State: Delaware
Volume: 59
Term: 0-0
Jurisdiction(s): Delaware
Source: https://static.case.law/del/59.pdf

WILLIAM H. KING, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Appellee.

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Guly 23, 1965)

WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

John Biggs, III, of Bader & Biggs, for the defendant below,
appellant.

Edward J. Sobolewski, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State,
appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 1, 1965.

HERRMANN, Justice:

The defendant William H. King was convicted and sentenced in
the Superior Court on a charge of attempt to bribe Deputy State
Insurance Commissioner Ralph Rago.

The sole question before us is whether the right-to-counsel rule
of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S, Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed.
2d 977 (1964) applies to the oral inculpatory statement given by the
defendant and admitted in evidence in the trial of this cause.

1.

The dispositive facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant for present purposes, are these:

State Police Trooper Vernon H. Waller went to the home of the
defendant one evening in the course of investigating Rago’s charge of
attempted bribery by the defendant. Indicating that he was making an
investigation, but without informing the defendant as to its nature, the

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officer asked the defendant to accompany him to troop headquarters to
answer some questions. The officer stated “We will be back shortly”
and “It won’t take too long.” The defendant demurred, stating that he
and his wife were visiting at the home of a next door neighbor. The
officer then asked the defendant some general questions about Ralph
Rago and his connection with a certain insurance company, and told
the defendant that Rago had accused him of attempted bribery. As a
result of the defendant’s reluctance to accompany him to troop
headquarters, the officer asked the defendant if he were willing to go to
the Attorney General’s office the following morning to discuss the
matter. The defendant agreed to do this. The officer then said “You
won’t consult an attorney will you?” and the defendant replied that he
would not.’ The officer then said “Come on in and clear this up. I want
to ask you some questions. Mr. Veasey [Chief Deputy Attorney
General] wants to go over this with you.”

The next morning, the defendant voluntarily went to the
Attorney General’s office and gave Chief Deputy Attorney General
Veasey and Trooper Waller the oral, partially incriminatory statement
here in issue. Before so doing, the defendant had telephoned an
attorney who was familiar with the case and discussed the status of
events with him. The attorney did not accompany the defendant to the
meeting with Mr. Veasey and Trooper Waller. The defendant testified
that Mr. Veasey did not advise him that he had the right to counsel
during the questioning; but Mr. Veasey did advise the defendant that he
did not have to make a statement. After the statement was given, the
defendant left the Attorney General’s office and was not arrested until
after indictment several weeks later.

IL.

The first facet of the question is whether a retrospective
application of the Escobedo case is being sought here. We think not.

1 As indicated above, for present purposes, the facts are stated on the basis of the
defendant's testimony. The officer denies the conversation regarding an attorney.

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A chronology of events is necessary in this connection:
The jury trial was held on June 24 and 25, 1963; the original sentence
was imposed on February 12, 1964; a first appeal to this court, in
which the instant question was not raised, was argued on June 9, 1964.
The decision in the Escobedo case was announced on June 22, 1964;
this court’s decision on the appeal then pending was announced on July
17, 1964 (see King v. State, Del., 203 A.2d 74). Thereafter, the
defendant began his efforts to avail himself of the rule of the Escobedo
case by filing a motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35, Del.C.
Ann.?, After a hearing in that proceeding, the Superior Court held that
the Escobedo case was not applicable, denied the motion, and on
January 8, 1965 reimposed the sentence. This appeal followed.

It thus appears that, at the time of the announcement of the
Escobedo decision, this case had not been fully decided; it was still on
direct review in this court.

[J The United States Supreme Court has recently held that
its analogous decision in Mapp v. State of Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct.
1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) is operative in state court convictions
which had not become “final” before rendition of that opinion, but
does not operate retro-actively upon state court judgments which had
become “final” at that time. The Court defined “final” to mean “where
the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal
exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before
our decision in Mapp v. Ohio.” See Linkletter v. Walker, 85 S.Ct. 1731,
1734, f.n. 5 (1965). In this connection, as early as 1801, Chief Justice
Marshall in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 2 L.Ed. 49,
stated:

“* * * if subsequent to the judgment [in the trial court] and
before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs. * * * the court must decide

Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 provides for correction at any time of an illegal
sentence imposed in violation of the Federal or State Constitution.

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according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment
* * * which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment
must be set aside.”

We conclude that the rule of Escobedo is operative in the instant
case because the judgment of conviction herein had not become “final”
at the time of the rendition of the Escobedo decision. Linkletter v.
Walker, supra. Thus, we do not reach the troublesome question, which
has given rise to such contrariety of judicial opinion elsewhere, as to
whether Escobedo shall have retrospective application. This question
remains to be decided by the United States Supreme Court.

We hold that the instant case is within the operation of the
Escobedo case if it is otherwise applicable.

il.

The defendant contends on this appeal that his conviction must
be set aside because, under the Escobedo case, he had a constitutional
tight to counsel during the interrogation under Del. C, Ann. Const. Art.
1, Sec. 7, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution, and that the violation of that right rendered inadmissible
the incriminatory statement here involved.

In Escobedo, the United States Supreme Court held:

“We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody,
the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have
not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to
remain silent, the accused has been denied ‘the Assistance of Counsel’
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as ‘made
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’, Gideon v.

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Wainwright, 372 U.S. [335], at 342, 83 S. Ct. [792], at 795 [9 L. Ed.

2d 799], and that no statement elicited by the police during the

interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.” (Emphasis

supplied)

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“* * * We hold only that when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its
purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to
operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be
permitted to consult with his lawyer.”

Thus, of the several factors stated to be necessary for the
application of the Escobedo rule, the combined elements of police
accusation and police custody are expressly required. Escobedo was
under arrest, handcuffed in a standing position, at police headquarters
during the interrogation and elicitation of the statement there involved.
The holding of the case must, of course, be considered in the light of
the factual circumstances there before the Court.

Hl We do not think that the United States Supreme Court has
held that the constitutional right to counsel attaches prior to arrest.
The guarantee has been gradually extended by that Court in the trilogy
of recent cases—but not that far in our view: In Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 US. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), it was held that
the right to counsel is guaranteed at trial; in Massiah v. United States,
377 US. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964), it was held that
the right to counsel is guaranteed between trial and indictment; and in
Escobedo, it was held that the right to counsel is guaranteed between
indictment and arrest. But this, we think, is as far as the Supreme Court
has gone.

Our conclusion is supported by the fact that of the more than
100 reported federal and state cases in which the Escobedo case has
been considered, we find none applying the principle of the case to a
pre-arrest stage.

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We are not disposed to extend the ta a of the Escobedo

case beyond its clear limits. We hold, therefore, that the constitutional

guarantee of assistance of counsel does not attach/prior to arrest.

TI The case before us offers no evidence of police custody
prior to, or at the time of, the defendant’s statement. The defendant
went to the Attorney General’s office voluntarily after having had an
entire night to consider his course of action, and after discussing the
situation with an attorney. Since he was not under arrest during the
questioning, we hold that his statement does not come within the
application of the Escobedo case.

We conclude that the defendant’s constitutional right of
assistance of counsel was not violated by the admission in evidence of
the oral statement here in issue.

This being our view of the matter, we do not reach the question
of whether the defendant had intelligently waived his right to counsel
or whether he was obliged to request counsel before the Escobedo case
becomes applicable. Cf. United States ex rel. Russo v. State of New
Jersey (3 Cir. 1965)——F. 2d——.

Finding no error, the judgment below is affirmed.

ERNEST W. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEARN BROTHERS‘
INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware, and C & LINC.,a
corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendants-Appellees.

cy

(August 12, 1965)

CAREY, Justice, SEITZ, Chancellor, and WRIGHT, Judge,
sitting.

Hiram W. Warder, for plaintiff-appellant.

Warren B. Burt and Roger Sanders, of Prickett & Prickett, for
Hearn Brothers, Inc., defendant appellee.

H, Alfred Tarrant, Jr., of Cooch & Taylor, for C&L, Inc.,
defendant appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 104, 1964.

CAREY, Justice:

Plaintiff-below seeks reversal of a judgment of the Superior
Court based upon a jury verdict.

Hearn Brothers, Inc. (Hearn) operates a supermarket in
Wilmington. C & L, Inc. (C & L) is a wholesaler whose warehouse
adjoins the supermarket. It is customary, whenever Hearn gives C & L
an order for groceries, for an employee of the latter to make delivery
by borrowing a grocery cart from Hearn. On the day plaintiff was
injured, he was a customer in the supermarket. He was injured by either
stepping against, or being struck by, a grocery cart used by Albert
Carucci, an employee of C & L who was making a delivery of groceries.
The original complaint contained a count charging strict liability of the

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defendants for using a device inherently dangerous. On motion before
trial, that count was stricken by the Court below. During discovery
proceedings, Hearn was requested to admit that it had abandoned all
control over the cart and the manner of its operation. Its response was a
simple admission. Counsel later, during a preliminary argument,
disagreed in their interpretation of the scope and meaning of this
admission and the Court below granted a motion to amend the answer
to that request. Both rulings are challenged here.

In discussing the application of the “strict liability” theory,
plaintiff does not suggest that the cart was defective in any way or that
it was inherently dangerous per se. The argument is, as we understand
it, that the jury should have been allowed to determine whether the
operation of the cart through the aisles of the store during business
hours was an inherently dangerous activity.

Assuming, without deciding, that this Court would apply
the rule of strict liability in a proper case, we think that its application
in this case is unjustified. The general nature of these carts and their
operation in supermarkets is well known and may be judicially noticed.
Such stores make a common practice of using this type of cart for
restocking their shelves with merchandise while customers are present.
The cart presents no great hazard when used with proper care;
certainly, its operation cannot justifiably be called an “ultrahazardous
activity” as that term is defined in Restatement, Torts Sec. 520, nor is
it properly described as “abnormally dangerous” within the meaning of
Professor Prosser’s language in Sec. 77 of his Law of Torts. It is when
the cart is not used with proper care that an appreciable hazard is
created, This is simply another way of saying that liability depends
upon the usual rules of negligence law.

The cases cited by plaintiff do not conflict with the foregoing
view. In Fahey v. Niles, 7 Boyce 454, 108 A. 135, Judge Boyce said to
the jury that a person using a dangerous instrument like a blowtorch to
remove paint from a house must exercise due care to see that it does
not set the house on fire, otherwise he is liable for his negligence; the
issues presented to the jury were the usual ones of negligence and

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proximate cause. In Tyndall v. Rippon, 5 Terry 458, 61 A. 2d 422, the
Court spoke of an automobile as a dangerous instrumentality; but the
case had nothing to do with strict liability, the issue being a question of
wilful or wanton conduct under our guest statute. In Barmore v.
Vicksburg, S & P. Ry. Co., 85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 210, 70 L.R.A. 627,
the appellate Court ordered submitted to a jury the question of
whether the operation of a railroad tricycle was a dangerous activity,
which meant one “liable to inflict serious injury to others, when
operated in the customary method of use”. As we understand it, that
ruling simply means that the Court could not take judicial notice of the
hazards presented by the use of a railroad tricycle, and that this issue
had to be determined by a jury.

| The second problem raised, which concerns the
amendment of an answer to a request for admissions, may be academic
in view of the foregoing ruling. It would appear that the admission
pertains only to Hearn’s liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Any need to discuss that doctrine would seem to be
unnecessary in view of the jury’s verdict, which necessarily implies a
finding that Mr. Carucci was not negligent or that Mr. Jackson was
contributorily negligent.

Because, however, there may be some other reason not entirely
clear to us, we will discuss the matter further. Dissension over the
meaning of defendant’s original admission arose in the briefs and
argument on a motion for summary judgment. Defendants promptly
moved to amend the answer, alleging a desire to clarify it and eliminate
the misunderstanding which had arisen. The Court below was abviously
satisfied with the explanation and allowed the amendment. We think
this action was well within the Court’s discretionary powers. 2A Barron
& Holtzoff, Federal Pleading and Practice Sec. 838; United States v.
Lemons, D.C., 125 F. Supp. 686; United States v. Wimbley, D.C., 125
F. Supp. 691. No prejudice to the plaintiff has been shown, and the
change was made well in advance of trial. There is no reason to hold
that the Judge abused his discretion. The only case relied upon by the
plaintiff is International Carbonic Eng. Co. v. Natural Carb. Co., D.C.,

il

57 F. Supp. 248, decided prior to the amendment of Federal Civil Rule
36. It has little or no materiality; its holding was merely that a party,
having answered a request for admissions, cannot raise the objection of
irrelevancy at the trial.

The judgment below must be affirmed.

as
STATE OF DELAWARE v. RICHARD MITCHELL

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(September 1, 1965)
LYNCH, J., sitting.
Jay H. Conner, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State of Delaware.

Theodore F. Sandstrom, (of Killoran & Van Brunt), for Royall
and Blanche Thompson, sureties on the Bail Bond.

Superior Court of Delaware, for New Castle County, No. 815
Criminal Action 1964,

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LYNCH, Judge.

Richard Mitchell, a Pennsylvania resident, was arrested on
August 4, 1964 by the Avondale, Pennsylvania, police on a charge of
receiving stolen goods—an act committed in Delaware. He was taken
before a magistrate and held for extradition to Delaware. On August 7,
1964, he waived extradition and the Newark, Delaware, police brought
him to Delaware. A charge of burglary in the fourth degree was placed
against Mitchell and he was held for prosecution in this court, and in
lieu of bail he was committed. On August 10, 1964, Royall and Blanche
Thompson, private and personal sureties’, posted a $1,000.00 bail
bond with a magistrate at Newark, Delaware, to secure defendant’s
release and he was released on bail.

‘rhe stipulation states that Mitchell is a nephew of Mrs, Thompson, by blood,
and of Mr. Thompson by marriage. The Thompsons received no bond premiums
or other compensation for becoming sureties on the bail bond,

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Mitchell had been arrested by the police of Highland Township,
Pennsylvania, on July 17, 1964 on a charge of receiving stolen
goods—this arrest related to an offense committed in Pennsylvania. A
$500.00 cash bond had been posted to secure his release on bail on
such charge. Thus it appears that when he was before the Delaware
authorities on August 10, 1964 defendant was already on bail for this
prior Pennsylvania charge. The stipulation states that Mitchell’s sureties
did not know about his prior offenses in Pennsylvania or that he was
out on bail when they gave bail in this case. The State says it has no
information from which to determine the truth or falsity of this
contention.

After August 10, 1964 Mitchell returned to his home in
Pennsylvania. Later he stood trial in Pennsylvania on the July 17, 1964
charge of receiving stolen goods and having been found guilty and he
was sentenced on November 23, 1964 to serve a jail sentence of six to
twelve months in the Chester County Farms jail. On February 26, 1965
he entered a plea of guilty on another charge, on indictment returned
September 15, 1964 by the Grand Jury of Chester County,
Pennsylvania, on a charge of receiving stolen goods and on that date he
was given another jail sentence of six to twelve months, commencing at
the expiration of the sentence he was then serving pursuant to the
November 23, 1964 sentence. The Warden of the Chester County
Farms jail advises he will have served the requisite time on the two
Pennsylvania charges and thus be eligible for release, to the Delaware
authorities, on November 25, 1965.

Mitchell was indicted by the Grand Jury in Delaware in this case
on September 14, 1964—on the charge on which the Thompsons posted
bond. The court furnished counsel to Mitchell and he entered a plea of
not guilty and the matter was set down for trial. The records of the
Prothonotary’s Office for New Castle County show that Mitchell’s case
was continued on December 11, 1964, until the March Term of Court
because defendant was then incarcerated in a jail of a foreign state.
Mitchell’s attorney in this case says the continuance was not on or at
Mitchell’s request.

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On December 14, 1964, a subpoena was issued by this court
seeking to compel Mitchell’s attendance in this court on December 18,
1964 for call of the criminal calendar and trial. When he failed to
appear a capias issued. Since it appeared he was incarcerated in
Pennsylvania the Attorney General’s Office moved then to forfeit his
bail bond, following this up with a formal motion, filed on June 15,
1965.

The sureties vigorously opposed the State’s motion. Briefs have
been filed and exchanged; the case was orally argued most vigorously
and it is now ready for decision.

Having fully stated the pertinent facts, it seems appropriate to
first state and consider the language of the constitutional provisions
that appear there and in our statutes and in our Court Rules relating to
bail, to see what rights an accused and his bondsmen have, after which
the court will take up and consider the contentions advanced by the
sureties in their briefs and at oral argument.

The language of the bond given by Mitchell and his sureties, so
far as is pertinent, reads:

«st © * UPON CONDITION that if the above bound RICHARD
MITCHELL be and appear before the SUPERIOR COURT AND ANY
FUTURE TERM THEREOF, to be held at Wilmington, for the County
aforesaid there to answer such matters and things as shall be objected
against him, and particularly touching a charge of DID FELONIOUSLY
BREAK & ENTER INTO THE FLYING ‘A’ SERVICE STATION
LOCATED AT 610 SOUTH COLLEGE AVE., NEWARK,
DELAWARE, WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF
LARCENY THEREIN, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 11, SEC. 395 OF
THE 1953 REVISED CODE OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, AS
AMENDED said to have been committed by the said RICHARD
MITCHELL at PENCADER Hundred, in said county, on the 17th day
of May, A.D. 1964, and shall not depart the Court without leave
thereof until final judgment of the Court on said matters charged
against him, then this recognizance to be void, otherwise to be in full

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force and virtue.

cen

Art. 1, Sec. 11, of the 1897 Constitution, Del. C. Ann., provides,
among other matters:
“Section 11. Excessive bail shall not be required * * *.”

“Section 12. All prisoners shall be bailable? by sufficient
sureties, unless for capital offenses when thie proof is positive or the
presumption great; * * *.”

Our Annotated Code, as amended, has two separate chapters
touching on the subject of bail® .

Chapter 21 of Title 11 of our Annotated Code, the title of which
is denominated “CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE”, applies to
bail in criminal matters. The pertinent sections of Title 11, which may
throw some light on the matters before the court, read as follows:

24 like provision appeared in the 1792 Constitution, in the 1831 Constitution
and now in the 1897 Constitution, There was no like language in the 176
Constitution. The history of bail in Delaware was referred to briefly in Quillen v.
Betts, 9 Terry 93, 48 Del. 93, 98 A, 2d 770, 772 (Supreme Court, 1953). The
statutes of Delaware, when it, with Pennsylvania, was a colonial province,
provided a man must generally be released on bail. During the time when Patrick

‘ordon was Governor of New Castle, Kent and Sussex Counties on the Delaware
and the province of Pennsylvania, when King George Il was King, an Act was
Passed by the provincial legislature, now appearing in Vol. 1, Del. Laws, Ch. 58, p.

35, providing:

Ethat all prisoners shall be bailable by one or more sufficient sureties to be
taken by one or more of the judges or justices that have cognizance of the fact,
uniess for such offences as are or shall be made felonies of death by the laws of
this government, * * *.”

3Chapter 33 of Title 10 of such Code, which title was denominated “COURTS

AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE” by the General Assembly at the time of

adoption of the Code, seemingly applies only to matters of bail in civil matters

and I find nothing in it that relates to criminal proceedings. The statute has no

form of bail bond, nor does it prescribe the contents and conditions of such
on

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Title 11 Del. C. Sec. 2101, provides that, except in capital
crimes—

“ * ® 4 person arrested by virtue of process issued upon an
indictment or information * * * shall be [freed on bail pending trial.] *
* * The court * * *, or any Judge thereof, or the Attorney General,
may determine the sum in which bail shall be taken, and set it down on
the process; or if no sum is so determined, the officer issuing the
process shall set down what sum he deems reasonable for bail.”

Title 11 Del. C. Sec. 2104(c), provides that:

“(c) If, after pleading to an indictment or information and
before final judgment, a person * * * departs from the court with
intention not to abide by the judgment thereof, the recognizance
previously entered into for his appearance at the court shall be delcared
forfeited, in like manner as a recognizance is now forfeited by default,
and proceedings had on such forfeited recognizance as are now
provided by court rule or by the laws of this State.”

Title 11 Del. C. Sec. 2105, provides the form and procedure of
bail bonds, it being stated that—

“Bail shall be taken by the prothonotary, clerk of any court
having jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, sheriff, or officer to whom
the process is directed, by a joint and several bond executed, by the
accused and his bail, to the State, in the sum set down for bail upon the
process, with condition, in substance, that if the accused appears in the
court, mentioned in the process, at the time and place of the return
thereof, to answer as expressed therein, and does not depart the court
without leave, the bond shall be void. Bond so taken shall be returned
with process, and, if default is made, it shall be recorded thereon in the
same manner as in the case of a recognizance.” (Emphasis supplied)

Except as appears in Title 11 Del. C. Sec. 2105, the statute does
not prescribe the form or contents of bail bonds in criminal matters,
except as to “the condition of the bond”. No procedure is set forth in
the statute for forfeiture proceedings. Rule 46(f), Rules of Criminal

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Procedure for Superior Court, Del. C. Ann., gives the procedure. It
appears that the bond in this case meets the statutory requirement.

The Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Superior Court include
rules on bail. For instance, Rule 5(b) directs a committing magistrate to
“admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules”.

Rule 5(c)—referring to Preliminary Hearings—also provides “The
committing magistrate shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in
these rules”.

Rule 9(b)(1) provides:

“x %* *. The amount of bail may be fixed by the court or the
Attorney General and shall be endorsed on the warrant.”

Rule 12(b)(5) provides, inter alia, that if the “court grants a
motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in the
indictment or information, it may also order that the defendant be held
in custody or that his bail be continued for a specified time pending the
filing of a new indictment or information”.

Rule 32(a)—relating to sentence and judgment—among other
things, provides that:

“Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or
continue or alter the bail.”

Rule 42(b)—relating to criminal contempt—provides inter alia
that “The defendant is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these
tules”.

Rule 46 provides:

“(a)Right to Bail. A defendant shall be admitted to bail either
before conviction or after conviction and pending appeal in accordance

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with the Constitution and laws of this State.

«(p)t# #*,

“(c) Amount. If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount
thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the court or committing
magistrate will insure the presence of the defendant, having regard to
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the
evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail
and the character of the defendant.

“(d) Form, and Place of Deposit. A person required or permitted
to give bail shall execute a bond conditioned upon his appearance at all
stages of the proceedings until final determination of the cause unless
otherwise ordered by the court. One or more sureties may be required,
cash or bonds or notes of the United States or of the State of Delaware
may be accepted and in proper cases no security need be required. Bail
given originally on appeal shall be deposited with the committing
magistrate or the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken. All
bail bonds shall be promptly forwarded to the prothonotary of the
Superior Court to which the defendant is held to answer. (Emphasis
supplied)

“(e) Justification of Sureties (Omitted).
“(£) Forfeiture.

“(1) Declaration. If there is a breach of condition of a bond,
the court shall declare forfeiture of the bail. (Emphasis supplied)

“(2) Setting Aside. The court may direct that a forfeiture be
set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears
that justice does not require the enforcement of the

4Relates to bail for a material witness.

La
i
forfeiture’ (Emphasis supplied)

“(3) Enforcement. When a forfeiture has not been set aside,
the court shall on motion enter a judgment of default and execution
may issue thereon. By entering into a bond the obligors submit to the
jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoint the clerk of the court
as their agent upon whom any papers affecting their liability may be
served. Their liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity
of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the motion as
the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court, who shall
forthwith mail copies to the obligors to their last known addresses.

“(4) Remission. After entry of such judgment, the court may
remit it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting
aside of forfeiture in paragraph (2) of this subdivision.

“(g) Exoneration. When the condition of the bond has been
satisfied or the forfeiture thereof has been set aside or remitted, the
court shall exonerate the obligors and release any bail. A surety may be
exonerated by a deposit of cash in the amount of the bond or by a
timely surrender of the defendant into custody.”

At oral argument, there was some discussion of and
consideration given to the restraints on a person on bail and where he
could go, and particularly if he could depart from the State. Ordinarily
that seems to depend on the form of the bond or court rule and too

57he sureties, through counsel, have greatly stressed this language; in effect, they
have argued ‘this language is a limitation on the court’s power to declare a
forfeiture, It is to be noted only that the language of the rule gives the court
discretion to set aside and/or remit a. forfeiture of a bail bond. No language
appears in the rules which provides that a court is given any discretion in orde:

the forfeiture of the bail bond. Contrariwise, Rule 46(f) (1) provides that “3
there is a breach of condition of a bond, the court shall declare forfeiture of the
bail” (Emphasis supplied), Seemingly, if it appears the principal in a bail bond has
violated the condition of the bond, it is for the court to order a forfeiture.

20 ee
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much generalization seems questionable®

At oral argument the attorney for the sureties made a very
strenuous argument, based on a so-called estoppel and also on what he
probably meant considerations of public policy, urging that there was
some kind of a duty on the court, taking the bond to inquire into and
ascertain if the defendant was under bail in another state, and if so to
make the bail high enough to make certain that the defendant would be
present in court when this case was called for trial. It appears, after
analysis, the argument is without substance. In light, however, of the
vigor of the arguments advanced by sureties and the seeming logic on
which their counsel based his arguments, it seems desirable that the
court fully consider and discuss the background of bail at common law
and then by statute in this state to test the merit of such arguments.

There is a most interesting discussion of bail in Sir James
Stephen’s, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) (excerpted
in Vol. 2, Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Little, Brown
& Company, 1908, Vol. 27). This discussion is set forth under what
Stephen has referred to as Criminal Procedure. Stephen points out
(page 444):

“The foundation of the whole system of criminal procedure was
the prerogative of keeping the peace, which is as old as the [English]
monarchy itself, and which was, as it still is, embodied in the
expression, ‘The King’s Peace,’ the legal name of the normal state of
society. This prerogative was exercised at all times through officers
collectively described as the Conservators of the Peace. * * * the
ordinary conservators of the peace were the sheriff, the coroner, the

6 langu: f the condition of the bond before the court, in effect, states that
the defendant under bail shall “not epart the court without leave”, ‘Some cases
indicate this means the geographical limits of the court’s jurisdiction; the cases are
not uniform; the practice is less than clear.

Tpages 444/479, All page references herein are to these essays.

es
{|

justices of the pease, [and] the constable, each in his own district. * *
#2

continuing, Stephen notes (page 445) that the language of the
Assize of Clarendon (1166) provided:

“* * ® that the sheriffs and justices should make inquiry upon
the oath of twelve men from every hundred and four men from every
township whether any man in any township was a robber, murderer, or
thief, or a receiver of robbers, murderers, or thieves; that every person
so accused should be taken and brought before the sheriffs and by them
before the justices, * *.”

Six “committees of judges * * * were to visit the circuits then
marked out”; seemingly these judges did not get around to the assizes
more than four times a year. Stephen proceeds (Id.) “* * * no lord of a
franchise * * * should interfere to prevent the sheriff from entering his
franchise * * * to arrest accused persons, * * *.”

Stephen then notes (p. 448):

“Shortly the system just described was as follows. Upon the
commission of a felony any one might arrest the offender, and it was
the duty of any constable to do so. If the offender was not arrested on
the spot, hue and cry might * * * be raised. * * *.”

Stephen observes (p.449) that

“The Assize of Arms and the Statute of Winchester fell into
disuse, but the right of summary arrest in cases of felony continues to

this day to be the law of the land, * * *.”

Subsequently, on the same page, Stephen says:

“One great alteration was made in the system just described
between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries. During that
period, summonses and warrants superseded the old hue and cry which

22 EE
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practically fell into disuse. The history of this substitution is curious.”

In aid of his explanation, the author brings out (Id.):

“Justices of the peace were first instituted in 1326. Their duties
were described in the most general terms. They were by 1 Edw. 3, c.
16, ‘assigned to keep the peace.’ By 34 Edw. 3,c. 1 (1360), they were
empowered ‘to take and arrest all those they may find by indictment or
suspicion and put them in prison.’ * * *.”

Stephen next says (Id.):

“k * * By degrees, * * *, the practice of issuing warrants came
into use. The general authority of the justices in all matters relating to
crime and indeed to the whole internal government of the country was
firmly established by a great variety of statutes, and it would be natural
that their directions should be taken when a crime was committed. It
would also be more natural for the justice to authorize the constable to
undertake the actual arrest of the offenders than to do it himself, and it
might often be convenient, if a suspected person was to be searched for
in more directions than one, to give written authority to various
persons for the purpose.”

After discussing what we now know as the Preliminary Hearing,
Stephen takes up consideration of the background and history of bail,
noting at page 472 et seq.:

“The next step to the preliminary inquiry held by the
magistrates is the discharge, bail, or committal of the suspected person.
Little need be said of the law as to the discharge or commital of the
suspected person. * * *. The law of bail has a separate independent
history.

“The right to be bailed in certain cases is as old as the law of
England itself, and is explicitly recognized by our earhest writers. When
the administration of justice was in its infancy, arrest meant
imprisonment without preliminary inquiry till the sheriff held his tourn

a

at least, and in more serious cases, till the arrival of the justices, which
might be delayed for years, and it was therefore a matter of the utmost
importance to be able to obtain a provisional release from custody.
** * ” (Emphasis supplied.)

“These very ancient authorities [referring to some early legal
authors] are somewhat general in their language, but it is still possible
to trace the history of the law relating to bail from the beginning of the
reign of Edward I. to our own days.

“The sheriff was the local representative of the Crown, and in
particular he was at the head of all the executive part of the
administration of criminal justice. In that capacity he, as I have already
shown, arrested and imprisoned suspected persons, and, if he thought
proper, admitted them to bail. The discretionary power of the sheriff
was ill defined, and led to great abuses, which were dealt with by the
Statute of Westminister the First (3 Edw. 1, c. 12, AD. 1275). This
statute was for 550 years the main foundation of the law of bail. * * *.

seg

“t # #*, % * % the Statute of Westminster determined what
offences were bailable or not for five centuries and a-half.

“Between 1275 and 1444, however, the sheriffs’ powers had
been to a great extent transferred to the justices of the peace in whom
the power of admitting prisoners to bail was vested by a series of
statutes.

cee”

In a Report to the National Conference on Bail and Criminal
Justice, held in Washington, D. C. on May 27-29, 1964, it is stated that
the history of bail—

“* * * originated in medieval England as a device to free untried

24 PO
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prisoners. Disease-ridden jails and delayed trials by traveling justices
necessitated an alternative to holding accused persons in pretrial
custody. At first sheriffs exercised their discretion to release a prisoner
on his own premise, or that of an acceptable third party, that he would
appear for trial. If the defendant escaped, the third party surety was
required to surrender himself; hence he was given custodial powers over
the accused. Bail literally meant the bailment or delivery of an accused
to jailors of his own choosing. In time, sureties—-who were usually
required to be property owners—were permitted to forfeit promised
sums of money instead of themselves in the event the accused failed to
appear.

“Tn 1275 the Statute of Westminister undertook to regulate the
discretionary bail powers of sheriffs by specifying which offenses were
bailable and which were not. Eventually, the sheriff's bailing functions
were transferred to justices of the peace. Common law rules for
exercising their discretion were based upon the nature of the charge,
the character of the accused and the weight of the evidence. Later
English statutes elaborated the procedure for obtaining bail. And in
1688 the Bill of Right established protection against excessive bail.ne.

“In 17th century England few defendants were sufficiently
mobile to flee, and the consequences of flight—outlawry and
confiscation—were harsh enough to make it an uncommon occurrence.
In addition, most bailed offenders were known personally to the sheriff
or justice of the peace and had reputations for trust worthiness,
attested to by their ability to get third persons of local esteem as
sureties.” This report also states (p. 2):

“The development of bail rights and obligations in America has
followed a different course. The United States Constitution does not
specifically grant a right to bail. The Eighth Amendment states only
that ‘Excessive bail shall not be required” * * *.”

The report points out that thirty-nine states guarantee a right to
bail before conviction in non-capital crimes. Four states limit the power

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to deny bail to treason and murder cases and three states grant an
absolute right to bail only in misdemeanor cases. Four states allow
judges almost complete discretion, in accord with the common law.*

This report, considered the enactment by the Congress of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 91, which provided that “upon all arrests in
criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except when the punishment may
be death * * *”, then proceeded to say that the Judiciary Act made
“bail in capital cases discretionary,” depending upon the “nature and
circumstances of the offense, and of the evidence, and usages of law”.
The report then notes:

“* ® # This absolute right to bail in a country with a virtually
limitless frontier called for the development of new techniques to
supplement the private surety who would personally guarantee to
produce his bailee. As a result, the institution of the bondsman arose to
take over the function of posting bail. In return for a money premium,
he guaranteed the defendant’s appearance at trial. In the event of
nonappearance, the bondsman stood to lose the entire amount of his
bond. For this reason, bondsmen in many jurisdictions required
indemnification contracts or collateral from the defendant or his
relatives to protect themselves from forfeiture losses. Selling bail bonds
became a thriving commercial adjunct to the judicial function of setting
bail. (Emphasis supplied.)

“In the everyday administration of criminal justice in American
courts, the legal right of an accused person to bail can usually ripen into
pretrial freedom only upon the consummation of a commercial bail
transaction. As early as 1912, the Supreme Court, (Leary v. United
States, 224 U.S. 567, 575 (1912); 32 S. Ct. 599,600; 56 L. Ed. 889
(1912)] recognized that the bondsman’s interest to produce the body
of the principal in court is impersonal and wholly pecuniary’. At the
same time the accused’s absolute right to bail in noncapital cases was

®Blackstone (Sharswood Ed.), Book 4, pages 297-~ 300 ct seq, discusses the
common law aspects and phases of bail in criminal case

26 Lt
i___|
steadfastly defended.” (Emphasis supplied)

The report, at a subsequent point, states:

“The American judge’s discretion in setting pretrial bail in
noncapital cases has consistently been interpreted to allow latitude only
in determining the bail amount. The opinions in Stack v. Boyle[342
US. 1,4, 72S. Ct. 1,3, 96 L. Ed. (3) (1954)] make clear several points
that underlie the theory of bail today. First, the sole consideration is to
ensure appearance at trial:

“The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the
accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit
to sentence if found guilty * * *. Like the ancient practice of securing
the oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the
modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of
money subject to forfeiture servés as additional assurance of the
presence of an accused * * *, Since the function of bail is limited, the
fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon
standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that
defendant. * * *. [342 U. S. at 4, 5, 72 S. Ct. at 3, 4, 96 L. Ed. 3]
(Emphasis supplied)

“Second, the fact that some defendants are more likely than
others to flee does not condone the denial of bail:

“Admission to bail always involves a risk that the accused will
take flight. That is a calculated risk which the law takes as the price of
our system of justice. We know that Congress anticipated that bail
would enable some escapes, because it provided a procedure for dealing
with them. * * *, [Separate opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, 342 U. S.
at 8, 72S. Ct. at 5, 96 L. Ed. 3]

“Third, bail cannot be set excessively high:

“In allowance of bail, the duty of the judge is to reduce the risk

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i____|

by fixing an amount reasonably calculated to hold the accused available
for trial and its consequence. [Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 46(c)] But the
judge is not free to make the sky the limit, because the Fighth
Amendment to the Constitution says:

‘Excessive bail shall not be required * * *.’ [Separate opinion of
Mr. Justice Jackson, 342 U.S. at 8, 72 S. Ct. at 5, 96 L. Ed. 3].”
(Emphasis supplied)

In the majority opinion? (Stack v. Boyle, 342 US. at 4, 72 S.
Ct. at 3, 96 L. Ed. 3) it was said (per Vinson, C. J.):

“From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 * * * to the
present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [Rule 45a], federal law
has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital
offense shall be admitted to bail. This traditional right to freedom
before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense,
and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction
***, Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption
of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its
meaning.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The late Mr. Justice Jackson, in Williamson v. United States, 184
F, 2d 280, 282-283 (C.C.A.N.Y. 1950), sitting as a Circuit Judge,
pointed out that our judges cannot use high bail as a device to protect
society from possible new crimes by the accused, even after
conviction.!® The language used by the Justice was as follows:

“The Government’s alternative contention is that defendants, by

There was no real dissent, except as to the manner of considering the further
proceedings in the case.

10Compare Fed. Rules No, 32 and 46(a) (2) of Criminal Procedure with Superior
Court Rules No. 32 and 46(a), They differ in language—and possibly in meaning.
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure bail following conviction, whether
pending sentence or appeal, is not a matter of right.

28 Po
i_|

misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail. Grave
public danger is said to result from what they may be expected to do,
in addition to what they have done since their conviction. If I assume
the defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal act
helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with
traditional American law the jailing of persons by the courts because of
anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect
society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this county and so fraught with danger of excesses
and injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary
judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of
which defendants stand convicted.”

In Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994, 996, 8 L. Ed. 2d 269,
Chief Justice Warren, sitting on an application fof bail, stated, however,
that a denial of bail on appeal would be justified in “* * * cases in
which, from substantial evidence, it seems clear that the right to bail
may be abused or the community may be threatened by the applicant’s
tleease. * * *.” He also intimated that bail might be refused if “* * *
there is a likelihood that the applicant will flee the jurisdiction. * * *.”
And compare Rehman v. State of California, 85 S. Ct. 8, 13 L. Ed. 2d
17 (1964), where Mr. Justice Douglas (also sitting in Chambers) denied
an application for bail, in light of a finding by the Trial Court, entered
in a proceeding to revoke bail, that “‘to permit Dr. Rehman to remain
on bail pending appeal constitutes an immediate, clear and present
danger imperiling, jeopardizing, and threatening the health, safety, and
welfare of the community.’ * * *.”

At a later point, in his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas said:

“*e & * Sf * * * the safety of the community would be
jeopardized, it would be irresponsible judicial action to grant bail.”

The cited report discusses THE ROLE OF THE BONDSMAN
(pages 22-32) and the report brings out at page 32 this factor:

“As independent businessmen, bondsmen are free to reject

PO 29
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prospective clients for any reason, without regard to the consequences
to the accused, A recent concurring opinion by Circuit Judge J. Skelly
Wright [in Pannell v. U. S. (115 U. S. App. D. C. 339), 320 F. 2d 698,
699 (D. C. Cir. 1963)] commented on this situation in the District of
Columbia:

“Certainly the professional bondsmen system as used in this
District is odious at best. The effect of such a system is that the
professional bondsman hold the keys to the jail in their pockets. They
determine for whom they will act as surety— who in their judgment is a
good risk. The bad risks, in the bondsmen’s judgment, and the ones
who are unable to pay the bondsmen’s fees remain in jail. The court
and the commissioner are relegated to the relatively unimportant chore
of fixing the amount of bail.” (Emphasis supplied.)

70 Yale Law Journal, pages 966/977, has an excellent discussion
of the subject of bail, some of which has already been noted. There is
little need to quote anything further from that study, which can throw
any light on the point under consideration, except to point out that
this article notes that in Leary v. United States, supra, Mr. Justice
Holmes stated, 224 U. S. 567, 575, 32 S. Ct. 599,600:

“ok * * bail no longer is the mundium although a trace is the right
to arrest. * * *, The distinction between bail and suretyship is pretty’
nearly forgotten. The interest to produce the body of the principal in
court is impersonal and wholly pecuniary. * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)

It is set forth in 8 C.J.S. Bail Sec. 29b that:

“Tn criminal cases a bail bond is an obligation, with one or more
sureties, conditioned that the same may be void on the performance by
accused of such acts as he may therein be required to perform. It is a
contract under seal, executed by accused, and from its nature requiring
sureties or bail to whose custody he is committed.”

A number of cases are cited in the footnote on page 55 of 8 C. J.
S.; many refer to a bail bond as “a contract” or “covenant”.

30 PO
i__|

In 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 57, page 817—Bail and Recognizance—it is
stated:

“The bond in a criminal action is in the nature of a contract
between the government on one side and the defendant and his surety
on the other. The sureties who sign the bond are generally held to have
consented to the terms thereof, and those terms may be modified by
the statute under which the bond is required and given. In general the
State and surety agree that-if the state will release the defendant from
custody, the surety will undertake that the defendant will appear
personally and at a specified time and place to answer the charge made
against him. If the defendant fails to appear at the proper time and
place, the surety becomes the absolute debtor of the state for the
amount of the bond. (Emphasis supplied.)

“In the absence of any conflict with statutory provisions, the
bond is construed and applied by the courts according to its express
terms, * * *,”

Vol. 4, Sec. 1816, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure’? states the
applicable rule in this language:

“Bail is evidenced by a bond or recognizance which ordinarily
becomes a record of the court. A bail bond is a contract between the
government, on the one side, and the principal and sureties, on the
other, In the absence of any conflict with statutory provisions, it is
construed and applied by the courts according to its express terms, and
with reference to the specific purpose for which the bond was intended.
Sureties are generally held, by signing a bond, to have consented to the
terms thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.)

[Hl The consideration for a bail bond as between the State and
the sureties thereon is the release of the defendant charged with crime,

118¢¢ footnote 12 below.

ee 31
L_|

and such release is a sufficient consideration for each part of the bond.
8 C.I.S. Bail Sec. 54, page 163.

In light of the background of bail and other factors as
they have been considered heretofore, page 878, et seq., it is clear that
the sureties in the case before me were free to make full inquiry of the
defendant Mitchell—cither personally, through relatives or the
Pennsylvania Police—to determine if they should become sureties; the
burden was on them, not the State, to obtain all necessary facts before
signing the bail bond. Certainly the accused Mitchell had a clear right to
bail—if he could get a bondsman. The magistrate had almost limitless
discretion to fix the amount. Considering the history and fundamental
principles of bail, I feel compelled to rule that the arguments advanced
by the sureties must be rejected, since they are without legal substance.
I need only consider the legal effect of the bail piece.

The sureties argue that imprisonment of the principal
(Mitchell) in a foreign jurisdiction (Pennsylvania) is “an act of law” and
it acted to exonerate the sureties from liability at the time of default
where it appeared the principal was incarcerated in said foreign
jurisdiction, at the time the principal was scheduled to appear in
Delaware, for prior offenses committed before or after they became
sureties. I can’t read the cases to support the contention made by the
sureties.

HI The condition set forth in Mitchell’s bond, supra, page
875, required him to “appear before the Superior Court * * * there to
answer such matters and things as shall be objected against him * * *”
and directed that he “shall not depart the court without leave thereof
until final judgment of the court on said matters charged against him”,
in which case “this recognizance to be void, otherwise to be in full
force and virtue”. It is to be noted that the bond has no exceptions in
it; if exceptions are to be recognized then they must be set forth in the
bail or based on law.

The court notes that Mitchell had been arrested (supra, p. 874)

32 Po
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in Pennsylvania on July 17, 1964, on a Pennsylvania offense, and had
been released on bond when he was arrested on the Delaware offense
which led to his giving bond in Delaware on August 10, 1964. The
State says it was ignorant of this, as do the sureties. I can find no case
which affects Mitchell’s right to bail or relieves the sureties because
Mitchell had given bail prior to the time when the bail bond before me
was executed and delivered on August 10, 1964.

Sureties’ counsel cited 8 Am. Jur. 2d—Bail—Sec. 184 and 4
Wharton’s Cr. Proced.’?, Sec. 1836, p. 678, n. 7, in support of his
position. The reference to 8 Am. Jur.—Bail—does not support the
sureties’ position nor does 8 C.J.S. Bail Sec. 77, page 210. In the last
cited treatise under the cited section there is some discussion of the
effect of arrest and imprisonment in given circumstances, and as
constituting a discharge of his bail. At 8 C.J.S., at page 210, it is clearly
stated:

“In another state. In their internal relations the states of the
Union are foreign to each other, and the act of one cannot operate to
defeat an obligation incurred to another; and hence if the performance
of a recognizance is rendered impossible by the imprisonment of the
principal in another state, it is not such an act of law as will discharge
bail.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Many cases are cited in support of this cited statement.

Counsel for sureties also cited an Annotation in 4 A.L.R. 2d at

12 anderson Edition, 1957. All citations to Wharton are to such edition. It is
stated by the author, at the section cited, that a “surety is discharged from
liability when the nonappearance of the defendant has been caused by an official
act of the state, an act of law, * * * or a subsequent arrest and extradition of the
defendant to another jurisdiction * * *.”” We have no such facts and circumstances
before the court that relate to the first two exceptions and he appears to be in
grtor on, his third exception, so the cltation is inapposite, at are Canby ». Griffin,
3 Har, 333 (Super, Ct. 1841) and State ». Roop, 1 Mary. 535, 536, 41 A. 196,
197 (Super Ct. 1853), since the facts of these cases are so different from those in
1 case at bar.

A 33
|__|

page 440, in support of their position. It is, however, stated further
along in this cited annotation—at page 446—that:

“Under the common-law rule that sureties will be exonerated or
relieved where the appearance of their principal is rendered impossible
by an act of law, the question has often arisen whether imprisonment
by another state will release bail given in a state court. Such
imprisonment has generally been held not to excuse the production of
the principal.” Emphasis supplied.)

Below will be found a collection of cases which hold that
imprisonment of a person by another state who has been released on
bail will not—as an act of law—excuse the production of such person
when it is time for the appearance of that person before the court
where the bail is applicable. Cain v. State, 55 Ala. 170, 172 (1876);
State v. Stanton, 59 Ariz. 55, 122 P. 2d 855, 856 (1942); Adler v.
State, 35 Ark. 517, 534 (1880); Bowling et. al. v. State, 229 Ark. 441,
316 S. W. 2d 343, 345 (1958); Vatcher v. Egas, 100 Cal. App. 99, 279
P. 1029, 1030 (1929); People v. Durbin, 218 Cal. App. 24 851, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 569, 572 (1963); Taintor v, Taylor, 36 Conn. 242, 252; Taylor v.
Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 371, 21 L. Ed. 287, 290 (Conn.); Public Service
Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 135 So. 24 777, 779 (Fla. App., 1961); Burd v.
Commonwealth, 335 S. W. 2d 945, 948 (Ky. Ct. of App., 1960); State
v. Altone, 140 Me. 210, 35 A. 2d 859, 860 (1944); State v. Wynne, 356
Mo. 1095, 204 S. W. 2d 927, 930 (1947); State v. Honey, 165 Neb.
494, 86 N. W. 2d 187, 189 (1957); Continental Cas. Co. v. People, 202
Misc. 740, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 495, 498 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1952); People v.
Hernandez, 15 A. D, 2d 798, 224 N. Y. S. 2d 703, 704 (App. Div.
1962); State v. Pelley, 222 N. C. 684, 24 S. E, 2d 635, 638 (1943);
Metcalf v. State, 57 Okl. 64, 156 P. 305, 307, L. R. A. 1916E, 595
(1916); Ricks v, State, 189 Oki. 598, 119 P. 2d 51 (1941); Ward v.
State ex rel. Carman, 200 Okl. 51, 196 P. 2d 856, 858, 4 A. L. R. 24
436 (1947); Weber v. United States, 32 F. 2d 110, 111 (C. C. A. OKL.
1929); Wallace v. State, 196 Tenn. 577, 269 S. W. 2d 780, 783 (1954)
and State v. Douglas, 91 W. Va. 338, 112 S. E. 584, 26 A. Li R. 408
(1922).

34 ee
i_|

Concededly there are decisions which seemingly support sureties”
position, and are opposed to the holdings of the cases enumerated
supra—see Allison v. People, 132 Colo. 156, 286 P. 2a 1102 (1955);
State v. Reed, 127 Wash. 166, 219 P. 833 (Wash. 1923); State v. Heslin,
63 Wash. 2d (957, 389 P. 2d 892 (1964); and State v. Williams, 48 N.
D. 1259, 189 N. W. 625 (1922)—but these are few. Then there are
other cases, where some courts, by way of dicta, have indicated that a
surety is discharged if his principal is in jail in another state, through
some fault of the principal. The reasoning which underlies such dicta is
less than clear and convincing, as well as being contrary to established
principles of contract law, and since I am not impressed with these
cases I reject them. I prefer the rule which is supported by the many
cases I have cited on page 885, since they seem to be what I would
regard as the “majority” rule, and are based on the applicable principles
of contract law.

The sureties finally urge that the court has some discretion in
whether or not to order a forfeiture and they argue the facts here are
such that the court should, in the exercise of such discretion, deny the
motion to forfeit.

Starting with the fundamental nature of a bail
undertaking—that it is a suretyship contract—it is clear that Mitchell has
violated the condition of the bail bond, in that (a) he did depart the
court without leave; and (b) he did not appear to answer the charge set
forth in the bond. These, or either of them, have resulted in the bond
being breached, making the sureties debtors of the State and liable
under the bond, 72 C.J.S. Principal and Surety Sec. 95. The general
rules of construction of contracts are applicable to suretyship
undertakings, 72 C. J. S. Principal and Surety Sec. 100. This court is
given no discretion—as I already have shown, in whether or not to
declare a forfeiture. The rule clearly states that if “there is a breach of
condition ***, the court shall declare forfeiture of the bail”. Rule
46(f) (1); see discussion in footnote 5, page 887 in declaring a
forfeiture of the bond.

At another time and under a different circumstance the sureties

Po 35
a

may be free to move to set aside or to remit the forfeiture. At this time,
in light of the conceded facts, the court finds a breach of the bail bond
and declares a forfeiture.

An order will be entered granting the motion and declaring a
forfeiture.

HANS HELMUT VORHAUER, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE,
Appellee,

(July 27, 1965)
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
Henry A, Wise, Jr., for appellant.
Richard I. G. Jones, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 59, 1962.

36 PE
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|
HERRMANN, Justice.

The defendant Hans Helmut Vorhauer was convicted and
sentenced on a charge of burglary in the fourth degree in violation of
11 Del. C. Sec. 395.

This appeal brings up for review the admissibility in evidence of
an oral inculpatory statement given by the defendant to the police
during an alleged illegal detention.

L
The uncontroverted dispositive facts are as follows:

The defendant was arrested in his home near Wilmington by
State Police officers Lt. Donald J. O’Connor, Det. Sgt. Thomas F.
Buckmaster and Det. William B. Fugate. The arrest took place on the
night of August 21, 1961 at 11:15 o’clock. The defendant was 18 years
of age, born in Germany, with education limited to the eleventh grade.
He was alone in the house in which he lived with his mother, apparently
teady to retire. The officers showed the defendant a warrant for his
arrest issued by Justice of the Peace Maurice F. Fitzharris under date of
August 1, 19611 pursuant to the complaint of Det. Fugate. The
warrant charged the defendant with breaking and entering Gaylords
Discount Department Store on August 1, 1961 with intent to commit
larceny. In usual form, the warrant was addressed “To Any Constable”
of New Castle County commanding him “forthwith to apprehend” the
defendant and “bring him before me [Magistrate Fitzharris] or some
other Justice of the Peace for the County aforesaid that he may be

1 There is no explanation in the record as to why the warrant sworn to and issued
August 1, 1961 was not executed until almost midnight on August 21.

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examined touching the premises and to be further dealt with as to law
and justice shall appertain.” The warrant also commanded the
Constable to summon the complainant Fugate “to appear and give
evidence relating to the subject matter of the complaint.”

In making the arrest, the officers asked permission to search the
house and the defendant consented; but nothing was found. Meanwhile,
the defendant’s mother returned home. She conversed with the
defendant and with one of the officers and learned of the charges
against her son.

The officers then took the defendant to State Police Troop No.
1 Headquarters at Penny Hill (hereinafter “Troop Headquarters”) and
he was placed in one of the two cells located in the basement of the
building. The cells were for temporary detentions only; there were no
facilities for longer incarcerations. The other cell was occupied by
Franklin Lee Minor, held as a co-defendant for the same offense.

At about 1:30 A.M., Det. Fugate sat down with the defendant in
or near the cell and attempted to interrogate him and to obtain a
written statement from him regarding the Gaylord burglary. The
defendant refused to answer all questions, repeating “I have nothing to
say until I am further advised by my attorney.”

“Processing” at Troop Headquarters, consisting of fingerprinting,
photographing and other administrative details, took about 20 minutes.
At about 3:30 A.M., during the processing, the defendant and Minor
‘were permitted to confront each other. Minor made accusatory remarks
to the defendant who did not reply. During this period, the officers, in
a friendly way, urged the defendant to confess, showing him items of
evidence from time to time.

At about 5:00 A.M., the defendant was taken before Magistrate
Fitzharris by Fugate and Buckmaster. Buckmaster “related the
circumstances” of the case to the Magistrate but neither of the officers
was sworn. The defendant was not informed by the Magistrate of his
tight to retain counsel and of his right to have a preliminary hearing, as

38 ee
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is required by Superior Court Criminal Rule 5(b), Del. C. Ann.; nor did
the Magistrate hear “evidence”, or give the defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses against him and introduce evidence in his own
behalf, as is required by Superior Court Criminal Rule 5(c); nor did the
Magistrate—“commit” the defendant or discharge him, as is required by
Rule 5(c).? The defendant’s uncontradicted testimony as to the scope
of the “hearing” was:

“Well, they took me in front of Magistrate Fitzharris. He asked
me my name;I told him. He said, “You are charged with the burglary of
Gaylord’s; $8,000 bail, and I was taken back to the Troop.”

Upon leaving the Magistrate’s office, the defendant was returned
to the cell at Troop Headquarters shortly after 5:00 A.M. From that
time on the morning of August 22 until the morning of August 23, the
defendant remained in the cell without communication except with
police personnel;> he was not questioned further during this period. On
the morning of August 23 at about 10:00 o’clock, still in the cell, the
defendant asked Det. Fugate for something to read and then
volunteered that he was ready to make a statement. Fugate conducted
the defendant to Lt. O’Connor and Sgt. Buckmaster and they took the
defendant’s oral statement, completing it at about noon. The statement
was partially inculpatory and partially exculpatory.

Thereafter, during the afternoon of August 23, the defendant
was returned to appear again before Magistrate Fitzharris. The record

?The Superior Court held in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding that this
appearance before the Magistrate was a nullity; and on September 5, 1961, the
Superior Court, sitting as a committing Magistrate gave the defendant a proper
preliminary hearing.

5The defendant testified that he requested permission to call his mother and his
attorney but that his requests were denied. The officers deny that such requests
were made, It is undisputed, however, that there was no communication by the
defendant with anyone outside Troop Headquarters during this period.

ee 39
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discloses no further hearing on the subject charge at that time.4 By a
“commitment” document dated August 23, 1961, executed by the
Magistrate, the defendant was “Held in default of $8,000. Bail Bond for
Superior Court” on the subject charge. At about 3:30 P.M. on August
23, the defendant was taken to the New Castle County Correctional
Institution by the officers pursuant to the commitment.

As to the reasons for not taking the defendant before the
Magistrate directly upon arrest, as commanded by the warrant, Det.
Fugate testified:

“Q Now you had a warrant for his arrest that commanded you
to bring him forthwith before Magistrate Fitzharris. Why didn’t you
obey the warrant?

“A Because there was a lot of investigation to be completed.

“Q You elected to ignore the mandate of your warrant and
take him for questioning instead of complying with the law with
respect to the warrant; is that right?

“A There are certain phases, sir, of the investigation, sir, that
had to be completed.”

And in connection, Sgt. Buckmaster testified:

“Q That warrant directed you to bring him forthwith before
Magistrate Fitzharris or some other magistrate, did it not?

“A That is correct.

“Q Did you comply with that warrant?

“The record contains reference to a fugitive warrant issued by Pennsylvania
authorities against the defendant but it does not appear that it had any significant
effect upon the course of events here under review.

“A

Yes, sir.

“Q When?

“A On 4:50 a.m. on the 22nd, approximately five hours after

he had been arrested.

“Q
“A
“Q
“Q
“Q
“A
“Q

“ny

And where did you take him in the meantime?
Troop One, Delaware State Police.

Now what was the purpose of taking him there?
To process him and to talk to him.

And how long did the processing require?

A matter of minutes.

A matter of minutes?

Longer than that, perhaps 20 minutes, by the time you

take fingerprints and photograph him.

“Q

So aside from the first 20 minutes you could have used for

that, the rest of the time was used for what purpose?

CoN

Interrogation.”

As to the reasons for returning the defendant and his
codefendant Minor to the cell at Troop Headquarters, after the
appearance before the Magistrate, instead of turning him over to the
correctional authorities, Sgt. Buckmaster testified:

<Q

Now after the alleged arraignment before Magistrate

Fitzharris what was the magistrate’s order * * *?

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“A He was tured over to us for transportation back to the
Troop.

“Q He was specifically turned over to you by the magistrate?
“A Yes, sir.

“Q He was not committed to the custody of the New Castle
County Workhouse?-

“A He was turned over to us, sir.

“Q  Isn’t it customary that a prisoner, after he is arraigned, be
turned over to the New Castle County Correctional Institution?

“A No, sir.”
Be

“Q What was done with him from the time he was taken
before the magistrate until he was taken down to the New Castle
County Correctional Institution?

“A He was at Troop One, sir.

“Q Doing nothing?

“A What do you mean, sir? He was being talked to by other
authorities.

“Q_ He was being interrogated?
“A Yes, sir.”

As to his reasons for giving the oral incriminating statement on
August 23, the defendant testified:

42 PO
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“Q Hans, why did you call and ask to be permitted to make a
statement?

“A Well, it seemed to be the only way to get out of the cell
and to get out to the Workhouse where I could somehow manage to
contact my family and you, my lawyer, and do something about the
situation in which I found myself.

“Q > Would you have made a statement if you had been taken to
the Workhouse after you had been at Magistrate Fitzharris?

“A No.
“Q > Would you tell us once more why you made a statement?

“A I was held incommunicado and I wanted to get a lawyer,
contact my family, see whether I could raise bail, and this was
physically impossible with me being in a cell at the basement of Penny
Hill Barracks.”

From the outset of the trial, the defendant took the position
that the oral statement of August 23 was inadmissible because taken
during, and as the result of, an unlawful detention. This position was
duly preserved by timely objection to the admissibility of the statement
after voir dire examination of the officers and the defendant, by
motion to strike, and by motion for directed verdict. The Superior
Court ruled that the sole test was voluntariness and submitted that issue
to the jury under a specific charge.

On motion for new trial, the Superior Court stated in this
connection that Wilson v. State, 10 Terry 37, 49 Del. 37, 109 A. 2d
381 (1954) was controlling; that thereunder the test was voluntariness
in which “many factors play a part”, including length of detention;
that, considering the age and apparent intelligence of the defendant, it
could not conclude that the conditions under which the defendant was
held, and the circumstances under which he offered to make the oral

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statement, were coercive as a matter of law; and that the issue of
voluntariness was properly submitted to the jury under the Wilson
case.> Sentence was imposed and the defendant appeals.

Upon the appeal the defendant contends, inter alia, that the
admission of his oral statement was prejudicial error and denial of due
process of law.

I.

A Statute and a Rule of Court are involved in the question
before us.

The Statute is 11 Del. C. Sec. 1911:

“Tf not otherwise released, every person arrested shall be brought
before a magistrate without unreasonable delay, and in any event he
shall, if possible, be so brought within 24 hours of arrest, Sundays and
holidays excluded, unless a Resident Judge of the county where he is
detained or of the county where the crime was committed for good
cause shown orders that he be held for a further period of not
exceeding 48 hours.”

The Rule is Superior Court Criminal Rule 5° which provides that
an arrested person shall be taken before a committing Magistrate
“without unreasonable delay” and specifies the rights of the accused

5TThe trial court and counsel have assumed that the rules regarding the admission
of confessions are applicable to the semi-exculpatory statement here involved; and
we shall, without deciding, make the same assumption,

The Criminal Rules of the Superior Court were promulgated by this court,
effective February 12, 1953, and were patterned closely upon the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. See “The New Rules of Procedure in Delaware” 18 F. R.
D, 327 (1953). These Rules have the force and effect of legislative enactment. See
48 Del. Laws, Chap. 209; 11 Del. C. Secs. 5121, 5122; compage Cohee v. Ritchey,
1 Storey 597, 51 Del, 597, 150 A. 2d 830 (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey,
10 Tesry 413, 49 Del. 413, 118 A. 2d 362 (1955).

44 PO
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and the nature of the proceedings to be held by the Magistrate.”

I.

HE Most succinctly stated, the problem before us on this
appeal is whether to apply the prevailing federal rule, known as the
McNabb-Mallory rule. Under the federal rule, any confession or

Bulle 5 provides as follows: “RULE 5. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
IMMITTING MAGISTRATE

“(a) Appearance. An officer making an arrest with or without a warrant or
any other authorized peace officer shall take the arrested person without
unreasonable delay before either the nearest available Justice of The Peace of the
county i in which the offense is alleged to have been committed or before the court
out of which the warrant issued, in accordance with the command of the warrant.
When an arrest is made without a warrant, a complaint shall be made as soon as
the accused is brought before a committing magistrate.

“(b) Statement by the Committing Magistrate. The committing magistrate
shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain
counsel and of his right to have a preliminary hearing. He shall also inform the
defendant that he is not xequired to make a statement and that any statement
made by him may be used-against him. The committing magistrate shall allow the
defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the
defendant to bail as provided in these rules,

“(c) Preliminary Hearing, The defendant shall not be called upon to plead,
If the defendant waives preliminary hearing, the committing magistrate shall
forthwith hold him to answer in the Superior Court. If the defendant does not
waive hearing, the committing magistrate shall hear the evidence within a

reasonable time. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him and may
introduce evidence in his own behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the
committing magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the committing
magistrate shall forthwith hold him to answer in the Superior Court; otherwise
the committing magistrate shall discharge him, The committing magistrate shall
admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules. After concluding the
proceedings the committing magistrate shall transmit forthwith to the
Prothonotary for the proper county all papers in the proceeding and any bail
n by him.

“Derived from McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S, 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed,
819 (1942) and Mallory v, United States, 354 US, 449, 77 8, Ct. 1356, 1L. Ed.
2d 1479 (1957). The latter case involved Federal Criminal Rule 5(a) which
requires that the arrested person be taken before a committing Magistrate without

“unnecessary” delay instead of the “unreasonable” delay referred to in our Rule.

— 45
L_

incriminatory statement obtained during an unlawful detention is
inadmissible in evidence for that reason alone, without regard for
voluntariness. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S.'65, 65 S. Ct.
896, 88 L. Ed. 1140 (1944).

This court has not been required heretofore to grapple with this
precise question, although it has been approached:

In Wilson v. State, supra, this court considered a contention,
made for the first time on motion for new trial, that the defendant was
not promptly arraigned, that his detention was unlawful, and that,
therefore, the statement made during such detention could not be used
against him. In Wilson, the defendant had been in police detention for
approximately 13 hours before the statement was obtained; it does not
appear in Wilson that the then-new Rule 5 was considered; and the
Mallory case had not yet been decided. For these reasons we consider
the Wilson case,:on which the trial court and the State relied, to be
inapposite.

The problem was again approached by this court in Thompson v.
State, Del. 174 A. 2d 141 (1961). There the defendant was a prisoner
serving a sentence on another charge at the time he was taken from the
Correctional Institution to police headquarters for questioning.
Thompson confessed within two hours after the police custody and
questioning began; and he was then returned to the Correctional
Institution until the next day when he was arraigned on the new charge.
It was contended that the delay in arraignment violated Rule 5. This
court there considered the Mallory case and held that it was inapposite
‘because Thompson had been in custody and, therefore, was not
restrained of his liberty during the period of questioning.

And most recently, in Lasby v. State, Del., 185 A. 2d 271
(1962), approximately 8 hours elapsed between arrest and arraignment
during which a confession was obtained by the police. This court
reaffirmed its holding in the Wilson case that police questioning before
arraignment is not in itself unlawful; and further held that, in view of
the 24 hour provision of Sec. 1911, the delay of 8 hours could not as a

46 ee

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matter of law be held to be an “unreasonable delay” under Rule 5.

Thus, in each of the cases which have come before this court to
date, the period of alleged unlawful detention was much less than the
24 hour maximum limitation specified in Sec. 1911 as the public policy
of this State.

In the case at hand, the circumstances under which the
defendant’s statement was secured reveal a plain disregard of the duty
enjoined by law upon State law enforcement officers and committing
Magistrates. Several basic facts are inescapable: (1) the defendant was
held in police custody for almost 36 hours without benefit of the
appearance and hearing required by Rule 5; (2) the proceeding before
the Magistrate in the early morning hours of August 22 was a nullity;
(3) the defendant was neither committed to the correctional
authorities, nor admitted to bail, nor discharged after the initial
appearance before the Magistrate; and (4) the police held the defendant
both before and after the initial appearance for the purpose of
interrogation; and the delay was for the purpose of obtaining a
confession and not for general investigatory purposes.

HI We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this
case, there was an “unreasonable delay” as a matter of law under Sec.
1911 and Rule 5(a); and that the detention of the defendant, in excess
of the 24 hour period specified by Sec. 1911, was unlawful by reason
of the violation of both Sec. 1911 and Rule 5(a).

We further hold that the incriminating statement obtained
from the defendant during such unlawful detention, ie., after the
expiration of the 24 hour period, was rendered inadmissible as a matter
of law for that reason alone, without regard for voluntariness.

While our conclusions are not based upon comparable
constitutional grounds, we adopt the rationale of this court in Richards
v. State, 6 Terry 573, 77 A. 2d 199 (1950) wherein this court adopted
the federal rule barring evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful
arrest. It was there stated:

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“We prefer the rule followed in the Federal courts. We conceive
it the duty of the courts to protect constitutional guarantees. The most
effective way to protect the guarantees against unreasonable search and
seizure and compulsory self-incrimination is to exclude from evidence
any matter obtained by a violation of them.

“We believe that as Jong as the Constitution of this state contains
the guarantees to the citizen referred to, we have no choice but to use
every means at our disposal to preserve those guarantees. Since it is
obvious that the exclusion of such matters from evidence is the most
practical protection, we adopt that means. It is no answer to say that
the rule hampers the task of the prosecuting officer. If forced to chose
between convenience to the prosecutor and a deprivation of

constitutional guarantees to the citizen, we in fact have no choice.
x HD?

We correlate “the fruit of wrongdoing” in an unlawful detention
and in an unlawful arrest—and we exclude both. Paraphrasing the
language in Rickards: We conceive it the duty of our courts, in the
administration of criminal justice, to enforce all applicable Statutes and
Rules of Court. We find here a flagrant disregard of both Sec. 1911 and
Rule 5. The exclusion in criminal trials of evidence obtained as a result
of such violation of the law is the most practical and effective means at
the disposal of our courts for the avoidance of similar violations in the
future. We adopt such means to enforce the law, seeking to deter
unlawful detentions just as we have sought to deter unlawful arrests.
The law may not be enforced by disobedience of the law.

We thus adopt the federal McNabb-Mallory rule within the
framework of the facts of the case before us. Our ruling is expressly
limited, however, to a detention in excess of the 24 hour period
specified in Sec. 1911, without the proceedings prescribed by Rule 5.
Consideration of the standards of reasonableness of a detention of less
than 24 hours must wait another case.

This being our view of the matter, it becomes unnecessary to
pass upon the other grounds of the appeal, including the question of

&

the ultimate effect of the defendant’s initial refusal to answer any
questions until he had the advice of counsel.

We conclude that the defendant’s statement was improperly
admitted in evidence against him. The judgment of the Superior Court
must be reversed and the case remanded.

JAMES C. JOHNSON, Employee-Appellee Below, Appellant, v.
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Employer-Appellant Below,
Appellee.

(uly 21, 1965)
(Reargument Denied September 15, 1965)

ee 49
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WOLCOTT, Chief Justice, CAREY, Justice, and SEITZ,
Chancellor, sitting.

John A. Faraone and James P. D’Angelo for appellant.

Carl Schnee and David B, Coxe, Jr., of Coxe, Booker & Walls, for
Chrysler.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 18, 1965.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the reversal by the Superior Court of an
award made by the Industrial Accident Board (hereafter “Board”). The
claimant appeals.

The claimant worked for Chrysler as a janitor. In 1957 he
injured his back and missed about six weeks’ work. He testified that on
November 23, 1962, a Friday, while moving a heavy barrel as a part of
his work he again injured his back; that he told a Mrs. Cox, a fellow
employee about his injury; that he was bothered by his back on the
ensuing Saturday and Sunday, and that he reported to the Chrysler
dispensary the following Monday. He further testified that he had not
worked at Chrysler since the day of his injury; that he was admitted
almost immediately to the Milford Hospital and was within a week
transferred to Riverside Hospital where a lumbar laminectomy was
performed a little over a week later. Actually, the operation was
performed on March 13, 1963.

The claimant’s testimony was corroborated in part by Mrs. Cox
who testified the claimant had spoken to her of his injury as he had
described; by the witness, Schuyler, a fellow employee, who took the
claimant to the Chrysler dispensary on a Monday on a jitney because of
his difficulty in walking; by the witness, Schmitz, a fellow employee,

50 PO
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and who was sharing a car pool with the claimant, and on the day of

the alleged injury drove the claimant’s car home for him because of the

pain in his back; and by the witness, Smith, the claimant’s

brother-in-law, who testified that the claimant was in pain and had

difficulty in moving about after the alleged injury.

In addition, the claimant called three doctors as witnesses who
gave as their opinion in response to hypothetical questions based upon
the claimant’s version of the accident that it was the precipitating cause
of the resultant back condition requiring the operation and the
subsequent disability of the claimant.

Chrysler in opposition offered evidence that claimant had not
received any treatment at its dispensary for a back injury in November,
1962, but on the contrary had reported to the dispensary with a
condition known as cellulitis of the nose which kept him from work
from November 28, 1962 through December 1, 1962. Another doctor,
engaged in practice with the claimant’s family doctor who testified on
his behalf, testified that he was treated for the nose condition in late
November. Claimant’s foreman on the job testified that claimant’s job
entailed no lifting at all, and that on November 26, 1962 he gave the
claimant a sick pass to report to the dispensary and that the claimant
made no reference to an injury. Chrysler also proved that the claimant
continued working at his regular job from November 23, 1962 through
February 15, 1963 missing only six days’ work during that period. It
was also proved that claimant was paid group insurance for November
28, 1962 through December 1, 1962 and for February 15, 1963
through August 18, 1963. Chrysler also offered testimony that the
claimant received unemployment compensation from August 26, 1963
until December 3, 1963.

On the basis of this record the Board found that claimant had a
back ailment prior to his alleged injury and that on November 23, 1962
he aggravated his pre-existing back disorder while performing his work,
and that this required medical, surgical and hospital services. The
Board’s award was for temporary total disability from February 21,
1963 until terminated by action of the Board.

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On appeal to it by Chrysler the Superior Court reversed the
award on the sole ground that there was no “sufficient competent and
satisfactory” evidence that the claimant had suffered an accident in the
course of his employment. The Court found it unnecessary to consider
other grounds urged by Chrysler.

HH it is, of course, correct that no award of compensation
for injury may be made by the Board unless the claimant establishes by
probative evidence that he suffered an injury and that such injury was
the result of an accident taking place in the course of his employment.
Furthermore, the accident must be established by proof with a definite
referral to time, place and circumstance. Faline v. Guido & Francis
DeAscanis & Sons, Del., 192 A. 2d 921; Belber Trunk & Bag Co. v.
Menesy, 8 Terry 595, 96 A. 2d 341. We think, if accepted as true, the
evidence offered in behalf of the claimant satisfies this requirement.

The Superior Court, however, was of the opinion that the
claimant’s evidence was not to be believed, apparently on the ground
that it was so contradictory to undisputed facts as to be incredible. His
evidence was, therefore, rejected entirely which, of course, left the
record barren of any showing on his part.

Hn appeal from the Board, however, the Superior Court
does not sit as a trier of fact with authority to weigh the evidence,
determine questions of credibility, and make its own factual findings
and conclusions. Although our Courts have expressed it in various ways,
we think the sole function of the Superior Court, as is the function of
this Court on appeal, is to determine whether or not there was
substantial competent evidence to support the finding of the Board,
and, if it finds such in the record, to affirm the findings of the Board.
General Motors Corporation v. McNemar, Del., 202 A. 2d 803; Faline v.
Guido & Francis DeAscanis & Sons, supra; General Motors Corporation
v. Freeman, 3 Storey 74, 164 A. 2d 686; Wright v. American Brake
Shoe Co., 8 Terry 299, 90 A. 24 681, and Le Tourneau v. Consolidated
Fisheries Co., 4 Terry 540, 51 A. 2d 862. Only when there is no
satisfactory proof in support of a factual finding of the Board may the
Superior Court, or this Court for that matter, overturn it. Children’s

52 ee
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Bureau of Delaware v, Nissen, 3 Terry 209, 29 A. 2d 603.

Admittedly, the record in this cause is full of contradictions,
particularly in the matter of dates, but this is not to say that the
claimant’s case is thereby completely to be disbelieved. We say this
because of the admitted fact that in February he visited his family
doctor complaining of his back. This was on Monday, February 18,
1963—the same day of the week he testified he went to the Chrysler
dispensary. Also, admittedly, he ultimately underwent surgery which
resulted in at least some disability. Conceivably, the claimant could
have been mistaken about the dates in question, and conceivably the
Board so found. Certainly, it is incredible that the claimant would have
testified he did not work after November 23, 1962 in the face of the
Chrysler employment record unless he was confused as to the times.

However, the Board, itself, in its findings held that the testimony
established the fact that on November 23, 1962 the claimant aggravated
his pre-existing back disability. Yet, it must be of some significance that
the Board’s award was for compensation commencing February 21,
1963, which would seem to be at odds with the finding of aggravation
on November 23, 1962.

We think the findings of the Board are unclear and probably
incomplete. Of prime importance is the failure of the Board to make a
finding one way or the other upon the question of whether the
claimant suffered an accident from which his disability came.
Assuming, therefore, as we think upon this record must be done, that
the Board accepted the testimony of the claimant that he suffered an
injury, and in view of the uncontroverted fact of his back condition,
the proper course for the trial judge to have followed would have been
to remand the cause to the Board with instructions to make a finding as
to “accident” and to clarify the apparent inconsistencies in the
findings.

This, however, was not done. On the contrary, the trial judge
weighed the evidence, determined the question of credibility of

ee 53
id

witnesses he had not heard, and reversed the award in the face of
evidence which, if accepted, would have supported the award. This, we
think, was to commit error because the evidence was sufficient to
permit the Board to make a sustainable finding either way with respect
to “accident”

The cause must therefore be remanded to the Superior Court
with instructions to remand the matter to the Board to clarify the
apparent inconsistencies in its findings, and to make a precise finding as
to whether or not the claimant suffered an accident in the course of his
work which resulted in injury to his back and, if so, when it occurred.

Chrysler makes other points in its brief which it contends should
lead to an affirmance of the Superior Court. These points were argued
to the Superior Court but not considered by it because of its finding
that the claimant did not suffer an accident.

The ‘points are that, first, there was no proof of a causal
connection between an injury and the claimant’s disability; second, that
the Board’s award was based solely on proof of an aggravation of a
pre-existing condition, and, third, that the claimant failed to prove total
disability after July 3, 1963.

These are matters which depend for answer upon the additional
findings and clarification which will be made by the Board upon
remand and, if necessary, can be reconsidered by it at that time.

The final point made by Chrysler is that the award should be
reversed at least in part as to the period for which he had previously
received unemployment compensation payments. The point was, of
course, not reached by the Superior Court, and the portions of the
record reproduced in the briefs and appendices do not show whether or
not it was raised and considered by the Board. Under the
circumstances, we decline to pass upon it. Upon remand to the Board it
may be renewed provided it had been raised in the prior proceedings.

The judgment of the Superior Court will be reversed and the

5a Po
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cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.

ANN WEBSTER, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF
DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below Appellee.

mii

| | |
wu
a

(September 16, 1965)

56 ee
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WOLCOTT, Chief Justice, and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ.,
sitting.

Vincent A, Theisen and Victor F. Battaglia of Theisen & Lank,
for defendant below, appellant

Ruth M. Ferrell, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff below,
appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware.

No. 12, 1964.
HERRMANN, Justice.

The jury found the defendant Webster guilty of involuntary
manslaughter after trial on an indictment for murder in the second
degree. Upon this appeal, the defendant asserts several grounds of
reversible error in the trial.

I.
The defendant’s version of the facts is as follows:

The defendant and her husband had been quarreling about his
threat to leave her. On the occasion of an earlier separation, the
defendant had been frightened by prowlers and she decided to purchase
a gun for self-protection. On the morning of the fatal shooting, at the
defendant’s request, a friend purchases a nine-shot .22 caliber revolver
for her, loaded it,.and delivered it to her. That evening, alone in their
bedroom, the defendant was again told by her husband that he
intended to leave. The defendant went into another room and returned

pd 57
{_]

with the loaded pistol in her hand. The husband, a semi-professional
athlete, thereupon threw a heavy baseball trophy at the defendant,
striking her in the head. The gun went off once and the husband was
hit. A struggle ensued during which the gun went off eight more times,
the husband being hit each time. The defendant was rendered
unconscious during the struggle, sustaining several head and face
injuries, When she regained consciousness, she fled the house to avoid
further attack by her husband who sought to renew the struggle. The
defendant ran to her mother’s home and went promptly to the police
station to report the matter, arriving about 8:45 P.M.

Because of her condition, the police immediately took the
defendant to the hospital where she was given first aid treatment; and
she was returned to the police station about 10:45 P.M. In the
meanwhile, the police commenced investigation and found the husband
dead, the body being in a chair in the kitchen of the house. The
investigating officers returned to the police station at about 11:30 P.M.
Interrogation of the defendant commenced at about 12:15 AM. She
was advised that she did not have to make a statement, that she had the
right to consult counsel, and that anything she said could be used
against her. During the interrogation she asked for and was given
cigarettes, coffee, and aspirin. Her written statement was completed
and signed at about 3:00 A.M., after eyeglasses were retrieved from her
home by the police so that she could read the statement. Thereafter,
the defendant was processed at the police station, including
fingerprinting and photographing. At about 4:30 A.M., at her request,
she returned to her home for a change of clothing prior to appearance
before the Justice of the Peace, which occured at about 5:30 or 6:00
A.M. She was thereafter promptly delivered to the constable.

IL

The defendant contends that her inculpatory statement was
admitted in evidence in violation of Superior Court Criminal Rule 5(a),

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Del. C.! The defendant relies upon Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) and McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1942).

The question is not properly before us for review. Neither
on the vior dire examination before the court nor in the presentation of
the statement before the jury was the question of unlawful detention
taised; and no objection to the admission of the statement was made at
any stage of the trial on that ground. Voluntariness, in the ordinary
sense, was the only issue raised at the trial in connection with the
admissibility of the statement; and that issue went to the jury in the
usual, way and under usual instruction. Compare Wilson v. State, 10
Terry 37, 49 Del. 37, 109 A.2d 381, 387 (1954).

HMM As a general rule, we will not consider on appeal
questions not fairly presented below. Matters of public policy, however,
are exceptions to the general rule. Rickards v. State, 6 Terry 573, 45
Del. 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950). Under that exception, because of its
importance to the proper administration of criminal justice, we proceed
to consider the question raised.

In the recent case of Vohauer v. State, Del., 212 A.2d 886
(1965), we adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule,? excluding evidence
obtained during an illegal detention, and applied it to a detention

1 Superior Court Criminal Rule 5(a) provides:

“RULE 5. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE

“(a) Appearance. An officer making arrest with or without a warrant or any
other authorized peace officer shall take the arrested person without unreasonable
delay before either the nearest available Justice of the Peace of the county in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed or before the court out of
which the warrant issued, in accordance with the command of the warrant. When
an arrest is made without a warrant, a complaint shall be made as soon as the
accused is brought before a committing magistrate.”

2Derived from McNabb v. United States, supra and Mallory v. United States,
supra,

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exceeding the 24 hour period specified by 11 Del. C. Sec. 1911.3 We
there held that, by virtue of the public policy announced in Sec. 1911,
any detention exceeding 24 hours, without the required appearance
before a Justice of the Peace, constitutes “unreasonalbe delay” and
illegal detention as a matter of law, unless the reason therefor is one
recognized by the Statute as a ground for permissible delay; and we
held that any inculpatory statement or confession obtained during an
unreasonable delay is inadmissible in evidence without regard for
voluntariness. We there stated:

“* * * The exclusion in criminal trials of evidence
obtained as a result of such violation of the law is the most practical
and effective means at the disposal of our courts for the avoidance of
similar violations in the future. We adopt such means to enforce the
law, seeking to deter unlawful detentions just as we have sought to
deter unlawful arrests. The law may not be enforced by disobedience of
the law.”

Thus, as a rule of evidence to enforce compliance with Rule 5 and Sec.
1911, we applied the McNabb-Mallory rule to the circumstances of the
Vohauer case. :

HME For the same basic reasons, we think that the
exclusionary rule should be applicable to illegal detentions of less than
24 hours, Clearly, a delay may be “unreasonable”, and in violation of
the Rule and the Statute, though less than 24 hours in duration. But no
clear-cut standards of reasonableness may be prescribed. Each case must
be considered by the trial judge on its own facts; and the number of
hours of detention prior to apprarance before a Justice of the Peace is
to be considered by the trial judge, together with all of the other

311 Del. C. Sec. 1911 provides: _.

“Sec. 1911. Hearing without delay; permissible delay

“If not otherwise released; every person arrested shall be brought before a
magistrate without unreasonalbe delay, and in any event he shall, if possible, be so
brought within 24 hours of arrest, Sundays and holidays excluded, unless a
Resident Judge of the county where he is detained or of the county where the
crime was commited for good cause shown orders that he be held for a further
period of not exceeding 48 hours.”

60 ee
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circumstances of the case, in determining whether the delay was
unreasonable, and in violation of Rule 5 and Sec. 1911, so as to bar
admission of a confession or statement obtained during such delay,

THN We emphasize that, unlike the issue of voluntariness
which is based upon constitutional grounds, the reasonableness of a
delay is a question of evidence to be determined by the trial judge
alone; it does not become a jury question. Compare Wilson v. State,
supra; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908
(1964). As we have indicated in Vorhauer, and as appears in McNabb
and Mallory, the exclusionary rule with which we deal here is a rule of
evidence, adopted by the courts as an instrument to implement the
proper administration of criminal justice; and it does not stand upon
constitutional grounds. See also Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410,
69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100 (1948). As a rule of evidence, it is to be
applied by the trial court, without jury participation, in the same
manner as other rules of evidence. Compare Lasby v. State, Del., 185
A.2d 271, 274 (1962). We find no merit in the defendant’s attempt to
read constitutional guarantees into the McNabb-Mallory rule.

HM In the instant case, the defendant was held as an accused
for approximately four hours before she signed the statement and for
approximately three hours thereafter before she was taken to the
Justice of the Peace. Part of this time was used to comply with her
tequests for spectacles and clothing. In considering the reasonableness
of the delay, the significant hours of detention are those occuring
before the confession and not those thereafter. United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140 (1944). We are
satisfied that there was not unreasonable delay in bringing this
defendant before a Justice of the Peace. On the contrary, we think that
the police officers in this case observed the legal proprieties, as well as
the civilities, most commendably.

There was no violation of Rule 5 or Sec. 1911 and, accordingly,
the statement should not have been ruled inadmissible in evidence on
that ground, as the defendant urges.

Po 61

The defendant contends that there were prejudicial errors in the
jury charge.

The court charged on the statutory crime of manslaughter,
reading 11 Del, C. Sec. 467* verbatim. The charge then contained the
following:

“If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Ann
Webster, unlawfully pointed a firearm towards the decedent, Arthur
Webster, and death results from the unlawful act, and if you do not
find that the act was committed under circumstances amounting to
murder in the second degree or voluntary manslaughter as I have
defined those crimes to you, you should find the defendant guilty of
involuntary manslaughter.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The defendant attacks this portion of the charge in two respects:

First, it is argued that it was prejudicial error for the court to use
the words “unlawfully pointed” in lieu of the statutory words
“intentionally pointed.”

THE While we agree that it would have been preferable to
utilize the statutory language, we do not agree that the difference in the
wording constitutes reversible error. The charge, as supplemented in
response to the jury’s subsequent inquiry, included three separate
readings of Sec. 467. The jury must have understood thereform that an

4 11 Del. C. Sec. 467 provides:
“Sec. 467. Pointing firearm; manslaughter if death ensues

“(a) Whoever, either in jest or otherwise, intentionally points a gun, pistol
or other firearm at or towards any other person at any time or place, shall be
fined not less than $10 nor more than $100, and the costs of prosecution.

“(b) Should death result to any person by the discharge of such gun, pistol
or other firearm while so pointed, ‘the person pointing the same shall be guilty of
Teo when such killing shall not amount to murder, and shall be punished
accordingly.”

62 Po
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intentional pointing was the gravamen of the offense; and we do not
believe that the jury was mislead, or the defendant otherwise
prejudiced, by the court’s use of the word “unlawful” instead of
“intentional.” An intentional pointing of the gun being unlawful under
the Statute, it cannot fairly be said that the court erred in its use of the
latter word for the former.

Secondly, the defendant argues that the court erred in
the above quoted portion of the jury instruction in that if failed to
charge on proximate cause, citing State v. Hupf, 9 Terry 254, 101 A.2d
355 (1953) and State v. Donovan, 1 Terry 257, 8 A.2d 876 (1939). We
find no merit in this contention. The Statute requires that “death
result” and the charge required that “death results.” The defendant
took no exception on this ground at the trial. We are satisfied that,
after hearing Sec. 467 read three times by the trial judge, the jury must
have understood that direct causation is an essential element of the
statutory offense. While a more definitive instruction on proximate
cause would have been better, we are convinced that the jury was not
so mislead or left so basically uninformed in this connection as to give
tise to reversible error.

As to the common law offense of manslaughter, the
charge contained the following:

“Also, quite apart from the statute which has been explained to
you, the common law endeavors to safeguard human life against the
reckless use of firearms and the negligent handling of a loaded firearm
causing death to another is manslaughter at common law.

“Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

Superior Court Criminal Rule 30(a) provides in part:

“sr * * Except with special permission of the court, no party may assign as
error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto
before the jury retires to consider itsverdict, stating distinctly the matter to which
he objects and the grounds of his objection, Opportunity shall be given to make
the objection out of the hearing of the jury.”

ee 63
L_

defendant negilgently and recklessly handled a loaded firearm, which
act was the proximate cause of the death of the decedent, Arthur
Webster, and if such act was not performed under circumstances
amounting to murder in the second degree, or voluntary manslaughter,
then your verdict should be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

The defendant contends that there was prejudicial error in this portion
of the charge in that the court failed to state that gross negligence is an
essential element of the common law offense, citing State v. Hupf,
supra. Here again, no exception was taken to the charge on the ground
now asserted. We have examined the matter, nevertheless, and have
concluded that there is no reversible error in this respect. The court’s
Tepetition of “reckless” and recklessly”, in relation to the “safeguard
of human life” was sufficient, we think, to indicate to the jury that
more than ordinary negligence was needed to support the common law
offense. A more complete statement of the “reckless disregard for the
lives or safety of others” specified in Hupf would have been preferable;
but, in our judgment, the instruction as given was adquate to withstand
the charge of prejudicial and reversible error.

HH Finally, the defendant contends that the trial judge erred
in failing to repeat the charge on self-defense when he repeated other
portions of the charge at the jury’s request. We do not agree. No
request was made for such repetition nor was exception taken at the
trial. The self-defense instruction was given in the original charge and
we do not think that it was error to fail to repeat it under the
circumstances.

Iv.

The defendant attempts to raise the following questions on
appeal for the first time:

1) The defendant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting certain evidence, under the State’s plea of surprise, without

64 Pe
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an appropriate instruction to the jury regarding the weight to be given
such evidence. The record discloses no request for such jury instruction
nor any objection to the jury charge on this ground.

2) The defendant contends that the testimony of a character
witness was received notwithstanding a recess conversation about the
witness between one of the jurors in this case and a juror sitting in
another case. The conversation was reported to the trial judge and was
found to be harmless after investigation. The defendant interposed no
objection on this ground to the admission of the testimony of the
witness.

3) The defendant submits as reversible error the trial court’s
refusal to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close
of the States’ case and again at the close of all of the evidence. The
argument is now made before us that the motion should have been
granted because the State failed to prove the causal connection,
between the death and the defehdant’s unlawful acts, requiste to
support a conviction of manslaughter. The record fails to disclose that
this question was raised at the trial, the motion for acquittal having
been addressed soley to the murder charge.

4) The defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence
of causal connection to support a jury instruction that the defendant
could be found guilty of manslaughter under 11 Del. C. Sec. 467. The
record discloses no exception to the jury charge on this ground.

5) The defendant contends that reversible error occurred
when, notwithstanding the fact that an objection was sustained and the
court admonished against repetition, the Attorney General repeatedly
asked questions about the defendant’s moral character without having
evidence reflecting upon her character. The defendant also contends
that, after admonition by the court, the Arrorney General repeatedly
questioned a police officer for his opinion as to the significance of the
difference between the number of spent shells and the number of body
wounds discovered. No application was made to the trial judge for
mistrial, for appropriate jury instruction, or for other relief; and,

— 65
i_]

apparently, the trial judge observed no prejudicial impropriety in this
connection sufficient to require recification sua sponte.

RRR

HH These questions may not be raised for the first time on
appeal. After careful consideration of each contention and of the entire
trial record, we have concluded that none of the matters asserted
amounts to “plain error” noticeable under Superior Court Criminal
Rule 52(b). Compare Wiggins v. State, Del., 210 A.2d 314 (1965).
And we are satisfied that none properly falls within the recognized
exceptions to the general rule that an appellate court will not ordinarily
consider questions which have not been fairly presented to the court
below. Rickards v. State, supra.

v.

HH The defendant contends that it was error for the court to
bar questioning of a character witness regarding a specific instance of
misconduct by the decedent. If error under the circumstances, we think
that this does not rise above harmless error prejudicing no substantial
right of the defendant. Superior Court Criminal Rule 52(a).”

ae ae ae

Accordingly, we find no ground requiring reversal of the
judgemnt below and it is affirmed.

© Superior Court Criminal Rule 52(b) provides: |
“(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”

7 Superior Court Criminal Rule 52(a) provi

“(a) Harmless Error. An error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”

a

6

AARON KOLBER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. HOLYOKE SHARES,
INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant Below, Appellee.

(September 22,1965)
WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

Richard J. Abrams, of Richards, Layton & Finger, for the
plaintiff below, appellant.

Richard F. Corroon, of Berl, Potter & Anderson, and Charles
Oechler, Robert Ehrenbard and Richard J. Concannon, of Kelley, Drye,
Newhall, Maginnes & Warren, New York City, for the defendant below,
appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 30, 1965.

|

P| 67
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HERRMANN, Justice:

This is an action for an agent’s commission or “finder’s fee”
brought by the plaintiff Aaron Kolber, a resident of New York, against
the defendant, Holyoke Shares, Inc., a Delaware corporation, in
connection with the sale of the defendant’s business. No similar action
has been brought in any other jurisdiction. The defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens and the
Superior Court granted the motion. The ultimate question before us is
whether the defendant made a sufficient showing to justify the
dismissal.

Affidavits, filed by the defendant in support of its motion, show
that all parties, ail potential witnesses, and all events relating to the
allegations of the complaint, are centered in the New York City area.
The defendant concludes therefrom that none of the acts complained
of, and none of the persons or places involved, bear any relationship to
Delaware, except that the defendant is a Delaware corporation. It is
also represented that the trial of the cause will involve a serious dispute
as to the facts, requiring confrontation of witnesses before the trier of
fact for the best test of credibility. The defendant’s inability to compel
attendance of New York residents as witnesses in Delaware, it is stated,
will deprive the defendant of the benefit of such confrontation. Finally,
it is stated that the New York Statute of Frauds governs the case, that
the law on the point is unsettled, and that the open questions of New
York law should be settled by the courts of New York.

Upon the basis of such showing, the Superior Court concluded
that the defendant was entitled to dismissal of the action on the ground
of forum non conveniens, relying upon Winsor v. United Air Lines, 2
Storey 161, 154 A. 2d 561 (1958) and General Foods Corporation v.
Cryo-Maid, Inc., Del., 198 A. 2d 681 (1941). We are unable to agree.

HHI it is quite ordinary for Delaware courts to determine
causes in which all persons involved are non-residents of Delaware and
in which none of the events involved occurred here. These factors alone
are not, in our opinion, sufficient to warrant interference with the

68 Po
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plaintiff's usual choice of forum.

What more has the defendant demonstrated? There is no
showing that the case involves a prodigious number of witnesses or an
unmanageable volume of documents and records; and the distance
between New York City and Wilmington has not proven to be undue
hardship in the many extensive litigations which have been carried on in
this State involving parties, witnesses, and lawyers, resident in New
York.

TL Concededly, the:best test of the credibility of witnesses
requires their appearance before the trier of fact. The advantages of
“live testimony”, as contrasted with depositions, are unquestionable;
but litigants are constantly obliged to resort to depositions under our
broad discovery procedures, even where the facts are in hot dispute;
and we perceive no sufficient reason for making this case an exception
on that ground.

This leaves the reason that unsettled New York law governs the
case. This factor is not sufficient reason, in our opinion, for dismissal
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, either alone or in
combination with the other factors mentioned. It is not unusual, of
course, for Delaware courts to deal with open questions of the law of
sister states or of foreign countries. Cf., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 7
Terry 458, 85 A. 2d 706, Aff'd. DuPont v. DuPont, 8 Terry 231,90 A.
2d 468 (1952); Bata v. Hill, 37 Del. Ch. 96, 139 A. 2d 159, aff'd. 39
Del. Ch. 258, 163 A. 2d 493 (1960). It has occurred frequently in the
past and, here again, we find no sufficient reason for making an
exception in this case.

Our conclusions are not in conflict with the Winsor case, the
General Foods case, or any other Delaware case which has come to our
attention.

The Winsor case is clearly inapposite on its facts. That case

ee 69
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involved a commercial airline crash in Colorado, resulting in the death
of many passengers. A large number of witnesses in the midwest were
involved. Several death actions were brought in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff in Winsor
brought his action first in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York. That court transferred the cause to the
District of Colorado for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
declining to transfer it to the District of Delaware as requested by the
plaintiff. See Winsor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 244.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff proceeded to bring suit in Delaware, the
State of incorporation of the defendant airline. The Superior Court
dismissed the Delaware action on the ground of forum non conveniens
and consigned the plaintiff to his pending transferred action in
Colorado. These factual distinctions, we think require no enlargement.

Nor is the General Foods case determinative. That case involved
a stay of the Delaware action in order to permit the defendant to go
forward with a companion action then pending in Illinois. A dismissal
of the Delaware action on the ground of forum non conveniens had
been refused. Thus, an interlocutory order settling no substantial legal
rights was there involved and this court, carefully recognizing the
discretionary nature of such an order, found no abuse of discretion and
upheld it.

In the case before us, however, the order of dismissal of the
action is neither interlocutory nor discretionary, purporting as it does
to settle finally all of the plaintiff's legal rights in this cause in this
jurisdiction. Moreover, no other similar action is pending elsewhere.

HME We confirm the guide lines set forth in General Foods as
to factors which may be considered in the application of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens. The requisite showing with respect to such
factors is far greater, however, for a dismissal than for a stay. The
dismissal of an action on the basis of the doctrine, and the ultimate
defeat of the plaintiff's choice of forum, may occur.only in the rare
case in which the combination and weight of the factors to be
considered balance overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant. Compare

70 PO
Ld

Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed.
1055 (1947). This is not such a case.

We have considered the other Delaware cases called to our
attention involving the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In none,
except Winsor, was the case finally dismissed on that ground; and, as
Chief Justice Terry observed, Winsor was “an extreme case.” Chrysler
Corporation vy. Dann, 3 Storey 430, 171 A. 2d 223 (1961). Cf., Dietrich
v. Texas National Petroleum Co., Del. Super., 193 A. 2d 579 (1963).

Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court erred in
dismissing the action. The judgment below must be reversed.

GEORGE R. and DOROTHY P. STERLING, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
JAMES G. CARR and LUSBY G. McCOY, JR.,
Defendants-Appellees, JOSEPH R. BIDEN and JEAN F. BIDEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMES G. CARR and LUSBY G.
McCOY, JR., Defendants-Appellees. VINCENT W.
VANDENBRAAK and JEAN VANDENBRAAK, Plaintiffs, v.
JAMES G. CARR and LUSBY G. McCOY, JR,
Defendants-Appellees.

(September 20, 1965)

WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN Jj., sitting.

Pd 1
|__|
David B. Coxe, Jr., and Carl Schnee, for Appellents Biden.

Richard J. Baker, for appellants Sterling.
Nathan P. Michlin, for appellants Vanderbraak.

E. N. Carpenter, IT, and Charles F. Richards, of Richards, Layton
& Finger, for appellees.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware.
Wovember 15, 1965)

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting
summary judgments to the defendants by applying the Delaware Guest
Statute in an action for personal injuries arising out of an accident
occurring in West Virigina. The defendants, appellees here, concede that
the merits of the appeal are controlled by this Court’s recent decision in
Firday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594, holding the Delaware Guest Statute
inapplicable to actions for personal injuries suffered outside of
Delaware. Ordinarily, therefore, we would reverse these summary
judgments for defendants.

Defendants, however, have moved to dismiss the appeal under Rule
21(2),Del.C. Ann., which provides in part that if a party fails “to take
any step in the cause at the time required” the Court may enter a
default decree or give such other relief as may seem just. Obviously, if
the motion to dismiss is granted, the erroneously entered judgments
below will stand.

The basis of the motion to dismiss is that the appeal was docketed

72 PO
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on February 12, 1965 and the Notice of Appeal served on the
Prothonotary on February 16,1965, but the record of the cause was
not filed with the Clerk of this Court within ten days of service on the
Prothonotary as required by Rule 7(2). The Prothonotary actually filed
the record with the Clerk of this Court on April 9, 1965, having
received a 20-day extension for that purpose by reason of the failure of
certain of the plaintiffs to pay the costs in the Superior Court as
required by Rule 3(e) of that Court, which also directs the
Prothonotary not to perform further service until the costs are paid. It
is argued that this delay, caused by the plaintiffs’ refusal to pay costs,
had the effect of preventing the defendants from presenting their case
prior to this Court’s decision in Friday v. Smoot, handed down on June
2, 1965.

Friday v. Smoot came on for argument on April 14, 1965. If no delay
in the filing of the record in this appeal had taken place, the following
schedule would have resulted as required by the Rules of this Court:

February 12, 1965 — Appeal docketed (Rule 5(2))
February 16, 1965 — Notice to Prothonotary (Rule 5(5))
February 26, 1965 — Record due (Rule 7(2))

March 29, 1965 — Appellant’s brief due (Rule 8)

April 19, 1965 — Appellee’s brief due (Rule 8)

April 29, 1965 — Appellant’s reply due (Rule 8)

It is thus apparent that, if the appeal had taken the ordinary
course, the appeal would not have been at issue and ready for argument
prior to April 29, 1965 (Rule 10), which date follows April 14, 1965,
when argument was heard in Friday v. Smoot. It seems to us that
probably defendants would not have had the opportunity to present
their case in any event for the reason that Rule 10 provides that, if the
appellee’s brief is filed less than 15 days before the next stated session,
the cause shall stand for argument at the second stated session. Since
April 29, 1965 is less than 15 days from May 10, on which the 1965
May Session opened, the cause would have been argued at the June
Session which opened on June 14, a date subsequent to the handing
down of the decision in Friday v. Smoot.

73

We think whatever delay the plaintiffs caused by failure to pay the
costs below therefore did not have the result the defendants say it did.
In any event, since one of the plaintiffs had made timely payment of
costs, the appeal could not be dismissed fairly as to him. The motion to
dismiss is denied.

In view of the defendants’ concession that Friday v. Smoot is
controlling, the judgments below are reversed and the causes remanded
for trial.

ERNEST M. GROVES, JR., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. HUGH
MARVEL, Defendant Below, Appellee.

(October 14, 1965)
WILCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
Robert C. O'Hora, for the plaintiff below, appellant.
Albert L. Simon, for the defendant below, appellee.
Supreme Court of the State of Delaware No. 56, 1965.

HERRMANN, Justice.

. This appeal requires interpretation of the co-employee
immunity-from-suit provision of the Delaware Workmen’s
Compensation Law.

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are
these: The plaintiff and the defendant were both employed by
Automotive Importers, Inc. (hereinafter “Automotive”) which engaged
in the business of automobile sales and service. The plaintiff was service
manager, with the primary duty of diagnosing customers’ service needs
and assigning the work; the defendant was an automobile salesman. On
a Saturday, at about 12:30 P.M., as the plaintiff was preparing to close
the service area (closing hour being 1:00 P.M.), the defendant drove an
automobile, recently puchased from Automotive and owned by his
wife, into the service area, the plaintiff's customary place of work. The
defendant’s customary place of work was the showroom. The vehicle
had been parked in a nearby company parking area awaiting completion
of repairs necessitated by an accident in which the defendant had been
involved. The defendant drove the vehicle into the service area to wash
it and to remove signs of the accident so that his wife would not learn

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about it. After placing the vehicle on the wash rack, the defendant
asked the plaintiff if he noticed a “miss” in the motor. The plaintiff
replied that he did and the defendant asked the plaintiff to look at the
engine. The plaintiff opened the hood and asked the defendant to start
the motor so that he might try to locate the trouble. Instead of entering
the car, the defendant reached through the window and switched on
the ignition. The defendant had left the vehicle in gear and,
consequently, the car jolted when the motor stated and pinned the
plaintiff against the wooden doors behind him. The plaintiff sought and
was granted workmen’s compensation benefits for the injuries thus
sustained. He subsequently brought this negilgence action against the
defendant for the same injuries.

The defendant moved for summary judgment claiming immunity
from suit under 19 Del. C. Sec. 2363¢a) Upon the pleadings and
affidavits, the Superior Court agreed and granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant. See 209 A.2d 462. The plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff's first argument is that summary judgment is barred
by the existence of genuine issues of material :fact;the defendant
denies the materiality of any issue of fact raised. We have disposed of
this problem by adopting arguendo, the plaintiff's version of the facts.

“ The ultimate questions before us are the meaning of the words
‘person in the same employ”, as used in Sec. 2363(a), and whether the

"19 Del. C. Sec. 2363(a) provides as follows:

“Sec. 2363. Third person liable for injury; right of employee to sue and
seek compensation; right of employer and insurer to enforce liability; notice of
action; settlement and release of claim effect; amount of recovery; reimbursement
of employer or insurer; ‘expenses of recovery, apportionment; compensation

enefits

“(a) Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this
chapter was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person
other than a natural person in the same employ ot the employer to pay damages
in respect thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefits or the taking of
proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of
temedies, but such injured employee or his dependants or their personal
representative may also proceed to enforce the liability of such third party for
damages in accordance with the provisions of this section. If the injured employee
or his dependents or personal representative does not commence such action
within 260 days after the occurrence of the personal injury, then the employer or
its compensation insurance cartier may, within the period of time for the
commencement of actions prescribed by’ statute, enforce the liability of such
other person in the name of that person. * * *,” (Emphasis supplied.)

16 ee
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defendant falls within that classification so as to be immune from this
action. :

The purpose of Sec. 2363(a), and like enactments, is to exclude
co-employees from the category of “third persons” who may be sued
by an injured employee, and thus to bar common law negligence suits
against co-employees by fellow employees or by subrogated employers
in connection with compensable injuries. It appears that the employer’s
immunity from suit has been legislatively extended to co-employees in
a number of states on the theory that, as part of the quid pro quo in
the compromise of rights which forms the basis of workmen’s
compensation, employees are entitled to freedom from negligence suits
for compensable injuries. The rationale for such legislation seems to be
that by becoming employed in industry, the worker multiplies the
probability of not only injury to himself but also liability to others; and
if he is exposed to ruinous suits for damages by co-employees, the
beneficent effects of workmen’s compensation are too drastically
reduced. See 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Sec. 72.20.

The statutory language here under examination is not original in
Delaware. The pertinent portion of Sec. 2363(a), adopted as an
amendment to our Workmen’s Compensation Law in 1955, is identical
to an amendment to Michigan’s Law adopted in 1952. The wording “in
the same employ” is also found in similar statutes of New Jersey and
New York. The courts of those States have construed the subject

language:

There is uniformity of opinion that a “person in the same
employ” means a person employed by the same employer and acting in
the course of his employment at the time of the injury to the
co-employee. It is agreed that the statutory language requires more than
an employer in common without regard for the time, place, or
circumstances of the accident; and that it encompasses more than acts
within the scope of the offending employee’s regular duties. Helmic v.
Paine, 369 Mich. 114, 119 N.W. 2d 574 (1963), Sergeant v. Kennedy,
352 Mich. 494, 90 N.W.2d 447 (1958), D’Agrostino v. Wagenaar, 183
Misc. 184, 48 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1944), aff'd 268 App.Div. 912, 51
N.Y.S.2d 756, Konitch v. Hartung, 81 N.J. Super. 376, 195 A.2d 649
(1963), 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Sec. 72.20. We
adopt this generally accepted meaning of the statutory language.

We come down, then, to the question of whether the defendant

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here was acting in the “course of his employment” at the time of the
accident. This terminology has been considered by our courts. In Dravo
Corporation v. Stronsnider 4 Terry 256, 45 A.2d 542 (1945), Judge
Rodney said:

“The reguirement that an injury occur ‘in the course of his
employment’ relates to the time, place and circumstances of the
accident. It covers those things that an employee may reasonably do
or be expected to do within a time during which he is employed, and at
a place where he may reasonably be during that time.”

And in Children’s Bureau v. Nissen 3 Terry 209, 29 A.2d 603, 607
(1942), the distinction between the terms “in the course of? and
pausing out of” employment was stated by Chief Justice Layton as
follows:

“An injury may occur in the course of employment without any
essential causal relation between the employment and the injury. The
requirements, ‘in the course of his employment’, and ‘out of

* * * the employment’ must conjoin. The former relates to the time,
place and circumstances of the accident; the latter to its origin and
cause. .

[HJ it is clear, therefore, that to have been acting in the course
of his employment, the the defendant need not have been engaged in a
regular duty or function of his own employment at the time of injury
to the plaintiff. Thus, neither the language of Sec. 2363(a) nor the
established definition of “course of employment” imposes such
requirement as a requisite for immunity. Konitch v, Hartung, supra.
The cloak of the immunity Statute covers the defendant if the act
complained of was one which the defendant might reasonably do, or be
expected to do, within a time during which he was employed and at a
place where he could reasonably be during that time — even through
vutside his regular duties.

Ll - Two well recognized types of act outside the scope of
regular duties fall within “course of employment”: one is helping a
co-employee with his work; the other is creating good will for
customers. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Secs. 27.11,
27.22%a). Indeed, it is agreed by the parties herein that. as a general
proposition, an employee acts within the course of his employment, so

8 PO
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as to be cloaked with the immunity of Sec. 2363(a), if the performance
of the act was in furtherance of the master’s business.

a What, then, is the status of this defendant under Sec.
2363(a) when his action is tested by the above standards? Starting the
motor at the plaintiff's request was the crux of the matter——not the
defendant’s motive in bringing the car into the service area in the first
place. In starting the motor, was the defendant acting in the course of
his employment? We think that, under the plaintiffs own version of the
facts, the affirmative is the only answer reasonably possible. The
adjustment of the motor was within the scope of the plaintiff's regular
duties and in furtherance of Automotive’s interests because the
automobile had been purchased recently from, and had just been
repaired by, Automotive. The accident occured during regular business
hours at a place where the defendant could reasonably be during
working hours; and switching the ignition and starting the motor, at the
plaintiff's request, was an act which the defendant could reasonably do,
or be expected to do, in furtherance of Automotive’s interests, The
defendant was helping a co-worker in the latter’s work and was
promoting customer good will, well recognized “course of
employment” activities, although outside the scope of regular duties.

But, the plaintiff agrues, the defendant was primarily motivated
by his personal interest in the car and not by the business interests of
the employer. Undoubtedly, the defendant was especially interested in
the automobile here involved because it was owned by his wife; but it is
not reasonable to suppose that, as a salesman, the defendant would not
have started the motor at the plaintiff's request if the vhecile had
belonged to an ordinary customer. Assuming a dual purpose at the
moment of switching the ignition, it is only reasonable to conclude that
personal and business motivations were concurrent. The defendant’s
action in starting the motor was not removed from “course of
employment” activities, under the above guidelines, by the defendent’s
personal interest in the vehicle.

We conclude, as a matter of law, that the defendant was a
“person in the same employ” as the plaintiff, within the meaning of
Sec. 2363(a), and was therefore entitled to the protection of the
statute.

719

It appearing that there is no issue of fact which, resolved in favor
of the plaintiff, would hold the defendant liable to the plaintiff on his
claim, the summary judgment in favor of the defendent was correct and
is affirmed.

SAMUEL WEINER and PHYLLIS WEINER, his wife, Plaintiffs below,
Appellants, v. WALTER S. WISNIEWSKI, Defendant below,
Appellee.

(October 15, 1965)
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J.J., sitting.

Gerald Z. Berkowitz of Wahl, Greenstein & Berkowitz, for
appellants.

F. Alton Tybout, for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware No. 33, 1965.

CAREY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court in favor
of the plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, in a case tried before a
jury. The judgment for Mr. Weiner was in the amount of $500. No
question concerning the wife’s cause of action has been raised in this
Court.

The action was the result of injuries sustained by Mr. Weiner in
an automobile collision on May Ist, 1963. Thereafter he consulted Dr.
Strange, an orthopedic surgeon, who found a narrowed disc space in his
neck. Dr. Strange testified that this condition had existed more than six
months prior to the accident and, in his opinion, would have continued
to become worse even if the accident had not occurred, although he
believed the impact had aggravated it. The doctor gave certain
testimony concerning the possibility of an operation to remedy
plaintiffs neck condition and, over objection, testified to the estimated
cost of the operation. Although the objection was originally overruled,
on motion of defendant prior to the charge,! the Court struck from the
record all testimony concerning the cost of an operation and directed
the jury not to consider it in any way.

Two contentions are now made by this appellant: (1) the trial
Court erred in striking the testimony; and (2) the verdict was grossly
inadequate in any event.

HI In order to recover the estimated expense of a future
operation, the appellant had the burden of showing by competent
testimony a reasonable probability that the operation would be
necessary. Laskowski v. Wallis, Del., 205 A. 2d 825; 10A Blashfield

1 also prior to counsels’ summation, we assume. See Superior Court Rule 51,Del.

P| 81
_-

Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (Perm. Ed.) 174; Herbert v. Stanley,
124 Vt. 205, 201 A.2d 698. Such probability in a case like this could
be proven only through a competent medical witness. Appellant
contends that it was proven by Dr. Strange. It is true that the doctor
made it clear that Mr. Weiner’s condition would likely become worse
rather than better; yet he did not predict that an operation would
probably be necessary. We quote from the record:

“Q. Have you recommended, Dr. Strange, that Mr. Weiner
undergo surgery for this particular condition?

A. I have mentioned to him that there is a surgical procedure
here but have not pressed it which we don’t do in the practice of
surgery. We sort of like the patient to seek out the surgery rather than
for us to press it on them, but I have mentioned it to him.

Q. Do you have an opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of
medical and surgical certainty, as to the future operative prospects and
the necessity of Mr. Weiner to correct this condition?

A. I would say a 50/50. He may be able to live with what he has
and be willing to work his activities around this neck rather than submit
to the surgery. I have a feeling that should he become worse and this
tingling and the pain become such, then he will seek out the surgery.

Re RRR

Q. Dr. Strange, do you have an opinion, based upon a
reasonable degree of medical and surgical certainty, that Mr. Weiner will
undergo in the future an operation such as you have described here, the
myelogram, the laminectomy and the eventual fusion?

A. As I said, why its about 50/50. If he continues to complain
of pain and feels that this is intolerable and should it become worse,
this is a major step for any person to take and he then may consider the
surgery. On the other hand, he may be able to regulate his activities
around his neck and feel that he can live with what he has. That is the
best I can do, is say that the chances are about 50/50, either way.”

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Hl In our opinion, these answers were insufficient to sustain
the burden resting upon appellant, and the Court was correct in so
tuling.

In objecting to the evidence concerning the expense of an
operation, defendant’s counsel said: “May it please the Court, if this
matter of the laminectomy is going to go on, I will object to any
further evidence on it and ask that the evidence so far be stricken unless
it be shown that there is a probability that Mr. Weiner will undergo this
operation. I don’t think it has been shown as yet.”

HE The appellant now argues that this objection was not
directed to a failure to show the necessity of an operation, but to the
question of plaintiffs willingness to submit to it. We do not so
understand it. Moreover, we think the record supports the belief that
the trial Judge and both trial attorneys? considered this language to
refer to the probability of the need for an operation; obviously, had the
trial Judge’s ultimate ruling been based merely upon a failure to show
plaintiff's willingness, the trial attorney would undoubtedly have
requested permission to cure the defect.

It is suggested that plaintiff was harmed by the lateness of the
Court’s final conclusion, in that’ he had been induced by the earlier
ruling to believe his evidence sufficient. If the ruling was based upon
the question of necessity, as we have held, plaintiffs only medical
witness had already testified fully on the point; if it was based upon
willingness, plaintiff is in no position to claim prejudice when he failed
to ask permission to reopen. He himself was the only person who could
properly testify on the point; it is not suggested that he was absent or
unavailable at the time.

II As to the contention that the verdict was grossly
inadequate, we note that the point was never raised before the Court
below in any manner. It may not be raised for the first time on appeal

2s ppellants’ present counsel did not participate in the trial.

83

before us. Robinson v. Meding, 2 Storey 578, 163 A, 2d 272;4C.J.S.
Appeal & Error Sec. 388, p. 1300; 5 Am. Jur. 24 94.

The judgment below must be affirmed.

RAFAEL RAYMOND SMITH, Appellent, v. STATE OF DELAWARE,
Appellee.

(October 15, 1965)
WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
Henry A. Wise, Jr., and Michael F. Tucker, for appellant.
FL. Peter Stone, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 43, 1965.

HERRMANN, Justice:

| | After jury trial, the defendant was convicted in the
Superior Court of grand larceny of cigarettes from a retail food market.
The question presented on this appeal is whether there was evidence of

84 PT
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a felonious taking sufficient to support the verdict. The undisputed
facts are these:

At about 3:00 P.M. on July 10, 1964, the defendant emerged
from an Acme Market in a merchandise mart near Wilmington, pushing
a shopping cart which contained three cigarette boxes. The defendant
had reached the parking area when he was approached by the store
manager who knew the defendant and had become suspicious. When
asked about the boxes, the defendant abandoned the cart and boxes,
ran the full length of the merchandise mart parking area away from his
automobile, and disappeared. Later, the defendant returned to his
automobile and drove away. Of the three boxes, one was found to be
empty and the other two contained 54 cartons of cigarettes—540
packages. There was evidence that the cigarettes were owned by the
Acme Market and had a value of $125.28. There was no direct
evidence, however, to negative a purchase of the cigarettes by the
defendant.

The defendant says that the evidence, as proof of a felonious
taking, was circumstantial and insufficient to establish a corpus delicti
and to support the jury’s verdict. We do not agree.

| | Circumstantial evidence, to establish an essential element
of an offense, must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.
Holland y,. State, 9 Terry 559, 107 A.2d 920 (1954). In effect, the
defendant is stating that it is reasonable to conclude from the evidence
that he might have purchased the 540 packages of cigarettes, or
obtained them in some other lawful way with the owner’s consent.

We think either possibility is too remote to make it a reasonable
supposition, in the absence of some evidence reasonably justifying the
conclusion. A single purchase of 540 packages of cigarettes in a retail
food market must be a rare occurence indeed—even for a heavy smoker;
and flight and escape dre not at all consistent with the status of
customer. We think it unreasonable to suppose that the defendent
purchased the cigarettes. It is equally unreasonable to suppose, under
the circumstances of this case, that this quantity of cigarettes was

delivered to the defendant with the owner’s consent in any other type
of transaction.

We conclude that, although circumstantial, the evidence here is
inconsistent with any rational conclusion other than that of guilt and
that, therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.

II The defendant did notraisethe subject question below. We
have reviewed the matter, nevertheless, since the defendant asserts the
basic and fundamental error of failure to establish an essential element
of the crime. Wiggins v. State, Del., 210 A.2d 314 (1965).

The defendant’s position being without merit, the judgment
below is affirmed.

F, MOSELL PYLE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. MARSHALLTON
CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, State Board of
Education, Defendants Below, Appellees.

(October 15, 1965)
WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
Ralph F. Keil and Carl Goldstein of Keil & Keil, for appellant.
F, Alton Tybout and B. Wilson Redfearn, for appellees.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 53, 1965.

CAREY, Justice.

The appellant here seeks the reversal of a decision of the
Superior Court, which affirmed a denial of Workmen’s Compensation
benefits by the Industrial Accident Board.

Mrs. Pyle, a teacher employed at the Marshallton Public School,
was injured in an automobile accident in Kansas on July 8th, 1962
while returning from the annual convention of the National Education
Association (herein “N.E.A.”) held in Denver, Colorado. The Industrial
Accident Board held that appellant “did not by preponderance of
competent medical and/or factual testimony establish that the injury
she sustained * * * was a compensable industrial injury arising out of
and in the course of her employment * * *”,

The only issue before us is whether the facts justify the Board’s
conclusion that appellant’s injuries did not arise out of and in the
course of her employment, within the meaning of the Delaware
Workmen’s Compensation Law, T. 19 Del. C. Ch. 23. Section 2301 of
that Chapter excludes coverage unless the employee when injured was
engaged in or about the employer’s premises or “engaged elsewhere in
or about employer’s business where his services require his presence as a
part of such service at the time of the injury.”

Mrs. Pyle attended the convention in Denver which commenced
on July Ist, 1962 as the delegate of the Marshallton Education
Association (herein “M.E.A.”), a voluntary organization consisting of
teachers, administrators, custodians, cafeteria workers and secretaries
employed in the Marshallton schools. That Association is an affiliate of
Delaware State Teachers Association which in turn is an affiliate of
N.E.A. Each Association in its respective area is completely
autonomous. The purpose of N.E.A. is to “elevate the character and
advance the interests of the profession of teaching and to promote the

ee 87
i_}

cause of education.”

Previously during the school term the M.E.A. had asked and
received permission from the Superintendent of Schools to send
delegates to a regional conference of the N.E.A. The record does not
disclose where this regional conference was held. At that time no
deduction was made from the salaries of those delegates for the time
they were away from school. However, neither the School Board nor
the State Board of Education contributed anything towards the
expenses, although we presume the School Board provided substitute
teachers during their absence. Perhaps because the school was not in
session during the summer, neither Mrs. Pyle nor the M.E.A. asked
permission from anyone for her trip. The M.E.A. paid a portion of her
expenses and she apparently paid the balance; her employer paid
nothing.

Mrs. Pyle’s contract with the School Board for both the school
year preceding and the year following her trip provided for a working
period of ten months—from September to June. She had, however,
taken advantage of the permission given by T. 14 Del. C. Sec. 1317 to
receive her pay in twelve rather than ten monthly installments. That
privilege is given to “teachers and principals who are employed for ten
months per year”, as was Mr. Pyle. There is nothing in her contracts
which purports to give her employer any right of control over her time
or activities during the months of July and August.

There was testimony that on prior occasions the School Board
had encouraged and even urged teachers to attend conventions of a
similar nature and that such was the “general policy of the Board”.
Whether this policy had ever in fact applied to meetings which took
place during the summer vacation or were held at places as far from
Delaware as Denver was not brought out. It does not appear that the
Board ever directed an employee to attend meetings of the N.E.A. or
contributed anything to the expense of attendance.’ There is a

1 4 subsequent alteration of this policy does not retroactively affect the facts of
this case.

88 PO
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suggestion in the record that a teacher’s rating may be assisted by such
attendance; there was no suggestion that non-attendance would mean a
loss in rating or would result in dismissal. It was brought out that such
attendance enables a teacher to improve her teaching ability and to
bring back new ideas and techniques whereby the school derives some
benefit.

In short, the Industrial Accident Board was justified in finding
that the appellant made the trip voluntarily and solely because she was
the delegate elected by M.E.A., without consulting the School Board
and perhaps without its knowledge, using no funds of that Board, at a
time when by her contract she was not subject to the Board’s control,
and without risk of any penalty for non-attendance. The only factors
relied upon as grounds for reversal are the alleged benefit to the school
and the general policy of encouraging attendance at conventions. The
Industrial Accident Board undoubtedly considered these factors too
intangible, too indirect and too remote to justify a finding that she was
making the journey in the course of her employment. We cannot say
that the Board committed reversible error in arriving at that conclusion.

As all the authorities hold, each case of this nature must be
decided on its particular facts. The basic rule is stated in 7 Schneider on
Workmen’s Compensation Sec. 1665(a) as follows:

“Where the trip or attendance is one which the employer
ordered or directed, or is the sole benefit of the employer, or is for the
mutual advantage of both the employer and his employee,
compensation may be recoverable”.

This principle was followed by our Superior Court in Children’s
Bureau of Delaware v. Nissen, 3 Terry 209, 29 A.2d 603. Although the
facts of that case presented a stronger basis for an award than the
present one, the Court reversed a finding in favor of the claimant. To
the extent that the Nisson case adopts the rule quoted above, it is
approved; present needs do not require consideration of any other
principles laid down therein because we are satisfied that the finding
made here is justified by the evidence.

89

We have examined the case cited by appellant. All are
distinguishable from the present one. In most of them, attendance at a
meeting was a required or customary part of the teacher’s service; in
others, the trip served a direct interest of the school as well as the
teacher’s private purpose. In nearly all of them, the Court was dealing
with a finding of compensability by the trier of fact, and the question
was whether there were facts to justify the finding. In the present case,
we need not express any opinion as to whether a finding of
compensability could be upheld; we have here a finding of
non-compensability which clearly finds support in the evidence.

The judgment below must be affirmed.

SARAH L. TYNDALL, Defendent Below, Appellant, v. MELVIN M.
TYNDALL, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

- 90 Po
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(October 25, 1965)

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice) HERRMANN, Justice, and SEITZ,
Chancellor, sitting.

Claud L. Tease of Tease, Faulkner & Dunlap, for appellant.

Robert W. Tunnell of Tunnell & Raysor and Ralph S. Baker, for
appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware
INo. 40, 1965.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order vacating an order dismissing on its
merits a husband’s action for divorce and granting a new trial.

The facts are that the husband filed an action for divorce. Some
two months later the wife filed an action for divorce against her
husband. Subsequently, a pretrial conference in both divorce actions
was held at which the possibility of a property settlement was
discussed. Nothing apparently resulted along this line and, ultimately, it
was concluded that the husband’s action would be tried first.

The trial of the husband’s action took place and lasted over into a
second day. At the conclusion of the taking of testimony the trial judge
tuled that the husband had not met his burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, and had failed to establish constructive

ee 91
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desertion. The petition was accordingly ordered to be dismissed.

Thereafter followed some discussion between Court and counsel as
to whether or not an appeal would be taken by the husband from the
decision thus rendered, apparently with the thought that the trial of the
wife’s action for divorce should await the termination of any appellate
proceedings. In the course of this discussion, at which apparently the
litigants were present, counsel for the husband stated for the record
that during the lunch hour a discussion had taken place between the
trial judge and counsel as to the meaning of a statute of this State
authorizing a division of real estate in the event of a divorce, there
apparently being some question as to whether or not a wife would be
entitled to such a division in the event of the grant of a divorce on the
husband’s application.

Following this, the trial judge stated that the question of the
division of property had not entered into his decision in the husband’s
action at all, and that the dismissal of that action was based solely upon
the failure of the husband to discharge the burden of proof cast upon
him. Thereupon, the Prothonotary entered on the docket a notation of
the dismissal of the action.

On the following day, at the direction of the Court, the
Prothonotary notified counsel to appear before the Court on the next
following day. At that time the Court vacated the dismissal of the
husband’s action and re-calendared the case for trial.

The reason given by the trial judge for this action was that he had
reached the conclusion that counsel for the husband was under the
impression that the question of division of property had had some
influence on his decision to dismiss the action. He again stated,
however, that that question had had no bearing whatsoever upon his
decision. However, in view of the fact that the litigants had overheard
the exchange of remarks between him and counsel, and in view of his
fear that they might have such an opinion, he had concluded to vacate
the order dismissing the action.

From the order vacating the dismissal, the wife appeals to this
Court.

Hl Law courts in Delaware have long had the inherent power to
vacate, modify or set aside their judgments or orders during the term in
which they were rendered. 1 Woolley on Delaware Practice, Sec. 838.
This power has been reaffirmed by present Rule 59 (c) of the Superior
Court Del. C. Ann. providing that within 10 days after the entry of
judgment the Court on its own initiative “may order a new trial for any
reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a
party.”

Hit therefore appears that the Court in the instant case had
the inherent power to strike its judgment dismissing the action and to
order a new trial provided the reasons assigned for such action were
such as might have been urged to the Court on motion for a new trial
made by a losing party.

HE Applications to the Superior Court for new trials are
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. Philadelphia B. & W. R.
Co. v. Gatta, 4 Boyce 38, 27, Del. 38, 85 A. 721,47 L.R.A..N.S., 982.
We think that the grant of a new trial by the Court sua sponte under
Rule 59 (c) is an excerise of that same discretion. This being so, appeals
to this Court from either the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial,
or from an order entered by the Court on its own motion, may be
reviewed by us solely to determine whether or not the judicial
discretion of the Court has been abused. Trowell v. Diamond Supply
Co. 8 Terry 422, 423, 47 Del. 422, 91 A.2d 797.

The appellee suggests that the grant of a new trial in this case came
about because the trial judge had changed his mind upon the evidence
offered and had concluded that his decision was against the weight of
that evidence. This, of course, is a customary ground asserted in
support of a motion for a new trial. We think, however, that the
suggestion made by the appellee was explicitly rejected by the trial
judge, himself. We reach this conclusion because of the repeated
statements by him in the proceedings that his decision dismissing the

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action was based upon the failure of the husband to prove the
allegations of the petition. Furthermore, the trial judge on at least two
occasions in the proceedings stated that the case was being
re-calendared for trial because of his fear that the litigants held a
different view as to the reason for the decision.

TI We are of the opinion that the grant of a new trial for the
stated reason was an abuse of sound judicial discretion. The discussion
between the Court and counsel in the presence of the parties took place
after the Court’s ruling that the husband had failed to prove his case.
Thereafter followed once or twice the Court’s statement that this
failure, alone, was the reason for the decision.

We do not think the asserted reason i. ¢., a possible
missunderstanding in the minds of the parties, is sufficient to justify the
vacating of a judgment entered after full litigation of the issues. The
sole result of the upholding of the order for a new trial would be to
force the parties to relitigate that which has already been litigated and
decided without recognition of any error in the proceedings.

Since we are of the opinion that there was no legal
justificiation for the striking of the judgment in favor of the defendant
and the granting of a new trial, it follows that such action by the trial
court was a misapplication of the law governing the grant of new trials.
As such, it amounts to an abuse of judicial discretion and will be
reversed on appeal. Pitts v. White, 10 Terry 78, 49 Del. 78, 109 A.2d
786.

By reason of the foregoing, a mandate will issue directing the trial
court to strike its order vacating the order dismissing the action and
granting a new trial with instructions to enter a judgment or dismissal
of the action.

Since we have not reviewed this matter on the merits, the
mandate to be issued will further direct that the appeal time available

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to the plaintiff will commence to run as of the day the order vacating
the dismissal is entered.

THOMAS J. FITZSIMMONS, CHARLES R. REED, SR., and HARRY
A. PROSCENO, Constituting the Board of Assessment of the
City of Wilmington, Delaware, Appelles Below, Appellants, v.
THOMAS A. McCORKLE and MARGARET B. McCORKLE,
Trustees, Owners and Wright & Simon, Inc., Lessee, Appellants
Below, Appellees.

(November 1, 1965)

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

O. Francis Biondi, City Sol., and Frank J. Gentile, Jr., City Sol.,
for appellants.

Albert L. Simon, for appellees.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. No. 38, 1965.

|

HERRMANN, Justice.

This as an appeal from an order of the Superior Court modifying
a decision of the Board of Assessment for the City of Wilmington
(hereinafter the “Board”) as to the amount of assessment on the
property at No. 911 Market Street in Wilmington.

The proceedings before the Board and the Superior Court were
governed by three Statutes:

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28 Del.Laws, Chap. 121! created the Board to make assessments
for city and school taxes on real estate in Wilmington, based upon the
“estimated full value” of each property. 51 Del.Laws, Chap. 4
(amending Sections 14 and 15 of 28 Del.Laws, Chap. 121) set forth the
procedures to be followed by the Board in publicizing its assessments
and in hearing appeals therefrom.? And 53 Del.Laws, Chap. 33, added
further details governing assessments, appeals from the Board to the
Superior Court, and appeals from the Superior Court to this Court.>

128 Del.Laws, Chap. 121, Sec. 8 provides in part:

_ _‘“* * * The assessment of real estate shail be made according to a certain rate
in and upon every hundred dollars of the estimated full value of the property
assessed, and so pro rata. All assessments upon real estate shall be so made as to
show separately the valuation of the property assessed, * * *.”

2s to the scope and nature of the appeal to the Board, 51 Del.Laws, Chap. 4
provides in part:

“Section 15. The Board of Assessment for the City of Wilmington shall also
hear and determine all appeals respecting the assessments. * * *, Upon appeals the
said Board shall have power to make additional assessments or alterations whether
appeal has been filed or not, but where no appeal has been filed, proper notice of
such additions or alterations shall be given to the owners or their agents whenever
possible; the said Board in connection with said assessment shall have the power
to determine and to do whatever may appertain to justice and right. * * *.”

353 Del. Laws, Chap. 33 provides:

“Sec. 15A. Appeals to the Superior Court

“In sitting and hearing appeals filed as provided in Section 15, the Board of
Assessment for the City of Wilmington shall permit the introduction. of all
relevant evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, presented by the
appellant or on behalf of the Board of Assessment. The Board shall make an
keep a record of all evidence presented at such appeal proceedings. The Board
Shall notify the appellant in writing, by registered mail, of the Board's decision
within five days of the date of its decision. Any person who feels aggrieved by the
decision of the Board may, within 30 days after receiving notice of the Board's
decision, appeal therefrom ‘to the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The
decision of the Board shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be
on the appellant to show that the Board acted contrary to law, fraudulently,
arbitrarily or capriciously. The appeal shall be heard on the proceedings of the
Board which shall be certified to the Court by the Board within 15 days after
service on the Board of the notice of appeal. The Court may affirm, reverse or
modify the decision of the Board. Either party to the appeal may appeal such
decision of the Superior Court to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware,
provided that such appeal is taken in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of
the Superior Court of the State of Delaware and the Rules of the Supreme Court
of the State of Delaware.”

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IL.

For the tax year 1962, the Board evaluated the land of the
subject property at $95,340 and the building at $31,550, at total of
$126,890, as the property’s “estimated full value.” Applying the
uniform percentage factor of 70% of value, the Board placed an
assessment of $66,738 on the land and $22,085 on the building. This
assessment has been the same since 1955.

The property owners appealed to the Board for reduction of the
assessment. At the hearing, Robert E. Hickman, appearing as an expert
witness on behalf of the owners, testified that the market value of the
property, land and building, at the time of the assessment was $80,000.
Mr, Hickman based his opinion upon sales and rentals of other
properties which he considered comparable and upon the capitalization
of the net rental income of the subject property. The Board heard no
other evidence.*

Upon the record of the proceedings before the Board,
supplemented by an affidavit of Mr. Hickman further explaining his
testimony, the Superior Court reversed the Board, set aside the
assessment, and instructed the Board to asses the property on the basis
of Mr, Hickman’s valuation of $80,000. The Superior Court held that
the record failed to support any assessment in excess of that established
by the owners’ evidence. The Board appeals to this Court.

The Board contends that the expert opinion evidence adduced
on behalf of the owners failed to sustain the burden of proof, imposed
upon them by 53 Del.Laws, Chap. 33, to show that the Board acted
“contrary to law, fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously.” The Board
argues that the owners’ evidence fell short of this statutory requirement

it appears that members of the Board viewed the property after the appeal was
taken but the record does not show what information was acquired thereby. In
this connection, it is noteworthy that in condemnation cases the view of the
premises is not evidence; it is only for the purpose of better understanding the
evidence. 10 Del. C. Sec. 6108(4).

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in that their expert witness improperly equated “present market value”
with “estimated full value”’; that the expert failed to consider certain
comparable sales which the Board considered significant; and that the
witness declined to consider the tenant’s gross sales in determining the
property’s fair rental value and fair market value. We are also told that,
to prevail, the owners must show that their assessment is
disproportionate to assessments of other properties; and that the
Superior Court erred in directing the Board to reduce and apportion the
assessment between land and building.

i.

HH s(n an appeal from an assessment, a prima facie case of
accuracy is made by the assessment record. The burden of presenting
evidence to meet the prima facie case and to rebut the presumption
rests upon the property owner. To fulfill the purpose, the owner’s
evidence must not only be competent; it must be sufficient to show a
substantial overvaluation. If rebutted by such evidence, the
presumption in favor of the accuracy of the assessment ceases to exist.
As provided by 53 Del.Laws, Chap. 33, the Board may then hear
evidence to support the assessment. But the Board may not rely solely
upon its assessment record, or personal knowledge of its members
unsupported by evidence. in the face of countervailing competent and
substantial evidence. By so doing, the Board leaves nothing before the
courts for judicial review on further appeal except a rebutted
presumption of accuracy and a discredited prima facie case. It follows
that when the owner’s evidence is competent and substantial and
unrebutted, there is little for the courts to do, on such record, but to
conclude that the Board acted at least arbitrarily, if not contrary to
law, in making an assessment on the basis of a value substantially
greater than that established by the only evidence in the case. Compare
Deitch Company v. Board of Property Assessment, etc., 417 Pa. 213,
209 A.2d 397 (1965); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. City of Newark, 10
N.J. 99, 89 A.2d 385 (1952).

Iv.

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[HJ The question then is whether the owner’s evidence was
competent and sufficient to overcome the presumption of accuracy and
the prima facie case made out by the assessment record. We think it
was.

The qualification of the witness produced by the owners, as an
expert on values of Wilmington real estate, is unquestioned. Was his
opinion supported by valid and acceptable reasons under the law?

The expert’s use of present market value as a measure
of the statutory “estimated full value” was proper. The term
“estimated full value” was proper. The term “estimated full value” is
not defined in the Statute; but it is not unsual to find such general,
undfined bases in tax statutes. It is generally agreed thereunder that the
fundamental rule, for evaluation of real estate for the purposes of
taxation, is that it is to be valued at its present actual market value, in
the determination of which all elements directly affecting value may be
considered. This Court so held in Council of Newark v. Clairingbold,
5 Boyce 133, 90 A. 1130 (1914), aff'd. 5 Boyce 507, 94 A. 1102
(1915), wherein the Statute provided for an assessment basis of “true,
just and impartial valuation.” Likewise, New York’s “full value”,
Maryland’s “full cash value”, Pennsylvania’s “actual value”, New
Jersey’s “true value”, and other similar statutory terms, have been held
to equate market value. People ex rel, Guaranty Trust Co, of N.Y. v.
Cook, Sup., 18 N.Y.S. 2d 965 (1940); Rogan v. County Commissioners
of Calvert County, 194 Md, 299, 71 A.2d 47, 52 (1950); McKnight
Shop. Center, Inc. v. Board of Prop. Assess., etc., 417 Pa, 234, 209
A.2d 389, 391 (1965); City of Newark v. West Milford Tp. Passaic
County, 9 NJ. 295, 88, A.2d 211, 214 (1952); Sheldon House Club,
Inc. v. Town of Branford, 149 Conn. 28, 175 A.2d 186, 188 (1961); 1
Bonbright, Valuation of Property, pp. 460, et seq.; 51 Am.Jur.
“Taxation” Secs. 696, 701. While value measured by market sales is not
the sole standard for tax assessment purposes, and other elements and
methods of valuation are pertinent and relevant, Brennan v. Black, 34
Del. Ch. 380, 104 A.2d 777, 793-794, (1954); Sibley v. Town of
Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 120 A.2d 77, 80 (1956), fair market
remains the basic measure. 51 Am.Jur. “Taxation” Secs. 696, 701, et

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seq.; 1 Bonbright, Valuation of Property, pp. 460, et seq.

Hin definding fair market value, we may use the definition
we have adopted in condemnation cases. Great Northern Ry. Co. v
Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 56 S.Ct. 426, 80 L.Ed. 532 (1936). It is the price
which would be agreed upon by a willing seller and a willing buyer,
under usual and ordinary circumstances, without any compulsion upon
the seller to sell or upon the buyer to buy, State ex rel Smith v. 0.15
Acres of Land, Storey 372, 169 A.2d 256, 258 (1961), assuming the
highest, best and most valuable use for which the property is reasonably
adaptable and available. Board of Education, etc. v. 13 Acres of Land,
etc., 11 Terry 387, 131 A.2d 180 (1957).

The expert witness used two well recognized methods of
determining market value: the comparable sales method and the
capitalization of rental income method.

The price at which comparable property in the area has
been bought and sold recently is generally accepted as one of the best
tests in determining the market value of real estate. Where, however,
evidence of such sales is not available, or where a double-checking of
result is desired, other methods may be employed to ascertain value;
and capitalization of rental income is generally recognized as one such
method. Sibley v. Town of Middlefield, supta; 51 Am.Jr. “Taxation”
Secs. 702, 703.

HAs comparable market data, the expert witness testified
that he considered the sales and the rental income of certain other
properties in Wilmington, including Nos. 604, 611, 701, 709, and 823
Market Street. These transactions were not attacked as being imporper
comparables under the established tests of similarity of improvements,
size, location, and general adaptability; reasonable recency of the
transaction; and a bona fide willing buyer-willing seller relationship.
Wilmington Housing Authority v. Harris, 8 Terry 469, 93 A.2d 518,
522 (1952). The Board indicated, rather, that other transactions in the
same city block as the subject property would have been better

102 —

comparables. The difficuty with this argument is that the record lacks
any evidence of such other comparables or the reasons why they would
have greater probative value. Therefore, on judicial review, no legal
basis appears for discrediting or rejecting, as incompetent, the expert’s
opinion of value based upon the market data he used.

As to the rental income basis for his opinion, the expert
capitalized the net rental lease on the subject property and added the
value of certain leasehold improvements. The lease had an unexpired
term of 10 years and provided for the tenant to pay all taxes, insurance,
repairs and other expenses. While the reliability of the capitalization of
net rental income may be questionable as the sole basis for valuation,
Aetna Life Ins. Co. y. City of Newark, supra, clearly it is a proper
element of value to be considered together with other pertinent and
relevant elements. Brennan v. Black, supra; 51 Am.Jur. “Taxation Secs.
702-705.

There is some question as to whether the owners failed to
produce the tenant’s gross sales figures at the Board’s request, or
whether the Board withdrew the request. It is immaterial, we think,
because the longterm lease here involved was not a gross sales
percentage lease and, therefore, such data would have had little
probative value in any event.

HE Turning to the sufficiency of the owners’ proof, we
have observed that the expert witness produced by the owners was
qualified beyond question; that his opinion was based upon valid and
acceptable grounds; and that there is a wide variance between the
Board’s valuation of approximately $127,000 and the owners’ evidence
of a value of $80,000. Recognizing that the owners’ evidence must be
substantial in quality, Aetna Life Ins. Co. V. City of Newark, supra, and
that the courts will not intervene in the assessment process unless
overvaluation is substantial. Alfred J. Sweet, Inc. v. City of Auburn,
134 Me. 28, 180 A. 803, 104 A.L.R. 784 (1935), we find the owners’
evidence in the instance case substantial in both respects.

We conclude that the owners’ evidence was competent and

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sufficient to rebut the presumption of accuracy and to overcome the
prima facie case made by the assessment record. Since the owners’
evidence stands unrebutted, we hold that the owners have sustained the
burden of proving that the Board acted arbitrarily in declining to
reduce the assessment in accordance with the only evidence in the case.

v.

The Board asserts that, to prevail, the owners must show that
their assessment is disproportionate to other assessments. It is argued
that uniformity, the ultimate constitutional standard of tax law (Del.
Const. Art.8, Sec. 1, Del.C.Ann.), formed the basis of the Board’s
decision, witness its finding that the subject assessment is “in line with
the adjoining properties.”

HEE (Undoubtedly, equality and uniformity are the
cardinal principles to be observed in the levying of taxes; and where it is
impossible to secure both the standard of value and the uniformity and
equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the
“just and ultimate purpose of the law.” Sioux City Bridge Co. v.
Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S.Ct. 190, 67 L.Ed. 340 (1923). In
the final analysis, the gravamen of a complaint for overassessment is
lack of equality and uniformity; for it is only when the property owner
bears a disporportionate share of the tax load that he has a just claim
for redress, And overvaluation does not necessarily mean lack of
uniformity and equality; for if the appraisal of all real estate in a tax
district is uniform, through all values be inflated, the reduction of one
assessment, without corresponding reduction of all other property,
produces not equality but inequality. Sloman-Polk Co, v. City of
Detroit, 261 Mich. 689, 247 N.W. 95, 87 A.L.R. 1294 (1933). Thus, it
is understandable that the Board would accord precedence to
unformity over standard of value when a choice must be made.

The problem is one of proof. The majority rule is that when,
nothing else appearing, it is shown that a property is appraised
substantially in excess of its market value, a presumption of inequality
arises and a prima facie case for relief is made. In maxim form: If

104 ee
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substantial overvaluation is proven, inequality is presumed. Alfred J.
Sweet, Inc. v. City of Auburn, 134 Me.28, 180 A. 803, 104 A.L.R. 784
(1935); People ex rel. Amalgamated Properties, Inc. v. Sutton, 274
N.Y. 309, 8 N.E.2d 871 (1937); People ex rel. Guaranty Trust Co. of
N.Y. v. Cook, Sup., 18 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968-969 (1940); Lowell v.
Commissioners of Middlesex County, 152 Mass. 372, 25 N.E. 469, 470,
9 LRA. 356 (1890).

On the point, the Board relies upon Hodges v. Town of
Kensington, 102 N.H. 399, 157 A.2d 649 (1960); Appeal of
McConomy, 156 Pa.Super. 264, 40 A.2d 99 (1944); and Cupples Hesse
Corp. v. State Tax Commission, Mo., 329 S.W.2d 696 (1959).:

As indicated in Hodges, it is the rule in New Hampshire that, in a
tax abatement case, if a plaintiff shows that his property is assessed at
more than its market value, he must go further and show that his
assessment is disproportionate to that of other property in that taxing
district.5 And, as appears in Cupples Hesse, the rule in Missouri requires
the taxpayer to show a valuation excessive when compared with other
teal estate generally.

The McConomy case does not support the Board’s position. It
there appears that the assessing authority introduced comptent
evidence of front foot value and evidence from which it could be
inferred that real estate throughout the neighborhood was assessed at
the same value. No such evidence appears in the case before us.
Compare Crucible Steel Co. of America v. Allegheny County Board of
Property Assessment, 356 Pa. 373, 52 A.2d 190, 194 (1947).

HHI We disagree in principle with the rule urged by the Board.

Sit is to be noted that the Board related the assessment of the subject property to
“adjoining properties” only. This would appear to be an inadequate disproportion
in any event because, in considering equality and uniformity, the comparsion is
with all other property in the taxing district, Sloman-Polk Co. v. City of Detroit,
supra; or with other property generally, Cupples Hesse Corp. ¥. State Tax
Commission, supra; ox at least with other like property similarly situated, Kinnear
v. King County, 124 Wash. 102, 213 P.472 (1923).

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It imposes too heavy a burden of proof upon the taxpayer; and it is
based upon the unacceptable assumption that public officials may not
have performed their duty and that other property in the taxing district
may also be overvalued and overassessed in violation of law. See Rollins
v. City of Dover, 93 N.H. 448, 44 A.2d 113 (1945); People ex rel.
Amalgamated Properties, Inc. v. Sutton, supra. In our view, the
presumption of inequality arising from substantial overvaluation is the
better rule and we adopt it.

We hold that the owners’ showing of substantial overvaluation in
the instant case raised a presumption of inequality; and that the owners
were entitled to rely on that presumption until rebutted and were not
required to produce further evidence of discrimination.

VI.

HH There is no merit in the Board’s contention that the
Superior Court erred in ordering the Board to reduce and apportion the
assessment between land and building. by 28 Del.Laws, Chap. 121,
Sec.8, supra, it is provided that all assessments shall show separately the
valuations on the land and the improvements. By 53 Del.Laws, Chap.
33, supra, it is provided that the Superior Court may affirm, reverse or
modify the decision of the Board. The Superior Court acted within its
powers. in requiring the Board to modify its assessment in accordance
with the Court’s decision and the governing Statute.

Having reviewed the appellants’ contentions and finding no error
in the judgment of the Superior Court, it is affirmed.

a
JOHN DOE v. JANE DOE.

P|
7" eee

06

|

(October 15, 1965)
CHRISTIE J. sitting.
A, James Gallo and Victor F. Battaglia, for plaintiff.
Stephen Hamilton and Frank O'Donnell, for defendant.

Superior Court for New Castle County, No. 38 Civil Action,
1965.

CHRISTIE, Judge.

The amended complaint in this divorce action alleges that the
parties were married on October 16, 1946. Thereafter they purchased a
farm as tenants by the entireties and lived together as man and wife
until November 2, 1964, when they separated. Plaintiff now seeks a
divorce upon an allegation that his wife committed adultery with a
named individual in the month of July, 1951. The complaint goes on to
allege that plaintiff has not condoned the adultery and has never
cohabited with his wife since he obtained information of her
commission of adultery.

Defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that the action is
barred by the general statute of limitations which reads in pertinent
part as follows:

“# * * no action based on a statute * * * shall be brought
after the expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause of such
action * * *,” (10 Del. C. Sec. 8106)

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Interpretation of this statute, under the facts of this case,
constitutes a matter of first impression in the courts of this state.

Before its amendment in 1947, the Delaware statute of
limitations was so worded as to apply to various enumerated actions
such as trespass, replevin, detinue and debt. There was no sweeping
Janguage that corresponded to the present provision and it was clear
that the unamended statute of limitations did not apply to divorce
actions.

In the case of D. v, D., 2 Terry 263, 20 A.2d 139 (Super. Ct.
1941), where the plaintiff had waited eleven years before bringing a
divorce action based on the spouse’s alleged impotency, the Court had
this to say:

“The question of delay in applying for relief has not been raised.
However, I find the law to be that delay is not alone a ground for
refusing relief. B. v. M., 2 Rob. Ecc. 580; 7. v. D., L.R. 1 Prob. & Div.
127, Castleden v. Castleden, 9 H. of L. Cas. 186. Particularly where
there is evidence to show that the delay on the part of the husband
arose from ignorance and from a supposition that matters were as they
should be. Lewis v. Hayward, 35 L.J.,N.S., Prob. & M. 105. However, in
cases of great delay, after years of married life, unequivocal proof
should be required.” (Ibid. 2 Terry 272, 20 A.2d 143)

Revision of the Superior Court Rules of civil procedure in 1947,
to become effective in 1948, resulted in the abolition of many of the
common law forms of action. In accord with this action, the statute of
limitations was amended in that same year so as to omit most of the
references to common law forms of action. It was at this time that
actions “based on a statute” were added to the list of causes included
within the three-year statute of limitations.

Although a divorce action under our State Constitution is
necessarily based upon statutory provisions, it is not the type of action
to which the statute made reference. Laws concerning the family unit
have always occupied a unique position and have usually been given a

108 PO
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specialized treatment. Considering the subject matter herein involved
and the unique place that family law plays in relation to the basic unit
of an ordered society, an important change in this law cannot be
assumed without a clear indication that the General Assembly meant to
enlarge the scope of the limitations provisions so as to include divorce
statutes. It seems more likely that the general language of the new
statute of limitations was employed in an attempt to ensure that all
civil actions previously covered would continue to be covered.

There is substantial authority for the rule that a general statute
of limitations does not apply to divorce actions. See Tufts v. Tufts, 8
Utah 142, 30 P. 309, 16 L.R.A. 482 (1892); 53 C.J.S. Limitations of
Actions Sec. 103, at p. 1084 (1948); Schouler Divorce Manual, Warren
Secs. 141, 142 (1944); but for a contrary view see Zlindra v. Zlindra,
252 Wis. 606, 32 N.W. 2d 656 (1948) and Franzetti v. Franzetti, 120
S.W. 2d 123 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1938). Cases on each side of the
question are collected in Ridgley v. Ridgley, 370 S.W.2d 679 (St. L.Ct.
of Appeals, Mo. 1963).

In two recent cases courts have had occasion to indicate that
other limitations exist in respect to the expansive language of the
Delaware statute of limitations. In 1962, the Federal District Court for
the District of Delaware concluded that the reference to an “action
based on a statute” contained in the Delaware statute of limitations did
not apply to the common law duty of a husband to support his wife
and children even though such duty was restated in a statute. Levine v.
Levine, 209 F. Supp. 564 (D. Del. 1962). In Schleiff v. B. & O. R. Co.,
36 Del. Ch. 342, 130 A.2d 321 (Ct. Ch. 1955), the statute of
limitations was applied in an action where concurrent jurisdiction in the
Court of Chancery and Superior Court was found to exist but it was
recognized that the statute would not invariably find application.

HHL | hold that 10 Del, C. Sec. 8106 finds no application in
divorce actions.

| | Delay in bringing a divorce action is a defense which is to
be considered by the Judge who tries the case in the light of all the

Pd 109
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evidence presented and with a view to the “great lights and sound
guides” developed by the ecclesiastical courts. An unreasonable delay
may constitute a valid defense under the particular circumstances of a
given case but the court is not bound by the arbitrary limitations
contained in a general statute of limitations. Many cases taking this
general approach are collected in 4 A.L.R.2d 1321 (1949).

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.

PETE BALMA and INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA, a Pennsylvania corporation, Plaintiffs Below,
Appellants, v. TIDEWATER OIL COMPANY, a corporation of
the State of Delaware, Defendant Below, Appellee.

(November 9, 1965)

WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

James P. D’Angelo and Stanley T. Czajkowski, for plaintiffs
below, appellants.

110 Pe

Rodman Ward Jr., and Richard I. G. Jones, of Prickett &
Prickett, for defendant below, appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 48, 1965.

HERRMANN, Justice.

The question on this appeal is whether the Delaware Scaffolding
Statute, 16 Del. C. Sec. 7701(a),* is applicable in this case.

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, are
these:

The plaintiff, Pete Balma, was an employee of Catalytic
Construction Company (hereinafter “Catalytic”) which had a contract
with the defendant Tidewater Oil Company (hereinafter “Tidewater”)
for repair and maintenance work at the latter’s plant. The contract
provided that Tidewater “may furnish for work to be performed by
Catalytic hereunder all equipment, apparatus, * * * tools * * * and
major and minor items of construction equipment.” Catalytic agreed to
“maintain in good order, repair and condition” all equipment furnished
by Tidewater. Tidewater made certain ladders, tools, and equipment
available to Catalytic under the contract. While working as an employee
of Catalytic, Balma used one of the ladders so provided, fell, and was
seriously injured. The ladder, an extension type, telescoped because it
was defective, causing the fall. Balma was assigned to, and supervised in,

*16 Del. C, Sec. 7701(a) provides:

“Sec. 7701. Scaffolding regulations

“(a) A person employing or directing another to perform labor of any kind in
the erection, repairing, altering or painting of a house, building or structure shall
not furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of
such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders or other mechanical contrivances
which are unsafe, unsuitable or improper, and which ate not so constructed,
placed and operated as to give proper protection to the life and limb of a person
so employed or engaged.”

ee 1

the work by his foreman, also a Catalytic employee. The tools and
equipment furnished by Tidewater, including the ladder involved in the
accident, were stored in a Tidewater tool shed, but were selected and
issued by a Catalytic employee.

As an employee of Catalytic, Balma sought and received
workmen’s compensation benefits for the injury caused by the fall.
Catalytic’s workmen’s compensation insurance carrier, Insurance
Company of North America, joined Balma as party plaintiff in this
third-party action, under 19 Del. C. Sec. 2363(a). In addition to
allegations of breach of common law duties, the complaint charges
breach of statutory duty under Sec. 7701(a), as follows:

“The Defendant failed to comply with the non-delegable duties
to provide a ladder in a reasonable safe condition in violation of 16 Del.
Code, Sec. 7701(a).”

Tidewater moved to strike the allegation and, after discovery,
the motion was treated as one for partial summary judgment. The
Superior Court held that Sec. 7701(a) had no application to Tidewater
under the facts of this case, and granted partial summary judgment in
the defendant’s favor. The plaintiffs appeal.

The plaintiffs concede that they must show that Balma was
employed by Tidewater and was under Tidewater’s direction in order
for the Statute to have application to Tidewater; but the plaintiffs
contend that, under a proper interpretation of the Statute, such
employment and direction appear from the above facts.

The only evidence presented shows that Balma was employed by
Catalytic; that there was no relationship between Balma and Tidewater;
that Balma was assigned to, and supervised in, his work by another
employee of Catalytic who, in turn, had no relationship to Tidewater.
There is no showing of privity of any kind between Balma and
Tidewater, or that any officer, employee, or agent of Tidewater had
any connection with the assignment or supervision of Balma’s work, or
with the issuance of the ladder from the tool shed. Moreover, Catalytic
had the duty under the contract to maintain the ladder “in good order,

uw ee
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repair and condition.”

The plaintiffs argue, nevertheless, that, because Sec. 7701(a) isa
workmen’s safety statute, a liberal construction of the statutory
language is appropriate; that, liberally construed, the word
“employing” may not'be confined to a master-servant relationship and
the word “directing” may not be limited to actual control and
supervision of the work; that, under such liberal construction,
Tidewater “directed” Balma to perform the work by virtue of its
contract with Catalytic.

HN SsWe find the plaintiffs’ proposition unacceptable. The
language of the Statute is clear, we think, and its meaning beyond
doubt. Words in a statute must be given ordinary meaning. Courts have
discretion to construe statutes only when they are obscure or doubtful
in their meaning. Where its language is clear and unambiguous, a statute
must be held to mean that which it plainly states, and no room is left
for construction. Rash v, Allen, 1 Boyce 444, 76 A. 370 (1910); Beck
v, Lund’s Fisheries, Inc., 3 Storey 45, 164 A.2d 583 (1960).-

HE The ordinary meaning of the word “employing” does not
permit a finding, under the uncontroverted evidence before us, that
Tidewater employed Balma. Similarly, the ordinary meaning of the
word “directing” does not permit a finding, under the uncontroverted
evidence before us, that Tidewater directed Balma either to use the
ladder or how to use it. Any such conclusion would be unreasonable,
we think, and would require an unwarranted stretching of the language
of the Statute. It is our opinion, therefore, that Sec. 7701(a) is
inapplicable to Tidewater under the facts of this case. Compare Miller v.
Weinberg, Del. Super., 190 A.2d 27 (1962).

The plaintiffs rely upon Quigley v. Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 100
N.E. 596 (1912) and Galbraith v. John B. Pike & Son, Inc., 18 A.D.2d
39, 238 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1963). They make the point that these cases are
entitled to more than usual weight because the pertinent language in
our Statute, enacted in 1917, is the same as that in the New York
Statute, enacted in 1897.

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The early Quigley case supports the plantiffs’ position; but we
cannot follow it. That case held that when a contractor constructs a
scaffold so that his sub-contractor must of necessity, or for reasonable
convenience in the work, use it, the contractor may be held to have
anticipated such use and to have assumed liability to the sub-contractor
and his employees for the safety of the scaffold. It appears to us that,
although grounded on the Statute, Quigley was decided upon common
Jaw principles rather than upon established rules of statutory
construction; that broadening the statutory language to such extent
amounts to judicial legislation.

As to Galbraith,—holding that a contract to furnish scaffolding
to an independent contractor amounted to a direction to use it—insofar
as that case may be contrary to the view we here adopt, we think it also
contrary to the prevailing view of the New York Court of Appeals, last
expressed in Kluttz v. Citron, 2 N.Y.2d 379, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 26, 141
N.E.2d 547 (1957):

“The words ‘employing or directing another to perform * * *
mean just that. Here the parties stipulated that this painter was engaged
as an independent contractor. Nowhere does it appear, and it is not
claimed, that this defendant at any time gave the plaintiff any
instructions or directions as to the manner or method in which he was
to perform the painting which he had contracted to do, but it was left
solely to his judgment and experience. * * *,”

Nor are the plaintiffs aided by the dissenting view in Kluttz that
“directing” means not supervision, but procuring another to do the
work; for, assuming the acceptability of that definition, there is no
evidence in the case before us to fit it. See, also, Sweeney v. Spring
Products Corp., 257 App. Div. 104, 12 N.Y.S.2d 72, aff'd. 282 N.Y.
685, 26 N.E.2d 814 (1939); Manguso v. Thirty-Third Equities, Inc.,
286 App. Div. 70, 142 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1955); Blackwood v. Chemical
Corn Exchange Bank, 4 App. Div. 2d 656, 168 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1957);
De Luca v. Fehlhaber Corp., 38 Misc. 2d 184, 237 N.Y.S.2d 852
(1963).

14 Po
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We conclude that no issue of fact appears which, resolved in
favor of the plaintiffs, would hold the defendant liable to the plaintiffs
under 16 Del. C. Sec. 7701(a). Accordingly, the partial summary
judgment granted by the Superior Court in favor of the defendant is
affirmed.

GEORGE McCLELLAND, Appellant-Employee, v. GENERAL
MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee-Employer.

(November 18, 1965)

CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., and MARVEL, Vice-Chancellor,
sitting.

F, Alton Tybout for appellant.

Max S. Bell, Jr., of Richards, Layton & Finger, for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 52, 1965.

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CAREY, Justice.

The Superior Court reversed a determination of the Industrial
Accident Board awarding workmen’s compensation to the appellant.
The record discloses that the evidence had been heard on three days,
and while a quorum of the Board had been present on each day, only
one member had in fact heard all the testimony. T. 19 Del. C. Sec.
2103 provides that a majority of the Board shall constitute a quorum
for the exercise of any of its powers or authority. There is no provision
in the Act for hearings by a single member or by masters or referees.
The Superior Court held that the same Board members who ultimately
decide an issue must have been present when testimony was presented
on that issue, unless the parties have waived that requirement. No such
waiver appearing, it accordingly ordered the case remanded for
rehearing.

Appellant in this Court does not complain of the foregoing
ruling. The only matter that he does question is a provision in the lower
Court’s order which apparently requires the Board to rehear all the
testimony. His contention is that there is no occasion for those
members who render a new decision to rehear evidence which they have
personally previously heard, and that they should be permitted in their
discretion to limit the rehearing to so much of the evidence as they did
not previously hear. He suggests that such action is permissible under T.
19Del. C. Sec. 2348(d).*

To be reviewed by this Court, a judgment or order entered
below imust be final or, if interlocutory, it must adjudicate substantial
rights. Wagner v. Shanks, Del., 194 A.2d 701; American Ins. Co. v.
Synvar Corp., Del., 199 A.2d755. Accordingly, this Court, sua sponte,

*(d) Whenever a cause shall be remanded to the Board for a rehearing, all
evidence theretofore taken before the Board in a previous hearing or hearings shall
become part of the evidence in the hearing upon the remand.”

116 Pe
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raised the question of whether the present problem is an appealable
matter and requested briefs on the point. In replying to that request,
appellant argues that the Superior Court order is a final judgment; but
that, if it be merely interlocutory, it nevertheless determines a
substantial right. Appellee disagrees with both arguments. This opinion
is confined to the question of appealability.

HBB A few states take the position that any decision which
sets aside an award of compensation and remands it for further
proceedings of any kind is a final judgment. Inland Steel Co. v.
Newsome, 281 Ky. 681, 136 S.W.2d 1077; Butler v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 88 Ga.App. 620, 76 S.E.2d 813. Many more jurisdictions,
however, have adopted a different view. They hold that the order of
remand may be either final or interlocutory, depending upon the nature
of the functions directed to be performed by the Board on the remand.
If those functions are purely ministerial, for example, where the Board
is directed to enter a specific different award, the judgment is final; but,
if those further functions are not merely ministerial but are
quasi-judicial, such as taking additional testimony and making new
findings, the judgment is not final. Grogan v. Wm. J. Scully, Inc., 42
N. J. Super. 174, 126 A.2d 41; Bogan v. Smoothway Constr. Co., 183
Pa. Super. 170, 130 A. 2d 207; Industrial Commission v. Dorchak, 97
Colo. 142, 47 P.2d 396; Hagmeier v. Dryden Rubber Division, etc., 245
Towa 1121, 66 N.W.2d 111; Falk v. Midland Dairy Co., Inc., 266 N.Y.
559, 195 N.E. 199; ACF Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 8
Ill.2d 552, 134 N.E.2d 764; Batchon’s Case, 333 Mass. 605, 132 N.E.2d
400; 101 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation Sec. 795, p. 49. We think the
majority rule is the correct one and we accept it as the law of Delaware.
Under this view, the order before us is not a final one.

The order being interlocutory, does it adjudicate any substantial
right? We must remember that appellant does not question the remand
of the case; his appeal is aimed only at the direction to rehear all the
testimony. We are unable to understand how this can properly be
denoted a determination of a substantial right; it is, in our opinion,
purely procedural in nature. Appellant suggests nothing to show that he
will suffer any actual harm or disadvantage by the requirement, even if

117

it be improper. He does point out the possibility that a witness who
previously testified may not be again available, but we think the
existence of such possibility is not a deprivation of any substantial
tight; should the possibility become an actuality, we think the Court
below would have the power to modify its order under Superior Court
Rule 60. Del. C. Ann.

Because of the foregoing conclusions, the appeal must be
dismissed.

JOHN MATUSHEFSKE, Justice of the Peace in New Castle County,
Respondent-Appellant, v. THOMAS HERLIHY, II, Chief
Deputy Attorney General, Petitioner-Appellee.

(November 15, 1965)

WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY, J., and MARVEL,
Vice-Chancellor, sitting.

William D. Bailey, Jr., of Bayard, Brill, Russell & Handelman, for
appellant.

David F. Anderson, of Berl, Potter & Anderson, and Peter W.
Green, for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 35, 1965.

CAREY, Justice.

The Superior Court granted writs of prohibition against
appellant herein, a Justice of the Peace, and the Court of Common
Pleas of New Castle County, barring them from taking any further
proceedings in certain criminal charges against the appellee, who was at

Dn
—_

the time Chief Deputy Attorney General, although he resigned that
office prior to the decision below. A stipulation of facts was filed on
the basis of which the Court held that “nothing done by the appellee
could be construed to amount to the commission of a crime.” In
addition to the usual command of the writ, Mr. Matushefske was
personally barred from taking any further action whatsoever in any
Court of the State based upon the events described in the statement of
facts. He alone has appealed.

The facts are these: In obedience to a subpoena, appellant
turned over to the Grand Jury certain of his official dockets. The Grand
Jury thereafter returned a true bill charging him with four counts of
non-feasance in office, two of which were for failure to keep records of
certain motor vehicle offenses brought before him. Four days later, a
warrant of arrest was issued based upon the indictment. Police officers
first delivered back to appellant his dockets, following which they
arrested him pursuant to the warrant and started to seize the dockets as
an incident to the arrest. He ordered them to desist, whereupon they
telephoned the appellee who instructed them to proceed with the
seizure, and they did so. The dockets seized by the police were not his
“live” or current books actually in daily use, but were those for the two
years preceding the period included in the current books.

Some days later, the appellant issued a warrant, based upon his
own complaint, directing the arrest of appellee on a charge of
contempt. Mr. Herlihy was arrested and taken before appellant for a
hearing. The matter was continued, however, and appellee promptly
filed a petition for prohibition in Superior Court (No. 3120).

Several months later (one day before Mr. Herlihy’s resignation
became effective), appellant swore out two complaints in the Court of
Common Pleas charging appellee with misfeasance and non-feasance in
office. These charges were based upon the same occurrences described
above. The warrants were never served, because Mr. Herlihy, having
learned of their issuance, promptly filed another petition for
prohibition in Superior Court (No. 3000). The two petitions were
briefed and argued together in the Superior Court.

I Motion was made in this Court to dismiss the appeal in
No. 3000 because the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas had not
joined in the appeal. We think the motion must be denied. Since
appellant was a party defendant in that action and since the order
below expressly prohibits him personally from taking any further
action in any Court, we consider that he has sufficient standing to
prosecute this appeal.

This Court has repeatedly indicated the purposes and functions
of a writ of prohibition. They are summarized in Canaday v. Superior
Court, 10 Terry 332, 116 A.2d 678, as follows:

“The writ of prohibition is a writ issued by a superior to an
inferior court to prevent such court from exercising jurisdiction over
matters not legally within its cognizance, or to prevent it from
exceeding its jurisdiction in matters over which it admittedly has
cognizance. It is designed primarily to keep the administration of
justice in orderly channels, and to prevent unwarranted assumption of
power over persons or matters not within the legitimate cognizance of
the inferior tribunal. Clendaniel v. Conrad [3 Boyce 549, 26 Del. 549,
83 A. 1036], supra; Knight v. Haley, 6 W.W Harr. 366, 36 Del. 366,
176 A. 461; Fouracre v. White, 7 Boyce 25, 30 Del. 25, 102 A. 186; 42
Am. Jur., Prohibition, Secs. 2, 5.

Generally speaking, the writ of prohibition may not be distorted
into a substitute for a writ of error for the correction of error,
irregularity or mistake in the proceedings in the court below which can
be reviewed by ordinary appellate process. 42 Am. Jur., Prohibition,
Secs. 8, 30; 2 Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Sec. 357a. The writ will be
denied if the petitioner has another adequate and complete remedy at
Jaw for the correction of the asserted error of the court below. Norton
v. Emery, 108 Me. 472, 81 A. 671; High on Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, Sec. 770; Chew v. Superior Court, 43 R.I. 194, 110 A.605.”

HL As stated in Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce 549, 83 A.
1036, a writ of prohibition will issue from a Superior Court to an
inferior tribunal only for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal

pT 121
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from exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction.

Ht is apparent in the present case that the Superior Court
based its decision solely on its conclusion that the appellee had in fact
committed no crime. This approach, we think, was incorrect because it
was in effect a decision on the merits of the charges, and therefore
beyond the permissible scope of prohibition, in which the question to
be determined is whether the inferior courts had jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the person or were about to exceed their
jurisdiction. But, even though we disagree with the reasons assigned by
the Court below, we will not reverse its judgment if the orders entered
were proper for some other reason.

As to No. 3000, we think the Court below should have
dismissed the petition as having been prematurely filed. It is the general
rule that prohibition will not be issued unless the attention of the
inferior court has been called to the alleged lack of jurisdiction, or it
has indicated in some fashion its intent to proceed. 73 C.J.S.
Prohibition Sec. 22, p. 99; 42 Am.Jur. 172; See annotation in 35
A.L.R. 1090. This rule was referred to, by way of dictum, in Knight v.
Haley, 6 W.W Harr. 366, 176 A. 461, in these words:

“Where the inferior court has jurisdiction of the person and
subject matter, prohibition does not lie to prevent an erroneous
decision, 50 C.J. 678; nor can it be assumed that any tribunal will act in
a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, and until it does some act, as,
when, upon challenge to its jurisdiction having been made, it overrules
the objection, or otherwise expressly or by necessary implication
announces its purpose to proceed, prohibition will not lie.”

There are, as the authorities demonstrate, many exceptions to
the foregoing rule, but none of them apply here. The Judges of the
Court of Common Pleas have never been asked to do anything in the
cases before them, and they have made no appearance in the Superior
Court or in this Court in these proceedings. Indeed, it is possible they
may never be requested to take any action, since the Attorney General
may see fit to enter a nolle prosequi. We see no reason in this case why

122 PO
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the general rule should not be observed. To ignore it here would be
equivalent to discarding it, and this we are unwilling to do.

The situation in No. 3120 is materially different. The appellant,
by his actions in his own Court as well as in the others, has clearly
evinced his determination to try that case unless prohibited from doing
so. We must therefore determine his jurisdictional right to hear it. In
deciding the matter, we pass over the various contentions of counsel as
to whether or not there is any inherent power in an inferior court to
punish coritempts and whether or not the authority conferred upon
Justices of the Peace by T. 11 Del. C. Ch. 3, Sub-Chapter XV, is broad
enough to include this case. In our opinion, another reason exists which
clearly justifies the order of the Superior Court in this case.

As a general rule, other remedies being inadequate,
prohibition will lie to restrain a Judge from proceeding in a case which
is within his jurisdiction but as to which he is personally disqualified by
reason of interest, bias or prejudice, at least where the facts are clear.
42 Am.Jur. 163; 73 C.J.S. Prohibition Sec. 11, p. 52. The cases are
collected in 92 A.L.R.2d 308. Every litigant is entitled to trial by a
disinterested judge. Whether in any case the interest shown to exist is
sufficient to create a disqualification depends upon the peculiar facts of
the case. In the present instance, it is plain that appellant had a personal
interest in the matter. He was under indictment, at the trial of which
his dockets would constitute important evidence either for or against
him. As a Justice of the Peace, he of course had an impersonal interest
in preserving them in compliance with the applicable statutes; as an
individual charged with crime, however, he obviously had a personal
interest to be served. We do not say that his actions were in fact
motivated solely or principally by this personal interest; the mere fact
that it existed is sufficient to disqualify him from presiding at a trial of
the contempt charge.

Of course, prohibition will not ordinarily be granted for this
reason when there is another adequate remedy. In the present instance,
we think any other possible remedy would be inadequate. For example,
if appellee were found guilty and the penalty should be a fine of less

1

!

than $100 or imprisonment of less than one month, there would be no
right of appeal, either under Art. 4 Del. Constitution Sec. 28, Del. C.
Ann., or under any statute. Habeas corpus might be available if a prison
sentence were imposed, but not if the penalty were limited to a fine.
Certiorari would probably be futile, because the disqualification would
not likely appear on the face of the record. See Nelte v. State, Del., 198
A.2d 921.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court below in
No. 3120 will be affirmed. The judgment in No. 3000 will be reversed
with instructions to discharge the rule and dismiss the petition.

THE STATE OF DELAWARE v. JOSEPH L. WALLACE and
EDWARD S. ROVNER.

125

(May 3, 1963)
DUFFY, P.J., sitting.

E, Norman Veasey and W. Laird Stabler, Jr., Deputy Attys.
Gen., for the State.

Emmett J. Conte, Jr., for defendant, Joseph L. Wallace.
Gerald Z. Berkowitz, for defendant, Edward S. Rovner.

Superior Court of Delaware, For New Castle County. No. 293
Criminal Action 2962.

DUFFY, President Judge, charging the Jury:

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, the defendants, Joseph L.
Wallace and Edward S. Rovner, are charged with six offenses. You will
have with you in the Jury Room the indictment specifying these six
offenses, Counts 1, 3, 4 and 6 charge offenses by the defendant
Wallace; Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6 charge offenses by the defendant Rovner.

Specifically, the defendant Wallace is charged with: Solicitation
of a Bribe, Malfeasance in Office, and two counts of Conspiracy.

The defendant Rovner is charged with: Accomplice to
Solicitation of a Bribe, Accomplice to Malfeasance in Office, and two
counts of Conspiracy.

126 PLL

The defendants deny completely and entirely that they are
guilty of the offenses which have been charged against them.

I have referred to the contentions of the parties. You must keep
in mind that the Court states them as contentions or claims only. You
must be guided solely by your own recollection of the evidence. This is
so because, under our law, you are the sole and exclusive judges of the
facts of the case, of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight
and the value to be given to their testimony.

It is not proper for the Court to comment on the testimony; it is
the Court’s duty to instruct you on the law to be applied to the facts,
as you find the facts.

First, I will consider the charges relating to bribery or
solicitation of a bribe. The first three counts in the indictment refer to
this subject.

HMM Bribery is generally defined to be the receiving, or
offering, of any undue reward by or to any person whose ordinary
profession or business relates to the administration of public affairs, in
order to influence his behavior in office, and to act contrary to the
known rules of honesty and integrity. It is committed by any person in
an official position who corruptly uses the power and interest of his
place for rewards or promises. State v. Davis, 18 Del. 139, 2 Pennewill
139, 45 A. 394 (1899); 8 Am.Jur., Bribery, Sec. 2.

Hl Bribery requires a criminal intent; the intent must be to
influence, corruptly, an official in the discharge of his duty. 8 Am. Jur.,
Bribery, Sec. 6.

Count 1 of the indictment charges that the defendant Wallace
solicited a bribe. Specifically, it is charged that in this County, from on
or about October 1, 1961, to on or about April 5, 1962, he unlawfully
solicited a bribe from Wilmington Renewal Associates, Inc., and its
agents, Lester C. W. Harris, Jr., and Leon N. Weiner. It is charged that
this was done personally and through an accomplice, the defendant

ee 127
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Rovner, for the purpose of influencing his official favor with respect to
a proposal submitted by Wilmington Renewal Associates in connection
with Poplar Street Project A, and which was subject to action by the
Wilmington City Council. Wallace was a Council member.

i | It is charged that the defendant, Wallace, solicited a bribe.
Solicitation in the sense here used means the asking, or enticing, or
requesting of another to commit a crime—that is, in this case, to
commit the crime of bribery. Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.1957) p.
1564.

Hl To constitute the crime of solicitation of a bribe, it is not
necessary that the act be actually consummated, that is, that a bribe be
received, or that the defendants profited thereby. It is sufficient if a
bribe was actually solicited.

Hl If you find that the defendant Wallace, while an elected
member of the Wilmington City Council, either personally or through
an accomplice, under the circumstances alleged in the indictment, State
y. Seitz, 40 Del. 572, 1 Terry 572, 14 A.2d 710 (1940), solicited a
bribe, as I have defined that crime to you, then your verdict should be,
“Guilty as to Count 1.”

On the other hand, if you do not so find, or if you are not so
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, then your verdict should be, “Not
Guilty.”

If you find the defendant Wallace not guilty as to this first
count, then you must acquit both defendants of all remaining charges.
On the other hand, if you find that the defendant Wallace is guilty as to
Count 1, then you must go on and consider the remaining charges.

As to the defendant Rovner, under Count 2 of the indictment,
he is charged with being an accomplice to solicitation of a bribe.
Briefly, it is charged under this second count that the defendant Rovner
unlawfully aided and abetted the defendant Wallace in soliciting the
bribe which is referred to in the first count of the indictment.

128 Po
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There is a statute of this State, 11 Del. C. Sec. 102(c), which
provides as follows:

“Whoever aids, abets, procures, commands or counsels any other
person to commit a crime or offense against the State is an accomplice
and is guilty of the same crime or offense as the principal.”

Hs if you find that the defendant Rovner did aid, or abet, the
defendant Wallace in the commission of the crime of soliciting a bribe,
as alleged in the indictment, then in that case your verdict should be,
“Guilty as to Count 2.”

On the other hand, if you do not so find, or if you have a
reasonable doubt concerning this defendant’s guilt, as to Count 2, your
verdict should be, “Not Guilty.”

I turn now to Count 3 of the indictment which charges both of
the defendants, Rovner and Wallace, with a conspiracy to solicit a
bribe. Briefly, it is charged that both defendants unlawfully conspired
to solicit the bribe which I referred to in connection with the first two
counts of the indictment.

HHA conspiracy is the combination of two or more
persons to do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means with
unity of design and purpose. The-gist of the conspiracy is the unlawful
combination between the parties. No formal agreement between the
parties to the conspiracy charged is necessary. It is sufficient that the
minds of the parties meet understandingly, so as to bring about a
deliberate agreement to do the acts and commit the offense charged.
Conspiracy implies concert of design, but not participation in every
detail necessary to carry the general purpose, or design into execution.
Although the common design is the essence of the charge, it is not
necessary to prove that the defendants came together, and actually
agreed in terms to have that design and to pursue it by common means.
If it be proved that the defendants pursued, by their acts, the same
object, often by the same means, one to perform it, and one to the view
to attain the same object, the Jury will be justified in the conclusion

Pod 129

L____t
that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. A
conspiracy may be shown by either direct evidence or it may be shown
by circumstantial evidence.

If you find that the defendants Wallace and Rovner engaged in
an unlawful conspiracy, as I have defined that term to you, to solicit a
bribe as charged in the indictment, then your verdict should be, “Guilty
as to Count 3.”

On the other hand, if you do not so find, or if you have a
reasonable doubt concerning the guilt of the defendants with respect to
Count 3, your verdict should be, “Not Guilty.”

The first three counts in the indictment referred to solicitation
of a bribe.

The next three counts refer to a charge of malfeasance in office.
Count 4 relates to the defendant Wallace and charges that he was guilty
of malfeasance in office while he was an elected member of the
Wilmington City Council. Very briefly, it is charged that from on or
about October 1, 1961, to on or about April 5, 1962, he unlawfully
and for his own pecuniary gain, personally and through an accomplice,
solicited a bribe from Wilmington Renewal Associates and its agents,
Messrs. Harris and Weiner, in order to influence his, that is, Wallace’s
official actions as a member of the City Council.

HH HN Malfeasance in office is generally defined to be the
wrongful or unjust doing of some official act which the doer has no
right to perform, accompanied by some evil intent or motive. The crime
pertains to the illegal acts of a public officer in the exercise of the
duties of his office. A public officer who commits any breach of trust
in relation to his official duties is guilty of malfeasance in office. State
v. Seitz, supra; State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 91 A.2d 751 (1952);
Clarke & Marshall, Crimes (Sth Ed. 1952) Sec. 444, pp. 637-639; 2
Brill Cy. of Cr. Law (1923) Secs. 1188-1191.

THM f the alleged act or acts were done by the public officer

130 ee
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with a dishonest, oppressive or corrupt motive, and under these fear
and favor may be considered as elements, then malfeasance must result.
State v. Seitz, supra. A public officer is guilty of malfeasance in office if
he accepts or offers to accept, any money or other benefit calculated in
any way to influence his official actions. It is not necessary that any
improper act on the part of the officer should follow. It is enough if he
corruptly agrees to open himself to improper influence. 2 Wharton’s
Criminal Law (1st Ed.) Sec. 1900.

If you find that the defendant Wallace, while an elected member
of the Wilmington City Council, engaged in the conduct alleged in
Count 4 of the indictment, and if you find that such conduct amounted
to malfeasance in office, as I have tried to define that phrase to you,
then your verdict should be, “Guilty as to Count 4.”

On the other hand, if you are not so satisfied or if you have a
reasonable doubt, then, as to Count 4, there must be a verdict of, “Not
Guilty.”

The Court then charged on the remaining counts and on
circumstantial evidence, conflicts in the testimony, presumption of
innocence and reasonable doubt.

LESTER McKINLEY JOHNSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v.
STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

131

(December 2, 1965)
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J. J., sitting.

Nicholas H. Rodriguez, of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, for
defendant below, appellant.

Merrill C. Trader, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff below,
appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 23, 1965.

|

HERRMANN, Justice:

The question before us is whether the defendant may be
convicted under an indictment as a principal though found to be an
accomplice.

The defendant was indicted for burglary in the fourth degree,
charged as a principal. At the trial, there was evidence that the
defendant drove two others to the scene of the crime, but that he
remained in the automobile while the others entered the building. After
deliberating for about an hour and a half, the jury submitted to the
Court the following question:

“Is a person just as guilty if he stays in the car as the ones that
actually broke and entered?”

After conferring with counsel, the Court called in the jury and
gave it the following supplemental instruction:

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“Now, your second question, I will answer this way: It is the law
of this State that where there is a breaking and entering and property is
stolen, and there are two, three, or more people present, though one
may take no particular active part in the breaking and entering or
stealing of the property, yet if he is present, aiding, procuring, or
counseling with the other or others, under the law of this State he is
equally guilty with the person or persons who actually take the

property.

“Now, if you should find in this case, from the evidence, that
this defendant was sitting in the automobile aiding and abetting the two
persons who went into the building, then in that case you could find
him guilty under this charge. Is that clear?”

No objection was made to this instruction; the jury retired again;
and within ten minutes returned a verdict of guilty. The defendant
appeals on the ground that the supplemental instruction constituted
reversible error.

| | First, there is the matter of whether the question is
properly before us for review, in the absence of a timely objection
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 30(a).! In view of the time
sequences before and after the jury’s query, and because it appears to
us that the defendant probably would have been acquitted if the
supplemental instruction were given in accordance with the defendant’s
contention, we think that, if error, it was basic and fundamental error,
such as to fall within the category of “plain error” noticeable by this
Court under Superior Court Criminal Rule 52(b)*, lack of proper

1 superior Court Criminal Rule 30(a) provides in part: .

“© * Except with special permission of the court, no party may assign as
error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to
make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.”

? Superior Court Criminal Rule 52(b) provides: —
“Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”

ee 133
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objection notwithstanding. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the
question.

HI Relying upon Schwartz v. State, 7 W.W. Harr. 484, 185 A.
233 (1936) and State v. Winsett, Del. Super., 200 A.2d 692 (1964), the
defendant contends that, under the Delaware Statute, an accomplice?
cannot be convicted under an indictment as a principal; that he must be
indicted as an accomplice. We disagree.

At the time of the Schwartz case, the pertinent Statute, 1915
Code s 4806* provided that an accomplice shall be deemed “equally
criminal as the principal offender, and shall be punished in the same
manner, and with the same punishment.” This Court held in Schwartz
that the Statute then in force did not make an accessory a principal and
did not permit the conviction of a defendant as an accessory upon an
indictment as a principal. It appears that the Attorney General
contended in Schwartz that the established practice in Delaware
permitted the indictment of an accessory as a principal. The Court,
however, could find “no uniform rule” upon the subject.

Thereafter, in 1939, the Statute was amended by 42 Del. Laws,
Ch. 157. The statutory language construed in Schwartz was changed

thereby so that, as now appears in 11 Del C. Sec. 102°, instead of

For present purposes, no distinction is made between accomplice and accessory.

41915 Code 9 4806 provided:

"4806. Sec. 1. Accomplices; Degree of Guilt of; How Punished; When to
Suffer Highest Degree of Punishment; How Triable; Acquittal of Principal no Bar
to Prosecution of:—Whoever shall abet, procure, command, or counsel any other
person, or persons, to commit any crime, or misdemeanor, shall be deemed an
accomplice and equally criminal as the principal offender, and shall be punished
in the same manner, and with the same punishment.

“But if the principal offender be under the age of fourteen years, and the
crime committed not capital, the accomplice, if of full age, shall suffer the highest
degree of punishment prescribed for the offense.

“An accomplice may be prosecuted, tried and convicted, without the
conviction, trial or indictment, of the principal; and an acquittal of the principal
shail not be a bar to the trial and conviction of the accomplice.”

511 Del. C, Sec. 102 provides:
“Sec. 102. Principal and accomplice

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being “equally criminal as the principal offender”, an accomplice
became “guilty of the same crime or offense as the principal.” Under
the Amendment, the accomplice remained punishable “in the same
manner and with the same punishment as the principal.”

HE The change in the Statute was significant, we think,
especially in the light of the then-recent Schwartz decision. It is
assumed, of course, that the General Assembly was aware of the
Schwartz decision of 1936 at the time of its enactment of the 1939
Amendment.

It is our opinion that, by the Amendment of 1939, the
Legislature intended to overcome and change the effect of the Schwartz
case so as to permit the conviction of an accomplice under an
indictment as principal. The sequence of events, the position of the
Attorney General as recorded in the Schwartz case, the practicality of
the change in the administration of criminal justice, the nature of the
amendatory language adopted — all lead us to that conclusion.

We hold, therefore, that the Schwartz case no longer states the
law correctly under our present Statute; and the same must be said of
the ruling of the Superior Court in the Winsett case which followed this
Court’s decision in Schwartz.

“(a) Whoever commits a crime or offense against the State is a principal.

“(b) Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another person would be a crime or offense against the State is
punishable as a principal.

“(c) Whoever aids, abets, procures, commands or counsels any other person
to commit a crime or offense against the State is an accomplice and is guilty of
the same crime or offense as the principal. — ;

“(d) An accomplice may be punished in the same manner and with the same
punishment as the principal, or the Court may in its discretion impose a
punishment of lesser degree upon an accomplice than upon the principal
notwithstanding the accomplice and the principal may have been indicted, tried
and convicted under the same indictment or information. If the principal is under
14 years of age and the crime committed is not a capital offense, the accomplice,
if of full age, shall suffer the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense.

“(e) An accomplice may be prosecuted, tried and convicted without the
indictment.

135

Accordingly, we conclude that, under 11 Del. C. Sec. 102, a
defendant may be convicted under an indictment as principal though
found to be an accomplice. We find no error, therefore, in the
supplemental jury charge as given in the instant case.

The judgment below is affirmed.

MARYLOU C. FIELDS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. SYNTHETIC
ROPES, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendant
Below, Appellee.

iN

36

(i

(Wovember 30, 1965)

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

Harold Leshem, and Sheldon L. Albert and James E. Beasley,
Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

PO 137
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Roger Sanders, Prickett & Prickett, for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 64, 1965.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal in a personal injury action from the entry of
summary judgment for the defendant.

For the purposes of this appeal, we accept as the facts that the
plaintiff's husband is the president, an employee and one of five stock
holders of the defendant corporation; that at the time of the accident
he was operating an automobile owned by the defendant corporation
within the scope of his employment; that his wife, the plaintiff, was
riding with him in the compnay-owned automobile; that the reason for
the plaintiff's presence in the automobile was to assist her husband in
making preparations for an impending selling trip for the benefit of the
defendant; that the plaintiff was to receive no compensation for her
assistance; and that, finally, the plaintiff was injured by reason of her
husband’s neligent operation of the company automobile.

We make the foregoing fact assumptions because they are
the aspect of the alleged facts most favorable to the plaintiff who has
had summary judgment entered against her. It remains to be seen
whether or not they would be established at a trial on the merits.

The plaintiffs action is against the employer corporation.
Defendant moved for summary judgment upon the ground of the
common law immunity of one spouse from suit by the other, and by
reason of the Delaware Guest Statute preventing recovery of a guest in
an automobile for injuries resulting from the ordinary negligence of the
driver. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion by reason of
the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity. It specifically did not pass upon

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the defense of the Delaware Guest Statute.

Hl In Delaware one spouse may not sue the other in an action
at law. Plotkin y. Plotkin, 2 W.W. Harr. 455, 125 A. 455. In this case
the court refused to extend various statutes of this State removing
certain common law disabilities of married women so as to remove the
common law immunity of one spouse from suit brought by the other.
The rule of the Plotkin case has been reaffirmed many times by
Delaware courts, most recently by this court’s decision in Saunders v.
Hill, 202 A.2d 807.

It is therefore quite apparent that this plaintiff may not maintain
an action against her husband to recover damages for her injuries caused
by his negligence. The parties to this cause are agreed upon this, but the
defendant says that the plaintiff-wife seeks to do indirectly what she
may not do directly by imputing her husband’s negligence to his
employer as the basis for her action.

In support of the argument of indirection defendant cites Lutz v.
Boltz, 9 Terry 197, 100 A.2d 647, and Ferguson v. Davis, 9 Terry 299,
102 A.2d 707. We think, however, that these cases do not support the
argument,

The Lutz case denied the right to a defendant to file a
counter-claim for contribution under the Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (10 Del. C., Ch. 63) against the driver of a vehicle in
which the plaintiffs were riding as guests. It was clear that by reason of
the Delaware Guest Statute (21 Del. C., Sec. 6101) the plaintiffs could
not have recovered damages from the driver of the car in which they
were riding. The Superior Court held that the Tortfeasor Contribution
Statute had no application unless there was a “common liability” to the
plaintiffs between the defendant and the proposed contributor. Since
the plaintiffs could not hold the proposed contributor liable, it
followed there was no “common liability” between him and the
defendant and, thus, the statute had no application. To the same effect
is Ferguson v. Davis, supra, decided on the authority of the Lutz case.

139

These two cases both were decided on the basis that a party not
directly liable to a plaintiff may not indirectly be held liable through
the means of enforced contribution to the defendant. Thus, in the Lutz
case the proposed contributor could not be held liable to the plaintiffs
by reason of the Guest Statute, and in the Ferguson case the proposed
contributor could not be held liable to the plaintiff because she was his
wife.

Hl The Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Statute comes into play
only when the proposed contributor shares with the defendant a
“common liability” to the plaintiff. Absent such liability, no
contribution may be enforced. The question in the two cases rests
squarely upon the statutory requirement that the right to force
contribution depends directly upon the existence of liability of the
proposed contributor to the plaintiff. We think they do not relate to
the question before us.

But, says the defendant, to permit suit against the
employer will, in fact, be to permit an indirect suit against the husband
by reason of the fact that in the event of a recovery against it for its
employee’s tort the employer may recover over against the employee,
thus indirectly forcing the husband to pay his wife’s claim for damages.
This does not follow, however, because the employer’s right of recovery
over against the employee is based, not upon the original claim based
upon the employee’s negligence, but upon the failure of the employee
to live up to his independent duty of care owed for the protection of
the employer’s interest. 3 Prosser on Torts, Sec. 116, p. 890; 2
Restatement of Agency 2nd, Sec. 401.

We have before us the more basic question of whether or not the
negligence of a husband-employee may be imputed to his employer as
the basis for an independent action brought by the employee’s wife
against the employer, alone. Or, stated differently, does the wife under
the circumstances before us have any cause of action which can be
asserted against anyone? The question is of first impression in this
State.

140 Ee
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In other jurisdictions a split of authority has developed upon the
question. Those jurisdictions which allow recovery by a wife in
situations such as this are illustrated by the leading case of Schubert v.
August Schubert Wagon Company, 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42, 64
A.L.R. 293. This is the view of a majority of the States. Those
jurisdictions which deny recovery in such situations are illustrated by
Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Company, 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99, 131
A.LR. 307.

The rationale of the Schubert case is that, despite the common
Jaw immunity of a husband from suit brought by his wife, the
husband’s trespass upon the person of the wife is an unlawful act,
though the husband may not be held liable for it. The husband’s
immunity from suit, however, is not carried forward to his employer.
This results from the fact that injury to another has been caused by the
negligence of the employee in the course of his employment. The
holding rests squarely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. The
Schubert case, therefore, places the liability of the employer upon the
concept of the culpability of the employee and not upon his personal
liability. The employer is held liable, not because his employee is also
liable, but because in the course of his employment, presumably in his
employer’s interest, the employee, by his tortious conduct has caused
injury to another. Under this view, it is immaterial that the
husband-employee is immune from liability.

The rationale of the Riegger case, however, is that the immunity
of the husband from suit brought by his wife is extended to the
husband’s employer in a suit brought against him by his employee’s
wife. Basically, the difference in this view from that expressed in the
Schubert case is that the doctrine of respondeat superior has as its true
basis the question of liability rather than culpability of the employee
for his tortious act. In other words, if the employee may be held liable,
the employer is liable and conversely, if the employee may not be held
liable, the employer may not be held liable.

We will not review the various other decisions since their

Po M41
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divergent views are fairly represented by the referred-to decisions. The
difference in the two lines of decision, we think, springs from a
fundamental disagreement upon the doctrine of respondeat superior;
one view being that the doctrine rests upon the culpability of the
employee; the second being that the doctrine rests upon the liability of
the employee.

Defendant argues that the rationale of prior Delaware decisions
should lead us to follow the line of decisions which grant the employer
of a husband immunity from suit by the wife for injuries caused the
wife by the husband’s negligent performance of his employment, if the
husband, himself, is immune from such a suit. Basically, we think, the
defendant’s point is that under no circumstances can a husband commit
a tort upon the person of his wife.

Thus, defendant says, Plotkin v. Plotkin, supra, granted the
husband immunity from suit by his wife because at common law they
were held to be one person and, thus presumably, could not commit a
tort against each other. We do not so read the Plotkin case. That
question was not before the court. The decision was not that no cause
of action could be created as between husband and wife because of
their fictional common law unity, but rather was that the right to sue in
enforcement of a claim for damages would be denied because “the right
to sue each other strikes at the very heart of domestic relations.” The
decision would seem to be the grant of immunity as a defense to an
action which otherwise could have been maintained. It was not, we
think, a holding that the. wife could not sue because she had no cause of
action as the defendant contends.

McHugh v. Brown, 11 Terry 154, 125 A.2d 583, similarly did
not reach the point. In that case, the question was whether or not a
parent could be held liable as a third party defendant under 21 Del. C.
Secs. 6105(a) and 6106, for the simple negligence of a minor who had
been permitted to drive the parent’s automobile, when at the same time
the minor, by reason of the Delaware Guest Statute, could. be held
liable only for his willful or wanton disregard of the rights of others.
This court construed 21 Del. C., Secs. 6105(a) and 6106 as in effect

142 Ee
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giving legislative approval to some aspects of the “Family Use
Doctrine” which, read together with the Guest Statute, imposed
liability upon the parent to the extent, and only to the extent, that the
minor was liable. Thus, the defense of the Guest Statute was available
as a defense in an action seeking to hold the parent liable for the tort of
a minor. The parent’s liability was not held to rest upon the doctrine of
respondeat superior, but squarely upon the statute. The case is not in
point.

Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 11 Terry 50, 123 A.2d 107,
similarly was an attempt by a defendant in a suit brought by a minor to
join a parent of the plaintiff as a third party defendant in a tort action
under circumstances in which the parent could not have been made a
direct defendant by the plaintiff-child. The case is distinguishable on
the same ground as the McHugh case.

The defendant also relies upon certain language of this court in
Saunders v. Hill, supra, which, on its face, says that our Wrongful Death
Act (10 Del. C., Sec. 3701) created a new cause of action and since no
cause of action at common law could arise in tort as between husband
and wife, the administrator of a wife could not sue her husband’s estate
by reason of her death caused by his negligence. Thus, it is argued, this
plaintiff never had a cause of action since such could not be created by
her husband’s act. This being so, it is argued that this plaintiff has no
cause of action to assert against the employer of her husband.

In Reynolds v. Willis, Del., 209 A.2d 760, however, we pointed
out that the phrase “cause of action” in Saunders y. Hill was used as
meaning the right to sue for a recovery upon a tort, as distinguished
from the tort, itself. It would have been technically more accurate, we
said, to have used the term “tight of action” rather than the term
“cause of action”, but the meaning of the decision was plain.

We think the defendant is incorrect, therefore, when it argues
that prior Delaware decisions have committed us to the rule that a
cause of action may never arise in favor of a wife by reason of the tort
of her husband. Rather, we think, the opposite is true. We think
Delaware courts have recognized the distinction between “cause of

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action” and “right of action.” Reynolds y. Willis, sapra, and cf.
Homiewicz v. Orlowski, 4 W.W. Harr. 66, 143 A.250.

HH Sit is clear that there is a distinct difference between
“cause of action” and “right of action.” The former is a state of facts
which show a union of the rights of one and their infringement by
another. The latter is the right of the injured one to secure redress for
the violation of his rights. The two terms are not interchangeable and
should not be confused. Foster v. Humburg, 180 Kan. 64, 299 P.2d 46;
Swankowski v. Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 271, 129 N.E.2d 182; Griffin v.
Workman (Fla.), 73 So.2d 844; Levey v. Newark Beth Israel Hospital,
17 N.J. Super. 290, 85 A.2d 827.

This being so, we think in principle that there is no reason in law
that a husband cannot commit a tort upon the person of his wife. At
the same time, however, the wife is remediless, for at common law and
in this State she may not sue her husband in a court of law. Therefore,
while she has a “cause of action,” i. e., her husband’s tort, at the same
time she has no “right of action,” i. e., the ability to enforce it by
bringing suit, since the law gives the husband the defense of immunity
in an action brought by his wife against him.

i | We are of the opinion that a husband may commit a tort
upon the person of his wife even though she is given no legal redress for
it against him. This tort, irrecoverable by the wife against the husband,
nevertheless is culpable conduct on the part of the husband. May the
wife, even though her husband is immune from suit by her, nevertheless
sue his employer upon the tort?

It is, of course, fundamental that an employer is liable
for the torts of his employee committed while acting in the scope of his
employment. 1 Restatement, Agency 2d, Sec. 219. The liability thus
imposed upon the employer arises by reason of the imputation of the
negligence of the employee to his employer through application of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. The foundation of the action against
the employer is still negligence, even though liability for that negligence

144 Po
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has been broadened to include the employer. Prosser on Torts (3rd Ed.)
Sec. 68, p. 470. The imposition of liability on the employer thus arises,
not because the employee is liable personally for his conduct, but
because the employer selected an employee who performed the
employer’s business negligently and caused an injury. As such, the
imputation of negligence rests squarely upon, and is justified by, the
culpability of the employee, not upon the circumstance of whether or
not the employee may, himself, be held liable for his act.

HH This being so, suit may be brought against an employer
based upon the tort of his employee, even though the employee,
himself, may have immunity from such a suit brought by the particular
plaintiff. This conclusion is in accord with the modern, and we think,
better-reasoned view. See 1 Restatement of Agency (2d) Sec. 217,
comment b; Prosser on Torts (3rd Ed.), Sec. 116, p. 890.

HH We hold, therefore, that the Superior Court erroneously
entered summary judgment for the defendant in this case upon the
theory that the employee’s immunity from suit was transferred to his
employer.

HM While the point has not been raised by counsel, we
emphasize that the employer in this case is a corporation in which the
employee-husband is a stockholder, and not a partnership in which he is
a partner. A stockholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the
corporate debts and, accordingly, the reason for granting immunity to a
partnership of which the husband is both a partner, i. e., liable for
partnership debts, and employee, does not exist. See David v. David,
161 Md. 532, 157 A.755, 81 A.L.R. 1100 and Caplan v. Caplan, 268
N.Y. 445, 198 N.E.23, 101 A.L.R. 1223.

Hi Defendant seeks to raise the question of whether or not
the Delaware Guest Statute would bar this action. While this point was
raised before the Superior Court, it specifically was not passed upon.
Under the circumstances, we have nothing to review. The point may be
renewed upon remand.

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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below for the defendant
is reversed.

RICHARD D. HALLMAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ELIZABETH
K. HALLMAN, Defendant Below, Appellee.

(November, 23, 1965)

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J.J., sitting.
Robert C. O’Hora, for appellant.

Henry N. Herndon, Jr., of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams,
for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 22, 1964.

oe

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the denial of a husband’s complaint for
divorce upon the ground of mutual voluntary separation of husband
and wife with no prospect of reconciliation (13 Del.C. Sec. 1522 (11).
The trial judge held that the husband had failed by a preponderance of
the evidence to prove that the separation was mutually voluntary. We
have examined the record and are of the opinion that the husband’s
evidence was not so clearly sufficient in support of his case that the
trial judge’s conclusions should be disturbed.

The judgment below is affirmed.

RONALD F. LEWIS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF

DELAWARE, Defendant Below, Appellee.

Wovember, 23, 1965)

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J.J., sitting.
James F. Kipp, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Richard I.G. Jones, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 54, 1965.

|

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial by the Superior Court of a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.

On October 11, 1963, the prisoner was sentenced to a term of
two years imprisonment upon one charge, and at the same time was

P| 147
Ld

sentenced to a term of two years upon a second charge. The sentence

upon the second charge was suspended and the prisoner placed on

probation for a period of two years commencing upon the expiration of
the sentence upon the first charge.

On July 23, 1964, the prisoner was admitted to parole. This
parole expired on March 1, 1965. On March 8, 1965 the prisoner was
arrested on several charges of fourth degree burglary and, on March 22,
1965, was sentenced to four prison terms of nine months each on four
such charges, the sentences to run consecutively for a total of three
years,

On May 7, 1965, the prisoner was brought before the Superior
Court and sentenced to a term of two years on a charge of violation of
probation imposed upon the second of the original charges. The
prisoner, himself, on June 3, 1965, filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus with the Superior Court which was denied. Thereafter, the
prisoner, again acting on his own initiative, filed a paper with this Court
which was directed to be treated as a Praecipe on Appeal. The Public
Defender’s office now appears for him.

The burden of the prisoner’s complaint is that his sentence for
violation of probation is illegal because the commencement of the
probation was indefinite. This is so, it is argued, because of the
indefinite termination of his prior sentence due to time off for good
behavior. Hence, he says there was no definite commencement date of
his probation in violation of 11 Del.C. Sec. 3902(a), which requires a
definite date for the beginning and ending of a sentence. He therefore
argues that he did not violate his probation because he had not been
validly placed upon probation.

We do not reach the question argued for two reasons:

HM First, the prisoner seeks review of an allegedly illegal
sentence. He seeks to do so by means of a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. This, he may not do for, as we held in Curran v. Woolley, 9
Terry 382, 104 A.2d 771, the Writ is inappropriate to such purpose

148

i_|
and will not be distorted in this State to a writ of review or means to
obtain post-conviction relief. His remedy, if any, is by motion under
Criminal Rule 35 of the Superior Court.

| | Second, in any event, the point seems academic. The
reason for this is that the two-year sentence imposed for violation of
probation will expire by its own terms before the termination of the
admittedly valid three-year term the prisoner is currently serving.

The judgment below is affirmed.
—

AIR MOD CORPORATION, Defendant Below, Appellant, v.
CHARLES W. NEWTON, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

149

Wovember 29, 1965)
WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J.J., sitting.

Harold C. Schmittinger, of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, for
defendant below, appellant.

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Joseph Donald Craven, for plaintiff below, appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 39, 1965.

HERRMANN, Justice:

The defendant, Air Mod Corporation, appeals from a judgment
of the Superior Court affirming an award by the Industrial Accident
Board (hereinafter the “Board”) of workmen’s compensation to its
employee, Charles W. Newton, the plaintiff. The award is attchked
upon several grounds: (1) that the finding of a compensable accident is
not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) that the finding of a causal
connection between the alleged accident and the plaintiff's physical
disability is not supported by the requisite quantum of expert medical
testimony; (3) that it was reversible error to bar evidence regarding
certain questionable statements, as to his physical condition, made by
the plaintiff in his application for employment; and (4) that the
apportionment provisions of the Delaware Workmen’s Compensation
Act, 19 Del.C. Sec. 2329,! should apply.

L
The pertinent facts are these:

In 1937, the plaintiff suffered a back injury as the result of a

119 Del.C, Sec. 2329 provides as follows: . .

“Sec, 2329. Compensation for disability resulting from occupational and
other pre-existing disease | . ;

“Whenever any disability from which any employee is suffering following the
contraction of a compensable occupational disease, is due in part to such
occupational disease, and in part to a pre-existing disease or infirmity, The Board
shall determine the proportion of such disability which is reasonably attributed to
the occupational disease and the proportion which is reasonably attributable to
the pre-existing disease or infirmity, and such employee shall be entitled to
compensation only for that proportion of his disability which is reasonably
attributable solely to the occupational disease.”

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fall. For 12 years thereafter, his back pain was intermittent; then
progressively more frequent; then continuous. In April 1959, the
plaintiff underwent surgery for the condition, the diagnosis being
sciatic neuralgia, ruptured intervertebral disc, and discogenic
spondylosis, A lumbar laminectomy (surgical removal of the posterior
arches of the vertebrae) was performed and discs were removed. The
operation included opening of the dura, one of the membrame
coverings of the spinal cord. Within a few weeks, the plaintiff returned
to the hospital complaining of pain ‘in the left leg and, shortly,
thereafter, he was hospitalized again for pain in the right hip and leg.
The diagnosis on both of these occasions was sciatic neuralgia.

In September 1959, the plaintiff applied to the defendant for
employment as a welder and was hired. On December 30, 1960,
according to the plaintiff’s testimony before the Board, he slipped and
fell in the course of his employment while pushing a hand truck on an
icy street pavement. He experienced no pain until he had driven part
way home that evening; but thereafter he suffered severe back pains.
On January 9, 1961, the plaintiff first made report to the defendant
and first consulted a physician about the pain he was experiencing. He
made no mention of a fall either in the first report or to the doctor first
consulted. On January 23, 1961, the plaintiff signed a statement in
which he stated he “did not actually fall from the ice.” The plaintiff
continued to work for the defendant until the end of March 1961. His
record of attendance at work was good both before and after the
December 30 incident.

In April 1961, the plaintiff underwent more back surgery, the
diagnosis being recurrent herniated intervertebral disc and cauda equina
arachnoiditis. The following operative procedures were performed: a
lumbar laminectomy involving the same vertebrae as in the 1959
surgery, with extradural removal of an extruded disc fragment;
exploration of the cauda equina (aggragation of nerve fibers) for
arachnoiditis (inflammation of the arachnoid, a second membrane
covering of the spinal cord) and removal of scar tissue overlying the
dura; a spinal fusion was also done. During this hospitalization, the
plaintiff signed an application form for non-occupational group

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accident and health insurance benefits, stating that his sickness or
injury did not arise out of his employment.

In July 1961, the plaintiff was again hospitalized for pain. The
diagnosis was arachnoiditis cauda equina; a left chordotomy (cutting of
pain fibers in spinal cord) was performed. In April 1962, the plaintiff
was again hospitalized, the diagnosis being arachnoiditis; this time, the
Operation was a right chordotomy. Since then, the plaintiff has been
completely and permanently disabled, paralyzed from the chest down.

On October 25, 1962, the plaintiff filed a petition for
workmen’s compensation, claiming that his permanent disability
resulted from the occurence of December 30, 1960. The Board found
that the plaintiff “strained his back” on that date; that such injury
“aggravated the pre-existing back disability” suffered by him; that his
disability constituted a compensable occupational disease under Sec.
2329; and the Board awarded compensation accordingly. On appeal by
the defendant, the Superior Court affirmed the award, but held Sec.
2329 inapplicable bacause the plaintiff's disability “does not amount to
an occupational disease.” The defendant takes this further appeal.

IL.

The defendant contends that the occurence of a compensable
accident on December 30, 1960 is not supported by substantial
evidence. The defendant points to the absence of any eye witness and
of any res gestae; the continuation of work for over two months; the
failure to make any report of the occurrence for ten days; the failure to
mention a fall, as described in the hearing before the Board, in any
report to the defendent or in any history given to a physician prior to
February 14, 1961; and the lapse of two years before a claim for
compensation was filed.

Upon review of the record, we agree that the plaintiff's
acts and statements are highly inconsistent with his testimony, at the
hearing before the Board, of a fall. In the final analysis, however, the
question is one of credibility and the weight to be accorded the

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plaintiff's testimony. The Board saw and heard the witnesses and
considered all the evidence now before us. Our function and the
function of the Superior Court on appeal from the Industrial Accident
Board, where the Board heard and saw the witnesses, is to determine
whether the record made before the Board shows substantial evidence
sufficient to support the Board’s finding and conclusions. General
Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 3 Storey 74, 164 A.2d 686 (1960); Lester
Newton Trucking Co. v. Neal, Del., 204 A.2d 393 (1964(; Nardo v.
Nardo, Del., 209 A.2d 905 (1965).

HH it is our opinion that the testimony of the plaintiff, if
believed, is substantial evidence sufficient to sustain the Board’s finding
of a compensable accident on December 30, 1960. Obviously, the
Board accepted the plaintiff's testimony, his prior inconsistent
statements and acts notwithstanding. We will not substitute our
judgment for that of the members of the Board as to credibility.
Therefore, the Board’s finding of a compensable accident will not be
distrubed.

I.

The defendant claims the lack of the expert medical testimony
requisite to establish a causal connection between the occurrence of
December 30, 1960 and the plaintiffs present disability. In this
connection, the defendant points to the absence of any expert evidence
to establish “with reasonable medical certainty” that the fall described
by the plaintiff caused the plaintiff's present condition.

Two doctors testified before the Board on behalf of the plaintiff.
A neurologist, who had not treated the plaintiff but who heard his
testimony before the Board, stated that the fall described by the
plaintiff “could result” in the disc injury. The orthopedic surgeon who
performed the operation of 1961 testified that, upon opening the dura,
a large piece of extruded disc was found; that in his opinion it had been
recently extruded because, otherwise, considerable pain would have
been experienced and, based upon the plaintiffs statements, it was

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assumed that there was “relatively little pain” after the 1959 operation;
that, according to the medical records (the operating surgeon being
unavailable as a witness), the subsequent chordotmies were performed
as surgical pain relief to relieve “continuing” and “intractable” pain
caused by reformed adhesions of nerve roots resulting partially from
prior surgery and partially from the fall; and that the plaintiff's present
condition, as found by the surgeon on December 20, 1962 after the
second chordotomy, was, in his opinion, “consistent” with the
plaintiff’s description of a fall, and “could have” resulted therefrom.

Hl Admittedly, from a legal point of view, a more positive
causal connection between the occurrence of December 30, 1960 and
the plaintiff's disability would be disirable; and, unquestionably, the
“reasonable medical certainty” test, furnishing probability of causation
rather than mere possibility, is preferable when obtainable. We must
recognize, however, the understandable reluctance of medical witnesses
to be dogmatic as to causation of a physical condition. In the thinking
and reasoning of a physician, we realize, the realm of probability and
the realm of possibility often overlap. Semantics must give way in the
search for a fair and just result; and the distinction between words like
“possible”, “probable”, “reasonable certainty”, and the like, may not
be over-emphasized. A “could have” answer of a medical witness, such
as we have here, may not be isolated and considered alone; it must be
considered in the light of all of the other evidence in the case. General
Motors Corp. v. Freeman, supra; Annotation 135 A.L.R. 516; 2
Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Sec. 80.32. In the instant case,
considering the medical testimony in the light of all of the evidence, we
have reached the conclusion that it is sufficient to establish the
requisite causal connection and to sustain the award.

HE There is a loose end in this part of the case which needs
securing. It appears that the orthopedic surgeon based his opinion of a
recent disc extrusion upon the assumption that the plaintiff suffered
“‘elatively little pain” after the operation of 1959. The Board barred
the defendant from testing this assumption by examining the plaintiff
and his wife as to the existence of such pain. This, we think, was error;

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and upon the further hearing which we ultimately find necessary, infra,
the defendant should be permitted to adduce evidence as to the
existence, nature, and severity of pain, if any, between the surgery of
1959 and the occurrence of December 30, 1960. The surgeon’s opinion
should be reevaluated in the light of such evidence.

Iv.

The defendant contends that the Board erred in disregarding the
significance and effect of certain answers given by the plaintiff in his
application for employment, and in refusing to admit certain proferred
evidence addressed to that phase of the case.

In the application form. filled out by the plaintiff on September
14, 1959, he wrote “No” to the following questions: “Any physical
defect or chronic disease?” and “Have you been confined by illness in
past year?”

The defendant argues that the plaintiff thereby misrepresented
his physical condition; that the defendant would not have hired the
plaintiff if his then-recent back surgery and condition had been
disclosed; that if the Board had not barred the evidence, the defendant
would have established that it would not have employed the plaintiff if
his answers to the questions had more accurately reflected the facts
about his health; and that, upon such showing, under the law, the
plaintiff would be precluded from receiving the benefits of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. The plaintiff responds that the
questions on the form were ambiguous; that the answers were true
responses to the questions as he understood them; and that the Board
properly barred, as immaterial, any evidence of the employment policy
of the defendant regarding applicants having physical defects.

We think if manifest, in the light of the plaintiffs undisputed
medical history, that his answers were false and misleading. We address
ourselves to the consequences of such misrepresentation upon the
plaintiff's right to workmen’s compensation benefits.

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It is generally agreed that an employee’s false
pre-employment statements as to his health may preclude him from
receiving workmén’s compensation benefits if the misrepresentations go
to the factum of the employment contract, or if there is a causal
relationship between the misrepresented physical condition and the
injury. See 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Sec. 47.53; 58
AmJur. “Workmen’s Compensation” Sec. 335; Annotation 136 A.L.R.
1124; Martin Company v. Carpenter, Fla., 132 So.2d 400 (1961); Fort
Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Griffith, Tex. Civ.App., 27 S.W.2d 351
(1930); Clark v. Union Pac. R. Co., 70 Idaho 70, 211 P.2d 402 (1949).

The basic problem was considered in Talarowski v. Pennsylvania
R.Co. (D.Del., 1955) 135 F.Supp. 503, a Federal Employers’ Liability
Act case, in which the defendant asserted as an affirmative defense that
the plaintiff in his application for employment falsified his physical
condition; that the falsification was relied upon by the defendant’s
physican; and that if the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s true
condition it would not have employed him. In denying the plaintiff's
motion to strike the affirmative defense, Judge Wright stated:

“An employee is not entitled to maintain a suit under the
provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act if his employment is
procured by reason of fraudulent statements made in his application for
employment, if said fraudulent statements are relied upon and are of

such a character as to have been a substantial factor in the hiring.
koe kD?

The fundamental principle involved was expressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Rock, 279
US. 410, 49 S.Ct. 363, 73 L.Ed. 766 (1929):

“* * * He [the employer] obtained and held his place through
fraudulent means. While his physical condition was not a cause of his
injuries, it did have direct relation to the propriety of admitting him to
such employment. It was at all times his duty to disclose his identity
and physical condition to petitioner. His failure so to do was a
continuing wrong in the nature of a cheat. The misrepresentation and

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injury may not be regarded as unrelated contemporary facts. As a result
of his concealment his status was at all times wrongful, a fraud upon
the petitioner, and a peril, to its patrons and its other employees. Right
to recover may not justly or reasonably be rested on a foundation so
abhorrent to public policy. * * *.”

See also Southern Pacific Company v. Libbey, (9 Cir., 1952) 199 F.2d
341; Long v. Big Horn Const. Co., 75 Wyo. 276, 295 P.2d 750 (1956).

We are not aided by an explicit provision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. By implication, however, there is evidence in the
Statuate of a public policy regarding an employee’s obligation of
truthful pre-employment health disclosure to his employer. The second
Injury Fund, created by 19 Del.C. Sec. 2327,? and the apportionment
provision of the Act, Sec. 2329 supra, are premised upon an employer’s
knowledge of an employee’s prior injury, disease or infirmity. To
enable an employer to resort to these statutory benefits, he must have
knowledge of the employee’s prior physical condition; and concealment
thereof may, unfairly and even fraudulently, deprive an employer of
the benefits accorded him by law. Thus, an employee who
misrepresents his health in applying for employment not only robs the
employer of the freedom of choice he should have in the selection of
employees, but also denies him certain valuable rights to which he is
entitled under the law.

219 Del.C. Sec. 2327 provides as follows:

“Sec. 2327. Compensation for subsequent permanent injury; special fund for

ayment

PiyuWhenever a subsequent permanent injury occurs to an employee who has
previously sustained a permanent injury, from any cause, whether in line of
employment or otherwise, the employer for whom such injured employee was
working at the time of scuh subsequent injury, shall be required to pay only that
amount of compensation as would be due for such subsequent injury without
regard to the effect of the prior injury. Whenever such subsequent permanent
injury in connection with a previous permanent injury results in total disability as
defined in section 2326 of this title, the employee shall be paid compensation for
such total disability, as provided’ in section 2324 of this title, during the
Continuance of total disability; such compensation to be paid out of a special
fund know as ‘Industrial Accident Board Second Injury Fund”.

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HH Upon the basis of public policy, the authorities above
discussed, and principles of fairness and justice, we hold that an
employee forfeits his right to benefits under the Delaware Workmen’s
Compensation Act if, in applying for employment, the employee (1)
knowingly and wilfully made a false representation as to his physical
condition; and (2) the employer relied upon the false representation
and such reliance was substantial factor in the hiring; and (3) there was
a causal connection between the false representation and the injury.
Compare Martin Company v. Carpenter, supra; H.J. Jeffries Truck Line
v. Grisham, Okl., 397 P.2d 637 (1964).

Hl While, in the instant case, it is clear that the plaintiff's
representations as to his health were less than the whole truth, and that
there was a causal connection between the misrepresented physical
condition and the plaintiff’s present physical condition, the record
before us does not sufficiently establish that the plaintiff knowingly
and wilfully made the misrepresentations, or that the employer’s
reliance on the false representations was a major factor in its decision to
employ the plaintiff. As indicated above, the Board barred the
defendant from showing that it would not have hired the plaintiff had
he correctly reported his back condition.

Accordingly, by the case must be remanded to the Board for the
taking of evidence on these issues, and for the making of findings of
fact and conclusions of law in connection therewith, consistent with
the foregoing.

Vv.

Finally, relying upon Zallea Brothers v. Cooper, 3 Storey 168,
166 A.2d 723 (1960), the defendant argues that, in any event, the
plaintiff's disability results from an “occupational disease”
apportionable under Sec. 2329; that, therefore, the defendant’s liability
should be limited to the proportion of the disability reasonably
attributable to the occurrence of December 30, 1960.

In the Zallea Brothers case, the Superior Court held that any

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disability which arises out of, or is aggravated by, particular conditions
of employment may be treated as a “compensable occupational
disease” within the meaning of our Act. We cannot agree with the
breadth of this definition.

The statutory definition of “compensable occupational disease”,
in 19 Del.C, Sec. 2301, leaves the term undefined:

“Compensable occupational disease’ includes all occupational
diseases arising out of and in the course of employment only when the
exposure stated in connection therewith has occurred during the
employment and the disability has commenced within 5 months after
the termination of such exposure;”

The meaning of the term is further beclouded by its general inclusion
within the definition of “injury” in Sec. 2301 as follows:

“Tnjury’ and ‘Personal injury’ mean violence to the physical
structure of the body, such disease or infection as naturally results
directly therefrom when reasonably treated, and compensable
occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of the
employment;”

Nor is the history of this portion of the Act of much assistance on the
question. The evolution of the occupational disease provision of the
Delaware Act parallels the development of similar provisions in
workmen’s compensation laws elsewhere. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s
Compensation Law, Secs. 41.11—41.50. Originally, as enacted in 1918
in 30 Del.Laws, Chap. 203, the Statute made no provision for
compensation for occupational disease. In 1937, the Act was amended
by 41 Del.Laws, Chap. 241 to provide a schedule of specific
compensable occupational diseases.> Finally, in 1949, the schedule of

3The nature of the scheduled diseases may be of some assistance in tracing the
trend of legislative thinking:

“Anthrax; Lead Poisoning; Mercury Poisoning; Arsenic Poisoning;
Phosphorus Poisoning; Benzene, and its homologues, and all derivatives thereof;
Wood Alcohol Poisoning; Chrome Poisoning; Caisson Disease; Mesothorium or
radium poisoning; Carbon Disulphide; Hydrogen Sulphide.”

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specified compensable occupational diseases was abandoned and the
general coverage, now appearing in Sec. 2301, was adopted.

As indicated, this evolution of statutory treatment of
compensable occupational diseases—from no coverage, to schedule
coverage, to general coverage—is not unusual. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s
Compensation Law, Sec. 41.20. In the expansion of occupational
disease legislation elsewhere, unlike our lack of definition, varying
definitions of the term appear, of different length and detail. There is a
common element generally running through the statutory definitions,
however: that of the distinctive relation of the disease to the nature of
the employment, as contrasted with diseases which might just as readily
be contracted in other occupations, or in everyday life, apart from
employment. Typical of the statutory definitions elsewhere is the
requirement that the disease be “characteristic of”, and “perculiar
to”, the occupation; and that it exclude “all ordinary diseases of life to
which the general public are exposed”; and that it be “due to causes in
excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such.” When the
Statute lacks definition, as in Delaware, it appears that judicial
definition, designed to describe the scope of the term, has tended to
stress the same elements. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law,
Secs. 41.32, 41.30—42.00.

This court has recently taken the position that the
Delaware Workmen’s Compensation Act may not be construed so as to
be transformed into a health insurance statute. Faline v. Guido and
Francis DeAscanis & Sons, Del., 192 A.2d 921 (1963). The same
admonition has been raised regarding federal compensation acts. E.g.,
Grain Handling Co., Inc. v. Sweeney (2 Cir., 1939) 102 F.2d 464. And
New York has adopted the same policy. Harman v. Republic Aviation
Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 82 N.E.2d 785 (1948).

The problem of the proper judicial definition of the undefined
term “compensable occupational disease” was met in New York in
Detenbeck V. General Motors Corporation, 309 N.Y. 558, 132, N.E.2d
840 (1956). That case, too, involved a back injury. The Court of
Appeals there held that where a workman’s congenital defect of the

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spine was agravated in the course of his employment, the resultant
disability was not a “compensable occupational disease” if the nature
of the employment was not such as to have a tendency to induce a
similar disability in an average workman. The Court stated:

“e * * An employee who is physically handicapped may
contract an occupational disease more easily because of his weakened
condition, but the test of what is an occupational disease is the same
whether the employee is decrepit or in normal health. There must be a
recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of
the claimant’s job. This test is not met where disability is caused by an
aggravation of a condition which is not occupational in nature. If an
employee contracts an occupational disease, he is not to be prejudiced
by reason of a pre-existing illness or defect, but neither is he to be
perferred over other employees by creating a different class of
compensable disabilities for his benefit.”

These conclusions were premised upon the earlier statement of the New
York Court of Appeals in Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., supra:

“An ailment does not become an occupational disease simply
because it is contracted on the employer’s premises. It must be one
which is commonly regarded as natural to, inhering in, an incident and
concomitant of, the work in question. There must be a recognizable
link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the claimant’s

* job, common to all jobs of that sort. * * *.”

ae RR

“A contrary decision, approval of the award, would transform
workmen’s compensation into life and health insurance.”

We are in accord with the rationale and resultant
definition there enunciated. We hold that a compensable occupational
disease, within the meaning of our Act, is one resulting from the
peculiar nature of the employment, i.e., from working conditions which
produce the disease as a natural incident of the particular occupation,

162 ee
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attaching to that occupation a hazard different from, and in excess of,
the hazards attending employment in general. Compare Goldberg v. 954
Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 12 N.E.2d 311 (1938).

HHI Manifestly, the plaintiffs disability in the instant case
does not come within the above definition. Therefore, it may not be
classified as a compensable occupational disease within the meaning of
Sec. 2329. Compare Blake v. Bethlehem Steel Company, 225 Md. 196,
170 A.2d 204 (1961). Any other decision goes too far, we think,
toward a transformation of workmen’s compensation into health
insurance; and, as we have stated, this would be contrary to settled
policy in this State. Faline v. Guido and Francis DeAscanis & Sons,
supra.

There is this to be said about the line of New Jersey cases relied
upon in the Zallea Brothers case: they involved tuberculosis, skin
diseases, tendon contracture, and other maladies much closer to the
general conception of occupational disease than is a back ailment; they
seem to be based upon a broadening of the New Jersey Statute; and it
does not appear that the Supreme Court of New Jersey has yet spoken
on the subject.

It is concluded on this point that Sec. 2329 has no application in
the instant case. The decision of the Board to the contrary must be
reversed.

Vi

HM Having determined that Sec. 2329 is inapplicable, we
have looked at the Second Injury Fund provisions of Sec. 2327 we are
of the opinion that Sec. 2327 may be applicable in the present posture
of the case, in view of the Board’s finding that the injury of December
30, 1960 “aggravated the pre-existing back disability.” Since the
plaintiff's claim is for total disability, the defendant may be entitled to
have compensation paid out of the Second Injury Fund.

Accordingly, the case is remanded to the Board for the further

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Le

purpose of hearing evidence, if necessary, and making findings of fact
and conclusions of law as to the application of Sec. 2327.

BRK

The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded to the
Board for further proceedings consistent herewith.

THE STATE OF DELAWARE v. JOHN MATUSHEFSKE.

164

WN

1

a

Lh

(October 1, 1965)
DUFFY, P. J. sitting.
Jay H. Conner and Charles L. Paruszewski, for the State.

Victor F. Battaglia and Hiram W. Warder, for defendant, John
Matushefske.

Superior Court of Delaware for New Castle County. No. 959
Criminal Action 1963.

CL i__|
i__|
DUFFY, President Judge, charging the Jury:

Members of the Jury, in this case the defendant, John
Matushefske, is charged with violating the law in the performance of his
duties as a Justice of the Peace. You are concerned only with this
charge. You are not to determine the guilt or innocence of any other
person with respect to any other charge or possible charge. The case
which you are called upon to decide is the case of State v. John
Matushefske, and this case only.

The charge is based on an indictment returned by the Grand
Jury of this County on September 17, 1963. Specifically, it is charged
that on or about July 3, 1963, the defendant violated a Delaware
statute in the way in which he proceeded in and disposed of a case
brought before him as a Justice of the Peace. That particular case
involved a prosecution by the State against one William T. Chipman
upon a charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in
violation of 21 Del. C. Sec. 4111(a).

HHH The defendant denies that he is guilty of any offense
charged against him by the State. And at this time I should also note
that the fact that the Grand Jury indicted the defendant is not to be
considered by you as evidence of his guilt of any crime. Whether he is
or is not guilty is for you to determin from the evidence which has been
presented during the trail. If your recollection of the evidence differs
from anything said about it by counsel, or by the Court, you must be
guided entirely by your recollection. Determination of the true facts,
and the drawing of any inferences from the proven facts, are matters
solely within your province. State v. Winsett, Del. Super., 205 A.2d 510
(1964).

HHI it is the Court’s duty to instruct you as to the law to be
applied by you to the facts, and it is your duty to follow the law as
outlined to you by the Court, and apply it to the facts as you find them
to be.

167
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As to the law, I first call to your attention a Delaware statute, 11
Del, C. Sec. 5910(a), dealing with the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

“When complaint is made in due form to a justice of the peace,
alleging that an offense has been committed, the justice shall carefully
examine the complainant on oath or affirmation and if he considers
there is probable ground for the accusation, he shall issue his warrant.”

Hl This means that when a complaint is made to a Justice of
the Peace that a crime has been committed, the Justice must swear the
person who makes the complaint. And after that person takes an oath
to tell the truth the Justice is to examine him or question him or take
his story. In short, the person who makes the complaint must state the
basis for it under oath to the Justice. And then if the Justice is satisfied
that there is probable ground for the accusation, he issues a warrant of
arrest for the person accused.

In proceedings on arrest and when the arrested person is taken
before a justice of the peace, this then brings into play another statute
which the defendant is here accused of violating. That statute, which is
11 Del. C. Sec. 5913, reads in full as follows:

“Upon the arrest of any person according to the provision of this
chapter, the justice of the peace, before whom he is brought in the
county where the offense was committed, shall try the case so far as to
determine whether the defendant ought to be discharged, or bound for
his appearance at court, or held to answer finally before the justice. In
which last case, the justice shall proceed to hear fully and to determine
the case. But if the matter is not properly cognizable before the justice
for final decision, he shall commit, or bind the party for his appearance
at the court having cognizance of the case.”

This statute means that when a person under arrest is
brought before a Justice of the Peace he must try the case, or hear the
case, up to a point where he can determine which of three categories

168

applies to the case. These are:

(1) The State does not have enough evidence to support a case
against the person accused and that person should therefore be
discharged; or

(2) The Justice does not have jurisdiction to hear the case
because a justice may not hear cases involving the offense charged, and
therefore the person accused should be held to appear in another court;
or

(3) The State does have at least a prima facie case against the
accused and the Justice has jurisdiction to hear the case and he should
therefore proceed to hear all the evidence fully and determine the case.

The Justice of the Peace is not obliged or required to determine
which of these categories applies when a person is first brought before
him following the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The Justice may grant
the accused a continuance for a reasonable time. And the Justice of the
Peace is not required to make the determination as to these categories
at the same time, that is, on the same day or at the same hearing. At
one time he may hear enough of the case to determine that he has
jurisdiction, and hear the balance of the case later. Or he may do it all
at one time or in one hearing.

But once the Justice of the Peace has determined or
decided that the State has a prima facie case and that it should be heard
in his Court, the Justice then must “proceed to hear fully and to
determine” that case.

When must he do this? As to this, the statute fixes no special
time, but the law is that he must do this within a reasonable time. And
what is reasonable depends upon all the circumstances surrounding the
case,

Hs How must he hear the case on its merits? Several

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things are pertinent as to this. First, the Justice must give the parties
reasonable notice of the time of a hearing. The parties in a criminal case
are the State, on the one side, and the accused, on the other side.
Notice to the State could be given by either notice to the Attorney
General or notice to the person who made the complaint on which the
warrant was based. It could also be given in any other way reasonably
likely, under the facts of the case, to advise the State of the time fixed
for hearing. The Justice of the Peace has no duty to give notice to
individual witnesses. He has no duty to call persons to testify before
him. His duty is to give notice to the parties, that is, to the State and to
the accused. Second, the Justice must give reasonable opportunity to
the parties, that is, to the State and to the accused, to present
witnesses, to hear the witnesses presented by the opposing side and, of
course, to cross-examine those witnesses. And, third, he must decide
the case upon the evidence presented by the witnesses at the hearing.
The Justice cannot decide the case on its merits by taking into
consideration, in any way, the evidence which he took or received
before he issued the warrant of arrest.

Such is the law with respect to proceedings before a Justice of
the Peace.

Hs [ tum now to the specific charges in this case. The State
makes two contentions, both of which I will submit for your
determination. The first of these is a charge known as nonfeasance in
office. Specifically, the State contends that the defendant did not give
it notice, through its witnesses or in any other way, of the date of a
hearing and that the defendant did not hear its witnesses before
deciding the case against William T. Chipman. I should note here that a
Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction to hear and determine a charge of
driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.

Nonfeasance by a public officer is a crime. A
Delaware Justice of the Peace is a public officer. And nonfeasance by a
public officer is the willful failure or neglect to perform a duty imposed

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upon him by law. Under a charge of nonfeasance the State is not
tequired to show that an accused who wilfully failed or neglected to
perform his duty was influenced by a corrupt or evil motive. Such a bad
motive is not a necessary element of the crime of non-feasance. The
State must show, rather, the existence of a duty imposed upon the
accused by law, and the wilful or intentional failure or neglect by the
accused to perform that duty. See State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.
2d 63 (1953); State v, Lally, 80 N.J. Super. 502, 194 A, 2d 252 (Super.
Ct., 1963). Compare In re Tull, 25 Del. 126, 78 A. 299 (Super. Ct.,
1910); 43 Am.Jur., Public Officers, Sec, 278; 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law
and Procedure, Sec. 1406.

I have already outlined to you the duties imposed by law upon
this defendant as a Justice of the Peace. If you find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he wilfully failed or neglected to give the State
notice of the date of hearing for the Chipman case, or that he did not
hear its witnesses before deciding that case, then you may return a
verdict of “Guilty of Nonfeasance in Office.” But if you are not so
satisfied, or if you have a reasonable doubt in the matter, then your
verdict as to the charge of nonfeasance in office should be, “Not
Guilty.”

I now turn to the second contention made by the State. This is a
charge known as misfeasance in office. Specifically, the State contends
that the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully made a finding of not
guilty and dismissed the prosecution against William T. Chipman.

Misfeasance by a public officer is a crime. As I have
already said, a Delaware Justice of the Peace is a public officer.
Misfeasance by a public officer, in the context of this case, is the
performance of a discretionary act with an improper or corrupt motive.
Commonweath v. Peoples, 345 Pa. 576, 28 A. 2d 792 (1942). See, also,
Allas v. Borough of Rumson, 115 N.J.L. 593, 181 A. 175, 102 A.L.R.
648 (1935); 67 C.J.S. Officers Sec. 133.

HHMI Under a charge of misfeasance the State is required to
show that the act in question was a discretionary one, and that in doing

Po 17
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it the accused acted with a corrupt or evil intent. As to intent, this may

be proved by direct evidence as to the state of mind of an accused, or it

may be inferred from other facts which are proved to the jury’s
satisfaction.

As a Justice of the Peace this defendant had the power to
dispose of the prosecution against Mr. Chipman. After reasonable
notice to the State he had the power to dismiss the charge for lack of
prosecution. How the defendant exercised that power was discretionary
on his part. If you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
made a finding of not guilty and dismissed the prosecution against Mr.
Chipman and that this was done by the defendant with an improper or
corrupt motive or intent, then you may return a verdict of “Guilty of
Misfeasance in Office.” But if you are not so satisfied, or if you have a
reasonable doubt as to this, then your verdict as to the charge of
misfeasance in office should be “Not Guilty.”

HH Circumstantial evidence is received in both civil and
criminal cases, Circumstantial evidence is where some facts being
proved, another fact follows as a natural or very probable conclusion
from the facts actually proved. It is the inference of a fact from other
facts proved; and the fact thus inferred is taken for granted, until the
contrary is proved.

Circumstantial evidence, in order to warrant a
conviction or to prove a point, must be sufficient to satisfy you beyond
a reasonable doubt. The rule is, that where evidence is solely
circumstantial, the jury must be satisfied (1) that the circumstances are
consistent with the accused’s having committed the act in question, and
(2) that the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable
conclusion. In short, a fact established by such evidence must be such
as to exclude any other reasonable conclusion. Evidence as to good
character or good reputation may be considered by you, if it is proved
to your satisfaction. It is to be given such weight, under the
circumstances of the case, as you think it is entitled to have — no more,
no less,

172 PO

HH if you find the testimony to be conflicting by reason of
inconsistencies, it is your duty to reconcile it, if reasonably possible, so
as to make one harmonious story of it all. But if you cannot do this,
then it is your duty and privilege to give credit to that portion of the
testimony which, in your judgment, is most worthy of credit and
disregard entirely any portion of the testimony which, in your
judgment, is unworthy of credit. In so doing, you should take into
consideration the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before
you, their apparent fairness in giving their testimony, their
opportunities for learning and knowing the facts about which they
testified, and any bias or interest that they may have concerning the
outcome of this proceeding.

HMMs This defendant, like every other person brought to
trial in a criminal proceeding in this State, is presumed to be innocent
until his guilt is established to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a
reasonable doubt. The burden of proving the commission of the offense
rests upon the State. If, after carefully considering the evidence, you
have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, you should give him
the benefit of such doubt. But proof beyond a reasonable doubt, does
not mean that the guilt of the accused must be established to an
absolute certainty. Such a requirement would be impracticable and
unreasonable.

HHL Reasonable doubt does not mean a vague, speculative
doubt, nor a mere possible doubt, but a substantial doubt; it is such a
doubt as intelligent, reasonable and impartial men may honestly
entertain after a careful and conscientious consideration of the evidence
in the case.

After a careful and conscientious consideration of the evidence
in the case you may return the following verdicts:

(1) As to nonfeasance in office: If you believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed that crime as I have
defined it to you, then your verdict should be “Guilty of Nonfeasance
in Office.” However, if you do not so believe, or if you have a

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reasonable doubt about it, then your verdict as to this charge should be
“Not Guilty.”

(2) As to misfeasance in office: If you believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed that crime as I have
defined it to you, then your verdict should be “Guilty of Misfeasance in
Office.” However, if you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable
doubt about it, then your verdict as to this charge should be “Not
Guilty.”

oe ae

After the jury had deliberated a number of hours, the Court
further instructed the jury as follows:

I do want to say to you that this case is an important one and
the trial itself has been long and expensive. Your failure to agree will
necessitate another expensive trial. The Court is of the view that the
case could not have been better or more exhaustively tried than it has
been on each side in this case. It is therefore desirable, if possible, that
you reach a verdict.

HH) The Court certainly does not desire that any juror
surrender his or her conscientious convictions; but, on the other hand,
each juror should conscientiously and honestly perform his or her duty
according to the law and the evidence which you have heard in the case.
And of course a verdict to which any juror agrees must be the
conviction of that person. The verdict to which he agrees must be the
result of his convictions and it ought not to be a mere acquiescence in
or an agreement to the conclusion of some other member or members
of the panel. But in order to get twelve persons, twelve minds, to agree
to a unanimous result, you must examine the questions which have
been submitted and which are proposed by the trial itself, with candor
and with a proper amount of deference and understanding of the views
expressed by the other members of the jury.

You ought to consider that the case must be decided at some

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time and that you were selected in the same way and from the same
source from which any other jury might be selected for this very
purpose. There is no reason to suppose at all that the case which has
been tried would at any time be submitted to twelve men and women
who are more intelligent or more capable or impartial or competent to
decide the case. And you should not consider that in another trial more
evidence might be presented on either side.

You may conduct your deliberations as you choose, but the
Court requests that you again retire and carefully consider the evidence
which you have heard in this case during the trial. Return to your jury
room and conduct your deliberations as you choose, but I do ask that

you look again at the evidence in the light of these comments which I
have just made.

HOMER C. MALCOM, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. LOUISE H.
DEMPSEY. Defendant Below, Appellee.

(December 3, 1965)
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

Julian D. Winslow, for plaintiff below, appellant.

George L. Sands and Carl W. Mortenson, for defendant below,
appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 73, 1965.

175

PER CURIAM.

As may be seen from our prior decision reported at 209 A.2d
159 (1965), this case, a negligence action, was remanded to the
Superior Court for new trial. It appears that, on the remand, the
plaintiff attempted to obtain final disposition of the cause by summary
judgment rather than by trial. The Superior Court denied the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and ordered the case for trial.

The action of the Superior Court was correct because it
was in conformity with the mandate of this Court. Moreover, the denial
of summary judgment is not appealable because, as is generally the case,
it neither adjudicated any legal right nor settled any substantial issue.
Alexander Industries v. Hill, Del., 211 A.2d 917 (1965); Haveg
Corporation et al. v. Guyer, Del., 211 A.2d 910 (1965).

The appeal is dismissed.

ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF NEW CASTLE COUNTY,
Delaware, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. DRAGON RUN
TERRACE, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware,
Petitioner Below, Appellee.

l

176 ee

(December 28, 1965)
WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J.J., sitting.
Clarence W. Taylor and Arthur J. Sullivan, for appellant.
Ralph F. Keil and Carl Goldstein, for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 74, 1965.

|

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

Appellee, Dragon Run Terrace, Inc., has moved to dismiss the
appeal of the Zoning Board of Adjustment of New Castle County on
the ground that the Board is not a party aggrieved by the judgment
below and, hence, has no standing to appeal.

This litigation began with the application of Dragon Run to the
Board under 9 Del.C., Sec. 2616, for a special permit for a trailer park
under Article 4, Sec. 2(8) of the New Castle County Zoning Code. The
Board denied the application. Dragon Run then sought review of the
Board’s decision by Writ of Certiorari pursuant to 9 Del.C. Sec. 2618.

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The Board, without objection by Dragon Run and pursuant to the Writ,
appeared before the Superior Court as the sole respondent and actively
defended its decision. Ultimately, the Superior Court reversed the
Board’s decision. Then followed this appeal.

Dragon Run argues that since the Board exercises quasi-judicial
functions, it is not a party to the proceedings before it and therefore
has no legal interest in maintaining its decision. This being so, it is
argued, the Board may not appeal from a judgment setting its decision
aside since it is not a party aggrieved. Cited in support of the argument
is 4 Am Jur.2nd, Appeal and Error, Sec. 234; 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error
Sec. 205; Miles v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540, 117 A.LR.
207; Lansdowne Borough Board of Adjustment, 313 Pa. 523, 170, A.
867, and numerous other cases to the same effect.

The Board is established by 9 Del.C., Sec. 2613 and by reason of
9 Del.C., Sec. 2616 is empowered to hear appeals brought to it by any
person aggrieved by either the grant or refusal of a building permit or
any decision made under the zoning regulations. The Board is granted
certain powers upon appeals to it by 9 Del.C., Sec. 2617.

By reason of Sec. 2617 the Board is empowered to correct error
in any decision made in the enforcement of the zoning regulations, to
decide requests for special questions and special exceptions, and in
cases of hardship to grant variances from the zoning regulation.

Appeals from decisions of the Board to the Superior Court are
authorized by 9 Del.C., Sec. 2618 to be taken by any person aggrieved
by the Board’s decision, by any taxpayer, or by any officer of the
county. The appeal is by way of Writ of Certiorari directed to the
Board requiring it to return the record upon which its decision was
based. .

In Nepi v. Lammot (City of Wilmington), 2 Storey 281, 156
A.2d 413, on appeal to the Superior Court from a decision of the
Wilmington Board of Adjustment it was held that the Board of

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Adjustment was the only indispensable party to the appeal to the
Superior Court from the Board’s decision, Furthermore, in Auditorium,
Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 8 Terry 373, 91 A.2d 528, this Court
accepted and decided an appeal from the Superior Court sitting in
review of a decision of the Wilmington Board of Adjustment in which
the Board of Adjustment was the only appellee. The decision is implicit
approval of the status of the Board as a party litigant.

The Wilmington Board of Adjustment under the Wilmington
Zoning Code is to all intents and purposes a counterpart in the City of
the County Zoning Board of Adjustment. 22 Del.C., Sec. 327 confers
upon it substantially the same powers which are conferred upon the
County Zoning Board of Adjustment by 9 Del.C., Sec. 2617, and
appeals from the decision of the City Board of Adjustment by reason of
22 Del.C., Sec. 328 are taken in substantially the same manner as are
appeals from the County Zoning Board of Adjustment under 9 Dei.C.,
Sec. 2618.

II We think there is no practical difference between the two
and that, accordingly the Nepi and Auditorium cases are pertinent
authority for the allowance of an appeal by the County Zoning Board.

Furthermore, we think Dragon Run is in error in
arguing that the Board is a quasi-judicial tribunal and, as such, subject
to the general rule that it has no standing as a litigant to defend its
decision. It is argued that under 9 Del.C., Sec. 2617(1) the Board has
the quasi-judicial duty of hearing appeals urging error in decisions made
by Zoning officials, but at the same time Sec. 2617(2) and (3) confer
upon the Board the power to grant special exceptions and variances. We
do not understand this latter function to be the exercise of a
quasi-judicial function. The exercise of these powers is the discharge of
an adminstrative or delegated function.

In point of fact, this appeal involves a decision of the Board
made under its adminstrative function. In so functioning, the Board is
more comparable to the Public Service Commission, the right of which
to appeal to this Court has never been questioned. Application of

179

Diamond State Tel. Co., 10 Terry 203, 113 A.2d 437; Application of
Diamond State Tel. Co., 1 Storey 525, 149 A.2d 324; Application of
Wilmington Suburban Water Corp., Del., 211 A.2d 602.

While the decisions cited to us by Dragon Run and, in
particular, Miles v. McKinney, supra, hold to the contrary, we decline
to follow them. We think that while the Board is only an agency of the
county, has no corporate existence and has no direct interest in the
outcome of the litigation, it nevertheless represents the public interest
in the protection and enforcement of the zoning regulations. As the
guardian of the public interest, it therefore has standing to defend its
decision on appeal, particularly in view of the fact that it is the only
indispensable party before the Superior Court. See Board of
Adjustment of City of Fort Worth y. Stovall, 147 Tex. 366, 216 S.W.2d
171; Patkin v. City of Medford, 332 Mass. 754, 124 N.E.2d 249;
Cunningham v. Leimkuehler (Mo.App.), 276 S.W.2d 633, and Rommell
v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16, 15 A.2d 6.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the appeal is
denied.

JOHN H. PHILLIPS, JR., and BEATRICE D. PHILLIPS, his wife,
Plaintiffs—-Below, v. DELAWARE POWER & LIGHT
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff—Below, Appellants, v. The MAYOR AND COUNCIL
OF the CITY OF WILMINGTON, a municipal corporation, and
Dabson Paving Company, a Delaware corporation, Defendants
and Third-Party Defendants—Below, Appellees.

180

(January 7, 1966)

CAREY, Justice, and MARVEL and SHORT, Vice-Chancellors,
sitting.

Clement C. Wood, of Allmond & Wood, for plaintiffs below,
appellants.

Roger Sanders, of Prickett & Prickett, for defendant and
third-party plaintiff below, appellant.

Alfred M. Isaacs, of Flanzer & Isaacs, for the Mayor and Council
of City of Wilmington, appellee.

William F. Taylor, of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, for

Dabson Paving Co., appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 20, 1965.

CAREY, Justice.

The action below was a suit in Superior Court for damages
caused by an explosion of gas which came into plaintiffs’ home from a
gas main. The Court below granted summary judgment on the ground
that the affidavits, depositions and other materials in the record failed,
as against appellees, to show negligence or proximate cause. Plaintiffs
and third-party plaintiff have appealed.

Plaintiffs (Phillips) originally sued Delaware Power and Light
Company (Delaware) alone, since the gas came from Delaware’s main in
the bed of Twenty-seventh Street in Wilmington. Delaware filed a
third-party complaint against the Mayor and Council of Wilmington
(City) and Dabson Paving Company (Dabson) on the theory that
certain resurfacing work that had previously been done on
Twenty-seventh Street was performed negligently and was the cause of
a break in the gas main, which it alleged was the true cause of the
explosion. Thereafter, Phillips amended their complaint by adding both
City and Dabson as defendants, charging negligence upon a theory
similar to that in the third-party complaint.

The explosion occured in the middle of the month of January,
and the repaving work had been done the preceding fall, The work was
carried out by Dabson under a contract with City, which had provided
the specifications. There were spots along Twenty-seventh Street which
had previously given trouble to City because the earth under the
pavement was apparently not sufficiently solid or firm to support the
pavement. To prevent further trouble of this sort, the old paving and
the sub-surface materials at those spots were removed to a depth of
about eighteen inches, the holes filled with select gravel, and eight

182 Pe
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inches of concrete poured on top of the gravel, thus making a “patch”.
After the patching, the whole street bed was covered with five inches of
hard-mix asphalt, packed with a roller. The gas main here involved was
three feet under the original surface. It was made of cast iron, eight
inches in diameter. It had been in use about thirty-three years.

After the explosion, Delaware found a fresh break in the pipe
from which gas was escaping, the break extending completely around
the circumference of the pipe. The break was not directly under, but
was near, a slab or patch laid by Dabson as described above. The
evidence justifies a finding that the explosion resulted from gas escaping
through this break, following the line of least resistance through the
ground around the service line, and entering plaintiffs’ home.

The vital question is whether there is any evidence in the record
to justify a finding that the break in the main was caused by any act of
the appellees.

The theory advanced by appellants is that the break was a
“tension” break, caused either by the weight of the machinery used to
patch the street surface, or by the weight of the slab laid. Two
witnesses testified that this “could” be the correct explanation. Only
one expert, however, was questioned as to the probable cause. This was
Mr. Clift, an officer of Delaware. We quote the significant parts of his
testimony:

“Q—Could that main have fractured because of cold weather?
A-Yes.
Q-It could have?

oe OR Ok

Q Then do you say that this piece of pipe broke because of force
applied to it, applied to it from somewhere else and not being,

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shall we say malleable or not bendable, that it just fractured?

A-—It was a characteristic fracture of a cast iron main, let me just say
that. We have many many cast iron mains break in our system,
many of them; not very many of mains of this size, most of the
mains that we have break are three-inch and four-inch mains which.
aren’t physically as strong as this and this differed very little from
the fractures of the mains that we dig up every year, find and dig
up.

Q-wWhat are the causes of these breaks that you have just been talking
about, these fractures or breaks that you have just been talking
about, some of the causes?

A—Well, you put your finger on one. Most of them occur during the
winter when the frost level has gone down. The causes are
probably brought about by ground stresses due to the frost and
also the transmission of traffic shock due to the frost to the main,
because cast iron mains are more susceptible to fracture because of
shock than steel. That about covers the water-front on why it
would break.

Q—This main was below the frost line?

A-I don’t know the amount of frost that was in that ground at the
time this occurred but my answer to that, I would say yes, that
there wasn’t frost down to the main at this point.

Q-There wasn’t frost down to the main?

A~I don’t believe there was.

Q-So we can’t attribute this break to frost?

A-Let me say that you can have strain by frost without the frost
encompassing the main.

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Q-I don’t quite understand that, maybe you could help me out?

A—Well, if you reduce the amount of cushion and I am speaking of
earth, and replace it with a solid medium you are making the main
more susceptible to shock. If a main has thirty inches of cover—I
think this is three feet of cover, I think they have told me that is
what it was—and we have a frost penetration of let’s say two feet
we have a cushion of one foot over the main and it makes it more
susceptible to the shock that is brought about, and also susceptible
to the strain.

So in my opinion it could have happened by frost or it could have
happened because of the manner in which the repairs were made in
the street.” ,

a

Q-—Now, do you have any theory that the placing of the slab by the
city of which we have just spoken some thirty feet to the east of
the break in the main had anything to do whatever with the break?

A-—TI have read the report of the engineer who places the fault of the
break on the slab and there is some merit in what he says that it
could have imposed strains sufficient perhaps to break the main
and it may have been a contributing factor; but having seen many
breaks in the winter I would not say with any confidence that that
is the reason that this main broke.”

ek eR oe

It seems obvious to us that Mr. Clift’s testimony at most
means that the break was just as likely to have been caused by frost as
by the slab or repair work. No expert witness has testified to anything
more than the possibility—not probability—that the acts of appellees
caused the break. Appellants point to the remark made by Mr. Clift
indicating that some unnamed engineer had placed “the fault for the
break on the slab.” The statement must be ignored because we do not

ee 185
id

have in the record any affidavit or deposition or even a report of this
engineer. Any consideration by a Court of a motion for summary
judgment is limited to the types of matters included within Superior
Court Rule 56, Del. C. Ann., unless good reason has been given why
affidavits cannot be presented. Counsel in this case were allowed more
than ample opportunity to perfect their record, but saw fit not to
introduce the unknown engineer’s report or testimony.

HE Obviously, the present situation is one in which the
assistance of experts is needed. As was said by Justice Stern in Lott v.
People’s Natural Gas Co., 324 Pa. 517, 188 A. 582:

“A layman could not be expected to know or fully appreciate
the laws of mechanics governing the problem involved. Questions as to
the elastic limit of steel, the tensile strength of the pipe, the pressure
that, in order to bend or break it, would have to be exerted at a given
point by a given force acting in a given direction and at a certain
distance, and the principles appertaining to leverage and fulcrums, are
matters requiring technical knowledge and experience beyond the range
of those who have not made them the subject of special study.”

To the same effect are Hardwick v. Kansas City Gas Co., 355
Mo. 100, 195 S.W. 2d 504, 166 A.L.R. 556 and Empire State Ins. Co.
of Watertown, N. Y. v. Guerriero, 193 Md, 506, 69 A.2d 259.

The following language from Jutras v. Satters, Inc., 96 N.H. 300,
75 A.2d 712 is pertinent:

“If a case cannot be decided intelligently by application to the
evidence of common knowledge or such as results from the experience
and the observation of the ordinary jury but requires technical
knowledge that comes from special experience or training, then, in the
absence of such technical knowledge, the plaintiff fails to establish a
case, Otherwise the jury would be deciding the case on conjecture
rather than reason.”

See also 20 Am. Jur. 647; 2 Jones on Evidence (5th ed.) 834; 2

186 Pe
=

Harper and James, Law of Torts 1116; Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) 245.

There can be instances where, even though the experts are
unable to give an opinion of probability, other evidence shows the
likelihood of a given cause. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 3
Storey 74, 164 A.2d 686. No such evidence is pointed out to us in this
case.

HH Citation of authority is unnecessary for the proposition
that a plaintiff may not recover when he shows nothing more than mere
possibility of causal connection between alleged wrongdoing and an
injury; something more is required; yet that possibility is all that is
shown by the record in this case. If the action were to be tried and no
other testimony were then presented than is now before us, any finding
of causation would necessarily be based upon speculation and
conjecture. In short, the trial Court would be duty bound to direct a
verdict in favor of appellees. The Court below was accordingly correct
in entering summary judgment on the basis of the lack of evidence of
causation. We need not, therefore, discuss the allegations of negligence
against the appellees.

| Appellants have raised a question concerning a statement
in the lower Court’s opinion which they interpret to mean that, on a
motion for summary judgment, the burden is upon the resisting party
in the first instance to produce proper evidentiary material sufficient to
demonstrate the existance of a dispute of material fact. We think that
appellants have misunderstood the Court’s meaning. In several cases, we
have made it plain that the moving party has the initial burden; he has
the job of seeing that the record contains enough evidence to justify the
granting of his motion. If he fails, the resisting party need not introduce
anything into the record. But if the movant performs his initial job
satisfactorily, then his opponent is obliged to bring in some evidence
showing a dispute of material fact. Cf: Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 4 Storey
463, 180 A.2d 467. The Court below did not violate this rule. Its
statements were simply a shorthand way of saying that appellees had
enough in the record to justify thier motion, and, if appellants knew of
evidence indicating the contrary, they should have produced it in a

187

manner recognized by the Rule.

Appellants charge reversible error in that the Judge
privately consulted three or four engineers as to some aspects of the
case without informing counsel before making his decision. We have
previously expressed our disapproval of this practice. Barks v. Herzberg,
Del. 206 A.2d 507. Although the Judge’s action was improper, it is
presently immaterial because of the conclusion we have reached.
Anything those engineers said to the Judge is not before us and has not
been considered by us.

The judgment below must be affirmed.

JAMES V. NOVELLINO, Plaintiff Below, Appellant. v. LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, a
Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant Below, Appellee.

(January 18, 1966)

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J.J, sitting.
Harold Leshem and Harvey B. Rubenstein, for appellant.
Richard I.G. Jones, of Prickett & Prickett, for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. No. 77, 1965.

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WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, James V. Novellino, from the

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grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Life Insurance
Company of North America.

Novellino, on November 1, 1962, made application for an
accident and sickness insurance policy with the defendant, Life
Insurance Company, through the solicitation of an agent acting for the
defendant and its sales supervisor. At the time the solicitation was
made, Novellino was told that if he made application and paid
one-twelfth of the premium due, the coverage of the policy to be
written would be effective immediately. According, Novellino made
application, paid one-twelfth of the premium due for the policy for
which he applied, and received a “Receipt for Payment of Premium
With Application.”

The receipt thus delivered provides in pertinent part as follows:

“If the sum paid with respect to any policy applied for in the
application bearing the same number as this receipt, as stated in such
application, is at least one-twelfth (1/12) of an annual premium on such
policy but not less than $10.00: (a) insurance under the terms of such
policy but, in the case of a Life Insurance Policy, not in excess of
$100,000, shall take effect from the date of application, if the
Company at its Home Office shall be satisfied that on that date the
Proposed Insured, and his wife and all dependent children, if family
insurance is requested, and the Applicant, if Payor Insurance is
requested, was or were insurable at standard rates under its rules and
practices, and shall approve without modification insurance for the
amount and on the plan, applied for; * * *.”

On November 6, 1962, Novellino was given a physical
examination by a doctor chosen by the defendant Insurance Company.
As a result of that examination and as the further result of a medical
report on Novellino delivered by his personal physician dated March 15,
1962, the defendant Insurance Company, on November 21, 1962,
decided that Novellino did not qualify physically for the insurance for
which he had applied at the standard rates. On November 23, 1962 the
Insurance Company issued to Novellino a modified accident and

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sickness policy effective November 25, 1962. The premium previously
paid by Novellino was credited by the defendant Insurance Company to
this modified policy.

On November 21, 1962 Novellino was injured and was
hopitalized on November 26, 1962. He brings suit for benefits under
the policy for which he had first applied on the theory that the
policy was in effect as interim insurance on November 21, 1962
because of the payment by him of the premium and the delivery to him
by the agent of the receipt.

There is no question but that, in law, an Insurance
Company may be bound by interim contract for the period of time
between the date of application for a policy and the final approval by
the Company and the issuance of an actual policy. However, this occurs
only when the receipt or other paper delivered initially to the insured
so provides. In the absence of such a binder, the Insurance Company
does not become an insurer of the applicant until final approval by it of
the application. See Annotation, 2 A.L.R.2d. 952.

The question, therefore, is always whether or not the language of
the receipt or other paper delivered to the applicant provides for the
immediate effectiveness of the applied-for insurance. If the receipt
excludes the existence of interim insurance, then the Company is not
bound.

The language of insurance contracts or receipts
delivered to applicants is always construed against the Insurance
Company which has drafted them. This is not to say, however, that in
the guise of construction a court may rewrite a contract drafted by the
Insurance Company. Only when there is ambiguity in the language
employed or confusion in the deliberate selection of language does any
problem of construction arise. When the language employed is free of
doubt and contains no ambiguity, the applicant is bound by its plain
meaning for he is required to read what he agrees to when itis
presented to him. Prudential Insurance Co. Of America v. Litzke,
6 W.W.Harr. 592,179 A. 492; Holtz v. New York Life Insurance

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Company, 7 W.W.Harr. 1, 179 A. 497; 29 Am.Jur., Insurance, Secs,
246, 258.

We think the language of the receipt delivered to Novellino
is free from any ambiguity and is plain on its face. Accordingly, any
so-called construction of this lauguage would in effect be to write a new
contract between the parties. This may not be done.

HE We think it free from doubt on the face of the receipt that
the applied-for insurance was to take effect only if the Home Office of
the Insurance Company was satisfied’ that on the date of application
Novellino was insurable at standard rates for the insurance applied for.
This provision of the receipt can have but one meaning and Novellino is
bound by it.

TI The facts are clear that prior to any knowledge of
Novellino’s injury, and on the basis of a medical examination and a
medical report, the Company had determined that Novellino in fact was
not insurable at the standard rates. Coincidentally, this determination
took place on the same day on which Novellino was injured but that
circumstance is of no materiality.

Furthermore, the Company issued a modified insurance
policy to Novellino. We think this act on its part amounted toa
rejection of Novellino’s offer contained in his application for insurance
and a counter-offer on the part of the Insurance Company which
Novellino in turn was free to either accept or reject.

Novellino cites numerous cases in support of his position. These
are Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Cir.,160F.2d 599;
Union Life Insurance Company v. Rhinehart, 229 Ark. 388, 315
S.W.2d 920 Duncan v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St.
441, 31 N.E.2d 88; Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 24
420, 274 P.2d 633; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Grant, 9 Cit.,
268 F.2d 307, and Brunt v. Occidental Life Insurance of California,
223 Cal.App.2d 179, 35 Cal.Rptr. 492. All of the cited cases are either

192

cases in which there was in fact an ambiguity. in the binding receipt
delivered to the applicant, or are cases in which the court announcing
the rule of strict construction against the Insurance in effect rewrote
the contract between the parties

These cases are not applicable in the case at bar, first, because
we are not concerned with an ambiguous provision in the contract and,
second, because we may not find an ambiguity where none exists in
order to hold the Insurance Company liable.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment below is affirmed.
De

ALLIED AUTO SALES, INC., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. THE
PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS AND COMPANY OF THE
FARMERS BANK OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE,
Defendant Below, Appellee.

(January 26, 1966)

CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., and MARVEL, Vice Chancellor,
sitting.

Nathan P. Michlin, for plaintiff below, appellant.

James T. McKinstry, of Richards, Layton & Finger, for
defendant below, appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 51, 1965.

PO 193

HERRMANN, Justice:

This is an action for the recovery of the amount of a check as to
which the plaintiff depositor unsuccessfully attempted to stop
payment, and in payment of which the defendant bank issued its
cashier’s check.

These facts are undisputed:

The plaintiff was engaged in the used automobile business and
maintained a regular checking account with the defendant bank. In the
course of its business, the plaintiff's president, Samuel Woloshin, issued
a check payable to the order of Solomon Klein, covering the purchase
of an automobile. Immediately after Klein left the plaintiff's place of
business, Woloshin, having become suspicious that Klein had sold him a
stolen vehicle, telephoned the defendant’s nearby branch office and
directed the branch manager to refuse payment of the check. This
telephone conversation took place sometime between 2:00 and 2:20
P.M. Klein was at the branch office at the time of the telephone call. He
was thereupon informed that the plaintiff’s check, which he was then
tendering, would not be cashed because he was not a customer of the
bank. After Klein left with the check, the branch manager immediately
telephoned Woloshin, told him of the status of the matter, and
suggested that Woloshin call the bookkeeping department at the main
Wilmington office of the defendant bank if he wished to stop payment
of the check. Immediately thereafter, Woloshin telephoried the
defendant’s main Wilmington office, spoke with a clerk in the
bookkeeping department, and told her he wanted payment on the
check stopped, giving her the reason therefor, and stating the urgency
of the situation. Shortly after 2:30 p.m., Klein presented the plaintiffs
check to a teller at the defendant’s main Wilmington office, located
more than a mile from the branch office at which the check was first
presented. Klein was referred to the assistant cashier who telephoned
the supervisor of the bookkeeping department (located in the same
building) to ascertain whether the check was good. The reply was.that

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there were sufficient funds in the plaintiffs account to cover the check
and that there was no stop payment order. The supervisor was then
informed by the assistant cashier that the check was being paid, and he
was instructed to have the amount of the check held against the
account. In compliance with Klein’s request, the assistant cashier issued
a cashier’s check to Klein in payment of the plaintiff's check. At about
2:45 p.m., after the issuance of the cashier’s check and the departure of
Klein, the supervisor of the bookkeeping department learned of
Woloshin’s stop payment order “in the usual course of the banking
procedures” of the defendant. The next day, Klein presented the
cashier’s check at the defendant’s Smyrna branch; and it was paid. This
suit followed.

The plaintiffs basic contentions are that the defendant
wrongfully failed to stop payment on the check pursuant to the
plaintiff’s stop payment order; that, therefore, it was incumbent upon
the defendant to countermand its cashier’s check in order to forestall
ultimate payment to Klein. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals.

Negligence is the crux of the first facet of the plaintiff's claim,
the issues being whether the defendant exercised due and reasonable
care and diligence under the circumstances and, if not, whether such
failure was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss. National
Dredging Co. v. President, etc., of Farmers Bank of State of Delaware, 6
Pennewill 580, 69 A. 607, 16 L.R.A..N.S., 593 (1908); Thomas v. First
National Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954).

The question before us on the appeal is the usual one when
summary judgment has been granted in favor of the defendant in a
negligence action: Has the defendant discharged its burden to
demonstrate, to a reasonable certitude, that there is no issue of fact for
trial which, if resolved in favor of the plaintiff, would hold the
defendant liable to the plaintiff on the claim? Williamson v. Wilmington
Housing Authority, Del., 208 A.2d 304 (1965).

We are unable to say that there is no such issue. The ultimate

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question in the case is whether the defendant’s employees, in the
bookkeeping department at its main office, acted with due and
reasonable care and diligence, in response to the plaintiffs stop
payment order, in view of the fact that the order was not of record in
the bookkeeping department when the assistant cashier made inquiry of
that department regarding the status of the account, before issuing the
cashier’s check to Klein. We cannot say, on the record before us at this
stage, that the answer to that question must be in favor of the
defendant; we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the defendant’s
employees were not negligent under the circumstances of this case. The
answer conceivably may hinge upon evidence at trial concerning the
customary banking practices and procedures that should have been
followed in this type of situation, and whether those practices and
procedures were observed in this instance—matters not apparent in the
present record.

Accordingly, we must conclude that the defendant has failed to
sustain its burden in support of its motion for summary judgment; that
entry of summary judgment in the defendant’s favor was error; and that
the cause must be remanded for trial of the issues of negligence and
proximate cause.

Determination of the negligence issue will dispose, we think, of
the question of whether the defendant had a right, and if so a duty to
countermand its cashier’s check for the protection of the plaintiff. If
the trier of fact finds the negligence and proximate cause issues in favor
of the plaintiff, it would appear that the second facet of the case will
not be reached. If, on the other hand, those issues are decided in the
defendant’s favor, there will be no basis remaining to support a
contention that the cashier's check was issued without
consideration—the sine qua non of the plaintiffs argument that the
defendant had both the right and the duty to countermand the cashier’s
check. See Polotsky v. Artisans Savings Bank, 7 W.W Harr. 151, 188 A.
63, 107 A.L.R. 1458 (1936); Dakota Transfer and Storage Company v.
Merchants National Bank and Trust Company, N.D., 86 N.W.2d 639
(1957); 5B Michie “Banks and Banking” Sec. 251; Johnson v. First
State Bank, 144 Minn. 363, 175 N.W. 612, 9 A.L.R. 960 (1920);

196

Rosenbaum v. First National City Bank, 13 A.D.2d 100, 213 N.Y.S.2d
513 (1961); 10 Am.Jur.(2d) “Banks” Secs, 543, 544, 569, 643;9 C.J.S.
Banks and Banking Sec. 173; 56 A.L.R. 532; 107 A.LR. 1463. In
either event, we think, the second question will become academic.

For the reasons stated, the summary judgment must be reversed
and the cause remanded.

NELLIE O’HARA, individually and as next friend of Thomas O’Hara,
Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. PETRILLO BROS., INC., a
Delaware corporation, Defendant Below, Appellee, v. WAYNE
HORNER and Harry Hitchens, minors, Third-Party Defendants
Below, Appellees.

(VJanuary 24, 1966)

WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

Vincent A. Theisen and Victor F. Battaglia, of Theisen & Lank, for

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plaintiff be w, appellant.

Alfred M. Isaacs, of Flanzer & Isaacs, for defendant below,
appellee.

William F. Taylor, of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, and
Theodore F. Sandstrom, of Killoran & Van Brunt, for third-party
defendants below, appellees.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 60, 1965.

HERRMANN, Justice.

The determinative question on this appeal, in the view we take of
the case, is whether the trial court erred in directing a jury verdict in
favor of the defendant and third-party defendants on the ground, inter
alia, that under the plaintiffs evidence he was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.

This negligence action was brought against the defendant Petrillo
Bros., Inc. (hereinafter “Petrillo”) for injuries suffered by the minor
Thomas O’Hara (herein referred to as the plaintiff, although the action
is brought by his next friend as plaintiff) as the result of the explosion
of a blasting cap. Petrillo was in the business of quarrying stone. The
plaintiff's action is based upon Petrillo’s alleged failure to exercise due
care and caution in the storage of blasting caps. Petrillo named as
third-party defendants Wayne Horner (hereinafter (Wayne”) and Harry
Hitchens (hereinafter “Harry”), friends and companions of the
plaintiff.

Accepting the plaintiff’s evidence for present purposes:

On a Sunday at about noon, Wayne, then 11, and Harry, then 12,
entered Petrillo’s quarry premises through openings in the fence, as

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they had several times before, searching for pigeons which they knew
nested in the open garage building. The boys found a box of blasting
caps in an unlocked cabinet, and a length of fuse and some matches
nearby. After firing several of the caps in the quarry, the boys divided
the remaining caps between them and left Petrillo’s premises. Later,
Wayne went to a nearby bowling alley, and took several of the caps
with him. While at the bowling alley, Wayne exploded several caps and
heard Harry exploding some of his in a nearby wooded area. Wayne
joined Harry and proceeded to explode all the caps he had with him.
Harry and Wayne then parted.

The plaintiff met Harry as he was leaving the wooded area. At the
time, the plaintiff was past 14 years of age, doing very well in the ninth
grade at school, and was a “smart little boy” according to his mother.
He had had home and scouting training with respect to the hazards of
matches and fires. The plaintiff had been at the bowling alley and heard
“oud bangs” coming from the wooded area where Harry and Wayne
were exploding caps. Curious to know what the noises were, the
plaintiff entered the wooded area, met Harry and asked him what was
happening. Although Harry did not reply, the plaintiff saw that he was
holding a box and asked, “Can I have a couple?” Harry gave the
plaintiff two blasting caps from the box and the boys parted. The
plaintiff did not know that he had been given blasting caps; based upon
some experience he had had with rifles and rifle ammunition, he
thought he had rifle cartridges without the lead bullet tops. He knew
that a fired cartridge has nicks and dents around the base and, seeing no
such marks on the objects handed him by Harry, he concluded that
they might be live cartridges. He decided to find out. Earlier, the
plaintiff had been building model airplanes with a friend. He borrowed
one of the models and went into the woods alone to “blow it up.” He
had had some experience with older boys in exploding large fire
crackers and in making and detonating homemade bombs. The plaintiff
first put one of the caps into the model plane with a fuse made of paper
but did not light the fuse. He then placed the second cap in the bank of
a ditch, lit a match, dropped it into the cap, ran across the ditch, and
hid behind a tree so that he would not be hurt by the explosion. When
nothing occurred after about a minute, the plaintiff returned and,

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seeing no smoke and thinking it was a dud cartridge, leaned down to

pick it up. As he did so, the cap exploded in his face and he was
seriously injured.

At the close of the plaintiff's case in the jury trial, the Superior
Court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and the third-party
defendants on the basis of the facts shown by the plaintiff's evidence.
The plaintiff appeals.

The ruling of the Trial Court and the contentions of the parties
involve various issues of negligence, contributory negligence and
proximate cause; but we confine ourselves to the issue of contributory
negligence because our conclusions as to that issue make the other
matters academic.

The ultimate question before us is the usual one when a verdict has
been directed in favor of the defendant in a negligence action: Under
any reasonable view of the evidence, would the jury have been justified
in returning a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant? Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 208 A.2d 495 (Del. 1965).

In our judgment, the only justifiable inference which can be
reasonably drawn from the above stated facts is that the plaintiff knew
that danger of injury was involved in exploding the object which he
thought was a cartridge. No other inference could be reasonably and
justifiably. drawn from the admitted fact that he ran quite a distance
and hid behind a tree to avoid injury when he thought that the
explosion was about to occur. Thus, knowing that he possessed some
kind of explosive which could be dangerous to his person, the plaintiff
exposed himself to the danger nevertheless.

HM Considering the plaintiff's maturity and capacity, his
ability to understand and appreciate the danger, his familiarity with
rifle shells, fireworks and homemade bombs, together with all of the
other circumstances of the accident, we are satisfied, from the

- plaintiffs own version of the facts, that reasonable minds could draw
but one inference therefrom: the plaintiff did not exercise ordinary

206 Po
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care; ie., that degree of care and caution which reasonably prudent
boys of the same age and intelligence would have exercised under like
circumstances. It follows that the plaintiff must be held guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. Pokoyski v. McDermott, 3
Storey 253, 167 A.2d 742 (1961). And the plaintiff is not aided by the
fact that he did not know a blasting cap from a rifle shell; for the legal
consequences of his course of conduct are not changed by his failure to
anticipate the exact manner in which the harm was to come to him
from the dangerous instrumentality to which he exposed himself.
Compare Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N.C. 782, 18 S.E.2d 412
(1942); Moore v. Order Minor Conventuals (4th Cir. 1959) 267
F.2d 296.

The plaintiff relies upon Boyd v. Hammond, 187 A.2d 413 (Del.
1963); Linthicum v. Truitt, 2 Boyce 338, 80 A. 245 (1911) and Weldon
v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. R. Co., 2 Pennew. 1, 43 A. 156 (1899). We
find nothing in those cases inconsistent with the views expressed here.

Accordingly, we conclude that the direction of a verdict in favor of
the defendant and third-party defendants was proper on the ground of
contributory negligence. In view of this conclusion, we need not pass
upon the parties’ other contentions.

The judgment below is affirmed.
—

WILLIAM HENRY DUPONT, Defendant Below, Respondent Below,
Appellant, v. DEBORAH ELDREDGE DUPONT, Plaintiff

Below, Petitioner Below, Appellee.

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Ganuary 27, 1966)

WOLCOTT, C. J., CAREY, J., and SHORT, Vice Chancellor,
sitting.

James L, Latchum and Charles S. Crompton, Jr., of Berl, Potter
& Anderson, for William Henry duPont.

Laurence H. Eldredge, Philadelphia, Pa., and S. Samuel Arsht
and Richard L, Sutton of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, for
Deborah Eldredge duPont.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 100, 1965.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant, William Henry duPont,
hereafter “father” from a final order entered in consolidated
proceedings in the Superior Court. The plaintiff, Deborah Eldredge
duPont, hereafter “mother,” former wife of the defendant, filed a
petition on September 7, 1965, seeking to have the father adjudged in
contempt in violation of the final decree of October 20, 1961 divorcing
the parties and purporting to award custody of the parties’ children to
the mother. On September 10, 1965 the mother filed a separate
petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of regaining
custody of the parties’ two older children, then living with the father.

The Superior Court denied motions to dismiss both petitions on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, and
consolidated both causes for trail. After trial, on November 12, 1965, a
final judgment was entered adjudging the father in contempt of court,
imposing sanctions upon him for contempt, and ordering him to deliver
the parties’s two older children to the custody of the mother within
four days, This appeal followed and, on application, a stay pending
final determination was granted, conditioned on accelerated briefing
and argument.

We take up first that portion of the final judgment adjudging the
father to be in contempt and imposing sanctions upon him.

The father was held in contempt, and costs and the payment of
the mother’s counsel fees were imposed as sanctions for that contempt.
The father argues that the order adjudging him in contempt is a nullity
because of lack of jurisdiction in the court.

The matter arises thus: In July, 1961, the mother commenced
divorce proceedings against the father, alleging desertion. The father

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appeared in the divorce action but made no contest. The action
culminated in a decree nisi. Prior thereto, in March, 1961, the parties
had entered into a separation agreement which, inter alia, provided for
support of the mother and the maintenance of their three children. By
the agreement, the father agreed that the mother should have sole
custody of the children. Until February, 1965 the parties’ three
children lived with the mother in Pennsylvania.

In October, 1961, the decree nisi became final. Shortly
thereafter, the mother requested the father to stipulate that the final
decree be revised nunc pro tunc so as to make it approve and
incorporate by reference the separation agreement. The final decree was
so revised by approved stipulation.

In February, 1965, the mother was admitted to a mental
hospital for a condition which proved to be temporary since she was
discharged as cured on March 10, 1965. On February 20, at the request
of the mother’s father, the father took custody of the two youngest
children and brought them from Pennsylvania to his home in Delaware.
The oldest daughter became a boarding student at the school she had
been attending but came to her father’s home on weekend visits. In
June, 1965, the youngest daughter, at her own request, was returned to
the custody of the mother in Pennsylvania. The father has retained
custody of the two older children despite requests by the mother for
their return. As a matter of fact, since June, 1965, the father and
mother have been engaged in litigation involving the custody and
maintenance of the two oldest children.

In September, 1965, the mother petitioned the Superior Court
that the father be held in contempt of court by reason of the retention
of custody by him of the two children in violation of the final decree of
divorce which had incorporated by reference the separation agreement
agreeing that the mother should have sole custody of the children.

The Superior Court held the father in contempt for willful
violation of the final divorce decree. The Superior Court held it had
jurisdiction to award custody of children in a final decree of divorce

212 ee

and to hold in contempt a party who willfully violated that award. The
rationale for the decision was that the Delaware Constitution
establishes one Superior Court as a state-wide court, and that,
therefore, 15 Del. C.,, Sec. 1510, which conferred jurisdiction upon the
Superior Court to award custody of children in a divorce proceeding,
was not legally amended in 1958 by 51 Laws, Ch. 29 purporting to
eliminate that jurisdiction of the Superior Court sitting in New Castle
County. While it is not expressly so stated, it seems apparent that
implicitly it was held that 51 Laws, Ch. 29, was unconstitutional.

HHS We disagree with the Superior Court in this respect. The
jurisdiction of the Superior Court over divorce and annulment depends
solely upon statute and not upon any provision of the Constitution.
Potter v. Potter, 9 W.W.Harr. 489, 2 A.2d 93; Brown v. Brown, 3 Terry
157, 29 A.2d 149. This being so, the General Assembly is at liberty to
confer jurisdiction over divorce in such manner as it may desire. This is
made plain by Article 4, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which authorizes
the General Assembly to create such statutory courts as it may desire.

In 1907, therefore, when the General Assembly recodified
divorce and annulment law, it had a free hand. It was not required to
confer such jurisdiction in the Superior Court. By 24 Laws, Ch. 211,
however, it did confer such jurisdiction upon the Superior Court sitting
in any of the counties of the state. This act contained no provision to
authorize the Superior Court in a divorce action to award custody of
children. In 1909 this was remedied by 25 Laws, Ch. 214, providing
that the Superior Court “within any of the Counties of the State” in a
divorce action could provide for custody of children. This act later
appears as 15 Del. C., Sec. 1510.

In 1958, the General Assembly by 51 Laws, Ch. 329, amended
15 Del. C., Sec. 1510, by providing that only in Kent and Sussex
Counties could the Superior Court award custody of children in divorce
proceedings. The effect was to eliminate that power of the Superior
Court sitting in New Castle County. The reason, apparently, was that
jurisdiction over custody of children had been conferred upon the
Family Court of New Castle County by 10 Del. C., Sec. 952. There was

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at that time no similar court in Kent and Sussex Counties.

[J The Superior Court relied upon Article 4, Sec. 7 of the
Constitution, Del. C. Ann., when it held that this power could not
partially be taken from it in New Castle County. Article 4, Sec. 7
provides that: “The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of all causes
of a civil nature, real, personal and mixed, at common law and all other
the jurisdiction and powers vested by the laws of this state in the
formerly existing Superior Court; * * *.” By Article 4, Sec. 17, the
General Assembly is empowered to repeal or alter any “Act of the
General Assembly giving jurisdiction” to the Superior Court.

We think, reading the two sections together, it is clear that the
General Assembly is prohibited from repealing or altering the common.
law civil jurisdiction of the Superior Court, but is authorized to change
or alter the statutory jurisdiction of that Court at will. Indeed, this
Court has so held with respect to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery, DuPont v. DuPont, 32 Del. Ch. 413, 85 A.2d 724. This
decision, by analogy, is pertinent in the case at bar. This is made clear
by the dictum of Justice Tunnell in his dissent in that case.

HN We are concermed in this case with an Act of Assembly
which purports to take away with respect to one county a statutorily
conferred power which had theretofore with respect to that county
been conferred upon the Family Court. We have no doubt that Article
4, Sec. 17 authorizes the General Assembly to do precisely this. It was
dealing with an Act of Assembly conferring jurisdiction and not with
the constitutionally solidified common law jurisdiction of the Superior
Court. It follows therefore that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction
in the divorce action between these parties to enter an order awarding
custody of the children to either. Therefore, the father could not have
been in contempt since the custody provision in the order was a nullity.
Mayer v. Mayer, 36 Del. Ch. 457, 132 A.2d 617. The approval and
incorporation by reference of the separation agreement accordingly
served no legal purpose since parties may not confer jurisdiction over
subject matter upon a court by consent. Annotation, 154 A.L.R. 445.

214 Pid
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As an alternative reason for the decision, the Superior Court held
that it was immaterial whether or not the Superior Court of New Castle
County had jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding to enter an order as to
custody of children, because it would admittedly have had jurisdiction
to enter such an order in a habeas corpus proceeding at the time of the
divorce decree. Accordingly, it was held the father was still guilty of
contempt because the order actually entered was valid as an equivalent
of an order of custody entered in a habeas corpus proceeding.

At the time of the divorce decree, the father was a
resident of Delaware and the mother was a resident of Pennsylvania. All
three children at the time were residents of Pennsylvania in the home of
the mother. It is obvious that the Superior Court could not have
obtained personal jurisdiction over the mother. The fact of her presence
in Delaware in connection with the divorce action did not make her
subject to service of process in Delaware. Woolley on Delaware Practice,
Sec. 122. Nor could jurisdiction over the persons of the children have
been obtained for they were not physically present in Delaware.

HH it follows that the father could not have instituted a
habeas corpus proceeding in the Superior Court to obtain custody of
the children. Nor could the mother have instituted such a proceeding
for she at that time had the children in custody.

We think, therefore, that under either alternative, there was no
valid order in existence of which the father could have been adjudged in
contempt. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider
whether or not his conduct was in fact contumacius.

We now take up that portion of the order entered in the
mother’s habeas corpus proceeding directing the father to deliver
custody of the two oldest children to the mother.

Hs An appeal from a decision of the Superior Court
sitting without a jury is an appeal upon both the law and the facts. We
have the duty, not only to review the evidence in search of factual

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support for the findings below, but also for the purpose of testing the
propriety of those findings. We act with restraint but when it is clear
that justice requires it, we have the duty of making our own findings
upon the evidence and setting aside clearly erroneous findings.
Particularly is this so when the findings depend upon inferences and
deductions from other facts. Delaware Racing Association, Application
of, Del., 213 A.2d 203; Nelson v. Murray, 211 A.2d 842; Nardo v.
Nardo, Del., 209 A.2d 905.

In the award of custody of children the paramount
matter to be considered is the welfare of the children involved. This
takes precedence over the desires of the parents who are contesting
with each other for such custody. Their legitimate interests and desires
may not be ignored, but at the same time they are not controlling. The
ultimate test of the propriety of an award of custody of children is
whether or not it provides for the best welfare of the children with as
little uncertainty as possible. In Re Two Minor Children, 3 Storey 565,
173 A.2d 876.

The Superior Court found that the father had failed to establish
that the mother was an unfit person to be awarded custody of these
children. We agree that there was no such showing, but we think the
father did not make any serious contention in this respect. On the
contrary, his acquiescence in the return of the youngest child to the
mother’s custody is a concession that she is a fit person, as is his
testimony that he has no objection to returning the two oldest children
provided they want to be returned to live with her. Similarly, we think,
the mother concedes that the father is a fit person to have custody.
This is implicit in her testimony to the effect that she can understand
that the son might want to live with his father rather than with her, but
that if such is to be, she should have liberal rights of visitation. We
think there is no real issue as to the relative fitness of either party to
have custody of the children.

HH Consequently, we think the finding of the trial court that
the father failed to prove the unfitness of the mother is immaterial,
particularly in the light of the governing rule that the welfare of the

}

216 Ee
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children is the prime consideration.

HSC We think the characterization by the court below of
the father as an arrogant individual who considers himself above the law
and at liberty to flout his legal obligations is not supported by this
record. We think a fair appraisal of the father’s position in this
unfortunate controversy is that he is not unwilling to have the mother
have custody of the children, but that he is resisting such return
because he is unwilling to force them to return to her custody in the
face of their opposition to so doing. We are of the opinion that this
position is not unnatural and does not rise to arrogance and flouting of
the law.

The Superior Court held that the preference of minor
children to be in the custody of one parent or the other is at most of
minor consideration in making a determination of an award of custody.
As a matter of fact, their preferences were completely ignored by the
Court. We think this was error for we believe the law to be that if a
child is of sufficient maturity to form an intelligent opinion upon the
subject, there is no justification for that opinion to be wholly ignored.
Cook v. Cook, 77 U.S. App. D.C. 388, 135 F.2d 945; Dunham v.
Dunham, 97 Conn. 440, 117 A. 504; Parks v. Parks, 275 Ala. 613, 157
So.2d 212. The preference of a child for one parent or the other is, of
course, not necessarily controlling on the Court because it must always
yield to the paramount consideration of what is best for the child, but,
nevertheless, it may not be ignored. Weems v. Weems, 255 Ala. 210, 50
So.2d 428; Vilas v. Vilas, 184 Ark. 352, 42 S.W.2d 379. Indeed, if
other considerations are equal, the desire of the child may be decisive.
39 Am. Jur., Parent and Child, Sec. 21. The question to be determined
is whether or not the child has reached an age of sufficient discretion to
form an intelligent preference, and whether or not the preference is
expressed because of some temporary dissatisfaction or passing whim. 2
Nelson on Divorce and Annulment (2nd Ed.), Sec. 15.19.

The oldest daughter testified emphatically that she did
not want to return to live with her mother but desired to remain in her
father’s home. She in fact had expressed this desire some months before

217
=

the events which led to her removal to her father’s home. The Superior
Court ignored her preference, characterizing it as having been inspired
by the father. We think, however, that there is nothing in this record to
support the finding that the father influenced her testimony.

The daughter actually testified in this trial in the presence of her
mother and was cross-examined by her maternal grandfather, counsel
for her mother. She re-stated her desire to remain with her father and
her opposition to returning to the custody of her mother. Irrespective,
therefore, of whether or not the details of her testimony were believed
by the Court, as apparently they were not, the fact remains that for
some reason good and sufficient to her, she desires to remain with her
father.

We ask what the effect of a forced return to her mother’s home
would have upon this 16-year-old girl? What sort of relationship would
she have with the mother whom she has spurned in open court by
testimony given under oath in her mother’s presence? While this is an
unfortunate situation, it is nevertheless a fact which, it seems to us, is
of particular importance in determining how the welfare of this girl will
be best served by an award of custody.

If the Court had doubt as to the bona fide desire of this girl, it
seems to us it would have been a proper act of discretion on its part to
have ordered a psychiatric examination to determine how deep-seated
was her desire not to be returned to her mother. This was not done,
nor, as a matter of fact, is there any testimony whatsoever concerning a
psychiatric or psychological examination of either of these children in
order to determine the effect on them of the granting of custody to
either parent.

We think, therefore, that an error of law was
committed by the trial judge in giving no weight at all to the express
desire of the 16-year-old daughter to remain with her father. Since
other considerations are equal, we think that her preference to remain
with her father should have been followed. The order awarding custody
of the daughter to the mother must therefore be reversed and the

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matter remanded with instructions to award custody to the father, with
liberal rights of visitation to the mother.

With respect to the son Larry, aged 11, the father’s counsel
offered to produce him as a witness either in open court or for
examination privately by the judge in chambers. It appears in the
record through hearsay that the son, too, had expressed a desire to
remain with his father and not to be returned to the custody of his
mother.

We think the son should have been examined as to his
preference and that the failure or refusal of the Court to do so was
error in law. The fact that his age was 11 years makes no difference,
provided that he was sufficiently mature to form an intelligent opinion.
Not only his preference but his maturity as well could have been
inquired into by the Court. The failure to do so, despite his age, was
error. Kreutzer v. Kreutzer, 226 Or. 158, 359 P.2d 536; 2 Nelson on
Divorce and Annulment (2nd Ed.), Sec. 15.19.

The order awarding custody of the son to the mother must
therefore be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings
to determine whether or not the son was of sufficient maturity to form
an intelligent opinion; whether or not he had in fact formed such an
opinion, and, in the light of that investigation, what final decision as to
his custody would be best for his future welfare.

On remand, if it appears desirable, some psychiatric examination
of the son might be had in order to determine how deep-seated his
desire to remain with his father is, and if that desire is not given effect,
what result that will have upon his future welfare. It seems to us quite
probable that if his desire not to be returned to the custody of his
mother is strong and deep-rooted, an order to return to her custody
might have a deep-seated and permanent effect on his future welfare.

HH in any event, this should be inquired into since we think
it highly pertinent and important in the determination of final custody.
Certainly, also, if the ultimate conclusion should be that the desire of

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the son to stay with his father is given effect, then the mother should
have very liberal rights of visitation. Indeed, as we read this record, the
father has no objection to such visitation rights. In any event, whether
he does or not, he can be compelled to acquiesce in them.

We note that since February, 1965, the oldest daughter has
attended two different schools; the son has attended three, and the
youngest daughter, two. We suppose frequent changes in schools not to
be in their best interests and, certainly, this would be so if the change
took place in the middle of a term. We suggest, therefore, the
undesirability of forcing a mid-term change on the son by a change in
his present custody. Any such change may well await the termination
of the school year.

We reluctantly have concluded that, perhaps unconsciously, the
final decision of the Court below was colored by his conclusion that the
father was a contumacious violator of the decree of Court. We have
held he was not and, since we think that erroneous finding was largely
responsible for the Court’s ultimate decision, we have no choice but to
reverse it. When we are convinced that the final award of custody of
children is erroneous, we have not hesitated in the past to reverse it and
substitute our own conclusion. See Nelson v. Murray, Del., 211 A.2d
842.

The judgment below will therefore be reversed and the cause
remanded with directions to strike the order finding the father in
contempt of court and the imposition of sanctions upon him by reason
of that contempt; with directions to award custody of the oldest
daughter to her father; and with directions to hold a further hearing, if
necessary, and, in particular, to examine the son to determine whether
or not it is in fact his preference to remain with his father and, if so,
how deep-seated and real that preference is, and, in the light of the
findings to be made, to make a final award of custody to either parent.
With respect to both the daughter and the son, liberal rights of
visitation should be allowed to the parent not having custody.

220

GREYHOUND LINES, INC., a corporation of the State of California,
Defendant Below, Appellant, v. JOSEPH S. CASTER and
JULIA CASTER, his wife, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, and
JOHN CALVIN GRIFFIN, Defendant Below, Appellee.

221

@Vanuary 19, 1966)
WOLCOTT, C.J. and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
C. Waggaman Berl, Jr., of Berl, Potter & Anderson, for appellant.
F, Alton Tybout, for plaintiffs below, appellees.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 69, 1965.

CAREY, Justice:

The Court below entered a judgment based upon a jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff for damages sustained as the result of injuries
suffered by Joseph Caster in an automobile accident which occurred in
July, 1964, at about 2:55 A.M. A passenger car, owned by Mr. Caster
and driven by defendant Griffin, collided with a bus owned by
Greyhound Lines and driven by defendant Womble, Greyhound’s
employee, at the intersection of U.S. Route 13 and Delaware Route 16
at Greenwood in Sussex County. That intersection is guarded by a
yellow flashing light facing traffic coming south on Route 13, and by a
red flashing light preceded by two large stop signs facing traffic coming
east on Route 16. The bus was moving south on Route 13 and the car
was moving east on Route 16. The Court below directed a verdict
against Griffin but left it to the jury to determine the claim against
Greyhound and Womble. No appeal has been taken by Griffin or
Womble.

222 PO
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There was uncontradicted testimony that Caster was asleep on
the back seat of his car at the time of the accident and had been asleep
for some time prior thereto. He testified that he was familiar with
Griffin’s ability to drive and considered him a good driver, and that,
when he had become tired, he turned over the driving to Griffin.
Another passenger ‘got into the front seat so that Caster would have the
entire rear seat for sleeping. Caster gave no instructions to Griffin
concerning the driving, and was satisfied that Griffin was fully capable
of driving properly without any instructions. From the meager record
before us, there appears to have been no testimony that Griffin was
incompetent or that his faculties were in any way impaired. There was
no charge that Caster himself was negligent. There is no suggestion that
Griffin was Caster’s employee or agent. The sole contention is that
Griffin’s negligence should be imputed to Caster because he was the
owner of the car and a passenger therein.

The trial Judge instructed the jury that, if they found Caster was
asleep at the time of the accident, they must find that Griffin’s
negligence is not imputed to Caster. Appellant duly excepted to that
instruction. It also excepted to certain other parts of the charge which
will be discussed later herein.

HL Much has been written by Judges, as well as textwriters,
concerning the imputation of a driver’s contributory negligence to an
owner-passenger. See, for example, annotations in 147 A.L.R. 978 and
50 A.L.R.2d 1296; 4 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice, Sec.
2493; Prosser on Torts, Sec. 72. No discussion of the various underlying
theories is presently needed. If we were to adopt the rule followed in
some states, there would be no such imputation in this case, even if the
owner had been awake. Gaspard v, LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So.2d
149; Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express et al., 22 Or. 377,
352 P.2d 1091, overruling White v. Keller 188 Or. 378, 215 P.2d 986;
SChweidler v. Caruso, 269 Wis. 438, 69 N.W2d 611. But the majority
tule, in the absence of statute, seems to be that the driver’s
contributory negligence will be imputed to, and will be a bar to an
action by, an owner-passenger, unless the owner can establish that he
had actually surrendered his right of control to the operator, even

pO 223
L_

though the owner was not in fact exercising that right at the time of the
accident. Beam v, Pittsburg Rys. Co., 366 Pa. 360, 77 A.2d 634; Harper
v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260, S.E.2d 185; Brooks v, Sentle, 74 Ohio App.
231, 58 N.E.2d 234; Langham v. Talbott, Tex.Civ.App., 211 8.W.2d
987; Ridgon v. Crosby, 328 Ill. App. 399, 66 N.E.2d 190. That rule has
been followed by our Superior Court in Eskridge v. Ruth, 9 Terry 439,
105 A.2d 785, and presumably in Balick v. Philadelphia Dairy Products
Co., 5 W.W.Harr. 269, 162 A.776. See also Halpern v, United States,
D.C., 129 F.Supp. 326, applying Delaware law. This Court has never
been obliged to pass upon these conflicting theories.* We see no need
to do so now because even the majority rule permits a recovery by the
owner if he can prove that he had in fact surrendered control to the
driver. Appellant to concedes.

The important question in this connection is, therefore, whether
Caster had relinquished control by going to sleep. On the point, we are
impressed with the reasoning of Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 3
Cir., 165 F.2d 920, and Rocky Mountain Produce Trucking Co. v.
Johnson, 78 Nev. 44, 369 P.2d 198. Those cases stand for the
propositions that a sleeping owner cannot exercise control; that the
situation is the same in this regard as if he were not present in the car;
and that there is no more reason to charge the driver’s negligence
against him than there would be if the owner had been at home.
Indeed, it is difficult for us to imagine how the owner could more
effectively divorce himself from control than by crawling into the back
seat and going to sleep.

HMM Several cases have been cited by appellant which have
denied recovery by a sleeping owner. Some of them are distinguishable.
Baird v. Baird, 223 N.C. 730, 28 S.E.2d 225, was primarily based upon
a New York statute making an owner responsible for a driver’s
negligence whether he was present in the car or not. In Knudson v.
Boren, 10 Cir., 261 F.2d 15, there was a finding of joint enterprise. Ter

*Hickman v. Parag, 3 Storey 217, 167 A.2d 225, did not involve an
owner-passenger.

224 PO
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Harr v. Steele, 330 Mich. 167, 47 N.W.2d 65, involved an
employer-employee relationship. Rodriguez v. State Farm Mutual Ins.
Co., La.App., 88 So.2d 432, has been expressly overruled by Gaspard v.
LeMaire, supra. Both Kline v. Barkett, 68 Cal.App.2d 765, 158 P.2d 51,
and Malone Freight Lines v. Tutton, 177 F.2d 901, may possibly be
predicted upon a husband-wife relationship, although the opinions are
not clear in this respect. In any event, to the extent that these
authorties disagree with Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., supra, we
decline to follow them. We are of the opinion that the jury instruction
on this point was correct.

Appellant suggests that this conclusion sets a dangerous
precedent in that an owner could turn over the driving duties to a
drunkard or an incompetent driver and, by going to sleep, evade his
responsiblities to others. We do not accept that suggestion, for such an
act on the part of the owner would usually be an act of negligence on
his part for which he would be responsible. 8 Am.Jur.2d 125. There has
been no claim in the present case that Mr. Caster was personally guilty
of negligence.

Appellant contends that the charge to the jury was erroneous
and prejudical in four other respects. The first such allegation is that no
part of T. 21 Del.C. Sec. 4168 should have been mentioned to the jury.
This section is as follows:

“Sec. 4168. General speed restrictions.

(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event,
speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with
any person, vehicle or other conveyance on or entering the highway in
compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use
due care.

(b) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the
requirements of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, drive at

ee 225
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appropriately reduced speed when approaching and crossing an
intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going
around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any
narrow or winding roadway and when special hazard exists with respect
to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway
conditions.”

It is contended that the second sentence of (a) limits the
protection of the whole section to persons who are on or entering the
highway in a legal manner, and it accordingly cannot be relied upon in
this case because Griffin was not such a person. This is another way of
saying that appellant 1owed Caster no duty under the section because
of the second sentence. We cannot agree. Cf. Carnes v. Winslow, 4
Storey 536, 182 A.2d 19. If the legislative intention was to limit the
whole section as appellant suggests, the other sentences would be
superfluous. The Judge was right in ruling that Womble was bound by
(b) and the first sentence of (a). He said nothing to the jury about the
second sentence of (a).

The second complaint is, as we understand it, that the
Judge erred in not limiting his instructions on negligence to the charge
of violating T.21 Del.C. Sec. 4110 (a) (2) which authorizes a driver
approaching a blinking yellow light to proceed “only with caution”.
The duty to exercise caution in that situation does not release the
driver from all other obligations imposed upon him by law, such as
observing the speed limits or keep a proper lookout. The Judge below
followed the usual practice of pointing out those rules which, under the
evidence, Womble could be found to have disobeyed. We are unable to
see how this is reversible error.

The third objection is that the charge was “weighted” in
Caster’s favor in that, in concluding the explanation of each item of
negligence charged, it stated that the verdict should be in plantiffs’
favor if the jury found such negligence, together with proximate cause,
had been proven, whereas only once or twice did it mention the
conditions under which they must find for appellent. We see no merit

226

in this contention; we do not share appellant’s feeling that this
numerical imbalance had the effect of “overemphasizing” plantiffs’
case,

The final objection is directed to the Judge’s refusal to
charge in the precise language of a prayer submitted by appellant
concerning the allegations of negligence against Womble. Examination
of the prayer shows that it probably contains one or more errors of law,
and in any event was an incomplete statement of the driver’s duties as
related to the facts. The Judge therefore properly rejected the prayer as
submitted; his refusal to take the time to “doctor it up”, rather than to
use his own language, is not reversible error, since we find no prejudicial
error in the language he did use.

The judgment entered below will be affirmed.
De

MARTHA G. GIORDANO, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. FRANCIS A.
CZERWINSKI, Defendant Below, Appellee.

227

(February 1, 1966)

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
Martha G. Giordano, pro se.

Edmund D. Lyons and Eduard F. von Wettberg, III, of Morris,
James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 37, 1965.

HERRMANN, Justice:

This appeal involves the propriety of the Superior Court’s
computation of the period of limitations under the circumstances of
the case.

The matter is presented on the pleadings: By their complaint,
the plaintiffs alleged that on January 30, 1960 they purchased a second
automobile and requested the defendant, through whom they had
previously acquired automobile insurance, to add the new car to the
existing policy. It is alleged that the defendant stated that he would
ascertain the amount of the premium and that, in the meanwhile, the
plaintiffs could assume that the new automobile was covered by
insurance. The plaintiffs further alleged that on February 2, 1960 the
automobile was involved in an accident; that upon telephoning the

228 Bo
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defendant to report the accident, the plaintiffs were informed for the
first time that the automobile was not covered with insurance; that the
defendant had never been licensed to sell insurance, but that the fact
was not learned until March 1964 when inquiry was made of the State
Insurance Commissioner; that the previous insurance which the
plaintiffs thought they had purchased from the defendant had actually
been procured by him from another agent. The plaintiffs further alleged
that in December 1962 a judgment was rendered against them in an
action arising from the accident; that they were obliged to pay the
judgment, counsel fees and costs; and that their premium rates for
automobile insurance have increased as a result.

The instant action was commenced on May 20, 1964, asserting
two causes of action: (1) a contractual right of the plaintiffs to be
indemnified by the defendant; and (2) fraud by the defendant in
falsely representing that he was licensed to sell automobile insurance.
The defense of limitations was raised. The Court below granted
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff,
Martha G. Giordano, appeals.

HE We agree with the Court below that no contractual right
to indemnity is made to appear from the complaint; that the cause of
action asserted is actually for breach of promise to provide or secure
insurance coverage and should be treated as such. We think, too, that
the Superior Court was clearly correct in holding that it appeared on
the face of the pleadings that there was no proximate causal
relationship between the alleged misrepresentation as to license and the
loss complained of and that, therefore, such misrepresentation did not
give rise to a cause of action for fraud.

|| As to the cause of action founded on contract, the
Superior Court correctly computed the limitations period from the date
on which the plaintiffs first learned that the defendant failed to provide
or secure insurance, The controlling principles of law are settled: while
the defendant’s concealment of his failure to provide or secure coverage
may have deprived him of the benefit of the Statute of Limitations, the
deprivation continued only until the plaintiffs discovered the failure, or

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could have discovered it by the exercise of due care and diligence; or,
otherwise stated, while the Statute of Limitations may not apply when
the acts complained of are fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff,
such application is suspended only until his rights are discovered or
could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Lieberman vy. First National Bank of Wilmington, 8 Del.Ch. 519,45 A.
901, 48 L.R.A. 514 (1900); Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 27 Del.Ch.
33, 29 A.2d 801 (1943); Trainer v. Deemer, 5 W.W.Harr. 396, 166
A.657 (1933).

In the instant case, it appears from the complaint that the
plaintiffs learned of the defendant’s failure to provide insurance on or
about February 2, 1960, when they reported the accident to the
defendant. Accordingly, the period of limitations was properly
computed by the Superior Court from that date. Since the applicable
period of limitations is three years (10 Del.C. Sec. 8106), it follows that
the complaint filed on May 20, 1964 is barred by limintations.

Accordingly, we find no error in the judgment below and it is
confirmed.

W. R. FERGUSON, INC., a corporation of the State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM A. BERBUSSE, JR., INC., a corporation
of the State of New York, Defendant.

230

(February 7, 1966)
WRIGHT, J. sitting.
Albert L. Simon, for plaintiff.

Bruce M. Stargatt, and Ben T. Castle (of Young, Conaway,
Stargatt & Taylor), for defendant.

Superior Court of Delaware for New Castle County, No. 488
Civil Action 1964.

WRIGHT, Judge.

This action is the result of a dispute over a construction
contract. The contract executed by the plaintiff as a sub-contractor and
the defendant as contractor was for the performance of work on the St.

231
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Francis Hospital at Wilmington, Delaware. The plaintiff’s claim is for an
alleged unpaid balance under the term of the contract and for extra
work not specifically provided for under the contract.

The defendant moves to dismiss the action or alternatively for
judgment on the pleadings as to certain parts of the action.

The motion to dismiss is based on the failure of the plaintiff to
submit the matter to arbitration, The pertinent section of the contract
in connection with this contention provides:

“All disputes, claims or questions subject to arbitration under
this contract shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
provisions, then obtaining, of the Standard Form of Arbitration
Procedure of the American Institute of Architects, and this agreement
shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law,
and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in the court of
the forum, state or federal, having jurisdiction. It is mutually agreed
that the decision of the arbitrators shall be a condition precedent to
any right of legal action that either party may have against the other.”

The plaintiff contends that the defendant has waived its right to
rely on the arbitration clause by (1) filing an answer and counterclaim
without asserting the arbitration clause and (2) disregarding the
arbitration provision in prior dealings with the plaintiff. There is not
before me at this stage enough of a record to merit discussion of
plaintiff's second point but the initial contention is worthy of
consideration.

In opposition to this contention the defendant relies on three
cases which are not in point. In Shribman y. Miller, 60 N.J. Super. 182,
158 A.2d 432 (1960) arbitration was raised in the answer as an
affirmative defense. In Wymard v. McCloskey & Co., 190 F.Supp. 420
(D.C-Pa. 1960) Affd. 292 F.2d 839 (C.A. 3 1961) and Formigli
Corporation v. Alcar Builders, Inc., 329 F.2d 79 (C.A. 3 1964) the
arbitration question was raised by the defendants by motion prior to

232 Po
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answer,

The defendant also emphasizes the fact that the clause at bar
makes arbitration a condition precedent to legal action. No Delaware
case in point has been found and the cases cited by the plaintiff do not
generally deal with the condition precedent type clause.

Independent School District No. 35, St. Louis County v. A.
Hedenberg & Co., 214 Minn. 82, 7 N.W.2d 511 (1943) dealt with this
precise question. The Court there treated the arbitration clause as it
would have any other clause in the contract recognizing that it was not
self-executing and like other parts of the contract could be modified,
rescinded or waived by the parties’ agreements, acts or conduct. The
Court also said:

“The ‘condition precedent’ clause is as binding on one party as
on the other, but it may, along with the arbitration provision, be
waived expressly or by implication. For, if the agreement to arbitrate
never becomes operative, the agreement not to sue without arbitration,
being dependent upon the agreement to arbitrate, also remains
inoperative.”

In The Batter Building Materials Company v. Kirschner, 142
Conn. 1, 110 A.2d 464 (1954) the court was confronted with the same
clause that exists in the present case. While the court declined to find a
waiver the possibility that a waiver might exist was recognized. See also
Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 139 N.E. 764 (1923).

Ht scems clear that the arbitration clause presently before
the court may be waived. I now turn to the question of whether or not
there has been a waiver.

The complaint was filed September 9, 1964. The
defendant answered on September 24, 1964. The answer contained a
general denial, two affirmative defenses (not connected with
arbitration), and a counterclaim. Both parties served interrogatories
upon the other which were answered. On June 25, 1965, the defendant

233
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filed this motion. Thus the matter of arbitration was first raised by the
defendant some 9% months after its answer was filed. I have no
hesitation, under such circumstances, in holding that the defendant has
waived the contract provision relating to arbitration.

Alternatively the defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings
as to two of the plaintiff’s claims. One such claim is that for extra work
which defendant claims is barred by the following provisions of the
contract:

“Section 5(c)—‘To make all claims for extras, for extensions of
time and for damage for delays or otherwise to the contractor in the
manner provided in the General Conditions of the Contract and
Supplementary General Conditions for like claims by the Contractor
upon the Owner, except that the time for making claims for extra cost
is one week’.”

“Article 1(f)—‘All time limits stated in the Contract Documents

are of the essence of the Contract’.

The plaintiff, however, points to another provision of the
contract which provides:

“In connection with 5(c) thereof, no claims for extra work will
be allowed unless such claims * * * have been authorized by the
General Contractor in writing previous to starting such.”

At this stage plaintiffs argument is somewhat difficult to follow.
It seems to be that this section supersedes and renders inapplicable the
clauses relied on by the defendant. However, the plaintiff also denies
that he is bound by the provision he cites contending that his claim
does not come within the definition of “extra work” used in the
provision.

Basic rules of contract interpretation require that internal
inconsistencies be resolved without elimination of any contract
provisions. .

234 ee
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HB “Extra work” is usually defined as being work not
foreseen at the time of entrance into the contract. 15A Words and
Phrases, p. 701 et. seq.; Collins v. Post, 227 Or. 299, 362 P.2d 325
(1961).

Plaintiffs claim, however, is for extras necessitated by some
negligence of the defendant in providing plaintiff with adequate
specifications or by reason of the poor workmanship of the defendant
or its other sub-contractors.

Hl [ conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff's claim actually is
an item of “extra cost” coming within the one-week provision of the
contract.

The final claim of the plaintiff which is resisted by the defendant
by way of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is for certain items
of damage under the following provision of the contract:

“Should either party to this Contract suffer damages because of
any wrongful act or neglect of the other party or of anyone employed
by him, claim shall be made in writing to the party liable within a
reasonable time of the first observance of such damage and not later
than the final payment, except as expressly stipulated otherwise in the
case of faulty work or materials, and shall be adjusted by agreement or
arbitration.”

Hl it is apparent that the validity of this claim turns upon a
construction of the phrase “reasonable time.” The pleadings raise a
substantial issue of fact in this connection and defendant’s motion
upon this cause of action must be denied.

Order accordingly.

235

DOROTHY PAUL, a/k/a DOROTHY NOSCOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PAUL’S LIQUOR STORE COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

(February 14, 1966)
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

Garry G. Greenstein, of Wahl, Greenstein & Berkowitz, for
appellant.

Victor F. Battaglia, of Theisen & Lank, for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 66, 1965.

CAREY, Justice:

This appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment presents the question of
whether a tenant is responsible, under the terms of a written lease, for
the rebuilding of an exterior brick wall which had been condemned by
the Building Inspector of Wilmington,

Appellant was the lessor, and appellee the lessee, of a three-story
building on Delaware Avenue in Wilmington, occupied as a store on the
first floor and an apartment on the second and third floors. Their lease
agreement was entered into on August 10th, 1954. Its period was for
five years, with an option to extend it for an additional ten years. That
option was duly exercised. Apparently as the result of ordinary wear
and tear over an extended period, the condition of the front wall
deteriorated to the extent that in 1962 the Building Inspector ordered
the wall reconstructed. The lessor had the wall torn down, a new
foundation laid and a new wall erected. She then brought this action to
recover the cost of that work.

Counsel are in agreement upon two points: (1) a tenant is
responsible for structural repairs or reconstruction only when he is so
bound by his contract; (2) a covenant to keep the building in good
order and repair does not obligate him to make structural repairs or
replacements. Cf. Harris v. Goslin, 3 Harr. 338. They disagree as to
whether the lease here involved places that responsibility upon the
tenant. According to appellant, this responsibility is imposed by the
second “condition” of the lease, which reads as follows:

“2, The lessee shall maintain and keep in good order and repair
the demised premises, including the sidewalks adjacent thereto, during
the term hereby granted, at its own cost and expense.

pO 237

It is further agreed that no major alterations shall be made in
said premises by the Lessee without the consent of the Lessors first had
and obtained in writing. The cost of any and all alterations to the
interior of the building and any redecorating or painting thereof, and
the maintenance thereof, shall be borne and paid for by the Lessee.

Lessors shall only be responsible for the costs of structural
repairs to the exterior walls of the premises and for repairs to the roof
of the premises if the same are substantially damaged by wind, storm,
or an act of God, and shall not be responsible for costs of other repairs
whether structural or otherwise.

HMM The first quoted paragraph, standing alone, binds the
lessee to make nothing more than ordinary repairs; it does not make
him “an insurer against natural wear and decay,” to use the language of
Harris v. Goslin, supra. Clark & Stevens v. Gerke, 104 Md. 504, 65 A.
326; Taylor v. Gunn, 190 Tenn. 45, 227 S.W.2d 52; Kaufman v. Shoe
Corp. of America, 24 Ill. App. 2d 431, 164 N.E.2d 617; 3A Thompson
on Real Property, (1959) Sec. 1232 and Sec. 1233. The second
paragraph deals only with alterations, and binds the lessee to pay for
interior alterations and their maintenance. The third paragraph binds
the lessee to nothing; as the Court below said, it limits the obligation of
the lessor to pay for structural repairs to the exterior walls and roof
when damaged by wind, storm or act of God, and disclaims
responsibility of the lessor for the cost of other repairs whether
structural or not.

HHL Appellant contends that the disclaimer contained in the
third paragraph, when coupled with the tenant’s undertaking in the first
paragraph, implies a duty of the tenant to pay for structural repairs
other than those caused by wind, storm or act of God. This argument
assumes that the wall had to be reconstructed by one party or the
other. But this is not necessarily true; it is entirely possible that neither
party had a duty to rebuild. Cf. Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor
Co., 291 Pa. 507, 140 A. 506.

HH We are not presently concerned with the question of

a
i

whether the tenant could have required the lessor to rebuild the wall;
our only problem is whether the tenant assumed that obligation under
this agreement. Nothing in the lease expressly says so, and we find
nothing therein which necessarily implies such an obligation. The
general rule is that a lease is construed against a lessor in case of
ambiguity. 32 Am.Jur. 133; Old Time Petroleum Co. v. Turcol, 18 Del.
Ch. 121, 156 A. 501. Even if this agreement be deemed ambiguous,
therefore, the Court below was correct in finding no liability on the
part of the tenant under the facts of this case. See 33 A.L.R. 532.

The order entered below must be affirmed.

FRANCIS McCOY, JR., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. THE STATE
OF DELAWARE, Appellee.

(March 1, 1966)
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
James F. Kipp, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Merrill Trader, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 80, 1965.

Tcl 239
|_|

CAREY, Justice.

The defendant has appealed from an order of the Superior Court
which declined to reverse a ruling of the Court of Common Pleas of
Kent County. The only question presently for consideration is whether
this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

On December 18, 1963, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to
a charge of being drunk on a highway in violation of T. 11 Del. C. Sec.
611. The Court of Common Pleas imposed a sentence of two days
imprisonment and five additional days for non-payment of costs.
Because defendant had already been in custody for seven days awaiting
the hearing, he was immediately released, pursuant to T. 11 Del. C. Sec.
3902 (b).

At the time this case arose, defendant was free on parole on a
conviction of a felony. Because of his plea in this case, his parole was
promptly revoked by the Parole Board and he is still incarcerated on
the felony charge. On June 30, 1965 (about eighteen months after
revocation of the parole) defendant applied to the Court of Common
Pleas for permission to withdraw his plea of guilty herein. The request
was denied, whereupon he appealed to the Superior Court, which
declined to reverse the action of the trial Court. He then filed the
present appeal. The Public Defender was asked to argue the matter
before us.

The right to a review by this Court exists only when and
to the extent provided in the Constitution and laws of this State. Casey
v. Southern Corp., 26 Del. Ch. 447, 29 A.2d 174; Short v. State, Del.,
181 A.2d 225. The provision of our Constitution, Del. C. Ann., here
pertinent is Article 4, Sec. 11(1) (b) which reads as follows:

“(1) (b) To receive appeals from the Superior Court in criminal
causes, upon application of the accused in all cases in which the

240 PT
|_|

sentence shall be death, imprisonment exceeding one month, or fine
exceeding One Hundred Dollars, and in such other cases as shall be
provided by law; and to determine finally all matters of appeal on the
judgments and proceedings of said Superior Court in criminal causes:
Provided, however, that appeals from the Superior Court in cases of
prosecution under Section 8 of Article V of this Constitution shall be
governed by the provisions of that Section.”

Hl The case now before us is not one “tin which the sentence
shall be death, imprisonment exceeding one month, or fine exceeding
One Hundred Dollars;” the maximum sentence which could be imposed
for the offense is five days imprisonment or a fine of $10, plus costs,
and the penalty actually imposed amounted to a total of seven days
imprisonment because of non-payment of costs. Accordingly, the
Constitution itself does not confer jurisdiction upon us to entertain this
appeal, Although the quoted section of the Constitution empowers the
Legislature to allow appeals in criminal cases where the sentence is less
than that set forth in Article 4, there is in fact no statute in existence
applicable to a conviction under Sec. 611. It is quite clear, therefore,
that we are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, which must
accordingly be dismissed.

THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v.T. PAUL
DABSON, Manufacturers’ Casualty Insurance Company, a
Pennsylvania corporation, and Seaboard Surety Company, a New
York corporation, Defendants Below, Appellees. T. PAUL
DABSON, Defendant and Counter-claimant Below, Appellant,
v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. THE
STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v.
GEORGE & LYNCH, INC. a Delaware corporation, Seaboard
Surety Company, a New York corporation, and Reliance
Insurance Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendants
Below, Appellees.

241

A

(arch 2, 1966)

242
L_|

WOLCOTT, C.J., CAREY, J., and MARVEL, Vice Chancellor,
sitting.

Samuel R. Russell, of Bayard, Brill, Russell & Handelman, for
State of Delaware.

William F. Lynch, II, and Robert M. High, of Morris James,
Hitchens & Williams,, for T, Paul Dabson et al.

David F, Anderson and Richard L. McMahon, of Berl Potter &
Anderson, for George & Lynch et al.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 78, 1965.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

These are two appeals by the State from the entry of summary
judgments against it upon its complaints, and a cross-appeal taken by
the defendants in one of the causes from the entry of summary
judgment in favor of the State upon their counterclaim. The appeals
and cross-appeal were consolidated for argument and decision in this
Court for the reason that they involve the same basic questions of law
and grow out of similar factual situations.

Briefly, the causes grow out of a number of contracts between
the State Highway Department and the two defendant contractors for
the construction of roads or portions of roads. The State seeks to
recover from the contractors and the bonding companies large sums of
money paid out by the Highway Department for work or materials not
required to be furnished under the several contracts involved, or paid
out by reason of changes in the contract requirements as to unit prices
for materials or changes in the quality and quantity of materials. These
payments were for so-called “overruns”. ‘

po 243
i___

The contractors defend the suits by asserting that all changes or
revisions in the original contracts were requested, approved or directed
by the Department’s Chief Engineer, and were later approved by the
Department, itself, either by resolution or by acceptance of the final
work and payment therefor. In addition, one of the defendants files a
counterclaim for work and material furnished but not paid for by the
Highway Department.

Basically, the position of the contractors is that the changes in
the contract requirements were made under the authority of the Chief
Engineer, later approved by the Department, and the final acceptance
and payment for the work constitutes under the contracts a release of
the contractors from further liability, there being no charge of fraud or
error of fact made by the State.

Basically, the State denies that the contractors have been
released from liability. It argues that the Chief Engineer had no
authority by law or contract to authorize any changes in work, prices
or materials prescribed by the contracts, In effect, the State seeks to
repudiate the acts of the Chief Engineer authorizing all the changes, and
also seeks to repudiate the final approval of the Department evidenced
either by formal resolution or final acceptance of the work and
payment therefor.

In an earlier appeal by one of these contractors from an adverse
judgment on its counterclaim, George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, Del., 197
A.2d 734, we reversed the judgment entered for the State upon the
counterclaim, now no longer pressed by the contractor, on the ground
that the sovereign immunity of the State from suit had been waived
pursuant to Article I Sec. 9 of the Constitution, DelC.Ann. by the
enactment by the General Assembly of 17 Del.C., Sec. 132(c) 9 which
authorizes the State Highway Department to enter into contracts. We
pointed out in that case that the Department was empowered to enter
into only vilid contracts which must necessarily have mutuality of
obligation and remedy, including the right on both sides to sue the
other for breach.

244 PO
|__|

In the George & Lunch case we further pointed out that any
other result would be unjust since, otherwise, the State, acting through
the Highway Department, could mislead its citizens into large
expenditures of money in performance of contracts and at the same
time deny them the right to hold the State accountable for its breach of
its contractual obligations. Such a result, we said, would be so
manifestly unjust as possibly to amount to the taking of property
without due process of law.

We think this decision fixes the standard of construction
of the statutes authorizing the State Highway Department to enter into
contracts and to supervise their performance, and also the meaning of
the contracts, themselves. This standard is that there must be, as
between Department and contractor, mutuality of rights, duties and
remedies.

As we have pointed out, 17 Del.C., Sec. 132(c) (9)
authorizes the Department to enter into contracts. The contracts in
question were entered into pursuant to this statute. Thereafter, by
reason of 17 Del.C., Sec. 158 (now repealed), performance under them
was under the direction of the Chief Engineer. This section provides:

“The execution and performance of all contracts awarded by the
Department shall be under the charge of the Chief Engineer, and his
decision shall in all matters concerning the performance of the work
and the compliance of the terms of the contract, be final.”

Each of the contracts in question contained in Article Two the
following provision:

“Jt is understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto
that all construction work included in this contract is to be done under
the direction of the said Chief Engineer of the Department and that his
decision as to the time construction and meaning of the said proposal
plans and specifications shall be final.”

The contractors’ bids were based upon the State Highway

po 245
i__|

Department’s Standard Specifications of 1957 (except in one contract
the Specifications of 1954 which are substantially similar) which were
specifically made a part of each contract. By Specification 21 it was
provided, inter alia, that the Chief Engineer could make alterations in
the quantities or character of the work or materials required; by
Specification 23 the Chief Engineer was authorized to order extra work
or material for which no prices were provided in the contract, and by
Specification 27 it was provided that the decision of the Chief Engineer
upon all questions of quality and quantity of materials, the execution
of the work, and the determination of payment due, shall be final and
binding.

It is quite apparent that the referred-to statutes, contracts and
specifications gave the Chief Engineer comprehensive powers with
respect to performance under the contracts. It is also quite apparent
that all the parties, the Department, the Chief Engineer and the
contractors were in aggreement that the Chief Engineer’s powers were
broad and that he had the final word with respect to performance. We
think the parties were correct in this respect for the plain effect of the
cited provisions is to confer that power upon him.

The State argues, however, that if this be true, then the details of
the contracts entered into become meaningless since they can be altered
at will by the action of the Chief Engineer. In a sense, this may be true,
but we point out that the details of the contracts are binding on the
contractors unless they are altered by the Chief Engineer, and that the
contractors are powerless to compel such an alteration. Furthermore,
this must have been intended since the contracts, themselves, authorize
alterations in the specifications when circumstances make such
alterations desirable.

If the State’s contention in this respect were followed, it
would result in the elimination from the agreement of some of the
provisions on the basis of which the contracts were entered into. This
cannot be since we are bound to give effect to all the provisions of an
agreement which are not contrary to law, and none of these are
contended to be contrary to law.

246 Po

HH The most the State argues is that the Chief Engineer
acted beyond the scope of his authority. We think, however, that his
actions were within the scope of the authority conferred upon him. The
State’s argument, upon analysis, would seem to be that as a matter of
good administrative policy the Chief Engineer’s power was too
untrammeled. With respect to the wisdom of a course of action,
however, we have nothing to do. Such decisions are to be made by a
branch of the government other than the judicial. If the policy does not
mun afoul of some legal inhibition, it will be upheld by the courts.

| | Furthermore, all of the action taken by the Chief Engineer
resulting in the so-called overruns was later approved formally by the
Department or finally accepted and paid for. The present causes are in
reality, therefore, an attempt by the State to repudiate the action of its
Highway Department and its Chief Engineer and to hold the
contractors liable for something which, under their agreements; they
were required to do. This, we think, cannot be allowed under the
concept of fairness referred to in the George & Lynch decision.

Under the facts before us, it is apparent that the State’s
representative permitted, and indeed encouraged, the contractors to
deliver materials and perform work on public property in a manner
suitable to the State. If, at this late date, the State may now repudiate
the action of its employees and hold the contractors responsible for
that which they had no option but to perform, the result will be to give
the State a merciless and unconscionable advantage over them. See
State ex rel. Washington Pav. Co. v. Clausen, 90 Wash. 450, 156 P. 554,
L.R.A.1917A, 436; David J. Joseph Co. v. United States, 82 F.Supp.
345, 113 Ct.Cl. 3; Standard Transformer Co. v. City of Detroit, D.C.,
146 F.Supp. 740, and Louisiana v. McIlhenny, 201 La.78, 9 So.2d 467,
142 A.L.R. 533. We think the circumstances work an estoppel against
the State to assert these claims.

HI The State relies on Article Four of the Contracts and
Specification 56 in opposition to the raising of an estoppel against it.
These, however, provide that the State shall not be estopped by a
certificate of performance or payment by it from recovering damages

ee
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for the failure of a contractor to live up to the standards required by
the contract and specifications. Necessarily, this includes changes in the
specifications properly authorized. There is no charge here that
substandard material was furnished, or improper work performed. We
think, therefore, that Article Four and Specification 56 have no
pertinency in this case. Even if they were applicable, there must be a
period of time after which the State could make no claim. That time
has now passed.

Finally, Specification 75 and 67 seem to us to be a
complete answer to the State’s contentions. Specification 75 provides
that as soon as possible after completion of the contract, the Chief
Engineer shall make a final net estimate of the amount due the
contractor on the contract which should be paid by the Department. If
the contractor accepts the last payment, the State is then released from
any further liability. Similarly, Specification 67 provides that when the
final estimate is paid and accepted, the contractor is released from
further liability except for proof of error as set forth in the contract
bond.

In these cases the final estimates were made by the Chief
Engineer, approved by the Department and accepted by the contractor.
We think this action released everyone from further liability in the
absence of a showing of fraud. Thus, the State may not maintain these
actions since it has released the defendants from further liability under
the contracts. Similarly, the contractors may not maintain their
counterclaims since they likewise have released the State from further
liability under the contracts.

The judgments below are affirmed.
Ee

ADDIE C. DAMMER and FRANK A. DAMMER, her husband,
Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. METROPOLITAN
MERCHANDISE MART, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant Below, Appellee.

LL
{|

(February 16, 1966)

CARREY and HERRMANN, JJ., and MARVEL,
Vice-Chancellor, sitting.

Edward W. Cooch, Jr., and H. Alfred Tarrant, Jr., of Cooch &
Taylor, for appellants.

Alfred M. Isaacs, of Flanzer & Isaacs, for appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware
No. 88, 1965.

—_—<—<

CAREY, Justice.

Plaintiffs below have appealed from a summary judgment
entered against them in Superior Court. The action seeks damages for
injuries suffered by Mrs. Dammer as the result of a fall on a crosswalk
at defendant’s shopping center.

On January 17th, 1963 at about noon, plaintiff, her daughter
and another lady were at the shopping center. They reached a place in

ee 1°
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front of the Franklin Simon Store and were headed towards the
Strawbridge & Clothier Store. Between the two stores, there is a
twenty-foot roadway leading from the front parking lot to another
parking lot in the rear. The ladies came to the curb of this roadway at a
marked crosswalk and paused to look for traffic. None was approaching
and they started across. Before stepping down, the plaintiff noticed
that a section of the macadam road pavement was broken or crumbled,
probably as the result of ice, On the left side of the crosswalk where
plaintiff was standing there was no hole, but there were loose stones
and small lumps of macadam along the area between two painted lines
delineating the crosswalk. The broken area extended perhaps two or
three feet outward from the curb, but reached no further than a few
inches to the left of the left-hand painted line. Beyond that line, both
to the left and in front of the broken area, there were some loose
pebbles and stones sparsely scattered about. On her first or second step
after leaving the curb, plaintiff stepped on a stone or piece of macadam
and fell to the pavement.

Plaintiff admittedly saw the condition described above before
she stepped off the curb. She had previously noticed other people
making the crossing without difficulty. She testified that, when she saw
the spot, she did not consider that it presented any source of danger to
her. She also agreed that, when she started to cross, no cars were
approaching from any direction. From the photographs in the record, it
is apparent that plaintiff could have avoided walking upon the broken
area by stepping a foot or two to her left beyond the painted line.
Counsel suggests that such action would have exposed her to a greater
tisk of being struck by a car; however, as plaintiff knew, no cars were
approaching. The weather was clear and dry, and we think she could
have easily noticed any cars which might have come along after she
started to cross even though she were a foot or two beyond the painted
line. While there were some scattered stones along that path, it would
have been easy to avoid stepping on them.

The argument Judge, assuming negligence on
defendant’s part, held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory

250 PO
i_|

negligence* in stepping upon the broken part of the pavement after
having seen its condition. We agree with his conclusion. Plaintiff was
under a duty to exercise due care for her own safety, i. e., the care
which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in a like situation.
We agree that there are many occasions when the liability or duty of a
plaintiff to appreciate the hazard presented by a given condition is a
jury question, and we do not criticize those cases cited in plaintiff's
brief. We are of the opinion, however, that those cases are not
applicable here because we think a reasonably prudent person is bound
to know that stepping on small loose stones can cause, and indeed is
likely to cause, a fall. See Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) 463; Rhein v. Wark
& Co., 4 Storey 10, 174 A.2d 132. Plaintiff saw the hazardous
condition; she should have appreciated the danger, even though she says
she did not; she could easily have avoided the risk in the manner
described above. On the basis of plaintiff's own testimony, the
defendant has discharged its duty to demonstrate, to a reasonable
certitude, that there is no genuine issue of fact with respect to
contributory negligence, which bars any_recovery by plaintiffs. Cf
Williamson v. Wilmington Housing Authority, Del., 208 A.2d 304;
Allied Auto Sales, Inc. v. President, Directors & Co. of Farmers Bank,
Del., 216 A.2d 666 (January 26, 1966).

The entry of summary judgment was correct and we accordingly
affirm it.

*We do not pause to consider whether the proper designation of plaintiff's
conduct should be “assumption of risk” rather than “contributory negligence.”
See Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) 450. The result here is the same.

MILTON L. MORAN, as next friend for DANIEL W. MORAN, a minor,
and individually, Plaintiff, v. DELAWARE RACING
ASSOCIATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.

251

(March 24, 1966)

CHRISTIE, J., sitting.
Harold Leshem, and Sidney Balick, for plaintiff.

F. Alton Tybout, for defendant.

No, 55 Civil Action 1964,
CHRISTIE, Judge.

Daniel W. Moran was 15 years old at the time of the accident
which gives rise to this law-suit. He was a 10th grade student doing well
in school. On June 17, 1962, Daniel and two friends were driven by
Daniel’s uncle to a place near White Clay Creek. The boys then crossed
the Pennsylvania Railroad tracks and went onto the land of Delaware
Racing Association to swim near an old dam on the White Clay Creek at
a location known locally as “Little Falls.” Below the dam at “Little
Falls” was a small rocky pond about 6 or 6 and 1/2 feet deep and
several feet wide in a wooded area some distance from the nearest road.

Daniel had been there to swim three or four times and was
familiar with the depth of the water and with the environs of the pond.
Each time he went there he had seen others swimming and picnicking at

252 Po
=

the same location. He noticed that others would dive into the pond
either from the top of the dam or from a level stone area or platform
formed by an old stone wall at the end of the dam. Daniel knew how to
swim and had been swimming and diving for a number of years.

After swimming in the pond and conversing with his friends,
Daniel climbed on the stone platform with the intention of diving from
the platform into the pool. The stone platform appears to be about ten
feet above the surface of the pond. The platform is reached by a path in
the woods which leads up to the back of the level area. When Daniel
was two or two and a half feet from the edge of the level area or stone
platform and before he started his dive, he slipped and fell off of the
level area as if from a small cliff. He suffered serious injuries which have
left him paralyzed from the waist down. Daniel stated afterward that if
he had actually made his dive he believes such dive would have been
made in safety.

Daniel did not seek nor obtain permission from the owners of
the area to swim there. He did not see any “No Trespassing” signs
although he did observe a “No Dumping” sign. He did not know who
owned the area in question.

Defendant had bought the area in 1957 and had left it without
new improvements. It had not in any way altered the Little Falls area,
Defendant says that according to tradition in the area, the dam was
built to form a mill race in about 1850 and has long been in disuse.

Defendant had posted “No Trespassing” signs in that general
area and had replaced such signs from time to time when they
disappeared or were torn down. There is no evidence that any such
signs were in evidence on the day of the accident. Inspection of the area
would have revealed that people were swimming and picnicking there
and that there were no signs forbidding trespassing.

The injured boy and his father seek to collect damages from
Delaware Racing Association on the theory that the Association, as
land owner, was negligent in one or more of the following particulars:

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1. Failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent entry to
the area where the injury occurred.

2. Failure to post signs or warnings.

3. Failure to erect barriers or fences.

4, Failure to maintain a guard or watchman at the location.
5. Failure to warn of hidden dangers.

There is no evidence of a hidden danger or that the
accident was caused by a hidden danger so the fifth specification of
negligence may be disregarded. It is apparent, however, that defendant
did not take effective means to prevent trespassing or to warn
trespassers. The question to be determined on defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is whether the evidence before the Court when
viewed most favorably to the plaintiff could form a legal basis of
liability on defendant’s part. This in turn depends on what duty, if any,
defendant had in respect to high school aged youths whom it knew or
should have known were trespassing or acting as if they were a
gratuitous licensee on its land in the vicinity of Little Falls.

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the record
contending that the record reveals no negligence on its part which
proximately caused the injuries.

In general, land owners owe no duty to trespassers. If
liability exists in this case, it would be predicated upon special rules
such as those stated in one of the following sections of the Restatement
of Torts (2nd edition).

“Sec. 335. Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Constant
Trespassers on Limited Area.

A possessor of land who knows, or from facts within his
knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude upon a

254

limited area of the land, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to
them by an artificial condition on the land, if

(a) the condition
(i) is one which the possessor has created or maintains and

(ii) is, to his knowledge, likely to cause death or seriously bodily
harm to such trespassers and

(iii) is of such a nature that he has reason to believe that such
trespassers will not discover it, and

(b) the possessor has failed to exercise reasonable care to warn
such trespassers of the condition and the risk involved.”

“Sec. 339. Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to
Trespassing Children

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to
children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the
land if

(a) The place where the condition exists is one upon which the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to
trespass, and

(b) The condition is one of which the possessor knows or has
reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and

(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in
coming within the area made dangerous by it, and

(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and
the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the

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tisk to children involved, and

(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate
the danger or otherwise to protect the children.”

Section 335 deals with the liability of landowners to constant
trespassers in respect to highly dangerous artificial conditions. Its scope
is not limited to children. For purposes of this decision, I will assume
that the stone wall and high level area or stone platform constituted a
dangerous artificial condition maintained by defendant.

Tl | am of the opinion, however, that the stone wall and
platform as described in Daniel’s depositions and pictured in the
photographs before the Court was not of such a nature that the owner
may be held to have had reason to believe that trespassers would not
discover whatever danger was inherent therein. It appears to be a very
ordinary stone structure presenting no greater danger than do other
walls, boulders and cliffs found in wooded areas, near waterways and
on old farms in New Castle County. The Court takes judicial notice that
there are many natural and artificial collections of stone in Brandywine
Park and elsewhere in this County as high and as hazardous as the place
from which Daniel fell. All old stone or concrete walls and steps
involving a stone surface ten feet above another stone surface can be
considered dangerous in that serious injury may result if one slips and
fails; but even in this day and age, liability does not flow from the mere
ownership of high ledges.

The platform from which Daniel fell was near a small shallow
pond used by trespassers for swimming. In other respects there is
nothing to distinguish this small stone platform from other raised
surfaces, the dangers of which are as apparent to a teenaged trespasser
as they are to an adult owner.

Does the existence of the swimming hole transpose an otherwise
commonplace stone platform into a special hazard the owner should
recognize as a dangerous condition which trespassers would fail to
appreciate? Under the circumstances of this case the answer must be in

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the negative.

Daniel was injured before he started to dive. He climbed on the
rock to dive but he could have climbed there for any of a number of
other reasons. The pool may not have been suitable for diving but it
was not the pool nor a dive which injured him. He was not injured by
diving into water which looked deep to him but which was in fact
shallow nor by diving from a poorly situated location. He was injured
by slipping and falling off of a high rocky area. The dangers of a fall in
such a location were as apparent to him as they would be to the owner
of the land. Plaintiff cannot recover under the provisions of Section
335 or any of the variously stated rules of law as to adult trespassers
whose presence is known or should be known to the owner.

Section 339 deals with liability of landowners for injury to
trespassing children on account of highly dangerous artificial condition.
The rules stated in Section 339 have been applied in Delaware and
appear to be replacing the stricter requirements of the “attractive
nuisance” doctrine in many jurisdictions. Beaston v. James Julian, Inc.,
10 Terry 521, 120 A.2d 317 (Superior Ct., 1956); Prosser on Torts, 3rd
Ed., p. 375. In the great majority of cases in which this Section or rules
similar to those contained in this Section have been applied, the injured
child has been not more than twelve years of age but older children
have also recovered thereunder in some cases.

Again, for purposes of this decision, I will assume (without
so holding) that the place where Daniel fell was an artificial and
dangerous condition. But there is nothing in the record from which it
could be ruled that the owner knew or should have known that the
condition created “an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily
harm” to the boy who was injured. Prosser on Torts, 3rd Ed. pp.
379-380; Prosser, “Trespassing Children” 47 Cal. L. Rev. 427, 455-61
(1959); McHugh v. Reading Co., 346 Pa. 266, 30 A.2d 122, 145 A.LR.
319 (1943); Hocking v. Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range Railway Co.,
263 Minn. 483, 117 N.W.2d 304 (1962); Coon v. Kentucky and Indiana
T. R. Co.., 163 Ky. 223, 173 S.W. 325, L.R.A. 1915D, 160 (1915);
Davis v. Goodrich, 171 CAL. App. 2d 92, 340 P.2d 48 (1959).

ee 257
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Again, it must be remembered that Daniel fell when he slipped

on a stone platform and that his injuries do not result from any special

situation which would have been more apparent to the owner than it
was to a 15-year-old youth.

There is no evidence from which it could be inferred that
defendant had reason to believe that trespassers would not discover the
danger inherent in climbing onto high places made of stone or from
which it could be inferred that children of Daniel’s age and experience
would be involved in unreasonable risk by climbing or walking where
the accident occurred. Plaintiff cannot recover on this record under any
theory of recovery which has been suggested to the Court.

Since there has been no showing that defendant violated any
duty it owed to plaintiff in connection with the condition alleged to
hhave caused the injury, I have not reached the question of the alleged
contributory negligence on Daniel’s part. Daniel does not seem to know
what actually caused him to fall. In thinking back on it, however, he is
of the opinion that part of the rock surface may have been wet and that
this wetness might have made a portion of the rock slippery. He
remembers that young children had been splashing around in that area
sometime before he climbed up there. I express no opinion at this point
in the proceedings as to whether or not defendant has established as a
matter of law that Daniel was contributorily negligent.

Judgment will be entered for defendant. It is so ordered.

HELEN M. RASH and ARTHUR T. RASH, Plaintiffs Below,
Appellants, v. C. & M. CORPORATION a Delaware corporation,
Alfred J. Vilone, Jr., Inc., a Delaware corporation, C. F. Hill
Carpentry Co., a Delaware corporation, and Charles F. Hill,
Defendants Below, Appellees, v. C F. HILL CARPENTRY CO., a
Delaware corporation and Charles F. Hill, Third-Party
Defendants Below, Appellees.

(April 5, 1966)

WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

Robert C. O’Hora and John P. Daley, Wilmington, for plaintiffs
below, appellants.

Clement C. Wood, of Allmond & Wood, Wilmington, for C. F.
Hill Carpentry Co. and Charles F. Hill, defendants below, appellees.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 91, 1965.

|

HERRMANN, Justice.

PO 259

This case involves procedure under Rule 21! of the Civil Rules
of the Superior Court, Del. C.

Plaintiff Helen M. Rash fell over a wire in her yard on September
28, 1962. She and her husband sued C. & M. Corporation, a Delaware
corporation (hereinafter “C. & M.”), and Alfred J. Vilone, Jr., Inc., a
Delaware corporation (hereinafter “Vilone”), charging negligence in
placement of the wire. Vilone entered an appearance and defended, but
C. & M. failed to appear.

On September 25, 1964, three days before the end of the
two-year period of limitations (10 Del. C. Sec. 8118), the plaintiffs,
with the written consent of Vilone, filed an amended complaint
intended to add as parties defendant C. F. Hill Carpentry Co., a
Delaware corporation, and Charles F. Hill (hereinafter “Hill
defendants”). With the amended complaint, plaintiffs filed a written
request to the Prothonotary and the Sheriff for the issuance of
summons and service thereof upon the Hill defendants with copies of
the complaint as amended. An order of court was not sought because
the plaintiffs deemed their action to be governed by Rule 15? under
the provisions of which, as they read them, leave of court was not
required for the action they sought to take, Vilone, the “adverse
party,” having consented.? On October 5, 1964, service of process and

*Rule 21 governs the adding of parties by order of court and provides:
“Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may
be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own
tive at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.”

?Rule 15 permits amendments to complaints without order of court under
certain circumstances, providing in part:

“(@) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
fo which no responsive pleading is pemmitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and ave shall be freely given when justice
so requires.”

it is noteworthy that others have expressed doubt and difference of
opinion in this connection, See 1A Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Sec. 443, 1965 Pocket Part, p. 111; compate Messelt v. Security
Storage Co, (D.Del., 1953) 14 F.RD. 507.

260 ee
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of copies of the amended complaint was made upon the Hill
defendants. Thereafter, they filed a motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the attempt to join them under Rule 15 was a nullity
because, under Rule 21 which controlled the situation, the plaintiffs
could not amend their complaint to add new parties defendant without
an order of court; that since such order was not obtained before
September 28, 1964, the last day of the period of limitations governing
the plaintiffs’ claim, the action was barred as to them. The Superior
Court agreed with the Hill defendants and granted summary judgment
in their favor. The plaintiffs appeal.

The plaintiffs concede that they should have proceeded under
Rule 21 which specifically governs the addition of parties, rather than
Rule 15 which governs amendments generally. They acknowledge the
prevailing view that conflict or ambiguity between the two Rules must
be resolved against the general and in favor of the specific. 2 Barron and
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 543; International Bro.
of Teamsters, etc. v. American Federation of Labor, (E.D. Mich., 1963)
32F.RD, 441.

The question remains, however, whether the Hill
defendants have standing to complain of non-compliance with the
order-of-court requirement of Rule 21. For the answer we look to the
purposes and functions of the Rule.

One of the purposes of the order-of-court requirement of Rule
21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which we took our
Rule 21, was to enable the Court to prevent a party from arbitrarily
ousting the Court of its federal diversity jurisdiction by an addition of
parties which would have that effect. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d
Ed.), Sec. 21.04; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Fibreboard Products,
Inc., (N.D. Calif., 1953) 116 F.Supp. 377. That purpose, of course, was
not carried over in our adoption of the Rule.

The other purpose underlying the order-of-court requirement,
however, remains important in our State practice as in the Federal
Practice: to protect existing parties and the court from the disruption

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and delay in the proceedings which might be caused by an untimely
introduction of new parties into the case. Obviously, the orderly
administration of cases requires court control and the opportunity of
existing parties to be heard as to the effect upon the course of the
proceedings of the injection of new parties. See Mullaney v. Anderson,
342 US. 415, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952).

But none of these considerations involves the party to be added.
Indeed, while notice of an application for an order of court under Rule
21 should be given to existing parties, notice is not required to be given
to the proposed new party. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d Ed.), Sec.
21.05. It is clear, therefore, that the order-of-court requirement of Rule
21 was not provided for the benefit of those in the position of the Hill
defendants. Since it appears, that at the time of the initiation of the
proceedings to add them as parties defendant, the Hill defendants had
no right to be noticed and heard under Rule 21, they may not be heard
to complain now of a defect in the proceedings purely technical as to
them.

i | The general principles governing limitations of action do
not require a different conclusion. As the appellees point out, courts
may not extend statutes of limitations out of notions of fair play. But
the conclusion we reach does not extend the Statute. Unquestionably,
the plaintiffs may have instituted a new and separate action against the
Hill defendants on September 25, 1964, the date on which they
proceeded under Rule 15; and unquestionably, the filing of such new
action would have tolled the Statute of Limitations. Indeed, except for
the failure to make a deposit for costs and for certain nomenclature on
the papers, the proceedings initiated by the plaintiffs on September 25,
1964 may be deemed equivalent to the filing of a new suit. The
question of costs and labels aside, the plaintiffs proceeded in the cause
against the Hill defendants before the expiration of the period of
limitations; and the Hill defendants were served with process and copy
of the amended complaint within a few days thereafter. It is unlikely
that they would have been served earlier in a separate action filed on
September 25. Thus, there was no greater “staleness” in the claim
against them than there would have been if the plaintiffs had chosen to

262

file a separate action. The appellees rely, in this connection, upon
Messelt v. Security Storage Co., (D.C. Del., 1953) 14 F.R.D. 507; Martz
v. Miller Brothers Company, (D.C. Del., 1965) 244 F.Supp. 246; Kerner
v. Rackmill, (D.C.M.D. Pa., 1953) 111 F.Supp. 150; Lomax v. United
States, (D.C.E.D. Pa., 1957) 155 F.Supp. 354. Those cases are
inapposite because,.in each, the Statute of Limitations had run before
any action was initiated in the proceedings to add or substitute new
parties. The appellees also rely upon Grummitt v. Sturgeon Bay Winter
Sports Club, (D.C.E.D. Wis., 1961) 197 F.Supp 455, aff’d. 7 Cir., 304
F.2d 93, which involved a distinctive Statute of Limitations having
special procedural provisions. Insofar as that case is contrary to the
conclusion we reach herein, we find it unpersuasive.

HM Rule 1 requires the “just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every proceeding.” Rule 21 was adopted to avoid the
harsh results of the common law. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d Ed.),
Sec. 21.04. It should not be construed technically to create a different
Kind of harsh result.

We hold that the plaintiffs should have their day in court against
the Hill defendants. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered below
must be reversed.

In the Matter of the Estate of DONALD G. MORROW, Deceased.

263

(April 4, 1966)
McNeilley, J. sitting

William Poole, and Robert K. Payson, of Berl, Potter &
Anderson, for petitioner-exceptant.

Clarence W. Taylor, of Hastings, Taylor & Willard, amicus curiae.

Orphans Court for New Castle County.

McNEILLY, Judge.

This is an appeal from a determination of the Register of Wills of
New Castle County with respect to the First and Final Account filed
with said Register by Ruth N. Morrow, Executix and sole beneficiary
under the Will of her deceased husband, Donald G. Morrow. It requires
an interpretation of the power or authority of the Register on an
accounting by an Executor to disallow the deduction of the payment in
full of a debt which was owed by decedent and his wife at the time of
his death as co-obligors.

An Order dated February 28, 1966 was filed by this Court
on March 1, 1966 indicating that the Register had no power or
authority to disallow such a debt, and this Opinion is written for the

pO

264 po

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purpose of setting forth the reasons for that Order.

On June 27, 1950, decedent and his wife, Ruth N. Morrow,
purchased a home in New Castle County, State of Delaware, as tenants
by the entrieties. At the same time they executed a Mortgage which was
recorded as a lien against subject property and gave their bond as
security therefore. Under the terms of this bond, they become jointly
and severally liable for the full amount of the indebtedness.

On February 19, 1964 the husband, Donald G. Morrow, died
and his Will was probated in the Office of the Register of Wills in and
for New Castle County on February 24, 1964. Under the terms of said
Will, Ruth N. Morrow, the surviving spouse, was sole beneficiary and
‘was appointed Executrix.

On July 9, 1964 the Executrix filed with the Register an
inventory and appraisement of the assets and liabilities of the Estate.
As an asset the entire appraised market value of the real estate was
listed, and as a debt the entire balance due on the bond and mortgage
was listed. The amount of this indebtedness subsequently was paid by
the Executrix and was claimed as an allowance in the First and Final
Account filed by her on February 23, 1965.

On March 1, 1965 the Register addressed a letter to the
Executrix which reads as follows:

“This office will not approve the First and Final Settlement
which you have submitted on the estate of Donald G. Morrow,
deceased.

It is the policy of this office, as established by myself, as
Register of Wills for New Castle County, to allow as a debt of the
deceased only one-half of the balance of any mortgage owed on
property held by the deceased and a surviving spouse as tenants by the
entirety.

Therefore, before the account can be approved by this office,

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you must reduce the amount of the mortgage for which you crave
allowance by one-half, and the amount of such reduction must be
reflected by an increase in the closing costs which are due this office.”

It is from this disallowance by the Register of the full payment
of the debt made by the Executrix that this appeal is before the Court.

Hf There is no dispute that the balance due on the bond and
mortgage in this case was a valid and enforceable debt against the
estate. The Supreme Court of Delaware has held unequivocally that the
estate of a deceased joint debtor is liable for the entire debt. In Keil v.
Keil (1958) 1 Storey 351, 145 A.2d 563, 76 A.L.R.2d 996, Chief
Justice Southerland said in his Opinion:

“A joint and several obligation of two parties, whether or not
husband and wife, creates an obligation which is, on its face, for the
benefit of both. Upon the death of one party his estate is still liable for
the debt.”

The Register concedes this but in support of his position in
allowing no more than one-half of the amount owed and paid as a
deduction from the gross estate he relies upon the following language of
Chief Justice Southerland in the same case:

“The question is this: If husband and wife jointly incur an
indebtedness secured by a mortgage on property held as tenants by the
entireties, and one spouse dies, is the estate of the decedent liable to
contribute to the survivor one-half of the common debts * * * And
if the right of contribution, upon payment of the debt during the
lifetime of both, is an attribute of the joint liability, we fail to see why
it does not exist upon payment made after the death of one. The
payment of the debt by the survivor is certainly a benefit to the estate
because it discharges a liability of the estate. This is true whether or not
there is any collateral in the hands of the creditor. Certainly if there
were no collateral contribution would be allowed. And what of the case

266 Pe
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in which one obligor has pledged his own collaternal for a joint debt?
Unless his co-obligor is a mere accomodation maker, it is held that he is
entitled to contribution. Commerce Union Bank v. Weis, 27 Tenn.App.
433, 181 S.W.2d 764. In such a case the co-obligor has no interest in
the property—the collateral—but must contribute if the other obligor
discharges the common liability.

ok kk kk

A joint and several obligation under our law may be enforced by the
creditor against both or either; but as between obligors each of them, in
the ordinary case, is liable for one-half the debt.

In our opinion, a common interest in the land or property
mortgaged or pledged for a joint debt is not the element that controls
the right to contribution. The liability to contribution flows directly
from the debt, and the mortgage is only the security for the debt.”

It is the contention of the Register that since the right of
contribution exists it is an asset of the estate which an executor or
-administrator is bound to report and account for and for which the
Register has the power, jurisdiction and duty to require an adjustment
in the executor or administrator’s account. I cannot agree, and in
reaching this conclusion I am doing so entirely upon my interpretation
of the powers and authority of the Register without any consideration
being given to the question of contribution and the persons or parties
who might be entitled to enforce or consider same.

Sections 31 and 32 of Art.IV of the Delaware Constitution of
1897, Del.C.Ann. as amended are as follows:

“Section 31. The Registers of Wills of the several counties shall
respectively hold the Register’s Court in each County. Upon the
litigation of a cause the depositions of the witnesses examined shall be
taken at large in writing and made part of the proceedings in the cause.
This court may issue process throughout the State. Appeals may be
taken from a Register’s Court to the Orphans’ Court. In cases where a

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Register of Wills is interested in questions concerning the probate of
Wills, the granting of letters of administration, or executors’ or
administrators’ accounts, the cognizance thereof shall belong to the
Orphans’ Court”.

“Section 32. An executor or administrator shall file every
account with the Register of Wills for the County, who shall, as soon as
conveniently may be, carefully examine the particulars with the proof
thereof, in the presence of such executor or administrator, and shall
adjust and settle the same according to the right of the matter and the
Jaw of the land; which account so settled shall remain in his office for
inspection; and the executor, or administrator, shall within three (3)
months after such settlement give notice in writing to all persons
entitled to shares of the estate, or to their guardians, respectively, if
residing within the State, that the account is lodged in the said office
for inspection.

“Expections may be made by persons concerned to both sides of
every such account, either denying the justice of the allowances made
to the accountant or alleging further charges against him; and the
exceptions shall be heard in the Orphans’ Court for the County; and
thereupon the account shall be adjusted and settled according to the
tight of the matter and the law of the land.

“The General Assembly shall have power to transfer to the
Orphans’ Court all or a part of the jurisdiction by this Constitution
vested in the Register of Wills and to vest in the Orphans’ Court all or a
part of such jurisdiction.”

This language is substantially the same as the language in the
Constitution of 1792 and all subsequent Constitutions of this State.

Surprisingly little material can be found in the cases, statutes or
reference works which throw any light upon the exact nature of the
office or the Register of Wills and the jurisdiction of the Register’s
Court. Even the historical approach does not give us a complete and full

268

story of the creation of the office of the Register and his function and
jurisdiction. Prior to 1704 the counties of “New Castle, Kent and
Sussex upon Delaware” were known as the territories of the Province
of Pennsylvania (Woolley, Delaware Practice, Vol. 1, Sec. 2, P.2.) We
must, therefore, look to the early Organic Laws of Pennsylvania to see
if we can ascertain the nature of the office of the Register of Wills.
Penn’s Charter of Liberties, 1682, was followed by the Frame of
Government of Pennsylvania, 1682, and the Laws Agreed Upon in
England in 1682. Item XXII of the Laws Agreed Upon in England
dated May 5, 1682 provides “That there shall be a Register for births,
marriages, burials, wills and letters of administration distinct from the
other registry”. This is the first reference which can be found to an
office for the registering of wills and testaments.

Judge Rodney’s opinion in Wilmington Trust Co. v. Baldwin
(1937) 8 W.W.Harr. 595, 195 A. 287, traces the history of the office of
Register of Wills from this point as follows:

“Because the Constitution of 1792 (art. 6, Sec. 17) first created
the Register’s Court and provided for the passing of executors’ and
administrators’ accounts before the Register of Wills, it would seem
logical to inquire as to the situation just prior to the adoption of that
Consititution, and of the changes made by it.

Disregarding the very early laws we find that in 1721 the
Colonial Assembly passed two laws now found respectively in Volume
1, Laws of Delaware, page 87, and in Appendix to volume 1, page 55.
The effect of these laws was that letters of administration were granted
by the Register of Wills and bond given; that settlements of
administration accounts were made before the Orphans’ Court, which
court was charged with the duty ‘upon hearing and due consideration
thereof to order and make just and equal distribution of what
remaineth clear’ (after the payment of debts) to the parties entitled.
The same provisions were contained in the Act of Nov. 1, 1742 (volume
1 Appendix, page 64), and the Act of 1751 (volume 1, page 284). In
1773 (volume 1, page 539) it was enacted that every executors’ and
administrators’ account should be filed in the Orphans’ Court for

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inspection for three months prior to its being settled. In 1787 (volume
2, page 888) executors, for the first time, were required to give bond as
well as administrators and, like administrators, to file their accounts in
the Orphans’ Court.

Under all of the acts hereinbefore mentioned the duties of the
register were confined to the granting of letters of administration and
taking the bond of the administrator, and to the probate of wills and
the issuance of letters testamentary and to the filing of inventories. He
had nothing whatever to do with any account of the personal
representative, which accounts were passed before the Orphans’ Court
which court had power to order a decree of distribution. Appeals from
the action of the Orphans’ Court were originally made to the Governor,
in equity, but by the Act of 1773 (volume 1, page 539) such appeals
were made to the Supreme Court. The foregoing state of the law
continued until the adoption of the Constitution of 1792.

In 1766 it was realized that no court had been empowered to
hear appeals from the action of the registers (which seem then to have
been confined to the probate of wills and the issuance of letters
testamentary and letters of administration and the filing of inventories),
and an entirely new court was set up to hear any such appeals. This
court was styled the ‘Court of Delegates’ (volume 1, page 427). Chief
Justice Read in a note in his compilation of Delaware Laws (now
known as volumes 1 and 2) says that no commission was ever issued
under this act, but that these provisions were repealed and supplied by
the provisions in the Constitution of 1792 creating the Register’s Court
which appeal to the Court of Law. See volume 1, page 427.

This then brings us to the Constitution of 1792 and furnishes the
first hint of the meaning of the Register’s Court.*

*Article VI of the Delaware Constitution of 1792 is the judiciary article of that
constitution and Sec. 1 thereof is as follows:

“The judicial power of this State shall be vested in a court of chancery, a
supreme court, and courts of oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery, in a
court of common pleas, and in an orphans’ court, register’s court, and a court of
quarter sessions of the peace for each county, in justices of the peace, and in such
other courts as the legislature, two-thirds of all the members of each branch
concurring, may, from time to time, establish”. Vol. 1, Del. Laws XXIX”.

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The Constitution of 1792, by section 17 Sec. 16, changed the
place of filing and settling executors’ and administrators’ accounts from
the Orphans’ Court, and required that these accounts be filed with and
settled and adjusted-by the Register of Wills. The Constitution changed
the provision that accounts must be filed three months before
settlement and in its place required that the personal representative
should notify the parties entitled to any share of the estate of the filing
of the account within three months from the date of settlement.

The Constitution of 1792, by Article 6, of art. 6* created the
Register’s Court in substantially the identical language found in our
present Constitution, and which language has been continued in every
revision since 1792, The term ‘Register’s Court’ was probably copied
from the State of Pennsylvania, where it had appeared as a new term in
their Constitution of 1790 (art. 5 Sec. 1). The Court was created by
section 17 and there is no additional provision regarding the jurisdiction
of the court”.

A search of the Colonial laws of New Castle, Kent and Sussex
reveals several references to the Register of Wills but nowhere is there
any definition of description of his function or duties other than that
to be inferred from the statutes referred to by Judge Rodney in the
Baldwin case. Article 12 of the Constitution of Delaware 1776. (1
Del.C. p. 88) which is not discussed by Judge Rodney in the Baldwin
case, provides in part:

“The president and privy council shall appoint the secretary, the
attorney-general, registers for the probate of wills and granting letters
of administration * * * who shall be commissioned as aforesaid.”
(Emphasis supplied)

No other mention of the Register is made in this Constitution of
1776, but it should be noted that the title given to the Register is
probably descriptive of his function and duties as described by Judge
Rodney.

Some assistance in determining the scope of authority and

pod 271
i_

jurisdiction of the Register of Wills can be obtained by examining the
parallel provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. (Vol. 5
American Charters, Constitutions and Organic Laws 1492-1908 by
Thorpe p. 3092 et seq.) The judiciary article of the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1790 as found in Article V, Section 1, of this Article is
as follows:

“The judicial power of this commonwealth shall be vested in a
supreme court, in courts of oyer terminer and general jail delivery, in
the court of common pleas, orphans’ court, register’s court, and a court
of quarter sessions of the peace for each county, in justices of the
peace, and in such other courts as the legislature may, from time to
time, establish.”

It will be noted that except for a separate Court of Chancery in
Delaware, the systems of courts in the two States under the early
Constitutions are practically identical. However, it is interesting to note
that Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 defines the
Office of Register of Wills more fully than does the Delaware
Constitution of 1792. Section 11 of Article V of the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1790 provides:

“A tegister’s office for the probate of wills and granting letters
of administration, and an office for the recording of deeds, shall be
kept in each county.”

The same phraseology is contained in Section 11 of Article V of
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 as is found in the William Penn
Laws Agreed Upon in England in 1682. In view of this similarity it is
reasonably clear in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the
Register of Wills provided for in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790
and the Register of Wills provided for in the Delaware Constitution of
1792 are the counterpart of the office of Register “for births,
marriages, burials, wills and those of administration” provided for in
the William Penn Laws of 1682.

The reason for emphasizing this similarity is that in

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Pennsylvania, both before and after the Charter of Seperation in 1701,
the sole jurisdiction of the Register was that of probating wills and
granting letters. Nowhere is there any indication that the Register of
Wills has any general authority or jurisdiction over the administration
of decedents’ estates. Since the origin of the office of Register of Wills
in Delaware undoubtedly dates back to the Penn Laws of 1682 it is
difficult to imagine the Resister in Delaware having any greater
jurisdiction than that of the Register in Pennsylvania prior to the
separation of the Colonies unless such jurisdiction has been specifically
conferred by statute,

The Pennsylvania Courts have clearly defined the jurisdiction of
the Register of Wills in a number of cases. In the case of Jn re Rockett’s
Estate (1944) 348 Pa. 445, 35 A.2d 303 at 304, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania said:

In this Commonwealth the line of demarcation between matters
of probate and of distribution or construction is distinct and definite.
In this connection, it was said by this Court, in Carson’s Estate, 241 Pa
117, 121, 88 A. 311, 312: “The probate of a will without regard to its
provisions is one thing; distribution of the estate of the testator in
accordance with its terms is another. The former is for the register; the
latter is none of his concern.’ It is clear that the issue here, ie. whether
or not clause (a) formed a part of testator’s will, is one of probate,
rather than of construction or distribution.”

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of In re Carson’s
Estate (1913) 241 Pa. 117, 88 a. 311, in discussing some of the earlier
Pennsylvania cases said:

“« + ® (quoting from Hegarty’s Appeal, 75 Pa. 503) * * *

‘But it certainly does not follow from this that his jurisdiction extends
to deciding upon the validity of any disposition upon any other ground
than that it is not in truth the voluntary act of the testator, even
though such validity may depend upon some extraneous matter of fact.

i

In Baxter’s Appeal, 1 Brewst. 451, 460, it was said, in the opnion of
this court, that, ‘though a writing propounded as a will may contain one
or more dispositions of property unlawful or void for any reason, it by
no means follows that it is not to be admitted to probate. It may
contain other useful provisions not at all affected by the cause of the
alleged invalidity’. * * * Professional opinion sustains the view that
the jurisdiction of the register in the probate of wills is confined to the
question whether the paper has been properly executed according to
Jaw and is in point of fact the will of the alleged testator, leaving all
other questions to subsequent decision if they should afterwards arise.
We consider this doctrine as most in accordance with general principles
as well as the provisions of our statutory system.’ ”

An examination of the Delaware Statutes governing the
jurisdiction, power and authority of the Register of Wills also drive us
to the conclusion that the Register of Wills does not have any general
jurisdiction over the administration of decedents’ estates. Title 12
Del.C. Chapters 13-25 inclusive contain the present laws governing the
settlement of personal estates and the duties of the Register of Wills. 12
Del.C. Chapter 13 specifically gives the Register authority to probate
wills and to hear caveats and petitions for review. 12 Del.C. Chapter 15
specifically gives the Register the authority and power to grant letters
testamentary and of administration, to remove executors or
administrators for neglect of duty, to require the giving of bond and to
perform certain other miscellaneous functions which are designated in
said Chapter. 12 Del.C. Chapters 19, 21 and 23 deal with the function
of the Register as an accounting officer in the receiving of inventories
and accounts. It is significant that in connection with the jurisdiction
exercised by the Register in the probating of wills and granting of
letters under 12 Del.C. Chapters 13 and 15, appeal lies to the Superior
Court, While in respect to all other functions of the Register
enumerated in succeeding Chapters 19, 21 and 23, the appeal lies to the
Orphans’ Court. Thus, when acting in a judicial capacity appeal from
the Register will lie to the Superior Court, while the action of the
Register as an accounting officer is subject to review in the Orphans’
Court.

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Judge Woolley (Delaware Practice, Vol. 1, Secs. 84—85,)
apparently believed that the Register had very limited jurisdiction in
matters of probate. He says, (at page 50):

“TX. REGISTER OF WILLS. Sec. 84. A portion of the judicial
power of the State is vested in Register’s Courts. A register’s court isa
court which has jurisdiction in matters of probate. This court is
presided over by a Register of Wills, who is a county officer chosen at
general elections by the qualified electors of the county in which this
court is situated, to serve for a term of four years. * * *

Sec. 85. Jurisdiction of Register’s Courts. All wills shall be
proved before the register of the county in which the testators resided
at the time of death. If a testator did not reside in the State, his will
may be proved before the register of any county wherein are any goods
or chattels, rights or credits, or lands, or tenements of the deceased.

The register has power to order any issue of fact whereof he may
prescribe the form, touching an instrument purporting to be a will, to
be tried by a jury in the Superior Court.

A will being allowed, the register may grant letters testamentary
to the executor thereof, and qualify him for the performance of his
duties.

In case of intestacy, administration of the goods and chattels,
tights and credits of an intestate, is granted by the register of the
county in which the intestate resided at the time of his death, and if the
intestate did not reside in the State, then administration may be
granted by the register of the county wherein the intestate had any
estate, personal or real.”

Judge Woolley then described the function of the Register as an
accounting officer. These functions are the ones now prescribed in
Article IV, Sec. 32 of the Constitution and in 12 Del.C. Chapters 19, 21
and 23 enacted pursuant thereto.

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There are very few Delaware cases that give much consideration.
to the jurisdiction of the Register of Wills or his function. In the case of
Robinson v. Robinson (1842) 3 Harr. 433, the Court of Errors and
Appeals considered the duties of the Register in respect to the filing of
accounts of personal representatives. In this case for the first time the
Court drew the distinction between the duties of the Register as an
accounting officer and his functions as a judge in the Register’s Court.
Justice Harrington speaking for the Court said at page 437:

“The constitution makes a manifest distinction between the
duties of the register as an accounting officer and his functions as a
Judge sitting in the register’s court. Section 21 of article 6, regards him
as an auditor to examine, adjust and settle administration accounts, and
gives an appeal from this settlement to the Orphans’ Court, where alone
these accounts can be questioned. Section 22 considers him for certain
purposes as a judge, and authorizes him to hold a court. It makes
provision for the ‘litigation of causes,’ and requires depositions to be
taken as a part of the ‘proceedings in the cause’. It contemplates parties
litigant and adversary proceedings, neither of which is contemplated or
practically observed as to the matters referred to in section 21. From
this court the appeal is to the Superior Court.” (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequently, this same problem was considered by the Superior
Court in the case of Wilmington Trust Co. v. Baldwin, supra. In this
case the Court had before it the problem involving the constitutionality
of a statute (3867 Revised Code, 1935) providing for a decree of
distribution. This statute provided that upon application by an
executor or administrator the Register of Wills should have authority
to issue a decree of distribution. It was urged that the statute was
unconstitutional by reason of the fact that it purported to confer upon
the Register a judicial power not authorized by the Constitution. The
Court reviewed the decision in the Robinson case, supra, and came to
the same conclusion reached by Judge Harrington in that case that the
Register occupies a dual position. Judge Rodney, speaking for the
Court, said 8 W.W.Harr. at page 607, 195 A. At page 292:

“The answer to this question brings us directly to a

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consideration of Robinson v. Robinson’s Adm’r, 3 Harr. 433, decided
in 1842. That case, as we read it, distinctly held that the Register of
Wills occupies a dual position: that under article 6, Sec. 17 of
Constitution of 1792 (article 6, Sec. 22 of Const. of 1831 and article 4,
Sec. 33 of Const. of 1897) the Register of Wills for certain purposes is a
judge and constitutes the Register’s Court; that in adjusting and settling
executors’ or administrators’ accounts under article 6, Sec. 16 of
Constitution of 1792 (article 6 Sec. 21 of Constitution of 1831, and
article 4, Sec. 34 of Constitution of 1897) The Register of Wills is not a
judge but an accounting officer from whose allowances exceptions may
be taken to the Orphans’ Court. (Emphasis added). With the opinion of
the Robinson Case we are strictly bound. It was the opinion of the
Court of Errors and Appeals, the highest Court of the state, and
concurred in by the Chancellor and every law judge of the state having
been heard on question reserved by the County Court.

Apply then the opinion to the present case. The administration
account has been filed by the administrator and adjusted and settled by
the register. This settlement by the Robinson Case was the act of an
accounting officer and not a judical function. Can the Legislature using
the ministerial act of settling the account as a basis, superimpose upon
it the judicial function in the Register’s Court Distribution of the Estate
as shown by the account?

We cannot say that, under certain circumstances, this cannot be
done. We can but point out some of the inherent and serious difficulties
which, in some cases, may present themselves.”* * *

Clearly, Judge Rodney had serious doubts about the difficulties
which might present themselves in the attempt of the Register to
exercise jurisdiction to issue decrees of distribution even when the
jurisdiction is given by statute.

Even more serious difficulties stand in the way of any attempt
by the Register to exercise general jurisdiction over decedents’ estates.
What process can he issue? What procedure does he follow? Does he
exercise equitable or legal jurisdiction? What records are kept? What, if

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any, appellate procedure is available? These and many more questions
would have to be answered if it were ever held that the Register has
general jurisdiction over «decedents’ estates. It may also be asked, if the
Register has this general jurisdiction over decedents’ estates, why have
proceedings for the construction of wills always been in the Court of
Chancery? There is a complete absence of any Delaware cases which
even remotely suggest that there is any inherent general jurisdiction in
the Register over decedents’ estates and their administration by
executors and administrators. A thorough search of every volume of the
Delaware Law and Chancery reports fails to reveal a single instance of
any such jurisdiction ever claimed for or asserted by the Register of
Wills.

The views expressed in the Robinson and Baldwin cases, supra,
as to the limit of the Register’s jurisdiction was also approved by Vice
Chancellor Pearson in the case of Bodziak v. Theisen (1946) 4 Terry
487, 50 A.2d 409. See also Barr v. Blackstone, (1940) 1 Terry 450, 13
A.2d 449, where Chief Justice Richards points out that although the
Register of Wills is a constitutional officer, the Constitution defines his
duties in only a very general way. Likewise, in Delaware Trust Co. v.
McCune (1951) 32 Del.Ch. 113 at 118, 80 A.2d 507 Chancellor
Wolcott recognized the limited judicial powers of the Register of Wills.
of. Kennedy v, Truss, (1940) 1 Terry 424, 13 A.2d 431, and ef. also
Worknot y. Millen’s, Admr., 1 Harr. 139, where the Court questioned
whether or not the Register of Wills was a judge authorized to
administer oaths.

Hl Absent any inherent general jurisdiction in the Register
over decendent’s estate and their administration by executors and
administrators, it becomes quite apparent that the Register has no
authority or power to establish a “policy of his office * * * to allow
as a debt of the deceased only one-half of the balance of any mortgage
owed on property held by the deceased and a surviving spouse as
tenants by the entirety.” His only function as an accounting office is to
ask the questions (1) Was there a debt? and (2) Was it paid? If the

278

answer to both is in the affirmative he must allow the item and pass the
account submitted.

WILMINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, a public body corporate and
politic, organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. The Following PARCEL
OF LAND, with the Buildings and Improvements thereon
erected, Situate IN the CITY OF WILMINGTON, COUNTY OF
NEW CASTLE and State of Delaware v. HERBERT M. AMES
and LILLIAN J. AMES, his wife, Owners, Pack & Process, Inc., a
corporation of the State of Delaware, et al., Lessees, Defendants
Below, Appellees.

Hil

(April 4, 1966)

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice, CAREY, Justice, and SHORT, Vice
Chancellor, sitting. .

Thomas Herlihy, Jr., Thomas Herlihy, II, and Morris Cohen, for
appellant.

James M. Tunnell, Jr., of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, and
William D. Bailey, Jr., of Bayard, Brill, Russell & Handelman, for
appellees.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 63, 1965.

|

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the Wilmington Housing Authority from the
final confirmation of an award by Commissioners sitting in the Superior

280 POT
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Court in condemnation proceedings. The award was for just
compensation for the taking by the Authority of almost an entire city
block with several substantial buildings thereon, the property of the
individual defendant, Ames.

The Authority attacks the inclusion by the Commissioners in the
award of the value of fixtures consisting of large and heavy pieces of
machinery used by the defendant, Pack & Process, Inc., in its business
of processing and packaging dry products.

Ames and his wife are presently the sole owners of Pack &
Process, Inc., although originally they owned only 50% of that
corporation, It operates under a lease with Ames expiring in 1968. The
nature of the business of Pack & Process, Inc. is that of a contract
packer. Such a packer is called on by manufacturers whose own
packaging capacities are limited, to supply immediate packaging
capacity. This means that the machinery of a contract packager must
have the capacity to permit the packer to diversify his operation. Such
a plant requires a flexibility ordinarily not available in the
manufacturer’s own plant.

Packaging machinery utilizes complicated mechanisms at high
speeds which require many and delicate adjustments for proper
operation. Many items of this type of machinery are exceedingly large
and the moving of them may be accomplished only with great difficulty
and expense. Furthermore, when such a machine is dismanteled and
moved, the readjustment of its delicate mechanisms is fraught with
difficulty and oftentimes is impossible to attain.

The Ames property, a former brewery, is being taken by the
Authority for a row-housing project. This former brewery is admirably
adapted for the packaging business of Ames, operated through his
wholly-owned company, Pack & Process, Inc.

Ames first learned of the housing proposal in 1961 when its
possibility first was made public. However, for a period of time — in
fact, until just before the institution of this condemnation action — the

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taking of the Ames property was never definitely decided upon by the
Authority, at least publicly. On the contrary, throughout a period of
about four years, whether or not the housing project would go forward
was a matter of considerable doubt.

Throughout this period, because of constantly increasing
demands upon his packaging facilities from manufacturers, Ames
gradually increased his productive capacity through the acquisition and
installation of additional machinery, This machinery was installed on
the premises in question, rather than upon a new location, because of
the inability of Ames to find out whether the property would be taken.

At the trial witnesses called by the defendants testified that,
while any piece of machinery, no matter what its size, can be moved
given the necessary manpower and money, nevertheless, it was
impractical to move the machinery in question because it could not be
reassembled readily to perform the task for which it is designed. All of
this machinery is attached to the buildings, either by bolts or water
lines, electric cables, air hoses, etc. Nevertheless, all of the attaching
devices can be disconnected from the machines which, thereafter,
could, with a maximum amount of effort, be moved to a new location.

These facts were testified to by expert witnesses called by both
sides. The fundamental disagreement among these experts relates to the
reassembling of the machines if they should be moved. Ames’ witnesses
testified that they could not be reassembled and adjusted in any
reasonable period of time, if at all. The experts of the Authority
minimized the difficulties of moving and reassembling.

This is the fundamental disagreement between these litigants; the
Authority arguing that, since the machinery may be removed without
damage to either itself or the freehold, the law requires that they be
regarded as chattels and not as fixtures to the real estate.

This Court, in Della Corporation v. Diamond, 210 A.2d 847, had
occasion to approve the principles governing the determination of
whether or not a chattel had become a fixture laid down in Warrington

L_|

v. Hignutt, 3 Terry 274,31 A.2d 480.

In that case the rule was laid down that a fixture is a
chattel which, by reason of its annexation to the real estate, is regarded
in law as a part of the real estate. In determining whether or not a
chattel has been sufficiently annexed to the realty to become a fixture,
the controlling test is the intention of the party making the annexation
as disclosed by the surrounding circumstances. To determine this
intention, various factors should be considered. Thus, the nature of the
chattel, the mode of its annexation, the purpose or use for which the
annexation has been made, and the relationship of the annexor to the
property, are all to be considered and weighed in determining the
question of intention.

HE No one factor is necessarily controlling. The Wilmington
Housing Authority argues that since the machinery was removable, that
necessarily determines the issue, but we think not. Removability alone,
while significant, is not controlling, as to what the intention of the
annexor was. The true test, we think, is whether or not the chattel was
affixed to the realty for a temporary or a permanent purpose.
Watertown Steam Engine Co. v. Davis, 5 Houst. 192; Equitable
Guarantee & Trust Co, v. Knowles, 8 Del. Ch. 106, 67 A. 961;
Martindale v. Bowers Beach Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 288, 118 A.299.

The trial judge in his instructions to the Commissioners
adequately, we think, told them how to determine whether a chattel
had become a fixture or not. He, quite properly, instructed them that it
was a matter of intention on the part of the annexor. He properly told
them what factors they should consider in order to determine what, in
fact, the annexor’s intention was.

The evidence before the Commissioners, particularly the
evidence offered by Ames, was sufficient to support their finding that
Ames intended the installation of this machinery to be permanent. This
finding meets the test laid down in this State as to whether or not a
chattel has, in fact, become a fixture.

ee 233
id

The Authority takes exception to this finding, apparently as a
matter of law, or, in the alternative, that all of the facts require a
finding that the installation was to be temporary only.

We have already referred to their argument based upon the
removability of this machinery but we think it pushes the argument too
far, While the machinery is removable, it is not to be removed easily
and properly. We think that a person installing and intending to operate
massive machinery of this kind in an adequate location probably
intended at the time of installation that the installation would be
permanent. This conclusion is simple common sense.

The Authority next argues that since the machinery was owned
by the corporation, Pack & Process, Inc., which was only a tenant of
the premises, that this fact precludes a finding of intention on the part
of Pack & Process, Inc., to make a permanent installation since its
occupancy of the premises was of a temporary nature under a lease.

This, however, is to ignore the fact that the lease held by
Pack & Process, Inc., had a number of years to go. Furthermore it is, we
think, reasonable to conclude that the lease between Ames and his
wholly-owned corporation, Pack & Process, Inc., would have been
renewed and extended from time to time, if necessary. The ownership
by the landowner of the corporate tenant is of great significance in
determining whether or not the intention at the time the machinery
was installed was to make it permanent or temporary. We think the
Commissioners were justified in finding that Ames intended to install
permanently through his wholly-owned corporation this machinery,
and that the machinery actually installed would have remained there
permanently but for the taking by the Authority. Therefore, it follows
that Ames, or Pack & Process, Inc., is entitled to be compensated for
these fixtures taken by the condemning Authority.

Hl The most the Housing Authority has demonstrated in this
appeal is that there is a possibility of difference of opinion between
reasonable men as to whether or not these items of machinery had

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become fixtures. Conceding this fact, nevertheless the Commissioners
found against the factual contention of the Housing Authority which
finding is based upon competent and sufficient evidence. This Court
will not disturb the factual finding of the Commissioners based upon
proper evidence.

The Authority, however, argues that the judgment should be
reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial by reason of certain
allegedly improper remarks made by counsel for Ames in his
summation to the Commissioners. The complained of remarks
commenced with a recitation of the growth of Ames’ packaging
business and his leasing of portions of the premises to other concerns.
As a result of the discussions concerning the possibility of an urban
renewal project in this area, one tenant failed to renew its lease and
another prospective tenant did not enter into a lease because of the
uncertainty as to the duration of time the premises would be available.
This particular series of remarks then culminated in the following
quotation:

“However, the real pressure and difficulty here developed from
the fact that they talked but they didn’t take. That is the thing that I
think maybe we could lose sight of in light of this case. There was talk
and talk, but in taking, this suit was never even filed until January 13,
1965.

“If they had gone ahead and taken it in 1962, that would have
been something else again, but what is a man, what is a businessman to
do, what would you do, as business people, if you had a property and
you didn’t have it? You were neither fish nor fowl. Would you find
yourself the capital to go out and buy another plant and, too, begin to
move gradually from this site to some other site? And if you did that
you might have a little problem about laying out the money for two
plants.

“TJ don’t know about that, but then suppose you did this and
they didn’t take? Suppose they come along and said, ‘We have changed
our minds.’

ees 235
Ld

“The wisdom of this whole project is such, I think, that a person
never could have been sure, until it was accomplished, that it would go
through.

“You can see the debatable features of it which are not issues in
this case which would make you wonder about the wisdom of the
project, and suppose they didn’t take.”

TE We think the complained of remarks do not amount to
such prejudicial error as to require the referral back of this cause for a
new trial. Throughout the trial the Authority had complained that
Ames, since knowing in 1961 of the possibility of the condemnation,
had kept right on installing machinery in the premises as his business
grew, and then sought compensation from the Authority for such
machinery installed during the period of time when the taking of the
property was imminent. Also, the Authority charged Ames with
neglecting many aspects of maintenance.

Counsel for Ames contends that the remarks were made in
explanation of the complaints of the Authority of Ames’ conduct in
this respect. He argues that it was not only proper but necessary for
him to point out to the Commissioners the reason why these matters
had been done. As to questioning the wisdom of the project, he says he
did not do this with the intention of inflaming the Commissioners, but
merely to emphasize the uncertainty of the fact that condemnation of
the property would ever take place. His argument is that, in view of the
uncertainty of the taking, which, in part at least, was caused by doubts
as to the wisdom of the project, Ames could not permit his business to
stagnate, but, on the contrary, was compelled by its requirements to
permit it to expand. Indeed, the failure on his part to do so would have
been an unwarranted reliance by him upon rumors and uncertainties.
For his own protection, he was required to do precisely what he did do.

In any event, we think the remarks not objectionable to such an
extent as to require the overturning of the award and the granting of a
new trial.

286 ee
i_|

Next, the Housing Authority complains of the following
Ip.
remarks of counsel:

“Therefore, you could do very grave injury to Mr. Ames if you
were to make a mistake against him, and if you were to make a mistake
against the Housing Authority under their theory of the facts, it would
not be a very serious error.”

In the context of the trial which had taken place before the
Commissioners and the contentions of both sides concerning the nature
of this machinery — that is, whether it was fixture or chattel — and in
view of the many repetitious statements of the position of the
Authority to the effect that the machinery could be removed and
resold, we think it was permissible to argue the point before the
Commissioners.

We do not regard these remarks as an invitation to load the
award against the Authority and in favor of Ames. On the contrary, we
think it permissible argument on the facts and an argument designed to
point out to the Commissioners inferences which could be made to aid
them in determing the facts.

Furthermore, the trial judge instructed the Commissioners that if
they should determine that the machinery was in fact fixtures, then
Ames was entitled to be awarded the reasonable value of them if they
were in place. If, on the other hand, the Commissioners should find
that the items were not fixtures, then they were instructed that they
would remain on the property subject to the right of Ames to remove
them but that, in that event, they could make no award either for the
value of the machinery or for the cost of its removal.

This, we think, is what counsel’s remarks were directed to. They
were intended to point out that if the machinery was held to be not
fixtures, the consequences to Ames might be expenses equal to the
value of the machinery. As such, counsel was pointing out the
consequences of a wrong decision. This, we think, was proper
comment. While his remarks may not have been as precise upon this

287

point as may now in retrospect be considered desirable, they,
nevertheless, were directed to that issue, and we think were not
improper to a degree to require the granting of a new trial.

For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the judgment below is
affirmed.

CHARLES DUNN, JR., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. MAYOR AND
COUNCIL OF CITY OF WILMINGTON, Defendant Below,
Appellee. .

(March 25, 1966)

pO

288 PO
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WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

Oliver V. Suddard and Richard Allen Paul, of Wise & Suddard,
for plaintiff below, appellant.

Stephen B. Potter, Asst. City Sol., for defendant below, appellee.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 76, 1965.

Ge

HERRMANN, Justice.

The question posed by the appellant is this: May the Mayor and
Council of Wilmington enact, and the Municipal Court of Wilmington
enforce, an ordinance creating a crime for which imprisonment may be
the penalty, other than for default of payment of a fine?

The appellant was charged in the Municipal Court of Wilmington
with violation of the Ordinance, enacted by the Mayor and Council of
Wilmington, creating the criminal offense of disorderly conduct within
the City limits and providing a penalty of fine or imprisonment, or
both. The appellant appeared with counsel and entered a plea of guilty.
He was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 30 days.
Certiorari proceedings were instituted in the Superior Court on the
ground that the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to impose a prison
sentence for violation of any City ordinance, except for failure to pay a
fine. The Superior Court upheld the judgment of the Municipal Court
[212 A.2d 596] and this appeal followed.

The appellant puts his appeal on three grounds:
First, the appellant attacks the constitutionality of the

Ordinance and the sentence by pointing (a)to the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution which prohibits involuntary

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servitude except as punishment for “crime,” and (b) to 11 Del. C. Sec.
101(a) which defines a “crime,” within the meaning of that Title, as an
“act or omission forbidden by a statute of this State or indictable at
common law.” Obviously, this argument is without merit. The
definition of a “crime” within the meaning of the Code does not limit
the definition of the word within the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment. As is concluded here, the power to create a “crime” has
been vested in the Mayor and Council of Wilmington, under certain
circumstances, and the requirements of the Thirteenth Amendment are
fulfilled by conviction and punishment for such “crime.”

Secondly, the appellant points out that the Mayor and
Council of Wilmington has only such power as may have been delegated
to it by the General Assembly, expressly or by necessary implication
[Wright v. Husbands, 36 Del. Ch.416, 131 A.2d 322(1957)] ; and—so
the argument goes—there has been no delegation empowering the
municipality to create any criminal offense for which a prison sentence
may be imposed in the first instance. We disagree. We find delegation of
the power by necessary implication in Section 31 of the City Charter of
18831 (17 Del. Laws, Chap. 207, p. 436) which empowers the City
Council generally “to do all those matters and things for the well being
of the said city which shall not be in contravention of any existing laws
of this State or the constitution thereof.” Compare in re Guerrero, 69
Cal. 88, 10 P. 261 (1886). It has not been shown that the Ordinance
here involved is in contravention of any existing law of the State. On
the contrary, the Ordinance outlawing disorderly conduct within the
City seems to fit nicely into the pattern formed by State law (11 Del.
C. Sec. 471) creating the offense of, and providing the penalty for,
disorderly conduct “in any public place within this State and outside
the limits of any incorporated city or town.”

‘The 1883 Charter was in force and effect when the instant sentence was imposed
in 1964. Since then, the current Charter of Wilmington has been enacted under
the Home Rule Statute (22 Del. C. Chap. 8). It is noteworthy that, by virtue of
22 Del. C. Sec. 802, the City is permitted to assume, under its new Home Rule
Charter, “all powers which, under the Constitution’ of this State, it would be
competent for the General Assembly to grant by specific enumeration and which
are not denied by Statute.”

Likewise, it has not been shown that the subject Ordinance is in
contravention of any constitutional limitation. This brings us to the
appellant’s third contention that such delegation, if found to exist
under the 1883 Charter, was an unlawful delegation by the Legislature
of its police power, citing State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79,
28 NW.2d 345, 174 A.L.R. 1338 (1947). In that case, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a statute, conferring upon county authorities
the power to enact and enforce ordinances governing the operation of
motor vehicles, was invalid as an unlawful delegation of legislative
power insofar as it purported to confer the power to treat a violation as
a misdemeanor for which imprisonment could be imposed in the first
instance. The Court there concluded that the power to prescribe
imprisonment may not be granted to cities or counties by the
Legislature except for the purpose of implementing the collection of a
fine which was deemed to be a civil action.

HMM The Keefe case appears to stand alone. The
time-honored rule is that the legislature may validly delegate to a
municipal govemment, pro tempore, the exercise of police power
within its boundaries, including the power to enact ordinances,
consistent with State law, which create crimes and impose the
punishment of imprisonment.” Before the Keefe case, it appears that
the authorities were uniformly agreed upon that principle, Annotation,
174 A.LR, 1343; and since Keefe, it appears that there has been little
contrariety of judicial opinion about the correctness of the prevailing
tule. See Commonwealth v, Cabell, 199 Pa. Super. 513, 185 A.2d 611,
614 (1962). We find the Keefe case unpersuasive.

Finding no merit in any of the appellant’s contentions, the
judgment below is affirmed.

71t is noteworthy that the grant of power under the Home Rule Statute expressly
excluded (22 Del. C, Sec. 802) the “power to define and provide for the
punishment of a felony.” The Code elsewhere provides that a felony is any crime
or offense specifically designated as such by law. 11 Del, C. Sec. 101(b).

291

EDWARD LITTLEJOMN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF DELAWARE,
Appellee.

(April 12, 1966)

WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

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Michael F. Tucker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Grover C. Brown, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dover, for the State.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 7, 1965.

EE

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice:

The appellant, Edward Littlejohn, was convicted of the
manslaughter of Mamie Bryant. He appeals, attacking the sufficiency of
the State’s evidence and the refusal to suppress from evidence
statements made by the deceased to neighbors shortly after the events
which the State maintains caused her death.

Prior to September 22, 1963, the day on which these events
took place, Littlejohn had lived with Mamie Bryant near Lincoln,
Delaware. Their near neighbors were Lillian and Joseph Robinson. On
the day in question, Littlejohn and Mamie Bryant, about 11:00 a.m.,
accompanied the Robinsons in their car on a trip. They visited various
places and all were drinking. At least one altercation took place
between Littlejohn and Joseph Robinson. They returned to Lincoln in
the early evening, going to their respective homes.

Shortly thereafter, Mamie Bryant came to the Robinsons’ home
and borrowed some matches. About ten minutes later, Mamie Bryant
appeared again at the Robinsons’. She asked them to take her to the
hospital because Littlejohn had thrown coal oil upon her and struck a
match to her. The trial court permitted the Robinsons to testify as to
her statements thus made to them.

TI The crime of manslaughter charged here is the killing of
another without malice while engaged in the doing of an unlawful act;
that is something which the defendant had no right to do. State v.

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Woods, 7 Pennewill 499, 77 A. 490. Seizing upon the element of the
crime that death must be caused by the doing of an unlawful act,
Littlejohn argues that there is no evidence that he intentionally set
Mamie Bryant afire.

The argument is that the only evidence offered by the
State was the statement made by the deceased to the Robinsons that
Littlejohn threw coal oil on her and threw a lighted match on her. This
evidence is characterized as circumstantial which, under the rule, must
be inconsistent with any hypothesis other than guilt. Holland v. State, 9
Terry 559, 107 A.2d 920. Thus, it is argued, the statement made by the
deceased is as consistent with the view that the coal oil had been
thrown and ignited accidentally.

We think the argument without merit. The deceased’s statement
was to the effect that Littlejohn first threw coal oil on her and then
threw a lighted match on her. If this statement was accepted by the
jury, as obviously it was, any possibility of accident is precluded.
Furthermore, the deceased’s statement is not circumstantial evidence
but is direct evidence even though hearsay. This being so, the rule of
Holland v. State has no application.

Hl Next, Littlejohn argues that the State failed to prove any
motive on his part to set fire to the deceased. This may be so but there
is no requirement of law that the State must prove a motive. The lack
of proof of motive may be of importance in a trial for a crime involving
an element of willfulness and malice when the State is relying solely
upon circumstantial evidence, State v. Buckingham, 11 Terry 469, 134
A, 2d 568, but as we have pointed out, this conviction does not stand
solely upon circumstantial evidence. The State may, of course, always
prove motive if it can, but its inability to do so is not fatal. 21 Am. Jur.
2, Criminal Law, Sec. 86.

HE Littlejohn next argues that the State failed to prove the
cause of death and to connect it with his act. The deceased actually
died from a severe distention of her stomach related to the presence of
a huge ulcer on the lesser curvature. The doctor who so testified went

294 POT
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on to state that “these terminal changes in the stomach which killed her
were sequential or secondary to the burns” which brought about
poisoning and secondary infection.

We think the evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury
that Mamie Bryant died from an organic condition which was a direct
result of the effect of the burns she suffered. Therefore, death having
resulted as a natural result of the burns inflicted by Littlejohn, he is
criminally responsible for the death. 52 Am. Jur., Homicide, Sec. 52.

Hl Finally, Littlejohn argues that testimony as to the
statements made by Mamie Bryant to the Robinsons shortly after she
had been bumed were inadmissible in evidence and should have been
supressed as hearsay evidence. They were admitted in evidence by the
trial judge as part of the res gestae.

HB One of the numerous exceptions to the rule of hearsay
evidence is a statement made as part of the res gestae. The basis for the
exception is that statements made instinctively at the time of an event
without the opportunity to fabricate are likely to be true. The law thus
presumes their truthfulness. While the statement to be admissible must
be made at or near the time of the event, the statement need not be
exactly coincident in point of time with the event. Today the test
applied is one of spontaneity; that is, was or was not the statement
induced by the shock of the event. 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 662;
31A C.IS. Evidence Secs. 413, 417; 2 Jones on Evidence, Sec. 321, and
see Cloud v. State, 2 Storey 182, 154 A.2d 680, 78 A.L.R. 2d 294.

In the case at bar Mamie Bryant returned to the Robinson home
not more than ten minutes after borrowing a box of matches; she was
obviously badly burned and in pain; she spoke louder and more
excitedly than normal, and she was on the verge of tears. The trial judge
ruled that these circumstances satisfied the requirement of spontaneity.
We agree with his ruling. In any event, his decision lay within his sound
discretion which ordinarily is conclusive upon appeal. 20 Am. Jur.,
Evidence Sec. 663.

295

To the extent that State v. Trusty, 1 Pennewill 319, 40 A. 766 is
inconsistent with this holding, we overrule it.

The conviction below is affirmed.

JAMES A. CRAWLEY, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE,
Appellee.

(April 13, 1966)
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
Michael F. Tucker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jay H. Conner, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, No. 49, 1965.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

296 fF
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This is an appeal from a Superior Court conviction of
burglary in the fourth degree (11 Del. C., Sec. 395.)

Sometime during the night of September 28, 29, 1964, the
business premises of Alton F. Neal, Inc. in Newport, Delaware, were
broken into forcibly through a second-story window. A safe in the
premises was broken into from which were taken a checkbook
containing five hundred blank checks on the account of Alton F. Neal,
Inc., and petty cash in excess of $50.00. Also taken from the premises
was a checkwriter machine.

The foregoing facts were proved by the State and are not
disputed by the prisoner. The State has therefore discharged its burden
of proving the corpus delicti, the occurrence of a crime.

The prisoner, however, argues that, while a crime undoubtedly
had been committed, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he had committed it. The State’s proof to connect the
prisoner with the crime follows,

On September 29 or 30, 1964, the exact date being in dispute,
the prisoner cashed at Tanzer’s Market a check drawn on the account of
Alton F. Neal, Inc., which was identified as one of the blank checks
taken from the safe of Alton F. Neal, Inc. The prisoner was also
identified as the person who, on September 30, 1964, attempted to
cash a similar check at Hearn’s Market.

The prisoner admitted cashing the check at Tanzer’s Market but
says it was the same check which he had previously tried to cash at
Hearn’s Market. In fact, because of cashing this check, prior to his trial
for burglary, he had plead guilty to a charge of obtaining money under
false pretenses in the Municipal Court of Wilmington.

The prisoner denied his guilt of burglary and explained his
possession of the check in question by saying he had found it on the
floor of a poolroom on West Sixth Street in Wilmington. He also called

Po 297
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alibi witnesses to prove he was in Atlantic City, New Jersey, during the
time the burglary took place.

The jury convicted him which, we think, requires the conclusion
that it disbelieved his alibi and his explanation for possession of the
check.

The basic question before us is whether or not the unexplained
possession of property stolen in the course of a proven burglary soon
after the time of burglary is sufficient in law to connect the possessor
of the property with the burglary.

HMI When the State has proved goods to have been stolen
which soon thereafter are found in the possession of a defendant, a
prima facie case that he is the thief is created. The burden is then cast
upon him to satisfactorily explain to the jury how he came into
possession if he desires to avoid the resultant presumption of guilt.
State v. White, 4 W.W.Harr. 316, 152 A.393; Schaffer v. State of Del.,
184 A.2d 689.

HL As we have stated, we must assume that the jury rejected
the prisoner’s explanation of his possession of the stolen check. This
being so, the State’s prima facie case stands unrebutted. There is,
therefore, sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.

The prisoner argues, however, that, while the presumption
arising from possession of stolen property may be sufficient to support
a conviction of larceny, more is needed to support a conviction of
burglary since that crime charges him, inter alia, with breaking and
entering. It is argued that there should be some proof placing him on or
about the scene of the crime at the time it took place.

Schaffer v. State, supra, is direct authority against the argument
for in that case possession of stolen property recently taken as the
result of a burglary, coupled with proof of the corpus delicti, was held
sufficient to sustain the conviction. And in State v. Edell, 7 W.W.Harr.
404, 183 A.630, it was held that when a dwelling had been broken into

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and chattels had been stolen therefrom, the possession of the stolen
chattels raised a rebuttable presumption that the. possessor had
committed the whole crime. We see no reason to refuse to follow these
precedents.

The prisoner cites to us authorities from other states, such as
Henggler v. State, 173 Nev. 171, 112 N.W.2d 762, to the contrary, but
we think they are not persuasive.

Finally, the prisoner complains that the trial judge did not
submit to the jury the question of whether or not the check in question
was in fact part of the loot of the burglary. He cites to us Wiggins v.
State, Del., 210 A.2d 314, a recent decision of this court.

In the Wiggins case the trial court instructed the jury that, since
the defendant was found in the possession of the stolen property, he
was presumed to be the thief. We held that, since whether or not the
goods in question were in fact the stolen goods was strenuously
controverted, error had been committed in the charge by the
assumption,, in the State’s favor, of the truth of a controverted fact.

The situation at bar is entirely different for there is no denial by
the prisoner that the check he cashed had in fact been stolen.

The conviction is affirmed.
|

WILLIAM T. MERRITT, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE,
Appellee.

(April 20, 1966)

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J.J., sitting.
James F. Kipp, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Ruth Ferrell, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

Supreme Court of State of Delaware, No. 72 1965.

No. 72, 1965.
WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction in the Superior Court of
burglary in the fourth degree. Merritt raises for our decision the single
question of whether or not due process under the 14th Amendment of
the Federal Constitution and under Article I, Section 7, of the

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—

Delaware Constitution, Del.C.Ann., has been denied him.

The facts assumed are these: Merritt, along with others, was
indicted for a burglary which took place at a warehouse where,
apparently, all of the accused worked, Merritt soon after retained
counsel, The case was on the argument list for the December Term,
1964, but did not come to trial. On January 5, 1965, Merritt’s counsel
obtained an order permitting him to withdraw as counsel for Merritt. It
does not appear that Merritt was notified of his counsel’s intention to
withdraw from the representation, or that he consented to such
withdrawal. It does appear, however, that a copy of the order
permitting counsel to withdraw was sent Merritt by certified mail, but
that the letter and its contents were returned to the sender because
Merritt, who was free on bail, had changed his residence. We think it
plain that Merritt, until he appeared in court for trial on April 8, 1965,
had no knowledge that his counsel had been granted leave to withdraw
from the case.

At the call of the trial calendar on April 8, 1965, Merritt stated to
the court that he was without counsel. The court then appointed the
Public Defender to represent him and instructed him to consult with
Merritt, allowing him thirty minutes to do so, despite the Public
Defender’s request for a continuance in order to consult adequately,
determine whether witnesses should be summoned in Merritt’s behalf
and, in general, prepare for trial. Nevertheless, at the end of
approximately thirty minutes, at the direction of the court, the trial
commenced, resulting in a verdict of guilty.

It is stated to us as a representation that there were witnesses who
could have been called in Merritt’s behalf whose testimony might well
have resulted in his acquittal, particularly in view of the fact that
despite his lack of defense it took the jury over two hours of
deliberation to convict Merritt on the testimony of two of his
fellow-employees, both of whom had pleaded guilty to identical charges
and who have subsequently received probation.

Il We think it fundamental that the denial of the assistance of

Po 301
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counsel to a criminal defendant is a denial of due process of law, both
under the Federal and Delaware Constitutions. There can be no
argument concerning this proposition. The State, however, argues that
as a matter of fact Merritt was not denied the right to counsel but, on
the contrary, was supplied with counsel by the State, itself.

HE Of course, counsel was appointed but the appointment of
counsel without, at the same time, giving him opportunity to consult
with the defendant and prepare his defense is the denial of the effective
assistance of counsel, which both Constitutions guarantee the
defendant. Avery v. State of Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84
L.Ed. 377, Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S.Ct. 116, 90 L.Ed. 61;
People v. Shiffman, 350, Wi. 243, 132 N.E. 760; McArver y. State, 114
Ga. 514, 40 S.E. 779, and Creed v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 156
A.2d 676.

We think Merritt, on the assumed facts as they have been
stated to us, and as they are contained in two affidavits by which
Merritt seeks to supplement the record before us, was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel in contravention of the 14th Amendment
and of Article I, Section 7, of the Delaware Constitution.

HI Two considerations lead us to this conclusion. First, we
think it was error to permit counsel to withdraw from a representation
in the absence of any notice whatsoever to his client. Indeed, we would
have supposed the first step in obtaining the court’s permission to
withdraw would have been notice to the client of the intention to
withdraw. The result was, as far as the record before us indicates, that
Merritt appeared in court for trial with the mistaken belief that he had
a lawyer and learned for the first time that he had none.

i | Second, if it is true, Merritt alleges, that given a reasonable
time he could have produced witnesses who would have materially
aided his defense, the refusal to give him that time, particularly in view
of the first consideration mentioned, was to force him to trial without
an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense.

Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the denial of
the requested continuance was an abuse of discretion sufficient to
require that a new trial be ordered.

Since, however, the facts and circumstances we have related do not
appear in the record upon which the appeal has been taken, but appear
in affidavits which are not properly a part of the record before us, we
will remand the cause with authority and instructions to ascertain the
facts. If the facts then ascertained are found to be as we have related
them, the remand will further instruct that the conviction of Merritt be
set aside and a new trial granted.

Hl In thus disposing of this case, we do not intend to imply
approval of attempts to supplement the record before us by affidavits.
On the contrary, we expressly disapprove such practice as being
contrary to the established procedures of this Court.

MARYLOU C. FIELDS, Plaintiff v. SYNTHETIC ROPES, INC., a
corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendant.

303

(April 25, 1966)

STOREY, J. sitting.

Harold Leshem, of Leshem & Rubenstein, and Sheldon Albert,
of the office of James E. Beasley, Philadelphia, for plaintiff.

William Prickett, and Roger Sanders, of Prickett & Prickett, for
defendant.

Superior Court of Delaware for New Castle County No. 80 Civil
Action 1964.

ee
STOREY, Judge.

This is a personal injury action against Synthetic Ropes, Inc., a

304 Pp
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corporation of the State of Delaware, arising out of a motor vehicle
accident which occured on March 14, 1962. The plaintiff, Marylou
Fields, was a passenger in an automobile owned by defendant
corporation and operated on the date of the accident by her husband,
John W. Fields, who was president and a stockholder of the
corporation. A brief chronology of events is as follows:

On the evening of the accident, Mr. Fields arrived home in
Wilmington, Delaware, at about 6:30 P.M. from defendant
corporation’s plant at Chester, Pennsylvania. He had planned a sales trip
on the following day for defendant corporation. Both he and Mrs.
Fields therefore decided to go to dinner and then to proceed to
defendant’s plant at Chester, where Mrs. Fields was to help her husband
ready himself for the ensuing sales trip by making rope samples and by
typing an itinerary. She was to receive no compensation for her
assistance, nor was she on defendant corporation’s payroll. At one time
she had acted as secretary to her husband and another employee on a
voluntary basis and for no compensation. Subsequently, the Fields
adopted a child and her assistance was irregular. She did assist her
husband many times prior to the date of the accident with rope samples
and typing an intinerary. Between 7:30 and 8:00 P.M., the Fields left
their home and proceeded to the Town House Restaurant in Media,
Pennsylvania. After dinner, and sometime between 11:00 P.M. and
1:00 AM., they left the restaurant and drove south on Route 1,
planning to use Route 322 to get to defendant’s plant. Mr. Fields,
however, missed the turn-off and indicated that he would use a road
farther south. While so preceeding south, the accident occurred which
injured plaintiff wife.

Defendant corporation has moved for a summary judgment and
in support of said motion submits that Delaware’s guest statute, 21
Del.C. Sec. 6101(a), bars plaintiff’s cause of action because at the time
of the accident, she was a guest in defendant’s automobile within the
purview of said statute. In short, defendant argues that plaintiff
intended or did no more than any other helpful wife would have done
under similar circumstances. No benefit, be it payment or otherwise,
flowed to the defendant corporation or to its employee and operator of

pT 305
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the motor vehicle, her husband. Thus, as a matter of law, defendant
contends the guest statute applies and bars plaintiff’s recovery.

The guest statute reads as follows [6101(a)]:

“(a) No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle, boat, airplane or other vehicle as his guest without payment for
such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against
such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident,
unless such accident was intentional on the part of such owner or
operator, or was caused by his wilful or wanton disregard of the rights
of others,”

HH The purpose ‘of the guest statute is to protect one who
generously, without accruing benefit, has transported another in his
motor vehicle. Engle v. Poland, 8 Terry 365, 91 A.2d 326 (1952);
Colombo v. Sech, 2 Storey 575, 163 A.2d 270 (1960). It was not
intended by the legislature to deny a right of action for injury suffered
through the negligence of the owner or operator of an automobile by
one who is being transported for the benefit of the owner or operator
or for the benefit of both the passenger and the owner or operator.
Robb v. Ramey Associates, Inc., 1 Terry 520, 14 A.2d 394 (1940),
[Citing Kruy v. Smith et ux., 108 Conn. 628, 144 A. 304 (1929).]

HH (One who rides in an automobile driven by another
merely for his own business or pleasure, without making any return or
conferring any benefit upon the driver, is a guest within the statute.
Benefit to the driver is the crucial factor in determining whether a
passenger in any given circumstances is a guest within the scope of the
statute. The guest statute is not applicable where the transportation is
provided solely for the driver’s benefit or for the benefit of both
passenger and driver. Dunn v, Stumbers, 4 Storey 102, 174 A.2d 567
(1961).

TH It is the settled law in Delaware that “payment” under the
guest statute need not be cash and is not an indispensable requisite to
constitute one a passenger. Elliott v. Camper, 8 W.W.Harr. 504, 194

TO

306 PO
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A.130(1937); Robb v. Ramey Associates, Inc., supra; Wilkes v. Melice,
9 Terry 206, 100 A.2d 742 (1953); Dunn v. Stumbers, supra; Truitt v.
Gaines, D.C., 199 F.Supp. 143, 318, F.2d 461 (Third Circuit, 1963).

In Robb v. Ramey Associates, Inc., supra, defendant, whose
business it was to sell burial lots in a certain cemetery, was transporting
plaintiff to a cemetery to induce plaintiff to buy a burial lot. The
Court, holding the guest statute inapplicable, stated that the
relationship discussed was not that of mere friendship, nor was it the
social one of hospitality, and at least the trip was for the mutual benefit
of both plaintiff and defendant.

In Dunn y. Stumbers, supra, the Court, in denying summary
judgment to a defendant restaurant manager who at the time of the
automobile accident had been transporting a waitress employed at the
restaurant to work because she had no other means of transportation
that day, held that it was a fact question as to whether defendant
manager expected to derive some benefit from transporting the plaintiff
waitress and that in the case at bar the jury might find that his action
was performed in part at least for his benefit. The defense in the Dunn
case contended that the defendent Stumbers was only doing the
waitress a “personal favor” in line with his policy of trying to be
helpful to employees in their personal affairs, and also that other
waitresses were available and could have substituted for the plaintiff
waitress. The Court, however, ruled that it would not hold as a matter
of law that no benefit resulted to the defendant.

Finally, we come to Truitt v. Gaines, supra. Here, the U.S. Court
of Appeals held that a retarded pupil and his mother were not guests
under the Delaware guest statute in an automobile which, at the time of
the accident, was being operated by the pupil’s school teacher, who was
taking them home from a doctor’s office. The Court held that the
evidence sustained the District Court’s conclusion that the teacher took
the retarded pubil, who had been injured on the school grounds several
days earlier, and his mother from home to the doctor’s office to
promote the mutual interests of the teacher and pupil and his mother,

EL
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and that the transportation of the pupil to the doctor’s office was a
“tangible thing which was substantial because it related to the teacher’s
employment as a teacher”. The Court cited Dunn v. Stumbers, supra, as
quite analogous to the facts present before it, and stated that the
Delaware decision was resolved upon the same principles which guided
the District Court. In Truitt vy. Gaines, supra, the defense contended
that the school teacher’s act in transporting the pupil and his mother to

. the doctor was performed solely out of charity for the Truitts and
solely as a humanitarian act. In a word, the host driver received only a
benefit in terms of feeling himself to be a good humanitarian. The
Court, however, held the facts in the record did not justify such
conclusion. Testimony of the State Superintendent of Schools, of a
fellow teacher, and of defendant teacher himself showed that what he
did was within a teacher’s expected responsibility and that he acted
both as a human individual and as a teacher. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the District Court, believing this testimony, had ample
reason for finding that the defendant teacher took the pupil for medical
care to promote the mutual interests of both himself and the pupil and
his mother.

The case law of Delaware and the principles set forth
therin having been reviewed, it is now incumbent upon this Court to
apply them to the facts presented here in ruling upon defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. It is to be noted, first, that in ruling
upon defendant’s motion, the facts are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Engle v. Poland, supra. Secondly, the
guest statute, because it is in derogation of the common law, is to be
strictly construed against the owner and operator. Truitt v. Gaines,
supra, This Court cannot say as a matter of law that the Delaware guest
statute applies and bars plaintiff’s cause of action. In the case at bar,
the trier of fact might find that Mr. Fields, while acting within the
scope of his employment as president of defendant corporation in
preparing for an ensuing sales trip and by driving to defendant
corporation’s plant on the night of the accident in the corporation’s
automobile, expected to derive some benefit for the defendant
corporation through the assistance of his wife, and the trier of fact
might find that their actions on the evening in question were performed

308 Ee
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in part at least for defendant’s benefit. Certainly, this Court cannot rule
as a matter of law that because defendant’s president and the plaintiff
are husband and wife, the evening of March 14th was purely a social
occasion, or if any assistance was rendered by the plaintiff, it arose
solely out of the marital relationship. To do so would be to ignore the
evidence presented. It may well be that the trier of fact may find, as did
the Court in Truitt v. Gaines, supra, that the transportation of Mrs.
Fields to defendant corporation’s plant in defendant’s automobile to
make rope samples and to prepare an itinerary was a tangible thing
which was substantial because it related to her husband’s employment
as president of defendant corporation who was about to embark upon a
-sales trip, or it may choose to believe that Mrs, Fields’ only reason for
being in defendant’s automobile on March 14, 1962, was to have dinner
and to be a helpful wife. In a word, there is no rule of Jaw present in
the Delaware decisions upon which this Court must declare as a matter
of law that the guest statute applies; nor is there any one fact that has
been presented which is determinative of the issue. The fact that Mrs.
Fields was not to be paid in money cannot be the test. Robb v. Ramey
Associates, Inc., supra, Dunn v. Stumbers, supra, Truitt v. Gaines,
supra. The fact that the transportation on the evening of March 14,
1962 was “in part” for a social or other reasons appears not to be
crucial. Dunn v, Stumbers, supra. The fact that plaintiff and defendant
corporation’s president, and operator of the automobile, are husband
and wife does not compel dismissal of the cause of action as a matter of
law. The key factor, it would seem, is and shall be “benefit” to the
owner or operator of the motor vehicle, and upon this question there is
a material issue of fact. Based upon the Delaware law, as reviewed
above, and considering the facts in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.