State: Rhode Island
Volume: 122
Term: 0-0
Jurisdiction(s): Rhode Island
Source: https://static.case.law/ri/122.pdf

404 A.2d 60.
PaMELa J. Parapiso vs. JosepH J. Parapiso
JULY 23, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

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Doris, J. This is an appeal from a child-support decree
entered by the Family Court. The questions presented are
first, whether the amount ordered is excessive as a matter of
law, and second, whether the trial justice erred in awarding

attorney's fees pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§15-5-16.

Pamela and Joseph Paradiso were divorced in 1971. The
divorce decree awarded custody of their two children to
Pamela, but left open the matter of alimony and child
support because Joseph was then unemployed.

In 1976, Pamela petitioned the Family Court for an award
of alimony and child support. At a hearing on her petition,
Pamela testified that she was working and had a net weekly
salary of $130. She also submitted a list of weekly expenses for
herself and her children totaling $170.

Joseph testified that he had remarried and that both he
and his new spouse were employed. He further testified con-
cerning the details of their average weekly wages and sub-
mitted a list of their weekly expenditures. In addition,
Joseph’s payroll record was admitted into evidence.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial justice found
that Joseph and his second wife had a net weekly income of
$250 and weekly expenses of $212. Concerning Pamela and
her children, he found that their weekly expenses were
reasonable and that Pamela’s salary was as claimed. On the
basis of these findings the justice ordered Joseph to pay $50 a
week in child support and to pay Pamela’s counsel fees of
$200.1 From the decree entered by the Family Court, Joseph
has appealed.

‘Although Pamela also petitioned for alimony, the decree of the trial justice
awarded child support only.

P| 3

HH se first address the propriety of the child-support order.
The amount ordered for child support is a discretionary
determination for the trial justice and, absent abuse in the
exercise of that discretion, that determination will not be dis-
turbed by this court. See, e.g., Yates v. Yates, 155 Conn. 544,
235 A.2d 656 (1967); Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 134
S.E.2d 227 (1964). The guiding principle in setting a child-

_ support award is to balance the needs of the child against the
financial ability of the absent parent. E.g., Simonet v.
Simonet, 279 So.2d 35 (Fla. App. 1973); see Bellows v.
Bellows, 119 R.I. 689, 382 A.2d 816 (1978); Pierson v.
Peirson, 119 R.I. 701, 382 A.2d 823 (1978); Moore v.
Moore, 53 B.1. 294, 166 A. 501 (1933). See generally Clark,
Law of Domestic Relations §15.1 at 496 (1968); 24 Am. Jur.
2d, Divorce and Separation §839 (1966).

Hsin the instant case the weekly needs of Pamela and her
children exceeded Pamela’s income by $40. After expenses,
which the trial justice concluded were reasonable, Joseph
had an ability to pay approximately $38. Notwithstanding
these figures, however, the trial justice ordered Joseph to pay
a sum—$50—that significantly exceeded both Pamela’s
needs and Joseph’s ability to pay. In so doing the trial justice
clearly abused his discretion. Santacroce v. Santacroce, 347
So.2d 815 (Fla. App. 1977); Costello v. LeNoir, 462 Pa. 36,
337 A.2d 866 (1975); Cole v. Cole, 259 Iowa 58, 143 N.W.2d
350 (1966); see DiNofrio v. DiNofrio, 85 R.I. 21, 125 A.2d
194 (1956); cf. Spaziano v. Spaziano, 94 R.I. 258, 179 A.2d
849 (1962). Instead, we think that an order of $38 would
strike the proper balance between the respective interests in
this case, and we direct that the order of the court below be
reduced accordingly.

HB sWe also think that the trial justice erred in awarding
Pamela $200 in counsel fees. By statute the Family Court
may in appropriate cases order the husband to pay counsel
fees as the court thinks “reasonable and proper.” G.L. 1956
(1969 Reenactment) §15-5-16. We have stated, however,
that “before the trial justice is warranted in making such an
award, he must find that the husband had a sufficient finan-

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cial ability to pay such fees and that the wife is without prop-
erty of her own available for that purpose.” Hull v. Hull,
120 R.I. 77, 81, 384 A.2d 1065, 1067 (1978). Here, as in
Hull, no such findings were made.

In any event, we think that it would be unreasonable to
order Joseph to pay counsel fees when the record indicates
that, after meeting expenses and paying the instant support
order, Joseph has nothing left. See Toy v. Toy, 108 R.I. 484,
490, 276 A.2d 754, 757 (1971). Under our adjustment of the
support order the parties stand in financial equipoise; Pamela
receives the amount just sufficient for her needs and Joseph
pays support to the extent of his ability. Accordingly, we
vacate that portion of the Family Court order awarding
counsel fees,

The decree appealed from is sustained in part as modified,
and overruled in part, and the cause is remanded to the
Family Court to enter a new decree in accordance with the
directives of this opinion.

Mr. Justice Josuin, dissenting. This case raises the recur-
ring problem of a father whose excess of income over his
reasonable expenses is insufficient to meet the reasonable
needs of his children. If the children’s needs are to be satis-
fied, the father must give up something he needs. If the
father is allowed to retain all that he requires, however, the
children must go wanting. Yet a solution must be found, and
it necessarily results in hardship either to the children or to
the father, or perhaps to both. Under our rule, a trial justice,
in his search for that solution, cannot be guided solely by
either the needs and welfare of the children or the capacity of
the father to pay. Instead, he must attempt to balance the
children’s need and the father’s capacity to pay. See Peirson
v. Peirson, 119 R.I. 701, 704, 382 A.2d 823, 824 (1978);
Spaziano v. Spaziano, 94 R.I. 258, 261, 179 A.2d 849, 851
(1962); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 79 R.I. 163, 167-68, 85 A.2d
565, 567 (1952). That factual determination is entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it
was “based upon an oversight or misconception of material

eC“ 5
evidence on a controlling issue, or was otherwise clearly
wrong.” Brown v. Brown, 114 R.I. 117, 120, 329 A.2d 200,
201-02 (1974); Rock v. Rock, 107 R.I. 172, 178, 265 A.2d
640, 644 (1970); Ricciardi v. Ricciardi, 91 R.I. 455, 458, 164
A.2d 855, 857 (1960).

In this case, the trial justice concluded that the unmet
needs of the children took priority over allowing the father to
maintain his present standard of living. To satisfy those
needs, however, did not require an award of $50 a week.
There is no evidence in the record that supports an award in
that amount. Indeed, the children’s mother testified that
they required only $40 a week. Evidence to support any
greater amount is totally lacking.

I agree with the majority, therefore, that an award of $50
a week cannot be allowed to stand. See DiNofrio v. DiNofrio,
85 R.I. 21, 29, 125 A.2d 194, 199 (1956). That the trial jus-
tice erred in fixing the amount of the award, however, does
not necessarily call for a complete reversal. He was required
to exercise his discretion concerning who should suffer hard-
ship—the father or the children—and he opted to place the
burden upon the father. Although he imposed a larger
burden than the evidence warrants, there is evidence that
will support an award of $40 a week for the children’s
support. I would therefore reduce the award only to that
amount rather than to the $38 awarded by the majority.

My disagreement with the majority is limited to the
amount of the weekly award. I agree with them that an
award of counsel fees is not justified on this record.

Ferdinand A. Bruno, for plaintiff.

Louis B, Abilheira, Salvatore L. Romano, Jr., for defen-
dant.

404 A.2d 472.
Wiia S. Rosen vs. Ropert H. Rosen
JULY 23, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

fo)

Josun, J. In this domestic relations matter, a final
decree was entered in the Family Court in July 1977 granting
the wife a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
About a month later the husband moved to vacate the
decree. He urged two grounds: (1) that the service of process
commencing the action was fatally defective and (2) that
when the final decree was entered another divorce petition
filed by the wife and alleging the same grounds was pending
in the Family Court. The motion to vacate was denied by a
Family Court justice and the husband appealed.

In support of his assertion that service was improper, the
husband refers to the testimony of two deputy sheriffs. They
testified that on the day service was to be made, they had
been advised that the husband would be at Brown Univer-
sity’s Rockefeller Library. The two officers, one in uniform
and the other in civilian clothes, proceeded to the library
area. While sitting in their automobile waiting for the
husband to emerge, the uniformed officer executed the
return of service, even though service had not yet been made.

When the husband came out both sheriffs approached him
from behind, and the plainclothes one asked him, “is your
name Mr. Rosen?” He responded that it was, whereupon the
non-uniformed sheriff placed the papers in the husband’s

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pocket. The husband threw the papers to the ground, ran
across the street, and announced that he had not been served.
The sheriff who had already executed the return was only a
few feet away as these events took place and he witnessed all
that occurred.

| The husband now argues that the service thus made did

not satisfy the statutory requisites and, therefore, was fatally
defective. The controlling statute is G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §15-5-20.! In substance, it provided that a
resident respondent in a divorce action shall be personally
served as provided for by the Family Court rules. Although
those rules do not specifically provide for the manner in
which the requisite service shall be made, Rule 37? prescribes

General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §15-5-20 reads as follows:

“No person shall be entitled to a divorce from the bond of marriage unless
the defendant shall, in accordance with rules adopted by the court, have been
personally served with process, if within the state, or with personal notice duly
authenticated, if out of the state, or unless the defendant shall have entered an
appearance in the cause; or unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court
that the petitioner does not know the address nor the residence of the
defendant and has not been able to ascertain either after reasonable and due
inquiry and search for six (6) months, in which case the court, or in vacation a
judge thereof, may authorize notice by publication of the pendency of the
petition for divorce to be given in a manner provided by law.” (Emphasis
added.)

*Rule 37 of the Family Court Rules of Practice provides:

“The citation in Divorce shall be in substantially the following form:

“State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
Providence, Se. Family Court
“To the Sheriffs of our several counties, or to their Deputies:

“You are hereby required to serve_____, Respondent, of ___—_
in the County of with a true and certified copy of the original
petition of ________ for Divorce, which said copy accompanies this
Citation, together with a copy of this Citation. Said Respondent is hereby
notified of the pendency of said petition before the Family Court within the
County of ________, and that he or she, said Respondent, is commmanded
if he or she intends to make any defense, that on or before the first Monday of

next, which is the Return Day of this Citation, or within ten days
thereafter, he or she cause his or her written appearance to be entered in the
Office of the Clerk of said Court at ______ in said County as above
named, and further that he or she defend against said cause according to law,
if he or she intends to make any defense, and that said Respondent do and
receive what the Court shall order and adjudge or decree therein.

CSC 9
the form of citation for use in a divorce action and it,
together with the form for making return of service® that is
printed on the citation, make clear that the personal service
required by the statute is accomplished by leaving a true and
certified copy of the original petition accompanied by a copy
of the citation in the hands and possession of a respondent.
These requirements are long-standing and, at least in
substance, their adoption and continued usage is tantamount
to compliance with the §15-5-20 requirement directing the
Family Court to provide by rule for the manner of making
personal service on a respondent in a divorce proceeding.
Apparently, the husband shares this view for he does not
challenge service in this case on the ground that the court has
not provided by rule for the manner of serving process.

This leaves for determination whether placing a copy of
the citation and a copy of the divorce petition in the
husband’s pocket, rather than in his hands, constituted
adequate service. Certainly that service accomplished its
intended purpose—it gave the husband fair and adequate
notice of the commencement of the action against him. In
comparable circumstances, a process server touched a
defendant with the summons and then laid it on the fender of
anearby automobile. Although the defendant refused to pick
it up, the court held that personal service had been accom-
plished because “it is generally held that if the process server
and the defendant are within speaking distance of each
other, and such action is taken as to convince a reasonable
person that personal service is being attempted, service

“Hereof fail not and make true return of this Citation with your doings
thereon.
“WITNESS the SEAL of our FAMILY COURT at Providence, this
day of A.D. 19.

Clerk”

*The form of citation provided for by Rule 37 used in divorce proceedings has
printed thereon under the heading “Return of Service” the following:

“I have this day in said county made service of this citation by leaving a
certified copy of the original petition for divorce which accompanied this
citation, together with a copy of this citation, in the hands and possession of
the within named respondent.”

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cannot be avoided by physically refusing to accept the
summons.” Nielson v. Braland,.264 Minn. 481, 484, 119
N.W.2d 737, 739 (1963). See also Hatmaker v. Hatmaker,
337 Ill. App. 175, 85 N.E.2d 345 (1949); Walkoczy v.
Bowers, 146 A.34 (N.J. 1929). In the present case in which
the officer actually was in physical contact with the husband
and placed the papers in his possession, the husband should
not be permitted to take those papers out of his pocket, throw
them away, and now claim that service was insufficient.

Two questions remain with respect to the service of
process. One is whether the execution of the return of the
service, prior to the actual service, by a duly authorized
officer who accompanied the serving officer rendered
improper an otherwise valid service of process. The husband
argues that under our law, service-of-process statutes must be
strictly construed. Barthlein v. Ellis, 112 R.I. 646, 314 A.2d
426 (1974); Shannon v. Norman Block, Inc., 106 R.1. 124,
256 A.2d 214 (1969); Geyer v. Callan Construction Co., 81
R.I. 247, 101 A.2d 876 (1954). Consequently, he argues that
failure to comply literally with the statutory requisites in this
case is fatal to valid service.*

Although the question is one of first impression in this
state, neither of the parties has referred us to cases from other
jurisdictions that are of any assistance. In our own limited
research of the subject, we have ascertained that the New
York Court of Appeals in rejecting a challenge to an affidavit
of service completed by one other than the officer who served
the process, said:

“The affidavit of the person who actually served the
summons is unnecessary so long as there is other
competent proof of such service. A third person may
have actual knowledge of such service, and when he
swears unequivocally and positively there is a presump-
tion that he swears from personal knowledge and not

‘Prior to our decision in Nocera v. Lembo, 111 R.I. 17, 298 A.2d 800 (1973), an
officer’s return was deemed conclusive and could not be controverted by motion or
plea. That case, however, permits the return to be contradicted upon a showing
supported by strong and convincing evidence.

es u

from hearsay.” Murphy v. Shea, 143 N.Y. 78, 81, 37
N.E. 675, 675 (1894). See also Sansbury v. Schwartz, 41
F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1941).

In the circumstances, it would be a serious departure from
the commonsensical view if we were to conclude that the
service here was a nullity merely because the return was
executed by an officer who accompanied the serving officer
and witnessed the events constituting service. The trial
justice found as a fact that the two officers acted in concert,
and we can perceive of no sound reason why the execution of
the return by the witnessing, rather than the serving, officer
should render an otherwise valid service invalid.

So, too, would we be ignoring commonsense were we to
reject the service because the return was executed prior to,
rather than subsequent to, the completion of service. What
was essential was the completion of service and the return,
whenever actually executed, speaks of what has occurred,
and that record is all that is important.

The last ground upon which the husband rests his claim of
defective service of process is the sheriff's failure to comply
with Fam. Ct. R. 39(b)* requirement that the citation be
read to the respondent when he is served. That contention
has no greater merit than the others thus far made by the
husband. Rule 39(b) applies only to service upon respondents

"That section of the rule provides:

“The clerk with whom such petition and affidavit shall be filed, if the
residence of the adverse party is disclosed in said affidavit, shall issue a citation
to such adverse party, which citation shall be accompanied by a certified copy
of the petition and the citation shall be directed for service to any disinterested
person and shall be served by delivering the said copy of the said petition in
hand to the said adverse party, whenever he may be without this State, and by
reading the said citation in his presence and hearing, or by leaving the said
certified copy of the said petition with a copy of said citation for such
adverse party at his usual place of abode without this State, with some
person living there, which service in either case shall be made at least three
(3) weeks before the return-day of such citation; and said disinterested
person shall return said citation, having made oath thereon of the place
where, the time when, and the manner in which he shall have made service
of the said citation.” Fam. Ct. R. 39(b). (Emphasis added.)

2 |

“without this State.” It is clearly inapposite in a case like this
in which the respondent is a resident of this state and service
is made here.

| | All that remains to be considered is the husband’s

contention that the trial justice should not have acted on the
wife’s petition for divorce because she had another petition
pending in the Family Court at the same time. There is, of
course, no question that the pendency of a prior action
between the same parties in the same court and on the same
subject matter may be asserted by a party as a ground for the
abatement of an action. Elmasian v. Daley, 87 R.1. 431, 142
A.2d 540 (1958); Dukehart v. Fales, 49 R.I. 407, 143 A. 615
(1928). But an action does not automatically abate for that
reason and a litigant who has not raised the issue of that prior
litigation during the trial is precluded from doing so on
appeal. See Austin v. City of Anniston, 243 Ala. 214, 8 So. 2d
410 (1942); Reed v. Frey, 10 Ariz. App. 292, 458 P.2d 386
(1969); Wirges v. Arrington, 239 Ark. 1047, 396 S.W.2d 292
(1965); State v. Harris, 357 Mo. 1166, 212 S.W.2d 733
(1948). A California court’s reply to a party whose argument
was similar to the husband’s in this case was the abrupt, but
nonetheless sufficient, reply “the rule is otherwise.” Howard
v. Howard, 105 Cal. App. 2d 126, 128, 232 P.2d 530, 531
(1951). Here the husband decided for himself that he had not
been validly served with process. He guessed wrongly and by
so choosing he gave up the opportunity to be present at the
trial and to plead matter in abatement. He will not now be
heard to complain that his choice was short-sighted.

The husband’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the decree
appealed from is sustained, and the case is remanded to the
Family Court.

Alfred Factor, Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, for
petitioner.

Leonard A. Kamaras, for respondent.

i)

1

404 A.2d 821.

Tue NarRAGANSETT ELECTRIC COMPANY
vs. Epwarp F. Burke et al.

JULY 24, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

es |:

Bevitacgua, C.J. The Narragansett Electric Company
(Narragansett) has petitioned this court for a writ of certio-
rari requesting us to review and quash the August 21, 1978
order of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). The peti-
tioner also seeks our termination of the PUC investigation
requested by the Attorney General, who alleged that Narra-
gansett had overcharged its customers by improperly imple-
menting a rate increase granted by the PUC in a January 24,
1972 order.

Prior to 1967, Narragansett supplied electricity partly from
its own generator and partly from power purchased from the
New England Power Company (NEPCO). During this
period, Narragansett operated under a fuel adjustment
clause. This clause, which was applied to rates charged of
commercial and industrial enterprises, adjusted the price of
electricity whenever the cost of fuel utilized by Narragansett
rose above or fell below $10.75 per standard net ton. When
the cost rose above the $10.75 base rate, Narragansett would
recover the amount for its extra outlays from its commercial
and industrial customers. When the cost of fuel fell below the
base rate price, the fuel clause operated to reflect that differ-
ence in credits on the bills of those customers.

In 1967, Narragansett contracted to sell all of the output
-from its generating plants to NEPCO. Under the terms of this
“Integrated Facilities” contract, all of Narragansett’s gener-
ating costs, including the cost of fuel, were paid by NEPCO.
According to the PUC, because the fuel adjustment clause
remained in effect under this contract and because the cost of
fuel fell approximately $2 below the base rate price, the
clause implemented customer credits with no corresponding
decrease in fuel costs. This resulted in a situation whereby
Narragansett’s cost of service was artificially inflated, thus
depressing Narragansett’s earnings. Recognition of these
credits by Narragansett contributed to its November 30, 1970
request for rate relief.

16 |

On this date, Narragansett asked the PUC to permit it to
increase its rates by $8,899,000 (Docket 1076). These addi-
tional revenues, which were based upon a 1970 test year,
were to be achieved by a combination of a $7,124,000
increase in base rates and a change in the fuel adjustment
clause amounting to $1,765,000. The fuel clause was thus
recalculated by lowering the base cost of fuel, so that Narra-
gansett would not have to issue credits in the future for the
differential that existed during the test year.

The PUC issued a summary order on January 24, 1972,
granting Narragansett additional revenues of $6,448,000.
Two days later Narragansett filed new rates in compliance
with the January 24, 1972 order. The PUC approved this
filing in an order issued on January 28, 1972.

On January 28, 1975, the Attorney General requested the
PUC investigation that led to this petition for certiorari. In
his request, the Attorney General contended that Narragan-
sett had implemented rates generating $7.8 million, or $1.4
million more than the $6.4 million rate revenues allowed by
the PUC in its January 24, 1972 order. Narragansett re-
sponded that although the implemented rates would have
generated $7.8 million over revenues earned in 1970, these
new rates only generated additional revenues of less than
$6.4 million when they became effective on January 28, 1972.

Before the PUC, attention focused on the revenue.impact
caused by substitution of the new fuel adjustment clause for
the old fuel clause. Both parties agreed that implementation
of the new fuel clause would have produced $1,765,000 in
additional revenue during the 1970 test year. Narragansett,
however, asserted that elimination of the old fuel clause
during 1972 resulted in much less revenue. Narragansett
attributed this result to the delay of the PUC in issuing the
order due to the 1971 Presidential price freeze, the outdated
test year, Narragansett’s rapidly deteriorating financial
condition and rising fuel costs.

The PUC found that on the basis of these factors, Narra-
gansett implemented rates that allowed only $359,000 of

es

additional revenues from the fuel clause change, instead of
$1.7 million, thus permitting it to increase the base rates by
$6,089,000. The problem that ultimately resulted in this
certiorari proceeding is that the facts leading to .
Narragansett’s decision to estimate the fuel clause at the
$359,000 amount were not raised at the hearing before the
PUC and thus do not appear in the record of Docket 1076.
Instead, claiming uncertainty as to exactly what portion of
the $6.4 million was to be attributed to elimination of the old
fuel clause, Narragansett requested the PUC to clarify its
order in what the Attorney General describes as an ex parte
meeting. Specifically, Narragansett wanted to inquire
whether the January 24, 1972 PUC order was based on test
year fuel costs so that $1.7 million of the $6.4 million would
be attributed to elimination of the old fuel clause, entitling
Narragansett to increase its base rates by approximately $4.7
million. In the latter event, Narragansett would adopt its
“fuel normalization plan,” designating $359,000 instead of
$1.7 million to elimination of the old fuel clause, thus taking
test year (1970) revenues and normalizing those revenues to
reflect December 1971 fuel costs.

The attorney for the Consumers’ Council was neither
informed of nor attended this meeting, held on January 25,
1972. It is this absence that resulted in the meeting’s alleged
ex parte status pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment)
§42-35-13!, At the meeting, a Narragansett representative
took notes to the effect that chairman Smith responded that
the test year fuel clause credit was entirely separate from the
$6.4 million awarded by the PUC on January 24, 1972.
Chairman Smith also instructed Narragansett to implement
its final rate design in accordance with its fuel normalization

1General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §42-35-13 provides in pertinent part as
follows:

“members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision or to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case shall not,
directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, communicate
with any person or party, nor, in connection with any issue of law, with any
party or his represenative, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties
to participate * * *.”

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plan. Before doing so, however, Narragansett met with the
Consumers’ Council on January 27, 1972 to explain its fuel
normalization plan. The PUC approved of these rates imple-
mented by Narragansett on January 28, 1972.

Three years later, the Attorney General requested the PUC
to order Narragansett to refund all revenues it had received
in excess of the $6.4 million that the PUC found to be reason-
able. The Attorney General stressed that a refund was neces-
sary because Narragansett had implemented rates represent-
ing a $7.8 million increase. The Attorney General also
alleged that Narragansett had wrongfully persuaded the
PUC to find that the rates filed pursuant to the fuel
normalization plan were in compliance with its order.
Moreover, the Attorney General claimed that the presenta-
tion at the meeting of January 27, 1972 to explain the rates to
the Consumers’ Council was incomplete, superficial and mis-
leading.

The PUC found that the record did not warrant a finding
that Narragansett had perpetrated a fraud upon the PUC or
that any misrepresentation had occurred that alone would
warrant setting aside the rates. Nevertheless, the PUC also
decided that because the January 24th order was subject to
two interpretations, the subject matter of the meeting fell
within the definition of a contested case; that the January
25th meeting was not limited to a request for clarification;
and that the January 25th meeting therefore possessed ex
parte status. The PUC further found that the disclosure
meeting of January 27 did not cure the injury or prejudice
suffered by the Consumers’ Council. The PUC thus ordered
Narragansett to refund all revenues collected in excess of
those it would have earned had the rates been implemented
as authorized by the PUC’s decision and order of January 24,
1972 and of March 6, 1972.

In its petition for certiorari, Narragansett argues (1) that
the January 25, 1972 meeting was not an illegal, ex parte
meeting; (2) that assuming arguendo a technical violation of
the ex parte statute, the PUC erred in voiding the January 28,

ee 19

1972 order; (3) that the PUC has no power to award refunds
or reparation; and (4) that the PUC erred in holding that
Narragansett’s compliance rates were unjust and unreason-
able. In view of our answer to Narragansett’s second and
third allegations, which we have discussed concurrently
below, we need not address Narragansett’s fourth argument.

I

In support of its position that the January 25th meeting
was not an illegal, ex parte communication, Narragansett
maintains that the meeting was held merely for the sake of
clarifying the January 24th order and that no issue of law or
fact was presented for decision by the PUC necessitating a
hearing. Narragansett’s analysis thus removes the subject
matter of the meeting from the Administrative Procedures
Act [G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) chapter 35 of title 42]
definition of “contested case”? and places it within the para-
meters of this court’s decision in Town of Charlestown v.
Kennelly, 80 R.I. 148, 93 A.2d 728 (1953). In Kennelly, the
public utilities administrator directed the telephone company
to submit for his approval a schedule of rates designed to
implement his earlier order. We stated that although the
better procedure would have dictated giving the opponent an
opportunity to be heard on whether the rates conformed
with the findings in the PUC decision and its first order,
there was no statutory requirement to that effect and no
prejuduce had actually resulted. We therefore held that no
new notice was required before entry of the order effectuat-
ing the admininstrator’s decision. In the instant case,
Narragansett contends that the PUC, which found that an
issue of law or fact existed that could have seriously altered
implementation of the rate award, erred in deciding that
Kennelly did not apply to the alleged clarification meeting.

*General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §42-35-1(b) defines “contested case” as
follows:

“a proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing, and
licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a specific party
are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for
hearing.” (Emphasis added.)

20 ee

Hsin GL. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §39-5-3,? the General
Assembly defined the framework within which this court
reviews PUC decisions. Under this statutory mandate, we
determine whether the decision of the PUC is lawful and
reasonable. In so doing, we do not exercise our independent
judgment or weigh conflicting evidence, and we will not dis-
turb administrative findings unless the record establishes that
the findings are not fairly and substantially supported by
legal evidence. Providence Gas Co. v. Burke, 119 R.I. 487,
497, 380 A.2d 1334, 1339 (1977); New England Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. PUC, 118 R.I. 570, 575, 376 A.2d 1041,
1044 (1977); United Transit Co. v. Public Utility Hearing
Board, 96 R.I. 435, 445, 192 A.2d 423, 428-29 (1963). See
G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §39-5-3. In order to disturb
an administrative order, we must be satisfied that the PUC
acted illegally, arbitrarily or unreasonably. See Providence
Gas Co. v. Burke, 119 R.I. at 497, 380 A.2d at 1339;
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUC, 118 R.I.
at 578-79, 376 A.2d at 1044. See also §39-5-3. Therefore, if
we decide that the PUC erred in finding that an ex parte
meeting occurred, or that the PUC acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in voiding its January 28, 1972 order and in
demanding a refund, then we must quash the PUC’s second,
remedial order of August 21, 1978, thus permitting its
January 28, 1972 order to stand.

Hs We believe that the record clearly supports the finding by
the PUC that an ex parte meeting occurred. The testimony of
Edward F. Hindle, attorney for Narragansett, establishes
that notwithstanding any lack of intent on the part of T.
Dexter Clarke, president of Narragansett, to raise a new
proposal, the topic of fuel normalization was initially
broached at the meeting on January 25. The testimony of

*General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §39-5-3 reads as follows:

“Findings of commission.—The findings of the commission on questions
of fact shall be held to be prima facie true as found by the commission and
the supreme court shall not exercise its independent judgment nor weigh
conflicting evidence. An order or judgment of the commission made in the
exercise of adminstrative discretion shall not be reversed unless the
commission exceeded its authority or acted illegally, arbitrarily or unreason-
ably.”

es

William McDade, a senior rate engineer at New England
Power Service Company, who prepared testimony and
exhibits for Narragansett, substantiates that an additional
rate design measure via fuel normalization was proposed on
January 25. This fact distinguishes the present situation from
the approval meeting held in the case of Town of Charles-
town v. Kennelly, supra. Even Mr. Hindle admitted that the
subject matter of the January 25th meeting had extended
farther than he had anticipated. Because the PUC was asked
to approve implementation of the fuel normalization plan,
which would result in Narragansett earning a greater
revenue than had the 1970 test year fuel adjustment clause
estimates been used, the process of ratemaking was techni-
cally still in progress. The meeting of January 25 thus fell
within the definition of “contested case” contained in
§42-35-1(b), so that all parties involved were entitled to an
opportunity for a hearing after reasonable notice pursuant to
§42-35-9.4 At the close of the meeting, the PUC instructed
Narragansett to implement its fuel normalization plan, thus
allowing Narragansett an increase in revenues over the test
year by $1.4 million. Because “the legal rights, duties, or
privileges” of both Narragansett and the public were
determined without a hearing, the proceeding violated
§42-35-13, which prohibits agency members from
communicating with any person or his representative
concerning their prospective findings of fact or decisions of
law in a contested case absent notice and an opportunity for
all parties to the case to participate.® We therefore hold that
the finding of the PUC that the January 25 meeting extended

‘General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §42-35-9 reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:

“(a) In any contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for
hearing after reasonable notice.

“(c) Opportunity shall be afforded all parties to respond and present
evidence and argument on all issues involved.

SFor the text of §42-35-13, see note 1, supra.

2

farther than a mere request for clarification and thus violated
the prohibition against ex parte meetings is fairly and
substantially supported by legal evidence.

Despite the fact that an ex parte meeting occurred, the
PUC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it voided its order
of January 27, 1972 and ordered Narragansett to refund the
amount of revenues collected in excess of those that would
have-been collected had the rates been designed to comply
with the January 24, 1972 order and the March 6, 1972
decision. Although violations of the ex parte prohibition in
other factual contexts have led courts to void the agency
order or decision, see, e.g., Camero v. United States, 375
F.2d 777, 780-81 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1967); WKAT, Inc. v. FCC,
296 F.2d 375, 382-383 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Sangamon Valley
Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224-25
(D.C. Cir. 1959); we choose to follow contrary precedent in
a ratemaking setting such as the one before us.

In Rhode Island, although ratemaking is legislatively
defined as a quasi-judicial function,® see Blackstone Valley
Chamber of Commerce v. PUC, 121 R.1.122, 125, 396
A.2d 102, 104 (1979), citing Narragansett Electric Co. v.
Harsch, 117 B.1. 395, 401, 368 A.2d 1194, 1201 (1977), it is
well settled that rates are exclusively prospective in nature
and that future rates may not be designed to recoup past
losses.’ See Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 119 R.1.
559, 565, 381 A.2d 1358, 1364 (1977); New England Tele-
phone ¢& Telegraph Co. v. PUC, 116 B.1. 356, 388, 358 A.2d
1, 20 (1976). This rule is grounded upon the principle that

°General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §39-1-3 provides in pertinent part:
“The commission shall serve as a quasi-judicial tribunal with jurisdiction,
powers, and duties to hold investigations and hearings involving the rates,
tariffs, tolls and charges * * * of * * * electric * * * public utilities * * *.”

"This rule has been relaxed only to permit the utility to belatedly collect rates
that became presently due where the utilities commission was remiss in its statutory
duty. The doctrine, however, has never allowed a utility to recoup retroactively
revenues lost even when they are lost due to the fault of the commission. See Bristol
County Water Co. v. PUC, 117 R.I. 89, 98 n.2, 363 A.2d 444, 449 n.2 (1976).

ee 23

“when a commission pronounces that a specific rate is a
‘reasonable and lawful rate for the future,’ that pronounce-
ment has the force and effect of a statute.” New England
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUC, 116 R.I. at 388, 358
A.2d at 20. The rule that rates are exclusively prospective
was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Arizona
Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 284
U.S. 370, 52 S.Ct. 183, 76 L.Ed. 348 (1932). In Arizona
Grocery Co. the Court held that a public utilities commission
cannot repeal its own earlier-approved rates by later finding
them unreasonable. The Court posited that the rates allowed
by the commission had the force and effect of a statute upon
which the utility was entitled to rely. Jd. at 386, 389, 52
S.Ct. at 185, 186, 76 L.Ed. at 354, 355. Application of any
other rule would encourage each ratemaking hearing to
continue indefinitely, encouraging waste of administrative
time and resources and discouraging reliance on commission
decisions.

We therefore hold that the PUC acted illegally in voiding
its order of January 27, 1972, and in ordering Narragansett to
refund revenues paid by customers in excess of the rates orig-
inally intended by the PUC in its January 24, 1972 order.

Although the rationale behind the rule that rates are exclu-
sively prospective is to avoid doing injustice to those who rely
on PUC rate orders, the result engendered by use of the rule
in this case may appear inequitable to the customers who
paid the excessive rates. We note, however, that although
there has been an ex parte communication in violation of
§42-35-13,° this section applies only to members and employ-

°G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §42-35-13 reads as follows:

“Ex parte consultations.— Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters
authorized by law, members or employees of an agency assigned to render a
decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case shall
not, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, communicate with
any person or party, nor, in connection with any issue of law, with any party or his
representative, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate;
but any agency member

(a) may communicate with other members of the agency, and

(b) may have the aid and advise of one or more personal assistants.”

OT

24 ee

ees of the particular agency, not to interested parties such as
Narragansett.° It is thus the PUC, not the representatives of
Narragansett, that has violated the prohibition of §42-35-13
by mistakenly permitting the clarification meeting to meta-
morphose into an ex parte communication. Although the
PUC may now wish to remedy its over-sight, it remains
subject to the judicially-created, commission-made rate doc-
trine until the General Assembly declares otherwise. As a
creation of the General Assembly, the PUC derives all of its
powers, duties and responsibilities from its enabling act.
Bristol County Water Co. v. PUC, 117 R.1. 89, 97, 363 A.2d
444, 449 (1976).

HE Although the General Assembly amended the Public Util-
ities & Carriers Act in 1975, giving the Division of Public
Utilities and Carriers the power to order refunds, see
§39-3-13.1,'° it is the rule in Rhode Island that absent legis-

Parties interested in the outcome of the dispute do not fall within the prohibition
of §42-35-13. In this manner the Rhode Island statute is more limited than its
federal counterpart, 5 U.S.C.A. §557 (1977). The federal version of §42-35-13
contains not only a subsection that parallels the §42-35-13 prohibition against
communications instigated by the agency, but also a subsection prohibiting all
interested persons from engaging in ex parte communication with members or
employees of the agency or an administrative judge. Compare §42-35-13 (see note 8,
supra) with 5 U.S.C.A. §§557(d)(1)(A) and (B) at 352 (1977), which read as
follows:

“(A) no interested person outside the agency shall make or knowingly cause to be
made to any member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge,
or other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the
decisional process of the proceeding, an ex parte communication relevant to the
merits of the proceeding;

“(B) no member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or
other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the deci-
sional process of the proceeding, shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any
interested person outside the agency an ex parte communication relevant to the
merits of the proceeding.”

‘There is no companion section to §557(d)(1)(A) in the Rhode Island statute.

‘General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §39-3-13.1 reads as follows:

“Power to order refunds.—The said division shall have the power, when deemed

~ by it necessary to provide remedial relief from unjust, unreasonable, or discrimina-
tory acts, or from any matter, act or thing done by a public utility which matter,
act or thing is in chapters 1 to 5, inclusive, of this title, or otherwise, prohibited or
declared to be unlawful, to order the said public utility to make restitution to any

Ps

lative guidance to the contrary, a statute will not be given
retroactive application if it creates, defines and regulates
substantive legal rights. See Fox v. Fox, 115 R.I. 593,
596-97, 350 A.2d 602, 604 (1976); Cipriano v. Personnel
Appeal Board, 114 R.I. 141, 144, 330 A.2d 71, 73 (1975);
Norton v. Paolino, 113 RB.I. 728, 733, 327 A.2d 275, 278
(1974). Because §39-3-13.1 affects a vested substantive right,
it is limited solely to prospective use by the PUC and there-
fore cannot be invoked in this case."

For the reasons stated above, Narragansett’s petition for
certiorari is granted, the August 21, 1978 PUC order is
quashed, and the record is remanded to the PUC with our
decision endorsed thereon.

Pasco Gasbarro, Jr., Samuel Huntington, for petitioner.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, R. Daniel Pren-
tiss, Esq., for respondent.

party or parties, individually or as a class, injured by said prohibited or unlawful
acts, by way of a cash refund, billing credit or rate adjustment, or any other form
of relief which the division may devise to do equity to the parties. Any award made
in restitution shall carry interest from the date of the injury, at the rate of seven
(7%) per cent from the date of the order of the division.”

For purposes of this discussion, we assume without deciding that §39-3-13,1
applies to the PUC as well as to the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers.

26

404 A.2d 65.
Srate vs. GeorcE F, Neary et al.
Grorce F. Neary et al. vs. Wituiam E. Laurir
JULY 24, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Jostin, J. The defendant, George F. Neary, is presently
serving a 5-year sentence imposed in 1976 after he was found

ee 27

to be a violator of a deferred sentence. He had received that
sentence on July 3, 1972, after pleading nolo contendere in
the Superior Court to an indictment charging that he had
entered an apartment intending to commit larceny. Neary
now contends that his indictment should be quashed because
it fails to charge an offense.*

Four years after the deferred sentence was imposed, Neary
appeared in the Superior Court, admitted violating the terms
of that sentence and, following receipt of a presentence
report, was brought before Judge Bourcier for sentencing. At
that hearing, the prosecuting attorney advised the judge that
Neary had received the deferred sentence on a charge of
burglary, an offense carrying a minimum sentence of 5 years
and a maximum of life imprisonment. A 5-year sentence was
imposed. Two months later, however, Neary’s motion to
vacate that sentence was granted by Judge Bourcier. The
judge confessed error in his earlier belief that the original
indictment charged Neary with burglary. Indeed, he said
that as he read the indictment, he was uncertain where “it
fits,” and that he was satisfied that he had improperly
imposed a 5-year sentence for the violation. Accordingly, he
vacated that sentence and referred the case to Judge
Mackenzie, who had originally deferred imposition of
sentence.

When that referral was considered on November 17, 1976,
the prosecutor advised the court that in the state’s view the
indictment charged an offense specifically provided for by
G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-8-3:° entry of a dwelling

'Neary also argues (1) that his plea of nolo contendere should be vacated and that
he should be allowed to replead to the 1972 indictment, and (2) that the 5-year
sentence was illegal. However, his initial contention that the indictment does not
charge an offense is dispositive and makes unnecessary our consideration of those
additional assertions.

*General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-8-3 reads as follows:

“Every person who, with intent to commit murder, rape, robbery, arson
or larceny, shall enter any dwelling house at any time of the day or night, or
who with such intent shall, during the daytime, enter any other building, or
ship or vessel, shall be imprisoned not more than ten (10) years or be fined
not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or suffer both such fine and
imprisonment.”

28 ee

house with intent to commit larceny. In response to Judge
Mackenzie’s announcement that he was continuing the case
so that he might have an opportunity to read a supplemental
presentence report, defense counsel, relying on State v.
Fortes, 114 R.I. 161, 174, 330 A.2d 404, 411-12 (1975),
objected to the judge’s consideration of any part of that
report which referred to the offense giving rise to the viola-
tion. Judge Mackenzie gave no heed to the objection, stating
that he wanted to ascertain what sort of person Neary was on
the date of sentencing and that he had no “higher opinion of
[the Fortes case] today than I did [when it came down].” On
December 15, 1976, Neary was sentenced to 5 years for the
violation. Neary’s subsequent motion to vacate that sentence
was denied and he appealed.

While that appeal was pending, Neary applied for post-
conviction relief, claiming (1) that the underlying indictment
did not charge an offense and should therefore be quashed;
and (2) that his conviction should be vacated and he should
be allowed to replead because, contrary to the rule enun-
ciated in Bishop v. Langlois, 106 R.I. 56, 66-67, 256 A.2d 20,
25 (1969), the record of the proceeding at which his plea of
nolo contendere was accepted did not disclose that the judge,
prior to taking the plea, conducted an on-the-record
examination in order to determine if it was being made
voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature of the
charges and the consequences of the plea. That application
was denied by another judge, Judge Gallant, who observed
with respect to the charge in the indictment that he, unlike
Judge Bourcier, had “no difficulty in finding that although
the section is not enumerated, the defendant is charged with
a violation of §11-8-3.” Neary appealed and his two appeals
were consolidated for argument before this court.

We need consider only Neary’s contention that the indict-
ment alleging that he “did enter the apartment of one
Charles Sullivan with intent to commit larceny” fails to
charge him with a crime. In countering that argument, the
state admits that the indictment does not refer to the specific
statute upon which the offense is predicated. It argues, how-

es 29

ever, that such a designation is unnecessary under the rule
adopted in §12-12-6 and State v. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500,
504, 190 A 854, 857 (1937). That rule makes such a designa-
tion unnecessary provided the indictment fully and plainly
identifies the offense charged. The state argues that this
indictment meets that requirement because “the apartment
of one Charles Sullivan” is obviously someone’s dwelling
house. Therefore, it concludes that the word “apartment” in
the indictment, viewed with common sense and not in an
unduly technical fashion, charges the entry of a “dwelling
house,” and that consequently it is clear beyond question that
the indictment charges an offense under §11-8-3.

The state’s argument would be more convincing if §11-8-3
were the only statutory provision requiring consideration.
Then, it could well be argued that common sense dictates
that an apartment is a dwelling house. Section 11-8-3, how-
ever, is not the only statute that we need consider.

An examination of its legislative history discloses that
§11-8-3, together with what is now §11-8-2, was originally
adopted as a single, one-paragraph enactment.* The statute

3General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §12-12-6 provides:

“The indictment or complaint may charge, and is valid and sufficient if it
charges, the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or
more of the following ways:

(a) By using the name given to the offense by the common law or by a
statute.

(b) By stating so much of the definition of the offense, either in terms of
the common law or of the statute defining the offense or in terms of
substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court and the
defendant notice of what offense is intended to be charged.

The indictment or complaint may refer to a section or subsection of any
statute creating the offense charged therein, and in determining the validity
or sufficiency of such indictment or complaint regard shalll be had for such
reference.”

This statute has since been repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, §20 and Super. R.
Grim. P. 7(c) replaces it.
‘Public Laws 1928, ch, 1209, §1, reads as follows:
“Every person who shall break and enter at any time of the day or night

any dwelling house or apartment whether the same is occupied or not, or
any outbuilding or garage attached to or adjoining any dwelling house,

30 es

retained its combined form in G.L. 1938, ch. 608. It was first
sectionalized in the 1956 General Laws. That bifurcation,
however, was not accomplished by the Legislature, but by’
the compilers who prepared the 1956 General Laws. In these
circumstances, in order to ascertain what conduct the Legis-
lature intended to criminalize, we must look to the original
1928 enactment and not to the separate parts into which that
enactment was fragmented in 1956. See State v. Brown, 97
RI. 115, 119, 196 A.2d 133, 136 (1963).

Viewed in this light, we find that in the first clause of the
1928 enactment, the Legislature used both the term “dwell-
ing house,” and the word “apartment” in a context that
strongly suggests that the legislators intended neither that the
two be synonymous nor that the term “dwelling house”
include the narrower word “apartment.” Had the Legisla-
ture intended either of those results, it could have accom-
plished that purpose by using only the term “dwelling house”
and omitting the word “apartment.” But just as it also used
the words “outbuilding” and “garage” as meaning something
different from a “dwelling house,” so, too, did it use the word
“apartment.” We must assume that it did so intending to
accomplish some useful purpose and contemplating that each
of those words would have some force and effect. See Provi-
dence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.1. 614, 624, 359 A.2d
682, 687 (1976); In re Shepard Co., 115 R.1. 290, 298, 342
A.2d 918, 924 (1975); Merciol v. New England Telephone ¢r
Telegraph Co., 110 R.I. 149, 153, 290 A.2d 907, 910 (1972).

This conclusion is supported by the fact that in the second
clause of the 1928 enactment, now §11-8-3, the word “dwell-
ing house” stands alone. The Legislature must have intended

without the consent of the owner or tenant of such dwelling house,
apartment, building, or garage shall be imprisoned not more than three
years or be fined not more than three hundred dollars or shall suffer both
such fine and imprisonment; and every person who with intent to commit
murder, rape, robbery, arson or larceny shall enter any dwelling house at
any time of the day or night, or who with such intent shall during the
daytime enter any other building, or ship or vessel shall be imprisoned not
more than ten years or be fined not more than five hundred dollars or suffer
both such fine and imprisonment.”

| 31

to distinguish between the term “apartment” and the term
“dwelling house” if it used them in contrasting ways in the
same statute. We must conclude therefore that, as used in
chapter 1209, the word “apartment,” like the words “garage”
and “outbuilding,” has a meaning different from the term
“dwelling house.” The charge that Neary “enter[ed] the
apartment of one Charles Sullivan with intent to commit
larceny” is therefore not encompassed by the terms of
§11-8-3.

In sum, then, Neary has “the constitutional right to be
clearly informed of the accusation against him so that he may
defend the same and later plead a conviction or acquittal in
bar of a subsequent charge for the same offense, and, further
so that the court, upon conviction, may pronounce sentence
according to the right of the case.” State v. Domanski, 57
R.I. at 504, 190 A. at 857. No indictment which deprives him
of that guarantee can be sustained. This indictment does not
measure up to that standard. Judge Bourcier made this clear
when, in vacating the sentence he had imposed under the
mistaken belief that the charge was burglary, he said:

“T am satisfied that when I considered this matter as a
burglary, violation burglary offense, that I was in error.
No ifs, ands or buts about it.

“As I read the indictment, I am not certain where it
fits. I don’t know where it sets, under 11-8-2 or 11-8-3.
11-8-2 requires breaking and entering, and 11-8-3
provides for entering a dwelling with intent to commit
larceny. But this indictment charges entering an apart-
ment, so I think the more we look at the indictment, the
more we see problems here.”

In the words of Judge Bourcier, the more we look at the
indictment, the more we are satisfied that it does not charge
an offense.

For the reasons stated, the defendant’s appeal from the
judgment in the postconviction proceedings is sustained, the
judgment appealed from is reversed, and the case is

32

remanded to the Superior Court for quashal of the indict-
ment and for such other proceedings in both appeals as may

be appropriate.

Seymour Posner, Special Assistant Attorney General, for
plaintiff.

Allegra E. Munson, Assistant Public Defender, for defen-
dant.

404 A.2d 814.
Srate vs. Repecca WILLIAMS.
JULY 24, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

©
ce

Josuin, J. The defendant, Rebecca Williams, was
indicted for robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. At
her arraignment in the Superior Court, she pleaded not
guilty to both charges. Before the case was reached for trial,
however, she requested leave to substitute pleas of guilty for
her prior pleas. At the hearing that followed, the trial justice
engaged in an extensive exchange with defendant and her
counsel concerning the nature of the offenses charged and the
consequences of her proposed change of pleas. Following
that exchange he said that he was satisfied that there was a
factual basis for the defendant’s guilty pleas and that they
were being offered voluntarily and intelligently. Accord-
ingly, he granted her motion for a substitution of pleas,
ordered that judgments of conviction enter, and continued
the case for sentencing. Following receipt of a presentence
report, he sentenced her to serve a term of 7 years at the
Women’s Reformatory.

Ss 35

Within a week after sentence was imposed, defendant filed
a motion entitled, “Motion to Set Aside Guilty Plea, Vacate
Sentence Imposed and Reinstate for Trial.” Notwithstanding
its title, nothing in the text of that motion or in defendant's
arguments at the hearing thereon even remotely touched on
grounds that would provide a basis for setting aside defen-
dant’s guilty pleas. Instead, both the motion and the argu-
ment focused entirely on equitable considerations that in
defendant’s view favored a lighter sentence than the one
imposed. The absence of a relevant relation between the title
of defendant’s motion on the one hand, and its content and
defendant’s supporting argument on the other, was
commented on by the trial justice in his bench decision deny-
ing the motion. He said that he “listened with care to every-
thing that [counsel] has said hoping that he would say some-
thing that was relevant to a motion to vacate the plea of
guilty,” but that “[nJothing that [counsel] has said has any-
thing whatsoever to do with a motion to vacate a plea of
guilty.” The case is now here on defendant’s appeal from the
order denying her motion.

On appeal defendant argues that the trial justice accepted
her guilty pleas without fully complying with Super. R.
Crim. P. 11.1 This argument, however, was not advanced
and, consequently, was not ruled on at the hearing on the
motion to vacate. Accordingly, there is apparently nothing
for us to review. See State v. Correia, 106 R.I. 655, 664, 262
A.2d 619, 624 (1970).

‘Super. R. Crim. P. 11 provides:

“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and
shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first
addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court
refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a
judgment upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea.”

36 ee

Hs Moreover, even if defendant had alleged the trial justice’s
noncompliance with Rule 11 as the basis of her motion to set
aside her pleas, Super. R. Crim. P. 32(d) would have pre-
cluded favorable action thereon, That rule provides in part
that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo
contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed
+ « »,” In this case, the motion was untimely because imposi-
tion of the sentence preceded the filing of that motion.

Hs The label defendant placed on her motion suggests that her
purpose might have been to vacate the sentence because it
was illegal. Such a motion would have been timely because
Super. R. Crim. P. 35 permits the Superior Court to correct
an illegal sentence “at any time.” The motion pertains, how-
ever, only to a sentence that is imposed after a valid convic-
tion but is not authorized under law. See United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506, 74 S. Ct. 247, 250, 98 L. Ed.
248, 253-54 (1954); 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure §582 at 552 (1969). See generally Frazier v. Langlois,
103 R.I. 607, 240 A.2d 152 (1968). Relief for this defendant
under Rule 35 is therefore unavailable because certainly
convictions of robbery and conspiracy to rob permit the
imposition of a 7-year sentence.

HH _sInlight of the foregoing deficiencies in defendant’s motion,
there are ample reasons for rejecting her appeal. To proceed
on that tack, however, would not mean that defendant
would be denied her opportunity to challenge the errors that
she alleges the trial justice made in accepting her guilty pleas.
That opportunity would be available by application to the
Superior Court under the Post Conviction Relief Act and if
there denied, she would then have a right to seek appellate
review in this court. See G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§10-9.1-1 to -9, as amended by P.L. 1974, ch. 220, §3.

Hs This approach was the one we took in the recent case of
{Johnson v. Mullen, 120 R.I. 701, 390 A.2d 909 (1978).
In that case we held that we would require that the post-
‘conviction route be followed “absent the most pressing
circumstances.” Id. at 706, 390 A.2d at 911-12. In our

ee) 37

judgment, this case possesses such circumstances and there-
fore falls within that limited exception. The issue raised here
is one of constitutional proportions, the necessary record is
before us, defendant has been imprisoned since 1977, and if
we do not act now, relief, if it is to come to her at all, will
probably not arrive until after she has become eligible for
parole. Moreover, it seems to us that to dismiss defendant’s
appeal at this point on procedural grounds and to require her
to resort to postconviction procedures would elevate form
above substance, result in a waste of valuable judicial time,
and needlessly prolong this matter. Accordingly, we treat this
appeal as if it were from the denial of an application for post-
conviction relief. See State v. Lanoue, 117 B.I. 342, 345, 366
A.2d 1158, 1160 (1976). See generally Walker v. Langlois,
104 R.I. 274, 275, 243 A.2d 733, 734 (1968).

We turn, then, to the crux of defendant’s complaint which
is that her convictions must be vacated and her earlier not
guilty pleas reinstated because the trial justice allegedly
accepted her guilty pleas without having first complied with
the mandate of Super. R. Crim. P. 11. That rule is substan-
tially like its federal counterpart in that it requires that the
court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
“without first addressing the defendant personally and deter-
mining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.”
Our rule further provides that “[tJ]he court shall not enter a
judgment upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.”

Even before that rule was adopted in this state, however,
we said that in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct.
1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), “the Supreme Court of the
United States, at least by implication, makes the procedure
set out in [Fed. R. Crim. P. 11] applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment when federal constitu-
tional rights are involved in the entry of the plea.” Bishop v.
Langlois, 106 R.I. 56, 65, 256 A.2d 20, 24 (1969). Elaborat-
ing on that pronouncement, and also on the Supreme Court’s
holding in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.
Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969), we announced as our rule

38 ee

“that in accepting the plea of guilty or nolo contendere
after the date of this decision, the trial justice ‘* * «
shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge and the con-
sequences of the plea.’ Such trial justice shall further
cause the record to show affirmatively that such inquiry
was made and that the accused did by his responses
thereto demonstrate clearly that he was aware of the
nature of the charge to which he pleaded and that he
was aware that such a plea constitutes a waiver of his
pertinent constitutional rights. Absent such an affirma-
tive disclosure in the record of compliance with this
mandate, the trial court, upon an appropriate petition,
shall vacate the plea entered and order that the accused
be permitted to plead over in proper course.” 106 R.I. at
66-67, 256 A.2d at 25.

Any doubts that might have been entertained on whether
Bishop required a dialogue between the sentencing justice
and the accused were dispelled in Flint v. Sharkey, 107 R.I.
530, 268 A.2d 714 (1970), where we said that a post-Bishop
or Boykin nolo or guilty plea

“will be vacated unless the record shows that the court
has conducted an on-the-record examination of the
defendant before accepting his plea to determine if the
plea is being made voluntarily with an understanding of
the nature of the charge and the consequence of the
plea.” Id. at 537, 268 A.2d at 719; see, e.g., Johnson v.
Mullen, 120 R.I. at 701, 390 A.2d at 913 n.3;
Bishop v. Sharkey, 108 R.I. 564, 568, 277 A.2d 747, 749
(1971).

In this case defendant does not now contend that she was
not fully advised by the trial justice, or that she did not fully
understand, that by pleading guilty she was waiving her
rights to a trial by jury, the presumption of innocence, the
privilege against self incrimination, and the rights to confront

| 39

and cross-examine her accusers, to testify and to call
witnesses in her own defense, to be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and to appeal a conviction to this court.
She argues, however, that under the rule in Bishop, and also
pursuant to Super. R. Crim. P. 11, the trial justice, in
addition to ascertaining that she was aware of those rights,
should also have addressed her personally to make certain
that she understood the nature of the charges against her and
the consequences of her pleas. She also asserts that the trial
justice neglected to determine whether there was a factual
basis for her pleas. She concludes that these alleged failures
mandate that her judgments of conviction be vacated and
that her not guilty pleas be reinstated.

The issues she raises were considered in their constitutional
context by the Supreme Court in Henderson v. Morgan, 426
U.S. 637, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976). In that
case, the Supreme Court held that a plea of guilty to a charge
of second-degree murder by an accused who neither knew
nor had been advised by counsel or court that an intent to kill
was an essential element of the offense charged was involun-
tary in the constitutional sense and could not support a judg-
ment of guilt. Id. at 647, 96 S. Ct. at 2258-59, 49 L. Ed. 2d at
115-16.

Expanding on that thesis, the Court also agreed with the
thrust of the petitioner’s argument that the voluntariness of a
plea should not be determined by whether “a ritualistic
litany of the formal legal elements of an offense was read to
[a] defendant,” but by examining “the totality of the circum-
stances” and determining “whether the substance of the
charge, as opposed to its technical elements, was conveyed to
the accused.” Id. at 644, 96S. Ct. at 2257, 49 L. Ed. 2d at
114. Moreover, the Court refused to assume that “notice of
the true nature, or substance, of a charge always requires a
description of évery element of the offense + * +.” Id. at 647
n.18, 96 S. Ct, at 2258 n.18, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 115 n.18.

And, finally, in language relevant in part to the Bishop
and Flint mandate that the explanation of the nature of the
offense charged must come from the trial justice, the Court
said:

40 a =

“Normally the record contains either an explanation
of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a repre-
sentation by defense counsel that the nature of the
offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover,
even without such an express representation, it may be
appropriate to presume that in most cases defense
counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in
sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is
being asked to admit. This case is unique because the
trial judge found as a fact that the element of intent was
not explained to respondent. Moreover, respondent’s
unusually low mental capacity provides a reasonable
explanation for counsel’s oversight; it also forecloses the
conclusion that the error was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt, for it lends at least a modicum of credibility
to defense counsel’s appraisal of the homicide as a man-
slaughter rather than a murder.” Id. at 647, 96 S. Ct. at
2258-59, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 115-16.

The Henderson case, however, was decided after our
decisions in Bishop and Flint were announced and subse-
quent to the adoption of Super. R. Crim. P. 11 which codi-
fied those decisions. Consequently, we must examine
Henderson to ascertain if its constitutional requirement on
this point is less exacting and demanding than that explicated
in our cases. If it is, then, of course, the less-demanding
Henderson requirement will govern. See Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 719, 95S. Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 575-76
(1975).

As we read Henderson, it requires only that at the conclu-
sion of the plea hearing, the trial justice should be able to say
with assurance that the accused is fully aware of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea. See State v.
Ohta, 114 Ariz. 489, 562 P.2d 369 (1977); In re Ronald E.,
19 Cal. 3d 315, 562 P.2d 684, 137 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1977).

*The defendant in Henderson pleaded in 1965, initiated proceedings in the New
York courts in 1970 to have his conviction vacated, and when relief was denied
turned to the federal courts in 1973. The case was argued in and decided by the

Supreme Court in 1976, 426 U.S. at 637-39, 96 S. Ct, at 2253-55, 49 L, Ed, 2d at
108, 111.

es 41
That objective may be attained by:

“(1) an explanation of the essential elements by the
judge at the guilty plea hearing;
(2) a representation that counsel had explained to the
defendant the elements he admits by his plea [foot-
note omitted];

(3) defendant’s statements admitting to facts consti-
tuting the unexplained element or stipulations to
such facts.” Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 376
Mass. 338, 343, 380 N.E.2d 662, 666 (1978).°

In addition to the constitutional requirement there is also
Super. R. Crim. P. 11’s specific provision that the court
address the defendant personally. That mandate, if appli-
cable, can be satisfied if the record of the “[Fed. R. Crim. P.
11] proceeding on its face discloses, despite the trial court’s
failure sufficiently to make the required explication of the
charges, that [the defendant] understood them.” United
States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 870, 98 S. Ct. 214, 54 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1977).

When we apply these principles to this case, we find that
the record, although it does not affirmatively show that the
trial justice engaged in an extensive interchange with the
accused about whether she fully understood the nature of the
charges, does disclose that defendant accompanied her
request that she be allowed to plead guilty with an affidavit.
In that affidavit she said, “I also understand that for purposes
of this case I am admitting sufficient facts to substantiate the
charge(s) which has (have) been brought against me in the
indictment(s) to which these pleas relate.”

Accompanying that affidavit is a certification of defense
counsel which reads:

*See Note, Due Process—Guilty Pleas—Constitutional Standards of
Voluntariness Were Not Satisfied by a Plea of Guilty Where Defendant Was
Unaware that Intent to Kill Was an Essential Element of the Crime, 5 Am.J. Crim.
L. 105, 112-113, 117 (1977).

42 ee

“T hereby certify that I have explained the above to
Rebecca Williams and that the defendant has read and
indicated to me that he/she fully understands all his/her
rights and the defendant voluntarily and intelligently
enters a plea of GUILTY-NOLO CONTENDERE to
the charge(s) in Indictment numbered P2 77-1101.”

Although it might be argued that what appears in the
affidavit and certificate is the kind of boilerplate litany that
Henderson does not tolerate, the state does not rely solely on
that affidavit and certification to establish defendant’s
comprehension of what she was doing. It relies also on the
assurances received by the trial justice from counsel that
defendant had “read the affidavit carefully with me, very
carefully, and very closely, and we have rehashed this and
rehashed it again, and rehashed it back and forth, and she
has finally agreed, voluntarily, that this is what she wants to
do, Your Honor.” In addition the trial justice inquired of
defendant whether she had gone over the affidavit with her
attorney “word-for-word.” She responded under oath that
she had, that she was able to understand everything she read,
that she was satisfied that she had been properly represented
by her attorney and that she had had a satisfactory and
adequate opportunity to discuss all of the facts of the case
with him and had made a complete disclosure to him of all
the facts so that he could properly advise her.

Finally, at the trial justice’s direction, the prosecutor
recited what facts the state was prepared to prove if the case
went to trial. The trial justice then inquired of defendant
whether she understood what the prosecutor had said. She
noted some discrepancies, but in large measure concurred
with the prosecutor’s statement. Furthermore, proof of the
facts she agreed to, even when viewed in the light most favor-
able to her, would clearly support convictions of the crimes of
conspiracy to rob and robbery. Thus, viewing the record as a
whole and the circumstances in their totality, we are satisfied
that defendant understood the nature of the offenses charged
and their essential elements. No more was required either to
satisfy the constitutional test or to comply with Rule 11’s
mandate.

43

The defendant assigns as additional error her claim that
she was not specifically advised of the consequences of a
conviction on the conspiracy to rob count and that her
conviction on that count should therefore be vacated.
Although it is true, as defendant argues, that the trial justice
did not specifically advise what the minimum and maximum
sentences for conviction of conspiracy were, he did inform
her that the minimum sentence for robbery was 5 years, that
she could also be sentenced to life imprisonment for that
offense and that he would be surprised if he imposed any-
thing less than a jail sentence. In addition, the prosecutor
indicated that the state intended to recommend a substantial
jail sentence. Furthermore, defendant's affidavit acknowl-
edges that the maximum sentence for conspiracy is 10 years.
In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the trial justice’s
specifically informing defendant of what was the permitted
punishment for a conviction of conspiracy to rob would not
in any way have contributed to her improved understanding
of the consequence of her pleas.

We reached a similar conclusion in Johnson v. Mullen, 120
R.I. 701, 390 A.2d 909 (1978). In that case the defendant
was charged both with possession of burglar tools and
robbery, and he sought to have his guilty pleas vacated
because the sentencing justice advised him only of the
penalty for robbery. In rejecting his challenge to the trial
justice’s refusal to grant that relief, we said:

“We do not believe that the sentencing justice’s
further admonition that the charge of possession of
burglar tools carried a 10-year maximum sentence
would have contributed to Johnson’s better understand-
ing of the penal consequences of his plea or in any way
affected the knowing entry of the plea. Johnson was told
that in pleading nolo contendere to all of the charges the
court could sentence him to life imprisonment. Never-
theless, he stood before the court with his attorney,
stated that he understood the penalty, and still wished
to plead nolo. The possibility that knowledge of the
punishment for the burglar-tools offense prevented him

“4 es

from understandingly evaluating the choice to plead or
proceed to trial strikes us as being highly improbable. In
fact, nowhere in his petition for postconviction relief or
in his supporting affidavit does Johnson suggest that had
he known of the penalty for this particular offense, he
would not have entered his plea. We, therefore, find
that the sentencing justice fulfilled his duty to make
Johnson aware of the penal consequences of his plea.”
Id. at 709, 390 A.2d at 913.

We conclude that Johnson controls, and that accordingly
the trial justice’s failure to inform defendant of the penalty
for conspiracy to rob does not require that her guilty plea be
vacated.

Finally, defendant points to that portion of Super. R.
Crim. P. 11 that prohibits the court from entering a judg-
ment on a plea of guilty “unless it is satisfied that there is a
factual basis for the plea.” The defendant contends that the
record here fails to disclose that the trial justice could have
been satisfied that the requisite basis existed. A precise and
succinct response to a like challenge in a similar case is found
in United States v. Bethany, 489 F.2d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1974),
where the court, quoting Jimenez v. United States, 487 F.2d
212, 213 (5th Cir. 1973), said:

“Contrary to appellant’s argument, this requirement
does not demand a ‘written, sworn, and filed stipulation
of evidence,’ but only that the court make an inquiry
‘factually precise enough and sufficiently specific to
develop that [defendant’s] conduct on the occasions
involved was within the ambit of that defined as crim-
inal.’ ”

In this case, the trial justice sufficiently demonstrated his
satisfaction with the factual basis for defendant’s pleas when
he heard (1) the prosecution’s summation of what the state
intended to prove, and (2) defendant’s response to his
inquiries concerning her reaction to the prosecutor's state-
ment. What he learned justified his concluding that defen-
dant had agreed to enough of the facts in the prosecution’s

ee 45
summation that submission thereof at trial as evidence would

have required that both charges against defendant be
submitted to the jury.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgments of conviction are affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court.

Lawrence Iacoi, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

William G. Grande, for defendant.

404 A.2d 69.
SraTeE vs. Braprorp L. Hoye.
JULY 25, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

46

Josuin, J. On July 6, 1974, the prosecutrix, then 16 years
old, and the defendant, Bradford L. Hoyle, attended an out-
door rock concert at the Stepping Stone Ranch. The prose-
cutrix testified that she was accosted by the defendant while
walking unescorted at the concert ground and that he forced
her to accompany him to an isolated area about one-half a
mile from the concert stage where he bound her hands with
his belt and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. The
defendant asserted that the girl had been under the influence
of drugs and that he had forced her to accompany him only
to prevent her from harming herself. He denied, however,
that he had engaged in intercourse with her. A Superior
Court jury believed the prosecutrix’s story and returned a
guilty verdict against the defendant on each count of the
two-count indictment that charged kidnapping and rape.
Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the
defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 10 years on each

es a

count, the sentences to run concurrently. The case is now
here on the defendant’s appeal. He contends that he is en-
titled to a new trial not only because the trial justice
erroneously denied three motions he made to declare a
mistrial and pass the case, but also because the trial justice
compounded that error by failing to give appropriate cau-
tionary instructions to the jury.

| | The first motion to pass was made when the prosecutrix,
who was sitting in the spectator’s section of the courtroom,
began to cry while her mother was being cross-examined by
defense counsel; the second came on the following day when,
after the completion of the mother’s testimony, the prosecu-
trix, who on the previous day had been removed from the
courtroom following the crying incident, was allowed to re-
turn and remain in the courtroom; the third and final motion
to pass was made when the state’s attorney, while cross-
examining defendant regarding the dilation of the
prosecutrix’s pupils, replied to defendant’s disclaimer of
professional expertise with the comment, “You may have
your opportunity [to be sent to school], Mr. Hoyle.” Each
motion to pass was denied and in each instance the trial
justice stated that in his final charge to the jury he would
include appropriate cautionary instructions concerning the
challenged conduct and comment.

We have frequently discussed the guiding legal principles
for motions to pass that are occasioned by the intentional or
accidental injection into a jury trial of extraneous matters of
an allegedly harmful nature. Perhaps the most recent
summary of those principles is found in State v. Marrapese,
116 B.1. 1, 351 A.2d 95 (1976), where we said with reference
to improvident remarks:

“Motions to pass a case and declare a mistrial are
matters within the discretion of the trial justice. He or
she has a ‘front-row seat’ at the trial and is therefore best
able to gauge the effect of the improvident remarks
heard by a jury: State v. Pailin, 114 R.I. 725, 729, 339
A.2d 253, 255 (1975). When matters of a harmful

nature are improperly brought before a jury, either
intentionally or inadvertently, the trial justice, in
response to a complaint being made, must assess the
potential prejudicial impact of the challenged material.
A decision must be made. If the prejudice is inexpiable,
the motion to pass should be granted. If the prejudice
can be cured, the instructions which follow must be
timely and effective. State v. Sherman, 113 R.1. 77, 82,
317 A.2d 445, 448 (1974). There is no fixed formula to
determine whether the prejudicial taint has been
removed. Each case must be decided on an ad hoc basis
and each challenged remark must be viewed in the
context in which it appeared and in light of the
attendant circumstances. State v. Bowden, 113 R.I.
649, 654, 324 A.2d 631, 635 (1974). A mistrial will be
ordered at the appellate level only if we are convinced
that the cautionary instructions were untimely or
ineffective, or if the improper material had been so
indelibly etched in the jurors’ minds that, despite his
timely action, the trial justice did not disabuse the
jurors’ minds of the prejudicial effect. State v. Sfameni,
115 R.I. 18, 22, 339 A.2d 744-45 (1975); State v. Costa,
111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36, 40 (1973); State v.
Mancini, 108 B.1. 261, 273-74, 274 A.2d 742, 748-49
(1971).” 116 R.I. at 7, 351 A.2d at 98.

Like principles control if the conduct complained of is a
display of emotion or other objectionable conduct rather
than an improper remark. See State v. Benoit, 117 R.I. 69,
79, 363 A.2d 207, 213 (1976).

In this case, our ad hoc evaluation of each of the incidents
giving rise to the motions to pass makes it clear to us beyond
question that none of them, even on the doubtful assumption
that any one of them could have inflamed and aroused the
passions of the jurors to the point at which defendant would
have been unduly prejudiced, was so egregious that a proper
cautionary instruction could not have cured the prejudicial
effect. :

ee) 49

Thus, although defendant argues that the prosecutrix’s
weeping at the sight of her mother testifying could have
evoked jury sympathy resulting in undue prejudice to him,
the record reveals that the trial justice did not notice the
sobbing until it had been brought to his attention by defense
counsel at a bench conference out of hearing of the jury. He
then observed that the tears were not profuse or the crying
loud or uncontrollable. In any event, the prosecutrix left the
courtroom promptly when the trial justice asked the
prosecutor to request her to do so.

On the next day of trial, over defendant’s objection, the
trial justice allowed the prosecutrix to return to the
courtroom, stating that her actions had not been sufficiently
unruly or demonstrative to justify ejecting her. He also relied
on the prosecutor’s assurances that he had reprimanded the
girl and that the crying episode would not be repeated.
Although the trial justice said that he would order her to
leave the courtroom if she thereafter became excessively
demonstrative, that action was not required.

Finally, even if the prosecutor’s school comment was
improper—and in oral argument before us he conceded that
it was—we cannot say that such an offhand remark, viewed
in the context of a cross-examination marked by some
flippancy on the part of defendant, required that the case be
passed. We conclude, therefore, that the trial justice did not
abuse his discretion in declining to pass the case. The
challenged incidents were not so flagrantly improper that the
jurors’ minds could not have been disabused of them by
appropriate cautionary instructions. See State v. Marrapese,
116 R.I. at 7, 351 A.2d at 98.

Recognizing that we might not share his views about
whether the case should have been passed, defendant argues
alternatively that a cautionary instruction should have been
given immediately following the denial of each of his motions
to pass. It is, of course, true that under our rule it is
ordinarily “essential that a cautionary instruction be given
immediately in order that the seed planted by the remark [or

50 |

conduct] will not be given time to germinate.” State v.
Sherman, 113, R.I. 77, 81-82, 317 A.2d 445, 448 (1974). In
some instances, however, an immediate instruction may tend
to highlight, rather than minimize, the harmful effect on the
jurors and thereby exacerbate rather than dissipate the
prejudice. Defense counsel expressed that fear to the trial
justice with respect to the first two motions and that concern
may well be the reason why defendant did not request
immediate cautionary instructions in those instances as well
as in the third instance, choosing instead to rely on the trial
justice’s representations that proper cautionary instructions
would be included in his final charge to the jury. In the
circumstances, he cannot now assign as errors that the
cautionary instructions were not given immediately
following the denial of the motions. See State v. Mancini, 108
RI. 261, 273, 274 A.2d 742, 748 (1971).

The defendant’s last contention is that the cautionary
instructions that were included in the final charge to the
jurors were insufficient to banish from their minds the
prejudice asserted by defendant. We do not reach that issue
because Super R. Crim. P. 30! bars a defendant from
assigning as error the giving of an erroneous instruction or the
failure to give a requested instruction unless objection has
been lodged on the record before the jury retires to consider
its verdict and unless the objection is sufficiently specific to
bring into focus the precise nature of the alleged error. State
v. Marrapese, 116 R.I. at 12, 351 A.2d at 100. In this case,

‘Super. R. Crim. P, 30 provides:

“At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court
instruct the jury on the laws as set forth in the request. At the same time
copies of such request shall be furnished to adverse parties. If a defendant
relies upon an affirmative defense, or justification, or matter in mitigation
and wishes the court to instruct the jury with respect to such, he shall so
advise the court in writing no later than at the close of the evidence. No
party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.
Objections shall be made out of the presence of the jury.” (Emphasis added.)

°

the defendant neither requested a specific charge nor
objected to either the trial justice’s having said something he
should not have said, or his having failed to say something he
should have said. Consequently, the contention that the
cautionary instructions were inadequate presents nothing for
us to review.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Stephen R.
Famiglietti, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Joseph DeCaporale, Office of the Public Defender, for
defendant.

404 A.2d 75.
CATHERINE Rosaxi vs. ScHooi. House Canpy Company.
JULY 25, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

82 Dn
ee

Jost, J. In this workers’ compensation proceeding the
employee, who sustained a compensable injury in 1973,
petitions to review and alleges a return of total incapacity.
The only witnesses to testify before the trial commissioner
were the employee; her attending physician, Dr. Howard S.
Sturim; and a medical librarian who authenticated certain
hospital records. On the basis of their testimony the
commissioner found for the employee. The employer
appealed to the full commission which found as a fact that
Dr. Sturim’s opinion stating that the employee’s total
incapacity related back to the 1973 injury was based not only
upon his own observations, but also upon medical reports
that were not in evidence. It held that to admit such
testimony was error; that the trial commissioner should have
stricken it; and that without that testimony there was
insufficient competent evidence to support the trial
commissioner’s finding that the employee had suffered a
recurrence of incapacity traceable to her 1973 injury. From a
decree embodying those findings and conclusions, the
employee appealed to this court.

The dispositive question here is whether Young v. New
England Transportation Co., 97 R.I. 499, 199 A.2d 300
(1964), governs. In that case the Workers’ Compensation
Commission, in finding that the employee had not
established that his present disability was due to a prior com-
pensable injury, relied on the testimony of Dr. Lester L.
Vargas, who had examined the worker on the employer's
behalf. The doctor was called by the employer as a forensic
expert, rather than as an attending physician, and he testified
that his opinion stating that the recurring disability was not
traceable to the original incapacity was based upon his own
personal examination of the employee and a collective
evaluation of certain medical reports not in evidence. In
those circumstances we held that it was improper to permit
Dr. Vargas to state an opinon that was derived in part from
facts not in the record when he stated his opinion. Id. at 503,
199 A.2d at 302.

Ss

Although not extensively articulated in the Young case, the
essential objection to permitting an expert to offer an opinion
on the basis of reports that are not in evidence

“seems to be that the [factfinder] is asked to accept as
evidence the witness’ inference, based upon someone's
hearsay assertion of a fact which is, presumably, not
supported by any evidence at the trial and which there-
fore the [factfinder] has no basis for finding to be true.”
McCormick, Evidence §15 at 34 (2d ed. 1972).

The circumstances under which Dr. Sturim testified in this
case and Dr. Vargas in the Young case, however, are substan-
tially different. Here Dr. Sturim was an attending or treating
physician who had even performed surgery on the employee
while in the Young case Dr. Vargas was a forensic expert
who, although called upon to testify about Young's condi-
tion, had merely examined but not treated him. The dif-
ference between the two situations is significant because
there is a substantial body of authority holding that an
attending or treating physician may base his opinion in part
upon the statements of other medically trained personnel if
they are used to supplement his own observations of the
person or situation in question. Jenkins v. United States, 307
F.2d 637, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Atchison, Topeka ¢
Santa Fe Railway v. Preston, 257 F.2d 933, 936 (10th Cir.
1958); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 286 Ky. 301,
305-07, 150 S.W.2d 479, 481-82 (1941); Patchek v. Norton
Concrete Co., 160 Mont. 16, 21-22, 499 P.2d 766, 769 (1972);
State v. Best, 89 $.D. 227, 239-41, 232 N.W.2d 447, 455
(1975); New Jersey Zinc. Co. v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 246, 250
(Tenn. 1975); Sundquist v. Madison Railways, 197 Wis. 83,
87, 221 N.W. 392, 393 (1928); McCormick, Evidence §15 (2d
ed. 1972); Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15
Vand. L. Rev. 473, 505-14 (1962); see Carrington v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 337 F.2d 913, 916 (4th Cir. 1964); State
Realty Co. v. Ligon, 218 Ala. 541, 543-44, 119 So. 672, 674
(1929); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §688 at 9-11, (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1970). But see Salotti v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad,
293 Ala. 1, 20-24 & 25 (Jones, J., concurring), 299 So. 2d
695, 712-16 & 717 (Jones, J., concurring) (1974).

TO

The rationale for this exception to the general rule
followed in the Young case is

“that the medical need for the communicated
information and the assumed reliability of medical
personnel generally justifies the slight danger of
erroneous information falling on the ears of the trier.
After all, the very notion of an expert assumes a person
competent to judge the reliability of the information he
receives. In fact, in another area of the law a duty is laid
upon the doctor to refer his patient to a specialist when
necessary. If that be so, the doctor ought to be able to
rely upon what he is told by the consultant.” Rheingold,
The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 473,
508 (1962).

Another telling reason for permitting this kind of testimony
appears in the leading case of Sundquist v. Madison
Railways, 197 Wis. 83, 87, 221 N.W. 392, 393 (1928), where
the court said: :

“In order to say that a physician, who has actually
used the result of those tests in a diagnosis and in the
treatment of the plaintiff, may not testify what that
diagnosis was, the court must deliberately shut its eyes
to a source of information which is relied on by
mankind generally in matters that involve the health
and may involve the life of their families and of them-
selves—a source of information that it is essential the
court should possess in order that it may do justice
between these parties litigant.

“In making a diagnosis for treatment physicians must
of necessity consider many things that do not appear in
sworn proof on the trial of a lawsuit—things that mean
much to the trained eye and touch of a skilled medical
practitioner. This court has held that it will not close the
doors of the courts to the light which is given by a
diagnosis which all the rest of the world accepts and acts
upon, even if the diagnosis is in part based upon facts
which are not established by the sworn testimony in the
case to be true.”

ee 55

In our judgment, the reasons underlying the exception to
the rule are cogent and the result sound, and we accept both.
Consequently, Dr. Sturim’s testimony, which fits into the
exception rather than the rule, should not have been stricken.
Because the Legislature has assigned the factfinding function
in compensation matters to the commission, this case must be
remanded to the full commission so that it may reconsider the
record, including Dr. Sturim’s testimony, and pass judgment
on the trial commissioner’s decree.

The petitioner’s appeal is sustained, the decree appealed
from is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Workers’
Compensation Commission for further proceedings.

Bernard W. Boyer, for plaintiff.

Bernard C. Gladstone, for respondent.

404 A.2d 72.
Franxuin D. Aucizre vs. Joun J. Fox et al.
JULY 25, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J.; Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Weissercer, J. This case is before us on appeal from a
judgment of the Superior Court for the County of
Washington denying the plaintiff's request for declaratory
and injunctive relief.

Following the adoption of the Westerly Town Council of a
budget for the fiscal year 1979-80, plaintiff, purportedly in
conformity with the provisions of §3-1-5(b) of the charter of
the town of Westerly, circulated a petition to “contest, reject
and delete all budgetary appropriations.” This petition
challenged each and every item of the budget and sought in
essence to present to the voters the question of whether this
budget or no budget should be adopted. No alternative
appropriations were suggested in respect to any of the
challenged items. The plaintiff obtained more than 200
signatures of qualified electors in support of his petition and
submitted the petition to the town clerk for attestation of
filing. Thereafter plaintiff filed the petition with the Wester-
ly Board of Canvassers (the board) which refused to submit
said petition to the voters of the town by way of referendum.
The plaintiff then brought action in the Superior Court

5

against defendants in their capacities as members of the
board. After hearing on May 2, 1979, the trial justice held
that this petition did not conform to the provisions of the
charter of the town of Westerly and that plaintiff was not
entitled to the relief sought against the board. The trial jus-
tice accordingly entered judgment for defendants. This
appeal ensued.

Both parties are in agreement that the Superior Court
appropriately assumed jurisdiction over this controversy and
that the matter is properly before us on appeal from the
judgment of that court. There is no doubt that this court has
jurisdiction to decide the merits of this dispute. Because of
the significant public interest involved, we shall not question
the route by which this case comes before us, though we
leave open the issue of whether alternative methods of review
of the board’s decision may have been preferable until a more
concrete controversy on this issue is presented to us. For the
present, we shall assume the correctness of the parties’ juris-

* dictional agreement and shall proceed to examine the merits
of the controversy.

The pertinent portion of §3-1-5(b) of the charter of the
town of Westerly reads as follows:

“(b) Within eight (8) day [sic] of the publishing of the
budget any item or items (the appropriation for any
department, office, or purpose) may be contested by
means of a petition for change signed by two hundred
(200) or more electors qualified to vote on financial
matters of the Town. Such petition may be instituted by
any qualified elector, but prior to being circulated for
signatures, such petition shall be filed with the Town
Clerk who shall attest to the filing and affix the seal of
the Town. If no petition for change is presented before
the expiration of this period, the budget as proposed by
the Council shall be considered as adopted.”

The foregoing provisions should be considered in

conjunction with the terms of §3-1-5(c) which is set forth in
relevant part as follows:

“The majority of the qualified electors voting at such a
referendum shall determine whether the proposed bud-
get shall or shall not be amended as proposed by any
valid petition for change. If more than one petition for
change affects the same appropriation, a plurality of
those qualified electors voting shall determine the
amount of such appropriation that will become a part of
the adopted budget.”

In the event that a real or seeming ambiguity is perceived
in reading the language of a statute, this court will attempt to
ascertain the intention of a legislative’ body from a
consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind its
nature, object, language and arrangement. Zannelli v. Di
Sandro, 84 R.I. 76, 121 A.2d 652 (1956). This doctrine is, of
course, applicable to the ascertainment of the intent of the
framers of a municipal charter. See Carter v. City of
Pawtucket, 115 R.I. 134, 341 A.2d 53 (1975).

Applying this doctrine to the pertinent provisions of the
Westerly charter, resolution of any ambiguity would be
achieved by considering in connection with the above-quoted
sections the terms of §3-1-6 of the charter which provide:

“A copy of the budget, as finally adopted by the
Council, or as amended by referendum, shall be certi-
fied by the Town Clerk and filed in the office of the
Town Treasurer{.] Sufficient copies shall be made avail-
able by the Town Clerk for the use of all officers,
departments and agencies, and for the use of interested
persons.” (Emphasis added.)

A reading of these provisions in pari materia discloses a
clear and unequivocal intent. The framers of the Westerly
charter contemplated that a taxpayer with the approval of
200 qualified electors might challenge one or more items in
the budget by a “petition for change.” The totality of these
provisions, however, clearly indicates the contemplation of
the framers that this challenge would be by way of proposing
an alternative which would effectively give the voters a
choice between an item as proposed by the council in the

es 59

budget and an item as proposed in the “petition for change.”
The ultimate result of the challenge would be to give the
voters a choice between an item proposed by the council and
an item proposed by the petitioning taxpayer.

The provision clearly does not contemplate a zero budget
being proposed as an alternative to the budget adopted by
the council. Thus, the petitioning taxpayer would have the
responsibility of suggesting a rational, positive choice to the
voters of the town, as opposed simply to seeking to
disapprove or extinguish each and every budgeted item as
plaintiff has sought to do here.

Where more than one interpretation is possible, this court
will not impute to the Legislature an intent which would
achieve unreasonable consequences. Town of Scituate v.
O'Rourke, 103 R.I. 499, 239 A.2d 176 (1968). It is reasonably
apparent that submitting a question which calls upon the
voters of the town of Westerly either to accept the budget as
proposed by the council or to reject it and end up with no
budget at all would be to pose a question to which a negative
answer would constitute an absurd result. This absurdity is
particularly apparent in light of the fact that the charter
makes no provision for a new budget submission after such a
referendum. Indeed, §3-1-6 of the charter clearly
contemplates that after the referendum, the budget as
adopted by the council “or as amended by referendum, shall
be certified by the Town Clerk and filed in the office of the
Town Treasurer.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is anticipated
that at the conclusion of the referendum, a viable budget will
have been finally adopted either as proposed or as amended.
No provision is made in the event that no budget at all should
be adopted and, consequently, a zero budget is not
anticipated or provided for. Therefore, the “petition for
change” as filed by the plaintiff was not in accordance with
the terms of the charter of the town of Westerly and did not
pose a question or questions which could properly be
submitted to referendum.

60

For the reasons stated, the plaintiffs appeal is denied and
dismissed, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed,
and the case is remanded to the Superior Court.

Vincent J. Naccarato, for plaintiff.

John R. Payne, Jr., for defendant.

404 A.2d 77.

Karuryn M. Traucorr vs. Eucene Petit, REGISTRAR.
JULY 27, 1979.

Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

es 61
PY
Beviacgua, C.J. Kathryn M. Traugott (Traugott) is
appealing from a Superior Court judgment that decreed,
inter alia, that married women, including Traugott, who
wish to register a motor vehicle or apply for an operator’s

license must use their Christian names followed by their
husband’s surnames.

Traugott, who was formerly married, used the surname of
her husband during the period of her marriage. Her divorce
decree, issued in Massachusetts, does not specifically mention
that she chose to resume the use of her birth name upon
obtaining her divorce. Nevertheless, subsequent to her
divorce, she changed her name back to Traugott on all public
records and on her private business records, with the
exception of her Rhode Island driver's license and her United
States passport, which contains both names. When she
attempted to change her name on her Rhode Island driver's
license, however, the Registry of Motor Vehicles (the
registry) informed her that to do so necessitated presentation

62 Ss

of either a divorce decree specifically granting her the use of
her birth name or another legal document evidencing the
change from her married surname to her birth name.
Traugott therefore complained to the Superior Court under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, G.L. 1956 (1969)
Reenactment) §§9-30-1 to -16 and 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970),
seeking an injunction and a declaration of her rights to
redress the violation of her civil and constitutional rights.

After the hearing, the trial court decided that the legal
name of a married woman, including that of Traugott, is her
Christian name followed by her husband’s surname. The
trial justice thus countenanced the registry’s policy of refus-
ing to change the name of a divorced woman on its records of
motor vehicle registrations and licenses without proof of a
divorce decree granting the woman the right to resume her
former or maiden name. Traugott is appealing from this
judgment.

The issue before this court is whether a citizen, divorced or
otherwise, has the right in Rhode Island to change her name
and to have that name change recorded by the registry
without presenting a court decree. Traugott maintains that
absent legislation to the contrary, all citizens in Rhode Island
have a common-law right to use, assume, and adopt any
name as long as the purpose of its assumption or adoption is
not fraudulent. She therefore reasons that because no Rhode
Island statute, including the enabling act of the registry,
abrogates this common-law right, all women, whether
married or single have the right to adopt any names they
choose as their legal names.!

‘Traugott’s second argument is that the policy of the registry violates her
constitutional rights as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and her civil rights under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970).
She claims that the trial justice erred in not finding the registry’s policy
unconstitutional. In oral argument, however, Traugott stated that she was not
relying on this contention. In any event, in view of our response to Traugott’s first
contention, there is no need to address her constitutional claim.

63

Zz Under the common law, individuals have the right to
change their name as long as they do so with a nonfraudulent
purpose. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373
Mass. 178, 183, 366 N.E.2d 717, 721 (1977); Stuart v.
Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 446-47, 295
A.2d 223, 226-27 (1972); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich.
Appl. 213, 215-16, 247 N.W.2d 354, 355 (1976); Moskowitz
v. Moskowitz, 118 N.H. 199, 202, 385 A.2d 120, 122
(1978); Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 682-83 (Tenn.
1975); Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 151, 226 N.W.2d
458, 463-64 (1975). This court has held that Rhode Island has
adopted the common law to the extent that it remains appli-
cable in given circumstances. Benevides v. Kelly, 90 R.I. 310,
312-13, 316, 157 A.2d 821, 822, 824 (1960). The common
law governs the rights and obligations of citizens in Rhode
Island unless that law has been ‘modified by the General
Assembly. Id. at 316, 157 A.2d at 824, citing Lombardi v.
California Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 54, 112 A.2d 701,
702 (1955). Both of the parties agree that absent appropriate
legislation abrogating the common-law right to change one’s
name nonfraudulently, the registry is powerless to require a
divorced woman to produce a divorce decree reestablishing
the use of her birth name in order to remove her ex-husband’s
surname from her driver’s license. The registry, however,
asserts that although the Legislature has not entirely
abrogated the common-law right, statutes enacted by the
General Assembly in the area of motor vehicle licensing and
registration evidence a “strong legislative intent to modify, in
a limited way, the general common law rule.” The registry
further contends that pursuant to statute and to registry
policy, the state of Rhode Island requires a married woman
who wishes to apply for a motor vehicle operator’s license or
to register a motor vehicle to use her husband’s surname and
a divorcee who wishes to do likewise to obtain a divorce or a
probate court decree indicating a name change. The registry
cites G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §15-5-17 as proof of this
contention. Section 15-5-17 reads as follows:

64 ee

“Change of name.—Any woman, to whom a divorce
from the bond of marriage is decreed, may be
authorized by such decree to change her name, subject
to the same rights and liabilities as if her name had not
been changed.”

The registry refers to the following portions of its enabling
act as authority for its own policy, G.L. 1956 (1968
Reenactment) §31-10-12:

“Contents of application [for operator's or chauffeur’s
license].—Every said application shall state the full
name, date of birth, sex, and residence address of the
applicant * * *,”

“31-10-26. Issuance of license—Signature of
licensee.—The registry shall (upon payment of the
required fee) issue to every applicant qualifying therefor
an operator’s or chauffeur’s license as applied for, which
license shall bear thereon a distinguishing number
assigned to the licensee, the full name * * * of the
licensee * * *.”

“§31-3-35. Notice of change of name.—Whenever
the name of any person who has made application for or
obtained the registration of a vehicle is thereafter
changed by marriage or otherwise such person shall
within ten (10) days notify the registry of such former
and new name.”

“§ 31-10-32. Notice of change of address or
name.—Whenever any person after applying for or
receiving an operator’s or chauffeur’s license shall move
from the address named in such application or in the
license issued to him or when the name of a licensee is
changed by marriage or otherwise such person shall
within ten (10) days thereafter notify the registry in
writing of his old and new addresses or of such former
and new names and of the number of any license then
held by him.”

ee 65

In §§31-10-12 and -26 the registry puts particular emphasis
on the phrase “full name,” interpreting the word “full” as
requiring a married woman to include her husband’s
surname on her application for a license and as requiring the
registry to issue such a license bearing the husband’s
surname. The registry also interprets the requirement of
notification in §§31-3-35 and 31-10-32 as necessitating that a
divoreée present to the registry a divorce decree pursuant to
§15-5-17, or a probate court decree pursuant to §8-9-9.
Section 8-9-9 reads in part as follows: “Every probate court
shall have jurisdiction, in the town or city in which it is
established + * * of change of names of persons * * *.”

We must consider the registry’s contention that the
General Assembly, by enacting §§8-9-9 and 15-5-17, has
sanctioned the registry’s policy of requiring a divorcée to
produce a court decree evidencing her name change in light
of our rule that absent legislative guidance to the contrary,
we shall not interpret statutes enacted by the General
Assembly as abrogating or superseding the common law. See
Souza v. O’Hara, 121 R.I. 88, 90, 395 A.2d 1060, 1062
(1978); 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction §61.01 at 41
(Sands 4th ed. 1974). In applying this rule to our general
name-change statute, §8-9-9, we note that the General
Assembly has not indicated an intent to modify the common
law. We therefore hold that §8-9-9 is an optional method
that may be employed to change one’s name. Similarly, a
number of courts have held that their name-change statutes
do not abrogate or supersede the common law, but merely
afford an additional method of effectuating a name change
as a matter of public record. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 384
A.2d 632, 633 (D.C. Ct. Appl. 1977); Secretary of the
Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, 184, 366
N.E.2d 717, 722 (1977); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich.
App. 213, 216, 247 N.W.2d 354, 355 (1976); Simmons v.
O’Brien, 201 Neb. 778, 779-80, 272 N.W.2d 273, 274 (1978).

The registry agrees that §8-9-9 affords an additional
method of changing one’s name without obliterating the
common-law right, yet neglects to categorize §15-5-17 with

66 es

§8-9-9 as a name-change statute. We find ourselves,
however, unable to differentiate between a statute that
allows a name change by probate court decree and one that
permits a divorce decree to contain a name change. Section
15-5-17, like §8-9-9, is an additional method that may be
utilized by divorced people who wish to change their names.
Section 15-5-17 merely allows those seeking a divorce in
Rhode Island to ask the court to include their changes of
name in the divorce decrees. This section thus obviates the
necessity of newly divorced people to then petition the
probate court to enter decrees establishing that they have
changed their names. In sum, §15-5-17 is an optional name-
change statute, like §8-9-9, that aids the common law and
avoids unnecessary, duplicative court proceedings. If we
were to hold otherwise, and rule that §15-5-17 requires
divorced people who wish to change their names to request
that the divorce decrees encompass the name changes, then
we would be imposing upon them an undue burden on their
common-law right to nonfraudulently change their names.
We are unable to impose such a burden in view of the fact
that the General Assembly has not indicated its desire to
modify the common law in this area.

Hs The registry’s claim that §§31-3-35, 31-10-12, -26, -32,
which require applicants to notify the registry of a name-
change and the applicant’s full name on license applications,
modify the common-law right of divorced people to change
their names nonfraudulently is also governed by Souza.
Because those sections do not expressly delimit the common-
law right to change one’s name nonfraudulently, we construe
them as merely requiring the applicants to state on
applications their full names as they have chosen them and to
notify the registry upon assuming new names. None of these
sections requires a divorced licensee to produce a divorce or
probate court decree as proof of a name change. We
therefore uphold Traugott’s claim that the General Assembly
has not abrogated the common-law right of qualified
applicants to use, assume, or adopt any name as long as the
purpose of its assumption or adoption is not fraudulent and
hold that the trial justice erred both in finding that a married

ee 67
woman’s legal name must be her first name with her
husband’s surname and in sustaining the registry’s policy to
that effect.

The plaintiff's appeal is sustained, the judgment appealed
from is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior

Court.

Sheila Cabral-Sousa, for plaintiff.
Francis J. Darigan, Jr., for respondent.

404 A.2d 81.
SraTE vs. CHARLES J, GIANOULOS.
JULY 27, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Keener, J. The defendant, Charles J. Gianoulos
(Gianoulos), was tried before a Superior Court jury on an
indictment that charged him and two others with violating
the provisions of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-4-3,
which, insofar as it relates to Gianoulos, provides that
anyone who is convicted of aiding or counseling another to
burn any building other than a dwelling house shall be
imprisoned no less than 2 nor more than 20 years, As we
review the evidence presented at a Superior Court jury trial,
we shall bear in mind Gianoulos’ contention that his “mere
presence” at the scene of the crime does not establish his
guilt,

During the early morning hours of July 2, 1974, North
Providence’s Lymansville Volunteer Fire Department,
responding to an alarm of fire, extinguished a blaze that
destroyed an unoccupied two-family dwelling located at 10
Packard Avenue. Investigators from the State Fire Marshall’s
Office concluded that the fire was set and that the original
ignition point was located in the front part of the house.
About a month later, North Providence police arrested
Gianoulos, David B. Dilorio (Dilorio), and Keith J. Burke
(Burke).

es 6a

Gianoulos and Dilorio gave written statements to the
police. On the other hand, Burke exercised his fifth-
amendment right and told the police nothing. In his
statement Gianoulos said that at 12:40 a.m. on the day in
question, David Dilorio “picked me up on Homewood
Avenue” and drove him and Burke “down to Packard Avenue
to the house.” Just as the trio arrived at Packard Avenue,
Dilorio announced that he was “going to set the house on
fire.” Dilorio and Burke, armed with a small can of gasoline,
advanced toward the rear of the house. Gianoulos said that
he remained on the sidewalk in front of the house, but when
he saw his companions coming toward the street, he returned
to the car.

During his testimony, Gianoulos attempted to refute or
explain certain parts of his statement. Although he had told
the police in his statement that Dilorio had “picked him up,”
Gianoulos attempted to disabuse the jury of any idea that the
pickup was preconceived. He told the jury that he had
actually been standing at the corner of Maplecrest and
Homewood Avenues in the Fruit Hill section of North
Providence when Dilorio and Burke came by in Dilorio’s car.
He told the jury that before their arrival, he had been
discussing with two other friends plans for a New Hampshire
camping trip. He explained that Dilorio and Burke joined
the group and contributed some input regarding the pro-
posed trip, which was scheduled for the very day on
which the trio was arrested. Packard Avenue is located in
North Providence’s Lymansville section. According to
Gianoulos, he had no idea whatsoever why they were
embarking upon a 10- to 15-minute ride to Lymansville until
Dilorio pulled up in front of the house. However, he
conceded that Dilorio’s invitation for the ride, while made in
the presence of the other two individuals with whom the new
arrivals were friendly, was limited to him alone. Gianoulos
admitted that he took a position in front of the house, but
insisted he did absolutely nothing. Once the trio returned to
the Fruit Hill area, Gianoulos took his car, which had been
parked on Homewood Avenue, and drove over to within a
block of the fire and there pulled the alarm which summoned

70 |

the Lymansville crew. A member of that crew was Dilorio.
Again, Gianoulos conceded that he could have stopped at the
Fruit Hill fire station, which was close to the Homewood-
Maplecrest intersection, and there sounded the alarm; but he
instead spent 10 minutes or so going to Lymansville because
he thought that the Fruit Hill station was locked up for the
night. Gianoulos attributed his failure to attempt to dissuade
Dilorio and Burke from embarking on the incendiary mission
and his failure to report their identities to either the police or
fire authorities to a fear of reprisal.

A rebuttal witness testified that when he arrived at the
scene of the fire, he asked Gianoulos to lend him a hand and
Gianoulos, in somewhat terse and direct language, told him
that he was not available even though Gianoulos was once a
member of the Fruit Hill volunteers.

The trial justice rejected Gianoulos’ efforts to picture
himself as an innocent bystander when he denied Gianoulos’
motion for a judgment of acquittal, which motion was made
after the prosecution and defense had completed their
presentation of evidence. In assessing the correctness of this
denial, we, like the trial court, must, without weighing the
evidence or assessing the credibility of witnesses, view the
evidence relied upon by the state in the light most favorable
to the state, drawing therefrom all reasonable inferences
consistent with guilt. State v. Distante, 118 R.I. 532, 536,
375 A.2d 212, 215 (1977). The state does not quarrel with the
proposition that mere presence at the scene, in and of itself, is
insufficient to warrant a conviction; but it contends that
there is other evidence adduced at trial which, when
considered along with Gianoulos’ presence, gives rise to a
reasonable inference of guilt.

We see no need to detail the evidence to which we have
already alluded. Obviously, Gianoulos’ erratic course of
behavior, plus the limited invitation for a ride and his
conduct subsequent to the discovery of the fire, all form a
firm evidentiary basis for the belief that Gianoulos, despite
his protestations to the contrary, was well aware of the

es a

purpose of the post-midnight motor trip from Fruit Hill to
Lymansville and had agreed to do his part as Dilorio and
Burke went about the task of spreading the gasoline around
the building. Consequently, we cannot fault the denial of the
motion for judgment of acquittal.

The second facet of Gianoulos’ appeal concerns three
incidents at which points the trial justice refused to pass the
case and declare a mistrial. After Gianoulos had testified on
cross-examination that he had not been with Dilorio since
the day of the arrest, the prosecutor asked him if it was not a
fact that 2 weeks earlier he had been seated alongside
Dilorio! in the very courtroom in which Gianoulos’ trial was
being held. The defense’s objection was overruled, and
Gianoulos answered in the affirmative. The trial justice ruled
that the question was fair game during cross-examination
and also pointed out that he would cure any prejudice when
he charged the jury. During the charge, the trial justice
alluded to the question and admonished the jury that the sole
purpose of the prior-courtroom-encounter evidence was to
impeach Gianoulos’ testimony that he had not seen Dilorio
since the arrest and that the jury could draw no other
unfavorable inferences from the fact that Gianoulos was in
court on an earlier occasion.

Later, when the prosecutor asked Gianoulos if he was
aware of any “other fires” in North Providence prior to the
Packard Avenue conflagration, the trial justice sustained
defendant’s objection on the ground that this evidence was
totally immaterial. Subsequently, the trial justice instructed
the jury that it could draw no inferences whatsoever against
Gianoulos because of the reference to other fires.

One of the state’s rebuttal witnesses was a brother of one of
the firefighters who extinguished the Packard Avenue fire.
The witness was asked by the prosecutor whether his brother
had told him that when Gianoulos was asked to help at the

1Dilorio’s trial preceded Gianoulos’ trial by 2 weeks. The jury returned a guilty
verdict against Diorio. The indictment, as far as it related to Burke, was dismissed
for lack of evidence.

72 ee

fire, Gianoulos ran away. The defense objected immediately,
and the question was never answered. The trial justice
refused to pass the case, concluding that the jury had not
been influenced by the “nature and tone” of the question and
Gianoulos had not been prejudiced because the question,
even if improper, had not been answered. Thus, the trial
justice felt that a cautionary instruction was unnecessary,
and none was given. Furthermore, this specific objection
became academic when it became obvious that the state had
produced the wrong brother as its rebuttal witness. When the
right brother appeared, he proceeded to tell the jury about
Gianoulos’ unwillingness to lend a hand to the Lymansville
crew.

As we have said on many prior occasions, motions to pass
and declare a mistrial are matters addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial justice. As a front-row-seat spectator,
he or she is best able to gauge the effect of an allegedly
improvident remark heard by the jury. Much of what we
have said in this area can be found in State v. Marrapese, 116
R.L. 1, 7, 351 A.2d 95, 98 (1976). We see no need to extend
the discussion in this area, except to say that we have
examined the record and see no reason to disturb the actions
taken by the trial justice.

In denying Gianoulos’ motion for a new trial, the trial
justice observed that there was sufficient evidence from
which the jury could reasonably infer that Gianoulos was
posted at the front of the property for the specific purpose of
aiding and abetting Dilorio and Burke “in any way should
the necessity arise.” Here, the trial justice, like the jury,
obviously rejected Gianoulos’ assertion that he was totally in
the dark concerning the reason why he, Dilorio, and Burke
were making the trip to Lymansville.

Gianoulos alse contends that even if the trial justice
properly assessed the evidence, the motion for a new trial
should have been granted on the ground that the jury’s
verdict was against the law. He bases his contention on the
fact that the trial justice in his charge had told the jury that it
could not consider Gianoulos’ statement unless it was

es 78

“satisfied by proof beyond a reasonable doubt”? that the
police had afforded defendant the four Miranda warnings
and had also informed him of his right to call off the interro-
gation at any time he desired. Gianoulos now argues that
there is absolutely no evidence that he was told that he could
bring the interrogation to a halt just by telling the police that
he no longer cared to respond to their questions.

Having in mind that the unobjected-to charge is the law of
the case, we believe the lack of information concerning
Gianoulos’ ability to terminate the questioning was harmless.
Since a jury is presumed to follow the trial justice’s
instructions, we must assume that it disregarded Gianoulos’
statement. Further, when Gianoulos testified in direct
examination, he gave, in substance, a line-by-line recitation
of what he had already told the police. The evidence which
gave the broad-based support for the finding of guilt came
during his cross-examination and the testimony presented by
the Lymansville firefighters who reported Dilorio’s presence
on the responding truck and Gianoulos’ refusal to volunteer
to help the volunteers.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment of conviction appealed from is affirmed.

Stephen Nugent, Special Assistant Attorney General, for
petitioner.

Harold I. Kessler, Friedman and Kessler, for defendant.

*Since the statement relates to the admissibility of evidence rather than proof of
an essential element of the crime, the measure of proof in this jurisdiction has been
“clear and convincing evidence” rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See
State v. Espinosa, 109 R.I. 221, 230-31, 283 A.2d 465, 469-70 (1971). Interestingly
enough, the Supreme Court has ruled that the admissibility of an in-custody incul-
patory statement can be measured by a “preponderance of evidence” standard.
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484, 92 S, Ct. 619, 624, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618, 624
(1972). Earlier this year the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took the
position that while it might be better practice to do so, there is no federal or state
requirement which directs the police to advise an accused of his right to terminate
his questioning at any time. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 374 Mass. 203, 205, 371
N.E.2d 775, 776-77 (1978). The court has compiled a list of jurisdictions that have
ruled on this question. All but two are in accord with the Massachusetts view. The
two are State v. Riddict, 291 N.C. 399, 408, 230 S.E.2d 506, 512 (1976), and
Micale v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 370, 374, 251 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1977).

403 A.2d 1387.

SAMUEL Brown vs. Hope Service Station, Inc., et al.
JULY 27, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Keuieuer, J. This is a workers’ compensation proceed-
ing. The worker is Samuel Brown (Brown). His employer,
the Hope Service Station, Inc. is the nominal owner and
operator of a gasoline service station situated in Scituate.
Sometime in May 1973, Brown was busily engaged in
renovating the exterior portion of the station’s premises. Part

|:

of the remodeling program called for the erection of a
retaining wall made up of railroad ties. As Brown com-
menced the retaining-wall project, he picked up one of the
ties and experienced some back pain. In the years that fol-
lowed, Brown continued to perform his service-station chores
despite his aching back. Occasionally, he would seek the
assistance of either a chiropractor or an accupuncturist.

In June 1976, the intensity of the ache had increased to
such a degree that Brown decided to consult a neurosurgeon.
Tests indicated the presence of a large protruding disc.
Surgery confirmed the disc’s presence. Once the disc was re-
moved, Brown began to look for compensation. As he did, he
became confronted with the question of which insurance
carrier should pay—the carrier who provided the coverage
on the day he picked up the tie or the carrier providing the
coverage at the time Brown stopped working and sought out
the neurosurgical skills of Dr. Julius Stoll, Jr.

Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (Fireman’s) was the
insurer on the day Brown picked up the railroad tie, while
American Universal Insurance Company (American) was
supplying the coverage in 1976 when Brown stopped work.
Neither insurer questions Brown’s right to receive benefits,
but each points to the other as the one obligated to provide
the monetary benefits set forth in the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act.

Hs The trial commissioner ruled that American was the one
obligated to pay, and the full commission affirmed his
findings. On American’s appeal we affirm the commission’s
finding regarding insurer responsibility because compensa-
tion is awarded, not on the basis of physical injuries sus-
tained, but on the basis of the resulting impairment in earn-
ing capacity. Parkinson v. Leesona Corp., 115 R.I. 120, 125,
341 A.2d 33, 36 (1975); Microfin Corp. v. DeLisi, 111 R.1.
703, 708, 306 A.2d 797, 800 (1973); Geigy Chemical Corp. v.
Zuckerman, 106 R.1. 534, 539-40, 261 A.2d 844, 848 (1970).
Since the crucial date is the time of incapacity rather than of
injury, when an employer purchases workers’ compensation

1 es

coverage, the insurer assumes the employer’s responsibility to
compensate the worker for his or her loss of earning capacity.
The insurable incident which invokes coverage is the
diminution in earning capacity rather than the injury itself
which caused that reduction.

This court on other occasions has adopted the date of in-
capacity rather than the date of the injury as the focal point
when determining such matters as the amount of compensa-
tion to be paid,! the length of the period during which
payments are to be made,? and the amount of the worker’s
average weekly wage.® Apart from our past actions, simple
justice would dictate that the crucial factor in this con-
troversy would be the date of incapacity rather than the time
of injury.

Prior to September 1, 1974, a worker who had suffered a
total loss of earning capacity could, because of the provisions
of G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-33-17, receive a week-
ly benefit that equaled two-thirds of the average weekly
wage the employee was receiving at the time of the loss.
Subsequent to August 31, 1975, such an individual’s weekly
benefits would equal the average weekly wage being paid to
individuals whose employers were subject to the provisions of
the Employment Security Act. In 1973 Fireman’s was charg-
ing Brown's employer a premium equal to $1.99 per $100 of
annual employee remuneration. Later, in 1976, American’s
premium amounted to $3.50 of every $100 paid the em-
ployees. Obviously, the increase in rates reflected, at least in
part, the additional benefits conferred upon the employees.
To hold Fireman’s liable for Brown’s 1976 benefits simply
does not make sense or comport with any notions of fair play.

1Parkinson v. Leesona Corp., 115 R.1. 120, 341 A.2d 33 (1975).

*Ludovici v. American Screw Co., 99 R.I. 747, 210 A.2d 648 (1965).

3Fontaine v. Gorfine, 105 R.I. 174, 250 A.2d 361 (1969).

ee 7

Admittedly, 22 years ago this court, when confronted with
a somewhat similar situation in Santilli v. Original Bradford
Soap Works, Inc., 85 R.I. 305, 131 A.2d 235 (1957), ruled
that the carrier on the date of the 1942 injury was liable even
though the incapacity did not manifest itself until some 11
years later in 1953 when another carrier was furnishing
coverage. The Santilli court gave no reason for the choice it
made. In fact, the court did point out that Santilli never had
a cause of action as a result of his knee injury “until it
incapacitated him in October of 1953.” Id. at 313, 131 A.2d
at 239. The absence of any rationale for the court’s choice
and the previous observations we have made in this case
cause us to rule that, insofar as Santilli is inconsistent with
today’s holding, it is hereby overruled.

Having affirmed the commission’s finding of American’s
liability, we now turn to Brown’s appeal in which he claims
that the commission erred in denying him partial disability
benefits following his return to work in late November 1976.
Like many others* who have been injured while working for
a family-owned corporation, when Brown returned to work,
he was paid the same weekly salary ($300) he had received
prior to his October hospitalization.

In Kilsey v. Chuck Wagon, Inc., 119 B.I. 443, 445, 379
A.2d 919, 920 (1977), this court stated that

“the receipt of post-injury weekly payments equal to
pre-injury weekly wages creates a presumption that an
employee, although disabled, has not sustained the
requisite impairment of earning capacity upon which
entitlement to weekly compensation benefits depend.
Peloso, Inc. v. Peloso, 103 R.I. 294, 298, 237 A.2d 320,
323 (1968). That presumption is rebutted, however, if
an employee demonstrates that the weekly payments re-
ceived during disability are an unreliable basis for
estimating earning capacity.”

4Rilsey v. Chuck Wagon, Inc., 119 R.I. 443, 379 A.2d 919 (1977); Peloso, Inc. v.
Peloso, 103 R.I. 294, 237 A.2d 320 (1968).

Te

1S

We indicated that the presumption could be rebutted by
evidence that the payments received by an employee are
intended as a gesture of gratitude ky a grateful employer for
past services rendered, Trzoniec v. General Controls Co.,
100 R.I. 448, 451, 216 A.2d 886, 888 (1966), or if the
remuneration represents accumulated sick leave and vacation
pay, Robidoux v. Uniroyal, Inc., 116 R.1. 594, 597-98, 359
A.2d 45, 47-48 (1976). In Kilsey, we held that the
presumption could also be rebutted if the employee
established that he or she was so disabled as to be incapable
of engaging in any gainful employment. 119 R.I. at 446,
379 A.2d at 921.

Brown argues that his postoperative inability to perform
work requiring a high degree of physical exertion necessitated
the employment of an additional auto mechanic. He con-
tends that the new mechanic’s $175 weekly wage effectively
reduced the value of his own $300 salary. We cannot agree
with Brown’s contention. The moneys paid the new em-
ployee came not from Brown, but from the station’s cor-
porate coffers. Here, the essential issue was and is whether
Brown in fact earned his $300 weekly salary. 2 Larson,
Workmen’s Compensation Law §57.42 at 10-94 (1976).
When Brown, the station’s guiding genius,® returned to
work, he was able to pump gas and keep books. He had con-
ceded that the 1976 gasoline sales were substantially more
than the station’s 1973 volume. Brown, of course, had the
burden of convincing the commisison that the gas-dispensing
and accounting efforts he expended in behalf of his employer
were not really worth the $300 wage he was receiving. Un-
fortunately for Brown, the commission placed more faith in
the payroll records than it did in Brown’s protestations that
the weekly sum he received and called “wages” was not really
wages.

Evidence concerning “wages”received by an employee on
his return to work is relevant on the issue of the extent of the

sBrown is the station's senior employee. By virtue of his rank, he is the only one
who is not required to punch a time clock.

P| 79

employee’s earning capacity and is entitled to such weight as
the commission might choose to give it. Factfinding is the sole
prerogative of the commission because by statute this court
cannot weigh evidence in workers’ compensation cases. Here,
Brown had the burden of presenting credible evidence indi-
cating that he remained partially incapacitated. The evi-
dence he presented was subject to evaluation by the fact-
finders. The commission obviously believed that Brown’s per-
formance at the pumps and his mathematical expertise were
worth every penny of the weekly $300 he was being paid.
Since there is competent evidence to support the
commission’s conclusion, we will not and cannot disturb it.

The employee’s and American’s appeals are denied and
dismissed, all the decrees appealed from are affirmed, and
the causes are remanded to the Workers’ Compensation
Commission.

Bernard W. Boyer, for petitioner.

John A. Baglini, Harold E. Adams, Jr., for respondent.

404 A.2d 487.
AxserT ZABso & Sons, INc. vs. ANIELLO ZABBO.
JULY 30, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Josuin, J. In this workers’ compensation proceeding the
employee, a plasterer by occupation, sustained a compen-
sable injury when he slipped from a staging and fractured his
left wrist. He and his employer entered into a preliminary
agreement providing for compensation benefits based on
total incapacity. Not long thereafter, the employer filed a
petition to review the preliminary agreement alleging
alternatively that the employee’s incapacity had ended or
that he was able to return to light work. A trial commissioner
agreed that the employee was no longer totally
incapacitated, and he ordered that payments for partial in-
capacity be made in accordance with the provisions of G.L.
1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-33-18, as amended by P.L.
1974, ch. 270, §1. On the employer’s appeal, the full
commission affirmed the trial commissioner’s findings of fact
and orders.

On its appeal from the full commission’s decree, the
employer initially argues for reversal on the ground that a
copy of a medical report was admitted into evidence, over
objection, without being properly authenticated. This report
was prepared by Dr. A. Louis Mariorenzi who, on behalf of

82 re

the employer’s insurer, had examined the employee to
ascertain the extent of his incapacity. Even were we to agree
with the employer that the admission of that report
constituted error, that error would not in itself be ground for
reversal of the commission’s award if there is in the record
other evidence that supports the commission’s ultimate
finding on the extent of the employee's incapacity. Litchman
v. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co., 100 R.I. 352, 359, 216
A.2d 129, 133 (1966); see 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compen-
sation §79.00 at 15-210-11 (1976).

In this case that other evidence, to be sure, consisted prin-
cipally of the employee’s own testimony that he did not feel
capable of returning to work because of subjective symptoms
that were at odds with medical opinions based on objective
symptoms. Although in these circumstances an employee's
testimony may be suspect, it is nonetheless entitled to
whatever probative force the factfinder gives it. Union
Smelting & Refining Works v. Calhoun, 101 R.I. 655, 658,
226 A.2d 498, 500 (1967); Erbe v. A.D. Juilliard & Co., 81
R.I. 37, 41, 98 A.2d 856, 858 (1953).

Here the full commission—and it is its decree, and not the
trial commissioner’s that we review—found that the
employee was partially incapacitated. It relied on the
employee’s testimony that he tried to return to work several
times but that he “just couldn’t do it,” that he could not
climb staging because he was unable to hold himself up with
his left hand, and that after he attempted to do so, he felt like
“someone [was] stabbing [him] right through the palm of
that hand.”

The full commission also relied on the testimony of Dr.
Mariorenzi contained in his deposition, instead of on the
statements in the report he had prepared for the employer's
insurer. In that deposition, he testified that he felt the
employee could return to gainful employment, but only if he
wore “a leather gauntlet support” on his hand. His qualified
opinion taken together with the employee’s testimony and
the reasonable inferences of which they are susceptible

83

provide the competent evidence that negates any error that
might otherwise exist in the admission of Dr. Mariorenzi’s
report. Their testimony and those inférences also supply a
proper evidentiary basis for the commission’s finding that the
employee was partially incapacitated. The existence of that
basis—absent fraud, and none is alleged—precludes us from
disturbing those findings. See Mazzarella v. ITT Royal
Electric Division, 120 R.I. 333, 388 A.2d 4, 7 (1978);
section 28-35-30.

Finally, the employer contends that during the entire
period of the employee’s alleged incapacity not only did it
make the weekly payments called for by the preliminary
agreement, but it also paid him $250 each week.
Consequently, it argues that the total weekly payments
received by the employee exceeded those to which he was
legally entitled, and that therefore, pursuant to §28-35-45,! it

General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-35-45 provides:

“At any time after the date of the approval of any agreement or at any
time after the date of the entry of any decree concerning compensation, and
if compensation has ceased thereunder, within ten (10) years thereafter, any
agreement, award, order, finding, or decree may be from time to time
reviewed by the workmen’s compensation commission, upon its own motion
or upon a petition of either party upon forms prescribed and furnished by
the commission, after due notice to the interested parties, upon the ground
that the incapacity of the injured employee has diminished, ended,
inereased or returned, or that the weekly compensation payments have been
based upon an erroneous average weekly wage. Upon such review the
workmen’s compensation commission may decrease, suspend, increase,
commence or recommence compensation payments in accordance with the
facts, or make such other order as the justice of the case may require. No
such review shall affect such agreement, award, order, finding or decree as
regards money already paid, except that an award increasing the
compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and
except that if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid,
an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the
date of injury, and any payments made prior thereto in excess of such
decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such
manner and by such methods as may be determined by the workmen's
compensation commission. Relief on such review shall not be denied an
employee or granted an employer or his insurer on the grounds that the
employee is incapacitated by any injury or disease which is different from
the one for which said employee was paid compensation if the injury or
disease incapacitating the employee results from an injury or disease for
which employee was paid compensation.”

84 ee)

was entitled to credit for the amount of the alleged
overpayments against future compensation benefits.

That contention, if at all meritorious, depends initially on
the reasons motivating the employer to continue the
employee on its payroll during the period of his incapacity.
Thus, for example, a weekly payment in an amount equal to
salary paid by a sympathetic employer will not be deemed a
disability benefit if paid, not with the intention that the
payment be in lieu of compensation benefits, but rather as a
voluntary gesture of gratitude for past services. Trzoniec v.
General Controls Co., 100 R.I. 448, 451, 216 A.2d 886, 888
(1966); see Kilsey v. Chuck Wagon, Inc., 119 R.I. 443, 379
A.2d 919, 920 (1977); Robidoux v. Uniroyal Inc., 116 R.I.
594, 597-98, 359 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1976).

| | In this case, however, unlike the situation in the Trzoniec
case, the evidence concerning the underlying reasons for the
weekly payments of $250 is not such as to permit us to decide
initially whether those payments were intended as
compensation or as a gratuity. In the circumstances, fairness
to both parties demands that we refrain from passing on the
legal issue pending the “resolution of the doubtful factual
[issue] by the commission, in whose exclusive province the
Legislature has placed that duty and responsibility.”
Teschner v. Horan, 118 R.I. 237, 242, 373 A.2d 173, 175
(1977).

The employer's appeal is denied and dismissed in part, the
decree appealed from is sustained in part, and the case is
remanded to the commission, which shall enter a new decree
containing findings concerning the reasons motivating the
weekly payments. If the commission finds that the payments
were intended to be in lieu of compensation, it should then
decide the legal question of the employer’s entitlement to
credit for excessive past payments.

Edward P. Sowa, Jr. for petitioner.

Raul L. Lovett, for respondent.

8

a

404 A.2d 476.
Errore C, Picerne vs. RoLanp P. SYLVESTRE.
JULY 30, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

86 —CSCiés
ee
KeLieuer, J. This is but another chapter in the ongoing

controversy between Ettore C. Picerne (Picerne) and Roland

P. Sylvestre and his wife, Elizabeth, (the Sylvestres). On

April 26, 1960,! Cranston’s tax collector conducted a tax sale

at which Picerne purchased the Sylvestres’ property. In

October 1971, Picerne filed a petition in the Superior Court

to foreclose the taxpayers’ right of redemption, and the

Sylvestres responded with the defense of adverse possession.

Later, in June 1972, the Superior Court ruled that such a

defense had no place in a foreclosure proceeding. The

Sylvestres’ appeal from this rejection was considered by a

four-member court. The court was evenly divided regarding

the appropriateness of the defense.* Thereafter, the

Sylvestres’ motion for reargument before the full court was

granted.° The full court was of the opinion that the Sylvestres

had a right to be heard and present evidence in support of
their adverse-possession claim.* The case was remanded to the

Superior Court, where a justice other than the one who

presided at the 1972 hearing listened to evidence adduced by

the litigants.

“In testifying, Picerne said that the sale took place on May 25. However, the tax
collector's deed indicates that the sale occurred on April 26, 1960. The collector's
deed was executed on May 25 and recorded the next day.

*Picerne v. Sylvestre, 112 R.I. 682, 315 A.2d 62 (1974).

8Picerne v. Sylvestre, 112 R.I. 945, 316 A.2d 348 (1974).

‘Picerne v. Sylvestre, 113 R.1. 598, 324 A.2d 617 (1974).

es 81

In 1975, when the Sylvestres began their presentation of
evidence in support of their adverse-possession claim, all the
parties agreed that the trial justice, in assessing the claim,
could consider the evidence at the hearing, plus the transcript
of the evidence taken in 1972 when Picerne was attempting
to foreclose the right of redemption, along with the exhibits
introduced at that hearing.

The Sylvestres live in a one-family home situated at 83
Packard Street in Cranston. They purchased this property in
May 1951. Subsequently, in 1957, they mortgaged the
premises in the amount of $8,000. The mortgagee is Mr.
Sylvestre’s brother, Norman. The Sylvestres’ testimony
indicates that during the 10-year period beginning on May
25, 1961, the exterior of the house had been painted on two
different occasions, aluminum combination windows had
been installed, and the front stairs had been replaced. They
themselves performed such chores as mowing the lawn, and
papering and painting the interior of the premises. The
Sylvestres insisted that they knew nothing about the 1960 tax
sale. During this 10-year period, they paid no municipal
taxes but explained to the trial justice that they assumed that
Norman, the mortgagee, was attending to this detail. The
husband informed the trial justice that the repairs and main-
tenance done during the decade in question were just part of
a routine performed since they first purchased the property.
According to the husband, the first time he was aware that
Picerne was claiming an interest in the property was in 1971,
when he was served with a process in connection with the
foreclosure petition. He also denied receiving any
communication from the tax collector notifying the Sylvestres
about the overdue taxes and the proposed sale.

In ruling for the Sylvestres, the trial justice found that they
had (1) maintained and repaired the property “openly and
notoriously” and (2) exercised “open dominion” and exclusive
occupation of the property, and that (3) such occupation and
dominion were so overt that they had ceased to be
subordinate to Picerne. In addition, the trial justice in his
written decision observed that there was no evidence which

88 ee

would support the belief that the Sylvestres had been notified
of Picerne’s claim or that they ever recognized Picerne as the
legal owner of the property. The trial justice also commented
that no evidence was presented by Picerne indicating that a
“certified letter” had been sent to the Sylvestres informing
them about the scheduled sale.

In challenging the trial justice’s conclusion that the
Sylvestres had acquired title to the Packard Street premises
by’ way of adverse possession, Picerne claims that the
Sylvestres failed miserably in attempting to establish the

“hostility of this possession. While we think there is much to be
said for this contention, we would first point out that the trial
justice’s remark about the lack of evidence concerning the tax
collector’s certified letter about the sale is totally erroneous.

As noted before, part of the evidence which was available
for the trial justice’s consideration was the transcript relating
to the “foreclosure” facet of the dispute and the exhibits pre-
sented at that time. One of the exhibits is the tax collector's
deed which runs to Picerne. It was executed on May 25,
1960, and recorded the following day. In the deed the collec-
tor recites that notice of the sale was “duly served” upon all
three Sylvestres® 20 days prior to the sale. General Laws 1956
(1970 Reenactment) §44-9-10 specifies that resident
taxpayers must be given at least 20 days’ notice of any pro-
posed tax sale with the notice being given either by registered
or certified mail, or by personal service. Section 44-9-12
provides that a collector’s deed must be recorded within 60
days of the sale and, if so recorded, the deed shall be “prima
facie evidence of all facts essential to the validity of the title
thereby conveyed.” Thus, the collector’s May 25 deed is
evidence that the city served the Sylvestres either personally
or by certified mail, and the collector's assertions give rise to
an inference that despite the Sylvestres’ professed concern
about the lack of a certified letter, they were well aware of
what was going on in the spring of 1960.

*The third Sylvestre is Norman, the mortgagee. General Laws 1956 (1970
Reenactment) §44-9-11 requires the collector to give notice of the sale to
mortgagees of record. Norman did not testify.

Pn 89

In his decision the trial justice likened the Picerne-Sylvestre
dispute to the controversy detailed in Adams v. Parks, 435
P.2d 122, 126 (Okla. 1967), and then went on to refer to the
following portion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion:

“««¢A party in actual possession of real estate cannot be
ousted from such possession or his title divested by
merely recording a tax deed of which he may not be
aware and under which nothing is claimed. If a party
claims under a tax deed and invokes the aid of the
special statute of limitations, he must bring~ himself
within the rule as to adverse possession.’ ” ’ ” :

In their brief the Sylvestres Cite Adams v. Parks, as standing
for the proposition that a “paper title-holder out of possession
must bring himself within the rules as to Adverse Possession.”
Both the Sylvestres and the trial justice fail to realize that
there is a difference between Oklahoma’s tax-sale statute and
ours, and, as will be seen, there is a reason for the difference.

In Shaffer v. Mareve Oil Corp., 204 S.E.2d 404, 408 (W.
Va. 1974), the court points out that in the early history of our
country courts were prone to protect the landowner by scru-
tinizing and narrowly construing the statute against the tax
purchaser and in favor of the property owner. However, the
depressed. economic conditions of the 1920’s and the 1930's
caused the legislatures to enact more comprehensive laws
relating to tax sales so as to boost the declining public
treasuries. The statutory revision had two goals: afford a
measure of stability to tax titles, and vest title to real estate in
responsible individuals who would assume and pay their fair
share of the tax burden. To attain these goals, one or more of
three types of statutes were usually enacted: a presumptive
statute, whereby the tax deed can be considered as either
prima facie evidence or conclusive proof that the various
statutory requirements have been met; a curative statute,
which provides that the tax deed is valid notwithstanding
irregularities of various sorts; and, thirdly, a short statute of
limitations, which bars the right to bring suit to set aside the
deed after a stated period of time. The Oklahoma statute® to

°12 Ola. St. Ann. §93.

90 es

which the court alluded in Adams v. Parks, precludes a
challenge to the tax sale unless suit is brought within the
5-year period following the recording of the tax deed.
However, a purchaser who wishes to invoke this statute is
required to take possession of the premises for 5 continuous
years.

| In Town of Jamestown v. Pennsylvania Co. for Banking &
Trusts, 101 R.I. 274, 279, 221 A.2d 821, 823-24 (1966), we
noted that in 1946 the General Assembly revamped the tax-
sale statute. The 1946 legislation, which is now known as
G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) ch. 9 of title 44, contains two
of the clauses usually employed to validate a tax deed.
Section 44-9-12 stipulates that the tax deed recorded within
60 days of the sale is prima facie evidence of the facts essential
to the validity of the title being conveyed, and §44-9-25
directs that no tax title shall be invalidated for any error or
irregularity which is neither substantial nor misleading,
whether the error or irregularity occurs in the proceedings of
the collector, the assessor, or any other official or officials
charged with duties in connection with the establishment of
such tax title. There is no requirement in Rhode Island law
that the purchaser take possession before laying claim to the
real estate purchased at a tax sale. In fact, as in this case,
challenges to the tax title can be made as late as a decade or
so after the sale.

These omissions are sufficient in and of themselves to
vacate the Superior Court judgment and order a
reconsideration of this evidence by the trial justice. However,
we believe, for the reasons that follow, that such a recon-
sideration is uncalled for.

| When we first ruled that the Sylvestres should be accorded
the opportunity to prove their adverse-possession claim, we
stressed that they had the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that their occupation of the premises in
question had ceased to be subordinate to Picerne’s legal title
and had been of such a nature that he was aware or should
have been aware that the character of their occupation had

a1

changed. In taking this position, we relied on previous
pronouncements by this court in cases in which a mortgagor
or his successor in a foreclosure suit defends on the basis of
adverse possession. Walsh v. Morgan, 60 R.1. 349, 198 A. 555
(1938); First National Bank v. Dispeau, 32 R.I. 396, 79 A.
945 (1911). There, the court ruled that a mortgagor's
possession does not become adverse until such time as the
“open,” “notorious,” and “positive” acts of the mortgagor
had alerted, or should have alerted, the mortgagee that the
mortgagor was now claiming title to the property.

Our reference to the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship
was purposeful. Under our tax-sale statute, the delinquent
taxpayer’s first year of possession is permissive, the permission
coming through the generosity of the General Assembly
because, by statute, the purchaser is precluded from seeking
possession or demanding rent during that time period.’ The
taxpayer or any person having interest in the property has an
opportunity, even after the foreclosure petition has been
filed, to seek the court’s permission to redeem the property.®

In fact, the Sylvestres in this litigation have sought the best

of both worlds. They have not only claimed adverse’

possession, but if that defense does not prevail, they have
asked the Superior Court to permit them to redeem the
property.® Our adverse-possession statute was never intended
to allow the possessor of property to mask his intent and then

1G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-9-12.
8G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-9-29.

°When a similar observation was made before the trial justice, he observed that
the Sylvestres should not be faulted in regard to their “either/or defense because
they were taking advantage of the alternative-pleading provisions of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Actually, Super. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2) exempts the
tax-sale foreclosure proceedings from the operation of the rules. The adverse-
possession plea is entertainable only because G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment)
§44-9-31 requires that any question concerning the petitioner's title is to be raised in
the foreclosure proceeding, or otherwise the respondent is “forever barred” from
challenging the petitioner’s title “in any other proceeding.”

92 ee

acquire the property by concealing the true situation from
the record owner. In adverse possession, strict proof of all its
elements is required. Martineau v. King, 120 R.I. 265, 268,
386 A.2d 1117, 1119 (1978). Hostility of possession
necessary to establish adverse possession implies the denial of
the owner’s title; and possession, however open and long it
may be, is not adverse without the denial of the owner’s title.
Application of Kamakana, 58 Haw. 632, 642, 574 P.2d
1346, 1351 (1978). Since the Sylvestres are seeking to convert
permissive possession into one of outright ownership, they
were required to show some affirmative act constituting
notice to Picerne that their occupancy was hostile to the
owner and they were claiming the property as their own.
Martineau v. King, 120 R.I. at 269, 386 A.2d at 1119.

In looking at the affirmative acts taken by the Sylvestres
which we believe might have alerted Picerne to the fact that
the permissive possession had taken on a hostile air, we look
at the painting of the house’s exterior, the installation of the
aluminum door and combination windows, and replacement
of the front stairs. Any one of these activities might have
warned Picerne that something out of the ordinary was
stirring at 83 Packard Street. Mrs. Sylvestre testified that the
house was first painted in 1964 and again in 1968. A receipt
indicates that the downpayment on the 1964 project was
given in October of that year. Her checks indicate that the
aluminum products were first installed in 1965. Mr. Sylvestre
told the trial justice that the front stairs were replaced in 1969
or 1970.

As noted before, the Sylvestres’ claim covers the 10 years
subsequent to May 25, 1961. Obviously, none of the
affirmative acts to which we have alluded occurred in 1961.
Thus, the first hint of hostility did not appear until 1964, 3
years into the 10-year period relied upon by the Sylvestres.
Since the requisite period of hostility has not been shown, the
Sylvestres’ claim must fall.

The petitioner’s appeal is sustained, the judgment
appealed from is vacated, and the case is remanded to the

SS °:
Superior Court where, at this late stage of the proceedings,
the Sylvestres’ prayer for permission to redeem can be
considered.

George Ajootian, for defendant.

James McAleer, for respondent.

404 A.2d 480.

Henry L. P. Beckwitu, Jr. vs. Ruope IsLanp
Scuoox or Desicn.

JULY 30, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Doris, J. This is a civil action brought by the plaintiff
Henry L. P. Beckwith, Jr., to recover damages for breach of
contract. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs direct case, a
trial justice of the Superior Court directed a verdict for the
defendant on all counts. Judgment was entered accordingly,
from which the plaintiff appeals. For reasons set forth
herein, we affirm.

Henry Beckwith first became employed by defendant
Rhode Island School of Design (RISD) during the 1964-65
school year. During that year and each of the following
academic years up to 1968-69, Beckwith was employed as a
full-time instructor under a series of one-year contracts.

Ce

In July, 1969, Beckwith entered into a three-year contract
as an assistant professor in the graphic design department. At
about the same time, RISD, through its Board of Trustees,
adopted a “permanent plan for appointment and tenure”
(the plan). The plan governed all subsequent appointments
with the intention that it would instill uniformity into RISD’s
hiring practices and insure adequate notice of contract
renewal or nonrenewal.

There were two distinct features of the plan. First, it
provided that “[t]he sequence for making recommendations
for appointment, termination of appointment, or tenure
shall move from the Department Head, to the Division
Chairman, to the Committee on Faculty Appointments
(hereinafter referred to as the CFA).”! Secondly, the plan
divided the various types of teaching appointments into six
categories lettered A to F. The categories ranged from one-
year appointments (category A), to tenure appointments
(category D), to nonfaculty teaching appointments (category
F).

Beckwith’s three-year contract, beginning in 1969, was in
category B. Category B, a category for new professors,
provided for the possibility of two successive three-year
appointments. At the end of the first three-year
appointment, the plan provided that:

“x * » the offer of a new appointment at a rank not less
than Assistant Professor or notification that no new
appointment will be offered or the offer of a position in
Category F must be given to the appointee before
December 15 in the third year of his appointment.”

On December 7, 1971, the third year of Beckwith’s three-
year contract, Beckwith received notice from his department
head, Thomas Sgouros, that he was recommending
nonrenewal of Beckwith’s contract.? This recommendation

'This committee was originally referred to as the “President's Advisory
Committee.”

*Sgouros was also serving as the chairman of the design division at this time.

EE

was duly submitted to the CFA. The CFA rejected the
recommendation, however, allegedly because Sgouros lacked
experience in the graphic design department, and instructed
Sgouros that any further recommendation would require the
unanimous endorsement of the faculty of the graphics
department.

Eventually, Sgouros and the department faculty agreed to
“offer” Beckwith a one-year appointment as an “Adjunct
Professor”—a position without faculty voting rights.
According to Beckwith, Sgouros individually, and the
department faculty as a whole, told him that at the end of
this trial year, he would either get a three-year contract or his
employment would be terminated, the decision to depend on
his performance. Beckwith testified that he agreed to this
arrangement because “[i]t was better than being fired.”

At the conclusion of the trial period, however, Sgouros
recommended only a one-year contract as a professor with
full-faculty status, rather than the three-year contract,
notwithstanding the fact that Beckwith’s performance
during the trial period had been approved. Sgouros
submitted this recommendation to the CFA on three separate
occasions. Each time the CFA rejected the recommendation
as “inappropriate” because it “did not conform to the Plan.”

Finally, on March 16, 1973, Sgouros changed his
recommendation and recommended that Beckwith’s
employment be terminated. The CFA voted to accept this
recommendation and the president of RISD, Talbot Rantoul,
notified Beckwith on March 30, 1973 that his contract would
not be renewed.

On April 13, 1973, an “appeal” hearing was held before
President Rantoul, Associate Dean Merlin Szosz of the School
of Design, and the CFA. Beckwith appeared and was heard.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the CFA voted on and
passed the following motion:

“In accordance with the procedures set up within the
operation of the Committee on Faculty Appointment,

2S

that allow a hearing after a decision has been made at
all levels, this Committee has held that hearing and has
considered the strong statements by the students, the
faculty, and alumni and the strong statements made by
Henry L. P. Beckwith, Jr. and has VOTED to set aside
the previous recommendation.”

President Rantoul allegedly told the CFA that he would “go
along with this decision.” On April 27, however, Rantoul
informed Beckwith that his contract would not be renewed.

At the close of plaintiff's direct case, defendant moved for
a directed verdict. Granting the motion, the trial justice
concluded that the evidence considered in a light most
favorable to plaintiff was insufficient to support the
allegations of contract breach in plaintiffs complaint. In this
appeal the overall thrust of plaintiff's argument is that the
trial justice misconceived the evidence and failed to consider
it in a light most favorable to plaintiff as required under the
directed-verdict standard. See, e.g., Fontaine v. Devonis,
114 B.I. 541, 543-44, 336 A.2d 847, 850-51 (1975).

|| We first address the assertion that the offer of a one-year
adjunct position breached plaintiff's contract rights under
the plan. Because plaintiff was a professor in the third year of
an initial three-year contract under category B, RISD could
do one of three things: it could terminate his employment; it
could renew his contract for a second three-year term; or it
could offer him a contract as a category F employee.
According to plaintiff, RISD did none of these. Instead,
RISD offered him an adjunct professorship, which position
plaintiff strenuously contends is not a category F position.
Therefore, he reasons in substance that, since he was not
fired and was not offered a category F appointment, a jury
could conclude that the adjunct contract was actually the
first year of a second three-year contract under category B.

We disagree. At the outset we note that a determination of
what rights devolved from plaintiff's contract with RISD was
a question of law for the court to decide. Only when disputed
issues of fact concerning the terms of a contract exist, should

Ss °°

a jury become involved with questions relating to the legal
effect of a written instrument. See Richardson v. Greensboro
Warehouse & Storage Co., 223 N.C. 344, 345-46, 26 S.E.2d
897, 898 (1943); State Bank of Wilbur v. Phillips, 11 Wash.
2d 483, 489, 119 P.2d 664, 666 (1941); Verdi v. Helper State
Bank, 57 Utah 502, 510, 196 P. 225, 228 (1921). See generally
Annot., 65 A.L.R. 648 (1930). In the case sub judice the essen-
tial facts were undisputed, and, in any event, the trial justice
in applying the directed-verdict standard was obliged to
construe the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Thus,
the issue was preeminently a question of law.

Turning now to the merits of plaintiff's argument, we
agree that the position of adjunct professor does not fit
precisely within the plan’s description of category F
employees, viz:

“« « » those associated with Rhode Island School of
Design in special services such as part-time instructors,
lecturers, critics, for those engaged in special research
projects, and for non-teaching positions such as
supervisors of laboratories, type workshops, wood
working shops, etc.”

Nevertheless, the minutes of various CFA meetings indicate
that adjunct professor appointments were quite common.®
And both the introductory remarks and the contents of the
plan clearly exhibit an intention that the plan encompass
within its various categories all of the teaching positions at
the school. The plaintiff admits that when he assumed the
adjunct position he lost his vote as a faculty member, which
fact is consistent with the nonfaculty status of a category F
position. Thus, notwithstanding its somewhat sui generis
character, we think that the trial justice was correct in
concluding that the adjunct position was in category F.
Moreover, ever assuming that the adjunct position was not in
category F, it would require contractual alchemy to change,

3For example, plaintiff's exhibit 12 (CFA minutes of December 11, 1972)
indicates that thirteen adjunct appointments were made in the division of archi-
tectural studies for the second semester of the 1972-73 academic year.

FO |

as plaintiff would have us do, the one-year adjunct position
with no faculty vote, into a three-year position with full
faculty status under category B. Nothing in the record
supports such an anomalous result.

The plaintiff argues in the alternative that even if the
adjunct position were in catgegory F, he was not offered this
position before December 15, 1971, as required by the notice
provisions of category B. This point is well taken. Not until
March 31, 1972, did President Rantoul officially offer the
position to plaintiff by letter. However, although we agree
with plaintiff that the offer was not timely, we part company
with plaintiff concerning the ramifications of late notice. The
plaintiff contends that under category B, failure to give
timely notice of nonrenewal automatically triggered renewal
of his contract for three years. He reaches this conclusion by
reasoning that the notice provisions of the plan establish a
contractually enforceable “expectation of re-employment.”
Our short answer to this contention, however, is that his
expectation of employment was fulfilled, albeit in category F.
The plaintiff was well aware by December 15, 1971, that

~both his department head and the CFA were not going to

recommend a three-year renewal. There is nothing in the
record justifying an exclusive expectation of continued
employment under category B as opposed to employment
under category F.

Moreover, there is no evidence of a college policy that,
absent timely notice, renewal was automatic. Decker v.
Worcester Junior College, 369 Mass. 960, 961, 336 N.E.2d
909, 910 (1975); of. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856
(5th Cir. 1970); Green v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128,
1134-35 (D.C, Cir. 1969). Accordingly, we find plaintiffs
claim of a justifiable expectation of continued employment to
be without merit.

The next argument advanced by plaintiff concerns an oral
promise allegedly made by his department head, Thomas
Sgouros. Considering the evidence most favorably to
plaintiff, the record indicates that Sgouros promised plaintiff

OE

a three-year contract upon the successful completion of the
one-year trial period as an adjunct professor, plaintiff would
be given a three-year contract. The plaintiff contends that
this promise is enforceable against defendant RISD. We
think not.

The record is devoid of evidence that Sgouros had the
authority—actual or apparent, to bind RISD in contract.
Under the plan the authority granted to department heads is
clearly advisory. Hence we find no discernible basis for
plaintiffs claim that this document conferred actual
authority. Nor is there any indication that RISD cloaked
Sgouros with apparent authority. Between the years 1965 to
1972, plaintiff received seven separate letters of appointment
from RISD. Each letter was signed by the president of RISD
on behalf of the Board of Trustees. Each letter, which
included the terms of employment, was signed on the line
marked “accepted” and returned to the office of the
president. This evidence reveals that plaintiff was well aware
of who the contracting agents for the school were. There is no
indication that his department head had ever been involved
in the employment process other than in an advisory fashion.

Similarly, we can find nothing in the record to indicate
that the RISD administration ratified the promise made by
Sgouros. Under the law of agency, a principal may consent to
the acts of an unauthorized agent and be bound under the
principle of ratification. See Seavy, Agency §32 (1964).
Before ratification can occur, however, the principal must
have full knowledge of all material facts.

In this case plaintiff points to various documents indicating
that the president and the CFA knew of the trial-period
arrangement with plaintiff. But there is not a scintilla of
evidence that they were aware that plaintiff had been
promised a three-year contract upon successful completion of
this trial period. Nor can this quid pro quo be fairly inferred.
At best, an inference might be drawn that the president and .
the CFA were aware that Sgouros had promised to
recommend a three-year contract.

10 ee

The plaintiff further argues that the vote of the CFA on
April 13, 1973, “setting aside” their previous reeommenda-
tion for nonrenewal of plaintiff's contract, amounted to a de-
cision to renew plaintiff's contract. According to plaintiff,
the CFA sat as an “appeals body” .with final authority
concerning renewal of plaintiff's contract. In support of this
contention, he maintains that the Board of Trustees, through
the plan, delegated ultimate hiring authority to the CFA.
Therefore, he contends, the president lacked authority to
reverse, as he did in this case, the renewal decision of the
CFA.

This syllogism cannot withstand analysis. In the first
place, we do not agree that the plan grants contractual
authority to the CFA. Under the plan the function of the CFA
is clearly advisory. The plan includes the CFA in the
“sequence” of recommendations for appointment or
termination. Indeed, the language of various CFA meeting
minutes is indicative of their advisory function. For example,
the minutes of March 15, 1973, state that “upon
recommendation” from the various department heads, the
CFA “voted to recommend’ the reappointment of Mr.
Marzynski + * * to recommend the reappointment of Mr.
Barnes * * * to recommend the reappointment of Mr.
Lawing,” and “to recommend the reappointment of Mrs.
Marcoux.” (Emphasis added.) Similar language is used in the
minutes of the meeting of December 15, 1971, where the
.CFA “VOTED to recommend the appointment of Mr.
Beckwith as Adjunct Professor of Graphic Design for the
academic year 1972-73.” (Emphasis added.) We see no
reason why the word “recommend” as used in the plan
should be interpreted to mean anything other than its
customary meaning. As one court has noted, “[a]
recommendation is not an act of final decisive power—it
merely suggests the desirability of a course of action to be
followed by another.” Mora County Board of Education v.
Valdez, 61 N.M. 361, 366, 300 P.2d 943, 946 (1956); see
Ingard v. Barker, 27 Idaho 124, 136-39, 147 P. 293, 297

(1915).

SS

The construction given to the plan by plaintiff would
render reference to the president superfluous since he is not in
the sequence of recommendation and, according to plaintiff,
is not vested with decision-making authority. This
interpretation also conflicts with the express authority
conferred on the president by the corporate bylaws. Through
these bylaws, the Board of Trustees delegates to the president
the power “to execute all duly authorized deeds,
conveyances, leases, transfers, discharges, agreements,
contracts, and other documents, instruments and obligations
of the corporation * + +.” Our review of the record discloses
nothing to indicate that the board intended by the adoption
of the plan to denude the president of authority to execute
contracts, paticularly employment contracts.

Moreover, even if the plan confers final decisional power
to an “appeals body,” that so-called body, according to the
facial language of the plan, is not the CFA alone. Rather, the
plan states that should the CFA or the president reject a
recommendation concerning employment a hearing will be
held “attended by the President, the [CFA], and the
Department Head or Division Chairman involved.” Thus,
under a literal reading of the plan, the CFA is but one
component of the so-called appeals body.

Furthermore, again assuming that the CFA served the
appellate function plaintiff ascribes to it and that it had the
authority to renew plaintiff's contract, we do not agree that
the CFA exercised that authority in this case. Because the
CFA voted to “set aside” its previous recommendation for
nonrenewal, it does not follow that the CFA was per force
deciding to renew plaintiff's contract. Indeed, immediately
following the recordation of the “set aside” vote, the CFA
minutes state:

“Tt was noted that the case of Mr. Beckwith would
again have to be resolved were his appeal granted. This
should be made clear to the faculty involved and to Mr.
Beckwith. If he is rehired and in two years the Depart-
ment Head feels Mr. Beckwith is not functioning well as
a teacher, there will be no alternative but non-renewal
of his contract.”

1

This language is not consistent with plaintiffs claim that the
“set aside” vote itself resulted in automatic renewal of his
contract. Likewise, the testimony of Dean Szosz, a
participant at the meeting at which the “set aside” vote was
taken, is at odds with the argument advanced by plaintiff. In
response to questioning by plaintiff's counsel, Dean Szosz
testified as follows:

“Q Did you know what the previous vote of the
committee was?

“A I believe that a majority of those on the committee
had voted to support the recommendation for non-
renewal, but it was not a unanimous vote at that
time.

“Q So that the effect of this vote was to reverse that
previous decision so that there would be a renewal
of the contract?

“A No. It rescinded all votes. Those in favor and those
against the motion. Therefore, it seemed to me the
sentiment of the committee was that they negated a
vote one way or the other.” .

We also reject plaintiffs claim that a jury should decide
whether the CFA vote resulted in a renewal of plaintiffs
contract. Since the essential facts were not in dispute, it was
the duty of the court to determine the legal effect of that
vote. See Associated Tabulating Services, Inc. v. Olympic
Life Insurance Co., 414 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. O. Frank Heinz Construction Co., 300 F.
Supp. 396, 399 (S.D. Ill. 1969); Cortland Asbestos Products,
Inc. v. J & K Plumbing & Heating Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 11,
12, 304 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (1969).

We have carefully studied the remaining arguments
briefed by the plaintiff and find them without merit and
warranting no further discussion in this opinion.

SS

The plaintiffs appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court.

Milton Stanzler, for plaintiff.

Peter J. McGinn, Steven Snow, for defendant.

404 A.2d 493.

ScHooL COMMITTEE OF THE TowN or NortH ProviDENCE
vs. NortH PRovIDENCE FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
Loca 920, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFL-CIO).

JULY 31, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

8

Bevi.acgua, C.J. This is an appeal from a Superior Court
order granting with prejudice the motion of the North
Providence Federation of Teachers (the union) to dismiss the
complaint of the plaintiff School Committee of the Town of
North Providence (the school committee).

On August 18, 1977, an arbitrator issued an award in
favor of the union after a hearing in which he found that the
school committee had violated two contractual provisions of
its collective-bargaining agreement with the union. On
November 16, 1977, the school committee filed a complaint
in Superior Court seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s award.
This complaint named the union as the party defendant, and
service of the complaint was made on Richard A. Skolnik,
Esquire, as the union’s agent. Mr. Skolnik entered a special
appearance on behalf of the union on November 19, 1977 to
file a motion to dismiss the school committee’s complaint.'.
This motion was based upon the failure of the school
committee to comply with G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)

'The union, through Mr. Skolnik, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Super. R.
Civ, P, 12(b)(5), thus raising the question of insufficiency of service of process. See 5
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §1353 at 578-79 (1969).
Super R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) provides as follows:

“Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:

(8) insufficiency of service of process + + +.”

OO

§9-2-122 regarding actions brought against unincorporated
associations. Section 9-2-12 requires that actions brought
against unincorporated associations be maintained against
the president and secretary, or the officers or members of the
association who substantially exercise the duties of the
president and secretary, if such persons exist. Mr. Skolnik
thus asserted that because service of process was made upon
him, rather than upon the president and secretary of the
union, who should have been named in the complaint, the
service was insufficient and invalid with the result that the
union was not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

On December 10, 1977, the school committee filed an
amended complaint. This complaint added as party
defendants George C. Cesana, in his capacity as president of
the union, and Merle T. Dresner, as secretary. These
additional defendants were served with the amended
complaint on December 13, 1977. The next day, the three
defendants filed an objection to the amended complaint.
That same day, a hearing on the union’s motion to dismiss
was held before a justice of the Superior Court. After hearing
arguments of counsel, the trial justice granted Mr. Skolnik’s
motion and dismissed the original complaint with prejudice.

The school committee is now before this court on appeal,
arguing that the trial justice erred in granting the union’s
motion to dismiss. The union, in turn, contends that in view
of the fact that the school committee did not file an original

*General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-2-12 provides:

“Actions against unincorporated associations.—Any action or other civil
proceeding may be maintained to recover any property, or upon any cause
of action for or upon which the plaintiff may maintain such an action or
proceeding against all the associates, by reason of their interest or
ownership, or claim of ownership therein, against the president and
secretary of such association, or the officers or members exercising
substantially the duties, respectively, of president and secretary, or if there
be no such officer, or officers or members exercising such duties, or either of
them, then against any other two (2) officers of such association, or if there
be but one (1) officer, then against such single officer, or if there be no
officer known to the plaintiff, then against any member of such association,
describing such officer or officers, member or members, as the
representative or representatives of such association.”

ee

complaint naming the proper parties within the three-month
period of limitations contained in G.L. 1956 (1968
Reenactment) §28-9-21,° the trial justice properly dismissed
the school committee’s complaint with prejudice, forever
barring the school committee from contesting the arbitrator's
decision of August 18, 1977. Section 28-9-21 requires
“[nJotice of a motion to vacate, modify or correct an
[arbitrator’s] award [to] be served upon the adverse party, or
his attorney,‘ within (3) months after the award is filed or
delivered * * *.”

As noted in 1 Kent, R.I. Civ. Prac. §12.10 at 116 (1969),
when the complaint shows on its face that the statute of limi-
tations has run, that issue may be raised by a motion to
dismiss. However, in the instant case, the union did not raise
the statute-of-limitations issue in its motion to dismiss.
Moreover, this issue was neither raised in the trial court nor
addressed by the trial justice. Therefore, the statute-of-
limitations issue may not be raised for the first time before
this court on appeal. The only question before the trial court
was whether service of process was insufficient due to non-
compliance with the requirement in §9-2-12 to name the
president and secretary in an action against the
unincorporated association that they represent so that the
Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Our duty
is therefore to ascertain whether the trial court erred in dis-
missing the school committee’s complaint with prejudice
because of the jurisdictional defect.
~“aGeneral Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-9-21 provides in pertinent part as
follows:

“Time for motion to vacate, correct, or modify award—Stay of
enforcement.—Notice of a motion to vacate, modify or correct an award
must be served upon the adverse party, or his attorney, within three (3)
months after the award is filed or delivered, as prescribed by law for service
of notice of a motion upon an attorney in an action; except that in opposition
to a motion to confirm an award, any of the grounds specified in §28-9-18
may be set up.”

“This section is read in light of §9-2-12, note 2, which specifically relates to
service of process upon the president and secretary of an unincorporated
association.

SS 10

In view of the fact that the school committee did not name
the president and the secretary of the union in its action and
served Mr. Skolnik pursuant to its original complaint, the
trial justice would not have erred had she merely dismissed
that complaint. A dismissal under Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (5)
for insufficiency of process does not have the effect of res
judicata, 5 Wright & Miller, supra §1353 n.1 at 584, because
it is not an adjudication on the merits. Bucholz v. Hutton,
153 F. Supp. 62, 68 (D. Mont. 1957). Therefore, such a dis-
missal does not prejudice the plaintiff's right to file another
complaint naming the proper party. Id. Dismissal with
prejudice, however, constitutes a full adjudication of the
merits as if the order had been entered subsequent to trial.
Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1972);
Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 362
(6th Cir. 1967). For this reason dismissal of the school
committee’s complaint “with prejudice” was unwarranted.
See Thomas v. Furness, (Pacific) Ltd., 171 F.2d 434, 435 (9th
Cir. 1948). We therefore hold that the trial justice erred in
dismissing the school committee’s complaint with prejudice.

The school committee’s appeal is sustained, the judgment
appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the
Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.

Robert S. Ciresi, for plaintiff.

Abedon, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey, Richard A.
Skolnik, Lynette Labinger, for defendant.

404 A.2d 495.
Srate vs. RaLpu Byrnes et al.

JULY 31, 1979.
Present: Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

ill

Keuiruer, J. After an unusually lengthy trial, a Superior
Court jury returned a verdict in which it found that on
August 14, 1975, the defendants, Ralph Byrnes, Charles
Flynn, and John Ouimette, were participants in the so-called
Bonded Vault robbery. Thereafter, the trial justice imposed
life sentences on each defendant, and they in turn appealed.
The defendants are presently before us on their appeal from
the denial by a Superior Court justice of their respective
motions, in which they claim to be indigent and ask that the
state pay for the cost of the transcript of the trial proceedings,
including the voir dire of the prospective jurors. The
transcript’s estimated cost is $15,000. Hereinafter we shall
refer to the defendants by their last names.

The three affidavits are, for the most part, identical. The
affiants claim that they are unemployed and have been since
the time of their arrest; they own no real estate, stocks,
bonds, securities, or automobiles, and have “no cash on
hand.” Their personal effects were described as “clothing and
certain other incidentals” having a cash value of less than
$500. Ouimette reported that he received from the federal
government a monthly disability check amounting to
$646.90, all of which, he averred, was used for the support of
his wife and 15-year-old child.

During the mid-March 1977 hearing, each defendant testi-
fied. Each direct examination consisted, for the most part, of
a repetition of what was set forth in the corresponding
affidavit. During Ouimette’s cross-examination, the
disclosure was made that the Ouimette family lives in a home

112 ee

owned by his mother. The monthly rent for these premises
amounted to $225. According to Ouimette, the last time he
received a paycheck was sometime in 1971. Later, he
acknowledged that sometime prior to 1974, he had pleaded
guilty to a gambling charge, but he said the operation was a
break-even situation in which he made a couple of dollars
and lost a couple of dollars. When the prosecutor sought to
inquire into Ouimette’s post-1974 gambling ventures,
Ouimette invoked the fifth amendment.

Ouimette described himself as one who had been “broke
all [his] life.” Despite this situation, he and his wife had at
their disposal a 1973 Lincoln Continental and a Cadillac
allegedly provided without cost by friends, including a
couple of automobile dealers. He claimed that his family “just
about got by” with the monthly check. The check was turned
over to the wife who, according to Ouimette, was in com-
plete charge of attending to the family’s fiscal affairs. He was
not sure how the bills were paid and he had absolutely no
idea whether his wife paid by cash, check, or money order.
During talk about the $15,000 downpayment made by his
mother when she purchased the house the Ouimettes now
occupy, Ouimette told the motion justice that he had no idea
concerning his mother’s source of income. While Ouimette
did admit to doing some illegal gambling during the
1968-1974 period, he once again drew a blank about how
much daily revenue it was generating; but he did say it
“possibly” might have worked up to a figure of $500.
However, according to Ouimette, the $500 daily operation
came to a quick end.

Byrnes conceded that 3 weeks after the Bonded Vault
holdup, he had ordered a new Lincoln Continental. The
deposit on the Lincoln was $1,500, and the sales price was
$11,000. At one point he explained that he was acting for his
sister because she was busy and couldn’t get to the dealer.
Again, he pointed out that the reason he was doing the
transaction was that he knew the salesman and was
attempting to save his sister some money. On January 26,
1976, the salé was cancelled and the deposit returned. Byrnes

es us

also acknowledged that one time when he was stopped by the
Providence police in December 1975, a search disclosed that
he had on his person some $2,600 in cash. Byrnes explained
that the $2,600 was money he had received from Ouimette’s
niece after he had sold her car. Byrnes admitted to taking
trips to Chicago and Las Vegas during the fall of 1977. He
said that Flynn had paid for those trips, but at another point
in his testimony he said he had paid for the trips.

Flynn’s cross-examination began with gusto as the witness
announced to the prosecutor and the trial justice and all
assembled: “I would like to say one thing. I am broke, I have
no property, I have nothing. I am not answering no more
questions.” Flynn apparently reconsidered, and when he
resumed testifying, he denied that he had paid for his and
Byrnes’ westward excursions. Instead, he claimed the money
came from Robert Dussault, an accused who had testified at
the trial as a witness for the prosecution. Flynn also told the
motion justice that Dussault had once given him $20,000 but
that he had spent the entire amount by the time he went to
prison.'He reported that he had not been gainfully employed
since 1969. He guessed that his trial attorneys had been paid
by Dussault because “they weren’t paid by me.”

Flynn married Ellen Dempsey on Valentine’s Day 1976. At
that time he was incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Insti-
tutions awaiting trial. He had known Ellen for some time
prior to the nuptials. Evidence was adduced from the
manager of a Cranston bank indicating that sometime in
December 1975, Ellen had applied for a mortgage so that she
could complete the purchase of a house whose sales price was
$77,900. Ellen had given the broker a $1,000 deposit. Later,
on December 15, 1975, Ellen stopped by the bank and told
the manager that she was withdrawing the application. At
that time, Ellen reported, she was working at a television
sales and service store.

The motion justice also heard from Sergeant Vincent
Vespia, Jr., a member of the Rhode Island State Police. He
testified that Ouimette was still a “major bookmaker.” This

4 |

conclusion was based upon Vespia’s surveillance of Ouimette
as well as an incident in November 1975 when a search of
Ouimette disclosed $500 cash and a bookmaker’s tally sheet

indicating that Ouimette was owed some $8,000.

We begin our consideration of the legal aspects of this
appeal by first discussing an indigent’s right to a free tran-
script. Griffin v. Mlinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19, 76 S. Ct. 585,
590, 100 L. Ed. 891, 898 (1956), made it quite clear that poor
defendants are entitled to the same appellate review afforded
to the defendants who have the necessary wherewithal so
that they can all furnish an adequate transcript for appellate
review. Indigency is a relative concept which must be con-
sidered and measured in the light of the facts of each case. In
attempting to define this elusive term, we subscribe to the
sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court of Washington:

“[ T]he term does not and cannot, in keeping with the
concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute
destitution or total insolvency. Rather, it connotes a
state of impoverishment or lack of resources on the part
of a defendant which, when realistically viewed in the
light of everyday practicalities, substantially and
effectually impairs or prevents his procurement of an
adequate statement of facts and transcript necessary to a
complete appellate review of his claims of error.” State
v. Rutherford, 63 Wash. 2d 949, 953, 389 P.2d 895, 898
(1964).

Most courts, when confronted with the issue now before
us, have ruled that the burden rests upon the defendant to
show both that he is indigent and that his appeal is not
frivolous. State v. Hudson, 154 Conn. 631, 637, 228 A.2d
132, 135 (1967).’ Our research has found only two states

1See United States v. Anderson, 567 F.2d 839, 840 (8th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Ellsworth, 547 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931, 97S.
Ct, 2636, 53 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1977); United States v. Schmitz, 525 F.2d 793, 795 (Sth
Cir. 1975); United States v. Kaufman, 452 F.2d 1202, 1202 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92.8. Ct. 1252, 31 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1972); Wilson v, State, 280
Ala. 167, 169, 190 So. 24 720, 722 (1966); State v. Reynolds, 108 Ariz, 541, 545,
503 P.2d 369, 373 (1972); Blair v. District of Columbia, 200 A.2d 93, 95 (D.C.
App. 1964); Bruner v. State, 581 P.2d 1314, 1316 (OMda. Crim. App. 1978); State
v. Bishop, 241 $.C. 459, 461, 128 $.E.2d 914, 915 (1962).

es 5

which could arguably be said to support defendants’ “burden
shifting” contention. See March v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal.
3d 422, 429-31, 102 Cal. Rptr. 597, 601-02, 498 P.2d 437,
441-42 (1972), State v. Rutherford, 63 Wash. 2d 949, 954,
389 P.2d 895, 899 (1964). But see State v. Clark, 88 Wash. 2d
533, 534, 563 P.2d 1253, 1254 (1977).

We take the position that the burden of establishing
indigency for purposes of receiving a trial transcript at state
expense remains at all times on the defendant. The state is
under no duty to rebut the assertions of indigency in the
motion or to prove that the defendant’s appeal is frivolous.

The defendants have supplied us with a copy of an unre-
ported decision of the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut and claim that it holds that once a
defendant introduces his affidavit of indigency, the burden
then shifts to the prosecution to show otherwise. The District
Court, in ordering that the transcript be supplied, had con-
cluded that a financial affidavit was sufficient, absent
contradiction by the state, to prove his indigency. We believe
that at no time did the District Court ever shift the burden of
proof to the government. We read its decision as merely
saying that there are times when a defendant’s financial
affidavit may be sufficient, in and of itself, to sustain a plea
of indigency, but the record presented in this case shows that
the March 1977 hearing was not one of those times.

In his bench decision, the motion justice observed that the
issue around which the testimony revolved was: “Are the
defendants here unable to pay?” He also stressed that these
three men had the burden of proof, and, in holding that they
failed to sustain their burden, he pointed to Ouimette’s
inability to recall certain facts and details. Although
Ouimette claimed that he had been penniless all his life, he
did have an accountant whose name he could not recall. The
* motion justice also described Ouimette as “evasive” and
alluded to his professed lack of knowlede regarding his wife’s
handling of the disability checks’ proceeds and the amount of
money he had on his person when arrested by the Providence

6 PO

police on May 22, 1975, and earlier in 1968.2 The motion
justice also alluded to the $500 found on Ouimette by
Sergeant Vespia on November 3, 1975, at a time when
Ouimette presumably was not working and had no other
source of income.

Byrnes’ testimony was classified as “contradictory.” The
motion justice was unable to determine who accompanied
Byrnes on his trips to Chicago and Las Vegas and who paid
for the airline tickets. Byrnes’ $1,500 downpayment and his
picking out of the extras that were to go with the Lincoln
Continental, he said, were at odds with an indigent’s
lifestyle.

Flynn’s determination to stand fast and tell the prosecutor
nothing produced a negative response. Such an attitude, the
motion jusice said, made it impossible for him to believe that
Flynn was giving an honest answer.

The motion justice recognized Ouimette’s and Flynn's
right to invoke the fifth amendment, but he also recognized
that they still had the burden of convincing him of their
indigency, and in that respect they failed. The failure was
not due to their reliance on the fifth amendment, but on their
evasive and contradictory statements. Accordingly, when all
is said and done, the motion justice obviously did not believe
either that Ouimette and Flynn were as “broke” as they said
they were or that indigent people go around putting $1,500
deposits on $11,000 Lincoln Continentals.

We direct one final observation to the motion justice’s
passing reference about the inconsistency of affording a free
transcript to a trio who had been found guilty of a robbery in
which “this enormous amount of money was taken.” This
gratuitous comment, which came early in the decision,
played no part in the ultimate determination. Once the
reference had been made to the amount of the “loot,” the
motion justice turned his attention to the evidence before him
and analyzed it. This shift becomes quite clear when one

*Quimette could not recall having $1,504 of cash on hand as suggested by the
question asked by the prosecutor, and the 1968 tally amounted to $1,679.

es wT

examines a later comment, in which the motion justice said:
“T think the case hinges, not so much on the defense put in by
the state, but on the fact that these three men have the
burden of proof, and their case is so weak that it falls of its
own weight.”

Long ago in State v. Hudson, 55 R.I. 141, 153, 179 A. 130,
135-36 (1935), this court said that the power to appoint an
attorney or provide a transcript to an indigent criminal
defendant lies with the Superior Court, and the exercise of
that power will not be disturbed unless there has been a clear
abuse of the trial court’s discretion. We see no such abuse.

The defendants’ appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
case is remanded to the Superior Court for further
proceedings.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, J.J.B. Wiggles-
worth, John S. Foley, Special Assistant Attorneys General,
for plaintiff.

John F. Cicilline, Providence, William Kunstler, New
York, NY, for defendants.

404 A.2d 490.
Srate vs. Joun H. ARNOLD.
July 31, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Keuieuer, J. The defendant, John H. Arnold (Arnold),
was convicted at a Superior Court jury-waived trial of
operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in reckless
disregard of the safety of others, with death resulting, in

| ug

violation of G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §31-27-1. The
sole issue in this appeal is whether the evidence adduced at
trial warrants the finding of reckless conduct, which finding
is the crucial element of the crime charged.

Shortly before noon of December 26, 1975, a tractor-
trailer rig operated by Arnold and proceeding in a northerly
direction along United States Interstate Route 95 struck an
automobile. The collision, which occurred in the town of
West Greenwich, somewhere south of the Coventry
interchange, caused the death of a 14-year-old girl.

Route 95 is a divided freeway. The portion used by the
northbound motorist consists of a breakdown lane, a low-
speed lane, and a high-speed lane. Guard rails run along the
outer edges of the breakdown and high-speed lanes. Weather
conditions on the day in question were far from ideal. The
sky was overcast, and the rain had been falling all day,
sometimes heavily. Although the rain had slowed down to a
drizzle at the time of the collision, the roadway was wet.
Since the trial justice accepted Arnold’s testimony as being
truthful, we shall detail its pertinent parts, especially as it
relates to Arnold’s manner of operation up to and including
the time of the collision.

Arnold described himself as a professional truck driver
who traveled in interstate commerce an annual average of
between 100,000 and 150,000 miles. On December 26 he was
driving a tractor that weighed approximately 16,000 pounds.
The trailer which the tractor was pulling was a “forty-foot
insulated * + * box” whose estimated weight amounted to
another 16,000 pounds. Arnold’s trip originated in New
Jersey. Once he was seated in the trailer’s cab, Arnold was 10
feet above the ground level. His average speed as he neared
the interchange was approximately 50 miles per hour.

At a point within three-quarters of a mile of the Coventry
interchange, Arnold was on the crest of a hill. As he came
down the hill, he came upon a depression in the roadway in
which a large puddle of water covering both of the
northbound lanes, as well as the breakdown lane, had

120 |

gathered. Numerous motorists, while proceeding through the
puddle, had dampened their ignition wires to the extent that
their vehicles had stalled and were halted on the side of the
road. One such vehicle belonged to Kenneth Nathanson.
Nathanson’s vehicle was a 1975 Dodge Dart. As Arnold
headed toward the depression, he saw the “big puddle” and a
“heavy cloud of fog right on top of the water.” Arnold could
see the Coventry interchange on the rise of a hill up ahead,
but he could not see what awaited him on the roadway on
the other side of the fog.

As Arnold approached the puddle and the fog bank from
the low-speed lane, he decelerated to approximately 35 miles
per hour. At this juncture, an automobile in front of the rig
turned into the high-speed lane. When the automobile hit the
puddle, it threw up water and steam from its exhaust, both
of which obscured Arnold’s vision as he entered the puddle.
When Arnold emerged from the fog bank, the high-speed-
lane vehicle was near his left front bumper, and less than a
truck length away and directly in front of the rig was
Nathanson’s Dodge Dart with its emergency or flashing lights
off.

When Arnold saw the motionless vehicle, he attempted to
avoid it by turning left. His effort was unsuccessful; the
tractor’s right front bumper struck the Dodge Dart’s left rear
quarter. The 14-year-old was seated on the back seat directly
behind the driver. The Nathanson vehicle traveled about 130
feet after the impact and came to a halt with its front up
against the breakdown lane’s guard rail.

1Conflicting evidence was offered regarding the exact location of the Dart and
whether its headlights or breakdown lights were on. Mr. and Mrs. Nathanson
insisted that the Dart was stopped completely within the confines of the breakdown
lane and the emergency lights were operating. The motorist who had swerved over
to the high-speed lane and made it through the puddle said that there were no
lights on the Nathanson vehicle. His passenger told the trial justice that three-
quarters of the Dart was projected into the low-speed lane. Arnold said he saw no
lights and insisted that the Dart had stopped in the low-speed lane. The trial justice
made no choice of whom he believed, since he considered these factors irrelevant to.
his ultimate finding.

es 121

Just before he began his analysis of the evidence, the trial
justice alluded to the weather conditions that prevailed on
December 26 and said that he had as his duty to determine,
in light of the weather conditions existing on the day in
question, whether Arnold “was aware or should have been
aware that those conditions were such as to lead a reasonable
man to realize that his manner of driving created an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others or made it highly
probable that the harm that could result would be
substantial.” In referring to such a phrase as “unreasonable
tisk of + * + harm,” the trial justice obviously had in mind
State v. Lisi, 105 R.I. 516, 520-21, 253 A.2d 239, 242 (1969),
where this court described the recklessness envisioned by the
statute as “a conscious and intentional driving that the driver
knows or should know creates an unreasonable risk of harm
to others, even though he has no actual intent to harm
them.”

However, subsequent to Lisi we emphasized in State v.
Lunt, 106 R.I. 379, 382-83, 260 A.2d 149, 151 (1969), that
the statute’s use of the word “reckless” connotes something
more than the negligence which would support a tort award,
and what is intended by the statute is the preclusion of
intentional conduct rather than intentional harm. The
crucial element in reckless driving offenses, we said, is
evidence which shows that the “driver has embarked upon a
course of conduct which demonstrates a heedless indifference
to the consequences of his action.” Here, at no time did the
trial justice ever speak in terms of “heedless indifference.”
When describing Arnold’s technique, he did say that Arnold
“was going too fast under all of the circumstances” and that
“he should have started to take the proper action long before
he did « * ».”

The fact pattern produced before the trial justice is
somewhat similar to that found in Maloney v. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, 31 Conn. Supp. 325, 330 A.2d 101 (1974).”
Maloney was the driver of a ten-wheel dump truck that hit
an automobile which had stopped for a stoplight at the base
of an exit ramp, from which collision fatalities resulted. The

122 ee

ten-wheeler’s brakes had frozen and as a result had failed to
take hold. Maloney should have known that his truck was
overweight (the weight totaled 62,160 pounds). He should
have realized, as an experienced driver, that the near-zero
weather carried with it a risk that ice would form on the
brake equipment when he drove through a puddle having a
depth of 18 inches; and, in consideration of the overloaded
truck and the approaching red light, he should have
descended the ramp at a slower speed than 35 miles per hour.
The Connecticut court held that Maloney’s conduct
warranted a finding of negligence, but not recklessness.

Here, while the evidence presented at trial supports a
claim of negligence, it falls far short of establishing
recklessness. There is simply no showing of a heedless
indifference to life and limb such as intoxication, excessive
speed, or defective equipment. We believe that in order to
have a conviction under our reckless-driving statute, evidence
of a course of conduct showing heedless indifference to its
consequences must be present. Mere error in judgment by a
driver is not sufficient. State v. Lunt, 106 R.I. 379, 383, 260
A.2d 149, 151-52 (1969). A responsible operator of a motor
vehicle should be aware that its operation offers a potential
source of harm to many, including one’s fellow motorist or
the pedestrian who is trying to cross the highway. One who
incorrectly judges the manner in which to reduce this
potential to the least probable level is negligent; one who
ignores the responsibility altogether can be called reckless.

Arnold had been driving within the speed limit and,
except for the freakish fog bank that hung over the puddle,
visibility was good. No evidence was produced to show that
he was exceeding the posted speed limit. To suggest that he
should have decelerated to less than 35 miles per hour is to
indicate a simple error in judgment but not, on this record, a
manifestation of a heedless disregard for the safety of others.
The errors in judgment Arnold made support an inference of
negligence but provide no basis for a finding of a reckless
homicide.

ee 123

The defendant’s appeal is sustained, the judgment of
conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
Superior Court with direction to enter a judgment of
acquittal.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, John M. Mc
Loughlin, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Hodosh, Spinella & Angelone, Gerard McG. DeCelles,
Providence, for defendant.

404 A.2d 500.
Brian Burns et al. vs. KATHLEEN SEcERSON et al.

AUGUST 1, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Bevitacgua, C.J. Kathleen Segerson, president of the
Newport Teachers’ Association (the union), and Thomas P.
Foley, Jr. (Foley), plaintiff in intervention, are appealing
from a Superior Court judgment that vacated an arbitration
award granted under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement (the agreement) between the union and the

| 195

School Committee of the City of Newport (the school
committee).

This dispute arose as a result of a notice posted on May 8,
1975 by the Newport School Department pursuant to Article
X, A.1 and A.2 of the agreement, which provide the
circumstances and time frame for posting vacancy notices.
The notice indicated that a vacancy existed in the position of
department head of the Business Education Department at
Rogers High School in Newport, Rhode Island. Four
applicants responded to the notice: George Ruggeiro
(Ruggeiro), Charles Gray (Gray), Foley and Raymond A.
Ferris (Ferris). All four applicants appeared before a
screening committee, which, after reviewing the applicants,
unanimously recommended Foley as its first choice and Gray
as its second choice. The school committee thereafter
appointed Foley to fill the vacancy.

Ferris, who objected to this appointment, filed a grievance
pursuant to Article III of the agreement, which describes the
four levels of the grievance procedure.! Ferris appeared at
the first and second levels, where the decision of the
screening committee was sustained. Ferris then invoked a
hearing at level 3, but failed to pursue his remedy at that
level. Despite the fact that no decision was rendered at level
3, the union; as Ferris’ representative, filed a grievance at
level 4. The parties then submitted to arbitration the
following issue:

“Did the School Committee violate Article III, A;
Article X; and other pertinent Articles of the Contract
by not appointing Raymond A. Ferris to the position of
Head of the Business Education Department at Rogers
High School? If so, what shall the remedy be?”

1Pursuant to Article III of the agreement, the grievance procedure consists of the
following four levels: at level 1, teachers discuss their grievances with the principal
or with their immediate supervisor; at level 2, the unsatisfied grievant files the
grievance with the chairman of the Association's Committee on Professional Rights
and Responsibilities (the chairman), who refers it to the Superintendent of Schools;
at level 3, the aggrieved person files with the chairman, who refers the grievance to
the school committee; at level 4, the chairman submits the grievance to arbitration,

126 ee

At the arbitration hearing the arbitrator decided to allow
Foley to appear as a party in interest. None of the parties
objected to this decision. Foley thus had the right to present
evidence and witnesses, to cross-examine opposing witnesses
and,to present a summation argument.

Before the arbitrator, the union, on behalf of Ferris,
contended that in appointing Foley to-fill the vacancy, the
school committee violated Article X, A.1 and A.3 of the
agreement. These provisions delineate the procedure to be
followed for promoting teachers. A.1 provides that vacancies
in promotional positions and newly created positions should
be adequately publicized by posted notices describing the
position, the qualifications desired of each candidate, the
salary, duties, etc. A.3 explains that vacancies should be
filled on the basis of the applicants’ qualifications for the
post, “provided, however, that where two or more applicants
are equally qualified, seniority in the Newport School System
shall control.” The union claimed that pursuant to the
agreement, Ferris’ qualifications are at least equal, if not
superior, to those possessed by Foley and that because Ferris
has more seniority than Foley, Ferris should have been
appointed as department head of the Business Education
Department.

After reviewing the evidence presented by the parties, the
arbitrator found that Ferris was at least as qualified as Foley
on the basis of the criteria contained in the vacancy posting
and ruled that the seniority clause in the agreement must
therefore prevail. For these reasons, the arbitrator issued the
following award:

“The School Committee violated Article X, Section
A.3., Contract, by not appointing Mr. Raymond A.
Ferris to the position of Head, Business Education
Department, Rogers High School. Mr. Ferris shall be
forthwith appointed to that position and shall be paid
the increment for the same from September 1, 1975.”

After the award of the arbitrator, the school committee
filed a motion in the Superior Court to vacate the arbitrator's

es er

award pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-9-182
Shortly thereafter the union filed a motion to confirm the
award pursuant to §28-9-17.3 Meanwhile, the Superior
Court granted Foley’s motion to intervene as a party
plaintiff, which he had filed pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P.
24(b).4

The trial justice denied the union’s motion to affirm the
award, reasoning that “the rights of the various parties
involved, including due process and contractual rights of

2General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-9-18 reads as follows:

“Grounds for vacating award. — In any of the following cases, the court
must make an order vacating the award, upon the application of any party
to the controversy which was arbitrated.

(a) When the award was procured by fraud.

(b) Where the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.

(c) If there was no valid submission or contract, and the objection has
been raised under the conditions set forth in §28-9-13.”

°General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-9-17 reads as follows:

“Order confirming award. — At any time within one (1) year after the
award is made, as prescribed in §28-9-16, any party to the controversy
which was arbitrated may apply to the court having jurisdiction as provided
in §28-9-14 for an order confirming the award; and thereupon the court
must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected,
as prescribed in § §28-9-18 and 28-9-19 or unless the award is unenforceable
under the provisions of §28-9-13. Notice of the motion must be served upon
the adverse party or his attorneys, as prescribed by law for service of notice
of a motion upon an attorney in an action in the same court.”

‘Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) reads as follows:

“(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a
party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or
executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or
agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or
made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency, upon
timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”

128 es

some of the candidates, have been overlooked or violated
* « «,” The trial justice therefore vacated the award of the
arbitrator and, in a supplemental decision, adjudged that the
matter of selecting a candidate be reinstituted at the moment
of posting the vacancy.

Both the union and the intervenor, Foley, have appealed
to this court. Foley, citing Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I.
332, 346 A.2d 124 (1975), contends that he was deprived of
notice and fair representation at level 4, the critical stage of
the grievance procedure both because the union, Ferris and
the school committee submitted the matter to arbitration
without his knowledge and because he was not considered by
the union and the school committee when an arbitrator was
selected. He also claims that the union and Ferris overlooked
the provisions in the agreement by failing to appear at level 3
of the grievance procedure.

The union asserts that the arbitrator's award is valid under
the law stated in Belanger, and that the trial justice erred in
vacating the award because his judgment was not grounded
upon any of the statutory grounds delineated in §28-9-18
and because the party moving to vacate the award
participated in the proceedings before the arbitrator. See
§28-9-18(c), note 2 supra. Finally, the union contends that
the remedy provided by the trial justice—namely,
remanding the matter to the school committee—is beyond his
jurisdiction, as stated in §28-9-19.5 Under §28-9-19, when a
trial justice vacates an arbitration award, he or she may only
direct a rehearing before the same or a different arbitrator.

SGeneral Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-9-19 reads as follows:

“Rehearing after vacation of award. — Where an award is vacated, the
court, in its discretion may direct a rehearing either before the same
arbitrator or arbitrators or before a new arbitrator or arbitrators to be
chosen in the manner provided in the submission or contract for the selection
of the original arbitrator or arbitrators or as provided for in §28-9-7, and
any provision limiting the time in which the arbitrator or arbitrators may
make a decision shall be deemed applicable to the new arbitration and to
commence from the date of the court’s order.”

es 129

In support of the judgment of the trial justice, the school
committee argues that the arbitrator’s award was not in line
with the Belanger case because the arbitrator ignored the
rights of Gray and Ruggeiro by considering solely the relative
merits of Foley and Ferris.

I

Hi The issues that have been raised and presented before this
court are controlled by Belanger. We can resolve Foley’s first
argument, that the union and the school committee breached
their duty of fair representation by not informing him that
the matter was submitted to arbitration and by not telling
him when the arbitrator was chosen, by referring to the
Belanger case. In Belanger, we noted that “a union must
make an honest effort to serve the interest of all of its
members, without hostility to any, and its power must be
exercised in complete good faith and with honesty of
purpose.” Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. at 341, 346 A.2d at
130-31. It is not necessary, however, that the union refrain
from taking a stance in situations in which its members
disagree. Id. at 339, 346 A.2d at 130. Yet the union must
nonarbitrarily and in good faith choose the side it desires to
represent, Id. at 343, 346 A.2d at 132. And the choice must
be based on the relative merits of the controversy after they
have been presented to the union by the contestants. Id. at
343-44, 346 A.2d at 132. ~

|| In this case, there is no evidence that the union considered
the merits of Foley’s application to fill the vacancy.
Therefore, the union breached one of the components of its
duty of fair representation as mandated by Belanger.
Although the union did not fulfill its duty to represent the
interests of one of its members fairly, we will not vacate an
arbitration award when each interested party has enjoyed
the opportunity to be heard and the arbitrator has considered
all of the relevant information in reaching his decision. 115
R.I. at 347, 346 A.2d at 133-34. Foley was given the
opportunity to present his case and to argue the issue that was
presented for arbitration. Because Foley has demonstrated no

130 P|

evidence of impropriety at the arbitration hearing, we hold
that his contention is unsupported by the record and is
therefore without merit.

II

Foley additionally argues that the trial justice correctly
vacated the award because the union and Ferris failed to
comply with the procedural requirements at level 3 as set out
in the agreement. However, we have held that “* * * once
substantive arbitrability is established, issues of procedural
arbitrability should be left to the arbitrator.” See School
Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, 120 B.I.. 810,
814, 390 A.2d 386, 390 (1978). Therefore, the trial justice
erred in considering the fact that the union had failed to
proceed through level 3 of the grievance procedure as a
reason to vacate the arbitrator’s award. Moreover, §28-9-18,
which enumerates viable grounds for vacating awards, does
not include the existence of procedural defects as a basis for
overturning awards. For these reasons, Foley’s second
contention is groundless.

We further note that the trial justice erred in allowing
Foley to assert that the matter was improperly submitted to
arbitration. Foley was foreclosed from raising this issue as a
result of the provisions in §§28-9-13(a)® and 28-9-18(c).”

*General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-9-13(a) reads as follows:

“Validity of arbitration without judicial order. — Grounds for attack. —
An award shall be valid and enforceable according to its terms and under
the provisions of this chapter, without previous adjudication of the existence
of a submission or contract to arbitrate, subject, nevertheless, to the
provisions of this section:

(a) A party who has participated in any of the proceedings before the
arbitrator or arbitrators may object to the confirmation of the award only
on one or more of the grounds hereinafter specified (provided that he did not
continue with the arbitration with notice of the facts or defects upon which
his objection is based) because of a failure to comply with §28-9-8 or with
§28-9-10 or because of the improper manner of the selection of the
arbitrators.”

For the text of §28-9-18(c), see note 2 supra.

ee 131

Section 28-9-13(a) disallows a party from attacking the vali-
dity of arbitration proceedings if that party has participated
in any of the proceedings before the arbitration panel with
notice of the facts or defects upon which his objection is
based. Section 28-9-18(c) permits a party to object to an
invalid submission to arbitration only if that party has
complied with §28-9-13. Foley participated in the arbitration
hearing with notice of the facts that Ferris did not appear at
the level 3 hearing, that the matter was submitted to
arbitration without Foley’s knowledge and that Foley had
had no input in selecting an arbitrator.

UI

We now reach the contentions of the union and the school
committee simultaneously. The union claims that the trial
justice erred in vacating the arbitrator's award because he
did so for reasons other than those stated in §28-9-18. The
school committee, in contrast, asserts that the trial justice

correctly overturned the arbitrator’s award because the
arbitrator neglected to consider the merits of all four
applicants.

As we noted above, §28-9-18 limits the jurisdiction of the
Superior Court to vacate an arbitrator's award. An
examination of the trial justice’s decision reveals that he did
not base his conclusion upon any of the grounds enumerated
in §28-9-18. Instead, he decided that the due process and
contractual rights of the parties had been violated or over-
looked. We have held, however, that “[a]bsent a manifest
disregard of the contractual provisions, or a completely
irrational result, the courts have no authority to vacate the
arbitrator's award.” See Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907,
914, 391 A.2d 1173, 1176 (1978), citing Belanger v.
Matteson, 115 B.I. at 356, 346 A.2d at 138. In this case, the
arbitrator’s award “drew its essence” from the contract and
was based upon a “passably plausible” interpretation of the
contract. See Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.1. at 912, 391 A.2d at
1176.

132

For the reasons stated above, the union’s appeal is
sustained, Foley's appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment appealed from is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Manning, West, Santaniello & Pari, V. James Santaniello,
Providence, Thomas T. Brady, Tiverton, for plaintiffs.

Natale L. Urso, Thomas J. Liguori, Westerly, for
defendants.

416 A.2d 659.

Town or West GREENWICH et al. vs. STEPPING STONE
Enrerprises, Lrp. et al.

AUGUST 1, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Bevitacgua, C.J. The defendant, Stepping Stone
Enterprises, Ltd. (Stepping Stone),! appeals from a Superior
Court judgment enjoining it, inter alia, from holding public
entertainment in West Greenwich, Rhode Island, without
first obtaining a license pursuant to G.L. 1956, § §5-22-1, -2,
-4 (the statute)* and the July 12, 1972 ordinance of the town

'Stepping Stone is a Rhode Island corporation that owns property in West
Greenwich. Henry V. Davis (Davis) is the president of Stepping Stone. Both
Stepping Stone and Davis are the defendants in this action. In the interest of
simplicity, however, we shall refer to Stepping Stone alone as the defendant.

2General Laws 1956 (1976 Reenactment) §5-22-1, as amended by P.L. 1966, ch.
260, §1, reads as follows:

“529-1. Town regulatory powers. — The town councils and city
councils may license, regulate and in those certain cases specifically set forth
in §5-22-5 may prohibit and suppress theatrical performances, rope and
wire dancing and all other shows and performances in their respective
towns, conforming to law.”

General Laws 1956 (1976 Reenactment) §5-22-2, as amended by P.L. 1938, ch.
333, §17, reads:

“5.22.2. Town license for exhibitions. — They may grant a license, for a
term not exceeding one (1) year, under such restrictions and regulations as
they shall think proper, to the owner of any house, room or hall in the town,
for the purpose of permitting exhibitions therein, which license shall be
revocable at the pleasure of said town council.”

General Laws 1956 (1976 Reenactment) §5-22-4, as amended by P.L. 1938, ch.
362, §1, reads:

““S-22-4. Town license required. — No person shall publicly or for pay or
for any profit or advantage to himself, exhibit or promote or take part in any
theatrical performance, or rope or wire dancing or other show or
performance, or conduct, engage in or promote any wrestling, boxing or
sparring match or exhibition, nor shall any person for any pecuniary profit
or advantage to himself, promote any public roller skating in rinks or halls,
or give any dance or ball, without a license from the town council of the

EE
of West Greenwich (the ordinance).

Stepping Stone had attempted to obtain licenses for
concerts scheduled to be held on July 18, 24, 25, 26 and 27,
1975; and August 2 and 9, 1975. These applications were
unanimously denied by the West Greenwich Town Council
(the town council) on July 9, 1975. This denial followed
extensive testimony concerning the Blue Grass Festival,
which was sponsored previously by Stepping Stone over the
July 4, 1975 weekend. During this concert, nearby residents
suffered constant personal abuse, threats, noise, extreme
physical exhaustion, invasion of and damage to their
property (including thievery and fires), traffic tie-ups and
general filth. These problems were compounded by the lack
of police staff and equipment. Because Stepping Stone had
failed to prove that it could provide adequate health and
safety facilities to safeguard against repetition of these
incidents, the town council refused to issue the requested
licenses.

town in which such performance, show, exhibition, dance or ball is sought
to be given.”

*The July 12, 1972 West Greenwich ordinance requiring applicants to obtain a
license before holding public entertainment reads in pertinent part as follows:

“Be it ordained by the Town Council of the Town of West Greenwich, as
follows:

“Section 1. Application:

No person shall hold any public entertainment within the Town of West
Greenwich without first filing a written application for a license to do so
with the Town Council of said Town. Said application shall be filed not
later than seven days prior to the next regular meeting of said Town
Council, provided, however, that said Town Council may waive this
requirement on good cause shown by the applicant.

“Section 2, Compliance With Other Laws:

No license shall issue by said Town Council until the applicant or
applicants shall affirmatively show that the proposed entertainment, if
allowed, or the premises to be used therefor, if allowed, shall otherwise
comply with all applicable Federal, State and local laws relative to the
health, safety and welfare of the public, including, but not limited to:
Traffic, zoning, parking, fire protection, and the like.”

136 ee

As a result of its inability to obtain the license permits,
Stepping Stone filed a complaint in Federal District Court for
the District of Rhode Island. The complaint stated that
Stepping Stone intended to exercise its federal constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and expression and its right under
42, U.S.C. §1983 to engage in a lawful occupation by
providing musical entertainment without the necessary
license permits. In that regard, Stepping Stone requested the
Federal District Court to enjoin the town council and the
acting Chief of Police from criminally prosecuting it for
violating the statute and the ordinance. The district court
declined to provide injunctive relief.

Stepping Stone had additionally asked the district court to
convene a three-judge court to declare unconstitutional the
. statutory prohibition against performing or promoting
musical concerts in Rhode Island without a license and the
town ordinance pursuant to which the members of the town
council had arbitrarily denied issuance of these permits. The
district court denied the request to convene the three-judge
court under the rule that a three-judge court need not be
convened if no substantial constitutional question is raised.
See Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. v. Andrews, Civ. No.
75-0218 (D. R.I., filed October 16, 1975); Goosby v. Osser,
409 U.S. 512, 518, 93 S.Ct. 854, 858, 35 L.Ed.2d 36, 42
(1973). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision. See Stepping Stone Enterprises,
Ltd. v. Andrews, 531 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976).

Because Stepping Stone had stated that it would proceed to
hold live entertainment on its property notwithstanding the
denial of the license permits, the town of West Greenwich
(the town) and Theodore Briggs, a resident, filed the instant
complaint in the Superior Court for Kent County on July 16,
1975, seeking both temporary relief and preliminary and
permanent injunctions prohibiting Stepping Stone from
holding public entertainment on those dates for which
licenses had been previously denied by the town council. A
temporary restraining order was granted that same day. On
August 12, 1975, an order was entered in the Superior Court

es 1:7

granting the town’s motion to consolidate the preliminary
hearing with the hearing on the merits. Later, Stepping
Stone filed a third-party claim in the Superior Court against
Robert J. Andrews, acting Chief of Police of West
Greenwich, and the individual members of the town council
and requested inter alia that the third-party defendants be
enjoined from criminally prosecuting Stepping Stone for
proceeding without a license permit and that the court
declare unconstitutional the statutory power of the town
council to deny arbitrarily the issuance of the license permits
absent the legality of the performance.

After a nonjury trial, the lower court granted the town and
Theodore Briggs permanent injunctive relief, noting that
Stepping Stone had reiterated in open court its intention to
provide musical entertainment without the required license
permits. The trial court observed that the ordinance
requiring a license for the showing of live entertainment is
premised upon federal, state and local laws that regulate the
health, safety and welfare of the public. Grounding its
decision on evidence elicited at the town meeting that
sanitation, traffic control, zoning, parking and fire
protection had been undermined at the Blue Grass Festival
and possibly would otherwise be jeopardized at future
concerts, the trial court granted injunctive relief to safeguard
the community from what it considered to be the immediate
and irreparable harm that would ensue if Stepping Stone
were not enjoined from fulfilling its threat to proceed with
the concerts without first obtaining the license permits.

Stepping Stone now appears before this court arguing (1)
that the statute and the ordinance violate its first-amendment
rights to free speech and expression as applied to the states via
the fourteenth amendment, (2) that the town of West
Greenwich lacks standing to enjoin or prohibit an alleged
nuisance, (3) that a court of equity lacks the power to enjoin
a violation of the criminal law, and (4) that a private party
may not obtain a Superior Court injunction to abate a
nuisance absent evidence of irreparable harm.

18
I

We need not address Stepping Stone’s first contention
because it has been answered by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. v. Andrews,
supra. Both the parties and the issue before the federal court
are substantially similar to those presently before us.
Moreover, the facts of both cases are identical. Before the
first circuit court, Stepping Stone alleged that the statute and
ordinance unconstitutionally violate its rights to free speech
and expression. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the attack on the statute and ordinance was insubstantial in
light of the United States Supreme Court precedent
upholding the power of states and towns to delineate
standards for the protection of the health and safety of their
citizens. We agree with the analysis of. the first circuit court
and refer Stepping Stone to that decision.

I

Stepping Stone next alleges that a municipal corporation
has no standing to enjoin or prohibit activities constituting a
nuisance. Pursuant to legislative grant,4 the General

“General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-6-1, which delegates police power
to municipalities, reads as follows:

“Scope of ordinances permissible. — Town councils and city councils may
from time to time make and ordain all ordinances and regulations for their
respective towns, not repugnant to law, which they may deem necessary for
the safety of their inhabitants from fire, firearms and fireworks; to prevent
persons standing on any footwalk, sidewalk, doorstep, or in any doorway, or
riding, driving, fastening or leaving any horse or other animal or any
carriage, team or other vehicle on any such footwalk, sidewalk, doorstep or
doorway within such town, to the obstruction, hindrance, delay,
disturbance or annoyance of passers-by or of persons residing or doing
business in the vicinity thereof; to regulate the putting up and maintenance
of telegraph and other wires and the appurtenances thereof; to prevent the
indecent exposure of any one bathing in any of the waters within their
respective towns; against breakers of the Sabbath; against habitual
drunkenness; to regulate the speed of driving horses and cattle over bridges;
respecting the purchase and sale of merchandise or commodities within their
respective towns and cities; to protect burying grounds and the graves
therein from trespassers; and, generally, all other ordinances, regulations
and bylaws for the well ordering, managing and directing of the prudential
affairs and police of their respective towns, not repugnant to the
Constitution and laws of this state, or of the United States.”

ES

Assembly has given town and city councils the police power
to promulgate regulations and ordinances to protect the
safety of their inhabitants. J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 116
R.I. 54, 66, 352 A.2d 661, 667 (1976); Atlantic Tubing &
Rubber Co. v. City Council, 105 R.I. 584, 587, 254 A.2d 92,
94 (1969); see Palombo v. Housing Board of Review, 92 R.I1.
421, 424, 169 A.2d 613, 615 (1961). The power of a munici-
pality to enforce its ordinances and regulations is also of
statutory derivation. See State v. Krzak, 97 R.I. 156, 160,
196 A.2d 417, 420 (1964). In G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment)
§45-6-2,° as amended by P.L. 1971, ch. 224, §1, the General
Assembly gave municipalities the power to impose penalties
for the violation of its ordinances and regulations. Although
the power to enjoin a violation of an ordinance is not
specifically enumerated in §45-6-2, we hold that when the
violation of an ordinance also constitutes a nuisance, a
municipality may seek an injunction in equity. We thus

subscribe to the view stated by the court in Harvey v. Prall,
250 Iowa 1111, 97 N.W.2d 306 (1959), which upheld the
power of municipalities to enjoin nuisances:

“Where the violation of an ordinance constitutes a
nuisance and equitable grounds exist equity may grant
relief therefrom, not because the act is a violation of the
ordinance, but because it is a nuisance.” Id. at 1119-20,
97 N.W.2d at 311.

General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-6-2, as amended by P.L. 1971, ch.
224, §1, reads as follows:

“Imposition of penalities for ordinance violations. — They may impose
penalties for the violation of such ordinances and regulations, not exceeding
in amount one hundred dollars ($100) or imprisonment not exceeding thirty
(80) days in some jail or house of correction, for any one (1) offense, unless
other penalties therefor, or penalties within other limits, are specially
prescribed by statute, to be prosecuted by some officer appointed for that
purpose, and to be recovered to the use of the town, or of such person or
persons, and in such proportions, as [they] in their said ordinances and
regulations shall designate.”

Oe

See also Village of Riverwoods v. Untermyer, 54 Ill. App. 3d
816, 822, 369 N.E.2d 1385, 1390 (1977); City of Saginaw v.
Budd, 381 Mich. 173, 178, 160 N.W.2d 906, 908 (1968);
Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 194-95, 167 N.W.
2d 45, 48 (1969); Village of Wind Point v. Halverson, 38 Wis.
2d 1, 11, 155 N.W.2d 654, 659 (1968). Without the right to
enjoin a nuisance, the police power of a municipality to
protect the health, safety and welfare of its inhabitants
would be merely illusory.

Ill

Stepping Stone’s third argument is that courts of equity
have no power to enjoin a violation of the criminal law
because a fine or imprisonment imposed for violation of that
law is an adequate remedy. It is well established that equity
courts lack criminal jurisdiction and that equity will not
enjoin acts merely because they are punishable as crimes.
Berberian v. Avery, 99 B.I. 77, 83, 205 A.2d 579, 582 (1964).
Nevertheless, because the same act may violate both the
criminal law and an equitable obligation toward another,
this court has enunciated an exception to this general rule. In
such situations a party may seek an injunction against
criminal activity if independent grounds exist that justify
equitable relief. See Rhode Island Bar Association v.
Automobile Service Association, 55 R.I. 122, 128, 179 A.
139, 141 (1935). The facts of this case fall within this
exception. If Stepping Stone were to hold the proposed
concerts without first obtaining the necessary license to do
so—which would entail an affirmative showing of
compliance with health and safety laws—then Stepping
Stone would violate both the criminal law and its equitable
obligation of ensuring the welfare of the townspeople of West
Greenwich and of those attending the concert.

The trial court thus grounded its grant of an injunction on
the claim that, absent injunctive relief, there would be
immediate and irreparable harm to the health and safety of
the townspeople and the concert participants. This court has
long recognized the threat of immediate and irreparable

|

harm as a valid ground for such equitable relief. See, e.g.,
Menard v. Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild-AFT 951, 117 R.I.
121, 126-27, 363 A.2d 1349, 1353 (1976); Lewis v. Town of
North Kingstown, 16 R.I. 15, 17, 11 A. 173, 173 (1887). The
Superior Court therefore had the power to grant equitable
relief in the form of an injunction.

IV

Stepping Stone’s last contention is that Theodore Briggs, a
complainant in the present action, presented no competent
evidence that he would suffer immediate and irreparable
harm in the absence of injunctive relief. Absent a showing of
abuse of discretion, we will not consider the propriety of
granting injunctive relief, which is a matter better left to the
discretion of the trial justice. Gilbane Building Co. v. Cianci,
117 RI. 317, 320, 366 A.2d 154, 156 (1976). However,
whereas the trial justice is usually in a better position to
evaluate the evidence introduced at trial, in this case the
parties agreed before the Superior Court that the trial justice
could read the transcript of the hearing before the town
council to avoid the necessity of introducing duplicate
testimony at trial. The trial justice therefore reviewed the
cold testimony given before the town council concerning the
prior Stepping Stone Blue Grass Festival. This court, which
has the same cold record before it, can evaluate the testimony
in the same manner as the trial justice. See Gillogly v. New
England Transportation Co., 73 R.I. 456, 462, 57 A.2d 411,
414 (1948). This testimony included the statement of
Theodore Briggs before the town council that during the Blue
Grass Festival of July 4, 1975, he spent three nights without
sleep, he suffered both fire and vandalism on his land, trash
was thrown upon his land and some of his trees were
chopped down. Because we find that the testimony of Mr.
Briggs at the town council meeting of July 9, 1975 sufficiently
demonstrates the need for injunctive relief in this case, we
hold that the trial justice was acting well within his
discretionary limits in issuing the injunction.

7) SS

Stepping Stone’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remitted
to the Superior Court.

V. James Santaniello, for plaintiffs.

Aram K. Berberian, for defendants.

405 A.2d 3.

~ STATE vs. JOEL JENISON.
State vs. MICHELE G. Cory.

AUGUST 1, 1979,
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, and Doris, JJ.

M4 es
P|

Josuin, J. The defendants, Joel Jenison and Michele G.
Cory, challenge the constitutionality of the composition and
operation of the first statewide grand jury that was convened
in Providence pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) ch.
11.1 of tit. 12, as enacted by P.L. 1974, ch. 221, §4. The
grand jury sat in that city and heard evidence regarding
crimes allegedly committed by the defendants in Kent and
Washington Counties. It subsequently met in each of those
counties and at those sessions, on the basis of evidence heard
in Providence, returned indictments against each defendant
for offenses allegedly committed therein. Motions to dismiss
were then filed by both defendants in both counties. In
Washington County, Judge Rodgers denied the motions and
the defendants appealed. In Kent County, Judge
McKiernan, instead of ruling on the motions, invoked
§9-24-27 and certified three questions to this court for
hearing and determination. Those questions present substan-
tially the same issues as does the appeal in the Washington
County case.! They are:

“1. Can a statewide grand jury sitting in Providence
County and not in attendance in Superior Court in the
County of Kent validly, with respect to proper venue
and due process, consider an indictment based on an
alleged crime committed in Kent County.

“2. Can a statewide grand jury sitting in Providence
County validly consider an indictment where the
Defendants have been bound over to a Kent County
grand jury which jury did not return an indictment.

“3, Is the clause in Title 9, Chapter 9, Section 3 of
the General Laws of Rhode Island 1956, as amended,
which mandates the exemption of ‘the president,

'The appeal, in addition, challenges the allegedly prejudicial presence of a
policeman on the grand jury and the alleged disproportionate composition of the
grand jury in comparison with the number of voters in the county, contrary to the
statutory requirement of proportionality. General Laws '1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§12-11.1-4, as amended by P-L. 1977, ch. 94, §1.

es is

professors, tutors and students of recognized universities
and colleges’ from serving as jurors, unconstitutional on
its face and as applied in that it violates:

a. The due process clause of the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States;

b. The right to trial by an impartial jury guaranteed
by the 6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States as applied to the States by the 14th Amendment;

ec. Article I §10 of the Rhode Island Constitution
which guarantees to the criminally accused the right to
enjoy a trial by ‘an impartial jury and not to ‘be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”

At the threshold is the procedural problem of whether the
cases are properly before us. Clearly, the appeal from Judge
Rodgers’ denial of the motion to dismiss is not. Because that
ruling was interlocutory, the appeal was premature and
therefore cannot be entertained. State v. Ferrara, 101 R.I.
377, 378, 224 A.2d 43, 44 (1966); State v. Ryan, 64 R.I. 92,
95, 10 A.2d 451, 452 (1940).

The defendants argue, however, that notwithstanding its
prematurity, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-24-32, as
amended by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, §10, allows them to
challenge an interlocutory order in this court. Although in
specified circumstances that statute permits the state to
prosecute an appeal from an interlocutory ruling, it is
unavailable to a defendant for that purpose. See State v.
Ouimette, 108 R.I. 283, 284, 274 A.2d 732, 733 (1971); State
v. Johnson, 113, R.I. 917, 319 A.2d 102 (1974).

No more bothersome is whether the certification pro-
cedures of §9-24-27 are appropriate. The rules governing the
use of those procedures are well established. Only recently
we referred to them in State v. Perry, 118 R.I. 89, 94, 372
A.2d 75, 78 (1977), where we said that:

46 ee

“before certifying a question, the trial justice must
determine, in his discretion, that the question is of
doubt and importance and that ‘* * * aided by the re-
search and arguments of counsel [he] is unable to reach
a satisfactory conclusion * * *.’”

In that case, we also said:

“The certification process contemplated by §9-24-27
entails a total stoppage of a trial pending determination
of the certified question. Such a drastic step may only be
taken after every effort of court and counsel has been ex-
hausted and no satisfactory answer reached. Only then
may a trial justice, in his discretion, halt trial proceed-
ings and certify a question to the Supreme Court.” Id. at
94-95, 372 A.2d at 78-79.

The trial justice in this case had the benefit not only of oral
arguments and comprehensive memoranda from both
parties, but also of the transcript of the hearing conducted in
Washington County before Judge Rodgers. Still he felt he
was unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion. The state
nevertheless argues that the issues were “easily resolvable”
and that Judge McKiernan should have followed Judge
Rodgers’ example. But merely because one judge resolved the
issues does not mean the questions were “easily resolvable” or
that another judge abused his discretion in not having done
likewise.

Moreover, as defendants suggest, Judge McKiernan must
have been aware that defendants’ constitutional challenges,
if sound, would invalidate not only indictments against them
but all others returned by this grand jury. In this context, dis-
cretionary certification before trial pursuant to §9-24-27 was
particularly appropriate to avoid wasting valuable judicial ,
time in the prosecution of innumerable possibly faulty
indictments.”

"In State v. Paradis, 66 R.I. 152, 18 A.2d 342 (1941), 165 criminal defendants
initiated certiorari proceedings to review the Superior Court’s refusal to certify
constitutional challenges to the composition of the grand jury that indicted them.
Despite the defendants’ argument that it was against the public policy to try all 165

es Mt

In view of all the circumstances, we believe Judge
McKiernan did not abuse his discretion in certifying the con-
stitutional questions. We need only consider the third
question, however, because our determination of it is disposi-
tive. That question challenges the constitutionality of the
jury commissioner’s application of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenact-
ment) §9-9-3, as amended by P.L. 1957, ch. 124, §1. That
Act, in pertinent part, exempts from grand- or petit-jury
service “the president, professors, tutors, and students of
recognized universities and colleges.”

The Federal Constitution does not guarantee the right to a
grand jury in a state criminal prosecution, Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 4S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884),
but if a state chooses to provide such a system, “it must hew
to federal constitutional criteria,” Carter v. Jury
Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 330, 90 S. Ct. 518, 523, 24 L. Ed.
2d 549, 557 (1970), at least with respect to the due-process
and equal-protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501, 92 S. Ct. 2163, 2168, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 83, 93 (1972). Thus, “a [S]tate cannot, consistent with
due process, subject a defendant to indictment or trial by a
jury that has been selected in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States.” Id. at 502, 92 S, Ct. at 2168, 33 L. Ed. 2d at
94.

of them only to have the indictments later found unconstitutional, the trial justice
elected not to certify. We refused to review that denial on certiorari. In response to
the applicants’ argument that it was in the interest of the state and the public
welfare to review the questions raised then rather than after a trial on the merits,
we observed that the Attorney General had opposed issuance of the writ and had
urged that the cases proceed in the regular way. It was his responsibility, we said,
to determine whether it would be sounder policy to suspend the trial of the cases
pending a determination of the constitutional questions to save the state what
might prove to be the néedless expense of numerous trials, In ruling otherwise in
this case, we still recognize that the possibility that the state will incur the needless
expense of numerous trials on possibly invalid indictments remains the Attorney
General’s responsibility. We have as our responsibility, however, to expedite the
trial of cases and to clear the dockets so that litigants can have speedy trials and a
prompt day in court.

us |

In developing that rule, the Supreme Court on equal-
protection grounds has consistently struck down the
systematic exclusion of racial groups or identifiable
minorities from service on grand or petit juries. E.g.,
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 51 L.
Ed. 2d 498 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92
S. Ct. 1221, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 87S. Ct. 643, 17 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1967); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664
(1879); see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824,
13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965); State v. Clark, 112 R.I. 270, 275,
308 A.2d 792, 795 (1973). It has also embraced the broader
principle that a criminal defendant is “entitled, as a matter of
due process, to a jury drawn from a representative cross
section of the community.” Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 378, 32 L. Ed. 2d 152, 169 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring); see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11,
92 S. Ct. 1628, 1632-33, 32 L. Ed. 2d 184, 191 (1972). This
principle applies to both grand and petit juries. Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. at 502, 92S. Ct. at 2168, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 94;
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 636, 92S. Ct. at 1228, 31
L. Ed. 2d at 545 (Douglas, J., concurring); Sperlich &
Jaspovice, Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and the Constitution, 1
Hastings Const. L. Q. 63 (1974); ef. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 526-33, 95 S. Ct. 692, 695-99, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690,
695-700 (1975) (sixth amendment requires petit jury drawn
from fair cross section of community).

Moreover, in cases arising in the federal courts, the Court,
in the exercise of its supervisory power, has applied the fair
cross-section principle to strike down the systematic exclusion
from both grand and petit juries of distinct groups in the
community such as daily wage earners, Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S. Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed. 1181
(1946), or women, Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67
S. Ct. 261 91 L. Ed. 181 (1946).

The fair cross-section principle has been supported in both
the grand- and petit-jury contexts by reference to the very

ee) Mig

nature of the common-law jury. Thus, the Court said in
Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. at 330, 90S. Ct. at 524,
24 L, Ed. 2d at 558, that “the very idea of a jury,” whether it
be a grand or petit jury, is “ ‘a body truly representative of
the community,’ ” and in Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. at
358, 59 S. Ct. at 539, 83 L. Ed. at 760, it noted that
“{iJndictment by Grand Jury and trial by jury cease to
harmonize with our traditional concepts of justice at the very
moment particular groups, classes or races—otherwise
qualified to serve as jurors in a community—are excluded as
such from jury service.” And in Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., 328 U.S. at 220, 66 S. Ct. at 985, 90 L. Ed. at 1184-85,
the Court explained:

“The American tradition of trial by jury, considered
in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings,
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from
a cross section of the community. Smith v. Texas, 311
USS. 128, 180; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85.
This does not mean, of course, that every jury must con-
tain representatives of all the economic, social,
religious, racial, political and geographical groups of
the community; frequently such complete representa-
tion would be impossible. But it does mean that pro-
spective jurors shall be selected by court officials with-
out systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these
groups.”

The fourteenth-amendment guarantee of an impartial jury
as an aspect of due process is as applicable to the grand as to
the petit jury because both perform a vital function in
protecting the criminal defendant. This court recognized
that function when, speaking of the common-law grand jury
in Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.1. 200, 4 A.2d 487 (1939),
it said:

“One of its main purposes was to protect the rights of
the individual citizen against possible oppression by the
crown or its agencies in the prosecution of crimes; or, as
has been elsewhere stated, to safeguard the individual’s

rights against private malice, party passion or
governmental abuse.”* Id. at 203, 4 A.2d at 488;
approved in In re Buxton, 111 R.1. 480, 482, 304 A.2d
350, 352 (1973).

The rationale for affording an accused the protection of a
judgment reached by the fair and impartial body of his peers
that make up a petit jury applies as well to an indictment
brought by the grand jury that performs the critical function
-of deciding whether to bring the initial accusation. Thus, a
state electing to use the grand jury system must abide by the
requirements of due process in assuring that the selection
process draws jurors from a fair cross section of the
community.

The ramifications of the fair cross-section requirement in
defining those cognizable classes that may not be excluded
have been explicated in the analogous areas of the sixth-
amendment right to an impartial jury trial and the Supreme
Court’s constitutional and supervisory power over federal
grand juries. Indeed, the reasoning that prohibits the
arbitrary exclusion of cognizable classes from jury service has
been fundamentally the same whatever the constitutional
context. The concept of a cognizable class for these purposes
includes “economic, social, religious, racial, political and
geographical groups.” Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328
‘U.S. at 220, 66 S. Ct. at 985, 90 L. Ed. at 1185. Groups
whose exclusion from grand or petit-jury service have been
found to violate the fair cross-section requirement in the con-

°This language is strikingly similar to the language used in Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S, 522, 530, 95 S. Ct, 692, 698, 42 L, Ed. 2d 690, 698 (1975) in defining the
function of the petit jury:
“The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power—to make availabie the commonsense judgment of the community as
a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to
the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.
[citation omitted] This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is
made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive
groups are excluded from the pool.”

Both bodies perform a vital function in protecting individual rights, and are
therefore subject to high constitutional standards of fairness.

es 151

text of both the sixth and fourteenth amendments or of the
court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the federal courts include
women, Duren v. Missouri, 47 U.S.L.W. 4089 (1979); Taylor
v. Louisiana; daily wage earners, Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., both supra; the less educated, United States v. Butera,
420 F.2d 564 (ist Cir. 1970); the “young adults,” id., various
racial and ethnic groups, Peters v. Kiff, supra; Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S. Ct. 667, 98 L. Ed. 866; Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 61S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940), and
teachers, Colvin v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W. 2d 281 (Ky.
1978).

The group excluded from grand-jury service in this case is
comprised of the presidents, professors, tutors, and students
of recognized colleges or universities. A transcript of the pro-
ceedings before Judge Rodgers that was introduced into evi-
dence at the hearing before Judge McKiernan discloses that
the governing statute conferring only an exemption,‘ was

applied by the jury commissioner as an exclusion. That
official’s testimony revealed that prior to the selection of this
grand jury a questionnaire was sent to all prospective grand
jurors, that in one of the questions the recipient was asked to

4General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-9-3 provides:

“The following persons shall be exempted from serving as jurors, namely:
the members of congress from the state of Rhode Island, the general officers
of the state, the members and officers of the general assembly during their
tenure of office irrespective of whether the general assembly is in session or
not, the warden, assistant warden, deputy wardens, correctional officers,
classification counselors, youth home life supervisors, the supervisor and
members of the committing squad, and the superintendent of any institution
under the management and control of the department of corrections, the
superintendent of any institution under the management and control of the
department of social and rehabilitative services, the jury commissioner and
his assistants, the justices of the state and United States courts, clerks of said
courts, practicing attorneys-at-law, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, marshals,
deputy marshals, members of any paid police force of the state or of any city
or town, members of any paid fire department of any city or town, priests,
ministers, rabbis and others holding ecclesiastical office in religious
organizations, authorized Christian Science practitioners and readers
respectively, every member of the federally recognized national guard shall
be exempt from jury duty only while actually on military duty on orders of
the U.S. department of defense or on orders of the governor, or who is in
receipt of such orders to military duty, the president, professors, tutors, and
students of recognized universities and colleges.” (Emphasis added.)

182 es

list his present occupation or profession, and that the person
was automatically excluded if the response to that question
indicated that his occupation or profession fell into one of the
exempt categories. The exclusion was routine and was
effectuated without regard to whether the person, by his
response to a later question, claimed the exemption. Indeed,
under the practice, the only way an individual in the exempt
category could serve was by acting affirmatively to waive the
exemption. In effect, then, the system operated to exclude
the targeted group entirely from service.

The state is, of course, “free to grant exemptions from jury
service to individuals in case of special hardship or incapacity
and to those engaged in particular occupations the unin-
terrupted performance of which is critical to the
community’s welfare.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 534,
95 S. Ct. at 700, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 700; Rawlins v. Georgia,
201 U.S. 638, 26 S. Ct. 560, 50 L. Ed. 899 (1906). Nonethe-
less, a jury selection system that entirely excludes an identifi-
able and cognizable class playing a major role in the
community, without a rational reason therefor,
impermissibly offends the fair cross-section requirement and
cannot be tolerated. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530, 95 S. Ct. 692, 697-98, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698 (1975).

We believe that the academic community here excluded is
such a cognizable class. See Colvin v. Commonwealth, 570
S.W.2d 281, 282 (Ky. 1978) (teachers are a cognizable class
that may not be excluded). But see State v. Porro, 158 N.J.
Super. 269, 385 A.2d 1258 (1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W.
3408 (1978) (students are not a cognizable class). It is
estimated to constitute at least 5 to 10 percent of the potential
jury pool,® and it is identifiable and distinguishable from

Although not as large as the class excluded in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed, 2d 690 (1975), which included 53 percent of the eligible
population, we believe that this group is sufficiently large to fulfill the cognizability
requirement. When a class is entirely excluded, we believe that its size is
determinative only as one aspect of showing that it is a distinct and identifiable
community group. That it is relatively small cannot justify total exclusion.

ee) 153

other social groups by its higher level of educational attain-
ment, cf. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (Ist Cir.
1970) (the less educated), and by a possibly greater liberality
of thought

It is unnecessary, however, to speculate on the particular
qualities shared by this group that are missing from the
spectrum of views on a jury that excludes its members. It is
sufficient to note that

*The Supreme Court has imposed on the defendants the initial burden of
demonstrating the existence of purposeful discrimination. E.g., Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S, 545, 550-51, 87 S. Ct. 643, 646-47, 17 L. Ed. 2d 599, 603-04 (1967);
Henandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480-81, 74°. Ct. 667, 671-72, 98 L. Ed. 866, 871
(1954). Such purposeful discrimination is found when a jury commissioner
deliberately excludes certain groups, ¢.g., Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S.
217, 66S, Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed. 1181 (1946) (daily wage earners excluded); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S, 60, 83-87, 62 S. Ct. 457, 470-73, 86 L. Ed. 680, 706-08
(1942) (all women not members of League of Women Voters excluded); see State v.
Clark, 112 R.1. 270, 275, 308 A.2d 792, 795 (1973). Once such a showing is made
the defendant has made out a prima facie case and it hecomes the state’s obligation
to rebut it.

In this case the defendants introduced statistics, drawn from United States census
reports and other statistical abstracts, indicating that in 1977, 3,716 professors and
instructors worked at recognized Rhode Island colleges and universities. In the
same year, 63,241 students were enrolled in recognized Rhode Island colleges and
universities. In 1975, furthermore, 11,917 Rhode Island residents were enrolled in
out-of-state colleges and universities. This list yields a total of approximately 78,874
members of the class subject to the exemption. Because only those registered voters
over the age of 21 are eligible for grand jury service, however, the exclusion applies
to a smaller number.

The defendants suggest that a conservative estimate indicates that from 25,000 to
50,000 members of the academic community of 78,874 are registered voters over
21. This number would constitute from 5 to 10 percent of the 544,922 registered
voters in Rhode Island in 1976. The figure is probably much higher than that,
because a substantial percentage of Rhode Island’s registered voters are also
between 18 and 21, and thus ineligible for jury service.

The defendant also suggests looking at the excluded class as “the better
educated,” following the reasoning of United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (Ist
Cir. 1970). From this perspective, census figures for 1970 show that 91,074 persons
25 years or over had some education beyond high school. In the same year, 34,915
were enrolled in Rhode Island colleges, contributing to a total of 125,989 members
of an “educated class.” In that year there were also 2,023 teachers in Rhode Island
colleges and universities. Thus, the 36,938 students and professors represented a
total of 29 percent of the “better educated” class that was excluded from jury
service,

The state has made no serious attempt to rebut defendants’ prima facie showing
of a purposeful discrimination.

154 es

“When any large and identifiable segment of the com-
munity is excluded from jury service, the effect is to re-
move from the jury room qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range of which is un-
known and perhaps unknowable, It is not necessary to
assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as
a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion
deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that
may have unsuspected importance in any case that may
be presented.” Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04, 92
S. Ct. 2163, 2169, 33 L. Ed. 2d 83, 94 (1972).

We can think of no rational reason to sustain the total and
arbitrary exclusion of this group from jury service. If the
reason were to secure the uninterrupted performance of
pedagogical tasks, teachers in primary and secondary schools
should be entitled to the same exclusion as college-level
educators. Moreover, the appropriate way to avoid interfer-
ing with the scholarly pursuits of professor and student alike
is by exempting, not excluding, them from service in
appropriate cases. The total and arbitrary exclusion of the
university and college academic community from the grand-
jury selection process is an impermissible violation of the due-
process right of the criminal defendant to be indicted by an
impartial grand jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community.

We therefore find that the exemption of §9-9-3 was uncon-
stitutionally applied when this grand jury was selected, and
that the indictments, having thus been returned by a grand
jury composed in violation of constitutional requirements,
cannot stand.’ It is therefore unnecessary to address the re-
maining certified questions.

7See, however, dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 298-305, 70 S. Ct. 629, 637-40, 94 L. Ed. 839, 853-56 (1950) and of Mr.
Justice Stewart in Rose v. Mitchell, 47 U.S.L.W. 4948, 4956-57 (1979), both
arguing that an accused should not be entitled to have his conviction set aside on
the ground that the jury that indicted him was improperly constituted, if the petit
jury that tried him did not violate constitutional standards.

Ss

The papers in the cases with our decision certified thereon
are ordered returned to the Superior Court for further
proceedings.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Thomas H.
Caruolo, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Abedon, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey, Providence,
Milton Stanzler, Edward N. Beiser, Linda Kushner (for Joel
Jenison) Keven A. McKenna, Ronald A. Dwight, Providence
(for Michele G. Cory), for defendants.

404 A.2d 505.

Tue Benpix Corporation et al. vs. Joun H. Norserc,
Tax ADMINISTRATOR.

AUGUST 2, 1979.
Parsent: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Josun, J. This is a petition for a writ of certiorari in a tax
case. In June 1976, a judgment was entered in the Superior
Court reversing a decision of the tax administrator and
ordering him to refund taxes, assessed by the administrator
against and paid by the taxpayers. Instead of seeking review
of that judgment by filing a petition for a statutory writ of
certiorari pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment)
§42-35-16,! the administrator filed a motion for relief from
judgment under Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).* He asked that
the case be reopened and remanded to the tax division for
further consideration of the correctness of the tax in light of
G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-11-15,? that directs that

Min pertinent part G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §42-35-16 provides:

“Any party in interest, if aggrieved by a final judgment of the superior or
district court rendered in proceedings brought under §42-35-15, may,
within twenty (20) days from the date of entry of such judgment, petition
the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a writ of certiorari to
review any questions of law involved. The petition for a writ of certiorari
shall set forth the errors claimed.”

*Super. R. Civ. P, 60(b)(6) provides in pertinent part:

“(b) Mistake; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: « + » (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

2General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-11-15 provides:

“If at any time the tax administrator, on his own motion or acting upon a
complaint by a taxpayer, shall determine that the methods of allocation
hereinbefore provided are inequitable either to the state or to the taxpayer,

es (|

the equities be balanced in allocating income to determine
the proper tax, and so that justice might be accomplished.
That section had not been considered at the original hearing
before the tax administrator or at the Superior Court trial.

The trial justice reserved decision on that motion and in
May 1977, in a written decision, denied it. Within 20 days
thereafter, the administrator brought “his petition for a writ
of certiorari to this Honorable Court pursuant to section
42-35-16,"4 alleging that both the June 1976 judgment
ordering the refund and the May 1977 denial of the Rule
60(b)(6) motion were erroneous, and praying that both be
corrected.® We ordered the writ to issue and directed the
parties to argue the question of the timeliness of the petition.

At the outset is the procedural question of whether in these
circumstances a petition for certiorari, be it for the statutory
writ under §42-35-16 or for the common-law writ, is the
appropriate vehicle for obtaining review of the errors

the tax administrator, after affording the taxpayer reasonable opportunity
to be heard, may apply such other method of allocation as shall be equitable
and, if necessary, shall redetermine the tax.”

‘The administrator overlooks the basis upon which his petition for a writ of
certiorari is premised when he states in his brief that he “framed his petition for
certiorari generally for review of the decision and judgment on the motion, without
specific reference to Section 42-35-16, since he was in doubt as to whether review of
a question of abuse of discretion would fall within the statutory language of Section
42-35-16, or should be considered as a petition for writ of common-law certiorari.”

'In arguing in his brief that the merits of the underlying Superior Court
judgment of June 1976 are not before us, the administrator also overlooks (1) his
representation in paragraph 7 of his petition for certiorari that “[t]he Tax
Administrator is aggrieved by the judgment entered on June 30, 1976 and by the
order entered on May 18, 1977,” and (2) his prayer for relief asking that a writ of
certiorari issue directing the certification of the whole record of the case “so that the
same may be reviewed and error corrected.”

158 |

charged by the administrator. Even were we to resolve that
issue in the administrator’s favor, however, he could not
prevail in this proceeding.

The language of Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)(the “other
reason” clause) does vest the Superior Court with broad
power to vacate judgments whenever that action is
appropriate to accomplish justice. The discretion granted
therein, however, is not without limitations and the clause is
not intended to constitute a catchall. Professor Kent suggests
that the “circumstances must be extraordinary to justify
relief.” 1 Kent, R.I. Civ. Prac. §60.08 at 456 (1969). And in
Greco v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 107 R.I. 195, 198,
266 A.2d 50, 52 (1970), we said that:

“We are persuaded, then, that the ‘other reason’ clause
should not be applied unless there has been a showing
by appropriate evidence of circumstances that would
establish a uniqueness that puts the case outside of the
normal and usual circumstances accompanying failures
to comply with the rules.” Accord, Vitale v. Elliott,
120 R.I. 328, 331, 387 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1978); Stevens
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 108 R.I. 209, 212-13, 274 A.2d 163,
165 (1971).

In this case the administrator is claiming, in essence, that,
either through his own or counsel’s inadvertence, he neither
considered the applicability of §44-11-15 when the case was
originally heard before him nor brought it to the attention of
the trial justice when the case was being reviewed in the
Superior Court. Application for relief from that kind of
mistake seems more appropriate under the “mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect” category of Rule
60(b) (1), than it does under 60(b) (6). Action taken at trial in
ignorance of the law, however, generally has not been
regarded either as “excusable neglect” under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1), 7 Moore, Federal Practice {60.22[2] at 252-54 (2d
ed. 1971), or as a basis for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6). Id. 60.27[2] at 370-71. In applying this principle
courts have refused to grant relief under Rule 60(b) when a
party or his counsel, after trial, discovers applicable law that

Ss

he did not perceive or raise at trial. E.g., United States v.
Erdoss, 440 F.2d 1221, 1223 (2d Cir. 1971) (failure to oppose
default judgment because of error of law); Benton v. Vinson,
Elkins, Weems & Searls, 255 F.2d 299, 300-01 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 885, 79 S. Ct. 123, 3 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1958)
(tardy discovery of statute of limitations); Baker v. Southern
Pacific Transportation Co., 22 F.R. Serv. 1251, 1252-53 (D.
Ore. 1976) (failure to raise compulsory counterclaim);
Torockio v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 56 F.R.D. 82, 85-87
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (failure to file requisite notice to sue);
Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission, 330 F. Supp.
328, 330 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 459 F.2d
32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107, rehearing
denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (failure to raise a statutory
exclusion); Weiler v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 601 (M.D.
Pa. 1961); United R.R. Operating Crafts v. New York, N.H.
& H.R. Co., 15 F.R.D. 365, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (failure to
raise constitutional issue at trial).

In Weiler the fact situation was substantially similar to
that in this case. The claim was for a federal tax refund and
the taxpayer was awarded judgment for the recovery of taxes
illegally collected. The government then moved to amend the
judgment to reduce the amount awarded, arguing for the
first time that certain erroneously made refunds operated to
reduce the amount in controversy. The District Court denied
relief, holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) does not provide an
avenue for relief from judgment where the only justification
for that relief is the litigant’s failure to argue a legal theory or
to interpose an arguably applicable defense.

We are unable to say that the circumstances in this case
were so unique and manifest injustice so likely to result that
we should rule as a matter of law that the trial justice abused
his discretion when he denied the tax administrator’s motion
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

The tax administrator’s petition for a writ of certiorari is
therefore denied, the writ heretofore issued is quashed, and
the papers in the case are ordered returned to the Superior
Court with our decision endorsed thereon.

160

Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, H. Peter Olson,
John B. Rosenquest III, Howard E. Walker, for plaintiffs-
respondents.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Allen P. Rubine,
Assistant Attorney General, Perry Shatkin, Chief Legal
Officer (Taxation), for defendant-petitioner.

405 A.2d 10.
Srate vs. Ropert A. ANGELL,
AUGUST 9, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

161

162 |
—“C;isSCSCSCSCSCiéC
Bevitacgua, C.J. The defendant, Robert A. Angell, was

indicted for murder and tried before a jury in the Superior

Court. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the judge

sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. The defendant
appeals from that judgment.

The testimony developed at the trial established that
Antonio Bettencourt and defendant were at the Watch-
emoket Bar in East Providence on the evening of September
19, 1973. A bartender at that bar, John Medeiros, testified
that the two men drank from approximately 6:30 p.m. until
8 p.m. and that Bettencourt was buying “rounds” of drinks
for himself and defendant.

Medeiros also testified that Bettencourt had a wallet full of
money. Under further questioning, Medeiros stated on cross-
examination that someone had told him that Bettencourt had
cashed a check that evening. He later testified on redirect
examination, over defendant’s objection, that he was told
that the amount of the check was approximately $230.

The defendant and Bettencourt left the Watchemoket Bar
near 8 p.m. and went to the East Providence Athletic Club.
James Carroll, a bartender at that club, testified that the two
men came in together and drank and played pool. He further
testified that defendant left the club at approximately 8:30
p.m. after he stated that he was going home to get his car to
give Bettencourt a ride home. Carroll also stated that
Bettencourt left the club a few minutes after defendant.

Carroll further explained that approximately 20 minutes
later, defendant, whom he described as being “out of
breath,” came back into the bar to look for Bettencourt but
left when Carroll told him that Bettencourt was gone.

163

Carroll also testified that from his position behind the bar he
could normally see and hear cars that entered and left the
club parking lot. He stated that upon defendant’s return to
the bar, he neither heard nor saw any car enter or leave the
parking lot.

Testimony was also elicited from Joseph Coelho and
William McNally, who were in the vicinity of the club that
evening. McNally testified that he saw Bettencourt walk into
the club that evening with another man. He stated that
sometime later he saw Bettencourt walking away from the
club followed up the street by the same individual with
whom he had entered the club. Coelho also stated that he
saw Bettencourt walk along the street away from the club
that evening and that a man who fit the description of
defendant followed Bettencourt up the street.

Testimony was also given by Edward Stanley, an East
Providence resident. Mr. Stanley testified that during the
evening of September 19, 1973, he was in his home on Fifth
Street when he heard someone moaning outside. He stated
that when he went outside, he found Bettencourt lying face
down along the side of the curb, whereupon he proceeded to
call the police.

The medical examiner, Augustine Colella, testified that
Bettencourt had a laceration between the back and top of
his head and that he had suffered a hemorrhage within the
subdural space of his head. He stated that the causes of death
were severe head injuries, including the subdural
hemorrhage, and the hemorrhage was consistent with blunt
trauma.

' Sergeant John Hardy of the East Providence Police
Department, an investigating officer, testified that the
following day he and another officer went to the area where
Bettencourt was found to look for evidence relating to the
incident. He stated that they found a 2- by 4-inch board
approximately 10 inches long about 6 to 10 feet from the area
in which Bettencourt was found. According to Sergeant
Hardy, the board was tagged for identification and turned

164 ee

over to the East Providence Bureau of Criminal
Identification. The board was not presented as evidence at
the trial, however, because it was destroyed by a fire in the
East Providence Police Station.

The defendant’s wife, Evelyn Angell, also testified at the
trial. Mrs. Angell, who failed to give the police a statement
concerning her husband’s alleged culpability in Bettencourt’s
death until 3 years after the incident, testified that on the
evening in question defendant left their apartment about
5:15 p.m. to go to the Watchmoket Bar. She stated that he
returned that evening between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. out of
breath with blood on his T-shirt. According to Mrs. Angell,
defendant stated that he had hit Bettencourt with a board
and that he thought that he had killed him. She further
testified that defendant told her that he had taken money
from Bettencourt and that he had showed her between
$100-$175. She also stated that her husband replaced his torn
T-shirt with a burnt-orange one. She then disposed of the old
T-shirt by putting it in the garbage. According to Mrs.
Angell, she and defendant rehearsed an alibi at his insistence.
The alibi concerned a visit to her mother’s house and was to
be used if the police questioned Mrs. Angell. During cross-
examination, Mrs. Angell indicated that the police had told
her that when Bettencourt was found, money was missing
from his person.

The defendant also took the witness stand to testify on his
own behalf. He stated that he was at the Watchemoket Bar
with approximately $10-$20 when he began drinking with
Bettencourt. Pursuant to Bettencourt’s invitation, he went to
the East Providence Athletic Club, where the two continued
to drink. He stated that he left the club alone and that he
went home to get his car to give Bettencourt a ride home.
According to Angell, he returned to the club with his car but
was told that Bettencourt had already left. He stated that he
then returned home and took his wife to visit with his
mother-in-law. The defendant denied that he struck and
robbed Bettencourt.

| 165

Alfred Nesbit, Mrs. Angell’s brother, testified as a rebuttal
witness. Mr. Nesbit stated that he was living with his mother
on Northup Street in Warwick on September 19, 1973, and
that defendant had not been there to visit that evening. He
further testified that defendant had not been to the Northup
Street residence to visit since November 1972.

The defendant alleges three errors on appeal, which we
will consider individually.
I

The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in his
denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the
state failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of
murder. The defendant argues that a death, standing alone,
does not establish criminal homicide and that there must be
some evidence independent of a confession or an admission
on the part of a defendant. The defendant thus asserts that

because the record is completely devoid of evidence to
support a finding of criminal homicide, the motion for a
judgment of acquittal should have been granted.

We do not dispute the principle that the corpus delicti of a
crime must be established before extrajudicial confessions or
admissions connecting the accused with the crime are
admissible into evidence. State v. Wilbur, 115 R.I. 7, 13, 339
A.2d 730, 734 (1975). As a result, there must be proof of the
crime from some source other than defendant’s admission.
Hall v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. 2d 844, 847, 262 P.2d 351,
352 (1953); People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 624, 234 P.2d
1, 7 (1951). The prosecution is thus required to establish the
corpus delicti through the production of sufficient direct or
circumstantial evidence to establish that the crime charged
was committed, regardless of who may have committed it.
State v. Boswell, 73 R.1. 358, 362-63, 56 A.2d 196, 198
(1947). We are of the opinion that only prima facie proof of
corpus delicti must be established prior to the introduction of
defendant’s admissions or confessions. People v. Bolinski, 260
Cal. 2d 705, 709, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350 (1968).

166 ee

An examination of the record in the instant case, excluding
the alleged admissions made by defendant to his wife, reveals
evidence that indicated that defendant and Bettencourt were
together at two bars the night Bettencourt sustained his
injuries. The testimony also indicated that Bettencourt, who
had cashed a check that evening, had a substantial amount of
money and that he was buying drinks for himself and
defendant. Additional testimony also indicated that de-
fendant followed Bettencourt up the street away from the
East Providence Athletic Club shortly before Bettencourt was
found injured in the street.

The medical testimony introduced indicated that Betten-
court suffered an injury to the back of his head and that the
injury was consistent with a blunt trauma. Doctor Colella
testified that the injury could have been caused by, inter alia,
the striking of the head by an instrument such as a billy club
or baseball bat. A 2- by 4-inch board approximately 10 inches
long was found near the area Bettencourt was injured. Fur-
thermore, there was the testimony of Mr. Stanley, who found
Bettencourt lying face down on the street with the injury to
the back of his head.

The defendant’s wife testified that on the night in
question, defendant returned home between 8 p.m. and 9
p-m., perspiring and out of breath with blood on his T-shirt.
The defendant’s wife also stated that her husband changed
his shirt and gave it to her to destroy. Furthermore,
defendant’s wife testified that defendant counted
approximately $100-$175 in her presence. This testimony
was consistent with other testimony that money was missing
from Bettencourt when he was found.

We are of the opinion that the evidence introduced in the
present case, absent the alleged admissions made by
defendant to his wife, would at the very least warrant the
reasonable conclusion that Bettencourt’s death was caused by
criminal activity. We therefore find that the prosecution
established the corpus delicti prior to the introduction of
defendant’s alleged admissions.

ee
W

The defendant argues that the trial justice committed error
in admitting into evidence, over his timely hearsay objection,
testimony that concerned the amount of the check allegedly
cashed by Bettencourt.

A witness for the prosecution, John Medeiros, testified
during direct examination that Bettencourt’s wallet was “full
of money” and “[there] was quite a bit there.” Under cross-
examination the witness was asked if he recalled whether
Bettencourt had cashed a check at the bar that evening. In
response, the witness answered, “I was told he did, not by me
he didn’t.” On redirect examination Medeiros was asked if he
was told the amount of the check cashed by Bettencourt.
Over defendant’s objection, Medeiros said he was told the
check was for approximately $230.

The defendant contends that the trial justice committed
reversible error in permitting Medeiros to testify that
someone told him that the check cashed was in the amount of
$230. The trial justice, reasoning that defendant had
initiated the inquiry concerning the check during cross-
examination, overruled defendant’s objection. On appeal,
the state counters defendant’s allegation by arguing that the
trial justice did not err in his ruling. The state also argues
alternatively that the testimony did not prejudice defendant
because it was merely cumulative evidence.

Although we agree with defendant that the testimony
concerning the amount of the check was objectionable
hearsay, we conclude that the testimony was not prejudicial
error requiring reversal of his conviction.

Hearsay evidence is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Manuel J.
Furtado, Inc. v. Sarkas, 118 R.1. 218, 224, 373 A.2d 169, 172
(1977); Allen V. D’Ercole Construction Co., 104 R.1. 362,
369, 244 A.2d 864, 869 (1968); Moore, Federal Practice, Rule
801(c) (2d ed. 1976). The reasons most often cited for the
need to exclude hearsay is the want of the normal safeguards

168 ee

of oath, confrontation and cross-examination for the
credibility of the out-of-court declarant. McCormick
Evidence §246 at 584 (2d ed. 1972).

Although Medeiros’s testimony concerning the amount of
the check was clearly hearsay and should have been
excluded, we have held that the admission of hearsay
evidence is not prejudicial when the evidence is merely
cumulative and when defendant’s guilt is sufficiently
established by proper evidence. State v. Camerlin, 117 R.I.
61, 64-65, 362 A.2d 759, 761 (1976). In the instant case, the
hearsay testimony clearly related to the amount of money
Bettencourt had the evening he suffered his injury. We are of
the opinion that there was ample evidence, other than hear-
say testimony, that indicated that Bettencourt had a large
sum of money that evening. Medeiros testified that Betten-
court had cashed a check that evening and that he had a large
sum of money in his wallet. The record also contains the testi-

mony of defendant’s wife, who testified that defendant
admitted to her that he hit Bettencourt with a board and
took a roll of money from him. Mrs. Angell also testified that
defendant showed her between $100-$175 that evening.

We are of the opinion that the admission of the testimony
regarding the amount of the check cashed by Bettencourt
was purely cumulative in light of the other evidence that was
presented to the jury. Id. We therefore conclude that the
admission was harmless error.

Il

During the trial, defendant sought to prevent his wife
from testifying when he argued that at common law, com-
munications made in confidence from one spouse to another
are privileged and cannot be disclosed without the
permission of the declarant-spouse. On appeal, defendant
contends that the common-law confidential-communication
privilege has not been abrogated by statute, and therefore it
was reversible error on the part of the trial justice to allow
Mrs. Angell to testify concerning defendant’s alleged
admissions.

es 169

In State v. Kenyon, 18 R.I. 217, 26 A. 199 (1893), this
court addressed the issue of privileged communications as
well as the common-law principle that made a husband and
wife incompetent as witnesses for or against each other in
criminal cases. We stated in Kenyon that the Legislature
specifically abrogated the disability of either spouse to testify
for or against the other in a criminal case. In making this
determination, we initially looked to the legislative
enactment entitled “Pub. Stat. R.I. cap. 214, §36,” whereby
a husband or wife of either party in a civil action was made
competent to testify as a witness. That enactment contained
the following specific provision:

“ Provided, that neither shall be permitted to give any
testimony tending to criminate the other or to disclose
any communication made to him or her, by the other,
during their marriage.’ ” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, we acknowledged that the confidential-communica-

tion privilege was preserved by the Legislature with respect
to civil cases.

We next looked to the Gen. Stat. of 1872, ch. 203, §40,
which stated:

“The husband or wife of any respondent in a criminal
prosecution, offering himself or herself as a witness,
shall not be excluded from testifying therein because he
or she is the husband or wife of such respondent.”

This section, which deals with criminal matters and which is
identical to the current statute G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §12-17-10, was passed by the Legislature 8
years after its civil counterpart. In ch. 203, §40, the
Legislature chose not to add the confidential-communication
proviso used in the civil statute. We reasoned at that time in
Kenyon:

“ Tt might not accord with a good public policy to allow
every litigant in civil suits about matters however small
to have the right to search household secrets for the
production of evidence. But the State should have all

170 es

possible constitutional means to ferret out and punish
crime.’

“An examination of section 40 leaves no room for doubt
as to its meaning. The husband or wife cannot be com-
pelled to be a witness. There must be a voluntary offer,
and upon such offer there can be no exclusion from
testifying, because of the relationship to respondent. In
other words, the witness is to testify as though the
relationship did not exist.”

It is a primary cannon of statutory construction that statu-
tory intent must be gleaned from the words of the statute, if
they are free from ambiguity and express a reasonable
meaning. Litile v. Conflict of Interest Commission, 121
R.I. 232, 237, 397 A.2d 884, 887 (1979); Statewide Mul-
tiple Listing Service, Inc. v. Norberg, 120 R.I. 937, 941,
392 A.2d 371, 373 (1978). Thus, where a statute is free
from ambiguity, there is no room for statutory construction;
and we must give the words their plain and obvious meaning.
The Legislature has chosen not to change the language of
§12-17-10, which is the same as the statute passed upon by
this court in State v. Kenyon, supra. We find no fault with
our reasoning in Kenyon and therefore hold that §12-17-10
has altered the common-law privilege of confidential
communications between a husband and wife. Thus, Mrs.
Angell was properly allowed to testify voluntarily against her
husband.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, John E.
Migliaccio, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Chief
Appellate Attorney, for defendant.

171

404 A.2d 833.

RicHarp RoMANELLO eé¢ al. vs. Ropert H. Macume e¢ al.
RicHarD RoMANELLO é¢ al. vs. Vinnie RICHMOND.
AUGUST 14, 1979.

Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

i) es

Bevitacgua, C.J. These are civil actions in which the
promoters of the Folk-Blue Grass Music Festival (the
festival), Richard Romanello and American Music
Productions, Inc., the plaintiffs herein, seek to recover
damages for the nonperformance of the festival at Stepping
Stone Ranch, West Greenwich, Rhode Island, on July 24-27,
1975. We have consolidated these two cases for the purposes
-of this decision.

Both cases arise from the same factual situation. On April
4, 1975, Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. submitted an
application, along with a license-fee check, to the West
Greenwich Town Council (town council) for an entertain-
ment license for the festival activities. On July 9, 1975, the
town council conducted a public meeting regarding the
application and following this meeting voted to deny the
application for all performances at Stepping Stone Ranch.

As a result of the town council’s actions, plaintiffs
instituted these two actions in Superior Court. The plaintiffs
initially filed a three-count amended complaint against the
town council, Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. and Henry V.
Davis.1 In Counts I and II of their complaint, plaintiff
alleged that the town council had acted in an illegal manner
in denying the application and that the denial violated the
terms of G.L. 1956, §§5-22-1, -2, -4° (the statute), and the

1Hereinafter, Stepping Stone Enterprises Ltd, and Henry V. Davis shall be
referred to as Stepping Stone.
*General Laws 1956 (1976 Reenactment) §5-22-1, as amended by P.L. 1966, ch.
260, §1, reads as follows:
“5.22-1 Town regulatory powers. — The town councils and city councils
may license, regulate and in those certain cases specifically set forth in
§55-22-5 may prohibit and suppress theatrical performances, rope and wire

es 173

West Greenwich Town Ordinance’ relating to the licensing
of entertainment activity (the ordinance). The plaintiffs
further contended that the town council was estopped from
denying the application because the town council neither

dancing and all other shows and performances in their respective towns,
conforming to law.”

General Laws 1956 (1976 Reenactment) §5-22-2, as amended by P.L. 1938, ch.
333, §17, reads:

“5.22-2, Town license for exhibitions. — They may grant a license, for a
term not exceeding one (1) year, under such restrictions and regulations as
they shall think proper, to the owner of any house, room or hall in the town,
for the purpose of permitting exhibitions therein, which license shall be
revocable at the pleasure of said town council.”

General Laws 1956 (1976 Reenactment) §5-22-4, as amended by P.L. 1938, ch.

362, §1, reads:

5-22-4 Town license required. — No person shall publicly or for pay or
for any profit or advantage to himself, exhibit or promote or take part in any
theatrical performance, or rope or wire dancing or other show or
performance, or conduct, engage in or promote any wrestling, boxing or
sparring match or exhibition, nor shall any person for any pecuniary profit
or advantage to himself, promote any public roller skating in rinks or halls,
or give any dance or ball, without a license from the town council of the
town in which such performance, show, exhibition, dance or ball is sought
to be given.”

*The July 12, 1972 West Greenwich ordinance requiring applicants to obtain a li-
cense before holding public entertainment reads in pertinent part as follows:

“Be it ordained by the Town Council of the Town of West Greenwich, as
follows:

“Section 1. Application:

“No person shall hold any public entertainment within the town of West
Greenwich without first filing a written application for a license to do so
with the Town Council of said Town. Said application shall be filed not
later than seven days prior to the next regular meeting of said Town

Council, provided, however, that said Town Council may waive this
requirement on good cause shown by the applicant.”

“Section 2. Compliance with Other Laws:

“No license shall issue by said Town Council until the applicant or
applicants shall affirmatively show that the proposed entertainment if
allowed, or the premises to be used therefor, if allowed, shall otherwise
comply with all applicable Federal, State and local laws relative to the
health, safety and welfare of the public, including, but not limited to:
‘Traffic, zoning, parking, fire protection and the like.”

174 |

rejected nor returned the license-fee check* submitted with
the application. Finally, plaintiffs alleged that both the
statute and the ordinance violated plaintiffs’ rights to due
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Count III, plaintiffs alleged that Stepping Stone had mis-
represented to them that the entertainment license had been
issued by the town council. The plaintiffs further contended
that Stepping Stone knew this representation was false and
that plaintiffs relied detrimentally upon this statement.

The plaintiffs also filed a separate two-count complaint
against Vinnie Richmond, in his capacity as Treasurer of the
Town of West Greenwich (town treasurer) pursuant to the
provisions of G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-15-5.5 In
this complaint, plaintiffs incorporated most of the same
allegations that they had made against the town council in
their earlier action.

In the first action, the town council and Stepping Stone
filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Super. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Stepping Stone, however, also chose to file
an answer to the complaint. This answer contained a cross-
claim against the town council. The town council also moved
to dismiss the cross-claim. After hearings thereon, the trial
court granted both of the town council’s motions to dismiss.

4Although neither the statute nor the ordinance requires a license fee, the parties
are apparently referring to Stepping Stone’s attempt to obtain a retail alcoholic
beverage license pursuant to chapter 7 of the General Laws, which does require
license fees.

5General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-15-5 reads as follows:

“Every person who shall have any money due him from any town or city,
or any claim or demand against any town or city, for any matter, cause or
thing whatsoever, shall take the following method to obtain the same, to
wit: Such person shall present to the town council of the town, or to the city
council of the city, a particular account of his claim, debt, damages or
demand, and how incurred or contracted; which being done, in case just
and due satisfaction is not made him by the town or city treasurer or such
town or city within forty (40) days after the presentment of such claim,
debt, damages or demand aforesaid, such person may commence his action
against such treasurer for the recovery of the same.”

| 175

In the second action, the town treasurer also made a
motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Super. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). After a hearing, the motion was granted by the
trial court.

The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in
granting the three motions to dismiss.

Because the complaints filed by plaintiffs against the town
council and the town treasurer were almost identical, we shall
initially consider the reasons used by the trial justices who
granted these two motions to dismiss. In granting the town
council’s motion, the trial justice reasoned that, based upon
Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. v. Andrews, 531 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1976), plaintiffs were precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata from complaining that the statute and the ordinance
were unconstitutional. He concluded that plaintiffs’ only
basis for complaint was the failure of the town council to give
plaintiffs notice of the July 9, 1975, hearing. The trial justice
resolved this matter by finding that because plaintiffs were
not a party of record before the town council, they were not
entitled to notice. In granting the town treasurer’s motion to
dismiss, the trial justice initially noted that the town
treasurer did not have the power to grant or deny public
entertainment licenses. He opined that plaintiffs acted
unreasonably when they concluded that the application for
the festival was accepted because the town treasurer
negotiated the license-fee check. The trial justice thus
concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim against the
town treasurer, and he granted the motion to dismiss the
complaint.

HE sWe have stated on numerous occasions that the sole
function of a Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a
complaint is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Dutson
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 119 R.I. 801, 803-4,
383 A.2d 597, 599 (1978). It is well established that such a
motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to
any relief no matter what facts could be proved in support of

176 ee

their claim. Jd. In drawing his conclusions, the trial justice is
bound to resolve all doublts in the plaintiffs’ favor and to
accept the allegations in their complaint as true. Noble Co. v.
Mack Financial Corp., 107 R.I. 12, 14, 264 A.2d 325, 327
(1970). In order to determine whether the trial court erred in
finding that plaintiffs’ complaints against the town council
and the town treasurer failed to establish any factual basis
upon which recovery could be based, we have examined the
two complaints.

In their complaints against the town council and the town
treasurer, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the town council
failed to apply properly the legislative standards established
in the statute and ordinance to the licehse application for the
festival. Although plaintiffs did not submit the license
application to the town council, plaintiffs did make an
allegation in their complaints that they authorized Stepping
Stone to submit the license application on their behalf. When
this assertion is read together with the remaining allegations
in the complaint, with all doubts resolved in plaintiff's favor,
the complaint establishes a limited principal-agent
relationship between plaintiffs and Stepping Stone for the
purpose of submitting the license application. As a result of
this relationship, plaintiffs, as principals, would thereby
possess the requisite standing to maintain the actions for the
alleged illegal conduct of the town council. See Weatherby v.
Weatherby Lumber.Co., 94 Idaho 504, 507, 492 P.2d 43, 46
(1972). The trial court erred, therefore, when it granted the
town council’s and the town treasurer’s motions to dismiss
the two complaints pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

We next consider the trial court’s granting of the town
council’s motion to dismiss Stepping Stone’s cross-claim. In
granting the town council’s motion, the trial justice ruled
that in order for Stepping Stone to recover in the cross-claim,
it would have to show that the town council acted in an
arbitrary or capricious manner in denying the license. The
trial justice concluded that in granting the town council’s
earlier motion to dismiss, the Superior Court justice found
that the town council had not acted in an illegal manner. He

es TT

therefore concluded that these findings precluded the town
council from being held liable under the cross-claim and
granted the town council’s motion to dismiss.

In reaching his decision, the trial justice clearly erred when
he failed to accept the allegations in the cross-claim as true
but instead went outside the complaint and made his ruling
based upon what he believed to be the findings of the
Superior Court justice in the earlier motion to dismiss. Our
examination of the cross-claim indicates that it alleges that
the town council acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner
when it voted to deny Stepping Stone’s license application for
the festival. The allegations, if proved, would entitle
Stepping Stone to relief for the wrongful refusal of the license
applications. The trial justice erred, therefore, when he
granted the town council’s motion to dismiss the cross-claim.

The plaintiffs’ and third-party defendant Stepping Stone’s
appeals are sustained, the judgments appealed from are

reversed, and the cases are remanded to the Superior Court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Thomas D. Gidley,
Robert C. Bruns, for plaintiff.

V. James Santaniello (for Robert H. Maguire et al.), Stone
& Clifton, Walter R. Stone, Edward C. Clifton (for Stepping
Stone Enterprises, Ltd. and Henry Davis), for defendants.

178

404 A.2d 829.
Do ores E. Suva vs, ANTHONY E. Sinva.
AUGUST 14, 1979.
Parsenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Ketiener, J. Anthony and Dolores Silva were once
husband and wife. On June 26, 1957, Dolores filed a petition
in the Superior Court seeking a divorce. Five days later
Anthony responded with a petition of his own, and on July 11
a decree was entered in the case involving Dolores’ petition,
awarding her temporary custody of the couple’s minor son,
John, on the weekdays and transferring temporary custody to
Anthony for the weekends. Dolores was also awarded tem-
porary use of the couple’s home and household furnishings

180 |

and a weekly child-support payment of $12. John at this time
was almost 2 years old.

Later, in 1962, Dolores, believing that her decree had
become final, remarried, and she, John, and her new
husband moved to Florida. Subsequently, Dolores returned
to Rhode Island and to the Family Court. There she filed a
cross-petition for divorce in the case in which Anthony was
seeking the divorce. Here a “Decree Nisi” was entered on
November 13, 1964, nunc pro tune October 23, 1964.
Anthony's petition was denied, Dolores’ cross-petition was
granted, and the decree contained the following stipulation:
“The issue of alimony and support is left open. This court
retains jurisdiction over the parties for the purpose of
determining an award of same if proper motion therefor is
made by Dolores E. Silva.” The final decree dissolving the
matrimonial bond and also awarding custody of the minor
child to Dolores was entered on April 28, 1965.

After a lapse of over 10 years, Dolores was once again
before the Family Court. On June 27, 1975, she asked that
Anthony be held in contempt for his failure to pay the $12
child-support order called for in the 1957 decree. When the
litigants appeared before the trial justice, Dolores had no
record of Anthony’s payments or nonpayments, and Anthony
insisted that he had paid everything up to the time Dolores
went south to Florida. He also maintained that he ter-
minated the support payments because Dolores had assured
him that, having obtained the divorce, she was then return-
ing to Florida and he could forget about the child support.

In a written rescript, the trial justice characterized Dolores
as an individual who was “unworthy of belief,” and he ruled
that she had failed to sustain her burden of proof. He also
ruled that the divorce decrees of 1964 and 1965 superceded
the temporary support order and thereby terminated
Anthony’s obligation to support the child. Dolores then filed
her notice of appeal.

A year went by, and Dolores once again wended her way
northward to the Family Court. In July 1977 her attorney

181

filed a motion asking that the court direct the issuance of an
execution against Anthony’s goods and chattels, and in sup-
port thereof an affidavit was offered in which Dolores
claimed that Anthony’s child-support obligations, including
interest, amounted to just over $25,500. This request was
denied without prejudice on the basis that her earlier appeal
deprived the Family Court of jurisdiction.

Dolores’ appeal directs itself to four issues: (1) subject-
matter jurisdiction, (2) the effect of the divorce decrees, (3)
the burden of proof, and (4) the reviewability of the denial of
the motion seeking the execution.

Hs Dolores takes the position that, even though it was she who
initiated the contempt proceedings in the Family Court,
jurisdiction to hear the petition remained in the Superior
Court. To support this contention, she refers us to State v.
Mulholland, 117 R.1. 321, 323, 366 A.2d 153, 154 (1976), in
which we ruled that the Superior Court retained jurisdiction
to hear certain motor-vehicle offenses which were pending
there at a time when the legislation creating the Division for
Administrative Adjudication had become effective. We
noted in Mulholland the absence in the legislation creating
the division of a savings clause or some method for trans-
ferring cases then pending in the Superior Court to the
division. However, in Fox v. Fox, 115 R.I. 593, 598, 350 A.2d
602, 604 (1976), we pointed out that the 1961 enabling act’
that created the Family Court specifically provided that once
the Family Court was established, all Superior Court
domestic-relations matters were to be transferred to the
Family Court for adjudication, and the language used in
directing the transfer makes clear that the Legislature
intended such matters as Dolores’ contempt petition to be
heard and decided by the Family Court.

HHMM Although the second issue appears to be one of first
impression in this jurisdiction, apparently as a general rule
temporary orders regarding support or alimony payments

1Public Laws 1961, ch. 73, §20.

182 es

terminate with the entry of the interlocutory decree* or the
rendition of the final decree of divorce.* Thus, even though
the temporary order was entered in the case involving
Dolores’ petition, we believe that Anthony’s obligation came
to an end with the entry in Anthony’s case of the 1964
“Decree Nisi.” At that point, Anthony was no longer
obligated to make the weekly support payments. Under the
terms of the “Decree Nisi,” Dolores could have, if she wished,
sought child support, but she did not. In fact, she could have
sought aid even though it was not provided for in the final
decree. Cambra v. Cambra, 114 B.I. 553, 556, 336 A.2d 842,
844 (1975).

Next, Dolores, after citing some cases of questionable
relevance, claims that “the burden of proving payment of a
judgment is on the person claiming the payment,” and from
there she goes on to argue that the trial justice erred when he
said that she had the burden. Here again, as a general rule, a
complainant who seeks to invoke the court’s contempt power
must make a prima facie showing by introducing proof indi-
cating the fact of the default and the amount due. 2 Nelson,
Divorce and Annulment §§16.1 at 408-409 and 16.19 at 419
(2d ed. 1961). In line with this authority, this court in Brown
v. Brown, 114 R.I. 117, 119-20, 329 A.2d 200, 201 (1974),
indicated that a prima facie case is established by the
petitioner’s producing the original support order and offering
proof of nonpayment, and once the prima facie case is estab-
lished, the question then becomes whether the respondent’s
noncompliance was justifiable. This presents a factual issue
on which the respondent has the burden of proof. Similar
sentiments have been expressed in Kemmerle v. Kemmerle,
171 Kan. 312, 314, 232 P.2d 220, 221 (1951), and State ex rel.
McKee v. McKee, 237 Ore. 583, 585, 392 P.2d 645, 646

2Van Diest v. Van Diest, 72 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308, 266 Cal. App. 2d 541, 546

(1968); Wilson v. Wilson, 99 N.J. Super. 427, 429, 240 A.2d 188, 189 (Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1968).

*Sunshine v. Sunshine, 527 P.2d 908, 909 (Colo. App. 1974); Chatsworth
Lumber Co. v. White, 214 Ga. 798, 799, 107 S.E.2d 827, 828 (1959); Rickus v.
Rickus, 184 Neb. 833, 835, 172 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1969). See also Rodearmel v.
Rodearmel, 173 Conn. 273, 377 A.2d 260, 262 (1977).

| 183

(1964). We cannot fault the trial justice for ruling that
Dolores carried the burden of proof as far as making an
initial showing of contempt.

Dolores’ motion serves as a reminder that in this juris-
diction, accrued but unpaid installments of alimony or child
support may be collected either by contempt proceedings, or
by the issuance of an execution for failure to comply with a
decree, or by an action at law as upon a judgment. Glodis v.
Glodis, 115 R.1. 370, 371, 346 A.2d 123, 123 (1975). The trial
justice’s denial of Dolores’ motion was based upon his belief
that the contempt appeal had divested the Family Court of
jurisdiction to entertain Dolores’ motion. Apparently, the
trial justice* had in mind the oft-cited rule which holds that
the transmittal and docketing of the record in this court
divests the trial court of the power to act in the case, even in
regard to motions pending before it at that time. Cavanagh
v. Cavanagh, 19 B.I. 479, 485, 380 A.2d 964, 968
(1977); Hattie Carnegie Industries, Inc. v. Lopreato, 114
R.I. 319, 323, 333 A.2d 145, 148 (1975); Devereaux v.
McGarry’s, Inc., 107 R.I. 325, 329, 266 A.2d 908, 910
(1970). However, the trial justice obviously was not aware
that at the time he was considering Dolores’ motion, the
record was still in the Family Court. The denial of Dolores’
motion occurred on December 12, 1977, and it was a week
later before the record was docketed in this court. Although
the “without prejudice” denial ostensibly lacks the requisite
finality for appellate review, we believe that the denial was
correct, even though the trial justice’s reasoning might be
faulted. To be exact, the denial should have been absolute
rather than without prejudice.

Since the Family Court had jurisdiction to hear Dolores’
motion, the next question that comes to mind is whether her
motion might be barred because of the election-of-remedies
doctrine. The answer is “No,” and the negative response
derives from this court’s previous pronouncements. This doc-
trine, which holds that the pursuit of one remedy will ex-

‘One Family Court justice considered the contempt petition, and’another justice

heard the execution motion.

184 |

clude the pursuit of another, applies only in those cases in
which the parties have two or more inconsistent remedies.
There is no bar to the use of concurrent and consistent
remedies. Inconsistency arises when the two modes of redress
are such that asserting one necessarily negates or repudiates
the other. Coderre v. Zoning Board of Review, 105 R.1. 266,
274, 251 A.2d 397, 402 (1969); Rhode Island Hospital Trust
Co. v. Rhode Island Covering Co., 95 R.1. 30, 35, 182 A.2d
438, 441 (1962). We see nothing inconsistent here. In this
jurisdiction a judgment creditor such as Dolores has a choice
of three concurrent and consistent remedies.

Notwithstanding the availability of these different avenues
of relief, Dolores’ motion for an execution is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. The underlying basis of the doctrine
of res judicata, as well as collateral estoppel, is that an issue
need, and should, be judicially determined only once. Matter
of McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1978). A judgment
may be given res judicata effect even though that judgment is
subject to an appeal. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 117 R.I. 83,
86, 362 A.2d 147, 149 (1976); Perez v. Pawtucket
Redevelopment Agency, 111 R.I. 327, 337-38, 302 A.2d 785,
791-92 (1973). Applying these principles to Dolores’ motion,
we find that the denial of her contempt petition obviously
bars her from taking a proverbial second bite, in which she
would attempt to prove to another Family Court justice that
Anthony failed to comply with the 1957 order. This she
cannot do.

Dolores’ appeal is denied and dismissed, and the case is
remitted to the Family Court with direction to delete the
words “without prejudice” from the decree denying Dolores’
motion for an execution.

Aram K. Berberian, for petitioner.

Michael E. Civittolo, Harris L. Berson, for respondent.

405 A.2d 16.

MEMBERS OF THE JAMESTOWN SCHOOL ComMITTEE et al.
vs. Dr. THomas C, Scumuvr et al.

AUGUST 15, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

OE

Bevitacgua, C.J. The United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island has certified for our resolution’
three questions concerning G.L. 1956, §§16-21.1-1, -2, -3
(Supp. 1978) (hereinafter referred to as the act). This statute
provides a program for busing pupils to schools not within
the limits of the city or town in which the students reside.
The plaintiffs, both individually as taxpayers of their towns
and collectively as members of the School Committees of
Jamestown and Charlestown, brought an action in the
Federal District Court against the Commissioner of
Education (the commissioner) and other state defendants,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the act violates both the
State and Federal Constitutions and an injunction against
administration of the statute. The following questions were
certified:

1. Does the act violate article XII of the Rhode Island
Constitution?

2. Does the act violate article IV, section 2 of the Rhode
Island Constitution? :

3. Can the act be fairly construed to avoid federal con-
stitutional infirmities?

Before addressing the certified questions, we note that
while the Federal District Court has the fundamental obliga-
tion to determine whether the act violates the Federal
Constitution, the function of this court is to construe the act®
and to decide whether it contravenes the Rhode Island
Constitution. Nowak, Rotunda, Young, Handbook on
Constitutional Law 21 (1978).

'The Federal District Court certified these questions pursuant to R.I. Sup. Ct.
Rule 6.

*General Laws 1956, §§16-21.1-1, -2, -3 read as follows:
“16-21.1-1, General Purposes. — This chapter shall be construed and
applied to create a state plan for the busing of pupils beyond city or town

limits, in recognition of the legislative policy to encourage the establishment
of and continuance of consolidated and regional schools, to provide a unified

os

The General Assembly has divided Rhode Island into five
transportation districts. Section 16-21.1-2. The act further
provides that students, whether they attend public schools or
nonpublic, nonprofit, regionalized or consolidated schools,
shall be transported to school by bus in two instances. First, a
student who both resides in and attends school in the same
transportation district receives transportation. Section
16-21.1-2. Second, under certain conditions, a pupil who
attends a school outside the trasnportation region in which he
resides, but within 15 miles of his residence, may obtain
busing services by acquiring a variance from the
commissioner. The latter provision is predicated upon
findings by the commissioner that no similar school exists
within the region in which the pupil resides and that bus
transportation is necessary to enable the student to enjoy an
educational opportunity that is rightfully his or hers to
pursue. Only upon making such findings may the com-
missioner grant a variance requiring a city or town to provide
bus transportation. Section 16-21.1-3.

statewide busing service, to afford to pupils who attend public schools the
opportunity at the election of the school committee of the city or town in
which the pupils reside, to attend a public school, either full time or part
time, outside of the city or town which provides a program or curriculum
not available within the city or town in which the pupil resides, as
authorized by §16-3.1-1, et seq, to afford to handicapped children equal
educational opportunity, to afford bus transportation to pupils who attend
non-public non-profit schools which are consolidated, regionalized or
otherwise established to serve residents of a specific area within the state,
and who may be counted for purposes [of] reimbursement to cities and
towns under the state aid formula provided by §16-7-22, et seq, to conserve
valuable natural resources by reducing the number of vehicles necessary to
transport pupils to school, and, to provide for the transportation of public
school students who attend schools located outside of the city or town in
which they reside, to protect the health, safety and welfare of pupils who
live at such distances from the schools which they attend as to make it
impractical or hazardous to require the pupil to walk to school.”

“16-21.1-2. School bus districts established. — There are hereby
established school bus districts within the state to provide bus transportation
in the interest of public safety, health and welfare for pupils in grades
kindergarten through grade twelve (12), or in special education programs,
who attend public schools, including vocational schools and special
education programs provided in accord with regulations of the Rhode Island
state board of regents for education, consolidated schools established under

ee = 15!
I

The plaintiffs contend that the act violates article XII of
the Rhode Island Constitution by diverting tax dollars
appropriated for the support of public schools to the
transportation of students enrolled in nonpublic schools. The
relevant sections of article XII are as follows:

“§1. Duty of general assembly. — The diffusion of
knowledge, as well as of virtue, among the people,
being essential to the preservation of their rights and
liberties, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to
promote public schools, and to adopt all means which

the provisions of [§16-10-1], regional schools established under the
provisions of §16-10-1, et seq, or who participate in cooperative programs as
provided by §16-3.1-1, et seq, and non-public non-profit schools which are
consolidated, regionalized or otherwise established to serve residents of a
specific area within the state which schools satisfy the requirements of law
for any of the grades of school, kindergarten through grade twelve (12), as
follows:

“Region I The towns of Burrillville, North Smithfield, and Cumberland,
and the city of Woonsocket

“Region II The county of Kent, except the town of West Greenwich and
the towns of Foster, Glocester and Scituate

“Region III The towns of Lincoln, Smithfield, Johnston, North
Providence, Barrington, Warren and Bristol and the cities of Cranston,
Central Falls, East Providence, Pawtucket and Providence

“Region IV The county of Washington and the towns of Jamestown and
West Greenwich

“Region V The towns of Little Compton, Middletown, Portsmouth and
Tiverton and the city of Newport

“A pupil attending a school, including a public school, vocational school,
special education program provided in accord with regulations of the Rhode
Island state board of regents for education, a consolidated school established
under the provisions of §16-10-1, et seq, a regional school established under
the provisions of §16-3-1, et seq, as authorized by §16-3.1-1, et seq, or a non-
public non-profit school kindergarten through grade twelve (12),
consolidated, regionalized or otherwise established to serve residents of a
specific area within the state for any of the grades of schools, kindergarten
through grade twelve (12), in the interest of public safety, health and
welfare, shall be provided with bus transportation to the school of facility
which the pupil attends, within the region in which the pupil resides, by the

100

they may deem necessary and proper to secure to the
people the advantages and opportunities of education.

“§2. Permanent school fund. — The money which
now is or which may hereafter be appropriated by law
for the establishment of a permanent fund for the
support of public schools, shall be securely invested, and

- remain a perpetual fund for that purpose.

ae

“§4, Implementation of article — Diversion of
funds. — The general assembly shall make all necessary
provisions by law for carrying this article into effect.
They shall not divert said money or fund from the
aforesaid uses, nor borrow, appropriate, or use the
same, or any part thereof, for any other purpose, under
any pretence whatsoever.”

The plaintiffs note the clear mandate in section 2 of article
XII that the permanent school fund be applied specifically
for the support of public schools and interpret section 4 in
conjunction with section 1 of the same article as prohibiting
the diversion of funds from the support of public schools to
the promotion of private schools. Typical of what plaintiffs
perceive as an unconstitutional diversion of funds is the
allocation of money for the purpose of transporting students
by publicly funded buses to private schools.

school committee of the city or town within which the pupil resides.

“16-21.1-3, Variances permitted. — Variances to require a city or town to
provide bus transportation to a pupil who attends a school, except a special
education facility, outside the region in which the pupil resides shall be
granted by the commissioner of education if he finds that there is no similar
school within the region, that such transportation is necessary to provide an
educational opportunity which the pupil has a right to pursue, and that the
school building which the pupil attends is within fifteen (15) miles of the city
or town of which the pupil is a resident.

“Variances to require a city or town to provide bus transportation to a
pupil entitled to enrollment [in] a special education program, provided in
accord with regulations of the Rhode Island state board of regents for
education, shall be granted by the commissioner of education if he finds that
such transportation is necessary in order that the pupil enroll in a special
education facility located outside of the region and there is no similar facility
within the region.”

1°

Hs At the outset we note that this court must construe a duly
enacted statute to be constitutional if such a construction is
reasonably possible. State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42, 46,
385 A.2d 642, 647 (1978); J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 116
R.I. 54, 71, 352 A.2d 661, 670 (1976). Before we decide
whether the act corresponds to the intent of the
constitutional framers, we shall first seek to glean that
intention from the language in section 1 of article XII.

The text of article XII, section 1 is facially ambiguous. It is
unclear whether the duties of the General Assembly “to
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of
education” was intended by the constitutional framers to be
limited to public education. If we apply the maxim noscitur a
sociis® to this language, then the word “education” would be
read in light of the less comprehensive idea “public
education.” See Commonwealth v. Baker, 368 Mass. 58, 68,
330 N.E.2d 794, 800 (1975); Deignan v. Cowan Plastic
Products Corp., 99 R.I. 193, 196, 206 A.2d 534, 536 (1965).
See also 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction §47.16 at D01
(4th ed. Sands 1973). As a result, the word “education” is
qualified by the word “public” and all the duties of the
General Assembly would be read as bounded by the domain
of public education.

On the other hand, section 1 is worded in the conjunctive:

“it shall be the duty of the general assembly to
promote public schools, and to adopt all means which
they may deem necessary and proper to secure to the
people the advantages and opportunities of education.”
(Emphasis added.)

Generally, the conjunctive “and” should not be considered as
the equivalent of the disjunctive “or.” See Earle v. Zoning
Board of Review, 96 R.I. 321, 324, 191 A.2d 161, 163 (1963).
Use of the conjunctive implies separate, as opposed to

*This doctrine permits the meaning of doubtful words to be discovered by
reference to their association with other associated words and phrases. See 2A
Sutherland, Statutory Construction §47.16 at 101 (4th ed. Sands 1973). The
meaning of general words is limited by that of the more specific words. Id.

19.

dependent, duties. See 1A Sutherland, Statutory
Construction §21.14 at 90-91 (4th ed. Sands 1972).
Therefore, we could interpret the duty of the General
Assembly to promote public schools as entirely independent
of its duty to adopt all means necessary and proper to secure
to the people the advantages and opportunities of education.
Because both interpretations of article XII, section 1 are
equally viable, we choose to view the constitutional mandate
of that section in broad terms and hold that the right of the
General Assembly to bus students is not limited to public-
school pupils for the reasons set forth below.

State courts have diverged on whether school-busing
legislation violates their state constitutions. A minority of
courts, relying on now-defunct precedent, has held that it is
not constitutional for states to use public funds to implement
a statute providing for the transportation of nonpublic-school
students. See, e.g., Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932
(Alaska 1961); Opinion of the Justices, 59 Del. 196, 216 A.2d
668 (1966); Spears v. Honda, 51 Haw. 1, 449 P.2d 130
(1968); Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho 390, 488 P.2d 860
(1971); Board of Education v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla.
1963); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002
(1942); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District No. 506, 33
Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); State ex el. Reynolds v.
Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962). In so
ruling, these courts relied on the reasoning of the New York
Court of Appeals in Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y.
200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938), which held that nonpublic-school
busing is an indirect contribution made in aid of the
maintenance and support of private schools. Id. at 211-12, 15
N.E.2d at 582. Approximately thirty years later, however,
the New York court expressly overruled Judd in Board of
Education v. Allen, 20 N.Y. 2d 109, 115, 228 N.E.2d 791,
794, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 799, 803 (1967), aff'd in Board of Educa-
tion v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060
(1968), thereby weakening the impact of cases premised on
Judd.

EE

A growing number of jurisdictions, however, adopting
what is commonly referred to as the child-benefit theory, has
rejected the view that legislation permitting busing to
nonpublic schools, thus contributing indirectly to the
maintenance and support of those schools, is constitutionally
infirm. See e.g., Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 663,
167 P.2d 256, 261 (1946); Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 147
Conn. 374, 391, 161 A.2d 770, 777 (1960); Board of
Education v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 461, 299 N.E.2d 737,
743 (1973); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 439, 191 S.W.2d
930, 932 (1945); Bloom v. School Committee, 376 Mass.
35, 47, 379 N.E.2d 578, 585 (1978); Rhoades v.
Abington Township School District, 424 Pa. 202, 220, 226
A.2d 53, 64 (1967); State ex rel. Hughes v. Board of
Education, 154 W.Va. 107, 121-22, 174 S.E.2d 711, 720
(1970). Under this theory, transportation of pupils is viewed
as a legitimate function of the governmental police power to
protect the health and safety of all students who are
compelled by law to attend school. In order to fall within this
theory, however, the benefit must reach children attending
public as well as private schools. Note, Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971), 4 Conn. L. Rev. 541, 542 (1971-72). Although private
schools arguably receive some benefit in having pupils bused
to their doors at state expense, courts acceding to the child-
benefit theory have consistently held that any aid derived by
private schools because their students receive bus
transportation is incidental to the direct benefit enjoyed by
the pupils themselves.

Use of the police power to further the well-being of
private-school children by providing bus transportation has
been analogized to police and fire-department protection of
nonpublic-school occupants and nonpublic-school buildings.
See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 17, 67 S.Ct.
504, 512, 91 L.Ed. 711, 724 (1947); Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal.
App. 2d 653, 660, 167 P.2d 256, 262-63 (1946); State ex rel.
Hughes v. Board of Education, 154 W.Va. at 118-19, 174
§.E.2d at 718-19 (1970). Each of these protective services

10 ee

constitutes a public expenditure of money that indirectly
benefits private schools. In view of the purpose of the act,
which is to protect the health, safety and welfare of Rhode
Island pupils, we agree that providing bus transportation to
students is a legitimate exercise of the police power. Safety is
a religiously neutral concept; revenues expended to ensure
the health, safety and welfare of all school children are spent
for a public purpose. The fact that the act answers the needs
of both private- and public-school children does not necessi-
tate the conclusion that the Legislature has erroneously
appraised the public need. See Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. at 6, 67 S.Ct. at 507, 91 L.Ed. at 718.

Indeed, the General Assembly is merely responding to the
dictates of the mandatory education law, §§16-19-1 to -9, by
enabling all citizens to comply easily and safely with that
law. See State ex rel. Hughes v. Board of Education, 154
W.Va. at 117, 174 S.E.2d at 718. In a sense, busing is a tool
for enforcing the duty of compulsory education of minor
children that states place upon parents. See Board of
Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 322-23, 199 A.628,
631-32 (1938); Alexander v. Bartlett, 14 Mich. App. 177,
182, 165 N.W.2d 445, 448 (1968). The United States
Supreme Court has held that parents, acting under a state
compulsory-education law, may send their children to state-
approved religious schools. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925). We would
thus be fostering an anomaly if we held that the state is only
obligated under article XII to assist those parents who choose
public over private schools, particularly when compliance
with the duty to educate children may result in danger to the
health or safety of school children who would otherwise
oftentimes be forced to confront on foot or on bicycles the
hazards of traffic or of inclement weather. See Rhoades v.
Abington Township School District, 424 Pa. 202, 206-07, 226
A.2d 53, 56-57 (1967). See also Alexander v. Bartlett, 14
Mich. App. at 181, 165 N.W.2d at 447-48. Although the
language of article XII, which does not specifically prohibit
the use of public funds for the support of private schools,

a  °

distinguishes the situation under our review from that of the
courts cited above, we believe that the rationale behind the
child-benefit theory pertains to the framers’ intent behind
article XII. Pursuant to the second clause in section 1 of

. article XII, the state has the obligation “to adopt all means
which they may deem necessary and proper to secure to the
people the advantages and opportunities of education.”
Because we perceive the ultimate goal of article XII to be
education in general, we therefore hold that article XII,
section 1 permits the state to utilize its police powers by
assisting all parents who must comply with the compulsory
education law, notwithstanding the fact that they may have
exercised their constitutional right to choose a religious,
rather than a public institution, as allowed in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, supra.

The California Supreme Court has similarly interpreted its
constitution and busing statute. Article IX, section 1 of the
California Constitution,t which refers to the diffusion of
knowledge as essential to the preservation of liberty, is
substantially similar to article XII, section 1 of the Rhode
Island Constitution. See Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d
653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946). The California court held that its
busing statute, which permitted private-school student
busing along established public-school bus routes, was validly
designed to effectuate the ideal of education for a self-
governing people embodied in the California Constitution.
See id. at 664-67, 167 P.2d at 261-63. See also Alexander v.
Bartlett, 14 Mich. App. 177, 181, 165 N.W.2d 445, 447
(1968).

“Article IX, section 1 of the California Constitution states:

“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvement.”

106 ee

Our holding is further buttressed by the fact that the
United States Supreme Court, applying the child-benefit
theory, found an analogous state busing statute to be
constitutional under the First Amendment. See Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16-18, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511-13,
91 L. Ed. 711, 723-25 (1947). Mr. Justice Black, writing for
the majority, approved the New Jersey busing statute as a
general program that neutrally benefits all citizens without
regard to their religious beliefs. See id. at 18, 67 S.Ct. at 513,
91 L. Ed, at 7255

In contrast with section 1, section 2 of article XI
unambiguously declares that funds belonging to the
permanent school fund must be used solely for the support of
public schools. On its face the act is constitutional
notwithstanding the provisions of section 2 because it does
not mandate utilization of the permanent school fund in
order to bus private school children. In implementing the
act, the Legislature can appropriate money into a fund other
than the permanent school fund for the purpose of busing
school children, Therefore, busing need not depend on
money from the section 2 fund. If this fund were diminished
for the benefit of nonpublic school student transportation,
however, implementation of the act would be in violation of
section 2. In this regard we note that the record indicates that
the permanent school fund has never been depleted for the
costs of the school busing program of the act. Henry W.
Stevenson, Jr., the Assistant Commissioner of Education,
who is in charge of the office of Educational Finance, has
indicated in his affidavit that funds used for the act’s busing
program are obtained from local revenues and sources other
than the permanent school fund of section 2. Assuming that

®The New Jersey situation is distinguishable from that of Rhode Island in one
main respect. In New Jersey, a township board of education, acting pursuant to the
busing statute, authorized reimbursing the money expended by parents for their
children’s bus transportation by regular buses operated by the public transportation
system. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, noted that this system does not furnish
transportation to school students, but only gives tax funds in the form of
reimbursement to parents. Therefore, he.claimed, the safety of the pupils remains
unaffected. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 19-20, 67 S.Ct. 504,

. 518-14, 91 L. Ed. 711, 725-26 (1947).

SS

the Federal District Court finds as a fact that the section 2
fund is not being utilized to further the goals of the act, we
also hold that in practice the act does not contravene section
2 of article XII. Other state courts interpreting constitutional
provisions similar to article XII, section 2, have upheld their
busing statutes when the costs for busing to private schools
were not paid out of the permanent school fund. See, e.g.,
Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 658, 167 P.2d 256,
258 (1946); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 444, 191 S.W.2d
930, 935 (1945).

We next examine whether the act is an appropriate
example of legislative authority pursuant to section 4 of
article XII. The plaintiffs suggest that in so doing we should
read the present version of section 4 in light of the 1841 draft
of section 4, which is as follows:

“Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall make all the
necessary provisions by law for carrying this Article into
effect. They shall direct the application of the interest
arising from said fund; but no law shall ever be passed
authorizing said fund or any money appropriated to
education or any part thereof, or the interest thereon, to
be borrowed; or to be diverted or appropriated to any
other use than the support of Public Schools in this
State.” (Emphasis added.)

Such a reading, they argue, leads to the conclusion that
section 4 as adopted also prohibits appropriations for busing
students to other than public schools. The current version of
section 4° contains no admonition against using “any money
appropriated to education * + « [for] the support of Public
Schools * * *.” Instead, it merely prohibits the use of the
permanent school fund for purposes other than those speci-
fied in section 2. Furthermore, coupled with this prohibition

°Section 4 reads as follows:

“The general assembly shall make all necessary provisions by law for
carrying this article into effect. They shall not divert said money or fund
from the aforesaid uses, nor borrow, appropriate, or use the same, or any
part thereof, for any other purpose, under any pretence whatsoever.”

108 ee

is the mandate that “[t]he general assembly shall make all
necessary provisions by law for carrying this article into
effect.”

We do not adopt plaintiffs’ interpretation of section 4.
Rather, assuming arguendo that the framers had ratified the
1841 draft version of section 4, it appears not to be in
harmony with section 1,7 which imposes on the General
Assembly the duty “to secure to the people the advantages
and opportunities of education,” as well as the duty to
promote public schools. Section 4 as adopted, however,
aligns with what this court perceives as the intent of the
framers manifested in section 1. As in section 1, in section 4
the General Assembly has two separate duties. One duty is to
apply the permanent school fund created by section 2 only
for the purpose described in that section, namely, for the
support of public schools. In response to its second
responsibility, which is to facilitate the “diffusion of knowl-
edge” and “to secure to the people the advantages and
opportunities of education,” the General Assembly enacted
the act. The act heralds a general program for the trans-
portation of school children and requires a neutral stance in
allotting state police-power benefits among all students of
Rhode Island. For these reasons, we hold that the act
comports with the intent of article XII of the Rhode Island
Constitution.

ran

The second question certified to this court is whether the
act violates article IV, section 2 of the Rhode Island
Constitution. Article IV, section 2 reads as follows:

“Section 1 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“tt shall be the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools, and
to adopt all means which they may deem necessary and proper to secure to
the people the advantages and opportunities of education.”

ee = 199

“§2. Power in general assembly — Enactment and style
of law. — The legislative power, under this Constitu-
tion, shall be vested in two houses, the one to be called
the senate, the other the house of representatives; and
both together the general assembly. The concurrence of
the two houses shall be necessary to the enactment of
laws. The style of their laws shall be, It is enacted, by
the general assembly as follows: * * *”

The plaintiffs argue that the act is an unreasonable
delegation of legislative authority as we interpreted that
phrase in Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional
School District Committee, 116 R.I. 90, 352 A.2d 634 (1976).
Relying on Jennings, plaintiffs contend that the act is so
devoid of legislative standards and safeguards that people of
ordinary intelligence are unable to determine who designates
which private schools will be regionalized. The plaintiffs
further assert that there are no guidelines to determine
whether more than one private regional school may serve the
same area and whether a private school has been “otherwise
established to serve residents of a specific area within the
state * * *,”

In Jennings we stated that the nondelegation doctrine pro-
hibits only unreasonable delegations of legislative power, id.
at 97-98, 352 A.2d at 638, citing City of Warwick v.
Warwick Regular Firemen’s Association, 106 R.1. 109, 113,
256 A.2d 206, 209 (1969), and established two prerequisites
to a valid delegation. First, the General Assembly must have
dealt with the fundamental issues of policy inherent in the
legislation. Second, the Legislature (delegator) may delegate
power to a private body (delegatee) only when legislative
standards and safeguards adequately circumscribe the exer-
cise of that power. Compliance with these guidelines is
necessary to protect the public from arbitrary or self-
interested actions on the part of the private-body delegatee.
Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School District
Committee, 116 R.1. at 98, 352 A.2d at 638-39.

200

In Jennings we found that the previous busing statute,
G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §16-21-2, contained no legis-
lative standards because it did not limit the circumstances in
which a school could declare that it served a specific geo-
graphical area and thus become entitled to transportation
services. Id. at 98, 352 A.2d at 639. Moreover, that statute
did not place limits on the size of the area that a private
school could decide to service. In effect, the schools them-
selves could determine not only which townships had to
provide busing, but also how far students were to be bused.
Id.

We also held in Jennings that the statute lacked adequate
safeguards against abuse because it permitted private schools
to act in their own self-interest by regionalizing or expanding
their present territories. The schools could thereby pass their
transportation costs on to public-school districts. Id. at 100,
352 A.2d at 640. Responding to Jennings, the Legislature
amended the busing statute in an effort to avoid the above
infirmities.

In compliance with the first prong of the Jennings test, the
General Assembly has outlined the fundamental policy con-
siderations inherent in the legislation. Furthermore, by
establishing five school districts and a variance procedure,
the General Assembly has carefully circumscribed the in-
terest that private schools may have in expanding for pur-
poses of transportation. See §§16-21.1-1, -2, and -3. In
contrast with the situation in Jennings, under the present
statute the duty of any particular city or town to bus students
to any school, no matter how unique the program of that
school may be, is extinguished at the point where the
transportation district ends, or, in the event of a variance, at
a distance of 15 miles from the city or town in which the
pupil resides. The General Assembly, not the schools, has
divided the service areas into five transportation districts, the
limits of which may be ignored only by the commissioner in
the exercise of his authority to issue variances where the
necessary conditions are met. Unlike the situation in
Jennings, even though a nonpublic school may control its

Ss

territorial service area, it can only expect to receive
transportation for its students within the geographic pa-
rameters established by the General Assembly. And, as noted
by defendants in their brief, use of a statute to the extent
allowed by the Legislature does not constitute selfish abuse of
that statute. Because the Legislature has recited the policy
considerations relative to the act and has provided adequate
safeguards and standards for implementation of those
sections, we hold that the act now conforms to the law
enunciated in Jennings and therefore does not violate article
IV, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution.

Tl

The third question presented to us for our consideration is
whether the act can be fairly construed to avoid federal con-
stitutional infirmities. As we noted above, however, our
duty, unlike that of the Federal District Court, is not to
render a decision on the federal constitutional claim. In
attempting to answer the above question, we find ourselves
teetering on the brink of addressing and deciding whether the
act violates the First Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. Because the Federal District Court did not request our
interpretation of specific statutory language, we respectfully
refrain from answering this question. See, e.g., Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47, 96 S.Ct, 2857, 2866, 49 L.
Ed.2d 844, 855 (1976); Baird v. Attorney General, 371
Mass. 741, 745, 360 N.E.2d 288, 291 (1977).

We thus answer the first two certified questions in the
negative: the act does not violate either article XII or article
IV, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution.

Mr. Justice Kelleher, with whom Mr. Justice Joslin joins,
concurring. In advising the Federal District Court as to the
reach of art. XII, I believe that, rather than relying on
canons of statufory construction, we must effectuate the in-
tent of the makers of the constitution by looking at the history
of the time and examining the state of things existing when
the constitution was framed and adopted, having in mind the
mischief that was to be remedied. Bailey v. Baronian, 120
R.I. 389, 392, 394 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1978). Consequently,

202

we must take a look at what were the educational concerns in
Rhode Island at the turn of the nineteenth century and what
transpired in the General Assembly during the 40 or so odd
years preceding the adoption of our constitution in 1842.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Rhode
Island schools were private enterprises assisted and aided by
the towns but supported by fees charged to those who at-
tended them. While municipal governments acknowledged
an obligation to assist schools, it was assumed that the pri-
mary responsibility for educating children rested with the
parents, the families, and other interested individuals. By the
end of the eighteenth century, most towns had provided
enough assistance to insure the operation of at least one or
more fee-charging schools in their areas. Many Rhode
Islanders were reluctant to accept the idea of tax-supported
free schools.

At this point in time, Rhode Island’s social structure was

composed of three groups: plantation owners and country
merchants; artisans and shopkeepers, who by the mid-1700’s
had become a part of an emerging class of mechanics and
small manufacturers; and farmers. The merchants and
plantation owners, having possessed the necessary
wherewithal, could send their children to private schools; the
artisans and shopkeepers lacked the wealth to afford private
education and could not muster sufficient clout which would
guarantee the enactment of free-school legislation; and the
farmers opposed free schools as an unnecessary tax burden
because they viewed the education then being provided as
being totally unrelated to their needs.

In 1795 John Howland spearheaded the movement to
establish free schools. At that time he was a member of the
Providence Association of Mechanics and Manufacturers.
Subsequently, in February 1799, the association, through a
special committee composed of Howland and such other in-
dividuals as Joel Metcalf, Peter Grinnell, and Samuel
Thurber, Jr., petitioned the General Assembly and listed
four reasons why the assembly should make “legal provision
for the establishment of Free Schools sufficient to educate all
the children + * « through the state.” The reasons were:

ee = 203

“That the means of education which are enjoyed in this
state, are very inadequate to a purpose so highly im-
portant; That numbers of the rising generation, whom
nature has liberally endowed, are suffered to grow up in
ignorance, when a common education would qualify
them to act their parts in life with advantage to the
public, and reputation to themselves; That in
consequence of there being no legal provision for the es-
tablishment of schools, and for the want of public atten-
tion and encouragement, this so essential a part of our
social duty is left to the partial patronage of individuals,
whose cares cannot extend beyond the limits of their
own families, while numbers in every part of the state
are deprived of a privilege which it is the common right
of every child to enjoy; * * + That liberty and security,
under a republican form of government, depend on a
general diffusion of knowledge among the people.”

The association’s petition was referred to committee, and
in a report submitted in June 1799 the committee
acknowledged the obstacles that would be raised to the pro-
posal but urged support for the petitioners’ request. The com-
mittee’s report was accompanied by a proposed bill entitled
“An Act to Establish Free Schools.” The bill required each
town to establish and maintain at its own expense one or
more free schools to serve white individuals between the ages
of 6 and 20 who needed and applied for instruction in read-
ing, writing, and common arithmetic. The Free School Act
finally became law during March 1800.

However, passage of the 1800 act did not establish free
schools throughout the state. All towns, with the exception of
Providence and Smithfield, refused to implement fully its
provisions. The law was repealed in 1803, but Providence,
under Howland’s leadership, continued to operate a system
of free schools.

Agitation for a statewide system of free public schools con-
tinued. The “American and Gazette,” a widely read news-
paper of the day, in its January 11, 1828, edition noted the
approach of the January session of the General Assembly and
commented:

20 ee

“Let free schools be established to the extent our present
means will allow, and future generations will provide
for preserving and enlarging the system. There is no in-
stance in which a system of free schools, once fairly es-
tablished, has been abandoned.”

In due course,* the Legislature enacted the School Act of
1828. The first section of this act provided that the first
$10,000 realized by the state treasury from the operations of
the lotteries and fees attained from auctioneers should be set
aside and paid to the various towns “for the exclusive purpose
of keeping public schools and paying expenses thereof * * +,”
The town’s share of this money was to be determined by con-
sulting the federal census reports and seeing what portion of
the town’s population was under the age of 16. Control of the
schools was vested in school committees rather than in town
councils. The towns were not compelled to supplement the
state’s appropriation. More importantly, the act established a
permanent fund for the support of the public schools and for
that purpose appropriated $5,000 with the direction that the
General Treasurer invest this sum “in the stock of some safe
and responsible bank * * *.” All lottery and auctioneer
income over $10,000, as well as “all donations that may be
made to said fund” were to be likewise invested. The
permanent fund in actuality was a trust fund whose income
could only be used if the payments made by the lottery entre-
preneurs and the auctioneers failed to reach the $10,000
level. It should be noted that the emphasis of the 1828 legisla-
tion was on “public,” rather than on “free,” schools.

Most of the pre-1828 events which I have related in this opinion can be found
detailed in a thoroughly informative and interesting article published by the Rhode
Island Historical Society in its publication Rhode Island History, Vol. 37:4
(November 1978). The article, which can be found at p. 111, is entitled “John
Howland: Pioneer in the Free School Movement,” and the author is Professor
Francis X. Russo. The 1828 to 1841 events to which I have alluded, including the
ups and downs of the permanent school fund, were extracted from Public
Education in Rhode Island (1918), written by the late, distinguished Rhode Island
educator, Dr. Charles Carroll. The description of the Dorr Rebellion facet of the
narrative comes from Professor Patrick T. Conley’s Democracy in Decline, a 1977
scholarly study of Rhode Island’s constitutional development from 1776 to 1841.

SE 3:

Subsequent sessions of the General Assembly saw the intro-
duction of several pieces of legislation where towns were
seeking to gain better benefits from the 1828 act. A decade
later, in 1839, the Legislature made a substantial revision in
the legislation relating to public schools. The annual appro-
priation was raised to $25,000, income received on surplus
federal funds deposited with the state pursuant to an act of
Congress approved in June 1836 was also allocated to the
support of the public schools, the permanent school fund was
preserved, the powers of the school committee were more
clearly defined, and municipalities were required to provide
the Secretary of State with a variety of statistical
information.

On October 4, 1841, the People’s Convention under the
leadership of Thomas W. Dorr met in Providence for the pur-
pose of creating a new government to supplant the legally
constituted state government, which at that time continued
to operate under the terms of the Royal Charter. The most
controversial of the much-needed reforms embodied in the
resulting People’s Constitution involved the extension of
suffrage. The proposed constitution rejected the charter
government's statutory requirement that in order to vote, a
person had to be a “freeholder of lands, tenements, or
hereditaments in such town where he shall be admitted free,
of the value of [forty] pounds [ca. $134] » * « or the eldest
son of such a freeholder.” Suffrage under the People’s Consti-
tution was instead to be extended to all adult white male
citizens with 1 year’s residence in Rhode Island. The
proposed constitution also contained specific directives for
public education and “free schools”; its art. XII reached
beyond the establishment of a permanent school fund and
attempted to get within its grasp “[a]ll moneys which now
axe or may hereafter be appropriated by the authority of the
state to public education * * *.”

The surprising support accorded to Dorr’s beliefs
prompted the supporters of the regular government to act.
Pursuant to a call given by the General Assembly, a Land-
holders’ Convention met in November 1841, but adjourned

206

after partly drafting a document that essentially ignored
reformers’ demands. Under pressure of the recently but
unofficially ratified People’s Constitution, the landholders
met again in February 1842 and adopted a proposed
constitution whose art. XII contained a declaration that was
as uncompromisingly supportive of public education as were
the pronouncements made by the Dorrites.° In late March
1842, the document was the subject of a 3-day referendum
and narrowly missed being ratified.

Dorr had been “elected” Governor under the provisions of
the People’s Constitution, and with the coming of spring
came the Dorr Rebellion. Dorr’s efforts to forcibly assume
the prerogatives of his office began with his May 18, 1842
attempt to seize the Cranston Street arsenal in Providence.
The seizure turned into a fiasco as Dorr’s antiquated artillery
refused to fire. Dorr fled the state but returned to Chepachet
in late June to await the proposed July 4 reconvening of the
People’s General Assembly, but the tide was running against
him. A call for another constitutional convention was issued.
This third effort had substantial support from many
individuals who embraced the principle of extending the
right of suffrage but abhorred violence. They believed that
voting reforms could be obtained through deliberations in the
convention rather than an armed confrontation. On July 27,
Dorr issuéd a order disbanding his undermanned and ill-
supplied military force, and on the following day, July 28,
militia loyal to the incumbent Governor stormed the insur-
gents’ fortification on Chepachet’s Acote’s Hill. Dorr’s war
had ended.

With the approval by the electorate in November 1842 of
the convention’s proposal came the adoption of art. XII and
the abolition of the lottery. Thus, even though the people had
given constitutional status to the permanent school fund,
they had at the same time dried up its most productive source
of revenue.

See Appendix.

27

Three additional historical comments are worth noting.
One was made by the state auditor when in June 1874 he
reported to the General Assembly about the events of the
fiscal year that had ended on the previous April 30. At page 5
he referred to the balance in the permanent school fund,
which was just in excess of $250,000, and reported that the
income subject to investment contributed by the auctioneers
amounted to $12,956, The auditor went on to say:

“Tt is a question or subject matter deserving the atten-
tion of your honorable body, whether the best interests
of the State, pecuniarily considered, would be enhanced
by repealing all laws having reference to any farther
reservation of the sum annually received from auction-
eers to be added to this fund. The sum now appro-
priated annually for public schools is nearly five times as
large as the accumulated dividends on this fund, and no
good reason seems to now exist for a continuance of this
practice or policy.”

The auditor commented that, in light of the present state
debt, good financial policy would seem to dictate that it
would be prudent and economical to dispose of assets and
investments of this nature.’

The Board of Education in its 1918 annual report to the
General Assembly at pages 15 and 16 alluded to the
permanent school fund and said that its yield was “so incon-
siderable a part of the money annually appropriated for the
support of public education that its income is practically a
negligible element in computing school budgets.”

Lastly, in 1922 the commission studying the question of
financing public education also alluded to the permanent
school fund and once again reported" that expenditures for

Apparently, the auditor overlooked art. XII’s directive that the permanent
fund is a “perpetual fund.” He was not alone because there were other times during
the 1800's when, the constitution notwithstanding, moneys which should have
been part of the fund were either spent or transferred to the general account.

UThe Report of the Special Commission on Public School Finance and
Administration, p. 11 (1922).

208

educational purposes “are being paid by appropriations from
the general fund.” The fund’s income for that period was
$11,301, and this sum was used to supplement the annual
appropriation for “teachers’ money.”

It is my belief that art. XII embodies the state’s
constitutional commitment to support and foster public
education exclusively. Many years ago Chief Justice Ames
put the purpose of this article in its true focus when, as a
single judge hearing an appeal from a decree of the
Commissioner of Public Schools, he observed that the twelfth
article of the constitution obligated the General Assembly “to
diffuse knowledge and virtue amongst the people of the State
by the promotion of public schools + * *.” Ammons v. School
District No. 5, 7 R.I. 596, 598 (1864). The permanent school
fund called for by sec. 2 is still in existence. General Laws
1956 (1969 Reenactment) ch. 4 of title 16 relates specifically
and solely to the custody and investment of the permanent
school fund. Today the use of the income from the fund is
dictated by the Board of Regents. However, it is obvious that
when the framers and adopters considered art. XII, they
never envisioned anything but school teachers and the basic
three R’s. They never thought there would come a day when
school committees would be confronted with such things as
student health programs, hot lunches, sports programs, and _
collective bargaining.

As time marched on, it has become obvious to all con-
cerned that the income from the permanent school fund
could never finance the state’s responsibilities in the educa-
tional area. Nevertheless, the inadequacies that have
developed afford no excuse for changing the immutable
language of art. XII. The diversionary prohibition found in
sec. 4, in my opinion, relates solely to the funds that do or
should find their way into the permanent school fund and the
income generated thereby pursuant to the provisions of what
was sec. 8 of the 1828 enactment. The constitutional restric-
tion refers to those funds and no others. While factfinding
has no place in an advisory opinion, it is a pretty safe bet that
whatever funds are being used to support the transportation

Ss 3°
of pupils of the private regional schools come from sources
other than the permanent school fund. In summary, while I
concur with the negative responses given by the Chief
Justice, my reasoning insofar as it relates to art. XII is
somewhat different from his.

Appendix
People’s Constitution
Declaration of Rights and Principles, No. 5.

The diffusion of knowledge, and the cultivation of a sound
morality in the fear of God being of the first importance in a
republican State, and indispensable to the maintenance of its
liberty, it shall be an imperative duty of the Legislature to
promote the establishment of free schools and to assist in the
support of public education.

Article XII — Of Education — Sec. 1. All moneys which
now are or may hereafter be appropriated by the authority of
the state to public education shall be securely invested and
remain a perpetual fund for the maintenance of free schools in
this state; and the General Assembly shall be prohibited from
diverting said moneys or fund from this use, and from
borrowing, appropriating or using the same, or any part
thereof for any purpose, or under any pretense whatsoever.
But the income derived from said moneys or fund shall be
annually paid over by the General Treasurer to the towns
and cities of the state for the support of said schools, in
equitable proportions; provided, however, that a portion of
said income may, in the discretion of the General Assembly,
be added to the principal of said fund.

Sec. 2. The several towns and cities shall faithfully devote
their portions of said annual distribution to the support of
free schools, and, in default thereof, shall forfeit their shares
in the same to the increase of the fund.

Sec. 3. All charitable donations for the support of free
schools and other purposes of public education shall be re-
ceived by the General Assembly, and invested and applied
agreeably to the forms prescribed by the donors, provided the

20

same be not inconsistent with the Constitution or with sound
public policy, in which case the donation shall not be
received.

Landholder’s Constitution
Article XII — Of Education.

Sec. 1. The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue,
among the people being essential to the preservation of their
rights and liberties, it shall be the duty of the General
Assembly to promote public schools and to adopt all other
means to secure to the people the advantages and
opportunities of education which they may deem necessary
and proper.

Sec. 2. The money which now is, or which hereafter may
be appropriated by law for the formation of a permanent
fund for the support of public schools shall be securely
invested and remain a perpetual fund for that purpose.

Sec. 3. All donations for the support of public schools, or
for other purposes of education which shall be received by
the General Assembly shall be applied according to the terms
. prescribed by the donors.

Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall make all necessary
provision by law for carrying this article into effect. They are
prohibited from diverting said moneys or fund from the
aforesaid uses, and from borrowing, appropriating or using
the same, or any part thereof, under any pretense
whatsoever.

Revens, DeLuca ¢ Najarian, Amato A. DeLuca, for
plaintiffs.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, John R.
McDermott, Special Assistant Attorney General, Thomas W.
Pearlman, David Hassenfeld, Intervenors, Joseph E.
Marran, Jr., Intervenor, Arnold E. Johnson, Intervenor, for
defendants. fi :

211

404 A.2d 842.

Joun Hoste e¢ al. d.b.a. Metvin Horstew & Co. os.
Greenwicn YACHT Sates, Inc. e¢ al.

AUGUST 15, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ. Joslin, J., not

3
A
s
A
Ee
we

2 ee

Kewiever, J. This is a Superior court civil action to
determine who has the superior claim to a 27-foot sailless
sailboat. The claimants are a Massachusetts general
partnership known as Melvin Holstein & Co. (Holstein)! and
Stanley H. Gladych, Jr. (Gladych). A Superior Court justice
ruled in Holstein’s favor, and Gladych appealed, claiming
that the trial justice misconstrued certain provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (the Code), G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) Title 6A.

The named defendant, Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc.
(Greenwich), is in the business of selling boats. Its place of
business is an East Greenwich waterfront boatyard.
Holstein, by its own admission, is a specialist in marine
financing. In mid-September 1976 Holstein agreed to provide
floor-plan financing? so that Greenwich could pay a
California boat builder for boats that were being shipped by
truck to East Greenwich. Holstein supplied the cash at just
about the time when two of the boats arrived at the yard,
and on September 23, 1976, Greenwich, through its
president, executed two promissory notes, each payable to
the order of Holstein. One note was for $9,571.50 and listed
as collateral for its collection:

Mn its financing agreement with Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., Melvin Holstein
& Co. appears to be doing business as Mystic Marine Finance.

2Floor-plan financing is a common method of lending money to an automobile or
boat dealer so that the dealer may purchase the goods which make up its inventory.
The lender secures the loan by the filing of a financing statement, and, as the goods
are sold, the dealer is expected to pay the bank from the proceeds of the sale.
Ordinarily, the lender periodically checks the state of the inventory to insure that
the dealer is abiding by the loan agreement, which in the case at bar had a
provision that the seller would notify the lender of a pending sale and obtain its
release before the sale was effectuated.

ee = 213

“1 — 1976 Newport 27
Hull No. 551, Serial No. CPY27551M77A
Complete with sails and appurtenances”

The other note called for the payment of $14,433 and listed
as collateral another “1976 Newport 27.” A third note which
is in the record indicates that a “1977 Challenger 24” arrived
at the yard in early October.

The subject matter of this dispute is “1976 Newport 27
Hull No. 551.” On September 29, 1976, a financing
statement giving Holstein a security interest in this vessel was
duly recorded in the Secretary of State’s office. The
statement’s description of the boat is identical to the
description of the collateral found in the promissory note.
However, the day before the filing, on September 28,
Gladych and Greenwich had signed a purchase-and-sale
agreement which specifically identified the boat as the
“Newport 27 #551.” Gladych signed the contract without
knowledge of the financing agreement between Holstein and
Greenwich. He paid $12,000 of the $15,000 purchase price
by a check dated September 29, 1976, and $2,500 by a check
dated December 22, 1976. The $500 balance was to be paid
upon delivery.

The agreement also called for the supplying of “optional
equipment,” which included such items as sails, a bow
pulpit, lifelines, a stern rail, winches, a head, and a bilge
pump. Also listed as optional extras were “commissioning in
spring” and “winter storage.”*

On February 3, 1977, Greenwich was in default on a series
of promissory notes held by Holstein. Upon learning that
Greenwich was selling boats in violation of their security
agreements, Holstein instituted this civil action seeking to

*Testimony at the hearing, as well as the amount of the note, indicates that the
second Newport’s length was 30 rather than 27 feet.

+At the hearing, there was evidence indicating that in the boat-selling business
any boat sold in late September is given free storage because New Englands sailing
season begins in May and ends in October.

ee

repossess the security. At that time Hull No. 551 was still in
Greenwich’s yard. Two days later Gladych moved to inter-
vene as an additional party defendant by virtue of his alleged
September 28, 1976, purchase.

The trial justice ruled that Gladych was not a buyer in the
ordinary course of business because “there was no sale and no
passage of title.” Consequently, the trial justice ruled that
Holstein could repossess. We disagree.

The trial justice’s allusion to a buyer in the ordinary course
of business reminds us that §6A-9-307(1) of the Code provides
in its pertinent part: “A buyer in ordinary course of business
* « « takes free of a security interest created by his seller even
though the security interest is perfected and even though the
buyer knows of its existence.” Both claimants agree that their
respective rights are to be governed by this section. Holstein
contended before us, and the trial justice accepted the
proposition, that Gladych could not be classified as a buyer
because of the relevant language of §6A-2-401(1), which
reads: “Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale
prior to their identification to the contract * « « and unless
otherwise explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by their
identification a special property * * *.”

In arguing no identification, Holstein places great
emphasis on the undisputed fact that at the time Gladych
and Greenwich executed the purchase agreement, none of
the optional equipment had been installed on or within the
hull. The trial justice, in relying on the lack of identification,
observed that “[o]ther things had to be done by the seller in
order to put this boat in a condition whereby delivery would
be made and title would pass and those things have not been
done even to this day. Therefore, I am satisfied that
Gladych’s contract to purchase the vessel involved did not
ripen into a sale + * +.” We disagree with the trial justice’s
conclusion.

Section 6A-2-501 recognizes that from the moment when
goods are identified to a contract of sale, the buyer has a
“special property + * * interest” which may arise before the

SS 2:

passage of title or the seller’s delivery of the goods. This
section makes it clear that if the contract is for a sale of goods
already existing and identified, identification occurs when
the contract is made, or if the contract relates to the sale of
future goods, the goods are identifiable when they are
shipped, marked, or otherwise designated by the seller as
goods to which the contract refers.

In clear and unmistakable language, the drafters of the
Code have stated that there is no necessity that goods, to be
identifiable, have to be in a deliverable state. Specifically,
comment 4 to §6A-2-501 reads:

“Tn view of the limited function of identification there is
no requirement in this section that the goods be in
deliverable state or that all of the seller’s duties with
respect to the processing of the goods be completed in
order that identification occur.”

We believe that the evidence indicates that the 27-foot boat
was identified to the contract at the time the purchase-and-
sale agreement was executed on September 28, 1976. The sales
contract between Gladych and Greenwich clearly specified
the existing “Newport-27 #551.” The fact that the boat was
not outfitted with all its extras’ does not bar its identification
to the contract, especially in light of comment 4.

A similar view to ours has been expressed in Draper v.
Minneapolis-Moline, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 2d 324, 241 N.E.2d
342 (1968). In Draper, the plaintiff agreed to buy a new
tractor and certain extras, including a cab and radio, from a
dealer. At the time the contract was made, the dealer did not
have the specified tractor in its inventory but received one
shortly thereafter. The buyer went to the store and was
shown the tractor-and was told that it was his. At trial the
buyer testified that the last three digits of the tractor’s serial
number were identical with the last three digits of the serial

"During the April repossession hearing, Greenwich’s president told the trial
justice that the only remaining items of the boat's accessories lacking at that time
were its sails, The seller still owed the sailmaker $350 on a pair of sails that were
valued at $700.

216

number shown on the sales agreement. Consequently, the
court held that there was a “complete and sufficient
identification of the tractor to the contract” within the
purview of the Code, even though certain extras were never
installed on the tractor.

Gladych viewed the Newport-27 at Greenwich’s yard, and
the parties specifically referred to it as hull “#551” in the sales
contract. This evidence, in our opinion, is sufficient to
identify the specific boat to the contract at the time the
contract was made. Consequently, because of the provisions
of §6A-2-501, Gladych on September 28 obtained a special
property interest in and to Hull No. 551 that was superior to
the security interest held by Holstein.

Holstein, hoping to take possession of an almost fully
equipped boat, also argues that, regardless of the
identification issue, Gladych’s claim must fail because there
‘was no passage of title since the boat had not been delivered.
This argument, in light of our finding of identification and in
the absence of any explicit agreement as to the necessity of
delivery before recognition could be afforded Gladych’s
special interest, is totally irrelevant.

Initially, such an argument would like to postpone the
time at which a purchaser can benefit from the “purchase in
good faith” doctrine from the moment of identification to
that of delivery. Holstein overlooks the fact that while
§6A-2-103(1)(A) defines a buyer as one who “buys or
contracts to buy goods,” this definitive section mentions
neither title nor delivery. Section 6A-9-307(1) is patterned
after §9-2(a) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, which
protected buyers “to whom goods are sold and delivered.” As
§6A-9-307(1) does not mention delivery, this omission is
further evidence that the deletion of the delivery requirement
was intentional.

Thus, the Code makes it possible for an individual to
become a buyer at the time of identification rather than at
the time of delivery. Courts* which have accepted this

"Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8,
10 (Ct. App. 1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Sero.

Ss

analysis have held that a buyer need not take possesion to be
a buyer in the ordinary course.”

In Matthews v. Arctic Tire, Inc., 106 R.1. 691, 694, 262
A.2d 831, 833 (1970), we noted that when inventory is
delivered to a debtor, the secured party gives implicit, if not
express, authorization for the sale of the collateral and
thereby surrenders any claim in the inventory to a buyer in
the ordinary course of business. Reliance on a debtor’s
possession of inventory has its risk. An inventory check today
is no guarantee against a sale tomorrow. The identification
approach requires inventory financiers to become better
acquainted with the inventory and marketing practices of
their borrowers. The risk of loss in such situations quite
properly should be on the lender rather than on the buyer.

The defendant’s appeal is sustained, the judgment
appealed from is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
Superior Court with a direction to order judgment in favor of
Gladych.

Mr. Justice Joslin did not participate.

Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Peter V. Lacouture, for
plaintiffs.

Edwards & Angell, Andrew J. Chlebus, for defendants.

Co., 183 Ga. App. 488, 492-94, 211 $.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1974); Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc, 24 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 525, 534 (1968).

"The historical evolution of §6A-9-307(1) and a further exposition and
endorsement of the role identification can properly play in mercantile affairs is
found in the following thoroughly informative discourse: Dolan, The Uniform
Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing and Financing
of Goods, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1147 (1978).

218

404 A.2d 836.

Watrer L. Carneva.e d.b.a. Cote’s PHARMACY 0s.
Harvey N. Smiru et al..

AUGUST 15, 1979.
Prusenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

219

Keiener, J. The plaintiff, Walter L. Carnevale
(Carnevale), owns and operates Cote’s Pharmacy, situated in
Newport at 104 Broadway. The defendants, Harvey N. and
Carol J. Smith (the Smiths), are the owners of property that
immediately adjoins the pharmacy. The Smiths’ property is
located at 96-100 Broadway and is separated from the
pharmacy by a firewall.

On December 24, 1969, the Newport Fire Department
was summoned to a conflagration that totally destroyed the
Smiths’ property. The pharmacy’s stock and fixtures suffered
smoke and water damage. The pharmacy was out of business
for a period of almost a week, and Carnevale attributes his
loss to the negligence of the Smiths and their fuel-oil dealer,
Peckham Coal & Oil Company (Peckham). He sued both,
and a Superior Court jury returned a $16,597 verdict for
Carnevale against each defendant. The Smiths and Peckham
appealed, claiming that the trial justice erred in denying
their motions for directed verdicts as well as in his charge to
the jury.

The decisive issue in this appeal is the denial of the motions
for directed verdicts. In considering the ‘denials, we are
bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
Carnevale, extracting from the record only those reasonable
inferences that support his claim; we are not concerned with
the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.
Nagy v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925, 928, 392 A.2d 365, 367
(1978); Evans v. Liguori, 118 R.I. 389, 394, 374, A.2d 774,
776 (1977).

220 ee

The record in this case, when viewed in the light most
favorable to Carnevale, reveals that the Smiths purchased
this building in March 1969. Sometime in the early summer
of 1969, Harvey N. Smith (Smith) contacted Peckham and
arranged for the dealer to deliver heating oil to 96-100
Broadway. The ground-floor portion of the premises was
rented to two tenants, Ben’s Chili Dog (Ben’s) and Moss
Music (Moss). The premises’ upper two floors were to be used
as a roominghouse containing approximately 15 living units.
Smith testified that he believed the heating system that
serviced Ben’s had been used regularly up until and after the
time that he purchased the building, but that the system that
heated the roominghouse area had been in disuse for
approximately 5 years. Moss had no central-heating system,
apparently placing its faith in the heat-generating qualities of
a gas-fed hot-water heater that was located in the cellar.
Smith testified that, in light of the lack of use of the
roominghouse heating units, he had asked Peckham to
inspect and update the system and make it operative. Smith,
who professed to know nothing whatever about heating
systems, also said that at no time prior to the fire did he
himself attempt to inspect any component of the heating
systems.

There was considerable disagreement between Smith and
Peckham concerning the responsibilities that Peckham had
assumed relative to the heating systems. Peckham, as part of
its business, sold oil tanks and, although its manager
admitted receiving instructions from Smith “to go ahead with
whatever [Peckham] thought was necessary,” the manager
insisted that the service to be provided by Peckham was
limited to oil delivery and an “annual checkup” of the boiler
and burner. In other words, it did not include an inspection
of any of the three oil tanks in the cellar. In fact, the manager
told the jury that once Peckham had updated the boiler, any
further repairs to the system would be more properly the con-
cern of the Smiths and their plumber. Nonetheless, a repair
invoice sent to Smith reveals that in September 1969 two of
Peckham’s workers spent a total of 141% hours “updating” the
system, at a cost to Smith of slightly more than $180, and that

| 221

in the process they used 30 feet of %-inch copper tubing.
Because there was testimony that no actual repairs were
made to Ben’s system, it follows that the copper tubing was
used in the servicing of the system that heated the rooming-
house area. Further, because the manager admitted that the
copper tubing most probably had been used to run between a
boiler and a tank, it is reasonable to conclude that Peckham’s
employees did in fact work on at least one of the two oil tanks
that were part of the roominghouse-area system.

On November 25, 1969, approximately a month before the
December fire, a Peckham employee delivered oil to the tank
that serviced Ben’s; the delivery was made as part of
Peckham’s automatic delivery service. Unfortunately,
however, a combination of mild weather and the heat
generated from cooking appliances had caused Ben’s to use
little oil since Peckham’s delivery of the month before. The
record clearly supports Carnevale’s theory that on November "
25, Peckham poured a substantial quantity of oil into a tank
that was already virtually full. Carnevale contends that, as
the result of both the deteriorated condition of the tank and
the pressure created by the unneeded oil, a seam in the-tank
ruptured, spilling enough oil to cover the cellar’s dirt floor
with approximately 2 inches of the substance. About a week
after the rupture, Newport’s fire marshal gave the Smiths
permission to relight the oil systems and the gas hot-water
heater. This approval followed the marshal’s personal
inspection of the premises to insure that the cleanup
operation had been adequately performed by the private
contractor hired by Smith for that purpose. According to
Peckham’s manager, his employer's role in the cleanup was
strictly limited to covering the cellar floor with a sawdust
compound, the purpose of which was, of course, to soak up
the spilled oil; Peckham provided both the labor and the
supplies free of charge.

The testimony concerning what happened after the oil
spill is confused. At a minimum, it appears that Smith and
Peckham’s manager had a telephone conversation very
shortly after the rupture and discussed, in Smith’s words, the

292 )

“possibility that since one tank had ruptured that the other
tanks within the building [that is, those that serviced
approximately a dozen individuals who were then in
residence] should be looked at, checked over, and if necessary
replaced.” Further, Smith testified to having told the
manager that he “wanted [Peckham] to do what had to be
done to insure that such an incident would not occur again
* * x,” In this connection Smith questioned the manager
about the possibility of replacing the two tanks that serviced
the roominghouse area with one large outdoor tank; Smith
was soon thereafter informed that installation of such a tank
would be a physical impossibility. As far as the record
indicates, the two men did not communicate further con-
cerning the two tanks that had not ruptured. Although the
fire marshal testified that he gave his permission to relight the
systems on the supposition that only two tanks would be in
use, the record establishes that, although there were no
further deliveries of oil to the still-ruptured tank, it was never
replaced. Rather, Ben’s was apparently to consume the oil
that remained—approximately half of the contents—and
that thereafter Peckham would replace the tank, at Smith’s
expense. Peckham’s manager testified that, to his knowledge,
there was nothing necessarily improper in allowing Ben’s to
consume the remaining oil.

On December 24, 1969, shortly before 10 a.m., an
employee of Peckham delivered oil to the two tanks that
serviced the roominghouse area, that is, to the tanks that had
not ruptured. Each tank had a filler pipe that protruded
through the foundation and out into a back alley. The
employee testified that each tank had a vent whistle, serving
to inform him when the tank was full, and that in order to
hear one of the whistles, he had to open the cellar door. He
opened the door after obtaining a key from Gerald Bienvenue
(Bienvenue), co-owner of Ben’s, but there is no evidence that
the employee ever actually entered the cellar. Evidence in
the record does state that for each fill the delivery person
heard a whistle. When the whistling had stopped, the tanks
were full, and the oil truck proceeded on its way. Within

es 293

minutes of the delivery’s completion, witnesses heard a sound
described by one as a “sudden explosion,” followed shortly by
what Carnevale termed a raging fire. Newport Fire
Department Captain John Oakley and Fire Marshal Herbert
F. Nolan each testified that he arrived on the scene
approximately 15 minutes after the fire alarm that had been
sounded at 10:18 a.m.; at that time each observed a massive
amount of black smoke, which the fire marshal testified
indicated an oil fire. Approximately a month after the fire,
investigators discovered a hole in the base of one of the two
roominghouse tanks that until then had remained undis-
turbed amidst the debris of the partly razed building.

Once Peckham and the Smiths made it known that they
were not presenting any evidence, the trial justice permitted
Carnevale to amend his complaint in order to include a count
involving the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The remaining
counts alleged specific acts of negligence on the part of
Peckham and the Smiths, in general charging the Smiths
with storing fuel oil in tanks which they knew, or should
have known, were “deteriorated, weakened, unsafe and
dangerous”; that Peckham should have inspected the tanks
before making its December 24 delivery; and that Peckham
failed to upgrade the heating systems properly.

For reasons that follow, we believe that the trial justice
erred in denying the motions for directed verdicts. In
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 631, 295 A.2d 676, 691
(1972), we described as follows the circumstances under
which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked by a
plaintiff as an aid in proving circumstantially that he was
injured by the negligence of a certain defendant or
defendants: (1) the event must be of a kind that ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been
due to any voluntary act or contribution on the part of the
plaintiff. A plaintiff able to rely upon res ipsa loquitur need
neither allege nor prove those specific acts of negligence that
proximately caused his injury; indeed, reliance upon the

224 ee

doctrine is proper only where the evidence has failed to
disclose the specific negligence but where the mishap would
not have occurred if those who had management of its cause
had used proper care. Turner v. Wallace, 71 Ill. App. 2d
160, 166-67, 217 N.E.2d 11, 14 (1966). For that reason the
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine furnishes
evidence that, in the absence of some explanation by the
defendant, the accident occurred as a result of negligence.
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.1. at 632-33, 295 A.2d at 692;
Cing-Mars v. Kelley, 95 R.I. 515, 522, 188 A.2d 379, 383
(1963).

On appeal the Smiths and Peckham contend that there
was no evidence which would support the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and that, therefore, their
motions for directed verdicts should have been granted.
First, they argue that there was no evidence before the jury
tending to prove that the fire-explosion episode was such as
would not have occurred absent negligence; second, they
contend that, in any event, there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that either or both defendants exercised the
type of control over the accident-causing instrumentality that
is required for invocation of the doctrine. Because of our
resolution of the issue raised by defendants’ first argument,
we need not discuss separately and at length the issue of
control.

Hi The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the mere
occurrence of an accident, without more, does not warrant
an inference that a defendant was negligent or that its
negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injury.
Montuori v. Narragansett Electric Co., No. 77-286-A. (R.1.,
filed June 11, 1979);Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 115 R.I.
309, 312, 342 A.2d 622, 625 (1975). Despite the evidentiary
boost given a plaintiff allowed to rely upon res ipsa loquitur,
the plaintiff must, of course, carry its burden of proof. As
Prosser explains, “[t]he inference must cover all of the
necessary elements of negligence, and must point to a breach
of the defendant’s duty.” Prosser, Torts §39 at 212 (4th ed.
1971). Where, however, the evidence does not disclose a

ee) 295

sufficient balance of probabilities in favor of negligence, the
doctrine is inapplicable, and the trial justice should direct the
jury that the plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of proof.
Id. at 211-12, 218. See Russo v. G.W. Gooden, Inc., 108 R.1.
356, 359, 275 A.2d 266, 268 (1971).

In most res ipsa loquitur cases, an inference of negligence
arises from an ascertainable injury-producing event—that is,
the cause of the plaintiff's injury is typically known, leaving
only the question whether an inference can be drawn from
the occurrence and its surrounding circumstances. Here,
however, in order to sustain Carnevale’s claim, the jury must
be able to infer both the cause of the explosion and fire and
defendants’ negligence relative to that cause. Russo v. G. W.
Gooden, Inc., 108 R.1. at 360, 275 A.2d at 269. See Rollins v.
Avey, 296 A.2d 214, 216, (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Manley v.
New York Telephone Co., 303 N.Y. 18, 25-26, 100 N.E.2d
113, 116 (1951). Carnevale correctly observes that the fact-
finder is permitted to base an inference on another that it has
already drawn. Waldman v. Shipyard Marina, Inc., 102 B.1.
366, 373, 230 A.2d 841, 845 (1967). However, our case law
makes clear that if a plaintiff intends to meet its burden of
proof by means of such pyramiding, the second or ultimate
inference drawn by the factfinder is permissible only if the
first or prior inference has been established to the exclusion of
other reasonable inferences. Waldman v. Shipyard Marina,
Inc., 102 R.I. at 373, 230 A.2d at 845. See also Conlin v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1120 R.I. 1, 5, 384 A.2d 1057,
1059 (1978). In this way the ultimate inference rests
upon a foundation that logically has the probative force of
established fact; were it otherwise, the ultimate
conglusion—here, that the circumstances surrounding the
accident indicate negligence—would rest on no more than
conjecture and surmise. Russo v. G.W. Gooden, Inc., 108
R.I. at 360, 275 A.2d at 269; Waldman v. Shipyard Marina,
Inc., 102 R.I. at 373, 230 A.2d at 845. We hold the opinion
that the evidence presented to the jury in this case was
insufficient, when measured against the standard of
Waldman, to allow an inference that the cause of the

226 ee

explosion and fire was as Carnevale theorized—a rupture
and ensuing spillage, both of which occurred immediately
after the tank had been filled on December 24, 1969.

We note at the outset that Carnevale introduced no expert
testimony to help the jury identify the likely source of the
ignition that would cause the explosion and fire or to support
his claim that the roominghouse tanks were dangerously
deteriorated and unsafe. Without question, ample evidence
exists that oil was involved in the fire at least after its
outbreak. The fire marshal, for example, testified that, in his
opinion, an oil fire was definitely in progress when he arrived
at the scene, which arrival, again, was at approximately
10:30 a.m. Also, Bienvenue testified that some “several
minutes” after having given a key to the cellar to Peckham’s
delivery person, he heard an explosion, and that thereafter
soot and black smoke escaped from the basement. However,
this evidence alone furnishes no basis for inferring that one of
the two roominghouse tanks ruptured before the fire and that
a resulting spill somehow caused the explosion and fire, In
addition, although one of the two tanks that serviced the
roominghouse was in fact found to have a hole in it, no
evidence came to light to relate that condition to a time prior
to the outbreak of fire; in fact, the defect was discovered not
only more than 1 month after the fire, but also only after the
tank had been taken out from under the entire contents of the
first floor, which at the height of the fire had collapsed into
the cellar. Finally, even assuming for the moment that a tank
did in fact rupture before the fire, the record is noticeably
devoid of any evidence, expert or otherwise, to suggest how
the spilled oil might have in turn triggered an explosion. See
Tedrow v. Des Moines Housing Corp., 249 Iowa 766,
771-72, 87 N.W.2d 463, 467 (1958); Kansas City Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 209 So.
9d 785, 788-89 (La. App. 1968).

Under such circumstances, it is apparent that Carnevale
has failed to prove with any degree of certainty that either of
the two roominghouse tanks was the instrumentality causing
the explosion and fire, and that, therefore, any inference of

es 227

negligence based upon that theory rests upon conjecture
alone. Rollins v. Avey, 296, S.W.2d at 216. See Salk v. Alpine
Ski Shop, 115 R.I. at 313, 342 A.2d at 625; Russo v. G.W.
Gooden, Inc., 108 R.I. at 360, 275 A.2d at 269. Because
there is insufficient evidence indicating what caused the
explosion and fire, there is simply no basis upon which to
conclude that either or both defendants could have prevented
it by the exercise of due care.

For these reasons, this evidentiary gap is also fatal to
Carnevale’s allegations of specific negligence. The
defendants’ motions for directed verdicts should have been
granted.

The defendant’s appeals are sustained, the judgments
appealed from are vacated, and the case is remanded to the
Superior Court with direction to enter judgments for the
defendents.

Ward & Cresto, Dominic F. Cresto, Strauss; Factor,
Chernick & Hillman Professional Corporation, Abraham
Factor, John L. Breguet, for plaintiff.

Rice, Dolan, Kiernan & Kershaw, John W. Kershaw (for
Harvey N. Smith and Carol J. Smith); Higgins, Cavanagh &
Cooney, Joseph V. Cavanagh (for Peckham Coal & Oil
Company), for defendants.

228

405 A.2d 1161.
StTaTE vs. James Epwarps.
AUGUST 20, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

es 229

Kewiener, J. The defendant, James Edwards (Edwards),
appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by the
Superior Court after a jury found him guilty of robbery. On
appeal, Edwards raises several issues which call into question
certain rulings made by the trial justice. Specifically, we are
concerned with a motion to suppress eyewitness-
identification testimony, a motion to pass the case and
declare a mistrial, and a motion for new trial.

The facts are as follows. During the cloudy midafternoon
of October 30, 1975, the Baker Street branch of the Rhode
Island Hospital Trust National Bank was held up by a man
and a woman. (Baker Street is located in the Washington
Park section of Providence.) About a year later a secret
indictment was filed, charging Edwards with the theft of a
sum just in excess of $4,400. The indictment against Edwards
was based in large part on the grand-jury testimony of
Sharon Hampton (Hampton). She had also been charged
with the October robbery and apparently agreed with the
state to testify against Edwards in a attempt to avoid
incarceration. However, on March 1, 1977, the day
Edwards’ trial was scheduled to begin, Hampton was no-
where to be found. Her last-minute disappearance forced the
state to rely upon Peter S. Greenberg (Greenberg), a
customer in the Baker Street branch at the time of the
robbery, to identify Edwards as the thief.

Shortly before the trial commenced, Greenberg was called
into the prosecutor's office, shown six mug shots, and asked if
he could identify one of them as depicting the man he had
observed inside the bank some 16 months earlier. Within
seconds, Greenberg identified the fifth photo as the one
representing the robber. When the trial was about to begin,
the prosecutor informed the court and defense counsel of the

230 es

out-of-court photo display and stated that he planned to elicit
identification testimony from Greenberg during the course of
the trial. The defense immediately moved for a voir dire to
determine the admissibility of the incourt identification and
objected to the prosecutor’s “eleventh hour” maneuver on the
ground that it had violated defendant’s right to counsel.

Greenberg was the hearing’s only witness. He is the
national sales manager for a manufacturer located near the
bank. He testified that when he arrived at the bank about 2
o'clock, he observed a man and a woman arguing near the
front door. Greenberg said he passed within a few feet of the
couple and was able to get a “good look” at the man. He
described him as a young man in his mid-twenties, about 6
feet tall, wearing brown elevated shoes, a black leather-type
trench coat, and a hat, which rested atop a “semi-Afro.”
Greenberg entered the bank and was apparently in the midst
of preparing a deposit slip when he heard someone say,
“Hands off the buttons. Move away. Put the money in the
bag.” When he turned around, he observed the man he had
just seen outside the bank now waving a gun around and
adjusting a dark green scarf over the lower portion of his
face. At that time, he was able to see that the man had a
receding hairline and long, curly black sideburns resembling
an “inverted triangle.”

Greenberg testified that the gunman ordered all the
customers to one side of the bank while the woman went
from teller to teller and collected the cash. Greenberg
thought she looked a bit younger than her armed companion
and noticed that she too wore a scarf over her face. He
estimated that the entire incident lasted 10 or 15 minutes.
When the police arrived, Greenberg gave a statement and
informed them that he could “probably” identify the man if
he saw his picture. During the next few months, Greenberg
was shown hundreds of photos by the Providence police and
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, he
was unable to identify any of them as the man who
brandished the gun on October 30.

es 231

Greenberg told the trial justice that upon his 1:30 p.m.
arrival at the courthouse for a trial that was to begin at 2
p.m., he was met by the prosecutor and Sergeant Gilbert
Ethier of the Providence Police Department. At that time,
Sergeant Ethier shuffled the six photos and handed them to
Greenberg, saying, “Look at these pictures. + + + [S]ee if you
can pick out the person in these pictures.” After viewing all
six photos, Greenberg dropped one on the table and said,
“This is the person.” Greenberg had identified Edwards as
the thief.

The prosecutor told the trial justice that once the trial
began, he would rely solely on Greenberg’s in-court identi-
fication of Edwards. The trial justice rejected any defense
claim that the photo exhibit that had taken place in the
Attorney General’s department was impermissibly suggestive
and denied Edwards’ motion to suppress. In addressing the
right-to-counsel argument, the trial justice conceded that he
had difficulty understanding the general rule that counsel
need not be provided at a photographic display; however, he
felt constrained to apply that rule to his interpretation of the
state’s constitution.

The general rule referred to by the trial justice was
enunciated in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S. Ct.
2568, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1973), where the Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution
did not guarantee an accused the right to counsel at
photographic displays at which a witness attempts to identify
a suspect. The Court limited that sixth-amendment right to
“trial-like confrontations,” such as corporeal identification
where an accused is physically present. On appeal, Edwards
asks that we adopt a higher standard of protection by relying
upon the assistance-of-counsel guarantee afforded by the
declaration of rights embodied in art. I, §10, of the Rhode
Island Constitution. We have in the past taken a similar
course of action. See State v. Maloof, 114 R.I. 380, 389, 333
A.2d 676 681 (1975).

232 es

Recently, in State v. Delahunt, 121 R.I. 565, 401 A.2d
1261 (1979), (Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua and Mr. Justice
Kelleher, dissenting), the majority of this court adhered to
the principles set forth in Kirby v. Illinois, 406, U.S. 682, 92
S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972), and held that under our
art. I, §10, an accused is entitled to counsel only at a
postindictment lineup. Much of what was said in Delahunt
could be repeated here. Suffice it to say, however, that the
majority in Delahunt is not yet persuaded that the potential
for abuse and the problems of misidentification in the use of
photographic displays are so great as to require the presence
of counsel. Accordingly, this court holds that the state
constitution provides no right to counsel at a post-arrest
photographic display.

Edwards presented an alibi defense. As his first witness he
called Glenn Miller, who lives and works in St. Louis,
Missouri. In direct examination he told the jury that during
the fall of 1975 Edwards was in St. Louis. He remembered
Edwards’ being there on October 30 because October 29 is
his wife’s birthday, and all his friends, including Edwards,
attended a birthday party in the Millers’ apartment that
ended sometime in the early morning of October 30. Accord-
ing to Miller, Edwards returned later in the day and spent
the afternoon at the apartment. During cross-examination
Miller made clear that he first met Edwards in 1967 and then
occasionally played basketball with him. Miller stressed that
he was closer to Edwards’ brother, Bruce, and that up to
1974 he had not considered Edwards a friend. When the
prosecutor then asked Miller what happened in 1974 to turn
an acquaintanceship into friendship, Miller replied: “Cause
he had just did some time and got out and seemed like he had
his head together.”

A motion to pass was immediately made, and it was
followed by a denial. In denying the motion, the trial justice
observed that the state had the right to inquire into the
friendship transformation and that it should not “be
penalized because a witness volunteered something that is
not sought.” After an extended colloquy between the trial

es 233

justice and counsel, the trial justice remarked: “Well, I think
I'm going to inquire of the jury. They’ve heard the answer
and if we've got people here who cannot render a fair and
impartial verdict on that basis, I’m going to disband this
jury.” A further exchange followed, and finally Edwards’
counsel asked that there be an individual voir dire of the jury.
The responses of two of the jurors give rise to this facet of
Edwards’ appeal. As each juror was brought into the court-
room, the prosecutor’s inquiry about what caused Miller in
1974 to look upon Edwards as a friend and Miller’s reply
were read to him or her.

During the voir dire of one juror, the following exchange
occurred:

“The Court: Do you still presume the defendant to be
innocent here, notwithstanding he may
have—assuming he was—in prison?

“Juror* * *: Well, yes to a certain degree, yes.

ae

“The Court: What do you mean by a certain degree?

“Juror* * *: Well, there are, I guess facts that go the
other way, too.

“The Court: Well, you understand that you're not
supposed to make a judgment until you
have * + * the collective benefits of your
fellow jurors deliberating on this case?

“Juror+ + *: Yes.
eee

“TDefense
Counsel]: And at this particular point, do you feel
that the State has proven that Mr.
Edwards is guilty?

eax

“Juror* * +; That’s a tough question.

eee

934 |

“The Court: Well, the question is, have you already
made up your mind?
nae

“Juror* « +: Yes, in a way. You know.”

The trial justice then said that he would not accept the juror’s
response and admonished him that jurors cannot decide a de-
fendant’s guilt or innocence until they have listened to all the
evidence and the charge. The juror told the trial justice that
he had not made up his mind and that he still presumed
Edwards to be innocent.

The defense counsel asked that a second juror be excused
after the following colloquoy:

“[Defense
Counsel]: Do you feel, + + * that assuming it to be
true that my client was in prison in 1974,
that that helps to kind of bolster up the
State’s case as you've heard it up to this
point?

“Juror* * *: Well, I’d have to say that it doesn’t help.

eR

“[Defense
Counsel]: Well, in what way doesn’t it help my
client for you to have heard that
statement? Could you clarify that for me
please?

“Juror* « *: I really don’t know. I would say it would,
his character, his past record—.”

Once again the trial justice informed the juror that evidence
of previous incarceration could not be used to decide the issue
of guilt or innocence. The juror then stated that Miller’s “did
some time” remark would not, in his mind, hurt defendant.
The trial justice denied Edwards’ request that the two jurors
be excused, saying he was convinced that they remained
impartial.

es 235

HM We have said on many prior occasions that deciding
whether to declare a mistrial is a discretionary function of the
trial court. The trial justice has a front-row view of the trial
which we do not have. Thus, he or she is better able to assess
the degree of prejudice and the effectiveness of curative
judicial instructions. There is no fixed formula to determine
whether the prejudicial taint has been removed. Each case
must be decided on an ad hoc basis, and each challenged
remark must be viewed in the context in which it appeared
and in light of the surrounding circumstances. A mistrial will
be ordered at the appellate level only if we are convinced that
the cautionary instructions were untimely or ineffective, or if
the improper material had been so indelibly inscribed upon
the jurors’ minds that, despite the trial justice’s timely action,
the jurors’ minds could not be disabused of the prejudicial
effect. State v. Gianoulos, No. 77-312-C.A. (B.L., filed July
27, 1979); State v. Freitas, 121 R.I. 412, 416, 399 A.2d
1217, 1219, (1979); State v. Marrapese, 116 B.I. 1, 7, 351
A.2d 95, 98 (1976); State v. Pailin, 114 R.I. 725, 729, 339
A.2d 253, 255 (1975).

Here, the trial justice conducted the individual voir dire
and, as noted before, engaged in a long discussion and, when
necessary, took the proper steps to dispel the prejudicial taint
of Miller’s response. Later, in his charge he advised the jury
to exclude the matter completely from its consideration.

Hsin this case, we have a bank robbery made unusual by the
robbers’ decision to have an argument before donning their
masks and going about their nefarious activities. Unfor-
tunately for Edwards, Greenberg was an eyewitness to the
argument and to their entry into the bank. Part of the record
in this case consisted of pictures taken by the automatic
cameras of the bank while the holdup was in progress; these
pictures show Greenberg as an interested observer of what
was going on while the two individuals whose argument he
had just witnessed in the parking area went about their
business of robbing the bank. From this record we cannot
fault the trial justice’s denial of the motion to pass the case.

236 |

In this jurisdiction a trial justice, as he considers a new trial
motion, must make an independent appraisal of the testi-
mony in the light of his charge to the jury, during which he
may pick and choose whom and what he will believe as he
weighs the evidence and assesses the credibility of the wit-
nesses. In a criminal case, once a trial justice has evaluated
the testimony, he or she then determines whether the evi-
dence adduced at the trial is such that the controversy as
presented to the jury is one upon which reasonable minds
could differ as to the conclusion the factfinders should reach
or whether the evidence fails to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the trial justice, because of his or her
more experienced judgment, finds that the dispute comes
within the reasonable-minds-could-differ category, the new
trial motion will be denied. On the other hand, if the trial
justice believes the controversy to be one where the state has
failed to sustain its burden of proof, a new trial will be
ordered.

The trial justice, in denying Edwards’ motion for a new
trial, specifically rejected his alibi defense,! and, in assessing
Greenberg’s testimony, observed:

“[T]his Court may have, had it been listening to this
testimony as the sole trier of fact, required something
more to convict this defendant than was adduced before
this jury, but this Court cannot say that reasonable men
could not differ on this testimony. + * * I can’t say that
the twelve people who believed Mr. Greenberg, are
completely wrong.”

Edwards argues that, in the light of these remarks, the trial
justice should have granted him a new trial. We cannot
agree.

\1The state rebutted the alibi defense by presenting as a witness a rental agent for
an apartment complex that is located in the Garden City section of Cranston. She
testified that during the fall of 1975 Edwards was in Rhode Island living in one of
the apartments. The trial justice believed her.

es 231

The comments expressed by the trial justice are almost
identical to those uttered by another trial justice who denied
the defendant’s motion for a new trial. State v. Colvin, 82
R.I, 212, 107 A.2d 324 (1954). In upholding the denial, this
court said:

“[E]ven if his own judgment might incline him to
another conclusion on one phase of the evidence, he was
not entitled to merely substitute his view of contra-
dictory evidence for that expressed by the jury’s verdict,
especially where different minds could naturally and
fairly come to different conclusions on such evidence.”
Id. at 222, 107 A.2d at 329.

Here, the trial justice, after making his own appraisal of
the evidence, expressed the belief that since the evidence was
such that reasonable minds might come to different conclu-
sions, the jury’s verdict would be upheld. However, the trial
justice did say that the time lapse between Greenberg’s seeing
the couple outside and inside the bank “was momentary and
it doesn’t take mental gymnastics for anybody to be able to
say those are the two people who were just outside.” He then
went on to say that Greenberg’s testimony, having in mind
“the manner of his presentation, his apparent intelligence,
his method of or capability in describing what he observed,”
furnished a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s guilty
verdict. Try as he might, Edwards has failed to convince us
that the trial justice did not do what was required of him as
he considered the new trial motion. State v. DaRocha, 121
RI. 182, 185, 397 A.2d 500, 502 (1979).

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua, dissenting. The majority
today, consistent with its recent opinion in State v. Delahunt,
121 R.I. 565, 401 A.2d 1261 (1979), that the right to
counsel attaches only to postindictment corporeal lineups,
holds that the attendance of counsel is not required at

PO

238 ee

postindictment photographic viewing and identification
procedures. Any federal constitutional claim to the assistance
of counsel at photographe displays has been specifically
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973).
This court, however, remains free to adopt a higher standard
of protection under appropriate provisions of our state
constitution. See State v. Maloof, 114 R.I. 380, 389, 333 A.2d
676, 681 (1975). Because of the serious deprivation of liberty
that may result from a mistaken identification, I would
require the presence of counsel at postindictment photo-
graphic displays under article I, section 10, of the Rhode
Island Constitution.

I make this conclusion because of my belief that, as a
practical matter no difference exists between the inherent
dangers of mistaken identification in an uncounseled post-
indictment corporeal lineup and a photographic display con-
ducted at the postindictment stage. The general process of
eyewitness identification is particularly vulnerable to a
number of facts that may ultimately affect the accused’s right
to a fair trial. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 329, 93S.
Ct. at 2583, 37 L.Ed.2d at 638 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct.
1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967). See also Criminal
Procedure—Photo-Identifications—Stovall Prospectivity
Rule Invoked to Avoid Extension of Right to Counsel, 43
N.Y.U.L, Rev. 1019, 1020 (1968). Coupled with the high risk
of mistaken identification is the fact that “the witness
thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the
photograph rather than of the person actually seen, reducing
the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom identi-
fications.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84,
88 S, Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 (1968). See also
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 235-36, 87 S. Ct. at 1937,
18 L.Ed.2d at 1162 (accused’s fate can be largely determined
at lineup).

es 239

Mistaken identification can result from unreliable
eyewitness perception or memory, particularly where the
witness has had slight opportunity for detailed observation
during the crime. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 329,
93 S. Ct. at 2583, 37 L.Ed.2d at 638. Moreover, as the Wade
court noted in the context of corporeal lineups “[a] major
factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of
justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of
suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution
presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.”
388 U.S. at 228, 87 S. Ct. at 1933, 18 L.Ed. 2d at 1158
(emphasis added). The potential for such influence, albeit
unintentional, exists as well at a photographic display.

A witness under strong psychological pressure to make an
identification may, due to various suggestive procedures,
unconsciously allow the mug shot image to gain independent
status in his mind and replace the true image of the criminal
which was obtained during commission of the crime. See
Comment, Photographic Identification: The Hidden
Persuader, 56 Iowa L.Rev. 408, 412 (1970-71). Suggestion
may also be initially communicated by the fact that the
witness generally assumes he is being shown pictures of
criminals. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal
Cases 82-83 (1963). The police may also prejudice the witness
by impugning the subject’s character or by disclosing that the
subject has been convicted of a crime similar to that viewed.
See Comment, Photographic Identification: The Hidden
Persuader, 56 Iowa L.Rev. at 409-11. Finally, when several
witnesses make an identification in each other’s presence,
there is a danger of undue influence. See 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at
1022. The victim of the crime may be especially vulnerable to
these suggestive influences. See Lasker, Possible Procedural
Safeguards Against Mistaken Identification By Eye Wit-
nesses, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 552, 554 (1955).

At trial, an accused attacking the fairness of a particular
photographic display faces a serious hurdle in accurately re-
constructing the manner and mode of that identification pro-
cedure. Because the defendant is usually absent from the

240 ee

display, any assertions of possible abuse must rest on mere
allegations that can be summarily rejected by the police. This
absence also hampers effective crdss-examination of the
witness making the identification. See 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at
1021.

The attendance of counsel at postindictment photographic
displays does not compel defense counsel’s constant presence
as the state assembles its case. A sharp distinction exists
between photographic displays and other forms of pre-trial
investigation. For example, any improper prosecutorial
conduct during witness interviews can be flushed out by ade-
quate cross-examination. Also, evidence obtained through a
mechanical, scientific procedure can be tested and
impeached on cross-examination despite defense counsel’s
absence from the identification proceeding. See Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 267, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1953-54, 18
L.Ed. 2d 1178, 1183 (1967) (handwriting exemplars).

In some instances, retention and display of photographs
used may suffice to bring out the physical suggestiveness of a
particular display. I believe, however, that the presence of
counsel is required at postindictment photographic displays
to detect the “myriad [of] almost imperceptible means of
communication” such as an inflection and expression where-
by law enforcement officials may influence the witnesses’
identification.? See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 334, 93
S. Ct. at 2586, 37 L.Ed.2d at 640 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Barry N. Capalbo,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Stephen C. Bridge,
Assistant Public Defender, for defendant.
a

An examination of the record reveals that the photographic display at issue was
conducted while the defendant was in custody. Because a corporeal identification is
considered more reliable than a photographic identification, see Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 n.6, 88 S. Ct. 967, 972 n.6, 19 L.Ed. 2d 1247,
1254 n,6 (1968), I would prohibit the use of postindictment photo identifications
when a suspect is in custody.

241

405 A.2d 1167.

Joun F. DeSrerano et al. vs.
Zoninc Boarp or REVIEW OF THE City or WARWICK.

AUGUST 24, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

242

Bevitacgua, C.J. This is a petition for certiorari brought
to review a Superior Court judgment which affirmed a
decision of the respondent Zoning Board of Review of the

Ee

City of Warwick (the board). The board had denied
petitioners’ application for a variance and special exception
from certain area and set-back requirements. We issued the
writ, and pursuant thereto, all records pertinent to the
matter have been certified to this court.

The record discloses that petitioners, John F. and Joyce
DeStefano, own a parcel of real estate located at the corner of
Davidson and Summerland Roads. The petitioners wished to
construct a single family dwelling on the property. While
such a dwelling is a permitted use under the applicable
zoning ordinances, the regulations require a minimum area
of 7,000 square feet. The lot in question, however, contains
only 5,000 square feet.

In order to accomplish their goal, petitioners filed an
application for relief with the board. They sought a special
exception to build on the undersized lot and relief from
various zoning regulations prescribing minimum set-back
requirements.

At the hearing before the board petitioners offered the
testimony of a recognized real estate expert who examined
both the parcel in qyestion and the plans for the proposed
structure. The expert testified that the proposed building was
in accord with the character of the neighborhood and would
not diminish the value of surrounding property. He further
stated that failure to allow the proposed use would work a
“hardship” upon petitioners because of the lack of additional
land adjoining the property.

Several individuals testified in opposition to petitioners’
request for relief. These remonstrants cited the fact that they
too had purchased undersized lots in the area and were
required to acquire additional property in order to construct
their dwellings. According to the objectors, petitioners
should be bound in similar fashion. One individual also
testified that he had unsuccessfully tried to purchase the lot
from petitioners on several occasions.

The board issued the following decision denying
petitioner’s application:

244

“After hearing all of the testimony and viewing the
premises and the surrounding area, the Board makes the
following findings:

“1. This is the application of John F. DeStefano seeking
an exception or variance to the Zoning Ordinance to
erect a single family dwelling on an undersized lot with
less than required setback from the street lot line on the
easterly side of Summerland Road and the Corner of
Davidson Road located on Assessor’s Plat 364, Lot 174,
zoned Residence A-7.

“2. In order for the applicant to qualify for a variance,
he must demonstrate to the Board that a denial of the
proposed use would result in a deprivation of the total
beneficial use of the property. The applicant did not
adduce any testimony concerning his inability to put the
land to any other use or to sell said land. As a matter of
fact, the only testimony that was adduced was by
remonstrant who testified that he had approached the
applicant to purchase said land and applicant refused.
Therefore, the testimony of the applicant concerning a
variance is not to be relied on and is totally without
credibility.

“3. In order for the applicant to qualify for a special
exception he must demonstrate to the Board that the
proposed use would not be inimical to the public health,
safety, morals and welfare. Testimony was adduced by
a bona fide real estate expert who testified that the
proposed use would not devalue the surrounding
property and would enhance rather than detract. This
was the only evidence that was submitted on behalf of
the applicant that could demonstrate the standard for a
special exception. However, the Board in its own

’ expertise in administering the Zoning Ordinance and

based on its own knowledge of the premises and its
locality, takes issue with the real estate expert and
further states as a matter of fact that the proposed use
would devalue the surrounding property. There was no

A  {

testimony concerning any traffic problem or any of the
other ancillary issues which are likewise to be demon-
strated as a burden of proof upon the applicant. The
applicant has failed in its burden of proof.

For these reasons, the petition is denied.”

The petitioners’ appealed this decision to the Superior
Court under G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-24-20.
Following a hearing, the trial justice denied the appeal on the
basis that the board neither misconceived the evidence before
it nor abused its discretion in ruling on the application.
Specifically, the trial justice pointed out that petitioners
knew the lot was undersized when they acquired it. The trial
justice also concluded that, with respect to the requested
variance, petitioners had failed to meet their burden of
showing that they were being denied all beneficial use of
their property. The trial justice further found that petitioners
had failed to demonstrate that granting a special exception
would not be inimical to the public health, safety, morals
and welfare,

Before us, petitioners contend that in denying their
application both the board and the trial justice acted arbi-
trarily and abused their discretion. The petitioners argue that
there is no competent evidence in the record which
contradicts the testimony presented by their expert witness
establishing their entitlement to the relief sought. Specif-
ically, petitioners point to the board’s failure to set forth the
facts upon which it relied in denying the requested special
exception. The petitioners also allege that sufficient evidence
was adduced to justify granting the variance.

I

iz As a threshold observation, we point out the the Superior
Court, in reviewing the action of a zoning board, must ex-
amine the entire record to determine whether “substantial”
evidence exists to support the board’s findings. Apostolou v.
Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 502, 388 A.2d 821, 824-25 (1978).
On certiorari to this court we review the record to determine

26

whether competent legal evidence exists to support the find-
ings of the Superior Court. Hardy v. Zoning Board of
Review, 119 R.I. 533, 541, 382 A.2d 520, 525 (1977).

During the course of oral argument, counsel for both par-
ties evidenced a degree of confusion regarding the proper
standard to be applied in evaluating petitioners’ claim. We
therefore once again set forth the various measures which can
be employed in seeking relief from area and set-back
requirements.

As we observed in Sun Oil Co. v. Zoning Board of Review,
105 R.I. 231, 251 A.2d 167, 169 (1969), relief from these
requirements may be granted under applicable local ordin-
ances. Additionally, relief may be obtained as a deviation
under the standards enunciated in Viti v. Zoning Board of
Review, 92 R.I. 59, 166 A.2d 211 (1960). See also Rozes v.
Smith, 120 R.I. 515, 519, 388 A.2d 816, 819 (1978).

An applicant seeking a special exception must show that
“neither the proposed use nor its location on the site would
have a detrimental effect upon the public health, safety, wel-
fare and morals.” Hester v. Timothy, 108 R.1. 376, 385-86,
275 A.2d 637, 641-42 (1971) (emphasis in original) citing
Nani v. Zoning Board of Smithfield, 104 R.I. 150, 156, 242
A.2d 403 (1968). The granting of a variance is conditional
upon a showing that literal adherence to the relevant zoning
ordinances would deprive the owner of all beneficial use of
his land. Westminster Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 103
R.I. 381, 386, 238 A.2d 353, 356 (1968). Under the principles
enunciated in Viti v. Zoning Board of Review, 92 R.I. 59,
166 A.2d 211 (1960), where a property owner is seeking relief
from area and set-back requirements for a use permitted by
the ordinance, he need only demonstrate an adverse impact
amounting to more than a mere inconvenience.

The Viti doctrine, however, was never intended to operate
where the requested relief can be obtained through local
zoning ordinances. Here §§3.4.3 and 14.2.3 of the Warwick
Zoning Ordinances allow the board to grant a special excep-
tion for the construction of a permitted use on an undersized

3

lot. Section 14.2.2 of the ordinances empowered the board to
grant relief from set-back requirments. The Viti doctrine is
therefore inapplicable in the present case.

aa

We now turn to the merits of petitioners’ application. With
regard to the denial of the special exception, petitioners
challenge the board’s failure to disclose the special knowledge
it relied upon in rejecting the expert testimony that the pro-
posed structure would not have a detrimental effect on the
surrounding property. In its decision, the board did refer to
its knowledge of existing conditions in that area of the city.
The board stated “the Board, in its own expertise in admin-
istering The Zoning Ordinance and based on its own knowl-
edge of the premises and its locality, takes issue with the real
estate expert and further states as a matter of fact that the
proposed use would devalue the surrounding property.”

We ruled in Kelly v. Zoning Board of Review, 94 R.I. 298,
303-04, 180 A.2d 319, 322 (1962), that a board is presumed to
possess special knowledge concerning local conditions and
needs as they relate to zoning. A decision reached by the
board pursuant to such special knowledge will not be upheld,
however, unless the record reveals the underlying facts or
circumstances the board derived from its knowledge of the
area. Perron v. Zoning Board of Review, 117 R.I. 571, 576,
369 A.2d 638, 641 (1977), and cases cited herein.

Despite the board’s reference to having knowledge of the
conditions in the area, the record in the instant case contains
no disclosure as to what conclusions it drew from this knowl-
edge. The board apparently based its denial upon the ob-
servation that the special exception sought would devalue the
surrounding property. However, the record is barren of any
disclosure of the facts upon which it concluded that a devalu-
ation would result. There being no legal evidence upon
which the decision could reasonably rest, we must conclude
that the board’s action was arbitrary and an abuse of
discretion. See V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Zoning Board of
Review, 103 R.I. 16, 19, 234 A.2d 355, 357 (1967).

1S
Tl

Hs With respect to the requested relief for a variance, we find
the record equally barren of competent evidence to support
the respondent’s decision. The record clearly demonstrates
that petitioners are being deprived fo the beneficial use of their
property. An examination of the pertinent zoning ordinances
indicates that none of the other uses permitted in a residential
district would have any reasonable application to the parcel
in issue. The board’s denial of the requested variance cannot,
therefore, be sustained.

IV

Hs Finally, we observe that both the respondent and the trial
court also relied upon the fact that the petitioners allegedly
knew that the lot in question was undersized at the time they
made the purchase. This factor cannot be employed as sup-
port for the denial of an application. See Denton v. Zoning
Board of Review, 86 R.I. 219, 223, 133 A.2d 718, 720
(1957).

The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of the
Superior Court is quashed, and the records certified to this
court are hereby remanded to the Superior Court with our
decision endorsed thereon.

Thomas A. Lynch, for petitioners.

*

William J. Toohey, City Solicitor, Russell Bramley,
William F. Calise, Assistant City Solicitors, for respondent.

24!

oO

406 A.2d 1241.
Epwin E. Cutt ef al. vs. Epmonp L. Vapnais.
AUGUST 27, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

250

Bevitacgua, C.J. This is an appeal initiated by Edmond
L. Vadnais from a Superior Court order on November 30,
1977. That order granted Edwin E. Cull’s and Genevieve
Gustafson’s motions to attach real estate held by the
defendant and his wife as tenants by the entirety, and to
preliminarily enjoin the defendant from transferring his real
estate pending service of the writ of attachment.

After the case was docketed in this court, plaintiffs filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the grant of
the writ of attachment in the present case is not an
appealable order and that this court should not review a
lower court’s grant of a writ of attachment by writ of
certiorari. On January 19, 1978, defendant filed a motion in
opposition to plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal. Before
addressing whether the trial court’s grant of plaintiffs’
motion to attach is an appealable order, we entered an order
on March 2, 1978, remanding the case to the Superior Court
in order to expedite disposition of the matter on its merits.
While the case was pending in this court, the Superior Court
heard the case on the merits pursuant to plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment and entered judgment for plaintiffs.

es 251
The facts, although not pertinent to the issues before us at
this time, are summarized as follows. The plaintiffs filed a
complaint in Superior Court upon learning that defendant
had represented himself as secretary-treasurer of a bona fide
loan association that both loaned money to employees of the
Providence Journal and paid investors a high rate of return.
Relying upon defendant’s representation, plaintiffs loaned
money to defendant at high interest rates. Later, plaintiffs
learned that defendant had been personally loaning money to
Providence Journal employees. The plaintiffs allege that they
had been misled and the record reveals the defendant at-
tempted to arrange a method whereby he could reimburse
them. The plaintiffs then brought this action requesting
compensatory and punitive damages and filed a motion with
the trial court seeking a prejudgment attachment and an ex
parte restraining order pending a hearing on their motion for
a prejudgment attachment. The restraining order was
granted the day the motion was filed. Later, plaintiffs filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction. In the order granting
plaintiffs’ motion to attach defendant’s property, the trial
court also granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction pending service of the writ of attachment.

After the trial court entered summary judgment for
plaintiffs upon their motion, plaintiffs filed a renewed
motion to dismiss defendant’s appeal on the ground that the
Superior Court’s disposition of the case had mooted the issue
on appeal. We have denied that motion.

i The defendant has raised two issues before this court: (1)
whether an order granting a prejudgment attachment of real
property is properly appealable! and (2) whether property
held as a tenancy by the entirety is exempt from prejudgment
attachment.? We shall consider both of these issues, not-

1Originally, the plaintiffs sought an attachment of the defendant's bank account,
but in light of the bank’s filing of an affidavit of no funds, we need not address this
*The defendant has also alleged that the order granting the plaintiffs’ motion to
attach was one continuing an injunction and is therefore appealable under G.L.
1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-24-7. This section permits appeals to the Supreme

252 es

withstanding the fact that these questions have become moot
as a result of the Superior Court’s disposition of this case on its
merits. These issues are of such importance that we have
decided not to wait until a future date to render an opinion.
Our decision at this time will thus avoid procedural
duplication should a similar factual situation arise.

I

The defendant contends that the grant of a motion for a
prejudgment attachment is a final judgment, appealable
under G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-24-1. Section 9-24-1
reads as follows:

“Filing of appeal.—Any party aggrieved by a final
judgment, decree, or order of the superior court may,
within the time prescribed by applicable procedural
rules, appeal to the supreme court. Subject to the
provisions of applicable procedural rules, such appeal
shall be taken by filing a claim of appeal in the office of
the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken,
and shall deposit with said clerk an amount not
exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00) as prescribed by the
tules and regulations of the supreme court.”

The defendant cites E.J. Hansen Elevator, Inc. v. Stoll,
167 Conn. 623, 356 A.2d 893 (1975), in support of his
position. In Hansen, the court found that orders that both
grant and deny motions for a prejudgment remedy meet the
tests of finality: the orders terminate a separate and distinct
proceeding, conclude the rights of some or all of the parties,
and effectuate a conclusion of the rights of the parties so that
further proceedings cannot affect them. Id. at 626, 356 A.2d
at 895.

Court whenever the Superior Court grants or continues an injunction by an
interlocutory order or decree. The temporary restraining orders and the
preliminary injunction in this case were granted only to safeguard the defendant's
real property pending the prejudgment attachment hearing and service of the
attachment. Because the temporary restraining orders and the injunction had no
independent status and have now expired by their own terms, the issue is moot.

es 253

The defendant also cites Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L.
Ed. 1528, 1536 (1949), for the proposition that prejudgment
attachment orders are not only collateral to rights asserted in
the action, but also are too independent of the action itself to
require deferral of appellate consideration until adjudication
of the entire case. The Cohen‘case, however, which involved
a denial of a motion to require the plaintiff to post security,
was decided prior to the United States Supreme Court case
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,
S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 70 S. Ct. 861, 94 L. Ed. 1206 (1950).
Swift concerned an order that vacated a foreign attachment
of a vessel. In Swift, the Supreme Court, in dictum,_
distinguished between a situation in which an order dissolves
a prejudgment attachment and one in which such an
attachment is upheld pending determination of the principal
claim. Id at 689, 70 S. Ct. at 865, 94 L. Ed. at 1210-11. In
upholding appellate review in the former case only, the
Court reasoned that

“{alppellate review of the order dissolving the
attachment at a later date would be an empty rite after
the vessel had been released and the restoration of the
attachment only theoretically possible.” Id.

The Court thus distinguished the result of an order dissolving
a prejudgment attachment from the effect on the parties
when an attachment is upheld pending resolution of the prin-
cipal claim. In the latter event, the Court found that the
rights of all the parties can be adequately protected during
the course of litigation on the main cause of action. Id.

HB Notwithstanding the fact that defendant has requested us
to follow the precedent set by the Connecticut court, we have
chosen to adopt the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in Swift. Therefore, as did the Supreme Court, we
hold that orders granting prejudgment attachments are inter-
locutory and do not fall within the Cohen rule, which allows
appeals when an order is deemed to “determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action * * +.” Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. at 546, 69 S. Ct. at 1225-26, 93 L. Ed. at 1536.

254 ee

HB Alternatively, defendant argues that an order granting a
prejudgment attachment has injurious consequences that vest
in that order elements of finality. The defendant claims that
these elements bring the order within the doctrine articulated
by this court in McAuslan v. McAuslan, 34 R.I, 462, 83 A.
837 (1912). The McAuslan doctrine is an exception to the
general rule that litigants generally may not obtain piecemeal
review of their case in this court. See Eidam v. Eidam, 108
R.I. 673, 680, 279 A.2d 413, 417 (1971). The McAuslan court
recognized that in many instances hardship and injury would
result if this court were to refuse to hear certain appeals
technically interlocutory in nature, when the merits of the
cause had not yet been determined in the lower court. See
McAuslan v. McAuslan, 34 R.1. at 470, 83 A. at 840. In these
circumstances, “‘* * * the decree is held to possess such an
element of finality as to bring it within the terms of the
statute limiting the right to appeal only from final decrees.’ ”
Id., quoting DuFourv. Lang, 54 F. 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1892).
We extended the McAuslan rule to the facts in Eidam, where
we held that an order vacating a prejudgment attachment
possesses elements of finality because the injury apprehended
is clearly imminent and irreparable. Eidam v. Eidam, 108
R.I. at 681, 279 A.2d at 417-18. However, we believe that
usually no harm befalls defendants subject to prejudgment
attachment orders in respect to real estate because pre-
judgment attachments do not obliterate property rights.* In-
stead, these attachments merely prevent defendants from dis-
posing of their real property before the trial court can deter-
mine whether they are liable. See Application of Tiene, 19
NJ. 149, 160, 115 A.2d 543, 549 (1955) (status quo main-
tained). We thus hold as a general rule that because orders
granting prejudgment attachments of real estate are inter-

*In Rhode Island defendants are protected by a statutory procedure governing
motions to attach personalty or real estate, See G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§10-5-2; R.I. Civ. P. 4(j). Both of these provisions eliminate the possibility of a
court order granting ex parte a motion to attach.

ee) 255

locutory and involve no threat of hardship or injury, such
orders do not fall within the McAuslan doctrine.*

For the above reasons, we hold that orders allowing
prejudgment attachments are not appealable.

I

The second issue raised by defendant is whether real estate
held as a tenancy by the entirety is exempt from prejudgment
attachment.®

HH ss Tenancies by the entirety, as they were known at common

law, are recognized in Rhode Island. Bloomfield v. Brown,
67 R.I. 452, 456, 25 A.2d 354, 356 (1942). At common law,
tenancies by the entirety are created when there exist the four
unities integral to the existence of the joint tenancy, namely
the unities of time, interest, title and possession, Knibb v.
Security Insurance Co., 121 R.I. 406, 410, 399 A.2d 1214,
1216 (1979), plus the fifth unity, two natural persons as one
person in law. Van Ausdall v. Van Ausdall, 48 R.I. 106, 108,
135 A.850, 851 (1927). Estates held by the entirety are thus
uniquely premised upon the common-law doctrine that
husband and wife are one, so that they take the whole estate
as a single person. 4 Thompson, Real Property §1784 at 61-62
(1979). As tenants by the entirety, both husband and wife
hold per tout et non per my. Id. at 59. Each party thus holds
all, but neither holds a separate share. The result is that
neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of his or her
part without the consent of the other. Id.

‘We recognize, however, that there may be instances where orders granting
prejudgment attachments could lead to possible injurious consequences. These
orders would be appealable in accordance with the principles set forth in the
McAuslan case.

°The attachment process is delineated in R.1. Civ. P. 4(j). Under this rule, a
motion for a writ of attachment is “granted only upon a showing that there is a
probability of a judgment being rendered in favor of the plaintiff and that there is a
need for furnishing the plaintiff security in the amount sought for satisfaction of
such judgment, together with interest and costs.” See R.I. Civ. P. 4())(3).

256 es

The extent to which a tenancy by the entirety is subject to
the claim of creditors of only one of the spouses is only
partially settled in this jurisdiction. At common law, because

- the husband was entitled to the possession of the wife’s realty
during her lifetime, his interest could be sold on execution to
satisfy his debts. 4 Thompson, Real Property §1790 at 102. In
Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 460, 25 A.2d 354, 358
(1942), we had the occasion to consider whether, under the
Married Women’s Rights Act, the husband’s interest in a
tenancy by the entirety is subject to levy and sale on
execution by his judgment creditor. We decided that because
the estate was held by the husband and wife as a tenancy by
the entirety, the husband’s interest could not be alienated
from the estate without the wife’s consent. Id. at 464, 25
A.2d at 360. For this reason, we held that an estate held by
the entirety is not subject to levy and sale on an execution
based upon a judgment against the husband alone. Id.

The defendant refers us to Bloomfield, arguing that if one
cannot levy and sell on execution property held by the
entirety, then one should not be able to attach that property.
In support of this contention, defendant cites Barron v.
Arnold, 16 R.I. 22, 11 A.298 (1887), where this court con-
sidered the question whether liquor, which could not be sold
legally, could be attached. We reasoned that because the
property could not be sold without violating the law, the
attachment could not be perfected by sale on an execution.
We therefore held that the liquor could not be attached.

The Married Women’s Rights Act, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) ch. 4 of tit.
15, was conceived by the General Assembly “to raise up the wife, in the eyes of the
Jaw, to the same position as that of the husband, thus entitling her to take and hold
real estate in her own right as a natural person in any manner permitted by existing
law, free from the control formerly exercised by the husband at common law. The
act is emancipatory and protective in character.” Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I.
452, 462, 25 A.2d 354, 359 (1942),

| 257

The Barron case, however, is inapposite to the present
situation which involves real estate, not personalty, The facts
at hand are therefore governed by §10-5-9,” which describes
the method to be utilized for attaching real estate. This
statute allows the issuance of a writ to attach “real estate, or
the right, title and interest of any defendant therein + « +.”

The defendant alleges, however, that his interest in a
tenancy by the entirety is analogous to a husband’s estate by
curtesy. In Greenwich National Bank v. Hall, 11 R.1. 124
(1875), we observed in relation to a tenancy by the curtesy
initiate that “during [the life of the wife, the] husband has no
interest in her real estate which can be attached in any suit to
which she is not a party.” Jd. at 128. A tenant by the curtesy
has no more than a “mere possibility of an interest” because
that interest only arises for the term of the husband’s life if he
survives his wife, who dies after he has had issue born alive of
her and capable of inheriting her estate.”

Hs In contrast with tenants by the curtesy, however, tenants
by the entirety are each presently seized and possessed of an
interest in the entire estate. 4 Thompson, supra, §1784 at 59,
63. We therefore hold that a spouse’s interest in real property
held by the entirety is legally sufficient to sustain a
prejudgment attachment notwithstanding the fact that that
interest is not subject to levy and sale on execution. Our
holding in this regard is strengthened by the case of Wood v.
Watson, 20 R.I, 223, 37 A.1030 (1897), where we held that
even contingent, executory or future interests in real estate
may be attached under Rhode Island statutory language
identical to §10-5-9. Id. at 224, 37 A. at 1030.

“General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §10-5-9 provides in pertinent part as
follows:
“Method of attaching real estate.—The officer commanded by any writ
to attach real estate, or the right, title and interest of any defendant therein,
shall attach the same by » « *.”

SBlack’s Law Dictionary 1636 (4th ed. 1968) (definition of tenant by the curtesy).

258 |

The defendant also contends that attachments on property
held by the entirety are futile because that property can be
transferred by a conveyance of both husband and wife, with
the intent of defeating the claims of the husband’s creditor.
Assuming without deciding that there is merit to the de-
fendant’s contention, we note that if the husband and wife
do not convey their property before one spouse dies, and if
the debtor spouse survives the death of the other spouse, the
creditor may enforce a prior attachment pursuant to an
active, unsatisfied judgment, thus compelling the entirety
property to be sold on an execution. See L ¢ M Gas Co. v.
Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 551, 161 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1968). In any
event, our answer to the question whether the interest of a
tenant by the entirety is attachable should not depend upon
an event that may never occur; namely, conveyance of the
property by both the husband and the wife.

For the reasons stated above, the defendant’s appeal is
denied and dismissed, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed and the record is remanded to the Superior Court.

Joseph F. Dugan, for plaintiffs.

Oster, Fay, Groff & Prescott, George M. Prescott, for
defendant.

405 A.2d 1178.
KaTHLeENn A. BERBERIAN vs. ANTHONY J. SOLOMON.
AUGUST 27, 1979
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

260 |

Weissercer, J. The plaintiff brought this action in the
Superior Court to enjoin the general treasurer from making
further payments of state funds to retired members of the
Rhode Island Legislature who are currently receiving
benefits through a pension system! which the plaintiff claims
is in violation of specific limitations placed on legislators’
compensation set forth in art. XI, §1 of amendments to the
Rhode Island Constitution.? After memoranda of law were
submitted by both parties, the trial justice granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on the basis that the complaint failed to set forth
facts from which he could determine that the plaintiff had
standing to bring the action. The plaintiff is before us on
appeal from the judgment entered on April 17, 1978.

HA plaintiff satisfies the requirement of standing if he can

show an “injury in fact” resulting from the challenged
statute. Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon,
113 R.I. 16, 317 A.2d 124 (1974), Although recent United
States Supreme Court decisions have liberalized standing
requirments to the point of allowing certain suits to protect
the public interest, the Court still insists that the represen-
tative allege his personal stake in the controversy—his own
injury in fact—before he will have standing to assert the
broader claims of the public at large. United States v.

Mn her brief, the plaintiff specifically challenges the constitutionality of G.L.
1956 (1969 Reenactment) §36-10-9(c), as amended by P.L. 1966, ch. 286, §1.
Section 36-10-2, as amended by P.L. 1967, ch. 127, §1, however, provides for the
appropriations to which the plaintiff objects. We will therefore consider that a
challenge is made to this section as well.

*Art. XI, §1 reads in relevant part as follows:
“The senators and representatives shall severally receive the sum of five
dollars and the speaker of the house of representatives ten dollars for every
day of actual attendance and eight cents per mile for traveling expenses in
going to and returning from the general assembly; provided that no
compensation or mileage shall be allowed any senator or representative for
more than sixty days attendance in any calendar year. The general assembly
shall regulate the compensation of the governor and of all other officers,
subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution.”

261

Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973); Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93S. Ct. 1146, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536
(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L. Ed.
2d 201 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92S. Ct.
1361, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 92S. Ct. 1029, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1972).

The authorities are in conflict about ‘the type of “injury in
fact” which a taxpayer acting in his individual capacity must
allege in order to maintain a suit to enjoin a state agency.
Sennott v. Hawksley, 103 R.I. 730, 241 A.2d 286 (1968). We
have not, up to now, specifically passed on this question.
Some jurisdictions, upon consideration of public policy,
require that a taxpayer must show an injury distinct from
that of the public in general in order to maintain such a suit.
Citizens Committee v. County Commissioners, 233 Md. 398,
401, 197 -A.2d 108, 110 (1964); Bonnet v. State, 141 N.J.
Super. 177, 199, 357 A.2d 772, 784 (1976), aff'd 155 N.J.
Super. 520, 382 A.2d 1175 (1978). We have taken this view
with regard to suits brought by taxpayers to restrain
government action at the municipal level. Smith v. Brock, 83
R.I. 432, 118 A.2d 336 (1955), The rationale of this position
is succintly stated in McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.1. 55, 83
A.2d 75 (1951):

“In this state it was long ago settled that ‘Suits for the
public should be placed in public and responsible
hands.’ O’Brien v. Board of Aldermen, 18 R.I. 113, 116.
The public officer vested with that authority is the
attorney general of the state. Only he may sue to redress
a purely public wrong except in those instances where
one of the public who is injured has a distinct personal
legal interest different from that of the public at large
+ = *,” Id. at 62, 83 A.2d at 78.

Some jurisdictions will allow a suit by a taxpayer without a
showing of special injury. Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d
361, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (1975).

262 ee

We need not decide today which rule we shall adopt in
respect to state expenditures in view of the fact that the
allegations in the complaint are insufficient to’ satisfy the
minimum requirements of standing under either rule. The
complaint not only is devoid of any statements concerning an
“injury in fact” which plaintiff will suffer as a result of the
challenged statute, but it also fails to assert the most
rudimentary allegation that plaintiff is a Rhode Island
taxpayer.

HE (On appeal from the granting of a 12(b)(6) motion, we will

not affirm the judgment below unless it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt that under any conceivable set of facts
which might be proven in support of claims alleged, plaintiff
will not be entitled to relief. Dutson v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co., 119 R.I. 801, 802, 383 A.2d 597 (1978);
Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 102 R.1. 8, 227
A.2d 582 (1967). We shall apply the same criteria to
allegations of standing just as we would to any other
allegation in the complaint. Rosen v. Restrepo, 119 R.I.
398, 380 A.2d 960 (1977); see Rhode Island Ophthalmologi-
cal Society v. Canon, supra. In the absence of any allegations
concerning standing, we are not at liberty to presume stand-
ing. This court, like the Supreme Court, requires a complaint
to contain specific statements from which standing may be
inferred.

Although in a relatively few instances we have resolved
reservations about standing in order to assume jurisdiction
because of serious substantive questions of immediate and
compelling public interest, we have generally observed the
rule that a justiciable controversy between the parties is basic
to the court’s assumption of jurisdiction. Lamb v. Perry, 101
R.I. 538, 225 A.2d 521 (1967). An example of this exception
to the general rule is found in Sennott v. Hawksley, supra,
where we presumed standing when an action was brought to
restrain the expenditure of funds appropriated for the
conduct of a state constitutional convention due to the

es 263

urgency and immediacy of the issue presented.’ In the case at
bar, however, wherein the statute under consideration has
been in existence since 1960,* we are not confronted with an
issue which has to be determined on the basis of the
immediate urgency of the situation. Citizens Committee v.
County Commissioners, supra, 233 Md. at 403, 197 A.2d at
110-11. Therefore, in the absence of any allegations to satisfy
the requirements of standing, the trial justice was correct in
dismissing the complaint.

The plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court.

Aram K. Berberian, for plaintiff.

Dennis J. Roberts I, Attorney General, Richard B.
Woolley, Special Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.

*It should be noted, however, that in Sennott v. Hawksley, 103 R.I. 730, 241
A.2d 286 (1968), there was at least an allegation that the plaintiff was a taxpayer.
This allegation under ordinary circumstances would not necessarily be conclusive
upon the issue of standing.

{P.L. 1960, ch. 20, §2 see In re Opinion to the Governor, 92. R.I. 46, 166 A.2d
224 (1960).

to
ES

405 A.2d 1171.

THE Heratp Przss, INc. vs. Joun H. Norperc,
Tax ADMINISTRATOR.

AUGUST 27, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Werssercer, J. This is a petition for certiorari to re-
view a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision of the
tax administrator assessing a sales and use tax against The
Herald Press, Inc. (Herald), a printing firm in Pawtucket,
Rhode Island.

Herald challenges the sales and use tax assessed on two
transactions. The first challenge involves the use tax imposed
as a result of the alleged purchase by Herald of certain capital
assets from Hendrix Electronics, Inc. (Hendrix), a manu-
facturer of electronic computer systems in New Hampshire.
The second challenge involves the sales tax assessed on an
advertising flyer printed by Herald for India Imports of
Rhode Island, Inc. (India Imports).

On July 18, 1975, Herald was sent a notice of a deficiency
determination under the sales and use tax law. The stated de-
ficiency, including interest and penalty, was $8,422.07. A

| 267

hearing was requested and was later held on November 4,
1975, before a hearing officer of the Division of Taxation. A
revenue agent testified he had performed the audit on Herald
and that he had mailed the deficiency determination. He
went on to testify that the assessment of the portion of the de-
ficiency determination involving the transaction with
Hendrix was based on the information contained in a letter
received by his supervisor from Hendrix and on an
examination of invoices sent to Herald by Hendrix. Accord-
ing to the revenue agent, Herald made three separate pur-
chases of equipment from Hendrix. He stated that the first
purchase was in the amount of $31,896 and occurred on
August 30, 1974. He stated the second and third purchases
were for $14,312 and $5,600 and occurred on January 13,
1975 and January 31, 1975. The agent also testified that ac-
cording to his supervisor all the items acquired by Herald
from Hendrix were fully installed and operating. The
revenue agent, however, conceded that “[t]o tell you the
truth, I didn’t see any of these three pieces of equipment” and
that he “did not see the machinery producing a product.” He
further testified that the system was returned and that all
payments were refunded on June 6, 1975. The agent stated
that this was the only relevant information utilized in
assessing the tax. He likewise stated that he assessed the
deficiency because the law requires that the equipment must
be returned within 120 days to be excluded as part of the
“sale price.” G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-18-12(B).

Mr. Walter Rutman (Rutman), the president of Herald,
also testified at the hearing. He stated that Herald had not
made a decision regarding the purchase of typesetting equip-
ment “when a whole series of containers arrived from
Hendrix » * +.” Rutman testified that he learned from Mr.
Faber (Faber), a sales representative of Hendrix, that the
system had been sent without an okay. Rutman, however,
also testified that Faber “Made some conditions that would
make it more attractive to us to enter into an agreement with
him.” According to Rutman, the equipment was accepted
solely on a trial basis and the cost of shipping and insurance
was to be assumed by Hendrix.

268 ee

Rutman also stated that the system was composed of four
phases: two terminals and a computer in the first phase;
additional terminals in phase two; a disc program in phase
three; and a hyphenation and justification program in phase
four. Rutman said “it was explained and understood by Mr.
Faver [sic] that without the last phase, the rest of it was
worthless.” Rutman further stated that Herald tried to utilize
the equipment, “but there were so many hardware failures,
that we couldn’t even test it properly.” According to
Rutman, the second phase was received in January 1975. He
also stated that he had been told that Hendrix would do their
utmost to send the third phase in January or the first of
February 1975. Near the end of January, however, Rutman
was informed that the model had not even been constructed.
As a result, Rutman‘told Hendrix’s eastern regional manager
to “pull the whole thing out.” Thereafter, Herald received
the invoice dated January 31, 1975, and part of the third
phase of the system. The material was never unpacked. After
January 21, 1975, Herald made constant complaints about
the equipment because, as Rutman explained, “[w]e couldn’t
get anything out of the program.” Rutman rejected three
alternative plans suggested in a letter dated March 18, 1975,
from Hendrix’s district sales manager.

According to Rutman, in the latter part of April an
agreement was made to remove the equipment but the actual
removal did not occur until June 6, 1975.

Rutman’s testimony was mirrored by the affidavit of Faber
who was no longer employed by Hendrix as of January 21,
1975. In his affidavit Faber stated he had assured Rutman
that if the entire system did not work to Rutman’s
satisfaction, Hendrix would take back all of the equipment
and refund all payments.

The tax administrator, in his final decision, approved and
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by
the hearing officer who had previously found that Herald
had made three separate purchases from Hendrix. The hear-
ing officer had also found that Herald had been dissatisfied

eS 269

with the operation of the system and had returned the entire
unit and received a refund on June 6, 1975. He concluded
that the transactions were “sales” under §44-18-7 and that
the merchandise had not been returned within 120 days of
the date of sale or purchase. See §44-18-12(B); Regulations
and Rules Issued by the Tax Administrator under the Sales
and Use Tax Law at 104 (1977).! Therefore, the hearing
officer had recommended that the deficiency determination
be accepted as correct. The tax administrator approved and
the trial justice affirmed.

The basic facts of the second transaction are undisputed.
Herald printed certain advertising flyers for India Imports.
The flyers, however, were delivered to T.C.S. Inc. of
Providence for the insertion of order blanks before being sent
to Mailways of Manchester, New Hampshire, for bulk mail
delivery outside of Rhode island. The hearing officer deter-
mined that Herald exercised the right and power over the
flyers and directed shipment to T.C.S. The fact that the
flyers were subsequently placed in interstate commerce did
not, in the view of the hearing officer, alter the fact that the
sale was made by Herald and delivery was made in Provi-
dence at the direction of the customer. Accordingly, the
hearing officer recommended that the deficiency be upheld
and the tax administrator adopted this conclusion. The trial
justice also upheld this portion of the sales tax deficiency
assessment. He stated that the tax administrator could have
opted to overlook the technicality of control but did not.
Thus, the trial justice concluded that while he might have
been inclined to view the problem differently, he would not
substitute his view for that of the tax administrator.

In the present case the tax administrator’s decision was
reviewed in the Superior Court pursuant to the provisions of
G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §42-35-15, as amended by
P.L. 1966, ch. 112, §1. Herald asserts, however, that it was
entitled to a de novo hearing in the Superior Court under the

*This regulation was originally promulgated July 1, 1947.

270 |

provisions of §44-19-18. This section was first enacted in P.L.
1947, ch. 1887, art. 2, §41, and was on the books when
Herald’s complaint in the Superior Court was filed on May
25, 1976.* That section provided in pertinent part that upon
petition by an aggrieved person the Superior Court

“shall proceed to hear said petition and to determine the
correct amount of the tax, interest, and penalties.”

However, Herald did not question the standard of review in
the Superior Court. Indeed, Herald’s complaint specifically
states that the action was brought under the provisions of
§42-35-15, the section of the Administrative Procedures Act
dealing with the judicial review of contested cases. We can
only say that we believe Herald properly instituted its
complaint under §42-35-15.

The relationship between §42-35-15 and §44-19-18 has.
never been considered by this court. We observe, however,
that §44-19-18 was in effect when chapter 35 of title 42
became effective on January 1, 1964. The Legislature also
provided in §42-35-18 that the chapter applied to all agencies
and agency proceedings not expressly exempted and that all
acts and parts of acts “inconsistent herewith shall stand
repealed.” Accordingly, we have consistently stated that in
enacting §42-35-15(a) the Legislature intended to provide a
single and exclusive method of obtaining judicial review of
agency action excluding only the decisions of specifically
exempt agencies. Colonial Hilton Inns of New England, Inc.
v. Rego, 109 R.I. 259, 284 A.2d 69 (1971); New England
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Fascio, 105 R.I. 711, 254

*General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-19-18 was amended by P.L. 1976,
ch. 140, §27, The pertinent language of the section was unchanged except that
provision was made for review in the Sixth Division of the District Court instead of
the Superior Court. A sentence was also added at the end of §44-19-18 providing
that an aggrieved party may seek review in this court by writ of certiorari in
accordance with the procedures contained in G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment)
§42-35-16, Herald contends that by including the same language in the amended
section the Legislature again manifested an intent to provide for a de novo judicial
review of the decisions of the tax administrator. The amendment, however, did not
take effect until October 1, 1976, and has no effect on this case. P.L. 1976, ch. 140,
§34, Thus, the issue of the effect of readoption of the same statutory language is not
squarely presented. We observe, however, that the language directing a court to
“hear and determine” a petition does not necessarily indicate a legislative intent to
provide for a trial de novo. See E. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Rocha, 118 R.I. 276,
373 A.2d 496 (1977).

 —_

A.2d 758 (1969); Yellow Cab Co. v. Public Utility Hearing
Board, 101 B.I. 296, 222 A.2d 361 (1966).

We considered an analogous issue in Sterling Shoe Co. v.
Langton, 103 R.1. 688, 240 A.2d 727 (1968). There we held
that the Administrative Procedures Act supplanted certain
portions of §44-10-11 and §44-19-17. We have also recently
stated that review of a tax administrator's decision is properly
sought under the provisions of §42-35-15. Rice Machinery,
Inc. v. Norberg, 120 R.I. 542, 391 A.2d 66, 69 n.2 (1978);
see Prospecting Unlimited, Inc. v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 116,
376 A.2d 702 (1977). Although the issue presented may not
have been raised in the foregoing cases, we believe that the
statements in those cases were correct. This court must
assume that the Legislature intended to have all statutes
relating to taxation construed to be consistent and to
effectuate and not defeat the policy of those laws. Edwards
v. Cardarelli, 65 R.I. 236, 14 A.2d 693 (1940). Further,
statutes in pari materia should be construed together in order
that they may be harmonious and consistent with their
general scope and purpose. State v. St. Pierre, 118 R.I.
45, 371 A.2d 1048 (1977).

In the present case, we believe that the procedures and
standards of review contained in §42-35-15(b) were clearly
intended to be incorporated into the provisions of §44-19-18.
In fact, the only identifiable disparity between these sections
is the period in which appeals must be filed. Accordingly, we
conclude that Herald was not entitled to a de novo review in
the Superior Court and that the procedure was properly
conducted under the provisions of §42-35-15.°

Herald contends that the decision of the tax administrator
was illegal because the procedure by which his decision was
reached deprived Herald of property without the due process

*Herald also obliquely contends that its due process rights were not protected
because §42-35-15 effectively makes the tax administrator’s factual determinations
final. This argument was not raised in the Superior Court and is not properly
before us. Tente v. Tente, 112 R.I. 636, 314 A.2d 149 (1974). In any event, the
argument raised by Herald is untenable in light of modern administrative law
prineiples. See generally, 4 Davis, Administrative Law §§29.08; 29.09 (1958). The
Legislature has provided in §49-35-15(g) that the review of factual findings is to be
limited in nature, We observe that a similar standard of review is embodied in 5
U.S.C.A. §706 (1977). Further, the Supreme Court has applied a doctrine of

272 ee

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Specifically Herald alleges the
requirement in §42-35-15 that a taxpayer pay the assessed tax
before obtaining judicial review of a decision of the tax
administrator operated to deprive Herald of property
without due process. Herald also contends that it was
deprived of property without due process because the tax
administrator who has a statutory duty to collect and assess
taxes, must also determine the validity of the assessment. At
bottom, Herald is arguing that the tax administrator is in-
herently biased due to his statutory duty.

We addressed the first contention in Moore v. Langton, 92
R.I. 141, 167 A.2d 558 (1961). We held that a statute
requiring the tax on intangible personalty to be paid before a
taxpayer could sue in the Superior Court did not deny due
process, We also believe that a taxpayer is not deprived of
property without due process because the tax administrator,
who has a statutory duty to collect and assess taxes, must also
determine the validity of the tax. The Supreme Court faced
an analagous issue in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.
Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed. 2d 712 (1975), There the Wisconsin State
Medical Examining Board was empowered to investigate and
determine whether physicians had engaged in prohibited acts
and whether disciplinary action should be taken. The subject
physician challenged the board’s power to temporarily
suspend his license on the ground that his due process rights
would be violated if the board investigated and also deter-
mined the suspension. The Supreme Court, however, rejected
the challenge. The Court determined that the mere fact
that the board combined investigatory and adjudicatory
functions did not trespass on constitutional rights. While the
Court conceded that a fair hearing in a fair tribunal was
basic to due process, the Court stated that absent special
factors in a particular case the performance of such functions
by the board did not contravene due process. See also Sterling
Shoe Co. v. Norberg, 411 F. Supp. 128 (D.B.I. 1976). In the
limited review on issues factual in nature of which the following cases are
illustrative. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut, Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 S. Ct. 801, 91 L.
Ed. 1028 (1947); South Chicago Coal &x Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 60 S.

Ct. 544, 84 L. Ed, 732 (1940); Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 56S. Ct. 190,
80 L. Ed. 229 (1938).

es 273

present case the taxpayer, Herald, has demonstrated no spe-
cific facts to lead us to believe that the administrative
procedure utilized in determining the tax deficiency was
improper in terms of due process.

Although the tax administrator’ has the duty and
responsibility to collect all taxes which are due and payable
under appropriate and pertinent statutes, as interpreted and
amplified by valid regulations, the tax administrator has an
equal duty and responsibility to accord to every taxpayer
every exemption and deduction to which he is entitled under
those statutes and regulations. The performance of these
duties does not create an inherent bias on the part of the
administrator which would preclude an impartial examina-
tion and weighing of the evidence or application of law. See
Powell v. Ward, 542, F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1976); Chelsea
Community Hospital v. Michigan Blue Cross Association,
436 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Mich. 1977).

THE HENDRIX ISSUE

Herald contends that a tax deficiency should not have been
assessed on the transaction with Hendrix because the bargain
was for the sale on approval of a total system which was
never delivered and never accepted. Therefore, Herald
contends that the 120-day period allowed for return of
merchandise never began to run. The tax administrator re-
sponds by arguing that the trial justice properly found there
was sufficient evidence in the record to uphold the tax
administrator’s conclusion -that three separate taxable
transactions had occurred.

Our review under §42-35-16 is limited to a review of “any
questions of law involved.” We have described this review as
being limited to determining whether there is any competent
evidence to support the trial justice’s decision. Correia v.
Norberg, 120 R.I. 793, 391 A.2d 94 (1978); Prospecting
Unlimited, Inc. v. Norberg, supra; Couture v. Norberg, 114
R.I. 704, 338 A.2d 538 (1975); Domestic Safe Deposit Co. v.
Hawksley, 111 R.I. 224, 301 A.2d 342 (1973).

We observe that hearsay evidence was admitted on behalf
of both sides. In the present case the revenue agent testified

74 Ce

on the basis of information gained from a letter sent by
Hendrix’s vice president of finance that three separate
purchases had occurred. This testimony as well as the letter
were admitted into evidence without objection. Faber’s
affidavit was introduced without objection in support of
Herald’s position. In his affidavit, Faber stated that he had
assured Rutman if the system did not work to Rutman’s satis-
faction, Hendrix would take back the equipment and refund
all payments. On direct examination Rutman testified in
effect, that the bargain was for the sale of an entire system
and that “without the last phase, the rest of it was
worthless.” We observe that once admitted, the hearsay
testimony was properly considered as competent legal
evidence. Correia, supra; see §42-35-10(a). Further, we do
not pass on issues of credibility or determine if evidence is
strong or weak. As stated previously, we only review the
record to determine whether there was any competent evi-
dence to support the decision. Correia, supra. Acordingly,
we must affirm the decision of the trial justice in regard to
the Hendrix transaction. In making this determination we
note that under §44-18-12 “sale price” does not include the
“amount charged for property returned by customers upon
rescission of the contract of sale” when the full amount is
refunded and the property returned within 120 days. The
pertinent regulation extends the 120-day period to sales “on
trial, on satisfaction, on sale or return.”* We believe that the
tax administrator, in promulgating this regulation, did not
alter or amend the scope of the statute. See Statewide
Multiple Listing Service, Inc. v. Norberg, 120 R.I. 937,
392 A.2d 371 (1978). Further, the regulation is not plainly
inconsistent with the operative language of the statute. Brier
Manufacturing Co. v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 317, 377 A.2d 345
(1977).

THE INDIA IMPORTS ISSUE

We recently observed in Coachman, Inc. v. Norberg, 121
R.I. 316, 397 A.2d 1320 (1979), that under §44-19-33, the
rules and regulations promulgated by the tax administrator
are prima facie evidence of proper interpretation of the Sales

‘Regulations and Rules Issued by the Tax Administrator under the Sales and Use
Tax Law at 108-06 (1977). The same regulation appeared in the Rules effective
December 10, 1968.

eS 215

and Use Tax Act. A pertinent regulation in effect at the time
of the transaction stated that:

[W]here the printer does not make delivery in this
state to the purchaser of advertising material which is
printed for distribution and use outside the state, but
said material is delivered by the printer to a mailing
agency in Rhode Island for such distribution by order of
the purchaser, the tax will not apply inasmuch as such
mailing by said mailing agency is deemed to be mailing
by the printer.®

In the present case, Herald delivered the flyers to T.C.S.
which in turn sent the flyers to Mailways in New Hampshire.
Thus, the transaction in this case was effectively the same as
that described by the foregoing regulation. Indeed, if Herald
had sent the flyers to New Hampshire or to a Rhode Island
mailing agency, it is clear under the regulation that the
transaction would not be taxable. The result should be no
different because Herald sent the flyers to T.C.S. for the
insertion of order blanks at the direction of the purchaser.
The facts relating to this issue are undisputed, and we believe
that the only reasonable inference which can be drawn in
light of the regulation is that the tax does not apply. Thus, an
issue of law is presented which we are constrained to resolve
in favor of Herald. DeNardo v. Fairmount Foundries
Cranston, Inc., 121 R.I. 440, 399 A.2d 1229 (1979).
Accordingly, the portion of the judgment regarding the India
Imports flyer must be reversed.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in part
and reversed in part and the case is remanded to the Superior
Court.

Smith & Smith, Incorporated, Z. Hershel Smith, for
petitioner.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Allen P. Rubine,
Assistant Attorney General, Perry Shatkin, Chief Legal
Officer (Taxation), for respondent.

SRegulations and Rules Issued by the Tax Administrator under the Sales and Use
Tax Law at 26 (Issued January 3, 1977). The identical regulation appeared at page
29 of the December 10, 1968 issue.

276

405 A.2d 1181.
SraTE vs. CHartes A. BENNETT.
AUGUST 28, 1979,
Presenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

277

WeisperceR. J. The defendant, Charles Bennett,
was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of rape,
kidnapping, and assault with a dangerous weapon. He has
appealed to this court from the judgment of conviction.

Hs The sole argument offered by defendant is that the trial
justice improperly refused to rule on an oral motion in limine
made by defendant at the close of the state’s case.1 The
defendant sought by means of this motion “to preclude the
State from using certain convictions as an impeachment tool
against this defendant should he decide to take the witness

1At oral argument the defendant waived arguments relating to the kidnapping
charge. We therefore do not consider the issue. Cooper Alloy Corp. v. E.B.V.
Systems, Inc., 111 R.I. 756, 306 A.2d 837 (1973).

278 ee

stand in this particular case.” Two reasons were offered in
support of the motion. First, defendant’s counsel stated that
defendant’s criminal record began in 1945 and that de-
fendant honestly could not remember if he was represented
by counsel.? The second ground was that the convictions
prior to 1953 were remote.

The trial justice stated, however, that he knew “of no part
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for this
kind of motion.” The trial justice also stated that in his
judgment defendant was seeking a preliminary ruling or ad-
visory opinion as to how the court would rule on an objection
to the admissibility of the convictions should defendant take
the stand and be confronted with the prior convictions. The
trial justice stated defendant was not entitled to a ruling until
that time. Accordingly, the trial justice refused to entertain
defendant’s oral motion in limine.

While we have never specifically considered the propriety
of the motion in limine, we believe that the trial justice had
inherent power to rule on the motion. In this state, the scope
of cross-examination is subject to control in the trial court’s
sound discretion. State v. Eckhart, 117 R.I. 431, 367 A.2d
1073 (1977); State v. Mattatall, 114 R.I. 568, 337 A.2d 229
(1975). Because one basic purpose of cross-examination is
impeachment, there can be no fixed limit to the scope of that
examination and the scope must be left to judicial discretion.
State v. Crescenzo, 114 R.I. 242, 332 A.2d 421 (1975). This
discretion should foster a search for the truth by giving
reasonable latitude to the purpose of cross-examination while
preserving a fair and orderly trial. State v. Frazier, 101 R.I.
156, 221 A.2d 468 (1966).

By statute in this state, no person is deemed an incompetent
witness because of conviction of a crime but “conviction or
sentence for any crime or misdemeanor may be shown to af-
fect his credibility.” G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)

*The issue of the defendant's representation by counsel at his prior convictions was
not briefed or argued. Accordingly, we deem the issue to have been waived.
Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.1. 723, 391 A.2d 79 (1978). We also observe that a
positive showing of nonrepresentation is required to raise the issue. State v.
Palmigiano, 112 R.1. 348, 309 A.2d 855 (1973).

es 279

§9-17-15. Admission of evidence of a conviction or sentence
for impeachment purposes is generally mandatory under this
section. We have held, however, that the trial justice has the
discretion to exclude evidence of remote convictions offered
to impeach a witness’ credibility. In State v. Lombardi, 113
R.I. 206, 319 A.2d 346 (1974), we declined to adopt a bal-
ancing theory under which evidence of a prior conviction
would be excluded in the trial justice’s discretion when he
determined that the prejudicial effect of such evidence out-
weighed the probative value. In so doing we stated that:

“Here, we have over the years followed a practice
which permits a witness to be impeached by evidence of
a prior conviction irrespective of whether that con-
viction was for a crime involving ‘moral turpitude’
affecting credibility, or was likely to result in dispropor-
tionate prejudice. The sweep of our broad practice has,
however, been somewhat narrowed by our insistence
that the prior conviction not be too remote in time, and
that at the time it is received in evidence the jury be
instructed that its admission is for the sole purpose of
impeaching credibility and is otherwise without
probative value.” Id at 208-09, 319 A.2d at 347.

The discretion to exclude evidence of remote convictions
does not flow, however, from §9-17-15. In Pedorella v.
Hoffman, 91 R.I. 487, 165 A.2d 721 (1960), we stated that
there is no hard and fast rule requiring the trial justice to
sustain an objection on the ground of remoteness to a ques-
tion aimed at impeaching a witness by means of a prior con-
viction. We observed that §9-17-15 did not provide the basis
for such an objection but stated that the better rule was to
leave the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. We
also noted that the exercise of discretion was subject to review
by this court only for abuse of discretion. For example, in
Mercurio v. Fascitelli, 107 R.I. 511, 268 A.2d 427 (1970), we
stated that the exclusion for remoteness of four convictions
for violation of the motor vehicle code occurring less than 3
years before trial would be a clear abuse of discretion.

280 Le =

Thus, the discretion of a trial justice to exclude evidence of
remote prior convictions is well established. The question is
when that discretion may be exercised. In State v. Lombardi,
supra, the trial justice denied a motion made by the defen-
dant after the state had rested to prohibit the state from using
a prior narcotics conviction for impeachment purposes. We
stated in regard to this motion that:

The state does not question the practice whereby
defendant obtained an advance ruling on whether, if he
took the stand, he could be impeached by his prior
criminal record. While to our knowledge that procedure
has not heretofore been followed in this state, it
apparently has been used elsewhere. United States v.
Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 947, 89 S. Ct. 1281, 22 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1969);
Barber v. United States, 302 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
see United States v. Stroud, 474 F.2d 737, 739 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 930, 93 S. Ct. 2759, 37 L.
Ed. 2d 157 (1973).” 113 R.1. at 207 n.2, 319 A.2d at 347
n.2.

The type of motion made by defendant in this case has
been considered by a number of state and federal courts.
Although the admissibility in federal courts of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes is governed by the
specific provisions of Fed. R. Evid. 609, the treatment
accorded to the motion in limine in federal courts is
instructive. See generally 3 Weinstein & Berger, United
States Rules, {{609[01] to 609[03b] (1978 ed.). For example,
in United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1977), the
defendant was convicted of possession and transfer of an
unregistered machine gun. The district court judge,
however, refused to rule before the defendant’s opening on
whether the prosecution could use evidence of a prior
manslaughter conviction to impeach the defendant’s
credibility. When the defendant took the stand, the trial
court ruled that the evidence was admissible. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that the
admission of evidence of the prior conviction had not been an

es 281

abuse of discretion. The court also stated, however, that the
trial court had the discretion to make an advance ruling on
the admissibility of such evidence.

“The fact that the rule [Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)] speaks of
using the impeaching conviction during cross-examina-
tion does not, in our view, indicate any restriction on
making an advance ruling so long as the court has
enough information to make the mandated deter-
mination as to probative value. Indeed, while we
emphasize that the timing is discretionary, we think a
court should, when feasible, make reasonable efforts to
accommodate a defendant by ruling in advance on the
admissibility of a criminal record so that he can make an
informed decision whether or not to testify. The court’s
ruling ‘may have a significant impact on opening
statements and the questioning of witnesses’ [citation
ommitted].

ak

“Having stressed the general desirability of giving a
ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions in
advance of actual testimony (whether during pre-trial
proceedings, at the close of the Government’s case, or
before the defendant or other affected witness takes the
stand), we nevertheless refrain from making this an
inflexible rule.” Jd. at 171-72.

Similarly, in United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528 (4th
Cir. 1978), the defendant made a pretrial motion pursuant to
Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) for an order protecting him from cross-
examination with respect to convictions more than 10 years
old. The motion was renewed at the conclusion of the
government’s case, but the trial judge again denied the
motion. As a result the defendant chose not to testify. On
appeal, the court held that the trial justice had abused his
discretion in allowing the use of such evidence. The court
also stated, however, that it was not improper for the
defendant to move in advance of trial to obtain a ruling on
the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment. But
see United States v. Johnston, 543 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1976)
(defendant not entitled to ruling before taking stand).

282 es

The New York Court of Appeals faced the question in
People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357
N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974). In that case, immediately prior to the
selection of the jury, the defendant’s counsel made a motion
to the trial court requesting the court in its discretion to
prohibit the impeachment of the defendant by prior crimes
and convictions if he decided to testify. The trial court
permitted the use of certain crimes but excluded others. The
court of appeals upheld these rulings and specifically
considered the propriety of the motion. The court empha-
sized that the nature and extent of cross-examination were
subject to the discretion of the trial judge. The court
continued and stated that:

“We now hold that in exercise of that discretion a Trial
Judge may, as the Trial Judge in this case did, make an
advance ruling as to the use by the prosecutor of prior
convictions « * * for the purpose of impeaching a
defendant's credibility. [citations omitted]

ARE

“In most cases, as in this case, but not necessarily in
all cases, a pretrial motion will be preferable. (Cf.
People v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530, 535.) Thereby, the
defendant with definitive advance knowledge of the
scope of cross-examination as to prior conduct to which
he will be subjected, can decide whether to take the
witness stand. Revelation of the impeachment testi-'
mony and announcement of the trial court’s ruling in
advance of trial are consistent with the objectives today
of broad pretrial discovery and disclosure.” Id. at
374-75, 314 N.E.2d at 416-17, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54.

The court in People v. Hill, 34 Ill. App. 3d 193, 339
N.E.2d 405 (1975) also considered the defendant's ability to
obtain an advance ruling regarding the admissibility of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes. There, prior to a
second trial the defendant renewed a written motion filed
before the first trial for an order excluding the use of the
defendant’s prior burglary conviction. The trial judge,
however, refused to rule on the motion stating that the

es 283

proper time to make the motion was when an attempt was
made by the state to introduce such evidence. The motion
was never renewed and the defendant, who did not testify,
was not therefore subject to impeachment. The court
reviewed thoroughly the federal and state cases on the
subject and stated that:

“In determining whether a prior conviction should be
admitted for impeachment of a criminal defendant, the
trial court might well need to see how the trial has pro-
gressed up to the point at which the defendant would
take the stand. « * *

“To summarize, we recognize that in some cases it
may be necessary for the trial court, on proper motion,
to make a ruling on the use of a prior conviction before
the beginning of the trial, especially where good reasons
are shown that defense counsel’s trial strategy will
depend upon the ruling. However, under the circum-
stances of the instant case, in which defense counsel
offered no such reasons, the refusal of the trial court to
make the pretrial ruling was not error. Defendant could
still have obtained an advance ruling on the matter by
renewing his motion at some point during the trial.” Id.
at 206, 339 N.E.2d at 414-15.

In People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22
(1974), the defendant’s lawyer, at the conclusion of the
people’s proofs, asked the judge to bar the use of the defen-
dant’s conviction record should he take the stand and testify
in his own behalf. The judge responded that under the
Michigan statute, which was effectively identical to
§9-17-15, he had no choice but to allow the use of the evi-
dence for impeachment purposes. The Michigan Supreme
Court, however, concluded that:

“We are persuaded that a trial judge may in the exercise
of discretion exclude reference to a prior conviction
record, and that it is error to fail to recognize that he has
such discretion and, therefore, to fail or to refuse to
exercise it.

284 es

kee

“The judge, thus, did not recognize that he enjoyed a
discretion to exclude such evidence and, in refusing
counsel’s request, did not exercise his discretion to allow
or disallow the use of such evidence. On remand, the
trial judge shall, upon request, in the exercise of his
discretion, decide whether to exclude any reference to
Jackson’s prior conviction record. Id. at 336, 217
N.W.2d at 26-27.

The California Court of Appeals also considered the issue
in People v. Delgado, 32 Cal. App. 3d 242, 108 Cal. Rptr.
399 (1973). There the trial court denied the defendant’s
pretrial motion to exclude the use by the prosecution of the
defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes
should the defendant decide to testify. By statute in Califor-
nia the trial court has a duty, upon timely request, to exclude
evidence only when probative value is substantially out-
weighed by substantial danger of undue prejudice. The court
of appeals ruled that the trial court had properly exercised
discretion in denying the motion. In so doing, however, the
court distilled the following procedure from federal cases:

“Tn the first place, since the trial court is in no position
to make an informed determination prior to hearing the
People’s evidence, the time most appropriate for the
motion to exclude evidence of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes is at the close of the People’s case
in chief or thereafter before the defendant takes the
stand to testify. [citations omitted] Secondly, the
burden of showing the danger of undue prejudice and
the need for defendant’s testimony in the ascertainment
of the truth is on the defendant. [citations omitted]
Third, except, perhaps, where it is obvious what the
defendant’s testimony would be [* * +], in meeting this
burden defendant should testify to his version of the

®The opinion in People v. Delgado, 32 Cal. App. 3d 242. 108 Cal. Rptr. 399
(1973), was disapproved in People v. Rist, 16 Cal, 3d 211, 545 P.2d 833, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 457 (1976), for reasons immaterial to a consideration of the proper timing of a
motion in limine.

es 285

facts in an in camera hearing or, in the alternative,
make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury
summarizing what his testimony would be. + * [T]he
defendant cannot be compelled to give testimony in the
in camera hearing, and should he do so, such testimony
would not be admissible in evidence for any purpose
except for impeachment should defendant ultimately
elect to take the stand and testify. [citation omitted]

“In expressing approval of the procedures developed
in the federal cases, we do not wish to be understood as
saying that there is no case in which a pretrial motion
and ruling would be appropriate. Neither do we mean
to preclude the development of pretrial procedures that
might serve the same purpose, to wit, giving the trial
judge sufficient information upon which to make a
reasoned determination. Manifestly, however, in the
absence of some procedure by which the trial court can
be fully informed as to the factors in the particular case
bearing on ‘probative value’ and ‘undue prejudice,’ a
pretrial ruling where the question is a close one is
contraindicated.” Id. at 252-53, 108 Cal. Rptr. at
407-08.

See also State v. Martin, 217 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa 1974);
Troxel v. Otto, 153 Ind. App. 437, 287 N.E.2d 791 (1972).
But see State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wash. 2d 217, 570 P.2d 1208
(1977) and People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 225, 519 P.2d 951
(1974) (trial justice does not have discretion to exclude
evidence of prior convictions).

| | As the court in United States v. Cavender, supra, noted,
some conflict exists in the state decisions. In those
jurisdictions which recognize the motion, however, there is
agreement that the motion and ruling must be made before
the defendant testifies. Cavender, supra. We do not believe
that it is appropriate to adopt a fixed rule regarding the use of
motions in limine. Instead we feel the procedure is best left to
the discretion of the trial justice.

286 es

HAs noted previously, the motion in limine is a procedural
tool used to prevent prejudicial evidence from reaching the
jury. The phrase “in limine” means “at the threshold.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 896 (4th ed. 1968). However, several
types of motions in limine may be utilized either before or
during trial. See generally Davis, Motions in Limine, 15
Clev.—Mar. L. Rev. 255 (1966); Rothblatt, The Motion in
Limine [sic] in Criminal Trials: A Technique for the Pretrial
Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence, 60 Ky. L. J. 611 (1972).
Thus a defendant may seek an order which absolutely
prohibits the prosecution from introducing or discussing a
defendant’s prior convictions. A defendant may also seek an
order to prevent the prosecution from utilizing the prior con-
viction unless permission is granted by the court. Rothblatt,
supra at 615-17. These motions may be made either before
trial, People v. Sandoval, supra, or at the end of the
prosecution’s case. People v. Delgado, supra.

Tsim the present case defendant moved at the end of the
state’s case to preclude the state from using certain
convictions prior to 1953 as an impeachment tool should
defendant decide to take the stand. We believe that the
better rule would require the trial justice to respond to such a
motion so long as he had before him all of the relevant
information upon which a decision might be based. The trial
justice in this instance, in the absence of any prior decision of
this court regarding the propriety of a motion in limine, did
not recognize that he had the power to pass upon the motion
at that juncture.

HM We hold today that a criminal defendant may utilize the
procedural device of a motion in limine for the exclusion of
evidence or other procedural limitations which might
significantly affect his decision to testify either prior to trial,
at the close of the state’s evidence or at other appropriate
times in advance of taking the stand to testify.4 This ruling

‘Insofar as it may be relevant, this holding will apply for the benefit of the
prosecution in a criminal case and also for the benefit of parties to civil actions.

Ss 287

shall be effective in respect to all cases which shall be tried
from and after the date of this opinion. In accordance with
our usual practice, defendant in this case shall also have the
benefit of this holding. Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261
A.2d 896 (1970); Bishop v. Langlois, 106 R.I. 56, 256 A.2d 20
(1969).

Consequently, the case shall be remanded for the limited
purpose of allowing the trial justice to rule on the defendant’s
motion to exclude certain of his prior convictions on the
ground of remoteness. After hearing the defendant’s and
prosecution’s evidence and/or argument on this question, the
trial justice shall determine whether in the exercise of his
discretion he would have admitted or excluded certain of
these prior convictions for impeachment purposes. If the trial
justice determines the convictions were remote and,
therefore, inadmissible for impeachment purposes, he shall,
without the necessity of any further order from this court,
order a new trial. If the trial justice decides that the
challenged prior convictions would have been admissible, the
conviction will stand, subject to the right of the defendant to
prosecute an appeal from the ruling on admissibility in
accordance with the rules of appellate procedure. State v.
Carufel, 106 R.I. 739, 263 A.2d 686 (1970).

The defendant’s appeal is sustained, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Joel D. Landry,
Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Chief

Appellate Attorney, John A. MacFadyen III, Nicholas
Colangelo, Assistant Public Defenders, for defendant.

288

405 A.2d 1187

E &J Inc. vs.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF WoonsockET et al.

AUGUST 29, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

WerssercEr, J. This is an action brought in the Superior
Court by the plaintiff, E & J Inc., to recover damages to its
real estate and its business caused by the condemnation of
adjacent land by the Redevelopment Agency of Woonsocket
(the agency). The plaintiff, a Rhode Island corporation, is

a «

the owner of real estate on Clinton Street in Woonsocket
designated as lot No. 182 on assessor’s plat No. 22 in that city.
The plaintiff owns and operates on lot No. 182 a quick-
service hamburger stand known as Carol’s Drive-In (Carol's).

The complaint was dismissed by the trial justice on
December 5, 1977, pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The trial justice found that Count I failed to allege facts
sufficient to establish a constructive taking of the real estate
by the agency and that Count II failed to allege facts
sufficient to establish that the agency was negligent in the
submission and administration of plans and timetables for
the redevelopment of area in question.

The plaintiff came before us on appeal from an oral
decision of the trial justice, no judgment thereon having been
entered in the record. Thereafter at our suggestion a written
judgment was entered nunc pro tunc. We shall treat the
appeal as having been claimed from said-judgment. Beauvais
v. Notre Dame Hospital, 120 R.I. 271, 387 A.2d 689
(1978); Malinou v. Kiernan, 105 R.I. 299, 251 A.2d 530
(1969).

Our review of the granting of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
employs the same criteria that a trial justice uses in the initial
examination of the complaint. Rosen v. Restrepo, 119 R.1.
398, 380 A.2d 960 (1977). That is, no complaint will be
dismissed unless it appears to be a certainty that plaintiff will
not be entitled to relief under any set of circumstances which
might be proved in support of his claim. Id. When a dismissal
is granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations must show
that there is some insuperable bar to relief. Dutson v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 119 R.1. 801, 383 A.2d
597 (1978).

Count I alleges that certain actions of the agency have
resulted in a constructive taking of plaintiff's real estate. The
agency was authorized by the city of Woonsocket (the city) in
an ordinance passed in 1972 to condemn such property as
was necessary to carry out an urban-renewal plan in an area

290

of the city known as the “Social Flat Lands.” The agency
thereafter condemned an area adjacent to, but not including,
plaintiff's place of business. The agency demolished all the
buildings on the real estate it had condemned, leaving the
neighborhood “barren” and in a “desert like condition.”
Certain streets which once directed traffic flow from Social
Street to Clinton Street where Carol’s is located were closed.
Carol’s became unprofitable to the point at which it no
longer could be kept open for business, and the land and
buildings thereon greatly depreciated in value. The plaintiff
alleges that these actions of the agency and of the city have
resulted in a taking of plaintiff's property and business
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 16, of the Rhode Island Constitution.
We disagree. Under both constitutions, plaintiff here has
alleged nothing more than noncompensable consequential
damages for loss of business and depreciation of property
values resulting from the condemnation of adjacent land by
the agency, and noncompensable damages from the closing
of streets and diverting of traffic pursuant to the city’s police
power.

Governmental action short of actual acquisition of
property may be a constructive taking or an inverse
condemnation! within the meaning of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments if such action deprives the property
owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 65
S. Ct. 357, 359-60, 89 L. Ed. 311, 318 (1945); Trager v.
Peabody Redevelopment Authority, 367 F. Supp. 1000, 1002
(D. Mass. 1973); see Paiva v. Providence Redevelopment
Agency, 116 R.I. 315, 321, 356 A.2d 203, 206 (1976). It is not
necessary that the plaintiff actually be removed from his
property or deprived of its possession, but merely that an

“Jnverse condemnation” is a term used to describe a cause of action against a
governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power
of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Ferguson v. Keene,
108 N.H, 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968).

es

interest in the property or in its use and enjoyment be
seriously impaired. Foss v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 309
A.2d 339 (Me. 1973); Canyon v. City of Chicopee, 360 Mass.
606, 277 N.E. 2d 116 (1971).

The right to just compensation for taking of private
property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, however, is confined to a taking of an interest
in property which the United States Supreme Court has
defined as “the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s
relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it.” United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. at 378, 65 S. Ct. 359, 89 L. Ed. at 318 (1945); Trager v.
Peabody Redevelopment Authority, 367 F. Supp. 1000, 1002
(D. Mass. 1973); see Paiva v. Providence Redevelopment
Agency, 116 R.I. 315, 321, 356 A.2d 203, 206 (1976). It is not
necessary that the plaintiff actually be removed from his
property or deprived of its possession, but merely that an
interest in the property or in its use and enjoyment be
seriously impaired. Foss v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 309
A.2d 339 (Me. 1973); Canyon v. City of Chicopee, 360 Mass.
606, 277 N.E. 2d 116 (1971).

The right to just compensation for taking of private
property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, however, is confined to a taking of an interest
in property which the United States Supreme Court has
defined as “the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s
relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it.” United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. at 378, 65 S. Ct. at 359, 89 L. Ed. at 318.
Diminution in value alone is simply not sufficient to present a
cognizable claim for taking of an interest in property under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Florida East Coast
Properties, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 572 F.2d
1108, 1111 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894, 99 S. Ct.
253, 58 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1978); Cabrera v. Municipality of
Bayamon, 562 F.2d 91 (1st Cir. 1977); Sayre v. City of
Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S.
837, 95S. Ct. 65, 42 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1974); Woodland Market

2
Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir.

1970); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241,
255, 269 N.E. 2d 895, 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 357 (1971).

The complaint before us simply alleges a taking of
property because its value has been lessened, and does not
make any claim of interference with plaintiffs possession,
use, or enjoyment of the subject property. It therefore fails to
set forth any specific property interest which has been
seriously impaired by the agency.

In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.
Ct, 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922), Mr. Justice Holmes, in com-
menting upon a statute which related to conditions under
which coal might be mined, observed:

“Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general
law.” Id. at 413, 43 S. Ct. at 159, 67 L. Ed. at 325.

In that case the Court ultimately determined that a statute of
Pennsylvania which forbade mining which would result in
the subsiding of structures used as human habitations was an
unconstitutional interference with the right of ownership. In
the case at bar, however, plaintiff in essence asserts that the
agency must conduct itself in such a way as to maintain the
businesss profits flowing from plaintiff's real estate and
consequently sustain its market value. Applying Justice
Holmes’ comment to such an assertion, we can see that no
governmental agency could long survive if among its burdens
it was required to maintain the market value of real estate
which is either adjacent to condemned land or, if not adja-
cent, which might be affected in some way by the actions or
nonactions of the governmental unit. Such an obligation
would be impossible for government to bear. See Benson v.
Housing Authority, 145 Conn. 196, 140 A.2d 320 (1958).

In Woodland Market Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland,
supra, the court of appeals held that a property owner having
property adjacent to an urban renewal project could not

Ss  !:

maintain an action for compensation under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments for depreciation in the value of his
property or for loss of income potential by reason of establish-
ment of the project. In that case, as in the present, the
plaintiff's losses resulted from the transformation of a neigh-
borhood by an urban renewal project from a residential
neighborhood to vacant and undeveloped land. The court
held that a change in the character of the neighborhood
without any interference with the plaintiff's interest in or
control over his property was not a taking:

“Loss of customers is not a taking of property in a con-
stitutional sense, though it may result in a loss of land
value. The action of the City has resulted in no diminu-
tion of the plaintiff's rights in its property. Its leasehold
estate has remained intact. What has altered is the char-
acter of the neighborhood, not the character of the
plaintiffs leasehold interest. Actions done in the proper
exercise of governmental powers which do not directly
encroach upon private property, though they may im-
pair its use or value, do not amount to a taking of such
property within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.” 426 F.2d at 958.

We conclude that plaintiff in Count I has not set forth
facts which show that plaintiff is entitled to relief under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution on the theory of a constructive taking or inverse
condemnation.

We also conclude that plaintiff has not stated a good cause
of action for a taking pursuant to article I, section 16, of the
Rhode Island Constitution. Section 16 reads as follows:

“Private property shall not be taken for public uses,
without just compensation.”

A number of states now provide recovery for property
“taken or damaged for public use.” 2 Nichols, Eminent
Domain §6.1[8] (rev. 3d ed. 1978). This constitutional

2

language has been liberally construed to award compensa-
tion for the type of injury claimed here, see Benson v.
Housing Authority, supra, 145 Conn. at 202, 140 A.2d at
323, although not by the majority of state courts which have
considered the matter. Note, Condemnation Blight and the
Abutting Landowner, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 583, 601 (1975).

The language of our constitution is not so broad. Section 16
provides compensation only for “property taken.” We have
construed this languge to mean that a taking is the “actual
seizing or direct taking of specific property for public use, as
distinguished from incidental injury to it when not taken
* * «,” General Finance Corp. v. Archetto, 93 R.I. 392, 397,
176 A.2d 73, 76 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S, 423, 82S.
Ct. 879, 8 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1962), citing In- the Matter of
Dorrance-Street, 4 R.I. 230, 245 (1856).

Depreciation of property values alone by the act of an
entity vested with the power of eminent domain is not a
taking of property within the meaning of section 16. We have
established by very early precedent in this state that
depreciation of property values is not a legal interest in
property which would entitle a property owner to recovery
against a municipality for compensation. Clark v. City of
Providence, 16 R.I. 337, 15 A. 763 (1888). This view is in
accordance with that taken by other jurisdictions which have
found that depreciation in property values is not a taking of a
valuable property right under their similar constitutional
provisions. Benson v. Housing Authority, supra. Loss of
future business profits is also not compensable as a taking.
O’Donnell v. State, 117 R.1. 660, 370 A.2d 233 (1977); State
Airport Commission v. May, 51 B.L. 110, 152 A. 225 (1930).
Where no land is physically taken and no interest in it which
the law recognizes is extinguished or affected in a manner
detrimental to the owner, the prohibition contained in article
I, section 16 of our constitution against the taking of property
without just compensation does not apply. See Benson,
supra. The Legislature may in its discretion provide compen-
sation for consequential damages, State Airport Commission
v. May, supra; Williams Bros. v. Tripp, 11 R.I. 447 (1877),
but it has not done so here.

a  *

The plaintiff's allegation that “certain of the streets which
once helped the flow of traffic from Social Street to Clinton
Street have been abandoned and closed to traffic” also does
not present a claim of injury to a valuable property right
under the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions.
Viewing this allegation in light of any conceivable set of facts
which would support it raises two different concepts—plain-
tiffs right of reasonable access to its property and plaintiff's
right to the traffic flow which passes by the property. See
Narciso v. State, 114 R.I. 53, 328 A.2d 107 (1974) (Kelleher,
J. concurring).

An abutting landowner has no property right in the traffic
flow and any diminution in value of the property resulting
solely from a diversion of traffic is not compensable. Id. at
62, 328 A.2d at 111; Saints Sahag & Mesrob Armenian
Church v. Director of Public Works, 116 R.I. 735, 360 A.2d
534 (1976). On the other hand, the right of access is an
interest in property which we have described as an easement
appurtenant to the land abutting a public highway. Saints
Sahag & Mesrob Armenian Church v. Director of Public
Works, supra; Narcisco v. State, supra; see Aust v. Marcello,
112 R.I. 381, 310 A.2d 758 (1973); Sullivan v. Marcello, 100
R.I. 241, 214 A.2d 181 (1965). It consists of the reasonable
opportunity to enter and leave one’s property through use of
the abutting way and also insures that once the abutter ar-
rives on that way, he can proceed from there to the general
system of roadways. Saints Sahag & Mesrob Armenian
Church, supra. There is no indication in the complaint that
this property interest has been interfered with or impaired in
any way.

|| Count II alleges that the agency was negligent in the
submission and administration of the plans and timetables
for the redevelopment of the area in question in violation of
its duties under G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-32-21.
Section 45-32-21 states merely that “the responsibility for
carrying out the plan shall vest in the agency.” This allega-
tion is so vague that it precludes any meaningful review. See
Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 119

26

B.I. 684, 381 A.2d 1365 (1978). Although the allegation as it
now stands fails to state a cause of action and was properly
dismissed by the trial justice, we shall remand the cause to
allow plaintiff to amend Count II with a more definite
statement which would demonstrate a specific duty owed by
the agency to landowners outside the project area and could
support an action for negligence.

In its brief, plaintiff mentions certain facts not pleaded in
Count II which conceivably could give rise to a cause of
action in trespass, nuisance or negligence. Those facts are
that on breezy days, great amounts of dust blow on plaintiff's
property from the project area across the street. In view of
the possibility that plaintiff may be entitled to some relief
under any or all of these theories, we shall allow plaintiff to
file a second amendment to Count II of the complaint. In our
discretion we may remand a case to the Superior Court with
such directions as are necessary and proper. G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §9-24-12; see Cheetham v. Cheetham, 121
R.I. 337, 397 A.2d 1331 (1979). Those directions may
include amendment of the pleadings to prevent injustice.
State v. Cain, 126 Vt. 463, 236 A.2d 501 (1967).

In light of the foregoing determinations, there is no
necessity for us to consider the argument raised by the agency
concerning the effect of the 30-day statute of limitations on
proceedings to challenge a redevelopment plan contained in
§45-32-22,

The plaintiff's appeal as to Count I is denied and
dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The
plaintiff's appeal as to Count II is also denied and dismissed,
but the matter is remanded to the Superior Court with leave
to the plaintiff to amend the complaint in order to state
claims for relief based on damage caused by, the breach of a
specific duty owed by the agency to abutting landowners and
based on damage arising out of trespass, nuisance or
negligence.

Frank O. Lind, Jr., Edward E. Dillon, Jr., for plaintiff.

Thomas J. Kane, Gerald M. Brenner, for defendants.

29)

NI

405 A.2d 1192.
State vs. Ropert CLINE.
AUGUST 31, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

8
a

300 ee

Weispercer, J. On April 11, 1974, Frank Pirri, an
itinerant fish vendor, was shot and killed while peddling fish
from his truck in the Chad Brown Housing Project in
Providence. It was believed that the assailant shot Mr. Pirri
in the course of attempting to rob him. As a result of
information obtained from an eyewitness, the defendant,
Robert Cline (Cline), was arrested in the early morning of
April 14, 1974, The day was Easter Sunday.

The defendant was transported to the Providence police
station. After the arrival of Detective Sergeant Gerald J.
McCarthy, defendant was brought to an interrogation room
where, according to police testimony, he was informed of his
Miranda rights by having them read to him from a so-called
“rights form.” Further, he was assertedly given a
supplemental explanation by Det. Sgt. McCarthy. At this
point defendant asked to make a phone’ call, but then
changed his mind, according to state’s witnesses. The
defendant claimed to have made several phone calls. Then
defendant signed the waiver-of-rights form,! and indicated

'The full text of the rights form was as follows:
“PROVIDENCE POLICE DETECTIVE BUREAU

Time3:40A.M. Statement taken by.
Date 4/14/74 Sgt. McCarthy, Det. Keune Present
Office of Det. Div. Providence Police Department

I, Robert Cline, having been informed that I am a suspect in the crime of
Murder voluntarily, without threats or promises on the part of the police, make
the following statement to members of the Providence Police Department after
having first been advised that:
1. Ido not have to give a statement.
2. Ihave the right to remain silent.
3, Anything I say can be used against me in a court of law.
4, I have the right to the presence of an attorney prior to and during any ques-
tioning by the police.
5. [have the right to the presence of an attorney during a line-up or confronta-
tion of witnesses, if any line-up or such confrontation takes place.
6, If I cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for me prior to any ques-
tioning, if I so desire.
I further admit and agree that:
7. After having been informed of my constitutional rights, I do understand these
rights, and I agree to give a statement at this time.
8. I do not want an attorney called or appointed for me at this time.
WITNESSES: Sgt. McCarthy Robert Cline
Det. T. E. Keune signature

301

his willingness to talk to the police. Thereafter he gave and
signed a partial confession, admitting that he shot the victim
in the course of a holdup. The defendant interrupted the
flow of his statement about 45 minutes after the police had
admonished him regarding his constitutional rights. At this
juncture, for the first time, defendant expressed a desire to be
represented by counsel.

The interrogation ceased. Detective Sgt. McCarthy then
contacted attorney Harry J. Hoopis (Hoopis), who had been
designated by a justice of the District Court to represent any
person who might be arrested as a result of the Pirri
investigation. Hoopis came to the station. McCarthy asked
the attorney if he would inquire if Cline was willing to show
the police the location of the gun. Hoopis and defendant,
after consultation, agreed to and did accompany the police to
the Point Street Bridge where Cline had stated that he
disposed of the murder weapon. Thereafter, a lineup was
held in the presence of Hoopis.

The case was tried in the Superior Court after extensive
preliminary hearings on motions to suppress and voir dire
examinations of the prospective jurors. The actual trial began
April 16, 1975, and resulted in a verdict of guilty of murder
in the first degree while defendant was committed to
confinement at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACT).
The defendant was also found guilty of escape from the
minimum custodial unit of the ACI. These verdicts were
rendered April 30, 1975. The defendant moved for a new
trial. The motion was denied May 21, 1975. On that same
date defendant was sentenced to death, and said sentence
was stayed pending appeal. The defendant appealed from his
murder conviction and also from the death sentence, alleging
numerous errors.

This court subsequently reviewed the constitution-
ality of G.L. 1956 (1969 Renactment) §11-23-2, as
amended by P.L. 1973, ch. 280, §1, the capital punishment
statute, pursuant to which the death sentence had been
imposed. We held in State v. Cline, 121 R.I. 299, 397 A.2d
1309 (1979), that the capital penalty portion of said statute

302 ee

was unconstitutional in that it provided for a mandatory
death sentence without taking into account the individual
background and record of the accused or any mitigating
circumstances which the accused might present in violation
of criteria laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 98 S. Ct. 2977, 57 L. Ed.
2d 1010 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct.
2054, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U.S. 633, 97 S. Ct. 1993, 52 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1977); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S.325, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct.
2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976). The defendant was re-
sentenced on March 2, 1979, this time to life imprisonment,
on the conviction of first-degree murder and was sentenced
the same date to a term of 3 years imprisonment for escape
from the ACI.

The case is now before us on the merits of defendant’s
appeal from his murder conviction. We shall refer in the
course of this opinion to more detailed facts as these facts are
relevant to the issues raised by defendant.

I

THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the confession
taken at the Providence police station on the ground that it
was involuntary and had been obtained by the use of physical
force and coercion. The defendant also alleged that the con-
fession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights,
including but not limited to his right to counsel.

A lengthy suppression hearing was held before the trial jus-
tice beginning October 2, 1974. This motion was denied on
October 17, 1974. Thereafter the suppression hearing was re-
opened on March 13, 1975, in order to allow defense counsel
an opportunity to present Dr. Joseph E. Donahue, the medi-
cal officer at the ACI. After hearing the testimony of Dr.
Donahue, the trial justice reaffirmed his decision denying the
motion to suppress.

es 308

Hs The defendant’s principal claim in support of his motion to
suppress might be summarized by the statement that he was
not given his Miranda rights as claimed by the Providence
police and that he was kicked, beaten, and otherwise coerced
into signing a confession. The trial justice found that de-
fendant’s statements were lacking in credibility. He found
that his testimony posed a number of inherent improba-
bilities, contained numerous contradictions, and in many
instances his testimony was negated by persuasive and
unimpeached documentary evidence. Although this court
exercises its independent judgment in determining whether
constitutional rights have been appropriately applied, Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726
(1963); State v. Smith, 121 R.I. 138, 396 A.2d 110 (1979),
we do not sit as a court of nisi prius, and deference must be
given to the findings of fact made by the trial justice. Indeed,
our rule has been that findings of fact on motions to suppress
will not be overturned unless such findings are clearly
erroneous. State v. Leavitt, 103 R.I. 273, 237 A.2d 309
(1968). We defined “clearly erroneous” in terms which had
been established in United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948):

“<«X finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake has been committed.” ’ ” 103 R.I.
at 290, 237 A.2d at 318.

This rule has been applied in a number of federal cases in
which the question of waiver or consent was the issue on
motions to suppress. United States.v. Greer, 566 F.2d 472
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009, 98 S. Ct. 1881, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 391 (1978) (confession); United States~. Brown, 557
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (confession); United States v. Page,
302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962) (consent to search). This rule is
consonant with the profound analysis given by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concerning the establishment of historical facts ‘
as a basis for determining voluntariness of a confession in
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81S. Ct. 1860, 6 L.
Ed. 2d 1037 (1961). The following language from the opinion
is instructive:

304 ee

“Determination of what happened requires assessments
of the relative credibility of witnesses whose stories, in
cases involving claims of coercion, are frequently, if
indeed not almost invariably, contradictory. That
ascertainment belongs to the trier of facts before whom
those witnesses actually appear, subject to whatever
corrective powers a State’s appellate processes afford.

“This means that all testimonial conflict is settled by
the judgment of the state courts. Where they have made
explicit findings of fact, those findings conclude us and
form the basis of our review—with the one caveat,
necessarily, that we are not to be bound by findings
wholly lacking support in evidence. See Thompson v.
Louisville, 362 U.S, 199.” Id. at 603, 81 S. Ct. at 1879,
6 L. Ed. 2d at 1058.

Applying the “clearly erroneous” standard to the facts
elicited at the suppression hearing, we note that the trial
justice was faced with contradictory testimony. Several
police officers testified that no force or coercion was used,
that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights as set forth
on the so-called “rights form” which was admitted as State’s
Exhibit 1, that he was advised of his right to counsel and that
he declined counsel at first, after changing his mind about
making a telephone call. The officers further testified that
after giving a partial statement in the form of a confession as
recorded in State’s Trial Exhibit 32 (also part of State’s
Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1), defendant expressed a desire
to be advised by a lawyer. At that point the officers stated
that the interrogation ceased and attorney Harry Hoopis was
contacted in accordance with a prearranged designation.

In the face of this testimony, defendant stated that he was
beaten, that his hands were stepped upon, that he was kicked
and struck with various blunt instruments. The defendant
admitted that his signature was on the rights form, but
claimed that he signed it only as a result of fear and coercion.
He categorically denied that any Miranda rights were set
forth to him by the police then or at any time in the past. In

| 305

his decision the trial justice pointed out a number of contra-
dictions and inconsistencies in defendant’s testimony on this
subject. Indeed, defendant at one point contradicted his
corroborative witness, Melvin Spivey, in regard to whether he
had been beaten in the cell block area. The trial justice
pointed out the defendant had not complained to a physician
who examined him 2 days after his interrogation that he had
been beaten. Perhaps the most persuasive uncontradicted
fact perceived by the trial justice was the willingness of
defendant to accompany the police to the Point Street Bridge
to seek to locate the murder weapon after defendant had
consulted with attorney Hoopis.

The trial justice felt that this conduct was not consistent
with the behavior to be expected from a person who had
been coerced by physical force into signing a confession. The
trial justice also pointed out the testimony of another
impartial witness, Reverend August J. Delvaux, the
Providence Police Department Chaplain, whose account of
events surrounding defendant’s being placed in the police
cruiser differed from that of defendant in many material
respects. Notably, Father Delvaux’s observations did not
include the incident of stepping on defendant's hands or any
other violence in placing defendant in the police car as Cline
recounted.

Probably the most persuasive evidence introduced by
defendant in support of his claim of brutality was the testi-
mony of Dr. Joseph E. Donahue which was presented on the
reopening of the suppression hearing on March 13, 1975.
Doctor Donahue testified that he examined Mr. Cline upon
his admission to the ACI on April 16, 1974 (2 days after the
interrogation). Doctor Donahue noted multiple contusions of
the left chest, left arm and both legs of defendant on this
occasion. In the course of this examination no complaints
were made by defendant as to the origin of these contusions.
Also, Dr. Donahue did not note any cuts or abrasions on the
hands of defendant. These contusions, in the doctor’s
opinion, might have ranged between 2 and 5 days “in dura-
tion from the time of their origin.” Previously the court had

306 ee

heard testimony from Dr. James F. Brown who had ex-
amined defendant on May 16, 1974. During the course of this
examination at Rhode Island Hospital in the Multiphase
Screening Center, scars on both hands were noted. For the
first time, during this examination, Cline had complained to
the doctor that he had been struck on the lower legs with a
heavy stick, such as a billyclub, struck over the shoulders
with a heavy, soft object such as a sandbag, and that persons
had stepped on his hands. It should be noted that Dr.
Donahue on April 16, 1974, had not noted any contusions or
marks in the shoulder area. On the basis of this testimony,
‘the trial justice found as a fact that no beatings had taken
place prior to the interrogation or in the course of the
interrogation by the members of the Providence police. He
determined that the bruises and scars noted by Dr. Donahue
and Dr. Brown had not been tied in to the interrogation and
in all probability could have resulted from activities of
defendant entirely unrelated to this interrogation or his
arrest. In sum, he found defendant’s testimony wholly
lacking in credibility and the corroborative evidence of
bruises was simply not linked-in any persuasive way with
actions by the police. On the totality of all of the evidence,
we cannot say that the trial justice’s findings of fact were
clearly erroneous in the light of the testimony taken at the
suppression hearing. He resolved contradictory testimony of
various witnesses, applying standards of credibility thereto.
We cannot fault his determination of these historic facts.

Hi The defendant further argues on the issue of voluntariness
that he had ingested intoxicants in the form of alcoholic
beverages, topped off by the smoking of marijuana and,
therefore, was incapable of voluntary waiver of his Miranda
rights. The trial justice rejected this claim in specific terms
when he found the confession was voluntary. Here again, the
trial justice’s finding was rather substantially buttressed by
the testimony of defendant himself, who said that he was
mellow but knew everything that was going on. Thus, de-
fendant never achieved the threshold factual plateau upon
which the question of his capacity for voluntariness would be

es 307

placed in issue, in the absence of a positive assertion that
defendant’s will had been overborne by voluntary ingestion
of intoxicants. Several police witnesses testified that
defendant was in full possession of his faculties, although one
police officer indicated that defendant seemed high to him
because of his unusual calmness. On this state of the
evidence, the trial justice was not clearly wrong in his finding
of voluntariness on this issue.

The defendant also challenges certain of the trial justice’s
evidentiary rulings on the ground that the latter excluded
some testimony which might have furnished circumstantial
evidence of intoxication by showing materials found in the
course of the search of the cab in which defendant was
arrested. In the light of defendant’s own testimony on this
issue, a foundation of relevancy was clearly not established
and, therefore, these rulings did not constitute error,
prejudicial or otherwise.

The defendant contends that the Providence police who
interrogated him did so in violation of his right to counsel.
This claim is predicated upon the argument that attorney
Hoopis had been appointed to represent Cline and that the
relationship of attorney and client existed between Hoopis
and Cline prior to the time of defendant’s interrogation by
the Providence police. He then asserts that principles set forth
in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84S, Ct. 1199, 12
L. Ed. 2d 246 (1946), as further applied in Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424
(1977), would prevent any waiver on the part of Cline, even
if voluntary, unless counsel was present for consultation.

The evidence in this case if viewed without torturing the
reasonable meaning of the witnesses’ statements shows
beyond doubt that the relationship of attorney and client did
not exist between Hoopis and defendant until defendant and
Hoopis met at the police station after the interrogation had
taken place. Hoopis stated on direct examination in the
suppression hearing:

308

“Q Did you have occasion to be appointed indigent
counsel of one Robert Cline?

“A Yes.
“Q And do you remember the day?

“A I know it was the Friday before Easter of 1974,
which would have probably been the 12th. April 12th I
received a phone call from Judge Orme’s office, first on
one case that I went down to the police station; then I
received a subsequent call stating that they expected
another arrest over the weekend and if I would be on
call over the weekend to represent anyone who may be
interested concerning certain crimes.

“Q Now, Easter Sunday, April 14th, were you so
called?

“A I was.

“Q And did you go, in response to this call, go to the
police station?

“A I did.
“Q And who called you if you can remember?
“A Gerald McCarthy, I believe, called me.

“Q And what time did you arrive at the Providence
Police Station on Sunday, April 14th, approximately?

“A Between four and five o’clock in the morning.
eae

“Q And did you have a conversation with Sgt.
McCarthy at this time?

“A Yes, I did.

“Q And what was the nature of that conversation with
Sgt. McCarthy?

“A He explained to me that Mr. Cline had been
arrested and questioned and then he directed me to Mr.
Cline.”

|) 309

From the foregoing testimony it is apparent that the
Providence police had arranged through the District Court to
have an attorney available in the event that a suspect was
arrested over the Easter weekend and made a request for
counsel. An examination of Hoopis’ entire testimony shows
that he had never met Cline prior to being called by Det. Sgt.
McCarthy to go to the police station that morning between 4
and 5 a.m. That same morning after consultation with
defendant, Hoopis and Cline went to the Point Street Bridge
in order to attempt to locate a pistol which had been
allegedly disposed of by Cline at that location. Later a lineup
was held at which Hoopis was present.

|| Generally, the relationship of attorney and client arises by
reason of agreement between the parties. The relationship is
essentially one of principal and agent. See C.C. Plumb
Mixes, Inc. v. Stone, 108 R.I. 75, 272 A.2d 152 (1971); Coro
Federal Credit Union v. Cameo Club, 91 R.1. 131, 161 A.2d
410 (1960). Although the agreeement which creates this
relationship need not be a formal contract, a contract at least
must be implied by the conduct of the parties. Lawrence v.
Tschirgi, 244 Iowa 386, 57 N.W.2d 46 (1953); Nicholson v.
Shockey, 192 Va. 270, 64 S.E.2d 813 (1951). Usually the
relationship is established by-a showing that the advice and
assistance of the attorney are sought and received in matters
pertinent to the attorney’s profession. Nicholson v. Shockey,
supra. Obviously, such a relationship could not exist between
persons who had never met and who in all probability were
unaware of each other’s existence prior to the meeting in the
Providence police station. The fact that Hoopis was
designated by a justice of the District Court to be available to
represent a person whom Hoopis did not know—in the event
that such person might be arrested for a crime for which
more than one suspect might be apprehended—could not
create the relationship of attorney and client such as existed
under the facts of Massiah v. United States, or Brewer v.
Williams, both supra. In those cases, without question
defendants and their attorneys had an unequivocal

310 ee

relationship prior to the bugging of the automobile in
Massiah and the “Christian burial speech” in Brewer.

Nevertheless, defendant misconceives the effect of Brewer
when he contends that after appointment of counsel a waiver
of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights could not be
made. This contention was specifically negated by Mr.
Justice Stewart when he stated:

“The Court of Appeals did not hold, nor do we, that
under the circumstances of this case Williams could not,
without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. It only held, as
do we, that he did not.” Id. at 405-06, 97S. Ct. at 1243,
51 L. Ed. at 441.

Thus, the finding of the trial justice that defendant had
waived his right to counsel prior to making statements to the
police did not violate under the facts of this case the
principles of Massiah and Brewer. The finding of waiver was
abundantly supported by the evidence in the record and was
not determined in violation of any constitutional principles.
On this record it is not necessary for this court to determine
whether it would adopt the rules enunciated by the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York in People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976) and
People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).

The defendant argues that his confession was not
voluntary, by reason of the fact that the police failed to warn
him of the severity of punishment which might be imposed
for his offense. It is apparent from the record and from the
rights form that defendant was told that he was a suspect in a
murder case and that his arrest and custody were based upon
probable cause to believe that he was the person who had
perpetrated the crime of murder. The evidence is conflicting
as to whether it was brought to the defendant’s attention that
he might have been subject to the death penalty in the event
of conviction. The short answer to this argument is that the

aul

Supreme Court in furtherance of the Miranda principles has
never required the police to give an estimate or admonition
concerning probable maximum penalties. In this instance,
subsequent judicial holdings have eliminated the death
penalty from consideration in this case and, therefore, if the
police had admonished or warned defendant concerning the
applicability of the death penalty, they would have been
warning him of a penalty which constitutionally could never
have been imposed. State v. Cline, supra.

The defendant finally argues that his confession should
have been suppressed on the ground that it was obtained in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR
7-104(A)(1).* This contention is without merit in light of our
determination that Hoopis did not represent Cline at the time
of his interrogation by the Providence police. Hoopis did not
represent Cline until Det. Sgt. McCarthy arranged a meeting
between the two pursuant to Cline’s request during the
course of his interrogation that he be given the advice of
counsel.

It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider whether this
canon is in any way relevant to police interrogation. The
canon is directed toward attorneys and is designed to control
the activities of members of the bar. Therefore, whether the
canon could ever be violated by a police officer who inter-
rogates a suspect without any consultation with an attorney-
at-law and without any participation by an attorney
expressly or by implication is a matter which we would
reserve until the question is presented in concrete form.

2DR 7-104(A)(1) reads as follows:

“DR 7-104. Communicating With One of Adverse Interest.—(A) During
the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:

(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party or is authorized by law to do so.”

aig es

On all of the foregoing issues, the trial justice found that
the state had sustained the burden of proving the confession
to be voluntary by clear and convincing evidence.

In our opinion the determination of the Superior Court not
to suppress the confession is factually not clearly erroneous
and is consonant with the constitutional principles
enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct.
1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) and with our own cases, State
v. Vargus, 118 B.I. 113, 373 A.2d 150 (1977); State v.
Beaulieu, 116 R.I. 575, 359 A.2d 689 (1976); State v.
Lachapelle, 112 R.I. 105, 308 A.2d 467 (1973); see State v.
Knott, 111 R.I. 241, 302 A.2d 64 (1973).

II
THE ISSUE OF EXCLUSION OF JURORS

The defendant contends that the trial justice’s exclusion of
eight prospective jurors from service on the jury empanelled
to try his case violated the principles laid down in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 776 (1968). At the outset we would do well to examine
precisely what the Supreme Court of the United States held
in Witherspoon. In that case a jury was empanelled to
perform two responsibilities. First, it was the task of the jury
to determine guilt or innocence; second, it was the function
of that jury to impose a penalty which might include a
sentence of death. The determination of whether to impose
capital punishment would depend upon an exercise of the
jurors’ discretion. Under an Illinois statute, the trial justice
proceeded to excuse 47 veniremen solely on the basis that
they had “ ‘conscientious or religious scruples against the
infliction of the death penalty’ or against ‘its infliction ‘in a
proper case.’ ” The Supreme Court found that 39 veniremen
were excluded “without any effort to find out whether their
scruples would invariably compel them to vote against
capital punishment.” Id. at 515, 88 S. Ct. ‘at 1773, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 781. The Court limited its holding with the following
important observation:

ee 313

“The issue before us is a narrow one. It does not
involve the right of the prosecution to challenge for
cause those prospective jurors who state that their reser-
vations about capital punishment would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s
guilt. Nor does it involve the State’s assertion of a right
to exclude from the jury in a capital case those who say
that they could never vote to impose the death penalty
or that they would refuse even to consider its imposition
in the case before them. For the State of Illinois did not
stop there, but authorized the prosecution to exclude as
well all who said that they were opposed to capital
punishment and all who indicated that they had
conscientious scruples against inflicting it.” 391 U.S. at
513-14, 88 S. Ct. at 1772-73, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 780.

It might well be argued that since Witherspoon specifically
held that only the death penalty was unconstitutionally
applied, and since the determination of guilt in that case was
not disturbed, even though made by a jury from which near-
ly all of those who indicated objection to the death penalty
had been summarily excluded, no constitutional challenge
can be made concerning the finding of guilt in the present
case.

| However, it is unnecessary for us to reach this question,
since in the instant case there was no violation by the trial
justice of the principles enunciated in Witherspoon. An
examination of the lengthy voir dire examination of all of the
jurors, including those who were excluded, reveals that the
trial justice made every effort to determine from the jurors
whether, in spite of their opinions regarding the death
penalty, they were able to assure the court that they would
follow their oaths as jurors and would determine the question
of guilt or innocence on the basis of the evidence submitted in
the case. The trial justice only sought to elicit assurances from
these prospective jurors that they would subordinate their
personal views concerning the death penalty to this para-
mount obligation to determine guilt or innocence based solely
upon the evidence presented to them. In our opinion, insofar

314 ee

as the principles of Witherspoon are applicable to the
selection of a jury whose sole consideration was guilt or
innocence and whose members were not to be concerned
with imposition of a penalty, the trial justice’s conduct of the
interrogation and his rulings on the question of qualification
were in complete consonance with those principles.

In the real context of an adversary voir dire, a trial justice
cannot perform his function in a vacuum, and, therefore, his
is not a theoretical exercise of the application of principles
which might be derived from appellate opinions. Frequently
the replies of jurors to questions posed by counsel whose
objectives are diametrically opposed will require the
application of fine judgmental determinations. In this
connection the trial justice in this case frequently
interrogated jurors in order to resolve ambiguities and clarify
equivocal replies to questions of counsel which they might
not have understood, and which were not always models of
clarity.

In every instance, his determination to exclude a juror who
could not give an assurance that he or she would subordinate
his or her philosophic disagreement with the death penalty to
the performance of his or her duty to determine guilt or
innocence in accordance with the evidence was entirely
justified.

Therefore, even assuming, without deciding, that the
principles of Witherspoon are in any way applicable to a jury
whose sole function is the determination of guilt or innocence
rather than penalty, even in the light of the more recent
studies and articles cited by defendant, there is utterly no
indication that this jury in the case at bar was in any way
lacking in impartiality or indifference so as to deprive
defendant of a reasonably impartial jury in accordance with
his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States or under the parallel
provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution.’

8It must be emphasized, in spite of this assumption, that the majority of the
Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct, 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776

es ais

In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to consider
the possible effect which the selective incorporation of the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in Duncan v- Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 88S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968), might
have had in a theoretical case not presented in this record
upon the scope of review of the guilt findings in
Witherspoon.

I
THE IN-TRIAL PUBLICITY ISSUE

The defendant challenges instructions given by the trial
justice during the course of trial concerning the obligation of
jurors in respect to the reading of and listening to media
accounts of the trial. The defendant further argues that on 3
occasions the trial justice declined to poll the jurors in respect
to allegedly prejudicial statements in the press.

Although this case was one in which the possibility of
imposition of sentence of death was involved, the press and
media exercised commendable restraint in purporting to
publish during the course of trial only matters which had
been presented in court before the jury. Thus, the only
allegation presented by defendant of prejudicial publicity in
the course of this lengthy trial is an assertion that defendant
was referred to in news accounts as “an escapee,” and the

(1968), specifically disavowed any holding that a conviction by a jury from which
jurors opposed to capital punishment had been excluded was invalid. In response to
studies and scientific evidence advanced to show that jurors unopposed to the death
penalty are partial to the prosecution on the basis of guilt or innocence, the Court
observed:

“The data adduced by the petitioners, however, are too tentative and
fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to
favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt. We simply cannot
conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter of
judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment
results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially
increases the risk of conviction. In light of the presently available
information, we are not prepared to announce a per se constitutional rule
requiring the reversal of every conviction returned by a jury selected as this
one was.” Id. at 517-18, 88 S, Ct. at 1774-75, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 782.

316 ee

further assertion that The Providence Journal and Evening
Bulletin erroneously reported that the death penalty was
mandatory for anyone who committed murder while “serv-
ing a sentence of imprisonment.” The thrust of the assertions
is that defendant was prejudiced by these accounts because a
juror might infer therefrom that defendant had committed
some prior crime in order to be in prison.

We have recently noted that when a claim is made of ex-
posure by jurors to newspaper articles during the course of a
trial, it is necessary to make a showing that defendant was
prejudiced thereby. Palmigiano v. State, 120 R.I. 402, 387
A.2d 1382 (1978). In that case we quoted the general rule as
expressed in United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th
Cir. 1972):

“ ‘Newspaper and television publicity surrounding a
trial represent the most common threats to the integrity
of the proceedings. This is not to suggest, however, that
juror exposure to any publicity vitiates the fairness of
the trial. The severity of the threat depends upon both
the nature of the information so publicized and the
degree of juror exposure to it.’” R.I. at 387 A.2d at
“1385.

In Palmigiano, supra, we further observed that in cases in
which substantial prejudicial publicity has been found to
have reached the jury during trial, the publicity has generally
involved “ ‘information about the defendant that would not
be admissible before the jury or that was not in fact put
before the jury in court.” Id. at 408, 387 A.2d at
1386, citing United States y. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 195 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922, 96 S. Ct. 2629, 49 L. Ed.
2d 375 (1976), quoting United States, v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815,
849 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S. Ct.
736, 30 L, Ed. 2d 745 (1972). See also State,v. Holmes, 110
Ariz. 494, 520 P.2d 1118 (1974); Quintana v. People, 158
Colo. 189, 405 P.2d 740 (1965).

si

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, we
find that nothing in the asserted newspaper articles set forth
any matter which had not already been presented before the
jurors. There was evidence in that case, as was required by
the nature of the charges, that defendant had been lawfully
committed to the ACI and that he had escaped therefrom. In
connection with the nature of the charge of murder, under
§11-23-2, as amended by P.L. 1973, ch. 280, §1, the jury was
exhaustively instructed concerning the nature and elements
of this crime during the voir dire examination of jurors prior
to empanelling, as well as in the final instructions given by
the trial justice. The statute purported to make the death
penalty applicable to “[e]very person who shall commit
murder while committed to confinement to the adult correc-
tional institutions * « *.” Although a purist in statutory
interpretation might disagree with the newspaper summary
of the charge, such a subtle distinction would be
imperceptible to the average intelligent lay person. We
believe that the newspaper acounts of which complaint is
made might well be characterized in the words of Judge
Russell in United States v. Jones, supra:

“With hardly an exception the cases in which sub-
stantial prejudicial publicity during the trial was found,
the publicity involved ‘information about the defendant
that would not be admissible before the jury or that was
not in fact put before the jury in court.’ * * +

“We have none of that in this case. The newspaper
publicity of which the defendants complained was * * *
an accurate condensed statement of testimony actually
admitted into evidence and heard by the jury. The news
accounts did not attempt * * * to evaluate the testi-
mony to the prejudice of the defendants. They included
no inadmissible evidence or evidence that was not
available to the jury or evidence that either then or later
was not fully developed in evidence heard by the jury.”
542 F.2d at 195-96.

318 ee

The foregoing comments are equally applicable to the case
at bar. Since no publicity which could remotely be termed
prejudicial has been pointed out by defendant, we do not
reach the question of the adequacy or correctness of the trial
justice’s response. It is only under circumstances where the
jury has been exposed to prejudicial information that the trial
court is obliged, in its sound discretion, to take appropriate
measures to assure a fair trial. United States v. Jones, supra at
194; United States v. Pomponio 517 F.2d 460 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1015, 96 S. Ct. 448, 46 L. Ed. 2d 386
(1975); United States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71 (4th Cir.
1974).

Therefore, since defendant has not shown any reasonable
possibility of prejudice from the publicity upon which his
challenge is based, his argument on this issue is unavailing.

Iv
THE CHARGE TO THE JURY

The defendant contends that the trial justice was in error
in failing to instruct the jury that it might return a verdict of
murder in the second degree or manslaughter. The trial
justice, however, declined to give such an instruction and
charged the jury only on the elements of murder committed
in the course of attempting to perpetrate a robbery.

Three eyewitnesses testified in this case that they saw
defendant shoot the victim. One eyewitness, Brenda Page,
testified that she saw Cline’s hand in the fisherman’s pocket
at the time of the shooting. Cline’s own statement, as
admitted into evidence, was in the following unequivocal
terms:

“Question, did you have anything to do with the
murder of the fisherman?

“ “Answer, yes, I shot him. I killed him. I’m sorry.
“ “Question, why did you kill him?

“ “Answer, I thought he was going to shoot me. People
said he carried a gun.

es si9

“Question, what were you doing when you shot him?
“ “Answer, holding him up.’ ”

There is not a shred of evidence in the case which would
indicate that Cline had any prior relationship or even
acquaintance with the victim in this case.

Our court has long followed the doctrine that instructions
should not be given on lesser degrees of murder or man-
slaughter unless there is evidence in the case to support such a
finding. State v. Saccoccio, 50 R.I. 356, 147 A. 878 (1929).
This rule has been consistently followed in more recent cases.
State v. Infantolino, 116 R.I. 303, 355 A.2d 722 (1976); State
v. Bradshaw, 101 R.I. 233, 221 A.2d 815 (1966). Our
observation in Infantolino, supra, is pertinent:

“A charge to the jury should be confined to propositions
of law related to material issues of fact which the
evidence tends to support. The jury’s attention should
not be directed to various propositions of law unless the
record contains evidence which supports and requires
it.” Id. at 307, 355 A.2d at 724-25.

A consideration of the evidence in this case would find no
basis to support a finding of murder in the second degree or
manslaughter. Either defendant was guilty of murder in the
course of attempted perpetration of a robbery, or he was
guilty of no crime at all. In charging the jury on the elements
of the only crime which could be inferred from the evidence,
the trial justice was wholly correct and acted in accordance
with reason and authority.

v

DISQUALIFICATION OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S ENTIRE STAFF

On March 27, 1975, before commencement of trial,
defendant moved to disqualify the assistant attorney general,
Albert DeRobbio, who had been assigned to try the case.
Indeed, the gravamen of defendant’s motion was that the
entire Attorney General’s staff be disqualified and a special

320 ee

prosecutor appointed to proceed with the trial. The basis of
this motion was that defendant’s former attorney, Walter
Stone, had become employed by the Department of the
Attorney General. There is no question that attorney Stone
had been active in the handling of matters relating to Cline’s
defense, including but not limited to the extensive motion to
suppress which had been heard over a period of 9 days. It
must be presumed that Stone had become privy to all matters
relating to the Cline defense prior to his departure from
employment with the office of the Public Defender where he
had been assigned to represent defendant. In fact, Stone did
not leave the Public Defender’s office until February 7, 1975.
The instant motion was made on March 27, 1975.

It is further true that the Canons of Professional Ethics and
Disciplinary Rules of this court forbid an attorney from
disclosing matters which have been confidentially imparted
to him to the disadvantage of his client. Specifically, DR
4-101(B) provides:

“(B) Except as permitted by DR 4-101(C), a lawyer
shall not knowingly:

(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.

(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the
disadvantage of the client.

(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the
advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the
client consents after full disclosure.”

The foregoing disciplinary rule is designed to implement
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
particularly the following pertinent portions:

“EC 4-5. A lawyer should not use information
acquired in the course of the representation of a client to
the disadvantage of the client and a lawyer should not
use, except with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, such information for his own purposes.

“EC 4-6. The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the
confidences and secrets of his client continues after the
termination of his employment.”

ee) sa

The fact pattern in this case does not in any way indicate
that attorney Stone breached his obligation as set forth in the
foregoing canons or disciplinary rules. Indeed, it might be
helpful to note the representations of fact made by assistant
attorney general DeRobbio during the course of argument on
this motion, in conjunction with an exchange which took
place between the trial justice and the attorney for
defendant:

“THE COURT: So that you don’t even have sus-
picion he might convey any information he received
from the defendant, is that correct?

“MR. POLLOCK: Your Honor, what we are
challenging, as well as the appearance of impropriety—

“THE COURT: That’s not my question. My
question is: are you saying you don’t even have the
suspicion at the present time? I know you're challenging
the appearance of impropriety, but I am asking you if
you have a suspicion he may convey any knowledge?
That’s a simple question.

“MR. POLLOCK: No, Your Honor, only through
the appearance, as I said. « * *”

eR

“MR. DeROBBIO: If Your Honor please, I have
summonsed Mr. Stone, and I believe * + * perhaps an
examination of Mr. Stone should be made by either the
Court or by the attorney for the defendant, and I feel a
determination as to what his participation was with this
defendant in disclosing any of the facts and what his
participation is with the Attorney General’s
Department and a statement from Mr. Stone as to any
conversations that he may have engaged in with the
Office of Attorney General; and I can state presently to
this Court, as an officer of the court, that Mr. Stone has
refused even to discuss the matter as to the assignment
date of the case itself—in no way has Mr. Stone in any
way indicated any of the factual situation, any of the
knowledge that he has received through his attorney-
client privilege.”

322 ee

In the face of this colloquy, there was no attempt by
defendant to show or even suggest, as a matter of fact, that
Stone had violated his ethical responsibilities in any way.

The defendant contends in his brief that even in the
absence of any evidence of violation of confidence, the entire
Attorney General's office should have been disqualified in
order to avoid the appearance of impropriety. In support of
this proposition defendant cites State. v. Latigue, 108 Ariz.
521, 502 P.2d 1340 (1972), and State,v. Chambers, 86 N.M.
383, 524 P.2d 999 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M.
372, 524 P.2d 988 (1974). In both of the foregoing cases it
was held that the office of the prosecutor, in the first instance
in the county attorney’s office and in the second instance the
county district attorney’s office, should be disqualified from
trying the case against a defendant whose former counsel had
subsequently become associated with the office of the prose-
cuting authority. Both courts selected this result in order to
avoid the appearance of impropriety. In the Latigue case,
supra, it is interesting that the Supreme Court of Arizona, in
dealing with a case in which the defendant's prior co-counsel
had become chief deputy county prosecutor, commented as
follows on the necessity of the appointment of a special
prosecutor:

“Tt is, of course, necessary that the County Attorney
secure the appointment of a special prosecutor if he
wishes to continue the prosecution of this case. The
record indicates that the trial court has agreed to take
this matter under advisement until the opinion of this
court has been made available to it.

“As a part of the trial court’s order in this case, there
should be included specific directions as to what
material shall be made available to the new special
prosecutor. This may include any material that the
County Attorney has obtained from sources completely
independent of his chief deputy—police investigations
and reports, confessions, items of evidence, etc., if any,
used in the murder, coroner’s report, statements of
witnesses taken outside the presence of the chief deputy,

ee) 993

etc. There is no reason to require a complete new
investigation. The order should also specifically prohibit
use of any of the work-product of any other item having
any possible connection with the chief deputy. It should
prohibit any discussion between the chief deputy and
the special prosecutor. Every possible effort should be
made to prevent any evasion, or appearance of evasion,
deliberate or accidental.” 108 Ariz. at 523, 502 P.2d at
1342.

It should be noted that even after the elaborate precautions,
it would be necessary to trust to the integrity of the lawyers in
question to obey that which would have been their obligation
in any event to avoid the revealing of confidences made by
the client to his former attorney.

Another line of cases has declined to require the
disqualification of an entire prosecutorial office because of
prior association of one member with a defendant. In State v.
Brazile, 231 La. 90, 90 So. 2d 789 (1956), the Supreme Court
of Louisiana overturned a trial court order to recuse the
district attorney and his assistants for the reason that the
second district attorney had served as one of defense counsel
at a prior trial. The court emphasized that there was no
reason to believe that the defendant’s prior counsel had
violated the confidential relationship existing between
attorney and client. Although the court was construing a
statute which set forth causes for recusation, one of the
pertinent grounds was if the district attorney “ ‘shall have
been employed or consulted as attorney for the accused
before his election or appointment as district attorney
* «x *.” Id, at 94, 90 So. 2d at 790. In construing this statute
the court observed that neither the district attorney nor his
first assistant had ever been employed or consulted as
attorney for the defendant. The court said that this statutory
provision would furnish no ground at all for the recusation of
the district attorney or his first assistant.

This case has been followed by State v. Brown, 274 So.2d
381 (La. 1973), wherein the Supreme Court of Louisiana

nes

324 ee

again refused to recuse or disqualify the district attorney's
office in a situation in which that office had employed an
assistant district attorney who had previously represented the
accused. In that case the court commented as follows:

“The mere fact that an assistant district attorney
previously represented an accused does not ipso facto
require disqualification of the District Attorney in the
criminal proceeding. Especially, as here, where the
Assistant District Attorney was not called upon to use
against his former client any confidential knowledge
gained through their former association, no prejudice
could result to the accused.” Jd. at 382.

In New Mexico following the decision in State v.
Chambers, supra, the court of appeals in State v. Mata, 88
N.M. 560, 543 P.2d 1188 (N.M. App. 1975), reached a
somewhat different conclusion when, after an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court made unchallenged findings of fact
that an attorney who had previously represented the
defendant and later was employed as an assistant district
attorney never discussed the case with the district attorney or
any of his assistants or employees and took no part in the trial
or preparation for trial on behalf of the prosecution. In the
light of these findings of fact, on an application for post-
conviction relief, the court held that any appearance of
unfairness or impropriety was dissipated.

In State v. Miner, 128 Vt. 55, 258 A.2d 815 (1969), an
assistant attorney general had previously represented the
accused in a murder indictment. The Attorney General
withdrew from the case, and the prosecution was entrusted
to the Windsor County State’s Attorney. Thereafter, the
defendant sought to dismiss the indictment. In sustaining the
lower court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment, the Supreme
Court of Vermont considered that the county state’s attorney
had worked in close relationship with the Attorney General’s
office in the preparation of the case for trial, but at no time
had he conferred with the former counsel of the defendant.
After taking into account the ethical responsibilities of
counsel, the court made the following comment:

es 325

“Fidelity to these standards prohibits an attorney
from engaging in a criminal proceeding against an
accused he has formerly represented in the subject
matter of the prosecution. But a conflict of this
consequence will not bar the State, as distinguished
from a disqualified representative, from protecting the
public interest. Other counsel who have not been
subject to any conflict may appear for the State where
the prosecutor’s function can be performed impartially
and free from any breach of privileged communica-
tions. Id. at 62, 258 A.2d at 819.

There is no doubt that an attorney who has represented a
defendant may not serve as his prosecutor. The cases on this
point are virtually unanimous. See Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d 953
(1970). The question at issue here is whether the entire
Attorney General’s office in a state where only that officer
carries the burden of the prosecutorial function in respect to
felonies should be disqualified merely because one of its
subordinate members has previously represented the ac-
cused, particularly since there is no suggestion that he has
violated the confidence of his former client or participated in
the preparation of the case in any way. After considering the
above cited authorities, we believe that the answer to this
question must clearly be in the negative. Even in those states
where one prosecutor’s office has been disqualified, the
necessity still exists for representatives of that office, as in
State. v.” Latigue, supra, to work closely with a special
prosecutor in whose integrity (and that of the former counsel
for the accused) reliance must ultimately have been reposed.
Thus, we believe that transferring responsibility from one
office to another, or the appointment of a special prosecutor,
provides a purported remedy which is more cosmetic than
substantial. Essentially the question is whether defendant has
been in any way prejudiced by virtue of the imparting of
knowledge from his former counsel to anyone involved in his
prosecution. On this record, there was no suggestion of any
such prejudice. Indeed, it was conceded for all practical
purposes that no breach of confidence had occurred.
Therefore, the trial justice was correct in refusing to
disqualify DeRobbio from proceeding with the trial of the
case.

326 es
VI

THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION
BY RONALD STONE

During the course of trial, defendant sought to exclude an
in-court identification by Ronald Stone, an eyewitness to the
shooting, on the ground that the police had utilized
suggestive procedures at the pretrial lineup and also at a
photographic display which preceded the lineup. In support
of his argument, defendant cites Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 97S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1977) and Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972).
In both of these cases suggestive procedures had been used,
but the court permitted in-court identification in both
instances on the ground that the totality of circumstances
supported the reliability of the identification. In Manson, an
experienced undercover police officer had only been shown a
single photograph, but the Supreme Court, concluding that
reliability is the linchpin, determined that under all of the
circumstances they could not say that there was “ ‘a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,’ ” 432
U.S. at 116, 97 S. Ct. at 2254, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 155, citing
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L.
Ed, 2d 1247 (1968). In Biggers, a showup where the
defendant was presented to the victim alone was found to be
suggestive, but the Supreme Court still permitted an in-court
identification when the record indicated that there was
sufficient reliability to overcome a substantial likelihood of
misidentification. These cases applied principles first asserted
in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed.
2d 1199 (1967), where an individual showup to a victim of a
stabbing was held to be justified by necessity.

We note that in all of the foregoing cases the element
which triggered scrutiny by the Court was suggestiveness.
The suggestiveness might have been overcome by other
factors but was present in the first instance in order to
provide the court with a reason for considering exclusion of
an in-court identification.

es aa7

In the present case Ronald Stone was shown not a single
photograph, but seven. The trial justice specifically found
that the photographs were remarkably fair in terms of
showing alternative persons who were similar in appearance.
He did not find any suggestiveness in the photographic
display. We have carefully reviewed the transcript of the
preliminary hearing and agree wholly with the findings of
the trial justice. Mr. Stone, in spite of searching cross-
examination, testified unequivocally that he had known
Cline prior to the shooting, knew his name, had seen him
“five or six times” at the Chad Brown Project. He insisted
that the police did not suggest to him whose photograph
should be selected. It is apparent from the record that he
picked Cline’s photograph from the group without assistance
from anyone.

The lineup itself was practically a model of adherence to
constitutional precepts. Indeed, no Sixth Amendment claim
is made in respect to this pretrial confrontation, because it
was conceded at the preliminary hearing that attorney
Hoopis was present during the course of the lineup. There
were four persons in the lineup, all others of whom were
found by the trial justice to be reasonably similar in coloring
and hair styles to defendant. The trial justice found nothing
suggestive about the lineup. He further found that the
officers were “seeking to be scrupulously fair” in refraining
from making suggestions to Mr. Stone.

In light of this record, we are of the opinion that none of
the elements of suggestiveness were present which would
have justified an exclusion of the in-court identification, even
in the event that the witness had not indicated an
independent source for such identification as was shown in
this case. In short, the trial justice was correct in refusing to
exclude Stone’s identification.

VII

THE ISSUE OF CONSOLIDATION FOR TRIAL OF
THE ESCAPE CHARGE AND THE MURDER CHARGE

328 es

The defendant had been separately indicted for escape and
for murder. Although the two charges had not been consoli-
dated, they were assigned to be tried together. Prior to trial,
defendant sought a severance of these two charges on the
ground that the trial justice should exercise his discretion in
favor of severance in order to avoid prejudice to defendant.

For. the first time on appeal, defendant not only challenges
the judge’s exercise of discretion, but claims that the trial
justice was wrong as a matter of law pursuant to the terms of
Rules 8 and 13 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure in allowing these two charges to be tried together.
It is a familiar principle that only those issues raised at trial
will be considered by this court on appeal. State v. Turley,
113 R.I. 104, 318 A.2d 455 (1974); State v. Quattrocchi, 103
RI. 115, 235 A.2d 99 (1967).

In the case at bar, defendant’s contention would be
unavailing, even if the trial justice’s ruling had been sought
and obtained on this issue. Super. R. Crim. P. 8(a) reads in
pertinent part:

“Joinder of Offenses. Two (2) or more offenses may be
charged in the same indictment, information, or
complaint in a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or
both, are of the same or similar character or are based
on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts
or transactions connected together or constituting parts
of a common scheme or plan.” (Emphasis added.)

In the case at bar defendant was charged in Indictment
No. 74-656 that he “being a prisoner confined in the
minimum custodial unit of the Adult Correctional
Institutions did escape from said minimum custodial unit
* « *,” The defendant was charged in Indictment No. 74-657
with the following offense:

“That Robert Cline * + * did murder one Frank A. Pirri
while committed to confinement to the Adult
Correctional Institutions in violation of §11-23-1 and
§11-23-2, Reenactment of 1969, as amended.”

es 329

Although the escape alleged in one indictment took place
on March 16, 1974, and the murder allegedly took place on
April 11, 1974, an analysis of the circumstances will disclose
that these two events were connected together so as to permit
joinder under the terms of Rule 8. In the classic sense the
evidence of one event would be mutually admissible in proof
of a necessary element of the second event. The importance
of evidence which is mutually admissible has been stated in
McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977):

“The reasoning behind the rule permitting a joint
trial of crimes where the evidence would be mutually
admissible is evident. Where evidence of one crime
would be admissible at a separate trial of another
charge, a defendant will not suffer any additional
prejudice if the two charges are tried together. It is
equally clear, however, that where offenses are joined
for trial because they are of similar character, but the
evidence would not be mutually admissible, the
prejudicial effect is apt to outweigh the probative value
of such evidence.” Id. at 610, 375 A.2d at 555.

The Maryland court indicated that this rule was more
stringent than the rule enunciated by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Lotsch, 102 F. 2d 35, 36 (2d Cir.), cert.
dened, 307 U.S. 622, 59 S. Ct. 793, 83 L. Ed. 1500 (1939),
and further refined in Drew v. United States, 118 U.S. App.
D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where the court said:

“Tn summary, then, even where the evidence would
not have been admissible in separate trials, if, from the
nature of the crimes charged, it appears that the
prosecutor might be able to present the evidence in such
a manner that the accused is not confounded in his
defense and the jury will be able to treat the evidence
relevant to each charge separately and distinctly, the
trial judge need not order severance or election at the
commencement of the trial. If, however, it appears at
any later stage in the trial that the defendant will be
embarrassed in making his defense or that there is'a
possibility that the jury will become or has become

330 Ce)

confused, then, upon proper motion, the trial judge
should order severance.” Id. at 17-18, 331 F.2d at
91-92.

If one applies the more stringent of these two rules, it
becomes apparent that a necessary element of proof in the
murder indictment was that defendant at the time of the
alleged crime was “committed to confinement to the Adult
Correctional Institutions.” Indeed, in order to avoid going
into the details behind this confinement, defendant offered to
stipulate thereto. However, this understandable desire to
render the circumstances of the offense more antiseptic
would not eliminate the need of the state to explain to a jury
how a defendant who was committed to confinement at the
ACI could have been present at the Chad Brown Housing
Project on April 11, 1974.

The state is entitled in any criminal prosecution to present
all evidence to the jury which is relevant to the charge. When
courts speak of the prejudicial effect of introduction of
evidence of other crimes, they are applying a rule which is
designed to prevent a jury from finding the defendant guilty
of a crime because of his general criminal disposition. In
criticizing the test set forth in Drew v. United States, supra,
the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that the Drew test
“overlook{ed] the reason underlying the ‘other crimes’ rule,
which excludes evidence relevant to proof of criminal
disposition because such evidence is generally more
prejudicial than probative.” 280 Md. at 611, 375 A.2d at 555.
This is another way of stating that evidence of the com-
mission of other crimes with certain exceptions is simply not
relevant to the proof of guilt of the specific crime with which
the defendant is charged. When such evidence becomes
relevant to the proof of an issue provable in a case, then the
inhibition is no longer applicable. See, e.g., State v.
Colangelo, 55 R.I. 170, 179 A. 147 (1935). In this case the
proof of escape from the ACI was highly relevant to explain
to the triers of fact how defendant could simultaneously be in
a status of commitment to the ACI, and yet, apparently, be
at liberty in the city of Providence. The defendant suggests in

ee) 331

his brief that various speculative (and incorrect) explanations
might have occurred to the jury which would have been
more advantageous to defendant than the actual facts of the
case. We know of no doctrine in the law that is designed to
insulate defendant from relevant truths, even if such truths
might lead the jury to draw less favorable inferences
concerning defendant than if they were not exposed. In this
case the balancing of prejudice against probative necessity
must inevitably lead to the conclusion that evidence con-
cerning the background of defendant’s presence at the Chad
Brown Housing Project on April 11, 1974, would be
admissible under the murder indictment. This evidence
would include an account of his having escaped on March 16,
1974. Even defendant does not contend that evidence of the
escape would not be relevant to the escape indictment.
Therefore, the’same evidence would be mutually admissible
in each case and these offenses could properly have been
joined under the provisions of Rule 8. Since the offenses could
have been joined in a single indictment, they could be tried
together under the provisions of Rule 13, which provides that
the “Court may order two (2) or more indictments * * * to be
tried together if the offenses + + « could have been joined ina
single indictment + * +.”

Therefore, in causing these indictments to be tried
together, the trial justice was not violating the rules of
criminal procedure as a matter of law.

In respect to the decision of the trial justice to exercise his
discretion in favor of joinder, we have repeatedly held that
the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on review
absent a clear abuse. State v. Johnson, 116 B.I. 449, 358 A.2d
370 (1976); State v. Matéatall, 114 R.I. 568, 337 A.2d 229
(1975); State v. Patriarca, 112 B.I. 14, 308 A.2d 300 (1973).
In Patriarca, the late Chief Justice Roberts discussed the
balance of prejudice resulting from joinder with the
efficiency and convenience of a single trial and went on to
note that real prejudice is something more than mere
disadvantage. It should be noted that in controlling the
introduction of evidence on the issue of escape, the trial

aaa

332 ee

justice excluded any and all reference to the reason for
defendant’s confinement, limiting the testimony of the
Superior Court clerk only to those facts which were essential
to show that he had been lawfully committed and was in
such status on the dates relevant to the charges contained in
the indictments. Thus, the trial justice exercised every effort
to limit prejudice, even while permitting essential proofs.

In this case it is highly doubtful that defendant was even
disadvantaged, since no evidence was admitted under
joinder which would not have been admitted if the murder
charge had been tried separately. Therefore, the trial justice
did not abuse his discretion in ordering that these indictments
be tried together.

| As a corollary of his argument concerning joinder,
defendant further contends that the phrase “while
committed to confinement” and the reference to §11-23-2, as
amended by P.L. 1973, ch. 280, §1, constituted improper
and unduly prejudicial matter which should have been
stricken from the murder indictment. In support of this
argument, defendant cites Government of Virgin Islands v.
Castillo, 550 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1977), in which interpreting a
statute of the Virgin Islands relating to enhanced punishment
for one who was in possession of an unregistered firearm,
where such defendant had been previously convicted of a
felony, the court held that evidence of the prior offense was
solely for the court and not for the jury and, therefore, was
not relevant to the jury’s consideration.

However much persuasive force this case might have in
respect to prior offenses under the statute then in issue, and
we specifically decline to comment upon that element, it can
have no application in respect to the determination of a clear
factual matter which is, like any other fact, for the jury to
determine. It is true that the issue of the defendant's status of
confinement had a bearing upon penalty. It is also true that
in respect to homicide generally, the severity of the homicide
(whether manslaughter, murder in the second degree, or
murder in the first degree) will in each instance affect the

es 333

severity of the punishment. Under §11-23-1, as amended by
P.L. 1974, ch. 118, §5, in order to find a defendant guilty of
first-degree murder, it will be imperative for the jury to
determine as a question of fact whether the elements
necessary to establish this offense have been proven. We
believe that it is no less a question of fact to determine
whether the defendant was “committed to confinement”
than to determine whether the defendant committed murder
in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, robbery.
Both of these elements would affect the ultimate penalty
imposed but must be determined as a matter of fact before
the penalty can be imposed. This has been recognized in
federal practice where the punishment for a crime is
dependent on the amount of money involved. Under such
circumstances the court may require the jury to determine
the amount. Jalberg v. United States, 375 F.2d 125 (Sth
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899, 88 S. Ct. 225, 19 L. Ed. 2d
221 (1967); see Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Criminal §512 at 366 (1969). In adding the
element “while committed to confinement” to the crime of
murder, the Legislature had created a separate and distinct
offense for which it provided a special and mandatory
penalty. Even though that penalty of execution has been
determined to be constitutionally impermissible, the
intention of the Legislature to create a specific and separate
category of crime is clear. Thus, the trial justice was not in
error in declining to strike this element from the charge.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s appeal is denied
and dismissed, the judgment of conviction is affirmed, and
the papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Nancy Marks
Rahmes, Thomas H. Caruolo, Special Assistant Attorneys
General, for plaintiff.

- William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Chief

Appellate Attorney, John A. MacFayden III, Assistant
Public Defender, for defendant.

334 es

406 A.2d 1246,
Haroip Tiwiineuast et al. vs. Jon J. Moran.

SEPTEMBER 4, 1979.
Paesenr: Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Welspercer, J. This is a petition for habeas corpus
wherein the petitioners, Harold Tillinghast and Gerald
Tillinghast (defendants), sought an order admitting them to
bail in accordance with the provisions of G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §12-13-7, as amended by P.L. 1974, ch. 118,
§12. The petition was denied by order of this court dated July
17, 1979. This opinion sets forth the reasons for that order.

The defendants were jointly indicted by a grand jury in
Kent County on charges of murder and receiving stolen

es 335

goods. They were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charges on December 11, 1978. A motion for a change of
venue to Providence County was granted on that same date.

On December 14, 1978, defendants were afforded a bail
hearing in accordance with the principles enunciated in
Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 R.1. 596, 253 A.2d 609 (1969),
and were committed without bail. On December 22, 1978,
motions for speedy trial were filed. These motions were
renewed on May 23, 1979. Counsel for defendants contend,
without contradiction, that the 6-month statutory period
within which defendants were entitled to be either tried or
admitted to bail expired on June 11, 1979.

The indictment was assigned for trial to May 21, 1979. On
May 17, attorney John Cicilline, counsel for Gerald Tilling-
hast, was engaged in trial in the state of Louisiana. Mr.
Cicilline, however, asked for an opportunity to be heard on
the status of the case on May 18, because he believed that a
continuance might be required due to the unavailability of
certain evidence which had been deposited for analysis with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Washington,
D.C. A Superior Court justice heard the parties on this issue.
At this hearing, attorney William A. Poore, counsel for
Harold Tillinghast, suggested to the court that another
justice of the Superior Court had granted a motion of
defendant to examine the evidence which had been placed
with the FBI but that this examination had not taken place
and could not occur prior to the date set for trial. Initially the
trial justice was extremely reluctant to grant the
continuance, but after counsel for the state represented that
96 items of evidence were in the custody of the FBI and would
not be available on May 21, the justice continued the case to
a date 14 days subsequent to the date upon which this
evidence became available.

The parties represented at oral argument, and a review of
the record revealed that the evidence actually became avail-
able on May 24, 1979, so that under the terms of the continu-
ance order, a new trial date was set for June 7, 1979. On that

336 ee

date a different trial justice had been assigned to try the case.
Counsel for one defendant was engaged in another trial and
was not available to go to trial in the instant case. As a
consequence, the trial justice ordered that counsel should
confer with the court on June 8, 1979, concerning the trial
schedule. The discussion which took place on June 8 among
the trial justice and attorneys for defendants is unrecorded.
The state’s attorney, who had been present at the conference,
suggested for the record at oral argument that everyone at
the conference agreed that the voir dire examination of jurors
should begin on June 18, rather than June 11, 1979, because
a new group of jurors would be available on the later date.
Empanelling on June 18 would guarantee a diminution of
holdover requirements for jurors during what was expected
to be a lengthy empanelling and trial period.! Mr. Cicilline,
attorney for one defendant, suggested at oral argument that
he raised no objection to beginning the voir dire examination
on June 18, but contended during argument that this should
not affect the speedy trial motions which had been previously
filed.

Meanwhile, defense counsel had filed a motion to dismiss
the indictment on June 7, 1979, together with a motion to set
bail. It should also be noted that on June 8, 1979, defendants
filed a supplemental response to the state’s request for
discovery. On June 13, 1979, the trial justice heard
defendants’ motions to dismiss and to set bail. On June 14,
the trial justice denied defendants’ motions and announced
that the voir dire examination of jurors would commence on
June 18, 1979, The parties agree that the trial began on said
date. The defendants argue that since the trial did not begin
on or prior to June 11, 1979, they were entitled to bail under
the provisions of §12-13-7 which reads as follows:

"The record discloses that empanelling of the jury began on June 18, 1979, and
proceeded steadily until it was concluded on July 9, 1979. The jury was sworn on
July 10, 1979.

es 337

“Every person who shall be indicted for or charged by
information with treason against the state, murder,
robbery, rape, arson or burglary and shall be
imprisoned under the indictment or information, shall
be tried or bailed within six (6) months next after the
time at which he shall plead to such indictment or
information, if he demand a trial, unless it shall appear
to the court that some material witness in behalf of the
state has been enticed away or is prevented from
attending court by some unavoidable accident.”

This court has considered the statutory right to bail where
a defendant has not been tried within 6 months in Marzilli v.
Howard, 108 R.I. 309, 274 A.2d 902 (1971); Ramsdell v.
Langlois, 100 R.I. 468, 217 A.2d 83 (1966); In Re Deslovers,
35 B.I. 248, 86 A. 657 (1913), and most recently in Cochrane
v. Laurie, 118 R.I. 903, 371 A.2d 605 (1977). The holdings of
all of the foregoing cases were aptly summed up in the order
issued in Cochrane v. Laurie, supra.

“Over a half century ago in In Re Deslovers, 35 R.I.
248, 86 A. 657 (1913), this court made it clear that
§12-13-7's mandate for trial or bail becomes operative
only if the accused has demanded a trial. See also State
v. Palmigiano, 111 R.I. 739, 306 A.2d 830 (1973). At
other times we have said that even where the demand
has been made, there may be circumstances where the
statutory right to be bailed could be lost where one like
Cochrane, imprisoned under a murder indictment for
more than 6 months after his plea, does not receive the
trial he requests.” 118 R.I. at 905, 371 A.2d at 606-07.

The court went on to point out that the petitioner in that
case, although he had claimed a speedy trial, was largely
responsible for the delay in his trial because he desired to wait
for the availability of counsel of his choice. Additional delay
was brought about by the petitioner’s pretrial motions

In the case at bar, it appears that the state was ready to
proceed with trial on June 7, but counsel for one defendant
was unavailable on that date. On June 8 the trial justice held

338 ee)

a conference to determine the future course of the case. He
had been assigned to try the matter and was prepared to go
forward with all necessary proceedings until the trial had
been completed. It is apparent that for strategic reasons the
state and counsel for defendants agreed to begin with a new
panel on June 18. It is generally believed among trial lawyers
that a lengthy trial is best begun with a fresh jury panel as
opposed to one whose members’ service is either completed or
who are already holding over beyond their 2 weeks of service.

Counsel for defendants do not deny this agreement, but
rather take the incongruous position that it should not affect
the motions for speedy trial and the running of the 6-month
period. We are of the opinion that counsel cannot agree on
the one hand to the commencement of a trial on a given date
and at the same time complain that the trial has not been
held at an earlier date. Just as a demand for a speedy trial
must be filed in order to trigger the running of the 6-month
period, so also the conduct of defendants must be consistent
with such a demand. In this case defendants’ conduct in
filing a pretrial motion to dismiss and to set bail on June 7,
for practical purposes, guaranteed that the court would be
required to hear these matters on and after June 11. This
conduct was quite inconsistent with a demand that a trial
occur on or before that date.

From the record as presented to us, it clearly appears that
the trial date of June 18 was selected by the parties without
objection having been asserted by either of the defendants.*
It was for this reason that the trial justice devoted a portion of
the intervening time to a disposition of the pretrial motions.
Had he been alerted to the position presently advocated by
the defendants, he could readily have begun the voir dire
examination on or before June 11, prior to the expiration of
the statutory period. We do not believe that under all of the
circumstances the defendants have established entitlement to
bail.

2At the hearing on June 13, 1979, on the defendants’ motion to dismiss and
motions for bail, counsel for Harold Tillinghast asserted that he had been ready to
go to trial on June 7, 1979. We believe this fact is irrelevant in light of the
agreement of this party as well as that of other parties in the selection of June 18 as
the date for commencement of trial.

339

For the reasons stated, we denied the petition for habeas
corpus in an order entered by this court on July 17, 1979.

Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.

John F. Cicilline, Joseph A. Bevilacqua, Jr., William A.
Poore, for petitioners.

Dennis J. Roberts, Attorney General, Stephen R.

Famiglietti, Thomas H. Caruolo, Assistant Attorneys
General, for respondent.

405 A.2d 1211.
Strate or Ruope Is.anp vs. Ina HOLLAND.
SEPTEMBER 5, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Bevitacgua, C.J. The defendant, Ira Holland, was

- convicted of the crime of rape by a jury in the Providence

County Superior Court pursuant to the provisions of G.L.

1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-37-1. From this judgment of
conviction, the defendant appeals.

At the trial, the following testimony was elicited. The
complaining witness, Annie Gonsalves, testified that at

es 34

approximately 6:30 p.m. on December 31, 1975 she was
walking home after parking her car. According to Mrs.
Gonsalves, a black male grabbed her from behind on
Carrington Avenue and dragged her up the stairs of the
Martin Luther King School where he sexually assaulted her.
During the assault, which lasted approximately one-half
hour, Mrs. Gonsalves’ clothing was torn and her eye-glasses,
which fell to the ground, were broken. After the assailant
released her, she ran to Camp Street, hailed a passing car,
and asked to be taken to the Miriam Hosptial.

While riding along Camp Street, Mrs. Gonsalves gave the
driver, Warren Dreher, a description of her assailant by
detailing the clothing he was wearing and generally
describing his physical characteristics. As they passed a
pedestrian on the corner of Camp and Cypress Streets,
Dreher slowed his vehicle, noticing that the individual fit the
description of the young man described by Mrs. Gonsalves.
He then asked her if that individual was the person who had
attacked her, and Mrs. Gonsalves responded that he was the
same man. Both Dreher and Mrs. Gonsalves watched the
man until he turned into the courtyard of an apartment
building in the area,

Two days following the attack, Mrs. Gonsalves went to the
Providence Police Station to view a lineup consisting of four
individuals, At that time, Mrs. Gonsalves identified Vincent
Pope as the man who had assaulted her. Dreher was also
asked to view the lineup. Although he stated that one
individual in the lineup looked similar to the man he saw on
Camp Street the night Mrs. Gonsalves was attacked, he did
not identify anyone specifically at the lineup.

After the lineup, Mrs. Gonsalves left the police station
with her son and went to a bank at the University Plaza.
While standing in line, Mrs. Gonsalves testified that she
recognized defendant, whom she saw in the bank, as the man
who had attacked her; she based her identification upon his
facial characteristics, physical build, and the fact that he was
wearing the same clothing he wore the night of the incident.

342 |

Mrs. Gonsalves further testified that she asked defendant his
name, where he lived, and his activities the night of
December 31, 1975. Following a short dialogue between the
two, Mrs. Gonsalves stated that she left the bank to tell her
son that her assailant was in the building. According to Mrs.
Gonsalves, defendant then came out of the bank and ran
down the street. Mrs. Gonsalves testified that defendant was
chased down the street by a number of individuals and he
was finally apprehended by members of the Providence
Police Department. When she arrived at the scene of the
arrest, defendant was handcuffed and lying on the ground.
Mrs. Gonsalves testified that she call defendant a “dirty rat”
at this time and that he responded, “I should have killed you
* * x,” (When he testified later, defendant denied making
this comment, but it was corroborated by prosecution
witness Edward St. Lawrence, a Providence police officer
who participated in defendant's arrest.)

At the police station defendant was placed in a lineup with
three other individuals who all wore clothing similar to that
of defendant. Dreher viewed the lineup and identified
defendant as the man he had seen on Camp Street and as the
man identified by Mrs. Gonsalves as her assailant.

The defendant testified at trial that there was a confron-
tation at the bank between himself and Mrs. Gonsalves. He
stated, however, that he did not run away from the bank
following his dialogue with her. Instead, defendant testified
that he left the bank and walked toward his home on
Grandview Street before he was arrested.

The defendant also presented several alibi witnesses who
testified that he was at a party at the home of a friend at the
approximate time Mrs. Gonsalves was attacked. Further
testimony was introduced by these witnesses to establish that
defendant did not leave the party until 9 or 10 p.m.

The defendant also presented the testimony of Mrs.
Gonsalves’ optometrist, Barnum Moss, who stated that
without glasses Mrs. Gonsalves vision was 20/200. He testi-
fied that Mrs. Gonsalves’ vision was only 10 percent of
normal without her glasses.

ee) 4g

During the trial, defense counsel learned for the first time
of the second lineup at which Dreher identified defendant.
Once defense counsel became aware of the preindictment
lineup, he immediately made a motion to suppress the lineup
identification and moved for a voir dire hearing to determine
whether the lineup was illegal and would thus taint the in-
court identification. The trial justice denied the motion to
suppress the lineup identification.

Following the close of testimony, the trial justice
instructed the jurors on the law of the case and made a
summary of some of the evidence. During this instruction,
the trial justice reviewed the testimony of Mrs. Gonsalves
concerning the location and condition of her eyeglasses
following her assault.

The defendant raises two issues on appeal concerning the
trial justice’s denial of the motion to suppress the lineup
identification and the requested voir dire hearing, and the
trial justice’s improper summary of Mrs. Gonsalves’ testi-
mony elicited at trial.

I

The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in his
denial of the request for a suppression hearing, outside the
presence of the jury, to inquire whether there may have been
any improprieties in the pretrial lineup-identification pro-
cedure. The defendant further argues that the trial justice
erred in his ruling that defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence was untimely and that the motion should have been
made before the trial had begun, pursuant to this court’s
holding in State v. Maloney, 111 R.I. 133, 300 A.2d 259
(1973) and Super R. Crim. P. 41(f).

1Super. R. Crim. P. 41(f) provides, in pertinent part, that a motion to suppress
evidence

“shall be made before trial in the Superior Courts + «.”

344 P|

The state argues that defendant was not entitled to a voir
dire hearing on this issue because defendant did not file a pre-
trial motion to suppress the lineup identification. The state
argues in the alternative that if the trial justice did err in
failing to conduct a voir dire hearing, the error was harmless
and therefore does not require reversal of the conviction.

A pretrial identification confrontation may be “so unne-
cessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification” that it denies an accused due process of law.
Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1972,
18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 1206 (1967). Pretrial confrontations must
be scrutinized for their fairness. United States v. Wade, 388
US. 218, 227, 87S. Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157
(1967).

Pretrial identification procedures may so taint in-court
identification testimony as to render such testimony inad-
missible on due-process grounds. Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 383, 88 S. Ct. 967, 970, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247,
1252 (1968); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272, 87 S.
Ct. 1951, 1956, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178, 1186 (1967). For such
identification procedure to amount to a due-process denial
depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding
it. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 385-86, 88S. Ct. at
972, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 1254; State v. Thornley, 113 R.I. 189,
192, 319 A.2d 94, 96 (1974); State v. Ouimette, 110 R.I. 747,
768, 298 A.2d 124, 137 (1972).

In the instant case we are not considering whether the
identification procedures were so tainted as to amount to a
denial of due process. The initial question presented here is
simply whether the trial justice should have conducted an
evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury when
defendant raised a question about the propriety of the
pretrial lineup identification.

Previous rulings have established that where a timely and
sufficient motion is made to suppress identification testimony
on the ground that the testimony has been tainted by pretrial
photographic identification procedures, the motion must be

es 45

heard and determined by the court outside the jury's
presence in the same manner as any other motion to suppress
evidence alleged to be inadmissible, because unlawfully
obtained. United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407, 410 (9th
Cir. (1969). In State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 404 A.2d 465
(1979), we adopted the rule that a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jurors if he
has made an initial showing of possible taint in a pretrial
lineup-identification procedure. As a result of our holding in
Porraro, we conclude in the instant case that defendant was
entitled to a voir dire hearing on the motion to suppress the
lineup identification.

The next issue before us is whether defendant waived his
right to a hearing because he made his motion to suppress
during the trial. In order to be timely, the motion, like all
motions to suppress, should normally be made prior to trial
since “to interrupt the course of the trial for such auxiliary
inquiries impedes the momentum of the main proceeding
and breaks the continuity of the jury’s attention.” Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342, 60 S. Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.
Ed. 307, 312 (1939).

The record is clear in the instant case, however, that
defense counsel was not aware of the existence of the alleged
tainted lineup (at which Dreher identified defendant) until
he read a transcript of defendant’s bail hearing after the
commencement of the trial. Evidence was also introduced at
trial that indicated that the lineup was conducted through
the use of a one-way mirror. Thus defendant himself might
not have been aware of the fact that he was participating in a
lineup at the time.

It is well settled that if a defendant can show that he was
reasonably unaware that there was a tainted pretrial lineup
identification, a motion to suppress the identification at trial
should be entertained. United States v. Cranson, 453 F. 2d
123, 126 (4th Cir. 1971). The trial justice erred therefore
when he failed to give defendant the opportunity during the
trial to attack the admission of the in-court identification
through the production of complete evidence about the
circumstances under which the pretrial lineup was
conducted.

46 es

Because no hearing was held by the trial court and no
findings were made regarding the fairness of the out-of-court
identification, we have an unsatisfactory record upon which
to review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
identifications made by Dreher.

Following the procedure we adopted in Porraro, we shall
remand the case to the Superior Court so that an evidentiary
hearing can be conducted. If the trial justice finds that the
pretrial identification did not violate due-process fairness
standards, or that the in-court identification had an indepen-
dent source, the judgment will be affirmed in conformity
with our resolution of defendant’s second ground of appeal.
If the trial justice finds otherwise, defendant will be given a
new trial.

In reaching this result, we are unwilling to conclude, as
the state urges, on the record before us that the trial court’s
refusal to permit defendant to explore the circumstances
surrounding the lineup identification by Dreher was
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828, 17 L. Ed. 2d
705, 710-11 (1967). We are of the opinion that it is of para-
mount importance that an accused fully benefit from his
constitutional due-process right as enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Wade, Gilbert and Stovall, all
supra.

I
The defendant next argues that the trial justice committed
reversible error when he commented on the evidence with
respect to whether or not Mrs. Gonsalves was wearing her
eyeglasses after she was assaulted. The defendant contends
that the trial justice erred and invaded the province of the
jurors when he improperly summarized the evidence and
said:
“T don’t believe either lawyer ever said anything to Mrs.
Gonsalves as to what she did with her glasses after she
found them. Whether she put them on her face and
wore them to the hospital, or whether she carried them
in her hand.”

es a7

The defendant asserts that Mrs. Gonsalves’ undisputed testi-
mony stated that she was not wearing eyeglasses at the time,
when, while being driven to the hospital by Dreher, she
identified the man on the street as her assailant.

Judicial comment on the evidence existed at common law,
but while the federal courts have retained this power, in the
overwhelming majority of states this function of the trial
judge was taken from him by constitutional provision, statute
or judicial decision. 9 Wigmore, Evidence §2551 (3d ed.
1940}. In this state the right to summarize the evidence is
controlled by statute. Section 8-2-38.2

|| This court has held, “both in civil and criminal cases, that
where a trial justice chooses to comment upon evidence he
must use caution to be completely impartial during the
course of such comment.” State v. Harris, 89 R.I. 202, 209,
152 A.2d 106, 110 (1959). We held in that case that the
improper summarization of the evidence by the trial justice
invaded the province of the jurors. Id.

In deciding whether a trial justice invades the province of
the jurors, we have said that the language used must be
judged as “ordinarily intelligent lay persons sitting in a jury
box would have understood it, as they listened to it within
the context of the whole charge at the close of the trial.” State
v. Goff, 107 R.I. 331, 339-40, 267 A.2d 686, 690 (1970) citing
State v. Hull, 106 R.I. 285, 288, 258 A.2d 791, 793 (1969). If
the court in instructing the jurors, comments on the
evidence, he must clearly and unequivocally advise them that
they are the sole judges of the facts and that they are the only
ones who determine the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, the trial justice
may also inform the jurors that they are not bound by the
comments of the court.

*G.L, 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §8-2-38 reads:

“In every case, civil and criminal, tried in the superior court with a jury, the
justice presiding shall instruct the jury in the law relating to the same, and
may sum up the evidence therein to the jury whenever he may deem it
advisable so to do; but any material misstatement of the testimony by him
may be excepted to by the party aggrieved.”

348 |

After examining the trial justice’s erroneous comments
concerning Mrs. Gonsalves’ eyeglasses in the context of the
entire charge, we are of the opinion that his error does not
require reversal of the conviction. Immediately preceding his
remarks concerning Mrs. Gonsalves’ eyeglasses, the trial
justice said:

“Now, a judge has to be extremely cautious in
commenting on any evidence, and as I indicated earlier
I don’t want you people to think that I am interfering in
any way with your conclusion. My recollection of the
testimony, which is unimportant if it conflicts with
yours * * *,”

The trial justice had earlier cautioned the jurors that:

“Nothing that I say by word or inflection, or gesture, is
intended to influence your verdict in any respect
whatsoever.”

When the trial justice gave his instructions, he told the jurors
in perfectly clear langauage that they were to make deter-
minations about the facts of the case and that their determi-
nations were to be made on the evidence as they recalled it.
Thus, we believe that on the record before us the trial
justice’s comment, although erroneous, was cured by his
cautionary language to the jurors and does not require a
reversal of the judgment of conviction.

The case is remanded to the Superior Court for an
evidentiary hearing in accordance with part I of this opinion.

Dennis J. Roberts I, Attorney General, Alan R. Tate,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Chief

Appellate Attorney, John A. MacFayden III, Assistant
Public Defender, for defendant.

349

406 A.2d 263.

Franx A. Carrer, Jr., Carer Disciptinary COUNSEL
vs. STEPHEN R. WALSH, Esquire.

SEPTEMBER 14, 1979.

Present: Bevizacgua, C.J., Josuin, Ket.ener, AnD Dons, JJ.

KeLiever, J. The respondent, Stephen R. Walsh, was
admitted to the bar of Rhode Island on October 10, 1952. He
is before us on an order to show cause why we should not
accept the recommendation of this court’s Disciplinary Board
(the board) calling for the respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law. The recommendation follows a hearing by
one of the board’s hearing panels and the board’s acceptance
of the panel’s report.

350 |

The board found that respondent had violated various
portions of Rule 47 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
in that he engaged in deceitful conduct;! neglected a matter
entrusted to his care; undertook a matter in which he lacked
the necessary competence;* and intentionally prejudiced the
client’s cause.*

The facts giving rise to this proceeding are undisputed. On
September 10, 1973, 20-year-old Dawn R. Ring died from
injuries sustained 2 days earlier when she was struck by a
motor vehicle while she was crossing Ocean Road in the town
of Narragansett. The operator of the motor vehicle was a
New Jersey resident, Lawrence Ewert. The vehicle was
covered by a liability insurance policy issued by a Texas
insurer, United Services Auto Association. The insurer had
been in contact with the deceased’s parents and had been
discussing with them a possible settlement.

Correspondence from an adjuster indicates that on March
29, 1975, the parents told the adjuster that they were unsure
whether they would accept the insurer’s offer. Two days
later, on March 31, 1975, the adjuster received a telephone
call from respondent indicating that he was now representing
the parents. An August 27, 1975, memo prepared by the
adjuster indicated that respondent had reduced his original
$75,000 demand to $70,000 and told the adjuster that “writs”
would be issued within the week if the insurer did not
increase its original offer.

XDR 1-102(A)(4).
2DR 6-101(A) (3).
8DR 6-101(A)(1).

“DR 7-101(A)(@).

ee 351

The deceased’s father told the hearing panel that sometime
during May or June 1976 respondent had told him that the
claim was going to be settled and that the daughter’s estate
should be probated before the settlement was effectuated so
that the proceeds would not be tied up in the deceased’s
estate. A petition for administration dated June 28, 1976,
was filed in the East Providence Probate Court, and within a
month the father was appointed administrator.

Later in 1976 the father met a parent of another girl who,
along with Dawn, was killed in the September 10, 1973
mishap. At that time the father was told by the other parent
that the statute of limitations had expired. The father then
spoke with the adjuster and was told that he was “out of
luck.” When the father confronted respondent and informed
him about his “out of luck” status, respondent told his client
that there was nothing to worry about because “we still had a
case going in the [c]ourt.” '

On September 27, 1976, respondent wrote to the father
and told him: “[P]lease be advised that legal action has been
instituted against the party involved in the auto accident
involving your daughter.” The letter went on to tell the
father that respondent was intending to institute a direct suit
against the insurer. At that point in time, the parents were
looking for other counsel and thinking in terms of a
malpractice suit.

The deceit charge was based upon the two September 1976
incidents—the confrontation where the father was told not to
worry, and the subsequent letter advising him the suit was
pending. Everyone concedes that when these assurances were
given, the statute had long since expired. When respondent
testified, he stated that in late August 1975 he had drawn up
a death-action complaint. He went on to explain that he was
then of the opinion that once he had filled out the complaint,
even though it never left his briefcase, the statute had been
tolled. The respondent acknowledged that this view was
erroneous but insisted that he did not discover the error until
sometime after September 1976. Thus, he asked the board to
believe that his misrepresentations were innocent rather than
fraudulent.

352 ee

It is obvious that the board rejected this defense on
credibility grounds. The board’s report describes this facet of
respondent’s testimony as incredible, pointing out that
earlier in his testimony respondent had tried to impress the
panel by telling of his long experience as a professor of law at
a local college, where he teaches law-related subjects to
students pursuing a course in Business Administration. Of
course, factfinding is the board’s prerogative, and we affirm
the board’s rejection of respondent’s innocent-misrepresenta-
tion defense.

The respondent’s defense of the neglect charges centers
about his hospitalization at a time when the statute of limita-
tions was just about to expire. Medical records indicate that
he was hospitalized for chest pains following a five-set game
of tennis. He was admitted to Rhode Island Hospital on
Sunday, September 7, 1975, just 3 days before the statute was
to lapse. He was discharged almost 2 weeks later on
September 20. He now claims that this sudden and unexpec-
ted period of disability excuses his failure to institute suit.
This defense further brings into question respondent's
credibility.

The respondent would like us and the board to believe that
if it were not for the quick trip to the hospital, he would have
commenced suit on the following Monday, Tuesday, or
Wednesday. This contention is completely at odds with what
respondent testified before the hearing panel. As noted
before, respondent had insisted that when he had filled out
the complaint, he had believed that he had tolled the statute.
When he was asked about the initiation of probate
proceedings in June 1976, respondent conceded that he did aot
know that at that time the statute of limitations had expired
about 8 months earlier. In fact, he said he was not aware that
his filling-out-the-complaint theory did not hold water until
he had discussed this matter with his present counsel some-
time in the late fall of 1976. When one of the panel members
asked respondent if he was worried about the statute’s
expiring, he replied: “No. I wasn’t thinking about that, Mr.
Ricci, no, I really wasn’t.”

es 359

Taking respondent’s words for what they say, it is obvious
to us that his September chest pains offer no excuse for his
failure to do what he should have done. We reject what
might be called respondent’s “sudden emergency” defense
and affirm the finding of neglect. Parenthetically, we would
add that further evidence of this neglectful attitude can be
found from respondent’s admission that process was never
issued because he was “unsure exactly how to approach this
particular matter as far as suing an out-of-state resident.”

The competency charge arose while the hearing was in
progress. When respondent conceded that he had never
handled a death action, an Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
moved that the pleadings be amended to include a charge
that respondent had agreed to represent a client in an area of
the law when he knew or should have known that he was not
competent to practice without first associating with a lawyer
who had the necessary competence. In making this motion,
counsel was relying upon the provisions of DR 6-101(A)(1).
However, the ethical considerations which precede DR 6-101
make it clear that an attorney may accept such employment
if in good faith he expects to become qualified through study
and investigation as long as such preparation would not
result in unreasonable delay or expense to his client.

Here, respondent’s difficulties do not arise from any
ignorance of the intricacies of the wrongful death act. His
present difficulties come about not because of a lack of
expertise in trying a wrongful-death action or in effectuating
a settlement of a wrongful-death claim. Rather, for reasons
perhaps best known to himself, he has ignored the simple and
direct language of the wrongful death act which states:
“[E]very such action shall be commenced within two (2)
years after the death of such person.” General Laws 1956
(1969 Reenactment) §10-7-2. Had the action been timely
commenced, for all we know respondent might have gone on
from there and, by diligence and dedication, acquired the
necessary knowledge so that he could have well served his
client’s cause. Consequently, we hold that the violation of
DR 6-101(A)(1) was not proved.

354 ee

The intentional-prejudice finding lacks evidentiary
support. Clear and convincing evidence is the standard by
which the respondent’s conduct is to be measured. Carter v.
Folcarelli, No. 79-40-M.P. (R.I., filed June 20, 1979). The
only evidence which would support the finding of intentional
prejudice is the September 1976 misstatements about the
pendency of the suit. This is the evidence which suggests a
willful course of conduct on the respondent’s part. However,
the fabrications came about a year after the statute had
expired, and by then the damage to the Rings had already
been done. The board’s finding of prejudice is vacated.

The only matter to be resolved is the question of sanction.
An attorney who is inattentive to his client’s interests and
whose candor leaves much to be desired should be
disciplined. The board has recommended suspension. While
the board’s recommendation is entitled to great weight, the
ultimate responsibility in this area is with this court.

The touchstone of a court’s power to discipline attorneys is
to fashion a sanction which fulfills the court’s obligation to
the public and profession, edifies the bar, and is fair and just
to the respondent. In re Vasser, 75 N.J. 357, 364, 382 A.2d
1114, 1117 (1978). The severity of the sanction to be imposed
is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case,
and the court may, of course, consider factors in mitigation,
such as the attorney’s prior professional conduct.

In seeking to select a suitable sanction, we would note that
in the early 1960’s the respondent served the city of East
Providence in various responsible legal positions at a time
when that municipality was designated and nationally
recognized as an “All-American City.” However, 2 years ago
in Ring v. Walsh, 119 R.I. 921, 378 A.2d 1071:(1977, we
became aware that the respondent had failed to file a timely
response to the Ring malpractice action and was defaulted.
Conversations with the respondent at the disciplinary
hearing indicate that he has given priority to his pedagogical
efforts. It is obvious that he can no longer serve his pro-
fessional responsibilities in both the law and education with

ee 358
equal vigor. Consequently, it is hereby ordered that the
respondent be and is publicly censured for the neglect and
deceit demonstrated in this case, and he is also directed to
submit his resignation forthwith from the practice of law in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 42-23° adopted by this
court on September 4, 1979. The respondent is further
directed to furnish to the clerk of this court on or before
October 1, 1979, the names and addresses of all clients
presently represented by him.

Mr. Justice Joslin participated in the decision but retired
prior to its publication. Mr. Justice Weisberger did not
participate.

Alan S. Flink, for petitioner.

Charles H. McLaughlin, for respondent.

APPENDIX
Rule 42-23

Any individual who desires to resign from membership in
the Bar of this state shall file a motion requesting the same
with the Clerk of the Court. If the Clerk reports that the
movant is a member in good standing and that there are no
complaints pending, the motion will be granted as a matter
of course.

Anyone whose resignation is accepted shall remain subject
to the Supreme Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction in
proceedings for any misconduct committed while a member
of the Bar.

All resignees shall, for a period of 5 years following the
acceptance of their resignation, file the statements of
registration presently required by Rule 45 of attorneys who
have discontinued the practice of law in this jurisdiction.

5See Appendix.

356

If a resigned member desires reinstatement, he or she shall
proceed as provided for in Rule 42-16.

Entered as an order of this court this 4th day of September
1979.

Bevilacqua, C.J.
Kelleher, J.
Doris, J.
Weisberger, J.
De
406 A.2d 266.

In RE Roser.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1979.
Present: Joslin, Kelleher, and Doris, JJ.

| 357
Le

Kewiener, J. This is a habeas corpus proceeding, in
which the petition is brought in behalf of a 17-year-old
named Robert whose extradition is sought by the state of
New Hampshire. .

On September 28, 1978, Robert was arrested by the Provi-
dence police on a fugitive-from-justice warrant that charged
Robert with committing an armed robbery in Laconia, New
Hampshire, 3 weeks earlier. Following his arrest, Robert was
brought before a justice of the Family Court and in due
course was released in the custody of his mother. Subse-
quently, on January 4, 1979, J. Joseph Garrahy, Jr., Gover-
nor of Rhode Island, acting pursuant to the pertinent provi-
sions of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) ch. 9 of title 12, the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, issued a rendition
warrant directing the Rhode Island authorities to apprehend
Robert and deliver him to an authorized agent in New
Hampshire. Thereafter, this petition was filed with us. The
petition as originally filed presented several contentions,
including the assertion that there is no constitutional or statu-
tory basis for the extradition of a juvenile. We stayed any exe-
cution of the rendition warrant and directed the state to
show cause why the petition should not be granted.

Meanwhile, on January 11, 1979, an act entitled “An Act
Relating To Extradition Of Children Under The Age Of
Eighteen” was introduced into the Rhode Island Senate, and
the Senate Clerk numbered it “79-S-121.” The Act made its
way through the legislative process and became law without
the Governor’s signature on May 9, 1979. Senate Bill
“79-S-121” is now known and cited as P.L. 1979, ch. 366.

Once ch. 366 became the law, Robert’s petition was
amended. The amended petition and the state’s show-cause
response were considered by us as we specially convened to
hear oral argument on July 27, 1979. At that time, Robert’s
present counsel argued that ch. 366 nullified the Governor’s
warrant. The state took the position that the 1979 legislation

358 ee

was unconstitutional. Following the conclusion of the hear-
ing, we immediately issued a written order denying the peti-
tion and vacating the stay. This opinion details the reasons
for the denial.

Chapter 366! makes Rhode Island’s version of the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act just a bit less uniform because it
adds to the Uniform Act a new section which, in essence,
provides that a person under the age of 18 shall not be extra-
dited for trial in another state as an adult unless and until a
Family Court justice shall have first determined that the
juvenile would have been treated as an adult if the out-of-
state offense had been committed in Rhode Island. In making
such a determination, the Legislature has directed the justice
to employ the provisions of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§§14-1-7, -.1. Section 14-1-7 gives a Family Court justice the
discretion to waive jurisdiction, after a “full investigation,”
over any juvenile 16 years of age or older where the juvenile
misconduct would be an indictable offense if performed by
an adult. Section 14-1-7.1 provides that any juvenile who,
after reaching his or her sixteenth birthday, commits what
would have been two indictable adult offenses shall
thereafter be prosecuted as an adult in the Superior Court for
all subsequent criminal misconduct.*

This court on other occasions has pointed out that extradi-
tion is not a matter of comity or compact between the states
but is mandated by art. IV, sec. 2, clause 2, of the United
States Constitution.’ Bailey v. Laurie, 118 R.1. 184, 188, 373
A.2d 482, 484 (1977); Brown v. Sharkey, 106 R.I. 714,
716-17, 263 A.2d 104, 106 (1970). Congress has implemented

1See Appendix.

Recently we pointed out that G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §14-1-7.1 is an
exclusion, rather than a waiver, of Family Court jurisdiction and upheld the consti-
tutionality of this exclusion. State v. Berard, 121 R.1. 551, 560, 401 A.2d 448,
453 (1979).

*Article IV, sec. 2, clause 2, of the United States Constitution states: “A person
charged in any state with treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice
and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the
state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having
jurisdiction of the crime.”

| 359

this constitutional command by requiring a chief executive of
a state to which a fugitive from justice may have fled to have
the fugitive arrested and detained upon the valid request of
the chief executive of another state. 18 U.S.C.A. §3182
(1969). The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is ancillary to
and in aid of the constitutional requirements of art. IV of the
United States Constitution.

Recently, in stressing the expeditious and summary aspects
of interstate extradition, Chief Justice Burger made it clear
that, once the Governor has issued his rendition warrant, the
judiciary can do no more than decide the following four
issues: (1) whether the extradition documents on their face
are in order; (2) whether the petitioner has been charged
with a crime in the demanding state; (3) whether the peti-
tioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and
(4) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. Michigan v. Doran,
439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S. Ct. 530, 535, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521,
527 (1978).

It is clear from a reading of Doran that Robert’s juvenile
status in Rhode Island is totally irrelevant. Chapter 366’s
prohibition against extradition of juveniles flies in the face of
art. IV’s command and the supremacy clause of art. VI and
is, therefore, unconstitutional. See Batton v. Griffin, 241 Ga.
548, 246 S.E.2d 667 (1978); Snyder v. State, 95 Idaho 643,
516 P.2d 700 (1973); People v. Pardo, 47 Ill. 2d 420, 265
N.E.2d 656 (1970); Ex parte Jetter, 495 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.
Cr. App. 1973); Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 700 (1976).

The petition for habeas corpus is denied.‘

This petition was considered on the assumption that when Robert was returned
to New Hampshire, he would be tried as an adult. However, the New Hampshire
Legislature had made provision for the juvenile fugitive. As of August 22, 1979, the
New Hampshire Superior Court is authorized to determine, after a hearing,
whether an extradited person under the age of 18 shall be treated as a juvenile or as
an adult. The extraditée may be placed on bail while the Superior Court makes its
determination and can remain on bail pending a final disposition of the matter. See
N,J. Rev. Stat. Ann, §169-B:25, Chapter 169-B represents an overhaul of New
Hampshire’s delinquency and neglect laws. Earlier, N.H. Rey. Stat. Ann.
§169:21-a afforded the same benefits, except the statute applied only to persons
who were under the age of 17.

360 ee

Mr. Justice Joslin participated in the decision but retired
prior to its publication. Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua and Mr.
Justice Weisberger did not participate.

APPENDIX
Public Laws 1979, ch. 366, in its entirety, reads as follows:

“SECTION 1. Chapter 12-9 of the general laws entitled
‘Extradition’ is hereby amended by adding thereto the
following section:

“12-9-12.1. Extradition ‘of juveniles.—When the extradi-
tion of a child under the age of eighteen (18) years of age is
demanded by another state, said child shall be summoned to
appear or ordered to appear before the family court pursuant
to the provisions of chapter 14-1.

“The provisions of section 12-9-12 shall apply to the
hearing conducted by the family court. In addition when the
other state seeks the extradition of said child for trial as an
adult, the family court shall determine whether or not said
child would have been tried as an adult in this state if
charged with the offense alleged to have been committed in
the other state. The family court shall apply the provisions of
sections 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 in making said determination.

“No person under the age of eighteen (18) shall be
extradited for trial in another state as an adult unless a justice
of the family court determines that said person would have
been tried as an adult in the state of Rhode Island.

“SEC. 2. This act shall take effect upon passage.”

McKinnon & Fortunato, Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., for
petitioner.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Thomas H.
Caruolo, Special Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

361

406 A.2d 360.
Wut H. Jounson ef al. vs. ALFRED S, PALANGE.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

es 363

Josun, J. This is a civil action that was originally
brought by five individuals who joined as plaintiffs to recover
damages from the defendant, Lieutenant Alfred S. Palange
of the South Kingstown Police Department, for alleged false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution.! The case was tried
before a jury in the Superior Court and resulted in a verdict
for the defendant. After entry of judgment, the plaintiffs
appealed.

In mid-afternoon on July 24, 1975, the five plaintiffs were
congregated on a sidewalk in front of the Parrot North in
South Kingstown where, according to their testimony, they
were “just talking, shooting the breeze” when a South Kings-
town police officer, Dale Barrington, appeared. He had been
ordered to the scene in response to an anonymous telephone
call reporting a disturbance. The plaintiffs testified that
Officer Barrington requested them to leave the sidewalk and
either return to the cafe or go home.

They further testified that they were accused of loitering,
and that they did not receive a satisfactory response to their
inquiry of what was meant by loitering. In any event they
did not comply with the officer’s request that they leave the
sidewalk but instead, according to Officer Barrington and
Officer Michael Brown, the next police officer to arrive on
the scene, gesticulated and shouted vulgar epithets at the
police officers.? Officer Barrington testified that at one point
several of the plaintiffs moved to within a foot of him and
“threatened” him with clenched fists although no blows were
ever struck. According to the officers this strident verbal
confrontation lasted 8 or 9 minutes and ceased only after
additional back-up police officers, including Lieutenant
Palange, appeared on the scene.

Prior to this trial, the complaints of two of the five plaintiffs were dismissed
pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 37 for their failure to appear for depositions.

"The epithets included “fucking asshole,” “fucking pig,” and “[dJumb son a
bitch.”

364 ee

The lieutenant testified that on his arrival there were fif-
teen to eighteen persons standing in a semicircle around
plaintiffs and the officers then present, and that as the
backup officers arrived the crowd began to disperse and
plaintiffs reentered the cafe. The lieutenant was advised by
Officer Barrington of what had occurred and was told that
plaintiffs had surrounded him when he tried to speak to
them; that they had “created a big stir and attracted atten-
tion all over the [Peacedale] Flats.”

The plaintiffs were then arrested on the lieutenant’s
instructions and were taken to the police station where they
were detained until 1 o’clock the following morning. They
were released after signing an agreement to appear in Dis-
trict Court to answer charges that they “did quarrel, fight
and behave in a disorderly manner * « * to the annoyance
and disturbance of a portion of the peaceable inhabitants of
the town” in violation of chapter 21, section 1 of the local
ordinances, and also that they, “obstruct[ed] a uniformed
police officer + « + in the execution of his duty” in violation
of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-32-1, as amended by
P.L. 1971, ch. 220, §1. Following the dismissal by the Dis-
trict Court of the criminal charges against them,* the five
plaintiffs commenced this Superior Court civil action for
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution against Lieu-
tenant Palange alleging that he had ordered their arrests and
detention without probable cause.

To establish their claim it was incumbent upon plaintiffs
to show with respect to (1) the false imprisonment claim that
they were detained without legal justification, Powers v.
Carvalho, 117 R.I. 519, 526, 368 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1977);
Webbier v. Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, Inc.,
105 R.I. 605, 613, 254 A.2d 285, 290 (1969); Barth v. Flad,

®It was stipulated in this trial that the charges against them in the District Court
were dismissed in reliance on State v. Berberian, 93 R.I. 318, 175 A.2d 282 (1961).
In that case the defendant was charged with behaving in a disorderly manner “ ‘in
that + * + he did create a disturbance,’ ” and we held that a verdict should have
been directed for the defendant because there was no evidence that he had created
a disturbance. Id. at 319, 175 A.2d at 282.

SS 365

99 R.I. 446, 448, 208 A.2d 533, 535 (1965); and (2) the mali-
cious prosecution claim that Lieutenant Palange had no
probable cause for instituting a criminal action against them.
Nagy v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925, 929, 392 A.2d 365, 367
(1978) citing Powers v. Carvalho, 117 R.I. at 526, 368 A.2d
at 1246; Lauzon v. Charroux, 18 R.1. 467, 470, 28 A. 975,
976 (1894). These two requisites have been held to be practi-
cally synonymous. See State v. Roach, 106 R.I. 280, 259 A.2d
119, 121 (1969); State v. McWeeney, 100 R.I. 394, 399, 216
A.2d 357, 360 (1966), and the guidelines for determining
whether they existed are found in §12-7-3(a). That enactment,
prior to its amendment in 1973, provided that a police officer
might lawfully arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant
when he:

“ha[d] reasonable ground to believe that a misdemeanor
ha[d] been or [was] being committed in his presence
and that the person to be arrested ha[d] committed or
[was] committing it.”

The plaintiffs argue initially* that the South Kingstown
ordinance is so facially defective and patently unconstitu-
tional that Lieutenant Palange could not reasonably have
relied on it as supplying probable cause either for arresting
them or for issuing criminal complaints against them, and
thus that the trial justice erred in allowing the ordinance to
be admitted into evidence.®

To support this contention plaintiffs rely primarily on the
line of cases headed by Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972), where the

‘The plaintiffs have submitted two briefs. The first was filed in the normal
manner; the second, entitled, “Substitute Issues and Arguments,” was filed but a
few days before oral argument. The defendant moved to strike the second brief
because our rules do not permit such a late filing. The plaintiffs’ response was that
the second brief was merely a reorganization of the arguments found in their
original brief. Having reviewed both the briefs, we conclude that no prejudice will
result to the defendant by our consideration of the plaintiffs’ substitute brief only.

"The plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutional validity of the obstruction
statute, §11-32-1, which they were also charged with violating.

366 Dn

Supreme Court held that the city of Jacksonville’s so-called
disorderly conduct ordinance was so vague as to be invalid.®

The plaintiffs argue that the South Kingstown ordinance
in question is so similar to the Jacksonville ordinance that is is
patently unconstitutional thereby precluding the application
in this case of the rule relied upon by the trial justice in
admitting the ordinance into evidence—the rule that police
officers are entitled to reply on the presumptive validity of
statutes and ordinances.

We applied this principle in Yekhtikian v. Blessing, 90 R.I.
287, 157 A.2d 669 (1960). In that case, the plaintiff who sued
for false imprisonment argued that the police officer who
arrested him for the commission of a statutory felony should
be held liable for damages if the statute were thereafter held
unconstitutonal. We rejected that contention by saying that:

“We think this position is untenable. It does more than
impose an unfair burden on a conscientious police
officer—it does violence to the sound public policy. One
can readily imagine the uneasiness of a people depen-
dent for the protection of their safety, lives and property
on a police department, the members of which are
reluctant to enforce an act of the legislature that has not
as yet been judicially approved.” Id. at 291, 157 A.2d at
671.

°The city of Jacksonville ordinance provided that:

“ Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays,
common drunkards, common night walkers, theives, pilferers or
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all
lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of
ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or
served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their
wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in
the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.” ”
405 U.S. at 156-57 n.1, 92 S. Ct. at 840 n.1, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 112 n. 1.

es 367

In Descoteaux v. Bonaventura, 115 R.I. 555, 350 A.2d 396
(1976), we applied the same principle where the detention
complained of was justified by the defendant as having been
made in a reliance on a statute which, though challenged
constitutionally in that case, had not been invalidated at the
time of the trial.

The plaintiffs recognize the doctrine of presumptive valid-
ity, but assert that it is inapposite here. They contend that
the South Kingstown ordinance is not distinguishable from
the Warwick ordinance which we declared unconstitutional
in State vy. Berker, 114 R.I. 72, 328 A.2d 729 (1974),” prior to
the arrest out of which this action grows and that conse-
quently, instead of applying the doctrine of presumptive
validity to insulate defendant from liability, we should in
substance be guided by the dicta in Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 38, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L. Ed. 2d
343, 350 (1979), a case that was decided subsequent to the
filing of plaintiffs’ brief.

In that case the Court said:

“[t]he enactment of a law forecloses speculation by
enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality—
with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flag-
rantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable
prudence would be bound to see its flaws.” (Emphasis
added.)

Merely because an attorney trained in the law, familiar
with the Papachristou line of cases, knowledgeable of State v.
Berker, would recognize possible and perhaps even fatal
frailties in the South Kingstown ordinance does not mean

7The ordinance at issue was section 14-10 of the Ordinances of the City of
Warwick which provided:
“ ‘Any person who shall be found reveling, quarreling, fighting or wantonly
making a false alarm or cry of fire or otherwise behaving in a disorderly or
indecent manner in the city or who shall aid, incite or encourage the same to
be done shall be guilty of a violation of this section.’ ” 114 R.I. at 73 n.1, 328
A.2d at 730 n.1.

368 |

that a South Kingstown police officer responding to a com-
plaint and faced with a situation proscribed by that ordi-
nance should, notwithstanding his limited legal training, be
held to the attorney’s standard. Indeed, were we to impose
on him that burden of determining as a question of law
whether or not the existing ordinance was constitutionally
entitled to enforcement, we would, in effect, be rejecting
part of the reason underlying Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967), where the Court,
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in holding that
good-faith police action based upon a presumptively valid
statute constitutes a valid defense in a damage action under
42 U.S.C §1983, observed:

“{a] policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty
if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and
being mulcted in damages if he does.” 386 U.S. at 555,
87S. Ct. at 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 295.

Thus, absent any prior declaration by this court that the
South Kingstown ordinance is unconstitutional, we are not
prepared to say as a matter of law that Lieutenant Palange
was foreclosed from relying on the ordinance’s presumptive
validity and that the trial justice erred in admitting the ordi-
nance into evidence.

The plaintiffs also argue that the ordinance should not
have been admitted because it was preempted by G.L. 1956
(1969 Reenactment) §11-45-1 (since repealed) read in con-
junction with G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §45-6-1 and
because it. consisted of sentence fragments making it “an
obvious nullity.” We believe the question of preemption, like
the question of the ordinance’s constitutionality, is one to be
resolved by the courts and not by police speculation. Since at
the time this action arose we had not ruled whether the state
legislation had preempted the field, the ordinance was at
least presumptively valid for law enforcement purposes.
Neither are we convinced that the ordinance was so gram-
matically defective that good faith police reliance on it was
precluded and there is no suggestion that defendant did not
act in good faith.

es 369

The plaintiffs next argue that even if the ordinance was
presumptively valid, the evidence was insufficient to permit
a jury to find that Lieutenant Palange had probable cause for
believing that plaintiffs had violated either the ordinance or
the obstruction statute. Hence, plaintiffs argue that the trial
justice erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict on
the issue of liability.®

In considering plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict the
trial justice, without weighing the evidence or considering
the credibility of the witnesses, was required—as we are on
appeal—to view the evidence and the inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to defendant
and to submit the case to the jury if, upon so viewing the
evidence, it appeared that there were material issues on
which reasonable persons might differ. Nagy v. McBurney, -
120 R.1. at 928-29, 302 A.2d at 367; Evans v. Liguori, 118
R.I. 389, 394, 374 A.2d 774, 776 (1977); Marshall v.
Tomaselli, 118 R.I. 190, 95, 372 A.2d 1280, 1283 (1977). In
proper context and otherwise phrased, it was incumbent
upon him to determine whether Lieutenant Palange, based
on the available facts and acting as an ordinarily careful and
prudent person, could have reasonably believed that the
South Kingstown ordinance was being violated. Quinlan v.
Breslin, 61 R.I. 327, 330, 200 A. 989, 991 (1938); accord,
Cook v. Lester, 99 R.I. 28, 31, 205 A.2d 143, 145 (1964).

In pertinent part section I of that ordinance makes it
“improper conduct,” punishable by fine or imprisonment,
for any person to

*Although the trial justice reserved his decision on the directed verdict motion, he
failed to render that decision once the jury returned its verdict and the plaintiffs’
counsel did not bring that failure to his attention. Super. R. Civ. P. 50(b) provides
that a trial justice may reserve a decision on a directed verdict motion and that,
“{wJhen the jury is discharged the court shall forthwith enter a decision on the
motion reserved whether or not the jury returned a verdict.” (Emphasis added.)
We believe Rule 50(b) imposes a mandatory obligation on the trial justice to rule on
a reserved motion for directed verdict. If he fails to do so and enters a judgment for
the non-moving party, he has impliedly denied the reserved motion and that denial
may be assigned as an alleged error on appeal.

310 es

“quarrel, fight, revel + * + commit any nuisance * * *
or otherwise behave in a noisy, disorderly or indecent
manner, to the disturbance or annoyance of the
peaceable people of [the] Town, or any portion of them

eee”? |

That language is obviously far reaching and indeed
somewhat nebulous. However, as we observed earlier, the
provision was not so “grossly and flagrantly” improper as to
preclude Lieutenant Palange from relying on its validity. The
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to him, indicates
that he ordered plaintiffs’ arrest, when he learned that they
had shouted obscenities at the officers first on the scene, for 8
to 10 minutes with sufficient volume to be heard 200 to 300
feet away, to attract attention “all over [Peacedale] Flats”
and to attract a crowd of fifteen to eighteen persons. Given
these facts and circumstances, the essential question was
whether Lieutenant Palange, acting as an ordinarily careful
and prudent person, could reasonably have concluded that
plaintiffs had quarreled, reveled or behaved in a noisy or
disorderly manner to the annoyance or disturbance of the
townspeople. In our judgment that issue was one on which
reasonable persons might differ and hence it was for the jury
to decide.

Moreover, the epithets uttered, see note 1 supra, may
have constituted what are known as “fighting words,” that is,
words which are not constitutionally protected as free speech
because “ ‘by their very utterance [they] inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’ ” Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522, 92S, Ct. 1103, 1106, 31 L. Ed. 2d
408, 414 (1972), quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 769, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 1035
(1942). Fighting words have been defined as “those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the
ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 1785, 29 L. Ed.
2d 284, 291 (1971). Such words, even when addressed to a
police officer, do not lose their character as fighting words,

ee 371

if, under the objective test that we apply, they “would cause
an average person to fight.” State v. Authelet, 120 R.I.
42, 57, 385 A.2d 642, 649-50 (1978).

Whether or not the plaintiffs’ verbal insults were in fact
fighting words is a question that we need not decide. We
raise the fighting words issue merely to underscore our belief
that the issue of probable cause was an additional variable
for the factfinders to consider in determining whether a
person of ordinary prudence could have believed that the
peacable inhabitants of the town or any portion of them were
being annoyed or disturbed by behavior proscribed by the
ordinance.

We reach the same conclusion with respect to whether
Lieutenant Palange could have had probable cause to believe
that plaintiffs had obstructed an officer in the execution of
his duty in violation of §11-32-1. The evidence on that
question, viewed most favorably to defendant, shows that
police officers responded to a complaint about “a disturbance
and drinking.” The first officer on the scene was confronted
by plaintiffs who, when asked to return to the bar or
disperse, began shouting loud obscenities at the officer. A
second officer arrived, repeated the request to disperse, and,
as a crowd gathered, was met by further epithets from
plaintiffs. In those circumstances, a jury could reasonably
have concluded that it was the officers’ duty under the town
ordinance to quell the disturbance which had arisen and that
Lieutenant Palange had probable cause to believe that
plaintiffs’ tactics had obstructed the officers in the execution
of that duty. Although the evidence may have been suscep-
tible to contrary reasonable conclusions, it ‘was the jury’s and
not the trial justice’s function to choose between them.

The plaintiffs contend that Lieutenant Palange could not
have had probable cause to believe the obstruction statute
had been violated because, they assert, spoken words can
never constitute the crime of obstructing a police officer in
the execution of his duty. A like assertion was but recently
rejected in DeFusco v. Brophy, 112 R.I. 461, 311 A.2d 286
(1973), where we noted that:

372 |

“in certain circumstances, the spoken word can be just
as effective in impeding an officer in the discharge of his
duty as if the orator had grappled with the officer.” Id.
at 464, 311 A.2d at 288.

We held in that case that the “verbal harangue was so staged
and of such length and so disconcerting in character that it
did in fact prevent the + + « officers from doing their duty.”
Id. See also cases cited in Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 1018, §4 at
1026 (obstruction may be committed without force or
violence), §8 at 1037 (profanity or vilification of police officer
may warrant conviction for obstruction where language used
hindered the officer or made his job more difficult) (1972).
Thus we believe that the jury was entitled to consider the
length, character, and impact of plaintiffs’ “verbal
harangue” in determining whether or not Lieutenant
Palange could reasonably have believed that the obstruction
statute had been violated.

We emphasize that the dispositive issue here is not—as it
would be if plaintiffs were faced with criminal charges—
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that they had violated the obstruction
statute, but only whether there were sufficient facts to give
Lieutenant Palange probable cause or reasonable grounds to
believe that they had violated the statute. That question, as
we have already said, was properly submitted to the jury for
resolution.

The plaintiffs’ other arguments relate to the trial justice’s
jury instructions, To the extent not already disposed of, they
require but little discussion. The record discloses that the
plaintiffs made known their objection to each of the jury
instructions they now challenge merely by stating that they
took “exception” to the particular instruction without voicing
any specific grounds therefor.? Super. R. Civ. P. 51(b)
provides in pertinent part, however, that:

Super. R. Civ. P. 46, in effect since January 10, 1966, abolished exceptions in
civil cases.

ee) 73

“No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless he objects thereto * * * stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection.” (Emphasis added.)

This provision is included in the rules in order to afford the
trial justice an opportunity to correct his instructions, if
necessary, and the objection must be specific enough so that
the court’s attention is focused on the precise nature of the
alleged error. Seabra v. Puritan Life Insurance Co., 117 B.1.
488, 503-04, 369 A.2d 652, 661 (1977). See Hoffman v.
Sachs, 121 R.I. 855, 403 A.2d 668 (1979). The plaintiffs’
general objections, without specific statements of grounds
therefor, were clearly insufficient under Rule 51(b) and thus
present nothing for us to review. Seabra v. Puritan Life
Insurance Co., 117 B.1. at 503, 369 A.2d at 661; accord, 9
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2554 at
644 (1971).

The plaintiffs’ appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court.

Mr. Justice Joslin participated in the oral arguments and in
the decision, but retired prior to the publication of the
opinion herein.

Aram K. Berberian, for plaintiffs.

William Gerstenblatt, for defendant.

CO

374

406 A.2d 366.

Vauiey Gas Company vs. Epwarp F. Burke.
Junius C. Micwaztson et al. vs. Vattey Gas Company.
October 1, 1979.

Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

376 |

Bevitacgua, C.J. On July 1, 1977, the Valley Gas
Company (the company) filed a revised tariff schedule with
the Public Utilities Commission (the commission). This
proposed new schedule was designed to increase the
company’s annual revenues by approximately $2.4 million.!
Exerting a power conferred by G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenact-
ment) §39-3-11, the commission suspended implementation
of the new rate schedule and began a series of hearings on the
company’s proposal. Those hearings commenced in January
1978 and continued until May 1978.

On June 14, 1978, the commission issued its decision and
order in this case. The commission’s decision examined the
evidence presented by both the company and the Rhode
Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (the division)
concerning the company’s rate base, cost of providing service
and the rate of return to which the company was entitled.
‘The commission concluded that although the company’s
current rate structure was indeed inadequate, the proposed
revenue increase of $2.4 million was excessive and unreason-
able. The commisssion therefore denied the proposed tariff
and ordered the company to submit new tariffs designed to
produce a revenue increase of $1.8 million.

‘The company filed an additional revised tariff schedule in March 1978. The
revised filing contained supplemental data for an updated test year ending
December 31, 1977. The original filing request employed a 1976 test year. The
commission allowed the new filing with the caveat that the amount of increased
revenues not exceed the originally requested total of $2.4 million.

es a77

Both the company and the Attorney General responded to
the commission’s action by filing separate statutory petitions
for certiorari pursuant to §39-5-1. We have consolidated
those petitions.”

On certiorari, the company presents three challenges to the
commission’s decision. Initially, the company contends that
the commission failed to allow for the recovery of certain of
its capital investments through depreciation and amortiza-
tion. Additionally, the company asserts that the commission
incorrectly calculated its working capital requirements.
Finally, the company argues that the commission erroneously
used a purchased-gas refund from the company’s suppliers to
reduce the company’s operating expenses. Representing the
division, the Attorney General objects to the commission’s
allowance of an attrition adjustment and the treatment of the
company’s deferred tax obligation.

Before proceeding to consideration of the various claims
made by both the company and the Attorney General, we
caution that we do not sit as factfinders in public utility rate
cases. That role belongs exclusively to the commission under
the provisions of §39-5-3. See Michaelson v. New England
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 121 R.I. 722, 404 A.2d 799
(1979). Our function is to determine whether the commis-
sion’s decision on a particular issue is “fairly and substantially
supported by legal evidence and sufficiently specific to enable
us to ascertain if the facts upon which [it is] premised afford a
reasonable basis for the result reached.” Rhode Island
Consumers’ Council v. Smith, 111 R.I. 271, 277, 302 A.2d
787, 762-63 (1973). See New England Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 118 R.1.
570, 575, 376 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1977). In so doing, we do
not weigh conflicting evidence presented to the commission.
See Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce v. Public
Utilities Commission, 121 R.I. 122, 127, 396 A.2d 102,
105 (1979). Judicial inquiry ceases when we find in the
record sufficient relevant and material evidence to form a
rational basis for the conclusions reached by the commission.

®The Rhode Island Consumers’ Council intervened in No. 78-223 - M.P. in order
to sustain the commission’s decision on the depreciation issue.

,

378 |

I Depreciation Deficiency

In 1975, the company commissioned Ebasco Services,
Incorporated, to perform a depreciation study. The study
included an examination of the company’s present deprecia-
tion accounting practice and the adequacy of its depreciation
reserves. Additionally, the study was to contain proposals for
the treatment of any discrepancy between the newly
calculated reserve and the actual reserve carried on the
company’s books.

The company submitted the Ebasco study as an exhibit in
the proceedings before the commission.? The Ebasco
employee who supervised the study, Julius Breitling, testified
for the company. According to Breitling, the study showed
that the company had been applying an insufficient
depreciation rate to its plant in service. Breitling testified that
the company’s depreciation rate should be raised from 1.9
percent to 2.6 percent to alleviate this problem and that the
new rate should be applied over the remaining life of the
property currently in service.‘

Mr. Breitling further observed that even adopting the
higher depreciation rate would not serve to allow the
company to recover the full investment made in its property.
According to Breitling, the company’s low depreciation rate
had resulted in the inadequacy of the company’s reserve for
depreciation. Specifically, Breitling found that the
company’s book reserve of $6,103,807 was $1,013,757 less
than the newly computed reserve requirement of $7,117,654.
In order for investors to recover this deficiency, Breitling
proposed an annual amortization expense of $31,324.

While accepting the company’s position that the higher
depreciation rate itself was justified, the commission reduced
the company’s rate base by the approximately $1 million
depreciation deficiency. The commission reasoned that
Commission, 120 R.I. 959, 963, 393 A.2d 1092, 1094
(1978) with respect to the depreciation charges, however, the

*The study was based upon the company’s plant in service as of December 31,
1975.
‘The 1.9 percent depreciation rate resulted from a 1969 depreciation study.

P| 379

because this property was no longer being used to provide
service, it should not be a component of the rate base upon
which customers must provide revenues to support a rate of
return.

The commission also rejected the company’s request to
amortize the deficiency. The commission based its ruling
upon testimony by the division’s witness, Mr. Galligan, that
the company had received excessive earnings in the past
because the rate base has been artificially inflated with assets
that should have been depreciated. According to the
commission, the company had failed to produce evidence to
show that these revenues not only provided a fair rate of
return but also the amount that would have been charged to
operating expense had the assets been properly depreciated.

The company contends that the commission’s decision
represents an unconstitutional confiscation of that property
making up the calculated depreciation reserve deficiency.
Specifically, the company asserts that the removal of this
property from the rate base prevents investors from earning a
fair rate of return from their investment. Additionally, the
company maintains that the failure to amortize the defi-
ciency denies investors their right to recover their investment.

None of the parties to these proceedings questions the
company’s right to employ amortization to allow recovery of
capital investments during their estimated service lives.
Clearly, the cost of furnishing public utility services includes
the value of the physical plant and equipment consumed in
rendering that service. This computation is the true measure
of depreciation, and customers receiving the service that
caused this wearing-out should pay for the cost of the
property used in their behalf. See Bonbright, Principles of
Public Utility Regulation, 198 (1969); Kolb & Lipstreu, New
Concepts and Current Issues in Public Utility Regulation,
10-11 (1963).

As the proponent of the proposed rate increase, the
company has the statutory burden of proof with respect to
the component elements of its request, including deprecia-
tion expense. §39-3-12. See United States v. Public Utilities

380 P|

company presented no evidence whether earnings during the
life of the property involved sufficiently exceeded the fair rate
of return to compensate investors for the inadequate
depreciation charges. The commission did, on the other
hand, make the reasonable inference from the division’s
testimony that the inflated rate base provided investors with
remuneration for the depreciation undercharges from actual
earnings over and above the fair rate of return.

In support of its contention that investors have not been
adequately compensated, the company points to the fact that
during the past several years, the company has failed to earn
the rate of return established by the commission. We cannot
say, however, that the fact that the returns over a 5-year
period were below administratively fixed levels conclusively
demonstrates that there were no periods during the life of the
property in which excesses of earnings over fair returns either
wholly or partially provided reimbursement for the deprecia-
tion deficiency.

While we appreciate the company’s difficulty in tracing its
historical depreciation practices, the fact remains that the
commission’s acceptance of the company’s request would be
based upon speculation. We find no evidence in the record
upon which the propriety of its proposal could be sustained.
The commission’s decision to disallow any amortization of
the deficiency was, therefore, reasonable.® Accord, Williams
v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 415
F.2d 922, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Washington Gas Light Co.
v. Baker, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 115, 125, 188 F.2d 11, 21, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 952, 71 S. Ct. 571, 95 L. Ed. 686 (1951);

*The company contends that such a result is inconsistent with our holding in
Narragansett Electric Co. v. Kennelly, 88 R.I, 56, 78-79, 143 A.2d 709, 722-23
(1958). In Kennelly we approved removal from the rate base of an amount
representing a depreciation deficiency. In so doing, we noted that the adminis-
trator had increased the annual depreciation rate to allow recovery of the
deficiency. Id. at 78-79, 143 A.2d at 722.

The need for such a recovery was not, however, at issue in Kennelly. We
reiterate that we do not reject the company’s entitlement to collect the deficiency;
our concern here today is with the absence of sufficient evidence to support its

recovery.

ee 381

United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, 37 Pa. Commonw. Ct. 195, 390 A.2d
849, 860-61 (1978); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct.
328, 341-43, 311 A.2d 151, 158-59 (1973).

Our decision regarding the amortization issue mandates
that the depreciation deficiency be removed from the rate
base. Depreciation reflects the reduction in service value of
an asset committed to rendering service. The removal of
depreciated property from rate-base valuation does not result
in confiscation because the utility has no right to expect
consumers to pay for property no longer used for rendering
services. Wilson, Herring & Eutsler, Public Utility
Regulation, 201-02 (1935). The deduction makes the rate
base portray the company’s net investment in used and useful
property upon which investors should expect a rate of return.
See Narragansett Electric Co. v. Kennelly, 88 R.I. 56, 78,
148 A.2d 709, 722 (1958); Bonbright, supra at 198. Having
determined that the cost of the depreciation deficiency had
been recovered, the commission properly removed it from
the rate base.

II Purchased-Gas Expense

In 1977 the company received a refund from its gas
supplier totaling $956,000. By a previous ruling, the
commission had ordered some $756,000 returned to the
company’s regular customers. The remaining $200,000
represents refunds on gas purchased from the company by
contractual customers. These customers do not fall within
the ambit of the statute, and the company is under no obli-
gation to refund those funds directly. See Providence Gas Co.
v. Burke, 119 R.I. 487, 491, 380 A.2d 1334, 1336 (1977).

With respect to the proposed rates at issue here, the
commission chose to treat the retained $200,000 as a

°The refund reflects adjustments on purchased-gas charges during the period
1974-75.

382 ee

windfall-income item not to be included in the test-year
calculations.’ The commission did, however, order that the
money be returned to the company’s customers by reducing
the company’s operating expenses for a 3-year period at a
yearly rate of $66,000.

The company maintains that the commission’s action was
arbitrary and unlawful because, in prior rate cases, the
commission did not allow utilities to recover extraordinary
losses. Moreover, the company contends that prior instances
of “extraordinary income” have not been subject to similar
treatment.

The ‘short answer to the company’s position is that the
commission is not bound by the methodology employed in
considering prior applications. See United States v. Public
Utilities Commission, 120 R.I. at 966, 393 A.2d at 1096;
quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
776-77, 88S, Ct. 1344, 1365, 20 L. Ed. 2d 312, 342 (1968).
Our concern is whether the commission’s end result in each
case is lawful and reasonable as gleaned from the record.
Rhode Island Consumers’ Council v. Smith, 111 B.1. at 280,
302 A.2d at 764.

Here, the record shows that the refund in issue reduced the
company’s overall purchase expenses. We acknowledge that
this refund involves customers who contracted for gas at a set
price and would not, under the terms of their contract with
the company, be entitled to a direct reduction in their
purchase price. Nevertheless, the customer revenue needed to
meet total purchased-gas expense is lowered by virtue of the
refund. We therefore find it reasonable for the commission to
attempt to reach an equitable result by reducing the
company’s general purchased-gas expense by the amount of
the refund.

TIL Cash Working Capital

The company next challenges the commission’s deduction

7Such nonrecurring items are ordinarily excluded from test-year calculations.
Rhode Island Consumers’ Council v. Smith, 113 R.I. 384, 307, 322 A.2d 17, 24
(1974).

ee 383

from the rate base of $102,856 as negative cash working
capital. We have previously stated that cash working capital
represents “the amount of cash required to operate a utility
during the interim (the ‘lag’) between the rendition of service
and the receipt of payment therefor.” Michaelson v. New
England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 121 R.I. 722, 404
A.2d 799 (1979). See also Providence Gas Co. v. Burman,
119 R.I. 78, 87, 376 A.2d 687, 693 (1977); Rhode Island
Consumers’ Council v. Smith, 111 R.I. at 288-89, 302 A.2d
at 768. Revenues that the company collects prior to the time
when it must make payments associated with that service are
known as “leads.” Michaelson v. New England Telephone &
Telegraph Co., supra. A lead-lag study matches these factors
and produces a figure that represents the company’s
monetary requirements for meeting its daily operating
expenses. A negative working capital requirement simply
means that the company is receiving more than enough
customer revenue to cover its operating expenses. See
Providence Gas Co. v. Burman, 119 R.I. at 88, 376 A.2d
at 693.

In its prefiled testimony, the company had included a
Jead-lag study which showed a negative cash working capital
requirement of $102,856. However, the company made a
working capital allowance of zero when computing its
proposed rate base.

The company presented testimony through its witness, Mr.
Kenneth Hogan, in an attempt to explain the reason behind
the discrepancy. According to Mr. Hogan, many of the
accounts receivable listed in the study as being collected
within 75 days were not, in fact, collected until much later.
Secondly, Mr. Hogan testified that the borrowing rate used
in the study was too low and that the actual level of company
borrowing necessitated that it maintain a higher compen-
sating balance. Mr. Hogan asserted that both of these factors
would serve to decrease the amount of capital on hand and
thus change the company’s cash working capital requirement
from a negative figure to zero. :

The division’s witness, Mr. Richard Galligan, urged that
the company’s lead-lag study be accepted and that the

384 ee

$102,856 be deducted from the rate base. Mr. Galligan based
his argument upon the fact that the study showed that the
company’s customers had furnished more than enough
revenue to meet current operating expenses. In effect, Mr.
Galligan contended that the customers, and not the
investors, were furnishing this capital to the company, and
therefore inclusion in the rate base was not justified.®

Before us, the company maintains that the testimony of its
witness adequately explained the discrepancy between the
study and the proposed rate base. Having proved the unrelia-
bility of the study, the company argues that the commission
acted unreasonably in using it to render its decision.

Our examination of the record finds ample justification for
the commission’s decision to use the lead-lag study. In testi-
mony before the commission, the division’s witness, Mr.
Galligan, cast doubt on the validity of the company’s
explanation for the discrepancy. Mr. Galligan testified that
his examination of the company’s records shows that the
borrowing level listed in the study was not unusually low.
With regard to the statement about accounts receivable, Mr.
Galligan observed that the company had failed to produce
any specific information on the amount of overdue accounts
that existed and opined that the company’s explanation was a
belated “rationalization.” Faced with this conflicting testi-
mony, we think it entirely reasonable for the commission to
employ the company’s original study.

IV Attrition Allowance

H_sIn its decision, the commission approved the company’s
proposal for an attrition allowance of $206,610. The
company’s witness, Mr. Hogan, testified that he calculated
the proposed adjustment by applying an annual inflation rate
of 6 percent to certain operating expenses.

°Working capital is an essential rate base item where investors furnish the fund,
because such investors are entitled to earn a return on all funds which they have
committed to providing service. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n.,
62 Cal. 2d 634, 664, 401 P.2d 353, 371, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 19 (1965).

et 385

Mr. Hogan also testified that he used an article entitled:
“An Uneasy Balance for the United States Economy,”
BUSINESS WEEK December 26, 1977, as the source of his
testimony concerning the 6 percent inflation factor. The
article contained the collective opinion .of twenty-seven
leading economists that price increases would average 6
percent for 1978. The company sought to introduce the
article into evidence. The division objected on the grounds
that the article contained the assertions of the economists/
authors involved and was, therefore, hearsay. The commis-
sion sustained the objections and excluded the article.

The division presented testimony through its expert
witness, Mr. Galligan, that the company required no
adjustment for inflation. Mr. Galligan argued that any infla-
tionary effects were compensated for by the fact that the
company’s operating expenses were based upon an updated
test year which accounts for inflationary trends. Further-
more, the witness testified that the company’s calculations
failed to take into account any offsetting savings achieved
through increased productivity. Notwithstanding these state-
ments, Mr. Galligan’s written prefiled testimony showed that
the company’s earnings had fallen by some $500,000 during
the period 1976-77.

The Attorney General now maintains that the company
had failed to introduce any competent evidence to support its
proposed attrition adjustment. Therefore, the argument
runs, the commission’s acceptance of the company’s proposal
becomes arbitrary and unreasonable. In that regard, the
Attorney General points to the fact that the magazine article
from which the inflation figure was derived was excluded
from the record. Alternatively, the Attorney General main-
tains that Mr. Hogan’s testimony was valueless because he
lacked expertise on the issue of attrition calculation. The state
further argues that the testimony of the division’s witness,
Mr. Galligan, constitutes the only substantial competent
evidence upon which the commission could have denied the
adjustment.

pe

386 |

The narrow issue to be determined here is whether the
commission’s decision to employ the company’s study can be
supported by the record. It is uncontroverted that the
commission itself excluded from the record the magazine
article containing the 6 percent figure. Mr. Hogan himself
testified that the figure was used in computing the company’s
proposal. The proposal was, therefore, unsupported by
evidence contained in the record, and its use by the commis-
sion cannot be justified.

In its decision, the commission observes that although it
excluded from the record the article giving rise to the 6
percent figure, the same figure was used in prior cases before
the commission. Notwithstanding this prior use, the fact
remains that the figure was never properly placed upon the
record before the commission and therefore cannot be used to
support its decision.

We are therefore constrained to conclude that the record is
barren of any evidence to support the commission’s finding
that an attrition adjustment of $206,610 was essential to
compensate the company for any erosion of earnings. We
therefore vacate the commission’s adjustment and remand
the matter to the commission to make an adjustment that is
supported by the record. See New England Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 118 R.I.
570, 576-77, 376 A.2d 1041, 1044-45 (1977).

V_ Deferred Taxes

Hs We next consider the Attorney General's challenge to the
commission’s allowance of $86,313 as a deferred tax expense.
This expense results from the company’s use of accelerated
depreciation in calculating its federal income-tax liability.

Pursuant to §441(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 26
U.S.C. 167 (1), regulated public utilities are entitled to the
tax advantages associated with accelerated depreciation if
the utility employs a normalization method of accounting.”

\This treatment applies only to property acquired after 1969. See Narragansett
Elec. Co. v. Harsch, 117 R.1. 395, 411, 368 A.2d 1194, 1204 (1977).

ee 387

Under normalization, taxes for ratemaking purposes are
determined on the basis of straight-line depreciation. In
determining its actual tax liability, however, the utility may
enjoy the benefits of accelerated depreciation.

The difference between the taxes which would be paid
under straight-line depreciation and the taxes that would be
paid under accelerated depreciation is placed into a deferred
tax reserve account by the taxpayer." See FPC v. Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Division, 411 U.S. 458, 460, 93 S. Ct.
1723, 1725, 36 L. Ed. 2d 426, 430 (1973); Rhode Island
Consumers’ Council v. Smith, 113 R.I. 384, 389-90, 322 A.2d
17, 20 (1974).

Here the Attorney General faults the resultant tax burden
that current rate payers must shoulder in funding the
deferred tax reserve. Because it does not reflect actual taxes
paid, the fund is not considered a presently deductible cost-
of-service expense. According to the Attorney General, this
nondeductible status, combined with the company’s 49.56
percent tax rate, forces current users to pay almost twice the
amount in pretax revenues to produce the required reserve
amount.

The Attorney General argues that this procedure works an
injustice against current rate payers by forcing them to
provide a fund which will benefit later rate payers. To that
end the Attorney General argues that the commission should
have adopted the division’s proposal to have current rate
payers pay only that amount actually needed for the reserve
and leave the additional tax consequence to later rate payers.

The commission’s principal reason for rejecting this
proposal was its opinion that such an adjustment might
jeopardize the company’s ability to maintain the advantages
of accelerated depreciation. Specifically, the commission

"The Federal Power Commission requires that this reserve be deducted from the
rate base. Thus, rates charged to customers are lowered by the amount of the
return on this reserve had it remained in the rate base. See Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Division v. Federal Power Commission, 462 F.2d 853, 857 N.8 (D.C. Cir.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 458, 93 S. Ct. 1723, 36 L. Ed. 2d 426
(1973).

388 ee

tuled that the adjustment would conflict with Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) regulations governing the deferred tax
reserve which must be maintained by a utility using normal-
ization.

The basic issue before us, therefore, is whether the
commission was correct in interpreting the IRS regulations as
preventing the proposed adjustments. It is reasonable to
assume that the IRS regulations do not contemplate a
delaying of the tax consequences of creating the reserve fund.
The regulations speak of maintaining a separate and distinct
fund which is readily identifiable. See Rhode Island
Consumers’ Council v. Smith, 113 R.I. at 389-90, 322 A.2d
at 20. It is conceivable that the IRS may not treat the
division’s proposed adjustment as cutting not only the tax
consequences of creating the fund, but also the fund itself. In
light of the possible risk that the company may lose the right
to use accelerated depreciation, the commission’s actions
were entirely reasonable.

Conclusion

In “Valley Gas Company v. Edward F. Burke,” No.
78-223 M.P., the petition for certiorari is denied and
dismissed.

In “Julius C. Michaelson et al. v. Valley Gas Company,”
No. 78-255 M.P., the records certified to this court are
ordered returned to the commission with our decision
endorsed thereon and with the directive that it recalculate
the attrition allowance.

Mr. Justice Joslin did not participate.
Edwards & Angell, Edward F. Hindle, Deming E.
Sherman (for Valley Gas Company); Dennis J. Roberts II,

Attorney General, John R. McDermott, Special Assistant
Attorney General (for Julius C. Michaelson et al.).

Carl Freedman, Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc. (for
The Coalition for Consumer Justice).

389

407 A.2d 490,
Henry Marce ito vs. Francisco Dr Frerras.
OCTOBER 24, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Keuiener, J. This is a negligence action in which the
plaintiff (Marcello) sues for the loss he sustained when in
October 1970, his motor vehicle was damaged as a result of
being involved in an intersectional collision with a motor
vehicle owned by the defendant (De Freitas). On May 18,
1978, a justice of the District Court, after a trial, entered
judgment for Marcello, awarding him $255.69 plus interest

fe

390 ee }

and: costs. On the following day, May 19, De Freitas,
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) of the District Court Rules of Civil !
Procedure (Dist. R. Civ. P.), moved to’ vacate the judgment
on the ground of newly discovered evidence and, relying on
the terms of Dist. R. Civ. P. 62(b), he also asked the trial
justice to stay the issuance of any execution. An ex parte stay
was immediately granted. Later, on June 8, the trial justice,
‘after a hearing denied both motions. Thereafter, De Freitas
filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court and demanded
a jury trial. Marcello responded with a motion in which he
asked (1) that the claim for jury trial be stricken and (2) that
the appeal from the denial of the motion to vacate be
assigned to the special cause: calendar. A Superior Court
justice granted the motion, and De Freitas appealed to this
court.

On October 4, 1979, De Freitas appeared before us in
response to our order and attempted to show cause why his
appeal should not be dismissed as premature because the
Superior Court has yet to rule on his appeal from the denial
of the motion to vacate. At that time De Freitas made it
perfectly clear that, at least as far as he was concerned, his
appeal to the Superior Court had nothing to do with the June
8, 1978 denial of his motion to vacate, but what he was in
fact seeking in the Superior Court by way of appeal was a
review of the May 18, 1978 judgment where the District
Court justice had found for Marcello and awarded the
$255.69 in damages. It is our belief that this contention
should be considered forthwith by us without the need of any
further oral argument.

To put De Freitas’ contentions in their proper perspective,
it should be noted that the period for taking an appeal to the
Superior Court from a judgment entered in the District
Court is 2 days after the entry of judgment. G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §9-12-10; Dist. R. Civ. P. 73 Review in the
Superior Court is de novo. Burns Electronic Supply Co. v.
Westmoreland, 116 R.1. 332, 339, 356 A.2d 479, 483 (1976).
De Freitas concedes that the 2-day appeal period following
the May 18 damage award would have expired on May 20,

ee 391

but he maintains that the running of the appeal period was
stayed when on May 19 the District Court granted his motion
to stay the issuance of execution. We cannot agree.

District Court Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 62(b) are
identical to their Superior Court counterparts. In his treatise
on the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Kent
points out that a 60(b) motion to vacate does not suspend the
finality of the judgment or the time for taking an appeal and
that 62(b) merely prevents the enforcement of the judgment.
1 Kent, R.I. Civ. Prac. §73.5 & n.38 at 515 (1969). Here,
De Freitas, instead of seeking relief by 62(b), could have
taken an appeal to the Superior Court and there, at a de novo’
trial, attempted to persuade the jury that, contrary to De
Freitas’ District Court testimony, there was no traffic control
signal at the intersection where the collision occurred. By his
failure to take the appeal, De Freitas is now precluded from
challenging the May 18, 1978 monetary judgment.

Finally, we recognize that in Riverhouse Publishing Co. v.
Providence Journal Co., 104 R.I. 192, 194, 243 A.2d 90, 91
(1968), there is language which at first blush might seem to
indicate to the reader that the grant of a 62(b) motion would
suspend the running of the appeal period. Riverhouse was
attempting to have the trial justice either reconsider his
earlier dismissal of Riverhouse’s libel complaint or, in the
light of what was then our recently published opinion in
Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 102 R.I. 8, 227
A.2d 582 (1967), allow the filing of an amended complaint.
Our reference to 62(b) was merely an attempt to demonstrate
the various avenues available to Riverhouse as it sought to
have the trial justice reconsider his earlier determination. In
fact, we specifically pointed out that had Riverhouse filed a
motion under Super. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend! the

1The District Court Rules have no provision which is similar to Super. R. Civ. P.
59, The omission comes about because Rule 59 deals with the grant of new trials
and, as noted earlier, under District Court practice, a trial de novo may be had by
the simple procedure of taking an appeal to the Superior Court.

392 ee

judgment, the appeal period would have been suspended.
Our allusion to 62(b) was pure dicta and affords no substan-
tive support for the procedural route taken by De Freitas.

The show cause order previously entered in this case is
withdrawn, the defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed,
and the case is remanded to the District Court for the
issuance of execution.

Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Inc., Netti C. Vogel, for
plaintiff.

; Lembo, DeCesare & Grogan, Donald R. Lembo, for
defendant.

407 A.2d 491.
STATE vs. JoHN CarILio,

NOVEMBER 2, 1979.
Present: Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

393

KeLieHer, J. This two-count indictment charges the
defendant, John Carillo (Carillo), with the crimes of murder
and conspiracy to murder. Both counts arise from the June
22, 1973, stabbing death of Donald Price (Price), which
occurred while Price, a state corrections officer, was on duty
at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI). Carillo was
found guilty on both counts after trial by a Superior Court jury
and, on November 30, 1973, was sentenced to life imprison-

es 395

ment on the murder charge and 10 years’ imprisonment on
the conspiracy charge. Thereafter, he appealed to this court.

Subsequent to the docketing of Carillo’s appeal, informa-
tion was received that cast doubt upon the testimony of a
prosecution witness, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) who had performed scientific tests for the state
and had given testimony about the results of those tests at the
trial. On the basis of that information, Carillo, claiming
newly discovered evidence, filed a new-trial motion. We
thereupon remanded the case to the Superior Court for a
hearing on that motion. On October 26, 1977, the Superior
Court denied Carillo’s motion for a new trial and ordered the
case returned to this court.

The record reveals that in June of 1973 Carillo was
confined in what is known as the B dormitory of the medium-
security building at the ACI. Shortly after midnight on June
22, 1973, Price was found lying on the floor near a desk from
which he was keeping watch on the prisoners living in B
dorm. Price was suffering from several stab wounds and was
unable to respond to questions about the attack. He died
shortly after being admitted to a nearby hospital.

Within minutes, the state police arrived at the scene and
immediately initiated an investigation. Each inmate of B
dorm was handcuffed and led away for questioning, and the
premises were throughly searched for physical evidence. The
search revealed, among other things, a type of table knife
whose blade had been sharpened and whose handle had been
wrapped with twine. The blade appeared to have “wiped-off
blood” on it. Also seized were two pairs of discarded under-
shorts, at least one of which was spattered with what again
appeared to be blood. In addition, the officers seized the
sheets from Carillo’s bed because they, too, were apparently
stained with what one officer believed 'to be blood.

There is also evidence in the record that the officers, prior
to making any arrests, received a statement from at least one
inmate who had heard screams for help at approximately the
time Price had been stabbed and who had seen Carillo and

396 ee

another prisoner running from the scene of the murder
immediately after Price’s screams were heard. On the basis of
both the physical evidence seized and the statements received
from people in the area, the officers made arrests, including
that of Carillo.

A visual examination of Carillo indicated the presence of
what appeared to be blood on his right forearm.
Consequently, Carillo was subjected to a further
examination designed to reveal the presence of blood on his
body. For that purpose, the chemical reagent benzidine was
used. In the words of one expert, benzidine is one of the most
commonly used tests for the detection of the presence of
blood. Application of the benzidine to Carillo’s body indi-
cated the possible presence of blood.

Carillo objects strenuously to the admission of the evidence
of the results of the benzidine test as well as to the use of
photographs taken of him after he had been given the benzi-
dine test. The most basic objection raised is an evidentiary
one since Carillo claims that there was an inadequate foun-
dation laid for admission of the test results. Specifically, he
argues that the evidence was inadmissible because (1) no
foundation was laid that the application of benzidine to the
body of a living person was a generally accepted procedure in
the field; (2) the state’s experts had not themselves conducted
research demonstrating the reliability and accuracy of such a
use of the test; and (3) the police officer who administered
the test was not shown to be qualified to do so.

The last objection is quite easily answered. During the ex-
tensive voir dire hearing conducted by the trial justice, the
officer involved testified that he had conducted “over a hun-
dred blood tests.” Further, we agree with the statement of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit that, speaking with reference to applica-
tion of benzidine to a human body, “[t]he simplicity of the
test makes it unnecessary to have it conducted by a physician.
It is a chemical test not a medical test and was properly
administered by a trained police technician. United States v.

| 397

Smith, 470 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The officer’s
qualifications as such a technician cannot be seriously chal-
lenged. In any case, it is well settled that the question of a
witness’ qualification to testify as an expert is within the
sound judicial discretion of the trial justice. State v. Johnson,
119 R.I. 749, 763, 383 A.2d 1012, 1020 (1978); State v.
Earley, 118 B.I. 205, 210, 373 A.2d 162, 165 (1977).

The remaining evidentiary objections can be discussed
together. The primary challenge to the test results rests on the
fact that they were admittedly not conclusive. Each expert
called before the court testified that normal procedure in all
cases of a preliminarily positive result was to perform addi-
tional tests to confirm positively the presence of blood; the
experts testified that only a negative result could be con-
sidered conclusive, that is, in reference to the absence of
blood. Nonetheless, the results of the intial test can be consid-
ered quite weighty by experts because, as both the officer
who administered the test and Dr. David R. Defanti, the di-
rector of the University of Rhode Island Crime Laboratory,
testified, benzidine almost instantly turns a deep blue to
blueish-green color when exposed to what is in fact blood.
That reaction was precisely the one obtained when the test
was performed on Carillo. Admittedly, what is called a “false
positive” is obtained when benzidine is exposed to a rather
large number of other substances that also contain the peroxi-
dase enzyme present in blood; however, it was the under-
standing of these same witnesses that the chemical reaction in
such a case would be noticeably slower and less intense in
color. In addition, it was their opinion that exposure to any
of those substances would nonetheless not produce a reaction
if the skin had in the interim been washed with even soap
and water; the effects of blood, on the other hand, are not so
easily removed. It seems unlikely that Carillo was sufficiently
exposed to any of those substances that would cause a “false
positive,”! considering the limited nature of his mobility at

1Examples of those substances are horseradish, radish, oranges, lemons, grape-
fruit, leaves, grass, asparagus, carrots, garden peas, squash, bananas, cauliflower,
romaine lettuce, potatoes, green beans, dandelion root, black fig pulp, green onion

bulbs, and watermelon; in addition, exposure to certain industrial cleaning
solutions might produce a “false” reaction.

398 ee

the time. Further, Carillo himself testified to having show-
ered only a few hours before the stabbing. In light of this evi-
dence, and because the record tends to confirm that the test
would operate with the same, though limited, degree of con-
clusiveness, we must agree with the conclusion of the trial
justice that the results of the test were probative. Further, we
agree with him that

“[t]he possibility of misleading the jury, because of the
controlled situation in which these events occurred up to
and including the test is remote, since the jury will be
aware that the test is preliminary only and not scienti-
fically conclusive for the presence of blood. This possi-
bility does not outweigh the probative value of the test
results.”

See United States v. Sheard, 473 F.2d 139, 148-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), citing Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990
(D.C. Cir. 1950).

Carillo also objects to the use of the test results because the
test was performed without a search warrant and conse-
quently runs afoul of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Carillo’s suppression motion came on to be heard during a
lapse in the jury-selection process. The defense presented as
its only witness a state police detective who was part of a
team of detectives that, upon its arrival at B dormitory, had
begun to interrogate all the inmates lodged in that facility.
The detective testified that Christopher Perry told him that
he, Perry, had seen Carillo sneak up on Price and stab the
officer in the chest. The detective also related that, according
to Perry, he had earlier in the day — at Carillo’s instructions
— picked up a rock in the prison yard and given it to Carillo,
who in turn used the rock as knife sharpener. This witness
also stated that the arrest had preceded the administration of
the benzidine test. Immediately after the detective finished
his testimony, the defense rested. Thereafter, the trial justice
tuled that there were reasonable grounds for Carillo’s arrest,
and we affirm this finding.

| 399

On appeal, however, Carillo takes further aim at the
denial of the motion to suppress by referring us to Chimel v.
United States, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.
Ed. 2d 685, 694 (1969), a holding that recognizes a warrant-
less search as being an incident of a valid arrest but stresses
that most often such a search is justified either to protect the
safety of the arresting officer or to deprive the arrestee of a
potential means of escape or an opportunity to destroy evi-
dence of a crime. Carillo now claims that none of these exi-
gencies were shown to be present when the benzidine swab
was being applied to his body.

At this juncture, we are presently reviewing the correct-
ness of the trial justice’s denial of the motion to suppress. At
no time while the motion was before the trial justice did
Carillo’s trial counsel make any effort in the way of evidenti-
ary presentation to alert the trial justice to what Carillo’s
present appellate counsel now maintains was the actual fact
when the police went about their task at the prison during
the early morning hours of June 22, 1973. While Carillo now
asks that we consider this issue in the light of all the relevant
evidence in the record, we shall not do so having in mind the
present posture of this case.

Redress in this particular area can be sought by way of our
Postconviction Relief Act, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment),
ch, 9.1 of title 10. If Carillo chooses to follow this route, con-
sideration should be given to the issue of whether or not the
application of benzidine to the body constitutes a search.”
Our examination of the benzidine cases indicates that there is
an assumption by the reviewing courts that such a technique
constitutes a search. We are not yet convinced that this is so.
However, for the purposes of the balance of this opinion, we
shall assume that it is.

*Another point of interest should be the rule enunciated in Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973), and United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973), which holds that a
full search of an arrestee’s person is reasonable in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest,

pO

400 ee

Hs The final challenge to admissibility of the results of the
benzidine test raises a somewhat interesting question. Carillo
claims that the “search” was in fact invalid under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments because of the clear car-
cinogenic properties of benzidine, properties that, according
to Carillo, offended fundamental standards of decency and
fairness and thus operated to deprive him of his due-process
rights. Assuming for purposes of this discussion that the
health dangers warned of by Carillo are accurate, we
must nonetheless judge the officer’s actions in light of the
knowledge possessed at the time; similarly, whatever may be
our opinion of the “fairness” of such a test in light of present
knowledge, we must measure the officer’s actions against
community standards of fair play and decency as they existed
at the time. In this regard, our review reveals that the issue of
the test’s hazards was not raised at trial. Rather, this question
is being raised for the first time on appeal.

HH __sIndeed, the only hints at trial of the possible danger in
using the substance came from witnesses for the state. Speci-
fically, the state’s principal toxicologist testified that he
would be “very reluctant” to perform the test on human skin
because the chemical is an irritant; further, Thomas B.
Curran (Curran), an agent of the FBI who testified for the
state, testified that he would not have used benzidine on a
body “[b]ecause it’s carcinogenic.” Yet, Carillo points to no
other testimony concerning the test’s danger, indicating that

-neither the defense nor the state had any detailed basis upon
which to question the procedure’s constitutionality on that
ground. Consequently, we cannot now say that, in light of
what was known at the time, the test was unreasonable ot
that it offended common notions of decency. Furthermore,
since the police were apparently unaware of any serious dan-
ger either to Carillo or to the officer who performed the test,
it seems clear that application of the exclusionary rule in this
case could not possibly serve its stated purpose of deterring
unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. E.g., State v.
Spratt, 120 R.I. 192, 193-94, 386 A.2d 1094, 1095 (1978),
citing, inter alia, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,

ee 401

446-47, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3028-29, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046, 1056
(1976).

Turning to the denial of the newly discovered evidence
motion, we repeat the principle that the trial court’s
determination of this issue is accorded great weight by this
court. E.g., Powers v. Carvalho, 117 B.1. 519, 524, 368 A.2d
1242, 1246 (1977); State v. Jefferson, 116 R.I. 124, 129, 353
A.2d 190, 194 (1976). The record indicates that Agent
Curran of the FBI was called by the state to testify to the re-
sults of the serological tests he had performed on items seized
on the night of the murder. During the course of his testi-
mony, Curran testified that benzidine turns blue “immedi-
ately” if blood is present, but that a false-positive reaction is
delayed. Specifically his testimony was that “[i]t [the reaction
time] might be as much as two or three minutes, or half an
hour, or something to that effect”; further, he testified that
the color of a false positive “is a light blue, much lighter
blue.” In this respect, it seems quite clear to us that Curran’s
testimony did no more than mirror the expert opinions given
earlier in the trial and outlined above. However, after the
trial, the state received and passed on to the defense informa-
tion from Clarence Kelly, director of the FBI, concerning
Curran, his qualifications, and the possible unreliability of
his testimony. First, it was learned that Curran’s trial testi-
mony stating that he possessed a Master’s Degree in zoology
was false because, even though he had taken all the courses
required for the Master’s Degree, Curran had in fact failed to
submit the required thesis. In addition, it was learned that
Curran had resigned from the FBI during an inquiry into his
conduct of another investigation; apparently, Curran had
reported results of tests that he had never actually performed
and had then lied under oath concerning those examinations.

We acknowledge the seriousness of knowing misrepresen-
tation by a witness for the state. See, ¢.g., United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L. Ed. 2d
342, 349 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70, 79
S. Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 1221 (1959). We also
accept for purposes of this discussion that the misrep-

402 ee

resentation, if cause for objection, is no less so because the
prosecuting attorney was unquestionably unaware of the
falsehood. See, e.g., Schneider v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 593, 595
(5th Cir. 1977); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th
Cir. 1964); Smith v. Florida, 410 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1969).
However, we must observe that the agent’s misrepresentation
solely concerned his possession of an advanced degree. As
indicated above, Curran’s testimony about the reaction of
benzidine with various substances was strictly cumulative in
nature; similarly, a post-trial reexamination by another FBI
specialist of the articles originally examined by Curran corro-
borated the findings testified to by Curran.

Carillo argues that “[h]ad the jury been aware of Mr.
Curran’s falsehood regarding his qualifications, they would
have been less likely to believe his testimony concerning the
reaction time of Benzidine to false positives.” Although such
a statement cannot be made with certainty, we accept for
present purposes that revelation of Curran’s actual educa-
tional status might have lessened his credibility somewhat.
Yet, in denying the new-trial motion, the trial justice
specifically found that “Curran still is qualified by education
and experience and training to be an expert in his field.”
Indeed, taking together the cumulative nature of much of
Curran’s testimony, the confirmatory tests run after trial by
the FBI, the evidence otherwise before the jury (char-
acterized by the trial court as “overwhelming”), and the pre-
cise nature of Curran’s misrepresentation, we must conclude
that there exists no reasonable likelihood that the testimony
as to a Master’s Degree could have affected the judgment of
the jury. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct.
2392, 2397, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 349 (1976); Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 79S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959); State
v. Carsetti, 111 R.I. 642, 651, 306 A.2d 166, 171 (1973).
That being the case, we cannot fault the denial of Carillo’s
motion for a new trial.

Carillo also alleges that the trial justice erred in permitting

the state, over the objection of his counsel, to question Carillo
in the presence of the jury concerning his having requested

| 403

the assistance of counsel once he learned he was under arrest.
Such questioning, he claims, was designed to plant in the
jurors’ minds the notion that Carillo, in calling for the
services of a lawyer, was implicitly conceding his involve-
ment in the homicide. The offending examination was as
follows: _

“Q. And when were you told that you were under
arrest?
A. I was downstairs when the state police detective
told me.
Q. He told you that you were under arrest for murder
didn’t he? :
Mr. Cicilline: Objection.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Well, what did he tell you that you were under
arrest for? .
Mr. Cicilline: Objection. _
The Court: Overruled.
A. I think he said I was just under arrest, that if I
wanted a lawyer I could have a lawyer.
. Gave you your constitutional rights?
Mr. Cicilline: Objection. + * « I move to pass
[after stating reasons for objection].
. Gave you your constitutional rights? Ask you if you
needed a lawyer, is that correct?
Yes, but he wouldn’t give me one when I said I
wanted a lawyer. He wouldn’t give me one.
. You asked him for a lawyer, is that correct?
He said I could have a lawyer. I said yes, I want a
lawyer.”
The question of improper prosecutorial comment arose
. recently in State v. Andrews, 120 R.I. 771, 390 A.2d 926
(1978). In that case we reaffirmed the standard laid down in
State v. Fontaine, 113 R.I. 557, 563, 323 A.2d 571, 574
(1974), that the language under consideration must have
been “ ‘manifestly intended’ or * * * of such a character that
a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it to amount
to a comment” on the defendant’s invocation of his constitu-

fe)

ro Fr 0

pO

404 ee

tional rights. Reviewing the challenged comment in context,
as we must, State v. Andrews, 120 R.I. 771, 775-76, 390
A.2d 926, 929 (1978), State v. Sawyers, 116 R.I. 230, 234,
354 A.2d 115, 117 (1976), we find it clear that neither prong
of the Fontaine test is satisfied. In particular, the jury, un-
aware of the legal niceties involved, clearly would not “natu-
rally and necessarily” construe the remarks as implying
Carillo’s own knowledge of his guilt. That being the case, we
can find no ground for reversal.

HH Carillo’s final objection is that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence certain portions of the autopsy report
prepared with respect to Price. Doctor Joseph A. Palumbo,
acting chief medical examiner, both conducted the autopsy
and testified to its results at trial. During the course of his
testimony, Dr. Palumbo referred to two pages of handwrit-
ten notes and diagrams, which were admitted into evidence
over Carillo’s objection. Carillo’s position is that the writings
were used to refresh the physician’s recollection on the stand
and, therefore, are allegedly inadmissible unless offered by
the opposing party. E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 612.

It seems obvious that Dr. Palumbo used his notes and
drawings to illustrate or clarify the testimony that he was pre-
senting, as well perhaps as to guard against some unexpected
lapse of memory. McCormick addresses the issue before us in
the following terms, which we think more relevant to the
question presented than are considerations of refreshing a
witness’ present memory:

“Tt is today increasingly common to encounter the offer
of tangible items which are not contended themselves to
have played any part in the history of the case, but
which are instead tendered for the purpose of rendering
other evidence more comprehensible to the trier of fact.
Examples of types of items frequently offered for pur-
poses of illustration and clarification include * « *
charts [and] drawings. If an article is offered for those
purposes, rather than as real or original evidence, * * *
the theory justifying admission of these exhibits requires

| 405

only that the item be sufficiently explanatory or illustra-
tive of relevant testimony in the case to be of potential
help to the trier of fact.” McCormick, Evidence §212 at
528. Cf. Segee v. Cowan, 66 R.I. 445, 20 A.2d 270
(1941).

The use of such aids as sketches is a matter addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial justice, and we find nothing that
convinces us that the trial justice improperly exercised his dis-
cretion.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed; the
judgment of conviction appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Joslin participated in the decision but retired
prior to its publication. Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not
participate.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Barry N. Capalbo,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Chief
Appellate Attorney, Dale G. Anderson, Assistant Public
Defender, for defendant.

406 |

408 A.2d 598.
Cuares Mepetros, Jr., et ux. vs. Hitton Homes, Inc.
NOVEMBER 21, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

=

407

Kewieuer, J. This appeal had its inception when a
Superior Court justice refused to allow the defendant
corporation to participate at a hearing at which the plaintiffs
would attempt to prove their damages following the entry of
a default against the defendant because it failed to answer
the plaintiffs’ complaint. Hereafter we shall refer to the
plaintiffs as “Hilton.”

Suit was commenced on September 7, 1974, by the filing
of a complaint in which the Medeiroses alleged that Hilton’s
agents had damaged the Medeiroses’ real estate with a

408 |

collection of surface water that resulted from the
unauthorized digging on the property of a ditch and the
laying of a sewer line which -was connected to a catch basin
situated on an adjacent lot. Since Hilton failed to respond to
the complaint within the prescribed 20-day period, a default
was entered on January 14, 1975. Thereafter, on September
6, 1975, Hilton filed a motion to set aside the default. This
motion was heard and denied on October 14, 1975.

At the October hearing, Hilton had contended that,
despite the denial of its motion to set aside, it still had a right
participate in a subsequent hearing at which the Medeiroses
would seek to establish their damages. In a September 3,
1976 written decision, the motion justice rejected this
contention; and on September 29, 1976, a judgment was
entered containing a finding that Hilton had no right to
participate in the hearing. No appeal was taken from that
judgment.

The damages hearing was ‘held on October 29, 1976. A
judgment was entered awarding the Medeiroses $13,134 in
damages. About 9 months later, Hilton’s present counsel
filed a motion to set aside the $13,134 judgment on the
ground that it was entered without any notice to it having
been issued. The motion was denied on September 16, 1977,
and this appeal ensued.

Rule 55 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
(Super. R. Civ. P.) deals with defaults, and it is fitting that
we discuss some of its pertinent provisions. The clerk of the
court may enter a default upon being made aware that a
party against whom affirmative relief is being sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend himself as provided by the
rules. Super. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The clerk is authorized by
Super. R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(1) to enter a default judgment
against a nonappearing defendant upon the request of the
plaintiff when the claim is for a sum certain or in a case
where the sum can be made certain by computation. In all
other cases, application for a default judgment must be made
to the court; and when a party has “appeared” in the action,

Ps — «(

he must be given a minimum of 3 days’ notice of the
pendency before the court of an application for the entry of
the default judgment. Super. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The court
is empowered by the terms of Super. R. Civ. P. 55(c) to “set
aside” a default “for good cause shown,” and, if a default
judgment has been entered, relief might be obtained through
the relevant provisions of Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A full
reading of Rule 55 shows that it embraces two steps: the
entry of a default, which is then to be followed by the entry
of a default judgment.

The motion to set aside the default was based upon an
affidavit of Hilton’s treasurer, who averred that Hilton had
failed to answer the pending suit because, after talking to the
Medeiroses’ attorney, the treasurer had the “clear
impression” that the attorney had promised that any further
litigation would come by way of a “new action against Hilton
Homes.” Hilton also insisted that it was still entitled to
participate in the hearing on damages despite the denial of its
motion to set aside because it believed that, by filing that
motion, it had, for the purposes of Super. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2),
“appeared” in the action.

The motion justice rejected this argument because his
research had convinced him that Rule 55 contemplates that
notice be given only in those instances in which the
defendant has filed an answer. According to the motion
justice, a defendant who chooses “not to answer” is forever
barred from participating in the damages facet of the suit.

In seeking to vacate the $13,134 default judgment, Hilton
invoked Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), which affords relief from
a void judgment. Hilton’s claim of voidness is based upon our
holding in Pollins v. McGovern, 110 R.I. 186, 291 A.2d 418
(1972). There, a default judgment had been entered in the
District Court against a defendant who had filed an answer
in the case. District Court Rules of Civil Procedure are, for
the most part, identical to those of the Superior Court. There
is no difference between the Superior Court’s and District
Court’s versions of Rule 55. In Pollins, we ruled that the

410 ee

default judgment was void in the light of the plaintiff's
failure to give the requisite notice. The Medeiroses
acknowledge the rule of Pollins but argue that because Hilton
failed to appeal from the judgment barring it from
participating in any way in the damages hearing, it is now
barred by the principle of res judicata from raising the
jurisdictional question.

Hs We would first point out that the Medeiroses’ reliance on
res judicata gives us little pause because the doctrine requires
a finality of judgment. Gnys v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co.,
121 RI. 131, 396 A.2d 107 (1979); Air-Lite Products, Inc.
v. Gilbane Building Co., 115 R.I. 410, 347 A.2d 623 (1975).
Finality of judgment contemplates an act that definitely
terminates the litigation between the parties so that if we
were to affirm the subject judgment, the trial court would
have nothing further to do on remand other than order
execution of the judgment previously entered. State v.
Piedmont Funding Corp., 121 R.I. 27, 394 A.2d 694
(1978); Murphy v. Bocchio, 114 R.I. 679, 338 A.2d 519
(1975); Rubin v. Rubin, 105 R.I. 647, 254 A.2d 424 (1969).
If we were to affirm the judgment barring Hilton from
participating in the damages facet of this controversy, the
litigation would still continue because the Medeiroses would
have been required to convince the trial justice that Hilton’s
willful trespass damaged their property. Since the September
29, 1976 bar-the-courthouse-door judgment is purely
interlocutory, res judicata vanishes as an issue.

HH —sJudgment by default is a drastic remedy which should only
be employed in extreme situations. Affanato v. Merrill Bros.
547 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1977). The appearance required by the
rule has been broadly defined and not limited to a formal
court appearance. Carlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. v. Fedder
Data Center, 556 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1977). The proviso in
question seeks to insure fairness by affording notice to a party
who has expressed an interest in defending the suit brought
against him. R.F. v. D.G.W., 192 Colo. 528, 560 P.2d 837
(1977). Here, when Hilton filed its motion to set aside the

Ss

default, it had, for the purposes of the rule, “appeared”! in
the case and was then entitled to a minimum of 3 days’ notice
of the hearing which culminated in the entry of the $13,000-
plus judgment. Big Spring v. Black Feet Tribe of Blackfeet
Indian Reservation, 175 Mont. 258, 573 P.2d 655 (1978).

In light of what we said in Pollins relative to voidness,?
Hilton should have been granted relief under Super. R. Civ.

P. 60(b)(4).

The defendant's appeal is sustained, the default judgment
is hereby vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior
Court for further proceedings.

Moore, Virgadamo & Lynch, Ltd., Joseph R. Palumbo,
Jr., for plaintiffs.

Blais, Cunningham, Thayer, Gagnon & Ross, Ernest J.
Pratt, for defendant.

Min. their complaint, the Medeiroses alleged that the Hilton's ditch digging and
pipe laying constituted an unlawful act and a willful trespass. Hilton’s motion to set
aside the default was accompanied by an affidavit of defense, in which Hilton
denied these allegations. An informative discussion of all facets of what courts have
said constitutes an “appearance” for the purposes of Rule 55(b)(2) can be found in
27 A.L.R. Fed. 620 (1976) and 73 A.L.R.Sd 1250 (1976). Both annotations point
out that an “appearance” is usually regarded as some overt action by which a party
against whom suit has been commenced submits himself or herself to the court's
jurisdiction. However, there is a difference of opinion as to whether a challenge to
the court’s jurisdiction constitutes an “appearance.” See 27 A.L.R. Fed. 620,
625-26 § 4; 73 A.L.R.3d 1250, 1259-61 § 7.

*Federal courts have ruled that a failure to give the 3 days’ notice, while a serious
procedural error, does not render the judgment void. In Winfield Associates, Inc.
v, Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1970), the court observed:

“A procedural defect, such as failure to give notice as required, may be
sufficient to afford relief from a default judgment on appeal ér for relief
under Rule 60(b) or together with other irregularities shown by the facts of a
particular case may render the judgment void, however the error should not
usually be treated as so serious as to render the judgment void.”

The courts taking this position point out that a judgment is void only if the court
which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if it
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, or if the judgment was procured
through fraud or collusion. We shall leave any reconsideration of Pollins v.
McGovern, 110 B.1, 186, 291 A.2d 418 (1979), to another day.

412

408 A.2d 601.
StraTE vs. Marco D. Norpstroo et al.
NOVEMBER 21, 1979.
Paesenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Weispercer, J. This case comes before us on appeal from
judgments of the Superior Court wherein the four defendants
were found guilty of conspiracy to assault with a dangerous
weapon and assault with a dangerous weapon; three of the
defendants were also found guilty of carrying a concealed
weapon, and two of these three were found guilty of assault
with intent to murder. All charges arose out of a series of
brutal assaults and batteries allegedly committed by the
various defendants upon a number of patrons of an
establishment known as the Narragansett Cafe in the city of
Newport.

The facts in the case were vigorously disputed, particularly
those elements relating to a conspiracy and the specific parts
played by individual defendants in regard to the various
assaults and batteries with dangerous weapons. On appeal

| 413

defendants raise a number of issues. In view of our response
to one of these issues, it will be unnecessary to reach or
discuss the other points raised.

The record establishes that on January 21, 1977, after the
state had rested its case against defendants but before the
presentation of defense testimony had begun, a conversation
took place between the trial justice and an attorney for one of
the defendants. During the course of this conversation, the
trial justice referred to defendants as “bad bastards.” This
comment was probably precipitated by counsel’s having
stated to the trial justice that he should have had his head
examined for getting into this case. The trial justice and
counsel were old friends, and the conversation was believed
by the trial justice to be a private and confidential communi-
cation.

Thereafter, however, the attorney placed this con-
versation on the record and moved that the trial justice
declare a mistrial and that he disqualify himself from further
participation in the case.! Both motions were denied. The
trial justice negated any bias on his part but agreed that the
remark was an unfortunate one which would never have been
uttered save for counsel’s opening the conversation in the way
that he did.

Later, on March 29, 1977, after defendants had been
sentenced, the trial justice read a written statement into the
record setting forth in further detail his reaction to the
conversation between himself and counsel. Counsel and the
trial justice throughout the controversy on this issue were in
substantial agreement regarding the contents of the
conversation of January 21, 1977, and the events that led up
to the trial justice’s characterization of defendants.

‘It was understood during the trial that any motion made by one defendant
would inure to the benefit of all.

414 ee

In State v. Nunes, 99 R.I. 1, 5, 205 A.2d 24, 27 (1964), this
court quoted with approval a statement from Stamp v.
Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 404, 413, 243 S.W. 27, 31 (1922):

“Not only must the judges presiding over the courts be
honest, unbiased, impartial, disinterested in fact, but it
is of the utmost importance that all suspicion to the
contrary must be jealously guarded against and if
possible be completely eliminated, if we are to give full
effect to the dignity of the bench and maintain public
confidence in its integrity and usefulness.”

In Nunes, supra, although the record failed to disclose any
court ruling that was inherently unfair or hostile to the
defendant, language uttered by the trial justice in passing on
a motion to revoke bail was such as to negate the required
impartiality, apparent as well as real.

In the case at bar, the trial justice is an experienced and
outstanding member of the bench. The attorney who raised
this issue is an eminent member of the bar. Both agonized
over the comment but reached different conclusions as to its
import.

We are of the opinion that the defendants have met the
burden of proof of prejudice laid down in State v. Nunes,
supra. Although the evidence submitted during the course of
the state’s presentation would warrant a person of ordinary
sensibilities to be horrified at the conduct ascribed to the
various defendants by prosecution witnesses, it is a familiar
principle that judicial officers must keep their minds open
until the entire case is concluded and arguments of counsel
have been heard. This duty often runs counter to natural
human reaction. Nevertheless, it is required in order to
vindicate our system of criminal adjudication. We are thus
constrained to conclude that the defendants were entitled to
the granting of their motion for mistrial under the
circumstances of this case. :

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ appeals are
sustained, the judgments of conviction are vacated, and the

SS
case is remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Frederick Cass,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

James M. Shannahan, John F. Cicilline, John A. O'Neill,
Jr., Joseph L. DeCaporale, Jr., Robert A. Shuman, Joseph T.
Trainor, for defendants.

408 A.2d 928,

NortH ProvipeNce ScHoor COMMITTEE vs.
Ruopve IsLanp State Lasor Retations Boarp et al.

NOVEMBER 21, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

WEISBERGER, J. This case comes before us on a petition
for certiorari from a judgment of the Superior Court which
reversed decisions by the Rhode Island State Labor Relations
Board (the board) ordering an election and requiring the
North Providence School Committee to bargain with repre-
sentatives of a group of employees who perform crossing-
guard duties.

This dispute primarily arises out of an interpretation of a
section of the Municipal Employees’ Arbitration Act, G.L.
1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-9.4-2(2) (the act), which
provides in pertinent part as follows:

“Municipal employee’ means any employee of a
municipal employer, whether or not in the classified
service of the municipal employer, except elected offi-
cials, administrative officials, board and commission
members, certified teachers, policemen, firefighters,
part-time employees who work less than twenty (20)
hours per week, and persons in supervision [sic]
positions.”

Section 28-9.4-3 accords to municipal employees as
defined above the right to bargain collectively with muni-
cipal employers. It is conceded that the school committee is a
municipal employer.

The Superior Court interpreted the statute as not granting
to part-time employees who work less than twenty hours the

Re

right to bargain collectively and, therefore, reversed
decisions of the board which purported to grant such rights to
the crossing guards. The facts are undisputed. School
crossing guards in North Providence work every day of the
school year, which normally covers 180 days. They work
approximately ten hours per week and are paid about $45 per
week, .

On September 12, 1975, representatives of Local 1033 of
the Laborers’ International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO (the union) filed a petition with the board, seeking
certification as the bargaining representative for the sixteen
crossing guards employed by the North Providence School
Committee. The school committee opposed the petition on
the ground that these crossing guards were part-time
employees who worked fewer than twenty hours per week
and therefore were excluded from the statutory definition of
“municipal employees” and hence were not entitled to
bargain collectively. The board issued an order based upon
the conclusion that the guards were full-time employees of
the town of North Providence and therefore did not come
within the “part-time” exception of §28-9.4-2(2) of the act.
Thus the board held that the twenty-hour limitation did not
apply to the crossing guards since they were “full-time
employees.” The order directed an election to be held.
Thereafter, an election was held on December 3, 1975,
wherein a majority of the guards voted to be represented by
the union, and the board certified the union as the bargain-
ing representative for the guards. The school committee
refused to bargain with the union and maintained its position
that the guards were ineligible to bargain collectively under
the act. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge on
January 2, 1976; and on June 25, 1976, the board ordered the
school commmittee to bargain with the union.

The school Committee appealed both board decisions -- the
order directing that an election be held, and the order to
bargain -- to the Superior Court. The only issue on appeal, as
before us, was whether the board was correct in determining

418 ee

that the guards were municipal employees as defined in the
act. The Superior Court held that since the guards worked
less than twenty hours ‘per week, they came within the
exception provided in §28-9.4-2(2) of the act and were
therefore not eligible to organize and bargain collectively
with the school committee. We agree.

Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity and
expresses a clear and sensible meaning, such meaning is
presumed to be intended by the Legislature and the statute
must be interpreted literally. Statewide Multiple Listing
Service, Inc. v. Norberg, 120 R.I. 937, 392 A.2d 372, 373
(1978); Markham v. Allstate Insurance Co., 116 R.I. 152,
155-56, 352 A.2d 651, 653 (1976); Podborski v. William H.
Haskell Manufacturing Co., 109 R.I. 1, 8, 279 A.2d 914,
918 (1971).

In the case at bar our Legislature clearly intended to create
asimple, bright-line exception to the definition of “municipal
employees.” This exception consists of part-time employees
who work less than twenty hours per week. The argument of
the State Labor Relations Board that such employees,
although they work fewer than twenty hours per week, are
not “part-time” employees is unpersuasive to us as it was to
the Superior Court. The board would create an ad hoc
interpretation based upon each job classification in place of
the clear line of demarcation which the Legislature
employed.

In support of its position, counsel for the board argues that
our statutory definition was derived from the Connecticut
Municipal Employee Relations Act which contains a similar
exception for “part-time” employees who work less than
twenty hours per week. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §7-467(2)
(West 1972).! Counsel for the board further argues that the
Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, in Thompson
Board of Education, Decision No. 925 (May 12, 1970),

!This statute has recently been amended in respect to provisions which are not
pertinent here. See 1978 Conn. Pub. Act No. 78-375, §1.

SS

authorized a unit of eleven bus drivers, eight of whom
worked fewer than twenty hours per week, to organize and
bargain collectively. This decision was based upon an
administrative rule which the Connecticut State Board of
Labor Relations had developed prior to the adoption of the
statutory definition of part-time employees.

However, in a later case wherein a group of approximately
fifty school crossing guards employed by the city of New
Britain sought bargaining rights, the Connecticut State
Board of Labor Relations rejected its prior interpretation and
construed the Connecticut exclusion literally. The crossing
guards were determined to be excluded from the right to
bargain since they worked less than twenty hours per week.
City of New Britain, Connecticut State Board of Labor
Relations Decision No. 1201 (Feb. 14, 1974). This decision
was upheld by the Connecticut Court of Common Pleas.
City of New Britain v. Connecticut State Board of Labor
Relations, 31 Conn. Supp. 211, 327 A.2d 268 (C.P. 1974).
Thus, the most recent interpretation given to the Connecticut
statute by its State Board of Labor Relations and by a
reviewing court is consonant with that adopted by the
Superior Court in the case at bar.?

We are of the opinion that the construction given by the
Superior Court that municipal employees who work less than
twenty hours are part-time employees and that they are
excluded from the definition contained in §28-9.4-2(2) of the
act is correct.

For the reasons given, the judgment below is affirmed.
The writ of certiorari heretofore issued is quashed, and the

2In originally adopting the twenty-hour rule, the Connecticut State Board of
Labor Relations assumed that those who worked less than twenty hours were not
only part-time workers, but that they were working less than half time. Thus the
assumption which underlay the rule was that the standard full-time work week was
forty hours. See Davidson ¢> Leventhal, Inc., Conn. State Bd. of Labor Relations
Dee. No. 120 (Feb. 3, 1948); Darcy, Foy, James, & Kingston, Connecticut Labor
Relations Statutes and Decisions: Differences from Federal Law, 9 Conn. L. Rev.
515, 525 (1977).

420

papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court with
our decision endorsed thereon.

Robert S. Ciresi, for plaintiff-respondent.

Vincent F. Kane, Legal Counsel, Labor Relations Board,
for defendants-petitioners.

408 A.2d 603.
STATE vs. JouN DeSmas.
NOVEMBER 23, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

; 6

42)

Dons, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of
conviction entered in the Superior Court adjudging the
defendant, John DeSimas, guilty of a violation of G.L. 1956
(1968 Reenactment) §21-28-4.06(1)(c), knowingly and
unlawfully visiting a common nuisance for the purpose of
using and taking phencyclidine and marijuana.

The defendant was charged in a two-count criminal
information. Count I charged him with unlawful possession
with intent to deliver phencyclidine. Count II charged him
with frequenting a narcotic nuisance. After trial before a
Superior Court justice, sitting without a jury, Count I was
dismissed and defendant was ‘adjudged guilty of Count II.
The trial justice imposed a sentence of six months at the
Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), suspended the
execution thereof, and placed defendant on probation for a
period of six months. From the judgment of conviction
thereafter entered, defendant has appealed to this court.

The defendant testified that on July 14, 1975, at about
5:30 p.m. he visited Ronnie Brown’s Warwick apartment,
which he had visited on two or three previous occasions. He

422 ee

testified that while he was sitting in the living room of the
apartment and drinking a beer, a person later identified as
Officer Terrence Kane, arrived and went into a bedroom
with Ronnie Brown. The defendant stated that he did not
speak to Kane before Brown and Kane went into the
bedroom. He also testified that later one of the arresting
officers searched him and removed a vial containing
phencyclidine from his pocket. He denied that he was
smoking marijuana at any time.

Officer Kane testified that on July 14, 1975, he arrived at
the apartment at approximately 6:00 p.m. to purchase some
illicit controlled substances from Brown. He stated that as he
was admitted into the apartment by Brown, he observed
several persons, including defendant, seated on a waterbed
in the living room. He said that these individuals were
passing around a hand rolled cigarette that he believed was
marijuana because it smelled sweet, like hemp. He stated
that he saw the cigarette in the hands of defendant. He also
testified that one of the individuals offered him a drag on the
cigarette but that he declined, stating that he did not want to
get high when he was buying a lot of narcotics. He stated
that when he was talking to Brown, defendant was about
three feet away.

Kane further testified that he and Brown then entered the
bedroom to complete the drug transaction. After agreeing on
the price, Kane went outside to his car to get the money.
While outside, he told a surveillance team that in addition to
Brown there were other suspects in the apartment. Kane
testified that he then reentered the apartment, leaving the
door ajar, and returned with Brown to the bedroom to
complete the transaction. When Brown was counting the
money, Kane identified himself as a police officer and placed
Brown under arrest. At that time the surveillance team
entered the apartment and arrested defendant and the other
persons who were also in the apartment.

On appeal, defendant alleges that there was insufficient
evidence produced at trial to convict him of a violation of

es 493

§21-28-4.06(1)(c).1 The defendant argues that the state had
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defen-
dant knew Brown used his apartment for the unlawful sale of
a controlled substance and that he visited that apartment for
the purpose of taking or using a controlled substance. He
asserts that the state produced no evidence purporting to
show that defendant visited Brown’s apartment for the
purpose of using or taking a controlled substance.

The state contends that sufficient evidence was produced
to establish that Brown’s apartment was a common nuisance.
It further urges that the totality of the evidence supports a
reasonable inference, and provides sufficient proof from
which the trial justice could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant’s visit to Brown’s apartment was for the
purpose of using or taking a controlled substance.

In a recent case involving a conviction under this statute,
we have indicated that specific intent is difficult to establish
by direct evidence; and because it is the result of a mental
process, it must ordinarily be proved by circumstantial
evidence, and that it may be inferred from conduct when it is
plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability. State v.
Boily, 116 R.I. 37, 41, 351 A.2d 818, 820 (1976).

General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §21-28-4.06 reads as follows:

“Any store, shop, warehouse, building, vehicle, airoraft, vessel or any place
whatever which is used for the unlawful sale, use or keeping of a controlled
substance shall be deemed a common nuisance. ’

“(1) Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:

(a) Knowingly keeping and maintaining such a common nuisance as
described in this section may be imprisoned for not more than five (6) years, and
fined not more than one thouseand dollars ($1,000), or both;

(b) knowingly permitting any store, shop, warehouse, building, vehicle,
aircraft, vessel or any place whatever which is owned or controlled by him to be
used as a common nuisance may be imprisoned for not more than fifteen (15)
years, and fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both;

() knowingly visiting a common nuisance as described in this section for the
purpose of using or taking in any manner any controlled substance may be
imprisoned for not more than one year and fined not more than three hundred
dollars ($300).”

424 ee

In Boily, there was testimony that the defendant had been
seen passing around what resembled a marijuana cigarette in
the apartment on previous occasions, had visited the
apartment earlier in the day, and was returning to the
apartment when he was arrested. The defendant, however,
was not in the apartment when the police entered to make
the arrest. It was held that these facts did not constitute
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of a criminal
offense by the defendant at the time of his arrest.

In the instant case, defendant was seated in the apartment
both at the time Kane entered it to carry out the purchase of
a controlled substance and also at the time the surveillance
team entered the apartment and made the arrests. The
defendant was also seen holding a marijuana cigarette.

The testimony of Officer Kane relating to the purchase of
narcotics from Brown, if believed, was sufficient to establish
that the apartment of Ronnie Brown was a common nuisance
as defined by §21-28-4.06. In addition, Officer Kane testified
that he indicated in the presence of defendant that he was in
the apartment to buy narcotics from Brown. In our opinion,
the trial justice was entitled on this evidence to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that
Brown’s apartment was being used for the unlawful sale, use,
or keeping of a controlled substance. The state further points
to testimony that defendant was holding a marijuana
cigarette and to defendant’s own testimony that he visited the
apartment on previous occasions, and argues that this was
sufficient for the trial justice to conclude the defendant
intended to visit the apartment to use marijuana.

The trial justice on the evidence concluded that defendant
went to the apartment for the purpose of using marijuana.
Prior to finding defendant guilty, the trial justice stated:

“The Court heard the testimony. The testimony of
Officer Kane, going there, what transpired. Mr. Kane,
obviously, had some experience in the field of drugs,
particularly marijuana. He said he knows what it smells

ee 425

like. It was being passed around. It was offered to him,
notwithstanding the testimony of the defendant.

“[S]pecifically, I find that the evidence is such, and the
reasonable inferences are such as to warrant a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant went to
this place, knew that narcotics were used or dispensed
there. He went for that purpose, and that he did carry
out the purpose, and did use narcotics there.”

It is apparent that the trial justice considered the testimony of
Officer Kane and defendant. He chose, as was his right, to
believe the testimony of Officer Kane. He then drew an
inference based on that testimony that defendant went to
Brown’s apartment for the express purpose of using or taking
a controlled substance in violation of §21-28-4.06(1)(c).

In our judgment, the inference drawn by the trial justice
that the defendant went to Brown’s apartment for the
purpose of using or taking a controlled substance is supported
by the evidence. Under the circumstances the trial justice’s
finding that the state has proved the defendant is guilty of the
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt is correct.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Daniel Schrock,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Aram K. Berberian, for defendant.

426

408 A.2d 606.
IN RE DENISE AND KEVIN.
NOVEMBER 30, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Bevitacgua, C.J. This is an appeal brought by Shirley
Zolnierz, the mother of Kevin and Denise Rich, from a
decree of the Family Court awarding custody of Kevin and
Denise to Child Welfare Services Division of the Department
of Social and Rehabilitative Services (CWS).

This case arises out of a petition filed by CWS in Family
Court on November 12, 1969, asking that Denise and Kevin
be adjudged “dependent” children within the meaning of
G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §14-1-3(H),! as amended by
P.L. 1969, ch. 252, §1 and placed in the custody of CWS.

+General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §14-1-3(H), as amended by P.L. 1969,
ch. 252, §1 provides in pertinent part:

“The terms ‘dependent’ and/or ‘neglected’ when applied to a child shall
mean and include any child--

Who is homeless or destitute or abandoned or dependent upon the public
for support * * + or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness
or depravity on the part of the parent or parents having custody or control of
such child is an unfit place for such child + + +.”

ee 421

After a hearing the court granted the petitions and
awarded legal custody of Denise and Kevin to CWS on
December 18, 1969. Since that time, however, the mother
and CWS have engaged in protracted litigation in the Family
Court regarding the custody and placement of Denise and
Kevin.

On the basis of a capias issued by the Family Court, the
mother came before the Family Court, and when the mother
refused to return the children to CWS, the agency filed a
petition requesting the court to order the return of the
children and also to place the children with an out-of-state
facility. Before the hearing the mother filed her own petition
seeking review of the prior court order as to care, custody and
control. Pending the hearing the court ordered the children
to undergo evaluations at the Juvenile Diagnostic Center.

On the basis of the reports submitted by the Juvenile
Diagnostic Center, by Dr. Sadovnikoff, a Child Welfare
Services Social case worker, and by the Childrens’ Friend &
Service, as well as the testimony and demeanor of the mother
at the hearings, the trial justice found that although the
mother of Denise and Kevin had a “deep and abiding love”
for her children, she was “not capable emotionally or
mentally to care for the children at the present time.” He
then ordered that they remain in the custody of CWS and
that placement outside the state of Rhode Island was in the
best interest of the children.

The petitioner argues that the trial justice erred in holding
that she was still incapable of caring for her children and that
the decree awarding continued custody and control of them
to CWS was insufficiently supported by the evidence. We
disagree. Initially, we note that the Family Court is one of
statutory creation and possesses only those powers conferred
upon it by statute. Castellucci v. Castellucci, 116 R.I. 101,
105, 352 A.2d 640, 643 (1976). General Laws 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §14-1-34, as amended by P.L. 1978, ch. 77, §1
grants power to the Family Court to award custody of
children found to be dependent within the meaning of the

498

statute to an appropriate agency and also to modify or revoke
such orders “at any time, for good cause shown.”

It is well-settled doctrine that the court should not change
or modify a previous order of care, custody and control of
minor children absent a showing that there has been some
alteration or change in the circumstances that existed at the
time of the original order. King v. King, 114 R.I. 329, 331,
333 A.2d 135, 137 (1976). Where such modification is sought,
it is incumbent upon the moving party to establish by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that because of altered
conditions or other good reasons a change is necessary in the
interest of the children’s welfare. Vieira v. Vieira, 98 B.I.
454, 457, 204 A.2d 431, 433 (1964); see King v. King, supra.

Though it is true, as the plaintiff contends here, that in
custody cases, the rights of natural parents are an important
consideration, we follow the long-established rule that in
awarding custody the court’s overriding concern should be
the best interest and welfare of the children. Engelhardt v.
Bergeron, 113 R.1. 50, 57, 317 A.2d 877, 882 (1974); Zinniv.
Zinni, 103 R.I. 417, 420, 238 A.2d 373, 375 (1968).

In reviewing the decree of a trial justice sitting without a
jury to determine whether his findings are supported by the
evidence, we are aware that these findings are entitled to
great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it
can be shown that they are clearly wrong or that the trial
justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.
Matracia v. Matracia, Sr., 119 R.I. 431, 436, 378 A.2d
1388, 1390 (1977); Raheb v. Lemenski, 115 R.I. 576, 579,
350 A.2d 397, 399 (1976). In such a case we need only
determine whether, having made supportable findings, he
applied the correct rule of law. Wolf v. Wolf, 114 R.I. 375,
376, 333 A.2d 138, 140 (1975).

We have carefully reviewed the record and find that it
contains substantial evidence to support the findings of the
trial justice, particularly his conclusion that the best interests
of the children militate against their return to the care,

ee 429

custody and control of the mother. Despite the contentions of
the mother, the record is barren of any evidence to indicate
that there have been any changes in the circumstances and
conditions of the parties such as would warrant a conclusion
that the well being and welfare of the children can best be
provided for by the mother. The plaintiff has therefore failed
to meet the burden of proof necessary to sustain a change of
custody.

The appeal is denied and dismissed and the decree
appealed from is affirmed.

Shirley Rich Zolnierz, pro se, appellant.
Raymond E. Shawcross, Chief Legal Counsel,

Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services, for
appellee.

408 A.2d 608.

Roserr V. Kauian vs. PEopLe ACTING
Turoucn Community Errorr, Inc. (PACE).

NOVEMBER 30, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

430

Bevitacgua, C.J. This is an appeal, in a civil action,
from a judgment granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

The plaintiff, Robert V. Kalian, is the owner in common
with others of a number of residential housing units in
Providence. The defendant, People Acting Through
“Community Effort, Inc. (PACE), is a nonbusiness corpora-
tion organized under Rhode Island law. As part of a general
program designed to bring pressure on plaintiff to improve
his property, PACE embarked upon a series of acts intended
to embarrass plaintiff in public. The defendant’s members
picketed at plaintiff's place of worship and at his place of
fraternal association and passed out leaflets accusing him of
practicing “slumlandlordism.”

The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking an injunction and

ee) 431

damages for invasion of privacy and infliction of severe
emotional distress. The trial justice initially granted a
temporary restraining order. Pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial
justice granted defendant’s motion and vacated the
temporary restraining order. The plaintiff now appeals from
this judgment.

The issue presented is to what extent this court should
recognize as a general principle of law that the invasion of
one’s privacy by another is subject to liability and damages
for resulting harm.

Both parties concede that an action for the invasion of
privacy was not maintainable at common law. In Henry v.
Cherry & Webb, 30 B.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909), the plaintiff
brought an action for the unauthorized publication of a
picture of the plaintiff in a newspaper advertisement. This
court stated that it was unable to discover at common law
that an invasion of privacy was actionable. The court stated
further that if the right of privacy should become necessary
or desirable, it would be the function of the Legislature to
enact legislation to insure this right. Inaction on the part of
the Legislature, however, could not confer that function on
the judiciary.

The plaintiff here contends that the right of privacy has
developed considerably since the Henry decision. That right
now provides protection against four distinct strands of the
general tort of invasion of privacy: (a) unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another, (b) appropriation of the other’s
name or likeness, (c) unreasonable publicity given to the
other’s private life, and (d) publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public.
Restatement (Second) Torts, §652 A(2) at 376 (1977):
Prosser, Torts, §117 at 802-18 (4th ed. 1971). The plaintiff
strongly urges this court to recognize a cause of action for the
fourth strand: publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye. The plaintiff in essence is asking this

432 |

court by judicial rule to create a new cause of action, a
function that is customarily left to the Legislature.

For 63 years following the Henry decision, the Rhode
Island Legislature failed to recognize any cause of action for
the invasion of privacy. In 1972, however, 3 months after
Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I. 1972), a
diversity case in which the Federal District Court noted the
lack of any common-law right of privacy in Rhode Island,!
the Legislature responded by enacting legislation providing
for both injunctive relief and damages for the unauthorized
commercial use of the name, portrait or picture of any
person.”

At the time of the enactment in 1972 of G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §9-1-28, the four strands of the right of
privacy described in the Restatement had been well recog-
nized in many jurisdictions. Rhode Island, however, saw fit
to limit this right only to protection against the unauthorized
use of name, portrait or picture for commercial advantage. It
can therefore be inferred that the Legislature deliberately
excluded the other three strands when §9-1-28 was enacted.

We agree that from a standpoint of sound public policy,
the creation of new rights of action in the field of individual
privacy is a question for the consideration and determination
of the Legislature. See Whitcomb v. Huffington, 180 Kan.

\1The Federal District Court stated:

“that a person has no right of privacy for the invasion of which an action
for damages lies at common law,’ is clear and unequivocal. The Henry court
left it to the legislature to provide for an actionable right of privacy if it so
desired. To date the legislature has not shown any such desire, and Henry
stands as the only existing Rhode Island authority on the right of privacy.”
Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.R.I. 1972).

°General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-1-28 states in part:

“Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without his written consent
may bring an action in the superior court against the person so using his
name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may
recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use.”

| 433

340, 304 P.2d 465 (1956). By this holding, however, we are
not saying that it is not within the power and authority of this
court to abrogate judicially created rules. See Digby v.
Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 388 A.2d 1 (1978). “When the
rationales which gave meaning and coherence to a judicially
created rule are no longer vital, and the rule itself is not
consonant with the needs of contemporary society, a court
not only has the authority but also the duty to reexamine its
precedents rather than to apply by rote an antiquated
formula.” Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 628, 351 N.E.2d
526, 531 (1976). That we decide against changing the rule
today does not in any way preclude this court from
reconsidering its position if the Legislature fails to act, and if
by such failure would perpetuate injustice.

The plaintiff in this case has no cause of action.? The
plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed.

Aram K. Berberian, for plaintiff.

Mortimer C. Newton, for defendant.

°The plaintiff raised several other issues but failed to brief and argue them before
this court. Under Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules, they are deemed to be
waived,

408 A.2d 930.

AssoctaTEs CaprraL SERVICES CORPORATION
vs. Ronap L, Riccarot.

NOVEMBER 30, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Pe 8 §— 135
a

Keener, J. This advisory opinion to the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island is rendered
pursuant to the pertinent provisions of Rule 6 of the rules of
this court. The above-entitled action was originally brought
by the plaintiff, Associates Capital Services Corporation
(Associates) against the defendant, Ronald L. Riccardi
(Riccardi), in the District Court as a diversity action under 28
U.S.C. §1332. Associates sought to recover a deficiency
judgment for $325,045.27 pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §6A-9-504(2), the Rhode Island counterpart of
the Uniform Commercial Code (Code).

The facts giving rise to this litigation are uncontradicted.
In 1972 Riccardi entered into two separate agreements for
the lease-purchase of specialized electronics components for
use in a two-way motor-vehicle communications system. The
leases called for total rental payments amounting to
$377,989. Riccardi made a $15,001 down payment, leaving a
balance due of $362,988. He executed security agreements
with Motorola Communications and Electronics, Inc.
(Motorola) and pledged the equipment as collateral.
Motorola subsequently assigned its interests in the security
agreements and the leases to Associates.

oS

In 1973, after making rental payments of $18,149.40,
Riccardi defaulted under the terms of both agreements.
Associates thereupon made demand for the total rental
balance then due, to wit, $344,838.60. When its demands
were unmet, Associates repossessed most of the collateral and
resold it at two public auction sales that realized a total of
$32,775. After crediting Riccardi’s account with an
additional $875 for equipment repossessed but not sold,
Associates sued Riccardi in the District Court, seeking a
deficiency judgment of $325,045.27. The District Court
concluded that the sales were not conducted in a
“commercially reasonable manner,”! but the court was
unsure whether judgment could be entered for the creditor
once it had ruled that the Creditor failed to dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Associates
Capital Services Corp. v. Riccardi, 454 F. Supp. 832, 834
(D.R.I. 1978).

As was noted in Rhode Island Hospital Trust National
Bank v. National Health Foundation, 119 R.I. 823, 835,
384 A.2d 301, 307 n.2 (1978) (Kelleher, J., dissenting), courts
have expressed three different views about the effect of a
creditor’s noncompliance with the mandate of §6A-9-504
that the disposition of collateral be made in a commercially
reasonable manner. These divergent holdings have been
synthesized by the District Court into the following certified
question:

“If a secured creditor fails to make a commercially
reasonable disposition of collateral in compliance with
Associates’ sales came under scrutiny because of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§6A-9-504(3), which in its pertinent part states:

“Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings

* » « and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the dis-
position including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, rea-
sonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended
disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor

nee”

Pe
the provisions of R.I. Gen.Laws §6A-9-504(3), 1969,

1. is such misconduct an absolute bar to a deficiency
judgment; or

2. may the secured creditor recover a deficiency
judgment subject to the debtor’s right under §9-507(1)
to recoup whatever damages are the proximate result of
such wrongdoing; or

3. can one presume that the collateral had a fair market
value equivalent to the amount of debt, and no
deficiency will be permitted unless the creditor
produces evidence to prove the reasonable amount that
the collateral would have sold for at a proper sale; or

4, will the effect of such misconduct be determined
according to a standard different from the three lines of
authority referred to in questions 1 - 3?”

Before we begin our response to the inquiry posed to us, we
acknowledge the assistance rendered the court by briefs filed
in behalf of the litigants and the amici briefs filed in behalf of
the various lending institutions doing business in this state.

We shall first discuss the notice requirements of
§6A-9-504(3), a factor that one amicus suggests is a separate
requirement for commercial reasonableness, not merely an
aspect of it, and an important fact not set forth by the
District Court either in its certified question or opinion.
However, another amicus intimates that Associates did notify
Riccardi but failed to advertise the sale sufficiently so that an
inadequate number of prospective buyers were present at the
sale.

In this context, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit when it disallowed an
attempt by the United States government to limit applica-
bility of the defense of commercial unreasonableness only to
instances in which the secured party failed to give the debtor
the requisite presale notice. In rejecting this contention, the
Court of Appeals found the notice distinction “without legal

oe

significance,” and decided instead that the “crucial question”
concerned “commercial reasonableness,” whether or not “the
factual context in which the issue is presented focuses upon
proper notification prior to sale or the manner in which the
sale is actually consummated.” United States v. Willis, 593
F.2d 247, 256 (6th Cir. 1979).

Having decided that notice or the lack thereof is not a
dispositive issue in the present controversy, we now turn to
the certified question. First is the question of whether a
creditor’s failure to conduct the sale of collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner constitutes an absolute bar
to recovering any deficiency. Courts adhering to the
absolute-bar rule have held that compliance with §9-504(3)
requirements of notice and commercial reasonableness are
conditions precedent to recovery of a deficiency. E.g.,
Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F.
Supp. 659 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Aélas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27
Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Camden
National Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973).

This antideficiency rationale is difficult to support in light
of §6A-9-504(2) and its unequivocal statement that “[i]f the
security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless
otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.”
(Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, adoption of the antideficiency rule appears
antithetical to the Code’s pervasive spirit of fairness. In
particular, the absolute-bar rule seemingly flies in the face of
the Code’s directive in Article One that:

“The remedies provided by title 6A shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be
put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed but neither consequential or special nor
penal damages may be had except as specifically
provided in title 6A or by other rule of law.” (Emphasis
added.) G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §6A-1-106(1).

ee

Other jurisdictions have rejected the absolute-bar rule on the
basis of the Code’s prohibition against penal damages.
Barbour v. United States, 562 F.2d 19, 21 (10th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692, 696 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Baker v. United States, 421
U.S. 912, 95 S. Ct. 1566, 43 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1975); Kobuk
Engineering & Contracting Services, Inc. v. Superior Tank &
Construction Co-Alaska, Inc., 568 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alas.
1977); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products,
Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 455, 535 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1975). We note
that the New York court in Leasco Computer, Inc. v.
Sheridan Industries, Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 897, 371 N.Y.S.2d 531
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975), repudiated its earier antideficiency
decision, Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Atlas
Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1971), and instead espoused the view that the debtor
sustained the burden, under §9-507(1), of proving the actual
damage flowing from the secured party’s noncompliance.
These damages would thereupon be deducted from the
deficiency. 82 Misc. 2d at 900-02, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 534-535.

Hi The New York decision in Sheridan leads us to a
consideration of the second suggested solution: whether we
would adopt the view that the secured creditor could recover
a deficiency subject to the debtor’s right to recoup damages
under §6A-9-507(1).? See, e.g., Barbour v. United States, 562
F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1977); Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190
Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d 341 (1973); Grant County Tractor
Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972). We are
displeased with the recoupment approach because it places
the burden of proving loss upon the debtor rather than on the

5In its relevant portions, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §6A-9-507(1) provides:

“If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of this part disposition may be ordered or restrained on
appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor
or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been
made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to
recover from the secured party any loss caused by the failure to comply with
the provisions of this part.”

TO

0 ee

creditor, thereby contravening the usual rule that the
misbehaving party should sustain the burden of proof.

H__sUpon reflection, we believe that neither the arbitrary
denial of a deficiency judgment nor the allowance of a
deficiency subject to the debtor’s right of recoupment affords
an entirely equitable result. Consequently, we now consider
an intermediate approach as set forth in the third suggested
solution: presuming the fair market value of the collateral at
the time of resale to be equivalent to the amount of the
outstanding debt. This view places upon the secured party,
rather than upon the debtor, the burden of rebutting the
presumption. E.g., United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501
F.2d at 695, 696; Kobuk Engineering & Contracting
Services, Inc. v. Superior Tank & Construction Co-Alaska,
568 P.2d 1007, 1013-14 (Alas. 1977); Universal C.I.T. Credit
Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 669, 453 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1970);
Savings Bank of New Britain v. Booze, 34 Conn. Supp. 632,
637, 382 A.2d 226, 228 (Conn. Super 1977); Clark Leasing
Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451,
456, 535 P.2d 1077, 1082 (1975). Before recovery can be
afforded to a secured creditor who failed to dispose of
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, “the secured
party must 1) establish the fair market value of the collateral
and, thereby, 2) rebut the presumption that the value of the
collateral equalled the indebtedness secured.” United States
v. Willis, 593 F.2d at 260.

Our analysis of the issue presented by the District Court’s
request further reveals that some jurisdictions appear to
articulate a rebuttable-presumption rule in combination
with the recoupment or offset provisions of §9-507(1). See,
Associates Financial Services Co. v. DiMarco, 383 A.2d 296,
302 (Del. Super. 1978); Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193,
223 S.E.2d 848 (1976). To us, these precedents appear to
chart a dangerous course because of the possible confusion
that may result when determining which standard applies.

We find the reasoning of the court in Kobuk Engineering
& Contracting Services, Inc. v. Superior Tank & Construc-

ee =

tion Co-Alaska, Inc., 568 P.2d 1007 (Alas. 1977), most per-
suasive. There, the factual context is similar to that presented
by Associates and Riccardi. In Kobuk, an equipment seller
sued the buyer for a deficiency in the amount of the unpaid
debt minus the money recovered through resale of the colla-
teral. Although the seller notified the buyer of the public
sale, it made no effort, other than to post notices on selected
courthouse and post-office bulletin boards, to advertise the
sale. The trial court, finding the sale to be commercially rea-
sonable, held that the creditor was entitled to the deficiency.
The Supreme Court of Alaska, however, reversed and then
considered the effect such a sale would have upon a suit for
deficiency. The court said:

“Where the collateral has been sold in a sale that does
not comply with the provisions of the UCC, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the fair and reasonable *
value of the collateral is at least equal to the amount of
the outstanding debt. In order to overcome that
presumption, the secured party has the burden of either
(1) obtaining a fair and reasonable appraisal at or near
the time of repossession, or (2) producing convincing
evidence of the value of the collateral. In order to meet
the latter burden, the secured creditor is required to
bring forward proof of the condition of the collateral
and the usual price of items of like condition.”

Id. at 1013-14.

Applying the foregoing principles to the issue presented,
we are firmly convinced that simple considerations of com-
mon sense and fair play mandate the adoption of the rebut-
table-presumption rule in Rhode Island. Accordingly, we be-
lieve that as a consequence of a commercially unreasonable
resale of collateral, a presumption arises that the fair market
value of the collateral at the time of resale equals the amount
of the outstanding debt. Consequently, the secured party, al-
though not precluded from recovering a deficiency judg-
ment, must assume the burden of proving that the fair mar-
ket value of the collateral was less than its presumed value. In

6

regard to the manner in which a secured party may prove
fair market value of the secured assets, Rhode Island courts
should consider evidence indicating the “reasonable amount
that the collateral would have sold for at a proper sale,” the
criterion included in the third suggested solution, through the
use, for example, of the various factors alluded to in Kobuk.

In opting for the presumptive view, we have rejected a
suggestion apparently put forth by Associates as a result of
the final facet of the District Court inquiry when it asked us
if the effect of Associates’ “misconduct” would be determined
by an approach different from the three that we have dis-
cussed in this opinion. Associates’ approach would have the
creditor institute a replevin action that, according to
Associates, would “force” the debtor to come forward with
his objections instead of waiting until the “eleventh hour” be-
fore challenging the sale. This supposed solution is actually
no solution. An action in replevin merely adjudicates who
has the superior right to possession of goods. If a plaintiff
seeking replevin fails to prevail, the goods are restored to the
defendant. Here, Riccardi concedes Associates’ right to re-
possess the collateral. What is disputed is Associates’ failure
to do what it was supposed to do once it took possession of the
electronics equipment. Consequently, replevin offers no solu-
tion to the problem posed by the District Court.

In conclusion, the members of this court give an affir-
mative response to the District Court’s third alternative in-
quiry and negative responses to each of the other alternatives.

Leo T. Connors, Thomas C. Mullaney, Jr., for plaintiff.

Sydney I. Resnick, for defendant. Edwards & Angell,
Edward F. Hindle, Andrew J. Chlebus, Gail E. McGann,
for Amicus Curiae, Industrial National Bank of Rhode
Island, Old Stone Bank and Woonsocket Institution for
Savings. Pucci & Goldin, Thomas D. Pucci, for Amicus
Curiae, Rhode Island Bankers Association.

443

408 A.2d 610.
Strate vs. Robert KALian.
DECEMBER 4, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, J].

Keiieuer, J. The record before us indicates that the
defendant, Robert Kalian (Kalian), owns two multiple-fam-
ily dwellings, both of which are located in the city of
Providence. One dwelling is situated on Goddard Street,
while the other is to be found on Douglas Avenue.

In March 1977, Kalian appeared before a justice of the
Superior Court on two separate occasions on appeals taken
from findings made by a justice of the Providence Municipal
Court. The Providence tribunal had ruled that Kalian, in his
maintenance of both properties, had committed a total of
thirty-four violations of the city’s Minimum Housing Code.
Twenty-seven violations related to the Douglas Avenue
premises, while the remainder applied to the Goddard Street

444 es

property. After a de novo hearing, the Superior Court justice
found Kalian guilty of committing the identical violations to
which we have just alluded.

In his consolidated appeal, Kalian raises three issues. He
argues that not guilty verdicts are in order on both appeals
because the prosecution failed to present any evidence at ei-
ther Superior Court hearing that (1) he owned the dwellings
in question; (2) the properties were used, or were intended to
be used, for human occupancy; and (3) the ordinance under
which he was charged provided a penalty for its violation.
The only facet of this three-pronged challenge worthy of
discussion is Kalian’s claim that ‘an acquittal is in order
because the state failed to prove the penal portion of the city
ordinance.

Everyone concedes that this facet of Kalian’s appeal
revolves about three basic principles; (1) every criminal stat-
ute or ordinance must provide for a penalty; (2) a conviction
for a violation of a statute or ordinance containing no such
provision cannot stand; and (3) when considering violations
of municipal ordinances, the doctrine of judicial notice may
not be used to ascertain whether or not a sanction can be
found in another section of the municipal ordinances. In the
past these principles have served as a.basis for our mandate
that certain criminal complaints be dismissed. State v.
Berberian, 112 R.I. 745, 315 A.2d 743 (1974); State v.
Tessier, 100 R.I. 210, 213 A.2d 699 (1965).

At both trials a certified copy of the city’s minimum-hous-
ing ordinance was introduced into evidence and made a full
exhibit. Section 13-24 of the ordinance provides that any per-
son violating any provision of the ordinance “shall upon con-
viction, be punished as provided in section 1-10 of this Code
of Ordinances.”

1Parenthetically, section 1-10 of the “Code of Ordinances of the City of Provi-
dence” is the general penalty clause that comes into play when no specific penalty is
provided within the specific ordinance. This section allows the imposition of a fine
up to $200 or a maximum prison sentence of 30 days.

es 445

Kalian takes the position that since the state failed to intro-
duce a certified copy of the general penalty clause, he cannot
be convicted of committing any crime. We disagree. Unques-
tionably a criminal statute is of no force and effect if no
penalty whatsoever is provided for its violation, but there is
no necessity that the penalty be included within the same
proviso. It may be provided by a separate enactment. State v.
York, 131 Iowa 635, 109 N.W. 122 (1906); State v. Knecht,
21 Ohio Misc. 91, 253 N.E.2d 324 (1969). It is obvious from a
reading of the minimum-housing ordinance that the
Providence City Council has provided a penalty for those
who choose to ignore the council’s mandate. The cases relied
upon by Kalian can be distinguished from the case now
before us. In neither Berberian nor Tessier was there any in-
dication that a penalty had been established for the conduct
complained of.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Dennis J. Roberts I, Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Aram K. Berberian, for defendant.

iS
a

409 A.2d 130.
SraTe or RHopE IsLanp vs, JosepH A. LAPLANTE.
DECEMBER 6, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Bevitacgua, C.J. The defendant, Joseph A. LaPlante,
was convicted of three misdemeanor charges, (1) driving

ee) 447

under the influence of intoxicating beverages; (2) driving left
of center; and (3) failing to obey a police officer, in the
Superior Court, Kent County, by a justice of said court
sitting without a jury. He now prosecutes his appeal from
said convictions.

The defendant, by a complaint issued out of the District
Court, was charged on three separate complaints with
driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages; driving
left of center; and failing to obey a police officer. The
defendant on February 27, 1974, withdrew his waiver of jury
trial and was referred to the Superior Court for further pro-
ceedings.

On February 17, 1978, one week prior to the trial, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaints as being
duplicitous in that each of the complaints alleged two dis-
similar, separate and distinct offenses.

The defendant argues that the complaints are void for
duplicity in that they charge defendant in the disjunctive
rather than the conjunctive, thereby leaving it unclear which
charge the state intends to prosecute.

The trial justice, in considering defendant’s motion to dis-
miss, concluded that defendant was sufficiently informed of
the offense with which he was charged and denied the
motion as being without merit.

We agree that a single complaint, indictment, or informa-
tion may charge an individual with more than one offense
only when the crimes charged in the single complaint, indict-
ment, or information are “cognate offenses.” State v. Berker,
112 B.I1. 624, 626, 314 A.2d 11, 13 (1974).

When a complaint, indictment, or information attempts to
charge two or more distinct offenses, not based on the same

Each standard form complaint contains printed language charging a violation
of G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §§31-14-1 and -2, followed by the disjunctive
conjunction “or.” The person preparing these complaints typed, in the appropriate
space following the disjunctive in each complaint, the offense which defendant
LaPlante allegedly committed.

448 ee

transaction, it is said to be duplicitous. State v. D’Amico, 1)0
R.L. 356, 359-60, 293 A.2d 304, 306 (1972); State v. Raposa,
107 R.I. 712, 715, 271 A.2d 306, 308 (1970). We have held
an indictment duplicitous where it charges the accused with
two or more distinct and substantive offenses in a single
count. State v. Fitzsimon, 18 R.I. 236, 239, 27 A. 446, 447
(1893). Whether the trial justice’s conclusion would be sus-
tained if the motion to dismiss had been timely made, we do
not decide.

Prior to the enactment of the Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the issue of duplicity was raised by a
motion to quash. State v. Hand Brewing Co., 32 R.1. 56, 64,
78 A. 499, 502 (1911). Said motion was addressed to the dis-
cretion of the trial justice. State v. Douglas, 78 R.I. 60, 62, 78
A.2d 850, 851 (1951); State v. Watson, 20 R.I. 354, 360, 39
A. 193, 195 (1898).

This court in State v. Cucca, 102 R.I. 95, 228 A.2d 572
(1967), stated that “[i]t is well settled that when a motion to
quash is not made prior to a plea of not guilty, or simultane-
ously therewith, the court consenting, such a motion is
addressed to the discretion of the court which will be sus-
tained if not abused.” Id. at 99, 228 A.2d at 574.

Rhode Island practice at that time required that objections
to defects in the complaint or indictment be raised prior to
the entry of a plea of the general issue. State v. Douglas, 78
R.I. at 63, 78 A.2d at 851-53; State v. Watson, 20 R.I. at
358, 39 A. at 194-95.

Subsequently, in 1972, the Superior Court adopted Super.
R. Crim. P. 12 governing pleadings and pretrial motions.
Rule 12 replaced the common law special pleas, demurrers,
and motions to quash with a single motion, the motion to
dismiss. Subsection (b)(2) of Rule 12 outlines these defenses
and objections which must be raised prior to trial.* Included

®R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) provides in pertinent part:

“(2) Defenses and Objections Which Must Be Raised. [O]bjections based
on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment, informa-

| 449

in this list are objections based on defects in the complaint; a
motion to dismiss based on a duplicitous complaint is such an
objection. The rule requires a defendant to file motions
within twenty-one days after entering a plea and allows a
court to entertain motions filed after twenty-one days,
provided they are made within a reasonable time from the
entrance of the plea.?

The defendant in the instant case filed no special pleas in
the District Court. And, in the Superior Court he filed his
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) approximately
four years after the original complaint had been filed and his
not guilty plea entered.

The defendant argues that by its silence the state has con-
ceded and admitted defendant’s motion and in essence he is
asking this court to require the state to comply in the strictest
sense with the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.
At the same time, he asks the court to forgive his noncompli-
ance with the same rules.

We are of the opinion that defendant’s argument has
no merit.

The proper way to attack a duplicitous complaint, indict-
ment, or information is by motion pursuant to Super. R.
Crim. P. 12 (b)(2), (3). Under this rule a motion must be
made prior to trial and within twenty-one days after a plea is
entered. The defendant did not raise the question of duplici-
tous charges until February 17, 1978, almost four years from
the time the charges were originally instituted.

tion or complaint + « + may be raised only by motion before trial. The
motion shall include all such defenses and objections then available to the
defendant. Failure to present any such defense or objection as herein pro-
vided constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant
relief from the waiver.”

3R.I, Super. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:

“(8) Time of Making Motion. The motion shall be made no later than
twenty-one (21) days after the plea is entered + « * but in any event the
court may permit the motion to be made within a reasonable time after the
plea is entered * * +.”

450 ee

Hs The failure of defendant to comply with Super. R. Crim.
P. 12 (b)(2), (3) constituted a waiver. State v. Mazzarella,
103 B.I. 253, 254-55, 236 A.2d 446, 447-48 (1967); cf. United
States v. Henry, 504 F.2d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir. 1974); Hanf
v. United States, 235 F.2d 710, 715 (8th cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 880, 77 S. Ct. 102, 1 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1956).

In the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s position
is without merit and the denial of the motion by the trial
justice was not an abuse of discretion.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Frederick C. B.
Smith, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Aram K. Berberian, for defendant.

451

409 A.2d 988.
SraTe vs. ELBERT BARNES AND DENNIS R. GoMEs.
DECEMBER 6, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

=

es 453
;

Dons, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of convic-
tion for simple assault entered following a jury trial in the
Superior Court. The defendants claim that the trial justice
abused his discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for a
continuance and that he erred in denying their motion for a
new trial.

The defendants, Elbert Barnes and Dennis R. Gomes,
were inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI).
On November 19, 1976, there was a disturbance at the ACI
during which a group of inmates dragged a fellow inmate,
one Jackie Hogue, from his cell and threw him over a railing
to the floor some twelve feet below.! Barnes, Gomes, and
another inmate were charged with assault with intent to
murder Hogue. Prior to the trial, Hogue left Rhode Island
because the state had dismissed the charges against him.
Hogue could not be located at the time of the trial and the
state therefore proceeded without him. The defendants did
not learn of Hogue’s disappearance until the day before the
trial. On the first day of trial, defendants moved for a
continuance on the grounds that Hogue, if available, would
contradict the state’s witnesses and would testify that neither
Barnes nor Gomes had assaulted him. The defendants, how-
ever, had made no efforts to locate Hogue before the trial and
could give no assurances either that he would be available
later or that he would testify on their behalf. The trial jus-

‘Although the distance from the railing to the floor was twelve feet, Hogue
landed on a picnic table and thus actually fell about nine feet,

454 ee

tice, noting this omission and the absence of any evidence
demonstrating the materiality of Hogue’s testimony to the
defense, denied the motion.

At trial two officers from the ACI, Ronald Toher and
Louis Ricci, testified that Barnes, Gomes, and other inmates
had entered Hogue’s cell, beaten him, and thrown him over
the railing. Two other officers who had been present at the
disturbance could identify neither defendant as Hogue’s
assailant. A defense witness, an inmate at the ACI at the time
of the assault, testified that he did not see Gomes touch
Hogue in any way as Hogue went over the railing. After
hearing this evidence, the trial justice granted defendants’
motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charges of assault
with intent to murder. The trial justice stated that the lesser-
included offense of simple assault clearly had been estab-
lished, and he instructed the jury on that offense. The jury
found both Barnes and Gomes guilty of assault.

_ The defendants subsequently moved for a new trial, alleg-
ing that the verdict was against the law, against the evi-
dence, against the law, and the evidence and the weight
thereof. The trial justice, after noting that he was obliged to
pass on the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses, stated that the only testimony that was critical to
the state’s case was that of Officers Toher and Ricci. Stating
that the jury had relied on this testimony, the trial justice also
noted that the testimony had been “to some degree chal-
lenged successfully by’ defense counsel. Nonetheless, he
emphasized that he was satisfied that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury’s finding; and, accordingly, he
denied the motion for a new trial.

Denial of a Motion for Continuance

|| A motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion
of the trial justice and will not be reversed by this court
absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Levitt, 118 B.I. 32, 41,
371 A.2d 596, 601 (1977). The trial justice, however, must
exercise his discretion consistently with a criminal

ee 455

defendant’s sixth amendment right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses on his behalf. State v. Patriarca, 112 R.1.
14, 37, 308 A.2d 300, 315 (1973). A reasonable adjournment
of the trial may thus be necessary to effectuate the
defendant’s constitutional right to a full defense. State v.
Carillo, 113 R.I. 32, 39-40, 317 A.2d 449, 454 (1974). A
defendant is not entitled to a continuance, however, as a
matter of course. Whether the denial of a motion for a con-
tinuance violates the defendant’s due process rights depends
on the circumstances of each case, “particularly in the rea-
sons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is
denied.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84S. Ct. 841, 11 L.
Ed. 2d 921 (1964); “State v. Leonardo, 119 R.I. 7, 375
A.2d 1388 (1977). In order to establish that a denial consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion, a defendant must show “that the
testimony of the absent witness would be material; + * * that
he had used due diligence to procure the attendance of the
witness or his deposition; * * * that it is reasonably certain
that the presence or testimony can be procured at the time to
which the trial would be postponed; and « « * that such
testimony be not merely cumulative.” State v. Patriarca, 112
R.I. 14, 38, 308 A.2d 300, 315 (1973).

Barnes and Gomes claim that Hogue’s presence was neces-
sary because his testimony would contradict that of Officers
Toher and Ricci and because he could not identify defen-
dants as his assailants. Though the trial justice found that
defendants did not demonstrate the materiality of Hogue’s
testimony, defendants now claim that the “probable inability
of” Hogue to identify them was material to their defense.

Hi The “material facts” of an issue of fact are those necessary

to determine the issue. Black’s Law Dictionary 881 (5th Ed.
1979). It is doubtful that any testimony given by Hogue
would have determined the issue of defendants’ guilt because
the testimony would not necessarily have exculpated defen-
dants. The defendants argue that “Hogue may well have testi-
fied” that defendants did not assault him and that he could
recognize his assailants. Although Hogue did fail to identify

456 ee

either of defendants when shown photographs of them
despite his earlier statement that he could identify the attack-
ers, the claim of defendants regarding the likely content of
Hogue’s testimony appears speculative. The same factors that
defense counsel cited in challenging the perception of the
state’s witnesses - the poor lighting, the commotion and
confusion - would apply equally to Hogue and could account
for his failure to identify the photographs of defendants.
Additionally, in the very short time that Hogue had been in-
carcerated at the ACI prior to the assault, he most likely had
not had the opportunity to become sufficiently acquainted
with either Barnes or Gomes to identify them. Because
Hogue’s testimony would not in any likelihood affirmatively
exculpate defendants, it appears to us to lack the materiality
regarding the guilt of defendants as required by State v.
Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 38, 308 A.2d 300, 315 (1973).

As this court intimated in Patriarca, a court may properly
deny a motion for a continuance if the movant fails to estab-
lish any of the four conditions set out in that opinion. The
defendants’ failure to show that Hogue’s testimony was
material to their defense therefore provides adequate grounds
for upholding the trial justice. In addition, it is our opinion
that defendants have failed to carry their burden under the
remaining elements of the Patriarca test as well.

The defendants argue that they had “every right to assume
that the State would call” Hogue to testify at trial. They rely
on the lack of notice until the day before trial as reason for
not having acted to procure Hogue’s attendance at trial.
Granted, the little time defendants had before trial probably
precluded them from successfully obtaining Hogue’s atten-
dance or testimony. Yet, it appears somewhat inconsistent
with the concept of due diligence that defendants, believing
Hogue’s testimony to be exculpatory, took no steps during the
ten months before trial to insure that Hogue would be pre-
sent. The failure of defendants to have taken the initial steps
necessary to secure Hogue’s presence may further attenuate
their claim of due diligence. Prior to granting a motion, a

ee 457

court may require that a defendant seeking a continuance
take at least the initial steps necessary to obtaining the pre-
sence of a witness for trial. United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d
1281, 1289 (5th Cir. 1976). The defendants’ attorneys must
therefore exercise all reasonable diligence to prepare for trial
despite time constraints. Jd. at 1291. The trial court may
require such efforts as a means of insuring “that the motion
[for a continuance] is made for reasons other than delay.” Id.

In these circumstances we hold that defendants, by failing
to take any positive action in procuring Hogue’s presence at
trial, failed to exercise reasonable diligence in preparing for
the trial.

The third of the Patriarca guidelines, a reasonable cer-
tainty that the testimony sought can be procured at the later
time, appears clearly unsatisfied. In fact, defendants sought
the continuance “in order to attempt to locate Mr. Hogue,
* * * and determine if Mr. Hogue were available to testify,
and if he would testify for the defense.” The defendants,
being unable to show that Hogue would testify for the
defense, have failed to show that Hogue’s testimony would
not be merely cumulative, the final guideline of Patriarca.

The defendant Barnes argued that Hogue would have pro-
vided exculpatory evidence, and therefore the denial of the
continuance deprived him of due process. Although due pro-
cess does require that a criminal defendant have a full oppor-
tunity for the best defense available, a motion for a continu-
ance remains within the discretion of the trial justice unless
the defendant proves the requirements in State v. Patriarca,
112 RI. at 37, 308 A.2d at 315. For the reasons stated in
regard to the materiality issue, this contention is without
merit.

Motion for New Trial

The defendants argue that the trial justice, by overlooking
material inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony,
did not independently evaluate the evidence. In ruling on a
motion for a new trial, a trial justice must “consider in the

458 ee

exercise of his independent judgment all of the material evi-
dence + + + [and] pass on its weight and the credibility of the
witnesses.” Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.J. 191, 193, 196 A.2d
836, 837 (1964); accord, State v. Edwards, 122 R.I. 228,
236, 405 A.2d 1161, 1165 (1979); State v. DaRocha, 121
R.I. 182, 185, 397 A.2d 500, 502 (1979). The trial justice
must then determine whether the evidence adduced at the
trial is such that the controversy as presented to the jury is
one upon which reasonable minds could differ in reference to
the conclusion the factfinders should reach or whether the
evidence fails to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Edwards, 122 R.I. 228 at 236, 405 A.2d at 1165. If the
trial justice, because of his more experienced judgment, finds
that reasonable minds could differ, he must deny the motion
for a new trial. Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. at 194, 196, A.2d
at 837. If, however, he believes the controversy to be one
where the state has failed to sustain its burden of proof, he
must grant a new trial. State v. Edwards, 122 R.I. 228 at
236, 405 A.2d at 1165; Lemieux v. American Universal Ins.
Co., 116 R.I. 685, 700, 360 A.2d 540, 547 (1976); Barbato v.
Epstein, 97 B.I. 191, 194; 196 A.2d 836, 837 (1964). The trial
justice may not, however, merely substitute his judgment for
that of the jury when reasonable minds may differ regarding
the conclusions reached. State v. Colvin, 82 R.I. 212, 222,
107 A.2d 324, 329 (1954). In ruling on the motion, the trial
justice should articulate the facts on which he has based his
ruling so that the reviewing court can ascertain whether he
has overlooked or misconceived material evidence on a
controlling issue or was otherwise clearly wrong in his
decision. Dixon v. Royal Cab Inc., 121 R.I. 110, 120, 396
A.2d 930, 935 (1979); Morinville v. Morinville, 116 R.1. 507,
512, 359 A.2d 48, 51 (1976). A trial justice need not, how-
ever, refer to all of the evidence supporting his decision; he
need only mention sufficient evidence to allow the Supreme
Court to discern whether he has applied the appropriate
standard. State v. DaRocha, 121 R.I. 182, 185, 397 A.2d
500, 502 (1979); Morinville v. Morinville, 116 R.I. 507,
511-12, 359 A.2d 48, 51 (1976).

|) 459

If the trial justice, after having properly evaluated the evi-

. dence, has denied the motion and the evidence is conflicting,

the Supreme Court will not interfere. Wilcox v. Rhode Island
Co., 29 R.I. 292, 295-96, 70 A. 913, 914-15 (1908) (quoting
Dewey v. Chicago & N.W.R.R. Co., 31 Iowa 373, 377
(1871)). If, however, it is unclear whether the trial justice
has independently evaluated the evidence, the Supreme
Court may assume that the trial justice has not done so. The
Supreme Court may then examine the record and may grant
the motion for a new trial only if the evidence strongly pre-
ponderates against the verdict. In examining the record in
the light most favorable to prevailing party, the Supreme
Court must look for any competent evidence which, if be-
lieved, would support the verdict. “If there is [any competent
evidence], the verdict does not strongly preponderate against
the evidence, and the jury’s verdict will not be disturbed.”
Morinville v. Morinville, 116 R.I. 507, 512-13, 359 A.2d 48,
51-52 (1976); accord, DeSimone v. Manzi, 114 R.I. 30, 33,
327 A.2d 840, 842 (1974); State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523,
531-32, 253 A.2d 612, 617-18 (1969).

The defendants argue that “it is impossible to assume
[either] + * + that ‘the trial [justice] implicitly determined
that Toher and Ricci were credible witnesses” or that he “in-
dependently assessed the credibility of the witnesses at all.”
This argument arises from the statement of the trial justice
that the testimony of the state’s witnesses had been “to some
degree challenged successfully” by defendants. This state-
ment, however, is consistent with the trial justice’s obligation
to defer to the jury when, after evaluating the evidence, he
concludes that reasonable minds may differ in interpreting
the evidence. In State v. Edwards, 122 R.I. 228 at 236,
405 A.2d at 1165, the trial justice had stated that although he
may have required “something more to convict this
defendant than was adduced before this jury,” he could not
rule that the fury’s verdict had been completely wrong. Simi-
larly, in State v. Colvin, 82 R.I. 212, 221, 107 A.2d 324, 329
(1954), the trial justice, although recognizing the right of the
jury to reach its own conclusion based on the evidence,

460 es

expressed some surprise at the conclusion the jury had
reached. In each case, this court sustained the trial justice,
his remarks notwithstanding, because reasonable minds
could interpret the evidence differently.

These cases seem most apposite to the statement made by
the trial justice in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Although the trial justice may have thought that the defense
counsel had perhaps partially refuted the state’s evidence, he
also emphasized that he was satisfied that the jury was cor-
rect in finding both Barnes and Gomes guilty of assault.
Taken together, the statements of the trial justice indicate
that he did evaluate the evidence and, finding parts of it con-
tradictory, accepted the jury’s decision because reasonable
minds could differ on whether proof beyond a reasonable
doubt had been achieved.

If, as the defendants argued, the trial justice had failed to
evaluate the evidence independently, this court would apply
the appellate rule and examine the record for any competent
evidence that supports the verdict. Morinville v. Morinville,
116 R.I. 507, 512, 359 A.2d 48, 51-52 (1976); State v.
Contreras, 105 R.1. 523, 531, 253 A.2d 612, 617 (1969). The
testimony of Officers Toher and Ricci, being competent and
inculpatory, should preclude this court from disturbing the
verdict for the reasons in Morinville v. Morinville, 116 R.1. at
516, 359 A.2d at 51-52. The trial justice’s denial of the
defendants’ motion for a new trial was therefore correct.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, John E.
Migliaccio, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Mary E. Levesque, Assistant Public Defender, for
defendant Dennis R. Gomes.

Anthony E. Grilli, for defendant Elbert Barnes.

46

4

409 A.2d 132.
STATE vs. JAMES CARVALHO.
DECEMBER 12, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Ke.iener, J. This indictment charging the defendant,
James Carvalho (Carvalho), with rape was tried before a
Superior Court jury. Carvalho was found guilty, and the trial
justice denied his motion for a new trial. His appeal is two-
fold. He contends that the trial justice violated his sixth-am-
endment right by denying his attorney’s request that an
alleged medical expert be allowed to sit at counsel table dur-
ing the examination and cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion’s medical experts. He also challenges the trial justice’s
denial of his motion for a new trial.

According to the prosecutrix, at approximately 2 a.m. on
October 22, 1976, she returned home after having spent the
evening at a local drinking establishment. As she stood on the
porch of her home searching for the key to the front door, a
stranger driving a small, dark car stopped and asked her to go
for a ride with him. The individual departed when she
swung her purse at him and told him to leave. A few minutes

es 463

later, the prosecutrix was grabbed from behind and pulled
along a driveway into a neighboring backyard where the
rape occurred. She screamed once for help, but the assailant
clapped his hand over her mouth, saying that if she made any
noise, he would kill her. The sexual assault ended when the
prosecutrix told the attacker that a car had driven up. Upon
hearing this, he, followed a few feet behind by his victim,
walked down the driveway into the street. The assailant fled
when the prosecutrix spotted two police cars on a neighbor-
ing street and began to scream for help.

A police officer responding to the screams tried to calm the
victim in order to determine what had occurred. He then
sent out a broadcast containing a description of the assailant.
Another officer apprehended Carvalho approximately 5
minutes later in the vicinity of the assault. Carvalho, who
had been caught driving a dark-colored sports car at a high
speed with its lights out, was returned to the scene of the
incident, where the prosecutrix immediately identified him
as the man who had raped her.

In his testimony, Carvalho substantiated several of the
events described by the prosecutrix, including one involving a
sexual interlude. He insisted, however, that the intercourse
was an episode in which both parties had voluntarily partici-
pated,

At trial, the prosecution presented two members of the
staff at Women and Infants’ Hospital, a physician and a
nurse, both of whom testified to the condition of the prosecu-
trix upon her entry to the hospital’s emergency room. The
physician described the multiple abrasions located on her
body and stated that findings derived from the pelvic exami-
nation were consistent with forcible penetration.

Prior to the presentation of this medical testimony,
Carvalho had asked that a nurse who worked at Rhode
Island Hospital’s emergency room be permitted to sit along-
side his counsel so that she could point out various portions of
the direct testimony that might be fair game for cross-exami-

464 ee

nation. The trial justice denied this request on the ground
that such a procedure “would open the door to a new and
perhaps unwise deviation from the normal courtroom proce-
dure * * +.” Carvalho argues that this refusal came at a
crucial time in the trial and deprived him of his sixth-amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Carvalho’s contention that the sixth amendment
encompasses the right to have an expert sit with defense
counsel to aid in the cross-examination of witnesses runs con-
trary to both the historical development of the amendment
and recent cases that define the term “counsel” as set forth in
the amendment. Under British common law, a defendant on
trial for a felony or treason could not be represented by coun-
sel, whereas a person charged with a misdemeanor was en-
titled to full assistance of counsel. 1 J. Chitty, Criminal Law
410 (4th ed. 1841). The colonies refused to embrace this rule.
Likewise, the states speedily ratified a congressional proposal
that now constitutes the first ten amendments to the Federal
Constitution. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61, 53S. Ct.
55, 61, 77 L. Ed. 158, 166 (1932). The sixth amendment
guards an accused from being convicted because of his ignor-
ance of legal and constitutional rights and his consequent
failure to assert such rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938).

Counsel provides a defendant with clear steerage through
a maze of unfamiliar legal procedure and jargon and focuses
on the central issues of the case. The sixth amendment
thereby gives substance to the due-process right to a fair hear-
ing. The true significance of this right to our system of justice
can be seen in the following observation of the United States
Supreme Court:

“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of deter-
mining for himself whether the indictment is good or

es 465

bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial with-
out a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have
a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of convic-
tion because he does not know how to establish his inno-

cence.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 68-69, 53S. C. at 64, 77 L.
Ed. at 170.

The term “counsel” as found within the context of the sixth
amendment has not been construed to include the assistance
of a person uneducated in the law. United States v. Wilhelm,
570 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Cooper, 493
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d
1176 (6th Cir. 1976); State v. Spurgeon, 200 Neb. 719, 265
N.W.2d 224 (1978). Indeed, even in those cases in which a
defendant has sought the assistance of an unlicensed or dis-
barred attorney, federal courts have refused to hold that the
right to counsel encompasses such individuals. United States
v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976); Turner v.
American Bar Ass’n, 407 F. Supp. 451 (1975).

It cannot be denied that courts have in many instances
allowed a defendant the assistance of a lay person. Such per-
mission rests, however, not upon a constitutional entitle-
ment, but with the discretion of the court. United States v.
Jordan, 508 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stockheimer, 385 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Wis. 1974); State v.
Unger, 103 N.J.L. 18, 134 A. 886 (Sup. Ct. 1926), affirmed,
104.N.J.L. 448, 140 A. 922 (E & A 1928); State v. Peterson,
266 N.W.2d 103 (S.D. 1978); Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 238
(1978). Thus, the issue of whether a non-party, such as the
nurse, should be permitted to sit at counsel table is a matter
that rests entirely within the sound discretion of a trial jus-

466 ee

tice. Here, we cannot interfere unless we are satisfied that
there has been an abuse of that discretion. For the reasons
which follow we find that the trial justice’s refusal to allow
the nurse to sit at counsel table was an acceptable exercise of
his judicial discretion.

We would but point out that at no time did the defense
offer anything by way of evidence or an offer of proof which
would satisfy the trial justice that the Rhode Island Hospital
nurse had the requisite expertise in the areas to which most of
the physician’s testimony was directed. The crucial witness in
this aspect of the case was not the other nurse, but rather it
was the physician who told the jury in simple and under-
standable terms why he believed the penetration was forced
rather than consensual. The mere representation that a nurse
“has experience in the emergency room of Rhode Island
Hospital” does not qualify her as one who could render
expert assistance to Carvalho’s counsel.

Furthermore, it should also be remembered that the nurse
was not excluded from the courtroom. A recess was taken
during cross-examination; and while the transcript is silent
concerning what went on during this period, upon resump-
tion of the trial the physician was asked what was meant by
the phrase “phallic intromission.” Perhaps counsel’s use of
this phrase is some indication that during the recess he did
confer with the nurse who performed her chores at Rhode
Island Hospital’s emergency room.

Carvalho also contends that the trial justice erred in deny-
ing his motion for a new trial when he rejected the defense’s
assertion that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of
the evidence. In expanding on this phase of his appeal,
Carvalho reminds us that a trial judge, in considering
motions for new trial, must consider the evidence in light of
his charge to the jury. Carvalho first points out that the jury
was told that a guilty verdict was in order only if the prosecu-
trix had resisted Carvalho’s advances “to the best of her abil-
ity.” He contends that the jury’s verdict was against the law
because there was absolutely no evidence that would justify

ee) 461

an inference that the prosecutrix resisted to the best of her
ability.

Carvalho lists the following factors that, according to him,
make it clear that the prosecutrix, in resisting his advances,
had failed to expend her best efforts: she screamed only once;
she did not kick, bite, or punch her assailant; she failed to do
all this even though there was no evidence that he ever exhi-
bited a weapon or claimed to have one. This line of reasoning
falls upon deaf ears.

Today the law does not expect a woman, as part of her
proof of opposition or lack of consent, to engage in heroics
when such behavior could be useless, fruitless, or foolhardy.
Fighting! to protect one’s virtue can be a risky business. All
that is required is that the woman offer such resistance as
seems reasonable under all the circumstances. State v.
Verdone, 114 R.I. 613, 621, 337 A.2d 804, 810 (1975).
Resistance to the best of one’s ability, in our opinion, is
synonymous with the phrase “offer such resistance as would
appear reasonable under the circumstances.” An analysis of
Verdone clearly indicates that resistance is a relative concept.
A variety of factors must be considered, such as the compara-
tive strength of the parties, the age and condition of the vic-
tim, and the degree of force exhibited by the assailant. If the
woman believes that the resistance will lead to her being seri-
ously injured, she is not required to test out this theory by
screaming out or exhibiting force against the attacker.

The evidence presented here was more than sufficient to
support a finding that the prosecutrix did resist Carvalho’s
advances to the best of her ability. She testified that upon
being grabbed from behind, she screamed for someone in the
house before Carvalho clapped his hand over her mouth. He
threatened to kill her if she made any noise. The force with
which she was pulled off the porch and along the driveway
and into the yard against her will is further substantiated by

\See Reidhead v. State, 31 Ariz. 70, 72, 250 P. 366-67 (1926), and Starr v. State,
205 Wis. 310, 312, 237 N.W. 96, 97 (1931), where the courts observed that the
victim had to “resist to the utmost.”

468 es

the police officer’s discovery of a sock and shoe located
approximately 5 feet apart on the driveway leading to the
yard. The abrasions found on the victim’s elbows, knees and
sacral area are a further indication of the predatory conduct
exhibited by Carvalho. The record amply justifies the trial
justice’s denial of the motion for new trial.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the
judgment of conviction is affirmed, and the case is remanded
to the Superior Court.

Dennis J. Roberts, Attorney General, James P. Renaldo,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Samuel A. Olevson, for defendant.

469

409 A.2d 536.

Perer J. Beaupo1n vs. Eucene P. Perr, Jr.,
RecIsTRAR OF Motor VEHICLES.

DECEMBER 12, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

es an
FC

Weissercer, J. This case comes before the court on a
petition for writ of certiorari, authorized by G.L. 1956 (1977
Reenactment) §42-35-16 of the Administrative Procedures
Act. The petitioner seeks review of a judgment entered by the
Sixth Division of the District Court. The District Court dis-
missed the petitioner’s appeal from an order of the Registry of
Motor Vehicles which revoked the petitioner’s driver's
license. We issued the writ and now have the pertinent
records before us.

The registry revoked petitioners’ license, after Mr.
Beaudoin was convicted a second time of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The
petitioner’s initial offense occurred in February 1975; he
pleaded nolo contendere to the resulting charge in the
Seventh Division of the Rhode Island District Court. In
October 1976, petitioner committed his second offense while
driving in Connecticut. He pleaded guilty as charged in the
Court of Common Pleas in Danbury, Connecticut.
Connecticut enforced its mandatory suspension provision
and revoked Mr. Beaudoin’s Connecticut driving privileges
on November 17, 1976. The petitioner does not question the
validity of either conviction.

On March 1, 1977, the Rhode Island Registry of Motor
Vehicles mailed a notice to petitioner requiring him to attend
a hearing. The notice stated that Mr. Beaudoin must arrange
for the hearing “for a Connecticut suspension.” Mr.
Beaudoin appeared before a hearing officer, who questioned
him concerning the circumstances of the Connecticut convic-
tion. The officer filed a report with the registrar, who then
ordered revocation of petitioner’s license for 1 year.

The petitioner received notice of the revocation dated
April 4, 1977. The official order stated:

“You are notified that as of the effective date of this
order your license is revoked for a period of: one year
and thereafter until you give proof of financial

472, ee

responsibility for the future; and you are further noti-
fied that the above number registration(s) and all other
registrations in your name as owner, are also suspended
as of the effective date and until proof of financial
responsibility for the future is given for such vehicles(s).

“This order does not affect those registrations for which
you have previously given and now maintain proof of
financial responsibility for the future.

“Ordered pursuant to the Rhode Island General Laws, 1956,
as amended Title(s) 31-11-6(3) & 31-32-4 & 5 and because of
your 2nd conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.”

The enforcement of the order has been stayed pending final
disposition by this court.

The petitioner challenges the registry’s action on two
bases. He maintains that the order of revocation informed
him inadequately in regard to the nature and cause of the re-
vocation. He further contends the registry lacks the authority
to revoke a driver’s license without judicial recommendation.

Mr. Beaudoin equates the order of revocation with a crim-
inal complaint, stating it must meet the standards set forth in
art. I, sec. 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The peti-
tioner misconceives the nature of a license revocation
proceeding. The proceeding is administrative rather than
criminal. The registry undertakes the proceedings to deter-
mine if the licensee should be allowed continued use of public
highways, notwithstanding his violations. Campbell v. State
of Colorado, Department of Revenue, Division of Motor
Vehicles, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971); Ritch v.
Director of Vehicles and Traffic of the District of Columbia,
124 A.2d 301 (D.C. 1956). Thus the provisions of art. I, sec.
10, do not apply to license revocation proceedings. Moreover,
an order is not to be equated with an initial notice of pro-
ceeding or hearing not challenged in the case.

We shall assess the sufficiency of the official order in light
of the purpose that it serves. The order must inform a licensee

es 473

of the status of his license and clearly mandate his future
actions. The order must also state the grounds for the action
taken against petitioner’s license. However, such findings
need not be set out in precise or specific language. Yellow
Cab Company of Providence v. Public Utility Hearing
Board, 79 R.1. 507, 511, 90 A.2d 726, 728 (1952). The essen-
tial purpose of these requirements is to ensure proper func-
tioning of the review process. The requirements exist because
the parties as well as the court are entitled to know and
should not be required to speculate on the basis for an admin-
istrative decision. Hooper v. Goldstein, 104 R.I. 32, 45, 241
A.2d 809, 816 (1968); Coderre v. Zoning Board of Review,
102 R.I. 327, 230 A.2d 247 (1967); Hopf v. Board of Review,
102 R.I. 275, 230 A.2d 420 (1967).

The petitioner contends that failure to cite the registry’s
statutory authority, G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment)
§31-11-3, renders the order fatally defective. We do not
agree. The registry made findings of fact sufficient to sustain
the revocation of the license pursuant to §31-11-3. Mr.
Beaudoin does not dispute these findings, nor does he claim
to be misled concerning the import of the order. He urges us
to find the order deficient as a matter of law. We decline to
do so in light of the clear, undisputed findings and the actual
authority vested in the registry. Although the registry failed
to cite §31-11-3 in the order, it is reasonable to conclude as a
matter of law that the registry relied thereon to revoke peti-
tioner’s license. In this respect, the omission is similar to the
grammatical oversight discussed in DiSalvo v. Williamson,
106 R.I. 303, 309, 259 A.2d 671, 675 (1969).*

Mr. Beaudoin also challenges the basic authority of the
registry to revoke a license as a result of an out-of-state con-
viction. The registry derives this authority from §31-11-3,
which reads as follows:

Yin DiSalvo v. Williamson, 106 R.1. 303, 309, 259 A.2d 671, 675 (1969), the
registrar erroneously referred to the respondent as “complainant” and failed to
complete the phrase “refused to submit.” The grammatical oversight was held not
to affect the validity of the Order.

474 ee

“The registry is authorized to suspend or revoke the
license of any resident of this state or the privilege of a
nonresident to drive a motor vehicle in this state upon
receiving notice of the conviction of such person in
another state of an offense therein which, if committed
in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or
revocation of the license of an operator or chauffeur.”

If Mr. Beaudoin had committed his offense in Rhode Island,
it would constitute grounds for revocation of his license.
General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §31-11-6, as
amended by P.L. 1974, ch. 120, §1, provides:

“The license of any chauffeur or operator shall be
forthwith revoked upon receipt by the registry of a
record of such operator’s or chauffeur’s final conviction
for any of the offenses hereinafter stated and the term of
revocation shall be for the periods hereinafter
enumerated:

“ee a

“(3) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor, such period of time, if any,
as may be recommended in the final sentence imposed
by a court having jurisdiction to impose such sentence.”

Mr. Beaudoin’s challenge focuses on the language of
§31-11-6(3) that requires judicial determination of the period
of revocation. He contends the Legislature intended that resi-
dent licensees be treated equally for out-of-state and in-state
convictions. Currently the registry sets the term of revocation
for resident licensees convicted out of state.

We are not persuaded by Mr. Beaudoin’s reading of the
two statutes. As we read §31-11-3, it is free from ambiguity.
Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity and
conveys a definite and sensible meaning that does not contra-
dict an evident legislative purpose, there is nothing to con-
strue. Gomes v. Rhode Island State Board of Elections, 120
RB.I. 951, 393 A.2d 1088, 1090 (1978); Statewide Multiple

es 415

Listing Service v. Norberg, 120 R.1. 937, 392 A.2d 371, 373
(1978); Markham v. Allstate Insurance Co., 116 R.I. 152,
155-56, 352 A.2d 651, 653 (1976). Guided by this standard,
we must give literal effect to the provisions of §31-11-3.

Both statutes, §§31-11-3 and 31-11-6, vest the power to
revoke with the Registry of Motor Vehicles. Section 31-11-6
directs revocation for certain offenses, mandating particular
terms for each offense. Section 31-11-6(3) differs from the
other subsections; it allows a court, having jurisdiction to
convict and sentence a person for driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, to recommend the period of manda-
tory revocation. In effect, the sentencing judge can recom-
mend that the license not be revoked. This discretion does not
alter the character of the offense; it still constitutes grounds
for revocation of the offender’s license.

Section 31-11-3 empowers the registry to set the period of
revocation in respect to out-of-state convictions. It clearly
states that the registry is authorized to revoke a resident’s
license upon receiving notice of an extraterritorial offense
“which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for
* * * revocation.” Mr. Beaudoin was convicted of such an
offense in Connecticut. We find nothing ambiguous in the
language of §31-11-3. It furthers, rather than contradicts, the
evident legislative purpose of monitoring the fitness of each
driver to hold a license.

Mr. Beaudoin’s construction would undermine the
operation of §31-11-3. Section 31-11-6(3) directs the Rhode
Island court having jurisdiction to sentence the licensee, to
recommend, if any, the term of revocation. The petitioner’s
construction of §31-11-6(3) to incorporate a parallel provi-
sion into §31-11-3 would require an out-of-state tribunal to
recommend action on a Rhode Island license. Section
31-11-6(3) would then require the registry to abstain from
revocation save in accordance with the recommendation of
an out-of-state judge. Our Legislature could not reasonably
be deemed to make its mandate dependent on the action of
an out-of-state tribunal.

476 Le ||

Nor could the registry submit an out-of-state conviction to
a Rhode Island court for recommendation of action on the
license of the person convicted. Section 31-11-6(3) refers to
the court “having jurisdiction to impose such sentence.”
Clearly the courts of this state have no jurisdiction over extra-
territorial offenses. The construction urged by Mr. Beaudoin
would nullify §31-11-3 or lead to an unworkable and absurd
result. We will not construe a statute to achieve meaningless
or absurd results. Town of Scituate v. O’Rourke, 103 B.1.
499, 512-13, 239 A.2d 176, 184 (1968); Zannelli v. DiSandro,
84 R.I. 76, 121 A.2d 652 (1956).

The petitioner also claims that this distinction between
licensees convicted in and out of Rhode Island denies him
equal protection of the laws. However, the General
Assembly has the power to differentiate among licensees if
the resulting classification bears a rational relationship to the
evident purpose of the statute. A legislative classification does
not require strict scrutiny unless it “impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S. Ct.
2562, 2566, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 524 (1976). The right to
operate a motor vehicle is not fundamental. Berberian v.
Petit, 118 R.I. 448, 454, 374 A.2d 791, 794 (1977). Resident
licensees convicted of driving offenses outside of Rhode
Island do not constitute a suspect class within the meaning of
that term. Id. at 453-54, 374 A.2d at 794.

Mr. Beaudoin has no objections to the substance of
§31-11-3. He challenges the Legislature’s designation of the
registry as the authority setting the term of revocation. He
claims denial of equal protection because §31-11-6(3)
mandates judicial participation in the case of an in-state
offender. We do not agree. We can easily discern a rational
purpose for this distinction. The recommendation required
by §31-11-6(3) is a by-product of the sentencing procedures.
The sentencing court has before it the facts necessary to assess
the offender’s fitness to drive. This situation does not hold

es am

true when the revocation proceeding results from an out-of-
state conviction. The Rhode Island courts have had no
contact with the offender or the circumstances surrounding
his conviction. The time required to review the matter and
make an intelligent recommendation would result in a poor
use of judicial resources. The General Assembly deemed it
advisable to delegate this responsibility to the Registry of
Motor Vehicles. We conclude that the General Assembly did
not act irrationally or unreasonably in its selection of the
registry as the proper authority to administer the provisions
of §31-11-3.

The petition is denied and dismissed, the writ of certiorari
heretofore issued is quashed, and the record certified to this
court is ordered returned to the District Court with our
decision endorsed thereon.

F. Monroe Allen, for petitioner.
Stephen F. Mullen, Chief Special Counsel, Office of

Special Counsel, Department of Transportation, for
respondent.

rc
Bey
io}

409 A.2d 136.
Carpi CorroraTIon vs. Ciry or Warwick, e¢ al.
DECEMBER 17, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Keiser, J. The plaintiff, Cardi Corporation (Cardi),
appeals from a Superior Court justice’s dismissal of its com-
plaint in which it sought an order compelling the defendant
municipality (Warwick) to arbitrate a dispute arising from
Cardi’s installation of storm sewers and drains in and along a
city street otherwise identified as Tidewater Drive.

In seeking the arbitration order, Cardi relies upon the per-
tinent provisions of the Public Works Arbitration Act, G.L.
1956 (1977 Reenactment) chapter 16 of title 37. Section
37-16-2 requires the arbitration of disputes and claims arising
out of contracts carrying a price tag in excess of $10,000
when the contract relates to “construction, alteration, repair,
or painting of any public building.” The trial justice’s
dismissal was apparently based on his belief that a “public
building” does not encompass within its terms a project
calling for the installation of sewers. Cardi argues that,
instead of sharing the trial justice’s “edifice” fixation, we
should indulge in a grammatical tour de force and regard the

ee 479

term “building” as a gerund rather than as a noun. Warwick
appreciates Cardi’s knowledge of the niceties of our language
but asks us, when was the last time we heard of anyone who
was hired to paint a sewer project.

While the General Assembly may have painted with a
broader brush when it legislated in certain areas of public
works contracts entered into by the state and its political sub-
divisions, our job is to construe chapter 16, not to redraft it.
The municipal public works arbitration provisions are free of
any ambiguity and convey a definite, sensible meaning.
Because the statute is self-declaratory, there is no need to
construe it. Vaudreuil v. Nelson Engineering and
Construction Co., 121 R.I. 418, 399 A.2d 1220 (1979);
Berberian v. Town of Westerly, 119 R.I. 593, 381 A.2d
1039 (1978); Brier Mfg. Co. v. Norberg, 119 R.1.317, 377
A.2d 345 (1977). It is obvious that if the change sought by
Cardi is to be effected, the change must take place within a
legislative rather than a judicial setting.

The plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
order appealed from is affirmed.

Adler Pollock & Sheehan Incorporated, Peter Lawson
Kennedy, for plaintiff.

Frank J. Cenerini, Assistant City Solicitor (City of
Warwick), for defendant.

1General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) chapter 13 of title 37 deals with the
wages and debts that may be owed by a public works contractor as the result of
having a bid accepted by the state or one of its municipalities. “Public works” is
defined in this chapter as “any public work consisting of grading, clearing,
demolition, improvement, completion, repair, alteration or construction of any
public road or any bridge, or portion thereof, or any public building or portion
thereof, or any heavy construction, or any public works projects of any nature or
kind whatsoever.” Interestingly enough, the General Assembly at its January 1978
session enacted what is today §37-13.1-1, which in its pertinent parts permits suits
by contractors against the state for controversies involving “the design,
construction, repair, or alteration of any state highway, bridge, or public works
other than those contracts which are covered by the Rhode Island public works
arbitration act * + *” (Emphasis added.)

iS
8

408 A.2d 1211.
SraTE vs. Joun G. Lemire.
DECEMBER 17, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Keener, J. The defendant, John G. Lemire (Lemire),
was convicted after a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court
on a one-count complaint that charged him with the illegal
possession of marijuana. His appeal is based upon the trial
justice’s acceptance of a toxicologist’s report.

On May 2, 1977, the state police, acting pursuant to an
arrest warrant, took Lemire into custody at approximately
10:15 p.m. while he was at work in Cranston at the Institute
of Mental Health. Lemire had failed to appear in the District
Court to answer a criminal complaint charging him with
assaulting a patient. The arresting officers took Lemire to the
nearby Howard barracks where they were notified that,

1A second ground of the defendant's appeal was his claim that his conviction
could not stand because the incriminating evidence was obtained as a result of an
illegal search. Subsequently, his counsel executed and filed with the clerk a
stipulation withdrawing this claim.

ee 481

because of the lateness of the hour, the prisoner would have
to be held in custody overnight. Since the Howard barracks
had no “lock up,” it was necessary to transport Lemire to the
Lincoln barracks. Departmental regulations require a full
body search of all persons who are to be incarcerated over-
night. During the search that night, a trooper saw a bulge in
one of Lemire’s pants pockets and extracted therefrom a
plastic bag containing a substance later identified by the
toxicologist as marijuana.

Lemire contends that only a botanist is qualified to give an
opinion regarding whether the contents of the packet was
marijuana. The report in question was prepared by the
Toxicology Branch - Law Enforcement Laboratory of the
Rhode Island Department of Health’s Division of Public
Health. The report, bearing the signatures of the certifying
toxicologist and the supervising toxicologist, identifies the
substance found in the packet as marijuana.

The identical issue raised here was raised and rejected by
us in State v. Cochrane, 114 R.I. 710, 339 A.2d 256 (1975).
There we said that the question of whether a toxicologist,
rather than a botanist, was qualified to identify a suspected
substance as marijuana is a matter addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial justice. We saw no abuse of discretion
in Cochrane, and we see none here.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the judg-
ment of conviction is affirmed, and the case is remanded to
the Superior Court.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, John J. McMahon,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Aram K. Berberian, for defendant.

482

409 A.2d 137.

Frank A. Carrer, Jr., Cuzer Discietinary CounseL vs.
Guen A. ANGER, Esquire.

DECEMBER 18, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

Kewiener, J. Glen A. Anger (Anger) has been a member
of the Rhode Island Bar since June 15, 1972, and during this
period has carried on the practice of law in the Woonsocket-
Blackstone Valley area. He is now before us in response to
our order to show cause why we should not accept the recom-
mendations of this court’s Disciplinary Board (the board)
calling for his suspension from the practice of law. The
recommendation comes after a series of hearings conducted
by one of the board’s hearing panels and concluding with the
board’s acceptance of the panel’s report. Anger had been
charged with violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR
1-102(A)(6) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ee 483

Hi The evidence adduced at the hearings was relatively un-
contradicted. On February 4, 1978, Anger purchased a new
Cadillac from a Woonsocket automobile dealer and tendered
in payment a check for $12,000. The check was drawn upon
the Greater Providence Deposit Corporation and in due
course was returned to the dealer with a notation of insuffi-
cient funds. Once the dealer told Anger what had occurred,
Anger issued a second $12,000 check drawn upon the Rhode
Island Hospital Trust National Bank. When the second check
bounced, the dealer’s efforts to contact Anger proved unsuc-
cessful because he had left Rhode Island only to return some
two months later, in April of 1978.

Anger’s sudden departure brought to light a second inci-
dent. In January 1978, he had purchased a parcel of com-
mercial property in Bellingham, Massachusetts, for $50,000.
As part of the purchase price he tendered two checks: one
was for $15,141.76, and the other was for $11,500. Both
checks were drawn on the Greater Providence account and
were not honored. When the seller contacted him, Anger
issued two checks on the Hospital Trust account, and they
too bounced. Thus, the seller was forced to engage counsel,
and litigation began in Massachusetts that culminated in the
cancellation of the deed and restoration of title to the seller.
At this point we would point out that the owner of the auto-
mobile agency also owned the Bellingham real estate.

At the hearing, Anger portrayed himself as blameless and
attributed all his difficulties to a financial consultant named
Ronald L. Riccardi, who had operated a business located in
Pawtucket known as Apex Financial Service, Inc. According
to Anger, the rubber checks were a direct result of Riccardi’s
false assurances that he had established a line of credit for
Anger with Hospital Trust.

The board rejected this contention, pointing out that
Riccardi’s failure offered no defense to the bad checks issued
on the Greater Providence account. Anger concedes that the
factual conclusions reached by the board are entitled to great
weight by us and will not be disturbed unless he can convince

484 ee

us that the board was clearly wrong. Here, the board found
that Anger’s check-writing endeavor was “conduct involving
dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation, which conduct
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.”

DR 1-102(A), in its pertinent provisions, warns all lawyers
that they

“shall not:

eke

(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation.

ae

(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely re-
flects on his [or her] fitness to practice law.”

The board obviously has overlooked the words in DR
1-102(A)(6), “any other conduct,” a catchall phrase for all
other misconduct that is not specifically alluded to in the
other portions of the rule. While we uphold the finding of
deceitful conduct, we must vacate the finding that Anger
violated DR 1-102(A)(6) because there was no evidence what-
soever of “any other” misconduct that the board believed
adversely affected Anger’s fitness to practice law.

Before us, Anger’s counsel made much of his client’s efforts
in the area of restitution. Furthermore, the owner of the
dealership and the Bellingham real estate made it perfectly
clear to the board that he wished the complaints could have
been withdrawn.

While restitution following a violation of an ethical duty
might be a mitigating factor in ascertaining the extent of a
disciplinary sanction, it affords no defense for an attorney’s
misconduct. In the Matter of Mahoney, 78 N.J. 248, 394
A.2d 89 (1978). Furthermore, neither the unwillingness of
the complainant to prosecute a charge nor the settlement of
any charge shall ipso facto warrant the abatement of an
investigation by the Disciplinary Board. Supreme Court Rule

| 485

42-8. Apart from the repayment, the other sole, but
somewhat significant, mitigating factors are Anger’s youth
and comparative inexperience. While we are deeply
concerned with the behavior he exhibited during the
January-April 1978 period, including his two-month absence
from the state, we believe that the public interest will best be
served by a short period of suspension.

Consequently, it is ordered that Glen A. Anger be and is
hereby suspended from engaging in the practice of law
beginning January 1, 1980, and continuing until further
order of the court; he may, however, apply for reinstatement
on or after July 1, 1980. He is further directed to furnish the
clerk of this court on or before December 21, 1979, the names
and addresses of all clients presently represented by him. The
effective date of this order has been deferred so that there
will be a reasonable period of time during which
arrangements can be made to protect the interests of his
clients.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.
Frank A. Carter, Jr., pro se, for petitioner.

Eugene F. Toro, for respondent.

486

409 A.2d 540.
Tue Kates Corporation vs. JoRDAN B. KirsHENBAUM.
DECEMBER 19, 1979.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Weissercer, J. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a
judgment of the Superior Court in a case arising out of a dis-

ee 487

pute over an alleged agreement to pay a real estate broker’s
commission. The plaintiff, Kates Corporation (Kates), seeks
to recover a commission on the sale of real property, located
at Weeden Street and Reservoir Avenue in Pawtucket, by
defendant Jordan B. Kirshenbaum to third-party defendant
Philip B. Smiley (Smiley). The trial justice directed a verdict
for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case.

The facts, considered in the light most favorable to plain-
tiff and with all reasonable inferences extracted from the rec-
ord that support plaintiff's position, are as follows. Vincent
Marcello (Marcello), a real estate broker in the employ of
Kates, became interested in Kirshenbaum’s Weeden Street
property when he saw a sales advertisement which defendant
had placed in the Providence Journal. Marcello telephoned
Kirshenbaum in Dallas, Texas, on September 5, 1973, to in-
quire whether he might represent defendant in the sale of this
property and thereby obtain a commission. Kirshenbaum
told Marcello he would receive a commission if he sold the
property. During the conversation Marcello and
Kirshenbaum reached an oral understanding that a five per-
cent commission, which they considered standard for the sale
of this type of property, would apply. Two days after this
telephone conversation Marcello sent to Kirshenbaum for his
signature an open listing agreement establishing the five per-
cent commission rate, Kirshenbaum did not return the agree-
ment with his signature, and thereafter Marcello made
“modest” but not “active” efforts to market the property.

Marcello next telephoned Kirshenbaum on February 12,
1974. Marcello was still interested in the Weeden Street pro-
perty and wanted some kind of agreement in writing before
beginning to market the property actively. Kirshenbaum
allegedly told Marcello he could actively market the property
at a price of $285,000, and that if Marcello came up with an
acceptable offer, he would pay him a five percent commis-
sion. Kirshenbaum asked Marcello to send him a letter con-
firming this discussion; Kirshenbaum said that he would
acknowledge the letter and return it to Marcello. Marcello

488 |

sent such a letter on February 13, 1974, stating in part that
“{a]lthough you will not give us an exclusive listing, you will
pay us a 5% commission if we bring you an acceptable
offer.”

After February 12, 1974, Marcello began active adver-
tising of the Weeden Street property. In a February 20, 1974
telephone conversation, Marcello asked Kirshenbaum whe-
ther he had received the February 13, 1974 letter.
Kirshenbaum said he had, and that he would acknowledge
and return it. There is no evidence that he ever did so.
Marcello continued to make earnest efforts to market the pro-
perty.

On April 18, 1974, Marcello received a telephone call from
Smiley, who was to be the eventual purchaser of the prop-
erty. Marcello met with Smiley on April 25, 1974, to discuss
the possible sale. Marcello telephoned Kirshenbaum on April
27, 1974, and they discussed the possibility of a sale to
Smiley. Kirshenbaum told Marcello that if the property sold
for $265,000, Marcello would receive the full five percent
commission, and that, if Marcello was willing to be flexible
and the property sold for less than $265,000, Kirshenbaum
and Marcello would negotiate something less than the full
five percent commission. Marcello told Kirshenbaum he
would accept less than five percent if the selling price was
below $265,000.

On May 1, 1974, defendant began to enter his own adver-
tising in the Providence Journal for the sale of the Weeden
Street property. Smiley told Marcello on May 1 that he had
seen one of Kirshenbaum’s own advertisements for the pro-
perty. On May 2, Marcello, by both telephone and letter,
communicated to Kirshenbaum his fear that Smiley and
defendant would make a deal without him.

On May 8, 1974, Kirshenbaum sent Marcello a letter
which is the only writing in this case signed by defendant:

“Dear Vincent:
“This letter will answer the last few letters that I re-

ee 489

ceived from you as well as several phone calls from you
relative to various properties.

“[ discussion of two other properties].

“As far as the Weeden Street property is concerned,
you will recall that when I first spoke to you I gave you
my opinion which was that since the greater Providence
area is such a small market you would probably receive
calls from the same people relative to making a purchase
who had called me in the past when I advertised. I fur-
ther explained to you that this was the reason I would
not be willing to give you an exclusive on the property.
You have made an attempt to come up with a buyer in
the last three months but to no avail, with the exception
of one unacceptable offer from an Allen E. Lewis.

“T notified you about two weeks ago that I would be-
gin advertising the property myself as I felt I had given
you ample time to come up with a buyer. I questioned
you then whether or not you had any other ‘concrete’
buyers and you had none.

“If due to my present advertising in the Providence
Journal, I am able to get a buyer, even though he might
have been someone who called you relative to the pro-
perty in the past, I do not feel that I would have any
obligation to you. If you do not agree, please notify me.

We ea?

Kirshenbaum sold the property to Smiley in May of 1974 at
a price of $256,000 and refused to pay Marcello any commis-
sion. Kirshenbaum explained to Marcello than no commis-
sion was owing, since Smiley had contacted Kirshenbaum a
year and a half earlier, and since defendant did not feel that
Marcello’s efforts in bringing the buyer and seller together
were significant to the consummation of the sale. This suit
followed.

HMOs After plaintiff had concluded its case, the trial justice

490 |

granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict! on the
ground that there was no note or memorandum of the alleged
agreement sufficient to satisfy the Rhode Island Statute of
Frauds. The statute, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-1-4,

provides in pertinent part:
“No action shall be brought:

“eke

“Sixth. Whereby to charge any person upon any
agreement or promise to pay any commission for or
upon the sale of any interest in real estate.

“Unless the promise or agreement upon which such
action shall be brought, or some note or memorandum
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to
be charged therewith, or by some other person by him
thereunto lawfully authorized.”

This appeal ensued.?

During the course of his cross-examination of Marcello, counsel for the defen-
dant introduced in evidence a letter sent by Marcello to defendant. Later when
defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case, plaintiff did
not raise the point that defendant had already begun to present evidence. At no
point has plaintiff argued that the motion for a directed verdict was untimely on
account of the prior admission of a defendant's exhibit. In view of plaintiff's failure
to raise the issue of defendant’s moving for a directed verdict after presenting
evidence, we do not address the question of whether on this account the motion was
improperly made.

*The defendant moved before trial to add as an additional party Commercial
Properties, Inc., which appeared to be a subsidiary of Kates. The motion was
granted. Commercial filed an answer claiming an interest identical to that of
Kates. The evidence adduced at trial was that Commercial was an agent for Kates.
‘The eventual final order was entered only against Kates, not against Commercial.
Only Kates has appealed the order.

In the absence of a special determination, an order of the Superior Court
“which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties « + +.” Super. R. Civ. P. 54(b). An order insufficient to
terminate an action by reason of Rule 54(b) is not appealable to this court.
Goodyear Loan Co. v. Little, 107 R.I. 629, 630, 269 A.2d 542-43 (1970).
Here, however, the interest of Commercial Properties in the litigation is
identical to that of Kates for all practical purposes, and the final order in
favor of defendant and against Kates precludes any recovery by Commer-
cial. The order of the trial court is therefore sufficient to adjudicate the
rights and liabilities of all the parties, and so Rule 54(b) does not bar this
court from considering the present appeal.

ee 491

This court had occasion to construe the sixth subsection of
§9-1-4 in Peacock Realty Co. v. E. Thomas Crandall Farm,
Inc., 108 B.1. 593, 278 A.2d 405 (1971). We stated there that
a memorandum of an agreement to pay a real estate agent’s
or broker’s commission is inadequate to satisfy the statute if it
fails to state the amount of the compensation or the commis-
sion to be paid to the agent or broker. Id. at 598-99, 278 A.2d
at 407-08. We stressed that our general policy frowns on any-
thing short of complete compliance with the statute by a real
estate broker. Id. at 602, 278 A.2d at 410. Although, as was
shown in the Peacock case, the deficiencies of a broker’s
memorandum may be cured by the defendant’s own admis-
sions on the witness stand, no such admissions were made by
defendant here. The plaintiff's case against Kirshenbaum
must depend on the signed writings of Kirshenbaum; and the
only writing he signed, the letter of May 8, 1974, although
referring to prior correspondence between Marcello and
Kirshenbaum, contains no reference to an amount of
compensation or rate of commission. Indeed, this letter tends
to negate the existence of any integrated agreement between
the parties.

The plaintiff argues, however, that Marcello’s letter to
Kirshenbaum dated February 13, 1974, supplies this missing
essential term, and that this letter ought to be read into
Kirshenbaum’s signed letter of May 8 by virtue of
Kirshenbaum’s statement, “This letter will answer the last
few letters that I received from you as well as several phone
calls from you relative to various properties.”® In Cunha v.
Callery, 29 R.I. 230, 231-32, 69 A. 1001, 1001 (1908), this
court adopted the rule that unsigned writings referred to in a

Although in reviewing a directed verdict for defendant, this court considers the
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Calhoun v. City of Providence,
120 R.I. 619, 633, 390 A.2d 350, 357 (1978), the court must treat the suffi-
ciency of defendant's letter to satisfy §9-1-4 as a question of law rather that a ques-
tion of fact. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Shaffer, 310 F.2d 668, 675 (10th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 948, 83 S. Ct. 1678, 10 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1963)
(applying Oklahoma law); L.J. Upton & Co. v. Colbath, 122 Me. 188, 196-98, 119
A. 384, 388 (1923); Johnson v. Auran, 214 N.W.2d 641, 651-52 (N.D. 1974).
Therefore, the directed verdict standard is not relevant to this issue.

492 ee

signed writing may be read together with the signed writing
to satisfy the requirements of the Rhode Island Statute of
Frauds. The reason for the rule is that a signed reference to a
document may vouch for the terms of that document to the
same extent as a signature directly on the document’s fact. It
is necessary, however, that the signed writing recognize, at
least implicitly, that the terms of the agreement are correctly
stated in the unsigned writing. Scheck v. Francis, 33 App.
Div. 2d 91, 94, 305 N.Y.S.2d 217, 221 (1969); Thirkell v.
Cambi, [1919] 2 K.B. 590, 595, 597; 1 Williston, The Law
Governing Sales of Goods §108 at 315 (rev. ed. 1948). See
Grant v. Auvil, 39 Wash, 2d 722, 726, 238 P.2d 393, 396
(1951). In no way can it be said in the present case that
Kirshenbaum has assented by his May 8 letter to the state-
ments and terms written by Marcello in his February 13
letter.*

Recently the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit “confess[ed] to being troubled by the thought that
recipients of * * * letters, should they decide not to respond,
do so at the peril of finding themselves bound by a solemn
obligation within the Statute of Frauds.” Centredale
Investment Co. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 540
F.2d 16, 19 (Ist Cir. 1976) (construing §9-1-4). We are just as
troubled by the notion that such recipients, merely by deign-
ing to “answer the last few letters [and] phone calls,” thereby
acquiesce in every essential term contained in those letters. As
far as the compensation or rate of commission due Marcello is
concerned, Kirshenbaum has signed nothing manifesting his
acceptance of Marcello’s version of the agreement on this
point. Kirshenbaum’s memorandum fails either to state or to
adopt from another writing the commission rate to be paid to

The plaintiff asks us to incorporate into Kirshenbaum’s letter an unsigned writ-
ing that the plaintiff himself drafted. Several courts have expressed unwillingness to
read material written by the plaintiff into the signed memorandum of the defen-
dant, in the absence of intrinsic assurances that the defendant meant to adopt the
terms of the plaintiff's writing. E.g., Young v. McQuerrey, 54 Haw. 433, 437, 508
P.2d 1051, 1054 (1973); Brause v. Goldman, 10 App. Div. 2d 328, 335, 199
N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (1960); Solin Lee Chu v. Ling Sun Chu, 9 App. Div. 2d 888,
888-89, 193 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (1959)

ee 493

the plaintiff. It is therefore inadequate to satisfy §9-1-4.
Peacock Realty Co. v. E. Thomas Crandall Farm, Inc., 108
R.I. at 598-99, 278 A.2d at 407-08. We decline to relax the
rule that, in the absence of such special circumstances as judi-
cial admissions, the compliance of a real estate broker with
the statute of frauds must be complete.

The plaintiffs appeal is denied and dismissed, the judg-
ment appealed from is affirmed, and the papers in the case
are remanded to the Superior Court.

Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury ¢> Parsons, Michael P. DeFanti,
Gordon P. Cleary, for plaintiff.

Kirshenbaum Law Offices, Inc., Sanford M. Kirshenbaum,
for defendant.

409 A.2d 544,
Srate vs. FRANK L. MARRAPESE, JR..
DECEMBER 20, 1979.
Present: Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

8
xt

496 ee
-
ee

Kewiever, J. This opinion might be entitled, “Bobo
Revisited.” Frank L. Marrapese, Jr.’s nickname is Bobo. In
State v. Marrapese, 116 R.I. 1, 351 A.2d 95 (1976), we
denied Bobo’s appeal after a jury had found him guilty of two
charges: (1) that he had received stolen goods and (2) that he
had conspired with James R. Harris and Harry L. Glantz to
steal a camper. The vehicle was going to be used to transport

| 497

Bobo and his girl friend, Vivian, to Florida where the couple
could spend some time soaking up the sun. When Bobo told
Vivian that the trip and their romance were off, Vivian went
to the state police and informed them of both the location of
the stolen camper and the identity of the thieves. Following
his conviction, Bobo received a 3-year prison sentence on the
stolen-goods charge and a suspended sentence of 6 years on
the conspiracy charge. The suspended sentence carried with
it a period of years during which Bobo was on probation. He
is now before us on his appeal from a June 21, 1978 imposi-
tion of the 6-year sentence. The sentence was imposed after a
Superior Court justice determined that Bobo had violated his
probationary status.

One of the prosecution witnesses at the violation hearing
was Bobo’s former friend and co-conspirator, James R.
Harris (Harris), who described Bobo’s involvement in a
stolen-car ring. This operation was centered in Providence
but catered to customers in such far-away places as
Pennsylvania. Harris, an admitted participant in the
operation, was an informant in the employ of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Harris told the trial justice that in January 1977 Bobo
called him and not only offered to sell him counterfeit auto-
mobile title certificates but subsequently also announced that
he, Bobo, was now marketing stolen cars whose serial num-
bers matched those on the certificates. The purchase price for
such items was $2,500 each. Harris then contacted the FBI
and told the agency of Bobo’s offer. For its part, the FBI
agreed to pay Harris, aid in his relocation, and give him
immunity for his stolen-car activities. In turn, Harris prom-
ised to forward all pertinent information to the FBI.

To implement this agreement, Harris contacted Bobo and
told him that he had a buyer who needed a car and a bogus
title certificate. This conversation led to a meeting in Harris’
Coventry home. Present at that time were Bobo; one of
Bobo’s acquaintances, Allie BiFalco; and Ernie DeFusco,
who was representing the buyer. Bobo told Harris and

498 ee

DeFusco that BiFalco was the individual to contact should
they have any question as to the impending sale. About 10
days later, Harris supplied the FBI with a copy of a false title
certificate.

During the first week in March 1977, Harris picked up a
1976 brown Cadillac Coupe de Ville in New York! and deliv-
ered it to a customer in Hershey, Pennsylvania. The purchase
price was $5,500. The price included the car, the bill of sale,
and the title certificate. Although Harris described this sale as
being strictly a cash transaction, the record indicates that the
customer paid by a check made payable to a “Steven
Rackman.” An FBI agent who testified at the hearing
attempted to explain this discrepancy by stating that Harris
had told the agent that he was “Rackman” and that he had
cashed the check. When Bobo’s attorney inquired why a
check supposedly presented to the bank on March 4 had a
stamp on its back which carried a March 7 date, the agent
explained to the trial justice that the buyer had told him the
check was presented late in the afternoon of Friday, March
4, at a time when the bank was recording all transactions
occurring at that time as having taken place on Monday,
March 7. :

After the first sale, Harris, with the encouragement of the
FBI, told Bobo that he was in the market for a second vehi-
cle. Bobo informed Harris that the price was going up. Sub-
sequently, in mid-April, BiFalco phoned Harris to instruct
him where the automobile could be picked up, but Harris
indicated that he wished to confirm the deal with Bobo.
BiFalco then responded, “I'm with Bobo now, I'll set the
whole thing up.” Harris recorded this conversation with the
aid of a device which the FBI had attached to his phone and
turned the tape over to the FBI. At the hearing, both the
agent and Harris identified the voice on the tape as being that
of BiFalco. This tape and a subsequent tape of a conversation
between Harris and Bobo were admitted into evidence.

.arris’ New York contact was BiFalco’s brother; Tom.

eS 499

Bobo might be called an entrepreneur because when he
testified, he described himself as an asphalt-paving
contractor and the owner and operator of a clothing store
situated on Atwells Avenue in Providence. According to
Bobo, his clothing specialty in the winter of 1977 was a line of
leather jackets that he purchased wholesale for $30 and was
selling retail for $50. Bobo explained to the trial justice that
he had “flooded two neighborhoods” with the jackets and
gave the surplus to Harris so that Harris could try his luck in
Coventry. At the trial Bobo conceded that the tape was a
recording of a conversation that he had with Harris on April
19, 1977, but claimed they were talking about the price
Harris had to pay Bobo for each of the jackets he sold to his
Coventry clientele.

However, the state maintained the tape concerned a
conversation that took place after Harris had agreed to set up
a sale of a car to an undercover agent called Billy Wells.
Harris testified that in mid-April he returned to New York
and picked up a 1976 red-and-white Coupe de Ville and ulti-
mately delivered it to Wells in East Providence. The selling
price for the two-tone vehicle was $6,000. Harris arrived in
Rhode Island with the car on the week-end and stored it
during this period in his own garage. Delivery was made to
Wells during the next week, and payment was delayed until
such time as Wells received the necessary cash from the fed-
eral government. The state insisted that the April 19, 1977
conversation actually related to the delay in the payment and
the ultimate division of its proceeds.

On the tape, after exchanging pleasantries, Harris assured
Bobo that he was “either gonna take care of that tonight or
by noontime tomorrow, one way or the other it’s cool.” Bobo
replied, “[WJell see if you can get it tonight.” After Harris
had assured him that he was “trying,” Bobo countered,
“Alright, you know what you're gonna give me, right?”
Harris answered, “Yeah.” Bobo responded, “Three two.
Thirty two.” Harris said, “You got it,” and also asked, “[D]o
you want me to just call you when it comes and say come

500 Ce)

over the house?” Bobo made it clear that there was no need
for speed, but when Harris asked, “[C]an I give you three one
* * « and then give you another one the next time,” Bobo in-
sisted, “It’s gotta be three two.”

Bobo maintained that his conference reference to “Three
two” or “thirty two” merely meant that he was satisfied by
Harris’ paying him $32 for each jacket Harris sold. He
explained that he was pleased with the small $2 markup
because the season was just about over, and he had made
enough profits on the jackets that carried the $50 price tags.
The trial justice, however, found that the conversation
related to stolen cars rather than leather jackets and the
“Three two” concerned Bobo’s share of the $6,000, to wit,
$3,200.

The first facet of Bobo’s appeal concerned the
prosecution’s reliance on and use of hearsay evidence, speci-
fically: (1) Harris’ report of BiFalco’s assurance that Bobo
was at his side as he and Harris talked about a second car
sale; (2) the FBI’s secondhand version of why there was a dis-
crepancy in the dates on the check; and (3) the agent’s state-
ment that Harris had told him that he, Harris, had cashed
the check.

In State v. DeRoche, 120 R.I. 523, 389 A.2d 1229
(1978), we discussed the constitutional limitations on the use
of hearsay in probation- and parole-revocation hearings in
the light of the minimum due-process requirements articu-
lated by the holdings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93
S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), and Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484
(1972). Morrissey delineates one of the requirements as “the

*During their dealings with BiFalco, the FBI undercover agent purchased three
cars, one of which was a Lincoln Continental. Wells had interested BiFalco in
some stolen diamonds, and Harris had set up a meeting where Bobo, BiFalco,
Wells, and Harris would get together and discuss matters of mutual interest. When
Bobo and BiFalco failed to appear at a Providence hotel as scheduled, Harris con-
tacted Bobo by phone. Bobo told his caller to “walk out of there” because “these
guys stink in the freezer.” Harris translated the “freezer” phrase to mean that Bobo
“figured that they were cops.” Harris left Rhode Island in June 1977.

es 501

right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
the hearing éfficer specifically finds good cause for not allow-
ing confrontation).” Id, at 489, 92 S. Ct. at 2604, 33 L. Ed.
2d at 499. In DeRoche, we said that the right of confronta-
tion as it relates to the admissibility of hearsay testimony
requires a determination by the trial justice whether the out-
of-court declarant is available for cross-examination. If the
declarant is available, the right of confrontation has been
satisfied. However, should the declarant be unavailable, the
trial justice must make a specific finding that there is just
cause for not permitting confrontation prior to the admission
of the hearsay testimony.

Assuming that the DeRoche standard is applicable to
Bobo’s violation hearing, the trial justice should have
excluded evidence indicating that Bobo was with BiFalco at
the time BiFalco talked with Harris, as well as the agent’s
attempt to explain the discrepancy in dates on the check. The
agent’s explanation regarding why the first sale was consid-
ered by Harris as a cash transaction was admissible, how-
ever, since Harris was available for cross-examination and,
indeed, was examined by defense counsel. The trial justice’s
error was inconsequential because the evidence which runs
afoul of the rule in DeRoche was merely cumulative when
viewed in light of all the evidence presented at the hearing.

Bobo next argues that the trial justice erred when he
allowed the FBI agent to identify one of the voices in the
tape-recorded conversation as being that of Harris. This con-
tention merits little discussion. Prior to the admission of a
witness’ opinion as to the identity of a speaker in a telephone
conversation, it need only be established that the witness is
familiar with the voice of the alleged speaker. United States
v. Ladd, 527 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1976); 1 Wharton, Crimi-
nal Evidence §189 at 373-76 (13th ed. 1972). In fact, require-
ments for voice authentication do not differ markedly from
those employed for document authentication; once a prima
facie case of authenticity is made out by the proponent of the
evidence, the testimony is admissible, and the reliability of

502 |

identification presents an issue for the factfinder. United
States v. Albergo, 539 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1976). Here, the evi-
dence indicates that the agent was quite familiar with Harris’
voice. He testified that he had spoken with Harris on numer-
ous occasions throughout the 5-month period Harris was
acting as an informant. In addition, Harris himself described
the conversations he had held with the agent regarding
Bobo’s dealings in stolen-car activities.

The two tape-recorded conversations were admitted into
evidence over the objection of Bobo’s counsel. While there
was a passing question as to the authenticity of the tapes, the
main objection to the Harris-BiF alco get-together concerned
its materiality, while the main objection to the Harris-Bobo
conversation was that there was a lack of any authentication
that the voice presumably belonging to Bobo was in fact
Bobo’s. Now before us Bobo claims that neither tape should
have been admitted into evidence because there was no foun-
dation laid concerning such matters as the recording device’s
capability to record a telephone conversation or the compe-
tency of Harris to operate the recorder.

Such a challenge merits little consideration. Of the two
tapes, the one more adverse to Bobo’s interests was the April
19, 1977 tape. The best proof of the authenticity of this tape
was Bobo. At the hearing, he acknowledged that he had
listened to this tape and that it accurately depicted the con-
versation he had with Harris. Harris’ testimony was further
proof of the tapes’ authenticity. He was present when they
were being made, and he identified each of the voices on the
tapes as belonging to BiFalco and Bobo, respectively. Further
persuasive testimony was obtained from James F. Kearney, a
special agent with the Providence office of the FBI. Kearney
informed the trial justice of the purpose of the tape and the
fact that consent was given to the taping by Harris and his
wife. He explained the operation of the tape recorder and the
procedure for receiving the tapes from Harris. Kearney told
the trial justice that, to the best of his knowledge, no addi-
tions or deletions had been made to the taped conversation of

|) 503

April 15, 1977 and that tape, he said, had been in his custody
in a safe at his Providence office. In summary, there was
ample evidence that established the authenticity and accu-
racy of the tapes in question.*

Bobo also complains about the trial justice’s rejection of his
efforts to show how Harris deceived a Family Court justice
during a proceeding which culminated in the approval of
Harris’ and his wife’s adoption petition. The trial justice re-
fused to admit such testimony on the grounds that it was nei-
ther material nor relevant to the violation hearing. Bobo
argues at length that the Family Court episode should have
been explored because it represents a graphic demonstration
of Harris’ complete insensitivity to the judicial process and
the sanctity of the oath.

In making this argument, Bobo overlooks the fact that the
trial justice was dealing with a probation-violation hearing
wherein the technical rules of evidence employed during a
full-blown criminal trial are not applicable. Here, the trial
justice’s refusal to consider Harris’ conduct in the Family
Court was a discretionary matter, and we see no abuse of
that discretion.

Having considered all the issues raised by the rulings made
by the trial justice, we would again emphasize that the evi-
dentiary standards applicable to a probation-violation
hearing are not as rigid as those applicable in a criminal trial,
and the standard of proof is met by evidence which
“reasonably satisfies” the trial justice that a violation has
occurred. State v. Turcotte, 400 A.2d 957 (R.I. 1979);
State v. DeRoche, 120 R.1. 523, 389 A.2d 1229 (1978); State
v. Skirvin, 113 R.I. 448, 322 A.2d 297 (1974). There
was sufficient evidence, apart from the objectionable
hearsay to which we earlier alluded, which would and did
reasonably satisfy the trial justice that Bobo had violated the

*Transcripts of both tapes were introduced into evidence, and the portions of
conversations between Bobo and Harris and Harris and BiFaleo which appear in
this opinion are taken from those transcripts.

504 es

terms of his probation. We see no need to repeat the evidence
properly adduced at the hearing, but there is no question that
it shows Bobo as a moving force behind, and the beneficiary
of, an interstate stolen-car operation whose receipts might
make many a tax-paying wage earner wonder when he or she
hears that “Crime does not pay.”*

After the violation hearing had concluded, Harris
appeared in the Federal District Court for the District of
Rhode Island as a reluctant government witness in a case
against Bobo which charged Bobo with interstate trafficking
in stolen cars. Harris refused to testify on the ground that fed-
eral officials had promised him, in exchange for his coopera-
tion, that he would not have to testify in any prosecution
involving events in which he was a participant. No mention
of this promise was made at the violation hearing when
Harris enumerated the conditions of his cooperation with the
FBI. Bobo now argues that he is entitled to a new violation
hearing, since the state violated his due-process rights by
deliberately suppressing any mention of that facet of the
agreement between Harris and the FBI that came to light in
the federal court.

In support of his contention, Bobo cites the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972), and Napue
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217
(1959), that a defendant is denied due process of law when
the state knowingly uses false testimony to obtain a convic-
tion even if the testimony goes only to the credibility of the
witness. Although this basic due-process guarantee was
enunciated with reference to criminal trials, it is equally
applicable to probation-violation hearings wherein the
defendant is afforded minimum due-process requirements.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92S. €t. 2593, 33 L. Ed.

‘During the period Harris worked as an informant, he was paid $10,200. The
FBI gave him a direct payment of $3,000, and a sizable portion, if not the entire
balance of $7,200, came to Harris as his share of the proceeds of the stolen-car

operation in which he was a participant. The FBI described Harris’ retention of the
proceeds as an indirect payment for services rendered. -

505

2d 484 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct.
1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973).

Bobo’s argument fails for the simple reason that it is totally
unsupported by any evidence that the state knew of or was
privy to all the details of the Harris-FBI understanding. This
is true despite the fact that the District Court, in quashing
Harris’ witness subpoena, found that representatives of the
federal government had promised Harris that he would not
have to testify in matters such as Bobo’s criminal trial. There
is no evidence to indicate that this promise was equally appli-
cable to Rhode Island’s probation-violation hearing. Bobo
never raised this issue at the hearing, and indeed, as noted by
the trial justice in denying the motion for a new hearing,
even though Harris did tell the federal court that he testified
before the state court under duress, Harris continued to
repeat that no promises were made to him by any Rhode
Island official. In fact, he conceded that he did have a sub-
poena from the state police, and therefore, had to testify.
Harris also made it clear that Captain Pare of the Rhode
Island State Police had told him that he could not guarantee
that Harris would not have to testify. Bobo’s due-process
argument with respect to Rhode Island’s suppression of the
total agreement between Harris and the FBI has no merit.

What we have just stated is equally applicable to Bobo’s
contention that Harris’ testimony at the violation hearing
was a product of coercion. There is no evidentiary basis to
support that contention.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Susan McGuirl,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

John F. Cicilline, for defendant.

506

409 A.2d 551.
SraTE vs. GzorcE F, Neary, et al.
DECEMBER 24, 1979.
Presenr Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

5

508 es
—

Weissercer, J. Defendants George F. Neary (Neary) and
Roland F. Martell, Jr. (Martell) were indicted on September
2, 1976, by the grand jury on charges of robbery in violation
of G.L, 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-39-1, carrying a pistol
without a license in violation of §11-47-8, as amended by
P.L. 1975, ch. 278, §1, assault with intent to murder in viola-
tion of §11-5-1, assault with a dangerous weapon in violation
of §11-5-2, and assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwell-
ing house in violation of §11-5-4. Prior to trial, a justice of the
Superior Court granted defendant Martell’s motion to sever a

companion charge of possession of a firearm after a previous
conviction of a crime of violence, in violation of §11-47-5.

Trial was held in Providence County Superior Court
before a jury which returned verdicts of guilty as charged on
February 8, 1977, with respect to the three counts of carrying
a weapon without a license, assault with intent to murder,
and assault with a dangerous weapon, after the trial justice
had granted defendants’ motions for acquittal on the charges
of robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwell-
ing house. The defendants subsequently filed motions for
new trial, which motions the trial justice denied, and judg-
ments of conviction were entered. Both defendants join in
appealing from these judgments.

The events which culminated in the grand jury’s indict-
ment and defendants’ subsequent convictions began during
the early morning hours of July 6, 1976, when Thomas
Edward Dauphinee (Thomas) heard a knock on the door of
the apartment he shared with his father, Bernard, and went
to answer it. Defendant Martell grabbed him and pulled out
a gun. After Thomas knocked the weapon from defendant’s
grasp, a number of encounters and struggles ensued, both in-

es 509

side and outside of the apartment, involving Thomas,
Bernard, both defendants, and two other individuals. In the
course of these confrontations, Thomas was hit over the head
with a beer bottle, and Bernard was severely beaten with a
baseball bat, suffering injuries which necessitated a hospital
stay of several months’ duration. The defendants’ grievance
with the Dauphinee family seems to have stemmed from the
fact that Thomas and another person who participated in the
incident had earlier borrowed Martell’s car and allegedly
damaged it.

Soon after the assaults, while in the hospital, Thomas
viewed an array of thirteen photographs, two of which, hav-
ing just been taken that morning, depicted defendants Neary
and Martell with the date July 6, 1976, conspicuously
positioned upon them. A detective had chosen the remaining
photographs at random, making no attempt in his process of
selection to approximate the likenesses of the men only just
then arrested for the crimes. At the voir dire hearing
conducted to determine the admissibility of Thomas’ in-court
identification of defendants, the trial justice ruled that the
photographic display viewed by the victim had been an im-
permissibly suggestive one, but that the in-court identifi-
cations, nevertheless, had been predicated upon independent
sources;! and the photographic identification was not such as
to have led to the likelihood of irreparable mistaken identifi-
cation.?

1 The trial justice found that the victim had sufficient opportunity to observe both
defendants clearly on the night of the incident. Additionally, Thomas Dauphinee
had known Martell personally prior to the episode here involved, and he had also
seen Neary previously on at least one occasion in a bar.

® The trial justice apparently applied the standard enunciated in Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968), wherein the
Court held that “each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convic-
tions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification
by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identifica-
tion procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id. at 384, 88 S. Ct. at 971, 19 L. Ed.
2d at 1253,

TT

510 es

During the suppression hearing, it was mentioned by
defense counsel that Thomas had also examined approxi-
mately six to eight “mug books” directly after the assaults and
somewhat earlier in time than the photographic array
produced by the detective? After regarding the “mug books”
for thirty or forty minutes, the victim failed to make any
positive identification; but the police officer who had
conducted the mug-book display testified that he did not
know whether or not the pictures of either or both defen-
dants had been among those contained in the “mug books”
shown to Thomas. Defendant Martell moved for production
of the “mug books,” but the trial justice refused to order such
production, noting that defendants were free to subpoena the
books for trial should they desire to view and introduce them.
In addition, the trial justice denied Martell’s request that he
defer ruling on the admissibility of Thomas’ in-court
identification of his assailants until he could subpoena the
books, Evidently, Martell’s counsel theorized that such
books, if defendants’ photographs were included in them,
would constitute exculpatory evidence which might then
impugn the reliability of the allegedly independently based
identifications by Thomas.

Initially, defendants attack the evidentiary statute, G.L.
1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-47-27, on the ground that their
convictions of possession of a firearm without a license in vio-
lation of §11-47-8* through reliance on the evidentiary provi-

3 Officer Zwolenski’s report, which had been the subject of defendants’ pretrial
discovery, contained the following statement on page 6: “ ‘Mug books were taken
into the hospital and viewed by Thomas with negative results.’ ” Defense counsel’s
comment was prompted by this excerpt.

* General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-47-8, as amended by P.L. 1975,
ch, 278, §1, provides in pertinent part:

“License or permit required for carrying pistol - Possession of machine gun.
-(a) No person shall, without a license or permit therefor, issued as provided
in §§11-47-11, 11-47-12 and 11-47-18, carry a pistol or revolver in any vehi-
cle or conveyance or on or about his person whether visible or concealed,
except in his dwelling house or place of business or on land possessed by him
or as provided in §§11-47-9 and 11-47-10,”

sil

sion of §11-47-27° to prove the absence of the licenses violated
their right to due process of the law. In short, defendants
claim that §11-47-27, by itself, may not satisfy constitution-
ally the state’s burden of proof that they had no licenses, since
such absence, by definition, constitutes an element of the of-
fense, and the state failed to adduce any evidence bearing
upon the possession or lack of firearm licenses on behalf of
either or both of the defendants.

Section 11-47-27 creates a statutory mandate that the
carrying or use of any firearm contrary to the provisions of
§§11-47-1 to 11-47-34 shall be evidence of the unlawfulness
of such carrying or use, thus easing the burden cast upon the
state and, further, eliminating any requirement that the
prosecution advance affirmative evidence to support a nega-
tive averment -- in this instance, the lack of a license. In the
event that there is evidence sufficient to warrant a finding of
possession, it then becomes incumbent upon the defendant to
raise the issue of the fact of his possession of a license.

The defendants have overlooked the manifest distinction
between the evidentiary concepts of the burden of produc-
tion and the ultimate burden of proof. While the accused
never bears the burden of satisfying the factfinder of his inno-
cence or justification, and the prosecution always bears the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused beyond a reason-
able doubt in a criminal prosecution (State v. Brown, 97 R.I.
95, 196 A.2d 138 (1963); State v. Stallman, 78 R.I. 90, 79
A.2d 611 (1951)), the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence may indeed shift from side to side, and this same bur-
den may properly devolve upon a defendant once the state

5 General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-47-27 reads as follows:

“Proof of unlawfulness of carrying. - No negative allegation of any kind need
be averred or proved in any complaint under §§11-47-1 to 11-47-34,
inclusive, and the carrying or use of any firearm contrary to the provisions of
said sections shall be evidence that the possession, carrying or use of any such
firearm is unlawful, but the respondent in any such case may show any fact
that would render the possession, or use, or carrying of such firearm
lawful.”

ae

512 ee

has developed a prima facie case and has adduced evidence
sufficient to make it just that the defendant be required to
challenge the proof with excuse or explanation. See Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 203 n.9, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2323 n.9,
53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 287 n.9 (1977), citing Morrison v.
California, 291 U.S. 82, 54S. Ct. 281, 78 L. Ed. 664 (1934).

|| Under our statute prohibiting the carrying of a pistol with-
out a license, the latter phrase is a descriptive negative which
constitutes an essential element of the offense. The statutory
inference formulated in §11-47-27, which places the burden
upon a defendant to introduce evidence of circumstances
that would render his possession lawful, does no more than
require the defendant to raise the issue of justification by evi-
dence peculiarly within his own control and based upon
knowledge immediately within his personal reach. Such
legislation which provides that proof of one fact shall be evi-
dence of an ultimate fact in issue is merely the enactment of a
tule of evidence and in no way violates one’s right to due pro-
cess of law. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad v.
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31S. Ct. 136, 55 L. Ed. 78 (1910).®
In order for such a legislative presumption to survive a consti-
tutional attack, there must exist a rational relation“ ‘between
the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed.” United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 66, 85 S. Ct. 754, 757, 13 L.
Ed. 2d 658, 662 (1965), quoting Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463, 467, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 1245, 87 L. Ed. 1519, 1523
(1943). We recognized that standard in State v. Tutalo, 99
R.I. 14, 205 A.2d 137 (1964), and cautioned that “the fact
inferred from the fact actually proved cannot be purely arbi-
trary or wholly unreasonable * * «.” Id. at 19, 205 A.2d at
140.

°The Court in this case stated the rule in apt and succinct terms:

“If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself prescribing a rule of
evidence, in either criminal or civil cases, does not shut out from the party
affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of
the facts bearing upon the issue, there is no ground for holding that due pro-
cess of law has been denied him.” Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad
v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43, 31S. Ct. 136, 138, 55 L. Ed. 78, 81 (1910).

| 513

Hs To rebut the statutory presumption of the unlawful carry-
ing of a weapon, defendants were free to introduce evidence
of the existence of their licenses to carry the weapons in ques-
tion by producing such licenses or records of a proper licens-
ing authority or other admissible testimony or documenta-
tion. At trial, the state adduced evidence sufficient to show
that both defendants had been in possession of a pistol at
some point during the morning's episode here at issue. From
the fact of their mere possession of the weapon, the legislative
rule of evidence authorized the drawing of the inference that
they did in fact lack appropriate permits or licenses.

Hs We reiterate that is is not beyond the bounds of either our
own or the Federal Constitution to infer that one appre-
hended by police with a pistol upon his person or in his auto-
mobile has no license if he fails to produce one or even to
claim at trial that such license exists. Since a presumption is
an inference sanctioned by statute or judicially created rule,
if the inference is a rational one, then so too is the presump-
tion. In the light of our everyday experience and common
sense, as well as the application of reasonable principles of
logical analysis, we cannot say that the presumption of the
want of a license from the possession of a weapon by one who
offers no evidence of the existence of such license is so totally
unwarranted or arbitrary as to exceed the bounds of constitu-
tional due process.” See State v. Maloney, 109 R.I. 166, 282
A.2d 34 (1971); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 361
N.E.2d 1308 (1977).®

7 As long ago as 1881, this court held that a statute providing, in a criminal prose-
cution for violation of the liquor law, that evidence of the sale or keeping of intoxi-
cating liquors for sale in any building shall be prima facie evidence that such sale or
keeping was illegal, was not unconstitutional and did not effect a deprivation of
life, liberty or property without due process of the laws. State v. Higgins, 13 R.1.
330, 331-32 (1881). Accord, State v. Sheehan, 28 R.I. 160, 66 A. 66 (1907)
(possession of undersized lobsters).

®In passing upon a substantially identical issue, Mr. Justice Braucher of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed that:

“In sum, we think G.L. o. 278, §7, as applied to a license to carry a
firearm, satisfies due process requirements. The defendant did not make any

514 ee

The defendants’ second major assertion of error relates to
the trial justice’s refusal to order production of the “mug
books” that had been presented to one of the hospitalized vic-
tims with negative results. In the alternative, defendants
argue that the trial justice should have deferred his ruling on
the admissibility of the in-court identifications by the
complaining witness until counsel had occasion to subpoena
the books in order to produce them in court and introduce
them in evidence for their potentially exculpatory value.

Initially, we note that since only defendant Martell
objected to the refusal of the trial judge to compel produc-
tion, the comtemporaneous objection rule, embodied in
Super. R. Crim. P. 51, precludes defendant Neary from
claiming error at this stage of the proceedings since he failed
to preserve the issue properly for appeal. State v. Myers, 115
R.I. 583, 350 A.2d 611 (1976); State v. Franklin, 103 R.I.
715, 241 A.2d 219 (1968). In any event, the issue proves to be
as unavailing to the defendant who raised it as to the one who
failed to do so by timely objection.

“Unquestionably, an accused in a criminal case must be
protected in his constitutional right to procure such witnesses
and evidence as are necessary to permit a full defense to the
offense charged, and a reasonable adjournment of the trial
may be necessary to effectuate that right.” State v. Carillo,
113 R.I. 32, 39-40, 317 A.2d 449, 454 (1974). But a request
for a continuance is well within the discretion of the trial jus-
tice and not allowable as a matter of course, particularly
where defense counsel has failed to use due diligence to

suggestion that he had a license. We find it nearly impossible to believe that
he had such a license but withheld it, subjecting himself to the risk of a man-
datory term of imprisonment. If he did so, for example, for the purpose of
establishing a legal principle, the words of the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970), are apposite: ‘The adversary system of trial
is hardly an end in itself . . . .” Such an absurd game does not contribute to a
search for truth; instead, it increases the risk of convicting the innocent and
acquitting the guilty. We find no unfairness in our traditional rule.”
Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 409, 361 N.E.2d 1308, 1312-13
(1977).

| sis

obtain such evidence and when its absence is fairly attri-
butable to the defendant’s fault. State v. Carillo, supra.

Doubtless the nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the
accused may constitute a procedural failure of constitutional
proportions. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83S, Ct. 1194,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); In re Ouimette, 115 R.I. 169, 342
A.2d 250 (1975). In the case at bar, however, the record
would indicate that the prosecution, in response to a defense
pretrial request for discovery, made available the officer’s
report which contained a reference to the use of the “mug
books” in issue with negative results. The record further indi-
cates that this report was made available prior to the com-
mencement of trial, and yet no request for production of the
“mug books” was made until after the trial had commenced.
At that point, the trial justice properly suggested that defen-
dant Martell subpoena the books if he desired to make use of
them.°

Not only did counsel for defendant make no attempt to
introduce the allegedly exculpatory “mug books” into evi-
dence during the course of the trial, but apparently down to
the present time he has made no effort to ascertain whether
they even included defendants’ pictures or not. Therefore, it
cannot be determined on this record whether the “mug
books” would contain any evidence of an exculpatory nature.
Even though more than two years have passed since the date
of trial, there has been no more light shed upon the subject

® Pursuant to Rule 16(g) (1) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
defendant who desires to inspect books or documents is required to make a request
therefor. The state is then required to respond in writing, indicating whether
inspection will be permitted. In the event that inspection is not permitted, then the
party who served the request may move for an order to compel compliance. In this
case the record does not show that the defendant ever requested inspection of the
“mug books.” Therefore, a motion to compel was inappropriate. Since the trial had
already begun, a subpoena duces tecum would have been the most expeditious
means of bringing the “mug books” into court for use by the defendant if inspection
disclosed relevance. It is also significant that the record does not show that defense
counsel ever asked informally or otherwise for permission to examine the books in
the police station.

516 es

than during the trial. We cannot say, therefore, that the con-
tents of the “mug books” “would be favorable to the defense
or material to the issues at hand.” State v. Contildes, 121
RB.I. 500, 508, 401 A.2d 426, 430 (1979). Thus, defendant
Martell cannot prevail upon an issue when he has not even
reached the threshold of establishing its relevance.

The defendants also take exception to the trial justice’s jury
instructions, which, in effect, characterized the “without a
license” phraseology of §11-47-8, and, further, the
exemptions found in that section and §§11-47-9 and 11-47-10
as affirmative defenses, thus shifting the burden of per-
suasion on those matters to defendants. Clearly, defendants
insist that the absence of a license is an element of the offense
which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt or run
afoul of the due process requirements mandated in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368
(1970).

In State v. Maloney, supra, we held in respect to this very
issue that the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution re-
mains on the state throughout the trial and never shifts to the
defendant. In the case at bar, the trial justice characterized
the defense of license as an “affirmative defense” which
defendant had the burden of proving by a “preponderance of
the evidence.” This instruction was erroneous, but in view of
the fact that the defendants had not raised the issue either of
the existence of a license or of circumstances that would place
them within one of the categories that dispensed with the
license requirement, such error was harmless. The trial jus-
tice did instruct the jury that “the State has the overall and
overriding burden of proving guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt.” This portion of the trial justice’s instruc-
tions related to the case as a whole and was an appropriate
statement of the law. Thus, we hold that these defendants

1°This branch of defendants’ argument has its origin in the Fourteenth Amend-
-ment to the United States Constitution and art. I, sec. 10, of the Rhode Island Con-
stitution,

ee 517

had the burden to raise the issue of license or justification in
the first instance. Had such issue been raised, the burden
would have been upon the state, as it has always been, to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of
the offense charged.

For the foregoings reasons, the defendants’ appeals are
denied and dismissed, the judgments of the Superior Courts
are affirmed, and the papers in the case are remitted to the
Superior Court.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Melanie Wilk
Spencer, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Chief
Appellate Attorney, Dale G. Anderson, Janice M. Weisfeld,
Assistant Public Defenders, for defendants

“Cf. Mullany v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed, 2d 508 (1975)
(once issue is properly presented, prosecution must prove absence of the heat of pas-
sion on sudden provocation beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. McGehearty,
121 R.I. 55, 394 A.2d 1348 (1978) (once a defendant sustains the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence sufficient to justify existence of doubt on the issue of
whether his intoxication was such as to negate his specific intent, the state has the
burden to establish by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not so intoxi-
cated); In re John Doe, 120 R.I. 732, 390 A.2d 920 (1978) (once a defendant in a
murder prosecution introduces some evidence of self-defense, the state bears the
burden of persuasion to negate that defense beyond a reasonable doubt).

518

410 A.2d 113.

PASQUALINA SPAZIANO Us.
ARMAND SPAZIANO AND Dorotuy Krupa.

JANUARY 8, 1980.
Presenn Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

| 519

WEISBERGER, J. This case comes before us on appeal from
an order of the Superior Court removing a default judgment
and limiting recovery by the plaintiff, Pasqualina Spaziano
(Pasqualina), against the defendant Dorothy Krupa to the
setting aside of a transfer of property made to her by the
defendant Armand Spaziano (Armand). The facts as set forth
in this amended complaint and the travel underlying this
controversy are as follows. :

Armand had borrowed $15,000 from Pasqualina and
failed to pay back the loan when due. Additionally, in order
to defraud creditors, including Pasqualina, Armand trans-
ferred his property, which included shares of stock in a cer-
tain holding company, to Dorothy Krupa without receiving
any consideration therefor. The complaint went on to allege
that defendant Krupa intended to dispose of the property in
such fashion as to cause irreparable harm to plaintiff. The
plaintiff sought judgment against both defendants in the sum
of $15,000, plus interest and costs, and further sought that
defendant Krupa account for and hold in trust for plaintiff
the transferred property and any rents or profits arising
therefrom.

Neither defendant answered the original or amended com-
plaint, and on June 16, 1976, default was entered. After
notice to defendants was given, a further hearing was held on
July 7, 1976, pursuant to which judgment was entered by de-
fault against both defendants in the sum of $15,000; the
judgment also provided for additional relief relating to the
restoration of the property transferred.

520 es

Thereafter, in April of 1977, defendant Krupa moved to
vacate the default judgment against her. She alleged several
grounds, including improper service, mistake, accident,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. She also provided an affi-
davit of meritorious defense. On May 17, 1977, the trial jus-
tice held a hearing on the various issues and determined not
only that service of process had been adequate, but also that
there was no sufficient ground to set aside the judgment for
excusable neglect. He found, however that plaintiff had no
cause of action against defendant Krupa for money damages,
vacated the judgment for money damages pursuant to Super.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), and ruled that there was no need for
defendant Krupa to answer plaintiff's amended complaint
because a money judgment could not be entered as against
defendant Krupa in this case. He went on to rule that the
only appropriate remedy against defendant Krupa was the
setting aside of the transfer of property made to her by
defendant Armand.

We have generally considered that an order vacating a de-
fault judgment lacks that degree of finality which would per-
mit an appeal prior to the rendition of a new and final
judgment. Griffin v. Rayhill, 112 R.I. 549, 313 A.2d 374
(1973); Giarrusso v. Corrigan, 108 R.I. 471, 472, 276 A.2d
750, 750-51 (1971). The plaintiff concedes in her brief that if
the trial justice had limited his determination to vacating the
default judgment against defendant Krupa, no appeal would
lie until a “new and final judgment.” Therefore, at this stage
of the proceeding, the thrust is toward the other rulings of
the trial justice which, in effect, precluded plaintiff from
seeking a money judgment from defendant Krupa after the
default judgment had been removed. We believe that the
peremptory ruling that the complaint did not state a claim
upon which monetary relief could be granted, without even
affording plaintiff the opportunity to amend, had an element
of finality which would cause these rulings to be reviewable
on appeal. See McAuslan v. McAuslan, 34 R.I. 462, 83 A.
837 (1912). Further, we believe that these rulings were
erroneous.

ee 521

Initially, the Superior Court had before it only a request
for removal of a default judgment. In response to this re-
quest, the court treated the petition to remove the default as
though it were a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thus plaintiff had no notice and opportunity to
defend against such a motion. See Gross v. School Committee
of the Town of Glocester, 114 R.I. 358, 333 A.2d 417 (1975).
In effect, the removal of a default judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b) should leave all matters at issue between the parties
“open and undisposed” for further proceedings. Bishop v.
United States, 266 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1959).

Moreover, even if notice had been given to plaintiff
obliquely that her right to a money judgment against defen-
dant Krupa was challenged, the granting of Rule 12(b)(6)
relief could not be sustained. Under the test set forth by this
court in Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 102 R.1. 8,
227 A.2d 582 (1967), and its progeny, it would have been
necessary for defendant Krupa to establish, after according
plaintiff the benefit of every inference in viewing the
allegations of her complaint in their most promising light,
that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that plaintiff could
not conceivably prove facts which would entitle her to
monetary relief. On this record defendant Krupa could not
sustain such a burden.

It has frequently been held that a money judgment may
enter pursuant to a complaint for fraudulent conveyance as
against a transferee, where such transferee has disposed of or
dealt with property wrongfully conveyed in such fashion that
a return of the property is impossible or in situations in which
the property has been diminished in value. In Damazo v.
Wahby, 269 Md. 252, 305 A.2d 138 (1973), the Court of
Appeals sustained the entry of an in personam judgment for a

1 Accord, Goldstein v. R.I. Hospital Trust National Bank, 110 R.1, 580, 296 A.2d
112 (1972); Noble Co. v. Mack Financial Corp., 107 R.I. 12, 264 A.2d 325 (1970);
Warren Education Association v. Lapan, 103 R.I. 163, 235 A.2d 866 (1967);
Busata v. Souther, 102 R.I. 609, 232 A.2d 396 (1967).

522 es

real estate commission against a wife to whom assets had
been fraudulently conveyed. The court, relying both upon
general equitable principles and the provisions of the Uni-
form Fraudulent Conveyance Act, stated the rule as follows:

“The better rule would seem to be that so long as the
property remains in the possession of the fraudulent
transferee, who does nothing to lessen its value, a judg-
ment in personam will not be entered. But where the
transferee allows or causes the property to depreciate in
value, or parts with the property without sufficient
consideration or puts it beyond the reach of the court,
equity will not allow itself to be frustrated but will
adapt its relief to the exigencies of the case and will
enter a money judgment if this will achieve an equitable
result.” Id. at 257, 305 A.2d at 142.

These principles have been recognized in Winter v. Welker,
174 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Aggregates Associated,
Inc. v. Packwood, 58 Cal. 2d 580, 375 P.2d 425, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 545 (1962); Miller v. Kaiser, 164 Colo. 206, 433 P.2d
772 (1967). Whether a state has adopted the Uniform Fraud-
ulent Conveyance Act or not (and Rhode Island has not), the
general equitable principles should apply. See McLaughlin,
Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46
Harv. L. Rev. 404, 443 (1933).

In the case at bar, a claim for monetary damages had been
set forth in the complaint against defendant Krupa as well as
against defendant Armand. Further, the complaint specifi-
cally alleged that “defendant Krupa intends to sell, give, or
otherwise dispose of some or all of the aforementioned prop-
erty- which disposition would cause immediate irreparable
harm to plaintiff *« +.” This allegation was further
expanded in an affidavit annexed to the complaint. Thus, it
could scarcely be said that “beyond a reasonable doubt * * *
the plaintiff could not conceivably prove facts which would
qualify her for [monetary] relief.” Warren Education
Association v. Lapan, 103 R.I. at 170-71, 235 A.2d at 871.

ee 523

Therefore, while we do not review at this time the propri-
ety of the removal of the default judgment, we vacate all
orders entered by the trial justice that purported to pass upon
and limit the relief to which the plaintiff was entitled as
against the defendant Krupa. For the reasons stated, the
plaintiff's appeal is sustained in part, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.

Alden C. Harrington, William Rutzick, Harry J. Weiss,
Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., for plaintiff.

William A. Gosz, for defendants.

24
409 A.2d 1220.
Town or Hopkinton vs, CLAYTON J. KEISER.
JANUARY 10, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Doris, J. This is a civil action to abate a public nuisance.
The defendant, Clayton J. Keiser (Keiser), is appealing from

ee 525

a denial of a motion for relief from an order pursuant to
Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The order from which Keiser is
appealing requires him to comply with two subsequent or-
ders of the court regarding removal of debris and derelict
motor vehicles from his property or to permit the plaintiff,
town of Hopkinton (Hopkinton), to do so. Pending disposi-
tion of this appeal, a stay of the order was granted by this
court.

The record indicates that on March 16, 1976, plaintiff filed
a complaint against defendant to enjoin Keiser from main-
taining a public nuisance on two lots, numbers 44 and 46, in
Hopkinton. By agreement of parties, the court entered an
order on April 6, 1976, specifying that Keiser would:

1) remove debris from the foundation on lot 44,

2) place a temporary floor on the foundation on lot 46,

3) remove all unregistered motor vehicles except one on
each lot,

4) remove all debris from lot 46, and

5) remove the mill structure and renovate the blacksmith
shop on lot 46.

On May 24, 1976, Hopkinton moved to adjudge Keiser in
contempt. The court found there was insufficient evidence
upon which to make a ruling and denied the town’s motion.

Subsequently, on May 27, 1977, Hopkinton again moved
to adjudge Keiser in contempt. A stipulation was entered on
October 4, 1977, whereby Keiser agreed to:

1) allow Hopkinton to remove the debris from lot 44,

2) break up the foundation on lot 44 so it could be re-
moved by Hopkinton,

8) put a temporary floor on the foundation on lot 44, and

4) remove all automobile and truck chassis from lots 44
and 46 except for one red van body and one unregistered
motor vehicle on each lot.

526 Pe

The latest date by which all this work was to be completed
was November 4, 1977.

On November 21, 1977, the court found Keiser in con-
tempt of all orders of the court and indicated he could purge
himself by completing items 2, 3, and 4 of the October 4
order.

On December 15, 1977, the court found Keiser had not
purged himself of contempt and granted Hopkinton permis-
sion to remove all debris, excluding motor vehicles, from lots
44 and 46.

On January 9, February 16, and March 7, 1978, the court
held hearings regarding Keiser’s motor vehicles. Ultimately
Keiser was found in contempt for maintaining unregistered
motor vehicles on lots 44 and 46. He was allowed to purge
himself of contempt by removing the motor vehicles by
March 13, 1978.

On March 21, 1978, Keiser was found in contempt for fail-
ing to remove the motor vehicles as set forth in the order of
October 4, 1977, and Hopkinton was given authority to re-
move the motor vehicles.

On March 28, 1978, Keiser filed a motion for relief from
the order alleging that the November 21, 1977 order mis-
takenly used the term “orders” as opposed to “order” with re-
spect to allowing plaintiff to perform his obligations, and
that the December 15, 1977 order was not confined to the
findings of the November 4, 1977 decision. This motion was
denied on April 21, 1978.

On May 1, 1978, Keiser appealed to this court.

On May 4, 1978, this court issued a stay pending disposi-
tion of Keiser’s appeal.

The defendant is appealing from the denial of his motion
for relief filed pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). He
raises two issues.

First, he contends that the November 21, 1977 order was

ee 527

written incorrectly. He contends that this order should have
only referred to the October 4, 1977 order and not to both the
October 4, 1977 and April 6, 1976 orders.

Second, defendant contends that the December 15, 1977
order was incorrect. Again, Keiser contends that the
December 15, 1977 order should have been limited to the
October 4, 1977 order.

Both of these issues must be examined pursuant to Super.
R. Civ. P. 60(b). The applicable provisions of this rule state:

“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excus-
able neglect * * +,”

This provision is applicable even when the mistake alleged is
one made by the judge. 1 Kent, R.I. Civ. Prac., §60.3 at 452
(1969). However,

“x » « judicial error of the trial judge, as contrasted
with mechanical error, cannot be corrected under this
rule, for it would constitute use of the rule as a substi-
tute for an appeal or for a motion for a new trial, which
in Rhode Island may not be addressed to the trial court
on account of its own error.”

In addition, it is necessary to examine these issues pursuant
to the standard of review for the denial of a motion for relief
from an order for mistake as detailed in In re Julie, 114 R.1.
419, 334 A.2d 212 (1975). In that case, the court stated that
the determination of the trial court will be disturbed only if it
is determined that the trial justice abused his discretion or
made his determination on an erroneous reading of the law.

In the context of these parameters, we consider the two
issues defendant raises on appeal. In regard to the first issue,
an examination of the contents of the November 21, 1977
order is necessary. The November 21, 1977 order states that:

528 ee

1) defendant is in willful contempt of the orders of the
court,

2) defendant may purge himself of contempt by comply-
ing with the October 4, 1977 order, and

3) if defendant does not comply with the October 4, 1977
order, he will be subject to incarceration and/or Hopkinton
can perform the obligations under the orders of the court.

Mr. Keiser claims on the basis of a statement of the trial
justice at the November 4, 1977 hearing that the word
“orders” was erroneously substituted for the word “order” in
item 3 of the November 21, 1977 order.

First, since defendant’s claim is based on a statement made
at the November 4, 1977 hearing for which no transcript has
been submitted, this court cannot consider that statement.
State v. Jennings, 117 R.I. 291, 294, 366 A.2d 543, 545
(1976). Second, in examining the entire record, we find no
abuse of discretion in regard to the denial of the Rule 60(b) (1)
motion. Given the facts that plaintiff was seeking to have
both lots 44 and 46 cleared at the November 4 hearing, that
lot 46 was apparently as cluttered with debris and vehicles as
lot 44, and that defendant had already been ordered to clean
both lots and has not done so in over two and a half years, the
trial justice could certainly have concluded that (1)
Hopkinton should be allowed to clean both lots, and (2) in
construing his November 21, 1977 order that he did mean to
refer to both the April 6, 1976 and October 4, 1977 orders.
This conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that the
November 21, 1977 order did hold defendant in contempt of
the orders of the court. The defendant did not appeal this
holding. Thus, this court finds that defendant’s motion for
relief from the order was properly denied.

The allegation that the December 15, 1977 order repeated
the mistake made in the November 21, 1977 order and was
not limited to the October 4, 1977 order is clearly not a
mechanical error as contemplated by Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Thus, we conclude that by raising this-issue, the defendant is

529

merely attempting to circumvent the time limits of appeal.
Consequently, this court will not entertain this second issue.
Yankee Investments, Inc. v. Efco Mfg. Inc., 101 R.I. 602,
606, 225 A.2d 793, 796 (1967).

The appeal is denied and dismissed, the orders appealed
from are sustained, the stay heretofore entered is vacated,
and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further
proceedings.

Frank J. Williams, Town Solicitor, Dean N. Temkin,
Special Counsel, for plaintiff.

Clayton J. Keiser, pro se.

409 A.2d 1216.
Srate vs. Louis R. Craro.
JANUARY 10, 1980.
Present: Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

530

Weispercer, J. The defendant, Louis R. Ciarlo, was
adjudged in violation of his engagement to be of good be-
havior as a condition of a previously imposed deferred sen-
tence, Pursuant to the violation of adjudication, the trial jus-
tice imposed sentence; and defendant is before us now on
appeal from the judgment of conviction and imposition of
sentence.

On September 10, 1975, defendant Ciarlo appeared before

ee 531

a justice of the Superior Court for arraignment on kidnap-
ping and robbery charges which stemmed from an indict-
ment of the grand jury. Although he initially pleaded not
guilty, defendant subsequently retracted that plea, and eight
days later, he was arraigned again and entered the plea of
nolo contendere before another justice of the court. On
November 10, 1975, defendant appeared for sentencing
before that same justice, entered into a deferred sentence
agreement! on count 1, kidnapping, and sentence was duly
deferred. With respect to counts 2, 3, and 4, which charged
defendant with robbery, the trial justice sentenced defendant
to incarceration at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI)
for a term of ten years. Of these ten years, defendant was
ordered to serve the first four years, and the remaining six
years were suspended. Sentence on each count was to run
concurrently, with probation for six years to commence upon
his release from prison.

At one point during defendant’s period of incarceration at
the ACI, a number of Maximum Security guards searched
defendant’s cell in response to an order from their captain,
who, several days earlier, had observed defendant acting in a
strange manner (apparently under the influence of some
drug). The guards discovered an assortment of forbidden
items, including pipes, clubs, blades, and syringes and
cookers adapted for subcutaneous injection of drugs, in a
false bottom of a cabinet located in his cell. The defendant
was arrested, and an information was filed on March 15,
1978, charging him, inter alia, with possession of a
hypodermic needle and syringe, possession of a bludgeon,

‘The agreement, dated November 10, 1975, and signed both by then Assistant
General Albert E. DeRobbio and defendant Ciarlo, reads as follows:

“Agreement under which Sentence is deferred

It is hereby agreed that sentence may be deferred on the above entitled in-
dictment - complaint, - upon payment of all costs, during the good behavior
of the defendant, and so long as the Attorney General is satisfied that the
defendant has violated none of the criminal laws of this state or any other
state, since the date of this agreement.”

532 es

and possession of a controlled substance.?

As a result of the items of contraband discovered in
defendant’s cell, the attorney general’s department presented
him on April 28, 1978, before the Superior Court as an
alleged violator of the November 10, 1975 deferred sentence
agreement. Defense counsel moved, inter alia, to dismiss the
hearing on the ground that the Superior Court lacked proper
jurisdiction over the matter, since, in defendant’s view, the
five-year period set forth in G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§12-19-19° would commence to run upon his release from
prison; hence the court lacked jurisdiction to violate defen-
dant on the deferred sentence while he was incarcerated. The
trial justice’s denial of that motion forms the basis of the pre-
sent appeal.

On May 26, 1978, defendant renewed his motion, and,
again, it was denied. He was then tried as a violator of the
deferred sentence agreement; on June 1, 1978, he was de-
clared a violator of the deferred sentence agreement entered

°*The trial court later granted the state’s July 19, 1978 motion to amend counts 3
through 8 to merge with count 2 and sentenced defendant on that date to the ACI
for one year, which sentence was suspended, and to one year’s probation on the
sentence to run concurrent with those previously imposed on the indictment, with
probation to commence upon defendant's release from the term he was serving.

°General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §12-19-19 provides:

“Sentencing on plea of guilty or nolo contendere - Deferment of sentence.
Whenever any prisoner shall be arraigned before the superior court, and
shall plead guilty, or refuse to contend with the state, he may be at any time
sentenced by the court; provided, that if at any time the court formally
defers sentencing the defendant, and thereupon a written agreement con-
cerning said deferring of sentence is entered into between the attorney-
general and the prisoner, and filed with the clerk of said court, thereafter
the court may only impose sentence within five (5) years from and after the
date of said written agreement, unless during said period, such prisoner shall
be sentenced to imprisonment in this or in any other state, in which event
the court may impose sentence at any time within five (5) years from and
after the termination of such sentence of imprisonment, or unless at the time
such sentence is formally deferred such prisoner shall be serving a term of
imprisonment under sentence previously imposed in another case, in which
event the court may impose sentence at any time within five ( years from
and after the date on which such prisoner is released from prison either on
parole or at the termination of such sentence of imprisonment, whichever
first occurs.”

533

into on count 1 of the indictment. On July 18, 1978, the court
sentenced defendant to three years at the ACI.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the Superior Court
had jurisdiction, by virtue of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§12-19-19, to try defendant as an alleged violator of a de-
ferred sentence agreement for offenses committed during his
incarceration at the ACI, when that agreement was entered
into on one count of the same indictment that had resulted in
the sentence he was serving at the time of the alleged viola-
tion.

Hs The defendant and the state agree that the deferred sen-
tence agreement is a contract between the two parties whose
signatures appear on the document. The pertinent language
on the agreement specifies that sentence on the relevant in-
dictment or complaint may be deferred not only so long as
the defendant remains of good behavior, but further, so long
as the Attorney General is satisfied that the defendant has not
violated the criminal laws of any state since the date of the
agreement. The contract, then, became effective at the very
moment of its execution. Thus “the effect of the agreement
‘was not to suspend the operation of a sentence, but to defer,
with defendant’s consent, the imposition of any sentence.”
Orabona v. Linscott, 49 R.I. 443, 446, 144 A. 52, 53 (1928).
By signing such an agreement, defendant became bound by
each and every statutory provision relating thereto. Powers v.
Langlois, 90 R.I. 45, 153 A.2d 535 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 905, 80S. Ct. 615, 4 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1960).

The defendant and the state disagree, however, with
respect to the construction of the deferment of sentence
statute. We turn initially to the legislative intent. The intent
of the Legislature prescribes the policy underlying the
statute, and that intent is to be found in the statute’s words
when they are free from ambiguity and express a clear and
sensible meaning; to that effect we have observed that the
plain and ordinary language of the statute declares its own
meaning. Litéle v. Conflict of Interest Commission of Rhode
Island, 121 R.I. 232, 397 A.2d 884 (1979); State v.
Patriarca, 71 R.1. 151, 43 A.2d 54 (1945).

4 es

Unquestionably, §12-19-19, subject to certain exceptions,
provides for a time limitation of five years from the date of
the execution of the deferred senterice agreement, within
which time the Superior Court may impose a sentence for its
violation. But by virtue of his deferred sentence agreement
with the state, defendant contends that he had thereby guar-
anteed only five years of good: behavior and that the five-year
period would commence, in effect, upon his release from the
ACI.

We have determined that the case of Giroux v. Superior
Court, 86 R.I. 48, 133 A.2d 636 (1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 919, 78 S. Ct. 349, 2 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1958), is control-
ling.* In Giroux, the defendant was serving a term of im-
prisonment under a sentence previously imposed for a prior
offense. During that period of incarceration he was brought
before the Superior Court on the representation of the
Attorney General that he had violated the terms of a deferred
sentence agreement by throwing a pail of hot water at one of
his guards. The court adjudged him in violation of his engage-
ment to be of good behavior as a condition of the deferred
sentence and imposed sentence.

We considered in detail the legislative history of §12-19-19
and determined that the provisions contained in the deferred
sentence agreement statute did not prohibit the court from
imposing sentence before a defendant's release from the sen-
tence of incarceration. The provisions do not prescribe a pro-
hibition at all but merely a limitation of the time within
which the Superior Court may sentence a defendant for a
violation after either event mentioned therein has occurred.
The statute fixed a definite starting point from which the

‘In Giroux v. Superior Court, 86 R.I. 48, 133 A.2d 636 (1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 919, 78 S. Ct. 349, 2 L. Ed. 24 278 (1958), the defendant relied upon that
portion of §12-19-19 that relates to “a term of imprisonment under sentence pre-
viously imposed in another case” while defendant, in the instant case, bases his
appeal on the part that reads “unless during said period such prisoner shall be sen-
tenced to imprisonment in this or in any other state.” Our language and holding in
Giroux, however, are applicable equally to either circumstance.

| 535

time limitation on the Superior Court’s power to sentence
would commence.

“The act did not alter the court’s power to sentence at
any time before the expiration of such limitation but it
did expressly deprive the court of the right to exercise
the power to sentence after the period of limitation had
expired.

“To construe the act as prohibiting the court from
sentencing while the offender remained in prison if
cause therefor arose, would be to pervert the true intent
of the legislature and tie the hands of the court with-
out serving any useful purpose.” (Emphasis in original.)
Id. at 51-52, 133 A.2d at 638.

At oral argument, defense counsel asked us to overrule our
holding in Giroux, although the case has been good law in
this jurisdiction for twenty-two years, and the General
Assembly, in all that time, has never changed the wording of
§12-19-19 in light of our discussion of the statute’s legislative
history and intent. Defense counsel conceded that his request
would lead to the incongruous situation in which a prisoner,
while confined to the ACI and subject to the terms of a writ-
ten deferred sentence agreement, need not be of good be-
havior during his period of incarceration but need only per-
form his part of the bargain upon his release.

| The purpose of the time limitation during which sentence
may be imposed following execution of the deferred sentence
agreement is to assure a defendant that he will not be subject
to the threat of imprisonment for his offense for the rest of his
life, but that the running of the five-year term may be tolled
or extended in certain enumerated situations. State v.
Taylor, 111 R.I. 653, 306 A.2d 173 (1978). A clear and
straightforward reading of the statute in light of Giroux
shows that the various events that will extend the period dur-
ing which sentence may be imposed do not give rise to an in-
hibition against the court’s imposition of a sentence during
the period of incarceration. This result would obtain whether
one was confined at the time sentence was formally deferred

536 Pe

because of a sentence previously imposed in another case, as
in State v. Carmello, 83 R.I. 303, 116 A.2d 464 (1955), or
whether one was confined at a later date because of an inter-
vening conviction and sentence, as in Almeida v. Langlois,
97 R.I. 325, 197 A.2d 498 (1964), or under circumstances
identical to those of the case at bar, as in Giroux.

The defendant asserts that the recent case of State v.
Johnson, 115 R.1. 550, 349 A.2d 609 (1976), overrules our
holding in Giroux. To support his position, defendant relies
upon the language in Johnson to the effect

“that the 5-year period will not commence until the ter-
mination of an intervening sentence or, in the case of a
previously imposed sentence, until the offender is re-
leased from prison on parole or at the termination of his
sentence. Shahinian v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 631, 638, 218
A.2d 461, 465 (1966); Almeida v. Langlois, 97 R.I. 325,
327, 197 A.2d 498, 499 (1964); Giroux v. Superior
Court, 86 R.I. 48, 133 A.2d 636 (1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 919, 78 S. Ct. 349, 2 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1958);
State v. Carmello, 83 R.I. 303, 116 A.2d 464 (1955).”
115 R.I. at 552-53, 349 A.2d at 611.

The defendant, however, misconstrues both the issue and
the holding of the Johnson case. There, the.defendant had al-
ready been released from prison, after having served time on
an intervening sentence, and he argued that the period of
time within which the Superior Court could properly impose
sentence had already expired prior to the date that he was
presented before it as a violator. Our concern was whether
the court could sentence a defendant for an offense that
occurred more than five years after the execution of the
deferred sentence agreement. As a consequence, Johnson is a
determination of an entirely different point. Specifically, we
simply reiterated our position that an intervening or a
previously imposed sentence may extend the statutory five-
year period of limitation. See Shahinian v. Langlois, 100 R.I.
631, 219 A.2d 461 (1966). Johnson does not stand for the
proposition that a deferred sentence agreement does not

Pe 537

become operative until the expiration of an intervening or
previously imposed sentence. As noted earlier, that
agreement takes effect at the moment of its execution. Thus
an intervening or previously imposed prison sentence may
extend the five-year period of limitation, but the agreement,
itself, commences upon execution and not at some later date.
No intervening or previously imposed sentence will postpone
the effective commencement of that agreement.

In light of our decisions in Giroux and Johnson, supra, we
are of the opinion that the Superior Court has jurisdiction to
impose sentence for the violation of a deferred sentence
agreement from the time of the formal deferment of the sen-
tence until five years after a defendant’s release from a
sentence he is then serving, or until the expiration of the five
years after any intervening sentence within that same period,
or until five years after the execution of the agreement,
where no previously imposed or intervening sentence
operates to extend the limitation period. Thus we hold that
the trial justice’s construction and application of §12-19-19
was correct.

For the reasons above indicated, the defendant’s appeal is
denied and dismissed, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Stephen R.
Famiglietti, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

John J. Bevilacqua, Thomas A. Tarro III, for defendant.

538

410 A.2d 116.
RacHAEL Siravo vs. GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE Co. et al.
JANUARY 10, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Weispercer, J. The United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, acting pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 6, has certi-

ee) 539

fied to us the following question of la

“Does an insured’s late filing of the sworn proof of
loss, which under the standard form of fire insurance
policy, R.I. Gen. Laws §27-5-3, he is supposed to render
within sixty (60) days after the loss, bar the insured’s re-
covery under the policy in the absence of the company’s
proving prejudice stemming from the insured’s failure to
comply with the time limits contained in said proof of
loss provision?”

The plaintiff sought recovery in the District Court from the
defendant insurance companies under the terms of two fire
insurance policies! covering her home, which was completely
destroyed by fire. The insurers advanced three defenses for
avoidance of the claim: arson traceable to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff's misrepresentation of the extent of loss, and the
plaintiff's failure to file a sworn proof of loss on time.? The
jury rendered a general verdict for the defendants, and the

‘The policies were issued in conformance with the form of policy prescribed in
G.L, 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §27-5-3, as required by §27-5-2.

*Policy provisions concerning notice of loss and filing of proofs of loss are as fol-_,
lows:

“The insured shall give immediate written notice to this company of any
loss, protect the property from further damage, forthwith separate the dam-
aged and undamaged personal property, put it in the best possible order,
furnish a complete inventory of the destroyed, damaged and undamaged
property, showing in detail quantities, costs, actual cash value and amount
of loss claimed; and within sixty (60) days after the loss, unless such time is
extended in writing by this company, the insured shall render to this com-
pany a proof of loss, signed and sworn to by the insured, stating the
Knowledge and belief of the insured as to the following: the time and origin
of the loss, the interest of the insured and of all others in the property, the
actual cash value of each item thereof and the amount of loss thereto, all
encumbrances thereon, all other contracts of insurance, whether valid or
not, covering any of said property, any changes in the title, use, occupation,
location, possession or exposures of said property since the issuing of this
policy, by whom and for what purpose any building herein described and
the several parts thereof were occupied at the time of loss and whether or not
it then stood on leased ground, and shall furnish a copy of all the
descriptions and schedules in all policies and, if required, verified plans and
specifications of any building, fixtures or machinery destroyed or damaged.”
(Emphasis in original.)

540 ee

plaintiff appealed, alleging error in the court’s jury instruc-
tions and in the admission of evidence.

Upon finding that the remainder of plaintiff's allegations
of error lacked merit, the Court of Appeals held that the an-
swer to the question certified was determinative of the cause
pending before it. After reviewing the opinions of this court
cited by the parties, the Court of Appeals was unsure of how
we would rule on the question. It therefore abstained from
deciding this question of state law and invoked the certifica-
tion procedure provided by Sup. Ct. R. 6.

The plaintiff relies on Pickering v. American Employers
Insurance Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971) to argue
that her failure to file the proof of loss within sixty days
should not bar recovery unless defendants are able to demon-
strate that they were thereby prejudiced. In Pickering, the
plaintiff sought recovery on her automobile liability insur-
ance policy for injuries caused by an uninsured motorist.
Among the defenses raised by the insurer was the plaintiff's
failure to comply with three provisions included in the pol-
icy. Those provisions declared ‘that the giving of notice of a
loss and the filing of a sworn written proof of claim should be
done “as soon as practicable,” while copies of legal process
served in the uninsured motorist’s suit were to be forwarded
to the insurer “immediately.” Id. at 157-58, 282 A.2d at 592.

In Pickering, we defined the term “notice” to include such
items as the furnishing of a proof of claim and a copy of the
summons and complaint. We then held that an insurer could
not rely on any of the so-called “notice” provisions of its pol-
icy unless it could demonstrate that it had been prejudiced by
the lack of notice.* Id. at 160, 282 A.2d at 593; Donahue v.

5In so doing, we overruled this court’s holding in 1917 that whether an insurer
was not prejudiced by the insured’s neglect to give the notice required in the policy
was wholly immaterial. Sherwood Ice Co. v. U.S. Casualty Co., 40 R.I, 268, 100
A. 872 (1917). The holding in the older case was based on the view that parties to
insurance policies were free to include or exclude any legal conditions they thought
necessary and proper. This assumption is no longer consonant with modern reali-
ties. Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 159, 282 A.2d 584,
593 (1971).

es vA

Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 110 R.I. 603, 604, 295 A.2d
693, 693 (1972). We based our holding on the express recog-
nition that an insurance policy is not a true consensual
arrangement but one that is usually described as a contract of
adhesion, available to the premium-paying customer on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Initially, defendants direct our attention to an opinion of
the United States District Court of Rhode Island, W. & H.
Jewelry Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 141 F. Supp.
296 (D.R.I. 1956). The plaintiff had sought recovery on a
policy insuring against losses caused by water damage. The
policy contained provisions identical to plaintiff's standard-
form fire insurance policy in regard to notice and proof of loss
and maintenance of suit on the policy. The insured had failed
to comply with the notice and proof-of-loss requirements.
Relying on our earlier decision in Sherwood Ice Co. v. U.S.
Casualty Co., 40 R.I. 268, 100 A. 572 (1917), the court ruled
that the insurer, to avoid the claim, need not show prejudice
caused by the delays in notice and filing. Subsequently, how-
ever, we rejected that part of the holding of Sherwood Ice
Co. in Pickering. The District Court’s ruling on this issue
therefore loses its persuasive force.

Having determined the W. & H. Jewelry Co. is no longer
apposite, we consider the parties’ arguments relating to the
applicability of the Pickering rule to noncompliance with the
proof-of-loss provision in a standard-form fire insurance pol-
icy. The defendants point first to the distinction between a
proof-of-loss requirement in a fire insurance policy and the
proof-of-claim and notice-of-loss requirements in an automo-
bile policy. They contend that the distinction weighs against
extending Pickering to the proof-of-loss provision. Basically,
they claim the provisions serve different purposes, especially
in the context of comparing automobile insurance with fire
insurance. On the other hand, plaintiff appears to argue that
a proof of claim is functionally equivalent to a proof of loss;
thus noncompliance therewith is a technical breach, as in
Pickering, requiring the insurer to show prejudice to bar
recovery.

542 rs

Although both notice and proof-of-loss provisions serve a
broad common purpose of informing an insurer of the loss for
which a claim is made, the two are distinct. 14 Couch,
Insurance 2d §49:391 at 23 (1965); 5A Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice §3481 at 428 (1970). The sole purpose of a
notice-of-loss provision is to afford the insurer a seasonable
opportunity for investigation to protect its interests. 13
Couch, Insurance 2d §49:38 at 659 (1915); 5A Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice §3481 at 428. The purpose of a
proof of loss, on the other hand, is to afford the insurer an
adequate opportunity to protect its interests by facilitating its
investigation. 14 Couch, Insurance 2d §49:373 at 15 (1965);
5A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §3481 at 428
(1970).

We believe, however, that the distinction does not warrant
a refusal to extend Pickering to proof-of-loss provisions.
Pickering required that an automobile insurer show preju-
dice resulting from an untimely notice of loss. Such prejudice
would result from an insurer’s inability to conduct any inves-
tigation until the time that the notice of loss is provided.
Without notice of loss, an insurer can conduct no investiga-
tion at all.* In contrast, an insured’s untimely compliance
with a proof-of-loss provision may adversely affect the ade-
quacy, but not the existence, of an insurer’s opportunity to
investigate a claim. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
noted, “There is no great hurry there [to furnish a proof of
loss], such as there is when loss occurs, and the insurer must
be notified so that it may proceed « « +.” Britzg v. American
Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J., 2 Wis. 2d 192, 202, 86
N.W.2d 18, 23 (1957). We therefore conclude that logic and
reason impel a showing of prejudice, even more forcefully,
before a declaration of forfeiture may be based upon an in-
sured’s untimely compliance with a proof-of-loss provision.
For this purpose, we analogize a proof-of-loss provision to the
so-called group of “notice” provisions at issue in Pickering.

4The defendant insurers admit that they received notice of the loss from their
agent immediately and “notice,” as such, was never an issue in this case at trial.

es v4

Notwithstanding this determination, defendants have
argued that we should not extend to fire insurance policies a
tule applied previously to automobile insurance. They assert
that the proof-of-loss requirement signifies the Legislature’s
concern with fraudulent claims resulting from “arson for
profit.” While we grant that a proof of claim is required, in
part, to protect an insurer against fraud, Fournier v.
German-American Insurance Co., 23 R.I. 36, 49 A. 98
(1901), we do not believe that application of the Pickering
rule will substantially impair the provision’s utility for deter-
mining the nature of a fire’s origin. Nor do we consider a
proof-of-loss provision to be a significant bulwark of the legis-
lative effort to detect and prevent arson. More relevant to the
determination of the origin of a fire is §23-28.2-11 which in
part directs that:

“The state fire marshall * * * shall investigate the
cause, origin and circumstances of every fire of suspici-
ous origin, by which property has been damaged or de-
stroyed + + +. Such investigation shall begin immedi-
ately after the occurrence of such fire and local govern-
ment officials shall cooperate completely and assist the
state fire marshall’s office in all phases of any such inves-
tigation.”

In their next argument, defendants note that the provisions
of a fire insurance policy, unlike the provisions of the auto-
mobile policy at issue in Pickering, are prescribed by statute,
G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §27-5-3, and were required
by §27-5-2 to be included in all fire insurance policies cover-
ing property located in this state.* The defendants raise two
arguments based on this distinction.

* Recently, G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §27-5-2, as amended by P.L. 1979, ch.
48, sec. 1, allows an exception to this requirement. The accompanying section,
P.L. 1979, ch. 48, sec. 2 (§27-5-9.1) now permits the issuance of simplified compre-
hensive insurance policies with the approval of the director of business regulation
notwithstanding §27-5-3, “provided that such policies contain provisions assuring
the policyholders and claimants protection not less favorable than they would be
entitled to under Section 27-5-3 + + ».” (Emphasis in original). The amendments
have no application to this case, for the policy was issued long before their enact-
ment and effect.

544 ee

The insurers point to our recent decision in AAA Pool
Service & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 121
R.I. 96, 395 A.2d 724 (1978). We there stated that the
standard-form fire insurance policy, issued pursuant to
§27-5-2 and §27-5-3, is not a contract of adhesion. Id. at
726.° We made this assertion while rejecting the contention
that an insurer’s bad-faith refusal to settle a claim arising
under a standard-form fire insurance policy constitutes a
breach of an implied contractual duty to act in good faith
and gives rise to an independent tort action. In light of a
portion of the rationale expressed for our holding in
Pickering, defendants question its applicability to a policy
not characterized as a contract of adhesion.

The plaintiff directs us to Donahue v. Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Co., 110 B.I. 603, 295 A.2d 693 (1972), decided about a
year after Pickering. While reiterating the adhesion contract
rationale that prompted adoption of the Pickering rule, we
recognized an additional basis for the rule. It was

“an implicit realization on our part that in this day and
age attempts to comply with notice provisions are some-
times carried on in a very informal way which fre-
quently consists of no more than a telephone call by an
insured to the seller of the policy who then, because of
his desire to serve his customer, takes over from there.”
Id, at 604-05, 295 A.2d at 694.

We believe this implicit realization that underlies the
Pickering rule is sufficient to warrant application of the rule
to the standard-form fire insurance policy, notwithstanding
our determination in AAA Pool Service & Supply, Inc. The
fact that such policies are statutorily prescribed would seem

*After we decided AAA Pool Service & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 121 RI. 96, 395 A.2d 724 (1978), the Legislature enacted §27-5-9.1, of
which we took note in footnote 5. This statute allows a carrier to offer more
favorable provisions than are contained in the standard-form fire insurance policy.
Therefore, after enactment of §27-5-9.1 it is correct to say that the insurer offers its
policy on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Cooper v. Government Employees Insurance
Co., 51N.J. 86, 94 n.2, 237 A.2d 870, 874 n.2 (1968). Whether this change would
require a recharacterization of fire insurance policies, we need not here decide.

545

immaterial to the informal manner in which attempts to
comply with “notice” provisions are conducted. Certainly the
average lay person is less likely without professional
assistance from his insurance company or otherwise, to
satisfy the relatively sophisticated requirements of a proof of
loss than to carry out the notice provisions at issue in
Pickering.

Finally, defendants argue §27-5-3 mandates that an in-
sured’s failure to file a proof of loss within sixty days of loss
bars recovery. Relying on the fact that the policy provisions
were prescribed statutorily, defendants argue that applica-
tion of the Pickering rule is tantamount to redrafting a clear
and unambiguous statutory requirement. To the contrary,
plaintiff argues that the Legislature did not intend to create a
forfeiture if an insured failed to comply strictly with the
proof-of-loss provision. Thus, plaintiff does not ask us, as did
the plaintiff in AAA Pool Service & Supply, Inc. to insert
within the prescribed fire insurance policy a provision or
term expanding the liability of such an insurer. Our task here
is one of statutory construction.

| When construing a standard-form fire insurance policy,
we are guided by the construction of such policies which
other jurisdictions have adopted. Greater Providence Trust
Company v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 116
RI. 268, 355 A.2d 718 (1976). Courts construing provisions
substantially identical to those here in issue, however, have
perceived different meanings. Some courts have construed
the language so that, in effect, an insureds late filing of a
proof of loss results in forfeiture of the claim.’ See, e.g.,
Zengerle v. The Commonwealth Insurance Co. of New York,
63 N.M. 454, 321 P.2d 636 (1958); Zibelin v. Pawtucket
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 229 N.C. 567, 50 S.E.2d 290

7Counsel for defendants directs our attention to several other cases he claims
exemplify the overwhelming authority in support of this view. E.g., McKay v.
American Central Insurance Co., 245 $.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Shouse v.
Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 254 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
These cases, however, involve suits on policies where a proof of loss was never filed.
This is quite a different situation than a late filing, which is the issue before us.

546 es

(1948). Other courts, instead of discerning an intent to create
a forfeiture, have held that an insured’s failure to submit a
timely proof of loss, in effect, merely postpones the maturity
of the claim. See, e.g., Maynard v. National Fire Insurance
Co. of Hartford, 147 W. Va. 539, 129 S.E.2d 443 (1963);
Klingler v. Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance Co., 193 Wis.
72, 213 N.W. 669 (1927), cited with approval in RTE
Corporation v. Maryland Casualty Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 632,
247 N.W.2d 171, 180 (1976).

We adhere to the rule that where the law prescribes a for-
feiture by a clear and explicit directive, the court cannot say
there shall be none. Housing Authority of Newport v.
Massey, 114 R.1. 492, 496, 335 A.2d 914, 916 (1975); Rainey
v. Quigley, 180 Or. 554, 559, 178 P.2d 148, 150 (1947). After
reviewing the standard-form fire insurance policy, we find
no clear and explicit legislative declaration that an insured’s
failure to submit a timely proof-of-loss statement results in a
forfeiture of an insured’s right to recover. Maynard v.
National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford, supra; Klingler v.
Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance Co., supra.

The defendants have argued that the proof-of-loss provi-
sion, read in conjunction with the clause regarding mainte-
nance of suit, works such a forfeiture. We disagree; we do
not read these provisions as an explicit and clear mandate of
forfeiture, as contemplated in Housing Authority of
Newport, supra. The provision governing suit is not con-
tained in the portion of the standard policy which deals with
proofs of loss. We contrast this language with the specific for-
feiture provision pertaining to willful misrepresentations or
omissions by the insured.* Nor is there anything in the provi-

*That provision in §27-5-3 states that:

“This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss, the in-
sured has willfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circum-
stance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the
insured therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured
thereto.”

eS 57

sions governing suit that clearly indicates a legislative inten-
tion that a claim be forfeited if proofs of loss are not filed
within sixty days after the fire. This factor distinguishes this
case from our ruling in Donahue v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co., supra. The provision then at issue in the standard-form
fire insurance policy requiring that suit be brought within
one year of the loss was clear and explicit. For these reasons
we do not find that our Legislature has mandated a forfeiture
when an insured has not strictly complied with the sixty-day
proof-of-loss provision.

We conclude the Legislature intended the sixty-day proof-
of-loss requirement to be directory, rather than mandatory,
in its effect. We believe the Legislature intended a result that
corresponds to the sentiments we expressed in Donahue v.
Associated Indemnity Corp., 101 R.I. 741, 748, 227 A.2d
187, 191 (1967), quoting Boughton v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change, 354 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Okla. 1960):

“The primary and essential part of the contract was in-

surance coverage, not the procedure for determining

liability.”
This construction is consistent with our belief in Pickering
that a technical breach of the “notice” provisions in an insur-
ance policy should not necessarily prevent an insured from
recovering the benefits for which he has paid. Pickering v.
American Employers Insurance Co., 109 R.I. at 160, 282
A.2d at 593. Otherwise we should be required to hold that
the giving of notice of loss by telephone under a statutory fire
policy would also at the option of the company defeat recov-
ery whether or not prejudice resulted. We therefore apply
the Pickering rule and hold that an insurer cannot rely on an
insured’s failure to submit a timely proof of loss under the
standard form of fire insurance policy in order to defeat re-
covery unless the insurer can demonstrate that it has been
prejudiced by the late filing.

We thus answer the question certified to us in the negative.

Hodosh, Spinella & Angelone, Thomas C. Angelone,

548 ee

Steven I. Rosenbaum, for plaintiff.

Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Inc., Raymond A. LaFazia,
for defendants.

410 A.2d 121.
In rE LEON.
JANUARY 11, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

550 CCCs

a

Weispercer, J. This is an appeal from an adjudication of
delinquency by a justice of the Family Court based upon
conduct that would have constituted murder in the second
degree if committed by an adult. The charges, equivalent to
charges of common law murder, related to two victims,
Frank Edward Young (Young) and Michael Fortes (Fortes),
the former of whom had participated in and asssisted the
respondent in an act of statutory burning in violation of G.L.

1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-4-3. The other victim, Fortes,
had apparently been a non-participating bystander.

The respondent does not specifically challenge the
adjudication of guilt in respect to the charge of statutory
burning,! but he does challenge the adjudication of guilt
respecting the charges of second degree murder. The facts
pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

On October 2, 1974, at about 5:30 p.m., respondent,
together with another inmate of the Youth Correctional
Center (YCC), entered the day room section of that unit.
They armed themselves with a pool stick and pool balls and
refused to accede to requests by supervisors to return to their
quarters. At this point respondent and his original
companion were joined by other inmates who armed
themselves with mops, broom handles, and dust pans.
Confronted with this militant array, the YCC staff members
left the room in order to secure riot gear. During the absence

"The respondent's contentions regarding the intake procedures of the Family
Court place in issue the ability of that court to decide any charge of delinquency
against him.

561

of the staff, the inmates, including respondent, threw
cushions into a corner of the day room behind a desk or
counter. Thereupon, respondent and others set fire to the pile
of cushions.

After the fire had started, a group of inmates barricaded
the front entrance to the day room. The respondent and
other inmates broke apart furniture and threw the pieces of
furniture and other debris onto the fire. State police and the
fire department were summoned. Meanwhile, the YCC staff
attempted unsuccessfully to reenter the day room but were
blocked by the barricade and were ultimately driven out of
the building by heat and smoke. The Cranston Fire
Department received the alarm at about 5:55 p.m. The state
police units arrived at about 5:40 p.m., and the fire-fighting
equipment arrived between 6 p.m. and 6:10 p.m.

The fire department personnel, equipped with masks and
breathing devices, gained entry by a rear door. All inmates
left or were rescued from the day room, except for Young and
Fortes, who were removed by the fire department personnel
but later died—Young as a result of burns and smoke
inhalation and Fortes from smoke inhalation and aspiration
of stomach contents.

In his brief, respondent raises five issues. The thrust of the
second issue is that respondent was denied the right to a
speedy trial, but at oral argument this issue was waived.
Therefore, it is necessary to discuss it further.

The respondent first contends that he was denied his due
process right to an impartial tribunal by the Family Court
procedure under which the court’s Intake Department,
pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §14-1-10,
engages in a preliminary investigation “to determine whether
the interests of the public or the child require that further
action be taken, and + * + report[s] its findings together with
a statement of the facts to the judge.” The respondent argues
that this preliminary investigation disqualifies any judge of
the Family Court from participating in the adjudicatory

852 ee

process. For this proposition respondent cites no authority
save an unreported decision of the Family Court.

It is conceivable that a judge may become involved in a
pretrial accusatory proceeding to such an extent that he
would be lacking in the essential ingredient of impartiality
needed to preside at a trial involving the same issues. Such a
case was In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L.
Ed. 942 (1955), where a Michigan judge who had served as a
one-man grand jury preferred contempt charges against two
persons who had appeared before him in his grand jury
investigation. It was held that he could not impartially try
the contempt charges which were based upon behavior that
occurred before him in his grand juror capacity. The
relatively innocuous Rhode Island procedures would scarcely
inevitably lead to a similar result.

We do not believe that §14-1-10, considered on its face,
requires the intake investigation to be conducted as a step in
an accusatory proceeding. Although it may result in a
determination to proceed with further investigation or with
an adjudicative proceeding, the investigation by the Intake
Department serves primarily to shield the child from
arbitrary bureaucratic action and to forestall the Family
Court from assuming jurisdiction when such would ill serve
the interests of the juvenile and the public. See In re Three
Minor Children, 110 R.I.11, 15, 289 A.2d 434, 436 (1972)
(in context of a neglect petition). In any event, counsel for
respondent conceded at oral argument that the justice who
heard this particular case had in no way participated in any
preliminary investigation or accepted any report that related
thereto. Thus we need not reach the question of whether
contact by a justice with an intake investigation or materials
developed therefrom could in a different context operate to
deny a juvenile respondent’s right to a fair and impartial
tribunal.

Another issue raised by respondent is the correctness of ‘the
holding by the Family Court that a homicide committed in
the course of a felony, other than those enumerated in G.L.

| 553

1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-23-1, constitutes murder in the
second degree.?

Murder in the second degree in Rhode Island has been
equated with common law murder. State v. Jefferds, 89 R.I.
272, 280, 152, A.2d 231, 235 (1959); State v. Hathaway, 52
R.L. 492, 501-02, 161 A. 366, 369 (1932); see State v. Miller,
52 R.I. 440, 444, 161 A. 222, 224 (1932). At common law, it
was stated as a general rule that a homicide committed in the
course of a felony constituted murder. 4 Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England *200-01. This
sweeping definition was subsequently criticized, and while
courts in England and the United States are not unanimous
in respect to the rule, the present rule, where unchanged by
statute, has been stated as follows:

“Homicide is murder if the death results from the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of an inherently
dangerous felony.” Perkins, Criminal Law 44 (2d ed.
1969).

This doctrine was recognized in State v. Miller, supra,
wherein a defendant who was a participant in the
commission of homicide in the course of an attempted prison
escape was held to have been properly found guilty of
murder in the second degree, even though escape was not one
of the crimes set forth in the statute defining murder in the
first degree. The respondent argues that Miller was wrongly
decided. We disagree and reaffirm the holding in Miller as
representative of the general common law rule as modified
by more recent cases. See generally Perkins, supra at 37-41.
In the case at bar, respondent committed a felony inherently
dangerous to life when he, along with others, set fire to

*General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment)§11-23-1 has subsequently been
amended to provide that an unlawful killing of a human being in the perpetration
of statutory burning in violation of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-4-3,
constitutes murder in the first degree. P.L. 1979, ch. 178, §1. This amendment,
having been enacted after the incidents here in issue, is not applicable to the case at
bar. Similarly, P.L. 1974, ch. 118, §5, which also amended §11-23-1, is not
material since it merely relates to the use of information charging.

554 ee

furniture and other debris in the day room which was then
occupied by a number of persons, including not only those
who were aiding and abetting in ‘the enterprise, but also
certain inactive bystanders, one of whom died as a result of
the fire. Therefore, the determination of the trial justice on
this issue was legally correct.

The respondent also raises the issue of the propriety of
applying the felony-murder rule in this instance in which the
death of a co-felon resulted. This question is raised only in
the case of the death of Young, who was an active participant
in the setting of the fire and in the barricading of the day
room; it is not contended that Fortes, for whose death
respondent has also been found delinquent, was a co-felon.
The precise question before us was considered in the case
of Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447, cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 931, 78 S. Ct. 1376, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1373
(1958). In that case the defendant and co-felon had set fire to
a vacant house. There was no direct evidence that the
defendant had actually performed an affirmative act in
setting the fire, but he had been present at the time of the
explosion and fire which took the life of the accomplice, one
Flynn.’ In respect to the application of the felony-murder
rule where death of an accomplice had resulted, the majority
opinion observed:

“The fact that the victim was an accomplice does not
alter the situation, since the act which caused his death
was in furtherance of the felony.” 391 Pa. at 553, 138
A.2d at 449.4

*The crime charge in Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447, cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 931, 78 S, Ct. 1376, 2 L. Ed, 2d 1373 (1958), was murder in the
first degree, since the burning of the dwelling house constituted arson, a felony that
would support a charge of first degree murder under the applicable statute.

‘A dissent written by Justice Musmanno in this case was based in part upon his
drawing of a factual inference from the record that Bolish was not in or near the
house when the explosion and fire took place. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. at
557, 138 A.2d at 451 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). There is no question in the instant
case that the respondent actively engaged in the setting of the fire.

| 555

We agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania that the fact that the victim was an accomplice
to the felony does not prevent the defendant from being
convicted of felony murder, so long as an act of the felon
foreseeably produced the fatal injury. There seems to be no
question in this case of proximate causation. The setting of
the fire led inevitably to the foreseeable result that the victim
died of burns and smoke inhalation.®

The defendant finally raises the issue of intervening and
superseding cause. This issue is raised by his exceptions to the
excluding by the trial court of evidence which would have
been elicited to establish the following factors enunciated in
respondent's brief: (1) the lack of training or planning for fire
emergencies by the Rhode Island Training School staff, (2)
the lack of fire-detection devices and fire-reporting devices at
the YCC, (3) the lack of a sprinkler system at the YCC, (4)
the length of time it took the Rhode Island Training School
staff to locate and use a key to the outside gate to gain access
to the rear of the YCC, (5) the delay in notifying the fire
department after the blaze had started, and (6) the delayed
rescue.

At the outset, it should be noted that in regard to items 4,
5, and 6, a considerable amount of evidence was actually
admitted on both direct and cross-examination. It appears
from the transcript that the training school staff did make
efforts to enter the day room in time to be of assistance to the
victims of the fire and to remove the persons who had set it.

*In State v. SanAntonio, 97 R.I. 48, 195 A.2d 538 (1963), we made a somewhat
analogous ruling in a case arising out of an indictment for operating a motor vehicle
on a public highway in reckless disregard of the safety of others, resulting in death.
In that case the defendant raised the issue of the negligent conduct of the decedent
which allegedly contributed to his death. We observed: “In fact it is universally
held that whether the decedent’s own reckless conduct contributed to his death is of
no consequence so long as the evidence shows that the conduct of the accused was a
proximate cause of such death.” Id, at 53, 195 A.2d at 540. Although not
dispositive of the issue raised by the defendant, this holding buttresses the
persuasive force of Commonwealth v. Bolish, supra.

556 ee

Nevertheless, the barricading of the front entrance, together
with the heat and smoke, impeded these efforts significantly.
The transcript further contains evidence that the fire began
at some time after 5:30 p.m., and that the Cranston Fire
Department responded to the fire with fire-fighting
equipment and rescue units at about 6 p.m.®

In any event, assuming arguendo that the training school
staff might have dealt with this emergency more efficiently,
and that the Cranston Fire Department might have been
summoned so as to respond more quickly, such assumptions
would not be of assistance to this respondent. His contention
is analogous to those raised in situations in which the victim
of a violent act has sought medical treatment which is not
rendered sufficiently promptly and efficiently to achieve an
optimum result in the palliation or curing of his wounds. The
general rule is set forth in Perkins, supra at 715-16, as
follows:

“An injury from which the victim bleeds to death is
the proximate cause of the decease even if the loss of
blood might have been stopped had medical aid been
promptly obtained. Obviously the fact that a doctor was
not at hand to render immediate aid cannot be regarded
as a superseding cause; but the result is not dependent
upon unavailability. ‘The question is not what would
have happened, but what did happen,” and there can
be no break in the legally-recognized chain of causation
by reason of a possibility of intervention which did not
take place, because a ‘negative act’ is never superseding.
Moreover, an injury is the proximate cause of resulting
death although the deceased would have recovered had
he been treated by the most approved surgical methods,

°The sequence of events would strongly militate against any inference of lack of
promptness in this response, in light of the somewhat chaotic nature of the initial
emergency.

™Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 638
(1920).” (Footnote in original, renumbered.)

P| 557

or by more skillful methods, or ‘with more prudent
care,’ or ‘with a different diet and better nursing,’ or
‘with proper caution and attention.’ ”

In State v. Gabriella, 163 Iowa 297, 304, 144 N.W. 9, 12
(1913), the court asserted that “[IJack of skill or bad judgment
or mere negligence in any form on the part of the surgeon
will not avail the slayer to protect him against the final
consequences of his wrongful act.”’See also Bailey v. State, 22
Ala. App. 185, 186, 113 So. 830, 831-32 (1927);People v.
McGee, 31 Cal. 2d 229, 243, 187 P.2d 706, 714-15 (1947);
Downing v. State, 114 Ga. 30, 31-32, 39 S.E. 927, 927
(1901).

The foregoing authorities are persuasive in suggesting that
proximate cause is not superseded, nor the act that produced
it excused, by the failure on the part of those who might have
assisted, cured, or rescued the victim to exercise a higher
quality of skill or efficiency or a more appropriate response in
the face of emergency when their actions might have
favorably affected the result. See generally Perkins, supra at
706-34. We are of the opinion that the trial justice, to the
extent that he did exclude evidence on the foregoing issues,
was correct in so doing.

It may be appropriate in this context to observe that
respondent here was adjudicated to be guilty of two charges
of murder and one charge of statutory burning. In response
to these charges, he was sentenced to the training school until
he would be twenty-one years of age. In fact, respondent has
long since been released from this facility and has now
attained the age of twenty-one, so that he is no longer
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Family Court. There is no
question that the adjudication of delinquency on the charge
of statutory burning, an adjudication which is not
specifically challenged, is sufficient to support the concurrent
sentence imposed in this case. It should be noted that
respondent was over eighteen years of age on December 1,
1976, the date sentence was imposed, so that his total
sentence, even if it had been served, would have been less

558 Le

than three years. Under principles recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States, it has been held that
when concurrent sentences have been imposed on multiple
counts and when a conviction on one count is valid, appellate
review of convictions on other counts is unnecessary.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85, 63S. Ct. 1375,
1378, 87 L. Ed. 2d 1774, 1778 (1943); Brooks v. United
States, 267 U.S. 432, 441, 45S. Ct. 345, 347, 69 L. Ed. 699,
703 (1925). Nevertheless, because of possible, though not
evident, collateral effects, we have considered the points of
appeal relating to second degree murder on their merits. See
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed.
2d 707 (1969). Still, we observe that in light of the charges
underlying the adjudication of delinquency, respondent
could scarcely complain of the severity of his treatment at the
hands of the Family Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is denied and
dismissed, the judgment of the Family Court is affirmed, and
the papers in the case are remitted to the Family Court.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Alfred French
Goldstein, Special Assistant Attorney General for petitioner.

Charles Greenwood, Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc. for
respondent.

559

409 A.2d 1223.

Stave or Ruove IsLanp ex rel WALTER M. CAMPBELL vs.
Arruour J. Fortis et al.

JANUARY 11, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

Per CurtaM. This matter comes before the court on a
consolidated appeal from the defendants’ several convictions
of parking on a sidewalk in violation of Traffic Regulation
5754 of the city of Providence. The defendants argue their
appeal on two grounds. We consider the second ground, the
state’s failure to introduce into evidence a provision stating a
penalty for violation of the regulation, dispositive of this
appeal.

The state concedes that it failed to introduce a penalty pro-
vision into the Superior Court record.* The state claims,

*The state’s concession distinguishes this matter from State v. Kalian, 122 R.1.
443, 408 A.2d 610 (1979), in which we sustained a conviction under the minimum
housing ordinance of the city of Providence. There we determined that an
ordinance stated a penalty sufficient to establish the criminal character of the

prohibited conduct by referring to a separate penalty provision. Traffic Regulation
5754 neither states a penalty nor refers to an applicable penalty provision.

560 |

however, that the defendants’ failure to raise the issue below
forecloses our consideration on appeal. We reject this
contention in light of State v. Tessier, 100 R.I. 210, 213 A.2d
699 (1965). There, we raised the no-penalty question sua
sponte, stating that it is “the duty of this court to dismiss the
complaint.” Id. at 212, 213 A.2d at 700. We will, therefore,
follow our decision in State v. Tessier and allow the
defendants to raise this issue for the first time on appeal.

We reverse the defendants’ convictions because no penalty
provision appears in the record, and we remand the case to
Superior Court with directions to dismiss the complaints.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin
II, Special Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Appellate
Division, for plaintiff.

Aram K. Berberian, for defendant.

— EE
Al0 A.2d 127.
SraTE vs. DoNALD SEPE AND Viro DeLuca.

JANUARY 15, 1980.
Present: Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Wessercer, J. This case comes before us on appeal from
a judgment of conviction of usury and extortion entered in
the Superior Court against the defendants after trial on a
criminal information setting forth said charges against the
defendants jointly. The facts as set forth in the testimony of
various state’s witnesses are as follows.

The complaining witness, Martin Emeno (Emeno), had
encountered financial difficulty in April of 1974, was unable
to borrow from conventional sources, and approached his
friend, defendant Donald Sepe (Sepe), with a request for a
$2,000 loan. Sepe represented that it would be necessary for
him to discuss the matter with his partner, defendant Vito
DeLuca (DeLuca), with whom the complaining witness was
also acquainted. In addition, Sepe indicated that if the loan
were granted, it would be necessary for Emeno to pay an in-
terest charge of $75 per week and to repay the principal of
the loan in a lump sum by the end of the month. Later that
same day, defendants went to Emeno’s Manton Avenue gro-
cery store. DeLuca entered the store and delivered $2,000 in

eS 563

cash to Emeno. Emeno thereafter paid Donald Sepe $75 in
cash each Friday until September 16, 1974, when his store
burned down. In late September 1974, Emeno endorsed over
to Sepe a check in the amount of $906.94, which had been
made payable to Emeno from the Joslin Multi-Service Cen-
ter. This check was later cashed by Vito Deluca.

Between September and December 1974, Emeno received
several telephone calls from Sepe asking for the weekly inter-
est payment. In December 1974, Sepe and a friend went to
Emeno’s home looking for additional money. During that
visit, Emeno’s father-in-law, one Norman Saucier, agreed in
Sepe’s presence to obtain a loan so that Emeno might pay an
additional $1,500 to Sepe. That loan was obtained, and on or
about December 6 or 7, 1974, Emeno and his father-in-law
went to Sepe’s house with a check for $1,500 payable to
Donald Sepe. Michael Sepe, Donald’s brother, accepted the
check and gave Emeno a receipt for it.

In January and February 1975, Sepe telephoned Emeno
frequently, seeking additional payments on the loan which
he still considered to be outstanding; but Emeno was unable
to make any payments at that time. In February 1975, while
riding in Sepe’s automobile, Emeno suggested he give Sepe a
diamond ring as a further payment. Emeno testified that
Sepe stated that he definitely wanted to know when the ring
would be available and that if Emeno “pulled any monkey
business or anything he was going to bust my head.” The ring
was delivered to Sepe on February 5, 1975.

The next significant contact between Sepe and Emeno
occurred in early March 1975, when Sepe telephoned early in
the morning and told Emeno that he would be picked up at
home in half an hour. Emeno waited outside because, he
said, he feared Sepe and DeLuca and did not want them to
come inside his home. Sepe and DeLuca arrived shortly
thereafter and drove Emeno to the Vic Calise Bakery on
Hawkins Street in Providence. Emeno testified that during
the drive, DeLuca and Sepe inquired whether Emeno had
insurance on his house and whether it might be possible for
them to break and enter into the house, steal some valuables,
collect the insurance money, and return the goods to Emeno
later.

564 ee

In April 1975, while Emeno was in the process of moving,
Sepe drove to Emeno’s home and stated that he would be
back at nine o’clock that same night. Later that night, Sepe
returned with his brother and was informed that Emeno was
moving because he could no longer afford the mortgage pay-
ments on his home. Emeno testified at trial that Sepe then
stated that he could have taken over the house and burned it
down, but his brother observed afterward that he didn’t
think taking the house over “was worth it.” Later that same
evening, Emeno drove with Sepe to the Manton Social Club.
On the way Sepe asked Emeno whether he still owned his
Cadillac. Emeno replied that he had had to give it up be-
cause he could not afford the payments. At this juncture Sepe
told Emeno that he was “stupid” because they could have
“worked” the car with the insurance company. He then
added, ““I ought to bust your head,” and then said, “I
should have done it a long time ago,” and, “I should do it
now.” the defendant DeLuca had made a similar threat to
Emeno’s father-in-law concerning Emeno in November
1974.

Emeno’s wife testified that she was “petrified” of the two
defendants and had placed padlocks on her home in
Warwick for fear of their entering. On one occasion Sepe
telephoned her concerning her husband’s whereabouts. Sepe
suggested he had heard rumors that Emeno had left the state.
Sepe further stated that “he (Sepe) had done this before and
would do it again.” She construed Sepe’s remark as a threat.
Ultimately in October of 1975, she went to the office of the
State Police and filed a criminal complaint.

Peter Nevola, a principal examiner of the banking division
of the Department of Business Regulation, testified that on
the basis of testimony given, the rate of interest collected
from April of 1974 through December 6, 1974, was 233
percent, Taking into account the payments made from the
begining of April 1974 to September 16, 1974, aggregating a
total of $1,800; the payment of $906.94; the payment on
December 6, 1974, of $1,500; and the transfer on February
5, 1975, of a ring with a cost value of $405 -- and assuming
that all of these payments were for interest on the original
loan of $2,000 -- Mr. Nevola testified that this total would

ee) 565

constitute interest from the date of the loan to the time of
trial of 207.5 percent per annum. In the event that some of
these payments were in fact applied to reduction of princi-
pal, the interest rate would have been even higher. Nevola
testified that under any theory, payments made from the
date of the loan in April 1974 until the date of trial on a loan
of $2,000 would exceed the maximum permitted rate of 21
percent per annum.

In support of their appeal, defendants raise six issues.

The first issue constitutes a challenge to the admission of
evidence concerning the alleged proposal by defendant Sepe
to commit certain other crimes: (1) the breaking and entering
into Emeno’s house so that defendants might steal valuables,
collect insurance money, and then return the valuables to
Emeno; (2) the proposal by Donald Sepe that he and his
brother could take over the Emeno house and later burn it
down; (3) the proposal that he could have “worked” Emeno’s
car with the insurance company.

It is a generally accepted rule that evidence indicative of a
bad character or a criminal disposition on the part of a
defendant is inadmissible to prove the likelihood that he com-
mitted a particular offense. State v. Mazzarella, 103 R.I.
253, 236 A.2d 446 (1967); State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. 170,
179 A. 147 (1935); McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of
Evidence §190 at 447 (2d ed. Cleary 1972). These authorities
nevertheless recognized certain exceptions to the general
rule. Although these exceptions cannot be stated with cate-
gorical precision, evidence of other conduct, even if criminal,
is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it
tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of
mistake, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the com-
mission of two or more crimes so related to each other that
proof of one tends to establish the others, or (5) the identity of
the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.
Id, at 448-51. See People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E.
286 (1901). In State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261, 266-67, 274
A.2d 742, 745 (1971), we recognized that incidents previous
to the crime charged, even if criminal in nature, might be ad-
missible in order to establish an intent, motive, plan, design,

566 ee

or scheme. See also State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. at 173-74, 179
A, at 149,

Wigmore points out that evidence of criminal conduct
tending to show that a defendant had formed a settled pur-
pose to appropriate certain property which could only be
obtained by doing several preliminary acts, the last of which
was the very criminal act for which defendant was charged,
are admissible, and that the criminality of such prior acts
does not affect their admissibility. 2 Wigmore, Evidence
§§304, 305 (3d ed. 1940). “Either they [prior acts] are
relevant by the above tests, or they are not; if they are not,
they are rejected because they are irrelevant; if they are, they
are received in spite of their criminality.” Id. §305 at 205. See
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 16 N.E. 452
(1888).

In the case at bar, the proposals to commit other acts of a
criminal nature in order to obtain payment of the sums be-
lieved to be due by defendants formed part of an overall
scheme or design to obtain these monies by fair means or
foul; they were thus relevant to complete the story of the
criminal acts for which defendants were on trial by proving
the immediate context of happenings near enough in time
and place to be a part of the same transaction under what has
been referred to as the “complete story” principle. State v.
Villavicencio, 95 Ariz. 199, 201, 388 P.2d 245, 246 (1964);
McCormick, supra §190(1) at 448. The admission of this evi-
dence, therefore, did not constitute error.

The second issue raised by defendants is the propriety of
the refusal by the trial justice to allow impeachment of the
credibility of the complaining witness, Emeno, by cross-
examination concerning his arrest or his having been charged
by the police for the alleged crime of embezzlement. Under
the provisions of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-17-15, it
has been long held in Rhode Island that the credibility of a
witness may be impeached by a showing of a conviction or
sentence for any crime, including a misdemeanor. However,
the credibility of a witness may not be impeached merely by
a showing of an arrest or criminal accusation. State v. Milne,
95 R.I. 315, 325, 187 A.2d 136, 141 (1962), appeal dismissed,

es 367

373 U.S. 542,-83 S. Ct. 1539, 10 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1963); State
v. Christofaro, 70 R.I. 57, 37 A.2d 163 (1944). The defend-
ant argues that cross-examination on such a subject would be
allowed under Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The short answer to this contention, assuming arguendo that
it has merit, is that the Federal Rules of Evidence have not
been adopted by Rhode Island. Should the court consider the
adoption of such rules, the change would be better accom-
plished by exercise of its rule-making power rather than on a
piecemeal case-by-case basis. Therefore, we decline to set
aside our settled rule at this juncture. The decision of the trial
justice in excluding this evidence was correct.

|| The third issue raised by defendants is based upon the
denial of their request for a mistrial as a result of a statement
by Emeno’s wife that she had purchased a German shepherd
dog “[b]jecause of Donald Sepe and Vito DeLuca.” The trial
justice denied the motion for mistrial and defendants contend
that this was reversible error. We said in State v. Verdone,
114 R.I. 613, 618, 337 A.2d 804, 808 (1975), where com-
ments by a prosecutor were under consideration, that the
question at issue was whether the statements had so inflamed
the jury as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. In order to
be prejudicial, such remarks must not only be extraneous to
the issues but also tend to inflame and arouse the passions of
the jury. In the case at bar, the question of ownership of a pet
had been raised by defense counsel in cross-examination. It
cannot be said that redirect examination on this subject was
wholly extraneous to the issues. It is highly doubtful, further-
more, that the statement by the witness would tend to arouse
the passions of the jury so as to deprive defendants of a fair
trial. As said in State v. Pailin, 114 R.I. 725, 729, 339 A.2d
253, 255 (1975),

“Motions to pass are addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial justice. He has a ‘front-row seat’ ‘at the trial
and can best determine the effect of the improvident
remarks upon the jury. His determination is to be given
great weight and will not be disturbed unless clearly
wrong.”

568 ee

Under the circumstances in the instant case, the trial jus-
tice considered this evidence to be relevant on the issue of
Emeno’s wife’s having been placed in fear of defendants by
their threatening statements and conduct. We are of the
opinion that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in admit-
ting the evidence and in refusing to declare a mistrial.

Hi The fourth issue raised by defendants challenges the strik-
ing of testimony offered by the defense concerning the repu-
tation of the complaining witness for veracity. Counsel for
defendant Sepe presented one Gustavo Gesualdo as a witness
and sought to elicit testimony from him concerning Emeno’s
reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which
he was employed. After several tentative efforts by counsel to
elicit testimony concerning specific contacts that this witness
had had with Emeno, the trial justice and counsel entered
into a colloquy during which the trial justice suggested that
the controlling case was Kolb v. Union Railroad, 23 B.1. 72,
49 A. 392 (1901); hence, he would accept evidence of
Emeno’s general reputation either in the community in
which he resided or in which he was employed. The trial jus-
tice also referred to McCormick’s treatise on evidence. The
general rule set forth in McCormick, supra §44 at 92, that a
witness may be impeached by proof of bad reputation for
truth and veracity as of the time of the trial, is expressed as
follows:

“The crucial time when the character of the witness
under attack has its influence on his truth-telling is the
time when he testifies. But obviously reputation takes
time to form and is the resultant of earlier conduct and
demeanor, so that it does not precisely reflect character
at a later date. The practical solution is to do what most
courts actually do, that is, (1) to permit the reputation-
witness to testify about the impeachee’s ‘present’ reputa-
tion, as of the time of the trial, if he knows it, and (2) to
permit testimony as to reputation (which is usually a
settled, continuing condition) as of any time before trial
which the judge in his discretion finds is not too remote
to be significant.” (Emphasis added.)

es 569

In the case at bar the impeaching witness had had contact
with Emeno approximately two and a half years prior to
trial. However, when the trial justice asked whether the
witness knew what Emeno’s reputation was during the time
just prior to trial, the witness answered in the negative.
Under all of the circumstances, we cannot say that the strik-
ing of such testimony regarding reputation constituted an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Null, 415 F.2d 1178,
1180 (4th Cir. 1969); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 19 R.I. 497, 34 A.
989 (1896).

The defendants’ fifth assertion of error is based upon the
trial justice’s denial of their motion to pass the case as a result
of the prosecutor’s comments on defendants’ failure to pro-
duce a witness. During final argument, the prosecutor sug-
gested that if Michael Sepe (brother of defendant Donald
Sepe) had not received the $1,500 check payable to defend-
ant, why had he not testified in the case? This remark was
improper under our holding in State v. Jefferson, 116 R.I.
124, 353 A.2d 190 (1976). The trial justice recognized this
impropriety and gave an immediate cautionary instruction in
which he stated to the jury:

“(There is no burden of any nature whatsoever in this
case, for the defendants to produce any testimony or to
prove anything. The burden is solely and completely
upon the State. You cannot infer that the absence of any
witness for the defendants creates any unfavorable situ-
ation for the defendants. You cannot draw any unfavor-
able conclusions or inferences of any nature from the
fact that a particular witness is not produced.”

Later in the charge to the jury, the trial justice reempha-
sized that the defendant has no burden or obligation to prove
anything and that the burden of proof rests entirely upon the
state. Here again, it cannot be said that the trial justice
abused his discretion in refusing the motion for mistrial, rely-
ing instead upon both immediate and final cautionary in-
structions. State v. Pailin, supra.

As their sixth issue, the defendants assert that the trial jus-
tice committed error in denying the defendants’ motions for
judgments of acquittal on both the extortion and usury

570

charges. It is a familiar doctrine that a trial justice confronted
with a motion for judgment of acquittal must view the evi-
dence presented in the light most favorable to the state and
must draw therefrom all reasonable inferences consistent
with guilt. State v. Jefferson, supra; State v. Wilbur, 115 R.I.
7, 339 A.2d 730 (1975). Neither the credibility of the
witnesses nor the weight of the evidence is before the court at
that time. Jefferson, supra at 128-29, 353 A.2d at 194,
Wilbur, supra at 15-16, 339 A.2d at 735; State v. Crescenzo,
114 B.I. 242, 256, 332 A.2d 421, 429-30 (1975). An examina-
tion of the record in the case at bar indicates that under the
foregoing test, there was ample evidence to justify the deci-
sion of the trial justice in denying the motions for judgment of
acquittal on both counts. There was evidence of threats made
by both defendants in regard to the extortion counts. There is
further evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the state, that both defendants acted in concert in making the
loan, in demanding payment therefor, and in achieving re-
ceipt of funds significantly beyond the statutory limit of 21
percent per annum. See G.L, 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§6-26-2; G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §6-26-3, as amended
by P.L. 1970, ch. 263, §1. Thus, the trial justice was correct
in denying the motions for judgments of acquittal on each
count.

For the reasons stated, the defendants’ appeal is denied
and dismissed, the judgment of the Superior Court is
affirmed, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Alan R. Tate,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

John. J. Bevilacqua, William A. Gosz, for defendants.

571

410 A.2d 986.

WESTINGHOUSE BroapcasTING Co., INc. vs.
Dray Meoia, Inc."

JANUARY 18, 1980.
Paesenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

573

Bevitacgua, C.J. This is an appeal by the defendant,
Dial Media, Inc., in a multiple claims civil action from an
order of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
on its book account claim. Although a counterclaim remains
to be adjudicated, the trial justice, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, has expressly
determined that there is no just reason for delay and has ex-
pressly directed the entry of judgment against the defendant
in the amount of $30,812.50 plus interest and costs.

The plaintiff is an Indiana corporation doing business in
Boston, Massachusetts, as WBZ-TV 4 (WBZ). The defendant
is a marketing and advertising firm incorporated in the State
of Rhode Island. Sometime in November or December of
1976, a WBZ salesman (Albert Salari) met with an agent of
defendant to discuss the purchase of advertising on plaintiff's
television broadcasting station. The defendant was seeking
air time to market two of its mail-order products, the
“Miracle Painter” and the “Miracle Slicer.”

The parties eventually entered into an agreement which
provided that, upon approval by plaintiff, advertisements
describing the miraculous properties of these products and
soliciting viewers to telephone or mail in their orders were to
be aired. These ads were broadcast during February, March,
and April of 1977.

In that same year, WBZ aired as part of the March 11
edition of its evening news program! a brief consumer report
on the “Miracle Painter.” In that report Sharon King, the

"The WBZ evening news program, known as “Eyewitness News,” is a nightly
news program produced by WBZ.

TO

574 ee

WBZ consumer affairs reporter, intimated that the product
did not paint as miraculously as its name and ads suggested.

At some point after the consumer report had been aired,
defendant refused to make payments to plaintiff under the
terms of the broadcasting contract.*

On May 20, 1977, plaintiff instituted this action by filing a
complaint in Superior Court to recover the payments, total-
ing $30,812.50, allegedly due from defendant.? The defend-
ant responded by filing an answer that denied plaintiffs alle-
gations and asserted as defenses “fraud” and breach of con-
tract. The defendant also filed a six-count counterclaim
alleging, inter alia, that the consumer report by Sharon King
maliciously, fraudulently, and negligently disparaged the
efficiency, reliability, and price of defendant’s product. The
counterclaim also alleged that the report caused defendant to
suffer loss of business and eventually forced defendant to
“curtail its business in the market served by WBZ.” The
defendant claimed compensatory damages in the sum of
$2,500,000 and punitive damages in the same amount.

On August 11, 1977, plaintiff, pursuant to Super. R. Civ.
P. 56, filed a motion with supporting affidavits for summary
judgment on its claim, At the same time it also filed a motion
to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim pursuant to Super. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The defendant filed an objection with an
opposing affidavit to plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment. The opposing affidavit contained the sworn statement
of Edward Valenti, the president of defendant corporation.
Mr. Valenti deposed that Albert Salari had represented to
defendant that if it advertised with plaintiff, plaintiff would
work in defendant’s best interest to promote the sale of the
“Miracle Painter” and the “Miracle Slicer.” Mr. Valenti also

*It is impossible to determine when defendant made its decision not to pay plain-
tiff, although the record indicates that defendant continued to run its ads on WBZ
for about a month after the unfavorable consumer report had been aired.

*The plaintiff asserted its claim in three counts, with each based on a different
theory of recovery: count I was based on a book account; count II on services ren-
dered; and count II{ on a written contract.

| 575

deposed that defendant considered the WBZ consumer re-
port on the “Miracle Painter” to be a breach of that represen-
tation.

On November 23, 1977, plaintiff's motions came to be
heard. After reviewing the pleadings and affidavits, the trial
justice granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. He
found that with respect to plaintiff's book account claim,
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
plaintiff was entitled to judgment against defendant as a
matter of law in the amount claimed. He premised this find-
ing on his conclusion that the best interest representation by
Mr. Salari constituted mere “puffing * + * [which] means
nothing” and which did “not answer the affidavit filed on be-
half of the plaintiff.”4 Additionally, the trial justice granted
plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim in re-
gard to counts III, V, and VI. The motion was denied in re-
gard to counts I and II, and withdrawn in regard to count
Iv.

The issues raised by this appeal concern (1) when a trial
justice can apply the provisions of Rule 54(b) and (2) when
summary judgment procedure is in order.

I

The defendant assigns as error both the trial justice’s order
granting summary judgment and his Rule 54(b) certification
of that order as a final judgment. The defendant contends
that Rule 54(b) was improperly applied because the action
below did not present more than one claim for relief. Accord-
ing to defendant, the transactional relationship of its coun-
terclaim to plaintiff's claim meant that the action presented
only one claim for relief. Under such circumstances Rule
54(b) would not be applicable and plaintiff would not be
entitled to a final judgment on its claim.

The defendant’s challenge to the Rule 54(b) certification of
the summary judgment order as a final judgment, in effect,
challenges our jurisdiction to review the merits of that order
at this time. General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment)

“The affidavit filed on behalf of plaintiff alleges that plaintiff duly fulfilled its
contract obligations by broadcasting defendant's ads in the manner and at the times

agreed upon.

TT

576 ee)

§9-24-1, as amended by P.L. 1975 ch. 244, §1, provides that
an appeal may be taken only from a “final judgment, decree,
or order * * *” of the Superior Court: The basic test of the
finality of a judgment for purposes of appeal is that it should
terminate all litigation arising out of the cause between the
parties on the merits. Pearson v. Old Stone Savings Bank,
119 R.I. 836, 383 A.2d 1029 (1978); McAuslan v.
McAuslan, 34 R.I. 462, 83 A. 837 (1912). Clearly, not all
litigation arising out of the cause between the parties in the
instant case has been terminated on the merits. There
remains to be adjudicated a counterclaim asserted in
defendant’s answer.

| | There are, however, certain circumstances in which a
decree or order. may be considered final for purposes of
appeal even though it does not terminate all litigation arising
out of the cause between the parties on the merits. Thus,
§9-24-7 provides for an immediate appeal whenever upon a
hearing in the Superior Court an injunction shall be granted
or continued, or a receiver appointed, or a sale of real or per-
sonal property ordered, or a new trial ordered or denied after
a trial by jury. We may also hear an appeal from an interloc-
utory order if overriding public policy considerations so war-
rant or when it appears that prompt action is necessary to
avoid imminent and irreparable harm. Eidam v. Eidam, 108
R.I. 673, 279 A.2d 413 (1971); The Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Director of Public Works, 98 R.1. 167, 200 A.2d 580 (1964).
Finally, according to Rule 54(b), an interlocutory disposition
may be certified as a final judgment if the conditions of the
tule are met.® Calore Rigging Corp. v. Sterling Engineering

SSuper. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides:

“When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multi-
ple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such deter-
mination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however desig-
nated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabili-
ties of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry. of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”

es

& Construction Co., Inc., 105 R.I. 150, 152, 250 A.2d 365,
367.

|| When reviewing a trial justice’s 54(b) certification, this
court first considers whether the action below involved either
multiple parties or multiple claims for relief (or both) and
whether the trial court’s interlocutory disposition adjudi-
cated one or more but fewer than all the claims (or the rights
and liabilities of one or more but fewer than all the parties)
before it. In regard to this determination, the trial justice’s
certificate is neither binding nor conclusive on this court. See
Pearson v. Old Stone Savings Bank, supra; McAusilan v.
McAuslan, supra. Secondly, this court must consider whe-
ther the trial justice properly determined that there was no
just reason for delay. This determination is subject to review
only for an abuse of trial court discretion. Calore Rigging
Corp. v. Sterling Engineering & Construction Co., supra at
154, 250 A.2d at 368. See generally 10 Wright and Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §2655 at 35-39 (1973).

HE sRule 54(b) by its own terms indicates that claims, counter-
claims, cross-claims, and third party claims are separable
units for applying its multiple claims provision. Under Rule
54(b) a counterclaim, whether permissive or compulsory, is
treated like any other claim. Cold Metal Process Co. v.
United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452, 76S.
Ct, 904, 908-09, 100 L. Ed. 1311, 1318 (1956). In the action
below defendant asserted a counterclaim in its answer, to
which plaintiff filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
This motion was granted in part, denied in part, and with-
drawn in part, leaving defendant’s counterclaim actionable.
Under these circumstances it is evident that the action below,
consisting of the claims for relief presented by either party,
presented more than one such claim. We reject as without
merit defendant’s contention that the transactional relation-
ship of its counterclaim to plaintiff's claim precludes a
finding that the action presented more than one claim for re-
lief. That relationship is not relevant to whether the action

578 ee

presents more than one claim for relief.6 Cold Metal Process
Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., supra.

In view of our determination that the action below pre-
sented more than one claim for relief, the trial justice’s sum-
mary judgment order regarding plaintiff's book account
claim clearly adjudicated “one or more but fewer than all of
the claims” before him. Furthermore, the trial justice did not
err in expressly determining that there was no just reason for
delay and in expressly directing the entry of judgment for
plaintiff on its claim. Once the court decided that plaintiff
was entitled to summary judgment on its claim, the deter-
mination and direction required under Rule 54(b) were mat-
ters within its sound judicial discretion. Thus, the burden
was on defendant to persuade us that the court abused its dis-
cretion with respect to this aspect of the application of the
tule. It has failed to do so. We do realize, though, that the
presence of an unadjudicated counterclaim that is transac-
tionally related to the claim underlying this appeal raises the
spectre of overlapping appeals and the attendant possibility
of an uneconomical use of judicial resources. The facts
underlying each claim, however, are uncomplicated and
little contested. Thus, we attach little significance to the
transactional relationship between the claims. See Coro, Inc.
v. R.N. Koch, Inc., 112 R.I. 371, 310 A.2d 622 (1973).

For these reasons we think the trial justice correctly
applied Rule 54(b) and that the appeal from the summary
judgment order certified thereunder is properly before us.

Ir
The plaintiff argues that the trial justice was correct as a
matter of law in granting its motion for summary judgment.
According to plaintiff, whatever the terms of its contract
with defendant, it has fulfilled its contractual obligations and
is entitled as a matter of law to recover against defendant.
We think plaintiff's argument misconceives the purpose of

summary judgment procedure.
“tis, however, relevant to whether there is just reason for delay. Cold Metal

Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452, 76 S. Ct.
904, 908-09, 100 L. Ed. 1311, 1318 (1956).

es 579

Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides in pertinent part that
summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the plead-
ings * * * together with the affidavits + + + show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.” Thus, if a
genuine issue as to a material fact is properly established, the
motion must be denied. O’Connor v. McKanna, 116 R.1.
672, 359 A.2d 350 (1976). Moreover, when ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court may not pass on the
weight or credibility of evidence, Palazzo v. Big G. Super-
markets, Inc., 110 R.I. 242, 245, 292 A.2d 235, 237 (1972),
but must consider affidavits and pleadings in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion, Marandola v.
Hillcrest Builders, Inc., 102 R.1. 46, 49, 227 A.2d 785,
787-88 (1967).

On appeal this court determines the motion anew and is
bound by the same rules. See O’Connor v. McKanna, supra.

In O'Connor, we held that summary judgment may not be
proper when the case involves an ambiguous contract. We
observed that this is the rule followed in the federal courts
and that those courts have held that the intent of the parties
to an ambiguous contract is a question of fact that cannot
properly be resolved by summary judgment, unless only one
reasonable interpretation exists.7 116 R.I. at 634-35, 359
A.2d at 353-54. Moreover, ascertaining such intent often
involves passing on the credibility of evidence. Such is
beyond the scope of summary judgment procedure.

A contract is ambiguous if, in light of our rules of contract
interpretation, it is reasonably susceptible of different
constructions, Fryzel v. Domestic Credit Corp., 120 R.1.
92, 99, 385 A.2d 663, 667 (1978). The determination of
the ambiguity of a contract is a question of law, and a court
may consider all evidence that is properly before it in
reaching its conclusion. Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 422
F.Supp. 1354, 1359-61 (D.R.I. 1976), revd on other

7Conversely, the construction of a clear and unambiguous contract presents an
issue of law, which may be resolved by summary judgment. Cassidy v. Springfield
Life Ins. Co., 106 R.I. 615, 619, 262 A.2d 378, 380 (1970).

580 eS

grounds, 565 F.2d 200 (First Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1611, 56 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1978); Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. G.W. Drayage ¢& Rigging Co., Inc., 69
Cal. 2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641 (1968).

Thus, the issue before us is whether, in light of these rules,
the trial justice determined a genuine issue as to a material
fact when he granted plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment.

The defendant argues that its affidavit put into issue the
bargained-for meaning, if any, of the best interest represen-
tation made by the WBZ salesman.’ The affiant deposed that
the representation, as understood by defendant, was a basis
of the bargain between plaintiff and defendant. The tenor of
defendant’s understanding of the representation, as we dis-
cern it from the affiant’s testimony, is that plaintiff thereby
promised, at the very least, to avoid intentionally harming
defendant’s interest in the marketing of the “Miracle Painter”
and the “Miracle Slicer.”® The plaintiff controverts this
understanding, but it does not deny that the WBZ salesman
made such a representation.

Although we express no opinion concerning the actual
bargained-for meaning, if any, of that representation, we

On appeal plaintiff challenged the sufficiency of defendant's affidavit on the
ground that the affidavit was not made on personal knowledge as is required by
Super. R. Civ. P, 56(e). The plaintiff, however, did not make such an objection in
the proceedings below. The objection is therefore deemed waived, and the affidavit
may be considered in ruling on the summary judgment motion. Klingman v.
National Indemnity Co., 317 F.2d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 1963). Cf. Burns v. Janes,
121 R.J. 343, 349, 398 A.2d 1125, 1128 (1979) (hearsay evidence to which no
objection is offered is entitled to be treated as if it were legally admissible and to be
accorded whatever probative weight the factfinder believes it deserves; the failure
to object is deemed a waiver of the incompetency of such evidence.) But of.
American Underwriting Corp. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 111 R.I. 415,
423, 303 A.2d 121, 125-26 (1973) (evidence violative of the parol evidence rule will
not be considered even though admitted without objection).

°The affiant deposes also that defendant considered the production and broad-
cast of the consumer report on the “Miracle Painter” to be a breach of this term of
the contract. If it is determined that the best interest representation constituted a
term of the contract, then whether WBZ’s production and broadcast of that report
breached that term is an issue of fact.

SS 561

find that in light of the allegations in defendant’s affidavit,
the trial justice determined a genuine issue as to a material
fact when he ruled on the meaning of the representation.

In interpreting a contract the parties’ intention must gov-
ern if that intent can be clearly inferred from the terms of the
contract and carried out consistent with settled rules of law.’®
Hill v. M.S. Alper & Son, Inc., 106 R.I. 38, 47, 256 A.2d 10,
15 (1969).

On the one hand, unless a plain and unambiguous intent
to the contrary is manifested, the words used in the contract
are assigned their ordinary meaning. Armfield v. Frank N.
McClure, Inc., 77 B.1. 390, 75 A.2d 196 (1950). In our opin-
ion, based on the ordinary meaning of each word,” when a
speaker represents that he will promote a certain concern of
the listener in the latter’s best interest, the listener may rea-
sonably infer that the speaker has represented, at the very
least, that he will not intentionally harm that particular con-
cern.

On the other hand, the situation of the parties and the cir-
cumstances attending the speaking of the words used in a
contract also are relevant to the determination of their
intended meaning. Hill v. M.S. Alper & Son, Inc., supra.
Here the evidence indicates that the representation was made
in the course of the negotiations that culminated in the con-
tract between plaintiff and defendant. It is just as reason-
able, therefore, to conclude, as did the trial justice, that in
the instance actually before us, the best interest representa-
tion reasonably should have been understood as no more than
mere salesman’s puffery.

1°Of course, the intent we seek is not some undisclosed intent that may have
existed in the minds of the contracting parties but is instead the intent that is ex-
pressed in the language of the contract. Theroux v. Bay Assoc., Inc., 114 R.I. 746,

339 A.2d 266 (1975), Flanagan v. Kelly’s System of New England, Inc., 109 B.I.
388, 286 A.2d 249 (1972). *

4As is our practice in cases of this kind, we look in the first instance to the dic-
tionary meaning of the language at issue to determine its ordinary meaning. The
term “best interest” does not appear as a separate entry in. Webster’s Third
International Dictionary (unabridged). The terms “best” and “interest” are,
however, defined therein.

582 es

We therefore find that on the facts before us the contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant is ambiguous. Thus,
the trial justice determined a genuine issue as to a material
fact when he ruled on the meaning of the best interest repre-
sentation. The defendant’s opposing affidavit raised a dis-
puted issue of fact, namely, whether the best interest repre-
sentation, as understood by the defendant, was a basis of the
bargain between the plaintiff and the defendant. The trial
justice determined this issue when he ruled that the represen-
tation was mere salesman’s puffery. He thereby exceeded his
authority on summary judgment procedure. As we have said
so often, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
the court is not authorized to try issues. The purpose of sum-
mary judgment procedure is issue finding and not issue deter-
mination. The issue also is genuine and as to a material fact
because it cannot be determined whether the plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law until it is determined
whether the representation was a basis of the bargain
between the plaintiff and the defendant and, if it was,
whether WBZ’s production and broadcast of the consumer
report on the “Miracle Painter” was a breach of that term.
See The Westerly Hospital v. Higgins, 106 R.I. 155, 160-61,
256 A.2d 506, 509 (1969); Falcon v. Mathews, 47 R.1. 237,
239, 132 A. 609, 610 (1926).

Accordingly, the defendant’s appeal is sustained and the
judgment appealed from is vacated, and the case is re-
manded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

Roberts, Carroll, Feldstein & Tucker, Bruce G. Tucker,
for plaintiff.

Schechter, Abrams & Verri, David A. Schechter, for
defendant.

583

410 A.2d 425.

Carzos Guarino vs, THE DEPARTMENT OF SocIAL WELFARE
OF THE STATE OF RuopE IsLanp et al.

JANUARY 18, 1980.
Parsenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

WEISBERGER,J. This case comes before us on a petition for
certiorari to review a Superior Court judgment sustaining a
determination of the Personnel Appeal Board (the Board)
which confirmed a discharge of the petitioner by the Director
of the Department of Social Welfare. This petition was filed
under the review provisions of the Administrative Procedures
Act, G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §42-35-16. The facts
underlying the controversy are as follows.

Carlos Guarino (petitioner) had been employed by the
Department of Social Welfare of the State of Rhode Island
for a period of nine years. Specifically, on March 18, 1970,
petitioner was assigned to duty as youth home life supervisor
at the Youth Correctional Center (YCC), a division of the
Rhode Island Training School for Boys; he had held this
position for ten months prior to the incident of which he
complains. Five days per week, petitioner worked a shift
beginning at 7 a.m. and ending at 3 p.m. Around noon on
the date in question, petitioner’s immediate supervisor
notified him that the person who would normally relieve
petitioner at 3 p.m. was ill and that petitioner had to remain
on the job until a replacement could be obtained. Efforts
made to find a replacement, however, were unavailing. At 3
p.m., petitioner agreed to stay for one more hour but stated
that he would then leave for the day. His supervisor (Mr.
Gervais) notified the superintendent, Joseph P. Devine, of
petitioner’s response. In turn, Mr. Devine instructed the
supervisor to inform petitioner that he must “stay until a
replacement was found, and, if he walked out, as he was
threatening to do, to keep right on walking.” This message
was relayed to petitioner; neverthelesss, he left his job at
approximately 4 p.m. without having been relieved of his

 —

duty either by a replacement or by permission of his superior.

As a result of this action, upon recommendation of
Superintendent Devine, petitioner was discharged by means
of a letter of termination dated April 15, 1970, The following
day his appeal was taken to the board in accordance with the
provisions of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §36-3-10. The
board held hearings over a period of time beginning May
13, 1970, and ending on December 9, 1970. A decision
confirming the discharge by the appointing authority was
filed April 27, 1971. From this decision petitioner claimed an
appeal to the Superior Court on May 12, 1971, pursuant to
the provisions of G.L. 1956 §42-35-15. A decision of the
Superior Court was rendered October 27, 1977, and
thereafter judgment was entered affirming the decision of the
Board.

The petitioner raises a number of issues, of which only one
is entitled to serious consideration. He asserts that the failure
to afford him a pre-termination hearing violates due processs
of law as that concept has been defined and applied by the
Supreme Court of the United States in varying contexts. See,
e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92S. Ct. 2593, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 484 (1972)(preliminary hearing on probable cause
required before parolee may be deprived of liberty); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556
(1972) (hearing required prior to seizure of property in
replevin proceeding); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91S. Ct.
1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971)(hearing on probable cause
required before deprivation of driver’s license); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287
(1970) (hearing required prior to termination of recipient’s
welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1969) (hearing
required prior to wage attachment).

1But of. Mackey v: Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 61 L, Ed. 2d 321
(1979) (Massachusetts statute providing for summary suspension of driver's license
without prior hearing after licensee's refusal to take breathalyzer test upon arrest
for operating motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor held not
unconstitutional on its face).

556

The short answer to this contention is that a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court of the United States have
found the foregoing cases inapplicable to the discharge of a
federal employee. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94S. Ct.
1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1974), In that case an employee of the
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) had been charged
with slandering other OEO employees, including the
regional director, who preferred charges against him. In
accordance with the provisions of the Lloyd-La Follette Act,”
as supplemented by Civil Service regulations and executive
order, Kennedy, the employee, was entitled to appeal after
his discharge to the Civil Service Commission and to receive
an evidentiary hearing. He challenged the provisions of the
act as constitutionally deficient in that there was no provision
for a trial-type hearing before an impartial officer prior to
Kennedy’s removal from his employment. A majority of the
Court rejected this contention and held that the evidentiary
post-termination hearing provided before the Civil Service
Commission met the requirements of due process. Writing
for a plurarity of three justices, Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated:

“Here appellee did have a statutory expectancy that
he not be removed other than for ‘such cause as will
promote the efficiency of [the] service.’ But the very
section of the statute which granted him that right, a
tight which had previously existed only by virtue of
administrative regulation, expressly provided also for
the procedure by which ‘cause’ was to be determined,
and expressly omitted the procedural guarantees which
appellee insists are mandated by the Constitution. Only
by bifurcating the very sentence of the Act of Congress
which conferred upon appellee the right not to be
removed save for cause could it be said that he had an
expectancy of that substantive right without the
procedural limitations which Congress attached to it. In

*This statute was first enacted by Act of August 24, 1912, ch. 389, §6, 37 Stat.
555. At the time of the Arnett decision, it was codified as 5 U.S.C. §7501 (1970). It
has since been completely revised, in a manner not pertinent here, by the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, Title IT, §204(a), 92 Stat. 1134.

es

the area of federal regulation of government employees,
where in the absence of statutory limitation the
governmental employer has had virtually uncontrolled
latitude in decisions as to hiring and firing, Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896-897 (1961), we
do not believe that a statutory enactment such as the
Lloyd-La Follette Act may be parsed as discretely as
appellee urges. Congress was obviously intent on
according a measure of statutory job security to
government employees which they had not previously
enjoyed, but was likewise intent on excluding more
elaborate procedural requirements which it felt would
make the operation of the new scheme unnecessarily
burdensome in practice. Where the focus of legislation
was thus strongly on the procedural mechanism for
enforcing the substantive right which was
simultaneously conferred, we decline to conclude that
the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart from
the procedure provided for its enforcement. The
employee’s statutorily defined right is not a guarantee
against removal without cause in the abstract, but such
a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which
Congress has designated for the determination of
cause.” Id. at 151-52, 94S. Ct. at 1643, 40 L. Ed. 2d at
32.

It is true that in a concurring opinion in Arnett, Mr. Justice
Powell disagreed with the plurality about the quantum of
deference that should be accorded a Legislature in
prescribing the procedures to protect an expectancy of
continued employment. He did agree, however, with the
majority that an evidentiary hearing prior to termination was
not constitutionally mandated, although he included the
caveat that once a property interest is conferred, a
Legislature may not constitutionally authorize the
deprivation of such an interest without appropriate
procedural safeguards. Id. at 167, 94 S. Ct. at 1650, 40 L.
Ed. 2d at 40-41 (Powell, J., concurring).

55S

In the case at bar, the procedures for review of the
dismissal of a state employee “for the good of the service”
bear a sufficient similarity to the procedures that were
considered adequate in Arnett to satisfy the requirements of
due process. Indeed, Rhode Island provides not only for
administrative review but for judicial review by the Superior
Court as well, with further discretionary review by this
court.

Thus we are of the opinion that the Superior Court was
correct in rejecting petitioner’s challenge to the procedural
safeguards set forth in §36-3-10, as supplemented by the
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35
of title 42. It is true that in Arnett, under the federal statute,
the employee was entitled, if he chose, to a hearing before
the very person who had upheld the charges against him. In
our opinion this right did not substantially enhance the due
process guarantees accorded to federal employees, nor was it
considered to be of substantial importance by either the
majority or dissenting justices.

The remaining contentions raised by petitioner are
essentially factual; they attack the factual findings of the
board as sustained by the Superior Court. In one instance,
petitioner challenges the authority of the superintendent to
require overtime services. This latter issue, though couched
in terms of a legal question, essentially was predicated upon
whether delegation by the appointing authority to the
superintendent had been appropriately made. This was a
mixed question of fact and law and was resolved against
petitioner by the board and by the Superior Court.

In respect to such questions, when more than one
inference is possible, the court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision
of the agency unless its findings are “clearly erroneous.”
Section 42-35-15(g)(5).

When we review a judgment of the Superior Court on a
petition for certiorari, our inquiry is limited to determining
whether the record reflects evidence, or reasonable

|!

inferences that may be drawn therefrom, to support the
findings of the tribunal whose decision is being reviewed.
Hardman v. Personnel Appeal Board, 100 R.1. 145, 152, 211
A.2d 660, 664 (1965). Utilizing this test, we find ample
evidence to support the Superior Court judgment upholding
the decision of the board.

In respect to the selection of punishment, we find no error
in the sustaining of the discharge by the Superior Court.
Serious consideration must be given to the need for discipline
among employees of a correctional facility. The importance
of remaining at one’s post until properly relieved cannot be
overemphasized in those situations in which a correctional
officer or home life supervisor is required to guard inmates
who are involuntarily confined. We have stated that police
officers constitute a military organization in many respects
and are subject to disciplinary methods that are “ ‘peculiarly
incident to the efficient functioning’ ” of their department.
Simmons v. Town Council, 112 R.I. 522, 531-32, 312, A.2d
725, 730 (1973); Howland v. Thomas, 98 R.1. 470, 476-77,
204 A.2d 640, 644 (1964). This observation might be applied
with equal force to correctional officers who are entrusted
with the safeguarding of persons confined, whether such
persons are juveniles or adults. In the instant case, the
penalty of discharge is not unduly severe when one considers
that the board specifically found that the petitioner had
disobeyed a direct order from his superior and had left his
post in defiance of his superior’s instructions prior to the
arrival of a proper replacement.

For these reasons, the petition for certiorari is denied and
dismissed, the writ heretofore issued is quashed, and the
papers in the case are ordered returned to the Superior Court
with our decision endorsed thereon.

Leo Paul Attilli, for petitioner.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Forrest L. Avila,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.

on

90

411 A.2d 907.
Gary Dovyzz vs. STATE.
"JANUARY 18, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

591

Wrissercer, J. This is an appeal from a summary denial
by the Superior Court of an application for postconviction
relief brought pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) tit.
10, ch. 9.1, as enacted by P.L. 1974, ch. 220, §3. The facts
underlying this petition are as follows.

592 |

Gary Doyle (petitioner) was indicted by the grand jury for
the counties of Providence and Bristol on March 14, 1975, for
assault with a dangerous weapon upon and murder of a four-
year-old child. The petitioner was represented by an assistant
public defender. Suppression hearings began on September
18, 1975, and concluded on September 24, 1975. The trial of
the case commenced immediately upon conclusion of the
suppression hearings and continued until October 3, 1975, at
which time petitioner pleaded guilty to murder in the second
degree. Pursuant to this plea, he was sentenced to a term of
thirty-five years’ imprisonment at the Adult Correctional In-
stitutions (ACI) of which sentence twenty-five years were to
be served and ten years were to be suspended; and petitioner
was to be placed on probation for a period of ten years from
and after the date of his release from the ACI.

On February 17, 1976, petitioner was heard on a motion
to reduce sentence, and said motion was denied. Thereafter,
petitioner sought appointment of private counsel for the pur-
pose of filing an application for postconviction relief. Present
counsel was appointed by this court, and an application for
postconviction relief was filed on February 23, 1979, in the
Superior Court for the county of Providence,

On May 4, 1979, the petition for postconviction relief
came on for hearing before the justice who had tried the case
and taken the plea of guilty. This hearing was for the purpose
of passing upon a motion by petitioner to compel the state to
file an answer that had not been filed in accordance with
$10-9.1-6(a), and also to pass upon certain preliminary
motions by petitioner, including a motion for appointment of
experts. The trial justice had before him certain witnesses’
affidavits which suggested that petitioner had smoked mari-
juana on the day he pleaded guilty to the murder charge.
Counsel for petitioner requested permission to present evi-
dence from additional witnesses who would testify concern-
ing petitioner’s use of marijuana and his condition on the
date of the plea. Counsel for petitioner also sought appoint-
ment of an expert witness who would testify concerning the

es 593

effect of marijuana use upon the voluntariness of petitioner’s
plea. The trial justice declined to hear any evidence from
petitioner. He denied the motions for discovery and appoint-
ment of experts. He granted the motion to compel an answer
by the state and also heard the testimony of the member of
the public defender’s office who had represented petitioner
during the trial and plea of guilty to the second degree mur-
der charge. This witness had been called by the trial justice
and was interrogated by the court. The trial justice overruled
petitioner's objections to the presentation of testimony from
the member of the public defender’s staff. He also overruled
protests based on the inability of petitioner’s counsel to cross-
examine this unexpected witness. The case was continued
until June 5, 1979.

On June 5, 1979, the trial justice, after hearing argument,
declined to hear any further evidence offered by petitioner on
the ground that he was so persuaded by his own recollection
of petitioner’s plea, coupled with the testimony by the attor-
ney who had represented petitioner, that there was no genu-
ine issue of material fact. He then granted a motion by the
state for summary judgment pursuant to §10-9.1-6(c) which
provides that:

“The court may grant a motion by either party for
summary disposition of the application when it appears
from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together
with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

HHH Section 10-9.1-7 provides that all rules and statutes appli-
cable in civil proceedings shall apply to postconviction ac-
tions. Thus, summary judgment could be granted in this case
only under circumstances in which such judgment might be
rendered pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure. We have stated on a number of occasions
that a trial justice may not resolve issues of fact upon a
motion for summary judgment but may only determine whe-

504 P|

ther such issues exist. Slefkin v. Tarkomian, 103 R.I. 495,
498, 238 A.2d 742, 743 (1968); Warren Education Associa-
tion v. Lapan, 103 B.I. 163, 169, 235 A.2d 866, 870 (1967).
On a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, the trial justice
may not pass on the weight or credibility of the evidence.
Palazzo v. The Big G Supermarkets, Inc., 110 R.I. 242, 245,
292 A.2d 235, 237 (1972).

In the case at bar, the trial justice obviously felt that the
claims of petitioner were patently false and contrived. He
viewed the testimony to be offered by the potential witnesses
as lacking in persuasive force in the light of his own recol-
lection and the testimony of petitioner’s former counsel.
However correct the trial justice may have been in this evalu-
ation, it constituted a determination of relative credibility in
a procedural posture in which such determination could not
be made. Consequently, the trial justice was in error in not
allowing petitioner an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the
voluntariness of his plea.

We believe that the trial justice was correct in holding that
the sole issue before the court was the question of whether
petitioner’s plea of guilty was voluntary. The guilt or inno-
cence of petitioner was not before the court at that juncture.
Therefore, petitioner’s requests for appointment of an expert
witness on the issue of child abuse and a physician to review
the autopsy report were properly denied at that stage of the
proceedings.

In remanding this case to the Superior Court for an eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue of voluntariness, we point out by
way of guidance that the petitioner is entitled to present wit-
nesses who allegedly observed him in the act of smoking
marijuana at or near the time when his plea was given and
accepted. The trial justice may consider the transcript of the
previous hearing held on this issue, including the remarks
and statements of the justice who heard this contention initi-
ally. The petitioner may, if he sees fit, cross-examine his prior
counsel who testified on May 4, 1979. We shall leave to the
discretion of the trial justice the question of appointing an

505

expert witness on the effect of marijuana upon the voluntari-
ness of the plea. Only if the petitioner establishes a factual
predicate upon which expert testimony would be helpful to
the trier of fact should such an expert be appointed. In the
event that the trial justice finds upon all of the evidence that
the plea of guilty was intelligently and voluntarily made,
then the judgment of conviction shall stand, subject to review
by this court. In the event that the trial justice should find
that the plea of guilty was not intelligently and voluntarily
made, then he shall reinstate petitioner's original plea of not
guilty and order a new trial.

For the reasons stated, the appeal of the petitioner is
sustained in part, and the case is remanded to the Superior
Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opin-
ion.

Mann & Roney, Robert B. Mann, for petitioner.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Thomas H.
Caruolo, Special Assistant Attorney General.

1A review of the record of the trial, together with the colloquy between the trial
justice and the defendant, persuades us that there was an adequate factual basis for
the plea, in accordance with Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Therefore, this issue need not be determined by the trial justice.

410 A.2d 428.

JEANNETTE FLANAGAN AND SuSAN GAGNE
vs. Prerce CHEVROLET, INC.

JANUARY 21, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

ee —

Weissercer, J. This case arises out of an automobile acci-
dent involving the plaintiffs and Richard Silva, who operated
an automobile owned by the defendant. The plaintiffs seek
reversal of a judgment entered for the defendant after a jury-
waived trial.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are undisputed. The
defendant undertook the repair of Mr. Silva’s automobile.
While repairing his vehicle, defendant loaned Mr. Silva a
1960 Buick. Mr. Silva and defendant executed a written
agreement setting forth the terms of the loan. As agreed,
defendant affixed Mr. Silva’s license plates to the borrowed
vehicle for the duration of the loan.

While operating the loaned vehicle, Mr. Silva struck a
vehicle owned and operated by plaintiff Susan Gagne.
Plaintiff Jeannette Flanagan, a passenger in the Gagne
automobile, sustained personal injuries as a result of the
collision.

The defendant conceded that Mr. Silva drove his vehicle
negligently. At the time of the collision, Mr. Silva was unin-
sured. The only question before us concerns whether defen-
dant is liable for Mr. Silva’s negligence.

5S

The Plaintiffs contend that G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment)
§31-33-6 controls the question of defendant's liability.
Section 31-33-6 sets forth generally the circumstances in
which an operator of a vehicle is the imputed agent of the
owner. In support of their contentions, plaintiffs cite
Avedesian v. Butler Auto Sales, Inc., 93 R.I. 4, 170 A.2d 604
(1961). In Avedesian the plaintiffs sued a car dealer for inju-
ries sustained in an accident with a dealer-owned automo-
bile, driven by an employee of the dealer. Upon the facts of
Avedesian, we determined that “the defendants’ liability
here, if any, arises by reason of the statutory agency contem-
plated in [§31-33-6].”! Id. at 15, 170 A.2d at 610.

Even if we assume a sufficient similarity of operative facts,
plaintiffs misplace their reliance on Avedesian. For after we
decided Avedesian, the General Assembly enacted G.L. 1956
(1968 Reenactment) §31-3-20, as amended by P.L. 1968, ch.
103, §2. Section 31-3-20 addresses specifically the situation in
which a dealer loans a vehicle to replace one being repaired.
Section 31-3-20 provides in its second and third paragraphs:

“Any manufacturer or dealer may loan a motor vehi-
cle or said plates or both to any person for the purpose of
demonstration of a motor vehicle, or when a motor
vehicle owned by such person is undergoing repairs, or
when such person has purchased a motor vehicle, the
registration of which by him is pending, and in any case
for not more than twenty (20) days in any year, pro-
vided the person operating such loaned motor vehicle or
a motor vehicle bearing such loaned number plate shall
furnish proof to said dealer or manufacturer that he has
liability and property damage insurance which will
cover any damage to any person or property caused by
the operation of such loaned vehicle for which the oper-

‘In Avedesian v. Butler Auto Sales, Inc., 93 R.I. 4, 170 A.2d 604 (1961), we
discussed the predecessor of G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §31-33-6, G.L. 1956
§31-31-3. For purposes of this appeal, we need not distinguish between them, as
they are identical in all material respects.

Ss

ator would have been liable if he had also been the own-
er; such proof of insurance shall be set forth on a form to
be obtained from the registry and such form shall be
subject to such conditions as the registry may impose;
provided that in the event the person loaned such vehi-
cle shall not have an insurance policy in effect, then any
liability or property damage shall be covered by the
dealer’s insurance policy.

“Any manufacturer or dealer may also loan a motor
vehicle, under the aforesaid circumstances, to which
vehicle may be affixed plates belonging to the person
operating such loaned motor vehicle when the number
plates would be of the same classification and the dealer
may issue a temporary certificate of registration of such
vehicle under which certificate such vehicle may be
operated upon the public highways for a period of
twenty (20) days from the date of issuance. Such certifi-
cate shall be issued upon a form to be obtained from the
registry and shall be issued under such conditions as the
registry may impose. The certificate shall be carried in
the vehicle for which it is issued and the operator or
person in control of the vehicle shall display such certifi-
cate for examination upon demand of any proper
officer, and any damage to any person or property
caused by the operation of such loaned vehicle shall be
the responsibility of such person and the dealer or
manufacturer shall be in no way liable therefor.”
(Emphasis added.)

We find the provisions of §31-3-20 dispositive of this appeal.”

"%n their briefs the parties discuss the issue of whether §31-33-6 was applicable to
this case, since the defendant contends that Richard Silva was a bailee pursuant to
the provisions of G.L, 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §31-1-17(f). We believe that the
defendant’s argument has considerable merit under principles enunciated in
Redding v. Picard Motor Sales, Inc., 102 R.1. 239, 229 A.2d 762 (1967); Goulet v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Rhode Island, 83 R.I. 310, 116 A.2d 178 (1955); Gallo v.
American Egg Co., 76 B.1. 450, 72 A.2d 166 (1950). Nevertheless, we believe that
§31-3-20 is the more relevant of the statutory provisions and is sufficiently disposi-
tive of the issues herein raised that it is unnecessary to discuss the effect of §31-33-6.

0 ee

i | The facts found at trial indicate that defendant complied

with the requirements contained in the second paragraph of
§31-3-20. The defendant placed Mr. Silva’s license plates on
the loaned vehicle and executed the temporary loan agree-
ment. The agreement states on its face, “This agreement
must be carried in lieu of a Registration.” It therefore served
as the temporary certificate of registration required by
§31-3-20.5

Thus defendant's liability to plaintiffs depends on the in-
tent of the General Assembly as manifested in the second
paragraph of §31-3-20. The statute clearly sets forth two dis-
tinct circumstances with differing results. A dealer which
lends an automobile in the enumerated situations has two
choices: it may lend the vehicle with dealer’s plates, or it may
affix the license plates belonging to its customer. If the dealer
lends an automobile bearing dealer’s plates to an uninsured
motorist, the dealer’s insurer bears the risk for damage
caused by the vehicle’s operation. If the dealer affixes the
operator’s license plates and issues a temporary registration,
the dealer is exempted from liability for damages resulting
from operation of the vehicle.

The plaintiffs contend that the words “aforesaid circum-
stances” incorporate into the third paragraph of §31-3-20 all
circumstances described in the second. They assert the
language, “provided that in the event the person loaned such
vehicle shall not have an insurance policy in effect,” describes
a circumstance. Their interpretation would shift the risk to
the dealer’s insurer whenever the dealer lends an automobile
to an uninsured motorist.

The reading urged by plaintiffs would require us to ignore
the provisions of the third paragraph, which provisions
exempt the dealer from liability when it has affixed the cus-

*Although §31-3-20 requires a dealer to issue a temporary certificate of registra-
tion “upon a form to be obtained from the registry,” the plaintiffs have not ques-
tioned the origins of the form used. We therefore assume it was obtained as directed
by §31-3-20.

Ps «ol

tomer’s license plate. The phrase, “the dealer or the manu-
facturer shall be in no way liable therefor,” conveys a plain
and sensible meaning. Incorporation of the uninsured
motorist language into the third paragraph would render the
entire paragraph meaningless. No distinction would then
exist between the operation of a loaned vehicle with the
dealer’s plates and its operation with the customer’s own
license plates. The court is not at liberty to ignore the distine-
tion enacted by the Legislature. We are bound to give effect
to every word, clause, and sentence in a statute if possible.
Chang v. University of Rhode Island, 118 R.I. 631, 375
A.2d 925 (1977); St. Clare Home v. Donnelly, 117 R.1. 464,
368 A.2d 1214 (1977).

Viewed in this light, the phrase “aforesaid circumstances”
refers only to the circumstances enumerated in the first sen-
tence. One of these circumstances is the loan of a motor vehi-
cle to an individual, “when a motor vehicle owned by such
person is undergoing repairs.”

The plaintiffs do not dispute that the defendant loaned
Mr. Silva its vehicle, while repairing the Silva automobile. As
we noted above, the defendant satisfied the requirements of
the third paragraph of §31-3-20. The defendant’s compliance
with these requirements entitles it to full exemption from lia-
bility pursuant to §31-3-20.

The appeal, therefore, is denied and dismissed, the judg-
ment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remitted to
the Superior Court.

William J. Burke, William P. Butler, for plaintiffs.

Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Michael P. DeFanti,
for defendant.

2
Ss
ix)

410 A.2d 432.

Srave or RuopE IsLanp vs. ELizaBeETH HEALY.
EizaBeTH Heavy vs. SratTe or RHoveE IsLanp.

JANUARY 22, 1980.
Presrnr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

603

Bevitacgua, C.J. This is an appeal from a decree of the
Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) denying
the employer’s petition to review a preliminary agreement
approved March 31, 1975, and granting the employee’s peti-
tion to enforce the agreement for payment of benefits for
total incapacity, pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment)
§28-33-17.1

The facts are not in dispute. On January 28, 1975,
Elizabeth Healy (employee) was employed by the State of
Rhode Island (employer). While so employed, she was
injured in the course of her employment, resulting in total

1General Laws 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-33-17, reads in pertinent part:

“While the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is total, the
employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to
sixty-six and two thirds per cent (66 2/3%) of his average weekly wages

604 ee

incapacity. On March 21, 1975, the parties executed a pre-
liminary agreement, approved by the Director of Labor,
which provided that the employer was to pay the employee
compensation for total incapacity.

From that date forward the employee received benefits
until she returned to work. Upon the employee’s return, the
employer, without executing and filing a suspension agree-
ment and receipt, and without a decree of the Workers’
Compensation Commission, terminated payments.

In April 1978, the employer filed a petition to review the
agreement, alleging that the employee had returned to work
and was earning wages equal to or in excess of wages earned
at the time of the injury. The employee responded to the
employer's petition to review by filing a petition to enforce
the agreement, alleging that the employer failed to comply
with the agreement and, therefore, was in contempt.

After a hearing the trial commissioner dismissed the
employer’s petition to review, granted the employee’s peti-
tion to enforce, and found the employer in contempt. He
then ruled that the employer could purge itself by making
payments pursuant to 28-35-42.2

While this case was pending, the Legislature enacted into
law chapter 232 of the P.L. 1978, §28-33-17.1° and

*General Laws 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-35-42 reads in pertinent part:

“Payment of compensation becomes due upon the signing of a voluntary
agreement by the parties and weekly thereafter on the same day.”

°General Laws 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-33-17.1, as enacted by P.L. 1978,
ch. 232, §1, states in pertinent part:
“An employee shall not be entitled to compensation under chapters 29 to
38 inclusive, of this title for any period during which said employee was
gainfully employed at an average weekly wage equal to or in excess of that
which he was earning at the time of his injury, notwithstanding an existing
agreement or decree to the contrary.”

ee 605

§28-33-18.1,4 which in essence provided for the unilateral
termination of an agreement in Workers’ Compensation if
the employee returned to work and was receiving earnings
equal to or in excess of wages earned at the time of the injury.

The Commission affirmed the decison of the trial commis-
sioner and made findings that the employer failed to make
the payments as provided, that the employer had not termi-
nated the agreement pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation
Act, and that, because the subsequent enactment of
§28-33-17.1 and §28-33-18.1 was substantive in character, it
could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
The Commission, therefore, ruled that the statutes were
inapplicable in the instant case.

The issue before us is whether §28-33-17.1 and §28-33-18.1
should be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of
their enactment.

The employer contends that the statutes’ in issue are
procedural and remedial and that the Legislature intended
them to be applied retroactively so as to prevent the “double
dipping” allowed by the Act as construed by this court in
Walker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 119 R.I.
581, 382 A.2d 173 (1978).

This court in Walker held that no employer may unilater-
ally suspend payment of compensation benefits called for by
a preliminary agreement. In order to obtain affirmative relief
from that obligation, the employer must resort to the proce-
dure made available by the Act. He must file an executed
suspension agreement and receipt, or file a petition to review

‘General Laws 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-33-18.1, as enacted by P.L. 1978,
ch, 232, §1, states in pertinent part:

“An employee shall not be entitled to be paid compensation for total
incapacity under chapter 29 to 38 inclusive, of this title, for any period
during which said employee was gainfully employed at an average weekly
wage less than that which he was earning at the time of his injury
notwithstanding an existing agreement or decree to the contrary.”

See footnotes 3 and 4.

ee

the preliminary agreement and have the Commission
terminate it by decree.

The Legislature, responding to the decision in Walker,
supra, enacted §28-33-17.1 and §28-33-18.1, ch. 232 of the
P.L. 1978, the so-called “double dipping” statute. This
statute essentially provided that notwithstanding an existing
agreement or decree to the contrary and regardless of his new
wage, an employee who is gainfully employed is not entitled
to benefits for total incapacity and is not entitled to partial
benefits unless his weekly wage is less than that which he was
earning at the time of his injury.

The employer does not dispute the principle of law that
the rights of the employee in compensation are governed by
the law in force on the date of his injury. Ludovici v.
American Screw Co., 99 R.I. 747, 748, 210 A.2d 648, 649
(1965); see Brown v. Hope Serv. Station, Inc., 122 R.1. 74,
403 A.2d 1387 (1979); Cabral v. Converse Rubber Co.,
121 R.I. 606, 401 A.2d 1281 (1979). These are substantive
rights that vest at the time the agreement is executed and
approved. See Carpenter v. Globe Indemnity Co., 65 R.I.
194, 14 A.2d 235 (1940). The employer contends, however,
that the amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act,
§28-33-17.1 and §28-33-18.1 approved in May 1978, P.L.
1978, ch. 232, §1, are procedural in nature and were
intended to be applied retroactively. He argues that the
Legislature did not mean to work any substantive changes
but merely to affect the procedure by which the employer
can terminate compensation benefits to which the employee
is no longer entitled because he has regained his preinjury
earning capacity.

As a general rule a statute is presumed to operate prospec-
tively and not retrospectively, unless it appears by clear,
strong language or by necessary implication that the Legis-
lature intended to give the statute retroactive force and
effect. C.H. Langdeau v. Narragansett Insurance Co., 96
R.I. 276, 279, 191 A.2d 28, 30 (1963); Capobianco v. United
Wire & Supply Co., 78 R.I. 309, 312, 82 A.2d 170, 172
(1951).

ee 607

In construing a statute, we must give the words of the Act
their plain and ordinary meaning. An examination of
§28-33-17.1 and §28-33-18.1, as enacted by P.L. 1978, ch.
232, §1, shows no language which expresses or specifically
indicates that the Act was meant to operate retroactively.
The absence of language specifically requiring retrospective
effect is significant. The Legislature passed this statute in
response to Walker, supra. It was well aware that a number
of cases were pending which involved this question. Thus its
silence on retrospective application is strong evidence of a
prospective intent.

The employer further argues that even if it contains no
language evincing a clear legislative intent, the statute may
nonetheless be given retroactive effect if it is merely
remedial. The employer places great reliance on the case of
Imperial Knife Co., Inc. v. Gonsalves, 86 R.I. 68, 133 A.2d
721 (1957). Its dependence on that case is misplaced. In that
case the court characterized the statute as procedural, and,
therefore, framed the question to be determined as one of
legislative intent. The court proceeded to infer from the
language of the statute that the Legislature intended that the
act apply retroactively.

It is true that purely remedial and procedural statutes that
in no way affect substantive rights can be held to be retro-
active in their operation. But, whether they are to be given
retroactive effect depends upon ascertaining the Legislature’s
intent to make them procedural or remedial. Fox v. Fox, 115
R.I. 593, 597, 350 A.2d 602, 604 (1976).

The procedural-act “exception to the presumption of pro-
spectivity” may only be employed if its invocation “neither
violates vested rights nor impairs the obligation of contracts.”

°We are cognizant of the fact that in statutory construction the words used are to
be given their plain meaning unless a contrary intention clearly appears; except
when the language admits of ambiguity, the words of a statute cannot be inter-
preted or extended but must be applied literally. Roe v. Affleck, 120 R.I. 679, 688,
390 A.2d 361, 366 (1978); In re Shepard Co., 115 R.I. 290, 342 A.2d 918 (1975);
Podborski v. Haskell Mfg. Co., 109 R.I. 1, 8, 279 A.2d 914, 918 (1971).

Ee

Grinnell v. Marine Guano and Oil Co., 13 R.I. 135, 136
(1880); see Romano v. B.B. Greenberg Co., 108 R.I. 132,
136, 273 A.2d 315, 317 (1971).

In the field of Workers’ Compensation, it is held that once
an injury occurs and an agreement is executed, “ ‘a contract
right to compensation in the amount prescribed for the injury
in question * * * may not be destroyed by subsequent retro-
active laws.” ’ Cipriano v. Personnel Appeal Bd., 114 R.1.
141, 145, 330 A.2d 71, 73-74 (1975) (quoting 2 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction §41.07 at 276 (4th ed. 1973)).

We have repeatedly held that an employee's right to com-
pensation must be determined according the Workers’
Compensation statutes existing at the time of the injury.
Parkinson v. Leesona Corp., 115 R.I. 120, 126, 341 A.2d 33,
87 (1975); Romano v. B.B. Greenberg Co., supra, at 136,
273 A.2d at 317 (1971). A statute enacted thereafter cannot
be applied retroactively to modify a preexisting compen-
sation right which has already vested in the injured
employee. See Cipriano v. Personnel Appeal Bd., supra, at
144, 330 A.2d at 73-74.

This Act could not have any retroactive application,
because to do so would be to impair and to violate rights that
vested in the employee at the time of the injury.

Therefore, having decided that the employee’s right had
already vested prior to the enactment of the amendment, we
need go no further, other than to hold that the amendments
enacted by the Legislature have a prospective effect only and
will not affect pending actions.

The employer’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the decree
appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
Workers’ Compensation Commission.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Richard B.
Woolley, Special Assistant Attorney General (for State of
Rhode Island).

609

Lovett and Linder, Ltd., Raul L. Lovett, Lauren E. Jones
(for Elizabeth Healy).

410 A.2d 436.

JoserH ZALoBowski vs. NEw ENGLAND TEAMSTERS
AND TruckiNc Inpustry Pension Funp.

JANUARY 23, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

610

KELLEHER, J. This is a pension-fund dispute that presents
a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. In May
1972, the plaintiff, Joseph Zalobowski (Zalobowski), applied
to the defendant, New England Teamsters and Trucking
Industry Pension Fund (the fund), seeking a pension.
According to Zalobowski’s computations, because he had
been a member of the fund for twenty-four years, he was
entitled to receive a monthly pension check that would
amount to $425. The fund’s trustees, however, took the posi-
tion that since Zalobowski had been an owner-operator for
six years and seven months of his twenty-four years in the
trucking industry, he was entitled to-a monthly check that’
was $163 less than the $425 envisioned by Zalobowski. The
fund, through its trustees, was willing to pay Zalobowski
$262 a month as a pension anid, in doing so, relied upon our
holding in Blinkhorn v. McCarthy, 113 R.I. 465, 322.A.2d 43
(1974).

1Edward C. Blinkhorn and his brother were seeking pension benefits from the
fund for a period during which they were corporate officers of a trucking company.
In affirming the trial justice’s dismissal of their complaint, we upheld the validity
of a provision in the pension plan whereby the trustees had excluded from coverage

corporate officers or owners of other organizations identified in the plan as “Contri-
buting Employer.”

ol

Discussions became pointless, and on July 30, 1974,
Zalobowski filed a civil action in the Superior Court, asking
that the fund be ordered to pay him the $163 differential.
The fund failed to answer the case, and a default judgment
in the amount of $3,423 was entered for Zalobowski. This
sum represented the amount that Zalobowski claimed was
actually due him for the months beginning November 1,
1972, up to and including the day the suit was initiated.

In computing the award, the trial justice refused to con-
sider any pension payment that had not accrued as of the
date of the filing of the suit. He did not, however, limit
Zalobowski to this amount, but stated that recovery for
future amounts could only be had through subsequent peri-
odic suits involving accrued pension payments. The fund
took no appeal from its unsuccessful attempt to remove the
default judgment.

Subsequently, Zalobowski filed a motion in August of 1975
to recover benefits that had accrued from the date of the last
award. The trial justice, in denying this motion, stated that
as only those rights and liabilities which arose prior to the
date of the original judgment had been determined,
Zalobowski must initiate an additional action in order to
resolve his rights on the merits. Zalobowski thereupon insti-
tuted this civil action, in which he seeks further delinquent
pension payments and an order requiring the fund to pay
future benefits as they become due.

At trial, both parties filed motions for summary judgment,
Zalobowski under the theory that as the issues involved were
the same as those in the first action, therefore, res judicata
applied; the fund on the ground that the issues were identical
to and controlled by our holding in Blinkhorn v. McCarthy,
113 R.I. 465, 322 A.2d 43 (1974). Zalobowski’s motion for
summary judgment was denied, that of the fund was
granted, and this appeal ensued.

In support of his argument that the trial justice erred in
denying his motion for summary judgment, Zalobowski
claims that the issue of his entitlement to the $163 monthly

2

differential was previously determined in his original suit
against the fund. Zalobowski bases this contention on the
doctrine of res judicata which acts as an absolute bar to the
relitigation of the same claim between the same parties when
a final judgment has been rendered on the merits. R.A.
Beaufort & Sons, Inc. v. Trivisonno, 121 R.I. 835, 403
A.2d 664 (1979); Molony & Rubien Construction Co. v.
Segrella, 118 R.J. 340, 373 A.2d 816 (1977); Corrado v.
Providence Redevelopment Agency, 113 R.1. 274, 320 A.2d
331 (1974). Once invoked, res judicata serves to render the
prior judgment conclusive with respect to any issues that
were raised or that might properly have been raised and liti-
gated. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 117 R.I. 83, 362 A.2d 147
(1976); Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. McGovern,
113 R.I. 169, 319 A.2d 358 (1974); Perez v. Pawtucket
Redevelopment Agency, 111 B.I. 327, 302 A.2d 785 (1973).

The fact that the original action resulted in a default judg-
ment does not render it any less conclusive an adjudication
for purposes of res judicata than a judgment rendered in an
answered case. Bradford v. Burgess, 20 R.I. 290, 38 A. 975
(1897); Innie v. W & R, Inc., 116 N.H. 315, 359 A.2d 616
(1976); Zimmer v. Zimmer, 457 Pa. 488, 326 A.2d 318
(1974).

We believe that Zalobowski’s reliance on the theory of res
judicata to prevent the fund from litigating the amount of his
monthly pension payment is misplaced. As stated above, be-
fore the rules of res judicata can apply, the claim of the
original final judgment must be identical to that claim which
a party seeks to have adjudicated in a subsequent suit. The
application of res judicata to the issues of this case, therefore,
turns on the question of whether Zalobowski is now proceed-
ing on a different claim, namely, the duty of the fund to in-
clude the $163 monthly differential in pension payments that
accrue after the filing date of the original suit.

Hi At first glance, it may appear that these two claims are
synonymous because they arise out of the same pension
agreement. This is not controlling because, as the fund so cor-

ee 613

rectly contends, the agreement is in the nature of an install-
ment contract wherein the obligation of the fund is divided
into a series of performances controlled by the single pension
agreement. Rose v. Baxter, 67 Ohio App. 1, 34 N.E.2d 1011
(1941). When a contract requires that money be paid in
installments, a distinct claim arises for each installment as it
becomes due. ten Braak v. Waffle Shops, Inc., 542 F.2d 919
(4th Cir. 1976); Ocean Cargo Lines, Ltd. v. North Atlantic
Marine Co., 227 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Kouri v.
Toma, 198 Okla. 111, 175 P.2d 975 (1947); Alsup v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 196 Tenn. 346, 268 S.W.2d 90 (1954).
Thus, a judgment on one such claim would not bar addi-
tional actions for payments that have accrued since the filing
date of the original action. Rousselle v. Jewett, 101 Ariz. 510,
421 P.2d 529 (1966); Thibodaux v. Burns, 340 So. 2d 335
(La. App. 1976); LaBour v. Michigan National Bank, 335
Mich. 298, 55 N.W.2d 838 (1952). By definition, the doctrine
of res judicata cannot then apply to subsequent actions that
seek monetary installments that have fallen due since the pre-
vious action was instituted.

Zalobowski argues, in effect, that this approach to obliga-
tions arising under an installment contract would crowd
courts with the relitigation of the same issues each time a
party sought recovery of an installment that has fallen due.
This ominous forecast merits little concern owing to the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel which renders conclusive in a later
action based on a different claim the determination of certain
issues actually litigated in a prior action. R.A. Beaufort &
Sons, Inc. v. Trivisonno, 121 R.I. 835, 403 A.2d 664
(1979); Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. McGovern,
113 B.1. 169, 319 A.2d 358 (1974). Collateral estoppel is inef-
fective with respect to issues that might have been, but were
not, litigated in the original action.

In actuality, Zalobowski’s first civil action resulted in a
default judgment against the fund for monthly payments
that had accrued as of the date of the filing of the suit.
Zalobowski’s entitlement to pension credits claimed during

5

his period of self-employment was never actually litigated.
Booher v. Richmond Square, Inc., 160 Ind. App. 44, 310
N.E.2d 89 (1974); Lovejoy v. Ashworth, 94 N.H. 8, 45 A.2d
218 (1946); Martin v. Poole, 232 Pa. Super. 263, 336 A.2d
363 (1975); Restatement, Judgments §68 Comment f (1942).
Thus, the fund, because of the installment nature of its con-
tract with Zalobowski, was barred neither by res judicata nor
by the related doctrine of collateral estoppel from litigating
this particular issue.

The plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Thomas W. Pearlman, Larry Dub, for plaintiff.

Roberts, Carroll, Feldstein & Tucker Incorporated,
Richard M. Peirce, for defendant.

61

nm

410 A.2d 1332.
Epwarp L. Macciacomo et ux. vs.
ARMANDO DiVINCENZO,
Tax ASSESSOR OF THE Crry OF CRANSTON.
JANUARY 23, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

616 eS

Ke.ieuer, J. Armando DiVincenzo is the tax assessor for
the city of Cranston. He is before us on a consolidated appeal
that revolves around certain actions taken by him as assessor
during the years 1977 and 1978. His conduct during 1977 was
challenged by a class action commenced by the plaintiffs,
Edward and Ingeborg Maggiacomo, on their own behalf and
that of all taxpayers similarly situated. When DiVincenzo re-
peated in 1978 what he had done in 1977, the plaintiffs insti-
tuted a second class action. However, they abandoned the
class-action aspects of this particular suit and ultimately
sought relief solely for themselves. Subsequently, the plain-
tiffs’ motion for a summary judgment in each suit was
granted. Hereinafter, we shall refer to the plaintiffs as “the
taxpayers” and the defendant, DiVincenzo, as “the assessor.”

The factual background giving rise to this controversy is
undisputed. On May 16, 1977, the Cranston City Council,
acting pursuant to the powers granted it by G.L. 1956 (1970
Reenactment) §44-5-1 and sec. 6.11 of the Cranston City
Charter, adopted a resolution that levied a tax on all ratable
real estate and tangible personal property located within the
city. This resolution authorized the assessor to set a tax rate
that could generate revenues of not less than $24,775,928.48
and not more than $25,000,000. Once the resolution passed,
the assessor set a tax rate of $67 per $1,000 of assessed valua-
tion. The potential tax revenue that might be realized by this
rate would have exceeded the council’s $25,000,000 maxi-
mum by $915,417.06.

617

A year later history repeated itself. The city council by its
resolution of May 15, 1978, directed the assessor to fix a tax
rate that could generate revenue of at least $28,798,173.95
but no more than $28,850,000. Ever vigilant in his duties and
true to his custom, the assessor fixed a rate that might have
generated approximately $1,250,000 more than the
$28,850,000 maximum established by the council.

In Superior Court the assessor conceded that, in setting the
tax rate, he had factored into his calculations a “collection
ratio” that made allowance for anticipated uncollectible
taxes. He further revealed that without a cushion for the un-
collectibles, the 1977 rate would have been $64.59 instead of
$67 per $1,000 of assessed valuation. The 1978 tax rate was
set at $76.95 per $1,000 of assessed valuation, whereas if the
assessor had deleted the “collection ratio” factor, the rate
would have been reduced by $3.25. The assessor admitted
that ever since assuming office, he had set a tax rate that con-
tained an allowance for the uncollectible taxes. He justified
this practice by arguing that even though he lacked the
power to levy a tax, he had the duty to set a rate high enough
to guarantee that the tax collector would receive an amount
at least equal to the minimum sum authorized by each levy.

The taxpayers, on the other hand, claim that when the
assessor set a rate which could yield a return in excess of the
maximum specified in the levy, he was usurping the power of
the council, specifically, its power to levy a tax. The various
justices of the Superior Court who considered the taxpayers’
motions for summary judgment found this argument most
persuasive. The assessor is now before us attempting to point
out where the trial justices erred.

The taxpayers sought relief from the inclusion of the
cushion for uncollectibles by filing a petition in compliance
with the terms of G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-5-26,
that in its pertinent part allows “[a]ny person aggrieved on
any ground whatsoever by any assessment of taxes against
him in any city or town * * *” to seek redress in the Superior
Court. Before us the assessor, as he did in the Superior Court,

618

focuses his attention on that portion of §44-5-26 which speaks
about “any assessment of taxes.” According to the assessor,
when the Legislature alluded to the “assessment of taxes,” it
was affording judicial relief only to those who were com-
plaining about the valuation placed on their property by the
assessor. The taxpayers, on the other hand, take the position
that “assessment of taxes” encompasses within it the entire
statutory method of imposing municipal taxes, including the
assessor’s duty to set a rate that will comply with the council’s
mandate.

At the outset, we acknowledge the earlier pronouncements
of this court regarding statutory construction. Based upon
these guidelines, our task is to glean the legislative intent
from a consideration of this legislation in its entirety.
Narragansett Electric Co. v. Harsch, 117 R.1. 395, 402, 368
A.2d 1194, 1199 (1977), citing Mason v. Bowerman Bros.,
Inc., 95 R.I. 425, 431, 187 A.2d 772, 776 (1963). Further-
more, we are mindful of this court’s mandate that “taxing
statutes are to be strictly construed” with doubts resolved in
favor of the taxpayer. Van Alen v. Stein, 119 R.I. 347,
359, 376 A.2d 1383, 1389 (1977); Potowomut Golf Club,
Inc. v. Norberg, 114 B.1. 589, 592, 337 A.2d 226, 227 (1975).

Turning now to chapter 5 of title 44, we find that the
words “assess” and “assessment” are used somewhat impre-
cisely.1 In addition, there is general recognition that the term
“assessment” may be used in a narrow sense to mean the
value placed upon property for the purpose of taxation by an
official appointed for that purpose, or in its broader sense to
include within its context all those steps involved in the impo-
sition of a tax on property. Philadelphia, Baltimore and
Washington R.R. v. Mayor and Council, 30 Del. Ch. 213,
221, 57 A.2d 759, 764 (1948); Commercial National Bank v.
Board of County Commissioners, 201 Kan. 280, 284-85, 440

‘See, ¢.g., G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-5-1 (assessment of valuations);
§44-5-1] and §44-5-13 (assess valuations); §44-5-16 (assessment on real property);
§44-5-22 (assessing the tax); §44-5-23, §44-5-24, and §44-5-26 (assessment of taxes).

ee 619

P.2d 634, 637-38 (1968); State ex rel. Halferty v. Kansas City
Power & Light Co., 346 Mo. 1069, 1078, 145 S.W.2d 116,
120-21 (1940); Moore v. Johnson Service Co., W. Va., 219
S.E.2d 315, 319-20, 322 (1975); Prentice v. Ashland County,
56 Wis. 345, 347, 14 N.W. 297, 298 (1882). Furthermore, we
are still impressed by the relevance of Professor Cooley’s
sagacious observation: “Assessment proper includes valuation
but valuation alone is not the assessment but instead only its
most important element.” 3 Cooley, The Law of Taxation
§1044 at 2114 (4th ed. 1924).

Parenthetically, we would point out that the word
“valuation” never appears in the pertinent portion of
§44-5-26 and that the word “assessment” is used in juxtaposi-
tion to “taxes.” Having in mind that the term “assessment” as
used in our taxing statutes carries with it a variety of mean-
ings and noting also the statutory language before us, to wit,
“[a]ny person aggrieved on any ground whatsoever by any
assessment of taxes « + +,” we have no hesitancy in holding
that within the context of §44-5-26 the term “assessment”
refers to the entire plan or statutory scheme for the imposi-
tion and collection of taxes, including the calculation of the
rate.

We turn next to the assessor’s contention that his applica-
tion of a collection ratio to the levy ordered by the city coun-
cil neither violated any express or implied rule of law nor
represented an arbitrary abuse of discretion. On the con-
trary, he contends with great vigor that his rate-setting
activities were necessarily implied from sec. 6.11 of the
Cranston City Charter.? We think otherwise.

2Cranston, R.I., City Charter, §6.11 (1962), provides in pertinent part that

“the council shall adopt and cause to be delivered to the city assessor a
resolution levying and ordering the assessment and collection of a tax on
ratable real estate and tangible personal property at such a rate to be fixed
by the city assessor as provided by law as will * * * amount in the aggregate
to a minimum and maximum to be set forth in the resolution. The minimum
shall be equal to the receipts from taxes on property as estimated in the
operating budget as adopted and the maximum shall be as determined by
the council.” (Emphasis added.)

620 ee

The obvious purpose of sec. 6.11 is to effectuate the collec-
tion of tax revenue needed to satisfy the financial demands
that are delineated in the city’s operating budget. The
assessor is obligated to set a rate that will bring in the mini-
mum but in no event exceed the maximum amount called for
in the levy resolution. The assessor’s concern for the uncollec-
tibles is commendable, but Cranston’s charter specifically
provides for this concern. Section 6.02 requires the assessor to
provide the director of finance with an estimate of the funds
to be realized from taxation, “taking into account the
probable rate of tax delinquency and other factors affecting
tax collection” so that the director may prepare a preliminary
estimate of the cost of municipal operations “in the ensuing
fiscal year.” Section 6.03 requires the mayor, with the assist-
ance of the director of finance and other city officials, to sub-
mit to the city council not later than April 1 of each year an
operating budget that includes “an estimate of receipts for
the ensuing fiscal year from taxes * * *.” Section 6.09 author-
izes the council to modify the proposed budget in any way it
sees fit but then specifically provides: “If the action of the
council results in raising the total of authorized expenditures
above the total of estimated receipts the council must provide
by ordinance an equivalent in increased receipts.”

A review of Cranston’s charter clearly shows that the
assessor's concern for the uncollectibles is to be made known
and accounted for before the budget is submitted to and
approved by the council. It is the council, acting pursuant to
sec, 6,11, and not the assessor, which has the authority to
levy a tax and fix its amount.

While this court has never decided the exact parameters of
the assessor’s duty vis-a-vis the levy, numerous other jurisdic-
tions have held that the tax assessor has no right to increase
the amount levied. In Massachusetts, for instance, where

Cranston operates on a fiscal year which begins on July 1 and ends on the
following June 30.

ee 621

assessors since 1785 have been permitted by statute‘ to add a
5 percent overlay to the amount voted, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that “assessing more than five per cent, above the
sums voted by the town to be raised, makes the assessment
illegal and void « « +.” Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144, 147
(1818). In Cone v. Forest, 126 Mass. 97, 97-98 (1879), the
amount levied was $1,800.11. The 5 percent permitted by
statute would have allowed an additional $90. Instead,
assessors added $115.16, and the court held that the $25.16 in
excess of the statutory limit was illegal.

In State v. Bentley, 23 N.J.L. 532 (1852), the assessor
added to the amount authorized $998.71 for contingencies.
The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the assessor
“did this in the exercise of what he considered a discretion
vested in him by established custom” and because “these
additional amounts were necessary to cover losses which
were to be anticipated in collecting the taxes + * +.” The
court, however, found “[t]his proceeding on the part of the
assessor was illegal” and stated unequivocally that “[t]he law
vests in assessors no such authority. * + * Assessors and
collectors are the mere instruments to execute the mandates
which emanate from these [levying] bodies. The taxing
power in every case may, and must, be relied on to provide
for contingencies of this kind. The power assumed in this case
by the assessor is of too arbitrary and dangerous a character
to be countenanced for a moment .” Id. at 545. E.g., Huse v.
Merriam, 2 Me. 375 (1823); Taft v. Barrett, 58 N.H. 447
(1878); State v. Flavell and Fredericks, 24 N.J.L. 370 (1854);
St. Louis & S.F. R.R. v. Thompson, 35 Okla. 138, 128 P. 685
(1912).

‘Its contemporary counterpart is found in Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 59 §25
(West) (as amended by 1978 Mass. Acts, ch. 514, §79), entitled “Additional
assessments,” and provides in pertinent part: .

“The assessors in any city or town, except Boston, may add to the amount
to be assessed not more than five per cent thereof, or such larger amount as
the commissioner may approve, although the limit of taxation as fixed in any
city may by such overlay be exceeded, such amount to be used only for
avoiding fractional divisions of the amount to be assessed in the
apportionment thereof + + +.”

622 eS

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we find no per-
suasive authority either in our reading of the General Laws,
the Cranston City Charter, or pertinent case law that would
permit the assessor to add an amount to the levy for future
uncollectible taxes. We conclude, therefore, that the assessor
exceeded his authority when he set the tax rate at an amount,
if fully collected, that would yield revenue above the maxi-
mum levy authorized by the city council.

A final but brief comment is directed to the assessor's argu-
ment that the Superior Court was barred from considering
the taxpayers’ motions for summary judgment because they
failed to notify Rhode Island’s tax administrator of the
pendency of these suits. Concededly, §44-1-13 stipulates that
whenever “the constitutionality or construction of any tax
statute or the validity of the assessment of any tax is in
question, the court before which such proceeding is pending
shall not proceed * * *” until the administrator has been
notified of the pendency of the controversy so that the
“administrator may appear and be heard with reference
thereto.” We would point out that this statute, when it is
looked at in conjunction with other portions of chapter 1 of
title 44, is relevant only when the challenge being made
concerns a tax that may be due the state. It has no applicabil-
ity to the field of municipal taxation.

Accordingly, in each case the defendant’s appeal is denied
and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Joseph T. Feeley, for plaintiffs.

Jeremiah S. Jeremiah, Jr., City Solicitor, John D. Biafore,
Assistant City Solicitor, for defendant.

623

410 A.2d 438.
SraTeE vs. JoHN CaBRAL.
JANUARY 29, 1980.
Present: Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Doris, J. This is an appeal by the defendant, John
Cabral (Cabral), from a conviction by a Superior Court jury
on a charge of indecent assault, a violation of G.L. 1956
(1969 Reenactment) §11-37-6. On December 19, 1976,
Cabral was indicted for rape and indecent assault on
Marilyn, then aged seven, and for rape and indecent assault
on Shawn, then aged eleven.

At a January 1978 trial, Marilyn and Shawn both testified
that Cabral had raped and indecently assaulted them separ-
ately and on different occasions in the boiler room of one of
the Providence Housing Authority's housing developments.
The girls lived in this development, and Cabral was
employed there as a maintenance man. During the course of
the trial, the trial justice granted Cabral’s motion for acquit-
tal on both counts of rape. The jury acquitted Cabral on the
charge of indecent assault against Shawn but found him
guilty of indecent assault against Marilyn. Thereafter, the
trial justice denied Cabral’s motion for a new trial and sen-
tenced him to a five-year term in the Adult Correctional
Institutions with the imposition of four years of that sentence
suspended. Cabral has been free on: bail pending the disposi-
tion of his appeal.

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the testimony
of a complainant of tender age in a prosecution for a sexual
offense must be corroborated. This court concludes that cor-
roboration is not required.! We have reached this conclusion

1Earlier, in State v. Wiggin, 106 R.I. 69, 256 A.2d 219 (1969), we declined to
consider the defendant’s argument that we adopt a rule calling for corroboration
before a conviction for rape could be sustained. In doing so, we relied upon the
defendant's failure to ask the trial justice to embody such a request in his charge to
the jury.

625

after a review of common law principles, statutory provisions
in our own and neighboring states, and the balancing of
interests, societal and individual, in the ascertainment of
truth and determination of credibility.

|| Although the United States Constitution, Art. III, sec. 3,
sets forth a corroboration requirement to prove a charge of
treason, there is no such requirement prescribed for the pro-
secution of sex crimes. In Rhode Island, by statute, treason is
the only crime which requires corroborative proof. G.L.
1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-43-2. The General Assembly at
its January 1979 session enacted P.L. 1979, ch. 302, An Act
Relating to Rape and Seduction, which repealed in its
entirety G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) chapter 37 of title 11.
Section 11-37-11 of the new act specifically states: “The testi-
mony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions
under this chapter.” Since Cabral’s trial and conviction
precede the 1979 legislation, §11-37-11 has no bearing on this
appeal, except to show that the Legislature has now codified
the common law.

Wigmore, after pointing out that the corroboration re-
quirement for prosecution of a sex violation was unknown at
common law, observed:

“x ** a rule of law requiring corroboration has
probably little actual influence upon the jurors’ minds
over and above the ordinary caution and suspicion
which would naturally suggest itself for such charges;
and the rule thus tends to become in practice merely a
means of securing from the trial judge the utterance of a
form of words which may chance to be erroneous and to
lay the foundation for a new trial. Finally, the purpose
of the rule is already completely attained by the judge’s
power to set aside a verdict upon insufficient evidence,
and under this power verdicts are constantly set aside,
in jurisdictions having no statutory rule, upon the same
evidence which in other jurisdictions would be insuffi-
cient under the statutory rule requiring corroboration.

626 es

“The fact is that, in the light of modern psychology,
this technical rule of corroboration seems but a crude
and childish measure, if it be relied upon as an adequate
means for determining the credibility of the complain-
ing witness in such charges * * +.”

7 Wigmore, Evidence §2061 at 354 (3d ed. 1940).

The arguments most often heard in support of the rule of
corroboration involve many factors, such as the jury’s
outrage at testimony of sex offenses, the difficulty in defend-
ing against such charges, the dangers of falsification, and the
severe penalties involved. Many of these concerns have their
origins in the writings of Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Jus-
tice of the Court of King’s Bench of 1671 to 1676. Hale, in
dealing at length with the subject of rape, wondered whether
prosecutrixes under the age of twelve should be allowed to
testify at all, He recommended that such a victim’s tale
should always be put before the jury under oath if the court
in its discretion felt the witness qualified to be sworn, but
otherwise as a sworn statement. It was in this context that
Hale went on to write these words:

“But in both these cases, whether the infant be sworn
or not, it is necessary to render their evidence credible,
that there should be concurrent evidence to make out
the fact, and not to ground a conviction singly upon
such an accusation with or without oath of an infant.

“For in many cases there may be reason to admit such
witnesses to be heard, in cases especially of this nature,
which yet the jury is not bound to believe; for the excel-
lency of the trial by jury is in that they are the triers of
the credit of the witnesses as well as the truth of the fact;
it is one thing, whether a witness be admissible to be
heard, another thing, whether they are to be believed
when heard.

“Tt is true rape is a most detestable crime, and there-

fore ought severely and impartially to be punished with
death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusa-

es 627

tion easily to be made and hard to be proved, and
harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never
so innocent.”

1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. ed. 1847)
p. 635.

The requirement for independent corroboration in sex-
offense cases has been the subject of ever increasing
criticism.? Contemporary empirical studies suggest that the
factors employed to support the corroboration requirement
do not justify the rule. There is a great reluctance to report a
rape. Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape 27-28 (1971); Note,
Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 Cal. L.
Rev. 919, 921 (1973). Juries generally tend to view rape
charges with skepticism and suspicion, especially when there
is a suggestion of willingness or agreement on the part of the
victim, Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury 249-254
(1966), see also Commonwealth v. Bailey, 370 Mass. 388,
394, 348 N.E.2d 746, 750 (1976), and convictions, in the ab-
sence of aggravating circumstances, are the exception rather
than the rule. Holstrom, The Victim of Rape Institutional
Reactions 238 (1973) (the study of 109 rape cases: eighteen
cases were tried; four concluded with a guilty verdict, ten not
guilty, one with a hung jury, and three with a guilty verdict
on a lesser charge).

The corroboration requirement poses a major hurdle to a
legitimate conviction for a sex offense. Due to the nature of

*See Ludwig, The Case for Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Requirement in New
York, 36 Brooklyn L. Rev. 387 (1970); Note, The Rape Corroboration Require-
ment: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L.J. 1365 (1972); see also Note, Towards a
Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 613 (1976). According to
a 1972 survey, twenty-five states at the time flatly rejected the corroboration
requirement, and ten others, though often using the corroboration language, actu-
ally demanded only that’a conviction for rape be based upon sufficient evidence. 81
Yale L.J. at 1367 n. 15. For recent decisions rejecting the requirement, see United
States v. Sheppard, 186 U.S. App. D.C. 283, 569 F.2d 114 (1977); People v.
Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal, 3d 864, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247 (1975); Arnold v.
United States, 358 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1976).

28 es

sex crimes, eyewitnesses are seldom available. Stapleman v.
State, 150 Neb. 460, 464, 34 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1946).
Recently, we have said that a woman, in order to show her
lack of consent, need not resist the advances of another when
to do so would be foolhardy and risky. State v. Carvalho, No.
77-433-C.A. (R.I., filed Dec. 12, 1979). Most women, when
confronted with a weapon-wielding assailant, make the
sensible decision not to resist physically. Thus, they lack the
bruises and torn clothing that would otherwise corroborate
the crime. Juvenile complainants are more likely to be
attacked by someone with whom they are acquainted and,
therefore, are less likely to encounter a weapon and threat of
battery and are less likely to scream and resist. Amir, Patterns
in Forcible Rape 168-69, 237 (1971); Graves and Franciso,
Medicolegal Aspects of Rape, 4 Med. Aspects of Human
Sexuality 109, 116 (April 1970).

The corroboration requirement, in effect, arbitrarily sin-
gles out victims of sex offenses as a class whose credibility is
immediately suspect. By its adoption of §11-37-11, the
General Assembly has rejected this concept as a discredited
anachronism, and we are happy to do likewise.

Finally, we would point out that the elimination of the
corroboration factor hardly leaves an accused unprotected
from an unjust conviction. There is a great deal of difference
between the times in seventeenth-century England when Sir
Matthew was writing about his experience as a jurist and to-
day in the United States. Here in this country an accused is
entitled to all of the constitutional and procedural safeguards
of our criminal justice system. The trial justice is bound to
charge the jury as to the presumption of innocence and the
state’s burden of proving all elements of a particular offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Sixth Amendment gives to
an accused the right to an attorney and to present defense
witnesses and compel their attendance. Additional protection
against any evidentiary insufficiency is afforded in the Rules
of Criminal Procedure by way of a motion for judgment of
acquittal or a motion for new trial. Further, a child may not

es 629

testify unless and until the trial justice has been satisfied that
the proposed witness can (1) observe, (2) recollect, (3)
communicate (a capacity to understand questions and to fur-
nish intelligent answers), and (4) appreciate the necessity of
telling the truth. These four factors are delineated in 2
Wigmore, Evidence §506 (3d ed. 1940), and are alluded to in
Pierce v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 86 B.1.
326, 330, 184 A.2d 421, 423 (1957); see also State v.
Mandarelli, 105 R.1. 696, 701, 254 A.2d 738, 741 (1969).

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment of conviction appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.

Dennis J. Roberts I, Attorney General, David H. Leach,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Joseph A. Bevilacqua, Jr., for defendant.

630 eS
410 A.2d 992,
Jean-Yves Drans vs. PRovIDENCE COLLEGE.
FEBRUARY 1, 1980,
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher and Doris, JJ.

Keizer, J. This appeal is a sequel to our holding in
Drans v. Providence College, 119 R.I. 845, 383 A.2d 1033
(1978). There, the controversy centered around the issue of
whether Jean-Yves Drans, a tenured professor at Providence

eS 631

College as of 1960, was subject to the mandatory retirement
age of sixty-five established by the college in 1969. Following
an extended discussion of the merits of the arguments of both
parties and amici curiae, we determined that

“the college had the authority to institute a retirement
policy for all its faculty members, including those with
tenure, but that this power is limited by an implied obli-
gation to make reasonable transition provisions when
the common practice within the academic community
would dictate such a course of action.”

Drans v. Providence College, 119 R.I. at 861, 383 A.2d at
1042.

In so holding, we vacated the decision of the trial justice
that the professor manifested his acceptance of the college’s
mandatory retirement policy by signing a form contract in
1970 which merely stated his name, status, and increased sal-
ary for the ensuing academic year. The trial justice had rea-
soned that the contract incorporated by implication the
mandatory retirement provisions of the Providence College
Faculty Manual.

The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further
proceedings on the issue of whether the reasonable expecta-
tions “within the academic community” would indicate that
the professor was eligible for special consideration upon
reaching the age of retirement. Specifically, this considera-
tion would be in the form of a transition provision designed
to cushion the economic shock incidental to mandatory
retirement. On remand, the trial justice commented, “I do
not know what academic community the Supreme Court
was referring to,” and construed our use of the phrase
“within the academic community” as meaning solely the
community within the bounds of the Providence College
campus. It was within this frame of construction that he

"The trial justice followed this remark by commenting: “All that I know is that
this is a controversy between a professor and Providence College and no one else.
What Boston University thinks or may do or what the American Association of
University Professors thinks or may do is of no consequence in resolving this con-
troversy.”

632 es

examined the retirement plan of Providence College and con-
cluded that the college’s award to the professor of an addi-
tional year of teaching beyond the age of sixty-five was a rea-
sonable and sufficient provision for his transition into retire-
ment. The trial justice has erred in taking this narrow view of
the academic community alluded to in our prior opinion.

We believe there is nothing ambiguous in our prior use of
the phrase “academic community” and would but point out
two instances in Drans in which the meaning of the phrase
was made clear. In our discussion as to the meaning of
“tenure,” we first said that we would have to look to the cus-
tom and usage of the academic community and then referred
to a portion of John F. Davis Co. v. Shepard Co., 71 R.1.
499, 47 A.2d 635 (1946). In that case the court alluded to the
well-settled principle that there may be times when a term
within a contract may carry with it a meaning that is unique
to the trade, business, or profession to which the contract re-
lates. Thereafter, we defined “tenure” as it is understood
within the “academic community,” specifically citing in-
stances of the common understanding of the term within col-
legiate circles in Iowa,? New Jersey,* and Ohio.‘ Similarly, in
our consideration of the 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure published by a Joint Confer-
ence of the American Association of University Professors and
the Association of American Colleges, we stated that “the
1940 Statement, as with their other joint statements, was
widely circulated and widely accepted in the academic com-
munity and, indeed, by Providence College.” Drans v.
Providence College, 119 R.1. at 858, 383 A.2d at 1040. The
sources to which we have just referred graphically indicate
that we never considered “academic community” to consist

2Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1973).

*American Association of University Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J.
Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (1974), aff'd 136 N.J. Super. 449, 346 A.2d 615 (App.
Div. 1975).

‘Rehor v. Case Western Reserve University, 43 Ohio St. 2d 224, 331 N.E.2d 416
(1975).

ee 633

solely of the professoriate and the administration of
Providence College. Rather, we’ were speaking in terms of
what we are now calling a “national academic community,”*
a phrase which encompasses within its reach all institutions
of higher learning in the United States.

When we originally remanded this controversy to the
Superior Court, we observed that there are times when those
who are employed in academia, be it in a teaching or
administrative capacity, recognize that a college
administration “must make some type of an accommodation
so that the economic security expectations of the tenured may
be preserved.” Drans v. Providence College, 119 R.I. at 860,
383 A.2d at 1041. Our remand was for the specific purpose of
a trial justice’s considering evidence that would indicate whe-
ther those who perform their pedagogical and administrative
chores within the national academic community believe that
Providence College was obligated to make a special transition
provision for Professor Drans and, if so, whether the benefits
furnished to him have met this obligation. See Karlen v. New
York University, 464 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Hope-
fully, upon remand, the litigation will terminate after the
trial justice has considered the various views expressed by
those interested and then reaches his or her own conclusion as
to the issues before him or her.

The plaintiff's appeal is sustained, the judgment appealed
from is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior
Court for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate.

Abedon, Michaelson, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey,
Milton Stanzler, Linda J. Kushner, for plaintiff.

William F. MéMahon, for defendant.

Ee
*Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1978).

634

410 A.2d 1336.
State vs. Rose SMALL.
FEBRUARY 1, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

es 635
a
Weispercrr, J. The defendant, Rose Small, was
convicted of simple assault and sentenced to imprisonment
for one year, of which nine months were suspended. From
this judgment she appeals. The proceedings relate to a series
of incidents on February 8, 1976, during which the defen-

dant was injured and her husband was killed in a violent en-
counter with officers of the Cranston Police Department.

At trial the defense presented no evidence. The evidence
adduced by the state indicates the following facts, At approx-
imately 7:15 on the evening of February 8, Mr. Small and
defendant, in one automobile, pulled up alongside a second
automobile which was parked at Dennis and Bay View
Avenues in Cranston. Seated in the parked automobile were
a young man and three young women. Mr. Small left his car
and approached the young people, yelling that he was “sick
of everything.” The defendant came up alongside her hus-
band. Mr. Small pulled open the driver-side door of the
parked automobile, pulled out a gun, and fired two shots at
the young man sitting in the driver’s seat. The four young
persons ran from their car and scattered, while Mr. Small
fired a third shot in the direction of one of them. A bystander
testified that defendant fired at least two shots at the young
women as they ran for cover.

Mr. Small got his wife back into his car and drove up Bay
View Avenue towards their home. Officer Sivo of the
Cranston police arrived at the scene of the shooting and was
told where the Smalls’ car was headed.! He came upon them
“TA bystander who viewed some of the shooting, being acquainted with Mr.

Small, informed Officer Sivo of the couple's identity and directed him towards
their home.

636

in front of the Small residence on Bay View Avenue while
they were getting out of their car. As Officer Sivo walked
towards defendant, she screamed at him that she had shot
nobody. Officer Bell, a Cranston policeman working in plain
clothes, arrived and saw Officer Sivo in a confrontation with
the Smalls. Sivo had a gun in his hand. Sivo called, “Be
careful. I think he has a gun.” Bell yelled, “Cranston Police,
arrest them. Put them in the car.” Mr. Small drew a revolver
and fired one shot at Sivo. Bell drew his gun and yelled,
“Drop it.” Mr. Small turned and fired directly at Bell. At this
point shots were fired by both policemen and Mr. Small.
According to Sivo’s testimony, defendant also had a gun and
was firing at Bell. The defendant was now between Mr.
Small and Bell, and she became engaged in a physical
struggle with Bell in an effort to disarm him or deflect his
aim. Soon all guns were apparently emptied. Bell jumped at
Mr. Small, jarred his gun away, and subdued him. Sivo
handcuffed defendant and placed her in the police vehicle.
Both Mr. Small and defendant were wounded during the
encounter; Mr. Small died of his wounds.

The defendant was charged. with four counts of assault
with a dangerous weapon -- allegedly committed against the
three young women and Officer Bell -- and with carrying a
pistol without a license. The jury concluded that the state
had failed to prove that defendant had been armed with a
gun, but the jury found her guilty of the lesser included
offense of simple assault upon Officer Bell.

In moving for a new trial after her conviction, defendant
asserted for the first time that her assault on Officer Bell was
justified as an act in defense of a third person (her husband).
The defendant makes the same argument here, claiming that
the trial justice erred in failing to. instruct the jury on this
defense. Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure provides in part, however, that:

If a defendant relies upon an affirmative defense, or
justification, or matter in mitigation and wishes the
court to instruct the jury with respect to such, he shall so

es 637

advise the court in writing no later than at the close of
the evidence. No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection.”

Since defendant did not raise her justification in a timely
manner as provided by Rule 30, she cannot claim that the
trial justice’s failure to give an instruction on this justification
was erroneous. State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 39, 371 A.2d 596,
600 (1977); State v. Crescenzo, 114 R.I. 242, 258, 332 A.2d
421, 430-31 (1975).

Even if it had been properly requested, moreover, defen-
dant would not have been entitled to a jury instruction on the
“defense of a third person” justification, since defendant had
no right to attack Officer Bell in an effort to protect her hus-
band. To begin with, Mr. Small obviously had no right to
shoot at Officer Bell. It is the rule in Rhode Island that even if
an arrest is unlawful -- an argument not made by defendant
here -- the arrest may not be resisted forcibly. General Laws
1956 (1969 Reenactment) §12-7-10; State v. Ramsdell, 109
RI. 320, 324, 285 A.2d 399, 402-03 (1971).? That the police
officers were in the process of arresting Mr. Small is clear.
The uncontradicted evidence shows that Officer Sivo was in
uniform; Officer Bell, although in plain clothes, identified
himself as a member of the Cranston police and ordered Mr.
Small arrested. Mr. Small then initiated the exchange of gun-
fire. Doubtless it was unmistakable to defendant that Mr.
Small was illegally resisting arrest. In these circumstances,

*The rule at common law is that a lawful arrest lawfully made cannot be resisted
by force. Heichelbech v. State, 258 Ind. 334, 337, 281 N.E.2d 102, 104 (1972);
State v. Fitanides, 373 A.2d 915, 922 (Me. 1977); Muska v. Apel, 203 Wis. 389,
395, 232 N.W. 593, 595 (1930); Vorhees, The Law of Arrest §86 at 51 (1904).

°Jn the present case the defendant could not reasonably have entertained the
belief that Mr. Small was justified in shooting at Officer Bell. We therefore need
take no position on the question, over which the jurisdictions are divided, of whe-
ther the “defense of a third person” justification protects an accused when the
accused was of the mistaken but reasonable belief that the third person would
himself be justified in using force.

pO

638 |

the law did not authorize defendant to enter the struggle to
resist on the side of Mr. Small. A person in defendant's
position is not authorized to join forces with an unjustified
user of force to assault one whose own use of force is justified.
United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974, 975-76 & n.1 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836, 91 S. Ct. 74, 27 L. Ed. 2d
69 (1970); Perkins, Criminal Law 1020 (2d ed. 1969). The
defendant had no right to use force where it was obvious her
husband had no such right. Taylor v. United States, 380 A.2d
989, 994 (D.C. App. 1977).

| | The defendant also attacks the sentence imposed by the
trial justice: imprisonment for one year, of which nine
months were suspended and three months are to be served.*
According to defendant, in view of the circumstances of the
case and certain facts about her history, particularly her lack
of a prior criminal record, the trial justice abused his discre-
tion when he imposed a sentence involving three months of
incarceration. But as we recently said in State v. Giorgi,
121 B.I. 280, 397 A.2d 898 (1979), the role of this court in
reviewing sentences is an extremely limited one. We interfere
with the discretion of the trial court “only when the sentence
is without justification and grossly disparate from sentences
generally imposed for similar offenses.” 121 R.I. at 282,
397 A.2d at 899; State v. Fortes, 114 R.I. 161, 173, 330 A.2d
404, 411 (1975). It can scarcely be contended that the sen-
tence imposed in the present case -- three months of incarcer-
ation for physically attacking a police officer during a shoot-
out -- contravenes this standard. The fact that defendant had
no prior criminal record does not alter this conclusion; it is
not excessive per se to impose a prison sentence on a first
offender. State v. Crescenzo, 114 R.I. at 264, 332 A.2d at
433.

‘Under G.L, 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-5-3, the penalty for assault is impri-
sonment for not more than one year, a fine not exceeding $500, or both. The
sentence here in issue is well within these limits.

The defendant was not charged under G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-5-5,
as amended by P.L. 1973, ch. 66, §1, with assault of a uniformed police officer
with resultant bodily injury to the officer.

es 639

As her final point, defendant asserts that the failure of the
trial justice to articulate reasons for the sentence he imposed
prevents this court from determining whether an abuse of dis-
cretion has taken place. Although it could be contended that
the trial justice gave some reasons for his sentence, we shall
assume arguendo that no articulation of reasons had been
supplied. The defendant asks us to establish a new require-
ment that sentencing courts enumerate the reasons for the
sentences they impose. In support of this proposed require-
ment defendant cites cases from Pennsylvania’s appellate
courts which require such exposition by sentencing judges.®
We note also that the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association has approved standards calling for sentencing
courts to state reasons for selecting a particular sentence. See
ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures
§18-6.6(a) (ii) (Approved draft, 1979). See also Standards
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures §5.6(ii
(Approved draft, 1968). These standards are directed
towards the trial judge as an aid in the appropriate exercise of
his discretion.®

5In Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977), Mr. Justice
Roberts gives a searching analysis of the advantages to be gained by requiring the
articulation of reasons for the imposition of sentence. We are not in disagreement
with the general principles set forth in that opinion, and those enunciated in the
ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate
Review of Sentences (Approved draft, 1968), The National Advisory Commission
Standards, and §10 of the Model Sentencing Act, all of which support the desirabil-
ity of the articulation of reasons for sentence in order to increase the conscious
rationality of the process. See Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. at 128 &
nn.13-15; 377 A.2d at 146-47 & nn,13-15. However, we think it is not desirable
that the validity of a sentence should rest upon such articulation, although we
would observe that a statement of reasons by the trial justice in justification of his
departure from the sentence that would normally be expected in response to a given
offense might well be of assistance in explaining to an appellate court why no abuse
of discretion has taken place.

°As in the federal system, our scope of review of the exercise of discretion in
sentencing is limited. In Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94S. Ct. 3042,
41 L, Ed. 2d 855 (1974), the Court ruled pursuant to the terms of the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5010(d) (1976), that a specific finding of “no
benefit” from treatment under the act was required if a sentence under that statute
was not chosen. However, the Court declined, either through statutory interpreta-

40 es

Inasmuch as we review only those sentences that appear
“without justification and grossly disparate from sentences
generally imposed for similar offenses,” Giorgi, supra;
Fortes, supra, we would gain little by adopting the rule
urged by the defendant. When a sentence appears grossly
excessive and disparate on its face, a statement of reasons
from the trial justice will seldom cure such defects if we
undertake review, though it may be persuasive in borderline
cases. In the normal case, such as the one at bar, where the
sentence obviously avoids any suspicion under the relevant
standard, it would not significantly advance the cause of
enhanced justice in sentencing to require a statement of
reasons as a sine qua non of the validity of the sentence.

For the reasons stated, the defendant’s appeal is denied
and dismissed, the judgment of conviction is affirmed, and
the case is remitted to the Superior Court.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.

Dennis J. Roberts I, Attorney General, Maureen E.
McKenna, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Joseph A. Bevilacqua, Jr., for defendant.

tion or on general principles, to require a statement of reasons. The Court
observed:
“The only purpose of such a requirement would be to facilitate appellate
supervision of, and thus to limit, the trial court’s sentencing discretion. In
short, we hold that the discretion vested in a district judge under §5010(d) is
essentially the same as the traditional discretion vested in the court, for ex-
ample, to impose the minimum sentence on a first offender or a larger sen-

tence on a recidivist.” 418 U.S. at 441-42, 94S, Ct. at 3052, 41 L. Ed. 2d at
867-68.

641

All A.2d 585.

EuizaBeTH Brown et al. vs.
Normanp A. ARCHAMBAULT et al,

FEBRUARY 6, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

Per Curiam. This case is before us on an appeal from a
mandatory preliminary injunction issued by the Superior
Court requiring the Treasurer of the Town of West Warwick
to “pay immediately on presentation any bills approved by
the School Committee for payment.” The defendant trea-
surer has moved for a stay of said injunction pursuant to our
Rule 8. We heard oral argument on February 5, 1980, with-
out the filing of briefs. This expedited hearing was given
because of the unique public importance of the questions pre-
sented by this appeal.

It is apparent from the facts conceded by the parties, al-
though no transcript has been furnished, that West Warwick
has exhausted its budget for school purposes, although one
month remains in the fiscal year. Approximately $450,000
would be necessary in order to fund the operation of schools
for this additional month. It is contended by the treasurer

64g es

that only $250,000 remain available for all municipal pur-
poses.

In the light of this grave financial dilemma, we are of the
opinion that the members of the Town Council of the Town
of West Warwick are indispensible parties to this litigation.
We believe that the town council plays an essential role in the
appropriation process and in the borrowing of funds in anti-
cipation of appropriations. The trial justice declined to add
the members of the town council as parties defendant in this
litigation. In so doing, he was in error.

We therefore remand this case to the Superior Court with
instructions to add the members of the town council as par-
ties defendant, to make provision for service of process on
such members, and to give them an opportunity to be heard
on the matters in issue. Thereafter, the Superior Court may
enter such order as it may deem appropriate under the cir-
cumstances.

The preliminary injunction heretofore entered by the
Superior Court in the absence of said indispensible parties is
hereby vacated. In light of this action, the motion for stay is
denied pro forma. The case is remanded to the Superior
Court for further proceedings.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.
John D. Lynch, for plaintiffs.

J. Peter Doherty, Stephen P. Nugent, James F. McAleer,
G. John Gazerro, Jr., for defendants.

643

410 A.2d 1340.
Strate vs. RONALD D. ARPIN.
FEBRUARY 7, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

i

| ots
SSCS
Bevitacgua, C.J. The defendant, Ronald D. Arpin

(Arpin), was tried before a jury in the Superior Court and

convicted of second-degree murder. Before the Superior

Court the defendant relied on the defense of lack of criminal
responsibility by reason of insanity. On appeal the defendant

CO

646 ee

assigns as error a number of the trial justice’s rulings. He also
urges us to grant him a new trial under the American Law
Institute’s (ALI) test for legal insanity, the test this court re-
cently adopted in State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254, 309 A.2d
469 (1979).

At about 2:45 p.m. September 19, 1974, as twelve-year-
old Kristen Judge got off the school bus in front of her home
on Howard Hill Road in Foster, Rhode Island, she noticed a
white Volkswagen van parked on the opposite side of the
road. A few minutes later, Kristen walked from her house
out to the road to meet a friend who was coming over for a
visit. As the two young girls walked back to Kristen’s house,
they passed the van and saw a man and a young woman kiss-
ing beside the van. A short time later, they came back down
the driveway and heard a girl scream. Concerned, the girls
returned to the house and asked Kristen’s father if he had
heard the scream. Although he had heard nothing, he
accompanied the girls back out to Howard Hill Road. Seeing
that the van had now gone, the girls proceeded along toward
the Foster fairgrounds. While in front of the fairgrounds,
they saw the Volkswagen van again, first heading toward
Foster, and then about a minute later heading back to the
spot where it had been parked when Kristen first noticed it.

At about the same time, Mrs. Linda Tramontano, who
also lived on Howard Hill Road, heard some noise in the
woods next to her home. She also heard a car door slam sev-
eral times and then the spinning of wheels. She walked out to
the road and saw the white Volkswagen van stuck in a ditch
and defendant trying to figure out how to free the van from
its predicament. Apprehensive because she was alone and
thinking that defendant might come to use her telephone,
Mrs. Tramontano called the Foster Highway Department for
assistance. Two members of the department arrived shortly
at her house. While she spoke to them outside, defendant
walked up, explained that his van was stuck, and asked for
help. The road men and defendant then walked back down
to the van.

es oa

At about 3:30 p.m., in response to Mrs. Tramontano’s
report of the suspicious vehicle, a Foster police officer arrived
at the scene. While the road men had been inspecting the
problem, defendant entered the van. As the officer tried to
help him out, defendant seemed very agitated, gasping for
breath, muttering, and struggling. The officer handcuffed
him, and the road men restrained him on the ground. While
restrained, defendant muttered that he had picked up a male
and a female hitchhiker and that they had given him some
white powder that “worked fast.” Believing that defendant
might need some medical assistance for drug intoxication, the
police officer called for an ambulance and also a wrecking
crew. The defendant continued to mumble about the hitch-
hikers, saying that the man had been beating up the girl.
When the medical crew arrived, they strapped the struggling
defendant to a stretcher. Meanwhile, the wrecker operator,
who had walked into the woods, came out and reported that
he had found a female body, partly naked, badly beaten, and
bloodied.

The ambulance crew drove defendant to the State Police
headquarters in Scituate for interrogation as a suspect in the
girl’s murder. The defendant originally stated that he had
picked up the girl and a man named “Donald,” and that
“Donald” had beaten the girl. During the interrogation,
however, defendant was informed that the two young girls
had seen the young woman with only one man, who fit
defendant’s description. The defendant then abruptly
changed his story, confessing that he, and not “Donald,” had
struck the girl. The police recorded the confession.

The defendant was charged with murder, assault with in-
tent to rape, and assault with a dangerous weapon. After a
psychiatric hearing, however, he was declared incompetent
to stand trial and was placed in the custody of the Depart-
ment of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals for seven-
teen months. Before the trial commenced almost two years
later, defendant filed various pretrial motions, including a
motion to suppress his confession. The trial justice denied this
motion and, over defendant’s objection, admitted the taped

TO

648 ee

confession into evidence. At trial, defendant relied
principally on an insanity defense and presented expert wit-
nesses who testified to his mental state at the time of the
homicide. At the conclusion of the state’s case, the charge of
assault with a dangerous weapon was dismissed. The jury
found defendant not guilty of assault with intent to rape, but
found him guilty of murder in the second degree, and sane.

I

We turn first to defendant’s contention that in denying the
motion to suppress the taped confession, the trial justice com-
mitted reversible error. The defendant argues that the waiver
of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461
(1938). The defendant claims specifically that at the time he
signed the waiver-of-rights form and gave the confession, he
lacked the mental capacity to understand the implications
and consequences of signing the waiver form. See id.; State
v. Espinosa, 109 R.I. 221, 283 A.2d 465 (1971).

At the pretrial hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress
the waiver-of-rights form and the confession, Captain
Edward D. Pare and Detective Norman Pineau, two police
officers, testified that they talked to Arpin at State Police
headquarters on September 19, 1974. Captain Pare testified
that he first saw Arpin at 4:25 p.m. being removed from the
ambulance handcuffed and strapped to a stretcher, and
noted that at the time defendant was squirming and

' appeared excited. After the medical crew released defendant
and removed the handcuffs, he accompanied Pare to his
office in the police station, where two other officers joined
them. Before asking any questions, Pare informed Arpin that
he was a murder suspect, informed him of his constitutional
tights, and gave him the warnings set out in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694
(1966). Arpin responded, “I know all that,” and said that he
understood the warnings. Captain Pare described Arpin’s de-
meanor in the office as “somewhat calm” and “coherent.”
The defendant initially told the fabricated story of “Donald”

es 649

in a rational, coherent manner, according to Pare.! Captain
Pare also testified that he used no force or coercion and made
no threats or promises. Captain Pare concluded the initial
interview at about 5:15 or 5:30 p.m. and asked Detective
Pineau to continue the interrogation.

Detective Pineau and another officer introduced them-
selves and once again advised Arpin of his constitutional
rights. When asked if he understood the warnings and whe-
ther he wished to waive the right and proceed, Arpin re-
sponded, “I do not need any type of attorney. I’m a witness. I
saw what happened.” Arpin then signed the waiver-of-rights
form and repeated the story of “Donald” that he had related
previously to Pare. At that time, however, an important
development occurred. Captain Pare reentered the office and
said that a young female eyewitness had stated that only one
man and one girl were in the van. He also said that the man
she described was Ronald Arpin. At this point, Arpin said,
“Okay I want to tell the truth. I want to get this over with.”

After asking all but Pineau to leave, defendant admitted
that he was “Donald” and had committed the acts he had
attributed before to “Donald.” Detective Pineau interrupted
him because of the inculpatory nature of Arpin’s statements,
and Arpin was read his rights for the third time. Arpin
nodded that he understood his rights and once again agreed
to waive them. Detective Pineau described Arpin at this time
as “very quiet, very passive.” Arpin proceeded to tell a
revised story involving only him and Dorene McKenzie.”

1 Arpin said that after he left work, he had picked up a male and a female hitch-
hiker. He also said he picked up a second hitchhiker, who got off near Wauregan.
Later, the male and the female hitchhikers got into an argument in the van, and the
man, “Donald,” slapped the girl once or twice. Arpin said that he pulled the van over
to the side of the road near Foster, where “Donald” and the girl continued their
quarrel in the woods. Arpin tried to intercede, but not before he saw “Donald” strike
the girl with a rock. He said that he tried to help the girl who was lying limp on the
ground but fled when “Donald” came at him. Arpin then went to seek assistance to
get his van out of the ditch.

*Apparently, Arpin picked up Dorene McKenzie near her high school in
Connecticut. Arpin claimed that she gave him the impression that she would have
sexual relations with him, and it was for this reason that he stopped along the road
near Foster. He said that in the woods she became reluctant, thereby making him
very angry, and that he lost control of himself before he struck her with a rock.

ee

650 ee

Although defendant refused to reduce the story to writing or
to sign any statement, he agreed to allow the police to tape it.
Before any statement was recorded, Arpin was advised of his
constitutional rights for the fourth time. Detective Pineau
asked defendant if he wished to waive the rights and give the
statement. Arpin responded affirmatively.

The defendant called only one witness, Dr. Herbert
Myers, who was qualified as an expert in psychiatry. Doctor
Myers testified that he had examined Arpin to determine his
competency to stand trial.? Before the examination, Dr.
Myers had scrutinized Arpin’s medical and psychiatric his-
tory and had ordered psychological tests. Doctor Myers
stated that the one and one-half hour psychiatric interview
revealed signs of serious mental illness. Doctor Myers stated
also that he believed Arpin had been suffering from a mental
illness when he signed the waiver-of-rights form and con-
fessed, and that even though Arpin may haye been aware of
signing the waiver form, he had not understood the implica-
tions.

In deciding defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial justice
considered two questions: (a) whether the Miranda warnings
were properly given, and (b) whether Arpin knowingly, vol-
untarily, and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to have an attorney present. The
judge noted that on both these questions the obligation of the
prosecutor was to establish proof beyond a reasonable

*Pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §26-4-3(b), as amended by P.L.
1976, ch. 261, §1, Superior Court Justice Fazzano, suspecting that defendant might
be incompetent to stand trial, ordered that defendant undergo psychiatric evalua-
tion and examination. Doctor Myers conducted the examination at Justice
Fazzano’s request.

“Doctor Myers found that Arpin was suffering from delusions of satanic posses-
sion, and that Satan talked to him and caused him to think evil thoughts about
women. He also indicated that he had sexual problems resulting from childhood
experiences. Doctor Myers referred in his report to Arpin’s feelings of persecution
and depression and to his resort to drugs and alcohol for escape. Projective tests
administered to defendant revealed sadistic, destructive impulses and a breakdown
of emotional controls.

ee) 651

doubt.® He found that the state had sustained its burden in
showing that the Miranda warnings were given in the proper
manner and at the proper time. On the issue of waiver the
trial justice distinguished Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199, 80 S. Ct. 274, 4 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1960), which defendant
argued was controlling,® and found that the waiver was vol-
untary. Furthermore, the trial justice found that the waiver
was also intelligently and knowingly made:

“[Arpin’s] account to both Captain Pare and Detective
Pineau were [sic] certainly described with thought, clar-
ity and reflection. Indeed, the defendant repeated his
story as to how he was a witness to what Donald did,
not once, but twice * * * until he subsequently con-
fessed. At this stage, I am satisfied he was alert, that he
was intelligent enough to understand that the investiga-
tion could focus on him, that he came up with this story
of Donald in an obvious effort to avoid being suspected
himself.”

In considering the testimony of Dr. Myers, the trial justice
stated:

“Doctor Myers did testify that when he, the doctor,
examined this defendant, that although he declared him
to be incompetent, he felt he was intelligent enough to
understand and to answer the doctor’s questions. The
doctor further testified that it was his opinion that the
defendant understood the questions in September but,
possibily, because of faulty reasoning he made those
statements incriminating himself.”

*The trial justice at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress inadvertently
raised the state’s burden of proof from “clear and convincing” to “beyond a reason-
able doubt.”

*In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S. Ct. 274, 4 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1960),
the United States Supreme Court held that a confession obtained from an insane
defendant and written by a deputy sheriff after a nine-hour interrogation in the
absence of friends, relatives, and legal counsel was involuntary. Id. at 207-08; 80 S.
Ct. at 280-81, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 249, The trial justice here found the factual
circumstances dissimilar.

052 es

At trial, the trial justice allowed the confession to be
admitted, and Capt. Pare, Det. Pineau and Dr. Myers testi-
fied before the jury concerning the events at police headquar-
ters and defendant’s demeanor at the time he signed the wai-
ver form and gave the confession. The trial justice in his
instruction to the jury referred specifically to this testimony
and cautioned the jury that unless they were satisfied by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the police had advised
Arpin of his constitutional rights and that Arpin had volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived those rights, they
could not consider defendant’s inculpatory statements.

In determining whether to permit a jury to consider incul-
patory satements allegedly obtained in violation of a defen-
dant’s privilege against self-incrimination, a trial justice must
comply with two procedural safeguards. State v. Espinosa,
109 RB.I. 221, 283 A.2d 465 (1971). He must first conduct a
preliminary hearing out of the jury’s presence in which the
state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
statements were obtained in a constitutional manner. Sec-
ond, if the trial justice admits the evidence, he “must speci-
fically instruct the jury that before they can consider such
evidence they must first determine for themselves that the
evidence in question was not obtained in violation of defend-
ant’s constitutional protections.” Id. at 228, 283 A.2d at
468-69. In State v. Leavitt, 103 R.I. 273, 237 A.2d 309
(1968), this court suggested that while reviewing the admis-
sion of evidence allegedly obtained in violation of a defen-
dant’s constitutional rights, we should look to see whether the
trial justice complied with the procedural safeguards. See id.
at 293, 237 A.2d at 320. We find that in the present case the
trial justice complied fully with the Leavitt and Espinosa
safeguards.

If we find full compliance, Leavitt and Espinosa require us
then to examine the record independently and in a light most
favorable to the state to decide whether the trial justice’s
ruling was clearly erroneous. If not clearly erroneous, the
trial justice’s ruling disposes of the defendant's constitutional
challenge. State v. Leavitt, supra; State v. Espinosa, supra.

es 653

After scrutinizing the record of the pretrial hearing on the
motion to suppress, we find that the trial justice was not
clearly wrong.

The defendant asserts that the trial justice did not ade-
quately consider Dr. Myers’ testimony, which revealed that
defendant had shown a pattern of prolonged mental illness,
establishing the strongest probability that defendant was in-
sane and therefore lacked the mental capacity to waive his
privilege against self-incrimination. The defendant asserts
that the trial justice applied a discredited “coherency stan-
dard,” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 320-21, 83 S. Ct.
745, 761, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770, 790 (1963), and gave far too much
credence to the statements of Captain Pare and Detective
Pineau that Arpin was calm, rational, and coherent. The
defendant relies principally on cases holding that an accused
whose “self-preservation mechanism is negated or overridden
by external force or fraud, a condition of insanity or the com-
pulsion of drugs” cannot act voluntarily, intelligently, or
knowingly. Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir.
1967), reh. en banc, June 19, 1968; see Eisen v. Picard, 452
F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1971); Gladden v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373
(9th Cir. 1968); Reddish v. State, 167 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1964);
State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118 (La. 1977); State v. LaRosa,
112 R.I. 571, 313 A.2d 375 (1974).

Our examination of the record reveals facts that might pos-
sibly lead a trial justice to rule that the waiver and the con-
fession were involuntary. For example, defendant was
clearly agitated at the murder scene where he was hand-
cuffed and strapped to a stretcher. He had consumed some
intoxicants earlier in the day,’ and he had a history of mental
disorders. We have taken full cognizance of these factors.
From our examination of the cases cited by defendant, how-
ever, we find even these facts distinguishable from the facts
that have motivated other courts to find involuntariness. In

TArpin stated in his confession that he had drunk about a half pint of whiskey
earlier in the day and that while in the van, he had smoked marijuana and con-
sumed a powerful stimulant, the “white powder.”

654 es

Blackburn v. Alabama, supra, for example, prior to the
crime and the confession, the defendant had escaped from a
mental institution in which he had been confined for four
years to receive treatment for paranoid schizophrenia. More-
over, the custodial interrogation in Blackburn lasted for over
nine hours, and the police practices were questionable. In
Gladden v. Unsworth, supra, the defendant confessed in a
drunken stupor. Witnesses testified that his pupils were
dilated and that he was “jabbering,” “babbling,” and “rav-
ing.” At the time of the confession, he could not stand and
perform simple movements without extreme difficulty. In
Pea v. United States, supra, the defendant had shot himself
in the head, causing himself to sustain a concussion, and had
not been given his Miranda warnings prior to interrogation in
the emergency room. The court emphasized in particular the
testimony of a doctor who found the defendant to be totally
indifferent to protecting himself. In Eisen v. Picard, supra,
the defendant did not remember committing the crime. Fur-
thermore, he had been suffering from prolonged depression
and had wandered about aimlessly in the woods for a long
period after the homicides. In Eisen the record revealed that
the trial justice gave short shrift to the insanity issue in his
ruling on the motion to suppress and that his instruction to
the jury on the voluntariness issue was not totally objective.
Eisen v. Picard, 452 F.2d at 864. In Reddish v. State, supra,
the police obtained the confessions after the defendant had
shot himself in the chest and was hospitalized in critical con-
dition. Moreover, doctors had administered to the defendant
several injections of Demerol, a painkiller.

We would reiterate that in order to reverse, we must find
that the ruling was clearly erroneous. State v. Espinosa, 109
R.L. at 229, 283 A.2d at 469. In State v. LaRosa, 112 R.1.
571, 313 A.2d 375 (1974), a case cited by defendant, this
court applied the “clearly erroneous” standard to uphold a
trial justice’s ruling that a confession was involuntary. The
trial justice had found, and the record persuaded us, that
“during the entire interrogation defendant was crying,
sobbing, and upset, and was later unable to remember what

es 655

had transpired.” Id. at 576, 313 A.2d at 377-78. This court
found the trial justice’s conclusion that the defendant was so
overcome by emotional stress as to make her waiver of rights
and inculpatory statements involuntary was not clearly
erroneous. Id. at 577, 313 A.2d at 378. In the instant case,
however, we believe that defendant’s fabricated exculpatory
narration in which he claimed that a fictitious “Donald”
committed the homicide, his four clear, affirmative responses
to questions about understanding his rights, and his
persistent willingness to waive them, all support the trial
justice’s ruling. Although we recognize that the line between
voluntariness and irivoluntariness is fine, and that “the notion
of ‘voluntariness’ is itself an amphibian,” Culombe v.
Connecticut,367 U.S. 568, 604-05, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1880, 6
L. Ed. 2d 1037, 1059 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.), we cannot say
that we harbor a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766
(1948).

I

On the issue of legal insanity, the trial justice instructed
the members of the jury that to find Arpin not guilty by rea-
son of insanity, they must find that at the time of the offense
defendant was laboring under such a defect of reason, from a
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not
know what he was doing was wrong. At the time of the trial
the M’Naghten rule was the proper test in Rhode Island for
the defense of lack of criminal responsibility by reason of in-
sanity. State v. Andrews, 86 R.I. 341, 134 A.2d 425 (1957);
State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 58 A. 905 (1904). Having
requested instructions under the ALI test,® the defendant ex-
cepted to the M’Naghten instructions and properly preserved
the issue by filing a timely appeal in February 1977.

*®*A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreci-
ate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law.” American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (Final Draft) §4.01(1)(1962).

pO

656 ee

In March 1978, this court decided State v. Johnson, 119
R.I. 749, 383 A.2d 1012 (1978) (Johnson I), reviewing an
appeal from a judgment of conviction for murder entered in
1975. In that case, the defendant, Bruce Johnson, had raised
an insanity defense and had requested instructions in
accordance with the ALI test. In Johnson I this court ordered
rebriefing and reargument solely on the issue of the selection
of an insanity test. 119 R.I. at 770, 383 A.2d at 1023. On
February 9, 1979, after the rehearing this court abrogated
the M’Naghten rule and formally adopted the ALI Model
Penal Code Test. State v. Johnston, 121 R.I. 254, 399 A.2d
469, 476 (1979) (Johnson II).

At the conclusion of Johnson II, this court stated that the
ALI test “shall apply to all trials commenced after the date of
this opinion,” expressing our opinion that prospective appli-
cation of the rule would best serve the interests of the crimi-
nal justice system. 121 R.I. at 271, 399 A.2d at 478.

In spite of the clear language in Johnson I, defendant
urges this court at least to give the rule of law enunciated in
Johnson II limited retroactivity,° entitling this defendant to a
new trial under the ALI test. In considering this issue, we feel
obliged to discuss briefly the rules concerning the propriety of
retroactive and prospective application of new rules of law in
certain cases, and to set forth the reasoning behind our deci-
sion to apply the Johnson II prospectively.

Ht is well settled that the highest court of a state may choose
to apply new rules of law in any manner it deems appropriate
and just. In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refin-
ing Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S. Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932),
Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote:

“A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent
may make a choice for itself between the principle of

°Limited retroactivity results in application of a new rule to cases still pending on
direct review at the time it was announced. See Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S.
23, 83S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963) (applying Mapp v. Ohio exclusionary
tule to case pending on direct review.)

es 6s7

forward operation and that of relation backward. It
may say the decisions of its highest court, though later
overruled, are law none the less for intermediate trans-
actions « « *. The choice for any state may be deter-
mined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of her
courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature.”
Id. at 364, 365, 53 S. Ct. at 148, 149, 77 L. Ed. at 366,
367.

To the same effect, the Court noted in Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965), that
new rules of criminal procedure may be applied either retro-
actively or prospectively, and “that the Constitution neither
prohibits nor requires retrospective effect.” Id. at 629, 85 S.
Ct. at 1737, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 608.

In the past this court has chosen to apply new rules of law
in the manner best suited to serve the interests of justice and
to avoid hardship. See, e.g., Digby v. Digby, 120 R.1. 299,
388 A.2d 1 (1978) (new rule effective sixty days after date of
opinion); Worsley v. Corcelli, 119 R.I. 260, 377 A.2d 215
(1977) (sixty days); State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693, 375 A.2d
944 (1977) (statutory change applied to cases pending on dir-
ect review); Mariorenzi v. Diponte, 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d
127 (1975) (sixty days); Haddad v. First National Stores,
Inc., 109 R.I. 59, 280 A.2d 93 (1971) (sixty days); State v.
Kaufman, 108 R.1. 728, 279 A.2d 412 (1971) (new rule of
proof applied to cases not having reached final judgment).

In deciding what effect to give the rule in Johnson II, this
court considered the factors set out in Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. at 636, 85 S. Ct. at 1741, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 612: (1)
the purpose of the new rule, (2) the reliance placed upon the
old doctrine, and (3) the effect of retroactive application on
the administration of justice. See Desist v. United States, 394
US. 244, 249, 89 S. Ct. 1030, 1033, 22 L. Ed. 2d 248, 255
(1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S. Ct. 1967,
1970, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 1203 (1967). In light of these factors
we first analyzed the effect of full retroactivity of the Johnson
II rule. As a practical matter, all defendants tried and con-

TT

658 es

victed under the M’Naghten test would have been able to
apply for post conviction relief and seek new trials. See G.L.
1956 (1969 Reenactment) §10-9.1-1 and §10-9.1-3, both
enacted by P.L. 1974, ch. 220, §3. We recognized that full
retroactive application would most likely have been consis-
tent with the purpose of the new rule: to ensure that a certain
class of wrongdoers deemed mentally incompetent is given
psychiatric treatment in mental institutions rather than con-
tinue to be confined without treatment in correctional insti-
tutions. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 626 (2d Cir.
1966). At the same time, however, we felt that the reliance
placed by all parties on the M’Naghten rule was substantial
and that such reliance would have been undermined by full
retroactivity. Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 300, 87S. Ct.
at 1971, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 1205 (1967) (Wade-Gilbert cule not
applied retroactively because authorities relied on prior rule);
Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732, 86 S. Ct.
1772, 1780, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 892 (1966) (Miranda rule not
applied retroactively because law enforcement officers nad
no fair notice). And most important, we concluded that full
retroactivity would have placed an unacceptable burden on
the administration of justice, requiring new trials on an issue
that depends heavily for its proper resolution upon the testi-
mony of lay and expert witnesses. The risk that witnesses
who testified at the earlier trials would no longer be available
would have been sizable; and without the necessary wit-
nesses, there could be no guarantee that the new trials would
be effective in properly determining the issue ot guilt or
innocence.

| | We therefore decided that prospective application of the
Johnson II rule to trials commenced after the date of the deci-
sion would best serve the interests of the criminal justice sys-
tem in this state. The defendant argues, however, that grant-
ing Bruce Johnson a new trial, while denying a new trial to
Ronald Arpin, whose appeal might have reached this court
ahead of Johnson’s, is arbitrary and inequitable, and is to
administer justice on the basis of a “judicial horse race.”!° In
WArpin was represented at trial and on appeal by the Office of the Public
Defender. In his brief, the public defender partially attributed the delay in defen-
dant's appeal to an appellate backlog of over seventy cases, a backlog not faced by
most private attorneys.

SS 659

response to this contention, we make two points: first, pros-
pective application of a rule, that is, announcing a rule for
the future while affording its benefits to the litigants at bar is
appropriate judicial procedure. See Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn.
419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966). It avoids the criticism that the
new rule is pure dictum and provides a worthy incentive to
the defendants and their counsel to advocate beneficial
changes in the law. Second, in view of our strong opinion
that full retroactivity of the Johnson II rule would have been
inappropriate, we feel that drawing the line where we did
was neither inequitable nor arbitrary. It is unfortunate, per-
haps, that any decision to apply a new rule of law requires
some linedrawing. In drawing the line, however, we attempt
to reach a result that serves all parties and to avoid arbitrary
distinctions based upon the stage of the appellate process at
which a case happens to be at the time of the decision
announcing the new rule." United States v. Tarrago, 398
F.2d 621, 627 (2d. Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).

Ill

In addition to requesting instructions on legal insanity
under the ALI Model Penal Code, defendant also requested
the judge to instruct the jury that when a defendant has
adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of san-
ity, the sanity of the defendant at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime is an element of the crime charged and
must be established by the state beyond a reasonable doubt,
just as it must establish every other element of the offense
charged. The trial justice refused to so instruct the jury.
Instead, he bifurcated his instructions on the elements of the
crime of murder and on the proper test for legal insanity in
Rhode Island.”

2 {WJhen a court is itself changing the law by an overruling decision, its deter-
mination of prospectivity or retroactivity should not depend upon the stage in the
judicial process that a particular case has reached when the change is made. Too
many irrelevant considerations, including the common cold, bear upon the rate of

progress of a case through the judicial system.” W. Schaefer, The Control of “Sun-
bursts”: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U, L. Rev. 631, 645 (1967).

12The bifurcation requires the jury to proceed in two separate steps: “If you find
that he is not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that concludes your deliberations,
but if you do find that he was guilty, the state has proven him guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, then you must consider whether or not he was insane on September
19, 1974.”

660 ee

The defendant’s instructions would have required the jury,
as part of their determination of guilt or innocence, to con-
sider the same factual evidence to determine simultaneously
whether Arpin was sane and whether he had the requisite
criminal intent for murder at the time of the crime. To the
extent that sanity and criminal intent are coextensive, then,
defendant’s instructions would have required the state to
prove both beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial justice’s
instructions, however, required the state to prove all the
elements of murder, including criminal intent, but required
defendant to establish his insanity by a fair preponderance of

- the evidence. The trial justice’s allocation of the burden of
proof on the issue of insanity was in conformity with current
Rhode Island law. State v. Page, 104 R.I. 323, 330, 244 A.2d
258, 262 (1968); State v. Jefferds, 91 R.I. 214, 218, 162 A.2d
536, 538-39 (1960); State v. Harris, 89 R.I. 202, 207, 152
A.2d 106, 109 (1959); State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 273, 58
A. 905, 910 (1904).

The defendant contends that to place the burden of per-
suasion of the defense of insanity on the accused in a murder
trial violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The defendant’s argument proceeds from the premise
that legal insanity and the criminal intent for murder cannot
coexist. Therefore, requiring a defendant to prove that he
was legally insane requires him at the same time to disprove
that he had criminal intent. Because criminal intent is an ele-
ment of the crime charged, the proof of which must be estab-
lished by the state, this procedural requirement violates due
process. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90S. Ct. 1068,
1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375 (1970). The defendant raises an
important unsettled question, and we feel obliged to give it
full consideration.

Jurisdictions in this country are fairly evenly split about
how the burden of proof on the insanity issue should be allo-
cated, and there is no clear modern trend. See Note,
Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof
of Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L.Rev.
499 (1976). Since 1895, the federal courts have required the

|) 661

prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, after
the defendant has come forth with adequate evidence to re-
but the generally accepted presumption of sanity. Davis v.
United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S. Ct. 353, 40 L. Ed. 499
(1895). Although some have read Davis as a constitutional
decision, the United States Supreme Court stated in Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1302
(1952) that in Davis, the Court established no constitutional
doctrine but only adopted a rule of procedure to be followed
in the federal courts. Id. at 797-98, 72 S. Ct. at 1007, 96 L.
Ed. at 1308. In Leland, the Court went on to say that an
Oregon statute that placed on a criminal defendant the bur-
den of proving his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt did not
violate “generally accepted concepts of basic standards of jus-
tice.” Id. 799, 72 S. Ct. at 1008, 96 L. Ed. at 1309,

Despite the Court’s holding in Leland that a state’s placing
the burden of proof of the insanity issue on the defendant is
not inconsistent with due process of law, its decision in In re
Winship, supra, and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95S.
Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975) have recently cast doubt on
the constitutionality of the type of state practice upheld in
Leland. In Winship, the Court said, “we explicitly hold that
the Due Process Clause protects the accused against convic-
tion except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.” In re Winship,397 U.S. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at 1073,
25 L. Ed. 2d at 375. Although Winship would seem to re-
quire a state merely to carry the burden of persuasion on the
factual elements of a crime, Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra,
extended Winship by requiring the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt even factual issues not explicitly included
by the state as elements of the crime charged.

In Mullaney, the Supreme Court considered a Maine
homicide statute that required a criminal defendant to rebut
a presumption of malice aforethought and to prove as an
affirmative defense that he acted in the heat of passion upon
sudden provocation, in order to reduce a murder conviction
to manslaughter. The effect of Mullaney was to cast doubt on

662 ee

the constitutionality of placing the burden of proving affir-
mative defenses on a defendant, when proof of the defense in
effect requires the accused to disprove an element of the
crime. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 702 n.31, 95 S.
Ct. at 1891-92 n.31, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 522 n.31.

The constitutional question involving insanity posed by
Winship and Mullaney is whether the sanity or mental capa-
city of a criminal defendant is so substantially interrelated
with criminal intent that it becomes a part of an element of
criminal conduct. The defendant contends that sanity is a
precondition to criminal intent, or, put another way, that
legal insanity is inconsistent with the criminal intent for mur-
der in Rhode Island. The defendant argues that the concept
of mens rea is based on the assumption that a person has the
mental capacity to control his or her conduct in conformity
with the requirements of society and to choose with a certain
degree of rationality between alternative courses of action. A
criminal defendant who lacks the mental capacity to control
his or her conduct, defendant contends, both lacks the requi-
site mens rea for murder and is legally insane. Under the cir-
cumstances of this case, however, we disagree.

We would first note that the United States Supreme Court
has clearly indicated that Mullaney and Winship do not lead
ineluctably to the conclusion that Leland v. Oregon, supra, is
no longer valid and that requiring a defendant to establish
legal insanity violates due process.!* Allocation of the burden
of proof of insanity to a criminal defendant, therefore, is not
constitutionally prohibited.

We have recently upheld a due process challenge to a pro-
cedural rule that required criminal defendants to carry the

In Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 97 S. Ct. 226, 50 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1976),
the United States Supreme Court dismissed as not presenting a substantial federal
question an appeal that challenged a Delaware statute that burdened a defendant
with proving his affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence. The appellant claimed that Leland had been overruled by Winship and
Mullaney. Subsequently, the Court stated that it was unwilling to reconsider
Leland and Rivera. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207, 97 S. Ct. 2319,
2325, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 290 (1977).

es 663

burden of proof of an affirmative defense other than insanity.
In light of Mullaney and Patterson, we held In re John Doe,
120 RI. 732, 742, 390 A.2d 920, 926 (1978), that in
Rhode Island to require a criminal accused who pleads self-
defense as an affirmative defense to a murder indictment to
carry the burden of persuasion on that issue by a preponder-
ance of the evidence was inconsistent with due process. 120
R.I. at 742, 390 A.2d at 926. After analyzing the murder
statute, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-23-1,4 as
amended by P.L. 1974, Ch. 118 §5, this court concluded that
“unlawfulness, that is, the absence of self-defense,” is an
element of the crime, and that the defense of self-defense
necessarily refutes that element of the crime of murder. In re
John Doe, 120 R.I. at 742, 390 A.2d at 926. Although we
are willing to state unequivocally that killing a person in self-
defense and killing “unlawfully” are inconsistent, even mutu-
ally exclusive, we are not willing to say within the circum-
stances of the case before us that killing with premeditation,
the requisite criminal intent for murder in Rhode Island, and
killing while legally insane are inconsistent or mutually ex-
clusive.

In Rhode Island at the time of defendant’s trial, the test for
legal insanity was the M’Naghten rule. State v. Andrews, 86
R.I. 341, 352, 134 A.2d 425, 431 (1957). Under the
M’Naghten test, a criminal accused was deemed to be legally
insane if he did not understand the nature or quality of his
actions, or did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
As we noted in Johnson II, supra, this test focuses almost
exclusively on powers of cognition. 121 R.I. at 261, 399
A.2d at 473; see United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 618
(2d Cir. 1966). We stated that “M’Naghten refuses to
recognize volitional or emotional impairments, viewing the

General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-23-1, as amended by P.L. 1974,
ch, 118, §5, provides ift pertinent part:
“The unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is mur-
der. [Alny other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated
killing « + » ismurder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the
second degree.”

664 ee

cognitive element as the singular cause of conduct.” State v.
Johnson, 121 R.I. at 261, 399 A.2d at 473; see United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 618. The mens rea element of
murder, premeditation, on the other hand, clearly focuses on
volition and intendment.'® LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law
§73 (1972). It could. therefore be entirely possible for a
defendant to suffer from cognitive impairments and yet to
premeditate and intend the results of his actions. We have
already determined above that in light of the prospective
application of the rule in Johnson II, we are not willing to
give this defendant the benefit of the newly adopted test for
legal insanity. We conclude, therefore, that a careful analysis
of the elements of the Rhode Island murder statute and the
M’Naghten test for legal insanity does not support
defendant’s argument that legal insanity and the criminal
intent for murder cannot coexist at the time of the
commission of a homicide. See Note, Constitutional
Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to
the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L.Rev. 499, 512
(1976).

We are of course fully aware that we have recently abol-
ished the M’Naghten rule in favor of the ALI Model Penal
Code test for legal insanity. State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254,
399 A.2d 469 (1979). We recognize that the new test is quali-
tatively different in its focus and emphasis from the
M’Naghten rule. The adoption of the new test was a policy
decision made in light of considerable advances in the sci-
ences of psychology and psychiatry, just as the original adop-
tion of the M’Naghten rule was based on contemporary con-
siderations of sound public policy. Because of our decision
not to apply Johnson II retroactively, we have here deter-
mined the constitutional issues involved in the burden of
proof of the insanity defense only under M’Naghten. We do
not address today the question of whether the extrinsic facts

The other components of the mens rea of murder, wilfulness, deliberation and
malice, see G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-23-1, as amended by P.L. 1974, ch.
118, §5, also focus on volitional powers, rather than on cognitive capacity. See
LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law §73 (1972).

665

necessary to establish the mens rea of premeditation and the
facts necessary to prove legal insanity under our new ALI test
are so interrelated, or overlap so substantially, as to present
constitutional problems. Our decision today does not
preclude future consideration of constitutional problems that
may inhere in the Rhode Island rule that requires a criminal
defendant, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, to estab-
lish legal insanity as defined by the new test.

IV

In his request to charge, defendant asked the trial justice to
instruct the jury on the statutory procedure for commitment
of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity. The
trial judge denied the request for this instruction without
explanation. We take note first of defendant’s admission in
his brief that the requested instruction on the disposition of
an accused after a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
misstated the law at the time of the trial. In framing the re-
quested instruction, defendant relied on G.L. 1956 (1968
Reenactment) §26-4-7.!° Three years before the trial took
place, however, the Legislature had repealed chapter 4 of
title 26 in its entirety, substituting a new chapter 4 of title 26
as enacted by P.L. 1973, ch. 175, §2. Furthermore, pertinent
provisions of the new chapter 4 of title 26 were later
amended in 1976, before the trial. 1976 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch.
203, §2, ch. 261, §1. The defendant contends that the
incorrect statement of the law was an unintentional over-
sight, which although erroneous, alerted the trial justice to
the action he desired the court to take. The defendant further
contends that the trial justice is obliged to state the law cor-
rectly and that defendant’s timely exception has placed the
merits-of-the-instruction issue properly before this court. See

1°Tf the jury finds the defendant not guilty on the ground of insanity and if the
going at large of the person so found not guilty shall be deemed by the Court
dangerous to the public peace, the Court shall certify its opinion to that effect to the
governor, who, upon the receipt of such certificate may make provision for the
maintenance and support of the person so found not guilty, and cause such person
to be removed to the criminal insane ward during the continuance of such
insanity.”

666 |

Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 274-75, 380 A.2d
349, 351 (1977).

| | We do not agree that the trial justice in this case had an

obligation to instruct the jury in accordance with the proper
statute. A trial justice has an obligation to give correct in-
structions only in regard to those rules of law that of necessity
must be applied to the issues raised at trial in order to secure a
fair trial. State v. Butler, 107 R.I. 489, 490, 268 A.2d 433,
434 (1970); see G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §8-2-38.
Rhode Island law does not require a trial justice to give in-
structions on the procedure of committing defendants found
not guilty by reason of insanity. Nor is a trial justice obliged
to correct misstatements of the law in a defendant’s request to
charge. In Violette v. Providence Ice Company, 49 R.I. 3,
139 A. 500 (1927), the plaintiff had excepted to the refusal of
the trial justice to give certain instructions and to modify
other instructions found to be inadequate. The court there
stated that “when a request to charge is denied as incorrect
the court is not bound to make and give a modification of the
charge requested.” Id. at 5, 139 A. at 501.

We believe that denial of defendant’s request to charge
would have been proper either because it was a misstatement
of the law or because no such instruction is required under
Rhode Island law. The trial justice had no obligation to
modify the charge to reflect the repeal of the old statute, the
enactment of the new statute, or its subsequent amendments.
Violette v. Providence Ice Co., supra.

Vv
The defendant finally contends that the trial justice erred
in not qualifying as an expert Dr. Jeffrey Klugman, a
medical doctor with some specialized training in psychiatry,
who had examined Arpin from May to June 1974 during
treatment at the Veterans Administration Hospital in West
Haven, Connecticut.

ee 667

Our examination of the record reveals that Dr. Klugman
received his medical degree from the University of
Pennsylvania in May 1973 and was a qualified Doctor of
Medicine when he examined Arpin and when he testified at
trial. After beginning his residency in psychiatry at the Yale
Medical School in July 1973, Dr. Klugman was assigned to
the Veterans Administration Hospital, where, with a limited
license to practice, he diagnosed and treated for various
psychological disorders a number of patients, including
Ronald Arpin. In July 1974, shortly after he treated Arpin,
he received a general license to practice in Connecticut. At
the time of the trial in November 1976, Dr. Klugman had
completed his residency and received a certificate in
psychiatry. He had set up a private practice and was a
teaching member of the Yale faculty. Although not yet
“certified” by the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology, he was at that time “Board eligible,” waiting a
prescribed period of time before taking the Board’s
examinations.

The trial justice ruled that Dr. Klugman was not qualified
as an expert to testify to his observations of Arpin at the
hospital or to offer a diagnosis based on those observations.
The defendant states in his brief that Dr. Klugman would
have been asked no hypothetical questions, nor would he
have been asked to offer an opinion on the ultimate legal
issue of defendant’s sanity vel non at the time of the
homicide. We shall assume this to be true for the purposes of
our review. The limited issue therefore is whether the trial
justice erred in refusing to allow Dr. Klugman to testify to his
observations and to offer his diagnosis.

“Whether a witness is qualified to express an expert opin-
ion is a matter which is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial justice, and the exercise of such discretion will not be
disturbed by this court on appeal absent a showing of abuse.”
Schenck v. Roger Williams General Hospital, 119 R.I. 510,
520, 382 A.2d 514, 519 (1977); see State v. Robertson, 108 R.1.

668 ee

656, 662, 278 A.2d 842, 846 (1971). In the circumstances of
this case we must hold that the trial justice abused his discre-
tion in refusing to permit Dr. Klugman to testify. Although
the record indicates some focus on Dr. Klugman’s qualifica-
tions and experience at the time he examined Arpin in 1974,
the trial justice should determine the competency of a witness
to testify as an expert based on his qualifications at the time
of the trial. Id. at 664, 278 A.2d at 847. We believe that Dr.
Klugman was properly qualified at least to relate his personal
observations and then to make a diagnosis based on those
observations. Cf. Schenck v. Roger Williams General
Hospital, 119 R.J. 510, 382 A.2d 514 (1977) (in malprac-
tice suit, cardiologist held competent to testify to patient’s
psychiatric condition as it related to issue of causation);
Lantini v. Daniels, 104 R.I. 572, 247 A.2d 298 (1968) (city
physician held competent to testify on question of police offi-
cer’s mental condition and ability to return to work).!”

We find, however, that the refusal of the trial justice does
not require reversal. After the trial justice made it clear that
he would not qualify Dr. Klugman to testify as an expert,
defendant’s counsel introduced as an offer of proof a sum-
mary of defendant’s psychiatric condition prepared by Dr.
Klugman. The trial justice denied the offer of proof. In a
similar context, in order to determine whether a trial justice’s

1We do not decide here whether Dr. Klugman was qualified to answer hypothe-
tical questions or to offer an opinion on the defendant’s sanity vel non at the time of
the homicide. In criminal cases, when the issue on which a putative expert will be
asked to offer an opinion is lack of criminal responsibility due to mental illness, the
rule of two civil cases, Schenck v. Roger Williams General Hospital, 119 R.1.
510, 382 A.2d 514 (1977) and Lantini v. Daniels, 104 R.I. 572, 247 A.2d 298
(1968), that medical doctors are competent to testify on matters of mental condi-
tion or insanity, does not control. The trial justice has discretion in a criminal trial
to require even medical doctors to demonstrate that they have some specialized
training and practical experience in the field of psychiatric disorders. See
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 367 Mass. 169, 182, 326 N.E.2d 320, 329 (1975). As ina
similar case in which the issue was the qualifications of a clinical psychologist, we
do not attempt here to delineate precise guidelines for determining what amount of
specialized training and experience in the field of mental disease will qualify a
medical doctor to express an opinion on the ultimate fact of a defendant's sanity.
See State v. Robertson, 108 R.1. 656, 662, 278 A.2d 842, 846 (1971).

ee 669

decision to exclude expert testimony constituted reversible
error, this court stated that:

“[w]e must, for the purposes of this appeal, examine the
case in light of the offer of proof in order to determine if
the rejected evidence reasonably could have altered the
result. The purpose of the offer of proof is to enable the
court to determine the materiality, relevance, and com-
petence of the evidence that was excluded upon presen-
tation so that we may determine whether defendant
was prejudiced by the exclusion.” State v. Almeida, 111
R.I. 566, 570, 304 A.2d 895, 898 (1973).

The defendant argues that because Dr. Klugmain was the
only witness who examined Arpin prior to the homicide, his
testimony would have been especially relevant and critical to
the defense. We do not feel in this case that the timing of the
examination is dispositive. The offer of proof shows the Dr.
Klugman would have testified to Arpin’s alleged paranoid
schizophrenia, his history of depression, crime, and sexual
disorders, and his satanic delusions. Our examination of the
record reveals that the testimony of Dr. Herbert Myers, Dr.
Manuel Soria, and Mr. John Racofsky clearly presented com-
parable medical and diagnostic information to the jury.’* We
conclude, therefore, that Dr. Klugman’s testimony would
have shed no new light on defendant’s mental condition
before the homicide, and its admission could not be said to
have reasonably altered the result reached by the jury. State
v. Almeida, supra.

The defendant’s exceptions are overruled, the appeal is
denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is
affirmed.

Doctor Manuel Soria, the clinical director of the forensic unit at the Rhode
Island Medical Center, examined and observed Arpin during the time he was in-
competent to stand trial, February 1975 to June 1976. John Racofsky, a clinical
psychologist affiliated with the Rhode Island Institute of Mental Health,
administered a battery of diagnostic and projective tests to Arpin on December 10,
1974, as preparation for Dr. Myers’ psychiatric interview on December 16, 1974, in
which Arpin was determined to be incompetent to stand trial. The testimony of Dr.
Soria and Mr. Racofsky supported the diagnosis of Dr. Myers that Arpin suffered
from paranoid schizophrenia.

670

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Alan R. Tate,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Chief
Appellate Attorney, John A. MacFadyen III, Lise J.
Gescheidt, Assistant Public Defenders, for defendant.

410 A.2d 1354.
Warwick ScHoot ComMMITrEe vs. GERALD T. Gipsons et al.
FEBRUARY 8, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris, Weisberger, and Murray, JJ.

671

Weispercer, J. This case is before us on appeal from a
judgment of the Superior Court which denied a petition for
mandamus brought against the defendants by the Warwick
School Committee (the committee). The parties have stipu-
lated to all facts relevant to this controversy. The most signi-
ficant facts are set forth below.

For the fiscal year, February 1, 1979, through January 31,
1980, the city council of Warwick approved a budget for the
school committee in the sum of $33,796,298.! Of this sum,
$22,557,103 were local funds raised by municipal taxes;
$10,846,789 were state funds; $83,793 were federal funds;
and $308,613 were derived from “other revenue.” Prior to
August 20, 1979, when the finance department of the city of
Warwick received typed purchase orders from the school
department, the purchasing agent would affix his signature
by rubber stamp and return the signed purchase orders to the
school department. School department representatives would
then forward the purchase orders to various vendors. Corres-
pondence beginning on August 20, 1979, between the
finance director and the superintendent of schools, disclosed
a concern on the part of the finance director regarding the
unencumbered balance of the committee budget. The
finance director refused to authorize the purchasing agent to
sign purchase orders aggregating $122,973.93 unless the
superintendent of schools either would certify that there was
a sufficient unencumbered balance in the school committee
budget to cover such purchases or would provide the finance

*The budget estimate submitted by the Warwick School Department for the same
fiscal year, February 1, 1979, through January 31, 1980, was $34,652,215.

Ce

director with information from which she could make such
determination.

The superintendent of schools declined to provide the re-
quested certification or the information from which the
finance director might make a determination, on the ground
that the elected school committee was not required to furnish
such documentation to the finance director as a condition
precedent to the approval of its purchase orders. The
committee contended that, under the Warwick City
Charter, it was charged by law with exclusive responsibility
for the care and control of the school department, and that
the finance director’s function in respect to expenditures of
the school department was purely ministerial. It further con-
tended that the finance director should not be concerned
with either the actual or potential deficit spending by the
committee, Consequently, the committee filed a complaint
for mandamus in the Superior Court seeking that the finance
director and purchasing agent be required to process the
school department purchase orders without the imposition of
any limitation or condition. -

After hearing the parties upon the stipulated facts, and
upon consideration of briefs and oral arguments, the trial
justice determined that the committee, like all other agencies
of the city, had no power to exceed its appropriation and that
it was the obligation of the finance director to ascertain and
certify “that there is a sufficient unencumbered appropria-
tion balance to pay for the items to be purchased” before
authorizing the purchasing agent to approve requisitions
from the committee. The trial justice found that he could not
determine from the stipulations and exhibits in the case whe-
ther there were in fact unencumbered funds available in the
appropriation account of the committee to cover the pro-
posed purchase orders. He held therefore that the finance
director was acting in accordance with the duties imposed
upon her by the charter of the city of Warwick and denied
the committee’s prayers for relief in its complaint for man-
damus. This appeal ensued.

a  :

We note, initially, that the city of Warwick is governed
under a legislative charter established by P.L. 1931, ch.
1852, and most recently revised by ,P.L. 1960, ch. 150,
which, after enactment by the General Assembly, was
approved by the electors of the city of Warwick in a referen-
dum held in November 1960, Article IX of this charter pro-
vides for public education. Specifically, §9-1 provides for an
elected school committee which, under §9-5, “shall deter-
mine and control all policies affecting the administration,
construction, maintenance and operation of the public
schools.” Sections 9-8 and 9-9 of the charter provide for the
submission of budget estimates and the purchase of materials
and supplies by the school committee in the following terms:

“9-8. Budget estimates.

The school committee shall submit budget estimates
in the same manner as city departments, but the budget
estimates and appropriations shall be considered by the
council in total only. The allocation of the amounts
appropriated shall be determined by the school commit-
tee.

“9-9. Purchases.

The finance department of the city shall assume all
the purchasing functions of the school committee, in
accordance with the requisitions of the school commit-
tee, and shall purchase and distribute such supplies and
materials as are required by the public schools. The
costs for such supplies and materials shall be charged
against the appropriation for the public schools.”

Article VI of the charter established the department of
finance and sets forth the duties of that department and its
director. In particular, §6-13 delineates the responsibilities of
the director of finance in respect to department requisitions
and purchase orders:

“6-13. Requisitions.
All purchases made and contracts executed by the

Ce

purchasing agent shall be pursuant to a written requisi-
tion from the head of the office, department or agency
whose appropriation will be charged, and no contract
or order shall be issued to any vendor unless and until
the director of finance certifies that there is to the credit
of such office, department or agency a sufficient unen-
cumbered appropriation balance to pay for the supplies,
materials, equipment or contractual services for which
the contract order is to be issued.” (Emphasis added.)

The provisions of the foregoing section clearly require the
director of finance to certify that there is a “sufficient unen-
cumbered appropriation balance” to pay for supplies,
materials, equipment, or services that may be the subject of
any contract or purchase order. The committee argues that
this section is inapplicable because the school committee is
not an office, department or agency within the provisions of
§6-13. This argument is resolved by the provisions of §10-21
of the charter which reads as follows:

“10-21. Definitions.

Reference in this charter in general terms to a depart-
ment or agency of the city shall include any depart-
ment, bureau, division, office, board, commission or
committee, however entitled or described, as the con-
text and subject matter may require.”

The definition section, when read together with the charter
provisions that make the finance director and purchasing
agent responsible for all purchasing functions of the school
committee, obviously brings the school committee within the
provisions of §6-13.

The committee argues that it is essentially a state agency,
since it carries out a state function under Title 16 of the Gen-
eral Laws of 1956. Nevertheless, the committee concedes that
Warwick is controlled by a legislative charter which specific-
ally sets forth the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the
school committee, as well as all other departments and agen-
cies of the municipality. We should look, therefore, to the

ee = =o

charter to discern the intention of the General Assembly in
respect to the conferring of powers upon the government of
the city of Warwick, including its school committee. See
Cummings v. Godin, 119 R.I. 325, 377 A.2d 1071 (1977).

A reading of this charter discloses a comprehensive scheme
of government in which the responsibility for policy and
management of public education is vested in an elected
school committee. This committee has’ fiscal autonomy
within certain limitations. The principal limitation upon this
fiscal autonomy lies in the inability of the committee to
appropriate its own funds or to levy a tax. Section 9-8 of the
charter requires the school committee to submit budget esti-
mates, and the ultimate appropriations must be considered
by the council “in total only.” Hence, the city council deter-
mines the total amount of the appropriation. Within that
total amount, the allocation of monies is determined by the
committee without supervision by the council or any other
officer of city government. . ‘

Nevertheless, the expenditure of funds may not exceed,
under the charter, the total amount appropriated by the
council.? There is no provision in the charter for deficit
spending by the school committee. Section 9-9 requires the
finance department to assume the purchasing functions of
the school committee. It further requires that the cost for
supplies and materials shall be charged against the
appropriation for the public schools. In carrying out this pur-
chasing function, the finance department is governed by the
provisions of §6-13, which requires that no purchase order or
contract be issued to any vendor unless the director of finance

2The question presented in Town of Scituate v. Scituate Teachers’ Association,
110 R.I, 679, 296 A.2d 466 (1972), arising out of refusal by an appropriating body
(financial town meeting) to furnish sufficient funds to implement the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement is not before us in this case. We shall reserve that
question until it is presented in an appropriate context. Similarly, the case at bar
does not raise the issue of the power of an arbitrator in furtherance of a collective
bargaining agreement to make an award which became a debt of the municipality.
Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. School Committee, 108 R.I. 444, 276
A.2d 762 (1971).

cs

certifies that there is a sufficient unencumbered appropria-
tion balance to pay for the items to be purchased. The plain
conclusion to be drawn from this provision is a prohibition
against purchases in excess of unencumbered appropriation.

Thus, despite its conditional fiscal autonomy, the commit-
tee is limited to expenditures within its appropriation. The
finance director had a legal duty to determine that there was
a sufficient unencumbered balance before honoring purchase
orders. Her request to the school committee was reasonable
in light of the stipulated fact that the school committee “can
and does incur (throughout the fiscal year) obligations which
constitute [e]Jncumbrances on the appropriated funds * * *
without the knowledge of the Finance Department.” Indeed,
the director’s request for a certification of unencumbered
appropriation balance or submission of information from
which she could make her own determination simply was de-
signed to implement performance of the duty imposed upon
her by the charter.

In recognizing the relationship between the finance
department and the committee, the trial justice was entirely
correct in his interpretation of the Warwick legislative char-
ter. He was correct, furthermore, in determining that the
finance director was acting within her responsibility and
authority in refusing to honor the purchase orders before first
ascertaining the unencumbered appropriation balance. It is
well settled that relief will be granted under a complaint for
mandamus “only where the [plaintiffs] have a clear legal
right to have the act done which is sought * * « and where
the [defendants] have a ministerial, legal duty to perform
such act without discretion to refuse.” Gormally v. Cannon,
119 R.I. 771, 776, 383 A.2d 582, 585 (1978); Demers v.
Adamson, 102 R.I. 453, 456, 231 A.2d 484, 485 (1967);
Aniello v. Marcello, 91 R.I. 198, 202-03, 162 A.2d 270, 272
(1960). In the present case, no such clear legal right to minis-
terial performance was established by the committee.
Indeed, the legal duty of the finance director was to act as she
did in this case. Therefore, the decision of the trial justice to
deny and dismiss the complaint for mandamus was fully sup-

677

ported by the stipulated facts and the conclusions of law to be
drawn therefrom.

For the reasons stated, the appeal is denied and dismissed,
the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, and the case
is remitted to the Superior Court.

Joseph A. Kelly, Albert B. West, for appellant.

William T. Murphy, Assistant City Solicitor, for appellees.

AIL A.2d 296.
In RE SusAN.
FEBRUARY 11, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

oO

es 679

Dons, J. This is an appeal by the respondent juvenile
from a decree of the Family Court adjudicating her to be
delinquent under G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §14-1-3(f)!
for having struck and injured a certified public school teacher
in violation of §11-5-7% and also from a decree placing the
respondent under the supervision of the probation depart-
ment for a period of one year on the condition that she do
some volunteer work in the community. Pending disposition
of this appeal, a stay of the probation order was granted by
this court.

The record indicates that on April 28, 1978, the East
Greenwich Police Department filed a petition in Family
Court alleging that respondent was a delinquent because she
had knowingly and willfully struck Eileen L. Geigen
(Geigen), a certified public school teacher in East Green-
wich, causing her bodily harm. Two different versions of the
incident were testified to at the hearing before a justice of the
Family Court. Geigen testified that on April 25, 1978, a
conference was held at East Greenwich High School in re-
gard to Susan’s performance in class. Present at the confer-
ence were Susan, her parents, Geigen, and other teachers,
Geigen stated that Susan, who was visibly upset, left the con-
ference and went to the school’s office where she obtained a
hallway pass in order to proceed to her physical education
class. Geigen testified that she observed Susan walking in an

‘General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §14-1-3(f) reads as follows:

“The term ‘delinquent’ when applied to a child shall mean and include
any child --
“Who has committed any offense which, if committed by an adult, would
constitute a felony + + +.”
*General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-5-7, as enacted by P.L. 1972, ch.
208, §1 reads as follows:

“Assaults of certified public school teachers - Penalty. - Any person who
shall knowingly and willfully strike a certified public school teacher causing
bodily injury while said teacher is engaged in the performance of his/her
duty shall be deemed to have committed a felony, and shall be imprisoned
not exceeding three (3) years or fined not exceeding fifteen hundred dollars
(81,500) or both.”

680 ee)

opposite direction from the location where the physical edu-
cation class was being held, and told Susan to proceed to the
gymnasium locker room. At this point, Geigen was following
Susan since, according to her, it was her responsibility to
make sure that Susan went to her physical education class. In
order to proceed to the girls’ locker room area it was neces-
sary to pass through several doors. Geigen stated that Susan
passed through one of the doors and then turned and pulled
the door shut, which caused Geigen to be caught in the door
and to yell “ouch.” Susan, according to Geigen, then held the
door pinned against her for about ten or fifteen seconds.
Geigen stated that her arm, hip, and thigh were pinned
between the door and the doorjamb, that the fingernail on
her right ringfinger was broken, and that the ringfinger
turned red and immediately began to swell. Geigen stated
that Susan then released the door, went toward the girls’
locker room door and yelled that she would punch Geigen.
Geigen testified that Susan then pinned her between the door
and doorjamb of the locker room door for about fifteen
seconds, after which Susan reported to the physical educa-
tion class. Geigen denied that she had pulled Susan’s sweater.

Geigen testified that she reported the incident to the assist-
ant principal and then visited the school nurse, who applied
ice packs to her hand and leg and advised Geigen to go to the
hospital at the end of the day. Geigen stated that at the end
of the day she reported the incident to the police and that she
was examined at the South County Hospital.

The school nurse testified that Geigen visited her on the
morning of April 25, 1978, that she observed a broken finger-
nail on her right ringfinger, which was swollen and red, and
that Geigen’s thigh was red, warm, and apparently bruised.
The nurse said that she advised Geigen to keep her leg ele-
vated, to apply ice packs, and to visit the hospital emergency
room at the end of the day.

Susan, who at the time of the hearing had finished high
school and was in the process of applying for college admis-
sion, told a different story. She admitted that Geigen had fol-

ee 681

lowed her toward the girls’ locker room. She denied that she
had pinned Geigen in either door. She stated that she never
heard the teacher say “ouch.” Susan testified that as she went
through the second door, Geigen grabbed her by the arm and
the hood of her sweater and that she then nudged Geigen and
told her “to get her hands off of me.” She denied that the
incident occurred as described by Geigen.

Gina Toro, a classmate and friend of Susan, testified that
she witnessed the incident. She stated that, although Geigen
and Susan had argued and were angry, Susan did not pin
Geigen in either of the doors. Gina testified that Geigen
grabbed Susan by the hood of her sweater.

The trial justice reviewed the testimony and stated that
since there was a conflict in the testimony, the issue was one
of credibility. He noted that “all of the witnesses appear to be
most creditable and in my mind I cannot feel that any person
or any of the witnesses in this matter are not telling it as they
best recall it.” The trial justice, continuing, stated:

“The complaining witness went to the nurse in close
enough proximity to this situation so that the Court is
satisfied that there must have been something that
occurred that caused the injury to the complaining wit-
ness. There has been absolutely no testimony to the
Court to indicate anything else that may have happened
other than as the complaining witness tells her story. If
there had been some contact between the complaining
witness and any other person, place or thing that the
Court could consider, there would possibly be some
doubt in my mind as to how this injury occurred. I am
satisfied, and I find that the petitioner was injured as
she has stated. There is no explanation other than the
facts as she has stated, and I am satisfied that it was
through the conduct of the respondent in this matter
that the complaining witness was injured, and I find
that the Town of East Greenwich has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the respondent in this case did
knowingly strike one Eileen L. Geigen, a certified pub-
lic school teacher causing her bodily injury.”

682 ee

The trial justice on March 8, 1979, entered a decree ad-
judging Susan to be delinquent - from which decree, re-
spondent has appealed. Thereafter, after receiving a present-
ence report, the trial justice entered a decree placing Susan
under the supervision of the probation department for one
year with the condition that she do some volunteer work in
the community. The respondent has also appealed from that
decree, the operation of which was stayed by this court pend-
ing disposition of respondent’s appeal.

The respondent on appeal contends that the trial justice
erred in adjudging her delinquent. She argues that since the
trial justice indicated that all the witnesses were credible,
that he could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
she had violated §11-5-7.

The petitioner states that even though the trial justice said
that he thought all of the witnesses appeared to be credible
and to be telling it as they best recalled it, he nevertheless
found that he believed Geigen’s account of the incident and
that said finding was not clearly wrong.

In a criminal prosecution the state is bound to prove each
and every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Welch, 117 R.I. 107, 109, 363 A.2d 1356, 1358
(1976); State v. Koohy, 105 R.I. 197, 201, 250 A.2d 711, 714
(1969). Juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt when charged with a crimi-
nal offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25
L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); In re Victor A. Pereira, 111 R.I. 712,
714, 306 A.2d 821, 823 (1973).

In the instant case there was clearly testimony which, if
believed, would have proved beyond a reasonable doubt
each element of the alleged violation of §11-5-7.

The question to be resolved is whether or not the trial jus-
tice indicated which evidence he believed. A trial justice’s
decision in a non-jury civil or criminal trial does not require
an exhaustive analysis of the evidence or a specific statement
of all the reasons for his conclusions. Instead it will suffice if

es 683

the decision reasonably indicates that he exercised his inde-
pendent judgment in passing on the weight of the testimony
and the credibility of the witnesses, and a decision in accor-
dance with these standards is entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed by this court unless it is incorrect as a
matter of law or is otherwise clearly wrong. State v.
Aurgemma, 116 B.I. 425, 436, 358 A.2d 46, 52 (1976). Also,
where the trier of fact expressly accepts the testimony of a
witness, which testimony is in conflict with that of another,
the acceptance of the one is an implied rejection of the other.
State v. Correia, 106 R.I. 655, 664, 262 A.2d 619, 624 (1970);
Flynn v. Pearce, 106 R.I. 323, 329, 259 A.2d 401, 404 (1969).

Hi Here, the trial justice made an exhaustive review of the
evidence and recognized that the case involved conflicting
testimony and the credibility of witnesses. It is true that be-
fore making his ultimate findings, the trial justice did state
that it was most difficult for him to find that any of the wit-
nesses were not credible and that he did not feel that any of
the witnesses were not testifying as best they could recall. We
are of the opinion that these statements were nothing more
than assurance to the witnesses that he was not accusing any
of them of deliberately lying. He then stated the basis for his
decision, which basis was his finding that the injuries sus-
tained by Geigen were verified by her visit to the school
nurse, and that in the absence of any other explanation for
her injuries, the teacher must have been injured as she had
testified. The acceptance by the trial justice of Geigen’s testi-
mony was an implied rejection of the conflicting testimony of
Susan and her friend.

Since the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive evi-
dence on a controlling issue, his decision adjudging respond-
ent delinquent is entitled to great weight and we will not dis-
turb it on appeal.

The respondent next argues that the trial justice abused his
discretion in placing respondent under the supervision of the
probation department for one year and imposing the condi-
tion that she do volunteer work in the community. She argues

684 ee)

that the order imposed was not in her best interest because
beginning in September 1979, she will be attending college in
the state of New Hampshire and that the imposed condition
of performing volunteer community work will interfere with
her college education.

The town points out that under the Interstate Compact on
Juveniles, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §14-6-1 et seq., a
compact to which New Hampshire subscribes, Susan’s proba-
tionary period could be served and supervised in New Hamp-
shire and the community work performed there, and that
consequently the condition imposed by the trial justice would
not interfere with Susan’s collegiate activities and therefore
the order was not against Susan’s best interests.

The power of the Family Court to order disposition of a
child is contained in G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §14-1-32
as amended by P.L. 1976, ch. 292, §1 which provides in part
that:

“Tf the court shall find that a child is delinquent * * *
within the provisions of this chapter, it may by order
duly entered * * *;

“Place the child on probation * * +.

Section 14-1-33 - Supervision of child placed on probation,
provides in part that:

“Whenever the court shall place a child on probation,
said court may do so upon such terms and conditions,
not inconsistent with law, as said court may deem best
for the welfare of the child « * * .”

Generally, when imposing conditions of probation, a court
is vested with broad discretion in order that the best interest
of the juvenile will be served, and its exercise of that discre-
tion will not be disturbed unless such discretion is abused. In
re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 337, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34 (1966);
see 43 C.J.S. Infants 78(b) at 292 (1978).

Here, the question of abuse of discretion by the trial justice
could arise only if the probation and conditions imposed

685

interfered with Susan’s attendance at college in New Hamp-
shire. At oral argument, we were advised that Susan is
attending college in New Hampshire and that New Hamp-
shire probation officials have agreed to supervise Susan under
the terms of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles. Since the
order of probation, including the condition of community
service, will not interfere with Susan’s college attendance, we
cannot say that the trial justice abused his discretion.

The appeal of the respondent is denied and dismissed, the
decrees appealed from are sustained, the stay heretofore
entered is vacated and the case is remanded to the Family
Court.

A. Earl Shaw, Jr., Town Solicitor, for petitioner.

Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Gerald C. DeMaria, for
respondent.

686

411 A.2d 300.

Ruope IsLanp CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 0S.
Mary C. Hackert, Direcror,
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.

FEBRUARY 13, 1980.
Pnesenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

687

Beviacgua, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of certi-
orari filed by defendant pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1969 Reen-
actment) §8-1-2 and G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment)
§42-35-16 to review a Superior Court judgment.

The facts are not in dispute. The Rhode Island Chamber of
Commerce pursuant to §42-35-8 requested the Director of
Employment Security to rule on the effect of the Governor’s
decision authorizing the suspension of the one-week waiting
period required by G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-44-14
on future filings for unemployment benefits within that
benefit year. The Governor, during the blizzard of 1978, in
accordance with §28-44-15, declared a state of emergency
and authorized the Director to suspend the waiting week re-
quirement with respect to unemployment resulting from the
blizzard.

The Director’s declaratory ruling stated that the suspended
waiting period was to be regarded as operative during the

SS

whole benefit year regardless of whether the unemployed
claimants returned to work after the emergency passed and
then refiled after being laid off again from their jobs.

As a result of said ruling, the Chamber of Commerce
(plaintiff) filed a complaint in the Superior Court. The
Superior Court based its jurisdiction on §42-35-15(a) of the
Administrative Procedures Act and reversed the Director’s
ruling. The Director (defendant) then filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with this court.

I
Initially this court must decide whether the Superior Court
had jurisdiction under §42-35-15(a) to review a declaratory
ruling.

The defendant argues that the trial court was without
jurisdiction because the respondent had not exhausted its ad-
ministrative remedies as required by §42-35-15(a) of the
Administrative Procedures Act and outlined in §28-44-43 and
§28-44-47 of the Employment Security Act. The defendant
further contends that the proper procedure is to follow the
section of the Employment Security Act that expressly allows
for an appeal from a declaratory ruling to the board of
review. General Laws 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-44-47.
We disagree.

The general rule in administrative law is that judicial re-
view is only available after all administrative remedies have
been exhausted. While §42-35-15(a) of the Administrative
Procedures Act states the general rule, it also states in perti-
nent part:

“Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
act or ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in
which review of the final agency decision would not
provide an adequate remedy.”

We read this sentence as an exception to the general rule.
Thus, when an inadequate remedy would result from requir-
ing a party to exhaust all available administrative remedies,
judicial review is immediately available.

a «

Is The trial justice concluded that the remedies available to
both plaintiff and defendant at the administrative level were
not adequate and thus assumed jurisdiction under
§42-35-15(a) to review and to decide the issue.

The trial justice found that if he were to remand the case
to the board of review, benefits would have to be paid until a
final determination could be reached. Because of the large
number of anticipated filings, he considered the matter a
pressing one having the potential to create hardships for all
parties. He then concluded that because of these circum-
stances the remedy suggested by defendant was inadequate
and that failure to consider the complaint would deprive the
plaintiff of a proper remedy. We believe that such a conclu-
sion was reasonable and therefore hold that the Superior
Court had jurisdiction to consider the complaint without re-
quiring plaintiff to exhaust its administrative remedies.

Il

Turning to the substantive issue raised by this petition for
certiorari, we are asked to determine whether an unem-
ployed person claiming benefits under the Employment
Security Act must serve a “waiting period” in any benefit
year in which the Governor, on account of a state of emer-
gency, has suspended the “waiting period” for the filing of an
unemployment claim in that year.

General Laws 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-44-14(3) of
the Employment Security Act requires that an eligible indi-
vidual claiming benefits under the Act must serve a “waiting
period” (defined in §28-44-14(1)) in any “benefit year” (de-
fined in §28-42-3(12)) prior to receiving such benefits. Sec-
tion 28-44-15! creates an exception to this general rule.

1General Laws 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-44-15 provides:

“Emergency suspension of waiting period requirement. -- If the governor,
upon the occurrence of a disaster, declares that a state of emergency exists,
the governor may then authorize the director to suspend the waiting week
requirement with respect to unemployment resulting directly from such
disaster; provided, however, that such action taken by the director shall
remain in effect only until the governor declares the emergency at an end.”

60 ee

The defendant argues that, pursuant to §28-44-15 and
Rule XX of the Employment Security Rules, once a claimant
files for benefits in a period during which the requirement of
a “waiting period” is suspended under §28-44-15, the
“waiting period” is also satisfied with respect to any subse-
quent refiling of claims for unemployment benefits within
the “benefit year” commenced by the original filing. The
plaintiff contends that the waiting period requirement is sus-
pended only for the duration of the emergency, that the sec-
tion is merely a specific exception to the general statutory
scheme, and that the Legislature, in enacting §28-44-15,
intended only to give immediate aid during a state emer-
gency, not to relieve claimants of the waiting period require-
ment with respect to other claims within the benefit year
triggered by the initial filing. We agree with plaintiff.

The issue before us is one of the statutory construction to
be given to §28-44-15. In construing a statute, this court must
give effect to all parts of the statute, if reasonably possible, in
keeping with its declared purpose. Carey v. Clark, 82 R.I.
412, 111 A.2d 238 (1955). Additionally, the words used must
be given their ordinary and customary meaning unless a con-
trary intention appears on the face of the statute. Andreozzi
v. D’Antuono, 113 R.I. 155, 319 A.2d 16 (1974). If the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and expresses
a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is pre-
sumed to be the Legislature’s intended meaning and the stat-
ute must be interpreted literally. See, e.g., Brier Mfg, Co. v.
Norberg, 119 R.I. 317, 322, 377 A.2d 345, 348 (1977);
Podborski v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co., 109 B.I. 1, 8, 279
A.2d 914, 918 (1971); Cataldo v. Pono, 89 R.1. 240, 242, 152
A.2d 98, 99 (1959).

In the instant case, the Employment Security Act clearly
and unambiguously states that “[b]enefits shall be payable to
an eligible individual only for those weeks of his unemploy-
ment within a benefit year which occur subsequent to one (1)
waiting period, which shall be served at any time during the
benefit year.” General Laws 1956 (1979 Reenactment)
§28-44-14(3). The only exception is found in §28-44-15. It

Ss

empowers the governor, in the event he declares a state of
emergency, to authorize the director of employment security
to suspend the waiting week requirement.

Our review of the language of §28-44-15 indicates that the
Legislature clearly intended to allow the suspension of the
normally required waiting period only for the unemployment
claims brought under strictly limited circumstances. First,
there must be the “occurrence of a disaster” and the governor
must declare a state of emergency. The governor “may” then
authorize the director of employment security to suspend the
waiting period with respect to unemployment claims, but
only those resulting “directly” from the disaster. Section
28-44-15 further provides that such suspension shall be effec-
tive “only until the governor declares the emergency at an
end.” There is no indication in the language of §28-44-15 that
the suspension of the waiting period, once in effect for disas-
ter related claims, should apply to any subsequent unem-
ployment claims filed in the same benefit year and arising
after the governor declares the state of emergency at an end.
By limiting the power to suspend the waiting period to unem-
ployment claims “directly” resulting from a disaster and to
the time frame of the state of emergency, the Legislature
obviously intended §28-44-15 to aid disaster victims but not
otherwise to alter or to waive the prerequisites to the receipt
of any later claimed benefits under the Employment Security
Act.

In our view, therefore, §28-44-15 cannot be construed as
waiving, in any benefit year commenced by a filing during
suspension of the normal waiting period, the waiting week
requirement of §28-44-14(3) with respect to subsequent
claims unrelated to the disaster.

The petitioner further argues that Rule XX? of the Em-

*Section C of Rule XX of the Employment Security Rules states in pertinent part:

“Bvery otherwise eligible individual who has already served a waiting
period for the benefit year during which he claims benefits, or who has
otherwise fulfilled the requirements of Section 28-44-14, must, in order to
receive benefits for any week of total unemployment:

ee

ployment Security Rules regarding waiting period credit
allows the waiting week requirement of §28-44-14 to be
“otherwise fulfilled.” She claims that a suspension of the
waiting period requirement pursuant to §28-44-15 is just
such an alternative method of satisfying §28-44-14.

This argument is without merit and amounts to adminis-
trative bootstrapping. Through the rule-making power out-
lined in §28-42-34, the board of review may adopt rules and
regulations interpreting the Employment Security Act. The
board cannot, however, modify the unambiguous require-
ments contained in the statute in such a way as to frustrate
the clear intent of the Legislature. See Little v. Conflict of
Interest Commission, 121 R.I. 232, 236, 397 A.2d 884,
886 (1979). To permit Rule XX to redefine the scope of these
statutory provisions would impermissibly thwart the power
of the General Assembly to legislate specific requirements.
Statewide Multiple Listing Service, Inc. v. Norberg, 120
R.I. 987, 941, 392 A.2d 371, 373 (1978); Petrarca v. Tax
Administrator, 113 R.I. 449, 457, 322 A.2d 621, 625 (1974).
See generally 1 Cooper, State Administrative Law 176-77
(1965); Note, Administrative Law in Rhode Island: The Judi-
ciary’s Search for a Path Toward Efficient Democratic
Government, 13 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 553, 576-79 (1979).
Accordingly, “where a regulation is plainly inconsistent with
the operative language of the statute it must be declared in-
valid.” Brier Mfg. Co. v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 317,323, 377
A.2d 345, 349 (1977). Insofar as Rule XX and the Director’s
interpretation of that rule endorse an alternative method of
fulfilling the waiting week requirement established in the
statutory scheme, the rule and the interpretation must fall.

Therefore, we hold that the waiting period mandated by
G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-44-14(3) must be served

1. Report in person at the appropriate office of the Department of
Employment Security during such week;

2. File his claim for such benefits in accordance with the procedures of
the said department; and

3. Register for work.” (Emphasis added.)

693

on a subsequent unemployment claim during any benefit
year when the original filing of a claim was for a period dur-
ing which the waiting period was suspended under
§28-44-15.

The petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed, and the
records certified to this court are ordered returned to the
Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon.

All A.2d 308.
Strate vs. ARAM K, BERBERIAN.
FEBRUARY 15, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

ee) 695

Weispercer, J. This appeal is before us on a denial of a
motion to dismiss a criminal complaint for reckless driving on
grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The
travel of the case and pertinent facts are as follows.

The defendant was initially charged in the Sixth Division
District Court with reckless driving, obstructing justice, and
refusing to yield to an emergency vehicle, all of which events
allegedly took place on April 11, 1972. The charges arise, in
defendant’s terms, out of “a traffic altercation with Sheriffs
van No. 10, on interstate route 195 in the city of
Providence.” A trial in the District Court on the charge of
refusing to yield to an authorized emergency vehicle resulted
in a finding of not guilty by the trial justice. Jury trials were
claimed on the charges of reckless driving and obstructing
justice. These cases were tried in the Superior Court for the
County of Providence on January 3, 1973. The trial resulted
in a verdict of not guilty on the charge of obstructing justice
and a verdict of guilty on the reckless driving charge. During
the post-verdict polling of the jury, a question was raised
regarding the hearing ability of one of the jurors. The
defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the juror
was so deficient in hearing ability as to be unable to perform
the function necessary to afford defendant a right to a fair
trial. The defendant also moved in the alternative that a thir-
teenth or alternate juror who had previously been excused be
substituted for the juror whose hearing was deficient. Both
motions were denied, and defendant was sentenced to serve
fifteen days at the Adult Correctional Institutions for the
offense of reckless driving. On appeal this court, being
equally divided, first affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court. State v. Berberian, 113 R.I. 521, 324 A.2d 330
(1974).2

‘The testimony given by state’s witnesses at trial indicated that the defendant
drove his station wagon between a sheriff's bus or van carrying prisoners and the
lead car of a three-vehicle convoy. (All three vehicles bore flashing lights.) Testi-
mony further indicated that although the defendant slowed down in front of the
bus, he blocked attempts by the bus driver to pass him. On the Wickenden Street
exit ramp from route 195, the defendant maneuvered alongside the bus in such a
fashion as to force the bus into the curbing which lined the exit ramp.

2On this appeal only four justices took part in the decision.

696 |

Later in 1976, defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus
before a full court which quashed the judgment of the
Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings on the ground that “the juror’s deafness may have
adversely affected his ability to decide the case intelligently.”
The case was remanded “for further proceedings.” State v.
Berberian, 118 R.I. 413, 420-21, 374 A.2d 778, 782 (1977).

Upon remand to the Superior Court, defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the reckless driving complaint on a number
of grounds, including the grounds of double jeopardy and
collateral estoppel. The motion to dismiss was denied and
defendant immediately appealed, prior to the trial of the
case.

The defendant asserts that he has a right to appeal from
the denial of his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds, even though such denial does not constitute a final
judgment. In support of this assertion, he cites Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651
(1977). Although the Court in that case was construing statu-
tory provisions conferring appellate jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §1291, Mr. Chief Justice Burger appeared to base the
majority opinion of the Court at least in part on constitution-
al grounds:

“Finally, the rights conferred on a criminal accused
by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly
undermined if appellate review of double jeopardy
claims were postponed until after conviction and sen-
tence. To be sure, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
an individual against being twice convicted for the same
crime, and that aspect of the right can be fully vindi-
cated on an appeal following final judgment, as the
Government suggests. However, this Court has long
recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an
individual against more than being subjected to double
punishments. It is a guarantee against twice being put
to trial for the same offense.” (Emphasis in original.)
431 U.S. at 660-61, 97 S. Ct. at 2041, 52 L. Ed. 2d at
660-61.

es 697

Since the full complex of rights under the Fifth Amendment
ban on double jeopardy has been made applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct.
2056, 23 L, Ed. 2d 707 (1969), we assume that an immediate
appeal on nonfrivolous double jeopardy claims would be
necessary in order to vindicate those rights fully. Therefore,
the appeal on the double jeopardy aspects of the case is prop-
erly before us.

; | Regarding the merits of the appeal, defendant claims that
reprosecution is barred in this case because his trial was ter-
minated without manifest necessity as that term has been de-
fined in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.
Ed. 165 (1824), and subsequent cases, including Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S. Ct. 1033, 10 L. Ed. 2d 100
(1963), and United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S. Ct.
547, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1971). Generally those cases have
established the proposition that to declare a mistrial over the
objection of the defendant in the absence of manifest neces-
sity is a violation of the defendant's valued right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal. It should be noted
that in the case at bar defendant moved in the trial court for
a mistrial and only in the alternative for the substitution of a
thirteenth juror in place of the one whose hearing was alleged
to have been impaired (a possibility that would have been
speculative at best at the time when the substitution was re-
quested) .? In light of this motion for mistrial by defendant, a

‘It should be noted that at the time the impairment of hearing first came to the
attention of the court, a verdict had already been rendered in the case and the
thirteenth juror had been excused prior to submission of the case to the jury for deli-
beration. Counsel for defendant moved for a mistrial immediately after interrogat-
ing the juror about his hearing on Thursday, January 4, 1973. It was not until
‘Tuesday, January 9 that the motion to substitute was made. By this time not only
had the thirteenth or alternate juror been excused and discharged, but the entire
jury had been excused and discharged. We agree with the trial justice that substitu-
tion of a juror previously excused after a verdict had been rendered would have
been of extremely doubtful legal validity, even if it proved to be practicable to have
obtained the physical presence of the previously discharged jurors. Without ex-
hausting the probabilities, we note it would have been extremely difficult for a
juxor who had not participated in deliberations to make a meaningful contribution

698 ee

segment of Justice Harlan’s opinion in United States v. Jorn
becomes most pertinent.

“Tf that right to go to a particular tribunal is valued,
it is because, independent of the threat of bad-faith con-
duct by judge or prosecutor, the defendant has a signifi-
cant interest in the decision whether or not to take the
case from the jury when circumstances occur which
might be thought to warrant a declaration of mistrial.
Thus, where circumstances develop not attributable to
prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the
defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove
any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant’s
motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial
error.” 400 U.S. at 485, 91S. Ct. at 557, 27 L. Ed. 2d at
556. (Emphasis added.)

In this case there is not the slightest suggestion of prosecu-
torial or judicial overreaching. No contention is made that
the juror’s hearing defect was known prior to the polling of

to reconsider a verdict that had already been agreed upon by eleven other jurors.
The defendant directs us to no case in which this anomalous procedure has been
utilized or to which it has even been referred. Our own research has disclosed no
such case. On principle, we believe that the trial justice was correct in rejecting this
alternative.

The defendant cited in support of the concept of substitution of an alternate juror
People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 552 P.2d 742, 131 Cal, Rptr. 782 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1077, 97 S. Ct. 820, 50 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1977). The Supreme Court
of California did permit substitution of an alternate juror after commencement of
deliberations in a case in which a juror had been discharged for good cause.
However, the substitution was made before verdict. Other courts have refused to
permit substitution of an alternate juror once deliberations have begun. United
States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100, 224
N.E.2d 710, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1966). This latter view is supported by commentary
contained in 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal §388 at 52
(1969), interpreting Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that alternate jurors “shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider
its verdict.” Rule 24(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“A juror whose name has not been drawn shall be discharged.” The ABA Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury §2.7 (Approved
draft, 1968), recommends substitution of an alternate juror only prior to the time
the jury retires to deliberate. It is not necessary for us to decide this latter issue in
the context of the instant case, since none of the foregoing authorities would even
obliquely suggest the substitution of a juror after verdict.

| 609

jurors after verdict. Thus, the bar to reprosecution is com-
pletely removed by defendant’s having moved for the mistrial
and having had his conviction set aside as a result of trial
error in the failure to grant the same. It has generally been
held that the ban on double jeopardy does not preclude the
reprosecution of a defendant whose conviction is set aside be-
cause of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction.
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 84S. Ct. 1587, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 448 (1964). Thus, both on the principle that defend-
ant’s motion for mistrial waives any assertion of bar to re-
prosecution, and on the principle that the setting aside of a
conviction for trial error does not bar reprosecution, defend-
ant’s claim that his rights under the double jeopardy clause of
the Fifth Amendment were violated by the trial justice’s
denial of his motion to dismiss must fail.

The defendant also raises the issue that his acquittal by one
District Court on the charge of failing to “grant right of way
upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency
vehicle,” collaterally estops the state from prosecuting him on
a charge of reckless driving. The doctrine of collateral estop-
pel was applied to state criminal prosecutions by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 90S. Ct. 1189, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970). The essen-
tial holding of that case could be summed up in the following
excerpt:

“ ‘Collateral estoppel’ is an awkward phrase, but it
stands for an extremely important principle in our
adversary system of justice. It means simply that when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be liti-
gated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”
Id. at 443, 90 S. Ct. at 1194, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 475.

| The Court went on to say that in order to determine
whether collateral estoppel applied, it would be necessary to
examine the record of a prior proceeding, take into account
the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter,
and then conclude whether a rational trier of fact could have

TT

700 |

grounded its decision upon an issue other than that which the
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. When we
apply this doctrine to the case at bar, it becomes most appar-
ent that a rational trier of fact could well have based a deci-
sion of acquittal in the District Court upon the issue raised in
the complaint, namely, whether defendant failed to grant a
right-of-way to an authorized emergency vehicle. In this re-
gard it would become a vital issue.to determine whether the
sheriffs bus or van was an authorized emergency vehicle
under G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §31-1-3(k) as it was set
forth prior to the amendment by P.L. 1973, ch. 252, §1. This
element is totally absent from and not necessarily pertinent to
the present charge of reckless driving. Therefore, the trial
justice was correct in denying defendant's motion to dismiss
on the ground of collateral estoppel.

The defendant in his appeal raises another question that
does not relate to the issue of double jeopardy. This issue
would not come within the exception of Abney v. United
States, supra, which allows an appeal from other than a final
judgment solely on double jeopardy grounds. Thus, defend-
ant’s claim that it was error to transfer his motions from
Providence County to Kent County without his consent will
not be considered at this time, since the ruling was purely of
an interlocutory nature.

For the reasons stated, the appeal is denied and dismissed,
the order appealed from is affirmed, and the case is re-
manded to the Superior Court for a new trial on the criminal
complaint for reckless driving.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Daniel Schrock,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Samuel A. Olevson, for defendant.

70.

=

411 A.2d 304,
Frep Borozny vs. CLAUDETTE A. PAINE, TREASURER.
FEBRUARY 15, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

WeisBercER, J. This case comes before us on appeal from
an order of the Superior Court, which order held the plaintiff
in contempt for failure to comply with a previous order of the
Superior Court which had required the plaintiff to correct
certain housing code violations in respect to a house owned
by him in the town of Lincoln. This dispute has had a long
and tortuous history in our judicial system. The salient fea-
tures are as follows.

On July 10, 1970, the Minimum Housing Inspector of the
town of Lincoln sent plaintiff a notice of housing code viola-
tions in respect to the subject premises. The violations were
not corrected. On March 20, 1974, the town Building and
Minimum Housing Inspectors issued an order to demolish
plaintiff's building. The plaintiff brought the present action
to enjoin the demolition. A justice of the Superior Court en-
joined the town from demolishing the building but ordered
that plaintiff bring his property into compliance with the
standards of the code by September 15, 1974. This order was
entered on May 21, 1974, by consent. On March 11, 1975,
the town filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint. The town
alleged that plaintiff had failed to comply with the consent
order, and requested vacation of the order and forfeiture of
the security that plaintiff had posted to cover demolition
costs. On May 6, 1976, another justice of the Superior Court
entered a modified order, also by consent, which set Septem-
ber 18, 1976, as the new deadline for completion of repairs.
The required repairs were not accomplished, and on July 6,
1977, the town solicitor moved to adjudge plaintiff in con-
tempt and sought permission to demolish the building.

On August 26, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the
order of May 6, 1976, on the ground that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. He based this claim upon an

ee) 703

allegation that the minimum housing standards ordinance
was invalid by reason of defective procedure in its adoption
and failure to conform to the enabling legislation. The trial
justice denied plaintiff's motion to vacate the prior order and
granted the town’s motion to hold plaintiff in contempt of
court. On December 7, 1977, a written order was entered ad-
judging plaintiff in contempt, ordering him to turn over to
his attorney the keys to his building, ordering an inspection,
and allowing plaintiff to purge himself of contempt by pre-
senting a reasonable plan for repair and rehabilitation of his
building. The order also provided that if plaintiff did not
purge himself of contempt, the building would be demol-
ished. The plaintiff appeals from this order.

In his appeal plaintiff asserts lack of subject matter juris-
diction in the Superior Court to enter the order of May 6,
1976, by reason of the alleged invalidity of the Lincoln mini-
mum housing standards ordinance.

HH The general rule is that collateral attack upon an order is
not allowed on review of a judgment of civil contempt for
disobedience of the order. When the court has jurisdiction of
the parties and of the subject matter, a party will not be per-
mitted to urge in defense of his alleged misconduct that the
court erred in entering the order. Hartt v. Hartt, 121
R.I. 220, 224-5, 397 A.2d 518, 521 (1979); Menard v.
Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild-AFT 951, 117 R.1. 121, 129-30,
363 A.2d 1349, 1354 (1976); Brown v. Brown, 114 R.I1. 117,
119, 329 A.2d 200, 201 (1974); Dupras v. Dupras, 103 B.I.
239, 240-41, 236 A.2d 260, 261 (1967); Ciallella v. Ciallella,
81 R.I. 320, 325-26, 103 A.2d 77, 79 (1954); Starkweather v.
Williams, 31 R.I. 134, 135, 76 A. 662, 663 (1910); see Walker
v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87S. Ct. 1824, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 1210 (1967); United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947).
As we pointed out in Hartt v. Hartt, supra, “This is really
another statement of the rule that a valid final judgment,
even though erroneous, is not subject to collateral attack.”
121 R.I. at 225, 397 A.2d at 521.

704 es

In the case at bar, the order of May 21, 1974, which re-
quired that repairs to the property be made, was entered by
consent. The order of May 6, 1976, which extended the dead-
line for completion of repairs, was also entered by consent.
The issue of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction was not
raised until the motion to vacate was filed on August 26,
1977. Later, on October 5, 1977, plaintiff filed an amended
complaint by permission of the court and reiterated the issue
of the ordinance’s invalidity. Lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion is the only basis upon which the earlier consent orders
could have been collaterally attacked. See Hartt v. Hartt,
121 BI. at 225, 397 A.2d at 521; Mayer v. Mayer, 36 Del.
Ch. 457, 463-64, 132 A.2d 617, 621 (1957); 1B Moore’s Fed-
eral Practice (0.405[4.--1] at 635 (2d ed. 1974). The thrust of
plaintiff's argument is based upon the alleged invalidity of
the Lincoln ordinance. He contends that the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Superior Court is controlled by the validity
of the ordinance that is enforced by the order. This conten-
tion is clearly without merit.

In Walker v. City of Birmingham, supra, the petitioners
were enjoined from participating in or encouraging mass
street parades without having obtained a permit as required
by the Birmingham parade ordinance. They violated the in-
junction and were brought before the Alabama circuit court
to show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt.
At the contempt hearing, the petitioners sought to challenge
the constitutionality of the injunction and the ordinance
upon which it was based. The circuit judge refused to hear
the contentions of unconstitutionality and found the peti-
tioners in contempt. In passing upon the contempt finding,
the Supreme Court of the United States, although conceding
that substantial constitutional issues might have been raised
concerning the generality of the language contained in the
Birmingham parade ordinance and the breadth and vague-
ness of the injunction itself, refused to permit a collateral
attack upon the injunction by way of a challenge to the con-
tempt order. The Court pointed out that the Alabama tri-
bunal had, as a court of equity, jurisdiction over the peti-

705

tioners and over the subject matter of the controversy. This
jurisdiction was not vitiated by reason of a constitutional
challenge to the ordinance upon which the injunction was
based. Similarly in the case at bar, the Superior Court’s
jurisdiction of the subject matter did not depend upon the
validity of the Lincoln housing ordinance. Perhaps this prin-
ciple is best stated in Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 42S.
Ct. 277, 66 L. Ed. 550 (1922):

“An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general
jurisdiction with equity powers upon pleadings properly
invoking its action, and served upon persons made par-
ties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed
by them however erroneous the action of the court may
be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity
of a seeming but void law going to the merits of the case.
It is for the court of first instance to determine the ques-
tion of the validity of the law, and until its decision is re-
versed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by
a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be
respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of its
lawful authority, to be punished.” Id. at 189-90, 42 S.
Ct. at 280-81, 66 L. Ed. at 559.

The plaintiff sought relief from the Superior Court by a
complaint that asked that the town be enjoined from demol-
ishing his building. The Superior Court is a trial court of
general jurisdiction and has been clothed by the Legislature
with “exclusive original jurisdiction of suits and proceedings
of an equitable character and of statutory proceedings fol-
lowing the course of equity.” General Laws 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §8-2-13; see Concannon v. Concannon, 116
R.I. 323, 328, 356 A.2d 487, 491 (1976). The court’s equit-
able powers were supplemented by G.L. 1956 (1970 Reen-
actment) §45-24.2-8, which specifically authorized the
Superior Court to proceed according to the course of equity
“to order the repair, vacation or demolition of any dwelling
existing in violation of the provisions of any ordinance * * *

706 CO

adopted pursuant to the authority hereof.”! Therefore, there
can be no question of the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to
determine the validity of the ordinance in question and, if the
ordinance is found to be valid, to enforce its provisions.

Inherent in the jurisdiction to determine the validity of an
ordinance is the possibility that a court may reach an errone-
ous determination. However, a collateral attack is not per-
mitted upon a final judgment, even though it may be alleged
to be erroneous. This rule is followed even in cases in which
the error is egregious. Kriesel v. Kriesel, 835 Wis. 2d 134, 139,
150 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1967). The Supreme Court of the
United States has aptly stated this principle in Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S, 56, 68 S. Ct. 401, 92 L. Ed. 476 (1948):

“Tt would be a disservice to the law if we were to depart
from the long-standing rule that a contempt proceeding
does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual
basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and
thus become a retrial of the original controversy. The
procedure to enforce a court’s order commanding or for-
bidding an act should not be so inconclusive as to foster
experimentation with disobedience.” Id. at 69, 68 S. Ct.
at 408, 92 L. Ed. at 487.

Thus, in view of the posture in which this case is presented to
us, we are precluded from reviewing the validity of the
Lincoln ordinance, though we observe that it was purpor-
tedly adopted in accordance with the provisions of the en-
abling legislation.

The plaintiff also challenges the contempt finding on the
ground that his disobedience was not willful. In light of the
plaintiff's failure over a period in excess of three years to
comply with orders to which he had given his consent, it can
scarcely be contended that the Superior Court was clearly

’The authority to enforce such ordinances was conferred upon the District Court
by P.L. 1977, ch. 277, §5. However, P.L. 1977, ch. 277, §7 provides that all
proceedings commenced prior to the amendment’s effective date of October 1,
1977, shall be governed by the law in effect prior to that date. The present
proceedings are thus unaffected by this transfer of jurisdiction.

es

wrong in finding that the plaintiff had not established inabil-
ity to perform or any other justification for noncompliance.
See Hartt v. Hartt, 121 R.I. at 231, 397 A.2d at 524;
Andrews v. Andrews, 134 Vt. 47, 349 A.2d 239 (1975). The
questions of willfulness and ability to perform are essentially
questions of fact. A determination of such facts by a trial jus-
tice is entitled to great weight and cannot be set aside by this
court unless the trial justice is clearly wrong. Menard, 117
RI. at 129, 363 A.2d at 1354; Abilheira v. Faria, 102 R.I.
214, 219, 229 A.2d 758, 762 (1967). In the case at bar the evi-
dence amply supports the factual findings of the trial justice.

For the reasons stated, the appeal is denied and dismissed,
the order appealed from is affirmed, and the case is re-
manded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

George M. Prescott, Oster, Fay, Groff & Prescott, for
plaintiff.

John Quattrocchi III, Town Solicitor, for defendant.

411 A.2d 912.
Coventry ScHoo CoMMITTEE vs. ALBIN RicuTarik ef al.
FEBRUARY 29, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Ketiener, J. This litigation involves a dispute between
various officials of the town of Coventry. Their disagreement
concerns the school committee’s right to retain the services of
an attorney who is not part of the town solicitor’s staff. The
disputants first reached the courthouse when on March 3,
1977, the committee filed a civil action in the Superior Court
asking that the town treasurer, the town manager, and the
town council be enjoined from interfering with the commit-
tee’s selection of a counsel of its own choice. The committee’s
complaint also sought a writ of mandamus that would have

ee

directed the treasurer to honor certain vouchers or payment
orders presented to the treasurer by the committee. The trea-
surer, manager, and council responded with an answer to the
complaint as well as both a counterclaim seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief and a third-party complaint naming the
committee’s attorney, Arthur G. Capaldi (Capaldi), as a
defendant and seeking a monetary: judgment against him in
the event the position they espoused was ultimately sus-
tained.

The controversy was submitted to a Superior Court justice
by way of an agreed statement of facts to which were
attached a number of exhibits that were jointly offered by the
litigants. Among the exhibits is a copy of the town’s charter.
On April 4, 1977, the trial justice, in a bench decision, ruled
that the charter permitted the committee to hire an attorney
for the sole purpose of advising the committee. The trial jus-
tice also declared that in all matters involving litigation, the
committee must be represented by the solicitor. As the trial
justice expanded on his original observations, he went on to
point out that the committee could hire an attorney who
might act either as a negotiator when the committee was en-
gaged in collective bargaining with any union that repre-
sented the school employees or as an arbitrator who has been
designated by the committee to participate in the precontract
and postcontract phases of arbitration.

The treasurer, manager, and council have taken appeals
from the judgment in favor of the committee and the dismis-
sal of their counterclaim and third-party complaint, while
the committee is before us on a cross-appeal, in which it chal-
lenges the correctness of the trial justice’s limited view of
what the committee’s counsel could or could not do.

The stipulated facts indicate that during the years 1973,
1974, and 1975 the relationships between the solicitor’s office
and the school committee were harmonious. The different
solicitors in office during this period or their designees served
the committee’s legal needs.! However, after the November
~The services rendered during 1973 and 1974 were paid from the committee’s
budget. In March 1975, the then solicitor retained Capaldi as the committee's

attorney. Capaldi was paid $1,250 a month, and the payment was made from the
solicitor’s budget.

10

1976 municipal election, a change in solicitors occurred, and
on November 11, 1976, the committee voted to retain
Capaldi, who was an assistant to the outgoing solicitor, as its
chief negotiator on all union contracts and made it clear that
he was to continue to act as the committee’s attorney. The
committee noted that the “present monthly retainer shall be
the same.” The monthly retainer amounted to $1,250.

Thereafter, the council voted to remove Capaldi and did
in fact appoint Bennett R. Gallo (Gallo) to the office of assist-
ant to the solicitor and specifically ordered Gallo to act as the
committee’s attorney. The committee made it clear that it
was completely satisfied with the legal services it was receiv-
ing.

The town’s annual financial meeting was held in February
1977, and the electors approved a budget which included a
$15,000 appropriation for the committee’s legal expenses.
The budget, as approved, also provided for a $15,900 salary
for the assistant solicitor whom the council had designated as
the committee’s attorney. When Capaldi made the fact
known to the committee that his retainers were no longer
forthcoming, the committee took action.

On or about the second of March 1977, the committee sub-
mitted its payroll to the treasurer. One of the payroll items
was a $4,500 proposed payment to Capaldi. The treasurer re-
fused to honor the committee’s request, and within a matter
of days most of Coventry’s officialdom was headed for Kent
County Superior Court. On March 3, a restraining order was
entered against the treasurer from interfering with the “law-
ful payment” of the school department payroll. The payroll
was processed, and six days later Capaldi received $3,750? of
his overdue retainers.

*The record fails to explain why the school committee was seeking a payment of
$4,500. It appears that at the time Capaldi spoke to the committee about the
retainer stoppage, he was speaking of services rendered in December 1976, January
1977, and February 1977. The $3,750 payment he received would amount to re-
tainers for three months, leaving unexplained the $750 balance.

Eee

The solution to this controversy can be found after a con-
sideration of the various portions of Coventry's town charter
and a review of past pronouncements of this court as they
relate to the powers and duties of a municipal school commit-
tee. The Coventry charter was adopted by the citizens in a
referendum held on November 7, 1972. The charter was to
become effective on January 1, 1973. The parties have stipu-
lated that the General Assembly by its passage of P.L. 1973,
ch. 4, “expressly ratified, confirmed and validated and
enacted in all respects the entire Home Rule Charter.”

Section 4.07 delineates the committee’s powers and duties.
This section makes it clear that the school committee is to
have “all the powers and perform all the duties prescribed by
the laws of the state.” While the committee must submit
budget estimates to the manager, the allocations of amounts
appropriated rests within the sole discretion of the school
committee; and the council’s power over the committee’s
budget is restricted to modifying the total amount of the bud-
get. The committee is charged, however, with the responsi-
bility of cooperating with the treasurer so that this office can
carry out its responsibilities.

Article VII of the charter concerns the solicitorship, and,
insofar as it is relevant to this intragovernmental tug of war,
it refers to his duties and his opinions in the following
fashion:

(1) “The town solicitor shall serve as chief legal advisor to
the council and to the town manager;

(2) “[t]he town solicitor shall appear for and protect the
rights of the town in all actions, suits, or proceedings, civil or
criminal, in law or equity, brought by or against it, or for or
against any of its departments, offices or agencies, including
the council, the manager and the school committee;

(3) “{t]he town solicitor shall also perform such other
duties, appropriate to his office, as the council and the man-
ager may require;

1 es

(4) “[t]he town solicitor shall examine and approve the
form of all ordinances and resolutions, of all invitations to
bid, contracts, and other legal documents issued by any de-
partment, office or agency of the town;

(5) “{ajll written opinions of the town solicitor furnished
to the council, the manager, and all departments, offices and
agencies of the town shall be filed with the town clerk and
shall become a public record.”

Recently as well as in the past, this court has reminded
those so interested that, because of art. XII of the Rhode
Island Constitution, public education is the responsibility of
the state, specifically, the General Assembly; and the various
municipal school committees, when discharging their respon-
sibilities, act as agents of the state. Cummings v. Godin, 119
RB.I. 325, 377 A.2d 1071 (1977); Royal v. Barry, 91 R.I. 24,
160 A.2d 572 (1960); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket
Teachers’ Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958). Under
our law, once an appropriation is made for the use of the
school committee, the expenditure of those funds is within
the committee’s sole and exclusive jurisdiction. Dawson v.
Clark, 93 B.I. 457, 176 A.2d 732 (1962); Bailey v. Duffy, 45
R.I. 304, 121 A. 129 (1923); Times Publishing Co. v. White,
23 R.I. 334, 50 A. 383 (1901).

The trial justice, in finding that the committee could hire a
lawyer who could act as an advisor but not as an advocate
first relied on those cases which hold that a committee acts as
the agent of the state and then, with that proposition for
support, decided that the committee had implicit power to
seek legal advice. In fact, the trial justice, after noting the
General Assembly’s vesting of exclusive control of public
education in the various school committees, observed: “[I]t is
my judgment that the town charter aside, they [the
committee] have all powers reasonably necessary to carry out

*This holding is based on legislation in which “the entire care, control, and man-
agement of all the public school interests of the several towns, shall be vested in the
school committee of the several towns, and they shall also draw all orders for the
payment of their expenses.” General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §16-2-18,

Ce ee

the powers expressly granted, including the power to engage
attorneys for legal advice.” (Emphasis added.) We think the
trial justice erred not only when he put the charter to one side
but also when he construed the charter’s terms in regard to
what functions are encompassed within the solicitor’s
domain.

Coventry’s Home Rule Charter was adopted pursuant to
sec. 7 of art. XXVIII of the amendments to the Rhode Island
Constitution. Earlier, in Royal v. Barry, 91 R.I. 24, 160 A.2d
572 (1960), the court ruled: “[N]o provision affecting educa-
tion contained within a home rule charter, so called, can
effectively regulate the conduct of school committees as
agents of the state unless expressly validated by an act of the
general assembly.” Id. at 30, 160 A.2d at 575. In Royal, the
court held that a provision of the Pawtucket Home Rule
Charter calling for open meetings of the school committee
was invalid because there was nothing in the subsequent val-
idating legislation that either expressly or impliedly ratified
the open-meeting proviso.

Here, Coventry's charter stands in a different light be-
cause, as noted before in this opinion, the parties concede
that the General Assembly has expressly validated the charter
in all respects. Thus, the committee's right to have counsel of
its own choice, if only to advise, must be found somewhere
within the terms of the charter’s art. VII.

When a court is called upon to construe the provisions of a
municipal charter, the usual rules of statutory construction
are employed. Borromeo v. Personnel Board, 117 R.I. 382,
367 A.2d 711 (1977); Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I. 482, 322
A.2d 630 (1974). With this principle as a guide, we need only
refer to Carter v. City of Pawtucket, 115 R.I. 134, 138, 341
A.2d 53, 56 (1975), where we pointed out that

“the provisions of city charters should be construed so as
to give, so far as possible, reasonable meaning and effect
to all parts of the section in question. Further, the words
used therein should be given their usual and ordinary
meaning.”

1 en

The trial justice, in viewing art. VII, was of the opinion
that

“[t]he people who drew this charter obviously cut this
thing right in half. The first half deals with advice, the
town solicitor is required to advise the town manager,
and the town council, nobody else, and it [the solicitor]
clearly has no power in my judgment to advise any
other body in the town. When it comes to actions and
litigation, the second paragraph governs that, and of
course he [the solicitor] has the power and the duty to
represent these bodies.”

The trial justice, in taking this approach, obviously over-
looked that part of art. VII whereby all written opinions of
the solicitor “to the council, the manager, and all depart-
ments, offices, and agencies of the town are to be filed with
the town clerk * * *” as public records. The limited advisory
role given the solicitor by the trial justice is completely at
odds with and effectively nullifies the mandate concerning
the solicitor’s written opinions, which are to be given to all
“departments, offices, and agencies of the town,” especially
since earlier in art. VII the “school committee” is specifically
designated as being within the departmental category. Fur-
ther, while this court has described school committees as
“agencies of the state,” we have in Cummings v. Godin, 119
R.I. 325, 377 A.2d 1071 (1977), explained that school com-
mittees are not “state agencies” because they act only on mat-
ters of local concern; and that although the committees exer-
cise a portion of the state’s power in the field of education,
they are nonetheless “municipal bodies” and their employees
“municipal employees.” Id. at 330, 377 A.2d at 1073. The
trial justice has misconceived the reach of art. VII.

It is obvious as one reads this article in its entirety that the
framers of the charter and those who approved it intended
that the town solicitor’s office would serve as the sole source
of legal assistance for all the various municipal boards,
departments, and agencies that operate within the aegis of
the Coventry charter. Among the services to be provided is

Ss

the giving of advice. If the advice is written, it becomes a
public record, conceivably enabling future generations to
evaluate the quality of past services rendered the town.

The mandamus issue, in our opinion, need not be resolved
because it is now moot. By signing the restraining order, a
Superior Court justice with one stroke of the pen granted
mandatory relief and resolved the issue that the treasurer
now seeks to raise. Since the $4,500 was paid to the commit-
tee, we see no necessity at this point in time in examining the
various pertinent provisions to see if they would afford a basis
for the action originally taken by the treasurer.

The only other question worthy of our consideration con-
cerns that portion of the third-party complaint in which an
order is requested directing Capaldi to return the retainers
paid to him since late November 1976. As a general rule,
when a municipal corporation has legal counsel charged with
a duty of conducting the legal business of a governmental
agency, contracts with other attorneys for additional or extra
legal services are void. Board of Supervisors v. Woodall, 120
Ariz. 379, 586 P.2d 628 (1978); Ashton v. Cook County, 384
Ill. 287, 51 N.E.2d 161 (1943); Cahn v. Town of Hunting-
ton, 29N.Y.2d 451, 328 N.Y. Supp. 2d 672, 278 N.E.2d 908
(1972); 10 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations §29.12 at
259-60 (3d ed. 1966).

There is a well-recognized exception to this principle
which recognizes the implied authority of a municipal board
or officer to hire counsel in the good-faith prosecution or de-
fense of an action taken in the public interest and in conjunc-
tion with its or his official duties where the municipality's
attorney refuses to act or is incapable of or is disqualified
from acting. Board of Supervisors v. Woodall, 120 Ariz. 379,
586 P.2d 628 (1978); Cahn v. Town of Huntington, 29
N.Y.2d 451, 328 N.Y. Supp. 2d 672, 278 N.E.2d 908 (1972);
City of Tukwila v. Todd, 17 Wash. App. 401, 563 P.2d 223
(1977). It appears that the litigants recognized the exception
because in the Superior Court they filed a stipulation
wherein they agreed that the trial justice could decide all

716 ee)

issues except

“1, Any claim by Arthur G. Capaldi for attorney's fees
in this matter

“2. Any claim by Arthur G, Capaldi for prior services
rendered to Coventry School Committee.”

Since the stipulation casts a doubt as to the issue of Capaldi’s
monetary liability, we think this facet of the committee-
council imbroglio would best be resolved after remand.

The defendant’s appeal is sustained in regard to all issues
with the exception of the trial justice’s ordering of the issu-
ance of the writ of mandamus; the plaintiff's cross-appeal is
denied and dismissed; the decree appealed from is vacated in
all respects; and we hereby order that upon remand the par-
ties shall present to the Superior Court a new decree that is in
conformity with this opinion.

Bennett R. Gallo, for plaintiff.

Charles T. Rennick, Jr., for defendants.

411 A.2d 910.
In RE Karen Mary Jones.
FEBRUARY 29, 1980.
Paesenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher and Doris, JJ.

77

Donis, J. This is an appeal from an order of the Superior
Court affirming the denial by a Central Falls Probate Court
of an adoption petition in which a 30-year-old married man,
Duncan Clinton Fraser (Duncan), seeks to adopt his 20-year-
old “lover,” Karen Mary Jones (Karen). In affirming the
denial, the trial justice noted that Duncan was “probably”
the father of Karen’s child. Duncan is married to another wo-
man and is the father of two children born of that marriage.
At oral argument we were informed that Karen is now mar-
ried to someone other than Duncan. However, notwith-
standing her present marital status, Karen continues to press
her appeal, claiming that the trial justice’s affirmance of the
Probate Court’s denial was totally erroneous.

Karen’s first claim of error relates to the lover's claim that
there was no evidentiary support for the Superior Court jus-
tice’s finding that she and Duncan were “lovers.” An easy an-
swer to this contention is to be found in the trial justice’s writ-
ten decision, in which he noted:

“Although no evidence was taken in the case in Superior
Court, it is conceded by the attorney for the appellants,
who did not desire to present evidence, that the rela-
tionship of lovers existed between the proposed parties
to this adoption.”

This concession amounts to a judicial admission, which cer-
tainly takes the place of evidence. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v.

m8 es
French, 88 R.1. 6, 15-16, 143 A.2d 318, 323 (1958).

Karen’s remaining contention, while novel, is not very per-
suasive. She takes the position that a justice who presides at
an adult adoption proceeding has no discretion whatsoever
but must grant the petition as a matter of course. In espous-
ing this claim, Karen points to two provisions of G.L. 1956
(1969 Reenactment) chapter 7 of title 15, to wit, §§15-7-4(d)
and 15-7-5, both amended by P.L. 1970, ch. 132, §1.

The first proviso vests jurisdiction to hear petitions for the
adoption of an adult in the Probate Court of the city or town
in which the petitioners may live. Section 15-7-5 speaks of the
necessity of obtaining the consent of the natural parents to an
adoption but specifically excludes the necessity of that con-
sent where the potential adoptee has attained the age of
majority. Thus, Karen claims that the Probate Court was
foreclosed from considering in any manner, shape, or fashion
her past adulterous association with Duncan and its potenti-
ally incestuous impact.

In speaking of judicial discretion, many years ago this
court remarked:

“In the trial of a case questions at times arise to which
no strict rule of law is applicable but which from their
nature and surrounding circumstances require the judg-
ment of the court. These questions are to be determined
by the court exercising its judicial discretion to further
the ends of justice.” Strzebinska v. Jary, 58 R.I. 496,
500, 193 A. 747, 748-49 (1937).

In our opinion, a probate judge is clothed with judicial
discretion as he considers a petition where one adult seeks to
adopt another. The common law did not recognize the right
to adopt. It exists solely by statute. In re Christine, 121 R.I.
203, 397 A.2d 511 (1979); In re Gregory, 118 R.I. 178, 372
A.2d 1277 (1977); In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 109 R.I.
443, 287 A.2d 115 (1972). We need not list the citations, but
this court has repeatedly said that a statute will not be con-
strued so as to achieve an absurd, meaningless, or patently in-

es 719

ane result.

Hs When Duncan and Karen appeared before the Superior
Court, their appeal was heard by the then Presiding Justice.*
After referring to the tragedy of Oedipus Rex and the Rhode
Island statutes regarding incest, the Presiding Justice then
went on to observe:

“Tt may be that public morality in our community has
reached a low ebb. However, it is the opinion of the
Court that it has not yet descended to such a nadir as to
require a probate or superior judge to implement an
adoption between persons whose relationship is essenti-
ally that of paramours. To suggest that the adoption
statute requires such interpretation is to concede that
the legislature of Rhode Island intended a sardonically
ludicrous result. This Court cannot construe our
adoption statutes in the light of any such intent.”

In endorsing these sentiments, we commend the Probate
Court’s refusal to stand idly by and be a witness to what
appears to be a perversion of the adoption process established
by the Legislature.

Karen’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate.

Aram K. Berberian, for appellant

'The then Presiding Justice, Mr. Justice Weisberger, is now a member of this
court,

3

411 A.2d 1326.

Max R. Karoman et al. vs. STANLEY D. Jacoss,
Tax Assessor, Ciry or East PROVIDENCE.

FEBRUARY 29, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

721

Murray, J. The taxpayers Max R. and William M.
Kargman filed in the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. 1956
(1970 Reenactment) §44-5-26 petitions for relief from alleged
overassessments on their property as of December 31, 1972,
December 31, 1973, and December 31, 1974.1 The petitions
for each year were consolidated for a jury-waived trial. A

'The assessment and levy of local taxes in Rhode Island is governed by G.L. 1956
(1970 Reenactment) chapter 5 of title 44. Under §44-5-1, valuations are assessed on
the 31st day of December in each year, and taxes are then apportioned accordingly.
The parties stipulated that the taxpayers had satisfied the statutory requirements
conditioning the filing of their petitions.

OT

722 |

Superior Court justice decided that the assessments exceeded
the property’s full and fair cash value,* and that the tax-
payers were therefore entitled to a refund of their overpay-
ments with interest. The Tax Assessor of the City of East
Providence (assessor) raises several assignments of error,
which we have consolidated to a few material points.

This case presents the identical parties and property
involved in our earlier decision of Kargman v. Jacobs, 113
R.1. 696, 325 A.2d 543 (1974). The taxpayers as general part-
ners in the Kent Farm Company (company) own in the city
of East Providence six parcels of land with buildings and
improvements all commonly known as Kent Farm. Kent
Farm is a privately owned, federally financed apartment
complex, constructed in accordance with the terms of
§221(d)(3)? of the National Housing Act and regulations
thereunder. A regulatory agreement between the company
and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) controls the
financial operation of this project and by its terms binds all
successors in interest.

At trial, the assessor, who qualified as an expert appraiser,
testified that, upon application of the uniform percentage of
80 percent employed in East Providence, he assessed Kent
Farm at a valuation of $3,021,420 for each year in issue. Of
the total assessed value, he allocated an amount of $139,960
to the land, based on comparable sales. The assessor testified
that there were no comparable sales of buildings and im-
provements, however. He derived the valuation of the build-
ings and improvements from an appraisal made in 1969 and
1970 by a revaluation firm. That firm had employed the

*General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-5-12 requires that

“All property liable to taxation shall be assessed at its full and fair cash
value, or at a uniform percentage thereof, not to exceed one hundred per
cent (100%), to be determined by the assessors in each town or city « * *.”

We have construed the term “full and fair cash value” to mean the price that prop-
erty would bring in a transaction in a fair market between a willing seller and a
willing buyer. CIC-Newport Associates v. Stein, 121 R.I. 844, 853, 403 A.2d 658,
663 (1979); Rosen v. Restrepo, 119 R.I. 398, 400, 380 A.2d 960, 961 (1977).

Housing Act of 1954, §221(d)(3), 12 U.S.G.A. §1715 1(d)(3) (1964), as
amended.

es 723

“replacement cost, minus depreciation” approach,‘ a recog-
nized method of property valuation, to arrive at its appraisal.
Three months prior to trial a fire had destroyed documents
containing a breakdown of the revaluation firm’s calcula-
tions. At trial the assessor admitted that, after the destruction
of those documents, previous tax-roll information constituted
the only documentary evidence available in support of his
assessment.

In contrast, the taxpayers presented testimony of expert
appraisers who relied on the “capitalization of income”
approach,° a recognized method of appraising real property,
to arrive at a valuation of Kent Farm. Peter A. Laudati, Jr.,
testified that a prudent buyer would purchase Kent Farm
solely for investment purposes. He stated that a buyer would
look primarily to the income stream, especially in light of reg-
ulatory restrictions, to gauge a fair purchase price. In view of
those factors and in the absence of comparable sales, Mr.
Laudati concluded that the capitalization of income
approach was the best method for valuating Kent Farm.

Mr. Laudati proposed alternative valuations, under the
capitalization of income approach, dependent upon
treatment of the assessed property tax in his calculations. In
the first instance, he included the then-assessed property tax
among expenses deducted from potential gross income.
Under that analysis, the complex produced a potential net
annual income of $96,400. Mr. Laudati then divided that
figure by 12 percent, the rate of return which he believed a
purchaser would expect from such an investment. That cal-
culation resulted in a capitalized value of $876,400 with the
inclusion of the land’s net present value.

‘In his testimony, the assessor defined “replacement cost” as the cost of replacing
a structure or improvement with a similar structure or improvement constructed
with new materials. Once this figure is determined, estimated accrued depreciation
is deducted, while the estimated value of the land is added. The result is the valua-
tion of the property by means of the replacement-cost-minus-depreciation method.
See Kargman v. Jacobs, 113 B.1. 696, 699 n.4, 325 A.2d 543, 545 n.4 (1974); see
generally 1 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 150-176 (1937).

See Kargman v. Jacobs, 113 R.I. 696, 700 n.5, 325 A.2d 543, 545 n.5 (1974).

794 es

In his alternative calculations, Mr. Laudati purported to
eliminate distortion in net income reflected in his first set of
calculations. According to his testimony, that distortion arose
from deducting the alleged tax overassessment from gross
income. He therefore did not include the property tax then
assessed among the expenses he had deducted previously
from potential gross annual income. He instead added 4.4
percent to the 12 percent rate of return he had previously
employed. That increment represented the tax ratio in East
Providence derived from a rate of $44.40 per $1000 assessed
valuation. Upon dividing pretax income of $227,300 by the
resultant capitalization rate of 16.4 percent, Mr. Laudati
obtained a valuation of $1,386,000. Mr. Laudati asserted
that for administrative purposes, the city should carry the
property on its tax rolls at a full and fair market value of
$1,732,500. Under that procedure, 80 percent of full and fair
market value would equal $1,386,000. Mr. Laudati testified
that an assessment of $1,386,000 would be substantially
accurate for each of the three years in question.

Max R. Kargman, who qualified as an expert appraiser
also, supplied additional testimony concerning the appropri-
ateness of using the capitalized-income approach to valuate
Kent Farm. Mr. Kargman employed the same general
method with a rate of return different from Mr. Laudati’s.
His calculations resulted in a proposed full and fair cash
value of $1,043,000 for Kent Farm, for each of the three years
in issue.

The taxpayers presented testimony also of Dr. Arthur
Solomon, director of the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for
Urban Studies and an expert on federally subsidized housing.
Doctor Solomon testified that at least five conceptual
problems impaired the utility of the replacement-cost-minus-
depreciation approach for valuating such property. Accord-
ing to Dr. Solomon, various effects of applicable regulations
on income and expenses would go unrecognized if that
approach were applied. He concluded that, for purposes of
valuating Kent Farm, the replacement-cost-minus-deprecia-
tion approach was “far more speculative” than the capitali-

Ce) 735

zation-of-income method.

The trial justice accepted the assessor’s valuation of the
land but rejected the assessed value of the buildings and im-
provements upon determining that it exceeded their full and
fair cash value. According to the trial justice, the “over-
whelming weight” of evidence convinced him that a prudent
buyer would purchase Kent Farm solely for investment. He,
therefore, determined that the income capacity of the prop-
erty would certainly affect the property's cash value. That
finding prompted him to reject the assessor’s testimony con-
cerning the property’s full and fair cash value, for the assessor
had opted to accord no weight to income in arriving at his
valuation. The trial justice determined that petitioners’
buildings and improvements should have been assessed at
$1,440,000, an amount reflecting 80 percent of a full and fair
cash value of $1,800,000.° Then, adding $1,440,000 to the
assessment of $139,960 that he had accepted for the land, the
trial justice entered judgment ordering a revised assessment
of $1,579,960 for each year in question.

In the litigation leading to our decision in Kargman v.
Jacobs, 113 R.1. 696, 325 A.2d 543 (1974), these taxpayers
challenged the legality of assessments assessed on Kent Farm
in 1971 and 1972. The posture of that case on appeal to this
court was the reverse of that of the present, however. There,
the taxpayers appealed from a Superior Court decision that
upheld the legality of the assessments for those years.” We
characterized the issue on appeal as one of burden of proof.
After reviewing the record, we determined that the trial jus-
tice had acted well within his capacity as factfinder in reject-

The trial justice's determination of the value of the buildings and improvements
reflects a figure higher than that calculated by Mr. Laudati. The taxpayers do not
question this finding, and we therefore regard his determination as correct in re-
gard to their interests.

"The assessment on December 31, 1970, prior to completion of the complex, was
$2,535,780. At the close of 1971, by which time the complex had been completed,
the property was assessed at $3,021,420, an amount identical to the assessments for
the following three years now at issue.

726 rs

ing the opinion of value offered by the taxpayers’ expeit. We,
consequently, upheld the trial justice’s finding that the tax-
payers had failed to establish that Kent Farm was assessed at
a level higher than its full and fair cash value. Id. at 703, 325
A.2d at 547.

I
In support of one of his contentions on this appeal, the
assessor directs our attention to a portion of a comment we
made in Kargman v. Jacobs, 113 R.1. at 705-06, 325 A.2d at
548:

“The gross apartment rental figure used in its [Kent
Farm’s] appraisal assumes a 100% rental for all units
during the year 1971. However, the East Providence
enterprise is limited by governmental order as to the
amount of monthly rental it can charge. In seeking to
establish fair market value, one looks for the fair rental
value rather than the actual income received. In using
the income approach, the significant element to be
established is the realty’s capacity for earning income
rather than income actually derived from its operation.
Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board,
44 Ill.2d 428, 256 N.E. 2d 334 (1970). At this point
there is no credible evidence that Kent Farm’s rental
was fair rental income.”

Pointing to the testimony of Mr. Laudati and Mr.
Kargman, the assessor correctly maintains that both experts
computed gross annual income in their capitalization-of-
income calculations by adding the maximum allowable
rents® obtainable from each apartment. The assessor argues

*The agreement between the company and the FHA provides that the company
“shall make dwelling accommodations and services of the project available to occu-
pants at charges not exceeding those established in accordance with a schedule
approved in writing by the [Federal Housing] Commission.” This restriction is one
of several imposed by the Federal Housing Administration as a condition for fed-
eral subsidization of §221(d)(3) projects. See Kargman v. Jacobs, 113 R.I. 696,
701-02, 325 A.2d 543, 546 (1974). In enacting §221, Congress sought to assist pri-
vate industry in providing housing for low- and moderate-income families and for
displaced families. 12 U.S.C.A. §1715 1(a).

Ce) 727

that their calculations yielded lower valuations of the
property than would have been derived from incorporating
its fair rental value in their calculations. This contention is
premised on equating the fair rental value to the earning ca-
pacity of Kent Farm in the absence of rental limitations. The
assessor claims that Kargman v. Jacobs, supra, requires
incorporation of fair rental value. He thus concludes that the
judge erred in admitting Mr. Laudati’s and Mr. Kargman’s
opinions of value.

The language cited by the assessor does indeed imply that a
capitalized-income appraisal of Kent Farm, computed on the
basis of actual rental income, is inadmissible. We have re-
examined our position in light of two decisions published
since Kargman. We now adopt a stance that rejects that im-
plication. We determine that the rule requiring capitaliza-
tion of a property’s earning capacity is inapplicable to a
§221(d)(3) apartment complex with its federal restrictions on
rental income.®

In Community Development Company v. Board of
Assessors, 377 Mass. 351, 385 N.E.2d 1376 (1979), this
same issue confronted the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts. The taxpayers there, owners of a project financed
and operated under §236'° of the National Housing Act,
appealed from a refusal of the Appellate Tax Board (board)
to consider federal rental income restrictions upon reviewing
the assessment of their project. The board had held that the
issue was controlled by a case that approved the assessment of
property without regard to a disadvantageous long-term

°We offer no opinion on the applicability of the rule to other circumstances. The
tule we applied in Kargman v. Jacobs, 113 R.1. 696, 325 A.2d 543 (1974), was
enunciated in Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 44 Ill.2d
498, 956 N.E.2d 334 (1970). In that case the assessed property was under long-term
leases commencing some years before and ending some years after the taxable year
in issue. At the inception of the leases the rents agreed upon were fair; when the tax
was levied, the property could have been rented for an amount substantially in
excess of the contractual rent, if the leases outstanding could have been canceled.
Id. at 429, 256 N.E.2d at 335.

1012 U.S.C.A. §1715 z-1 (1976), as amended.

7238 Ce)

lease. See Donovan v. Haverhill, 247 Mass. 69, 141 N.E. 564
(1923). It therefore upheld the use of “fair market” rentals
by the assessor to compute potential gross annual income
used in calculating the capitalized value of the project. The
board reasoned that “fair market” rentals “could have been
obtained were it not for the Federal Regulations” and were
therefore the best evidence of the earning capacity of the
project. Community Development Company v. Board of
Assessors, 377 Mass. at 354, 385 N.E.2d at 1378.

The court reversed the board’s ruling. It rejected the
board’s estimate of the project’s earning capacity, in part be-
cause it was based on “hypothetical rent receipts in excess of
those allowed by law.” 377 Mass. at 354, 385 N.E.2d at
1378. The court noted that the Legislatures of three states
had recognized the appropriateness of special procedures for
assessment of low-income housing projects because of govern-
mental restrictions on rent. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§8-215
and 8-216 (1971); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §125.1415a
(1976); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §3843 (Supp. 1978). The deci-
sion of Royal Gardens Company v. Concord, 114 N.H. 668,
328 A.2d 123 (1974), provided precedent for its ruling.
There, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that, in
assessing a §236 project, the master should have considered
the regulations that required the project owner to charge
below-market rents and that limited the rate and amount of
investment return. Id. at 672, 328 A.2d at 125.

Upon reversing the board’s ruling, the Supreme Judicial
Court necessarily rejected the board’s view that the case of
Donovan v. Haverhill, supra, was controlling. The court
grounded that rejection on its perception that the project’s
rental restrictions did not resemble a disadvantageous lease.
“Imposition of the Federal restrictions was a condition of
financing the project on favorable terms, and without the
Federal assistance the project would be impossible.”

Whe operative facts of this case are identical to those in Springfield Marine Bank
v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 44 Ill.2d 428, 256 N.E.2d 334 (1970). See footnote
9, supra.

es 729

Community Development Company v. Board of Assessors,
377 Mass. at 355, N.E.2d at 1379.

In Royal Gardens Company v. Concord, supra, a majority
of the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled also that the
federal restrictions were a relevant factor to be weighed in
valuating the §236 project. The court determined impliedly
that the disadvantageous-lease cases cited by the dissent were
inapposite also. Among the lease cases evidently deemed
unpersuasive in Royal Gardens Company v. Concord, supra,
was Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board,
44 Tll.2d 428, 256 N.E.2d 334 (1970). We relied on
Springfield Marine Bank in Kargman v. Jacobs, supra, to
support the language now in issue. In light of the rulings in
Community Development Company v. Board of Assessors
and Royal Gardens Company v. Concord, both supra, we
are now persuaded that application of the principles of
Springfield Marine Bank to a §221(d)(3) complex is inappro-
priate. We therefore rule that federal regulations limiting the
rents of a §221(d)(3) apartment complex are a relevant factor
in the assessment of its value. See Somers v. City of Meriden,
119 Conn. 5, 8-9, 174 A.184, 186 (1934); Kargman v. Jacobs,
113 R.L. at 708, 325 A.2d at 549 (Joslin, J., dissenting). As a
result, we hold that the trial justice did not err when he
admitted into evidence opinions of value of Kent Farm which
incorporated the maximum allowable rents in their support-
ing calculations.

IL

The assessor raises several other issues meriting limited dis-
cussion. In the first, he asserts this court held in Kargman v.
Jacobs, supra, that the assessments then in issue were proper
because the assessor had used the “reproduction cost”
approach, a recognized method of property valuation. Prem-
ised upon that assertion and the claim that he used the same
method to obtain the assessments now in issue, he appears to
contend that the assessments in issue are insulated from fur-
ther challenge. We disagree.

There is no support in Kargman v. Jacobs, supra, for the

730 Ce)

assessor's statement of what this court held. Apparently, the
following sentence gave rise to his assertion:

“The trial justice believed that the method employed by
Jacobs [the assessor] was ‘one of the recognized and
accepted ways of ascertaining value,’ and that since
defendant’s method was a proper one, plaintiffs had
failed to carry their burden.” Kargman v. Jacobs, 113
R.I. at 701, 325 A.2d at 546.

We need look no further than its words to refute this argu-
ment. The sentence declares not what this court held but
rather what the trial justice believed.

In his next argument the assessor maintains that the trial
justice rejected his testimony for a reason held impermissible
in the case of Pendleton v. Briggs, 37 R.I. 352, 92 A.1024
(1915). The assessor claims that the trial justice rejected his
testimony solely because no original records existed that
could be introduced into evidence. He points out that the tax-
payers introduced into evidence copies of reconstructed
appraisal cards, which showed the assessed valuation of the
land and buildings. Relying on a quoted passage from
Pendleton,” the assessor appears to contend that the trial jus-
tice erred when he rejected that evidence in his decision.

In Pendleton, the assessor had introduced evidence other
than the original records to refute the taxpayer’s claim that

18H his brief, he quotes the following:

“The defendant contends that the tax assessors being required by law to
assess and apportion the taxes and to post notices of the time and place of
their meeting, etc., that the only competent evidence that they had per-
formed those duties must be found in their records and that in the absence or
non-existence of such records the plaintiff cannot be allowed to prove by
other evidence that the assessors had properly performed the duties required
of them by the statute.

We cannot adopt this view of the defendant. We know of no statute re-
quiring a board of assessors to keep a record of its doings. The original
notices for the years 1908 and 1909 having been lost, we see no reason why
their authorization and publication cannot be established by the other evi-
dence which the plaintiff offered.” Pendleton v. Briggs, 37 R.I. 352, 357, 92
A. 1024, 1026 (1915).

es 731

the assessor had not performed his duties in connection with
the assessments in issue. On appeal, the taxpayer contended
that only the original records were competent evidence. This
court rejected that contention; we saw no reason that war-
ranted exclusion of the other evidence introduced by the
assessor to establish performance of his duties. Id. at 357, 92
A. at 1026.

In arguing for its application to this case, the assessor mis-
conceives the nature of our ruling in Pendleton. That deci-
sion concerned the admissibility of, rather than the weight to
be accorded to, such evidence. Here, the assessor premises his
contention on the admission of evidence other than the origi-
nal records. His complaint would have merit under Pendle-
ton only if the trial justice had excluded such evidence on the
ground that it did not consist of the original records.

The assessor next directs our attention to the case of
Greenough v. Board of Canvassers and Registration, 33 R.I.
559, 82 A. 406 (1912). We there ruled that the tax assessors
are entitled to a presumption that they have performed their
official acts properly until the contrary is proven. Id. at 571,
82 A. at 410-11. See CIC-Newport Associates v. Stein, 121
R.I. 844, 852, 403 A.2d 658, 662 (1979). The assessor
claims the trial justice erred by not taking this presumption
into consideration. We reject this argument.

Absent proof to the contrary, the presumption imputes
legality to assessed valuations. In this case, the taxpayers
introduced ample evidence into the record from which the
trial justice could determine that Kent Farm was not assessed
in accord with 80 percent of its full and fair cash value. Upon
proof to the contrary, the trial justice properly disregarded
the presumption of legality in Greenough.

Il
In support of his remaining contentions, the assessor
directs our attention to the trial record. He claims it demon-
strates that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived the

732 )

evidence on three vital points. In resolving these contentions,
we adhere to the rule that this court will not disturb the find-
ings of fact of a Superior Court justice sitting without a jury
unless it is shown that he was clearly wrong or that he mis-
conceived or overlooked material evidence on a controlling
issue. CIC-Newport Associates v. Stein, 121 R.I. 844,
852, 403 A.2d 658, 662 (1979); Fernandes Realty Corp. v.
Lagace, 121 B.I. 513, 516, 401 A.2d 43, 45 (1979).

The assessor seizes first on a misstatement that the trial jus-
tice made in his recapitulation of Mr. Laudati’s' testimony
while reviewing the evidence:

“and after discussing in detail the various factors he
[Laudati] considered, and after using a capitalization
rate of 8%, he found the full and fair cash value of the
subject property to be $1,732,500.”

The record discloses that Mr. Laudati, in fact, employed
capitalization rates of 12 percent and 16.4 percent in his
alternative calculations of the value of Kent Farm.

We conclude that the trial justice did not misconceive or
overlook a material fact on a controlling issue when he mis-
stated the rate. This misstatement occurred in that portion of
the trial justice’s decision that merely reviewed the evidence
at trial. The assessor introduced no evidence to contest the
rates of capitalization used by Mr. Laudati. Those rates, as
such, were not in issue and were therefore not controlling on
the opinions of value derived from them. The trial justice,
accordingly, made no finding about the proper rate of capi-
talization. The misstatement in no way impinged upon the
trial justice’s findings of the full and fair cash value of Kent
Farm in light of the evidence on the record.

The assessor points next to that portion of the trial justice’s
decision where Mr. Laudati’s testimony concerning the prop-
erty’s full and fair cash value is recapitulated. There, the
trial justice summarized Mr. Laudati’s testimony as having
assigned a full and fair cash value of $1,732,500 to Kent
Farm, with a resulting 80 percent assessed value of

es 733

$1,386,000. The assessor claims, and the record supports his
conclusion, that Mr. Laudati upon capitalizing income of
$227,300 at a rate of 16.4 percent determined that the full
and fair cash value of Kent Farm was $1,386,000. Mr.
Laudati then added 25 percent of $1,386,000 so that the city
would “administratively” carry the property at a full and fair
cash value of $1,732,500, while assessing it at $1,386,000 or
80 percent of $1,732,500. The assessor claims that Mr.
Laudati should have taken 80 percent of $1,386,000.

The trial justice’s findings of fact, in contrast to his restate-
ment of the testimony, are the appropriate foci for this
court’s review. Misstatements of the abstracted evidence are
relevant only insofar as they are reflected in findings of fact
that are unsupported by the record. Such findings must relate
to material facts on a controlling issue to constitute reversible
error. CIC-Newport Associates v. Stein, and Fernandes
Realty Corp. v. Lagace, both supra.

Although there is a strand of conceptual merit to the
assessor’s argument, we determine that the trial justice’s find-
ings are supported by Mr. Laudati’s testimony at trial. His
presentation may have been conceptually inadequate, but
the proper time to discredit it was at trial.1° The trial justice,

'8In Fernandes Realty Corp. v. Lagace, 121 R.1. 513, 515, 401 A.2d 43, 46
(1979), we noted that capitalized valuations based in part upon the very taxation
under challenge are likely to result in a distorted valuation. This problem is elimi-
nated when pretax income is capitalized with an appropriate percentage adjust-
ment in the capitalization rate. Mr. Laudati attempted to avoid this problem, but
his approach incurred a new conceptual shortcoming because the city assessed
property at a uniform 80 percent of full and fair cash value. Although unnecessary
to resolution of the issue before us, we shall endeavor to correct his mistake for the
benefit of future appraisals,

Capitalization of income, if the proper rates are employed, yields an estimate of
a property’s full and fair cash value. Nevertheless, upon calculating what he
believed was Kent Farm’s full and fair cash value of $1,386,000, Mr. Laudati
asserted that the property should be carried on the city’s tax rolls at a full and fair
cash value of $1,732,500. This assertion was made in recognition of the 80 percent
uniform percentage of assessment employed in East Providence. On appeal defen-
dant claims that the assessment should have been at 80 percent of the full and fair
cash value. While the assessor’s position is correct in theory, the problem is that
when a city assesses taxes at a uniform percentage, that factor must not be allowed
to distort the capitalization rate.

734 ee

therefore, committed no reversible error when he accepted
Mr. Laudati’s uncontradicted testimony on this issue. More-
over, the assessor’s claim of error, if allowed, would result in
further diminution of Kent Farm’s assessed value. Our deci-
sion to deny this claim results, therefore, in no prejudice to
the party advancing it.

Finally, the assessor contends that the trial justice, in re-
jecting the city’s assessment, overlooked or misconceived
material evidence presented by the assessor. He directs our
attention to a statement made by the trial justice in his deci-
sion: “the sole expert opinion relied on by the city was unsup-
ported in the evidence by any factual data or factual basis
+ * *,” The assessor maintains that this passage shows that
the trial justice overlooked or misconceived his testimony.
The assessor further claims that the only reason offered by
the trial justice for rejecting his testimony was that the origi-
nal records had been destroyed and that the trial justice had

Mr. Laudati failed to prevent such distortion; his assertion that the property
should be carried on the tax rolls at $1,732,500 merely compounded his original
error. When capitalizing Kent Farm’s pretax earnings of $227,300, Mr. Laudati
added 4.4 percent to the 12 percent rate of return which he had used previously to
capitalize net income. He derived the figure of 4.4 percent from a property tax rate
of $44.40 per $1000 assessed valuation. The problem is that such a rate applies to 80
percent of full and fair cash value. He should therefore have used the percentage
that would return $44.40 on $1250 full and fair cash value of which $1000 is 80
percent. Had he done so, he would have obtained a figure of 3.552 percent reflect-
ing a tax of $35.52 on each $1000 of full and fair cash value.

If he had added 3.552 percent to 12 percent he would have obtained 15.552
percent. He should have divided pretax income of $227,300 by 15.552 percent
instead of the 16.4 percent figure he used. He would then have obtained a full and
fair cash value of $1,461,548 for Kent Farm. Applying 80 percent to that full and
fair cash value, he would have obtained an assessed value of $1,169,238. Upon
applying a rate of 4.4 percent to $1,169,238 -- reflecting a tax rate of $44.40 per
$1000 assessed valuation --he would have obtained a tax of $51,914. Applying the
12 percent rate of return to the full and fair cash value of $1,461,548, he would
have obtained a return of $175,386. Verifying the accuracy of these figures is the
fact that the sum of $51,914 and $175,386 is $227,300, the actual pretax income of
Kent Farms.

Calculated in this manner, the amount of tax is derived from 80 percent of the
full and fair cash value and reflects the uniform percentage employed in East
Providence. The return is calculated directly from the full and fair cash value,
rather than from the value employed for purposes of assessment.

es 735

therefore held that he could not properly weigh the assessor’s
opinion of value. In essence, the assessor contends that the
trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence on
a controlling issue when he rejected his opinion of value
while accepting Mr. Laudati’s opinion.

In such cases, we have ruled that a trier of fact can accept
the property valuation of one set of experts and reject that of
another set of experts, particularly when he gives good rea-
sons for so doing. Kargman v. Jacobs, 113 R.I. at 702, 325
A.2d at 546; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. French, 88 R.1. 6,
11-12, 143 A.2d 318, 321 (1958). The record before us sup-
ports the trial justice’s finding that Kent Farm was over-
assessed. He did not overlook or misconceive the assessor’s tes-
timony; rather, he rejected it for good reasons,

The assessor introduced no statistical breakdown in sup-
port of his opinion of value obtained by employment of the
replacement-cost-minus-depreciation approach. Earlier,
however, he testified that replacement cost was the cost of re-
placing a structure or an improvement with a similar struc-
ture or improvement constructed with new materials. Yet, he
adduced no statistical evidence to support his determination
of the replacement cost. The trial justice found the recon-
structed appraisal cards unavailing not because they were re-
constructed, but because they contained no evidence show-
ing how the replacement-cost figure was derived. The cards
merely restated the assessed valuations for each parcel,
figures to which the parties had stipulated previously.

The problem with the assessor’s testimony was that it was
predicated on the statistical validity of the replacement-cost
figures. The trial justice did not overlook or misconceive the
assessor's testimony; he found it uripersuasive in the absence
of evidence supporting the accuracy of the figures upon
which his testimony was predicated. In this sense, there were
no factual data or factual bases for his testimony, as the trial
justice stated in his decision. Without statistical support, the
assessor’s testimony was of little more probative weight than
testimony of the taxpayer's expert that the trial justice re-

736 ee)

jected in Kargman v. Jacobs, supra. See also Nasco, Inc. v.
Director of Public Works, 116 R.I. 712, 721, 360 A.2d 871,
876 (1976). Furthermore, the assessor did not calculate the
elements of physical and economic depreciation and thus cre-
ated an obvious gap in his method of valuation.

The assessor argues, however, that the assessments chal-
lenged in this case were identical to the 1971 assessment
“baptized” by this court in Kargman v. Jacobs, supra. He
claims that this factor constitutes a proper foundation for the
trial justice’s acceptance of his testimony in this case. This
argument misconceives the nature of our ruling in Kargman
v. Jacobs, supra. There we held that the trial justice did not
err when he found the taxpayers had failed to establish that
the assessment exceeded Kent Farm’s full and fair cash value.
That holding did not necessarily establish that the assessor
had assessed Kent Farm at its full and fair cash value.
Rather, we ruled that the taxpayers had not overcome, as a
matter of law, the presumption that the tax assessor had per-
formed his official acts properly. See CIC-Newport Associ-
ates v. Stein and Greenough v. Board of Canvassers and
Registration, both supra.

Our review of the evidence in this case indicates that the
trial justice did not err in finding that the taxpayers had met
their burden. The assessor did not introduce any opinions of
value based on the capitalization-of-income approach. Mr.
Laudati, on the other hand, presented a thorough basis for
his opinion of value derived from the capitalization of Kent
Farm’s pretax income. See Fernandes Realty Corp. v.
Lagace, 121 R.1. 513, 515, 401 A.2d 43, 46 (1979). These
factors combined with the undisputed evidence that a buyer
would purchase Kent Farm solely for investment lead us to
conclude that the trial justice could properly determine that
Mr. Laudati’s opinion of value was more persuasive than the
assessor's. Mr. Laudati relied on the capitalization-of-income
approach, which the assessor declined to employ. For these
reasons, we determine that the trial justice neither over-
looked nor misconceived material evidence adduced by the
assessor on a controlling issue.

737

Having determined that the assessor’s contentions are
without merit, we dehy and dismiss his appeal.

F. Thomas O’Halloran, Marcus E. Cohn, David Saliba,
for plaintiffs.

Joseph T. Little, for defendant.

412 A.2d 221.
Joun P. Lro vs. Maro Dispuay, Inc.
MARCH 7, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

738 ee

Ke.iewer, J. This is a workers’ compensation case in
which the employee contends that he is entitled to triple
damages because his work-related injury occurred at a time
when he was a minor. Both the trial commissioner and the

appellate division of the Workers’ Compensation Commis-
sion rejected this contention, and so do we.

The facts are uncontradicted. The employee received seri-
ous job-related injuries to his left hand at 12:45 p.m. on
August 3, 1977. He was born on August 3, 1959, at 3:56 p.m.
Everyone agrees that the employee would not be entitled to
triple damages if he were eighteen as of 12:45 p.m. on the
day he was injured.

The rejection of the employee’s contention is based upon
the common law. As a general rule, for the common-law
computation of the time during which an act is required or
permitted to be done, the first day is excluded and the last
day is included.! However, the common law recognizes an
exception to the foregoing rule in that, when computing a
person’s age, the day upon which the person was born, even
though he or she was born at the day’s last moment, is in-
cluded, and the person, therefore, reaches his or her next
year in age at the first moment of the day? prior to the anni-

General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §43-3-13 is declarative of the common
law. In essence, the statute-states that whenever time is to be reckoned from any
day, date or act done, such day, date, or day when such act is done is not to be
included within the computation of time.

*The reference in the rule to “the day’s last moment” and “the first moment of
the day” can best be explained by the following excerpt from Nichols v. Ramsel, 2
Mod. 280, 86 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1677):

“So in a devise the question was, whether the testator was of age or not? And
the evidence was, that he was born the first day of January in the afternoon,
of that day, and died in the morning on the last day of December: and it was

es 739

versary date of his or her birth. See Nichols v. Ramsel, 2
Mod. 280, 86 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1677); Turnbull v.
Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1969); Nelson v.
Sandkamp, 227 Minn. 177, 34 N.W.2d 640 (1948); State v.
Brown, 443 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1969); State of New Jersey in
the Interest of F.W., 130 N.J. Super. 513, 327 A.2d 697
(1974); Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833 (1976).
See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 1153 (1949). While the General
Assembly has reduced the age of majority from twenty-one to
eighteen, it has not modified the common-law principle to
which we have referred.

Although the employee argues that we should ignore the
common law and calculate the time when he achieved his
majority by using the actual hours found in the record, we
believe that the rule first expressed over three hundred years
ago in the Ramsel case furnishes a uniformity and certainty
that is most desirable. If the rule is to be changed, the change
must be made at the State House rather than here at the
courthouse.

The employee’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
decree appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.
Charles H. McLaughlin, for appellant.

Paul A. Lietar, for appellee.

held by all the Judges that he was of full age; for there shall be no fraction of
a day.”

Just before the turn of the century, this court in Mathewson v. Ham, 21 R.I. 203,

42 A. 871 (1899), in alluding to the non-fractionalized view of a day's time, said:

“[T he law does not regard a part of a day. Hence, a thing done at any time
in a day is taken the same as though it had been done in the first minute of
the day. Any part of a day, for the purpose of computing time, is taken as a
whole day. 2 Black Comm. 141.”

740

412 A.2d 222.

Ana DaLomsa SANTIAGO vs.
Faustino GONSALVES SANTIAGO.

MARCH 7, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

ee) 741

Ketxener, J. Ana and Faustino Santiago were divorced
by a decree entered in the Family Court on November 12,
1976. Faustino is before us on his appeal from a portion of the
decree which directs the Family Court clerk to take approxi-
mately $3,750 that is presently on deposit in the court’s reg-
istry and “pay [it] over to the State of Rhode Island.” We
shall first detail the reasons for the pay-over order and then
discuss Faustino’s jurisdictional challenge to its issuance.

Faustino and Ana were married in Seekonk, Massachu-
setts, on February 26, 1973. Their wedding license indicates
that Faustino was a twenty-six-year-old native of the Cape
Verde Islands who lived in Rotterdam, Holland, and worked
as a seaman. The license also shows that Ana was a seven-
teen-year-old Cape Verdean native who resided in East
Providence. Her occupation was described as “student.”
When Ana appeared before the Family Court on October 13,
1976, seeking a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differ-
ences, there was another entry to be made concerning the
couple’s vital statistics: they were now the parents of a two-
and-a-half-year-old daughter, Carlotta.

Much of the testimony presented at the Family Court was
given by way of interpreters. Ana told the trial justice that
she was then receiving from the Department of Social and
Rehabilitative Services (DSRS) semimonthly payments for
the support of herself and Carlotta. Each payment amounted
to $117.

Somewhere in Faustino’s testimony he let it be known that
he had been injured aboard ship and received a “substantial
settlement.” The settlement, which had been effectuated
through the efforts of a Boston law firm, had been dissipated.
Faustino claimed that he had nothing left from the settle-
ment. The trial justice, upon hearing this, directed Ana to
return to the stand. Ana explained that in November 1974
Faustino had received by way of settlement a net amount of
$33,000.

When the trial justice became aware that the couple had
lived in a Central Falls tenement that was owned by Faus-

742 es

tino’s brother, Liborio, the trial justice continued the hearing
until the following November 8 and directed Ana’s attorney
to make sure that Liborio and Faustino’s uncle, Jose Gon-
salves, were present in court on that day and had with them
all relevant documents relating to the settlement proceeds.
The records further indicate that on this day the trial justice
was told that contempt proceedings were to be instituted
against Faustino pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA),
G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §§15-11-1 et seq., because of
his failure to comply with an order entered by a master,
which order directed Faustino to pay $20 a week to DSRS as
partial reimbursement for the assistance payments being
made to Ana and the child. The trial justice ordered that the
citation be issued returnable for the next hearing date.

On November 8 Liborio appeared and told the trial justice
that Faustino arrived in Rhode Island on July 22, 1973, after
spending ninety-five days in a Connecticut hospital for treat-
ments relating to a broken leg. Liborio confirmed the fact
that in the autumn of 1974 Faustino had received $33,000.
Records of a Boston bank indicate that a joint bank account
was opened in the names of Liborio and Faustino on October
7, 1974, with an initial deposit of $31,500. Liborio explained
that on October 16 he withdrew $11,500 from this account,
gave $7,500 of the withdrawal to his brother, and kept the
remaining $4,000 as reimbursement for the various expenses
he had incurred in his brother’s behalf when Faustino was
hospitalized. Liborio told the court that his brother then
Opened a savings account in a Pawtucket bank with a $3,000
deposit and “he keep the rest of the money in his pocket.”
According to Liborio, most of Faustino’s cash found its way
into barrooms “and other places.” Liborio did acknowledge,
however, that Faustino used some of the settlement proceeds
to furnish the couple’s tenement, purchasing such staples of
the American way of life as a television set and “one stereo.”

Uncle Jose brought a savings account passbook to court.
The account stood in the names of Jose and his wife. Its
balance on August 6, 1975, was $98.97. Thereafter, the

es 743

account received a substantial cash infusion, including two
deposits that totaled $9,000. Jose conceded that Faustino was
the infusion’s donor. The account also shows a series of with-
drawals so that, as of the day of the hearing, there was a
balance in the account of $3,246.01. Jose testified that he
made all the withdrawals and delivered them to his nephew.

As the trial justice examined the bankbook, he noticed that
Jose had withdrawn $1,250 immediately prior to coming to
court on November 8. When the trial justice asked Jose where
the $1,250 went, Jose pointed to Faustino’s attorney. At this
juncture, Faustino’s attorney informed the court that he and
Ana’s counsel had agreed that $1,250 was to be used for
counsel fees, with Ana’s attorney receiving $750 and the
balance to be retained by him.

Thereupon, the trial justice, after alluding to Faustino’s
former testimony that he was penniless, directed Faustino’s
attorney to deposit the money allocated for fees into the regis-
try of the court, and he also impounded Jose’s bankbook.
Ana’s attorney was instructed to file a motion for counsel
fees, but when Faustino’s counsel asked if he could be in-
cluded within the invitation, the trial justice said: “No, that
doesn’t go * * * for you, Mr. Kirshenbaum. You have been
representing this man who had $33,000, and I would doubt
very much that you would take him on unless you got a re-
tainer from him at the time.” Mr. Kirshenbaum responded
that he had received “some money” but insisted, “I had a
contract price with him.”

When Faustino was recalled to the witness stand, he testi-
fied that the only remaining portion of the $33,000 settle-
ment was the almost $4,500 that remained in Jose’s bank
account. He also explained that he was about to return to the
Cape Verde Islands. Apparently, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service had instituted deportation
proceedings because Faustino had entered this country
illegally. The trial justice compounded Faustino’s woes when
he found him in contempt and ordered him to be
incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions until
Friday, November 12.

744 es

The first witness at the November 12 hearing was the
Family Court’s supervisor of collections from individuals who
are required to reimburse DSRS pursuant to the terms of
URESA. His records indicated that, taking into account the
erratic weekly payments made by Faustino, there was a bal-
ance of $4,452.19 in support payments made for her and the
child’s benefit for which no reimbursement had been made.

Faustino was present at this time. When asked by the trial
justice about the contract, he responded: “I do not have any
contract with anyone. I only picked him as my attorney.”
Thereafter, the trial justice authorized the payment of a $750
fee to Ana’s attorney, and he made certain findings of fact
which are incorporated in the decree now under review.

As we proceed to the various facets of this appeal, we are
reminded that at this point in time Faustino has returned to
the Islands, and his trial counsel has retired from the practice
of law and now calls Florida his home.

When the trial justice impounded Faustino’s funds, includ-
ing the $1,250 that the attorneys had agreed to share, there
was then pending before the court Ana’s divorce petition and
her URESA petition. While Faustino’s attorney insisted that
there was an agreement regarding the fee, Faustino told the
trial justice that there was no such agreement. We believe the
question of any fee due Faustino’s attorney, particularly in
light of the contradictory testimony given by his client, was a
matter addressed to the trial justice’s discretion, and on this
record we see no abuse of that discretion.

The state’s right to the impounded funds presents a differ-
ent issue. In challenging this right, Faustino’s counsel points
to §15-11-5 of the 1950 version of URESA, which in its perti-
nent parts provides: “For the purpose of this chapter, a hus-
band in this state is hereby declared to be liable for the sup-
port of his wife if she is over fifty (50) years of age or physic-
ally incapacitated + * +.” Faustino claims that there is no im-
poundment right because it is conceded that Ana is neither
fifty years of age nor incapacitated. In taking this position,
Faustino ignores the fact that §15-11-5 also imposes upon

es 745

him a duty to support “any child or children under eighteen
(18) years of age * * *.” He also overlooks §15-11-14, which
recognizes the state’s right to be reimbursed by a father for
“expenditures” made by the state to support an individual
who should have been receiving paternal support. Here, the
state has been paying for Carlotta’s support; each semi-
monthly payment goes for the joint support of the mother
and the child. If Faustino actually was seeking the benefit of
the statutory over-fifty-years limitation, it was incumbent
upon him to show what portion of the approximately $3,750
now in the registry was attributable to payments made for
the support of the wife. At this late stage of the litigation, we
are not about to undertake such an endeavor. Parenthetic-
ally, we would point out that the General Assembly at its
January 1979 session, with the enactment of P.L. 1979, ch.
260, repealed in its entirety, as of July 1, Rhode Island’s 1950
version of URESA and substituted therefor an updated and
thoroughly revised version of the uniform act. No longer is a
husband’s duty to support his wife limited to spouses who are
either over the age of fifty or physically incapacitated. Conse-
quently, we cannot fault the reimbursement order.

The respondent’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the
decree appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remitted to
the Family Court.

Raymond E. Shawcross, Chief Legal Counsel,
Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services, for peti-
tioner.

Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, Alfred Factor, for respond-
ent.

746 es

412 A2d 1131.
JoserpH RoMANO, et al. vs. SALVATORE MANCINI, et al.
MARCH 10, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

Per CurtaM. This case comes before us on a show-cause
order directing the plaintiff to show cause why his appeal
and petition for writ of certiorari should not be dismissed on
the grounds that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.

The Providence County Superior Court dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction plaintiff's complaint against the Public Safety
Director and the Chief of Police of the Town of North
Providence in which he sought a temporary and a permanent
injunction, a restraining order, reinstatement, and back pay
to forestall his dismissal from the North Providence police
force. Citing the grievance procedure contained in the
collective bargaining contract between plaintiff's representa-
tives, the North Providence Chapter of the Fraternal Order
of Police, and the town as “an adequate remedy at law,” the

es ar

Superior Court declined to invoke equity jurisdiction.

The plaintiff on the day the Superior Court judgment was
entered filed an appeal in this court; four and one half
months later he petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari.
We granted the writ without prejudice to the respondents to
question the providence of our grant and directed the parties
to brief the issue of the proper way to seek review in this case.
Romano v. Mancini, 120 R.I. 941, 397 A.2d 530 (1979).

Although plaintiff has ignored our request to brief the lat-
ter issue,! he implores this court to reverse the Superior Court
judgment. He claims that he is without legal remedy because
the town has unilaterally determined that as a probationary
member of the police force he was not entitled to a dismissal
hearing and because the Superior Court has refused to resolve
the question of his status. The pivotal issue in plaintiff's case
is whether he is a probationary or a permanent member of
the North Providence police force.

HE Without burdening this opinion with a discussion of the
law and circumstances implicated: in the question of
plaintiff's status, we conclude that plaintiff may litigate this
question, which involves a matter of contract interpretation,
through the grievance procedures outlined in sections 16 and
17 of the collective bargaining contract. When parties have
bargained for and agreed upon a mechanism for resolving
contract disputes, they have no recourse but to pursue the
remedy for which they contracted. Jacinto v. Egan, 120
R.I, 907, 911, 391 A.2d 1173, 1175 (1978); School Com-
mittee v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance, AFT Local
9301, 120 R.I. 810, 815, 390 A.2d 386, 389 (1978); Bar-
tington School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor
Relations Board, 120 R.I. 470, 479, 388 A.2d 1369, 1375

‘Because of the posture we take in this case -- upholding the Superior Court’s dis-
missal for lack of jurisdiction -- we shall not belabor the point of what avenue of re-
view plaintiff should have followed; the result in either instance would have been
the same. However, we do not by this action in any way mean to intimate that the
procedural rules governing review in this court may be ignored. We emphasize that
our decision in this case in no way diminishes the force and effect of those rules.

748

(1978); Cranston Teachers Assoc. v. Cranston School Com-
mittee, 120 R.I. 105, 109, 386 A.2d 176, 178 (1978);
Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332, 353-54, 346 A.2d 124,
138 (1975). If one of the parties refuses to submit to the
agreed-upon procedure, the opposing party may sue for en-
forcement of the contract. See, e.g., G.L. 1956 (1979 Reen-
actment) §28-8-1 to §28-8-3.

Therefore, the plaintiff was constrained under the agree-
ment to seek relief or redress for alleged violations of the pro-
visions of the agreement in the procedures provided by the
contract.

We hold that the trial justice was correct in dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint in view of the legal remedy available
under the collective bargaining agreement.

The plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed, the writ
improvidently granted is quashed, and the papers certified to
us are ordered returned to the Superior Court with our
decision endorsed thereon.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.
Irving I. Zimmerman, Richard E. Kyte, Jr., for plaintiff.

Louis Baruch Rubinstein, Robert S. Ciresi, for defendants.

749

412 A.2d 231.
-STATE OF RuoveE IsLanp vs. JAMES R. O'BRIEN.
MARCH 11, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

~

Bevitacgua, C.J. This is a criminal appeal in which the
defendant, James R. O’Brien, claims three instances of rever-
sible error in a Superior Court jury trial that resulted in his
conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor in violation of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§31-27-2, as amended by P.L. 1974, ch. 120, §2, and for
driving to endanger, death resulting, in violation of G.L.

ee) 751

1956 (1969 Reenactment) §31-27-1, as amended by P.L.
1978, ch. 208, §2.

The prosecution witnesses and defendant, who took the
stand, testified uniformly to the following sequence of events.
At approximately 10:30 on the night of May 9, 1974, a green
Pontiac Firebird with a tattered roof drove through a green
light on Elmwood Avenue in Providence at a speed of
approximately thirty to forty miles per hour. The night was
clear and the highway was well lit. Some fourteen car lengths
down the four-lane avenue from the stop light, the left front
portion of the car struck a pedestrian who was standing near
the double lines in the middle of the avenue. The driver of
the vehicle did not stop. The victim later died of his injuries.

Police arriving at the scene obtained a description of the
vehicle from an eyewitness to the accident. Presently, in
Memorial Square in Providence, another Providence police
officer stopped a vehicle which answered to the eyewitness

description. The officer testified that defendant was the per-
son driving the car. Moreover, he stated that the driver
appeared to him to be inebriated.

The investigating officers at the accident scene found a
metallic letter “O” on the ground not far from where the vic-
tim lay. The officers later matched this letter “O” with the
letter “P” and the letters “N-T-I-A-C” that they pried off the
car which was stopped in Memorial Square. The state intro-
duced the letters into evidence at trial along with a series of
photographs depicting the damaged left-front portion of the
green Firebird.

At approximately 1 o’clock on the morning after police
took defendant into custody they administered a breathalyzer
test to him. The results of that test revealed that the percent-
age of alcohol in his blood was greater than that necesary to
meet the statutory definition of intoxication.

1General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §31-27-2.1, as amended by P.L.. 1978,
ch, 174, §1, provides in pertinent part:

“(c) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of §31-27-2 of this chapter,

the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood at the time alleged as shown by

759 ee

The medical examiner who conducted an autopsy on the
victim testified that he found in the victim’s blood traces of
alcohol which exceeded the statutory percentage.” He further
testified that the victim died of shock from multiple injuries
and that those injuries were consistent with the victim’s hav-
ing been struck by an automobile.

When Providence police arrested defendant, he had the
license of his brother, Paul M. O’Brien, in his possession. Be-
lieving that Paul M. O’Brien was his true name, police sought
an indictment and filed a complaint against defendant using
the name Paul M. O’Brien, alias John Doe® and the address
appearing on the license. At his arraignment in 1975,
defendant pled not guilty as Paul M. O’Brien. Two years
later, the trial court introduced him to the jury as Paul M.
O’Brien. Three days into the trial, his attorney called as the
first defense witness, Paul M. O’Brien, and defendant took
the stand. It was not until he was sworn as a witness that he
revealed his true identity to the court.

I
The defendant first complains that the trial justice abused
his discretion by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine
him beyond the scope of direct examination. On direct exam-

chemical analysis of the person’s blood, urine or breath shalll give rise to the
following presumptions:

3. If there was at that time one tenth of one percent (.10%) or more by
weight of alcohol in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.”

‘The officer who administered the breathalyzer test to defendant testified that at the
end of the first phase of the test defendant's blood alcohol level was .18 percent and
at the end of the second phase it was .13 percent.

?The medical examiner stated that the level of alcohol in the victim’s blood was
-22, percent at the time of the autopsy.

As a matter of course the police seek indictments and file complaints in the form
of defendant's name and the alias John Doe. Section 12-12-2 of the General Laws
sanctions this practice by allowing criminal process to issue in a fictitious name or
by description. General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §12-12-2, as amended by
P.L, 1974, ch. 118, §11.

P| 753

ination, defendant identified himself as James Robert
O’Brien, and Paul O’Brien as his brother. Over defendant’s
objections, the trial justice allowed the prosecutor to inquire
into how the discrepancy in names occurred. The defendant
states that he had given the police his brother’s driver’s
license and that he had never before told the court his true
name. Moreover, he admitted that he had been driving on
Elmwood Avenue on the night of the accident and that he
had been convicted of manslaughter in Massachusetts in
1970.

In Rhode Island the scope of inquiry on cross-examination
is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Eckhart, 117 R.I. 431, 436, 367 A.2d 1073, 1075
(1977); State v. Crescenzo, 114 R.I. 242, 252, 332 A.2d 421,
427 (1975). On review, we shall affirm an exercise of discre-
tion unless abused. Pansey v. Pansey, 115 R.I. 97, 102, 340
A,2d 120, 124 (1975); State v. Sprague, 113 R.I. 351, 364,
322 A.2d 36, 43 (1974).

In addition to interrogating a witness about matters that
the witness testified to on direct examination, a cross-exam-
iner may also probe into collateral matters in an attempt to
contradict, discredit, explain, or lessen the impact of the wit-
ness’ direct testimony, or attack his memory and credibility.
State v. Ragonesi, 112 R.I. 340, 346, 309 A.2d 851, 854
(1973). When the defendant in a criminal case chooses to tes-
tify, he automatically raises the issue of his identity as the
perpetrator of the crime charged. By testifying that his name
was not the same as that on the complaint and indictment,
defendant raised a serious issue of whether he was the person
who committed the acts charged. The state properly clarified
the confusion on cross-examination and the trial court pro-
perly permitted this relevant inquiry. See State v. Earley, 118
R.I. 205, 212, 373 A.2d 162, 166 (1977); State v. Prescott, 70
R.I. 403, 411, 40 A.2d 721, 725 (1944). Accordingly, we find
that the prosecutor did not inquire beyond the bounds of per-
missive cross-examination and that the trial court committed
no abuse of discretion.

754

I

The defendant next contends that the admission of his
prior manslaughter conviction into evidence denied him due
process of law as an impermissible method of impeaching his
credibility insofar as the prior crime did not involve honesty
or veracity. He also urges us to adopt the balancing test
developed in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir.
1965), wherein the trial justice must weigh the probative
value of the prior conviction against its potential for con-
fusion and impermissible prejudice before he may admit the
prior conviction into evidence. Id. at 768.4

In State v. Lombardi, 113 R.1. 206, 319 A.2d 346 (1974),
we expressly declined to abandon our longstanding statutory
rule® governing the impeachment of witnesses by prior con-
victions in favor of a Luck balancing test. Nor did we deem it
necessary to construe the statute narrowly to limit admissible
convictions to those of crimes involving moral turpitude. Id.
at 208, 319 A.2d at 347. Although we recognize the varying

4In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), Judge McGowan, the
author of the Luck opinion, declared that Federal Rule of Evidence 609 had
worked significant changes in the Luck rule, narrowing the discretion of the trial
court to admit evidence of past convictions. Id. at 357-61. Under Fed. R. Evid.
609(a)(1), to use a prior felony conviction against a defendant’s interests, the
government must first convince the trial court that the probative value of the evi-
dence outweighs the threat of impermissible prejudice. Jd. Under Rule 609(a)(2),
any past crime involving dishonesty or false statement is admissible. As a result of
this clause, the federal courts have had to make ad hoc inquiry into what crimes en-
compass dishonesty or false statements as a necessary adjunct to determining admis-
sibility. See, e.g., United States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
and cases noted at page 777.

Although its continued vitality in the federal courts is questionable, Luck
remains influential in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Baldwin, 405 Mich.
550, 275 N.W.2d 253 (1979); People v. Ocasio, 47 N.Y.2d 55, 389 N.E.2d 1101,
416 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1979); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 398 A.2d 1007 (Pa. 1979).

5General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-17-15 provides:

“Effect of conviction for crime.--No person shall be deemed an incompetent
witness because of his conviction of any crime, or dentence to imprisonment
therefor; but shall be admitted to testify like any other witness, except that
conviction or sentence for any crime or misdemeanor may be shown to affect
his credibility.” (Emphasis added).

Pe 755

approaches and supporting justifications which other juris-
dictions prefer,® we again assert our belief that any changes
in the rule should be made by the Legislature if at all. Id. at
209, 319 A.2d at 347; Mercurio v. Fascitelli, 107 R.I. 511,
516, 268 A.2d 427, 430 (1970). We construe Legislative sil-
ence as acquiescence to the rule as it now stands.

Moreover, we are satisfied that the limitations we have en-
grafted onto the statute comport with the requisites of a fair
trial. Whenever a party seeks to impeach a witness by evi-
dence of a prior conviction, it is incumbent on the trial court,
sua sponte, to consider whether the conviction is too remote
in time to be of any present probative value. See State v.
Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144, 386 A.2d 378, 387 (1978) (remote-
ness key to prior crimes evidence). Furthermore, at the time
the sponsoring party introduces this evidence the trial court
must, of its own accord, instruct the members of the jury that
they must limit their use of this evidence to their assessment
of the credibility of the witness and that otherwise it has no

"In addition to the Luck approach and the modification of Luck embodied in
Fed. R. Evid. 609, our sister states have adopted a variety of rules to govern the
admissibility of past crimes. The Supreme Court of Hawaii has declared the prac-
tice of impeachment of a defendant by prior crimes an unconstitutional invasion of
an accused’s right to testify. State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
In West Virginia, only convictions for perjury and false swearing are admissible to
impeach the defendant’s credibility. State v. McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 431 (W.Va.
1977). On the opposite end of the spectrum are jurisdictions that follow a statutory
mandate, similar to the one in Rhode Island, which permits the state to impeach a
defendant with evidence of any prior crime and vests the trial justice with no dis-
cretion except to consider the issue of remoteness. Commonwealth v. West, 357
Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970); State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wash. 2d 217, 570 P.2d 1208
(1977).

We recognize that under the Rhode Island law of evidence, when the trial justice
must rule on the admissibility of other types of evidence--for example, collateral
evidence or character evidence--he has broad discretion to weigh the probative
value of proffered evidence against its potential for prejudice. See State v. St.
Pierre, 118 R.I. 45, 54, 371 A.2d 1048, 1052-53 (1977) (evidence of reputation);
State v. Rezendes, 111 R.1. 169, 174, 300 A.2d 472, 475 (1973) (relevancy); State v.
Reardon, 101 R.1. 18, 25, 219 A.2d 767, 772 (1966) (relevancy).

For a fairly comprehensive survey of the varying rules of other states, see the
appendix to Judge Wilner’s opinion in Burrell v. State, 309 A.2d 1354, 1363-67
(Ma. App. 1979).

756 ee)

probative foree as proof of any of the elements of the crime
charged. State v. Lombardi, 113 R.1. at 209, 319 A.2d at
347; Mercurio v. Fascitelli, 107 R.I. at 517, 268 A.2d at
430-31. In so doing, the trial justice will minimize the risk of
jury confusion about the intended purpose of the evidence.

In the instant case when the prosecutor sought to introduce
defendant’s prior Massachusetts manslaughter conviction the
trial justice considered but failed to issue the requisite cau-
tionary instruction. Neither the prosecutor nor defense coun-
sel reminded him of the cautionary-instruction requirement.

Ordinarily, the trial justice’s error would require reversal
because a cautionary instruction is necessary to mitigate the
strong likelihood of impermissible prejudice that might
accompany this evidence.’ In this instance, however, the evi-
dence of the prior conviction was superfluous and the risk of
confusion was minimal. At trial and on appeal defendant did
not contest that he had been driving on Elmwood Avenue at
the time of the accident, that he had been drinking alcoholic
beverages prior to the accident, that he had struck the pedes-
trian, and that he had fled the scene of the accident. More-
over, he offered no evidence to mitigate, to justify, or to ex-
cuse the charge of reckless conduct. Indeed, on redirect
examination and recross-examination he admitted to facts
sufficient to convince a jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. An attack on his credibility was unnecessary. In fact,
if that evidence had any impact on his credibility, it would
have tended to prove the unlikely proposition that he had
been lying when he testified to facts that proved his guilt.
Even if the jury drew from this evidence the impermissible
inference that defendant was inclined to commit crimes, in
light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the
corroborating testimony of defendant, we are persuaded that

7The Supreme Court of Maine in State v. Roy, 385 A.2d 795 (Me. 1978), noted
two examples of how evidence of past crimes may prejudice a defendant. First, the
specter of this damaging evidence may dissuade the defendant from taking the
stand on his own behalf. Second, the jury may infer that the defendant is a recidi-
vist and convict him on that basis and not on proof of the crime charged. Id. at
‘797-98.

es 757

this error does not require reversal. Neither do we think,
given the dictates of judicial economy, that a new trial is
warranted.

Although on the record of this case we find that the failure
of the trial court to issue cautionary instructions was harmless
error, we reemphasize the curative importance of cautionary
instructions when a party offers evidence of a prior convic-
tion to impeach a witness.* Accordingly, we reiterate that it
is the sole responsibility of the trial justice, in the interests of a
fair trial, immediately to caution the jury that it is to use this
evidence for impeachment purposes only. If the trial court
should forget to execute its duty to instruct, we would hope
that counsel, as officers of the court, would remind the trial
court of its responsibility. See People v. Denny, 86 Mich.
App. 40, 44, 272 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1978).

Tl
In defendant’s last specification of error he claims that the
trial court mistakenly granted the state’s motion to amend by
interlineation the titles of the indictment and complaint, and
wrongly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal based
on the defense of misnomer. The defendant’s novel surprise
defense tactic precipitated both motions.

By invoking a misnomer defense at the close of the trial,
defendant raised two questions of law for the trial court to re-
solve and for us to review. Initially, we shall consider whe-
ther the amendment of the titles prejudiced defendant. It is
an elementary principle of criminal law, unaltered since the
age of Blackstone, that any form of criminal process “is an
accusation of a person of crime. It is an accusation against a
person, not against a name. A name is not the substance of an
indictment (or complaint).” Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio St. 43,
50 (1869) (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 302).

When a person who allegedly committed criminal acts is
*See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561, 87 S.Ct. 648, 652, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606,

612 (1967); State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wash. 2d 217, 229, 570 P.2d 1208, 1214 (1977).
See generally State v. Earley, 118 R.J. 205, 212, 373 A.2d 162, 165-66 (1977).

758 ee

known, and he is positively identified by his accuser and him-
self as the person who perpetrated those acts, his name is
superfluous to the trial of that crime. See G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §12-12-2. When an error in the title of the pro-
cess is confessedly a technicality, the defendant cannot claim
it is prejudicial. United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d 764,
766-67 (3d Cir. 1970); State v. Drury, 13 B.I. 540, 541
(1882). We agree wholeheartedly with the Third Circuit that
“in the progress of the law, narrow formalism should be elim-
inated + * +.” United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d at 766. It is
the solemn duty of the courts and counsel to expedite justice,
not hinder it.

Second, the trial justice found that the defendant had not
timely raised the misnomer defense. The proper time for
clearing away technical defects in an indictment or com-
plaint is before trial.? Under Super. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) an
accused must present all formal defenses, like misnomer, via
a motion to dismiss within a reasonable time after the
arraignment or he is deemed to have waived any formal ob-
jection to the process. See State v. Drury, 13 B.1. at 540-41
(misnomer defense waived unless timely made); ef. State v.
LaPlante, 122 R.I. 446, 409 A.2d 130 (1979) (defendant
must raise duplicity defense within reasonable time after gen-
eral plea entered). Two years after the arraignment and
three days into trial is hardly the proper time to raise a mis-
nomer defense. The trial court properly concluded that the
defendant had waived any misnomer claim and, therefore, it
correctly denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal and appropriately granted the state’s motion to
amend the titles of the indictment and complaint.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

°When there is no threat of injustice to the defendant, however, the trial justice,
on a motion to amend, may cure the misnomer by interlineation after the trial has
begun. Dunlop v. Warden of the Maryland House of Corrections, 229 Md. 619,
619-20, 182 A.2d 51, 51 (1962); Commonwealth v. Liebowitz, 143 Pa. Super. Ct.
5, 79, 17 A.2d 719, 721 (1941). Punctilious adherence to the rules of criminal
pleading is not an end in itself.

759

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin
III, Special Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Appellate
Division, for plaintiff.

Aram K. Berberian, for defendant.

412 A.2d 228.
Ricuarp GrEenwoop e¢ al. vs. RopertT Rantiu et al.
MARCH 11, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Doris, J. This is an appeal from a judgment entered in
the Superior Court in a civil action heard before a justice of
that court sitting without a jury. The plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the State Department of Transportation from continu-
ing to discharge surface runoff water onto the plaintiffs’ pro-
perty through a highway culvert and drain. In an answer
amended at trial without objection, the state admitted con-
struction and maintenance of the drain but claimed the exist-
ence of a prescriptive easement giving it the right to continue
directing surface runoff water onto the plaintiffs’ property.
The trial justice found that the state had acquired 4 prescrip-
tive easement to discharge the surface runoff water onto the
plaintiffs’ property and dismissed the complaint. From a
judgment thereafter entered, the plaintiffs have appealed.

The plaintiffs, Richard and Sandra Greenwood, alleged
that a highway drainage pipe constructed and maintained by
the state causes flooding of their property on Watch Hill
Road in Westerly when it rains and that this flooding consti-
tutes a continuing trespass. The plaintiffs sought an injunc-

eS 761

tion against the state to cease the discharge and to divert the
runoff water from their property and also sought damages in
the amount of $50,000.

At trial, Sandra Greenwood testified that the property
now owned by plaintiffs was obtained by deed dated July 25,
1975, from her parents who had owned the property since
sometime in the 1950s. She stated that prior to taking title,
plaintiffs discovered a culvert and a ditch where curbing had
been removed at the edge of the property. Sandra testified
that, at the time, the culvert was covered with underbrush.

Sandra stated that upon discovery of the culvert, she called
the Department of Transportation and was advised by a
Richard Beretta that the property was a natural wetlands
area and that consequently the state was entitled to continue
to discharge the runoff surface water onto the property.

Mrs. Greenwood further testified that she then made an
inquiry to the State Department of Natural Resources in re-
spect to whether or not the property was a wetlands area and
received a reply from the director of that department that the
property was not wetlands.

The plaintiffs commenced construction of their home in
October 1975, and the flowage of the surface water was
altered slightly when a septic tank was installed during the
construction.

Richard Beretta, chief of the drainage section of the
Department of Transportation, testified without objection
that the culvert in question was constructed n 1934, replacing
an old culvert in an area where the contours of the road slope
down in both directions toward the location of the culvert.
The state introduced the 1934 contract plan for the recon-
struction of Watch Hill Road, which plan showed the old
culvert on the present site of the new one.

Beretta testified that originally he had thought the pro-
perty was covered by the Wetlands Act but learned later that
it was not. Both Beretta and Mrs. Greenwood testified that
attempts by the parties to adjust the situation were unsuc-
cessful.

762 es

The trial justice found that, before they acquired title,
plaintiffs knew that the water was coming onto the property.
He further found that the state had utilized the culvert from
1934 to 1975 in opposition to the rest of the world without
any interference from anyone, including plaintiffs’ predeces-
sors in title, and that the state thereby acquired an easement
by prescription. The trial justice accordingly denied plain-
tiffs’ request for injunctive relief and dismissed the com-
plaint.

On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial justice failed to
set forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law in deter-
mining that the state had acquired an easement by prescrip-
tion and that the state had failed to introduce sufficient evi-
dence to sustain such a determination by the trial justice.
They further argue that the course of the flowage was altered
with the installation of the septic tank and that therefore the
prescriptive period for the present flow of the water had not
run,

What is at issue here is the right to dispose of surface water
onto the property of another, rather than the right to actual
possession. Such a right is an incorporeal hereditament, as
distinguished from a corporeal hereditament, and what the
state claims to have obtained is an easement by prescription.
General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §34-7-1; Carpenter
v. Dos Santos, 96 R.I. 334, 191 A.2d 282 (1963); Foley v.
Lyons, 85 R.1. 86, 125 A.2d 247 (1956). It is generally held
that an easement may be acquired by prescription to drain
surface water collected upon the land of one person over the
lands of an adjacent proprietor. 2 Thompson, Real Property

-§315 at 10 (1961). A right to the flowage of water and the dis-

posal of waste in pipes or drains through lands of another
may be acquired by prescription. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements
and Licenses, §48 at 457-58 (1966); see Annot, “Easements
by Prescription - Drains” 55 A.L.R.2d 1144 (1957).

In a recent case we have stated that:

“One who claims an easement by prescription must
establish open, adverse, and continuous use under a

es 763

claim of right by strict proof, that is, by clear and satis-
factory evidence.” Jerry Brown Farm Ass’n v. Kenyon,
119 R.I. 43, 51, 375 A.2d 964, 968 (1977).

No particular act to establish an intention to claim ownership
is required. It is sufficient if one goes upon the land openly
and uses it adversely to the true owner, the owner being
chargeable with knowledge of what is done openly on his
land. Sherman v. Goloskie, 95 R.1. 457, 466, 188 A.2d 79, 83
(1963) (quoting Marvel v. Barley Mill Road Homes, Inc., 34
Del. Ch. 417, 104 A.2d 908 (1954).

Applying the above standards to the present case, the rec-
ord indicates that the present culvert replaced an earlier one
and has been regularly maintained by the state since 1934.
The prescriptive period had long since run before the acquisi-
tion of the property by plaintiffs. There is no evidence of any
objection ever having been made to the runoff surface water
prior to the complaint by plaintiffs in 1975. Furthermore
there is an admission in the complaint that the use com-
plained of was not permissive.

The plaintiffs, however, state that the culvert and drain
were covered by brush when discovered by them. It is clear,
however, that this was only a temporary condition since as
Mr. Beretta testified the state’s routine maintenance program
requires the periodic cleaning out of all culverts and basins.
In any event, the discovery by plaintiffs was made long after
the statutory prescriptive period had run. Once the state had
acquired a prescriptive easement to drain the surface runoff
water upon plaintiffs’ land, no act of plaintiffs could divest
the state of that right since such an easement conveys a good
and rightful title forever. General Laws 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §34-7-1. .

Here, the trial justice exercised his fact-finding power and
determined that the state has sustained its burden of proving
its claim by clear and convincing evidence. His findings of
fact will be upheld unless they are clearly wrong or unless the
trial justice has misconceived or overlooked material evi-
dence. Jerry Brown Farm Ass‘n v. Kenyon, supra at 52, 375

764

A.2d at 969. Our reading of the record convinces us that the
trial justice was not clearly wrong nor has he overlooked or
misconceived material evidence.

The plaintiffs have attempted on appeal to raise two con-
stitutional questions, neither of which was raised before the
trial justice. We have made it clear in the past that except in
most unusual circumstances, we will not consider constitu-
tional questions unless they have been properly submitted on
the record before the trial justice allowing him the original
opportunity to pass on them. Dixon v. Royal Cab, Inc., 121
R.I. 110, 119, 396 A.2d 930, 935 (1979) (citing Town of Foster
v. Lamphere, 117 B.1. 541, 545, 368 A.2d 1238, 1240 (1977)).
Since the plaintiffs did not first raise their constitutional
claims properly in the court below, we will not review them
here.

The plaintiffs’ appeal is. denied and dismissed, the judg-
ment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remanded to
the Superior Court.

Natale L. Urso, for plaintiffs.
Stephen F. Mullen, Chief Special Counsel, Office of

Special Counsel, Department of Transportation, for defend-
ants.

765

412 A:2d 225.

Frank T. Canario vs,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

MARCH 11, 1980.
Parsenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

Murray, J. Four complaints issued by the First Division
District Court charged petitioner with (1) operating an un-
numbered motorboat in violation of G.L. 1956 (1970 Reen-
actment) §46-22-3, (2) failing to exhibit lights on a motorboat
as required by §46-22-5(b), (3) operating a dredge to take

os

quahogs in violation of G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment)
§20-11-3,! and (4) carrying a dredge on his boat in violation
of §20-11-9, At the close of a trial held on April 5, 1977, a
District Court justice found the petitioner guilty of all
charges and imposed fines for each offense. On April 24,
1977, the petitioner commenced this certiorari proceeding to
obtain review both of an alleged error at trial and of the
deprivation of his claimed right to a jury trial in the Superior
Court. We ordered the writ to issue. Canario v. Department
of Natural Resources, 118 R.I. 940, 373 A.2d 831 (1977).

At oral argument, however, we learned what perhaps we
should have realized earlier from the substance of an affi-
davit submitted by petitioner as a supplement to the record,
per order of this court on August 9, 1979. The affidavit dis-
closes that after petitioner’s conviction in the District Court,
his trial counsel attempted to file a notice of appeal to the
Superior Court with the Clerk of the First Division District
Court.? According to the affidavit, the clerk refused to file
the notice of appeal, informing counsel that petitioner had no
right of appeal to the Superior Court. The clerk further in-
formed petitioner’s counsel that he could file an appeal or file

4General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §20-11-3 has since been amended by
PLL, 1979, ch. 196, §5.

"General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §12-22-1, as amended by P.L. 1976,
ch. 173, §5, provides that:

“Every person aggrieved by the sentence of the district court for any
offense other than a violation may, within five (5) days after such sentence
appeal therefrom to the superior court for the county in which the division
of the district court is situated, by claiming an appeal in the court or in the
office of the clerk of the court appealed from or at any of the penal institu-
tions of the state, before any justice of the supreme or superior court, or
before a justice clerk of the court appealed from, or before any of the persons
authorized to take bail at said penal institutions.”

Rule 37 of the Dist. R. Grim. P. presoribes certain refinements of §12-22-1 to be
followed when appeal is claimed either in open court or to the court clerk, The
tule, which took effect on September 1, 1972, has not been amended to reflect that
under §12-22-1 sentences for violations are no longer appealable to the Superior
Court, General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §12-22-1.1, as enacted by P.L.
1976, ch. 173, §6, now governs the procedure for appeals from fines imposed in the
District Court upon the finding of a violation.

es

for a writ of certiorari with this court. This chain of events
led to the petition for the writ that we ordered.

The substance of the affidavit suggests that petitioner
should have sought a writ of mandamus in the Superior
Court. In Malinou v. McElroy, 99 R.I. 277, 207 A.2d 44
(1965), we ruled that, unless specifically authorized by stat-
ute otherwise, the duty of a clerk of court to file papers pre-
sented to him is purely ministerial, and that he may not re-
fuse to perform it except upon order of the court. Id. at 279,
207 A.2d at 45. At oral argument, petitioner’s appellate
counsel requested that we treat his petition for certiorari as
one for mandamus. She directed our attention to cases where
we have treated appeals as the equivalents of a writ of
certiorari. See Latham v. Rhode Island Department of Edu-
cation, 116 R.J. 245, 250-51, 355 A.2d 400, 403 (1976);
'Schiavulli v. School Committee of North Providence, 114
R.I. 443, 445-46, 334 A.2d 416, 417 (1975).

| | We would be disposed to apply that line of precedent to
this proceeding were it not for a crucial missing link: the clerk
of the First Division District Court is not a party to this ac-
tion. We now treat mandamus proceedings as civil actions in
which equitable relief is sought.’ Rosen v. Restrepo, 119
RB.I. 398, 400, 380 A.2d 960, 961 (1977). An order for the
issuance of a mandamus writ in this case would lead to
employment of the equitable powers of this court against a
person who is not a party to the proceeding before us. For
that reason, we must decline to treat this proceeding as one
for a writ of mandamus.

| If the petitioner pursues the alternative of filing a com-
plaint in the Superior Court to seek relief by way of man-
damus, many of the issues submitted to us may be the subject

In doing so, we have rejected our ruling in State ex rel Montaquila v. Avery, 90
R.I. 305, 157 A.2d 886 (1960), that mandamus is not in the nature of an equitable
proceeding.’ “[W]e are no longer in the days when common-law pleading was in
full flower. We look to substance, not labels.” Sarni v. Meloccaro, 113 R.1. 630,
636, 324 A.2d 648, 651 (1974). Cf. Reporters Notes to Super. R. Civ. P. 24
(rejecting holding of Montaquila v. Avery, supra.)

768 ee

of consideration in that tribunal. Therefore, it would be
premature for us to attempt to deal with issues which may
well be resolved in the Superior Court or which may be pre-
sented to us in a more refined posture. This factor prompts us
to conclude that the writ of certiorari in this case should be
quashed as improvidently issued. See Gilbert v. Travelers
Indemnity Co., 117 R.1. 515, 368 A.2d 1236 (1977).

We grant the petitioner leave to file a complaint for a writ
of mandamus in the Superior Court within sixty days from
the date on which this decision is filed. The writ of certiorari,
having been improvidently issued, is quashed; the papers in
the case are ordered returned to the District Court with our
decision endorsed thereon.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.

William F. Reilly, Public Defender, John A, MacFadyen
III, Chief Appellate Attorney, Janice M. Weisfeld, Assistant
Public Defender, for petitioner.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin
III, Special Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Appellate
Division, Faith A. LaSalle, Special Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, for respondent.

412 A.2d 243.

Tina FonraIne vs.
Romeo CaALDARONE, Director OF Lazor.

MARCH 14, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

770 es
Pe

KE.ieHeEr, J. This is an appeal by the Director of Labor
(the director) from a decree of the full Workers’ Compensa-
tion Commission affirming the trial commissioner’s grant of
benefits from the Second Injury Indemnity Fund to Tina
Fontaine (Tina).

The facts are undisputed. When Tina was part of the work
force, she was employed by a group of dentists as a dental
assistant. Among the many tasks assigned to her was the
taking of dental X rays. On December 31, 1957, Tina and the
dentists’ insurer executed an agreement whereby Tina was to
receive weekly payments of $32 and other compensation
benefits as long as she was totally incapacitated. The agree-
ment described Tina’s injuries as “radiation burns on left
thumb, middle finger -- left hand.” On March 7, 1977, the
insurer wrote to Tina and advised her that the enclosed check
would be the last payment due from the insurer because the
statutory maximum of 1,000 weeks of benefits had been
attained with the March 7 mailing.! Two days later, in a
letter dated March 9, the insurer notified the Department of
Labor’s Division of Workers’ Compensation that Tina had
reached the 1,000-week plateau. It also enclosed a copy of its
last medical report and advised the division’s director that
“subject to your decision,” Tina was now eligible for Second
Injury Indemnity Fund benefits.

Tina’s petition for Second Injury Indemnity Fund benefits
was filed with the commission on March 10. A copy of the
petition was filed with the Director of Labor on April 14.
Hearings on the petition occurred on May 11 and June 15.

Throughout this controversy the director has taken the
position that the commission lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Tina’s petition because of her failure to comply with the

‘In 1957 the Workers’ Compensation Act, to wit, G.L. 1956 §28-33-17, absolved
an employer from the obligation of paying weekly benefits to a totally incapaci-
tated individual once that individual had received either 1,000 weeks of benefits or
the individual had received benefits totaling $16,000.

es ™m

terms of G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment) §28-37-6. According
to this section, any party claiming Second Injury Indemnity
Fund benefits shall first file with the director a petition
“which petition shall follow the procedure as outlined in
chapter 35 of this title”; and if the claim is questioned, the
director “shall forthwith transmit all papers” to the commis-
sion where a hearing will be held. According to the director,
the commission was powerless to act until such time as the
director transmitted Tina’s papers to the commission. We
disagree.

Second Injury Indemnity Funds are in the nature of a trust
fund, and the director’s concern in regard to Tina’s bypassing
him is commendable. However, we are also aware that the
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act are to be liber-
ally construed to effectuate the benevolent purpose that led
to its enactment. Church v. Doherty, 107 R.I. 432, 267 A.2d
693 (1970). We believe that in enacting §28-37-6 the General
Assembly had two specific goals in mind: (1) to ensure that
the director, as the administrator of the Second Injury
Indemnity Fund, had proper notice of all claims against the
fund and (2) to avoid needless and oftentimes lengthy litiga-
tion before the commission when the claimant is obviously
entitled to the statutory benefits. However, we are also
aware that there may be times when administrative inertia
may be equivalent to the denial of the relief sought. See
Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1978); West
Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Commissioner of Department
of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 745, 748, 207 N.E.2d 505,
509 (1973).

Admittedly, Tina might have placed the cart before the
horse when she filed for benefits in March without first
checking things out with the director. However, the cart was
returned to its rightful position in April when she filed a sec-
ond petition for benefits and gave the director notice of its
pendency. Her claim came on for hearing before the trial
commissioner on May 1]. At that time counsel for the dir-
ector told the trial commissioner that on April 14 counsel had
written to the director and inquired if “the fund would vol-

712 es

untarily pay Miss Fontaine.” According to the director’s
counsel, no response was made to the inquiry. In our
opinion, the director’s continued silence is the equivalent of a
denial of Tina’s petition and warranted the commission’s
assumption of jurisdiction.

There were two witnesses at the hearing before the trial
commissioner. They were Tina and Dr. Bert S. Jeremiah, a
specialist in reconstructive surgery of the hand. Docto;
Jeremiah has been treating Tina “for many, many years.”*
He explained that Tina’s difficulty arose because, instead of
having the patient hold the film to the gum line, Tina would
hold the film with one hand and take the X ray with the
other. The surgeon pointed out that Tina’s thumb had been
amputated because it had developed a malignancy. He also
informed the trial commissioner that any return to work car-
ried with it a risk to Tina’s well being because of the risk to
the left hand of “axillary metastasis.”

The director rested without presenting any evidence, but
his counsel asked for the “opportunity to have a medical
examination.” The denial of this request constitutes the dir-
ector’s final reason of appeal. The director contends that he
has a right to demand a medical examination of any em-
ployee seeking Second Injury Indemnity Fund benefits. Tina
relies upon our ruling in Saccoccio v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp., 107 R.I. 53, 264 A.2d 905 (1970), where we
ruled that an employer may not require an employee to sub-
mit to the medical examination called for in §28-33-38 if, at
the same time of the request and the employee’s refusal, the
employer is denying liability by insisting that the compensa-
tion act is inapplicable.

The full commission, in rejecting the director’s claim of
right, took a different tack. It ruled that there was no evi-
dence that the director had asked Tina to be examined by a
doctor of his choice or that Tina ever refused to submit to

*Doctor Jermiah told the trial commissioner that he had also treated Tina’s sister,
Anna. Anna also worked for the dentists. Her radiation burns were the subject of
litigation in Fontaine v. Gorfine, 105 R.I. 174, 250 A.2d 361 (1969).

es 713

such an examination. The commission, in making these find-
ings, has misconceived the evidence. When Tina’s counsel
was asked by the trial commissioner if counsel would agree to
a continuance so that the examination could be held, the re-
sponse was: “No, I object to it, Your Honor.” We also believe
that the request made by the director’s counsel for a medical
examination is the equivalent of a request made under
§28-33-38. Nevertheless, this misconception is harmless.

Addressing ourselves to the rule of Saccoccio, we believe
that the rule is inapplicable to a Second Injury Indemnity
Fund claim because of our long-held belief that the Second
Injury Indemnity Fund is in the nature of a trust fund having
as its trustees the director, the General Treasurer, and the
Attorney General. Silva v. Devine, 90 R.I. 120, 123, 155
A.2d 605, 607 (1959). Since §28-37-1 gives the director the
primary responsibility for administering this trust, the direc-
tor-trustee has the implicit power* to require a physical
examination before he makes a definite finding about a
claimant’s eligibility. However, this right is not absolute. Just
as inaction by the director in making a determination
regarding benefits allows an employee to bypass him and
present the claim directly to the commission, so too the dir-
ector’s failure to make a timely request for the examination
cannot preclude the commission from making an indepen-
dent determination on this issue. If the commission has
doubts in regard to this issue, it may seek the opinion of the
“impartial” physician referred to in §28-35-24.*

Here, the commission affirmed the trial commissioner’s
findings of Tina’s continued total incapacity. Specifically,
the trial commissioner, after alluding to and relying on Dr.
Jeremiah’s testimony, remarked: “[I]t is inconceivable to
imagine any work that the petitioner would be capable of

An examination of the compensation act reveals no express grant of this author-
ity.

4While §28-35-24 requires the employer to bear the expense of the impartial
examination, we believe that where Second Injury Indemnity Funds are involved,
the expense should be charged against the fund.

FT

TTA be =

performing in the labor market at the present time because of
her injury.” While we may fault the commission’s reasoning
about the presence of a request for a physical and the denial
of that request, we cannot on the state of this record fault its
approval of Tina’s petition.

The director’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
decree appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.

Bernard W. Boyer, for petitioner-appellee.
Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Richard B.

Woolley, Special Assistant Attorney General, for respondent-
appellant.

412 A.2d 236.
Rosert MacKnicur et al. vs. ANTOINETTE Pansey et al.
MARCH 14, 1980.
Prasat: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

776 ee
ee
Werspercer, J. This is a civil action to enjoin the convey-

ance of real property from defendant Antoinette Pansey

(Mrs. Pansey) to defendant Gordon D. Noonan, and to com-

pel specific performance of an alleged prior agreement by

Mrs. Pansey’s agent to sell her property to the plaintiffs,

Robert B. MacKnight, Jr., and Portia J. MacKnight. The

plaintiffs contend that Mrs. Pansey had authorized Lionel J.

Carreiro (Carreiro), a real estate agent with whom the pro-

perty was listed, to sell it on her behalf. From a Superior

Court judgment granting the plaintiffs’ prayers for relief, the
defendants appeal.?

Carreiro, the real estate agent, visited Mrs. Pansey on May
21, 1977, after he learned that she was interested in selling
her Bristol property. Carreiro and Mrs. Pansey discussed
possible price ranges and agreed to list the property at a sale
price of $69,500. Mrs. Pansey then signed a standard-form
multiple listing agreement, which granted to Carreiro “the
exclusive right to sell” the property and guaranteed him a
commission regardless of who might procure the sale. The
testimony conflicts in regard to whether any of the blanks in
the listing-agreement form (other than the sale price) was

1The notice of appeal was filed after rendition of the decision, but prior to entry
of final judgment. Since no issue has been raised concerning the timeliness of the
notice, we shall treat the appeal as though it had been taken from the judgment
itself. See Beauvais v. Notre Dame Hospital, 120 R.1. 271, 275, 387 A.2d 689
691 (1978); Malinou v. Kiernan, 105 R.I. 299, 300, 251 A.2d 530, 531 (1969).

ee 777

filled in when Mrs. Pansey affixed her signature.

On May 28, Carreiro showed the house to Mr. MacKnight,
who offered to buy it for $69,500. Later that day Carreiro
and the MacKnights filled out a purchase-and-sale agree-
ment; Mr. and Mrs. MacKnight signed the agreement in the
spaces reserved for “buyers” and Carreiro signed in both the
“realtor” and “salesman” spaces, leaving blank the spaces
marked “sellers.” Mr. MacKnight gave Carreiro a check for
$300 as a deposit. MacKnight understood that Carreiro was
going to take the sales agreement to Mrs. Pansey for her sig-
nature. MacKnight testified that Carreiro gave him a photo-
graph of the property and said, “I might as well give you this
picture, You just bought it. You own it.” Carreiro testified he
told MacKnight that as soon as Mrs. Pansey signed the sales
agreement, “then we would have a sale.” Carreiro took the
sales agreement and check to Mrs. Pansey, but she refused to
sign the agreement until she had consulted her attorney.

The next day Mr. MacKnight and Carreiro met with Mrs.
Pansey at her property. MacKnight and Mrs. Pansey “were
getting along [with each other] very good,” according to
Carreiro’s testimony; MacKnight stated that they discussed
closing dates and financing terms. However, since Mrs.
Pansey preferred to contact her attorney first, she did not
sign the sales agreement on this occasion either.

On the Fourth-of-July weekend Mr. MacKnight met with
Mrs. Pansey who adverted to merely “mechanical” difficul-
ties in connection with the sale to the MacKnights. But,
according to MacKnight’s testimony, Mrs. Pansey told him
she “ha[d] no concern because the house is yours.” Thereafter
both Mr. and Mrs. MacKnight made several attempts --some
successful, some not -- to reach Mrs. Pansey or Carreiro by
telephone. On July 25 Mr. MacKnight called Mrs. Pansey,
who told him she had sold the property to defendant Gordon
D. Noonan. MacKnight’s $300 check to Carreiro was never
cashed.

Mrs. Pansey testified that the tenor of her agreement with
Carreiro was only that he might show the property for sale

78 es

--not sell it. She said she merely wanted some idea of what
the property was worth; she wanted to keep the property in
the family, perhaps through sale to her son. According to her
testimony, Mrs. Pansey “positively” told MacKnight she
wasn’t sure whether she wanted to sell the property, and she
never agreed to sell it to the MacKnights. Carreiro testified
that in his opinion the property could only have been sold
when Mrs. Pansey signed the sales agreement. Carreiro said
he told the MacKnights that “there was no agreement”
because Mrs, Pansey had not signed the sales agreement.
Carreiro testified that his duty was to report offers to the
seller; “it’s up to them to accept it or reject it.”

Sitting without a jury, the trial court heard the evidence
and ruled that Mrs, Pansey, by signing the multiple listing
agreement with Carreiro, had made him her agent to con-
tract for the sale of the property. The trial court ruled that
Carreiro had in fact entered into such a contract with the
MacKnights. The court further found that the multiple list-
ing agreement was “an adequate writing signed by the party
to be charged” to satisfy the statute of frauds. The court
enjoined the conveyance of the property to defendant
Gordon D. Noonan and ordered that it be conveyed to the
MacKnights.

The defendants in their appeal assert that Carreiro had no
authority to sell the property on behalf of Mrs. Pansey.
According to defendants, the multiple listing agreement did
not create such an agency relationship as to enable Carreiro
to bind Mrs. Pansey to a contract of sale; nor did Mrs. Pansey
by any other action confer such authority on Carreiro, nor
did Mrs. Pansey ratify any attempt by Carreiro to contract
for the sale of her property. The defendants also challenge
the ruling that the listing agreement satisfies the statute of
frauds.

We first consider whether Carreiro had the authority to
bind Mrs. Pansey to a sales agreement. The trial court found
“as a fact that the document Mrs. Pansey executed for Mr.
Carreiro at her home was an exclusive right to sell the real

es 779

estate which she gave to Mr. Carreiro knowingly,” and that
“she failed to revoke the power, the exclusive right to sell
which she gave to Mr. Carreiro before he had, in fact, sold
it.” This ruling necessarily embodies a conclusion of law that
the listing agreement could be itself confer upon Carreiro the
power to contract to convey the property.

We believe that this legal conclusion was not consonant
with established case law in this and other jurisdictions. As
we have previously ruled, an exclusive-agency listing
agreement does not, by itself, give the real estate agent the
power to bind his principal to a contract of sale. Winiarski v.
Leon Meyer, Inc., 82 R.I. 125, 130, 106 A.2d 503, 505-06 .
(1954). The owner of real property who lists it with an agent
generally retains the right to decide whether to accept the
offers which the agent brings him. Carreiro, by bringing the
sales agreement to Mrs. Pansey for her approval and signa-
ture, performed his responsibilities in full accord with the
accepted practice of the real estate business and did not
attempt to exceed an agent’s typical function of finding
ready, willing, and financially able buyers to present to the
seller.

In an effort to distinguish Winiarski, the MacKnights cor-
rectly point out that that case dealt with an “exclusive-
agency” contract, not an “exclusive power of sale,” as is pre-
sent here. The former type of agreement prevents the princi-
pal from employing another real estate agent but permits the
principal to avoid the obligation to pay a broker’s commission
when he sells the property himself. The exclusive power of
sale, on the other hand, obligates the principal to pay the
agent his commission even when the principal himself finds
the purchaser and consummates the sale. Zifcak v. Monroe,
105 R.I. 155, 157 n.3, 249 A.2d 893, 895 n.3 (1969);
Donahue v. Reiner Co., 46 R.I. 302, 304-05, 127 A. 359,
360-61 (1925).

The distinction between these two types of agreements,
however, has no bearing upon the question whether a real
estate agent can bind the principal to a sales contract. It is

780

well established that an agent with an exclusive power of
sale, like one with an exclusive agency, has no implied
authority to bind his principal by entering into a contract for
sale of the realty, despite the ‘presence in the listing
agreement of such terms as “exclusive right to sell” or “sole
and exclusive power to sell.” Bernstein v. Yee Wong, 236 F.
Supp. 5, 6 (D.D.C. 1964) (exclusive right to sell); Solana
Land Co. v. National Realty Co., 77 Ariz. 18, 25-27, 266
P.2d 739, 744-45 (1954) (authorization to sell and exclusive
right to sell); Preisendorf v. Jenkins, 193 Neb. 611, 614, 228
N.W.2d 591, 593 (1975) (exclusive right to sell); Gilmour v.
Simon, 37 Can. S. Ct. 422, 425 (1906) (exclusive right of
sale); Walker, American Law of Real Estate Agency 34 (2d
ed. 1922); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1014, §7[c] at 1022-23
(1955). Therefore, the factual distinction asserted by the
MacKnights between the listing agreement in Winiarski and
the present case is without legal significance. Various courts
from other jurisdictions which have interpreted exclusive-
power-of-sale agreements have followed the meaning given
to these standard forms by the real estate business. Compare
Annot., supra, with North & Ring, Real Estate: Principles
and Practices 237 (5th ed. 1960). This doctrine also is
consistent with the expectations of property owners who
most frequently retain agents to find them willing buyers,
not to make final and binding decisions on whether, on what
terms, and to whom to convey. See generally Annot., supra.

The rule we announced in Winiarski and reiterate here
does not, of course, mean that a principal cannot confer upon
his agent the additional authority to bind him to a sales
contract. A specially worded agency contract delineating the
agent’s authority in clear, express, and unequivocal terms
may accomplish this result. Words or conduct apart from the
listing agreement may do so as well. Such a case was
Cuddigan v. List, 93 R.1. 505, 177 A.2d 195 (1962), in which

“It should be noted in this case that the contract submitted to Mrs. Pansey pro-
vided for only a $300 deposit and was subject to the plaintiffs’ obtaining a $50,000
mortgage. These are terms that sellers might not automatically find to be accept-
able.

es 781

an agent with a “sole and exclusive right to sell” telephoned
his princiapl to convey a purchase offer that was below the
listed price. The principal said he would accept the offer,
whereupon the agent drew up a receipt and accepted a check
from the purchaser, who signed a contract of sale. We held
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that
the principal, by agreeing to accept the lesser amount, had
“authorized [the agent] to enter into an agreement to sell the
property and to sign whatever was required to render such
agreement valid and binding.” Id. at 509, 177 A.2d at
197-98. Thus, in Cuddigan, the telephone conversation, and
not the listing agreement, created the agent’s power to bind
the principal to a sales contract. Nothing in Cuddigan may
be read as suggesting that the listing agreement without the
telephone conversation would have been sufficient to create
such a power.

As a further argument the MacKnights, both in brief and
at oral argument, strenuously attempt to bring the facts of
this case within the rule of Cuddigan by adverting to evi-
dence that, they argue, is tantamount to the critical tele-
phone call in Cuddigan. The trial court did not pass directly
on this contention, nor on the MacKnights’ contention that,
if one assumes Carreiro’s original actions were unauthorized,
Mrs. Pansey ratified the sales agreement. Our examination of
the record shows us no evidence to suggest that Carreiro ever
purported to possess or exercise a power to enter into a con-
tract of sale on behalf of Mrs. Pansey. The MacKnights, it is
true, can point to testimony of a continuing course of verbal
assurance by Mrs. Pansey and Carreiro that may well have
led them to believe that a contract would ultimately be exe-
cuted. Such evidence does not, however, tend to prove that
Mrs. Pansey empowered Carreiro to form the contract.

|| Moreover, there is in the record no written sales contract
signed by Mrs. Pansey or “some other person by [her] there-
unto lawfully authorized,” sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-1-4.* Clearly the

5General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-1-4 states in part:
“No action shall be brought + + + [w]hereby to charge any person upon any

TO

782 ee

listing agreement -- the only document in this case signed by
Mrs. Pansey -- does not meet the established criteria for
memoranda of sales of land. Such memoranda must set out
who are the seller and the buyer, their respective intention to
sell and to purchase, a description of the subject matter of the
sale, the purchase price, and terms of payment. Durepo v.
May, 73 B.1. 71, 76, 54 A.2d 15, 18-19 (1947); Sholovitz v.
Noorigian, 42 R.I. 282, 285-86, 107 A. 94, 95 (1919). A list-
ing agreement does not name the eventual buyers of the pro-
perty or express their intention to buy; for that reason it is ele-
mentary that listing agreements do not set forth the terms
that will later be included in sales contracts to which the list-
ing agreements may eventually lead. Lusky v. Keiser, 128
Tenn. 705, 164 S.W. 777 (1914); Handlos v. Missman, 7 Wis.
2d 660, 667, 97 N.W.2d 419, 423 (1959).

HM The MacKnights also argue that the sales agreement they
signed satisfies §9-1-4. The sales agreement in this case un-
doubtedly supplies many of the elements absent from the list-
ing agreement; it sets out the terms of the purported sale, but
it is not signed by Mrs. Pansey, the party to be charged.*
According to the contentions of the MacKnights, Carreiro’s
signature on the sales agreement suffices to charge Mrs.
Pansey upon the contract, since, as they assert, Carreiro was
Mrs. Pansey’s authorized agent to contract for the sale of her
property. Although we find this argument engaging, we have
concluded that Carreiro did not by his signing of this agree-
ment purport to be acting in behalf of Mrs. Pansey for
purposes of §9-1-4. His signature as “realtor” and “salesman”

contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments * * + [uJnless the
promise or agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some
note or memorandum thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to
be charged therewith, or by some other person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized.”

‘Mrs, Pansey’s signature on the listing agreement cannot be imputed to the sales
contract. Although in some situations signed and unsigned writings may be read
together to satisfy the statute of frauds, the signed writing must refer to the
unsigned one in such a fashion as to imply assent to its terms. Kates Corp. v.
Kirshenbaum, 122 R.1. 486, 491-2, 409 A.2d 540, 544 (1979). It is obviously
impossible for a listing agreement to refer to a contract of sale that is not yet in
existence.

es 783

merely evidenced his participation as a sales agent. Carreiro
did not sign either his own name or that of his principal on
the line marked “seller,” nor did he otherwise manifest the
intention that his signature should constitute explicit or im-
plicit acceptance on behalf of Mrs. Pansey of the terms of the
contract.’ To the contrary, there is every indication that
Carreiro signed the sales contract merely to note that he par-
ticipated in the transaction as realtor, and thus to safeguard
his right to the commission referred to in the agreement. As a
result, neither Mrs. Pansey nor her putative authorized
agent, acting as such, signed the sales agreement in such
manner as to be bound by its terms.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered a nearly identical situation in Moritt v. Fine, 242
F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1957). In that case the plaintiff's suit for
specific performance was based upon two documents,
denominated “Deposit Receipts,” but which were actually
buy-sell agreement forms as well. As in the case at bar, the
sellers had not signed the document; the buyer had; and the
alleged agent had signed his own name at a place that was
appropriate for a broker's signature. The defendants raised
the Florida statute of frauds, and the trial court dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim. Under the appropriate
standard of review, the court of appeals assumed the agent
was authorized to bind the sellers to contracts of sale. The
court reasoned that the “Deposit Receipt” forms contained in
effect two agreements -- one between the buyer and the
sellers, and one between the buyer/depositor and the broker
who held the deposit. The signature of the agent, the court
ruled, clearly related only to the latter agreement, even
though several of the terms of the sales agreement appeared
above the agent’s signature.

*In order that the requirements of the statute of frauds be met, satisfactory evi-
dence must show that the signature on a memorandum was affixed with intent to
authenticate the memorandum’s contents. 2 Corbin on Contracts §520 at 762
(1950); Restatement Contracts §210 (1932); of. Kates Corp. v. Kirshenbaum, 122
R.I. 486, 492, 409 A.2d 540, 544 (1979) (signature on separate writing; no intent
to authenticate found).

74 es

“{H]owever much authority it is alleged [the agent] had
to act for the owners of the land he did not purport to
exercise this authority by signing as their agent to sell;
his signature merely acknowledges his own receipt of
the money and his own consequent obligation.” Id. at
131.

The court added that “had [the agent] signed the contract so
that his signature stood for an acceptance of its terms quite a
different question would have been presented to the trial
court for decision.” Id.°

Similarly, in a recent case controlled by Rhode Island law,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that the
signature of duly authorized agents in blanks labeled
“Prepared by” and “Recommend” did not manifest any
intention on the part of the agents to bind the principal to the
terms of the documents; neither did an agent’s signature in a
blank labeled “Approve” manifest such an intention when
the face of the document suggested that four such signatures
were required for final approval and only one was entered.
Centredale Investment Co. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of
America, 540 F.2d 16, 18-19 (Ist Cir. 1976) (construing
§9-1-4).

While we reject Carreiro’s signing of the sales agreement as
sufficient to charge Mrs. Pansey under §9-1-4, we do not

‘In dissent Circuit Judge Brown argued that dismissal on the pleadings was im-
proper because the buyer should have had the opportunity to introduce evidence
tending to show that the agent had intended to authenticate the terms of the sales
agreement, even though he apparently signed merely as the recipient of the buyer's
money deposit, Moritt v. Fine, 242 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1957) (Brown, J.,
dissenting). Judge Brown reasoned that the agent could have satisfied the statute of
frauds by signing the document “top, bottom, left or right margin, across the face,
or on the reverse side,” provided that intent thereby to authenticate the document
could be proved. Id. at 135. Therefore, he maintained, the presence of the
signature in the wrong place was not conclusive. In the present case, unlike Moritt,
the MacKnights had the opportunity to present evidence that Carreiro, although he
signed merely as “realtor” and “salesman” and refrained from signing as “seller,”
intended to authenticate the sales agreement in his alleged authority as agent-to-
contract. The failure to adduce such evidence precludes a finding of intent to
authenticate the agreement, thereby rendering Judge Brown’s objection to the re-
sult in Moritt inapplicable to the case at bar.

es 785

mean to suggest that an authorized agent who places his sig-
nature in an uncharacteristic place on a memorandum will
necessarily fail to bind his principal or charge him under
§9-1-4, The statute does not require a signature to meet
exacting requirements of form. The test of a signature, whe-
ther of a party to the agreement or his agent, to satisfy the
statute of frauds is whether the signer intends, however im-
plicitly, to vouch for the accuracy of the essential terms of the
agreement. Kates Corp. v. Kirshenbaum, 122 R.I. 486,
492, 409 A.2d 540, 544 (1979). When, as here, it is clear
that a signature fails to serve this function, the writing fails to
meet the requirements of the statute. In this case Mrs. Pansey
may not be charged upon the contract.

As their final argument, the MacKnights assert that the
requirement of a writing in this case may be circumvented
under the rule enunciated in Peacock Realty Co. v. E.
Thomas Crandall Farm, Inc., 108 R.I. 593, 278 A.2d 405
(1971), and more fully expounded in Adams-Riker, Inc. v.
Nightingale, 119 R.I. 862, 383 A.2d 1042 (1978). Peacock
Realty involved a claim for a broker’s commission to which
claim the defendant interposed the statute of frauds. The
defendant’s president admitted under oath that he had
agreed to pay the broker a 10-percent commission for the sale
of the property in issue. We held that these admissions, taken
together with a signed writing which contained the other
terms of the agreement, rendered the agreement enforceable.
In Adams-Riker, an employer sued its employee to recover its
share of commissions under an alleged oral employment con-
tract not to be performed within one year. Throughout the
proceedings the defendant admitted the terms and conditions
of his employment agreement. Although there was no signed
writing as in Peacock Realty, we extended the rule of that
case and held that when a party to be charged judicially
admits all of the terms of an alleged contract, he will not be
permitted to perpetrate an injustice by invoking the lack of a
signed memorandum as a defense.

Neither Peacock Realty nor Adams-Riker stands for the
proposition that a defendant who denies that a contract was

786 es

ever entered into may be bound by the terms alleged’by the
plaintiff solely because the defendant makes reference to
those terms in open court. Throughout their testimony
Carreiro and Mrs. Pansey expressed their conviction that no
contract ever emerged from the negotiations with the
MacKnights. Carreiro testified repeatedly that there was no
contract because Mrs. Pansey never signed the sales agree-
ment; “I couldn’t force her to sign it [if I wanted to].” Mrs.
Pansey testified that she never consented to sell the property
to the MacKnights. Thus Mrs. Pansey and her purported
agent did not admit the existence of the contract; and in the
absence of such an admission, there is no substitute for com-
plete compliance with the requirements of §9-1-4. Kates
Corp. v. Kirshenbaum, 122 B.1. at 492-93, 409 A.2d at 544;
Peacock Realty Co. v. E. Thomas Crandall Farm, Inc., 108
R.I. at 602, 278 A.2d at 410.

The defendants’ appeal is sustained, the judgment
appealed from is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
Superior Court for entry of judgment for the defendants.

Aisenberg & Dworkin, Alan T. Dworkin, for plaintiffs.

Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Edward J. Regan, for
defendants.

787

412 A.2d 926,

PROVIDENCE TEACHERS’ UNION vs.
ProvipENCE ScHooL COMMITTEE.

MARCH 17, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

PER CURIAM. ‘This case comes before us on a motion
by the Providence Teachers’ Union (the union) to affirm a
judgment in the Superior Court confirming an arbitrator’s
award. On July 16, 1976, the Providence School Committee
(the committee) notified the Providence Teachers’ Union by
letter that the positions of department head, head guidance
counselor, and department chairman would be eliminated.

The union immediately filed a grievance challenging the
abolition of these positions. On April 10, 1978, an arbitration
panel determined that such action violated the terms and
conditions of the contract and ordered the positions, as well

183

as the former incumbents, to be reinstated. The panel further
directed that the compensatory periods lost were to be com-
pensated at the rate of $5 per period.

Subsequently the union filed a petition in the Superior
Court to confirm and enforce the award. After a judgment
was entered in the Superior Court to confirm and enforce the
award, defendant committee filed its appeal.

The defendant argues that (1) the arbitrators exceeded
their jurisdiction because G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment)
§28-9.3-2, the statute which grants teachers the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively, excludes from its coverage
certified teachers not engaged in teaching duties and (2) the
arbitrators so imperfectly executed their powers that a
mutual, final and definite award was not made. We
disagree.

The issue raised in the instant case is no different than the
one decided by this court in Barrington School Committee v.
Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 120 R.I. 470,
388 A.2d 1369 (1978). The Barrington School Committee
under similar circumstances had refused to bargain on the
question of the elimination of department chairmanships.
This court held that where the problem involves “both a
question of management and a term or condition of employ-
ment, it is the duty of the committee to negotiate with the
teachers involved.” 120 R.I. at 479-480, 388 A.2d at 1375. In
effect, this court decided that certified teachers with the added
duties of “department chairmanships” are within the provi-
sions of §28-9.3-2. We therefore conclude that Barrington
School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations
Board, supra, is controlling, and we reject defendant’s first
contention.

A careful reading of the award indicates that the issue
submitted to the arbitration panel, that is, whether the aboli-
tion of the position of department head and other adminis-
trative positions violated the terms and conditions of the
collective bargaining agreement, was resolved in clear and
concise language.

789

Because we find defendant’s objections without merit, we
hereby grant the motion to affirm.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.

Abedon, Michaelson, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey,
Julius C. Michaelson, Richard A. Skolnik, for plaintiff.

Vincent J. Piccirilli, for defendant.

412 A.2d 924.
Town oF Barrincron vs. Nicuoxas L. DiSatvo.
MARCH 19, 1980.
Present: Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

Ke.iener, J. This controversy presents an issue of public
concern that centers on an alleged abuse of the judicial en-
forcement of the criminal law. We have, therefore, issued
our common-law writ of certiorari as requested by Barring-
ton’s town solicitor. The solicitor asked that we review the
action taken by a justice of the District Court on September
19, 1977, in which a nolo plea entered a year earlier by
another justice was vacated and the plea was changed to not
guilty. Hereafter we shall refer to the petitioner as “the
town” and the respondent by his last name.

The record certified to us by the District Court’s First Divi-
sion indicates that on January 30, 1976, DiSalvo appeared
before the District Court and pleaded nolo to a criminal
complaint that charged him with driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of liquor. The District Court com-
plaint, on its face, contains a box checked by the justice in
charge of the arraignment to indicate that DiSalvo was noti-
fied of his “rights” prior to the acceptance of his nolo plea.
Since DiSalvo had a previous record, the District Court jus-
tice ordered him to enroll in a ten-hour course given by the
Continuing Education Section of Rhode Island Junior
College. The course is entitled “Driving While Intoxicated
Counterattack.” A certificate of DiSalvo’s successful comple-
tion of the course was filed in the District Court on June 18,
1976. Later, on June 25, 1976, DiSalvo appeared before the
court and was fined $200, and his driver’s license was ordered
suspended for one year. Subsequently, on June 20, 1977,
DiSalvo’s counsel filed a motion to vacate the nolo plea,
alleging that DiSalvo “did not understand or appreciate the
consequences of his plea.” A notation on the motion indi-

ee 791

cated that it would be heard four days later on June 24.
According to the town, the motion was not heard on that day
because DiSalvo’s attorney failed to appear.

While the District Court docket sheet contains no mention
whatsoever of the filing of the motion to vacate, it does con-
tain two pertinent notations: one notation, apparently made
on July 19, 1977, indicates that the motion was continued for
hearing to September 9, 1977; the other notation carrying the
date September 9, 1977, reads: “Dfs. motion to vacate sen-
tence and enter not guilty granted. -- Continued to Septem-
ber 23, 1977 for trial.”

While the town contends that it had no notice relative to
the September 9 hearing, it rests this petition strictly on the
proposition that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
vacate the nolo plea. There is merit to this contention.

| | When the motion to vacate was filed on June 20, 1977, the
time for direct review of the acceptance of the nolo plea had
long expired because District Court Criminal Rule 32(d) in its
pertinent part reads: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is
imposed * + +.” While Dist. R. Crim. P. 35 allows the Dis-
trict Court, where there has been no appeal to the Superior
Court, to correct an illegal sentence at any time, such a
motion lies solely to correct a sentence which is not author-
ized by law. See State v. Williams, 122 R.I. 32, 404 A.2d
814 (1979). DiSalvo gains no benefit from the rule because
the one-year suspension is authorized by G.L. 1956 (1968
Reenactment) §31-11-6(3); §31-27-2(7)(c) (1979 Supp.)
warrants his educational sojourn; and the $200 fine comes
well within the $500 maximum established in §31-27-13(b).

Hs The foregoing deficiencies in DiSalvo’s 1977 attempt to set
aside his 1976 plea do not preclude a judicial review of what
transpired in the District Court when his nolo plea was
accepted. The appropriate forum for hearing this matter is
the Superior Court through DiSalvo’s employment of the
relevant portions of the Postconviction Relief Act, G.L. 1956
(1969 Reenactment) chapter 9.1 of title 10 (1979 Supp.). The

1 es

General Assembly, in enacting this legislation, has
established an orderly procedure for dealing with postconvic-
tion applications whereby a claim can be heard and, if neces-
sary, evidence adduced so that the trial justice hearing the
application will have the benefit of a complete record.

Section 10-9.1-1(a) and (b) makes it clear that once the
avenues for direct review have been exhausted, postconvic-
tion relief is available to (a) “[a]ny person who has been con-
victed of * * * a crime * * * and who claims: (1) that the
conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state
‘x * *” and then goes to say: (b) “* * * Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, it [the act] comprehends and takes
the place of all other common law, statutory, or other reme-
dies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the
conviction or sentence.” Section 10-9.1-2 with pristine clarity
stipulates that postconviction proceedings seeking relief from
a judgment entered in the District Court shall be initiated in
the Superior Court for Providence County. Recently, in
Johnson v. Mullen, 120 R.I. 701, 390 A.2d 909 (1978), we ©
emphasized that, absent compelling circumstances, this court
will not sanction any departures from the procedures
delineated in the Postconviction Relief Act. Thus, DiSalvo is
free to go to the Superior Court where a record can be made
regarding what actually occurred in the District Court! on
January 30, 1976.

‘Proceedings in the District Court are neither stenographically nor electronically
recorded. While DiSalvo concedes that before he pleaded nolo he had been advised
by the January 1976 justice that by pleading he was waiving a variety of constitu-
tional rights, he claims that he was not “fully aware” that a consequence of his plea
would be the suspension of his operator’s license. This claim may be considered by a
Superior Court justice in light of DiSalvo’s last appearance before this court which
occurred subsequent to his having been arrested by the Barrington police in 1968
for driving while under the influence of liquor. DiSalvo refused to take the breath-
alyzer test, and, consequently, the Registry of Motor Vehicles suspended his license.
The Superior Court vacated this suspension. The Registrar of Motor Vehicles
appealed this action via the statutory petition for certiorari referred to in Rhode
Island’s version of the Administrative Procedures Act. We quashed the Superior
Court order in DiSalvo v. Williamson, 106 R.I. 303, 259 A.2d 671 (1969).

es 793

The petition for certiorari is granted, the District Court’s
order vacating the January 30, 1976 nolo plea is quashed,
and the papers in the case are remanded to the District Court
with our decision endorsed thereon.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua and Mr. Justice Doris did not
participate.

Stephen J. Carlotti, Town Solicitor, Hinckley, Allen, Salis-
bury & Parsons, Gordon P. Cleary, for petitioner.

John F. Cicilline, for respondent.

413 A.2d 55.
Ropert J. Carrer vs. ARLENE C, CARTER.
MARCH 19, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

794

Ke.ueueEr, J. Robert and Arlene Carter were married in
Providence, Rhode Island, on May 12, 1941, and are the par-
ents of four adult sons. Robert and Arlene lived together as
husband and wife until mid-1975. On June 19 of that year,
Robert filed a petition for divorce in which he alleged that
Arlene had been guilty of extreme cruelty toward him, that
she had been guilty of drunkenness affecting the family life,
and that their irreconcilable differences had caused the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage. The cruelty and
drunkenness grounds were abandoned, however, and the
divorce was granted on July 29, 1977, on the ground of irre-
concilable differences. Robert is now before us on his appeal
from that portion of the interlocutory divorce decree that
awarded alimony to Arlene.

ee 795

The record that is before us presents a disturbing marital
picture in which Arlene’s dependence on alcohol increased to
the point that she became unable to care for herself or her
family. Throughout this controversy Robert has consistently
contended that Arlene’s alcoholic overindulgences barred the
award of any alimony to her. This contention necessitates a
review of what has transpired legislatively since the General
Assembly first established “irreconcilable differences” as a
ground for divorce.

“Trreconcilable differences” first appeared on the statute
books when the Legislature at its January 1975 session
adopted P.L. 1975, ch. 287, sec. 1, now cited as G.L. 1956
(1969 Reenactment) §15-5-3.1. The act became effective on
May 22, 1975, and less than a month later Robert instituted
these proceedings. The 1975 amendment authorized the
Family Court to “make provision for alimony.” A year later,
the Legislature, with its enactment of P.L. 1976, ch. 294, re-
pealed §15-5-3.1 and substituted a revised version. The 1976
amendment retained “irreconcilable differences” as a ground
for divorce but specifically stated that evidence or allegations
of specific acts of misconduct “shall be improper and inad-
missable, except for the purpose of determining a party’s en-
titlement to an award of alimony, in which the fault of * * *
[the] party seeking alimony shall be relevant * « *.”

In his appeal, Robert claims that the 1976 amendment ab-
solutely precludes an award of alimony to a spouse whose
actions amount to misconduct. He also claims that, as a mat-
ter of law, Arlene’s admitted overindulgence in alcohol bars a
grant of alimony even though the trial justice failed to make a
specific finding as to how he characterized this fact of
Axlene’s behavior. We would go on and consider this conten-
tion except that while this appeal was pending here, the Gen-
eral Assembly made further substantial changes to various
portions of chapter 5 of title 15, including §15-5-3.1. At its
January 1979 session, the Legislature enacted P.L. 1979, ch.
279, so that today §15-5-3.1 contains no reference whatso-

See Appendix.

796 es

ever to the fault of a party seeking alimony as being relevant.
Instead, fault, according to the new statute, is relevant for
“making a determination pursuant to sections 15-5-16 and
15-5-16.1 of the general laws « * *,”

Section 15-5-16 now sets forth several criteria for the court
to consider as it awards alimony or counsel fees. Specifically,
§15-5-16 lists a variety of factors a trial justice “shall
consider” including the length of the marriage; the conduct
of the parties during the marriage; the health, age, station,
occupation, amount and source of income, vocational skills,
and employability of the parties; and the estate and liabilities
and needs of each party. Section 15-5-16.1 allows the Family
Court to assign to either the husband or the wife a “portion of
the estate of the other.” One criterion listed in the statute as
being relevant to such an assignment is the conduct of the
parties during the marriage.

The enactment clause of the 1979 amendment expressly
stated that the amended version of chapter 5 of title 15 was to
be applied “to all petitions pending on the date of passage of
this act and to all petitions filed thereafter.” In Zaharakos v.
Zaharakos, 118 R.1.°387, 374 A.2d 101 (1977), this court,
in the light of similar language contained in a 1976 amend-
ment, applied the law as it was at the time of the appellate
decision rather than the one that was in effect at the time
judgment was made. There is no reason to do otherwise here.

Consequently, we shall remand the case so that the trial
justice can make the requisite findings concerning fault and
the other criteria listed in §15-5-16, especially in regard to
whether he considered Arlene’s addiction in the category of
fault or illness and, if it is in the category of fault, whether
Robert’s purchases of alcohol contributed in any manner to
Arlene’s present debilitated condition.

There is a second facet to Robert’s appeal that should be
considered. This facet merits consideration particularly if the
trial justice, after remand, believes that Arlene qualifies for
an alimony award. The alimony awarded consisted of an $80
weekly payment until the marital domicile was sold. There-

ee 797

after, the weekly award would be $100. Robert claims that
the amounts are totally unjustified. His contention is better
understood after a brief recitation of the travel of this case
through the Family Court.

Robert began offering testimony in support of his conten-
tions on June 21, 1976. His presentation continued for several
days thereafter with the testimony finally concluding late in
April 1977. On October 8, 1976, however, the day’s hearing
was devoted to considering Arlene’s motion for a temporary
weekly allowance. After Arlene’s counsel had told the trial
justice that an emergency situation had arisen because his cli-
ent was unable to take care of herself, the trial justice agreed
to listen to testimony from Arlene’s niece.

The niece, after describing conditions in the marital domi-
cile that supported counsel’s claim of emergency, told the
trial justice that if some type of allowance were provided, she
was agreeable to taking Arlene into her home and providing
her aunt with food, care, lodging, and spending money.
When the trial justice asked the niece how much in the way
of monetary compensation she would need to afford those
services, the niece estimated between $75 and $100 a week.
When, during cross-examination, Robert’s counsel began to
press the niece about the basis of her cost estimates, the trial
justice reminded counsel that any decision concerning
Arlene’s motion would result in a “temporary order.” He
assured counsel that when the hearing on the merits resumed
and the alimony issue was before him, counsel could “go into
it fully.” Accordingly, he ordered Robert to pay the niece the
sum of $80 a week for the specific purposes previously enum-
erated.

After the hearing on the merits resumed, time marched on,
and on April 21, 1977, during a colloquy with counsel, the
trial justice apparently reiterated his position by saying:

“J think there might have been some complaint that she
wasn’t receiving anything, so we decided at that time to
at least hear the matter of her needs and his ability on a
temporary basis during the trial of the case and I think
that’s what we did.” (Emphasis added.)

798 es

Despite this statement, the trial justice subsequently decided
that he had “taken all the hearings as being part of the hear-
ing on the merits.” Robert’s counsel, in a fruitless attempt to
explain his understanding of the court’s position regarding
Arlene’s support, unequivocally stated: “[T]here was nothing
said, according to my recollection or notes that + + * [the
hearing on allowances] would be taken as the testimony on
the merits.” Unconvinced, the trial justice noted Robert’s
objection and suggested that Robert had not been
prejudiced. In reply, Robert’s counsel argued that the
hearing on the merits of the divorce petition was devoid of
testimony regarding Arlene’s needs or income. We agree.
Although the trial justice’s efforts to avoid duplication may
be laudatory, his determination regarding the amount of the
permanent award of alimony cannot stand in light of his
assurance that this issue would be explored fully once the
emergency situation had been resolved.

Robert’s appeal is sustained, that portion of the decree
appealed from relating to the alimony award is vacated, and
the case is remanded to the Family Court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appendix

Prior the the Legislature’s 1979 session, §15-5-16 served as
the Family Court’s source of power to make appropriate
orders in a divorce proceeding on issues concerning custody
and child support. Shortly after the Legislature convened on
January 12, 1979, Representative Marion H. Donnelly and
several of her colleagues introduced a bill which sought to
repeal §15-5-16 and in its place substitute a new §15-5-16
which would authorize the award of alimony and counsel
fees to either party. Later, on March 14 Senator James
Costello introduced a bill which would have amended the
then §15-5-16 so that the noncustodial natural parent would
be granted reasonable visitation rights with his or her child.
Both bills made their way through the legislative process.
The House bill became law on May 7 when the Governor
signed it, and the bill was subsequently designated by the
Secretary of State as P.L. 1979, ch. 279. The Senate bill be-

es 799

came law on May 11 without the Governor's signature. The
Secretary of State designated it as P.L. 1979, ch. 338. It is
obvious that when ch. 338 became effective, the §15-5-16
that it sought to amend was no longer the.law. This confus-
ing situation has been duly noted by the compilers of the
General Laws. We shall resolve the confusion by construing
both 1979 enactments in such a manner that §15-5-16
includes the alimony and counsel-fee provisos of ch. 279 as
well as the noncustodial-natural-parent-visitation guarantees
found in ch. 338.

Kirshenbaum Law Offices, Inc., Allen M. Kirshenbaum,
for petitioner.

F. Albert Starr, for respondent.

* 413 A.2d 58.
Strate vs. IpALio SANTos.
MARCH 20, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

IA

Ce C“(;sSSCisS 803

ee

Dons, J. This is an appeal from a Superior Court judg-
ment of conviction wherein Idalio Santos (defendant), was
adjudged guilty of transporting for immoral purposes and of
committing an abominable and detestable crime against
nature. The defendant now claims that the trial justice de-
prived him of his right to a public trial, admitted into evi-
dence the fruits of an illegal search and seizure, improperly
sustained his own objections to questions asked by defense
counsel, and erroneously admitted into evidence hearsay
statements concerning the defendant’s prior bad acts. Addi-
tionally, the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the
statutes under which he was convicted, alleging that they are
vague and infringe upon his right of privacy. We reject the

defendant’s arguments and affirm the judgment of the Super-
ior Court.

804 ee

On December 30, 1977, the complainant went to the
Rustic Pub in Swansea, Massachusetts, to meet her sister and
some friends. While there, she met defendant, with whom
she talked and danced from about 10 p.m. to 1 a.m. when
the establishment closed. The complainant extended, and
defendant accepted, an invitation to accompany her to a
New Year's Eve party to be held at her sister’s home the fol-
lowing evening. Before leaving the Rustic Pub, she and
defendant agreed to meet for coffee at a nearby Howard
Johnson’s restaurant in Swansea. The complainant parked
her car in the front lot of the restaurant and defendant
parked his car in the larger lot behind the building. While at
the restaurant, they discussed the party, exchanged phone
numbers and addresses, and then left at approximately 1:30
a.m.

As they left the building, they walked to the rear parking
lot. The complainant testified that after they had reached
defendant’s car and had said goodnight, defendant grabbed
her and refused to let her go. In response to her efforts to
loosen his grasp, defendant told her to be quiet and to avoid a
scene. The defendant further told the complainant that he
did not care if he was hurting her and that he had a knife
which he would use if he had to. The defendant then ordered
her to get into his car. The complainant, though she never
saw the knife, testified that she entered the car because she
was afraid defendant would hurt her.

The defendant entered the car immediately after the com-
plainant, and they drove to a secluded area in Bristol, Rhode
Island. The defendant then ordered her to get into the rear
seat of the car where he first had sexual intercourse and then
anal intercourse with her. The complainant testified that she
was too afraid to resist defendant other than by unsuccess-
fully attempting to push him away.

At approximately 4 a.m., both parties dressed and they re-
turned to the Howard Johnson’s parking lot. The complain-
ant testified that as they left Bristol, defendant asked her
whether she intended to complain that he had raped her be-

es 805

cause two other women had previously done so. She further
testified that when they arrived at the restaurant parking lot,
defendant again asked whether she would say she had been
raped or had willingly had sex.! The complainant then left
defendant’s car and, after resting in her car for a short time,
drove to her home in Somerset, Massachusetts. Later that
morning she called the Swansea Police Department and,
after talking with a police officer, went to a hospital for an
examination. The following day the complainant met with
members of the Rhode Island State Police and showed them
the location in Bristol where defendant had taken her.

On January 1, 1978, members from the police departments
of Fall River and Somerset, Massachusetts, went to defen-
dant’s apartment in Fall River and arrested him. The defen-
dant told the arresting officers that the complainant had con-
sented to everything they had done together. He further said
that he could not understand why women let him make love
to them and then accused him of rape, and that this was the
third time he had been so accused. On January 2, 1978 the
police searched defendant’s car, which they had previously
seized, at the Somerset Police Department and discovered a
knife in the glove compartment.

The defendant was subsequently tried in the Superior
Court on four counts: rape, the abominable and detestable
crime against nature, kidnapping, and transporting for
immoral purposes. After calling the complainant as its first
witness, the state moved to clear the courtroom of all specta-
tors during her testimony. Counsel for defendant objected,
arguing that the complainant was not of tender years and
therefore should testify in open court. The trial justice, how-
ever, ordered the courtroom cleared of all spectators, stating
that the exclusion did not deprive defendant of his right to a
public trial. The trial justice, relying on the opening state-
ment of counsel and the facts to be elicited during the com-
plainant’s testimony, held that it would be in the best inter-

‘The trial justice cautioned the jurors that they could use the testimony only as

- evidence that defendant had spoken to her while they were in the car.

pr

806 ee
ests of all parties to exclude the spectators from the '
courtroom.

The complainant then testified, identifying defendant as
her assailant and relating what had transpired on the evening
of December 30, 1977. After the complainant repeated
defendant’s statement that two other women had previously
accused him of rape, the trial justice instructed the jury that
he had admitted the testimony only to show that the conver-
sation occurred and that the jurors should not consider her
testimony as evidence that other rapes had actually hap-
pened. Similarly, after the police officers testified that
defendant had told them that this was the third time women
had claimed that he raped them, the trial justice instructed
the jury that they could consider the testimony only as evi-
dence of defendant’s state of mind.

At the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel requested in-
structions that consent could be raised as a defense to the
abominable and detestable crime against nature. The trial
justice instructed the jury that consent was not relevant
either to that charge or to the transporting charge. The jury
then returned its verdict, acquitting defendant of the rape
and kidnapping charges and convicting him of transporting
for immoral purposes and committing an abominable and
detestable crime against nature. From these judgments of
conviction defendant now appeals.

HE The defendant first claims that the exclusion of all spec-
tators from the courtroom during the testimony of the com-
plainant deprived him of his right to a public trial. Although
the right to a public trial is fundamental, it is not a “limitless
imperative” of a criminal defendant. United States ex rel.
Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (E.D.N.Y.
1974). As we have previously noted, the right is subject to “a
court’s inherent power to regulate admission to the court-
room and to restrict attendance at the trial as conditions and
circumstances may reasonably demand in order to preserve
order and decorum, or to protect the rights of the parties and
the witnesses, or generally to further the administration of

ee) 807

justice.” State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261, 271-72, 274 A.2d
742, 747 (1971). A trial justice thus had the discretion to
exclude spectators from the courtroom in certain circum-
stances, including when necessary to protect a witness from
the embarrassment or emotional pressures that often result
when a victim must relate the details of a lurid crime in open
court. United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967,
971 (2d Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Smallwood v.
LaValle, 377 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); People
v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 63, 123 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954);
Commonwealth v. Knight, 469 Pa. 57, 66-68, 364 A.2d 902,
906 (1976).

When fashioning an exclusion order to alleviate a witness’
embarrassment or emotional trauma, a trial justice has more
latitude than if he were closing the courtroom for another
reason. Accordingly, if necessary the trial justice may exclude
some or all spectators during the witness’ testimony. United
States ex rel. Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F. Supp. at 1151;
Commonwealth v. Knight, 469 Pa. at 68, 364 A.2d at 908.
The trial justice remains obliged, however, to strike an
acceptable balance between the accused’s right to a public
trial and the need to protect the witness, paying particular
attention that neither the scope nor the duration of the order
violates the rights of an accused. Commonwealth v. Knight,
469 Pa. at 66, 364 A.2d at 906. The duration of the order is
an especially important factor. United States ex rel. Small-
wood v. LaValle, 377 F. Supp. at 1151; Butler v. Smith, 416
F. Supp. 1151, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). If the exclusion order
is necessary and the trial justice has limited its duration to
that minimally required to protect the testifying witness,
there is no denial of a public trial, even if the court excludes
all spectators. The temporary exclusion of all spectators is
permissible when, as here, a witness must testify to the
details of a sexual assault. Because the trial justice limited the
exclusion order to the testimony of the victim, it did not, as
defendant Santos claims, totally deprive him of his right to a
public trial.

808 ee

The defendant also contends that the trial justice lacked
sufficient reason to close the courtroom because the witness
had exhibited no signs of emotional disturbance while on the
stand. Whether an exclusion order is warranted depends on
the circumstanges presented in each case. Commonwealth v.
Knight, 469 Pa. at 66, 364 A.2d at 906. The need to close the
courtroom will often be acute when, because the witness is
young, emotionally upset, or the victim of a sex crime, he
cannot bring himself to testify in open court. Commonwealth
v. Stevens, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 457, 352 A.2d 509 (1975); 3
Wharton, Criminal Procedure §439 at 222-25 (12th ed.
1975). Because of the concern for the defendant’s right to a
public trial, the trial justice should exercise his power spar-
ingly and should exclude the public only when necessary to
enable the witness to testify fully and accurately. United
States ex rel. Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F. Supp. at 1152.
The trial justice need not, however, wait until the witness
breaks down on the stand before issuing an exclusion order.
Such a requirement would unnecessarily subject the witness
to the sort of emotional trauma that the exclusion of specta-
tors is intended to avoid. Commonwealth v. Knight, 469 Pa.
at 67, 364 A.2d at 907. A trial justice may properly order the
public from the courtroom if, in light of the nature of the
crime, the expected testimony, or the emotional state of the
witness, he has determined that the testimony would likely
be severely hampered or distorted if the witness were re-
quired to testify in public. See Commonwealth v. Stevens,
237 Pa, Super. Ct. at 468, 352 A.2d at 515 (not unreasonable
for trial court to find testimony hampered if courtroom not
cleared).

Here, the trial justice issued the exclusion order on the
basis of the opening statements of counsel and the nature of
the testimony to be elicited from the complainant. The jus-
tice ruled that it would be in the best interest of all parties to
close the courtroom during the young woman’s testimony.
The age and experience of the witness, though important fac-
tors in deciding whether to exclude the public, are not con-
trolling. Commonwealth v. Stevens, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. at

es 809

467-68, 352 A.2d at 514-15. Accordingly though the com-
plainant was twenty-two years old at the time of trial, the
trial justice was not precluded from finding that she would
be subject to the same sort of emotional stress while testifying
as would hinder the testimony of a younger witness. In light
of the lurid nature of the crimes about which the com-
plainant testified, it was reasonable for the trial justice to
conclude that she would be able to relate her testimony to the
jurors only in the absence of court spectators. We therefore
find that the trial justice acted properly in closing the court-
room for the limited purpose of ensuring that the com-
plainant would testify as accurately and under as little emo-
tional stress as was possible.

The defendant also challenges the unconstitutionality of
the statutes under which he was convicted, G.L. 1956 (1969
Reenactment) §§11-10-1 and 11-34-5, arguing that they are
impermissibly vague and deprive him of his constitutional
right of privacy. As a corollary of this argument, defendant
urges this court to recognize a right of privacy that would
prevent the state from making criminal the private sexual re-
lations between consenting adults. We decline to do so.

| _ The constitutional requirement that criminal statutes be
precisely drawn prevents a state from prosecuting anyone
under a penal statute that does not give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his conduct is unlawful. United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74S. Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.
Ed. 989, 996 (1954); State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 36, 371
A.2d 596, 598 (1977). The rationale for this requirement is
that no one may “be held criminally responsible for conduct
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617, 74S. Ct. at 812, 98
L. Ed. at 996. As this court has recently noted, however, the
language of a statute challenged on vagueness grounds must
be interpreted in light of its “common law meaning, its statu-
tory history and prior judicial interpretations of its particular
terms.” State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. at 36, 371 A.2d at 598; see
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23, 94S. Ct. 190, 192,
38 L. Ed. 2d 179, 182 (1973) (per curiam) (claims of vague-

s10 es

ness must be judged in light of judicial interpretations of stat-
ute). We need look no further than our previous opinions to
resolve defendant’s vagueness argument.

This court has previously had the opportunity to examine
§§11-10-1 and 11-34-5 and has upheld each statute against a
vagueness challenge. In State v. Milne, 95 R.I. 315, 187 A.2d
136 (1962), a defendant convicted of receiving a person into
his room for the purpose of performing fellatio, alleged that
§11-34-5, by virtue of its vague and indefinite description of
the proscribed conduct, deprived him of his right to due pro-
cess under both the state and federal constitutions. Prior to
resolving the vagueness issue, the Milne court discussed the
legislative purpose in enacting Title 11 and found that its pro-
visions evinced an intent “to proscribe all natural copulation
that takes place outside of the marriage status.” Id. at 321,
187 A.2d at 139. Interpreting §11-10-1 in this light, the court
found that it necessarily proscribed all unnatural sexual
copulation. Id., 187 A.2d at 139. The court rejected the
argument that had the Legislature intended to make fellatio
unlawful, it would have done so explicitly in §11-10-1.
Instead, the court presumed that the Legislature had
eschewed a statutory enumeration so as not to limit the
statute to the matters enumerated. Id., 187 A.2d at 140. The
court reasoned that the Legislature had purposely chosen the
term “crime against nature” to achieve a degree of
comprehensiveness that would not have been possible with
an enumeration. The court then held that fellatio was
criminal under §11-10-1 and, accordingly, was an indecent
act within the meaning of §11-34-5. Id. at 322, 187 A.2d at
140.

The court employed similar reasoning in holding that the
term “indecent act,” as used in §11-34-5, possessed the degree
of certainty required by the constitution. Emphasizing the
impracticability of establishing “rigid legislative criteria”
when dealing with sex crimes, the court states that a reason-
able certainty in regard to the conduct proscribed was all
that the statute need provide. The court noted the near
impossibility of describing all means by which one could vio-

fT

es gil

late §11-34-5 and concluded that when the statutory
language “is as specific as the subject matter reasonably per-
mits, the constitutional requirement is satisfied.” State v.
Milne, 95 RB.1. at 323, 187 A.2d at 140.

As it had done in construing §11-10-1, the court reasoned
that the Legislature, by using the language “indecent act”
had intended to give the statute a broad meaning and “to
avoid the exclusory effect” that might have resulted had it
attempted to enumerate the acts proscribed. Id. at 323-24,
187 A.2d at 141. So construing §11-34-5, the court held that
it was intended to bar all unlawful sexual conduct, whether
natural or unnatural, including the act of fellatio. Accor-
dingly, the term “indecent act” was sufficiently specific to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of definiteness for
criminal statutes. Jd. at 324, 187 A.2d at 141.

This court again considered the meaning of §11-10-1 in
State v. Levitt, 118 B.I. 32, 371 A.2d 596 (1977), wherein a
defendant charged with forcing a woman to perform fellatio
on him argued that the term “abominable and detestable
crime against nature” was impermissibly vague. In examin-
ing the interpretive case law, we found State v. Milne, 95
R.I. 315, 187 A.2d 136 (1962), dispositive and therefore
placed no merit in that defendant’s vagueness claim. We held
that the statute as construed provided fair notice to defen-
dant that his conduct was unlawful. State v. Levitt, 118 R.I.
at 36, 371 A.2d at 598-99.

HHI Viewing both §§11-10-1 and 11-34-5 in light of Milne and
Levitt, as we are required to do, we see no reason to find
either statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to
defendant Santos. In construing §11-10-1 in Levitt, we found
Milne dispositive of the vagueness claim because it “provided
specificity to what otherwise might [have been] considered
an ambiguous criminal statute, [and] fixed its meaning for
subsequent cases * * *.” State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. at 36, 371
A.2d at 598. Although Milne concerned a prosecution for an
act of fellatio, our construction of §11-10-1 was not, as
defendant argues, limited to the inclusion of that act within

812 |

the terms of the statute. As we clearly stated in Milne, the
legislative intent in enacting §11-10-1 was to proscribe “all
unnatural sexual copulation.” State v. Milne, 95 R.I. at 321,
187 A.2d at 139. The act of anal intercourse for which
defendant Santos was convicted, being an act of “unnatural
sexual copulation,” was clearly proscribed by §11-10-1, as
construed by Milne. Santos, therefore, may not complain
that the statute did not provide fair warning that his conduct
was proscribed. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21,
22-23, 94S, Ct. 190, 192, 38 L. Ed. 2d 179, 182 (1973); State
v. Levitt, 118 R.I. at 36-37, 371 A.2d at 598-99 (statute read
in light of prior judicial interpretations).

In Milne, we held that the term “indecent act,” as used in
§11-34-5, was sufficiently definite to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of certainty. The defendant Santos was con-
victed under another part of this statute which made it un-
lawful to transport a person for the purpose of any “lewd or
indecent act.”? Although Milne did not construe the part of
the statute now before us, the language in each part is nearly
identical; and there is no reason for us to construe “lewd or
indecent act” any differently than we construed the term “in-
decent act” in Milne. For the reasons stated in Milne, there-
fore, defendant’s vagueness claim regarding §11-34-5 is with-
out merit.

The defendant further asserts that §§11-10-1 and 11-34-5
are unconstitutional because they violate his right of privacy
under the state and federal constitutions. Neither party has
briefed the issue of defendant’s standing to raise this argu-
ment. In order to reach the merits of the privacy claim, we
shall assume, without deciding, that defendant has standing.

There is no right of privacy explicitly mentioned in either
the Rhode Island or the federal constitution, The Supreme
Court of the United States, however, has recognized a right

I

*General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-34-5 provides in part:

“Tt shall be unlawful for any person to + * * transport + + + another for the
purpose of prostitution, or for any other lewd or indecent act; * * +.”

ee) 813

of personal privacy derived from certain guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. Though the Supreme Court has yet to establish
definitively the extent of this right, it is clear that the right of
privacy insulates certain fundamental personal decisions
from government interference.

To date, the Supreme Court has dealt with the right of pri-
vacy primarily in the context of personal decisions regarding
contraception and abortion. The court first enunciated the
constitutional right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965),
wherein the Court invalidated a statute proscribing the use of
contraceptives.? The Griswold Court reasoned that
penumbras emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights gave those guarantees life and substance and cre-
ated a zone of privacy that protects the individual from gov-
ernmental interference. Stating that the marital relationship
was within the zone of privacy and that the enforcement of
the statute would be “repulsive to the notions of privacy sur-
rounding the marriage relationship,” the Court held the stat-
ute unconstitutional. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
485-86, 85 S. Ct. at 1682, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 515-16.

The Court has since established that the right of privacy is
not confined solely to the marital relationship. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92S. Ct. 1029, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1972).
The Eisenstadt Court upheld a District Court order issuing a
writ of habeas corpus to a person convicted under a Massa-
chusetts statute prohibiting the unlicensed distribution of
contraceptives.* Viewing the statute as a prohibition of con-
traception per se, the Court found that it violated the rights
of unmarried persons under the equal protection clause of the

*The challenged statute provided:

“Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the
purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or
imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined
and imprisoned.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §53-32 (West 1960) (repealed 1969
Conn. Pub. Acts 828 §214).

“Massachusetts General Laws Ann. ch. 272 §21A (West 1970).

fn

sud es

Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the right
of access to contraceptives, whatever right it may be, must-be
the same for married and unmarried persons alike.

Although resting its decision on equal protection grounds,
the Court also explicated the right of privacy, stating that the
right was not:confined to the marital relationship. Acknow-
ledging that in Griswold the right to privacy had inhered in
the marital relationship, the Court reasoned that the marital
couple was not simply an independent entity but an associa-
tion of separate individuals. Elaborating, the Court stated
that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S. Ct. at
1038, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 362.

The Supreme Court has subsequently made clear that the
right of privacy is not so inclusive as the language in Eisen-
stadt might make it appear. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), the Court considered
whether a Texas criminal statute that permitted abortions
only when necessary to save the life of the mother infringed
the right of privacy. Summarizing its prior decisions, the
Court stated “that only personal rights that can be deemed
‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’
» « » are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.” Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S, at 152, 93 S. Ct. at 726, 35 L. Ed. 2d at
176 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct.
149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937). The Court further stated that its
prior opinions had established that the right of privacy
applied to activities concerning marriage, procreation, con-
traception, family relationships and child rearing and educa-
tion. Id. at 152, 93 S. Ct. at 726, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 176-77.°

Texas Penal Code Ann. arts. 1191-1194, 1196 (Vernon 1961).

Expressing its belief that the basis of the right to privacy was the “concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action” that inhere in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court held that the right was sufficiently broad to include a
woman’s decision whether or not to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153, 93 S. Ct. 705, 727, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 177 (1973).

Cc

es sis

In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitu-
tional on privacy grounds a New York statute making crimi-
nal the unauthorized sale or distribution of contraceptives.”
In Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678,
97S. Ct. 2010, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1977), the Court reiterated
its earlier statements that one aspect of the liberty protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a
right of personal privacy which includes an interest in inde-
pendence in making certain kinds of important decisions. Id.
at 684, 97 S. Ct. at 2016, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 684 (quoting
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S. Ct. 869, 51 L. Ed. 2d 64
(1977)). The Court stated that although the outer limits of
the protection afforded to individual decision making were
not yet defined, decisions relating to marriage, contracep-
tion, procreation, and family relationships clearly were pro-
tected. In striking down the statute, the Court considered
only the individual’s decision whether or not to have a child,
characterizing it as “among the most private and sensitive”
that a person could make. The Carey Court reserved judg-
ment on whether, and the extent to which, a state could
regulate private consensual sexual relations between adults.
Id. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17, 97S. Ct. at 2018 n.5, 2021 n.17, 52
L. Ed. 2d at 687 n.5, 691 n.17.

The language in Eisenstadt forbidding unwarranted gov-
ernmental interference in matters as fundamental as the deci-
sion to have a child suggests that unmarried adults may be
entitled to similar protection in their decision about whether
to engage in private consensual sexual conduct. Indeed, a few
state courts have expanded the right of privacy to encompass
private consensual sexual relations between adults. State v.
Pilcher, 242. N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (sodomy statute uncon-
stitutional on privacy grounds as applied to consenting adults
of opposite sex); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 214, 381
A.2d 333, 339-40 (1977) (fornication statute infringes right of
privacy). But see State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542
P.2d 1147 (1975) (right of sexual privacy between consenting

"New York Educ. Law §6811(8) (McKinney 1972).

si6 )

adults fundamental), rev'd sub nom. State v. Bateman, 113
Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864, 97 S. Ct.
170, 50 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1976); State v. Elliot, 88 N.M. 187,
539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975) (application of sodomy statute
to private consensual acts between adults unconstitutional),
rev'd, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976); In re P., 92 Misc.
2d 62, 76, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455, 465 (Fam. Ct. 1977) (right of
privacy protects “private, intimate consensual sexual conduct
not harmful to others”), rev’d sub nom. In re Dora P., 68
App. Div. 2d 719, 418 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1979).

|| If read alone, the language of Eisenstadt is susceptible of
such an interpretation. We believe, however, that the para-
meters of the right of privacy can be better ascertained by
viewing Griswold and its progeny collectively. In doing'so,
we find that the right of privacy is closely related to the deci-
sion whether or not to have a child. Though the Eisenstadt
Court broadly construed the right of privacy, the Roe Court
subsequently employed a narrower construction. In Roe, the
Court stated that only those personal rights that are
“ fundamental’ ” or “ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty’ ” are protected by the right of privacy. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. at 152, 93 S. Ct. at 726, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 176
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149,
82 L. Ed. 288 (1937)). The Roe Court included within the
concept of privacy, activities that relate to marriage, procre-
ation, contraception, and family relationships. Id. at 152, 93
S. Ct. at 726-27, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 176-77. The claimed right of
an adult to engage in any sort of private consensual sexual
conduct related to none of these matters. Although such acts
may be conducted in the utmost privacy, they are not for that
reason alone entitled to the degree of protection the right of
privacy confers on decisions regarding the use of contracep-
tives or the termination of a pregnancy. The latter decisions
are inextricably linked to “the decision whether to bear or be-
get a child,” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453, 92S. Ct. at
1038, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 362, and it is this decision that under-
lies the holdings of the Supreme Court in Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe. Carey v. Population Services Inter-

es 817

national, 431 U.S. at 688-89, 97S. Ct. at 2018, 52 L. Ed. 2d
at 687. Notwithstanding the opinions of some state courts to
the contrary, we do not believe that the decision of an un-
married adult to engage in private consensual sexual activi-
ties is of such a fundamental nature or is so “ ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty’ ” to warrant its inclusion in the
guarantee of personal privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152,
93 S. Ct. at 726, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 176 (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288
(1937)). In rejecting defendant Santos’ claim that G.L. 1956
(1969 Reenactment) §§11-10-1 and 11-34-5 infringe his right
of privacy, we find persuasive the recent decisions in which
the Supreme Court has declined to give the right a more
expansive reading.

In Carey the Court reiterated what it had said in Roe,
stating that Griswold and its progeny had established that
“the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.” 431
U.S. at 687, 97 S. Ct. at 2017, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 686. Although
the question whether the right of privacy protects the private
consensual sexual conduct of adults had been raised in Carey,
the Court found it unnecessary to reach that issue. Id. at 694
n.17, 97 S. Ct. at 2021 n.17, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 691 n.17.
Instead, the Court emphasized the interrelationship between
the right of privacy and the “right of decision in matters of
childbearing” in striking down the statute. Id. at 688-89, 97
S. Ct. at 2018, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 687.

In a decision prior to Carey, the Supreme Court declined
to extend the right of privacy to sexual matters not related to
childbearing. The Court summarily affirmed a District
Court judgment that upheld a Virginia sodomy statute
against a privacy challenge. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney, 425 U.S. 901, 96S. Ct. 1489, 47 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1976).
In Doe, the District Court essentially had viewed the right of
privacy as incident to the marital relationship. Doe v.
Commonwealth’s Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200-02
(E.D. Va. 1975). Accordingly, that court had held that pri-
vate consensual homosexual conduct between adults was not

818 es

protected by the right of privacy and could be prosecuted
under the sodomy statute. Id. at 1201-02.°

In light of the Doe Court’s affirmance of the determination
that the right of privacy excluded private consensual homo-
sexual conduct and the Carey Court’s emphasis of the interre-
lationship between the right of privacy and matters relating
to childbearing, we hold that the right of privacy is inappli-
cable to the private unnatural copulation between unmarried
adults.

During the course of the trial, the trial justice on his own
motion occasionally excluded questions asked of the wit-
nesses. The defendant Santos now argues that by excluding
questions not objected to, the trial justice took the role of an
advocate and failed to maintain the appearance of imparti-
ality. For the reasons stated below, we find this claim with-
out merit.

It is the responsibility of the trial justice to ensure that the
parties properly present the case so that the truth may be as-
certained. The quest for truth requires that the evidence
adduced before the jury be free of “irrelevant considerations
and appeals to prejudice and emotion” that might otherwise
divert the jury from the real issues’ of the case.
Commonwealth v. Haley, 363 Mass. 513, 518, 296 N.E.2d
207, 211 (1973) (quoting Lummus, The Trial Judge, 19-21
(1937)). Thus, a trial justice may exclude objectionable evi-
dence on his own motion without awaiting a formal objec-
tion. People v. Martin, 24 Ill. App. 3d 710, 716, 321 N.E.2d
368, 373 (1974); State v. Thornburgh, 220 N.W.2d 579, 584
(Iowa 1974); Commonwealth v. Haley, 363 Mass. at 518,
296 N.E.2d at 210-11; McCormick, Evidence §55 at 129 (2d
ed. 1972); 1 Wigmore, Evidence §18 at 321 (3d ed. 1940).
The record indicates that the trial justice did precisely this;
the justice clearly explained to counsel that he intended to ex-

"The Supreme Court's decision in Doe, though a summary affirmance, is a dis-
position of the case on the merits; and the result, though not the District Court’s
reasoning, is thus binding on the lower courts. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
343-44, 95 S. Ct, 2281, 2289, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223, 236 (1975).

es si9

clude any extraneous or unreasonable questions in order to
limit the inquiry to those matters that were material and rele-
vant to the case,

By excluding objectionable questions in this manner, the
trial justice did not, as defendant argues, sacrifice his impar-
tiality. On the contrary, the justice acted quite even-
handedly, excluding questions asked by the prosecutor as
well as those asked by defense counsel. There is nothing in
the record to show that the trial justice advocated the posi-
tion of one party over the other, nor did his conduct evince
any bias or belief regarding the credibility of the witnesses.
See State v. Lint, 361 A.2d 926, 927 (Me. 1976) (per curiam)
(trial justice not impartial when his questions indicate wit-
ness not believable); Commonwealth v. Lanza, 228 Pa.
Super. Ct. 300, 303, 323 A.2d 178, 179 (1974) (trial justice
may not show bias or belief in credibility of witness). Addi-
tionally, the trial justice instructed the jurors that they should
decide the case only on the basis of the evidence, and that his
rulings did not reflect his opinion on the issues of the case and
should not be considered by them in determining defendant’s
guilt. In light of all this, we find that the trial justice acted
properly in excluding the questions on his own motion and
maintained the requisite impartiality while doing so.

The defendant further argues that the trial justice erred in
admitting into evidence a knife obtained during an allegedly
illegal search and seizure of his car. We need not reach the
merits of defendant’s Fourth Amendment arguments because
the evidence discovered was not relevant to the crimes for
which defendant was convicted.

The gist of defendant’s argument is that the trial justice
should have suppressed the knife discovered during the
unlawful search-of his car. The knife increased the likelihood
that defendant had threatened the complainant with physi-
cal harm and was therefore relevant to the rape and kid-
napping charges - crimes that involve a question of force or
compulsion. The jury, however, acquitted defendant of these
charges. The knife was not relevant to defendant’s conviction

820 es

for committing an abominable and detestable crime against
nature or for transporting for immoral purposes. The test of
relevancy is whether the offered evidence has any tendency
to make the existence of the fact sought to be proven more
probable or less probable than it would have been without
the evidence. Capezza v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp.,
118 R.I. 1, 6-7, 371 A.2d 269, 272 (1977); McCormick,
Evidence §185 at 437 (2d ed. 1972); 1 Weinstein’s Evidence,
{ 401[07] at 401-27 (1979). The admission of the knife into
evidence did not affect the probability that defendant com-
mitted either crime, and therefore is not relevant to the con-
victions now before us. If the admission of the knife is not
relevant to defendant’s convictions, it follows that the means
by which it was obtained also are not relevant.

We now consider whether the trial justice erred in admit-
ting defendant's allegedly hearsay statements into evidence.
At trial, the complainant and two police officers testified that
defendant had told them that on two other occasions women
had accused him of rape. The trial justice cautioned the
jurors that they could use the complainant’s testimony only as
evidence that defendant had spoken to her. The justice fur-
ther instructed the jurors that defendant’s statements to the
police officers were admissible only to show his state of mind.

An extrajudicial statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement is hearsay evidence and,
unless within an exception, is barred by the hearsay rule.
Manuel J. Furtado, Inc. v. Sarkas, 118 R.I. 218, 224, 373
A.2d 169, 172 (1977); State v. Clark, 112 R.I. 270, 274, 308
A.2d 792, 794-95 (1973); State v. Vaccaro, 111 R.1. 59, 62,
298 A.2d 788, 790 (1973); State v. White, 107 R.I. 306,
309-10, 267 A.2d 414, 416 (1970) (quoting 6 Wigmore,
Evidence (3d ed.) §1766 at 178); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c);
McCormick, supra §246 at 584. If offered to prove something
other than the truth of the matter asserted, however, a
statement is not hearsay and the rule does not apply. Manuel
J. Furtado, Inc. v. Sarkas, 118 R.1. at 224-25, 373 A.2d at
172; McCormick, supra, §246 at 585; 6 Wigmore, Evidence
§1766 at 250 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).

es 621

Hs Thus the hearsay rule would preclude the use of defen-
dant’s statements only if the prosecutor had offered them to
prove the truth of the matter asserted - that defendant had
twice previously been accused of rape. The record clearly
shows that the trial justice did not admit the statements for
this purpose. On the contrary, he instructed the jury that
they could use defendant's statements only for certain limited
purposes. Because the trial justice admitted defendant’s
statements as evidence of matters other than those asserted
therein, we find that they were not hearsay. 6 Wigmore,
supra, §1766 at 250.

Though the statements are not hearsay, they are not auto-
matically admissible; the purpose for which they were intro-
duced must also have been relevant to an issue in the case.
See Fed. R. Evid. 402; 6 Wigmore, supra, §1766 at 250. The
trial justice ruled that defendant’s statement to the police was
admissible as evidence of his state of mind. The defendant
had stated that he could not understand why girls let him
make love to them and then scream rape, and that this was
the third time he had been accused. This statement clearly
manifests defendant’s consciousness of guilt, which is incor-
porated within the term “state of mind.” To the extent that
the statement evinced consciousness of guilt, it was relevant
to whether defendant had raped complainant and was thus
properly admissible. We are not convinced, however, that
the purpose for which the trial justice admitted defendant’s
statement to the complainant was relevant to the charges
against him.

HME ss The trial justice instructed the jurors that he had admitted
the statement “only for the fact that the conversation was
held in the vehicle.” Though the evidence that defendant
spoke would certainly be relevant to whether the two had
conversed, the conversation itself was not relevant to
whether defendant committed any of the crimes charged.
The test of relevancy is whether the offered evidence renders
a desired inference either more or less probable than it would ~
be without the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401; McCormick,
supra, §185 at 437. The relevant inference to be drawn from

822 ee

defendant’s statement concerned his state of mind - his con-
sciousness of guilt immediately following the crime. The trial
court did not admit the statement for this purpose. It
admitted the statement solely to show that a conversation
had occurred - a matter irrelevant to whether defendant had
committed a rape. Accordingly, we find that the trial justice
erred in admitting defendant’s statement for that purpose.

This error, however, does not require automatic reversal.
We must first examine the record to determine the probable
impact of this evidence and whether it affected the ultimate
outcome of the case. State v. Roderick, 121 R.1. 896, 900-901,
403 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1979); State v. Bower, 109 R.I. 198,
203-04, 283 A.2d 39, 41 (1971). If the admission of the evi-
dence “neither distracted the jury’s attention from, nor influ-
enced its decision on the ultimate issue of the defendant’s
guilt,” the error in admitting it was harmless. State v.
Andrews, 120 R.I. 771, 779, 300 A.2d 926, 931 (1978).

In this case, we find that the admission of defendant’s
statement to the complainant as proof that the conversation
took place was harmless error. This statement was relevant
primarily to whether defendant had raped the complainant.
That defendant was acquitted of the rape charge is ample
evidence that the admission of the statement was harmless.
Even if defendant had not been acquitted, however, there
was sufficient independent evidence to minimize the impact
on the jury. The complainant testified in great detail about
the crime and positively identified defendant at trial. Addi-
tionally, the trial justice had properly admitted the nearly
identical statement defendant later made to the police. In
light of these facts, we find that the admission of defendant’s
first statement did not influence the jury’s decision on
defendant’s guilt.

Though we find that defendant’s out-of-court statements
pose no hearsay problems and are relevant to his state of
mind, we must now determine whether they should have
been excluded as evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts. In
general, evidence of the bad character of an accused, includ-

es 823

ing his prior bad acts, is initially inadmissible as evidence that
he committed the crime charged. State v. Jalette, 119 R.I.
614, 624, 382 A.2d 526, 531-32 (1978); State v. Horton, 47
R.I. 341, 347, 133 A. 236, 239 (1926); McCormick, supra,
§190 at 447; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, §240 at 528-31
(13th ed. 1972); 1 Wigmore, supra, §192 at 641-42. Evidence
of an accused's prior criminal acts may not be used because
the potential for creating prejudice in the minds of the jurors
outweighs its probative value. McCormick, supra, §190 at
447; 1 Wharton, supra, §240 at 535. “The rule is that the
prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal
acts of the accused unless the evidence is substantially rele-
vant for some other purpose than to show a probability that
he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of crimi-
nal character.” McCormick, supra §190 at 447.

| An exception to the above rule allows the use of evidence of
an accused’s prior bad acts to show his criminal intent. State
v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 624, 382 A.2d 526, 532 (1978);
State v. Mazzarella, 103 B.I. 253, 257, 236 A.2d 446, 449
(1967); State v. Colangelo, 55 B.I. 170, 173-74, 179 A. 147,
149 (1935); State v. Horton, 47 R.I. at 347, 133 A. at 239; see
1 Wharton, supra, §245 at 554-56; 1 Wigmore, supra, §192
at 642. This court has stated that if evidence “tends to
establish guilty knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan,
scheme, system, or the like, [it] is proper” and a court may
admit it. State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. at 174, 179 A. at 149. In
these instances, the probability of prejudice to the accused is
outweighted by the state’s interest in introducing the evi-
dence. A trial justice, however, should admit this sort of evi-
dence cautiously and should instruct the jury on its limited
use. State v. Jalette, 119 R.J. at 625, 382 A.2d at 532. As
we noted in Jalette, evidence of other sexual crimes is
“uniquely apt to arouse the jury’s hostility.” For this reason
we stated that the prosecutor should introduce evidence of
similar sex crimes sparingly and only when reasonably neces-
sary to show one of the traditional exceptions to the general
prohibition against the initial use of character evidence. Id.
at 627, 382 A.2d at 533.

624 PC )

|| The defendant’s statements both when he was arrested and

when the complainant left him tended to establish his guilty
knowledge concerning the rape and were thus properly
admissible. State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. at 174, 179 A. at 149.
The term “state of mind” used by the trial justice encom-
passes consciousness of guilt, and either may be proved by
evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts. See State v.
Colangelo, 55 R.I. at 173-74, 179 A. at 149. We thus find no
reversible error in the admission of the defendant’s
statements that he had twice previously been accused of
rape.

The defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the judg-

ment of conviction appealed from is affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the Superior Court.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Alfred French
Goldstein, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Barbara Hurst, Mary E. Levesque, Paula Rosin, Assistant
Public Defenders, Anthony F. Muri, Amicus Curiae, Rhode
Island, Affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, for
defendant.

825

412 A.2d 1132.
G. H. Waterman & Co., Inc. vs. Joun H. Norserc.
MARCH 21, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Bevi.acgua, C.J. This is a petition for certiorari to
review a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision of the
tax administrator assessing a use tax against the petitioner, G.
H. Waterman & Co., Inc. (corporation), in the amount of
$10,829.49 including interest and costs.

On August 24, 1971, the corporation was sent a notice of
deficiency determination under the sales-and-use-tax law re-
sulting primarily from its acquisition in 1965 and 1967 of
eleven antique cars from its sole stockholder, George H.
Waterman, Jr., in pro tanto satisfaction of Mr. Waterman’s
debt to the corporation. At the corporation’s request, an
administrative hearing on the deficiency determination was
held on February 15, 1972. As a result of the evidence
adduced at this hearing, the assessment against the corpora-
tion was upheld by the tax administrator in a final decision
dated July 18, 1972. Thereupon petitioner filed a complaint

ee) 827

in Superior Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures
Act, G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §42-35-15(b), as
amended by P.L. 1979, ch. 340, §1, seeking review of the tax
administrator's decision. Prior to considering the matter, the
Superior Court granted petitioner’s motion for leave to pre-
sent additional evidence before the tax administrator. A
second and more extensive administrative hearing was then
held on May 15, 1975. In a written decision the officer pre-
siding at this hearing found that petitioner had acquired the
antique cars for investment purposes and that use tax was
properly imposed on the petitioner’s acquisition of the cars.
The tax administrator, after reading the record, affirmed
and adopted this decision in his final decision dated March
11, 1976. After hearing argument and reviewing the record,
a justice of the Superior Court affirmed the tax administra-
tor’s March 11, 1976 decision.

At the first administrative hearing, a revenue agent of the
Rhode Island Division of Taxation testified that she audited
petitioner’s books on July 13, 1971, and found that between
July 1, 1965, and July 31, 1969, there was an increase of
$176,712.05 in the tangible personal assets owned by peti-
tioner and listed in its corporate ledger-under the investment
account. The bulk of the increase, $157,790, was found to be
derived from petitioner’s purchases from its sole stockholder,
Mr. Waterman, of eleven early-model cars, six of which were
acquired on December 31, 1965, and five of which were
treated as having been acquired on July 1, 1967. The revenue
agent determined that use tax was due as a result of these
purchases.

At the second hearing, Mr. Waterman testified that
petitioner was incorporated in Rhode Island in 1940 and that
the nature of its business was selling “cotton yarns and other
type of yarns from mills in the South and in the North.” He
also stated that petitioner began to end that business “around
1970.”

Mister Waterman further testified that in 1965 and 1967,
upon the advice of his accountant, who also served as the cor-

828 es

poration’s (outside) accountant, he transferred the eleven
cars to petitioner in partial satisfaction of a debt he owed to
the corporation. Mister Waterman also explained that he had
acquired the cars because of his interest in antique automo-
biles which began as a hobby in the late 1920s but later
turned into “more of a business because the value of the cars
changed so rapidly over the years.” According to Mr. Water-
man, petitioner acquired the cars from him because “they
were an excellent investment” and petitioner intended “to
either lease them or hold them until we could sell them for a
price I thought was right.”

According to Mr. Waterman’s accountant, who also
testified at the second hearing, both Mr. Waterman and peti-
tioner had acquired the cars because of their appreciating
value and then held them for sale or lease. The accountant
testified also that it was his suggestion that Mr. Waterman
transferred the cars to the corporation.

I

Before this court, petitioner contends first that respondent
tax administrator and the trial justice who affirmed respond-
ent’s March 11, 1976 final decision “misconceived the nature
of Rhode Island ‘use’ tax as a tax on any ‘transfer of property’
located in Rhode Island.” Specifically petitioner contends
that the antique cars acquired by it were held for lease or sale
to out-of-state lessees or buyers and that therefore it was not
subject to use tax on their acquisition because (1) petitioner
was not the ultimate user of the cars in this state and (2) G.L.
1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-18-11, exempts from use tax
the acquisition of property shipped or brought into this state
for the purpose of subsequently being transported and used
solely outside the state.

Initially we note that under §42-35-16 of the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act our review of the Superior Court
decision affirming the use-tax assessment is limited to a re-
view of “any questions of law involved.” We examine the rec-
ord to determine whether any competent evidence exists to
support the decision of the trial justice and whether his deci-

es 829

sion is affected by any errors of law. Herald Press, Inc. v.
Norberg, 122 R.I. 264, 405 A.2d 1171, 1177 (1979);
Randall v. Norberg, 121 R.I. 714, 717, 403 A.2d 240, 242
(1979).

General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-18-20 as
amended by P.L. 1977, ch. 200, art. 4, §1, imposes use tax on
the “storage, use or other consumption in this state” of a
motor vehicle purchased from any retailer or from other than
a licensed motor-vehicle dealer. “Storage” is defined in
§44-18-9 as

“any keeping or retention in this state, except for sale in
the regular course of business or for subsequent use
solely outside this state, of tangible personal property
purchased from a retailer.”

“Use” is defined in §44-18-10 as

“the exercise of any right or power over tangible per-
sonal property incident to the ownership of that pro-
perty, except that it does not include the sale of that pro-
perty in the regular course of business.”

The petitioner’s argument that respondent and the trial jus-
tice misconceived the nature of the use tax because, argu-
ably, petitioner was not the “ultimate user” of the subject
property seems itself to be a misconception of the controlling
issue under the statutes cited above. The issue under those
statutes is whether petitioner purchased the cars “for sale in
the regular course of business” or acquired and stored them
“for subsequent use solely outside this state,” not simply whe-
ther it held the cars for sale or lease.

Hi We find that there is competent evidence in the record to
support respondent’s decision, which was not questioned by
the trial justice, that petitioner purchased the cars for invest-
ment purposes, not for sale in the regular course of business
or for subsequent use solely outside this state. The thrust of
the testimony at the second administrative hearing was that
petitioner acquired and held the cars because they were “in-

830 |

creasing approximately 10 percent a year in value.”! Indeed,
although the record indicates that Mr. Waterman, during his
ownership of the cars, leased several of them, there is no evi-
dence that petitioner ever entered into any such leases. More-
over, at the time petitioner acquired the cars, the regular
course of its business involved the brokerage of textile yarns
and associated products. Mister Waterman testified that
petitioner did not begin to terminate that business until 1970,
some five years after its most costly and numerous car pur-
chases. And petitioner’s accountant, in a September 30, 1971
letter written to respondent, stated that “the vintage cars did
not in any way participate in the principal business activity
of the corporation which is selling textile yarns and associated
products.”

In addition we note that §44-18-25 of the sales-and-use tax
law creates a statutory presumption in favor of respondent’s
position respecting petitioner’s acquisition of the antique
cars. Section 44-18-25 provides in pertinent part:

“Tt shall be presumed * * * that all tangible personal
property sold or in processing or intended for delivery or
delivered in this state is sold or delivered for storage,
use, or other consumption in this state, until the con-
trary is established to the satisfaction of the tax adminis-
trator. The burden of proving the contrary is upon the
person who makes the sale and the purchaser, unless the
person who makes the sale takes from the purchaser a
certificate to the effect that the purchase was for
resale.”

1Subsequent to oral argument petitioner submitted a supplemental memoran-
dum asserting that under the case of Correia v. Norberg, 120 R.1. 793, 391 A.2d
94 (1978), the testimony of its witnesses that it held the cars for lease or sale should
have controlled the findings of fact made by the factfinder. It Correia we held that
“the positive testimony of a witness, when uncontradicted and unimpeached « « *
cannot be disregarded by the trier of fact but must control the findings thereof
+ * » [unless such] testimony contains inherent improbabilities or contradictions
* * +.” As our opinion indicates, however, petitioner's reliance on Correia is
misplaced. A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that there is competent legal evi-
dence to support the findings at issue.

es 831

The petitioner does not dispute the applicability of this pre-
sumption to its purchases, nor does it contend that a resale
certificate was issued with respect to any of its purchases.

The petitioner’s argument that its purchases of the cars fell
within the exemption of §44-18-11* also fails. This exemp-
tion, consistent with the mandate of the commerce clause of
the U.S. Const., art. I, §8, excludes from taxation any pro-
perty which in the flow of interstate commerce enters Rhode
Island and, with only minor interruption, continues on its
interstate journey. Randall v. Norberg, 121 R.1. at 719,
403 A.2d at 243. The petitioner, as the party seeking an
exemption from taxation, had the burden of establishing that
its purchases fell within the scope of §44-18-11. Capitol
Building Co. v. Langton, 101 R.I. 131, 137, 221 A.2d 99, 103
(1966). In view of the foregoing, we cannot say that peti-
tioner satisfied that burden.

Il

The petitioner also argues before this court that its statu-
tory and procedural due-process rights were not observed by
respondent in reaching his decision to uphold the use-tax
assessment. The petitioner first contends that respondent
failed to comply with §42-35-12 of the Administrative
Procedures Act because he did not rule on each of petitioner’s
“proposed findings.”

The pertinent language of §42-35-12 provides:

“If a party, in accordance with agency rules, submitted
proposed findings of fact, the decision shall include a

®General Laws 1956 (1970 Reenactment) §44-18-11 provides in part:

“ ‘Storage’ and ‘use’ do not include the keeping, retaining, or exercising of
any right or power over tangible personal property shipped or brought into
this state for the purpose of subsequently transporting the same outside the
state for use thereafter solely outside the state, or for the purpose of being
processed, fabricated, or manufactured into, attached to or incorporated
into, other tangible personal property to be transported outside the state and
thereafter used solely outside the state.”

$32 ee)

ruling upon each proposed finding.”®

The federal Administrative Procedures Act contains a similar
provision, 5 U.S.C.A. §557(c)(1977). Courts have construed
both the federal provision and its state counterpart as not re-
quiring a separate, express ruling on each proposed finding of
a party, provided the agency’s decision on such proposed
findings are clear from the record. American President Lines,
Lid. v. N.L.R.B., 340 F.2d 490, 492 (1965); National Labor
Relations Board v. State Center Warehouse & C.S. Co., 193
F.2d 156, 158 (1951); Montana Consumer Council v. Public
Service Comm’n., 168 Mont. 180, 192-93, 541 P.2d 770, 777

(1975).

Here petitioner never in fact submitted any designated
“proposed findings of fact.” In its memorandum of law to re-
spondent, petitioner included twenty-three numbered
paragraphs labeled “statement of facts,” which primarily re-
ported petitioner’s disposition of each of the eleven cars in
question, and two paragraphs labeled “ultimate facts,”
which asserted that petitioner held the cars within the flow of
interstate commerce and for sale or lease out of state. Even
were we to assume that these paragraphs constituted pro-
posed findings of fact, respondent’s ruling on them is abun-
dantly clear from his decision; the twenty-three factual state-
ments were rejected as immaterial and the two conclusory
statements were rejected as unfounded. Under these circum-
stances, to remand the case for specific rulings on each
numbered paragraph would be to “insist upon a needless
compliance with ritual.” Hopper v. Goldstein, 104 R.I. 32,
46, 241 A.2d 809, 816 (1968).

9On January 20, 1977, the tax administrator supplemented the administrative
hearing procedures of the Division of Taxation by promulgating the following rule:

“Requests for findings of fact (sec. 42-35-12) must be submitted in a separ-
ate document and beso headlined. A statement of facts included in a brief or
memorandum of law will be considered only to represent the proponent’s
version of the facts.”

At all times in question here, however, there were no agency rules in effect to
govern submission of requests for (or proposed) findings of fact.

fo

es 835

The petitioner next argues that respondent failed to
comply with §42-35-9(e)(5)* of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act because neither he nor the officer presiding at the
second administrative hearing furnished petitioner, prior to

* respondent’s rendition of a final decision, with proposed

findings of fact to which petitioner could take timely excep-
tions.

As we construe §42-35-9(e), however, §42-35-9(e)(5)
neither expressly nor impliedly requires the agency to furnish
a party with proposed findings before a final decision is ren-
dered. This provision of the Administrative Procedures Act
delineates what “the record in a contested case shall include.”
Tt does no more and no less. The petitioner’s argument there-
fore evinces an erroneous construction of the provision.

The petitioner lastly argues that the respondent violated its
right to due process under the state and federal constitutions
because in the petitioner’s view, the respondent's final deci-
sion does not deal with its principal contention that during
the taxable periods at issue it was holding the antique cars for
lease or sale out of state. In view of the record before us, we
consider this argument to be without merit.

The petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed, the writ
heretofore issued is quashed, and the papers certified to us
are ordered returned to the Superior Court with our decision
endorsed thereon.

~4General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) §49-35-9 in pertinent part provides:
“(e) The record in a contested case shalll include:
(1) all pleadings, motions, intermediate rulings;
(2) evidence received or considered;
(3) a statement of matters officially noticed;
(4) questions and offers of proof and rulings thereon;
(8) proposed findings and exceptions;
(6) any decision, opinion, or report by the officer presiding at the hearing;

(7) all staff memoranda or data submitted to the hearing officer or members
of the agency in connection with their consideration of the case.”

8

4

Salter, McGowan, Arcaro & Swartz, Incorporated, James
R. McGowan, for petitioner.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Allen P. Rubine,
Assistant Attorney General, Perry Shatkin, Chief Legal Offi-
cer (Taxation), for respondent.

412 A.2d 926,
Rotanp G, Mercier vs, Crry or CENTRAL Fats et al.
MARCH 26, 1980.
Paesenr: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

Ps
CSCS
Doris, J. This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment

in which the Superior Court held that a provision of the

Home Rule Charter of Central Falls empowered the city

council to enact an ordinance mandating the retirement of all
firefighters and policemen at the age of sixty-five.

The plaintiff, Roland Mercier, had been a member of the
Central Falls Police Department for thirty-six years, serving
as Chief of Police since 1969. In November 1976, the Council
for the City of Central Falls (council) passed an ordinance
imposing on all members of the fire and police department
pension plans and a mandatory retirement age of sixty-five
years. Because plaintiff was seventy-one years old at that
time, he was forced to vacate his position in December 1976,
although prior to that time he had performed his job satisfac-
torily. The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action,
alleging that the council lacked the authority to compel the
mandatory retirement of any municipal employee and that
the ordinance was therefore void.! The trial justice ruled that
the council had the authority to enact the ordinance. The jus-
tice reasoned that a provision in the city’s Home Rule Charter
establishing a merit employment system provided the basis of
authority for the council to act.

The sole issue before us is whether the council possessed the
authority to enact the ordinance. Although we concur with
the trial justice that the council was empowered to enact the
ordinance, we disagree with his finding that the city’s Home
Rule Charter provided the source of the council’s authority.
In 1925, the Legislature: passed a law conferring on the
council the authority to establish a pension fund for the
officers of the Central Falls Police Department.? Pursuant to

1The plaintiff also argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it dis-
criminated against: police personnel and firefighters in general and plaintiff in
particular. The trial justice ruled adversely to plaintiff's discrimination argument,
and plaintiff has not sought review of this decision,

*Public Laws 1925; éh. 703, §§1, 2. The act provided as follows:

“Section 1. The city council of the city of Central Falls is hereby author-
ized and empowered to create and disburse a pension fund or funds for off-

836 ee

this statute, the council has since created a pension fund. The
1925 act further empowered the council “to establish by
ordinance all rules and regulations pertaining to said fund
* * « as to it shall seem expedient.” Public Laws 1925, ch.
703, §2. It is from this legislation that the council derived its
authority to impose a mandatory retirement age. The grant
of power to create and to regulate the pension fund impliedly
includes a grant to enact ordinances on incidental matters
that are necessary to the proper and efficient administration
of the fund. Soltis Appeal, 390 Pa. 416, 418-19, 185 A.2d
744, 745 (1957); Doyle v. City of Scranton, 22 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 8, 10, 347 A.2d 330, 331 (1975). The age at which all
policemen whose positions are covered by the pension fund
must retire is one such incidental matter.

It is established that this court may sustain a correct judg-
ment of a lower court although we do not accept that court’s
reasoning. DiRaimo v. DiRaimo, 117 B.1. 703, 708, 370 A.2d
1284, 1287 (1977). Accordingly, because of the provisions of
the 1925 legislation, we sustain the judgment of the trial jus-
tice.

The plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the
judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., for plaintiff.

James M. Shannahan, for defendants.

cers and permanent members of the police department of said city who, by
reason of age, physical or mental infirmity, injuries sustained or illness
incurred while in the performance of duty, or for other causes, may be unfit
to perform active duty.

“Sec. 2, The city council of said city is hereby authorized and empowered
to collect and divert to said fund or funds one per cent of the annual salary
due to each officer and member of said police department, and, from time
to time to appropriate from the general funds of the city such sums of money
as may be necessary for the proper carrying out of the purposes of this act,
and to establish by ordinance all rules and regulations pertaining to said
fund or funds as to it shall seem expedient.”

837

413 A.2d 72.

Ricuarp J. McGee, Administrator c.t.a.
vs. PHiLiie McGEE et al.

MARCH 31, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.

WeisBercer, J. This is a complaint for declaratory judg-
ment, in which the plaintiff administrator, Richard J.
McGee (Richard), sought directions from the Superior Court
in respect to the construction of certain provisions of the will
of his mother, Claire E. McGee, and instructions relating to
payment of debts and distribution of assets from the
testatrix’s estate. The sole issue presented by this appeal con-
cerns the question of the ademption of an allegedly specific
legacy to the grandchildren of the decedent and the conse-
quent effect of such ademption upon payment of a bequest in
the amount of $20,000 to Fedelma Hurd (Hurd), a friend of
the testatrix. The provisions of the will pertinent to this
appeal read as follows:

es 839
“CLAUSE ELEVENTH:

I give and bequeath to my good and faithful friend,
FEDELMA HURD, the sum of Twenty Thousand
($20,000.00) Dollars, as an expression to her of my
appreciation for her many kindnesses.

“CLAUSE TWELFTH:

I give and bequeath all of my shares of stock in the
Texaco Company, and any and all monies standing in
my name on deposit in any banking institution as fol-
lows:

(a) My Executor shall divide the shares of stock, or
the proceeds thereof from a sale of same, with all of my
monies, standing on deposit in my name, in any bank,
into three (3) equal parts and shall pay 1/3 over to the
living children of my beloved son, PHILIP; 1/3 to the
living children of my beloved son, RICHARD and 1/3
over to the living children of my beloved son, JOSEPH.
Each of my grandchildren shall share equally the 1/3
portion given to them.” (Emphasis added.)

At the time of the execution of the will and up until a short
time before the death of the testatrix, a substantial sum of
money was on deposit in her name at the People’s Savings
Bank in Providence. About five weeks prior to his mother’s
death, Richard, proceeding pursuant to a written power of
attorney as modified by an addendum executed the following
month, withdrew approximately $50,000 from these savings
accounts. Of this amount, he applied nearly $30,000 towards
the purchase of four United States Treasury bonds, com-
monly denominated as ‘flower bonds,” from the Federal
Trust Company in Waterville, Maine (Richard then resided
in that state). His objective in executing this transaction was
to effect an advantageous method of satisfying potential fed-
eral estate ‘tax liability.1 The bonds, however, did not serve

1Although not otherwise redeemable before maturity, flower bonds may be re-
deemed at par value, plus accrued interest, upon the owner's death for the purpose
of paying the federal taxes on his estate. See Girard Trust Bank v. United States,
602 F.2d 938, 940 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1979).

840 ee

the intended purpose since at the time of Mrs. McGee’s death
her gross estate was such that apparently no federal estate tax
liability was incurred. The remainder of the monies with-
drawn from the savings accounts were deposited in Clare
McGee’s checking account to pay current bills and in a sav-
ings account in Richard’s name to be transferred to his
mother’s account as the need might arise for the payment of
her debts and future obligations. The sole sum that is now the
subject of this appeal is the approximately $30,000 held in the
form of United States Treasury bonds.

The complaint for declaratory judgment sought instruc-
tions concerning whether the administrator should first sat-
isfy the specific legacy to the grandchildren from the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the flower bonds or whether he should
first pay the $20,000 bequest to Fedelma Hurd, since the es-
tate lacked assets sufficient to satisfy both bequests.

After hearing evidence and considering legal memoranda
filed by the parties, the trial justice found that the bequest to
the grandchildren contained in the twelfth clause of the will
constituted a specific legacy. He held further, however, that
Rhode Island regarded the concept of ademption with dis-
favor and he sought, therefore, to effectuate the intent of the
testatrix. He proceeded to determine that since there is an
assumption that one intends to leave his property to those
who are the natural objects of his bounty, rather than to
strangers, the administrator “should trace the funds used to
purchase the Flower Bonds and should satisfy the specific leg-
acy to the grandchildren” under the twelfth clause of the
will. Consequently, the trial justice held that the legacy to
Fedelma Hurd under the eleventh clause of the will must
fail. This appeal ensued.

The McGee grandchildren suggest that the principal de-
sign of the testatrix’s estate plan, ascertainable from a con-
templation of the testamentary disposition of her property,
was to benefit her family rather than “outsiders.” They urge
us to consider her intentions -- which they assure us were con-
cerned, in part, with protecting the family interests from an

es sl

anticipated reduction of the estate’s value by taxes -- in deter-
mining whether the transfer of the funds in her accounts did
in fact work an ademption. In addition, Richard points out
that the decedent did not herself purchase these bonds. On
the contrary, Richard acquired them in order to help dis-
charge anticipated tax obligations of the estate and informed
his mother of them only subsequently to the purchase. He
argues, furthermore, not only that the funds with which he
purchased the flower bonds originated in his mother’s
accounts, but also that since these bonds “are as liquid as
cash” they are indeed monies standing in the decedent’s name
on deposit in a banking institution. He suggests that this
description conforms in every respect to the formula drafted
into the twelfth clause of her will. Merely the form of the leg-
acy has changed, according to Richard, not its essential char-
acter, quality, or substance.

In response, appellant asserts that an ademption occurred
by the voluntary act of the testatrix during her lifetime, since
her son withdrew the funds as an authorized agent operating
under a lawful power of attorney. There is evidence, more-
over, that the testatrix subsequently ratified the purchase of
the bonds when Richard afterwards told her of his actions
and their intended effect upon estate taxes.? As a conse-
quence, Hurd asserts that there was no longer any money
standing on deposit in the name of the testatrix in any bank
with which to discharge the specific legacy to the grandchil-
dren. These transactions resulted in an extinction of the sub-
ject matter of the legacy. Hurd argues, in addition, that the
intention of the testatrix, even if discernible, is irrelevant to
the question of the ademption of the bequest. She therefore
contends that her general legacy should be payable from the
proceeds of the sale of the flower bonds.

At the outset, we recognize that the instant case concerns
specifically the concept of ademption by extinction, a legal

*Richard testified his mother “was pleased that [he had] done this because there
would be more money available for the children and grandchildren.”

a2 es

consequence that may attend a variety of circumstances
occasioned either by operation of law or by the actions of a
testator himself or through his guardian, conservator, or
agent. Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, 82 A. 988 (1911); In
re Wright, 7 N.Y.2d 365, 165 N.E.2d 561, 197 N.Y.S.2d 711
(1960). In particular, a testamentary gift of specific real or
personal property may be adeemed -- fail completely to pass
as prescribed in the testator’s will -- when the particular arti-
cle devised or bequeathed no longer exists as part of the tes-
tator’s estate at the moment of his death because of its prior
consumption, loss, destruction, substantial change, sale, or
other alienation subsequent to the execution of the will. In
consequence, neither the gift, its proceeds, nor similar substi-
tute passes to the beneficiary, and this claim to the legacy is
thereby barred. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills
§134 at 741, 743-44 (2d ed. 1953); 6 Bowe & Parker, Page on
the Law of Wills §54.1 at 242, §54.9 at 256-57 (1962); Note,
Wills: Ademption of Specific Legacies and Devises, 43 Cal.
L. Rev. 151 (1955).

The principle of ademption by extinction has reference
only to specific devises and bequests and is thus inapplicable
to demonstrative or general testamentary gifts. 6 Page, supra
§54.3 at 245, §54.5 at 248. In Haslam v. de Alvarez, 70 B.I.
212, 38 A.2d 158 (1944), we prescribed the criteria for deter-
mining the character of a legacy, relying on the earlier case of
Dean v. Rounds, 18 R.1. 436, 27 A. 515 (1893), wherein we
held that “[a] specific legacy, as the term imports, is a gift or
bequest of some definite specific thing, something which is
capable of being designated and identified.” Id. When the
testator intends that the legatee shall receive the exact pro-
perty bequeathed rather than its corresponding quantitative
or ad valorem equivalent, the gift is a specific one, and when
“the main intention is that the legacy be paid by the delivery
of the identical thing, and that thing only, and in the event
that at the time of the testator’s death such thing is no longer
in existence, the legacy will not be paid out of his general
assets.” Hanley v. Fernell, 54 R.I. 84, 86, 170 A. 88, 89
(1934). In particular, the designation and identification of

Pe) 843

the specific legacy in a testator’s will describe the gift in a
manner that serves to distinguish it from all other articles of
the same general nature and prevents its distribution from
the general assets of the testator’s estate. 6 Page, supra §48.3
at 11-12,

In the case at bar, the trial justice construed the twelfth
clause of Mrs. McGee’s will as bequeathing a specific legacy
to her grandchildren. While it is true that the party who con-
tends the legacy is a specific one must bear the burden of
proof on this issue, DiCristofaro v. Beaudry, 113 R.I. 313,
320 A.2d 597 (1974), and appellant, in her brief, character-
ized the twelfth clause as a bequest of a particular residuary
gift, the trial justice apparently found that petitioner's con-
tentions met the burden and that the testatrix clearly con-
sidered the bequest a specific one.

Without a doubt, the trial justice properly interpreted the
McGee grandchildren’s bequest, primarily because of the
tone of the other provisions, the tenor of the entire instru-
ment, see Hanley v. Fernell, 54 R.I. at 86, 170 A. at 89;
Gardner v. Viall, 36 R.I. 436, 90 A. 760 (1914), and the spe-
cificity with which the testatrix described that portion of the
twelfth clause relative to the Texaco stock. Additionally,
money payable out of a fund -- rather than out of the estate
generally -- described with sufficient accuracy and satisfiable
only out of the payment of such fund, Haslam v. de Alvarez,
or a bequest of money deposited in a specific bank, Hanley v.
Fernell, is, as a rule, a specific legacy. When a will bequeaths
“the money owned by one which is on deposit” in a desig-
nated bank, although the amount remains unspecified, the
gift is nevertheless identifiable and definite, apart from all
other funds or property in the testator’s estate; and the legacy
is specific. Willis v. Barrow, 218 Ala. 549, 552, 119 So. 678,
680 (1929); Prendergast v. Walsh, 58 N.J. Eq. 149 42. A. 1049
(Ch. 1899). Despite the fact that Mrs. McGee did not name
any particular bank in the twelfth clause of her will, she be-
queathed all the money in her name “in any bank.” In view
of the fact that she expected all of her money remaining at
her death to go to her grandchildren and, further, the money

a4 es

to be payable from a particular source -- that is, accounts in
her name in banking institutions -- we conclude that the leg-
acy was sufficiently susceptible of identification to render it a
specific one.

Accordingly, since the bequest to the grandchildren is
specific, we must now determine whether or not it was
adeemed by the purchase of the bonds. Note, Ademption and
the Testator’s Intent, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1961). In con-
nection with the early theory of ademption, the courts looked
to the intention of the testator as the basis of their decisions. 6
Page, supra §54.14 at 265. But ever since the landmark case
of Ashburner v. MacGuire, 2 Bro. C.C. 108, 29 Eng. Rep. 62
(Ch. 1786), wherein Lord Thurlow enunciated the “modern
theory,” courts have utilized the identity doctrine or “in spe-
cie” test. This test focuses on two questions only: (1) whether
the gift is a specific legacy and, if it is, (2) whether it is found
in the estate at the time of the testator’s death. Atkinson,
supra §134 at 742; Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. at 742; Comment,
Ademption in Iowa -- A Closer Look at the Testator’s Intent,
57 Iowa L. Rev. 1211 (1972). The extinction of the property
bequeathed works an ademption regardless of the testator’s
intent. In re Tillinghast, 23 R.I. 121, 123-24, 49 A. 634, 635
(1901); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Cox Ch. 184, 30 Eng.
Rep. 85 (Ch. 1789); 6 Page, supra §54.15 at 266.

The legatees of the twelfth clause argue that the subject
matter of the specific bequest, although apparently now un-
identifiable in its previous form, actually does exist in the
estate of their grandmother but in another form as the result
of an exchange or transfer of the original property. But there
is a recognized distinction between a bequest of a particular
item and a gift of its proceeds, see generally Annot., 45
A.L.R.3d 10 (1972); and the testatrix, in the instant case, did
recognize the distinction in the twelfth clause of her will by
bequeathing the Texaco stock “or the proceeds thereof from a
sale of same” but omitting to include similar provisions re-
garding proceeds in connection with the language immedi-
ately following which described the bank-money legacy. It
appears that the testatrix’s intention, manifest on the fact of

es 85

her will, was that her grandchildren receive only the money
in her bank accounts and not the money’s proceeds or the.in-
vestments that represent the conversion of that money into
other holdings. Atkinson, supra §134 at 743-44; 6 Page, supra
§54.9 at 256-57, §54.16 at 268-70; see Gardner v. McNeal,
117 Md. 27, 82 A. 988 (1911).

In accordance with the generally accepted “form and sub-
stance rule,” a subtantial change in the nature or character of
the subject matter of a bequest will operate as an ademption;
but a merely nominal or formal change will not. In re Peirce,
25 R.I. 34, 54 A. 588 (1903) (no ademption since transfer of
stock after consolidation of banks without formal liquidation
was exchange and not sale); Willis v. Barrow, 218 Ala. 549,
119 So. 678 (1929) (no ademption by transfer of money from
named bank to another since place of deposit was merely
descriptive); In re Hall, 60 N.J. Super. 597, 160 A.2d 49
(1960) (no ademption by transfer of the money from banks
designated in will to another one since location was formal
description only and did not affect substance of testamentary
gift).

Since the money previously on deposit in Mrs. McGee’s
bank accounts no longer existed at the time of her death, the
question arises whether the change was one of form only,
rather than substance. We have determined that the change
effected by Richard was not merely formal but was substan-
tial. There is no language in the will that can be construed as
reflecting an intention of the testatrix to bequeath a gift of
bond investments to her grandchildren. The plain and expli-
cit direction of the twelfth clause of the will is that they
should receive whatever remained in her bank accounts at
the time of her death. Since no sums of money were then on
deposit, the specific legacy was adeemed. Clearly, this case is
dissimilar to those in which the fund, at all times kept intact,
is transferred to a different location, as in Willis and
Prendergast, where the money merely “changed hands,” not
character. See also In re Tillinghast, 23 R.I. 121, 49 A. 634
(1901) (no ademption by mere act of transferring mortgages
to own name since they were in specie at the time of

OS

46 ee)

testatrix’s death). The fact that Mrs. McGee did not herself
purchase the bonds is not significant. Disposal or distribution
of the subject matter of a bequest by an agent of the testator
or with the the testator’s authorization or ratification simi-
larly operates to adeem the legacy. Gardner v. McNeal, 117
Md. 27, 82 A. 988 (1911); In re-Wright, 7 N.Y.2d 365, 165
N.E.2d 561, 197 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1960); Glasscock v. Layle, 53
S.W. 270 (Ky. 1899).

The petitioner improperly relies upon the case of Morse v.
Converse, 80 N.H. 24, 113 A. 214 (1921). In that case the tes-
tatrix voluntarily placed her property into the hands of a con-
servator to care for and use for her support. The conservator
purchased a Liberty bond out of bank deposits bequeathed in
the testatrix’s will, and the legacies were not adeemed
thereby. But, contrary to the case at bar, the testatrix in
Morse neither knew about nor consented to the conservator’s
acts; therefore, the court explained, the change “furnishes no
evidence of an intentional revocation by her.” Id. at 26, 113
A, at 215. But see In re Wright, citing Matter of Ireland’s
Estate, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405 (1931) (specifically be-
queathed stock adeemed even though sold by conservator
after testator had become incompetent).

Hs Moreover, under the principles enunciated by Lord Thur-
low in Ashburner v. MacGuire, and more fully expressed in
the case of Humphreys v. Humphreys, only the fact of
change or extinction, not the reason for the change or extinc-
tion, is truly relevant. The vast majority of jurisdictions ad-
here to this rule. See Atkinson, supra §134 at 741-42; 6 Page,
supra §54.15 at 266-68. This “in specie” theory of ademption,
although it may occasionally result in a failure to effectuate
the actual intent of a testator, has many advantages. Signifi-
cant among these advantages is simplicity of application, as
opposed to ad hoc determination of intent from extrinsic evi-
dence in each particular case. This theory further has the ad-
vantages of stability, uniformity, and predictability. The
argument in support of Lord Thurlow’s rule is well expressed
in 6 Page, supra §54.15 at 266:

Ce) 847

“Tf the sale or collection of the bequest works an
ademption or not depending upon testator’s intention as
inferred from the surrounding circumstances, many
cases will arise in which it is difficult or impossible to as-
certain what testator’s intention was; and probably, in
many cases, testator did not think of the consequences
which would follow from his conduct. If the sale or col-
lection of the bequest operates as an ademption or not,
depending upon his intentions, and such intention may
be shown by his oral declarations, then the controlling
evidence in the case will consist of the written will, exe-
cuted in accordance with statute, together with
testator’s oral declarations. This violates both the letter
and the spirit of state wills statutes, which insist on the
formalities of writing and execution in order to avoid
opportunities for perjury. For these reasons, it is now
held that the sale, destruction, or collection, of the be-
quest or devise, adeems it without regard to the actual
intention of the testator.”

Accordingly, we hold that the trial justice erred in allow-
ing the admission of extrinsic evidence regarding Mrs.
McGee’s intent. We further hold that the specific legacy in
the twelfth clause of the testatrix’s will is adeemed and the
legatees’ claim to this bequest is thereby barred. We direct
the trial justice to order the petitioner to satisfy the general
pecuniary legacy bequeathed in the eleventh clause of the
will from the sale of the flower bonds, with the excess to pass
under the residuary (fourteenth) clause of the will.

The respondent’s appeal is sustained, the judgment below
is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Superior Court
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., for petitioner.
John S. Brunero, John S. Brunero, Jr., Edward W. Day,

Jr., Breslin, Sweeney & Gordon, David F. Sweeney, for
respondents.

g

413 A.2d 78.
In RE VINCENT.
MARCH 31, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

Wespercer, J. This is an appeal from an adjudication of
waywardness by a justice of the Family Court. The adjudica-
tion was based upon conduct which, if committed by an
adult, would have constituted the crime of receiving stolen
goods in violation of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)

ee) 849

§11-41-2.1 The facts underlying this proceeding are as
follows.

Vincent, who was under the age of eighteen at the time of
this alleged offense, was a high-school student. A fellow
student, one W.H., owed Vincent some money for certain
tires with which Vincent had supplied him. Vincent became
more and more pressing in his demands for payment of this
debt. Ultimately, Vincent told W.H. that “he knew he could
sell a chain saw” if W.H. could get one for him. W.H.
testified that following this conversation he stole a chain saw
from the garage of his neighbor to whose house his parents
had a key.

Thereafter W.H. placed the chain saw in the trunk of his
automobile, returned to school, parked the automobile, and
told Vincent that the chain saw was in the trunk of his car.
W.H. gave Vincent the keys, and Vincent departed. About
five minutes later, Vincent returned and, according W.H.,
said that he had taken the chain saw. Shortly after W.H.
arrived at his home, he checked the trunk and found that the
chain saw had been removed. That same night W.H. saw
Vincent at the home of a mutual friend, and Vincent stated
that “he got rid of the chain saw.”

After the presentation of the state’s evidence, counsel for
Vincent moved for judgment of acquittal. The trial justice
denied the motion. Thereafter Vincent took the stand and
testified that he never received any chain saw from W.H. At
the close of all the evidence counsel for Vincent renewed his
motion for judgment of acquittal, and the trial justice again
denied the motion. The trial justice determined that Vincent

1General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-41-2 reads as follows:

“Receiving stolen goods—Evidence of knowledge.—Every person who shall
fradulently receive any stolen money, goods, securities, chattels or other
property, knowing the same to be stolen shall be deemed guilty of larceny,
although the person who stole the same may not have been prosecuted or
convicted therefor; and the possession of any such stolen property shall be
evidence of guilty knowledge by the person having such possession that such
property was stolen, except such person shows that it was acquired in the
due course of trade and for adequate consideration.”

850 es

had committed the offense charged and adjudged him to be
wayward. The sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial
justice erred in denying Vincent’s motion for judgment of
acquittal at the conclusion of all the evidence.? No challenge
was raised either in the briefs or in oral argument to the
correctness of the ultimate determination of guilt.

Vincent’s counsel correctly states that the appropriate test
for evaluating a motion for judgment of acquittal is to view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and to
draw from the evidence every reasonable inference consistent
with guilt. The trial justice is then required to determine
whether under such a test the state has failed to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Moretti, 113 R.I.
213, 215-16, 319 A.2d 342, 343 (1974); State v. Rose, 112
R.I. 402, 406, 311 A.2d 281, 283 (1973); State v. Saulnier,
109 B.1. 11, 15-16, 280 A.2d 85, 88 (1971). Only if the trial
justice determines that in such a frame of reference the
evidence is insufficient to be submitted to the trier of fact
may he grant a motion for judgment of acquittal. State v.
Riffkin, 112 R.I, 308, 313, 309 A.2d 15, 17 (1973).

The principal thrust of Vincent’s appeal lies in the conten-
tion that even viewed in the light most favorable to the state
and with every reasonable inference consistent with guilt
drawn therefrom, the proof is insufficient to establish guilty
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Vincent suggests that
reliance upon the evidentiary presumption of §11-41-2
violates standards established by the Supreme Court of the
United States as to the burden of proof in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), and
further explicated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95S.
Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975). These cases establish that
the state has the burden of proving each element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the burden of persua-

*The advantage of moving for judgment of acquittal in a case tried before a
justice without the intervention of a jury is somewhat difficult to perceive, since the
same arguments could be more effectively made in contesting a finding of guilt on
the merits.

CO ) 851

sion may not be shifted to the defendant on any essential ele-
ment of the crime. We applied this doctrine in respect to this
same statutory offense in State v. Kurowski, 100 R.I. 25, 210
A.2d 873 (1965), years prior to Winship and Mullaney. We
have recently reaffirmed that a legislatively authorized
inference or presumption does not have the effect of shifting
the burden of proof to a defendant in a criminal case, even
though it may place upon him the burden of going forward
with evidence in order to raise an issue of fact. State v.
Neary, 122 R.1. 506, 511, 409 A.2d 551, 554-55 (1979).

Since the decisions of the Supreme Court in Winship and
Mullaney, much scrutiny has been given to the general sub-
ject of the role of presumptions in determining guilt in
criminal cases. See Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349
A.2d 300 (Ct. Spee. App. 1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362
A.2d 629 (1976), for a searching analysis of this subject.

Both prior to and since Winship, the Supreme Court has
attempted to clarify the effect of statutory and common-law
presumptions in a number of cases decided over a period of
several decades. Among these cases are Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S. Ct. 642, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1970);
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 23 L. Ed.
2d 57 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S.
Ct. 279, 15 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1965); United States v. Gainey,
380 U.S. 63, 85 S. Ct. 754, 13 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1965); and Tot
v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 1519
(1943). In Gainey, the Court upheld on a “rational
connection” test a statutory presumption that the defendant’s
unexplained presence at an illegal still would warrant a
finding that he was operating the still. The next Term, in
Romano, the Court declared invalid a statutory presumption
which as construed by the trial judge apparently mandated®
an inference that presence at the site of an illegal still would
support a finding that the person present was in possession or

*The majority in County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157
n.16, 99S, Ct. 2213, 2225 n.16, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777, 792 n.16 (1979), placed this
construction upon the trial justice’s charge to the jury in Romano,

$52 es

control of the still. In Leary the Court struck down a
statutory presumption which authorized jurors to infer from
a defendant’s possession of marijuana that the marijuana had
been illegally imported and that the defendant had known of
the illegal importation. This presumption, the Court held,
was arbitrary because it could not be said that the presumed
fact was “more likely than not to flow from the proved fact
on which it is made to depend.” Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. at 36, 89 S. Ct. at 1548, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 82. Finally, in
Turner, the Court declared invalid a presumption that
possession of cocaine would support a finding that the
cocaine was illegally imported and that the defendant knew
of its illegal importation. In the same case the Court upheld
an identical presumption in respect to heroin. This latter
legislatively authorized inference was held by the Court to
satisfy even a reasonable-doubt standard.

Probably the seminal case in this area is Tot v. United
States, supra. This case involved a prosecution under a
section of the Federal Firearms Act that made it unlawful for
any person who had been convicted of a crime of violence to
receive a firearm that had been transported in interstate or
foreign commerce. The act further provided that the
possession by such a person of a firearm “shall be
presumptive evidence that such firearm * * + was shipped or
transported or received « * * in violation of this Act.”
Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, §2 (f), 52 Stat. 1250 (1938)
(repealed 1968). The Supreme Court held that the inference
permitted by this statute was arbitrary and irrational and
therefore unconstitutional. Tot established the so-called
“rational connection” test which was followed in the later
cases, This doctrine prevents a legislature from establishing a
permissive inference when there is no rational connection
between the proven fact and the fact to be inferred. That
Congress could not constitutionally establish a mandatory
inference bearing on an element in a criminal case the Tot
Court assumed on the theory that “it is not within the
province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or
presumptively guilty of a crime,” McFarland v. American

es 853

Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86, 36S. Ct. 498, 501, 60
L. Ed. 899, 904 (1916). See Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and
Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 1187, 1201-02 (1979). Rhode Island has recognized that
a statutory presumption or legislatively authorized inference
does not obviate the necessity of a determination by the trier
of fact that the totality of evidence in the case, including such
inferences, must constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, we regard statutory inferences or presumptions as
being permissive rather than mandatory. The trier of fact,
judge or jury, is free to accept or reject the inference in each
case. State v. Neary, 122 R.1. at 513, 409 A.2d at 555; State
v. Kurowski, 100 R.1. at 28, 210 A.2d at 875. See County
Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-60, 99 S.
Ct. 2213, 2224-26, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777, 792-94 (1979), for a
comprehensive discussion of this concept.

Perhaps the case that most closely approximates the instant
case is Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357,
37 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1973). In that case Barnes was convicted in
the United States District Court for possessing United States
Treasury checks stolen from the mails, knowing them to be
stolen. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:

“ ‘Possession of recently stolen property, if not satis-
factorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from
which you may reasonably draw the inference and find,
in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown by
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession
knew the property had been stolen.’ ” Id. at 840 n.3, 93
S. Ct. at 2360 n.3, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 384 n.3.

Barnes had deposited four checks in an account which he had
opened under the pseudonym “Clarence Smith.” Each check
bore the apparent endorsement of the payee and a second
endorsement by “Clarence Smith.” Barnes had later
explained to a postal inspector that he had received the
checks in question from people who had sold furniture for
him from door to door and that the checks were signed in the
payees’ names when he received them. He denied making the
payees’ endorsements.

854 ee

Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, after tracing
the development of the principles enunciated in Turner,
Leary, Romano, and Gainey, suggested that

“[t]he teaching of the foregoing cases is not altogether
clear. To the extent that the ‘rational connection,’ ‘more
likely than not,’ and ‘reasonable doubt’ standards bear
ambiguous relationships to one another, the ambiguity
is traceable in large part to variations in language and
focus rather than to differences of substance.” Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. at 843, 93 S. Ct. at 2361, 37 L.
Ed. 2d at 386.

Turning to the constitutionality of the traditional common-
law inference utilized by the trial judge in his charge, Mr.
Justice Powell said that for centuries courts have instructed
juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn
from the fact of unexplained possession of stolen goods. He
stated that the unexplained possession of recently stolen
Treasury checks payable to persons whom Barnes did not
know created a strong inference, based on common sense and
experience, that Barnes must have known or been aware of
the high probability that the checks were stolen.

“Such evidence was clearly sufficient to enable the jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner knew
the checks were stolen. Since the inference thus satisfies
the reasonable-doubt standard, the most stringent
standard the Court has applied in judging permissive
criminal law inferences, we conclude that it satisfies the
requirements of due process.” Id. at 845-46, 93 S. Ct. at
2363, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 387.

Vincent also cites in support of his contentions County
Court of Ulster County v. Allen, supra. In that case the
Court upheld a challenged New York statute which provided
that, with some exceptions, the presence in an automobile of
a firearm constitutes presumptive evidence of the possession
of such firearm “by all persons occupying such automobile at
the time such weapon * * » is found.” The Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Stevens, overturned a judgment by the

es 855

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which in a habeas
corpus proceeding had held that this statute was facially
unconstitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court held that the
statute was neither facially unconstitutional nor invalid as
applied to three adult males who had been convicted of
possession of handguns which, together with ammunition,
were located in an open handbag owned by a sixteen-year-
old girl also present in the vehicle.*

An examination of the facts in Barnes and Allen impels us
to the conclusion that the totality of circumstances in the case
at bar are at least as persuasive in pointing toward guilt as
were the facts in either of those cases, which facts were held
sufficient by the Supreme Court of the United States to
constitute the necessary quantum of proof.

| | In the instant case direct evidence was obtained from an
active participant who stated that he had stolen the chain
saw for the purpose of giving it to Vincent. Evidence was fur-
ther presented in the testimony of W.H. that Vincent had
previously said that he could sell a chain saw. W.H. then
testified that he turned his keys over to Vincent, who later
told him that he not only had taken the chain saw but that he
had gotten rid of it. To parallel the observation of Mr. Justice
Powell in Barnes, supra, we observe that on the basis of such
evidence, common sense and experience tell us that Vincent
must have known or been aware of the high probability that
his fellow student had stolen the chain saw. Since under the
square holding of Barnes such evidence would have been
clearly sufficient to enable a trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Vincent knew the chain saw was
stolen, the trial justice was correct in denying Vincent’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is denied and
dismissed and the case is remitted to the Family Court.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.

“The girl had also been convicted of possession of the guns, but her case was not
before the Supreme Court.

856 ee

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Joel S. Chase,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Barbara Hurst, Chief Appellate Attorney, John A.
MacFadyen III, Mary Levesque, Assistant Public Defenders,
for defendant.

413 A.2d 486.
Prantations Lecat DrrensE Services, INc.
vs. WiLL1aAM W. O’BRIEN.
APRIL 8, 1980.

Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Doris and Murray, JJ.

Per Curiam. This matter came before the court on our
order directing the plaintiff, Plantations Legal Defense Ser-
vices, Inc., to appear and show cause why its appeal in the

Ss

above-entitled case should not be dismissed in light of our
ruling in Plantations Industrial Supply v. O’Brien, 119 R.I.
426, 379 A.2d 365 (1977).

In a complaint filed in the Superior Court, plaintiff sought
a writ of mandamus to compel defendant, William W.
O’Brien, in his capacity as deputy clerk of the District Court’s
Eighth Division, to issue, pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1969 Reen-
actment) §9-28-3, a citation for supplementary proceedings
against a judgment debtor. Upon a judgment dismissing its
mandamus action in the Superior Court, plaintiff filed a
notice of appeal to this court. After plaintiffs appeal had
been docketed, we issued our show-cause order.

Section 9-28-3 provides for the issuance of supplementary
process “[o]n the filing of an application by a judgment cre-
ditor, execution on whose judgment has been returned either
wholly or in part unsatisfied and unpaid + + *.” The
defendant in the instant case refused to issue the requested
§9-28-3 citation on the ground that plaintiff's execution had
not been properly returned as an unsatisfied execution.

It is well established that the legislative enactments relat-
ing to the service of process are to be followed and construed
strictly. Plantations Industrial Supply v. O’Brien, 119 R.I.
at 429, 379 A.2d at 367. To this end we held in the Planta-
tions Industrial Supply case that it was proper for a clerk, as a
prerequisite to issuing a §9-28-3 citation, to examine the exe-
cution presented as unsatisfied to see if it had been served in
accordance with the legislative and judicial strictures governi-
ing service of process. We then stated, “[tJhis being so, the
issuance of a citation for supplementary proceedings involves
the use of the clerk’s discretion and is immune from review by
way of mandamus.” Id. at 430, 379 A.2d at 367.

In light of these principles it is clear that the trial justice
acted properly in dismissing the plaintiff's action for man-
damus.

Accordingly, the plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed,
the judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is re-

858 |
manded to the Superior Court.
Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate.

Aram K. Berberian, for plaintiff.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Forrest Avila,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.

413 A.2d 83.

Frank A. Carter, Jr., Cuter DiscipLinary COUNSEL
vs, STEPHEN R. WALSH.

APRIL 10, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher and Doris, JJ.

In a manner of speaking, this is a postscript
to ‘Carer 'w v. Tash 122 R.I. 349, 406 A.2d 263 (1979),
where, on September 14, 1979, we ordered the respondent

| 859

“to submit his resignation forthwith from the practice of law
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 42-23 + + *.” This
order was part of an opinion in which we affirmed the Dis-
ciplinary Board’s findings that the respondent had neglected
a matter entrusted to his care and had engaged in deceitful
conduct. The respondent now asks that we reconsider the
penalty imposed and in the process differentiate a “resigna-
tion * » « from the practice of law,” as called for in our
opinion, from Supreme Court Rule 42-23’s proviso that
speaks of a resignation “from membership in the Bar of this
state + + *,” As will be seen, there is a reason for this request.

For the past twenty years, respondent has been teaching
law-related subjects at a local college. On November 6, 1979,
he was notified that his pedagogical pursuits insofar as they
concerned those courses would be terminated “until such
time as the court decides that you will again be permitted to
practice law in the State of Rhode Island + * *.” The
respondent apparently believes that, even though he is re-
quired to resign “from the practice of law,” once he complies
with this request, he will be an inactive practitioner who,
nevertheless, “continues to possess a license” to practice law.
We cannot concur in this line of thinking.

To put respondent’s contention in its proper perspective,
we would point out that in Carter v. Walsh, 122 R.I. 349,
406 A.2d 263, 265 (1979), after affirming the board's factual
findings, we alluded to the court’s obligation “to fashion a
sanction which fulfills the court’s obligation to the public and
profession, edifies the bar, and is fair and just to the respond-
ent.” The board was of the opinion that a suspension was in
order, but we, after considering the years of distinguished
service respondent had rendered as an attorney prior to his
becoming immersed in the ways of academia, opted for a
mandatory retirement “from the practice of law.” In the
interest of preciseness, we should have employed the
language of our rule and demanded his resignation “from
membership in the Bar of this state * » *.” The distinction
between these two phrases is strictly one of semantics.

860 |

The phrase “member of the Bar” may describe the entire
legal fraternity of those admitted to practice before any
court; sometimes it may refer only to attorneys who are
licensed to practice in a particular jurisdiction; and it is
sometimes used, more colloquially, to describe lawyers and
nonlawyers who are permitted to practice before some
administrative agency. Joh. A. Benckiser G.m.b.H., Chem-
ische Fabrik v. Hygrade Food Products Corp., 253 F. Supp.
999, 1000-01 (D.N.J. 1966). Our rule’s reference to “mem-
bership in the Bar of this state « + *” was intended to include
only those individuals who are licensed to practice law in this
jurisdiction.

The respondent, in his desire to return to the classroom
and regain his former teaching assignments, has somehow
overlooked the last portion or our resignation rule, which
reads: “If a resigned member desires reinstatement, he or she
shall proceed as provided for in Rule 42-16.” This language is
a clear indication that anyone who resigns from the bar,
either voluntarily or as a result of an order of this court, no
longer possesses a license to practice law under our auspices.
Accordingly, the respondent may take no comfort from the
verbiage used in our order. Once he has resigned from the
practice of law, he will no longer hold the license that was
first given to him on October 10, 1952, when he was
admitted to the bar of Rhode Island.

The respondent’s request that we reconsider the sanction
selected in September 1979 is denied.

Mr. Justice Weisberger and Mrs. Justice Murray did not
participate.

Alan S. Flink, for petitioner.

Charles H. McLaughlin, for respondent.

861

413 A.2d 85.

AIELLO Construction, Inc. et al vs. NATIONWIDE TRACTOR
TRAILER TRAINING AND PLACEMENT Corp.

APRIL 10, 1980.
Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Kelleher, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

Welspercer, J. This case comes before us on appeal from
a judgment of the Superior Court which awarded damages to
the plaintiffs for a breach of contract allegedly committed by
the defendant when it failed to make certain installment pay-
ments required by the contract. The case was tried by a jus-
tice sitting without the intervention of a jury. The facts as
found in his decision are as follows.

The plaintiffs, Aiello Construction, Inc., and Smithfield
Peat Co., Inc., as joint venturers, entered into a written con-
tract with defendant in March of 1973. The contract re-
quired plaintiffs to haul fill and perform grading work in
order to bring a large area owned by defendant to an approx-
imately level condition. The contract further provided that
plaintiffs would remove ledge on a portion of the premises,
grade eight inches of bank run gravel over the entire yard,
grade two inches of crushed run gravel over the entire yard,
and finally apply penetration and seal coats of oil topped by
application of peastone. The surface was then to be rolled.

SS

The defendant was in the trucking business and also engaged
in the training and instruction of tractor-trailer operators.
The yard area was to be used in the operation of this training
enterprise.

In payment for the work to be performed and the material
to be furnished, defendant agreed to pay $33,000 in five
monthly installments of $6,600 each. The installments were
to become due on April 15, May 15, June 15, July 15, and
August 15, all during the year 1973. The contract provided
that any amount not paid would bear a service charge of 1/2
percent per month.

The plaintiffs began work in late March 1973 and con-
tinued the work until on or about May 10, 1973, at which
time all of the preliminary work had been done save applying
and grading the two inches of crushed run gravel, which was
a prerequisite to the performance of the oiling. The plaintiffs
then stopped work to allow the ground to settle. Meanwhile,
defendant paid the monthly installment that was due on
April 15. Thereafter, defendant did not pay the May install-
ment, although over a period from June to August of 1973 it
did make partial payments which, when added to the April
installment, aggregated $10,500. No further payments were
made, and the president of the defendant company indicated
that funds were not available to make the payments that
were due. As a result of the failure to make payments, plain-
tiffs did not resume work. The plaintiffs brought the instant
action for breach of contract. The defendant filed a counter-
claim which alleged that plaintiffs were in breach of the
agreement between the parties because they did not complete
the work for which they had received payment. The defen-
dant’s counterclaim also contained a count which sounded in
negligence.

The trial justice found as a fact that defendant was in
breach of the contract and that this breach relieved plaintiffs
of the obligation to perform any further work under the con-
tract. He further found that defendant was not entitled to re-
cover on its negligence claim. The trial justice awarded dam-

86 ee

ages for the breach of contract by calculating the costs which
plaintiffs had incurred in the performance of the work up to
the time they withdrew from the project as a result of the
breach. He found that the costs amounted to $21,500. To this
sum he added $3,000 which he determined from the testi-
mony to be the profit which plaintiffs would have made had
the contract been completely performed by both parties.
From the sum of $24,500 the trial justice deducted the pay-
ments made by defendant in the amount of $10,500. He
ordered judgment to enter for plaintiffs in the amount of
$14,000 together with interest at the rate of 8 percent per
annum from the time of filing of the complaint to the date of
judgment. He found the theories underlying defendant’s
counterclaim difficult to perceive and determined that
defendant was entitled to no compensation or diminution of
the award of damages. Thus judgment was entered for the
plaintiffs for $16,800. This appeal ensued.

| The defendant raises a number of points in support of its
appeal. It first argues that the trial justice erred as a matter of
fact and law in finding that defendant had breached the con-
tract in such a way as to excuse plaintiffs for not completing
the work. In regard to the findings of fact, this case involved
conflicting testimony offered by witnesses presented by both
parties. The trial justice found plaintiffs’ witnesses more
credible and in some instances found the testimony of
defendant’s witnesses of little or no probative value. It is well
settled that we cannot disturb the finding of a trial justice
unless the adverse party is able to show that in resolving testi-
monial conflicts the trial justice misconceived or overlooked
material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. Salo
Landscape & Construction Co. v. Liberty Electric Co., 119
RI. 269, 272, 376 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1977); Gim v. Jan
Chin, Inc., 117 B.I. 39, 43, 362 A.2d 143, 146 (1976); Silvia
v. Wicks, 116 R.I. 545, 547-48, 359 A.2d 33, 34 (1976). In re-
spect to the challenge to the legal validity of the trial justice’s
holding that failure to pay installments on a construction
contract is a breach that would excuse further performance,
our holding in Salo Landscape & Construction Co. v. Liberty

SE

Electric Co., 119 R.I. 269, 376 A.2d 1379 (1977), is dis-
positive. There we observed that in the event an owner fails
to pay an installment due on a construction contract, such
owner “is guilty of a breach that goes to the essence of the
contract and that entitles the injured party to bring an ac-
tion.” 119 R.I. at 274, 376 A.2d at 1382. A similar holding
may be found in Pelletier v. Masse, 49 R.I. 408, 410-11, 143
A. 609, 610 (1928), wherein the court noted that nonpay-
ment of an installment due may justify the contractor in re-
fusing to continue the work and in bringing an action on the
contract for damages for its breach or quantum meruit for
reasonable compensation for what the contractor has done.
Under such circumstances, the court suggested, an action on
the contract for the amount of the installment due would be
inappropriate. Id. at 411, 143 A. at 610. See also 3A Corbin
on Contracts §692 (1960); Restatement Contracts §346
(1932). Thus, the determination by the trial justice that
defendant was solely responsible for the breach of the con-
tract was amply supported by the evidence in the case and by
the applicable law.

The defendant next contends that ambiguities in the con-
tract should be resolved against plaintiffs. However meritori-
ous this principle may be, the trial justice found no
ambiguities in the contract, and neither do we. Hence, this
argument is unavailing.

The defendant further argues that the contract was indivi-
sible and that failure to pay an installment would not excuse
the refusal on the part of plaintiffs to complete the work. Our
holding in respect to the first argument is also dispositive of
this contention. Since the breach by defendant went to the
essence of the contract, plaintiffs were excused from further
performance.

The defendant argues that the trial justice did not correctly
assess datnages. He cites in support of his argument George v.
.George F. Berkander, Inc., 92 R.1. 426, 169 A.2d 370 (1961).
In that case the rule of damages for breach of contract was
stated to be such “as will serve to put the injured party as

86

close as is reasonably possible to the position he would have
been in had the contract been fully performed.” Id. at 430,
169 A.2d at 372. It is precisely this rule that the trial justice
attempted to apply. Although the measure of damages may
be variously stated under the principle of our holding in Ber-
kander, certain alternatives are well set forth in Restatement
Contracts §346(2) as follows:

“For a breach by one who has promised to pay for
construction, if it is a partial breach the builder can get
judgment for the installment due, with interest; and if it
is a total breach he can get judgment, with interest so
far as permitted by the rules stated in §337, for either

“(a) the entire contract price and compensation for
unavoidable special harm that the defendant had reason
to foresee when the contract was made, less installments
already paid and the cost of completion that the builder
can reasonably save by not completing the work; or

“(b) the amount of his expenditure in part
[pe]rformance of the contract, subject to the limitations
stated in §333.”2

The general rules set forth in the Restatement are further
elucidated by the commentary. A portion of the comment on
subsection (2) of Restatement §346 reads as follows:

“h, Another common form of stating the measure of

1Restatement Contracts §333 (1932) reads in part as follows:

“(a) Such expenditures are not recoverable in excess of the full contract
price promised by the defendant.

“(b) Expenditures in preparation are not recoverable unless they can
fairly be regarded as part of the cost of performance in estimating profitand :
loss,

“(c) Installments of the contract price already received and the value of
materials on hand that would have been consumed in completion must be
deducted.

“(d) If full performance would have resulted in a net loss to the plaintiff,
the amount of this loss must be deducted, the burden of proof being on the
defendant.” :

EE

recovery is as follows: Damages, measured by the
builder’s actual expenditure to date of breach less the
value of materials on hand, plus the profit that he can
prove with reasonable certainty would have been real-
ized from full performance. + + + The builder has a
right to his expenditures as well as his profits, because
payment of the full price would have reimbursed those
expenditures in full and given him his profit in addition

ee «”

An examination of the record in this case discloses that the
trial justice scrupulously followed this method of assessment
of damages, that his findings of fact were amply supported
by the evidence, and that he did not overlook or misconceive
the evidence in arriving at his conclusion. Although we ap-
proved of a quantum meruit action in Salo Landscape &
Construction Co. v. Liberty Electric Co., 119 R.I. at 274-75,
376 A.2d at 1382, we recognized alternative remedies in
Pelletier v. Masse, 49 R.I. at 410-11, 143 A. at 610. In apply-
ing these alternatives, a court must select the most appropri-
ate remedy depending upon the factual posture of the case
and the election of remedy by the plaintiff. The remedy sel-
ected by the trial justice in this case was appropriately rele-
vant to the factual posture and the remedy sought by plain-
tiffs. Therefore, the trial justice cannot be faulted for his
assessment of damages either in regard to the law or to the
facts.

The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in deter-
mining that certain evidentiary offerings in support of its
counterclaim were irrelevant. The trial justice obviously con-
sidered many elements of defendant’s counterclaim to be
frivolous. Some of the claims relating to damage to defen-
dant’s business and property caused by plaintiffs’ negligence
and the removal of a chain-link fence were considered to be
“ridiculous” by the trial justice in light of the totality of evi-
dence in the case. It was the task of the trial justice to con-
sider relevance of evidence relating to damages in the light of
his determination that defendant was at fault for breach of
this contract and in the light of the failure of defendant to lay

56S

a foundation which established liability of plaintiffs for such
damages. Such determinations of relevance normally are
considered to be within the discretion of the trial justice. In
the absence of abuse of discretion, such evidentiary rulings
will not constitute a basis for reversal. Gaglione v. Cardi,
120 R.I. 534, 538, 388 A.2d 361, 363 (1978). We have
noted that it is the burden of the party opposing such
evidentiary rulings to establish that the proposed evidence
was material and that its exclusion had a prejudicial
influence on the decision of the court. Atlantic Paint &
Coatings, Inc. v. Conti, 119 R.I. 522, 526-27, 381 A.2d
1034, 1036 (1977); Mercurio v. ‘Fascitelli, 116 R.I. 237, 244,
354 A.2d 736, 740 (1976). We believe that defendant in the
case at bar has failed to sustain such a burden.

Finally, the defendant contends that the trial justice was in
error in awarding interest to the plaintiffs at 8 percent per
annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. The
defendant argues that G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment)
§9-21-10* is inapplicable since the contract provided for in-
terest at the rate of 1% percent per month on any install-
ments due and unpaid. The trial justice held that the interest
rate contained in the contract was inapplicable since the
plaintiffs did not bring suit on the contract, but for breach
thereof. We believe this holding to be correct since the trial
justice found that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently per-
formed under the contract so as to be entitled to the full con-
tract price, The applicable statute in force at the time of the
rendition of this judgment could well be argued to have re-

*General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-21-10, as amended by P.L. 1976,
ch. 146, §1, and further amended by P.L. 1977, ch. 10, §1 (which became effective
March 21, 1977, three days prior to the date of entry of judgment in this case),
reads as follows:

“In any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision made for
pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the clerk of the court to the
amount of damages, interest at the rate of eight per cent (8%) per annum
thereon from the date the cause of action accrued which shall be included in
the judgment entered therein. This section shall not apply until entry of
judgment or to any contractual] obligation where interest is already pro-
vided or as to any condemnation action.”

EE

quired interest to be computed from the time of accrual of
the action. The statute as it read up until three days prior to
rendition of judgment did provide for “interest at the rate of
eight per cent (8%) per annum thereon from the date of com-
mencement of the action which shall be included in the judg-
ment entered therein.” The interest provided in the contract,
if applicable, would have been at the rate of 18 percent per
annum. Thus, if the trial justice was in error in assessing in-
terest in accordance with the statute that had previously been
in force as opposed to the statute as it had been amended just
prior to entry of judgment, or if he was in error in assessing
statutory interest rather than the interest set forth in the con-
tract, this error could scarcely be prejudicial to the defen-
dant. Indeed, the trial justice’s assessment of interest was the
least onerous to the defendant of all available computations.
Although the plaintiffs agree that the trial justice erred in the
computation of interest inasmuch as the plaintiffs would now
prefer either the 18 percent as provided in the contract or 8
percent interest from the date of accrual of the cause of
action, since the plaintiffs have not appealed in this case they
have no standing to challenge the interest awarded. Thus we
hold that the trial justice committed no prejudicial error in
his award of interest on the judgment.

For the reasons stated, the defendant’s appeal is denied
and dismissed, the judgment of the Superior Court is
affirmed, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.
Oster, Groff ¢x Prescott, George M. Prescott, for plaintiffs.

James Cardono, for defendant.

870 ee)

413 A.2d 83.
Sanpra A. DrRocco vs. Vincent DiRocco.
APRIL 10, 1980.
Present: Kelleher, Doris, Weisberger and Murray, JJ.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal by a husband from a
decree entered in the Family Court granting his wife’s peti-
tion for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
On Wednesday, March 5, 1980, oral argument was
presented, both for and against the wife’s motion, which asks
that, acting pursuant to our Rule 16(g), we summarily affirm
the Family Court decree and deny the husband’s appeal.

The husband, who professes an inability to understand
English, appeared before us with an interpreter.
Through the interpreter and in direct conversation with
us, the husband made it clear that the sole reason for
appealing is his dissatisfaction with the terms of the
property agreement that are incorporated within the

es sm

divorce decree. According to the husband, his trial coun-
sel was directed to contest the wife’s petition unless the
husband’s interest in the couple’s jointly held real es-
tate was preserved. The husband was present at the
Family Court hearing, and he assumed that the matter
had been resolved according to his wishes; but “upon dis-
covering such was not the case,” he initiated this appeal.
The husband now claims that his counsel’s “misleading
and false representations”! vitiate the Family Court
proceeding.

If he is to prevail on this contention, he cannot do so
by way of an appeal from the entry of the interlocutory
divorce decree. Whatever merit there may be to the hus-
band’s alleged inability to know what was going on in
the Family Court, the truth or falsity of the charges he
now makes about his trial counsel cannot be considered
by us in this proceeding. The matters he complains of may
serve as a basis for a motion to vacate the divorce decree,
and the appropriate forum for considering such a motion
is the Family Court. There, testimony can be taken, par-
ties can be examined, and factual findings made by a
trial justice who can assess the credibility of witnesses
who appear. However, the assertions presently being
made by the husband serve as no defense to the motion
presently before us.

Consequently, the motion to affirm is granted, and
the husband’s appeal is denied and dismissed without
prejudice to his seeking relief as outlined above.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.
Robert J. Bevilacqua, Anthony DeSimone, for appellee.

Vincent DiRocco, pro se.

1The quotes appearing in this opinion are taken from the husband’s pro se brief.
At the hearing before us, we were informed by the interpreter that he had assisted
the husband in preparing the brief.

ee 873
es

July 27, 1979.

C. A. No. 78-112. Srare v. DonaLp Porraro. The
defendant’s motion for reargument is denied.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua and Mr. Justice Weisberger
did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General,
Thomas H. Caruolo, Special Assistant Attorney General, for
plaintiff. John F. Cicilline, for defendant.

Appeal No. 77-310. Harry HorrMan v. Marvin Sacus.
The defendant’s motion for extension of the time within
which to petition for reargument is granted. The petition for
reargument is denied. The stay entered in this case on July
25, 1979 is vacated.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. John F.
McBurney, for plaintiff. Richard A. Ciccone, for defendant.

Appeal No. 79-97. Savoy Reatty Corp. v. LPL, Inc. et
al. The plaintiff's motion to vacate the Superior Court order
for bond as prayed is denied. This case is remanded to the

874 ee

Superior Court with the direction that said court conduct a
hearing on the amount of bond to be required herein and,
based upon the evidence adduced at said hearing and any
other appropriate factor, reconsider its previous order for
bond in this case. Upon conclusion of said hearing, the papers
in this case shall be returned to this court forthwith.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Z. Hershel
Smith, for petitioner. William J. Gallogly, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-48. IN THE Matrer oF Rosert. This peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus was heard by us in open court
on Friday, July 27, 1979. For reasons that will appear in a
subsequent opinion, the petition is hereby denied and the
stay of extradition is vacated.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Dennis J.
Roberts, II, Attorney General, Thomas H. Caruolo, Special
Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff, Irving Brodsky, for
defendant.

M. P. No. 79-262. Brown & SHARPE MANUFACTURING
Company v. Joun Kine, e¢ al. A determination on the
petition for writ of certiorari is hereby deferred pending
resolution of the administrative appeals of respondents King
and Charlebois in the District Court. The order of the Dis-
trict Court striking petitioner Brown & Sharpe Manufactur-
ing Company as a party to those administrative appeals is
stayed until further order of this court.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Michael P.
Defanti, Gordon P. Cleary, for petitioner, Richard A.
Skolnik, Joseph R. DeCiantis, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-266. Meracuem Resins Corporation 0.
Henry OupHam, et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is
denied.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Valentino D.
Lombardi, for petitioner, John P. Barylick, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-274. Maver Levirt v. Mary Jane O’NEILL.
The petitioner’s motion for stay of the Superior Court judg-

ee 8

ment is granted pending a determination by this court on the
petition for writ of certiorari.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Paul V.
Curcio, for plaintiff, Amato DeLuca, Ronald Glantz, for
respondent.

M. P. No. 79-282. Ranpy ANDERSON 0. JoHN J. Moran.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is remanded to the Su-
perior Court and: shall be treated as if originally filed with
that court. The Superior Court is directed to conduct a hear-
ing on the question of bail, taking into consideration the
length of the petitioner’s continued incarceration since ar-
yaignment and any other factors which may be relevant to a
determination of reasonable bail.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Allegra E.
Munson, for petitioner, Dennis J. Roberts, II, Attorney
General, for defendant.

M. P. No. 78-255. Umperro List ef al. v. MICHAEL
Marra. The defendant's petition for reinstatement of this
appeal is granted. The clerk of the Superior Court is directed
to transmit the record in this case to this court forthwith.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. W. Slater
Allen, Jr., for plaintiff, Richard A. Ciccone, Albert R.
Ciullo, for defendant.

M. P. No. 79-277. Wiut1am R. Brenner v. Ricuarp N.
Fontaine e¢ al. The motion for stay of enforcement of the
Superior Court judgement pending appeal is granted.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Andrew M.
Gilstein, for plaintiff, Paul A. Fontaine, for defendant.

August 3, 1979.
M. P. No. 78-401. In ne: Perrrion or Ruope IsLaAND
Broapcasters Association. The Rhode Island Broadcasters
Association (the Association) filed this petition on November

9, 1978, asking that we modify our Provisional Order No. 11,
which sets forth temporary guidelines for members of the

876 es

Rhode Island Bar who elect to advertise their services. Speci-
fically, the Association asks that we remove the ban against
advertising on radio and television in light of certain constitu-
tional predicates.!

The petitioner, in mounting its constitutional attack, raises
substantial questions. Rather than rest our conclusion on the
validity of the petitioner's claim of violations of its first-
amendment and equal-protection guarantees, we believe, af-
ter much reflection, that the use of the electronic media by
attorneys seeking to advertise their services should be regu-
lated, not proscribed.

Accordingly, the petition to modify is granted, and the
attorneys for the petitioner are directed to submit to this
court and the attorneys representing the Rhode Island Bar
Association, within 20 days of the issuance of this order,
copies of the proposed draft of the modified rule. The Bar
Association shall deliver its comments on the draft to us
within 10 days following its receipt of the draft. Edwards &
Angell, James J. Skeffington, George W. Shuster, William P.
Robinson III, for petitioner. Letts, Quinn & Licht, Daniel J.
Murray, Richard A. Licht, for respondent.

August 30, 1979.

Appeal No. 78-433. Exxiorr R. OLevson v, WILLIAM
CaparonE. This is an appeal from a Superior Court order
granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a
claim of malicious prosecution.

Following the filing of briefs, we issued an order to the
plaintiff directing him to appear before us on May 8, 1979 to
show cause why his appeal ought not to be dismissed in light
of Super. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) and (e) and this court’s well-estab-
lished rule that, where no genuine issues of material fact

Provisional Order No. 11 provides, in relevant part, that “[aldvertisements should
be placed only in newspapers, periodicals and the yellow pages of telephone directo-
ries” and that “[nJo advertising should be conducted on radio or television.”

ee) 877

exist, summary judgment may properly enter if dictated by
applicable law. Kirby, Inc. v. Weiler, 108 R.I. 423, 425, 276
A.2d 285, 286-87 (1971).

The plaintiff, through his attorney, appeared before us on
the specified date and attempted to show cause. He failed,
however, to demonstrate that any genuine issues of material
fact existed in the case at bar and additionally failed to excuse
his failure to comply with the requirement of Super. R. Civ.
P. 56(c) that a party against whom a motion for summary
judgment is made, if he is to avoid the granting of the
motion, must in his response set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

The plaintiff having failed to show cause why his appeal
should not be dismissed, his appeal is herewith denied and
dismissed, the judgment appealed from is affirmed and the
case is remanded to the Superior Court. Samuel A. Olevson,
for plaintiff. Mark E. Liberati, Theodore A. Miller, for
defendant.

September 13, 1979.

M. P. No. 79-133, MicHarL ViLLeLLa vo, THE RETIRE-
MENT BoaRD OF THE City oF ProvipENcE ef al. The petition
for writ of certiorari is granted. Gladstone & Zarlenga, B.
Lucius Zarlenga, for petitioner. John Rotondi, Jr., Deputy
City Solicitor, Frank Mastrati, Jr., Special Counsel, for
respondents.

M. P. No. 79-267. Crry or ProvipENcE v. ROBERT
Ka.ian AND ANNA Kain. The petition for writ of certiorari
and motion to consolidate are denied. Richard G. Riendeau,
for plaintiff-respondent. Aram K. Berberian, for defendants-
petitioners.

M. P. No. 79-279. A. Cartotri & Co., Inc. v. Joun H.
Norserc, Tax ApMINIsTRATOR. The petition for writ of certi-
orari is granted. Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons,
Stephen J. Carlotti, for petitioner. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, William G. Brody, Assistant Attorney

878 es

General. Perry Shatkin, Chief Legal Officer (Taxation), for
respondent.

M. P. No. 79-281. Kazan ARAMIAN ef al. v. Crry oF
Proviwence et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Edward John Mulligan, for petitioners. John Rotondi, Jr.,
Deputy City Solicitor, Gerald G. Norigian, Assistant City
Solicitor, Lavine, Sutherland and DiGianfilippo, Ltd.,
Joseph DiGianfilippo, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-318. ApraHamM GoLpsTEIN v. Berry
Perrarca. The petition for writ of certiorari and request for
restraining order are denied. Foster N. Acton, for petitioner.
Alan H. Pearlman, for respondent.

September 20, 1979.

M. P. No. 79-125. Warca Hux Fire Districr v.
ANTHONY Grorpano et al. The petition for writ of certiorari
is granted.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate. Edwards
& Angell, Timothy T. More, for petitioner. John J. Gentile,
Jr., Assistant Town Solicitor, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-250. Pawrucxer Tracers’ ALLIANCE,
Locat 930 v. ScHoo. CoMMITTEE OF THE CiTy oF
Pawtucket. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate. Abedon,
Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik and Lipsey, Richard A. Skolnik,
Lynette Labinger, for petitioner. Higgins, Cavanagh &
Cooney, Joseph F, Cavanagh, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-295. Donatp OKxoniewskI v. BoaRD OF
Review, Ruope Istanp DePARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
Srcuriry. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate.
Mortimer C. Newton, for petitioner.

September 27, 1979.

M. P. No. 79-173. IN THE Marrer or Ernest B. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied as moot.

| 879

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate. William
F. Reilly, Public Defender, Mary M. Lisi, Assistant Public
Defender, for petitioner. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney
General, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-306. Carino ScHoot CoMMITTEE 0.
Ruopve IsLanp Boarp oF REGENTS FoR Epucation et al, The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate. Breslin,
Sweeney & Lichatin, David F. Sweeney, for petitioner.
Natale L. Urso, Thomas J. Liguori, Jr., for respondents.

September 27, 1979.

C. A. No. 77-372. Srarev. James Epwaros. The petition
to reargue is denied.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate. Dennis J.
Roberts I, Attorney General, Barry N. Capalbo, for
plaintiff. William F. Reilly, Public Defender, Stephen C.
Bridge, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant.

Appeal No. 79-304. RicHarp A. Partseaur v. R.J.F.
Pariseautt & Sons Inc. e¢ al. The plaintiff here has
appealed from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court.
Therefore, treating the defendants’ motion to affirm as a
motion to dismiss this appeal as interlocutory, said motion to
dismiss is granted.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate. Ralph T.
Lewis, Jr., for plaintiff. Abraham Belilove, Howard I.
Lipsey (Receivers for defendant corporations), for
defendants.

October 2, 1979.

Appeal No. 78-335. Caro ORLANDO v, Caror WIRE AND
Cas.e Co. This case comes before us on a motion to affirm
under Rule 16(g). The case is here on appeal from a decree of
the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission.

We issued an order to show cause why the decree should

880 ee

not be affirmed on the ground that the appeal essentially in-
volves a challenge to a finding of fact of the Commission
based upon credibility. Counsel for the employee argued this
matter on October 1, 1979.

Since the employee has failed to show cause, the decree is
hereby affirmed and the appeal is denied and dismissed.
Edward John Mulligan, for petitioner. Bernard W. Boyer,
for respondent.

October 12, 1979.

M. P. Nos. 79-283 and 79-284. Tue Crry or ProvipeNce
et al. v. Mary JANE O’NEILL, and Mayer Levirr et al. v.
Many Jane O'NEILL. The petition for writ of certiorari in
each case is granted and these cases are hereby consolidated
for the filing of briefs and for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Ronald H.
Glantz, City Solicitor, John Rotondi, Jr., Deputy City Solici-
tor, Gerald G. Norigian, Assistant City Solicitor, Hinckley,
Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Paul V. Curcio (for Mayer Levitt
et al.), for petitioners. Revens ¢ DeLuca, Amato A. DeLuca,
for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-299. NatHan M. Honic v, GENERAL
Motors Corroration et al. The petition for writ of certiorari
is denied.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Gunning,
LaFazia & Gnys, Inc., Netti C. Vogel, for petitioner.
Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Gerald C. DeMaria, for
respondent.

C. A. No. 78-43. Srare v. Roperr A. ANGELL. The
petition for reargument is denied.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Dennis J.
Roberts II, Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special
Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff. Barbara Hurst, for
defendant.

C. A. No. 78-268. Sratev. James Ropericx. The motion

es 881

to reargue or in the alternative to amend the opinion is
denied.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Dennis J.
Roberts II, Attorney General, Lawrence M. Iacoi, Special
Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff. Mann & Roney,
Robert B. Mann, for defendant.

C. A. No. 79-151. Braprorp Hoyze v. State. The state’s
motion to dismiss this appeal is denied. Appellant Hoyle’s
application for post-conviction relief was not heard in
Superior Court due to the pendency of his direct appeal in
this court. Hoyle’s direct appeal has now been decided: State
v. Hoyle, 122 R.I. 45, 404 A.2d 69 (1979).

Accordingly, this case is remanded to the Superior Court
for further proceedings on appellant’s application for post-
conviction relief.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Bradford
Hoyle, pro se, for plaintiff. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney
General, Stephen Lichatin II, Special Assistant Attorney
General, for defendant:

Appeal No. 73-106. Ronct Manuracturinc Co., INc. v.
SraTeE or Rope IsLanp AND Direcror or Pusuic Works. The
petition to reargue is denied.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Leo M.
Goldberg, for petitioner. Stephen F. Mullen, Special
Counsel, for respondent. .

October 15, 1979.

Appeal No. 78-204. Raymonp Lavey v. Epwarp Lavey
et al. The plaintiff administrator was before this court on
October 4, 1979, in response to our order in which we asked
him to show cause why the appeal of Richard A. Lavey
should not be sustained. Earlier, Richard was before the
Superior Court on a motion to remove a default. His motion
was based on the assertion that he was never served with pro-
cess and that, therefore, the judgment was void. In denying

882 ee

the motion, the Superior Court justice observed that the
court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion because it
had been filed more than a year after the entry of the default
judgment. Before us the administrator admitted that he was
unable to show cause, conceding that a void judgment is not
governed by Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)’s 1-year limitation.

Accordingly, Richard’s appeal is sustained, the judgment
appealed from is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the
Superior Court where a hearing will be held on Richard’s
claim of no service. William J. Peotrowski, Jr., for plaintiff.
Lovett & Linder, Ltd., Richard Bruce Feinstein, for
defendants.

October 16, 1979.

M. P. No. 79-408. Franx A. Carrer, Jr., Crier Discr-
PLINARY CouNSsEL v. Rosert C. DeLGuwice. The respondent
is a member of the Bar of this state. On September 24, 1979
this Court entered its order directing him to appear before us
on Friday, October 12, 1979 and show cause why he should
not be disciplined for his failure to file a response with this
Court’s Disciplinary Board to a complaint filed with the
Board by a client in April, 1979. The respondent failed to
appear.

Accordingly, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that as a
result of the failure of Robert C. DelGuidice to respond to
our order entered on September 24, 1979, he is, without any
further notice, indefinitely suspended from the practice of
law.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Frank A.
Carter, Jr., pro se, for petitioner. Robert C. DelGuidice, pro
se, for respondent.

Appeal No. 78-432. CoNcERNED PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS
oF Coventry e¢ al. v, Town or Coventry et al. This case
comes before us on motion by the defendants pursuant to
Rule 16(g) to affirm a judgment of the Superior Court dis-
missing the plaintiffs’ complaint and voiding a lis pendens

es 883

filed incident to said complaint. Counsel argued said motion
on October 5, 1979.

On consideration of said arguments and the record in the
case, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed.
Montaquila, Ciullo & DeFalco, Arnold N. Montaquila,
Kenneth J. Rampino, for plaintiffs. Bennett R. Gallo, for
defendants.

Appeal No. 79-73. RicHarp J, Fiynw et al. v. Paut A.
BurxHarpt et al. This case comes before us on a motion to
affirm a judgment entered by the Superior Court pursuant to
a mandate issued by this court in Flynn v. Burkhardt, 118
R.I. 69, 378 A.2d 1057 (1977). Counsel argued the motion
on Friday, October 5, 1979.

We are of the opinion that the Justice of the Superior
Court followed the mandate of this court and that his deci-
sion on damages was supported by the evidence presented.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is
hereby affirmed. Milton Bernstein, for plaintiffs. Charleson
é Brill, Marvin A. Brill, for defendants.

Appeal No. 79-159. Josrrn Fatvo et al. v. KATHLEEN
Broom. This is an automobile negligence action in which the
defendant is before us on an appeal from the denial by a
Superior Court justice of her motion for new trial following
the jury’s return of verdicts for Joseph Falvo and his son,
Stephen, and the estate of Joseph’s father. The total aggre-
gate of the three verdicts is $10,000. Pursuant to the provi-
sions of our Rule 16(g), the plaintiffs have asked that we sum-
marily dismiss the defendant’s motion because the issue on
appeal is factual and there is abundant evidence to support
the denial of the new trial. Oral arguments on this motion
were heard on October 4, 1979.

A new trial on the issue of damages will not be granted un-
less the trial judge is satisfied that there is a demonstrable dis-
parity between the amount awarded and the pain and suffer-
ing shown to have been endured as a consequence of the inju-
ries sustained. Our examination of the record convinces us

884 Pe

that the trial justice correctly applied the controlling princi-
ples enunciated in Wood v. Paolino, 112 B.1. 753, 315 A.2d
744 (1974). Here, the trial justice, in commenting on the
jury’s award, remarked: “I think this jury really responded to
the merits of the case.” It is obvious that the trial justice’s
conscience was not shocked by the jury’s award and neither
are ours. The plaintiffs’ motion is granted.

Accordingly, the defendant’s appeal is denied and dis-
missed, and the judgments appealed from are affirmed. J.
Renn Olenn, for plaintiffs. Carroll, McHugh & Pirraglia,
John G. Carroll, Edward E. Dillon, Jr., for defendant.

October 18, 1979.

Appeal No. 78-200. Dororuy M. Szeseck v. Rowe
Automatic Satzs, Inc. This case came before us in response
to our order to the employee to show cause why her appeal
should not be dismissed.

After considering the briefs filed in the case and the oral
arguments presented, we are of the opinion that the
employee has failed to show cause in view of our holding in
Kyle v. Davol, 121 R.I. 79, 395 A.2d 714 (1978), and in
light of the fact that the Workers Commission’s factual find-
ings are binding if supported by legally competent evidence.
Leahey v. State, 121 R.I. 200, 397 A.2d 509 (1979);
Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283, 387 A.2d
1034 (1978).

Consequently, the appeal is denied and dismissed.
Lawrence L. Goldberg, Robert D. Goldberg, for appellant.
Robert C. Hogan, Inc., Robert C. Hogan, for appellee.

M. P. No. 79-286. Diana Maces, p.p.a. et al. v. THE
Westerty Hosrrrat et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is
denied. Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Gerald C. DeMaria,
Albert R. Romano, for petitioners. Robert W. Lovegreen,
Joseph A. Kelly, Martin K. Donovan, James T. Murphy, for
respondents.

| 885

M. P. No. 79-310. Pamexa Lorrro v. Co J. Lorrro, Jr.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. McKinnon and
Fortunato, Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Amy R. Tabor, for
plaintiff-respondent. Aram K. Berberian, for defendant-
petitioner.

M. P. No. 79-313. RutH Mier et al. v, MEMBERS OF THE
Zonrno Boarp or Review or Cranston et al. The petition
for writ of certiorari is denied. Edwards & Angell, Joseph V.
Cavanagh, Jr., for petitioners. Adler, Pollock & Sheehan,
Incorporated, Richard W. MacAdams, Higgins, Cavanagh
é Cooney, John Cooney, Jr., Alan Gelfuso, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-353. Joun InranTa.ino v. Joun Moran,
Dmecror oF THE ApuLT CorrecrionaL Instirurion. The
petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for bail pend-
ing appeal are denied.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not participate. Joseph

A. Bevilacqua, Jr., for petitioner. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-393. Patrick T. Boy.e e¢ al. v. Frank
Newman et al. The motion for stay is granted. The defen-
dants and the University of Rhode Island are, in accordance
with the order of this court dated 12 October 1979, permitted
to proceed with its scheduled disciplinary proceedings in its
normal fashion. The defendants and the University of Rhode
Island are further permitted to carry out any appropriate
action called for pursuant to any hearing that may be held in
accordance with the University’s disciplinary proceedings
subject to judicial review. A stenographic record may be
made of the proceedings by the plaintiffs provided that a
copy be made available to the University at its expense if
desired and further provided that such transcripts shall be
held by both parties subject to further order of a court of
competent jurisdiction prior to public dissemination.
DeSimone & DelSesto Law Corporation, Herbert F.
DeSimone, Gerald McG. Decelles, for plaintiffs. Nicholas
Trott Long, Assistant Public Defender, for defendants.

886 es
October 19, 1979.

Appeal No. 79-59. Geratp Zito e¢ al. v, Aupor V.
G.aupe v, SHERWooD ConstRucTION Co. This case comes be-
fore us on a motion by the third party defendant, Sherwood
Construction Co. (Sherwood), to affirm judgments entered
in Superior Court in its favor on defendant Glaude’s com-
plaint and also on Sherwood’s counterclaim.

It appears that defendant Glaude held a mortgage on real
estate owned by plaintiffs (Zitos). When plaintiffs allegedly
defaulted on their payments, Glaude held a mortgage fore-
closure sale on October 8, 1976. Sherwood was the high bid-
der at the sale and made a $1,000 deposit toward the pur-
chase price of $6,300, the balance to be paid on November 8,
1976.

The “terms and conditions of sale” provides in part, as fol-
lows:

“All the right, title and interest conveyed by said
mortgage deed will be sold subject to the terms and con-
ditions in the published notice of sale and those herein-
after set forth.”

After the foreclosure sale, but before the balance of the pur-
chase price was paid, the plaintiffs commenced action
against Glaude to set aside the sale and filed a notice of Lis
Pendens against the real estate. Because of the Lis Pendens,
Sherwood refused to consummate the deal.

Glaude filed a third party complaint against Sherwood
seeking that any right of Sherwood to the property be elimin-
ated and that he be allowed to retain the $1,000 deposit paid
by Sherwood. Sherwood filed an answer praying for return
of its $1,000 deposit. Prior to trial the action by plaintiffs
against Glaude-was settled. A trial was held before a Superior
Court justice, sitting without a jury, who found for
Sherwood both on the third party complaint and counter-
claim, and ordered judgments to enter in favor of Sherwood
for $1,000.

es 887

The trial justice found that Sherwood had breached its
agreement by refusing to consummate the purchase. How-
ever, because there was no resale of the property, the court
found that Glaude had sustained no actual damage. The
court also found that although, the “terms and conditions of
sale” provided that in the event of default, the purchaser
would lose its deposit, that such a clause was not a liquidated
damage clause but rather a penalty clause which the court
refused to validate. The trial justice entered judgment for
Sherwood both on Glaude’s third-party complaint and also _
on Sherwood’s counterclaim. Glaude appealed and
Sherwood moved to affirm the Superior Court judgments
under our Rule 16(g).

We placed the motion on the motion calendar in order to
afford defendant an opportunity to show cause why the
Superior Court judgments should not be affirmed. On
appeal, Glaude alleged (1) that the trial justice erred in find-
ing that the contract clause was a “penalty clause” and, (2)
that the trial justice erroneously precluded testimony tending
to show bad faith or conspiracy on the part of Sherwood.

After reading the briefs and hearing oral arguments we
conclude that the trial justice did not err in ruling that the
clause was a penalty clause. Psaty & Fuhrman v. Housing
Authority, 76 R.I. 87 (1909), and that in any event, because
of the nature of Lis Pendens that Glaude could not convey all
he intended. See Connell v. The Savings Bank of Newport,
AT RB.I. 60 (1925). The argument that the trial justice erred in
precluding evidence tending to show bad faith or conspiracy
on the part of Sherwood not having been argued by defen-
dant in the Superior Court will not be considered by us on

appeal.

Consequently, the third party defendant’s motion to
affirm is granted, the defendant’s appeal is denied and dis-
missed, and the judgments appealed from are affirmed.
Laurent C. Bilodeau, for Aldor V. Glaude. Kirshenbaum
Law Offices, Sanford M. Kirshenbaum, for third-party
defendant Sherwood Construction Company.

888 |

M. P. No. 79-407. Franx A. Carrer, Jr., Cuter Discrp-
LINARY COUNSEL v. VincENT J. Baccart. The respondent is a
member of the Bar of this state. He appeared before us on
Friday, October 12, 1979 in response to our order, in accor-
dance with our Rule 43, directing him to show cause why his
admission to the Bar should not be revoked or suspended.
The respondent was indicted on June 27, 1979 charged with
embezzlement and violation of banking laws. The
respondent on September 18, 1979 pleaded guilty to both
charges.

On the charge of embezzlement, he was sentenced to the
Adult Correctional Institution for two (2) years, sentence sus-
pended and placed on probation for four (4) years. On the
charge of violation of banking laws, he was sentenced to the
Adult Correctional Institution for one (1) year, sentence sus-
pended and placed on probation for one (1) year. The re-
spondent was to make restitution as a condition of probation.
The respondent at his appearance failed to show cause why
his admission to the Bar should not be revoked or suspended.

Accordingly, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 43, it is
hereby ordered that Respondent Vincent J. Baccari be and he
hereby is disbarred beginning November 15, 1979 from
further engaging in the practice of law. The respondent is
further directed to comply with Rule 42-15 and to furnish to
the Clerk of this Court on or before November 1, 1979, the
names and addresses of all clients represented by him. The
Clerk shall take such action as prescribed by said Rule 42-15.

Mr. Justice Kelleher, dissenting in part. Since the crimes to
which the respondent pleaded guilty involved the theft of
money due his client, I believe he has forfeited any claim for
special consideration by us, and I vote for immediate disbar-
ment.

Mr. Justice Weisberger did not participate. Frank A.
Carter, pro se for petitioner. Vincent J. Baccari, for
respondent pro se.

ee 889
October 25, 1979.

M. P. No. 79-316. SratTev. Joun J. Tarvis. The petition
for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General, for plaintiff-respondent. John J. Tarvis, pro se,
for defendant-petitioner.

M. P. No. 79-322. Town or Sout KincsTown v. RHODE
IsLanp Ox. Co., Inc. et al. The petition for writ of certiorari
is denied. Mark S. Spangler, for petitioner. Hogan & Hogan,
Donald J. Packer, Thomas S. Packer, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-372. Tue ScHoot ComMIrTEE OF THE Ciry
or ProvipeNce v. Boar or REGENTS FoR Epucation. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Vincent J. Piccirilli,
for petitioner. Natale L. Urso, Thomas J. Liguori, Jr., for
respondent.

C. A. No. 77-201. Sratev. Jutio J. Arroyo. The petition
to reargue is denied. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General,
David A. Cooper, Special Assistant Attorney General, for
petitioner. William F. Reilly, Public Defender. Mary B.
Levesque, Assistant Public Defender, for respondent.

October 26, 1979

M. P. No. 77-194. Cavuerine A. GREENE v. GLoria M.
McDonatp, WarvEN, Women’s Division, ApuLr CorrEc-
TIONAL InsrrruTion. Being adjudged guilty of criminal con-
tempt by a justice of the District Court, petitioner, Catherine
A. Greene, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
seeking relief from an order confining her in the Women’s
Division, Adult Correctional Institution, for a period of 30
days. Upon filing of her petition, she was released on bail
pending consideration of her appeal by this court.

We have heard oral argument, considered the briefs sub-
mitted by counsel, examined both the record and the judge’s
certification. We find the record silent as to the circum-
stances surrounding the alleged offense, making proper con-
sideration and review of the petition impossible. We hereby

890 es

remand the petition for writ of habeas corpus and the papers
to the Superior Court and direct said court to proceed to hold
an evidentiary hearing. That court shall make findings as to
the specific location of the alleged offense and as to all other
facts and testimony attending the incident.

Upon termination of the evidentiary hearing in the Super-
ior Court, the petition and papers therein shall be returned to
this Court forthwith. Everett A. Petronio, for petitioner.
Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General. Frederick G. Cass,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-356. IN re: Tomas Joszpu. The petition
for certiorari is granted. The petitioner’s request for a stay is
granted only insofar as it seeks a stay of that portion of the
decree to be reviewed which would allow representatives of
the news media to be present and report what transpires
when testimony will be presented by the litigants. The record
in this case need not be transmitted to this court until such
time as the Family Court hearing has concluded, a decree
containing the trial justice’s findings has been entered, and
the requisite transcript has been prepared. Robert R. Nocera,
for petitioner. Mitchell S. Riffkin, for respondent.

AppeaL No. 78-149. Francis J. Conton v. LEBANON
Knrrtinc Mitts. This case comes before us on a show cause
order directing the employer to show cause why his appeal
should not be dismissed in view of the fact that through the
inadvertence of the employer the Workers’ Compensation
Commission was unable to make findings which we can re-
view.

Plaintiff filed an original petition seeking benefits for an
employment-related disability. The trial court found that the
petitioner was partially incapacitated and that 25 percent of
his disability was within the scope of his employment.

The employer appealed from the decree of the Trial Com-
missioner to the full Commission. Upon appeal, the respond-
ent furnished them with a partial transcript.

The Commissioner entered a final decree denying the re-

es sol

spondent’s appeal and affirming the decision of the Trial
Commissioner. In its decision, the Commission stated that,
without a full transcript, they were at a loss to determine
whether the Trial Commissioner was in error. They further
stated that:

“We do not see how we can consider that the decree is
against the evidence and the law since we do not have a
transcript setting forth the evidence.”

The respondent appealed from the decree of the full Com-
mission and has provided this court with an ample transcript.

Although the respondent has filed a more complete trans-
cript for this appeal, it is impossible for this court to review
the findings of the Commission, since it made no findings or
conclusions of law. The scope of review of this court is lim-
ited to searching the record to determine if there is any legal
evidence to support the Commission’s findings. Absent fraud,

the findings will not be disturbed. Beauchesne v. London &
Co., 118 B.I. 651, 375 A.2d 920 (1977). We are bound by the
Commission's findings.

Limited as we are as to our own role in reviewing the
Commission’s findings, we are constrained to support its de-
cision. In any event, the defendant has failed to show cause
why its appeal should not be dismissed.

For the reasons stated we deny the defendant’s appeal.
The decree appealed from is affirmed and the case is re-
manded to the Workers’ Compensation Commission for
entry of a decree consistent with this opinion. John F.
McBurney, for petitioner. Robert C. Hogan, Inc., Robert C.
Hogan, for respondent.

Appgau No. 79-14. Grorcr S. Porter v. B.B.F., Inc.,
anD J. Recan Sree. Erection Co., Inc., AND GEORGE
Manztin. This matter comes before this court on the plaintiff's
motion pursuant to Rule 16(g) to affirm a judgment of the
Superior Court. The defendant objects to the motion con-
tending that the evidence does not support the jury verdict
and that the variance between the pleading and the proof is

892 ee

fatal to the judgment.

The oral arguments, the memoranda submitted by coun-
sel, and an examination of the record reveal that the evidence
submitted at trial was clearly contradictory.

It is well-established law that credibility is a factual issue.
It is the function of the trial court, not of the appellate court.
Where a jury verdict has been endorsed by a trial justice we
will not make an independent examination of the record un-
Jess that justice in passing on the motion for a new trial over-
looked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise
clearly wrong, Gilbert v. Girard, 109 R.1. 68, 279 A.2d 919
(1971). We find that the defendant’s contention is without
merit.

As to the second contention in support of his objection, we
hold that Rule 15(b) of the Superior Court is dispositive. The
record indicates that the defendant failed to object to the evi-
dence alleged to be at variance with the pleading. Rule 15(b)
provides that pleadings may be amended within a certain
prescribed period and thereafter by leave of court or consent
of the adverse parties. It further prescribes that “implied con-
sent to the trial of the issues not within the pleadings is usu-
ally manifested by failure to object to evidence.” If a party
has had fair notice that the evidence raises new issues but
does not object, he has implied his consent.

Because the defendant failed to object after receiving fair
notice, he cannot at this state of the proceedings raise this as
an issue. His objections therefore are denied and dismissed
and the plaintiff's motion to affirm is hereby granted.
Thomas H. Quinn, for plaintiff. Abraham Goldstein, for
defendants.

November 1, 1979

M. P. Nos. 78-223 anp 78-225. Vauuey Gas Company 0.
Epwarp F. Burke and Junius C. Micuaxtson et al. v.
Vatiry Gas Company. The motion of Valley Gas Company
to modify or in the alternative for rehearing, as prayed, is

Ce) 893
denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Demine E.
Sherman, for Valley Gas Company. Dennis J. Roberts I,
Attorney General, John R. McDermott, Special Assistant
Attorney General, for Julius C. Michaelson et al. and
Edward F. Burke.

M. P. No. 79-303. Jerrrey R. Hucues v. Eucene Perit,
Recistrar. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. David C. Moretti,
for petitioner. Louis M. Cioci, Assistant Special Counsel, for
respondent.

M. P. No. 79-332. Exarye Campo v, DEPARTMENT OF
Emp.oyment Security. The petition for writ of certiorari is
denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. David B. Green,

Warren D. Weinstein, Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., for
petitioner. Gary R. Pannone, Special Legal Counsel, Board
of Review, for respondent.

M. P. No, 79-371. Rev. James C. RAwLinson ef al. v.
Boarp or Canvassers or Crry or Woonsocker et al. The
petition for writ of certiorari is granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Rev. James C. Raw-
linson, pro se, for petitioners. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney
General, John S. Foley, Special Assistant Attorney General,
for respondent.

November 2, 1979

M. P. No. 78-197. Srate v. Joun Capito. We issued
our common-law writ of certiorari to insure the review by
this court of the defendant’s challenge to the denial of his
motion for a new trial which was based on newly discovered
evidence. This issue has been considered and rejected this day
in State v. Carillo, No. 74-273-C.A. Consequently, the above
petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed. Dennis J. Rob-
erts II, Attorney General, Barry N. Capalbo, Special Assist-

804 PCs
ant Attorney General, for plaintiff. William F. Reilly, Public

Defender, Barbara Hurst, Chief Appellate Attorney, Dale G.
Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant.

November 13, 1979

AppeaL No. 78-134. Roserr §S. Lynam e¢ al. ov.
CransToN GENERAL Hospirat. This case was argued Novem-
ber 8, 1979, pursuant to a motion to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed.

The thrust of the plaintiffs’ appeal was based upon alleged
trial errors which were not raised by timely objections in the
Superior Court. Since the errors alleged in the case of Robert
S. Lynam were not asserted in the court below, and in light
of a verdict for the defendant in said case, the question of the
propriety of directing a verdict against plaintiff Marie C.
Hall becomes moot, since she would only have been entitled
to a judgment in the event that defendant was liable to her
son. Therefore, plaintiffs.having failed to show cause, the
appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment of the Superior
Court is affirmed, and the case is remitted to the Superior
Court. Fessel and Goldman, Robert 8. Goldman, for plain-
tiffs. John F. Dolan, for defendant.

Appra No. 79-126. Jose Gouarr et al. v. Town oF
Brisrot et al. This case comes before us on a motion to affirm
a judgment of dismissal in the Superior Court on the ground
that the action was not filed within the time limited by stat-
ute.

After hearing argument of counsel on November 8, 1979,
we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to show cause why
the judgment of the Superior Court should not be affirmed.
Therefore, the appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment
of the Superior Court is affirmed, and the case is remitted to
the Superior Court. Louis B. Abilheira, for plaintiffs. Tilling-
hast, Collins & Graham, William R. Grimm, Normand G.
Benoit, for defendants.

es 895
November 16, 1979

M. P. No. 78-331. Roserr E. Licvort, Direcror oF
ADMINISTRATION v. B. ALBERT Forp et al. This is a petition
for certiorari wherein the director of the Department of
Administration challenges the Superior Court’s dismissal of
his appeal from a decision of the Personnel Appeal Board or-
dering the reinstatement of an employee who, at the time of
her discharge by the director, was a revenue officer in the
Division of Taxation. The Superior Court judgment was
based upon the trial justice’s finding that the director was not
an aggrieved person within the meaning of the pertinent pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956
(1977 Reenactment) §42-35-15(a).

On November 5, 1979, the employee, through her counsel,
appeared before us in response to an order to show cause why
the director's appeal should not be sustained in light of the
holding in Matunuck Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Sheldon, 121 R.1.
386, 399 A.2d 489 (1979). The Matunuck case, like others of
recent vintage, holds that a governmental agency or official,
while not technically aggrieved, may obtain judicial review if
the public has an interest in the issue at stake which reaches
beyond that of the immediate parties. Liguori v. Aetna Casu-
alty e> Surety Co., 119 B.1. 875, 384 A.2d 308 (1978); East
Greenwich Yacht Club v. Coastal Resources Management
Council, 118 R.I. 559, 376 A.2d 682 (1977); Altman v.
School Committee, 115 B.1. 399, 347 A.2d 37 (1975); Buffiv.
Ferri, 106 R.I. 349, 259 A.2d 847 (1969).

Counsel for the employee concedes that employment of
qualified, competent people in the state’s service is a matter
of public interest but points out that §36-4-42 provides that
actions taken by the Personnel Appeal Board in favor of an
employee are to be final and binding on all parties. This
reference constitutes good cause, and the director’s appeal is
assigned to the regular calendar. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, William G. Brody, Assistant Attorney
General, Perry Shatkin, Chief Legal Officer (Taxation), for
petitioner. Joseph A. Doorley, Jr., for respondents.

806 ee)

M. P. No. 79-411. Burr A. Jorpan v. ANN JorDAN. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Aram A. Arabian, for
plaintiff-respondent. Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, Alfred
Factor, for defendant-petitioner, Robert J. Fallon, Legal
Counsel, Child Welfare Services, James A. Farrell, Jr.,
Guardian Ad Litem for Arthur and Emily Jordan.

M. P. No. 79-421. Davin LaRocus et al. v. COMMERCE
Ou. Rerininc Corroration. The petition for writ of certi-
orari is denied. Thomas H. Quinn, Jr., for petitioners. Letts,
Quinn & Licht, Daniel J. Murray, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-432. James C, Raw inson et al. v. Boarp
OF CANVASSERS OF THE City or Woonsocket et al. The
petition for writ of mandamus is denied. James C.
Rawlinson, pro se, for petitioner.

C. A. No. 78-168. Srare v. Cures Puriurps et al. The
state’s motion to dismiss the question certified to this court by
the Superior Court is granted. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney
General, Stephen Lichatin III, Special Assistant Attorney
General, Chief, Appellate Division, for plaintiff. John D.
Lynch, for defendants.

Appea No. 79-70. Donaup SALMANSON v. Morris Kark-
un et al, The defendants appeared before us on November 7,
1979 in response to our order to show cause why their appeal
should not be dismissed in light of our rulings in Nass v.
Garniss, 44 R.I. 162, 116 A. 341 (1922) and Grayboyes v.
Shaiz, 74 R.I. 495, 62 A.2d 512 (1948).

The defendants having failed to show cause the appeal is
hereby dismissed. Melvin A. Chernick, for plaintiff. Smith &-
Smith, Incorporated, Z. Hershel Smith, for defendants.

AppraL No. 79-97. Savoy Rearty Corporation 0.
L.P.L., Inc. This case comes before us on defendant’s
motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to file a $375,000 bond
as ordered by the Superior Court, and on defendant’s
motion, pursuant to Rule 16(g), to affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.

| 897

The defendant’s motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to
file the bond is denied as being moot. The motion pursuant to
Rule 16(g) to affirm the judgment below is granted in light of
our holding in Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 B.1.
134, 364 A.2d 1277 (1976). Smith & Smith, Inc., Z. Hershel
Smith, Edward M. Botelle for plaintiff. Longolucco,
Lenihan & Orsinger, James J. Longolucco for defendant.
Order #64.

Appeat No. 79-119. RayMonp A. Turcotte v. Pau J.
Bento e¢ al. The plaintiff appeared before us on November
7, 1979 in response to our order to show why defen-
dants’ motion to dismiss for failure of plaintiff to file his brief
should not be granted and, further to show cause why this
appeal should not be dismissed in light of this court’s ruling
that there is no appeal from a Superior Court judgment ren-
dered pursuant to the provisions of §45-20-1.1. Kurbiec v.
Bastien, 120 R.I. 111, 385 A.2d 667 (1978).

The plaintiff conceded that the appeal be dismissed.
Accordingly plaintiffs appeal is hereby dismissed. Paul M.
Chappell, for plaintiff. Corcoran, Peckham & Hayes, Patrick
ON. Hayes, Jr., Kathleen Managhan, for defendants.

AppeaL No. 79-185. Anna A. Perry v. Linwoop G.
Howarp, Jr. The defendant’s motion to affirm the judgment
of the Superior Court pursuant to Rule 16(g) is granted.
Quinn, Cuzzone & Geremia, John F. Cuzzone, Jr., for
plaintiff. Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Inc., Netti C. Vogel,
for defendant.

November 29, 1979.

M. P. No. 79-348. Epwarp E. Voccowa v. JoHn Moran,
Waren et al. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is de-
nied without prejudice to petitioner’s right to renew said
petition if trial on the indictments which are the subject of
petitioner’s speedy trial claim does not take place within 90
days of the determination of violation.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. William A. Dimitri,
Jr., for petitioner. Dennis J. Roberts I, Attorney General,

898 es

Stephen Lichatin III, Special Assistant Attorney General,
Chief, Appellate Division, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-350, Srantey H. Wurre III e¢ al. v.
ZoninG Boar oF Review oF THE Crry or East PRrovipENCE e¢
al. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Carty & Carty,
Joseph B. Carty, Jr., for petitioner. Robert R. Nocera, Assist-
ant Solicitor, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-376. Town or CuMBERLAND v. JuNE S.
Navutex et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Richard R. Acker-
man, Town Solicitor, for petitioner. Little, Little, McDonald
& Gaschen, Francis A. Gaschen, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-405. Warwick ScHooL CoMMITTEE v.
GerraLp T. Grppons, PurcHAsING AGENT FOR THE CITy OF
Warwick et al. The petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
Petitioner’s motion to advance its appeal entitled Warwick
School Committee v. Gibbons et al.; No. 79-427-A is denied
as moot, said appeal having already been assigned to the
December, 1979 argument calendar. °

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Joseph A. Kelly,
Albert B. West, for petitioner. William T. Murphy, Assistant
City Solicitor, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-425. Grorcr, Inc. v. Jorn H. Norperc,
Tax Apminisrrator. The petition for writ of certiorari is
granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Gorham & Gorham,
John Gorham, Edmund L. Alves, Jr., for petitioner. Dennis
J. Roberts II, Attorney General, William G. Brody, Assistant
Attorney General, Perry Shatkin, Chief Legal Officer (Taxa-
tion), for respondent.

M. P. No, 79-434. Srave v. Joun A. Santi. The peti-
tion for writ of certiorari is denied.

ee 899

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Stephen A. Lichatin
III, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff-respondent.
John F. Cicilline, for defendant-petitioner.

M. P. No. 79-454. Waxrer J. Puawsxi v. Pararcra C.
Puxawsx. The petition for writ of certiorari and application
for stay are denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. William Y. Chaika,
for petitioner. Joseph E, Marran, Jr., for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-477. Srate or Ruove IsLanp v, FREDERICK
B. Porter et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, for plaintiff-respondent. Ira L. Schreiber,
Sharp, Randolph & Green, A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., v.
Thomas Lankford, Jr., for defendant-petitioner Frederick B.
Porter.

C. A. No. 79-237. State v. Gary Doyze. The defendant’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Thomas H. Caruolo, Special Assistant
Attorney General, for plaintiff. Robert B. Mann, for defen-
dant.

ApreaL No. 78-338. Ortanpo D. CapPatso et ux. v.
Rosert E, BRuNELLE et ux. This is an automobile negligence
action which arises out of an intersectional collision. Traffic
along the highway upon which the Brunelle vehicle was
proceeding was controlled by a stop sign that required the
Brunelle vehicle to come to a full stop before it entered the
intersection. The vehicle failed to come to the requisite halt.

On November 9, 1979, the defendants, through counsel,
appeared before us in response to our order to show cause
why their appeal from a grant by a Superior Court justice of
the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial should not be dismissed.
The trial justice’s ruling was based upon his finding that the
jury’s award was “grossly inadequate” and its determination

900 ee

as to the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff “was
disproportionate to the evidence as the Court views it in the
exercise of his independent judgment.”

After considering the defendants’ oral argument and sup-
plemental brief, we find that no cause has been shown. Con-
sequently, the defendants’ appeal is denied and dismissed,
and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for a new
trial. Capalbo & Capalbo, Thomas J. Capalbo, Thomas J.
Capalbo, Jr., for plaintiffs. Carroll, Kelly 4 Murphy, Dennis
S. Baluch, for defendants.

December 13, 1979.

M. P. No. 79-410, CrntTREDALE SicN Company v. JoHN
H. Norperc, Tax ADMINISTRATOR OF THE STATE OF RHODE
Isanp. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. John D. Lynch, for
petitioner, Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, William
G. Brody, Assistant Attorney General, Perry Shatkin, Chief
Legal Officer (Taxation), for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-439. Paun O. Bocuossian, Jr. et al. v.
Wnuire, WeLp & Co., Incorroratep et al. The petition for
writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Abedon, Michael-
son, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey, Julius C. Michael-
son, Jeffrey J. Teitz, for plaintiffs-respondents, Hanson, Cur-
ran & Parks, William A. Curran, Robert D. Parrillo, for
defendants-petitioners.

M. P. No. 79-461. In rae Matter or Norma M. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Stephen C. Bridge,
Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner, Chester Lupton,
Legal Counsel, Child Welfare Services, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-462. In THE Marrer or Norma M. The
petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

| 901

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Stephen C. Bridge,
Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner, Chester Lupton,
Legal Counsel, Child Welfare Services, for respondents.

Appeal No. 78-52. Eastern Scientiric Co. v. PLEASANT
View Nursinc Home, Inc. v. CARROM Furniture Division oF
ArriiATeD HosprraL Propucrs, Inc. This is an action for
monies due and payable on book account. The defendant
counterclaimed by alleging breach of an agreement concern-
ing delivery of certain hospital supplies and furnishings. The
plaintiff impleaded its supplier as a third party defendant.
The defendant moved to amend its counterclaim to add the
supplier as a party to the counterclaim. This motion was
granted but the amended counterclaim was not filed for a
period of thirteen months due to unexplained delay on the
part of the defendant.

After said filing, the third party defendant moved to strike
the amended counterclaim on the ground that this unreason-

able delay had interfered with its ability to defend. The
motion was granted.

When the matter came on for trial, a justice of the Super-
ior Court denied a motion to reargue the striking of the
amended counterclaim, and granted plaintiffs motion to
narrow the issues, holding that only the complaint was prop-
erly before the court, and that no counterclaim could be con-
sidered. Faced with the elimination of its counterclaim, the
defendant stipulated to judgment on the complaint but
reserved its right of appeal if any.

On this record we issued an order to the plaintiff to show
cause why the defendant’s appeal should not be sustained
and the matter remanded for trial on the counterclaim and
third party complaint. We heard argument pursuant to this
show cause order on December 5, 1979. We are of the opin-
ion that the plaintiff has failed to show cause why this matter
should not be remanded for hearing on the defendant's orig-
inal counterclaim and the third party complaint. We believe
that the trial justice was in error in not allowing the defen-
dant to go forward on its original counterclaim although it

902 es

had lost the right to proceed on the amended counterclaim.
We find no error in the denial of the motion to reargue. The
relief granted to the third party defendant was proper under
the circumstances. However, the gratuitous benefit con-
ferred upon the plaintiff against whom a counterclaim had
been timely filed was not justified. See Harrigan v. Mason &
Winograd, 121 R.I. 209, 397 A.2d 514 (1979). Since the
amended counterclaim was stricken as a result of its having
been tardily filed, it never had the effect of superseding the
original counterclaim. Therefore, when the amended coun-
terclaim was stricken, the original counterclaim remained as
a valid, existing pleading in the case. Obviously the plaintiff
should have the right in such circumstances to proceed with
its third party complaint against the supplier.

Therefore, the case is remanded to the Superior Court for
further proceedings consistent with this order. Roberts,
Carroll, Feldstein & Tucker, David W. Carroll, for plaintiff,
Brian J. Sarault, for Pleasant View Nursing Home, Robert K.
Mattson, for Affiliated Hospital Products, Inc.

December 17, 1979.

M. P. No. 78-163. Warcx Huwt Fire District et al. v.
Harrison F, Day et al. This is common-law certiorari where
the petitioners seek a review of the grant by the Westerly
Town Council of an application for a license to operate a
parking lot for a period of one year, the period having
expired on May 1, 1979. On December 7, 1979, the peti-
tioners appeared before us in response to our order to show
cause why their petition should not be dismissed on the
ground of mootness because the one-year life of the license
had already expired. We also questioned the insufficiency of
the record that purported to show the deliberations of the
council during the meeting when it approved the license
application.

Despite the petitioners’ protestations to the contrary, no
cause was shown. Consequently, it is hereby ordered that the
petition for certiorari be dismissed. This court also suggests

es 903

that in the event review of license issuance is sought in the
future, the litigants expend every effort to compile and pre-
serve a record that will give a reviewing authority an
accurate and reasonably full recitation of what transpires,
including the council’s considerations about the advisability
of summertime parking lots and the applicants’ compliance
with the various town and state requirements. Edwards &
Angell, John H. Blish, Swan, Jenckes, Asquith & Davis,
Andrew H. Davis, Jr., for petitioners, John H. Gentile, for
respondents.

Appeal No. 79-248. Joxun Artie et al. v. JouN DoLan
et al. The litigants were before us on December 7, 1979, as
we considered a motion by the defendants for a summary dis-
missal of the plaintiffs’ appeal from the Superior Court deci-
sion that denied their request for injunctive relief. The dis-
pute concerns the erection of a fence by the defendants in an
area that once served as a common driveway between the
respective properties of the parties. The dismissal motion was
filed pursuant to the pertinent provisions of Supreme Court
Rule 16(g).

After consideration of the issue presented by the plaintiffs
and the various contentions espoused at oral argument, the
defendants’ motion is denied and dismissed. Temkin, Merolla
& Zurier, Barry J. Kusinitz, for plaintiffs, Thomas L. Mar-
caccio, Jr., for defendants.

December 20, 1979.

M.P. No. 79-440. Recina SmitH v. Housinc AuTHORITY
OF THE Crry or ProvipeNcr. The petitioner’s motion to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis is granted. The District Court judg-
ments which petitioner asks us to review were appealable to
Superior Court.

Therefore, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Rhode Island Legal
Services, Inc., William Rutzik, Barbara Hurst, for peti-
tioner, Francis B. Brown, for respondent.

904 ee

M. P. No. 79-456. Srare v. Kevin Mureuy et al. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied as moot.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin III, Special Assistant
Attorney General, Edwards & Angell, Knight Edwards,
Joseph V. Cavanagh, Jr., John D. Deacon, (for The Provi-
dence Journal), for petitioner, John D. Lynch, for respond-
ents.

M. P. No. 79-457. SraTe v. Kevin Mureny et al. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied as moot.

Mr. Justice Doris did not partcipate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin II, Special Assistant
Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Division, for petitioner,
John D, Lynch, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-465. Lawrence N. CANNONE v. STATE.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Edmond A.
DiSandro, for petitioner, Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney
General, Richard B. Woolley, Special Assistant Attorney
General, respondent.

M. P. No. 79-476. STATE vo. ALEXANDER Avia et al. The
petition for writ of certiorari is granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin III, Special Assistant
Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Division, for plaintiff-
respondent, McOsker, Isserlis & Davignon, Milton L. Isser-
lis, Michael Fitzpatrick, for defendants-petitioners.

M. P. No. 79-503. THe Marrec Corporation et al. v.
Tue Zoninc Boarp oF THE Crry or Warwick et al. The peti-
tion for writ of certiorari and motion for stay are denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Hinckley, Allen,
Salisbury ¢ Parsons, Paul V. Curcio, for plaintiffs-respond-
ents, Revens & DeLuca, Sandra A. Blanding, for defendants-
petitioners.

905

Appeal No. 79-422. Rorrman anp Son, Inc. v. WILLIAM
I. Crausman. The plaintiffs motion to affirm the judgment
of the Superior Court pursuant to Rule 16(g) is granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Anthony F. Muri,
for plaintiff, William I. Crausman, pro se, for defendant.

December 28, 1979.

M. P. No. 79-507. Paur Dinosie e¢ al. v, ALBERT TAM-
suri et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Thomas W. Pearl-
man, for petitioners, Gunning, LaFazia ¢ Gnys, Inc., Guy
J. Wells, for respondents.

M. P. No. 79-337. Ruove Istanp Bar AssocisTION 0.
Benepicr Baber, Esquire AND ALLEN E. Erickson, Esquire.
This matter is before the Court on an order to Benedict Bader
and Allen E. Erickson to show cause why they should not be
suspended from the practice of law for failure to pay dues to
the Rhode Island Bar Association. Benedict Bader and Allen
E. Erickson failed to appear before the Court on December
8, 1979 as directed by the order to show cause.

If Benedict Bader and Allen E. Erickson have not paid
dues in full within 30 days from the issuance of this order,
they, having failed to show cause before this Court, shall not
engage in the practice law in this State nor be employed by a
person, firm or corporation engaged in the practice of law in
this State until the dues have been paid in full and we have
acted favorably on a petition for reinstatement.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Daniel J. Murray,
for petitioner.

C. A. No. 77-433. Srave vo. James Carvatno. The peti-
tion to reargue is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, James P. Renaldo, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General, for plaintiff-respondent, Samuel A. Olevson,
for defendant-petitioner.

906 es

C. A. No. 78-171. Srate v. Vincent GiorpaNo. The
petitioner’s motion for transcript of the Superior Court bail
hearing as prayed is denied as moot. The petition for writ of
habeas corpus is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General, for plaintiff-respondent, Vincent Giordano,
pro se, for petitioner.

C. A. No. 79-296. Srare v. VincenT GiorpANo. The
petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General, for plaintiff-respondent, Vincent Giordano,
pro se, for petitioner.

Appeal No. 78-220. Gustave D. HEon, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE Estate or LEONTINE A. HEON v. Paut A. BoucHERr et
ux. On December 15, 1975, at approximately 1 p.m., the
defendant husband, Paul A. Boucher, was operating his
wife’s automobile in a northerly direction along Lonsdale
Avenue in Pawtucket. The vehicle struck and fatally injured
Leontine A. Heon, a 71-year-old pedestrian who was
attempting to cross the highway. She died within minutes,
and this civil action ensued.

At a Superior Court jury-waived hearing, the trial justice
found that Mr. Boucher was 75 per cent responsible and
awarded damages accordingly. While Mr. Boucher main-
tained that he was proceeding along the highway at approxi-
mately 20 to 25 miles per hour, the trial justice rejected this
testimony. In doing so, he relied upon a police report which
indicated that skid marks at the scene revealed that the vehi-
cle traveled at least 40 feet before it came to a halt. In this
appeal, the Bouchers claim that the trial justice erred in rely-
ing on the skid-mark testimony “because there was no evi-
dence that the vehicle stopped immediately upon impact.”

On December 4, 1979, the Bouchers, through counsel,
appeared before us in response to our order to show cause
why their appeal should not be summarily dismissed in light

es 907

of the fact that Mr. Boucher’s testimony refutes the conten-
tion now made on appeal. The transcript indicates that when
the trial justice asked Mr. Boucher if his vehicle continued on
after impact, he replied, “No, it didn’t.” The trial justice
then followed up this response by inquiring if the “vehicle
stopped immediately’; Mr. Boucher answered in the
affirmative. At the show cause hearing, the defendants were
at a loss to explain the exchange that took place between the
trial justice and the defendant operator.

Consequently, no cause having been shown, the defen-
dants’ appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Superior
Court. Albert Elliot Sarkisian, for plaintiff, John F.
McBurney, for defendants.

Appeal No. 79-378. Atan F. MacDonatp ef al. v.
Ricuarp M. Vars et al. The defendants’ motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ appeal is granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Vernon A. Harvey,
Gregory F. Fater, for plaintiffs, Moore, Virgadomo &
Lynch, Ltd., Joseph Palumbo, Jr., for defendants.

January 4, 1980.

"M. PB. No. 79-420. Town or Sourm Kinosrown 0.
Micuaz Sirensxt et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is
denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Robert B. Gates, for
petitioner, Michael F. Horan, for respondents.

January 10, 1980.

M. P. No. 79-330. Prrition or Ruope IsLanp DEFENSE
Arrorneys AssociaTIon. The petition of the Rhode Island
Defense Attorneys Association requesting promulgation of a
rule authorizing open-panel prepaid legal service plans and
prohibiting closed-panel plans, as prayed, is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Aram K. Berberian,
for petitioner.

908 es

M. P. No. 79-471. Ggorce C. Woon v. A. Marte Woop.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris and Mrs. Justice Murray did not partici-
pate. George C. Wood, pro se, for petitioner, Gary Yesser,
for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-522, In THE Marrers or: Meuissa E. AnD
Parnicia E, Treating the petition for writ of prohibition as a
petition for writ of certiorari, the petition for certiorari is
granted and the writ shall issue forthwith. Petitioners’
motion for stay is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Mary M. Lisi, Assist-
ant Public Defender, for petitioners, Chester Lupton, Legal
Counsel, Child Welfare Services.

January 17, 1980.

M. P. No. 79-404. Mior Broruers Company, INc. v.

Jerome Smiru. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. William G. Savas-
tano, for petitioner, Mark L. Smith, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-444. Srare v. Josep E. Rogus. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin III, Special Assistant
Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Division, for plaintiff-
respondent, Lynch & Coleman, John D. Lynch, for defen-
dant-petitioner.

M. P. No. 79-487. Joun OrzecHowski et al. v. STATE.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Decof, Weinstein ér
Mandell, Martin W. Aisenberg, Mark S. Mandell, Jay S.
Goodman, for petitioners, Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney
“General, John S. Foley, Special Assistant Attorney General,
for respondent.

es 909

M. P. No. 79-510. Frank Newman et al. v. Patrick T.
Boyte et al. The order granting the request for permanent
injunction is an appealable order and petitioners have appro-
priately filed a notice of appeal.

Therefore, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Letts, Quinn &
Licht, Daniel J. Murray, Joseph DeAngelis, Nicholas Trott
Long, for petitioners, DeSimone & DelSesto Law Corpora-
tion, Herbert F. DeSimone, Gerard McG. DeCelles, for
respondents.

January 24, 1980.

M. P. No. 79-485. Harry Douctas Perris v. WituiaM E,
Russ et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Pettis, Healy &
Jones, Bernard Healy, for petitioner, Rice, Dolan, Kiernan &
Kershaw, Thomas C. Plunkett, Leonard A. Kiernan, Jr., for
Continental Casualty Company.

M. P. No. 79-523. Sratev. Tomoruy Hastam et al, The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General, for plaintiff-respondent, Aram K. Berberian,
for defendants-petitioners.

C. A. No. 77-454. Srate v. GrorcE F. Neary et al. The
- defendants’ petition to reargue is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Melanie Wilk Spencer, Special Assistant
Attorney General, for plaintiff, Barbara Hurst, Dale G.
Anderson, Janice M. Weisfeld, Assistant Public Defenders,
for defendant.

Appeal No. 79-443. JoHn Marspen 0. Peeriess INsur-
aNcE Company, The defendant’s motion to dismiss this
appeal as premature is granted.

910 es

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Joseph A. Capineri,
for plaintiff, Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Inc., Lincoln C.
Almond, for defendant.

January 31, 1980.

M. P. No. 80-7. AsHton Fire Disrricr v. Locan 2725,
LA.F.F., AFL-CIO. The petition for writ of certiorari is
granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Francis R. Foley, for
petitioner, Hogan ¢& Hogan, Edward T. Hogan, Thomas S.
Hogan, for respondent.

M. P. No. 79-435. Dennis Wimort v. Joun Brown,
Waroen. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General, for plaintiff-respondent, Dennis Wilmot, pro
se, for defendant-petitioner.

M. P. No. 79-505. Evetyn Panpozzi et al. v. THE
Proviwence Loncs No. 14 or THE BENEVOLENT AND ProreEc-
give Orper or Exxs. The petition for writ of certiorari is
denied.

Mr. Justice Doris and Mrs. Justice Murray did not partici-
pate. Letts, Quinn & Licht, Frank N. Ray, Daniel J.
Murray, Dianne Curran, for plaintiffs-respondents, Carroll,
Kelly & Murphy, John R. Mahoney, for defendant-peti-
tioner.

M. P. No. 79-521. Murex Lacorte et al. v. MERANNA
Curistian et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
The respondents’ request for attorney's fee is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris and Mrs. Justice Murray did not partici-
pate. Zimmerman, Roszkowski & Brenner, Richard E. Kyte,
Jr., for plaintiffs-respondents, Laurent C. Bilodeau, for
defendants-petitioners.

M. P. No, 80-34. In THE Matter or Desoran A. The

ee 911

petition for writ of certiorari and motion for stay are denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Mary M. Lisi, Paula
Rosin, Assistant Public Defenders, for petitioner, Dennis J.
Roberts II, Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

C. A. No. 78-234. Stave v. Louis R. Crarto. The peti-
tion to reargue is denied,

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua and Mr. Justice Doris did not
participate. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Faith A.
LaSalle, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff-
respondent, John J. Bevilacqua, Thomas A. Tarro III, for
defendant-petitioner.

Appeal No. 79-424. Rrra G. Datre v, Wiiiam C.
Datpe. The defendant’s motion to affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court pursuant to Rule 16(g) is granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Ralph R. Ryan, for
plaintiff, Carroll, McHugh & Pirraglia, John G. Carroll, for
defendant.

February 4, 1980.

Appeal No. 79-142. Ronaxp Bett et al. v. Zoninc Boarp
oF Review oF THE City or East Provence e¢ al. The plain-
tiffs appeared in response to a Show Cause Order issued by
this court on November 29, 1979 to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed since review of a Superior
Court judgment in a zoning case can only be obtained by
petition for writ of certiorari.

There having been no cause shown, the appeal is hereby
dismissed and the papers remanded to the Superior Court.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Anthony E. Grilli,
for plaintiffs, Joseph B. Carty, Jr., for defendants.

Appeal No. 79-256. FrienpLy Liquors, Inc. v. Eucene J.
Pontsriant et al. The defendant, Eugene J. Pontbriant,
appeared in response to a Show Cause Order issued by this

oz

court on November 29, 1979, to show cause why this appeal
should not be dismissed since review of a Superior Court
judgment in a zoning case can only be obtained by a petition
for a writ of certiorari.

There having been no cause shown, the appeal is hereby
dismissed and the papers remanded to the Superior Court.

Mr. Justice Doris not participating. Richard R. Ackerman,
Inc. for plaintiff, Macktaz, Keefer and Kirby, Joseph P.
Carroll (for Eugene J. Pontbriant), Gerald M. Brenner,
Assistant City Solicitor (for Zoning Board of Review of the
City of Woonsocket), for defendants.

February 7, 1980.

Appeal No. 78-278. Rrra A. Morcan v. Victor Morcan.
At the direction of this Court, the parties appeared to show
cause why both the appeal and cross appeal should not be
dismissed. We affirm the judgment below in light of the fact
that on the basis of the evidence in the record the Family
Court justice did not err or abuse his discretion by incorpor-
ating the agreement in the divorce decree and awarding the
wife counsel fees.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Capalbo ¢> Capalbo,
Thomas J. Capalbo, Jr., for petitioner, Nardone, Turo &
Naccarato, Vincent J. Naccarato, for respondent.

February 8, 1980.

Appeal No. 79-403. Marcarer Scuener et al. v. B. & Y.
Reatry Co., et al. This matter was heard on February 5,
1980 in accord with a Show Cause Order issued December
28, 1979, that directed defendants to show why their appeal
should not be dismissed for failure to file notices of appeal
together with filing fees within the time period required by
Sup. Ct. R. 4(a).

The defendants having shown insufficient cause, their

appeals are dismissed and the papers are remanded to the
Superior Court.

es 913

Mr. Justice Doris not participating. Milton Bernstein, for
plaintiffs, Stephen A. Gordon Lid., for defendants.

February 11, 1980.

Appeal No. 78-199. Hexen E. June et al. v. IRENE Camp-
BELL et al. This is a Superior Court automobile negligence
action in which a default judgment was entered against Irene
Campbell (Irene) for the respective plaintiffs in the total
amount of $10,000. Thereafter, Irene filed a motion to
remove the default on the ground that, notwithstanding the
deputy sheriff’s return to the contrary, she was never served
with process. The motion was denied, and Irene took an
appeal.

On December 6, 1979, Irene, through her counsel,
appeared before us in response to our order to show cause
why her appeal should not be dismissed because (1) she failed
to obtain the requisite certificate called for by Super. R. Civ.
P. 54(b) in a multiple-party action and (2), even assuming
the certificate had been obtained, there is nothing in the rec-
ord which could serve as a basis for faulting the trial justice’s
findings.

Our concern about the failure to comply with the certifica-
tion portion of Super. R. Civ. P. 54(b) proved needless. At
oral argument, proof was presented indicating that a named
defendant, Miles F. Campbell,’ had died several months
prior to the Jung-Campbell collision. Whatever interest the
deceased had in the Campbell vehicle has been transferred to
Irene. Thus, the only viable question is the correctness of the
trial justice’s denial of the motion to vacate.

At the Superior Court hearing, Irene denied ever being
served with process and then presented additional documen-
tary evidence which purported to show that on other occa-
sions when the Campbell clan had been involved in auto-

"There was a third defendant, Frank L, Fraioli, the operator of the Campbell car.
A default judgment was entered against him for $10,000 on June 21, 1976, Nothing
has been realized on that judgment.

ou es

motive litigation, the insurer had been contacted soon after
process had been served. However, there was nothing in this
documentary evidence that would support such a conclusion.
For instance, introduced as an exhibit was an affidavit of an
attorney who had sued Irene. The attorney averred that
Irene’s insurance carrier was American Universal Insurance
Company. There is an accident report to American Universal
dated October 25, 1965, reporting an accident that occurred
two days earlier. Neither the affidavit nor the report consti-
tute proof that Irene’s contact with her insurer was post-
service. The two-day interval between the October 1965
collision and the report date would indicate that Irene was
reporting to her insurer before litigation became a reality.

Irene’s daughter, Patricia, who lived with her mother dur-
ing the time when service in this case was supposedly made,
testified that at no time did she ever see the papers which
were served upon her mother, nor did she hear her mother
mention anything about a summons having been served upon
her. On cross-examination, however, Patricia conceded that
during the time of the alleged service she was working away
from home five days a week, Monday to Friday, from 8 a.m.
to 4:30 p.m.

The sheriff of Kent County presented his records, indica-
ting that Irene had been served with process on July 18, 1967.
The deputy sheriff whose return was being challenged testi-
fied by way of deposition. He insisted that Irene had been
served.

The trial justice, in denying the motion to vacate, alluded
to our ruling in Nocera v. Lembo, 111 RB.1. 17, 298 A.2d 800
(1973), where we ruled that a sheriffs return could be im-
peached by “strong and convincing evidence.” The trial jus-
tice found that Irene had failed to sustain this burden of
proof. Likewise, we find that Irene has failed to persuade us
that the trial justice, in his consideration of the record and
testimony, misconceived and overlooked material evidence.

Cause not having been shown, it is hereby ordered that the
defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment

ee 915

appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
Superior Court. Harold H. Winsten, Richard D. Boriskin,
for plaintiffs, Gordon C. Mulligan, for defendants.

February 14, 1980.

M. P. No. 80-29. Or.anpo A. ANDREONI v0. GRAND
Lopcr or THE STATE OF RuopE IsLaNnD, INDEPENDENT ORDER
oF Opp Fetiows et. al. The petition for writ of certiorari is
denied.

M. P. No, 80-57. IN THE Matrer oF THE ESTATE OF
Concercao Lopes Fonseca. The petition for writ of
certiorari and motion for restraining order are denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Owen B. Landman,
Selya and Iannuccillo, Inc., for petitioner, Richard Bruce
Feinstein, for respondents.

M. P. No. 80-58. Va.iey Gas Company v. Epwarp F,
Burke. This petition for statutory certiorari was filed pur-
suant to General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) 39-5-1 and
the writ shall issue in accordance with the provisions of
39-5-2, provided, however, that the record of the Public Util-
ities Commission in this proceeding shall not be required.
The stay entered herein on February 12, 1980 is continued
until further order of the court.

This case is assigned for oral argument to Thursday, March
13, 1980 at 9:30 a.m. The petitioner shall file its brief on or
before February 25, 1980 and the respondents shall file their
brief on or before March 3, 1980.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Edwards ¢ Angell,
Edward F. Hindle, Deming E. Sherman, for petitioner,
Dennis J. Roberts I, Attorney General, John R. McDermott,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Appeal No. 78-161. Town or Hopkinton 0. Cray J.
Keiser. The defendant’s request for permission to file his
motion for rehearing out of time is granted. After considera-
tion thereof, the motion for rehearing and request for stay of

o16 es

the Superior Court orders are denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Frank J. Williams,
Solicitor, for plaintiff, Clayton J. Keiser, pro se, for defen-
dant.

Appeal No. 78-222. Jorn Sxryzpisc et al. v. Aqua Fun,
Inc. v. A. AND A. ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION Com-
pany. This case comes before us on an order to show cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed because less than all
claims were disposed of in the Superior Court and no certifi-
cate of express determination of no just reason for delay was
entered by the trial justice in accordance with Super. R. Civ.
P. 54(b). Oral argument was presented by the parties on
February 6, 1980.

It appears that a counterclaim filed by A. and A. Engin-
eering and Construction Company, third party defendant,
against the third party plaintiff, Aqua Fun, Inc., was not dis-

posed of in the Superior Court, and also no formal judgment
was entered in respect to the third party complaint.

Therefore, the papers may be remanded to the Superior
Court for the County of Newport, either for disposition of the
third party defendant’s counterclaim, or for entry of a certifi-
cate of express determination of no just reason for delay by
the trial justice, and also for entry of a formal judgment upon
the jury’s verdict in relation to the third party complaint.
Meanwhile, it is determined that the issuance of execution
and supplementary process, where less than all claims have
been disposed of in the Superior Court, was premature. Con-
sequently, the decision on supplementary process is vacated
without prejudice to such proceedings being reinstituted
after all claims have been disposed of or certificate of no just
reason for delay has been entered. The appeal is dismissed
pro forma.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Thomas T. Brady,
Inc., Thomas T. Brady, for plaintiffs, Quinn, Cuzzone &
Geremia, John F. Cuzzone, Jr., for defendant Aqua Fun,
Inc.

es 17
February 21, 1980.

C. A. No. 78-458, SraTev. Epwarp Farre.u. The state’s
motion that we treat its notice of appeal as a petition for writ
of certiorari is denied. The defendant’s motion to dismiss the
state’s appeal is granted.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua and Mr. Justice Doris did not
participate. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Faith A.
LaSalle, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff,
Joseph A. Bevilacqua, Jr., for defendant.

February 28, 1980.

M. P. No, 78-323. Crry or CenTRAL Fauts, A MuNIcIPAL
Corporation v. Locat 1485 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
Firericnters, AFL-CIO et al. The petitioner’s motion to
amend the return date on the writ of certiorari is denied. The
petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed and the writ

heretofore issued is quashed. Paul G. MacLean, City
Solicitor, for petitioner, Capineri & Crowley, Frederic C.
Crowley, for Local 1485 International Association of Fire-
fighters, AFL-CIO.

M. P. No. 80-10. CatHerine E. Scuwarz v. Coasta
Resources MANAGEMENT CouNCIL, STATE OF RHODE IsLAND
et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Catherine
E. Schwarz, pro se, for petitioner, Goldman & Biafore,
Dennis H. Esposito, for respondent.

M. P. No, 80-25. Acnes Scorr MacGarFuin v. Depart-
MENT OF EMPLOYMENT Securiry Boarp oF Review. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Natale L. Urso,
Thomas J. Liguori, Jr., for petitioner, Gary R. Pannone,
Special Legal Counsel, Board of Review, for respondent.

M. P. No. 80-75. BrisroL AND WaRREN Gas CoMPAny 0.
Epwarp F. Burke, CHAIRMAN et al. The petitioner’s motion
for stay of the decision and order of the Public Utilities
Commission pending review is granted.

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua and Mr. Justice Kelleher are

918 |

of the opinion that the stay should be denied. Coffey,
McGovern, Noel & Novogroski, John G. Coffey, Jr., W.
Kenneth O’Donnell, for petitioner, Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, John R. McDermott, Special Assistant
Attorney General, John A. Notte III, for respondents.

M. P. No. 80-82. Stare v. Epwarp C. Acquisto. The
petition for writ of certiorari and motion for stay are denied.
Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin
III, Special Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Appellate
Division, for plaintiff-respondent, Bruce G. Pollock, Assist-
ant Public Defender, for defendant-petitioner.

C. A. No. 80-55. Henry Matreau v. STATE oF RHODE
IsLanp et al. The plaintiff's motion to dismiss this appeal as
premature is granted. Nugent & Nugent, J. Joseph Nugent,
Jr., for plaintiff, Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General,
Jeffrey B. Pine, Special Assistant Attorney General, for
defendants.

March 4, 1980.

Appeal No. 77-361. Joun R. Jones, Jr. v. Waurer
Mostxy. The defendant was directed to appear on March 3,
1980, and Show Cause why his appeal should not be dis-
missed in view of the fact that his motion for a new trial was
not supported by allegations appropriate for such a motion
following a jury-waived case, Colvin v. Goldenberg, 108 R.I.
198, 273 A.2d 663 (1971), and further, that the remaining
issues he raised lacked merit.

No cause having been shown, the appeal is hereby dis-
missed and the papers are remanded to the Superior Court.
Kathleen Managhan, for plaintiff, Dean J. Lewis, for
defendant.

March 13, 1980.

M. P. No. 80-10. Catuerine E. Scuwarz v. Coastal
Resources MANAGEMENT CounciL, STATE or RHopE IsLAND
et al. Certiorari was denied in this case on February 28, 1980.

ee 919

Petitioner has filed a motion requesting that we reconsider
our decision. The petitioner seeks review of a Superior Court
ruling affirming a decision of the Coastal Resources Manage-
ment Council. The Superior Court justice, after noting his
limited powers of review in administrative appeals, stated:

“As I indicated earlier, there are few avenues open in
view of the statute that governs administrative appeals,
and I do not find anything in the record that would
authorize the court to grant relief as prayed for by the
plaintiff.”

We have thoroughly reexamined the petition for certiorari
and accompanying exhibits and we find therein no basis for
disturbing the conclusion of the Superior Court justice.

Therefore, the motion of petitioner requesting that we
reconsider our previous denial of certiorari is denied.
Catherine E. Schwarz, pro se, for petitioner, Goldman &
Biafore, Dennis H. Esposito, for respondents.

M. P. No. 80-65. Crry or Woonsocket v. FRATERNAL
Orpen or Poxice, Lopcx #9 et al. The petition for writ of cer-
tiorari is denied. Aram P. Jarret, Jr., Assistant City Solicitor,
for petitioner, Paul P. Baillargeon, for respondents.

M. P. No. 80-81. KaTHERINE M. Burke v. ScHoo1 Com-
MITTEE OF THE Town oF LincOLN. The petition for writ of
certiorari is granted. Abedon, Michaelson, Stanzler, Biener,
Skolnik & Lipsey, Richard A. Skolnik, for plaintiff-respond-
ent, Asquith, Wiley & Ryan, Harry W. Asquith, Edward W.
Moses, for defendant-petitioner.

M. P. No. 80-95. Sravev. Roserr G. Cote. Treating the
petitioner’s writ of error as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, said petition is denied. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney
General, for plaintiff, Robert G. Cole, pro se, for defendant.

C. A. No. 78-224. SraTe v. ELperr BARNES AND DENNIS
R. Gomes. The petitions of defendants Elbert Barnes and
Dennis R. Gomes to reargue are denied. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, Faith A. LaSalle, Special Assistant Attor-

920 ee)

ney General, for plaintiff, Anthony E. Grilli, for defendant
Elbert Barnes, Mary E. Levesque, Assistant Public Defender,
for defendant Dennis Gomes.

C. A. No. 78-400. Stave v. Janer Waxsu e¢ al. The
motion of James Cardono to withdraw as counsel for the
defendant is denied. His motion to prosecute this appeal as
appointed counsel for an indigent defendant is granted.

Counsel for the defendant and the state are directed to
inquire into the whereabouts of defendant Janet Walsh, with
the assistance of defendant’s surety if necessary, and to
promptly report the results of their inquiry to this court.
Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, for plaintiff, James
Cardono, for defendant Janet Walsh.

C. A. No. 80-3. Srare v. Davin Couns et al. On
motion of counsel, John L. Cosentino is appointed to repre-
sent defendant James Foreman and Gerard DeCelles is
appointed to represent defendant Darryl Amado in the
prosecution of their appeal. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney
General, Stephen R. Famiglietti, Special Assistant Attorney
General, for plaintiff, John L. Cosentino, Gerard McG.
DeCelles, Alton W. Wiley, for defendants.

Appeal No. 78-314. Barsara Rocers v. Ropert W. AND
Mary E. LaVattey. This case comes before the court on an
order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.

After hearing arguments of counsel on March 4, 1980, we
are of the opinion that cause was not shown. Therefore, the
appeal of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed. Resmini, Fornaro,
Colagiovanni & Angell, Ronald J. Resmini, for plaintiff,
Taft, McSally & McKenna, James J. McKenna, for defen-
dants.

Appeal No. 79-354. ANN SANTELLE e¢ al. v. Miriam Hos-
pra et al. This case came before the court on March 4,
1980, on the defendants’ motion under Rule 16(g) to affirm
the judgment below which dismissed the complaint for fail-
ure to file this action for wrongful death within two years
after decedent’s death.

Ce ] 921

After hearing arguments of counsel and considering plain-
tiffs’ brief, we are of the opinion that in a wrongful death
action, the two year period within which the action must be
brought constitutes a condition or limitation upon the cre-
ated right itself and not merely a limitation affecting the
remedy. The statute permits of no exception to this require-
ment. Short v. Flynn, 118 R.I. 441, 374 A.2d 787 (1977);
Tillinghast v. Reed, 70 R.1. 259, 38 A.2d 782 (1944). There-
fore, the motion to affirm the judgment below is hereby
granted. Lynch & Coleman, John D. Lynch, for plaintiffs,
Roberts, Carroll, Feldstein & Tucker, David W. Carroll, R.
Kelly Sheridan, Jr., Hugh L. Moore, Jr., Hinckley, Allen,
Salisbury & Parsons, Thomas D. Gidley, for defendants.

Appeal No. 80-49. Srar Srreer AREA NEIGHBORHOOD
Ass’N v. Crry or Pawtucker Boarp or Zoninc Appeats. The
plaintiff herein has appealed from an order of the Superior
Court upholding a ruling of the Pawtucket Board of Zoning
Appeals. There is no right of appeal from such an order. Bassi
vy. Zoning Board of Review, 107 R.I. 702, 271 A.2d 210
(1970).

Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed
and the papers are remanded to the Superior Court. Stone,
Clifton & Clifton, Walter R. Stone, for plaintiff.

March 19, 1980.

Appeal No. 79-236. Provipence Tracers UNION 0.
Provence Scuoot Committee. This matter-comes before us
on a motion by the plaintiff to affirm a judgment of the
Superior Court confirming an arbitrator's award. This
motion was filed pursuant to our Rule 16(g). Oral argument
was presented by the parties on February 8, 1980. Pursuant
to principles enunciated in Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907,
391 A.2d 1173 (1978), and Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I.
332, 346 A.2d 124 (1975), the motion to affirm is hereby

"granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Abedon, Michael-
son, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey, Julius C. Michael-

92 Pe

son, for plaintiff, Vincent J. Piccirilli, for defendant.

March 20, 1980.

M. P. No, 80-86. W. Epwarp Woon eé al. v. WARREN V.
Pictixo et al, The petition for writ of certiorari and motion
for stay are denied. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General,
R. Daniel Prentiss, Allen P. Rubine, Assistant Attorneys
General, for plaintiff-respondent, Adler, Pollock é Sheehan,
Incorporated, John F. Bomster, for defendants-petitioners.

March 27, 1980.

M. P. No. 79-517. Avan L. BiRNBAUM et al. v. JOHNSON
& Wats Couxecs et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is
denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. DiSandro Associates,
Edmond A. DiSandro, for petitioners, William J. McGair,
for respondents.

M. P. No. 80-101. Ernest D. Grorce et al. v. Mites
Lazoratoniss, Inc. et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is
denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Archibald B.
Kenyon, Jr., for plaintiffs-respondents, Rice, Dolan, Kiernan
& Kershaw, Leonard A. Kiernan, Jr., for defendants-peti-
tioners. .

M. P. No. 80-107. Srar Srreer Arca NEIGHBORHOOD
Ass’N v. City or PawTucxer Boarp or ZONING AprEALs. The
petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Stone, Clifton &
Clifton, Walter R. Stone, for petitioner, Moses Kando,
Matthew C. Cunningham, for respondent.

Appeal No. 79-269. SmrrurieLp Pear Co., Inc. v.
Scorr-Lez Construction Co., Inc. et al. This case came
before us on March 6, 1980 on defendants’ motion under
Rule 16(g) to affirm the judgment below vacating a lis pen-
dens which plaintiff had placed upon land owned by certain

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of the defendants.

After hearing arguments of counsel and considering plain-
tiffs brief, we are of the opinion that the Superior Court jus-
tice correctly determined that the nature of plaintiff's action
here did not justify the filing of a lis pendens. Therefore, the
motion to affirm the judgment below is hereby granted.

Mr. Justice Doris did not participate. Oster, Groff & Pres-
cott, George M. Prescott, for plaintiff, Letts, Quinn & Licht,
Robert N. Huseby, Sr. (for Citizens Savings Bank), Abedon,
Michaelson, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lipsey, Carol E.
Najarian (for Ralph Camuso and Marion Camuso), for
defendants.

March 28, 1980.

C. A. No, 79-218. Strate Ex Rev Harry SUNDERLAND v.
Bryan WILLIAM JENNINGS. This case came before the court
on March 7, 1960, on the state’s motion under Rule 16(g) to
affirm the judgment of conviction below of the defendant of
driving under the influence of liquor. After hearing
arguments of counsel we are of the opinion that questions
raised by defendant have been settled by this court in State v.
Jennings, 117 R.I. 291, 366 A.2d 543 (1976). The motion to
affirm the judgment below is hereby granted. Dennis J.
Roberts II, Attorney General, Stephen Lichatin III, Special
Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Division, for
plaintiff, Aram K. Berberian, for defendant.

April 3, 1980.

M. P. No. 79-196. Joun H. Norserc, Tax Administrator
v. Doris M. Anmsrrone. The petitioner’s motion for stay of
execution sale as prayed is granted. Dennis J. Roberts II,
Attorney General, William G. Brody, Assistant Attorney
General, Perry Shatkin, Chief Legal Officer (Taxation), R.
Gary Clark, Assistant Tax Administrator, for plaintiff-
respondent. Samuel A. Olevson, for defendant-petitioner.

M. P. No. 80-122. Srareet al. v. HaRoLD MarxuaM, JR.

924 es

et al. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Edward H.
Torgen, for petitioners. Adamo & Newman, Edward H.
Newman, for respondents.

April 7, 1980.

AppeaL No. 78-376. Wayne L. Terri v. Recina R.
TerriLt. On February 27, 1980, respondent was ordered to
appear before this court on Monday, April 7, 1980, at 9:30
a.m. to show cause why her appeal in the above-entitled case
should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 16 of
the rules of this court relating to the filing of a brief. After
hearing argument from counsel for respondent, it is hereby
ordered that respondent’s appeal shall be dismissed unless
respondent shall file a brief in support of her appeal on or
before April 21, 1980.

Adamo & Newman, Edward H. Newman, for petitioner.
Kirshenbaum Law Offices, Inc., Allen M. Kirshenbaum, for
respondent.

Appeat No. 79-163. BLANCHE Dessert v, Rocer Dessert.
On February 27, 1980,.respondent was ordered to show
cause on Monday, April 7, 1980, why his appeal in the
above-entitled case should not be dismissed by reason of
failure to comply with Rule 16 as to time of filing a brief.
After hearing argument of counsel for respondent, it is
hereby ordered that said appeal shall be dismissed unless
respondent files his brief on or before April 14, 1980.

Raymond A. Thomas, for petitioner. Leo T. Connors, for
respondent.

Apprat No. 79-333. JoserH Prete v. Leo P. BARONIAN et
al, On February 27, 1980, plaintiff was ordered to appear
before this court on Monday, April 7, 1980, at 9:30 a.m. to
show cause why his appeal in the above-entitled case should
not be dismissed for lack of prosecution for failure to have
filed a brief in accordance with Rule 16 of the rules of this
court. Since plaintiff failed to appear to show cause pursuant

es 995

to this order, his appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of
prosecution.

John A. Varone, Matthew J. Zito, for plaintiff. Edwards
é& Angell, Stephen O. Meredith, for Intervenors-Defendants.