State: Missouri
Volume: 365
Term: 1955-1956
Jurisdiction(s): Missouri
Source: https://static.case.law/mo/365.pdf

Srars or Missourt, on the Information of Joun M. Dauron, Attorney
General, Relator, v. Taz Merropourran Sr. Louis Sewer Dis-
mriot, a Body Corporate, Municipal Corporation, and Political
Subdivision of the State of Missouri; Wm1iam C. E. Bucxur,
Joun M. Boepanor, JosspH L. Doran, Wmuiam W. Marrin,
J. BE. Wo1ams, Jr., and Groran C. Winison, Trustees of The
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, Respondents, No. 44550
—275 8. W. (2d) 225, .

Court en Bane, January 10, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, February 14, 1955.

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John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Robert R. Welborn, Assist-
ttorney General, for relator. _ .

John P. McCammon for respondents.

—Quo warranto against the Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer District and its trustees on the ground that it is operating
under an invalid and unconstitutional plan. There is no dispute
about the facts. The issue to be decided is whether the Plan under
which the District is organized and operating attempts to confer

[228] HYDE, J.

_
powers in excess of the constitutional authority under which the
District was formed.

See. 30(a), Art. VI (all constitutional references are to the
Constitution of 1945) authorizes the people of St. Louis City and
St. Louis County ‘‘to establish a metropolitan district or districts
for the functional administration of services common to the area
included therein’’; and provides that this power ‘‘shall be exercised
by the vote of the people of the city and county upon a plan pre-
pared by a board of freeholders.’’? The freeholders were properly
selected to prepare a plan for a Metropolitan Sewer District and the
plan prepared by them has been adopted by the voters. Relator con-
tends the entire plan should be held unconstitutional and void as. in
excess of any constitutional authorization.

Sec. 30(b) provides that, upon adoption by the voters the plan
“‘shall become the organic law of the territory therein defined, and
shall take the place of and supersede all laws, charter provisions
and ordinances inconsistent therewith relating to said territory.”’
The authority to prepare such a district plan is a broad grant of
legislative power to the freeholders (with confirmation by the voters)
similar to the grants in Sections 18, 19 and 20, Article VI, giving
certain counties and cities the right to frame, adopt and amend their
own charter. It is even greater because their plan supersedes con-
flicting laws. It is a recognition of the fact that the St. Louis Metro-
politan area has many problems which require ‘‘services common
to the area’; and it warrants provisions for powers, essential to
preservation of the public health and welfare, for a district such as
this one which, as hereinafter shown, exercises only governmental
powers. The apparent intent is to give the freeholders, with the ap-
proval of the voters, power to do whatever the Legislature could
ordinarily do with respect to the creation, organization and authority
of such a district.

The District Plan adopted in this case provides for its incorpora-
tion and government (Art. 1), its boundaries and extensions (Art.
2), its powers (Art. 3), enforcement of its ordinances (Art. 4), its
board of trustees (Art. 5), its executive director (Art. 6), its finances
(Art. 7), its personnel (Art. 8), its improvements (Art. 9), its elec-
tions (Art. 10) and amendments (Art. 11). There are miscellaneous
provisions in Article 12 and there is a schedule fixing the date of
the election on its adoption, the effective date of the Plan; and the
appointment, first meeting and first expenses of the trustees. Re-
lator summarizes the powers [229] of the District as set out in the
Plan, as follows:

“*(1) To extend the existing sewer system;

“*(2) To prevent pollution of water (Sec. 3.020(1)) ;

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“*(8) To prepare and adopt plans, designs, estimates, ete., for
sewer system, pumping and ventilating stations, disposal
and treating plants, etc., as the Board may deem necessary

(See. 8.020(2) ) ; .

“*(4) To construct extensions and additions on public or private

property (See. 3.020(3) ) ;

**(5) To construct sewage disposal plants and to sell products or

by-products manufactured in. the course of sewage treatment
(See. 8.020(4)) ;

“(6) To acquire and to sell personal property (Sec. 3.020(5)) ;

“(7) To exercise the power of eminent domain (Sec. 3.020(6)) ;

“(8) To contract for. the construction of sewers and their use

with either private persons or public agencies (Sec. 3.020-
(1);

““(9) And to charge therefor (See. 3.020(8)) ;

**(10) To contract for and to operate facilities for the abatement
of water pollution by industrial waste (Sec. 3.020(9));

(11) To seek and obtain grants in aid (See. 3.020(10)) ;

“(12) To make social security agreements for the benefit of em-
ployees (See. 3.020(11)) ;

*(18) To ineur debts by borrowing or otherwise and issue appro-
priate evidence thereof (See. 3.020(13)) ;

**(14) To issue tax anticipation warrants (Sec. 3.020(14));

“(15) To issue bonds payable (1) from taxes, (2) from special
benefit assesments, (3) from revenues, or (4) from any
combinations of such methods (See. 3.020(15)) ;

(16) To establish rates and charges for use of sewer facilities
(See. 3.020(16)) ;

“(17) To contract with municipalities or water companies for the
collection of sewer service charges (Sec. 3.020(17)) ;

“*(18) To enter upon any lands for the purpose of making surveys
(See. 8.020(18)) ;

“*(19) To approve plans and designs for sewers, pumping, dis-
posal and treatment plants, and no such facilities shall be
constructed without the approval of the District (Sec.
8.020(19)) ; .

“*(20) To levy, assess and collect taxes on all taxable property
in the District (See. 3.020(20)) ;

“*(21) To fix, levy and collect special benefit assessments on real
property in the District (Sec. 3.020(21)) ;

«*(22) To provide a retirement system for employees (Sec. 3.020
(22));

*(23) To require owners of real property to connect with sewer
facilities of the District (See. 3.020(28)) ;

’

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“(24) To subdivide the District into subdistricts and provide
the boundaries therefor (Sec. 3.020(24)) ;

**(25) To make contracts and execute all imstruments necessary
in the premises (Sec. 3.020(12));

“<(26) And to provide for the functional administration of other
services when authorized by amendment of the Plan (Sec.
8.020(25)) ;

(27) To establish flood control lines and to control the.use of
private lands within said lines, to alter channels and reg-
ulate the erection of all structures within such flood lines

+ (See. 8.080) ;

“*(28) To police streams and prohibit dumping therein (Sec.3.040) ;
and

[280] ‘*(29) To impose penalties for violations of its ordinances
(See. 3.010).””

| | Relator says the Constitution only authorizes the establishment

of a metropolitan district, ‘‘for the functional administration of
services common to the area included therein’’, and contends the above
enumerated powers attempted to be granted in the Plan are far in
excess of requirements for that purpose. Relator argues for a narrow
definition of the term ‘‘functional administration’’ and says that- a
valid plan could only confer powers which were directly related to
the operation of sewer facilities in the area included in the Plan.
Powers which relator specifically claims are beyond the authority to
operate sewer facilities are those stated in Sec. 3.030 to establish
building lines or floodway reservation lines along or adjacent to any
watercourse or stream and to prevent building without permission
within such lines, which relator says confers zoning powers; and
those stated in Sec. 3.040 to police and clean out channels of streams,
to prohibit dumping therein and to require removal, of material de-
posited within the lines fixed by the District. Relator further claims .
the District includes areas which do not have common sewer problems
becquse they. drain through different watersheds. Relator also says
“the following may not properly be considered within the scope of
the constitutional limitation of ‘functional administration’: (1) The
condemnation of property authorized by Section 3.020(6) of the
plan; (2) Unlimited borrowing authorized by Section 3.020(18) ;
(3) The bonding of the District, authorized by Section 3.020(15) ;
(4) The issuance of tax anticipation warrants, authorized by Section
3.020(14); and (5) The taking over by the District, without com-
pensation, of all sewers in the area covered, under Section 3.010.”
However, the constitutional authority is not merely to prepare
and adopt a plan for operation of sewer facilities. It does not say
services common to sewers. Instead it authorized a plan for operation
of ‘‘services common to the area.’? This is a very broad term and is

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not limited to any particular kind of services. Moreover, the author-
ity is for a plan which ‘“‘shall become the organic law of the territory”’
on the subjects and purposes of the plan. Our view is that all services,
common to the area for the protection of the public health and
welfare in connection with drainage and sewage disposal, may be
properly established for such a district as this. We think the term
“functional administration’’ of such services, as used in the Constitu-
tion, means the administration of such services so as to make them
function properly for the purposes for which they were intended,
namely: preservation and protection of the public health and welfare
by drainage and sewage disposal. Drains and sewers are closely con-
nected, with many related problems, and have a common, purpose with
respect to public health and welfare; so that similar principles are
applicable to both. (17 Am. Jur. 780, Sec. 2; See also 28 C. J. S. 231,
Sec. 1.) It is certainly proper for a single district to handle the
problems of both. (See Chap. 248, especially Sec. 248.010 authorizing
districts for construction of drains or sewers. Statutory references
are to RSMo. and V.A.M.S.) Providing for drainage and sewerage is
a governmental function and an exercise of the police power of the
state. (State ex rel. Becker v. Wellston Sewer District, 332 Mo. 547,
58 S.W. (2d) 988; Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan
Sewer District v. Town of Strathmoor Village, (Ky.), 211 8. W. (2d)
127; 17 Am. Jur. 780-781; Sec’s. 3-5, 785-786, See’s. 11-13; 28 0.3.8.
232, Sec. 2.) Therefore, it was proper to provide in the Plan for
powers to prevent pollution of water, to plan and construct sewers
and sewer plants and to require their use, to regulate drainage by
establishing building lines and floodway reservations along water-
courses, to prevent building within such lines, to police and clean out
channels of streams and to prevent dumping therein. It is very likely
that proper sewage disposal could not be accomplished without proper
drainage control, especially in the situation herein involved. It is
shown by relator’s exhibit (filed with and made a part of its petition)
“that most industrial, [281] commercial, and residential property
in the County is on comparatively high ground and drains downhill
through the City.’’ It is easy to understand what floods caused by in-
adequate drainage can do to sewage disposal. We hold the powers
authorized by the Plan for drainage, sewage disposal and prevention
of pollution and obstruction of streams are within the constitutional
authority and valid.

Relator’s claim that the Plan attempts to include i in the Dis-
trict areas, which have no common problems of sewage disposal, is
based on the inclusion of three county areas that do not drain through
the City. These are the Lemay Sewer District, which has a sewer sys-
tem draining directly into the Mississippi River below the southern
limits of the City; the Gravois Creek watershed which drains into the

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River Des Peres a short distance above the place where that river
flows into the Mississippi and which relator says drains only a very
small part of the City, and the Coldwater Creek watershed which
drains a part of the County north of the City and flows into the Mis-
souri River above its confluence with the Mississippi. However, the
area to be included in such a District is a matter of legislative discre-
tion (in this case of the freeholders with the approval of the voters)
subject, of course, to the limitation that it must not be arbitrary and
unreasonable. (See 11 Am. Jur. 901, Sec. 199; 17 Am. Jur. 791, Sec.
20; 28 C. J. S. 240, Sec. 7.) As stated in relator’s exhibit ‘‘disease
communicating insects and microbes recognize no political boundaries
of county, city, or village.’? Thus, health hazards of raw sewage,
septic tank effluent or inadequately treated sewage affect areas other
than those of the watershed through which they drain. It is suggested
that one large disposal plant for sewage from areas draining into the
Mississippi south of the City would be the most effective and econom-
ical way to protect the people of the City and those of adjacent areas
of the County. As to the area north of the City, draining into the
Missouri River, not only are these same factors present but also this
sewage must flow down the Mississippi past the City and the water-
works which supply the City. We, therefore, hold that it does not
appear unreasonable to include these areas in the District and that
the Plan is not invalidated by their inclusion.

Hl The other powers’ objected to, namely, condemnation, 3.020(6),
incurring debts, 3.020(18), issuance of tax anticipation warrants,
3.020(14), and issuance of bonds, 3.020(15), are essential powers of
such a District. Our Legislature has always given drainage and sewer
districts the power of condemnation and they could not function with-
out it. (See Chap. 249, relating to sewer districts in the County;
See also 17 Am. Jur. 789, Sec. 18, p. 811, See. 54; 28 O.J.S. 233,
See. 2.) Likewise, without the power to incur debts and issue bonds,
adequate drains, sewers and disposal plants could not be constructed.
However, in the exercise of this power, the District is subject to the
financial limitations imposed by the Constitution on all governmental
subdivisions. Therefore, it cannot by tax anticipation warrants or
otherwise ‘‘become indebted in an amount exceeding in any year the
income and revenue provided for such year plus any unencumbered
balances from previous years’’, without ‘‘a vote of two-thirds of the
qualified electors voting thereon’’, and even then, ‘‘not to exceed five
per centum of the value of taxable tangible property’’ of the District.
(See, 26, Art. VI.) These limitations are recognized and stated in the
Plan, Sec’s. 7.130 and 7.150. We hold these contested powers, with the
limitations placed on them are proper and valid powers and that the
Plan is not invalidated by establishing them.

The provision of Sec. 3.010 for taking over all existing sewers,
constructed by public agencies, is likewise a necessary, proper and

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valid provision. These sewers are not private property; they have
been built for public purposes under the police power of the state.
They are public property aud their transfer to this District is a mere
transfer of custodianship. (Veail v. Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District, (Ky.), 197 S. W. (2d) 413.) [2382] We
have stated similar principles as to property of school districts. (See
School District of Oakland v. School District of Joplin, 340 Mo. 779,
102 8. W. (2d) 909.) The transfer is only from one public trustee
to another.

Hl Relator also makes the following contentions about the taxing
powers of the District and the methods provided for assessing and
collecting taxes: (1) that the provision for taxing all tangible pro-
perty is in excess of its authority and invalid; (2) that the attempt
to levy property taxes at different rates in the City and the County
violates Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution; (3) and that the method
provided for assessing and collecting taxes which imposes duties on
City and County officers is improper and invalid. As to the first con-
tention, relator points out that Sec. 30(b), Art. VI, under which this
District is organized, provides: ‘‘The plan shall provide for the
assessment and taxation of real estate in accordance with the use to
which it is being put at the time of the assessment, whether agricul-
tural, industrial or other use, giving due regard to the other provisions
of this Constitution.’’ This does not say that tangible personal
property may not be taxed by the District. As hereinafter stated, we
do not think this provision relates to taxation for the general purposes
of the District, because it provides a different basis of assessment than
is provided for general taxes. (See Sec. 4(b), Art. X.) Other provi-
sions of the Constitution do authorize consideration of all tangible
property together in connection with the limitations on and require-
ments for payment of the indebtedness of any political subdivision
of the State, which is how this District is classified for purposes of
taxation. (Sec. 15, Art. X.) See. 26(b), Art. VI, prohibits any: such
district as this from becoming indebted in excess of ‘‘five per centum
of the value of taxable tangible property therein as shown by the last
completed assessment for state and county purposes.’’ Sec. 26(f),
Art. VI, provides that before incurring any indebtedness any such
district ‘‘shall provide for the collection of an annual tax on all tax-
able tangible property therein sufficient to pay the interest and prin-
cipal of the indebtedness.’’ Real and tangible personal property are
also placed on the same basis in several provisions of Article X on
taxation. (See See’s. 8,11(a),and12(a). ) Relator does not claim the
District has no right to tax real estate for its general purposes and
our view is that it was within the constitutional grant of legislative
power to provide for taxation of all tangible property for the general
purposes and general obligations of the District. Ad valorem taxation

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of all taxable property in sewer districts has heretofore been author-
ized. (See Sec. 249.090; see also 28 O.J.S. 232, Sec. 2.) Sec. 11(a);
Art. X provides that political subdivisions, which under Sec. 15, Art.
X includes drainage, sewer and levee districts, may levy taxes on all-

. property subject to their taxing powers. We hold it was proper for
the Plan to provide for general taxation of tangible personal property
as well as real estate.

Hl Sec. 11(a), Art. X also provides that the assessed valuation in
any political subdivision ‘‘shall not exceed the assessed valuation of
the same property for state and county purposes.’’ Sec. 8, Art. X re-
quires that taxes ‘‘shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.’’ These
provisions are for the purpose of bringing about uniformity in assess-
ment and levy of taxes. They apply to general taxes and we do not
believe that the framers of the Constitution intended to change the
basis of assessment for taxes on property for the general purposes
of such a district by what was said in Sec. 80(b), Art. VI. Real
property (and tangible personal property) is required by Sec. 4(b),
Art. X to be ‘‘assessed for tax purposes at its value or such percent-
age of its value as many be fixed by law.’’ It seems more reasonable
to believe this provision for ‘‘assessment and taxation of real estate
in accordance with the use to which it is being put at the time of the
assessment’? referred to special assessments. The use to which the
property is being put is more applicable to the basis of benefits which
is the usual criterion for [233] special benefits. ‘A special assess-
ment can be levied only on land.’’ (48 Am. Jur. 566, Sec. 3.) A special
assessment ‘‘is not a tax in the sense of a tax to raise revenue for
general governmental purposes’’ but it ‘‘is taxation in the sense that
it is a distribution of that which is originally a public burden.” (48
Am. Jur. 565, Sec. 8, p. 571, Sec. 9; See also 28 C.J.S. 397, See. 55.)
Thus these terms must have been used in this latter sense. In any
event, the statement was qualified by the final clause, ‘‘giving due
regard to the other provisions of this Constitution.’’ This very clearly
prevents the assessment of property for general purposes of the Dis-
trict from being made on any other basis than its value (Sec. 4(b),
Art. X) and requires that such value shall not exceed the assessed
valuation for state and county purposes. (Sec. 11(a), Art. X.)
Therefore, the District may properly take the assessment of real and
tangible personal property, made by the City and County Assessors,
as its assessment basis for taxes for its general purposes.

| | The matter of conflict with Sec. 8, Art. X by levying general
property taxes at different rates in the City and the County, presents
a serious question. We cannot uphold the method of levying general
taxes adopted by the Board because it does not conform to consti-
tutional requirements. Sec. 7.180 provides that after determining the

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amount of taxes required for the next year (for operation and main-
tenance and also for any interest or maturing principal on District
bonds) the Board of Trustees (the governing body of the District, See.
1.020) shall certify to the Board of Aldermen and other specified
officers of the City the amount of such taxes to be collected on all
taxable tangible property in the District within the corporate limits of
the City and shall certify to the County Council and other specified
officers of the County the amount of such taxes to be collected on all
taxable tangible property in the District within the County. Sec.
7.180 then provides that the officers of the City and County ‘‘shall
levy such rate of taxation upon all taxable tangible property in the
District * * * within their respective jurisdictions as will produce
the respective amounts of taxes certified.”’

The result of this method for the first year is that a tax of three
cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation is required to collect
the amount certified to be collected in the County while a tax of only
two cents on such valuation is required to collect the amount certified
to the City. This result is in direct conflict with See. 8, Art. X which
provides: ‘‘Taxes * * * shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.’’
This provision clearly prohibits taxing real estate and tangible
personal property for the general purposes and general obligations of
the entire District at a different rate on its valuation in various parts
of the District. This tax is the general tax of the District and the
levy is made for the District and not for City and County whose
officers act for the District in making it; and it is not uniform on the
same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the District which
authorizes the levy and receives the taxes. Surely no one would claim
that the Missouri General Assembly could avoid this constitutional
uniformity provision, in providing a tax for the general purposes of
the state, by apportioning the amount to be collected in each County
so that the required rate of levy would be different in each County
instead of being uniform throughout the state. ‘‘If the tax is a state
tax it must be uniform throughout the state. If the,tax is a county tax,
it must be uniform throughout the county, etc. * * * The uniform-
ity corresponds to the territorial limits of the taxing district.’”’ (1
Cooley on Taxation 645, Sec. 311.) Clearly fixing the amount to be
collected has the effect of fixing the rate and is the vital step in levy-
ing the tax. (See 51 Am. Jur. 614, Sec. 647.) The word levy ‘‘is
sometimes used, in the administrative sense, as referring to the mere
ministerial or executive acts of ascertaining and entering taxes on
the tax book and collecting them.’’ (84 C.J.S. 679, Sec. 349.) We ©
construe Sec. 7.180 to use the term ‘‘levy’’ substantially in that sense.
Therefore, [234] we must hold that the portion of the property tax
in the County in excess of tHat in the City is an invalid levy.

rs

Of course, this uniformity does not apply to special assessments
which are on a different basis from ad valorem taxes (see State ex rel.
Jones v. Nolte, 350 Mo. 271, 165 8. W. (2d) 632) but this tax is levied
for the general purposes and general obligations of the entire Dis-
trict and must be uniform throughout the District to comply with
the Constitution. Undoubtedly, if the City and County were each
made subdistricts for separate improvements in each, a tax to pay
for such separate improvements would present a differexit situation.
Furthermore, authority for apportionment of the amounts to be col-
lected for the general purposes of the entire District between the City
and County without any standards whatever would be invalid for
another reason. Sec. 8, Art. X is a recognition of the principle of
equality and uniformity of taxation required by the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
which ‘‘imposes a limitation upon all powers of the state which can
touch the individual or his property, including among them that of
taxation.’’ (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th Ed. 580, Sec. 249; See also
12 Am. Jur. 207, Sec. 518; 51 Am. Jur. 222-225, Sec’s. 167-169; 16
OSS. 1042, Sec. 520; 84 C.JS.S. 75, Sec. 21 et seq.; Kansas City South-
ern Ry. Co. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658; 41 S. Ct.
604, 65 L. Hd. 1151; Hillsborough Twp. v. Cromwell, 326 U. 8. 620, 66
S. Ct. 445, 90 L. Ed. 358 ; State ex rel. Ashby v. Cairo Bridge & Termi-
nal Co., 340 Mo. 190, 100 8. W. (2d) 441.) While classification may be
made in tax legislation, it must be a reasonable classification and there
can be no discrimination between taxable subjects which properly be-
long to the same class. (See 51 Am. Jur. 235-239, Sec’s. 176-178; 84
C.J.S, 112, Sec. 36; 1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th Ed. 712, See. 334.) Cer-
tainly whether property, of the same value and in this same District, is
located in the City or the County is not a reasonable basis for classi-
fication for taxation for the general purposes and general obligations
of the entire District, especially since the part of the County in the
District is essentially urban, much of it in incorporated cities. To
make this the sole basis for a different amount of tax on the same
valuation for the same purpose would be palpably arbitrary and
unreasonable. As fhe above cited authorities show, a levy based on
such arbitrary action would be invalid at least to the extent of the
unequal result obtained.

However, an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute will
not be sustained if there is any reasonable theory upon which its
constitutionality may be upheld; and if it is susceptible of two con-
structions, one making it valid and the other invalid, construction
sustaining validity will be adopted. (State ex rel. Kelley v. Kirby,
260 Mo. 120, 168 S. W. 746; State ex rel. Columbia Telephone Co. v.
Atkinson, 271 Mo. 28, 195 S. W. 741; Automobile Gasoline Co. v. City
of St. Louis, 826 Mo. 485, 82 8. W. (2d) 281; State ex rel. Webster

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Groves Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 365, 115 8. W. (2d)
816; Zinn v. City of Steelville, 351 Mo. 413, 173 8S. W. (2d) 398.)
Sec. 7.180 read alone states no standards for making the apportion-
ment between the City and the County, and seems to authorize arbi-
trary action. However, when it is read and construed with Sec. 1.020
it ean be held valid. Sec. 1.020 provides: ‘‘Pursuant to the provisions
of this Plan and subject to the limitations imposed hereby and by the
Constitution of Missouri, all powers of the District shall be vested in
a Board of Trustees.’’ (Our italics.) This reads Sec. 8, Art. X into
and makes it a part of Sec. 7.180 and requires an apportionment that
will result in a uniform tax. It is apparent that the Board could
make an apportionment on the basis of assessed valuation which would
produce a uniform tax on all tangible property in the District and
such a tax levy would be valid. The situation presented by this record
is an invalid exercise of a valid power. We, therefore, hold that See.
7.180 does not invalidate the Plan.

[285] As to the duties imposed on City and County officers
in assessment, levy and collection of District taxes, we hold this is not
improper. It is very similar to what has previously been done by the
Legislature in provisions for drainage and sewér districts. (See
Chap’s. 248 and 249, particularly Sec’s. 248.120 and 249.130.) How-
ever, there is no good reason why the District Board should not be
authorized to make the complete levy of the general tax rate itself
as does the School Board of the City. (See Sec. 165.637.) As we have
noted, fixing the amount to be collected determines the tax rate. (S¢ée
51 Am. Jur. 621, Sec. 656; 84 O.J.S. 679, Sec. 349.) Of course, it is
proper to use the property assessment made by the Assessors of the
City and County and that is the advisable thing to do in view of the
limitations of Sec. 26(b), Art. VI and Sec. 11(a), Art. X. Collection
of taxes by the Collectors of the County and City is not only proper
but in accord with the ordinary practice and usual provisions for col-
lection of taxes of political subdivisions with power to tax. We hold
that the District is properly organized and established in accordance
with the constitutional authority; that the challenged powers are
proper and valid; and that the trustees are properly and lawfully
occupying their positions as such.

Judgment of ouster is denied. All concur.

Ow Motion ror Reaearine or to Mopiry Opinion

HH HYDE, J.—Respondents argue for a change in our ruling
concerning Sec. 7.180 of the Plan. They say that the basis of assess-
ment in the City and the County is not the same and that it is neces-
sary to make an apportionment between the City and the County of
the total amount to be collected by general taxes in order to have
uniformity of taxation. They say ‘‘when all taxpayers outside of

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the City are assessed at a lower percentage of fair value than those
within the City, those within the City may properly demand that
the tax may be made uniform, in accordance with the guarantees of
the state and federal constitutions.* * * Realizing, as the Board
of Freeholders did, that with different assessors, different assessment
theories and practices, with also a possibility that the resulting
valuations in City and County might well lack uniformity, they
wisely provided the means whereby the Board of Trustees could
secure uniformity of the tax. This result is accomplished by the
device of hearings and findings of fact. (Sec. 7.190, Plan.) * * *
The Board of Trustees made the determination that an ‘equalization’
of the tax will require the collection of the amounts set out in the
ordinance.’’

In the first place, there is nothing in the record in this case about
unequal assessments. However, and more important, our Consti-
tution provides the method for having equal assessments by requiring
in See. 4b, Art. X that real and tangible personal property ‘‘shall
be assessed for tax purposes at its value’’ (except where percentage
of value is authorized by law) ; and the General Assembly has estab-
lished the State Tax Commission to enforce this provision. Sec’s.
188.880 and 138.390 RSMo., V.A.MS. give the State Tax Commission
ample authority for this purpose. Futhermore, there is no reason
why the District could not be authorized to make its own assessments
if that seems desirable. Sec. 11(a), Art. X prohibits the District’s
assessed valuations from exceeding the assessed valuation for state
and county purposes but does not say they shall not be lower. What.
respondents really argue for (under their view of Sec. 7.180 of the
Plan) is the power to in effect exceed the valuations for state and
county purposes in the County by levying their general taxes on the
basis of what they believe the County assessments should be. They
would do this by apportioning to the County the amount of taxes
which they believe would be produced by assessments in the amounts
they think should have been made by the County. We reaffirm our
ruling that the Constitution prohibits this method.

The motion is overruled. All concur.

a "

Jnweit M. Scuwarrz, Administratrix of the Estate of Epmunp J.
Scuwarrz, Deceased, Respondent, v. Kansas Crry Souramrn

Ramway Company, a Corporation, Appellant, No. 44261—275
S.W. (2d) 236.

Division Two, January 10, 1955.

Motion for Rehearing, to Modify Opinion or to Transfer to Bane Overruled
in Per Curiam Opinion Filed, February 14, 1955.

Richard 8. Righter, Robert D. Youle, James F. Walsh and Lynn
M. Ewing for appellant.

Sam R. Gardner and Jo B. Gardner for respondent.

[236] WESTHUES, C.—This is a suit filed by plaintiff Jewell
M. Schwartz as administratrix of the estate of Edmund J. Schwartz,
her husband, deceased, to recover damages for his death. A trial by
jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum
of $22,500. Defendant appealed. .

Plaintift’s cause of action was based on the Federal Employers’
Liability Act. Plaintiff’s husband lost his life on August 27, 1952,
when he was cutting weeds and brush on defendant’s right of way

a °

in Vernon County, Missouri. The immediate cause of death was
that a tractor Schwartz was using in mowing the weeds turned over
and trapped him thereunder.

Plaintiff’s case was submitted to a jury on failure of the defendant
to furnish Schwartz a safe place in which to work; failure to warn of
the dangerous condition [237] of the ground by reason of the contour
of the ground and the guy wires on the right of way; and failure to
provide a helper or guide to assist in the work.

The defendant’s principal point of defense on this appeal is, as it
was at the trial, that Schwartz was not an employee of the defendant,
but was an independent contractor. Further, if he was an employee,
plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that defendant
failed to furnish a safe place to work.

The evidence showed the following: Schwartz was a farmer living
near Richards, Missouri. In 1951, he entered into a contract with the
defendant Railway Company to mow weeds or brush on the railroad
right of way. The contract provided that Schwartz was to use his own
tractor and mowing equipment at a stipulated price per hour. In
July, 1952, a similar contract was executed whereby Schwartz agreed
to mow weeds and brush on defendant’s right of way by use of his
own tractor and mowing machines at $3 per hour. In August, the
section foreman notified Schwartz that mowing was to begin August
11. Under the contract Schwartz had the right to work any number of
hours on any day he chose. Plaintiff testified that on Sunday, August
10, her husband began the work of mowing and put in a few hours’
work on that day. On the morning of August 27, 1952, plaintiff took
her husband in their automobile to a road crossing south of the
Marmaton River, where his equipment was then located, to commence
his work for the day. It was understood that plaintiff was to meet
her husband at this crossing at 7:00 P.M. Mrs. Schwartz returned to
the crossing and waited some time but her husband failed to show up.
Plaintiff became alarmed and notified the section foreman and some
of her friends. .A search was made and Schwartz was found dead
under the tractor which had turned upside down. Witnesses testified
that the tractor had turned over near a guy wire which was anchored
in the ground. At this point where the tractor turned over, there
was an embankment upon which the railroad tracks were located.
At the spot where the guy wire was anchored in the ground, there was

_ a level space and on the lower side of the point where the wire entered
the ground, it was level for about 3 feet. It is plaintiff’s theory that
Schwartz drove the tractor onto this level space where it struck the
guy wire and then turned over, the 3-foot space not being of sufficient
width for the tractor to pass. The slope from the top of the embank-
ment down to the bottom was rather steep. It is also plaintiff’s theory
that the lower portion of the guy wire was hidden from view by the

TT

high weeds and brush. It is plaintiff’s contention that the insufficient
level space below the guy wire for the tractor to pass the wire itself
plus the fact that it (the guy wire) could not be seen rendered the
place unsafe for Schwartz; that defendant should have notified
Schwartz of the danger or have sent a guide with him for the purpose
of pointing out the danger. It was in evidence that a great deal of the
space along the embankment was uneven and rough.

The Federal Employers’ Libility Act, upon which plaintiff
based her claim, eliminated from the law the defense of ‘‘contributory
negligence.’? The plea of ‘‘assumption of risk’? was eliminated to
the extent that an employer may not escape liability where negligence
on his part in whole or in part contributed to the injury. Tiller v.
‘Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 143 A.L.R. 967, 318 U. 8. 54. However, to
establish liability, a plaintiff is required to produce evidence from
which negligence may be inferred by,a jury. In this case, plaintiff was
required to produce evidence from which it could be inferred that the
defendant was in some "degree negligent in not furnishing plaintiff a
safe place in which to work. Many hazards are encountered by employ-
ees in the industrial world that no amount of care or foresight can
avoid. Apropos of this, note the following taken from the Tiller case,
supra, 143 A.L.R. Le. 975, 976, where Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurring opinion, said: “Tndustrial enterprise entails, for all
those engaged in it, certain hazards to life and limb which [238] no
amount of care on the part of the employer can avoid. In denying
recovery to an employee injured as a result of exposure to such a
hazard, where the employer has in no sense been negligent or derelict
in the duty owed to his employees, courts have often said that the
employee ‘assumed the risk.’ Here the phrase ‘assumption of risk’
is used simply to convey the idea that the employer was not at fault
and therefore not liable.’’

In the ease before us, Schwartz was employed to mow weeds and
brush with his own mowing equipment upon defendant’s right of way.
The right of way consisted to a great extent of embankments with
slopes of various degrees and uneven terrain. Telephone and telegraph
poles with guy wires, are common and of general use on railroad
right of ways. They were present on the railroad property where
Schwartz was to do the mowing. It would certainly have been impos-
sible for the defendant to have removed the guy wires and poles or to
have provided a level terrain for Schwartz. It would also have been |
impractical to have provided a guide for the purpose of informing
Schwartz of the location of the guy wires and poles or to inform him
where, in the opinion of the guide, the slope was too steep for the
tractor to be used with safety. Schwartz was an experienced operator
of tractors and in all probability knew as much as anyone of the
dangers of using tractors on a steep incline. Plaintiff introduced evi-

Se °

dence that the weeds and brush were so high and dense as to obstruct
the view of the lower part of the guy wire. The upper part of the guy
wire and the pole to which it was attached were within view. But,
be that as it may, Schwartz was employed for the very purpose of
cutting the weeds and brush. Had the defendant cleared the ground
before employing Schwartz, there would have been no weeds and
brush to cut. Again, who could have made the place safe for such
weed cutters? Further, the plaintiff says the level space below
where the guy wire entered the ground was not wide enough for a
tractor to pass. The level space was not intended to be used for that

_ purpose. After viewing the case from all angles, we fail to see wherein

the defendant was negligent or failed in its duty to Schwartz. Mowing
weeds on the slopes of railroad embankments with tractor power is
somewhat dangerous and cannot be made entirely safe. It is common
knowledge that sometimes tractors do turn over when used on embank-
ments. The operator of the tractor must use his own judgment and
avoid the danger. No amount of care on the part of defendant
could have eliminated the danger in this case. In the case of Ecken-
rode v. Penusylvania R. Co., 164 F. (2d) 996, le. 1000, the court
at the conclusion of the opinion made the following comments which
may well be used in this case: ‘‘Any Federal Judge who sees these
railroad accident cases come in and go out of the courts must be
troubled by the unsatisfactory social results obtained. Some claimants
go out with very large verdicts. Others go out with nothing. Yet
# * # the disastrous consequences wpon the victim or his family
are equally heavy. But so long as the law is that the defendant must be
negligent for the plaintiff to recover for his injuries it is our respon-
sibility to apply the negligence test honestly and not to pretend that
there is negligence when it does not exist. It does not exist in this
case.’’? In that case there was a judgment for the defendant. It was
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. See 335 U. 8. 329.

Plaintiff has cited many cases, both state and federal, to support
her contention that defendant was negligent in failing to provide
her husband a safe place in which to work. We have examined a
number of these and by referring to the cases cited it will be found
that in each there was evidence of some defect in the appliance or some
lack of due care. In Joice v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 354 Mo.
439, 189 S. W. (2d) 568, Joice was injured when an extra train
struck a motorcar. The negligence charged was failure to notify
Joice of the whereabouts of the extra train and in furnishing him
a defective motorcar for use in assigned work. In Curtis v. Atchison,
T. & SF. Ry. Co., 863 Mo. 779, 253 S.W. (2d) 789, the negligence
charged was failure to have the lights burning [239] which had been
provided to illuminate the yards where Curtis stumbled over an
obstacle. In Holmes v. Terminal R. R. Assn. of St. Louis, 363 Mo.

Ss

1178, 257 §.W.(2d) 922, Holmes was injured when he slipped on an
iey surface trying to pull a heavy baggage truck. The negligence was
failure to have the truck properly lubricated, failure to remove the
ice, and that the truck was too heavy for one man to move. In Willis
y. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 352 Mo. 490, 178 S.W. (2d) 341,
there was a defect in the loading device used in loading and unloading
automobiles on and off railroad cars.

In Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. 8. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, Haney, the
deceased, a member of a train crew, was alleged to have been struck
in the back of the head by a mail hook hanging loosely on the outside
of a mail car. Haney was struck as the train passed him at the rate of |
8 to 10 miles per hour. In Blair v. B. & O. RB. Co., 323 U. 8. 600, 89
L, Ed. 490, the plaintiff was injured while unloading heavy steel pipes
from a railroad car. Blair had protested that the pipes were too
heavy for him to unload and suggested that the railroad car should be
moved to the consignee’s place of business where proper equipment for
unloading such pipes was located. Blair was ordered to unload the
pipes. In attempting to perform that task, he was injured. One of
the charges of negligence was that the floor of the warehouse was
uneven where the unloading took place.

Cutting weeds and brush on railroad right of ways whether by
tractor power, or horse-drawn mowing machines, or by scythes in the
hands of employees is accompanied by dangers of various degrees
that cannot be avoided. A man cutting weeds on a steep embankment
with a scythe may strike a wire, rock, or other substance causing him
to fall to his injury. So, in this case, if Schwartz had been warned
that there were present on the right of way such obstacles as telephone
and telegraph poles, guy wires, uneven terrain, ete., it would not have
conveyed to Schwartz any information which he did not already
know. It is, therefore, our opinion that the evidence in this case was
insufficient to sustain a finding of negligence.

It follows that the judgment in plaintiff’s favor must be and is
hereby reversed. Bohling and Barrett, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Wesruuns, C., is
adopted as the opinion of the court. Bllison, P. J., and Dew and
Anderson, Special Judges, concur; Leedy, J., not sitting.

On Moron vor RwxEarmve, To Mopiry Opmnion, or To TRANSFER
to Court En Banc

Hi PER CURIAM:—Respondent has filed motions for rehearing,
or to modify the opinion, or to transfer to the court en banc, wherein
it is vigorously urged that this court decided the case on an issue
that was not in the case.

It is boldly asserted that respondent did not submit the case to
a jury on the theory that the defendant failed to furnish a safe place

a ;

to work. The suggestions in support of the motions begin with the
following statement: ‘The court missed the boat in this case. It
got in the wrong boat and took plaintiff for a free ride over the
rapids, and splashed water on him; and it was not Holy water.”
That statement calls for a review of respondent’s brief.

Point I of the brief was devoted to the question that the deceased
was an employee and not an independent contractor. That question
was not decided but for the purpose of the opinion we took for granted
that the relation of employer and employee existed.

Point IT reads as follows: ‘‘The Plaintiff Made a Submissible
Case.’? Thirty cases were, cited under that statement. :
[240] Point III reads: ‘‘Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 2 Is Correct.

“A. The decedent was engaged in interstate transportation
or commerce as a matter of law.’’ Five cases were cited.

“B. If instruction No. 2 was erroneous defendant joined in
that error.’’ Ten cases were cited. .

“C, The facts which the jury found under Instruction No. 2,
as a matter of law, amounted to negligence in failing to furnish
a reasonably safe place to work.’’ Seven cases were cited.

“PD. Defendant had an absolute duty to warn deceased of the
hidden dangers and Instruction No. 2 properly submits this
ground of recovery.’’ Ten cases or authorities were cited here.
Now, let us look at respondent’s argument in the brief. At page

84 thereof, we find the following: ‘‘C. The facts which the jury
found under Instruction No. 2, as a matter of law, amounted to
negligence in failing to FURNISH A REASONABLY SAFE PLACE
TO WORK.”? Emphasis was furnished by respondent. The brief
continues as follows: ‘‘With reference to the ground of recovery
that deceased was not furnished a reasonably safe place in which to
work, Instruction No. 2 requires a finding: * * *.’? This is followed
by nine separate statements of facts which respondent insists the
jury was required to find.

Respondent concludes his argument with this statement: ‘‘It, there-
fore, appears that the facts and the authorities authorized the sub-
mission as given in Instruction No. 2, of defendant’s failure to
furnish a reasonably safe place to work, including the employment of
an unsafe method, or failure to furnish additional help if the mowing
machine was to be used.’”

It is apparent that if this court got in the wrong boat, it was
respondent that led the way and took plaintiff over the rapids. We
may add that if water was splashed on plaintiff, it was her attorney
that did the job. The writer of the opinion is the author of these
comments.

The motions for rehearing, or to modify the opinion, or to transfer
to the court en bane are overruled.

a

Ratea L. Auexanper, Administrator of the Estate of Alvin Jens
Glasgow, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Irvin O. Guascow,
Defendant-Respondent, Ivan Guascow, Third Party Defendant,
No. 44617—275 S. W. (2d) 339.

Court en Banc, February 14, 1955.

BR. E. Ausmus for appellant; Alexander, Ausmus, Harris &G Welliver
of counsel. ‘

Ford & Ford and Jones & Jones for respondent.

" eee

[340] HYDE, J.—Action in equity against a surviving partner to
adjudge the partnership dissolved (by the death of the other partner)
and for appointment of a receiver, liquidation and accounting. Judg-
ment was for defendant (in effect dismissing plaintifi’s bill) and
plaintiff appealed. The Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed
(Alexander vy. Glasgow, 270 S. W. (2d) 161); but on application of
plaintiff the case was transferred.

The petition alleged that defendant and his brother Alvin were
partners in operating four drug stores in Dunklin County; that Alvin
died September 15, 1939; that defendant took possession of the part-
nership property and conducted the business; that no steps had been
taken to administer on the partnership estate; and that Alvin’s estate
had not received any accounting from defendant or any money from
the partnership business. Plaintiff was appointed Alvin’s adminis-
trator on October 2, 1948. Defendant filed answer denying the
allegations about possession of partnership assets and failure to ac- ,
count.

Thereafter plaintiff filed interrogatories which defendant answered
showing the following facts. No steps were ever taken by him to
administer on the partnership. Three days after Alvin’s death, de-
fendant formed a new partnership with Alvin’s wife Ivah, which
continued until February 15, 1944 and she received half of the net
profits of the business. This was done on the advice of Ivah’s brother-
in-law, an attorney, to save costs. In Februrary 1944, defendant paid
Ivah $17,500.00 for her interest in the business which defendant
considered to be one-half. Since that time, defendant operated the
business as his own. The business operated at a small loss in 1939 and
1940 but began making profit thereafter. Alvin and Ivah had four
children who were minors at the time of his death. Defendant stated
his conlusion that Ivah also acted in these transactions as trustee for
these children but stated no facts to show any authority to bind them
or dispose of their interests. Defendant then filed a third party com-
plaint against Ivah asking, if it should be determined that he was
obligated to plaintiff, that he should have judgment against her for
the full amount.

Thereafter, defendant filed an answer stating the facts set out in
his answers to the interrogatories and further stating: ‘‘that at the
time of the formation of a new partnership herein referred to between
this defendant and Ivah Glasgow, the value of the undivided one-half
interest in said partnership business owned by Alvin Jens Glasgow
‘was not in excess of the amount of property that the said Ivah Glasgow
would have been entitled to from the estate of Alvin Jens Glasgow
as her widow’s allowances and other statutory property exclusive of
debts and obligations, and this defendant alleges that the said. Alvin
Jens Glasgow, at the time of his death, did not die possessed of any
other property out of which to pay the widow’s statutory allowances

a "

and absolute property other than the value of the equity of the said
‘one-half interest of Alvin Jens Glasgow in the partnership business;
* # ® that, taking into consideration the fact that the said Alvin Jens
Glasgow left a widow and four minor children, and taking into ¢con-
sideration the fair value of the one-half interest of Alvin Jens Glasgow
in said partnership business and debts due and owing by said partner-
ship, that the widow’s allowances out of the estate of Alvin Jens
Glasgow would have exceeded the value of the equity of said Alvin
Jens Glasgow in his undivided one-half interest in said business;
* * * that taking into consideration the value of the one-half interest
of Alvin Jens Glasgow in the partnership business herein referred
to at the time of his death and the partnership [841] debts. due by
said partnership, that upon proper and timely application Ivah
Glasgow, the widow of Alvin Jens Glasgow, would have been entitled
to an order of the Probate Court of Dunklin County, Missouri, re-
fusing letters of administration on the individual estate of Alvin Jens
Glasgow.’’ The answer also stated that all creditors of the partnership
of defendant and Alvin were fully paid prior to the time plaintiff
was appointed administrator and that there were no individual eredi-
tors of Alvin. At. the time plaintiff was appointed administrator, in
1948, only one of the four children of Alvin and Ivah was a minor;
however the other three had reached their majority several years
prior to plaintiff’s appointment. Reference is made to the opinion
of the Court of Appeals (270 8. W. (2d) 161) for other facts stated
in this answer and in defendant’s answers to the interrogatories.
Defendant also set up laches and estoppel as a defense because of the
facts stated. .

Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the paragraphs of the answer
alleging this new matter on the ground ‘‘that said matters set forth
in said answer do not constitute any defense to the cause of action
set forth in plaintiff’s petition.’’ Plaintiff had previously filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both of these motions ‘were
overruled. Thereafter, at a pre-trial conference, the cause was sub-
mitted to the Court upon the following agreement:

“THE COURT: It is agreed by both parties that the Court can
determine:

“First, whether there was a conversion by Irvin and Ivah,

“Second, the date of the conversion, if any, from all of the facts
pleaded in all of the pleadings, including the interrogatories.

“Tt is agreed by and between the parties that the Court shall first
determine and file findings of fact and conclusions of law, based upon
the pleadings, to which each party may take exceptions, and upon the
overruling or sustaining of the exceptions, of either party, the Court
shall enter an order making up the issues of the trial or render final
judgment.”’

7 a

Thereafter, the following judgment was entered against plaintiff
and the third party petition was dismissed : .

“This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court on all
the pleadings, the interrogatories and answers thereto, and the ad-
missions of the parties at pre-trial conference, is again taken up by
the Court. .

“Tt is the order and judgment of the Court that Ralph Alexander,
as Administrator of the Estate of Alvin Jens Glasgow, take nothing
by his petition and the issues on his petition and defendant Irvin O.
Glasgow’s answer are found against the plaintiff and in favor of the
said defendant, final judgment is entered in favor of the defendant
Irvin O. Glasgow.’’

Hl Plaintiff in his brief contends that ‘‘the judgment of the trial
court was in contravention of the agreement made by the court and
attorneys in the pre-trial conference and contrary to the court’s own.
order made at said conference.’’ It is true that the court did not
make findings of fact and a statement of the grounds for its decision
which a party is entitled to have on request. (Sec. 510.310. Statutory
references are to RSMo. and V.A. ) However, plaintiff did not
preserve this matter for appellate review by stating it as an allegation
of error in his motion for new trial (Sec. 512.160(1) and Rule 3.28) ;
and, therefore, has waived this procedural matter.

Hl 0n the merits, plaintiff says that a partnership is dissolved by
the death of a member; that a surviving partner has the responsi-
bility, in a fiduciary capacity, to liquidate the partnership assets and.
make distribution ; that, if he continues the partnership business, he is
liable both for losses incurred and profits made; and that a suit in
equity for an accounting is the proper and only adquate remedy for
the administrator of the deceased partner, citing Roberts [842] v.
Hendrickson, 75 Mo. App. 484; Bell v. McCoy, 136 Mo. 552, 38 S. W.
829 ; Goodson v. Goodson, 140 Mo. 206, 41 8S. W. 737; Tufts v. Latshaw,
172 Mo. 859, 72 8. W. 679; Whitesell v. Pioneer Const. Co., (Mo.
App.), 2S. W. (2d) 147; Groves v. Aegerter, 226 Mo. App. 128, 42
8. W. (2d) 974; Pryor v. Kopp, 842 Mo. 887, 119 8, W.(2d) 228;
Maynard v. McClellan, 236 Mo. App. 352, 156 S. W. (2d) 770; 40
American Jurisprudence 342, Partnership, Sec. 306, and See. 319,
p. 858; Richter v. Richter, (Ga.), 43 8. EH. (2d) 635; 178 A.L.R, 436
and annotation. Plaintiff also says that as such administrator he is not
bound by any agreement entered into between the surviving partner
and one of several heirs of the deceased partner. The purport of the
Court of Appeals opinion seems to be to the contrary, or at least it
seems to hold that the administrator is bound by estoppel against the
heir who made the agreement even though other heirs were minors,
and that is the reason we transferred the case. We agree with these
propositions stated by plaintiff, but find there is more than that to be
considered in deciding this case.

a ;

Hl The submission of this case was in effect a submission on an
agreed statement of facts, that is the facts stated in the pleadings
and the interrogatories. Plaintiff’s theory as stated in his motion
for new trial (called a ‘‘motion for judgment or in lieu thereof a re-
hearing’’) is ‘‘that under the law and the facts admitted by the plead-
ings, the interrogatories, and the pre-trial hearing in said cause,
plaintiff is entitled to judgment.’’ Plaintiff also took the position
in this motion that he was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
Plaintiff stated in a letter to the court after the motion was filed:
“The facts can be determined from the pleadings and the interroga-
tories * * * and from a copy of the pre-trial hearing.’’ However, the
only record of the pre-trial hearing in the transcript is the order here-
inabove set out in full. The Judge who conducted the pre-trial confer-
ence and entered judgment had resigned and the transcript was set-
tled by his successor. We think the reasonable construction of the
agreed order of submission in this case was that it was submitted for
decision on the same basis as a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
except that facts stated in answer to the interrogatories were also to
be considered. This view is supported by a letter written by one of
plaintiff’s’ attorneys to defendant’s attorney, after the motion for
new trial had been filed, which stated: ‘‘It is my understanding that
a motion for judgment on the pleadings such as we have filed in this
case admits that all facts being pleaded are true and in effect says
that admitting that all facts pleaded are true, still that we are en-
titled to a judgment.’? We, thereforc, hold that under the agreed
submission the Court could properly consider as true all new facts
pleaded in defendant’s last filed answer.

| | Of course, legal conclusions are not included but ultimate facts
are. Certainly one of the matters that the Court could consider to
be true are the statements as to the value of Alvin’s interest in the
partnership. If, as stated, the value of this interest at the time of
Alvin’s death was not in excess of the amount of the allowances to
which his widow was entitled as her absolute property (see Sec’s.
461.120, 462.450, 462.460, 462.470) then she did not deprive the minor
, children of anything, to which they were entitled, by taking possession
of it and entering into a new partnership with defendant. In this
situation, the children would have had no value or interest to be
converted. Of course, Ivah would be estopped by her conduct; and
if she was solely entitled to the property and the minor children
had no rights therein, plaintiff would also be estopped. (Maynard
v. McClellan, 156 S. W. (2d), le. 775.) The question before us is
the sufficiency of the evidence (the facts before the trial court by
agreement) to support the judgment. This being a case tried without
a jury we review it both on the law and the evidence. (Sec. 510.310)
On the theory herein stated, we hold that it was proper for the trial
court to enter the judgment it did.

The judgment is affirmed. All concur.

Burry Buarr, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Guo. H. Nerrueron Home ror
Acrp Women, a Corporation, Defendant-Respondent, No. 43487—
275 S. W. (2d) 344.

Court en Bane, February 14, 1955.

Sam Mandell and £. E. Empie, Jr., for appellant; Popham, Thomp-
son, Popham, Mandell & Trusty of counsel.

a

Clay C. Rogers and James W. Benjamin for respondent; Rogers,
Field & Gentry of counsel.

[845] COIL, C.—The question here involves the tort liability of
a private charitable organization. The facts necessary to a disposi-
tion are disclosed by plaintiff-appellant’s petition, dismissed on de-
fendant-respondent’s motion, and are these:

Defendant owns and operates for profit a four-storied building in
downtown Kansas City, the total space of which is leased or rented
to various tenants and in which defendant negligently maintained a
“common stairway for the use of tenants and their invitees. Plaintiff,
a business invitee of a third-floor tenant, who had sustained injury
while using the common stairway, sued for $15,000 as damages. De-
fendant, a pro forma corporation organized for charitable purposes,

a .

occupies no part of the building but uses all the profits from its
operation for the maintenance and operation of a home for aged
women,

Clearly, and it is not disputed, unless defendant is immune from
liability by reason of its status as a charitable organization, plain-
tiff’s petition does state a claim on which relief may be granted
against defendant. Lambert v. Jones, 339 Mo. 677, 682 [1], 98 S.W.
2d 752, 755[1, 2].

Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of immunity from liability of
charitable organizations in this state was never a correct rule of law;
that it restilted from the application of an exception to the usual
rules of liability, and that stich an exception should never have been
ereated except by legislative act; that present ‘‘public policy’’ de-
mands that the inherent error in the application of the exception be
no longer perpetuated; and alternatively that, assuming the desir-
ability of the rule of immunity in former times, the reasons for it
have vanished and thus the rule should also vanish. From these
premises it is contended that this court should by present decision
overrule ‘all the prior cases in this state which [846] have granted
immunity and hold that charitable organizations are liable in tort in
accordance with the established legal principles applicable between
claimants and individuals and private corporations not organized and
operated for charitable purposes.

Plaintiff also contends that instant case is one of first impression
in this state in that the question of whether immunity should be
granted under facts like those here has never been adjudicated. With
this we agree. And, for reasons to be set forth, we have reached the
conclusion that there never has been, and that there should not now
be established by court decision, a rule in this state which exempts
or would exempt charitable organizations from tort liability where
the activity out of which the alleged liability arose is or was wholly
unconnected with, and not directly related to, the charitable enter-
prise for which the particular charity was organized and is operated;
and that the fact, standing alone, that all the net profits from a chari-
table organization’s commercial enterprise are used to carry on and
accomplish the charitable activities and purposes of the organization,
does not constitute or furnish the necessary direct connection or rela-
tion to call for the application of the immunity rule.

‘We examine the Missouri cases to determine what the present Mis-
souri immunity doctrine is. The Missouri cases on the subject are
cited in footnote (1).

4Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 458; Whittaker

v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 187 Mo. App. 116, 117 S.W. 1189; Nicholas v. Evan-
gelical Deaconess Home, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S.W. 648; Roberts v. Kirksville
Ss.

jollege (Mo. App.), 16'S.W. 2d 625; Eads v. Y.W.C.A., 325 Mo. 577, 29
.W. 2d 701; Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital, 239 Mo. App. 38, 187
ville v. St, Luke’s Hospital, 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W. 2d 615,

S8.W. 2d 469

a

The Adams case denied recovery to a patient who sued a hospital
(charitable organization) for burns received from hot water bottles
having been allegedly negligently placcd against him. The Whittaker
ease denied recovery to a hospital employee who sued the hospital
(charitable organization) for injuries received as a result of an al-
leged defect in a mangle being used by the employee while doing the
hospital ironing. The Nicholas case denied recovery from a hospital
(charitable organization) sought by a paying patient who was burned.
as a result of a hospital nurse using carbolic acid instead of alcohol
with which to rub plaintiff’s back. The Roberts case denied recovery
to a paying patient from a hospital (charitable organization) where
the evidence tended to establish that plaintiff was negligently burned.
by a hot water bottle while under the influence of an anesthetic. We
shall discuss the Eads case infra, The Stedem case denied recovery
from a hospital (charitable organization) by a paying patient in-
jured when a pitcher of hot water tipped over on her due to an al-
legedly defective pitcher stand; and held that the fact of the exis-
tence of liability insurance was irrelevant to the question of liability.

It should be noted in connection with the cases mentioned thus far

‘that the Stedem case did not undertake to examine into the correct-
ness of the doctrine of exemption applicable to the hospital, but
confined its ruling to the proposition that the fact of the existence of
liability insurance could not create liability if liability did not exist
independent of the insurance. The Nicholas case relied upon the
conclusions reached in the Adams and Whittaker cases and adopted
them as sound. The Roberts case denied liability for the reasons set
forth in the Nicholas case.

In the Dille case, Division Two of this court said (196 8.W. 2d
616): ‘Thus we are not asked to examine into the soundness of the
Missouri cases dealing with the immunity of charities from tort lia-
bility, but the scope of our review is limited to, and insofar as plain-
tiff’s contention is concerned, the case turns on, .a determination of
the foundation on which such immunity rests.’’ The court then made
an extensive review of the Missouri cases for the sole purpose of
detérmining the foundation of the immunity doctrine as it had been
applied in those prior cases. That review was [847] complete, and
no purpose will be served to repeat it here. We point out, however,
that the court, in the Dille case, conceded that much of the language
used in the prior cases did not make clear the theory upon which
those prior cases had denied liability. The review there was to
resolve the doubt and the Dille case made it erystal clear that Mis-
souri’s rule of immunity as theretofore applied was based upon the
proposition that broad considerations of public policy made it more
desirable in the long run to prohibit the use of money donated for
charitable purposes to pay damage claims. Thus, whatever language
is contained in the cases prior to Dille which might have been con-

a ;

strued as indicating some other theory as the foundation for the Mis-
souri immunity rule, may and should be disregarded.

And so, in all the Missouri cases save Eads, to be presently dis-
eussed, the courts went no further than to hold that hospitals or-
ganized and operated for charitable purposes, and then engaged
directly in the conduct of the charitable enterprise for which they
were organized, should be immune from tort liability whether that
liability was asserted by a beneficiary of the charity, one who con-
tributed to the charity by reason of paying hospital charges, or by
an employee of the hospital; because, on the whole, the public would
be better served by not permitting charitable donations to be used to
pay damage claims. None of those cases announced or attempted to
announce a rule of immunity which was to be applied except to the
fact situations then before the courts and none of them promulgated
an immunity doctrine broader in scope or application than was called
for by the facts of each of those cases. And we repeat, in each of
those cases, the charitable organization involved, a hospital, was en-
gaged directly in the conduct of the charitable enterprise for which
it had been organized and'for which it was then being operated.

Thus, in so far as the cases discussed are concerned, Missouri’s
charitable immunity doctrine was never so absolute or so broad as to
cover all situations in which the liability of charitable organizations
might be asserted, irrespective of the connection between the organiza-
tion’s activity out of which the alleged liability arose and the chari-
table enterprise for which the charity was organized.

Did the Hads case change or extend the doctrine as it had been
theretofore applied? Plaintiff in that case was an elevator operator-
employee in defendant Y.W.C.A.’s. six-storied building in downtown
Kansas City, the basement, first (except the lobby), and third floors
of which were occupied and used by the Y.W.C.A. The second, fourth,
and fifth floors were rented to tenants who conducted businesses un-
related to Y.W.C.A. activities. The sixth floor was unoccupied.
Plaintiff, who had taken an employee of a fourth floor tenant from
the fourth to the third floor (occupied by Y.W.C.A.), was injured
when her dress caught on the unguarded prongs of a safety lock
which was attached to the inside of the elevator shaft at the third
floor. It was there held: that Y.W.C.A. was a charitable institution
and that it derived revenue from the rented parts of its building
did not destroy its status as a charity; that the same rule of exemp-
tion applied to a charitable association, like Y.W.C.A., as applied to
a charitable hospital; and that ‘“We are not persuaded that it would
be the better publie policy to abandon the doctrine heretofore followed
in this state.’’? 29 S.W. 2d 707. (Emphasis present writer’s.)

Many authorities weré reviewed in Eads demonstrating the conflict
among the courts of different states as to immunity from tort liability

a

of charitable institutions and the various theories were noted upon
which immunity, partial immunity, or no immunity were based. In
discussing the question as to whether the facts in Eads called for
application of the same rule of immunity which had been applied in
prior Missouri cases it was said: ‘“‘It is suggested that, even if we
adhere to the rule of ecemption followed in the Missouri cases above
referred to, it should not be applied in this case because the building
in which plaintiff was hurt was being used largely for the purpose of
producing revenue and plaintiff when injured was or just had been
serving a tenant rather than a patron of [848] the association. While
it is true the elevator served tenants of the building and plaintiff had
just taken up an employee of one of the tenants, it is also true that the
elevator was used by the association in direct connection with its
charitable work, as its reading and rest rooms were on the third floor.
Tt was at that floor that the alleged defective device was located, and
plaintiff had taken the passenger im question, a young woman, to that
floor. On the facts presented, it comnot be said that the elevator and
the defective appliance which caused plaintif’s injury were not used
in connection with and as facilities for the carrying on of the chart-,
table work of the association as much as was the case with the defective
ironing machine in Whittaker v. St. Luke’s Hospital, supra. The fact
that the elevator also served tenants in the building and that the
passenger who had just been taken up happened to be an employee of
a tenant rather than a recipient of the benefits of the association, would
not, we think, upon the facts shown, justify the application of a rule
different from that which would apply had the use of the elevator been
confined to portions of the building occupied and used by the associ-
ation only in the direct carrying on of its charitable activities. Our
conclusion is that wnder the evidence presented the Y.W.C.A. is not
liable and that as to it the demurrer was properly sustained.’’
(Emphasis present writer’s.) 29 8.W. 2d 707, 708.

It would appear that Eads did not change or extend the immunity
doctrine as theretofore applied in the Missouri cases. We do not
construe it as compelling a conclusion contrary to our holding in the
instant case. On the contrary, an analysis of the Hads case (particu-
larly in view of the Dille case which reviewed the Eads case and others,
and held that Missouri’s doctrine was not based upon the trust fund
theory as such but rather upon broad considerations of public policy)
demonstrates that Eads did not attempt to extend the doctrine of
immunity to a case like the instant one; but held only that the evidence
there showed that plaintiff’s work as an elevator operator for the
Y.W.C.A. in its building was directly related to the condnet of YW.
C.A’s charitable enterprise.

There is, however, some language in the Hads opinion at 29 S.W.
2d 706 (1st col.), which, standing alone, might tend to indicate that
income from a charitable organization’s investments used solely for

a "

charitable activities is impressed with the same ‘‘trust’’ as are original
donations. It was there said: ‘‘Logically, it seems to us that to take the
income in such cases for satisfaction of damage claims would amount
to a diversion of trust funds, upon the same principle as would a
taking of the property that produced the income. In either instance
the practical result would be to deprive the institution of the means
wherewith to effectuate the purpose of its organization.’”’

But when this language is examined in connection with the entire
opinion and in the light of the Dille case, we think it not contrary to
our present holding. This, for these reasons: the quoted language
from Eads was used in connection with the refusal of the Missouri
court to recognize a distinction made by some other courts whereby
_ recoveries were permitted by paying hospital patients and denied to

charity patients ; the language was used upon the assumption that the
Missouri immunity doctrine was based upon the ‘‘trust fund’’ theory,
when, as explained in the later Dille case, such assumption was not
valid; and finally the fact is that the court in Eads treated separately
the contention that Missouri’s immunity doctrine should not apply
“because the building in which plaintiff was hurt was being used
largely for the purpose of producing revenue and plaintiff when
injured was or just had been serving a tenant rather than a patron
of the association’’, a needless and futile procedure, if the quoted
language was intended to announce a doctrine applicable to instant
facts. We adhere to our opinion, heretofore expressed, that Eads
should not be construed as authority contrary to our present holding;
but in so far as Eads may, by implication of certain of its language,
be so construed, it should no longer be followed.

[849] Our conclusion is, therefore, that Missouri’s charitable im-
munity doctrine has never been extended to protect funds derived by
charitable organizations from commercial enterprises wholly uncon-
nected with their charities. But, even so, should this court now, by
present decision, extend the immunity doctrine as heretofore applied
to relieve a charitable organization from liability under the present
facts? In other words, do the same considerations of over-all public
policy which we have heretofore said called for the application of the
immunity rule under the particular facts of the prior cases, make it
desirable to extend that rule to cases like the present? As was noted
in Dille v. St. Luke’s Hospital, supra, 196 S.W. 2d 619[2, 3],
‘*publie policy’’ is a vague and uncertain thing, incapable of precise
definition. It is unnecessary for us to attempt to define ‘public
policy’’ or to attempt to state precisely the limits upon our judicial
power to declare ‘‘public policy.’’ Suffice for proper disposition of

instant case to say that we are unwilling to declare that the ‘‘public
policy’’ of this state requires the extension of our rule of charitable
immunity to cover the factual situation in this case. Here defendant
operated a building to produce income. The operation was not con-

a

nected with the conduct of its charitable activity. We are aware of no
consideration involved which would permit us to conclude that ‘‘publie
policy’’ requires that we extend immunity from tort liability to an
organization while exclusively engaged in such a commercial venture.
‘We deem it far safer and certainly wiser to apply in this case, and in
all others which are not controlled by the existing doctrine of im-
munity, the usual established rules of tort liability until such time as
the legislature may determine that immunity should be granted in
this type of case.

In view of our conclusion, it is unnecessary to rule the broader
contentions made by plaintiff. Other questions, such as: whether a
re-examination of the correctness of the law as it now exists should be
made and, if so, whether, as a result of that examination, we could or
should wipe out entirely the doctrine of immunity to charities from *
any tort liability; or whether that re-examination would show that a
consideration of the ‘‘public policy’? on which the doctrine of stare
decisis is said to be based, would override the desirability (if we
reached the conclusion that the reason for the rule of immunity has
now vanished and that the rule should therefore also vanish) of
judicially so declaring, and thus require the conclusion that the con-
tinuation of the present doctrine is a question for legislative de-
termination; these, and other related questions, we necessarily leave
unanswered, _

Our holding goes no farther than to rule the specific facts of this
ease. What activity will or will not constitute the necessary connection
with or direct relation to the charitable enterprise for which the par-
ticular charity was organized and is operated will depend upon the
facts of each case. There will undoubtedly be some borderline cases.
Each will have to be determined on its own particular facts. We are
convinced, however, that the fact, standing alone, that the net profits
from the renting and leasing of a downtown office building, which
building is not used in connection with defendant’s charitable activity,
is not such a direct relation to the enterprise of conducting a home
for aged women as to bring this defendant within the charitable im-
munity doctrine as it exists in this state. And this, even though the
ownership and operation of the building may not be ultra vires the
charitable corporation.

Reversed and remanded.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Com, C., is adopted as
_ the opinion of the Court en Bane. All concur.

a

Luramrsn Aurennem Socrery or Missourr, a Corporation, and
Lurarran CHaritms Assodiation or Sr. Louis, Missouri, a
‘Corporation, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Harry C. Younauousn,
Ese EB, Hunp, and Hurpert Nimeyer, Defendants-Appellants,
Lui Niemeyer, Eun, Fienvp, Lorenn W. Kuuimer, Faep Fienve,
Jutia Mazrren, Eumer F. Picker, Norman Pioxer, THEODOR
Pickrr, Kawners Picker, Berry Smirs, Irma Minurr, and
Wiuma M. Kuun, Defendants, No. 48692—275 8. W. (2d) 361.

Court en Banc, February 14, 1955.

Arnold J. Willmann and John A. Notan for appellants.

George Higel and Albert Miller for respondents.
.

[861] WESTHUES, C.—The plaintiff corporations, Lutheran
Altenheim Society of Missouri and Lutheran Charities Association
of St. Louis, Missouri, filed this suit to try and determine title to
certain real estate, located in the City of St. Louis and in St. Charles
County, Missouri, claiming to be the absolute owners in fee thereof
by virtue of the last will and testament of Clara L. Fienup, deceased.

The defendants named in the petition were the collateral kinsmen
of the testatrix. They were Harry C. Younghouse, Else E. Held,
Lulu Niemeyer, Herbert Niemeyer, Emil Fienup, Lorene W. Keller,
Fred [362] Fienup, Julia Maetten, Elmer F. Picker, Norman Picker,
Theodor Picker, Kenneth Picker, Betty Smith, Irma Miller, and Wilma
M. Kuhn. A number of these defendants filed an answer to the peti-
tion; others defaulted. By the answer, the defendants claimed an un-
divided one-half interest in the property as heirs of the testatrix, con-
tending that by the last will and testament the plaintiff corporations
received only a one-half interest in the property ; that Clara L. Fienup
died intestate as to the other one-half interest. A trial was had
before the court and the court entered a decree. for plaintiff corpora-
tions on the theory that by her last will and testament the testatrix
devised a one-half interest to each corporation. From that judgment,
the defendants Harry C. Younghouse, Else H. Held, and Herbert
Niemeyer appealed.

The question before the trial court was and on this appeal is
whether the plaintiff corporations by the fifth clause of the will each
received a one-half interest in the property or whether they received

ae
only a one-half interest jointly and that testatrix died intestate as
to the other one-half. The clause of the will reads as follows:
“Fifth: Upon the death of my son, Clarence, this trust shall
cease, and one-half (14) of the trust estate then remaining shall
go to the Lutheran Altenheim of the City of St. Louis, Missouri,
d the Lutheran Orphans Home, at the present time situate
at Des Peres, St. Louis County, Missouri. Should either organiza-
tion not be in existence at such time, then the interest hereby
bequeathed to it shall go and belong to its suecessor ; should there
be none, then the said trustees, or the surviving trustee, shall
designate either some deserving Orphans Home or some deserving

Old Folks Home as beneficiary.’’

The testatrix died on January 14, 1949. Her son Clarence T.
Fienup died on June 1, 1951. The property involved in this suit was,
after the son’s death, delivered to the plaintiff corporations and was
in their possession at the time this suit was filed and at the time
judgment was entered.

The appellants say in their brief that ‘‘Since there was no evidence,
oral or documentary, before the trial court, other than the will itself,
the Court erred in finding that it was the intention of the testatrix
by clause fifth, to dispose of the whole of her estate to respondents,
instead of only one-half thereof.’’ (Citing cases)

The respondent corporations say that ‘‘The intention of the testa-
tor must appear in the formal instrument, and extrinsic evidence
cannot be resorted to to as¢ertain the intention of the testator.’’
(Citing cases) Respondents say that the clause is susceptible of being
construed as a testamentary disposal of the whole estate and therefore
must be so construed because the law presumes that in case of a will,
the testator disposed of his whole estate unless the language of the
will clearly indicates otherwise.

Hl The controlling rule in construing wills is to ascertain the
intention of the testator. Such intention must be gathered from the
will itself. However, courts in determining the intention of a testator
may consider the surrounding circumstances. The rule is stated in
69 C.J. 63, Sec. 1120, as follows: ‘‘In determining the testator’s in-
tention the court should place itself as nearly as possible in his posi-
tion, and hence, where the language of the will is ambiguous or
doubtful, should take into consideration the situation of the testator
and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time the will
was executed, * * *,.’? See Heard v. O'Dell, 335 Mo. 202, 72 S.W.
(2d) 491, le. 494 (1); ‘Taylor v. Hughes, Mo., 251 S.W. (2d)- 94,
Le. 99 (4, 5); First National Bank of Kansas City v. University of
Kansas City, Mo., 245 8. W. (2d) 124, Le. 127 (1-4).

The rule as to the presumption against intestacy is well stated
in 69 C.J. 91, Sec. 1147, where it is said: ‘‘Hither in the absence of
statute, or under statutes declaratory of the common law, there is

a “

[363] a presumption that a testator intended to dispose of his entire
estate and not to die intestate either as to the whole or as to any part
thereof, and where a provision of a will is fairly open to more than
one construction, a construction resulting in an intestacy as to any
part of the estate will not be adopted if by any reasonable construction
it can be avoided; * * *.’’ See also Smoot v. Harbur, 357 Mo. 511, 209
S.W. (2d) 249, Le. 251 (1-3); Meiners v. Meiners, 179 Mo. 614, 78
S.W. 795.

Hl With these rules in mind, let us examine the present will to
determine the intent of the testatrix as expressed in clause ‘‘Fifth’’
of her will. It is true the trial court did not hear any oral evidence.
However, we may ascertain to some extent the situation of the testatrix
from the will itself and from the pleadings and admissions made in
the record,

Testatrix, at the time shé executed her will on September 12, 1936,
was a widow and she had only one child, a son. By her will, she gave
$400 to a cemetery-association to provide perpetual care for the family
burial lot. By the next clause, she gave all of her personal effects to
her son Clarence T. Fienup. ‘She expressed the desire that in case
her son did not care to keep all of the household goods, such goods
should go to her niece, Mrs. Herbert Held, and to her nephews, Harry
C. Younghouse and Herbert Niemeyer.

By the fourth clause, she gave all of the remainder of her property,
real, personal and mixed, to the St. Louis Union Trust Company and
her nephew Herbert Held in trust for her son. The son was to be
paid certain amounts periodically and more in case of an emergency.
She gave the trustees power to sell her property and to reinvest the
proceeds in other property. She expressed a desire that a farm of
176.62 acres located in St. Charles County, Missouri, not be sold since
it was her opinion that the farm would increase in value. Then came
the fifth clause which we have heretofore set forth in full. Note that
by that clause testatrix provided that in case either of the plaintiff
corporations should not be in existence at the time the trust ceased,
the trustees should designate some other deserving organization of
like nature as a beneficiary.

Considering the situation of the testatrix at the time the will was
made and that she minutely detailed how her property should be
disposed of, it is inconceivable that she intended to die intestate as to
any of her property. Note that in the disposition of her personal
effects she expressed a wish that such of the household goods as her
son should not ‘wish to keep should belong to her niece and two of her
nephews who are appellants in this case. Note, too, that in disposing
of her property, she used terms which were all inclusive, as, for ex-
ample, in the third clause, ‘‘All of my personal property, household
goods and personal effects of every kind and description,’? and in
the fourth clause, ‘‘All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,

both real, personal and mixed, of every kind and description * * *.””
Then, in the fifth clause, it is significant that she provided for the
disposition of the property should either of the corporations not be
in existence at the time the trust ended. Would it not be strange if
testatrix by her will made an alternative disposition of household
goods not wanted by her son and left one-half of her estate undisposed
of?

Courts have dealt with questions of this nature in the past and
such cases may be used as a guide in this case. Note in Meiners v.
Meiners, supra, the clause under consideration was very much like the
clause now before us. It read (78 S8.W. Le. 796): ‘‘ ‘Item. 4. I will,
give, bequeath and devise to my sons, John, Herman, Jr., and
Aloysius, the undivided one-third in all my real estate, * * *.’’?
This court held that considering the will as a whole, it clearly ap-
peared that the testator intended to dispose of all his property, there-
fore, by Item 4 he devised a one-third to each of his three sons named.
That case has been cited with approval by this court and very | recently
by this court en bane. See Smoot v. Harbur, supra.

It is clear from the will as a whole that it was the desire of testatrix
that her [864] property should ultimately go to the charitable cor-
porations designated by her will. Even her own son did not receive
any real estate in fee. In fact, he was not given a full life interest
but only certain stipulated amounts, that is, $30 per month and main-
tenance. Any balance of the income from the trust estate was to be
added to the principal of the trust estate. The provisions of the will
are repugnant to any intention on the part of testatrix that as to a
one-half interest she made no provision and that hér nieces and
nephews should inherit that half of her estate.

The trial court was correct in ruling that each of plaintiff corpora-
tions received a one-half interest by the fifth clause of the will.

Defendants cite a number of cases to sustain their theory. For
example, Crowson v. Crowson, 323 Mo. 633, 19 S.W. (2d) 684;
Hill v. Hill, 261 Mo. 55, 168 S.W. 1165; and Mississippi Valley
Trust Company v. Bowler, Mo. App., 149 S.W. (2d) 379. In those
cases, the courts: held that the makers of the wills clearly indicated
that their entire estate was not disposed of. Note what the court
said in the Bowler case, 149 S.W. (2d) 881, 382 (5): ‘We think
it clear that the testatrix knew and intended that she was not dis-
posing of all of her property by the will, and that she would die
intestate as to a part thereof. We have given due consideration to
the rule as contended for by appellant, to the effect that ordinarily
a testator is presumed to intend to dispose of his whole estate. How-
ever, such presumption is only indulged by the courts when it appears
consistent with the intention of the testator, but, when the will
shows a contrary intention, that presumption fails. Crowson vy.

a :

Crowson, 823 Mo. 633, 19 8.W. 2d 634; Allison v. Hitchcock, 309.
Mo. 488, 274 S.W. 798, and cases therein cited.’’

The court in its decree made the findings of fact wherein it was
stated that testatrix by the fifth clause of the will intended to say that
“Upon the death of my son, Clarence, this trust shall cease, and one-
half (14) of the trust estate then remaining shall go to the Lutheran
Altenheim of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and one-half (%) to the
Lutheran Orphans Home, * * *.’”? The words italicized were in-
terpolated by the court. Appellants say the triai court was in error
in placing these words in the will of the testatrix. It is not an im-
portant point. In fact, that was simply a way the trial court used
in. expressing what was intended by the will. Respondents in oral
argument stated it would have been better not to have inserted these
words and suggested the decree be modified to that extent. If the
trial court so desires, the modification may be made. We do not deem
the matter of sufficient importance to order a modification.

Having concluded that the trial court correctly decided the case,
we hereby affirm the judgment,

PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Wrsruuns, C., is
adopted as the opinion of the Court en Bane. Dalton, Hollingsworth,
Hyde, Ellison and Westhues, JJ., concur ; Leedy, J., and Cave, Special
Judge, dissent, and adopt the dissenting opinion of Barr ett, C., in
Division Two as their dissenting opinion:

Mermoranpum or Dissent

Hi BARRETT, C.—In this case, unlike Meiners v. Meiners, there
are no extrinsic circumstances. In [365] this case only the will itself
was before the court and the language of clause five is so plain and
unambiguous that there is nothing to interpret,—‘‘ Upon the death of
my son, Clarence, this trust shall cease, and one-half (4) of the trust
estate then remaining shall go to, the Lutheran Altenheim of the
City of St. Louis, Missouri, and the Lutheran Orphans Home * * *,”’
Thus in words and meaning as plain as the English language is
eapable of expressing the testatrix, in this clause, disposed of ‘‘one-
half (14) of the trust estate then remaining.’’ In the Meiners case
one word in the clause in question, ‘‘the,’’ created the difficulty.
Furthermore the clause under consideration there referred to ‘‘one-
third of all my estate.’’ There is no such ambiguity or reference in
clause five of this will.

Likewise in Smoot v. Harbur, as was pointed out in Lang v. Estorge,
(Mo.) 242 8. W. (2) 50, there was an ambiguity in the will and its
meaning was made dear by extrinsic evidence and other provisions
of the will. It is tiue that in clause four the testatrix disposes of all
her property—‘‘All the rest, residte and remainder of my estate,
both real, personal and mixed, of every kind and description and

“ ae

wheresoever situate * * *,”’ But there she was creating a trust, a
trust for the benefit of her son. His circumstances are not known and
the reason for the trust is clothed in mystery. It is assumed from
the fact that he only is mentioned or provided for that he was an
only child, and he was certainly the natural object of her bounty.
In clause five the trust terminated upon his death but only ‘‘one-half’’
of the trust estate is disposed of. As we have said, there was no
ambiguity and therefore the presumption against partial intestacy
and the auxiliary rules of construction are not appropriately ap-
plicable. 2 Page, Wills, Sec. 927, p. 848; 57 Am. Jur., Secs. 1158-
1159. Clause four has no relation to clause five and resort to the
other clauses in the will does not explain clause five or indicate an
intention on the part of the testatrix to dispose of all her property
to the specifically named organizations. Whatever the testatrix may
have intended, it can only be said that there is no ambiguity in the
language employed, it is not subject to interpretation and in unmis-
takable language disposes of ‘‘one-half (14) of the trust estate then
remaining’’ and as plainly written and expressed should be construed.
Lang v. Estorge, supra. For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

Srare or Missourt, Respondent, v. Viremia Kina, Appellant, No.
44122275 8. W. (2d) 310.

Division Two, February 14, 1955.

Le

Alphonse J. Lynch and Curtis C. Crawford for appellant.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Robert R. Wetorn; As:
sistant Attorney General, for respondent,

[311] BOHLING, C.—Virginia King appeals from a conviction
of grand larceny imposing a sentence of three years imprisonment ‘
under Laws 1951, p. 455, appearing as § 556.285, RSMo Supp. 1953,
VAMS. (Statutory references herein are to RSMo 1949 and VAMS,
unless otherwise indicated.) Appellant questions the ‘constititionality
‘of the statute; the sufficiency of the information; the sufficiency of
the evidence; and contends error was committed in the admission
of evidence, the refusal of a.continuance; the giving of instructions,
and in the State’s argument. .

oT

The statute, with its title, reads: ‘‘An act to provide that larceny
of goods, wares or merchandise or other personal property under
certain conditions, regardless of value, shall be grand larceny and °
providing a penalty therefor.

‘Every person who shall have been convicted three times of larceny
in any degree and who subsequently shall steal, take and carry
away any goods, wares or merchandise or other pérsonal property,
regardless of the value thereof, shall be guilty of grand larceny and,
upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary not exceeding five years or in the county jail not exceeding one
year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.”

The instant information charged appellant with three prior convic-
tions of petit larceny and with feloniously stealing one bottle of
whiskey of the value of $4.10, the property of Mitchell, Sam and
Harry Schenberg, co-partners, in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, on
September 6, 1952. No issue is presented by appellant regarding
her commission of the larceny of September 6, 1952. She offered no
testimony.

[812] The three convictions of petit larceny occurred prior to and
the offense of September 6, 1952, occurred subsequent to the effective
date of Laws 1951, p. 455.

Hl Several points in appellant’s brief may be considered together.
Appellant contends, based on her convictions of petit larceny oc-
eurring prior to the effective date of the statute, that the information
failed to state an offense under the statute; that the evidence did not
support a conviction under the statute, and that the statute was un-
constitutional as to this prosecution of appellant. Specifically, she
. States that the statute contravenes the due process and equal protection

of the law clauses of the Federal and State constitutions (U. S. Const.

Amend. 14; Mo. Const., Art. I, §§ 2, 10) and is an ex post facto law

(U. 8. Const., Art. I, § 10; Mo. Const., Art. I, § 18) in that it ar-

bitrarily defines petit larceny as grand larceny, thus creating a new

offense upon a showing of three convictions consummated prior to the
effective date of the statute.
Appellant cites no authority directly in point but stresses dictum

in several cases under the Missouri habitual criminal-act (§ 556.280)

that: ‘As has been held several times, the habitual criminal statutes

themselves do not create a separate offense, but merely subject second

offenders to heavier punishment for the crimes they commit.’’ State v.

Hefflin, 338 Mo. 236, 89 S. W. 2d 938, 940[2], 103 A. L. R. 1301;

State v. Collins, 266 Mo. 93, 180 S. W. 866[2,3]. These and other

like observations do not establish appellant’s position.

At the time of the effective date of Laws 1951, p. 455, other statu-
tory enactments, so far as material here, defined the offense of grand
larceny as the stealing of personal property of the value of $30

° imi”

or more (§ 560.155), a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceed-
ing five years (§ 560.160), and the offense of petit larceny as the
stealing of personal: property under the value of $30 (§ 560.240), a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail or a fine,
or both.

Construing the statutory provisions relating to the offenses of petit
and grand larceny, it is clear that the General Assembly in enacting
Laws 1951, p. 455, imposed a greater punishment for an incorrigible
larcenist, three times convicted, than for larcenists not having such
a criminal record.

One does not violate Laws 1951, p. 455 unless he commits a larceny
subsequent to its effective date. The statute applies to ‘‘every person
who shall have been convicted three times of larceny in any degree
and who subsequently’’ commits another larceny. It is similar in this
respect to § 556.280, our habitual criminal act. All are charged with
knowledge of the provisions of the statute. The allegations of the
prior convictions are not charges of distinct crimes but are merely
to disclose facts bringing the new offense within the statute and for
determining the criminality of the new offense. In ruling that prior
convictions aggravating a new offense need not occur subsequent to
the effective date of the statute, the cases hold that prior convictions
of crime constitute a reasonable basis for the classification of of-
fenders with respect to the severity of the punishments to be imposed.
Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429, 431(1,2); State of Iowa ex rel.
Gregory v. Jones, 128 Fed. 626, 629, 630; State v. Adams, 89 Kan.
674, 677, 182 P. 171, 173[8]; Tones v. State, 9 Ok. Cr. R. 646, 138
P, 249, 253, 48 L. RA. (NS) 204, 212; Graham v. West. Virginia,
224 0, ’s. 616, 623 (1, 2), 56 L. Ed. 917, 382 ‘9. Ct. 583.

Ex parte Gutierrez, supra, was a proceeding under a statute pro-
viding that one convicted a second time of petit larceny, a first con-
viction being a misdemeanor, was guilty of a felony and was to be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison. State of Iowa ex rel.
Gregory v. Jones, supra, was a proceeding under a statute providing
that one convicted a third time of larceny of property of a value in
excess of $20 was to be imprisoned for not less than 15 years. In each
instance the convictions involved occurred prior to the effective date
of the statute and the convictions were upheld.

[313] State v. Adams, supra, involved Kansas Laws 1911, p. 250,
Ch. 165, § 1, which provided that a person convicted a second time
under the Kansas prohibitory liquor law was to be ‘‘deemed guilty
of a felony’’ and punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary. The
information charged defendant with a conviction of said law in 1908, a
misdemeanor, and a violation of said law after the effective date of
Kan. Laws 1911, p. 250, supra. In sustaining the application of the
statute to the charge, the court stated: ‘‘Former conviction of crime

a ;

is a sufficient basis for the classification of offenders with respect to
the severity of the punishment they shall receive.’’

In Graham v. West Virginia, supra, statutory provisions imposing
more severe punishment upon habitual criminals than upon first of-
fenders were upheld against contentions that the statute violated
Federal constitutional provisions relating to due process of the law,
to equal protection of the law, to former jeopardy, to privileges and
immunities, and to cruel and inhuman punishment. The court stated:
“The propriety of inflicting severer punishment upon old offenders
has long been recognized in this country and in England. They are
not punished the second time for the earlier offense, but the repetition
of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier penal-
ties when they are again convicted.’’ (224 U. 8. le. 628(1).) And:
“The fact of such sentence [prior conviction], indicating the gravity
of the offense, affords a reasonable basis for classification.’’ (Id, le.
630.)

Among other authorities to like effect are: Commonwealth v. Graves,
155 Mass. 168, 29 N. B. 579, 16 L. R. A, 256; In re Miller, 110 Mich.
676, 68 N. W. 990, 34 L. R. A. 398, 400, 64 Am. St. R. 376; Taylor v.
State, 114 Neb. 257, 207 N. W. 207, 209[4]; Armstrong v. Common-
wealth, 177 Ky. 690, 198 S. W. 24, 26[4]; Rand v. Commonwealth, 9
Grat. (50 Va.) 738, 743 ; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. 8. 311, 45
L, Ed. 542, 21 8. Ct. 389, affirming 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874, 73
Am. St. R. 293; Moore v. Missouri, 159_U. 8. 673, 677, 40 L. Ed. 301,
16 S. Ct. 179, affirming 121 Mo. 514, 520, 26 S. W. 845, 346, 42 Am.
St. R. 542; 24 O. J. S, 1143, §§ 1958, 1959, b, 1960, e; 1 Cooley, Con-
stitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., 553, 554; 1 Bishop, Criminal Law,
9th Ed., 190, § 283; Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, 774. The sub-
ject is well treated in 25 Am. Jur. 261, §§ 3-8, 12; Annotation, 182
A. L. R. 92, I, and annotations there mentioned.

Appellant’s authorities do not establish her position and her con-
tentions are overruled. Some statuteg, differently worded, do not apply
to convictions prior to their effective date.

I Appellant says, although the statute be constitutional and
applicable, yet the State failed to establish the three prior convictions
by competent evidence and the judgment cannot stand.

The three prior convictions of appellant of petit larceny charged
in the information occurred in the St. Louis court of criminal corree-
tion on January 5, 1942, on April 2, 1947, and on August 5, 1948.
Mrs. Marion Cronin, deputy clerk of said court of criminal correction,
identified certain books as ‘‘Issue Books,’’ the official record of the
clerk of said court. Over objections interposed, certain Issue Books
were offered in evidence and, as established of record, portions thereof
were read to the jury by the witness. She testified that (State’s ex-
hibit No. 2) Issue Book 131 at page 729 showed the name of ‘‘Virginia
King,”’ the charge ‘‘petit larceny,’’ the issuance of a warrant Novem-

; a

ber 27, 1941, and an entry: ‘‘January 5, 1942. Defendant pleads not
guilty. Tried by the court. Defendant adjudged guilty. Punishment
assessed at 90 days in the workhouse.’’

Mrs. Cronin also identified Judge James W. Griffin’s docket, who
was deceased, and with reference to appellant’s prior conviction of
January 5, 1942, the entry on said exhibit (No. 7) reading: ‘(January
5, 1942 12 Virginia King, 90 days WH’’.

[814] Mrs. Cronin also identified the files in the cases involving the
prior convictions; and, with respect to the conviction of January 5,
1942, testified to an entry on the back of the warrant reading the
same as that shown on State’s exhibit No. 2, supra, for January 5,
1942.

The testimony with reference to the convictions of April 2, 1947,
and August 5, 1948, was of like nature and need not be detailed. All
this testimony was admitted over appellant’s objection on the ground,
among others, that it was not the best evidence.

Mrs. Cronin stated, when asked where ‘‘is the judgment? A. On the
back of the warrant.’’

The St. Louis court of criminal correction is ‘a court of record.”
§ 479.010. Its proceedings, in general, are ‘‘governed by the laws regu-
lating proceedings and practice in criminal cases.” §§ 479.180,
541.010; In re Bedard, 106 Mo. 616, 621(I), 17 8S. W. 693(1). Its
clerk is ‘‘subject to all the requirements and obligations exacted of
and imposed by law upon clerks of courts of record.’’ § 483.395. The
clerk of a court of record ‘‘shall record the judgments’’ et cetera
of the court (§ 483.075), the judge requiring the clerk to correctly
make out the judgment dockets et cetera (§ 483.140). See §§ 483.105,
483.110. ‘‘Whenever a judgment upon a conviction shall be rendered
in any court, the clerk of such court shall enter such judgment and
sentence thereon fully on the minutes, stating briefly the offense
for which such conviction shall have been had * *.’? Supreme Court
Rule 27.11, 42 VAMS 117. See \§§ 546.590, 476.040; State v. Able,
65 Mo. 87, 38.

We have said: ‘A court of record can speak only by its record.”
State ex rel. v. Farris, Mo., 264 8. W. 363, 366[2]; State ex rel. v.
Westhues, 315 Mo. 672, 286 S. W. 396, 399[7] ; State ex rel. v. Good-
rich, 159 Mo. App. 422, 425, 140 8S. W. 629, 630[4].

A judgment is the final judicial determination of the matter pre-
sented in the record. § 511.020. ‘‘In order that a judgment may be
admitted as evidence in another action, it is necessary that it should
first have been entered of record.’’ 49 C. J. 8., Judgments, 231, § 107.
See generally Id., §§ 106 et seq.; 24 C. J. S. Criminal Law, 124,
§§ 1593-1595 ; 18 Ene. PL & Pr. 439, n. 1; Smith v. Steel, 81 Mo. 455,
459. ‘‘This court has said a judgment is the act of the court, its entry
in the record the act of the clerk, the first being judicial, the second
ministerial; and that though a judgment derives its force from its

rendition by the court, yet one given by a court of record can only
be proved by the record.’’ State ex rel. v. Cockrell, 280 Mo. 269, 285,
217 8. W. 524, 580. ‘It requires a judgment of guilt upon the record
to establish the defendant’s guilt and ‘that he has been convicted.’’
Schooley v. United States (8 Cir.), 4 F. 24 767, 769[2].

Minutes or memoranda of the nature offered in evidence may afford
authority for the entry of the judgment of a court of record but they
are not the judgment of the court and are not the correct method for
establishing a prior conviction in a court of record. Smith v. Steel,
81 Mo. 455, 458; State ex rel. v. Goodrich, supra; State v. White, 339
Mo. 1019, 99 S. W. 2d 72, 75[9]; State v. Vinson, 387 Mo. 1023, 87
S. W. 2d 637, 638[5-8]. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 377,
379. We find no showing of record for the introduction of secondary
evidence establishing the judgments of appellant’s prior convictions.
For a judgment of conviction of the St. Louis court of criminal cor-
rection, see State v. Bruckner, Mo., 272 S. W. 1061, 1062.

State v. Brown (1893), 115 Mo. 409, 415, 22 8. W. 367, 369(3), was
a prosecution for the commission of a second petit larceny at a time
when our habitual criminal act (RSMo 1889, § 3959; now § 556.280)
authorized a penitentiary sentence for a second or subsequent con-
viction of petit larceny. Over objections interposed, the State, to
prove the prior conviction, adduced testimony of the justice of the
peace and offered in evidence his docket and the commitment. The
justice’s docket showed: ‘‘Charge, [815] stealing.’’ The filing of the
information. The issuance of the warrant. The arrest..The plea. A.
hearing and a finding “‘against the defendant, and in favor of the
State, and assessed his punishment at thirty days’ imprisonment in
the county jail.’’ The issuance of the commitment. The commitment
recited facts establishing the offense to be petit larceny. In remanding
the case, we said: ‘‘The only way known to the law whereby the
former conviction of the defendant of the crime of petit larceny
could have been established was by the judgment of the justice so
reciting; but this the judgment in question does not do. It nowhere
appears in the judgment what was the offense of which the defendant
was convicted. * * It is true also that we might infer from the
commitment in evidence that the offense was petit larceny; but this is
no ease for inferences. Where the second conviction virtually raises a
misdemeanor to the grade of a felony, which is to result in incarcerat- .
ing the accused in the penitentiary for a period of from two to five
years, and where such second conviction is made absolutely dependent
on a former one, a decent regard for the rights and liberty of the
aceused, however humble his station in life, ought to and does re-
quire that nothing less than a judgment of conviction, plainly setting
forth the former offense and adjudging the accused guilty thereof,
will suffice as a basis for the second prosecution.’’ See also State v.
Griffie, 118 Mo. 188, 198, 28 S. W. 878, 881(2); Gordon v. State, 86

Fla, 255, 97 So. 428[2]; Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106, 69
A. L. B, 783, 788, 789.

No case cited by the State involved the proof of judgments estab-
lishing prior convictions. State v. Bowman, Mo., 213 S. W. 97, 98[4];
Ex parte Siegel, 263 Mo. 375, 383(IL), 173 8. W. 1, 3[3]; State v.
Williams, 191 Mo. 205, 214(V), 90 S. W. 448, 451(5); 24 0. J. S.,
Criminal Law,-132, § 1601. In each case the questioned judgment was
the judgment appealed from and a part of the record proper before
the court. Upon appeal we examine the record proper for error under
Supreme Court Rule 28.02, 42 VAMS 122. See § 547.270; State v.
Barr, 326 Mo. 1095, 84 8. W. 2d 477, 479[4]; State v. Rutledge, Mo.,
267 S. W. 2d 625[1]. In the instant case we do not find the judgments
. of appellant’s prior convictions of record.

Under the authorities the prior convictions of appellant were
not established by competent evidence; and appellant’s conviction of
an offense under Laws 1951, p. 455, cannot stand.

The court gave instructions submitting appellant’s guilt of petit
larceny for the offense of September 6, 1952, if the jury failed to find
the tliree prior convictions, and to acquit appellant altogether if they
failed to find appellant guilty of the offense of September 6, 1952.
Appellant, citing no authority, contends she was entitled to her dis-
charge if the jury failed to find the three prior convictions. We think
the point without merit. Upon a trial for an offense of grand larceny,
if the evidence shows the value of the property would constitute petit
larceny, the defendant may be convicted of that offense. § 560.245.
Under § 556.230 the conviction of a defendant of any offense neces-
sarily included in the offense charged is authorized. The habitual
criminal act (§ 556.280) does not contemplate that one charged there-
under is entitled to an acquittal in the event the jury fails to find
the prior conviction et cetera but does find the accused guilty of the
offense on trial.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded. Barrett and
Stockard, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Boutane, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. Ellison, P.J., Leedy, J., and Tipton, J.,
and Broaddus, Special Judge, concur.

Stars or Missouri, at the Information of Sranumy Waunaca, Pros-
ecuting Attorney in and for the County of St. Louis, at the Rela-
tion of Lestmr W. Remexs, Cartas W. Disxrorcmr, Mrs. Horr
B. Baxer, W. Donato Dusan, Mrs. Viremta M. Fawserr and
Burron F. Sawyer, Relators-Appellants, v. Cuartzs H. Zrrste,
Percy J. Orrawerin, Howarp E. Rweway, Henry L. Meme,
Gxores E. Niepr and Aprterrr Vow Gontarp, Respondents-Ap-
pellees, No. 48887—275 8. W. (2d) 353.

Court en Banc, February 14, 1955.

Oliver J. Miller for relators-appellants ; Lashly, Lashly & Miller of
counsel.

Don O. Russell and Joseph Ren respondents-appelle’
Fordyce, Mayne, Hartman, Renard & Stribling of counsel. =”

[858] HYDE, J.—Quo warranto to oust respondents from the
offices of school directors of the School [354] District of the Village
of Huntleigh, St. Louis County, which relators claim is not a legally
organized school district. Relators are directors of Reorganized School
District R-7 of Kirkwood, St. Louis County, and claim that part of the
territory included in the new Huntleigh District belongs to and re-
mains in District R-7. The trial court held the organization valid and
dismissed the petition.

The question for decision is whether territory included in this re-
organized enlarged school district under the authority of the 1948
School Reorganization Act (Laws 1947 II, p. 370; Secs. 165.657-165.-
707, statutory references are to RSMo and V.A.M.S.) could later be
made a part of a separate town or city district in accordance with
the procedure set out in Sec. 165.263.

There was an agreed statement of facts and some additional testi-
mony. Huntleigh became an incorporated village in 1929 and had a
population of 180 in 1950. Prior to November 21, 1947, Huntleigh
was completely included in Des Peres School District No. 45; but on
that date, it enlarged its boundaries to include an area to the north
known as Huntleigh Woods, which was in the School District of the
City of Ladue. On October 29, 1949, District R-7 was established,
which included the Des Peres District, so that all of the original part
of Huntleigh (as it existed from 1929 to 1947) became a part of Dis-
trict R-7. However, the newly annexed part of Huntleigh remained
in the Ladue District. On June 3, 1952, after the required notice,
a meeting was held at which it was unanimously voted to organize all
of Huntleigh into a separate town school district and respondents
were elected directors. It is conceded that the organization proced-
ure complied with all of the requirements of Secs. 165.263 and 165.267;
the only question being whether territory properly taken into the re-

a

organized school district, established under the 1948 Act, could be
taken out of it by the procedure provided in Sec. 165.268. Other
facts shown by the record are that District R-7 had an assessed valua-
tion of $32,055,800.00 of which $746,110.00 was in the area of Hunt-
leigh included in it. The tax income of District R-7 in 1952 was about
$1,250,000.00 of which amount its Huntleigh area paid approximately
$30,000.00. The enumeration showed 32 school children in Huntleigh
but only four attended schools in District R-7.

See. 165.263, paragraph 1, provides as follows: ‘‘1. Any common
school district containing within its boundaries a city, town or village;
the plat of which has been filed in the recorder’s office of the county
in which the same is situated, or any district having two hundred or
more children of school age by the last enumeration, may be organized
into a town or city school district, and, when so organized shall be a
body corporate, and known as ‘The School ‘District of. 7 and
in that name may sue and be sued and possess the same corporate
powers and be governed the same as other school districts except as
herein provided; and every extension that has heretofore been made,
or that hereafter may be made, of the limits of any city, town or village
that is now or may be hereafter organized under the laws of this state,
shall have the effect to extend the limits of such town or city school
district to the same extent, and such extension of the limits of any
city or town school district shall take effect on the first day of July
next following the extension of the limits of such city, town or village,
except that such extension of the limits of any town or city, contained
in a county of the first class shall not be affected by the provisions of
this section; provided, that any incorporated city, town or village
having a population of three thousand or less, the plat of which has
been previously filed-in the recorder’s office of the county in which
the same is situated, and which is divided by a school district boundary
line, so that said incorporated city, town or village lies partly in one
school district and partly in another, shall have the right to organize
as a separate town or city school district in the manner provided in
section 165.267.’ (Italicized portion added by amendment in 1947;
Laws 1947 I, p. 510.)

The other paragraphs of Sec. 165.263 mainly concern the proced-
ure to be followed in determining the question of whether to [355] or-
ganize a town or city school district. Different procedure is provid-
ed for towns and cities under 3000 population and for those over 3000
population, which are also authorized to organize separate districts
under the same circumstances.

Appellants contend that this section should be construed to prevent
taking any territory from an enlarged district reorganized under the
1948 Act, arguine that the whole section was intended to apply only
to common school districts, which are mentioned in the first line of

a "
paragraph 1, and that under the rule of ejusdem generis the proviso
at the end of paragraph 1 should be construed to apply only to a city,
town or village which is divided by a common school district boundary
line. Respondents point out Sec. 165.707 (Sec. 15 of the 1948 School
Reorganization Act) which provides: ‘‘Changes of boundary lines
and disorganization of enlarged districts may be effected as now or
hereafter provided by Sections 165.263 to 165.373.’’ They say that

_ this directly recognizes the method of taking’ all territory included in
an incorporated city, town or village and making it into a ‘separate
town or city district, provided by Sec. 165.263, and specifically
authorizes the use of this method to take such territory from an en-
larged district, reorganized under the 1948 Act, to make a new town
or city district. They also argue that the clear intent of the Legisla-
ture in enacting the proviso was to enable small incorporated com-
munities to protect their civic, economic and social unity by always
keeping the whole town in the same school district.

However, the italicised portion of Sec. 165.263, added by the 1947
amendment (Laws 1947 I, p. 510) has been overlooked. The addition
of these words, ‘‘except that such extension of the limits of any town
or city, contained in a county of the first class shall not be affected by
the provisions of this section’’, to paragraph 1 of Sec. 165.263 was the -
only purpose of the 1947 amendment as shown by setting out these
words in the title of the amending Act. While this clause is not as clear
as it might be, it does plainly say that an extension of town limits
(‘that has heretofore been made or that hereafter may be made’’) in
a county of the first class ‘‘shall not be affected by the provisions of
this section.’’ This undoubtedly means that, in first class counties,
the extension of boundaries cannot have the effect they do in other
counties to authorize keeping all of the town in the same school district.
It certainly refers to all of the provisions of the section, because it was
not limited to the provisions preceding this clause, and, therefore,
would include the provisions of the proviso following this inserted
clause, We think the effect of this amendment was to make inappli-
cable to St. Louis County (a county of the first class see Sec. 48.020;
State on Inf. Taylor v. Kiburz, 357 Mo. 309, 208 8S. W. (2d) 285) all
provisions of Sec. 165.263 authorizing either the extension of existing
school district boundaries by making an extension of town or city
boundaries or the creation of a new town or city district when a town
or city is divided by a school district boundary line by extension of its
boundaries; and we so hold.

It may be noted that this amendment became effective September
10, 1947 (Laws 1947 I, p. 567) and that the extension of boundaries
of Huntleigh was on November 21, 1947. Thus this amendment,
making the provisions of Sec. 165.263 inapplicable to St. Louis County
towns divided by school district lines, by extension of boundaries, was
in effect before Huntleigh’s boundaries were ever extended into

° |

another school district. It appears from the record herein, as well as
from what we judicially know, that there was good reason for such an
amendment making these provisions inapplicable to counties of the
first class. That is the enormous suburban population growth during
the last decade, which has been particularly great in St. Louis County,
bringing about the formation of many new incorporated cities, towns
and villages and the extension of boundaries of many older ones. The
evidence shows the incorporation of ten new towns since 1948 in St. .
Louis County. It also shows that many towns are divided by school
district lines. It is apparent that chaotic conditions would result
from the application of the provisions of Sec. 165.263 to this [356]
situation to take territory from established districts after large in-
vestments had been made in new school buildings and teaching staffs
built up for them: Undoubtedly, that is what the Legislature had
in mind in making this amendment.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions
to enter judgment of ouster in accordance with the views herein ex-
pressed. All concur.

Frep H. Frazmr, Respondent, v. Forp Moror Company, a Corpo-
ration, Appellant, No. 43538—276 8. W. (2d) 95.

Court en Banc, February 14, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, March 14, 1955.

Shughart & Thomson, Harry P. Thomso: and John M. Kilroy
for appellant Ford Motor Company.

John B. Moritz and Walter A. Raymond for respondent.

" ae

[97] BOHLING, C.—Fred H. Frazier, plaintiff, secured a $9,000
verdict and judgment against the Ford Motor Company, a corpora-
tion, defendant, in a common law action for personal injuries sus-
tained in the performance of his duties for defendant. He had re-
jected the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation act. Plaintiff invoked
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Defendant’s answer was a general
denial, coupled with pleas of contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and negligence of a fellow servant. Defendant contends that
plaintiff failed to make a res ipsa case; that the court erred in ad-
mitting evidence and in giving and refusing | instructions, and that
the verdict is excessive.

Plaintiff had been an employee of defendant in the paint depart-
ment on the second floor as a spray gun painter for about 21 years.
He was transferred to defendant’s sealer department on the third
floor on Monday, September 26, 1949, and on Wednesday, the 28th,
was injured while working in an automobile body on one of defend-
ant’s conveyor lines.

Defendant’s overhead conveyor on the third floor of its plant in
Kansas City is approximately 450 feet long. It is an oblong line and
makes several curves. The conveyor chain is suspended by pressed
steel ball bearing rollers spaced at intervals along the chain. The
rollers travel on a 4 inch I beam, and are driven by an electric motor
located in the body shop through a reduction gear with a sprocket on
what is known in the-record as a C-131 chain. The conveyor moves

-about 12 or 18 feet a minute when in operation.

A master switch at the motor is thrown by the electricians to start
and stop the conveyor for the day’s work. Other switches are located
along the conveyor line. These are safety switches for stopping the
conveyor and if one is turned off, the conveyor can be started again
by turning it on if all the switches are in the ‘‘on’’ position. A shear
pin, made out of soft material, is located in the main sprocket, and
if the conveyor hangs, this pin will shear and cause the conveyor -
to stop. There was testimony the conveyor would stop and start at
intervals during the day and would hang up at times for some rea-
son; that when it sheared the pin the bodies would bounce back-
wards and if it ‘‘unclogged itself’? without shearing the pin the line
would bounce forward.: The conveyor starts and stops gradually
when operated by the electric switches.

Unfinished automobile bodies are suspended from the conveyor in
the body shop by means of chains and ‘‘C’’ hooks attached to bolts
on the body floor. The total length of a chain and hook is about 4
feet. The suspension is toward the center of the body, a swinging
attachment. The bottom of the body moves about 8 inches above the
floor.

The bodies pass through the bonderizing or spray and the lamp
or drying tunnel, which is just large enough for the bodies to pass

through. They then enter the sealer department, move east on the
conveyor down a ramp a distance of 12 to 15 feet, make a turn to
the north for a few feet and then to the west, returning to the body
shop.

Employees, known as ‘‘sealers,’’ insert a sealer compound along

the seams of the automobile body to prevent water from entering and
the body from rusting. The sealer steps into the body upon its
entering the sealer section and applies the compound by means of a
long hose and calking gun operated under air pressure. Stepping
into the suspended body with the hose and gun causes the body to
sway a little. .
, A convertible automobile body, one without a top, entered the sealer
department [98] late in the afternoon. Plaintiff entered the body
with his hose and calking gun. He would finish his task in about a
minute, while the body was moving approximately its length. Plain-
tiff testified that when the body started into the curve to the north
“‘the line came to a sudden stop and throwed me off balance, lunged
forward.’’ ‘The body comes to an abrupt stop just momentarily and
then it lurched forward violently and suddenly, * * just approxi-
mately the length of the body.’”’ This was unusual and mexpected,
caused the suspended body to swing backward and forward and side-
ways and plaintiff to be thrown on his back to the bottom of the
body in the rear and strike the sharp edges and hard.surface of its
metal parts. Plaintiff did not know what caused the body to stop
and lurch. He did not do it.

Plaintiff got out of the body. He was sick, weak and trembling.
He went to the men’s rest room, about 20 feet away, and vomited.
He returned and finished the convertible body. The conveyor had
just started to move. Another job came through, but before he could
finish it they shut the conveyor down for the day.

Plaintiff sustained injuries to the soft tissue of his back, right leg.
and hip, neck and head. No bones were fractured. He returned to
work for defendant the following Monday, losing two day’s time. He
testified his work causes him pain. He has continued to earn regular’
wages.

The sealer department is also referred to as the ramp and the
sealer operation as the ramp job.

Defendant had testimony to the effect that the conveyor stopped
and started gradually; that it stopped and started at irregular in-
tervals during the day; that if the conveyor stopped it might cause
an automobile body to swing’ 6 to 12 inches; that it was not possible
for it to swing as contended by plaintiff, and that there was no un-
usual movement of the conveyor at the time involved. Witnesses for
defendant also testified that they saw plaintiff as they were leaving
the plant after work and plaintiff told them he had slipped on the

ramp on the third floor and hurt his knee. Plaintiff denied making
the statements. .

Defendant contends plaintiff failed to make a submissible res ipsa
loquitur case because the evidence permitted of as equally reasonable
inferences of a cause or causes of plaintiff’s injuries for which de-
fendant was not liable as a cause or causes for which defendant was
liable, such as, among others, the movement of the conveyor being the
result of an act of a fellow servant, or a latent defect in the mechanism
which the defendant had no opportunity to discover.

The Missouri Workmen’s Compensation act explicitly pro-
vides that the defenses of negligence of a: fellow servant, contributory
negligence of the plaintiff, and the risks assumed by the employee
“shall be allowed to an employer who has elected to accept this
chapter, if the employee has elected to reject it.’’ § 287.080, RSMo
1949. Under the statute control by a fellow servant for whose acts
the master is not responsible to plaintiff would not be that exclusive
control in the master required for a res ipsa loquitur submission.

In Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 75 8. W. 2d 1001, 1003[7],
we said: ‘‘What is a res ipsa loquitur case anyhow? Reduced to
simple terms, does it not merely mean that negligence can be proved
by circumstantial evidence and that certain circumstances, as to the
character of an accident, are sufficient to take the case to the jury.’’
The basis of the allowable inference ‘‘is the doctrine of probabilities.’’
(Emphasis ours.) Byers v. Essex Inv. Co., 281 Mo. 375, 219 8. W.
570, 571[5]. The doctrine is a rule of evidence, peculiar to the law
of negligence, operating when applicable to make a prima facie case
of negligence without direct proof thereof. It excuses a lack of
precision in the proof.

Tn a res ipsa loquitur case the plaintiff has the burden of proving
each factual ingredient necessary for a prima facie case. McCloskey
v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. 2d 557, 563/5], 92 A. L. R. 641.
This includes the burden of prima facie establishing [99] that de-
fendant was negligent. Bond v. St. Louis-8, F. R. Co., 815'Mo. 987,
288 §. W. 777, 782[2]; Conser v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., Mo,
No. 43,454, 266 8. W. 2d 587; Sleater v. John R. Thompson Co., Mo.
App., 173 8S. W. 2d 591, 592[2]. A factor bearing on the quantum
of proof to make a submissible res ipsa case on defendant’s negligence
is the duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant.

It is stated in 85 Am. Jur. 920, Master and Servant, § 500: ‘‘Even
though the defenses peculiar to the relation of master and servant
embodied in the fellow servant rule and the rule as to assumption of
risk are not regarded as fatal to the application of the rule res ipsa
loquitur in its distinctive sense in all cases between parties in that
relation, they necessarily confine the rule in its operation between
such parties within narrower limits than when the relation of carrier
and passenger is involved. The res ipsa loquitur rule is never to be

a °

applied except where the accident not only supports the conclusion
of negligence on the part of the defendart, but also reasonably ex-
cludes every other, and obviously that condition is not satisfied in the
case of a servant if the inference, from the accident and its physical
cause or causes alone, that it was due to negligence for which the
master would be responsible to the servant is no stronger or more
reasonable than the inference that it was due to the negligence of a
fellow servant, or to a risk which the injured servant had assumed
for which the master would not be liable.’? (Italics ours.) See also
Annotation, L. R. A. 1917H, 53, 124, 241; 65 0. J. S. 1011, Negligence,
§ 220(8), b, (b), aa; 57 C. J. S. 58, Master and Servant, § 501, nn.
24, 25; 38 Am. Jur. 1000, Negligence, § 303.

Missouri cases having the issue for determination are in accord
with the above quoted text, as also are ‘cases from other jurisdictions.

In Removich v. Bambrick Bros. Const. Co., 264 Mo. 48, 173 8. W.
686, 687, L. R. A. 1917H, 233, plaintiff, who was digging earth in a
trench, was injured when a cable broke and allowed a bucket filled
with earth to fall upon him. The court said: ‘‘To make out a case
for the application of this [the res ipsa] doctrine, the facts relied on
ought to be such as reasonably to exclude all defensive inferences
attributable by operation of law to the negligence of the plaintiff,
or that of a fellow servant (absent a fellow-servant statute), defects
in the lethal instrumentality which are latent, or so recent in hap-
pening as to afford no reasonable opportunity for their discovery,
lack of causal connection, and the assumption of the usual hazards
of the employment.’’ (Italics ours.)

In Grindstaff v. J. Goldberg & Sons Structural Steel Co., 328 Mo.
72, 40 8. W. 2d 702, 705[7-9], plaintiff was injured while moving a
steel truss when the chain by which the truss was suspended broke.
In holding the plaintiff failed to make a submissible res ipsa case,
the court said: ‘‘Now a latent defect, not discoverable by any rea-
sonable inspection, may have caused the chain to break, a cause not
attributable to negligence on the part of any one; or the chain, on
account of its size, weight, or other plainly discernible quality, may
have been obviously wnjit for the purpose for which it was used, but
notwithstanding was negligently selected and used by a fellow servant,
negligence for which the master is in no wise responsible. * * To
make out a case for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
the facts relied on must be such as to reasonably exclude any other
hypothesis than that of the negligence claimed. * * While it is not
necessary that they exclude every possible hypothesis except that of
the defendant’s negligence [Gordon v. Packing Co., 328 Mo. 123,
40 8. W. (2d) 693], it is entirely clear that, if two or more inferences
can be equally well drawn from them, one of which points to negli-
gence on the part of the defendant as the cause of plaintiff’s injury,
and the others to causes for which the defendant was in no way re~

" ae

sponsible, proof of such facts does not make out a prima facie case
for plaintiff. * *’’ (Italics ours.)

In Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo, 364, 173 S. W. 2d 18, 18[5],
20[8], the above and [100] other authorities are reviewed in holding
“‘plaintiff’s evidence was not sufficient to exclude causes for which
defendants were not responsible.’’? The court, citing cases, also stated.
among other things: ‘‘In order to make out a prima facie case under
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the evidence must be such as to reason-
ably exclude the negligence of the injured as a contributing cause
of the injury, to wit, ‘that he was injured, without any fault on his
own'part.’’’ See, among others, McGrath v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
197 Mo. 97, 104(I), 94 S, W. 872, 874(1); Gibbs v. General Motors
Co., 350 Mo. 431, 166 8S. W. 2d 575, 581[8]; Sleater v. John R.
Thompson Co., Mo. App., 173 8. W. 2d 591; Pauley v. Baltimore
& O. R. Co., Mo. App., 215 8S. W. 2d 78, 81[8]; Estes v. Estes, Mo.
App., 127 8. W. 2d 78, 80; Hart v: Emery, Bird, Thayer D. G. Co.,
233 Mo. App. 312, 118 S. W. 2d 509, 512[11]; Marceau v. Rutland
R. Oo., 211 N. Y. 2038, 105 N. B. 206, 51 L. R. A. (NS) 1221, 1224,
Ann. Cas. 1915C, 511; Prest-o-Lite Go. v. Skeel, 182 Ind. 593, 599,
106 N. EH. 365, 367[6, 7]; Trim v. Fore River Ship Bldg. Co., 211
Mass. 593, 98 N. EB. 591.

In specific negligence cases turning on circumstantial evidence the
proof should establish the desired inference with such certainty as
to cause it to be the more reasonable and probable of the conclusions
to be drawn. Fritz v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 243 Mo. 62, 148
8. W. 74, 78 (¢, 1, 2); Schoen v. Plaza Exp. Co., Mo., 206 S. W. 2d
586, 538(2]; Bowers v. Columbia Terminals Co., Mo. App., 213 8. W.
2d 663, 670[7]. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases
is not required.

Gordon v. Muehling Packing Co., 328 Mo. 128, 40 8. W. 24 693,
697[6], bears most directly on the point of plaintiff’s cited cases.
Gordon was injured while cleaning an electric sausage machine when
it suddenly and wnexpectedly started without the electric switch
being pressed. Plaintiff stresses the portion reading: ‘‘(2) The plain-
tiff’s injury was due to some defect in the appliances furnishing the
power rather than in the meat-grinding machine, and this doctrine
is peculiarly applicable where, owing to the subtle and dangerous
character of an electric current, the injury to the servant is due to
a defective electrical appliance furnishing or controlling power or
light.’? The Gordon case is not in conflict with the cases hereinbefore
mentioned. It and the Grindstaff case were handed down by Division
No. I of this court on the same day. Plaintiff in the Gordon case
adduced testimony that the defect was in the electric switch and not
the grinding machine; that neither he nor anyone else touched the
electric switch on the occasion in question; that the switch had been
out of order and the machine had started under like circumstances

a "

on two or three occasions, and that the foreman had told him bow to
prevent this by placing a piece of paper between the two metal plates
in the switch control.

The other cases relied on by plaintiff are Cruce v. Gulf, M. & O. R.
Co., 358 Mo. 589, 216 S. W. 2d 78, 80; Jones v. Terminal R. Ass’n, Mo.,
242 8. W. 2d 473, 475[1]; Whitaker v. Pitcairn, 351 Mo. 848, 174
S. W. 2d 163, 166 [1]. They were under the Federal Employers’ Lia-
bility Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 51), making common carriers liable for injury
or death to employees engaged in interstate commerce ‘‘resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier.’’? The act abbrogated the fellow servant
rule in instances within its provisions. Reed v. Director General of
Railroads, 258 U. 8. 92, 95, 42 8. Ct. 191, 66 L. Hd. 480; 56 C0. J. 8.
1144, § 355 d; 35 Am. Jur. 882, § 410, n. 14; § 399, n. 1. The
earrier’s liability under the act approaches its liability to a passenger
and the cases are not controlling here. Some occurrences may be ‘of
such a nature as do not happen without a negligent cause chargeable
under the law to the defendant. Statements critical of the Charlton
and Grindstaff cases, supra, (see the Cruce case, supra) may apply to
eases within the Federal act, but do not rule cases under provisions
of the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation act which make the negli-
gence of a fellow servant a defense. See comment at 65 C. J. S. 1013,
n. 18.

[101] We are directed to no evidence in the instant record as
existed in the Gordon case giving rise to a more reasonable inference
that plaintiff’s injuries were the result of negligence chargeable to
defendant than to negligence for which defendant was not liable in
law; for instance, some act of a coemployee of plaintiff under their
common foreman causing the movement of the conveyor to be momen-
tarily stopped. The conveyor, according to plaintiff, started up again
and plaintiff continued to work until quitting time. The reasonable in-
ference is that the conveyor did not stop on account of some defect
therein. Plaintiff may be able to make a res ipsa loquitur case but
under the Removich, Grindstaff and other cases supra the instant
record falls short of doing so.

* Defendant claims error in the refusal of its requested instruc-
tion G. Plaintiff first says the refusal was proper because instruction
G was repetitious of instructions C and E, instructions of a general
nature on the burden resting upon plaintiff to prove his case.

Plaintiff does‘not contend the instruction misstated the law. It
submitted the converse of plaintiff’s verdict directing instruction on
defendant’s actionable negligence. After stating plaintiff’s submitted
theory of his case, it informed the jury that if plaintiff had not shown
by a preponderance ofall the credible evidence that defendant did
negligently cause or permit the conveyor to make a sudden and un-
usual jerk and stop and to again start forward suddenly on the

” a

occasion in question and that plaintiff received personal injuries as
a direct result therefrom the verdict should be for defendant.

In criminal cases the refusal of a deféndant’s requested instruc-
tion correctly submitting the converse of the state’s main instruction
is reversible error, unless the state’s instructions clearly submit the
converse of the essential issue or issues involved. State v. Ledbetter,
332 Mo. 225, 58 S. W. 2d 453, 454; State v. Fraley, 342 Mo. 442, 116
8. W. 2d 17, 20[2-4]. The Fraley case also ruled that concluding
the state’s verdict directing instruction with the words ‘‘and unless
you so find and believe from the evidence you should acquit the de-
fendant,’’ or words to like effect, was not a sufficient converse sub-
mission and did not justify the refusal of a requested proper converse
instruction. The Fraley case expressly overruled conflicting holdings
and observations in State v. Sloan, 309 Mo. 498, 274 8S. W. 784,
738[6], and other cases mentioned in the Fraley case; and in so
ruling stated : ‘‘Defendants in criminal cases, if they so desire, ought
in justice have the right to submit their defense to the jury in a
direct way by instructions. * * In civil cases defendants have the
right to submit their defenses by instructions in a direct way.’’

In State v. Quinn, 344 Mo. 1072, 180 S, W. 24 511, 5138, 4], the
state’s contention that a given instruction informing the jury “‘ ‘if,
upon consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt
of defendant’s guilt, you should acquit,’ ’’ sufficiently covered de-
fendant’s converse instruction, justifying its refusal, was overruled.

In plaintiff’s case of Relford v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., Mo.
App., 50 8. W. 2d 171, 173[3], defendant’s refused. instruction was
found to ignore a ground of recovery submitted by plaintiff; but the
court also stated that had it properly declared the law, it was ‘‘nothing
more than the negative statement of the law already instructed upon,’’
and its refusal. was not reversible error. Earlier cases are to like
effect; see Kirkpatrick v. American Creosoting Co., 225 Mo. App. 774,
37 8. W. 2d 996, 100422, 24], citing cases. Other civil cases appear
to be more in harmony with State v. Fraley, supra.

The instant defendant’s refused instruction submitted the converse
of plaintiff’s instruction on the merits of plaintiff’s case and was not
covered by other instructions on behalf of defendant. In Boles v.
Dunham, Mo. App., 208 S. W. 480[3], the court held it was error to
refuse a defendant’s instruction presenting the converse of plaintiff’s
case, stating: ‘Defendant was undoubtedly entitled to it.” See
Davis v. [102] Springfield Hospital, Mo. App., 196 8. W. 104, 108[4].

In approving a defendant’s submission converse to a plaintiff’s
verdict directing instruction in civil cases, we have said that the de-
fendant is entitled to a proper converse instruction. Borgstede v.
Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205, 88 S. W. 2d 378, 878; Kimbrough v. Chervitz,
353 Mo. 1154, 186 S. W. 2d 461, 466; Lindquist v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 850 Mo. 905, 169 8. W. 2d 366, 369[5]; Broderick v.

Le "
Brennan, Mo. App., 170 S, W. 2d 686, 687[1-3]. Like rulings have
been made in res ipsa loquitur cases. West v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co., 361 Mo. 740, 236 S. W. 2d 308, 311[5]; McCarty v. Milgram
Food Stores, Inc., Mo., 252 S. W. 2d 343, 844[1, 2]; Quigley v. St. .
Louis Pub. Serv. Co., Mo., 201 S. W. 2d 169, 170 [1-5].

In McCormick v. Kansas City, Mo., 262 S. W. 2d 868, 871[8], an:
order granting a new trial for the giving of an instruction submitting
the negative of plaintiff’s theory by hypothesizing the converse of
plaintifi’s submission or by hypothesizing facts which, if true, nega-
tived an unsafe condition as submitted by plaintiff, was reversed and
the judgment ordered reinstated. In holding the refusal of defend-
ant’s burden of proof instruction, fully covered by an instruction
given on behalf of plaintiff, was not error, the court in Counts v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Mo. App., 149 S. W. 2d 418, 423[7], observed
that defendant would have had a sound basis for complaint had the
instruction hypothesized findings of fact upon an issue of fact in evi-
dence.

‘In the instant case defendant had substantial evidence that plain-
tiff was not injured by any action of the conveyor; that the conveyor
did not and could not have stopped and started in the manner de-
scribed in the evidence on behalf of plaintiff. We conclude the de-
fendant was entitled to a converse instruction bearing on the merits
of plaintiff’s submitted case. It appears that the same basic logic
on the issue under discussion should apply in civil as in criminal
cases.

Plaintifi’s verdict directing instruction, after hypothesizing |
certain findings, continued: ‘‘* * then you are instructed that from
such facts aforesaid * * you may infer that the defendant was
negligent; and you may so find, unless you believe and find from all
the facts and circwmstances in evidence that the aforesaid occwrrence,
if so, was not due to the megligence of the defendant; and * *.”’
(Italics ours.) Defendant says the italicized clause shifted the burden
of proof to defendant. The instruction follows in substance the con-
clusion suggested for a res ipsa submission in Harke v. Haase, 335
Mo. Le. 1111, 75 8. W. 2d Le. 1004, |

Since McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. 2d 557, the in-
ference of a defendant’s negligence in a res ipsa case is not conclusive
on the jury although it be not rebutted. The inference is binding on
the court in that under the law it is substantial evidence requiring
the submission of the fact of negligence to the jury; but the facts
of the occurrence, while warranting the inference of negligence, do
not compel a finding by the jury that defendant was negligent.
Harke v. Haase, supra, quoting Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233,
33'S. Ct’ 416, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905; Duncan v. St.
Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 355 Mo. 733, 197 8. W. 2d 964, 966; Tabler v.
Perry, 337 Mo. 154, 85 8. W. 24 471, 475[7]; Turner v. Missouri-K.-T.

; a

RB. Co., 346 Mo. 28, 142 8. W. 2d 455, 460, 129 A. L. R. 829; Charlton
v. Lovelace, 351 Mo. 364, 173 8S. W. 2d 18, 17[4]; Cruce v. Gulf,
M. & O. R. Co., 358 Mo. 589, 216 8. W. 2d 78, 82[7]; Conser v. Atchi-
son, T. & 8. F. R. Co., supra; Duneker v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
Mo. App., 241 8. W. 2d 64, 66 [2, 4, 7]. ‘‘Unless you believe and find
from all the facts and circumstances in evidence that the aforesaid
occurrence’’ was not due to negligence of the defendant gives rise to
the thought that there must be evidence of record to warrant a finding
that defendant was not negligent, notwithstanding a defendant does
not have the burden of establishing he was not negligent. However,
the instruction, read as a whole and with [103] other instructions in
the case, has been sustained as against defendant’s presentation of
error. Welch v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 703, 210 S. W. 24 79, 85, 86.

Defendant complains of the admission of certain evidence over ob-
jection with respect to the extent of plaintiff’s injuries and the amend-
ment of plaintiff’s petition at the close of all the evidence. Matters
of this nature should not be. live issues upon a retrial. The case was
hard fought and there are incidents in the instant record foreign to
the issues presented. Other contentions may be readily obviated with-
out affecting plaintiff’s submission.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded. Leedy, H ol-
lingsworth, Ellison and Westhues, JJ., concur; Dalton, J.,-concurs
in result; Hyde, J., and Cave, Special a udge, dissent.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bourne, ©., is adopted
as the opinion of the Court en Bane.

PER CURIAM:—On motion for rehearing respondent con-
tends that the requirement that the evidence reasonably exclude every
other hypothesis than the defendant’s negligence has been fully met
and satisfed by plaintiff’s evidence; and that the opinion erroneously
failed to state the facts shown by the record, as follows: (1) that the
fellow employees of plaintiff were forbidden to operate the switch
to the conveyor line, as only foremen, electricians and maintenance
men were permitted to do that; (2) that had anyone turned a switch
to stop the conveyor line it would have stopped gradually, if operating
normally; (3) that only two of defendant’s employees were near at
the particular time ‘and neither of them turned a switch or saw-any-
one else do so; and (4) that plaintiff was standing in the suspended
auto body and could not have reached the switch if he had tried.

It will be noted that all of this evidence is directed solely to the
operation of the conveyor by an electric switch or switches, however,
plaintiff testified, as the opinion shows, that when operated by the .
electric switches the conveyor starts and stops gradually with a maxi-
mum swing of six or seven inches. ‘‘If it is stopped with an} of the
switches, it will make a gradual stop.’? The evidence mentioned as
having been omitted tends only to exclude the operation of the switches

eee "

as a cause of the violent lurch and swing backward and forward and
sideways, but it did not exclude acts by fellow servants in other
respects than the mere operation of an electric switch or switches
and plaintiff’s own testimony tends to show that the unusual action
complained of was not due to the control or interference with the
electric current by a switch or switches.

Respondent further contends that the opinion conflicts with the
rule that ‘“‘any negligence of a fellow employee making a servant’s
place of work unsafe is no defense to the master.’’? The cases relied
upon support the rule, but do not deal with the question as to whether
the plaintiff has made a. submissible case of negligence under the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine.

It will not be necessary to review other assignments as to matters
which are fully covered in the opinion.

The motion for a rehearing is overruled.

Srarp or Missouri, Respondent, v. Dock Booxnr, Appellant, No.
44274276 S. W. (2d) 104.

Court en Bane, February 14, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, March 14, 1955.

" Ld
Le

Robert L. Spelbrink for appellant.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and John 8. Phillips, Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent.

[104] WESTHUES, J.—Dock Booker, appellant in this case, was
convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis,
Missouri, of murder in the first degree and his punishment was fixed
at death. From the sentence imposed, he duly appealed to this court.

Appellant, whom we shall refer to as defendant, was charged with
having inflicted mortal wounds on Harl Harrison by shooting him
on August 15, 1953. From these wounds, Harrison died on August
21, 1958. On this appeal, defendant’s principal point is that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of murder in the first
degree. Many other complaints are found in the brief about alleged
errors committed in the course of the trial. The majority of these are
so indefinite that it is difficult to determine what defendant is com-
plaining about. In view of the punishment assessed, we shall review
the whole record to determine if the defendant had a fair trial.

The defendant ¢laimed the shooting was accidental and also
in self defense. The evidence justifies the following statement of
what occurred between defendant and Harrison on August 15, the
day of the alleged fatal shooting. Defendant and Harrison were
baseball players; they were about, the same weight and height and
both were between 40 and 45 years old. They had known each other
and had met at taverns and other places and on several occasions
had had arguments as to their respective effectiveness as pitchers.
About ‘2:00 o’clock on the afternoon of August 15, the defendant
went to Vie’s Tap Room, a tavern located at 2518 North Taylor
Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri. There were a [105] number of people
in the tavern. Defendant seated himself at a table and had a number
of drinks. About 2:45 or 3:00 o’clock, Harrison, the deceased, also
went to the tavern. Harrison seated himself on a stool at the bar
and ordered a bottle of beer. Defendant, at this point, left the table

a *

where he had been seated and went to Harrison and asked him to buy
a drink. Harrison replied, ‘‘I’m not going to buy you a God Damn
thing.’”’ Defendant retorted, ‘‘As many drinks as I’ve bought you,
and you won’t buy me one.’’ The evidence was that Harrison did
not get to drink his beer because the argument became heated and
Fred Mitchell, the man in charge of the tavern, ordered the two to
leave. He put the defendant out at the front door onto Taylor Ave-
nue, and Harrison out at’a side door into a narrow alley or ‘‘gang-
way’? which led into a main alley which ran north and south between
Cottage and Kennerly. The deceased turned north at the main alley
and was next seen at Cottage Avenue, the next street to the north.
The defendant was seen walking north on Taylor. <A sister of the de-
fendant operated a ‘‘little lunch counter’’ in the rear of a tavern
referred to as Sugar Ray’s place which was located at’ 2526 North
Taylor, a short distance north of Vic’s Tap Room. The defendant’s
sister, Rena Jackson, testified that shé had had the lunch counter at
Sugar Ray’s for some time; that her brother, the defendant, had
left a loaded pistol with her which she kept under a counter in the
place. Defendant testified that after he left Vic’s Tap Roor, he went
to Sugar Ray’s place and took the gun and placed it in his pocket.
The defendant and the deceased were next seen at the place where
Harrison was shot (the mouth of the alley at Cottage Avenue). A
nephew of the defendant, James Biggs, testified for the State. His
testimony was that he saw his uncle and another man in the alley
and that he went up to where they were. He testified as follows:

“Q. Did you have an occasion to go over there where your
uncle was?

“AL Yes.

“Q. And now tell the court and jury in your own words,
please, what if anything you saw and did at that time?

“A. Well, I went over—I seen him and another fellow over
there in the alley; I went over there in the alley; the fellow was
sitting down on the stone next to a pole. My uncle slapped the
fellow and the fellow got up and he slapped him again.

° ’ 8 8 & & ee 8 & &

“Q. And then what happened?

‘*A. The fellow stood up and my uncle shot him.

“*Q. Now then, did you have any conversation with your uncle
at that time?

“‘A. Well, I told him, I said, ‘Buddy, let the fellow alone.’
He didn’t say anything and I asked—

“MR. SPELLBRINK: I object to that as a self-serving state-
ment, if the Court please.

“THE COURT: Overruled.

“Q. Did you see a gun in your uncle’s hand at the time it was
fired?

“A, Yes,

7 a

“*Q. In what hand did he have the gun, please?

“A. He had it in his right hand.

“Q. Can you tell us whether or not during the time that your
uncle was—what if anything during the time that your uncle
was slapping this fellow who was shot, what if anything this
fellow said or did?

“A, Well, I didn’t see him do anything.”’

A witness, Rosella Mathews, testified that on August 15, at about
3:30 P.M., she was in a room at 4459 Cottage Avenue, the home of
a Mrs. Bramblett; that she was dressing Mrs. Bramblett’s hair; that
she was facing a window and saw what occurred between the defendant
and the deceased at the alley. Note her description of what she saw
and heard:

“Q. While you were looking out of the window, tell the court
and jury what, if anything, you saw and heard.

“A, Well, when I looked out the window I saw these men
walk up and [106] when they walked up this elderly man was
sitting on a rock and this Dock Booker, he came up to the man
and he said, ‘You think you’re smart,’ and then he slapped
him, and he repeated that several times and slapped him several.
times, and then the man, he stood up, the elderly gentleman, he
stood up and he said, ‘Go on and let me alone, I’m not bothering
you,’ just like that. He said, ‘No, you just think you’re smart.’

“Q. And then what happened, please?

“A. Then he just walked over to him and shot him. .

“Q. Can you tell the court and jury, Mrs. Mathews, whether
or not at any time during this altercation that you have just
described you saw this fellow who got shot, with any weapon or
anything in his hands?

“A, No, sir, I did not.

“Q. Can you tell us what, if anything, this fellow who got
shot did to protect himself?

“A. Not one thing.

**Q. And can you tell us whether or not this fellow who was
shot made any threat to him? .

“A. No, sir, he did not.’”’

The evidence was that four men were present when the shooting
occurred: the defentlant, the deceased, James Biggs, and a fourth man
unknown to Biggs. The evidence does not show who this man was.
The State’s evidence, if true, was sufficient to sustain a verdict of
murder in the first degree. In fact, the evidence did not justify any
other finding.

The defendant testified that before the shooting the deceased had
an open knife in his hand and threatened him and told him to stay
off Taylor Avenue; that he, the defendant, told the deceased to stop;
that he, the defendant, took the gun from his pocket and showed it

a "

to the deceased thinking that would stop him but that deceased ad-
vanced with the open knife; that a scuffle followed and the gun was
accidentally discharged. Defendant was asked if he had signed a
statement about the shooting and he denied he had signed a statement.
He was shown a statement and then defendant stated he had for-
gotten about it and admitted he had signed the statement. The state-
ment was offered in evidence in its entirety at defendant’s suggestion.

In this statement, defendant stated that he shot the deceased in
self defense. No scuffle was mentioned therein. In the statement
defendant was asked, ‘‘How far from him were you when you fired
the shot?’? Hig answer was, ‘‘About three steps from him.’”’ The
doctor who examined the deceased and treated him during the few
days he lived testified that the bullet entered the body on the left side
more to the back ‘‘Just at the lower border of the rib cage, where the
ribs end down there.’’ (Italics ours) .

No witness corroborated the defendant in support of his theory
of self defense or that the shooting was accidental. Not a witness
was called by the defendant. He was the only witness. We must
rule that the evidence was ample to support a finding that defendant
was guilty of murder in the first degree. State v. Page, Mo., 130
S.W. (2d) 520.

The trial court submitted the case to the jury by instructions
authorizing a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, in the
second degree, or manslaughter. The court also instructed the jury
authorizing a verdict of not guilty if the shooting was in self defense
or if it was accidental.

Defendant complains that the instruction submitting murder in the
first degree was incorrect because murder in the first degree was
defined ‘‘as wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, malice and malice
aforethought.’’ It is claimed that the instruction was indefinite, im-
proper, conflicting, and a comment on the evidence. The instruction
follows the wording of the statute, Section 559.010, VA.M.S. The
portion of the instruction complained of reads as follows: ‘‘“* * *
the Court instructs the jury that if you believe and [107] find from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant * * *
wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought,
did shoot one Earl Harrison * * *,’? The instruction also defined
the terms ‘‘wilfully,’’ ‘‘deliberately,’’ ‘‘premeditatedly,”’ ‘‘malice,’’
and ‘‘malice aforethought.’’ The instruction is in proper form.

Defendant also complains that the instruction did not state ‘‘and
thereby inflicting upon Harl Harrison a mortal wound, of which said
wound Earl Harrison within a year and a day thereafter died, ete.’’
We find no basis for such complaint. The instruction contains sub-
stantially the very words which defendant says were omitted. Note
the wording of the instruction: ‘“* * * and that within a year and

. a
a day thereafter, to-wit, on the 21st day of August, 1953, he died from
the effects of such shooting, * * *.’?

So it is with many of the complaints in the motion for new trial

-and in the brief. They are either indefinite or the record does not
support the complaint made. For example: the motion for new trial
states that the evidence failed to show the venue of the crime charged.
That fact was proven by a number of witnesses and also by cireum-
stantial evidence. One of the witnesses to the shooting was asked
whether the events to which she had given evidence ‘“‘happened here
in the City of St. Louis, is that correct?’’ She answered, ‘‘Yes, sir.’””
Venue may be proved by cireumstantial evidence. State v. Holland,
354 Mo. 527, 189 S.W. (2d) 989, Le. 996, 997 (6, 7); State v. Cobb,
359 Mo. 878, 221 S.W. (2d) 745, le. 747 (8-5); State v. Palmer, 281
Mo. 525, 220 S. W. 680, lc. 682 (2, 3); 23 O.J.S. Criminal Law, See-
tion 914, Subsection b., p. 172.

In the last point briefed, defendant complains that the trial
court refused to grant a new trial on newly discovered evidence. De-
fendant’s attorney filed an affidavit that he did not discover the evi-
dence until after the trial. The newly discovered witness signed’ a
sworn statement that he saw the killing as he passed by the street
and alley, but did not give his name to the police or to the defendant
or anyone else; that after he heard defendant had been convicted, he
visited defendant in jail on January 14, 1954, and informed him of
what he had seen on the day of the shooting; that defendant told lim
to go to see his lawyer; that he did so and that the lawyer prepared
the affidavit setting forth what the witness knew of the shooting.

The trial court heard arguments on the motion and considered the
affidavits pertaining to the newly discovered evidence and overruled
the motion. The question before us is whether the trial court’s ruling
was an abuse of discretion. State v. Stroud, 362 Mo. 124, 240 S.W.
(2d) 111, Le. 118 (5, 6); State v. Brown, Mo., 245 S.W. (2d) 866,
le. 868 (9, 10) ; State v. Brotherton, Mo., 266 S.W. (2d) "712, Le. 718
(9)(10). In passing upon the motion, the trial court made some
comments which indicated his consideration of the question of whether
the newly discovered evidence would probably produce a different
result. The trial court was in a better position to judge this matter
than this court. However, the record in this case shows that the
alleged newly discovered evidence is inconsistent with the physical
facts and contrary to all the evidence of witnesses in the case, in-
eluding some of the evidence of the defendant. In fact, when all the
evidence is considered in connection with the affidavit, it leaves a
doubt as to whether the newly discovered witness saw or heard what
he claims in the affidavit. We hold that the motion for new trial was
properly overruled.

The indictment in this case is in proper form; the defendant was
represented by an attorney; a jury trial was had; the verdict is

a °

legally sufficient; the motion for new trial was argued by counsel and *
considered by the trial court before it was overruled. We find no
reversible error in the record. The judgment is affirmed. The date
of the execution is ordered on and for Friday, the 1st day of April,
1955, All concur.

Rosrrt G. Dowp and Marcenimn B. Down, JosspH Darrino and
Jean. Darrmo, Josepx Maciocia and Viera Macrocia, CHarims
Brusart, Douetas O. Brooxs, Harry Fruisn, Jr., and Hazen
Fruist, Frank Granivo and Dororny Giantno, Ronanp H.
Rogrpiesr, Grrrrupe E, Gorssuive, Lana K. Gorssuive, Russenu
Park; Loo H. Kunpsr, Jr. and Caroumnn V. Kuzpsr, W. J.
Lami and Miprep Lami, Cumvrorp SHerman and Daruis
Suerman, Frep W. Fumcx and Vaneria M. Fromck, Frawx H.
Waensr, Louis Wincox and James B. Gannon, Jz., Vanoz T.
Brooxs, Lo Marcui and Francis Marcui, Mrs. Denia WaLrHer,
Srriza Wintovessy Bowman, Auicu EH. Gramm and Howarp
Gramm, Mrs. Brssm Park, Janz M. Witnovansy WinriaMs,
DoraBetin McCann, Owen H. Grirriras and Ones M. Grirvrrus,
Respondents, v. Lazu Srrus, Incorrorarmp, a Corporation, Ap-
pellant, No. 44128—276 S. W. (2d) 108.

Division Two, February 14, 1955.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, March 14, 1955.

ercher & Tzinberg and H. L. C. Weier for defendant-appellant.

g & Matthes and M. C. Matthes for plaintifts-respondents

[108] BOHLING, C.—Robert G. Dowd and Marcellian B. Dowd,
husband and wife, and, as we read the record, twenty-five owners of
one or more lots in Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision of Jefferson County,
Missouri, instituted this suit as a class action on behalf of themselves
and other lot owners in said subdivision to restrain the threatened
granting of the privileges of said subdivision to owners of lots owt-
side of the platted boundaries of said subdivision by Lake Sites, In-
corporated, a corporation, ‘and for a decree ‘‘declaring that plaintiffs
and other lot owners in said subdivision and their heirs, successors
and assigns have the exclusive right to use’’ the lake, roadways and
parkways therein. The decree of the court granted the injunctive
relief prayed for in the petition, and adjudged and deereed that the
respondents and other owners of lots in said subdivision, as shown by

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the plat of record thereof, their heirs, successors and assigns and guests
“have the exclusive right to use said Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision and
all facilities and privileges incident thereto.’’ The defendant has
appealed, contending respondents are not entitled to the relief granted.

Respondents suggest we may not have jurisdiction over the
appeal, stating that title to real estate is not involved. They cite
Stewart v. Stewart, Mo., 269 S. W. 2d 49, 51[4], a partition suit
wherein the only controverted issue was the method in which the
partition was to be accomplished, there being no controversy regarding
any share of the several tenants in common in the real estate. In the
instant proceeding the pleadings sought an adjudication and the
judgment adjudged and decreed in the lot owners, as an appurtenant
to their respective lots, an ‘‘exclusive’’ easement in the lake, roadways
and parkways of the subdivision. A title controversy is in issue and
adjudicated, and title to real estate is directly and not merely inci-
dentally or collaterally involved. Jurisdiction of the appeal is in this
court. Nettleton Bank v. McGauhey’s Estate, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S. W.
2d 771, 774, 775; Farmers Drainage Dist. v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
Mo., 255 S. W. 2d 745, 748[2]; Mills v. Taylor, Mo., 270 S. W. 2d
724, 726[1]; Hunter v. Hunter, 355 Mo. 599, 197 8. W. 2d 299,
300[1]; Hoelmer y. Heiskell, 359 Mo. 236, 221 S. W. 2d 142,
148 [1, 4].

The pleadings, the trial and the presentation here proceed upon the
theory that respondents were deceived and induced to purchase their
respective lots by reason of fraudulent representations made upon
behalf of appellant by the salesmen of the lots.

Ed Buscher, as trustee for himself, Bill Buscher, Edward R. Blades
and I. J. Shyne, acquired title to the NW fractional part of Sev. 29,
Twp. 43, R. 8, containing approximately 144 acres. It was their
purpose to create a lake thereon, plat the property, and sell the lots.
Missouri State Highway F passes through the property, taking ap-
proximately 4 acres of the land. About 40 acres are north and 100
acres are south of said highway. The owners caused Lake Sites, In-
eorporated, to be organized, with Ed Buscher, President, Bill Buscher.
Vice-president and Assistant Secretary, John Wahl, [110] Treasurer,
and I. J. Shyne, Secretary. They, with Mr. Blades, constituted ap-
pellant’s Board of Directors. The title to the 144 acres was trans-
ferred to said corporation. Theodore Hurtgen, a surveyor, was em-
ployed to survey the 144 acres, establish the shoreline of the lake to
be created by the construction of a dam and to plat the property into
lots. The lake covers approximately 20 acres. He platted the 100
acres south of the highway. He did not, at that time, finish platting
the 40 acres north of Highway F.

Appellant was desirous of proceeding with the development. On
May 24, 1949, appellant filed in the Recorder’s Office of Jefferson
County, Missouri, said plat of Lake Tckakwitha Subdivision, con-

“ a

sisting of a lake, roadways, parkways, paths and 182 lots, divided
into Blocks 1, 2, 3 and 4, all south of said Highway F, and proceeded
with the sale of said lots. The surveyor did not plat the 40 acres north
of Highway F until the Spring of 1952, and the 40 acres, being con- -
sidered suitable for summer homes, was subdivided into larger tracts,
there being 35 tracts in the plat thereof. When respondents were
advised of the threatened sale of said tracts by appellant with the
right to use the facilities of Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision in the pur-
chasers thereof, this suit was instituted.

Under stipulation of the parties it was admitted that respondents
were owners of lots in Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision and the following
exhibits were introduced in evidence by respondents: A deed con-
veying the 144 acres to Ed Buscher as trustee. A deed conveying
said 144 acres to appellant-corporation. A copy of the recorded plat
of Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision. A copy of the application to pur-
chase lots in said subdivision from appellant, such an application
having been executed by each purchaser of a lot in the subdivision.
A small photographie reproduction of the plat (with the dedication
recitals omitted), convenient for handing to prospective purchasers.
These exhibits are ‘‘Plaintiffs Exhibits’? A, B, C, D and B, respec-
tively.

We briefly outline the parol evidence. The fraudulent representa-
tions, admitted over objections interposed on behalf of appellant, made
by salesmen and inducing respondents to purchase lots in the sub-
division were to the following effect: The subdivision as shown on
the plat constituted the whole development. The lake, roadways,
parkways et cetera of the subdivision were for the use and benefit of
the owners of the lots therein and their guests. When the 182 lots
shown on the plat were sold appellant was going to move out and turn.
the management of the subdivision over to the lot owners, who could
form their own association. Respondents were not informed and did
not know of appellant’s intention to subdivide the land north of High-
way F and sell lots or tracts therein with privilege of user of the
facilities of Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision. There was testimony that
some respondents purchased additional land in the subdivision or
made improvements on their lots after being informed of appellant’s
intention to sell the tracts north of Highway F with the privilege of
using the facilities of Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision.

On behalf of appellant: It was the intention of the incorporators
from the beginning’ to subdivide the whole of the 144 acres, and sell
the lots or tracts thus divided with the privilege of user of the lake,
roadways and parkways of the subdivision. Theodore Hurtgen, a
surveyor, was employed to lay out the subdivision. He was under
pressure to perform other work and when he platted the 100 acres
south of Highway F it was agreed that he might perform the other
work with the understanding he was to return and subdivide the 40

acres north of Highway F. As stated the plat of the 100 acres was
recorded and the sale of the 182 lots began. Although requested many
times to complete his work, the surveyor did not subdivide the 40
acres north of Highway F until the Spring of 1952. Appellant en-
tered into a written contract with H. Glenn Weber, who was engaged
in the real estate business, to sell the 182 lots and also the lots or
tracts north of Highway F when platted. The lots were sold by
salesmen employed by Weber. Such’ lots as were sold by the in-
eorporators of [111] appellant were sold under Weber’s direction, and
they received a like commission on their sales. Appellant adduced
testimony that the alleged fraudulent representations were not made,
and that whenever the question arose, it was explained that the 40
acres north of Highway F was to be subdivided and the purchasers
were to have the privilege of using the lake and facilities south ‘of
Highway F. Several purchasers of lots south of Highway F testified
that when they made their purchases they were informed the land
north of the highway was to be subdivided as a part of the original
development and purchasers thereof would have the privilege of using
the lake and other facilities shown on the plat.. Appellant caused to
be prepared and published prior to the sale of any lots newspaper
articles in which the statement was made that the whole of the 144
acres were included in the development. Many purchasers own more
than one lot. At the time of trial there were approximately 100 to
105 owners of property south of Highway F, and there remained of
the 182 lots 14 to 16 lots unsold.

Appellant certified on the plat of the 100 acres (Respondents’ Ex-
hibit C) that Lake Sites, Incorporated ‘‘is the owner of the lands com-
prising Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision,’’ being lands ‘‘lying within the
boundaries as shown upon this plat * *.’”

It is also expressly stated upon said plat that:

“Lake Sites, Incorporated, reserves the title to all roadways, drives,
parkways, pathways, and parks surrounding the lake.’’

The ‘‘application’’ (Respondents’ Exhibit D), executed by each
purchaser of lots in the subdivision, contained provisions to the fol-
lowing effect, material here:

The purchaser specified the number of the block and the lot desired,
viz.: ‘Lot No. —, Block No. —’’; and agreed to pay therefor as
filled in in the application. Upon payment, the applicant was ‘‘to
receive a warranty deed’’ conveying a merchantable fee simple title to
the lots described, ‘‘but subject to the covenants and restrictions con-
tained in the plat of said land, and which are printed on the back of
this application.”’

Appellant agreed to diligently prosecute the development of the
subdivision, including the construction of necessary roads and paths;
“to reserve a parkway surrounding the lake to which the owner of
said lot shall have access at all times;’’ to maintain all improvements

° a

in the subdivision up to January 1, 1951, at its sole expense, after
which date the applicant agreed to pay an annual assessment for such
expenses to be levied by the appellant, not exceeding, however, $25
per lot per annum for the tier of lots nearest the lake and $20 per
lot per annum for all others. The application was not binding on
appellant until acceptance by it ‘‘and subject to the terms of the
acceptance submitted herewith.’’ _

The acceptance by the appellant repeated the covenants on the part
of the appellant to construct the roads et cetera, to execute a deed,
to maintain the improvements up to January 1, 1951, and also ‘‘to
reserve a parkway surrounding said lake to which the owner of said
lot shall have access at all times.’’ It also contained the following
statement on its face: ‘‘The company will not be responsible for any
representations not incorporated in this contract.”

The ‘‘Restrictions’’ referred to in the application and material here,
appearing on the reverse side thereof, read:

“The following restrictions shall be subject to proper enforcement
clauses :

“Deeds to lots in this block will be made subject to the following
covenants and restrictions which shall run with the land and bind all
subsequent owners until and including January 1, 1975. * * *

“12, As a part of the consideration for the sale of this lot grantor
shall have the right to assess the owner of this lot beginning January
1, 1951, and each succeeding January Ist thereafter such sum as
grantor shall deem necessary for the management, upkeep and main-
tenance of the Dam, Road and other improvements; provided, how-
ever, that no assessment for any one year [112] shall exceed the sum
of $25.00 per lot or tract for first tier lots and $20.00 per lot or tract
on all others * *,

“Said grantee, his heirs and assigns, shall, subject to compliance
with the foregoing restrictions, and while holding said lot, have license
personally and for the family and lot owner’s guests, to the use and
privileges of the lake in said subdivision, which shall include’ boating,
bathing, fishing and the use of the private beaches only, also the park-
way surrounding said lake, including the right to moor boats in front
of said parkway, all subject to the rules and‘regulations prescribed
by grantor from time to time.

““All of the covenants and agreements herein made shall run with
the land and shall bind the grantor herein, its successors and assigns,
and the individual resident lot owners, their heirs and assigns.’’

One who has been the victim of fraud in the inducement of a
contract, as here pleaded and relied on, may proceed in equity to re-
scind the contract, or affirm the contract and demand its completion
or damages for noncompletion, or bring an action for daiages for the
fraud. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Brown-C. Inv. Co., 309 Mo. 638,
274 8. W. 815, 820; National Theatre Sup. Co. v. Rigney, Mo. App.,

a "
130 S. W. 2d 259, 261; 24 Am. Jur. 8, § 190; 37 C. J. 8. 354, § 65.
In such instances, as contended by respondents, a broad latitude is
indulged in the admission of testimony to establish fraud. Respond-
ents stress 32 C. J. 8. 942, § 979, a, reading: ‘‘It is well established
that, as fraud vitiates everything which it touches, parol evidence is
always admissible to show, for the purpose of invalidating a written
instrument, that its execution was procured by fraud, or that, by
reason of fraud, it does not express the true intentions of the parties.
The rule in this respect is not rendered inapplicable by the fact that
the writing contains a recital to the effect that all agreements between
the parties are contained therein, * * or that no representations had
been made, or that all representations were merged in the written
contract * *; and the fact that the writing recites that it contains
the only representations made and relied on has been held not to
prevent a party from showing the contrary by parol evidence.’’ See
also respondents’ cases of National Theatre Sup. Co. v. Rigney, supra;
Rice v. Lammers, Mo. App., 65 8. W.,2d 151, 153[4, 8, 9]; Rabenau
vy. Harrell, 278 Mo. 247, 213 8. W. 92, 94[7]-; Boyles v. Burnett,
213 Mo. App. 288, 249 S. W. 719, 721[1]; and Wells v. Adams, 88
Mo. App. 215, 227 (involving fraud in the execution of the, and not
the inducement to, contract). In respondents’ cases, as stated in the
quotation from 32 C. J. S. supra, the evidence is admitted for the
purpose of invalidating the written instrument.

‘The rule relied on by respondents is subject to limitations. It
is stated in 82 C. J. S. 952, § 979, d, that parol testimony establishing
fraud in the procurement of a written contract ‘‘cannot be legally
used to control or vary the terms of such agreement.’? 20 Am. Jur.
968, § 1104. Titles to real estate would be uncertain, and statutes
requiring contracts relating thereto to be in writing and for their
registration would be of questionable value if the effect of the con-
tract provisions are to be determined by the testimony of witnesses.

In McPherson v. Kissee, 239 Mo. 664, 669, 144 S. W. 410, 412, the
parties agreed to exchange property, defendant contracting that his
property was subject to two deeds of trust to secure the payment of
$5,000. However, his land was subject to three deeds of trust to
secure $5,803. The deed of trust not mentioned in the contract
secured $808, which defendant contended was for interest on $4,000
of the $5,000 mentioned in the contract, did not constitute a separate
indebtedness, and of which he verbally notified plaintiff. The court
stated: ‘‘All such evidence was improperly admitted, as tending to
vary and change the terms of a written contract which purported to
fully describe all the encumbrances on the property.’’ And, with
respect to plaintiff’s contention that defendant verbally represented
one creditor would extend the time for payment and would loan addi-
tional [113] money on the land, said: ‘‘As the parties had examined
the property they were trading for and were relying on a written

" a

contract, we will disregard all their verbal statements and representa-
tions. Such oral statements were merged into the written agreement.’?
See also Rock Island Implement Co. v. Wally, Mo. App., 268 8. W.
904, 913[18, 19]; Crossan v. Noll, Mo. App., 120 8. W. 2d 189,
191[8-6]; Scott v. Tanner, Mo. App., 208 8. W. 264, 266[6]; Eng-
land v. Houser, 178 Mo. App. 70, 81 et seq., 163 S. W. 890, 893[4];
Peoples Bank of Ava v. Baker, Mo. App., 193 8. W. 632, 633[1, 4].

The fraud relied on by respondents was perpetrated to induce
respondents to purchase the lots in the subdivision. This is not a
ground for a court of equity to make a new contract in the place of
the contract actually made. General Refractories Co. v. Sebek, 328
Mo. 1148, 44 8. W. 2d 60, 64[2]; Krick v. Thompson, 349 Mo. 488,
162.8. W. 24 240, 245[5].

Appellant held the fee simple title to the land here involved
prior to the sale of the lots. None of the lots as platted extend to the
lake. They stop at the line of the parkway around the lake. So far
as disclosed of record appellant conveyed to the purchasers by lot and
block number and did not part’ with its title to the lake, roadways and
parkway. The recorded plat recites that appellant ‘‘reserves the title
to all roadways, drives, parkways, pathways, and parks surrounding’
the lake.” The deeds executed by appellant were expressly ‘‘subject
to the covenants and restrictions’ appearing on said plat and printed
on the back of the application executed by each purchaser. The
purchasers, their heirs and assigns, were given the right of user of
the lake and the parkway surrounding the lake, subject, however, to
rules and regulations to be prescribed by appellant. The covenants
ran with the land and were binding on the grantor and grantee until
January 1, 1975. To vest in respondents ‘‘the exclusive right to use
said Lake Tekakwitha Subdivision and all facilities and privileges

. incident thereto’’ is to vary the terms of the written agreement ex-
isting between respondents and appellant. Under the authorities
respondents are not entitled to such relief.

Injunction is a proper remedy to restrain the violation of
restrictive covenants on land. Respondents’ authorities involved the
violation of written restrictions on land. Proetz v. Central District
of C. & M. Alliance, Mo. App., 191 S. W. 2a 278, 274, 277; Meder v.
‘Wilson, Mo. App., 192 8. W. 2d 606; 43 C. J. 8. 580, § 87, b, (1).
The instant case involves no express covenant covering the relief
sought by respondents and violated by appellant. Respondents’ au-
thorities do not apply. An ‘‘exclusive’’ easement is an interest in
land and, in the circumstances of record, could only be ereated by
deed. Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116, 120; Farmers Drainage Dist. v.
Sinclair Refining Co., Mo., 255 §. W. 2d 745, 748. Furthermore, we
have said injunction is not the proper method to try title to real estate
between individual litigants. Mexico Refractories Co. v. Pignet’s
Estate, Mo., 161 8. W. 24 417, 419/4].

The judgment and decree is reversed and the cause remanded with
directions to dismiss respondents’ action without prejudice. Westhues
and Barrett, OC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bouue, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. Ellison, P.J., Lecdy, J., and Dew and
Anderson, Special Judges, concur.

Nora Ann Huuron, Respondent, v. Grover L. Hucxrsa, Appellant,
No. 44619—276 S. W. (2d) 78.

Court en Banc, March 14, 1955.

Eugene E. Northern and Brewer & Northern for appellant.

Neale, Newman, Bradshaw, Freeman & Neale, Jean Pau
Walter 8. Pettit, Jr., and Donald J. Hoy for respondent.

[79] DALTON, J.—Action. for $15,000 damages for the wrongful
death of plaintiff’s husband, Walter W. Helton, who was killed in a
collision between the automobile in which he was riding as the guest
of N. A. Sellers and an automobile operated by defendant Grover L.
Huckeba. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiff for $7,000 and
defendant appealed to the Springfield Court of Appeals. That court
reversed the judgment and remanded the cause with directions that
judgment be entered for defendant-appellant. Helton v. Huckeba
(Mo. App.), 270 S.W. (2d) 486. On application of plaintiff-respond-
ent the cause has been transferred to this court and we shall review
the record as on original appeal. Section 10, Art. V, Const. of Mis-
souri 1945. :

It was admitted that Walter W. Helton was, on December 22, 1950,
riding in a Chevrolet automobile which was being’ operated by N. A.
Sellers northwardly on State Highway No. 17, in Texas county; that
on the same date defendant Huckeba was driving a Ford automobile
southwardly on the same highway; that, at a point approximately
seven miles south of the junction of State Highway No. 17 and U. 8S.
Highway No. 63 in Texas county, a collision occurred between the
said automobiles; and that, as a result of said collision, Walter W.
Helton was injured and died on said date. The record further shows
that N. A. Sellers, the driver of the Chevrolet, was killed in the same

Le

° a
collision and that, of the four occupants of the Ford, one was killed
and three were severely injured.

The cause was tried and submitted on a single charge of primary
negligence, to wit, ‘‘that the defendant Grover L. Huckeba at the time
and place of said collision failed to use the highest degree of care
in the operation of said Ford automobile in that he carelessly and
negligently failed to drive and operate said Ford automobile as close
to the right-hand side of the highway as practicable.’? See Secs.
304.010 and 304.020 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.

Appellant first contends that the court erred in overruling de-
fendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evi-
dence because ‘‘there was not any substantial evidence of any proba-
tive force to show negligence on the part of the defendant.’”? This
assignment requires the consideration of the evidence favorable to
plaintiff on this issue, most of which evidence has been reviewed in
detail and with particularity in the opinion of the Springfield Court
of Appeals. Reference is had to said opinion for a more detailed
statement of the evidence. Helton v. Huckeba, supra. Some addi-
tional facts will be stated in the course of this opinion. Many of the
applicable principles of law have also been reviewed at length in said
opinion and they will not be repeated here, however, we are unable
to agree with the conclusions reached by the court that plaintiff failed
to make out a submissible case of negligence, and that none of defend-
ant’s evidence aids the plaintiff’s case.

In reviewing the record we must consider the evidence favorable to
plaintiff and the favorable inferences therefrom and disregard de-
fendant’s evidence, unless it aids the plaintiff’s case, and disregard.
all unfavorable inferences from plaintiff’s and defendant’s evidence,
as the jury had a right to do. In other words, we must review the evi-
dence favorable to the verdict of the jury and remember that the
credibility, weight and value of the evidence [80] was primarily for
the jury and the trial court.

From the favorable evidence in the record, the jury could have
found the facts to be about as follows: On the afternoon in question,
Oharlie Biggs accompanied by Helton (plaintifi’s husband), Sellers
and Wormington, drove from Lebanon to Summerville, where Sellers
purchased a new 1950 Chevrolet automobile and, later, started driving
it northwardly on Iighway No. 17 toward Lebanon, accompanied by
Helton. Biggs, following in another automobile, didn’t drive over 35
miles per hour and Sellers was ‘‘just a little ahead.’”? Both auto-
mobiles were traveling at about the same speed. Biggs saw the tail-
light of the Chevrolet go around a curve ahead of him and knew when
the wreck happened. He came upon it at once and saw “‘smoke going
up -over the cars.’” His automobile was the first car to arrive after
the collision and he did not meet or pass any cars at that time. Charlie
Holder, a farmer residing a couple of hundred steps south from the

a "

point of collision, was coming up as Biggs stopped. Holder had seen
the Chevrolet pass his place going north with its lights on, at a speed.
of about 35 miles per hour and being operated on its proper (east)
side of the highway. The time was between five and six p.m.; ‘‘it
was getting dark.’’ Holder had seen the Chevrolet coming and had
waited for it to pass, he had also seen a second car coming behind,
but he walked on across ahead of the second car and had gotten across
when he heard the crash. When he and his son heard and then saw
the collision, they went to it. There were no cars between the Sellers’
and the Biggs’ cars. The road was an ordinary two-lane black top
road with a gradual upgrade near the Holder house to the point of
collision, but steeper near the Holder house. The road makes a bend
to the right ‘‘but not too much”’ as one goes north. The bend is not
right after you break over the top of the hill, but after ‘‘you get on
the level.’? The Chevrolet ‘‘had just barely got to maybe where the
road started to bend the least bit,’’ at the end of the curve nearer the
Holder house. It hadn’t gotten on the main curve going north. The
wreck had happened on a straightaway south of the curve. The
Chevrolet was not in the main curve. The Ford, approaching from
the north, going south, would have been on the outside of the curve.
There was an open, safe, four foot shoulder on the right going south.
The collision occurred on level ground. The top of the hill was less
than 200 feet from the Holder barn. Immediately after the collision,
the front ends of the two automobiles were pointed somewhat together
and 8 or 10 feet apart, with the Ford southeast of the Chevrolet.
There is some confusion as to directions. One witness said the road
goes east and turns southeast in going north and that the Holder barn
was on the south side of the road and the house on the north. Plain-
tiff’s exhibit No. 7, an enlargement of that part of defendant’s ex-
hibit A-2 which purports to show State Highway No. 17, correctly
shows the relative positions of the two automobiles immediately after
the collision.

Most of the debris resulting from the collision was in the north-
pound lane. The back wheels of the Chevrolet were off the pavement, _
it was headed east with the front end protruding some three feet over
the center line and onto the east side of the pavement. There was ‘‘a
skid mark from the center of the pavement, right near the center of the
pavement around,—it circled around and made an arch, around off the
pavement to the left rear wheel of this Chevrolet. * * * It wasn’t a
continuous mark; it was a bouncing mark, probably six or seven or
eight skid marks. * * * You could trace those bouncing marks. They
stopped at the hind wheel. There was skid marks on the gravel where
they stopped.’’? The skid marks could be traced to the left hind wheel
of the Chevrolet. A rubber tire skidding sideways had made an uneven
ragged mark that showed ‘‘very plain’’ on the pavement. ‘‘It was a
rough, irregular mark.’’

The Chevrolet had been hit on its right front side. “The right
side of the Ford hit the right side of the Chevrolet on the front.’? The
right front portion of each automobile was badly wrecked and the right
[81] front tire of each automobile was deflated (see plaintiff’s Exhibit
No. 8, Helton v. Huckeba, supra, 270 8. W. (2d) 486, 489). The Ford
had stopped on its left side of the highway, headed at an angle, south-
east and the front ends of both cars were on the east side of the pave-
ment. ‘‘There was a lot of debris in front of the Chevrolet, * * * a lot
of metal off of both cars, a lot of dirt and glass * * * a lot of debris in
general off of the wrecked automobiles,’’ and ‘‘anti-freeze from these
radiators.’’ State Highway Patrolman E. L. Walker made a written
report on the collision and signed it. Sergeant Earl Barkley had read
and approved the report. The report was marked defendant’s Eix-
hibits A-1 and A-2. After Sgt. Barkley had testified and had been
cross-examined, the exhibits were offered in evidence by defendant
(apparently on the theory that the report was in conflict with Bark-
ley’s testimony, since it stated, ‘‘there were no skid marks.’’). On
objection by plaintiff that the exhibits were hearsay, the court admit-
ted them ‘‘for the purpose of impeachment only.’’

Defendant’s Exhibit A-1 contained an alleged statement by de-
fendant to Patrolman Walker, as follows: ‘‘I saw him coming at me
and when he didn’t pull over, I pulled to the left.’? Defendant’s Ex-
hibit A-2, contained an alleged statement by defendant to Patrolman
Walker to the effect that when the driver of the on-coming Chevrolet
did not go back to his side he (defendant) ‘‘pulled to the left trying
to go around him.’’ See 270 S.W. (2d) 486, 489.

When the debris was cleared off the pavement in front of the
Chevrolet, certain marks were apparent on the pavement. ‘‘There was
an arch formed down around this Chevrolet, where it had rubbed the
pavement. There was oil and water and battery acid there.’’? The
mark started around five feet over from the center of the highway, on
the Chevrolet’s east lane, and arched around in a sort of semi-circle
to the right-hand front of the Chevrolet to ihe right front tire. The
right front wheel of the Chevrolet was on the mark and the tire had
been knocked down. The mark looked like a metallic serateh or mark
on the pavement. It could have been made by the rim or bumper or
any metallic substance. The mark was not gouged*in any depth into
the pavement, but ‘‘showed plain enough’’ for you to ‘‘see where the
mark was.’’ ‘““There was plenty of light there’’ so that the mark could
be seen. .

Since appellant contends that defendant’s evidence does not aid
the plaintiff’s case, we review portions of defendant’s evidence. De-
fendant had taken the deposition of D. C. Dearman, who was one of
three passengers in defendant’s automobile. The deposition was taken
after Dearman had instituted an action for damages against defendant
to recover for personal injuries sustained in the collision, and he

(Dearman) was cross-examined with reference to the particular
allegations of negligence set forth in his petition as filed and pending
in Texas county. In the trial of the present case the parties agreed
that the deposition and the attached exhibit (the Dearman petition,
supra,) could be offered and received in evidence and that neither
party would make an objection, and this was done. Dearman testified
that he and his companions had a four day pass from Fort Leonard
‘Wood and that they were headed for Carrollton, Georgia, 625 miles
away. Defendant was driving south on State Highway No. 17, ‘‘going
around 40 to 45 miles an hour.’’ It was ‘‘just dusky dark,’’ when the
headlights of an automobile traveling in the opposite direction sudden-
ly appeared in front of them. ‘‘It was right near us before anybody
ever seen the lights.’’? When these lights came into view, defendant
was driving on his right-hand side of the road and the approaching
lights were completely over on the same side, that is, on defendant’s
side of the road. When the headlights of this automobile traveling in
the opposite direction ‘‘all of a sudden came’’ into view, defendant
“*turned his car and slowed down’’ and the impact took place.

On cross-examination, Dearman admitted that he had author-
ized Hdward V. Sweeney, an Attorney At Law of Monett, Missouri, to
file a suit against defendant [82] Huckeba for damages for personal
injuries sustained in the mentioned collision; that he had had corre-
spondence with said attorney with reference to said suit; that the suit,
which was filed December 31, 1952, in Texas county, was still pending
with his consent and approval; and that it had not been settled. He
disclaimed knowledge or authorization of the specific allegations.
Plaintiff’s counsel then, without objection, read into evidence a certi-
fied copy of.the petition which Dearman had filed against defendant
Huckeba. The petition charged defendant with negligence in driving
at a high, dangerous, excessive and unreasonable rate of speed; failing
to keep and maintain a properly vigilant lookout for other vehicles on
said highway ; failure to drive as near the right-hand side of the high-
way as practicable; failure to turn to the right of the center of the
highway so as fo pass without interference, et cetera. The exhibit was
properly admitted in impeachment of Dearman’s testimony. See
Bickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 863 Mo. 651, 253 S.W. (2d)
122, 125 (3).

Defendant in his own behalf testified: ‘“Well, we were just jogging
along down the highway there, and seemed like we were getting into,
—fixing to get into a curve or maybe got in a curve and all at once
two lights popped up in my face just like something shot at you,
seemed like * * *, And about this time he was on my side of the road,
and I was on the right and he was on the sare side I was, well, I just
had a split second and I didn’t know hardly what to do. I said, ‘Maybe
if I jerk my car to the left that I can miss him’; whether I got my car
jerked to the left, I couldn’t say, but that was the intention, to jerk

it. I didn’t know what was on the right. * * * Well, I was over pretty
close,—just to the end of the pavement on the right. * * * I couldn’t
see well right there. When the lights got in my face, up in front of
me, I didn’t have time to look no way, to the right or left or nothing.

* * He was right up in my face. * * * I do know when I saw them it
was right in front of me there. * * * I don’t admit that I pulled. I
admit that I,—that my intention was to pull; whether I pulled any or

. not, I don’t know.’’ Defendant further testified that Dearman had
talked to Attorney Sweeney and had then brought a suit against him
(Huckeba) and that the suit was still pending.

Plaintiff’s counsel cross-examined the defendant as to the alleged
statements he had made to the patrol officers and reference was made
to the report (defendant’s Exhibits A-1 and A-2). While defendant
remembered that two patrolmen talked to him, he didn’t know what
he had told them, or whether the statements were true. Neither the
report, nor any conflicting statements were offered in evidence by
plaintiff in impeachment of the defendant’s testimony.

As stated, appellant contends that there is no evidence in the
record from which the negligence charged and submitted can be
inferred, ‘‘or from which the jury could reasonably infer such negli-
gence’’; that there is no evidence of any probative force in the entire
record from which the positions of the respective vehicles invotved,
prior to or at the time of the collision, can be determined; and that to
say ‘‘there is circumstantial evidence as to where the vehicles were at
the time of the impact requires guesswork, conjecture and specu-
Jation.’’? Appellant relies upon and cites cases in support of two ab-
stract principles of law, as follows: (1) ‘‘Negligence is never pre-
sumed.’’? Joplin v. Franz (Mo. App.), 240 S. W. 209; Borrini v.
Pevely Dairy Co. (Mo. App.), 183 S.W. (2d) 839. (2) ‘‘Where evi-
dence is such as would support either of two contradictory inferences
or presumptions respecting the ultimate facts, there is failure of proof,
since it leaves the subject of liability in the field of conjecture.’?
Bowers v. Columbia Terminals (Mo. App.), 218 S.W. (2d) 663;
Muesenfechter v. St. Louis Car Co. (Mo. App.), 139 S.W. (2d) 1102.
Appellant also contends that the facts and circumstances proven by
plaintiff do not exelude guesswork, conjecture and speculation as to
the existence of the necessary facts to show negligence. Schoen v.
Plaza Express Co. (Mo. Sup.), 206 S.W. (2d) 536. .

HM The Borrini and Bowers cases are particularly relied upon.
The Borrini case may be distinguished upon its own peculiar facts, in-
cluding the type of road and traffic conditions. A different charge of
specific negligence was involved, to wit, negligence in failing (on
meeting a motor vehicle coming from the opposite direction) to turn to
the right of the center of the highway so as to pass without inter-
ference. In that case certain direct evidence on plaintifi’s behalf
excluded her from the benefit of certain favorable inferences. The

Bowers case was submitted on negligence in failing to keep a lookout
ahead and laterally for persons on the street. In that case there was
no evidence that the deceased had proceeded in a straight course from
where last seen by the witnesses, nor as to where he had been during an
extended interval of time, nor that he had been in a position where he
could have been seen by the truck driver had the driver kept the look-
out required. The cases are not controlling under the facts of the
present case.

On the record here presented it was for the jury to determine the
place of the collision. On this issue the jury could consider the evi-
dence as to the location of most of the debris from both cars upon the
traveled portion of the highway more than three feet east of the center
line of the highway, the semi-circular marks upon the pavement, the
location of the respective automobiles immediately after the collision,
the testimony of defendant himself that immediately before the col-
lision he intended to turn to the left, the testimony of Dearman that
a turn was made, together with all other facts in evidence, and the
jury could infer and find that the collision occurred on the east side of
the highway and that defendant turned the Ford automobile from
the west side of the highway to the east side immediately prior to the
collision. Filkins v. Snavely, 359 Mo. 356, 221 8.W. (2d) 736, 787;
Brawley v. Esterly (Mo. Sup.), 267 8.W. (2d) 655. And see Hamre v.
Conger, 357 Mo. 497, 209 S.W. (2d) 242, 249(10).

Appellant; however, contends that there is no evidence from which
the position of the Chevrolet automobile immediately prior to the
collision can be determined, except the testimony of defendant and
Dearman that the Chevrolet was upon the west side (its left side) of
the highway and directly in the path of defendant’s automobile.
Plaintiff was in no way bound by the testimony of defendant and
Dearman that the Sellers automobile was on its left side of the highway
and directly in front of defendant’s automobile, when defendant
turned his automobile to the left. The jury could believe or disbelieve
all or any part of this testimony. For the purpose of determining de-
fendant’s right to a directed verdict we disregard all of defendant’s
evidence, unless it aids the plaintiff’s case. The jury could believe and
find from the fact that the front and right-hand side of the Chevrolet
was wrecked by collision with the right front part of the Ford auto-
mobile that the Chevrolet had not, immediately before the collision,
been on its left-hand side of the road and that it was not returning to
its own side of the road, and to the place of the collision, immediately
prior to the time of the collision, and could find that the collision and
damage was caused by defendant’s turn to the left. In determining
the issue of negligence, as charged, the jury could also consider de-
fendant’s evidence to the effect that defendant pulled to the left side
of the highway rather than to the right shoulder at a time when he was
blinded by the lights of the approaching automobile. The jury could

further consider the fact that defendant did not see the lights of the
approaching automobile until ‘‘a split second’’ before the collision.
See Bowers v. Columbia Terminals, supra, 213 S.W. (2d) 663, 667(4).

Appellant also insists that ‘‘there was no evidence whatever regard-
ing the relative positions and movements of the Sellers or defendant’s
car’’ immediately prior to the collision. Schoen v. Plaza Express Co.,
supra. Bowers v. Columbia Terminals, supra. The record in this case
is materially different from the record in either of the cases relied
upon. There was evidence here that defendant was driving upon his
[84] own right-hand side of the highway and that upon being con-
fronted by the lights of the approaching automobile and immediately
before the collision he swerved his automobile sharply to the left. Ap-
pellant may not question the evidence as to these facts, a finding as
to which were included within and submitted by defendant’s in-
struction No. D-2-G. From other evidence in the record the jury could
also find that the Sellers car was on its own right-hand side of the high-
way when it passed the Holder house and at, and immediately before,
the collision, as stated.

After a full consideration of all the evidence in this record we must
and do hold that the evidence was substantial and sufficient to show
that, at the time and place of the collision, the defendant negligently
and carelessly failed to drive and operate his Ford automobile as close
to the right-hand side of the highway as practicable and directly and
proximately caused the collision and Helton’s death. Filkins v.
Snavely, supra; Brawley v. Esterly, supra. It was for the jury to
determine whether or not the facts supported plaintifft’s or defendant’s
theory and whether or not the defendant exercised the highest degree
of care in turning to the left.

Appellant next contends that the court erred in giving in-
struction No. P-1-G for the following reasons: (1) There is no evi-
dence to support it; (2) It gave the jury a roving commission to in-
dulge in guesswork and speculation; (3) It ignored defendant’s theory
and, when read with defendant’s instructions, was misleading; and
(4) It ignored the law of this state that under appropriate cireum-
stances, a motorist meeting another automobile may turn to the left,
Borrini v. Pevely Dairy Co., supra, and Lewis v. Zagata, 350 Mo. 446,
166 S.W. (2d) 541, 545 are cited. The instruction was plaintiff’s
principal instruction. Our holdings, supra, are sufficient to dispose of
points 1 and 2, supra. The instruction directed a verdict for plaintiff
on a particular submitted finding of facts, including one ‘‘ * * * that
the defendant Grover L. Huckeba at the time and place of said col-
lision failed to use the highest degree of care in the operation of said
Ford automobile in that he carelessly and negligently failed to drive
and operate said Ford automobile as close to the right-hand side of the
highway as practicable.’’ Negligence was one of the facts submitted.
Venditti v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 362 Mo. 339, 240 S.W. (2d)

921, 926(4). Defendant’s theory was submitted by instruction D-2-G
as follows: ‘‘The Court instructs the jury * * * that a person meeting
a car coming from the opposite direction may be justified under some
circumstances, in turning out to the left instead of to the right to
avoid a collision. And in this connection, you are further instructed
that if you believe and find from the evidence that at the time and
place of the accident mentioned in evidence defendant Huckeba was
traveling on his right-hand side of the highway, and immediately be-
fore the collision saw another motor car approaching on the same side
or the left-hand side of the driver of the approaching car, if so, and if
you further find and believe that it reasonably appeared to defendant
Huckeba, who was on the proper side of the road, if you find he was,
that there would be a collision unless he turned to the left, and, acting
upon such appearance, he swerved his car in that direction, and in
doing so did what a person exercising the highest degree of care would
have done under similar circumstances, then said defendant Huckeba
did not violate the law of the road and was not guilty of negligence and.
you will find the issues for the defendant.’’ See Lewis v. Zagata, supra ;
Filkins y. Snavely, supra. We find no conflict between the instructions.
The first authorized a verdict for plaintiff upon a finding that de-
fendant negligently and carelessly did certain things, while the second,
in effect, told the jury that if the facts submitted by the second in-
struction were found to be true then the acts submitted by the first in-
struction were not negligently done. When read together with de-
fendant’s instruction, plaintiff’s said instruction was neither erroneous
in ignoring defendant’s theory of defense, or the laws of the state
with reference to motor vehicle [85] operation, nor was the instruction
misleading as to such law or such defense. .

Ln Appellant further contends that the court erred in overruling

efendant’s motion for new trial for the reason that plaintiff was
guilty of fraud and deceit in agreeing with the court and defendant
(in order to secure the overruling of defendant’s application for a
continuance) that, if defendant’s witnesses E. L. Walker and W. E.
Anderson were present, they would testify in accordance with the facts
set out in defendant’s application for a continuance and, thereafter,
after such facts were read to the jury, arguing to the jury that ‘‘they
(plaintiff’s counsel) made such an agreement to prevent defendant
from obtaining a continuance and that the testimony set out in the
application was a statement which had been prepared by defendant’s
lawyer and that they did not believe the testimony was true because
Sgt. Barkley was their superior officer and they (the witnesses) would
not contradict Sgt. Barkley.’”’

The record shows that, after counsel had stated in argument that
defendant’s attorney had prepared the statement and that the agree-
ment was made to prevent a continuance, defendant’s counsel objected

to the argument. The objection was sustained, subject to plaintiff’s
right to comment on the testimony read to the jury. Thereafter, plain-
tiff’s counsel proceeded as follows: ‘‘I agreed they would testify to
it. I didn’t agree it was the truth, and I don’t agree it was the truth
now, and I will tell you why I don’t. Sgt. Barkley was over both of
those fellows, and he was there present, and he approved the report.
And you know and I know that they would not contradict Sgt. Barkley
on what he says about it. Now enough for that.’’ No objection was
interposed to this argument and no relief was asked. Appellant admits
there was no error in overruling his application for a continuance. No
error appears with reference to the argument. While it is subject to
criticism, counsel did not consider the matter serious at the time. The
court sustained the only objection made and no further relief was
asked. Appellant’s position now is that the alleged ‘unfair argu-
ment’? showed that the original agreement was made in bad faith and
that a new trial should be awarded, regardless of the defendant’s lack
of diligence at the trial. The trial court did not agree, nor do we.
Blanford v. St. Louis Public Service Co. (Mo. Sup.), 266 S.W. (2d)
718, 721 (1). The assignment is overruled.

| | Appellant’s final contention is that ‘‘the court erred in failing
to grant defendant a new trial for the reason that Sgt. Barkley and
witness Holder changed their testimony from that given at the former
trial of this cause and this defendant had no lmowledge or information
as to such change * * * and was taken entirely by surprise at a time
and under circumstances where witnesses and evidence to show the
falsity of their testimony and the changes in their testimony could
not be obtained or produced by the defendant, all of which deprived
this defendant of a fair trial. Supreme Court Rule 3.22.”

No such issue was presented at the trial. No affidavit of surprise
was filed, no delay was requested to get a transcript of the prior
testimony of the witnesses. No prior diligence was shown. No error
in the course of the trial is claimed. The matter of surprise was at-
tempted to be raised for the first time in the motion for a new trial,
which motion was accompanied by a transcript of the prior and
subsequent testimony of the mentioned witnesses.

In the application for a continuance it was stated that the testimony
given by Sgt. Barkley in the former trial was false and consisted of
purported facts which did not exist. Counsel also argued that ‘‘de-
fendant didn’t know what other facts Sgt. Barkley might testify
to at the present trial.’’ Nevertheless, the record shows that counsel
had agreed upon a setting of the case for trial on the date on which
it was tried, and without a copy of the witness’ prior testimony. The
matters stated in the motion and shown by the exhibits were directed
to the trial court’s discretion. That’ [86] court overruled the motion.
No abuse of discretion is shown, The assignment is overruled. Page v.

Payne, 2938 Mo. 600, 240 S.W. 156, 161(4). And see Donati v.
Gualdoni, 358 Mo. 667, 216 S.W. (2d) 519, 522.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Leedy, 0.3., Dalton, Hollingsworth, Hyde, Ellison and Westhues,
JJ., and Cave, Special Judge, concur.

Srare or Missourt, Respondent, v. Gzoras Wasuinaron Harpy, Ap- ©
pellant, No. 44045—276 8. W. (2d) 90.

Court en Banc, March i4, 1955.

: |
|

Morris A. Shenker and William R. O’Toole for appellant.

109

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and W. Don Kennedy, Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent.

[91] HYDE, J.—Defendant was convicted of aiding and assisting
in establishing a lottery as a business and avocation, in violation of
Sec. 563.480 (statutory references are to RSMo and V.A.MS.); and
was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary. Defendant has ap-
pealed.

Defendant alleges error in overruling his motion to suppress evi-
dence, in receiving in evidence admissions made by him at the time
of his arrest, and in refusing his motions for a directed verdict. De-
fendant also complains of the argument to the jury by the State’s
attorney.

Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was to prevent the use
in evidence of certain lottery paraphernalia in the hands of the police
on the ground that it was seized by officers before defendant’s arrest
without a warrant, claiming the search and seizure was unreasonable,
illegal and violative of Sec’s. 15 and 19 of Article 1 of the Missouri
Constitution. Section 15 provides that the people shall be secure in
their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and Section 19 provides that no person shall be com-
pelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause.

The evidence on the motion to suppress was that defendant
was arrested in a room [92] on the ground floor of a three story
boarding house. (There was a sign on the house ‘‘Rooms for Rent’’.)
The evidence was the testimony of the two arresting officers who
watched the place from 9:15 to 9:45 P. M. and saw three men and a
woman enter this room. The window shades, of the two windows of
the room, were drawn but there was an L shaped tear in one of them
and the officers could see through it into the room. They saw a woman
seated on a chair looking at an open policy book with drawings in her
hand. Defendant was standing near a table in the center of the room.
One of the officers, with eight years of experience on the gambling .
squad, had seen numerous books of the same kind used for policy. The
officers went into the common hallway of the boarding house and saw
a man named Clarkson come out of the room with result drawings
in his hand. He was arrested, the drawings seized, and the officers
entered the room (where defendant was) through the door he had
left open. Defendant was then arrested and the officers took from
him ninety-nine policy result drawings marked IXL Class 5412;
seven result drawings marked Class 5411; twenty carbon copies of
policy writers’ top sheets, Class 5412, an original take sheet, five
policy hit slips and thirty-six dollars in money. These articles and
the money were all in the waistband of defendant’s trousers. De-
fendant made some statements to the officers after his arrest which
will be referred to in considering the evidence on the merits. We
considered similar contentions on a motion to suppress in State v.
Humphrey, 358 Mo. 904, 217 S. W. (2d) 551. There, as here, the
officers saw the policy papers before making the arrest. We held that
St. Louis police officers could make a lawful arrest ‘“‘when there are
reasonable grounds ‘to suspect that a misdemeanor has been com-
mitted’’ citing Hanser v. Bieber, 271 Mo. 326, 197 S. W. 68;
Wehmeyer v. Mulvihill, 150 Mo. App. 197, 180 S. W. 681; Commis-
sion Row Club v. Lambert, (Mo. App.), 161 S. W. (2d) 732; that
‘“when a person is lawfully arrested, the arresting officer may take
from him articles of value as evidence’’, citing State v. Raines, 339
Mo. 884, 98 S. 'W. (2d) 580; State v. Williams, 328 Mo. 627, 14 8. W.
(2d) 484; and that ‘‘as to the claim that the use of these policy
slips in evidence violates the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, this has been ruled against defendant’s contention’’,
citing State v. Pomeroy, 180 Mo. 489, 32 8. W. 1002. (See also City
of St. Louis v. Washington, (Mo. App.), 223 8. W. (2d) 858; City
of St. Louis v. Simon, (Mo. App.), 228 S. W. (2d) 864.) Defendant
relies mainly on State v. Dunivan, 217 Mo. App. 548, 269 S. W. 415
and State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. W. 100. In those cases, the
only basis for the search was suspicion and the facts were very dif-
ferent. In this case, the officers first saw the paraphernalia of the
lottery and observed the actions of several persons in its use under

defendant’s direction; and it may also be noted that a felony is
herein involved. We hold that the Court properly overruled the
motion to suppress.

Defendant’s contention that he was entitled to a directed ver-
dict (see 8. C. Rule 26.10) depends upon his contentions that the
motion to suppress should have been sustained and that the admis-
sions he made at the time of his arrest were inadmissible because the
corpus delicti had not been established. If the lottery paraphernalia
taken at the time of defendant’s arrest and the admissions he then
made were admissible in evidence, it is obvious that a case for the
jury as to defendant’s guilt was made by the State. Defendant relies
on the statements made in State v. Humphrey, 358 Mo. 504, 217 S. W.
(2d) 551 and State v. Emerson, 318 Mo. 633, 1 8S. W. (2d) 109, that
“The two elements necessary to prove the corpus delicti of a lottery
(in violation of Section 563.430) are: (1) the establishing of a lottery
by someone, (2) that the person charged aided or assisted in making
or establishing it.’’? This statement is incorrect and the rulings -in
those two cases to that effect should be and are hereby overruled. As
pointed out in State v. Price, 361 Mo. 1034, 288 S. W. (2d) 397, it
would have been correct in those two cases to have said: ‘‘that the
two elements above quoted were necessary to establish guilt of the
defendant [93] rather than that they were necessary to establish
corpus delicti.’? We stated the correct rule in the Price case as fol-
lows: ‘‘In this state the corpus delicti has neyer been construed to
require or consist of more than these two elements: (1) Proof, direct
or circumstantial, that the specific loss or injury charged occurred;
(2) someone’s criminality as the cause of the loss or injury. Or
tersely, (1) the act; (2) the criminal agency of the act (other than
the aceused’s confession.) * * * But, once evidence other than the
defendant’s confession shows that the specific crime charged was com-
mitted by someone, then defendant’s confession is admissible and, of
course, if believed completes the case.’? (See also State v. Skibiski,
245 Mo. 459, 150 S. W. 1088; State v. Saussele, (Mo. Sup.), 265
S. W. (2d) 290.) Thus, while it is essential that there be at least
circumstantial evidence of the existence of a lottery, it is not necessary
to prove the corpus delicti to show that the person charged aided or
assisted in making or establishing it. Therefore, when the evidence
is sufficient to show the act and the criminal agency of the act (the
existence of a lottery and assistance of someone in operating it), then
the confession of the defendant is admissible to show the second ele-
ment necessary to establish his guilt, namely: that the defendant
aided or assisted in making or establishing the lottery and also that
he did so as a business or avocation.

In addition to the facts shown on the motion to suppress,
hereinabove stated, which were repeated in the trial on the metits,
one of the officers, Sergeant Bloecher, testified as an expert on policy

operations, showing how the game was played and the paraphernalia
used. Bets were made through policy writers who recorded numbers
chosen by the bettors in a book, making an original and two carbon
copies. These were called top sheets and they were identified by the
writer ’s book number and also a class number indicating the particular
drawing in which the bettor would participate. The policy writers
would go to the manager and give him two copies, keeping the other
in the book. They would also.give the manager the money to cover
the bets less the writer’s commission. The manager listed the bets
on a take sheet and turned it over with the top sheets to a ‘‘pick up
man’”’ for the operator of the lottery, retaining a copy of the take
sheet and the money. The ‘‘pick up man’’ would deliver these to the
operator of the policy company and get the result drawings from him,
or his ‘‘cut loose man’”’, showing the winning numbers in the drawing.
These result drawings showed the name of the company and the class
number indicating the time of day of the drawing, using odd numbers
for the morning drawing and even numbers for the evening drawing.
(For a description of these result drawings, also called result ballots,
see City of St. Louis v. Washington, 223 8. W. (2d), Le. 860.) The
“‘pick up man’? would bring these result drawings back to the manager,
who distributed them to the writers and they distributed them to the
players. The writers would pay the winners of small amounts; appar-
ently large winners collected through the manager. When one of the
writers’ bettors had a winning number, the writer would prepare a hit
slip showing his book number, the class number and the amount of
money won. He would turn this over to the manager and get the money
to pay it. These hit slips were taken by the ‘‘pick up man’? to the op-
erator of the company. Sergeant Bloecher said (based on his experience
and knowledge of policy operations) that the presence of the carbon
copy top sheets indicated that the policy writers had turned in the bets
they had recorded for drawing 5412; that the presence of the result
drawings indicated that the drawing was held, the lottery completed,
and that the winning numbers for drawitig 5412 were those shown
thereon ; that the presence of the take sheet indicated that the writers
whose book numbers were listed on it had turned in the amounts of
money shown for bets on that drawing; and that the presence of the
hit slips indicated that writers had wins on their books in the amounts
shown on the slips. ‘He also said that, after a drawing was held, the
manager would have the carbon copy top sheets, the result drawings,
the take sheet and the hit slips.

‘[94] The money and lottery papers taken from the waistband of
defendant’s trousers were in a leather pouch. These papers showed
a total amount of bets of $85.00 turned in for this particular drawing.
There were also 78 result ‘drawings on the floor of the room, having
various class numbers, which were picked up by one of the officers.
After his arrest defendant said ‘‘they had just started again and

he had been going about two weeks, that they have two drawings a
day, at twelve noon and at eight p.m. He works on a commission but
he wouldn’t state how much commission and he said the top sheets
and the money seized from him had been turned in to him by the
writers for tonight’s drawing; also, the result drawings marked 5412
were for the eight o’clock drawing that evening. * * * He said that
the sheets that he had and the money, had been turned in to him by
the writers.”’

Our conclusion about this evidence is that (without defendant’s
admissions) it was sufficient substantial circumstantial evidence to
show that a lottery had been established by someone and also that de-
fendant aided and assisted in it as a manager, collecting bets from
policy writers, sending them in to the operator, distributing the
drawing results and arranging payment of bets on winning numbers.
This evidence was also sufficient to show defendant was doing this
as a business or avocation. This evidence was much more comprehen-
sive and substantial than that in State v. Jackson, (Mo. App.), 220
8. W. (2d) 779, cited by defendant, where only possession of a policy
writer’s book was shown, and that in State v. Humphrey, supra, where
only possession of top sheets and result ballots was shown (217 S. W.
(2d), le. 552) likewise by one who may have been a policy writer
but apparently not a manager. In this case, the corpus delicti was
amply proved, making defendant’s admissions clearly admissible.
These admissions were certainly sufficient to complete the case against
him, if anything more was needed. We, therefore, hold that the court
properly overruled defendant’s requests for a judgment of acquittal.

Ln Defendant’s final contention is that the argument to the jury
by the State’s attorney was speculative, beyond the scope of the evi-
dence and inflammatory; and also constituted a comment on defend-
ant’s failure to testify. The State’s attorney taking the figure of
$85.00, listed as bets on the top sheets for the drawing on the evening
of his arrest, said this would amount to $170.00 per day and $61,888.00
for a year, and stated that defendant was the core and wheel of an
operation amounting to $61,000.00 per year. He further stated: ‘‘He
wants you to believe that we are talking about a penny ante game.
‘We are not. We are talking about big business; we are talking
about the hard earnings of people, human beings, like you and I,
whose livelihood, whose bread money, whose butter money is taken
by vultures like this.’’ Defendant cites State v. Burns, 286 Mo. 665,
228 S. W. 776; State v. Campbell, (Mo. App.), 278 S. W. 1051;
State v. Taylor, 8320 Mo. 417, 8S. W. (2d) 29; State v. Florian, 355
Mo. 1169, 200 8S. W. (2d) 64; and 23 O.J.S. 542, stating the duty
of the prosecutor to try the defendant fairly and impartially, to
refrain from applying unbecoming names and epithets to him and to
confine himself to the evidence and fair and reasonable deductions and
conclusions to be drawn therefrom. However, considering the evi-

dence as to the nature and operation of the policy game, we do not
think the calculations made in the argument can be held to be with-
out any reasonable basis, especially since the method of calculation
was stated. Moreover, they were made partly in answer to the argu-
ment of defendant’s counsel that ‘‘we are not talking here about a
man running a big policy operation, getting a big income from it, or
anything of that sort.’’? We have said: ‘‘Applying unbecoming names
or epithets to a man or woman on trial is never excusable. This court
has always looked with disfavor on this kind of conduct on the part
of a prosecutor and in many instances held such conduct sufficiently
prejudicial to constitute reversible error. However, this is a question
which must, in each instance, be considered in connection with the
nature of the [95] case, all the facts and circumstances in evidence,
and all of the incidents of the trial including the conduct of defending
counsel.’? (State v. Harmon, 317 Mo. 354, 296 S. W. 897; see also
State v. Mangercino, 325 Mo. 794, 30 S. W. (2d) 763; State v. Vallo,
(Mo. Sup.), 33 S. W. (2d) 899; State v. Wilkins, (Mo. Sup.), 100
S. W. (2d) 889; State v. Sanchez, (Mo. Sup.), 269 S. W. (2d) 46.)
However, the term ‘‘vulture’’ was used in describing the operations
in which defendant was engaged and we think the jury would so
understand it. Under all the circumstances, our conclusion is that
this does not require a reversal.

Defendant’s further contention that the State’s argument con-
stituted a comment on defendant’s failure to testify in violation of
Section 546.270, likewise cannot be sustained. The State’s attorney
said: ‘‘Look at the evidence on the State’s side of the scale. On the
defendant’s side is nothing.’’ He also, on three occasions, referred
to the State’s evidence as ‘‘uncontradicted.’’ We have held in State
v. Johnson, 362 Mo, 833, 245 S. W. (2d) 43; State v. Spradlin, 863
Mo. 940, 254 8. W.'(2d) 660; and State v. Hayzlett, (Mo. Sup.),
265 S. W. (2d) 321 that statements similar to the one above quoted
did not constitute a violation of the statute. We have also con-
sistently held that it was not a violation of the statute to state that
evidence was uncontradicted, undisputed or uncontroverted. (State
vy. Ruck, 194 Mo. 416, 92 8S. W. 706; State v. Fields, 234 Mo. 615,
138 8. W. 518; State v. Gordon, 253 Mo. 510, 161 S. W. 721; State
v. Hughes, 258 Mo. 264, 167 8. W. 529; State v. Steele, 280 Mo. 63,
217 S. W. 80; State v. Butler, (Mo. Sup.), 221 8. W. (2d) 160.)
In this case, it appears there were other persons in the room with
defendant, who could have testified, so the statement did not nec-
essarily refer to defendant. (See State v. McKeever, 339 Mo. 1066,
101 8S. W. (2a) 22, 82.) The rulings in the above cited cases are
recognized by defendant but it is said that this matter was over-
emphasized by being repeated. While undue repetition might have
been ground for action by the trial court, if deemed prejudicial, it
was presented to the trial court in defendant’s motion for new trial

and overruled. ‘‘Whether or not a particular improper argument is
so prejudicial under the facts in the particular case, as to necessitate
a reprimand of counsel or a discharge of the jury, is largely within
the discretion of the trial court. An appellate court will not interfere
unless the record shows that the trial court abused its discretion to
the prejudice of the appellant.’”? (State v. Tiedt, 360 Mo. 594, 229
S. W. (2d) 582, 588.) We cannot find an abuse of discretion in this
case.

The judgment is affirmed.

Leedy, C.J., Dalton, Hollingsworth, Ellison and Westhues, JJ., and
Cave, Special Judge, concur.

Es
Mnzrzerurs Burr, Respondent, v. Kansas Crry Pusuic Szrvicz Com-
pany, a Corporation, and Frank P. Frruas, Defendants, Kansas
Crry Pustic Sprvics Company, Appellant, No. 48817—276 S. W.
(2d) 120.

Court en Banc, March 14, 1955.

Charles L. Carr and Frank J. . Rogers for appellant.

David T. Cavanaugh, Thomas E. Hudson and Hudson & Cavanaugh
for respondent.

[121] DALTON, J.—<Action for damages for personal injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff, a passenger on defendant Kansas City Public
Service Company’s bus, when the bus and a Dodge automobile, the
latter operated by defendant Ferlas, collided head-on on Tenth street
in Kansas City, Kansas, on October 13, 1949, about 9:40 p.m. Verdict
and judgment were for plaintiff and against both defendants for
$15,000. Defendant Kansas City Public Service Company has ap-
pealed and here contends (1) that the trial court erred in submitting
the cause against said defendant under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine;
(2) that instructions 1 and 2 are erroneous; and (3) that the verdict
of the jury is excessive and so excessive as to show passion and
prejudice against said defendant. .

At the time of the collision in question plaintiff, a fare-paying
passenger, was seated on the right-hand side of the bus in the second
seat from the front and next to the aisle. The bus was southbound
on Tenth street, a paved north-south street approximately 40 feet
wide. The last stop of the bus prior to the collision was at Central
avenue and the collision occurred about two blocks further south and
before the bus reached Pacific avenue. Although the collision oc-
curred in the State of Kansas, there is no reference in the briefs to
any applicable Kansas statutes or court decisions.

Plaintiff, who was her sole witness as to the collision, testified that
the bus was moving along in the normal fashion, downgrade, ‘‘and
then all at once there was a crash, and it pitched me forward and
hit me on the bar across the seat * * * It (the bus) stopped after
it hit whatever it was.’? When plaintiff was thrown forward, her
left shoulder hit the metal grip or bar on the end of the seat in front
of her and she sustained an injury. Shortly after the collision,
plaintiff went to the front of the bus and looked out. She saw that
the bus had stopped ‘“‘right up against’? an automobile. The bus
operator had made no outery and plaintiff had received no ‘“‘warning
of any impending stopping of the bus.’’

On cross-examination plaintiff said that, prior to the collision, she
had seen nothing unusual about the way the bus was being operated;
that the bus did not slow [122] down prior to the collision; that the
operator ‘‘did not honk his horn’’; that the bus was being operated
“right in the middle of the street’’; that cars were parked on both
sides: of the street, but she did not notice how close the right-hand
side of the bus was to the parked cars; and that, when she looked
out of the front window, the bus was “‘still in the middle of the
street’’ and up against the Ferlas car, which was ‘‘pretty well over
on the right.’’ The front of the car ‘‘was right up against the left-
hand side of the bus * * * on the east.’’ The bus was turned
slightly to the left or to the east into the automobile of Mr. Ferlas.

The day after the collision the bus company sent plaintiff a question-
naire, which she executed and returned to the company. As a part of
her cross-examination the defendant offered the statement in evidence.
Some of the questions and answers were: ‘‘Q. Did you see the acci-
dent? A. I heard the crash. Q. Where were you when the accident
took place? A. On west side of bus going south. Q. What part of
vehicle came in contact with bus? A. Left side of automobile (front).
Q. (a) What was the speed of bus? (b) of vehicle? A. (a) Ordinary.
(b) I couldn’t say. Q. Who, in your opinion, is to blame for accident?
A. The bus was on the right side of street. I didn’t see the automobile
until after it hit.” In answer to the general question, ‘‘How did the
accident oceur?,’’ she wrote this statement, ‘‘To my opinion the auto-
mobile was coming out of an alley headed west and made a turn to the
north. The first I knew was when I was thrown up against the seat in
front of me and heard glass breaking. The bus driver was driving very
careful. I have been on the bus quite often when he was driving and
he always seems to be very careful. I would say the automobile hit
the bus.’’

The evidence on behalf of defendant Kansas City Publie Service
Company tended to show that the bus operator was driving the bus
southward in the usual manner on its own or west side of Tenth street;
that the Ferlas automobile, northbound, was being operated partly on
the west or wrong side of Tenth street; that, while the automobile was
some distance south of the bus, the operator saw the headlights of the
automobile, indicating the automobile was being operated on the west
or wrong side of the street; that the operator sounded his horn, flicked
his lights, warned the passengers and stopped the bus within 18 to 24
inches of automobiles parked at the west curb; and that the automobile
kept coming and, although there was space of 25 feet or more of clear-
ance to the left of the bus for the automobile to pass on the east side of
the street, the automobile collided with the bus. The left front head-
light and corner of the bus and the left front of the automobile were
damaged by the collision.

Defendant Ferlas, testifying in his own behalf, stated he was driving
his automobile north on the east side of Tenth street at about 20 to 25
miles an hour. Upon approaching the place of collision, he was blinded
by a bright spotlight or headlight shining in his rear view mirror and
reflecting into his eyes and, for a few seconds, he was unable to see
anything. He started to slow down, but drove a few feet while blinded,
and came to a stop on the east or his right-hand side of the street. A
couple of seconds later, after he had stopped, there was a collision and
he was injured and dazed and did not recall anything further.

Plaintiff pleaded and submitted her cause under the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine on the-theory that her evidence showed her to be a fare-paying
passenger upon the bus of a public carrier and that a collision occurred

between the public carrier’s bus and another vehicle and plaintiff was
thrown forward against the seat in front of her and injured. Roth-
weiler v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 259, 234 S.W. (2a) 552,
553; Powell v. St. Joseph Ry., [123] Lt., Heat & Power So., 336 Mo.
1016, 81 S.W. (2d) 957, 958, and cases there cited. And see Anno-
tations 25 A.L.R. 690; 83 A.L.R. 1163; 161 A.L.R. 1113.

| | Appellant first contends that the court erred in submitting the
case under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine because there was no evidence
of any unusual movement of the bus and because plaintiff, by her own
testimony, showed the cause of the collision and specific negligence on
the part of the defendant. Appellant says that plaintiff, by her own
testimony, made a submissible case on specific negligence; and that her
testimony shows that defendant negligently drove its bus across the
center of the street and on to the left side thereof, and not as near the
right-hand side as was practicable, and into collision with the automo-
bile of defendant Ferlas. Appellant refers to plaintiff’s testimony
about the bus being operated in the middle of the street and about
Ferlas’ car being pretty well over on the right and against the left-
hand side of the bus and about the bus being still in the center of the
street and turned to the left after the collision had taken place. The
rule relied upon is aptly stated in Belding v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., 358 Mo. 491, 215 S.W. (2d) 506, a case in which a bus and another
vehicle sideswiped in meeting and passing, as follows: ‘‘ * * * when
the plaintiff, having pleaded a case of res ipsa loquitur, goes so far in
his own evidence as.to point out, and reveal his knowledge of, the
specific act of negligence which was responsible for his injury, there is
neither room nor necessity for the application of the doctrine. But on
the other hand, even though the plaintiff’s evidence may tend to show
the specific cayse of the accident, he will nevertheless not lose the
benefit of the doctrine, nor be deprived of the right to rely upon it in
the submission of his case, if, after his evidence is in, ‘the true cause is
still left in doubt or is not clearly shown.’ ’’ Appellant relies particu-
larly on Conduitt v. Trenton Gas & Electric Co., 326 Mo. 133, 31 S.W.
(2d) 21; Berry v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 843 Mo. 474, 121
S.W. (2d) 825 and Venditti v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 360 Mo.
42, 226 S.W. (2d) 559.

Whether the operation of a motor vehicle in the center, or to the left
of the center, of the street was a negligent operation depended upon
the detailed facts attending such operation. The fact that the bus may
have been operated ‘‘right in the middle of the street’’ did not show
specific negligence in failing to operate the bus as near the right-hand
side of the street as practicable, absent a showing that the condition
of the street to the right of the bus was not occupied and was in such
condition that it was in fact practicable to have operated the bus
further to the right. No such showing was made by plaintiff. Plaintiff

did not know how close the bus was being’ operated to the parked auto-
mobiles referred to. Plaintiff offered po evidence tending to show that
the bus was not in fact being operated as near the right-hand side of
the street as practicable. Plaintiff’s testimony tends to show that she
knew nothing about the location, or operation of the Ferlas’ automo-
bile prior to the collision. Her testimony, as to where the automobile
and the bus came to rest after the collision was complete, did not show
specific negligence in the operation of the bus. The collision happened.
at night and plaintiff testified to no facts or circumstances attending
the collision which show specific negligence in the operation of the bus
‘‘right in the middle of the street’ or across the center line. Any mere
conclusions as to the cause of the collision may be disregarded. White
vy. St. Louis Public Service Co., (Mo. Sup.), 259 S.W. (2d) 795, 799(1).
Plaintiff also testified that no horn was sounded, or the bus slowed,
or any warning given to her before the collision occurred, but, likewise,
the attendant circumstances are not shown by her testimony and there
is no contention here that this testimony was direct evidence of specific
negligence on the part of the bus operator.

The facts and circumstances testified to by plaintifi do not show that
she had knowledge of the specific negligence causing [124] the collision
and her injuries, nor does her testimony show that the direct and proxi-
mate cause of the collision was the operation of the bus in the center of
the street or across the center line. Clearly, the facts and circumstances
testified to do not so directly and definitely show the precise and specif-
ie negligent act or acts causing the collision so as to preclude the plain-
tiff from reliance upon and the submission of her case under the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine. Hill v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 359 Mo.
220, 221 S.W. (2d) 130, 133 (4) ; Rothweiler v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra, 284 S.W. (2d) 552, 553; Belding v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra, 215 S.W. (2d) 506, 510; Williams v. St. Louis Public Serv- -
ice Co., 363 Mo. 625, 253 S.W. (2d) 97, 100-102. The assignment is
overruled.

Hl Appellant next complains of the giving of instructions Nos. 1
and 2. Plaintiff’s instruction 1, after requiring the preliminary finding
that plaintiff was a passenger on defendant’s southbound bus traveling
on Tenth street, directs a verdict on the finding that defendant’s serv-
ant ‘‘* * * in charge of and operating said bus, caused, allowed
and permitted the same to come into contact and collide with the auto-
mobile of defendant Frank Ferlas being operated in’ a northerly direc-
tion on 10th Street, if so, and plaintiff was caused to be thrown into
and against the metal part of the seat of said bus, as shown by the
evidence, if so, and defendant Kansas City Public Service Company
was thereby negligent, if you so find, and the negligence of said Kansas
City Public Service Company, if so, caused or contributed to cause the
plaintiff’s injuries, if you find she was injured * * *.””

It is contended that this instruction ‘‘divects a verdict on a finding
by the jury of the happening of the accident, resulting injury to plain-
tiff and that defendant was thereby negligent without requiring a
general finding of negligence and without any consideration of the
other facts and cireumstances in evidence.’’ Appellant says ‘‘the in-
struction does not require a finding that the bus was negligently caused,
allowed and permitted to collide * * *’’; and that the instruction
“is abstract and gives the jury a roving commission (even under a
general negligence submission) and does not require a finding of
essential facts necessary to place liability on defendant.’’ Appellant
further says the evidence presented two conflicting factual situations;
that a verdict directing instruction should have hypothesized a finding
of facts necessary to a verdict for plaintiff; and that the instruction
required no finding of facts ‘‘which would speak negligence on the part
of defendant’s bus operator, or from which it could be reasonably in-
ferred that the operator’s negligence was the cause of the collision
BOR OR

The assignment must be overruled. We have held that the cause was
properly submitted under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The instruc-
tion sufficiently requires a finding of a passenger and carrier relation-
ship, defendant’s operation of the bus, a collision with another vehicle,
injury to plaintiff, negligence of defendant and that such negligence
caused or contributed to cause the collision and plaintiff’s injury. See
Venditti v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 362 Mo. 339, 240 S.W.
(2d) 921, 925. Further, the instruction must be read and considered
with instruction No. 2 which reviewed and required a finding of the
same facts as instruction No. 1, except that no finding that defendant
was negligent was required, but the instruction concluded, as fol- «
lows: ‘‘* * * and plaintiff was caused to be thrown into and against
the metal part of the seat of said bus and was injured as a result there-
of, then you are instructed that such facts, if you believe them to be
true, are sufficient circumstantial evidence wpon which the jury may
infer that the defendant Kansas City Public Service Company was
negligent and you may so find unless you find and believe from other
evidence and from all the facts and circumstances in evidence, that
said collision of said bus was not due to negligence of the defendant
Kansas City Public Service Company.’’

[125] Appellant contends (1) that instruction No. 2 was erroneous
because plaintiff proved specific negligence and could not, avail herself
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; (2) that the instruction did not re-
quire a finding of negligence; and (3) that the instruction erroneously
placed the duty on defendant to disprove negligence and ignored the
affirmative duty of plaintiff to prove negligence. The instruction was
neither a burden of proof, nor a verdict directing instruction and it
was unnecessary for the instruction to require a finding of negligence _
or to advise the jury as to which of the parties had the burden of proof.

Instruction No. 1, a verdict directing instruction, required a finding of
negligence as a condition to a verdict for plaintiff. Instruction No..6
advised the jury that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to
prove her case by a preponderance, that is, the greater weight of the
eredible evidence. Instruction No. 5 defined the terms, ‘‘negligence,’’
“negligent’’ and ‘‘negligently.’? We have previously ruled that the
plaintiff’s evidence did not show specific negligence ; and that the cause
was properly submitted under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In ad-
vising the jury ‘‘that such facts, if you believe them to be true, are
sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which the jury may infer
that the defendant Kansas City Public Service Company was negligent
and you may so find unless you find and believe from other evidence *
and from all the facts and circumstances in evidence, that said collision
of said bus was not due to the negligence of the defendant Kansas City
Public Service Company,” the instruction did not impose upon de-
fendant the duty to disprove negligence, but only advised the jury as
to what they might find from certain evidence, unless they found the
facts otherwise. The instruction is not similar to the one condemned
in the case of Rothweiler v. St. Louis Public Service Company, supra,
234 S.W. (2d) 552.

bm The final assignment concerns the amount. of the verdict. Ap-
pellant contends (1) that the verdict for $15,000 is excessive and that
it ‘should be reduced very substantially’’; and (2) that the verdict ‘‘is
so excessive as to show passion and prejudice on the part of the jury,”’
that “‘the excessiveness of this verdict cannot be cured by remittitur’’
and that ‘‘the cause should be reversed and remanded on account of
the excessiveness alone.’’

Plaintiff was a housewife and prior to the receipt of her injuries, she
had done all of her own housework without assistance, such as cooking,
washing, ironing, cleaning, hanging out clothes and working in and
about the place. She was approximately 59 years of age when injured
(62 at the time of the trial in February 1953). As stated, when the
collision occurred plaintiff was thrown forward and her left shoulder
struck the grip or bar on the end of the seat in front of her. When she
reached home she was having some pain and took aspirin for it. She
disrobed and observed a red mark on her shoulder, but she assumed
her injuries were not serious. The next day her shoulder was sore and
began to discolor. Whenever she moved her left arm there would be a
sharp pain. There was some swelling and, ‘‘as time went on, it got
larger’? and she applied hot cloths. The area was ‘‘black and blue’”’
for quite some time. She had ‘‘sort of wrenched”’ her neck, and it be-
came stiff and sore, there was soreness on her left side and she had head-
aches. She could not use her left arm, or lift with it, and her collar-
bone hurt. She consulted her family doctor, Dr. Maurice A. Walker,
who examined her and sent her to Dr. P. E. Hiebert for X-rays. Dr.
Walker continued to check her condition and ordered the use of hot

and ‘‘infra-red ray light on her neck.’’? At his direction she discon-
tinued the use of her arm and put it in a sling for six weeks to two
months. During this time she was not able to do her usual and normal
household duties, and did not work ‘‘to speak of.’? The swelling on
her left shoulder, ‘‘about the size of an egg,’’ lasted some two months
and gradually disappeared, but the pain and stiffness in her neck and
in her left side did not, and ‘‘on damp, cold days it is worse.’’

[126] She had previously had no difficulty or trouble with her left
arm or shoulder, but, after her injury and up to the time of the trial,
she could not raise her left arm up to comb her hair. She could not
reach high enough to hang up clothes, nor could she get her left hand

* back of her. She just can’t do things with that left arm like she used
to do. She has continued to have terrible headaches, and pain and stiff-
ness in her neck, conditions that did not exist prior to her injury. She
had previously been active in social work and school activities, but,
after her injury, she has had to refuse to help with such activities,
since she ‘‘can’t do too much lifting.’’ She has discontinued helping
serve in lodge work and such social activities, since she can’t attend
to the cooking and entertaining connected therewith. She also had to
give up a neighborhood club for the same reason.

Dr. P. E. Hiebert (a specialist in the field of radiology, X-ray diag-
nosis and treatment) saw plaintiff on October 25, 1949 and made an
X-ray examination of her left clavicle and the region of the clavicle
and the sternum, where they unite to form a joint known as the sternal
clavieular joint. He found a paling of the bone, as the calcium had
been removed to a slight degree, but was ‘‘unable to demonstrate any
fracture or broken bone or any dislocation.’’ Carrying the arm in a
sling from the 18th to the 25th could possibly have produced this pal-
lor. On account of the swelling he observed and on account of the pain
and tenderness complained of, he made a further examination on No-
vember 16, 1949, at which time he found that ‘‘the space between the
sternum and the end of the clavicle was somewhat greater than the
space on the right side, which was more normal,’’ and he reached the
conclusion that ‘‘she had effusion in that joint * * * some water in
the joint’”’ as a result of a probable injury or trauma to the acromio-
clavicular joint on the left side. The condition observed, that is, this
effusion or inerease in the interarticular space in the joint would tend
to produce pain and discomfort, this because this joint is by its very
nature a very poor joint and not mechanically stable, and it is prone
to remain sore for a longer period of time than other joints. The area
“thad all the clinical manifestations of an injury that was of a few
days ago,’’ consistent with the history of accident on October 5, 1949.
Although the clinical impression from both examinations was that ‘‘she
should have had some kind of a fracture,’’ no fracture could be demon-
strated.

The examination by Dr. M. A. Walker, plaintiff’s family physician,
on October 24, 1949, disclosed ‘‘a yellowish discoloration in the left
superclavicular area * * * firm swelling at the sternoclavicular
joint, that is the place where the collarbone * * * is attached to the
breastbone or sternum, on that area was ‘‘a rounded firm tender swell-
ing.’”’ Dr. Walker testified: ‘‘I thought she bad a fracture of the inner
end of her collarbone. * * * Thad put her arm ina sling, she wasn’t
able to use it anyway, and I sent her to Dr. Hiebert’s office for an X-ray
examination. * * * [I had her put on heat, various forms, hot pad,
hot moist applications and heat lamp. * * * I think that she has a
permanent disability of the sternoclavicular joint on the left side due
to that injury. * * * She has had changes in that joint that will be
permanent, that are permanent.’’ He further said that any treatment
that could have been given was given; and that the disability he found
could be due to the injury on October 13, 1949. He still sees her peri-
odically and casual examinations have been made, you can see the swell-
ing in the joint. There is a permanent bony swelling and there is
crepitation of the joint, a crackling or crunching in the joint when it
is moved.

Dr. Alexander Lichtor examined plaintiff on February 6, 1953, at
that time she complained of tenderness of the left collarbone (clavi-
cle) with pain on moving of the left shoulder, or moving the left arm
at the left shoulder, especially moving the arm away from the body. In
addition she complained of headaches in the back of her head, and pain
in the upper part of her back when she had her headaches. He [127]
found that there was a marked tenderness over the left collarbone to-
ward the breastbone; that the tenderness was not only over the bone
but at the joint between the collarbone and the breastbone; that by her
moving the left arm, or by having it moved, caused her to complain of
alot of pain in that area; that there was definite limitation of motion
of the left arm in all directions but especially in moving the arm away
from the body; that there was not a good range of motion; and that
motion was definitely limited. Other motions were also limited, that is
forward and backward, and the left arm motion was constantly being
protected because of the pain; rotation (that is turning the arm later-
ally or externally) also produced pain ; and there was tenderness over
the upper border of the left shoulder at the junction’ of the shoulder
and the neck. X-rays taken of the area revealed some osteoporosis,
‘that is the bone was not strong, it was not as fully filled with calcium
and protein as a bone which is present in a normal individual with
normal bones or in a younger individual’’; and there was a softening
of the bone in the area complained of. In his opinion plaintiff was dis-
abled as far as the use of her left arm was concerned. No operations
were to be recommended, only conservative treatment with heat and
pain tablets. The disability was permanent. The disability could have
been caused by her being thrown against the seat at the time of the
collision. Defendant offered no evidence concerning plaintift’s injuries,

- a

It will be noted thgt no special damages are shown, such as hospitali-
zation, medical expenses, loss of wages, et cetera, nevertheless the evi-
dence shows that plaintiff, a housewife, has suffered substantial injury
and damage, and that her physical injuries and the impairment of the
use of her left arm have resulted in permanent disabilty. Such per-
manent injuries and the pain, personal inconvenience and handicap
resulting therefrom are entitled to full consideration by the trial court
and jury and on appeal, regardless of the absence of special damages.
Jensen v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 967, 238 S.W. (2d) 805, 308; Douglas
v. Twenter (Mo. Sup.), 259 S.W. (2d) 853; Stofer v. Kansas City
Public Service Co., 226 Mo. App. 376, 41 S.W. (2d) 614, 620.

There is no precise method for determining the maximum award
which the evidence in this case will support. Each case must be con-
sidered upon its own peculiar facts. Due regard should be given to
the purchasing power of the dollar, to the rule of reasonable uniform-
ity of awards for similar injuries and to the fact that the jury and
the trial judge were in a better position than this court to measure an
award of reasonable compensation, as well as to the fact that the trial
court has approved the verdict in question.

Considering plaintiff’s evidence as true and giving her the benefit of
all reasonable inferences arising from it, we think the verdict is clearly
in excess of the maximum amount that is reasonably warranted by the
evidence and in excess of reasonable compensation for the injuries and
damage sustained, however, we do not find the verdict so excessive as
to show passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. McCaffery v.
St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 545, 252 $.W. (2d) 361, 368;
Douglas v. Twenter, supra, 259 8.W. (2d) 358, 365.

Appellant has cited many cases where the injuries and damage ap-

_ pear much less severe than those sustained by plaintiff. Kulengowski
v. Withington (Mo. App.), 222 8.W. (2d) 579; Hughes v. St. Louis
Nat. League Baseball Club (Mo. App.), 218 S.W. (2d) 632 (later trans-
ferred to this court and the issue of damages was not decided, 224 8.W.
(2d) 98); Wofford v. St. Louis Public Service Co. (Mo. Sup.), 252
S8.W. (2d) 529; McBride v. Clarida (Mo. App.), 254 S.W. (2d) 36.
Plaintiff, as respondent, has cited cases where the injuries were more
severe. McCaffery v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra, 252 S.W.
(2d) 361; Marezuk v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 355 Mo, 536, 196
S.W. (24) 1000.

[128] It is our conclusion that, on the record presented, the maxi-
mum amount for which the judgment appealed from can be sustained
is $9,000. If the plaintiff-respondent will within 15 days enter a re-
mittitur of $6,000 as of the date of the judgment below, the judgment
will be affirmed for $9,000 as of its date, otherwise the judgment will
be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. It is so ordered.

Leedy, C.J., Dalton, Hollingsworth, Hyde, Ellison, and Westhues,
JJ., and Cave, Special Judge, concur.

James Ryan, Appellant, v. Camppenu Srxry-Srx Expruss, Inc, a
Corporation, Respondent.

Srave ex rel. Jamus Ryan, Relator, v. Waitam H. Kinnoren, Judge

of the Circuit Court of the Highth Judicial Cireuit of Missouri,
Respondent, Nos. 44546 and 44565—276 S. W. (2d) 128.

Court en Bane, March 14, 1955.

_ William H. Becker, Robert C. Smith, Jr., and Roberts P. Elam for
relator; Clark & Becker of counsel.

F. X. Cleary, C. M. Kirkham and Moser, Marsalek, Carpenter, Cleary
& Carter for respondents.

[28] WSSTHUBS, J.—The above cases were consolidated by

. Case No. 446
ntiff Ryan in this court asking this court to
reuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, to take
jurisdiction of Case No. 44546.

The events leading up to this controversy are briefly as follows:
Ryan, while driving a truck on July 1, 1952, in Audrain County,
Missouri, was injured when his truck collided with a tractor-trailer
combination driven by Charles W. Aldridge, as agent of Campbell
Sixty-Six Express, Inc. Ryan, on September 19, 1952, filed a suit for
damages in the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri. Aldridge,
the driver, and Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., owner of the tractor-
trailer, were named as defendants. On October 9, 1952, these de-
fendants filed a general denial as their answer. On January 14, 1953,
the defendants filed an application for a change of venue from Boone
County. Ryan then announced that he would dismiss his suit with-
out prejudice and file a suit in the Cireuit Court of the City of St.
Louis where the defendant Express Company maintains an office.
On February 10, 1953, an answer was filed in the Boone County Cir-
cuit Court without leave setting up a counterclaim for defendant
Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc.

On March 9, 1953, there was filed in the Cireuit Court of Boone
County a suit against James Ryan, the plaintiff in the original suit.
The plaintiffs in this suit were Charles W. Aldridge, Campbell Sixty-
Six Express, Inc., and C. W. Lindsey. It was alleged in Count I
that Aldridge had been injured in the collision in Audrain County
and $1000 was asked as damages therefor; in Count II, Campbell
Sixty-Six Express, Inc., alleged that the cargo carried by the tractor-
trailer had been damaged and $1000 was asked for such damage. It
was alleged in Count III that C. W. Lindsey was the owner of the
tractor-trailer which it was alleged was damaged in the accident. For
such damage $1000 was asked.

On July 10, 1953, James Ryan filed a suit in the Circuit Court of
the City of St. Louis against Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., for
$75,000 as damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sus-
tained as a result of the collision and $25,000 punitive damages.
(There is a second count in the petition which we need not mention

- since it does not affect the,present appeal.) This is the action which
was dismissed by the trial judge and from which this appeal was
taken, The order of dismissal was entered on February 10, 1954. This
order was set aside on May 7, 1954, and on the same day the order
of dismissal was reentered. It will be noted that the case was dis-
missed after the Circuit Court of Boone County had made an order
staying the proceedings in that court awaiting the final outcome of
the suit filed in St. Louis.

The order staying the proceedings in the Boone County Cir-
euit Court was made on motion to dismiss filed by Ryan on April 8,
1958, wherein he alleged that the suit was filed in bad faith and for
the sole purpose of fixing the venue of a trial. A hearing was had on
this motion on October 26, 1953. [180] On November 3, 1953, the
Circuit Court in Boone County entered the order staying the action

in that court pending the determination of the suit in St. Louis. The
court made findings pursuant to the hearing on the motion. To in-
dicate the theory and grounds on which the trial court stayed the
proceedings, we quote the following taken from the findings of the
court: ‘‘Thereafter, on the 9th day of March, 1953 the plaintiffs in
this case, being Charles W. Aldridge, Campbell Sixty-Six Express,
Ine. and OC. W. Lindsey, acting in concert with and at the instance of,
and through the attorneys for the liability insurer of Campbell Sixty-
Six Express, Inc. did file this action in bad faith for the purpose
of depriving James Ryan of the right to file his claim for personal
injuries in the city of St. Louis. * * * And the Court doth further
find that the said Charles W. Aldridge has stated in his deposition,
taken in case No. 41013, that he was not injured in said accident and
that conflicting statements have been made in pleadings in this and
other causes as to the alleged ownership of said tractor and trailer
by Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Ine. or C. W. Lindsey. The Court
further finds that in the original petition filed by the said Campbell
Sixty-Six Express, Inc. it was alleged that said Campbell Sixty-Six
Express, Inc. had been damaged and was liable for damages to the
cargo which it carried in its said truck, but that the said Campbell
Sixty-Six Express, Inc. has now filed an answer to the written inter-
rogatories served upon it by the defendant stating that it did not in
fact suffer cargo damage as a result of said accident, and the Court
doth therefore find that the original petition in this cause, Count
Two of which was filed in the name of Campbell Sixty-Six Express,
Ine., was filed at the instance of the said Campbell Sixty-Six Express,
Inc. and the Transport Insurance Company, its liability insurer,
solely for the purpose of preventing the said James Ryan from filing
his said cause of action for personal injuries in the City of St. Louis,
Missouri. And it further appearing to the Court that said James Ryan
has stated a cause of action in the suit which he now has pending in
the city of St. Louis, Missouri against the said Campbell Sixty-Six
Express, Inc. The Court doth therefore determine, after considering
the public policy and interest, efficiency, convenience, economy and
the bad faith of the plaintiffs herein in instituting said action and in
the exercise of its discretion, that it would be to the best interest of
justice that Count Two of this petition be stayed pending the prosecu-
tion and determination of the St. Louis action, being case number
65978 in Division One of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and the Court
further having determined that it may in its discretion stay further
proceedings in this action for the foregoing reasons.’’

Similar findings were made as to the other two counts of the peti-
tion filed in the Boone County Circuit Court by Aldridge, Campbell
Sixty-Six Express, Inc., and Lindsey against Ryan.

We are of the opinion that the trial judge of the Cireuit Court of
Boone County was justified in staying the proceedings in that court

pending the outcome of the case filed by Ryan in the Cireuit Court
of the City of St. Louis. Plaintiff Ryan in the case filed in Boone
County Circuit Court had the right to dismiss his case. Only a general
denial and an application for a change of venue had been filed to
his petition when he notified the court that he desired to dismiss with-
out prejudice. See Section 510.180, V.AMS.; 27 C.JS.S. 159-162,
Sections 7 and 8; Piatt v. Heim and Overly Realty Co., 342 Mo. 772,
117 S.W. (2d) 327. The order permitting Ryan to dismiss without
prejudice and the order striking the counterclaim were entirely proper.

Did the Cireuit Court of Boone County have the authority to stay
the proceedings in the suit there pending to await the outcome of the
suit filed by Ryan in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis? As
a general rule it is proper to abate or dismiss a second suit where
a prior suit is pending in another court involving the same parties
and the same subject matter. 1 C.J.S. 58, Section 33. [181] There
are exceptions to this rule and the case before us comes within the
exceptions. See 1 0.J.S. 109, Section 69; Russell v. Taylor, (Texas)
49 §.W.(2d) 783, le. 736 (1). In the circumstances, the Cirenit Court
of Boone County did not abuse its discretion by staying the pro-
ceedings, awaiting the final determination of the suit pending in the
court in St. Louis, State ex rel. U. 8. Fire Ins. Co. v. Terte, 851 Mo.
1089, 176 S.W.(2d) 25, l.c. 80 (7) ; City of Caruthersville v. Cantrell,
Mo. App., 230 S.W.(2d) 160, Le. 163 (3); 1 C.J.S. 1405, Section 182.

Hl In 1 CJS. 1405, Section 183, we find the general rule stated
to be as follows: ‘‘The granting of a stay of proceedings being largely
a matter for the discretion of the court, the grounds on which a stay
will be granted vary according to the requirements of the particular
case in which the stay is sought.’’ It will be noted that the stay
order was entered by the Cireuit Court of Boone County on November
8, 1953. Thereafter, on May 7, 1954, respondent in the mandamus
proceeding, the Honorable William H. Killoren, Judge of the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis, dismissed Ryan’s petition on the
ground that the court did not have jurisdiction because of the pending
action in Boone County. We hold that the court was in error and
that it did have’ jurisdiction to proceed with the case.

It is therefore ordered in Case No. 44565 that our writ of mandamus
be made peremptory that respondent judge take jurisdiction of the
case of James Ryan v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc.

In Case No. 44546, wherein Ryan’s petition was dismissed, the
order of dismissal should be set aside and the cause remanded for
further proceedings.

Tt is so ordered.

Leedy, C.J., Dalion, Hollingsworth, Hyde, Ellison, JJ., and Cave,
Special Judge, concur.

Srarz or Missouri, at the Relation of Epwarp L. Down, Circuit At-
torney for the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, Relator, v.
Howorasie Jars F. Nanarn, Judge of the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, Now Presiding in the Crimi-
nal Causes, Assignment Division Thereof, Respondent, No. 44559
—276 8. W. (2d) 135.

Court en Banc, March 14, 1955.

Edward L. Dowd, Circuit Attorney of City of St. Louis, for relator.

-

Hyman G. Stein for respondent.

[1386] CAVE, Special Judge—This is an original proceeding in
prohibition. Relator, as circuit attorney of the City of St. Louis,
seeks to prohibit respondent, a judge of the circuit court of said city,
from proceeding further in a certain criminal cause pending in said
court for reasons hereinafter detailed.

Briefly stated, the pertinent facts disclosed by the pleadings are:
On May 23, 1954, the relator, as circuit attorney, filed in the St.
Louis Court of Criminal Correction an information charging one
Leland 0. D. Cluck with the offense of ‘‘robbery in the first degree
by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon’’ (§ 560.135, RSMo
1949, VAMS) ; Cluck was arrested and on June 9, a preliminary trial
was held before a magistrate who, after hearing evidence, bound thé
defendant over to the circuit court to answer the said charge of rob-
bery in the first degree; on June 21, relator, on his official oath, filed
in the Circuit Court for Criminal Causes an information charging
defendant Cluck withthe crime of robbery in the first degree by means
of a dangerous and deadly weapon; on June 28, defendarit appeared
in court with counsel and pleaded not guilty to such charge and the
cause was set for trial on’ October 11, 1954. During July, respondent
was serving in the Assignment Division of the Circuit Court for
Criminal Causes; on July 14, defendant Cluck and his counsel ap-
peared before respondent for a pre-trial conference (the nature of
which is later discussed) ; during such conference defendant and his
counsel stated to respondent that defendant desired to and would,
plead guilty to the lesser offense of ‘‘assault with intent to commit
robbery’’ (§ 559.190) ; whereupon respondent made and entered the
following order: ‘‘On Court’s own motion, charge reduced to assault
with intent to rob, whereupon defendant withdraws former plea and
pleads guilty as charged. Sentence deferred to July 30, 1954, for
pre-sentence application for parole filed.”’ Relator promptly filed his
petition for prohibition in this court and our preliminary rule was
issued.

The fundamental question presented by the pleadings is: Oan a
circuit judge, before trial and over the objections of the circuit at-
torney (or proseciiting attorney), reduce the degree of a criminal
offense charged in an information or indictment to a lesser offense
and accept a plea of guilty to such lesser offense?

Hl Respondent alleges in his return and argues in his brief that
he had jurisdiction to make the order quoted above because: While
he was serving as Judge of the Assignment Division for. Criminal
Causes, he adopted a policy of preparing a special docket listing several
pending’ criminal cases thereon and notifying the cireuit attorney and
the attorneys representing the defendants of the time and place he
would hold a pre-trial conference relative to such cases; that these
conferences were held in accordance with Rule 25.09 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure adopted by [187] this court; that relator notified
respondent that no one from his office would attend such conferences ;
that respondent did hold a pre-trial conference in the Cluck case, and
states his theory of the authority for making the above order as fol-
lows: ‘‘It is the contention of respondent that if, in making such
inquiry, such facts appear to the Court as impel the conclusion that
a defendant’s requested plea of guilty to a lesser included offense
should be accepted, it is within the Court’s discretion and jurisdiction

” to accept such a plea.’’

Relator denies that he or any one in his office ever notified respond-
ent that a representative of the circuit attorney’s office would not
attend pre-trial conferences, but that he had notified respondent that
his office would not divulge the state’s evidence at such a conference
and prior to a plea of guilty. We note that on page 4 of respondent’s
return it is alleged that ‘‘Relator’s assistant assigned to said Division
was present in court when the case of said Leland O. D. Cluck was
called for a pre-trial conference.’? However, the lack of friendly
cooperation, if so, between the office of relator and respondent would
not enlarge the jurisdiction of respondent in the present matter.

Rule 25.09 authorizes a court, in its discretion, to call a con-
ference of the attorneys for the parties to consider the possibility of:
‘“‘(1) The simplification of the issues;, (2) The necessity or desir-
ability of amendments to the pleadings; (3) The possibility of ob-
taining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid un-
necessary proof; (4) The limitation of the number of expert and
character witnesses; (5) Such other matters as may aid in the dis-
position of the action.’ It is apparent the broad purpose of this rule
is to simplify the issues and expedite the trial of a case. It does not
authorize the court to inquire into all the facts for the purpose of
determining whether a defendant should or should not be permitted
to plead guilty to a lesser offense than the one charged in the informa-
tion. Neither does Rule 25.04 authorize such a proceeding. This rule
reads: ‘‘A defendant may plead not guilty or guilty. The court

may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept a plea
without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge.’’? There is no rule or
statute authorizing a circuit court ‘‘of its own motion,’’ before trial,
to reduce the degree of the offense charged and to accept a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense.

HI There is no allegation in the return or claim made in the
brief that respondent heard any testimony at the pre-trial conference
or of any facts ascertained by him at such conference other than this
allegation: ‘‘In the course of such conference said defendant and
his counsel stated that said defendant Leland O. D. Cluck desired to
enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of assault with intent to
rob.’’ Such a ‘‘desire’’ is understandable, but that fact would not
confer jurisdiction upon the court, of its “‘own motion” to make an
order reducing the offense charged. The punishment for conviction
of the offense charged is from five years in the penitentiary to death,
and not subject to parole; while the punishment for the reduced
charge is from a fine of one hundred dollars to a maximum of five
years in prison, and is subject to parole.

In what office has the law lodged the duty and responsibility for
the commencement of prosecution of a criminal offense and carrying
the same forward to its conclusion? Unquestionably such is the
responsibility of the cireuit attorney or prosecuting attorney. § 56.450
provides that the circuit attorney shall ‘‘manage and conduct all
criminal cases, * * * of which the circuit court * * * shall have
jurisdiction * * *.” In State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345
Mo. 169, 181, 182 S.W. 2d 979, 986, we said that a circuit or prose-
cuting attorney ‘‘ ‘is a quasi judicial officer, retained by the public
for the prosecution of persons accused of crime, in the exercise of
sound diseretion to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent,
between the certainly and the doubtfully guilty.’’’ And in State ex
rel. Griffin, Pros. Atty. v. Smith, 863 Mo. 1235, 1239, 258 S.W. 2d
590, 598, we discussed the dignity and importance [188] of the office
of prosecutor and recognized that he, like every other attorney at
law, is an officer of the court, nevertheless ‘‘he is not a mere lackey
of the court nor are his conclusions in the discharge of his official
duties and responsibilities, in’ anywise subservient to the views of
the judge as to the handling of the State’s cases. * * * It is clearly
the weight of authority that if there is no statute respecting the right
to enter a nolle prosequi [and there is no such statute in Missouri]
that such right lies within the sole discretion of the prosecuting at-
torney.’? In State v. Hatcher, 136 Mo. 641, 643, 38 S.W. 719, it is
said: ‘‘There is no doubt that a prosecuting attorney, after an indict-
ment has been found for an offense, may elect to prosecute for a
lower grade of the same offense, necessarily included within the same

offense. There is no statwte on this subject, but the power is inherent
in the state’s officer thus to nolle any portion of an indictment.’’
These cases, and others that might be cited, support the conclusion

that the prosecutor has the sole authority and discretion to nolle
prosequi a criminal proceeding or to elect to reduce the offense charged
before trial.

" We have considered the cases cited by respondent but do not con-
sider them controlling or persuasive on the specific issue before us.
Such cases are: Ex parte Peoples, 100 P. 2d 295; Collins v. Robbins,
84 A. 2d 586; Ex parte Carlson, 186 N.W. 722; Hobson v. Youell,
15 S.E. 2d 76; McDonald, District Attorney v. Sobel, 72 N.Y.S.
2d 4; Smith v. Roach, 106 P. 2d 536; State v. Wilmot, 163 P. 742.
Generally those cases announce the rule that a defendant may plead
guilty to or be convicted of a lesser offense than the one charged if
the lesser offense is necessarily included in that charged against him,
and the evidence authorizes the submission of the lesser offense. §
556.230. Such rule has no application to the question under considera-
tion.

From what we have said it follows that respondent was without

_ jurisdiction to make the order reducing the charge against defendant
Cluck and accepting a plea of guilty to the lesser offense, and to that
extent our provisional rule in prohibition should be made absolute,
but in all other respects the rule should be discharged so that the
State may proceed with the prosecution against Cluck under the first
degree robbery charge, if it is so advised. It is ordered accordingly.
All coneur.

_Davip Decxzr, Respondent, v. Erwin H. Frerez, as Administrator
e.t.a. of Estate of Erwin Ossine, Deceased, and Norma 0.
Bramon, Appellants, No. 44471—276 8. W. (2d) 144.

Division Two, March 14, 1955.

Louis B. Sher and Donald J. Sher for appellants.

Cook, Fairfield, Howard & Murphy and Joseph J. Howard for
respondent.

[145] BOHLING, C.—David Decker, plaintiff-respondent, filed
this suit in equity August 18, 1952, against [146] Erwin Ossing to
establish a trust in what is known as 3711-18 Kossuth avenue, St.
Louis, Missouri, arising out of a tax sale and deed. Erwin Ossing died
December 9, 1952. Hrwin H. Fittge, as administrator ¢. t. a. of the
estate of Erwin Ossing, deceased, and Norma O. Bramon, his sole
beneficiary who holds the legal title to said real estate, were sub-
stituted as parties defendant. The case was submitted on an agreed
statement of facts and pleadings were filed to conform thereto.
Jankowski v. Delfert, 356 Mo. 184, 201 S. W. 2d 831, 335[8,9]. Plain-
tiff prayed for a decree vesting title in plaintiff and for general relief.
Separate answers were filed by the defendants. The decree was for
the plaintiff and defendants have appealed.

That the facts may be more readily understood, we mention that
§ 141.940(3), RSMo 1949, applicable to the tax sale involved, is to
the effect, so far as material, that when the combined amount of prior
liens for other taxes and the amount of the bid of the purchaser ex-
ceeds fifty per cent of the appraised value of the property, the tax
sale is to be confirmed and the sheriff is to execute his deed to the
purchaser.

In 1945 the City of St. Louis obtained a judgment for taxes on the
real estate involved. The custom of the City is to hold such judg-
ments without action until an offer is received for the property. Then
thie judgment and costs and costs of sale are estimated and a deposit
is accepted with the understanding that upon a sale and payment

of the balance of any unpaid taxes against the property the deed is
to be delivered.

It was the frequent practice of plaintiff-respondent to bid « on and
purchase property from the City of St. Louis in the above manner.
He very seldom took the title in his own name. On several occasions
he had purchased property at sheriff’s sales and taken the title in
the name of Erwin Ossing. Within a few months Ossing and his wife
would transfer the title to plaintiff or his nominee. The property in
question is the only exception to this procedure.

Plaintiff on May 5, 1950, advised Harry Budde, who handles such
matters in the collector’s office for the City, that he was interested
in buying the property and, wpon the costs being estimated at $850,
plaintiff delivered his personal check to Harry Budde for $850, with
the understanding the balance of the unpaid taxes would be paid upon
the delivery of the deed. Execution was ordered and notice for sale on
June 14, 1950, was published. On the day of sale, plaintiff, Erwin
Ossing, a licensed attorney, and Harry Budde conferred with Edward
Linahan, an employee of the sheriff’s office in charge of all execution
sales, and Budde advised Linahan that plaintiff had made the neces-
sary deposit to bid the property in at the sale. Plaintiff was the sole
and highest bidder and bid the property in for $855.51 at the sale
vonducted by Linahan, in the presence of Budde, Ossing and plaintiff.
Plaintiff ‘directed said Linahan to make the deed to Erwin Ossing.”’

The sheriff’s report of sale was duly filed in the circuit court, and
the court appointed two disinterested appraisers on June 22, 1950,
who, on July 5, 1950, filed their report appraising said real estate at
$6,500. Said report of the appraisers was accompanied by a statement
of the collector of revenue of the City showing the other general real
estate taxes to which the property was subject. The circuit court
found that the bid plus the subsequent taxes, ete., exceeded fifty per
cent of said appraised value, approved the sale and authorized the
sheriff to execute his deed to Erwin Ossing. The sheriff executed his
deed to Erwin Ossing on August 17, 1950, and acknowledged the same
in open court on August 22, 1950.

Both plaintiff and Ossing did business with the 0. J. McCawley
Realty Company. On May 5, 1950, Erwin Ossing sold some real estate
through said realty company. On August 29, 1950, Erwin Ossing,
without plaintiff being present, brought in his own check for $2,477.97,
the amount of the balance of the taxes, penalties, interest, costs, etc.,
to Harry Budde, received said sherifi’s deed, and had the same duly
recorded. The $2,477.97 was received by Erwin Ossing from the sale
of his property on May [147] 5, 1950. The real estate company mailed
the sheriff’s deed to Ossing on October 8, 1950.

The O. J. McCawley Realty Company collected the rents for plain-
tiff on at least ten parcels of real estate. Some of the parcels had been
purchased by plaintiff at tax sales and held in the name of Erwin Os-

sing and were carried on the books of said realty company in the name
of Erwin Ossing, with rent checks issued to said Ossing until the par-
cel was transferred to plaintiff or his nominee. The rent checks on
such parcels, so issued to Ossing, were delivered to plaintiff, the owner.
The books of the realty company show that the rent checks on the
property in suit were remitted to Erwin Ossing prior to his death,
and subsequent to his death to Norma O. Bramon; and said books
also showed insurance $110.75, repairs $172.30, and taxes, water
license and other expense $193.79 charged against Ossing’s account.
Ossing or his heir paid real estate taxes as follows: 1950, $106.85;
1951, $106.88; 1952, $108.37.

A letter received by Mr. Ossing from plaintiff’s attorney is dated
July 2, 1952. It mentions that the attorney had written to Mr. Ossing
in ‘December, 1951 ‘‘with reference to the property sold to you by
Dave Decker,’’ and shortly thereafter had spoken to him about the
controversy, and had been informed by Ossing that he preferred to
settle it with plaintiff personally, which was agreeable to the attorney.
The letter also stated that Ossing had not settled with plaintiff and
plaintiff insisted that it be ‘‘cleaned up’’; that plaintiff had delivered
to the attorney a cashier’s check payable to Ossing for the amount
Ossing had paid in and a deed to be executed by Ossing conveying the
property to plaintiff; and that the attorney would have to follow
plaintiff’s instructions about suit if the matter was not settled, which
the attorney thought ‘‘entirely unnecessary’? and desired to avoid.

The record discloses, after adjusting the account between plaintiff
and defendants with respect to the real estate involved, that there
remains a balance due defendants of $757.97 from plaintiff as of the
day of judgment in the event a trust be established, the plaintiff
having made a deposit into court of a sufficient sum to pay said balance
due defendants.

Plaintiff and defendants present the case on the theory of a result-
ing trust. Defendants contend plaintiff failed to carry the burden
necessary for the decree in plaintiff’s favor.

Ho establish a resulting trust by parol evidence the proof must
be so clear, cogent, positive and convincing as to exclude every reason-
able doubt of its existence from the mind of the chancellor. Norton v.
Norton, Mo., 43 S. W. 2d 1024, 1032 [6] ; Berry v. Hartzell, 91 Mo. 132,
136, 3 S. W. 582.

HI However, it has been well stated ‘‘that a resulting trust is
founded upon ‘the natural presumption, in the absence of rebutting
circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase money intends the
purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, and that the
conveyance in the name of another is a matter of convenience and
arrangement between the parties for collateral purposes.’’’ Carr v.
Carroll, Mo., 178 S. W. 2d 485, 436[2], quoting Condit v. Maxwell,

142 Mo. 266, 274(I), 44S. W. 467, 469(1). See also Jankowski v. Del-
fert, 356 Mo. 184, 201 8. W. 2d 381, 334{1-3].

‘Where a transfer of property is made to one person and a part of
the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor
of the person by whom such payment is made in such proportion, as
the part paid by him bears to the total purchase price, unless he mani-
fests an intention that no resulting trust should arise or that a result-
ing trust to that extent should not arise.’ 2 Restatement, Trusts,
§ 454; Baumgartner v. Guessfeld, 38 Mo. 36, 41; Stevenson v. Smith,
189 Mo. 447, 466, 88 S. W. 86, 91; Wrightsman v. Rogers, 239 Mo. 417,
428, 144 S. W. 479, 482[2]; Hynds v. Hynds, 253 Mo, 20, 35(IV),
161 8. W. 812, 816(IV), 818[9]; Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App.
405, 167 S. W. 634.

Wl [148] Defendants say that Ossing paid the major part of the
consideration ; that all of the consideration was paid before the deliv-
ery of the deed on August 29, 1950, and that’no resulting trust was
created by plaintiff theretofore paying the $850 or bidding in the
property at the execution sale, stating ‘‘a resulting trust must arise,
if at all, the instant the deed is taken.’’ Jacobs v. Jacobs, Mo., 272 8.
W. 2d 185, 189.

The source of the consideration is the foundation of a resulting
trust, which has its origin in an agreement implied from the cireum-
stances or established by proof. The trust, however, does not exist by
virtue of an agreement. The intention of the parties at or before,
not subsequent to, the acquisition of title determines the question of a
purchase-money trust or no trust. The intention may be proved by
parol. Milligan v. Bing, 841 Mo. 648, 108 8. W. 2d 108, 109 [1-4];
Mays v. Jackson, 346 Mo. 1224, 145 S. W. 2d 392, 399; Padgett v. Os-
borne, 859 Mo. 209, 221 8. W. 2d 210, 212[8]; Cloud v. Ivie, 28 Mo.
578; §§ 456.010, 456.030, RSMo 1949. The evidence of the terms of an
oral agreement is offered not for the purpose of establishing an un-
enforceable express trust but to nullify the intention of a loan or gift
and to indicate the disposition the real owner intended to make of the
property ; that is, that the title at the time of the delivery of the deed
stood impressed with the trust. Smithsonian Institute v. Meech, 169
U. &. 898, 409, 18 S. Ct. 396, 42 L. Ed. 793; Wrightsman v. Rogers,
supra; Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 414, 167 8. W. 684,
636 [5, 6]; Scholle v. Lawmann, Mo. App., 189 8. W. 2d 1067, 1069

1,2].
l The agreed statement of facts clearly establishes that plaintiff dis-
covered this property and was the originator of its sale that he might
purchase it. He made the arrangements with the collector’s office to
that end and delivered his check for $850 as a deposit thereon with
the understanding he would pay the balance of the unpaid taxes
against the property when the deed was delivered. Plaintiff was the
sole person entering into this agreement. The first knowledge Ossing

had of the transaction disclosed under the agreed facts was when he
appeared with plaintiff at the bidding on the day of the sheriff’s sale.
At the sale the property was bid in by and sold to plaintiff, Plaintiff
had theretofore placed the title of several parcels so purchased in the
name of Ossing and in this instance he also instructed the sheriff to
place the title in Ossing’s name, the understanding being, so far as
disclosed by the agreed facts, that plaintiff, as agreed with the col-
lector’s office, was obligated to and would pay the other taxes against
the property and accept the delivery of the deed in Ossing’s name.
Under the authorities, wp to when Ossing delivered his personal check
on August 29, 1950, for $2,477.97, representing the balance of the
taxes against the property, plaintiff was the beneficial owner of the
agreed upon rights to the property, and upon Ossing accepting the deed
his legal title stood impressed with a resulting trust for that portion of
the total consideration paid by plaintiff.

The facts distinguish the instant case from the cases stressed by
defendants, which involve the sufficiency of the evidence. In Chechik
v. Koletsky, 311 Ill. 488, 148 N. H. 66, 38 A. L. R. 742, 745 (nearest
in point), plaintiff, a real estate agent, relied upon a $300 down pay-
ment made when the contract for purchase was executed between the
vendors and defendant-transferee, plaintiff’s sister-in-law. The trans-
feree had inspected the property in company with plaintiff before
executing the contract and later closed the contract in accordance
with its terms. The property was valued at $12,400 and the cash con-
sideration was $3,000. There was testimony pro and con about evenly
balanced as to whether the $300 was a loan to the transferee or a pay-
ment by plaintiff on the purchase price. Shelby v. Shelby, 357 Mo.
557, 209 S. W. 2d 896, 899, 900, involved indefinite contributions by
five children of insubstantial parts of the purchase price of a home
for the family in the name of the mother and the testimony thereon
was indefinite and vague and not of the standard for decreeing a result-
ing trust. Consult [149] the authorities there cited, including Adams
v. Adams, 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S. W. 2a 610, 614[6, 7, 10]. In Dee v.
Sutter, Mo. App., 222 S. W. 2d 541, 543[6], there was a failure of
proof that plaintiff made the payment involved. The facts in Ferguson.
vy. Robinson, 258 Mo. 118, 167 S. W. 447, 452 et seq., are more detailed,
but the gist of plaintiff’s contention was that defendant had agreed
to bid in certain property of plaintiff’s at public sales with the under-
standing plaintiff was to pay defendant the amount expended there-
for, interest on the expenditures, and a reasonable sum for defendant’s
services and receive the property from defendant. The testimony was
in conflict and the trial court’s holding that it was insufficient to
establish plaintiff’s contentions was upheld.

Hl We are of the opinion-that Ossing held that portion of the
title represented by his payment of $2,477.97 as constructive trustee
for the plaintiff.

a

Decrees are to be affirmed if the right result is reached in the trial
court although the reason advanced for affirmance be not the correct
ground for sustaining the decree. Brewster v. Terry, 352 Mo. 967,
180 S. W. 2d 600, 602[1]; Jackson v. Merz, Mo. App., 223 $. W. 2d
136, 188[8].

In Bispham, Equity, 4th Ed., 133, cited by defendants, is the fol-
lowing (taken from the note to Keech v. Sandford, 1 Lead. Cas. in
Eq. 48, 1c. 62): ‘* “Whenever one person is placed in such relation
to another, by the act or consent of that other, or the act of a third
person, or of the law, that he becomes interested for him, or interested
with him in any subject of property or business, he is prohibited from
acquiring rights in that subject antagonistic to the person with whose
interest he has become associated.’’’ This is on the theory that a
trustee, or one occupying a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary position is
precluded from gaining any personal advantage touching the subject
of the trust or confidence. .

For instance: In Tyler v. Tyler, 54 R. I. 254, 172 A. 820, a father’s
property had been sold on execution for $10. It was of considerable
value and the purchaser’s attorney informed him he could repur-
chase it for $250.. The father tried to repurchase but could not find
the attorney. He went to his son for advice and assistance and told
him the situation. The son secretly purchased the property for him-
self and was held a constructive trustee for the father. He was not
allowed to gain the advantage through an abuse of the confidential
relation. See, among others, State ex rel. Duggan v. Kirkwood, 357
Mo. 325, 208 S. W. 2d 257, 259[1], 2 A. L. R. 2d 216, citing authority,
which is in accord with Bispham, Equity, quoted supra; Black v.
Gray, 411 Tl. 508, 104 N. E. 2d 212, 213[8-5]; 54 Am. Jur. 173, §§
225, 226, 228; 65 O. J. 476, §§ 226, 227.

A confidential and fiduciary relation existed between plaintiff and
Ossing. There is nothing in the agreed facts changing this relation
up to the delivery of the deed. The forwarding of the rent checks to
Ossing by the realty company, which acted as agent for both plaintiff
and Ossing, was no more binding on plaintiff than on Ossing, there
being no evidence as to what caused it so to do. There is no affirma-~
tive showing of objection by plaintiff to Ossing’s action until Decem-
ber, 1951. Plaintiff’s attorney then wrote Ossing and shortly there-
after saw him about the matter. Mr. Ossing died December 9, 1952.
The agreed facts are dated December 14, 1953. Clearly: plaintiff and.
Ossing had been friends, and plaintiff reposed confidence in Ossing.
Plaintiff must have taken the matter wp with Ossing prior to placing’
it with the attorney. Ossing stated to the attorney ] he desired to settle
it with plaintiff personally, which the attorney pr eferred to have ‘him
do. The letter of July 2, 1952, notwithstanding an inadvertent- use
of the word sold, proceeds on the theory that Ossing held the title’ in
trust for plaintiff, as the attorney states he held plaintiff’s cashier’s

check payable to Ossing for the amount he had paid in and a deed
ready for execution by Ossing transferring the title to plaintiff. If
the situation were not as outlined in the letter, the agreed facts do
not disclose that Ossing made known any different contention. Ossing
knew plaintiff [150] had paid $850 of the consideration for the prop-
erty and plaintiff’s position that he held the title in trust. Under
the record Ossing’s payment of the $2,477.97 was an abuse of the
confidence plaintiff placed in him. He held the title represented by
the $2,477.97 payment as a constructive trustee for plaintiff. This, as
has been stated, is not necessarily because of an imputation of fraud,
but because to permit him to retain the property thus procured
would tend to induce fraud and would be against public policy upon
the true owner doing equity. Van Raalte v. Epstein, 202 Mo. 173, 192,
99 S. W. 1077, 1081.

The decree was for the right party. It is affirmed. Barrett and
Stockard, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bounre, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. Ellison, P. J., Leedy, J., and Dew, Special

Judge, concur.

Leo Gracz, Adminstrator of the Estate of Opa Gracz, Deceased,
Respondent, v. L. A. Surrs, C. T. Scummr and the Wasash
Rarizoap Company, a Corporation, Defendants, WapasH Rat-
RoaD Company, a Corporation, Appellant, No. 44583—277 S. W.
(2d) 503.

Court en Bane, April 11, 1955.

Boyle G. Clark, Robert C. Smith, Jr., and Raymond C. Lewis, Jr.,

for appellant; J. H. Miller and Clark & Becker of counsel.

Ralph L. Ale: er and R. E. Ausmus for respondent Alexander,
is G Welliver of counsel.

[504] HOLLINGSWORTH, J.—Plaintiff, administrator of the
estate of Oda Grace, deceased, sued defendents, Wabash Railroad Com-
pany, a corporation, L. A. Smith, its engineer, and C. T. Schmidt, its
fireman, for the wrongful death of Mrs. Grace, when a car in which
she was riding was struck by a Wabash train at a public crossing in
the City of Sturgeon, Missouri. The jury discharged Smith and
Schmidt but found a verdict against the Wabash in the amount of
$5,000, and judgment was so entered.

The Wabash appealed to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Grace v. Smith et al.,
270 S. W. 24 79. Thereafter, upon application of said defendant, the
cause was transferred to this court under the provisions of Art. V,
§ 10, of the Constitution of Missouri. In its brief filed in the Court
of Appeals and in a supplemental brief filed here, defendant asserts
error: (1) in the overruling of its motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict upon grounds, (a) defendant cannot be held
liable for a tort committed by its agent when the ageht was exonerated
of the tort and especially is this true, appellant says, because the case
was not pleaded, tried or submitted on such a theory, (b) defendant
was under no duty to maintain a light in a wigwag signalling device
installed at the crossing upon which plaintiff’s [505] intestate was
killed or to keep an electric light bulb therein burning, (¢) plaintiff’s
intestate was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
and (d) the sole cause of plaintiff’s intestate’s death was the negli-
gence of the driver'of the automobile in which she was riding when
struck by defendant’s train; and (2) error in the giving and refusal
of certain instructions.

Substantial portions of the opinion of the Kansas City Gourt of
Appeals will be used without quotation marks.

After alleging various facts, with which we are not here especially
concerned, plaintiff charged :

“That the said collision and the fatal injury and death of plaintiff’s
intestate were directly and proximately caused and occasioned by the
carelessness and negligence of the defendents, L. A. Smith and C. T.
Schmidt and Wabash Railroad Company, its agents, servants and.
employees in the following particulars, to-wit:

“(A) That the defendants carelessly and negligently operated the
said engine and train of cars at a rate of speed which, under the

151

circumstances, was -high, dangerous and excessive, to-wit: 75 miles

per hour.
es 8 8 8 &

“(D) That the defendant(s) operated said engine and train of
ears at a high and dangerous rate of speed and at a speed in excess
of six (6) miles per hour in violation of the Ordinanve of the City of
Sturgeon, Missouri.

“‘(E) That the defendants failed to have and provide a watchman
at said crossing and failed to have and provide a mechanical device
thereat that would give sufficient warning of the approach of said
engine and train of vars.

ee eo ee

“(I) That the defendants carelessly and negligently attempted to
cross said Ogden Street when said defendants knew or should have
known in the exercise of the ordinary degree of care that the signal
light on said Ogden Street crossing was not functioning.’’

Defendant maintains a line of railroad through the City of
Sturgeon. It runs in an east-west direction and crosses Ogden Sireet,
the main street of Sturgeon, near the depot. It is a north-south street.
There are three sets of tracks at this crossing, the furthest south is
the house track, the set next, to the north, is the passing track, and
the set north of that is the main line. The distance from the southern-
most point of the south rail of the house track to the northernmost.
point of the north rail of the main line is 32 feet. There was a con-
ventional crossarm railroad sign on the south side of the tracks, along
the east side of Ogden Street. On the north side of the crossing, on the
west side of the street, was a wigwag signal device, consisting of a metal
disk from 12 to 15 inches in diameter, with a black cross painted on it,
and with a red light bulb in the center of the disk. This device was
attached to a post so that the disk faces traffic on the street and, when
a train approaches, it lights up and swings in an are of about one
yard. On top of the post is a bell which rings at the same time that
the wigwag operates. This device had been in use there for a long
time prior to the date of the accident.

The evidence was to the effect that Mrs. Grace and her husband,
aged respectively 72 and 70 years, had for many years lived on a
farm about two miles south of Sturgeon; that they did their shopping
and banking in Sturgeon, where they also attended church; that they
frequently visited their daughter, who lived north of Sturgeon; that
they frequently drove to town and to their daughter’s home, over
this crossing.

Mr. Carter, a lawyer who lived at Sturgeon, was driving south
along Ogden Street, to his home, at about 7:10 p.m., on October 9,
1952. It was then dark. He testified that as he approached this
crossing’ he heard a train approaching from the west and observed

the wigwag signal in operation; that he stopped his automobile about
60 feet north of the crossing and observed [506] an automobile ap-
proaching from the south; that he turned off his lights; that the
automobile did not stop or slow down, but approached at a speed of
20 miles per hour; that the train was whistling and its bell was
ringing; that the wigwag signal was in operation, the bell ringing;
that he did not think the light was burning on the wigwag; that when
the automobile entered upon the main line, it was struck by the train;
that the train was travelling at a speed of 75 or 80 miles per hour;
that when the bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Grace were found Mr. Grace
was dead. Mrs. Grace died within a few minutes thereafter. Mr.
Carter stated that at the time the accident occurred there were two
boxears parked on the house track, west of the crossing; that the
track curves to the northwest from the crossing; that on account of
the curve he did not think that one approaching from the south, in
an automobile, could have seen a train approaching from the west,
even in daytime; that such a person would not have been able to see
the headlight of an approaching train but might have seen rays of
light therefrom; that the boxears would block the view; and that he
first saw the oscillating wigwag and heard the bell when he was about
250 feet north of the crossing.

Mr. Seitz, signal maintenance man for the Wabash, stated that he
was called to Sturgeon at about 10:00 p.m. that night to repair the
light on the wigwag signal; that the wire was broken and the light
was out; that three days before the light was in operation when he
inspected it; and that it is possible for a light to operate at one time
and fail to operate at'another time, by reason of a broken wire.

Mr. Sexton stated that one night some ten days before the accident
he observed a train pass over this crossing; that the light of the
wigwag was not in operation; that the following day he asked the
station agent of the Wabash if he had noticed this fact; and that
the Wabash maintenance man arrived during this conversation.

Mr. Estepp stated that either on the morning of the accident or
the day before he observed that the light on the wigwag was not in
operation.

Mr. Jennings stated that after the accident, on the night of October
9, 1952, he observed a freight train pass through Sturgeon; that the
light on the wigwag was not in operation; that about a week or
ten days before the accident occurred he observed a train pass over
the crossing ; that the light on the wigwag was not in operation.

Mr. Palmer observed that the light was not in operation on the
night of the accident, an hour or so after the accident occurred. Mr.
Roberts, while the train that caused the casualty was still on the
track, noticed that the light was not working.

Mr. Smith, the engineer operating the train at the time the casualty
oceurred, stated that the train was scheduled to leave Moberly at

6:48 p.m. and arrive at Sturgeon at 7:00 p.m.; that the train actually
left at 7:00 and arrived at 7:05 or 7:06; that the diesel motored engine
was equipped with whistle, bell, headlight and Mar’s light, the latter
oscillating and throwing its beams to the front and to the side; that the
speed at Sturgeon was 78 miles per hour ; that there are no slow orders
for Sturgeon; that he still travels through Sturgeon at 78 miles per
hour; that the maximum speed permitted is 78 miles; that when he ob-
served the Grace automobile the engine was probably 75 feet from the
crossing; and that he applied emergency brakes before the collision
occurred.

Mr. Schmidt, the fireman, stated that the distance from Moberly to
Sturgeon is 12 to 14 miles.

Plaintiff’s case was submitted under two verdict-directing instruc-
tions, P-1 and P-5. Instruction P-1 was directed solely to liability
of the Wabash Railroad Company. After hypothesizing facts not here
in dispute, it further declared: ‘‘* * * *, and if you further find and
believe from the evidence, that, at the time and place in question, the
defendant, Wabash Railroad Company, its agents, servants, employees
operated said train at a high, dangerous and excessive rate of speed
under the circumstances then and there existing; and [507] if you
further find and believe from the evidence that, at said time, there was
an ordinance in force in the City of Sturgeon prohibiting the running
of trains at a greater speed than six (6) miles per hour in said City
of Sturgeon and that the defendant, Wabash Railroad Company, its
agents, servants and employees, did, at said time and place, run its
engine and cars at a greater speed than six (6) miles per hour, and
if you further find and believe from the evidence that defendant
Wabash Railroad Company did install and maintain an automatic
warning light at said crossing and that said automatic warning had
been maintained by said defendant, if you so find, for sufficient length
of time for persons traveling upon and along said Ogden Street to
rely on said sign to warn them of the approach of any train or trains
on said railroad track at said crossing, and if you further find and
believe from the evidence that the defendant, Wabash Railroad Com-
pany, negligently and carelessly permitted said automatic warning
light to be and remain out of order and repair, and that same would
not operate, and that said automatic warning light had been in such
eondition for a sufficient length of time for said defendant, by the
exercise of ordinary care on its part, to have discovered that said
automatic signal light was in such condition, and to have repaired the
same prior to said collision, and if you further find that the said Oda
Grace knew defendant had installed and had been maintaining said
automatic warning light, and relied thereon, and if you further find
that such acts and failures, and each of them if you so find, were
negligence on the part of the defendant, Wabash Railroad Company
and if you further find and believe from the evidence then as a direct

and proximate result of such negligence on the part of said defendant,
if you so find, said railroad train did collide with the automobile in
which the said Oda Grace was riding, and that as a direct and proxi-
mate result of said collision the said Oda Grace was injured and that
she died as a direct and proximate result of such injuries, if you so
find, * * * then your verdict shall be for the plaintiff and against
the defendant, Wabash Railroad Company.”’

Instruction P-5 was addressed solely to liability of the defendants
Smith and Schmidt and, in terms substantially as embodied in In-
struction P-1 above, directed a verdict against them if the jury found
they operated the train at an excessive rate of speed in violation of
the ordinance. It made no reference to the wigwag signalling device.

At the instance of defendants, the trial court, by Instruction N,
directed the jury that Mrs. Grace ‘‘while riding in the automobile
involved in the collision was required to exercise ordinary care and
prudence for her own safety as said automobile approached the
crossing in question and her failure, if you find she did so fail, to
exercise that degree of care and prudence that you believe that a
person of ordinary care and prudence would have exercised under the
same and similar circumstances in observing the wigwag, hearing or
seeing the approach of the train and hearing the crossing alarm was
negligence that directly contributed to her death then your. verdict
shall be for the defendants.’’ At plaintiff’s request, the court in-
structed the jury that the burden of proving contributory negligence
of Mrs. Grace was upon defendants.

Forms of verdict were given to the jury for its use in returning a
verdict, among which was a form for its use if it found against the
Wabash and in favor of Smith and Schmidt. As stated, that was the
verdict ‘agreed upon and returned by the jury.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals with much logic, and supported
by respectable authority, concludes that the predetermined schedule
fixed by the railroad for the operation of its train from Moberly to
Sturgeon, a distance of 12 to 14 miles, within 12 minutes, constitutes
negligence on the part of the railroad for which it is liable inde-
pendent of its liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior ;
that the pleadings and evidence definitely warranted such a submis-
sion; [508] and that it is immaterial whether the defective wigwag
signalling device constituted a separate or concurring ground of
negligence under the evidence.

Defendant challenges that conclusion asserting that negligence of
the railroad, independent of that of its servants, was not pleaded
and that, if it were, the law of Missouri does not recognize the doctrine
as declared in cases from other states cited in the Court of Appeals
decision. Upon consideration of the whole record, we have concluded
that even though the pleadings would admit of submission of the case
upon the theory adopted by the Court of Appeals, yet it was not in

fact tried or submitted upon that theory. But, we are further con-
vinced that the case was properly tried and submitted upon the
theory that the railroad was liable for the negligent operation of its
train by its servants at an excessive rate of speed under the doctrine
of respondeat superior combined and concurring with its independent
negligence in maintaining its signalling device in a defective condi-
tion, as hypothesized in Instruction P-1; and that a submissible case
was made against it upon that theory, notwithstanding the finding
of the jury that negligence of the servants in operating the train at
an excessive speed did not, in and of itself, warrant a finding against
them. This, for the reasons following’: The evidence that ‘the rail-
road, by its servants, negligently operated the train at an excessive
rate of speed is clear and both the railroad and they are liable there-
for, unless Mrs. Grace was guilty of contributory negligence; the
evidence does not show Mrs. Grace guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law; the jury reasonably could find she would have
been guilty of contributory negligence had she not been deceived as
to the approach of the train by the failure of the signalling device to
display its customarily swinging red light when trains were ap-
proaching the crossing; Smith*and Schmidt, although negligent in
operating the train at an excessive speed, were not chargeable with
any negligence attributable to maintenance of the signalling device
and, therefore, not liable because Mrs. Grace would have been guilty
of contributory negligence but for the assurance given her by the
non-functioning light on the wigwag that the car in which she was
riding could enter upon the crossing in safety; but that the railroad,
chargeable with both acts of negligence was liable, because its inde-
pendent negligence absolved her of contributory negligence as to it.
‘We will undertake to amplify and justify these conclusions.

HI The evidence, including photographs introduced, shows that
the main business district of Sturgeon lies immediately north of the
crossing. It was unquestionably a dangerous one; defendant so recog-
nized it by the installation of the wigwag signalling device equipped
with a red light. Such recognition of its duty to install the device
clearly imposed upon defendant the further duty to keep the red
light thereon in good working condition so that the travelling public
approaching the crossing would not be led to believe it safe to enter
upon it when the light was not functioning. Bachman v. Quincy,
O. and K. C. R. Co., 310 Mo. 48, 274 S.W. 764, 767; Dehn v. Thomp-
son, Mo.App., 181 8.W. 2d 171, 174. If the red light was not func-
tioning as Mr. and Mrs. Grace approached the crossing, that fact
amounted to implicit assurance that the crossing could be made in
safety. Mullis v. Thompson, 358 Mo. 230, 213 §.W. 2d 941, 944 [1, 2].
The evidence is sufficient to warrant'a finding by the jury that Mr.

.and Mrs. Grace were familiar with the red light on the device.
Sturgeon was their shopping, banking and church center. They went

over this crossing to enter thé city for these purposes and to go
through the city to visit their daughter who resided north thereof
at least once each week for many years. It is a matter of common
knowledge that under such circumstances they would become familiar
with the signalling device and the swinging red light thereon and
that they would come to rely upon it when entering upon the crossing.
The evidence also warrants a finding that the red light on the device
was not functioning when the train which killed Mr. and Mrs. Grace
went over it, [509] and that it was not functioning on the morning
of or the morning before the collision. The jury could also find that,
in the exercise of ordinary care, defendant should have known of
the defective condition in ample time to have repaired it before the
train here involved went over the crossing or to have taken other
precautionary measures such as placing a watchman thereat. We
hold that a submissible case was made against the defendant Wabash
upon its negligent failure to properly maintain the signalling device.
(This conclusion also disposes of defendant’s contention that the trial
court erred in refusing Instruction C withdrawing the issue of the
defective signalling device from the jury; and its further contention
that Instruction P-1 was erroneous ia submitting such issue.)

Hl The operation of defendant’s train over the Ogden Street
crossing at a rate of speed in excess of the limits prescribed by the
ordinance constituted negligence as a matter of law. Ruenzi v. Payne,
208 Mo.App. 113, 231 S.W. 294, 296; Todd v. St. Louis-San Francisco
R. Co., Mo.Sup., 87 S.W. 2d 557, 558; Mullis v. Thompson, 358 Mo.
230, 218 S.W. 2d 941, 946. Obviously, the jury could find that de-
fendant’s negligent speed was a proximate cause of Mrs. Grace’s
injuries, unless she was guilty of contributory negligence. Cases,
supra.

The burden of proving contributory negligence of Mrs. Grace
was upon defendants. unless it was otherwise shown. We think that
the evidence does not show her to be guilty of such negligence as a
matter of law. In the first place, it doés not disclose which of the two,
Mrs. Grace or her husband, was driving the car in which they were
riding. (Leo Grace, aged 47, son of Mr. and Mrs. Grace, testified that
Mrs. Grace ‘‘did drive.a car, but not when father was with her.’’
The court, upon motion of defendants, struck the answer.) Conse-
quently, she may have been a mete passenger, and it must follow
that she cannot be charged with the degree of care required of an
operator. Her conduct, therefore, must be determined as though she
were a passenger. There is no alternative. So assuming, the most
she could do would be to note the danger, warn her husband, if he did
not see or hear it, and urge him to stop; or she or her husband, or
both of them, might have been deceived into a sense of security by
reason of the non-functioning of the red light on the wigwag device. |
Mullis v. Thompson, supra. The question of her negligence was one

for the jury. Miller v. Union Paeific R. Co., 54 8.Ct. 172, 173 [5],
290 U.S. 227, 233, 78 L.Ed. 285, 289. But it also is clear that the
facts and circumstances in evidence did present a jury question as
to her contributory negligence. Miller v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra,
Le: 174; Southern Pac. Co. v. Wright, (C.C.A.), 248 F. 261, 264;
State ex rel. Alton R. Co. v. Shain, 846 Mo. 681, 143 S.W. 2d 283,
239. :

Hl We may at this point also note and dispose of defendant’s
contention that the sole cause of the collision and Mrs. Grace’s in-
juries was the negligence of the driver of the car in which she was
riding, and that the court erred in refusing to render judgment for
it on that ground. In support of that contention defendant cites
Jurgens v. Thompson, 350 Mo. 914, 169 S.W. 2d 353, 356. The issues
and facts in that case are in no wise analogous to the issues and
facts here under copsideration. In the case of Miller v. Union Pac.
R. Co., supra, the court considered a situation (assuming the pas-
senger status of Mrs. Grace) quite similar to the instant case, and
therein held that contributory negligence of the automobile operator
would not interrupt the sequence of events set in motion by the
negligence of the defendant railroad or insulate its negligence from
the accident, but would concur therewith so as to constitute in point
of time and in effect what was essentially one transaction, and that
the railroad was liable to a passenger in the car to the same extent
as though the collision had been caused by its negligence alone. We
agree with that holding.

We hold that the jury was justified in finding that although
Mrs. Grace would [510] have been guilty of contributory negligence
had not the failure of the red light to function amounted to an assur-
ance it was safe to enter upon the crossing; and that, therefore, the
engineer and fireman, though guilty of negligence in operating the
train at an excessive speed, should be exonerated from liability, but
that the railroad, whose negligence in maintaining the defective device
relieved her of contributory negligence, was liable because of its
combined and concurring specified acts of negligence.

The judgment is affirmed.

Leedy, O.3., Dalton, Hyde and Westhues, JJ., and Cave,’ Special
Judge, concur. .

Lustzr C. Brasney, Appellant, v. Gus N. Armens, Dr~pa AruEns
and Anezio Ganos, Co-Partners, Doing Business as Buu Jay
Carn, Respondents, No. 44323—277 8. W. (2d) 538.

Division Two, April 11, 1955.

Donald L. Randolph for appellant.
William H. Ergovich and Charles A. Darby for respondents.

[538] BOHLING, C.—Lester C. Beasley sued Gus N. Athens,
Della Athens and Angelo Ganos for damages for personal injuries
for an assault and battery. The jury returned a verdict for the de-
fendants and judgment was entered thereon. Plaintiff has appealed,
claiming error in giving an instruction and restricting his counsel in
argument.

Plaintiff, to vest jurisdiction of the appeal in this court, states ‘the
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $7,500.’’ Mo. Const. Art.
V, § 3; RSMo 1949, § 477.040. Like statements have been considered
insufficient. State ex rel. v. Schade, Mo., 265 S. W. 2d 383, 384[1];
Schoenhals v. Pahler, Mo., 272 8. W. 2d 228, 229[1].

The transcript of the record, so far as material, sets out the
pleadings; states that ‘‘plaintiff, to sustain the issues in‘ his behalf,
offered evidence, both oral and documentary’’ and ‘‘defendants, to
sustain the issues in their behalf, offered evidence, both oral and

documentary’’; sets out the instructions; the opening and closing
arguments on behalf of plaintiff; the verdict; the judgment; the mo-
tion for new trial and ruling thereon; the taking of the appeal, [539]
and the agreement to and approval of the transcript by the attorneys
for the litigants and its approval by the court.

Plaintiff, in his petition, asked $5,000 actual and $5,000 punitive
damages. Ordinarily, this being an action for monetary relief, plain-
tiff’s prayer would vest appellate jurisdiction here. Higgins v. Smith,
346 Mo. 1044, 144 S. W. 2d 149, 152; Simmons v. Friday, 359 Mo.
812, 224 8. W. 2d 90, 93. However, the petition is not conclusive
on the amount in dispute. Wagner v. Mederacke, 354 Mo. 977, 192
S. W. 2d 865, 866; Bell v. Wagner, Mo., 169 8. W. 2d 374. The courts
of appeals are courts of general appellate jurisdiction. This cotirt
is a court of limited appellate jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction must
affirmatively and with certainty appear upon the record of the trial
court at the time the appeal is granted, and may not rest in specula-
tion and conjecture as to the amount involved. Cases supra; Ash-
brook v. Willis, 338 Mo. 226, 89 S. W. 2d 659[4-6]; Lemonds v.
Holmes, 360 Mo. 626, 229 S. W. 2d 691, 692; Higgins v. Smith, 346
Mo. 1044, 144 8. W. 2d 149, 151[5, 6].

Counsel for plaintiff in speaking to plaintiff’s damages in his argu-
ment stated plaintiff had not sustained any ‘‘permanent disabling’’
physical injuries; that plaintiff’s chief injuries were to his feelings
and humiliation and the pain he suffered when thrown on the side-
walk and his face, elbow, hand and knee were scratched, and his
suffering from the knee for sometime; that he was not asking the jury
for $10,000; that, in effect, if they gave plaintiff $10,000 a remittitur
would be entered, and: ‘‘I think he is entitled to $1,000 actual dam-
ages and $1,000 punitive damages in this case.’’? This was plaintiff’s
trial theory on the issue.

Tn Vanderberg v. Kansas City, Mo., Gas Co., 199 Mo. 455, 458, 97
8. W: 908, when this court had jurisdiction of appeals involving over
$4,500, plaintiff asked $5,000 actual and $5,000 punitive damages.
The record disclosed the actual damages were small and punitive dam-
ages not recoverable. We there held that, whenever necessary to
preserve the constitutional integrity of this court, we reserve to our-
selves the right to pierce the shell of the pleadings, proofs, record, and
judgment sufficiently far to determine that our proper jurisdiction
is not infringed upon, or improper jurisdiction is not foisted wpon
us by design, inadvertence, or mere colorable and not real amounts.
Parties do not have the unbridled whimsical power to control ap-
pellate jurisdiction by a mere stroke of the pen in their pleadings.
‘Wagner v. Mederacke, Bell v. Wagner, Ashbrook v. Willis, all supra;
Buddon Realty Co. v. Wallace, Mo., 188 8. W. 2d 28, 29; Pittsburg
Bridge Co. v. St. Louis Transit Co., 205 Mo. 176, 103 8. W. 546;

S

Wolff v. Mathews, 98 Mo. 246, 11 S. W. 563; Mathews v. Danahy,
25 Mo. App. 354. See Baer v. Baer, 364 Mo. 1214, 274 8. W. 2d 298.

The amount in dispute under the pleadings would vest appellate
jurisdiction here. But looking deeper, it is not so. Under plaintift’s
trial theory he was entitled to recover $1,000 actual and $1,000 puni-
tive damages. To say under the transcript before us that the amount
in dispute is more and in excess of $7,500 would rest in speculation
and conjecture, an amount of color and not of substance. The record
does not affirmatively and clearly show that we have jurisdiction.

‘We might have disposed of the appeal on the merits without greater
difficulty; but usurpations of power by a court of last resort under
a constitutional government should not knowingly occur. Vordick v.
Vordick, 281 Mo, 279, 284, 219 8. W. 591, 592.

The cause is transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals.
Barrett and Stockard, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bouane, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. Leedy, P.J., and Dew, Special Judge,

concur.

Srarz or Missouri, at the Relation of Henen Heaprick and Wint1amM
O. Heapricx, Relators, v. Wantr EB. Bamny, Judge of the Cir-
cuit Court of Jasper County, Missouri, Presiding in Division One,
Respondent, No. 44660—278 S. W. (2d) 787.

Court en Bane, April 25, 1955.

Charles M. Cook for relators.

George M. Flanigan and McReynolds, Flanigan & Flanigan for
respondent. .

[789] CAV, Special Judge—This is an original proceeding in
prohibition. Relators contend that the respondent, a Judge of the
Circuit Court of Jasper County, Missouri, exceeded his jurisdiction
in making an order requiring relators to produce for inspection and
transcribing certain tape recorded statements more fully referred to
infra. To our provisional rule, the respondent filed his return and the
relators filed reply thereto. .

At the time the petition for writ of prohibition was filed in this
court, a suit was pending in the Circuit Court of Jasper County
styled ‘‘Helen Headrick and William 0. Headrick, Plaintiffs, vs. Nova
Jean Samuels et al. Defendants’’, and respendent was judge of that
court. .

That suit was in two counts: The first seeks to recover damages
in the sum of $50,000 for personal injuries allegedly suffered by
Helen Headrick as the result of the negligence of Mrs. Samuels; and
the second count is a claim by William O. Headrick for his damages
resulting from the alleged injuries of his wife, Helen.

While this cause was at issue and waiting trial, the defendant, Mrs.
Samuels, filed a motion seeking an order of the circuit court requiring
.the relators to produce certain tape recorded statements for inspec-
tion and transcribing by her.

The sufficiency of the motion was not called in question, and we
need not refer to it in detail. Evidence was heard in support of the
motion, resulting in an order requiring the relators to produce the
tape recordings for inspection and transcribing. °

From the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto in this procecding,
and from the evidence heard by the respondent on the motion to
produce, the facts are substantially as follows: On March 22, 1954,
an automobile, owned by Fred Isenman and driven by Mrs. Samuels,
was involved in a collision with two other vehicles. Relator Helen
Headrick and a Mrs. Fred Isenman were passengers in that auto-
mobile. Immediately after the accident, Mrs. Samuels was taken to
a hospital, and while there, Fred Isenman, on her behalf, telephoned
attorney Charles Cook requesting that he come to the Samuels home
to discuss with the parties the facts concerning the collision. About
three hours later, Cook arrived at the Samuels home and interviewed
Mrs. Samuels, Mrs. Fred Isenman and Helen Headrick, and recorded
their statements by the use of a wire recording machine, which are
referred to as ‘‘tape recordings’”’. At that time, Mrs. Samuels under-
stood Mr. Cook was going to represent her and her husband in any
litigation growing out of the collision. There were several other
persons present at the time. In the recorded statement of Helen
Headrick, she described how the collision occurred and stated that
she had not received ay injuries as a result thereof. Mrs. Isenman,
in her statement, described how the accident occurred. At the con-
clusion of the interview, Mrs. Samuels and her husband signed and
delivered a written contract employing Mr. Cook as their attorney,
but he did not sign the contract. Two days later, relators Helen
Headrick and William O. Headrick employed Mr. Cook to file suit
on their behalf against Mrs. Samuels and other defendants who were
the owners and operators of the other vehicles involved in the colli-
sion. On the same day Mr. Cook returned to the Samuels their con-
tract with this notation written thereon: ‘‘Withdrawal because of
conflict of interest, 3-24-54—Charles M. Cook’’. Shortly thereafter,
Mr. Cook filed the present damage suit on behalf of relators Helen
Headrick and William O. Headrick and against Mrs. Samuels and
others.

Hi The statutory authority for an order to produce certain docu-
ments is found in Section 510.030, R. 8. 1949, V.A.MS., the pertinent
part of which is: ‘‘Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor * * *, the court in which an action is pending may * * *
order any party to [740] produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photo-
graphs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody, or control * * *.’’ (Italics
supplied.)

Hl Relators admit that the statements in issue are not privileged
as confidential communications to an attorney, because other parties
were present. Canty v. Halpin, 294 Mo. 96, 242 8. W. 94. It also

appears that Mr. Cook was not acting as attorney for relators when
the statements were recorded. However, they contend that the state-
ments do not contain ‘“‘competent and admissible evidence’’; and.
‘good cause’? was not shown. Those are the only questions raised in
their brief.

It is well settled that Section 510.030, supra, does not author-
ize an order for the production of any of the documents or things
mentioned in said section unless they ‘‘constitute or contain evidence
material’? to some matter involved in the action; and, that ‘good
cause’? must be shown for the production of relevant:and material
documents. State ex rel. Terminal R. Assn. v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065,
257 S.W. 2d 69.

In the trial court the burden rested upon the defendent, who was
the party seeking the order, to satisfy the trial judge as to the rel-
evancy and materiality of the statements sought to be ordered pro-
duced, and to show that they were not privileged and that there was
good cause for their production. In this prohibition proceeding, how-
ever, relators are attacking the order which respondent made and the
burden is on them to show that the statements ordered produced are
not relevant or material to the issues in the pending cause and hence
are not competent or admissible as evidence therein; or that good
cause has not been shown for their production; or that respondent
otherwise lacks jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction in enter-
ing the order. The presumption is in favor of the right action of the
trial court. State ex rel. v. Flynn, supra; State ex rel. Cummings
et al. v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 219 S.W. 2d 383, 386.

To meet their burden, relators contend that the statements of
Mrs, Headrick and Mrs. Isenman are merely hearsay and would not
be admissible in evidence except for possible impeachment purposes.
In support of this contention, they cite State ex rel. Thompson v.
Harris, 855 Mo. 176, 195 S.W. 2d 645; State ex rel. Mo. Pac. ‘R. Co.
v. Hall, 325 Mo. 102, 27 8S. W. 2d 1027; State ex rel. Page v. Terte,
824 Mo. 925, 25 S.W. 2d 459; State ex rel. Missouri Broadcasting
Co. v. O’Malley, 344 Mo. 639, 127 S.W. 2d 684.

Those cases are not gontrolling insofar as the statement of Mrs.
Headrick is concerned. They discuss a set of facts where the plain-
tiff in the original suit was seeking to compel the defendant ‘to pro-
duce for his inspection a written statement which the plaintif’ had
given to the defendant or its agent. Under such circumstances, the
plaintiff would be seeking an order to inspect his own statement
which, of course, would not be competent or material evidence. In
the instant case, an entirely different situation is presented. The
defendant is seeking the production of a statement by the plaintiff
which allegedly contains competent and material evidence against the
plaintiff. It is apparent that one of the vital issues in the damage
suit is whether Mrs. Headrick suffered injuries as a result of Mrs.

Samuels’ negligence. The record supports the conclusion that her
statement contains an admission that she did not receive any injuries.
If that be true, such a statement would be an admission against
interest and would be admissible in evidence by the defendant. South-
ern Bank of Fulton v. Nichols, 202 Mo. 309, 323, 100 S.W. 618 ; Mertens
v. MeMahon, 834 Mo. 175, 66 S.W. 2d 127, 187; Grodsky v. Con-
solidated Bag Co., 324 Mo. 1067, 26 S.W. 2d 618, 620; [741] Hudlow
y. Langerhans, 230 Mo. App. 1160, 91 S.W. 2d 629, 632; State ex
rel. Railroad v. Wood, 316 Mo. 1082, 292 $.W. 1033. Consequently,
the recorded statement contained ‘‘evidence material’’ to a vital issue
in the pending action. ‘‘Good cause’’ will appear from what is said
infra.

‘We now consider whether respondent could, under Section 510.030,
order relators to produce the statement of Mrs. Isenman. She was a
passenger in Mrs. Samuels’ automobile at the time of the collision,
and merely ‘‘related her version of the facts surrounding the acci-
-dent’’. She is not a party to any suit against Mrs. Samuels. Conse-
quently, any statement she made would be hearsay and not admissible
in evidence. It could be used only for the purpose of impeachment.
All the cases hold this possibility will not authorize an order to pro-
duce under the statute.

Hi However, we are of the opinion that there is another reason,
independent of the statute, why the court was authorized, in its dis-
eretion, to order the production of the statements of both Mrs. Isen-
man and Mrs. Headrick. From the evidence detailed supra, the
court could properly find that relators’ present attorney was acting
in behalf of Mrs. Samuels at the time he took the statements; and
that they were taken primarily for her protection in impending litiga-
tion. He was her agent performing a service for his client. Her
interest in the statements has some elements of a property right.
Under such circumstances, Mrs. Samuels is entitled to the production
of the statements as the ‘‘work product’’ of her then attorney. State
ex rel. Terminal R. Assn. v. Flynn, supra.

| Certainly the court had inherent power to supervise and regu-
late the conduct of the attorney and the comditions upon which he
could withdraw from one employment and accept another involving
conflicting interests. In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W. 2d 672;
Rules 4.06, 4.87 and 4.44, Canon of Ethics. To hold otherwise would
be to allow opportunity for unfair advantage to an attorney and
those who later employ him in situations where their interests con-
flict with those of his original client. Under such circumstances the
courts will carefully review the whole situation and make such orders
and attach such conditions thereto as fairness and justice require.

From what we have said, it follows that our rule should be dis-
charged. It is so ordered.

Leedy, C.J., Dalton, Hollingsworth, Hyde and Westhwes, JJ., concur.

4

Puaza Express Company, INnc., a Corporation, and N. R. Yaryay,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ranprn Gattoway, Administrator of
the Estate of Burr Gannoway, Deceased, and Lona B. GanLoway,
Defendants-Respondents, No. 43989—280 S. W. (2d) 17.

Court en Banc, June 18, 1955.

Clay C. Roger W. Benjamin for respondents; Sylvan
Brumer and Rogers, Field & Gentry of counsel.

[20] DALTON, J.—The appeal of this cause was first heard in
Division Number One of this court and an opinion was prepared and
adopted. Subsequently, the cause was transferred to Court en Bane
where it was re-argued and reassigned. We shall without quotation
marks adopt a considerable portion of the prior opinion prepared by
Coil, C.

Defendants-respondents’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs-appellants’
‘pill in the nature of a bill of interpleader’’ was sustained on the
ground that no claim had been stated within the provisions of Section
507.060. (All section references are to RSMo 1949 V.A.M.S.) Plain-
tiffs appealed from the final judgment of dismissal.

.

Plaintiffs’ bill alleged in substance that: In April 1952 Bert
Galloway brought an ‘action for $20,000 damages for alleged personal
injuries sustained by him in June 1951 due to the alleged negligence
of defendants, Plaza Express Company, Inc., a corporation, and its
employee, N. R. Yaryan; Bert Galloway died in October 1952; in
November 1952 Lola E. Galloway, Bert’s widow, brought an action
against the same two defendants, Plaza Express Company and Yar-
yan, for $15,000 for Bert’s wrongful death, alleging that the in-
juries sustained by Bert Galloway in the same June 1951 accident
resulted in his death; on January 2, 1958, pursuant to his motion
suggesting the death of Bert Galloway and moving for the sub-
stitution of himself as party-plaintiff, Randel E. Galloway, the duly
appointed administrator of Bert Galloway’s estate, was substituted ;
the action instituted by Bert Galloway during his lifetime survived
to his personal representative only in the event that the alleged in-
juries did not result in Bert’s death; the claims of the two plain-
tiffs are such that the plaintiffs (defendants in each of the above-
mentioned suits) ‘‘are, or may be, exposed to double or multiple
liability, in the absence of a prior determination of whether or not
the death resulted from the injuries alleged’’ to have been sustained
in the collision in June 1951; plaintiffs are not liable in whole or in
part to either of the plaintiffs in the two suits. Attached to the bill
were Bert Galloway’s original petition, the order substituting his
administrator as party-plaintiff, and the petition of Lola HE.
Galloway.

The prayer for relief was that defendants in this suit (plaintiffs
in the respective suits mentioned) ‘‘be required to interplead and
have adjudicated the issue whether the alleged negligently-caused
personal injuries sustained by Bert Galloway did or did not result
in his death’’; and that the defendants be restrained from prosecut-
ing their respective suits in which’ they are plaintifis until final
judgment in the instant proceeding; and for other relief. .

If the relief sought were granted, its effect would require the dis-
missal or other termination of either the administrator’s or the
widow’s action. Thus the value of the denial of relief to each defend-,
ant in the instant action is at least $15,000. .

| | Section 507.060 provides: ‘‘Persons having claims against
the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead
when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to
double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the
joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which
their claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical
but are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plain-
tiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the
claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such
interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim, The provisions

of this section supplement and do not in any way limit the joinder of
parties permitted in section 507.040.’’

The quoted language is clear and unambiguous. It requires no
construction. The sole question, then, is whether plaintiffs have stated
facts authorizing the relief provided for in the statute. As we read
the [21] plain language of this statute, there are only two vital facts
which must appear from the averments in plaintiffs’ statement of
their claim. These are that persons have claims against plaintiffs, and
that those claims are of such nature that plaintiffs may be exposed to
“double liability.’’ Obviously, ‘‘double liability’? means ‘‘exposed to
double recovery for a single liability.’’ The other pertinent parts of
the statute eliminate the necessity for the existence of facts and con-
ditions, the existence of which was formerly necessary to the mainte-
nance of equitable interpleader or of bills in the nature of inter-
pleader. Thus is eliminated the necessity that the same thing, debt,
or duty be claimed by each of the parties against whom relief is
sought. This, because the section provides that the claims need not
be identical. So, also, it is not necessary that the claims of the parties
be dependent or derived from a common source because the section
specifically provides that the claims may be independent of one
another and that they need not have a common origin. And it is not
necessary that a plaintiff, in order to use the machinery of the section,
have no claim or interest in the subject matter or that he stand
perfectly indifferently between the claimants in the position of a
stakeholder. This, because the section provides that one seeking re-
lief may deny liability to any or all of the claimants. Thus, while
it is clear that the equitable remedies of interpleader and of bills in
the nature of interpleader are encompassed within the provisions
of Section 507.060, it seems equally clear that the terms of the sec-
tion materially modify and extend those remedies as heretofore
recognized in this state.

HI Now there can be no doubt that instant defendants do have
claims against present plaintiffs. One claim is for $20,000 and the
other for $15,000 damages. The sole remaining question, then, is
whether, under the facts stated in their bill, plaintiffs may be, in fact,
subject to two recoveries for a single liability, for which single lia-
bility they are legally subject to only one recovery.

Defendants-respondents say ‘‘the fact remains that there is no
double liability for the same obligation possible in the circumstances
in the instant case inasmuch as there can be no liability for the same
obligation’’; that one is an obligation which if proved is owed origi-
nally to the person injured and after death to his personal represent-
ative for his injuries; that the other is an obligation owed to the widow
if facts are proved which show that the respondents wrongfully caused
the death of Bert Galloway; and that the amounts involved are dif-
ferent, the claims of damages are, different and the obligations them-

selves cannot conceivably be the same. Defendants-respondents further
contend that their respective claims are not adverse to each other even
though the proof of an essential fact necessary to a recovery by one of
the claimants necessarily disproves an essential fact necessary to a re-
covery by the other claimant; ‘‘and that the mere fact that a similar ¢
essential fact element is involved in two or more suits or that the plain-
tiffs in one suit must prove the opposite of what the plaintiff in another
suit must show in order to recover, does not allow the defendant to join
all of the plaintiffs in the various suits in a single ‘interpleader’
action.’’

Section 537.020 provides in pertinent part that ‘‘Causes of action
for personal injuries, other than those resulting im death, * * *
shall survive to the personal representative of such injured party,
* # % 7 (Emphasis ours.)

Section 587.080 provides in pertinent part that ‘‘Whenever the
death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, negligent or de-
fault of another * * * the person who or the corporation which
would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an
action for damages, * * *.’? (Emphasis ours.)

Sections 537.070 and 537.090 provide that the widow or widower
may, under the circumstances here existing, recover damages for such
wrongful death not to exceed $15,000.

At common law an action for personal injuries did not survive the
death of the injured party. Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat
& Power Co., 335 Mo. 319, [22] 330(5), 78 S.W. (2d) 205, 211(18-
20) ; Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo. 672, 677(1),
66 S.W. (2d) 920, 922(1, 2). An action for wrongful death was not
cognizable at common law. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 53, 175
S.W. (2d) 889, 895(6, 7). Thus only by virtue of Section 537.020
may an action for personal injuries survive to the personal repre-
sentative of deceased. And this action survives only if the injury to
the deceased did not result in his death. Likewise, it is solely by virtue
of the wrongful death statutes above that any claim or cause of action
accrues to a widow or other person named in Section 537.070. Allen
y. Dunham, 188 Mo. App. 193, 201, 175 §.W. 185, 137; Jordan v. St.
Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., supra, 73 S.W. (2d) 212.

It follows that, at the instant of Bert Galloway’s death, a claim for
damages for the personal injuries he received in the June 1951 colli-
sion between his automobile and defendants’ truck survived to his
administrator if, but only if, the injuries received as a result of the
collision did not result in Bert Galloway’s death. It also follows that
a claim or cause of action for Bert Galloway’s wrongful death accrued
to his widow if, but only if, those same injuries received at the same
time did result in Bert Galloway’s death. There was at this death
only one claim in existence. It was either the same claim for damages
which Bert Galloway had in his lifetime or it was a new claim which

accrued to his widow upon his death. Both claims-could not and did
not exist. Which of the two did exist depends upon a determination
of the fact issue of whether the injuries Bert Galloway received did
or did not cause his death.

But both the instant defendants (plaintiffs in the two damage
actions) could, as they did, assert their respective claims. An essen-
tial element of the administrator’s claim, one which he must allege
and prove, is that the injuries sustained by deceased did not result in
deceased’s death. (We note that the averment that the injuries did
not result in his death is not contained in the administrator’s peti-
tion—but such omission is not decisive of any question here pre-
sented.) An essential element of the widow’s claim which she must .
allege and prove is that the injuries sustained by deceased did result
in his death. Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 336 Mo. 497, 501, 502, 79 S.W.
(2d) 109, 111(1-3), (4). Both the administrator and the widow are
(unless plaintifis may obtain relief in their present action) entitled
to proceed with their respective separate claims and, not only may
each separately proceed but, unless a judgment for plaintiff in either
of those actions would be res judicata of the other action, each may
recover and be entitled to have satisfied his or her separate judgment.

Hl Before examining the precise question of res judicata as pre-
sented by instant facts, we point out that the widow and the adminis-
trator are here different persons. We therefore do not reach or
decide the question of whether a widow or an administratrix, if they
were the same person, would be bound by the litigation of and the
determination in either action of the fact issue of whether death did
or did not result from the injuries. (See Downs v. United Rys. Co.
of St. Louis (Mo. Sup.), 184 S. W. 995, 997(4), wherein the widow
and the administratrix were the same person and wherein it was held
that a judgment for defendant in an action by the administratrix -
did not bar her action as widow for wrongful death. While the basis
for this decision does not appear to take into account the matter here
suggested, nevertheless, we point out that where there is a judgment
for defendant in either a suit by an administratrix or by a widow, it
cannot be discerned under our general verdict system whether such
judgment for defendant was based upon a finding on the negligence
issues or upon a determination of the question of whether the injuries
did or did not result in death.) We also should make clear that we do
not reach the question or decide whether the widow or administrator
would be bound by a judgment in an action by either, even where they
were different persons, where the widow or other person or persons
who brought the wrongful death action under Section [23] 537.070
is or are the sole beneficiaries of the two actions; in other words, a
situation wherein the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the two actions
are the same person or persons. See: Rest., Judgments, Ch. 4, § 92
(2), p. 455. (We note, incidentally, that instant plaintiffs’ statement

.

of their claim does not aver facts excluding the possibility that the
widow is the sole beneficiary of her deceased husband’s estate. How-
ever, inasmuch as defendants have not raised that issue, we think it
proper, under the circumstances of the instant case, to assume that
the sole beneficiary of the two actions is not the same person.)

‘We therefore treat instant facts ag presenting a situation wherein
the widow and the administrator are different persons and the benefi-
ciary of the two actions is not the same person. Under these facts,
we are aware of no principle, and none has been pointed out, in the
doctrine of res judicata by which a judgment in either of the pend-
ing damage actions would bar the other, or by which either party-
plaintiff would be estopped by a verdict or judgment in the other case
as to any fact issue litigated in such other case. Specifically, if the
widow recovered a judgment in her action, or if the administrator
recovered a judgment in his action, even though the fact issue in each
action as to whether deceased’s injuries did or did not result in his
death would have been litigated and determined, the judgment in
neither action would bar the maintenance of the other, nor would the
widow or the administrator be bound in her or his respective action
by the determination of such fact issue in the other action. This, be-
cause the widow and administrator are different persons and are not
in privity with each other. Their interests are necessarily adverse.
Whether res judicata is based upon a former adjudication of the same
cause of action or upon a former adjudication of a fact issue in a
different cause of action, a basic requirement is that the parties in
order to be bound must be the same parties. Kimpton v. Spellman,
351 Mo. 674, 681(2), 173 8. W. (2d) 886, 891(3-7) ; Rest., Judgments,
supra, :

‘We must conclude, therefore, that instant plaintiffs ‘‘may be ex-
posed to double * * * liability’? within the meaning of Section
507.060. This, in turn, requires us to further conclude that plaintiffs’
averments state a claim within the specific provisions of Section
507.060 and that they are entitled to the relief contemplated by that
section. .

Defendants argue that plaintiffs do not state a claim under
Section 507.060 because (1) there is no definite fund or other prop-
erty, (2) there is no offer to pay a fund into court, (8) defendants
each have a right to a separate jury trial as to the fact issue of whether
the injuries resulted in deceased’s death, and (4) there is no possible
double or multiple liability.

Contentions (1) and (2) are apparently based upon the premise
that Section 507.060 does not materially broaden the scope of inter-
pleader as interpleader has heretofore been recognized in equity. How-
ever, Section 507.060 does not require that there be in existence a
definite fund or other property. In fact, the section does not mention
a fund or other specific property. Its provision that ‘‘persons having

claims against the plaintiff’”’ does not limit, nor purport to limit, such
claims to claims to a definite fund or to other specific property. And
the language of the statute negatives any idea that a fund or other
property need be deposited in court or that any offer to do so need
be made. This, because the statute says that the plaintiff may deny
that he is liable to any of those who have claims against him. As we
understand defendants’ argument, it must run thus: Even though
Section 507.060 has by specific language abolished the necessity for
the existence of facts which were essential to the maintenance of
equitable interpleader or a bill in the nature of interpleader, never-
theless, because the statute deals with interpleader, it must therefore
be construed as requiring the existence of at least some of the specifi-
cally abolished requirements.

The Kansas City Court of Appeals in John A. Moore & Co. v. Me-
Conkey, [24] 240 Mo. App. 198, 204, 203 S.W. (2d) 512, 515(6), in
dealing with said statute said: ‘‘The first sentence of the quoted
statute prescribes virtually the sole test of whether or not a bill of
interpleader will lie. The statute does not destroy or change the na-
ture of the remedy of interpleader as recognized in equity; it merely
broadens its scope. 1 Carr Missouri Civil Procedure, p. 163; 4 Pome-
roy’s Eq. Jurisprudence, 5th Hd., Symons 902, 922. It is purely a
procedural statute.’? And at 515(8) it is further said: ‘‘The statute
does not create an action; it merely regulates and liberalizes the
procedure to be followed in the ancient equitable action of inter-
pleader.’’ In Barr v. Snyder, 858 Mo. 1189, 219 S.W. (2d) 305, this
court cited the Moore case and other authorities to support the state-
ment that the statute ‘“‘extends the scope of bills of interpleader and
bills in the nature of a bill of interpleader.”” 219 8.W. (2d) 305,
308(1, 2).

‘We agree that the statute was intended to and did extend the
remedy of interpleader, as heretofore recognized by the decisions of
the courts of this state in actions referred to as equitable interpleader
or in the nature of interpleader, to include another form of personal
property referred to in the statute as ‘‘claims.’’? And in this connec-
tion, it is expressly provided by said Section 507.060, as follows:
‘ce ®°* Tt is not ground for objection to the jomder that the claims __
of the several claimants or the title on which their claims depend do
not have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and
independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not
liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. * * *.’? In
this case one defendant has a claim for $20,000 against the plaintiffs
and the other has a claim for $15,000. Both claims are against the
same parties on account of the same injuries, which are aJleged to
have been caused by the negligence of the plaintiffs herein. On the
facts alleged we have held that the instant plaintiffs ‘“taay be exposed
to double liability.’’ Which of the two defendants is entitled to

prevail and recover against plaintiffs depends, as stated, on whether
or not the alleged injuries produced death. It follows, we believe, that
contentions (1) and (2) supra, do not support the trial court’s action
in sustaining defendants-respondents’ motion to dismiss.

Hl As to contention (3) that the defendants each have a constitu-
tional right to a separate jury trial as to the fact issue of whether
the injuries resulted in deceased’s death: In support of this conten-
tion defendants-respondents cite Art. I, Sec. 22(a) Constitution of
Missouri 1945, providing (‘‘that the right of trial by jury as hereto-
fore enjoyed shall remain inviolate’’) ; Sections 510.180 and 510.190
RSMo 1949 (as to consolidation of actions, separate trials and waiver
of the right of trial by jury) ; Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. 404, 111 S.W.
1151; Citizens’ Trust Co. v. Going, 288 Mo. 505, 232 S.W. 996.

Of course both of the pending actions instituted by the respective
defendants are, actions at law, but the present action entitled ‘‘bill
in the nature of a bill of interpleader’’ upon its face purports to
state an action in equity and prays affirmative relief which only a
court in equity has jurisdiction to grant. The rule as to the right of
jury trial is stated in Lee v. Conran, supra, 213 Mo. 404, 412, as
follows: ‘If the issues joined entitle the parties to an ordinary judg-
ment at law, then, under the Constitution and the laws of the State,
the parties are entitled to a trial by a jury; but if the issues tendered
are equitable in their nature and call for equitable relief, then the
cause is triable before the chancellor.””

As hereinbefore stated, plaintiffs prayed not only that defendants
be required to interplead and have adjudicated the issue as to whether
the personal injuries sustained did or did not result in Galloway’s
death, but also that defendants be restrained from prosecuting their re-
spective actions [25] until final judgment in the instant proceeding

* and for other relief. Plaintiffs-appellants not only insist that their peti-
tion states a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section
507.060, but that the action is a proceeding in equity and they refer to
their petition as a ‘‘bill in the nature of a bill in equity.’’? While they
say: ‘‘The instant action is an entirely statutory proceeding brought
‘under a provision which in express language abolishes most of the old

> common law restrictions on equitable interpleader actions,’’ they insist
that the case should be decided ‘‘according to the principles considered
applicable to interpleaders,’’ but as modified and enlarged by Section
507.060. Heinrich v. South Side Nat. Bank in St. Louis, 363 Mo. 220,
250 S.W. (2d) 345, 348; Buerger v. Costello, 240 Mo. App. 1194,
226 S.W. (2d) 610, 611; Standard Surety and Casualty Co. v. Baker,
‘105 F. (2d) 578; 1 Carr, Missouri Civil Procedure, 162, Sec. 67. We
‘hold that the proceeding is an equitable one, the object of which«is.
not to protect a party against a double liability, but to protect against
a double vexation in respect to one liability. Barr v. Snyder, supra;
Heinrich v. South Side Nat. Bank in St. Louis, supra, Defendants

therefore are not entitled to a jury trial in this proceeding. State
ex rel, Duggan v. Kirkwood, 357 Mo. 325, 208 S.W. (2d) 257, 262.

Hl Defendants’ contention (4) has heretofore been disposed of by
our holding that plaintiff may in fact be exposed to double liability
within the meaning of Section 507.060.

It necessarily follows from what has been said and held supra that
the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss and that the
judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.

While the order of reversal and remand disposes of the appeal,
perhaps a further statement should be added. We have noted that
plaintifis asked that defendants be required to interplead and to have
adjudicated the single issue as to whether the injuries sustained by
Bert Galloway did or did not result in his death. Plaintiffs also asked
‘for such further relief in the premises as the court may deem equi-
table and just in the premises.’’ We are of the opinion that, while
plaintiffs are entitled to relief under Section 507.060, the statute does
not contemplate, under the present facts, that the two defendants be
required to interplead for the sole and limited purpose of adjudi-
cating that single fact issue. Instead, we construe the petition as
asking’ that defendants be required to interplead under the provi-
sions of Section 507.060 for the purpose of determining who has and
owns the claim arising from the alleged negligence of plaintiffs re-
sulting in the injuries sustained by Bert Galloway on June 27, 1951.
Who in fact owns the claim depends on whether plaintiffs’ acts and
the injuries resulting therefrom to Bert Galloway produced death,
While the statute authorizes that the defendants be required to
interplead their ‘‘claims’’, the decision as to who is entitled to proceed
against the plaintiffs turns upon the question of fact, as mentioned.
Under the statute in question, which extends the scope of bills of
interpleader and bills in the nature of interpleader and regulates and
liberalizes the procedure to be followed, the plaintiffs were authorized
- to seek affirmative equitable relief under the facts pleaded and, if such
facts be established, to the relief, as stated. However, since plain-
tiffs affirmatively allege that they are not liable in whole or in part
to either of the plaintiffs in the two pending actions, and since plain-
tiffs herein have asked affirmatively for the determination of the issue
of fact as to whether the injuries did or did not result in death, the
plaintiffs must remain parties in interest in this proceeding and be
bound along with the defendants by the judicial determination of
that issue. When the ownership of the claim or cause of action for the
injuries, or the injury and death of Bert Galloway has been deter-
mined, the owner thereof may proceed therewith as an action at law -
in the court in which the claim is pending and the other claimant
must be enjoined from proceeding [26] further with his or her claim.
Equity having assumed jurisdiction for the purpose mentioned will

have exhausted its jurisdiction in granting the relief requested and.
authorized.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Leedy, C.J.,
Hyde and Eager, JJ., concur ; Hollingsworth, J., dissents in separate
opinion; Westhues and Storckman, JJ., dissent and concur in dis-
senting opinion of Hollingsworth, J.

HE HOLLINGSWORTH, J. (dissenting) —I respectfully dissent
from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that
defendants are not entitled to have a jury determine the fact issue
as to which of the defendants has a claim against plaintiffs (which
fact issue, of course, depends upon whether the injuries received by
Bert Galloway in June, 1951, did or did not result in his death). My
dissent is substantially for the reason stated by Coil, C., in the divi-
sional opinion as follows: ‘‘The fact that the question of whether
plaintiffs are entitled to have the defendants interplead may or may
not be, in the first instance, a question involving an equitable issue,
does not prevent the issues among the parties, after they have inter-
pleaded, from being determined by a jury.’’

In view of the reasons assigned in the majority opinion for a
contrary conclusion, I deem it desirable to more fully state my posi-
tion. :

The majority opinion holds, as I understand, that because plain-
tiffs’ pleading was entitled a ‘“‘bill in the nature of a bill of inter-
pleader’’ and purported ‘‘to state an action in equity and prays
affirmative relief which only a court in equity’ has jurisdiction to
grant’, therefore, defendants are not entitled to a jury trial ‘“‘in this
proceeding’’. It seems clear to me that the foregoing fails to dis-
tinguish ‘‘this proceeding’? from the ‘essentially separate ‘‘proceed-
ings’’ to follow wpon'the determination that defendants are required
to interplead. ‘‘This proceeding’? may be equitable in nature, al-
though its designation as a ‘‘bill in the nature of a bill of inter-
pleader’’ and the fact that its prayer sought further equitable relief,
would not necessarily convert a purely statutory right into an equi-
table right. But conceding for present purposes that ‘‘this pro-
eeeding’’ was equitable, the fact remains that the only essential pur-
pose of ‘‘this proceeding’? was to determine whether defendants
should be required to interplead pursuant to the provisions of RSMo
1949, § 507.060, V.A.M.S. Now, the miere fact that plaintiffs’ pleading
sought some further relief, even assuming that this further relie:
could be granted only by a court of equity, surely does not mean that
any ‘‘further equitable relief’? need be granted. In an equity suit, §

* the court grants only the relief which appears meet and proper under
all the evidence; the court need not grant relief simply because a
plaintiff asks for it. The decisive question must always be, to what

relief are plaintiffs entitled under the evidence? It seems abundantly

clear to me that the only relief which need be granted and the only
relief to which plaintiffs are entitled under Section 507.060 and the
evidence is a judgment that the defendants interplead their actions.
‘Whether or not that relief be called ‘‘equitable relief’’ is wholly un-
important. If it is equitable relief, then equity has fulfilled its sole
essential function by adjudging the basic issue that defendants be
required to interplead. The ‘‘equity’’ jurisdiction is then at an end
if the chancellor decides that such relief is all the plaintiffs should
have. What proceedings thereafter occur depend not in the slightest
upon whether ‘‘this proceeding’’ (the petition for interpleader) was
or was not equitable. Whether defendants are entitled to a jury trial
in “this proceeding’’ is not the question. The question is whether
after ‘‘this proceeding’? (the adjudication that defendants inter-
plead) has ended, defendants may have a jury determine [27]
whether Bert Galloway’s injuries did or did not result in his death.
The answer to this question has no connection with whether the ended
proceeding was or was not equitable; it depends solely wpon whether
the issue is or is not a fact issue. Clearly, it is a fact issue which a
jury should determine.

Furthermore, even if it be conceded that the trial chancellor had
jurisdiction and the judicial power to require the parties to try the
disputed fact issue to the court without a jury, certainly this should
never be done unless there is some principle of right and justice which
compels that requirement. There is no principle of which I am aware
that would compel a court, after having determined the one essential
“‘equitable issue’, to say that every other connected issue is thereby
also equitable and that therefore the denial of a jury trial is compelled.

Thus far, I have assumed that plaintiffs’ original pleading made
the proceeding ‘‘equitable’’ in the first instance. But, I cannot agree
that this proceeding was ever an equitable proceeding. It is a statu-
tory proceeding. There is nothing in the statute (§ 507.060) which
‘prohibits the issues arising after the order of interpleader from being
determined by a jury. All the court should do is to determine whether
defendants be required to interplead. If they should and are ordered
to do so, the fact issues arising thereafter should be determined by a
jury.

I would reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to
enter a judgment requiring defendants to interplead their entire
eases; directing that (in the absence of an agreement to waive a jury)
the fact issue of whether Bert Galloway’s injuries resulted in his
death should be determined by a jury; and further directing that if
it appears that prejudice would result to the successful party as to
that issue by proceeding to have the same jury determine liability
and, if so, damages, that a separate jury trial as to those issues be had.

Dave Coors, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bonwm Payron and D. Waynz
Rowuanp, d/b/a Tau Spymour Crrizmn, Defendants-Respond-
ents, No, 44269—280 S. W. (2d) 47.

Court en Bane, June 18, 1955.

John Hosmer and John Newberry for appellant.

Haymes & Haymes, Ellsworth Haymes, Combs & Combs aa
} ymbs for respondents.

[49] COIL, C.—Plaintiff-appellant has appealed from a judgment
which, in effect, dismissed his three count amended petition in which
he sought $60,000 actual and punitive damages from defendants-
respondents for alleged libel.

| Respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the transcript was fled out of time. The notice of appeal was
filed February 13, 1954, and the transcript, May 28, 1954, fourteen
days beyond the expiration of 90 days from the filing of the notice
of appeal. Section 512.180. (ATI section references are to RSMo 1949,~
V.A.MS.) The transcript, as filed here, contained this entry under.
date of May 25, 1954: ‘‘Upon motion of plaintiff’s attorney, John
Hosmer, the Court this day enlarges and extends period of time for
filing transcript on appeal a period of twenty days on account of
failure to file within 90 day period being due to excusable neglect.’
Sections 506.060, 2(2) and 512.140 authorize a trial court to extend
the period for filing a transcript where that court determines that
the failure to have filed in time was the result of excusable neglect ;
subject, of course, to the provision of 8.0. Rule 3.26 that the total
period of the extensions granted by the trial court shall not exceed
six months from the date the notice of appeal is filed in the trial court.
It appears from counsels’ affidavits and counteraffidavits that plain-
tiff’s motion to extend the time for filing the transcript was not in
writing and that no notice was [50] given by plaintiff to opposing
counsel that the plaintiff intended to apply for the extension. It
seems agreed, however, that the trial court, prior to making the order
above noted, advised one of defendants’ counsel that the motion had
been made and that the court intended to sustain it and make the
order extending the time. Defendants’ counsel, then present in
court, objected on the sole ground that, inasmuch as he was not the
chief defense attorney in the case, he did not know whether such chief
attorney would consent to the extension. No objection was made that

the failure of plaintiff to file the transcript within 90 days was not
the result of excusable neglect. Under the circumstances, we are of
the opinion that there has been no such violation, if any, of procedural
steps as to call for the dismissal of this appeal. The motion to dis-
miss is, therefore, overruled. See: Baldwin v. Desgranges, 355 Mo.
959, 966, 199 S.W. 2d 858, 354, 355.

Plaintiff’s original petition contained 4 counts. Defendants’ mo-
tion to dismiss was overruled as to count 1 and sustained as to counts
2,8, and 4. Defendants filed their separate answers to count 1. About
a year later, the trial court granted plaintiff leave to file, and plain-
tiff filed, an amended petition. Count 1 of the amended petition was
identical with count 1 of the original petition. Count 2 of the amended
petition was identical with count 4 of the original petition, except
that plaintiff included in count 2 of the amended petition the entire
newspaper article from which the alleged defamatory matter set forth
in original count 4 had been extracted. Count 3 of the amended
petition combined in substantially identical form counts 2 and 38 of
the original petition. The trial court sustained defendants’ motion
to dismiss count 1 of the amended petition and to strike counts 2
and 8, and granted plaintiff 10 days to file a motion for new trial,
Plaintiff’s motion for new trial was overruled and he has appealed
from the judgment of the trial court, the effect of which, plaintiff
contends, was to dismiss all 3 counts of his amended petition.

The briefs discuss the effect of the various rulings of the trial court.
It seems to us, however, that the appeal in this case necessarily involves
the sole question of whether each of the four counts of the original
petition or:each of the three counts of the amended petition stated
claims upon which relief might be granted. Plaintiff could not appeal
from the order dismissing counts 2, 3, and 4 of the original petition,
because count 1 was still pending. It, therefore, is apparent that it
is of no consequence whether we treat with the three counts of the
original petition (which were dismissed) and count 1 of the amended
petition (which was dismissed), or with all three counts of the
amended petition. It would, therefore, serve no useful purpose to
discuss or determine the validity of the parties’ views as to the effect
of the susiention of defendants’ motions to strike or as to the claimed
abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting an amended peti-
tion to be filed a year after the dismissal of three counts of the original
petition. We, therefore, proceed to decide whether counts 1, 2, and
8 (or any of them) of the amended petition state claims upon which
relief may be granted.

All three counts are identical in these averments: that defendants
are the editors and publishers of a weekly newspaper circulated and
read by the general public in the City of Seymour and throughout
Webster and adjoining counties; that on a certain date (specified in
the various counts) ‘‘a certain article concerning the plaintiff was

printed in said newspaper containing the following false, defamatory,
malicious and libelous words about and concerning the plain-
tiff, * * *’ Hach count, after setting forth the words allegedly
published, proceeded: that the ‘‘good name, fame and reputation’’
of the plaintiff have been injured and that he has been brought into
‘“public reproach, ridicule, disgrace, contempt, and infamy; that he
has been caused to suffer great mortification, humiliation, embarrass-
ment and shame; * * *,”’? The prayer of each count was for $10,000
actual and $10, 000 punitive damages.

[51] ‘The allegedly defamatory communications set forth in eounts
1, 2, and 3, respectively, are:

Count 1. “‘ ‘Personally I’d still like to put in a plug for having
a city marshal who looked like a law enforcement officer. Put him in
something that looks like a uniform even if its just matching khaki
shirt and pants. Insist that his badge and belts and weapons be worn
out in the open. Nobody likes to be ticketed by a guy who looks just like
anybody else loafing on the curb, and who reaches way down deep
in his longies under his unbuttoned overalls to drag out his horse
pistol or black jack.’ ’”

Count 2. ‘‘ ‘Dave Coots, Seymour’s infamous ex-marshal, .. .’ and
that the whole of said article, including the caption or headline, but”
excluding the picture of the plaintiff which was also printed adjoining
said article, is set out haec verba below:

“MARSHALL ARRESTED BY COOTS
GOES TO MARSHFIELD JAIL

“Dave Coots, Seymour’s infamous ex-marshall, Tuesday morning
was appointed as a special officer by John Holmquist, police judge,
to arrest James Hamblin, present city marshal, on a contempt-of-
court charge?’’’ (It is unnecessary to here set forth the other para-
graphs of the article.)

Count 3. ‘‘ ‘This is not my idea, but someone told me he had a
sure scheme for filling the coffers of the City of Seymour.. In view
of the widespread publicity given our Marshal recently, he said,
the City Council should put Dave in a cage and charge admission to
tourists.’ ’’ [And a later article]: ‘‘ ‘I actually feel sorry for a man
who can’t take a little good natured ribbing. Last week I made a
couple of cracks about Dave Coots in this column which everyone
considered amusing except, of course, Dave himself. Dave’s a law
enforcement officer, at least the City Council seems to think he is. He
ought to be well enough acquainted with the law to know that if a
newspaper says something’ slanderous or libelous about someone, that
person can sue, ———like several other Seymourites I’m tired of
being pushed around by a one-man army. It’s one thing to have
proper law enforcement. It’s another thing to have law enforcement
that’s crude, belligerent, unfair, and at times, ignorant.’ ”

HE Article I, § 8, Mo. Const., 1945, provides that the jury, under
the direction of the court, shall determine the law and facts in suits
for libel. It is well established, however, that a petition in which dam-
ages are sought for defamation by libel is subject to a motion to dis-
miss. Jacobs v. Transcontinental & Western Air, 358 Mo. 674, 680,
216 S.W. 2d 523, 526[6,7], and cases there cited. But the fune-
tion of a trial court and of an appellate court in determining the
sufficiency of a petition setting forth a claim for damages for libel is
necessarily limited to a determination of whether the communication
set forth in the petition, together with matters of inducement and
innuendo which may be there contained, is capable of a defamatory
meaning. This function may require the court to determine whether
the communication reasonably conveyed the meaning ascribed to it
by plaintiff and, if so, whether that meaning was defamatory in char-
acter. Restatement, Torts, Vil. 8, § 614, p. 304.

Hl Preliminary to a consideration of the alleged libels set forth
in the three counts of the amended petition, it would be well to here
dispose of some general propositions and isolate the exact question
for decision. It is not specifically averred in the amended petition
that plaintiff was or had been, during the time of the various publica-
tions, the city marshal of the town of Seymour. Indeed, so far as the
petition is concerned, it is alleged that the statements that plaintiff
was or had been such marshal were false. Defendants contend, how-
ever, that it affirmatively appears that plaintiff was a public official
and that defendants were editors and publishers of a newspaper;
from which premise defendants contend that the petition discloses
that the occasions of the publications were conditionally privileged.
In oral argument there appeared to be no dispute that plaintiff [52]
was the Seymour marshal during the time of three of the publica-
tions and that the other communication referred to plaintiff’s prior
status as such marshal. We shall. assume, therefore, for present pur-
poses, that the petition does disclose that plaintiff was a town marshal.
Even so, the fact, if it be a fact, that the occasions of the publications
may have been conditionally privileged cannot be decisive as to the
sufficiency of plaintiff’s petition. This, bevause plaintiff may recover
damages by reason of false defamatory matter communicated on a
conditionally privileged occasion, provided he: proves abuse of the
occasion. Therein, of course, lies the difference between absolute and
conditional privilege. Laun v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, 350
Mo. 572, 578[2], 584, 166 S.W. 2d 1065, 1068[2, 3], 1073[15, 16].
Thus, unless plaintiff’s petition showed on its face that the occa-
sions for the communications were absolutely privileged (and there
is no contention that it does), or unless plaintiff’s petition affirma-
tively averred that the occasions for the communications were not
abused (and the petition does not so do), we could not, on the ground.
urged, hold that plaintiff had failed to state claims upon which relief

could be granted. Furthermore, there can be no question of privilege
involved in publishing false reports (labeled facts) about anyone.
And it is alleged that the communications were false. The question
of privilege usually arises when the publication contains the true
facts, or substantially so, but also contains untrue comments based
on such true facts, or where the publication of true facts also con-
tains untrue statements by others. Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co.,
364 Mo. 82, 258 8.W. 24.583, 585[1-7]; Kleinschmidt v. Johnson,
Mo., 183 S.W. 2d 82, 843, 4].

Hl Defendants also contend generally that where alleged libelous
words are contained in a newspaper article, the whole of the article
must be set forth in the petition so that the court may construe the
alleged libelous words in their context. It is true that the court must
construe an article as a whole in determining the reasonable meaning
of the words alleged to be libelous. Hylsky v. Globe Democrat Pub.
Co., 848 Mo. 83, 88[1], 152 S.W. 2d 119, 121[1,2]. The amended
petition, standing alone, does not disclose that the entire articles
have not been set forth in each of the counts. But even if it be as-
sumed that the entire articles have not been set forth, it is not always
necessary to do so. Lorenz v. Towntalk Pub. Co., Mo., 261 S.W. 2d
952, 954. Plaintiff has pleaded the alleged libelous words haee verba
and, in considering the sufficiency of plaintiff’s petition on motion
to dismiss, we may not determine whether omitted portions of an
article would qualify the meaning of the pleaded words. Quite an-
other question might arise when, at a trial of the cause, plaintiff sought
to introduce in evidence an entire article which changed the meaning
of the extracted parts which were set forth in the petition. Such.a
situation would involve a question of the admissibility of evidence,
ie., whether the proof conformed to the pleading, a question with
which we are not here concerned. See: Meriwether v. Knapp & Co.,
211 Mo. 199, 206-210, 109 S.W. 750, 751, 752.

rt It should also be noted that in none of the counts has plaintiff
pleaded any extrinsic circumstances which he alleges affect the defam-
atory meaning of the communication or its applicability to him, nor
has he stated the meaning,which he ascribes to the words used. In
other words, plaintiff has pleaded no matters ordinarily referred to as
“mducement’’ or ‘‘innuendo’’. Restatement, Torts, Vol. 3, § 563,
comment f, pp. 149, 150. Plaintiff simply says that defendants pub-
lished in their newspaper ‘‘about and concerning’’ him certain false
and defamatory matter. He then quotes the exact matter published
and says that the foregoing false and defamatory matter injured him.
Therefore, we must reasonably construe the words themselves and
determine whether they, standing alone, and without any averment
as to what the words may have meant by reason of other cireum-
stances, are reasonably capable of defamatory meaning.

Hl [53] Section 559.410 defines a libel: ‘A libel is the malicious
defamation of a person made public by any printing, writing, sign,
picture, representation or effigy tending to provoke him to wrath or
expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him
of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, * * *.’’
This definition is applicable in both criminal and civil cases. Hylsky
v. Globe Democrat Pub. Co., supra, 152 S.W. 2d 122[5, 6]. And any
false, unprivileged, written communication which, reasonably con-
strued, comes within the statutory definition is libelous per se. Seested
v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 575, 31 S.W. 2d
1045, 1052[4-7].

Hl The difficulty encountered in an attempt to apply the statu-
tory definition in a given case stems from the fact that it is not en-
tirely clear whether the law is that an unprivileged, false, written
communication is automatically a ‘‘defamation’”’ if it tends to expose
to ‘‘public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to deprive * * * of the
benefits of public confidence and social intercourse’’, or, whether
the writing itself must amount to a ‘‘defamation’’ which, if so, is
libelous if it also tends to expose to ‘‘hatred, ete.’” And if the latter
is the correct rule, what is a ‘‘defamation’’ or what language is
capable of a defamatory meaning? It is plaintiff’s contention that
the rule first stated is the law, while defendant contends to the con-
trary. It is true that some of the cases, in which the writers were
not considering the specific question here posed, may, by implication
at least, indicate that a false, written, unprivileged communication is
libelous and therefore, of course ‘‘defamatory’’ if it exposes to
hatred, contempt or ridicule. See: Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co.,
supra, 258 §.W. 2d 588-590; Childers v. Nesselroad, 357 Mo. 1218,
1221[1], 212 8.W. 24 727, 728[1].

It would appear, however, that the cases which have dealt squarely
with the instant question have held that the writing must itself amount
to a ‘‘defamation’’, and that if (and only if) it is, then if it exposes
one to hatred or contempt, ete., it is libelous. In Diener y. Star-
Chronicle Pub. Co., 232 Mo. 416, 433, 185 $.W. 6, 11, the court en
bane said that ‘‘it is argued that the tendency of the publication
was to expose plaintiff to ‘public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or
to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social inter-
course,’ ete. Rev. St. 1899, § 2259 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 1425). But he
who thinks that an article merely having that tendency is either a
civil or a criminal libel has studied the law of libel to little purpose.
-The controlling words in that section are ‘malicious defamation’ by
means of printing and writing, ete., tending to provoke him to wrath
or expose him, ete. There must be defamation in a libelous sense be-
fore there can be a libel. * * * To make a libel there must be defama-
tion in the sense of the law, before the public scorn and contempt
feature is operative. Defamation includes the idea of calumny, asper-

sion by lying; the injury of another’s reputation in that way. To
defame is to speak evil of one maliciously, to dishonor, to render in-
famous.’’ And see: Hylsky v. Globe Democrat Publishing Co., supra,
152 S.W, 2d 122[5, 6]; Orchard v. Globe Printing Co., 240 Mo. 575,
588, 589, 144 S.W. 812, 815.

HE The Restatement of Torts, Vol. 3, § 559, p. 140, says: “A
communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.’’? However,
in Comment b under Section 559 is this: ‘‘Communications are often
defamatory because they tend to expose another to hatred, ridicule
or contempt.’” .

In 53 C.S.S., Libel and Slander, § 18, p. 59, the rule is stated that
‘In order to be libelous per se, the defamatory words must be of
such a nature that the court can presume as matter of law that they
will tend to disgrace and degrade the person or hold him up to public
hatred, contempt, or ridicule or cause him to be shunned and avoided;
in other words, they must reflect on his integrity, his character, and
his [54] good name and standing in the community, and tend to expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or disgrace. * * * It is not sufficient,
standing alone, that the language is unpleasant and annoys or irks
plaintiff, and subjects him to jests or banter, so as to affect his
feelings.’’ (Emphasis ours.)

The importance of all of which in the instant case is this: There
can be no doubt that the communications set forth in counts 1 and 3
are capable of a meaning which would expose plaintiff to ‘‘ridicule.’’
Certainly that is true if ‘‘ridicule’’ is used in the sense of subjecting
plaintiff to jests or banter or injured personal feelings. Consequently,
if the statute makes a communication libelous solely because it ex-
poses one to ridicule, then the words alleged in count 1, for example,
are capable of a defamatory meaning and count 1 would therefore
state a claim for relief. We are of the opinion, however, that it is
the law in Missouri that a communication is not defamatory solely
because it may expose one to ridicule in the sense, at least, that it
exposes him to jests or injured personal feelings. And, however diffi-
cult it may be to formulate a definition of ‘‘defamatory’’ which may
be applied in détermining whether particular words constitute a
“‘defamation’’, we need go no further in this case than to reach the
conclusion that words do not constitute a ‘‘defamation”’ solely be-
cause they subject one to ridicule.

As to Count 1. Section 509.210 ‘provides’ that in a libel or
slander action, it is sufficient to aver that the alleged libelous words
were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff, and that a statement of
extrinsic facts is wamecessary to show the application to plaintiff of
the alleged defamatory matter.» Even so, however, count 1 pleads no
‘matter which would indicate that the article set forth in count 1,

even though it was spoken of and concerning the plaintiff, conveyed
the meaning that the publishers of the article intended thereby to
charge that plaintiff was not a proper law enforcement officer because
of the noted deficiencies in his dress and the mentioned objectionable
actions on his part. We shall assume, however, for present purposes,
that the petition sufficiently alleged that plaintiff was falsely accused
of the mentioned deficiencies in dress and of the mentioned objection-
able acts. Even so, we are of the opinion that the words used, standing
alone, are not capable of a defamatory meaning. As we have hereto-
fore indicated, the words are such that they might well subject plain-
tiff to jests or banter and affect his personal feelings, but they could
not, standing alone and reasonably construed, so affect his reputation
or character or his integrity as to tend to provoke him to wrath or
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him
of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse.

As to Count 2. There it is alleged that plaintiff was falsely
ealled ‘‘Seymour’s infamous ex-marshal.’? We have no doubt that
the false characterization of one in writing as ‘‘infamous’’, standing
alone, or in context, is actionable per se. Webster’s New Interna-
tional Dictionary, 2d Ed., Unabridged, defines ‘‘infamous’’ as: ‘‘1.
Of very bad report; having a reputation of the worst kind; held in
abhorrence; guilty of something that exposes to infamy; base, de-
testable; as, an infamous traitor. 2. Causing or producing infamy;
deserving detestation; scandalous to the last degree; as, infamous
acts, vices. 8. Having a bad name as being associated with something
detestable; perilous; noxious. 4. Law. Branded with infamy by con-
viction. Syn.—Nefarious, odious, contemptible, shameful, ignomini-
ous.”

In 48 C.J.8., p. 48, concerning the word ‘‘infamous’’, it is said:
“Primarily, without fame or good report; hence in its general or
common use, detestable, held in abhorrence, odious; shameful or dis-
graceful, The term ‘infamous’ has been said to have a technical im-
port more extensive than mere degradation or reproach.

“Tt has been held synonymous with ‘base’ see 9 C.J.S. p 1553 note
15, ‘detestable,’ ‘disgraceful’ see 27 C.J.S. p 146 note 66, ‘ignomini-
ous’ see 42 O.J.S. p 378 note 50, [55] ‘odious,’ ‘scandalous,’ ‘shame-
ful,’ and ‘vile.’ ’’ And concerning the word ‘‘infamy’’: ‘‘Loss of
character, public disgrace; that state which is produced by the con-
viction of crime and loss of honor; that state of incompetency im-
plying such a dereliction of moral principle as carries with it a con-
clusion of a total disregard to the obligation of an oath.’’

A written communication which contains the false charge that one
is an ‘‘infamous ex-marshal’’ is entirely capable of a meaning which
would so harm the reputation, character, and integrity of the one
so described as to lower him in the estimation of the community,
expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule, and deprive him

of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse. The words,
standing’ alone, are capable of being reasonably construed as meaning
that plaintiff was and is an infamous person or that he was an
infamous town marshal; either of which meanings carries with it the
imputation that plaintiff is or had been guilty of infamous acts by
reason of which he had been reduced to a state of infamy.

As to Count 3. The first article set forth in count 3 shows
on its face that the writer purportedly reported the idea of some
unknown person that because of recent publicity concerning plain-
tiff ‘‘the City Council should put Dave [plaintiff] in a cage and
charge admission to tourists’’ in order to obtain money for city pur-
poses. While these words are capable of a nondefamatory construc-
tion, we are of the opinion that we may not say that the words, rea-
sonably construed, are not capable of being understood in such a way
as to so harm and injure the reputation and character of plaintiff
as to provoke him to public wrath and expose him to public hatred,
contempt, and ridicule, and to deprive him of the benefits of public
confidence and social intercourse. It is true that the ostensible reason
suggested as to why tourists would pay admission to see the plain-
tiff in a cage was because of his recent publicity. But it is also true
that the repetition of the suggestion that a human being be placed
in a ‘‘eage’’ for public display may well carry with it the meaning
that it would be necessary to cage plaintiff in order to place him on
public exhibition. In the usual course of events, one who, because
of publicity, good or bad, has become notorious enough to cause
vecpte to nay just to look at him, would not need restraint or con-
finement. The false suggestion of the necessity to cage a human being
is capable of reasonably being construed as a false accusation that
one is so mentally deficient or otherwise devoid of normal human
characteristics as to require restraint. We, therefore, may not say
as a matter of law that the words were not defamatory and would
not tend to expose plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,
and so injure plaintiff’s reputation as to deprive him of the benefits
of public confidence and social intercourse,

The second article set forth in count 8 suggests that the writer of
the first article intended thereby to be funny, and ends with the
statement that ‘‘It’s one thing to have proper law enforcement. It’s
another thing to have law enforcement that’s crude, belligerent, un-
fair, and at times, ignorant.’’ Clearly, the words, heretofore set forth,
which preceded those just quoted are not capable of a defamatory
meaning. The last quoted words amount to the allegedly false charge
that the methods used by plaintiff to enforce the law in Seymour were
erude, belligerent, unfair, and sometimes displayed plaintiff’s igno-
rance of law enforcement. In our view these words are not capable
of a meaning which would so harm plaintiff’s reputation or reflect
upon his character and integrity, as to lower him in the estimation of

the community or deter persons from associating or dealing with him.
The words, in final analysis, only convey one person’s opinion of
plaintiff’s methods in the field of law enforcement, which field in-
volves the highly controversial questions of what are proper law en-
forcement methods and whether a given individual has knowledge
of, and practices, the methods which others think proper. The words,
reasonably construed, do not reflect on plaintiff’s [56] character,
good name, or standing in the community.

It follows that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to
count 1 and reversed as to counts 2 and 3, and the caso is remanded.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Com, C., is adopted as
the opinion of the Court en Bane. Leedy, C.J., Dalton, Hollingsworth,
Westhues, Eager and Storckman, JJ., concur; Hyde, J., concurs as
to Counts 1 and 2; dissents as to Count 3 stating a cause of action.

Rory Warson and Gzores Warson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jamus-
B. Buaa and Aurora Casker Company, a Corporation, Defend-
ants-Respondents, No. 44314—280 8. W. (2d) 67.

“Court en Banc, June 18, 1955.

E. C. Hamlin and C. M. Wantuck for appellants.

Turner White and Chinn & White for respondents.

[68] VAN OSDOL, C.—This is an appeal from a judgment
entered upon the trial court’s sustention of defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings. The case involves questions of the timeli-

ness and sufficiency of a tender upon repudiation of a contract of
release.

Plaintiffs instituted the action July 19, 1951, for damages for
personal injuries occasioned by the collision, March 3, 1951, of the
automobile in which the plaintiff wife was riding and a motor vehicle
belonging to defendant Aurora Casket Company and operated by
defendant James B. Bugg.

Plaintiffs’ original petition was in two counts. In the first count,
the plaintiff wife, Ruth Watson, sought recovery of $35,000 actual,
and $5,000 punitive damages; and, in the second count, the plain-
tiff husband, George Watson, sought recovery of $5,000 for medical
expenses incident to the treatment of his wife, and for the loss of her
companionship and services.

In the original petition, it was alleged that defendants through
their agents secured a purported release from plaintifis for and in
consideration of the sum of $305; that the release was secured and
executed through a mutual mistake of fact; that the mistake of fact
consisted of a belief, on the part of all concerned including a medical
examiner at the time, that the plaintiff wife had sustained injuries
only ‘to her fingers and damage to her clothing, whereas plaintiff
wife, it was alleged, had suffered further and more serious injuries.

Subsequently, on November 20, 1953, plaintiffs filed their amended
petition, also in two counts. In the amended petition it was alleged
that defendants through their agent and medical examiner fraud-
ulently caused a purported release to be secured from plaintiffs; that
the physician made positive representations of fact to plaintiffs to
the effect that all injuries sustained by plaintiff, Ruth Watson, were
of a temporary nature, and she would not be further troubled with
the injuries; that further representations were made to the effect
that a blow to the wife’s head and injury to her internal organs
(alleged to have been suffered in the collision) to which the physician’s
attention had been directed, were of no consequence; and that all of
the representations were untrue and served to induce plaintiffs to
enter into the purported release. Plaintiffs also stated they had made
a tender of $305 received at the time of the purported release which
sum defendants had refused to accept. In the original petition and
in the amended petition, the plaintiffs prayed the court to ‘‘set aside,
eancel, and hold for naught the purported release - - - for the reasons
as shown, and that plaintiff have judgment against defendants’? on
the original claims, ‘‘less the sum of $305 heretofore paid.”’

Defendants’ answer admitted and denied various allegations of
the petition, and further stated ‘‘that on the 30th day of March, 1951,
for a valuable consideration paid to them on said date by defendants,
to-wit: the sum of $305.00, plaintiffs and both of them executed and
delivered to defendants a full and complete release and discharge of
and from any claim on account of said accident ---.’’ A copy of the

release was attached to the answer. Further answering, defendants
stated that plaintiffs’ original petition had been filed July 19, 1951,
and on November 19, 1953, an attorney for plaintiffs came to the
office of defendants’ attorneys ‘‘and laid the sum of $305.00 in cash
on the desk of one of defendants’ attorneys and stated that said sum
was a tender of the proceeds received under said release; that said
sum was refused by defendants’ attorneys; that plaintiffs had not
at any time previous to November 19, 1953, offered to return any
part of the consideration received by them for the release.’’

Upon motion, the trial court required plaintiffs to file a reply: in
which reply plaintiffs stated that they had not, prior to November
19, 1958, made a tender to [69] defendants; but that at the time of
the making of the tender, November 19th, the defendants made no
objection that the tender was not timely.

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was
sustained by the trial court, specifically stated that the affirmative
allegations in defendants’ answer, and the admission of the facts as
to the tender of the consideration received, disposed of the entire
litigation without regard to other or further proof.

Herein, plaintiffs-appellants contend the trial court erred in ren-
dering judgment for defendants. They assert their tender of the
amount they had received as consideration for the release, as they
alleged in their amended petition, was timely and sufficient and it
was not absolutely essential for them to have restored or tendered
restoration before they originally instituted their action on their
original claim. Defendants-respondents on the other hand contend
the restoration or tender of restoration was a condition precedent to
the vesting in plaintiffs of a claim or a cause of action. They say
plaintiffs’ failure to restore the consideration plus interest, or tender
the same before they instituted their action, was fatal to their case,
and the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.

Hl As to the rescission of contracts of settlement or release on
the ground of fraud, and the essentiality of a tender—in this State
there is a distinction between fraud in the factum or the execution
and fraud in the treaty or the inducement as to the requirement of
restoration or tender of restoration of the consideration for a release.
Fraud in the factum renders the contract void, and no tender is
necessary. Fraud in the treaty (as was alleged in the amended peti-
tion in this case) renders it merely voidable, and absent some other
ground dispensing with the rule, tender is a prerequisite or condition
precedent to the avoidance of the release and to the maintenance of
an action on the original claim or cause of action. Metropolitan Pay-
ing Co. v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 309 Mo. 688, 274 S. W. 815;
McCoy v. James T.. McMahon Const. Co., Mo. Sup., 216 8. W. 770;
Althoff v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 166, 102 S. W. 642; Och v.
Missouri, K.&T. R. Co., 180 Mo. 27, 31 S. W. 962; Loveless v. Cunard

Mining Co., Mo. App., 201 8. W. 875; Wessel v. Wm. Waltke & Co.,
196 Mo. App. 582, 190 8. W. 628; Malkmus v. St. Louis Portland
Cement Co., 150 Mo. App. 446, 181 8. W. 148; Annotation 134 A.L.R.
6, at page 49. The instant action upon an unliquidated claim for dam-
ages was not within an exception to the rule of essentiality of a tender,
which exception is that a plaintiff-releasor is not required to return
that which he would in any event be entitled to retain because of a
defendant’s original liability. Contrast Trokey v. U. 8. Cartridge
Co., Mo. App., 222 S. W. 2a 496.

Prior to Section 934 R.S. 1939, a statute originally enacted in
1899 but repealed in 1943 (L. 1943, p. 358, Civil Code of Missouri), it
was held that a release must be set. aside in an equitable action but the
Section 934 changed that, making it proper procedure to attack a
release by reply in an action at law. Althoff v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
supra. The Section provided that the issue of the fraudulent or wrong-
ful procurance of a release should be submitted to the jury with other
issues in the case. But the Section was procedural and did not change
the law governing the rescission of contracts of settlement upon the
ground of fraud. Althoff v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra; Wessel v.
Wm. Waltke & Co., supra. It will be observed that § 509.070 RSMo
1949, V.A.M.S. (L. 1948, p. 370, Civil Code of Missouri), provides
that a plaintiff may state his original claim against the defendant and
also in either the original or amended petition or a reply, a claim for
having any release, composition, settlement, or discharge of the orig-
inal claim set aside as fraudulent or otherwise wrongfully procured.
‘We are of the opinion the last named § 509.070, like the former
Section 934, did not change the substantive law governing the rescis-
sion of contracts of settlement upon the ground of fraud. Nor do we
suppose the latter § 509.070 contemplated [70] that litigants may
no longer avail themselves of the procedure of submitting the issue
of the fraudulent or wrongful procurance of a release, composition,
settlement or other discharge, to a jury along with all other issues
in the case, with a general verdict on all issues.

In Althoff v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra, the reply alleged the
repudiation of a contract of settlement on the grounds, inter alia, of
fraud, and the tender by plaintiff of the consideration of the con-
tract to defendant before the institution of the action. It was said
that a court cannot declare as a matter of law, in a given case, what
will be a reasonable time within which to make the tender. (Except
in a case wherein we may say that reasonable minds could not differ
on the issue.) This is a question of fact for the jury to determine
according to the facts and circumstances of each case under the
guidance of proper instructions to be given by the court. In the
Althoff case, as stated, the restoration of consideration was allegedly
tendered prior to the institution of the action, and the evidence in-
troduced supported the allegation. In that case defendant did not

proffer an instruction submitting the issue of the timeliness of the
tender and consequently -waived that issue. 7

It is just that a plaintiff should not appropriate the benefits of a
contract of settlement and deny its obligations. A contract of settle-
ment or release like other contracts may be rescinded on the ground
of fraud (or mutual mistake of fact), but only upon repudiation
and tender within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud.
Althoff v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra.

It would seem that a tender may be timely even if it is made after
the institution of the action. 45 Am. Jur., Release, § 52, pp. 711-712,
However, in several decisions it has been said that tender should be
made before the institution of the action on the original claim. MeCoy
v. James T.'MeMahon Const. Co., supra; Wessel v. Wm. Waltke &
Co., supra; Kingman-Moore Implement Co, v. Ellis, 125 Mo. App.
692, 103 S. W. 127. This is on the theory that a plaintiff has no
“cause of action’’, or no ‘‘right to sue’’ or may not ‘‘maintain an
action’’ on an original claim until there is rescission including the
essential restoration or tender of the restoration of the status quo. *
McCoy v. James T. McMahon Const. Co., supra; Althoff v. St. Louis
Transit Co., supra. We surmise that the language, indicating the
tender must be made before the institution of the action on the orig-
inal claim, is a ‘“‘carry over’? from the time prior to 1899, when it
was sometimes said to have been necessary to bring and successfully
maintain an equitable action for a rescission before instituting an
action at law on the original claim. See again Och v. Missouri, K.&T.
R. Co., supra. However that may be, yet, in our case, even though
plaintiffs made no actual tender before they filed their original peti-
tion and made no tender in their original petition, it was admitted
that the day preceding the filing of plaintiffs’ amended petition,
plaintiffs actually tendered the amount they had received as consid-
eration for their execution of the release. Having made the tender
plaintiffs could and did state a claim, including the performance of
the condition to its maintenance, in their amended petition by includ-
ing the allegations of defendants’ fraud in the procurement of the
release and the plaintiffs’ tender of the restoration of the amount
received.

Hl But it is contended the amoint of the tender was not sufficient,
inasmuch as interest was not included. Language of the court in the
case of Wessel v. Wm. Waltke & Co., supra, indicates that tender
should be of the amount received and interest thereon. This was also
the opinion of the reviewing court in Carroll v. United Rys. Co. of
St. Louis, 157 Mo. App. 247, 137 S. W. 303 (overruled on another
point in Blank, Inc. y. Lennox Land Co., 351 Mo. 982, 174 8. W. 2d
862). Most of the cases, which we have cited supra, state that a plain-
tiff in repudiating a release is obliged to tender defendants with the
‘amount received’? and we hesitate, where the issue is fraud, to recog-

nize a further and possibly onerous requirement that interest must
be included. We note that this court in the case of Macklin. v. Fogel
Const. Co., 326 Mo. [71] 38, 31 8. W. 2d 14, at page 18, in speaking
of the sufficiency of the tender as made in that case, made in circum-
stances similar to the alleged tender in our case, held the tender of |
the amount received was sufficient, making no mention of the inclusion
of interest.

The judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded.

It is so ordered.

PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Van Ospon, C., is
adopted as the opinion of the Court en Banc. Leedy, C.J., Dalton,
Hollingsworth, Westhues and Storekman, JJ., concur. Hyde and
Eager, JJ., dissent.

'
a

Srarz or Missouri, at the Relation of Jurumras O’Conneuy, Chief
of Police of the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, Relator,

v. Honoraste Jams F, Nanaue, Judge of the Circuit Court of

the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, now Presiding in Divi-

. Sion No. 11 Thereof, Respondent, No. 44693—280 8S. W. (2d) 96.

Court en Bane, June 13, 1955.

il

Edward L. Dowd, Circuit Attorney, for relator.

200

|

Godfrey P. Padberg and Sidney M. Glazer for respondent.

[97] HYDE, J.—Prohibition to prevent respondent circuit judge
from proceeding in a habeas corpus case on the ground that the same
matter was pending before the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction
and that it had custody of the prisoner. The question for decision is
whether, after the Court of Criminal Correction has issued a writ of
habeas corpus and has neither dismissed nor finally determined the

. case, the circuit court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus
- for the production of the same person before it to determine the same
matter.

The facts as shown by the pleadings and exhibits attached are that
-the St. Louis police arrested B. F. Bethel at 5:30 A.M. November 8,
1954, About noon, his counsel filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the Court of Criminal Correction. A writ was issued returnable
forthwith but thereafter, on motion of the Circuit Attorney, an order

was made granting the relator the statutory time of 24 hours to file
return. (See Sec, 532.170, statutory references are to RSMo and
V.A.MS.) The return made the next day showed that Bethel was then
held on a charge of burglary and larceny and a warrant issued thereon
and he was remanded to the custody of relator. It also appears that
bail was then fixed for Bethel. However, during the afternoon of
November 8th, about 15 minutes after the order was made giving
relator 24 hours to file return, Bethel’s counsel told Judge Comerford,
who had made the order, that he wanted to dismiss the habeas corpus
petition and Judge Comerford said he would not allow him to do so.
It is not claimed that this conversation occurred in the courtroom, or
while court was in session, or that any motion to dismiss was filed or
made in court at any time, After his conversation with Judge
Comerford, Bethel’s counsel filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
Cireuit Court and respondent issued the writ. When relator refused
to produce [98] the prisoner forthwith, respondent ordered a citation
for contempt to be prepared against him.

Even under our old procedure, at least when court was in
session, a case was not actually dismissed until there was an order of
dismissal. (For when a court is in vacation see Rule 3.04; as to ses-
sions of Court of Criminal Correction see Sec. 479.120.) Section
510.130 provides that ‘‘a plaintiff shall be allowed to dismiss his action
without prejudice at any time before the same is finally submitted.”
The word ‘‘allowed’’ together with what is said in Section 510.150
about the order for dismissal clearly shows there must now be an order.
Section 510.130 uses the same language in this respect as the former
statute which we construed in State ex rel. Big Bend Quarry Co. v.
Wurdeman, 309 Mo. 341, 274 §. W. 380, in which we said: ‘‘This
section negatives the idea that a plaintiff may on his own motion dis-
miss a suit at any time and under all circumstances, because it fixes
a period in which a plaintiff ‘shall be allowed’ to take a nonsuit.
That implies that such final disposition of the case must be by order
of the court permitting such dismissal; otherwise the word ‘allowed’
would not be used. * * * An order of court is necessary, so that
persons affected may have an opportunity to object.’? We set out
therein examples of situations in which a court could properly refuse
to order a dismissal at the instance of a plaintiff. (See also State ex
rel. Ostmann vy. Hines, 148 Mo. App. 298, 128 S. W. 250; State ex rel.
Borsenberger v. McElhinney, Mo. App., 38 S. W. (2d) 281; Mosely
by Cobb v. McFields, Mo. App., 285 8. W. (2d) 399.) Furthermore,
under See’s. 510.130 and 510.150, there must be an order because in
most cases it is necessary to have a determination as to whether the
dismissal shall be with prejudice or without prejudice. While we
think petitioner Bethel should have been allowed an order of dismissal
under the circumstances shown (See 39 O.J.S. 650, Sec. 86) if a
proper motion therefor had been made in court, nevertheless we must

hold that his habeas corpus case was never dismissed but was still
pending in the Court of Criminal Correction during the rest of the
day of November 8, 1954. Moreover, it remained pending wiitil it was
finally determined the next day by remanding Bethel to the custody
of relator and fixing bail for his release on the charge then pending
against him.

Since this habeas corpus case was pending undetermined in
the Court of Criminal Correction, we must hold that the Cireuit
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear another habeas corpus peti-
tion by the same petitioner to determine the same subject matter.
“Pursuant to a general rule of wide application, on which there is no
conflict of authorities, it has been held that a court is without juris-
diction where it attempts by habeas corpus to interfere with the exer-
cise by another court of jurisdiction theretofore acquired, whether
such jurisdiction is acquired in another habeas corpus proceeding or
on appeal, or otherwise, unless the prior jurisdiction has been ter-
minated.’’ (39 0.3.8, 596, Sec. 53; See also 25 Am. Jur. 223, Sec. 108;
Church on Habeas Corpus 374, Sec. 265; State ex rel. Burtrum v.
Smith, 357 Mo. 184, 206 8. W. (2d) 558; State ex rel. Evans v.
Broaddus, 245 Mo. 123, 149 S. W. 473; State ex rel. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Knehans, Mo. App., 31S. W. (2d) 226; State ex rel. Mack v.
Seott, Mo. App., 235 8. W. (2d) 106; Commonwealth ex rel. Lawton
et al. v. Gordon, Ky., 247 S. W. 45; Millikin v. Jeffrey, Tex., 299 S.
W. 393.) The Court of Criminal Correction is a court of record (Sec.
479.010) and has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court in
habeas corpus. (See Sec, 479.090.) In fact, Section 532.0380 says ‘in
the City of St. Louis the application, in the first instance, shall be
made to the judge of the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction.’’
It is true that this statute could not prevent the Circuit Court, which
gets its habeas corpus jurisdiction from the Constitution (Sec. 4,
Art. 5), from issuing such writs when application is first made there.
(In re John G. Hagan, 295 Mo. 435, 245 S. W. 336.) Nevertheless,
these statutory provisions show the Court of Criminal [99] Correction
has jurisdiction in any such case and authority to complete any case
properly commenced therein. Respondent cites In re Breck, 252 Mo.
302, 158 8. W. 843, holding that res judicata does not apply to habeas
corpus; and that to one deprived of his liberty there is no limit to
the number of applications which can be made for release by habeas
corpus (except as stated in Section 582.020); but that, of course,
applies to an application made after a previous application has been
finally determined.

Respondent also calls attention to Section 544.170 and Rule 21.14
and says relator’s contentions ‘‘would emasculate summary relief by
habeas corpus in cases involving arrest without warrants.’’ How-
ever, ‘‘when the writ of habeas corpus issues, the officer holds his.
prisoner under that writ, and under no other,’’? (State ex rel, Evans

Pe 208
P|
vy. Broaddus, supra, 149 S. W., 1c. 477; See also Church on Habeas
Corpus 260, Sec’s. 175-176; 25 Am. Jur. 245, Sec. 148; 39 O.J.S.
650, Sec. 87.) Therefore, after the writ issues, the prisoner is in cus-
tody of the court and not im the custody of the police so that Rule
21.14 does not apply; and, therefore, the case of State ex rel. Cunning-
ham v. Leavitt, Mo. App., 271 8S. W. (2d) 68, cited by respondent,
is not in point. This does not mean that the prisoner must be kept in
jail because the court issuing the writ is authorized to take bail (Sec.
- 582.460) or ‘‘place him in such care or custody as his age or. other
circumstances may require.’’? (Sec. 532.520; see also 25 Am. Jur.
245, Sec. 148; Ex Parte Frederick W. Brockman, 233 Mo. 185, 134
S. W. 977.) It is not claimed that any request to fix or take bail was
made to the Court of Criminal Correction. Of course, the court is
not required to allow the maximum time for return authorized by
Section 532.170, Nevertheless, these are all matters of judicial discre-
tion and the fact that some other judge may not agree with the way
such discretion has been exercised in a particular case does not auth-
orize another court to interfere to make and enforce a different ruling
on the case while it is still pending undetermined in the court where
it was properly brought. We held in State ex rel. Evans v. Broaddus,
supra, that not even an appellate court could do that. Certainly a
prisoner cannot be in the custody of two different courts at the same
time.

In our consideration of the facts of this case we have followed our
rule that we will take as true every material fact which is not denied
or confessed and avoided. (State ex rel. Allison v. Barton, 355 Mo.
690, 197 S. W. (2d) 667; State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward,
351 Mo. 761, 173 S. W. (2d) 920; State ex rel. Townsend v. Mueller,
830 Mo. 641, 51 S. W. (2d) 8.) One matter that was denied and,
therefore, left unsettled was whether or not in the hearing before
respondent anything was said about giving bail under Rule 21.14. In
view of our ruling that Rule 21.14 was not applicable because Bethel
was in the custody of the Court of Criminal Correction, and not in
the custody of the police, that is not a material fact for the deter-
mination of respondent’s jurisdiction. We must, therefore, hold that
respondent was without jurisdiction to proceed in the Bethel habeas
corpus case. Since charges were filed and bail fixed, all matters are
now moot except for the contempt charge ordered commenced against
relator for failure to produce Bethel on the writ issued by respondent.
As we have held Bethel was in the custody of the Court of Criminal
Correction, relator was required to hold him under its writ. There-
fore, respondent was without jurisdiction to issue a writ and the
contempt charge cannot be sustained. (See St. Louis, K. & 8. R. Co.
v. Wear, 185 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357; Ex Parte Irwin, 820 Mo. 20, 6
8. W. (2d) 597; Missouri Electric Power Co. v. City of Mountain
Grove, 352 Mo. 262, 176 S. W. (2d) 612.)

The preliminary rule in prohibition is made absolute. All concur.

Orviniz C. Mier, Respondent, v. Carront C. Corrzen, Appellant,
No. 44063—280 S. W. (2d) 100.

Court en Bane, June 18, 1955.

Albert Copaken and Sylvia Copaken for appellant.

Kaer P. Vanice, II, Edwin Earnshaw and Kirchner & Vanice for
respondent,

[101] BARRETT, C.—The question presented by this appeal is
whether, in the particular cirewmstances of this record, the trial court
appropriately exercised its discretion in decreeing specific perform-
ance of a contract to sell real estate, a house and lot in Kansas City.

Hl Before considering the case upon its essential merits, how-
ever, it is necessary by way of introduction and approach to briefly
note certain general factors concerning which the parties are not in
complete agreement. The appellant seller claims, among other things,
that the trial court prejudicially erred in the admission of evidence,
and particularly in refusing to admit and consider certain proffered
evidence. The appellant prepared and requested the court to make
sixteen specific findings of fact. The court refused to adopt the ap-
pellant’s sixteen requests and adopted as its findings of fact the re-
spondent’s fourteen specific requests. In addition the court adopted
the respondent’s offered declarations of law and accordingly entered .
a judgment decreeing that the appellant specifically perform the
contract by conveying his house and lot to the respondent. In connec-
tion with these matters the appellant has briefed and argues twenty
poinis, but it is not necessary to a disposition of this appeal to consider

them in detail. Upon this appeal it is the duty of this court to ‘‘con-
sider any evidence which was rejected by the trial court aud duly
preserved for the appeal when the appellate court believes such evi-
dence to be admissible,’’ paying deference ‘‘to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.’’ V.A.MS.,
See. 510.310(4). In this connection in this case, this court defers to
all findings of fact, which -of necessity were solely dependent upon
the trial court’s persuasion and finding as to the credibility of con-
flicting oral evidence. Specifically, and contrary to the appellant’s
elaim, there was uo substantial evidence of fraud, mutual mistake
of fact, or mental incapacity as those terms are generally defined and
technically employed in equitable actions, Herzog v. Ross, 358 Mo,
177, 218 8. W. (2) 921; Kirby v. Balke, 306 Mo. 109, 266 S. W. 704;
Brown v. Fagan, 71 Mo. 563. On the other hand, the trial court
declared as a matter of law that ‘‘Owners have a right to sell for
what they please, and buyers have a right to pay what they please. The
consideration was not grossly inadequate, and the courts will specifi-
cally enforce contracts, even though it be a hard one,’’ but the court
did not specifically find as a fact ‘‘that the price was not grossly in-
adequate,’’ the fact was declared as a matter of law. In addition to
the indicated rules and deference, however, this is, after all, a suit
in equity to enforce specific performance of a contract to convey real
property and it is the duty of this court to review the record anew
and to enter such judgment as, having regard to the applicable,
compelling, equitable principles, the trial court should have entered.
V.A.MS., Sec. 510.310(4); Glauert v. Huning, (Mo.) 266 S. W. (2)
653; Herzog v. Ross, supra. One of the distinguishing characteristics
of a suit for specific performance is that the trial court’s discretion
is reviewable anew upon appeal to this court (McClintock, Equity,
pp. 129-130), and the essentially meritorious question here is whether
in the circumstances the trial court appropriately exercised its discre-
tion and decreed specific performance.

[102] In brief outline the circumstances were that on June
15th, 1951, the appellant, Carroll C. Coffeen, through the agency of
a real estate broker, H. H. Flippo, entered into a contract with Floyd
R. Finch by which they exchanged properties, an apartment, known
as 2607-09 Cherry, owned by Mr. Coffeen and a house, known as 309
South Chelsea, owned by Mr. Finch. In the exchange the apartment
was valued at $25,000 and the house on Chelsea at $12,000. In addi-
tion, in order that Mr. Finch might finance a loan on the apartment,
Mr. Coffeen deposited $6000 in a savings account as collateral se-

. curity for the loan, Twelve days later, on the 27th day of June, Mr.

Coffeen entered into a written contract with the respondent, Orville
C. Miller, by which he agreed to convey the property at 309 South
Chelsea to Mr. Miller for the sum of $2400, $100 to be paid upon
the signing of the contract, $800 to be paid upon delivery of the deed

and ‘‘subject to a first Deed of Trust on said property held by the
Sentinel Federal Savings & Loan Asgociation of Kansas City, the un-
paid balance of said loan being Fifteen Hundred ($1,500.00) Dollars.’’
Mr. Coffeen was to furnish an abstract within ten days showing ‘‘good.
title,’ and, according to the contract, the taxes and rental were to be
prorated between the seller and the buyer. The following day Mr.
Coffeen rued his bargain and sought, unsuccessfully, to be released
from his contract. Hight days later Mr. Miller instituted this action
for specific performance and the trial court, as indicated, has entered
a decree compelling Mr. Coffeen to execute a warranty deed conveying
the property to Mr. Miller upon the payment of $2400, which sum
Mr. Miller actually paid into court after the entry of the decree,
September 30th, 1953.

These are the bare facts of the case and it is necessary, at this point,
to consider by way of discrimination certain other matters. relating
to the essence of the remedy of specific performance and particularly
to consider in what circumstances the remedy is granted as a matter
of right. It is argued by the respondent that if a contract is freely
and voluntarily executed, and its terms are clear and specific ‘‘and
it is free from objection,’’ specific performance will be decreed as a
matter of right and not as a matter of grace or favor. In this connec-
tion it is urged, in support of the court’s declaration of law (not, as
indicated, its finding of fact), that every man has a right to deal with
his property as he pleases, that the consideration was not grossly
inadequate, and, that the court would specifically enforce a contract
“even though it be a hard one.’’ Also in this connection it is said
that old age, mental weakness, inadequate consideration, or confi-
dential relation, are not in and of themselves independent and sub-
stantive grounds upon which a court of equity will relieve a party
from a contract voluntarily entered into. Abstractly and in a general
way there can be no objection to these assertions. However, a more
accurate and complete statement of the general rule is that ‘“‘specifie
performance is somewhat of grace as over against a hard and fast
matter of absolute right. The chancellor has discretion to perform
or not to perform. But he has studied the law of specific performance
to little purpose who supposes that discretion may be exercised with-
out reason and of capricé.. The discretion to be exercised is a sound
(that is) judicial discretion. It is exercised against performance when
plaintiffs come into a court of equity with unclean hands; or when
the contract is incomplete or so ambiguous as to be uncertain in terms
and intendment; or where the contract is unfair, overreaching, biting;
or when there are present (in pleadings and proofs) elements of
mutual mistake in matter of substance, covinous contrivances, fraud,
imposition, surprise or accident, as those terms are widerstood in the
law. Absent such features and present a fair, plain contract, one
complete and certain in terms and intendments, specific performance

goes as a matter of right.’’? Beheret v. Myers, 240 Mo. 58, 77, 144
S. W. 824, 830. See also annotation 65 A.L.R. 7, ‘‘Specifie Perform-
ance of a Contract as a Matter of Right.’’ These rules have been ap-
plied and specific performance .appropriately decreed, absent the
objectionable [103] features, in many instances but, in addition to
Beheret v. Myers, supra, two specific cases will suffice by way of
illustration, Kirby v. Balke, 306 Mo. 109, 266 8. W. 704; and Frank
A. Gilbert Realty Co. v. Timmerman, (Mo.) 183 8. W. (2) 181.

Furthermore, as the respondent contends, absent the other in-
equitable incidents, a promise to transfer a specific interest in land
is unique (Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 860), and ‘(mere inadequacy—
that is, inequality in value between the subject-matter and the price—
is not a ground for refusing the remedy of specific performance; in
order to be a defense, the inadequacy must either be accompanied by
other inequitable incidents, or must be so gross as to show fraud.’’
8 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 926, p. 631; 2 Restatement,
Contracts, comment pp. 665-666. Nevertheless, one of the equitable
incidents for consideration in withholding or decreeing specific per-
formance of a contract is the fairness and reasonableness of the con-
sideration in view of all the circumstances. Annotation 65 A.LL.R.,
Le. 85; Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 367. In this connection, despite
the statement that ‘‘imadequacy as a negative defense, and as. an
affirmative ground for a cancellation, is governed by one and the same
rule”? (8, Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, p. 631), there is a dif-
ference in the suits to cancel deeds, relied upon by the respondent,
and in the suits for the specific performance of contracts. Binnion
v. Clark, 859 Mo. 202, 221 §. W. (2) 214. Likewise, the suits for
specific performance of contracts in consideration of support, of which
Campbell v. McLaughlin, (Mo.) 205 8S. W. 18, is an example, stand
alone. In all the cases relied upon by the respondent where inadequacy
of consideration was a factor and specific performance was decreed
there were additional compelling factors. There had been part per-
formance of the contract (Strachan v. Drake, 61 Colo. 444, 158 Pac.
810), the rights of third parties had intervened or there had been a
change of position (Scott v. Habinck, 188 Ia. 155, 174 N. W. 1), or,
the contract arose out of a divorce, alimony and support judgment
(Greenwood v. Greenwood, 96 Kans. 591, 152 Pac. 657; 97 Kans.
880, 155 Pac. 807), or, the contract was in consideration of support
(Woodworth v. Porter, 224 Mich. 470, 194 N. W. 1015), or there was
in fact no inadequacy of consideration (Harrison v. Town, 17 Mo.
237) or, the inadequacy of consideration waz not too disproportionate,
$2500 in an exchange of properties, as in Kirby v. Balke, supra.

In this case 309 South Chelsea consists of a whole lot worth $1200,
a five-room frame bungalow with a full basement and a screened-in
front porch in a well-kept residential neighborhood. One witness said
that the house could not be replaced for less than twelve to thirteen

thousand dollars. There is a living room with a fireplace, two bed-
rooms, a bath, a dining room and an enclosed breakfast nook. There
‘was a new gas furnace in the house and in the back yard there was
a paved space for a patio, The plaintiff produced one witness who
gave it as his opinion that the present value of the property was
$7000 and that its value in 1951 was $5250 to $5500, This man was
of the opinion that a sale price of $12,000 was too high, but he was
also of the opinion that a sale for $2400 in 1951 ‘‘was a little cheap,’’
he said, ‘‘a little too cheap.’’ According to the adopted findings of
fact Mr. Coffeen ‘thas collected rent on the premises aforesaid at
the rate of $85.00 per month since July 1, 1951.’ The trial court
made no specific finding as to the value of the property, but without
question it was worth eleven to twelve thousand dollars in June 1951,
and by any standard the sole consideration of twenty-four hundred
dollars was indeed shockingly inadequate, if not so flagrantly in-
adequate as to compel a denial of specific performance (Restatement,
Contracts, See. 367), it was certainly so conspicuously inadequate as
to make the contract and its enforcement oppressive, unfair and
biting. Beheret v. Myers, supra.

Not only was the consideration shockingly inadequate but Mr. Miller
was well aware of the fact and of the property’s true value, (Frederich
y. Union Electric L. & P. Co., 336 Mo. 1038, 82 8. W. (2) 79), and
that knowledge came to him long [104] before Mr. Coffeen acquired the
property, even though, as the findings of fact state, he was inex-
perienced and never owned a piece of property in his life. He and Mrs,
Miller had some friends, Mr. and Mrs. Hirsch, who lived two doors
north at 305 South Chelsea, and they were frequent visitors in their
home. Mr. Miller was in the house in 1950 or 1951 when Mr. Finch
owned it, ‘‘just walked through it.’? The reason for his visit on this
occasion was that Mr. Finch had told Mr. or Mrs. Hirsch that ‘‘he
might rent the place,’? but Mr. Finch ‘‘didn’t say definitely that he
was going to rent it.’? Mr. Miller and Mr. Finch belonged to the same
lodge and he claimed that his other conversations with Mr. Finch con-
cerned their lodge work and he denied that Mr. Finch offered to sell
him the property for $12,000 and that he made a counteroffer of $10,-
000. He was through the house on another occasion when some friends
of Mr, Finch were living there, ‘‘Mr. Finch at that time thought he
might rent the place instead of selling the place. * * * I told the
people if Mr. Finch decided to rent the place I would like to have the
first opportunity.’’ Previously some lady connected with a real estate
firm had talked to Mr. Miller about buying the place, he thought she
asked $10,500 for it, but ‘“when she named the price I said it was too
far above me, that was the end of it.’’

HH The trial court found that Mr. Coffeen had trafficked exten-
sively in real estate, and while respondent’s counsel would draw the
inference that Mr. Coffeen was a shrewd, experienced ‘‘speculator”’ in

real estate and that Mr. Miller was an innocent, inexperienced novice,
the fact is that in general these two men stand on about an equal foot-
ing, except for Mr. Miller’s obviously superior natural acuteness. Mr,
Miller’s education did not extend beyond the sixth grade, but he is
evidently in the prime of life and holds the very responsible position
of ‘‘locomotive machinist inspector’’ with the Missouri Pacific Rail-
road. Mr. Coffeen had gone through ‘“‘grammar school’? and had at-
tended night school for a few months in Omaha. He was seventy years
of age when the contract was executed. He had been a cable splicer
for a telephone company and for fourteen years prior to 1948 had
operated an automobile generator repair shop in Kansas City. In the
meantime Mr, Coffeen had engaged in several real estate transactions,
but upon analysis the transactions were neither so shrewd nor success-
ful as to betoken superior bargaining capacity with Mr, Miller, even
had they been left to their own devices. But, as indicated in these
respects we defer to the trial court’s findings and consider the events
surrounding the execution of the contract and Mr. Miller’s further
knowledge of the value of the property.

By the 25th of June a real estate broker had given Mr. Coffeen a
card with Mr. Miller’s name on it as a person interested in the 309
South Chelsea property. On that day he called on the telephone and,
according to Mr. Miller, ‘‘wanted to know if I would be interested in
renting this property at $100.00. I said no, sir. He wanted to know
if I would be interested in buying the house. I said, ‘That all depends.’
‘Well,’ he said, ‘Do you think you could dig down in your sock and dig
up a couple of thousand dollars?’ ‘Well,’ I said, ‘I don’t know about
that.’ ’’ Mr. Miller says that he did not know the man and told him ‘‘if
he wanted to talk to me to come down to my home,’’ and they made an.
appointment for ten o’clock on June 27th. At the appointed hour Mr.
Coffeen appeared at Mr. Miller’s home and, after some preliminary dis-
cussion, Mr. Miller says that Mr. Coffeen said, ‘‘Would you pay me
$1500.00 due the Sentinel Loan Company on that property and give me
$600.00 cash?’ Mrs. Miller, in testifying as the first witness, volun-
teered the information that when Mr. Coffeen made the offer of $2100
her husband said, ‘‘Did I understand you right?’’ Mr. Miller said that
by reason of his working around Diesel locomotives ‘‘sometimes there
is a little roaring when you first get up of a morning,’”’ and, he said,
“Let me understand you right.’’? Mr. Coffeen [105] repeated his
offer of $2100 and Mr. Miller ‘‘asked him if he had the papers on this
property.’’ Mr. Coffeen informed him that he had the papers at his
residence and they immediately drove to his home and Mr. Miller .
examined the papers. He said, of the papers, ‘‘It didn’t mean anything
to me because I didn’t know what the score was,’”’ but the papers con-
sisted, among other things, of the ‘‘closing statement’’ showing in de-
tail the values used in the exchange of properties between Mr. Finch
and Mr, Coffeen. The statement contains this item, ‘‘By credit, trans-

a i

fer of 309 So. Chelsea $10,500’’ which figure plus the $1500 due the
loan company totaled $12,000. It was at this juncture that Mr. Coffeen
called someone on the telephone, Mr. Flippo, and reported to Mr.
Miller that Mr. Flippo had to have a commission of $300 and Mr.
Coffeen then raised the price to $900 and the payment of the $1500
loan. According to Mr. Miller, Mr. Coffeen’s desire to sell his property
for $2400, twelve days after its acquisition, was based upon two
factors, he was interested in another piece of property for which he
needed: ready cash and he was anxious to avoid the payment of further
commissions to real estate agents.

In addition to the reasonable inferences from Mr. Miller’s own
testimony as to his knowledge of the property and its value, these
parties were not left to their own devices and did not negotiate and
consummate their contract alone and on equal terms. Kirby v. Balke,
306 Mo., Le. 121, 266 8. W., le. 708. After Mr. Coffeen raised the
price to $2400 Mr. Miller said, ‘‘If that is your price we will take the
papers and we will see an attorney.’ Mr. Coffeen suggested his own
attorney, Mr. Aughinbaugh, but they went to Mr. Miller’s lawyer and
the lawyer, without advising or counseling Mr. Coffeen, examined the
papers and prepared the contract which the parties immediately exe-
cuted. Mr. Miller wrote a check to Mr. Coffeen for $100 but the check
was left with Mr. Miller’s lawyer. As we have said, the day after the
execution of the contract Mr. Coffeen sickened of his bargain and con-
sulted his lawyer and in a day or two the lawyers and their clients met
and it was unsuccessfully sought to extricate Mr. Coffeen from his
difficulties by way of a settlement. Of this conference and attempted
settlement, Mr. Aughinbaugh, for whom all the parties profess great
respect, said, ‘‘I went to (counsel’s) office with the contract and told
him Mr. Coffeen had talked to me about it and had said that he was
in bad shape about this contract and that he didn’t understand the
trazisaction, he thought he was to get more than $2400.00. * * * I
talked to him, told him this man did not want to go through with the
contract, that he felt like there was a misunderstanding about the
price. I discussed it freely with him and told him the man would be

. willing to pay something to get out of the contract if he caused any-
body’any hardships about it. When we got down to amounts I sug-
gested that he might pay a few hundred dollars. He said there was
more than a few hundred dollars, there was several thousand dollars
profit in it, he was not about to recommend its cancellation, he was
specifically going to force it.’? Subsequently, (subject to the trial
eourt’s ruling upon objection that ‘‘I can take it into consideration
and strike it out in an equity case, if I want to’’?) Mr. Aughinbaugh
said, ‘‘As a lawyer I don’t like to give the sum and substance of what
was said. I do remember one thing very distinctly that one of the
reasons I wanted not to have anything to do with it, I told (counsel)

and told them there I thought this man didn’t know what he was doing,
he ought to be adjudicated if I had anything to do with it.”

But whatever conflicting or different inferences might be drawn
from the evidence, the record demonstrates beyond dispute shockingly
inadequate consideration, and a conspicuously harsh, biting, and op-
pressive contract. Beheret v. Myers, supra; Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 197
Mo. 123, 95 S. W. 213; 49 Am. Jur., Sec. 51, p. 66. In addition to
these inequitable inferences and incidents, certain other compelling
factors [106] inhere in the contract and transaction and plainly dem-
onstrate the inequity of a decree of specific performance in the partic-
ular cirewmstances of this case. Hargis v. Smith, (Mo.) 178 8. W. 72,
75; Ranck v. Wickwire, 255 Mo. 42, 61, 164 8. W. 460, 466; 49 Am.
Jur., Sec. 58, p. 72. While this is not to deprive one of a profitable
bargain (Basye v. Jamison, 124 Mo. 551, 27 8. W. 560; 49 Am. Jur.,
Secs. 59-60), even a “‘hard one’’ improvidently entered into by the
seller, the sole loss or injury resulting to Mr. Miller from a withholding
of the discretionary decree of specific performance is the loss of a
profitable bargain and the ‘‘right to make a clean and substantial
profit’’ from the property of his adversary. Annotation 65 A.L.R., Le.
9. And in this connection it is notable that there are no intervening’
rights of innocent third parties and there has been no unfavorable
change of position in either Mr. Miller’s affairs or his finances (Frede-
rich v. Union Electric L. & P. Co., 336 Mo., Le. 1051, 82 8. W.
(2), Le. 85) and there has been no possible loss to him that could
not have been recovered in an action for damages for breach of the
contract. Hisenbeis v. Shillington, 349 Mo. 108, 159 8. W. (2) 641;
Houtz v. Hellman, 228 Mo. 655, 671, 128 S. W. 1001, 1006; annotation
65 A.LLR., Le. 37. In the circumstances of this transaction the plain-
tiff’s remedy at law for damages was particularly adequate for his
protection in every respect. Gottfried v. Bray, 208 Mo. 652, 106
S. W. 639. In short, in view of the shocking inadequacy of the con-
sideration and the presence of the noted inequitable factors, enforce-
ment of the contract would impose an unreasonable, disproportionate
hardship upon the defendant, Coffeen, and, in all the circumstances,
the justice of the deeree of specific performance is not made to appear.
Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 367; Rockhill Tennis Club v. Volker,
331 Mo. 947, 969, 56 S. W. (2) 9, 18-19; annotation 65 A.L.R., Le.
64, 85. Accordingly the judgment and decree is reversed and the cause
remanded with directions to dismiss the plaintiff’s action.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing’ opinion by Barrurt, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the Court en Banc. All concur.

Srare or Missouri, on the Information of Jonw M. Danton, Attorney
General, ex rel. ARTHUR B. Suepuey, Jn, Relator, v. Charx R.
Gameue, Irvine Epison, Water L. Mercaurs, Arrnur B. Bazr,
and Frawx Ascummpyzr, Members of and Constituting the
Board of Police Commissioners of St. Louis County, Missouri, and
Apert B. DuBots, Superintendent of Police of St. Louis County,
Missouri, Respondents, No. 44978—280 S.W. (2d) 656.

Court en Bane, June 28, 1955.

Carroll J. Donohue and Lynn Meyer for relator.

Herbert C. Funke, Counselor of St. Louis County, and David L.
Millar for respondents.

Erwin Teinberg, amicus curiae; Elmer HE. Hilpert of counsel.

[657] STORCKMAN, J.—This information in the nature of quo
warranto attacks the authority of the newly created police depart-
ment of St. Louis County to take over and perform the law enforce-
ment functions heretofore vested in the sheriff and constables of St.
Louis County. The proceeding, instituted by the attorney general at
the relation of the acting marshal and chief of police of the city of
Ladue in St. Louis County, is directed against the members of the
board of police’ commissioners and the superintendent of police of
St. Louis County. It is an original remedial writ of which this court
has jurisdiction. Sec. 4, Art. V, Constitution of Missouri, 1945.

On March 28, 1950, the county of St. Louis, by a vote of its people,
adopted a charter for its own government pursuant to § 18, Art. VI,
of the 1945 Constitution of Missouri. Art. II of the charter provided
that among the ‘“‘County Officers’’ to be elected were four constables
and a sheriff. It also provided that the ‘‘elective County Officers
* #® # shall have all the powers and perform all the.duties provided
by law, except as otherwise provided by this charter’? and in the
event of a vacancy in any elective county office ‘‘the same shall be filled
by the County Supervisor subject to confirmation by a majority of the
Council.’ Art. III, § 6 of the charter provided: ‘‘The governing
body of the County shall be the County Council which, except as
otherwise provided in this charter, shall have and exercise all the
powers and duties vested in counties and county governing bodies
by the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri and by this
charter. All legislative power of the County shall be vested in the

Counceil.’’

Section 22 of Art. III of the charter provided: ‘‘Pursuant to and
in conformity with the Constitution of Missouri and without limiting
the generality of the powers vested in the Council by this Charter, the
Council shall have, by ordinance, the power: * * * (2) To provide
for the compensation of elective County officers unless such compensa-
tion of all elective officers [658] shall remain the same as now set by
law until changed by ordinance.’’

The charter as permitted by the constitution provided for its amend-
ment ‘‘By ordinance adopted by the Council and submitted to the
voters at a general or special election and approved by a majority of
those voting on the proposition ;”’ St. Louis County Charter, Art. VIII,
§ 82(2). Thereafter, on August 25, 1954, the county council enacted

* Ordinance No. 500 which provided forthe submission to the voters of

St. Louis County of a proposal to amend the county charter. This

proposal was adopted by the voters of St. Louis County at the Novem-

ber 2, 1954, election.

The central purpose of the amendment is shown by § 4.10, Art. II
of the charter as amended, which reads as follows:

“*All powers and duties of the offices of Sheriff and Constables
of the County with respect to preservation of order, prevention of
erimes, and misdemeanors, apprehension and arrest, conserving
the peace, and other police and law enforcement functions other
than those relating to civil actions and the detention, care, custody
and control of persons or prisoners in the County Jail, provided
by law, shall be vested in and performed by the Superintendent of
Police and the Department of Police of the County as hereinafter
provided, and the Sheriff and Constables of the County shall have
no power or duties with respect to the same except when called
upon by the Superintendent of Police as hereinafter provided.”’

\

Section 49, Article V of the amendment makes provision for a
department of police consisting of a board of five police commissioners,
a superintendent of police and the department personnel. The super-
intendent of police is appointed by the board of police commissioners
and the superintendent selects the other personnel on the basis of
merit. ‘

The substantial duties and powers of the superintendent and the
police department appear in the charter as amended, § 49.10 of Art.
V, in part, as follows: .

“The Superintendent of Police and the Department of Police,
including the duly authorized officers, agents and deputized repre-
sentatives thereof shall have all the powers and perform all the
duties of the Sheriff and the Constables, as provided by law, ex-
cept those powers and duties expressly vested in the Sheriff and
Constables of the County under Section 4.10 of-this Charter. In
addition thereto, the Superintendent and the Department of Po-
lice shall enforce the ordinances and orders of the Council, and
have such other powers and duties as may be provided by ordi-
nances of the Council, including, but not limited to, the perform-
ance of police duties in incorporated areas of the County under
contract authorized or entered into by the Council with the
governing body of any such incorporated area. He shall also have
the power to deputize members of the police departments of the
various municipalities of the County under such standards, con-
ditions and regulations as the Board of Police Commissioners
shall approve.’’

Other parts of the charter amendment are more or less definitive and
in aid of the provisions quoted. The St. Louis County Council on Feb-
ruary 11, 1955, adopted its Ordinance No. 570 implementing the
charter amendment with respect to the creation, organization, admin-
istration and operation of the police department. Under the terms
of the amendment and Ordinance No. 570, the transfer of functions
from the offices of sheriff and constables to the department of police
is scheduled to become éffective July 1, 1955.

The charter of St. Louis County, the amendment, the ordinances
attacked and the form of ballot are all before us in their entirety and
there is no dispute about the facts. We have been aided by able briefs
of the parties and of the St. Louis County Bar Association as amicus
curiae. The [659] case is thus submitted without oral argument.

The relator makes numerous attacks upon the right and author-
ity of the respondents to hold and to exercise the powers and duties
of the offices of members of the board of police commissioners and of
superintendent of police of St. Louis County. Generally, the essence
of these charges is the contention that the sheriff and constables of
St. Louis County are not county officers within the meaning of § 18 of
Art. VI of the Constitution of 1945, but, on the other hand, are state

officers performing governmental functions which cannot be taken
from them by the charter of St. Louis County. Most of the other con-
tentions are ancillary or supplementary to this central proposition.

Hl [f St. Louis County has the right to do what it is undertaking,
its authority must be derived from § 18, Art. VI, of the 1945 Consti-
tution. This being so, we must determine the intent and purpose of
these constitutional provisions. The section first appeared in the 1945
Constitution and is wholly new. So far as we have been able to dis-
cover, it has never been interpreted or construed by this court. Be-
cause of the novel provisions of the section, prior decisions are of
little help. Fortunately, the intent is expressed with sufficient clarity
that few, if any, construction aids are needed.

The sections of Article VI with which we are chiefly concerned are:

“Section 18(a). County Government by Special Charter—Limi-
tation —Any county having more than 85,000 inhabitants, accord-
ing to the census of the United States, may frame and adopt and

. amend a charter for its own government as provided in this arti-
cle, and upon such adoption shall be a body corporate and politic.

“Section 18(b). Provisions Required in County Charters—
The charter shall provide for its amendment, for the form of the
county government, the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms
of office and salaries of the county officers, and for the exercise of
all powers and duties of counties and county officers prescribed by
the Constitution and laws of the state.

“Section 18(¢). Provisions Authorized in County Charters—
Participation by County in Government of Other Local Units—
The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legislative
power pertaining to public health, police and traffic, building
construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the county
outside incorporated cities; and it may provide, or authorize its
governing body to provide, the terms upon which the county shall
perform any of the services and functions of any municipality, or
political subdivision in the county, except school districts, when
accepted by vote of a majority of the qualified electors voting
thereon in the municipality or subdivision, which acceptance may
be revoked by like vote.

e # & Be #

“Section 18(e). Laws Affecting Charter Counties—Limita-
tions —Laws shall be enacted providing for free and open elections
in such counties, and laws may. be enacted providing the number
and salaries of the judicial officers therein as provided by this
Constitution and by law, but no law shall provide for any other
office or employee of the county or fix the salary of any of its offi-
cers or employees.’?

St. Louis County, regardless of its charter, remains a legal subdivi-
sion of the state. Art. VI, §§ 1 and 18(a). As such, it is charged with
the performance of the state functions just as other counties are,
Section 18(b), supra, expressly requires that the charter must pro-
vide ‘‘for the exercise of all powers and duties of counties and county
officers prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the state.’”’

A charter county differs from others chiefly in the form of county
government which it may adopt. The charter must provide [660] for
the structure of county government and shall provide for ‘‘the num-
ber, kinds, manner of selection, terms of office and salaries of the
county. officers.’’ Section 18(b), supra. In fact, the General Assembly
is prohibited from providing for any office or employee of the county
or fixing the salary of any of its officers or employees other than elec-
tion and judicial offices and officers. Section 18(e), supra. This is an
express limitation on the legislative power.

Moreover, charter counties are endowed with some of the powers
and functions of a municipal corporation in the area outside incorpo-
rated cities. They are empowered to exercise legislative power pertain-
ing to public health, police and traffic, building construction, and
planning and zoning in such areas. Section 18(c), supra. These are
police powers ordinarily vested in municipal corporations. See, for
example, §§ 73.010 and 73.110, RSMo 1949, relating to the organiza-
tion and powers of cities of the first class. A county under the special
charter provisions of our constitution is possessed to a limited extent of
a dual nature and functions in a dual capacity. It must perform state
functions over the entire county and may perform functions of a local
or municipal nature at least in the unincorporated parts of the county.
These are constitutional grants which are not subject to, but take
precedence over, the legislative power. St. Louis County alone has the
right to determine ‘‘the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms of
office and salaries’’ of its county officers. There can be no doubt that
this is a proper constitutional provision, since the people of the state
are sovereign (Art. I, § 1) and they ‘‘have the inherent, sole and ex-
clusive right to regulate the internal government and police thereof
# # %? Art I, § 3. The constitution is harmonious in recognizing an
exception to the provision for general laws for the organization and
classification of counties. Art. VI, § 8.

In the case of State on inf. of McKittrick v. Williams, 346
Mo. 1008, 144 S.W.2d 98, a sheriff was held to be a county officer
within the meaning of a constitutional provision authorizing the
General Assembly to provide for the removal from office of county
officers. It was pointed out in this case that the words ‘‘state officer’
are generally used to refer to officers whose official duties and func-
tions are co-extensive with the boundaries of a state and not to a sheriff
whose functions are confined to his county and who is commonly known,
as and called a county officer. There is now even less reason for doubt

that a sheriff is a county officer, since the 1945 Constitution eliminated
the sheriff as a constitutional officer. Our state statutes tend generally
to classify the sheriff at the county level. For instance, § 57.080, RSMo
1949, provides that when the office of sheriff becomes vacant it shall be
filled by the county court.

‘We hold that the sheriff is a county officer within the meaning of the
constitutional provisions for county charters, and particularly §§
18(b) and 18(e), Art VI. This clearly appears from the language of
the pertinent sections. The result is that provision must be made by
the charter county for the performance of the duties enjoined upon
sheriffs by our statutes, but the county has the choice as to what officer
or agency will be designated to perform the duties. Or the duties may
be divided for the purpose of performance as provided by the amend-
ment to the St. Louis County Charter. .

| | What we have said with respect to the sheriff’s office applies
with even greater force to the constables of St. Louis County. The
territorial jurisdiction of a constable is even more limited, and § 63.-
050 of our statutes provides that the county court shall appoint a
constable if a vacancy shall occur in that office. We also hold that the
constables of St. Louis County are county officers as that term is used
in the various parts of § 18,.Art. VI of the Constitution.

The records and debates of the 1943-44 Constitutional Conven-
tion fortify our conclusion as to the purpose and intent of these
county charter provisions of the constitution. [661] Section 18, Article
VI of the Constitution was § 20 of File No. 12 which was the report
of the Committee on Local Government (City of St. Louis, St. Louis
County and Jackson County), No. 8. During the consideration by the
convention of this file and section, Delegate Charles H. Mayer, a mem-
ber of the committee and one of the advocates of the provision, stated:
“Of course, officers would have the same power inside the city as out-
side to enforce the state laws, to enforce any state law * * *. It couldn’t
enforce those local regulations inside the city but it would enforce, the
state laws just the same as any other county would do it.’’ Transcript
of Debates, page 2127. And further, on pages 2127 and 2128 of the
transcript, this exchange occurred :

“MR. MAYER: Well, you may notice in Section 2 [a part of §
20] that it provides what the charter may provide for. It says’
what officers the county shall have—their selection and their terms
of office and their salary. The exercise of powers vested in
“ [and] the performance of all duties imposed upon counties and
county officers by the Constitution [and] laws of the State.

“MR. TEE: May I inquire further? You mention that the
new governmental creature here would determine what officers
they would have. Now, if determining those officers ‘hey would
or would not determing to have a sheriff, would they .

“MR. MAYER (Interrupting): They might call him any-
thing bat they must provide some officer to carry out the laws of
the State.’’ (Italics added.)

It is proper to consult the proceedings and debates of the Constitu-
tional Convention even though they are never of binding force on the
courts and their persuasive value depends upon the circumstances of
each ease. See Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 356 Mo.
808, 203 8.W.2d 734, 737; Ex parte Oppenstein, 289 Mo. 421, 233
S.W. 440, 444; State ex rel. Aqamsi Land Co. v. Hostetter, 336 Mo.
391, 79 S.W.2d 463, 469; and State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway
Commission, 328 Mo. 942, 42 S.W.2d 196, 202; 11 Am. Jur. 707.

Hl The relator contends that the ballot under which the proposi-
tion was submitted. to the voters was a nullity ‘‘because of its inac-
curacy, vagueness, and generality and because it submitted a multi-
plicity of propositions,’’ and therefore that the election at which the
charter amendment was adopted was void. The official ballot, except
for the voting spaces, reads as follows:

“SHALL THE CHARTER OF ST, LOUIS COUNTY BE

AMENDED AS PROPOSED BY ORDINANCE NO. 500, 1954,

ENACTED BY THE ST, LOUIS COUNTY COUNCIL ON THE

25TH DAY OF AUGUST, 19542

“Said Charter as so amended would provide for the establish-
ment and operation of a County Department of Police, for the
transfer to such Department of all police powers and duties now
vested in the Sheriff and Constables of St. Louis County, for the .
administration of such Department by a Superintendent of Police
appointed by a Citizens Board of Police Commissioners, for the
establishment of rules and regulations relating to the employment,
promotion and retention of employees in such Department, for
the powers and duties of the Supervisor, Sheriff and Constables
of St. Louis County, and for the establishment of a Department of ©
Justice, all as provided in Ordinance No. 500, 1954, enacted by the
St. Louis County Council on the 25th day of August, 1954.”?

It was not necessary to reproduce on the ballot the charter amend-
ment in its entirety. Enough was printed on the-ballot to identify the
amendment and show its character and purpose. The ordinance
reference was sufficient for those who were interested in further de-
tails. State ex rel. Harry L. Hussman Refrigerator and Supply Co.
v. City of St. Louis, 319 Mo. 497, 5 §.W.2d 1080, 1085.

[662] The charter was amended in six different places in order to
accomplish the purpose of the amendment and to harmonize the
charter provisions with respect thereto. The new Department of Police
was added to the departments listed in § 37, and to avoid confusion
with this new department, the name of the Department of Law En-
forcement was changed to the Department of Justice in § 46 and else-
where where it occurred in the charter, However, the several parts of

the amendment submitted were ‘‘plainly so related that, united, they
form in fact but one rounded whole’’ and cannot be said to submit a
multiplicity of purposes. Hart v. Board of Education of Nevada
School District, 299 Mo. 36, 252 S.W. 441, 442. We rule this assign-
ment against the relator and hold that the ballot provided was a legal,
proper and valid one.

Hl [it follows from what we have said that Ordinance No. 500
enacted August 25, 1954, the charter amendments approved November
2, 1954, and Ordinance No. 570 enacted February 9, 1955, dealing as
they do with the mechanics of law enforcement in St. Louis County,
are in harmony with the 1945 Constitution of Missouri. The charter
as amended and the ordinances are valid enactments and take prece-
dence over general statutory provisions with respect to the agencies for
Jaw enforcement in the various counties of the state, being exceptions
thereto provided by the constitution. Tremayne v. City of St. Louis,
820 Mo. 120, 6 S.W.2d 935, 940-941. The amended charter and these
ordinances of St. Louis County make adequate provision forthe en-
forcement of state laws in St. Louis County. The sheriff and the con-
stables of St. Louis County are bound by the provisions of the charter
as amended and by the ordinances specified.

Relator’s duties with respect to the enforcement of the laws of the
State of Missouri arid the ordinances of the city of Ladue remain un-
affected by the charter amendments and these ordinances; he simply
deals with and cooperates with a different officer or agency of St. Louis
County. This is also true of the other members of the police depart-
ments of the various municipalities located in St. Louis County.

The relator places great reliance upon the case of State ex rel. v.
Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524, which was a mandamus action by the
police commissioners of the city of St. Louis against the state auditor
to compel him to issue warrants for the payment of the monthly pay-
roll and police expenses. As we have observed previously, the county
charter provisions are wholly unlike others in the constitution. The
sections of the constitution relating to county charters specifically pro-
vide what the county must do with respect to performing state and
constitutional functions, and further states what the legislature can-
not do. We have considered carefully the numerous other cases and
authorities cited by the relator. It would unduly lengthen this opinion
and serve no good purpose to discuss each of them in detail. It is
sufficient to say that they are not controlling in ruling the matter now
before the court.

We have considered all of relator’s contentions and find that they
are not well taken. We hold that the board of police commissioners and
the office of superintendent of police of St. Louis County are properly
organized and established in accordance with constitutional authority ;
that the challenged powers ‘are proper and valid; and that the re-
spondenis, Clark B. Gamble, Irving Edison, Walter L. Metcalfe,

Arthur B. Baer and Frank P. Aschemeyer, are the duly authorized

members of the board of police commissioners of St. Louis County,

Missouri, and that the respondent Albert B. DuBois is the duly

authorized superintendent of police of St. Louis County, Missouri.
The judgment of ouster is denied. All concur.

Srart or Missourt ex rel. Missourt Warzr Company, a Corporation,
Appellant, v. Kenner V. Bostran, Mary Bosrtan, and Tue
Aronison, Torrxa awp Sanra Fe RAILWAY Company, Respond-
ents, No. 44753—280 S. W. (2d) 663.

Court en Banc, June 18, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, July 11, 1955.

229

J. Marcus Kirtley, Rufus Burrus and Gerald K. Presberg for rela-
‘tor-appellant; Carter, Bull & Baer of counsel.

Byron A. Stewart, Lathrop, Righter, Blackwell & Parker, Richard
8. Righter and William M. Stapleton for respondents Kenneth V.
Bostian and Mary Bostian. John H. Lathrop, Sam D. Parker and
Henry W. Fox for respondent The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Company.

[664] DALTON, Acting Chief Justice——Action to condemn cer-
tain specifically described real estate in Jackson County for specifi-
cally stated purposes. Respondents filed motions to dismiss relator’s
first amended petition, which motions were sustained and the peti-
tion dismissed with prejudice. The Missouri Water Company, a
corporation, designating itself as plaintiff and relator, appealed to
the Kansas City Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the judgment
of dismissal. State of Missouri ex rel. Missouri Water Company v.
Bostian (Mo. App.), 272 8. W. (2d) 857. On motion of appellant the
cause has been ordered transferred to this court and we shall deter-
mine the cause as on original appeal. Art. V., Sec. 10, Constitution of
Missouri 1945; Supreme Court Rule 2.06.

The first amended petition is, in part, as follows:

“Comes now the State of Missouri, at the relation of the use of
(sic) Missouri Water Company, a corporation, and for its cause of
action herein, alleges and avers as follows:

“1, That the Relator herein, Missouri Water Company, is a cor-
poration, organized and existing under the laws of Missouri, and
engaged in the business of producing, purifying, treating and distrib-
uting water to inhabitants of the City of Independence, Jackson
County, Missouri, and to other inhabitants and customers in the area
adjacent to said City of Independence, Missouri. That it is a public
utility and is subject to the lawful orders and control of the Missouri
Public Service Commission. That its principal office is located at 123
West Kansas, Independence, Missouri. That the Relator specifically
possesses the power. of eminent domain under Sections 393.010 to
Sections 393.100 R. 8. Missouri 1949, inclusive.

“2. That Relator has planned and is now ready to produce, treat
and distribute water to its customers from subterranean streams
through wells. Relator states that it is necessary for the production,

treatment and distribution of water to its customers, and to adequately
and economically supply the demand of its customers, that Relator
take, acquire, hold, use and- enjoy the ownership and legal title and
immediate possession thereof to the real estate hereinafter described.
[665] That said lands will be used for the purpose of taking water
from the earth beneath the lands and from underground streams,
and to erect dams and levees thereon and to lay and construct pipes
and mains for the conveyance of water in, over and through said lands
and in, over and through the lands situated between the source of
water supply and the point of delivery of said water, and to acquire
sufficient lands upon which to build works for the pumping, storage,
distribution and management of water.

“3, Relator states that the lands which are being condemned lie
within Jackson County, Missouri; that said lands, properties or in-
terest, ownership of, or legal rights in which are, or may be, claimed
and asserted by defendants Kenneth V. Bostian, Mary Bostian * * *
and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, a corporation, are as
follows, to wit: * * #77

Following the specific description of the property sought to be con-
demned, the petition contains other allegations including the following:

“5. That Relator has been unable to agree with the defendants
herein, upon the proper compensation to be paid for said lands as
above described, although Relator has in good faith endeavored so
to do.

“6, That the lands which Relator seeks to condemn by this pro-
ceeding are for public use and are described in paragraph three of
this petition. * * *,”

Bach of the motions to dismiss, as filed by defendants-respondents,
contained an assignment that relator’s first amended petition ‘‘fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,’’ as well as other
objections and grounds.

The order of dismissal with prejudice recites that ‘‘the Court finds
that said First Amended Petition fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted because said Petition shows on its face that
plaintiff and relator do not have the right or power to maintain con-
demnation proceedings against the defendants under and pursuant
to Section 393.030, Mo. R.S., 1949, because said Petition shows that
plaintiff is not seeking to acquire by condemnation lands upon which
to build works for the pumping, storage, distribution and management
of water to be taken from a stream that is not navigable, and, there-
fore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought
under the allegations of the First Amended Petition.” (Italics ours).

Appellant contends the trial court erred in holding that the first
amended petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under the provisions of Section 393.030 RSMo 1949; that the
cireuit court’s decision emasculates and renders meaningless the pro-

visions of the statute; that it will be presumed the Legislature did
not enact an absurd law, but intended a reasonable construction per-
mitting beneficial results; and that Section 393.030, supra, grants
broad powers to condemn land for the purposes stated therein, regard-
less of the source of the water.

Section 393.030 is as follows: ‘1. Any corporation, company or
individual proposing to supply with water any city, town or village
shall have the right to take water from any stream that is not naviga-
ble, and to erect a dam thereon and to lay pipes for the conveyance of
water im, over or through any lands situated between the source of
water supply and the point of delivery of said water, and to acquire
by condemnation sufficient lands upon which to build works for the
pumping, storage, distribution and management of water, wpon com-
plying with the proceedings herein provided for.

“2, In case any such corporation, company or individual cannot
agree with the owners of such water or lands sought to be obtained,
or right of way, upon compensation to be paid, or in case the owner
is incapable of contracting, be unknown, or be a non-resident of this
state, such corporation, company or individual may apply to the cir-
cuit court of the county where said land or any [666] part thereof
lies, or the judge thereof in vacation, by petition, stating what is
desired.’’ (Italies ours).

Respondents insist that the court properly dismissed the amend-
ed petition on the ground stated because appellant does not have and,
under Section 393.030, supra, appellant has not been granted the
power to condemn land ‘‘for the purpose of obtaining a source of
underground water.’’ Respondents contend that statutes conferring
the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed against the
condemnor and in favor of the landowner; and that, when the statute
is so construed and applied, the petition fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

Respondents argue that appellant wants the land of the respondents "*
“as a site for wells” ; that ‘‘nowhere in Section 393.030 is a water com-
pany given the power to acquire land for the purpose of obtaining a
source of underground water’’; that no other source of water, other
than ‘‘from any stream that is not navigable,” is mentioned anywhere
in the statute; that ‘‘the provision concerning non-navigable streams
is the only mention made in the statute of a source of water supply’’;
that, ‘‘in applying the rule of strict construction of eminent domain
statutes, the courts have held that the power can be exercised only for
the exact purpose for which it was granted’’; that ‘‘the express ref-
erence to a non-navigable stream as a source of water supply, and the
failure of the statute to mention, by even the remotest implication, a
power to acquire land to obtain any other source of supply, completely
negatives the existence of any such power’’; that to consider the
several provisions of Section 393.030 as independent grants of power

is to destroy by construction the orderly sequence set forth in the
statute; that, ‘if Section 393.030 had been intended to confer the
right to condemn land for the purposes of drilling wells and obtain-
ing sub-surface water, ‘Section 393.050 would have authorized the
commissioners to ascertain the value of such water sources’’; that
“the statute gives neither the power to condemn land for the drilling
of wells, nor the power to assess damages for the taking of such land’’;
and that ‘‘we are not here concerned with a water company which has
a source of water supply, and is seeking to condemn the land solely
for the construction of a distribution system, or for the building of
works for the pumping, storage and management of water.’’

Statutes granting the right of eminent domain are to be
strictly construed. The rule is well settled in this state. The right is
not to be implied or inferred from vague or doubtful language but
must be clearly given in express terms or by necessary implication.
State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, 830 Mo. 252, 257, 48 S. W. (2d) 891,
893; Southwest Missouri Light Company v. Scheurich, 174 Mo. 235,
241, 73 S.W. 496, 497; Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 343 Mo.
28, 37, 119. S.W. (2d) 826, 831; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, See,
26, p. 650. In applying the rule, statutes granting the power to take-
private property for publie use are strictly construed against those
who seek to avail themselves of the benefit of such statutes and the
power is not to be extended beyond the plain provisions of the statute
relied upon. Schmidt v. Densmore, 42 Mo. 225, 234. On the other
hand, ‘‘while eminent domain statutes are to be strictly construed as
far as the power to condemn is concerned, yet they are not to be
construed so as to defeat the evident purpose of the Legislature.’’.
State ex rel. Siegel v. Grimm, 314 Mo. 242, 284 S.W. 490, 493; 29,
C.J.S8. 806, Sec. 22. Further, the doctrine of strict construction does
not exclude a reasonable and sound construction of the statute under
consideration. Kansas City Interurban R. Co. v. Davis, 197 Mo. 669,
676, 95 S.W. 881.

; | From the quoted portions of the first amended petition it.
appears that the petition alleges that the Missouri Water Company
is a Missouri corporation engaged in the business of producing, puri-
fying, treating and distributing water to the inhabitants of the City
of Independence, Missouri; that the corporation is a public utility
subject to the lawful order and control of the Public Service Com-
mission of Missouri; and that it is [667] necessary for the corporation
to acquire the lands described in order to adequately and economi-
cally supply its customers with water. It is apparent from these al-
legations that the corporation seeks to bring itself within and that it
has brought itself within the express provisions of Section 393.030,
supra, as being a corporation ‘‘proposing to supply with water any
city, town or village.’’ The fact that the petition further states that
the corporation has been supplying and proposes to continue to sup-

ply water to other inhabitants and customers resident in the area
adjacent to said city does not in our opinion add to or detract from
the allegation that the company is a corporation and that it does pro-
pose to supply a city with water and, particularly, the inhabitants of
the City of Independence, Missouri. While the petition alleges that the
corporation is distributing and proposes to continue distributing
water to the inhabitants of the City of Independence, rather than to
the city in its corporate or proprietary capacity, we must and do
hold that these allegations are a sufficient statement of the fact that
the corporation does propose ‘‘to supply with water’’ the City of
Independence.

Considering the language of the statute further, it appears in plain
and unambiguous language that such corporation ‘‘shall have the
right’’ (1) to take water from any stream that is not navigable, and
(2) to erect a dam thereon, and (8) to lay pipes for the conveyance
of water in, over and through any lands situated between the source
of water supply and the point of delivery of said water, and (4) to
acquire by condemnation sufficient lands upon which to build works
for the pumping, storage, distribution and management of water,
upon complying with the proceedings provided for. We have num-
bered the several portions of the section for reference purposes.

The amended petition, as indicated, specifically alleges: ‘‘That
said lands will be used * * * to erect dams and levees thereon and
to lay and construct pipes and mains for the conveyance of water in,
over and through said lands and in, over and through the lands
situated between the source of water supply and the point of delivery
of said water, and to acquire sufficient lands upon which to build
works for the pumping, storage, distribution and management of
water.’’ These allegations conform to the portions of the statute
which we have numbered (2), (8), and (4), but respondents insist
that no right has been granted by the section to any corporation that
proposes to supply any city with water, wnless the source of such
water is a stream that is not navigable. They contend that the portions
of the section which we have numbered (2), (3) and (4) are depend-
ent grants of power and have no application unless the source of the
water to be furnished to the city is a stream that is not navigable.
Respondents seek to construe the statute as if it read, ‘‘Any cor-

poration * * * proposing to supply any city with water from any
non-navigable stream shall have the right * * *,” The statute is
not so written. The source of the water which the corporation pro-
poses to furnish is not specified, nor in any manner limited by the
statute. The subsequent grant of authority ‘‘to take water from any
stream that is not navigable’’ is not a limitation upon the word ‘‘wa-
ter’? as previously appearing in the statute. We find no basis in the lan-
guage of the section or in any subsequent section which limits the
power and authority granted under the subsequent portions of the

statute to only such corporations as propose to furnish water from
non-navigable streams. The statute does not limit the corporation’s
right of condemnation to that of securing a source of supply from
streams that are not navigable, but it does expressly grant additional
rights to such corporation to take real estate (land) for other specified
purposes. The corporation here seeks to condemn the described real
estate for statutory purposes and it does not seek to condemn water,
as such, nor to divert water from a non-navigable stream.

‘We are not here concerned. with the reasons which may have in-
fluenced the legislature to draft the statute in its present form and
to specifically give such a corporation the right to take water from a
non-navigable stream. We consider the statute as written. [668] We
must and do hold that the statute in plain and unambiguous language
grants to a corporation proposing to supply any city with water, as
plaintiff corporation is doing and proposes to do, the right and author-
ity ‘‘to acquire by condemnation sufficient lands upon which to build
works for pumping, storage, distribution and management of water,
upon complying with the proceedings * * * provided for.’’ As
we read the statute, such right is given regardless of the source of the
water which the corporation proposes to furnish such city.

The provisions of paragraph 2 of Section 393.050 with reference
to the assessment of damages for the appropriation and use of a
stream, or the diversion of water therefrom, in no way conflict with
nor contradict paragraph 1 of the same section, but rather tend to
supplement the first paragraph in a case where there is in fact an
appropriation of a stream, or the diversion of water therefrom, and
not a mere appropriation of real estate for some of the uses and pur-
poses expressly set forth in Section 393.030, as is sought in this case.

It follows, from what has been said, that the added allegations of
the amended petition to the effect that ‘‘said lands will be used for
the purpose of taking water from the earth beneath the lands and
from underground streams’’ in no way tends to defeat the right of
eminent domain for the statutory grounds stated in said petition.
The added allegations do not, as respondents contend, state a use
that is beyond the statutory authority to acquire ‘‘lands upon which
to build works for the pumping, storage, distribution and manage-
ment of water.’’ Certainly the statute contemplates that water is to
be pumped from some source and as we haye held ‘‘such right is given
regardless of the source of the water.’’ If the source is on the land’
condemned for such works, the condemnor may pump, store and
distribute it. The trial court erred in dismissing the amended petition
on the ground stated in the order, to wit, ‘‘because said petition shows
that plaintiff is not seeking to acquire by condemnation lands upon
which to build works for the pumping, storage, distribution and
management of water to be taken from a stream that is not
navigable * * *.7

Respondents, however, insist that the order of dismissal may be
supported on other grounds set forth in the motions to dismiss, to
wit: (1) ‘‘because relator is not entitled to maintain this action in
the name of the State of Missouri’; (2) ‘‘because said petition fails
to set forth the separate ownerships of the parcels of real estate
sought to be condemned’’; and (8) (as to respondent, Atchison,’
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company) because the court lacks
jurisdiction over the property of said respondent in this proceeding
because ‘‘this defendant long prior hereto acquired, and is now the
owner and in possession of, land comprising a portion or portions of
the area described in said condemnation petition as amended; that the
property sought to be taken of this defendant is in connection with
the existing trackage and line of railroad operated by this defendant,
and has been acquired and retained and is necessary for such public
purposes of this defendant; and that such public use on the part of
this defendant, for which said land is needed as aforesaid, is not
susceptible of being made subservient to the use or uses for which
relator under the condemnation petition as amended proposes to
acquire same.’? No evidence was heard on these additional assign-
ments and no specific rulings were made with reference thereto.

Respondents cite no authority in support of their first contention,
except Section 393.080, 2, supra, granting ‘‘such corporation’’
the right to apply to the circuit court. Appellant’s only answer to
the contention is that ‘‘the power of eminent domain is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty to be exercised by such agencies, for such
public purposes and in such manner as may be provided by law’’
(State ex rel. Lane v. Pankey, 359 Mo. 118, 221 S.W. (2d) 195,
196). Appellant further says that, if the state is not a proper party
to the action, its presence on the record as plaintiff, does not defeat
the jurisdiction of the circuit court and the name of the state may be
stricken as surplusage. Section 507.050 RSMo 1949.

Hl [669] We find no support for appellant’s contention that
the state is a proper party in this action. The Missouri Water Com-
pany, a corporation, is the real party in interest. Section 507.010
RSMo 1949. However, we find no support for respondents’ position
that the dismissal of the action with prejudice may be supported.on:
the ground that the corporation has instituted the action in the name
of the state and to the use of the corporation. While the corporation
has designated itself as relator, rather than plaintiff, the facts upon
which relief is sought are clearly stated. See Section 509.050 RSMo
1949. The corporation should have designated itself as plaintiff, but
its failure to do so in the first instance was not ground for dismissal
with prejudice. It is clear from the allegations of the petition that
the corporation is the real party in interest. No one could be misled
to his prejudice on account of the error in question. The record shows
that the trial court referred to the corporation as ‘‘plaintiff and re-

lator’? and to the opposing parties as defendants, as they are desig-
nated in the petition. The fact that the corporation has designated
itself as relator, rather than as plaintiff, is not fatal to the action. We
must and do hold that the attempt of the corporation to maintain the
action in the name of the state at the relation of the corporation was
‘mot sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition with prejudice.

In support of their contention that the trial court properly
dismissed the amended petition with prejudice ‘‘because it fails to
set forth the separate ownerships of the parcels of real estate relator
seeks to condemn,’’ respondents cite Sections 393.050 and 393.060;
Union Electric Lt. & Power Co. v. Dawson, 228 Mo. App. 1224, 78
S.W. (2d) 867, and Union Depot Co. v. Frederick, 117 Mo. 188, 21
§.W. 1118. The authorities cited do not support respondents’
position.

The amended petition on its face is not subject to the objection
leveled against it and such is not ground for dismissal because, after
a general description of the land sought to be condemned it is alleged
‘that said lands are further and more particularly described and set
forth in separate tracts and parcels, and which in the aggregate com-
prise and compose the whole tract as above and previously described
and set forth, and such parts are claimed by or an interest asserted:
therein, by all of the defendants, and each of them, herein named.’?
(Italies ours). Since the petition alleges a joint interest of all the
defendants in all of the lands described, there is no basis on the face
of the petition for the contention that the petition was properly dis-
missed with prejudice because it failed to set forth the separate
ownership of the separate parcels of real estate. Union Depot Com-
pany v. Frederick, supra, 117 Mo. 188, 147.

HI As to the third additional ground urged in support of the
court’s action, it is only necessary to say that there is nothing in the
petition to indicate that any of the described real estate is subject
to any public use or that it is now used for railroad purposes or
used ‘‘in connection with the existing trackage and line of railroad
‘that is now operated by”’ respondent Railway Company, nor is there
anything in the record to show that, in view of the public use to which
the property is now subjected, it is not susceptible of being made
subservient to appellant’s proposed use. No facts are stated in the
amended petition which call for the application of Section 393.100
RSMo 1949, and no proof was offered by respondent Railway Com-
pany in support of the allegations of its motion to dismiss.

The dismissal of the amended petition with prejudice may not be
supported on any of these additional grounds as now contended for
by respondents.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Hollingsworth,
Hyde, Westhues, Eager and Storckman, JJ., concur; and Stone,
Special Judge, concurs.

Srare or Missouri ex rel. Josue N. Wenig and Ernustine Waits,
his wife, Relators, v. Watpo C. Mayrienp, Judge of the Cireuit
Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, Respondent, No. 44690
281 8. W. (2d) 9.

Court en Bane, July 11, 1955.

J. Raymond Dyer for relators.

|

R. C. Brinkman, J. Jaeckel and Moser, Mars
Cleary & Carter for respondent.

[10] EAGER, J.—This is a proceeding in mandamus instituted
in this rt. The alternative writ was issued and the cause has been
argued. Relators ask this court to require respondent Judge to vacate
his order of October 8, 1954, in the case of Joseph N. Wells et ux.,
v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., a corporation, as violative of the
mandate issued by this court in that case on July 12, 1954. That man-

date was issued pursuant to the opinion reported at 269 S.W. 2d 761,
in which this court held that the amended petition stated a cause of
action and reversed a judgment of dismissal. By the present order
respondent struck from that amended petition various portions,
including all parts referring to. an ordinance of the City of St.
Louis. The contents of the parts so stricken will be referred to in
more detail hereinafter.

| | Respondent raises at this time in his brief, but not in his
answer and return to the alternative writ, the contention that this
court was without jurisdiction of the appeal in the case of Joseph N.
‘Wells et ux. v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., supra. We have examined
the briefs in that case and find that no such question was raised there.
Since that is not necessarily conclusive, however, we have examined
the record. However, the mere fact that respondent Judge now raises
the point as respondent in this mandamus [11] proéeeding, in lieu
of the defendant in the original case, should lend no aid to the conten-
tion.

The contention is based on the following facts: that the circuit
court on March 3, 1952, set aside its order of January 12, 1952, over-
ruling defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended petition (and orders
on the motion to strike), and then entered an order that the motion
to dismiss was ‘‘resubmitted’’ and was sustained ; that no motion for
new trial was filed within ten days thereafter, that the order became
and was a final judgment, and that the motion to vacate filed on
April 4, 1952, was wholly unavailing. Counsel further argue that
the subsequent order of July 30, 1952, sustaining the motion to vacate
and reinstating the motion to dismiss, is unavailing and void. Later
the motion to dismiss was again sustained on February 17, 1953,
and appeal duly taken, resulting in the opinion referred to above.

‘We are mindful of the case of Coyne v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
360 Mo. 991, 232 S.W. 2d 377, cited by respondent, and of § 510.150,
RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. But it fairly appears from the record (and
the necessary inferences from matters stated and not stated) that
in and by the order of March 3, 1952, the circuit court (Judge Harry
F. Russell) did, on its own motion and without notice or hearing,
reverse its previous rulings, set aside those orders, ‘‘resubmitted’’ the
matter and sustained the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ counsel
set up the substance of these matters in his motion to vacate the order,
which motion was argued, submitted and later sustained (on July
30, 1952). Subsequently, all parties proceeded to reargue and re-
submit the motion to dismiss (and motion to strike) as though the
order of March 8, 1952, had been of no effect, and that motion was
sustained ‘‘with prejudice,’’—resulting in the appeal referred to.

This court has held that a dismissal (even though not stated to be
without prejudice as suggested in § 510.150, RSMo 1949, V.A.MS.)
does not constitute an adjudication upon the merits or a valid, final

FP

a
judgment, if made without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(Crispin v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 866, 287 S.W. 24
158; Bindley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 358 Mo. 31, 213 S8.W. 2d
387.) The opportunity to be heard may involve either the merits or
‘‘whether the dismissal should be without prejudice’? And in
Hoppe, Ine., v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Banc, 361 Mo. 402, 235
S.W. 2d 347, this court held that an order setting aside a judgment,
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, although made within
thirty days, was void as violative of due process. (Citing and discuss-
ing various cases.) .

Under the circumstances we cannot hold that the dismissal order
of March 8, 1952, constituted a valid, final judgment. The subsequent
action of the court in vacating the order, and of the parties in re-
submitting and re-arguing the motion, seems to concede and corrobo-
vate the lack of notice and the inherent invalidity of the order. Re-
spondent admits in paragraph 8 of his return in the present case
that at least a portion of the order of March 3, 1952, was made with-
out notice. Surely there would not have been notice as to part but
‘not all. While this court must always examine a question of its own
jurisdiction, such a contention as this is not looked upon with any
: unusual favor when raised at such a late date. We note also that
respondent Judge does not indicate now that his presently attacked
order striking parts of the amended petition was in any way based
upon any supposed lack of jurisdiction. The* jurisdictional conten-
tion is overruled.

The allegations of the amended petition are rather fully set
out im the opinion referred to above (269 S.W. 2d 761.) It would
unduly prolong this opinion to repeat them here in detail. The
amended petition is repetitious and exceedingly long. Some recita-
tion is necessary here, however, in order to properly understand the
present ruling. The original suit is one by the parents of an eleven
year old boy for damages for his wrongful death. It is alleged: that
defendant maintained a ‘‘private-dump”’ on a tract of its vacant land
[12] immediately adjoining an alley (and other publicly used
‘‘Janes’’) in a densely populated area in the City of St. Louis; that
it did so for the convenience of its tenants in adjoining buildings;
that such dump was above the grade of the alley; that tenants of
defendant, and perhaps others, dumped trash, including broken and
‘unbroken glass, on said tract immediately adjacent to the alley; that
such trash was periodically hauled away by defendant; that to de:
fendant’s knowledge the neighbors used said tract for various pur-
poses, and that the neighborhood children played thereon; that the
said dump and particularly the broken glass, thus ‘‘hard-by’’ the
alley and lanes, was an unreasonable and highly dangerous hazard
to those who might be using these public ways, and especially so to
children who might inadvertently stray from the passageway; that

the actual line of demarcation between the alley and the dump was
obscured by dirt and weeds so that it was, for practical purposes, im-
possible of detection; that no warnings had ever been given, no
fence or barricade erected, and no signs put up. It was further
alleged that deceased, while chasing June bugs with other neigh-
borhood children, inadvertently and lawfully strayed approximately
three feet on to defendant’s tract (and dump), stumbled on broken
glass covered by weeds, fell, and received cuts in the abdomen from
which he very shortly died. Interwoven with the above (and consti-
tuting paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18 and 21 of the amended petition)
appear the following allegations: that under the Constitution of
Missouri, St. Louis is a charter city; that by Charter it is empowered
to regulate all acts affecting the public health, morals, safety and
welfare of its inhabitants; that pursuant thereto it enacted (prior to
the occurrence in question and in effect at such time) an ordinance
defining, regulating and requiring the licensing of ‘‘private dumps,’’
which ordinance is set out in full. Briefly, the ordinance prohibits the
acceptance of refuse or waste substances (which specifically included
glass) for deposit on any land inside the city unless application is
made to the Health Commissioner for a permit, together with’a plat,
a plan of operation and other data; it provides for an examination
of the site by the health commissioner, a report by him, the issuance
of a permit if the application be approved by the Board of Public
Service, an annual fee, and that the permit shall show the established
grade and elevation, ‘‘above which dumping shall not be permitted ;””
there were further provisions for the display of a prominent sign,
for revocation proceedings on violation, and for a revocation of the
permit if the dump ‘‘constitutes a real menace to the health, safety
or welfare of the immediate residents of the neighborhood * * *,”
and also a fine for violations. We find no specific requirement for
covering refuse so deposited except in case of a “‘sanitary land-fill,”’
for the deposit of combustible or ‘‘putrescible’’ refuse. By fair in-
tendment the ordinance may be said to contemplate inspections by
the Health Commissioner. Plaintiffs further alleged that this ordi-
nance was designed ‘‘to prevent personal harm and injury * * * as
well as to prevent unsightly deposits,’ that.defendant flagrantly vio-
lated said ordinance in procuring no permit, placing no sign, per-*
mitting dumping above grade, and in not covering the refuse
deposited; also, that the death of plaintiffs’ son directly resulted
from such violations.

On July 31, 1954, defendant filed its motion to strike from the
amended petition all of the above paragraphs concerning the ordi-’
nance and its basic authority and also the word ‘‘unlawful’’ (in
paragraph 24) referring to defendant’s operation of the dump. The
grounds of this part of the motion were that this matter did not con-
stitute any part of the pretended cause of action and that the ordi-,

nance did not create, and could not be the basis of, a civil action.
This part of the motion will be considered first. The motion was
sustained in its entirety by respondent on October 8, 1954.

The. contention of respondent is that the ordinance is a penal
ordinance, that it contains no provision for a right of recovery [13]
in plaintiffs, and that it may not be made the basis of a civil aetion.
His counsel comment on the fact that this court did not say that
relators were ‘‘entitled to plead the ordinance * * * and to have a
directing instruction based thereon,’’ and that to hold such would
be to hold that the Board of Aldermen of the City of St. Louis could
ereate new rights of action not previously recognized under the general
law. We disagree with this contention and we think that our former
opinion considered the ordinance (and allegations connected with it)
as a proper and integral part of the amended petition. The court
expressly held: that a violation of a municipal ordinance designed
for the protection of the person injured is generally held to be negli-
gence per se; that the injured person may institute a common law
action for negligence and ‘‘set up and prove’? a violation of the ordi-
nance ‘‘as constituting a negligent act;’’ that such an ordinance does
not modify or extend the common law liability or non-liability of a
landowner to trespassers or licensees, but that plaintiffs may sue on
a (claimed) common law liability of defendant to their son and base
their case ‘‘upon conduct made negligent by ordinance,’”? which
would be actionable negligence as to one rightfully on defendant’s
premises, or who came within an exception to the rule of non-liability
to trespassers or bare licensees; that this, however, necessitated a con-
sideration of the common-law relationship between defendant and
plaintiffs’ son, which the court proceeded to consider. The court
held, in effect, that the maintenance of a hazardous condition im-
mediately adjacent to a public alley in a thickly populated area, when
defendant knew of the use of the ‘alley and of defendant’s land by
children, and when there was likelihood that someone lawfully using
the way (and especially a child) might inadvertently stray into the
hazard, was actionable negligence. The court also held: that an
action may be maintained under these circumstances at common law;
that the ordinance did not create a new right of action, but that its
violation may constitute negligence which will support the common
law right of action; that the deceased thus did come within an ‘‘ex-
ception to the general rule of non-liability of landowners to tres-
passers or bare licensees.’’

While it is hardly necessary to go beyond the face of that opinion,
it seems entirely clear under a multitude of authorities that the vio-
lation of a penal ordinance is evidence of negligence in a civil action
for personal injuries, if the plaintiff was one of the class for whose
benefit the ordinance was adopted, and if the ordinance was enacted
to protect persons or property, conserve public health, or promote

public safety. Such ordinances are not considered as creating a new
liability, but merely as defining the duty already owed at common
law to the public or the person injured. In addition to the authorities
cited in the opinion in question at 269 S.W. 2d, Le. 767, see also: 20
R.C.L., p. 38 et seq.; State ex rel. Vogt v. Reynolds, Bane, 295 Mo.
375, 244 S.W. 929; Lenz v. Seibert, Mo. App., 259 S.W. 829; McPher-
son v. Premier Service Co., Mo. App., 88 S.W. 2d 277; White v.
Hasburgh, Mo. App., 124 S.W. 2d 560; Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco
Co., Mo. App., 115 S.W. 2d 219; Kuba v. Nagel, Mo. App., 124 S.W.
2d 597; Robinson v. Ross, Mo. App., 47 S.W. 2d 122, and the very
recent case of Arthur Floyd et al. v. St. Louis Public Service Co., No.
44,468, opinion by Division One of this court filed’ on May 9, 1955,
280 S.W. 2d 74. In the following cases (among others) the ordinance
or statute was pleaded, as here: Gillespie v. Terminal R. Ass’n., Mo.
App., 204 S.W. 2d 598; Huckleberry v. Missouri Pac. RR Co., 324
Mo. 1025, 26 S.W. 2d 980; Lenz v. Seibert, Mo. App., 259 8.W. 829;
Robinson v. Ross, Mo. App., 47 S.W. 2d 122; State ex rel. Vogt v.
Reynolds et al., Banc, 295 Mo. 375, 244 8.W. 929; Jelly v. Pieper, 44
Mo. App. 380; Hanson v. Springfield Traction Co., Mo., 226 8.W. 1;
Genglebach v. Payne, Mo. App., 236 S.W. 1092; Kuba v. Nagel, Mo.
App., 124 §.W. 2d 597. We see no sound objection to the pleading of
the ordinance in the present case; it is true that it is usually not
necessary to plead an ordinance where it is to be used ‘‘merely as
evidence’? (Hart v. Skeets, 346 Mo. [14] 1118, 145 S.W. 2d 143),
but it seems to us that under the circumstances here it may develop
that the ordinance is not merely evidentiary. We note also that
these portions of the amended petition were not stricken on the ground
that they were evidentiary, but on substantive grounds. It is the
contention of; plaintiffs (to be determined on the merits at the trial,
of course) that the alleged violation of the ordinance here was such
conduct as to constitute the making of hazardous ‘‘changes’’ on de-
fendant’s land immediately adjacent to a public highway, thus mak-
ing applicable the common-law rule of Liability sometimes referred to
as the ‘‘hard-by’’ rule. (See: Jelly v. Pieper, 44 Mo. App. 380;
Buesching v. St. Louis Gas Light Co., 73 Mo. 219; Kelly v. Benas,
217 Mo. 1, 116 8. W. 557; Dutton v. City’ of Independence, 227 Mo.
App. 275, 50 8S. W. 2d 161; Hayes v. Michigan Central RR Co.; 111
US. 228; Restatement of Torts, § 369.) Under these circumstances
we think the allegations concerning the ordinance became and were
a constituent part of the claim asserted in the amended petition. We
hold that in the opinion shown at 269 S. W. 2d: 761, this court so re-
garded these allegations, and that the mandate was not followed by
respondent Judge when he struck those parts of the amended peti-
tion concerning the ordinance of the City of St. Louis.

Whether or not the deceased was within the class or classes of
persons for whose protection the ordinance was enacted, whether his

injury and death; were such occurrences as were within the contem-
plation of the Board of Aldermen, and the question of causation are
all matters to be determined at the trial. We are dealing only with
the pleadings here, and the amended petition is sufficient to put these
elements in issue.

In view of the foregoing, it is wholly unnecessary to pass upon the
contention of relators that a previous ruling of the motion to strike
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the amended petition was res adjudicata.

; | ‘We think that an entirely different situation prevails con-
cerning that part of respondent’s order striking paragraphs 22 and
23 of the amended petition. Those paragraphs contained allegations
of supposed aggravating circumstances, in substance to the effect
that neither defendant nor its officers expressed any ‘‘commiseration,’’
nor attended the funeral of deceased, nor sent flowers, but that de-
fendant’s managing agent took the position that the injury and death
“‘were of no concern to it or to her;’’ that defendant’s wanton
neglect and indifference indicated ‘‘callousness and * * * indul-
gence * * * of its arbitrary will * * * amounting to licentious-
ness * * *,? This court did not consider those allegations in any
way in its previous opinion. It held, it is true, that the amended
petition stated a cause of action, but wholly without reference to any
specific elements of damage. The striking of paragraphs 22 and 23
(on the ground that they stated nothing upon which relief could be
granted) was not, therefore, contrary to the mandate of this court.
That was a matter lying entirely within the province and discretion
of the trial court and we shall not interfere. We hold that the doctrine
of res adjudicata does not apply to prevent the striking of paragraphs
22 and 23, but space will not permit discussion. . .

Respondent insists that the writ of mandamus may not prop-
ly be issued here, because, (1) respondent: was acting in a judicial
and discretionary capacity, and, (2) there is an adequate remedy by
appeal. There are no substantive issues of fact made by the petition
» for the writ and the return. All questions to be determined are mat-
ters of law, and primarily involve the construction of the previous
opinion. The previous opinion stated with sufficient clarity that the
allegations concerning the St. Louis Private Dump ordinance were
basic allegations of negligence and that these allegations, with the
others, stated a cause of action. We do not feel that our opinion left to
the cireuit court such judicial discretion in the premises that he was
permitted [15] to strike these allegations. Plaintiffs were given a clear,
legal right to assert these allegations (whatever may be the proof later)
by virtue of the opinion. We do not feel that respondent acted arbi--
trarily, but we do hold that, so far as these allegations are concerned,
he had no such discretion as to prevent this court from making the -
alternative writ of mandamus peremptory. (Compare: State ex rel.
Lovell ¥. Tinsley, Mo. App., 236 S. W. 2d 24.)

In the case of State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes, 343 Mo. 827, 123 S.W.
‘2d 105, (cited by respondent), it was held that the entry of a probate
order of distribution, involving determination of heirship, amounts
payable, and possible advancements and indebtedness, was a judical
act and, in effect, a final, appealable judgment. That situation differs
vitally from the present one. Respondent also ¢ites: Lovell-McConnell
Mfg. Co. v. Bindrim et al. (2d Cir.), 219 F. 533, and Kellogg v.
Donovan, 167 Mich. 95, 182 N. W. 501. In the first case mandamus
was sought to set aside an order of the District Court striking allega-
tions of certain impertinent issues from’ the answer. The court held
that such order was made in the performance of a judicial function
and that the remedy should be by appeal. But we should note that
in that case there had been no previous consideration of the pleading
by the appellate court (as here), thus leaving the District Court free
to exercise its discretion. The last case cited, supra, is substantially
identical.

We realize that it has been held that the mere fact that an appeal
would be ‘‘slower’’ does not in itself make the issuance of the writ
of mandamus proper (State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes, 343 Mo. 827,
123 S/W. 2d 105). But it is also true that the remedy by appeal should
be equally adequate and effective to-prevent the allowance of the
writ.’ See: State ex rel. Downs v. Kimberlin, 364 Mo, 215, 260 S.W.
2d 552; State ex rel. General Motors Acceptance Corp., Banc, 330
Mo. 220, 48 S.W. 2d 857; Perkins v. Burks, 336 Mo. 248, 78 $.W. 2d .
845; State ex rel. Yale University v. Sartorius, Bane, 349 Mo. 1039,
163 S.W. 2d 981; State ex rel. Lefholz v. McCracken, 231 Mo. App.
870, 95 S. W. 2d 1239. We are not here employing the writ of man-
damus as a substitute for an appeal. The order complained of is an
interlocutory order which is not now appealable. In the present
situation relators could only accede to that order, try their case (per-
haps being met with objections as to the admissibility of the ordinance
and all evidence concerning it) and appeal after a final adverse
judgment. Under the circumstances, we feel that it would be unjust
to require this. For a somewhat similar situation see: State ex rel.
Wright v. McElhinney, Mo. App., 72 8.W. 2d 895. Moreover, in the
issuance of the present writ this court is not reviewing the matter as
on appeal, but is enforcing its own mandate and, in effect, is merely
maintaining its own jurisdiction. This it may always do.

The issuance of the writ of mandamus is largely discretionary with
the court in each particular case. (State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, Banc,
880 Mo. 252, 48 S.W. 2d 891; State ex rel. Lovell v. Tinsley, Mo.
App., 236 S.W. 2d 24; Perkins v. Burks, 336 Mo. 248, 78 S.W. 2d
845; State ex rel. Hanlon v. City of Maplewood, 231 Mo. App. 739,
99 S.W. 2d 188). We have determined that the alternative writ
should be made peremptory in so far as concerns that part of
respondent’s order of October 8, 1954, striking paragraphs 8-13,

inclusive, and paragraph 21 of the amended petition, and the word
‘unlawful’? from paragraph 24; as to the remainder of the order of
October 8, 1954, the alternative writ is quashed. It is so ordered.
All coneur.

Jack Coorzr Transport Company, Ino., a Corporation, Respondent,
y. Jamus Russent Srurruepmam and Verne MoCunzover, Offi-
cers and Agents of International Association of Machinists, Local
Lodge No. 778, A.F. of L., and O. B. Entoz and Cuarnas Tomrry,
Officers and Agents of International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Lodge
No. 552, A. F. of L, Appellants, No. 43706—280 S. W. (2d)
832,

Court en Bane, July 11, 1955.

Cliff Langsdale and Gibson Langsdale for appellants.

John E. Park and John H. Kream
re of counsel.

for respondent; Gage, Hill

G. Carroll Stribling and Harold H. Thomas, Jr., amici curiae.

[882] WESTHUES, J.—Plaintiff filed this suit to enjoin the de-
fendants from picketing plaintifi’s place of business located in, Kansas
City, Missouri. The trial court issued the injunction and the defend-
ants appealed.

The case was argued and submitted at the April Session in 1954 in
Division IT of this court. An opinion was adopted holding that the
state courts did not have jurisdiction of the case and that juris-
diction was in the National Labor Relations Board. The case was trans-
ferred to the Court En Bane where it was reargued and submitted
at the April Session, 1955. Since the case was transferred, the United.
States Supreme Court decided the case of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 75 8. Ct. 480, which in our opinion sustains the ruling of no
jurisdiction. ,

Plaintiff’s business consisted of transporting new cars and trucks
for the Chevrolet Division of General Motors Corporation from its
plant at Kansas City to various points in eight midwestern states. It
employed about 175 drivers, 20 office and clerical workers, and a
maintenance crew of about 25. The truck drivers were members of an
A.F.L. union. The dispute in this case concerns the 25 employees
making up the maintenance crew.

The defendants named in the petition are James Russell Stuffle-
beam and Verne McCullough, representatives and officers of Local
Lodge No. 778 of the International Association of Machinists, and
0. B. Enloe and Charles Tomity, members and officers of, Local Lodge
No. 552 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, The two unions are affiliated
with the A. F. of L. [838] Plaintiff in its petition charged in sub-
stance that the defendants and others representing the two locals
named as defendants called on the president and other officers of
plaintiff corporation at various times during the year 1952 and re-
quested that the plaintiff enter into a contract with the two unions
designating them as the collective bargaining representatives for the
employees of plaintiff who made up the maintenance crew; that plain-
tiff through its officers refused to negotiate with the defendants for

the reason that a majority of the employees did not belong to defend-
ant unions; that the contract which the defendants asked plaintiff to
sign provided for a ‘‘union shop’’ meaning that if the contract were
signed, all the maintenance employees would be required to join the
named unions within 30 days or be discharged. It was alleged further
that after, plaintiff refused to sign on the ground that defendants did
not represent a majority of the employees, the defendants threatened
to picket plaintiff’s plant which would result in a complete ‘‘shut
down” of the business because the union drivers would not cross the
picket line. Plaintiff alleged that on August 14, 1952, the defendants
again demanded that plaintiff sign the collective bargaining agreement
and when plaintiff again refused on the ground that the two unions _
did not represent a majority of the employees, the defendants placed
a picket at plaintiff’s plant which resulted in a complete shut down
of the business. The next day, August 15, 1952, a petition for a re-
straining order was filed and a temporary injunction was issued which
was made permanent on February 26, 1953.

The object sought to be accomplished by the picketing of plaintift’s
plant as stated in the petition was as follows: ‘‘The intent and pur-
pose of this picketing is unlawfully to compel plaintiff to recognize
said unions as the bargaining representatives of plaintifi’s employees
for the purpose of collective bargaining, unlawfully to compel plain-
tiff to sign a collective bargaining agreement with said defendant
unions and unlawfully to compel plaintiff to coerce and force its em-
ployees to become members of said unions as a condition of continued
employment with plaintiff. * * * Defendants likewise well knew
that for plaintiff to recognize said unions as the labor organizations
selected by a majority of plaintifi’s employees, when in fact and in
truth a majority of said employees have not selected said unions as
its exclusive bargaining agent, would be contrary to law and would
be compelling plaintiff to commit an unlawful act in that it would
unlawfully interfere with said employees’ rights to freely designate
and select a labor organization of their own choosing as guaranteed
them under Section 29, Article I, Missouri Constitution, and by See-
tion 7, National Labor Relations Act, as amended.”’ .

The trial court made the following findings based on the evidence
produced by both plaintiff and defendants:

“7, Plaintiff has not objected to and presently has no objec-
tions to any of its employees voluntarily joining either of the de-
fendant’s unions.

“11, Plaintiff did not then nor does it now have a dispute of any
character with any of its maintenance employees in regard to
wages, hours, or other conditions of employment nor has it at any
time had any contractual or bargaining relationship with either
of the defendants’ unions.

“13, The picketing was at all times conducted in an orderly
and peaceful manner and continued until temporarily restrained
on the morning of August 15, 1952.

‘*20. The picketing conducted by the defendants herein was
conducted for the purpose of intimidating or coercing plaintiff,
by causing it substantial business losses, to compel, influence or
require its employees to become members of either or both of said
defendants’ unions and to recognize the defendants as the bar-
gaining representative of its maintenance employees. The picket-
ing was carried beyond the field of persuasion for organizational
purposes,”

[834] At the time this case was tried in the circuit court, cases of
this nature were considered within the jurisdiction of state courts. It
was held that picketing which was unlawful under state laws could
be enjoined in a state court. However, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and
Helpers, Local Union No. 776, 846 U. 8. 485, 74 8. Ct. 161, held that
any picketing which constituted an unfair labor practice as defined
in the Labor Management Relations Act came within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The court stated.
that state courts have jurisdiction of cases where ‘‘ ‘local matters as
public safety and order and the use of streets and highways’’’ are’
involved. See 74 S. Ct. Le. 164 (2,'3). After the Garner case was
published, this court decided the case of Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
‘Weber, 364 Mo. 573, 265 S. W. (2d) 325. It was held that the state court
had jurisdiction because the picketing was unlawful in that its purpose
was to coerce the employees to violate the anti-trust laws of Missouri.
See 265 8. W. (2d) Le. 380, 831 (1) (2). However, on certiorari, the
Supreme Court of the United States in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
TIne., 75 8. Ct. 480, held that the state court did not have jurisdiction.
One of the reasons assigned for holding the state court had no juris-
diction was that the plaintiff secking the injunction alleged in the
petition that the conduct of the union sought to be enjoined was a
violation of the federal Act. Note what the court said, 75 S. Ct. Le.
486(5): ‘‘Respondent itself alleged that the union conduct it was
seeking to stop came within the prohibitions of the federal Act, and
yet it disregarded the Board and obtained relief from a state court.
It is-perfectly clear that had respondent gone first to a federal court
instead of the state court, the federal court would have declined
jurisdiction, at least as to the unfair labor practices, on the ground
that exclusive primary jurisdiction was in the Board. As pointed out
in the Garner case, 346 U.S. at page 491, 74 S. Ct. 161, the same con-
siderations apply to the state courts.’’ See also Capital Service, Inc.
y. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 501, 74 8. Ct. 699.

It is apparent that under the rulings of the Garner, Weber, and
Capital Services cases, decided by the Supreme Court of the United

States, the state courts do not have jurisdiction of this case. Plaintiff
in this case, as the plaintiff in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra,
alleged that the conduct of the defendants was a violation of the
National Labor Relations Act. Since we do not have jurisdiction, we
shall not pass upon the question of whether the evidence sustained
the charge in the petition that the conduct of the defendants violated
the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Neither shall we
determine whether the trial court held that the Act had been violated.
’ It follows that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed
on the sole ground that the state courts do not have jurisdiction of the
case. The trial court is, therefore, directed to dismiss plaintiff’s peti-
tion without prejudice. It is so ordered. All concur.

Srare ex rel. Cucm Grizerr Gurser, Relator, v. Honorapuz Watpo
C. Mayrimtp, Judge of the Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, Mis-
souri, Respondent, No. 44691—281 S. W. (2d) 295.

Court en Bane, July 11, 1955.

Evans & Dixon and William W. Evans for relator.

William S. Bahwand Bahn & Gerhard for plaintiff in original action
and for respondent in opposing petition for writ of prohibition.

[295] WESTHUES, J.—Relator filed a petition in this court ask-
ing that the respondent Waldo C. Mayfield, Judge of the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, be prohibited from assuming
jurisdiction of a case filed’ in his court under the style of William
Sinders and Genevieve Sinders, ‘Plaintiffs, vs. Clyde Bradley, Marlyn
Leroy Holliday, and Cecil Gilbert Gerber, Defendants,

a =

The facts out of which the case arose were as follows: On April
3, 1954, a Mereury automobile collided with a tractor-trailer truck
on U. 8. Highway 66 in Pulaski County, Missouri. Beverly Joan Sin-
ders, a minor daughter of William and Genevieve Sinders, was serious-
ly injured. She was taken to the City of St. Louis, Missouri, where
she died in a hospital as a result of the injuries sustained in the
collision.

The parents of this minor child filed suit in the Cireuit Court of
the City of St. Louis, Missouri, to recover damages for the wrongful
death of their minor child. Plaintifis and their daughter were resi-
dents of the State of Texas. The defendants named in the petition
were Cecil Gilbert Gerber, operator of the Mercury car involved in
the collision, who was a resident of Texas, and Clyde Bradley, owner
of the tractor-trailer, and Marlyn Leroy Holliday, agent of Bradley
and operator of the tractor-trailer, residents of the State of Michigan.
It will be noted that all parties are nonresidents of the State of
Missouri.

The defendant Gerber filed a motion to quash the issuance of
summons and the return thereon on the theory that the venue of the
cause of action was in Pulaski County, Missouri. Respondent Judge
denied the motion whereupon Gerber applied to this court for a writ
of prohibition. A preliminary writ was issued and the case was argued
at the April Session and briefs were filed.

[296] The sole question presented is the proper venue of this case:
Is venue in the City of St. Louis where the daughter of plaintiffs
died or is such venue in Pulaski County where the collision occurred
which resulted in the injuries causing the death? .

This question calls for our interpretation of Section 506.290 RSMo
1949, V.A.MS. It reads as follows:

“Any suit under the provisions of sections 506.200 to 506.320
shall be filed in the county in which the cause of action accrues
or in the county where the plaintiff resides, and if there be other
defendants in such action who are residents of the state of Mis-
souri, then such action shall be brought in any county in which
any one of said defendants reside, or in the county within which
the plaintiff resides and the defendant may be found.”
Respondent contends that the cause of action accrued in the City of

St. Louis because that is the place where plaintiffs’ daughter died.
It is argued that until the victim died, there was no cause of action
for death. Citing Nanney v. I. H. Shell & Son, Mo. App., 138 S.W.
(2d) 717, and McComb v. Vaughn, 358 Mo. 951, 218 S.W. (2d) 548.
There was no question of venue in the McComb case. This court in
discussing the question of a cause of action based on injury and the
proper person to maintain the suit said (218 S.W. (2d) Le. 551(5)):

“In our opinion the deceased’s declaration was not admissible as an
admission. At the time the declaration by decedent was made there

was no claim or cause of action in him or in any plaintiffs herein.
‘When he was injured a claim for the injury was vested in the de-
ceased and existed in him until his death, when the claim abated.
After his death the abated claim was not transmitted to his widow,
plaintiff Lagatha, by way of revival or survival of the claim upon
which deceased might have recovered had he lived. But, upon his death,
a new and distinct cause of action sprang into being and accrued to
plaintiff Lagatha. This occurred only upon the death of deceased and
by virtue of statute.’’ And so, in the Nanney case, supra, no question
of venue was discussed. The St. Louis Court of Appeals ruled, as did
this court in the McComb case, that where an injured person died as
a result of injuries, a cause of action arose for the wrongful death.
We have no fault to find with the rulings in those cases, However, they
do not rule the question before us.

We are of the opinion that the Missouri Legislature intended to and
did, in fact, fix the venue of actions of this nature, that is, actions
based on Section 506.210 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., involving the oper-
ation of cars on the state highways by nonresidents, in the county
where the wrongful conduct causing injury or damage occurred.
That, as we view it, is the only practical construction of the statute.
A construction that the venue, in case of death, is in the county -where
the injured person died, would defeat the very purpose of the statute.
For example: If a person injured in Missouri and taken to another
state for treatment should die in that state, suit could not be main-
tained in this state. Our ruling that the venue in a case such as this
must be in the county where the injury was inflicted is supported by
good authority.

In the case of Melton’s Adm’r. v. Southern Ry. Co., (Ky.) 33 8. W.
(2d) 691, the decedent was injured in Virginia and later died in the
State of Kentucky. Suit was filed in the State of Kentucky. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky, 83 S.W. (2d) Le. 693 (4-7), in discuss-
ing venue in cases of this nature, said: ‘‘Under familiar law, appel-
lant’s cause of action herein, if any, is governed by the law of the
state of Virginia where the accident occurred, although appellant’s
decedent died in this state. 17 C. J. 1255. Appellant’s right is not
based on the death of his decedent, but on the wrongful causing of
that death by the appellee. That occurred in Virginia and it was
there that the injury was done the appellant. He may not have had
a cause of action until his decedent died, as held in Louisville & N.R.
Co. v. Simrall’s Adm’r, 127 Ky. 55, 104 S.W. 1011, 31 Ky. Law
Rep. 1269, but that is a very different [297] question from the
one concerning where the i injury was done him.’

A like ruling was made in Vancouver 8. S. Co. v. Rice, 288 v. 8.
445, 58 8. Ct. 421. There a person was injured on a vessel in navigable
waters. The person died in the State of Oregon. A suit was filed in
an Oregon court for the wrongful death as provided in an Oregon

statute. The Supreme Court of the United States held that ‘‘The
right to recover for death depends upon the law of the place of the
act or omission that caused it and not upon that of the place where
death occurred.’? See also Campbell v. Rio Grande Western R. Co.,
(Utah) 52 P. 594; Konold v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., (Utah) 51 P.
256; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 70 N.Y.S.
(2d) 697, Le. 700, 701 (2,8).

In Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.(2d) 804, Lc. 808 (2), the court said:
“True it is that the alleged negligent fabrication and construction
of the trailer hitch described in the complaint occurred in Illinois and
the case at bar was filed in that State, but the injuries to the plaintiff
and her husband were sustained in Iowa. The locus delicti is the
place where the accident occurred, and where the injuries. were in-
flicted, as distinguished from the place of the incipient negligence,
25 C.J.S., Death, Sec. 28, p. 1098; Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc, 2°
Cir., 110 F. 2d 970, 183 A.L.R. 255.’

In criminal cases, the venue is in the place where the wrong was
committed. For example: Suppose the defendants in this case had
been guilty of such a degree of negligence as would justify a prosecu-
tion for manslaughter. The venue of the crime would be in Pulaski
County and not in the City of St. Louis, Missouri. No manslaughter
prosecution would be maintained unless the victim died. It would be
immaterial where the victim died; the venue would be in the county
where the wrong was inflicted.

In construing a statute, the object to be accomplished must be con-
sidered. 82 C.J.S. 593, Sec. 323, and eases there cited. The purpose
of the statute in question was to fix venue in the State of Missouri
for the trial of cases based on negligent operation of motor vehicles
on the highways of this state by nonresidents of Missouri. See Sec-
tions 506.200-506.320 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. That being the purpose
of the statute, it necessarily follows that the proper venue of the suit
filed by William and Genevieve Sinders for the wrongful death of
their daughter is in the county where the alleged wrong was done.
‘We rule that the venue of this case under the admitted facts lies in
Pulaski County, Missouri.

Our preliminary rule in prohibition is made absolute. It is so
ordered. All concur.

Srare or Missouri, ex rel. Starz Highway Commission or Missouri,
Appellant, v. Granpison A. Goopson, Jz, and Exmasera C.
Goopson, Respondents, No. 44552—281 S.W. (2d) 858.

Division Two, July 11, 1955.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, September 12, 1955.

Robert L. Hyder, Ralph H. Duggins and Minor CG. Livesay for
appellant.

James Glenn and Arthur M. O’Keefe for respondents.

[859] BOHLING, C.—This is a condemnation proceeding arising
out of the relocation of U. S. Highway 36 across 216 acres of land
owned by Grandison A. and Elizabeth C. Goodson, Jr., husband and
wife, defendants, in Macon County, Missouri. We refer to the
parties as styled in the trial court. Plaintiff’s petition sought the
appropriation of 11.17 acres for new right-of-way and 2.47 acres for
permanent easement for a drainage ditch across the defendants’
Jand and the appointment of commissioners to assess the just compen-
sation due defendants therefor. Commissioners were appointed and
awarded defendants $1,065 net damages as just compensation. The
defendants filed exceptions to the report of the commissioners on the
sole ground the damages awarded were grossly inadequate and did
not constitute just compensation to defendants. Plaintiff contended
defendants were not damaged. A jury in the cireuit court awarded
defendants $10,000. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment
entered thereon. We have jurisdiction by reason of the amount in dis-
pute. State ex rel. Chariton River Drainage Dist. v. Montgomery,

Mo., 275 8. W. 2d 283, 284[1]. -

] Plaintiff attacks defendants’ instruction D-4, first contending

* the opening paragraph constitutes reversible error, especially in view
of defendant Goodson’s testimony. Instruction D~ 4 reads:

“The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff, State Highway
Commission, has, by law, the right to locate its highway over the
property of the defendants and thereby take their property without
consent and against their will; the law also declares that private
property shall not be taken or damaged without just compensation
to be paid to the owners; and what in this cause constitutes such a
just compensation is a question to be decided by your verdict.

“In passing wpon this question, if the jury find from the evidence
that the defendants’ property in question is damaged, then the jury
should allow the defendants:

“First, the fair reasonable market value of the property actually
taken by the plaintiff from the defendants’ land, as shown by the
evidence.

“And second, for such damages, if any, to the remainder of de-
fendants’ said Tand caused by the establishment, building and main-
tenance of the highway in question, over the defendants’ land, which
you may find from the evidence, defendants have sustained thereby ;
and the total amount found on ‘account of these two items, less any
special benefits, the amount of which has been proved, if any, as de-

fined in other instructions herein, as will accrue to defendants’ re-
maining property, will be your verdict for the defendants in this case,
if your verdict in this case is for the defendants.””

Plaintiff directs attention to the following testimony:

Defendant Goodson testified that after he ascertained what the
contemplated arrangements were for drainage: ‘‘I started immedi-
ately to defend myself.’’

“T’d tell the jury to give me another road [is] just like giving me
another wife. It can’t benefit me a bit.’”

“T’ve got two highways within one farm and it’s not pleasant.’’

Defendant organized a private drainage district: ‘‘Because the
highway department took it away from me.’’ ‘‘I meant we had
formed a drainage district and I knew that construction violated the
laws of the State of Missouri.’”’ .

Defendants stress State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Haid,
April 19, 1933, Bane, 382 Mo. 606, 607(1), 610[1,2], 59 8. W. 2d
1057, 1058[1-8]. Other defendant-cases are mentioned hereinafter.
[860] The Haid case was a certiorari proceeding to determine
whether the ruling upholding a like instruction in State ex rel. State
Highway Commission v. Caruthers, June 21, 1932, Mo. App., 51S. W.
2d 126, 130[5], conflicted with any prior ruling of the Supreme
Court upon a like or similar instruction; and it was correctly ruled it
did not. As disclosed in the Haid opinion, the only issue presented
to this court by said relator was that the paragraph ‘‘is an abstract
proposition of law and for that reason should not have been given.’
The Haid opinion next points out that the relator’s cases involved
rulings that it was not error to refuse an instruction stating an ab-
stract proposition of law; that such holdings were not rulings that
giving abstract instructions constituted reversible error; and that:
“Relator does not point to any decision of this court condemning an
instruction similar to the one under consideration. On the contrary, ©
respondents cite cases which approve such an instruction.’’ In so
ruling the court stated arguendo and by way of dictum that the in-
struction ‘‘could not have possibly prejudiced or injured the com-

. mission. It would seem more reasonable to assume that an instruction
informing the jury that the commission had a lawful right to take
what it was attempting to take would have tended to help rather than
harm the commission.’’ A case is only authority for what it actually
decides. The reasoning adopted is not a holding or a precedent.
State ex rel. Bixby v. St. Louis, 241 Mo. 231, 238 (I, a), 145 8. W. 801,
803[2, 3]. The issue of error on the merits was not urged here by the
Highway Commission in the Haid case, the Commission recognizing
that its only standing was to establish a conflict in rulings. An
opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals, the Huddleston case
discussed infra, holding a less objectionable paragraph reversible

error and stressed by plaintiff herein, was neither cited to nor
mentioned by the court in the Haid opinion.

Instructions approved by the trial court are copied in the opinions
cited by respondent in the Haid case but in none was the merits of a
like instruction presented for determination here. Consequently, no
conflict in rulings was established for quashing' the opinion of the
court of appeals. Said instructions were not as objectionable as the
instant instruction, except the property owner’s instruction in St.
Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co. v. Knapp, Stout & Co., 160 Mo. 396, 409 (IIT,
1), 61 S. W. 300, 303(8), which, so far as here involved, was an
appeal by the owner, who did not attack his given instructions. Nor
do we perceive of a valid reason for the owner objecting to the para-
graph under discussion. Property owners were the appellants in the
following cited cases: St. Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co. v. St. Louis
Union Stockyard Co., 120 Mo. 541, 552, 25 8. W. 399, 401; Chicago,
G. W. R. Co. v. Kemper, 256 Mo, 279, 293(III), 166 S. W. 291,
295[7], Ann. Cas. 1915D, 815; Southern Ill. & Mo. Br. Co. v. Stone,
194 Mo. 175, 182(2), 92 S. W. 475, 476(2). In Metropolitan St. R.
Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 898(1), 416(VI), 94 S. W. 860, 861(1),
868(6) ; Gary v. Averill, 8321 Mo. 840, 848, 12 S. W. 2d 747, 751[15],
the plaintiff-condemner appealed but the instant issue was not pre-
sented. We do not find the instant issue ruled by this court on the

vmerits.

In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Huddleston, July
22, 1982, Mo. App., 52 S. W. 2d 88, 34[2], the Springfield Court of
Appeals held a property owner’s less objectionable instruction erro-
neous in view of the evidence adduced. It read: ‘‘The court instructs
the jury that under the Constitution of the State, private property
cannot be taken for public use without just compensation being paid
to the owner. The plaintiff in this case has taken a strip of land
through defendants’ lands for the purpose of a highway. Your
verdict therefore must be for the defendants, unless,”’ in short, the
special benefits equaled or exceeded the value of the land taken and
the damages to the portion not taken. The owner testified he did not
know ‘“‘the difference in market value before and after the road was
put through’’; that ‘‘I love the place,” ‘‘I wanted to keep it’’; that
he would not have sold it at all if he could have helped it; and that
the farm was injured and ruined. [861] The court reasoned that the
assistance of the court was had solely because the parties could not
agree on the compensation and damages; that neither the court nor
the jury had anything to do with the location of the highway over
defendants’ land nor the justice of the taking of the land for that
purpose.

The Haid case, supra, and defendants’ other cases (ruling like in-
structions not prejudicially erroneous) differ in that we find in none
testimony similar to that found in the Huddleston and in this case.

In each of defendants’ cases the State Highway Commission as rela-
tor was plaintiff. They are State ex rel. v. Williams, Mo. App., 263
S. W. 2d 444, 446, 44873, 4]; State ex rel. v. Leftwich, Mo. App., 263
8. W. 2d 742, 745[4]; State ex rel. v. Boone, Mo. App., 52 8. W. 2d.
186,188; State ex rel. v. Bank of Lewis County, Mo. App., 102 8. W.
2d 774, 777; State ex rél. v. Stoddard Gin Co., Mo. App., 62 8. W.
2d 940, 948; State ex rel. v. Watkins, Mo. App., 51S. W. 2d 543,
545[7], and State ex rel. v. Hartman, 226 Mo. App. 604, 44 8. W. 24
169, 170[4, 5]. Some of the above cases cite the Haid case, supra, as
authority. In only the Williams and Stoddard Gin Co. cases do the
words ‘‘without their consent and against their will’? appear. From
the Williams’ opinion there were no facts of record to lead the court
to believe plaintiff was prejudiced. In the Stoddard Gin Co. case the
Highway Commission appealed from an order granting defendant a
new trial. The instant issue is not discussed. The court ordered the
verdict reinstated and judgment entered thereon. Less objectionable
instructions were before the court in the other cases. In the Leftwich
case the court considered the paragraph unnecessary, abstract in
nature, and best omitted; and observations to like effect are in the
Watkins and Hartman cases.

The State Highway Commission proceeds in condemnation pro-
ceedings in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 523, RSMo
1949 (see §§ 226.270 and 227.120(18)) ; and the sole question for the
jury to consider in the instant case under § 523.050 was the owners’
just compensation. Kansas City Sub. B. R. Co. v. Kansas City, St.
L. & C. R. Co., 118 Mo. 599, 617, 618, 24 S. W. 478, 483.

Cautionary instructions are of course proper where the record war-
rants, resting’ largely in the trial court’s discretion. The Kemper case
and Gary v. Averill, supra, among others. Practicing attorneys may
well question an instruction cautioning the jury in behalf of their
client when submitted by an opponent. The questioned paragraph
emphasizes evidence foreign to any issue with which the jury was
concerned. It may state an abstract proposition of law but the factual
situation implied in ‘‘without consent and against their will’’ does
not necessarily follow. The property owner may prefer the location
of the highway through his land over a location, say, a mile or more
from his land, and consider he is entitled to compensation because
some of his land is devoted to public use. ‘‘Without consent and
against their will’’ could only refer to and comment upon defendant
Goodson’s statements quoted above. Said statements presented no
fact issue and embraced no constitutive element for consideration in
arriving at the damages, the sole issue for the jury. The paragraph,
introducing the owners’ main damage instruction, is in apt language
to inflame the minds of the jurors, to arouse their sympathy for the
defendants and prejudice against the plaintiff, and for a verdict in
a larger amount than warranted by an impartial consideration of the

evidence. We conclude after a careful review of the authorities that
the record establishes reversible error.. Illinois, I. & M. R. Co. v.
Easterbrook, 211 Ill. 624, 71 N. B. 1116, 1118, so ruled a similar in-
struction.

We consider plaintiff's complaint against paragraph 4 (be-
ginning: ‘‘And second *’’) of instruction D-4 and the assignment
that the court erred in refusing plaintiff’s instruction B. Refused
instruction [862] B is known as a ‘‘measure of damages’’ instruction.
(difference between fair market value of the property before and
after condemnation) and paragraphs 3 and 4 of instruction D-4 are
known as an ‘“‘admeasurement of damages’’ instruction (value of
land actually taken and damage to remainder of tract, less special
benefits). State ex rel. Chariton River Drainage District v. Mont-
gomery, Mo., 275 8. W. 2d 283, 285[2,3]., Refused instruction B
conforms to instruction No. 1 in City Water Co. v. Hunter, 319 Mo.
1240, 6 S. W. 2d 565, 566[4], and that statement of the law stands
approved in other cases. See the Montgomery case, supra Le. 286,
quoting earlier cases; Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Shipp, 305 Mo. 663,
267 S. W. 647, 649[2]; State ex rel. State Highway Commission v.
Craighead, Mo. App., 65 S, W. 2d 145, 148[8], and cases cited. An
“‘admeasurement of damages’’ instruction, perhaps more appro-
priately worded, was approved in the Montgomery case. Plaintiff
admits like instructions have been approved. The Montgomery
opinion also ruled it was not error to refuse a ‘‘measure of damages’’
instruction where an ‘‘admeasurement of damages’’ instruction was
given, stating (lc. 286, 287): ‘‘But it seems each expression inclu-
sively defines as well as complements the other. The St. Louis Court
of Appeals [the Craighead case, supra] has nicely expressed it as
follows, ‘Of course, in the final analysis, the measure of damages in a
condemnation proceeding is the difference in the reasonable market
value of the entire tract before and after the appropriation of the
part taken. [Citing cases.] However, the same result may be and
usually is reached in another way, * * [by an admeasurement of
damages instruction].’’’ The foregoing answers the ‘‘point’’ made
in plaintiff’s brief. It is usually a safe rule to adopt an applicable
instruction which has uniformly met the approval of the appellate
courts. Refused instruction B meets this condition. While its refusal
has been held not error in the circumstances of record here, from the
language in the Montgomery case it could have been given to submit
plaintiff’s view of the issue. See also State ex rel. State’ Highway
Commission v. Williams, Mo. App., 263 S. W. 2d 444, 446, 449[5].
The addition of ‘‘or damaged’? to Art. 2, § 21, Mo. Const. -1875 (now
Art. 1, § 26, Mo. Const. 1945), reading: ‘‘That private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensa-
tion’? (see Mo. Const. 1865, Art. 1, § 16; Mo. Const. 1820, Art. 13, §
7) did not affect the then existing rule or add new elements of just

compensation, ‘‘or damaged’? applying when an owner’s property,
although not taken, was damaged. St. Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co. v.
Knapp, Stout & Co., 160 Mo. 896, 418, 61 S. W. 300, 304; Texas-Hm-
pire Pipe Line Co. v. Stewart, 331 Mo. 525, 55 8. W. 2d 283, 285[1-3].
After all, the jury is concerned ‘with the decrease in the reasonable
market value of the remainder of the tract on this specific aspect of
the compensation to be paid.

Plaintiff questions the quoted clause in defendants’ instruc-
tion D-6, defining ‘‘special benefits,’’ reading: ‘‘* * and not such
benefits as are shared in common with all other landowners who are
benefited solely from the fact of the building of the road.’? The in-
struction is a copy of defendants’ instruction No. 1 in State ex rel.
State Highway Commission v. Hartman, 226 Mo. App. 604, 44 S. W.
2d 169, 170. The court in the Hartman ease (1c. 171[9]) considered
the instruction not reversible error. A reading of State ex rel. State
Highway Commission v. Pittsburg Mtg. & Inv. Co., Mo. App., 86
S. W. 2d 944, 946[1], relied on by plaintiff to establish error, does
not sustain plaintift’s contention. The instruction in the latter case
was considered erroneous because of a statement to the effect that
special benefits are not shared by a ‘‘considerable number of other
property owners.’’ The court pointed out that special benefits could
be shared by a considerable number of other property owners on the
highway.

Hl Plaintiff states the court ‘erred in admitting evidence as to
drainage conditions that existed prior to the construction [863] of
the highway.’’ Defendant Goodson, whose qualifications are not
questioned, testified the 42 inch tube installed underneath the high-
way to drain defendants’ land would not provide an adequate
opening for that purpose. Plaintiff’s cross-examination of several of
defendants’ witnesses adduced corroborating testimony. ‘‘Where
land is flooded, or its drainage prevented, by the obstruction of the
flow of water, or its diversion from its natural channel, there is, in
general, such a taking or injury as entitles the owner to compensa-
tion”? 29 G. J. 8. 980, § 117. See 18 Am. Jur. 782, § 151, n. 19, and
Supplement § 161.1; Inter-River Drainage Dist. v. Ham, 275 Mo. 384,
204.8. W. 728, 724[2]; Rose v. City of St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509.

| | Plaintiff claims error in permitting defendants’ witness
Haynes, who had much experience in the real estate and appraisal
business, to take ‘‘into consideration the question of fencing’’ in his
testimony respecting defendants’ damages. The cost of fencing
when necessary is one of the elements that increases the just compen-
sation to the landowner, and evidence of the cost of suitable fencing
is competent to afford a means of arriving at the just compensation
for that burden. Howell v. Jackson County, 262 Mo. 403, 419, 171
8. W. 342, 347, quoting 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., § 741;
State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Haid, 332 Mo, 606, 59

8. W. 2d 1057, 1059; 29 CO. J. S. 1036, § 164; 18 Am. Jur. 909, § 268.
Plaintiff does not point out where the only remaining point
in plaintiff’s brief, which is in the form of an assignment of error on’
the exclusion of certain evidence, appears in the record or point out
wherein the authority cited to the point establishes error. In the
circumstances the matter thus presented is not for review. Scott v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co., 8833 Mo. 874, 62 S. W. 2d 834, 840[17, 18];
State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Cook, Mo. App., 161 8. W.
2d 691, 694[5]. :
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded. Barrett and
Stockard, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bomtine, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Epwarp A, Wiystow and Burnice L. Winstow, his wife, Appellants,
v. Riowarp SaunRwEIn and Joan Saverwmn, his wife, Respond-

ents, No. 44708—282 8. W. (2d) 14.

Division Two, September 12, 1955.

Hale W. Brown for appellants.

Meyer, Hoester & Coleman for respondents.

[14] STORCKMAN, J.—This suit in equity was brought by the
plaintiffs to enjoin the defendants from using and trespassing upon
‘a thirty foot strip of ground adjoining the east side of plaintiffs’ Lot
No. 5 in Hillcrest No. 3, a subdivision in St. Louis County. The de-
fendants filed an answer and counterclaim and the case was tried by
the court. Judgment was réndered dismissing both plaintiffs’ cause
of action and defendants’ counterclaim. The plaintiffs were allowed
a delayed appeal to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which court held
that title to real estate was involved and transferred the case to this
court. See Winslow v. Sauerwein, Mo.App., 272 8.W.2d 836.

The amended petition upon which the case was tried consisted
of two counts. The first count was substantially the same as the
original petition and alleged that [15] the disputed strip was set
aside as 4 private street by those who platted the subdivision and
that the plaintiffs were owners in fee simple of that portion of the
thirty foot strip east of plaintiffs’ lot No. 5. Count II (more fully
explained later) claimed only an easement in the disputed strip. De-
fendants’ counterclaim alleged that the thirty foot strip in dispute
was an open and public street; that the plaintiffs and the other
abutting property owners did not have any right, title or interest
in it, and prayed that judgment be rendered declaring the disputed
tract to be an open and public street, and further prayed that the
“Court ascertain the rights of all parties to this Cross Petition.”

The judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs’ bill and de-
fendants’ counterclaim is as follows:

“This cause having been heretofore submitted to the Court
upon the pleadings, evidence and proofs adduced, and the Court
having seen and heard the same and being now duly and fully
advised of and concerning the premises, finds the issues herein
joined in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs on
Count I and Count II of plaintiffs bill in equity and dismisses
plaintiff’s bill in equity, and the Court further finds the issues”
in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Sauerwein on said
defendants counter-claim. WHEREFORE, it is ordered and ad-

judged by the Court that plaintiff’s bill in equity be and is here-

by dismissed, and that defendants Sauerwein take nothing by

their counter-claim herein against plaintiffs and that said de-
fendants go hence without day and with their costs herein in-
curred. Memorandum of Court filed.’’

The memorandum referred to in the judgment is as follows:

“After hearing the evidence, reading and considering the
briefs and authorities, bearing upon the questions involved, the
Court finds as follows:

“J, That plaintiffs are the owners by the entirety of Lot 5 of
Hillerest No. 3, according to plat recorded in Plat Book 30,
page 103.

“2, That plaintiffs do not own the fee of the thirty-foot strip
in front of their lot, but merely have an interest or easement
therein, in common with others similarly situated, to use the
same for ingress and egress to their property, above described.

“3. That the thirty-foot strip is not a public street, but a pri-
vate right-of-way.

“4. That no single owner, alone, of any lot abutting on said
right-of-way thirty-feet wide, can maintain a suit of this nature
under the circumstances in this case.

“5, That in view of the above, neither plaintiffs Winslow nor
defendants Sauerwein (on their counter-claim) can recover, and
judgment will be entered accordingly today.’’ .

Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial was limited to Count II of
plaintiffs’ petition. The only relief the motion sought was to set aside
the judgment and decree ‘‘herein rendered in favor of defendants
and against these plaintiffs on Count II of plaintiffs’ petition.’’ De-
fendants did not file a motion for new trial, nor did they appeal.

For the purpose of determining the questions involved on this ap-
peal, Count I of plaintiffs’ petition and the defendants’ counterclaim
must be disregarded. The issues made by those pleadings have gone
out of the case completely because no allegations of error with respect
to their disposition were presented to the trial court by motions for
new trial. Section 512.160, RSMo 1949, provides that ‘‘no allegations
of error shall be considered in any civil appeal except such as have
been presented to or expressly decided by the trial court.’’ Rule 3.23
of the Rules of the Supreme Court is even more [16] definitive. In-
sofar as is pertinent here, Rule 3.23 provides ‘‘Allegations of error,
in order to be preserved for appellate review, must be presented to
the trial court in a motion for new trial.’’ The St. Louis Court of
Appeals recognized, in the recent case of Wright v. Ickenroth, Mo.
App., 215 S.W.2d 48, that it cannot pass upon matters not relied on
in the motion for new trial.

The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court is determined
by the kind of questions properly preserved and presented for review

on |

and such questions are not necessarily the same as those contested in
the trial court and determined by its judgment. For example, a
failure to raise a constitutional question in a motion for new trial
waives such question and it cannot be presented for the first time in
appellant’s brief. State ex rel. Wallach v. Oebler, 348 Mo. 655, 154
§8.W.2d 781. The review may be further limited by a failure to men-
tion a constitutional question in the appellate briefs. McGuire v.
Hutchison, 356 Mo. 203, 201 8.W.2d 822. The same rule, of course,
applies to all grounds upon which the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court depends, such as the amount in dispute (Lemonds v.
Holmes, Mo., 229 S.W.2d 691) and questioris involving title to real
estate (Pursley v. Pursley, Mo., 213 S.W.2d 291). In the latter case
the court stated, 213 S.W.2d 291, 292-293: ‘‘Plaintiff did not appeal
and the supposed issue of title tendered by the pleadings dropped
out of the case.’’

It is not necessary to determine whether Count I of plaintiffs’
amended petition or the defendants’ counterclaim involved questions
of title to real estate, because the issues raised by these pleadings
have not been preserved for review. Shanks v. St. Joseph Finance &
Loan Co., Mo., 163 8.W.2d 1017, 1019[4].

In order to determine if title to real estate is involved, we must
look to the more limited subject matter of Count II of plaintiffs’
amended petition which alleges in substance: Plaintiffs as husband
and wife are owners of Lot 5 of Hillcrest No. 3 by reason of a
warranty deed duly recorded July 18, 1940; that plaintiffs’ immedi-
ate predecessors in title, being the owners of all the lots in Hill-
erest No. 8, carved thirty feet from the eastern side of Lots 1, 2,
8, 4, 5 and 6, and made a private dedication of the strip so carved;
that plaintiffs and other owners of lots in Hillerest No. 3 have used
the private street sometimes referred to as Hillcrest Place as tenants
in common and plaintiffs ‘‘have an exclusive easement in common
with the other lot owners in HILLCREST NO. 8 for the private use
of the PRIVATE STREET so marked PRIVATS on the plat of said
HILLCREST NO. 8’’; that defendants and their agents and servants
have trespassed over, along and upon the easement against plaintiffs’
wishes; that defendants ‘‘have no right, title or interest to the
realty so being used by them’’ and ‘‘these plaintiffs along with the
other land owners in HILLCREST NO. 8 have an exclusive easement
to use the said Private Street’’; that plaintiffs have repeatedly asked
defendants to desist from using! said private street but defendants
have refused and threaten to continue the acts of using the realty to
which they have no right, title or interest. Plaintiffs allege they
have no adequate remedy at law and pray for an order ‘‘enjoining
defendants and their agents and servants acting under and for them
from further using and trespassing over, along and upon the Private
Street described in Plat of HILLCREST NO. 3 which is recorded in

Plat Book 30, Page 103, of the St. Louis County Records’’ and
damages of $1000.00.

Besides specific responses to the paragraphs of the petition, the
answer of defendants Sauerwein consisted of a general denial and
a plea that plaintiffs never owned the street or any portion of it and
plaintifis ‘‘have no right, title or interest in said property as set
forth in plaintiffs’ petition.’’! We do not need to consider plaintiffs’
[17] reply to defendants’ counterclaim, since it went out of the case
with the counterclaim.

Of the cases cited by respondent, Linders v. Linders, 856 Mo. 852,
204 S.W.2d 229, and Gerber v. Schutte Inv. Co., 354 Mo. 1246, 194
8.W.2d 25, deal with the methods of determining what issues were
submitted in the trial of the case and are not helpful on this appeal.
In the Chapman v. Schearf cases, Mo.App., 220 S.W.2d 757, and 360
Mo, 551, 229 S.W.2d 552, both the court of appeals and the supreme
court recognized that it was the request in plaintiff’s petition that
title to the road across defendant’s land be quieted that vested ap-
pellate jurisdiction in the supreme court. Title adjudication was the
very relief sought in that case. In the case at bar, only injunctive re-
lief against trespass is sought by Count II of the amended petition
and neither party claims to be the owner of the fee. The collateral
or incidental question is whether the easement for traveling is public
or private.

The finding in the ‘‘Memorandum of Court’’ that plaintiffs had
an interest or easement in common with others similarly situated for
ingress and egress to their property, and that the tract was not a
public street but a private right-of-way, was decided only as an in-
cident or step in the ultimate disposition of Count II by dismissal.
This, the memorandum stated, was because no single owner of any
Jot abutting on said thirty foot right-of-way could maintain the suit.
Consistent with the prior decisions of this court, we hold that this
case on appeal does not involve title to real estate within the meaning
of Article V, § 8 of the 1945 Constitution of Missouri. In the recent
ease of Judge v. Durham, Mo., 274 8.W.2d 247 (1955), the contro-
versy was between adjoining landowners with respect to an alleged
driveway easement. The relief, granted as prayed, was a permanent
injunction against interference with the easement. On appeal this
court held (274 8.W.2d Le. 250): ‘The mere fact that it may be
necessary to determine the existence or the ownership of an alleged
easement in order to rule the ultimate issue presented in the cause,

The transcript does not show the filing or refiling of an answer to the
amended petition, but apparently the parties and court treated the case as if
defendants’ answer and counterclaim filed to the original petition had been
refiled and we so consider it for the present purpose. The pleadings of ad-
ditional parties brought into the case on application of the original de-

fendants need not be considered since the issues on appeal are between the
plaintiffs and defendants Sauerwein.
[| .

and that such is done by the trial court, does not give this court ap-
pellate jurisdiction on the ground that title to real estate is involved,
* * #” See also McClard v. Morrison, Mo., 273 S.W.2d 225; Gibson
v. Sharp, Mo., 270 8.W.2d 721; Pursley v. Pursley, Mo., 213 8.W.2d
291; Norman v. Summerfield Jones Const. Co., 819 Mo. 599, 4 8.W.2d
1064; Sikes v. Turner, Mo., 242 S.W, 940; Heath v. Beck, Mo., 225
S.W. 998; Dillard v. Sanderson, 282 Mo. 436, 222 S.W. 766.

The respondents filed in this court a motion entitled ‘‘Motion to
Remand’’ which prays that ‘‘the cause be remanded to the St. Louis
Court of Appeals, with instructions that the above cause be dis-

" missed.’’? Since no grounds exist for jurisdiction in the supreme
court, it is ordered that the case be retransferred to the St. Louis
Court of Appeals. To that extent only respondents’ motion is sus-
tained; in all other particulars the motion is overruled since the
court of appeals and not this court has jurisdiction to determine the.
ease on appeal. All concur.

Srare or Missouri, Upon the Relation of Waurer H, Tosrrman,
Secretary of State of Missouri, M. E. Morris, Director of Reve-
nue of Missouri, and Hues H. Waaconmr, Superintendent,
Missouri State Highway Patrol, Relators, v. Tas HonoraBie
Joun F. Cook, Judge, Division 2, Sixteenth Judicial Cireuit of
Missouri, Respondent, No. 44732—281 S.W. (2d) 777.

Court en Banc, September 12, 1955.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and .Will F. Berry, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, for relators.

John M. Records and Tweedie Fisher for respondent.

[778] HOLLINGSWORTH, J.—Original proceeding in prohibi-
tion. Relators, respectively, the Secretary of State of Missouri, the
Director of Revenue of Missouri, and the Superintendent of Missouri
State Highway Patrol, seek to prohibit respondent, Judge of the
Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Division No. 2, from asserting
and attempting to exercise jurisdiction over their persons in a cer-
tain cause, numbered 578,639, filed in the circuit court of Jackson
County, at Kansas City, and pending before respondent, entitled
Transport Manufacturing & Equipment Co., a Corporation, and
Riss & Company, Inc., a Corporation, plaintiffs, vs. Walter H. Tober-
man, Secretary of State of Missouri, Missouri State Highway Com-
mission, Harris D. Rodgers, Chairman, Missouri State Highway Com-
mission, M. E. Morris, Director of Revenue of Missouri, Missouri State
Highway Patrol, Col. Hugh H. Waggoner, Superintendent, Missouri
State Highway Patrol, defendants.

Two issues are presented: (1) whether relators entered their gener-
al appearance in said suit and thereby waived any ground of com-

_ ee

plaint against respondent, and (2) whether the petition in said suit
states a cause of action under the popularly so-called Administrative
Procedure and Review Act, §§ 536.010-536.140 RSMo 1949, V.A.MS.,
so as to subject relators (as defendants in said action) to the venue
provisions of § 536.050, the pertinent part of which reads as follows:,
“The power of the courts of this state to render declaratory judg-
ments shall extend to declaratory judgments respecting the validity
of rules [of administrative agencies], or of threatened applications
thereof, and such suits may be maintained against agencies whether
or not the plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon the
question presented. The venue of such suits against agencies shall,
at the option of the plaintiff, be in the circuit court of Cole county,
or in the county of the plaintiff’s residence, or if the plaintiff is a
corporation, domestic or foreign, having a registered office or business
office in this state, in the county of such registered office or business
office. * * #7

(All statutory references herein following are to RSMo 1949,
V.A.MS.)

The petition in said suit alleges:

1. It is an action for a declaratory judgment and injunction and
venue thereof is conferred upon the Circuit Court of Jackson County
under § 536.050,

2, Plaintiff Transport Manufacturing & Equipment Co., herein-
after referred to as ‘““TM&EH”’, is a corporation organized under the
laws of Illinois, licensed to do business in Missouri and other states,
and has a general office in Kansas City, Missouri. Riss & Company,
hereinafter referred to as ‘‘RISS’’, is an intrastate and interstate
common carrier of freight by motor vehicle, organized under the
laws of Colorado, licensed to do business in Missouri and other states,
has a general office in Kansas City, and holds proper certificates of
convenience and necessity from each of the appropriate agencies of
the various states through which it operates.

8. TM&E owns a large number of over-the-road tractor-trailer
trucks which are leased to RISS. Some of these trucks bear title
certificates and licenses from states other than Missouri. RISS con-
currently has ‘‘lessee titles’’ and licenses to such vehicles in Missouri.
In the conduct of its business, RISS has leased from TMGE and
others large numbers of such vehicles. .

4. Defendants are administrative officials or agencies as defined
in § 586.010 (1), [779] or members of such agencies, having juris-
diction or power to regulate interstate and intrastate motor carriers
or power to require the purchase of motor vehicle registration plates
and exact fees for the operation of motor vehicles over the highways
of Missouri as prescribed by the statutes and Constitution of Missouri,
or power to police and enforce such statutes and the policies, rules
and regulations of defendant administrative officials or agencies.

5. During 1954 the Missouri State Highway Patrol, ‘‘acting upon
requests, orders, directives, or rulings, the exact nature of which
is unknown to these plaintiffs, issuing from and promulgated and
disseminated by one or all of the other defendants or their agents
separately or in concert with each other, but the exact origin of which
is unknown to these plaintiffs, did arrest or cause to be arrested
certain drivers who were agents and employees of plaintiff RISS
while such drivers were operating tractor-trailer trucks in the service
of plaintiff RISS, some of which trucks were owned by plaintiff
TM&E, and some of which were owned by others, but all of which
were under lease to plaintiff RISS ; that said Missouri State Highway
Patrol personnel issued summonses directing said RISS drivers to
appear before magistrates in the counties of St. Louis, Franklin,
Crawford, Phelps and Greene in Missouri and on occasion did take
said drivers before such magistrates and did charge them with
operating motor vehicles upon the highways of the State of Missouri
with improper or invalid registration plates thereon in violation of
RSMo 1949 Chapter 301 in that the plates were not Missouri registra-
tion plates, but were plates of other states; * * *.’”

6. Said acts and the threatened continuance thereof are doing and
will do plaintifis great and irreparable injury.

7. The aforesaid action of defendants ‘‘has been and is predicated
upon a misinterpretation of RSMo 1949 Chapter 301 that by such
statute RISS is the ‘owner’ of all commercial vehicles operated
in its service such that those vehicles must be registered in Missouri
and bear Missouri license plates.’’

8. The petition then alleges plaintiffs’ conclusions of law as to the
proper and lawful interpretation of Chapter 301, and especially §
301.010 (16) and § 301.270, the latter section authorizing non-resi-
dents to operate certain commercial motor vehicles in this state with-
out registration or fee, provided the state in which such vehicles are
registered extends like exemptions to vehicles registered under the
laws of this state. The petition concludes with a prayer for findings
(1) that RISS is not an ‘‘owner’’ within the meaning of Chapter 301;
(2) that TM&E is entitled to reciprocity under § 301.270; and for
injunctive relief.

Upon the filing of the petition in said action, summons was served
upon the defendants named therein (including relators) in Cole
County and not elsewhere, and respondent, without hearing, caused.
to be issued to the defendants in said suit (including relators) an
order temporarily restraining them from arresting or causing the
arrest of RISS employees operating motor vehicles leased from
TM&E.

Thereafter, relators, expressly limiting their appearance to the
purpose of the motion, moved to dismiss the suit for lack of juris-
diction, alleging therein (1) that each of them was a state officer

having an office in Cole County; (2) that neither of them had been
personally served with process in Jackson County; and (3) that said
suit was not one for a declaratory judgment respecting the validity of
any rule or threatened application of any rule within the meaning of
§ 536.050. The motion was by respondent overruled and this pro-
ceeding ensued.

It is admitted that none of the defendants in said suit resides in
Jackson County and no suggestion is made that there is any provision
of law authorizing the filing of said suit against them or either of
them in Jackson County, other than the limited authority of §
536.050.

Hl [780] Respondent insists that inasmuch as relators in their
motion to dismiss objected only ‘‘to the jurisdiction over their person
for the sole purpose of the Declaratory Judgment proceeding, but did
not object to jurisdiction over their person in the Temporary Re-
straining Order proceeding’’, they have entered their general ap-
pearance in the Jackson County Cireuit Court and cannot now com-
plain of improper venue. In the motion to dismiss, as above stated, rela-
tors appeared specially and only for the purpose of the motion. They
prayed an ‘‘order of the circuit court finding that it does not have
jurisdiction of the persons of movants and that the proper venue of
this cause is not in the cireuit court for the County of Jackson,
State of Missouri.’”? In refraining from asking any further or
affirmative relief, relators did only what under the old civil code was
generally done in order to avoid a charge of having invoked the juris-
diction of the court by asking affirmative relief and thereby pleading
themselves into an entry of appearance, and which, under the new
civil code, they are no longer so strictly required to refrain from
doing. §§ 509.290 (2) and 509.340. Obviously, if respondent had
not and could not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of defendants
in said action, then his temporary restraining order would be inopera-
tive in any event. Relators did not enter their general appearance in
the Jackson County Cireuit Court.

Hl In determining the merits of this proceeding we are not con-
cerned whether the plaintiffs in the suit in question have pleaded or
can amend their petition so as to plead a cause of action against the
defendants named therein. Our only concern is whether the petition
states or can be amended to state a cause of action that gives rise to
the special venue provisions of § 536.050. If the facts pleaded in the
petition show that they do not and cannot present a justiciable issue
as to the validity of a rule or rules (promulgated by relators as ad-
ministrative agencies) or of the threatened applications thereof by
them within the meaning and fair intendment of the so-called Ad-
ministrative Procedure and Review Act, then venue of said action
does not lie in Jackson County. In other words, the plaintiffs in said
action may not by mere allegation in their petition that venue lies in

Jackson County under § 536.050 subject relators to the special (and
onerous) venue provisions thereof. This for the reason that, unless
otherwise provided by statute, the venue of actions against executive
heads of departments of state government lies generally in the
county in which their offices are located and their principal official
duties are performed, State ex rel. Gardner v. Hall, 282 Mo. 425, 221
S.W. 708, 711-712, and we judicially know that relators are heads of
executive departments of state government and their offices are lo-
cated in and their principal official duties are required to be per-
formed at the State Capital in Jefferson City.

The word ‘‘rule’’, as used in § 536.050, means, as defined in §
536.010, ‘‘every regulation, standard, or statement of policy or inter-
pretation of general application * * * adopted by an agency * * *
to implement or make specific the law enforced or administered by it
or to govern its organization or procedure * * *.’’ Section 536.020
provides that a certified copy of every rule promulgated under the
Administrative Procedure and Review Act shall be filed in the office
of the secretary of state and that such rules become effective ten days
after filing unless a later date is required by statute or in the rules. °
See also Art. IV, § 16, Constitution of Missouri. Nowhere in the
petition do the plaintiffs in said action plead any rule or attack the
validity of any rule promulgated by relators, or any of them, or any
threatened application of any such rule, within the meaning of said
act. What the petition really seeks is a judicial declaration that RISS
drivers are not guilty of any criminal violation of Chapter 301,
relating to registration of commercially operated motor vehiéles and
that highway patrolmen should therefore be enjoined from arresting
them. Such a declaration involves judicial construction of a statute
as distinguished [781] from any rule made by relators or any of
them.

Hl It appearing that respondent does not have jurisdiction over
‘the persons of relators but does assume so to have, prohibition is the
proper remedy. State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 235
S.W. 2d 304, 307 [8]; State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029,.
238 S.W. 2d 393, 396 [4].

Our provisional rule in prohibition is made absolute. All concur.

Srarr or Missounrt, on the Information of Joun M. Davron, Attorney
General, Relator, v. Harry F, Russrni, Respondent, No. 44651—
281 §. W. (2d) 781.

Court en Bane, September 12, 1955.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and C. B. Burns, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General, for relator.

Paul Bakewell, Jr., for respondent; Bakewell, Bakewell & Cramer
of counsel.

[781] LEEDY, C. J.—Original action in quo warranto brought by
the Attorney General ex-officio. The first count of the amended in-
formation (seeking ouster of respondent from office as ‘“‘a judge of
the State of Missouri’’) has been abandoned; the object of the other,
or second, count, as disclosed by its prayer, is that respondent, Harry
F, Russell, ‘‘be ousted from the exercise of the franchise of practicing
law during his term of office as a Judge of the State of Missouri,
and while receiving pay as a Judge of the State of Missouri.’’

The facts are not in dispute, and in brief, are these: Respondent,
who had served several successive terms as a Judge of the Highth
Judicial Circuit of Missouri, was, at the general election held in
November, 1952, retained in that office, under the non-partisan court
plan (Art. V, § 29, [782] Const. of Mo.) for a six-year term expiring
December 31, 1958. Subsequently, on October 10, 1953, upon proper
proceedings then pending before it, and in conformity with Art. V,
§ 27, Const. of Mo., the Committee on Retirement of Judges and
Magistrates unanimously found Judge Russell to be ‘“‘unable to dis-
charge the official duties of his office of Cireuit Judge of the Highth
Judicial Cireuit, St. Louis, Missouri, with efficiency by reason of such
continued sickness and infirmities [the exact nature of which the
findings had previously described]; and that his disability is per-
manent . . ..’? Said findings were thereupon entered upon the perma-
nent records of the committee, as directed by Supreme Court Rule
12.07, and the committee forthwith issued an order reading (in-
sofar as here pertinent): ‘‘. .. that effective at the close of this
day Harry F. Russell be retired from his office as Circuit Judge of the
Highth Judicial Cireuit; that thereafter he receive one-half his
regular compensation until the end of his term of office . . ..’? After
having been so retired from office, respondent has admittedly
practiced law (to a very limited extent), meanwhile receiving one-
half the regular compensation formerly paid him as a circuit judge.

The question presented is whether, under the facts and circum-
stances above outlined, respondent Russell presently continues to be
a judge within the meaning of (and, hence, amenable to) that pro-
vision of Art. V, § 24, Const. of Mo., which interdicts the practice of
law or the doing of law business by judges and magistrates.

Art. V, § 27 of the Constitution, conferring authority upon a
committee to retire judges from office for disability, reads, in perti-
nent part, as follows: ‘‘Any judge of a court of record or magis-
trate who is unable to discharge the duties of his office with efficiency
by reason of continued sickness or physical or mental infirmity shall
be retired from the office by order of a committee . . . after notice
and a fair hearing and on a finding of two-thirds of the committee

that the disability is permanent. The judge so retired shall receive
one-half his regular compensation until the end of his term of
office... .”?

The two new and distinctive features introduced into our organie
law by the foregoing section upon the adoption of our Constitution in
1945 were these: (1) Supplanting the former cumbersome method
of removal of judges from office for disability (through action by the
General Assembly with the approval of the Governor, Art. VI, § 41,
Const. of 1875) with a speedier, more flexible and efficient committee
system; and (2) providing for compensating a judge so removed
“until the end of his term of office.’’ It may be said at this juncture
that it is upon the meaning to be ascribed to the foregoing italicized
words of § 27 that this case turns.

At the time of the adoption of the new Constitution there was also
in effect a statute (§ 2043, RSMo 1939, which has been carried forward
into the 1949 revision as § 478.027, VAMS) under which the authority
of a disabled circuit judge (one ‘‘unable to qualify for any cause, or
to discharge his duties or hold his courts from continued sickness
or mental or physical infirmity’’) might be suspended (pending his
recovery) by the Governor appointing a judge pro tem. Such sus-
perision of the regular judge’s ‘“‘pbwer to act’’ continued until the
Governor became satisfied of his competency in all respects to act as
judge. Meanwhile the appropriate governmental unit was required
to pay full salaries to both. But that statute says nothing about, nor
does it seem designed to cover a situation involving, permanent dis-
ability, a deficiency which § 27 corrects by providing that a judge so
disabled ‘‘shall be retired from the office,’’ ete.

That the committee’s action in Judge Russell’s case created a
vacancy in the cireuit judgeship theretofore held by him, and the .
necessity for, and the fact of, the appointment of a successor is
conceded by relator. Accordingly, he agrees that respondent is not
now a judge of any court, and that he is not eligible for even’ tempo-
vary judicial service under the provision of Art. V, § 6, [783] which
authorizes the temporary transfer of ‘‘judicial personnel’’ from one
court to another. Notwithstanding this, and seizing upon the pro- .
vision of § 27 that a ‘‘judge so retired shall receive one-half his
regular compensation umtil the end of his term of office,’’ and partic-
ularly the words just italicized, relator, on the basis of that language
alone, contends that respondent ‘‘is still a judge of the state of
Missouri.”’? The essence of his whole argument on this point appears
in these excerpts from his brief: That ‘‘no person can have a ‘term
of office’ unless he occupies .an office ;’’ that the section ‘‘specifically
provides itself that a person retired under such section actually has
a ‘term of office’ and, therefore, holds the office, which office, of course,
is that of judge. . . . Therefore, since respondent will, under the
provisions of Section 27 of Article V of the Constitution, continue

to receive one-half of his regular compensation until the end of ‘his
term of office,’ we submit that the respondent is at present occupying
the position of judge of the state of Missouri.’’

“The right to hold the office of judge, from whatever source that
right is derived, depends on the existence of the office.” 48 O.J.S.,
Judges, § 4.

The Constitution vests the judicial power of the state in certain
courts, namely, ‘‘a supreme court, courts of appeals, circuit courts,
probate courts, the St. Louis courts of criminal correction, the existing
courts of common pleas, magistrate courts and municipal corporation
courts.’”? Art. V, § 1. Turning now to definitions: ‘‘The word judge
is defined by Bouvier to be, ‘A public officer lawfully appointed to
decide litigated questions according to law. This, in its most extensive
sense, includes all officers who are appointed to decide such questions,
and not only judges properly so called but also justices of the peace and
jurors, who are judges of the facts in issue. In its more limited sense,
the term judge signifies an officer who is so named in his commis-
sion and who presides in some court.’’’ State ex rel. Lafayette
County v. O’Gorman, 75 Mo. 370, 375-376. ‘‘Judge—One who pub-
licly is charged with and performs judicial functions; one who pre-
sides at the trial of causes involving justiciable matters in which the
public at large is interested... .’’ Ballentine’s Law Dict.
(1948). ‘‘ ‘Judge’ is a term employed to designate a public officer
selected to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice.”
48 C.J.S., Judges, § 2. ‘A judge may be defined as a public officer,
who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial powers.’ 30 Am.
Tur., Tudges, § 2; Todd v. U. S., 158 U.S, 278, 280; U. 8. v. Clark, 1
Gallison, 497.

Relator would concede the untenability of his position had the
words in question been ‘‘until the end of the term for which he was
elected.’’ He points to that provision of the Constitution (Art. TIT,
§ 12) régarding the acceptance of appointive office or employment by
a member of the General Assembly ‘‘during the term for which he
was elected’? as demonstrating that the framers of the Constitution
“clearly realized that there is a difference between ‘his term of
office’? and the period covering the time during the term for which
a person is elected.’’ His only other authority is a New York statute
(29 McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, § 24)
in relation to compensation of certain judges after removal, which
relator says makes a difference between a ‘‘term of office”? and the
“term for which he was elected.’’ We find it inapposite. Such statute
provides that a judge within its protection shall continue to receive
one-half his salary ‘‘until the expiration of the term for which he
was elected, or until the time fixed by this section.’’ There the sub-
ject matter was dealt with comprehensively by detailing, among
other things, the time, manner and limits (in amount) of such pay-

ments, and for the cessation thereof upon the death of such judge, or
when attaining 70 years of age notwithstanding the term for which
he was elected had not yet expired. It is not to be supposed that our
organic law would descend into such particularities. [784] The fail-
ure or omission to use the phrase ‘‘until the end of the term for which
he was elected’’ foreclosed any question as to whether the legal rep-
resentatives, heirs or assigns of a Judge so retired, and whose demise
occurred prior to the expiration of the term for which he was elected
would be entitled to receive, either in a lump sum or in instalments,
the amounts aceruing after such demise ‘‘until the end of the term
for which he was elected.’’ It seems the omission of such phrase in
the present instance was not the result of inadvertence. Moreover,
the very section of the Constitution respondent is charged with having
violated by reason of practicing law (Art. V, § 24) contains this
further provision, ‘‘. . . but no judge’s salary shall be diminished
during his term of office.’? That language, without the familiar
qualifying phrase ‘‘except as otherwise provided in this Constitution,’’
or words of like import (with instances of which the Constitution
fairly bristles), negates the idea that a judge retired for disability
under § 27 thereafter has a live and subsisting ‘‘term of office,’’ this
because a contrary view would result in irreconcilable conflict between
these two sections—the one prohibiting, and the other effecting,
diminution of a judge’s salary during his term of office.

We think that the language ‘‘until the end of his term of office’
was not used in the sense that, paradoxically, a judge ‘‘so retired’’
shall remain in office notwithstanding his removal; on the contrary,
it means so much of the period for which he had been elected or
appointed as would have been served by him had § 27 not become
applicable to his situation. To rule otherwise would be to say that
upon being retired from the office of circuit judge respondent then
became the occupant of a judgeship, but he was no longer the judge
of any court—a judgeship without form, structure, duties, functions,
and wholly devoid of judicial power or authority, and having the
single incident of the right to receive, during a limited period, one-
half the regular compensation formerly received by him as a circuit
judge. It is apparent that such a person is not a judge, and hence not
within the purview of Art. V, § 24 of the Constitution.

The ouster prayed must be, and it is, denied.

Dalton, Hollingsworth, Hyde, Westhues, JJ., and Cave, Special J.,
coneur; Eager and Storckman, JJ., not sitting because not members
of the court when cause was submitted.

bo

" ae

Gzorcz G. Asuury, Respondent, v. Paut G. Wiut1sms, Administrator
of the Estate of Gzorez W. Minnick, Deceased, Appellant, No.
44633—281 8. W. (2d) 875.

Division Two, September 12, 1955.

Mt

Thompson & Thompson for appellant.

* Ld

Russell D. Farris, Eugene A. Farris and Wilson D. Hill for re-
spondent.

[877] STORCKMAN, J.—The plaintiff, George G. Ashley, filed
his claim in probate court against the decedent estate of his father-
in-law, George W. Minnick, to recover the reasonable value of services
rendered to Mr. Minnick during’ the last years of his life, a period of

about eight years. The claim was certified to circuit court where a
jury returned a verdict for $12,000 in favor of plaintiff. From the
judgment rendered thereon the defendant, Paul G. Williams, ad-
ministrator of the estate of George W.. Minnick, deceased, has taken
this appeal.

George W. Minnick had been a widower for many years, He had
four living children, two sons and two daughters. He owned a 47
acre farm in Clay County just across the Ray County line, on which
he had lived in recent years. A son, William Orville Minnick, and
his wife lived on the farm with him for a period of about three and
a half years. Orville’s wife wanted to go back to the Ozarks where
she had a farm, so Orville and she moved away in March, 1943.
Thereafter the farm and its improvements were rented for cash or
shares of the crops. Mr. Minnick continued to live on the farm alone,
cooking his own meals, until October, 1945. One daughter, Allie,
married to the plaintiff, George G. Ashley, lived’with her husband and
their family on a farm about five and one-half miles southwest of
Richmond in Ray County. In 1945 Mr. Minnick was 81 years of age,
and it had become apparent that he was no longer able to stay by
himself. During the latter part of September Mr. Minnick talked with
his daughter, Allie Ashley, about coming to live in the Ashley home.
About a week later Mr. Minnick talked to George Ashley in Allie’s
presence about the same matter. Shortly thereafter, in early October
1945, he moved into the Ashley home where he lived until the time of
his death on July 9, 1953. Although it is not clear as to the kind of
her employment, it appears that while Mr. Minnick lived in the Ashley
home Allie Ashley ‘‘was out working, making a living’’ and she ‘‘was
bringing in the food to eat.’? Further details of the evidence will be
referred to in the course of the opinion.

Errors assigned are: (a) In permitting the witness, Allie Ashley,
to testify to the terms of the contract with the deceased since defend-
ant contended she was a party to the contract; (b) In not directing a
verdict for the defendant for the reason that there is no substantial
evidence that a contract existed between George Minnick and his
son-in-law, George Ashley, to care for him for pay; (c) In permitting
a practical nurse to testify in response to a hypothetical question with
respect to the value of the services alleged to have been rendered by
the plaintiff; (d) In giving and reading to the jury plaintiff’s in-
struction No. 1, because it permitted recovery for the furnishing of
food, washing of clothes and furnishing a home to defendant’s dece-
dent when there was no evidence of the value of such services, and
further that it failed to limit the recovery to the services of nursing
and caring’ for defendant’s decedent, and that (e) The verdict of
$12,000 is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court
and to show that the discretion of the jury has been arbitrarily exer-
cised_and abused.

Hl We will frst consider the question of whether there is sub-
stantial evidence that there was a contract or mutual understanding:
that the plaintiff would be compensated for the services rendered by.
him to his father-in-law, George W. Minnick. For the reasons later
referred to, all the evidence in this record on appeal may be con-_
sidered in determining this issue. In reviewing this question, the
evidence most favorable to the plaintiff must be accepted [878] as.
true, the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all reasonable in-
ferences arising from such evidence, and all evidence unfavorable to
the plaintiff must be disregarded. Stephens v. Kansas City Gas Co.,
354 Mo. 835, 191 8.W.2d 601; Sibert v. Boger, Mo., 260 S.W.2d 569.
For numerous other cases, see Mo. Digest, Appeal and Error, Key No.
927[5], and Trial, Key No. 156[3].

The controlling evidence is that somewhere between the middle
and the latter part of September, 1945, Allie Ashley talked to- her,
father about his staying at the Ashley home, and he wanted to talk
to the plaintiff, George Ashley, about it. Allie Ashley testified that
“Cwe went back the following Sunday, and he [Mr. Minnick] talked
to George, and he made.a statement to George also.’’ Her father made
an agreement with her and he also made a second agreement with her
husband George. She heard the conversation between her father and
her husband and her father told George that ‘‘if it was all right with
him, that he would come there and stay with, with him, and that he
wanted him [George] to have what he had at his death”’ and ‘‘that he
[George] was to care for him”’ [Mr. Minnick]. Thereafter her father
moved to the Ashley home where he stayed and was cared for by the
plaintiff except for an interval that Mr. Minnick was in the hospital
and at a nursing home when the plaintiff became ill. On cross exam-
ination, witness Allie Ashley testified that she did not-present an
account to her father because ‘‘that agreement was between my hus-
band and my father,’’ and on redirect examination the witness testi-
fied without objection that her husband did not present an account
or bill to her father during his lifetime because the agreement had
been made ‘‘between my husband and my father’’ before her father
came to live with them, and that ‘‘there had been a prior agreement.’”

Walter Hicks testified that Mr. Minnick had told him that George |
and Allie were ‘‘awful good to me’’ and that ‘‘I made my will and
I left everything to George and Allie.’ Mrs. Walter. Hicks testified
that Mr. Minnick told her that he had done better than making a
will, that he had made deeds out to George and Allie. Jake Spor
testified that he had tried to buy the Minnick place and Mr. Minnick
told him that he would not sell it because he intended for George
Ashley and Allie to have it at his death. Silas M. Smith, another
neighbor and friend, testified that Mr. Minnick had told him that he
liked living with George and Allie and that he was well treated, and

that when he was gone he wanted George and Allie to have what he
had for taking care of him.

In view of this testimony and the other facts and circumstances in
evidence, we hold that there was substantial evidence of an agreement
or mutual understanding between the plaintiff and George W. Min-
nick that the plaintiff should be compensated for the services rendered
to George W. Minnick, thereby rebutting the presumption arising out
of the family relationship that the services were performed gratui-
tously. In the case of Nibler v. Coltrane, Mo., 275 §.W.2d 270, the
agreement sued on was that the claimant, a niece, was to receive
whatever property the survivor of two aunts should have at her death
if the niece lived with them, remained unmarried, and performed
certain services. The proof was held sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption that the services in question were gratuitously rendered.
and to permit the plaintiff niece to recover the reasonable value of her
services. See also Vosburg v. Smith, Mo. App., 272 S.W.2d 297;
In Re Stein’s Estate, Mo.App., 177 S.W.2d 678; and Joseph v. Joseph,
Mo.App., 164 S.W.2d 145. In support of his contention that there
was no substantial evidence of an agreement to pay for the services
rendered, the defendant cites the cases of Nelson v. Poorman’s
Estate, Mo.App., 215 8.W. 753; Trantham v. Gullic, Mo.App., 201
8.W.2d 522; Vosburg v. Smith, supra; and Roller v. Montgomery’s
Estate, Mo. App., 80 S.W.2d 246. In the Vosburg case the evidence
was sufficient and a recovery permitted. In the other cases no agree-
ment was proved nor were there facts or circumstances from which
a jury could infer an agreement.

[879] The defendant further contends that the evidence on the
agreement to pay is so contradictory that ‘‘it is equivalent of insuf-
ficient evidence,’ citing cases typical of which is Adelsberger v.
Sheehy, 332 Mo. 954, 59 §.W.2d 644, wherein it is stated (59 S.W.
2d Le. 647): ‘“Where'a party relies on the testimony of a single
witness to prove a given issue, and the testimony of such witness is
contradictory and conflicting, one version thereof tending to prove
the issue, the other tending to disprove it, with no explanation of the
contradiction, and no other fact or circumstance in the case tending
to show which version of the evidence is true, no case is made, and the
jury should not be permitted to speculate or guess which statement of
the witness should be accepted. * * *’’ The testimony of Allie Ashley
on the issue of whether there was an understanding or agreement that
the plaintiff would be paid for the services he rendered to Mr. Minnick
was not contradictory or conflicting. She consistently testified that
her father did agree to pay for the services to be rendered. The un-
certainty was whether plaintiff’s compensation was to be a joint or a
several interest in the property of the deceased. The defendant’s
theory and contention below was that there was only one contract
and that the interest of the plaintiff and his wife under the contract

” a

was joint. This, however, was urged only as a reason for disqualifica-
tion of the wife as a witness and not as grounds for dismissal because
of the nonjoinder of the wife as a necessary party or other appropriate
relief. Even if it be assumed that George Minnick stated that he
wanted George and Allie to have whatever he had left for taking care
of him, this did not necessarily mean or imply that they must have it
jointly. They could take whatever he had left in severalty as well as
jointly in the proportion that the services of each bore to the total
services rendered.

Although the agreement was informal in terms, the purpose and
intent is clear and we are convinced that the evidence was sufficient
to carry the issue to the jury. The credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to their testimony were questions for the jury.
There is at least an implied recognition of this fact in defendant’s
brief on page 37, wherein it is stated: ‘‘Under her [Allie Ashley’s]
testimony, if there was any contract at all, it had to be joint. Cer-
tainly not several, even though she testified to that effect.”’

Defendant’s counsel interrupted the direct examination of
the plaintiff’s wife, Allie Ashley, to ask some ‘‘preliminary ques-
tions.’’ This was before any objection had been made to her competen-
ey. During this examination, conducted in the presence of the jury,
defendant’s counsel interrogated the witness exhaustively about the
making of the agreement for the care and maintenance of her father.
Counsel asked about the conversations the witness had had with her
father and about the later talk between the plaintiff and witness’s
father in her presence. Counsel undertook to prove by her own testi-
mony that the contract Mr. Minnick made was with her and her hus-
band jointly. When he finished his examination, defendant’s counsel
objected ‘‘to her testifying to any contract between them’’ because
she was a joint party to the contract. The trial judge overruled the
objection, and we think rightly so.

It is the function of the trial judge to determine all matters of fact
upon which the admissibility of evidence depends, and this includes
the competency or capacity of a witness to testify. 2 Wigmore on
Evidence, 3rd Bd., § 487; Clark v. McAtee, 227 Mo. 152, 127 S. W.
87, 49. The evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that the witness
was competent because the agreement sued on was a several one be-
tween the plaintiff and Mr. Minnick. See Snider v. MeAtee, Mo., 178
S.W. 484, 488; Martin v. Abernathy, 220 Mo.App. 76, 278 S.W.
1050; and Mollett v. Beckman, Mo. App., 78 S.W.2d 886. We cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion in holding the witness
competent to testify.

Even if the plaintiff’s wife had been incompetent under the
“Dead Man’s’’ statute, [880] § 491.010 RSMo 1949, the deféndant
waived his right to exclude her testimony by his interrogation of her
during direct examination without objection upon the very subject

matter about which he claimed she was incompetent to testify. In
Ladd v. Williams, 104 Mo.App. 390, 79 S.W. 511, 512, the court in
reviewing a similar situation stated: ‘‘If it be conceded that Ladd
was not a competent witness, the defendant waived the incompetency
by not making a timely objection to his testimony. The objection made
was not until the defendant had drawn from the witness, on his
cross-examination, evidence that she was not expecting, and that was
prejudicial to her interest. A party cannot take the chance of waiving
the incompetency of a witness, in the expectation of drawing from
him favorable testimony for himself, and, when the experiment proves
disastrous, withdraw his waiver, and have the evidence he himself
has drawn out stricken out of the record. * * *””

In the case of State v. Emrich, Mo., 250 $.W.2d 718[4], it was
held that the incompetency of the witness was waived by failure
to object to the witness’s testimony prior to the time the testimony
was given. The incompetency of a witness to testify where the other
party to the contract or transaction in issue and on trial is dead, is
waived by the taking of the witness’s deposition or the serving of
interrogatories. Hodge v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., Mo., 261 8.W.
67; Lehr v. Moll, Mo., 247 §.W.2d 686. By his ‘‘preliminary ques- _
tions’’ during the direct examination of plaintiff’s wife, defendant
waived the witness’s incompetency as effectively as if he had taken
her deposition.

Hl On several occasions the defendant objected after the witness
had answered the question. When those objections were sustained,
however, no motions to strike these answers were made, The sustaining
of an objection to a question does not have the effect of striking out
the answer in the absence of a motion to strike the testimony given.
Russell v. Union Electric Co., 238 Mo.App. 1074, 191 S.W.2d 278;
Steeley v. Kurn, 848 Mo. 1142, 157 S.W.2d 212, 218; Radler v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 830 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011, 1013.
Even though the answers of the witness were conclusions, the testi-
mony remains in the case where there is no motion to strike and the
credibility of such testimony is for the jury. Goodman v. Allen Cab
Co., 360: Mo. 1094, 282 S.W.2d 585; Vosburg v. Smith, Mo. App., 272
§.W.2d 297.

Hl Geneva Coffman, a practical nurse of five or six years’ expe-
rience, was permitted to answer, over defendant’s objection, a hypo-
thetical question as to the reasonable value of services of the kind
rendered to Mr. Minnick, The witness testified that she had had ex-
perience at one time or another with all of the items mentioned in
the question, and that the fair and reasonable charge per day for
performing such services would be $10.00 for an eight hour working
day. The defendant charges that the court erred in permitting the
witness to answer, because the witness was not qualified by experience
or knowledge. As we have previously pointed out, the matter of a

witness’s competency or qualifications is peculiarly within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. We will not interfere with the ruling of
the court unless an abuse of discretion appears. Scrivner v. American
Car & Foundry Co., 330 Mo. 408, 50 8.W.2d 1001, 1008. The authori-
ties cited by the defendant tend to support the admission of the
witness’s testimony rather than its rejection. See Bosard v. Powell, 79
Mo.App. 184; Elstroth v. Karrenbrock, Mo.App., 285 8. W. 525;
and Nesbit v. Shisler, 175 Mo.App. 565, 158 S. W. 419. We find no
error in permitting the witness to answer.

I The defendant further complains that instruction No. 1 was
erroneous in that it permitted respondent to recover for the services
of furnishing deceased with food and washing his clothes and in fur-
nishing him with a home when there was no evidence offered by the
respondent as to the value of such services, and that the instruction
failed to limit the recovery to the services [881] of nursing and caring
for deceased as that was the only service wpon which there was any
evidence of value. This instruction follows substantially instruction
No. 2 given and, considered in the case of Love v. Richardson, Mo. App.,
61 S.W.2d 220, 223. Opinion evidence of the reasonable value of the
services involved was given by plaintiff’s witness Geneva Coffman
and defendant’s witness Marvin Penny, operator of a nursing home.
Moreover, many of the services were of a sort that their reasonable
value is within the common knowledge of the court and jury.

‘Where the reasonable value of particular services is a matter of
common knowledge, proof of the reasonable value is not essential to
a recovery in quantum meruit. As stated in McDonough v. Freund,
823 Mo. 346, 19 S.W.2d 285, 287, ‘‘The members of a jury may be
presumed to know the value of the services of a nurse or common
laborer.’’ In Re Hartle’s Estate (Wright v. Hartle), Mo. App., 236
§.W.2d 40, the mother of a child and her present husband filed suit
against the estate of her former husband to recover for the support of
the child during the period of about nine years that the child lived
with the plaintiffs. The court held (1.¢.42): ‘‘There was no necessity
for the introduction of opinion evidence upon the question of value,
and the court should have reached its own conclusion from the facts be-
fore it without regard to any lack of probative force in Mrs. Kilhaf-
ner’s testimony.’’ In the case of Wise v. Rubenstein, Mo.App., 24
8.W.2d 203, it was held that the value of domestic services need not
be proved in that the judge as well as the jury is presumed to know
the value of such services. There is no merit in the assignment of
error.

| Defendant urges that the verdict for $12,000 is ‘‘so grossly
excessive as to shock the conscience of the court and as to show the
diseretion of the jury has been arbitrarily exercised and abused.”’
The verdict of the jury was unanimous. The trial court had an oppor-
tunity to review the alleged excessiveness of the verdict and did not

see fit to grant a new trial for this or any other reason or to require
a remittitur.

Mr. Minnick was 81 years of age when he moved to the plaintiff’s
home in October 1945. He was given a room-for his private use and
he continued to occupy it until the time of his death over seven years
later. He was tottery and did not do physical labor but was in
moderately good health for a man of his age. The plaintiff took Mr.
Minnick places and attended to business matters for him. He furnished
a home for Mr. Minnick and performed all necessary personal serv-
ices, including cutting his hair. Mr. Minnick’s physical and mental
health steadily deteriorated and from January 1952 on, he could not
dress himself and became bedfast. From that time on he required
practically continuous care, attention and nursing services. For two
years. before Mr. Minnick became bedfast he was not able to stay by
himself and was never left alone. After he became bedfast Mr. Min-
nick’s mental and physical condition was such that he had to be cared
for like a baby. He was a large man, weighing close to 200 pounds
when he became ill. He lost control of his kidneys and bowels and had
to be kept in diapers. His clothing and bedclothing had to be changed
frequently, and there were daily washings. He had to be bathed and
fed and given his medicine. His condition was such that he could not
be left alone even at nighttime—someone had to be with. him con-
stantly. The plaintiff took care of and attended to Mr. Minniék, bath-
ing and feeding him, changing and washing his soiled clothing and
bedclothing. There is ample evidence that the plaintiff rendered many
services in providing a home for Mr. Minnick and attending to his
business affairs prior to the time that he became totally disabled. After
that time, the services required were extremely burdensome and dis-
agreeable. It is apparent from the record that Mr, Minnick was
capably cared for and the services were rendered with kindness and
devotion.

Geneva Coffman testified the reasonable value of the services of a
practical nurse [882] in such a case was $10.00 per day, which did
not include washing and some other services that Mr. Minnick re-
ceived. Defendant’s witness, Marvin Penny, operator of the Penny
Rest Home which had nine patients served by one practical nurse,
testified to a reasonable value of $150.00 per month per person. The
services about which Mr. Penny was asked included ‘‘furnishing a
home, providing provisions and other necessities of life.’’ As we have
heretofore indicated, the value of many of the services are within the
common, knowledge of jurors. We have examined the cases cited by
the parties, and under.the facts and circumstances in evidence, we
are not persuaded that the amount of the verdict is excessive.

_, Finding no error in the record, the judgment should be affirmed,
and it is so ordered. All concur.

Sratz or Missouri, at the Relation and to the Use of Auvin D. Harren,
Collector of Revenue of Jackson County, Missouri, Appellant,
v. Kansas Crry Powzr & Liguir Company, a Corporation, Re-
spondent, No, 44231—281 8. W. (2d) 784.

Division Two, September 12, 1955.

Donald B. Clark for Alvin D. Hatten and Jack C. Terry for Fire
I District No. 1 appellant.

Fane, Arthur J. Doyle and Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne
ondent.

[785] LEEDY, P. JThis action is prosecuted by the Collector
of Jackson County to recover taxes for the years 1948-1951, both in-
clusive, as levied by the county court upon defendant’s distributable
property for the benefit of Fire District No. 1 in that county. Judg-
ment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. Jurisdiction of the appeal
is in this court [786] because the case involves the construction of
the revenue laws of this state, Art. V, § 8, Const. of Mo.

The question presented is that of the correctness of the trial court’s
findings that the separate assessment of defendant’s distributable
property for the benefit of the fire district, and the levy made by the
county court based thereon ‘‘were invalid and without authority of
law.’’ Although. there were four counts in the petition, they differ
only as to dates and amounts, and so for brevity we have employed
above, and will throughout the opinion continue to use, the singular
number in referring to questioned steps, and otherwise, as though
taxes for only one-year were involved.

HJ The subject of the validity of, and liability on the part of a
public utility (such as defendant) for distributable property taxes
assessed and levied for the benefit of certain governmental units has
been considered by this court in several cases under divergent facts
and legal contentions. State ex rel. Halferty v. Kansas City Power &
Light Uo., 346 Mo. 1069, 145 8.W. 2d 116; State ex rel. Jackson Co.
Library Dist. v. Evans, 360 Mo. 1052, 232 S.W. 2d 386. See, also,
State ex rel. Benson v. Union Electric Co., 359 Mo. 35, 220 8.W. 2d 1.

In brief outline, the statutory scheme for subjecting the property
of such utilities to taxation is this: § 153.080 (this and all other
statutory referénces are to RSMo 1949 and VAMS unless otherwise
expressly noted) provides, inter alia, that ‘‘all property, real and
tangible personal, owned by * * * electric power and light com-
panies * * * shall be subject to taxation for state, county, munici-
pal and other local purposes to the same extent as the property of
private persons. 2, And taxes levied thereon shall be levied and col-
lected in the manner as is now or may hereafter be provided by law
for the taxation of railroad property in this state, and county courts,
county boards of equalization and, the state tax commission are hereby
required to perform the same duties and are given the same powers
in assessing, equalizing and adjusting the taxes on the property set
forth in this section as the said courts and boards of equalization and
state tax commission have or may hereafter be empowered with, in
assessing, equalizing, and adjusting the taxes on railroad property;
and the president or other authorized officer of any such * * *
electric power and light companies * * * is hereby required to
render statements of the property of such * * * electric power
and light companies * * * in like manner as the president, or other
authorized officer of the railroad company is now or may hereafter
be required to render for the taxation of railroad property.”’

The law governing the taxation of railroad property which is thus
made applicable to power and light companies is to be found in Chap.
151, § § 151.010-151.340. These statutes have been construed as divid-
ing the property of such companies into two classes, distributable and
local. ‘Distributable property (with which alone we are presently
concerned) is to be assessed and valued as a whole, and the aggregate
value allocated to certain taxing subdivisions on a wire or track
mileage basis, and the local property to be assessed by the local
assessor of the taxing subdivision in which such property is located.
State ex rel. Hayes v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry. Co., 185 Mo. 618, 37
8.W. 582; State ex rel. Spratt v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 162 Mo.
391, 63 S.W. 495: State ex rel. Union Electric Light & Power Co. v.
Baker, 316 Mo. 858, 293 S.W. 399. § 151.020 provides in substance
that the president or other authorized officer of a railroad company
shall furnish to the state tax commission annually a sworn, statement
setting out in detail certain information with respect to the distrib-

utable property owned by it ‘‘in each county, municipal township,
incorporated city, town or village through or in which it is located
in this state.” Under § 151.060 the state tax commission is required
to assess, adjust and equalize the aggregate value of the property
specified in § 151.020. Under § 151.080 the aggregate value of all
such property is apportioned or allocated by the tax commission to
certain local taxing subdivisions according to the ratio that the pole
mileage [787] in such subdivision (in the case of power and light
companies, or trackage in the case of railroads) bears to the whole
length of the pole mileage (or trackage) in this state.

The tax commission is required to keep a record of its proceedings,
and to certify its action to the county court setting forth certain in-
formation with respect to distributable property owned by each rail-
road (or power and light company) in the state, and the value thereof
per mile and its total length ‘‘in each county, city, town, village and
municipal township;’’ also the total values ‘‘assessed, adjusted,
equalized, and apportioned to such county, city, town, village and
municipal township therein by said commission.”’ (§ 151.090.)

§ 151.140, in relation to levying the tax, provides that the ‘‘county
court, upon the receipt from the state tax commission * * * shall
# # * ascertain and levy the taxes for state, county, municipal town-
ship, city, incorporated town and village and school purposes * * *
and for other purposes on the railroad and the property thereof, in
such county, municipal township, city and incorporated town or
village, at the same rate,’’ ete.

IB 1» the Halferty case, supra, it was held that under the then
existing statutes there was no lawful authority for the assessment
and levy of distributable property taxes for the benefit of a water
supply district. At the time of that decision neither water districts
nor fire districts were mentioned in any of the statutes (then and now
under scrutiny) in relation to the successive steps of listing (§ 151.-
020), apportioning (§ 151.080), certifying (§ 151.090), and levying
(§ 151.140) distributable property taxes for the benefit of taxing sub-
divisions. Counties, cities, towns, villages and municipal townships
were the ones mentioned. Subsequent to the Halferty decision, § 151.-
080 was amended (insofar as here material) so as to include certain
other subdivisions, to wit, special road districts, publie water supply,
fire protection and sewer districts. Laws 1941, p. 695; Laws 1945, p.
1952.

The situation presented as a result of such amendments (here-
inafter referred to as ‘‘amendment’’) is that § 151.020 (with respect
to the statement to be made by the utility to the tax commission and
whereon the latter acts) does not in terms provide for the separate
listing of, nor any other means for ascertaining, distributable property
lying within a fire district so as to form the basis for apportion-
ment, whereas the amended section (§ 151.080) specifically mentions

fire districts as being one of the subdivisions to which the tax com-
mission shall make a separate apportionment of values. The latter
section is also at odds with § 151.090 (requiring the commission
to certify to the county court the pole miles ‘‘in each county, city,
town, village and municipal township; also the total value * * * as
assessed, adjusted, equalized, and apportioned to such county, city,
town, village and municipal township therein’’), and for like reason
it is also in conflict with § 151.140 which, in authorizing the county
court to levy the taxes, refers to the subdivisions last above mentioned,
but not to firé districts.

As to the assessment aspect, plaintiff readily concedes that if the
tax commission does not have before it or cannot obtain the pole miles
or trackage in a fire district, then there would be no ratio to apply,
and consequently there could be no apportionment to it. But plain-
tiff urges that whether the tax commission has the authority to com-
pel the furnishing of such figures is immaterial in this case because
the defendant had, in fact, submitted that information in its annual
statement, and it not being contended such information is incor-
rect, no issue exists in that regard. True, defendant did submit
such information, but only under protest, all the while challenging
the commission’s authority to make such a requirement. Inasmuch
as the adoption of plaintiff’s theory would settle nothing except this
lawsuit, and the question being one requiring a definitive answer, not
merely as to this defendant’s liability for the years here involved, but
also as to all others affected, including the taxing authorities, [788]
we think the case should not pass off on such a tangent.

The rule is that ‘‘taxing statutes are construed strictly in favor of
the taxpayer, bearing in mind that they should be applied with due
regard to the apparent intention of the Legislature as expressed in
the statute, with a view to promoting the apparent object of the
legislative enactment.’’ State ex rel. Halferty v. Kansas City Power
& Light Co., supra, lc. 122. Plaintiff argues that by the amendment
of § 151.080, bringing in additional subdivisions, the legislature in-
tended to correct a situation brought to its attention by the decision
in the Halferty case; that there could be no possible purpose in
making special provision for apportionment of distributable property
values to fire districts, as was done by the amendment, unless it was
intended that the property so apportioned would be subject to the
taxing power of the county in order to raise revenues for the dis-
tricts so enumerated. And so plaintiff makes the contention that in-
asmuch as § 151.080 enjoins upon the tax commission the duty of
making separate apportionments of values to fire districts, that ‘‘the
authority to obtain necessary information and to do all other acts
necessary to the performance of such function must necessarily
follow and be implied.’’ Even if this be conceded, we still fail to ap-
preciate how this would solve the problem, because the authority of

the tae commission in that regard cannot be thought to create a duty
on the part of the county court to levy taxes based on such separate
apportionments when. the very section empowering the court to levy
does not comprehend or embrace such a district. We think the ap-
plieability of the principle of implied powers in implementing the
apportionment statute must be denied for the reason that all ac-
companying steps in the taxing process are particularized in the other
sections to which we have referred, and none of such other sections
were repealed or amended. The legislative history of the amendment
in question when considered in connection with certain others pro-
posed, but not adopted, fortify this view. The amendment of 1941
(Senate Bill 199) added special: road districts, water supply and
sewer districts to the apportionment section (fire districts were added
in 1945). Senate Bill 199 was one of a series of bills under consid-
eration by the 61st General Assembly which would have revamped
the railroad tax act by making specific provision for the inclusion of
such newly added districts (‘‘and any other municipal corporation
or political subdivision of the state which is now or may hereafter
be organized with power to levy a general tax upon all property’’)
in all sections thereof wherein local subdivisions were enumerated.
This would. have made a consistent pattern and workable plan, but
Senate Bill 199 alone was passed. The failure or refusal to adopt
such other amendments renders the meaning of that which was
adopted sufficiently ambiguous and uncertain as to justify resort to
legislative history in an effort to ascertain intent. Obviously there
was no legislative intent that the other key sections to which we have
adverted be amended. We have therefore come to what seems to be
the inescapable conclusion that the failure to conform such other
sections to § 151.080 as amended resulted in a casus omuissus in the
statutory scheme as regards obtaining the requisite information
whereon to base a separate apportionment as well as the further act
of certifying the same and that of levying for the benefit of those
particular districts affected by, and brought into the act through, the
amendment.

Plaintiff nevertheless insists that the validity of the tax should be
sustained under the doctrine of State ex rel. Benson v. Union Elec-
trie Co., supra, this upon the theory, as we understand the con-
tention, that because defendant’s distributable property is subject
to the taxing power of the county, that by force of the statute under
which the fire district was created and exists the county court is
authorized to levy taxes for the benefit of such a district. The
Benson case did in one sense so hold with regard to distributable
property for the benefit of a library district, but on final analysis it
will be found the levy was sustained [789] as having been made
under the railroad tax act governing the levying of taxes for school
purposes, The Benson case did not purport to overrule the Halferty

case; it distinguished it. Under plaintiff’s present contention, the
result in the Halferty case would have been different, and it is to be
noted that the holding in the Halferty case was upon a consideration
of sections of the statute involving the taxing powers of a water
district which. are substantially and to all practical purposes like
those of fire districts, as here involved. The peculiar facts in the
Benson case, as well as differences in the statute there under con-
sideration, make that case distinguishable from the one at bar. Unlike
the case at bar, the Benson case did not involve a levy based upon a
separate apportionment by the tax commission for the benefit of the
library district, and the statute there in question (the act under
which the library district was created and the tax voted) directed
that the tax be levied and collected in the manner that taxes relating
to school districts are levied. Such manner, as prescribed by the rail-
road tax act, did not involve, nor was it based upon, separate ap-
portionments to school districts, but rather, after ‘the aggregate
valuation has been certified, the court ascertains the average rate of
taxation in all the districts of the county, and through its clerk
apportions ‘‘the said taxes for school purposes’’ proportionately to
the enumeration returns of the several districts.

The fire district act, § 321.270, in relation to the levy and collec-

tion of fire district taxes, provides: ‘‘It shall be the duty of the body
having authority to levy taxes within the county to levy the taxes
provided in this chapter, and it shall.be the duty of all officials
charged with the duty of collecting taxes to collect such taxes at the
time and in the form and manner and with like interest and penalties
as other taxes are collected; * * *.’’ Thé foregoing statute does not,
in terms, direct how or in what manner such taxes are to be levied.
True, it does say that they are to be collected ‘‘at the time and in the
form and manner and with like interest and penalties as other taxes
are collected.’’ If this comprehends the levying of distributable
property taxes (and if so it also embraces all other steps necessary
to effectuate the imposition and collection of the tax), there would
still be no definite guide because, as the Benson and Halferty cases
demonstrate, such form and manner varies, depending upon the
purpose for and subdivision to which made.

We think it manifest that the authority of the county courts to
levy distributable property taxes based wpon separate apportion-
ments of values. allocated by the tax commission under § 151.080 is
confined to those subdivisions enumerated in § 151.140, thus exclud-
ing levies for fire districts under the present state of the statutes.

The judgment is, accordingly, affirmed. All concur.

Roszrt E. Anprrson, Appellant, v. Mr. and Mrs. Barney Cinnamon,
Mr. and Mrs. Putin Cinnamon, and Mr. and Mrs. Dave Gasr-
MAN, Respondents, No, 44187—282 8. W. (2d) 445,

Court en Bane, September 12, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, October 10, 1956.

John J. Cosgrove, Henry Arthur and Campbell, Arthur & Clark
for appellant.

sbree, Shook, Hardy & Ottman,
A, J. Gronoff and George V. ‘Ayhoord for respondents.

[446] HYDE, J.—Action for $15,000.00 damages for personal in-
juries. The court dismissed plaintifi’s petition, on defendants’
motion, on the ground of failure to state a claim wpon which relief
can be granted. This ‘case requires determination of the duty owed
by owners of a building to firemen on the premises for the purpose of
fighting a fire.

The petition alleged that defendants owned an apartment build-
ing with a three story porch, ‘‘running from the west wing to the
east wing’’; that the porch was in a dangerous and unsafe condi-
tion, insecurely fastened to the building and insecurely supported;
and that defendants knew of such condition but ‘‘carelessly and
negligently failed to put said porch in a reasonably safe condition.’’

Paragraphs 8, 4 and 5 of the petition further state: ‘‘3. Plaintiff
states that on April 1, 1958, while in the discharge of his duty as a
member of the Kansas City Fire Department, he was engaged with
others of said fire department in fighting a fire in said building, and
that to extinguish said fire, plaintiff and other firemen went on said
porch with fire hose and other fire fighting equipment, and that
ladders were placed against said porch.

“4. Plaintiff further alleges that while he and the other firemen
were fighting the fire as above described and attempting to extinguish
the same, the defendant Barney Cinnamon was on the premises and
had full knowledge of the presence of plaintiff and the other firemen
on said porch, together with the fire fighting equipment above de-
scribed; that notwithstanding his actual knowledge of their presence
upon said porch and his knowledge that said porch was dangerous
and unsafe for ordinary usage, he carelessly and negligently failed
to warn plaintiff that said porch was dangerous and unsafe and.
insecurely attached and supported, and thereby permitted plaintiff
and the other firemen to enter into a situation which was a dangerous
trap.

“5. That as a direct result of defendants’ negligence in failing to
repair said porch and put the same in a reasonably safe condition,
said porch collapsed when plaintiff and the other firemen went thereon
in order to fight said fire, and that as a direct result of the defendants’
negligence in failing to warn plaintiff of said condition and in per-

mitting him to. go into said dangerous trap, plaintiff fell when said
porch collapsed.’’

| | The. status of a fireman i is generally held to be the same as
that of a licensee. (Prosser on Torts, 628; 88 Am. Jur. 785, Sec. 125;
65 C.J.8. 494, Sec. 35; Restatement of Torts, Sec’s. 342 and 345 and
Missouri Annotations; 13 A.L.R. 637, 61 A.L.R. 1028, 141 A.L.R. 584
annotations.) Firemen.are in a different class [447] from licensees
because their right to enter is independent of any permission of the
possessor of the property, who has no right to exclude them, and some
cases say they have a status sui generis. (Skypulski vy. Waldorf Pa-
per Co., (Minn.), 45 N. W. (2d) 549; Ryan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co., (Il.), 42 N. EH. (2d) 128.) Nevertheless, the duty of a possessor
of land to fireman is the same as to licensees, who enter with his per-
mission, as the authorities hereinabove cited show. Firemen enter
under a license given by law, primarily for the benefit of the public
generally, although the possessor may also be benefited by their work.
Firemen have police powers at fires. (Kansas City Charter 1946, Art.
8, Sec. 81.) We, therefore, must determine this case on the basis of
a-possessor’s duty to a licensee.

Tt is the well settled law in this state that a possessor owes
no duty to licensees as to maintenance but that the licensee takes
the premises as he finds them, except for wantonness or some form of
intentional wrong or active negligence of the possessor. (Stevenson
v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 348 Mo. 1216, 159 S. W. (2d) 260;
Porechey v. Kelling, 853 Mo. 1084, 185 S. W. (2d) 820; Walters v.
Markwardt, 361 Mo. 936, 237 S. W. (2d) 177; Twine v. Norris Grain
Co., (Mo. App.), 226 8S. W. (2d) 415.) ‘It would be an obviously
unreasonable burden to impose on landowners to require them to keep
the whole of their premises in such condition as to make every part of
it safe for those whose- unusual and exceptional right of entry may
never accrue. The broad range of such a duty, the impossibility of
forecasting the precise point to which the officer’s duties may call

“him, the infrequency of his probable visits, all clearly preclude the
idea that the balance of social benefit can require such a serious re-
striction on the owner’s use of his land, or justify the imposition of
such a burden on his exchequer to prevent so vague a risk of so im-
probable an injury.’’ (The Liability of a Possessor of Land in
Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land—McCleary, 1 Mo.
Law Rev. 45, 57, quoting from Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts.)
Therefore, the claim “‘of defendants’ negligence in failing to repair
gaid porch and put the same in a reasonably safe condition’’ cannot
be a basis of liability to plaintiff.

As to the duty to warn, claimed by plaintiff, there seems to
be some conflict of authority throughout the country. However, most
of the cases cited by plaintiff can be distinguished as involving un-
usual hazard from highly dangerous substances kept on the premises

such as gasoline or explosive material. (See Campbell v. Pure Oil
Co., (NwJ.), 194 Atl 873; Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th Street Corp.,
(N.Y.), 81 N. E. (2d) 503; Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger,
(Ohio), 140 N. E. 770; Clinkscales v. Mundkoski, (Okla.), 79 Pac.
(2d) 562; see also Lamb v. Sebach, (Ohio), 3 N. EH. (2d) 686.) The
cases of Smith v. Twin State Gas & lee. Co., (N.H.), 144 Atl. 57
and Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, (Tex.), 156 S. W. (2d) 1010,
involved negligence of a publie utility company in handling gas
(failing to find a leak in one and failing to shut off the line to
a burning building in the other) rather than the duty of a posses-
sor of land. As we pointed out in the Stevenson case (159 8. W. (2d),
Le, 263), and as also stated in the Missouri annotations to See’s.
342 and 345, Restatement of Torts, we have never established the
broad rule of liability to licensees stated in those sections to the ex-
tent of a duty to warn licensees of every known condition that might
involve an unreasonable risk to them. While we agree with the cases
requiring warning of the presence of inherently dangerous substances
involving unusual hazard, especially when there is a fire on the
premises which is likely to explode them, nevertheless: to establish
such a duty as to all known conditions that could involve some
danger would require additional duties of possessors of land in a great
many situations in which it has been held no duties exist under
previous decisions of this state. We do not think we should change
the law of this state to that extent.

A leading case on the duty of a possessor of land is Glaser v. Roths-
child, [448] 221 Mo. 180, 120 S. W. 1, holding that leave and license
“bestows no right to care.’? In following this case, in Gilliland v.
Bondurant, 332 Mo. 881, 59 S. W. (2d) 679, as to a possessor’s duty
to a licensee, we said: ‘‘the only duty of the owner is that he must
not willfully or wantonly injure him, or knowingly let him go into a
hidden peril, or otherwise, by an affirmative negligent act, injure
him after his presence is or should be discovered in a position of
danger. He owes him no affirmative duty of care to protect him.’’
We think the explosive material cases are a good example of what is
meant by letting one go into hidden peril and some of them are set
out in the footnotes to 45 C.J. 796 which we cited in connection with
that statement. (See also 65 C.J.S. 504, Sec. 38; Boyer v. Guidicy
Marble, Terrazzo & Tile Co., (Mo. Sup.), 246 S. W. (2d) 742 and cases
cited concerning duty as to explosives.) Thus it is unusual hazard
that requires warning to licensees. Harmful chemicals, explosives
and other inherently dangerous materials developed by modern
science and industry, no doubt, would be within this rule at least
under cireumstances where licensees could not be expected to know
of their presence or effect. However, in Gannon v. Royal Properties,
186 N.Y.S. (2d) 129, it was held failure to warn of presence of gas-
oline was not negligence when the fire was in a garage, the court say-

ing: ‘‘Gasoline is known by everybody to be stored about a garage.’’
The court further stated: ‘‘While the testimony in behalf of plain-
tiffs was that only about ten percent of garage fires involved burning
gasoline, still such a condition could not come as a surprise to fire-
men and we are unable to accept the proposition advanced by plain-
tiffs that it became the duty of defendant to warn the firemen of the
nature of the fire because such a fire called for a special type of
attack. This is a matter of professional experience and judgment
which can hardly be expected to exist on the part of property owners
and the responsibility therefor cannot properly be shifted ‘to them.’’
Thus the presence of gasoline in a place where it might reasonably
be expected would not be a hidden peril.

We have never held there is a duty to warn licensees of structural
conditions, due to age and natural deterioration or to improper con-
struction, or to warn of conditions due to casual negligence of persons
with respect to objects or materials not inherently dangerous even in
attractive nuisance cases. (See Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo, 1227, 130
S. W. (2d) 623; Emery v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 494, 148 8. W. (2d)
479.) Such structural conditions are capable of being observed and
ascertained. To require such a warning would place a very great
burden on the possessor of land, especially as to firemen, because he
would not know when they might come, what part of his premises they
might use or how they would use them. It would also be likely to in-
terfere with the operations of the firemen in fighting the fire for a
possessor to undertake to tell them where to go and. where not to go.

Meiers y. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. HB. 491, 13 A.
L.R. 688, cited by plaintiff, was not a warning case but instead in-
volved keeping safe the usual means of access to the premises. Plain-
tiff, a fireman, fell in a coal hole in an unlighted driveway while on
his way to a building on the premises which was on fire. The court
held that, as to the rightful use of this driveway, for the purpose
intended by the owner, the fireman ‘‘was neither a trespasser or
licensee’; and so found the duty to an invitee applicable. The court
said its decision was limited ‘‘to the case of one not a licensee entering .
business property as of right over a way prepared: as a means of
access for those entitled to enter, who is injured by the negligence
of the owner in failing to keep that way in a reasonably safe condi-
tion for those using it as it was intended to be used.’”? Certainly it
cannot be said that defendants’ porch in this case was being used as
it was intended to be used. In the Jenkins case, (81 N. BH. (2d) 503)
in New York, a warning was required in an unusual hazard case
(gasoline) ; and Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N. Y. 525, 37 [449] N. EB.
(2d) 234, on the authority of the Jenkins case, applied the unusual
hazard rule to a hole in the floor, holding that it was a jury question
whether the hole in the floor constituted an unusual hazard. This
case in effect follows the rule of Sec. 345 of the Restatement of Torts

.” a

(which it cites) requiring a warning to licensees as to known dangers;
and as we have noted, this is not the Missouri rule.

Another case on which plaintiff relies is Shypulski v. Waldorf
Paper Products Co., 232 Minn, 394, 45 N. W. (2d) 549. In that case,
defendant had built a wall of concrete blocks in its warehouse which
was ‘‘dangerous to anyone entering the warehouse at a time when
there was any lateral pressure against the wall.’’ There was a fire
in the warehouse which plaintiff and other firemen extinguished.
Thereafter they entered the warehouse to make certain that the fire
had been entirely extinguished and while there the wall of concrete
blocks collapsed injuring plaintiff. The court held the owner owed
the firemen no duty to keep the building in a reasonably safe condi-
tion and that no liability could be predicated upon the existence of
any defect in the condition of the wall. However, the court held
that defendant did have a duty to disclose such a hidden danger
known to it, citing mainly the explosion cases, the New York cases
hereinabove discussed, and Sec. 845, Restatement of Torts. We think
there is a real difference between explosive material which is almost
certain to explode when reached by fire and a defective structural
condition, whether due to faulty construction or age and natural
deterioration. There can be hardly any doubt about what will happen
in the case of explosives, while the result of stresses and strains on
structural conditions is more of a matter of opinion, and it is like-
wise one about which those with the professional experience and
judgment of firemen are usually capable of having an informed
opinion. This may be a matter of degree. However, concerning
matters of degree, the United States Supreme Court once said:
“Things do’not have to be in broad contrast to have different practi-
eal and legal consequences. Actions take estimation from degrees,
and of this life and law are replete with examples.’’ Industrial
Accident Commission v. Davis, 259 U. 8. 182, 42 S. Ct. 489, 491, 66
L. Hid. 888. Certainly there are good reasons for the higher degree
of care required as to explosives because the greater risks and dangers
from them do constitute an unusual hazard. Therefore, we do not
think the rule requiring warning in the case of unusual hazard from
explosives should be applied to the same extent to structural condi-
tions generally.

Another difference between the Shypulski case and this case is
that there the firemen went into the building where the wall of con-
erete blocks was located after the fire had been extinguished and
there was ample opportunity to warn them before they went near it.
The fact that they were making an inspection under those conditions
might justify the application of the rule as to inspectors. (38 Am.
Jur. 786. Sec. 126; Jennings v. Industrial Paper Stock Co., (Mo.
App.), 248 8. W. (2d) 43 and eases cited.) However, the petition in
this case only alleges that one of the owners ‘‘was on the premises

and had full knowledge of the presence of plaintiff and other firemen
on said porch together with their fire fighting equipment.’ It is
not alleged that defendants or any of them knew that the firemen in-
tended to get on the porch before they did so (and bring their fire
fighting equipment there) but only states that one of defendants
knew of their presence there. Certainly this does not show opportu-
nity to warn beforehand as in the Shypulski case. The situation of
fire going on and the firemen actively hghting it is very different
from that of making an inspection after a fire has been extinguished.

Plaintiff further says that, under the pleaded facts, defendant
Barney Cinnamon was guilty of active negligence, citing 65 C.J.S.
322, See. 1, (defining active negligence), also p. 502, Sec. 36 (dis-
cussing active negligence); Dickerson v. [450] Connecticut Co.,
(Conn.), 118 Atl. 518, 519; Texas Pacifie Coal & Oil Co. v. Bridges,
(Tex.), 110 S. W. (2d) 1248, 1251; Rasmussen v. Palmer, 134 Fed.
(2d) 780, 782; Newman v. Fox West Coast Theatres, (Cal.), 194 Pac.
(2d) 706; Burke v. John E. Marshall, Inc, (Cal.), 108 Pac. (2d)
738; Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, (Tex.), 156 8. W. (2d) 1010;
Valdale Apartments v. Ercito Mazzella Const., Inc., 115 N.Y.S. (2d)
59. Plaintiff also refers to railroad cases of failure to warn of ap-
proaching cars or trains at places where licensees might reasonably
be expected. In these cases, failure to warn is coupled with affirma-
tive acts. An example is Ahnefeld v. Wabash R. R. Co., 212 Mo. 2&0,
111 S. W. 95. In that case, in addition to failure to warn, there was
the active negligence of running a train into the plaintifi’s decedent.
Likewise, in Burke v. John Marshall, supra, plaintiff was struck by
a lumber carrier operated on a dock by defendant; and also in Valdale
Apartments vy. Ercito Mazella Const., supra, the damages were due
to the negligent operation of a bulldozer, where obviously, as the
court said, actual operation of the bulldozer was affirmative action.
Texas P. C. & O. Co. v. Bridges, supra, discusses active negligence
and indicates that making a safe condition dangerous such as leaving
open a pit which had been covered might be active negligence. New-
man v. Fox West Coast Theatres, supra, presents a somewhat similar
situation, where defendant allowed water to get on a washroom floor
creating an unsafe condition after plaintiff was permitted to come on
the premises, which the court said involved a greater risk of injury
to the licensee. Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, supra, was a case of
an explosion from escaping gas. The judgment was not against the
possessor of the land but was instead against the Gas Company and
plaintiff was not in the building, but was standing at the curb line.
This case is not very persuasive authority because, without discussion
of reasons, the court said that the Gas Company’s failure to cut off
the gas within a reasonable time after it learned of the fire was active
negligence, citing only one case, Valee v. Joiner, (Tex.), 44 8. W.
(2d) 988, holding there was active negligence in the operation of a

truck and a streetcar resulting in a collision, certainly a very dif-
ferent situation. In the Rasmussen case, a boy on a box car touched
an electric wire. It was held no case was made against the railroad
even under the law of New York which required an owner to take
reasonable steps to protect a licensee from a concealed danger. The
Dickerson case was an automobile guest case and, of course, the
operation of the car required positive acts. None of these cases are
authority for holding that the failure of defendant Barney Cinnamon
to warn the firemen to leave the porch was active negligence.

“The failure to warn is negative rather than active in its nature.’’
(Dunn v. Bomberger, 213 N. C. 172, 195 S. W. 364, 367.) That is
certainly true of failure to warn alone and not in connection with
any affirmative conduct. If Cinnamon had urged plaintiff and the
other firemen to go on the porch we would have a different case and
cirewnstances under which active negligence could be claimed. Clink-
scales v. Mundkoski, supra, (79 Pac. (2d), lc. 564) is such a case, also
involving explosive substance. There the defendant, knowing that
barrels near a burning barn contained gasoline, ‘‘expressly stated
to the deceased that they were empty, in order to cause deceased to
go nearer the barn where he could play the hose upon said burning
barn.’’ Since the effect of the allegations concerning’ Cinnamon was
that, after plaintiff and the other firemen were on the porch with
their fire fighting equipment, he did not warn them that the porch
‘‘was dangerous and unsafe and insecurely attached and supported’’,
we hold that plaintiff’s petition did not show a case of active negli-
gence on his part. We limit our decision herein to holding, where it
is not alleged that the possessor of land was informed that firemen
intended to enter and use the porch of his building with their fire
fighting equipment before they went on it, he cannot [451] be held
liable for failure to warn them to leave it after he knew of their
presence there. Our conclusion is that our law imposes no duty to
warn under such circumstances.

The judgment is affirmed.

Leedy, CO. J., Dalton, Eager and Storckman, JJ., concur ; Hollings-
worth, J., concurs in result; Westhues, J., dissents in opinion filed.

HE WESTHUES, J. (dissenting)—I cannot coneur in the result
reached in the opinion prepared by Judge Hyde in this case. In the
conclusion, it is stated, ‘“We limit our decision to holding, where it
is not alleged that the possessor of land was informed that fireman
intended to enter and use the porch of his building with their fire
fighting equipment before they went on it, he cannot be held liable
for failure to warn them to leave it after he knew of their presence
there.’”’? (Emphasis supplied)

To say that a property owner would be liable if he failed to warn
firemen if he had opportunity to do so before the firemen went onto
a porch that he knew was likely to fall, and not be liable for failure
to warn after the firemen had entered upon the porch, is to draw a
distinction where no difference exists. In other words, the opinion
of Judge Hyde holds that a property owner may stand idly by while
firemen who are on a defective porch fall to their death or great
injury and not be liable even though a warning would have saved the
firemen; but, if the owner has notice of the firemen’s preparing to
go onto the defective porch and fails to warn, then he will be liable.
In my humble opinion, the petition in this case states a cause of action.
The question of fact, that is, whether Barney Cinnamon had knowl-
edge of the weakness of the porch and whether after the firemen
entered upon the porch, Cinnamon had time to warn, should be de-
termined by a jury.

I respectfully dissent.

Cuartins Rwer, Appellant, vy. Vance Juuian, Chairman, Missouri
State Board of Mediation, Jefferson City, Missouri, and Kansas
Crry Pusnic Servics Company, a Corporation, Kansas City,
Missouri, Respondents, No. 48830—282 8. W. (2d) 484.

Court en Bane, September 12, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, October 10, 1955.

iy
a
S

Lhomas C. Swanson, James Daleo, Roy P, Swanson, George H.
Gangwere and Richard G@. Poland for appellant.

John M. Da Attorney General, and Robert F. r, Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent Vance Julian. :

Charles L. Carr for respondent Kansas City Public Service Com-
mission. .

Swofford, Schroeder & Shankland, Homer A. Cope, 8}
g ield & Geniry and O’Sullivan & Killiger
amici curiae.

Roy P. Swanson and George H. Gangwere amici curiae; Richard
@. Poland of coun:

Powell C. Groner, pro se; John H. Hendren of counsel.

[487] STORCKMAN, J.—This is a suit to recover damags
sum of $15,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by

the plaintiff on November 14, 1950 in Kansas City due to the negli-
gence of the operator of a motorbus upon which she was a fare-paying
passenger. The trial court dismissed the plaintift’s action and she ap-
pealed. The amount involved vests this court with jurisdiction. See-
tion 8, Article V, Constitution of Missouri 1945.

In 1949, as it had been for years, the Kansas City Public Service
Company was engaged in the operation of the mass transit system in
Kansas City and adjoiming portions of the State of Kansas. Its
collective bargaining agreement with its operating employees was
scheduled to expire on December 31, 1949. The company and union
representatives negotiated but failed to agree upon a new contract.
Shortly before the contract termination date the State Board of Media-
tion took jurisdiction and the company and its employees continued
to operate the transit system. A public hearing panel was established,
hearings were had, and on March 25, 1950, the panel handed down its
report which, among other things, recommended a reduction of five
cents per hour in the employees’ rate of pay. The transit company
notified the union representing the employees that if a settlement could
not be reached by May 1st the company proposed to put into effect
the wage reduction as recommended by the hearing panel. An agree-
ment was not reached and a work stoppage was definitely threatened.
On April 29, 1950, the day before the proposed wage reduction was
to become effective, the governor of Missouri issued a proclamation
and two executive orders invoking the provisions of what is commonly
kmown as the King-Thompson Act. This act, Laws of Mo. 1947, Vol. 1,
p. 358, is chapter 295 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri 1949, §§
295.010 through 295.210, V.A.M.S. By his Executive Order No. IT
the governor authorized and directed Vance Julian, Chairman of the
State Board of Mediation, to take possession of all or such parts of the
plants, offices, facilities and equipment of the Kansas City Public
Service Company as may be necessary to insure the operation of the
utility in the public interest. Mr. Julian acted pursuant to the ap-
pointment, and the transit system continued to operate. The gover-
nor’s proclamation and excutive orders remained in effect until Decem-
ber 11, 1950, at which time the transit company and its employees
agreed upon a new contract. It is during this period that the plain-
tiff claims to have been injured.

” The plaintiff’s suit was directed against ‘‘Vance Julian, Chairman,
Missouri State Board of Mediation, Jefferson City, Missouri, and
Kansas City Public Service Company, a Corporation, Kansas City,
Missouri, Defendants.’’ The defendant Vance Julian will herein some-
times be referred to as Julian and the defendant Kansas City Public
Service Company as the company or the transit company. In the alter-
native, the plaintiff alleged either (1) that Julian was the operator
and manager of the transit company on the date of the injury, or
(2) [488] that Julian was not such manager or in control of the trans-

portation facilities but that the transit company ‘‘was in sole and
complete control and management of its facilities,’ or (3) that both
Julian and the transit company ‘‘were in control and operation of the
defendant public service company’s transportation facilities’; and
that she does not know which alternative is true.

The transit company filed its separate answer denying liability be-
cause, among other reasons, the casualty occurred at a time when the
governor of Missouri had taken ‘‘possession of the plant, officers,
equipment and ‘facilities of this defendant for use and operation by
the State of Missouri in the public interest’? under § 19 of the King-
Thompson Act, and that at the time of the casualty Julian, pursuant
to the governor’s orders, and not the transit company, was in full
possession and control of transit company’s property and was operat-
ing the public utility business, and that the operator of the motor-
bus was not ‘‘at said time and place employed by this defendant or
acting for or on behalf of this defendant within any scope of employ-
ment of this defendant, or in any capacity for this defendant.’’

Defendant Julian filed his separate motion to dismiss as to him.
Among other things, he alleged that if he operated or possessed
the property of the transit company he did so for the sole purpose of
securing the continued operation of the property in the public inter-
est, health and welfare pursuant to the proclamation and executive
orders of the governor, and that for all other purposes at all times
mentioned in plaintiff’s petition, the transit company was operating
streetcars and motorbusses in Kansas City for the transportation of
persons for hire and was in sole and complete control and management
of its facilities and business; and that the defendant transit company
“was the master of the operator of the motorbus mentioned in plain-
tiff’s petition and was liable as such for any negligence, if any, as
alleged in plaintift’s petition.’’ Further, Julian alleged that if he did
operate and manage the property he was acting on behalf of the
State of Missouri which had not consented to be sued.

Pursuant to the motion of defendant transit company there was a
separate trial of the issues as to whether the transit company or Julian
and the State of Missouri was operating the bus in question, and
whether or not the operator and driver of said bus was the employee
of the transit company or the employee of said Vance Julian and the
State of Missouri. The hearing on the issues was without a jury and
the trial court found that the motorbus involved in the accident was
in the exclusive possession, control and operation of the State of
Missouri acting by and through its state agent and representative,
Vance Julian. The judgment was that both defendants, the transit
company and Julian, be ‘‘dismissed with prejudice.’’

- The primary question involved is whether the employer-employee
relation existed between the motorbus driver and one or both of the
defendants. Our first consideration is whether the legal status exists

by operation of law, that is, by legislative fiat, and, if not, whether the
relation was in fact created assuming the statute authorized it.

Authority for the proclamation and executive orders of the governor
must be found in V.A.MLS. §§ 295.180-295.210, since the authority of
the executive and his representatives’ cannot exceed the power granted.
by the General Assembly. Section 295.180 provides in substance that
if the effective operation of a public utility is threatened or interrupted.
by a lockout, strike or work stoppage, the governor is ‘‘authorized to
take immediate possession of the plant, equipment or facility for the
use and operation by the State of Missouri in the public interest.’’
The governor’s power and authority may be exercised through such
department or agency of the government as he may designate. The
section specifically provides that the properties of the utility ‘‘shall
be returned to the owners thereof as soon as practicable after the
settlement of said labor dispute, and it shall thereupon be the duty of
such utility [489] to continue the operation of the plant facility, or
equipment in accordance with its franchise and certificate of public
convenience and necessity.’? Section 295.200 provides penalties for
unlawful acts by persons, employees or representatives of the public
utility designed to interfere with the operation of the utility and gives
the courts power to enforce by injunction and other legal and equi-
table remedies any provision of the chapter or any rule or regulation
preseribed by the governor. Section 295.210 contains clauses expressly
preserving the constitutional privileges of an individual employee and
safeguarding his right to quit his work.

The proclamation of the governor and his executive orders must all
be within the grant of authority from the General Assembly. Likewise,
acts of any representative appointed by the governor must be within
the authority granted him by the governor. Acts in excess of the
grant of power and authority would be invalid. There is no conten-
tion that cither the governor or his representative Julian exceeded
their authority in what was done.

The material evidence is largely documentary. The proclamation
issued by the governor April 29, 1950, found that there was a threat-
ened interruption of the operation of the Kansas City Public Service
Company, a public utility, as a result of a labor dispute, and that the
public interest, health and welfare were jeopardized thereby, and
proclaimed that ‘‘the exercise of the authority vested in me by See-
tion 19 of an Act of the 64th General Assembly found in Laws of
Missouri, 1947, Vol. 1, pages 859 to 866, both inclusive, is necessary
to insure the operation in Missouri of the Kansas City Public Service
Company a publie utility.”

Executive Order No. 1, signed by the governor on the same day,
made certain recitals and concluded with the following order: ‘‘I
hereby take possession of the plants, equipment and all facilities of
the Kansas City Public Service Company, located in the State of

Missouri, for the use and operation by the State of Missouri in the
public interest, effective at 11:00 P.M., Sunday, April 30, 1950.’

The proclamation and Executive Order No. 1 had to do with taking
possession of the utility property under the King-Thompson Act:
Executive Order No. II, Julian’s letter of April 29, 1950, and subse:
quent events had to do with the manner and method by which the
utility was operated and the extent to which Julian used the powers
granted to him.

The governor’s Executive Order No. II, also dated April 29, 1950,
after certain recitals, stated :

““(1) That Vance Julian Chairman of the State Board of
Mediation, is hereby authorized and directed 10 take possession
of the plants, offices, facilities and equipment of every nature
and description used in the operation of the business of the
Kansas City Public Service Company in the State of Missouri or
such parts of each of said plants, offices, facilities and equipment
to the extent that it may be necessary for the purpose of carrying
out the provisions of this Order, which is to insure that the said
utility above mentioned is effectively operated in the interest of
the people of this state in order that they may have the benefit of
necessary and essential public passenger transportation.

“‘(2) That Vance Julian, Chairman of the State Board of
Mediation, is further authorized and directed to take possession .
of any and all real and personal property or any other assets
wherever the same may be situated which are used or shall be
necessary to be used in connection with the operation of such
plants, offices, facilities and equipment and to operate and arrange
for the operation of such plants, offices, facilities and equipment
[490] in any manner necessary in order to maintain public passen-
ger transportation for the people of the State of Missouri and in
order that the public interest may not be interfered with.

““(3) For the purpose of carrying out the processes* of this
Order, that Vance Julian, Chairman of the State Board of Media-
tion, is authorized to select and hire such employees and agents
as may be necessary and suitable to carry out the same; to exer-
cise any contracttial or any other rights of the owners of said
plants, offices, facilities and equipment; to do any and all other -
things that may be necessary or desirable for or incidental to the
use and operation of said plants, offices, facilities and equipment
in order to effectively operate the same in the public interest and
to take any and all other steps that may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Order.

“Italics in quotations at this point and elsewhere in this opinion have
been supplied unless otherwise indicated,

"The word “processes” as used here and elsewhere in this order and
Julian’s letter of April 29, 1950, probably should be read as “purposes.”

“*(4) That Vance Julian, Chairman of the State Board of
Mediation, shall operate the plants, offices, facilities and equip-
ment mentioned herein under the terms and conditions of employ-
ment in effect at the time possession thereof is seized by him
under the terms of this Order and he shall continue to operate the
same until and unless otherwise directed by me.

“*(5) That Vance Julian, Chairman of the. State Board of
Mediation, may permit, in his discretion and upon such terms and
conditions as he deems advisable, the management of the aibove
public utility to continue tts managerial functions to the extent
consistent with the processes of this Order.

“*(6) All state agencies are directed to cooperate with Vance
Julian, Chairman of the State Board of Mediation, to the fullest
extent possible in carrying out the purposes of this Order.

“(7) That Vance Julian, Chairman of the State Board of
Mediation, is authorized and directed to maintain the customary
procedure for the adjustment of workers’ grievances. He shall
recognize the right of the workers to continue their membership
in any labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, provided that such concerted activities do not
interfere with the operation of public passenger transportation.

“*(8) All rules and regulations of the aforesaid utility govern-
ing the internal management and organization of the company
shall remain in force and effect throughout the term of operation
by the State of Missouri.’’

Pursuant to the proclamation and executive orders, defendant
Julian, on April 29, 1950, transmitted to Powell C. Groner, presi-
dent of Kansas City Public Service Company at Kansas City, a letter
reading as follows:

“I hand you herewith the Proclamation of Governor Forrest
Smith, dated April 29, 1950. I also hand you a copy of Execu-
tive Orders No. 1 and II relating to the same subject matter.

“Governor Smith, by virtue of said orders will take possession
of the plants, equipment and all facilities of the Kansas City Pub-
lic Service Company, located in the State of Missouri, for the use
and operation by the State of Missouri in the public interest, all
to be effected as of 11 0’clock P.M. Sunday, April 30, 1950.

“‘T have been directed in Executive Order No. II to take posses-
sion of the plants, offices, facilities and equipment of every nature
and description, [491] both real and personal, used in the opera-
tion of the business of the Kansas City Public Service Company
in the State of Missouri, or such parts as are necessary for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of the orders of Governor
Smith. I am by this letter taking this formal step as of 11 0’clock

P.M., Sunday, April 30, 1950. All of which is done to insure that

the said utility above mentioned is effectively operated in the in-

terest of the people of this state in order that they may have the
benefit of necessary and essential public passenger transporta-
tion.

“Paragraph 5 of Executive Order No. II gives me the power to
continue the operation of the utility under the present manage-
ment. This I propose to do. Therefore, by virtue of the power
given to me by the above mentioned orders, Honorable Powell
C. Groner is ordered and directed to operate and manage the
utility to the extent consistent with the processes of the Gover-
nor’s orders. He will have the full charge of said utility and all
officers and employees will continue under the terms and condi-
tions of employment at the time possession thereof is seized, to-wit
11:00 P.M., Sunday, April 30, 1950. All wage scales and working
conditions will remain the same unless otherwise directed.

‘Paragraph 7 of Executive Order No. II will be in force and
effect. The company and employees will operate wnder the terms
of the 1949 labor agreement unless same has been amended by
mutual agreement.

“‘AN rules and regulations of the aforesaid utility govern-
ing the internal management and organization of the company
shall remain in force and effect throughout the term of operation
by the State of Missouri.’’

Additional evidence with respect to the operation of the utility will
be discussed in the course of the opinion.

Hl The two witnesses that testified, Mr. Groner and Mr. Julian, both
drew conclusions both of law and fact during the course of their testi-
mony. Self-serving statements were also made in documents and
otherwise during the period of the state’s seizure. For example, Mr.
Groner on May 1, 1950, apparently on his own initiative and without
consulting Julian, prepared and posted a bulletin in which it was
stated: ‘‘Kansas City Public Service Company is no longer engaged
in the operation of the transit system, and same is being operated by
the State of Missouri without liability or responsibility on the part
of said company during the period of State operation.’’ The bulletin
also stated that ‘‘The officers, officials and employees of the company
have become employees of and are working for the State of Missouri.’’
Other such statements were made with respect to the liability for
Workmen’s Compensation payments and in presenting an application
for an increase in fares before the Missouri Public Service Commis-
sion. These are typical of statements by transit company executives
at various times during the period in question. There is no showing
that the plaintiff is connected in any way with these statements, and
objection was duly made at the trial. Such statements are obviously
self-serving, They are not binding on the plaintiff and will not be

considered of any evidentiary value in determining the issues in this
ease; Wahl v. Cunningham, 332 Mo. 21, 56 8.W.2d 1052, 1059. Like-
wise, it binds no one that Julian considered the seizure to be a
“technical”? one. The statements of Mr. Groner and Mr. Julian might
be of some significance if offered in connection with a controversy be-
tween the state and the transit company, but they can have no possible
competency or relevancy with respect to plaintiff’s claim.

Julian was, at the time in question, the chairman of the State
Board of Mediation duly appointed pursuant to § 295.030. He was
also serving as the agent or representative of the state through whom
the governor exercised the power and authority [492] granted in, §
295.180. Since the capacity in which he was serving was fully disclosed
and acknowledged, it is not contended that he incurred any personal
obligation or liability. When we refer to Julian he will be deemed to
be acting in his capacity as agent or representative of the state.

Hl In order for the state to acquire the status of employer with
respect to the operating personnel of the utility, there must be express
legislation so providing or the relation must -come into existence as
the result of contract or result from the application of common law
principles to the facts in the case. .

Since the statute does not expressly so provide, the relation of
employer and employee between the state and the operating personnel
of the utility did not arise by operation of law. In this instance we
use the term ‘‘operation of law’’ to express the manner in which
rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person or persons by
the application to the particular situation of express statutory pro-
visions without any act of the party or parties. Black’s Law Diction-
ary, 4th Ed., Operation of Law.

Merely invoking the provisions of the King-Thompson Act by the
issuance of the governor’s proclamation and Executive Order No. 1
without more, did not have the legal effect of converting the operating
employees of the transit company into state employees. Such intent ©
and purpose would have to be clearly expressed. The New Jersey
statute for dealing with labor disputes in public utilities is similar to
our own. However, it expressly provides that ‘‘during the continu-
ance of such possession the relationship between the government of the
State of New Jersey and the persons employed at such public utility,
shall be that of employer and employee.’’. NJSA 34:13B-19.

The General Assembly has the power to impose the status by express
legislative enactment.’ Thus our Workmen’s Compensation Act spe-
cifically creates the status of ‘“‘statutory’’ employer and employee.
V.A.MS., § 287.040; Viselli v. Missouri Theatre Bldg. Corp., 361 Mo.
280, 284 S.W.2d 563, 567; Perrin v. American Theatrical Co., 352 Mo.
484, 178 8.W.2d 332, 334; Baker v. Iowa-Missouri Walnut Log Oo.,
Mo. App.; 270 $.W.2d 73, 75; Rucker v. Blanke Baer Extract & Pre-
serving Co., Mo.App., 162 S,W.2d 845, 846.

The defendant transit company has cited a number of cases which
arose under the World War I Railroad Seizure Act, in support of its
contention that ‘‘taking possession’’ in and of itself relieves the transit
company of liability. These authorities are not helpful in the present
situation because of the difference in statutory provisions and execu-
tive orders. This distinction is made apparent in the case of Mo. Pac.
R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 41 8.Ct. 593, whiere, by the express pro-
visions of the Federal Act, the new managers were required to com-
pletely sever their relations with the railroad companies, the employees
were controlled by the federal administrator and not by the company,
a remedy was provided in lieu of the carrier’s liability and the govern-
ment got the profits or was charged with the loss resulting from
operations.

We will not imply from the statute an intention to make the utility
personnel state employees by legislative edict unless such intent is
clearly expressed. See State ex rel. Buder v. Hackmann, 305 Mo. 842,
265 §.W. 582, 534, wherein a statutory provision for payment of the
necessary expenses of the assessor and his deputies was held to ‘‘fall
far short of constituting clear and satisfactory authority for the pay-
ment by the state of clerk hire for assessors.’’? The aét not only fails
to provide expressly and with clarity that the operating personnel of
a utility shall, by operation of law, become state employees, but also
wholly fails to make any provision fairly susceptible of such a con-
struction.

Hl The proclamation and Executive Order No. 1 made no pro-
vision with regard to the use or operation of the utility property.
[493] It is from Executive Order No. II, Julian’s instructions to
Groner, and the activities of Julian and Groner thereafter that we
must determine who was legally liable for torts resulting from the
operations of the utility at the time plaintiff claims to have been
injured.

By Executive Order No. II Julian was authorized to take possession
of the utility property or such parts thereof as might be necessary
‘“to insure that said utility above mentioned is effectively operated in
the interest of the people of this state.’’ By § 2 of the order he was
authorized ‘‘to operate and arrange for the operation’’ of the utility.
By paragraph 3 Julian ‘‘is authorized to select and hire such em-
ployees and agents as may be necessary and suitable to carry out’’ the
provisions of the order. By § 5 Julian in his discretion was authorized
to permit ‘‘the management of the above public utility to continue
its managerial functions to the extent consistent with the’’ purposes
of the order. .

In transmitting the proclamation and executive orders to Mr.
Groner, president of Kansas City Public Service Company, Julian
specifically stated that he proposed “‘to continue the operation of the
utility under the present management’”’ and that Mr. Groner ‘“‘will

Have full charge of said utility and all officers and employees will
continue under the terms and conditions of employment at the time
possession thereof was seized.’’ Other than contacting Mr. Groner as
stated, there is nothing in the record tending to show that Julian
undertook to hire or take over the employment of any of the operating
personnel of the utility. It is apparent from an examination of the
proclamation and the executive orders in their entirety that Julian
did not use to the fullest extent the powers granted him which we
will assume without deciding were valid grants of authority.

« We are presently interested in determining whether Julian entered
into any hiring or contract of employment with the operating per-
sonnel of the utility on behalf of the state. State employment, while
it must be authorized by law, generally has its basis in contract, ex-
press or implied, the same as any other hiring. 67 C.J.S. 114, Officers,
§ 5(4) states that ‘“* * * an employment, although it may be
ereated by law, usually arises out of a contract between the govern-
ment and the employee; *.* *.”

This court has adopted the definitions of master and servant found
in § 2, Restatement of the Law of Agency. Smith v. Fine, 351 Mo.
1179, 175 S.W.2d 761, 765; Mattan v. Hoover Co., 350 Mo. 506, 166
§.W.2d'557, 564. Section 2 of the Restatement defines a master as fol-
lows: ‘‘A master is a principal who employs another to perform serv-
i¢e in his affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physi-
eal conduct of the other in the performance of the service,’’ A servant
is ‘‘a person employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled
or is subject to the right to control by the master.’’? The record is
devoid of any evidence that Julian controlled or had the right to con-
trol the physical conduct of the operating employees of the utility.

None of the utility employees were paid by the state. This is a
strong factor indicating that they were not state employees. Williams
vy. Gideon-Anderson Lumber Co., Mo.App., 224 S.W. 51, 58. In 81
€.5.8. 978, States, § 53, with reference to state employees, it is stated:
“Payment of particular persons by the state is a very strong circum-
stance showing that they are state employees, and it has been held that
one becomes a civil servant or employee only when he furnishes his
services or labor for compensation directly paid to him by the state.
*"* # An independent contractor, working for the state, has been
held not ‘an employee of the state.’ ’’? Under the evidence, we must
Hold that there was no contract of employment, either express or im-
plied, between Julian on behalf of the state and the operating per-
sonnel of the utility.

- The question then arises whether the state, through its representa-
tive, Julian, [494] exercised such control over the physical operation
of the utility as to impose a liability for the acts of the operating per-
sonnel of the utility under principles of common law.

Mr. Julian testified that he did not participate in the management
of the company and had no intention of doing so; that all of his in-
structions were given to Mr. Groner in two letters, one written at the
time he delivered the proclamation and executive orders, and the
other written in connection with the payment of Workmen’s Compen-
sation claims; nor was there any showing that Mr. Julian actively
participated in the management of the utility. Apparently the only
time Julian was consulted was when the transit company was seek-
ing something for its own advantage. On these occasions Groner and the
other executives must be held to be acting in their capacity as corporate
officials and not as representatives of the state.

Hl The “‘plant, equipment or facility’? which the statute author-
ized the governor to take from the possession of the utility was its
physical property. Tucker v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 298 Mo.
51, 250 S.W. 890; Canary Taxicab Co. v. Terminal Ry. Assn. of St.
Louis, 316 Mo. 709, 294 8.W. 88. The act did not purport to authorize
the governor to command the services of the personnel of the utility,
whether it be the president of the company or the operator of one of
its busses.

| | The governor’s Executive Order No. II was not a mandate for
Julian to operate the property personally, and the evidence shows
that he did not do so. Paragraph 5 of Executive Order No. II author-
ized Julian to permit the existing management to continue its func-
tions, and his letter of April 29, 1950 shows that this is what he did.
The management of the transit company continued to act as a unit
and Julian did not disturb its employment relations.

Whether the company established a relation of independent con-
tractor with the state is not necessary for decision in this case. How-
ever, the relation is clearly akin to it. In § 2, Restatement of the Law
of Agency, an independent contractor is defined as ‘‘A person who
contracts with another to do something for him but who is not con-
trolled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with
respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertak-
ing.’’? Was the transit company subject to Julian’s right to control
with respect to its ‘‘physical conduct in the performance of the under-
taking’’? We do not think so on the facts of this case.

Hl The briefs in this case discuss at great length the kind and ex-
tent or degree of possession taken by the state pursuant to the King-
Thompson Act. Possession alone is not determinative of the issue of
liability. Our inquiry is who was the master of the driver of the
motorbus in question, and we need not determine precisely the kind
or extent of the state’s possession except as it affects our primary
question. It is aptly stated in 73 C.J.S. 196, Property, § 14, ‘‘Both
in common speech and in legal terminology, there is no word more
ambiguous in its meaning than. ‘possession’ when considered in its
relation to property.’”’

Actual possession, or, as it is sometimes called, pedis possessio, has
been defined by the Missouri courts as ‘‘real’’ and ‘‘visible’’ and as
“* ‘actual and continuous occupancy or exercise of full dominion.’ ’”’
Jackson v. Rothschild, Mo.App., 99 8.W.2d 859, 861; Bradbury Mar-
ble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo.App. 96, 106 S. W. 594, 599;
Crain v. Peterman, 200 Mo. 295, 98 S.W. 600. The possession which
Julian assumed was largely declaratory in nature. It was proclaimed
by the governor and again by Julian in his letter to Mr. Groner, but
actually nothing was done about it. No one was dispossessed and
everyone stayed on his accustomed job. The state’s possession was not
real or visible, nor was the transit company ousted from its ‘‘actual
and continuous occupancy or exercise of full dominion’’ over its
premises. Not only did the company retain the occupancy of its
physical property, but the revenue was received and retained as it
had always been and was used for operating expenses, improvements,
[495] relocating tracks, and even the purchase of additional equip-
ment to the extent of between $300,000 and $400,000.

It is apparent from the record, and we so hold, that possession of
Julian and the state was not intended to be and was not in fact actual
possession. Insofar as the possession needs to be identified by name,
it might be called a legal possession or a nominal and technical pos-
session. It was more or less the assertion of the right to possession
which did not, in this case, ripen into exclusive or actual possession.

| | That the right of use and possession is not conclusive as to
liability is shown by the case of Bibb’s Adm’r. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co.,
87 Va. 711, 14 8.E. 163. In this case the railroad company contracted
for repairs to one of its bridges. The company reserved the right to
continue to use the bridge and to inspect the work as it proceeded.
While so using’ the bridge, an accident occurred through no active
negligence of the company, and an employee of the bridge contractor
was injured. It was held that this was not such possession or control
as to impose liability upon the railroad company. The mere retention
by the one in possession of the right to inspect the work of an inde-
pendent contractor as it progresses for the purpose of determining
whether it is completed in accordance with the contract does not create
the relation of master and servant with those engaged in the work.
Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14, 145 S.W. 16, 20-21; Williamson
vy. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., Mo., 265 S.W.2d 354, 359.

It cannot be said that the state retained any right to control with
respect to the ‘‘physical conduct in the performance of the undertak-
ing.’’ Julian designated the ‘‘present management”’ to continue the
operation of the utility. Although his contacts were with the president
of the company, it would be straining the situation unduly to say
that Groner was ‘‘the management.’’ Obviously the transit company
remained in control as the managers of the utility business. So far
as the record shows, Julian did not even retain control of policy-

making matters. He was not consulted with respect to improvements
made or new equipment purchased, some of which was quite sub-
stantial.

Where the statute does not expressly so provide and participation
in operations has been limited as here, the courts have held that
government did not ineur liability by asserting the right to seize
property of the utility and to have ‘‘nominal’’ or ‘‘technical’’ posses-
sion. In Marion & Rye Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 280,
46 S.Ct. 253, 255, the railway company made its claim for the alleged
taking of possession and use of the railroad by the United States under
the Federal Control Act. The court held that even if there was a
technical taking that the company had remained in actual possession
of its property and there could be no recovery.

In the case of Stanton v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 127 W.Va. 685, 34 S.H.2d
257, the action was for the wrongful death of a coal mixer. The de-
fendant coal company asserted that the government of the United
States under an executive order issued by the President of the United
States was, on August 27, 1943, decedent’s employer and in complete
possession and control of the mine and its operation and therefore
defendant was under no liability whatsoever. The President’s order
provided that the secretary of the interior shall take over such con-
trol of coal mines as he may deem necessary to accomplish the main-
tenance of full production of coal for the effective prosecution of the
war. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the
regulations ‘‘clearly indicate that, except and only if necessary to
effect the primary object of Government control, such control would
be nominal.’’? The court pointed out that the control of the mines was
wholly unlike the control of the railroads, since in the latter case the
director general had been made liable for damages resulting froni the
negligent operation [496] of the railroads and the carriers themselves
had been relieved. A petition for review by the Supreme Court of the
United States on certiorari was denied (326 U.S. 740, 66 S.Ct. 53).
The Stanton case is quite similar on the essential facts and the ap-
plicable principles to the case at bar. In the case of State v. Traffic
Tel. Workers Fed., 142 N.J.Eq. 792, 61 A.2d 570, 573, the seizure was
referred to as a ‘protective custodianship’’ in a situation where the
seizure was comparable to the one in the case at bar.

Under the facts of this case the state did not incur any liability to
persons injured as a result of operations during the seizure of ‘the
utility, and it follows that Julian’s motion to dismiss was properly
ruled.

Our next subject of inquiry is whether the transit company
remained liable for the torts of the utility personnel after April 29,
1950, as it had been before. None of the state’s funds were used in
the operation of the utility between May 1 and December 11, 1950.
Mr. Julian did not seize any of the company’s money nor its bank

339

account; nor did he collect any of the current income during this
period or sign any checks. The payment of the operating employees
out of funds which belonged to the company, or which were treated
as its own, was a circumstance tending to prove the utility personnel
were employees of the company during this period of time. Menard
v. Goltra, 328 Mo. 368, 40 S.W.2d 1053, 1058. After eliminating self-
serving declarations and conclusions from the record, there is no
competent evidence that the employer-employee relationship between
the transit company and its employees was severed on April 29, 1950,
and we hold that the relation continued to exist during the period in
question and that at the time of plaintiff’s alleged injury the transit
company was the employer and master of the operator of the motor-
bus in question.

HMM The defendant company would also be liable on the theory of
ratification for tortious acts of the operating personnel of the utility.
The defendant company received and retained the revenue derived
from the carriage of passengers during the period in question. Al-
though Mr. Groner mentioned an accounting, it was never made.
The company’s acceptance and retention of the fares of passengers
under the circumstances amounts to a ratification that establishes the
relationship of master and servant in such a way and in such a char-
acter that the company must be held responsible for any negligence
of the operator of the motorbus. In the case of Dempsey v. Chambers,
154 Mass. 830, 28 N.E. 279, the plaintiff ordered coal from the de-
fendant. The coal was delivered by one who was not defendant’s ser-
vant, and in doing so he broke a plate glass window of the plaintiff.
After the delivery of the coal, and with knowledge that the person who
delivered the coal had broken the window, the defendant demanded
that the plaintiff pay for the coal. It was held that there was a ratifi-
cation which made the deliverer of the coal the agent and servant of
the defendant for the delivery of the coal, and that the defendant
became responsible for his negligence in that regard. The opinion by
Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated, 28 N.E. Le. 280, 281:

“We have found hardly anything in the books dealing with
the precise case, but we are of opinion that consistency with the
whole course of authority requires us to hold that the defendant’s
ratification of the employment established the relation of master
and servant from the beginning, with all its incidents, including

the anomalous liability for his negligent acts. See Coomes v.

Houghton, 102 Mass. 211, 218, 214; Cooley, Torts, 128, 129. The
ratification goes to the relation, and establishes it ab initio. The
relation existing, the master is answerable for torts which he has
not ratified specifically, just as he is for those which he has not
commanded, and as he may be for those which he has expressly
forbidden.”’

[497] The case of Lamb v. Davidson, 69 Mo.App. 107, recognized
the principle of ratification. In that case the tortious act ‘consisted of
the detention by defendant’s daughter and nephew of plaintifi’s
eattle which had strayed into defendant’s pasture. The original de-
tention had been without defendant’s knowledge. The opinion states,
le, 114, ‘“* * * if they were not acting for him, nor as his ser-
vants, he after being’ notified by Lamb of what had been done, rati-
fied the act bot which there is some evidence in the record) he is
responsible.’’

The principle of ratification under these circumstances is well
established in. common law. In 85 Am, Jur. 997, Master and Servant,
§ 563, it is stated: ‘‘Where one. assumes without authority to act
ag the agent of another, the latter’s ratification of the transaction
relates back and establishes the relation of employer and employee
with all of its incidents including the employer’s liability for the
employee’s wrongful acts and omissions.’”

Whether there were net profits during the period the record does
not show, but it does not'matter. The company did receive and retain
the income derived from the operation of the utility during the period
in question, and that is sufficient to support a ratification.

HM Neither of the defendants have questioned the constitution-
ality.of the King-Thompson Act. The amici curiae have no right to
question the act’s constitutionality although they have undertaken
to do so. Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann, 345 Mo. 449, 184 8.W.2d
65, The plaintiff first raised the question of the act’s constitutionality
in her reply. This has been held too late. Nemours v. City of Clayton,
851 Mo. 817, 172 S.W.2d 937. Even though.the question were timely
raised by plaintiff, it would not be necessary to rule the constitutional
questions because their determination is not,essential to the proper
decision of the case presented. State ex-rel. State Board of Mediation
vy. Pigg, 862 Mo. 798, 244 $.W.2d 75; Kansas City v. Tiernan, 356
Mo. 188, 202 8.W.2d 20.

For the reasons given, the judgment of ‘the trial court, dismissing
the ease as to the defendant ‘Vance Julian, Chairman, Missouri State
Board of Mediation, is affirmed.

The judgment dismissing the defendant Kansas City Public Serv-
ice Company, a Corporation, is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Leedy, C.J., Dalton, Hollingsworth, Hyde, Westhues, JJ. and
Stone, Special Judge, concur; Hager, J., not sitting.

Rossetti Byers, Appellant, v. Lemay Bank & Trust Company, a
Corporation, Respondent, No.. 44666—282.S. W. (2d) 512.

Division Two, September 12, 1955.

" Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled in Per Curiam
Opinion Filed, October’ 10, 1955.

peg erman D, Olian and Lowis E. Zuckerman for appellant,

Tralles, Hoffmeister & Gilpin and Fred J. Hoffmeister for respond-
ent.: .

[513] BOHLING, C.—Russell Byers, plaintiff, appeals from a
judgment in favor of the Lemay Bank and Trust Company, a corpo-
ration, on plaintiff’s claim for $4,452 against defendant, and from a
judgment of $3,780.40 on defendant’s counterclaims against plaintiff.
The litigation involves the disaffirmancé by a quondam infant of con-
tracts entered into while a minor. The trial was to the court without
a jury. Plaintiff. contends the judgment on each claim should have
been in his favor. We have jurisdiction as the amount in dispute ex-
ceeds $7,500. Schmidt v. Morival. Farms, Inc., Mo., 240 S. W. 2d 952,
954[2]; Davis v. Hauschild, Mo. App., 288 S. W, 2a 920, 921[1, 2]
Mo., 243 8. W. 2d 956, 957[1].

In plaintiff’s petition plaintiff pleaded his minority, admitted his
indebtedness to defendant as evidenced by his $6,500 note of Febru-
ary 19; 1952, and his renewal note of March 21, 1952, therefor ; alleged
the application by defendant of $4,452 ($4,440 as established by the
evidence) of his deposits on said indebtedness on March 25 and 26,

1952, and sought the recovery of the moneys so applied by defendant,
plaintiff alleging he desired to invoke his rights and immunities as a
minor and had notified defendant on July 23, 1952, ‘‘of his intention
of repudiating, rescinding and avoiding’ his said written obligation.

Defendant’s answer charged plaintiff fraudulently represented
that he was 23 years of age, and that defendant, being deceived and
entrapped thereby, loaned to plaintiff $6,500, for which plaintiff
executed to defendant his said note of February 19, 1952, and, as
security therefor, his chattel mortgage on five automobiles, represent-
ing to defendant that he was the sole owner of said automobiles, and
that plaintiff disposed of said automobiles without the knowledge or
consent of defendant.

Defendant’s two counterclaims are based on plaintiff’s unpaid
notes. In its first counterclaim defendant sought judgment on a $1,900
note, dated July 1, 1952, which represented the then balance due on
the original $6,500 indebtedness of February 19, 1952. [514] In its
second counterclaim defendant sought judgment on a $1,590 note of
February 21, 1952. Defendant prayed judgment on each note for the
respective balance due, -with interest and an attorney’s fee of ten per
cent in accord with the terms of each of said notes.

Plaintiff, for his defense to defendant’s counterclaims, pleaded his
infancy. These were all the pleadings in the case.

The clear preponderance of the evidence established the facts al-
leged by defendant. Plaintiff was 21 years old August 19, 1952.
§ 457.010, RSMo 1949. He worked at many places and bought and
sold automobiles. He banked with defendant. When he applied for
his first loan in November, 1950, he talked to Edgar P. Crecelius,
president of defendant, and wanted to know if defendant would
“floor plan’’ automobiles for him, Mr.- Crecelius asked plaintiff his
age and plaintiff answered that he was 23 years old. The cashier and
assistant cashier of defendant corroborated this testimony of Mr.
Crecelius. Thereafter a number of loans were made to plaintiff by
defendant, each note being secured by a chattel mortgage, and plain-
tiff paid the notes in due course.

On February 19, 1952, plaintiff borrowed $6,500 from defendant,
executed his note therefor and secured its payment by a chattel
mortgage on five automobiles. The note was payable on demand or,
if no demand, on March 19, 1952. It was not paid and Mr. Crecelius
called on plaintiff at his car lot. Plaintiff informed Mr. Crecelius that
the automobiles had been disposed of; that he did not know where
they were; that he did not have the money; and that he could not
help it that they were subject to defendant’s mortgage. Mr. Crecelius
told plaintiff he would give him a few days to meet his obligation but
plaintiff would have to come to the bank and renew the loan. Plain-
tiff, on March 24, 1952, executed a new note for $6,500 and a chattel
mortgage on the five automobiles.

a ws

Plaintiff had a balance in the bank to his eredit of $6.17. He de-
posited $4,134 in the bank on March 25, 1952. Mr. Crecelius applied
$4,140 on plaintift’s $6,500 note on March 25th. Plaintiff made
another deposit of $300 on March 26, 1952, and it also was applied by
defendant against the loan. The note was renewed several times
and plaintiff made several payments thereon. The last renewal note,
for $1,900, was executed July 1, 1952. It has not been paid.

Plaintiff also borrowed $1,590 from defendant on February 21,
1952, executing an installment note, payable in eighteen monthly
payments, and, as security, gave a chattel mortgage on a 1952 sedan.
Plaintiff paid $265.02 on this note, but the sedan was disposed of
without defendant’s knowledge, and the note has not been paid.

The judgment, as stated, was against plaintiff on his claim and
for defendant on its counterclaims, the court finding defendant en-
titled on defendant’s first counterclaim to $1,900, with interest of
$133 and attorney’s fees of $190, total $2,223.00; and on defendant’s
second counterclaim $1,825, with interest of $99.90 and attorney’s
fees of $132.50, total $1,557.40, a grand total of $3,780.40.

Defendant does not contend that the case falls within any of
the acts of ratification set forth in § 481.060, RSMo 1949, which pro-
vides: ‘‘No action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person
upon any debt contracted during infancy, unless such person shall
have ratified the same by some other act than a verbal promise to pay
the same,’’ and specifies the acts constituting a ratification after the
infant becomes of full age.

Protecting those lacking in experience and of immature mind from
designing adults developed in the common law of feudal England.
Y. B. 21 Edw. I, p. 318 (1292). The purpose is to shield minors
against their own folly and inexperience and against unscrupulous
persons, but not to give minors a sword with which to wreak injury
upon unsuspecting adults. With the advancement of civilization,
the spread of education, and modern industrial conditions minors
attain a high state of sophistication. Many earn their own livelihood
and are [515] more worldly-wise than their parents. Plaintiff’s
father testified plaintiff never came to him for fatherly advice. The
common law is said to be a growing institution, keeping pace with
social and economic conditions. State ex rel. v. Beck, 337 Mo. 839,
85 S. W. 2d 1026, 1029. The protection of adults against depreda-
tions by minors knowingly employing fravdulent methods out-
weighs the interests of such minors, and adults should have available
the remedies not founded on contract for their protection. Every
case involving a contract to which a minor is a party should not
necessarily be forced into the Procrustean bed of the rule that allows
a minor to escape responsibility for his other acts upon exercising the
privilege of rescinding his contract at his will. Plaintiff was not a

toddler, or a teen-ager, but an ‘‘old’’ infant, cunning enough to con-
ceive and perpetrate a fraud upon experienced adults.

Different results have been reached in different jurisdictions and
in some instances within the same jurisdiction on the responsibility
of a minor who, as an inducement for an adult to contract with
him, misrepresents that he is of age and deceives the adult by his
false statement to the adult’s resulting injury. Some jurisdictions
tend to uncompromisingly permit minors to rescind their contracts.
A number of jurisdictions hold that the minor is not estopped by mis-
representations as to his age in actions at law and a lesser number
where the suit is in equity; but other jurisdictions hold estoppel is
available in an action at law and a greater number apply estoppel
where the suit is in equity. Annotation, 90 A. L. R. 1441, 18 A. L. R.
520, 6 A. L. R. 416. An apparently increasing number of jurisdic-
tions hold the infant liable in tort for inducing the contract by mis-
representations that he is of age. Wisconsin Loan & Finance Corp.
v. Goodnough, 201 Wis. 101, 228 N. W. 484, 67 A. L. R. 1259, and
Annotation, 1264; Vermont Acceptance Corp. v. Wiltshire, 103 Vt.
219, 158 Atl. 199, 73 A. L. R. 792. See also 43 C. J. 8. 88, § 27, n. 83
et seq., 206, § 90, n. 94 et seq., 86, § 26; 27 Am. Jur. 818, § 96, n. 6 et
seq., 798, §§ 66-72; 1 Williston Contracts (1986), 726, § 245, 700,
§ 238; 19 Cornell L. Q. 620; 81 U. of Pa. L. R. 731; 15 U. of Pitt. L.
R. 78; 84 Va. L. RB. 829; 81 Yale L. J. 201. Liability ex delicto and
liability ex contractu are based on different principles and involve
different measures of recovery. If an infant is liable for his torts
generally, the better reasoned decisions hold he is liable for his
deceit in misrepresenting his age. His deceit induces the contract.
It does not involve the subject matter of the contract. The recovery
is the damage resulting to the defrauded person and not the contract
consideration. He is not held liable on the contract in form or sub-
stance.

Plaintiff argues that he was only asked his age, and that since de-
fendant did not ask him to show his service card, or ask him where he
was born, or ask him for his birth certificate, defendant did not ex-
ercise reasonable diligence and may not successfully assert it was
misled by plaintift’s statement. We do not agree. The misrepresenta-
tion is the vital fact. All the elements of a deceit are present. Plain-
tiff stated his age was 23. Plaintiff knew this was untrue. Plaintiff
made the statement with the intent that defendant act upon it. De-
fendant acted upon the statement in the manner contemplated by’
plaintiff. Defendant suffered actual damage by reason of plaintiff’s
misrepresentation as to his age, and the damage was the natural and
probable consequences of plaintiff’s fraud.

There are statements, as pointed out by plaintiff, in Missouri de-
cisions to the effect ‘‘* * that infants are not subject to the binding
effect of estoppel.’? Miller v. St. Louis & 8. F. R. Co., 188 Mo. App.

402, 174 8. W. 166, 169[6]; Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor
Store Co., Mo., 197 S. W. 42, 45[5, 6]; Gerkey v. Hampe, Mo. App.,
274 8. W. 510, 514; Ridgeway v. Herbert, 150 Mo. 606, 615, 51 8. W.
1040, 1042, 73 Am. St. R. 464. The Miller case involved a 17 year
old laborer and the contract on its face indicates advantage was taken
of the infant’s [516] immaturity of mind and lack of experience.
A close reading of the Ridgeway case (lc. 613 and 1042) and the
cases cited in support of the statement in the Miller case (Campbell
v. Laclede Gas Co., 84 Mo. 352, 368, and McBeth v. Trabue, 69 Mo.
642, 657) discloses no sufficient facts were adduced upon which to
base an estoppel. Plaintiff omits from his quotation of the Orchard
case the italicized words: ‘“‘Under these facts no estoppel could arise
against either of the minors * *.’? As observed in Myers v. Hurley
Motor Co., 273 U. S. 18, 22, 23 (discussed infra), of a like statement
in Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. 8. 300, 318, 26 L. Ed. 87, 89 the state-
ment is too broad. This court in Ryan v. Growney, 125 Mo. 474, 483,
28 S. W. 189, 190, 755, considered that a minor who represented him-
self to be of age to induce an adult to purchase his land was estopped
from canceling his deed in a court of equity. The earlier Ryan case
is not mentioned in the Ridgeway case. We also read the Gerkey case
and Sassenrath v. Lewis Motor Co., Mo. App., 246 8. W. 2d 520,
522[8], to recognize that an infant may be subject to an estoppel
in appropriate circumstances. The issue in plaintiff’s case of Hente
v. Michie, 236 Mo. App. 322, 151 8. W. 2d 107, 108, was on the weight
of the evidence. Plaintiff’s cases do not involve an affirmative mis-
representation of his age by a minor to an adult as an inducement
to contract.

In Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U. 8. 18, 47 8. Ct. 277, 71 L.
Bd. 515, 50 A. L. R. 1181, a minor after attaining majority sued to
recover $406.12 paid defendant on the purchase price of an automobile
which defendant had repossessed under the sales agreement. Plain-
tiff had the appearance of a man of 24, but made no misrepresenta-
tions or practiced any deception to induce the making of the contract.
Defendant sought to set off $525.96 for damages to the automobile
while in plaintiff’s possession. The court stated the action was for
money had and received under a disaffirmed contract. ‘‘Such an ac-
tion, though brought at law, is in its nature a substitute for a suit
in equity; and it is to be determined by the application of equitable
principles. In other words, the rights of the parties are to be de-
termined as they would be upon a bill in equity. The defendant may
rely upon any defense which shows that the plaintiff in equity and
good conscience is not entitled to recover in whole or in part.’’ Le.
24, The court applied the equitable maxim, that he who seeks equity
must do equity, stating: ‘‘When an infant of mature appearance, by
false and fraudulent representations as to his age, has induced
another person to sell and deliver property to him, it is against

natural justice to permit the infant to recover money paid for the
property without first compelling him to account for the injury which
his deceit has inflicted upon the other person.’ l.c. 26. ‘‘The defense,
in effect, is that the plaintiff was guilty of tortious conduct to the
injury of the defendant in the transaction out of which his own cause
of action arose. In such case it is well settled that the relief is by way
of recoupment * *.’? Le. 27. Defendant was held entitled to a set
off up to but not exceeding the amount of plaintiff’s claim. The court
stated its conclusion did not rest upon estoppel, following Sims v.
Everhardt, supra, on the issue and being ‘‘not disposed now to re:
examine the question.’”

Broadly stated, we have considered minors responsible for their
marriage (§ 451.090, RSMo 1949; State v. Bittick,-103 Mo. 183, 15
S. W. 325, 23 Am, St. R. 869, iW L. R. A, 587; see also Walker ve
Walker, 316 Ill. App. 251, 44 N. EH. 2d 987); for their crimes (State
y. Adams, 76 Mo. 355; State v. Adams, 316 Mo. 157, 289 8. W. 948),
and for their torts (Pledge v. Griffith, 199 Mo. App. 303, 202 8. W.
460, 464; Swoboda v. Nowak, 213 Mo. App. 452, 255 8. W. 1079,
1082[7, 8, 18]).

The effect of plaintiff’s claim is to rescind his contract and recover
the money defendant applied to the discharge of his [517] obligation.
We hold the trial court correctly ruled plaintiff’s claim.

Defendant’s counterclaims are-suits on the two notes executed
by plaintiff. while. a minor, and the judgment, which includes interest
and attorney fees, is a judgment on said notes. Defendant’s counter-
claims are not in tort. Section 431.060, supra, provides that, in the
circumstances here of record, ‘‘no action shall be maintained whereby
to charge any person upon any debt contracted during infancy.”

It is stated in Koerner v. Wilkinson (1902), 96 Mo. App. 510, 516
et seq., 70 8. W. 509, 510 et seq., that at common law an infant’s void-
able contracts were enforcible against him unless he disaffirmed them
after he attained his majority; that under the law existing between
1879 (R. S. 1879, § 2516) and the enactment of § 431.060 in 1895
(Laws 1895, p. 181) an action could not be maintained on a con-
tract made ‘during infancy: unless ratified by the infant in writing
after attaining majority; that the Act of 1895 merely increased the
number of acts by which such contracts might be ratified, and that
no action can be maintained on such contracts unless the infant has
vatified the contract in the manner specified by the statute after he
becomes of age. Windisch v. Farrow, Mo. App., 159 8. W. 2d 392,
394[5, 6].

In defendant’s case of Swoboda v. ‘Nowak, 218 Mo. App. 452, 255 8.
‘W. 1079, 1082[7, 8,13], it was held-that an infant awas liable on a note
given in settlement of his tort, since he was liable for the tort; but
the consideration for the note was held to he as fully open to inquiry
as thougli the suit were onthe original tort. The instant case does

not present that situation. Defendant’s notes were not given in settle-
ment of a tort. On its presentation, defendant is not entitled to hold
the judgment on its counterclaims.

The judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s claim is affirmed, but the
judgment against plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaims is reversed
and the cause as to said counterclaims remanded for such action as
defendant may properly take. Barrett and Stockard, CC. concur.

PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Boutne, C., is
adopted as the opinion of this court. All the judges coneur.

Ow Monon ror Renarnve on TO TRANSFER

Hi PER CURIAM Plaintiff has filed a motion for rehearing or,
in the alternative, to transfer to court en. banc.

Plaintiff says that the opinion sets aside the established rule in
this State that: ‘Generally speaking, a minor is no more responsible
for his representations than he is for his deed,’’ stressing the cases
mentioned in this paragraph. Plaintiff’s cases are distinguishable on
the facts. In Ridgeway-v. Herbert, 150 Mo. 606, 615, 616, 618, 51 S.
‘W. 1040, 1042-1044, the infant and others were under the mistaken
belief that-he was of age when he executed the papers; the adult
took advantage of the infant’s improvidence, and under the cireum-
stances the minor was considered not responsible for his representa-
tions. As we read Gerkey v. Hampe, Mo. App., 274 8. W. 510,
514(8], 515, and Sassenrath v. Lewis Motor Co., Mo. App., 246 8. W.
2d 520, 522, the minor did not misrepresent that he was of age. The
answers in the Sassenrath case were general denials. In the Gerkey
case the court stated it was not saying a minor could never estop him-
self; Plaintiff directs attention’ to the fact that Ryan v. Growney, 125
Mo. 474, 484, 485, 28 S. W. 189, 191, 755, mentioned in the original
opinion, was on ‘‘motion for rehearing’? remanded ‘‘that the lower
court may rehear the same, unbound by anything said in the original
opinion.’? The decree in that case cancelled the minor’s deed to
defendant but adjudged in defendant a lien upon the laud for the
consideration paid plaintiff.- There was no bill of exceptions in the
case, and [518] upon the findings of the trial chancellor set out in
the record proper that the plaintiff was not under the influence of
liquor to the extent he did not comprehend his actions, and that he
made an affidavit that he was of full age, this court in the original
opinion held plaintiff was estopped from calling upon: a court of
equity to repudiate his contract and reversed the decree with direc-
tions to dismiss plaintiff’s petition. The court, as expressly stated
on, the motion for rehearing, remanded, the case because the ‘facts
were not as fully disclosed in the’ record or in the chancellor’s ‘find-
ings as desired for a final adjudication. There was no evidence or
finding before this court that defendant was ignorgnt of plaintiff’s

age and was deceived by representations of the plaintiff that he was
of age. Had the court desired to depart from the law announced,
it appears that the judgment would have been affirmed and the case
not remanded for a new trial as only the defendant appealed.

The instant plaintiff had reached the age of discretion and had
the appearance of and was engaged in and conducting business as an
adult. His representation that he was of age is attributable to a
base motive. No advantage was taken of him in the transaction by
defendant. :

Plaintiff’s claim, though at law to disaffirm his obligation and
for money had and received, is in its nature a substitute for a suit in
equity. Defendant, as stated, interposed the defense and the proof
established that plaintiff was guilty of tortious conduct ‘to the in-
jury of defendant. If seeking, in effect, equity, plaintiff should do
equity. The result may be the same as an estoppel. In the circum-
stances of the instant case, the essential facts being established, the
defendant should be allowed such relief in the nature of a set-off
as might be available to the extent of plaintiff’s claim. Defendant
was denied a recovery on its counterclaims based on debts con-
tracted by plaintiff during infancy.

Plaintiff’s motion for rehearing or to transfer is overruled.

Srarz or Missourt, on the Information of Jonw M. Daxron, Attorney-
General, Relator, v. Mizs Lasorarorms, Inc., McKusson and
Rozsins, Inc., McPrxz Drue Company, a Corporation, McPuxz,
Ino., C. D. Smima Deve Company, a Corporation, Sr. Lous
Waotesate Drue Company, a Corporation, and Mryzr Bros.
Drug Company, a Corporation, Respondents, No. 42152—282 8.
W. (2d) 564.

Court en Banc, October 10, 1955.

351

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Robert R. Welborn, Assist-
ant Attorney General, for relator.

Jumes M. Douglas and Thompson, hi
McKesson and Robbins, Inc., St. Louis Wholesale Drug Company and.
Meyer Brothers Drug Company; Kenneth BE. Mi
Newkirk, Eager, Swanson & Midgley for McP- .
Robert A. Brown, Jr., and Brown, Douglas & Brown for GC. D. Smith
Drug Company. .

@. Cawley, James C. Wilson and Coi
nt Miles Laborato:
» and Watson, Ess, Wh:

[566] STONE, Special Judge—tThis original proceeding in quo
warranto was instituted by the filing on June 29, 1950, of an in-
formation charging’ seven corporate respondents with violations of
the Missouri anti-trust statutes. Sections 416.010 to 416.040, incl. (AIL
statutory references herein are to RSMo V.AMS.) After the

filing of separate answers by respondents, an order was entered on
[567] November 13, 1950, appointing Lyman Field, Esq., as special
commissioner to take evidence upon the issues joined and to report
the evidence thus taken, together with his findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. Following extended hearings, our commissioner filed
his report on September 8, 1953, in which he concluded that none of
the respondents had violated the Missouri anti-trust statutes as”
charged in the information. The Attorney-General (hereinafter re-
ferred to as relator) exeepts to the commissioner’s findings and con-
clusions only as to Miles Laboratories, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as Miles).

Hl Miles is an Indiana corporation duly registered and quali-
fied to do business in Missouri, which manufactures and sells through-
out the United States several brand-name proprietary medicines.
However, the evidence was confined, almost entirely, to distribution
and sale of a single product, Alka-Seltzer, which, during the period
under consideration, i.e, three years prior to June 29, 1950,) was dis-
tributed by Miles in Missouri in three ways, to-wit, (1) by sales to
retailers through nine drug wholesalers (including the other six
respondents in this case, hereinafter referred to as the other respond-
ents), who were appointed by Miles as del eredere factors, (2) by
direct sales to approximately one hundred thirty other wholesalers in
Missouri, and (8) by direct sales to approximately seventy-five large
retailers, including Katz Drug Company, operating a chain of drug
stores in Kansas City and elsewhere, and (prior to May, 1949) Mil-
gram Food Stores, Inc., operating a chain of grocery supermarkets
in Kansas City. With each of the nine drug wholesalers in Missouri
(as well as drug wholesalers throughout the nation) who were ap-
pointed as del credere factors, Miles entered into a written consign-
ment agreement providing, among other things, that Miles would
furnish a consigned stock of its products to the factor, that Miles re-
served the right to designate the purchasers from whom the factor
should or should not solicit orders for the consigned Miles products
and reserved absolute title to such products until delivery to the
purchasers thereof, that the factor would fill orders only at stated
prices and discounts and would remit promptly to Miles the pro-
ceeds of sales of Miles products less the factor’s commission, and
that the factor would ‘‘not enter into any contract under the fair trade
laws or otherwise suggest the prices at which any purchaser of said
products shall resell the same.’” Noting that relator had conceded his
inability to find any Missouri case indicating that such consignment
agreements violate our anti-trust statutes, and pointing out that the

~FSection 516.360, the three-year statute of limitations, is applicable in
proceedings under the Missouri anti-trust statutes. State ex inf. Attorney
General v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 288-285, 169 S.W. 145, 167-
168(9).

357

relationship between Miles and its factors was that of principal and
agent [State ex rel. Parker v. Thompson, 120 Mo. 12, 20, 25 S.W. 346,
848] and that the factors’ guaranty of payment for Miles products
sold through them did not affect that relationship [Suman v. Inman,
6 Mo. App. 384], our commissioner properly concluded that the evi-
dence as to the other respondents, limited as it was to proof of execu-
tion of the consignment agreements and dealings in strict accordance
therewith, was wholly insufficient to justify a finding against those
respondents.

‘We turn to the issue as to Miles. The information closely
follows the language of Sections 416.010 to 416.040, incl.,? and [568]
in general terms charges violations of each of those statutes. However,
the gravamen of relator’s charge is that Miles was guilty of so-called
vertical price-fixing, i.e., the fixing and maintenance of resale prices;
and, the determinative questions here are (1) whether Miles entered
into any arrangement, agreement or understanding to fix or maintain
the resale price of Alka-Seltzer or to lessen full and free competition
in the sale thereof and (2) if so, whether such action violated the
Missouri anti-trust statutes. Having found that ‘‘no price-fixing
agreements were shown or proved by the evidence,’”’ our commissioner
deemed it unnecessary to rule the second question. Although a com-
missioner’s findings may be persuasive [State ex inf. Barker v.
Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 144, 176 S.W. 382, 387], ‘‘(t)he
case is here for our weighing upon the law, and for our examination
upon the evidence, as we may find it to be from the record’’ [State ex

*Section 416.010 provides that “Any person who shall create, enter into,
become a member of or participate in any pool, trust, agreement, combina-
tion, confederation or understanding with any person or persons in restraint
of trade or competition in the * * purchase or sale of * * * any article
or thing bought or sold whatsoever, shall be deemed and adjudged guilty
of a conspiracy in restraint of trade * * *.”

Section 416.020 provides that “Any person who shall create, onter into,
become a member of or participate in any pool, trust, agreement, com-
pination, confederation or understanding with any other person or persons to
regulate, control or fix the price of * * * any article or thing whatsoever,
of any class or kind bought or sold, * * * or to maintain said price when
so regulated or fixed, * * ® shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a
conspiracy in restraint of trade * * *.”

Section 416.040 provides that “All arrangements, contracts, agreements,
combinations or understandings made or entered into between any two or
more persons, designed or made with a view to lessen, or which tend to
lessen, lawful trade, or full and free competition in the * * sale in this
state of any * * article, or thing bought and sold, of any class or kind
whatsoever, * * * and all arrangements, contracts, agreements, combina-
tions or understandings made or~entered into between any two or more
persons which are designed or made with a view to increase, or which tend
to increase, the market price of any * * article or thing, of any class or
kind whatsoever bought and sold, * * * are hereby declared to be against
public policy, unlawful and void; and any person or persons creating, enter-
ing into, becoming a member of or participating in such arrangements,
contracts, agreements, combinations or understandings shall be deemed
and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade * * *.”

inf. Attorney General v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 274-275,
169 S.W. 145, 164-165] and the ultimate responsibility for determina.
tion of both issues of fact and questions of law rests upon us.

As readily acknowledged by its President, Mr. Walter R. Beardsley,
Miles has ‘‘strongly advocated”’ and supported fair trade legislation
throughout the nation and has been a leader in procuring enactment of
such legislation in forty-five states, Missouri being one of only three
states which does not have a fair trade act. (The other two are Texas
and Vermont.) Since 1934, Miles has followed consistently the policy

. of refusing to sell Alka-Seltzer to those who do not maintain the sug-
gested minimum retail prices of 49¢ for the ‘‘60c size’’ and 24¢ for the
“*30¢ size.’’? Lists showing Miles’ suggested minimum retail prices
for all of its products have been published and distributed to both
wholesalers and retailers, and its salesmen, such as Jacob Raca, Jr.,
who traveled the northern half of Missouri (including Kansas City)
during the period under consideration here, have been instructed to
check advertised and ‘‘shelf”’ prices on Miles products and to report
any ‘‘price violations’ to their superiors promptly. It is apparent
from the record that Miles’ price maintenance policy has become well
known in the drug industry. As stated by Mr. Morris R. Shlensky,
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of Katz, Miles is one
of the ‘‘very few’’ drug suppliers ‘‘who are sincere about * * ad-
herence to suggested minimum prices’’ and ‘‘are really severe in their
policing of their (price) policy.”’

Shortly after Milgram began to handle drug items about 1940, a
sales representative of Miles, Stair by name, called on John W. Mabry,
then manager of Milgram’s drug department, and ‘‘talked about their
suggested price.’’? Mabry told Stair that ‘‘we will try to go along’’
with Miles’ price maintenance policy and, as Mabry construed it, he
“made a promise’’ that ‘‘we would get their (Miles) suggested
prices.’’ So long as Mabry continued as manager of its drug depart-
ment, Milgram did maintain Miles’ suggested minimum retail prices,
except for one brief reduction (subsequently [569] discussed with a
Miles representative) to meet a price advertised by a local competitor
who ‘‘made a mistake.’? When Mabry was transferred to another de-
partment and Sheldon Levine became manager of Milgram’s drug’
department about 1946, Mabry told Levine (to use Mabry’s language)
“that I agreed to kind of go along with their (Miles) policy of sug-
gested retail prices” or (to use Levine’s language) ‘‘that he (Mabry)
had agreed to maintain that price with Miles’’; and, Miles’ suggested
minimum retail prices were respected and maintained until March,
1949, when Levine ‘‘thought it was good business’’ to cut the price
of Alka-Seltzer and advertised the ‘‘60c-size’”’ first for 39¢ and later
for 35¢.

In May, 1949, Maurice Blond, Katz’ merchandise manager, called
Perry L. Shupert, Miles’ sales manager, at Miles’ home office in Elk-

hart, Indiana, and told Shupert that Katz ‘‘no longer could ignore’’
Milgram’s advertised prices on Alka-Seltzer and intended to meet
competition. Shupert ‘‘requested that we do nothing about meeting
-competitive situations.’? Within a few days, Kendall McKee, Miles’
division sales manager from Chicago, and Raca, Miles’ local repre-
-sentative, conferred personally with Katz’ Shlensky and Blond, who
again urged that ‘‘we should be allowed to go along and meet the
competitive situation’’ created by Milgram’s advertised prices. McKee
“requested that we not go ahead’”’; and, after Katz’ Shlensky had
talked over long: distance with Beardsley, Miles’ president, Katz de-
‘cided to maintain Miles’ suggested prices on Alka-Seltzer for the time
being.

Levine, ‘Milgram’s drug manager, having refused Shupert’s tele-
phonic request and McKee’s personal request to raise Milgram’s retail
price on Alka-Seltzer to Miles’ suggested minimum, Miles’ Shupert
wrote Raca, Miles’ local representative, on May 18, 1949, that Levine
had been notified ‘‘that we would refuse to sell him any more merchan-
dise,’’ and that ‘‘We will write all wholesalers in the area which
services all of their outlets, advising them not to accept any orders
for merchandise? In the meantime, you will have to do a thorough
job of policing your wholesalers in the Kansas City area to determine
whether or not any of these tobacco, candy or grocery jobbers sell Mil-
gram any of ow: products.’’ Shupert also asked Raca over long dis-
tance’ to ‘‘see if I (Raca) can find out where he (Milgram’s Levine)
is getting any Alka-Seltzer and they can cut him off.’”’ In response to
Shupert’s requests for ‘‘a thorough job of policing * wholesalers”
(not confined to factors), Raca said that he called on seven wholesalers
(only three of whom were factors) and told each, in susbstance, that
Miles ‘‘was having trouble with Milgram over the price violation’’ as
to Alka-Seltzer and ‘‘we would like to have them cooperate with us and
not to sell’? any Miles products to Milgram. According to Raca, each
‘wholesaler’s representative said that ‘“‘he would try to cooperate with
us.’’? The only such representative who testified, G. E. Stockton of Gib-
son Products Company (not a factor), stated that he had told Raca
that ‘I would work with him,”’ although admitting on cross-examina-
‘tion & seeret intention to sell Miles products to Milgram whenever he
could. :

After the early part of May, 1949, Milgram’s orders to Miles’ home
office were not filled, but Milgram subsequently obtained Alka-Seltzer

*Perhaps significantly, Shupert did not testify;.but,, John A. Cawley,
Miles’ Assistant Secretary “in charge of all of the fair trade problems of
the company.” denied that “all wholesalers in the area” had been written
but produced:a copy of a letter addressed on May 16, 1949, to. thirty-six
drug wholesalers in Missouri. Kansas, Nebraska. Towa and Illinois, who
hhad been appointed as del credere factors, in which Miles reauested “your
cooneration, until otherwise notified, by refusing to sell” any Miles products
to Milgram.

by purchase from the Plattner Company, a Kansas City wholesaler,
pursuant (as Levine averred but Raca denied) to arrangement made

by Raca contrary to his employer’s direction. In any event, Milgram
continued to advertise Alka-Seltzer at prices below those ‘‘suggested’’

by Miles, so Katz’ Shlensky again complained [570] to Miles’ Shupert.

By letter dated June 2, 1949, Shupert told Raca of a long distance
telephone call ‘‘just received’? from Shlensky, instructed Raca ‘‘to

send us copies of the news items showing all of the price violations by

the Milgram people,’’ and said ‘‘I want to caution you about selling to

‘any tobacco, candy, notion, grocery jobbers, etc., quantities beyond

their normal requirements and purchases they have made heretofore.’’

On June 24, 1949, Miles’ Shupert wrote Raca that ‘‘we are checking

on several of their (Milgram’s) sources of supply and if we can get
complete evidence we will stop their activities along this line.’’? And,

in his letter of October 19, 1949, Shupert again admonished Raca ‘‘that

you should carefully watch any account in your territory that might

be supplying them (Milgram) with this merchandise,’’ warned him

that Milgram ‘‘could very easily be buying Alka-Seltzer from one

of your tobacco or candy accounts’? (none of whom were shown to |
have been factors), pointedly told Raca that ‘‘if you can find if any of
them have sold any merchandise to Milgram * * * you should warn
them that Milgram should not be sold,’’ and assured him that ‘‘if you
ean find out any information through any employee in their (Mil-
gram’s) warehouse as to where they can get this merchandise, it cer-
tainly would be a feather in your hat because we would cut them off
immediately.’’

Katz’ Shlensky and Blond, who had been ‘‘biding time’’ while Miles
unsuccessfully sought to ascertain and cut off Milgram’s source of
supply, finally concluded that ‘‘we were not going to ignore’’ the
Milgram competition any longer, ‘“‘whatever conseqences * might
come.’’ Having ‘‘prepared ourselves by having a very heavy quantity
of merchandise in the warehouse,’’ Katz advertised the ‘‘60c size’’ of
Alka-Seltzer for 33¢ on Sunday, October 30, 1949. The following day
Philip Small, president of Parkview Drugs, Inc., operating seventeen
drug stores in Kansas City, sent Miles a copy of the Katz advertise-
ment, assuring Miles in the letter of transmittal that ‘‘the price of
Alka-Seltzer has always been maintained according to your wishes at
49c by all drug chains during’ the past years,’’ pointing out that “‘ Alka-
Seltzer has been broken to 33c’’ by Katz, inquiring about ‘‘your atti-
tude in this matter,’’ and affirming Parkview’s desire ‘‘to work with
you as we have done in the past.’’ Miles’ Raca also reported the Katz
advertisement to his superior, McKee.

“Within the next day or two,’’ President Beardsley of Miles called
Katz’ Shlensky over long distance. Shlensky pointed out to Beardsley
that Katz ‘‘had, at the expenditure of many millions of dollars, built

Ce

up a reputation with the public for being severely competitive,’’ that
“‘we were being very embarrassed’’ by Milgram’s ‘‘price competition
on Miles Alka-Seltzer that we had taken * for an extended period of
time and, in cooperation with Miles, we hadn’t done anything about
it,’’? and that ‘‘we finally felt that we had to meet competition.’’
Beardsley launched into an extended discussion of price maintenance,
“‘confirmed that Miles had been the protector of the drug industry or
one of the most important ones for a good many years,’’ told Shlensky
that he ‘‘should be ashamed to talk about meeting grocery store com-
petition,’ and ‘‘asked that we discontinue advertising any cut price
on Miles Alka-Selizer.’’ After some discussion of ‘‘the penalty of not
adhering to their (Miles’) price policy,’’ Shlensky suggested that, if
Miles should refuse to sell Katz in Kansas City, perhaps Miles would
continue to sell Katz in ‘‘fair trade states.’’ Beardsley ‘‘refused to go
along with us on that’’ and bluntly ‘‘asked me (Shlensky) what we
proposed to do.’? Shlensky said that ‘‘we would talk it over.’’ The .
following day Shlensly called Beardsley, who was ‘‘very happy’’ when
Shlensky told him that ‘‘we had decided to go along with Miles Labora-
tories on maintenance of prices’? and ‘‘we would immediately dis-
continue the practice of cutting prices.’’ Miles’ Shupert promptly
wrote Small, Parkview’s president, ‘‘that we have contacted Katz * *
and straightened out this matter satisfactorily—thank you very much
for calling it to our attention.”? Thereafter, Katz observed Miles’ sug-
gested minimum retail [571] prices until another quo warranto pro-
ceeding against other respondents ‘‘was settled.’’? Katz’ Shlensky
“new then that Miles would not refuse to sell us if we cut prices,
and we immediately started to meet competition and to cut prices on
Alka-Selzer”’ and ‘‘we have been ever since.’’

Hl The foregoing review of the evidence hearing on the Milgram-
Katz affair will suffice to show Miles’ avowed desire and obvious efforts
to cut off Milgram’s source of supply of Miles’ products, whatever and
wherever that source might have been; and, since Miles’ Raca induced
four wholesalers (in addition to three factors) to agree that each
‘would try to cooperate with us’’ in refusing to supply Milgram, the
record fairly supports a finding that Miles entered into a combina- ©
tion, agreement or understanding, in direct violation of Section 416.-
010, for the purpose of refusing to sell to Milgram. Empire Storage
& Ice Co. v. Giboney, 857 Mo. 671, 675-676, 210 8.W.2d 55, 57(2),
and eases there cited; affirmed 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed.
834. However, we need not and do not rest our disposition of the case
on such finding, for, in our view of the evidence, Miles also entered
into resale price maintenance understandings with Milgram and with
Katz.

Hi Miles’ defense is anchored to the ‘‘single trader doctrine,”’

recognized in both our state* and federal’ courts, that one engaged in a
private business may buy from whomsoever he pleases and may sell, or
refuse to sell, to whomsoever he will. But, there is an obvious difference
between a mere refusal to sell and an agreement or understanding
to fix or maintain retail prices [United States v. A. Schrader’s Son,
252 U.S. 85, 99, 40 S.Ct. 251, 64 L.Hd 471, 475],-even though
the path between the two may be narrow [United States v. Bausch &
Lomb ‘Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 729, 64 S.Ct. 805, 88 L.Wd. 1024,
1039] and the line of demarcation may be indistinct and may defy
precise definition. Shakespeare Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 6
Cir., 50 F.2d 758, 760; Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Go. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 6 Cir., 11 F.2d 387, 842, And, the single trader
doctrine, as stated in the leading case of United States v. Colgate Co.,
250 U.S. 800, 89 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ed. 992, 7 A.L.R. 448, has been ‘much
hedged about by later cases,’’ confers only a ‘‘limited dispensation’’
[Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626, 73 S.Ct.
872, 97 L.Ed. 1277, 1299-1300], and certainly affords no license for
a combination, agreement or understanding forbidden by our anti-
trust statutes. Dietrich v. Cape Brewery & Ice Co., 815 Mo. 507, 521,
286 S.W. 38, 48. In respect to the so-called Milgram-Katz affair, Miles
was not content to pursue a policy of mere refusal to sell, and its
activities cannot be justified under the single trader doctrine.

We have not overlooked Shlensky’s answer on cross-examination,
on which Miles leans heavily, that ‘“we never had an agreement with
Miles, no, just an understanding’’; but, when read in context, that
statement simply tends to confirm the existence of an unlawful and
prohibited ‘‘understanding’’. Miles’ contention that, as used in See~
tions 416.010 to 416.040, incl., the term ‘‘understanding’’ connotes
“an agreement of opinion or feeling’’ [Webster’s New International
Dictionary, 2nd Ed., p. 2769] rather than mere knowledge, discern-
ment [572] or comprehension [cf. United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., D.C. Mo., 234 F. 127, 148] may be conceded. But, a
combination, agreement or understanding violative of our anti-trust
statutes may be either express or implied* and thay be proved as effec-

‘Dietrich v. Cape Brewery & Ice Co. 315 Mo. 607, 520-521, 286 8.W. 88,
48(14); Staroske v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 235 Mo, 67, 79, 188 S.W. 36, 39-40(9);
State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 46, 52 S.W. 595,
608;' Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 97 Mo.App. 64, 69, 71 8.W. 691, 692.

“United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ud

992, 997(8), 7 ALR. 448, 448; Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 258
421, 428-429, 40 §.Ct. 572, 64’ L.Ed, 998, 996: Federal Trade Commis
Raymond Bros.-Clark Co.,'268 U.S. 565, 578, 44 S.Ct. 162, 68. L.
455(2); Nelson Radio & Supply Go. v, Motorola, 5 Cir., 200 F.2d 911, 914(7).
certiorari denied 845 U.S. 925, 73 S.Ct. 783, 97 L.Ed. 1356; Adams-Mitchell
Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 2 189 F.2d 918, 916(4).
“‘égtate ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 458, 116 S.-W. 902,
1046. affirmed 224 U.S. 270, 82 S.Ct. 406, 56 L.Bd. 760; cf. Frey & Son v.
Cndahy Packing Co. 256 US. 208, 210, 41 S.Ct. 451,’65 L.Ed. $92, 894-
895(2); Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441,
455, 42° 8.Ct. 150, 66 L.Ed. 807, 314, 19 A.L.R. 882.

tively by facts and circumstances as by direct evidence.” ‘‘When
people set out to do acts that are either mala in se or mala prohibita,
they do not put up a sign over the door, or a stamp on the act, declar-
ing their purpose and intent’’ [State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen’s Fund
Insurance Co., 152 Mo. 1, 40, 52 S.W. 595, 606]; but, ‘‘in the field of
illegal bargains the parties often take pains not to put into express
words, either oral or written, a promise that is illegal but is in fact
included by tacit understanding.’’ Corbin on Contracts, Volume 1,
Section 18, p. 36. Read with, the foregoing in mind, the voluminous
record in this case satisfies and convinces us that Katz not only had
an understanding of Miles’ price maintenance policy and the probable
consequences of refusal to follow it (to which, as Miles contends,
Katz’ ‘‘understanding”’ was limited) but also had an understanding
with Miles as to maintenance of the retail price of Alka-Seltzer.

Hl We are persuaded also that, about the time Milgram began to -
handle drug items in 1940, Miles and Milgram entered into an under-
standing as to maintenance of the retail price of Alka-Seltzer. Although
this was more than three years prior to institution of this proceeding,
the applicable limitation prescribed by Section 516.130 does not refer
to the date of entry into the forbidden agreement or understanding
but rather to the date of the last proven act thereunder [State on inf.
of Taylor v. American Ins. Co., 355 Mo. 1053, 1118-1119, 200 S.W.
2a 1, 43(28); State ex inf. Attorney General v. Arkansas Lumber
Co., supra, 260 Mo. loc. cit. 292, 169 S.W. loc.cit. 170(15)]; and, in
the instant case, the parties continued to act under the same under-
standing until Milgram’s Levine, by advertisement of reduced prices
in March, 1949, touched off the chain reaction which resulted in in-
stitution of this proceeding on June 29, 1950.

That Katz (after another quo warranto proceeding against other
respondents ‘‘was settled’’) and Milgram (in March, 1949) sold Alka-
Seltzer at reduced prices and thus ‘‘were treacherous” to Miles does
not tend to disprove existence of the unlawful understandings as to
retail price maintenance, for parties to unlawful as well as lawful
understandings may, for selfish purposes, violate them. State ex rel.
Crow v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., supra, 152 Mo. loe.cit. 40, 52 8.W.
loc.cit. 606.

Hl Finding that Miles entered into understandings with Katz and
with Milgram, which were designed to maintain the resale price of
Alka-Seltzer and tended to lessen full and free competition in the sale
thereof, it becomes necessary to rule the issue, presented as one of

“Dietrich v. Cape Brewery & Ice Co., supra, 815 Mo. loc.cit. 520, 286 S.W.
loc. cit. 43(11); State ex inf. Attorney General v. Arkansas Lumber Co.,
supra, 260 Mo. loc.cit, 306, 169 S.W. loc. cit. 174(20); Bastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers’ Ass'n. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612, 84 S.Ct. 951, 58
L.Ed. 1490, 1499, L.R.A. 1915A 788; Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 84,
37 S.Ct. 353, 61 L.Ed. 597, 605-606.

first impression in this jurisdiction, as to whether vertical resale
price maintenance agreements or understandings are within the pro-
hibition of our anti-trust statutes, We have examined-all of the nu-
merous cases cited by diligent and resourceful counsel (most of which
are discussed in the annotations at 7 A.L.R. 449, 19 A.L.R. 925, 32
A.L.R. 1087, 103 A.L.R. 1331 and 125 A.L.R. 1385), bearing upon the
validity of vertical price maintenance agreements at common law.
The federal courts held that such agreements [573] were invalid at
common law ;* but, as the cited A.L.R. annotations demonstrate, there
was hopeless confusion in the holdings of the state courts. We need
not and do not pursue the debatable question as to whether the St.
Louis Court of Appeals, in the only Missouri case in which this sub-
ject has been mentioned [Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo.App. 602], held (or
intended to hold) that resale price maintenance agreements were valid
under the common law in Missouri, for the instant inquiry is whether
such agreements are valid wnder our anti-trust statutes which are
highly salutary and remedial in their purpose [State v. Green, 344
Mo. 985, 988, 180 8.W.2d 475, 476(2)] and were enacted in aid of and
to supplement the common law. State ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil
Co., supra, 218 Mo. loc.cit. 359-360, 425, 116 8.W. loe.cit. 1012, 1034.

Our Missouri anti-trust law is written in such plain and compre-
hensive language that this court on one occasion thought that it
“leaves scant room for construction’? [State ex rel. Kimbrell v.
People’s Ice, Storage & Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168, 221, 151 S.W. 101,
118] and later said that it ‘‘is so explicit and all-inclusive in its
language that there is left no room for construction by the courts.”
State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., 801 Mo. 445, 544, 256
S.W. 175, 204. Sections 416.010 and 416.020 denounce and condemn
any person entering into any combination, agreement or understand-
ing with any other person or persons (note the use in the disjunctive
of both singular and plural) in restraint of trade or competition or to
regulate, control, fix or maintain the price of any article; and, Section
416.040 is directed against all arrangements, contracts, agreements,
combinations or understandings between any two or more persons
designed or tending to lessen full and free competition in, or to in-
crease the market price of, any product. Any reported opinion should
be read in the light of the facts of that particular case, and it would

"Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 25,
88 S.Ct. 257, 62 L.Ed. 561, 559(8); Butterick Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 2 Cir., 4 F.2d 910, 912(2), certiorari denied 267 U.S. 602. 45 S.Ct. 462,
69 L.Ed. 808; Waltham Watch’ Go. v. Keene, D.C. N.Y., 202 F. 225, 284(2),
affirmed without opinion 209 F. 1007, certiorari denied 282 U.S. 724, 34 S.Ct.
902, 68 L.Ed, 815; Kellogg Toasted Cor Flake Go. v. Buck, D.C. Gal., 208

. 883.

*Morse v. Consolidated Underwriters, 349 Mo. 785, 789. 168 S.W. 2d 586,
587(1): State ex rel. Major v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 240 Mo. 35, 58, 144
S.W. 1088, 1092(6); State ex rel. Chicago, Ru. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 172
Mo. 446, 460(4), 72 S.W. 692, 6

be unfair as well as improper ‘‘to give permanent and controlling
effect to casual statements outside the scope of the real inquiry’’
[Rauch v. Metz, Mo., 212 S.W. 358, 357(3)] in the cases cited by
Miles,” none of which involved or ruled the validity of resale price
maintenance agreements but upon which Miles here relies to establish
that ‘‘the Missouri anti-trust laws condemn only (horizontal) combi-
nations among competitors absent a monopoly.’’ Adoption of Miles’
theory that our ‘‘anti-trust statutes are aimed solely at combinations
of competitors,’’ or acceptance of Miles’ further contention that, in
any event, a charge of violation of our anti-trust statutes ‘‘must be
based upon a body of transactions constituting a system of resale
price maintenance,’’ would require us to interpolate and read into the
statutes exceptions which obviously are not there and which we have
no right to put there. State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckeler Lumber Co.,
supra, 301 Mo. loc.cit. 544-545, 256 S.W. loc.cit. 204.

But if (contrary to our expressed opinion) the case at bar afforded
any reason or basis for judicial construction of the Missouri anti-
trust law, we are reminded that the primary rule in statutory [574]
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent
{see cases collated in West’s Missouri Digest, Vol. 26, ‘‘Statutes’’,
Key No. 181(1)] and that remedial statutes enacted in the interest of
the public welfare should be construed with a view to suppression of
the mischief sought to be remedied." The conditions which motivated
enactment in 1891 of anti-trust legislation in Missouri have been re-
eently considered and discussed at length in the exhaustive and eru-
dite report of Special Commissioner Rush H. Limbaugh in State on
inf, Taylor v. Armour & Co., No. 42185 [not reported], to which the
interested are veferred.*® As was so ably demonstrated in that re-
port, nothing in the literature or recorded incidents of that period
indicates ‘‘that the revolt against the evils in the business practices
of the times * * * was less determined or less articulate’’ against
vertical price-fixing than against horizontal price-fixing, and ‘“‘there
is nothing in the provisions of the three sections [Sections 416.010,
416.020 and 416.040] * * * and nothing in their history which
indicates that by them the legislature meant only to invalidate (hori-
zontal) price-fixing combinations among competitors.’’

The record before us is replete with what counsel for one respondent
aptly denominated as ‘‘elaborate philosophical discussions’’ concern-

“State ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 218 Mo. loc.cit. 416-417,
116 S.W. loc.cit. 1081; State ex inf. Crow v. Continental Tobacco Co., 177
Mo. 1, 32, 75 S.W. 737, 746; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 284 U.S.
199, 209, 84 S.Ct. 859, 58 L.Ed. 1276, 1281, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525.

Co-operative Live Stock Commission Co. v. Browning, 260 Mo. 824, 344,
168 S.W. 934, 988(2); State ex rel. Laundry, Ine. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 827 Mo. 93, 106, 84 S.W.2d 37, 42-48(3); Dodd v. Independence
Stove & Furnace Co., 330 Mo. 662, 671, 51 S.W.2d 114, 118(11).

2*See also Commissioner Limbaugh’s excellent and enlightening article on
“Historic Origins of Anti-Trust Legislation,” 18 M.L.R. 215-248 (1958).

ing the economic desirability vel non of fair trade legislation, all of
which is beyond and without the pale of our inquiry. For, when the
legislature, acting within its constitutional orbit, has declared the
public policy of the state, ‘‘such declared policy is sacred ground
which we may not invade’’ [State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckeler Lum-
ber Co., supra, 301 Mo. loc.cit, 544, 256 S.W. loc.cit. 204]"* and we
are not permitted to concern ourselves ‘‘with the winds of economic
doctrine.’’ Yankwich, ‘‘Competition, Real or Soft?’’, 14 F.R.D. 199,
216. The proponents of fair trade legislation, having been rebuffed
in their repeated and persistent efforts to obtain enactment thereof
by our General Assembly, may not attain the same end by judicial
fiat. We are satisfied that, as has been stated in respect of the Texas
anti-trust statutes which are ‘‘very similar’’ to ours [State ex inf.
Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 218 Mo. loc.cit. 361, 116 S.W.
loc.cit. 1013], ‘‘(i)t is certainly the intention of our anti-trust laws
to guarantee dealers in this state the untrammeled right to sell goods,
wares, merchandise, and products owned by them at such prices as
they may determine’’ [Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5,175 8.W.2d
230, 235(14)]; and, we conclude, as did Commissioner Limbaugh in
the Armour case, that there is no escape from the conclusion that
vertical agreements or understandings for fixing or maintaining re-
sale prices are within the prohibition of our Missouri anti-trust
statutes.

[575] Our finding that Miles entered into illegal resale price
maintenance understandings with Katz and Milgram makes it un-
necessary to review and discuss the evidence pertaining to adminis-
tration of Miles’ ‘‘refusal to sell policy’? elsewhere in Missouri. It
will suffice to point out that an unlawful agreement to fix or maintain
prices may not be inferred from uniformity of prices charged for a
given article, absent any showing that such uniformity is an artificial

See also State ex rel. Kimbrell v. People’s Ice, Storage & Fuel Co.,
supra, 246 Mo, loc.cit. 221-222, 151 S.W. loc.cit. 118(25); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S, 150, 221-222, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129,
1167; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.
188, 195-196, 57 S.Ct. 189, 81 L.Ed. 109, 120(3), 106 A.L.R. 1476; Hills Br
y. Federal Trade Commission, 9 Cir. 9 F.2d_ 481, 485-486(11); Miles
Laboratories v. Seignious, D.C. S.C., 30 F.Supp. 549, 552-553.

“Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act [15 U.S.C.A. Secs. 1-7], similar “in
substance” to our anti-trust statutes [State ex Inf. Attorney General v
Arkansas Lumber Co., supra, 260 Mo. loc.cit. 286-289, 169 S.W, loc.cit. 168-
169], resale price maintenance is illegal except where the Miller-Tydings
Act [50 Stat. 698, 15 U.S.C.A, Sec. 1] is applicable, Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386, 71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035,
1043(2); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721, 64
S.Ct. 805, 88 L.Ed. 1024, 1084(4); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316
US. 241, 250, 62 S.Ct. 1088, 86 L.Ed. 1408, 1418(4); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 378, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502.

condition,** and that, considered in the light of this principle, the
evidence in the instant case affords insufficient support for relator’s
contention that Miles’ activities ‘‘resulted in a system of implied
agreements and understandings with retailers throughout the state.”

Hl {be record before us reflects no challenge of or threat to Miles’
resale price maintenance policy in the Kansas City area, other than
that posed by the sales of Alka-Seltzer at reduced prices by Katz and
Milgram, who are in that market the leading ‘‘cut-rate’’ competitors
in drug sundries, as was stated by Parkview’s Small whose seventeen.
drug stores in Kansas City put Parkview in third place far behind
Kata; and, the transcript adequately demonstrates that Miles regarded.
the so-called Milgram-Katz affair as of major significance and im-
portance. Indeed, the understanding between Miles and Katz was
reached with Miles’ president and as a direct result of his blunt and
effective ‘“persuasion’’, so Miles’ instant difficulty may not now be
laid at the door of hirelings, in absentia at the trial, presently said to
have had no authority to ‘‘administer’’ Miles’ ‘‘refusal to sell policy’’
in Missouri,** nor may it be brushed aside or dismissed summarily as
the unfortunate but excusable product of sporadic activity on the part
of overly-enthusiastic sales representatives. Miles, with a not incon-
siderable background of knowledge and experience in this field, appar-
ently took in respect of the Milgram-Katz affair a calculated risk
that its action in this ‘‘non-fair trade state’’ would not become the
subject of judicial scrutiny and review. After careful consideration
of every aspect of the matter, we are of the opinion that assessment
of a fine of $5,000 and costs against Miles, in lieu of forfeiture of its
right and privilege to do business in this state [Section 416.070],
constitutes a reasonable penalty for Miles’ violations of our anti-
trust statutes.

It is, therefore, the judgment of this court that, upon our finding
of Miles’ guilt in the particulars hereinbefore stated, a fine of $5,000
and the costs: of this proceeding should be and hereby are assessed
against Miles, which said fine and costs shall be paid to the Clerk of
this Court within sixty days after the date of adoption of this opinion ;
that, should Miles fail to pay said fine and costs within the stated
period, the State of Missouri shall have execution therefor to be levied
by the Marshal of this Court and enforced according to the laws of
this state in such cases made and provided, this Court retaining juris-

* State ex rel. Taylor v. Anderson, 363 Mo. 884, 891, 254 8.W. 2 609, 614;
State on inf. of Taylor v. American Ins. Co., 355 Mo. 1053, 1087, 200’S.W.
2d 1, 22; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 21 U.S. 417, 448-449,
40 S.Ct. 298, 64 L.Ed. 348, 352. _

*Section 416.070 provides that, in all proceedings for violation of our
anti-trust statutes, “proof of the acts of any person who has, been acting
as the agent of such corporation in transacting its business in this state
in. the name, behalf-or interest of such corporation shall be received as
prima facie proof of the acts of the corporation itself.”

diction of the case until said fine and costs be paid by Miles; and,
that all of the other respondents herein should be and hereby are
discharged without day.

All concur, except Hager, J., not sitting.

In the Matter of the Application of Frank H. Spnvx, Joun W. Bat-
LARD, JAMES B. Kurriaan, Irvin Fane and Wiwriam E. Kune,
Constituting the Boarp or Ponice Commissions or Kansas Crry,
Missouri, and Acting for and as Said Boarp or Pouce Commis-
SIONERS or Kansas Crry, Missouri, Relators, v. Wiutiam E, Kemp,
Roserr J. Bunson, Harry 8. Davis, Inus W. Davis, Tuomas
J. Gavin, Reep O. Gewrry, Don Jackson, JosepH M. Nouan,
Warrrr R. Scorr, and L. P. Cooxinenam, Respondents, No.
44534—283 §. W. (2d) 502.

Court en Banc, September 29, 1955. .
Rehearing Overruled in Per Curiam Opinion Filed, November 14, 1958,

o
Re}
EA)

2
5

Harry F. Murphy and Cornelius Roach III for relators.

David M. Proctor, City Counselor, John J. Cosgrove, Associate City
Counselor, and J. L. Parks, Assistant City Counselor, for respondents.

[507] HOLLINGSWORTH, J.—Original proceeding in manda-
mus. Relators as the members of the Board of Police Commissioners of
Kansas City, Missouri, seek to compel the Mayor, the Council and the
City Manager of said City to appropriate an amount in excess of that
appropriated to meet the expenses of the [508] Police Department for
the fiscal year beginning May 1, 1954.

Section 84.730 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., provides:

“Tt shall be the duty of said board [of Police Commissioners],
on the fifteenth day of January of each year, to prepare, in
writing, a budget estimating the sum of money which will be
necessary for the next fiscal year, to enable said board to discharge
the duties hereby imposed upon it, and to meet the expenses of
the police department, which it shall forthwith certify to the
governing body of such cities, * * * *, Said governing body of
such cities is hereby required to appropriate the total amount so
certified, payable out of the revenue of said cities after first hav-
ing deducted the amount necessary to- pay the interest on the
indebtedness of said cities, the amount necessary for lighting the
city, and any sum required by law to be placed to the credit of the
sinking fund of said cities, * * * except that in no event shall
the governing body of such cities be required to appropriate for
the use of the police board in any fiscal year an amount in excess
of one-sixth of the general revenue fund of such year.’’

The petition alleged that pursuant to the provisions of said section
relators made and certified to respondents an estimate of $4,028,726
as the amount necessary to enable the board of police commissioners to
discharge its duties and to meet the expenses of the police department
for the aforesaid fiscal year, which said sum, it was alleged, the council,
by virtue of the provisions of said statute, was required to appropriate
because it is not in excess of the maximum amount fixed thereim, but
that it refused so to do and did appropriate a lesser sum, to wit:
$3,551,354. In an amended return to our alternative writ issued pur- -
suant to the provisions of Art. V, §4, Constitution of Missouri, respond-
ents alleged that the sum demanded by relators was in excess of one-
sixth of the general revenue fund for the fiscal year beginning May 1,
1954; that the sum of $3,551,854 theretofore appropriated was likewise
in excess thereof, and that the alternative writ should be quashed.

The issues being thus joined, this court appointed Honorable
Christian F. Stipp as Special Commissioner to take testimony and to
report his finding of facts and conclusions of law, which he has ably

and painstakingly done. Both parties have filed exceptions to certain
conclusions of law reached by the Special Commissioner and to numer-
ous of his findings as to whether certain items of revenue constitute a
part of ‘‘the general revenue fund’’ of said fiscal year, within the
meaning of § 84.730. (All statutory references herein are to RSMo
1949, V.A.M.S., unless otherwise indicated.)

Kansas City is a municipal corporation organized and existing
pursuant to the provisions of a special charter framed and adopted by
the people as authorized by the State Constitution. The city manager
is the chief administrative officer and the members of the council and
the mayor constitute the legislative body of the city. The Kansas City
police department operates under the exclusive direction and control
of the board of police commissioners which was created by state statute
and whose members are appointed by the governor. § § 84.350-84.860.
Pursuant to the provisions of state law, charter provision and fiscal
direction, the various departments of city government and the police
department submitted to the city manager their budget requests for
the fiscal year 1954-1955 which began on May 1, 1954. The city man-
ager prepared the annual budget for the city for that year in which he
estimated the revenues which would be received and recommended the
appropriations to be made. The relators had certified a budget of
$4,028,726, but the city manager recommended an appropriation of
$3,551,354. The budget, with the latter amount, was subsequently
approved by the council and the appropriation made.

In the preparation of the city budget, the anticipated revenue was
allocated to various funds in the city treasury as follows:

[509] Allocation
Item Source of Revenue Pund Amount
1. General Property Tax Levy
(10.39) General $7,911,021
2. General Property Tax Levy (
(4.61) General Debt and
Interest 8,505,746
8. Special Park Tax Levies East Park 181,260
West Park 197,220
4. Cigarette Stamp Taxes General 950,000
East Park 105,556
5. Gasoline and: Motor Fuel
Taxes Street 1,920,000
6. Vehicle Licenses General 22,500
East Park 513,615
West Park 218,885
Parking Meter Receipts General 115,000

ea

Taxicab Driver’s Licenses General 4,500

9. Revenue from Other Street
Uses
10. Alcoholic Beverage Licenses
11. Business, Professional and
Occupational Licenses
12. Kansas City Power and
Light Gross Receipts Tax
13." Gas Service Company Gross
Receipts Tax
14. Publie Transportation Com-
. pany—Bus Licenses
15. Public Transportation Com-
pany—Street Car Licenses
16. Steam Company License
17. Telegraph Company Fran-
chise Taxes
18. Natural Gas Company Gross
Receipts Tax
19. Telephone Company Gross
Receipts Tax
20. Dog Licenses
21. Municipal Court Fines and
Forfeitures
[510]
22. Traffic Bureau Fines and
Forfeitures
23. Cireuit Court Fines and
Forfeitures
24. City Hall Rents and Con-
cessions
25. Municipal Auditorium Re-
ceipts
26. Net Rentals from Veteran’s
Housing Project
27, Municipal and Platte
County Airport Receipts
28. Grandview Airport Receipts
29. Park Property Rentals and
“* Concessions
30. Rental of Miscellaneous
City Owned Property
31. Rentals and Concessions

General
General

General
East Park

General
General

General
East Park

General
General

General

General

"General

General

General

General
General
General
General
General

General
General

East Park
West Park

General
General

875
$ 42,000
303,500

1,658,420
380

1,540,000
786,365

122,000
40,665

22,000
58,000

1,000
8,500

912,500
42,000

685,000

355,100
35,000
87,970

258,100
75,000

448,095
670

30,750
750

50,120
16,950

3876

Item Source of Revenue

32. Interest Earnings

33. Accrued Interest on Bonds
Sold

34. Interest on Investments

85. Interest on Special Assess-
ments

36. Produce Merchants’ Rentals‘
37. Stall Fees

38. Reservation Fees

[511]

89. Kansas City Southern Rail-
way Right-of-Way Ease-
ment

40. Miscellaneous Market a
Revenue

41. Service Refunds

42, Parking Lot Rentals

43. Weighing Fees—Public
Scales #1

44. Surplus Commodities Distri-
bution Fees

45. Rental from Telephone Pay
Stations

46. General Government Service
Charges

47, Street Cut Repair and Back-
fill Fees

48. Gas Cut Inspection Fees

49. Service Fees—Special
Assessment Projects
(Administration)

Allocation

Pund Amount
General $ 80,000
General Debt

and Interest 80,000
General Debt

and. Interest 5,000
‘Water 175,000
Sewer Special

Assessment 17,157
Street and Avenue

Spec. Assessment. 5,297
Cumulative Insur-

ance Reserve 2,500
Sewer Special

Assessment 22,000
Street and Avenue Spee.

Assessment 7,000
Public Market 107,500
Public Market. 7,000
Public Market 6,000
Public Market 8,000
Public Market 700
Publie Market 2,500
Public Market 4,200
Public Market 6,500
Public Market 2,000
Public Market 150
General 6,715
General 103,000
General 1,740
General 12,000

50. Service Fees—Special
Assessment Projects
(Engineering)

51. Recreation and Public Wel-
fare Charges

52. Recreation Fees

58. Publie Safety—Buildings
and Inspection Division
Fees

54. Public Safety—Smoke
Regulation Division

55. Public Safety—Tow-in and
Storage Charges

56. Public Health Charges

57. Hospital Charges

58. Boulevard Cut Repair Fees

59. Burial Permits and Ceme-
tary Services

[512]
60. Sale of Fire and Extended
Coverage Insurance

61. Municipal Farm Revenue

62. Farm Rentals

63. Sale of Water

64. Merchandising, Jobbing and
Contracting

65. Miscellaneous Public Enter-
prise Revenue .

66. Rental of Miscellaneous’
Buildings and Lots |

67. State Grant for Tuberculosis
Hospital ,

68. Federal Reimbursement for
Civil Defense Equipment

69. Land Clearance for Rede-
velopment Authority

70. Federal Payments in Lieu of
Taxes

71. Contribution from Starlight
Theater Association

General 72,000
General 11,900
East Park 68,270
West Park 2,210
General 208,490
General 31,500
General * 100,000
General 91,055
General 234,870
East Park 38,500
West Park 4,600
West Park 450

Cumulative Insurance

Reserve 35,000
General. 363,600
Water 2,500
Water 5,463,903
Water 65,000
Water 61,000
Water 120
General 210,000
General 299,000
General 15,150
General 3,520
General 15,000

Item Source of Revenue™

72. Sale of City Real and Per-
sonal Property

78. Miscellaneous Non-Revenue
Receipts

74. Sale of Stores

75. Sale of Postage

76. Service to Storerooms

TT. Equipment Capitalized

78. Recoveries on Insurance

Claims

79. Recoveries on Damage
Claims

[513]
80. Equipment Rentals

81. Intra-Fund Receipts

82. Reimbursable Services

83. Collections from Assessments

84. Prior Year’s Revenue

Allocation

Fund.

General
Hast Park
West Park

General
East Park
Working Capital
Public Works
Working Capital
Working Capital
Working Capital
Working Capital

Public Works
Working Capital

Public Works
Working Capital

Public Works
Working Capital
Public Works
Working Capital
Water
Working Capital,
Public Works
Working Capital -
Insurance Revolv-
ing
Sewer Assessment
Street and Avenue
Special Assessnient
General
West Park
General Debt
and Interest
Water
Street Repair
and Maintenance ~
Insurance Re-
volving

Amount

16,000

- 4,650
1,500
11,750
350
481,049
240,455
38,558
6,682
6,730

500

400

308,650
93,070
225,000
69,381
40,260

70,000
145,500

29,000
762,340
49,485

100,000
35,249

27,853

49,462

The fiscal system of Kansas City is set up on a ‘‘fund accounting
basis’, Income and disbursements are accounted for through many
different ‘‘funds’’ and each ‘‘fund’’ may embrace several ‘‘accounts’’,
the latter being managerial devices for ready ‘determination of collec-
tions and disbursements. There is no ‘‘fund’’ designated as the
‘general revenue fund’’. .

The meaning of the term ‘‘general revenue’’, as used in §
84.730, becomes a matter of first importance.

“By revenue, whether its meaning be measured by the general or the
legal lexicographer, is meant the current income of the state from
whatsoever source derived which is subject to appropriation for public
uses. This current income may be derived from various sources, as
our numerous statutes attest, but, no matter from what source derived,
if required to be paid into the treasury, it becomes revenue or state
money; * * *.”? State ex rel. Thompson v. Board of Regents, 305 Mo.
57, 264 S.W. 698, 700. See also State ex rel. McKinley Pub. Co. v.
Hackmann, 314 Mo. 33, 282 8.W. 1007, 1011. It would seem clear
therefore that the term ‘‘general revenue’? would mean all current
income of the city, however derived, which is subject to appropriation
for general public uses, as distinguished from special uses.

| One of the principal issues in the case is: May Kansas City, by
authority of its charter or by ordinance, devote funds otherwise con-
stituting general revenue to special uses, and in that manner deprive
the state of the benefit thereof in reckoning ‘‘one-sixth of the general
revenue fund’’ for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of the city’s
liability under § 84.730?

Obviously, if the city, by its charter or by ordinance, may devote a
substantial portion of what ordinarily would be considered general
revenue to a special use by [514] a process of ‘‘earmarking’’ its use
for a special purpose and thereby take such portion so ‘‘earmarked”’
out of the category of general revenue, then the city may starve its
state operated and controlled police department into utter ineffective-
ness and create a situation which heretofore the state assiduously has
undertaken to prevent by statutes such as § 84.730 and its forerunners.
See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265 Mo. 51, 67, et seq., 175 S.W.
591, 593, et seq.; State ex rel. Field v. Smith, 829 Mo. 1019, 49 S.W.2d
14, 76, 78; Laws 1939, pp. 558, 559; § 7676, RSMo 1939.

The Special Commissioner came to the conclusion that the term
“general revenue fund”’, as used in § 84.730, meant and included ‘‘all
current revenue of the city, however derived, which is not required to
be devoted to a special purpose by constitutional, statutory, or charter
provision or by covenants in bond obligations which are authorized by
the constitution, the statutes or the charter.’? (Emphasis ours.)
Respondents rest upon the labors of the Special Commissioner in reach-
ing the above conclusion, asserting merely that he was correct in so
holding, and citing the cases upon which the Special Commissioner

based his conclusion, to wit: Ex parte Siemens v. Shreeve, 317 Mo. 736,
296 S.W. 416 ; State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 818 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.
2d 718; Morrow v. Kansas City, 186 Mo. 675, 85 S.W. 572; Kansas
City v. Frogge, 852 Mo. 233, 176 8.W. 2d 498; Turner v. Kansas City,
354 Mo. 857, 191 S.W. 2d’612, and Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W. 2d 195. Relators vigorously disagree.
They insist that in § 84.730 the General Assembly used the phrase
“general revenue fund”’ as the collective designation of all that part
of a city’s current income, however derived, which is subject to ap-
propriation for general public use, excluding only that income which
is appropriable solely for particular public uses under the specific
authority of constitutional or statutory provisions explicitly requiring
that such income be devoted to special purposes or be paid into special
funds.

The statutes creating the board of police commissioners of Kansas
City and the police department thereof, defining their respective
duties, powers and responsibilities, and providing for their mainte-
nance, § § 84.350-84.860, expressly retain jurisdiction of the Kansas
City police system as an agency of the state. American Fire Alarm
Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners, 285 Mo. 581, 227 S. W. 114,
116-117 [1-3]. It is, therefore, hardly conceivable the Legislature
could have intended that the city, chargeable as a state agency with
the maintenance of the state controlled police department in the man-
ner prescribed by § § 84.730 and 84.780, should at the same time have
the power as a municipal corporation to defeat the legislative mandate
of the State of Missouri through a policy of ‘‘earmarking”’, either by
charter or ordinance, portions of its revenue that otherwise would
constitute ‘‘general revenue’’ within the meaning of § 84.730. This
does not mean that the city may not, for its own purposes, lawfully
divide its funds or allocate them in any manner it sees fit or subject
its general revenue funds to particular public purposes, so long as it
does not do so contrary to statute or its charter. 64 C.J.S., Mun. Corp.,
§ 1884, pp. 443-444. But we think it does mean the city may not,
solely by authority of its charter or by ordinance, make such funds
unavailable to the state under § 84.730. In so concluding, we reaffirm
a principle long since announced and consistently followed in this
state.

Kansas City could only frame and adopt a charter ‘‘consistent with
and subject to the Constitution and laws of the state * * *.”” See
what is now Art. VI, § 19, Constitution of Missouri. Its charter must
not be out of harmony with the general laws of the state nor invade
the province of general legislation or attempt to change the policy of
the state as declared for the people at large, Kansas City v. Marsh Oil
Co., 140 Mo. 458, 41 S.W. 943, 945-947; nor may it be out of harmony
or in conflict with the controlling law of the state, State ex rel. Hawes
y. Mason, 153 Mo. 28, 85, 60, 54 S.W. 524, 526, 534. [515] ‘‘The law

establishing the police commissioners {of Kansas City] and the system
of police under them is an evidence of the policy of the state with
reference to the police of one of its principal cities and it cannot be
subverted by a local charter.’’ State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police Com-
missioners, 80 Mo.App. 206, 219. See also same case, 184 Mo. 109, 183-
184, 71 S.W. 215, 220; Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 161, 182°
S.W. 2d 74, 77.

In State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2 8.W. 2d, 713,
721, we said: ‘‘The cases construing the police laws are in point. The
state has authority to provide by general law for the establishment of
a metropolitan police force in a city operating under a special charter,
and compel the city to maintain it by taxation. * * * * In State ex
rel. v. Mason, 153 Mo. 28, 54 S.W. 527, it was held that the city of St.
Louis could be compelled, by mandamus to pay the expense of the
police system of that city, established by an act of the Legislature
(Laws 1860-61, p. 446). It is significant that the original legislative
act supplanted the municipal system which had. existed prior to that
time. Id. loc. cit. 82 (54 S.W. 524). The opinion written by Judge
Gantt, referring to earlier cases, says (loc.cit. 47 (54 8.W. 530)) : ‘The
power of the Legislature to provide the necessary agencies to perform
the high functions of the state in the preservation of * * * peace,
ete., and to impose the duty of paying therefor on the locality for
which * * * said agencies were created, was fully and firmly estab-
lished.’ ””

The cases cited by the Special Commissioner and relied upon by
respondents do not militate against the doctrine above announced.
Each of them recognizes and holds inviolable the rule that the charter
of a city (organized as is Kansas City) is subordinate to the will of the
General Assembly insofar as it relates to governmental policy as
distinguished from matters of local municipal concern,

Hl {i follows that we must and do sustain relators’ contention and
hold that general revenue of the city which is devoted to special pur-
poses or allocated into special funds by virtue of the city’s charter
(and ordinances) is to be included in reckoning one-sixth of the general
revenue fund under § 84.730, unless such charter provisions or ordi-
nanees placing such funds to a special purpose or into special funds
were enacted pursuant to express or clearly implied constitutional or
statutory authority. .

In the light of the conclusion above reached, we now consider the
specific items which relators contend the Special Commissioner er-
roneously excluded from the general revenue fund under § 84.730.

Hl item 38, designated in the Special Commissioner’s report as
“Special Park Tax Levies’’, aggregates $328,480. The Special Com-
missioner held that these levies were authorized by the Legislature
under § 90.010 and were not allocable to the general revenue fund.
Section 90.010 does authorize ‘‘any city’? to levy a 2-mill tax, the pro-

ceeds of which ‘‘shall be known as the park fund’’. Relators concede
that to the extent Item 3 consists of a 2-mill tax as provided in §
90.010 it constitutes a special fund expressly authorized by statute
and. is not allocable to general revenue. Said item is, however, the
aggregate of a levy of a 24%-mill tax amounting to $272,370 and a
““ten-cent-per-front-foot tax levy’? amounting to $56,110, for which
latter tax there is no statutory authority whatever. Relators therefore
insist that all of said sum over and above a 2-mill levy, to wit: one-
fifth of $272,370 ($54,474), and the front-footage tax in the sum of
$56,110, total $110,584, must be allocated to general revenue, Respond-
ents say that although the Special Commissioner correctly found that
this item was not allocable to general revenue, he did so under an
erroneous premise that § 90.010, upon which the Special Commissioner
based his finding, is not applicable to Kansas City, citing Kansas
City ex rel. North Park Dist. v. Searritt, 127 Mo. 642, 29 S.W. 845;
that the charter of Kansas City authorizes a [516] tax of 214 mills;
and that under the Commissioner’s ruling to the effect that charter
authorization was tantamount to legislative authority, he properly held
such fund not to constitute general revenue within the meaning of
§ 84.730.

Section 60, Article III, of the city’s charter authorizes the levy of a
2Y-mill tax upon all of the real estate, exclusive of improvements, in
each park district for the improvement and maintenance of the boule-
vard system under the jurisdiction of the Board of Park Commis-
sioners. Section 62 authorizes a maintenance tax of ten cents per
front foot of land abutting said boulevard system. It is apparent that
Item 3 was obtained by virtue of these two charter provisions.

If we were to accept respondents’ contention that § 90.010 did not
apply to the situation here, then we should hold that all of the 244-mill
tax ($272,370) is allocable to general revenue, because of our con-
clusion that charter provisions for the earmarking of general revenue ©
to special purposes in the absence of constitutional or express statu-
tory authorization therefor do not authorize the diversion of the
general revenue funds referred to in § 84.730 into special funds so as
to defeat the purpose thereof. However, we are convinced that,
despite respondents’ assertion, § 90.010 does announce a legislative
policy that impliedly authorizes the diversion of a 2-mill tax on the
aforesaid real estate for park maintenance. To that extent, Item 3 is
not allocable to general revenue. The portion of Item 8 realized from
an excessive levy of one-half mill, $54,474, must be allocated to general
revenue. But, even though the front-foctage tax is without statutory
sanction, we are convinced its nature and purpose is such it cannot be
considered as general revenue under § 84.730. It is a limited local
assessment against real estate abutting the boulevard systeni over and.
above the regular boulevard maintenance tax of 24% mills levied
against all real estate in the two respective park districts. (These two

districts include the whole of Kansas City. See § 56, Art. ITI, Kansas
City Charter.) Presumably, such a special assessment is made against
abutting property on the theory special benefits accrue thereto because
of the proximity of such property to the boulevard system and, if so,
it could not lawfully be diverted to a general purpose. Such a tax is
not general revenue that has been earmarked in violation of the
principle hereinabove stated.

| | Item 5, designated as ‘‘Gasoline and Motor Fuel Taxes”’, in
the amount of $1,920,000, was levied under the provisions of § 288,
Art. VIII, of the charter, which provides that all taxes from the sale
of-gasoline or other motor fuel shall be appropriated for street
maintenance or for payment of principal and interest on any bonds
issued for such purpose. Concededly, there is no constitutional or
statutory authority authorizing it to be so appropriated. The record is
not clear, but it does appear that of these funds the sum of $162,761 is
obligated to the payment of general obligation bonds of the city, which
amount, relators concede, is deductible from the total of $1,920,000,
leaving a balance of $1,757,239 allocable to general revenue under
§ 84.730.

Item 6, designated as ‘‘ Vehicle Licenses’’, amounts to $750,000.
Section 61, Art. III, of the charter authorizes the appropriation of all
vehicle license taxes, except 3% thereof for firemen’s pension funds,
for the maintenance of parks, boulevards, ete. The application of
the aforesaid 8% ($22,500) to firemen’s pension funds is given ex-
press legislative approval by § 86.657, as a consequence of which
$22,500 of said fund is properly excluded from the general revenue
fund. However, there is no legislative authorization for the diversion
of the balance of said funds, to wit: $727,500, and that portion of said
sum must be included in general revenue under § 84.730.
Items 36 through 45, designated as ‘‘Public Market’’, amount
144,550. (This does not include $45,407 allocated to the public
market fund from the general debt and interest fund, and with which
‘we are not here concerned.) The income [517] ($144,550) realized from
operation of the city’s public markets is paid over to the city treasurer
as annual and current revenue. The city, pursuant to authority of its
charter, has issued revenue bonds hypothecating this income. But no
part of such income arises out of any debt owed by the city to people
from whomi the income is derived.

* Section 82.420 of the statutes makes it the duty of the city to estab-
lish a city market, but the Legislature has not seen fit to give the city
authorization to issue revenue bonds hypothecating the income there-
from. Relators concede that had the Legislature authorized’ the city
to ‘pledge its income from public markets to the payment of revenue
bonds, as it has authorized the city to do in the acquisition of parking
facilities under'§ 71.360, we would then be confronted with a different
situation, Even though the city’s charter authorizes the issuance of

such bonds, yet such authorization cannot be asserted as against the
state under § 84.730. We hold that Items 36 through 45, totalling
$144,550, must be allocated to general revenue.

Liem 70, designated as ‘Federal Payments in Lieu of Taxes’’,
amounts to $3,520. This income is paid to the city by the Federal
Housing Administration in lieu of taxes under a contractual arrange-
ment between the city and the administration. It was allocated to the
general fund by respondents, but the Special Commissioner held that it
should be allocated to the general revenue fund, the general debt and
interest fund and the east and west park funds in the proportion that
property taxes were allocated by the Commissioner. The allotment to
general revenue of its portion of this item, as'‘thus computed by the
Commissioner, was $2,045. Relators contend that Item 70 is not mm-
pressed with any trust, was commingled with general revenues and that
the decision of the Commissioner as to its proper allocation has no
relation to any contention of the parties, nor to any evidence intro-
duced. We must agree with relators. While the money received by the
city from the Housing Administration is in lieu of taxes, or more
properly, perhaps, compensation for the loss of taxes, it is not revenue
derived from taxes and it is not impressed with the specifie uses to
which general property taxes must be allocated. It follows that the
whole of said item of $3,520 should be allocated to the general revenue
fund.

Item 84, designated as ‘‘Prior Years’ Revenue’’, was estimated.
as of January 1, 1954, to amount to $1,023,889. This estimated sum
was by the city in its budget allocated in accordance with the City’s
aforesaid charter provisions as follows: General Fund, $762,340;
General Debt and Interest Fund, $100,000; West Park Fund, $49,485;
Water Fund, $35,249; Street Repair and Maintenance Fund, $27,358 ;
and Insurance Revolving Fund, $49,462. (Concededly, for reasons not
pertinent here, no portion of the General Debt and Interest Fund, the
‘Water Fund, or the Insurance Revolving Fund is allocable to general
revenue.) The Special Commissioner said of Item 84: ‘‘Item 84
represents the revenue to be received during the fiscal year 1954-1955
from activities of prior years and includes (1) revenue which was
appropriated in prior years and which was not expended, and (2)
revenues which were received in prior years in excess of the revenues
expected to be received. This revenue is subject to appropriation
for use in the various funds to which it was allocated. The revenue
allocated to the general fund ($762,340) is a part of the general
revenue fund of the city.’’

Relators contend that inasmuch as there is no constitutional or legis-
lative authorization therefor the sum of $49,485 allocated to the West,
Park Fund and the sum of $27,353 allocated to the Street Repair and
Maintenance Fund should be included in and added to the aforesaid

sum of $762,340, hereinabove allocated by the Special Commissioner
to the general revenue fund.

Respondents contend: ‘‘Only $270,000: of this amount is definitely
appropriable for state purposes. In prior years the total revenue was
divided among the Police Department and the City Departments.
[518] Savings were made in some of the city departments aggregating
$141,500.00; that is, all of the money appropriated to them was not
expended. The amount of these savings was carried forward into the
fiscal year in question. Since it is a part of the total revenues from
which the Police Department received its lawful share it should not
again be included in the fund appropriable to the Police Department.
If-it were included the City would be doubly taxed, and the property of
the City and its citizens would be taken without due process-of law in
violation of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.

“$350,000 of the total amount in Item 84 represents an excess in
collection from the amount of revenue estimated to be collectible in
the fiscal year 1953-1954. This collection is from sources which we
regard as local in character such as the City Hall, Auditorium, etc.,
discussed hereafter under Point VI. Should our contention in this
regard be sustained this $350,000 as well as the $154,454 should be
excluded from appropriations for state purposes.’’

Respondents’ objection to the allowance of $350,000 of Item 84 be-
eause allegedly that portion of said item is derived from activities
“local in character’’, as distinguished from activities arising out of
the exercise of police power, will be hereinafter ruled adversely to
respondents for reasons there more fully stated.

Respondents cite no authority in support of their contention that
if such surplus is included in reckoning the city’s liability the city
would be thus doubly taxed, and the city’s property would be thereby
taken without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The allocation
of this surplus from prior years’ revenue to the general revenue fund
for determining the extent of the city’s liability under § 84.730 does
not amount to double taxation. “To constitute double taxation in the
prohibited sense the second tax must be imposed upon the same
property for the same purpose, by the same state or government during
the same tawing period * * *,’? (Emphasis ours.) 61 C.J., Taxation,
§ 69, p. 187. The ‘‘general revenue fund of such year”’, as employed
in § 84.780, is nothing more nor less than a res, that, by statute, is made
the basis of computing the city’s liability for that year. It is worthy
of note that another section of the statutes, § 84.780, provides that the
city’s liability as determined under § 84.780 is payable ‘‘out of any .
moneys in the city treasury not appropriated to the specific purposes
above enumerated in section 84.730’’, to wit: interest on indebtedness,
lighting costs and established sinking fund.

Le

Furthermore, when a municipality acts as an agency of the state, as
Kansas City does in maintaining its police force, federal constitutional
restraints do not apply against the state. City of Trenton v. State of
New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 8.Ct. 534; City of Tulsa v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 4 F. 2d 899, 403 [4-7]. See also State ex rel. Hawes
vy. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 52 et seq., 54 S.W. 524, 582 et seq.

It follows that relators’ contention must be sustained. The sum of
$49,485, allocated out of the aforesaid surplus to the West Park Fund
(less any portion thereof that may represent proceeds from the ten
cent front-footage tax on properties abutting the boulevard: system),
should be and is allocated to general revenue, for the reason said sum
is surplus over and above the total amount accruing to and received by
the city from the 2-mill tax authorized by § 90.010, which is the
statutory limit of the city’s authority to earmark general funds for
park purposes; and the sum of $27,353, allocated to the Street Repair
and Maintenance Fund, should be and is allocated to general revenue
for the reason that there is no legislative authority whatever for the
allocation of general revenue to the Street Repair and Maintenance
Fund; all as was more fully hereinabove discussed. These sums added
to the $762,340 heretofore [519] allocated to general revenue make a
total of $839,178 (less any proceeds from the front-footage tax).

In addition to the budgeted surplus above referred to, there
was during the 1954-1955 fiscal year unappropriated surplus on hands
in'the city treasury which is not reflected in the budget upon which
the city’s liability under § 84.730 was reckoned, and which relators
insist must be included in such reckoning.

In a stipulation filed in this court subsequent to argument and sub-
mission of this cause, it is shown and admitted that in fact (as dis-
tinguished from the estimate in the budget) there was for the fiscal
year of 1954-1955 ‘‘unappropriated surplus’’ in the city treasury
allocated under the city’s aforesaid charter provisions, as follows:
General Fund, $1,666,971; West Park Fund, $125,309; Bast Park
Fund, $88,458; Street Repair and Maintenance Fund, $237,052; and
Market Fund, $292,494. Total, $2,410,284. Of this total, $1,941,042
was actually appropriated and expended prior to the end of the fiscal
year.

‘At the hearing before the Special Commissioner, Mr. Porter Homer,
Director of Research of the Budget of Kansas City, testified: At the
beginning of the fiscal year, the council does not’ appropriate all of its
unappropriated surplus, because the city has a better credit rating if it
hias financial reserves. But it is generally thereafter appropriated in
régular course. Appropriations are made on a yearly basis and when
savings from prior appropriations and income from under-estimated
collections have been put into an unappropriated surplus fund they-are
subject to appropriation without reservation as to purposes for which
they may be spent. In the past, the police department has received some

appropriations from surplus funds, but not on the basis of one-sixth
thereof. If the council believed an appropriation necessary for the
police department, it made the money available out of unappropriated
surplus.

We think it clear that the actual amount of such funds available to
the city during the fiscal year (less any moneys accruing from the
front-footage tax), rather than the priorly estimated amount thereof,
should be considered current revenue for the purpose of reckoning the
city’s liability under § 84.730. ‘‘Current revenue’’, as stated, means
income from any source that is or will be at hand and currently avail-
able for public use. State ex rel. Thompson v. Board of Regents, 305
Mo. 57, 264 S.W. 698, 700. See also Greenhalgh v. Woolworth, 361 Pa.
548, 64 A. 2d 659, 664 [6]; Public Market Co. of Portland v. City of
Portland, 171 Ore. 522, 180 P. 2d 624, 643-645. As unappropriated
surpluses came into the treasury or became freed of any charge, trust
or pledge to. special use during the fiscal year, they became available
for appropriation and were appropriated to such general public use as
the council decided.

Section 84.730 does not fix the basis of the city’s liability at one-sixth
of the anticipated or the levied general revenue of the fiscal year, but
at ‘one-sixth of the general revenue fund of such year’’. There can be
no gainsaying the fact that the ‘‘general revenue fund of such year”?
is made up and consists of (1) general revenue funds on hand in the
city’s treasury at the beginning of ‘‘such year’’ plus (2) general
revenue becoming currently available for appropriation during ‘‘such
year’. Therefore, such portion of unappropriated surpluses as is
allocable to general revenue became a part of the city’s ‘‘general
revenue fund’? for the fiscal year beginning May 1, 1954, and must be
included in reckoning the city’s liability under § 84.730. Indeed, we
do not understand respondents to contend otherwise; they seem only
to differ with relators as to what portions of such surpluses are allocable
to general revenue. To hold otherwise would enable the city to deprive
the police department of its needs by deliberately underestimating or
over-appropriating each year’s available revenue, and thus also to
“doth have thy cake and eat it’? by thereafter bringing the resulting
surplus funds back into its treasury balance without liability under §
84.730.

[520] The total of all surplus funds in the General Fund, West
Park and Hast Park Funds, Street Repair and Maintenance Fund and
the Market Fund, as shown by the stipulation, is $2,410,284. Of this
amount we have priorly in this opinion allocated $839,178 (the por-
tion thereof initially estimated) to the general revenue fund, leaving
for consideration the balance of $1,571,106 (the portion actually re-
ceived in addition to the estimated amount), none of which is devoted
to any constitutionally or legislatively authorized special fund, and

all of which, therefore, is allocable to the general revenue fund under
§ 84.730 (except any proceeds from the front-footage tax).

Relators’ final exception relates to an item of $544,300 ap-
pearing in the January 1, 1954, estimate of revenues (Exhibit 2)
to the eredit of the General Fund, which relators contend should be
allocated to the general revenue fund under § 84.730: It (the item
of $544,800) was transferred to the General Fund from the Revolving
Public Improvement Fund. The Special Commissioner did not include
it in making his computations of the city’s liability for the reason, he
concluded, it did not represent revenue received by the city but was
an amount transferred from another fund pursuant to an accounting
practice of the city. The respondents’ brief does not mention the item
at all. .O
The testimony of Mr. Homer was: The Revolving Public Improve-
ment Fund was established in 1926 and was largely maintained
throughout the years by contributions from the General Fund, totalling
in excess of $2,000,000, through the fiscal year ending 1953-1954. These
funds were used for the purchase, among other things, of heavy equip-
ment or structures, such as bulldozers or depots, for the use of the
various departments. Unused portions of such funds, plus, it seems,
certain rental charges paid on the equipment by the departments using
it, would be returned to the general fund. Refunds to the general fund
from 1944 through 1953-1954 totalled $809,857. The 1954-1955 contri-
bution will nearly exhaust the Revolving Public:Improvement Fund,
whose function has been taken over by another fund. ‘The amount: of
the transfer is large, not a normal occurrence. The council could. use
all or any part of the Revolving Public Improvement Fund that comes
back into the General Fund for any general purpose.

The mere fact that the amount of money coming back into the
General Fund from the Revolving Public Improvement Fund during
the fiscal year of 1954-1955. is unusually large does not and cannot
amount to a ‘‘windfall’? such as might unjustly enrich the police
department beyond its estimated needs at the expense of the.city. By
the express provisions of § 84.730; the department is limited in its de-
mands to a ‘‘sum of money which will be necessary for the next-fiscal
year.’’? We must presume the members of the police board have
complied with their oaths of office. And, too, although the city may
challenge any item of the department’s estimate here involved as not
being authorized by law, it has not done so. There is, therefore, no
such an issue here. We can see no distinction between funds that were
returned from the Revolving Public Improvement Fund to the General
Fund and any other surplus that goes back to the General Fund. We
hold that said item of $544,300 must be allocated to the general
revenue fund under § 84.730.

We now consider respondents’ objections to the report of the Special
Commissioner.

Respondents first insist that the Special Commissioner erred.
in “not excluding the cost of street lighting, sinking fund obligations,
police and firemen’s pensions, FICA contributions (social security),
costs of election and the portion of the contingent fund from the
revenues held to be appropriable for state purposes.’’

Section 84.730 requires that the appropriation for the police de-
partment be ‘‘payable out of the revenue”’ of the city, after first having
deducted the amount necessary [521] to pay the, interest on the in-
debtedness, the amownt necessary for lighting costs, and any sum re-
quired to be placed to the credit of the sinking fund. This does not
mean that the revenues available for the upkeep of the police depart-
ment be diminished by the amount required to pay interest, lighting
costs or sums to, be placed in the sinking funds, unless the total of city
funds is insufficient to defray both police maintenance costs and the
specific items mentioned in the statute. The purpose and effect of the
above provision is merely to give interest charges, street lighting costs
and sinking funds priority of allowance and payment. Obviously, this
provision can be a matter of concern only if and when insufficient pro-
vision is made or there are insufficient revenues with which to pay both
the upkeep of: the police department and the aforesaid preferred items
of the city’s-upkeep. There is no issue here on that score. The con-
tention is overruled. _

Item 27, designated in the report as ‘‘Municipal and Platte
County Airport Receipts’, amounts to $448,095. Of this item the
Special Commissioner said: ‘‘This revenue is income to the city. It
is required to be placed in the general fund by the charter. It is not
required to be devoted to a special purpose. This revenue * * * isa
part of the general revenue fund of the city.’’ The evidence discloses
that in July of 1954 the city, under constitutional authorization,
pledged said receipts to the payment of revenue bonds.

Respondents say.: ‘‘Section 27, Article VI of the Constitution, em-
powers the City to issue airport revenue bonds and pledge the revenues
of the airport as security for the bonds, All of the revenues of the City’s
airport are.so pledged. * * * Revenues so pledged are in the nature
of a trust fund. They fall within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.’’ Relators’ brief
says that ‘‘airport revenues would have been authorized by constitu-
tional provision (Art. VI, § 27, Const. of Mo.) to be devoted to a
particular public use if they had been hypothecated prior to May 1,
1954, * * *.. But these revenues were not so hypothecated until July
of 1954, and were orginally commingled with other income allocated
to the city’s General Fund.’’

It is obvious that funds of the city which were unpledged prior to
the date the board of police commissioners certified its needs to the city
council and prior to the beginning of the fiscal year (May 1, 1954)
cannot be excluded from general revenue in reckoning the city’s

liability under § 84.730. In State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265 Mo. 51,
85, 175 S.W. 591, 598, this court said: ‘‘We can only say to those
officers of Kansas City that the law points to them the way. It requires
the police commissioners to make their estimate and demand at the
beginning of your fiscal year. If that demand is within the law, you
ate then in position to meet it. At the time the law requires it to be
made, you have before you the whole city loaf to be cut and distrib-
uted. The law says that, at the instance of the sovereign state, you
must cut a certain slice of that loaf for police protection to your
citizens and the other citizens of the state. You then had it within your
power to meet the demands of the law. If the law is a harsh one, go
to the Legislature,’’

Item 24, designated as ‘‘City Hall Rents and Concessions’’,
amounts to $37,970; Item 25, designated as ‘‘Municipal Auditorium
Receipts’, amounts to $258,100; Item 26, designated as ‘‘Net Rentals
from Veteran’s Housing Project’’, amounts to $75,000 ; Item 28, desig-
nated as ‘‘Grandview Airport Receipts’’, amounts to $670. The Special
Commissioner found that each of these items constituted revenue of
the city, was required by the charter to be placed in the general fund,
and was allocable to general revenue funds under § 84.730.

Respondents do not challenge the Commissioner’s finding that these
items were revenue coming into the city’s treasury and were required
by its charter to be placed in [522] the General Fund. They do contend
however that each and all of said items are local in character and
exempt from appropriation for state purposes, citing in support there-
of: State ex rel. Kansas City v. Field, 99 Mo. 352, 12 8.W. 802; Kansas
City ex rel. North Park Dist. v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642, 29 S.-W. 845;
Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 41 S.W. 943; In re Hast
Bottoms Drainage & Levee District, 305 Mo. 577, 259 S.W. 89; State
ex rel, Gass v. Gordon, 266 Mo. 394, 181 S.W. 1016; 62 C.J.S., Mun.
Corp., § 183, p. 389, to § 191, p. 350; MeQuillin on Municipal Corpora-
tions, Vol. 2, p. 151, § 4.85, §§ 4.89 et seq.

We have carefully read each of the above cases. None is in point.
The first three hold that where a city’s charter contains a code of pro-
cedure for the exercise of its legislatively granted power of eminent
domain, such code shall take precedence over general statutory provi-
sions relating to the same subject matter. The case of In re Hast Bot-
toms Drainage & Levee District, supra, holds that the establishment of
sewer districts was a matter of local or municipal concern. State ex rel.
Gass v. Gordon, supra, a long and involved case, deals with the mean-
ing of the word ‘‘revenue’’ as applied to a school law set forth in Laws
1915, p. 89, § 1. Respondents do not refer us to a word in any of these
cases that sheds any light upon the issues here involved and, after care-
ful search, we have found none. The citation from MeQuillin is not
helpful to respondents.

~ The proper maintenance of an adequate police system, in ‘Kansas
City is a matter of'state concern. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265
Mo. 51, 67, 175 S.W. 591, 593. See also Van Gilder v. City of Madison,
222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25, 105 A.L.R. 244, and ann. at p. 259. The
fiscal ‘affairs of a municipality such as Kansas City are subject to such
legislative control as is necessary to the proper enforcement of matters
of general state concern. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 193, p. 352. Home
rule constitutional provisions ‘‘do not prevent the legislature from
imposing a duty on a municipality which will result in the creation of
a debt to be met by local taxation where the duty or debt imposed is not
for local or corporate purpose but arises from the performance of a
function which a municipal corporation performs in its governmental
capacity as an agency of the state.’”’ 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 194, p.
-355. In State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 153 Mo. 28, 52, 54 S.W. 524, 531,
we said: ‘The query of learned counsel for the auditor, ‘Has the
general assembly the further power to require such appropriation to be
made in preference to appropriations for other equally necessary de-
partments out of any revenue of such cities, as is attempted by the 13th .
section of the Act of March 15, 1899?’ is unhesitatingly answered ‘in
the affirmative.’’? The phrase ‘‘any revenue of such cities’, as used in
the foregoing quotation, must be construed to méan current income
from whatever source the city may derive it which is subject to ap-
propriation for public use. State ex rel. Thompson v. Board of Re-
gents, 805 Mo. 57, 264 8.W. 698, 700. We hold that the revenues de-
rived by the city as deseribed in Items 24, 25, 26 and 28 were by the
Commissioner properly allocated to the general revenue fund under
§ 84.730.

(It was upon the basis above set forth that we held as ‘untenable
respondents’ contention that on account of $350,000 of Item 84 (Prior
Years’ Revenue) being ‘‘derived from activities local in character”
it was exempt from allocation to general revenue under § 84.780:)

HH Ziem 29, designated in the record as ‘‘Park Property Rentals

and Concessions’’, amounts to $31,500; Ftem 30, designated in the
record as ‘‘Rental of Miscellaneous City-Owned Property’’, amounts to
$50,120; Item 31, designated as ‘‘Rentals and Concessions’’, amounts
to $16,950. Respondents claim each of these items represents earnings
from municipal or local activities and are exempt from appropriation
[523] for state purposes. We have hereinabove considered that con-
tention as to other items of a kindred nature (city hall rents and con-
cessions, municipal auditorium receipts, ete.) and ruled it adversely to
respondents. .
* ED Items 46 through 59 amount to $952,300. The Special Com-
missioner held that all of them were allocable to the genéral revenue
fund. under § 84.730. Respondents contend he erred in so holding for
the reason that the revenue is derived from the éxer cise of police power
or from activities local in character.

By reference to the schedules hereinabove set forth, it will be seen
that these items relate mainly to income accruing to the city for so-
ealled ‘‘governmental services’? (such as notary and recording fees,
court costs, ete.) ; street cuts and backfills ; tow-in charges and services;
recreation facility fees; public health, welfare and hospital services;
inspection fees in connection with public safety; burial and cemetery
services, et cetera.

- We have heretofore adversely ruled respondents’ contention that in-
come received from activities local or municipal in character is exempt
from allocation to the general revenue fund under § 84.730. But
respondents now say that certain of the income included in Items 46
through 59 comes to the city in payment of services rendered by the
city in the exercise of its police power, such as license fees for the
regulation of motion pictures, carnivals and other enterprises. They.
say that the city is authorized by law to collect fees for regulation and
that such fees are not taxation and should not be subject to appropria-
ion for state purposes, citing Kansas City v. School District of Kansas

_ Gity, 356 Mo. 364, 201 8.W. 2d 930, 982; and Viquesney v. Kansas
City, 305 Mo. 488, 497, 266 S.W. 700, 702 [3-5]. The above cases hold
that the city has the power to charge fees for regulation of certain
enterprises under its police power, but, as we read them, they do not
announce any doctrine that would justify a conclusion that the state
cannot include such fees in reckoning the city’s liability under §
84.780.

Respondents also say of the street cut repair and backfill fees and
gas inspection fees that they are less than the expense of the services
rendered and are not revenue; that they reimburse a fund. We think
they reimburse no fund that has constitutional or legislative authoriza-
tion for its existence so as to deprive what otherwise is general revenue
as contemplated under § 84.730. They are placed in the general funds
of the city and are used for general purposes. The objections made by
respondents to the allocation of Items 46 through 59 to the general
revenue fund are overruled.

Tiem 9, designated ‘‘Revenue from Other Street Uses’’,
amounting to $42,000, was allocated by the Special Commissioner to
general revenue. Respondents say that part of the money in this item
is derived from charges made for permits to ‘‘dig up’’ streets which
are usually insufficient to pay the cost of restoration, and that part of
it comes from loading zone permits; that the fees from street digging
charges are local in character and that the fees from loading zone
permits originate from an exercise of the police power ; and that, there-
fore, neither is to be allocated to general revenue under § 84.730. We
have hereinabove ruled both contentions adversely to respondents.

HH Ziem 20, designated as ‘‘Dog Licenses’’, amounting to $42,-
000, was allocated to general revenue by the Special Commissioner.
Respondents object upon the ground such licenses are exacted for a

local activity and under the city’s police power. Both grounds are
ruled adversely for reasons hereinabove stated.

Item 7, designated as ‘‘Parking Meter Receipts’’, amounting
to $115,000, was by the Special Commissioner allocated to general
revenue. Respondents say that ‘‘should it be held that the parking
meter [524] receipts derive from the police power, then a situation is
presented which is somewhat different from other police power fees.
Parking meter receipts are substantially more than the cost of main-
taining the meters and collecting the money. For the fiscal year in
question, the cost of collection and maintenance was estimated at $25,-
000, and the amount to be collected at $115,000. If this gross amount
is revenue appropriable for state purposes, at least the cost of the
machines should be deducted. Since our parking meters have already
been paid for, that cost is no longer an issue, but the principle should
be declared.’”’

The proper allocation of this item is not dependent upon whether it
represents, or will represent, profit or loss from an activity of the city
or whether it is income from a local or police activity; it is an amount
that the city estimates will come into its general fund from parking
meters during the fiscal year. Concededly, it is placed in the city
treasury for general use; it is not devoted to any special use. Conse-
‘quently, it constitutes a part of the general revenue fund under § 84.-
780.

Item 61, designated as ‘‘Municipal Farm Revenue’’, amounts
to $363,600, of which $360,000, it is estimated, will be derived from
livestock and poultry raised on the farm, and $3,600 of which will be
derived from operation of a dog pound thereon. The municipal farm
is owned and operated as a correctional institution for the confinement
and useful oceupation of prisoners. The entire sum was by the Special
Commissioner allocated to general revenue. Respondents say (in ad-
dition to contentions heretofore ruled against them) that if the court
should hold that the income from the farm arises out of an exercise
of the police power, then the estimated cost of production, $205,346,
should be deducted. Suffice it to say that the gross income anticipated
from municipal farm operations was allocated by the city to the general
fund. The entire fund goes into the treasury as current revenue for
general use and is not devoted to a special use. Consequently, it must
be treated as a part of the general revenue fund under § 84.730.

HE Liem 71, designated as ‘‘Contribution from Starlight Theater
Association’’, amounts to $15,000. Of it the Special Commissioner said :
“Item 71 is revenue received from the Starlight Theater, Association
as repayment of a loan which the city made to the association some time
prior to the preparation of the budget for the fiscal year 1954-1955,
Regardless of the character of this revenue, it is income to the city
which is not required to be devoted to a special purpose or paid into a
special fund, and this revenue ($15,000) is a part of the general

revenue fund of the city.’’ Respondents say it is not revenue, but
repayment of a loan and that it is a local park activity and is therefore
exempt. We hold that it definitely constitutes a part of the general.
revenue fund under § 84.780,

Item 72, designated as ‘‘Sale of City Real and Personal
Property’’, amounts to $22,150. The city had allocated $16,000 there-
of to the general fund and $6,150 thereof to park funds. The entire
sum was by the Special Commissioner allocated to general revenue, on
the ground that no part thereof is required to be devoted to a special
use. Respondents contend it is not revenue and that $6,150 should be
allocated to park funds. For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we hold
that all of the fund inures to the general fund and is a part of the
general revenue fund under § 84.730.

litem 73, designated as ‘‘Miscellaneous Non-Revenue Re-
ceipts’’, amounts to $12,100. It consists of amounts recovered from
insurance on fire losses, unclaimed moneys, recovery of damages td
city property and like sources. The Special Commissioner allocated
the sum to general revenue. Respondents say none of this money is
revenue; that it reimburses an original fund and that the amount of
insurance is far less than the insurance premiums. The money is
clearly a part of.the general revenue fund of 1954-1955, and as such
is allocable under § 84.730.

HM [525] In addition to ruling the objections of the parties to the
foregoing challenged findings of the Special Commissioner, we have
considered and approved ‘as correct his unchallenged findings. We,
therefore, tabulate and total such findings for the purpose of assessing
the extent of the.city’s liability for support of its police department
under § 84.780 for the fiscal year beginning May 1, 1954, as follows:

Source of General Not General
Revenue Revenue Fund Revenue Fund
Item 1 General Property Taxes $7,617,147 $ 293,874
2 General Property Taxes © 3,505,746
3 Special Park Levies 54,474 274,006
4 Cigarette Stamp Taxes 1,055,556 —
5 Gasoline and Motor .
Fuel Tax 1,757,239 162,761
6 Vehicle Licenses 727,500 22,500
7 Parking Meters 115,000 —
8 Taxicab Driver’s Licenses 4,500 —
9 Other Street Uses 42,000 —
Ttems 10-23 * Licenses, Franchises 6,570,430 =
24-26 Rentals 371,070 —_
27-28 Airport Receipts 443,765 —_—

“29-81 Rentals and Concessions 98,570

82-35 Interest 80,000 811,454
36-45 Public Market 144,550 —
46-59 Service Charges, Fees, etc. 952,300 —

Item 60 Sale of Insurance
61 Municipal Farm 363,600 —
Items 62-66 Water Fund — 5,592,523
67-69 State and Federal Grants — 524,150
Item 70 Federal Payment in Lieu
of Taxes 8,520 ose
71 Starlight Theater 15,000 —
72 Sale of Property 22,150 —
73 Miscellaneous Receipts 12,100 —
Items 74-81 Working Capital and Public
Works Working Capital
Funds —
Item 82 Reimbursable Services — 404,641
88 Collections from Assessments —— 174,500
84 Estimated Prior Years’
Revenue 839,178 184,711
(less any proceeds
from the front-
footage tax)

Unappropriated Surplus over and
above such surplus as above
estimated $1,571,106
(less any proceeds
from the front-
footage tax)
Contribution from Revolving Public
Improvement Fund 544,300 no

$23,405,055 $12,661,960

HMM [526] One-sixth of the general revenue fund (subject to re-
duction to the extent of any front-footage tax proceeds therein) for
the fiscal year of 1954-1955 amounts to $3,900,842.50. The city has
denied liability in excess of $3,551,854. Under § 84.730, the city’s
potential liability remains undischarged to the extent of the difference
between these two sums, to wit: $349,488.50. But a practical matter
yet remains to be considered in determining the extent to which man-
damus will lie. This cause was submitted to this court on May 11,
1955. The issues deal with the share of public moneys of Kansas City
to which the police department was entitled during the fiscal year
ending May 1, 1955. No amount of money here awarded can now affect
the efficiency of its operation during that period. Under such circum-

stances, it would be unjust to award any judgment in excess of the
amount lawfully required by relators to discharge outstanding obliga-
tions of the department for which requisitions were lawfully issued
as provided in § 84.780. The alternative writ of mandamus is there-
fore made peremptory to the extent only that respondents cause to be
appropriated and paid to relators out of any money in the city treasury
not appropriated to the specific purposes enumerated im § 84.730, any
amount not exceeding $349,488.50 (less any front-footage tax pro-
ceeds therein) for which the police department remains legally liable
and for which it issued timely requisitions as provided in § 84,780. All
costs are taxed against respondents.

Leedy, C.J ., Dalton and Westhues, JJ., concur; Storckman, J., con-
eurs in separate concurring opinion, in which Leedy, C.J., Hollings-
worth and Westhues, JJ., concur; Hyde, J., concurs in part and dis-
sents in part in separate opinion; Zager, J., concurs in part and dis-
sents in part, and concurs in separate opinion of Hyde, J.

STORCKMAN, J. (concurring) —Another persuasive indica-
tion that surplus funds in the city treasury and unexpended funds
from previous years were intended to be included in calculating ‘‘the
general revenue fund of such year”’ is found in statutes comprising the
county budget law. Section 50.670 provides that whenever the term
“revenue’’ is used in the county budget law it ‘‘shall be understood
and taken to mean the ordinary and general revenue to be used for the
current expenses of the county * * * regardless of the source from
which derived.’’ The section further provides that the county court
shall prepare a ‘‘budget of estimated receipts and expenditures’’ and
that ‘‘the receipts shall show the cash balance on hand as of January
first and not obligated, also all revenue collected and an estimate of all
revenue to be collected, also all moneys received or estimated to be re-
ceived during the current year.’’ Thus it appears that the General
Assembly intended that county budgets should be prepared so as to in-
elude surplus funds or funds appropriated but not used in previous
years as well as current receipts and income. While the definitions and
procedures provided in § 50.670 are limited to the county budget law,
we may take into consideration statutes involving similar or related
subject matter when such statutes shed light upon the meaning of the
statute being construed, unless we are expressly prohibited or a con-
trary intention plainly appears. State ex rel. St. Louis Police Relief
Ass’n. v. Igoe, 340 Mo. 1166, 107 S.W.2d 929, 934; 16 C.J.S. 60, § 19b.

The governing body of Kansas City is required by the terms of the
statute to appropriate for tha use of the police board ‘“‘the sum of
money which will be necessary for the next fiscal year, to enable said
board to discharge the duties * * * imposed upon it, and to meet the
expenses of [527] the police department.’’ However, the amount so
appropriated shall not exceed one-sixth of ‘‘the general revenue fund

of such year.’’ § 84.730 V.A.MLS. If the sum so appropriated was pay-
able immediately and without further limitation to the police board
so that the board could build up surplus funds and maintain a reserve,
the contention that the one-sixth limitation should apply only to cur-
rent income of the-city would be more plausible. However, the board is
only authorized ‘‘to requisition semimonthly upon the chief finance
officer of the, city such swm, within the limits of the annual appropri-
ation, as may be necessary for that period, which sum shall be allocated
by said officer and placed to the credit of the police department.’’ §
84.780 V.A.MLS.

The statutes contemplate that the police board will budget its needs
on.an annual basis and to hold that the board is entitled only to one-
sixth of the current receipts and income when collected would be a
departure from the legislative theory and plan. We find no clear ex-
pression of intention to exclude the cash on hand or surplus funds in
calculating the ‘‘general revenue fund’’ for the purpose of determin-
ing the maximum appropriation. The terms used in statutes must be
given their usual and ordinary meaning unless such construction will
defeat the manifest intention of the statutory provision. O’Malley v.
Continental Life Ins. Co., 385 Mo. 1115, 75 'S.W.2d 837; 82 C.J.S. 639,
§ 3829b. Whether the one-sixth limitation is too high or too low is a
legislative matter and not for the courts.

For these additional reasons I concur in the opinion of the court.

Suparare CoNCURRING AND DissENTING OPINION

7 HYDE, J.—1I cannot agree with the part of the principal opin-
ion herein which holds that amounts not due to or received by the City
during the year involved must be considered in determining the total
amount to which the limitation of one-sixth, made by Sec. 84.730
RSMo., V.A.MS. applies. It must be conceded that Sec. 84.730 is far
from being clear and definite. However, it is my view that the reason-
able construction of this limitation it specified, and the legislative in-
tent of the statute, is that the Police Board budget (if it requires it) is
entitled to one-sixth of all revenue (constituting general revenue)
which the City receives or has due to it during the year involved; but
that during the subsequent year it is not entitled to one-sixth of any
funds derived from unexpended revenue received by the City in any
prior year and carried over to be used later. In other words, I think
the words, ‘‘one-sixth of the general revenue fund of such year’’,
mean one-sixth of the fund derived from general revenue received by
or due to the City during such year and no more. The words ‘‘of such
year’’ are particularly significant; and the same idea is suggested by
the words ‘‘payable out of the revenue of said cities’’.also found in
See. 84.730, ,

I think this meaning is consistent with our long established con-
stitutional plan of keeping all local finances on an annual basis. Ever
since 1875 (See. 12, Art. 10, Const. 1875) we have had the provision
that (without a two-thirds vote) no city or other local governmental
unit shall become indebted ‘‘to an amount exceeding in any year the
income and revenue provided for such year.’’? The purpose of this is
to prevent annual obligations from exceeding annual revenue. The
Legislature, no doubt, had this financial system in mind when it passed
the Kansas City Police Act in 1939 (Laws 1939, pp. 545, 559.) Sec. 24,
Art. 6 of the 1945 Constitution contains the additional requirement
that all local governmental units have an annual budget. Sec. 26(a)
thereof now provides for considering unencumbered balances of previ-
ous years in determining how much such units become indebted in
any year; and while savings from previous years may be spent by the
City for any lawful purpose, they clearly do not constitute revenue
provided for a subsequent year as shown by the separate reference to
them in this constitutional provision. I cannot believe that the Legis-
lature meant [528] by the language used in Sec. 84.730 that the Police
Board was entitled both to one-sixth of all the general revenue of the
City in the year for which it was provided and also during the next
year to one-sixth of any surplus of revenue carried over from the year
for which it was provided. In short, the Police Board is not entitled
to one-sixth of any revenue twice.

As shown by the opinion herein, the City budget is prepared and
approved at the beginning of the fiscal year and appropriations are
made in accordance with this budget. The City gets a better credit
rating if it has financial reserves and, therefore, the budget is inten-
tionally underestimated. Of course, as the opinion properly holds, this
underestimated amount has nothing to do with the total amount the
Police Board is entitled to receive, if the full one-sixth of the revenue
fund of the year is required to meet the Police Board budget, because
it is entitled to one-sixth of the actual general revenue of the City pro-
vided for the year and not one-sixth of an estimated amount. There-
fore, when, as in this case, the budget of the Police Board is greater
then one-sixth of the actual general revenue of the year, the Board
should first be given one-sixth of the estimated amount and later, as
revenue in excess of the estimated amount comes in, the Board should
be given additional appropriations up to the full amount of one-sixth
of all revenue due the City for the year as it is received by it, even
including one-sixth of delinquencies that are paid after the end of the
year. However, surplus amounts, which the City has accumulated
from not spending revenue due it in preceding years, are, in my view,
no part of the general revenue fund of any subsequent year, as that
term is used in Sec. 84.730. Therefore, if the Police Board was not
entitled to one-sixth of such surplus of a previous year during such
year (because its budget was not large enough during such year to

pS

require it), or if it did get one-sixth of that surplus during such year,
then: in either event it is not entitled to any part of it during the-year
involved herein or any subsequent year.

To illustrate: if the actual general revenue due the City in the
fiscal year of 1953 was $21,000,000.00, the Police Board was entitled
to $3,500,000.00 if it needed it and made such a budget request. How-
ever, if the Police Board only requested $3,000,000.00 and for that
reason the City had $500,000.00 surplus, which it did not spend but
carried over to the next year, the Police Board would not be entitled
to one-sixth of that amount in the 1954 fiscal year even if its 1954
budget was larger than one-sixth of the total amount of the actual
revenue due to and received by the City during the 1954 fiscal: year.
Likewise, if in 1953 the Police Board asked for and got $3,500,000,00,
but the City made a saving of $500,000.00 in the operation of other
departments, the situation would be the same, namely: the Police
Board could only get one-sixth of the actual revenue due to.and re-
eeived’ by the City during the 1954 fiscal year and would not in the
next subsequent year be entitled to any part of the $500,000.00.surplus
accumulated during the previous year. Otherwise, the Police Board
would get a one-sixth part of the same fund not once but twice. There-
fore, while I agree that, for 1954, the Police Board is entitled to one-
sixth of the next to the last item, ‘‘unappropriated surplus over and
above such surplus as aboye estimated—$1,571,106’’ (and any other
additions to such surplus from revenue due in that year, if any), I do
not agree that the Police Board is entitled to one-sixth of item 84,
“estimated prior year’s revenue—$839,178.”” Likewise, I do not agree
that the Police Board is entitled to one-sixth of the last item, ‘‘Con-
‘tribution from‘Revolving Public Improvement Fund—$544,300.00”,
-because it is made up of revenue collected in preceding years; or,
‘of item 71, ‘‘Starlight- Theater—$15,000.00’’, which was a payment
of a loan of funds made from revenue of a previous year. If the legis-
lative intent was-in accordance with the construction made in this
dissenting opinion, it. could be made clear and definite by an amend-
ment to Sec. 84.730, As to all other items and rulings, I concur in n the
‘prineipal opinion.

~ [529] ‘Eager, J., concurs.

; Ow Momon vor Ranmanne .

R CURIAM :—Respondents’ motion for rehearing does not
challenge our basic finding ‘‘that general revenue of the city which is
jdevoted to-special purposes or allocated into special funds by virtue of
-the-city’s charter (and ordinances) is to be included in reckoning one:
sixth of the general revenue fund under § 84.730, unless such charter
‘provisions or ordinances placing such funds to a special purpose or
into special funds were enacted pursuant to express or clearly implied
constitutional or statutory authority.’’? But they do strenuously urge
us to relieve them of the rigors of said statute by judicially legislating

exceptions to its provisions. In answer to this insistence, we must say,
as we said in the original opinion, that is not our function. If, due
to modern methods of municipal operation and financing, § 84.730 has
become archaic or is oppressive, the problem is political and relief can
be had only from the legislature; the courts ate without jurisdiction
in the premises.

Bearing these postulates in mind, we have given careful considera-
tion to each of the assignments of respondents’ motion and, with the
exceptions hereinafter stated, have concluded that the motion should
be overruled.

I .

Respondents say that in ‘‘deciding that airport receipts
(Items 27-28, $443,765), unpledged for the payment of revenue airport
bonds prior to the date the Police Board certified its needs, could not
be excluded from general revenue, the implication seems to be that if
the revenue is pledged, under authority of Section 27, Article VI of
the Constitution, it should be excluded. If this implication is war-
ranted we respectfully suggest that the opinion be clarified.”’

The opinion does imply and, considered in its entirety, holds in effect
that whenever revenues of the city are devoted or pledged to a special
purpose or fund pursuant to express or clearly implied constitutional
or legislative authority, as is the case with these funds, Items 27-28,
then such funds must thenceforth throughout the succeeding years of
their encumbrance be excluded from general revenue to the extent of
the encumbrance in reckoning the city’s liability under § 84.780.

IL

HH Respondents call our attention to the failure of the original

opinion to pass upon certain city expenditures in reckoning its lia-
‘bility under § 84.730. The opinion did overlook a paragraph in
respondents’ brief reading as follows:

“By direction of state statute, the City will contribute $341,000 to
police and firemen’s pension fund, by federal statute $150,000 to FICA
(social security), and by state statute $193,548, to costs of elections.
All of this money should be deducted from the fund appropriable for
police purposes. Otherwise, to that extent, the City and its Citizens
would be burdened with double taxation, and property would be taken
without due process of law, in violation of Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.’’

Of these items, respondents now say:

“In addition to the contribution to the Firemen’s Pension Fund
from vehicle licenses mentioned in Item 6 of the opinion, the City
made additional contributions of $198,500.00 to the Firemen’s Pension
Fund, by the direction of the same Statute, Section 86.657, RSMo.
1949, and, as well by direction of Section 86.653.

“By direction of Section 86.297, R.S.Mo. 1949, the City contributed
to the Police Pension Fund the sum of $120,000.00.

“By direction of Section 117.140, R.S.Mo. 1949, the City contributed
for elections, other than municipal, and for the maintenance of the
Election Board, the sum of $193,548.00.

' “By direction of Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 3, Laws
‘Missouri, 1951, [530] Page 788, and particularly Section 4(1) Page
798, and in compliance with a contract authorized thereby between
the City and the Division of Budget and Comptroller of the State of
Missouri, * * * the City contributed to the FICA (Social Security)
Fundi the sum of $182,749 for employees employed in departments the
revenues of which you hold to be General Revenues.’’

+ It is to be noted that respondents have abandoned their contention
of double taxation and deprivation of due process, and now resort to
the provisions of certain statutes.

Section 86.297 does require the city to make contributions of por-
tions of its revenue to the police pension fund and it is clear, therefore,
that any contributions made by the city in accordance with saidi
statute should be excluded from general revenue under § 84.730, and
we so hold. .Section.86.657 authorizes the city to set aside certain por-
tions of its revenues for pensioning its firemen and certain of their
‘dependents. Section 86.653 creates the fire department pension fund
and requires, among other things, that all moneys receivedi by the city
from certain sources shall be paid into that fund. It is clear that any
payments made by the city in accordance with these statutes should
be excluded from general revenue under § 84.730, and we so hold.

_ Any moneys. paid out by the city for its share of the salaries and ex-
penses of the Board of Election Commissioners for the conduct of
elections (which includes general, special and primary elections, un-
less otherwise specified, § 117.010) under the provisions of § 117.140
are but a general charge upon the city in the course of its operation,
payable out of general revenue. No special fund is created nor is any
‘of the general revenue of the city ‘‘earmarked’’ for such purpose.
Henee, such payments are not to be excluded in reckoning the city’s
liability under § 84.730, and we so hold.

A different situation exists, however, with regard to payments made
by the city under Laws 1951, pp. 788-796, §§ 105.300 to 105.460,
V.A.MS,, relating to social security. Under that Act, when put into
operation by the city, the city is required to pay into a contribution
fund, by such Act created in § 6 (105.390) thereof, certain moneys;
and it is further required that such funds be kept separate from other
public funds. It seems clear, therefore, that funds allocated by the
city to and paid into such fund should be excluded from general
revenue under § 84.730, andi we so hold.

III.

HH Respondents say that through error not chargeable to the
court there was a duplication of figures in an exhibit on which Item
84, Estimated Prior Years’ Revenue, was computed, which, on its face,
subjected $496,967 to ‘‘two appropriations * * * from this particular
amount of money’’, They also say that through error not chargeable
to the court substantially one-half of an item of $45,485 should have
been excluded from the general revenue fund. These matters are now
immaterial and moot. It is conceded, as we understand, that the police
department operated during the fiscal year ending May 1, 1955,
within the funds appropriated for its maintenance and, due to express
limitations placed upon the peremptory writ ordered issued herein,
actually will take nothing, other than its costs, under the judgment
rendered. Consequently, respondents cannot be hurt by the duplica-
tion or the other erroneous addition to general revenue referred to.
To further consider them can be of no aid to any one.

Iv.

In holding that actual surpluses available during any fiscal
year rather than prior estimates thereof should be considered current
revenue for the purpose of reckoning the city’s liability under §
84.730, we further said: ‘‘As unappropriated surpluses came into the
treasury or became freed of any charge, trust or pledge to special use
during the fiscal year, they became available [531] for appropriation
and were appropriated to such general public use as the council
decided.”’

Respondents say that the quoted language may be interpreted to
mean that the police department would be entitled during such year
to one-sixth of any such surplus becoming available during the fiscal
year even though it had been allowed one-sixth thereof earlier in the
same year. Such language is, of course, not to be so interpreted. Any
such surplus becoming available during the fiscal year would be
teckoned in computing the city’s liability for such year only when
it came from funds not included in the original estimate. And that
is precisely what we did in computing the liability of the city under
§ 84.730, as our opinion, when read, will reveal.

The opinion is modified to the extent above set forth and the motion
for rehearing is overruled.

Lewis B. Hagmrman and Herman Sparper, Respondents, v. Crry or
Sz. Louis, a Municipal Corporation, Josep T. Haypgn, License
-Collector of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, Jurma1an O’CoNNELL,
Chief of Police of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and Joun M.
Daron, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, Appellants,
No. 44557—283 S. W. (2d) 623.

Division Two, September 12, 1955.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled and Opinion
Modified on Court’s Own Motion, November 14, 1955.

i Pp
[|

Samuel rman, City Counselor, Charles J. Dolan, Associate
City Counselor and Thomas F. McGuire, istant City Counselor,
for appellants.

John Grossman for r sponden

[624] BOHLING, O0.—Lewis B. Hagerman and Herman Sparber,
licensed auctioneers of the city of St. Louis, instituted this action for a

declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to test the constitutionality
of St. Louis ordinance provisions regulating the ‘‘retail auction sales
of jewelry, watches, clocks or silverware.’ The trial court held the
provisions unconstitutional and void. The plaintiffs pleaded that the
questioned ordinance provisions contravene § 40(30), Art. ITI, Mo.
Const. 1945, prohibiting special laws (the section applies to city
ordinances—McKaig v. Kansas City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S. W. 2d 815,
816[2]), and § 1, 14th Amend., U. 8. Const., (sic): ‘which, among
other things, provides that no state shall make or enforce any law
which shall deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws’’. The city contends said provisions are a valid
exercise of its police power. The case is of first impression.

The provisions here involved are §§ 19—24 of ordinance 46591, ap-
provéd April 10, 19538, amending Chapter 7, §§ 1—20, Revised Code,
City of St. Louis, 1948, p. 237, relating to Auctions and Auctioneers.
Certain of said §§ 1—20, which plaintiffs comply with and do not ques-
tion, are material to the instant issues. Judicial sales or sales by
executors or administrators are specifically exemptedi from certain pro-
visions. Sections 6—11, 14, and 18 are immaterial here. We quote or
state the substance of the material provisions.

Section 1 defines certain terms: (a) Auction crier. One who assists
a public auctioneer. ‘‘(b) Fill in stock. Merchandise added to the
stock on hand with the intention of selling it at public auction. (c)
Public auctioneer. Any person who shall arrange for the disposal of
any goods, wares, merchandise, fruits, stocks, bonds and other securi-
ties, livestock or other personal property, or any real estate * * in any
building * *, or in any other place in the city at public offering * *,
either in person or by duly employed and licensed auction criers * *.
(d) Stock on hand. Any merchandise that a merchant usually and

- ordinarily carries throughout the year’’ and not acquired for sale at
public auction.

Section 2 requires a license as a public auctioneer to auction ‘‘any
property, whether the same shall be his own property or the property
of others.’’

Section 8. Applicants for license as public auctioneer must state
in writing, among other things, the length of time of residence in Mis-
souri and in the city as a licensed auctioneer or crier, or retail or
wholesale merchant; the auctions conducted in the city within two
years; a general description of the merchandise to be auctioned, its
owner andi place of the auction.

Section 4 authorizes, upon proper application, the issuance of a
license if the applicant has been a resident of the state and continu-
ously engaged in business in the city for one year next prior to the ap-
plication as a licensed public auctioneer, or licensed auction crier, or
as a retail or wholesale merchant; gives other information required by
the license collector, pays the license fee, and gives an approved bond.

fo

Section 5 requires the applicant to tender a $3,000 bond before any
license be issued to a public auctioneer, with a surety company author-
ized to do business in Missouri as surety ; said bond to be payable to the
city and conditioned upon the principal paying all losses and damages
oceasioned by any material misrepresentation of fact or belief or any
suppression of fact concerning any property sold at auction or any
violation of said Chapter 7.

Section 12. The license collector may investigate any part or all
of the property before or after issuing the auctioneer’s license.

. “Section 18. False statements by auction crier. It shall be unlawful
for any person. acting as auction crier to make any statements which
are false in any particular, or which have a tendency to mislead any
person present, or to make any misrepresentation as to the quality,
quantity, character, [625] present condition, value, cost, general selling
price, or whether new or secondhandi of any property offered for
disposal by auction sale.’’ Auction criers may not sell any ‘‘fill in’’
article without first stating such fact in a clear audible voice to all
persons present.

Section 15 makes it unlawful to auction any ‘‘fill in’’ article unless
every advertisement of the auction clearly and unequivocally states
that fill in merchandise has been added to the ‘‘stock on hand.”

Section 16 requires the owner of auctioned property to give every
purehaser at a price of $2.50 or more ‘‘an invoice, containing a full
deseription of the article, its selling price and a statement giving
each and every warranty under which the article was sold.’’

Section 17 provides for the revocation of any license for cause.

Section 19 prohibited ‘‘any retail auction sale of jewelry, watches,
clocks or silverware at any time during the month of December.”’

Section 20 was the penalty section.

On November 18, 1951, § 19, supra, prohibiting the sale of jewelry
ete. during the month of December, was held to contravene § 40(30),
Art. TIT, Mo. Const., and the 14th Amend., U. S. Const. in Morgans
Credit Jewelry Company, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, et al., in the Cireuit-
Court of the City of St. Louis, which judgment became final.

Thereafter, on April 10, 1953, ordinance 46591, relating to ‘‘retail
auction sales of jewelry, watches, clocks and silverware,’’ was passed.
(For convenience, unless otherwise indicated the word ‘‘jewelry’’
refers to jewelry, watches, clocks or silverware.) It amended said
Chapter 7 by repealing §§ 19 and 20, supra, and adding §§ 19—25 to
said Chapter. Section 25 re-enacted the penalty provisions. Sections
19—24, here in controversy, are to the following effect.

Section 19 makes it unlawful to conduct ‘‘any retail auction sale of
jewelry, watches, clocks or silverware, at any time during the months
of June and December in any year.”

. Section 20 makes it unlawful to conduct ‘‘any retail auction sale of
jewelry * *, unless the person or firm whose stock is being offered for

sale at auction shall have been in the retail jewelry *. * business at
the location and in the premises at which said auction sale is to be,
cried for at least one year next before the commencement of the said
auction sale, and shall not have conducted an auction sale at any time
within said one year period at said location or on said ‘premises.’’ .

Section 21 makes it unlawful to conduct a ‘‘retail auction sale of
jewelry * * over a period of more than 15 days,’’ and ‘‘between the
hours of 6 p.m. and 8 a.m. the following day.’’

Section 22 requires ‘‘the auctioneer or crier,’’ before commencing
any retail auction sale of jewelry, to ‘‘make a complete-and accurate
inventory’’ of each and every article to be offered for sale at the auc:
tion and file the same with the license collector; and to ‘‘mark each’
and every article’’ to be offered for sale at the auction ‘‘by some band:
or tag’’ identifying and describing ‘‘each article by carat weight, per-
centage of purity, kind of metal or plating, weight and quality and.
color of stones, number of jewels and adijustments of watches, and
whether they be new or used articles.’ The inventory aforesaid ‘‘shall-
not exceed in value the average inventory of the’’ owner of the stock
‘for the 12 months next preceding the said auction.’’

“Section 23. Any retail auction sale of jewelry * * shall cease and
end upon the sale * * of the stock of goods listed and'marked ac-'
cording to Section 22 * *, and * * shall not, under any circum-
stances, be conducted * * for a longer period than 15 days.’’

“Section 24. It shall be unlawful * * to add to or increase the’
stock offered for sale as listed and marked in accordance with Section
22 * *, in any manner, and fill in stock of any nature, kind or charac-
ter shall be prohibited.’’

The city summarizes the restrictions as follows: (1) Retail auctions
of jewelry are unlawful unless the jeweler has been in the [626] retail
jewelry business in the premises of the auction for at least one year.
§ 20. (2) That no such auction has been conducted upon said premises
for at least one year. § 20. (3) The auctioneer shall make an accurate
inventory of every article to be offered for sale and file the same with
the license collector. § 22. (4) Such auction sale shall not be‘con-
ducted for more than 15 days. §§ 21, 23. (5) No such auction shall be
conducted between 6 p.m. and 8 am. § 21. (6) The auctioneer is re-
quired to mark or tag each and every article subject to sale describing
its carat weight, percentage of purity et cetera. § 22. (7) The said’
inventory shall not exceed in value the average inventory of the
jeweler for the previous 12 months. § 22. (8) Fill-in stock is pro-
hibited. §§ 24, 23. (9) Retail auction sales of jewelry are unlawful in
the months of June and December. § 19.

Plaintiff Lewis B. Hagerman had been in business in St. Louis as a
merchandise broker and licensed auctioneer for seven years. He posted
the required bond, the Bankers Indemnity Company being surety
thereon. He had a store where he had seats for his customers and

displayed general merchandise of all sorts, mainly radios, televisions,
washers, ironers, small electrical appliances, jewelry, watches, rugs
et cetera. He conducted auctions on Mondays, Wednesdays and Satur-
days, mostly between 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. but sometimes until 12 m.
The merchandise sold varied with the seasons of the year but he esti-
mated that 30% of his annual sales might be classified as jewelry. He
sells costume jewelry but does not sell ‘‘precious’’ stones. When he
sought. to renew his license in May, 1958, he was asked if he was going
to sell watches or jewelry during June, and upon answering in the
affirmative, the license collector stated he could not obtain a license
because the ordinance prohibited the auction of jewelry in the month of
June. He acquires merchandise when distributors or dealers experience
financial difficulties. He makes purchases at less than wholesale cost.
He mentioned the purchase of watches for about $29 that retailed at
$92.50 and which he auctioned for from $33 to $40.

:. Mr. Hagerman testified one could not afford to lease premises, ad-
vertise its location, and prepare to auction merchandise, jewelry, et
cetera if limited.to an auction sale of 15 days or less annually, as pro-
vided in §§ 21 and 28 of the ordinance.

He explained it was impractical to comply with the provisions of
§§ 2224 with respect to the merchandise sold. Patrons would not at-
tend an auction to bid on, say, only twenty-five standard items day
after day or week after week. As full a line of merchandise as possible
is needed. If prohibited from adding articles (that is, ‘‘fill ins’’), he
would have but.one sale a year and be out of business.

.Plaintiff Herman Sparber had been a licensed auctioneer for 30
years. He formerly conducted a jewelry store in St. Louis. His princi-
pal business is the auctioning of jewelry on a commission basis between
6-p.m. and 8 p.m, on Mondays and Thursdays. He testified that down-
town department and other stores were open at the same time, some re-
maining open until 8:30 p.m. His sales are made on the basis that
the customer, if dissatisfied, may return the article with his receipt and
receive back his purchase money. Jewelers going out of business fare
much better by auctioning their stock than by selling to jobbers or
dealers. It generally takes from 4 weeks to 4 months to liquidate a
stock of jewelry, and what is then left is ‘‘jobbed off’’ at about 20 cents
on the dollar. It is necessary to use ‘‘fill ins” to carry on an auction
of a jewelry store and have it amount to anything. The advertisements
state ‘fill ins’ ‘or additional stock will be used. He stated a profit
could be made on a standard article if sold for half price, and some
paid more and some paid less than that at auctions.

+ The testimony was that to comply with § 22 requiring the auctioneer
to make and file with the license collector an accurate inventory of
every article to be offered for sale and to tag each such article to show
its carat weight, purity, metal or plating, color and quality, number of
jewels et cetera would entail a prohibitive expense; as to be accurate

one would have to take [627] stones out of their settings, weigh and
appraise them, reset them and repolish the article, which would cost,
perhaps, $3 to get the stones out and $35 to reset them.

June and December, by reason of gifts, are the best months for the
sale of jewelry, and prohibiting the auction of jewelry in said months
would materially affect the business.

The city offered no witness.

The city contends that §§ 19 through 24, supra, were enacted
to prevent fraud and deception and to protect the financial welfare
of its citizens, are reasonable and valid regulations under the police
power of the city and, hence, the trial court erred in holding said see-

+ tions invalid and unconstitutional. The city stresses Holsman v.
Thomas (1925), 112 Oh. St. 397, 147 N. B, 750, 39 A. L. R. 760;
Biddles, Inc. v. Enright (1925), 239 N, Y. 854, 146 N. E. 625, 39
A. L. R. 766; Mogul v. Gaither (1923), 142 Md. 380, 121 A. 32; Levy
y. Stone (1929), 97 Fla, 458, 121 So. 565. These and other cases cited
by the city are distinguishable in that §§ 1—18, supra, also regulate
auctions in defendant city. For annotations on the subject matter and
that the rulings are not all one way, see 111 A. L. R. 473, 39 A. L. R.
773, 31 A. L. R. 299.

Biddles v. Enright, supra, a leading case involving an auction of
jewelry, upheld statutory provisions (known as the Sunset law) requir:
ing the auction of goods generally, subject to specifically named ex-
emptions, in the city of New York to be in the daytime. The court
reasoned that bidders might be deceived where they examined precious
stones et cetera under artificial light with no opportunity for’ exami-
nation by daylight without any actual intent on the part of the auc-
tioneer to defraud, and that thugs might gather at night where jewelry
was on display and rob bidders carrying away such purchases. (39
A. L. R. Le. 770.) The Biddles case points out that the original reason-
ing for such enactments was stated in the preamble of an act of the
colonial assembly of New York in 1778, reading : ‘‘ ‘Whereas a Practice
of Selling Goods by Auction at Night, when their Qualities cannot be
accurately distinguished, has obtained in the City of New York, where-
by the unwary have been frequently imposed upon, and great Frauds
committed, for prevention whereof, Be It Enacted’ ’’ et cetera. From
People ex rel. Moskowitz v. Jenkins (1911), 202 N. Y. 53, 94 N. EB.
1065, 35 L. R. A. (NS) 1079, 1088, it appears that in New York during
and ever since colonial times it was not lawful for citizens generally
to pursue the oceupation of auctioneer, it being a business of privilege
and not of right and subject to special license and authority; citing
People ex rel. Schwab v. Grant (1891), 126 N. Y. 478, 27 N. B. 964,
965, cited in the Biddlles case and holding the mayor of New York’s
refusal to license an auctioneer was not subject to supervision or con-
trol.

In Holsman v. Thomas, supra, ordinance provisions of Cleveland
somewhat similar to restrictions 1, 2 and 4 (§§ 20, 21, 23) above were
held constitutional, being within the police power of the city. The
court cites and quotes (39 A. L. R. lc. 765) Biddles v. Enright, supra,
and Mogul v. Gaither (mentioned in a subsequent paragraph), supra,
where a provision similar to restriction 1 (§ 20) above was held not an
arbitrary classification between those engaged in the jewelry business
for one year and others so engaged for a lesser time. The Holsman
case quoted a portion of Mogul v. Gaither (not determining whether
the descriptions stated were accurate), to the effect: ‘‘‘‘‘That but
two classes of persons sell such merchandise at public auction, viz.:
(a) Reputable merchants, because either retiring from business, or of
a wish to reduce inventory, or of the need or wish to raise money more
quickly than by sale in the ordinary course of business. (b) By mer-
chants, not reputable, who would make sales at public auction from a
desire to deceive and defraud the public, who often are itinerant
merchants with but little, if any, financial responsibility, who go from
place to place to make such sales and remain in each place but a short
time, leaving it in time to avoid being held civilly or criminally [628]
responsible for the fraud of such sales.’’’ ”’

In Levy v. Stone, supra, ordinance provisions prohibiting the sale
of jewelry between 6 p.m. and 8 a.m. (restriction 5—§ 21) were held
within the municipal police power to protect the public against decep-
tion, fraudulent imposition, and unscrupulous practices. The court,
stating that there was some diversity of opinion, stressed the Holsman
and Biddles cases, supra.

Other cases are to like effect. Provisions forbidding the auction of
jewelry at night have been sustained in Doering v. Swoboda (1934),
214 Wisc. 481, 253 N. W. 657/5, 6]; Matheny v. Simmons (1932), 165
Miss. 429, 139 So. 172[1]; Davidson v. Phelps (1926), 214 Ala.
236, 107 So. 86[3]; Re West (1925), 75 Cal. App. 591, 243 P.
55[7]; Clein v. Atlanta (1927), 164 Ga. 529, 189 S. B. 46, 53 A. L. R.
933, 939; Wagner v. Trenton (1926), 102 N. J. L. 492, 184 A. 1152];
City of Roanoke v. Fisher (1923), 187 Va. 75, 119 S. E. 259, 262[4].
Provisions forbidding auction sales of jewelry continuing for more
than 30 days within one year were sustained in Gordon v. Indianapolis
(1982), 204 Ind. 79, 183 N. W. 124, and Holsman v. Thomas, supra.
Power to regulate auction sales was held to include the power to
prohibit the auction of jewelry in State ex rel. Cook v. Bates (1907),
101 Minn. 801, 112 N. W. 67, but compare Orr v. Rochester (1935),
393 Minn. 871, 258 N. W. 569.

Plaintiffs first contend that §§ 19- 24 contravene Art. III, §
40(30), of the Constitution of Missouri prohibiting any special law
“where a general law can be made applicable, and whether a general
law could have been made applicable is a judicial question to be

Se

judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on
that subject.’’

City of Springfield v. Smith, 322 Mo. 1129, 19 S. W. 2d 1, 3[2, 4, 5],
states: ‘‘It is well established in this state that a law is not a special
law if it apply to all alike of a given class, provided the classification
thus made is not arbitrary or without reasonable basis.’’ After point-
ing out that making the issue.a judicial question in Missouri was
unique in that only three other states had like constitutional provi-
sions, the court further said: ‘‘ * This is important, because little aid
can be given in the present controversy by decisions of some of the
other jurisdictions tending to hold that, the question of classification
is solely a legislative one.’

In State ex inf. v. Hedrick, 294 Mo. 21, 241 8. W. 402, 420, we said:
“The basis of sound legislative classification is similarity of situation
or condition with respect to the feature which renders the law appro-
priate and applicable. A law may, not include less than all who are
similarly situated. If it does, it is special, and therefore invalid, be-
cause it omits a part of those which in the nature of things the reason
of the law includes.’’ And (lc. 407) we quoted the following from
Budd v. Hancock, 66 N. J. L. 135, 48 A. 1024: ‘‘ ‘The test of a special
law is the appropriateness of its provisions to the objects that it ex-
cludes. It is not, therefore, what a law includes, that makes it special,
but what it excludes.’ ’””

In holding an ordinance prohibiting automobile dealers from keep-
ing their places of business open, on Sundays and six national holidays
a special law, court en banc in McKaig v. Kansas City, 363 Mo. 1033,
256 8. W. 2d 815, 817[5, 6], and 818[8], quoted and applied the fore-
going from State ex inf. v. Hedrick, supra, together with the following
from Reals v. Courson, 349 Mo. 1198, 164 8. W. 2d 306, 308[4]: ‘If in
fact the act is by its terms or ‘in its practical. operation, it can only
apply to particular persons or things of a class, then it will be a special
or local law, however carefully its character may be concealed by form
of words.’ ’? See also Laclede P. & I. Co. v. St. Louis, 853 Mo. 67, 182
8. W. 2d 70, 72.

Licenses and regulations that tend to discourage or even pro-
hibit may be imposed on businesses and occupations that are inherently
harmful andi dangerous to society or the public welfare; but businesses
and oceupations that are lawful and useful [629] may not thus be
oppressed or prohibited by harsh: enactments. McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 8d Ed., §§ 24.46, 24.320, 24.823—325 ; 37 Am. Jur. 956,
§§ 305, 308; 16 C. J. S. 1416, §§ 668, 669 ; 53 C. J. S. 509, §§ 16,17; 62
C. J. S. 823, § 161. Unprincipled persons engage in many useful
businesses and occupations. The justification for suppressing or pro-
hibiting a business or occupation should be found in its inherent
nature. See People ex rel. Moskowitz v. Jenkins, 202 N. Y. 58, 58, 94
N. E. 1065, 1067, 35 L. R. A. (NS) 1079, 1088; Adams v. Tanner, 244

U. S. 590, 594; 87 S. Ct. 662, 61 L. Hd. 1336, L. R, A. 1917F, 1163,
Ann. Cas, 1917D, 973; Korber v. Portland, 185 Or. 288, 295 P. 203,
204; Kusnetzky v. Security Ins. Co., 313 Mo. 143, 157 (III), 281-8. W.
47, 51 [5].

| The Biddles, Holsman, Mogul, Levy and other cases, supra,
cited by the city proceed on the theory that auction sales are proper
subjects to be suppressed or prohibited. Other and later cases do not
place sales by auction in the category of businesses or occupations to
be suppressed or prohibited, as, for instance, slaughterhouses, fireworks
manufacturers, scavengers, saloonkeepers. The business of selling
goods by auction has been said to be as old as the law of sale and to be a
lawful and useful business. 7 C. J. S. 1289, §§ 1,2; 5 Am. Jur. 446, §§
2, 3. It, as are other occupations, is subject to reasonable regulations.
5 Am. Jur, 447, §§ 2-4; 6; 7 C. J. 8. 1241, § 2; McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 3a ha, ’s 24,368; Antieau, Municipal: Corporations, §
6.05(2).

Hl Missouri statutes (Ch. 348, RSMo 1949) licensing and regulat-
ing auctioneers contemplate auction sales by licensed auctioneers for
others and also at duction stores or rooms (Id., § 348.110).

| | The sale of jewelry by auction is not a pernicious business sub-
ject to being prohibited by legislation. Korber v. Portland (1931),
135 OF. 238, 241, 295 P. 203, 206; Orr v. Rochester (1935), 193 Minn,
371, 258 N. W. 569 [2]: See Miller v. Greenville (1926), 134 8. O. 314,
182 8, E. 591, 46 A. L. R. 155, 156, 157 (involving a jewelry auction).

Cases involving regulations of the sale of general merchandise at
auction, not specifically regulating auctions of jewelry, have held un-

_ constitutional and invalid restrictions, among others, to the following
effect: Prohibiting sales by auction. Balesh v. Hot Springs (1927),
173 Ark. 665, 293 S. W. 14; Miller v. Greenville (1926), 184 S. C. 314,
182 8. B, 591, 46 A.-L. R. 155, 157. Prohibiting sales for more than a
stated number of consecutive days in any calendar year. Miller v.
Greenville, supra; Commonwealth v. Loch (1982), 245 Ky. 848, 54
S. W. 2d 373, 374[8, 4]. Prohibiting auctions between the hours of
6 p.m. and 8 am. Miller v. Greenville, supra; Webber v. Scottsbluff
(1942), 141 Neb. 363, 3 N. W. 2d 635, 638[6-8]; People v. Gibbs
(1915), 186 Mich. 127, 152 N. W. 1053[5], Ann. Cas. 1917B, 830, 884;
Perry Trading Co. v. Tallahassee (1987), 128 Fla. 424, 174 So. 854, 11
A. L. R. 468, 466, 470. Prohibiting additions to a regular stock of
merchandise. Webber v. Scottsbluff, supra; Perry Trading Co. v.
Tallahassee, supra; Jones v. Jackson’ (1983), 195 Tenn. 329, 259 8. 'W.
2d 649, 651. Prohibiting the owner naming an upset price. Perry
Trading Co. v., Tallahassee, supra. Requiring the merchant to have
been in business in the city for one year. Commonwealth v. Loeb, supra.
Requiring the filing of an inventory with an official prior to the auction
showing ini detail the quality, quantity et cetera of the merchandise to
be auctioned.’ Webber v. Scottsbluff, supra. See also Jones v, Ji ackson;

supra. Requiring a statement attached to each article to be auctioned
showing the materials and its quality. Perry Trading Co. v. Tallahas-
see, supra. See also Jones v. Jackson, supra. Requiring the posting of
a bond. Perry Trading Co. v. Tallahassee, supra. Among the reasons
adtvanced for holding the restrictions invalid were: They did not have
any relation to the public health, safety or welfare (Webber v. Scotts-
bluff; Commonwealth v. Loeb), and, if considered as police regulations,
were oppressive and prohibitory [630] rather than regulatory, being
arbitrary and unreasonable and imposing unnecessary restrictions on
auction sales (Webber v. Scottsbluff ; Perry Trading Co. v. Tallahassee ;
Miller v. Greenville; People v. Gibbs).

Hl It is pointed out in Mogul v. Gaither, and quoted with approval
in Holsman v. Thomas, supra, 39 A. L. R. lc. 765, with respect to
ordinance provisions similar to § 20 here involved that ‘‘the obvious
purpose’’ is to permit merchants who have an established business of
one year’s standing as a jeweler to dispose of his stock of jewelry by
auction upon certain conditions while prohibiting auction sales of
jewelry by those who conduct auctions as a business. This holding
prohibits citizens generally from conducting the lawful business of
selling jewelry at auction.

The public is protected under § § 1 through 18, supra, against
the objections found in the city’s authorities and which the city adopts
in its presentation. Disreputable persons and itinerants are not eligi-
ble to be licensed to sell merchandise at auction or to act as auctioneers
in the city. Not only must the licensee be a resident of the state but he
must have been continuously engaged for a year in business in the city
as a licensed auctioneer or auction crier or as a merchant (§ 4). He
is required to give a $3,000 bond for the protection of bidders against
misrepresentations and other violations of § § 1—18 (§ 5); and each
purchaser of an article costing $2.50 or more receives an invoice con-
taining a full description of the article, its selling price and every
warranty under which the article was auctioned (§ 16). These and
other restrictions in said § § 1—18 on auctioneers and auction sales in
the city, some of which are not mentioned herein, distinguish this case
from the city’s authorities. The instant record is to the effect that the
citizens are not defrauded or imposed upon by auction sales of jewelry
in the city but make purchases of jewelry to their advantage at less
than retail prices, and that stores selling jewelry in the city are open
after 6 p.m. on Mondays and Thursdays. Regulation contemplates tht
continued existence of the thing regulated.

A retail auction sale of jewelry is made nnlawful under § §
19—24 ‘‘unless the person * whose stock is being offered * shall have
been in the retail jewelry * business at the location * at which said
auction sale is to be cried for at least one year *, and shall not have
conducted an auction sale at any time within said one year period at
said location or on said premises.’’ § 20. Said § 20 divides auction sales

of jewelry into auctions by retail jewelers who have been in business
for one year and auctions by those who conduct auction sales as a
business, permitting the former under certain conditions, while pro-
hibiting the latter, to conduct an auction sale of jewelry. See Holsman
v. Thomas, supra. It next divides said jewelers into those who have
been in business for one year at the location at which the auction sale
is to be cried and jewelers who have not been in business at their loca-
tion for one year. Again, the last above preferred class of jewelers are
divided into those who have not conducted an auction sale at any time
within one year at their location and those who have conducted an auc-
tion sale within one year at their location. Section 20 prohibits such
auctions by the last-mentioned class in each instance. We do not per-
ceive how the classifications mentioned affect the public health, welfare
or safety of the citizens of the community ; and whether they do there
are no distinctive cireumstances which reasonably justify limiting the
right to conduet retail-auction sales of jewelry to those so authorized
by § 20 while excluding others of the same class from so doing. Failing
to include all who are similarly situated, the law is a special law.
Springfield yv. Smith, supra; Ex parte Lerner, 281 Mo. 18, 218
8. W. 331, 333[6]; State v. Baskowitz, 250 Mo. 82, 100, 156 8. W. 945,
953[8], Ann, Cas. 1915A, 447; Laclede P. & L. Co. v. St. Louis, 353
Mo. 67, 182 §. W. 2d 70, 73[6]. We think the Missouri cases stressed
by the city are distinguishable on the facts involved. Some involved
matters subject to being prohibited by legislation. [681] City of
Springfield v. Stevens, 358 Mo. 699, 216 S. W. 2d 450; Ex parte Lock-
hart, 850 Mo. 1220, 171 8. W. 2a 660; State v. Kemnedy, 343 Mo. 786,
123 §. ‘W. 24.118; ‘Waters v. St. Louis, ‘Mo, 259 8. W. 2d 377.
The judgment is affirmed. Barrett and Stockard, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bontine, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

.

In the Matter of Brenpa Lou Waxerimip, Frank Waxerietp, Peti-
~tioner, v. Charencs THorp and Acnes THORP, Respondents, No.
* 44872283 S. W. (2d) 467.

Court en Banc, November 14, 1955.

a ; || Il

Fred A. Gossom for petitioner.

Frank H. McColloch for respondents.

[469] EAGER, J.—This is a proceeding in habeas corpus instituted
in the St. Louis Court of Appeals by a father to obtain possession of
his minor daughter. The minor was then in the possession of respond-
ents. The Court of Appeals issued the writ and, after hearing the
matter on the pleadings, briefs and arguments, ordered that the cus-
tody and possession of the child be awarded to petitioner. On applica-
tion of respondents this court ordered the cause transferred here
pursuant to § 10, Art. V of the Missouri Constitution, 1945. The case
is, therefore, here as though it were an original proceeding instituted
in this court. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, filed on January
11, 1955, is reported at 274 S.W. 2d 345. This opinion will be ex-
pedited by setting out at this point the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
It is as follows:

“Per Curiam. This is a proceeding in habeas corpus which was
instituted in this court by one Frank Wakefield, the natural father,
to obtain the possession of his minor child, Brenda Lou Wakefield, who
is now in the possession of respondents, Clarence Thorp and Agnes
Thorp, his wife. The latter, incidentally, is petitioner’s half-sister.

“Petitioner resides in St. Louis County, and respondents in St.
Charles County.

“Tt appears from the facts which counsel have brought to our
attention that petitioner and the child’s mother, Mary Lou Wakefield,
were married on October 1, 1949, when. he was nineteen and she but
fifteen years of age. Brenda Lou was born on December 31, 1950,
which means that she is now barely four years of age.

“On October 15, 1951, Mary Lou brought an action in the Circuit
Court of St. Louis County for a divorce from petitioner, who there-
upon filed a cross bill in which he asked for a decree of divorce in his
favor. We are told that Mary Lou did not seek custody of the child,
but that petitioner did; and at any rate the court, on February 8, 1952,
dismissed Mary Lou’s petition and sustained petitioner’s cross bill,
not only granting him a divorcee, but also awarding him the custody of
Brenda Lou, with the mother to have the right of visitation at all
reasonable times.

“Upon the entry of such decree, petitioner immediately placed
Brenda Lou in the care of respondents, where she has remained until
the present time. Petitioner insists that such transfer of Brenda Lou
to respondents was only intended to be temporary and until such time
as he was able to make ‘suitable arrangements for her care. He has
since remarried, and! asserts that he has established a home in St. Louis
County where she could have adequate care and parental affection.

‘<The basis of petitioner’s claim in this habeas corpus proceeding is
that Brenda Lou is being unlawfully withheld and detained by
respondents, and that he is entitled to her possession by virtue of the
decree in the divorce action awarding her custody to him.

“In thei amended return respondents contend that even though
the divorce decree does not so show, the fact nevertheless is that peti-
tioner was only awarded custody upon the condition, and with the
understanding, that he would place Brenda Lou in their care and con-
trol. In other words, they predicate their right to the possession of
the child upon an alleged verbal order of the judge in the divorce
action, which was admittedly not incorporated in the decree, but by
which it is alleged that both petitioner and the mother agreed to abide.

“For further return respondents set up that petitioner is not a fit
and suitable person. to have the child, and that her best interest and
welfare will be served by permitting [470] her to remain in their
possession, at least until the determination of a motion to modify which
is now pending in a divoree action in the Cireuit Court of St. Louis
County. Such motion was filed by the mother, who has also remarried
and is now Mary Lou Perkins, and prays that the decree be modified
so as to vest custody, not in herself, but in respondents, who have
undertaken to join with her as proponents of the motion.

“So far as the pleadings are concerned, petitioner filed a motion to
strike out certain matters contained in the original return, but aban-
doned such motion when respondents filed an amended return. ‘The
case was thereafter submitted by petitioner wpon an amended motion
for judgment on the pleadings, and by respondents upon a motion to
quash the writ and remand Brenda Lou to them.

“f1] The latter motion is predicated upon the assumption that
inasmuch as petitioner filed no verified answer to or denial of their
amended return, there is no question before us challenging the legality
of Brenda Lou’s detention.

“Such result would of course follow if the material facts set up in
the return disclosed a lawful restraint, and there was no answer or
denial under oath. Section 532.820 RSMo 1949, V-A.MS.; Gugenhine
v. Gerk, 326 Mo. 338, 31 S.W. 2d 1; x Parte Davis, 333 Mo. 262, 62
8.W. 2d 1086, 89 A.L.R. 589; State ex rel. White v. Swink, Mo. App.,
256 S.W. 2d 825. In this case, however, petitioner does not dispute the
facts set up in the return in so far as they relate to the authority by
which respondents purport to hold his child, and consequently there
‘was no occasion or place for an answer or denial in any form. On the
contrary, he admits the truth of the material facts alleged, and only
desires to raise the question of whether such facts serve to justify the
child’s restraint as a matter of law. Ex parte Thornberry, 300 Mo. 661,
254 S.W. 1087; In re Breck, 252 Mo. 302, 158 S.W. 848. In this situa-
tion the issue presented is purely one of law for the raising of which

a a

a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the proper and appropriate
remedy.

“T2,3] Turning to the facts stated in the amended return, respond-
ents show no right to withhold possession of the child by setting up as
their pretended authority an alleged verbal order or direction of the
judge in the divorce action conditioning his award of custody upon
the promise that petitioner would place the child in their care and con-
trol. It is axiomatic that a court of record can only speak by and
through its records. Odom v. Langston, 358 Mo. 241, 218 8.W. 2d 948;
State ex rel. Robertson v. Sevier, 845 Mo. 274, 182 S.W. 2d 961; State
ex rel. Gentry v. Westhues, 315 Mo. 672, 286 S.W. 396; Cunio v.
Franklin County, 815 Mo. 405, 285 S.W. 1007. The decree in the
divorce action coneededly contained no such condition or qualification
upon petitioner’s right of custody; and any order or direction of the
judge with respect to the subject matter of the decree, but not in-
corporated in it, has no legal force or effect, as counsel for respondents
impliedly concedes.

- 14,5] Neither may we in this proceeding review the propriety of
the divorce court’s award of custody, nor may we change or alter such
award. Not only did the divorce court have jurisdiction to award
custody as it did, but its jurisdiction in such limited respect also
continues during Brenda Lou’s minority, provided the divorce action
does not meanwhile abate. Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo. 588, 252 S.W. 2d
323; Schumm v. Schumm, Mo. App., 223 8.W. 2d 122. Any modiifica-
tion of the decree can only be made on proper application in the cir-
cuit court where the divorce action is pending, and is beyond the scope
of our power on habeas corpus. In re Morgan, 117 Mo. 249, 21 S.W.
1122, 22 8.W. 918; Bell v. Catholic Charities, Mo. App., 170 8.W. 2d
697; Tripp v. Brawley, Mo. App., 261 S.W. 2d 508; In re Kohl, 82 Mo.
App. 442. : .

*'6] The only question remaining is whether respondents may
justify their detention of the child upon the charge made in their
return that a petitioner is not a fit [471] and suitable person to be en-
trusted with her custodly.

“Respondents call attention to the repeated declarations of the
courts that in custody proceedings the welfare of the child is always
the primary consideration, with the consequence that the matter of a
parent’s fitness to have custody is inherently a proper subject of in-
quiry whether raised by the pleadings or not. Suffice it to say that
such question does not arise in this proceeding as one of first impres-
sion, but has already been decided by the divorce court which, in
awarding custody to petitioner, necessarily held that he was a fit and
proper person to exercise the right which was being conferred upon
him. Tripp v. Brawley, supra. The divorce court’s decision upon that
feature of the case is therefore conclusive so far as the enforcement of

its decree is concerned, and if it was to be questioned by any aggrieved
party, the only remedy would have been by appeal.

“Inasmuch as respondents have shown no legal right to Brenda
Lou’s possession, it follows on the admitted facts that she should be
taken out of their possession and delivered over to petitioner in accord-
ance with the prayer of his petition.

“Tt is so ordered.”’

Respondents contend here: that the court in this proceeding should
hear evidence and determine wpon equitable principles the right to
custody, being guided therein solely by what seems best for the welfare
of the child; that the petitioner is in fact an unfit person to have
custody; that there has been a change of circumstances since the di-
vorce decree and that there was a concealment of material facts from
the circuit court at the time of the divorce decree; that in fact that
court orally ordered custody to be placed with the respondents; that
there exists a conflict between the present opinion of the Court of
Appeals and the opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals in Fergu-
son v. Garrison, 262 S.W. 2d 163; and, lastly, that respondents do not
otherwise have adequate protection of their interests because they were
not and are not formal parties to the divorce proceedings.

At the expense of some repetition we note here that the following
principles are firmly established in the jurisprudence of Missouri:

An order awarding the custody of a minor child, and contained
in an unappealed decree of divorce, is a final order entitled to the force
and effect of a final judgment, unless and until modified by the court
making the decree. State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith (Banc), 857 Mo.
184, 206 S.W. 2d 558; Bell v. Catholic Charities of St. Louis, Mo. App.,
170 S.W. 2d 697 ; Tripp v. Brawley, Mo. App., 261 S.W. 2d 508 ; Mahan.
y. Mahan, 239 Mo. App. 317, 192 8.W. 2d 626; Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo.
583, 252 S.W. 2d 328, 328, To that extent such a decree is res adjudi-
cata. Shepard v. Shepard, Mo. App., 194 8. W. 2d 319; Foster v. Foster,
Mo. App., 146 SW. 2d 849; Crooks v. Crooks, Mo. App., 197 S.W. 2d.
678. The effect of such order may, of course, cease upon the death of
one of the parties to the divorce action, for such action thereupon
abates. Schumacher v. Schumacher, Mo. App., 223 8.W. 2d 841; State
ex rel. Walker v. Crouse, 240 Mo. App. 389, 205 S.W. 2d 749.

Hi A court speaks only through its records which import absolute
verity, and extraneous evidence will not be permitted to impeach the
records. State ex rel. Spratley v. Maries County, 339 Mo. 577, 98 S.W.
2d 623; Flansburg v. Kaiser (Banc), Mo., 184 8.W. 2d 1004; State ex
rel. Gentry v. Westhues, 315 Mo. 672, 286 S.W. 396. In fact this
doctrine was established in the very early case of Medlin v. Platte
County, 8 Mo. 235. In the light of these authorities we may not, in any
event, consider the alleged oral directions of the divorce court by which
respondents seek to supplement or impeach the written record award-
ing custody.

| | The writ of habeas corpus is properly used, in certain in-
stances, to procure custody and possession of a minor child; § 532.370,
RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; Ex parte De Castro, 238 Mo. App. 1011, 190
S.W. 2 949; State ex rel. White [472] v. Swink, Mo. App., 256 S.W.
24.825; Tomlinson v. French Institute of Notre Dame De Sion, 232
Mo. App. 597, 109 S.W. 2d 73; In re Richardet, Mo. App., 280 S.W. 24
466; Cox v. Carapella, Mo. App., 246 S.W. 2d 518; Schumacher v.
Schumacher, Mo. App., 228 S.W. 2d 841, 1. ¢. 845; State ex rel.
Walker v. Crouse, 240 Mo. App. 389, 205 8.W. 2d 749. Such, generally,
are situations where the parent to whom custody was awarded is en-
forcing such an award, where there has been no formal award of
custody, where the parent to whom custody has been awarded has died
and the divoree proceeding has thus abated (Schumacher and Crouse
cases, supra,) or where for some reason the award of custody is illegal
on.the face of the record and the legality of the order is questioned by
habeas corpus. There may be other situations, and we do not mean for
this statement to be exclusive. But the writ may not be employed to
interfere with the inherent right and jurisdiction of our circuit courts
to determine and! award custody of minor children in divorce cases of
which they have proper jurisdiction and in which they have exercised
that jurisdiction by making a custody award of record. Bell v. Catho-
lie Charities of St. Louis, Mo. App., 170 S.W. 2d 697 (citing various
authorities) ; State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith (Banc), 357 Mo. 184, 206
S.W. 2d 558; Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo. 583, 252 S.W. 2d 323, 327;
Tripp v. Brawley, Mo. App., 261 S.W. 2d 508. The same situation
exists where a decree of adoption has been entered andi an appeal,
therefrom is pending. Thelen v. Ekberg, 237 Mo. App. 258, 167 S.W.
2d 645. And such is true even though the court to which a petition of
habeas corpus is addressed would have had the right and power to
adjudicate the matter had it been presented to it in the first instance.
State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith (Banc), 357 Mo. 184, 206 S.W. 2d 558.
Respondents have cited as supposedly contra, 25 Am. Jur., Habeas
Corpus, p. 207 ; that text cites in support of the contrary statement one
Georgia case, but on the same page is found a statement indicating that
various authorities support the rule announced above. Be that as it
may, we think the Missouri law is well established.

Hl 1t is universally held that a parent has the paramount right to
the custody of his or her minor child as against third persons, unless
it is established! that he or she is an unfit person or is unable to care
properly for the child. Bell v. Catholic Charities of St. Louis, Mo.
App., 170 8. W. 2d 697; McDevitt v. Morrison, Mo. App., 180 S.W:
2d 608. And, when the court by a divorce decree has awarded custody
to.a parent, it must be presumed in subsequent proceedings in another
court that such parent was then a. fit person to have custody. Bell v.
Catholic Charities of St. Louis, Mo. App., 170 S.W. 2d 697, 699.

HI We believe that the St. Louis Court of Appeals has followed
these guiding principles here, andi we adopt its opinion, supplementing
it, however, with our own views. That opinion covers fully the pro-
priety of determining the issues on the pleadings as a matter of law,
and we need not discuss that feature further, although respondents
have insisted that a verified answer to their amended return was
necessary. 7

Hl Respondents urged in their application for transfer a conflict
with the cases of Ex Parte Kaufman, Mo. App., 262 S.W. 2d 56, and
Ferguson v. Garrison, Mo. App., 262 8.W. 2d 163, for the reason that
in each of those cases the respective Court of Appeals heard evidence
and awarded custody in accordance with its views as to, the best
interest of the minor child. The supposed conflict with the Ferguson
case has been briefed in this court. We may simply and briefly dispose
of this question. In the Kaufman case, supra, there had been no prior
adjudication of custody (as stated in the first paragraph of the
opinion) and the Court of Appeals was thus free to adjudicate the
question on the petition for habeas corpus. The case of Ferguson v.
Garrison, supra, presents a different question. There the mother
sought by habeas corpus to obtain possession and custody of her minor
daughter from the child’s uncle; it appeared that the mother had been
granted custody in a divorce decree in Jackson County several years
previously. Respondents, [473] by their return, alleged petitioner’s
unfitness to have custody of the child and also her previous and present
inability to care properly for the child. On these issues the court heard
evidence and determined that the welfare of the child required that she
remain with the respondent uncle, and it was so ordered. (The parties
in the present case raised incidentally in the St. Louis Court of
Appeals the question as to whether the prior custody award was
properly put in issue in the Ferguson case, but we are guided here by
the opinion itself.) Inasmuch as that opinion (Ferguson v. Garrison,
Mo. App., 262 S.W. 2d 163) adjudicates and awards possession and
custody of the minor in the face of, and in opposition to, an apparently
unmodified custody award, it is opposed to the various decisions hereto-
fore cited, and it is now overruled. In so ruling we express no opinion
on the merits of the controversy there. It is also interesting to note
that the Ferguson decision appears to be directly in conflict with the
decision in the case of Tripp v. Brawley, Mo. App., 261 $.W. 2d 508,
handed down by the same court a few weeks previously.

‘We do not in any sense disregard the principle, so ardently
advanced by respondents, that the welfare of the child is the para-
mount consideration in adjudications of the right to custody. We rec-
ognize that principle and endorse it fully. We do say, however, that
this question, as all others, must be considered in the orderly process
of judicial procedure; when the right to custody has once been finally

determined and the award thereof becomes a final judgment, no other
court may interfere, at least under the circumstances present here.

HE We do not think that the question of the right of respondents
to intervene or file a motion to modify in the original divorce proceed-
ings is before us, though it has been argued in the briefs and orally.
We leave that question to the court before which it may arise. Nor does
the fact that respondents may not (if true) have any right to inter-
vene or prosecute such motion give them any greater rights in the
present proceeding. Their past custody of the child does not neces-
sarily result in any enforceable future rights, for there is no doctrine
of right by adverse possession in the custody of children, We express
no opinion on the merits of theix contentions or claims.

The original record of the Court of Appeals shows that there
was filed in the cireuit court a motion to modify the original custody
order ; this was filed by the mother of the child in question on May 17,
1954, and it has apparently not been disposed of. The present respond-
ents sought to join in the prayer of that motion. We note (in connec-
tion with respondents’ claim of a fraudulent concealment by petitioner
at the time of the original divorce decree) that upon the hearing of such
a motion the court may consider not only changed facts and cireum-
stances, but also material facts existing at the time of the decree but
unknown to or concealed from the court. Armstrong v. Armstrong,
Mo. App., 185 8. W. 2d 845, and authorities there cited., This court may
not, sua sponte, issue any directions to the circuit court, for this is
not an appeal. We note further that under certain circumstances re-
course may be had, by interested parties, to the provisions of Chapter
211, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., containing our juvenile laws, And see:
Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo. 583, 252 8.W. 2d 323, 327; State ex rel.
White v. Swink, Mo. App., 256 S.W. 2d 825. However, the situations
in which those statutes are applicable are necssarily restricted.

The minor, Brenda Lou Wakefield, is remanded to the custody
of the petitioner, Frank Wakefield, but without prejudice to the right
of any proper party to proceed in the Circuit Court of St. Louis
County by any proper steps in the matter of the custody of said minor.

It is so ordered. All concur.

ri

: a

Franx J. Bogan, Administrator of the Estate of Emma Boeap, De-
ceased, and Frank J. Bogap, Administrator d.b.n. of the Estate
of Mizz Bogan, Deceased, Appellants, v. Harry A. Wacutrr and
R. L. BurrerworrH, Respondents, No. 44659—283 8. W. (2d)
609.

Division Two, September 12, 1955.
Rehearing Overruled in Per Curiam Opinion Filed, November 14, 1955.

Herbert F. Hahn and Horace f. Robinson for appellants.

Robert M. Zeppenfeld and Breuer & Northern for respondents.

[610] BOHLING, C.—This is an appeal of a suit in equity insti-
tuted by Mike Bogad and Emma Bogad, husband and wife, of St. Louis
County, Mo., against Harry A. Wachter and Mrs. R. L. Butterworth,
of St. Louis, Mo., for the specific performance of a contract to sell to
plaintiffs certain real estate, for the restoration of the possession of
the property in plaintiffs, for an accounting of the rents and profits
after plaintiffs had been dispossessed, and for general equitable relief.
We refer to the parties as plaintiffs and defendants. Defendant Wach-
ter considered plaintiffs had breached their contract with respect to
payments of the monthly installments and put one Fred Rauhaut in
possession. Plaintiffs in an amended petition made Fred Rauhaut an
additional party defendant on the theory the original defendants had
contracted to sell the property to him. However, all controversies
raised: by the pleadings between Rauhaut and plaintiffs and Rauhaut
and the original defendants were disposed of by stipulation and dis-
missal during the progress of the trial. Thereafter, the chancellor
found the original defendants had not waived the contract’ provisions
for the payment of the monthly installments and dismissed: plaintiffs’
petition. Plaintiffs appealed.

Mike Bogad and Emma Bogad departed this life and Frank J.
Bogad, administrator of the estate of Emma Bogad, deceased, and
Frank J. Bogad, administrator d. b. n. of the estate of Mike Bogad,
deceased, have been substituted as parties appellants.

Mr. Bogad came to America in 1922, Mr. and Mrs. Bogad were
married in St. Louis in 1923. Each was a native of Austria-Hungary,
and received a sixth grade education. He was a plasterer by trade,
later a plasterer contractor, and for 15 years did plaster work for Mr.
Wachter.

Mx. Wachter was a real estate agent, was secretary of the Surety
Home Savings and Loan Association, and also constructed houses. He
and the Association had offices at 2011 South Broadway, St. Louis,
Mo. He owned the property involved known as the Tulane Trailer
Court near the Fort Leonard Wood Military reservation, Pulaski
county, Mo. He placed the title in Mrs. R. L. Butterworth, his
daughter, on account of his age, being approximately seventy.

Bogad testified that Wachter and he inspected the Trailer Court;
that Wachter informed him the water facilities would have to be

lowered below the freezing line; that the wooden sewer would hold for
10 or 15 years, and that a septic tank was not needed. Wachter asked
$15,000 for the property. (Bogad and Fred Rauhaut had discussed
the purchase with the thought that if Bogad put in $3,500 and Rauhaut
$2,500 they could make the Trailer Court attractive and operate it as
a partnership. Rauhaut never paid his $2,500.) Bogad informed.
Wachter he would purchase if he could raise $3,500 by an additional
Joan on his home. Wachter arranged for the Surety Home Savings and
Loan Association to make the loan.

Mr. and Mrs. Bogad went to Wachter’s office and a written contract,
dated August 20, 1951, for the sale and purchase of the property—the
land and 8 trailers—was [611] executed by Wachter as agent, sign-
ing ‘‘R. L. Butterworth by H. A. Wachter,’’ as party of the first part,
and Mike Bogad and Emma Bogad, as parties of the second part. So
far as material, the vendees were to pay $15,000 (with 4% interest
on unpaid balances), payable in monthly installments of $400 each at
Wachter’s office in St. Louis, the first payment becoming due Septem-
ber 20, 1951. The vendees could pay the outstanding balance at any
time. The contract provided in part:

‘Time is expressly made the essence of this contract and if Parties
of the Second Part fail for 30 days after any monthly installment be-
comes due and payable to pay same, then this contract shall become
null and void and Party of the First Part shall retain all payments
made as liquidated damages and may sell said property to other
parties for their own benefit.”’

Mr. and Mrs. Bogad could read English. Bogad testified he had his
son. read the specifications in the plastering contracts ‘‘down for me
so I could understand what that would mean.’’ Wachter read the con-
tract to them. Mrs. Bogad testified she read the contract at Wachter’s
suggestion but she did not understand everything that was in it. The
Bogads understood the property was costing $15,000, payable $400
monthly, beginning September 20, 1951.

Several adjournments of the trial occurred. When all the issues
involving defendant Rauhaut were disposed of, as stated in the first
paragraph hereof, which occurred prior to plaintiffs taking up the
accounting feature involving rents and profits after plaintiffs had been
dispossessed, the court and counsel for the litigants agreed that the
first issue to be determined was that commonly known as ‘‘waiver,’”’
Le., whether defendants had waived the provisions making time of the
essence of the contract for default in the payment of the $400 monthly
installments; and if defendants had not waived said contract provi-
sions there was no occasion to hear evidence on the rents and profits
after plaintiffs were dispossessed. The trial so proceeded, restilting, as
stated, in plaintiffs’ petition being dismissed.

Bogad took possession of the property. He received the proceeds of
a $3,500 loan by increasing the loan on his home to $8,889, The water

pipes had to be installed before freezing weather, and he started mak-
ing improvements. In about two weeks the State Health Department
informed him the sewer facilities had to be improved or the Trailer
Court would be condemned. Bogad secured plans and started to im-
prove the sewer facilities. He also constructed a pump house and
improved ‘‘a 3-room shack.’’

Bogad rented trailers and also rented space to owners of trailers.
He testified he collected at least $500 a month in rents, and sometimes
the collections were between $600 and $700 a month. He had to pay
the operating expenses of the Trailer Court, such as expenses for
electricity, water, oil et cetera, and his payments to the Loan Associ-
ation.

With respect to the $400 monthly payments to begin September 20,
1951, the record is to the effect that Bogad made deposits as follows to
the credit of Wachter in the Waynesville Security Bank:

Payment due September 20, 1951—credited October 3, 1951.

Payment due October 20, 1951—credited November 1, 1951.

Payment due November 20, 1951—$300 credited December 5, 1951.

Payment due December 20, 1951—$300 credited January 7, 1952.

Payment due January 20, 1952—$300 credited February 1, 1952.

Payment due February 20, 1952—no eredit.

Mr. Bogad is plaintiffs’ only witness on the issue of waiver. It is
true as defendants state that Bogad’s testimony is confusing and con-
tradictory in places; but certain essential facts are not disputed. Some
of [612] the confusion may arise from his lack of a precise knowledge
of the English language. The court suggested that counsel state their
questions plainly and give him time to answer. Bogad testified that
Wachter made trips to the Trailer Court and on one or two occasions
Robert M. Zeppenfeld was with him. The substance of his testimony
is that until some time in February, 1952, when Wachter and Zeppen-
feld came to the Trailer Court, Wachter never complained to him about
the time of his making his payments or the amount of his payments;
that on one occasion he told Wachter many soldiers had been moved
and he had only $300 and Wachter said that was all right, he could
catch up with the payments in the Spring. Bogad did say that Wachter
saw him about the payment due September 20, 1951; and then that
it was not about the payment but about the work he, Bogad, was doing.
On one or two occasions Bogad’s answer gave the impression he made
the payments at Wachter’s office in St. Louis. The payments were
deposited to Wachter’s credit in the Waynesville bank. Bogad so testi-
fied later, and from other testimony he meant he took the deposit slip
to Wachter’s office for Wachter to credit the payment in Bogad’s
receipt book. Ee testified that when Wachter and Zeppenfeld came to
the Trailer Court in February, 1952, and complained about the pay-
ments and wanted to check his records, he told Wachter he would

bring his records, which were in St. Louis, to Wachter’s office the fol-
lowing Saturday.

Wachter throughout his testimony denied that he ever agreed to
forego the prompt payment of any of the $400 installments or agreed
to the payment of lesser amounts. He testified: When he did not re-
ceive the $400 due September 20, 1951, he, with Mr. Zeppenfeld, his
attorney, made a trip to the Trailer Court, told Bogad his $400 monthly
payments should be made when due, and made arrangements for Bogad
to deposit the payments in the Waynesville Security Bank instead of
Wachter’s office in St. Louis. He received a deposit slip through the
mail from the bank on October 5th, showing Bogad had deposited $400
on October 8rd to Wachter’s credit. When the $400 payment due
October 20th was not paid, Wachter again made a trip to the Trailer
Court and told Bogad he would have to make the payments promptly.
On November Ist he received a deposit slip covering the payment due
October 20th. The $400 payments due in November, December and
January were not made on the 20th of the month. Wachter made
trips to the Trailer Court and complained to Bogad about his failure
to pay on the 20th. When he received the $300 deposit slip on Decem-
ber 5, 1951, he went to the Trailer Court and protested to Bogad about
his failure to meet the terms of his contract. When he received the
deposit slip on January 7, 1952, he wrote Bogad on January 9, 1952,
stating that he had the $300 deposit slip ; that Bogad had promised he
would make up the arrears, and:‘‘I must insist that these payments be
caught up.’’ (Bogad testified he did not receive this letter.) Wachter
testified he made another trip to the Trailer Court and again insisted
that Bogad catch up on his payments. When he received the deposit
slip for $300 on February 4th, for the deposit on February Ist, he
wrote Bogad on February 6, 1952, stating:

“T have carefully checked the trailer camp account, and find you do
not have a penny invested. With what was spent down there since you
are there and the rent taken in and what you paid me, you have $1,-
500.00 to $2,000.00 over. You are $200.00 behind in my payments and
I must insist that this be taken care of right away. I cannot let you
collect the rent and put the money in your pocket and give me what
you want to. This is not going on forever. I must positively get $400.-
00. You are taking i in $800.00 rent. See that the $200.00 gets in the
bank immediately.’’

Bogad testified he received this letter. Wachter’ testified he went
to the Trailer Court after writing said letter and told Bogad that Rau-
haut said he had $1,000 coming and was going to file a lien; that they
ought to have a checkup, and Bogad promised to come in. Zeppenfeld
testified that on that occasion Wachter told Bogad [613] he was
through with him and was going to put Rauhaut in possession, and he
also corroborated Wachter’s testimony about making trips to the
Trailer Court in September, November, December and January.

Bogad brought his records to Wachter’s office on the Saturday after
Wachter and Zeppenfeld were at the Trailer Court in February, 1952,
Wachter checked Bogad’s records and considered them not correct. He
told Bogad he had broken his contract and to stay away from the
Trailer Court; that he was putting Rauhaut in charge. Bogad testified
that Wachter told him if he paid the $700 he could go back; that he
told Wachter he would go to the Trailer Court, collect the rents, and
pay him the $700, but Wachter said: ‘‘No, you don’t collect no more.’’
‘When Bogad returned to the Trailer Court two days later he found
Rauhaut had taken possession.

Neither Bogad nor Wachter definitely established the date when
Wachter and Zeppenfeld came to the Trailer Court in February, 1952.
Bogad testified it was two days after he received the letter of Febru-
ary 6th; that he could not say for sure what date it was. Wachter tes-
tified that he did not know what day this occurred ; that it wasn’t long
after the letter of February 6th, it was before or the middle of Febru-
ary; that Rauhaut went into possession the middle, or ‘‘somewhere
around there’’ of February; that Bogad ‘‘was out’’ ‘‘the middle or
latter part of February’’; that he could not say whether Rauhaut took
possession before February 20th. Witness Zeppenfeld testified the trip
to the Trailer Court with Wachter was on a holiday, George Washing-
ton’s birthday, Friday, February 22, 1952.

Wachter testified that plaintiffs sought the $3,500 loan to improve
the Trailer Court; that he told Bogad the water pipes had to be
lowered; that Bogad started work on the Trailer Court in a week or
ten days after he took possession; that he knew they were lowering
the water pipes and enclosing the pump house; that he knew about the
sewer work being necessary; that Bogad told him and the work was
being done; and that Bogad’s records showed expenditures of $1,276.-
48 for material and $1,299.31 for labor, a total of $2,575.79.

Bogad testified that he expended approximately $3,400 in improving
the property; that his records tended to show expenditures of $2,931.-
28 on improvements; that he considered the property his and did not
keep a record of all the expenditures; and that Wachter made trips to
the Trailer Court ‘‘to see that I done the work right.’

The case is here de novo. Due deference is to be accorded the
findings of the chancellor on conflicting evidence. Jones v. Linder,
Mo., 247 8. W. 2d 817, 819[2]. However, there is little dispute on the
essential facts and our duty embraces the weighing of the evidence and
the making of findings upon a review of the record before us.

Hl Defendants say, citing the authorities noted, that waiver is a
voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right (67 C. J. 289, § 1, 302, § 6), and that the burden of
proof was upon. plaintiffs (67 C. J. 309, § 11). Forfeitures are not
favored in equity; and it is not our understanding that proof of
waiver of a forfeiture must be so clear etc., as to leave no room or rea-

sonable ground for hesitancy on the part of the chancellor, as contended.
by defendants, citing Forrester v. Scoville, 51 Mo. 208. See Missouri
eases infra; 67 C. J. 309, § 11, n. 59, § 12, n. 67; Annotation, 107 A. L.
R. 358(b).
The cases sustain the statement in the Annotation at 107 A. L. R.
847(IL,a), that although the decisions usually deal with the problem
presented in terms of ‘‘waiver,’’ ‘‘it is apparent that the elements
present in the ordinary case are more nearly those of estoppel. Usually,
where it is held that a right of forfeiture has been ‘waived,’ the vendee
has, by the vendor’s conduct, been lulled into a sense of security which
would render inequitable a sudden assertion of forfeiture. * * So,
from the decisions may be drawn a general principle [614] to the effect
that when a vendor deals with his vendee in a manner that, or assents
to such a course of action with reference to the contract as shows that,
notwithstanding any existing default in payment, he regards the
vendee’s rights under the contract as fully subsisting, he cannot sud-
denly, and without warning, declare a forfeiture, or maintain that one
has automatically occurred.’’
Our cases are in accord. We have said:
«In equity time is not ordinarily regarded as of the essence of con-
tracts, and this is especially true as regards executory contracts for the
sale of land which are considered in equity as vesting the equitable
title in the purchaser subject to the claim of the vendor for the pur-
chase money.’ [Citing authority.] Even when time is of the essence
of the contract the vendor may waive the condition or requirement in
that respect and he does so by receiving payments after a default.
[Citing authority.] Forfeitures are not favored and if the contract
does not provide for it or if time is of the essence but has been waived
it is necessary that the vendor give the vendee notice of his intention to
forfeit the contract before the vendee may be deprived of equitable
relief against the forfeiture. [Citing authority].’’ Branch v. Lee,
Mo., 159 S. W. 2d 677, 679[8, 4].
' “A default may be waived by acts recognizing the contract as exist-
ing, such as * * by permitting the purchaser to expend money in
reliance on the contract.’’ Regers vy. Gruber, 351 Mo. 1033, 174 S. W.
2d 830, 831[1, 2]. See also Rayburn v. Atkinson, Mo., 206 S. W. 2d
512, 516; Parkhurst v. Lebanon Pub. Co., 356 Mo. 934, 204 S. W. 2a
241, 247; Chapman v. Breeze, 355 Mo. 873, 198 8. W. 2d 717, 721[11] ;
Kyner v. Bryant, 353 Mo. 1212, 187 S. W. 2d 202, 206.
. Under the instant contract the vendees had a grace period of
80 days after the payment due dates before the contract could be de-
elared null and void and the payments forfeited. The vendors accepted
the $400 payments of the vendees due September 20th and October
20th, 1951, ten or more days after their respective due dates. These
payments were made within the grace period. On December 5, 1951,
the vendors accepted a $300 payment on the $400 due November 20,
Le

1951. The vendees had under the contract provisions until Deceriber
20, 1951, to pay the $100 balance before the forfeiture clause applied.
Notwithstanding the default existing between December 20th and
January 7th, the vendors accepted another $300 payment on January
7, 1952, and the vendees’ default ceased to exist. The vendees were in
default on the $200 balance between January 19, 1952, and February 1,
1952, when they made another $300 payment, which the vendors again.
accepted, and again reinstated the 30-day grace provisions. Then some
time in February, 1952, either before the expiration of the grace period
or on February 23, 1952, the vendors, under the circumstances nar-
rated, dispossessed the vendees and put another in possession of the
property.

In addition to the acceptance of payments out of time and of lesser
amounts than due, the case involves improvements made by the vendees
with the vendors’ knowledge and consent. We do not have the usual
situation with respect to improvements by a vendee under a contract of
purchase. Consult Annotation, Ann. Cas. 19170 89. Here the vendors
knew prior to the execution of the contract that the vendees were
borrowing $3,500 on their home for the purpose of improving the
property the vendors contracted to sell to them. Vendors and vendees
contemplated the lowering of the water pipes at the time of contracting.
The improvement of the sewer was essential to the operation of the
property. The vendors knew of the necessity for the improvements.
The improvements were of a permanent nature and in furtherance of
the use to which the vendors had devoted the property. According to
the vendors the vendees produced records indicating expenditures
totaling $2,575.79 over the period involved. The improvements made by
the vendees were several [615] times the amount due the vendors
when the vendees were dispossessed. Wachter forbid Bogad collecting
rents which Bogad claimed were due. The vendors’ actions appear
oppressive and with a view to securing an unfair advantage under the
letter of the contract. The record establishes that the vendees signed a
contract prepared and placed before them by Wachter. It also indicates
they did not fully understand the terms of the contract. The equities
of the vendees, giving consideration to the improvements, should affect
the consciences of the vendors. Under the vendors’ testimony, the
vendees were dunned for payment orally and by letter. ‘‘This is not
going on forever’’ in the letter of February 6, 1952 may have consti-
tuted a threat to dispossess, but it also was an acknowledgment by the
vendors of the acceptance of payments out of time and for lesser
amounts and the letter did not invoke the forfeiture provisions of the
contract. Said letter recognizes a $200 balance to be due, but de-
fendants’ insistence therein that it be paid was premature under the
forfeiture clause of the contract as the grace period had not expired.
If the forfeiture clause was still in effect on February 20th, only
$300 was in default, and not until March 21, 1952, would the $400 due

———— .

February 20th be in default. A demand for $700 was not within the
forfeiture provisions. A declaration of forfeiture and dispossession of
the vendees after said letter and prior to February 20, 1952 (the testi-
mony of Wachter as well as that of Bogad would support such a
finding), was premature and not authorized by the contract. If the
dispossession occurred on the 23rd of February, 1952, then we hold the
vendors by their actions in permitting the vendees to proceed with the
improvements while accepting payments out of time and for lesser
amounts constituted a waiver to so act on said date in the circumstances
of record.

ba! The decree was for the wrong party and is, therefore, reversed
and the cause remanded with directions to take an account of the
rents and profits after the wrongful dispossession of the plaintiffs and
of the payments due defendants and, upon ascertaining the equities
between the parties, enter a decree granting plaintiffs specific per-
formance of the contract, conditioned upon such performance by
plaintiffs as the facts establish to be equitable and just. Barrett and
Stockard, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bontine, O., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges coneur.

On Morton ror ReHwarine

Hi PER CURIAM:—Defendants, in their motion for rehearing,
contend our statement of facts in this equity suit gives credence to
ineredible testimony of plaintiff Bogad, failed to give due considera~
tion to the testimony of defendant Wachter, and that we reached an
erroheous result.

Defendants say the transcript does not show that ‘‘Bogad testified
* * that Wachter informed him * * that the wooden sewer would hold
for 10 or 15 years, and that a septic tank was not needed.’’ (Op. f[ 5.)
The sewer was a wooden sewer with no septic tank; and defendants
have inadvertently overlooked Bogad’s testimony that Wachter told
him ‘‘the idea was to put the sewer in and sheeting board, and the sewer
would hold 10 or 15 years and you never need a septic tank.’’ (Tr.
81, 34, 73, 74.)

Defendants question the statement: ‘‘Bogad informed Wachter he
would purchase if he could raise $3,500 by an additional loan on his
home.”? (Op. § 5). Bogad, on cross-examination, so testified. (Tr.
76.) At that time the Bogad home was security for a balance of
$5,857.25 on a loan. Wachter testified: ‘‘He [meaning Bogad] sug-
gested that if I would increase the loan to $3,500.00, he would come
down [616] here and spend it in improvements and put up some
cottages.” (Tr. 237.) The checks connected with the $3,500 loan are
dated: $500, August 24, 1951, an advancement, and for the balance,
August 31,1951, .

Next defendants take exception to the statements (emphasized.
here) in the paragraph beginning: ‘‘Mr. Bogad is plaintiffs’ only

witness on the issue of waiver. It is true as defendants state that
Bogad’s testimony is confusing and contradictory in places; but certain
essential facts are not disputed.’’ Defendants say they stated Bogad’s
testimony was ‘“conflicting, contradictory, unreasonable, unbelievable
and ineredible.’? We are unable to follow defendants in their claim
that Bogad’s testimony was unreasonable, unbelievable and incredible.
‘Wachter’s testimony corroborated Bogad on some material facts. We
remain of the opinion that on the issue of waiver, the issue tried, certain
essential facts are not disputed. Bogad borrowed $3,500 to make im-
provements at the Trailer Court, not to pay the $400 monthly install-
ments. Defendant Wachter knew this and knew that improvements
were being made. He accepted payments of the installments after
their due date and also partial installments after the due date and
after the forfeiture date under the contract terms. It is not determina-
tive on the issue of waiver whether Bogad deposited his payments in
the Waynesville bank or took the bank deposit slips to Wachter’s office
for Wachter to enter the credits in Bogad’s receipt book. Defendants
say, without reference to transcript pages, the improvements took
place in August, September and October, 1951, and also that they had
been completed by November 20, 1951. If it is so established of record,
we have inadvertently overlooked it. The date when the improvements
were completed within the six months involved is not determinative.
The material fact is that Bogad did make improvements of a permanent
nature and defendants, under the record, are enriched thereby.
Wachter testified that the records Bogad brought to his office in ,
February, 1952, showed total expenditures of $2,575.79 ; and Wachter’s
complaint at the time was that Bogad was collecting enough rents to
timely pay the $400 monthly installments but did not do so, as Wachter
testified: ‘‘I said: ‘You are not fooling me, you got that rent’ ’’; ‘‘I
told him he had broken his contract, and that I was putting Rauhaut in
charge.’’

Defendants’ complaints do not call for a change in the result. The
foregoing are illustrative thereof.

HB With defendants waiving and thereafter suddenly without
reasonable notice asserting a forfeiture and arbitrarily and wrongfully
ousting Bogad and taking possession of the Trailer Court without
recognition of any rights that existed or might exist in Bogad, Bogad’s
plea of being ready, able and willing to perform and offering and
tendering compliance with such orders as the court might make as a
condition to equitable relief, was a submission to the jurisdiction and
orders of the court and a sufficient offer of performance in the unusual
circumstances of record. Kyner v. Bryant, 353 Mo. 1212, 187 S. W. 2d
202, 206[5, 6], mentioned in the opinion; Deichmann v. Deichmann,
49 Mo. 107; Cape Girardeau-Jackson I. R. Co. v. Light & D. Co., 277
Mo. 579, 210 S. W. 361, 372(II).

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

a “

Svars x rev. Ropurt Lamar, Prosecuting Attorney for Texas County,
Missouri, Relator, v. Davin E. Iupny, Judge of the Probate Court
for Texas County, Missouri, Respondent, No. 44892—283 8. W.
(2d) 480.

Court en Bane, November 14, 1955.

Robert L. Lamar for relator, pro se.

David FE. Impey, Judge of Probate Court of Texas County, pro se,
and Hi vert for respondent

[481] WESTHUES, J.—Relator as Prosecuting Attorney of Texas
County, Missouri, filed this proceeding in’ this court seeking a writ of

prohibition to restrain the respondent David E. Impey, Judge of the
Probate Court of Texas County, Missouri, from taking any further
action in an insanity case pending in his court. On April 11, 1955, this
court issued its preliminary rule in prohibition returnable to the court
en bane in 30 days. Respondent judge filed a return on May 6, 1955.

An agreed statement of facts was also filed from which we learn
the following: Respondent is the duly elected and qualified Judge of
the Probate Court and Ex Officio Judge of the Magistrate Court of
Texas County, Missouri. On February 4, 1955, one Arthur H. Horner
was charged with the crime of murder in the Magistrate Court presided
over by respondent. Horner was ordered held without bail for pre-
liminary hearing set for February 9, 1955. Horner applied for a con-
tinuance and the case was set for March 21, 1955. On March 15, 1955,
there was filed in the Probate Court presided over by respondent a
complaint by one Roy Haney charging in substance that Horner was
insane; that Horner did not have sufficient property to support him
at a state hospital for the insane; that he was so deranged as ‘‘to en-
danger himself and others.’’ The respondent judge set the hearing on
said complaint for March 21, 1955.

On March 16, 1955, relator, as Prosecuting Attorney, with leave,
filed a motion asking the Probate Court to dismiss the insanity pro-
eeeding and to refuse to take jurisdiction thereof. This motion was
overruled; whereupon, the relator filed an application in this court
for a writ of prohibition. On April 9, 1955, respondent, as Judge of
the Magistrate Court, accorded Horner a preliminary hearing on
the murder charge, the result of which was that Horner be held with-
out bail for the Circuit Court of Texas County, Missouri. A tran-
seript of these proceedings was filed in said Cireuit Court on April 11,
1955. On April 30, 1955, an information was filed in the Cireuit Court
charging Horner with murder.

| Relator and respondent do not agree as to the nature of the
proceedings in the Probate Court. Respondent contends that the in-
sanity proceeding was as provided for by Sections 458.020, 458.060,
and 458.070, V.A.M.S. Relator says the proceedings in the Probate
Court were under Section 202.807, V.A.M.S. (Pocket Parts, p. 20).
See State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W. (2d) 72,
where parts of this statute were held to be unconstitutional. We must
resolve this question in favor of relator’s contention. There are no
allegations in the verified statement filed in the Probate Court calling
for any action on the part of the court as provided for by Sections
458.020, 458.060, and 458.070, supra. No mention was made in the
verified statement that Horner was incapable of managing his affairs
ealling for the appointment of a guardian. It was stated in specific
terms that Horner’ had no property and was ‘‘so deranged as to en-
danger himself or others and will be dangerous to the safety of the
community by being at large and that he is now being confined or re-

pe

strained, * * *.”? That language is substantially the same as that
found in Section 202.807, supra. The objective of the proceeding in the
Probate Court was to have Horner placed in some institution where he
would not endanger himself or others. We, therefore, hold that the
proceeding in the Probate Court was commenced under the provisions
of Section 202.807, supra.

‘We are of the opinion that when the charge of murder was
filed against Horner and he was arrested and placed in jail, the State
had jurisdiction over the person of Horner. This jurisdiction over thé
person by the State through its officers having control of criminal
prosecutions could not be defeated by any proceeding in the Probate
[482] Court on the basis of a verified statement that Horner was insane
and should be placed in some state institution. The law pertaining to
the prosecution of criminals makes ample provision for such situations.
See Sections 545.750, 545.760, 545.770, and 546.510, V.A.M.S. Section
546.510 provides that if a person charged with crime is found to be
insane by a jury ‘‘an order shall be entered of record by the court
that he be sent to a state hospital, designating it,’’ and that he be
taken to such institution for safe keeping.

In ease a defendant becomes insane after arrest and before trial, he
may be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Sections 545.-
750, 545.760, and 545.770, supra. The law provides further that if a
defendant becomes insane after conviction, he may be sent to an in-
stitution provided for such persons. See Section 549.040, V.A.M.S.;
State v. Anderson, Mo., 254 8.W. (2d) 638, lc. 640 (9, 10); 23 OSS.
231, Section 940.

Téi is evident that the question of Horner’s sanity can be determined
in connection with the criminal prosecution. We call attention to
the fact that Horner is now being held in custody without bail and;
therefore, cannot be dangerous to the public. The law is well settled
that the jurisdiction of a court first invoked cannot be defeated by a
subsequent proceeding in a court having concurrent jurisdiction of the
person or subject matter. 21 C.J.S. 745, Section 492; State ex inf.
Goodman ex rel. Crewdson v. Smith, 331 Mo. 211, 58 S.W. (2d) 271;
Finley v. Smith, 352 Mo. 465, 178 S.W. (2d) 326, Le. 329 (2, 3) ; State
ex rel. Lipie v. Flynn, 858 Mo. 429, 215 S.W. (2d) 446, le. 451 (7);
State ex rel. Nelson v. Williams, Mo. App., 249 8.W. (2d) 506, Le. 512
(6-8) (9) ; 22 C.J.8. 186, Section 111; Jackson y. Kaiser, 353 Mo. 919;
185 S.W. (2d) 784.

In State v. Hagerty, 152 Minn. 502, 189 N.W. 411, le. 412 (3; 4);
the court said: ‘‘Prior to the date of the probate court order, de-
fendant had, by the justice of peace, been committed to the jurisdiction
of the district court on the charge of murder. The jurisdiction thus
conferred extended to all matters involved and incident to the indict-
ment and trial of the accused, including any question respecting his
sanity and mental capacity to intelligently interpose his defense. G.S.

a “

1918, Section 9217. The jurisdiction of the district court so acquired
could not be divested by any action or proceeding in the probate
court. °

Respondent says that at the time the verified affidavit was
filed in the Probate Court, there was no case pending against Horner in
the Cireuit Court of Texas County, Missouri. We deem that to be
immaterial. A’ criminal prosecution had been commenced against
Horner in the Magistrate Court and was then pending. The Magistrate
Court had committed Horner to custody without bail. That court had
jurisdiction of the person to the exclusion of the Probate Court wherein
proceedings were instituted subsequent to the charge filed in the
Magistrate Court and after the arrest of Horner. In this State, prose-
cutions of felonies are by indictment or information. If by information,
it is necessary to commence the prosecution by a complaint in a magis-
trate court where the defendant is given the right to have a prelimi-
nary hearing. We hold that when a defendant is arrested his person
is in the jurisdiction of the court established to try criminal cases.
Respondent cites the case of Quaintance v. Lamb, Iowa, 170 N.W. 398.
There a defendant was bound over to await the action of a grand jury.
Before he had been indicted, insanity proceedings were instituted and
the defendant declared insane and placed in an institution. The court
held that the insanity proceeding was valid because it had been filed
before the defendant had been indicted. The court, in the course of its
opinion, stated a rule which we deem applicable to this case. Note
what the court there said, 170 N.W. Le. 899: ‘‘Can it be that after
the jurisdiction of the district court has attached, but before the
trial of the case has actually begun, the commissioners of insanity
can open the jail door, take out the criminal defendant, and dispose
of him as they may think best? [483] Surely, this is not the law. It
must be that the jurisdiction of the district court attaches at the time
of the service of a warrant issued upon an indictment, and that from
this time it has control of the person of the defendant, not only for
the purpose of the criminal investigation, but for all matters incident
thereto.”’ .

Hi ‘We note that in the case before us Horner had been arrested,
charged with murder, and was in jail when the Probate Court pro-
ceeding was begun.

It follows that our preliminary rule in prohibition must be made
absolute.

It is so ordered. All concur.

s

° a

Crtuste Franxuin, Respondent, v. OpEut Franxuin, Appellant, No.
44830—283 S. W. (2d) 483.

Court en Bane, November 14, 1955.

Frank Mashak for appellant.

Sanford E, Wool for respondent.

[484] ILOLLINGSWORTH, J.—Odell Franklin,’ defendant, ap-
pealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals from an order of the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis allowing plaintiff, Celeste Franklin, $150
attorney’s fee and temporary alimony in the sum of $10 per week
during the pendency of her action against him for divorce, which order
was by the Court of Appeals affirmed. Franklin v. Franklin, 273 8.W.
24.737. On application of defendant the cause was transferred to this
court under the provisions of Art. V, § 10, of the Constitution.

The facts are well stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
to which reference is made. They need not be again set forth herein.
The essential question presented is whether, after refusing to answer
certain interrogatories propounded to her under the discovery provi-
sions of the civil code, § § 510.020 and 510.060 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.,
or to orally testify as to the status of her prior marriage to one Ivory
Shelly, on the ground her answers might tend to incriminate her,
plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action for divorce or a motion for
temporary alimony.

[485] The right of divorce is predicated upon and presupposes a
valid marriage, 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 1, p. 521, and a motion for
temporary alimony, in cases where the marriage is not admitted, must
be supported by prima facie proof of the marriage. Hill v. Hill, Mo.
App., 236 §.W. 2d 394, 400; 27 C.J.8., Divorce, § 208, b(1), ¢(1, 2),
pp. 895-897. Good faith of the applicant is also a necessary element of
such a motion, Brinker v. Brinker, 860 Mo. 212, 227 8.W. 2d 724, 727;
this latter element being ordinarily, but not necessarily, determined
from the pleadings, 27 C.J.8., Divorce, § 208, g, pp. 899-900. And,
ordinarily, upon prima facie showing of marriage, the wife’s motion
for temporary allowances will be sustained if otherwise meritorious,
even though the husband tenders an issue of the validity of the mar-
riage; this, for the reason that to deny the motion might foreclose the
wife of the means with which to establish her contention that the mar-
riage was valid. Carroll v. Carroll, 68 Mo.App. 190, 193-194; Ascher
v. Ascher, 202 Mo.App. 622, 216 S.W. 576, 578. We are convinced,
however, that the state of the record in this case is such that the mo-
tion should not in justice to defendant be considered without regard to
plaintiff’s right to maintain her case on the merits. Upon service of
the petition, defendant promptly sought discovery from plaintiff as to
‘when and where she was married to Shelly and when, where and in
what cowt she was divorced from him. At first, plaintiff sought to
avoid the issue entirely but, upon being ordered to answer such inter-
rogatories under penalty of dismissal of her action, she claimed the
privilege of not answering, on the ground that to do so might tend to
incriminate her. This privilege she likewise claimed at the hearing of
her motion for temporary allowances. Thus, it seems, at least prima
facie, that plaintiff refused to disclose facts peculiarly within her
knowledge that were essential to an intelligent and lawful adjudication
of her right either to divorce or to temporary support and suit money.

Of course, plaintiff had the right to refuse to answer both the
written interrogatories and the questions propounded to her at the
hearing on the motion if to answer would tend to incriminate her. But,
may she, by virtue of that privilege, obtain affirmative relief of divorce
or temporary allowances, which otherwise would be denied to her on
refusal to auswer pertinent written or oral interrogatories? We have
not been cited to nor have we found any case authorizing her to do so.

“ a

This court is committed to the doctrine that a witness who appears
and testifies generally at a trial on the merits may not be discredited
by showing that at a former hearing or in a priorly given deposition
such witness refused: to testify on the ground his testimony might tend
to incriminate him. Masterson v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 507,
528-525, 108 S.W. 48, 53-54 (98 S.W. 504); Garrett v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 219 Mo. 65, 87-95, 118 S. W. 68, 74-78; State v. Weber,
272 Mo. 475, 199 S.W. 147, 148 ; lil v. Missouri Packing Co., Mo. App.,
24 8.W. 2d 196, 198; State v. Conway, 348 Mo. 580, 154 S.W. 2d 128,
184, It has also been held that a defendant in an action for damages
for personal injuries arising out of a collision of motor vehicles may
not be discredited by showing that when charged in the justice of the
peace court with reckless driving on the occasion of the collision he
“stood on his constitutional rights and declined to testify.’’ Hall
Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 1190 et seq., 212 S.W. 2d
748, 750 et seq. But those cases are not in point here for at least two
reasons. In the first place, the witnesses, including the party defend-
ant in the last cited case, testified fully in the case on trial; the refusal
to testify, in each instance, having been in an earlier proceeding. In
the second place, none of the witnesses claiming the privilege had in-
voked the jurisdiction of the court in quest of affirmative relief; and
the party defendant had done so only by way of counterclaim.

Divorce is a statutory action, but the courts generally follow the
rules of equity and apply equitable principles in determining the
rights and: liabilities of the [486] parties. State ex rel. Couplin v.
Hostetter, 344 Mo. 770, 129 8.W. 2d 1, 2; Link v. Link, Mo.App., 262
S.W. 2d 318, 319; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 7, p. 525. One seeking a di-
voree must prove himself to be the innocent and injured party. Simon
v. Simon, Mo. Sup., 248 8.W. 2d 560, 562. The latter requirement is
neither more nor less than an application of the equitable doctrine of
“clean hands”’ to a divorce action. That doctrine says that ‘‘whenever
a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion
and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other
equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court
will be shut against him * * *; the court will refuse * * * to award
him any remedy.’’ Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur., (Symons) 5th Ed., Vol. 2;
§ 897, pp. 91-92. See also Stierlin v. Teschemacher, 333 Mo. 1208, 64
S.W. 2d 647, 652, 91 A.L.R. 121,

To illustrate the anomalous situation that would arise if plaintiff’s
contention were to be sustained, let us suppose that the interrogatories
propounded to her, both written and oral, had involved some miscon-
duct on her part and peculiarly within her knowledge, such as, al-
though not criminal, would defeat her right to divorce. In such a case,
no one would deny that her refusal to answer would defeat her action.
Schooler v. Schooler, 258 Mo. 83, 167 S.W. 444, 447 [7]; Whitmore v.
American Ry. Express Co., 219 Mo. App. 294, 269 S.W. 654, 657;

Block v. Rackers, Mo. Sup., 256 S.W. 2d 760, 764; Meier v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 199 F. 2d: 392, 396 [4]. Now, may she by
being privileged to refuse to answer certain questions as to her mis-
conduct on the ground that her answer might tend to incriminate her
obtain an advantage that less offensive conduct would not afford her?
Such a doctrine could enable plaintiff to obtain a divorce without
being the innocent and injured party. The answer is obvious. Al-
though plaintiff may refuse to answer self-incriminating interroga-
tories, yet, when she does, her action must be judged in the same man-
ner and by the same rules as though she had refused to answer any
other pertinent written or oral interrogatories.

The law is that upon oral or written interrogatories being properly
propounded to discover relevant and material facts peculiarly and ex-
clusively within the knowledge of the party, his refusal to answer
justifies striking his pleadings. § 510.060 RSMo 1949, V.A.MS.;
‘Goodrich Zine Corporation v. Carlin, 4 F. 2d 568; State ex rel, Wil-
liams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 190 8.W. 2d 907, 909 [2, 3] ; State ex rel.
Cummings v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 219 8.W. 2d 383, 390. This
sound and salutary rule applies, insofar as we are advised, without ex-
ception to all parties seeking relief in the courts. Especially would
its application seem to be called for in divorce actions, where equitable
principles govern and the state is an interested party. Sec State ex rel.
Couplin v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 770, 129 S.W. 2d 1, 4; Koslow v. Taylor,
356 Mo. 755, 203 S.W. 2d 433, 487.

At oral argument of this case, it was suggested by plaintift’s counsel
that full disclosure of plaintiff’s knowledge concerning the status of
her former marriage would show no criminality on her part. The
judgment rendered herein is reversed and, to the end that no injustice
may be done plaintiff, the cause is remanded for such further proceed-
ings as may be taken in accordance with the views herein expressed.
All concur.

Stars or Missourt ex rel. Starz Hiawway Commission or Missourt,
Relator, v. Honoraste Craupn E. Curris, Judge of the 19th
Judicial Circuit of Missouri, of the Circuit Court of Laclede
County, Missouri, Respondent, No. 44817—283 S. W. (2d) 458.

Court en Banc, November 14, 1955.

eS
i)

Robert L. Hyder and Minor C. Livesay for relator.

I

HH. O. Eldredge and Claude T. Wood for respondent.

., [480] DALTON, J.—This is an original action in prohibition. Re-
lator seeks to prohibit respondent, Judge of the 19th Judicial Cireuit,
from entering an order in the circuit court of Laclede County remand-
ing to the cireuit court of Pulaski County five separate exceptions
which had been filed to the award of Commissioners in a condemnation
case instituted in the circuit court of Pulaski County. These excep-
tions, involving the amount of damages to be paid to the respective ex-
ceptors for the taking of their respective separate tracts of real estate
in the condemnation proceeding, were transferred from the circuit
court of Pulaski County to the cireuit court of Laclede County on
change of venue from Pulaski County, after certain other exceptions
that had been filed in the same condemnation case had been transferred
on change of venue from Pulaski County to other counties.’

The alleged grounds upon which respondent proposes to act in re-
manding the exceptions are that the circuit court of Pulaski County
had no jurisdiction to transfer the said exceptions to the cireuit court
of Laclede County for trial; that the circuit court of Laclede County
acquired no jurisdiction of said exceptions, because other exceptions
filed in the same condemnation case had been transferred to other

counties; that the original condemnation action was still a single case;
and that the cireuit court of Pulaski County had no jurisdiction to
transfer a part of the case to Maries County, a part to Phelps County
and a part to Laclede County.

HL We are first confronted by respondent’s contention that, in
his answer and return to our preliminary rule in prohibition, he denied
certain allegations contained in the petition for the writ; that his
answer and return contained certain allegations as to which the relator
made no reply; that certain specific issues of fact are undetermined ;
that there has been no request for the appointment of a commissioner
to take testimony and make findings of fact; and that no stipulation
has been filed disposing of these disputed fact issues. While we fully
agree that certain detailed facts are undetermined, we think it is
clear from respondent’s answer and his return, as well as from the
admissions contained in his brief in this court, that the essential facts
upon which this cause turns are not in dispute, but are definitely ad-
mitted. In stating the facts we shall frequently refer to respondent’s
pleadings and brief and to the admissions therein.

It is admitted that on May 14, 1948, relator filed a condemnation
suit in the cirenit court of Pulaski County, which suit was styled, State
of Missouri ex rel. State Highway Commission of Missouri, plaintiff,
ys. Allen T. Burcham, et al., defendants, file No. 2559. The purpose of
the action was to acquire eight different separately described parcels
of real estate owned by eight different groups of individuals. Respond-
ent in his answer and return points out that this is the condemnation
case which was considered by this court in State ex rel. State Highway
Commission v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 222 S.W. (2d) 64, a mandamus
action, wherein respondent was required to accept jurisdiction of all
issues tendered in relator’s condemnation petition then pending before
him. Pulaski County was then a part of respondent’s judicial circuit.
Section 478.187 RSMo 1949.

Thereafter, commissioners were duly appointed in said cause to
ascertain and report the just compensation, if any, to which the several
groups of defendants were respectively entitled. The commissioners
viewed the several tracts and filed one Report of Commissioners,
apparently, in full conformity with the provisions of Section 523.040
and 523.050 RSMo 1949, showing certain stims as the just compensa-
tion to which the eight separate groups of defendants were respectively
entitled for their respective tracts of real estate. The several defend-
ants were served with a copy of the commissioners’ report and duly
notified of [461] the filing and date thereof and, within ten days from
the receipt of such notice, all of the defendants filed written exceptions
to the award of the commissioners. The relator filed exceptions to the
award made as to seven of the tracts. .

Relator, as plaintiff in the condemnation suit, after the several ex-
ceptions to the commissioners’ report had been filed, filed certain

applications for change of venue from the circuit court of Pulaski
County on the ground that the inhabitants of Pulaski County were
prejudiced against plaintiff (applicant) and, also, for the reason that
the defendants, the opposite parties therein, had an undue influence
over the inhabitants of Pulaski County. The petitions for change of
venue were sustained and certain orders, as hereinafter stated, were
made,

It is admitted that, after all of the exceptions to the award of the
commissioners had been filed with the clerk of the cireuit court of said
county, the said clerk, without any order of the court having been
made directing him so to do, and without any of the parties having so
requested, made out seven separate docket sheets covering the excep-
tions filed, and numbered those docket sheets, respectively, 2559A-
2559G, inclusive. (Apparently, one of the exceptions had been disposed
of.) . .

Respondent, in his answer and return states: ‘‘Number 2559A was
apparently intended to include the issue of just compensation as to the
Jand owned by Allen T. Burchan;; 2559B, the land of Wilbur B. John-
son and Etta Johnson ; 2559C the land owned by William ©. Anderson.
and wife; 2559D the land owned by Orville and Josie Laughlin;
25595 the land owned by Roy Laughlin and Jeretta Laughlin, 2559F_
the land owned by Orville Laughlin and Josie Laughlin and James
Laughlin and Gladys Laughlin ; and 2559G the land owned by Charles
H. Elliott and Helen Elliott.’’ In his brief in this court, respondent
says that, ‘‘on April 6, 1953, on the docket sheet bearing No. 2559A,
the court entered an order granting a change of venue to Maries
County, Missouri, upon application of the plaintiff, the State Highway
Commission. On April 23, 1958, or 17 days later, the circuit court of
Pulaski County, Missouri, entered an order on each of the docket:
sheets numbered from 2559B to 2559F, inclusive, purporting to grant
a change of venue to the cireuit court of Laclede County, Missouri. In
other words, on April 6, 1953, the circuit court of Pulaski County,
Missouri, attempted to send the Burcham exceptions to the circuit
court of Maries County. On April 6, 1953, the circuit court of Pulaski
County, attempted to send the Elliott exceptions to the circuit court.
of Phelps County. As to exceptions in 2559B to 2559¥, inclusive, the
order for change of venue was actually not made by the circuit court of
Pulaski County, Missouri, until April 23, 1953, long after two prongs
of the lawsuit had been sent to other counties, one of them having been
sent to Phelps County. No order for a severance or for a separate
trial nor any order for the clerk to make out separate docket sheets was.
ever made in the circuit court of Pulaski County, Missouri.’’ (Italics
ours.)

As indicated, the exceptions involving five of the tracts of real estate
in question were attempted to be transferred on change of venue from
the cireuit court of Pulaski County, to the circuit court of Laclede

a ”

County. Respondent admits that the circuit court of Pulaski
County ‘‘made five entries in said condemnation suit purporting to
award a change of venue to relator to the circuit court of Laclede
County,’ to wit, in Nos, 2559B, 25590, 2559D, 2559B, and 2559F.
‘When these exceptions, which respondent refers to as ‘‘five segments
of the lawsuit,’’ reached the cireuit court of Laclede County, the
several defendants-exceptors interested in the ‘respective tracts in
question, filed their motion to remand these exceptions to the circuit
court of Pulaski County on the ground that the circuit court of Laclede
County, Missouri, was without jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action ; that the circuit court of Pulaski County, Missouri, was without
jurisdiction to transfer ‘‘the above case’’ to the cireuit court of Lac-
lede County, Missouri; that the circuit court of Pulaski County, Mis-
souri, [462] exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to transfer ‘‘the
above case’? to the circuit court of Laclede County, Missouri; that ‘‘the
circuit court of Pulaski County, Missouri, was without jurisdiction to
transfer a portion of the above case to the circuit court of Maries
County, Missouri, another portion thebeof to the cireuit court of Phelps
County, Missouri, and another portion thereof to the circuit court of
Laclede County Missouri’’; ‘‘that the vircuit court of Pulaski County,
Missouri was without jurisdiction to grant a change of venue in the
above case for the reason that the statutes of Missouri which purport
to allow a change of venue in civil cases has been repealed by the
Constitution of Missouri for 1945; and: that no request for severance
or for separate trials has ever been made in the above cause.’’

After the motion to remand was heard by respondent in the circuit
court of Laclede County on October 5, 1954, he stated his position as
follows: ‘‘It is made clear to the Court today in pre-trial conference
that, upon the filing of the application for change of venue in this
cause in Pulaski County, the Court sent one branch of the case to
Maries County and then sent the other branch, the one we are con-
cerned with today, to Laclede County. * * * The Court takes the
position that this was one case in Pulaski County when it was filed by
the condemnor against various property owners, that since no sever-
ance was made in Pulaski County, it was one case at the time the
application for change of venue was filed, that it was one case when
the change of venue order was made, and that the circuit court of
Pulaski County had no jurisdiction to transfer a part of the case to
Laclede County and another part to Maries County.”’

Respondent announced in open court his intention to sustain de-
fendants’-exceptors’ motion to remand ‘‘the case’? and to order the
cireuit clerk to return these five exceptions to the cireuit court of
Pulaski County, however, he agreed to allow plaintiff (relator here)
time to apply for a writ of prohibition.

It will be noted that at the time of announcing his decision to remand
the exceptions, respondent did not mention or refer to the change of
venue statutes, nor to any other ground relied upon by the defendants-

exceptors in their motion to remand. In his answer and return to our
preliminary rule, however, respondent alleges that the statutes of
Missouri, which purport to allow a change of venue in civil cases, to
wit, Sections 508.090 and 508.140 RSMo 1949, have been repealed by
Sections 6 and 15 of Article V of the Constitution of Missouri 1945;
that said statutory provisions are inconsistent with the 1945 Constitu-
tion and, therefore, were repealed by implication by its adoption; that
the legislature has never re-enacted Section 508.140 and, therefore, the
entire section is invalid and ineffective, and, by reason thereof, there
is no existing valid statute that authorizes or permits a change of
venue from one county to another; and that the circuit court of Pu-
laski County was without jurisdiction or authority to transfer a civil
ease from the Judge of the 89th Judicial Circuit to the Judge of the
19th Judicial Circuit, or to transfer a case to a circuit court in the 19th
Judicial Circuit and without the 39th Judicial Circuit. (As to the
counties in these circuits, see sections 478.187 and 478.201 RSMo 1949
as amended Laws 1951, p. 438.) Respondent, in his- brief, further
points out that ‘‘the petitions for change of venue filed by relator in
the circuit court of Pulaski County were directed only to the inhabit-
ants of Pulaski County and not against the Judge of the 39th Judicial
Cireuit of Missouri.’”’

In this court respondent contends (1) that ‘‘the cireuit court of
Pulaski County, Missouri, was without jurisdiction to grant a change
of venue in the condemnation suit for the reason that the statutes of
Missouri which purport to allow a change of venue in civil cases have
been repealed by the Constitution of Missouri for 1945’; (2) that
“‘the filing of exceptions in a condemnation suit does not convert the
original suit into as many separate suits as there are separate tracts of
land, because [468] the condemnation suit which relator brought in
the circuit court of Pulaski County, Missouri, is and remains one law-
suit until such time as an order for severance and for separate trials
has been ordered’’; and (3) that ‘‘the relator has failed to establish
any right to prohibition in this action.’’ These contentions clearly
point out the issues presented on this record.

It will be noted that, while relator contends that respondent is act-
ing and threatening’ to act and will act without legal authority or juris-
diction and in excess of jurisdiction and will remand the five exceptions
in question to the circuit court of Pulaski County, unless prohibited
by an order of this court, and while the burden rests upon relator to
show that respondent is without jurisdiction to enter the order remand-
ing the several exceptions to the circuit court of Pulaski County or will
exceed his jurisdiction in making such an order, the case necessarily
turns upon respondent’s contentions, as set forth in his answer and
return to our preliminary rule, and as here urged, to wit, that the cir-
cuit court of Pulaski County acted in excess of jurisdiction and with-
out authority in transferring the several exceptions to the cireuit

court of Laclede County and, therefore, that the circuit court -of
Laclede County acquired no jurisdiction. Respondent of course insists
that, since by reason of the facts as stated the cireuit court of Laclede
County acquired no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of said ex-
ceptions, it became, and now is, respondent’s duty to remand the
several exceptions to the circuit court of Pulaski County. State ex rel.
Creamer v. Blair, 364 Mo. 927, 270 8.W. (2d) 1. .

As stated, respondent contends there -is no existing valid
statute authorizing or permitting a change of venue from one county
to another county ; and that the statutes which purport to allow changes
of venue in civil cases have been repealed by Sections 6 and 15, Article
V, Constitution of Missouri 1945.

Section 508.090 RSMo 1949, in part, provides that ‘A change of
venue may be awarded in any civil suit to any court of record, for any
of the following causes: * * * (8) That the inhabitants of the county:
are prejudiced against the applicant; (4) That the opposite party has
an undue influence over the inhabitants of the county * * *.’’ Section
508.140 RSMo 1949, in part, provides: ‘‘If reasonable notice shall have
been given to the adverse party or his attorney of record, the court or
judge, as the case may be, shall consider the application, and if it be
sufficient, a change of venue shall be awarded: to some county in the
same, adjoining or next adjoining cireuit, convenient to the parties
for the trial of the case and where the causes complained of do not
exist * * #7 .

We have omitted the part of these sections dealing with the dis-
qualifications of a judge, because in the case of State ex rel. Creamer
v. Blair, supra, 270 8.W. (2d) 1, 4, it was held that Sections 508.090
and 508.140, supra, were nullified to the extent that they conflicted
with Sections 6 and 15, Article V of the Constitution of Missouri 1945,
that is, ‘‘in so far as they provide for the granting of a change of venue
upon the ground of disqualification of the judge.’’ And see State ex
rel. Harnest v. Meriwether (Mo. Sup.), 270 S.W. (2d) 20, 23(4). The
portions of the sections, as set out above, do not refer to instances in-
volving the disqualification of a judge. Respondent, however, insists
that the several provisions of said statutes are dependent and insepara-
ble; that the invalid and unconstitutional portions cannot be sepa-
rated from the remaining portions of the sections; and, further, that
the legislature would not have enacted the statutes in the form in
which they remain after the invalid and unconstitutional portions have
been deleted. ue

“Tt is well settled that a statute may be sustained as constitutional
in part though void in other parts, unless‘its provisions are so con-
nected and interdependent that it cannot be presumed the legislature
would have enacted one without the other. ‘The test * * * is whether
or not ,* * *, [464] after separating that which is invalid, a law in all’
respects complete and susceptible of constitutional enforcement is left,

which the legislature would have enacted if it had known that the
exscinded portions were invalid.’ State ex rel. Audrain County v.
Hackmann, 275 Mo. 534, 205 S.W. 12, 14. The rule is thus succinctly
stated in State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680, 697, 67 8.W.
592, 596, 90 Am. St. Rep. 480; ‘Where the part of an act that is un-
constitutional does not enter into the life of the act itself, and is not
essential to its being, it may be disregarded, and the rest remain in
force.’ ? Poole & Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1188, 125
S.W. (2d) 23, 83; 82 C.J,S. 149, Section 92.

As stated, the invalid and unconstitutional portions of the two
statutes are those portions which provide for the granting of a change
of venue upon the ground of the disqualification of the judge. No
part of either of the two Constitutional provisions upon which the
respondent relies deals with the matter of a change of venue from a
county because of grounds (3) and (4) in Section 508.090. We find
no conflict between the portions of the statutes, as set out above, and
any portions of the Constitution relied upon. With the invalid por-
tions of these two statutes deleted, the portions which we have set out
above are complete in themselves and capable of enforcement and appli-
eation to cases where a change of venue is sought from the county
on either ground (3) or (4) of Section 508.090. We find no basis for
concluding that the legislature would not have enacted these statutes
in their present form if it had known that the provisions with reference
to a change of venue because of the disqualification of a judge were
invalid. To the extent here in question, we must and do hold that the
remaining provisions of the two statutes are valid and enforceable; and
that a change of venue in a proper case on grounds (3) or (4) could
be granted from the circuit court of Pulaski County in the 39th
Judicial Circuit to the cireuit court of Laclede County in the 19th
Judicial Cireuit.

Hi Did the circuit court of Pulaski County lose jurisdiction of the
five exceptions in question by sending one of the other exceptions in
the condemnation case to Maries County and another to Phelps County
for trial of the issue of damages as to the particular tracts there in-
volved, so that it had no jurisdiction to send five exceptions on change
of venue to Laclede County for trial?

The condemnation suit in question was instituted by relator under
the provisions of Chapter 523 RSMo 1949. See Section 226.270 RSMo
1949. Commissioners were appointed and filed their report in con-
formity to the provisions of Section 523.040 RSMo 1949. The plaintiff
and defendants in the condemnation suit filed their respective separate
exceptions to the commissioners’ report as to the respective awards
made by the commissioners. In this connection Section 523.050 RSMo
1949, in part, provides: ‘‘ * * * the report of said commissioners may
be reviewed by the court in which the proceedings are had, on written
exceptions, filed by either party in the clerk’s office, within ten’ days

after the service of the notice of aforesaid; and the court shall make
such order therein as right and justice may require, and may order a
new appraisement, wpon good cause shown. * * * Such new appraise-
ment shall, at the request of either party, be made by a jury, under tlie
supervision of the court, as in ordinary cases of inquiry of damages
* # #7 (Italics ours.) Further, Section 523.060 RSMo 1949, ex-
pressly provides that ‘‘any plaintiff or defendant, individual or eorpo-
rate, shall have the right of trial by jury of twelve persons, if either
party file exceptions to the award of commissioners in any condemna-
tion case.’’? And see Article 1, Sections 26 and 22(a), Constitution of
Missouri 1945.

It has long been held in this state that, upon the filing of exceptions
to the report of commissioners in a condemnation case, there is no need
for a formal order of court setting aside the commissioners’ report;
and that, when a party files his exceptions [465] to the report and asks
for a jury to assess his damages, he is entitled to a jury as a matter of
right. The court has no discretion in the matter. Southern Missouri &
Arkansas R. Co. v. Wyatt, 223 Mo. 847, 354, 122 S. W. 688; St. Louis
I. M. &S&. RB. Co. v. Pfau, 212 Mo. 398, 410, 111 8.W. 10; Southern
Missouri & Arkansas R. Co. v. Woodard, 193 Mo. 656, 661, 92 S.W.
470. The right to a change of venue because of the prejudice of the
inhabitants of a county is of course one of the rights given to litigants
in such cases by the statutes above mentioned. The St. Louis, Oak Hill
and C RB Co. v. Fowler, 113 Mo. 458, 466, 20 8.W. 1069.

As stated, respondent insists that the filing of the several exceptions
in a condemnation case did not convert the original suit into as many
separate actions as there were separate tracts of land; that the con-
demnation case remained one lawsuit, since: no formal order for
severance or for separate trials had been entered; and that the re-
moval to Maries County as to one party defendant removed the entire
condemnation case and all exceptions to that county.

Respondent relies upon a particular provision in Section 508.140
RSMo 1949 to the effect that, if one or more of several parties plaintiff
or defendant ask a change of venue and ‘‘the change is awarded the
entire cause shall be removed:’’ Fears v. Riley, 148 Mo. 49, 63, 49
S.W. 836; Bowling v. Lewis, 228-Mo. App, 618, 71 S.W. (2d) 503, 505.
This is the same section which respondent, as indicated above, contends
is ‘‘invalid in toto,’’ because of conflicts with the Constitution of
1945. We think the rule stated in the statute has no application here,
where, prior to the application for change of venue, separate exceptions
raising separate issues had been filed under the statutory provisions re-
ferred to, which statutes expressly granted the exceptors separate
trials as to the separate tracts, ‘‘as in ordinary cases of inquiry of
damages.’’ No formal order of the court for severance and separate
trials of the several exceptions was required in view of the constitu-
tional and statutory provisions referred. Any order of the court look-

ing to that end was sufficient. Nor could said provisions of Section
508.140 apply here, where the trial court had definitely ordered a
severance and separate trials of the issues of damages as to the respec-
tive tracts by granting separate changes of venue as to different ea-
ceptions involving the issue of damages as to the several tracts. See
Section 510.180 RSMo 1949; and Supreme Court Rule 8.195 which is
not yet effective.

Respondent further relies upon The Kansas City, Nevada and Ft.
Smith R. Company v. Erwin, 50 Mo. App. 552, 555, where in a con-
demnation case involving eleven separate tracts of land, each of the
several owners of the several tracts filed exceptions and the clerk
docketed each as a separate case, but no severance was asked by any
of the parties and ‘‘no order looking to separate trials was made by
the court.’’ In that case the plaintiff applied for a change of venue as
to all of the excepting defendants and the vente of the case was
changed to Johnson County. Apparently there was a single applica-
tion for change of venue and a single order by the court. The Court of
Appeals held that there was only one case ‘‘as the record stood when
the change of venue was ordered’’; and that the clerk could collect for
only one transcript of the record. In that case no action of any kind
had been taken with reference to any particular exceptions when the
change of venue order as to the whole case was entered. The opinion is
not applicable under the facts here.

The filing of the separate exceptions involving the issue of
damages for the taking of the respective tracts presented separate and
distinct issues for trial under the procedure governing ordinary eivil
cases. State ex rel. State Highway Conm. v. James (Mo. App.), 115
S.W. (2d) 225, 226. Hach of the exceptions filed by the respective
landowners as to the awards for their separate tracts were independent
of the exceptions as ‘to the other tracts, as each claim stood upon its
own footing. [468] State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Scheer
(Mo, App.), 84.8.W. (2d) 641, 642.

The opinion of this court in the case of State ex rel. Union Elec-
tric It. & Power Co. v. Bruce, 334 Mo. 312, 66 S.W. (2d) 847, reviews
the procedure in condemnation cases, but respondent insists that what
is there said was wunecessary to the decision; and that it is obiter
dictum and not controlling. In that opinion it is stated: ‘‘If excep-
tious are filed to the award the question of damages is all that is left
in the case. * * * Hach landowner defendant may file exceptions.
The exceptions filed are tried separately as to each landowner and the
outcome of one does not affect the other. * * * The right to a trial by
jury does not depend wpon any action of the court. Our Constitution
guarantees that right. * * * ‘It was not necessary for the court to
make an order sctting aside the report of commissioners in order to
entitle defendants to a jury trial on the question of compensation, as
either party was entitled to such a trial as a matter of right, which was

guaranteed to them by the fundamental law of the State.’ * * * The
exceptions that are filed to the award may be termed the pleading that
first raises an issue of fact triable by a jury. * * *.”’ In answer to a
contention that an application for a change of venue must be filed at.
the beginning of the suit, the court further said: ‘‘The damages to
each must be separately assessed. Therefore, any one of the defendants,
or the plaintiff, who was of the opinion that he could not obtain a fair
trial by jury in his county, would be compelled to file an application
for a change of venue at the beginning of the proceeding. This would
necessitate sending the entire case to another county. * * * All this
can be avoided by permitting an application for change of venue to be
filed after the filing of exceptions to the award.’’ We think the opinion
in the Bruce case correctly reviews the well established procedure in
this state in condemnation cases.

In the case before us it is admitted that No. 2559A refers to the
Burcham exceptions to the commissioners’ report; that ‘‘2559A was
apparently intended to include the issues of just compensation as to the
land owned by Allen T. Burcham’’; and that the circuit court of
Pulaski County, on April 6, 19538, made an order in case No. 2559A
by which a change of venue was granted from Pulaski County to Maries
County. Clearly such order was entirely sufficient to constitute an
order of severance for the purpose of the trial of the issue of damages
as to the Burcham tract of land. The sending of these exceptions to
Maries County for a trial of the issue of damages as to this exceptor
was sufficient to effect a complete severance of these exceptions from
the other exceptions filed in the original condemnation case. There-
after, on the same day it is admitted that the circuit court of Pulaski
County made an order in case No. 2559G that the petition for change of
venue therein from the inhabitants of Pulaski County be sustained
and the venue of case No. 2559G be changed to Phelps County. It is
admitted, as stated, that case No. 2559G referred to the exceptions filed
by Charles H. Elliott and Helen Elliott; and that it ‘was apparently
intended to include the issues of just compensation as to the land
owned by’’ Charles H. Elliott and Helen Elliott. This was a sufficient
severance and order for a separate trial of the Elliott exceptions.
Thereafter, five further separate orders were entered of record chang-
ing the venue of the exceptions numbered 2559B, 2559C, 2559D, 2559E
and 2559F, from the circuit court of Pulaski County to the cireuit court
of Laclede County. A $10.00 docket fee was paid in each case. These
several orders as entered in the circuit court of Pulaski County suffi-
ciently separated the several exceptions from each other and from the
remaining exceptions. Apparently the exceptions, filed to the commis-
sioners’ report as to the eighth tract remained in the original case, at
least no order appears to have been made therein.

The orders of the cireuit court of Pulaski County clearly evidence
an intention to effect a complete severance of the several exceptions

from each other for the purpose of separate trials. The circuit court of
Pulaski County had full jurisdiction [467] and authority to send the
five exceptions in question to the cireuit court of Laclede County for
trial and the said circuit court of Laclede County acquired full juris-
diction to proceed with the trial of said exceptions as independent
eases, nevertheless, unless prohibited, respondent will remand these five
exceptions to the circuit court of Pulaski County on the ground that
the circuit court of Laclede County acquired no jurisdiction of them,

On the record presented respondent is without lawful authority
to remand the five exceptions to the circuit court of Pulaski County.
An order to remand would be in excess of jurisdiction. Relator’s rem-
edy by appeal in the circumstances would be wholly inadequate.

Our preliminary rule should be made permanent. It is so ordered.
All coneur.

Paun W. Presume, (Plaintiff) Appellant, v. Micuamn J. Douzrry,
Danten J. Nacg, Isaac C. Orr, and Wii1am E. Buper, as Mem-
bers of the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of St.
Louis; Waurer H. Tosrrman, Secretary of State of the State of
Missouri; Joun M. Dauron, Attorney-General of the State of
Missouri, (Defendants) Respondents, Oscar A. Murnipr, and
Micrann Frrzcurap, (Intervenor-Defendants) Respondents, No.
44808—284 S. W. (2d) 427.

Court en Bane, November 14, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, December 12, 1955.

a
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Pa
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ler,

James M. Douglas for Michael J. Doherty, Daniel J. Nai
Orr and William E. Buder as Members of the Board of Election Co:
missioners of the City of St. Louis, defendants-respondents.

Mar hechter for Oscar A. Mueller and Michael Fitzgerald,
defendant-intervenors-respondent.

[430] HYDE, J.—Action for declaratory judgment to determine
validity of the 1952 division of the City of St. Louis into seven senato-
rial districts. The present Board of Election Commissioners, which
did not make the challenged redistricting and have been substituted
for the members of the former Board who did make it, filed answer
denying the invalidity of the ‘redistricting. However, their answer
also contained a counterclaim asking for a declaratory judgment, if
the redistricting should be declared unconstitutional and void, which
would: determine the authority of the-present Board to create new
senatorial districts. The other defendants also filed answers denying
invalidity of the redistricting and certain voters were allowed to inter-
vene and answer as proponents of the validity of the redistricting.
[481] The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s petition with prejudice and
plaintiff has appealed. .

This matter was previously before us in Preisler v. Doherty, 364
Mo. 596, 265 8, W. (2d) 404, in which we held that Count 2 of plain-
tiff’s petition (the basis of this case) stated a claim for declaratory
relief but that Count 1 (based on plaintiff’s claimed right to run for
the office of state senator at large in the 1952 election) was moot and
properly dismissed. This redistricting was also challenged in State ex

rel. Sommer vy. Calcaterra and State ex rel. Scott v. Calcaterra, 362 Mo.
1148, 247 S. W. (2d) 728, in which we denied prohibition against the
Board, to prevent conducting primary and general elections in these
senatorial districts, (We will refer to the Board of Election Commis-
sioners making the redistricting as ‘‘the Board’’ and to their successors
as ‘‘the present Board.’’) This writ was denied on the ground that re-
districting was a legislative function; holding that prohibition will
not lie to control administrative, ministerial or legislative functions,
but only to prevent bodies exercising judicial or quasi judicial func-
tions from doing unauthorized acts or acts in excess of the authority
vested in them. In this present case, the matter of the validity of this
redistricting is directly presented on the merits.

Hl It is well settled that courts have jurisdiction and authority
to pass upon the validity of legislative acts apportioning the state into
senatorial or other election districts and to declare them invalid for
failure to observe non-discretionary limitations imposed by the Con-
stitution. (State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, 146 S. W.
40 and cases cited 241 Mo., Le. 473; Annotation A.L.R. 1337; 18 Am.
Jur. 191-201, Sec’s. 16-31; 16 C.J.S. 488, Sec. 147; See also Jones v.
Freeman, Okla., 146 Pac. (2d) 564, stating le. 570, that the courts
of 38 states had exercised this power.) However, as these authorities
show, the courts may not interfere with the wide discretion which the
Legislature has in making apportionments for establishing such dis-
tricts when legislative discretion has been exercised. It is only when
constitutional limitations placed upon the discretion of the Legislature
have been wholly ignored and completely disregarded in creating
districts that courts will declare them to be void. In such a case, discre-
tion has not been exercised and the action is an arbitrary exercise of
power without any reasonable or constitutional basis. As said in a
leading case (State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, Wis., 58 N. W. 35,
55) : ‘If, as in this case, there is such a wide and bold departure from
this constitutional rule that it cannot possibly be justified by the
exercise of any judgment or discretion, and that evinces an intention
on the part of the legislature to utterly ignore and disregard the rule
of the constitution in order to promote some other object than a con-
stitutional apportionment, then the conclusion is inevitable that the
legislature did not use any judgment or discretion whatever.’’ Like-
wise, In re Sherill, N.Y., 81 N. B. 124, 128, the Court said: ‘‘But, if
the Legislature under the assumption of an exercise of discretion does a
thing which is a mere assumption of arbitrary power, and which, in
view of the provisions of the Constitution, is beyond all reasonable
controversy, a gross and deliberate violation of the plain intent of the
Constitution, and a disregard of its spirit and the purpose for which
express limitations are included therein, such act is not the exercise of
discretion, but a reckless disregard of that discretion which is intended
by the Constitution, Such an exercise of arbitrary power is not by

authority of the people. It is an assumption, and, when it.is claimed
that an act is thus in violation of the Constitution, a question of law is
presented for the determination of this court.’’ Thus, in the matter of
districting, as well as in other matters, the Legislature has no authority
to enact unconstitutional laws.

Those cases, and others cited (241 Mo., lc. 473), involved apportion-
ment laws of state legislatures. However, in this case, we are not
dealing with a law enacted by our General Assembly, which as a
coordinate branch of [432] our government has all of the legislative
power of the State except that denied it by express limitations of the
Constitution. This is true because the 1945 Constitution has taken
away from the General Assembly the whole matter of senatorial dis-
tricting. (Art. IIT, See’s. 5, 7 and 8, 1945 Const.) Section 7 provides
for a commission to redistrict the State after each United States de-
cennial census. Section 5 provides that no county shall be divided in
making districts composed of more than one county; and, no doubt,
because of this provision, Section 7 authorizes a variance in population
of districts which shall not be more than one-fourth of the quotient of
the division of the population of the State by the number of districts.
When this commission allots more than one Senator to any county or
to the City of St. Louis, Section 8 provides for local districting by local
administrative officers. In the City of St. Louis this’ is ‘‘the body
authorized to establish election precincts’, which is the Board of
Election Commissioners. (See. 118.150, statutory references are to
RSMo. and V.A.MS.-except when otherwise noted.) Thus, in this
case, we are considering acts of administrative officers who have been
delegated very limited legislative power for a single purpose, namely:
to divide the City into senatorial districts ‘‘of contiguous territory, as
compact and nearly equal in population as may be.’’ There is even
good authority for proceeding against such officers by mandamus when
they have not followed mandatory constitutional provisions in district-
ing. (See Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Com-
missioners, 224 Mass. 598, 113 N. E. 581; Donovan v. Suffolk County
Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55, 113 N. E. 740; State ex
rel. Herbert v. Bricker, Ohio, 41 N. E. (2d) 377.) Moreover, they are
not limited to any subdivision lines (wards, etc.) except by necessity
+o precincts which they make and may revise at any time. (Sec.
118.150) Therefore, it is obvious that it is much easier for them to
make compact districts than for a legislature or commission restricted
to county lines (or following town, ward or other district lines) and
that there can be no reasonable basis for failing strictly to follow this
mandatory constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the Political
Atlas of the City in evidence, showing there are many reasonably com-
pact Wards, Legislative Districts, Magistrate: Districts and Congres-
sional Districts, in the City, indicates there is no necessity for the de-
parture from constitutional standards shown i in this case. 5

Hi With these principles in mind, we will consider the facts of
this case; and in doing so, we will consider all the evidence duly pre-
served, which we find to be admissible, whether rejected by the trial
court or not (Sec, 510.310) taking judicial notice of some generally

known facts and official records. Maps of the City showing all seven.

districts, and of the districts separately, show that none of them are
compact. Topographical maps of the City made by the United States
Geological Survey show that this lack of compactness is not due to
physical features of the area or works of man in the area. In fact, such
features and works that might be reasonable natural boundaries are
disregarded. For example, in the 3rd District, the large open space of
Forest Park is in the center with 30 precincts on the south side and 25
precincts on the north side; and also three precincts are included on
the east end of the Park from another ward, which are completely
separated from the precincts north and south of the Park. It also
includes a long strip separated from the Park by the west branch of
the 5th District. In the 4th District there are precincts on both sides
of the railroad yards. Likewise, in the 5th District, the main business
section of the City separates the two parts of the District; one part
extending north from the business section and the other extending
west.

The general description of the seven districts is as follows: The Ist
District extends around the southern boundary of the City and is what

is described in some of the cases as a hollow district. It surrounds a |

large part of the 2nd District. The 2nd District is somewhat in the
form of the letter ‘T’’, The south part of the top of the “‘T’’ which
is the largest part, extends [483] into and is surrounded on three
sides by the 1st District. The 3rd District has previously been de-
scribed as separated into three parts by Forest Park. From its north
part a long strip averaging about four precincts in width, extends
east between even narrower (in some places) strips of the 5th and 7th
Districts. The 4th District extends from the Mississippi River to
Forest Park, a distance of more than four miles, and is wider at both
ends than in the middle. The most flagrant violations of the constitu-
tional requirement of compactness are the 5th and 7th Districts. The
5th District is in the form of the letter ‘‘L’’. One part extends from
“the business section in a general north and south direction about
four miles along the Mississippi River. The other part extends west
from the River more than five miles, the westernmost part extending
along the northern boundary of Forest Park and separating the long
east and west strip of the 8rd District from the Park. Each part of
the 5th District is only one precinct wide in one place and much of the
western branch is only two and ibree precincts wide, This District
winds through seven wards of the City, including only two of them
complete. The 7th District winds through six wards of the City, like-
wise including only two of them complete, from the western limits of

the City almost to the Mississippi River, about six miles in length, be-
ing cut off from the River by a narrow strip of the northern branch
of the 5th District in that area, which is there only one and two pre-
cinets in width. Connecting the two wards taken in complete in the 7th”
‘District is a long narrow strip more than a mile in length and only
two precincts wide. The 6th District contains an area in the northern
part of the City which is reasonably compact but it has two branches
extending south from it, the eastern branch being surrounded by parts
of the 5th and 7th Districts. . (Attached as an Appendix to this
opinion are diagrams of the 5th and 7th Districts.)

The 1950 population of the City was 856,796 so that exact equality
of division ‘would give each of the seven districts 122,399, However,
since there were no census figures by precincts, but only by wards,
there are no accurate figures on the population of these districts and
it cannot be known exactly how many people are in each or any of
them. While there are no constitutional or statutory provisions re-
stricting the Board to ward lines, it is obvious that too great a de-
parture from them would make it impossible to actually use the last
decennial census in determining the population of the districts as re-
quired by Sec. 10, Art. III of the 1945 Constitution. This is certainly
true as to the 5th and 7th Districts, with each taking only a part of the
precinets of four or five wards. (Generally wards have from 25 to 80
precincts.) The Board’s estimate, which it appears was made by
assuming that the precincts in each divided ward were equal in popula-
tion (Sec. 118.150 requires precincts to contain approximately 500
voters), together with the variance from exact equality and the num-
ber of precinets in each district, is as follows:

“District Precincts Population Over Quotient Under Quotient

1 126 197,831 5,482

2 118 119,748 2,651
3 110 121,246 1,153
4 92 110,691 11,708
5 125 132,675 10,276

6. 12 111,862 10,587
T 116 132,743 10,844 "

Thus it appears from the Board’s own estimate that the most ex-
treme violations of the standard of compactness (5th and 7th Districts)
were not made for the purpose of obtaining equality of population but
instead created the greatest inequality. On this subject, in the Barrett
case (241 Mo., Le. 481), commenting [434] on a similar situation, this
Court said this ‘“‘shows that collectively the greatest variances in
population are in the districts which are the least compact, or, in other
words, it shows that compactness was not sacrificed in order to obtain
equality in population, nor vice versa.’’ In State ex rel. Lamb v.
Cunningham, supra, (53 N. W., Le. 58) the Court said of such a situa-

tion: ‘‘Compaciness, being of lesser importance, may, to some extent,
yield in aid of securing a nearer approach to equality of representa-
tion ; but in some instances, in the act in question, it is made to yield
in aid of securing inequality of representation.’’ In the Sherill case,
supra, (81 N. E., lc. 132) the Court held a redistricting act of the
Legislature void, commenting on a district more nearly compact than
either the 5th or 7th Districts in this case (see diagram 81 N. E., Le.
126), as follows: ‘‘A reference to the diagram will show how grossly
the provision of the Constitution in regard to compactness has been
violated in the Thirteenth senatorial district which is within the county
of New York. All of the territory of the county of New York compris-
ing that portion of Manhattan Island shown on the diagram is com-
paratively level and fully covered by blocks bounded by streets, on
which blocks buildings have been erected for business or residential
purposes, and no possible purpose for the exercise of discretion to
make a district that is not reasonably compact has been shown, and no
effort whatever seems to have been made to make the district mentioned
in as compact form as practicable. * * * A reference to the bound-
aries of the senate districts in said county as made by the constitutional
convention shows that the county can be divided into districts which
are reasonably compact; each having comparatively few sides and
angles. (We- interpolate that the first St. Louis senatorial districts
under the new Constitution, made in 1946, while not models, are
mostly more compact than those herein involved. See State ex rel.
Davis v. Ramacciotti, Mo. Sup., 193 8. W. (2d) 617.) Within the
limits of a city entitled to many senators the requirements for compact-
ness would seem to exclude all possibility of a district in the shape of
the Thirteenth senatorial district as shown on the diagram. In re
Timmerman (Sup.) 100 N. Y. Supp. 57. The disregard of constitu-
tional provisions in forming the Second and Thirteenth senate districts
is clear, and they so affect the entire apportionment as to make it
necessary to declare the act wholly unconstitutional and void.’’ It was
well stated in People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40
N. E. 307: ‘‘There is a vast difference between determining whether
the principle of compactness of territory has been applied at all or
not, and whether or not the nearest practical approximation to perfect
compactness has been attained. The first is a question which the courts
may finally determine ; the latter is for the Legislature.’’ It is obvious
from the record in this case not only that departures from compactness
were not made to obtain equality of population, but also that the
departures from ward lines in making districts were not used to obtain
compactness but instead aided in making them less compact, more
irregular, longer and narrower. We think the only reasonable conclu-
sion from the facts in this case is that the Board did not apply the
principle of compactness of territory in the 1952 redistricting but in-

stead completely disregarded this mandatory provision of the Consti-
tution.

Intervenors cite People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill.
451, 40 N. E. 307; People ex rel. Barrett v. Anderson, 398 Ill. 480,
76 N. B. (2d) 778, le. 779; People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 81 N. B.
(2d) 581; State ex rel. Hopkins v. Tindell, 112 Kan. 256, 210 Pac. 619;
Attorney General v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 306 Mass. 25, 27
N. E. (2d) 265; Graham v. Special Commissioners, 306 Mass. 237, 27
N. E. (2d) 995; Stenson v. Secretary of State, 308 Mich. 48,13 N. W.
(2d) 202; People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 185 N. Y. 473, 31 N. EB. 921;
In the Matter of the Application of George Smith v. Board of Super-
visors, 148 N. Y. 187, 42 N. E. 592; Matter of Dowling, 219 N. Y. 58,
113 N. E. 545; In the Matter of Richardson et al., 307 N. Y. 269, 121
N. E. (2d) 217. They rely most strongly on the Richardson case. There
were dissenting opinions in both the Appellate Division (132 N.Y.S.
(2d) 249) and: in the Court of Appeals but the [485] majority held
the evidence (apparently only maps of the districts) insufficient to
sustain the allegations of the petition concerning purposes of the re-
apportionment or to show the territory was ‘‘not convenient, con-
tiguous and in as compact form as practicable.’’ The Court noted the
four assembly districts reapportioned were required to be in the same
Senate district and that the shifting of the Senate district lines re-
quired the new Assembly district lines to be altered to conform to the
Senate district boundaries and to enclose territory in which the in-
habitants, excluding aliens, were as nearly equal in number as may be.
In making the districts herein involved, the Board had the whole City
from which to make them and it did not have the problem of excluding
aliens. Moreover, there is more in this record than maps of the dis-
tricts and it appears that worst violations of the standard of compact-
ness were not made to obtain equality of population but achieved the
opposite result. The other cases cited do not involve such flagrant vio-
lations of the standard of compactness; some are cases in which town
or county lines had to be used and others involve the true exercise of
legislative discretion. Intervenors argue that the Barrett case is not
applicable, citing the statement in one of the concurring opinions (241
Mo., Le. 520) that everything except the last paragraph was dictum.
However, that was the view of only two of the judges, the majority
concurring in the ruling that the entire 1911 apportionment act was
“unconstitutional, null and void’’ (241 Mo.,1.c. 509) ; and we judicially
know that this apportionment so declared: void was never followed or
considered in effect, but that instead the 1901 apportionment remained
in effect. (See Sec. 12894 RS 1939.) Intervenors also seek to dis-
tinguish the Sherill case, supra, because of a provision of the New York
Constitution about judicial review, (81 N.E., le. 126.) Elowever, we
agree with the following statement of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
about this matter in Jones v. Freeman, supra, (146 Pac. (2d), le.

570): ‘‘Most of the courts, in passing upon the constitutionality of
legislative apportionment acts, have based their jurisdiction upon the
broad ground that it is always a proper function of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of the Legislature when their juris-
diction is properly invoked, and they have not thought it necessary to
find express constitutional authority for such action.”’

Certainly the framers of the Constitution did not intend for sena-
torial districts to be laid out according the the free will and caprice
of the officers charged with that duty. The requirements of contiguity
and compactness were placed there for a purpose. Our original Consti-
tution of 1820 did not contain them. (See Sec. 6, Art. III, Const. 1820,
1 V.A.MS, 79.) No doubt they were found to be necessary to the
preservation of true representative government and: they appear in
the 1875 Constitution in substantially the same form as in the present
Constitution. (See See’s. 5, 6 and 9, Art. IV, Const. 1875, 1 V.A.M.S.
177-179.) It has been stated that the purpose of these requirements
was ‘‘ ‘to guard, as far as practicable, under the system of representa-
tion adopted, against a legislative evil, commonly known as the ‘‘gerry-
mander,’’ and to require the Legislature to form districts, not only
of contiguous, but of compact or closely united, territory.’ ’’ (State ex
rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, supra, 241 Mo., le. 497; See also 2 A. L. R.
1337.) As said in State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, supra, (53
N. W., Le. 59) ‘‘Such constitutional mandate and standards cannot be
broken down or rendered inoperative on the theory of discretionary
power.’’ There is no discretion to violate mandatory provisions of the
Constitution ; certainly not by these administrative officers. We must
hold that this 1952 redistricting violates the Constitution and is un-
constitutional and invalid.

The result we reach makes it necessary to consider the present
Board’s alternative counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Plaintifft’s
contention is that, if the districting is invalid, senatorial candidates
from St. Louis must run from the State at [486] large as provided in
Sec. 22.030. The present Board asks us to ‘‘determine whether the
senatorial candidates from the City of St. Louis must run from the
State at large as provided by Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 22.030 or whether
these defendants, as members of the Board of Election Commissioners
of the City of St. Louis, are authorized and: directed by law to create
new senatorial districts in the City of St. Louis.”

See. 8, Art. ITI, 1945 Constitution, applies to senatorial districts in
counties entitled to more than one senator, and the City of St. Louis is
a county for this purpose. Sec. 8 charges the Board of Election Com-
missioners in the City of St. Louis with the duty of dividing the city
into senatorial districts in accordance with the standards therein set
out. This duty is further enjoined and: amplified by Sec. 22.030. We
think that the Board of Election Commissioners has a continuing duty
to make a valid redistricting. (See Jones v. Freeman, supra, 146 Pac.

(2d), Lc. 573 and cases cited.) Unlike the State Senatorial Apportion-
ment Commission, the Board of Election Commissioners has a con-
tinuous existence and, having failed to discharge its duty under the
Constitution and statutes, the Election Board is not relieved of its
obligation. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes contain any provi-
sion terminating the authority and responsibility of the Election Board
to make a legally proper redistricting. Sec. 22.030 provides for the
election at large of the senators ‘‘to be elected at the next election’’
for failure of the Election Board to comply with the section. But it
does not say that the election of senators at all succeeding elections
until the next decennial census shall be at large. We hold that the
Board of Election Commissioners has a continuing duty to divide the
City of St. Louis into senatorial districts complying with constitutional
and statutory requirements.

Further evidence of intention to provide a continuing duty and
obligation to make a valid redistricting is found in Sec. 10, which
(referring to both senatorial and representative districts), provides:
“Such districts may be altered from time to time as public convenience
.”? Certainly public convenience requires it now that the
ion of the City of St. Louis into districts has been held
invalid. A similar provision for altering districts was contained in
Sec. 9, Art. IV, of the 1875 Constitution, but that section, unlike pres-
ent Sec. 10, also related to districts of two or more counties; and in
State ex rel. Major v. Patterson, 229 Mo. 878, 129 S. W. 888, this pro-
vision was held to refer only to the power of the Legislature and not
of a county court. The ruling in that case was that, after valid legisla-
tive districts had once been established, the county court could not
again redistrict the county during the same decennial period. Under
the 1945 Constitution this provision for altering districts can no longer
refer to the power of the Legislature because now it has no power of
apportionment of either senators or representatives. (Sec’s. 2 and 7,
Art. ITI, 1945 Constitution.) The power to apportion senators is in a
commission provided in Sec. 7, Art. III, 1945 Constitution; and that
section provides that in case of failure of a commission to make the
apportionment after a decennial census, then a new commission is re-
quired to be appointed after the next election. When no apportion-
ment is made by a commission, senators must run at large in the next
election. Thus all senatorial districts must go out of existence after
each decennial census and the provision that they ‘‘may be altered
from time to time’? must mean they can be altered any time a com-
mission makes an apportionment. The times when a commission can
act to alter districts is stated in Sec. 7, and, since the Legislature now
has no power over this matter, this power stated in See. 10, Art. IIT,
1945 Constitution, must have been intended to apply to the local
authority, the County Court or the Board of Election Commissioners,
which are the only tribunals having power to district counties entitled

to more than one senator. (Sec’s. 3, 8 and 10, Art. III, 1945 Constitu-
tion.) However, in accordance with the reasoning of State ex rel.
Major v. Patterson, supra, we think only one valid [487] apportion-
ment is intended for each decennial period. This must be true because
the decennial census is made the basis of reapportionment.

The policy shown by all of the constitutional provisions herein dis-
cussed is against senators running at large and that requirement is
limited to the emergency situation provided for in Sec. 7, Art. III,
1945 Constitution, applicable only to the next election after a commis-
sion fails to make any apportionment. We think the provision im Sec.
22.080 for senators running at large likewise was intended to be appli-
cable only to the next election after a County Court or Board of Elec-
tion Commissioners failed to make the certification it requires and did

"+: not take away their authority to make districts and timely certify them
‘ before a subsequent election. In this case, there has been at least
technical compliance with the terms of Sec. 22.030 by the Board’s
certification of districts made prior to March 1, 1952, after the Seere-
tary of State’s certification to it of the apportionment made by the 1951
Senatorial Apportionment Commission; and senators have been elected
from all of the districts so certified. We, therefore, hold that when a
division of a county or of the City of St. Louis into senatorial districts
is made and held unconstitutional and invalid, that the local tribunal
designated by Sec. 8, Art. III, 1945 Constitution, has the continuing
authority and duty to divide the county or city into such districts; and
in such ease it is a substantial and sufficient compliance with the
provisions of Sec. 22.030 if this is done and certified to the Secretary
of State on or before March first of the year of the next general elec-

- tion.

HI It should be pointed out that Sec. 10, Art. IIT, 1945 Consti-
tution, requires that the last decennial census shall be used: for this
purpose. It should also be stated that the terms and tenure of the
senators elected from these districts in 1952 and 1954 cannot be af-
fected by redistricting. As we said in Preisler v. Doherty, supra, (265
S.-W. (2d), Le. 407) we judicially know that the senators from all
of these districts have been elected and have been seated: by the Senate;
and that ‘‘under Section 18 of Article III of the Constitution the state

. Senate shall be and is ‘the sole judge of the qualifications, election and
“yeturns of its own members.’ ’’ (See also Jones v. Freeman, Okla.,
146 Pac. (2d) 564 and cases cited, le. 574.) Ifa valid redistricting is
timely made, senators will be elected from the new odd numbered dis-
tricts in 1956 and from the new even numbered districts in 1958. (See.
11, Art. IIT, 1945 Const.)
_ [EBL The judgment is reversed and because of the time element in-
volved, and in order to give the present Board more time to divide the
City into senatorial districts based on the last decennial census, in-
stead of remanding to the circuit court with directions to enter de-

[488]

rabige Gar) 7

mi

me BL a

claratory judgments in accordance with the rulings herein made, we
will here and now ‘‘give such judgment as such court ought to have
given’’ as authorized by Sec. 512.160(3). It is, therefore, adjudged,
decreed and declared that the seven senatorial districts established in
1952 and certified to the Secretary of State of Missouri by the Board
of Election Commissioners for the City of St. Louis on Februrary 1,
1952, and filed in the office of the Secretary of State on February 4,
1952, do not comply with the provisions of Sec. 8, Art. III of the Con-
stitution of Missouri; that this districting is unconstitutional and in-
valid; and that hereafter Senators cannot be nominated and elected
from said districts, either in the year 1956 or thereafter. It is further
adjudged, decreed and declared that the present qualified and acting
Board of Election Commissioners for the City of St. Louis is authorized
to and has the duty to create seven new valid senatorial districts in
the City of St. Louis from which Senators may be nominated and
elected in the year 1956 and thereafter, until after the next decennial
census of the United States. All coneur.

[440] On Motion ror Rrumarine

PER CURIAM :—Intervenors have filed a motion for rehear-
ing, as have defendants Secretary of State and Attorney General, con-
tending that Section 510.140 (statutory references are to RSMo. and
V.A.MS.) prevents this Court from entering judgment here upon the
authority of Section 512.160(3). They say Section 510.140 makes it
mandatory for this Court to remand this case for them to present evi-
dence.

‘We find no merit in this contention. In the first place, the actual
defendants in the case (the only necessary parties) filed no motion in
the trial court, to dismiss or otherwise, and did not join in intervenors’
motion, so obviously they submitted the case on the evidence offered
by plaintiff. Furthermore, intervenors in their motion at the end of
the trial (both orally and in writing) moved ‘‘the Court to enter up a
judgment in favor of these defendants and to dismiss Plaintiff’s Peti-
tion at plaintiff’s costs for the reason that under the law and the evi-
dence in this case, plaintiff is not entitled to any of the relief prayed
for in his Petition.’? Our conclusion is that this cannot be construed
as a motion under Section 510.140 but instead was a motion for a
judgment declaring the validity of the redistricting involved, and
amounted to a final submission of the case. That was the proper pro-
cedure in a declaratory judgment case where it is the express duty of
the trial court to make a declaration of rights regardless of which
party is entitled to it. (Smith v. Pettis County, 345 Mo. 839, 186 S. W.
(2d) 282; Kingston v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 Mo. 448, 154
8. W. (2d) 39; Strype v. Lewis, 352 Mo. 1004, 180 S. W. (2d) 688;
King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 8. W. (2d) 547.) Intervenors say the

italicized portion of their motion is surplusage and should be disre-
garded. However, for the reasons stated we hold that it must be con-
sidered and upon the whole record we find that all parties made a
final submission of the case. Therefore, Section 510.140 is not available
to intervenors in this Court.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

Betierive Country Cus, a nonprofit, pro forma decree corporation,
Appellant, v. Howarp McVzy et al., Respondents, No. 44092—
284 8. W. (2d) 492.

Court en Bane, November 14, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, December 12, 1955.

John R. Stockham and Benjamin Roth for plaintiff-appellant ; Stock-
ham, Roth, Buder G Martin of counsel.

Harry H. Craig and Norman W. Ai ruster for defendant’
spondents ; C , Armbruster, Schmidt & Wilburn of counsel,

[494] CQIL, C.—Bellerive Country Club, a nonprofit, pro forma
decree corporation, brought an action for an injunction to restrain and
enjoin alleged unlawful picketing at its club entrance and for actual
and punitive damages. The club has appealed from a judgment deny-
ing relief. We shail refer to the parties as they were designated in the
trial court.

Plaintiff, a private club in St. Louis County, with a membership of
about 300 families, furnished golfing, swimming, tennis, dining, and
other entertainment facilities to members and their guests. Plaintiff
regularly employed about 30 persons, about 20 of whom were busboys,
waiters, cooks, groundskeepers, and locker attendants, of whom only
one was a union member.

Individual defendants, other than Howard McVey, were officers
and members of defendant [495] St. Louis Joint Executive Board of
the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International
League of America, A. F. of L., and of the Bartenders, Waiters, Cooks,
Waitresses, and Miscellaneous Hotel Employees Unions, comprising

a

the Joint Executive Board, who were sued individually and as repre-
sentatives of a class consisting of the entire membership of Locals 26,
50, 51, and the Local Joint Executive Board and its affiliates.

There was no evidence that, and it does not otherwise appear that,
interstate commerce was involved or affected by any of the activities
here considered. We have appellate jurisdiction because the construc-
tion of Art. I, Sec. 29, Mo. Const. 1945, is involved.

Plaintiff alleged that one of the objectives of the picketing was ‘‘to
compel the plaintiff to induce or coerce its employees into becoming
waembers of and to select Locals 51, 26, 60[50], the Local Joint Execu-
tive Board or its affiliates as their collective bargaining representatives
which would be unlawful under Sec. 29, Art. I of the Constitution of
Missouri, 1945.’

Defendants pleaded that ‘‘the purpose of the picketing was to in-
form the public generally of the fact that plaintiff’s employees were
non-union; * * * for the purpose of advocating the cause of union
labor, and for the purpose of promoting defendants’ lawful interests
as well as the interests of plaintiff’s employees’; and defendants
denied that the picketing was unlawful in any respect alleged in
plaintiff’s petition. None of the defendants testified, and none of de-
fendants’ evidence directly concerned the objectives of the picketing.

“We examine all the evidence to determine whether plaintiff’s proof
sustained its charge that an objective of the picketing was unlawful
in the respect noted.

The evidence (or in some instances the admissions or agreements
of the parties) showed that in the spring of 1952, defendant Sorbie
and another union representative called on the president of plaintiff
club and informed him that certain unions, including theirs, had re-
cently organized the employees of the Norwood Hills and Glen Echo
Country Clubs and that they wished to discuss the status “of plaintiff’s
employees. They admitted that they did not represent a majority of
plaintiff’s employees but felt that they would, and wanted to know
plaintiff’s attitude toward unionization. Plaintiff’s president replied
that if ‘‘our people wanted a union, we would have a union and have a
contract; if the majority didn’t want a union, then, of course, I
wasn’t going to deal with them. As far as I was personally concerned,
T hoped our people didn’t feel that they wanted or needed a union;
that we had very satisfactory relations with our employees, many of
whom had been there twenty to thirty-five years; that we tried to pay
proper wages.’’ It developed in the conversation that plaintiff had
recently raised employee wages and Mr. Sorbie thought that a ‘‘bit
unfair.’’ The president explained the club policy as to wages by stating
‘that plaintiff did not wish. to lose employees because of inadequate
wages and that when he, as president, heard that other clubs were
paying higher wages, plaintiff had always increased its rates, and that
it intended to continue that policy and practice, It also developed

Pe

a “

that some of plaintiff’s employees were said to have commented to em-
ployees of other country clubs to the effect that they (plaintiff’s em-
ployees) did not need a union and did not see why other club employees
had joined one. Plaintift’s president replied he did not know that had
happened, and that, while he could not tell his employees what to do
when they were away from the club, he would tell them that he thought
it unwise for them to ‘‘get into other people’s affairs.’ Mr. Sorbie
asked if union representatives would be permitted on the club grounds
to talk with plaintift’s employees; to which question plaintiff’s presi-
dent replied that he could not grant such request because plaintiff was
a private place, that only members and guests or deliverymen were
allowed on the grounds, and that if union representatives were per-
mitted to come on the grounds for the purpose of talking’ union, it
would indicate to the employees that the club president [496] felt that
plaintiff’s employees should join the union. He further said there
was no objection to union representatives talking to the club employees
either at the club entrance or at the homes of the various employees.

Soon after the above conversation, plaintiff’s president informed

» the club employees of his meeting with Mr. Sorbie and related to them
the substance of the entire conversation. He also informed them that
it was ‘‘up to them entirely whether they should join a union, or not.”
He said so far as plaintiff was concerned the matter of joining a union
was still (at trial time) ‘‘up to the employees”’; since the establishment
of the picket line, a number of the employees have said to plaintiff’s
president that they did not want a union and that, in answer, he
reiterated that ‘‘it was entirely up to them.”

For the week of May 26, 1953, the club premises had been ‘‘turned
over’? to the District Golf Association for the purpose of holding the
Western Open Golf Tournament. As tournament manager, plaintiff’s
president arrived early on the morning of the 26th and found a single
picket walking at the club entrance carrying a ‘‘sandwich board’’
sign which said ‘‘Non-Union Employees’’ and which bore some other
words indicating that the employees were nonunion. Since May 26,
there has been one picket at the club entrance (except for the week of
the golf tournament when, at times, there were more than one) from
7am. till 8 p.m. The picketing has been peaceful at all times and the
conduet; of the individual pickets, ‘‘exemplary.”’

Plaintiff was not consulted or notified by defendants or any other
person or organization that the picket line was to be established.
Plaintiff’s president had had no contact with any of the defendants
other than the meeting in the spring of 1952’ and was never informed
as to the objective of the picket line. He understood from his (plain-
tiff’s) counsel that the unions contended it was ‘‘an advertising line.’’

Plaintiff’s evidence was that the picket line stopped all deliveries
to the club by union drivers; that none of its regular suppliers had
made a delivery since the picket line. Although defendants’ pickets

testified that ten or more trucks had crossed the picket line, there was
no testimony as to whether the drivers of these trucks were union
members. The picket line made it necessary for the club to obtain its
regular supplies in various ways, viz., by using a club truck to pick
up supplies at certain suppliers’ establishments; in other instances,
the suppliers would not permit this and it was necessary for the club
to use its truck to pick up supplies at various stores where the club
purchased them at retail. (These retail purchases of food items were
made almost every day and sometimes two or three times a day.) In
some instances, the owners of supplying firms would deliver supplies
in the owner’s private automobile; and at other times merchandise
for the club was delivered to some other address. It was necessary to
hire a new employee, a son of one of the members, at $1.25 an hour for
a 40-hour week, to operate the club truck for the sole purpose of
picking up club supplies which theretofore had been delivered by the
suppliers to the club building. There was evidence that this truck,
a 1946 Ford, had traveled about 23,000 miles from 1946 until the
establishment of the picket line, and that, since the picket line to time
of trial (about 6 weeks), the truck had been driven about 4,500 miles.
In several instances, the club manager had placed orders with regular
suppliers in the week preceding trial, which ordered merchandise was
placed in the hands of the respective drivers but which, in each in-
stanee, was not delivered. Prior to the picket line, gasoline used by
club vehicles was delivered to the club each Friday. Since the picket
line, there had been no deliveries of gasoline and it had been necessary
i to buy it at filling stations at retail prices. Prior to the picket line,
: iee was delivered and placed in the various receptacles in the club by
j the drivers for the ice suppliers. Since the picket line, the club truck
has picked up the ice at the supplier’s establishment and it has been
necessary for various club employees to stop performance of their
regular duties to [497] assist in placing the ice when it arrives at the
grounds in the club’s truck. In order to receive a certain butcher
block and table which had been ordered by the club and which was in
the hands of a motor freight line, it was necessary to make the delivery
to the home of one of the club employees.

There was evidence adduced by plaintiff for the limited purpose of
showing the reasons which the suppliers expressed to the club for their
failure to make deliveries of supplies as had been done prior to the
establishment of the picket line. Anheuser-Busch explained that their
drivers could not cross picket lines and that the club could not pick up
supplies at the brewery because the company practice and policy was
to prohibit picking up by customers where deliveries could not be
made because union drivers would not cross a picket line. Falstaff
brewery informed the’ club that its position was the same as that of
Anheuser-Busch, noted above. The president of the club wrote a letter
to City Products Company, the regular ice supplier for the club,

_

a .

informing it that it had failed to deliver a specific order and asking
the reason therefor in the light of a statement ascribed by the letter
to Mr. John Haston who, according to the letter, was in charge of the
picket line and who, again according to the letter, had stated that the
picket line ‘‘is not there for any purpose other than to advertise that
the employees of the club are non-union, and that therefore it’s not
there to stop any deliveries of any kind.’’ City Products Corporation
answered by a letter in which it was stated that the regular deliveries
of ice to the club were stopped ‘‘when a picket line was formed around
the Country Club, and our drivers would not make a delivery. A
definite order was placed on June 19th for a delivery to be made on
June 20th. The driver attempted to make the delivery, but was
stopped by the picket line. He, therefore, did not make the delivery.
We have questioned the driver since, and he informs us that he had
taken this delivery up with his union; and he was told by his union
that he would be fined if he would eross this picket line.’’

The driver for the So Good Potato Chip Company, who before the
picket line called at the elub each Thursday, obtained an order and
delivered it each Friday, arrived at the club during the Western Open
with merchandise for delivery. When he saw ‘‘the man with an um-
brella’’ he kept on going without making the delivery and had made
no delivery to the club since, although he had sold potato chips to the
elub on a parking lot near a Kroger store. This driver said that he did
not know what unions were conducting the picket line, did not recall
what the picket sign said, and did not know the purpose of the picket
line. He was a member of Local 611, affiliated with Teamsters A. F.
of L. In answer to a question as to why he did not cross the picket
line, he said “I don’t suppose there was any definite reasons. There
was just an impulse there. I saw the man, and I kept on goimg.’’? And
the only reason he has not made deliveries was because the picket line
was there. The club manager had testified that this driver had told
him that he (the driver) would be fined if he delivered orders to the
club. The driver denied this statement and testified that he had re-
ceived no instructions from his union as to whether he should or should
not cross that or any other picket line,

The driver for McFarland Brothers Wholesale Meat Company, a
regular supplier of the club, a member of Local 700, affiliated with
Teamsters A. F. of L., testified that the first and last time he per-
sonally had occasion to take an order to the club was about two weeks
prior to the trial; that he saw the picket there and asked who was on
strike; that the picket replied, ‘‘the Cooks and Bartenders,’’ and
further said, ‘‘You can go in if you want to’’; that ‘“He wouldn’t
stop me, but he would just turn the number in on the truck.’”? The
driver did not deliver the order and had made no delivery since. On
cross-examination, this driver was not certain that the picket said that

someone was ‘‘on strike’’ or whether he simply said that the people
at the club were nonunion.

The driver for the Mar Meat Company, a member of Local 700, affi-
liated with [498] Teamsters A. F. of L,. testified that he was instructed
to deliver an order to the club about two weeks prior to trial time. He
did not make the delivery because he saw the umbrella and ‘‘I didn’t
want to cross the picket line.’’? He called the company “and they said
‘Bring it back.’ Q Did you have any reason that you do not cross
picket lines? A Just my own. Q What is your reason? A I didn’t
want to—I am a union man.’’

The driver for the Old Vienna Company, a member of Local 611,
affiliated with Teamsters A. F. of L., arrived at the club with ordered
merchandise about two weeks before trial. He asked the picket if any-
body was delivering. The picket replied, ‘‘No, but if you want to go
in you could go in; that it was up to you.’? And the picket told him
that ‘‘they were on strike.’? So he did not deliver the merchandise.
“T just used my own judgment and didn’t [cross the picket line] for
my own reason.’’ He did not remember what words were on the sign
or the umbrella.

A contract between the club and some union musicians, by the terms
of which the musicians had agreed to furnish music at a club dance
scheduled for May 30, was not fulfilled. The orchestra leader who had
signed the contract, testified that he found out there was a picket line
about three days prior to May 80; that he did not play the engagement
because, ‘‘ Well, first of all, I have never crossed a picket line in my
life; and the second reason was, that I wanted my own union to check
on it and find out whether the strike was being observed, and so forth.
* = % My first information was, it was a personal issue, and I could
cross it if I wished to. And I said (to the witness’s union repre-
sentative), ‘Well, based on that thing (a signed contract), do you
think it would be-all right to cross it?’ he said, ‘Well, I suppose so.’
* ® * T said, ‘Well, I probably will.’ He said, ‘Do you know the full
case on it?’ I said, ‘Well, no, I don’t know the full case about it. Does
any one know it?’ Anyway, after much talking he didn’t think it would
be a good idea to cross the line, he said ‘although I can’t tell you what
to do. I would rather leave it up to your own judgment whether you
think you'should or should not cross the line.’ So I do a lot of work
with a lot of union people, and I didn’t want to be the one to set a
precedent as an orchestra leader and cross that line.’’ In answer to
a quesion as to why he had never crossed a picket line he said, ‘‘ Well,
I think it is injurious to myself as a union member, and I might par-
ticipate in doing something that would hurt another union of which
Tama member. That is a part of a principle. Rather than rational
thinking, it is part of a principle.’

The evidence further showed that despite the picket line, the club
dance scheduled for May 30 was held and recorded musie was used,

and that a July 4th dance was held at which a nonunion band com;
posed of college students played. The Western Open Golf, Tournament,
was conducted despite the picket line, although there were many re-
sulting inconveniences. The club has continued to operate and there
has been no appreciable decline in the members’ use ofthe club, al-
though one member canceled a scheduled wedding reception for his
daughter because he was fearful that the facilities would be inadequate
because of the picket line, and for the further reason that he did not
want his own company’s labor relations to be affected adversely. The
elub had on hand substantial inventories of staple food items and of
liquor and has been able to obtain other necessary supplies by the
methods heretofore indicated.

The evidence also showed that certain canvas tents which had been
erected on the club grounds prior to the picket line, for use at the
Western Open by a company employing union drivers, were removed
after the establishment of the picket line and after the company had
obtained permission for its union drivers to go into the elub grounds
and remove the tents. It also appeared that although Coca Cola drivers
were thought to be nonunion, that company will not permit its drivers
to cross a picket line. The one plaintiff’s employee who was a union
member had worked regularly despite the picket line. A driver for
the Railway Express Agency, a member of Local 610 affiliated with
Teamsters A. F. of L., crossed [499] the picket line on July 1 and,
delivered a golf bag to the club golf professional after he had obtained
permission from the picket. The driver said ‘‘I never cross a picket
line without first inquiring,’’ and further stated that he had been
subpoenaed as a witness before he made the delivery to the club; that
he did not know, the objective of the picket line and, as his reason for
not crossing picket lines without the consent of the pickets, said
‘ot @ * T don’t know, that is just one of the things, when there is a
picket line, I don’t have to cross it. * * * If they give me permission,
fine, I will deliver it, but if not, I won’t. * * * I-don’t have to if there
is a picket line out there. I am a union man; regardless of if I am
working or not working, I don’t go through a picket line. * * * They
[the picket] are out for something; they are trying to organize the
men or something; they are.out there for more money; they are out
there for a reason. Q And, therefore, you will not cross the picket
line? A That is right. Q Even though you don’t know the reason for
the picket line? A That is right.’’

The two pickets denied that they had told anyone that the club
employees were on strike and said that they had never used the words
‘fon strike.’? One of the pickets had answered one driver and the
other had answered questions by two drivers, each by’ telling them, in
accordance with their instructions, to call the union office.

- Defendants’ evidence showed that in certain instances unions in-
struct their members to cross ‘organizational’? picket lines, and that.

Ss

union members do at times cross such picket lines. Whether the in-
stances referred to are those in which a clause in a particular contract
makes such instructions by unions and the subsequent action by its
members necessary, was not entirely clear from the evidence. It was
customary for union pickets to record and turn in to the union the
license numbers of vehicles crossing a picket line.

#rom all the foregoing, it is fair to say that these facts are undis-
puted or are clearly shown by the record: The picketing was carried
on by one picket at a time at the only club entrance; the conduct of
the pickets was at all times ‘‘exemplary’’—in short, the picketing was
peaceful and the manner of picketing was untainted by any unlawful
or objectionable conduct on the part of the pickets; there was no
dispute between the plaintiff and its employees; the wages, hours, and
working conditions of plaintiff’s employees were not shown to be
below the union standard for like employees—in fact, the only evi-
dence on the subject was that the wages paid by plaintiff equaled
those paid similar union employees in nearby country clubs; there was
no definable dispute, as such, between defendants and plaintiff’s em-
ployees, other than a possibly inferable difference of personal opinion
between them as to the desirability of the employees joining any or a
particular union; no effort had been made by defendants to solicit
plaintiff’s employees for union membership, either before or since
the picketing, except as the picket line itself may have amounted to a
form of solicitation; the picketing was ‘“‘stranger’’ picketing; and
plaintiff was a pro forma decree corporation, not in competition with
any other club or business.

‘We note again that no witness testified as to the objective of the
instant picketing. None of the individual defendants, some of whom
were admittedy responsible for the picketing, and who presumably
had personal knowledge of the real purpose of the picketing, took the
stand to state its objectives or to support the pleaded objectives.

And we think it is also fair to say that the picket line was established
under these circumstances: Defendant Sorbie and another had called
on plaintiff’s president to discover plaintift’s attitude toward unioni-
zation of its employees. These representatives discovered: that, while
plaintiff’s president personally hoped plaintiff’s employees would
not wish to become unionized, he, nevertheless, made clear that plain-
tiff would be governed, with respect to their unionization, by the wishes
of its employees. So far as the evidence shows, neither plaintiff nor
defendant did anything with reference to the unionization of plain-
tiff’s employees subsequent to the meeting in the spring of [500] 1952.
Yet despite complete inaction for about a year defendants chose to
establish a picket line on the very day the Western Open Golf Tourna-
ment was to open at the club.

We think there can be no doubt, from a review of all the evi-
dence, that defendants knew or should have known that a picket line,

irrespective of its validity or purpose, would inevitably result in
cutting off regular deliveries of at least a large portion of necessary
supplies to the club; and that defendants knew or should have known
that such would have an adverse effect upon the efficiency of, and the
cost of, the club’s operations. And it follows that the establishment of
the picket line, with knowledge of its inevitable effect, is persuasive
evidence that defendants intended that the picket line have that effect.
The proof is abundant that the picketing did have that effect, in that it
did cause an increase in the cost of operation, some inefficiency and in-
convenience, and in general created an undesirable situation from the
club’s standpoint—a situation over which the club apparently had no
control.

Hl We think it is clear that the right guaranteed to employees by
Art. I, Sec. 29, Mo. Const. 1945, ‘‘to organize and to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing’’ is a free choice,
uncoerced by management, union, or any other group or organization,
so that picketing with an objective in violation of that guaranty must
be regarded as equally unlawful as where coercion to violate a statute
is involved.

| The parties agree and we have held that peaceful picketing
may be enjoined if one of its objectives or purposes is unlawful. Katz
Drug Co. v. Kavner, Mo., 249 S. W. 2d 166, 170 [7-9]. The diffculty
is that it appears to us that ‘‘organizational’’ or ‘‘advertising”’ picket-
ing usually, if not always, has the effect, to some extent, of tending to
cause the employer, in order that he may avoid the hardship, loss,
and inconvenience imposed upon him as the comparatively innocent
middleman, to be tempted to persuade his nonunion employees to join
a union. And where, as in the instant case, the evidence is such as to
compel the inference that the picketing union knew or should have
known that one effect of the picketing would, as it did, cause an in-
crease in the cost of the club’s operation, and would, as it did, result
in the club’s inefficient and inconvenient operation, it reasonably may
be said that in one sense one of the objectives or purposes of the picket-
ing was to coerce the employer to violate the employees’ constitution-
ally guaranteed right of free and uncoerced choice ‘‘to organize and to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing’’
and thereby was an unlawful objective.

Hl We think, however, that the total problem involved is not so
simple of solution. Surely such an inflexible application of the meaning
of Art. I, Sec. 29, Mo. Const. 1945, as above suggested would, in some
circumstances, effectively and unconstitutionally deny the right of
free speech involved in peaceful picketing. And while we appreciate
the fact that picketing is not necessarily the legal equivalent of free
speech (Hughes et al. v. Superior Court of California, 339 U. S. 460,
465; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. Hanke et al.,
339 U. S. 470, 474) and that peaceful picketing, under certain cir-

cumstances, may be enjoined without violating the constitutional
guaranty of free speech (Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 386
U.S. 490, 93 L. Ed. 834, 69 8. Ct. 684), still the free speech involved
as an element of communication in peaceful picketing may not be
denied solely because an effect of certain, otherwise permissible,
picketing may ‘be to tend to bring about a violation of a provision of
our state constitution.

As we understand, before the right of free speech inherent in peace-
ful picketing may be denied, there must be some clear showing that one
of the ‘‘objectives’’ of the picketing is unlawful or that to permit
peaceful picketing under the particular circumstances would cause
such harm to others as to outweigh, as a matter of public policy, [501]
the desirability of permitting the peaceful picketing even though to
enjoin it denies one of its ingredients—tfree speech.

It would appear, therefore, that a proper interpretation and
application of Art. I, Sec. 29, Mo. Const. 1945, and the solution of
this case calls for a distinction between a ‘‘purpose’” or an ‘‘objective’’
of picketing and the ‘‘effect’’ of the picketing conducted for a lawful
“‘purpose.’’? That is to say that solely because the ‘‘effect’’ of the
picketing in the instant case may have had a tendency to cause the
employer to violate his employees’ constitutional right of free and un-
coerced choice, it does not inevitably follow that one of the ‘‘objec-
tives’’ or ‘‘purposes’’ of the picketing was unlawful. But the same
reasoning process leads to the conclusion that under some circum-
stances it may appear that the ‘“‘effect’’ of peaceful organizational
picketing is in fact inseparable from and amounts to one of its ‘‘ob-
jectives.’’

Thus where, as here, the evidence considered as a whole discloses
no reasonable ‘‘objective’’ other than to accomplish the ‘‘effect’’ which
the picketing had, it would be entirely unrealistic to hold that the
object of the ‘‘organizational’’ or ‘‘advertising’”’ picketing instantly
involved was other than to affect so adversely the club’s operation as
to cause the employer to intervene and coerce its employees into
union membership. We think the conclusion that such was the real
objective of the instant picketing is inescapable under the facts.
While, as twice noted, defendants did not offer proof of the purpose
or objective of the picketing, they pleaded and now contend that the
sole objective was to advertise the fact that plaintiff’s employees were
not members of the union and thereby through the influence of public
opinion cause plaintiff’s employees to be unionized. There are facts
and circumstances which convince us to the contrary.

It is of some importance to make clear the nature of the entity,
here the plaintiff. It was and is a private country club. It is its mem-
bers, operating a club for themselves and their guests. It is not in
competition, in an economic sense, with any other business or enter-
prise. Thus, in determining the objective of instant picketing, we bear

in mind that the same conduct which, when done in connection with a
competitive business, might be construed as not indicating an unlawful
objective, bears a different interpretation when considered in connec-
tion with a noncompetitive, noncommercial, private club.

We note that advertising to the public, by means of picketing the
entrance of ‘a country club (a noncompetitive pro forma corporation),
where the picket carried an umbrella bearing the word ‘‘nonunion’’,
was patently not designed to have any substantial effect on public
opinion. Obviously the advertising medium employed was not one
ealculated to reach any appreciable number of persons. It is certain
that there were other advertising media through which a substantial,
rather than an insubstantial, number of persons would have been
advised that plaintifi’s employees were nonunion.

This is not to say that defendants were bound to choose any par-
ticular method to advertise the fact of plaintiff’s employees” nonunion
status to the public or that they could not choose an ineffective medium.
The significance of their having employed an ineffective advertising
method, lies in the fact that their choice of media amounts to a com-
pelling indication that the real objective of the picketing must have
been something other than to inform a relatively small segment of the
public that plaintiff’s employees were nonunion. And while we rec-
ognize the fact that the manner in which public opinion may be aroused
and the effect of that public opinion, are often nebulous and intangible,
still we think the facts in evidence demonstrate that transparently the
importance of the publicity ingredient of the instant picketing was
infinitesimal.

And then there is this further circumstance: that no publicity to
the public took place for a year after defendants had the [502] same
knowledge concerning plaintiff and its employees as they had when the
picketing began; that during this interim, so far as the record shows,
no effort was made by defendants to persuade plaintiff’s employees
to the cause of unionism, either by personal interviews or by adver-
tising the fact of plaintiff’s employees’ nonunion status to the public,
by picket signs, or otherwise; and that the picket line was established
on the very morning a large golf tournament was to be conducted on
plaintiff’s premises. Again, this is not to say that defendants were
bound to pursue any particular course or observe any particular time-
table in their organizational efforts. It is to say, however, that the back-
ground of, and the‘circumstances under which, the picket line was
established are again compelling indications that the real objective
must have been something other than to arouse public opinion and
thereby persuade plaintiff’s employees to the cause of unionisin.

Further, there is the fact that no defendant took the stand to support
the pleaded objective of the picketing. This is a circumstance prop-
erly considered. We agree with defendants that plaintiff had the
burden of proof but, under all the circumstances shown in evidence

by plaintiff, we think the total silence of individual defendants is a
significant circumstance to be considered and which, in the setting of
this case, supports an inference unfavorable to defendants as to the
objective of the picketing. .

‘When the foregoing circumstances and others heretofore mentioned
in the statement of the evidence are considered, we think only one
reasonable inference is supported, viz., that the instant picketing was
not in fact ‘‘organizational’’ or ‘‘advertising’’ picketing but was, and
was intended to be, a form of picketing, whatever its label, which had
as its objective to affect adversely the plaintiff’s continued normal
operation and to attempt thereby to cause plaintiff to intervene and
to attempt to coerce its employees into union membership. We reach
this conclusion because, as we view it, the evidence supports it and does

not support any other reasonable conclusion.

‘We should make clear, however, that we do not hold that peaceful
“organizational”? or ‘‘advertising’’ picketing should be enjoined
solely because its effect may be to tend to cause the employer to inter-
vene and attempt to coerce the employees into union membership. We
think that where the reasonably discernible objective of peaceful
“organizational’’ picketing is to persuade employees to join a union,
such picketing is not in violation of Art. I, Sec. 29, Mo. Const. 1945,
even though an ‘‘effect’’ of such picketing may have a natural ten-
deney to cause the employer to coerce his employees into union mem-
bership. C£. Pappas v. Stacey (Sup. Jud. Ct. of Maine), 116 A. 2d 497
(review denied by U. 8S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 24, 1955, Case No. 386). And
we do not hold that peaceful ‘‘organizational’’ picketing becomes
unlawful solely because one result of that picketing is to cause sup-
pliers and the public to refuse to cross the picket line. Missouri
Cafeteria v. McVey, 362 Mo, 583, 592, 242 §. W. 2d 549, 552. We do
hold, however, that where it clearly appears from all the evidence and
circumstances in a given case that the ‘‘objective’’ is the same as the
attempted ‘‘effect’’, ie., where the real purpose is to attempt to cause
the employer to bring pressure upon its employees to join a union, the
peaceful picketing involved is in fact not ‘‘organizational’’ picketing
but thereby becomes a form of picketing for the purpose of accom-
plishing an unlawful objective and should be enjoined. (We do not
reach the question of when, if ever, peaceful ‘‘organizational’’ or
“advertising’’ picketing, as such, is enjoinable even though its ob-
jective is not in violation of law where the effect of such picketing is
to cause such severe economic hardship to a helpless employer as to be
not justified by any relatively substantial interest of the union.)

‘We have examined the many cases and other authorities cited by
the parties. No purpose would be served by reviewing them here. We
should be Jess than frank were we to say that they are readily, if at
all, reconcilable. And, certainly, we do not go [503] beyond the facts
and circumstances of this case.

We recognize that plaintiff had the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the unlawfulness of an objective of the instant
picketing. This burden may be met by circumstantial evidence. From
what we have said heretofore it is apparent that we think plaintiff
has satisfied its burden of proof.

Individual defendants agree that the trial court had jurisdic-
tion of them. It appears that plaintiff’s action was against defendants
as individuals as well as against them as representatives of classes
consisting of ‘‘the entire memberships of Locals 51, 26, 50 and the
Local Joint Executive Board and its affiliates.’’ Defendants in their
return and answer, denied that the named defendants adequately
and fairly represented the named classes. Plaintiff adduced no evi-
dence that individual defendants were ‘‘fairly chosen and adequately
and fairly represent the whole class’’ as required by Supreme Court
Rule 3.07(a). Consequently the injunction to be entered should be
directed against individual defendants in their alleged and admitted
representative capacities but not specifically against the classes alleged
to have been represented by individual defendants. And the injunc-
tion should be tailored so as to prevent picketing which has for its ob-
jective an attempt to cause plaintiff to coerce its employees to join a
union. :
As noted, plaintiff, as ancillary to injunctive relief, sought
actual and punitive damages. It has been generally held that equity
will not award punitive damages. 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 117, p. 709.
‘We have found no Missouri case on the proposition. It is, however,
the law in Missouri that the allowance of punitive damages is always
discretionary. Mitchell v. Pla-Mor, Inc., 361 Mo, 946, 237 S.W. 2a
189. Consequently, without holding that a court of equity may never
award punitive damages, we are of the opinion that the proper ex-
ercise of a sound discretion prevents the assessment of punitive
damages under all the evidence in the instant case.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for the assess-
ment of actual damages and the entry of a decree and judgment in
accord with the views herein stated.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Cor, C., is adopted as
the opinion of the Court en Bane. All concur.

Manrinyn Bonen, an Infant by Bummer Loren Buwnon, her Next Friend,
Appellant, v. Erwin Musume, Respondent, No, 45057—284 8.
‘W. (2a) 441.

Court en Bane, November 14, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, December 12, 1955.

Lyng, MacLeod & Davidson, Russell N. MacLeod and F. Daley
Abels for appellant.

* Jones, Hocker, Gladney G Grand, Harold C. Gaede,
Harold B. Bamburg for respondent.

[441] DALTON, J.—Action for damages for personal injuries
sustained by plaintiff, a ten year old [442] child, when she was struck
by defendant’s automobile as she was crossing a public street in the
city of St. Louis. The cause was submitted on defendant’s alleged
humanitarian negligence in failing to stop or warn. Verdict and judg-
ment were for defendant and plaintiff appealed. Since the amount sued
for was $5,000, the appeal was taken to the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
where that court would have affirmed the judgment [Bunch v. Mueller
(Mo. App.), 278 S.W. 2d 25], but on application of plaintiff-appellant
the cause has been transferred to this court. We shall review the
record as if on original appeal to this court. Art. V, Sec. 10, Const. of
Mo. 1945.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that the court erred in giving Instrue-
tion No. 5, on sole cause, at the request of defendant. Defendant-
respondent, however, insists (1) that the instruction correctly de-
clares the law; (2) that, in any event, it was not prejudicially
erroneous; and (3) that, even if the instruction is erroneous, the
error is immaterial because the plaintiff-appellant failed to make a
submissible case of humanitarian negligence for the jury on the
grounds submitted. Respondent says there was ‘‘no evidence to show
where the defendant was at the time the plaintiff first came into a
position of imminent peril.”’ If plaintiff failed to make a case for the
jury, the error, if any, in the giving of Instruction No. 5 was harmless
and immaterial. O’Dell v. Dean, 356 Mo. 861, 204 S.W. 2d 248; Cole-
man v. Ziegler (Mo. Sup.), 248 S.W. 2d 610, 617. Accordingly, we
must determine whether plaintiff made a case for the jury on the
grounds submitted. :

The evidence favorable to plaintiff tended to show that on
September 19, 1952, plaintiff was residing with her parents at 4158
McRee Street in the city of St. Louis. About 5 p.m. in the afternoon of
that day, she started to go to a drug store south of Lafayette Avenue
to get a paper for her mother. Lafayette is 30 to 35 feet in width and
runs east and west. It intersects, at right angles, Tower Grove Avenue
which is 50 to 55 feet in width. The intersection was marked for ‘a
four-way stop.’’? There were four lines of traffic, two each way on
Tower Grove, and two lines of traffic, one each way on Lafayette.
Plaintiff was walking south on the east side of Tower Grove. She
stepped off the sidewalk into Lafayette to cross it at the corner and
she walked straight across from the sidewalk. While on the curb, she
looked both right and left before she started to cross and she saw no
automobile approaching that would interfere with her crossing. She
then started walking south and ‘‘never did run.’’ When she reached
the center of Lafayette she looked again to her right and saw ‘‘nothing
coming.’’? She continued walking south, until she was struck and
Imocked down by defendant’s eastbound automobile. The front part
of the automobile, the radiator, hit her. The automobile came from
her right. She never saw it, until it struck her. She was knocked -
down and fell in the street in front of the automobile. After she was
down and the automobile had been stopped, it was so close to her she
could touch it. Her evidence does not otherwise show how far she had
walked beyond the center of Lafayette, nor how far she was moved
eastwardly from her original position by the impact of the automobile.
The skin of her right hip was broken and the hip was bruised. Both
knees were cut and plaintiff suffered other injuries.

There was evidence that, shortly after the collision, defendant
told two police officers that, as he reached the crosswalk, the child
started crossing the street from north to south; that the child ‘“‘walked
in front of’’ his automobile; that he saw her when she was about 10
feet ahead; that he didn’t see her until he struck her; that the front
bumper of his automobile struck her; that, at the instant of the colli-
sion, he was traveling about 10 miles per hour; and that he had not ex-
ceeded 15 miles per hour in crossing Tower Grove.

Plaintiff also offered parts of defendant’s prior deposition testimony
to the effect that he was going east on the south side of Lafayette; that
he had had to creep through the traffic on Tower Grove; that his maxi-
mum speed was 5 or 8 miles per hour; that plaintiff was on his (south
side) of [448] Lafayette, when he saw her ; that he was looking straight
ahead, when he saw her; that he didn’t see anyone crossing Lafayette
before he saw plaintiff; that he had looked to the left before he reached
the crosswalk and saw no one crossing the street; and that the range of
his vision included the crosswalk to his left.

Defendant’s testimony favorable to plaintiff at the trial tended to
show that there was very heavy traffic in each of the four lanes of

traffic on Tower Grove; that he had had to inch his way across; that
he had to stop and start, and to hesitate and then go a little farther;
that he had had to stop and let automobiles pass in front of him in
each of the two northbound lanes (east lanes) on Tower Grove; that,
when the traffic cleared in the furtherest east lane, he looked to his
left, looked at the crosswalk, and saw no one; that he never saw plain-
tiff, until she was crossing the center line of Lafayette and coming
into his side of the street; that she must have passed in, front of a
westbound automobile on Lafayette, ‘‘as she appeared right out of
nowhere in front of’? him; that he saw her ‘‘just as she bumped into’”’
him and ‘‘diagonally cut across in front of?’ him; that his speed, after
the last northbound cars on Tower Grove had passed in front of him,
did siot exceed 5-8 miles per hour, but that it could have been 2 or 3
miles per hour; that his speed during the first 5 feet did not exceed 2
miles per hour; that at 5 miles per hour, he could have stopped in one
foot, including reaction time, and in about 114 feet at 8 miles per hour;
that at no time did he sound his horn; that, after the last northbound
car had passed in front of him on Tower Grove, there was nothing to
obstruct his view of the crosswalk across Lafayette ; that, when he start-
ed up after the last car had passed, he was more than 10 feet west of
the east line of Tower Grove; that his automobile was in good condi.
tion and the streets dry and level; and that, when he saw plaintiff,
he stepped on the brakes and ‘‘stopped dead’’ and there were no skid
marks.

Other evidence favorable to plaintiff included a part of the testi-
mony of defendant’s witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Jacques. They both
saw the plaintiff cross the north half of Lafayette going south. She
crossed in front of their westbound automobile. She looked only to the
east. There was nothing between plaintiff and the defendant’s auto-
mobile (as the defendant was coming east through the east line of
northbound traffic on Tower Grove) to have prevented defendant from
seeing the plaintiff as she moved across Lafayette to the point of colli-
sion.

Plaintiff offered no direct testimony as to how fast she walked in
crossing Lafayette to the point of collision. She said she did not run
and her evidence indicates that she was proceeding in the usual and
ordinary manner of a child of her age. No reasons for haste or delay
appear. In such case the rate at which she traveled was a matter of
common knowledge. Jurors are presumed to know of such matters.
“This court has taken judicial notice of the fact that the ordinarv
walking speed of the average man is two or three miles per hour or 2.9
to 4.4 feet per second.’’ DeLay v. Ward, 364 Mo. 431, 262 S.W.:2d 628,
635, and cases cited. A ten year old child would walk at approximately
the same speed. Further, her testimony tends to show she had reached
the approximate center of the eastbound traffic lane in the south half
of Lafayette, and that she was oblivious of her peril when she was

struck by the radiator of defendant’s automobile. The distance of de-
fendant’s automobile from plaintiff’s line of travel at any particular
time, as plaintiff moved across Lafayette, was a mere matter of com-
putation by the jury, dependent upon what speed the jury might be-
lieve and find the plaintiff to have been walking and the defendant to
have been traveling as he moved from his stopped position in Tower
Grove to the point of collision. Where plaintiff was when she came
into a position of imminent peril of being struck by defendant’s auto-
mobile was a fact question for the jury to determine under all of the
circumstances in evidence. Wofford v. St. Louis Public Service Co.
(Mo. Sup.), 252 S.W. 2d 529, 538; Kelley v. St. Louis [444] Publie
Service Co, (Mo. Sup.), 248 8.W. 2d 597, 601,

In view of the evidence in the record as to the speed at which de-
fendant operated his automobile and the distance within which he
could stop it at stated speeds, it is clear that there was evidence from
which a jury could find that, after plaintiff came into a position of
definite and certain peril from the approach of defendant’s automobile,
the defendant was a sufficient distance away from her, and from
her line of travel, that he could have stopped his automobile or sounded
a warning and have avoided striking and injuring her. The jury could
find that plaintiff had. stepped off the sidewalk at the north curb of
Lafayette and had walked directly south along a proper crossing at
a speed of 2 to 3 miles per hour; that she traveled some 18 to 20 feet
in Lafayette and, after she had passed the center of Lafayette, she was
struck and knocked down by the front bumper and radiator of de-
fendant’s automobile; that at 2.9 to 4.4 feet per second it took her
some 4 to 7 seconds to walk from the north curb of Lafayette to the
point of collision; that the front of defendant’s automobile had moved
from a stopped position west of the easternmost northbound traffic lane
on Tower Grove to the point of collision at from 2 to 3 or 5 to 8 miles
per hour; that his speed did not exceed 2.9 feet per second during the
first 5 feet; that it took defendant some 3 or more seconds to move from
his stopped position to the point of collision; that during all of such
time there was nothing to obstruct defendant’s view of plaintiff and
her movements; that defendant could have stopped his automobile
-within a foot to a foot and a half, including reaction time; and that he
neither stopped, nor sounded a warning, but drove his automobile
directly into and against the plaintiff. The court did not err in re-
fusing to direct a verdict for defendant. See DeLay v. Ward, supra,
262 S.W. 2d 628, 6384; Anderson v. Prugh, 364 Mo. 557, 264 S.W.
2d 358, 363.

Appellant contends that the court erred in giving Instruction
No. 5, ‘‘for the reason (a) that the factual situation precluded a sole
cause defense; and (b) that as a result thereof the instruction did not
and could not hypothesize a set of facts justifying a sole cause de-
fense,’’ Of course there must be facts in evidence which will sustain

a a

a sole cause defense before a defendant may properly have a sole cause
instruction. Johnson v. Cox (Mo. Sup.), 262 S.W. 2d 18, 16; Bootee v.
K. C. Public Service Co., 353 Mo. 716, 183 S.W. 2d 892, 896; Long v.
Mild, 347 Mo. 1002, 149 S.W. 2d 853, 860. In other words, the evidence
must be such that the sole cause instruction may hypothesize a suffi-
cient state of facts and circumstances to necessarily exclude the de-
fendant’s humanitarian negligence as a possible concurring cause of
plaintiff’s injury by demonstrating that defendant was free from
such negligence and showing that plaintiff’s conduct was the sole cause.

Instruction No. 5 is as follows: ‘‘The Court instructs the jury that
if you find and believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, Marilyn
Bunch, while crossing Lafayette Avenue near its intersection with
Tower Grove Avenue from the north curb to the south curb of said
Lafayette Avenue, looked only toward: her left, that is to say, east on
Lafayette Avenue, and that plaintiff failed to look to her right, if you
so find, and in so failing she was negligent, and thereupon plaintiff
suddenly and unexpectedly ran from the north curb of Lafayette
Avenue toward and directly into the path of defendant’s automobile,
and that in so running she was negligent, and that such failure, if any,
to look toward her right before plaintiff suddenly and unexpectedly
ran into the path of defendant’s automobile, if you so find, was the
sole cause of the collision; and if you further find that when plaintiff
came into a position of imminent peril of being struck by defendant’s
automobile, the automobile of defendant was then so close to plaintiff
that in the exercise of the highest degree of care defendant could not
have avoided the collision by stopping said automobile, or giving a
signal or warning of his proximity and approach, if you so find, then
and in that [445] event you are instructed that the defendant was not
guilty of any negligence, and your verdict should be in favor of de-
fendant, Erwin Mueller.’’

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the giving
of the instruction we must consider the evidence favorably to de-
fendant. Bootee v. K. ©. Public Service Oo., supra, 183 S.W. 2d 892,
896; Rothe v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S.W. 2d 7, 9; Ferguson v. Better-
ton, 364 Mo. 997, 270 S.W. 2d 761.

In addition to defendant’s testimony, hereinbefore reviewed, de-
fendant testified that, when the front of his automobile was about 8
feet clear of the intersection, he saw the plaintiff for the first time
near the center line of Lafayette apparently running diagonally across
the street toward the path of his automobile. At that time he was going
at a speed of from 5 to 8 miles an hour. He applied his brakes at once
and his automobile was stopped almost immediately. Plaintiff ran
into the left front fender of his automobile after it was stopped, but
her momentum carried her forward and she fell down on both knees
in front of his left headlight. He also said that the front of his auto-
mobile was about 8 feet cast of the crosswalk on Lafayette when the

collision occurred. Defendant said he was driving south of the center
line of Lafayette. Automobiles were parked on each side of the street.
He had about one foot of clearance on the right and not over 2% on
the left between him and an approaching automobile.

Defendant’s witnesses, Jacques and wife, who were in the auto-
mobile going west on the north side of Lafayette testified that there
were cars parked on the north side of the street; and that the auto-
mobile in which they ware riding was being brought to a stop, in com-
pliance with the stop sign at the intersection, when Mrs. Jacques
noticed plaintiff and directed her husband’s attention to her. He
stopped his automobile and the plaintiff put her head down and ran
across the street. He said that the defendant’s automobile stopped
immediately and that the plaintiff threw out her hands against the hood
of defendant’s automobile and fell to a sitting position in front of it.
One of these witnesses said plaintiff was in front of and at the edge
of a car parked at the north curb, the other said plaintiff was standing
in the street on the north side of Lafayette, ‘‘just down from the
eurb,’”’ in front of a parked car; and that plaintiff looked east, but
not west, and ‘‘put her head down and. darted across the street.’’ The
front of the car parked at the north curb was at the stop sign on
Lafayette, which sign was 12 or 14 feet east of the east edge of Tower
Grove. There was testimony that plaintiff ran from the north curb to
a point beyond the center of the street where the collision occurred.
On the basis of the testimony of defendant’s witnesses, plaintiff ran
some 18 feet or more to the point of collision. Defendant’s Instruction
No. 5, as indicated, submitted that plaintiff ‘‘ran from the north curb
of Lafayette Avenue toward and directly into the path of defendant’s
automobile.’? Defendant offered no evidence tending to show that
plaintiff walked to the center of Lafayette apparently conscious of the
approach of his automobile and then suddenly darted against or in
front of his automobile, nor did defendant’s evidence fix the speed
at which plaintiff ran, but we think the jury, within limits, could
determine that issue of fact as a matter of common knowledge at
around 5 or 6 miles per hour. The speed indicated would be 7.3 to
8.8 feet per second. If plaintiff ran diagonally, as defendant and his
witnesses testified, it would have taken her two seconds or more to
move from the north curb to the point of collision.

Since there was a collision, it is apparent that defendant was
also approaching the point of collision. Defendant said he moved for-
ward (from a complete stop at a point about one foot west of the
easternmost northbound lane on Tower Grove) some 10 feet from the
east curbline of Tower Grove to the point of collision, which he said
was 8 feet beyond the crosswalk on Lafayette. While defendant re-
peatedly referred to the crosswalk on Lafayette, he at no time indicated
its [446] width, nor did any other witness. However, the stop sign,
as stated, was 12 or 14 feet east of the east line of Tower Grove. De-

fendant said that at the end of the first 5 feet his speed was less than
2 miles per hour; and that his highest speed was 5-8 miles per hour
before the collision. On the basis of defendant’s evidence defendant
moved 18 feet (exclusive of the width of the crosswalk) at an increas-
ing speed from 2 to 8 miles per hour to the point of collision. During
this time, defendant and his witnesses agree that there was nothing to
obstruct defendant’s view to his left from the curb to the center of
the street, where defendant first saw the plaintiff. At 2 miles per
hour, defendant was moving 2.9 feet per second, at 5 miles per hour
7.3 feet per second and at 8 miles per hour, he would have moved
11.7 feet per second. It is apparent that defendant was in excess of
20 feet away, when plaintiff started to run. Further, defendant’s
evidence is that plaintiff was apparently oblivious, since she only
looked to her left.

We think that a consideration of all the evidence favorable to de-
fendant fails to show a sole cause situation for the reason that, if we.
assume the truth of all of the evidence favorable to defendant, the
facts established do not exclude defendant’s negligence as a possible
concurring cause of plaintiff’s injuries, nor establish as a matter of
law that defendant was not negligent as charged and submitted under
the humanitarian doctrine in failing to stop or warn after the plaintiff
came into imminent peril. The matter of when plaintiff came into a
position of imminent peril and whether defendant, thereafter, could
have avoided striking her by stopping or warning were the issues which
should have been submitted to the jury. Plaintiff made a submissible
ease on those issues and defendant’s evidence did not show that plain-
tiff appeared suddenly and in close proximity to defendant’s auto-
mobile from a place where she could not have been seen. Instead, his
evidence shows that she came from a place in full view of defendant,
and had crossed more than half of the street to reach the point of colli-
sion. ITis view, as he approached, was unobstructed. Therefore, the
only issues were whether defendant could have avoided a collision
by stopping or warning, after plaintiff came into a position of immi-
nent peril from his approaching automobile. The giving of Instrue-
tion No. 5, constituted prejudicial error.

In view of the conclusions reached, we do not reach appellant’s
further contention that Instruction No. 5 is erroneous ‘‘for the reason
that it failed to negate defendant’s negligence,’’ and in that ‘‘no facts
were hypothesized from which the jury could find defendant not guilty .
of the negligence submitted by plaintiff,’ nor do we reach appellant’s
contention that ‘‘the instruction was misleading and self-contradic-
tory’’ and misled the jury into considering plaintiff’s antecedent
negligence. Clearly, the instruction is not in an approved form and it
unnecessarily submitted to the jury a required finding that the acts of
plaintiff relied upon by defendant as constituting sole cause were in

fact negligent acts, although such characterization and finding was
unnecessary to a sole cause defense.

‘Whether or not the instruction, if it had been based wpon substantial
evidence, would have constituted reversible error in view of the particu-
Jar facts and circumstances and other instructions in this case is a
matter we need not determine.

For the error in giving Instruction No. 5 in the absence of sub-
stantial evidence to sustain a sole cause submission, the judgment is
reversed and the cause remanded. All concur.

Fenrx Poeuz, Appellant, v. J. 0. Swinx, Respondent.
Turopore Herrron, Appellant, v. J. O. Swix, Respondent, Nos.
44377 and 44878—284 8S. W. (2d) 868.

. Division Two, November 14, 1955.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Banc Overruled, December 12, 1955.

W. A. Bro re for appellants,

Roberts & R and Smith & Smith for respondent.

[869] BARRETT, C.—In these consolidated actions Felix Pogue,
the presiding judge of the County Court of St. Francois County, and
‘Theodore Heffron, an associate judge of the county court, sought to
recover a judgment for actual and punitive damages against J. 0.
Swink who was then the circuit judge of the Twenty-seventh Judicial
Cireuit which included St. Francois County. The record consists of
the petitions and attached exhibits, which, necessarily, are explanatory
of the petitions and of the facts and circumstances out of which the
actions arose, and the defendant’s motions to dismiss the actions for
the stated reasons that the petitions show on their faces that the acts
complained of were done and performed by the defendant while acting
in his judicial capacity ‘‘and within the sphere of his jurisdiction’’
and, therefore, the petitions failed to state causes of action against the
defendant. The trial court sustained the motions, dismissed the peti-
tions with prejudice, and the plaintiffs have appealed.

oe

Briefly, these are the allegations and the facts and circumstances
out of which the actions arose: On January 15, 1951, Judge Swink,
apparently upon his own initiative, entered an order changing the
salary of the deputy circuit clerk from $1980 to $2160 a year. The
order was attested by the cireuit clerk who certified that he had de-
livered a copy of the order to the clerk of the county court. On the
2nd day of February Judge Swink caused a citation to be served upon
the appellants summoning them to appear ‘‘before the Circuit Court of
St. Francois County * * * at 9:30 A. M. on Monday, February 5th,
1951, then and there to show cause, if any you have, why you should
not be punished for contempt of the Circuit Court of St. Francois
County * * * for disobeying the order of January 15th, 1951, in-
creasing the salary of Julia F. Presnell, Deputy Circuit Clerk of
said County and State.’’ On the 5th day of February the judges of the
county court filed a response to the citation, signed by their attorney,,
in which they stated that they were the qualified and acting judges of
the county court and that they ‘‘have acted in their official capacity
at all times during the month of January, 1951’’ and that they had
certified to the state auditor a salary of $1980 instead of $2160 for the
deputy circuit clerk in their ‘‘official capacity and for the financial
welfare of the taxpayers of St. Francois County’’ in accordance with
the orders in the offices of the county and cireuit clerks appointing her
on October 1, 1949. It was also alleged: in the response that the order
of Judge Swink ‘‘shows on its face’’ that it was not authorized under
the specifically noted statutes and it did not appear from the order
that the increased salary was necessary or required. It is alleged in
the petitions that the appellants appeared before Judge Swink in ae-
cordance with the citation and that ‘‘in open court”’ he inquired of the
appellants whether they intended to obey the order and upon their
answering ‘‘No,’’ ordered the sheriff to imprison them in the county
jail for a period of twenty-four hours. It is alleged that the sheriff
did imprison [870] the plaintiffs and, at the time, Judge Swink’s
order was oral but subsequently a record entry was made ‘‘of the pre-
tended judgment and a sentence’’ and that in making and entering
“such pretended judgment the defendant was acting without any
jurisdiction of either the person of the plaintiff or the subject matter
and was falsely usurping the functions and power of a Circuit Judge.’’
It is alleged in the petitions that the order of imprisonment was illegal
“for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction to issue said order
or to adjudge the plaintiff(s) in contempt of court for the reason
that the pretended order * * * changing the salary of said Julia F.
Presnell, if effective, was only a ministerial act, and was, in no manner,
judicial in character, and, if effective, gave only the right to said
Deputy Cireuit Clerk to collect by proper remedy any salary increase
to which she might be entitled’? and that the circuit court had no juris-
diction over the persons of the plaintiffs or the subject’ matter

“touching the purported order and the act of the defendant causing
the plaintiff(s) to be imprisoned was illegal and void, and the im-
prisonment was illegal and false.’’ It was then alleged that the de-
fendant’s actions and conduct in imprisoning them was malicious and
wilful. A second count in the petitions alleges that on the 6th day of
February the defendant again commanded the plaintills to appear
before him and upon their repeated refusal to obey the order in-
creasing the deputy’s salary, he again sentenced them to imprisonment
for twenty-four hours. About two o’clock of that day the appellants,
upon a writ of habeas corpus, were released from their imprisonment
by the St. Louis Court of Appeals (Pogue v. Smallen, (Mo. App.) 238
S. W. (2) 20), and these actions for damages followed shortly.

The appellants, recognizing the general rule of nonliability
of a judicial officer, in a civil action, for his acts in his judicial capacity
and within his jurisdiction (22 Am. Jur., Sec. 52, p. 890; 30 Am. Jur.,
Sees. 40, 48, 45, pp. 752, 755, 758; 12 Am. Jur., Sec. 65, p. 433; annota-
tions 18 A.L.R. 1344; 178 A.L.R. 802) seek to bring their actions within
the exceptions to the general rule. Their theory of liability in general
is stated in this language: ‘‘These two suits are based upon the two
acts of imprisonment and damages are sought for the reason that the
defendant, although he was Judge of the 27th Judicial Circuit, in this
matter had no jurisdiction of either the subject matter or the parties,
and had usurped the power and function of a judge in finding the
plaintifis guilty of contempt and im sentencing them to imprison-
ment.’’ The petitions are given the titles ‘‘False Imprisonment and
Trespass’’ but in their brief and in their allegations the plaintiffs
have commingled, without discrimination, the actions for false im-
prisonment, malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process.
Thompson vy. Farmers Exchange Bank, 333 Mo. 487, 454-455, 62
S. W. (2) 803, 810. But the gist and basic theory of the actions
is that Judge Swink acted entirely without jurisdiction, in any mean-
ing of the term, and is, therefore, civilly liable in damages to the plain-
tiffs.

Ht is asserted that the Cireuit Court of St. Francois County,
in the person of Judge Swink, did not have jurisdiction of the persons
of the appellants. But this assertion is not argued or elaborated upon
unless the statements in their argument that ‘‘These plaintiffs were
illegally brought before the defendant’’ or ‘‘The first day in Court
they appeared by virtue of a citation. The second day their appearance
in Court was enforced”’ are intended to mean that by reason of their
enforced or illegally compelled appearances they did not voluntarily
subject themselves to the court’s jurisdiction and, therefore, there
was in fact no jurisdiction of their persons. But, admittedly, ‘‘the de-
fendant was the duly appointed, legally qualified and acting Judge of
the Circuit Court of St. Francois County, Missouri’? St. Francois
County is a part of the Twenty-seventh Judicial Circuit (V.A.MS.,

Secs. 478.078, 478.163), as a circuit court it is a court of record
(V.A.MLS., Sec. 476.010), and it is a court of general jurisdiction
(V.A.MS., Sec. 478.070) invested with ‘‘the judicial power of the
state.’’ Const. Mo., Art. 5, Secs. 1, 14. The appellants, [871] together
with their attorney, personally signed and filed, on the 5th day of
February, the above noted response to the citation, no question was
then raised as to the court’s jurisdiction of their persons and they
did appear in court, personally and with their attorney, and these
unequivocal general appearances gave the court jurisdiction of their
persons. Mahan v. Baile, 358 Mo. 625, 630-631, 216 S. W. (2) 92, 93-94,
The appellants, to demonstrate that the court did not have
jurisdiction of the subject matter (83 C.J.S., p. 555), urge that the
subject matter was the deputy clerk’s salary. On the other hand, to
demonstrate jurisdiction, the respondent urges that the subject matter
was contempt, and the cireuit court being a court of record with general
jurisdiction, of necessity, had jurisdiction of the subject matter, namely
contempt. V.A.M.S., Secs. 476.110, 476.130. The appellant county
judges in support of their position urge that under the statutes re-
lating to circuit clerks and their deputies the circuit judge’s power
and functions were not judicial but wholly ministerial. And, therefore,
they argue, by analogy, that the rules of liability applicable to min-
isterial officers invested with some discretionary duty or some quasi--
judicial function are applicable to the acts and conduct of Judge
Swink. Illustrative of this class of cases, and a case which does not
involve the conduct of a public officer, are Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo.
28, Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 491, and Albers v. Merchants’ Exchange
of St. Louis, 188 Mo. 140, 39 8. W. 473. By demonstrating that Judge
Swink’s actions with reference to the deputy clerk’s salary were
wholly ministerial the appellants seek to establish that he acted ‘‘wholly
without jurisdiction’’ and is therefore civilly liable to them in damages.
Annotations 13 A.L.R, 1344, 1851; 173 A.L.R. 802, 808. .
In part, the argument fails to precisely note the force and meaning
of ‘ministerial’ and ‘‘judicial ’’ as applied to the duties and functions
of a judge of a court of record. ‘“‘But this distinction drawn between
judicial and ministerial acts has no application to judges of superior
courts of record, since all the acts of a judge of record, which he does
as stich, are, in reality, judicial; for the word ‘judicial,’ when applied.
to the acts of a judge of record, does not merely mean those acts done
by him wherein his discretionary powers are involved, as contra-
distinguished from what are called his ministerial duties: the word
rather means every act done by him in his judicial capacity as judge,
while acting within his authority, and whether involving a greater or
less degree of judgment.’’ 15 Am. L. R. 427, 482. Also in part, the
argument ignores the meaning and full significance of ‘‘jurisdiction’”’
and ‘‘jurisdiction of the subject matter’? when applied to the powers
and duties of a court of record. Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12. (The

better reasoned of the leading cases on the subject of the civil liability
of judicial officers for false imprisonment are Lange v. Benedict and
Chancellor Kent’s opinion in Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 282.)
But in our view the record and the resolution of this appeal do not of
necessity compel a decision whether contempt or the deputy clerk’s
salary was the subject matter upon which the court in fact acted and
had jurisdiction. But see and compare: Thompson v. Farmers Ex-
change Bank, supra, and Yates v. Lansing, supra. It would seem, as a
practical matter, that the thing or action that injured the appellants
and of which they really complain is not the judge’s raising the
deputy’s salary and ordering it paid but rather his sentencing them
to jail for contempt.

The appellants contend, however, under the statutes relating
to cireuit clerks and their deputies (V.A.M.S., Sec. 483.845), partic-
ularly since the amendment in 1945 (Laws Mo. 1945, pp. 1527, 1582),
that the circuit court had the power to approve the appointment and
fix the compensation of the deputy and ‘‘to further designate the period
of tenure.’’ The order of the cireuit court is required to be entered of
record and a certified copy of the order filed with the county clerk, but,
the appellants argue, once these acts are performed the cireuit judge’s
power or duty in the matter ends and the only power then remaining
in the [872] judge is the power to modify or rescind the order of
appointment ‘‘and then everything is back where it started,’’ and the
force of the argument is that the circuit judge, therefore, did not have
jurisdiction of the subject matter, or acted ‘‘wholly without jurisdic-
tion,’’ with the consequence that he is civilly liable in damages to the
appellants. But as Judge Wolfe’s opinion in the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding (Pogue v. Smallen, (Mo. App.) 238 8. W. (2) 20) suggests,
the statutes relating to cireuit clerks and their deputies (V.A.MS.,
Sees. 483.015, 483.080, 483.140, 483.345 and 483.350) must be con-
strued together. And, as that opinion points out, after quoting the
statutes, ‘‘the order mentioned in the section is one permifting the
clerk to appoint his assistants. The concluding clause provides that
the ciréuit court may modify the order at any time, and this authority
to modify the order is not limited, as the petitioners assert, to the mere
tenure of office, but carries with it the right to modify the salary, for
it is plain that the fixing of the salary is a part of the order permitting
the appointment and there is nothing in the section to suggest that the
right to modify the order shall be limited in any way.’’ That opinion
holds, and we think correctly so, that the county court was obliged to
issue warrants to the deputy clerk for the salary specified by the cir-
cuit judge in the order permitting her appointment, and her increased
salary was effective from the date of the order.

The decisive question in the habeas corpus proceeding was
whether the county judges’ refusal to comply with the order constituted
contempt and it was held that it did not because there was no order

on the county court to pay the deputy, the only order was one author-
izing an increase in salary of the deputy clerk (‘‘I, J. O. Swink, Judge
of the 27th Judicial Cireuit * * *.do hereby authorize the salary of
Julia I. Presnell, Deputy Cirevit Clerk * * * be changed from
$1,980.00 per year to $2,160.00 per year, effective January 1, 1951.’’),
and after that order was made it became ‘‘functus officio, that is, the
order was spent and the power of the court terminated in respect to
it,’’ subject to the circuit judge’s right to modify it later if he saw
fit. But, since the force of the order was spent, there was no valid order
upon the appellants and they were not in contempt of Judge Swink’s
court for their refusal, or, in the words of the citation, ‘‘for disobeying
the order of January 15th, 1951, increasing the salary of Julia F.
Presnell.”’

While the St. Louis Court of Appeals discharged the appel-
lants that court did not determine whether Judge Swink was civilly
responsible for the acts complained of in these actions, he was not a
party to that proceeding. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. (N.Y.), Le. 285;
Lange y. Benedict, 73 N. Y., lc. 81. The decision in that proceeding
did not determine whether the ‘‘subject matter’’ of any of the pro-
ceedings before Judge Swink was contempt or the deputy’s salary and
it did not determine whether he had ‘‘jurisdiction’’ of the subject
matter. However, the plain implication of the statutes and the opinion
is that the Circuit Court of St. Francois County was not ‘‘wholly with-
out jurisdiction’’ of the subject of the salary and tenure of the deputy
cireuit clerk. In ‘‘approving’’ the appointment of a deputy and her
salary it is implied that a specific matter was submitted for decision
and that action, of course, requires the exercise of judicial discretion
and action as contrasted with a mere ministerial act of approval. 6
C.J.8., pp. 127, 129. Even in the absence of specific statutes upon the
subject, courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power to do
all things reasonably necessary to preserve their existence and function
as a court (State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 351 Mo. 769, 777, 174 8. W.
(2) 181, 188), and have the power to appoint necessary attendants,
including clerks and janitors. 14 Am. Jur., Sec. 22, p. 262; State ex
rel. Howard v. Smith, 15 Mo. App. 412. The office of judge of a court
of record with general jurisdiction invests the court and the judge
holding the office with some attributes of sovereignty and necessarily
presupposes commensurate detached responsibility of action on the
part of the person occupying the exalted position. Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 335, 350, 20 L. ed. 646.

[873] The appellants do not question the fact of Judge Swink’s
having had jurisdiction of the subject of contempt (Thompson v.
Farmers Exchange Bank, 333 Mo., Le. 457, 62 8. W. (2), Le. 811-
812), even though, as the court of appeals held, they were not in fact
“in. contempt.’? Under the allegations of the petition, and the fact
was, the defendant was the qualified and acting judge of the Circuit
Court of St. Francois County and however rash and imprudent his

conduct, he did act in his official character and capacity as a judge of
a court of record with general jurisdiction (Lange v. Benedict, 73
N. Y., Le. 32-33; Bradley v. Fisher, supra), and whether the deputy’s
salary or contempt was the subject matter of any of the proceedings
before him, he was not ‘‘wholly without jurisdiction.’’ In these cir-
cumstances the diffiewlty with the appellants’ basic theory of liability
in these actions is their failure to carefully distinguish between acts
‘which exceed the officer’s jurisdiction, and those performed by him
entirely without jurisdiction.’’ Annotation 13 A.L.R., Le, 1855. It is
in this respect that the plaintiffs’ actions differ from the Ketcham
cases (Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F. (2) 948; Ketcham v. Commonwealth,
204 Ky. 168, 263 S. W. 725; Ketcham v. Manning, 212 Ky. 325, 279
S. W. 344) in which a court of general jurisdiction, upon its own
initiative, resolved itself into a ‘‘court of inquiry,’’ haled a spectator,
who was neither a witness nor a party to any proceeding, before the
court and sentenced him for contempt upon his failure to answer
questions propounded by the court, an illustration of truly ‘‘usurped’’
authority. But in these actions, as indicated, whether contempt or the
deputy’s salary was the subject matter, Judge Swink was not ‘‘wholly
without jurisdiction’’ of the subject matter. Jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter, in its broader sense, ‘‘is not confined within the particular
facts, which must be shown before a court or a judge, to make out a
specific and immediate cause of action; it is as extensive as the general
or abstract question, which falls within the power of the tribunal or
officer to act concerning. * * * The power to inquire and adjudge
whether the facts of each particular case make that case a part of an
instance of that general thing—that power is jurisdiction of the sub-
ject-matter.’’ Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y., le. 27-28.

Although his action in sentencing the appellants for contempt was
void, as the court of appeals held, it does not follow that he was
“entirely without jurisdiction’’ so as to be civilly liable in damages
to the plaintiffs. As stated, the court in the person of Judge Swink
had jurisdiction of the persons of the appellants and jurisdiction of
the subject matter even though he acted in excess of his jurisdiction.
“« “Hxcess of jurisdiction,’ as distinguished from the entire absence of
jurisdiction, means that the act, although within the general power
of the judge, is not authorized, and therefore void, with respect to the
particular case because the conditions which alone authorize the
exercise of his general power in that particular case are wanting, and
hence the judicial power is not in fact lawfully invoked.’’ 80 Am. Jur.,
See. 47, p. 760; Ussery v. Haynes, 344 Mo. 530, 539, 127 8S. W. (2)
410, 416. In the detailed circumstances set forth in the petitions the
consequence is that Judge Swink acted in excess of his jurisdiction,
hot wholly without jurisdiction, and is, therefore, not civilly liable
in damages to the dppellarits, and the trial court properly dismissed
their actions with prejudice, In principle, as well as in the detailed

circumstances, these actions fall within the facts and the rules applied
in the following cases: Thompson v. Farmers Exchange Bank, supra;
Ussery v. Haynes, supra; Yates v. Lansing, supra; Lange v. Benedict,
supra; Bradley v. Fisher, supra, and Waters v. Barclay, 57 Idaho 376,.
64 Pac. (2) 1079. Accordingly the judgments in the consolidated
actions are affirmed. Bohling and Stockard, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by BarRecr, C,, is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Srarr or Missourt ex rel. Hore, Pumuirs, Inc., a Corporation, Re-
lator, v. Joun H. Lucas, Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri, Respondent, No. 44786—284 8. W. (2d)
452.

Court en Banc, November 14, 1955.

Rehearing Denied, December 12, 1955.

Clyde J. Linde, Robert B. Langworthy, Billy 8. Sparks and Robert
J. Coleman for relator; Lengworthy, Mate & Linde and _Ringolsky
& Jacobs of counsel,

Raymond @. Barnett and John H. Foard for respondent. ‘

[453] WESTEUES, J.—Relator, Hotel Phillips, Inc., filed an appli-
eation in this court for a writ of mandamus to direct respondent,
Honorable n EH. Lucas, as Circuit Judge, to require answers to be
made to relator’s interrogatories filed in a suit pending in the Cireuit
Court of Jackson County, Missouri.

The case involving the interrogatories was filed on April 3, 1953, in
- the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, by Arthur Mag and the
First National Bank of Kansas City, a corporation, as executors of the
estate of Lottie Silvertone, deceased, and as trustees under her last will
and testament, against Phillips Investment Company, a corporation,
Hotel Phillips, Inc., a corporation, Joe Capra, Frank Aceurso, Sam
Accurso, and Jack Accurso to recover $62,000 as property damages
alleged to have been sustained on December 18, 1952, when a building
located at 1113-1115 Wyandotte Street, Kansas City, Missouri, owned.
by plaintifis was destroyed by fire.

It was alleged that defendants were tenants and subtenants of plain-
tiffs and had full control of the property; and that the defendants
were guilty of negligence in permitting the fire to start and spread.
It was alleged that defendants violated certain terms of the leases
with plaintiffs and that the fire was a direct result of those violations.
Defendant Hotel Phillips, Inc., filed a separate answer denying plain-
tiffs’ charges of negligence.

On December 2, 1954, relator, Hotel Phillips, Inc., filed interroga-
tories to plaintiff Arthur Mag. On December 9, 1954, plaintiff Arthur
Mag filed objections thereto. The respondent judge on December 21,
1954, indicated that the objections would be sustained. The present
proceeding was thereupon commenced.

The interrogatories which relator insists should be answered were
the following:

“Comes now defendant Hotel Phillips, Ine. by its attorneys, and
propounds the following interrogatories to Arthur Mag, Executor of
the estate of Lottie Silvertone and as Trustee of the Last Will and
Testament of Lottie Silvertone, deceased, one of the plaintiffs herein,
to be answered by him under oath: .

‘1, State whether the building known as 1118-1115 Wyandotte
Street, referred to and described in the Second Amended Petition for
Damages, was insured against loss by fire on December 14, 1952.

“2, If your answer to interrogatory No. 1 is in the affirmative,
please state:

“*(a) The amount of such insurance;

“*(b) The Company or companies in which such building was
insured and the amount of insurance carried by each
company on said building;

**(¢) Whether you filed a proof or proofs of loss, and if your
answer is in the affirmative, attach a copy of the proof
or proofs of loss filed by you after said fire;

“‘(d) Whether you set out the amount of loss claimed by
you in each proof of loss;

‘*(e) The amount of loss claimed by you in your proof or
proofs of loss;

““(£) Whether you were compensated, by any insurance com-
pany or companies for said loss;

“‘(g) The amount of insurance paid to the estate of Lottie
Silvertone, deceased, by each company;

[454] ‘‘(h) The amount of insurance paid to the Trust Estate
created under the Last Will and Testament of Lottie
Silvertone, deceased, by each company;

“‘(i) The amount of the actual damage to the property
known as 1118-1115 Wyandotte Street which was
caused by said fire on December 14, 1952;

‘*(j) Whether the actual loss and damage to the building at
1118-1115 Wyandotte Street on. December 14, 1952,
was fully covered by fire insurance.’

The objections to these interrogatories were ‘‘that the facts called
for by each of the interrogatories are irrelevant and immaterial to each
and every one of the issues of this case and are facts which properly
and lawfully should not be considered by the jury in deciding any of
the issues in this case.’”

The question for decision before us was tersely stated by respondent
as follows: ‘‘Husked of form and incidentals, the comprehensive
overall question is this: Were Relator’s trial court interrogatories of
a character requiring answers?’’

Relator contends that it is entitled to know whether the
property damaged, by the fire was insured and, if so, whether the loss
was paid in full or in part so it may determine who the real parties
in interest are; that if the loss has been paid in full, plaintiffs cease to
have any interest in the case.

The case of General Exchange Ins. Corporation v. Young, 357 Mo.
1099, 212 S.W.(2d) 396, le. 400, 401 (10, 11), sustains relator. In
that case, the insurance company (plaintiff in the case) was permitted
to sue in its own name for the amount it had paid on the loss. The in-
sured was permitted to sue for the loss in excess of the amount paid by
the insurance company. This court held plaintiff had not split her
cause of action; also that an insurance-company is subrogated for the
amount paid to the rights of the insured as against third parties
causing the damage.

Respondent does not contend that an insurance company is not
subrogated to the extent it has paid on the loss, but says that plaintiffs,
even though fully reimbursed for the loss, may nevertheless maintain
the action for the damage done. Citing Sexton v. Anderson Electric
Car Co., 234 8.W. 858. In that case, plaintiff-owner of a car which had
been wrecked sued the company causing the damage. The defendant
contended thar plaintiff was not the real party in interest. It was
shown that an insurance company had paid the loss. The court held
that under the terms of the policy the insured had agreed to sue for
the benefit of the insurer; that the insurance company was the real

party in interest but that under the agreement the insured could main-
tain the suit.

However that may be, the vital question now before us is not
in. whose name the suit for damages may be prosecuted but whether the
interrogatories are such that material, competent evidence may be
discovered for the trial of the case. Respondent stated the question
correctly in bis brief which we quoted above and repeat for emphasis:
“‘Were Relator’s trial court interrogatories of a character requiring
answers?’ We answer the question in the affirmative.

The question of the real party in interest may become very material
in the lawsuit. 'The same is true as to the amount of loss claimed by
the insured. It vannot be determined in advance whether the answers
to the interr6; ies will produce information which may be of aid in
doing justice. e function of the interrogatories is to find out if such
evidence exists. This court en bane, in the case of State ex rel. Cum-
mings v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 219 $.W.(2d) 383, lc. 390 (20),
made the following comment which may well be applied to this case:
“The search for the truth should proceed unhampered within con-
stitutional and statutory limitations. It is the trend of modern
practice in nearly every jurisdiction to so enlarge the scope of dis-
covery provisions that the discovery procedures will be a useful and
practical implement in [455] the search for and presentation of the
truth. That is the spirit in which our New Code was conceived and
implemented. The law frowns more and more upon ambush and delay
and approves more and more candor and fairness between parties
litigant. The modern discovery statutes and modern legal thinking
have abrogated the old common-law theory that litigation was a game
wherein the litigants had a right to conceal and withhold ‘their evi-
dential resources.’ ’”?

Again, in te ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 190 S.W.
(24) 907, Lv. 912 (10), the court en bane said: ‘The spirit of the new
code ig to allow essential information, admissible in evidence, to be
obtained by thv Jess expensive method of interrogatories whenever that
is reasonabl: anu. proper.’?

Hl It fellows that our writ of mandamus heretofore issued should
be made peremptory to require answers to the interrogatories.

It is so ordered. All concur.

Aurrup Rarusen, C. E. Dovur, Cuarance E. Corman, V. B. Von-
pisgr, C. A. VonTuun, J. E. VowTuun, Bert McCowzun, Luraze
Turner, Cart Guinasprz, W. Eiwyn Jowns, M. G. Conran, Dow
Bucxuzy, Aurrep Beckiey, Lem Gamer, H. L. Turner, G. D.
Garner, Onin F. Scuwanxs, Jr., 0. F. Lawson, Roy Cocxrum,
Leroy Mums, Vincm W. Forman, N. F. Karr, Carn Gruvira
and Ricwarp Grirrrts, Respondents, v. Ruorganizep ScHoon
District R-II of Sunrex Country, Missouri, Cari Brvr, Frank
Wanp, Joun Brapury, Joun McEwen, Justin Prories, Sreve
Bowpisu, Boar or Epucarion or Reoreanizep ScHoou Districr
R-II or Sunupy County, Missouri, Jamus E. Kiwwexn, Collector
of Shelby County, Missouri, Appellants, No. 44787—284 8. W.
(2a) 516.

Court en Bane, November 14, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, December 12, 1955.

a
pat
ip

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and John W. Inglish, Assistant
Attorney General, for James H. Kidwell, Collector of Shelby County,
Missouri; Hess G Collins and Paul D. Hess, Jr., for Reorganized

School Dist. R-II of Shelby County, Missouri, Carl Belt, Frank Wand,
John Bradley, John McEwen, Justin Peoples, Steve Bowdish, Board
of Education of Reorganized School Dist. R-II of Shelby County,

Missouri, appellants.

Wheeler and Rendlen & Rendlen for

J. Andy Zeng
respondents.

[519] STORCKMAN, J.—Two cases involving the same question
were consolidated. for argument on app Both cases involve the legal-
ity of a school tax levy. Jn one case the trial court decided in favor of

‘ality of the tax, and in the other case the decision was against its
y. One opinion on the s will be written. In neither case
facts in dispute. .

Briefly, the essential facts in this case are that at a special election

in the defendant school district a proposition was submitted to

a ™

authorize an increase in the school levy for a period of one year. The
revenue from the proposed levy was ‘‘to be used as a building fund
for an elementary school and gymnasium.’’ The amount of increase
submitted was in excess of the constitutional limit of one dollar which
could be levied by the defendant school district without voter ap-
proval. The proposal carried by more than a majority, but received less
than two-thirds of the votes cast. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the collec-
tion of the tax and to have the levy declared void. Defendants have
appealed from the judgment in plaintiffs’ favor.

Plaintiffs contend that § 11(c) of Art. X of the 1945 Constitution,
as amended, requires the approval of at least two-thirds, rather than a
simple majority, of the qualified electors voting thereon in order to
authorize a school levy in excess of the constitutional limitation of one
dollar for the purpose of erecting school buildings.

Section 11 of Article X in its present form was adopted November q,
1950, as an amendment to the 1945 Constitution. The amendment was
proposed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 8. Laws of Missouri 1949,
pp. 642-644. The original § 11 of Art. X of the 1945 Constitution was
repealed in its entirety and a new § 11 was adopted by the people;
however, the only change or addition was in subsection 11(¢). For
convenient reference we will set out § 11(c), with the portion added
by the amendment shown in italics. It is as follows:

“Tn all municipalities, counties and school districts the rates of
taxation as herein limited may be increased for their respective
purposes for not to exceed four years, when the rate and purpose
of the increase are submitted to a vote and two-thirds of the
qualified electors voting thereon shall vote therefor; provided im
school districts the rate of taxation as herein limited may be in-
creased for school purposes so that the total levy shall not exceed
three times the limit herein specified and not to exceed one year,
when the rate period of levy and the purpose of the increase are
submitted to a vote and a majority of the qualified electors vot-
img thereon shall vote therefor; provided in school districts in
cities of 75,000 inhabitants or over the rate of taxation as herein
limited may be increased for school purposes so that the total levy
shall not eacced three times the limit herein specified and not to
exceed two years, when the rate period of levy and the purpose of
the increase are submitted to a vote and a majority of the qualified
electors voting thereon shall vote therefor: Provided, that the
rates herein fixed, and the amounts by which they may be in-
creased, may be further limited by law; * * *.771

| | The plaintiffs contend that the words ‘‘for school purposes’’
in the amendment were adopted from the Constitution of 1875 and that
they have an adjudicated meaning that does not include the erection

1Emphasis within quotations, here and elsewhere in the opinion, has been
supplied by the writer unless otherwise indicated.

of school buildings. First let us examine the rule for which they con-
tend. It is stated in Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo.
839, 205 S.W. 196, 199, as follows: ‘‘The rule is firmly settled that
the adoption in a later Constitution of the [520] words and contest of
another, which had been construed by a court of last resort, is pre-
sumed (in the absence of a contrary intention) to have been done to
give the adopted words their adjudicated meaning.”’

First, it should be pointed out that the words in question could not
have been adopted directly from the Constitution of 1875. The new
constitution, as adopted by the people in 1945, did not use these words
in § 11 and there was a lapse or interval of five years before the words
were brought in by the 1950 amendment. There is in this case a lack
of continuity which uniformly exists where the rule is applied. The
point is that, by reason of the lapse of time, it cannot be logically
claimed that these words were adopted from the 1875 Constitution any
more than from some other source. With much more reason it could
be said that the words were taken from § 5 of Art. IX of the 1945 Con-
stitution, where they are used without any restricted or limited mean-
ing being expressed. This will be further discussed later in the opinion.

Further, the presumption can have no application where the
context of the amended section is materially different. The cases cited
by the plaintiffs in support of the rule are ones in which provisions
from previous constitutions have been reincorporated directly into a
later constitution in their entirety, or without material variation.
Take, for example, the case of Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck,
supra, which was a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an income tax law
on the ground that it violated § 4, Art. X, of the 1875 Constitution.
This section in the 1875 Constitution was: ‘‘All property subject to
taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value.”? 1 V.A.M.S. 249.
This same provision, without material change, was § 30, Art. I of the
1865 Constitution, 1 V.A.M.S. 118. In the 1820 Constitution it was
Art. XIU, § 19 (1V.A.MS. 96). The court held, since the context
was the same, the adjudicated meaning of the word ‘‘property,’’ ac-
quired under the previous constitution, should not be disturbed.

‘The other case cited by plaintiffs is also a classic example of the appli-
cation of the rule. In the case of Sanders v. St. Louis & N. O. Anchor
Line, 97 Mo. 26, 10 8.W. 595, the court was concerned with the con-
struction of Art. I, § 1, of the 1875 Constitution, which provided that
“The State shall have concurrent jurisdiction on the river Mississippi,
and every other river bordering on the State, so far as the said river
shall form a common boundary to this State and any other State or
States.’’ This same provision, in almost identical language, was con-
tained in the Constitution of 1865 (§ 2, Art. XI), 1 V.A.MS. 145, and
the 1820 Constitution (§2, Art. X), 1 V.A.M.S. 93.

The parties differ with respect to the application of the rule. The
touchstone of this point, and perhaps the whole case, is whether the

‘‘context’’ in § 11 of the 1945 Constitution, as amended, is the same as
the context in which the words ‘‘for school purposes’? were used in
§ 11 of the 1875 Constitution. Context is defined as: ‘‘The part or
parts of a discourse preceding or following a ‘text’ or passage or a
word, or so intimately associated with it as to throw light upon its
meaning.’’ Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Edition.

The most significant and vital difference in the context of the two

sections is the omission, in the new section, as amended, of all reference
to the erection of buildings as a separate classification for voting pur-
poses. The 1875 Constitution in effect provided that the annual rates
for school purposes might be increased to an amount not to exceed
$1.00 on the condition that a majority of the votes were cast in favor
of the increase, except that for the purpose of erecting public buildings
in school districts, the rate of taxation may be increased upon a two-
thirds vote.
. The most vital part of § 11, Art. X of the 1875 Constitution that was
abandoned entirely and not carried over into the new constitution or
the 1950 amendment, reads as follows (1 V.A.M.S. 251): “For the
purpose of erecting public buildings in counties, cities or school dis-
tricts, the rate of taxation herein limited may be increased when the
rate of such increase [521] and the purpose for which it is intended
shall have been submitted to a vote of the people, and two-thirds of
the qualified voters of such cownty, city or school district, voting at
such election, shall vote therefor.’’ There is no counterpart in the
1945 Constitution, as amended, of the above provision separately
classifying the purpose of levying a tax for the erection of school
buildings.

Tf § 11 of the 1875 Constitution had not expressly created the excep-
tion with respect to the vote necessary to create a tax for the erection
of school buildings, or if such provision had been repealed, there would
have been no occasion for the exclusion of the erection of school
buildings from the term ‘‘school purposes’’ generally. See the first
sentence of § 11 which gives the broad grant of power to tax ‘‘for
school purposes.’’ This is further evident from the statement in the
case of State ex rel, Brown v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 83 Mo.
395, which appears to be the first case construing § 11, Art. X, of the
1875 Constitution as it relates to school taxes. The genesis of the classi-
fication ruling is probably in that case, wherein the court states, Le.
897: ‘‘The plaintiff contends that all taxes relating to schools, school
buildings and indebtedness on account of schools and school buildings
are taxes for school purposes and but for the constitutional classifica-
tidn of these different taxes into taxes for school purposes, taxes for
the purpose of erecting public buildings and taxes to pay an existing
indebtedness there would be plausibility in the argument.’?

The purpose of erecting school buildings was expressly carved out
and separated from other school purposes in the old constitution.

‘The context is not the same in the new section, and that removes the
prop that held the meaning up. Obviously, affirmative negation is
not necessary, and an intention contrary to the presumed use may be
apparent from all the circumstances.

The construction of the old section resorted to over the years re-
lated primarily to what items should go into each of the two classes
established by § 11 of Art. X of the 1875 Constitution. The plaintiff
taxpayers cite a number of cases, all decided while the 1875 Constitu-
tion was in effect, in support of their contention that the words ‘‘for
school purposes’’ do not include the erection of new buildings or class-
rooms. lt might be questioned whether actually there was, under the
1875 Constitution, a construction such as that for which the plaintiffs
contend. In referring to this matter, it was stated in the case of
Harrington v. Hopkins, 288 Mo. 1, 231 S.W. 268: ‘‘The language of
the section just quoted is too plain to need construction.’’ The Harring-
ton case as well as Jacobs v. Cauthorn, 293 Mo, 154, 238 S.W. 443, and
State ex rel. Marlowe v. Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Co., 382 Mo.
879, 58 8.W.2d 750, all involved the question of whether alterations,
repairs, improvements or the furnishing of existing buildings were in-
eluded within the term ‘‘erecting buildings,’’ and it was held’ they
were not. In Hudgins v. Mooresville Consol. School Dist., 312 Mo. 1,
278 S.W. 769, it was held that the expense of equipping new buildings
could be included in the cost thereof and was not a school purpose
which must be paid out of annual revenue. In Peter v. Kaufmann,
327 Mo. 915, 38 S.W.2d 1062, an attack was made upon a bond issue
levied for the purpose of completing a schoolhouse. This was held
to be a separate and distinct tax and a valid levy. The case of Rus-
sell v. Frank, 348 Mo. 533, 154 S.W.2d 63, held that a levy could not
be made for payment into the building fund when no buildings were
contemplated by the funds to be later transferred to the fund for the
payment of general operating expenses of the school system. This was
held. void as an obvious evasion of the limits imposed by the constitu-
t10n.

‘In each instance where the term ‘‘for school purposes’’ has been
construed not to include building purposes, it has been because of an
express constitutional or statutory provision. For instance, the case
of Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People ex rel. Wood, 163 Ill. 616, 621, 45
N.E, 122, 123, twice cited in Missouri cases, is based upon [522] an
Illinois statute which authorizes a tax annually upon the taxable
property of the district, of ‘‘not to exceed two per cent. for educational,
and three per cent. for building purposes.’’ In the State of Georgia
there is no constitutional or statutory classification, and in the case of
Board of Commissioners of Roads & Revenues of Twiggs County v.
Bond, 208 Ga. 558, 47 8.B.2d 511, 512, the court held: ‘‘On the other
hand, the term, ‘for educational purposes,’ is broad enough to cover
all things necessary or incidental to the furtherance of education,

which would include the construction of schoolhouses, the only limita-
tion being the one fixed by the Constitution itself, to wit, that the levy
of a direct tax for educational purposes should not exceed fifteen
mills.’’

Hl The “constitutional classification’’ has been abandoned in the
new section, as amended, and in this changed situation the controlling
rule is: ‘‘With the disappearance of the reason, the thing disappears;
when the reason for a rule of law fails, the rule fails. When the reason
for a definition of a legal term ceases, the definition is obsolete.’’ State
ex inf. Norman v. Ellis, 325 Mo. 154, 28 §.W.2d 363, 367. The reason
for the definition was that the 1875 Constitution expressly required it.
That reason having been removed by the enactment of § 11 of Art. X
of the 1945 Constitution, as amended, the previous definition became
obsolete.

In the case of State ex rel. Crow v. Hostetter, 187 Mo. 636, 39 S.W.
270, it was contended that only males were eligible for the office of
clerk of the county court. The basis of this contention was that the
constitution provided that a public officer must be a citizen of the.
United States-and that he must have resided in the state for one year
“next preceding his election or appointment.’’ The court pointed
out that the omission of limiting words was significant, and stated, on
page 649:

“The dropping of the word ‘male,’ in describing the qualifica-
tions for such offices, has value as a guide to the legislative purpose
in enacting the present law on this subject. Can there be any
doubt as to the intended effect of such a change of the statute on
the particular question before us? .

. ‘It is always allowable in interpreting statutes to consider the
prior law as compared with the present, in endeavoring to reach
the true intent of the legislature which, when found, is the spirit
of the law that the courts should enforce.’’

Hi Plaintiffs are, in effect, asking us to imply an exception where
none exists under the express terms or plain intendments of the con-
stitutional provision. The law is well settled that it is the duty of the
court, in construing the constitution, to give effect to an express pro-
vision rather than an implication. In the ease of State ex rel. Scott v.
Direks, 211 Mo. 568, 111 S.W. 1, the question involved was the eligi-
bility of the relator to serve as sheriff where the constitutional provision
with respect to tenure had been amended. The court refused to construe
an exception where none was expressed, applying this rule (111 S.W.,
Le. 4): ‘But, however that may be, it must be borne in mind that, in
endeavoring to reach the meaning of the provision under consideration,
thete is a well-settled rule of interpretation, to wit: ‘Where no excep-
tions are made in terms, none will be made by mere implication or
construction.’ ’”

Hi The fact that a word, term or phrase in a different context and
under different circumstances may have a changed meaning is well
demonstrated by the ruling in Towne v. Hisner, 38 §.Ct. 158, 159,
wherein Mr. Justice Holmes stated: ‘‘But it is not necessarily true
that income means the same thing in the Constitution and the Act.
‘A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary sreatly in color and content ac-
cording to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.’’

There are other differences in the context, but the ones we
have pointed out [523] are sufficient without more to distinguish the
present use of the words from the use in the 1875 Constitution.
Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the words ‘‘for school purposes’”’
were adopted from the former constitution so as to foreclose an inquiry
into their meaning as used in the amended section.

If construction is needed, the court should approach the
construction of § 11 of Art. X of the 1945 Constitution, as amended,
from the standpoint of accepted rules of construction, the compulsion
of the previous definition having been removed. As stated in Cummins
v. Kansas City Publie Service Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920, 931:
“Tt is of course fundamental that where the language of a statute is
plain and admits of but one meaning there is no room for construc-
tion.’’ This rule applies with equal force to constitutional provisions.

If there is a conflict or ambiguity in the section that requires con-
struction, it can only arise between the term ‘“‘school purposes,” as
used in the amendment, and the term ‘‘respective purposes’’ appearing
in the first part of § 11(c), which reads: ‘‘In all municipalities,
counties and school districts the rates of taxation as herein limited
may be increased for their respective purposes * * *,”? The word
‘‘respective,’? as used in this connection, means ‘‘relating to particu-
lar persons or things, each to each; particular; several; as, their re-
spective homes.’? Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Edition.
Obviously, the use of the word ‘‘respective,’’ in this instance, is to
indicate a several, and not a joint, purpose. It is used for convenience
to avoid repeating the words municipal, county and school or school
district as modifiers of ‘‘purposes.’’ We consider the meaning to be
the same as if the drafters of the provision had stated ‘‘in all munici-
palities, counties and school districts, the rate of taxation as herein
limited may be increased for municipal, county and school district (or
school) purposes, respectively * * *.’”? The only question that can be
raised is whether the term “‘school district purposes’’ should be con-
strued to have a meaning that includes new buildings, while the term
“school purposes’’ should be construed to have a limited meaning
exclusive of building purposes. Certainly there is no distinction or
classification expressly created, nor do we believe that any can reason-
ably be read into the section by implication. Such a construction would
be strained and fanciful.

Hl Neither ‘“‘respective purposes,’’ ‘‘school district purposes”’ nor
‘school purposes’’ are technical words or phrases. Technical words
are those ‘‘of or pertaining to the useful or mechanical arts, or any
science, business, profession or sport, or the like.’’ Webster’s New In-
ternational Dictionary, 2d Edition. Therefore these terms must be
given their plain or ordinary meaning unless such construction will
defeat the manifest intent of the constitutional provision. State ex inf.,
Rice ex rel. Allman v. Hawk, 360 Mo. 490, 228 S.W.2d 785, 788.

‘We cannot agree that it is necessary, as plaintiffs contend, to
treat the term ‘‘school purposes’’ as surplusage if it does not have
the meaning for which they contend. It might as well be contended
that the phrase ‘respective purposes,’’ occurring in §§ 11(b) and
11(c), is surplusage in one or both places it is used. Unless limited
by the constitution, the legislature could extend to school districts
the power to tax for purposes beyond its usual realm. The limitation
results only because the constitution so provides. There could be no
objection if the constitution permitted by failure to restrict or even
provided that school districts could tax, for example, to build roads
and bridges in the district. It appears to be good draftsmanship and
entirely logical to mention ‘‘respective purposes’’ and ‘‘school pur-
poses,’’ as they occur in the section, in order to make it clear that the
intent is to keep each political subdivision in its own traditional field.

HE Nor can we find any logical basis for the contention that
building purposes [524] are excluded by the majority requirement
and included in the two-thirds provision. With equal logic any other
item of educational purpose might be excluded or included. We con-
sider that the limitations in the amendment of a rate ‘‘not to exceed
three times’’ the primary constitutional limit, and the period of ‘‘not
to exceed one year”’ as to duration of the levy, indicate an intent to
include all purposes in each instance. These added safeguards or
limitations are designed to compensate for lowering the required
majority.
: Assuming, however, that there is ‘‘room for construction,”’
there are well-recognized rules for the guidance of the court. ‘‘The
fundamental purpose in construing a constitutional provision is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people
who adopted it.”’ 16 C.J.S. 51, § 16. This is the rule in Missouri:
Graves v. Purcell, 3837 Mo. 574, 85 S8.W.2d 543; State ex rel. Aquamsi
Land Co. v. Hostetter, 336 Mo. 391, 79 S.W.2d 463, 468; State ex inf.
Norman v. Ellis, 325 Mo. 154, 28 S.W.2d 363; State ex rel. Lashly v.
Becker, 290 Mo. 560, 235 S.W. 1017, 1020; State v. Adkins, 284 Mo.
680, 225 S.W. 981. In this instance the framers are the General
‘Assembly of Missouri, since § 11 in its entirety was repealed and a
thew section adopted in lieu thereof, as shown by Senate Joint Resolu-
‘tion No. 3. Laws of Missouri 1949, p. 642.

a

ce

Consideration should be given to the purpose of the consti-
tutional provision in question and a reasonable interpretation should
be made of the language used. State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker, supra.
The language used in § 11 (c), as amended, presents no obvious con-
flict. The words ‘‘school purposes”’ are general words and the meaning.
of the term must be construed broadly and in accordance with their
plain and ordinary meaning, unless some good reason, consistent with
the purpose of the constitutional provision, otherwise appears.

A principle of construction that should be kept in mind is
that while the construction of constitutional provisions should be
neither liberal nor strict, it is quite generally held that in arriving at
the intent and purpose the construction should be broad and liberal
rather than technical, and the constitutional provision should re-
ceive a broader and more liberal construction than statutes. State ex
yel. Lashly v. Becker, supra; 16 0.3.8. 54, § 16; 11 Am. Jur. 670-671,
§ 59. The reason is, a constitution is expected to be effective over a
longer period of time, and its method of revision or amendment is more
cumbersome than the legislative process.

The unfettered term, ‘‘school purposes,’? connotes an all-
inclusive meaning and there are numerous circumstances that support
that interpretation. The amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolu-
tion No. 8 used the term ‘‘school taxes’’ in its title, which indicates
an intent that all kinds of school taxes be embraced in the language
used. The title reads (Laws of Missouri 1949, p. 642): “Repealing
and reenacting Section 11, Article X, Missouri Constitution, and in
addition providing school tawes may be increased not to exceed three
times constitutional limitation by majority vote for period of two
years in districts in cities of 75,000 or over and one year in other school
districts.’’ This throws light upon our problem and may be considered
according to the rule stated in 16 O.J.S. 65, § 23, as follows: ‘‘Although
the title to an act of the legislature proposing an amendment to the
constitution is not necessary to the validity of the act, nevertheless
such title may be resorted to when construing and interpreting the sec-
tion of the constitution to which it relates.’’ ‘‘School taxes’’ are not
distinguishable from taxes ‘‘for schools,’’ and this latter term was 5
held to include ‘‘all sorts and kinds of taxes.’’ See St. Louis & 8. F. R.
Co. v. Gracy, 126 Mo. 472, 29 S.W. 579, wherein the court stated (126
Mo., Le. 481): ‘‘It is evident that the words ‘for schools,’ in such a
connection, were not employed with reference to the details of any
scheme of taxation * * *, but, in a wider, larger sense, to describe
all sorts and kinds of [525] taxes, sanctioned by the constitution and
laws, for the support of schools.’’ . -

The term ‘‘school purposes’’ appears in § 5 of Art. IX
of the 1945 Constitution, as originally adopted. This section of the ar- °
ticle on education relating to the public school fund provides: ‘“‘The
proceeds of all certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund,

and all moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or
donated to any state fund for public school purposes’’ shall be paid
into the state treasury and invested and preserved as a public school
fund, the annual income of which shall be faithfully appropriated ‘‘for
establishing and maintaining free public schools.’’ The 1875 Constitu-
tion (Art. XI, § 6) had used the phrase, ‘‘for purposes of education,”’
but this was changed to ‘‘public school purposes’? in Art. IX, §.5,
of the 1945 Constitution. One of the rules for interpreting the
meaning of words in a constitution is that: ‘‘In the absence of a con-
trary intention, the same meaning attaches, or is presumed to attach,
to a given word or phrase repeated in a constitution, wherever it
occurs therein.’”’ 16 0.J.S. 60, § 19(b). The fact that the term ‘‘school
purposes’’ was in the 1945 Constitution at the time the 1950 amend-
ment was adopted indicates that we should look to the meaning as
there used rather than the meaning claimed to have been intended in
a former constitution which had been superseded more than five years
previously.

HH The report of the constitutional convention committee in-
dicates an intent to use the term in a broad sense. The committee on
Taxation, Levy, Assessment and Collection, No. 10 of the 1948-1944
Constitutional Convention, considered and reported on the section
in question. The majority report of this committee, in its explanatory
comment or ‘‘Remarks’”’ on § 11 (File No. 19, pp. 8, 11), refers to
‘school purposes.’’ It states: ‘‘Experience has demonstrated the need
of somewhat higher rates for school purposes, and this has been taken
eare of in the new Section.’’ The majority report used the term
““respective purposes’’ in the text of the section, and in that form it
was adopted by the convention. The minority report employs the
term ‘‘school purposes’’ which also shows an intent to get away from
the distinction and classification of the section of the former consti-
tution.

It should be carefully noted that the amended portion of the
section follows with meticulous care the language used in the orig-
inal provision for increase of the levy. For instance, both provisions
require that ‘‘the rate and purpose of the increase’? must be submitted
to the voters. Here again, there is no limitation on the purpose of
the increase when there was an opportunity to limit the purposes if
the framers (the legislature) had so desired. If the General Assembly,
in redrafting § 11 for reenactment, had intended to limit the applica-
tion of amendment to ‘‘the usual and ordinary expenses of maintaining
and operating schools’”’ or ‘‘school district purposes excluding the
erection of buildings,’’ it could have easily clarified the situation by
the use of some such expression. In order to give the words the con-
struction contended for by the plaintiffs, we must assume that the
General Assembly used a devious and round-about method of expres-
sion where a plain, simple, intelligible way was available to express the

meaning for which the plaintiffs contend. See State ex rel. Crow v.
Hostetter, 137 Mo. 636, 39 S.W. 270, wherein the court stated (137
Mo., Le. 648): ‘If the lawmakers had regarded sex as determining
eligibility, it seems to us that they would have expressed themselves
plainly to that effect, as they did in former years. They have so
expressed themselves in other statutes; * * *.”’

On each occasion that the General Assembly had an opportu-
nity to express itself it treated ‘‘school purposes,”’ ‘‘district purposes’?
and ‘‘respective purposes’? as synonymous. That the legislature did
not intend to limit the meaning of the words ‘‘school purposes”’ is
evident from its activities in connection with implementing both the
1945 Constitution and the 1950 amendment as regards § 11. The titles
to both the 1945 Act and the 1951 Act used the term ‘‘school pur-
poses.”’? The 1945 Act, after reciting the sections to be repealed,
stated: ‘‘all relating [526] to taxation for school purposes, and to
enact in lieu of said sections three new sections relating to the same
subject * * *.’ Laws of Missouri 1945, p. 1629. Senate Bill 208,
approved January 25, 1946. Senate Bill 5, approved on March 15,
1951, after the 1950 amendment, in its title stated this was an act ‘‘to
amend Section 165.080, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1949, relating to
increases in tax levies for school purposes * * *,’? Thus, in each in-
stance the General Assembly treated the subject matter of these two
acts all as ‘“‘school purposes’’—the first being before it had proposed
the 1950 amendment.

Furthermore, the resulting statute, which is now § 165.080, RSMo
1949, draws no distinction between the purposes for which a two-
thirds vote is required and those purposes for which a simple majority
is sufficient. Plaintiffs undertake to connect the term ‘‘necessary
majority’? with the purposes for which school taxes ean be voted.
There is nothing in the language of the constitution or the statute to
encourage such a belief. It is plain that the words ‘‘necessary ma-
jority’’ do not relate to the purpose of the tax, but to the amount of
the tax and its duration. A school tax voted by a two-thirds majority
may be in an unlimited amount and may be effective for not to exceed.
four years. A tax carried by a simple majority, however, must be
limited to three times basic limit of one dollar and ean be effective for
one year only. This statute and the manner in which it was enacted
further confirms the fact that the only distinction or classification made
by the legislature related to the amount of the increase and the period
for which the levy was voted.

A contemporaneous legislative construction is entitled to and will
be given serious consideration by the court in determining the meaning
of an ambiguous constitutional provision, both as a matter of policy
and also because it may be presumed to represent the true intent of
the instrument. State ex rel. City of Carthage v. Hackmann, 287
Mo. 184, 229 S.W. 1078, 1081; State ex rel. O’Connor y. Riedel, 829

Mo. 616, 46 S.W.2d 131; State ex rel. Wayland v. Herring, 208 Mo.
708, 106 S.W. 984. The General Assembly, in framing the 1950
amendment and the act to implement it, as well as the 1945 constitu-
tional provision, must be presumed to have known the problems pre-
sented which indicated the desirability of an amendment, and to
have drawn the amendment in a way to prevent or remedy the diffi-
eulty. Koontz v. City of St. Louis, (Mo.), 84 8.W. 2d 131; Lovins v.
City of St. Louis, 336 Mo. 1194, 84 S.W.2d 127; State ex rel. City of
Boonville v. Hackmann, 293 Mo. 318, 240 S.W. 185; State ex rel. City
of Carthage v. Hackmann, 287 Mo. 184, 229 S.W. 1078, 1080; 16 C.J.S.
52, 58, § 16.

The General Assembly, unless restrained by the constitution, is
vested, in its representative capacity, with all the primary power
of the people. Ludlow- Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339,
205 S.W. 196, 197. In view of this fact, great deference should be
had for the fact that the legislature made no distinction between

“*school purposes’’ and ‘‘district purposes’’ at any time when dealing
with this section. In considering contemporaneous legislative con-
struction, this court, in the case of State ex rel. O’Connor v. Riedel,
supra, held (46 S.W.2d, Le. 184): ‘“Though not conclusive, such in-
terpretation is entitled to great weight and should not be departed
from unless manifestly erroneous.”

Also, we have been reminded: of the well-established rule of
construction that an interpretation of a statute by public officers
charged with its execution, while not controlling upon the courts, is
entitled to consideration. State ex rel. Barrett v. First Nat. Bank of
St. Louis, 297 Mo. 397, 249 S.W. 619; Automobile Gasoline Co. v. City
of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 485, 82 S.W.2d 281, 283. It is claimed by the
school districts that the commissioner of education and others in his
department interpret the term ‘‘school purposes’’ as including erection
of buildings. However, we do not think the matter of such interpreta-
tion is properly before us, and we have [527] reached our conclusions
apart from any such consideration.

HMM Plaintiffs also complain of the representations that were
made or facts that were not disclosed by the proponents during the
campaign for the adoption of the 1950 amendment. Such a construc-
tion, even if it were proven, which it is not, is entitled to no considera-
tion. In the case of State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway Commission,
828 Mo. 942, 42 S.W.2d 196, 202, this court considered public utterances
of the advocates of an amendment to the constitution. This court,
after referring to an Arkansas case that ‘‘disregarded altogether’’
evidence of this sort, held, 1c. 202: ‘‘Without going that far in this
case, and not forgetting the return alleges the people did believe and
rely on the statements made to them, we hold it is neither conclusive
nor persuasive evidence that the particular clause of the amendment

here under consideration has the particular meaning respondent
attributes to it.’” 7 .

Unless the meaning of the terms employed is not clear, ques:
tions as to the wisdom, expediency or justice of the constitutional
provision should play no part in the construction thereof. Further
constitutional restrictions should not be held to apply if any reasonable
doubt as to their repugnance can exist in the judicial mind. Ludlow-
Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196. There is
nothing inherently wrong in permitting the voters in a school district
to tax themselves by a majority vote in a limited amount for a limited
time for any educational purpose. The rule of the majority is so much
a part of our political system and, in fact, of our way of life, that it
should not be denied to the people unless the law clearly so provides.
Tanner v. Lindell R. Co., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155, 158. Long term
levies and bonded indebtedness are covered by other constitutional pro-
visions. An annal levy for building purposes would seem to pre-
sent no more cause for alarm than an annual levy for maintenance and
operations. Both are vitally necessary for the successful operation of
our school system.

We should keep in mind that § 11(c¢) gives the legislature
the power to further limit the rates fixed by the constitution and
the amounts by which they may be increased. This indicates an in-
tent to vest the power of further safeguarding the people against
their own acts, so to speak, in the General Assembly rather than in
the courts. This fact should contribute to a liberal construction of the
constitutional limitations.

HM We believe, and so hold, that the only reasonable and har-
monious construction of the term ‘‘school purposes’’ is that it in-
eludes within its meaning construction of a building or additional
classrooms. Accordingly the judgment of the trial court is hereby
reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment
in favor of the defendants.

Leedy, O.J., Hollingsworth and Hyde, JJ., concur; Eager, J.,
dissents in separate opinion; Westhues, J., and Ruark, Special J.,
dissent, and concur in separate dissenting opinion of Eager, J.

EAGER, J. (dissenting)—A majority opinion and a dissenting
opinion were filed in this case on June 13, 1955. Thereafter the court
of its own motion granted a rehearing; supplemental briefs were filed
and the case has been reargued.

By stipulation of all parties this case was consolidated on appeal
with the case of State of Missouri ex inf. J. Patrick Wheeler, Pros.
Atty., ex rel. John Berhorst et al., Appellants vs. Reorganized School
District R-VI in Lewis County, Missouri et al., Respondents, No.
44,689, 365 Mo. 545, 284 9.W. 2d 585, which is an appeal from the
Cireuit Court of Lewis County. The cases involve the same question

SC ;

and only one opinion on the merits will be written. We consider here,
however, the contentions made by counsel in both cases, upon the
original submission and upon the rehearing as well. Both suits are
actions seeking, by injunction, to declare certain school district levy
increases to be void. The parties will be referred to in this [528]
opinion as plaintiffs (respondents here) and defendants (appellants
here). This court has jurisdiction primarily because the case necessi-
tates a construction of the Constitution of the State of Missouri.

There is no controversy concerning the facts. As shown both by
the pleadings and by an agreed statement they are as follows: On July
20, 1954, pursuant to notice, a special school election was held in the
defendant school district, at which election a proposition was submitted
to authorize an increase in the school levy of one dollar and forty-five
cents ($1.45) per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation, for a
period of one year, to be used as a building fund for an elementary
school and gymnasium; the $1.45 so referred to was in excess of the
constitutional limit of one dollar, which may be levied without a vote,
and also in excess of a previous levy increase of fifty cents which had
been approved on April 6, 1954. At the election the proposal received
214 affirmative votes and 160 negative votes; in other words, it received
a favorable majority, but not two-thirds of the ballots cast. Following
this election the defendant members of the Board of Education certi-
fied that the proposed levy increase had been approved, caused a levy
to be made accordingly, and the defendant County Collector extended
the levy of the tax upon the tax books against all assessed real and
personal property in the school district. This suit was instituted
at the relation of various residents and taxpayers of the school district
to enjoin the collection of the tax and to declare the levy and its certifi-
cation void. The trial court heard the cause and granted the injunc-
tion, holding that a two-thirds vote on the proposition was necessary,
and that the proposed levy and tax were void.

The legal question in the case may be more simply stated than
determined. It is asserted by plaintifis (and, of course, denied by
defendants) that no school levy increase for the purpose of erecting
new buildings may be adopted except by a two-thirds vote of the
qualified electors voting thereon. The question primarily involves a
construction of § 11(c) of Article 10 of the Constitution of Missouri,
as adopted in 1945 and amended November 7, 1950, by vote of the
people upon Resolution submitted by the General Assembly, which
Resolution has now become §§ 11(a) to 11(f), inclusive, of Article
10. Section 11(b) prescribes the limits of taxation which may be im-
posed without a vote. We set out at this point § 11(c¢) as originally
adoped by the 1943 Constitutional Convention, as follows:

“Tn all municipalities, counties and school districts the rates of
taxation as herein limited may be increased for their respective pur-
poses for not to exceed four years, when the rate and purpose of the

—

increase are submitted to a vote and two-thirds of the qualified electors
voting thereon shall vote therefor; provided, that the rates herein
fixed, and the amounts by which they may be increased, may be
further limited by law; and provided further, that any county or other
political subdivision, when authorized by law and within the limits
fixed by law, may levy a rate of taxation on all property subject to
its taxing powers in excess of the rates herein limited, for library,
hospital, public health, recreation grounds and museum purposes.’’

The material part of the amendment adopted in 1950 (and now ap-
pearing immediately after the first semicolon in original § 11(e),
supra), is as follows:

‘provided in school districts the rate of taxation as herein limited
may be increased for school purposes so that the total levy shall not
exceed three times the limit herein specified and not to exceed one
year, when the rate period of levy and the purpose of the increase are
submitted to a vote and a majority of the qualified electors voting
thereon shall vote therefor; provided in school districts in cities of
75,000 inhabitants or over the rate of taxation as herein limited may
be increased for school purposes so that the total levy shall not exceed
three times the limit herein specified and not to exceed two years, when
the rate period of levy and the purpose of the increase are submitted to
a vote and a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon [529]
shall vote therefor’’; (The emphases shown here and elsewhere on the
words ‘‘for school purposes’’ and ‘‘for building purposes’’ have been
supplied.)

The basic question involved here is whether this amendment of
1950 authorized school districts to increase taxes above the constitu-
tional limits of § 11(b) of Article 10, for the purpose of erecting new
buildings, by a bare majority vote, subject to the other limitations
of the amendment; or, expressed in another way and perhaps’ more
simply, whether “for school purposes,” in § 11(c), Article 10, as
amended, includes the erection of new buildings. The trial court
found that under Article 10, § 11(¢), as amended, and the provisions
of the applicable statutes, the levy increase for building purposes
was not properly and legally adopted by a simple majority, that a
two-thirds vote was required, and that the levy and the extension of the
tax were void; and the various defendants were enjoined from en-
forcing the levy and from collecting the tax.

In so far as we have found, the term “‘for school purposes’? has not
previously been construed or considered by the courts in connection
with § 11(c), Article 10 of the present Constitution. It was considered
several times as it appeared in Art. X, § 11 of the Constitution of
1875. Since we shall refer to some of those opinions, we set out here

. excerpts of the material parts of that section, as follows:

««* # Provided, the aforesaid annual rates for school purposes may

be increased, in districts formed of cities and towns, to an amount not

to exceed one dollar on the hundred dollars valuation, and in other
districts to an amount not to exceed sixty-five cents on the hundred
dollars valuation, on the condition that a majority of the voters who
are taxpayers, voting at an election held to decide the question, vote
for said increase. For the purpose of erecting public buildings in
counties, cities or school districts, the rate of taxation herein limited
may be increased when the rate of such inerease and the purpose for
which it is intended shall have been submitted to a vote of the people,
and two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city or school
district, voting at such election, shall vote therefor * * *,’”

In considering that section of the 1875 Constitution, the
Missouri courts held several times that there were inherent distinctions
between levy increases for “‘school purposes’? and levy increases for
the erection of new buildings (or, we may say, ‘‘bwilding purposes’’),
that the two types of increases required different votes, and that the
constitutional limitations on the amount of increases ‘‘for school pur-
poses’? did not apply to levy increases for building purposes. Probably
these decisions were based upon the distinction expressly made in the
Constitution, but whatever the source, the courts emphatically recog-
nized the distinction. To this effect see: Peter v. Kaufmann, 327 Mo.
915, 38 S. W. 24 1062 ; Hudgins v. Mooresville Consol. School Dist., 312
Mo. 1, 278 S.W. 769; Harrington v. Hopkins, 288 Mo. 1, 231 S.W. 263,
265; Jacobs v. Cauthorn, 293 Mo. 154, 238 S.W. 443; Russell et al. v.
Frank et al.—Bane, 348 Mo. 588, 154 8. W. 2d 68; State ex rel. Brown.
v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co., 83 Mo, 395, and State ex rel. Setzer
v. Wabash, St. L. & Pae. Ry. Co., 90 Mo. 166. In the case of Peter v.
Kaufmann, (38 8.W. 2d at l.c. 1066, 1067), this court said:

“Section 11, Art. 10, of the Constitution places limitations on the
annual rates of taxation which can be levied for school purposes,
which term is construed to cover all the usual and ordinary expenses
of maintaining and operating schools. Hudgins v. Consolidated School
District, 312 Mo. 1, 12, 278 S.W. 769. But, as we have seen, the only
limitation on the rate of taxation for buildings is that such rate and
the purpose thereof shall be submitted to a vote of the people of the
district and receive the sanction of a two-thirds majority of those
voting. Therefore, no building tax, whatever the rate, which has re-
ceived a two-thirds majority vote of the voters of the district at a
legally called election, [530] can be held violative of the Constitu-
tion. A limitation of 100 cents per $100 valuation is fixed by statute.
Section 11183, Rev. St. 1919. A levy for building purposes and erec-
tion of buildings is a separate and distinct tax not included in the
term ‘school purposes’ and not subject to the limitation as to amount
imposed by the Constitution. Hudgins v. Consolidated School District,
312 Mo. 1, 12, 278 S.W. 769.”’

In fact there does not seem to be any real controversy between the
parties here as to the distinction so recognized under the 1875 Constitu-

EE)

tion. Counsel for defendants say, however; among other things: That
the above cases are not applicable here because the express distinction
between school purposes and building purposes was not preserved in
§ 11(c) of the present Constitution ; that the present § 11(c) in itself
discloses an intent (presumably of the legislature and the people) not
to be bound by the prior construction; that the purpose of the 1950
amendment was to permit levy increases in limited amounts and for a
linvited time, without regard to purpose; that various statutes show a
legislative construction favorable to defendants; that if ‘‘school pur-
poses’’ is not construed to include ‘‘building purposes’’ then no levy
increase for building purposes could ever be properly authorized’ by
§ 11 (¢), supra; and, finally, that any other construction would intro-
duce chaos and confusion into the administration of the school dis-
tricts of Missouri. Other incidental contentions will be referred to in
the opinion.

It is true, of course, that § 11(c) of Article 10 of the present
Constitution makes no express distinction between levy increases for
“school purposes’? and ‘‘building purposes’; in fact, it does not
mention ‘‘building purposes’’ as such, or the erection or acquisition of
buildings. The 1943 Constitutional Convention and the people of
Missouri originally adopted § 11(c) in a form which specifically re-
quired a two-thirds vote (and not to exceed a four-year term) for any
and all levy increases. We regard this as highly material, for the form
in which the section was thus adopted eliminated automatically all
necessity for any distinction between ‘‘school purposes’’ and ‘‘building
-purposes.’’? The Convention, therefore, certainly evidenced no intent
to cut down the two-thirds majority theretofore uniformly required on
levy increases for building purposes; and we need look no more to any
intention of the convention, for it had thus performed its work and
departed. The people of Missouri, by their vote, adopted the 1945
Constitution containing the all-inclusive two-thirds requirement of
(original) § 11(c). If any uncertainty exists, it has arisen by reason
of the amendment adopted on November 7, 1950, following the Legis-
lative Resolution. And we pause here to say, parenthetically, that in
construing the Constitution (or any amendment) the primary con-
sideration is the understanding of the people at the time of its adop-
tion, since it derives all its force as a fundamental law from the people.
Household Finance Corp. v. Shaffner—Bane, 356 Mo. 808, 203 8.W.
2d 734, 787.

There is, of course, nothing in this record tending to demonstrate
specifically the intent of the people in adopting the amendment. The
statement is made in plaintiffs’ briefs that in the campaign for the
adoption of this amendment the people were never advised that funds
so voted might be used for building purposes. That fact, if true, is
outside the record, and we prefer not to risk stretching the doctrine
of judicial notice that far.

‘We cannot agree that § 11(c) as it now exists shows, in and
of itself, an intent ‘‘not to be bound by”’ the previous construction of
the phrase ‘‘school purposes.’’ This contention seems to be based wpon
the absence of any express distinction between ‘‘school purposes’’ and
“building purposes.’’ As previously stated, all necessity for such was
eliminated when the all-inclusive requirement of a two-thirds vote was
first adopted. But the phrase ‘‘for school purposes’’ was revived by
the amendment of 1950; so, as of that date, we must look to its past
meaning in order to determine what it was understood to mean upon its
re-adoption. The phrase ‘‘for school purposes’? had [531] been
adopted by the people in 1875 as one having a fixed meaning entirely
distinct from building purposes; and over a period of approximately
seventy years this phrase, ‘‘for school purposes,’’ had consistently
been considered by the people and construed by the courts as meaning
“all the usual and ordinary expenses of maintaining and operating
schools’? (Peter v. Kaufmann, 327 Mo. 915, 38 8.W. 2d 1062, 1066).1
So far as we can see it makes little difference how the meaning arose;
the chief point is that the words had a distinct meaning. Unless there
is some express wording in.the new § 11(c) to indicate the contrary, we
think that we must consider that the words were used and adopted in
the amendment in accordance with their traditional, historic and pre-
vious meaning, as acquired over this long period of years. Such is a
recognized rule of constitutional construction. (Moore v. Brown—
Banc, 350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W. 2d 657; Imdlow-Saylor Wire Co. v.
Wollbrinck—Bane, 275 Mo, 339, 205 S.W. 196.) We find no express
wording in the present section to indicate the contrary. And we note
further that if the 1948 Constitutional Convenion ‘‘abolished’’ the
phrase (as counsel argue) and distinction, which it apparently did
solely because the distinction was no longer necessary, the people of
Missouri revived the phrase by adopting the 1950 amendment when,
for the first time, any distinction was made under the 1945 Constitu-
tion between a simple majority vote and a two-thirds vote; the people
are presumed under these circumstances to have attached to the words
their previously fixed meaning? And actually the convention did
not abolish the phrase ‘for school purposes’? at all, but merely elimi-
nated, temporarily, the necessity for it. Counsel argue, very ably, that

*We do not attribute a contrary intent to the case of St. Louis & 8.F. Ry.
Co. v. Gracy, 126 Mo, 472, 29 S.W. 579, in which the court was considering
then existing statutes and the mechanics of collection; moreover, that
opinion seems to have recognized a distinction between the phrases “for
schools” and “for school purposes.” :

‘We have noted the cited case of Decker v. Diemer, 229 Mo. 296, 129 $.W.
986, which involved the application of county funds, and no question of a
levy inerease for any purpose. It seems apparent that school districts have
Jong been separately considered and the ease is not persuasive,

20n October 4, 1958, the people of Missouri also adopted, on referendum,
the “State Support of Schools Bill,” now § 161.021, V.A.M.S., 1955 Laws,
specifically defining “School purposes” as “teacher and incidental funds.”

the real purpose of the 1950 amendment was to permit a levy increase
for any purpose by a majority vote, so long as the increase was limited
to three times the usual constitutional limitation (one dollar per
hundred here) and the effective period was limited to one year. But
if we adopt this argument we would thereby make the phrase ‘‘for
school purposes’’ entirely superfluous; and certainly some purpose and
meaning must be given to every part of the section if such may reason-
ably be done. This rule seems to apply with particular emphasis to
constitutional construction and to require consideration of every word
and every phrase (State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman—Banc, 363 Mo.
245, 250 S.W. 2d 701; State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway Com.—
Bane, 328 Mo. 942, 42 S.W. 2d 196, 203; State on inf. McKittrick v.
Williams—Bane, 346 Mo. 1003, 144 8.W. 2d 98, 103). And, accordingly,
a construction which renders any words or any phrase meaningless
should be avoided, if possible, (id). Certainly school districts may
only tax for some objective connected with schools, and the first clause
of the section gives them ample authority to increase the rate of
taxation for any and all purposes within their powers, upon a two-
thirds vote (ie., ‘In all municipalities, counties and school districts
the rates * * may be increased for their respective purposes * *’’).
If this were not true then we would attribute to the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1948 the adoption of a perfectly useless provision, for this
sub-section was the only provision for increase adopted by it. We,
therefore, construe the ‘‘respective purposes’’ of a school district as
including all purposes and objectives for [532] which a school district
may properly levy an increased tax, and we believe that the Constitu-
tional Convention so intended it and the people so adopted it. The
amendment was adopted to permit some form of increase upon a
simple majority. If the phrase (of the amendment) ‘‘for school pur-
poses’? is not construed to have a limiting effect, then we think that it
has no meaning whatever and is rank surplusage; and if it was in-
serted for no reason, certainly a serious mistake was made. If the
phrase was not thus intended to limit the all-inclusive ‘‘respective
purposes,’’ then this part of the amendment might just as well have
read: ‘‘provided in school districts the rate of taxation as herein
limited may be increased? so that the total levy shall not exceed three
times the limit herein specified and not to exceed oné year, when * * *
a majority of the qualificd voters * * shall vote therefor.’’ If de-
fendants are correct in their contentions, such wording would have
been just as effective and much more simple. It seems to us rather
ridiculous to imply that ‘‘for school purposes’’ had to be inserted to
distinguish the functions of a school district from those of a county or
a city; certainly a school district cannot levy county or city taxes.
We conclude that this phrase was used and adopted with a restrictive

sIt is at this point that the phrase “for school purposes” appears.

effect and in the light of the previous understanding and interpretation
so long accorded to it. Consequently, we believe and those who concur
in this opinion hold that the purposes for which a levy increase may
be or is authorized under this section upon a majority vote (of less than
two-thirds) do not include an increase for erecting or purchasing new
buildings.

‘What we have already said probably answers the contention that,
upon our present construction, there could be no means of increasing
a levy for building purposes. We hold that there is, by means of the
two-thirds vote (and other requirements) contained in the first clause
of the section. It seems clear that the Convention of 1943 and the
people originally intended and considered that the ‘‘respective pur-
poses’’ (so used) should include both the ‘‘school purposes’ and the
building purposes referred to separately and specifically in the 1875
Constitution, and thus combined them, requiring a two-thirds majority
for all.

HH Counsel for the school districts have called our attention to
many statutes as supposedly evidencing a legislative intent favorable
to their contentions and which, they say, should be persuasive here.
It would be impossible to discuss all these statutes in detail; they cover
many subjects, including annexations, the discontinuance of school dis-
tricts, accounting, length of school terms, tax levies and other sub-
jects. Many of these could in no eyent be specifically applicable to the
districts here involved, because of population requirements. Counsel
argue: (a) That in many of these sections the term ‘‘school pur-
poses’’ (as in the annexation statutes) very apparently has a broader
meaning than we have given the term in this opinion; and (b) that,
in others (such as certain taxing statutes) there is a reference to
“school purposes,’? but no specific reference to building purposes.
The vast majority of the statutes so cited are re-enactments, either ver-

’ batim or substantially so, of statutes existing prior to the adoption
of the 1945 Constitution. As to those, and on contention (a) above, we
say that if the term ‘‘school purposes,’’ as there used, be given a
broader meaning, then the statutes were each and all in conflict with
the 1875 Constitution where the term concededly was given an ex-
pressly limited meaning; we can hardly attribute such a meaning or
construction to a whole group of statutes. Contention (b), supra,
is that certain of the school taxing sections (and perhaps others) refer
to ‘‘school purposes’’ with no reference to building purposes, and, as
we understand the contention, that our construction would leave a gap,
so to speak, in the authority of the districts. That does not follow, for
these are not the laws upon which tax levies for building purposes de-
pend. Under the 1939 Revised Statutes increased levies for school
purposes and for building purposes were separately authorized [533]
(§ § 10,358 and 10,359, RSMo 1939) ; with these provisions and the
basic constitutional grants it would seem that there was no need for

any reference to building purposes in any of the sections referred to,
prior to the adoption of the 1945 Constitution. The later statutes are
discussed in the next paragraph. At most, the cited statutes may only
be considered as indicative of a possible legislative intent.

Counsel also call our attention to the wording of certain statutes
enacted next following the adoption of the 1945 Constitution (§
165.080, RSMo 1949, being A. L. 1945, p. 1630) and as amended follow-
ing the adoption of the 1950 Constitutional amendment (§ 165.080,
V.A.MS., 1951 Laws, pp. 469-470) ; these, it is argued, indicate that the
legislature construed the present § 11(c) of Article 10 as permitting a
bare majority vote to be effective for any purpose. The 1945 Act,
supra, necessarily required a two-thirds majority to make effective any
increase above the specified constitutional limit, and also required that
each purpose (and the rate and period proposed therefor) be stated
separately. We note also that the legislature.there avoided the use of
the phrase ‘‘school purposes’’ (and its previously fixed meaning) and
used a new phrase,—‘‘district purposes,’’—as consonant with the all-
inclusive § 11(c) as it then existed prior to the amendment. The 1951
Act, supra, also requires that each purpose (and the rate and period
proposed therefor) should be stated separately, and provides: ‘‘and
if the necessary majority of the qualified voters voting thereon, as re-
quired by article X, section 11 of the constitution, shall favor the pro-
posed increase for any purpose, the result of such vote, * * * for each
purpose * * * shall be certified * * *,’”? The gist of the argument is
that the use of the words ‘‘for any purpose’? indicates a legislative con-
struction to the effect that a bare majority vote is sufficient ‘‘for any
purpose.’”’ We do not so understand or construe the statute; counsel
apparently overlook the word ‘‘necessary’’ appearing immediately be-
fore the word ‘‘majority.’’ We believe that the words ‘‘necessary ma-
jority’? include a two-thirds majority, as well as a bare majority,* and
that the legislature has now merely provided that when a proposal of
inerease (for any purpose) receives the majority necessary or required
for that increase by the Constitution, it shall thereupon be certified and
take effect. In fact a consideration generally of the legislation since 1943
confirms our views as herein expressed. In school districts of 75,000
to 500,000 population, levy increases for ‘‘school purposes’’ (sic)
and building purposes are still covered in separate sections of the
Statutes (§ § 165.487 and 165.490, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.). Section
161.040, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., which was last re-enacted in 1947,
deals with the apportionment of the state public school fund, and pro-
vides in part that: ‘‘When any district has legally levied for school
purposes (teachers’ wages and incidental expenses) a tax rate not less
than the constitutional limit * * *’”’ it shall receive certain allot-
ments, We do not say that this is an all-inclusive constitutional. defini-

4And see the phrase “two-thirds majority” as used in Peter v. Kaufmann,
827 Mo. 915, 88 S.W. 2d 1062, 1. c. 1066.

tion of school purposes, but it most certainly indicates a restrictive use
of the term, In the 1955 legislative session Senate Bill No. 3, the so-
ealled ‘‘State Support of Schools’’ bill, was enacted subject to refer-
endum. It was approved by the people on October 4, 1955. In its first
section, now § 161.021, V.A.M.S., 1955 Laws, it specifically defines
“School purposes’ as ‘‘teacher and incidental funds.’’ If, however,
we should be controlled here by apparent legislative intent as supposed-
ly indicated in literally scores of sections of the statutes, we might well
find ourselves wandering in a labyrinth from which there is no return.
Certainly the people, in adopting the 1950 constitutional amendment
could not have known of, understood and interpreted the various and
sundry statutes. But they did know that school districts had never been
permitted, in fact, to increase levies for building purposes by less
than a two-thirds vote.

HM [534] We do recognize the doctrine that constructions
placed upon the Constitution and statutes by the legislature or public
officers charged with their execution are persuasive and entitled to
weight, where the meaning is doubtful (Folk v. City of St. Louis, 250
Mo. 116, 157 S.W. 71, Le. 76; Gantt v. Brown, 244 Mo. 271, 149 8.W.
644, Le. 646). But such constructions are not in any event binding
on the courts; such is especially true if the supposed legislative con-
struction is not clear. Here we think that the weight of legislative
construction supports the views herein stated. And the principle is
not applicable if the provision being’ construed is not ambiguous.

It is insisted that the administrative interpretations of the Depart-
ment of Education, as given to various school districts, should be
highly persuasive. In the first place there is no evidence of any such
interpretations in the transcript of either of the consolidated cases,
and counsel have injected the matter into the cases extraneously,
largely upon the rehearing. But even so, while it may be the duty of
the Commissioner of Education to ‘‘advise * * school district officers
* on all matters pertaining to the school law’? (§ 160.100, RSMo
1949, V.A.MLS.) this injunction certainly does not mean that he shall
construe the Constitution of Missouri; this court will not, and should
not, be controlled in its constitutional construction by the mere ex-
pediencies of a situation created in part by any such advice. We refer
not to the Commissioner personally, but to the department as a whole,
and the sources of any legal advice which may have been given.

| It has also been suggested that the words ‘‘public school pur-
poses’? ag ‘used in § 5, Article 9 of the 1945 Constitution have a
broader meaning than we have given to the words ‘‘school purposes’’
here, since that section provides for using the income of the fund there
in question for ‘‘establishing and maintaining’’ free public schools;
and it is further argued that the construction of the words in the two
articles should be harmonious. We must consider each of the respec-
tive phrases in the full context in which it is used. Section 5 of Article

9 is dealing with and setting apart the ‘‘Public School Fund’’ con-
sisting of ‘moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or
donated to any state fund for public school purposes.’’ It has no
reference whatever to taxation. The Constitution distinguishes be-
tween the various funds held by the state, according to the purpose for
which each fund was respectively created. One such fund is the
“‘Publie School Fund.’’ The words ‘‘belonging to or donated to any
state fund for public school purposes,’’ merely serve to set apart such
money, property, etc., from all money or property belonging to or
donated to any other state fund. The income from this fund, together
with such moneys as are appropriated by the legislature, is applied to
the support of the public schools ('§ 3(a), Art. 9, Constitution, 1945),
and this combined fund is designated as the ‘‘State School Moneys
Fund”’ (§ 161.225, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.). A «wholly different source
of support for the schools is the method of local taxation provided by
Article 10 of the Constitution. When thus considered, we see that the
phrases are used in wholly different contexts in the two articles; the
use in Article 9 of the words ‘‘public school purposes’? (note the
slight but perhaps immaterial difference) should not be controlling
or even persuasive in construing Article 10 dealing solely with taxa-
tion, where a specific use and interpretation of the term ‘‘school pur-
poses’’ has been recognized over a long period of years. In Article 9
there was no reason to differentiate between any different purposes
concerning schools, whereas under Article 10, as we say, a distinction
had long been recognized for purposes of local taxation. Section
161.040, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., is a statute implementing § 5, Article
9, supra, and the legislature (if such interpretation be of any signifi-
cance) therein used the words ‘‘levied for school purposes (teachers’
wages and incidental expenses).’’ We note also that the term ‘‘School
Purposes’’ is used in the title of § 3(b) of Article 9, which section
specifically refers merely to the swpport of the schools,—not to
building or establishing [535] schools. Our construction is more
harmonious with that use of the term than is the construction now
contended for of § 5 of the same Article. Everything considered, we
think little is to be gained by any comparison of the words actually
involved with other words and terms appearing outside of the particu-
Jar article now in question.

HH In view of the foregoing, we have determined that the levy
increase in question was void and unenforceable. We believe that the
taxpayers of Missouri have long recognized the distinction between
the majorities required for tax inereases for school operating purposes
and for acquiring school sites and buildings. As a practical matter, an
inerease may always be voted for any purpose by a two-thirds
majority.

No thinking person considers lightly the needs of our public
schools, both in operations and-for buildings, But the framers of our

a ve

fundamental law, and the people in adopting it, have seen fit to affix
sundry restrictions on the taxing powers of local bodies which might
perchance, become over-zealous. The tax-paying citizens of Missouri
are entitled to the measure of protection afforded by those restrictions.
This court has the final responsibility of construing and enforcing
those provisions, and in this opinion we only seek to carry out that
responsibility. We cannot compromise our interpretation of the funda-
mental law to meet some immediate need. The mere fact that a two-
thirds majority was not obtained in either of these instances indicates,
perhaps, considerable doubt on the specific propositions involved, and
the wisdom of such permanent, over-all limitation.

The issues here have not involved any questions of maintenance,
ordinary repairs, or the purchase of equipment or furnishings. In
this respect, the majority opinion heretofore filed may have been mis-
understood. Nor does the present case in any way involve or affect
the power of a school district to incur indebtedness under § § 26(b)
and 26(f) of Article 6 of the Constitution and the statutes enacted
pursuant thereto.

The foregoing represents the views of the writer and of those who
concur in this opinion. We, therefore, respectfully dissent from the
opinion of the majority.

Westhues, J., and Ruark, Special J., concur in the foregoing dis-

senting opinion.
[|

Tar State or Missouri, at the Information of J. Parrick Warener,
Prosecuting Attorney of Lewis County, Missouri, at the Relation
of Jouw Brrnorst, Frank H. Gaus, Homer E. Gaus, Asperry
Boysgr, Gzores Exurson, Roy O. Crist, Cuarnes Suumars, Jon
Hare, W. J. Srepumns, W. B. Powzin, J. C. Wisrman, Ray
Bowman, W. A. Norstnerr, Hurpurt Barr, A. C. Etsnnpzre,
Nos# Srany, Sumner Henry, Goren Wippows, Groren RicHTsr
and J. O. Rew, Appellants, v. Roreanizep ScHoon Distrior
R-VI in Lewis Counry, Missouri, Rosrrr S. Mamrs, THomas
Brown, James Nunn, Roy McDowru, W. L. Brevsr, and
‘Trmopors StuRHAN, Board of Education of Reoreanizep Scroon
Disreicr R-VI in Lewis County, Missourt, Kennzrs 8. Prawn,
Collector of Lewis County, Missouri, and Busrex Construction
Company, a Missouri Corporation, Respondents, No. 44689—284
S.W. (2d) 535.

Court en Banc, November 14, 1955.
Rehearing Denied, December 12, 1955.

ox
ry
a

J. Andy Zenge, Jr, J. . Patrick Wheeler and Rendlen & Rendlen for
appellants. . :

B

Boyle G. Clark and Raymond C. Lewis, Jr., for respondents ; Clark
& Becker of counsel.

[536] STORCKMAN, J.—This is an action seeking to declare a
school tax levy void and to enjoin its collection. Defendants’ motions to
dismiss plaintiffs’ petition were sustained and plaintiffs have appealed.
This case was consolidated for argument on appeal with the case of
Alfred Rathjen, et al., v. Reorganized School District R-II et al., No.
44,787, 365 Mo. 518, 284 S.W. 2d 516.

The relators are residents and taxpayers of the defendant
school district. Their petition alleges that at the annual school election
held on April 6, 1954, a proposition was submitted to authorize the
levy of a tax rate of one dollar on the hundred dollars assessed valu-
ation for the construction of new and additional classrooms in the school
district; that more than a majority but less than two-thirds of the
ballots and votes cast were in favor of levying the tax proposed; that
‘onder the provisions of Article X, Section 11, of the Constitution of
Missouri, 1945, as amended and the provisions of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri, applicable thereto, the levy of One Dollar ($1.00) on the
One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) valuation for building purposes
could not be made by the defendant school district and board of
education unless and until such levy had been voted by two thirds
(2/8rds) majority of the qualified resident, taxpaying voters in said
school district voting in said election’? ; that defendant members of the
Board of Education declared and certified that proposed tax rate was
approved and adopted and that said tax rate has been extended and

would be collected and disbursed for the construction of new and addi-;
tional classrooms unless it be declared void and its collection, be
enjoined.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss alleging that the petition failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted were sustained, and
after an unavailing motion to set aside the court’s order of dismissal
this appeal was taken. . .

. The legal question involved is the same as presented in the case “of
Alfred Rathjen, et al., v. Reorganized School District R-IT of Shelby
County, Missouri, et al., No. 44,787, 365 Mo. 518, 284 8. W. 2d 516, and
for the reasons given in the opinion this day filed in that case the judg-
ment herein should be affirmed and it is so-ordered, Leedy, C. J.,
Bik “ollingsworth and Hyde, JJ., concur; Eager, J., dissents in separate,
opinion; Westhues, J., and Buark, Special Judge, dissent, and concur _
in separate dissenting opinion of Zager, J.

[537] EAGER, J. (dissenting)—Pursuant to stipulation this case
was consolidated on appeal with'the case of Albert Rathjen, et dl.,"
Respondents vs. Reorganized School District, R-II of Shelby County,
Missouri, et al., Appellants, No. 44,787, 365° Mo. 518, 284 8. W. 2d 516,"
which is an appeal from the Cireuit Court of, Shelby County. The
opinions have now been filed in the latter case, after a rehearing, and,
since the cases involve the same question, no opinion on the merits need
be written in the present case. Appellants will be referred to herein’
as plaintiff-relators and respondents will be referred to as defendants.

HI The suit is one seeking, by injunction, to declare a certain’
school levy increase to be void. The trial court’ sustaincd motions to
dismiss the petition. The facts, as pleaded in the petition, are as fol-
lows: The plaintiff-relators (three of whom later withdrew, by leavé)
are residents and taxpayers of the defendant school distri¢t; on April
6, 1954, pursuant to notice, the annual school election was held in the
defendant school district, at which election two propositions were sub-
mitted to the qualified voters as follows: (1) A levy imerease of
eighty-five cents on the hundred dollar valuation’ for ‘‘s¢hool pur-
poses,’? in addition to the one dollar which might:’be-levied by the
Board without voter approval; and (2) a levy of one-dollar on the
hundred dollar valuation ‘‘for Building Purposes (Building Fund for
buildihg classrooms). This levy.for one year’’; that on proposition
(2) above, namely, the Building Fund levy, there were 406 affirmative
votes and 868 negative votes, constituting a majority of less than two-
thirds; that in fact the building fund levy was sought for the purpose
of building new classrooms; that the deferidaut School District and the
defendant members of the Board of Education thereupon certified that
the building fund levy had been approved, and adopted and caused a
levy to be made accordingly upon all real and personal property in the
district ; that the defendant County Collector extended said levy upon
the tax books of the county and was ‘‘about to’’ collect’the tax ; that the

Board of Education had entered into a contract with the defendant
construction company which defendant was ‘‘about to’’ begin the con-
struction of new classrooms. The petition further alleged that the
aforesaid building fund levy, and all subsequent acts pursuant thereto,
was void and of no effect because it had not received the approval of
two-thirds of the qualified voters voting in the election in question, as
required by Article X, § 11 of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, as
amended, and by the Revised Statutes of Missouri. Plaintiff-relators
asked permanent injunctions against all defendants prohibiting them,
individually and collectively, from taking any action to enforce the
said one dollar building fund levy and from collecting or attempting
to collect the tax. They also sought a declaration that the levy and tax
were void and unenforceable. All defendants except the County Col-
lector filed, motions to dismiss, in substance alleging that the petition
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because, as a
matter of law, only a ‘‘simple majority’’ of the qualified voters was
required for the approval of this levy under the Constitution and
Statutes of Missouri. The Cireuit Court sustained the motions to dis-
miss, and after an unavailing motion to set aside this order and rein-
state the petition, plaintiff-relators appealed.

The legal questions involved herein have been fully considered by
this Court in the majority and dissenting opinions now filed in the
case of Alfred Rathjen, et al., Respondents vs. Reorganized School
District R-II of Shelby County, Missouri, et al. Appellants, No.
44,787, 365 Mo. 518, 284 §. W. 2d 516. For the reasons stated in the
dissenting opinion therein the writer feels that the order of the Cir-
cuit Court in the present case should be reversed and the cause re-
manded for further proceedings. Westhues, J., and Ruark, Special
Judge, concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

Tauuman Company, a Corporation, Appellant, v. Wmniam Laran,
Harotp J. Grssons, Ernest Conn, Bryon Trerrs,. Wooprow
Wuson, Joun Nepiou, Cumrrorp J. Her, Joun D. Uarey,
Wurm A, Morris, R. L. Portarp, and Luster Stayton,
Respondents, No. 48437—284 8. W. (2a) 547.

Court en Banc, November 14, 1955.

Rehearing Denied, December 12, 1955.
Le

John R. Stockham, Eugene H. Buder and Benjamin Roth for
appellant; Stockham, Roth, Buder & Martin of counsel.

Y ister and Wiley, Craig & Arm-
spondents; Wiley, Orc Armbruster, Schmidt & Wil-
burn of counsel.

[548] WESTHURS, J.—This suit was-filed in the Circuit Court‘of
St. Louis County, Missow , by plaintiff, a corporation engaged’ in
selling at wholesale plumbing, heating, and imill supplies, to enjoin
[549] the picketing of its place of business and for damages alleged
to have been caused to its business by such picketing. The trial court
after ‘an extensive hearing on the question of whether the picketing.
was lawful took the case under advisement. While the case was thus
pending, the picketing was discontinued and the trial court dismissed
plaintiff’s petition. Plaintiff corporation’ appealed’ from that judg-

The defendants are members, offidérs, and agents of Warehduse-
men, Loaders, Stackers, and Graders, Local Union 688, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of
America, of the A.F.L. The action is brought against defendants in-
dividually and as a class. We shall refer to defendants as Local 688.

The case on appeal was first submitted in Division IL of this court
in September, 1953. On March 8, 1954, in an opinion by Judge Leedy,
the cause was remanded with directions for a hearing’on the question
of damages. On June 14, 1954, the cause was transferred to the Court
en bane where in October, 1954, it was argued and submitted. On
March 1, 1955, the court set aside the submission to await the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States of the case of Artheuser-
Busch, Ine. v. Weber. Another compelling reason for the court’s
action was the number of changes in the personnel of this court. The
case was reargued and resubmitted on September 27, 1955. The case
of ‘Webér -v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 75 S. Ct. 480, had
then been decided and published. That ease and the case of United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U: S. 656,
74 8. Ct. 838, decided June 7, 1954, were cited by plaintiff and the
‘defendants in the supplemental briefs filed for ‘the September, 1955,
hearing. Those cases have a material bearing on the issues of law’ in-
volved on this appeal. It is, therefore, desirable to write 4 new opinion
even though the result will be the same as that in the opinion in Divi-
sion II.

Plaintiff contends that even if the trial court was justified i in denying
injunctive relief because of the mootness of that question, the trial
cowtt should have heard evidénce on the question of damages. Plain-

tiff argues that the picketing was unlawful and in addition was con-
ducted in an unlawful manner and had it not been that the question
of the injunctive feature became moot, the trial court would have been
justified in granting injunctive relief.

The defendants say that the picketing was lawful and peaceful
and, therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Defendants also
say that if it should be held that the picketing was unlawful and con-
ducted in an unlawful manner, the state courts have no jurisdiction
and the Federal Board, particularly the N.L.R.B., has exclusive juris-
diction of the subject matter.

For a better understanding of the case, it may be well to relate
briefly the principal events which brought about this litigation. Prior
to January 1, 1952, Local 688 was the bargaining agent representing
the employees of thirteen wholesale plumbing houses in the St. Louis
territory. The contract expired December 31, 1951, and on failure of

‘the parties to agree on terms of a new contract, a strike was called
on January 2, 1952, of the employees of these houses belonging to
Local 688. There were twelve other such establishments whose em-
ployees were not represented by Local 688 as a bargaining agency. At
the time the strike was called, picket lines were placed at all of those
twelve business houses as well as at the thirteen houses represented
by Local 688. The plaintiff Tallman Company, which was one of those
not so represented, employed two union truck drivers who were repre-
sented by Local 682 as bargaining agent. Of its 23 employees, only 12
or 13 of the Tallman employees were eligible to membership in de-
fendants’ Local 688. The pickets carried signs and distributed leaflets,
The view we take of this case renders unnecessary our setting forth
the contents of these leaflets and the wording of the signs.

[550] Plaintiff, on March 4, 1952, filed its petition asking
that the picketing be discontinued and for damages. A hearing was
held March 20-22, 1952, and the trial court took the case under ad-
visement. On April 2, 1952, an election of the employees of plaintiff
resulted in their choosing the Tallman Employees Association as their
bargaining representative. On April 10, 1952, the N.L.R.B. approved
the selection. Local 688 thereupon removed the picket lines. On June
9, 1952, the trial court entered its decree dismissing plaintifi’s peti-
tion. The picketing having been discontinued rendered moot the in-
junctive feature of the case and the trial court was justified in so
treating that question. However, during the trial, it was stipulated
that the question of damages as prayed for by plaintiff should be tried
at a later date. Note a portion of the agreement as stated by de-
fendants’ attorney : .

“MR. CRAIG: It is stipulated by and between the parties to this
cause that the issues of the case relating to damages may be continued.

for later hearing, and that in so doing neither the plaintiff nor the

defendants will waive any rights that they might otherwise have had.””

If the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter, then, of course, it rightly dismissed plaintiff’s petition in-
eluding the claim for damages. We must therefore determine the ques-
tion of jurisdiction. In considering the question of whether the
picketing was for a lawful purpose and was conducted. peacefully, it
must be noted that the Tallman Company did not have any dispute
with its employees. The Tallman Company at all times was willing
to bargain with any representative selected by its employees. None of
its employees was a member of defendants’ Local 688. After the picket
lines were established, the Tallman Company attempted to have an
election under the supervision of the N.L.R.B. but Local 688 disclaimed
any interest therein.

Picketing by a non-representative union may be lawful or unlawful
depending upon the purpose and intent of the picketing and the
manner in which it is conducted. In this case, it was conclusively
established that the purpose of the picketing was unlawful. It was
in violation of the rights of the Tallman employees ‘‘to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing.’’ Article
I, Section 29, Constitution of Missouri 1945, and Title 29, Sections
157 and 158 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. De-
fendants’ purpose in picketing the Tallman Company place of business
was to force plaintiff to sign a collective bargaining agreement and to
force plaintiff’s employees to join Local 688. Defendants do not
contend otherwise. In oral argument in this court and in their brief,
they take the position that such picketing is lawful. Note what was
said in the brief: ‘‘The Court did not err in finding for defendants,
because even if the avowed purpose of the picketing had been to force
plaintiff to sign a collective bargaining agreement agreeing to hire
only members of Local 688, that purpose would not have been unlawful,
though as a result plaintiff’s employees would have been forced to
join the union or lose their jobs, Art. I, Section 29, Const. Mo. 1945,
not applying.” .

Some of the evidence on this point and on the manner of conducting
the picketing was reviewed in Judge Leedy’s opinion, a portion of
which we set forth: ‘‘While here there had been no direct demand
by the union upon the employer for a contract, there was credible
evidence that one of plaintiff’s foremen was approached by a man who
represented himself to be a business agent of Local 688 in which the
purported agent inquired, ‘Why don’t you people sign up?’ The fore-
man replied that none had ever approached ‘us’ to join, to which the
agent replied, ‘You might as well sign wp because when all these other
contracts are signed there still will be pickets in front of your place.’

“Tt was also shown by a salesman for the company that the captain
of the picket line asked if the salesman ‘would talk to Mr. Tallman
or Mr. Thompson (President) as to whether we would join the union,

and they would offer us the same contract as’ a [551] certain other
(previously non-union) house got. .

“Moreover, counsel for defendants stated at the trial: ‘We will
certainly stipulate that these organizational picket lines are put up
and are existing now and that as far as the union is concerned they,
will not come down until such time as the employees join the union
and they get recognition. * * * We are willing to go a step further
and say to the Court and will so stipulate that in putting up these
organizational picket lines it is our hope that everyone that encounters
that line will refuse to cross it. It is our hope that every concern that
has previously done business with the company picketed will terminate
its business relations with that company and discontinue all relations
until the picketing itself is discontinued. We hope the customer, the
suppliers of the plaintiff, will have nothing to do with them and.we
hope that the public opinion will become so strong as to persuade the
employees to our way of thinking.’

“In addition to this, the following testimony of the Executive
Seeretary of Local 688 (who did not know the wage scale and working
conditions at the plaintiff company) is highly revealing:

“*Q. If the Tallman Company would right now agree to sign a
contract with Local 688 what would you say? A. As of right now?
* * * T would say I didn’t want it, we couldn’t sign it. * *.*

«*¢Q. Why not? A. Because we don’t Tepresent a majority, of the
members, the employees. * * *

“<Q. Now, how long do you propose to maintain this picket line?
A. I propose to maintain it until such time a3 the weight of public
opinion can result in the employees joining the union and the company
signing an agreement with us..* * *

“««Q. How will the pressure of public opinion affect the employee?
A. If they saw, for instance, that the public was taking their business
to a firm which employs workers and pays decent wages and has decent
conditions, it is possible the employees might recognize there must be
something worth while about such a situation and they will come.
down and investigate the Union and sign up. * * *

“¢Q. Do you believe the Tallman Company employees are capable
of determining their own best interests? A. Not necessarily, when
sources of information are controlled, when people have certain
economic pressures to put on you, you are no longer a free agent.

““*Q. You believe you can better determine their interests than
they can? A. I don’t know as how I can necessarily, but a person
outside of the pressures which work on the employee at Tallman’s, who
can be objective about evaluating the situation, who has background
experience, has seen this happen thousands of times, can often be a
better judge as to what is better for the person than the individual.’

“In the light of the facts we have enumerated, we think the con-
clusion inescapable that the object of the picketing was not to pub-

licize the fact that the Tallman employees were not members of the
picketing union, but on the other hand was designed to so adversely
affect plaintiff’s business (and correspondingly, the ability of the
employees to remain employed there) that the company would feel im-
pelled to intervene in an effort to have the employees join the union,
and obtain a contract.’

Hi ‘The evidence also disclosed that the pickets on duty at the
Tallman place were actively engaged in ‘‘baiting’’ for trouble. Cus-
tomers coming to the place were accosted by the pickets'and intimi-
dated and threatened. One customer was told he would find the road
home pretty rough. When the customer replied the roads were not
rough, the picket replied, ‘‘I’m telling you the facts, Mister, it will
be mighty rough.’’ Another customer was told by a picket, ‘‘If you
go back in any more you will get hurt.’’ These customers did not
return. One of the employees, as she returned from lunch, heard one
of the pickets say, ‘“Throw a God-damned bomb in the place. That
will bring them ‘to terms.’’ [552] It was the practice of the pickets
to follow any cars or trucks leaving plaintift’s place of business and
to harass them along the highway or streets. This became very annoy-
ing.and the police were called on for protection. It was admitted by
the defendants that after the police stopped a few cars of the pickets
following customers, they adopted the practice of having two cars
follow so that when the police stopped one, the other would take his
place.

Robert Kahtz, a salesman for Tallman, testified that on one occasion

when he left the Tallman Company to go to his home in Cape
Girardeau, he was followed by two cars being driven by Haley and
Pollard, two of the pickets. Kahtz stated that in the 4100 block on
Kingshighway in St. Louis, one of the pickets, having driven his car
ahead of Kahtz, stopped his car, and the other picket driving a car
following put his bumper against the Kahtz car and tried to shove
it into the car ahead. Kahtz testified that he was followed by Pollard
cwho, on the highway south, tried on several occasions to force Kahtz
off the road; that this harassment continued until he reached Festus.
It may be noted that Pollard testified that he followed more cars and
trucks leaving Tallman than any other picket because his car could
‘travel faster than any of the other cars.
! Other incidents are in the record of the pickets’ using obscene
language and making threats toward customers and employees of
the Tallman Company. We do not deem it necessary to relate further
‘examples since those we have related are indicative of the general
-conduct of the members of the picketing force.

Picketing to coerce employees to join a certain union and to
‘designate that union as a bargaining agent is a violation of our state
constitutional provisions, supra, and Sections 157 and 158, Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947; Katz Drug Co. v. Kavner, Mo.,

249 S.W. (2d) 166, lc. 169, 170 (4-6) (7-9), and cases there cited. In
the opinion adopted in Division II, Judge Leedy interpreted the
meaning of Article I, Section 29, of our Constitution in these words:
“The right of choice thus guaranteed employes means a free choice,
uncoerced by management, union, or any other group or organization,
so that picketing with an objective in violation of that guaranty must
be regarded as equally unlawful as where coercion to violate a statute
is involved, as in the Giboney case.’’ Giboney v. Bmpire Storage and
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 93 L.Ed. 834, 69 S.Ct. 684; Pappas v. Stacey,
116 A. (2d) 497.

As we interpret the cases of Garner v. Teamsters, 846 U.S. 485,
74 8. Ot. 161, 98 L. Ed. 228, and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
supra, state courts would not have jurisdiction of this case if the
picketing had been peaceful and orderly even though unlawful as
violative of our state constitution and the provisions of the Labor
Management Relations Act. It was held that in such situations the
jurisdiction vests exclusively in the Fedetal agencies. We so held
in Cooper Transport Co. v. Stufflebeam, 365 Mo. 250, 280°S.W. (2a)
832. However, in this case, the picketing was not peaceful and orderly.
The harassment of customers and the salesmen of the Tallman
Company by the pickets as shown by the evidence was such that a state
‘court would have jurisdiction to enjoin. As we understand the
‘Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., and United Construction Workers v.
Laburnum Construction Corp. cases, supra, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that state courts do have jurisdiction to enjoin
threats of bodily injury and property damage to employees. In the
‘Weber case, the U. S. Supreme Court, at page 485 of 75 S. Ct., had
the following to say: ‘‘In Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Hmploy-
ment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, 62 8. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 1154,
‘the State was allowed to enjoin mass picketing, threats of bodily in-
‘jury and property damage to employees, obstruction of streets and
public roads, the blocking of entrance to and egress from a factory,
and the picketing of employees’ homes. The Court held that such
conduct [553] was not subject to regulation by the federal board,
either by prohibition or by protection.’’

In the case of United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, supra,
the U. 8. Supreme Court held that an employer may maintain a tort
-action against a union in a state court to recover damages inflicted
by tortious conduct on part of pickets maintained by the union. Note
‘what the court said, at page 840, Syl.(4), 74 S. Ct.: “If Virginia
is denied jurisdiction in this case, it will mean that where the federal
preventive administrative procedures are impotent or inadequate, the
offenders, by coercion of the type found here, may destroy property
without liability for the damage done. If petitioners were unorganized
‘private persons, conducting themselves as petitioners did here, Virginia
would have had undoubted jurisdiction of this action against them.

The fact that petitioners are labor organizations, with no contractual
relationship with respondent or its employees, provides no reasonable
basis for a different conclusion.

“The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
is, therefore, sustained and its judgment affirmed.”

We hold that the state trial court in this case was not without
jurisdiction to grant plaintiff relief by injunction against the tortious
conduct alleged in its petition and supported by substantial evidence.
‘We hold further that having jurisdiction, the trial court was not
justified in dismissing plaintiff’s petition after the picketing ceased
but should have held a hearing on the question of damages.

The case is therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court with
directions to determine the question of damages. The costs to date are
hereby taxed against defendants. The costs that may accrue on the
hearing of damages are to be taxed against the losing party. It is so
ordered. All concur. .

Srare or Missourr ex inf. Jouw M. Daron, Attorney General, Rela-
tor, v. Exvis Mousnr, Respondent, No. 44898—284 8. W. (2d) 473.

Court en Banc, December 12, 1955.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, Robert R. Welborn, Assistant
Attorney General, and J. Hichard Roberts, Special Assistant Attorney
General, for relators.

Richard M. Webster for respondent.

[474] HOLLINGSWORTH, J.—This is an original proceeding
in the nature of quo warranto brought by the Attorney General to oust
respondent Elvis Mouser from exercising the powers, functions and.
duties of the office of Clerk of the Cireuit Court and Ex Officio Re-
corder of Bollinger County, which it is alleged respondent has usurped
and now unlawfully exercises. The facts are not in dispute.

* Bollinger County is a county of the fourth class. By virtue of §
59.090 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., the clerk of the circuit court is the ex
officio recorder thereof. (All statutory references herein are to RSMo
1949 and V.A.MS., unless otherwise indicated.)

At the general election of 1950, respondent was elected clerk of the

circuit court for a term of four years beginning on the first Monday
in January, 1951, and until his successor should be elected and quali-
fied. At the general election of 1954, respondent became and was a can-
didate to succeed himself for the next ensuing term of four years to
begin on the first Monday in January, 1955, and Murrell J. Taylor
became and was his only rival candidate. Murrell J. Taylor received
a majority of the votes cast at said election, thereby defeating respond-
ent. Following the election and prior to entering upon the duties of
said office or qualifying so to do, to wit: on December 7, 1954, Murrell
J: Taylor died. On January 6, 1955, the Governor appointed Mrs.
Medford J. Taylor as successor to respondent and she thereafter, on
January 8, 1955, qualified for said office. Notwithstanding the facts
aforesaid, ‘respondent, under claim of right, has continued without
cessation or abandonment to éxercise all of the powers, functions and
duties of said office to the exclusion of the Governor’s appointee.
* [EB Article VII, § 12, of the Constitution provides: ‘‘Except as
provided in this Constitution, and subject to the right of resignation,
all officers shall hold office for the term thereof, and until their succes-
sors are duly elected, or appointed and qualified.”

Section 483.015 of the statutes provides that at the general election
of 1882 and every four years thereafter clerks of certain courts of
record (including the clerks of circuit courts) shall be elected and
shall enter upon their duties on the first Monday in January next
ensuing their election and that they ‘‘shall hold their offices for the
term of four years, and until their successors shall be duly elected and
qualified, * * *7?

Section 483.020 provides: ‘“When any vacancy shall occur in the
office of any clerk of a court of record so elected, by death, resignation,
removal, refusal to act or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the governor
to fill sich vacancy by appointing some eligible person to said office,
who shall discharge the duties thereof until the next general election,
at which time a‘clerk shall be chosen’ for the remainder of the term,
who shall hold ‘his office until his suécessor is duly elected and quali-
fied, unless sooner removed.”?

It is in effect conceded that if the latter section invests the governor
with power to appoint a snecessor to respondent, then respondent.
has unlawfully usurped the office in question since the appointment
and qualification of Mrs. Taylor.

In the early case of State ex inf. Crow v. Dabbs, 182 Mo. 359, 81
S.W. 1148, this court held that the death of a person élected cireuit
judge before he had qualified created [475] no vacancy in the office

and that the incumbent was entitled to serve the full term to which
the deceased had been elected. And, it must be candidly admitted,
such is the majority rule. See cases annotated in 74 A.L.R, at page
486 et seq. However, in the case of State ex inf. Major v. Amick, 247
Mo. 271, 285, 152 S.W. 591, 594, the doctrine announced in the Dabbs
case, supra, was expressly renounced by this court as being contrary to
the history and traditions of our concept of majority rule, ‘‘in the light
of the spirit of our election laws, with the liberal provisions for
filling vacancies in all offices, * * *.’? See special concurring opinion,
loc. cit. 598, in which a majority of the judges agreed. And, in the
more recent (1944) case of State ex rel. Bothwell v. Green, 352 Mo.
801, 180 S.W. 2d 12, 18, this court, en banc, although noting that the
rule announced in the Dabbs case, supra, was the general rule in a
majority of the states, yet disregarded it as being effective in this state
under the later ruling of the Amick case, supra, and pertinently said
of it: ‘The rule springs solely from the constitutional and statutory
provisions of the jurisdictions which apply it.’’ And so it is, of course,
that we must consider the purpose and meaning of § 483.020, under.
which the Governor acted in appointing Mrs. Taylor as successor to
respondent. Burnett v. Brown, 194 Va. 108, 72 8.B. 2d 394.

The ruling in the Amick case, 247 Mo. 271, 152 8.W. 591, 594, which
renounced the majority rule formerly adopted in the Dabbs case,
is in accord with the constitutional and legislative policy of this
state. In State ex inf. Barrett v. McClure, 299 Mo. 688, 253 S.W.
743, 744, we held that ‘‘the legislative policy of the state has been to
fill the vacancy for an elective office by election as soon as practicable
after the vacancy oceurs.’’? Respondent in effect so concedes. In the
concluding paragraph of his brief, he states: ‘‘The respondent respect-
fully submits to this Court that the death of Murrell J. Taylor after
his election to, but prior to his qualifying for, the office of Circuit
Clerk and Ex-Officio’ Recorder of Deeds of Bollinger County did not
create a vacancy because the incumbent, respondent, is entitled to re-
main in office until a successor is elected and qualified. It is not the
respondent’s contention that he is entitled to serve a full four year
term, It is the respondent’s position that he should serve wntil a suc-
cessor may be elected.’’ (Emphasis ours.)

The trouble with respondent’s suggestion is that there is absolutely
no authority to elect a successor at the next general election to fill an
unexpired term of a cireuit clerk except that provided in § 483.020,
under which the Governor appointed respondent’s swecessor to serve
umtil the next general election. Respondent does not contend other:
wise; at least, he makes no pretense of citing any authority for the
election at the next general election of .a successor to serve the unex-
pired term of respondent. Insofar as we have discovered there are
only two statutes under which a successor to a circuit clerk elected by
the people, as was respondent, can be elected prior to the end of a full

term. These are (1) a general statute, § 105.030, applying to all state
and county officers (with certain non-pertinent exceptions), and (2)
said § 483.020, referring especially to clerks of courts of record and
under which, as stated, the Governor purported to act. The latter sec-
tion, being special, would govern over the general statute. But, in this
case, it would make no difference which of the two is applicable. Both
expressly apply to officers who have been elected by the people and
both direct appointment of a successor by the Governor to serve until
the next general election only when a vacancy has occurred. Now
respondent cannot blow both hot and cold on the effect of these
statutes. If, as respondent contends, there is no vacancy in the office
of respondent by reason of the death of Murrell Taylor prior to
qualifying, then, under § 483.015, respondent’s tenure must continue
for a full four years from the first Monday in January, 1955, and until
his suecessor is elected and qualified; and if in the general election of
1958 a suecessor be elected to succeed him, but does not qualify, then
respondent could continue in office another term; and so it [476] could
continue indefinitely. Such a possibility is contrary to the public
policy of this state. With the foregoing in mind, we must seek to
ascertain the true intendment of § 483.020.

It is phrased differently than any of the statutes or constitutional
provisions construed in any of the cases to which we have been referred,
including those cited in A.L.R. as sustaining the majority rule. We
think its differing phraseology readily distinguishes its meaning from
the general rule announced in those cases. It provides that ‘‘when
any vacancy shall occur in the office of any clerk of a court of record
so elected * * *’’, ete. (Emphasis ours.) Note that it does not refer
to a clerk ‘‘so elected and qualified’, The term ‘‘so elected’’ refers
to and must be considered in pari materia with § 483.015. When so
considered, the phrase clearly includes Murrell J. Taylor, who had .
been ‘‘so elected”’ but had not qualified. We must assume, nothing to
the contrary appearing, that had the Legislature intended to limit the
meaning of the term ‘‘any vacancy’’ as applying only to a person who
had been elected and qualified, it would have said so. In this connec-
tion, note also the designed use of the phrase ‘‘elected and qualified”’
in a later clause of the statute when the legislature defined the electee’s
tenure in these words ‘‘who shall hold. his office until his successor is
duly elected and qualified’’, thereby evidencing a mindful distinction
between the meaning of the term ‘‘elected’”’ as used in the first part
of the statute and the phrase ‘‘elected and qualified’’ as used in the
latter portion thereof.

We also observe a further provision of the statute which we think
reveals a clear intention not to limit its provisions to a person who has °
qualified and entered upon his duties. By its terms it becomes operative
when any vacancy occurs ‘‘by death, resignation, removal, refusal to
act or otherwise’’. (Emphasis ours.) Surely, the phrase ‘‘refusal to

act’’, by any fair interpretation of its intendment, must be construed
to refer specifically to a person who, after being elected, refused to act,
as distinguished from a person who, after qualifying, refused to act.
Of course, such a phrase conceivably could apply in the latter case,
but ordinarily such a person would resign or, if he refused to act and
failed to resign, he would be subjected to removal. Now, if the phrase
‘refusal to act’’ does, as we think, refer to a person who, although
elected, refused to qualify, and thereby creates a ‘‘vacancy’’ within
the meaning of the statute, then as a matter of course so do the other
applicable causes of vacancy set forth in the statue, to wit: ‘‘death’’
and ‘‘resignation”’, also refer to a person elected but who has not
qualified.

And, finally, it must be borne in mind that the four year term to
which respondent was elected had ended and there was a vacancy in
his office but for the further provision of § 483.015 that he continue to
serve until his successor was elected and qualified. Obviously, §
483.015 deals only with the tenure of clerks who serve their full term
and the election of their successors in ordinary course. It does not
contemplate or deal with the tenure or method of selection of those who
are to sueceed to the office to serve an unexpired term. The clause
authorizing clerks elected under its provisions to serve until their
successors are elected and qualified certainly was not enacted for the
benefit of the clerks so elected nor for the primary purpose of giving
them a longer term than four years. Its purpose is primarily for the
benefit of the public, to wit: that there be no interruption or hiatus
in the functioning of the office to the detriment of the public; and the
resultant extension of tenure is purely incidental. So, therefore, it
would seem clear that when the necessary steps are taken by the
Governor under the provisions of § 483.020 to prevent any hiatus in

. the functioning of said office the purpose of the provision is served,
the term to which the original holder was elected is-ended and the
vacancy becomes an accomplished fact; and an appointee of the
Governor, upon qualifying, would succeed to the office.

We hold that the phrase ‘‘any vacancy’’, as used in § 483. 020,
should be and it is construed [477] to include the death of the electee
or his refusal to act or to qualify following his election as well as any-
vacancy occurring after he.has qualified. So construed in accord with
its explicit terminology, the statute breathes life into the spirit of our
election laws and expedites rather than frustrates the will of the people
of Bollinger County, a majority of whom voting at the general elec-
tion of 1954 opposed the election of respondent. to succeed himself.

Our conclusion is supported by respectable authority. See the sub-
stantial list of states holding to the so-called minority rule set forth in
74 ALR. 494 and a Jater annotation in 164 A.L.R. 1248 et seq. In the
ease of Campbell v. Dotson, 111 Ky. 125, 63 S.W. 480, the facts and ap-
plicable constitutional provisions were similar to the facts and statu-

|

tory provisions hereinabove set forth. Of them, that court said: ‘‘It can-
not be maintained that in such a case the old incumbent would hold
over until the next regular election, and that his successor might then
be elected ; for there is no authority for holding an election at that time.
for such an office, unless there is a vacancy in it, and, if there is a
vacancy, then it must be filled by appointment until that election, as
_was done in this case by the appointment of Dotson. We cannot believe
it was intended by the constitution to bring about any such result as
appellant’s contention leads to. The term of county offices is fixed
at four years. Elections are required to be held every four years to fill
these offices. The persons elected enter upon the duties of their offices
on the first Monday in January after their election. The term of the
officer expires when the term of his successor begins. He holds until the
election and qualification of his successor, so that there may always
be an incumbent in the office to attend to the public business. * * * *
The aim was simply to prevent an hiatus in the office in case the new
officer for any reason failed to qualify. The constitution fixes a definite
term for each of these offices, and fixes a definite time when the regular
election to fill them shall be held. It also provides for filling vacancies,
and requires that these shall be filled by election, except when the un-
expired portion of the term is so short as to make this impracticable.
The construction urged by appellant is wholly out of keeping with the
spirit and purpose of the constituional provision. It is true, appellant
holds until the election and qualification of his successor. His succes-
sor was elected at the November election, 1897. The person elected
having died before the time for him to take possession of the office, the
term for which he was elected became vacant, just as much as if he
had died after qualifying, but before the time for entering upon the
duties of his office ; and when Dotson was appointed to fill this vacancy,
gave bond, and took the oath, appellant’s successor had been elected
and qualified, and therefore his right to the office ceased.’”’

Hl In holding as we do, it should be understood that the acts of
respondent as de facto clerk of the circuit court and ex officio recorder
of Bollinger County since January 8, 1955, insofar as they concern the
public or the rights of third persons, are to be considered as valid as
though he had been a de jure officer. State ex rel. City of Clarence v.
Drain, 335 Mo. 741, 73 8.W. 2d 804, 805-806.

It is the judgment of this court that respondent has unlawfully
usurped the office of Clerk of ‘the Cireuit Court and Ex Officio Re-
corder of Bollinger County since January 8, 1955; that he be ousted of
said office and its emoluments as of said date; and that all costs herein
be taxed against respondent. All concur.

Ce

Tuappeus J. R, Bunuock, Appellant, v. Enna Porrer and Cruster
Porrur, Respondents, No. 43767—284 S. W. (2d) 598.

Division Two, December 12, 1955.

Riddle & Baker, Veryl L. Riddle and Charles H. Baker for appellant.

Bradley & Noble for respondent Elna Porter.

[599] STORCKMAN, J.—This action, involving title to real estate,
was tried before the court sitting without a jury. The plaintiff has
appealed from a judgment rendered December 31, 1952, finding that
the plaintiff’s interest in the property was that of a contingent
remainderman in fee simple without ‘‘right of use or present enjoy-

ment * * * until the termination of the life estate of defendant Elna
Porter,’’ and that the defendant Chester Porter, husband of Elna
Porter, had no interest in the property. The court further found that
the property was not subject to partition. Since the defendant Chester
Porter has taken no active part in the trial of the case or on appeal,
references to the defendant or the respondent will be intended to
designate Elna Porter unless otherwise indicated.

The first amended petition upon which the case was tried was in
three counts. The first count alleged that the plaintiff was the owner
“in fee simple, of an undivided one-half of the real property hereinbe-
fore described and the remainderman, in fee simple, of the remaining
undivided one-half of said property,’’ and that the defendant Elna
Porter is the owner of a life estate in an undivided one-half interest
in said property. The second count alleged that the plaintiff was
“the owner, in fee simple, of an undivided three-fourths of the real
property hereinbefore described and the remainderman, in fee simple,
of the remaining undivided one-fourth of said property.’’ The third
count was for partition of the property. Defendant Elna Porter, by
her amended answer, contends that she is the owner of a life estate in
the entire property and is entitled to remain in possession for and
during her natural life and that the plaintiff is a contingent remainder-
man not entitled to partition. Defendant Chester Porter claimed no
interest in the property and made default.

The real estate in question, located in Holeomb, Dunklin County,
Missouri, is residence property. The legal controversy arises out of
the terms used in the general warranty deed dated April 22, 1919,
which, omitting the signature and acknowledgment, is as follows:

“THIS INDENTURE, Made on the 22nd day of April A. D.

1919, by and between M. A. Hogue of Dunklin Cownty Missouri

Party of the First Part, and J. R. Bullock and Elna Bullock (his

wife) and her bodily heirs by J. BR. Bullock of the County of

Dunklin, in the State of Missouri, parties of the Second. Part:

“‘WITNESSETH, That said party of the First Part, in con-
sideration of the sum of Highty three hundred and no/100

* * * * DOLLARS, to me paid by the said parties of the Second

Part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do by these.

presents Grant, Bargain and Sell, Convey and Confirm, unto the

« said parties of the Second Part, Ais heirs and assigns the following
» described Lots, Tracts or Parcels of Land, lying, being and
situated in the County of Dunklin and State of Missowri, to-wit:

[The real estate is here described by metes and bounds.]

[600] ‘‘TO0 HAVE AND TO HOLD The premises aforesaid,
with all and singular the rights, privileges, appurtenances and
immunities thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining unto
the said parties of the Second Part and unto his heirs and assigns,
FOREVER, the said M. A. Hogue hereby covenanting that he is
lawfully seized of an indefeasible Estate in Fee in the premises

. herein conveyed; that he has good right to convey the same; that
the said premises are free and clear from any incumbrance done or
suffered by me or those under whom J claim, and that I will

+ WARRANT AND DEFEND the title to said premises unto the
said parties of the Second Part, and unto his heirs and assigns,
- FOREVER, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons

» whomsoever Eacept all taxes for the year 1918 and hereafter.

“IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said party of the First
Part have hereunto set his hand the day and year first above
written.”

The: original deed is before us as an exhibit; it is upon a printed
form. The portions in italics were inserted in typewriting.

At the time of the conveyance J. R. Bullock and Elna Bullock (now
Elna Porter) were married to each other and the plaintiff, their son
.and only child, was then one year and. eleven months old. The defend-
ant Elna Porter testified that she paid $4,000 of the $8,400 considera-
tion. paid for the property. J. R. Bullock, his wife and son all occupied
the property until November 18, 1930, when J. R. Bullock divorced his
wife. After the divorce J. R. Bullock married again and Elna Bullock
married Chester Porter. J. R. Bullock occupied the dwelling for about
six-‘months after his remarriage but removed therefrom at the request
of the defendant Elna Porter who, with her husband Chester Porter,

. has since occupied the property as her residence.

On February 19, 1935, J. R. Bullock died intestate leaving as his
heirs the plaintiff and Pearl Ola Brooks, a daughter by a previous
marriage.’ The defendant testified that the house was purchased for
the use of Mr. Bullock, herself and their son. She claimed that she had
“the ruling of the house’’ and her son could live in the house with her
ifthe helped a little with the expenses. The plaintiff, 35 years old at
-the time of the trial, has at least on occasions lived in the house with
shis mother and has contributed tothe payment of some of the expenses
of, maintenance. .

-» The plaintiff, on May 26, 1950, prior to the filing of the suit, ob-

tained a quitclaim deed from his half sister, Pearl Ola Brooks, and her
husband. The stated consideration was $1.00 and other valuable con-
sideration. The plaintiff testified that he paid the $1.00, and that the

other consideration consisted of a settlement whereby the plaintiff
agreed not to press any claim against the Brooks for any money that
he did not get from his father’s estate.

Plaintiff asserts that his father, J. R. Bullock, was the owner of an
undivided fee simple interest which plaintiff and his sister, Pearl Ola
Brooks, inherited at the time of the father’s death. The plaintiff
attributes the creation of this interest to the use in the deed of the
words ‘‘his heirs and assigns’’ together with the fact of his father’s
divorcing the defendant.

HL The words “J. R. Bullock and Elna Bullock (his wife) and
her bodily heirs by J. R. Bullock,’’ standing alone, give little difficulty
as to their meaning. At common law the term ‘‘her bodily heirs’’
created a fee tail estate which limited the descent to the class of heirs
specified. However, this has been changed by our statutes. Section
442.470, RSMo 1949, provides that any person who might become
seized of an estate in lands that would have been in fee tail at common
law, ‘‘instead of being seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and
adjudged to be, and shall become, seized thereof for his natural life
only; and the remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the per-
son to whom the estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee,
devisee or donee in tail, first pass according to [601] the course of the
common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or conveyance.”’

Section 442.480 provides that where a remainder in lands shall be
limited to take effect on the death of any person, the word heirs ‘‘shall
be construed, to mean heirs or issue living at the death of the person
named as ancestor.’’ Section 442.490 provides that where a remainder
shall be limited to the heirs of the body of a person to whom a life
estate in the premises shall be given, the persons who shall be the heirs
of the body of such tenant for life ‘‘shall be entitled to take as pur-
chasers in fee simple, by virtue of the remainder so limited in them.”’

In the case of Mattingly v. Washburn, 355 Mo. 471, 196 S.W. 2d 624,
the deed of conveyance named as grantees ‘‘Nettie K. Mattingly and
her bodily heirs * * * parties of the second: part.’’ It was held, 196.
S.W.2d Le. 626, that ‘‘under the authorities Nettie K. Mattingly took
alife estate under the deeds in question and her son John a contingent
remainder, the contingency of his estate becoming vested being his
qualifying upon the death of Nettie K. as her ‘bodily heir,’ a con-
tingency which fell in when he predeceased his said mother.”’

In the case of Stigers v. City of St. Joseph, Mo., 166 $.W. 2d 523,
the land: was deeded to Quantie Stigers for and during the term of her
natural life and at her death to the heirs of her body. This court held
that the plaintiffs, who were sons of Quantie Stigers, were merely
contingent remaindermen during their mother’s lifetime and had no
vested rights to protect during the lifetime of Quantie Stigers. Other
Missouri cases are to the same effect,

HI The grant to J. R. Bullock and Elna Bullock, his wife, as we
ave seen, created a life estate in them by reason of the provisions of
§ 442.470. Because they were husband and wife, their interest. i in the
life estate was by the entirety because § 442.450 permits such an estate
and the authorities hold that this.is the legal force and effect of such
a conveyance. 41 O.J.S. 460, Husband and Wife, § 34b; 26. 4m. Tur.
705, Husband and Wife, § 80.

Plaintiff misconceives the effect of the divorce upon the life estate
which’ his parents possessed in the property. At most, the: effect of
the divorce was to convert the tenancy by the entirety in the life estate
to a tenancy in common. J. R. Bullock and Elna Bullock: continued
as cotenants of the life estate. Absent provision to the contrary, the
duration of such a life estate is measured by the lifetime of the one
last to die and not by the joint lives of the cotenants.. In 31 C.J.S, 78,
Estates, § 65(2), it is stated: ‘‘An estate for the tenant’s own life and
for the life of another person does not terminate on the death of the
tenant during the life of the other person but only on the death of the
survivor of these two persons, and an estate to two persons for and
during their natural life continues during the life of each, and is ter-
minated only at the death of the survivor.’ (Emphasis supplied.)

The intent and purpose of the conveyance as gathered from
the terms of the déed and the circumstances of the parties make the
above statement of the duration of life estates particularly applicable
to this case. At the time the property was acquired J. R. Bullock and
Elna Bullock weré husband and wife and the parents of the plaintiff,
then about two years old. The husband and wife both contributed to
the purchase price: The use of the words ‘‘heirs of her body by J.B.
Bullock’’ shows an intent to keep the descent to the issue of that
marriage. It shows an intent to exclude from inheritance Pearl. ‘Ola
Brooks, a daughter of J. R. Bullock by a previous marriage, and also
the bodily heirs of Elna Bullock by any other marriage. The obvious
purpose was that J. R. Bullock and Elna Bullock should have the use
of the property during their lifetime and the fee should then vest.in
the bodily heirs of that particular marriage. Further, the deed shows
an intent that the duration of the life estate should be measured by
the life of the one who was last to die and that such one should have
the use of the entire premises. [602] The conduct of the parties during
the lifetime of J. R. Bullock was consistent ‘with this construction.
After the divorce neither J. R. Bullock nor Elna Bullock undertook
to partition their life interests. For a. portion of the time each oc-
cupied the entire premises. The term ‘‘for his natural life only’’

§ 442.470 refers as much to the right and interest of Elna Bullock as ‘it
did to that ‘of J. R. Bullock. .

Furthermore, by force of this statute, § 442.470, the quantum of the
estate taken by J. R. Bullock and Elna Bullock was limited to their
natural lives only, To permit this life estate so held to be expanded

into a fee would mean that it could be alienated contrary to the pro-
visions of the statute, § 442.470, which establishes and safeguards the
life estate and remainder interests. A life tenant may convey his
interest, but the grantee acquires no greater or different interest than
that possessed by the life tenant, and such conveyance will have no ef-
fect upon the rights or interests of the remainderman. Friesz v. Friesz,
344 Mo. 698, 127 S.W.2d 714, 717 [5]; Schee v. Boone, 295 Mo. 212,
243 S.W. 882, 885 [8].

Hl Plaintiff contends, however, that the use of the words “‘his
hetts and assigns’’ in the granting and habendum clauses of the deed
and in the covenant of warranty shows an intention of the parties to
give J. R. Bullock ‘‘one-half in fee.’’ Logically, and in order of state-
ment, there is more reason to say the term ‘‘his heirs and assigns’”’
refers to the bodily heir in whom the fee simple estate ultimately vests
than to J. R. Bullock, one of the life tenants. Assuming, however, that
the word ‘‘his’’ refers to J. R. Bullock, the essential question, then, is
whether the description of the parties in the premises of the deed
can be modified and restricted by the words ‘‘his heirs and assigns’”’
appearing subsequently in the deed. We do not construe these words
to express an intention to enlarge, restrict or modify in any way the
estates created in the premises by use of the words ‘‘J. R. Bullock and
Elna Bullock (his wife) and her bodily heirs by J. R. Bullock.’ This
phrase is more definite and specific than the term ‘‘his heirs and
assigns,’’ and it has been held in Hunter v. Patterson, 142 Mo. 310, 321,
44 S.W. 250, that the specific words will prevail over the general
limitation. In the event of an inconsistency, the provisions in the
premises of a deed generally prevail over the habendum. In Re
Collins’ Trust Estate, 354 Mo. 614, 190 S.W.2d 259. The term
““premises’’ is generally held to refer to all that part of the deed which
precedes the habendum clause, including the names of the parties.
McCune Gill’s Tiedeman on Real Property, 4th Ed. § 589. The
dominant rule in Missouri is that the intention of the parties is to be
gathered from the deed as a whole. In Re Collins’ Trust Estate, supra ;
Petty v. Griffith, Mo., 165 $.W.2d 412, 415; Clinton County Trust Co.
vy. Metzger’s Executors, 219 Mo. App. 365, 271 S.W. 1008. The primary
and dominant intent of this deed appears to be expressed in the
premises, wherein the parties of the second part are described as
“J. R. Bullock and Elna Bullock (his wife) and her bodily heirs by
J.B. Bullock.”

If we give the description of the parties of the second part, as con-
tained in the premises, their complete significance, then the reference
to ‘her bodily heirs by J. R. Bullock’’ is included within the meaning
of the words ‘‘parties of the second part’’ wherever that term is
mentioned in the deed. Whatever significance the term ‘“‘his heirs and
assigns’’ has, can be applied only after the estates created by the

description of the second parties in the premises of the deed has been
recognized and given effect.

In support of his contention the plaintiff cites and relies heavily
upon two New Jersey cases. In Kimble v. Mayor and Common Couneil
of City of Newark, 91 N.J.L. 249, 102 A. 687 (1917), ‘the deed named
Jacob Ralph aid Elizabeth Ralph, his wife, as parties of the second
part. The granting and habendum clauses and the covenant of seisin
referred to the party of the second part and her ‘heirs and assigns.
The covenant of warranty was to Jacob Ralph and Elizabeth Ralph,
heirs and assigns. The court held that Jacob and Elizabeth Ralph
were seized of a life estate by the entirety with right of survivorship
[603] ‘‘and that to the estate of the wife there was added a limitation
over to her heirs.’’ Several factual differences appear. The term
“bodily heirs’? was not used at all and, most importantly, the term
was not included in the description of the party of the second part.
Furthermore, in New Jersey the quantity of the estate conveyed must
depend tipon the operative words df conveyance and the whole in-
strument cannot be. examined to determine intent, which is contrary
to the Missouri rule. For similar reasons the case of Den ex dem Eliza
Hardenbergh v. Jacob R. Hardenbergh, 10 No. Li. 42 (2828), has no
persuasive effect.

‘It may be that during the five- year interval: between “the
divorce in 1930 and the death of J. R. Bullock in 1935, J. R. Bullock
had the right to partition the life estate which he did not have while
it was held by the entirety. This right, if it ever existed, was not
exercised by J. R. Bullock and was extinguished by reason of his
déath. In the view.we take of the case, we do uot reach the question of
what the rights of J. R. Bullock were during that period of time or
whether defendant forfeited her dower and other rights ‘in J. R.
Bullock's property, as contended by the plaintiff’ Nor do we under-
take to decide what reversionary rights, if, any, the grantor might
havé in the event the defendant Hina Porter died without bodily heirs
by J. R. Bullock. The determination of that question would involve
persons not parties to this litigation and questions of interpretation
which were not reached in the decision of this case.

‘We therefore Hold that the defendant Elna Porter is the owner of a
life estate in the entire real estate in-question and that the plaintiff
is a contingent remainderman subject to qualifying at the time of her
death as a bodily heir of Elna Porter by J. R. Bullock.Having no
vested or severable interest, the plaintiff is not entitled'to partition.
Noyes vy. Stewart, 361 Mo. 475, 235 S.W.2d 333; Dodd v. McGee; 354
Mo. 644, 190 8.W.2d 231.

-The judgment is affirmed. All concur. . . on te

Pg]

Joun P. Drxon, Respondent, vy. Bustness Mun’s Assuranon Com-
pany or Amurioa, a Corporation, Appellant, No. 43873—285 8. W.
(2a) 619.

Court.en Baie, October 10, 1955.

Rehearing Denied, December 12, 1955.

George L. Gordon, Henry I. Eager, Donald W. Johnson and
Kenneth E. Midgley for appellant; Gordon & Gilmore and Blackmar,
Swa son, Midgley, Tones & Eager of counsel. °

Lyman Field and Rogers, Field & Gentry for respondent. ,

[622] COIL, C—This case came to the writer on reassignment.

John P, Dixon, respondent (herein called plaintiff), was the insured
in an accident and health policy (containing also a provision for a
death indemnity) issued by appellant, Business Men’s Assurance
Company of America (herein sometimes called defendant or BMA).
Plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $8, 187.50, including indemni-
ties allegedly due under the policy, ‘‘vexatious penalties,” and attor-
neys’ fees. BMA here contends that the trial court erred: in failing to
direct a defendant’s verdict; in giving an instruction; in submitting
the -question of damages and attorneys’ fees for vexatious refusal
to pay; and in failing to discharge the jury because of alleged mis-
conduct on the part of plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff, 59 at trial time, was a machinist for the Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company. He had obtained an accident and health policy
from BMA in March 1946. He was in the Missouri Pacific Hospital
in St. Louis from September 16 to September 24, 1947. (According
to plaintiff, the.only purpose of the hospitalization was for an opera-
tion on his jawbone in order that dentures would fit properly.) On
September 25, 1947, he notified BMA of his confinement ‘‘for an opera-
tion on Lower Mandible performed by Dr. W. A. Shinneman’’. When
BMA’s agent delivered a check for $40 as indemnity for the hospital
confinement, conversations occurred which resulted in the execution
by. plaintiff, on October 22, 1947, of an application for a new policy
like and in addition to the one then in force. As a result, the policy
giving rise to the present controversy was issued, dated October 22,
1947.

Of the 35 questions in the application, only five (or portions of,
them) and the answers thereto are material to the issues:

“*1,. Are you in good health and free from any bodily impairment?
qe not, explain). [Ay Yes.

“°2, Have you consulted or been treated by any physician, surgeon
or practitioner within five years? (Give full particulars, including
date, name and address of physician). [A] Oct. 1, 1947. Oper. on
jaw bone. Alveolectomy. Dr. Shinnmann. Mo. Pac. Hosp. St. Louis,
Mo.

“4, Has any physician ever given an unfavorable opinion of your
physical condition after either formal or informal examination, or have
you ever changed your residence on account of your health? (If so, give
particulars). [A] No.

“7, Do you now or have you had any of the following?:(a) * * *
Arthritis, * * *? Dates-Duration-Results-Doctors. [A] No.

“35, * * * Do you represent each and all of the foregoing answers
to be true and complete? [A] Yes.’’

* [623] Plaintiff had worked regularly without incident from Sep-
tember 25 until November 18, 1947, when he sustained an injury to his
lower back which totally disabled him continuously to trial time, May
25, 1953. He was hospitalized in the Missouri Pacific Hospital asa
result of this injury from April 10 to April 20, 1948. Plaintiff was
paid monthly indemnities for total disability under both policies
through June 1948,

In May 1948, Ralph E. Weaverling, then Director of Field Service
for BMA, reviewed plaintiff’s policies and file pursuant to company
routine requiring a review of cases in which indemnities had been paid
for six months. As a result, he obtained from plaintiff a written
authorization to Missouri Pacific Hospital to furnish BMA informa-
tion concerning plaintiff, including hospital and medical records, in the
hospital’s possession. Pursuant to the authorization and a request by
BMA, the hospital sent a letter dated July 12, 1948, and received by
Weaverling of BMA on July 16, 1948. (That letter will sometimes be
called the hospital letter.)

Weaverling took a portion of the hospital letter to BMA’s chief
underwriter and inquired ‘‘if a history of that kind would have per-
mitted the company to have issued the policy that was issued to Mr.
Dixon on October 22, 1947’’. Upon being informed that the company
would not have issued the policy ‘“under these conditions had they
known of it’’, Weaverling shortly thereafter stated the’ company’s
position to plaintiff as follows: ‘‘* * * that the policy was improperly
issued and we did not know until we had received the hospital report
from St. Louis with regard to the impairment that was recited in the
hospital record and I told him at that time that the.company would
discontinue payments that had already been paid for seven months on
this policy and that we would ask for a refund of $700 that had been
made as an overpayment.’’

After other meetings and negotiations between Weaverling and
Dixon, during some of which plaintiff was represented by an attorney,
a settlement was effected and a release executed by plaintiff. (The

number, details, and effect of the meetings and negotiations which
culminated in the settlement and release are described and argued ex-
tensively by counsel for both parties. In our view, these matters are
not material on the narrow issue which determines submissibility and
therefore we do not include those details in this statement.) Suffice
to say, it is admitted that on September 16, 1948, plaintiff, with the
approval of his attorney, executed a release (and at the same time
surrendered the policy), by the terms of which the stated consideration
was a payment by BMA to plaintiff of $275 and the waiver by the
company of its claim for a refund of the $700 theretofore paid plain-
tiff. Plaintiff released and discharged BMA from all claims, present
or future, that he had or might have arising on account of the policy
issued on October 22, 1947.

Plaintiff alleged and sought to prove that the release was invalid
on the sole ground that there was no consideration for it; it being
plaintiff’s position below and here that no bona fide dispute existed
between the company and plaintiff at the time of the release, and that
therefore the amounts paid plaintiff (including the $700 and the $275)
were indemnity payments for which the company was legally liable.

Generally, it is defendant’s theory that a bona fide dispute existed
based on defendant’s reasonable belief in good faith at the time
of the release that plaintiff misrepresented material facts when he
stated in the application that he did not have arthritis, and when he
failed to state that, at tinies during a period of about two months im-
mediately prior to the date of the application, his fingers had cramped
while he was doing critical work as a machinist ; and that both the ‘‘no’’
answer as to arthritis and the failure to disclose prior cramping of his
fingers were material misrepresentations in that they actually contrib-
uted to plaintiff’s disability resulting from the November 1947 acci-
dent. This latter, because, defendant says, the low back injury was
superimposed on a pre-existing arthritic [624] condition in plaintift’s
spine, and.that the answer ‘‘yes’’ to the arthritis question would have
disclosed the arthritic spine, and that a disclosure of the fact of the
prior cramping of his fingers would have caused defendant to make
further investigations which would have led to defendant’s discovery of
the arthritic condition in plaintiff’s spine. And defendant contends that
it had information at the time of the release which caused it reasonably
and in good faith to believe that there was no liability under its policy
based upon information which caused it reasonably and in good faith
to believe that plaintiff had made material misrepresentations in the
application, and that, therefore, there was a good consideration for the
release.

The present posture of the case is such that the sole issue (on the
question of defendant’s contention that a verdict should have been
directed) concerns the validity of the release. That is to say, in so
far as the issues on submissibility are concerned we may take it as

established that but for the release plaintiff was entitled-to:the
monthly indemnities from’the date of injury to the-date of trial. -.
Hl Plaintiff had the burden to prove the release invalid where,.as
here, the execution of the release was admittéd.. Plaintiff discharged
‘that burden, prima facie; when he adduced evidence tending to show
that he did not.make, in law, fraudulent, material misrepresentations
in the application. (We deem it unnécessary to relate plaintiff’s evi-
dence, because, as-we-understand, defendant does not contend that
plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case ag to the invalidity of the
release.) Foster v. Aetna Life Ins. Co:-of Hartford, Conn., 352 Mo.”
166, 1742], 176 S.W.2d 482, 485[4,5]. The burden-of going forward
with evidence sustaining the validity of the release (not the burden of
proof) shifted to defendant. Foster v.’ Aetna, supra, 176-S.W. 2d
485[6-8]. Defendant sought to discharge that burden..by adducing
positive. and unequivocal proof that the..only information. in its
possession at the time -of the release, and the sole’ reason it denied
liability under its policy at the time of the release, was the hospital
‘letter. That letter, was, of course, documentary evidence in the broad
sense of that'-term. 32 C.J.S., Evidence, §. 623, p. 475:: And.it is a
broadly stated general rule that the-construction of an uriambiguous
written. instrument is a matter for the court. 88 C.J.8., Trial, § 217, p.
499. In the Foster ease, supra,-the ‘‘documentary evidence’’ referred
to (176 S.W. 2d 486[9]) consisted of ‘‘the notice of injury; the state-
ment of Dr: Gundlach, the attending physician; the hospital record ;
and the coroner’s report with a statement and opinion of Dr: Gundlach
sattached to it.’? In:the Foster .case we said, with reference to the
aforedescribed documentary evidence (176 S.W. 2d 486[9]); ‘‘The
interpretation of such evidence was for the court.and, if it: was: such
as might cause an honest doubt in the minds of reasonable men as
to-whether-insyred died from disease or accident, there .was,:a basis
for compromise and the court should have given a peremptory. instruc-
tion for the defendant.’’ Now, without conceding that in our present
case the hospital letter (relevant,.not to prove the. truth of the state-
ments therein, but to.prove what information defendant.had at the
time of the release) did not in its ultimate effect-involve a mixed ques-
tion of law. and fact, nevertheless, we do agree that it was for the
trial court, at least in the first instance, to construe the legal. effect
of the letter. And in the circumstances of this case, -we need go no
farther. : :
. | | So that the question in the instant. case must be, whether the
information in the hospital letter, viewed in the light of the applica-
tion, was such that the trial court should have declared as a matter of
law that the fact that defendant had obtained and had in its possession
the hospital letter was a reasonable investigation by which. defendant
had ascertained facts or evidence which would have caused a reason-
able person to believe in good faith that plaintiff’s.statement in the

application that he did not have arthritis, and that his failure to have
disclosed in the application that his fingers had cramped at times while
on his machinist [625] job (in answer to any of the questions 1, 2, or
‘4ysupra) amounted in law to fraudulent, material misrepresentations.

It is apparent that the information contained in the hospital letter
is decisive on the submissibility issue as here presented. But before
setting forth and’ discussing’ the contents of the hospital letter; the
nature-of the policy, in so far as it relates to statements in the applica
tion, should be examined.

: & -The policy contained no sound health provision ; that is, no pro:
vision making the effectiveness of the policy depend upon whether
plaintiff was in fact in sound health at the time it was issued. Equally
important ig the fact that the policy contained no provision making
‘plaintiff’s answers to the questions in the application, warranties.
Nor was there any provision in the policy conditioning its existence
upon the truth of the representations or providing that the falsity in
fact of any representation would avoid the policy. On the contrary,
the policy ‘specifically provided (question 35, supra) that plaintiff
represented that each of the answers were true and complete.

«‘The rule in this state, as we understand it, is that where ma-
terial representations made‘in an application for a policy of life insur-
‘ance are warranted to be true, or the policy is conditioned upon the
truth of the representations, or provides that the falsity of the repre-
sentations shall avoid the policy, then the representations, if in fact
untrue, will avoid the policy, though the representations were innocent-
ly made. This is so because such is the contract. The insurer is entitled
to stand on thé contract as written, and the innocence of the insured in
‘malting the representations’ is a matter of no concern. But where there
is no such warranty or provision in the policy a misrepresentation, in
order’ to avoid the policy must have been fraudulently made. This
is the rule applicable to contracts generally, and we see no reason why
an exception should be made with respect to insurance contracts. * * *

“Defendant invokes’ the rule, announced in the decisions, that the
‘statute, section 5732,'R.S. 1929, Mo. St. Aun. § 5732, p. 4873 [RSMo

1949, § 376.580, V.A.M.S:], providing that no misrepresentations made
in obtaining or securing a policy of life insurance shall be deemed
material, or render the policy void, ‘unless the matter misrepresented
shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the
policy is to become due and payable, applies alike to warranties and
representations, and draws no distinction between innocent and
fraudulent’ misrepresentations. We are unable to see how this rule
helps defendant. Obviously, the statute does not disturb the law of
‘Insurance contracts except in that it avoids defenses founded on mis-
representations ‘when the matter misrepresented does not contribute
to the-contingen¢y or event on which the policy is to become due and
payable. The purpose of the statute is to aid, not to hinder, the'in-

Pe

sured—to limit,.not to extend, the righs of the insurer.’’ Houston v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 195,.205, 97 8.W. 2d 856, 860.

And other well- settled applicable legal principles are: That
“if at the time of the release there existed a-bona fide. controversy be-
tween plaintiff and defendant concerning defendant’s legal liability,
then the payments to plaintiff constituted a good consideration for the
release, otherwise not. Foster v. Aetna, supra, 176 8.W. 2d.485[2];.
and that the bona fide controversy must have existed at the time of the
release based. upon information in defendant’s possession at that time.
in order for the payments recited in the release to have constituted
good consideration. Foster v. Aetna, supra, 176 §.W. 2d 485[3]. °

In the light of the foregoing applicable law, we.may more
precisely state our exact question: Did the hospital letter .contain
information which, as a matter of law, could have caused Weaverling.
to have believed, reasonably and in good faith, either, that plaintiff.
knew or should.have known that he had arthritis at the time-he executed
the application, or that plaintiff knew or [626] should-have known that
his failure to include in his answer to any question the fact, that his
fingers had theretofore cramped while he was performing machinist’s
duties, was a concealment of material information called for by any
questions and, if so, whether such concealment was of a matter. which
“actually contributed’? to plaintiff’s low back injury?

The hospital letter was: .

“This is with reference to your letter of Fuly q, ‘1948 ‘concerning
Mr. John P. Dixon.

“Mr. Dixon, a machinist employed by the Missouri Pacific Railroad.
Company at Kansas City, Missouri, residing’ at 3544 Wabash Avenue,
Kansas City, Missouri, was first admitted to this hospital on September
16 and discharged on September. 24, 1947.

“On admission.he.was complaining of pain and contraction of his
fingers after about two hours of work. He stated that.the condition
had existed since July 1947 and that he had no previous attack. He
said that about two months prior to admission while doing some critical
work on his job he noticed that the first two fingers and the thumb.of
both hands would cramp up during work. This was accompanied by
a tingling on the dorsal surface of the forearm. These spells at first
oceurred from one to three times a week but had increased to nearly’
every day or more than once a day. He said they did not occur outside
of his job. When the attacks came on he would stop work for five to
ten minutes and then could.continue with his job. He had also noticed
cramping of his legs in his sleep, momentarily, but said it did not feel
like the condition of his hands. There-had never been: any fainting.

“The patient was seen by the. consulting neurologist who found that
a neuro-physical examination was negative” for objective evidence
of. organic nouro-defect..

‘‘Roentgenograms of the thoracic spine showed increased kyphosis
of the mid-thoracie region. There were hypertrophic changes of the
bodies of the thoracic vertebrae, especially of the middle and lower |
thoracic region; due to spondylitis. There was -a slight décrease in
the supero-inferior diameter of the anterior portion of the bodies’ of
several of the mid- and lower thoracic vertebrae thought to be second-
ary to the increased kyphosis. -

‘X-rays of the right upper bicuspid and molar regions showed root
fragments in what appeared to be the first molar area around which
there was irritation or infection. These were removed while he was in
the hospital.

“Laboratory work showed a blood count of 4,340,000 R.B.C. 18 gm.
hemoglobin, 13,200 W.B.C., and a differential count of 68 segs., 29
small lymphs., and 3 monocytes. Malaria smear was negative, blood
Kahn ‘negative. Icterie index on September 24 was 10. Urinalysis
was negative for albumin.and sugar. Blood calcium was 10. .

“The patient was treated .with salicylates while in the hospital
and was discharged on salicylates and bromides with a final diagnosis
of occupational neurosis and hypertrophic arthritis of the spine.

“Mr. Dixon was re-admitted to this hospital on April 10 and dis-:
charged on April'20, 1948. At-the time of admission he:stated that he
was injured on November 18, 1947 while working at’ Kansas City,
Missouri. He said that he was pulling on a draw bar and developed
severe pain in his back. He had been reporting ‘to his local physician
in Kansas City where he was also examined by the consulting
orthopedic surgeon on’ our Kansas City staff. We received a report
from the consulting orthopedic surgeon dated December 3, 1947 in
which he stated that he was of the opinion that Mr. Dixon may have
suffered a fracture of the left transverse process of the third lumbar’
vertebra while lifting. However, our x-ray examination did not reveal
a fracture of the left transverse process of the third lumbar vertebra.

“My, Dixon complained of pain in the lumbosacral region of his
back: Motions of the back were painful in the lumbosacral region, but
there was no deformity ofthe [627] lumbar region. There was a slight
hunchback condition of the upper thoracic spine, which condition was
present: when he was a patient in this hospital in Septemnber 1947, but
it was not a factor in his disability in April 1948.

“Neurological examination was negative for organic neuropathology.
X-ray examination of the lumbar spine, ‘sacrum, and sacroiliac joints
showed slight scoliosis of the lumbosacral region, convexity toward the
left. There was-no evidence of fracture, dislocation, or bone injury.:
There was a calcification in the région of the abdominal aorta, which
condition was not a factor i in his-disability of April 1948 and was not
due to injury. .

“Xray examination of the cervical spine showed hypertrophic
changes of the bodies of the 2, 8, 4, 5, 6, and 7th cervical vertebrae due

to chronic arthritis. There was a slight decrease in the supero-inferior
diameter of the anterior portion of the body of the 5th cervical
vertebra, probably developmental in nature. There was a scoliosis
of the lower cervical and. upper thoracic spine, with convexity toward
the left.

“It was our opinion that Mr. Dixon had suffered a low back strain

on November 18, 1947 while pulling and lifting with his back in an
awkward position. There was a superimposed pre-exisiting arthritis:
of the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spines.
* <We found no evidence of fracture: of the cervical, thoracic, or
lumbar spine, but the consulting orthopedic surgeon, in Kansas City,
was of the opinion that he may have suffered a fracture of the left
transverse process of the third lumbar vertebra from muscle pull.
However, we were unable to observe a fracture of the left transverse
process of the third lumbar vertebra.

‘‘Mr. Dixon was discharged from the hospital on April 20, 1948 and
was advised to report to his local physician for further observation and
treatment. It was our opinion that he would be disabled for two or
three months from the date of discharge.’’

It will be observed that the hospital letter dealt with the two
hospitalizations of plaintiff. As to the first hospitalization, only the
fifth and eighth paragraphs dealt with anything relating to arthri-
tis. Giving those paragraphs their most favorable construction from
defendant’s standpoint, all that they disclosed was that X-rays were
taken of the thoracic spine which showed evidence of hypertrophic
arthritis and that, when discharged,-there was a diagnosis of hyper-
trophic arthritis of the spine. The remainder of the letter, dealing |
with the second hospitalization, discloses (in so far as it relates to
matter pertaining to arthritis) that an X-ray of the cervical spine.
showed hypertrophic changes of the bodies of the 2nd, 8rd,-4th, 5th,
6th, and 7th cervical vertebrae due to chronic arthritis, and that the
low back strain suffered by plaintiff on November 18, 1947, was super-
imposed upon a pre-existing arthritis of the entire spine.

It must be remembered that the second hospitalization did not occur
until after the application for the second policy had been executed by, ,
plaintiff. Thus defendant was bound to know that nothing contained
in the letter as to the April 19, 1948, hospitalization could have related
to plaintiff’ 's knowledge at the time of the application unless something
stated in the portion dealing with the second hospitalization made it
clear that plaintiff’s statements in the application were knowingly
false. But irrespective of this and considering the entire letter, there
is nothing in it which a trial court could say, asa matter of law, would
catise a reasonable layman to believe in good. faith that plainti ‘mew
or should have known at the time he executed the application that.
he had arthritis i in his spine. This, because there was nothing in ‘the
hospital letter which should have caused Weaverling to believe that the

hospital had disclosed to plaintiff the result of any of the X-rays or the
diagnoses made. At best, all that it would appear reasonable to con-
clude from the information in the hospital letter. pertaining to
arthritis, was that there was a possibility that plaintiff, in some not
[628] apparent manner, had gained some knowledge of an arthritic
condition in his spine during or subsequent to his first hospitalization
and prior to the time he executed the application. Even this possibility
would need.to be based on the inferences that plaintiff must have
known that some portion of his back had been X-rayed and, therefore,
must have. inquired as to what, the X-ray disclosed, or must have
examined his hospital record, or must have been told what the X-rays
disclosed or what the diagnosis was. Such inferences, even if possible,
are not, on the face of the letter, reasonable. And even if it be assumed
that the diagnosis was made known to plaintiff, still it would be
necessary to reject the further inference that, in connection with such
disclosure, plaintiff was not also told that the condition found in his
spine was a normal condition. for one of his age, generally described
as hypertrophic arthritis, but not amounting to the infectious disease
known as arthritis. In any event, it is apparent that probably the most
reasonable conclusion from the portion of the letter pertaining to
arthritis was that, unless plaintiff had had some active back trouble
prior to the time of his hospitalization (and Weaverling did not pro-
fess to so believe because of the hospital letter, and plaintiff’s testimony
was to the contrary), plaintiff, like any other layman, would not have
known that he had arthritis and therefore honestly would have said
in his application that he had no arthritis.

The paragraphs of the hospital letter which pertained to the eramp- .
ing of the fingers, at least from a layman’s standpoint, are paragraphs
3 and 8. Certainly, by reason of paragraph 3, Weaverling was justified
in believing that plaintiff knew that, between some time in July 1947
and September 16, 1947, he had had pain and contraction in the fingers
after two hours of critical work as a machinist, causing the first two
fingers and thumb of each hand to cramp and a tingling on the dorsal
surface of his forearm; and that, this cramping did not occur outside
the.job but had increased in frequency to almost every day and some-
times more than once a day. The difficulty with defendant’s position
on this aspect of the matter is that paragraph 8 of the hospital letter
demonstrated to a reasonable person that upon examination this condi-
tion had been diagnosed as ‘‘oceupational neurosis.’’? Now Weaverling
had only the hospital letter and relied upon it. Thus it is apparent
that if he did not know and did not learn the meaning of ‘‘occupational
neurosis’, then he had no reasonable basis for believing that plain-
tiff’s failure to have disclosed this cramping of the fingers in the
application amounted to an intentional concealment of a matter called.
for by either question 1, 2, or 4, supra, or that the undisclosed condi-
tion of the fingers was a matter which ‘‘actually contributed’ to plain-

tiff’s low back injury, or that such a disclosure would have led to the
discovery of any condition which did ‘‘actually contribute’’ to the low
back injury. .

If, on the contrary, Weaverling knew or had ascertained the mean-
ing of ‘‘oceupational neurosis’’ he would have known or discovered
that itis: ‘‘(a) One in which the occupation of the individual appears
to be the precipitating cause. (b) A disorder affecting groups of
muscles used in the performance of special movements.’’ Blakiston’s
New Gould Medical Dictionary, Ist Ed., p. 668. In that event, he
would have relied upon the diagnosis and thus, based solely on the
hospital letter, should have known that the condition of plaintiff’s
hands most likely did not ‘‘actually contribute’ to plaintiff’s low
back injury sustained in November 1947, and should have known that
disclosure of the cramping of the fingers would not inevitably have
led to the discovery of an arthritic condition in plaintiff’s spine.

And we find nothing in the hospital letter pertaining to the second
hospitalization, which would have caused a‘layman, in view of the
prior diagnosis of occupational neurosis, to have believed reasonably
and in good faith, that there was any causal connection between the
chronic arthritis of the cervical spine and the cramping of the fingers;
nor would the letter have clearly [629] indicated that the disclosure,
in the application, of the cramping of the fingers would have led to
the discovery of hypertrophic arthritis of the spine. The fact that at
the trial defendant adduced a medical opinion that there could be
some connection between the arthritis in the cervical spine and the
cramping of the fingers, is not important on the present issue, in view
of Weaverling’s testimony that he had only the hospital letter and
relied solely upon it, and in the absence of evidence that Weaverling
obtained this medical opinion prior to the denial of liability and the -
taking of the release.

Furthermore, while Weaverling’s testimony may not have been
conclusive against defendant as to what a reasonable person in good
faith could have believed from examining the hospital letter, still
portions of his testimony as to the effect of the hospital letter on him
are significant. He testified: ‘‘Q This so-called summary of the
hospital record upon which you eut him off, Mr. Weaverling, does that
contain any fact that indicates that Dixon knew that he had arthritis
at the time he made his application? A No. Q Did you at the time
you cut him off on the basis of that summary or anything else have any
information that indicated that Dixon was acting in any way other
than honestly and in good faith at the time he told your man Mais
[the agent who took the application] I have never had arthritis? A
No. * * * Q And has anybody ever told you, anybody ever said to
you, any doctor that has treated him or seen him or any doctor that
X-rayed him in the Missouri Pacific Hospital, have they ever told you
that they told this poor man that he had arthritis? A No. * * * Q

Le

So at the time you cut him off, as far as what he knew you didn’t have
any evidence to support the fact that he knew when he signed this ap-
plication that he was making false or fraudulent answers, that is the
fact, isn’t it? A Yes.’’

After a careful consideration of the hospital letter, together with
the questions and answers in the application, and bearing in mind that
Weaverling had open to him the means by which he could have resolved
any possible questions suggested by the letter, we are of the opinion
that, at best, the effect of the hospital letter was to have caused a rea-
sonable person to have made further investigation to have ascertained
further facts or information.

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in refusing
to declare as a matter of law that the obtaining of the hospital letter
constituted a reasonable investigation from which evidence or informa-
tion was obtained that could have caused a reasonable person in good
faith: to have believed, solely on the basis of the hospital letter, that
plaintiff had knowingly misrepresented any matter which contributed
to plaintiff’s November 1947 low back injury. .

Hl Defendant contends that the trial court erred in submitting
the question of penalties. Section 375.420 RSMo 1949, V.A.MS.,
provides in effect that when it appears at the trial of an action that
an insurance company has vexatiously refused to pay a loss under its
insurance contract, the jury may allow plaintiff damages not to exceed
ten per cent of the amount of the loss and a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Defendant points out that the present action was not instituted un-
til nearly three years after it had obtained the release, valid on its face,
executed by plaintiff with the advice and approval of his counsel, and
that there was no substantial evidence of any express demand for pay-
ment prior to the institution of this action. And, as defendant also
points out, the general rule is that ‘‘vexatious refusal to pay contem-
plated by the statute ‘Is not to be deduced from the mere fact that
upon suit the verdict is adverse to the defendant.’ * * * The word
‘vexatiously,’ as used in the statute, has been defined by the decisions
of this court to mean without reasonable, or probable, cause or ex-
euse.’? Camdenton [630] Consolidated School Dist. v. New York Cas.
Co., 340 Mo. 1070, 1092, 104 S.W. 2d 319, 331[10]. And it is further
true that the question of whether there was a bona fide dispute is
determined on the basis of information in defendant’s possession at
the time of taking the release, while the question as to whether statu-
tory penalties may be assessed depends upon all the evidence adduced
at the trial of the action.

The filing of the action was a demand for payment and defendant
refused payment by denying liability on the ground that plaintiff had
released it of all claims. The real issue tried and the-only issue sub-
mitted by defendant was the validity of the release upon which de-
fendant relied solely as a defense. And defendant offered no sub- ”

stantial evidence at the trial-in an effort to support the hypothesis that,
even if there was nota bona fide dispute at the time of the release,
there was a bona fide dispute at trial time because of facts developed
after the release and before trial. On the sole defense submiitted, the
jury found; in effect, that defendant had not ascertained facts or in-
formation at release time which could have caused a reasonable person
to believe, in good faith, that there was no liability:

- Under these circumstances, we must hold that the trial court did not
err in submitting to the jury the issue of damages for vexatious re-
fusal to-pay.-

Hl Defendant contends that the court erred in giving instruction
1 on behalf of plaintiff because ‘‘(a) It contains abstract statements’
of law and attempts to shift the burden of proof; (b) It contains
sundry assumptions and arguments; (c) It includes elements which
there -wasno substantial: evidence to’ support; and ignores uncon-
tradicted facts;-(d) It submits issues of law to the jury; (e) It
ignores vital issues and defenses; (£) It is so long, confusing and prej-
udicial as to require reversal:’’

As to (f). There is no doubt that the-instruction is long. It
occupies more than four pages of the typewritten transcript and about
three pages of plaintiff’s brief. However, we cannot agree that its
lerigth alone caused this particular instruction to be confusing or:
misleading, While it is one instruction in thé sense that it all follows
the number ‘‘1’’, yet in fact it deals with three distinct subjects, viz.,
an abstract statement of the applicable law, the validity of the release,
and liability under the policy if the release is invalid. These three
subjects are set forth separately and understandably. * :

As to (a). There is no doubt that the instruction does contain two
paragraphs which set forth abstractly certain applicable principles of
law. But the application of these principles to the fact issues is later
made apparent. Abstract instructions are usually condemned when
tliey are not related to the fact issues. ‘There is no claim made that the
abstract statements of- law: were not correct, except in one respect;
viz., that the abstract statements ‘‘attempt to shift the burden of
proof.’’ This contention is stated by defendant as: ‘‘the first paragraph
of ‘this instruction, very plainly says that a ‘purported’ release taken
under assumed circumstances is not binding, clearly-implying that the
burden is‘on defendant to wphold the release here.’’ We think the con-
tention is untenable in view of the facts that'the first paragraph, using’
the words “purported release”’, was an abstract statement, nondiree-
tory in nature, and that defendant’s instruction B (on the burden of
proof) thade it abundantly clear that defendant was entitled to a ver-
dict unless plaintiff had sustained his burden to prove that the release
was obtained ‘‘without any consideration.’”

“As to (b). The claim is that the instruction contains ‘‘assumptions
and arguments.’’ Defendant lists 11 expressions in the instruction

which are claimed,to be argumentative. “A -reasonable limit on the
length of this opinion makes it not feasible to discuss each of these
specified expressions separately. Suffice to say that we have examined
the instruction in the light of these claims. We are of the opinion that,
while some of the wording of the instruction [631] is such that it is
somewhat argumentative, the instruction, read in its entirety, is not
reversibly erroneous for that reason. ,

Defendant also says that.the instruction assumes certain facts. Two
of the alleged ‘‘assumptions’’ oceur in the abstract statement of law
and not in the directive portion of the instruction. We cannot agree
that the directive. portion of the instruction unwarrantedly makes the
assumptions charged.

As to (¢)—that the instruction ‘‘includes elements which there was
no substantial evidence to support; and ignores uncontradicted facts.’””
Defendant says'this language of the instruction submits or ‘‘asserts”’
facts mot supported by the evidence: ‘(And if you further find that
any reasonable investigation by the defendant * * * would and
should have disclosed that the said condition of plaintiff’s hands *.* *
was in no way related to or connected with any condition in his spine
or his later back disability * * *.’’ Plaintiff’s medical witness testi-
fied positively.that there was no connection between the cramping of
plaintiff’s hands and the arthritic condition in the spine or the sub-.
sequent back injury. And the jury reasonably could have found that.
“any reasonable’’ investigation’ would have so shown.

Defendant further says that the instruction eliminated the question
of. plaintiff’s attorney’s advice as it bore upon the question of good
faith or upon plaintiff’s knowledge of the contentions of defendant
at the time of the release. The question on the validity of the release,
under the.circumstances of this case, did not depend upon plaintifi’s
knowledge of defendant’s contentions, nor, as we see it, was it neces-
sary to submit the facts as to plaintiff’s attorney’s advice. The es- ©
sential question was whether there was a bona fide controversy which,
in, turn, depended upon the information defendant had at the time of
taking the release, The facts as to plaintiff’s attorney’s advice was not
an. essential element of plaintiff’s case, and defendant did not submit,
or séek to offer, an instruction containing the alleged omission on any
theory bearing on the bona fide dispute question.

As to (d)—that the instruction submits issues of law to the jury.
Defendant claims that the ‘“‘proper construction of the letter from the
Missouri Pacifie Hospital’’ was erroneously submitted to the jury as
such was a law question for the court. We have heretofore referred to
the question as to whether the construction of the hospital letter was
purely a matter of law for the court. We found it unnecessary, in the
‘present status of the case, to decide that question. In so far as the in-
struction is concerned, we are of the opinion that defendant is in no
position to complain on the.ground that the.effect of the hospital letter

az ae

on a reasonable person was submitted to the jury. This, because de-
fendant by its instruction A joined in that submission. Instruction A
said in part that: ‘“‘* * * if you find * * * that * ** before the
date of the written release * * * defendant was claiming and contend-
ing that plaintiff was not entitled to such indemnity * * * upon the
ground that defendant had information from the St. Louis hospital
* * * that prior to the issuance of said’ policy plaintiff had certain
occupational and diseased conditions of his hands and back which were
not disclosed * * * and * * * that defendant on‘or before the date
of said release had reasonable ground to believe and did believe said
information, in good faith on substantial grounds, * * *.’’ In-view of
defendant’s positive evidence that the only ‘‘reasonablé’ ground”? for
the belief hypothesized was the hospital letter, deferidant joined in the
submission to the jury of the letter’s effect upon-its agent, Weaverling.

As to (e)—that the instruction ignores vital issues and defenses. In
this respect, defendant says that the instruction ignored the material
facts that, had plaintiff disclosed in the application the prior cramping
of his hands, defendant would have secured the complete Missouri
Pacific Hospital record, would have thereby discovered [632] the
arthritic condition in plaintiff’s spine, and would not have’ issued the
policy. As we understand it, defendant means that because defendant
adduced oral testimony to the effect that, if defendant had known at
the time of the application that plaintiff’s hands had theretofore
cramped while on the job, defendant would have made an investigation
and would have obtained the facts which, defendant says, would: have
included the hospital report showing the arthritis in the spine. Now,
as we view it, this was a theory advanced by defendant, and supported
by defendant’s oral testimony, by and from which the’ jury could find
that the failure to disclose the condition of the hands actually con-
tributed to the disability in the lower back claimed by plaintiff. -

Plaintiff’s instruction 1 did require the jury to find that the
eramping of plaintiff’s hands ‘‘did not contribute * * * to the dis-
ability in plaintiff’s spine and back, * * * which resulted from an
accident * * * on November 18, 1947.’’ It is true that this language
does not submit the evidentiary basis:of defendant’s theory, in that
it does not require an affirmative finding by the jury that the dis-
closure of the hands’ condition would not have led to discovery of the
arthritis in the back, But the language used did require the jury to
make a general finding that the ‘condition of the hands did not in fact
contribute, which includes within it the negative of defendant’s stated
theory of defense.

Defendant would be in a better position to urge its present conten-
tion were it not for the fact that by instruction A it also submitted
only a general finding that the undisclosed cramping ‘of the hands did
contribute to plaintiff’s later disability. Instruction A} like plaintiff’s
instruction 1, does not hypothesize defendant’s evidence of the manner

in which the failure to disclose did contribute. The language of de-
fendant’s instruction A in this respect is: ‘‘and if you find that said
undisclosed or misstated information [referring in part to the.condi-
tion of plaintift’s hands] contributed to the disability later claimed by
plaintifi”’.

Thus we conclude that. plaintiff’s failure, under the cireumstances,
to have hypothesized defendant’s evidence which supported, its theory
of ‘‘contribution’’ and to have required a negative finding on it, did
not constitute an omission from the verdict-directing instruction of
an essential element of plaintiff’s case on the question of the: validity
of the release.

Defendant also contends that the trial court: erred in failing
to discharge the jury and in failing to reprimand plaintiff’s counsel
because of his alleged misconduct which, defendant says, was ‘‘cumula-
tive and highly prejudicial in effect’’. Defendant points to some 18
incidents in the transcript to support its contentions. ,We deem it un-
necessary to detail these. We have examined, all of them. If our count
is correct, in 12 of them defendant’s counsel made an objection to-a
remark of, or in most instances to a question by, plaintiff’s counsel. In
each of the 12, the objection was sustained and defendant’s. counsel
asked for no further relief. In two of the instances, the objection of
defendant’s counsel to plaintiff’s counsel’s question or remark. was
sustained and, on request, the trial court instructed the jury to dis-
regard the question or the remark. In two. of the instances, no ob-
jection of any kind was made. In one instance, an objection was sus-
tained on the ground that a question asked was argumentative. Upon
request of defendant’s counsel to reprimand plaintiff’s. counsel for
repeatedly asking argumentative questions, the court said to plaintiff’s
counsel, ‘‘ Avoid the argument,-Mr. Field.’’ In the remaining instance,
after an objection had been sustained to a question on the ground that
it was argumentative, defendant’s counsel, out of the hearing of the
jury, moved that plaintiff’s counsel be reprimanded for repeatedly
asking argumentative questions. The court told plaintiff’s counsel to
refrain from asking argumentative questions and expressed the hope
that he would not be forced to reprimand counsel ‘in the presence of
the jury. [633] Whereupon, defendant’s counsel’s motion to discharge
the jury was overruled.

The record before us reflecting the alleged misconduct as ‘set forth
above, demonstrates that the only question before us for review is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to discharge the
jury in the last instance noted. Clearly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.

‘We may observe with reference’ to the cited incidents i in which the
court either granted the relief requested or in which there was no ob-
jection made, that most of them occurred during the cross-examination
by plaintiff’s counsel of defendant’s witnesses. And while it is true,

as the court recognized by his correct separate rulings, that the ques-
tions were argumentative in form, still we could not hold, in view of
the fact that the trial court overruled defendant’s motion for new
trial in which the trial court was charged with error in refusing to
reprimand counsel and to declare a mistrial because of them, that these
trial incidents, separately or in cumulative effect, prevented defend-
ant from receiving a fair trial.
The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing’ opinion by Com, C., is adopted as
the opinion of the Court en Banc. Dalton, Hollingsworth, Westhues,
JJ., and Matthes, Special Judge, concur ; Hyde, J., dissents in separate
opinion; Storckman, J., dissents and-concurs in dissenting opinion of
Hyde, J.; Eager, J., not sitting. Leedy, C.J., dissents and concurs in
separate dissenting opinion of Hyde, J.

HYDE, J. (dissenting) —I respectfully dissent and adopt as my dis-
sent the dissenting memorandum of Commissioner Lozier in Division
No. One, as follows: .

I am unable to concur in Commissioner Coil’s opinion. It is
clear, from the opinion, that if securing the hospital letter alone con-
“stituted ‘reasonable investigation’’ which gave defendant information
which could have caused a reasonable man to believe in good faith
that there was no liability under the policy, defendant was entitled to
a directed verdict. It is my view that Weaverling reasonably could
have believed, after examination of the hospital letter alone, that
plaintiff knew or should have known that he had some type of arthritis.
This, because the letter stated that a final diagnosis, at the time of
plaintiff’s first release from the hospital, was ‘“hypertrophic arthritis.”’
It seems to me that it was perfectly reasoriable for Weaverling to infer
that this final diagnosis had been communicated to plaintiff prior
to his release. If such was a reasonable inference, then it was also
reasonable for Weaverling to believe in good faith: (1) That plaintiff
was aware of this ‘‘hypertrophiec arthritis’’ condition when he executed
the application; and (2) that the ‘‘hypertrophie arthritis’’ condition
did actually contribute to plaintift’s disability. The latter, because the
hospital letter stated that the low back injury was superimposed upon
a pre-existing arthritic condition of the spine.

Leedy, C.J., and Storckman, J., coneur.

Paw Hunorr, Crarence V. Hunorr, Miuprep Biepsol Suesrer
and Marre Burpsoz Winenr, Appellants, v. OC. A. Crircatow
and Rura Orircutow, His Wife; Warm W. Derpro and
Buatrice Dororuy Drpro, His Wife; Tuomas C. Rominzs and
Synvia Maxine Romuvus, His Wife; Wmiiam A. Grmernarpr
and Derta Gewrmnarpr, His Wife; and Merroporrran Sr.
Louis Company, a Corporation, Respondents, v. Jackson Davis
and Vireinia B. Davis, His Wife, Third Party Defendants, No.
44437285 §..W. (2d) 594.

Division Two, November 14, 1955.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, January 9, 1956.

Frederick E. Steck and Oliver & Oliver for appellants.

‘Arnold and Oliver F. Erbs for respondent Metropolitan
i eee Company; Blanton & Blanton for respondents and third
party plaintiff: errill Spitler for third party defendants.

_ [595] BOHLING, C.—This suit was filed June 2, 1953,-to deter-
mine title to adjoining Lots 1 and 4, Matthews Second Addition, Town
of Matthews, New Madrid county, Missouri, against the claimants of
separate portions (four) thereof and the holder of a deed of trust
on one of said portions; and also four [596] counts.in ejectment for
possession. We refer to the parties as plaintiffs and defendants. The
defendants pleaded affirmative defenses to plaintiffs’ claim, and also
counterclaimed to quiet title to the portions respectively held by each.
They filed a third party claim against Jackson Davis and Virginia
B. Davis, his wife, on warranties in deeds in their chain of title. The
answer of the third party defendants adopted, by reference, the
answer of the original defendants as well as their said counterclaim.
The answer of the owner of the deed of trust presented like issues.
Plaintiffs filed a reply. The plaintffs claim as heirs of a homesteader;
as remaindermen without right of possession’ until the termination of
a life estate in 1950. Briefiy stated, defendants claim title under tax
sales, followed by warranty deeds; adverse possession; and action
to quiet title; and plead limitations, laches and estoppel, in defense,
and if plaintiffs have title ask, in the alternative, that defendants
be reimbursed for the taxes and the increased value of the land ac-
eruing from improvements made after the tax sales, and that the
third-party defendants be held on the warranty in their several deeds.
A change of venue was granted.to Scott county. The trial court, after
taking the submission under advisement, made a general finding in
favor of all defendants and entered judgment accordingly, the effect
of which was to adjudge. and decree that the interested defendants
were the owners in fee simple of their respective portions of said Lots
land 4; that plaintiffs had no.interests therein; and that the deed of
trust was a valid lien against the portion of said ‘ots therein described.
The plaintiffs appealed.

Louis Hunott, the common source of title, acquired title to Lots 1
and 4 under the name of ‘‘liouis Hunot’’ by warranty deed on October
29, 1910. He was twice married, having three children by his first
wife and none by his second wife. His first wife died in 1912.
Margaret Owings, the widow of John Owings, had two childrén, W.:G.
(Gobel) and Irene Owings. Mr. Hunott and Mrs. Owings were married.
in 1914 and resided on the lots, where he died intestate September 20,
1922.

Margaret Hunott, the widow, continued’ to live on Lots ‘1 and 4

after Mr. Hunott’s death. There was testimony that about 1936 or
1937 she went to Tyler, Texas, to make her home with her daughter,
Mrs. Irene Wood, where she died October 15,1950; but defendant
Critchlow testified she returned and lived on the property for a time
after 1939. : .
: Plaintiffs, with the date of their'birth and‘ relationship ‘to Louis
Hunott, are: Clarence V. Hunott, son, born January 17,-1900. Mildred
Bledsoe Sheeter, granddaughter, born October 28, 1914, and Marie
Bledsoe Winget, granddaughter, born March 16, 1913, daughters of
Mrs. Clara Himott Bledsoe, who died December 18, 1916. Philip
Hunott, grandson, born April 30, 1921, the son of Louis Alfred Hunott,
who died July 12, 1934, We understand Louis Alfred Hunott died
‘intestate.

The two lots were sold for taxes under the J ones: Munger law (Laws
1988, p. 425). Lot 4 was sold for delinquent taxes for the years 1928
to 1933, inclusive, and a tax deed, dated December 3, 1938, and
recorded December 7, 1938, conveyed the title to W. G. Owings, the
son of Margaret Owings. Lot 1 was sold for delinquent taxes for the
years 1932 to 1986, inclusive, and a tax deed, dated and recorded
November 28, 1939, conveyed the title to Lot-1'to ‘‘Margarét Owings.”’

Upon the probating of Margaret Hunott’s will it was disclosed that
Margaret Owings was Margaret Hunott. The will was signed Margaret
Hunott, but it was captioned : ‘“Last Will and Testament of Margaret
Hunott (also ksiown as Margaret Owings) ’’; and recited: ‘I, Margaret
Hunott, also known as Margaret Owings, "#6 * #2?" There was
testimony that after the death of Louis Hunott his widow sometimes
used the name Margaret Owings.

By separate warranty deeds dated July 12, 1943, “w. G. Owings
conveyed Lot 4 and [597] Margaret Owings conveyed Lot 1 to Jackson
Davis. Mr. Davis testified he Inew Margaret Owings but did ‘not
now she was Louis Hunott’s widow. The two deeds ‘were recorded
August 5, 1948. Mr. Davis paid $1;800 for the two lots.

Lots 1 and 4 extend in a generally east-west direction, Lot 1 being
immediately north of Lot 4. Lot 1 is 4 quadrilateral, 231.6 feet north
and south, with its north line fronting’ 396 feet’on a street. Lot 4, in
the form of a triangle, has its apex atthe southeast corner of Lot 1
and an alley, extends westwardly 405 feet along the alley, and has

a base of 70 feet. The dividing line between the two lots is 407.2 feet
in length. The title of defendants to different portions of said lots
emanated from Jackson Davis and wife under warranty deeds. The
property lines of the following defendants extend north and south
from the street line on Lot 1 to the alley line on Lot 4. To defendants
William. A. Gemeinhardt and wife, the east 80 feet of the two lots.
To defendants Thomas C. Rominés and, wife, the 140 feet immediately
west of said 80 feet. To defendants C. A. Critchlow and wife, the
west 176 feet of the two lots. Defendants Critchlow, who own the land
immediately west, deeded the west (approximately) 93 of said 176
feet by 147 feet deep to defendants William W. Depro and wife, the
west line being slightly beyond the west line of Lot 1...

Defendant Metropolitan St. Louis Company, a corporation,-made
two loans to defendants Romines, secured by recorded deeds of trust
on said defendants’ portion of Lots 1 and 4, on the strength of the
record title. The loans were made October 8, 1946. One deed of trust
secured an indebtedness of $4,000, and the other secured an indebted-
ness of $1,000. At the time of. trial, the $4,000 loan had been, paid
but the deed of trust had not. been released of record; and. there was
a balance of $686.68, principal amount, unpaid on the $1,000 loan.

Jackson Davis, on September 24, 1945, filed, an action in the Cireuit
Court of New Madrid county to quiet the title to said Lots 1 and 4
against Margaret Hunott, Louis Alfred Hunott, Clarence Virgil
Hunott, Marie.Bledsoe and Mildred. Bledsoe, if living, and if dead,
their consorts, heirs, devisees, alienees, or immediate, mesne, or re-
mote, voluntary, or involuntary grantees. Notice of the commence-
ment of the action was published in the Southeast Missouri News, of
Lilbourn, Mo., a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the county.
The affidavit for publication was executed by Ralph B. Bailey, attorney
for said plaintiff, and stated ‘‘that service cannot be had on the defend-
ants in the manner prescribed by Section 27, page 366 of the Laws of
Missouri for 1943, because the plaintiff does not know whether the
defendants are living or dead and does not know their last Post Office
addresses.’’ The judgment, entered December 17, 1945, adjudged the
fee simple title to said lots in Jackson, Davis, plaintiff. The instant
plaintiffs, among other things, say the court, never obtained juris-
diction over any of the defendants named in said suit, contending
the attempted service by publication was void because the application
failed to ‘‘show why service cannot be had in the manner prescribed
in Section 27’ as required by Laws 1948, p. 867, § 28(b), and that
said judgment is open to collateral attack whenever and wherever it
comes in the way; citing, among others, Hankins v. Smart,.345 Mo.
978, 187 S. W: 2d 499, 501[3]; Abernathy v. Missouri P. R. Co., 287
Mo. 30, 228 S. W. 486, 487[2]; Orrick v. Orrick, Mo. App., 233 8S. W.
2d 826, 829; Haake v. Union Bk, & Trs. Co., Mo. APP» 548. W. 2d 459,
463[12-15].-

The evidence established that improvements by defendants or their
predecessors in title had enhanced the value of the respective portions
of Lots 1 and 4 as follows: Defendants Critchlow, who had rehabili-
tated the dwelling house, approximately $4,000. Defendants Romines,
on whose portion a home and other improvements had been made,
approximately $9,000. Defendants Depro, who constructed a home
on their portion, $18,000 to $20,000. Defendants Gemeinhardt, $364.
The taxes on their respective portions were paid. The record [598]
establishes no increase in the value of Lots 1 and 4 since 1922 other
than that resulting from the improvements placed thereon by the
respective defendants or their grantors.

The testimony established that Philip“Hunott talked to Mr. Critch-
low and Mr. Gemeinhardt the latter part of 1952, perliaps November,
stating he came to see about the chances of plaintiffs to secure a part
of the property, and that each informed him they thought the matter
had been settled in court. Mr. Critchlow is Mrs. Depro’s father and the
Depros built their home on his promise to.give them the ground. They
constructed their home between March and June, 1953, receiving their
deed May 18, 1953, recorded May 18, 1953. It was within $500 of
completion when summons was served on them Juné 2, 1953, which
was the first they knew of the claim of plaintiffs. Mr. Critchlow testi-
fied he thought so little of Philip Hunott’s seeing him that he did
not mention the matter to the Depros until after suit-had been filed.

Matthews had a population of 500 or less in 1922, and a home-
stead did not ‘‘inelude more than five acres of ground, or exceed the
total value of fifteen hundred dollars.’? RSMo 1949, § 513.475; R. S.
1919, § 5853. (Statutory references are to RSMo 1949 and VAMS
unless otherwise indicated.) Margaret Hunott, there being no minor
children, succeeded to the homestead rights until her remarriage or
death, and the remainder estate in the homestead vested in the heirs
of Louis Hunott. Hall v. Hall, 346 Mo. 1217, 145 S. W. 2d 752, 754(2];
§§ 513.495, 468.010; B.S. 1919, §§ 5857, 303.

| | Said Lots 1 and 4 comprised about three acres of ground. With
respect to the fair market value of said lots at the time of Louis
Hunott’s death, Clarence Hunott, plaintiff, valued the property at
$1,000 to $1,200, and plaintiffs’ witness George Steele valued it at
$1,000 to $2,000. Mr. Steele did not know that a barn was on the lots
and did not take it into consideration. For defendants there was
testimony that Mr. Hunott kept his property in good condition; that a
house in good condition and an ‘‘A No. 1’’ barn, 40 x 60 feet, were on
said lots at his death. Defendant Critchlow, who knew the property,
stated it was worth ‘‘at least $2,500’? in 1922. Another witness for
defendant estimated its value at $3,000 to $3,500-in 1922, and stated the
barn had been taken down and erected on. other property while the
widow lived there. In 1943 Lots 1 and 4 sold for $1,800. The barn had
been removed and there was testimony from plaintiffs as well as de-

“608

fendants that the dwelling was in a very much run-down condition,
and did not compare with its condition in 1922.

. A finding that said lots had a value of $2,500 or more in 1922 was
warranted. This exceeded the allowable value of a homestead. -

HH There was no admeasurement of dower or homestead to

Margaret Hunott, the widow, at any time; and defendants say that
upon the expiration of ten years after her husband’s death in 1922
her dower and quarantine rights became barred by limitations and her
possession of Lots 1 and 4 became adverse. The authorities sustain
defendants.to the extent the value of Lots 1 and 4 exceeded in 1922
the homestead therein. See particularly Falvey v. Hicks, 315 Mo.
442, 286 S. W. 385, 391(V), holding a widow had no homestead proper
-in so much of her intestate husband’s real property as exceeded the
-statutory homestead ; that the fee to such excess real property vested in
his heirs, subject to such dower and quarantine rights as existed in the
widow, and that the widow could and had acquired title to such excess
real property by adverse possession. The dwelling in the instant case
was on Lot 1 and the barn on Lot 4. Plaintiffs say they: accept this
solution and confine their claim of homestead to Lot 1 only. We out-
line the reasoning:

A widow, until dower be assigned, may occupy the mansion house
and the messuages or plantation thereto belonging. § 469.220; R. S.

1919, § 334, The statutes provide for the admeasurement of dower;
and if an action therefor be not commenced within ten years from the
death of the [599] husband, the widow’s right of dower is barred.
§ 469.470; R. S. 1919, § 359. Commissioners appointed to set out a
widow’s dower give consideration to a widow’s rights in the homestead,
because ‘‘the amount of such dower shall be diminished by the
amount of the interest of the widow in such homestead; and if the in-
terest of the widow in such homestead shall equal or exceed one-third
interest for and during her natural life, in and to all the real estate of
which such housekeeper or head of a family shall have died seized, no
dower shall be assigned to such widow.’’ § 518.505; R. S. 1919, § 5859.
Jordan v. Rudluff, 264 Mo. 129, 185, 174 S. W. 806, 808. The right of
“occupancy in the widow is commonly referred to as the widow’s right
of quarantine, is an incident of her right of dower, and when her
right of dower expires, her right of quarantine is also lost. Moore v.
Hoffman, 327 Mo. 852, 39 S. W. 2d 339, 343[9], 75 A. L. R. 185,
following Falvey v. Hicks, supra.

The possession by the widow of so much of Lots.1 and 4 as repre-
sented a value in excess of the homestead therein was adverse to the
heirs of the homesteader, thé remaindermen, and ripened into a title
by adverse possession prior to the institution of this action June 2,
1958. § § 516.010, 516.080; Falvey v. Hicks, supra. (Consult § 469.470
“and Moore v. Hoffman, supra, 39 8. W. 2d Le. 348 et seq., involving
adverse possession by a doweress.)’ This title was as complete as one

acquired by deed. Scannell v. American Soda Fountain Co., 161 Mo.
606, 618, 61 S. W. 889, 891; Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo. 596, 600. - .

The testimony established that the good condition of.the improye-
ments and not the land imparted the value to Lots.1 and 4 in. 1922.
Clarence Hunott testified that about 1922 he sold twelve lots, he did
not recall their size, in Matthews for a total of.$250. The remainder-
men had their remedy to prevent the dismantling of the barn for ereé-
tion elsewhere, extraordinary deterioration of. the dwelling,.and the
widow’s acquisition of an interest in the fee through.adverse posses~
sion. Such items, insofar as they may have-an effect-on the value .of
the homestead, should not enlarge the original homestead infterests. .

The tax deeds of-1938 to Lot 4 and of 1939 to Lot 1 are: in the
chain of title of the defendants. We are now concerned with Lot 1;
and the discussion is to be taken as bearing on Margaret Owings’ tax
deed, recorded November’28, 1939, and the title to Lot 1.

A homestead is not exempt from sale for: taxés. Robinson + v.
Levy, 217 Mo. 498, 521, 117 S. W. 577, 584(6).° Land: is “chargeable
with its own taxes, no matter who is the owner, nor in whose name itis
or was assessed.’’ § 137.170.

Granger v. Barber; 361 Mo. 716, 236 S. ‘W. 2d 293, 296[4,. 3h
a suit attacking a tax sale and deed “under the Jones-Munger act
(Laws 1933, :p. 425), held that tax sales under the provisions of said
act in effect at the time of the instant tax sale passed the. title of the
remaindermen, although they were not entitled to possession by réason
of an outstanding life estate, pointing out that said act (p., 480,.§
9952a) provided: ‘‘*.and- it shall not be necessary to include the
name of the owner, mortgagee, occupant or any other person or corpo-
ration owning or claiming an interest in or to any of said lands or lots
in the notice of such sale’’.

Section 9957 of said act (p. 438) provides that the tax deed shal
vest in the grantee an absolute estate in fee simple.’’

Keaton v. Jorndt, 259 Mo. 179, 196,168 8. W. 734, 738[4], states:
““While as between the life tenant. and the remainderman, the former
is bound to pay the annual taxes *-*, yet with this obligation inter
sesse the State has nothing to do. * * If the life tenant fails to ful-
fill this duty, and both the life tenant and -the remainderman be prop-
erly sued and the land‘be sold, the State’s lien is foreclosed upon the
fee; for the lien of the State is upon the fee, anda fee passes-by the
sale and by the deed of the Sheriff, other things. being equal.’’ - ::

HM [600] . The plaintiffs, remaindermen, to avoid the effect-of the
legal fee simple absolute title of record passing under the tax and
subsequent deeds to defendants say that as between life tenants and re-
maindermen the dtity to pay the general taxes rests upon life tenants
in possession (Falvey v. Hicks, 315 Mo. 442, 286 8. W. 385, 389[6];
Hall v. French, 165 Mo: 480, 438, 65 S. W. 769, 771), and seek to. have
the tax sale operate merely ag a payment of the taxes, inuring to their

a

beiiefit and leaving the title exactly Where it was before. the tax sale
and deed (McCune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 306, 388(VI), 102 S. W. 997;
1006(6)-; Bullock.v. Peoples Bank, 351 Mo. 587, 173 S. W. 2d 753, 759 ;
Peterson v. Larson, 285 Mo. 119, 225 8. W..704, 706[5]; Mathews v.
O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235, 238 8. W. 451, 459[7, 8]); that “since
Margaret: Hunott owned only: a life estate, that is all defendants and
their predecessors in title purchased from her, and they were obligated
tolpay-the taxes until the expiration of the life estate which they pur-
chased’ (Mathews v..0’Donnell, supra; Bone v. Tyrrell, 113 Mo. 175,
188(VI), 20 S.-W. 796, 799(5) ; Bradley v. Goff, 248 Mo. 95, 102, 147
§. W. 1012,:1014[3, 4]; Nichols v. Hobbs, Mo., 197 S. W. 258, 260),
and that limitations did not begin to run against the remaindermen
until her-death, October 15, 1950 (Falvey'v. Hicks, supra, 286 S. W.
le. 389[8] ; Mathews v. O’Donnell, supra, 233 S. W. le. 460[12, 13];
Johnson v. Adams, Mo., 7 8. W. 2d 1010,.1011[1]; Powell v. Bowen,
279 Mo. 280, 214 9.:W. 142;.143(1], 146).

‘In ‘some. of plaintiffs’ cases the sale or proceedings did not affect
theifee or remainder interest but only affected the interest of the life
tenant. The Falvey (286 S. W. 387), Hall (165 Mo. 484, 65 S. W. 771),
Bradley (147 S. W. 1014), Bone (113 Mo. 185, 20 8. W. 798) cases. In
others: the defendant was the life tenant or one standing in the shoes
68-the life tenant. The McCune (102 §. W. 1006(b)), Bullock (173
SW. 2d 759 et seq.), Peterson (225 8. W. 706(2)) cases. In others
the defendant had actual or was charged with constructive notice of
the’ life.tenant’s: interests. The Hall (supra), Mathews (2383 S. W.
459), ‘Bone:(113 Mo. 178, 179, 20 S. W. 796) cases. Nichols v. Hobbs,
supra, involved a devise to a daughter-in-law ‘‘and to the heirs of her
body,’’ and ‘said devisee’s deed conveying ‘‘all hér right title and in-
terest’’ to defendants. The record of the will in the recorder’s office
émittdéd the words ‘‘and to the heirs of her body.’’ It was held the life
tenant’s grantees were charged with notice of the probate files and
revords, which disclosed gtantor’s true title, and- took only her
interests. Johnson y. Adams, supra, involved a void administrator’s
sale and deed of the homestead to pay a decedent’s debts and a pur-
chase-by his widow. Wicoff v. Moore, Mo., 2578. W. 474, 475, involved
a.void tax judgment-against a homestead and'a void tax deed, and the
tax sale‘ purchaser was the second husband of the life tenant and
the original defendant. Tax sales and deeds were also irivolved in the
Falvey, McCune, Bullock; Peterson, Mathews, and Bradley cases. As

x ned hereinafter Powell y. Bowen, supra, considered the deed
i“void’” as to the married woman’s fee simple estate there involved:
fz! Defendants say it was not necessary for plaintiffs to wait until

‘idow’s death: to have their rights determined ; citing § 527.150;
‘angér v. Barber, supra.

* « Séetion-527.. 150, the quiet title statute, provides, so far: as ‘material :

“exny person claiming any title, estate or interest in real property.

whether the same be legal or equitable, certain or contingent, present
or in reversion, or remainder, whether in possession or not, may in-
stitute an action against any person or persons having or claiming to
have any title, estate or interest in such property, whether in posses-
sion or not,’’ to determine the title ete. of the parties, respectively,
in such real estate. The quoted provisions first appeared in Laws
1897, p. 74, § 1, effective March 15, 1897.

Northeutt v. Eager (1896), 182 Mo. 265, 274(8), 83 S. W. 1125,
1127 (3), held that under the prior law (R. S. 1889, § 2092) one [601]
in possession claiming the fee could not compel a suit to try title by a
remainderman out of possession who conceded a life estate to plaintiff,

An early ease involving Laws 1897, p. 74, § 1, held remaindermen
who were under no disability and who failed to sue to quiet title with-
in ten years after their right to bring such suit accrued were not
barred of their right to bring such suit or of their estate in remainder;
explicitly stating the court reached a different conclusion to that in
cited Iowa cases under a similar statute because: ‘‘The life estate is
the support and foundation on which the remainder must stand.”
Armor v. Frey (1913), 253 Mo. 447, 474(VIII), 161 8. W. 829, 887
(VIII). In Powell v. Bowen (1919), 279. Mo. 280, 214 S. W. 142,
148[1], 146, court en bane by a five to two vote reached a like result
in a quiet title action. That case involved a married woman’s title
to lands and a deed in 1882 by her and her husband at a time when the
right of possession was in the hushand, and married women were under
the disability of coverture. Her acknowledgment was defective and
the majority opinion considered the deed ‘‘void’’ as to her interests.
Such rulings are to the effect remaindermen may but are not required
to sue to quiet title to avoid the statute of limitations on the théory
they have no right of action against which limitations run until they
have a Possessory interest. The life tenant was not the tax sale pur-
chaser in Granger v. Barber, supra.

Defendants contend plaintiffs’ attack on the tax sales and
deeds should have been instituted within three years after the recording
of the tax deed in 1939 under § 140.590, which so provides ‘‘* * ex-
cept in cases where the taxes havé been paid or the land was not
subject to taxation, or has been redeemed as provided by law * *.’’
Granger v. Barber, supra, 236 8. W. 2d 296[5], held the three- year
limitation of § 140.590 applicable in appropriate instances to remain-
dermen prior to their being entitled to possession of the land: '

Plaintiffs, however, say the instant case comes within the excep-
tions mentioned in § 140.590, and that § 140.610 (Laws 1933, p. 442,
§ 9960b), specifying what one claiming by adverse title to a tax deed
is required to prove to defeat the title conveyed by such deed (among
other things, that the taxes had been timely paid or the land ‘“‘had been
redeemed pursuant to law”’), does not prevent setting aside a tax deed
on grounds other than those mentioned (Burris v, Bowers, 852 Mo.

1152, 181 S. W. 2d 520, 522[1]), contending, as stated, the instant
tax sale constituted the payment of the taxes and left the title exactly
where it was before said sale.

If the. three-year limitation of § 140.590 does not apply, those
claiming title adverse to such tax title do not necessarily have an un-
limited time in which to sue to recover the land or defeat the tax
deed. William H. Johnson T. & R. Co. v. Belt, 329 Mo. 515, 46 S. W.
2d 158, 156[10]. Tax title cases have been decided on the theory the
ten-year limitation generally applies in instances. wherein the special
three-year limitation does not apply. Gulley v. Waggoner, 255 Mo.
618, 625, 164 S. W. 557, 560. See Rutter v. Carothers, 223 Mo. 631,
641 (III), 122 8. W. 1056, 1059 (3).

:Plaintifis state they cannot be divested of their legal title by
the equitable doctrine of laches in an action at law in which no affirm-
ative equitable relief is asked; citing Bell v. George, 275 Mo. 17, 204
8. W. 516, 519[2] (an action in which neither party asked equitable
relief), and Powell v. Bowen, supra, 214 S. W. Le. 145, 146. In Powell
v. Bowen and Johnson v. Adams, as stated supra, as well as Bell v.
George and Lewis v. Barnes, 272 Mo. 377, 199 S. W. 212, 217[4], the
proceedings or conveyances involved did not affect or were void as to
the legal titles sought to be affected. In the instant case plaintiffs
seek to defeat the absolute estate,in fee simple passing under the tax
and, subsequent deeds to the several defendants; and defendants in-
terposed estoppel and laches in defense.

. In Cockrill v. Hutchinson, 135 Mo. 67, 75, 36 8, W. 375, 377, 58
Am.St. RB. 564, a wife, her husband joining, mortgaged [602] lands of
the wife to secure $450. The wife died in 1877, leaving her husband as
tenant by the curtesy and two daughters surviving, her only heirs.
One daughter died intestate, leaving the other as her only heir. The
husband purchased the land for $300 at a sale under the mortgage
June 18, 1878. He conveyed to one Hazen, who conveyed to defendant
Hutchinson in.1887. Hutchinson had no knowledge of any claim of
the daughters and placed valuable improvements on the land. The
father died in 1888. On December 31, 1892, the surviving daughter
sued to redeem the land from the sale under the mortgage on the
ground the life tenant’s purchase was for the benefit of himself and
the remaindermen. The court considered the life tenant acquired
the legal title for the benefit of himself and the remaindermen if the
latter paid their share of the purchase money within a. reasonable
time, but since the plaintiff had waited about fourteen years after the
life tenant’s purchase and the land had been greatly increased in
value by improvements made by defendant in good faith, it would be
inequitable to permit the remaindermen to wrest the property from
defendant. Defendants also cite, among others, Morrison v. Roehl,
215 Mo. 545, 556(IV), 114 8. W. 981, 984(4) ; Willoughby v. Brandes,
317 Mo. 544, 297 8. W. 54, 58[11]; Wichter v. Hanley, 299 ‘Mo. 696,

253-8. W. 1002, 1008[5, 6]. In the Cockrill and Morrison cases the
encumbrances were in existence at the time of the creation of the life
estate and remainder interest, and the life tenant was not obligated to
discharge the encumbrances, whereas in the instant’case the payment
of taxes was primarily the obligation of the life tenant. However,
under Granger v. Barber, as stated supra, the instant tax sale and
deed passed the remainder interest, as well as the life estate, and were
not void. .

In some circumstances remaindermen may lose their rights where
an outstanding superior title acquired by a life tenant passes to a pur-
chaser in good faith for full value who makes valuable and lasting im-
provements on the land. More thaw rights of the life tenant and the
remaindermen inter sesse are here involved.

So far as material here all litigants are sui juris. Margaret Hunott.
openly exercised acts of ownership over Lots 1 and, 4. She went into:
possession of the whole. She, as widow, was entitled to possession
for life of only ‘that portion of the lots which did not exceed a value
of $1,500. She atquired title to that portion of said lots having a
value in excess of $1,500 by adverse possession. She permitted the
dwelling to come into a state of disrepair. She permitted an ‘‘A No. 1’”
barn to be dismantled for erection elsewhere. Permanent improve-
ments were made on the lots. The record permits of a finding that’ the
remaindermen had or were charged with knowledge of these facts.
They, so far as disclosed of record, treated the occupants following Mr.
Hunott’s death September 22, 1922, as the owners of ‘said lots until
November, 1952, when Philip Hunott talked to Mr. Critchlow and Mr.
Gemeinhardt. Up to that time the heirs of Louis Hunott took no in-
terest in, exercised no control over, had nothing to do with, and never
set up any claim to the property or any portion of it.

Nothing of record disclosed a lémestead interest in said Lot 1 or
Lot 4. No real estate was inventoried as an asset of the estate of Louis
Hunott, deceased. Nor was real estate inventoried as an asset of the
estates of Clara Marie Bledsoe (now plaintiff Mrs. Winget) and
Mildred Geneva Bledsoe (now plaintiff Mrs. Sheeter), Minors. The
legal title to an aBsolute estate in fee simple passed under the instant
tax sale and deed. Granger v. Barber, Keaton v. Jorndt, and § 9957,
supra. Two years passed after the tax sale of Lot 1 before the collec-
tor’s tax deed was delivered to the purchaser. ‘The plaintiffs made no
attempt to redeem. Laws 1933, p. 437, § 9956a, Valuable and lasting
improvements were made by defendants or their predecessors: in title:
on their respective portions of said, lots. There was nothing’ of record
to apprise defendants that the tax and subsequent [603] deeds did not’
pass the title they purported to-convey on their: face. A finding that:
defendants were bona fide purchasers for full value without notice was.
within the record made. Hendricks v. Calloway, 211 Mo. 536, 559 (IV),”

111 S.. W, 60, 66(4) ; Marston v. Catterlin, 270 Mo. 5, 192 8. W. 413,
415[4, 5]; Bradford v. Davis, Mo., 219 8. W. 617, 618.

. The rule usually followed in suits to quiet title or to cancel tax
deeds is that plaintiff must recover on the strength of his title and
not on the wealmess of his adversary’s title. Gee v. Bullock, 349 Mo.
1154, 164 S. W. 2d 281, 284[9].’ The court determines the better title
as between the parties. Johnson v. MeAboy, 350 Mo. 1086, 169 S. W.
2d 932, 934[4, 5]. A like rule exists in ejectment proceedings. Lang-
ford v. Welton, Mo., 48 8. W. 2d 860, 863[5].

As to one not charged with notice, ‘‘Margaret Owings’’ took and
gave constructive notice that she was claiming the fee simple title to
Lot 1 upon recording the collector’s tax deed on November 28, 1989.
This suit was not instituted until June 2, 1953, thirteen and a half
years after the tax deed was recorded, and approximately nine years
and ten months after the recording of the warranty deeds to Jackson
Davis. The lien of the State for taxes was upon the fee, and the col-
lector’s tax deed passed the fee simple title, the remainder interests
as well as the life tenant’s interests. If in the circumstances of record
the trial court considered that defendants had the better title and
right to possession, we are not disposed. to interfere under the record
and presentation made,

-The judgment is affirmed. Barrett, C., concurs in result; Stockard,
C., concurs.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bonutna, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Joun R. Exxis, Respondent, v. State Department or Pusuio Hearn
Anp Weurarg, No. 44976—285 8. W. (2d) 634,

Court en Bane, November 14, 1955.

Rehearing Denied, January 9, 1956. ,

“John MU. Dalton, Attorney General, Paul McGhee, Assistant Attorney’
General, Hlmore G. Crowe and Alfred M. Mansur for appellant. |,

David C. Black, Robert A. McIirath,and C. M. Buford for resbond:
ent. . . i

[636] HYDE, J.—This is a proceeding to review the action of the
State Division of Welfare removing respondent (hereinafter called
claimant) from the aid to dependent children rolls as not being
physically incapacitated. This action was affirmed: on appeal to the
Director of the Department of Public Health and Welfare (hereinafter
ealled Director); but on appeal to-the Circuit Court of Reynolds
County, the court found that claimant ‘‘did not have a fair hearing
in the cause nor a fair determination on the record’? and it, was: re-
manded to the Director ‘‘for further. hearing and,redetermination of
the issues.’’ This order was affirmed on appeal: to the. Springfield
Court of Appeals. (Ellis v.. State Department of Publie Health and
Welfare, 277 S. W. (2d) 831.) The case was transferred here on ap-
plication of the Department.

Section 208.040 (statutory references are to RSMo. and V. AM. $.).
after 1951 (Laws 1951, p..755) authorized:aid to dependent children
to be granted to a parent when children under the age of sixteen
years (regularly attending school) [637] have been. deprived, of
parental support by reason of physical.incapacity of a parent. Since
the only issue in this case is whether respondent is physically incapaci-
tated, other requirements of this statute will not be stated ; except that,
as to physical incapacity, it was further provided: ‘‘when benefits are

claimed on the basis of physical or mental incapacity of a parent,
the‘pobable duration of the physical or mental incapacity must be
three months or more, and if the incapacity is not obvious, such in-
capacity -shall be certified to by competent and appropriate authority
designated by the division of welfare. Benefits may be granted and
continued for this reason only while it is the judgment of the divi-
sion of welfare that a physical or mental’ defect, illness or disability
exists which prevents the parent from performing any substantially
tiiful -activity.’’ Section 208.050 provides: ‘‘Aid to dependent
children shall not be granted or continued with respect to any child
* * * (2) Who is living in a home with a parent and stepparent both
of whom are able-bodied.’’ Section 208.060 requires that ‘‘applica-
tions for aid to dependent children shall be made by the person with
whom the child will live while receiving aid.’’ A claimant may appeal
if, ‘benefits are cancelled and have a hearing in the county of his
residence conducted by, ‘the ‘Director or a referee appointed for such
purpose. (Sec. 208.080.as amended Laws 1951, p. 772.) Thus it is the
ical ability of the parent to work and not what he actually earns
is the decisive factor.

. [HM The review in this kind of case in the circuit court is ‘‘upon
the:record.of the proecedings had before and certified by the director.’’
(Sec. 208.100 (4).) : Appeals from the circuit court are likewise ‘upon
the-record inthe same manner as * * * appeals from the director to
the cireuit court.’ (Sec. 208.110.) Remand to the Director is
authorized if the court decides ‘‘that a fair hearing and determination
of the applicant’s eligibility and rights urider this law was not granted
* * * or that his decision was arbitrary and unreasonable.’’ (Sec.
208.100(5).) We considered this language in Howlett v. Social
Security Commission, 347 Mo, 784, 149 8. W: (2d) 806, saying, ‘“We
danriot and we do not ‘say that the Commission’s decision upon the
fadts i is'arbitrary and unr easonable simply because we might possibly
Wave found, the facts differently upon the same ‘evidence; this-was
within their provinée alone. But if the ultimate decision of the com-
niission is not based upon substantial evidence, the finding must be
GHaracterized as arbitrary and unreasonable and the determination
teverséd.’? Following this decision, we have held: ‘If the findings
and order of ‘the Director are supported by substantial evidence in the
record before us, we may not disturb the judgment appealed from
and ‘oust, affirm it.” (Collins v. Division of Welfare, 364 Mo. 1032,
270 SW. (24) 817; See also 81 C.J.S. 62, Sec. 27 and Missouri cases
¢ited.) This is a narrower review than. that provided by Sec. 22, Art.
V; y Const. ‘applicable to all final administrative decisions “which
ie'judicial or quasi-, judicial atid affect private rights’’; and which
ther provides that review by the courts shall include, ‘‘in cases
ini which a hearing i is: required by law, whether the same are supported

by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record:’’ (See
Wood v. Wagner Electric Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 197 S: W. (2d). 647:)

However, our conclusion is that this broader review is not‘ applicable
to benefits authorized by Sections 208.010 and 208.040. (Placed on
same basis by See. 208.060.) In the Howlett case, supra, (149 S.. W.
(2d), le..812) we said: ‘‘Old age assistance benefits are not payments
to which a citizen is entitled as a right. They are themselves gratui-
ties given by the state to the needy, and as long as-the principle of
classification is’ a reasonable one, the legislature: may deny them: to
one class while granting them to another.’’-.It is further stated in
Hardy v. State Social Security Commission, Mo. App., 187 8. W.' (2d)
520, 523: **Old age assistance is a gratuity of the'sovereign. It isa
creature of the statute and not a right that a claimant may [638]
demand. The legislature can grant it or withhold.it- at will, or it may
grant it with such reservations and under such conditions as-it deems
proper. Such restrictions, if reasonable, are binding upon the-com-
mission and upon the courts.’? (See also 81 C.J.S: 41,-See. 16.)
Sec. 88(a), Art. ITI, 1945 Const. classifies old age assistance and aid
to dependent children as a grant of public money.

‘While persons who meet eligibility requirements of public assistance
acts are entitled to receive grants ‘‘pursuant to reasonablé and legally
authorized rules and regulations fairly administered, and without
undue discrimination or preferences’’, nevertheless ‘‘recipients or
applicants have no inherent or vested right ‘in public assistance they
are receiving or desire to receive’, and ‘‘the matter of extending, ex-
panding, curtailing, or withdrawing public assistance is one of public
policy only.’’ (Senior Citizens League v. Department of Social Securi-
ty, Wash., 228 Pac. (2d) 478, 483; See also Newland v. Child, Idaho,
254 Pac. (2d) 1066, 1070. Thus there are no vested rights because
the Legislature, at any time, may abolish all such benefits. However,
there may bé vested rights in allowances that have ‘already accrued.
See Creighton v. Pope County, Ill, 50 N. BE. (2d). 984.) It is also true
that ‘‘if a government sets up provision for a gratuity or bounty that
is given as a matter of grace within the conditions specified; it has
full power to create or to vest in an existing administrative agency
authority to determine whether the conditions are met as a matter of
fact and to dény resort to judicial review as a matter of right.”” (State
ex rel. Westbrook v. Oklahoma Public Welfare Conimission, Okla,
167 Pac. (2d) 71, 73; see also Helms v.-Alabama Pension Commission,
163 So. 807, 808.) The Supreme Court of Illinois in Hughes v.
Illinois Public Aid Commission, 118 N. EH. (2d) 14, 17, held ‘‘there
are no vested rights in a gratuitous pension granted -by the State
where such pension is not granted in contractual requital and -as
consideration for services rendered or some: other'valiable considera-
tion’’; and that in such cases, because there are no vested rights,
the Court ‘‘must decide the issues on the law as it stands at’the time

of our decision and not as of the time the cause of action accrued or of
the time of the trial court’s decision.’? (See also Lynch v. United
States, 292 U. S. 571, 577, 54 S. Ct. 840, 842, 78 L. Ed. 1434.) In State
ex rel. Police Retirement Board v. Murphy, 859 Mo. 854, 224 8. W.
(2d) 68, we held that ‘‘the police retirement act confers upon a
beneficiary legal rights in the pension fund which the board may not
deny without due process of law, and that such rights are ‘private
rights’ within the meaning of Art. V, Sec. 22.’? We pointed out this
was true because ‘‘all such benefits flow from private rights created by
the act, and not as gratuities from the board’, since ‘‘the funds from
which benefits are paid are collected in part from contributions made
by: the members.’’? Workmen’s Compensation cases requiring review
‘under Art. V, Sec. 22 are not in point because Workmen’s Compensa-
tion is contractual in nature and not in any sense a gratuity. (DeMay
vy. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 87 8. W. (2d) 640.) Our. con-
clusion is that ‘‘private rights’’ covered by Art. V, Sec. 22, 1945
Const. are rights in the nature of property rights or fundamental
civil rights protected by the Bill of Rights of our state and federal
constitutions. Since such rights are not involved herein, we must
hold that the review provided by Art. V, Sec. 22 is not applicable and
that the review in this case must be on the basis provided in the above
mentioned statutes.

The material facts of this case as stated by the Court of ‘Ap-
peals (277 8. W. (2d), Le, 834) are as follows: Claimant (57 years
old) said that he had worked “at purt near everything under the sun’’
in his ‘“‘younger days’’ but that he had had no ‘‘regular employment
since 1943.’’ According to claimant, he had ‘‘what they call * * *
broken down nerves’’, impaired hearing, continual pain in his neck
which ‘‘sémetimes * * * hurts so bad it makes my head hurt’’, ‘‘weak
bad spélls’’, neuritis and [639] rheumatism. He had lost his right
index finger and two joints of his right middle finger in a saw mill
accident four or five years before the hearing. Dr. J. R. Pyrtle of
Centerville, Missouri, testified that, in his opinion, claimant was
not ‘‘physically able to hold down a.regular job of work that would
require manual labor.’’ (His findings included low blood pressure,
weakness, tremor, palsied, coordination centers not proper, dizzy
spells, tieuritis,.arthritis and rheumatism.) In short, claimant’s evi-
dence substantially supported his contention that he was physically
incapacitated for manual labor—the only character of work he was
fitted to do. (He said his loss of fingers in the saw mill was due to a
dizzy spell.)

Three exhibits, all on printed forms, were ‘‘made a part of the
record’’ by the referee. One was a ‘‘medical report’’ from Dr. R. C.
Engelhardt of Poplar Bluff, to whom claimant had been sent by the
county director for re-examination. The doctor concluded that claim-
ant had ‘‘no disability.’? Another exhibit was a form ‘‘certification”’

from Dr. Engelhardt that ‘‘this person does not have a physical or
mental disability which renders him. incapacitated to work in ‘the
usual manner at any occupation for which his age, training, experience,
or education would fit him.’’ Both the ‘‘medical report’? and the
“‘certification’’ were dated July 19, 1952. The third exhibit, dated
August 1, 1952, was described as a ‘“‘report of the medical review
team”’ in Jefferson City. The county director, who was the only wit-
ness for the Division, testified that he had forwarded the ‘‘medical
report’’ of Dr. Engelhardt (together -with ‘‘some previous .medical
reports’’ not in evidence) to the medical review team, which ‘‘is made
up of two people, a doctor and a welfare worker, who observe and re-
view the medical information submitted to them and * * * make a
decision on whether sufficient physical incapacity exists to justify
public assistance.’’

The county director testified that claimant had “owned a truck and
a small saw mill until after the case was closed’’; that he had ‘‘sold
wood to the charcoal plant’’, ‘‘fire wood around Centerville’? and
“ties to the Moss Tie Company at Glover’’; and, that the records of
the charcoal plant and the tie company (none of which were produced
at the hearing) showed that, during a period of six months ending in
June, 1952, claimant has sold ‘‘an average of one load of ties and one
load of cord wood’’ each week and had earned about $35 per week.
However, the county director also said that claimant’s 17 year old son,
living in the home, owned 4 truck and a power saw and worked with
him. He said: ‘‘I understand he buys timber and the two of them
cut it and truck it to the charcoal plant.’? Apparently, this was also
true of sawing ties. Thus, while this evidence indicates income pro-
duced by both of them working together, it did not show much as to
claimant’s physical ability to do manual labor. :

Therefore, it is apparent that claimant had substantial evidence
of physical incapacity which would prevent him ‘‘from performing
any substantially gainful activity’? and deprive his children of
parental support; and that there was no substantial evidence in the
record to show there was no such physical incapacity unless the
medical report and certificate of Dr. Engelhardt was admissible. In
fact, the record indicates.the Department representatives considered
that this certificate settled the matter and no further showing on their
part was necessary. Appellant still makes this contention and our
attention is now called to the amendment of Section 208.040 by thé
68th General Assembly (H.B. 107, Sec. 1; V.AMS., June 1955
Pamphlet 64)-so that the certificate requirement now reads as follows:
“The physical or mental incapacity must be certified to by competent
medical or other appropriate authority designated by the division of
welfare, and such certificate is hereby declared to be competent evi-
dence in any procéedings concerning the eligibility of such claimant
to receive aid. to dependent children benefits.’

« We think it is clear that a certificate of physical incapacity by a
designated [640] authority may be required by the Legislature as a
condition precedent to receiving these benefits. (See State ex rel.
Lambert v. Padberg, 346 Mo. 1082, 145 S. W. (2d) 128; State ex rel.
Eagleton v.:Hughes, 855 Mo. 38, 194 8. W. (2d) 807; Creighton v.
Pope County, Ill, 50 N. E. (2d) 984, 990.) We also believe the reason-
able. construction of this provision of Section 208.040 is that such a
certificate is required before anyone can get on the rolls to receive the
benefits provided and that it would be necessary to prove that such a
certificate had been granted in any procéeding to collect such benefits.
(Apparently claimant was so certified when he was granted these
benefits in 1951, as indicated by references to previous medical re-
ports. Therefore, of course, the certificate of incapacity would be
admissible in evidence for that purpose. (Sec. 208.080 also authorizes
appeals.when an application is disallowed in whole or in part or if any
benefits are modified.) However, removing a claimant from the rolls
is.an entirely different matter. There is no provision in the statutes
for a certificate of physical capacity to perform a gainful activity;
the only certificate mentioned is a certificate of physical incapacity
and that is the certificate made admissible in evidence by the recent
amendment.: There would be no reason for a hearing on removal from
the rolls (total cancellation of benefits) if the result was to be deter-
mined by a certificate of physical capacity. The certificate admitted in
this case stated: ‘‘this person does not have a physical or mental
disability which renders him incapacitated to work in the usual man-
ner. at any occupation for which his age, training, experience, or
education would fit him.’’ That, of course, was the controlling issue
to be. decided in the hearing. We agree with the Court of Appeals
(277 S. W. (2d), Le. 835) that hearings such as the one herein in-
volved, should be governed by the rules of evidence as applied in civil
eases; and we hold this certificate was not admissible. This is likewise
true of thé report of the medical review team which repeated the
statement of the certificate.

| | However, the medical report is different because it states facts
as'found by Dr. Engelhardt and his expert opinion based on these
facts. (See Long v. United States, C.C.A.4th., 59 Fed. (2d) 602.)
We think it would be admissible upon a proper showing under the
Uniform Business. Records as Evidence Law, Section 490.660-490.690.
See Melton v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251 8S. W.
(2d). 663; Gray v. St. Louis-8.F.R. Co., 363 Mo. 864, 254 8. W. (2d)
577; Conser v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., Mo. Supp., 266 8. W. (2d)
587:) Nevertheless, if admitted on proper showing, it only would be
evidence to be considered and weighed by the Director (as the finder
of facts) with the other evidence in the case. It is apparent from this
record that instead of such consideration the certificate based on this
examination was deemed to be ‘conclusive. (See statements made by

_——kz XX ”®

the referee set out in the Court of Appeals opinion, 277-8. W: (2d); le.
335.) Likewise, the statement of facts in the Director’s decision and
order completely ignores the testimony of claimant’s doctor and does,
not even mention that he had any medical evidence. The decision
emphasizes the view that physical incapacity ‘‘be certified to by com4
petent and appropriate authority designated by the Division’ of ‘Wel-
fare’’; and the decision clearly indicates that it is based on the certifi-
cation ‘that claimant was not incapacitated. While as we have stated,
a certificate of physical incapacity i is necessary as a condition precedent
to being placed on the rolls to receive benefits, nevertheless, a certifi--
eate of physical capacity does not automatically remove one from the:
rolls and conclusively deprive him of the right to receive benefits. It
requires competent substantial evidence to do that, after claimant-has’
made a prima facie case. Of course, a claimant “has the burden: of:
proof (McBee v. State Social Security Commission; Mo.’ App., 188
S. W. (2d) 349) and as the Court of Appeals held, in this case; any-
“fact finding administrative agency, passes upon the credibility of the
witness and may decide a claim solely upon a finding of lack! of
eredibility of uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony offered in’
support of the claim.”’ (277 8. W. (24), lc. 338.) [641] However, the:
Director’s decision in this case indicatés that’ it was not based on‘
credibility of claimant’s evidence. We must: hold that there was no
competent substantial evidence produedd by the Division of Welfare:
at the hearing in this case and, therefore, the decision based on the
view that the certificate of physical capacity was conclusive, was’
arbitrary and unreasonable.

The judgment of the cireuit court is affirmed as to result only (for
reasons see Court of Appeals opinion, 277 8. W. (2d), l.c. 338): and
the cause is remanded to the Director of the Department of Public:
Health and Welfare for redetermination of the i issues. All eoneur. -

ON Morton ror REHEARING

HYDE, J.J Appellant misconstrues our opinion as holding that
a‘person cannot be’removed from the public assistance rolls ‘upon a
certificate of capacity to perform a gainful activity. What we said on
this subject applied to the admissibility of such a certificate as. evidence’
in a hearing on an appeal from the action of the Director of Welfare
removing a person from the rolls. It has no application whatever to~
administrative action by the Director of Welfare in removing a person
from the rolls. Of course, the Director of Welfare may and should’
frequently have all recipients'of public assistance investigated, and
act in accordance with his judgment upon the facts disclosed by such
investigation. (See. 208.130.) If there is no appeal, his action is final
(subject, of course, to his future action based‘on changed ‘conditions) '

. and thereafter no question can arise concerning the basis of his-action)
We only have held that if a claimant is removed from the rolls for. aid-

to dependent children, by the Director of.Welfare, and takes an ap-
peal, then, if at the hearing the claimant produces credible, competent,
substantial, evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case of physical
incapacity, the burden of going.forward with the evidence to show his
physical capacity to.engage in gainful activity shifts to the Division of
‘Welfare; and that the Director of Public Health and Welfare must
make his, decision upon. consideration of all the competent evidence
produced at:the hearing,

| Appellant also complains ‘of our rulings that the rules ‘of evi-
dence as-applied in civil cases, govern proceedings in public assistance
appeals hearings ; and that medical reports stating facts are admissible
under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law (Sec’s. 490.660-
490.690) ; saying that compliance with such requirements would im-
pose. too great a burden. on the Division of Welfare. As to the first
complaint, it is sufficient to say that inadmissible evidence is not sub-
stantial evidence, which, as we pointed out, is necessary to sustain a
decision, Of course, this does not mean that any case will be reversed
for improper admission of. evidence. Instead, the court (as authorized
in‘all non jury cases by Section 510.310) will consider all the evidence
duly preserved (whether admitted or not),, which it finds to be ad-
missible, and decide the case.on such evidence.

As to the latter complaint, we think appellant overestimates
the supposed difficulties of making a proper showing under the Uni-
form Business Records Act. (For a discussion of essential require-
ments ‘see Hospital Records and ‘‘The Business’ Records as Evidence
Law?’’—Caruthers and Gilerest, 6 St. Louis Bar Journal 39, Oct.
1955.) Appellant says it cannot comply with these requirements with-
out having as witnesses the examining doctor or his employee who
prepared the report. Of course, the report must be identified by
someone before it is admissible and Section 490.680 makes sufficient
the identification by a custodian or other qualified witness who testi-
fies to its identity and rhode of its preparation; and it is then only
necessary also to show that it was made in the regular course of business
at or near the time.of the examination. Certainly this does not require.
the doctor who made the report to be a witness, as provision is
specifically made for any. qualified witness [642] to testify to the es-
sential facts and this could be done by deposition, or.settled at a’ pre-
trial hearing. -Appellant argues that we should hold this report ad-
missible under the exception to the hearsay rule described in Long v.
United States, 59 Fed. (2d), 1.c. 603 and seems to have the idea that.
such a ruling would remove all requirements of identification and
showing as.to preparation. However, the Business Records Act rec--
ognizes and ,is based on the very exception to the hearsay rule for
which appellant contends ;-but it broadens its’ application and makes
the requirements-for identification and admissibility simple, definite
and certain. (See 9 Uniform Laws. Ann. '385;.20 Am. Jur. 881, See,

: | CU i.

1048 note 8 and cumulative supplement thereto; 5 Wigmore on Hyvi-
dence, 8rd Ed. 361, Sec. 1520.) ‘‘A writing standing alone does not
of itself constitute evidence; it must be accompanied by competent
proof of some sort from which the jury can infer that it is authentic
and that it was executed or written by the party by whom it purports
to be, unless such facts are admitted by the adversary’’. (20 Am. Jur.
776, Sec. 922.) Thus in holding the Business Records Act applicable,
we really are holding the report admissible under the exception to the
hearsay rule which appellant invokes, That Act provides the require-
ments for admitting reports admissible under such exception; and it
would not simplify matters to say it is an official report. (See discus-
sion of necessary showing for introduction of official reports in Snider
v: Wimberly, 857 Mo. 491, 209 S. W. (2d) 289; 5 Wigmore 517-524,
Sec’s. 1633-1633a.) In view of the statement of Wigmore (Sec. 1520)
that the reason for the Uniform Act was ‘‘the application of this Ex-
ception had gradually developed a mass of detailed petty limitations
that have no relation to the practical trustworthiness of the documents
offered’’, our view is that it prevents rather than creates difficulties,
for appellant, to hold that the Business Records Act is applicable to
such medical reports.
The motion for rehearing is overruled. All concur.

Wurm R. Dorson and Wiu1am R. Dotson, Jr., Appellants, v.
INTERNATIONAL Harvusrer Company, a Corporation, and Joun

_, Cron, d/b/a Cron Impuemen'r Company, Respondents, No.
44104285 8. W. (24) 585. :

Division Two, December 12, 1955.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Banc Overruled, January 9, 1956,

Alfred M. Wooleyhan and Pe & Penick for respondent Inter-
national Harvester Company.

Carstarphen & Harvey, for respondent John Croll.

[586] BARRETT, C.—This is an action for damages for breach of
warranties concerning a two-row, tractor-drawn corn planter. Mr.
William R. Dotson and William R. Dotson, Jr., claiming to have been
partners in certain farm operations, are the plaintifis and the pur-
chasers of the corn planter. The defendants are Mr. John A. Croll,
who was a dealer in farm machinery and farm implements at Hannibal
and sold the corn planter to the Dotsons, and International Harvester
Company, the manufacturer of the corn planter. After hearing the
evidence adduced by the plaintiffs as well as the defendants’ evidence,
the trial court sustained the defendants’ separate motions for directed
verdicts and entered judgment against the plaintiff. Thus, upon the
plaintiffs’ appeal and this record viewed most favorably to the plain-
tiffs (Hunter v. Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co., (Mo.) 260 8. W. 970,
971), the question for decision is whether a jury should have been per-
mitted to reason upon the facts and circumstances and find any ex-
press warranties by either or both of the defendants respecting the
corn planter, whether any express warranties found were shown to
have been breached, whether the damages claimed resulted from the
breaches and, finally, whether all or any part of the particular damages
claimed are recoverable in this action. It is in the fact of the court’s
having directed verdicts for the defendants. that the questions and the
scope of the issues involved upon this appeal differ, in part, from the
recent jury submitted cases of Dugan v. Trout, (Mo. App.) 271 S. W.

(2) 598; Davies v. Motor Radio Co., (Mo. App.):286 S. W. (2) 409;
Worley.v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., (Mo. App.) 253 S. W. (2)
532 and Heuer v. Ulmer, (Mo. App.) 281 S. -W.- (2) 320. Originally
the plaintiffs made the astounding claim-of the loss of four corn
erops, for tlie years, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, and: damages in the sum
of $40,000. But upon entering into the trial of the case, undoubtedly
due to. the admitted circumstances that the corn planter had not been
purchased until March 22, 1948, and was not-used by the Dotsons in
planting corn in 1950, the plaintiffs amended their petition. by inter-
lineation and claimed only the loss of two corn crops, for the years
1948 and 1949, and damages in the sum of $17,000. Consequently, we
are now concerned only with the existence of warranties, breaches and
losses for the years 1948 and 1949.

In their pleadings, throughout the trial of the case, and upon this
appeal, the plaintiffs rely upon express warranties only, both oral and
written. ‘They have now assumed the widest possible range, but, un-
deniably, the warranties claimed and relied upon are express and not
implied. When Mr. Dotson called upon Mr. Croll in Hannibal on
March 22, 1948, Mr. Croll did not have a two-row, tractor-drawn corn
planter in stock. Nevertheless, on that date, Mr. Dotson signed a writ-
ten ‘‘Order For Farm Equipnient’’ for a No. 230 corn planter, for
the price of $242.63, ‘‘subject to all of the conditions and agreements
herein contained AND THE WARRANTY AND, AGREEMENT
PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF.” The “‘ Warranty
and Agreement”’ on the reverse side of the order, so far as material
here, was as follows: ‘‘The Seller agrees to furnish free * * * anew
part to replace any part which, with proper use, proves defective dur:
ing the first ninety (90) days after delivery, provided the [587] de-
fective part is promptly téturned. The Purchaser agrees to give
each item of equipment a fair trial as soon as possible after receiving
and within two (2) days after the first use. If it then fails to work
properly and prompt notice is given, the Seller will send a man within
a reasonable time to put it in order, the Purchaser agreeing to render
friendly assistance. If it still fails to work properly and the Pur-
chaser promptly returns it to the Seller at the Seller’s place of
business, the Seller will refund the amount paid, which shall constitute
a settlement in full. Retention of possession or continued use shall
constitute an acceptance and satisfaction of. warranty and further
assistance rendered the Purchaser shall not be considered a waiver of
this provision. * * * No agent of the Seller has authority to alter, add
to or waive the above warranties, which are agreed to be the only.
warranties given and in lieu of all, implied warranties.’

Space will be conserved aid it is hoped that the issues involved upon
this record will be precisely’ delimited by some observations and cer-
tain assumptions concerning’ this separate, express written warranty,
sometimes called a ‘‘conditional ‘warranty.’”’ Dugan v. Trout, supra.

While the plaintiffs claim that they have complied with the conditions
of this: warranty, or have excuses for their failure to do so, the fact
respecting: their claim here is that they do not rely upon a breach. of
this warranty alone as establishing their cause of action. They claim,
of course, that. the warranty was: breached, but a breach of that war-
ranty is not the essence of their claim.. The-corn planter was delivered
to the Dotson farm in- April 1948, unassembled and crated: Mr. ‘Dot:
son and his son were not at home and did‘not see ‘‘the man’’ who
assembled the corn planter, nor did they know the identity of the per-
son who did assemble it, they returned: home one. day and it -was
assembled. They tested the corn planter before using it-and the test
indicated that it was functioning normally-and properly'in every
respect, but they contend that -it was' not ‘ascertainable’ that it was
virtually a complete failure until after the corn came up and so they
could not give and-were excused from giving the specified notice after
the two days’. first-use. The corn planter was not:returned to the sel-
ler’s place of business for the purpose of enforcing or-complying with
the provision respecting the return of ‘the purchase price, they say
because Mr. Croll and International Harvester .Company representa-
tives persuaded. them to keep the corn planter and continue their use
of it. Annotation 24 A.L.R. (2) 717; Berry v. Walter ‘A. Wood Mow-
ing & Reaping Machine €o., 62’ Mo. App-.41.’ Whatever the reasons,
they still have the corn planter.and as late‘as 1950 had loaned it-to-a
neighbor for the-purpose of planting corn.. ‘This is not a suit to rescind
the contract ‘and recover the purchase price, vor is a breach of this
specific warranty asserted as a failure of.consideration or as a defense
against a suit -to-recoyer the contract-price of the corn planter. For
eases involving these issues and whether: there had been compliance
with the conditions see Dugan v. Trout, supra; J. I. Case’ Threshing
Machine Co. v. Gardner, 159 Mo. ‘App: 274, 140 8. W.- 318; Nichols,
Shepherd & Co. v: Larkin; 79 Mo, 264-;-Gaar-Scott & Co. v. Nelson, 166
Mo. App. 51, 148 8S. W. 417; Boyer v.’ Neel; 50°Mo. App. 26; Likewise,
for the purposes of this appeal, we are not concerned with: whether
the warranty contained in the purchase order provided an’ exclusive
remedy and neither are we concerned with the damages ‘recoverable
for breach of this ‘particular warranty. Bank.of.Polk v: Wood, 189
Mo. App. 62, 173.8. W. 1093; 3 Williston; Sales; -See. 61a, p. 358.-In
short; in view of-the plaintiffs’ excises and their claim that Mr. Croll
had not complied‘with the warranty, it.is-assuined solely for the pur-
poses of this. opinion-that there could be additional express warranties,
oral-and written, not attributable to the warranty contained in the pur-
chase order (1: Williston, Sales, Sec. ‘215, -p. 554) and that,-précisely;
ig the basis of the. plaintiffs’ claim of liability in this case. Mayfidld v:
George 0.'Richardson Mach. Co., 208 [588] Mo. App. 206, 231 8. W,
288;- Meyer v. Packdrd Cleveland Motor. Co:, 106 Ohio 8S. 328, 140.
N. E. 118. .The plaintiffs, whether, recognizing the limitations imposed

by the express warranty or for whatever reason, rely upon another
printed document and additional express oral warranties by Mr. Croll.

International Harvester Company printed .and under the dealer-
ship contract furnished Mr. Croll with the blank, printed-order form.
In addition, in connection with the distribution of corn planters, the
company printed and there was attached to-each corn planter, or made
available to purchasers a pamphlet denominated ‘‘Owner’s Manual.’’
The Dotsons claim that they were aware of or had read a copy.of the
manual before purchasing the corn planter. They seize upon. the
language printed on the covers of the manual and insist that they
constitute additional express warranties comparable to the advertise-
ment and oral sales representations contained in Turner v. Central
Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S. W. (2) 603, 158 A.L.R, 1402. It
is said that in addition to the warranty contained in the purchase
order Mr. Croll-admittedly sold the corn planter with the additional
warranties contained in the manual. As to International Harvester
Company it is said that by printing and distributing the manual the
company made ‘‘representations that the corn planter would drop
seed at regular intervals in rows,’’ representations of ‘‘quality and
performance.’’ While the appellants insist that all warranties were
express they either confuse or do not indicate the precise type of war-
ranty relied upon. In their reply brief they say, ‘‘These two appel=
lants, farmers, bought this mechanical corn planter for a specific,
definite purpose, so specified by them and so understood by the seller,
to properly, effectively and efficiently plant corn. As the maker
thereof, the Harvester Company represented, guaranteed and war-
ranted in writing addressed to the owner and buyer tt would properly,
effectively and efficiently plant corn and do the things plaintiffs
bought it to do.’’ .

The manual consists of sixty-eight pages of detailed diagrams and
pictures’ of the corn planter and of every part, including every bolt
and nut. Each part is identified and its function described and there
are detailed instructions as to the assembling of tlie corn planter and the
repair and replacement of the parts. There are several pages of ‘‘Parts
Lists And Illustrations,’ each part is given a serial number and is
described. The plaintiffs seize upoh the printed matter on the covers
and the first page of the material as constituting the warranties. They
rely upon these two sentences on the front cover: ‘This manual con-
tains information which will be valuable to you during’ the entire life
of your equipment. Rely on your manual for operating and main-
tenance information and rely on your International Harvester dealer
when in need of skilled mechanical service or genuine IHC parts.’’
On the first page is this statement: ‘‘To The Owner. This planter, if
properly adjusted and cared for, will give many yéars of dependable
operation. Proper lubrication is important and a lubrication chart
is provided on page 2 to aid in keeping the planter lubricated. This

quick-attaching planter, equipped with parts for accurate planting at
higher speeds and a power lift which is operated from the tractor, is
made of the best material available, and is designed to do many kinds
of planting operations. A large variety of seed plates and the multiple
drive sprockets give a variety of spacings which cover all needs.’? On
the inside back cover, beneath the headline ‘‘Play Safe. . . Insist On
Genuine IHC Parts,’’ there appears these sentences: ‘‘When you
bought your International Harvester tractor or machine, you made a
good choice—you have a machine that deserves good care and good
service. When wear and tear make new parts necessary, remember
why you bought an International Harvester Quality Product. You
bought quality to be sure of performance. Don’t handicap your
equipment by careless selection of replacement parts. PLAY SAFE!
Go to. International Harvester dealer for Genuine IHC Parts. The
IHC monogram is your guarantee of quality, [589] your best assur-
ance that your International Harvester Equipment will continue to
give you top-grade performace, no matter what you ask of it.’? On
the back cover there are pictures of approximately sixty small parts
and under the headline, ‘“Why Genuine IHC Parts Save Money,”
there appears this statement: ‘‘The wise buyer of a farm machine
knows that the quality of the parts service he can obtain is frequently
quite as important as the original quality of the machine. For these
reasons he always buys genuine IHC service parts: 1. IHC parts fit.
They are made from the same patterns as the original parts. 2. IHC
parts last. * * * 8. IHC parts are priced right. * * * Depend on
your McCormick-Deering dealer for all your farm machine service
parts. * * #7 i
Some of these statements, particularly if read out of context,
may have the attributes and qualities of representations of fact which
if relied upon by the buyer might induce a sale. 1 Williston, Sales,
Sees. 197, p. 506, 206, p. 583. If so, as applied specifically to the corn’
planter, it is-doubtful that they are any broader or of greater import
and meaning than the warranty contained in the purchase order. But
read in its context it would indeed be a contention in words to say that
the language’.employed was a material representation of fact con-
stituting an express or promissory (Vold, Sales, Sec. 141, p. 441)
warranty of the corn planter. It is the ‘‘Owner’s Manual,’’ but it is
precisely what it purports to be, ‘‘Setting Up Instructions Parts List.’’
It is addressed to the subject of the assembly, care, maintenance and
repair of the corn planter and in so far as it contains representations
of fact the emphasis is upon parts with an urgent recommendation that
the manufacturer’s and dealer’s parts be used in repairs and replace-
ments, But this is not determinative because the manual alone does’
not comprise the explicit warranty relied upon by the plaintiffs.
| & The plaintiffs do not rely alone upon the mere force of the
language contained ‘in the manual as constituting a warranty, they’

assert that Mr, Croll. made certain oral representations based upon
the manual and that International Harvester Company authorized and
ratified his representations or is estopped to deny the fact.and that
therefore there was a: breach of obligation by both Mr. Croll and the
company. Some further..background is necessary to precisely under-
stand the warranty relied upon. Mr. Dotson testified that corn. prices.
were exceptionally. good in 1947 and he and his son decided ‘‘to try?’
for a large acreage, of good-corn. They had read the literature, the
manual, concerning the tractor-drawn corn planter and Mr. Dotson
ealled on Mr. Croll in Hannibal ‘‘about our needs. We told. him what
we intended to do, and what we wanted, what type. planter, we wanted.
one that would plant corn exactly as we wanted it without fail. * * *
We told him we wanted-a corn. planter that would plant this corn
niné inches apart, and that we. could use at high speed, and that would
put the fertilizer down in the. same operation.’’? According to Mr.
Dotson, Mr. Croll said, ‘this planter will be especially suitable for
your use.’’ It is then said that Mr. Croll orally.-made the representa-
tions contained in the manual, that Mr. Dotson relied upon them, and
thus the sale was accomplished. In their briefs the plaintiffs say that.
in this manner both Mr, Croll and the company ‘‘made and gave ex-
press warranties and guarantees that this planter would properly
plant corn.’’. At another point in their brief-the plaintiffs assert that
‘“warranties as to fitness for a particular..use may be contained in
literature, manuals of advertisements concerning a particular prod-
uct.”” In this connection they .state that ‘‘Another requirement of
warranty in this type of case, is that the representations which warrant
the quality and performance of the machine contribute to the induce-
mont of the purchase, ‘and that the purchaser acted in reliance wpom
them.’ ., . :

It may be assumed, as asserted, that the facts set forth and relied
upon constitute a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by Mr.
Croll (Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co..-v. Bradford, 206 Mo.
App. 609, 227 §. W, 628; Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc:; 235 Mo.
App. 679, 147-8. W. (2) 124) but it does not-necessarily follow [590]
that the court erred in refusing to submit the case to.the jury upon that.
theory.. Upon this record, one of the underlying, basic reasons for
the ‘existence of. warranties; particularly the obligation imposed by
the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, does not obtain and
is.not made to appear. The nature and extent of Mr. Croll’s special
knowledge of farm machinery is not known, perhaps it should. be as-
sumed that:he, at.least, thought of himself as possessing some partic-
ular. knowledge ‘and.skill, otherwise he would not have been engaged
in the business even for a short period of time. Nevertheless, the fact
is that Mr. Croll is a farmer and, as the Dotsons, lives in Ralls County.
It..does not appear whether the Crolls and. Dotsons were intimate
neighbors, but they are all farm people from Ralls County and their

occupations are primarily that of farmers. .Mr. and Mrs. Croll eom-
prised the partnership doing business as Croll Implement Company
and entered’ into a dealer’s contract and the business of selling farm
machinery manufactured by International Harvester Company
February 27, 1947 and by October 31, 1948, they were no longer:in the
business. Mr,. Dotson has owned and operated the 460 acre farm on
Salt Creek in Ralls County since 1931. The son, William, Jr., attended
the University .of Missouri ‘‘Agricultural Engineering School’’ for
four years. He was in partnership with his father in their farm opera-
tions in 1948 and 1949, actively engaged in actual farm work in 1948
and part of 1949. But in July 1949 William went to work for Mr,
Parrish, who succeeded-to Mr. Croll’s dealership, and thereafter sold
International Harvester Company machinery and farm implements,
including, presumably, corn planters. In any event, the sale of this
particular corn.planter by Mr. Croll and its purchase by the Dotsons
is not comparable to sales.and purchases between total strangers, or,
indeed, to a sale by a dealer or retailer ‘‘economically able to dictate
the processes of manufacture of the goods which they sell.’’ Overstreet,
“Some Aspects Of. Implied Warranties In The Supreme Court Of
Missouri,’’ 10 Mo. L. R. 147, 169; Bogert & Fink, Warranties In Sales,
25 Tl. L..R. 400. In the circumstances of this sale, thérefore, it is
difficult to find the existence of-the underlying, basic factors. and
reas6ns.impelling-and supporting-the inference of warranty. A modern
two-row, tractor-drawn, corn planter may appear to be a fairly com-
plex machine to a layman, but complex as it now is, it is a compara-
tively simple device, in. fact it is yet but a farm implement. The occu-
pations of the parties are of some significance (1 Williston, Sales, Sec.
235, p. 608), and certainly'as to.a warranty for a particular purpose
these parties stand upon an equal footing and it is not possible to find
or infer that the Dotsons justifiably relied: upon Mr. Croll’s superior
knowledge and experience, or upon any promissory representations
he may have made respecting the.corn planter. Vold, Sales, Sec. 142,
p. 446; 1 Williston, Sales, Sec. 235, p. 607; Spruce Co. v. Mays, 333
Mo. 582, 62 8. W. (2) 824; Hunter v. Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co.,
supra. .

Hl im connection with ‘both. the warranties and Liability for the
damages claimed theré'is a further perplexing aspect to this record.
In their briefs-it.is plainly claimed that International Harvester
Company is liable for the loss of both corn crops, the year 1949 as
well as 1948.:‘While they do not-plainly concede that Mr. Croll is not
liable for the loss of the 1949: crop, they. tacitly admit the fact. But
if they do not-'so concede, the fact is that upon this record he
could not possibly be charged with the 1949 loss. After the planter
was delivered and-assembled Mr. Croll had nothing further to do with
it except that,, before it was used,.he came by one day when neither of
the plaintiffs were home and set the planter- wheels 88 inches apart

as they had requested, instead of forty-two inches. They say that
after the corn came up they complained to Mr. Croll and he repeatedly
promised to do something about the planter but never did. In their
briefs they say, ‘‘Mr. Croll walked out on his responsibility and duty
when he sold out in October, 1948.’’ In these circumstances, nothing
[591] further appearing, they could not use the planter the second
year and charge Mr. Croll with the second year’s loss. Annotation
83 A.L.R. (2) 511, Gaar-Scott & Co. v. Nelson, 166 Mo, App. 51, 148
8. W. 417.

Hl in their briefs it is claimed that International Harvester Com-
pany made the representations contained in the manual and that the
breach of that warranty resulted in the loss of the 1948 crop. As to
1949, it is said, ‘‘The following year, 1949, in reliance upon the state-
ment and representation made by defendants’ employees Armbruster,
Mott, and Pendergast representing that the machine would then and
there function and do the job of planting it was supposed to do. The
plaintiffs used it again with further resulting damages.’’ As stated,
they claim to have talked to Mr. Croll on several occasions after the
corn came up but the promissory representations or warranties upon
which they of necessity must rely are the warranties inducing the sale,
those made by Mr. Croll when the corn planter was purchased and,
according to the plaintiffs, they are the signed purchase order, the
manual and his oral representations based upon the manual. Ratifica-
tion and estoppel aside, any statements or representations by either
Mr. Croll or employees of International Harvester Company sub-
sequent to the sale, being without consideration, could not be invoked
or relied upon as obligations of warranty. Richardson v. Landreth,
(Mo. App.) 260 S. W. 128; Moomaw v. Emerson, 80 Mo. App. 318;
Moore v. Miller, (Mo. App.) 100 8S. W. (2) 881, 335; Brandtjen &
Kluge, Inc., v. Hunter, 235 Mo. App. 909, 145 S. W. (2) 1009; Vold,
Sales, p. 446.

Neither International Harvester Company nor any of its
representatives had anything to do, directly, with the sale of the
corn planter to the Dotsons and, of course, made no representations.
Mr. Croll sold the corn planter. While the Dotsons claim to have read
a manual before purchasing the corn planter, it does not appear
where or how they came into possession of it. They say that Mr. Croll
had a manual in his place of business when they bought the corn
planter and Mr. Dotson says that on that occasion he read ‘‘parts of
it, the parts describing the planter and what it would do.’’ But the
manual offered in evidence by the plaintiffs ‘‘came attached to the
corn planter delivered to my place’? which, obviously, was after the
sale. In this connection, in their petition and in their briefs here the
plaintiffs assert that Mr. Croll in selling and warranting the corn
planter was the agent of International Harvester Company and, in-
ferentially, that certain of the company’s representatives were his

agents or acted in his behalf. But there is no evidence from which it
could reasonably be inferred within the generally accepted meaning
of the word ‘‘agent’’ that Mr. Croll was the company’s agent or that
its representatives were his agents or acted in any manner in his be-
half in connection with the corn planter. Mr. Croll was in business
in partnership with his wife and by virtue of a written contract was
a ‘‘dealer’’ in the strict sense of the term, engaged in selling farm
machinery manufactured by the International Harvester Company
and there is no evidence that their relationship was altered or changed
into that of principal and agent on either side and there was nothing
in the dealings of the parties to lead the Dotsons or anyone else to
believe there was. The company furnished Mr. Croll blank order
forms, literature and signs bearing the company’s monogram but
there is no proof that he was the company’s agent in selling and
warranting the corn planter and it follows as of course that the
company was not for that reason obligated by any warranties made
by Mr. Croll or, conversely, that he was responsible for the ‘actions of
the company or its representatives. McCormick Harvesting Machine
Co. v. Heath, 65 Mo. App. 461, 466-467; 2 Williston, Sales, See. 445.
Compare, particularly upon their facts: Hunter v. Waterloo Gasoline
Engine Co., supra; Barry v. Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping
Machine Co., 62 Mo. App. 41; Hackett v. Van Frank, 105 Mo. App.
884, 79 S. W. 1013; Timberland Lumber Co. vy. Climax Mfg. Co., 61
F, (2) 391; Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Frigidaire Sales Corp., 113
F. Supp. 405.

HM [592] What has been said concerning agency and representa-
tions made after the sale may be sufficient to dispose of the plaintiffs’
claim of ratification and estoppel by International Harvester Company.
As indicated, the company had no part in making the original sale of
the corn planter to the Dotsons and there is no evidence that either
the company or its agents were aware of the claim that the corn planter
was purchased for a special or particular. purpose. It is said, however,
that ‘‘These original representations were ratified and confirmed by
the defendant International Harvester Company by the Company’s
subsequent action.’ The claims of ratification and estoppel are based
upon the fact that representatives of the company ‘‘went to the farm
three different times to perform work on the machine so that it would
operate as it was represented and warranted to operate. They stated
to plaintiffs on these occasions that because of the work the Company
had performed the planter would thereafter plant corn as it was
supposed to do.’’ It is not necessary to set forth in detail the cireum-
stances in which company representatives went to the Dotson farm or
to Hannibal, on one occasion, and looked at, examined, or did some
work on the-corn planter. William, Jr.,-did not claim to have had
any direct contact with a company representative until the spring of
1949. Incidentally, the acts and conduct relied upon as constituting

ratification and estoppel took ‘place in 1949 and as late as 1950. Mr
Dotson wrote to the company and called in person upon its branch
office in Quincy complaining of the corn planter. But no one fromi the
company responded to the calls until ‘‘after the planting season of
1949,’’ Mz. Dotson’s letter to the Quincy branch is dated January 7,
1950, and there is a letter in the record from the ‘‘service supervisor’?
of the Quincey branch, Mr. Mott, to Mr. Dotson dated January 4;
1950. In any event, he said,“‘The only’ contact ‘I had with any repre-
sentative after that time (after Mr. Croll set the planter wheels in)
was when Mr. Pendergast came down to Mr. Nichols’ place in 1950.’
On that occasion Mr. Pendergast ‘‘worked on’’ the planter but’ there
“‘very little, if any’’ conversation. Mr. Pendergast did tell the

son about the plates but that was in 1950. The son talked to Mr. Arp
and Mr. Mott after he began working for Mr. Parrish in July 1949
and ‘‘They said they felt sure they could and they would do all in
their power to fix it'up. * * *.”? He also talked to Mr. Armbruster
after the 1948 season and ‘‘He told me we should try a larger plate,
and I pointed out that there were some springs evidently missing ac-
cording to the manual. He said definitely they belonged there and that
I should get them.”? They obtained the springs and different plates
but they made no difference, according to William, in the performance
of the corn planter. All of this may have some bearing on the waiver
of notice and upon the Dotsons’ excuses for their nonperformance of
the conditions contained in the original purchase order, but there is
nothing in the circumstances from which it is a fair inference that
their conduct had anything to do with ratifying sales warranties made
in 1948 or in which the elements of estoppel to deny the warranties
could be found. Cooperative efforts, helpful suggestions, inspections
and even repairs one and two years after the original sale may not be
construed as new or additional warranties, or a ratification of an
original warranty and neither may such conduct be construed as an
estoppel concerning a sale and warranty to which the company was not
a party. Annotation 24 ALR. (2), Le. 720; Hackett v. Van Frank,
supra.
| | As one of the plaintiffs stated, the springs missing from
one hopper and the needed changes in the seed plates were not’ the
things that made the corn planter worthless for the purposé for
which it was designed. The fact is that no ore knows what, if ‘any-
thing, was wrong with the corn planter. In testifying’ Mr. Dotson
said, ‘“We don’t know the trouble with the machine and no one has
found out to date, but you couldn’t depend on that machine to
follow any pattern.”’ In their briefs they say, ‘‘It is clear that the
exact nature of the defect was never ‘discovered, even by the ex-
perts.’ >? The evidence relied upon as demonstrating that the planter
was worthless [593] was that i “was first tested, the tests, indicated.

that it was functioning properly, and.then‘uséd and when the corn
came up the fact of its failure to plant properly was apparent. To
illustrate and briefly note, Mr. Dotson said, ‘‘At the end of the
fields when we would start out on a row, there would be sufficient
corn. * * * It would be thickly planted, bunched up, then it would
be scattered out, and some places in between it would be properly
spaced. * * * Around nine to eleven inches, and then after that there
would be a skip for as long as twenty-five or thirty feet. Then there
would be a big bunch of corn drop out, and it followed that same
pattern all through’ the field.”” As to the 1949 crop, he said, ‘There
would be places where it would be properly ‘spaced, and I would
say in 1949 it may have been improved slightly, and then there would
-be real thick planting where it would be right together, oh say, an inch
apart, and then there would be long skips and then it‘would be-properly
planted, the same type of planting as in 1948.’’

This is not to say that this evidence alone is so wholly lacking in
probative force that it does not support the inference that the corn
planter was defective in some respect or wholly worthless for the pur-
pose for which it was manufactured. Neither is it to say that the
evidence is insufficient to show that the loss of the crops or their failure
to grow was due'to the ineffectiveness of the corn plantér. Meyer
Furnace & Supply Oo. v. Greenwell, (Mo; App.) 297 8. W. 1973.77
C.J.8.; Sec. 369¢, p. 1808. But it would seem, as to so comparatively
a simple implement as a corn plantet’, that more should be required
than mere proof of use and the failure of ultimate result, somé evidence
of faulty design or defect in parts and specific functions. Worley v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., (Mo. App.) 253 S. W. (2) 582, 538; Over-
street, 10 Mo. L. R., le. 192, The-mere use of some machines and
implements and the failure of results may demonstrate faulty design
or defects and thus cogently support the inference of breach of
warranty. Advance Rumley Thresher Co: v. Briggs Hardware Co.;
202 Mo. App. 603, 206 S. W. 587; Davies y. Motor, Radio Go., (Mo.
App.) 236 S. W. (2) 409 ; Tavland y. Wood Bros. Thresher Co., 212
Minn. 310, 3 N. W. (2) 112; Gale Sulky Harrow Mfg. Co. v. Moore,
46 Kans. 324, 26 Pac. 708; Hallock v. Cutler, 71 Tl. App. 471. But in
most instances there has been ‘proof of specific defects or proof of a
failure of function which demonstrated unfitness of purpose or breacli
of warranty.. Dugan v. Trout, supra; Heuer v.’ Ulmer, (Mo., App.)
281 8. W. (2) 820; Witte v. Cooke Tractor Co., (Mo. App.) 261 S. Ww.
(2) 651; Dubinsky v. Lindburg Cadillac Co, (Mo. App.) 250 8. W.
(2) 830.

It should be carefully noted that this appeal has been “cousidered
and treated upon the basis and theories upon. which it was. tried. and
presented here. For the reasons indicated, the trial court did not
err in sustaining | the defendants’ motions for directed verdicts-and,

ve a

accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. Bohling and Stockard, CC.,
coneur. : . : .

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Barrerr, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur. 5 .

Karaizen L. Wison, Administratrix of the Estate of Epwarp G.
Jonns, Deceased, Appellant, v. ALBprr ToLiver, Respondent, No.
44625—285 8. W. (2d) 575. .

Division Two, December 12, 1955.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, January 9, 1956,

Russell Roberts, Philip Fowler, Jim Clemens and Edwards, Hess &
Collins for appellant.

DeCoster, Thomas R. McGinnis and Charles E. Gray for

[577] “BOHLING, C.—A collision. of two automobil
to this action. Edward G. Jones was killed in the collision; and
Kathleen L. Wilson, administratrix of his estate sued Albert Toliver
for, damages. Defendant’ answered and counterclaimed. The. jury

found against plaintiff and for defendant, awarding defendant $16,-
000 damages. Judgment followed. Plaintiff contends error was com:
mitted in not directing a verdict for plaintiff on defendant’s counter-
élaim, in the exclusion of certain testimony, in giving and refusing
certain instructions, and in-the argument ‘of defendant’s counsel.
. Each litigant contends the other was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law, and plaintiff contends deferidant did not: make a
submissible humanitarian case. These are close factual i issues calling
for a detailed statement of the facts.

Edward G. Jones, with his wife, Lenora, to his right on the front
seat, and his sister, Mrs. Bertha Garrett, on the-right side of' the rear
seat, left Kirksville, Missouri, their home, in Jones’ 5-passenger Chev-
rolet coupe about 4:15 am. July 20, 1952, for Galesburg, - Illinois.
Their route was eastwardly 0 over Missouri highways 6 and 16 to Canton;
Missouri.

Albert Toliver, of Ewing, Missouri, was proceeding. in his Hudson
sedan westwardly over Mo. 6 to La Belle, Missouri, to pick ‘up his
son-in-law for-a trip to Illinois.

For convenience we refer-to Edward G. Tones as plain and: to
Albert Toliver as defendant.

The two automobiles collided about 5 10 a am, at the east: end of the
junction (stated by one litigant to be a lopsided wye) of Highways
Mo. 6 and Mo. 16, about one-half mile east of Lewistown, Missouri.
Each was in its proper lane’of travel: the Chevrolet, for eastbound
traffic on Mo. 16; the Hudson, for westbound ‘traffic on Mo. 6. The
morning was clear and sunny. The blacktopped highways, each 24 feet
wide, were dry. No obstructions to the view or appreciable ‘grades
are involved.

Plaintiff and his wife were “instantly killed. Mra, Garrett and
defendant, who was knocked unconscious, were seriously injured. They
were the only eyewitnesses to the impact of the automobiles, =

Highway Mo. 6 extends westwardly from U. 8. 61 near Taylor, Mis-
souri, through Ewing, Lewistown, La Belle and Kirksville to a point
on U. S. 36 near St. Joseph, Missouri. Highway Mo. 16 is an east-west
road, 18 miles in length, between the junction. of Mo. 6 and 16 to U.S.
61 at Canton, about 14 miles north.of Taylor, and passes, through
Monticello. What isnow Mo. 16 was originally part of Mo. 6 (See
Centennial Road law, 1st Ex. Sess. 1921, p. 155, § 29, Lewis county;
§ 227.020, statutory references are to RSMo 1949 and VAMS). In. the
nineteen ‘thirties a new highway was constructed from near Taylor
through Ewing to connect at the junction involved with said, east-
west road across Lewis county, and the numberof the: old highway.
from the junction to Canton was changed to Mo. 16-and the new high-
way was designated a part of Mo. 6. The old highway (now, Mo. 6 and
Mo. 16) is a due east-west road in the vicinity of the junction. High-

way Mo. 6 runs slightly southeast-northwest at the junction, forming
an acute angle with Mo. 6 at the east end of the junction.

Each highway had its center line marked by a dashed line, painted
white. The painted center line on Mo. 6 followed the curve of Mo. 6
through the junction ; whereas the painted center line of Mo, 16 ended
at the north edge of the westbound traffic lane (if extended) of Mo. 6.
Consequently, a westbound automobile on Mo. 6 would not pass over
the painted center line of Mo. 16 at the junction; but an automobile
from the west on Mo. 6 desiring to proceed eastwardly over Mo. 16
would: pass over the painted center line of Mo. 6 at the junction. The
general layout for painting the center lines is under the maintenance
department of the State Highway Commission, comes [578] through
to the district level, and-the district maintenance department does the
actual painting.

A highway sign for eastbound traffic just south of the pavement
showitig, with arrows, Junction Mo. 16 straight ahead, Mo. 6 to the
right, was 300 or more feet west of the west end of the curve for Mo.
6 at the junction; and immediately opposite said west end of the curve
was anotlier sign showing Mo. 6 to the right and Mo. 16 straight ahead.
There was no ‘‘stop’’ sign for either plaintiff or defendant. On the
north side of Mo. 16 for westbound traffic, not here involved, were two
highway signs; one, approximately 60 feet east of said west end of the
curve, showed Mo. 6 westbound, and the other, about 230 feet farther
east, was a stop sign. In the neighborhood of 472 feet east of said west
end of the curve and 300 feet east of the easternmost meeting point of
the highways was a crossover for the interchange of traffic between the
two highways.

Defendant testified that he first saw the Chevrolet when: the two
automobiles were about 300 feet apart, each being about 150 feet from
the point of impact, and that each automobile was traveling about 50
miles an hour. Plaintiff's evidence was corroborative. Mrs. Garrett,
the sole survivor in the Chevrolet and plaintiff’s witness, stated she
could not give the speed, but that plaintiff had traveled at about the
same speed from Kirksville to the point of collision, 45 or 50 miles, in
about 50 minutes, and she noticed no appreciable difference, in the
speed of the Chevrolet after she saw defendant’s Hudson. (Consult
State v. Enochs, 389 Mo. 953, 98 S. W. 2d 685,.686[1]; State ex rel.
Alton R. Co. v. Shain, 346 Mo. 681, 143 S. W. 2d 233, 238[8].) The
case is submitted on these estimates.

' Mrs. Garrett further testified that the Chevrolet traveled in the
eastbound lane of Mo. 16 and was never on the wrong side of Mo. 16;

that it was east of the house nearest the junction when she. first saw
defendant’s Hudson approaching but she could not say where the
Clievrolet was with reference to ‘the junction (the house is approxi-
mately 170 feet west of the west end of the curve and approximately
306 feet west of the point of impact) ; that the Hudson was ‘‘weaving”’

when she looked up; that it swerved to the left, crossed the center line
.on the curve of Mo, 6, then back into its lane, and appeared to’ come
into the Chevrolet head on; that a ‘screeching sound’? of the Hudson’s
tires accompanied its weaving, and that plaintiff’s last words were:
“I wonder what that guy - - -,’’ and that his wife screamed just before
the collision. . :

Defendant was familiar with the junction. He testified that hé was
at all times in his proper lane of travel around the curve and his
automobile did not swerve or weave across the center line of. Mo. 6;
that he could have seen the Chevrolet some distance farther back than
150 feet; that ‘‘when I first saw it he was well to‘his right in ‘his lane
of traffic headed east and then all at once, without any signal or any-
thing, he started to cross the white line into my lane of traffic’’; and
that what he is saying is that the Chevrolet crossed the painted center
line of Mo. 6. Defendant also testified that when the automobiles were
800 feet apart he realized the Chevrolet would either go around’ the
curve on Mo. 6 or straight ahead due east on Mo. 16; that he, defendant,
continued to follow around the curve on Mo. 6 for 100 feet; that when
the automobiles were about 100 feet apart and each 50 feet from the
point of impact he first put on his brakes and started’to swerve his
Hudson ; and that he traveled about 100 feet after he saw the Chevrolet
before he did anything.

Witnesses Sam Gnuse, who arrived at the scene at 6: 25° a.m., before
anyone had been removed from either automobile, a first arrival, and.
Patrolman L. P. Forrest described where the debris was on the high-
way et cetera. Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 8 is a plat, drawn to scale, of
the junction and Mo. 6 and 16 in the immediate vicinity, and it was
agreed that it fairly represented the intersection. Witness Gnuse drew
a circle on said Exhibit No. 8 indicating where the debris was. Defend-
ant stated the circle [579] represented the approximate point of i im-
pact.

Patrolman Forrest made measurements of the scene. He testified:
The Hudson bounced back 6 feet and the Chevrolet bounced back 26
feet from the point of impact. It measured 136 feet from the west end
of the curve to the point of impact and 85 or 86 feet from the point
of impact to where the south edge of the pavement on Mo. 16 meets
the northeast edge of the curved pavement on Mo. 6 (the west point of
the triangular plot of ground between Mo. 6 and 16). The point of
impact was 6 feet south of and opposite the end of the white painted
center line of Mo. 16 and 10 feet north of the center line of Mo.'6 at
that point, making the point of impact 22 feet north of the south edge
of the pavement on Mo. 6. (This corresponds with the ‘circle-placed on
Exhibit No. 8 by witness Gnuse.) There was a 53-foot straight east-
west skid mark of one’ tire of the Chevrolet in.the south lane for’Mo.
16 to the point of impact and the skid marks of the Hudson were 50
feet in length.

. From:photographs offered in evidence: The damage to the Chevrolet
was greatest at its:right front’or southeast corner as it traveled east,
including the headlight and front fender. The damage to the Hudson
;was.more on its front, mostly to the right front, with the right front
-fender pushed back, up and in and the left front fender showing no
material damage. One witness testified the left front corner of the
Hudson -was:damaged ‘(as stated in defendant’s brief) but he later cor-
rected this, stating he meant the.right front corner.

; Defendant’s theory was that the cars were traveling on the same
highway; that.the painted curved center line of Mo. 6 divided their
lanes for travel, and that § 304.020(3) applied.

- Plaintiff contends. the collision was within the intersection of Mo.
:6 and 16 and § § 301,010(6) and 304.020(12) apply.

‘The court adopted defendant’s theory. Briefly, defendant submitted
primary negligence on the part of plaintiff in driving at an excessive
speed: (50: miles-an‘hour). when plaintiff knew or should have known
that.in leaving Mo. 6 and proceeding eastwardly on Mo. 16 he would
be-required.to pass over the center line of Mo. 6; and primary negli-
gence in plaintiff operating-his automobile so as to cross the center line
of Mo. 6 from.the south to the north side thereof when defendant was
in.such close proximity that there was great danger of a collision; and
negligence under the humanitarian doctrine in plaintiff failing to
turn his.car to the right and remain south of the center line of Mo. 6.
‘Plaintiff’s instructions sought a recovery on defendant’s negligence in
driving at an excessive speed and under the humanitarian doctrine in
iling to slacken speed and swerve. . .°
Section “304.020 (3) provides that operators of automobiles
meeting: an.apptoaching opposing automobile on the same highway

“shall ‘turn. to the right of the center of the highway so as to pass
without interference.’?.

“An intersecting highway”? is defined in § 801.010(6) as “any
highway which. joins another, whether or not it crosses the same.’’ The
‘area of ‘an intersection has’ been considered to embrace the paved
space common.-to both highways. Brumback v. Simpson, Mo., 247
8:-W, 2d 635, 687[1,2]; Knight v. Richey, 868 Mo. 293, 250 8. W. 2d
972, 979[10]. See 60 C. J. S. 833, § 351a; 5 Am. Jur. 662, § 288; 2
‘Blashfield, Automobile Law, § § 981, 982.

.. The question whether the highways were intersecting highways was
‘for the court under the undisputed: facts. The area common to Mo.
‘6 and Mo. 16 tnder the instant facts embraced at least the paved area
bounded by-a prolongation of the northeast curved edge of the pave-
ment of Mo.:6.across Mo. 16, the west end of the curve of Mo. 6, and
the north and south edges of the pavement of Mo. 16 within said east
and west bouridaries. Plaintiff entered upon Highway Mo. 16 when he
‘passed. the west end of the curve of Mo. 6. In the circumstances the
rights of the motorists at and within the intersection is not to be ruled

by the fact that the district maintenance department [580] of the
State Highway Commission did not paint the center line on Mo..16
to connect with the center line painted around the curve of Mo. 6;
but stopped the center line of Mo. 16 at the imaginary prolongation’ of
the northeast edge of the pavement of Mo. 6 as it curved across Mo.
16. The case involves the operation of motor vehicles across a highway
intersection ; and the rights of the motorists are governed by-statutory
provisions enacted by the General Assembly regulating” traffic: at, high-
way intersections.

Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s contention, if sustained, would
give a motorist intending to make a left turn into a street joining but
not crossing another the right of way to enter the intersection and make
the left turn over an opposing motorist on the same stréet reaching
the intersection at approximately the same time, and in-effect nullify
§ 304.020(6) which requires a motorist desiring to turn left to prodeed
beyond the center of the intersection before turning left. Section
304.020(12) applies to motorists approaching’ an’ intersection on dif-
ferent streets. With respect to this contention other-provisions of the
law exacting the highest degree of care of motorists would require the
motorist desiring to so turn left to remain to his right of the center of
the highway: until he could make the turn in the-exercise of proper
care. Defendant under the instant facts was the motorist traveling
around the curve and making a turn to the left. .

HM Plaintiff contends defendant was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law and was not entitled to his submissions
of primary negligence against plaintiff.

Defendant says the application of statutory regulations of motor
vehicle traffic gives consideration to the existing circumstances and
conditions, and the regulations are not to be applied rigidly, absolutely
and peremptorily or receive literal constructions resulting in an
absurdity, citing Wines v. Goodyear T. & R. Co.; Mo. App., 246 S: W.
2d 525, 528[1-4], a case involving traffic on a six lane street when icy
and where the motorist apparently, although not following the letter
of the statute, exercised a greater degree of care than was exacted by
the statute under the facts and circumstances. That is not the instant
situation. :

Absent statute or ordinance regulation of vehicle traffic at highway
intersections, the vehicle first reaching and entering the intersection
has the right of way over a vehicle subsequently reaching the inter-
section unless the situation would indicate to a reasonably prudent man:
that to proceed would probably result in a collision, it being the duty:
of the second arrival to allow the first arrival to pass in-safety. Minnis
v.-William J. Lemp Brewing Co., Mo. App., 226 S. W. 999, 1000[21;
60 C. J. 8. 871, § 362, b, (3) ; 5 Am. Jur. 663, § 289; 2 Blashfield,
Automobile Law, 206, § 991." ” .

This common law rule has been changed by § 304,020(12), requiring
a motorist approaching from the left to yield the right of way to
another approaching from the right on an intersecting highway ; pro-
vided: ‘‘The right of way shall mean the right to proceed when two
or more vehicles will reach such intersection at approximately the
same time.’’ .

Generally, an issue of contributory negligence turns on the testimony
of an opponent’s witness or on conflicting testimony, and in such in-
stances the issue is for the jury. Where a litigant’s own evidence
establishes his contributory negligence, the issue is for the court.

The defendant saw the Chevrolet when the two cars were 300 feet
apart, and each 150 feet from the point of impact. Each car was
traveling 50 miles an hour. The greatest length of the area common
to both highways was 172 feet, which was along the south edge of a
prolongation of the pavement for Mo. 16 through the intersection.
When plaintiff entered the west end of this common area defendant
was approximately 133 feet from the intersection; and when defend-
ant entered the intersection plaintiff had covered approximately [581]
136 of the 172 feet, was just south of the end of the painted center
line of Mo. 16, and about to pass from the area common to both high-
ways and wholly onto Mo. 16. This is not a case of split second priority
in entering upon the intersection. Under the authorities plaintiff had
the superior right to proceed across the intersection and, at first, a
right to assume that defendant would obey the law and yield the
right of way. Knight v. Richey, 363 Mo. 293, 250 8. W. 2d 972, 976;
Gabelman v. Bolt, Mo. App., 68 8. W. 2d 909, 913[1], upheld, 336
Mo. 539, 80 S. W. 24 171, 172[2]; Sommer v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co., Mo. App., 262 S. W. 2d 385, 338[1]; Ritzheimer v. Marshall,
Mo. App., 168 S. W. 2d 159, 165[4]; Minnis v. William J. Lemp
Brewing Co., supra. °

HI Defendant testified he realized that plaintiff would turn to
the right around the curve on Mo. 6 or go straight ahead due east on
Mo. 16. If plaintiff intended to go around the curve, he would be ex-
pected to start turning at the west end of the curve. Defendant
states in his brief that ‘‘plaintiff’s automobile was not swerved before
the accident.’’ Soon after plaintiff passed said west end of the curve
defendant had warning and should have realized from plaintiff’s
failure to turn that plaintiff was going straight ahead and not turn-
ing. Defendant testified: ‘‘Q. You are unable to tell the jury then
any more than you did put on the brakes sometime before this acci-
dent occurred, is that right? A. Immediately before it occurred, yes,
sir. Q. You mean that you did put them on immediately before it
occurred? A. Yes. Q. Sir? A. Yes, sir. Q. Can’t you give us some
idea how far back you were when you put your brakes on? A. Ap-
proximately fifty feet. Q. You traveled then with the Jones car in

ee

your range of visibility - -for approximately a hundred feet before ‘you
did anything, is that right? A. Yes.’?-

“Bevery person operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this
state shall drive the same in a careful and prudent manner, and shall
exercise the highest degree of care, and at a rate of speed so as not
to endanger the property of another or tlie life or -limb of any person
* * 7 § 304.010; Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 387 Mo. 1205, 1210, 88
8. W. 24 373, 374[4, 5]; Burlingame v. Landis, 362 Mo. 528; 242 s. Ww.
24 578, 580[1, 2).

Defendant may not at first have been chargeable with knowledge of
plaintiff’s intention to proceed straight ahead due east but he was.
aware of plaintiff’s approach. Defendant’s testimony establishes that
he was taking a chance on being able to go through the intersection at
undiminished speed after he saw plaintiff would reach the intersection
well ahead of him and also after he saw plaintiff in-and proceeding
across the intersection. He admittedly traveled approximately 100
feet before acting to avoid a collision with a car that traveled about
136 feet into the intersection, needed only a fraction of a- second to
be in the clear, and which had entered the intersection when defendant,
was about 133 feet from it. The facts demonstrate that neither de-
fendant nor plaintiff was able to stop his automobile within a braking
distance of ‘approximately 50 feet. We may assume that experienced
motorists in the exercise of the highest degree of care know that an
automobile cannot be stopped within a braking distance of 50 feet
when traveling 50 miles an hour. Consult Pennington v. Weis, 353
Mo, 750, 184 $. W. 2d 416, 418;-Hopkins v. Highland Dairy Farms
Co., 848 Mo. 1158; 159 S. W. 2d 254, 257[4]. Defendant: was intent
on proceeding through the intersection at unabated speed until it was
too late for him to avoid the collision. Under thé provisions of
§ 304:020(12) defendant’s actions: were not an exercise of the highest
degree of care in the circumstances of record. ‘The-only reasonable
conclusions to be drawn from defendant’s testimony -are that his
actions proximately contributed to the resulting collision and that he
was negligent as.a matter of law. Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774,
217 S. W. 2d 495, 499[6]; Roberts v. Consolidated Paving and
Material-Co., 335 Mo. 6, 70 8. W. 2d 548[1]; Burton v. Moulder, Mo.,
245 S. W. 2a 844, 846[6-8]; Folluo v. Gray, Mo. App., 256 S. W. 2a
278, 276[1, 2]. [582] See also Iman v. Walter Fréund Bread Co.
332 Mo. 461, 58 8. W. 2d 477, 479[2-5].

Tt follows that defendant’ 's submissions of primary negligence
should have been refused. His sole cause instruction should have
been refused: Johnson v. Cox, Mo., 262 8. W. 2d 13, 14; Wilkins v.
Stuecken, 359 Mo. 1047, 225 8. W. 181, 184[8, 4]. As stated, the
ease involves statutory regulations of motor traffic at highway inter-
sections.

: [HE We here take up defendant’s contention that ‘plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in crossing over the center
line of Mo. 6 directly into the path of defendant’s. oncoming car at a
time when defendant’s car was in dangerous proximity to plaintifi’s
car; citing Yeaman v. Storms, supra; Branscum v. Glaser, Mo., 234
8. W. 2d 626, 627[1-3]; Folluo v. Gray, supra. The stated contention
is based on defendant’s trial theory that the two cars were approach-
ing oné another on the same highway and is not well taken under our
ruling that the law governing the rights of motorists at highway
intersections is. applicable. However, the case-is to be retried and we
consider the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a matter
of law, a close issue under the facts. ©

It is stated in Danzo v. Humfeld, Mo., 180 8. W. 2d 722, 726: ‘ ‘So
far ‘as primary negligence is concerned, the obligation to exercise due
earé remains mutual and reciprocal. One may not disregard the laws
of prudence and exact of others a primary obligation to protect him
against his lack of caution. If he exercises due care for his own
saféty, then, absent information to the contrary, he may rely upon
the presumption .that others will obey the law.’’’ Clark v. Chicago
& A. R. Co., 127 Mo. 197, 213, 29 S. W. 1018, 1017.

Many motorists seemingly have the idea that the mere fact they
reach and enter an intersection ahead of a motorist on an intersecting
highway gives them the right to proceed across the intersection re-
gardless of the conditions confronting them and relieves them of all
eaution. This is not the law. Under § 304.010 motorists are required
to exercise the highest degree of care at all times and places on the
highways of this state. Gude v. Weick Bros. Undertaking Co.; 322
Mo. 778, 783, 16 8. W. 2a 59, 60; La Banea v. Pundmann, Mo., 147
8. W. 2d 466[1].

All of the affirmative testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses established
that plaintiff operated his car without any change in its speed or
course across the intersection until he applied his brakes within
approximately 53 feet of the point of impact. Defendant’s testimony
did not:aid plaintiff. Mrs. Garrett testified that she heard a ‘‘sereech-
ing sound of the tires’’ of.defendant’s car and that the sound accom-
panied the ‘‘weaving’’ of the’ Hudson. The ‘‘screeching sound’’ was,
of course, the result of defendant’s application of the brakes. Plain-
tiff, in the exercise of the highest degree of care, was warned by the
highway signs for eastbound traffic, first, that he was approaching
the junction of Mo. 6 and Mo. 16; that Mo. 6 turned to his right and
Mo. 16 continued straight ahead, and this warning was repeated when
he entered the west end of the intersection. Plaintiff knew from these
warning signs that westbound -traffic' on Mo. 6 crossed the lane for
eastbound traffic on Mo. 16, plaintiff’s intended line of travel. Not-
withstanding these warnings, plaintiff continued ahead at unabated
speed and took no action to avoid a collision until it was too late to do

so.. Consideration is to be given the unusual situation: existing at the
intersection; the distance plaintiff had to travel to cross the. inter-
section; the fact’ that defendant’s car was within his observation both
prior to and after he entered the intersection; that the only line of
travel for defendant (westbound) on.Mo. 6 was across Mo. 16 at the
intersecton, whereas plaintiff, at first and depending on his inten-
tions, could have proceeded southeast along the curve of Mo. 6 or,
straight east on Mo. 16, and that defendant was proceeding ahead at
unabated speed. With each car equally-distant from ‘the point of
impact (150 feet) and approaching the point of impact.at the same
speed (50 miles am hour), as the case. was submitted in the trial
court. [583]. and. here; it is inescapable ‘that the collision, as .demon-
strated .by the results, was inevitable unless plaintiff.or defendant.
took action to prevent it, which, from all the affirmative testimony in
the -case, neither did until it was too late. The greater the speed
the earlier the situation should be comprehended. The precautions to
be taken increase with the danger encountered. - Much of what has been
said regarding defendant’s negligence as a matter of law is applicable
here. Reasonable minds should agree that plaintiff and defendant
were taking chances in attempting. to pass through the intersection
ahead of the other, and each was negligent.as a: matter of law. See
authorities cited re defendant’s negligence as a matter of. law, and
alsé Hammond v. Emery-B:-T. Dry Goods Co., Mo., 240 8. W.. 170,
178[1-4].

Hl Plaintiff also contends defendant ‘did not make a submissible
ease under the humanitarian doctrine on, plaintiff’s failure to turn
to his right. Plaintiff stresses a portion of defendant’s testimony
that it appeared to defendant plaintiff ‘‘had started around the
curve and then changed his mind and pulled to the left’’ and argues
defendant’s imminent peril did not arise ‘‘until plaintiff ‘started to
cross the white line’ ’’.of Mo, 6; that is, when each car was only about
50 feet from the point of “impact. Defendant testified ‘Well, I
eouldn’t tell you exactly,’’ ‘‘I couldn’t tell you for sure’’ whether
plaintiff proceeded straight east; that, asked whether ‘plaintiff ‘was
going to his right and then to his left, defendant'answered: ‘‘No,hé
was following his line of traffic however it runs and then‘he appeared
to eross the line into my lane of traffic”’; that defendant 'was telling
counsel plaintiff “crossed the center line into’my lane of ti‘affic with-
out any warning.’”” We have studied defendant’s testimony on this
fact: issue with extreme’ care and from the record his ‘only testimony’
having probative value on tlie issue is that plaintiff procéeded through
the intersection in plaintiff’s lane of traffic and, instead of turning
southeast along the curve of Mo.6, plaintiff crossed the eurved painted
center line of Mo. 6 in the ‘eastbound traffic lane’ of Mo:'16 in the
intersection as eastbound traffic on Mo, 16 was required to do. We

are of opinion the imminent peril zone is not as restricted as plain-
tiff contends. -

“(The meaning of the term ‘imminent peril’ as the basic fact of the
humanitarian doctrine. has-been well settled. The peril truly must be
imminent—that is, certain, immediate, and impending; it may not
be remote, uncertain or contingent. A likelihood or bare possibility
of injury is not sufficient * *.’’ Blaser v. Coleman, 358 Mo. 157,
213 8. W. 2d 420, 421[2]. While plaintiff, having entered the inter-
section first, had a superior right to. cross, his right to assume that
defendant would yield the right of way and permit him to‘clear the
intersection was not an absolute right but was subject to the funda-
mental duty of all motorists to exercise the highest degree of care to
avoid.injury to- himself or others. Weis v. Melvin, Mo., 219 S. W. 2d
810, 311[1-3]; Pappas Pie & B. Co. v. Stroh Bros. Del. Co., Mo. App.;
67. 8. W. 2d 798; 796[1]. With no change in the speed of plaintift’s
automobile, a finding ‘that defendant was oblivious of plaintiff’s
intention to proceed due east as-plaintiff first proceeded into the inter-
section was warranted. The facts demonstrated that neither plaintiff
nor defendant was able to stop his automobile within a distance of
50 feet. Plaintiff could have turned his car with greater celerity than
he-could effect a stop. A fair reading of the whole of defendant’s
testimony, as well as that of other witnesses to the fact, is that plain-
tiff pursued a straight due east course across the intersection. The
collision occurred where the paths for eastbound traffie on Mo. 16
and westbound traffic on Mo. 6 cross near the southeast end of the
intersection. Taking the evidence favorable to defendant, defendant
was pursuing his course without deviation around the curve at un-
diminished speed. Plaintiff was chargeable with notice as he pro-
ceeded. across the intersection that if both cars continued on their
respective courses at their respective speeds a collision would ensue.
Tt was for the jury to say in the circumstances of record where the
imminent peril of the collision arose and whether thereafter plaintiff:
[584] in the exercise of the highest degree of care could have turned
to, his right along the curve of Mo. 6 and avoided the impending col-
lision. Teague v. Plaza Express Co.,'354 Mo. 582, 190 S. W. 2d.254,
256[8, 4]; Lilly v. Boswell, 362 Mo. 444, 242 S. W. 2d 73, 76
[5, 6]; Marezuk v.-St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 355 Mo. 536, 196 S. W.
2d 1000, 1002[4]; Harrell v. Berberich, 359.Mo. 551, 222 8. W. 2d
788, 735[8-5]; Bowman v. Standard Oil Co., 350 Mo. 958, 169 8. W.
2d 885, 386[1-3]-; Pennington v. Weis, supra. Yeaman vy. Storms,
358 Mo. 774, 217 S. W. 2d 495, 498, cited'by plaintiff, is distinguish:
able on the facts in that the imminent peril zone was very narrow,
plaintiff having his‘car under.control and able to stop in ten ‘feet
when. he. pressed on the accelerator to get across the point of impact
ahead of defendant. .

HH Mrs. Garrett, plaintiff’s witness, testified that she was eon-
scious at all times during the occurrence; that defendant’s car. was
swerving ; that she put her arm up to keep from hitting the top of the
ear and laid a hand on her brother’s shoulder to help hold herself.
She described in detail what happened to Mr. and Mrs. Jones and
herself, stating that her foot was caught between the seats and was
nearly severed and the bone was under her brother’s arm and pene-
trating his body, and that it was fifteen minutes by her watch before
help arrived—Mr. Gnuse and a companion. They found defendant
slumped over the wheel of his car and thought he was dead, They
heard a woman, Mrs. Garrett, screaming in the other car and ran to
it. Plaintiff offered to prove by Mr. Gnuse that Mrs. Garrett was
screaming with pain; was very bloody; was repeatedly shouting:
‘He is dead’’; was making frenzied prayers to God; was in a condi-
tion of physical and mental shock, and, mixed in with the screaming
and praying, was repeatedly saying: ‘‘Why did he keep swerving.”’
The offer of proof was refused.

Plaintifi’s position is that the statement ‘‘why did he keep swerv-
ing”’ was admissible under the res gestae rule because the testimony
of Mrs. Garrett established the nature and extent of her injuries and
her condition of shock. Trial courts are privileged to exercise a
reasonable discretion in determining whether hearsay testimony of
statements made are admissible as a part of the res gestae. Moore v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., Mo., 251 8. W. 2d 38, 40[1]. This may
occasion what appears to be some conflict in holdings on -the issue.
In view of Mrs. Garrett’s testimony that she did not lose conscious-
ness, her detailed testimony covering the occurrence before and after
the collision, and other factors, we are not prepared to say that the
trial court committed reversible error in its ruling. As considéred in
Sconce v. Jones, 343 Mo. 362, 121 8. W. 2d 777, 782, after reviewing
the authorities, we think the trial court might properly consider that
plaintiff’s evidence did not establish that Mrs. Garrett was under
such influence of shock ‘or pain as to be unable to reflect or reason
after the accident so that the statement, when made, was the
spontaneous utterance of thoughts created by or springing out of the
event itself, or that they were the event speaking through Mrs. Gar-
rett instead of Mrs. Garrett speaking about the event, Woods v-
Southern R. Co., Mo., 73 §. W. 2d 374, 877[2-4] ; Landau v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 305 Mo. 568, 267 S. W. 376, 378. .

The opinion need not be extended to develop other matters meri-
tioned in the briefs. Some are sufficiently covered for the purposes
of this review by what has been said and others are likely not to
recur.

: The judgment is teversed and-the cause is remanded. Barrett and
Stockard, CC., concur.

PER. CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bowe, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

In the Matter of Joun R. Otiver, Respondent, No. 44549—285 8. Ww.
. (2d) 648.

Court en Bane, January 9, 1956.

Gl. A. Grassmuch, Jr., for respondent John R. Oliver.

[648] DALTON, J.—This is an original proceeding based upon an
information filed in this-eourt- by the Bar Committee of the Eighth
Judicial’ Circuit of Missouri. The information charged respondent,
a duly licensed attorney at law.and a member of the bar of this state,
with certain acts of -professiohal’ misconduct as therein specified,
alleged that’ he was-an unfit’ person to practice law in this state and
prayed the court to appoint a special commissioner to take testimony
and report his findings and conclusions to the court, and that the
court enter its decree permanently disbarring respondent from the

practice of law.

' A citation was duly issued and served and respondent’s answer to
the ‘citation was.duly filed. Thereafter, Hon. Roy B. Meriwether,
Judge of the Tenth. Judicial Circuit. of Missouri, was appointed
special commissioner. of this court to hear the testimony and report,
as stated. He accepted the appointment, qualified, heard the testimony
and reported his findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with
his recommendation that respondent be permanently disbarred from
the practice of law. Respondent was represented by counsel and [649]
present at the hearing and testified in his own behalf, but filed no ex-
ceptions to the report of the special commissioner and he has filed
no pleadings, suggestions or brief in this court. Informants filed a,
motion asking the court to approve and follow the recommendations
of the ‘special commissioner, which motion was ordered to be taken
with the. case. The cause was finally submitted in this court on
September 28, 1955 on the record and brief of informants.

The charges against respondent were based upon his alleged dis-
position of certain moneys received by him in the settlement of a
client’s claim. Many facts are not in dispute. Walter Jones and Annie
Jones, were. husband and wife. Walter had been employed in St.
Louis for, some sixteen years, For many years he had been a porter
in Matt Cicerich’s tavern or saloon in the Laclede Hotel at Sixth
and Chestnut in the city of St. Louis. Annie was employed as a maid
in, a home in Memphis, Tennessee. On or about March 28, 1952,
Walter died as a result of an automobile accident and Annie came to
St. Louis to attend the coroner’s inquest and the funeral of her hus-
band. She there met Matt Cicerich, who introduced her to respondent
and recommended his employment as her attorney to prosecute her
claim for the. wrongful death of her husband, Respondent was so
employed: by a written contract dated March 31, 1952 and providing
a contingent fee of one-third the amount recovered. Respondent
subsequently effected a settlement of Annie’s claim for $8,000. There-
after releases were executed and the net proceeds of the settlement
were received by respondent and deposited in his personal checking
account in a‘St. Louis bank. On or about December 18, 1952, respond-
ent sent ,his personal check for $1,000 to his client in Memphis,
Tennessee, and advised her ‘‘I will send more to you in the next
thirty days. I have had to pay out a lot on proven claims filed. I paid
Mr. Cicerich the funeral bill and bill for moneys that he advanced to
me, for this prosecution, and I will send you an accounting as soon as
I can.’’? Prompt demand, as hereinafter stated, was made for the
balance claimed to be due Annie Jones, but no further accounting
was made until February 10, 1953, when respondent mailed her his
personal, check for $2.69 and a statement purporting to show the
dispo ition made of the remaining proceeds of the settlement. The
statement showed the payment of $1,000 to Annie on December 18,
1952, the payment of respondents fee of $2666.66, a payment to Matt

—

Cicerich of $457; being the amount he is alleged to have advanced and
paid to one E. B. Koonce for the funeral and burial of Annie’s hus-
band (an item which Annie had agreed to and understood was to be
paid from the fund), and the payment of certain minor items of
costs and taxes. Other items listed in the statement and purporting to
account for the balance of the proceeds of the settlement--will be
subsequently discussed.

* With reference to the disposition of this balance of the net proceeds
of the settlement, the information charged: ‘‘That respondent did,
during the months of December, 1952, and January, 1953; without
notice to client or any consultation with client, undertake’to divest
himself of immediate possession of client’s remaining money and
divert the same from client, and did issue respondent’s checks on his
bank account in St. Louis, where he had deposited the’ funds of his
client derived from the settlement of the case as aforesaid, until he
had issued and permitted to be cashed, or had cashed, a number of
checks, and made some cash payments for alleged court‘ costs, to
various people, as the operator and his brother of a tavern or saloon
in the City of St. Louis, the bar tender of the saloon, the bar maid of
the place, respondent himself, and others, on their mere alleged un-
proved and unverified and most questionable and apparent non-
existent claims that they had loaned money to the deceased husband
in his life-time, until there remained in respondent’s account at the
bank out of client’s funds received only the sum heretofore mentioned
of’ $2.69, which as aforesaid respondent sent to his client in February,
1953, with a notation on his check: ‘Bal. due Annie Jones on Power
of Attorney signed April, [650] 1952’, * * *. That the same was
done by respondent by collusive or other improper arrangement with
the persons receiving such checks in an effort to try to deprive client
of her money that was due her and for the benefit and enrichment
of respondent, * * *. That respondent did falsely represent to his
client that he had paid out large sums of her money to others’ when
in truth and in fact he retained the money himself and failed to dis-
close to his client that he had done so; that respondent did thus mis-
appropriate the money of his client and fail to properly account to
his client for her money, contrary to his professional duties to his
client, and contrary to the spirit and rules of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, as expressed in the preamble to Rule 4 of this Court-and
particularly as expressed in Rules 4.47, 4.82, 4.15 and 4.06 of this
Court.’”

With reference to these charges, the special commissioner found
respondent ‘‘guilty as charged in the information’’; and particularly
found that ‘‘the truth of all of the allegations of said information’
haye been definitely. proven and established by the great weight and
abundance of credible testimony produced in evidence.”’ .

In his report of his findings as to particular facts, the special. com-
missioner found that Annie Jones, widow of Walter Jones, deceased,
by written contract, dated-March 31, 1952; voluntarily employed
respondent to represent her ‘‘in the litigation of any and all claims
that have arisen or may arise’’-by reason of the death of her husband
in an’automobile collision in the city of St. Louis; that respondent’s
contingent fee was to be one-third of the amount collected; that Annie
Jones further signed Exhibit ‘‘B’’, dated March 30, 1952; by which
she purported to voluntarily waive any and all rights under the
statutes and laws of Missouri relating to the ‘‘Death Benefits’ re-
ceived by her for the-wrongful death of her husband and to authorize
the payment of all his-just and legal debts from the amount she re-
ceived; that she also signed Exhibit ‘‘C’’, dated.April 8, 1952, being
a Power of Attorney to respondent to-collect any and all damages
and disperse.same according ‘to-all legal and bona fide claims against
her late husband; that before. Exhibits ‘‘B’? and ‘‘C”? or either of
them were signed by Annie-Jones, and as an,inducement for her to
sign the same, the said John R. Oliver fraudulently represented to
her that it was necessary for her to sign the papers for him to employ.
an additional attorney to assist him in-the prosecution of her lawsuit
for ‘the collection .of daimages.for the death of her husband; ‘‘that.
said Annie Jones was and is an ignorant colored woman, 57 years of
age, with no knowledge of business matters, scarcely able to read or
write; that she did not read said documents at the time of signing
same but relied fully upon the said John R. Oliver to-know what she,
should sign in-connection with her claim or suit; * * * that Oliver
did not read the documents to her and she relied upon what he told
her they were * * *; that the said John R. Oliver did then and there
misrepresent to Annie Jones the real reason, why (sic) the signing
of informant’s exhibits “B*:and ‘C’; and that-said fraud and decep-
tion on the part of said John R. Oliver was a part of a fraudulent
plan to make available for his own'use the funds to be received from
the wrongful death of Walter Jones.”

The -special comniissioner’s report does not’ summarize the. de-
tailed facts shown by the ‘record; but quotes testimony at length to
support the conclusions reached. We -shall review-the facts found,
supplementing them .at..times from the record, so that the commis-
sioner’s further findings and observations may be better understood.

On réceipt of respondent’s letter of December 18, 1952, Annie con-
sulted an attorney in Memphis and respondent was contacted by tele-
phone on December 24,1952. A demand was made for the balance of
the! money due her. Respondent asked her. attorney, ‘‘How much
money does she want?’’ He: further said that he had to settle some
debts. Resporident’ was-then adviséd.that’ Annie‘knew of no debts
except the funeral’ expenses of-her husband. - Respondent replied,
“Well, it is the’ funeral bill and a hundred dollars’’ he had to pay

somebody. [651] Respondent insisted he was honor-bound to pay
some debts, refused to fix a day for paying the balance and finally
said he would pay the balance in about 30 days. Respondent said the
balance would be about $3,000; that the total, including the $1,000
remitted, ‘‘won’t go as much as $5,000.’’ Not hearing further from
respondent, an effort was made to contaet him by telephone. When
that:failed, a telegram was sent .and respondent later advised that a
farther report would be made about February 7, 1953. As stated,
respondent’s letter of February 10, 1953, contained a check for
$2.69 and a statement purporting to show how the proceeds of the
settlement had been disposed of. Among the items for which respond-
ent took credit were the following: ‘‘5. To Matt Cicerich, money ad-
vanced. to be paid in Court for fines 3-29-49—3-1-53, $1,475.00. ‘6.
To-Matt Cicerich, money loaned to Walter Jones for attorney fees
8-30:37—4-7-48, $1,400.00. * * * 8, To Mat Cicerich, money advanced
to Walter Jonés during 30 day period before he died, $218.00. 9. To
John Cicerich, money loaned to Walter Jones paid Dee, 30th, 1952,
1948-49-50-51, $500.00. 10. To Cleo Canfield, barmaid at tavern
where Walter Jones worked for Matt Cicerich, $200.00. 11. Charles
Zirkel, bartender at same tavern, $25.00.’’. The receipts filed in
support of the above items were dated December 30, 1952, subsequent
to the time that Annie’s Memphis attorney had demanded for her the
balance in respondent’s hands and had advised respondent that she:
kmew-of no claims, except funeral expenses. Respondent’s personal
checks which purport to have been given in payment of items 5, 9 and
10 are dated December 30, 1952. The check in payment of item 8 is
dated December 16, 1952. No checks were issued in payment of items
6vand 11.-

‘Item 6 was purportedly supported by a receipt, dated December
30, 1952, as follows: ‘‘Received of John R. Oliver, Attorney in fact,
$1,400.00, money advanced and loaned to Walter Jones for attorney
fees, 3-20-37 to 4-7-48; $1,400,”’ signed Matt Cicerich. The date in
1987 was several years before respondent was admitted to the bar.
Respondent’ admitted that no check was issued or money paid to
Matt Cicerich on this item. He said the $1,400 remained in his per-
sonal’ account and was checked out by him for personal benefit for
personal items of expense. On cross-examination, he admitted the
receipt was false; that Cicerich had advanced no money to Walter
Jones; that “respondent had not paid the money to Cicerich; that
respondent received'and directly appropriated the client’s funds to
the extent’ evidenced by the receipt; and that the true facts were not
disclosed to his client. Respondent’s attempted explanation was that
he had known Walter Jones for more than ten years and had rendered
him legal services during this period; that Matt Cicerich had guaran-
teed respondent’s fees for'such services; that Walter Jones had been
arrested on about fifteen occasions for gambling and disturbance’ of

the peace; that respondent had represented him by’ appearing ‘in
chambers before the police judge; that he had made only two court
appearances; and that he had represented Jones against collection
agencies. He insisted that Matt Cicerich had told Annie that her
husband owed respondent around $2,000 for legal services, which he
(Cicerich) had guaranteed. Respondent said he (respondent). told
Annie she did not have to pay his fee, but Annie insisted that he pay
all of her husband’s debts and he did so. On cross-examination
respondent admitted that he had: previously testified that he had
represented Walter Jones thirty or forty times in ten years, mostly
in police court.

There was testimony on behalf of informants that a careful check
of the police records of arrests in the city of St. Louis, during the
period between 1934 and 1952, showed that Annie’s husband had been
arrested only twice in that city, once in 1941, when he was represented
by the public defender and entered a plea of guilty to a criminal
offense, and once in 1951 when he was arrested for investigation. The
records of the Bureau of Identification, where fingerprint.records of
all persons arrested are kept, also showed that Annie’s husband,
Walter Jones, had only been arrested [652] twice, once on February,
21, 1941 and once on March 4, 1951.

Respondent testified that, after Annie returned to Memphis, he
notified the places where her deceased husband had worked that he,
respondent, had a power of attorney and that any claims they had,
against Walter Jones would be ‘‘entertained.”’ He said Annie knew
that Matt Cicerich claimed $3,000 due from her husband: for money:
borrowed over a period of years while Walter was working for Matt;
and that Matt had also told her that her husband owed his brother.
John some money. Annie denied knowledge of any of these claims,
or of any authorization to pay them.

As to item 5, respondent said that after the $8 000 was collected;
Matt Cicerich presented his claim to him and showed a handwritten
account book and gave him the names of four persons that knew Matt
had loaned cash to Walter Jones. Respondent said the, claim -was
supported by the testimony of Pigg and Coleman, colored porters in
the Laclede Hotel at Sixth and Chestnut in St. Louis, and by the
testimony of Cleo Williams, a porter or bellhop at the Arlington
Hotel and by one Murphy, the manager of the bar in the Laclede
Hotel. Respondent said he questioned these witnesses about amounts
and dates in Matt’s book and they told stories of men coming in Matt’s
saloon and-saying that they were going to kill Walter Jones if not,
paid and that Matt advanced $300 in money at different times ta
Walter Jones and Walter Jones paid the men off. Respondent
claimed he had spent five nights of three hours each questioning the
witnesses in the back of Matt’s saloon as to the correctness of Matt’s
claim; that he checked the police court records in an effort to find out

what Walter Jones had done with the money he had borrowed; that
he (respondent) found a long list of arrests of Walter Jones, some
of which he knew about, also that bonds had been given and two fines
assessed and paid; that he personally knew Walter had been arrested
fifteen times; that the witnesses, Pigg and Colman, said Jones had
told them before he died that he had not paid the account. Respondent
said the witnesses satisfied him as to the correctness of Matt Cicerich’s
account book; and that he paid Matt Cicerich $1,475.00 and took a
receipt showing ‘‘for fines and money loaned to Walter Jones from
3-29-49—8-1-52,”’ and returned the:account book to Matt. Informants’
evidence tended to show that no fines had ever been assessed against
Walter Jones (Annie’s husband) either in the police court of the
city of St. Louis, or in the Court of Criminal Correction.

As to item No. 8, the purported receipt attached to the statement
sent Annie on February 10, 1953, read: ‘‘Received of John R. Oliver,
Attorney in fact, $218.00, money loaned and advanced to Walter
Jones over and above his salary during the last thirty days of his life,
from March 1, 1952, $218.00 (signed) Matt Cicerich.’’ As to’ this
claim, respondent testified, that it was for money that Matt Cicerich
had advanced to respondent to investigate three insurance policies
on Walter Jones’s life that Matt Cicerich had given to respondent for
investigation. The advancement was after Jones was dead. No
collections were made on any of these policies. Two of the policies
had been cancelled out and one dropped, All were industrial policies
and none named Annie Jones, as beneficiary. Respondent admitted
that Matt Cicerich advanced no such funds to Walter Jones: that
respondent rendered no service to Walter Jones; aud that on March
31, 1952, after Walter Jones’s death respondent gave Matt Cicerich
a receipt for $188 advanced to him. Respondent said the $138 was’
paid to him by Cicerich after Jones’s death and was a part of thé $218
later paid to Matt, Cicerich by respondent. Respondent: through Matt
actually received the entire $218 of Annie’s money,

As to item No. 9. Respondent said that he never saw John Cicer-
ich in connection with this claim; that the claim was mailed to him
from some place in Texas; that he sent it back to be signed; that he
telephoned to John Cicerich in Texas and asked about the claim and
what it was for; and that he (respondent) then wrote on the claim,
**To money loaned and advancéd to [653] Walter Jones for which he
promised to pay me about six months before his untimely death,
$500.00.’” The remainder of the claim ina different handwriting
read: ‘‘From 1948-49-50-51—Dee. 1951, November 24th, ’48, $100.00.
December 12, 749, $50.00. June 24th, ’50, $150.00. October 26th, 751,
$200.00.’? Respondent said ,he didn’t know where the check was sent,
but said he asked Matt where John Cicerich was. Respondent claimed
that he verified the correctness of John’s claimby the oral testimony

of Pigg and Coleman, hereinbefore mentioned. Respondent had
previously represented John Cicerich.

As to ifem No. 10, the barmaid’s claim for $200, respondent said.
that her loan to Walter Jones was supported by the testimony of Pigg
and Coleman and by two other persons standing there in the tavern,
who refused ‘to give him their names, but that they stated that she
gave ‘Walter Jones $200 at a time when he was threatened with bodily
harm or his life was threatened. Respondent quoted one of these
unnamed men as stating that he knew that Cleo had loaned this
colored boy (Walter Jones) some money one evening when he was
in there, when a truck driver came in and threatened to punch Walter
in the head.

As to item No. 11, the $25.00 claim of Charlie Zirkel. Zirkel was a
bartender in Matt Cicerich’s saloon, where the barmaid, Cleo Canfield,
also worked. Respondent claims he paid Zirkel $25.00 in cash out of
Annie’s funds upon the oral testimony of Pigg and Coleman, the
witnesses hereinbefore referred to, that they knew that Zirkel had
loaned that amount of cash to Jones.

» Respondent’s theory of defense concerning the payment of the
several claims in question was that Annie knew of most of the claims
against her husband; that she knew the approximate amount of them,
or knew of claims in excess of the payments subsequently made; that
she knew she didn’t have to pay them, but -she insisted, against
the ‘advice of respondent, -that she wanted them paid; and that
she orally directed the payment of these claims. Respondent, how-
ever, admitted that he had previously testifiéd before the Bar Com-
mittee to the effect that, when Annie visited’ St. Louis after the
death of her husband, no one stated the amount of any claim, and
no one knew that there were any claims, other than funeral ex-
penses; and that he (respondent) knew nothing about the amount of
any -claims, even when the releases were sent to Memphis to be exe-
cuted by Annie. Respondent had previously testified that, when the
releases were sent to Memphis for Annie’s signature, he didn’t know
anything about these claims that he later paid, except an income
tax claim and the claim for funeral expenses. Respondent offered no
evidence before the special commissioner other than his own testimony.

After quoting at length from the record, the special commissioner
made the following observations, conclusions and findings, which are
fully supported by the evidence: ‘‘John R. Oliver had the exclusive
possession and control of all the funds. The money was not kept in a
separate fund or account. It all remained -in the hands of John R.
Oliver and was subject exclusively to his order or orders.

“No statement as to the funds, the amount, size or location was
ever given to Annie Jones or anyone for her, until after demands
were being made by Annie Jones and/or some one on her behalf for
an accounting of the funds.

»:“ Oliver was in complete charge of the funds and all proceedings
thereon at all times and in all places. He hunted up the claims, found
one in Texas, John Cicerich. He passed upon all claims: He was-the
sole judge as to whether the claim should or should not be paid.

“Oliver did not consult or confer with any attorney about the
manner in which he should proceed to hear the claims. There did not
seem to appear to Oliver any complications to him as to how he should
proceed in order to have a fair and just hearing. He could have-talked
with some fellow attorney and informed him that he hada very odd
and peculiar matter pending [654] and asked sucha fellow ‘attorney
how he thought would be the better way to proceed in: justice to all
and to protect himself from any comeback,

“Annie Jones was not consulted by letter, phone or otherwise. She
did not know that an investigation of the claims of creditors was
being made. John R. Oliver was attending to the entire ‘proceeding.
He was the sole judge. He had charge of the funds.and had charge
of the authority to do as he pleased. There was no 6ne above him,
or charged any authority with him. The places where the hearings
were had were all in Matt Cicerich’s saloon. All claims presented
were allowed.

‘None of the claims presented were supported by a “written instrur
ment of any kind. No promissory note, I.0.U., no cancelled check
showing the payment of the alleged money loaned. In-spite of the
many items of varying amounts, large and small, all items seemed-.to
be cash transactions.

“There was no court reporter or stenographer there to take the
testimony of witnesses. Oliver made no memorandum as to what each
witness said. Oliver made no record as to what was said; he has.no
memorandum in writing as to what was paid. In fact Oliver does not
now remember the details of what the witnesses said at the hearing,
and he has no records or memorandums by which he can. refresh his
memory.

“Oliver did all of the questioning of witnesses. The client, “Annie
Jones, was not present at any of the hearings. She was ‘not invited
to be there. She did not know they were going on. The client received
no protection. The flow of client’s money was directed away! from her
and direct into the hands of John R. Oliver.

At the pretended hearings no witnesses were duly sworn. Oliver
testified that he administered an oath to all witnesses but admitted
that he was not a notary public and did not have legal authority .to
administer an oath to a witness. He stated however that-he did. ad-
minister the oath to all witnesses just to impress the witnesses. -No
minutes or record of the pretended hearings were taken by anyone.

“No person was present at any of such pretended hearings rep-
resenting Annie Jones. Annie Jones nor anyone representing her
had knowledge that such a pretended hearing or hearings were being

held. Not a pretended witness present who seemed to be opposed to
any of the- pretended claims. It was a friendly, agreeable and non-
controversial hearing or hearings among friends in a close relation-
ship,::;who had no interest in Annie Jones.

* Mx. Oliver certainly must have realized as a practicing attorney
that the methods he invoked in the pretended hearing of the claims in
question’ were far below the standards of the legal profession.’’

The. special commissioner concluded his report with the finding
Atthat ‘said. John R. Oliver has wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully
committed acts against the interest of the public, has been unethical
-and violated the oath of his office as a practicing attorney-at-law, and
special commissioner recommends that the said John R. Oliver be per-
manently and fully removed from the practice of law in Missouri.’’

It is unnecessary for us to review the record further, except to say
that, in view of respondent’s background, training and experience,
the ‘récord shows-no extenuating circumstances. Respondent testified
that he was born-August 25, 1910, and was 44 years of age at the time
of tlie heariig; that he ‘‘believed’’ he was admitted to the bar in this
state in April 1939; that, at one time, he had worked for the United
States District Court at St. Louis handling naturalization and pass-
port matters; that he served as assistant circuit attorney in the city
of St. Louis from 1940 to 1944; that he, thereafter, ‘‘handled the
legal work for the Sales Tax Department of the State of Missouri’’;
that after the adoption of the 1945 Constitution, he was attorney for
the State Department of Revenue; that he left the Department of
Revenue ‘in' October 1950 and entered the private practice on a full-
time basis; and that, at the times here in question, he maintained an
office in the [655] International Building at 722 Chestnut in the city
of St. Louis.

It is well settled that ‘‘the nature of a lawyer’s profession neces-
sitates: ne utmost good faith toward his client and the highest loyalty
ion to-his client’s interests.” In re Thomasson’s Estate,
1,:144°8.W. (2d) 79, 83. The relation between attorney
ds highly fiduciary and of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and
good faith on attorney’s part. Laughlin v. Boatmen’s Nat. Bank of
St. Louis, Mo. Sup., 163 S.W. (2d) 761; Bybee v. S’Renco, 316 Mo.
517, 291°S.W. 459, 461. A breach of fidelity to a client’s interest
constitutes constructive fraud. Fiske v. Buder, 8 Cir., 125 F. (2d)
841; In re Conrad, 340 Mo. 582, 105 S.W. (2d) 1, 10.

In the case of In re Conner, 357 Mo. 270,'207 8.W. (2d) 492, 499,
this court said: ‘‘Misconduct of attorneys in converting and using
money held in a fiduciary capacity has been before us in other cases.
We have uniformly held such conduct justifies disbarment. In State
Bar Committee v. Stumbatigh, (Mo. Sup.), 123 S.W. (2a) 51, 53,
this Court said: ‘‘ ‘Whether so provided by statute or not, it is always

a ground for the disbarment of an attorney that he has misappro-
priated the funds of his client, either by failing to pay over money
collected by him for his client or by appropriating to his own use
funds intrusted to his ecare.”? * * * ‘The law requires that a
Jawyer shall maintain a higher moral standard than simply to avoid
convietion of embezzlement or larceny. His clients are entitled to
rely on his honesty and on his devotion to their interests.’’ *’’

A careful review of the entire record in this case convinces us that
the charges made against respondent have been sustained by the
overwhelming weight of the credible evidence. Accordingly respond-
ent should be permanently disbarred from the practice of law. It is
so ordered. All concur.

Pinz Lawn Bank & Trust Company, a Corporation, Plaintiff-Appel-
Jant, v. Crry or Puvz Lawn, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant,
Gutsrrt Autry and Anna Furne Avuty, Intervenors-Respondents,
No. 44760—285 8. W. (2d) 679.

Division Two, January 9, 1956.

Gerwitz & Seegers and G. L. Seegers for appellant.

Lester Watson and Wm. J. Hough for respondents.

[680] STORCKMAN, J:—In this action, begun as a declaratory
judgment suit, the filing of an intervening petition was allowed. The
object of the intervening petition was to cancel a note and deed of
trust held by the plaintiff and to enjoin foreclosure. After a hearing
on an order to show cause, a temporary injunction was issued. On
final hearing of the issues brought into ‘the case by the intervening
petition the note and deed of trust were cancelled and a permanent
injunction was issued. From such order and judgment this appeal
was taken. The issues between the parties to the original action have
not been heard or determined and are-not involved on this appeal.

An outline of the various pleadings filed and proceedings had in
the trial court is necessary to a proper understanding of the questions
involved. The plaintiff, Pine Lawn Bank & Trust Company, a banking
corporation, on April 9, 1954, filed'a declaratory judgment action
against the defendant, City of Pine Lawn, a municipal corporation
of the fourth class. In its petition the plaintiff alleged that the de-

fendant city had asserted a claim of liability against it and had de-
manded to be reimbursed for a deficiency of $34,642.70 in city funds
on deposit with the defendant bank caused by the wrongful and un-
authorized acts of the city clerk, Gilbert Auty. The plaintiff bank
tendered with its petition and deposited with the clerk of the circuit
court two cashier’s checks aggregating the amount of the demand,
and prayed for an adjudication of the rights and liabilities of the
plaintiff and defendant and the payment [681] out of the checks
on deposit of any amount found to be due from the plaintiff to the
defendant. The defendant, on April 14, 1954, answered requesting
the. adjudication of the rights of the parties and the payment to the
defendant of the two checks which plaintiff had deposited. Shortly
theréafter, on April 21, Gilbert Auty and Anna Ferne Auty, his
wife, were allowed to intervene in the action. Their intervening
petition sought the ‘cancellation of a note and deed of trust for
$14,848.65, and an injunction against the plaintiff and the trustee
in the deed of trust from foreclosing it. Neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant were served-with a motion to intervene as provided
in § 507.090, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. The parties were served with an
order to show cause on May 6, 1954, why a temporary injunction
should. not be issued.

On -May 5 the defendant city filed its amended answer and cross
pill against the plaintiff in which it denied for the first time that the
plaintiff bank had made an unrestricted tender of the sum of $34,-
642.70, This new pleading further set up a cross bill against plaintiff
alleging that on November 23, 1953, the defendant city demanded of
plaintiff bank the sum of $34,642.70 which represented cash paid by
the plaintiff bank to Gilbert Auty in exchange for.checks made to
the defendant city and restrictively endorsed for deposit only in
plaintiff bank for the credit of the defendant city and further repre-
sented. money given by plaintiff bank to the said Gilbert Auty in ex-
change for checks bearing improper and unauthorized endorsements.
The pleading further alleged that the said Gilbert Auty had no
authority of any kind.-whatsoever to receive withdrawals from said
bank ‘account of defendant city or to receive the proceeds of checks
restrictively endorsed for deposit to the account of the defendant city
in. the plaintiff bank.. The prayer of this so-called cross bill was for
$34,642.70, with. interest at six per cent from November 23, 1953, the
date of demand.

On May 6 plaintiff bank filed its return to the order to show cause.
In addition to factual,denials and allegations, the plaintiff objected
to the filing of the intervening petition and requested that it be
stricken. In this state of the record the hearing on the order to show
cause was held on May 6, which hearing resulted in the granting of,
a temporary injunction upon ‘the intervenors’ posting a bond for
$1500.00.

Thereafter, on May 14, the plaintiff bank filed an answer to the
intervening petition which, in brief, consisted of further denials and
allegations with respect to the facts in issue, and further objection to
the standing of intervenors as proper parties in the case. The prayer
of the answer was for dismissal of-the intervenors’ petition. On the
same day the plaintiff bank: filed its separate cross claim against
Gilbert Auty which alleged that if judgment was rendered against
the plaintiff bank and in favor of the defendant city, the bank would
be entitled to have judgment over against Gilbert Auty for the
amount of any such judgment. This cross claim was directed at’
Gilbert Auty alone and did not refer to or ask any relief against the
intervenor Anna Ferne Auty. Thereafter, on June.23, the intervenors:
filed an answer to the plaintiff’s cross claim, which denied generally
the allegations of such cross claim against Gilbert Auty. On the same
day the plaintiff bank filed a motion to dismiss the defendant city’s
amended counterclaim and for judgment in favor of the bank against
the defendant city.

The final hearing on the intervening petition and responsive
pleadings thereto was held on June 23, 1954, and the: matter was
taken under advisement by the court. On November 1, 1954,- the
court rendered its decree finding that Anna Ferne Auty had executed
the note and deed of trust as a result of duress and ordered the said:
instruments cancelled as to her, and further enjoined the. plaintiff.
and plaintiff’s trustee, Douglas W. Dodds, from foreclosing said deed.
of trust. The decree further recited that the court, having heard no
testimony from the intervenor Gilbert Auty, found against him and
dismissed his intervening petition. Plaintift’s motion for [682] judg-
ment or, in the alternative, for a new trial was directed against the
judgment entered in favor of the intervenor Anna Ferne Auty: In-
connection with the overruling’ of the motion, on December 29,. the
court filed a memorandum which, among other things, stated that the
court believed that the intervention was proper because ‘‘The sub-'
ject matter of intérvenors’ petition involves the same money tendered
as settlement in this cause by plaintiff to defendant, or part of the
same, as that involving the deed of trust which intervenors sought
to have cancelled.’’’ On December 30 defendant city filed in the cause
its second amended! answer to plaintiff’s petition, which alleged that
only the city treasurer had authority to withdraw the funds from
the city’s accounts at the plaintiff bank and further amplified and-
extended the factual allegations. The relief requested, however, was
the same, the recovery of $34,642.70 together with interest thereon
from November 23, 1953, at the rate-of six per cent, and for its costs. .
In due course this appeal was taken ‘‘from the judgment in: favor
of intervenor, Anna Ferne Auty, and against this plaintiff.”?

-It will not be necessary to review in detail the testimony of the
witnesses at the trial on the merits. It’is sufficient for the present

to say that the evidence adduced by the intervenors tended to show
that plaintifi’s representative went to the Auty home at about
noontime on August 24, 1953, and made representations to Mr. and
Mrs. Auty that Mr, Auty was short in his accounts with the city and
that a report of such fact was to be made to the city council that night;
that Mr. Auty was likely to be prosecuted and it would be helpful if
the Autys signed a note for $14,848.65 and a deed of trust securing the
same on the residence property of the Autys which then stood in the
name of Mrs. Auty, having been transferred to her name alone from
Mr. and Mrs. Auty as tenants by the entirety on about March 18,
1953. Intervenors’ evidence further tended to show that Mrs. Auty
had requested that the matter be deferred until the next day in order
that she could interview an attorney, and that such request was
denied by plaintiff’s representative. The plaintiff bank adduced
evidence denying the use of duress. Gilbert Auty did not take the
stand at all but Mrs. Auty testified at both trials. On this conflicting
evidence the trial court found the issues in favor of the intervenor,
Anna Ferne Auty, and against the plaintiff. As heretofore stated, the
intervening petition of Gilbert Auty was dismissed.

The defendant City of Pine Lawn has treated the intervention
as a contest solely between the plaintiff bank and the Autys. It
did not file any rettrn to the order to show cause or answer to the
intervenors’ petition. The city took little or no part in the trial
of the issues and did not appeal. It has filed no brief on appeal.

Appellant bank contends that the trial court erred in the following
particulars: Because the intervenors’ petition and application failed
to state facts entitling them to the relief prayed for in that the
pleading contained merely conclusions. Because intervention was
permitted contrary to the statute in that the court acquired no juris-
diction over the parties and because there was no question of law or
fact common to the cause on intervention and the main cause, and the
intervention injected an independent controversy into the original
case. Because Douglas W. Dodds, trustee in the deed of trust, an
indispensable party to the intervening cause of action, was not made
a party to the action. Because the judgment did not dispose of the
entire controversy in that the note, deed of trust and other documents
were cancelled as to Anna Ferne Auty only. Because the evidence
was insufficient to warrant the judgment of cancellation and injunc-
tion and that the intervenors were guilty of laches in not acting
promptly after the alleged duress was removed.

‘We shall first consider the assignment that intervention injected
an independent controversy and foreign issue into the original case.
This question requires a more detailed examination of the issues made
by the pleadings in the original action and by the intervening peti-
tion. At the time [683] the application was made and intervention
was permitted, defendant city had filed’ its answer to plaintiff’s

petition. Plaintiff’s petition. alleged in substance that the plaintiff
was a banking corporation and the defendant a city of the fourth
class, and that the defendant hadi been a depositor with the plaintiff
bank since about 1947; that Gilbert Auty was city clerk and one of"
his duties was to deposit certain funds in the plaintiff bank, and in
August, 1953, the defendant city notified the plaintiff bank that
City Clerk Auty had converted to his own use funds that should have
been deposited and that the city would look to the bank for réimburse-
ment; that on August 24, 1953, the bank loaned to Auty and his wife
$14,848.65 ‘‘on collateral security’? which loan was to cover any and
all shortages that might be disclosed in Auty’s accounts, and Auty
and his wife had authorized the plaintiff to pay to defendant the
proceeds of the loan if an audit of the accounts disclosed a deficiency ;
that the plaintiff completed the loan and issued its cashier’s check and
held the same awaiting the completion of the audit; that on November
28, 1958, the defendant city demanded of the plaintiff the sum of
$34,642.70 in accordance with the final audit; that on December 9,
1953, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant city the sum of $34,642.-
70, the full amount demanded, which tender consisted of a cashier’s
check for $14,848.65, being the proceeds of the loan to Auty and his
wife, and another cashier’s check for $19,794.05; that defendant re-
fused the tender and had threatened suit, and unless the court ad-
judicated the rights and liabilities of the parties the plaintiff would
be subjected to litigation and expense and that the plaintiff had no
adequate remedy at law. The plaintiff delivered the two checks to
the clerk of the court to abide the decision of the court. The prayer
of plaintiff’s petition was that the court’ determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties and determine the amount due from plaintiff
to defendarit and satisfy the judgment out of the checks on deposit
and that any excess funds on deposit be returned to the plaintiff and
that costs be assessed against the defendant.

Defendant’s:answer alleged in substance: That the checks as alleged
in plaintiff’s petition were offered to the defendant by the plaintiff
but were’ withdrawn because the parties could not agree upon the
terms of the release to be given; that in view of the allegations in
plaintiff’s petition, the defendant was now willing to accept said checks
in full and ‘complete satisfaction of defendant’s claim. The prayer of
defendant’s answer was that the court order the clerk of the court-to
pay over to the defendant the checks described in plaintifft’s petition
and that ‘‘the Court adjudicate this cause at its earliest. convenience,
in view of the fact that the defendant is a municipal corporation of
the 4th Class,’’ and that the costs be assessed against the plaintiff.

It was in this stage of the pleadings that the intervenors filed in the
cause their’ pleading entitled, ‘‘Application of Gilbert and Anna
Ferme Auty to Intervene and to Enjoin Plaintiff, Pine Lawn Bank &
Trust: Company, a Banking Corporation, and Douglas W. Dodds,

NE
|

as Trustee, From Foreclosing a Certain Deed of Trust as'Set. Out in
Plaintiff’s Petition.’’ The first paragraph of intervenors’.- petition
reads: ‘‘Now at this day comes Gilbert Auto and Anne Ferne Auty
and state to the Court that they are the same parties referred to..in
paragraph 5 of plaintiff’s petition and request the Court for Permis-
sion to intervene herein on their own behalf.”’ oe
Then follows a series of admissions and denials of the various.
paragraphs of plaintifi’s petition, in which intervenors. admit that
plaintiff is a, banking corporation, that defendant is a-city of the
fourth class, that defendant city has been a depositor with the plain-
tiff bank since about 1947, and that Gilbert Auty was elected city
clerk for the City of Pine Lawn and deny all other allegations of.
plaintiff’s petition. Then follows what is denominated ‘‘COUNT. 2,”’.
which states: .
*“Comes now Anna Ferne ‘Auty and Gilbert “ Aato Inter-
venors herein and state to the Court that Anna Ferne’ Auty is
the owner of certain real property [684] and was at all.tinies ~
herein mentioned, of Lot 47 of Council Grove Heights,.and more *
particularly known and numbered as numbered 6105 Margaret,
“Avenue, Pine Lawn, Missouri. ‘

“‘Intervenors further state that on or about the 24th day of.
August, 1953, James T. Dodds, Vice-President of the Pine Lawn ..
Bank & Trust Company, plaintiff herein, secured for the plain:
tiff herein a certain promissory note and deed of trust from

. Anna Ferne Auty and Gilbert Auty, which. note: and deed of

- trust was obtained from the said Anna Ferne Auty and Gilbert. -
-Auty through and by fraud, duress, misrepresentation and: de-
ception.

-“TIntervenors further state that Douglas W. Dodds, President
of the Pine Lawn Bank & Trust Company is named as Trustee in
the aforementioned deed of trust, and is now advertising said °
property for foreclosure on the 10th day.of May, 1954..

“‘Tntervenors further state that they have no adequate remedy :‘
at law, and that unless Douglas W. Dodds, Trustee, and plaintiff. ."
Pine Lawn Bank & Trust Company are restrained and forbidden ..
-from selling said property on the 10th day of May, 1954; as:

. above described, Intervenors Anna Ferne Auty, owner ‘of said
property, and Gilbert Auty, -will suffer irreparable Toss. ‘and
damages. os ,

“‘WHEREFORE, Intervenors and Anna Ferne Aunty, ¢ owner ‘of
said property and Gilbert Auty pray the Court to enter its de- ,.:
-eree enjoining and restraining the said Trustee Douglas: .W. :
Dodds and the plaintiff Pine Lawn Bank & Trust Company from
foreclosing under the above mentioned deed of trust in which

‘ the said Douglas W. Dodds is Trustee, and that said note and
. deed of trust executed by the Intervenors be declared. null, and.

———— ”

void and that said note and deed of trust bé cancelled; and that
said deed of trust be released: of record by the holder thereof, and
that in-the. meantime a temporary writ of injunction shall issue
restraining and enjoining Douglas W. Dodds, Trustee, and the
plaintiff, Pine Lawn Bank & Trust Company, from continuing -.
the advertising the above mentioned property for sale and the
foreclosure thereof on the 10th day of May, 1954,-and that the

Court make such other and further orders and decrees as to the

Court may seem, just and proper.’’

Intervenors took no position on any relief prayed for by plaintift
or defendant. The first section of intervenors’ petition, in.the nature
of an answer to plaintiff’s petition, ends with this prayer: ‘“Where-
fore, having fully answered, these Intervenors pray to go hence with’
their costs.’’ Actually, all. the intervening petition purports to do is
to set up a cause of action by the Autys against the plaintiff bank to
annul and cancel the note and deed: of trust and to enjoin its fore-
closure. Properly pleaded, it-is the sort of case that has an independ-;
ent standing and could be brought without reference to the pending.
ease. It has been stated that ‘‘* * * the purpose of intervention is
to settle in one action and by a single judgment the whole contro-
versy among the .persons involved,’? 67 C.J.S. 998, Parties, § 60.
Essentially our intervention statute provides a remedy whereby: a
person not joined may become a party so as to enable him to protect
his rights in the existing subject matter of a pending action.

Intervenors agree with the plaintiff bank. that their right to inter-,
vention is governed by § 507.090, RSMo, 1949, V.A.M.S. More specifi-
eally, intervenors rely upon subsections 1 (2) and (8) as legal justifi-.
eation of their intervention. These portions of the intervention statute
provide that anyone shall be permitted to intervene upon timely
application ‘‘(2) When the representation of the applicant’s in-.
terest by existing parties is or may be. inadequate and the applicant
is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) When the.
applicant is so situated as to be adversely [685] affected by a distri-
bution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof.’? These grounds are mandatory-and if inter-
venors have brought themselves within one or both of the categories
specified the intervention was proper; otherwise, it was not.

Not every ‘‘interest’’ will furtiish legal grounds for intervention.
In State ex rel. Farmers Mutuals Auto Ins. Co. v. Weber, 364 Mo.
1159, 273 S.W. 2d 818, the trial court’ refused to permit a garage
liability insurer to intervene in a personal injury action against a
person who had purchased ‘a truck from the insured garage. The
action of the trial court was affirmed against a contention that the
insurer had an ‘‘‘interest’’. in the litigation. This court ruled,. 273
S.W.2d 321: ‘‘As used in the above quoted portion of Section
507.090, and in intervention statutes generally, ‘interest’ means a‘

Le

direct. and immediate claim to, and having its origin in, the demand
made or proceeds sought or prayed by one of the parties to: the
original action, but such ‘interest’ does not include a mere con-
sequential, remote or conjectural possibility of being in some manner
affectéd by the result of the original action; to come within the above
statute, the ‘interest’ must be such an immediate and direct claim
upon‘ the very subject matter of the action that intervener will either
gain or lose by the direct operation of the judgment that may be
rendered therein.’’ . .

While the intervention statute should be liberally construed in
favor. of the applicant, the statute must be substantially followed.
The intervenors did not claim that they would or might be bound by
judgment in the pending action and, under the facts of the case, they
would not have been since they were not parties thereto, State ex rel.
Farmers Mutuals Auto Ins. Co. v. Weber, 364 Mo. 1159, 273 8.W.2d
818, 822 [5]. Nor is there any assertion by the intervenors that they
would: be adversely affected by the delivery-to the defendant of the
checks on deposit with the clerk. The intervenors made no claim
directly or indirectly to the check which represented the proceeds of
the alleged loan. In fact, to do so would have been a recognition of
the validity of the transaction which they were attacking.

The language of our statute discloses no purpose or intent to per-
mit the issues between the original parties to be changed or to per-
mit the intervenors to inject new issues foreign to the original action,
and our’ courts have so held. In Monticello Bldg. Corporation v.
Monticello Inv. Co., 380 Mo. 1128, 52 §.W.2d 545, an intervenor
attempted'to inject an action to foreclose a deed of trust and to ob-
tain a judgment against the mortgagor into a suit brought primarily
to restrain the mortgage trustee from foreclosing. This court held
that the attempted action of the intervenor would not be permitted
since it amounted to the injection of an entirely new and inconsistent
eause of action. In ruling the question’ this court quoted from 21
C.J. 848, § 341, which in ‘part is as follows: ‘‘The injection of an
independent controversy by intervention is improper. If a person’
desires to set up a new and independent claim to the subject matter
of the suit it must be done by an original bill; it cannot be done by
an intervening petition.’’ See, also, 30 C.J.S. Equity, § 161, p. 606,
New Issues. The ruling in the Monticello case was followed in Davis
vy. Austin, 848 Mo. 1094, 156 S.W.2d 908. Davis, as executor of a°
decedent estate, filed suit against Austin as administrator of another
estate for the purpose of determining title to realty. Dockery filed a
motion to intervene; claiming an interest in the property. This court
held that the intervening petition did not disclose that the intervenor
had any interest’ in the land as an heir, and that his claim to the
whole ‘property as assignee of tax certificates could not be asserted
by intervention’ since intervention is a proceeding by which a person

is. permitted to make himself a party plaintiff or defendant,.or where
the intervenor is demanding something adverse to both.- Intervention.
was denied because the intervening petition would improperly inject:
an independent controversy in the case which should’ be--the subject
matter of an original suit. See also.67 C.J.S. 987, Parties, § 58, where.
the Davis and Monticello cases are cited in support of the statement
that: ‘‘In [686] some jurisdictions an independent controversy can-.
not be injected into a suit by intervention, * * *.’?"In Hoffman:-vi:
Bigham, 324 Mo. 516, 24 S.W.2d 125, 182, this court stated: .‘*The.
case started out as a quiet title suit. The defendants filed an answer:
claiming the right of redemption. Spencer filed--an intervening:
petition asserting he was bound by the covenants of. warranty in his
deed to the respondent Hoffman and therefore entitled to come into
the case as a party. But we cannot see why, under this guise, he
should be permitted to ingraft another lawsuit onto the ‘controversy -
having for its object the recovery of a money judgment for damages.’’:

The Kansas City Court of Appeals decided a-similar situation in
the case of Coffin v. Damon, Mo.App., 139 8.W.2d-563. The‘plaintiff*
had sued upon a note and to foreclose a deed of trust.-The intervenor
claimed that by the terms of the will of her grandfather the land
could not be encumbered, and the prayer of her intervening petition
was for a construction of the will and to have the eneumbrance de-
clared void. Intervention was permitted and the rélief requested was
granted. On appeal it was held that the intervenor should ‘not have
been permitted to come into the case. The court stated, 139 8.W.2d
564:

“The plaintiffs’ suit was an ordinary action to foreclose a deed
of trust, did not and could not as a matter of law: affect the in-
terest of any one not a party to the action. The only'title or right
in the land which would be conveyed by a foreclosure sale was +
the right and title of the grantors in the deed of trust.

“Tn such circumstances the court should not have’ permitted
Margaret Huls to intervene. State on Inf. v. Chicago, R. I. & ‘
P. R. Co., Mo.App., 193 8.W. 932; Bondurant v. Raven Coal
Co., Mo. App., 25 S.W.2d 566, 571. .

“Margaret Huls had neither right nor ‘interest in the ‘estate
conveyed in the deed of trust and she therefore was not a neces-
sary or proper party to the action. Missouri Central Building & +
Loan v. Eveler et al., 287 Mo. 679; 141-S.W. 877, Ann. ‘Cas:
1913A, 486 ; Gray v. Clement, 296 Mo. 497; 246 S.W. 940. As the
relief granted was based upon the issues brought into the case by"

’ the pleading of Margaret Huls, who should not have been per-
mitted to intervene, the decree cannot be sustained:’’
The intervenors cite and rely upon State ex ‘rel. Duggan v. Kirk-
wood, 357 Mo. 325, 208 S.W.2d 257, in which the relator, ‘as trustee
of an engineering firm, was permitted to intervene in a suit by a

former employee of .the engineering firm against another company
for compensation.’ The relator claimed that the former employee
had violated a contract for the employee’s exclusive services by the
wrongful use of confidential information, and that the engineering
firm was entitled to a portion of the employee’s recovery in the pend-
“ing case. The reason for permitting the intervention was stated by
“this court, 208 S.W.2d 262: ‘Under these circumstances we think
that relator would also come within provision (8). of that- paragraph
which provides that an applicant may be permitted to iatervene ‘when
the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribu-
tion or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof.’ This for the reason that if the sum found due
Magidson equitably belongs to relator, relator would be adversely
affected by the distribution to Magidson of any part of the $90,000 in
eustody of the court.’? The facts of the cited case distinguishes it
from the instant case.’

“The Autys, as!intervenors in this case, have made no showing, either
by the-pleadings or the evidence in the case, that they had a legal
interest in the original action or that they would be adversely affected
by the distribution or disposition of the checks on deposit with the
court; hence they did not bring themselves within the purview of the
statute. The deed [687] of trust was not specifically mentioned in
the plaintiff’s petition, and its validity was not an issue in the original.
action.. Wé hold that the intervenors injected an independent action
and issue in the case and that it was error to permit the intervention.

Since the intervenors made no claim to the checks on deposit, it is
not necessary to decide if the deposit of the two checks constituted
such a fund or property contemplated by the statute. The apparent
purpose of the deposit was to keep the tender good as regards interest
and to satisfy any judgment that might be rendered based on plain-
tiff’s indebtedness to the defendant. See State ex rel. Simons v.
Wileox; Mo.App., 224 8.W.2a 392, 396 [4, 5], wherein it was held
that money paid into court to satisfy a final judgment did not create
or ‘constitute such a -fund as would justify intervention under our
statute.

The plaintiff bank objected to.the intervention ‘by allegations in
its return-to the order to show cause and in its answer. The question
was preserved for review in plaintiff’s motion for new trial. No claim
of waiver has been made by the intervenors, nor have we been able
to find any grounds for holding that the plaintiff waived its right to
object to the intervention.

Our conclusion is that: the case should be reversed. and vemanded
because it was error for the court to permit the intervenors to bring
their action-in the pending case. It will therefore not be necessary to
consider the: other allegations of error made by the plaintiff since
they are not likely to recur in further proceedings.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions
to set aside the order allowing Gilbert Auty and Anna Ferne Auty
to intervene, and to strike or dismiss their pleadings without.prejudice,
however, to their right to proceed in an ‘independent action and to
proceed with the trial of the cause between the original parties. All
coneur. :

Marvenie Auten, Appellant, v. Sv. Louis Pusiic Smrvice Company,
a Corporation, Respondent, No. 44195285 S. W. (2d) 663.

Division Two,’ January 9, 1956.

° ee

Morris & Morley and John J. Morris for appellant.

Lloyd E, Boas and Harry Bell for respondent.

[664] EAGER, P. J.—This is an action for damages for personal
injuries. Plaintiff, a passenger on [665] one of defendant’s buses in
St. Louis, Missouri, claimed that she was caused to fall by a sudden
and violent jerk of the bus as it approached her stop. This occurred
on January 7, 1952. The case was submitted to the jury upon the
res ipsa loquitur theory, there was a verdict and judgment for the
defendant and plaintiff has appealed. Plaintiff claimed injuries to
her left shoulder, neck and back. She had been examined and
treated by various physicians and in two or three hospitals, and
testimony from three of her physicians was produced at the trial.
Because of the nature of the present assignments of error, it will not
be necessary to review the controverted facts on the question of
liability or the details of the claimed injuries. Plaintiff relies here
on two allegations of error, both of which concern the admission of
allegedly incompetent and ’ prejudicial evidence. Further incidental
references to the evidence will be made hereinafter.

_ The first and principal complaint is that the court erred in per-
mitting defendant’s counsel to introduce and read to the jury the
back of Exhibit 6B, being a part of the records of the St. Louis
County Hospital, where plaintiff was a patient in January, 1953, and
an ‘‘out-patient’’ at the clinic in February and March, 1953. The
exhibit in question was dated March 12, 1953, and was signed by a
Doctor Ruby. Because of the nature of this assignment we quote the
exhibit verbatim, except for signature and date: .‘‘This patient is
malingering. She says she has pain in her neck and legs and left
shoulder following. accident which occurred one year and three
months ago. No fracture. No dislocation, or any other injury, would
make it possible for her to wear a neck brace this long. Patient, says
that without it she has pain yet. This patient is doing herself much
harm by not using her neck. She will develop some atrophy and
fibrosis. If she has all the pain in her left arm she claims to have, by

‘now she would have atrophy in her left arm and forearm from disuse.
Since she states she can’t move the left upper extremity except in a
-very limited range of motion, refer this patient to physiotherapy to
see if they can get her to realize the importance of exercising, per-
haps helping her. X-rays show no evidence of trauma, old or new,
only that she has some degenerative changes consistent with her age.’’

The hospital :records were .produced under subpoena by Miss
Bernice Brown, who had been the medical record librarian at that
hospital for ten years. She was examined and cross-examined at
great length concerning these records, first out of the presence of the
jury and by courisel for both parties. She testified: that the records
were the hospital records of plaintiff; that-they were kept in the
witness’ custody, and that they were’made and kept in the regular
and ordinary course of the hospital’s business; that the entries therein
were made at or near the times the respective persons involved saw
the patient; that the doctors write the history, findings, progress
notes and all the diagnoses; that the nurses make certain incidental
entries, including the nurses’ notes; that she knew all the doctors
whose names were shown; that the records come to her, complete,
upon the discharge of the patient; that she could not know personally
that every entry was made immediately after the event, but that she
knows the procedure; that she visits the various departments of the
‘hospital; that if a patient is seen in the clinic as an out-patient, a
record is made by the doctor at the time, and in the regular course of
business, and that entry becomes a part of her records; that Dr. Ruby
.was a, resident physician at the hospital in March, 1953, but had
since left and gone. west; that she was familiar with his handwriting,
which she identified in the body of Exhibit 6E. Many of the clinic
records read ‘in evidence concerned examinations and tréatment of
‘plaintiff prior to the accident. Plaintiff’s counsel objected to all the
records generally as not properly qualified under the Uniform Busi-
ness Records Act, but the trial court held that they were admissible
and ‘announced that it would consider specific objections to specific
parts. The present assignment concerns only the matter quoted
above,

[666] The objections with which we are now concerned are: that
‘the matter was hearsay; that plaintiff was denied the right of cross-
examination thereon; that it consisted of conclusions; that it was
highly prejudicial and unfair, and that it invaded the province of the
jury. These objections were made to the quoted matter as a whole.

We first consider the’ objections of hearsay and denial of
‘cross-examination, which are, in effect, the same. Hospital records
have long been held admissible generally in Missouri (in the absence of
privilegé) as official records kept pursuant to statute. Borrson v.
M.K.T. RR, 351 Mo. 214, 172 S.W. 2d 826, 833; Kirkpatrick v. Wells,
819 Mo. 1040, 6S.W. 2a 591, 598; Galli v. Wells, 209 Mo. App. 460,

239 S.W. 894; Sullivan v. K.C: Pub. Serv. Co., Mo. App., 231 8.W.
822, 826. Thus even prior to the enactment of the Uniform Business
Records Act (§§ 490.660-490.690, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., L. 1949, p.
275), the objections of hearsay and deprivation of cross-examination’
were held to be generally ineffective. Since that enactment it has
been held distinctly in Missouri that hospital records come within
the purview of the Act and that, when properly qualified thereunder,
they are admissible generally. Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
363 Mo, 474, 251 S.W. 2d 663; Gray v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 368 Mo.
864, 254 S. W. 2d 577. And see York v. Daniels, Mo. App:, 259 S.W.
2d-109, involving the records of an autopsy, which, of course, is in
point as a clear analogy. A brief and instructive review of thé Mis-
souri cases appears in the October, 1955 issue of the St. Louis Bar
Journal at page 39. Objections to such records as hearsay and as
depriving a party of the right of cross-examination are, therefore,
not effective if the records have been properly qualified under the
Uniform Business Records Act (heréinafter referred “to’ as ‘‘the
Act.’’)1 For a full citation of cases on the subject from other juris-
dictions see those cited in the 1955 Pocket Supplement of Wigmore’
on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. 6, § 1707. The Missouri. view appears to
be definitely in line with the great weight of authority. There must,
of course, be a preliminary showing of the identity of the record, the
mode and time (or times) of its preparation, and that it was made in
the regular course of business; if this, and the ‘‘sources:of informa-
tion,”’ are sufficient ‘‘in the opinion of the court,” then the record,
generally, is admissible. The requirements of this preliminary show-
ing have been discussed by the Missouri Courts, and some hospital
records have "been rejected, in whole or in part, as- insufficiently
qualified. Conser v. A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co., Mo., 266 8.W. 2d 587; Gray
v. St.L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 363 Mo. 864, 254 8.W. 2d 577; Staté v. MeCor-
mack, Mo., 263 8. W. "oa 344. We have outlined in some detail the testi-
mony of the Record Librarian’ concerning the hospital records: pro-
duced here. We have determined that this qualification was sufficient,
and we so hold. To require more would, as a practical matter, seem
to enforce the attendance and testimony of the various persons who’
co-operated in making the record, which is the very thing the Act
seeks to obviate. 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 8rd Ed., § 1707; and a
reasonable liberality seems to be imposed by the very wording of
§ 490.690. To construe the act too strictly would be to repeal it. The
qualification of the records here was applied not merely to them as a
whole, but to various parts thereof including specifically Exhibit 6H.

We do not hold, however, that the proper qualification of
hospital records under the Act necessarily makes all parts of the rec-
ord automatically admissible. If specific and legally proper objec-

+0f course, specific parts may actually be hearsay if the source of in-
formation is insufficient.

tions are made to parts of the record, on grounds other than hearsay
generally, such parts may be properly excluded. Kraus v. K.C. Pub.
Serv. Co., Mo., 269 S.W. 2d 743; Gray v. St. Louis-S.F. [667]. Ry.,
363 Mo, 864, 254 §.W. 2d 577. And it has been said that the Act does
not make relevant that which would not otherwise be relevant. Han-
cock y. Crouch, Mo. App., 267 8.W. 2d 36; and see Long v. United
States (4th Cir.), 59 F. 2d 602; K.C. Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich &
Sons, Mo., 250 S.W. 2d 692 (by analogy only). In other words, all
that the Act does, essentially, is to eliminate the hearsay objection.
“HEE We do not propose to point out here all the matters which are
or are not admissible when made part of a properly authenticated
and qualified hospital record. Of the Missouri cases the interested
may read: Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251 S.W.
2d,663 ; Kraus v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., Mo., 269 S.W. 2d 748; Gray v.
St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 363 Mo. 864, 254 §.W. 2d 577; York v. Daniels,
Mo. App., 259 S.W. 2d 109 (private autopsy records, but analogous).
The case of New-York Life v. Taylor (App. D.C.), 147 F. 2d 297, is
strongly relied on by plaintiff’s counsel. In that case certain
psychiatric diagnoses and. history were rejected, chiefly as being
opinions and conjectural, and not an ‘‘automatic reflection of obser-
vations.’’ There was a strong dissent. We are not bound by that
decision nor is our evidence the same; we may say, however, that the
principles adopted in the dissenting opinion conform more nearly to
those. heretofore applied by the Missouri courts and by the great
weight of authority generally. For constructive criticism of the ma-
jority opinion see 59 Harv. L.R., p. 561, lc. 564-565, and also Buck-
minister’s Estate v. Commissioner of Int. Rev. (2nd Cir.), 147 F. 2d
331. For a further discussion of the matters which sliould be held
admissible see: Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio 416, 72 N.E. 2d 245; Watts
v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. Rep. 283, 58 Atl. 689; Gallagher v.
Portland Traction Co., 181 Ore. 385, 182 P. 2d 354; Borucki v. Mac-
Kenzie Bros., 125 Conn. 92, 3 Atl. 2d 224; Valenti v. Mayer, 301 Mich.
551, 4 N.W. 2d 5; Reed v. United Commer. Trav. (2d Cir.), 123 F. 2d
252. As to previous history, with particular reference to the occasion
for entering the hospital, compare the Melton and Kraus cases, supra,
and also see York v. Daniels, Mo. App., 259 S.W. 2d 109. It would
seem that the following parts of a duly authenticated and’ qualified
hospital record should be admissible, unless subject ‘to specific objec-
tions such as irrelevancy, inadequate sources of information, as being
self-serving, as going beyond the bounds of legitimate expert opinion,
or on similar substantive grounds: the physical examination findings,
the patient’s symptoms and complaints, treatment and progress rec-
ords, diagnoses by those qualified to make them, the results of analyses
and laboratory tests, X-rays, the behavior of the patient, and those
parts of the patient’s history inherently necessary (or at least help-
ful) to the observation, diagnosis and treatment of the patient (Melton

v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251 8.W. 2d 663, re history).
The matters here noted do not purport to be exclusive. Since the
hearsay objection is obviated, we see no reason why: a proper expert
medical opinion contained in a hospital record should not be accorded
dignity equal to that of a similar opinion from the witness -stand;
to preserve the right of cross-examination intact as to such matters
would be to repeal the statute (dissenting opinion in New York Life’
y. Taylor, supra). Much discretion must remain in the trial court,
and, of course, all records admitted must be confined to and connected
with the bona fide observation, diagnosis and treatment of the patient?
in question.”

| The entire back of Exhibit 6E was read in evidence.’ A blan-'
ket objection was made to the entire offer. Indeed, the allegation ‘of’
error here is directed at the whole exhibit, as offered. If any part or
parts of the exhibit were admissible, the objections were properly
overruled. Curtis v. Indemnity Co. of Amer., 327 Mo. 350,37 S.W.
2d 616, 626; Ray County Sav. Bank v. Hutton, 224 Mo. 42, 123 -S.W.:
47; Logan v. Field, 192 Mo. 54, 90 ‘S.W..127; Schwinegruber v. St.
Louis [668] Pub. Serv. Co., Mo. App., 241 SW, 2d 782; White v.
Hasburgh, Mo. App., 124 S.W. 2d 560; Weinshenk v. Sullivan, Mo.
App., 100 S.W. 2d 66; and this principle was particularly applied to
hospital records in Gallagher v. Portland Traction Co., 181 Ore. 385,'
182 P. 2d 354. Portions of the evidence so offered were clearly ad-’
missible; among these are: the complaints of the patient ; physical:
finding ‘Cor history) of no fracture; the medical opinion that thé:
patient was doing herself harm by not using her neck and that she
would develop atrophy and fibrosis; the recommendation of ‘physio-
therapy,; the interpretation of the X4 -rays, and perhaps ‘other things:
It was certainly not the duty of the trial court to sift the wheat from
the chaff, Physicians may properly express legitimate ‘expert opiniot .
and, as such, they do not invade the province of the jury. | va
v. St.Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 863 Mo, 651, 253 S.W. 2d 122; "Wild ve
Pitcairn, 847 Mo. 915, 149 gw, 2d 800. There was direct testimony
that the doctor who wrote this entry was, at the time, a resident
physician of the hospital; from’ this we may presume his quali
tions. With all other objections disposed of the assertion of prejudice,
alone, cannot avail. We need not, and do not, utider these cireuin-’
stances, pass upon the independent admissibility of the statement that
“this patient is malingering.”’ Those who are curious as to this may
read the opinions in Hickmann v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo.’
651, 253 S.W. 2d 122, and People v. Gorgol (Calif. App.), 265 P. 2d
69, and the authorities cited. The fact that some of the matters in
Exhibit 6E may, if so, have been in conflict with other evidence of
defendant goes merely to the weight of the evidence. There was no
error in admitting the evidence in question; it having been properly

a

admitted, plaintiff’s motions to strike and for a mistrial were proper-
ly overruled.

What we have already said is applicable in part to appellant’s
other point, which is not extensively briefed here. Plaintiff admitted
having a prior fall in a Kroger store in St. Louis in June, 1950; also,
that. her back was.then treated by a Dr. Dorsey by bandaging and
heat, and that she ‘‘laid around’’ for three weeks. She testified that
she completely recovered. At the trial defendant produced under
subpoena the files of the Manufacturers and Merchants Indemnity
Company which company had made a settlement with plaintiff for
that injury. The original files were produced by Edward W. Warner,
Claims Attorney for the company in St. Louis, who was also the
Claims Manager for its Midwest Division; he had been with the com-
pany since May 29, 1950. He testified that records of claims filed were
regularly kept; he identified the files and record of plaintiff’s claim,
stated that.they were made and kept in the ordinary course of the
company’s business, and explained in much detail the method of
handling claims and preparing the files and records in the St. Louis
office, stating further, that the method described definitely applied to
the claim. in question; he further testified that the various dates
shown in plaintiff’s file were, in his opinion and according to his ex-
perience, dates at or around the times of the events in question, in a
chronological order, and according to normal handling. He did not
know of his own knowledge when the entries were made. He did not
personally work on. plaintiff’s claim; he further testified that when
such a file is prepared, carbons of everything are kept in the St.
Louis office and all originals are sent immediately to the Home Office
in Cincinnati, Ohio, where they are stamped as received, with the
date. In this particular matter the St. Louis files had been destroyed
after one year according to the universal practice, and Mr. Warner
had received the original file from the Home Office about a week before
trial, with instructions to keep it in his possession at all times. De-
fendant’s counsel was permitted to tell the jury, from reference to
this file, the amount paid plaintiff in settlement of her claim and to
read to the jury the following medical report of Dr. Dorsey, dated
July 14, 1950: “Report of accident to Mrs. Marvelle Allen. Sustained
June “10th, 1950 in Kroger store in Wellston, Missouri; stepped on
something and [669] fell on her back, injuring back. Pain in lower
abdomen; severe .pain in back. Treatment: Bandage to back, small
part. Electric heat applied every third day. Internal medication for
pain. Disability for about eight weeks more. Bill to date, $35.00.’’

Counsel objected to the file generally on the ground that the witness
was not the proper custodian, that he had no personal knowledge of
the entries, and that the file or record had not been properly qualified
under the Uniform Business Records Act; specifically, he objected
to the medical report as being ‘‘repetitious’’ because plaintiff had ad-

mitted on direct examination that she had been injured in the Kroger
store and ‘‘to what extent.’’ The objections were overruled. Plain-
tiff’s counsel later offered to show the jury the entire file, but when
the court deemed this unnecessary and in some particulars improper,
he read to the jury a report from the St. Louis office to the home
office, including many details of the fall, the medical treatment, the
expected period of disability and the settlement negotiations. This
embraced various things not included in the above medical’ report.

‘We think that the records were sufficiently qualified under the Act
to meet the objections now urged. Counsel have only briefed the con-
tention that Mr. Warner was not the proper custodian, that he had no
personal knowledge of the time of making the entries and that he
did not know whether any part ‘of the file had been ‘‘removed.’’ Mr.
‘Warner was at least the temporary custodian, and if that is insufficient,
he came within the meaning of the words ‘‘or other qualified witness,’’
as used in Section 490.680 of the Act; he related in detail the practice
in the particular office in question in the preparation and keeping of
such records, both as to mode and-time. The speculation about a
“possible ‘‘removal’’ of some -portion of the record is based on nothing
“but a question to Mr. Warner as to his lack of personal knowledge,
and hardly justifies comment. We hold that the parts of the file which
defendant offered were admissible. Moreover, wé do not’ think that
this evidence was prejudicial to plaintiff. The objection that the
medical report was repetitious was properly overruled for certainly
the plaintiff did not testify to all the substance of that report; see
Galli v. Wells, 209 Mo. App. 460, 239 S.W, 894, 899. And defendant
should have the right to put in its own version, by proper evidence,
on any material issue. Under these circumstances we need not decide
whether plaintiff’s counsel waived his objections by reading as he
did from these records.

The judgment of ‘the trial court is affirmed. “It is so ordered. All
concur. :

Scare or Missounr ex rel. J. A. Rouveyron, Commissioner of Finance,
and Universtry Banx, a Corporation, Relators, University
Bank, a Corporation, Appellant, v. Pum M. Donneray, Gover-

; nor, Jams T. Buair, Jr., Lieutenant-Governor, and Joun M.
Daron, Attorney, General, Members of the Board of Appeals,
and OC. H. Gorrzrr, R. E. Ontpnanr, M. A. Voponey, C. L.
Kerysrr and Porrer C. Jurrries, Intervenors, Respondents, No.
44843285 8. W. (2d) 669.

Court en, Bane, January 9, 1956.

John W. Oliver and Henry Andrae for petitioner; Caldwell,
Downing, Garrity & Ea: and Hendren & Andrae of counsel.

James T. Riley and Ike Skelton for intervenors; Shelton & Bradley
of counsel.

[672] STORCKMAN, J.—This appeal grows out of a proceeding
sto incorporate a bank under the provisions of Chapter 362, RSMo
1949, V.A.M.S. The commissioner of finance refused the charter and
the proposed incorporators appealed to the board of bank appeals.
The board overruled and set aside the decision of the commissioner
of finance and ordered him to grant the certificate of incorporation.
The commissioner and an objecting bank were granted a writ of
review by the Cireuit Court: of Cole. County., After a hearing the
eireuit court dismissed the application for a writ of certiorari or
review and ordered that the writ be-quashed. The objecting bank
then filed a notice of appeal to this court.. The bank also filed in this
court a mandamus action, the object of which is to require the judge
of the Circuit Court of Cole County to hear the case and review the
order of the board of appeals on its merits. ‘The mandamus action,
No. 44,831, [678]-and the appeal, No. 44,843, were consolidated for
argument in this court.

On January: 18, 1952, Clarence H. Goppert and four others, herein
sometimes referred to as .the. proposed incorporators, filed their
application, for a. bank charter with the commissioner of.the Division
of Finance. The proposed location of the bank is in a place known as
Dodson which, at the time the application was filed, was an unincor-
porated area just-outside of the southern limits of Kansas City in
Jackson County. On July 18, 1958, the commissioner, J. A. Rouveyrol,
refused to issue the charter and so notified the proposed incorporators
who thereafter, on July 21, 1953; appealed to the board of appeals as
provided in § 362.045, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. This board, composed of
the governor, the lieutenant-governor and the attorney general, held
hearings on September 9 and October..9, 1953, and on March 8, 1954,
‘a majority of the board reversed. the order of the commissioner of
finance and ordered the bank charter to issue. “Attorneys representing
the University Bank'of Kansas: City appeared at the. hearings before
the board of bank appeals on September 9 and October 9, and opposed
the granting of the charter. .

On March 25, 1954, J. A. Rouveyrol, ‘‘a person interested, in
the order of the Board of Appeals, both in his official capacity as
Commissioner of Finance, and. also as-a person interested in repre-
senting the position of the Protestant in the above entitled cause”’;
and the University Bank, ‘‘the Protestant herein,'a corporation in-
terested in the order of the Board of Appeals,’’ petitioned the board
of appéals. for a ehearing. On,the same day the hoard of appeals,

by unanimous action, purporting to act in accordance with its rule-
making power, § 862.045, ] 1, made an ‘‘Order Regarding Applica-
tion for Rehearing’’ which stated that the board ‘‘acknowledges re-
ceipt and accepts jurisdiction of said Application for Rehearing, and
by this order determines and provides that the time for appeal to the
Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri from the ultimate decision of
this Board of Appeal shall be ‘within thirty days after the applica-
tion for rehearing is denied, or if the application is granted, then
within thirty days after the rendition of the decision on rehearing,’
as provided in Section 386.510, -R. 8S. Mo., 1949, to which express
reference is made by Paragraph (8) of Section 362.045.’’ There-
-after, on April 1, 1954, the incorporators of the proposed bank of
Dodson filed with the board of appeals a motion to strike the applica-
tion for rehearing or, in lieu thereof, to overrule the same, alleging
among other reasons that neither the commissioner of finance nor the
University Bank were proper parties to the proceedings. On June 10,
1954, the board of bank appeals, by a majority-vote with the governor
dissenting, entered its order overruling relators’ application for
rehearing.

“On June 15, 1954, the commissioner of finance and the University
Bank filed their application for a writ of review in the Circuit Court
of Cole County, Missouri, and the court issued its writ of certiorari
or review to the board of bank appeals. A return was made by the
members of the board of July 8, 1954, and the entire record, including
transcripts of the evidence and the documents before the board of
appeals, was lodged with the circuit court. On July 17, 1954, the
proposed incorporators filed a motion to intervene in the Circuit
Court of Cole County, which was granted. The proposed incorporators
then filed their motion to dismiss relators’ application for review and
to quash the certiorari or review, in which they reiterated their con-
tention that the relators had no legal standing in the matter as parties
to the proceedings either before the board of appeals or before the
circuit court. :

The entries on the circuit judge’s docket for September 8, 1954,
are as follows: ‘‘Parties announce ready. Motions presented and
taken with the case. Trial by the Court. Passed for submission of
briefs. Mr. Skelton granted 10 days to file brief. Mr. Oliver granted
5 days thereafter to file brief.’’ On December 2, 1954, the court
granted the motion of the proposed incorporators [674] to dismiss
relators’ application for a writ of certiorari or review, and the pro-
ceedings for a review by the relators was dismissed and the writ
quashed on the ground that ‘‘the relators have no standing’’ in the
case.

On December 11, 1954, the relators filed their joint motion to set
aside the order dismissing relators’ application for a writ of certiorari
or review and to set aside the order quashing the writ of certiorari or

iim” ™

review. Relators’ motion was presented to the court on January 3,
1955, and taken under advisement. On February 5, 1955, the court
refused to give a form of order offered by the commissioner of finance
and the University Bank entitled, ‘‘Order and Statement of Grounds
of Decision Regarding Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss Relators’
Application for Review and to Quash the Certiorari or Review.’’ This
proposed order related to declarations with respect to jurisdiction,
procedure and parties on the appeal. On the same day, February 5,
the court overruled and denied relators’ motion to set aside its order
dismissing and quashing the writ of certiorari or. review.

On February 14, 1955, the University Bank, as relator, filed its
petition for writ of mandamus directed to the judge of the Cir-
euit Court of Cole County in which it was charged that the court
had a duty under the constitution and statutes to review on its
merits the order of the board of bank appeals and that it had not
done so. On February 15 the ‘‘University Bank, one of the Relators
above named”’ filed its notice of appeal to this,court. It will be.
noted that the commissioner of the Division of Finance is not a
party to the petition for a writ of mandamus nor did he appeal from
the decision of the circuit court. The University Bank alone is the
relator and appellant in this court.

Hl In considering the questions involved, it is well to bear in
mind that the subject matter with which we are dealing is the exercise
of the police power of the state. This has been defined as ‘‘the power
inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits,
to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of
society.’’ 16 C.J.S. 537, § 174. State ex rel. Carpenter v. City of St.
Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2 8.W.2d 718, 722 [13]. It is generally recognized
that ‘‘the banking business is properly subject to reasonable legisla-
tive regulation under the police power of the state.”’ 9 C.J.S. 32, §.
5. In State on Inf. of Taylor, Atty. Gen. v. Currency Services, Inc.,
858 Mo. 988, 218 S.W.2d 600, 605 [8, 9], this court, in considering our
banking statutes, quoted with approval from a decision by. the
Supreme Court of Illinois [Wedesweiler v. Brundage, 297, Il. 228,
130 N.E. 520] as follows: ‘‘ ‘The privilege of engaging in any lawful
business is the right of every individual, of which no one can be
deprived except by a general law acting equally on all individuals in
the same situation. It is subject to the police power, and must be
exercised in accordance with the requirements of statutes passed in the
exercise of that power for the protection of the public.’ ’”’ _

Hi The state cannot divest itself of the right to exercise the
police power. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Lat-
shaw, 825 Mo. 909, 830 S.W.2d 105, 109 [5]. It cannot be delegated
to private persons. State ex rel, Normandy Fire Protection District
vy. Smith, 358 Mo. 572, 216 S.W.2d 440, 16 C.J.S, 548, § 178. The
police power can be delegated to subordinate.state agencies and can

be exercised by such agencies to the extent of: such delegation of.
authority. State ex inf. Gentry v. Curtis, 319 Mo: 316, 4 S.W.2d
467, 470 [2]. Within these limitations it is for the General: Assem-
bly to say to what extent the police power shall be exercised in the
regulation of the incorporation of banks and in what manner and by
whom it shall be used. A person, official-or private, can‘have no
greater part in the exercise of the police ‘power than is accorded him:
by law. .

j | The first question for our determination is whether the com-
missioner of finance and the protesting University Bank were parties
to the incorporation proceedings [675] before the board of appeals
so as to be entitled to a review in the circuit court and ‘here. The:
amendment to the banking laws made by thie 68th General Assembly
expressly provided that pending appeals ‘‘shall be determined by
such board [of appeals] ‘in accordance with the law in effect prior
to the effective date of this section.’’ § 361.094, RSMo. Cum.: Supp.
1955, L. 1955, H.B. 212, § 4. Due to this saving clause we need not:
concern ourselves with the amended ‘statute except as it may be of
aid in the construction of the statutes applicable 'to this pending case.

The provision for judicial review of the decisions of the board of
bank appeals, § 362.045, subsection 8, RSMo 1949, V.A.MS., is as
follows: ‘‘The decision of the board may be reviewed by the circuit
court as provided in section 386.510, RSMo 1949.’’ The statute re--
ferred to is the provision for review of decisions of the -public’
service commission. Section 886.510 in part provides: ‘‘ Within thirty
days after the application for a rehearing is denied, or, if the applica--
tion is granted, then within thirty days after the rendition of the
decision on rehearing, the applicant may apply to the circuit court
of the county where the hearing was held or in which the commission
has its principal office for a writ of certiorari or review (herein re-
ferred to as a writ of review) for the purpose of having the reason-
ableness or lawfulness of the original order or decision or the order or
decision on rehearing inquired into or determined.’? The statute fur-
ther provides: ‘‘The commission and each party to the action or pro-
ceeding before the commission shall have the right to appear in the re-
view proceedings.’’

The appellant would liavé us go beyond ‘the confines of § 386.510
for a determination of who is 4-proper person to apply for a rehearing’
before the board of bank appeals. It contends that it is an‘interested
party within the meaning of § 386.500, subsection 1, which provides:
“After an order or decision has been made ‘by the commission any
corporation or person or public utility interested therein ‘shall have
the right to apply for a rehearing in respect to any matter deter-
mined therein, * * *.’? Even if we were permitted to determine the
parties to this procéeding according to the’ provisions of the public
service act, the appellant would not qualify as such.

Section 386.420 of the public service commission act expressly
provides who the persons are that shall be entitled to be heard and
to introduce evidence. Among the parties provided for are ‘‘such cor-
porations and-persons as the commission may allow to intervene.’’.
The decisions of this court have uniformly regarded the statute as .re-
quiring. an interested person to make a showing of interest and be~
come a party by intervention. In the case of State ex rel. Consumers:
Public Service Co. v. Public Service Commission, 352 Mo. 905, 180
§.W.2d 40, the appellants were electric public utility companies per-
mitted by the commission to intervene. .The respondents moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appellants had no sub-
stantial interest that would entitle them to intervene before the com-
mission, to file a petition for rehearing or to prosecute review pro-
ceedings. This court considered what ‘‘interest must be-involved to
entitle anyone to become a party before the Commission’’ and stated,
Le. 45: ‘‘The Legislature has provided’ statutory methods for speedy’
and efficient review. The question here is: To whom did the Legisla-
ture intend to make this method of review available? -Since the public
welfare is involved in every Commission case (and is the controlling
factor in its decision), to a certain extent every citizen is interested
in all its cases. But it is certainly not intended that every citizen may
participate in any case. That would prevent the Commission from
functioning efficiently.’”’ And, further, Le. 46:' ‘“The reasonable con-
struction seems to be that the interest necessary to authorize. inter-
vention should be the same as that required to become a complainant
upon whose complaint a case is commenced.’’ In dismissing one of the
appeals, the court stated, le. 47: ‘‘Certainly this could have been
shown by evidence, and it might have supported the [676] other:
intervenor’s contentions by a showing similar to that of an. amicus
curiae in a case in court, but that does not show an ‘interest’-in the
result sufficient to constitute a reasonable basis for imterventions;
Therefore, as to it, the motion to dismiss the appeal should be sus-
tained and its appeal is dismissed.” .

Incorporating the review procedure of § 386.510 into the banking
statutes was intended to determine the kind and manner of ‘review:
“by the cireuit court’’ and not the parties to the action. The parties
entitled to the review must be determined by reference to the
banking statutes and not by the public service commission act. The-
banking statutes prior to the amendment make no provision for: any’
original party to the proceedings either before the commissioners or
the board of appeals other than the proposed incorporators. Nor ‘is
there any provision for the intervention by interested parties as thére
is in the public service commission act. § 386.420 (1). We are con--
vinced that the legislature did not intend, for purposes of judicial re"
view, to expand the category of permitted parties to include: all

‘*interested’’ parties without regard to whether they had’ theretofore
been parties or were qualified to be.

The presence of the University Bank is first noted at the hearings
of September 9 and October 9, 1953, before the board of appeals. It
is designated in the transeript of the evidence as the ‘‘Protestant.’’
Counsel for the protestant cross-examined witnesses and conducted
the direct examination of three witnesses ‘‘on behalf of the Protes-
tant’’ and introduced some exhibits. Attached to the transcript of
October 9 are affidavits of secrecy signed by the ‘‘Attorneys for
Protestants, in the matter of the hearing of the appeal taken by the
proposed incorporators of the proposed Suburban Bank of Dodson,
Jackson County, Missouri.’’? In the application for rehearing. filed
after the decision by the board of appeals, the commissioner of finance,
in addition to claiming to act in his official capacity, also purported
to act ‘‘as a person interested in representing the position of the
Protestant in the above entitled cause.’. This application further
recites ‘‘Comes also University Bank, the Protestant herein, a cor-
poration interested in the order of the Board of Appeals.’’ It does
not appear that the courts of Missouri have had occasion to judicially
define the term ‘‘Protestant’”’ as used herein; however, in Webster’s
New International Dictionary, 2nd Ed., this definition appears: ‘3.
One who makes or enters a protest; as the protestants against pro-
posed legislation.’’ This definition is consistent with the capacity in
which the University Bank appeared before the board of bank appeals.
This agency, created by the legislature to consider applications for
the incorporation of banks, ‘performs a function handled directly by
the legislature prior to constitutional requirement of incorporation
under general laws. Art. XI, § 2, Constitution of Missouri, 1945.

The appearance of the University Bank before the board of appeals
as a ‘‘protestant’’ did not give it the legal standing of a party to the
proceedings entitled to seek a judicial review of the order. As stated
in 73 O.J.S, 517, § 176, ‘‘Not every person who files a protest and is
given an opportunity to be heard by the administrative agency has
a right to appeal from an order of the agency, but whether a partic-
ular person has the right to contest administrative action is largely
a question of law, dependent on a number of variable factors, in-
eluding the nature and extent of his interest, the character of the
administrative act, and the terms of the statute.’’ Our conclusion is
that the University Bank had no legal authority to maintain an action
for judicial review of the decision of the.board of bank appeals.

In the case of In Re Chain Yacht Club v. St.-Louis Boating Associa-
tion, Mo. App., 225 S.W.2d 476, an objector attempted to intervene
in a judicial proceeding for the incorporation of a yacht club. This
ease was decided after the enactment of § 507.090, the comprehensive
section on intervention. The would-be intervenor appealed from
an order denying its application. The [677] court of appeals dis-

missed the appeal and in its opinion’ quoted with approval from the
case of Young Women’s Christian Association v. St. Louis Women’s
Christian Association, 115 Mo.App. 228, 91 8.W. 171, as follows (Le.
478): ‘‘The statutes appear to contemplate an ex parte proceeding,
instead of one to which persons or corporations can be made parties
on their application because they hold rights which may be infringed
by granting the petition. The members of this court are of the
opinion that the St. Louis Women’s Christian Association had no
legal right to intervene in the corporation proceedings and no right
of appeal from the decree. The essential point is that it had no right
-to become a-party to the proceeding.’’ The appellant makes no pre-
tense of having undertaken to bring himself within the provisions of
§ 507.090 relating to intervention generally and there appears to be
no basis for such an application.

Hl Nor is there any provision in the applicable statutes giving
to the commissioner of finance any rights as a party after the board
of appeals has obtained jurisdiction. Section 362.045, subsection 2,
provides: ‘The board shall have access to any and all statements,
reports, data and files in the office of the commissioner of finance who
‘shall present all such documents and any other information bearing on
the subject, in-his possession, to the board. Each member of the board
shall take the same oath required of the commissioner of finance to
keep secret all facts and information thus obtained.’’ An administra-
tive agency is not a party to a litigation as that term is customarily
used: and should not be so considered unless the legislature has so
provided. Pennsylvania Labor Rélations Board v. Heinel Motors,
25 A. 2d 806, 844 Pa. 238. We hold that under applicable law the
commissioner had no right to invoke a judicial review of the decision
of the board of appeals. This holding is in accord with the weight of
authority with respect to the right of a public officer or board to ap-
peal in the absence of a statutory provision. 2 Am. Jur. 958, P.P.
128, § 178. See annotation 117 A.L.R. 216.

The commissioner in the first instance and then the board
of bank appeals represented the general public interest in the exer-
cise of the police power. The proposed incorporators were the per-
sons whose private rights might be affected by the action of the com-
missioner or the board of appeals. The minimum requirements of Art.
V, § 22, Constitution of Missouri 1945, were satisfied by the pro-
visions for review in the statutes then existing. The broader legisla-
tive provisions apply only to future appeals. § 361.094, RSMo Cum.
Supp. 1955. .

| The legislative construction of the banking act confirms
the conclusions which we have reached. The 68th General Assembly
amended the banking laws to provide for an appeal board of five
thembers to be appointed by the governor and further specifically
provided that the commissioner of finance shall be deemed ‘a party

to an appeal proceeding before the board and that certain speci-
fied banks may intervene. Section 361.095, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1955,
L, 1955, H. B. 212, § 5. The fact of this amendment is ‘‘a significant
factor’’.and highly persuasive that the prior law did not contemplate
that the commissioner ‘of finance and the banks specified were parties
to the proceedings or their review. State ex inf. Gentry, Atty. Gen.
y. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 321 Mo. 461, 12 S.W. 2d 64, 80 [5]. The
specific provision of the amendment that the commissioner be deemed
a party on appeal and that other banks be permitted to intervene
is a legislative construction that the right did not exist under the
law applicable to this case. State ex rel. Bank of Nashua v. Holt,
348 Mo, 982, 156 S.W.2d 708, 712 [8]. This rule of construction was
applied in. the case of Drainage District No. 23 v. Hetlage, 231 Mo.
App. 855, 102 S.W.2da 702, 709 [8], wherein it was held: ‘‘We con-
elude, that from the legislative construction of article 1, chapter 64,
as indicated by the subsequent amendment thereof, drainage districts
organized under the provisions of said article 1, chapter 64, did not
have the power to bring suit to redeem or to bid at tax sales for state
and county taxes prior to this [678] amendment, and that conse-
quently, it enacted this statute for the purpose of expressly conferring
‘such authority upon cirewit court districts. While this legislative in-
terpretation.is not conclusive, it is highly persuasive.’’

A further reason that néw parties cannot be injected on
appeal is that under the controlling method of appeal the circuit
court exercises a jurisdiction in its nature derivative or appellate
rather than. original. Lusk v. Public Service Commission, 277 Mo.
264, 210 S.W. 72, 75 [4]; State ex rel. Anderson Motor Service Co.
v. Public Service Commission of Mo., 339 Mo. 469, 97 8.W.2d
116, 119.

Hl It does not appear whether the purported rule of the board
of appeals with respect to motions for rehearing and the time and
manner of appeal was filed with the secretary of state as is required
as a-prevequisite to its effectiveness. § 586.020; Art. IV, § 16, 1945
Constitution. However, this is of no consequence since the board’s
rule-making power is limited to, making ‘‘rules and regulations for
ats proceedings.’’ § 362.045 (1). See also § 536.010 (2). It could
not by rule restrict or enlarge the statutory: or constitutional pro-
visions for judicial review. of its own acts. Nor does its order purport
to do so.

HM Our conclusion is that the trial court correctly’ decided
that the commissioner of finance and the University Bank had. no
“standing”? to invoke a judicial review of the decision of the board
of bank appeals. In 42 Am. Jur. 596, § 204, it is stated: ‘Only
-a person with a ‘legal standing’ can resort to the courts for re-
lief from administrative action, whether the party resorting to
the court avails himself of a statutory or nonstatutory remedy.

699

The question of a person’s legal standing to. apply~for judicial re-
lief does not touch the merits of a suit, but merely the authority
of the court resorted to to entertain the action.’

HMM Appellant strongly urges that the area proposed as a loca-
tion for the Suburban Bank of Dodson has been annexed to the City
of Kansas City since the decision by the board of appeals. Copies
of ordinances bearing on such issue are annexed to the motion for
rehearing filed with the board of appeals and a motion to stay on
this ground was filed in the cireuit court on September 7, 1954.
We could not in any event consider new or additional evidence.
‘State ex rel. Rutledge v. Public Service Commission, 316 Mo. 238,
289 S.W. 785, 787 [5]. However, we do not reach or decide this or
any other question relating to the merits. .

The judgment should be © affirmed and it is so ordered. All concur,

Starz or Missouri ex rel. Universtiy Bang, Appellant, v. Sam C.
Buair, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Respondent,
No. 44831—285 8. W. (2d) 878.

Gourt en Bane, January 9, 1956. -

John W. Oliver and Henry Andrae for petitioner ; Caldwell, Down-
ing, Garrity & Eastin and Hendren & Andrae of counsel.

James T. Riley and Ike Shelton for intervenors ; Skelton & Bradley
of counsel.

[679] STORCKMAN, J.—This is an original proceeding for manda-
mus instituted upon the petition of the relator, University Bank of
Kansas City, against the respondent, Sam C. Blair, as judge of the
Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, ‘‘to the end that said Re-

spondent be directed to hear and determine the cause pending before
it on the merits of said cause.”

The cause referred to was a, writ for the judicial review of a deci-
sion of the board of bank appeals. An appeal was also taken to this
court from the action of the court in quashing the writ. The appeal,
being cause No. 44,843, entitled, ‘‘State of Missouri ex rel. J. A. Rou-
veyrol, Commissioner of Finance, and University Bank, a corporation,
Relators, University Bank, a corporation, Appellant, vs. Phil M. Don-
nelly, Governor, James T. Blair, Jr., Lieutenant-Governor and John
M. Dalton, Attorney General, Members of the Board of Appeals, and
CO. H. Goppert, R. EB. Oliphant, M. A. Vodney, C. L. Keyser and
Porter C. Jeftries, Intervenors, Respondents,’’ was consolidated for
argument with this mandamus proceeding. The decision in the case on
appeal decided contemporaneously herewith disposes of the issues in
this case. Reference is made to the opinion in the appeal case for the
facts and the grounds of the decision.

This case is distinguishable from decisions cited by the relator bank
in that a judgment from which an appeal could be taken was rendered
.by the trial court in this case. The cireuit court did not limit the
issues and appears from the record to have conducted a full hearing,
although the basis of its decision was that neither the relator bank nor
the commissioner of finance was lawfully authorized to prosecute the
proceedings for judicial review. We have affirmed that judgment and
it is decisive of this mandamus action.

The remedy by appeal was adequate to secure the only ruling which
could be made. The general rule is that mandamus will not lie if a
specific and adequate remedy by appeal exists. State ex rel. Howe v.
Hughes, 343 Mo. 827, 123 §.W.2d 105.

The alternative writ issued herein should be quashed, and the
peremptory writ denied. It is so ordered. All concur.

U. 8. Parks, Respondent, Appellant, v. Guy A. Txompson, Trustee
of the Missourr Paciric Raroap Company, a Corporation,
Appellant, Respondent, No. 44712—285 S, W. (2d) 687.

Division Two, January 9, 1956,

. ene!
re
Le

H. L. Harvey and E. A. Barbour, Jr., for appellant Guy A. Thomp-
son.

Jo B. Gardner for respondent.

[688] BOHLING, C.—U. 8. Parks recovered a judgment against
Guy A. Thompson, Trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company,”
a corporation, for $20,000 under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,”
45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. The trial was to the court without a jury.°
§ 510.310 (Statutory references are to RSMo 1949 and VAMS unless
otherwise indicated.) Hach litigant has appealed. Plaintiff’s main
contention is: ‘‘The amount of plaintiff’s recovery should be in-
ereased.’’ Defendant contends the court erred in: admitting certain,
evidence, and that the judgment is excessive. A prior appeal is re-
ported at 363 Mo. 791, 253 S. W. 2d 796. A companion case is Rogers:
v. Thompson, 364 Mo. 605, 265 S. W. 2d 282. The parties state the

facts developed at the second trial are’ substantially the same as
stated by the court on the first appeal, with the exception that addi-
tional evidence was adduced on the issue of damages. Reference is
made to the opinion on the first appeal for a more detailed statement.

Passenger trains are operated at times by defendant in different
sections. Plaintiff was injured when defendant’s westbound train No.
2d 9, on which he was fireman, ran into the rear Pullman ‘of Ist 9,'a-
short distance’ west of Syracuse, Missouri,.about 7:40 a.m., January
1, 1948, killing’a number of passengers, injuring others, and causing’
property damage. The passengers were on Ist 9 and 2d 9 carried
baggage; express and mail. Other crew members on 2d'9 were Con-'
ductor Rogers, Engineer Butler, Flagman Journey and a porter,

Defendant’s Eastern Division extends from St. Louis to Kansas
City. The terminal for freight service was Jefferson City and for
passenger service was Sedalia. Plaintiff had made runs in’ freight~
service to Jefferson City, but had never made a run west of Jefferson”
City and was not informed about the track or location of signals west
of Jefferson City.

When 2d 9 arrived at Jefferson City about ‘2:20 a.m., January 1,
1948, 1st 9 had departed. Plaintiff then found out he was going to
Sedalia and informed his engineer he did not know about the railroad
west of Jefferson City. Second 9 was held at Jéfferson City for about
an hour and a half for a signalman.

The weather, which had not been good, worsened west of Jefferson
City with snow, sleet, wind and ice. This, with the steam’ and smoke
from the engine, affected the visibility aliead.

‘We state briefly the substance of defendant’s operating rules
material here. They are more fully net forth at 253 S. W. 2d ac. cio.
801.

General Rule B: ‘‘Employees must be conversant with and obey
the rules and special instructions. *””

Rule 34 required the communication of signal indications between
members of engine and train crews.

Rule 108. ‘In case of doubt or uncertainty the safe course must
be taken.”

Rule 509 required the stopping of trains at red signals, and obtain-
ing a clearance from the dispatcher before proceeding.

Rule 518 required enginemen, in stormy weather, to approach all
signals not plainly [689] seen, at restricted speed. (Plaintiff testified.
restricted speed meant 15 miles an hour, expecting to stop.) .

Rule 955 makes firemen subordinate to enginemen.

Rules 963 and 980 required the keeping of a careful Tookout,

Rule 979 made firemen responsible with engineers to prevent rule.
violations. It required firemen to call the attention of conductors or
enginemen immediately to any apparent failure to comply with rules

™ a

or instructions; and. made them responsible to the extent of their
ability to prevent accidents or violations of rules. .

Rule 961 made it the duty of the & engineer to handle the engine and
prevented firemen from operating.engines unless authorized to do so.
Article 59 of the Union Contract was to like effect, and, we under-
stand, plaintiff did not qualify under § 26(a) of Special Instructions
No. 8 for an engineer in passenger, service.

At California 2d 9 received the following message from the dis-
patcher at Jefferson City: ‘‘After you meet No. 20 at California and
2d 70, Engine 2209 at Clarksburg, there is no opposing trains in
block between Clarksburg and M. K. T. crossing.’”? The M. K. T.
erossing is at Sedalia.

Plaintiff testified that after leaving Clarksburg he saw three ‘red
signals, which meant stop, and he called them to the engineer, who
answered: ‘‘The message takes care of that’’; that no stop was made
or clearance obtained; that all he did was call-the signals to the
engineer, he did not mention to the engineer he was violating the.
rules and signals or ask him to stop; that west of Syracuse the track
curved to the right, had a slight downgrade; that the steam changed
to the other side of the engine and he saw what looked like the road
ending in a snowbank and, a little closer, it looked like a train; that
he shouted a warning to the engineer; that the engineer. applied the
emergency brakes; that there were no torpedoes, fusees, flagman or
lights; that the speed of 2d 9 had been about 30-35 miles an hour and
perhaps increased to 40 miles an hour on the downgrade. Plaintiff
was injured in the ensuing wreck. 1

As a result of the hearing investigating the accident plaintitt was
dismissed from service January :14, 1948.

There is no merit in plaintiff’s point that he was not con-
tributorily negligent. The case was tried below on the theory that
defendant was negligent and also that plaintiff was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence. In plaintiff’s suggested findings of fact and con-
clusions of law to the trial court, plaintiff, in more than one instance,
admitted he was contributorily negligent. The trial court stated,
among other things in its findings, that defendant admitted liability
and plaintiff admitted some contributory negligence. Such was the
trial theory and, although the case is here de novo, the parties are
bound by their trial theory. Purvis v. Hardin, 343 Mo, 652, 122 8. W.
2d 936, 939[8]; Duffley v. McCaskey, 845 Mo. 550, 134 S. W. 2a 62,
65[11]; Smithpeter v. Wabash R. Co., 360 Mo. 835, 231 S. W. 2d 185,
146[17], 19 ALR 2d 950. The contention was ruled against plaintiff
on the prior appeal (253 S. W..2d Le. 801).

Defendant makes the point that the court erred in admitting,
over objections interposed, evidence of ‘‘the amount plaintiff earned
as a fireman prior to his discharge, for the reason that such evidence
was ‘speculative. Rogers v. Thompson, 265 8. W. 2d 282; Parks v.~

Thompson, 253 8, W. 2d 796.’’ Plaintiff testified he earned around
$300 a month as a fireman for defendant; and: that following: his in,
juries his earnings were about $150 a month, The Rogers opinion ‘has
an observation arguendo (265 8. W. 2d 1.c. 289[7]). that the reinstate-
ment of a discharged employee rests iti conjecture, but the case icon-.
sidered that the prior earnings: of a discharged employee had some
evidentiary value on the issue of damages for an injury sustained.in
the occurrence resulting in the employee’s discharge. We [690], find
nothing in the Parks case in conflict therewith. “The ‘presentation does
not-establish error. - Hoan os

The trial- court found plaintift’s damagés at $30,000; reducett:
the amount $10,000 on accouiit of the contributory negligence of
plaintiff, and entered judgment for $20,000. Plaintiff says we' should
increase the judgment to°$42,750, with: interest on $20,000: from thé
date of trial. Defendant contends that. $20, 000 is' excessive and should
be reduced. © * ‘ a

When plaintiff realized a collision would occur. “he tried to get the
curtain of the cab loose but it was'frozen. He was clinibing: over the
bar across the top of the coal tendér when ‘thé wreck o¢eurred and
the engine cab came down on ‘his back. just: below the belt line-and
mashed and injured him.’ He was knocked out-for ‘a short’ time and:
later climbed down from’ the ongine | and went ‘to the ‘rear coach of
2d 9.

Plaintiff was. hospitalized until January 13, ‘1948, except while
attending the four-day investigation of the-accident at Sedalia. ‘He
made ‘seven out-patient visits ‘to the Missouri. Pacific hospital at St:
Louis between’ January 20th and April 6, 1948. ‘He -was again iad-
mitted to said hospital July 9th and dismissed July 12; 1948.: He:was-
admitted to the Missouri Baptist hospital: November ‘4, 1949, abs:
patient of Dr’ R. D. Woolsey, and dismissed November 7,°1949: .

Plaintiff testified he was never completely -relieved:-of pain-and.
lias had to go to bed oni several occasions; that his’sleep is interfered.
with unless he sleeps with a board under the mattress. and when he’
sits in a straight chair for any length of time, he ‘has to move frequent-.
ly; that he could do-no lifting, or. pick’ up ‘heavy .things and carry:
them, or stoop, bend down to the ground and: work, or use-his arms, as
for instance, in painting; that he takes: pills to telieve the pain when’
he has these ‘‘spells.’’ He stated he-would be 58 Septeriiber:5,.1954;
and: was 52 at the time: ofthe accident.‘We note that -plaintiff’s ex+
liibits -1 and 1-A, the Missouri Pacific’ héspital recérds concerning’
plaintiff’s admittances on January 3 and’ July: 9,!1948, respéctively,
give his date of birth as September -5, 1892,'and_.plaintiff’s' exhibit! 8,
the: Missouri Baptist’ hospital record -of: November, 1949, mentioris
his age as 57. ‘Plaintiff @laimed a life expéctancy on the basis-of age’
57—16.48 years. ‘See 42° VAMS 802; : Plaintiff: was -earhing $300

monthly at the time of his injury and has been operating a taxicab
for some time, earning around $150 a month.

» Two depositions of Dr. R. D. Woolsey, a neurosurgeon, are in the
record. The first, dated June 16, 1951, is mentioned in the former
opinion (253 S. W. 2d Le. 799). The second deposition is dated
August 18, 1953. He was called to plaintiff’s home in November, 1949.
Plaintiff ‘complained of pain: upon pressure in the lumbosacral area,
had: right leg limitation of straight leg raising, and limitation of for-
ward bending at about 20-80 degrees of normal. He sent plaintiff to
the Missouri Baptist hospital. The x-rays showed the usual amount
of osteoarthritis of the: lumbar spine for a man of plaintifi’s age.
(All the doctors agreed the x-rays were not of a type to show a rup-
tured disc.) His diagnosis was ‘‘a ruptured intervertebral dise’’ at
the 4th or 5th interspace in the lumbar area, just below the belt line.
The hospital record- shows plaintiff entered November 4, 1949, and was
dismissed November 7, 1949, with the comment ‘‘has improved
remarkedly.’’’ Dr. Woolsey directed plaintiff to sleep on a mattress
with a board-under it and to- wear a lumbosacral belt. Plaintiff has.
seen him three times since. Plaintiff saw him twice within a month or
two after leaving the hospital, stating ‘“he was much better.’’ Plain--
tiff was much improved and he advised plaintiff it was all right to go
to work, He saw plaintiff again May 6, 1953, and plaintiff stated that
at times he had considerable pain, pain in his back and down the
back of his right leg, but he was able to drive a taxicab. He advised
plaintiff to continue working. He did not recommend and does not
now recommend surgery. In his opinion plaintiff at times was better
and without pain, but ordinarily had a good deal of pain from day to
day; that operating a taxicab was not very good for plaintiff; that
plaintiff’s [691] back pain ‘was the result of the trauma of January 1,
1948, and was not caused' by plaintift’s osteoarthritis. He considered
plaintiff’s condition permanent, a 20-25% partial permanent dis-
ability, arid ‘continuéd to recommend. a hard bed and a lumbosacral’
belt,: especially when working.. Plaintiff’s ability to earn has been
decreased. He did not do a myelogram to localize plaintiff’s trouble
because plaintiff was improving and an operation was not necessary.
His experience has been that better results are obtained to wait and
70 to 80% are cured that.way. There is a good chance plaintift’s
condition will improve without an operation. He stated 60% of those
he operated’ on were working at their former positions and about
90% were working. The charge for an operation would be $500 and
for the hospital (10 days) $300.

De. F, G. Pernoud,'a surgeon of St. Louis, examined plaintiff June:
14, 1951, and gave his deposition.on June 15, 1951. His deposition is
corroborative of the depositions given by Dr. Woolsey. See 253 S. W.
2d°Ke. 799.. He also stated plaintiff’s lumbar spine appeared ‘com-.
pletely flat and his large loin muscles were tense.

Dr. George L. Hawkins, Jr., a neurosurgeon on the staff of the Mis-
souri Pacific hospital and defendant’s witness, examined plaintiff May
5, 1953, Plaintiff was walking and cooperative. Plaintiff complained
of low back pain, pain in his right leg, from thigh to knee, and stated
he had difficulty im lifting. He had limited lateral bending in his
lumbar spine. These may be symptoms of a herniated disc. Plaintiff’s,
complaints were subjective, and he failed to find physical conditions
compatible with plaintift’s complaints. Plaintiff had a marked hyper-.
trophic or degenerative arthritis of the spine, which could not have
been the result of the accident (and Dr. Pernoud testified to like’
effect). Plaintiff’s spine had the normal curvature. Straight leg.
raising could be performed to 75 degrees, which was. normal for one
of plaintift’s age. Plaintiff had no loss of muscular strength in his
lower extremities. He found no evidence of a fractured disc, and
attributed plaintiff’s pain to the arthritis of his spine. No operation
is needed. Trauma could have aggravated plaintift’s arthritic’ condi-
tion and cause him to have pain. It is possible for a gradual deteriora-.
tion to occur and cause disability a year or so after a trauma. Plain-
tiff’s present condition may continue and it may not. Witness per--
forms laminectomies. Surgery is not a last resort measure, but is
employed when the patient does not respond to conservative treat-
ment. Eight weeks should be a sufficient delay in:ordinary circum:
stances. An operation is the most certain way to determine the
existence of a ruptured dise. Witness’ findings indicated no inter-
spinal nerve root compression and a myelogram was unecessary.
procedure. >

Plaintiff’s petition on which the first trial-was held was in three
counts. Count I asked damages for personal injuries and for. loss of
wages while plaintiff was disabled from performing his duties for
defendant. Counts II and III were based on charges plaintiff had
been wrongfully discharged by defendant. Count II was for loss of-
wages. Said counts were dismissed on motion at.the first trial; Count.
IIL prior to trial and Count II at the close of all the evidence. We
affirmed. 253 8. W. 2d le. 797 and 802. On-January 17, 1949, plain-
tiff wrote O. F. Dougherty, his superintendent,’ stating he knew he
had made a bad mistake and asked to be put back to work with yard
rights only. The first trial was in October, 1951, approximately three
years after plaintiff’s injury. The instant ‘trial was in June, 1954.
Plaintiff admitted at the instant trial he testified at’the first trial-
that, except for six months after his injury and a later period of a
week while in the hospital, he could have performed his. work for
defendant all right. At the instant trial’ he testified that sizice the:
first trial he had changed his mind about being able to perform his
former duties, and that he could not then or now do so. Plaintiff's
testimony .at the first trial was-consistent' with his pleadings that he: .
could ‘have’ returned to work and earned the wages’ for’ which he

sought a recovery in Count II. [692] See 253 S. W. 2d le. 800. De-
fendant argues plaintiff should be bound by his pleading (Count I
was’ not. amended in the respects mentioned) and his testimony ‘at
the first trial, and not be allowed to blow hot and cold.

“Howard Mohrlock, of the Allen Commercial Service, St. Louis, en-'
gaged in civil investigations, testified that he observed plaintift’s
activities on four or five days in 1952 and took motion pictures of
plaintiff at'intervals during that time; that he saw plaintiff operating
a taxicab, gétting in and out, going up and down stairs, polishing the
taxi, carrying luggage for passengers, running, walking, stooping and
bending; and that plaintiff’s actions indicated no apparent disability
or injury: ‘The-motion-pictures, taken while plaintiff was working and
without his knowledge, confirm the testimony of this witness and
refute that of plaintiff in a number of instances, such as on plaintifi’s
ability to-lift and carry things, to stoop, to bend down and to use his

- arms, Plaintiff in rebuttal testified that he refused to carry heavy
articles for his passengers.

“Onir review of cases-tried to the court! without a jury,- including
negligence cases, falls within § 510.310, which provides, so far as
material, that: “At or after ‘the trial, ‘the court shall render such
judgment as it-thinks right upon the law and the evidence.”’ {| 2.1
And: ‘The appellate court shall review the case upon both the law:
and the evidence as in suits of an equitable nature. The judgment
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial: court to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses.’’ 4. Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 8. W. 2d 289,
290[1], quotes and applies the following from Redden. v. Boehther,
Mo. App., 223 8S. W. 2d 127[1]: ‘‘ ‘The question for our determina-
tion is therefore not merely one. of whether the court’s finding was
supported by substaintial evidence. On the contrary, it is our duty
to make our own independent finding of the facts and reach our own
conclusion as to where the weight of the evidence lies. Whatever
findings the lower court may have made’ are in no sense binding upon
us; although in ‘matters where the evidence is conflicting and close we
shall have due regard for the lower court’s opportunity to judge the
eredibility of-the-witnesses.’ ’’?. Cross v. Gimlin, Mo., 256 S. W. 2d
812[2, 3] ; House v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., Mo., 217 8. W. 2d 382-
{1]; Dye v. School Dist. No. 32, 355 Mo. 231, 195 S. W. 2d 874, 878-
[4,16]; Lowtrip-v. Green, 863 Mo. 619, 252 S. W. -2d 524, 527-
[6]- This is the ‘established procedure in reviewing suits in equity.
Lynn v. Coates, Mo., 142 8. W. 24 1014, 10191]; Juengel v. City of
Glendalé, Mo.; 161 S.W. 2d 408,-410/6] ; Lastofka v. Lastofka, 339 Mo.
770, 99'S. W. 2d 46, 54[1, 2]. We affirm the judgment below, or enter
or direct such judgment as justice requires. Cases supra. In appropriate
instances equity; retaining jurisdiction-to do full justice, may award
damages. Woolum v. Tarpley, Mo.; 196 S.-W. 1127, 1128{3]; Hadley

Bros.-Uhl Co. v. Scott, Mo. App., 93 S, W. 2d 276; 280[3]; Maytag
Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., CCA 7th, 45 F. 2d 299, 3011], certiorari
denied 283 U. S. 848, 51 S.-Ct..489, 75 L. Ed. 1452. In the last
mentioned case, a suit to enjoin unfair: competition et cetera, with a
prayer by defendant for similar relief and damages, .a court of
equity awarded $500,000 damages where the case: was tried without
objection or demand for a jury, which judgment was reduced by: the
court of: appeals and judgment directed to beentered for. $250,000
(le. 303).

The Seventh ‘Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides: ‘‘In suits at. common law, where:the value in controversy
shall exceed Twenty Dollars, the right’ of trial by jury. shall bé pre-
served, and‘no-fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise-re-éxamined‘in
any court of the United States, than according’ to the rules of ‘the
common law.’’ Consult Missouri constitutional provision Art. 1, §
22(a). The right is a privilege for the benefit of: the parties. and
may be' waived by them. Henderson’s Distilled Spirits, 81 U:.S. (14
Wall.) 44, 58, 20 L. Ed. 815; Maytag Co. v. Meadows. Mfg. Co.,.supra,
45 F, 2d Le. 801[2-4] ; F. Carrera & Hermano [693]-v. Font, Gamundi
‘& Co., 70 F. 2d 999; 1001/3]. Trial by jury at common‘law when the
Constitution was adopted was trial by a-jury composed of twelve men
(Thompson v: Utah, 170 U. 8. 348, 350, 18 8. Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061),
-and the unanimity of the ‘twelve jurors was essential to a verdict
(American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. Ss. 464, 17 8. Ct.. 618, 41 L. Bd.
1079).

In Minneapolis & St. Li. R Go. v. Bombolis, 241 v. 8. 211, 217, 218,
36 S. Ct. 595, 60 L. Hd. 961, LRA 1917A 86, Ann. Cas. 1916E- 505,
thé court held state courts may give effect: to a-local: practice’ per-
mitting of less than a unanimous verdict in actions under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act, stating, among other things :‘‘Two préposi-
‘tions as to thé operation and effect of the Seventh Amendment are as
‘conclusively determined as.is that concerning the nature and character
of the jury required by that Amendment where applicable. -(a). That
:the first Ten Amendments, including of course the Seventh, are not
concerned with state action;‘and deal..only with: Federal action.
-[Citing cases.] And, as a necessary corollary, .(b) that the. Seventh
Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts. of the United
States and does not in any manner whatever’ govern or‘regulate trials
by jury in’state courts or the standards which must be applied’ con-
cerning the same. [Citing cases.] So completely .and ‘conclusively
have both of these principles been settled, * * that it is true to ‘say
that to concede that they are open to- contention would-be to grant
that nothing whatever had been settled-as to the power. of state and
Federal governments or the authority of state and Federal courts and
their mode of procedure from the beginning..* * And. it was, of
course, presumably an appreciation of the- principles so ‘thoroughly

settled which caused Congress in the. enactment of the Employers’
Liability Aét td clearly contemplate the existence of a concurrent
power and duty of both Federal and state courts to administer the
rights conferred by the statute in accordance with the modes of pro-
cedure prevailing in such courts.’’ Other cases are: to like effect, see
annotation, 96 L: Ed. 415, § 8.

‘The Court in Dice v. ‘Alvon, C. & Y. BR. Co., 342 U. 8. 359, 72 S.
Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. 398, by a five to four vote, ruled in a jury tried
ease that Ohio law providing for the determination of factual issues
by the court rather than by the jury as to fraud in the execution of a
release was not applicable to actions under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act. The ruling in the Bombolis case was not overruled.
‘The majority opinion undertook to distinguish it and the minority
opinion considered it applicable to the stated issue in the Dice case.
"342 U.S. at 363 and 365 et seq.

In Union P. BR. Oo. v. Hadley, 246 U. 8. 330, 334, 38 8S. Ct. 318,
62 L. Ed. 751, an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
the jury returned a verdict for $25,000, which was reduced by the
trial court to $15,000, and to $13,500 by the Supreme Court of
Nebraska. The United States Supreme Court said: ‘‘The court had
the right to require a remittitur if it thought, as naturally it did, that
the verdict was too high.’’ See Joice v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 354
Mo, 439, 189 8, W. 2d 568, 576, 161 ALR 383; Counts v. Thompson,
359 Mo. 485, 222 8: W. 2d 487, 495; Sanders v. Illinois C. R. Co., 364
Mo, 1010, 270 S. W. 2d 731, 737, and observations re remittiturs in
Dimick v.- Schiedt, 298 U. 8. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L. Ed. 603, 95 ALR
11650.

‘The ‘procedure adopted by plaintiff and defendant in the trial of
the instant case ‘does not call for the direction and acceptance of a
remittitur or an additur ‘as a condition for not remanding a case for
new trial. The instant issue differs. Where parties waive a jury and
try their case under § 510.810, the review, as stated above, is ‘“‘upon
both the law and the evidence as in suits of an equitable nature.’’ In
his brief filed here plaintiff points out that defendant has waived
his constitutional right to a trial by jury; that this court “‘tries the
matter of, damages de novo’’; [694] and prays for an increased
judgment against defendant. Defendant ‘contends the. judgment
should be reduced. Plaintiff and defendant voluntarily exercised a
privilege accorded litigants by Missouri law and chose to by the case
without a jury- under § 510.310. Neither has been nor is being de-
“prived of any right whatsoever. -

As trier of the facts we are concerned with the ultimate fact for
determination, the damages to be awarded plaintiff, and findings on
the evidentiary facts considered in arriving at the ultimate conclu-
sion need not necessarily be specifically. stated. Our review is as in
suits in equity and in accord with the Federal law on the issue of

damages. Plaintiff’s testimony with respect to. the extent of his in-
juries contradicts his testimony at the first trial. ‘The medical: testi:
mony on the issue is contradictory. We are as able as a trial court to
pass on the credibility of witnesses testifying by deposition. The
record includes testimony bearing on plaintiff’s \activities. several
years after his injury, substantiated by motion pictures. Plaintiff is
able to work at a gainful oceupation. Plaintiff’s damages are subject
to diminution by reason of his contributory negligence. 45 U.S.C.A,
§ 53, We have no hesitancy under the instant reord in-holdi
should not enter a new judgmént inereasing the amount of p'
damages. Our conclusion on the amount of damage’, after studying
plaintiff’s and defendant’s evidence. on the issue, is that a judg-
ment of $15,000 is just and proper. 7

Accordingly, the cause is remanded with directions to enter judg-
ment for plaintiff i in the amount of $15,000, with interest from date of
judgment. in the trial court. Barrett, C., dissents; Stockard, C.,
concurs. ~ — ~

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bouine, C., i
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur. .

Srars or Missourr ex inf. Jonn M. Davron, Attorney-General,

Relator, v. ARTHUR C. MosiEy, Respondent, No. 48977286 8: W.
(2d) 721.

adopted

Court en Banc, January 9, 1986. - Ts
Motion for Rehearing Overruled in Per Curiam Opinion Filed, February
: 18, 1956. Saas ve

‘

John M. Dalton, A orney Genétal, Robert R: Welborn and Fred
L. Howar Assistant Attorneys Gener 1, for relator.

Walter Wehrie, Hynian’ @. 8 and Herbert W
respondent. . ae

[722] LEEDY, C: J—This is an original proceeding in quo
warranto instituted by the Attorney General against respondent to
determine the latter’s title to the office claimed him, that of

A is County. The information charges that respondent
has been guilty of willful and fraudulent violation arid neglect of his
offi duties, and has knowingly failed and refused to do or perform

ties which by law it was his duty to do or perform
with respect’to the execution and enforcement of the criminal laws,

and by reason of his having been guilty, of willful and thalicious
oppression, partiality, misconduct and abuse of .authority in‘his
official capacity and under color of his: office as sheriff, respondent
lias forfeited his said office, and notwithstanding: such forfeiture. he
has unlawfully usurped and continues-to hold said office. The relief
sought is a determination: of the forfeiture, and that respondent .be
ousted. Hon. William’ H. Becker of Coltimbia was appointed .as
Special Commissioner to hear-the evidence, and-report his findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The duty thus enjoined upon the Special
Commissioner was.carried out with painstaking . veare and Signal
ability, as his comprehensive report attests.

Before the issues were joined respondent, by motion; songht
leave to file a plea: attacking this court’s jurisdiction over the. subject
matter of the action. The motion was summarily overruled on the
theory (although not so’ stated in the order) that.the question: sought
to be raised was no longer an open one. Notwithstanding. this, and as
his first point, respondent reasserts such want of jurisdiction, and,
being a. question that can be raised at any stage of a proceeding, we
have examined it anew, and have reached the same conclusion as that
which compelled the withholding of leave: in the first, instance: .The
present attack is based on the same ground .as that formerly sought
to be tendered, i. e., that the ‘statutory scheme with respect to for-
feiture of office and the removal of incumbents not subject to impeach-
ment, nor within the exception.engrafted upon Art. VII, § 4, of the
Constitution (RSMo 1949, §§ 106.220—106:290, :VAMS), constitutes
an exclusive remedy, and hence this court is deprived of jurisdiction
in quo. warranto affecting such offices. -It was held in State ex inf, Mc-
Kittrick v. Wymore,'343 Mo. 98, 119 S.W.-2d 941, 119 A.L.R. 710, that
these very statutes (then known and numbered as §§ 1120211209,
RSMo 1929) did not constitute an exclusive remedy, and..did not limit,
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in quo warranto, and that the
latter would lie to determine the title of a prosecuting. attorney
(whose office had allegedly been forfeited by reason of misconduct)
notwithstanding statutory provisions for-the removal of officials for
misconduct. The doctrine of the Wymore case was expressly [723]
reaffirmed in State ex inf. Taylor v. Cumpton, 362 Mo.'199, 209, 240
S.W. 2d 877, 888, and in State ex inf: Saunders v. Burgess; 364 Mo.
548, 264 S.W. 2d 339, 841.

Respondent contends that these cases are. distinguishable from, ‘and,
therefore, not controlling in, the case at.bar’for these reasons: Be-
cause the Wymore case was decided prior-to the adoption of the. present
Constitution, and the provision there involved was worded differently
from the section of the new Constitution here invoked; and because
the other two cases, although: decided: subsequent to the adoption of
our new Constitution, did not- consider or -pass on the point now
urged, which, reduced to its simplest terms,-is that the statutory

remedy is made exclusive by force of Art. VII, § 4, of the Constitution,
reading as follows: ‘‘Except as provided in this Constitution, all
officers not subject to impeachment shall be subject to removal from
office in the manner and for the causes provided by law.’’ Respond-
ent would construe this language as if it read thus (to quote his
brief) : ‘‘[E]xcept ‘as provided’ in this Constitution, removal actions
against officers not subject to impeachment ‘shall’ be in ‘the man-
ner * * * provided by law.’ ’’ This interpretation omits considera-
tion of, and renders nugatory, the key words (“subject to’’) in the
declaration that officers affected -by said provision ‘shall be subject
to removal * * * in the manner * * * provided by law.’

The majority opinion in the Wymore case regarded the text of the
constitutional provision there in question (from which Art. VII, § 4,
the particular section now under scrutiny, is derived) as reading
thus: .‘‘The General Assembly shall, in addition to other penalties,
provide for the removal from office of county, city, town and township
officers, on conviction of willful, corrupt or fraudulent violation or neg-
lect of official duty. Laws may be enacted to provide for the removal
from-office, for cause, of all public officers, not otherwise provided for
in this Constitution”? (Art. XIV, § 7, Const. of 1875, as amended.)
It may be said in passing that the present writer concurred in the
result reached by the principal opinion in the Wymore case in a
separate concurring opinion; in which concurring opinion two other
judges concurred, our view being that all portions of the foregoing
section had been eliminated by prior amendment save and except that
language which we have italicized above, and hence the question of
exclusiveness of the remedy was not in the case. But the prevailing
or majority view was otherwise, as above stated, and when so con-
sidered—as it should be: because settled by that decision—we are un-
able to discern any real difference in meaning and effect between it
and the corresponding section of the present Constitution, Art. VII,
§ 4, so that as regards the claim of exclusiveness of the statutory
remedy, this case stands on the same footing as, and is controlled by
the doctrine of, the Wymore case, in consequence of which the juris-
dictional question raised by respondent is ruled against him.

Relator relied on ten specific charges, which the Special Commis-
sioner’s report summarizes as follows:

“1, The Whiskey ‘Hijacking’ Charge. This charge concerned the
theft and recovery of a truck load of whiskey stolen in St. Louis
County in November of 1952 and recovered in the County in Decem-
ber, 1952. The. charge in substance’ was (a) that the Respondent
Sheriff was: derelict in his duty to investigate the crime and recover
the whiskey, and (b) that the Sheriff hampered an investigation of
‘the identity of the thieves and their accomplices by refusing Deputies
Burke and Mueller the possession of photographs ‘of suspects for dis-
play to‘prospective witnesses in the field,

“2. The Reward Charge. This was in substance a charge that’after
recovery of the stolen whiskey, the Respondent Sheriff demanded and:
received personally a clieck for a portion of the reward offered: by -the!
[724] insurer of the stolen whiskey. It is charged that in 80 doing the’
Sheriff violated Section 558.140, ‘R.S. Mo. 1949.

“3. The Charge Concerning the El Avion: Shooting-and ‘Depuby
Nick Burke’s Escape. The substance of this charge is that Deputy:
Sheriff Nicholas Burke shot and wounded Deputy Sheriff William
Smith at a party at which the Respondent: Sheriff was present} that
in violation of his duty: to pursue and:arrest felons,:the Respondent
Sheriff failed to make any’ attempt whatsoever to ‘arrest’ Deputy
Burke at that time; that Deputy Burke was allowed to. depart - thé
scene without hindrance. .

“4. The Carnival Gambling Charge. This: was a charge that ii St.
Louis County illegal gambling flourished: openly -at‘-carriivals spon-~
sored by various organizations; that this gambling’ was notorious’ dnd
that widespread publicity was given the illegal gambling; that despite
the extent, the illegality, andthe notoriety, the Respondent ‘Sheriff:
failed to enforee the gambling Jaws until after the institution of this
action, —

“5, The Abortion Case Shakedown Charge. This was ‘a’ thange
that ‘the Respondent Sheriff participated in the arrést’ ‘of ari abor:'
tionist and later in the acceptance by dne of his deputies of 4°$1,500.00
bribe from an abortionist to cause the prosecuting witness to leave" the
County and the prosecution to fail.

“6. Charge of Failure io Enforce the Liquor Control ‘Law. The
substance of this charge is that the violations of the Liquor Control
Act in St. Louis County from 1950 to August 7, 1953, were widée-
spread, open, and iiotorious, and'that the Respondent knowingly and.
willfully. failed to enforce the Liquor Control Law and ordered his
deputies if they observed a liquor law. violation, to take no action. but
report to the Respondent Sheriff. .

“7. The Shamrock Inn. Charge. The substance of the charge is
that the Respondent Sheriff failed to do his duty to investigate and
act on complaints ‘that’ gambling laws were being violated at the
Shamrock Inn and Silver Leaf Bar, located in Breckenridge Hills, a,
village in St. Louis County. ‘

“8, The ‘Big Charlie’ and ‘Little Charlie’ Gambling Charge: “his
charge is that the Sheritt’s office failed to act on complaints of opera”’
tion of gambling games known as ‘Big Charlie’ and ‘Little Charlie
in three taverns located in University City. .

“9° The. Drift Inn and Mac’s Pool. Room ‘Charge. This charge is
that the Respondent Sheriff failed to enforce the gambling ; and liquor
Jaws being violated at a pool room and tayern on. North Elm Street,
in an unincorporated area of St. Louis County. :

+f10, The Elmwood. Park Gambling Charge. This is a charge that
the. Respondent Sheriff failed to suppress. gambling in the streets in
Elmwood Park, a, densely settled nincomporated area in St. Louis
County.’’ :

Insofar as presently relevant, respondent’ s answer and xeturn ad-
mitted the averments concerning his election, qualification and tenure
of office as Sheriff of St. Louis County, denied all charges of miscon-
duet and failure to perform his duties, and.affirmatively averred that
he had at. all times faithfully performed his duties as sheriff,

Lengthy hearings were held before the Special Commissioner as
evidenced by the fact that the transcript returned by him contains
the testimony of 347 witnesses and 216 exhibits, and consists of 4192
pages of testimony in some 30 volumes. The Special Commissioner
concluded thatthe evidence -was. such. that. respondent should be ab-
solved of all, charges.except two, i. e., the.carnival gambling charge:
and the reward charge. His recommendation was that the judgment
be.not. one: of ouster, but that as to.the carnival gambling charge,
respondent should be reprimanded for.his failure to enforce the laws
against gambling and lotteries for charitable, civic and municipal
purposes from the beginning of his present term, January 1, 1953,. to.
the date of the institution of this proceeding, August 7, 1953; and as
to the reward charge, it was [725] recommended that respondent be
fined $500.00, taxed with one-half the costs, and adinonished that the
demanding, of such rewards for the performance of official duty will
henceforth be punished by ouster. Both sides. filed lengthy exceptions
to the report, relator’s consisting of 41 separate items, and .respond-
ent’s 9., We are satisfied with the correctness of all his findings of
fact, but the view we take of the law renders it unnecessary that any
of, ‘the facts be, reviewed except those in relation to the two charges
last mentioned.

At the expense of brevity, but in the interest of clarity and under-
standing of the posture of the case at this stage of the proceedings,
we set forth below, in full, the Commissioner’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law with, respect! to the’ ‘carnival gambling, as follows:

ph Carnival, ‘Gambling Charge °
From roots reaching backward i in time so far they are not visible
in this record there flourished in St. Louis County: illegal gambling
at public gatherings and the operation of illegal lotteries for charitable
purposes from 1948 to 1953, inclusive ‘(and up until August 7, 1958,
when this suit was filed). From 1948, until the time of the filing of
this suit, a large number of the well known civic, religious, fraternal,
patriotic, and municipal, organizations openly conducted public ‘carni-
vals’ ‘at which many recognized types of, forbidden gambling games
were operated, incliiding dice games, bingd games, poker games,
cliuck-a-luck, wheels of chance, and lotteries at which valuable prizes
were awarded, These valuable prizes consisted of money, automo-

piles, finished: and furnished.homes, home appliances, and other:
merchandise and goods.--In the games, cash prizes were usually:
awarded, although at times, some of the more reticent rewarded the
player (who: paid cash) with merchandise prizes. All net receipts
from these. gambling. operations were used for charitable, civic, fra.
ternal, religious, or patriotic purposes.

“During this: period there was practically no attempt to. conceal
the operation. or illegal. nature of the games played or lotteries:
operated at.the carnivals. This record discloses a few but ineffectual.
attempts to give the illegal lotteries a legal form by such devices as
noting on the lottery ticket that the price paid was a ‘donation,’.or by
pretending that the lottery ticket holder had. been elected to a ficti-
tious office to which the prize was attached as a salary. But, by and
large, the gambling games and lotteries were conducted openly with-
out concealment and with an apparent belief that the law would not
be enforced against gambling and lotteries conducted for municipal,
religious, charitable, fraternal, civic, or patriotic purposes. The
existence of these illegal operations troubled the public conscience
of St. Louis County to such an extent that in the September Term,
1948; the grand -jury; impanelled by the Cireuit Court for that term,
took cognizance: of: the existence of these illegal operations and under-
took to formulate a-‘carnival code’ which would be enforceable:

-#The pertinent portion of the grand jury report is as follows:

“« ‘We have given close attention to the conduct of carnivals in the
Cowity, at which various types of gambling operations were per-
mitted. We are cognizant of the impossibility of securing convictions
of: citizens of no previous criminal character who have violated the
gambling code by operating’.a carnival for a‘ purely charitable pur-
pose: ‘We recognize, too, the temptation. to professional gamblers to
frequent. or associate. themselves with charitable carnivals where
games with which they are well acquainted are operated. Nevertheless,
regardless of the charitable nature of such enterprises, when such
gambling operations are permitted, even though minors and children
are not permitted to participate, it sets a very bad example’ to the
young and gives them instruction in gambling.

“« “With these thoughts in mind, we suggést that dice games, card.
games, chuck-a-luck and‘roulette should be absolutely prohibited, and
the operators of carnivals. should be warned that the use of such
gambling paraphernalia will résult in the [726] isstiance of informa-
tion against the operators thereof and the seizure and destruction of
the equipment described. Because this paraphernalia is costly, the
seizure .and destruction of it would be a lesson to the operators not
easily forgotten, and would serve as a warning to other carnival
operators:ambitious to engage in like action that they would suffer a
tremendous financial loss. We ask the police in the various: munic-
ipalitiés where carnivals are operated, to serve: warnings that gam-

blers or other police characters seen on the premises will: be arrested
and held for the statutory period. As we recognize that the American
people seek the milder forms of taking a chance, as an inducement to
contribute to charities, we believe that the giving of groceries and
prizes other than: cash should be tolerated. In this matter we have
contacted the organization of the Peace Officers of St. Louis County,:
and we are gratified to find that they agree fully. with our views in
this matter, and that they, together with various St. Louis County
groups who hold carnivals for whatever purpose, have been earnestly
seeking some guide as to what could or could not-be permitted at
carnivals. For the guidance of all parties therefore, we suggest the
following Carnival Code to exclude at least this handful of obvious
gambling devices and games: .

“J. No Roulette.

“© No Chuck-a-luek:

“<©3. No Over and Under.

“« «4. No Games Involving Dice.

“<5. No Games using Ordinary Playing Cards or Poker Chips.

“<6, No Gash Prizes.

“We commend the Peace Officers Association for the assurance
that its membéts would enforce ‘this Carnival Code throughout the
County ‘of St. Louis, and we further commend the City Council of
Kirkwood for anticipating this action of our Grand Jury: in already
prohibiting such devices.’

“This grand jury carnival code undertook to direct the law enfore-
ing officers concerning what types of violations should be prosecuted
and what types might go unprosecuted. There was no legal authority
for the grand jury’s action in rewriting, im effect, the laws concerning
gambling and lotteries for application in St. Louis’ County. ‘Never-
theléss, the grand jury was made up of.substantial and public
spirited citizens who were doing their best to bring about suppression
of the more notorious aspects of gambling for charitable purposes.
The Respondent Sheriff and the Prosecuting Attornéy served notice
generally that the grand jury’s carnival code would be. enforced and
that gambling in contravention of: the carnival code-would not be
tolerated in the future.:. The carnival code was widely publicized by
a local St. Louis County publication (The St. Louis County Observer)
which had previously conducted’ a campaign’ of publicity- against
gambling at public gatherings.. Following the grand jury’s preserib-
ing the carnival code, the Respondent, among other peace ‘officers,
approved the carnival code as a guide to law enforcement. Subsequent
grand juries took note of the existence of the code and some instances
of its breach. a vo

“Despite the carnival code and ‘the good resolutions which accom-
panied it, neither: the carnival code or the underlying state laws
against so-called .carnival gambling and lotteries, conducted’ for

charitable purposes, were observed or enforced. Direct -and cireum-
stantial evidence shows that the Respondent was aware that illegal
gambling’ and illegal lotteries were conducted openly and notoriously
and to great extent thoughout the succeeding years of 1949, 1950,
1951, 1952, and 1958, up to the filing of this action. .

“The evidence shows, and it is conceded, that the illegal gambling
and the operation of illegal lotteries could have been suppressed by
action of the Sheriff alone, or by action of. the Sheriff and the Prose-
euting Attorney.. :

‘During the years 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1958, the St. Louis
County Observer, the local publication which had made a public issue
of the failure to enforce the gambling laws continued to publish news
articles [727] concerning the existence of open gambling at carnivals
and to criticize the law enforcement officers,.county and municipal,
for failure to enforce the laws and the carnival code.

“The organizations which continued: to- violate the laws against
gambling and lotteries included some of the most worthy civic, reli-
gious, fraternal, patriotic, and municipal organizations in the County.
The conduct of the gambling and lotteries for charitable purposes in-
volved some of the-most respectable and substantial citizens of the
County who happened to be serving as officers of the organizations
engaged in ‘the operations. The attitude ofthe. churches whose
auxiliaries conducted gambling and lotteries .was interesting. The
evidence shows that some of the churches forbade their members to
engage in the conduct of gambling and lotteries on the ground that
such conduct ‘violated ecclesiastical law. Others tolerated the practice
and even furnished buildings and grounds for the operations on the
expressed ground that church policy did not forbid gambling of a
lesser’ and non-injurious degree. The: church officials did not ap-
parently feel obliged to interpret and advocate enforcement of the
secular law.

“There is no, evidence in this record that the Respondent Sheriff
or any of his deputies benefitted in a financial way from the operation
of the gambling games and the lotteries: It-can, on the other hand;
be fairly inferred that the law enforcement officers would not suffer
any net loss in political support by tolerating open and widespread
illegal gambling and illegal lotteries by organizations with large
membership. On the financial side, most of the fiscal officers of the
organizations conducting the gambling and the lotteries kept careful
accounts of the receipts and disbursements from their operations.
Many of these accounts are in evidence.

‘The evidence shows that in adjoining counties there were some
similar violations of the law which fell far short of the open, wide-
spread, and notorious conduct of gambling and lotteries for charitable
purposes in St. Louis County from 1948 to the filing of this action.

a

“In St: Louis:County by 1953, the conduct of gambling and illegal

lottery enterprises by civic, religious, fraternal, patriotic, and munic-
ipal organizations had become the standard-method of raising money
for charitable purposes. Much of the burden of charity, public wel-
fare, recreation for youth, and religious support, which is derived
from voluntary donations in other communities, was derived from
illegal gambling and lotteries in St. Louis County. One witness com-
plained, and perhaps with reason, that the people of St. Louis County *
had become so conditioned by the practice that it was difficult to raise
money for .charitable purposes other than by gambling and lottery
enterprises.
.. “As for the size of these illegal operations, some were small local
picnics. with ten cent gambling games accompanied by a lottery or
drawing at which a grand-prize or a home appliance or an automobile
might be awarded. Other affairs were carnivals of considerable
magnitude lasting several days and involving receipts of several
thousands of dollars. In St. Louis County from 1948 to 1952, inclusive,
a lottery of great magnitude-was conducted-in which a furnished home
worth over fifteen thousand dollars was awarded annually, and
lottery tickets were sold not only in St. Louis County. and in Missouri,
but in many other states of the Union. In-the year 1953, the conduct
of illegal gambling and lottery enterprises for ‘charitable purposes’
‘was open, notorious, and widespread. In the year 1953, the Respond-
ent Sheriff knew of the existence of the open, notorious, and wide-
spread illegal gambling and lottery enterprises,. but nevertheless,
willfully and knowingly failed to enforce the laws against gambling
and lotteries until the filing of this action August 7, 1953.

“There is no ‘evidence that the Sheriff otherwise failed to enforce
the laws against gambling, and there is no evidence that he profited
finaricially from gambling of any nature.’’

[728] Conclusions of Law
- “1. No municipal, patriotic, civic, or religious organization has
any license’ td violate the laws of the State against gambling or
lotteries, regardless of the civic or charitable uses to be made of the
profits or absence of personal profit to the organization or its mem-
bers. Gambling and lotteries for charitable purposes are forbidden
by law in Missouri. Unless and until the policy expressed in the laws
against’ gambling and lotteries is changed by lawful procedures, the
Respondent Sheriff, and all others charged with the duty of enforcing
the laws, have a duty to suppress gambling and, lotteries, conducted
for any purpose and to enforce the laws against gambling and lotteries.

“2. The Respondent Sheriff .was guilty of knowingly and -will-
fully failing to enforce the laws of the State of Missouri against
gambling and against’ operation of lotteries for charitable, civic, and
inunicipal purposes from January 1, 1953, to August 7, 1953. .

“*3, The Respondent Sheriff’s duties do not perniit: him’ to:choosé
the criminal laws which he will enforce or the persons against whom
he will enforce them.

“4, The Respondent in this proceeding cannot be -punished - for
failure to enforce the laws in respect to carnival. gambling occurring
prior to January 1, 1953, the date upon which his present term of
office commenced, and in view of the fact that this action was not
instituted until August 7, 1953.

“*5, With respect to carnival gambling, evidence of open, wide:
spread, and notorious existence of carnival gambling in St. Louis
County prior to January 1, 1953, was not admissible to prove derelic-
tion of duty punishable in this case, but such evidence may. be con-
sidered to prove knowledge of the nature and extent of such carnival
gambling as continued to be conducted in the present term of Re-
spondent beginning January 1, 1953.

“6. Because this is a case of first impression, and because no- per-
sonal advantage, other than possible political favor, was received by
the Respondent Sheriff as a result of failure to “enforce the laws
against gambling and lotteries for municipal, civic, and religious pur-
poses, the Respondent should not be ousted as a result of such failure
to enforce the law, but should be reprimanded.’’ ~

The Reward Charge

The reward charge is that respondent demanded and received!
personally a check for a portion of a reward offered by the insurer of
a cargo of whiskey (625 cases) which was stolen on November 10,
1952, while in transit in St. Louis County, and later recovered. We
set forth below, in somewhat abbreviated form, and without using
quotation marks, the facts as found by the Special Commissioxier,
as follows:

The insurance carrier, The Agricultural Insurance Company, acting
through its attorney in fact, Appleton and Cox, Inc., of New York and
Chicago, advertised an offer of a reward of $2500 for the recovery
of the property and the conviction of the thieves, Shortly following
the recovery of the whiskey, Mueller and Burke, respondent’s dep-
uties, learning of the advertised reward, asked to, be consideted. if
it were paid.

Thereafter, the thieves having been apprehended, Harold Angell,
Vice-President of Appleton and Cox, Ine., with offices in Chicago,
determined, to take action with respect to the payment of the reward!
The agent in charge of the St. Louis office of the FBI was consulted
by Angell, and the agent furnished the names of Burke and Mueller,
as well as that.of St. Louis Police Officer Judge, as being entitled to’
consideration in that connection. Thereafter, on June 8, Angell
addressed and sent to Sheriff Mosley a letter enclosing a draft for
$1000, payable jointly to Mueller and Burke.” "This was received ‘about

June 10. Some days later, and the draft not having been delivered,
Mueller (who was then in private business and no longer a deputy)
went to the sheriff’s office and conferred with the sheriff and Burke
in reference to the matter. The sheriff showed Mueller and Burke [729]
the letter and.-draft, and advised them that he felt that he was en-
titled to an equal share of the reward, and that:he was going to com-
municate with the insurance company about the matter. He did not
deliver the check to Burke and Mueller at-that time, but.put it back
in his desk.

A few days later Mueller wrote a letter to Angell, which was re-
ceived in due course, in which he stated that the sheriff was in receipt
of the check for $1000, ‘‘but had refused to release the check to Mr.
Burke or myself, insisting on an equal share for himself. * * * This
has been refused and he is in turn holding up the check.’’ The’ letter
requested that the draft in the sheriff’s possession be voided, and that
separate checks-be sent to Burke and Mueller at their home addresses.
Mueller stated he was writing in Burke’s behalf also because of the-
embarrassing situation in which Burke, still a deputy, found himself.

‘A few days after receiving the letter from .Mueller, Angell, in
Chicago, received a long distance call from Sheriff Mosley. The
sheriff told Angell he had received the draft payable to Burke and
Mueller, and wondered if Angell knew of the work he, the sheriff,
had,done. He told Angell that he had spent several nights watching
the truck load of whiskey. Angell replied that he knew Burke and
Mueller worked under the sherift’s direction, but did not realize
that the sheriff had personally participated in the case or had done
anything outside his normal duties. Angell said he would be glad to
check into the matter, think it over and call the sheriff back. In the
conversation the sheriff told Angell he stiJl had the $1000 draft. He
did not expressly ask for money, but said he felt the extra work he
had done entitled him to consideration in the reward. Angell then,
consulted the New York office, and later telephoned the sheriff, and
first suggested they might be able to send the sheriff another couple of
hundred dollars. The sheriff said that was fine but let Angell know ~
he would have been happier if the amount were more. The sheriff told
Angell that Mueller was no longer with the sheriff’s office, and per-
haps the additional money to be sent to the sheriff might be pooled
with Burke’s share of $500. Angell objected, stating that his com-
pany was publicly committed to Mueller and Burke for $500 each, .
and that it. would not be proper to ask either to accept less. Finally
Angell agreed to send the sheriff an additional $500. Nothing was.
said at that time about a Deputy Sheriffs’ Benefit Association. The
additional draft in the sum of $500, payable to Sheriff Mosley, was
mailed with a letter. dated June 23, 1953, to Sheriff Mosley and re-
ceived by him. The letter stated in part: ‘I am accordingly enclos-
ing herewith draft #530079 payable to your good self in the amount

of $500.00 in token of our appreciation. This draft is being. sent to
you with the understanding that you will release our draft to Mr
Mueller and Mr. Burke.”’

The sheriff received the $500 draft in due course, and on June 25
the draft for $1000 was delivered to and endorsed by Burke, and later
cashed by Mueller and the proceeds distributed to those entitled
thereto.

Thereafter, on July 8, the sheriff wrote a letter to Appleton and
Cox, Inc., New York office, to Angell’s attention, returning the $500
draft umeashed. This letter, which-was prepared after consulting able
counsel, stated "in part:

“Tt was never my desire to participate in-the reward personally. I
had hoped the St. Louis County Deputy Sheriffs’ Benefit Association
might derive some benefit therefrom. If you choose so to do you may
send a contribution to said Association in care of Mr. Earl Butenhoft,
its Treasurer.

“Please understand there is no solicitation of a reward to the
Association in this letter,.as that is a matter entirely within your
discretion.”’

Concerning this mention of the Deputy ‘Sheriffs’ Benefit Associ-
ation in the letter of July 8, the Special Commissioner reports that
this ‘‘was the first time it had been mentioned by the sheriff in the
dealings with Angell, with Appleton and Cox, and with Burke and
Mueller, The testimony in the record: to the contrary is not credible.”

[780] When the letter of July 8 finally reached Angell in Chicago,
Angell sent a $500 draft payable tothe Benefit Association, as sug-
gested.

Upon the facts thus found, the Special Commissioner reported as
his conclusions of law the following:

Conclusions of Law

“1, Tt is contrary to the statutory and common law of this State,
founded on public policy, for an officer to solicit, demand, or receive
a reward or fee for doing his duty. The observation of this rule of
law is necessary to uniform administration of justice without dis-
¢rimination or favor. When officers are permitted to accept or de-
mand rewards for doing their duties, those who'pay, willingly or un-
willingly, will. tend to receive greater atténtion to their complaints
and requests for ‘action, and those who do not’ pay will tend to receive
Tess attention to their complaints and requests for action.

‘‘The judgment in this case should contain an admonition to thé
Respondent and ‘all other officers that the demanding of rewards ‘or
fees for the performance of official duty will henceforth be’ punished
by ouster.

“2. The Respondent Sheriff is guilty of demanding a fee and re-
ward by color of his’ office, for an official act done in the investigation
and recovery of the whiskey stolen in St: Louis County, November 10,

1952, in violation of Section 558.140; and also is guilty of reéeiving
and retaining for thirteen days a fee or reward-in the form of a
bankable draft for $500.00 for an official act done in thé investigation
and recovery of whiskey stolen in St. Louis County November 10,1952.

‘*3, Because this is a case of first.impression,: and because: the
Respondent returned the $500.00 draft, the Respondent Sheriff should
not be ousted, but should be fined $500.00 and taxed with one-half
the costs of this proceeding. Section 558.130, R.S:-Mo., 1949, does not
as a matter of law require ouster because the Respondent demanded
and received a reward in violation of Section 558.140, B.S.’ Mo., 1949.’?

The Wymore case is the leading authority sanctioning this. court’s
jurisdiction in quo warranto to determine forfeitures of office of the
kind here'in question notwithstanding the existence of.statutes pro:
viding for removal of such officers, thus denying the exclusiveness:of
the latter remedy. Because of the extended treatment that case gives
the nature, scope and effect of such quo warranto proceedings, and be-
cause controlling in the circumstances here present, we remind of what
was thete said (343 Mo. 98, 106-107,.119. S.W. 2d 941, 948), as
follows:

“The writ [of quo warranto] is not directed against the individual
claiming the office. It is directed against his right to hold the office:
It is not an action im the interest of any individual. It is an action to
protect the public against usurpation. 22 Stan. Ency. of Procedure,
p. 25. The dominant issue in quo: warranto is title: It proceeds on the
theory that the office has been forfeited by an act of miscondict:on
the part of the official. On the other hand, removal concedes title and
proceeds on the theory that the official either has not ‘forfeited by the
act forbidden’ or has committed a criminal offense and subjected
himself to punishment and forfeiture of the office on conviction: Thé
courts are without authority to create and declare a forfeiture of
office. Absent forfeiture at common law, the forfeiture can be created
and declared only by either the constitution or valid legislative enact-
ments. The rule is stated by standard texts as follows: .

“<*Quo warranto will also lie for the purpose of ousting an in-
cumbent whose title to the office has been forfeited by misconduct or
other cause. And in such a case it is not necessary that the question
of forfeiture should ever before have been presented to any court for
judicial determination, but the court, having jurisdiction of, the quo
warranto proceeding, may determine the question of forfeiture for
itself. The question must, however, be judicially determined [731]
before he can be ousted. “and if the alleged ground for ousting the
officer is that he has forfeited his office by reason of certain acts or
omissions on his part, it must then be judicially determined, before
the officer is ousted, that these acts or omissions-of themselves work
a forfeiture of the office. Mere misconduct, if it does not of. itself
work a forfeiture, is not sufficient. The court has no power to create

a forfeiture, and no power to declare a forfeiture where noné already
exists. The forfeiture must exist in fact before the action of quo
warranto is commenced.’’?’ Mechem, Public Officers, Sec. 478, p. 308:
--* When the court has jurisdiction in quo warranto proceedings it
may oust an incumbent from an office which he is holding: without
right, although the question of the right or of forfeiture, if that is in
the case, has never before been presented to any court for judicial
determination. The court which. has original jurisdiction in quo war-
ranto may determine the question of right or the. question of for-
feiture for itself, unless the statute provides that forfeiture shall
follow a-criminal prosecution and sentence, and if the act complained
of does not ipso facto create a forfeiture, and is only a misdemeanor in
office on account of which the law provides the manner in which the
vacaney is to be declared, it is held that quo warranto will not lie.’
Ency. of Pleading & Practice, Vol. 17, p. 400.””

State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy, '347 Mo. 484, 489-490, 148 S. W.
2d 527, 530, elaborates upon the foregoing doctrine in this language:
“Tt is also true that it [quo warranto] will lie against a county officer
who has been legally elected or appointed to office in the first instance
but has forfeited his office by misconduct. State ex inf. v. Graves,
Mo-Sup., 144 8.W. 2d 91; State ex inf. v. Wymoré, 345 Mo, 169, 182
S.W. 2d 979. But * * * the theory on which the writ is issued is that
at the time of the filing of the information the franchise Has ceased to
exist and become forfeited because of the misconduct of its holder. The
officer who violates his oath of office by corruption, wilful misconduct
or neglect of official duty automatically loses the right to office and
becomes a mere interloper. * * * In either case the judgment in quo
warranto does not try the question of forfeiture. It merely recognizes
judicially fait accompli and ousts the wrongdoer from enjoying. the
privileges of a franchise which he has ceased to possess.’’ (Italies, the
present writer’s. )

§ 106.220 (all statutory references are to RSMo 1949 and the cor-
responding sections of VAMS). provides, among other things, that an
officer: such as sheriff ‘“* * * who shall knowingly or willfully fail
or refuse to door perform any official act or duty which by law it is
his duty to do or perform with respect to the execution or enforcement
of the criminal laws of the state, shall thereby forfeit his office * * *.”

As‘in'the second Wymore ease, 345 Mo. 169, 182 8.W. 2d 979, it is
unnecessary to decide here whether respondent may be ousted from
his present term because of misconduct arising in the one immediately
preceding it, and we again reserve the question. And it may be added
that no question has been raised as to the admissibility of evidence of
widespread, open and notorious carnival gambling in respondent’s
former terms as ‘bearing on his knowledge of the nature and extent
thereof as continued in his present term. :

. TD The-evidence shows, as was found by the Special Commis.
sioner, that respondent knowingly and willfully failed to enforce the
laws of the State of Missouri -against gambling and against operatiop.
of lotteries for charitable, civic and municipal purposes from the
inception of his present term until at least the date of the filing of-the
information herein. By. force of § 106.220, supra, and under: the
principles governing proceedings of this nature, as hereinabove set
out, the: conclusion is inescapable that respondent had automatically
lost his right to the office of Sheriff of St. Louis County: prior to the
institution ofthis proceeding. The fact that respondent did not
profit personally as.a result of his lax.and [732] complacent policy
toward carnival gambling does not affect the matter. State ex inf.
McKittrick v. Williams, 346 Mo. 1003, 144 8.W. 2d 98. And so having
“forfeited by the act [or omission] forbidden,” he became a usurper,
and as such his ouster must go as a matter of course.

| As to the reward-charge, we think it clear that the conduet
complained of constituted a violation of § 558.140, which provides as
follows: ‘‘Every officer who shall, by color of his office, unlawfully
and willfuly exact or demand or receive any fee or reward to execute
or do his duty; or for any official act done or to be done, that is not
due, or more than is due, or before it is due, shall upon conviction be
adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.’’

It is provided’ by the next precedirig section, § 558.180, that ‘‘* * *
every officer who shall be convicted of any official misdemeanor or
misconduct in office * * * shall, in addition to the other punishment
prescribed for such offenses, forfeit his office.’’ It is unnecessary to a
decision on this branch of the proceeding to determine whether the
doing of an-act prohibited by § 558.140 ipso facto works the forfeiture
thus provided for, or whether it arises only upon, and as a consequence
of, conviction. In the nature of things, § 558.140 cannot apply ‘to
persons other than officers, and so it would seem clear that it is as
much a part of the official duty of a sheriff to refrain from doing any
of the acts denounced by that statute as it is to carry out what may
be ‘referred to as the affirmative duties respecting his office as ex-
pressly enjoined upon him by other sections. Consequently, the
evidence brings respondent’s actions in connection with the reward
charge literally within the automatic forfeiture provisions of § 106.220,
as for ‘‘willful or fraudulent violation or neglect of any official duty,’’
so that, for this additional reason, ouster must be, and it is, awarded.
Inasmuch as most of ‘the charges against respondent were not sus-
tained by the evidence (and some appear to have been made without
substantial basis), and some: presenting matters of first impression,
and in-view of the size and extent of the costs, we have concluded.
that all‘of them should not be borne by. him. It is therefore ordered
that the cost be taxed one-half against relator, and one-half against
respondent,

Dalton, Hollingsworth, Hyde, and Westhues, JJ., and Cave, Special
Judge, coneur; Zager and Storckman, JJ., uot sitting because not
members of the court when cause.was submitted.

Hi PER CURIAM:—The motion for rehearing complains of the
ruling that ‘“‘having forfeited by the act [or. omission] forbidden,”’
respondent ‘‘became a usurper, and as such his ouster must go as a
matter of course.’’ It is chargéd that by so ruling the court has
surtendered or denied its discretionary power with respect to the
remedy or punishment it may order in a quo warranto proceeding.
This is a misapprehension.

As regards the judgment to be entered in a quo warranto proceed-
ing, we think a preexisting forfeiture of office for misconduct stands
on a different footing than those instances where a private corpora-
tion is proceeded against for having improperly exercised some
corporate franchise, or where the validity of the organization of some
public corporation is questioned.

As was pointed out in Commonwealth vy. Allen, 70 Pa. 465, 470,
“The quo warranto'is a great’ prerogative writ; and may be refused
if demanded for light and trivial causes. Hence, in England, in
questions of mere privilege, where its loss proceeds from innocent
acts, as removal out of corporation limits, the court may and does let
the corporation first declare the amotion. But when a forfeiture of
office occurs by an illegal act, the violation of law stands on a [733]
different footing. In such cases in this state the power of the court
will not be invoked im vain by the law officer of the government, the
attorney-general, whose duty it is to vindicate the broken law.’
(Italics, the present 'writer’s.)

In State ex rel. Pope v. Mansfield Special Road District et al., 299
Mo. 663, 253 8.W. 714, 716, the judgment in quo warranto ousted the
appellants from office as commissioners of a special road district, but
also restored to or reserved in them such powers and duties as would

. ‘enable them to continue to collect taxes arid pay interést on. outstand-
ing bonds. This court in holding such judgment to-be.a nullity said:
“Tf the act providing for the creation of the special road district was
repealed by implication by the adoption by Wright county of town-
ship organization, then, in the absence’of any qualifying legislation
authorizing a retention of any of the powers of the district, it ceased
to exist, and a judgment in quo warranto could do no more than give
judicial recognition of its demise. A modified judgnient of ouster
therefore attempting to perpetuate its powers in any respect is a mere
nullity.’’

What judgment Tess than. ouster could properly be rendered where,
as here, prior to the institution of the proceeding, there iad been an
automatic forfeiture of the officer’s right to hold the -office by reason
of his willful misconduct’ or neglect of official duty, and in conse-

quence of which he had become an interloper—a usurper? We are
not cited to any authority, nor do we know of any holding that such
a person may nevertheless retain either title to, or possession of such
office, under a proper judgment in a quo warranto proceeding. If any-
thing said in State ex inf. Taylor v. Cumpton, 362 Mo. 199, 214, 240
S.W, 2d 877, 886 [13,14], be regarded as holding to the contrary, the
‘case should be, to that limited extent, overruled. It follows there was
nothing improper, much less revolutionary, in our holding that upon
the facts and law as found in this case, ouster would go as a matter
of course,

Other questions presented by the motion have either been elimi-
nated by our modification of the opinion this day made, or answered
by the opinion itself, or they do not warrant discussion. The motion
for rehearing is overruled.

Svarz or Missourr, Respondent, v. Raeu Josmpn Oreny, Appellant,
No. 44722—286 8. W. (2a) 804,

Division Two, February 18, 1956,

Charles M. Shaw for appellant.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and John W. Inglish,. Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent.

. [805] BOHLING, C.—Ralph Cerny appeals from an order,
deemed a final judgment, overruling his motion to vacate or correct
a judgment imposing a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment,.for
burglary and larceny: Supreme Court Rules 27.26, 28.03, 28.05, Our
review is de novo. Rule 28.05. His conviction was affirmed in State.
vy. Cerny, Mo., 248 S. W. 2d 844. . an

The material portion of appellant’s motion reads: . "

“Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

“Comes now the petitioner, Ralph J. Cerny, and respectfully prays
this Honorable Court to sustain this petition for Writ of Error.
Coram Nobis, in the above entitled cause for the reason that new
evidence, unknown to this Court, to the Prosecuting Attorney, to the’
petitioner and his attorney, has been discovered and obtained; said
new evidence’ was not available at the time petitioner appeared be-*
fore this Court for trial. ,

“Petitioner respectfully contends that said’ ew evidence warrants
that the judgment to be set aside and the sentence imposed thereunder
be vacated. Petitioner will show: that a gross miscarriage of justice
had resulted in his conviction, and that the new evidence, pertinent to
his cause, and indisputable and irrefutable, if it had all been known
and available at the time petitioner was put on trial, a different and
favorable verdict would have been rendered by the jury which heard
petitioner’s case.’’

The above paragraphs are followed by a statement of appellant’s
conviction and sentence and, under a heading ‘‘ Authorities,’’ certain
statements followed by citations; the statement that affidavits were
attached to and made a part of the petition, and movant’s signature
and affidavit, The ‘‘affidavits’’ attached to the motion are typewritten
statements, in the form of questions and answers to’ the effect that
James Lynch and another committed the offense, but these ‘‘affi-
davits’’ are not signed and are not sworn ‘to.

HH Supreme Court Rule 27.26 (42 VAMS 120), so far as material,
reads (emphasis-ours): ‘‘A prisoner in custody under sentence and
claiming a right to be released on the ground that such sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws’ of this State or the
United States, or that the court imposing suéh sentence was without
jurisdiction to do so, or that such sentence was in excess of, the
maximum sentence authorized by law or is otherwise’ subject t6 col-
lateral attack, may file a motion at any time in the court which
imposed such sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the same. Unless
the motion and the files and records of the case show to the satisfac-
tion of the court that’ the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court
shall cause notice thereof to be servéd on the prosecuting attorney,
grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and maké
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If thé”
court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction or
that the sentence imposed was illegal or otherwise subject to collateral
attack, or.that there was such a denial or infringement of the constitu-
tional rights of the prisoner as to-render the judgment subject to
collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set aside the judgment’
and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new
trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. * *””

The above quoted portion of Rule 27.26 is in substance the same as
similar provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, relating to [806] judgments
of the Federal courts. State v, Eaton, Mo., 280 8. W. 2d 63, 65. Like
principles are applicable’ to each.

The purpose of said § 2255 was to minimize the defects encountered
in habeas corpus proceedings instituted in the district court of the.
prisoner’s confinement by providing a remedy for determining the
legality of the detention in the court imposing the sentence where. the-
issues could be presented more conveniently and expeditiously for

determination. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 218, 219, 72
S. Ct, 263, 96 L. Hd. 232.

The remedy covers, broadly, situations where the sentence is ‘‘open
to collateral attack,’’ affording relief within the specified grounds
equivalent to that accorded in a habeas corpus proceeding. United
States v. Hayman, supra, 342 U. 8. 205, 216-219. See generally, 4
Barron, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2806; Anmotation, 20
A. L. R. 2d 976.

Adams y. United States, D.C. Gir, 222 F. 2d 45, 46, states: “That
section [2255] requires that a sentence be vacated when the court-finds
‘that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the
sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to
collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement
of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack’. As the Fourth Circuit ‘has said—
‘Prisoners adjudged guilty of crime should understand ‘that 28
US.C.A. § 2255 does not give them the right to try over“again the
eases in which they have been adjudged guilty. Questions as to the
sufficiency of the evidence or involving errors either of law or of
fact must be raised by timely appeal from the sentence if the petition-
er desires to raise them. Only where'the-sentence is void or other-
wise subject to collateral attack may the attack be made by motioi
under 28 U.S.C:A, § 2255, which was enacted to: take ‘the’ place’ of:
habeas corpus in such cases and was intended to confer no broader
right of attack than might have been made in its absence by habeas
corpus.’ Taylor v. United States, 4 Cir., 177 PF, 2d 194, 195.’ See,
among others, Sanders v. United States, 5 Cir, 205 F. 2d 399,
400[1]; Pelley v. United States, 7 Cir., , 214 F. 2d'597, 598, certiorari
denied, 348 U. 8. 915, 75 8. Ct. 296, 99° L.Ed. 718; United States v.
Jonikas; 7 Cir., 197 F. 2d 675, 676,' certiorari denied 344 U. 8. 877,
73 S. Ct. 171, 97 L. Bd. 679; Crow v. United States, 9 Cir. 186 F. 2d
704, 706 ; Barnes v. Hunter, 10 Cir:, 188 F*. 2d 86, 88, certiorari denied
342 U. S. 920, 72 S: Ct. 368, 96 L. Hd. 688; Kreuter v.-United States;
10 Cir., 201 F.2d 88, 35.

HM Rule 27.26 affords a prisoner a convenient means for a direct
attack on the judgment of conviction by motion in the original pro-
ceeding. The attack is governed by the general principles applicable
to habeas corpus proceedings within the grounds specified in Rule
27.26, which lie only where the sentence is void or otherwise subject
to collateral attack. Barnes v. Hunter, supra; Bloombaum y. United
States, 4 Cir., 211 F. 2d 944[1-3]; United States v. Walker, 132 F.
Supp. 482, 436[4-1] ; United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7[1,21;
State v. Freedman, Mo., 282 8. W. 2d 576, 580[1]; State ex rel. v,
Dobson, 135 Mo. 1, 12, 36 S. W. 238, 240; State ex rel. v. Blair, 357
Mo. 287, 208 8, W. 2a 268, 275(7].

‘Habeas corpus proceedings are, in nature, civil rather than
criminal proceedings (State ex rel. v. Nast, ‘209. Mo. ‘708, 731, 108
S. W. 568, 569; 39 C. J. S. 426, § 1; 25 Am. Jur. 151, § 12), as.are
writs of error coram nobis (24 C. J. S. 143, § 1606; 31 Am. Jur, 822, §
799). A writ of habeas corpus, while a writ of right, is not a writ of
course and properly issues only upon a showing of. probable cause.
Ex parte Tuvell, 301 Mo. 251, 256 S. .W. 463[1]; State ex rel. -v.
Swink, Mo. App., 256 S. W. 2d 825, 832[12, 13]; Barrett v. Hunter,
10 Cir., 180 F. 2d 510, 514[10]. [807] As to writs, of error coram
nobis, see State v. Wallace, 209 Mo. 358, 365, 108 S, W. 542, 543.

Appellant’s motion failed to state any fact and. the evidence
adduced failed to establish any ground upon which the court could
grant the relief prayed. :

The facts essential to establish the illegality involved in the
alleged ground for relief must be stated in the motion that the court,
in the words of Rule 27,26, may. determine from.an examination of
“the motion and the files and records of the case’? if notice should be
served on the prosecuting attorney and a hearing granted on the,
motion. A motion stating mere conclusions is insufficient. Ex parte
Tuvell, supra; Tucker v. Kaiser, Mo., 176 8. W. 2d 622, 623[2]; State
ex rel. v. Dobson, 135 Mo. 1, 7 et seq,, 36 8. W. 238, 239; United States
v. Sturm, 7 Cir., 180 F. 2d 413[2], certiorari denied, 339 U. 8.986, 70
8. Ct. 1008, 94 L, Ed, 1888; United States v. Fleenor, 7 Cir,, 177 F. 2d
482[4]; Walker v. United States, 7 Cir, 218 F. 2d 80, 81[5, 815
Yodock v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 307[10].

| | Groundless motions may be summarily disposed of, and trial
courts may enter findings and, conclusions of law to that effect. Con-
sult Adams v. United States, D.C. Cir., 222 F. 2d 45, 48, citing cases.

The gist of the appellant’s motion is that ‘‘new evidence’’
has been discovered. No allegation of the facts to be established by:the,
new evidence are to be found in the motion and the statements therein
to the effect that the new evidence would warrant setting aside the
judgment and vacating the sentence et cetera are mere conelusions,
and fail to state facts for the granting of ‘‘hearing on the, motion.’*

A hearing is not required when all issues are of law and can be deter-
mined by the record. Smith v. United States, 6 Cir., 213 F. 2d 730 (31;
Pettway v. United States, 6 Cir. 216 F. 2d 106[5).

Briefly of the insufficiency of the showing on the motion. Cstny
was tried and convicted in October, 1949. The principal fact Cerny,
sought to establish at the hearing on the motion was that one James
Lynch- admitted he had committed the crime for which Cemy had’
been tried and convicted. We assume he had some competent evi-
dence to that effect. Cerny first had this information in February,
1951, when Lynch stated to Cerny and others, while both were con-
fined in the penitentiary, that he, Lynch, and one Timberman, were
the perpetrators of said crime. ‘Alter being so informed, Cerny, who

had not appealed his conviction, sued out a writ of error, and, upon
application, was released from the penitentiary on bond May 28,
1951. Cerny’s conviction was affirmed on May 12, 1952, and, he was
returned to the penitentiary May 14, 1952. (The state established
Cerny’s guilt on the original trial and the sufficiency of the evidence
was not questioned by Cerny. 248 8. W. 2d Le, 845.) Although Lynch
made his statement to Cerny in February, 1951, Cerny did not file
the instant motion until October 31, 1953, more than three years (see
§ 541.200, RSMo 1949, VAMS) after the offense of December 4, 1948.
Cerny was represented by the same attorney at the trial in October,
1949, in the review of that trial in this court, and at the hearing on
thé instant motion. Cerny testified he talked to"his attorney two or
three times about the instant proceeding during his release from the
penitentiary on bond. He also sought-to show that the merchandise
taken (cigarettes) were of different brands than testified to at his
trial.

The ruling in Figueroa v. Saldana, 1 Cir., 23 F. 2d 327, 328, certi-
orari denied, 277 U. S. 574, 590, 48 S. Ct. 530, 72 L. Ed. 995, is appli-
cable here: ‘‘It is not now contended that any error was committed
in the trial of his case in the courts of Porto Rico, or that he was con-
victed without the due process guaranteed: by the Constitution of the
United States. The sole ground upon which the petition for the writ
of habeas corpus is based is the alleged confession by another party
that he committed the crime for [808] which the appellant i is serving
a sentence made after the’ petitioner had entered upon his term of
imprisonment. This might be urged as the proper subject for execu-
tive clemency, but it affords no basis for judicial action.’’ See also
Hauck v. Hiatt, 3 Cir., 141 F. 2d 812[2]; McGuire v. Hunter, 10 Cir.,
188 F, 2d 379, 881[7], 822 U. 8. 710, 64 S. Ct. 1053, 88 L. Ed. 1553;

* United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 12[5]; Sharpe v. Common-
wealth, 284 Ky. 88, 143 S. W. 2d 857, 858[2]; Powers v. State, 168
Miss: 541, 151 So. 730, 782[8-5] ; People v. Vernon, 9 Cal. App. 2d
138, 49 P. 2 326, 329[6].

In State v. Sadowski, Mo., 256 S. W. 753, 756[14,-15], we held a con-
fession by another that he and not defendant had committed the
offense was not for consideration. upon appeal unless properly pre-
served for judicial review in a motion for new trial and that such
newly discovered evidence should be presented for executive clem-
ency.

Neither habeas corpus (McKean v. Kemp, 338 Mo. 597, 92.8. W. 2d
141[1]; State ex rel. v. Dobson, 135 Mo. 1, 12, 36 S. W. 238, 241)
not a writ of error corain nobis (State v. Stanley, 225 Mo. 525, 582,
533, 125 S, W. 475, 477; Schoenhals v. Pahler, Mo., 257 8. W. 2d 662,
664 [1, 2]; Kings Tale Drainage Dist. v. ‘Winkelmoyer, 228 Mo. ‘App.
1102, 62 8. W. 2d 1101, 1103[1-5]; Griggs v. Venerable Sister Mary
Help of Christians, Mo, App., 238 S. W, 2d 8, 16[15-17]; Wagner v.

P|

Shelly, 240 Mo. App. 550, 210 S. W. 2d 394, 397[2, 3]) may be used
as a substitute for a motion for new trial on the ground of newly dis--
covered evidence of petitioner’s innocence.

“The judgment is affirmed. “Barrett and Stockard, OC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Boxuine, C., is adopted
as.the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Enten Dioxgrson, Respondent; y. Sr. Lovis Pustié Service Com-
+ PaNny, a Corporation, Appellant, No. 44705—286 8. W. (2d) 820:

Court en Banc, January 9, 1956.
Rehearing Denied, February’ 18, 1956.

Lloyd E. Boas and Robert EB. Staed for appellant. -

John T..Murphy, Jr., and Morris B. Kessler for respondent ; Joseph
Nessenfeld of counsel.

[822], BAGER, J- ig a suit 'f 2s for personal in-
juries. The trial resulted in a, verdict and j q intiff in
the sum of $7,500. On appeal td the St. Louis Court of Appeals the

judgment was reversed outright. That opinion appears at 271 8.W:
2d 201. The case was transferred-here by order of this: court under
the provisions of § 10, Art. V of the Missouri Constitution, 1945; it
is, therefore, here as though wpon an original appeal to this court.
The City of St. Louis was originally a defendant but a verdict was
directed for it, and no appeal was taken by the plaintiff from the
judgment [823] entered against the present appelldnt alone. The
basis of the ruling of the Court of Appeals will be shown and dis-
cussed hereinafter.

At about 8:00 A.M., on March 29, 1949, Ellen Dickerson was a
passenger on one of defendant’s buses on her way to work. The bus,
going south on Sarah Street, stopped at the Chouteau Avenue inter-
section, and then turned right or westward into Chouteau where there
was a regular bus stop. It was at this stop that plaintiff wished to
alight. The bus driver testified that the traffic on Sarah Street pre-
- vented him from making‘a ‘‘wide’’ turn into Chouteau, but that he
stopped with the front of his bus ‘‘up at’’ the-‘‘Bus Stop’’ sign.
One witness said the bus made a normal turn. It is clear that the bus
was stopped with its right side some distance from the north eurb of
Chouteau. This fact is material, so we note here that: plaintiff said
the distance was ‘‘about ten feet’’; a witness who helped measure
the distance immediately after the crash which ensued said it was
1114 feet; one passenger said about 9 feet, others much less; the
driver said 8 feet at the rear and 414 feet at the front; one witness
testified that the left side of the bus was within-about one foot of
the center of the street. In any event, when the bus stopped and the
doors were opened two men were waiting to get off ahead of. plaintiff
at the rear door; they had alighted, one had just walked to the curb,
and plaintiff was still on the top step when the bus was struck violently
from behind by a city street flushing truck, at about its center, and
knocked several feet, more or less straight west. Plaintiff was thrown
into the street by the impact, alighting on the: lower part of her
back with her right arm apparently under her and her feet toward
the bus. She was picked up, taken to the curb, and rested there until
police officers and an ambulance came, Her injuries will be described
later. The driver testified that people were also getting off at the
front door of the bus. There were no cars parked along the north
curb of Chouteau for 250 feet from the corner. The distance of the
rear of the ‘bus from the corner was variously estimated at from 8 to
60 feet. The time which elapsed between the stopping of the bus
and the impact was variously estimated at ‘‘about 2 seconds’? or
longer by the plaintiff, 15-20 seconds by the bus driver, and ‘‘around
20 seconds’’ by a passenger.

The driver of the city truck (going west on Chouteau) testified:
that it was.an old model Mack truck; that he slowed at the Sarah in-
tersection and shifted gears, saw the bus making a righthand turn,

and proceeded on across the intersection; after he crossed he shifted
back from third to fourth gear, necessarily looking down momentarily
as he did so; at that time the bus appeared to be moving straight
westwardly; as he looked up again, and moving at 10-15. miles per
hour, he saw the bus stopped about 10-15 feet ahead of him and.about
10 feet out from the curb, practically. in the line in which he’ was
traveling; that its left wheels were across the south rail of the west-
bound street car track; that he immediately put his foot on the brake,
but had not succeeded in making a ‘‘full application’’ of the brakes:
by the time of the collision, and that he struck the bus about 60 feet.
west of Sarah Street, at a speed of about 12-15 miles per hour; that
the crash was violent and loud; that the truck was not quite as wide.
as the bus; that he did not swerve the truck nor attempt to use the
emergency brake. There was testimony from this witness on cross-
examination in the nature of estimates or guesses (without actual.
tests) that he thought he could stop the truck in 9-10 feet at'a speed of
12-15 miles per hour. The truck driver was plaintift’s witness. This
driver and his supervisor measured the distance of the bus from the
eurb after the collision as 1144 feet. There was’ evidence that the
bus came to a ‘‘normal’’ stop, except for its position. Some of the’
other passengers on the bus were shaken up rather violently, and the
bus driver testified that several went: to the hospital. Plaintiff
offered in evidence an ordinance of the City of St. Louis providing
that ‘‘no person except in an emergency or to allow another vehicle
to cross its path [824] shall stop a vehicle in any street except near
the right-hand curb * * *.”’ The theory upon which a verdict was
directed for the city was that it was, at the time, performing a govern-
mental function.

On these facts the Court of Appeals held that the ‘negligence of
the driver of the city truck constituted an ‘‘intervening efficient and
proximate cause’’ which broke the chain of events, and rendered any
negligence of the bus driver too remote to operate as a proximate
cause We disagree for the reasons stated herein. In this matter ques-
tions of proximate cause and efficient, intervening cause are insepar-
ably interwoven. They are not easy of solution, and we repeat the oft-
used principle that in this determination each case must stand on its
own individual facts; the final result boils down largely to a construc-"
tion of the evidentiary situation.

Generally, we may say that an efficient, intervening cause
is a new and independent force which so interrupts the chain of
events as to become the responsible, direct, proximate and im-
mediate cause of the injury. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 111, pp. 685-
691; Hogan v. Fleming, 317 Mo. 524, 297 S.W. 404; but it may
not consist merely of an act of concurring or contributing negligence.
(id.) Such definitions are often somewhat difficult to apply. Indeed
it has been said that an intervening cause is merely: proximate cause:

flowing from a source not connected with the defendant. Shearman
& Redfield on Negligence, (Rev. Ed.) § 37, p. 99. The picture becomes
clearer when -we consider-the practical test of proximate cause. A
proximate cause is generally considered to be that cause or act (as of
negligence) of which the injury was the natural and probable con-
sequence.. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, (Rev. Hd.) § 55, p.
94; Gray v. Kurn, 345 Mo, 1027, 187 8.W. 2d 558; Snyder v. Jensen,
Mo., 881 §.W. 2d 802, Thus, from the essential meaning of proximate
cause arises the principle that.in order for an act to constitute the
proximate. cause of an injury, some injury, if not the precise one in:
question, must have been reasonably foreseeable. If some injury is
reasonably to be anticipated or is. reasonably probable as a result of.
the defendant’s act of negligence, then the added act of a third
person, though he also be negligent, does not break the chain of.
causation and defendant is liable; in such event the act of the.third
person is mere concurring negligence. See generally: Shearman &
Redfield, supra, pp. 101-103; Snyder v. Jensen, Mo., 281 8.W. 2d 802;
Floyd.v. St. Louis Public Service Co.; 280 S.W. 2d 74; Cox v. Wrinkle,
Mo., 267 S.W. 2d 648; Champieux v. Miller, Mo.; 255 8.W. 2d 794;
Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 357 Mo: 808, 211 S.W.
2d 35. In this situation (if defendant was guilty of negligence) we,
therefore, arrived at the relatively simple question: could defendant’s
driver reasonably anticipate that some injury to one or more passengers
was probable when he-stopped the bus where he did? :

‘We may say here very briefly that on this evidence a clearly
submissible case of negligence was made against defendant, both
under the ordinance and the common law. Plaintiff was entitled to
the most favorable view of the evidence, and one could hardly deny
that the stopping of a bus 10 to 1114 feet from the curb for dis-
charging passengers on:a‘busy city street was a thing which somé
reasonable-minds might consider a hazardous thing to do; nor do we
think that: 10-1114 feet out was ‘‘near the curb’’ as required by the
ordinance; no émergency is claimed. No explanation was made as to
why the driver could-not have driven on further down Chouteau to
pull in to the-eurb, with no cars parked for 250 feet. The violation of
an ordinance is, of course, negligence per se. Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs:
Realty. Co., Mo., 269 S.W. 2d 761, and eases cited.

Hi Having thus determined that there was, at least, a submissible
issue-on defendant’s negligence, we must decide whether the driver,
at the time of stopping ashe did, could have reasonably foreseen or
anticipated. some probable injury to his passengers from so doing.
He was, of course, held to the exercise of the highest [825] degree of
care. Many of the cases cited and to be cited herein hold that it is not
necessary to show that he should have anticipated the precise injury
which occurred. While there is no Missouri case on these precise
facts-the following cases present somewhat analogous situations in

which the liability. of the original negligent party was upheld; in
other words, where the act of the defendant was held to be a proximate
cause; since he might reasonably have anticipated that: some.injury:
might ensue. Floyd v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo.; 280°S:W.
2a 74; Matthews v. Mound City Cab' Co.,-Mo. App., .205’°S.W. 2d
243; Snyder-v. Jensen, Mo., 281 S.W. 2d 802; Cox-v.- Wrinkle, Mo:,
267 S.W. 2d 648; Champieux v, Miller, Mo.,-255 S.W. 2d 794; Berry.
v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 357 Mo. 808, 211:..S.W:.2d:35;
Domitz v. Springfield Bottlers, 359 Mo. 412; 221 §.W. 24831; .Wood
v. St. Louis Public’ Service Co., (Banc), 362 Mo. 1103, 246 S.W.. 2d-
807; Cade v. A.T. & S.F. Ry., 364 Mo. 620, 265-S.W. 2d 366; Me-
Closkey v. Renne, 225 Mo. App, 810, 37 8.W..2d 950; Jackson... City:
of Malden, Mo. App., 72 8.W. 2d 850; Byars.v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., 334 Mo. 278,66 S.W. 2d 894; Creech v. Riss & Co., Mo., 283 8.W.:
2a 554; Zuber v: Clarkson Construction Co., 863 Mo. 362, 251-5: W.
2d 52. It would be impossible to discuss all thése cases factually with-
in a reasonable compass. One (Matthews) -involved: the: sudden
stopping of a cab in the traffic lane-of-a city street; others (Cox and
Champieux) involved parking on highways; Floyd, MéCloskey. and.
Jackson involved. the improper parking of trucks on. city. streets;
Domitz- involved obstruction of the view of an intersection by the
parking of two large vans; most, if not all, of those cases involved
eoneurrent negligence of two or more persons. These cases illustrate
the application of the doctrine of proximate cause'under somewhat
analogous situations, particularly including the element of reasonable
foreseeability. ‘Perhaps the nearest in point on the facts.are the Floyd,
Matthews and McCloskey cases,.swpra. In: some of these cases injury.
was even less to be anticipated than in ours; as in the Floyd case; in
others the difference is only one of degree,.as'in the cases involving
stopping on a highway, or the suddenness of .a stop ona city street.
We do not disagree with the Court of Appeals on its statethents of the
law, but only upon the application of the-law to these facts:
Counsel for defendant cite sundry cases on the questions of: inter-.
vening cause and proximate cause; among these are: DeMoss v
Kansas City Railways Co., 296 Mo. 526, 246 S.-W. 566; Madden v.: ~
Red Line Service, Mo: App., 76 S.W. 2d 435; Wright -v. K.C.. Struc
tural’ Steel Co.; 236 Mo. App. 872, 157 S.W. 2d 582;‘and Smith wy
Mabrey, 348 Mo. 644, 154 S.W. 2d 770. We have considered: these
eases and do not believe that the principles of law announced: there
differ-from those we have expressed. The factual situations.all differ,
of course, and while it may plausibly be argued that the cases:so cited.
should be persuasive here, we have concluded that-the trend and.
meaning of all the Missouri decisions is more consonant with: a‘holding:
of proximate causation on the part of defendant hére; we-do so: hold.
In that connection we note that: according to the evidence-niost. favor-.
able to plaintiff the bus stopped with its left side near: the middle of

the street and thus ‘completely obstructing the main traffic lane; that
the driver should reasonably have considered the probability of injury,
not’ only from careful drivers of other vehicles, but from negligent
ones (Champieux v. Miller, Mo., 255 8.W. 2d 794; Snyder v. Jensen,
Mo., 281 S.W. 2d 802; Cox v. Wrinkle, Mo., 267 S.W. 2d 648) unless
the ‘act of the other driver was so ‘‘extraordinary’’ as not to be
reasonably foreseeable (id.). Indeed, even a criminal act has been
held not to constitute -an independent, intervening cause. Gaines v.
Property Servicing Co., Mo,, 276 S.W. 2d 169. Here, certainly, the
driver need not have contemplated the precise thing which occurred
(Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 857 Mo. 808, 211 S.W.
2d 35, and other cases cited) but he might well have considered, for
instance, the danger-of injury to alighting passengers by other vehicles
swerving to the right to miss the bus, [826] and perhaps other con-
tingencies. We need not discuss the extent of the negligence of the
driver of the city truck; we may assume that he was negligent to
some extent but, under all the evidence, reasonable minds certainly
might differ as to whether his action was so ‘‘extraordinary’’ as to be
éntirely outside of any reasonable anticipation. Counsel argue that.
the bus had been stopped long enough for the driver of any other
vehicle to see it; the most favorable testimony for plaintiff on this
was ‘‘about two seconds’’; the driver of the bus said 15-20 seconds
and other versions differed. There was rather clear evidence that it
had been stopped just long enough for one passenger to alight and
walk 10-11 feet’ to the curb. But, again we note that so long as pas-
sengers were alighting and walking in the street some danger existed,
and the time element becomes less important. Defendant’s duty to
exercise the highest degree of care for the protection of all its passen-
gers continued throughout the unloading process (Gott v. K.C. Rail-
ways, Mo., 222 8.W. 827) and if it was negligent in stopping the bus
where it did, its negligence continued to the time of the impact. The
argument of defendant’s counsel to the effect that the collision would
still have occurred had the bus been parked within a foot or two of the
eurb is too speculative for consideration here; the evidence does not
even show the width of the city truck. Usually, of course, the question
of proximate causé (either sole or concurring) is a jury question.
Cox v: Wrinkle, Mo., 267 S.W. 2d 648; Floyd v. St. Louis Public
Service-Co., Mo., 280 S.W. 2d 74. -We hold that it was such here, and
that defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was properly overruled.

Hl This necessarily brings us to a consideration of the specific.
errors now urged by defendant. First, it contends that it was error
to permit Dr. Cohen, one of plaintiff’s attending physicians, to testify
that plaintiff was ‘‘perfectly honest’’ about. her symptoms and ‘‘not
feigning anything.”’ As to the latter question, there was no objection
at all, and as to the first, the objection (if sufficient in form) came
after the answer and there was no motion to strike. Corsidered more

broadly, however, we find that the questions followed questions by
defendant’s counsel to this witness asking if ‘‘some people are able to
feign that sometimes’’ (i.e. pain, wincing, etc.), and to Dr. Wenner-
man, another attending physician, asking if ‘‘sometimes those things
can be feigned.’’ Both of those questions were answered generally in
the affirmative. Certainly plaintift’s counsel was entitled to interro-
gate Dr. Cohen on re-direct.as to whether, in his opinion, the plaintiff
was in fact ‘‘feigning’’; the question as to whether he believed she
was ‘‘perfecily honest,’’ considered in its context, could only have
reference to the likelihood of ‘‘feigning,’’ and we think it.was so
understood. The question could perhaps have been better worded, but,
under the circumstances, this was not reversible error. And see Eick-
mann vy. St. Louis Publie Service Co., 363 Mo. 651, 253 S.W. 2d 122.

HM The next assignment is of error in excluding the report of
a supposed physical examination of plaintiff. According to a state-
ment of defendant’s trial counsel, he had subpoenaed ‘‘the entire
employment and medical record’? of plaintiff froni her last employer.
The papers were produced ‘by a witness. whose capacity was not
shown; they were.not offered in evidence as.a whole, but on specific
inquiries the witness-read the dates of employment and termination,
the reason for leaving, notation of a lay-off, comments on plaintiff’s
skill, attention, ete., all without objection, The witness. stated that
the papers or file were the complete employment record of plaintiff,
and (immediately following the above) that ‘the record’’ was one kept
in the ordinary course of business. This witness was asked no ques-
tions concerning a physical examination of plaintiff. Counsel: then
offered to read a supposed report of a physical examination of plain-
tiff which he stated was in the employment file and signed by one
“Martin F. Kouri’’ (wholly unidentified) and which, among other
things, stated under ‘‘Remarks’’: ‘‘Low back ‘injury. 3-29-49. Re-
covery about complete.’’ To this offer plaintiff’s counsel objected on
the [827] ground that the tendered evidence was hearsay and incom-
petent for any purpose. The -court sustained the objection. There-
after counsel for plaintiff cross-examined the witness concerning
plaintiff’s pay-rate and salary and her failure to receive any salary
for one week. These questions in no way involved the supposed
physical examination.

Defendant insists that because there was no objection to the records
as a whole,‘and because of the cross-examination, this’ report should
have been received in evidence, citing Dorn v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., Mo: App., 250 S.W. 2d 859, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 774. These
and similar authorities are based either on the theory that the whole
of a book, document or record has already been offered and received
in evidence, or that one party has been permitted to offer previously,
without objection, evidence of the same type or character.’ The latter
limitation is shown in the Dorn opinion at 250°8.W. 24.1. ¢. 866, The

rule (or rules) and its limitations is discussed at.some length in Wig-
more‘on Bvidence, (8rd Ed.) Vol. 1, pp. 304 et seg.; and see also,
Longmire.v.-Diagraph-Bradley Stencil Machine Corp., Mo. App.; 176
S.W.. 24-685, 1c, 646-7. “Much discretion rests in the trial court in
such matters. C.J.S., Evidence, § 190, p. 914. We do not think
that an unidentified report of a physical examination. (with its sup-
posed history) is so clearly evidence of the same character as. pay-
rates, period of employment, ‘etc.,-as to make the rule applicable here.
And the principle,.it seems, should only be applied to prevent ‘‘plain
prejudice’? (Wigmore, supra.) It does not seem that plaintiff here led
the defendant into any ambush by a failure to object...Defendant: has
not: briefed the question as to whether the so-called report of physical
examination was admissible under the Business Records Act, § 490.680,
RSMo 1949,:V.A.MS.; to say the least, however, it is doubtful that
it was admissible as such, for lack of.a sufficient showing of the
elements: required.: Kraus v. K.C. Public Service Co.,.Mo., 269 S.W.
2a: 743.; Conser v. A.T. & S.F. Ry., Mo, 266 S.W. 2d 587; Gray -v. St.
L. & S.F. Ry:, 863 Mo. 864, 254 S.W. 2d 577, And the court is ex-
pressly given-much discretion under the very wording of that statute.
We hold that the éxelusion of this evidence was not error.

HH Defendant insists that Instructions 1 and 2 given on behalf
of plaintiff were prejudicially erroneous; the first of these set out the
substarice of the ordinance requiring” vehicles to be stopped ‘‘near the
tight-hand curb,’’ and further submitted: that if the jury found that
the bus.was stopped approximately 10 feet from the curb for the pur:
pose of unloading passengers, such constituted negligence; and ‘that
if the jury further found (here hypothesizing briefly the fact of the
collision) that defendant’s negligence, if any, ‘‘directly contributed
and concurred’’ with the negligence of the driver of the truck, if any,
in. causing ‘plaintiff’s. injuries, then plaintiff should recover. The
principal complaints-of this instruction are that it assumes that 10
feet away is not ‘‘near the curb”’ and ‘that such constitutes negligence,
that it ignores the fact’ that ‘‘near the curb’’ means only as near as
practicable, and that it does not properly require the jury -to find
that-a violation of thé ordinance was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s
injuries.. Counsel also insist that the violation of the ordinance could
not have been the proximate cause because of the efficient, intervening
eause-shown by plaintiff’s‘own evidence.. We have already ruled on the
substance of this latter contention. Under all the evidence here we
think that-there was really no substantial doubt that 10 feet was not
“near the curb’’; the only real question was whether the bus was
stopped 10 or 11 feet from the curb or approximately 2 to 4 feet from
the ‘curb; it is unnecessary to decide here whether in other situations
the phrase ‘‘near ‘the curb’? might mean as near ‘‘as practicable,’’
for, regardless of: any supposed difficulty in making the tum, this
driver had-250.feet of clear curb line-in which to get ‘‘near the curb’”

moreover, hé testified that he did in fact stop the-rear of the bus.3 feet
from the curb and the front 434 feet from the curb; this would seem
to [828] show that, on his own theory, 10 feet was not as near ‘‘as
practicable.’? We hold that stopping the bus 10 feet or more from the
curb under these circumstances, which spot was directly in the main
line of traffic, was a violation of the ordinance, and that the jury
might properly be so instructed, See Jones’v. Central States Oil Co.;
350 Mo. 91, 164 8.W. 2d 914, 919-920; Benoist v. Driveaway Co., Mo.
App., 122 8.W. 2d 86, 90; Gaines v. Property Servicing Co., Mo., 276
S.W.: 2d 169. The violation of an ordinance is per se negligence, as
heretofore noted, The- submission of causal connection, though some-
what abbreviated, we hold sufficient. Defendant’s: negligence need
only be a proximate cause, and not ‘necessarily the sole proximate
cause. Gaines v. Property Servicing Co., Mo., 276 S.W: 2d 169; Floyd:
v. St. Louis Public Service Co. Mo., 280 °S.W. 2d 74; Byars v.
St. Louis Public Service’ Co., 384 Mo.- 278, 66 S.W. 24 894. In the
ease of Domitz v. Springfield Bottlers, 359 Mo. 412, 221 8.W. 2d 831,
this court said that the phrase ‘‘directly contributed to’’ was equiva-
lent to proximate cause, quoting from another opinion which construed
the term as negativing any independent, intervening cause; ‘and see
Gaines v. Property Servicing Co., Mo., 276.8.W. 24 169, 175. We-think
that on these facts the submission of proximate cause sufficiently nega-
tived the defense of an intervening. cause (including the ‘element-of
anticipation) and that if defendant wished a specific instruction on that
defense it should have requested one. .It did ask-for and receive a very
complete instruction on sole cause, and perhaps did not wish an
inference of its own negligence which. the other instruction might
have raised. We do not.regard this instruction as a model, but hold
that it did not constitute reversible error.

Hl Instruction No. 2 submitted common law negligence in stopping
the bus approximately 10 feet from the curb, if the jury so found,
upon the theory that the jury might find that such was not a.reason-
ably: safe place to discharge passengers, and that such act might be
thus found to constitute negligence; it hypothesized the collision and
submitted the question of causation substantially as in Instruction:
No.1. The point now made that the submission was defective on the
question of causation ‘has already been covered. The remaining ob-
jections are that the instruction failed to hypothesize the negligence
of the driver of the truck, as shown by plaintiff’s own evidence,-and
that generally the instruction was a ‘‘toving commission.’’ Cases are
cited to the effect that complicated, factual situations shown in evi-
dence may not be ignored (Ferdente v. St. Louis Public. Service Co.,
Mo., 247 8.W. 2d'778) and generally that the facts must ‘be hypoth-
esized (Yates v. Manchester, 858 Mo. 894, 217 S.W.-2d 541, and
other cases). We need not quarrel with the principles announced.
Mucli has since been said and written about the Yates opinion, and’

we note here particularly the cases of Hooper v. Conrad, 364 Mo. 176,
260 S.W. 2d 496, and Knight v. Richey, 863 Mo, 298, 250 S.W. 2a
972. The gist of the later opinions is that only those facts essential
to a finding need be hypothesized, and these, of course,. vary. in
every case; more is required in a case where there are “‘two or
more divergent sets of essential facts.’’ In this case we do not feel
that the details of the truck driver’s supposed negligence were es-
sential, because defendant could be held liable under the authorities
already cited, whether he was in.fact negligent or not. Moreover,
defendant fully hypothesized his alleged negligence in its sole-cause
instruction which was not in conflict with the present instruction. We
note here that defendant’s liability is not based alone on the danger
of a collision with that particular truck, but upon the probability of
any injury to its passengers. The only. fact which was claimed to
make the place of stopping unsafe was the distance of the bus from
the curb, and this was sufficiently hypothesized.. We think that the
“‘eonnection’’ between the stopping of the bus in the main traffic
Jane and the collision was hardly a controverted issue at the trial. In
this instruction the jury was specifically required to find that defend-
ant’s acts constituted negligence. We hold that the instruction ‘was
not prejudicially erroneous.

| | [829] The last contention of defendant is that, the verdict was
excessive, Its amount was $7,500. The age of plaintiff is not stated,
but she was a British ‘‘war-bride’’ and apparently was comparatively
young. Her prior health was relatively normal. The evidence is un-
controverted that, in addition to various bruises, minor injuries,
‘headaches and shock, she sustained: a strain of the lower back, an
injury to the coccyx which at the time of trial was thought ta be
permanent, at least without an operation ; some vaginal bleeding, pain
in both sides for about two years (apparently connected with the
female organs) and pain and weakness in her right arm for-a long
period with a remaining weakness in it to the time of trial; she had
no fractures; her principal complaint at the time of trial was a con-
tinuing ‘‘dull, throbbing pain’’ in the region of the coccyx (or end of
the spine) which bothers her ‘‘every day,’’ and which ‘‘hasn’t gotten
any better.’? The probable result of an operation for this was shown
to be somewhat’ conjectural. Plaintiff was attended by three physi-
cians, two of whom testified. She had been examined by physicians
for defendant but none of them testified. She actually lost only
three weeks’ work, but testified that her work thereafter was accom-
panied by much discomfort and pain, We have examined the. cases
cited on this point by defendant, but they are of little assistance,
since they necessarily involve materially different facts; in three of
the six cases.cited the verdict of the jury was-not reduced and ap-
-parently those ‘cases are cited as showing what other juries awarded.
That cannot. be persuasive here. We cannot say that, on these facts,

the verdict is so excessive as to require a remittitur; we cannot say
that’ any ‘‘injustice * * * is manifest’? (Arl v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., Mo. App., 243 S.W. 2d 797, 800, one of the cases cited by
defendant) from the size of this verdict. We do not consider, as
counsel suggest, that plaintift’s injuries were ‘‘minor’’ and ‘“‘created
no disability whatever.’”” We may compare this case in some respects
to that of Williams y. Illinois Cent. RR Co., 360 Mo. 501, 229 S.W.
2d 1, where a verdict reduced to $7,500 was allowed to stand.

The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. It is so ordered.
The opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals shown at 271 S.W. 24
201 is quashed. All concur.

GRayBaR ELECTRIC Company, Inc., Appellant, v. AUTOMOTIVE,
Perroteum & ‘Auuiep [ypusrrms Emptoynrs Union, Locan 618,
et al., Respondents, No. 44192—287 S. W. (2d) 794.

Court en Bane, February 18, 1956.
Rehearing Denied, March 12, 1956,

David F. Crossen, s H. Spoehrer and Victor B. Harris for
appellant. ‘ . .

‘mbruster for respondents ;
v of counsel. :

. [795]. HOLLIN' RTH, J.—Plaintift has appealed from a
judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis dismi i

action against Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Industries Employees:
Union, Local 618, and its officials to enjoin alleged unlawful picketing
of plaintiff ’s business premises and for compensatory and exemplary
damages in the aggregate sum of $550,000.

Plaintiff is a wholesale distributor of electrical products. It is
engaged in interstate commerce and is subject to the provisions “éf
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A! § 141 et
seq. Its plant is located at 2642 Washington Avenue, St. Louis,
where an office force ‘of 120 persons ‘and a warehouse force. of 15
persons are regularly employed, Deféridant union, Local 618, is’ an
unincorporated affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Tea:
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of “America, A. F. of L.
The individual defendants are its principal officers and are made
parties both in’ their official capacities and as “individuals, being’
sufficiently representative of the. cliss of which they are members.
No employee of plaintiff is a member of Local 618 and no claim is
made that any of them ever has been or has expri essed any desire to
be a member thereof.

After unsuegessful attempts to organize plaintiff’ 's warehousemen,
defendants began picketing’ plaintiff’s ‘premises on .May 14, 1952.
Plaintiff thereupon petitioned ‘the National Labor Relations Board
for investigation and certification of representatives and was’ advised
that no claim ‘of representation was made by the union and that the,
Board had no jurisdiction to determine any question of representa-
tion.

Prior to June 12, 1952, plaintiff bad received no communication
whatever from defendants. Ori that, date,.in response to [796].
written inquiry from plaintiff, defendant union, ‘by letter advised
plaintiff as follows:

“This labor organization has established a "picket line at the
premises of your company and we desire to advise you of the objects
and purposes for which such picketing is being conducted and of our.
attitude and policy with respect to various cordllary matters that.
may arise in the course thereof. .

“ According to information. available, to. us, a ‘majority of .the
employees of your concern are not members of this labor: organization..
We are interested in persuading those employees, if possible, and,
by the use of lawful means only, to apply for membership in our.
Local Union. ia

“In connection with the efforts. of our Union ‘te persuade such
employees to make application for membership, we have found that:
public opinion plays a very important role.. That is to say, if the
employees of an eraployer come to the conclusion that the public (con-
stituting their customers) prefers to patronize them as union mem:.

bers, such employees more readily respond to the request of a Union
to become members, * * * *
anaes

«# * * * This Union is not making any demand at this.time
upon your Company or its management to execute or agree to any
contract with our Union covering any of your said employees.
ee REDD

This suit was brought on June 18, 1952, on which date the trial
court issued a restraining order against further picketing of plain-
tiff’s premises and an order on defendants to show cause why a
temporary injunction should not be issued. Plaintiff’s amended
petition alleged, as grounds for temporary and, upon final hearing,
permanent injunction: that no labor dispute existed between plain-
tiff and the union or any of plaintiff’s employees; that defendants
“are maintaining continuous picketing of plaintift’s premises for the
purpose of preventing deliveries to and from said premises so that
plaintiff will be coerced into recognizing said Local 618 as a repre-
sentative of its employees, in violation of said Labor Management
Relations Act and of Section 29, Article 1, of the Constitution of
the State of Missouri’’; that the pickets “are stopping all persons
who approach plaintiff’s premises and requesting them not to deal
with plaintiff; are seeking to and in fact succeeding in stopping de-
liveries to plaintiff; are advising plaintiff’s customers * * * and
trucking companies * * * that no deliveries should be made because
of the aforesaid picketing’’; and that unless restrained said picketing
will cause plaintiff irreparable loss and now has reduced plaintiff’s
business to the extent of $116,000.

The joint answer of defendants denied the aforesaid allegations
and affirmatively alleged, among other things: that the picketing
was for the lawful purpose of informing the public that plaintiff’s
employees were non-union, thereby to persuade the general public
to patronize similar business enterprises that were union, and
thereby to persuade plaintiff’s employees of the desirability of
unionism; that to deny defendants the right to picket plaintiff’s
premises would deny them the right of free speech in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States and Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of Missouri and
the right to engage in organizational activities in violation of Article
I, Section 29, of said Constitution of Missouri.

Defendants’ joint answer further affirmatively alleged that the
facts pleaded by plaintiff, if true, constitute a violation of Sections
157 and 158 (a) (1) and (3) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947; that Section 160 of said Act provides the means whereby
the acts alleged may be restrained in the Federal Courts and that
the means so provided in the Act are exclusive; that Congress, by said

Act, pre-empted the field of such disputes and that the courts of Mis-
souri are without jurisdiction in the premises.

[797] Upon trial of the case, it was agreed that damage counts
pleaded in both the petition and answer would be deferred until
final disposition of the issue of plaintiff’s right to injunctive relief.

Plaintiff’s evidence will be briefly stated. (Italiciséd language
appearing throughout this opinion indicates our emphasis unless
otherwise specified.)

“The picketing consisted of a single picket walking along the
sidewalk in front of the motor vehicle entrance ‘to plaintiff’s ware-
house and carrying an umbrella with the word ‘‘TEAMSTERS” in
capital letters and the word ‘‘NON-UNION”’ in larger letters; one
umbrella also had thereon the additional words, ‘‘This company does
not employ members of Teamsters Local 618’’; another the additional
words, ‘‘Not under contract with Teamsters Local 618’’. The
picketing was at all times entirely peaceful.

Plaintiff leases three trucks from Lueking Transfer Company
which bear plaintiff’s name but are operated by Lueking employees
who work for plaintiff on a permanent basis. Said employees are mem-
bers of Local 600, another affiliate of Teamsters Union. These trucks
are used by plaintiff exclusively for city deliveries. After the picket-
ing started, the Luecking drivers refused to cross the picket line.
This was likewise true as to other truck drivers with incoming and
outgoing freight. At first, the picketing began about 7:30 a.m. and
continued to about 5:30 p.m. In order to avoid the picket line, the
Lueking drivers, at the direction of plaintiff, would arrive at 6:00
a.m., load their trucks and return after the picket went off duty.
Later’ the picketing hours were lengthened and arrivals and de-
partures of trucks were changed accordingly. This resulted in the
picketing going on an around-the-clock basis. Thereafter no deliveries
were made to or from plaintiff’s premises by the regular truckers
or Lueking drivers. The employees of some fifty of the trucking
companies that customarily made deliveries to and for plaintiff,
although advised that there was no strike at plaintiff’s premises and
no labor dispute of any kind with its employees, refused to make de-
liveries because of the picketing. Numerous notices given to plaintiff _
by such trucking companies as to failure to make deliveries to plain-
tiff of merchandise in their possession and consigned to plaintiff were
received ini evidence. These notices recited, in substance, that the
refusals to deliver were due to a ‘“‘strike’’ at plaintiff’s place of
business. One of the pickets at plaintiff’s premises stated: ‘‘I turned
back twelve trucks this morning.’’ On another oceasion one of the
pickets was heard to say to a driver: ‘‘Can’t you see we are picketing
this place? You are not supposed to go in there.’’

By using a warehouse operated by Lueking and some of plaintiff’s
own warehouse employees, plaintiff -was enabled to maintain its

city deliveries tg a limited extent. But such deliveries were always
late, which resulted in extensive cancellations of orders, amounting
to, a reduction in plaintiff’s business. during the first fifteen days
of picketing in the sum of $58,000. Defendants agreed that plaintift’s
losses were sufficient to justify injunctive relief if it was otherwise
entitled to it...

At the close of. plaintiff’s evidence in chief, defendants orally
moved for a dismissal of the petition, ‘‘in the nature of an oral motion
for a directed verdict’’, which motion the court took under advise-
ment, it being understood that if the court denied, the motion de-
fendants thereafter would present their evidence. ‘

On June-23, 1958, the parties, in open court, stipulated:

“1 That subsequent to the close of plaintiff’s case, and on
December 9, 1952, plaintiff filed unfair labor practice charges against
defendants with the Fourteenth Region of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board in Case No. 14-CB- 180, said charges alleging that .de-
fendants.have been and are engaging in unfair labor practices with-
in the meaning of Section (8b) subsections (1) (A) and (2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, based upon the following
alleged acts and conduct:

[798] .‘‘‘On or about May 14, 1952 and at all times sinee that
date in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act said organization by
its agents, officers and repnesentatives, has attempted to cause the
Graybar Electric Company, Inc. to' discriminate against its employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(8)-of the Act by picketing for the pur-
pose of forcing said employer to coerce and restrain its employees in
the exercise of their rights as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.

“Further, in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act,
continuously from May 14, 1952 said labor organization has by
its, officers,. agents and -representatives unlawfully coerced and
restrained the employees of Graybar Electric Company, Inc. in the
exercise of their rights as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act in that
said labor organization has picketed for the purpose of coercing said
employees in their right to join or not join a labor organization and
has restrained said employees by that picketing in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed to them by. Section.7 of the Act.’

2, That subsequent to the filing of the unfair labor practice
charges as aforesaid; .the. Regional Director for ‘the Fourteenth
Region of the National Labor Relations Board made-an investigation
of said charges and refused to issue a complaint. in connection there-
with.

“3. That plaintiff duly appealed “from the ruling of said Regional
Director. [refusing?] to.issue said complaint to the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board in Washington, D.C.

“4. That on the 21st day of April, 19538, the General Counsel
for the National Labor Relations, Board issued his ruling and de-

.cision in connection with said appeal i in words and figures as follows,
to-wit:

“Your appeal from the Regional Director’ 's refusal to issue
a complaint in the above captioned case, charging a violation of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor- Relations Act, has
been duly considered by the General Counsel.

“««The General Counsel sustains the ruling of the Regional
Director. Like the Regional Director, the General Counsel concludes
that there is insufficient evidence to warrant further proceedings.’ ’’

Defendants’ motion to dismiss thereafter was sustained by the
trial court and judgment was entered for defendants, from which,
as stated, plaintiff appealed. The cause théreafter was argued in
-Division One of this Court, but disposition was withheld pending de-
cision of the case of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., in the Supreme
Court of the United States. In the meantime, "the casé of Garner v.
‘Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 776, 346 U.S. 485, 14
S.Ct, 161, 98 L.Ed. 228, was decided by the Supreme Court of’ the
United’ States. Following the decision of the Weber case in said
Court in March, 1955, 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 386, this
case, of our own motion, was-transferred to Banc, where it was again
briefed and on September 27, 1955, orally argued and submitted.

Hl Both parties say the Garner and Weber cases are decisive
of the question of whether the State Court in which instant case was
tried or the Natiorial Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has jurisdic-
tion of the controversy here involved. The difficulty is, however, that
the parties are diametrically opposed as to which of the aforesaid
tribunals the Garner and Weber cases declare to be vested with
jurisdiction; plaintiff asserting that an analysis of the decisions
shows it would be error. to deny state jurisdiction ; defendants
,asserting the decisions determine that the NLRB is vested with ex-
clusive primary jurisdiction to hear the controversy and that it
has investigated the charges and found them without merit, thereby
sanctioning the picketing as lawful (protected) picketiig under the
federal Act.

In the Garner case, certain trucking business operators sought to
enjoin the union from picketing on the ground that the purpose
thereof was to coerce operators into violating a Pennsylvania statute
(quite sitiilar in substance to pértinent provisions [799] of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947) forbidding employers to en-
courage or discourage membership in a labor organization by dis-
crimination in hiring, tenure of employment, or any condition of
employment. The trial court entered a decree restraining the picket-
ing. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on the ground the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29-U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., ‘“‘pre-
eluded any State action by way of a different or additional remedy
for the correction of the identical grievance.’ 873 Pa. 19; 94 A. 2d

893, The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.
Justice Jackson, affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, and in doing so made, among others, the following
observations:

“The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth held, quite correctly,
we think, that petitioners’ grievance fell within the jurisdiction of
the Nation Labor Relations Board to prevent unfair labor practices.
It therefore inferred that state remedies were precluded. ** * *

wean

“Congress has taken in hand this particular type of controversy
where it affects interstate commerce. In language almost identical
to parts of the Pennsylvania statute, it has forbidden labor unions to
exert certain types of coercion on employees through the medium of
the employer. It is not necessary or appropriate for us to surmise
how the National Labor Relations Board might have decided this
controversy had petitioners presented it to that body. The power and
duty of primary decision lies with the Board, not with us. But it is
clear that the Board was vested with power to entertain petitioners’
grievance, to issue its own complaint against respondents and, pend-
ing final hearing, to seek from the United States District Court an
injunction to prevent irreparable injury to petitioners while their
case was being considered. The question then is whether the State,
through its courts, may adjudge the same controversy and extend
its own form of relief.

“Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to
be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to
the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and appli-
cation of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal
and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and
notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending
a. final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that cen-
tralized administration of specially designed procedures was neces-
sary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to
avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of
local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. * * * * A
multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as
apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are
different rules of substantive law. * * * *

eee e se

‘cs ® ® * But when two separate remedies are brought to bear
on the same activity, a conflict is imminent. It must be remembered
that petitioners’ state remedy was a suit for an injunction prohibiting
the picketing. The federal Board, if it should find a violation of the
national Labor Management Relations Act, would issue a cease and
desist order and perhaps obtain a temporary injunction to preserve

the status quo. Or if it found no violation, it would dismiss the
complaint, thereby sanctioning the picketing. * * **

‘‘The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of speci-
fied types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is
to be free of other methods and sources of restraint. For the policy
of the national Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn
all picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed processes
to [800] fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the
Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the
weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor
combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal
policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or
by methods which the federal Act prohibits.’’

The Weber case came down after the Garner case. It grew out
of a dispute between labor unions over millwright work being
performed for Anheuser-Busch, Inc., each union claiming the work
for its own members, resulting in one of the unions going on strike.
On the day after the strike was called, Anheuser-Busch filed with
NLRB a charge of unfair labor practice under one (only) section
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Before the Board
acted upon the charge, Anheuser-Busch sought an injunction in the
Cirenit Court of the City of St. Louis on the ground the strike con-
stituted a violation of Missouri’s statutes defining unlawful restraint
of trade and a secondary boycott under the common law of Missouri
and was in violation of several subsections of the National Labor
Management Relations Act other than those of which it had com-
plained to the Board. The NLRB held that no dispute existed within
the meaning of the invoked section. Thereafter the St. Louis Circuit.
Court granted an injunction, holding that the striking union’s con-
duct constituted an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade under Mis-
souri law. On appeal, this Court (Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Weber,
864 Mo. 573, 265 8.W. 2d 825) affirmed the judgment. The Supreme
Court of the United States held we erred in so doing. In the course of
its opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it quoted with ap-
proval from the Garner case, and further said:

“A State may not enjoin under its own labor statute conduct
which has been made an ‘unfair labor practice’ under the federal
statutes. Such was the holding in the Garner case, supra. The Court
pointed out that exclusive primary jurisdiction to pass on the
union’s picketing is delegated by the Taft-Hartley Act to the National
Labor Relations Board. * * * *

: oe

““We do not mean to pass on the question whether the Board, by
finding that no violation of (D) was involved, inferentially ruled
that other subsections were or were not violated. The point is
rather that the Board, and not the state court, is empowered to pass

upon such issues in the first instance. If a ruling on (D) neces-
sarily encompassed a ruling on the other subsections, we would have
a different case. * * * *

BR

‘ce # ® ® (E]ven if it were clear that no unfair labor practices
were involved, it would not necessarily follow that the ‘State’ was
free to issue its injunction. If this conduct does riot fall within, ‘the:
prohibitions of § 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, it may fall within thé
protection of § 7, as concerted. activity for the purpose of mutual aid
or protection.

eee

«# * * But where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor
practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within
the. sections prohibiting these’ practices, aiid where the’ éonduct, if
not prohibited by the federal’ Act, may be reasonably deeméd to come
within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must de-
cline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congréss ‘has
selected for determining such issues in the first instance.’”’ .

Plaintiff seizes upon the statements made in the Garner ' and
‘Weber cases to.the effect that exclusive primary jurisdiction to pass
on thé legality of union picketing was vested by the Labor’ Man-
agement Relations Act in the National Labor Relations Board, and
the further statement in the Weber case to the effect that had the
NLRB found the union not guilty of any violation of any’ of [801]
the unfair labor practices defined in subsections 158 (b) (4) of the
Labor Management Relations Act instead of limiting its finding to
subsection (D) thereof, ‘‘we would have a different case’’.

In its brief filed to the Court en Bane, plaintiff said these cases
amount to a holding that federal jurisdiction is primary only ‘and
not exclusive and that when the NLRB, acting’ through its General’
Counsel, determined that the conduct involved was not an unfair
labor practice, the state court was free to apply its own laws, to wit:
the provisions of Article I, § 29, of the Constitution of Missouri,
which guarantees to eniployees the right to organize and to bargain,
collectively through representatives of their own choosing.

As we read the Garnet and Weber cases, they hold to the contrary.
By the use of the phrase ‘‘primaty jurisdiction’’, these’ cases mean
that not even the federal coutts can determine whether certain
acts constitute an unfair labor practice until the NLRB has first con-
sidered them; and that when the NLRB has exercised its jurisdic-
tion, such action is final, except by way of review to the extent’ pro-
vided in § 160 (£), to wit: ‘‘Any person aggrieved by a final order
ofthe Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief
sought may obtain’a review of such order in any United States court
of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor- practice in ques-
tion was alleged to have.-been. engaged: in or wherein such’ person

resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written peti-
tion praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside.
* * * #7 So, in effect, say the hereinabove emphasized extracts
from the Garner case and, more specifically, says ‘the ‘Wéber case in
these words, loc.cit. 487: ‘‘Contrélling and therefore’ superseding
federal power cannot be curtailed by the State even though the
ground of intervention be different than that on which’ federal,
supremacy has been exercised.’’ A fortiori, jurisdiction cannot bé
exercised by the State courts, where the acts alleged to constitute
the unfair labor practices complained of by plaintiff ‘and denied by
defendants present an issue within the legislative scope of the Act.’
Such an exercise of State powers would come ‘into conflict with the
power given to the Congress to regulate matters affecting interstate
commerce.

The statement made in the Weber opinion to the effect that if the
ruling on subsection (D) of 8(b) (4) encompassed a ruling of the
other subsections, “‘we would ‘have a different case’’, seems to yhean,
that had NLRB decided that the picketing there involved did not
constitute a charge of any unfair labor practice, as defined in’ the
Act, and neither did it constitute picketing protected (“‘sanctioned”’
is the word used in the Garner case) by the fedetal Act, then the
State Court would have jurisdiction to consider its legality under
State laws not involving allegedly unlawful labor practices over
which NLRB had been given exclusive primary jurisdiction by the
federal Act, such’ as, for example, picketing violative of the police
power of the State, anti-conspiracy statutes, or tortious acts resulting
in damage to the employer or employees. Note thé further statement
in the Weber case, loc.cit. 487: ‘‘Moreover, we must ‘not forget that
this case is not clearly one of ‘unfair labor practices’. Certainly if
the conduct is eventually found ‘by the National Labor Relations
Board to ‘be protected by the Taft-Hartley Act, the State cannot be
heard to say that it is enjoining that conduct for reasons other than
those having to do with labor ‘relations.’

But, even if we err in our interpretation of the meaning of the
aforesaid phrase, it simply cannot have the meaning attributed to
it by plaintiffs, for the reason it would be destructive of the definitely
clear holding of both the Garner and Weber cases that the Labor
Management Relations Act has vested exclusive primary jurisdic:
tion of labor disputes such as is here involved in the National Labor
Relations Board and that its action; subject to federal court review,
is binding upon the states.

In its reply brief, plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of the Garner
and Weber cases [802] by asserting for the first time that the dis-
missal of its charges by the General Counsel amounted to a refusal to
accept jurisdiction rather than a decision on the merits and: that

jurisdiction to determine the dispute was thereby invested in the
state courts, citing: Lincourt v. N.L.R.B., 170 F. 2d 306, 307 (1st,
1948) Jacobsen v. N.L.R.B., 120 F. 2d 96 (C.C.A. 3, 1941) ; Building
Trades Council v. Kinard, 346 U.S. 983, 74 S.Ct. 873 (1954) ; Cooper-
Utter Lumber Co., 34 L.R.R.M. 1287 (Wisconsin Labor Board, 1954) ;
Raisch Motors, 35 L.R.R.M. 1631, 1632 (New York Labor Board,
1955) ; Walker Motors, 36 L.R.R.M: 1290 (Michigan Labor Board,
1955); Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks, 124 F. Supp. 697, 85
L.R.R.M. 2361, 2366 (D.C., N.M., 1954). These cases involved a sit-
uation not shown to be present in the instant case.

In 1954, NLRB announced it would decline jurisdiction in a certain
elass of cases wherein the dollar volume of the employer’s business,
as it affected interstate commerce, was below certain specified
amounts. See Raisch Motors, 85 L.R.R.M. 1631, 1632; National Labor
Relations Board v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675, 71 S.Ct. 948, 95 L.Hd. 1284. This is also the background of the
Kinard case (Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co.,
346 U.S, 933, 74 S.Ct. 373, 98 L.id. 423) wherein the United States
Supreme Court refused to pass upon the right of the State court
to grant its own relief in the absence of a showing that the employer
had applied to the NLRB or that it would be futile to do so. See
decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, Kinard Construction Co.
y. Building Trades Council, 258 Ala. 500, 64 So. 2d 400.

‘We think the above listed cases cited by plaintiff are readily dis-
tinguishable from the instant case. They deal with disputes which
the Board, without regard to the merits, had arbitrarily refused to
hear. In other words, in the aforesaid cases, the Board had refused
to consider the merits or to exercise its jurisdiction to award or refuse
relief in any event, apparently on some theory akin to de minimis
non cwrat lex. -No suggestion i is made that the refusal to issue a com-
plaint in this case is based upon any such theory.

Upon what basis did the Board, acting through its General Counsel,
refuse to issue a complaint? And what effect, if any, did the charges
made by plaintiff to NLRB and the Board’s action thereon have on
the question of jurisdiction of this controversy ?

The charges made by plaintiff to the Board, as well as the allega-
tions of plaintiff’s petition, were that defendants’ picket line was
maintained for the purpose of preventing deliveries to and from its
premises so that plaintiff would be coerced into recognizing Local
618 as a representative of its employees, in violation of the Labor
Management Relations Act. Such an allegation comes squarely
within §§ 157 and 158 (a) (1) and, possibly, 158 (a) (3) of the Act;
-29 U.S.C.A., which provide:

§ 157 “Hmployees shall have the right to self- organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other

concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities * * *7)

‘(The term ‘“‘employee’”’ includes any employee, ' ‘and ‘is ‘no
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless ex-
plicitly otherwise specified. See § 152 (3), 29 U.S.C.A.) . be
3 158. ‘‘(a) It shall be an unfair labor-practice for an employer

‘*(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; .
se be
“(3) by discrimination in regard to. ‘hi r
ployment or any term or condition of employm: nt to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organizatiqn: | eee

Defendants’ answer presented a.clear-cut issue as to whether the
conduct with which [803] they were charged was true and, if’so,.
whether it was. prohibited by the Act or, if not.so prohibited, eould,
be found to come within the protection afforded by the Act. Garner.
ease, supra. Consequently, when the Cireuit Court of the City of St,
Louis assumed jurisdiction and heard the evidence, it was. without,
jurisdiction so to do. Garner and Weber cases, supra; Jack Cooper’
Transport Co. v. Stuffiebeam, 365 Mo.. 250, 280 S.W. 2d 832, We do.
not understand that plaintiff otherwise contends. Plaintiff’s con:
tention seems to be that jurisdiction vested in, the State court .
the NLRB refused to prosecute the charges filed with it by. plaintiff
long after submission of the case in the State court. We cannot,
agree.

Section 160 of the Act prescribes in detail ‘the procedure to ibe

followed by the Board if, after investigation of a charge such as was
made by plaintiff, it decides to proceed further with it by the filing
of a complaint and, after notice to the party complained of: to hear,
and determine the merits; and, finally, -review of ‘such. - Proceeding as
hereinbefore stated.
. Sections 102.9 to 102.19 of the Rules of the Board are set forth in
an appendix to Title 29 U.8.C.A., following §.262., Rule 102,10 pro-
vides for the filing of such charges: before the: Regional Director of
the NLRB in the first instance. Rule 102.19 provides that if the
Regional Director declines to issue a complaint, his action mi
reviewed by the General Counsel. ;

Section 158 (d) of the Act provides: Oe ee The General Coun:
sel of the Board shall exercise general supervision over all. attorneys
employed by the Board (other. than trial examiners and legal. assist;
ants to Board members) .and over the officers and employees in the
regional offices. He shall have final authority, on, behalf of the Board,
in respect of the investigation. of charges and. issuance, of complaints
under section 160 of this. title, and.in respect of the prosgcuti “of
such complaints before the Board, * *, #2? 7

“As above stated, it was stipulated that the Regional Director ‘‘made
an investigation” of the charges filed by plaintiff and refused to
issue a complaint. Thereafter, on appeal to the General Counsel, he
fouhd that ‘‘there is insufficient evidence to warrant further pro-
ceedings’. By express provision of the Act (§ 1538 (d) above
quoted), he had final authority on behalf of the Board to determine
that very issue. Such a finding in and of itself precludes any legiti-
mate contention that the Board declined to accept jurisdiction of the
controversy. ‘Rather doés it definitely reflect that the Board did:
exercise its jurisdiction, did consider the evidence, and did decide
tidt the evidence did not warrant further action. .

‘Tt is true, as plaintiff contends, that § 160 (f) of the Act provides
only for an appeual’ from “‘a final order of the Board granting or
denying in whole or in part the #elief sought’’, and that it has been
held ‘in Lincourt v."National Labor Relations Board, Ist U.8.C.C.A.,
170 F.2d 306, that the refusal of the General Counsel to issue a com-
under § 153 (d) is not an appealable final order of the Board
in the meaning of § 160 (f). Assuming, however, that the con-
sion reached in thé Lincourt case is sound, it does not follow, as
we understand the provisions of § 153 (d), that a finding by the
General Counsel that there is insufficient evidence to warrant further
vodeedings does not constitute a final disposition of the case on the
, at least until further charges are filed and a new investigation
tide under the provisions of the Act. It would seem that for some
rédsén known to the Congress it saw fit not to provide for appeals
from a decision of the General Counsel not to issue a complaint.
However much ‘the failure of the Act to provide for an appeal from
Sieh ‘ ‘a disposition of the case may be deplored i in that it seems to leave
the" ‘complaining’ party without further remedy, any rectification
theteof i is necessarily a matter for the Congress.

But, again, if we err in-holding that the action of the Board
was.a disposition of the case on the merits, it does not follow that
jurisdiction, which had theretofore been in the NLRB, reverted to
the State court. The case of Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks, 124
F'Supp. 697, [804] cited by plaintiff in its reply brief as authority
for its contention, was subsequently reversed with directions, Retail
Clerks Local No. 1564 v. Your Food Stores of Santa Fe, by the 10th
US.C.C.A., 225 F, 2d 659, the court saying: “Moreover, the refusal
NURB té entertain the instant grievance on its merits did not
of itself‘ alter the pertinent law thereby revesting the state court with
auithority to proceed. Amended section 10(a) of the Act specifically
provides what this Court deems to be the only way state authorities
vested with authority now within the exclusive purview of the

KUL! Unless and until there is an express ceding of Jurisdiction toa
proper state agency exclusive jurisdiction remains in the federal
agency. For sake of order such must be true. Otherwise, an intermi-

i m

nable problem of determining jurisdiction would exist, throwing
needless confusion into an area clearly pre- -empted by Congress.’’
(Section 10(a) of the Act, as referred to in the above quotation, is
Section 160 (a), Title 29 U.S.C.A. It empowers the NLRB by agree-.
ment with any state agency to cede to such agency jurisdiction over
labor disputes affecting interstate commerce if the regulating labor
Jaws of such state are not inconsistent with the Labor Management
Relations Act. Missouri has no such agency and no contention is made
that NLRB has ceded or -could: cede any of its Jurisdiction’ to our
Missouri courts under this provision.)

We hold that the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis was with-
out jurisdiction of the merits and its judgment of dismissal must’ be
sustained on that ground.

The majority of the members of the court adhering to the views
expressed in the principal opinion herein, and upon the further~
authority of The Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. Stanley Clayton, ete.,
228 F. 2d 384, the motion for rehearing is overruled.

Leedy; C.J; Dalton, Westhwes and Storckman, JJ.; concur; ; Eager,
J., dissents in dissenting opinion; and Hyde, J., dissents and eoncurs
i dissenting opinion of Hager, J.,

Hl EAGER, J. (dissenting).—The majority opinion holds, as is
urged by defendants’ counsel, that the Labor Board accepted juris-
diction and adjudicated the charges of unfair labor practices on the
merits, thus foreclosing all other proceedings. I ‘cannot agree. The
matter never reached the Labor Board, as I understand the applicable
law. Prior to the amendment of the N.L.R.A. in 1947, the Labor
Board was both prosecutor and judge. Because of many objections to
that somewhat inconsistent combination of functions, the two were
separated in the Act as amended (Title 29, § 153, U.S.C.A.); the
Board retained all judicial (or quasi-judicial) functions while the
full and sole power of prosecution was given to the General Counsel.
The latter is appointed by the President, with the consent of the
Senate, and his primary function is to investigate charges, and issue
and prosecute complaints ‘‘before the Board’’; he also has incidental
supervisory powers over certain other attorneys, not including legal,
assistants to board members or trial examiners. The Board has no
jurisdiction to proceed in an unfair labor practice matter until the
General Counsel issues a complaint. In issuing or refusing to issue
complaints, the action of the General Counsel is final, as is conceded
in the majority opinion. As the prosecutor under thé act (or ‘‘of the
Board,’’ if that term is preferred) he is an administrative officer. In
Lincourt v. N.L.R.B. (C.A. 1), 170 F. 2d 306, the court said: ‘The
issuance of a complaint under § 10 of the Act is a matter of adminis-
trative discretion. * * *’”? See also: General Drivers Local 886,
AFL, v. N.L.R.B. (C.A. 10), 179 F. 2d 492. Certainly he has been

so regarded; and his decisions are in no wise judicial determinations.
It is also pertinent to. note that in issuing or refusing to issue com-
plaints, he acts wholly independently of the Board, and that neither
the Board nor the courts can control, direct, or restrain his actions,
by mandamus or otherwise. Hourihan v. N.L.R.B. (C.A.D.C.), 201
F, 2d 187, certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 930; rehearing denied, 345 U.S.
961, 346 U.S. 848, 880, 917; there the court said, lc. 188; ‘‘* * * The
Board cannot issue.an order [805] until the General Counsel issues a
eoniplaint. A, court has no power to-order the General Counsel to,
issue a complaint and no power to require the Board to issue an order
in a matter which is not before the Board.’’. (Italics inserted.)

The relationship between the General Counsel and the Board be-
comes more readily understandable when we compare it to that exist-
ing between a prosecuting attorney and the court of general juris-
diction in which he serves. When a set of facts is submitted to the
prosecutor for possible prosecution and he talks to the witnesses, he
may well decide that the evidence is, im his opinion, insufficient for
prosecution or conviction. In such case, he merely declines to file an
information or charge. However, a grand jury may still indict, or a
sueceeding prosecutor may still file a charge on the same facts. No
one, it seems, would have the temerity to suggest that the act of the
prosecutor. constituted an adjudication of, acquittal. That case has
never. reached the court; and it certainly makes no difference what
reason the prosecutor has given, i.e.,. whether ‘‘insufficient evidence’’
or something else. And in such a situation the court certainly has no
power or jurisdiction to gall in the proposed defendant and demand
that he plead or stand trial. To my mind the situation in the. present
case is‘substantially.the same. The regional. directors are, in effect,
assistant prosecutors; the prosecutor (General Counsel) has notified
all interested parties to consult them first, and if not satisfied, to
“‘appeal’’ to him; this may be done very informally, indeed by letter.
When the General Counsel acts, no findings whatever are given to
the parties,—no results of an investigation. Indeed, with the immense
volume of such appeals, it would seem impossible that he, personally,
should-even see all of-them. There is simply a notice and ruling that
no complaint will be filed, with or without a stated reason. There has
been no pretense of a hearing on notice.

In my opinion there has been here a mere declination to file an
unfair labor practice complaint, and nothing has been adjudicated.
The views expressed herein appear to be in complete harmony with
the opinion in the recent case of N.L.R.B. v. Swift & Company (E.D.
Mo.), 180 F. Supp. 214, including that court’s interpretation of the
Garner case, discussed hereinafter. The majority opinion here seems
to concede that.if there had been no adjudication, the state court would
have jurisdiction to proceed. The only suggestion in the majority
opinion which lends any color-to the supposed authority of the General

Counsel to adjudicate, is that § 158, supra, gives him attthority ‘‘on
behalf of the Board’’ to investigate charges, issue complaints and
prosecute complaints. When read in their full context, these words
do not alter the nature or substance of the powers and functions given
to the General Counsel. They seem to mean merely that he is the
prosecutor of the Board; and they ‘are apparently only incidental,
_perhaps traditional, in nature. The General Counsel cannot act for
-himself personally, nor for the government generally. These ‘words
‘merely point out the department or body to which he and his-fune-
tions are attached. His functions and duties‘are such: that he is really
an independent chief administrator of labor rélations, rather than
the attorney for the Board. In any event the authorities hold, beyond
question, that he is wholly independent of the Board in performing the -
functions with which we are concerned here, and that he cannot be
coerced in any way by the Board; also, that he is most certainly an
administrative officer. Likewise, it might be said that’ any prosecut-
ing attorney acts ‘‘on behalf of the court,’’ for our courts ‘are the body
of the government finally entrusted with the enforcement of law; yet
no one contends that:a declination to act by a prosecuting attorney
adjudicates a lack of guilt. Moreover, if the General Counsel is actually
and inherently an agency of, or an inherent part of, the Board, it
should be able to ‘control his ‘actions, In the respects concerned’ here,
at least, it most certainly can not.

| | It is held, as indeed it must be, that the action taken here by
the General Counsel is final. (Title 29, § 153°(d) U.S.C.A.; Hourihan
_ [806] v. N.L.R.B., 201 F. 24 187; Lincourt v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d
306.) It is not even suggested, by court or counsel, that -plaintift here
did not invoke all the applicable provisions of the Act in the charges
of unfair labor practices which: it filed: with the Regional Director of
the Labor Board. (Contra to the situation in Weber, 348 U.S. 468).
Thus, on the admitted facts and law, plaintiff has gone as far as it
may possibly go under federal procedure without -yet having obtained
any adjudication’ by a judicial (or even quasi-judicial) body. It
seems unnecessary to discuss the situation in those cases where federal
jurisdiction has been declined because of the insufficiency of the dollar
volume of interstate commerce involved; the situation there may -be
similar, but it is certainly’ distinguishable, for those declinations are
made pursuantto regulations determined by the Board itself, not the
General Counsel. However, the majority here seems to feel that; even
there, state jurisdiction may be operative. Indeed, counsel presently
representing these defendants are now in this court seeking to invoke
state jurisdiction in just such a situation. (Gene Quirin, et -al.,
Appellants, v. O. J. Buchanan, Respondent, No. 45; 014, argued at‘ ‘his
Session.)

In neither the Garner case nor the Weber case did the court have
the present situation before it for adjudication. In the Garner case,

no application whatever had been made for relief under the federal
Act, and the decision is predicated upon that fact. The court said:
“Nor is there any suggestion * * that the federal Board would de-
-¢line to exercise its powers once its jurisdiction was invoked.’’? And
in that opinion the court consistently referred to action of the Board,
as a ‘‘tribunal’’ for adjudication. (See N.L.R.B. v. Swift & Company,
180 F. Supp. 214.) The present question could not have been directly
decided there. In the Weber case only a partial application for relief
had been made under the Act, giving rise to the now renowned state-
ment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that: ‘‘If a ruling on (D) neces-
sarily encompassed a ruling on the other subsections, we would have
a different case.’’ Here, full application for relief was made, although
plaintiff could not and did not even reach the Board, as indeed the
employer did to a limited extent in the Weber case. The Weber case
_Seems to have proceeded on a theory of exhaustion of remedies; the
federal remedies have been exhausted here. Also, in the Weber case
the court held that if the labor board itself had held that there was
no unfair labor practice (on the merits), the state court might have
jurisdiction. We need not go that far here to sustain our jurisdiction.
Both in the Weber case and in the subsequent case of Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter (and the court) seems to invite the presentation. of cases
exploring the ‘‘penumbral area’’ which can only be made clear “‘by
the course of litigation.’’ In so far as I can see, this case is, at the
least, one for such an exploration. Certainly the Supreme Court of
the United States has not adjudicated the present question.

So far as concerns the reference to the so-called ‘‘protected area’”’
in the Weber case, it may be said that it is at least doubtful if those
statements were necessary to the decision there, or that they are
applicable here. If such an ‘‘area’’ exists it would certainly exist as
.a matter of substantive law, which any court must enforce, and thus
would not be a mere matter of jurisdiction or procedure. If there is a
restriction of rights guaranteed by the federal statute, then the plain-
“tiff should be denied relief on the merits—not on the ground that the
state court lacks jurisdiction. And if it be suggested that the General
Counsel here may have ruled as a finality that the picketing here was
within the ‘‘protected area,’’ (which, by his own words, he did not)
-then we would be conceding to him legislative as well as judicial
powers, when in fact he has neither; [807] for if he is permitted to
«write words into the act which are not there, he is legislating.

’ The courts are expressly given a power of review over actions of
the Board. (Title 29, § 160 (f) U.S.C.A.). No right of review is
available here under the provisions of the Act, for the simple reason
that plaintiff could never reach the Board with its charges. All power
of review in this situation has been denied (Lincourt v. N.L.R.B.
(C.A. 1), 170 F. 2d 306), The provisions of the Administrative

Procedure Act expressly except from judicial review those matters
“eommitted to agency discretion.’’ (Title 5, § 1009, U.S. C.A.) In
deed, no one in the present case’ even suggests that’ plaintiff, might
have procured any review of the action of the General Counsel, any-
where. In other words, there is here a final order of an administrative
officer, directly affecting substantial property rights, with no right
of review whatever. If this is the meaning and intent of the appr
priate part of the Act, I, for one, ‘have a serious doubt of its co
tionality as so construed, for it would certainly seem to impinge Upon
the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In N.LRB. v.
Swift & Company (E.D. Mo.), 130 F. Supp. 214, speaking on sub-
stantially identical facts, the court said, le. 219: “Mherefore, in, the
present case the Fespondent Swift is faced with a situation where it
alleges a grievance which, under the Garner case, is broadly subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Board, whose General Counsel re-
fuses to issue a Complaint on which an adjudication could be made,
and then turns around and contends that the State procedure is pre-
eluded. In effect, the General Counsel of the Board is contending not
that there is a conflict of remedies, but that there should be nd. remedy
whatsoever. Having in mind the language of thé Garner casé"that ‘the
manner in which the matter is decided does not destroy the pofentiali-
ties of conflict where a conflict exists, it. is clear in this case that no
conflict can arise when the road to an adjudication by the Labor
Board is thus blocked To hold otherwise would deny the respondent
due process of law.’’ I see no reason why the right of free speech,
guaranteed by the First Amendment (and: which, along with:ithe
Fourteenth, defendants have’ specifically urged) should emasculate
the Fifth Amendment. Looking at this matter realistically,” there ‘Ys
no doubt that uninhibited ‘‘peaceful’’ picketing, particularly‘ at’ he
vehicular entrance of a plant, as here, may utterly destroy a business
which has no existing labor ‘dispute whatever. It has never been my
conception of due process that such acts may be fully and finally
sanctioned without any right of appeal by the owner of the business
to a court or judicial body; such, to me, seenis to be contrary to-the
principles of a government of law. If this be true, Congress could
only correct the situation by. providing a recourse to. some judicial
body, and not merely by defining the ‘‘ penumbral area.”

While these cases usually speak of ‘‘jurisdiction”’ or a ‘‘lack of
jurisdiction,’? I doubt that this is truly a question of jurisdiction.
The question is rather whether the state court has been prohibited
from proceeding in a field where the federal’ jurisdiction may be
paramount. The state court certainly had jurisdiction of the parties
and a general, jurisdiction’ fo determine what might constitute a
violation of state law. Under ‘these circumstances, when ‘the pa
stipulated to the filing of the charges of unfair labor practidés and
the result of that action, I ‘think that the t court was at iberty t6

proceed ‘on the merits to adjudicate whether there had been any
vidlation of Missouri law. It merely dismissed the petition, on oral
motion, giving no ‘redsons.

Under these cireimstances, T think that the judgment should be re-
versed and the caiisé remanded for proceedings in’ accordance with
the’ ‘views herein expressed, and specifically to determine, on the
mnerits, whether the acts complained of constitute a violation of Mis-
souri law. Hyde, J., conéurs.

Th’Re Ooun 1, Vandis, an’ Attorney, No. 44453287 8. W. (24) 758.

++" Gourt en’ Bane, March'12, i956.

: Lyle M. Allen and George C. Willson, IIL, for informants.

Stephen F. Pinter for respondent. .

[754] -. EAGER, J.—This is a disciplinary proceeding against Ogle
E:. Veach, a member ‘of the Bar of Missouri; he will hereinafter be re-
fered. to as the respondent.- The information was filed direct in this
court on June.3, 1954, under Rule 5.03, by the. members of the Bar
Committee for the Highth Judicial Circuit. That committee had con-
ducted .an informal investigation, and thereafter had held formal
hearings after due notice to respondent, who appeared there in per--
son and by attorney. After such hearings, the committee found that
there was probable cause to- believe that respondent was guilty of
professional misconduct in both particulars set out in the notice;
these conform, generally, to Counts i and Il'of the information filed
here. -

‘Count I of the information charges professional misconduct in
that respondent, with the aid of one Ross, solicited the personal injury
claim of William’C. Hugueley in St. Louis, Missouri, on February 23,
1952, and.thereafter; Count II alleges the suspension of respondent
from the practice’ of law by a. judgment of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, by reason-of ten separate acts of improper solicitation or
attempted solicitation of personal injury claims; that suspension was
for a period of five years from September 24, 1953; attached to the
information are authenticated copies of the judgment and opinion of
that court. The prayer is that respondent be permanently disbarred.
Summons in. usual form was issued and.served, and the court also
entered its-order‘ requiring respondent to show cause why he should .
notbe disciplined by reason of the judgment of the Supreme Court,
of IDinois.,

Respondent filed his answer : denying the charges of Count I and
specifieally denying that Ross solicited on his behalf or with his
authority; the answer admitted the-suspension in Illinois, as alleged
in. Gount. II, but denied the sufficiency of the evidence there, and
denied: the ‘‘legality’”’ of that judgment because respondent was not
then; engaged in practice in Illinois and had no office or home there.,
Respondent likewise filed a'return to the order to show cause alleging:
(1) that, no-rule had been adopted by this court permitting any sum-
mary. order based on the Illinois proceedings; (2) that respondent
was and is a resident of Missouri, had no office in Illinois for some
years -prior to. the proceedings there, and that he was originally
licensed here; (3) that the opinion of the Supreme Court of Iinois
‘discloses no basis for.the severe condemnation’’ adjudged; (4) that
the ‘criticism there. levied against him for not producing certain -
corroborating witnesses wasi-unjustified. Informants have filed their
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count II of the informa-

tion, on the ground that respondent has failed to allege any’ facts

sufficient to show why the Hlinois judgment should not subject him to’ ”

discipline here. That motion is now pending.

This court then appointed the Honorable John W. Calhoun, former -

Judge of the Cireuit Court of the City of St. Louis, as Special Com-
missioner to take testimony, make findings, and report to this court
his findings and conclusions on Count I [755] of the information.
The Special Commissioner duly qualified and proceeded to hold hear-
ings at various times. Respondent appeared there in person and by
counsel and participated in the hearings. It developed at these hear-
ings that William C. Hugueley and Mildred P. Jamerson, both of
whom. had testified before the committee at the informal and formal’
hearings’ (see Rule 5.03), had moved to Chicago, Illinois, and were
then married; these witnesses had not answered a request that they
appear before the Commissioner ; consequently, the informants offered,
and the Commissioner received, over objection, the record of’ their

testimony at both such prior hearings. Although it’may be that all ‘

such evidence was properly received under Rule 5.03, since these
witnesses were fully cross-examined at the formal hearing and after
due notice to respondent, we need not cross that bridge here; we shall
consider only the testimony of these witnesses at the formal hearing

before the committee, which consisted almost entirely of cross.’

examination by respondent’s counsel. There can certainly be no lack
of due process in so doing. Thus, we proceed first’to a review of the
evidence on Count I of the information. Since it is our duty to make
our own decision, after giving due regard to the findings and recom-
mendations of the Commissioner, we review the evidence: independ-
ently.

It appears that respondent lived in Illinois until he enrolled in the
Benton College of Law in St. Louis, from which he graduated in’ 1928 ;
at approximately that time he was admitted to the Bar of Missouri.
He continued to practice here until about 1939 or 1940, when he was
admitted to practice in Illinois. From that, time until about 1951 he
maintained an office in East St. Louis, Illinois, after which time he

apparently moved back to Missouri. At the time of the occurrences,

charged in Count I he had an office address in St. Louis, Missouri. °
William C. Hugueley, an employee of Fisher Body Division of
General Motors in St. Louis, sustained injuries in an’ automobile
accident on February 22, 1952, and was taken to the St. Louis City
Hospital and there placed in a ward with various other patients. Two
friends, a Miss (or Mrs.) Mildred P, Jamerson and Charles F. Ober-
haus visited him there from time to time, and parts of the evidence
stated here consist of their testimony. Combining the evidence of
these three persons, it appears therefrom generally that about 1:00

P.M. on Saturday, the day after the accident, a man appeared at”

Hugueley’s bedside, entirely unrequested and unknown to him, and

introduced, himself as Mr. Ross. This man said that he had been in- |
formed that Hugueley was hurt, that he was working for an attorney,
that ‘‘we are well equipped to do the job * * we take pictures of the
place,’’ that he figured Hugueley needed a good lawyer, and that
“they should get started on it right immediately before it gets too
old * *.”? Hugueley told him that he would not be interested until
he talked with his friends, but that he could-come back if he wanted
to; the man returned the next afternoon (Sunday) and talked both
with Hugueley and Miss Jamerson, to the latter of whom he also in-
troduced himself as ‘‘Ross.’’ On either Saturday or Sunday he men-
tioned Mr. Veach, the respondent, whom he said was then in Alton,
Illinois, working on a case; he further said that Mr. Veach ‘‘usually _
worked with him.’? Qn Sunday Ross left after a few minutes when
Hugueley’s wife came in; in the meantime, however, he had said that
he wanted them to meet Mr. Veach, talked about ‘‘cases’’ he had been.
interested in, and asked if Miss Jamerson would be there on Monday.
On two occasions Ross was asked for his card, but he said that he ‘‘had
changed his shirt’’ and had none. Neither Hugueley nor Miss Jamer-
son told Ross not to bring Mr, Veach there, nor did they invite him
to do so. Miss Jamerson testified that she told Ross that if Hugueley
. wanted him he would get in touch with him, and that he talked about
eases and left. On Monday evening Ross came back with respondent
Veach, who did most of the talking after he was introduced by Ross.
Charles Oberhaus and Miss Jamerson were also there and much of the
conversation was between them and [756] Veach because Hugueley
‘as ‘‘more or less’’ letting them handle the matter and he was ap-
parently not in a physical condition to conduct negotiations; Mr.
Veach then mentioned other specific cases in which he had been
associated and the matter of large settlements obtained; Miss Jamer-
son and Oberhaus asked Veach for his card and she testified that he
‘eventually’? gave them one and wrote his telephone number on it;
the card was produced at the hearing. Miss Jamerson also asked him
what his ‘‘terms’’ were and he replied that ‘‘we get a third.’’ Ober-
haus testified that Veach did not in so many words say ‘‘Give me the
ease,’’ but when asked by respondent’s own counsel: ‘‘Did he solicit
the case or not, in your presence?’’ he answered “‘I believe he did;
yes.’’? Miss Jamerson further testified that on the day Hugueley went
home from the hospital and while some insurance people were there,
the doorbell rang, the landlord answered, and when she looked out a
little later she saw respondent get into a car across the street and
drive away; also, that Ross was with him. She further testified that
someone telephoned the house the next morning and said ‘‘This is Ross
and Veach,’’ and that she told the person speaking that Hugueley al-
ready had a lawyer (he having apparently employed a Mr. Mashak on
the previous evening.)

The respondent testified before the Commissioner: in substance as
follows (we shall note in parentheses certain comparisons with his
testimony before the Bar Committee): that since 1952 he had been
associated with the law firm of Cox, Cox & Cox in St. Louis; that he
had known a Roy Garrett who had previously referred his brother’s
case to respondent, and had also referred to him the case of a
“lady * * that got hurt one time’’; that Garrett was not a lawyer,
but ran a trailer camp and had been i in the insuranée business; that
on February 28, 1952, he found a telephone niessdge on his. desk
instructing him ‘to meet Roy Garrett at the City Hospital to see a
friend of his there, but ‘‘they had it’ Ross instead of Roy’’; that he
went to the City Hospital that evening, met Garrett in the reception
room and was taken into the ward and introduced to Hugueley. (In
his testimony before the Committee respondent said that Garrett had,
at the time, been visiting his injured brother; that Garrett was ‘‘there
with Mr. Hugueley’’ when he, Veach, got to the hospital; also, that
Hugueley’s name was on the telephone message slip, but that the slip
had been misplaced in the file of his attorney.) When Veach arrived,
Miss Jamerson and Oberhaus were present at Hugueley’s bedside. A
‘‘general’’ conversation ensued about Hugueley’s health, ete., and
respondent asked Hugueley if he had sent for him to which the latter
answered ‘‘Yes’’; that at about this juncture Huguéley’s wife came
in and Hugueley told him to go and talk with Miss Jamerson and
Oberhaus, which he did a short distance from the bed; he told these
persons ‘‘who I was with,” gave them his card on request, did not
remember whether he told them his ‘‘charges,’’ and said that if he
could be of any service they should let him know. He further testified
that he did not ask for employment, nor did he ‘‘solicit’’ the case, He
denied that he had ever gone to Hugueley’s residence or telephoned
there. Respondent testified that he knew no Ross, and that “Ross”
and Roy Garrett were evidently the same person; he had known Gar-
rett about twenty-five years. Respondent produced as an exhibit a
telephone message which he identified as the memorandum given to
him on the day of the telephone call. It read: ‘‘For Mr. Veach Date
2/25/52 Time 10:30 A.M, While you were away Mr. Roy Telephoned
x Wants to see you x Message at 7:00 p.m, at City Hospital. Friend
hurt in accident Signed Virg. h.’’ He testified that le had located this
message just two or three months previously in his former attorney’s
file, specifically stating: ‘‘and that was in it” (ié. this message was
in the file). He further testified that he had not. discussed the matter
recently with the telephone girl at that office. He said further that
he kept most of his memos of old telephone messages for “‘referral,’’—
even for four or five years.

[757] Virginia Hazer, the telephone operator, testified (on Mareh
25, 1955): that on March 10, 1955, respondent had brought to her an.
original telephone message similar in all particulars to the exhibit

described above (and in her handwriting) except that the name of the
caller was ‘‘Ross’’ instead of ‘‘Roy’’; that respondent then asked her
to change the name ‘‘Ross’’ to ‘‘Roy,’’ saying that it was a mistake,
and that she rewrote the message in identical form except for that
change of name; the rewritten message was the one produced by
respondent, and she had given the original back to respondent. She
further testified that Roy Garrett had called at various times, that
she knew no ‘‘Ross,’’ but that she thought she had the name correct
when she originally wrote the message. . .

Roy Garrett testified for respondent and his testimony is principally
noteworthy for its vagueness and evasiveness. It is difficult to select
anything concrete and positive out of it. He had known Veach about
twenty-five years, ‘‘off and.on.’’ He remembered little of any conse-
quence. He thought he had been visiting a barber from Salem,. Mis-
souri, (not his brother) at the City Hospital when he met Hugueley
there, although he was not at all sure of Hugueley’s name. At any
vate, that man (supposedly Hugueley) suggested that he needed a
lawyer, and Garrett said ‘‘I could recommend a fellow to you,’’
whereupon he was asked to ‘‘send him down.’’ He said that he called
““the office’? and told the girl ‘‘it was Roy-* and * to have Mr.
Veach meet me at the lobby *.’’ He denied ever saying that his name

_ was Ross. Veach met him and -he introduced Veach to the man in the
ward; Garrett, so he said, talked to his friend and left, and ‘‘I didn’t
Imow "what happened or nothing about it.”” He was very indefinite as
to what previous trips he had made to the hospital at or about this
time, and also about dates in general; finally, he merely presumed
that he had called Veach, because ‘‘he wouldn’t be there if I hadn’t.””
He had éalled respondent on sevéral occasions; he was not introduced
at the time in question to anyone else and did not believe that anyone
-else was present; he did not remember Oberhaus or Miss Jamerson,
but they ‘‘might’’ have been there; he was not asked for a card; he
stated that in making telephone calls he usually said, ‘‘it is Roy,”’—
at least after the first call. Garrett further testified that he had previ-
‘ously done ‘some work”? for two lawyers (one of whom was a respond-
ent in the case of In re Gallant, et al., 231 Mo. App. 150, 95 S.W. 2d
- 1249), and as to one of these he said: ay did all kinds of work for him
in the practice of law,’’ but that he did not go to see prospective
clients, . . .

In support of the charges in Count II of the information there has
been filed in this court the judgment and opinion of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in its cause No. 32,789, Ogle H.-Veach, dated Septem-
ber 24, 1953. The opinion is reported at 1 Ill. 2d 264. Under the view
we take of the case it will be unnecessary to recite the facts stated in
that opinion. The case came there on review, first from the Committee
on, Grievances of the Illinois Bar, and lastly from the Board of
Governors, acting as Commissioners. It will suffice to say that the

present respondent was therein charged in sixteen counts with the
solicitation of personal injury business (along with one other charge
on which he was discharged) and that he-was found guilty of -ten
separate acts of solicitation or attempted solicitation... The court .de-
clined to disbar respondent, as recommended by the Committee and
the Commissioners, but suspended him for a period of five years.. In
the course of the opinion the court reviewed in some detail each. of
the charges which had been sustained and said, in part: ‘‘The record
in this case evidences conclusively..a career of active and repeated
solicitation of personal injury business by respondent. * * * Tt in-
dicates a planned and intentional mode of operation. * * This was a
bold plan of promotion for his own legal business—strictly prohibited
by the Canons of Professional Ethics.’’

-Since Count IT is pending here on the motion of Informants for
Judgment [758] on the Pleadings, we shall consider that count first.
We have determined that the motion should be sustained since, in. our
view, neither the answer of respondent to that count, nor. his return
to the order to show cause, presents any defense. We shall discuss
briefly the contentions and arguments of ‘the respondent. The mere
lack of a specific rule of this court providing for summary action in
such cases is wholly immaterial, This court has the inherent, power to
discipline those persons ,enrolled. as members of the Bar. of. Missouri.
In Re Richards, Bane, 833 Mo: 907, 63 S.W..2d.672; Rules 5.01 to
5.17, inclusive. The very presentation of this argument concedes, the
inherent.power of the court, for any such rule, would only..be evi-
dentiary of that inherent power already existing...The contention that
the Supreme Court of Illinois acted illegally because respondent. was
not, at the time, engaged in practice in Illinois and had no office or
home there, is wholly without merit. He was enrolled as a member of
the Illinois Bar and had practiced there actively for some years; that
court at all times retained inherent jurisdiction over him as an_ officer
of the court. It does not appear that any question of jurisdiction-was
there raised, but that, on the Contrary, respondent defended through-
out on the merits.

The remainder of the contentions consist of arguments ¢ going to the
merits of the Ilinois judgment*and opinion, and a: criticism of the
severe punishment imposed, and, more or less by indirection, respond-
ent-argues that since the charges there did not involve his character, or
constitute moral turpitude, the judgment is not such a one as should
be recognized in another jurisdiction. In that connection, his counsel
states in the brief, rather brazenly, we think: ‘‘Solicitation,.even if
proven, certainly does not have any effect on the private character of
an attorney, not even his professional character is involved.’? The
particular emphasis on ‘‘character’’ is apparently gleaned ‘from the
ease of Selling v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46, 61 L.Ed. 585, cited and relied
upon by Informants, In that case the respondent had been disbarred

“in Michigan; and. proceedings were instituted to strike his name from
‘the roll of thé Bar of the Supreme Court-of the United States. The
-répeated references there’ to a ‘‘fair private and professional char-
acter’’ (which, specifically, seems to impart the ‘‘character’’ idea to
“respondent) appear merely to refer to the rule of that court setting
‘out the qualifications for admittance. ‘The: court there held that the
loss of ‘the requisite qualification for membership ‘in ‘the Bar, by
wrongful éonduct wherever committed, operates everywhere and
furnishes reason in every ‘jurisdiction for a revocation of license. The
court further held that the effect‘of the judgment of the Michigan
eourt should be-recognizedunless: ‘(1) there was a lack of due pro-
‘eess; (2) there was sucli an- infirmity of proof as to create a clear
conviction that the conclusion should: wot’ be accepted; or (3) there
sappeared ‘some other ‘‘grave reason?’ which would indicate that the
result would conflict with the court's duty under the principles of
“ight and justice.’’ In our opinion, none of those exceptions or
qualifications are applicable here. - :

Tt does not appear that the Missouri Courts have previously
had this particular question for decision: "The Springfield Court of
Appeals in the case of In Re Sizer, Mo. App:, 184 S.W. 2d 1085,
indicated: the view that a: foreign suspension of a Missouri attorney
‘might be' grounds for suspension in ‘Missouri. We now hold that on
the present record the judgment and opinion of the Illinois Supreme
Court constitirtes and is‘ a'sufficient grovind for disciplinary action by
‘this 'court. ‘In'so ruling we'are supported, directly or in principle, by
‘the following authorities: People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass’n. v.
Lindsey, '86 Colo. 458,283 P. 589; State Board of Law Examiners v.

“Brown, 538 Wyo. 42, 77 P. 24 626; In’Re Leverson, 195 Minn. 42, 261
N.W. 480; In Re Disbarment of Isserman, 345 U. 8. 286,97 L. Ed.
1018; Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364,183 P. 2d 833; In Re Ulmer,
‘268 Mass. 878, 167 N.B. 749; In [759] Re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368,
“101 P. 2d 790, and Selling v. Radford, 243:U.8. 46, 61 L. Ed. 585,
supra. In the Lindsey case, supra, the court said in part, at 283 P,
1. c. 546: ‘** * * The respondent’s oath of office as an attorney and
‘counselor at law is not only binding here in Colorado but everywhere.
“He cannot put it aside or renoutice it at pleasure. It abides with him

all times and places, and he will be held responsible to this court

x misconduct as an’ attorney so-long as his name continues on
‘thie: Yoll} nor can he put himself in a position which will place him be-
“yond the inherent power of‘ this court to purify the bar of its un-
Sworthy members, and td keep its roster clean.’? Some of the cases
‘nist cited appear to proceed on a theory of comity, while others.

“tlecognize ‘the ‘foreign judgmient as one entitled to full faith and

“otedit. Actually, the matter would seem to involve both doctrines.

‘The'judgnient appears to us to be one entitled to full faith and credit

hint so far'as it finally’ adjudicates that in Illinois the respondent was

‘guilty of the: misconduct -with which he was charged. Such being
true, we cannot; in any sense, permit that issue to be re-litigated here.
Such.a judgment is only subject to attack for: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over. the subject matter; (2) failure to give due notice to the de-
fendant; and (3) fraud in the ‘‘concoction’”’ of the judgment. Howey
v. Howey, Mo., 240 8.W. 450; Leichty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 354
Mo, 629, 190 S.W. 2d 201; Kilbourn v. Kilbourn, 354 Mo. 17, 190
S.W. 2d 206.-None of these grounds appears here; and respondent
appeared and ‘contested the INinois proceedings. We cannot and will
not reinvestigate the merits of those charges. See: 50 C.J.S., Judgments,
§ 891, p. 492 et seq.; Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 89
L, Ed. 1577; Cook’s Estate v. Brown, 346 Mo, 281, 140 S.W. 2d 42;
Shearer -v. Parker, 864 Mo. 723, 267 S.W. 2d 18. The element of
comity appears when we consider what effect we shall give such a

- judgment here. There may be cases in the future where, recognizing
the finality ofthe foreign adjudication, we may not see fit to give it
effect in Missouri: We reserve that right, ‘but: feel that this is not such
a‘case.

- We cannot escape the general convietion that a lawyer who
has, after fair and adequate -hearing, been suspended for profes-

‘sional misconduct -in a sister state, should not be permitted to
practice in Missouri-while he remains so suspended, if the ground
of his suspension is also a ground for disciplinary action here. If

-one has been:guilty of conduct inconsistent with the standard expected
-of lawyers as~officers of the court, it should make no difference
whether the acts were committed on this side or the other side of a
theoretical fence. There are no territorial boundaries in cases of such
-misconduct.’ The wrong and the guilt is within the person himself,
and ‘he carties it with him; he cannot be mentally and professionally
purée’ in Missouri and impure in Illinois. To: hold otherwise would
make a mockery: -of' disciplinary procedings where an attorney has
practiced back and forth across state lines, as here.

-It is ‘true that in some of the cited cases questions of moral integrity
were involved. The distinction thus attempted to be made, however,
‘goes. merely to: the degree of the offense and to the extent of the
punishment. The acts of which respondent -was found guilty in
Illinois are equally a violation of our own Canon of Ethies, and they
-aré expressly prohibited here. See Rules 4.27, 4.28 and 4.47. In such
a situation there is no reason why we ‘should not recognize and give
effect to the judgment, not by allowing any automatic or extra-
territorial effect to the Illinois judgment, but by our own independent
action in purging our own bar, once the matter has been brought to
our ‘attention. Respondent has, in our opinion, shown no good and
sufficient reason to the contrary, even under the qualifications men-

* tioned in the case of Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 61 L, Ed. 585, on
which he seems to-rely. The remainder of his complaints consist of

[|

arguments concerning the evidence, supposedly unfair comments in
the opinion about the lack of corroboration of his own testimony, and
the fact that, allegedly, the Illinois decision is inconsistent with prior
decisions. in the extent of punishment adjudged. With these matters
£760] we need not concern ourselves; as to them, the judgment is
entitled to full faith and credit, and it speaks here as the last word
‘of the Iinois court.

The charges contained in Count II of the information herein
-are sustained, and by reason thereof, respondent will be suspended
from the practice of law in Missouri during the remainder of the
period fixed by the judgment of the Supreme Court of-Illinois, namely,
to the 24th day of September, 1958.

The Special: Commissioner has reviewed the evidence applicable
to Count’ I in detail, and generally. as it has been stated here. In
part, the comments of the Commissioner on the evidence are .as
follows: ‘‘The testimony of. respondent, Ogle-E. Veach, is full of dis-
crepancies, and when considered with the testimony of other disin-
terested witnesses varies greatly from their version of the particular
occurrence that was the subject of inquiry and is in-many respects
obviously untrue. * * His version of his visit to the, City Hospital
and what occurred there is so different and so inconsistent with the
testimony of disinterested persons testifying about the same. occur-
rence that it cannot and should not be believed. It is most unlikely
- that. he discussed with Mr. Hugueley ‘only the condition of his health
and how he felt, and as Mr. Hugueley made no suggestion or any
offer.to employ him, said nothing more to him.’

“Roy Garrett’s testimony is chiefly distinguished for its evasiye-
ness, its lack of positiveness about factual situations and his failure
to remember incidents that should have been known to-him and about
which he was questioned. * * * There is little in his testimony that is
reliable except that on occasions he had served the interests of at
least three lawyers, ‘Buzz’ Hannigan, Harris R. Herbert and respond-
-ent, Ogle E. Veach.’’ The finding of the Commissioner on Count 1
was that Ogle E. Veach was guilty as charged therein; his conclusions
of law on that count were as follows: ‘‘I find as a matter of law, on
the facts as found herein, that it was unprofessional, unethical, un-
lawful and in violation of Rules 4.27, 4:28 and 4.47 of the Rules of
this Court for respondent to have, himself, solicited and through an
intermediary to have solicited and attempted to persuade a person to
assert a claim for personal injuries and to have sought to induce such
person to employ respondent, Ogle EB. Veach, to represent him and
that such’ conduct fully justifies disciplinary action against respondent
. by this court. In re: Gallant et al, 95 S8.W. (2d) 1249.”” His recom-
mendation of discipline on Count I was a suspension from the practice
of law for a period of one year, such suspension to commence at the
end of any term of suspension fixed under Count II.

We agree with the Commissioner. The purpose of disciplinary
proceedings, of course, is not to punish the offender, but to protect
the public and those- charged with the administration of justice.
Leimer v, Hulse, 352 Mo. 451, 178 S.W. 2d 335, 399. There was a
sufficient link in the circumstances here to connect the acts of the so-
ealled ‘‘Ross’’ (Garrett) with respondent; and he, by his own acts
and acquiescence, accepted them. The act of respondent in having
the name on the telephone message slip surreptitiously changed from
“Ross”? to Roy, without disclosure, was, in itself, a fraud on the
Commissioner. The very use of the name ‘‘Ross’”’? by Garrett was a
fraud. We accept and approve the findings and conclusions of the
Commissioner, and we sustain the charges contained in Count I of
the information.

Respondent, Ogle E. Veach, will be suspended from the practice
of law in Missouri, on the charges of which he-has herein been found
guilty under Count IT of the information, until September 24, 1958;
he will be further suspended from the practice of law’ in Missouri,
‘on the charges of which he has: been found guilty under Count T of
the information, for an additional period of one year; to begin on
September 24, 1958, and to end on September 23, 1959. All costs
are adjudged against respondent. It is so ordered. All concur.

2
‘Lypia M. Zmiie, (Plaintiff) Appellant, v. Emma L. Parzer and
Gustav H. Parzer, (Defendants) Respondents, No. 44886—287
8. W. (2d) 771.

Division One, March 12, 1956.

am A, Seibel for appellant.

Lester G. Seacat and Harry A. Hall for respondents.

[772] HYDE, J.—Action to quiet title to land in which defendant,
Emma L. Patzer (hereinafter called defendant) claimed an interest
on the ground that she had not been named or provided for in her
father’s will. The issues at the trial were whether defendant was a
pretermitted child under See. 468.290 (RSMo. and V.A.M.S.) and,
if so, whether her rights were barred by limitations. The trial court
entered a decree adjudging her to be the owner of an undivided %4,
interest in the land and plaintiff has appealed. : .

The father of plaintiff and defendant, George Zillig, died in
September 1926 and his will made in February of that year, in his
own handwriting, was as follows: ‘‘Brazito Mo. this is my last Will!
I leave the Home place with Buildings and House holdgoods to my
Daughter Lydia. What is left in the Shop you can put up at auction
and Divide the proceeds evenly between all of you with the little
money (if any) after my funeral is paid. If, Lydia should Marry you
ean sell the Homeplace if you see fit, except the Household goods,
they are to be Lydias entirley, and Divide what you get between all
of you. I appoint my two sons Herman and Otto as Exeecutors of.
this Will without Bond’? (Emphasis ours)

The testator’s wife had died before this will was made. At that
time, four of the testator’s seven children were living .with him
in his home place (which so far as the record shows. was the only-land .
he owned) ; they were plaintiff and three sons Henry, William and
Herman. His other three children were married and lived elsewhere;
they were his son Otto and his daughters Louise Blockberger and
defendant. Herman and plaintiff operated a general merchandise
store in a building they rented nearby. Henry and William con-
tinued to live in the home place after their father’s death, making
no contribution to the living costs, although one farmed and the
other worked at odd jobs. Before this suit was commenced, all three
of these brothers died single, unmarried and without issue. In 1954,

shortly before this suit was commenced, Otto and the children of Louise
(after hér death) conveyed to plaintiff by quitdléim deeds. In 1928,
all seven of the children had conveyed part of the home place, a tract
of the land 100 feet square, to the Brazito Farmers Telephone Com-
pany and the consideration of $50.00 was paid to and retained by’
plaintiff. In 1934, plaintiff alone made a deed to the State Highway
Commission for a strip 40 feet wide off of the home place for State
Highway 54. Tt'was also shown that plaintiff had paid all taxes, -
made repairs on the buildings and built a chicken house and brooder
house. .

Defendant contends that her father failed to name or provide
for her in his will and, therefore, died intestate as to her; and that
under Sec. 468.290 she was entitled to a one-seventh interest in the
land and has inherited additional interests from two of her brothers
who died without issue, claiming her father also died. intestate as ~
to them. Defendant points out that only three children are named
in the will (Lydia as a devisee and Herman and Otto as executors)
and claims there is no language in the will definite enough to desig-
nate any [773] others. Defendant cites and relies on Batley v.
Batley, 239 Mo. App. 664, 193 S. W. (2d) 64 and Pounds v. Dale, 48
Mo. 270, In the Batley case, the testator named his living children
(and so designated them) but did not mention or provide for his
grandchildren who were descendants of deceased children. It was .
held that designating the named children as his only living children
was not sufficient ‘‘to raise a clear implication or inference that he
intended to disinherit claimants.’’ In Pounds v. Dale, the testator
had nine children but left all of his property to his wife. His will’
also provided for paying debts to two of his sons for money borrowed
from them. .They were the only children named or referred to in”
any way in the will. The Court said it would guess that he meant to
disinherit his children ; but that to make the statute inapplicable ‘‘ ‘the
will must show upon its face that he remembered them; and though
they be not direétly named, there must be provisions or language
that point. directly to them.’ ’’ Therefore, it was held he died intestate
as to plaintiff. (See also Wetherall v. Harris, 51 Mo. 65 holding
that, where the children of the testator are neither expressly named
nor so alluded to in his will as to show affirmatively that they were in
his mind when making it, the presumption is conclusive that, they .
were forgotten.)

"The applicable statute (Sec. 468.290) is as follows: ‘‘If any person.
make his last will, and die, leaving a child or children, or descendants.
of such child or children in case of their death, not. named or pro-
vided for in such will, although born after the making of such will,.
or the death of the testator, every such testator, so far as shall regard
any such child or children, or their descendants, not provided for,
shall be deemed to die intestate; and such child or children, or their

descendants, shall be entitled to such proportion of the estate of the
testator, real and personal, as if he had died intestate, and the same
shall be assigned to them, and all the other heirs, devisees and
legatees shall refund their proportional part.’? (Emphasis ours.)
Only three of the'testator’s seven children were nainéd in the will but
the statute is inapplicable if they were all provided for in the will.
Children may be provided for as a class without naming them
separately. (McCourtney v. Mathes, 47 Mo. 533; Ernshaw v. Smith,
Mo. Sup., 2.8. W. (2d) 803, 57 Am. Jur. 404, Sec. 589; 26 C.J.S.
1050, Sec, 45; Annotations 152 A.L.R. 727, 170 ALR. 1338; In-
heritance by Pretermitted Children—Dainow, 82 Il. Law Rev.
I, 8.) In the McCourtney case, the Court reviewed the earlier cases,
and approved the construction of the statute made in Hockensmith v.
Slusher, 26 Mo. 287 ‘‘that the object of it is to produce an’ intestacy
only when the child, or the descendant of a deceased child, is un-
known or forgotten, and thus unintentionally omitted; and the
presumption that the omission is unintentional may be rebutted when
the tenor of the will or any part of it indicates that the child or grand-
child was not forgotten.’? The Court also pointed out that it had
been held in Guitar v. Gordon, 17 Mo. 408, that when a testator had.
named a daughter who was dead (making a bequest to her) but not
naming her children that this was 4 sufficient provision for these
grandchildren. This construction of the statute has been reaffirmed
by the Court En Bane in Lawnick v. Schultz, 325 Mo. 294, 28 S. W.
(2d) 658 and Miller v. Aven, 327 Mo. 20, 34 S. W. (2d) 116, over-
ruling Meyers v. Watson, 234 Mo. 286, 136 S. W. 236 which required
a bequest in a substantial amount to have such effect. In the Me-
Courtney case, the testator léft to his wifé all of his real and personal
estate and ‘‘also the sole and entire management and education of
my children’’; but provided that, if she married, ‘‘the estate in her °
Possession at that time shall be disposed of according to law among
my surviving heits.’’ The Court held that the will sufficiently showed
that all of the testator’s children were remembered and provided
for, saying’: ‘There are two allusions by the testator to his children;
one in giving to his widow their management and education, and one
in giving a remainder to his heirs, contingent upon her marriage.
They were all remembered or were all forgotten; and while he re-
membered [774] them collectively, can it be said that he had forgotten
them all individually? The object of the statute was to guard the
testator against the effect of a mistake in providing for some of his
children to the exclusion of others, through forgetfulness’ of their
existence, or in otherwise disposing of his property in such forgetful-
ness, and the failure to allude to them is made evidence that they were
so forgotten. In speaking of his children or heirs, had: the testator -
named some of them, with no allusion to the plaintiff,.we might then
assume that she was forgotten; but where all were remembered col-

lectively and equally provided for, with nothing to indicate that one
was more in his memory than another, we. must .assume that. each
one was remembered and provided for.’

In the Ernshaw case, land was left to a daughter for life, then
equally to. the-testator’s grandchildren surviving the: daughter. It
was contended by one of the grandchildren that there was no provision’
for him because the estate was contingent and he might die before the
life tenant. We said (2 S. W. (2d) 803): ‘‘We agree .with the appel-.
lant as to the character of the estate created but think it was a pro-
vision for appellant within the contemplation of the statute. The.
naming of grandchildren as a class, without further description,
includes all who answer that description at the time the will took
effect.’’ Cases in which it was held that the language of the will did ,
not sufficiently designate children or descendants are Goff v. Goff,
352 Mo. 809, 179 8. W. (2d) 707, 152 A.L.R. 717, where the will gave .
“to any person who might contest this will the sum of $1.00 only in.
lien of any other share or interest in. my estate, either under this
will or through intestate suecession’’; and Yeates v. Yeates, (Ark.),-
16S. W. (2d) 996, 65 A.L.R. 466, where the testator left his land to
a son, although stating he was under obligation to some of his chil-
dren, for care and attention during sickness, ‘‘and not to run any risk
as to other contesting their rights’? made his will without mention-
ing or providing for any of those who had cared for him; and ended
his will by ‘‘bequeathing $1.00 to each of the other contestants just
claims as being my children, all other claimants being debarred.”’ In
the latter case, while recognizing that a testator’s intention to give
children less than a full share, may be expressed ‘‘by providing for
them as a class without naming them separately’, the Court held ‘‘the.
will is so ambiguous that it is impossible. to say that he complied
-with the statute by naming his children either as a class or individ-
ually.’? This is the contention of defendant in this. case; and it is.
stated in her brief: ‘‘The phrase ‘all of you’ may mean either ‘all
of you’ three who were named, or ‘all of you! four children who
were living in the home place, or ‘all-of you’ seven children in the
family as plaintiff claims.’”? Nevertheless, it is clear that the phrase.
‘fall of you’? does refer to the testator’s children, whether. it re-
fers to those named in the will, those living at home,.or all seven
of them. If he meant children, is not the most reasonable meaning
of this phrase ‘‘all of you children?’’ If so, the will certainly would -
indicate that none of them were forgotten. It seems: unreasonable to
believe that he meant only the four living at home because he named
a son as executor who did not live at home. (Otto was married and.
lived in Kansas.) Likewise, it does not seem reasonable that he in-
tended to divide the proceeds from the auction only among the three
whose names appear in the will, leaving out the other children living
at home with him. In Pounds v. Dale, relied on by defendant (48

ne

Mo., le. 273) it is said: ‘‘Had the testator spoken of his children
in the aggregate, specifying none, we must infer they were all in his
mind.’’ Why is not saying ‘‘all of you’’ speaking of his children in
- the aggregate? How can it reasonably be said that such a designation
leaves out any one? If there had been a large amount to divide from
the auction, and a controversy over who was to share in it, who would
we decide were entitled to it? ‘Surely we would say all seven of them.
The well established rules of construction of wills are ‘that
“the keystone of construction in determining the meaning [775] of
any will is the intent of the testator’’; and that ‘“‘this intent must
be gathered from the whole will.’’ (Housman v. Lewellen, 362 Mo.
759, 244 S. W. (2d) 21; see also cases cited in West’s Missouri Digest
under Wills 438 and 470.) Likewise, ‘‘the ordinary, primary mean-
ing is to be given to the language of the will, unless other terms used
disclose that such meaning is repugnant to the testator’s intent as it
appears from the whole will.’’ (Housman v. Lewellen, supra, and
cases cited.) ° Considering this will as a whole and what it shows the
testator’s intent to be, we find that it leaves his home place and house-
hold goods to his daughter Lydia and provides for the rest :of his
property (only personal property) to be converted into money and
divided ‘‘evenly between all of you.’”’ Likewise, if Lydia should
marry (since she never married it is unnecessary to determine
-whether he meant before or after his death) then authority was given
to ‘‘sell the home place if you see fit’? (no doubt if ‘‘all of you’’ see
fit since no specific authority to sell was given to the executors) ‘‘and
divide what you get between all of you.’’? One.of the executors
named lived with the testator and thus would represent those children
who lived with him; the other was married and had his own home and
would represent those children who lived in their own homes. The
fact that all would be thus represented is certainly an indication of
the testator’s intent that this provision was for. the benefit of all his
children, There is no qualification whatever made to the words ‘‘all of
you’’ to show that, they meant any less than all seven. Obviously
these words. could not have referred to any persons other than the
testator’s children and defendant does not contend they did, but
says: only that there is doubt as to how many of his children he meant.
We think the reasonable construction of the will is that only Lydia
was .to have anything more than an equal share of the testator’s
property. and that he meant that, except. for the specifie property
given to Lydia, everything else went to all of his children equally. In
short, by ‘‘all of you” he meant ‘‘all.’’ Thus he made provision for
all of :his children in the aggregate as a class or group and defendant
is not a pretermitted child. We, therefore, hold that defendant has
no interest in the land involved,
. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions
to enter judgment declaring and quieting title in plaintiff. All concur.

State or Missount, Appellant, v. Harpy Porrtnerr, Respondent, No,
44611287 S. W. (2d) 782.

Division Two, March 12, 1956.

i

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Donal D. Guffey, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant.

Joslyn & Joslyn, L. D. Joslyn and T. B. Russell for respondent.

[782] LEEDY, J—Hardy Pottinger (herein called defendant)
was prosecuted in the Cireuit Court of Mississippi County for the
felony of obtaining money under false pretenses. The jury returned
a verdict of guilty, and fixed [783] his punishment at imprisonment
in the penitentiary for a term of two years. On the same day the
court, acting on its own motion, ordered that this verdict be set aside
(on the ground that the court should have sustained defendant’s
motions for a judgment of acquittal offered at the close of the state’s
case in chief, and at the close of all of the evidence), and entered in -
defendant’s favor a judgment of acquittal, from which order and
judgment the state prosecutes this appeal.

The action of which the state complains is more fully refiected in
those portions of the record of the trial subsequent to the coming in
of the verdict, as follows:

“Whereupon, the court orders the clerk to enter and file the
verdict aforesaid.

‘‘Now in the presence of the Prosecuting Attorney and the de-
fendant, as well.as his attorneys, Joslyn & Joslyn, the Court announces
that it has decided that it should have sustained defendant’s motion
for acquittal filed at the close of the State’s case, and erroneously
‘overruled the same; and that the Court should have sustained de-
fendant’s motion for acquittal filed at the close of all the evidence
in the. case and erroneously overruled the same; that the Court is at
this time setting aside the verdict of the jury for the reason that the
Court, has concluded as a matter of law the testimony in evidence in
the case is not sufficient to sustain a judgthent of conviction of the
offense charged. For that reason does hereby set aside the jury ver-
dict and enters its order of acquittal for the defendant.

‘It is therefore considered, ordered and. adjudged by the’ Court
that the defendant go hence without day, fully acquitted and dis-
-charged; and that he recover of the State of Missouri his costs in
this behalf expended and incurred, and that a bill of said costs be
certified to the State Auditor for allowance and payment.”’

Contending that neither the statutes or the rules of criminal pro-
cedure contemplate or permit an appeal by the state from such an
order and judgment, defendant filed in this court his motion to dis-
miss the state’s appeal, which was ordered taken with the case. We
proceed, then, to a determination of the question raised by the
motion.

- Rule 28.04, governing appeals by the state, provides as follows:

‘The state shall be entitled to take an appeal in the following cases
and in no others: :

“ (a) when, prior to judgment, upon motion or upon the court’s
own view, it is adjudged that an indictment or information is in-
sufficient ;

“(b) when a judgment is arrested or set aside.’

Rule 27.22 specifies the grounds upon which the court may arrest
or set aside a judgment, as follows:

“The court may, of its own initiative, arrest or set aside the judg-
ment before the transcript of the record is filed in the appellate
court if an appeal be taken, and in any event not later than thirty
days after entry thereof, upon either of the following grounds:

“*(1) that the facts stated in the indictment or information do not
constitute an offense, or

“«(2) that the court is without jurisdiction of the offense charged.
The effect of such an arrest of judgment shall be to place the de-
fendant in the same situation he was before the indictment was found
or the information filed.’’ :

The statute this rule was intended to supplant is § 547.050. Obvious-
ly, the court did not base its action upon the authority conferred by
Rule 27.22 or § 547.050, because insufficiency of the evidence is not
comprehended within the terms of either as a ground for arresting or
setting aside a judgment i in a criminal case.

It is to be borne in mind that there is no provision in the rules of
criminal procedure [784] corresponding to § 510.290 (applicable
only in civil cases) to the effect that if a motion for a directed verdict
is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to
have submitted the case to the jury subject to a later determination
of the legal question raised. by the motion, and further providing
that a party who has moved for a directed verdict may within ten
days move to have the verdict set aside, and to have - judgment
entered in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict. In such
respect, the procedure prevailing in the two types of cases is wholly
unlike.

In any view that may be taken of the court’s action, it is certain
that there was no warrant in law for entering a judgment discharging’
the prisoner at the stage of the proceedings indicated. This is true-
even if it be conceded that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain.
the charge, but we do not reach the merits of the latter question be-
cause of the disposition we find it necessary to make of .the defend-:
ant’s motion to dismiss.

In support of its right to appeal in the case at bar, the state invokes
paragraph (b) of Rule 28.04, contending that the action of the.trial
court in setting aside the verdict and entering a judgment of acquittal
“constitutes an arrest of .judgment.’’ Taken literally, the terms of:
that paragraph may lend color to the state’s view. But it is to be
remembered that this rule was established pursuant to the rule-mak- |
ing power conferred on the Supreme Court by Art. V, § 5, Const, of
Missouri. Limitations upon the exercise of that power are thus enu-
merated in the section just mentioned: ‘‘The rules shall not change
substantive rights, or. the law relating to evidence, the oral examina-
tion of witnesses, - juries, the right of trial by jury, or the right of,
appeal.’’ (Italics mine.) In consequence of these, limitations Rule,
28.04 could not constitutionally change the state’s right of appeal as.
it existed as of the effective date of the rule, by enlarging or extending
it to other matters, subjects or things, nor do we think it purports to
do so. The rule is derived from § § 547.200 and 547.210 under which
the right was limited to those instances, and only those,.where ‘‘any.
indictment or information is adjudged insufficient upon demurrer.
or exceptions, or where judgment thereon is arrested or set aside.’’
True, paragraph (b) does not say, in terms, as did the statute, that
the arrest or setting aside of a judgment, to be appealable, shall be
upon an adjudication of insufficiency of the indictment or information,
but such is the plain import of the paragraph notwithstanding the-
omission of the word ‘‘thereon.”

As said in State v. Craig, 2238 Mo. 201, 202, 122 S.W. 1006, “As a a
general rule the State has no right to a writ of error or to an appeal
in a criminal prosecution, from a judgment. in favor of a defendant,-
whether upon a verdict of acquittal or upon the determination by the
court of a question of law,.unless it be expressly conferred by statute
in the plainest and most.unequivocal, terms. [12 Cyc., :p. 804; State v.
‘Wear, 145 Mo, 162.]’’ In the Craig case the state appealed from a
judgment sustaining defendant’s plea in abatement to an indictment,
and it was held the appeal would not lie because sustaining a plea in
abatement did not come within the terms of the statute which provided
that an appeal would lie when an indictment is quashed or adjudged
insufficient on demurrer.

In State v. Bollinger, 69 Mo. 577, defendant had entered plea of
guilty to a charge of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of ten years. He then moved to arrest the

judgment on the ground that at the time of the commission of the
offense he was a slave, and as such not liable to punishment. The
motion in arrest was sustained, and the state appealed. It was there
held that the state’s right of appeal was limited to those cases where,
either on motion to quash, on demurrer or on motion in arrest of
judgment, the indictment had been adjudged insufficient either in
form or substance. In so holding, the court said: ‘‘The first question -
which the record before us presents is, whether the state can prosecute
an appeal under the circumstances disclosed upon [785] the face of it.
Sections 18 and 14, Wag. Stat. 1114 provide as follows: 13. ‘The state
in any criminal prosecution shall be allowed an appeal only in the
cases and under the circumstances mentioned in the next succeeding
section.’ 14. “When any indictment is quashed, or adjudged insuf-
ficient on demurrer, or when judgment thereon is arrested, the court
in which the proceedings were had either from its own knowledge, or
from information given by the prosecuting attorney and there -is
reasonable ground to believe the defendant can be convicted of an
offense, if properly charged, may cause the defendant to be committed
or recognized to answer a new indictment: or if the prosecuting
attorney prays an appeal to the supreme court, the court may in its
discretion grant an appeal.’ We think it clear that under the above
sections the right of the state to prosecute an appeal is limited to those
cases where the indictment has been adjudged to be insufficient either
on motion to quash, on demurrer, or motion in arrest of judgment be-
cause of defective indictment.’’ State v. Risley, 72 Mo. 609; State v:
Heisserer, 83 Mo. 692; State v. Ashcraft, 95 Mo. 848, 8 S.W. 216;
State v. Rowe, 22 Mo. 328.

State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1, 17 8.W. 646, 14 L.R.A. 846, on
which the state relies in its reply brief, while critical of certain recitals
in the Bollinger case, agrees that the statute there under scrutiny
had not provided an appeal on behalf of the state, nor did it regard
the Bollinger case as decisive of the appeal question in Burgdoerfer 3
case, which was held to extend to the state in all cases in which the
indictment was for any reason held. insufficient on motion to quash,
on demurrer, or on motion in arrest.

No appeal can be taken’ by the state in the case at bar because it
does not come within Rule 28.04, nor the statute, § 547.210, which the
rule was intended to supplant. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
All concur.

Srarz or Missouri, Respondent, v. Jamms McCrary, Appellant, No.
. _ 44987—287 S. W. (2d) 785.

Division Two, March 12, 1956.

Ward & Reeves for appellant.

po

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Aubrey R. Hammett, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

[786] EAGER, P.J.—Defendant was charged by information with
first degree murder. He was found guilty of second degree murder
and sentenced to ten years’ confinement. He has appealed. The case
has been briefed here on his behalf, and the sole contention made is that
a previous trial at which the jury was discharged for failure to agree,
constituted former jeopardy. The point was raised ‘at the last trial
by motions for acquittal and after the trial by a motion for acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict.

More specifically, the contentions of défendant are: that the dis-
charge of the jury was improper because done in his absence; that
he had clearly been placed in jeopardy, and that this jeopardy could
only be nullified or terminated by a lawful and proper discharge. of
the jury ; that, therefore, he must now be discharged. The proceedirigs
of the first trial lasted three days, exclusive of the deliberations of
the jury. The jury deliberated for approximately forty-six hours,
Jess rather limited recesses. During this time its ynembers had twice
made ‘‘their report to the court,” presumably concerning. their prog-
ress. On the day of the discharge the record shows the following:
“And now at 7:45 P.M. again come the jury in this cause into open
court and again make their report to, the court that they are now'and
have heen unable to agree on the guilt or innocence of the’ defendant

herein and therefore the court doth order that the [787] jury selected
to try this cause be discharged.’’ It does not appear that the defendant
was in custody at any time during either trial; on the contrary, the
record indicates that he. was at liberty on bond. By evidence adduced
in support of the after-trial motion for acquittal it appears that at
the time the jury reported finally and was discharged, defendant
had voluntarily gone down to the county courtroom on the floor below
the circuit courtroom; when he returned to the circuit courtroom, his
son-in-law having called him, the jury was just leaving; he asserts
that he then learned for the first time that the jury had been dis-
charged. The record does not show whether his counsel was then
present. No objection to the discharge of the jury was then shown of
record.

The claim of defendant here is based on his right and privilege to
be present at every material stage of the trial. See § 546.030, RSMo
1949, V.A.M.S. (all future references will be to those statutes unless
otherwise stated), Rule 29.02 of this court, the double jeopardy pro-
visions of § 19, Art. I, Missouri Constitution, 1945, and also § 18(a)
of the same Article. It will be noted that § 19, supra, expressly confers
upon the court the right, in its discretion, to discharge a jury which
fails to render a verdict, thus -expressly eliminating the double
jeopardy defense if a jury is properly discharged. Section 546.080,
supra, and Rules 29.02 and 29.03 provide that no person shall be tried
for a felony unless he ‘‘be personally present during the trial,’’ but
that a verdict may be received by the court in his absence when such
absence is ‘‘willful or voluntary.’’? The proviso just mentioned was
added by amendment in 1879 after this court held that it was reversi-
ble error for the trial court to receive a verdict of guilty in the ab-
sence of the defendant, even though her absence was due to the fact
that she had escaped from the sheriff (State v. Buckner, 25 Mo. 167).

Counsel cite in support of their contention the following cases:
State v. Smith et al., 90 Mo. 37, 1 S.W. 753; (reported in the latter
citation by a different name) State v. Ulmo, 19 Wash. 2d 663, 143 P.
2d 862; State v. Chandler, 128 Or. 204, 274 Pac. 308; State v. Wilson,
50 Ind. 487; Stough v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. Rep. 62, 128 P. 2a 1028;
Bagwell v. State, 129 Ga. 170, 58 S.E. 650; Upchurch v. State, 36 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 624, 38 S.W. 206; Rudder v. State, 29 Tex. App. 262, 15
S.W. 717; Ex Parte Thomas, 127 Tex. Orim. Rep. 248, 75 S.W. 24
681; State v, Reynolds, 845 Mo. 79, 181 S.W..2d 552; Holt v. State,
160 Tenn. 366, 24 S.W. 2d 886; State v. Schuchardt, 18 Neb. 454, 25
N.W. 722; State v. Sommers, 60 Minn. 90, 61 N.W. 907; State v.
Smith, 44 Kan. 75, 24 Pac, 84. We have considered and read all of
these and various others. Space will not permit the discussion of each
case individually. Most of these cases from other states held, general-
ly, that a discharge of the jury in the absence of the defendant was
equivalent to an acquittal because of the double jeopardy provisions

Lt

of their respective constitutions or statutes. In substantially all of
those cases, however, it affirmatively appeared that the defendant was
in jail at the time, and that his absence was most certainly not volun-
tary. The Ulmo, Stough, Bagwell and Wilson cases emphasize the fact
of the enforced absence of the defendant; in fact, the court in the Ulmo
case said that it was omitting a discussion of those cases where the
defendant had voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings at
a time when he should have anticipated that the jury might report.
Some of the cases so cited appear to have been decided primarily on
other points than the absence of the defendant (see: Upchurch, Holt
and Schuchardt cases) as, for instance, that there was no sufficient
showing of a necessity for the discharge of the jury at all, In State
v. Reynolds, 345 Mo. 79, 181 S.W. 2d 552, it was merely held that when
defendant requested and procured a continuance after the jury was
empaneled he had consented to the discharge and could not later
plead double jeopardy. We fail to see why counsel cited that case.
In State v. Smith, 90 Mo. 37, 1 8.W. 753, it appeared that defendant
had been absent during the entire voir dire examination of [788] the
jury panel and at some preceding steps; the court offered to permit
further examination when defendant appeared but refused to allow
additional time for challenges, as requested. A motion to quash the
panel was filed promptly and overruled. It appeared that defendant
was not in custody, but it was not shown whether he had been notified
when the jury would be examined. The court held that the motion to
quash ‘should have been sustained and reversed the judgment of con-
viction; in so doing it noted that defendant has been absent during
a highly material part of the proceedings, that the public had an
interest ih the trial of criminal causes and that even if defendant’s
absence be considered voluntary, there could be no waiver. The court
also said that the expression of the one exception in the statute (now
§ 546.080) permitting the court to receive a verdict during a volun-
tary or willful absence of the defendant, excluded all authority to
take other steps in defendant’s absence. No question of double
jeopardy was ‘involved there. We shall refer to this ease again later.

Several courts have held that the absence of the defendant when a
jury was discharged did not constitute prejudicial error or operate
as an acquittal; this, largely on the theory that the discharge of the
jury was a matter wholly within the discretion of the trial court, that
defendant could have done nothing but object if he had been present,
that such objection would undoubtedly have been unavailing, and
that no prejudice had resulted. To this effect see: State v. Farne, 190
S.C. 75, 1 S.B. 2d 912; Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, Ky., 12 8.W.
148; State v. Vaughan, 29 Iowa 286; State v. White, 19 Kan, 445. In
the Farne, Yarbrough and Vaughan cases the defendanits were in jail.
In the Farne case the court said that ‘“‘* * * in recent years, it is be-
lieved, there has been a reaction against the idea that the punishment

of crime is a sort of invasion of natural right * * *,’? and held that
it was more in accordance with due administration of the law and good
sense to hold that there had been no former jeopardy. In Common:
wealth v. McCarthy, 163 Mass. 458, 40 N.E. 766, a verdict of ‘guilty
was received during the voluntary absence of the defendant; Massa-
chusetts had no statute, such as ours, expressly permitting this to be
done. The court held that since defendant was not in custody (as the
court said was true in most of the reported cases) he was not deprived
of his right to be present and his voluntary absence would be deemed
a waiver of that right; furthermore, that it would be wholly unreason-
able to let a defendant have it within his power to make it impossible
to complete the trial if, perchance, he should see indications that the
verdict might be against him, for he might then by absconding,
nullify all that had been done. The court might have well gone-
further, in view of the present contention, for it would seem that on
defendant’s theory here the defendant might by absconding, work
an acquittal.

It has been held in various cases that a defendant waives his right
to be present at a given stage of the trial by voluntarily absenting him-
self. Thus, see: Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675, 86 Am. Dee, 736 (return
of verdict) ; United States v. Noble, 294 F. 689, aff. (C.A. 9), 300 F.
689 (additional instructions to jury) ; State v. Way, 76 Kan. 928, 93
P. 159 (return of verdict) ; State v. Smith, 183 Wash, 136, 48 P. 2d
581, 100 A.L.R. 474 (taking of testimony) ; Lowman v. State, 80 Fla.
18, 85 So. 166 (absences during questioning of juror and during the
taking of testimony) ; People v. Harris, 302 Ill. 590, 185 N.H. 75 (ab-
sence from substantial part of trial); State v. McGinnis, 12 Idaho
336, 85 P. 1089 (argument of counsel) ; State v. Rubaka, 82 Conn.
59, 72 A. 566 (examination of jurors) ; Yates v. Commonwealth, 215
Ky. 725, 286 §.W. 1046 (taking of testimony) ; Kindrick v. Common-
wealth, 226 Ky. 144, 10 S.W. 2d 639 (retirement of jury); State v.
Thurston, 77 Kan. 522, 94 P. 1011 (reading portions of evidence back
to jury) ; Scott v. State, 113 Neb. 657, 204 N.W. 381 (further instrie-
tions to jury); Henry v. State, 94 Fla. 783, 114 So. 528 (return of
verdict) ; Barton v. [789] State, 67 Ga. 653, 44 Am. Rep. 743 (return
of verdict) ; Frey v. Calhoun, 107 Mich. 130, 64 N. W. 1047 (return of
verdict). And see the annotation in 100 A.L.R. at pages 480 et seq.;
where most of the above cases and others are discussed, and the cases
cited in 28 A.L.R. 2d, page 478 et seq.; also, Dangel, Crim. Taw,
(1951) pp. 345 et seq.

The Missouri courts have held brief absences of a defendant during
the taking of evidence or during argument té be nonprejudicial error.
Thus see: State v. Gonce, 87 Mo. 627; State v. Bell, 70 Mo. 633; State
v. Grate, 68 Mo. 22. This court stated (State v. Gonce, 87 Mo., 1. ¢.
633) that to reverse a judgment on account of a brief voluntary
absence of the defendant, when such was not called to the attention

of the court, ‘‘would be to establish a dangerous precedent * * *,”
In State v. Murphy, 292 Mo. 275, 237 S.W. 529, it appeared that de-
fendant had been absent during the taking of some more or less
formal testimony ; when he returned, most of the testimony was taken
again. This court held that he was not prejudiced, though stating
that his presence ‘‘could not be waived.”’

In State vy. Brewer, 109 Mo. 648, 19 S.W. 96, complaint was made
that the defendant (who was on bail) had been absent at the time of
the qualification of one juror. In discussing the matter, the court
said: ‘‘This practice cannot be tolerated. The improper impaneling
of the jury was a matter of exception, As none was taken, it cannot
be noticed here. State v. Hayes, 81 Mo. 574. We are cited to State v.
Smith, 90 Mo. 37. In that. case the defendant brought the matter to
the attention of the-court and demanded the right to examine the
jurors on voir dire. This being refused, he duly saved his exceptions.
That case went to the extreme. We are not disposed to extend it. When
a defendant is on bail, it is his duty to be in attendance upon the
court. The judge has other duties to perform besides watching the
personal movements of the defendant. No possible prejudice is sug-
gested here as resulting from this temporary absence, and it is no
ground for reversal. State v. Grate, 68 Mo. 22.’’ In State v. Hope,
100 Mo. 347, 18 S.W. 490, in discussing the proviso of the statute per-~
mitting a verdict to be received during defendant’s voluntary or will-
ful absence, the court says that the statute ‘‘evidently proceeds on the
assumption that by such wilful or voluntary absence the defendant
waives the right to be present, * * *’? We mention this merely to
illustrate the recognition of the doctrine of ‘‘waiver’’ in the Missouri
law, despite the case of-State v. Smith, 90 Mo. 87, 1 S.W. 753. The
court there further said, lc. 359: ‘‘* * * The issue actually before
‘us requires only a decision upon the validity of a waiver, by defend-
ant’s own act, of his right to be personally present at the rendition of
the verdict.’’ The court then held the statute to be constitutional and
apparently regarded it as merely a recognition and expression of the
common law waiver by defendant of a right which he had. As further
illustrating this view, the court cited, evidently with approval, a
number of cases holding that even in the absence of a statutory pro-
viso such as ours, a voluntary absence by defendant constituted a
waiver of his right to be present either at the rendition of a verdict or
at other phases of the trial. (100 Mo., Le. 360). -

In State v. Neal, 350 Mo. 1002, 169 8.W. 24 686, it was held that a
defendant could and did waive his constitutional right to be present
at the presentation of his motion to quash the indictment; although he
was in jail at the time,

Respondent urges that the discharge of the jury for failure to agree
is not a material part of the trial. To this.we cannot assent, and we
prefer to put our decision on other grounds. From a consideration of

the authorities we conclude that while a defendant in a felony case
has the inherent right to be present at all material stages of his trial,
if he consciously and voluntarily absents himself from the place of
trial at a time when the jury is discharged after adequate deliberation,
for a failure to agree, he may not complain. We confine [790] this
decision strictly to the facts of this case; it makes no great difference
whether we call this an implied waiver or merely a failure of defend-
ant to exercise his right and privilege to bé present. We think that
the present wording of our statute (§ 546.030) permitting the recep-
tion of a verdict during the voluntary or willful absence of the defend-
ant is declaratory of a policy that such rights may be waived. We do
not agree with the statements in State v. Smith, supra, that’ the ex-
pression of that exception necessarily excludes all other exceptions,
and that in no other instance may the actual presence of defendant be
waived. It is certainly no more important that defendant be present
when a mistrial'is declared than that he be present when a verdict is
returned. We do not believe that the legislature meant to say that the
defendant must, in all events, be present at every other stage of the
trial. We are not overruling the Smith case; it is based ‘on entirely
different facts; we do hold, however, that the language so used there
should not be applied to the situation presented in this case. The
same is true of the statement in State v. Murphy, -292 Mo. 275, 237
S.W. 529, that defendant’s presence ‘‘could not be waived.’’

In this case defendant’s absence was evidently inadvertent. But to
hold that a defendant, who is at liberty during the trial, must in all
events be present at every material step, is to place in his hands the
power completely to nullify the trial. If he should absent himself and
remain away the court would simply have to suspend all proceedings,
and eventually discharge the jury and declare a mistrial. And then,
on the present coritentions, the defendant would also claim an im-
proper discharge and the right to an acquittal because of the jeopardy
of the unfinished trial. Such a result is to us unthinkable. It is the
‘duty of such a defendant ‘‘to wait upon the court,’’ and to be present
at all times whén he may anticipate that proceedings might take
place; here a jury had been out for approximately two days, and
certainly its report and discharge could not have been wholly unex-
pected. Moreover, we think that defendant’s absence here, and under
these circumstances, could not have been prejudicial. Our present
holding is based on this fact, as well as the fact of a waiver. We must
presume that the court here properly exercised his discretion in dis-
charging the jury, and certainly the facts of record so indicate; in-
deed, the contrary is not suggested. It would have been the better
practice to wait for the defendant, but the discharge of the jury was
not wrongful or illegal and did not work an acquittal. _

Some authorities seem to distinguish between a waiver of | the right
to be present in capital cases and in felony cases generally. (Annota-

tion, 23 A.L.R. 2d 491; 23 C.J.S. Crim. Law, § 975). We see no logical
basis for the distinction, for the state is interested, certainly, in all
felony prosecutions. Moreover, the Missouri Legislature, in amending
our statute in 1879 (now § 546.030), made no distinction between the
requirement of the presence of the defendant in capital cases and in
other felony cases; unless it speaks again we may well regard this as a
declaration of state policy. The question is more or less academic here,
for the only conviction is of second degree murder with a ten-year
sentence imposed.

‘The details of due process are not dictated to the states, and in this
class of eases, generally, no federal question is involved. Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 59 L. Ed. 969. It is within the power of a
state to establish its rules of practice in such matters (id.).

We feel that the principles here announced better promote the
administration of justice than would a literal and dogmatic interpreta-
tion of the statute and rules providing for defendant’s presence; we
do not believe that in this decision we are infringing upon the defend-
ant’s inherent right and privilege to be present. Finding, thus, that
the discharge of the jury at the first trial was not illegal or improper,
and that such trial did not, under our Constitution, constitute a
former jeopardy, the present judgment is affirmed.

It is so ordered. All concur.

Honey T. Granam,. Frances N. Anprrson, Louise: B. MoCarrry,
. Epwa F, Getnnorn, Bonrta S. Ruwpz, Mary E. Narpiy, Mary
L, Bears, and Litaian A. Sap, For and In Behalf of All Mem-
- bers of the College Club of St. Louis, St. Louis Branch of the
American Association of University Women, Who are or May Be
in Similar Status, Plaintifis-Appellants, v. Maramry A. Kircn-*
wor, Karatenn L. Hammonp, and Rura Puummer, on Behalf
of All Members of an Organization, Formerly and Now Known
as’ The College Club of St. Louis, Now a Corporation, Cottzen
i, Cuus or Sr. Louis, a Corporation, and Mrrcanrine-ComMprcn
Bank anp Trust Company, Now Known as Mercantire Trust
Company, a Corporation, Defendants-Respondents, No. 44654—

+ 987 8. Wy (2d) 830.

Division One, March 12, 1956.

§

Hal A. Hamilton for appellants.

Fred J. Hoffmeister and Paul ¥. Plummer for respondents.

[881] WESTHUES, J.—This is a suit in equity to determine
title to real estate located at 5428 Delmar Boulevard, in the City of
St. Louis, Missouri, and personal property, mostly bonds and cash,
of a value in excess of $11,300. The trial court found that plaintifis
had no interest therein and from the decree entered, plaintiffs ap-
pealed.

A schism occurred in the College Club of St. Louis, St. Louis
Branch of the American Association of University Women, a Mis-
souri corporation. Plaintiffs, representing one of the groups, contend
that they are entitled to the property. Defendants contend title to
the property to be in the corporation. For a better understanding of
the contentions of the parties, we shall relate a history of the events
preceding the schism.

In 1899, a national organization known as the Association of Col-
legiate Alumnae was founded. In 1921, its name was changed to
American Association of University Women (sometimes called
A.A.U.W. for the sake of brevity). In 1901, the College Club of St.
Louis was organized. In 1898, the St. Louis Branch of the Association
of Collegiate Alumnae came into being. The objectives of these clubs
were about the same and, in 1921, the two St. Louis organizations
were merged and were granted a charter by a pro forma decree of the
Cireuit Court of St. Louis under the name of College Club of
St. Louis, St. Louis Branch of the American Association of Univer-
sity Women. The purposes of the corporation were that of ‘‘uniting
college women for social companionship and for the promotion of
educational and other interests beneficial to the community, to
promote and foster among its members and others an interest in
the sciences, liberal arts and general education and to advance the
cause of other civic interests in the community and to render assist-
ance to worthy young women in securing a college or university
training.”

In the course of time, the organization accumulated property in-
cluding a Club House located at 5428 Delmar Boulevard which was
used as headquarters, a place for meetings, lectures, other educational
and social activities of the club. There were also several bedrooms
rented to club members who lived at the club.

In carrying out its educational and philanthropic purposes, the
club was governed by By-Laws. Included therein were requirements
for membership which, in substance, provided that an application for
membership was examined by a committee and if an applicant was
found to be eligible, she was admitted to membership subject to the
further approval of the national organization.

The organization seems to have functioned smoothly until 1949
by which time the club had ‘‘spent approximately $65,900.00 on
Freshman Scholarships and on loans to girls after the Freshman year,
and * * * made college possible for 226 girls.” In 1949, the local

Branch: was notified of a proposed change in the By-Laws of the
national organization and that its adoption or rejection would be
determined at a national convention to be held in June, 1949, at
Seattle, Washington. The proposed by-law which was adopted at
the national convention above-mentioned provided in substance that
a woman holding an approved degree from an approved institution
should.be entitled to membership in the Association on presentation
of her proper credentials and on payment of dues. The by-law con-
eluded with this provision: ‘‘The provisions set forth in this section
[832] are the sole requirements of eligibility and admissibility for
membership both in the national Association and in a branch.’’ This
"was a radical change in the procedure. The local by-laws provided
the basis of the practice long followed, that is, that the local club
reserved the right to approve or reject an applicant for member-
ship. To establish this practice, the St. Louis Branch, in December,
1983;-adopted the following resolution: ‘‘RESOLVED, that it be the
policy of this club that the name of each person applying for mem-
bership: in the club shall be proposed by some club member, and that
the names of applicants, after being passed by the Membership Com-
mittee, be brought before the Board of Managers for approval.’’

It is apparent that the amendment of the By-Laws of the national
organization presented a -conflict with the By-Laws of the St. Louis
Branch.

The A.A.U.W. held national conventions biennially. The St. Louis
Branch’ was entitled to representation at the national convention
through delegates. Lillian A. Stead, the President of the St. Louis
Branch, aud Lillian Stupp were sent to the national convention in
June, 1949, as delegates. Prior to the time of this convention, the
proposed change in the By-Laws of A.A.U.W. was the subject of much
discussion and the club submitted to its members for a vote the
question of whether the club delegates should be instructed to vote
for of against the proposed amendment. This vote resulted in 101
votes against the amendment arid 76 approving it. The delegates
obeying the instructions voted against the amendment. Nevertheless,
the proposed change was adopted. This created quite a serious
problem for the St. Louis Branch. To continue to be affiliated with the
national organization, it ‘was obligated to conform to the By-Laws of
the ‘national organization. Many members of the St. Louis Branch
did not want to surrender the right to control the admission of new
members, After much discussion at meetings of the club, it was de-
cided 'to submit to the membership the question of whether the club
should terminate its affiliation with the national organization. It
was agreed that the majority of those voting would decide the issue.
The form of the ballot submitting the question was as follows:

“1, Ivote that the College Club of St. Louis, St. Louis Branch

of the A.A.U.W., remain a branch of the American Association —
of University ‘Women.
“°2, I vote that this organization, the College Club of St. Louis,

St. Louis Branch of the A.A.U.W., terminate its affiliation with .

the American Association of University Women and take the’

necessary legal action to amend its charter in order to effectuate °

fully its change of name.”’

Of the 385 members eligible to vote, 319 votes were cast, showing
181 voting to remain with the Association and 188 voting to with:
draw. One of the plaintiffs here, Lillian A. Stead, as President df
the St. Louis Branch, notified the national organization of the action
taken by the vote and that the local Branch was withdrawing froni
national. This occurred on October 11, 1949.

Many of the members of the club refused to abide by the aétion of
the majority and withdrew from the local club or did ‘not thereaftet
pay dues to it. The officers and board of directors of the then’ St.
Louis Branch resigned at a meeting, the resignations to be effective
when a new board was elected. On October 22, 1949, a petition was
filed by the defendant corporation in the Cireuit Court of the City of
St. Louis, Missouri, asking that the name be changed from thé College
Club of St. Louis, St. Louis Branch of American Association of Uni-
versity Women to “the College Club of St. Louis. The court appointed
an amicus curiae to determine the advisability of granting the re-
quest. Many of the group that wanted to remain’with the national
organization, including all named plaintiffs in this suit, on behalf of
themselves and one hundred and fifty others, filed objections to the pro-
posed change in name. After a hearing, [883] the amicus curiae re-
ported to the court recommending that the name be ¢hanged. The
trial court entered a decree accordingly and no appeal was taken
from that judgment.

_ The group which contested the change i in the name of the _corpora-
tion was composed of the plaintiffs in the ptesent suit. “Eyer sinde
the withdrawal of the club from the national organization, the
property of the corporation, including the house, bonds, and casi,
has been under the control and possession of the defendant corpora
tion and its officers. Plaintiffs and the group represented by them
have continued their membership in the national Association. This
is permissible under the A.A.U.W. By-Laws which provide:

“Article ITI Membership and Dues

“Section 1. Composition—The membership of the Associa- °

tion shall consist of individual and corporate’ members.’ The

Association is an association of members which functions through

regional, state, and branch divisions. It is not a federation of ©

local groups.’

It is. the contention of plaintiffs that their group remained loyal
to the national organization and that they and not the defendants

™ a

or the defendant corporation are entitled to the property of the
club. That presents the principal question for our decision.

Hn the first point briefed, plaintifs claim that they are not
bound by the action of the trial court in the case wherein the court
changed the name of the corporation. They say that title to the
property was not directly in issue in that case. Title to the property
was not involved or adjudicated in that case. .50 O.J.8. 282, See. 735.
However, many questions were adjudicated in that case which are
binding on plaintifis in this case. Plaintiffs by their objections made
in the suit for change of name of the corporation questioned the
authority of the President and other officers to act on behalf of the
corporation in filing the suit; they questioned the legality of the
proceedings of the corporation which resulted in the election of those
officers; they questioned the right of the corporation to change its
name and the legality of the proceedings authorizing the change.
These questions were adjudicated in that case and are binding on
plaintiffs in this case. The questions were proper questions to, be
determined and must be considered res judicata in this case. 50
C.J.8. 206, See. 721.

In the second point briefed, plaintiffs say that ‘‘The by-laws
of a club constitute a contract between the club and its members, and
the by-laws are of as great a weight as the charter of the corporation
in determining whether procedures of the club have been proper.”
If by that assignment plaintiffs seek to question the legality of the
procedures of the club by which the board of directors and the
officers resigned and a new board and officers were elected in the fall
of 1949, our answer must be that the legality of that procedure was
determined in the former case when .the name of the corporation
was changed. .

The plaintiffs in this case participated in all of the proceed-
ings which resulted in the withdrawal of the club from the national
organization and the resignation of the board and officers of the
corporation. They now say in point three of their brief that ‘‘No
estoppel arises where one may have concurred in or even aided in
the commission of a wrong and who later takes an opposite position
and seeks to right that wrong.’’ One case is cited as authority for
that statement, Kuhl v. Meyer, 42 Mo. App. 474. In that case, a
majority of the members of an unincorporated society attempted to
divert the funds of the society and to distribute them among the
members. That action was contrary to the purposes for which the
funds were held under the constitution of the society. The action
was held to be illegal and void. The case does not help plaintiffs.
The actions of the defendant corporation in [884] withdrawing
from the national organization and in changing its name cannot be
held to be illegal. The funds of the corporation were never diverted
from the purposes for which they were held. The College Club of St.

Louis continued the educational and philanthropic activities in the
same manner as it had pridr to the change of name. It is true that
after withdrawing from the national organization, it no longer had
a voice in the national Association. That-was true of the College Club
of St. Louis prior to the merger in 1921. The activities of the club
were then the-same as now and also the same as during the period
when it was a branch of the national organization. The point must be
ruled against plaintiffs.

In point four, plaintifis say that ‘‘Where rights and remedies
within an organization have been exhausted, a member or members
thereof may resort to the Courts for redress.’’ Plaintiffs have not
been denied an opportunity to litigate their-grievances in court.
They actively participated in the suit for a change of ‘name of the
corporation. They now are litigating the question of the ownership of
the property. It is evident, therefore, that plaintiffs’ point is with-
out merit.

HI The final point briefed, reads as follows: ‘‘Neither a minority
nor even a majority of the members of an organization: can by their
actions take possession of the property of that organization and divert
it from the purpose for which it was acquired and to which it was
devoted, and that faction remaining loyal to the general organization
is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the organization’s property.’’
In that statement, it is assumed that the property in question was
diverted from the purposes for which it was acquired and to which it
was devoted. The evidence as above-indicated showed the contrary
to be true. Plaintiffs contend that the By-Laws of the national Associa-
tion do not provide for the withdrawal of a brarich. ‘The By-Laws are
silent on this question. However, the By-Laws of the national organi-
zation do provide that in case a branch refuses to abide bythe By-
Laws of national, it forfeits its membership. Note what the A.A.U.W.
By-Laws provide: ‘‘A branch shall be deemed to have forfeited its
right to continue as a branch for any of the following reasons:
If * * * a branch * * *, or has maintained branch by-laws or
practices in conflict with the national Charter and By-Laws; * * *,”

By withdrawing its membership as a branch, the defendant cor-
poration is in the same position as if it had waited to. be (and had
been) ousted by national. The only effect of such forfeiture of the
branch would be that the defendant corporation would no longer be
affiliated with national. The property of the corporation would not
thereby be transferred to national nor, to any group that might agree
to withdraw its membership from the corporation branch and retain
membership in national.

The theory of plaintiffs was stated at the trial of this case as fole
lows: ‘* * * it is our contention that, when you boil it right down,
it is. the members themselves that own the property ; the maj cans
not deprive the minority of their property, as: long. as they operate as

a continuing branch of the National Association—and, there are vari-
ous cases so holding.’’ That statement is not a correct declaration of
the applicable law. It ignores the fact that this is an incorporated
club and title to the property is in the corporation and not in the
membership. See 14 C.J.S. 1280, 1281, Sec. 4, where the rule is thus.
stated: ‘‘In case of the incorporation of a pre-existing club, the
corporation generally succeeds to its property.’’ A member of an
incorporated club like the defendant in this case does not have any
title to any of the property. In case a member resigns or for any
other reason ceases to be a member, all rights of the member are ter-
minated, :

It is evident that the trial court ruled correctly in holding that the
title to the property in question is vested in the defendant corporation.
- The judgment is affirmed. All concur.

KAMO Evnorric Coopnrarive, Ine., Appellant, v. Cuarence S, Bakur
and Azice Baker, Respondents, No. 44809—287 8. W. (2d) 858.

Division Two, March 12, 1956.

Andrew Howard and Bill Davenport for respondents.

[860] STOCKARD, C.—This is an appeal from a judgment in the
amount of $1,200 awarded to respondents as compensation for the
appropriation by plaintiff of an easement by condemnation for the
construction, operation and maintenance of an electric transmission
line over respondents’ land. On appeal to the Springfield Court of
Appeals the judgment [861] was affirmed. KAMO Electric Co-
operative v. Baker, Mo. App., 274 S.W. 2d 497. The case was trans-
ferred here pursuant to the provisions of §10, Art. V of the Missouri
Constitution, 1945, because of the general interest in and the impor-
tance of the questions involved ; therefore it is here as though upon an
original appeal.

By its petition, appellant sought to appropriate a perpetual ease-
ment 100 feet in width and 3,525 feet in length over the real estate of
respondents (1) for the construction, operation and maintenance of
an electric transmission line; (2) to construct necessary gates in
fences in order to permit ingress and egress to said electric transmis-
sion line; (3) to cut and trim trees and to remove any obsiructions
within the 100 foot right of way which would interfere with the con-
struction, operation and maintenance of the transmission line; and (4)
to cut down and remove any tree or growth and to remove any struc-
tures within 50 feet on either side of the transmission line which might
endanger the same by fire, storm or otherwise, or which might in any

way cause the transmission line to become dangerous to life or
property. .

Appellant covenanted in its petition that the right of way would
not-be fenced or enclosed by it; that it would make no use of the right
of way except for the erection of said electric transmission line and
the operation and maintenance thereof; that the use by respondents
of the land covered by the easement would not be obstructed or inter-
fered with except insofar as this may be done by the construction,
operation and maintenance of the transmission line and by patrolling
the line by condemnor’s employees; and that if it should be necessary
to remove any fences in connection with the construction, operation
and maintenance of the transmission line, appellant would replace the
fences in as good a condtion as they were before removal. Reference
is made to the reported opinion by the Springfield Court of Appeals
(274 8.W. 2d 497) for additional facts concerning the physical
features of the electric transmission line and the location of the right
of way on the farm of the respondents.

At the time of the trial the electric transmission line had been
constructed. Appellant assigns as error the admission into evidence
of testimony concerning the damage on the right of way which occurred
during the construction of the line.

The general rule is well established in this State that, if a
part of a tract of land is taken by condemnation, the just compensa-
tion to which the owner is entitled, referred to as damages, is the
difference, if any, between the fair and reasonable market value of the
entire tract of land before and after the appropriation of said part.
State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Cox, 336 Mo. 271, 77 8.W.
2a 116 [8]; Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Stewart, 331 Mo. 525, 55
S.W. 2d 283 [3]; City Water Co. of Sedalia v. Hunter, 319 Mo. 1240,
6 S.W. 2d 565 [4]; Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Shipp, 305 Mo. 663, 267
S.W. 647 [2]; Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed, Mo. App., 32
§.W. 2d 783 [1]; Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Killian, 225 Mo.
App. 454, 40 S.W. 2d 730 [1]; Empire District Electric Co. v. Johns-
ton, 241 Mo. App. 759, 268 S.W. 2d 78 [5]. It is also well established
that the question of damages is to be determined with reference not
to the time of trial nor to the time of the construction of the project,
but to the time of the appropriation. State ex rel. State Highway
Commission v. Deutschman, 346 Mo. 755, 142 S.W. 2d 1025 [6];
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Second Street Improvement Co., 256
Mo. 386, 166 S.W. 296 [5]; City of St. Louis v. Paramount Shoe Mfg.
Go., 237 Mo. App. 200, 168 8.W. 2d 149 [2]; State ex rel. State High-
way Commission v. Blobeck Inv. Co., 233 Mo. App. 858, 110 S.W. 2d
860 [1]; State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Baumhoff, 230
Mo. App. 1080, 93 8.W. 2d 104 [13]. The parties agreed that the time
of the apropriation in this case was July 10, 1952, which was, of
course, before the transmission line was constructed.

‘When part of a tract is taken the damages are not limited
to such as result [862] from the mere severance of title caused by the
taking, but include damages caused by the use of the property for the
purpose for which the condemnation is made. Such use embraces the
construction of the work or improvement and the maintenance, use
and operation of the same.’’ Lewis, Eminent Domain (8d ed.) §710.
See also 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain §153; 18 Am. Jur. Eminent Do-
main §249; Annotations 49 A.L.R, 697 and 124 A.L.R. 416. If the
trial of this case had been held before the transmission line had been
constructed, it would have been proper for the jury to take into con-.
sideration, when supported by evidence, those various factors result-
ing from the appropriation which were reasonably apparent at that
time and which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy would con-
sider. 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.) §14.232. This would in-
clude a consideration of the proper and lawful uses for which appellant
acquired the right of way, for as stated in Missouri Power and Light
Co. v. Creed, supra [17], the recovery of just compensation is ‘‘limited
to (and would therefore include) such damages, whether present or
prospective, as arise from risks and hazards which may be known, or
may reasonably be expected to result from the construction and
maintenance of the utility in a proper and legal manner.’’ Therefore,
it would have been proper for the jury, in determining the burden
imposed on the land at the time of and by reason of the appropriation,
to take into consideration that appellant was going.to construct on the
right of way an electric transmission line, and also that it had
acquired the right to enter upon the right of way to patrol the line and
to operate and maintain it. When there is an appropriation of only
a part of a tract of land, lawful and proper uses to be put to the land
appropriated may be considered not on the theory that a recovery is
to be allowed for speculative risks and contingencies which may
never happen, but instead upon the theory that these are mat-
ters which affect ‘the market value of the remainder of the land as of
the time of the appropriation. The inquiry goes only to the damages
sustained by reason of the taking. Missouri Power & Light Co. v.
Creed, supra [8]. However, it must be presumed that in constructing,
patrolling and maintaining the transmission line, appellant will act in,
a proper and-lawful manner. Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed,
supra [9]. Testimony concerning: the burden at the time of appropri-
ation resulting from the proper use by the appellant of the right of
way must be definite and certain, and only such depreciation. in value
may be considered as may: be reasonably expected to follow from the
lawful invasion of the premises by the appellant, as distinguished
from acts, the result of which are purely remote, speculative, and
conjectural in their nature, and which are not fairly and reasonably
to be anticipated. Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed, supra [7].

“When the electric transmission line had been constructed at
the time of the trial the actual damage that was done by the condemnor
on the right of way during the construction of the transmission line
may be shown as evidence of the extent of the burden cast upon the
land at the time of: the-appropriation, provided that the acts were not
tortious and the damage could have been. reasonably anticipated.
Evidence.of this nature was admitted in State ex rel. State Highway
Commission v. Riggs, 226.Mo. App. 1053, 47 8.W. 2d 178. However,
when evidence of damage done during construction is admitted the
jury should be properly :instructed concerning the consideration to
be given it. ,

|| In this case the owner of the land testified at length concern-
ing damage done during the construction of the transmission. line, and
stated that during construction appellant drove trucks over the right
of way leaving tracks, that holes were dug in which to set the poles,
trees were cut and stumps left on the right of way. These acts of
respondent were not tortious and at the time of the appropriation could
reasonably have been expected to occur in the proper exercise of the
rights obtained by. condemnation. The reasonable expectation that
these acts. would occur,.as.substantiated [863] by the fact that. they
did oceur, constituted a burden on the land.at the time of the appropri-
ation. This witness also testified that, during the construction of the
line, his cows got out of the field, that they might get out in the future,
that fences were cut and left down and that appellant trespassed off
the-right of way in four different places. The.court sustained objec-
tions to the testimony -that the cows got out and that the fences might,
be left down. No objection was made to the testimony of the tres-
passes. The testimony that the fences. were cut and left down con-
stituted evidence of tortious acts and should have been excluded.

The difficlty with this case is that both parties apparently mis-
construed for what purpose evidence of construction damage could
properly be admitted. Appellant took the position that in no event
was such evidence admissible, and from.the comments. made. during
the trial and thé instructions requested itis clear that it was respond-
ents’ position that damages resulting from the lawful use by appellant
of the right of way constituted separate items to be considered by the
jury in arriving at its verdict. Neither position is correct.. As will
subsequently be seen this case must be reversed: hecause of improper
instructions, and in the event of a new trial, if evidence is offered of
damage resulting from the lawful use of the right of way by appellant
it’should be kept: within: the limits herein set forth, and the jury
should be properly instructed as.to the purposes for which the evi-
dence maybe considered.

Appellant assigns as error the admission of evidence concern-
ing what it calls ‘‘future damage’’ and ‘‘items of damage purely re-
mote, speculative and prejudicial. by respondents’ witnesses Baker,

Arndt, and Schnick.’’ The admission of this evidence came about
when appellant cross-examined the above named. witnesses concerning
the factors they had taken into consideration in arriving at the
opinions expressed as to the damage resulting from the appropriation.

Without calling the attention of these witnesses to the condemnation
plan outlined in appellant’s petition or otherwise showing that they
imew and understood exactly what rights and interests had been
appropriated by appellant, they were asked on direct examination to
express their opinions as to the difference in the value of respondents’
whole farm before and after the appropriation of the easement by
appellant. No objection was made that these witnesses were not
qualified to express an opinion. On cross-examination appellant’s
counsel interrogated them at considerable length concerning their
reasoning and the grounds on which they arrived at the conclusion
that the depreciated value of respondents’ farm was in the.amounts
they had severally stated. Hach witness stated on cross-examination
that his opinion as to the reduction in value’by reason of the appropri-
ation was based in part on the damage done by appellant during the
construction of the transmission line. One of the witnesses stated
that he also’ had taken into consideration the damage that ‘‘they
(appellant) might do’’ and that appellant had trespassed off the
right of way during construction, Witness Schnick stated on cross-
examination that he had considered the damage ‘‘whenever they come
through to maintain the line, what (growing crops) they waller down,
and one thing and another.’’ Witness Arndt stated that he had con-
sidered ‘‘that they’ll (appellant) be going back and forth through
the place repairing the lines, causing washes and one thing and
another; driving through there at any time of the year they might
choose to.’” .

Value and damages in condemnation proceedings are not suscepti-
ble of precise proof, aud in many cases can only be approximately
shown by the opinions of witnesses having the requisite information.
Although it was not shown that these witnesses had the requisite infor-
mation, they each expressed an opinion without objection, and the
weight to be given to the opinions expressed, as affected by the informa-
tion brought out on cross-examination, is to be determined by the jury
in connection with the circumstances under which they were offered.
Texas-Empire [864] Pipe Line Co. v. Stewart, 331 Mo. 525, 55 S.W.
2d 283. It is true that the cross-examination developed that some of
the reasons upon which the opinions were based were remote and in- .
definite, and that one opinion was in part based upon damage result-
ing from tortious acts. However, appellant did not attempt to show
that absent these improper factors the witness had no opinion, or that
if the, witness did have an opinion absent the improper factors, it, too,
was improper for some other reason. See State ex rel. Kansas City
Power & Light Co, v. Gauld, 360 Mo. 795, 230 S.W, 2d 850 [4]. As to

one witness no motion to strike the opinion was made, but.only a
motion to strike certain testimony brought out on cross-examination
which was contended by appellant to be remote and speculative. As
to the other two witnesses the motion to strike was directed to all the
testimony of the witness concerning his estimate of the reduction of
value of the land, and some of the testimony was proper. In view of
the manner in which this evidence was brought out and the cireum-
stances under which the motions to strike were made, we cannot say
that reversible error occurred. Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v.
Stewart, supra [4]; Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Whitener, Mo.
App., 237 S.W. 2d 239 [6]; State of Missouri ex rel. State Highway,
Commission of Missouri v. Johnson, Mo. Sup., 287 S.W. 2d 835.

Hl Appellant contends in its brief that the admission of the ob-
jected to evidence concerning construction damages and so-called
“‘future damages’’ was improper because it has ‘‘covenanted or con-
tracted in the petition, and is bound by these proceedings to pay the
landowners any future damages suffered by them by reason of appel-
lant’s use of the easement.’’ A condemnor need not appropriate the
full rights available to it. Shell Pipe Line Corporation v.. Woolfolk,
831 Mo. 410, 58 8.W. 2d 917 [1]; State ex rel. State Highway Commis-
sion v. Ferbert, Mo. App., 71 S.W. 2d 55 [1]. It may also covenant
that any time it enters upon land to exercise the rights obtained
therein by condemnation it shall pay to the landowners the full and
actual damage resulting from the lawful entry. For an example of
such a covenant see Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Stewart, Mo.
App., 35 S.W. 2d 627 (rev’d 55 S.W. 2d 283 on other grounds). The
purpose of the condemnor to exercise less than the full rights available
to it under the statutes must appear with reasonable certainty in the
petition or be brought in by way of amendment thereto. Shell Pipe
Line Corporation v. Woolfolk, supra [3]; State ex rel. State Highway
Commission v. Ferbert, supra [1]. We do not agree with appellant’s
construction of the petition in this case. It contains no covenant that
appellant will pay actual damages whenever an entry upon the right
of way is made.

| | Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in giving instruc-
tions 3 and 5 at the request of respondents. Instruction 5 told the
jury that respondents have not collected and cannot collect from the
plaintiff any sum of money as damages for the appropriation and use
of their land other than what it awarded in its verdict, unless negli-

_ gence is shown on the part of the plaintiff in its use of the right of
way for the construction, operation, maintenance and patrolling of
its electric transmission lines. This instruction is the same as an in-
struction held to be erroneous in Missouri Power & Light Company v.
Creed, Mo. App., 32 S.W. 2d 783 and in Missouri Power & Light Co.
y. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., Mo. App., 58 S.W. 2d 321, ex-
cept that it adds the provision pertaining to negligence. The instruc-

tion is subject to the same criticism made of the instructions: in those
two cases in that it is ‘readily susceptible to the: construction ‘that
the verdict in this case was to cover, not only the damages accruing by
way of depreciation in the market value of the land on account of the
taking of the easement, but also whatever damages might thereafter
be sustained if and when the numerous contingencies (not involving
negligence) counted on by the witnesses might occur.” Missouri
Power & Light Company v. Creed, supra, at 788.

[865] The witnesses in this case testified to numerous contingen-
cies which could be expected ‘to result in damage which, when’ and if
occurring, would not be the result of any negligence on the part’ of
appellant.- They also testified to numerous acts that appellant did
after the appropriation which constituted a lawful use of the land.
In determining the compensation for the appropriation, the jury was
in no event entitled to assume or take into consideration that appel-
lant might act negligently. Therefore, adding the phrase ‘‘pertaining
to negligence’ did not remove the objections made against the instruc-
tion in the Creed and John Hancock cases. The erroneous feature
of the instruction in those two cases was that it in effect told the jury
to include in its verdict damages for ‘the various-things that were’ or
might be done ‘after the appropriation whether or not. negligence was
involved. The instruction we have here in effect told the jury that it
should assess damages for the appropriation of the casement-and also
assess damages for the numerous acts of appellant done subsequently.
to the appropriation which it had heard the witnesses relate. This, of
course, is not the correct measure of damages. As between this in-
struction and the instruction condemned in the two cited cases, the
instruction here more clearly points out that in addition to the just
compensation (or damages) occurring by way of depreciation of the
market value of the whole farm on account of the taking of the ease-
ment, the jury should also award a sum of money as damages for the
numerous events and contingen¢ies subsequent to the appropriation
related by the witnesses.

Instruction 8 purported to tell the jury that in determining
the difference in the fair market value of respondents’ whole farm
before and after the appropriation it should consider the uses to’ which
the condemned land is to be applied. Such an instruction would be
proper, but the instruction stated that the jury should assess the
“just compensation and: damages.’’ This necessarily was confusing in
view of the evidence. ‘The terms ‘‘just compensation’? and ‘‘damages’”
in condemnation cases are used interchangeably and in case of a
partial taking, as here, each term when used separately, refers to
what the landowner ‘is’ entitled ‘to receive by reason’ of the reduction
in the fair market value of the whole tract as a result of the appropri-
ation of a part. The use of both terms in this instruction in effect told
the jury that it should award ‘‘just compensation”’ for the appropri-

- ation and also award ‘‘damages’’ for those subsequent uses by appel-
lant referred to in the instruction and as related by the witnesses.
This is particularly true when this instruction is read in connection
with instruction 5. The phrase ‘ ‘just compensation and damages’?
has uo place in the instruction and should not be used eventhough
there is no instruction corresponding to instruction 5.

By reason of instruction 5, and the readily susceptible and im-
proper construction of instruction 8 when read in connection with
instruction 5, the jury was improperly instructed in this ease.

‘We need not consider in detail the alleged error resulting from the
trial court striking out the testimony of two witnesses, of, appellant.
‘What has previously been said indicates that: these two witnesses did
not take into considefation all the proper elements in arriving at the
opinions expressed concerning the reduction in value of respondents’
farm before and after the appropriation, and on a new trial appellant
ean be guided accordingly. We also need not, consider the alleged
errors resulting from certain comments. of respondents’ counsel in
oral argument and that the verdict was excessive.

The judgment is reversed and the cause. is remanded. Bohling and
Barrett, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by grocxann, C., is adopt-
ed as the opinion of the court. All the judges coneur.

. .
Roser 8. Kine, Appellant, v. Gunmnuve K. Prove, Respondent, No,
45151288 8S. W. (2a) 923.

Court en Bane, March 12, 1956.
Rehearing Denied, April 9, 1956.

He

Carl H. Willbrand for appellant.

Allan M. Fisher for respondent.

[923] WESTHUES, J.—Plaintiff Robert S. King, a real estate
proker, filed this suit against Gertrude K. Pruitt to recover a real
estate sales commission in the sum of $575. A trial resulted in a ver-
dict for the defendant. From the judgment, plaintiff appealed to the
Kansas [924] City Court of Appeals. That court reversed the judg-
ment and remanded the case for retrial. The appeals court held that
instruction No. 4, given by the court, was not supported by evidence,
therefore, it was error to have given it. This court, on application of
the defendant, ordered the case transferred to this court.

The opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals is reported in
280 S.W.(2d) 872.

The particular point, indeed the one point, on this appeal is whether
the evidence justified an instruction to the jury submitting the ques-
tion of whether King, as defendant’s alleged agent, concealed from
her material facts known to him and not to defendant and thereby
forfeited his right to a sales commission.

Instruction No. 4 reads as follows:

“The Court instructs the jury that a real estate agent or broker
must act with entire good faith toward his principal, and that he must
disclose all facts within his knowledge material to the matter in which
he is employed, or which might influence his principal’s action, so if
you find and believe from the evidence that defendant employed
plaintiff to sell her property for her and was her agent, if so, and if
you further find and believe from the evidence that plaintiff did not
disclose to defendant that Thornton and Minor Clinic, Inc. was the
actual purchaser, if so, and that said failure to disclose was material,
if so, and would have influenced defendant’s action, if so, then your
verdict must be in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.’””

The facts were these: Defendant, Mrs. Pruitt, owned property at
3217 Campbell Street, Kansas City, Missouri. This property was back
of and adjoining that of the Thornton-Minor Clinic. George L.
Williams, the business director of the Clinic, had been with that con-
cern for twenty-five years. Williams, who had for many years known
plaintiff Robert 5. King, testified that he talked with King sometime
in February or March of 1952, and asked him if he could buy the
Pruitt property for him; that it was wanted for parking space; that
the Clinic was desperately in need of such space. Mr. Williams stated
further that he did not want anyone to know that his concern was
interested in buying the property. Cross-examination of Williams
showed the following on this point:

“Q. Mr. Williams, the reason that you tried to keep the Thorn-
ton-Minor name out of this deal was because you thought it might
effect the purchase price, the sale price?

“A, Well, we were going to try to buy more than one piece
and didn’t want any one to know.’’

Plaintiff King knew Williams was manager for the Thornton-Minor
Clinic. He admitted that Williams had asked him to purchase some
property for him. King was asked whether the value of real estate
would be affected if a buyer wanted a ‘‘particular tract for a particu-
lar purpose’’ and his answer was that ‘‘sometimes’’ it does affect the
price. King further testified that after Williams had asked him about
purchasing some property, he called the defendant: Mrs. Pruitt and
asked her if the property at 3217 Campbell Street was for sale; that
Mrs. Pruitt answered in the negative. Plaintiff stated that he then
informed the defendant that he was in the real estate business and if
at any time she wanted to sell the property to call him; that in a few
weeks she did call him and informed him that the property was for
sale at $11,500; that he, plaintiff, then had a contract of sale prepared
naming Mary L. Childs, who was secretary to Mr. Williams, as pur-
chaser whose address was 486 35th Street. It was admitted that de-
fendant never saw or heard of Williams or the Thornton-Minor
Clinic in connection with the sale before she signed the contract agree-
ing to sell the property for $11,500. There was evidence that Mrs.

“ a

Pruitt agreed to pay plaintiff a sales commission. She was represented
by. an attorney when she signed the deed. This attorney did not know
that Williams or the Clinic was interested in the sale. Mrs. Pruitt
testified [925] that she did not agree to pay a commission; that she
wanted $11,500 net to her for her property; that she insisted on the
full amount when she signed the deed. All parties agree that defend-
ant refused to sign a deed unless she was paid the full amount.
Plaintiff at the time agreed to this for the purpose of making’ the sale
but reserved the right to sue the defendant for his commission,

It. was agreed by all parties that Miss Childs was a mere straw party ~
and had no interest in the sale and that three days after the property
was deeded to her, she conveyed it to the Thornton-Minor Clinic. It
was also agreed that Williams negotiated. the sale on behalf of
Thornton-Minor Clinic.

. It is our opinion that the evidence justified the giving of
instruction No. 4 and that a jury could well have found that plain-
tiff intentionally concealed from the defendant a material fact which
might have influenced .defendant’s action. By concealing a material
fact, an agent forfeits his right to compensation. 12 C.J.S. 159, 160,
Sec. 69b; Dittmeier v. Missouri, Real Estate Commission, Mo.App.,
237 S.W.(2d) 201, Le. 206 (7-9) ; Politte v. Wall, Mo.App., 256 S.W.
(2d) 288, L.e. 285(4) ; Curotto v. Hammack, 362 Mo. 457, 241 S.W.(2d)
897, Le. 900 (2) ; Blakeley v. Bradley, Mo., 281 S.W.(2d) 835, le. 839
(4); Larner-Diener Realty Co. v. Fredman, Mo., 266 S.W.(2d) 689,
Le. 695 (4). .

It, is the duty of a-broker to act with the utmost good faith
and loyalty in the interest of his principal. He cannot secretly repre-
sent any adverse interest. 12 C.J.S. 96, Sec. 41, and 105, Sec. 43. It
is our opinion that plaintiff in this case by his own evidence admitted
he did not act with the utmost good faith and loyalty in the interest
of his alleged principal, the defendant Mrs. Pruitt. The plaintiff King
carried out the wishes of Williams in keeping from the defendant the
knowledge as to who the real purchaser was. This was kept a secret
for the very reason that knowledge of the fact by the defendant might
affect the price of the property. King, whether for compensation or
friendship or any other purpose, did in fact look after the interest
of Williams who in turn was acting for the Thornton-Minor Clinic.
Murphy v. Knights of Columbus Bldg. Co., 155 Mo. App. 649, 185
8.W. 446, Le. 449 (2). Plaintiff led the defendant to believe that Miss
Childs-was the real purchaser. He knew this was not true. In such
circumstances, he cannot recover compensation from the defendant for
making the sale. .

Appellant King in his brief cited the case of Klein v. Terminal R.
Assn. of St. Louis, Mo. App., 268 S.W. 660, le. 664. The court there
said, Le. 664 (4-7), “It has never been held however, that the mere
failure to disclose the name of the purchaser, without more, would

defeat the broker’s .recovery.’’ In the case before us, King according

to his own evidence was protecting adverse interests by the conceal-

ment of the name of the real purchaser.

. Instruction No. 4, given by the trial court, correctly declared the

law and there was ample evidence to support the finding of the jury..
The. judgment is affirmed. All concur.

Wasase Rairoap Company, Respondent, -v. Dannen Muas, In-
CORPORATED, a Corporation, and Vouuey Bunou, Appellants, No.
45157—288 S. W. (2d) 926.

Court en Bane, March 12, 1956.
Rehearing Denied, April 9, 1956.

William C. Frank and
er of counsel.

Jayne & Jayne for respondent.

[927] HYDE, J.—Plaintiff sued for damages to its Diesel “unit
caused by a collision with defendants’ truck. Defendant Dannen
Mills counterclaimed for damages to the truck and defendant Bunch
counterclaimed for personal injuries. Verdict and judgment was for
plaintiff for $764.50 and against defendants on the counterclaims.
Both defendants appealed:

The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
(Wabash R. Co. v. Dannen Mills, 279 8. W. (2d) 50); but on de-
fendants’ application we transferred the case because of the ruling
by the Court of Appeals that defendants ‘did not make a jury case
on humanitarian negligence. Plaintiff submitted on primary negli-
gence (failure to keep a lookout and driving-upon the crossing when
plaintiff’s locomotive was on the crossing) without requiring a finding
that the collision was not due to the humanitarian negligence sub-
mitted in the other instructions given at the defendants’ request.
(Plaintiff’s humanitarian negligence was set up ‘both as a defense
and as the basis of the counterclaims.) By authoriziig plaintiff’s
recovery on defendants’ primary negligence arid ignoring the humani-
tarian submission in instructions A and B as to which antecedent
primary negligence was not a defense, instruction 1 was in direct
conflict with instructions A and B and was prejudicial error for
the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. (See also
Scudder v. St. Joseph Belt Ry. Co., 388 Mo, 492,.92 8. W. (2d) 188;
McGrath v. Meyers, 341 Mo. 412, 107 S. W. (2d) 792.) Therefore, the
judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded unless we can
sustain plaintiff’s contention that no humanitarian negligence ease
was made.

; | Considering the evidence most favorable to defendants, as
we must on this issue, we find the jury could reasonably have believed
the facts hereinafter stated. Plaintift’s freight train of 76 cars was
going north toward the crossing of Highway 11 (an east and west
road) at between 80 and 40 miles per hour: The track was slightly
downgrade to the north for about a half mile; but beginning about one-
eighth mile south of the crossing it was upgrade. The track curved a
little to the northwest for some distance south of the crossing (then
back to the north) but the curve ended about 500 feet south of the
crossing, so that from that point the track ran north across the High-
way. At the time of the collision, it was raining and defendant Bunch
said it was freezing on the side glasses so that he could not see out
either side, but his defroster and windshield wiper kept the wind-
shield clear. He said he was listening for signals as he approached
the crossing but heard none. He said he was traveling about 40 miles .
per hour (his speed was more or less as he went over hills) ; that-he
looked south at a driveway about 500 feet east of the crossing but saw
nothing at that point (he could see about 300 feet of the track through
the windshield) ; that he then looked north as he passed the last

house 210 feet from the crossing; and that then seeing nothing’ ‘he
‘just pushed down on the accelerator and let the truck roll on.’”’
The truck collided with the train, striking between the two diesels
which were pulling it. Bunch said [928] .(on cross-examination) that
he increased his speed when he stepped down on the accelerator after
passing the last house but he did ot know how much; then he also
said ‘‘it was supposed to pick up’’ when he pushed down on it but
that he did not know whether it did or not. He said he was not
coasting at that time.

Plaintiff’s engineer, Henry D. Adams, said he first saw the truck
(with a trailer attached) when it was about a quarter of a mile away
from the crossing when his engine was coming ‘around the -curve,
curving back to the north. He estimated its speed as 40 to 50
miles per hour (in a deposition he had said 60 to 70' miles per hour)
but that its speed was fast for a truck and could have been:around 60
miles per hour. He said he whistled then (about 800 feet fromthe
erossing) and, after he completed the whistle, turned the bell on
(about half a quarter from the crossing) but that the truck driver
gave no indication of seeing the train or laving any “knowledge
of its approach; and that he did not observe the truck slowing down
during all the time he watched prior to the time it hit the train.
He said the train was a little closer to the ¢rossing. than the truck
when he first saw it; that he kept an eye on the truck right wp to.the
time the collision happened and observed its entire path on that road up
to the time of the collision; and that the truck driver never did ‘show
any evidence to him of knowledge of the danger. He said that about 800
feet away he became concerned about the driver’s failure’ to respond
and that was why he whistled there but that he did not apply his
brakes until the truck hit'the train; he ‘‘didn’t deem it necessary to
do that.’’? (In the deposition he said that at 800 féet he thought the
driver ‘‘had had a heart attack or was asleep or something.’’) He
also said he first became concerned over the failure of this man to
slow down about half a quarter of-a mile away. He said, in the dep-
osition, at that point ‘‘I was’ getting uneasy about it. I figured..I
was going to hit him or he was going to hit me or something.’? From
the time he first observed the truck until it hit the train, he did not
observe any slackening of the speed of the truck. He also said that if
the emergency brakes had been applied 500 feet back from the eross-
ing, it probably. would have slowed the train down so that the: truck
could have got by in front of it;'and that he believed it would. He
applied the brakes when the’ collision: occurred. The next whistle
he gave (after whistling at 800 feet) was a nine second whistle for
the crossing which began when the engine was 250 to 300 feet from
it. He waited until that point so that this nine second whistle (two
longs, a short and a long) would not be completed before reaching’ the _
crossing. He said this whistle was still sounding when he was on the

crossing. He said: ‘‘I whistled for the crossing, just usually, you
naturally think they are going to stop and when you find out they
are not going to stop, it is generally too late for anybody to do any-
thing.’’ At the trial he said he thought the truck would stop until it
got within about 60 feet of the crossing. The fireman on the left
(west) side of the engine did not see the truck until the engineer
ealled his attention to it when the engine was very close to the cross-
ing. He said the crossing signal was sounded but could not say how
many feet south of the crossing it was started. The conductor in the
caboose did not hear a whistle but said the cupola windows were
closed. Defendants had other witnesses who were in the houses near
the crossing and did not hear any whistle for this crossing, although
a whistle was heard for the crossing one-half mile south. There was
evidence that 32 cars had passed the crossing before the train was
stopped. There was also evidence that such a train could be stopped
in 12 or 15 car lengths but this was limited to stopping on an upgrade.

It is our view, on this evidence and the inferences the jury could
reasonably draw from it, that defendants made a submissible case
on humanitarian negligence. This is a case of discovered peril such
as authorizes recovery on the stricter last clear chance rule. (See
A. L, I. Restatement of Torts, Sec. 480.) There is no doubt that
Bunch was actually oblivious and that plaintiff’s engineer was aware
of [929] his approach even before he reached a position of imminent
peril. ‘In the absence of obliviousness, the position or danger zone of
imminent peril of a person approaching the path of a moving vehicle
reaches no farther beyond the direct path of such moving vehicle
than the distance within which such approaching person is unable by
his own efforts to stop short of it.’? (Lotta v. Kansas City Public
Service Co., 842 Mo. 748, 117 8S. W. (2d) 296, 300; see also Yeaman
y. Storms, 858 Mo. 774, 217 S. W. (2d) 495; Hayes v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., Mo. Sup., 269 S. W. (2d) 639.) Thus the greater the
speed of the approaching vehicle, the wider the zone of imminent
peril; but obliviousness (with reasonable appearances of oblivious-
ness) widens it still farther. In such a case as this, the zone of
imminent peril began and the duty of the engineer arose when it
was or should have been reasonably apparent to him that the truck
driver was oblivious of the approaching train and was intent on
continuing across its path (Silver v. Westlake, Mo. Sup., 248 S. W.
(2d) 628, 682 and cases cited) ; and it was his duty to act on reason-
able appearances and at a time when action would be effective. (See
Frandeka v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 861 Mo. 245, 234 8. W.
(24) 540, 547 and cases cited.) Commenting on this duty, while
recognizing that usually an engineer is entitled to assume that one
approaching the track with an unobstructed view has discovered or
will discover the oncoming train, Restatement of Torts (comment b
under Sec. 480) states: “However, it is not necessary that the cir

‘cumstances be such as to convince the defendant that the plaintiff
is inattentive and, therefore, in danger. It is enough that the cir-
cumstances are such as to indicate a reasonable chance that this is
the case. Even such a chance that the plaintiff will not discover. his
peril is enough to require the defendant to make a reasonable effort
to avoid injuring him. Therefore, if there is anything in the de-
meanor or conduct of the plaintiff which to a reasonable man in the
defendant’s position would indicate that the plaintiff is inattentive
and, therefore, will or may not discover the approach of the train,
the engineer must take such steps as a reasonable man would think
necessary under the circumstances. If.a train is at some little dis-
tance, the blowing of a whistle would -ordinarily be enough, until
‘it is apparent that the whistle is either unheard or disregarded. The
situation in which the plaintiff is observed may clearly indicate that
his inattention is likely to persist and that the blowing of the whistle
will not be effective. If so, the engineer is not entitled to, act upon
the assumption that the plaintiff will awaken to his danger but may
be liable if he does not so reduce the speed of his train as to enable
him to stop if necessary.”

The place where one comes into a position of imminent peril under
the evidence in a particular case is a question for the jury to
determine. (Harrington v. Thompson, Mo. Sup., 248 S. W. (2d) 519;
Kelley v. St. Louis Public Service Co.; Mo. Sup., 248 S. W. (2d) 597;
Silver v. Westlake, Mo. Sup., 248 8. Ww. (2d) 628; Stith v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 442, 251 8. W. (2d) 693.) We think’ the
situation in this case is very similar to that discussed in the Teague
cases. (White v. Teague, 353 Mo. 247, 182 S. W. (2d) 288; Teague v.
Plaza Express Co., 354 Mo. 582, 190 S. W. (2d) 254; Teague v. Plaza
Express Co., 856 Mo. 1186, 205 S. W. (2d) 563.) The situation in
those cases was also one of discovered peril from observed approach
of a motor vehicle at undiminished speed; and the speeds and dis-
tances involved were much like those shown in this case. Likewise,
it appeared that slackening speed could have permitted the Teague
automobile to pass through the intersection safely. In.fact, we think
this is a stronger case of observed appearances of obliviousness be-
cause, in the Teague eases, the casualty occurred at night when the
approaching car could be observed only by its headlights. It.is true
that in the Teague cases, the other instrumentality involved was not
a train but a truck which could have been stopped in 80 feet after
the brakes took hold, so that there was a clearer case on slackening
speed. Nevertheless, in this case, the engineer saw the truck driven
[930] at undiminished speed toward the track on a cold rainy day
(in February), when its windows would-be closed, under such cir-
cumstances that he said gave no indication. of the driver seeing the
train or showing any evidence of the driver’s knowledge of the danger
and with no response to his first whistle. As said in the second

365 Mo.—53 . beet

“Teague case (190 S. W. (2d), Le. 256): ‘‘If he (the driver) is ap-
parently dominated by a fixed intent to pursue his course into the
(train’s) very path, he is no less in peril at any given time and
place after such fixed intent becomes apparent than would be the
ease if he was aware of his predicament, but was physically unable
to extricate himself.’’ (See also State ex rel. Thompson v. Shain, 349
Mo. 27, 159 S. W. (2d) 582, 586.)

Did the engineer’s duty to act commence when the engine was 500
feet south of the crossing’? The engine was then less than 844 seconds
from it (if going 40 miles per hour) or about 914 seconds if going
35 miles per hour; the truck was a second or less farther away de-
pending on its speed. A case in which it was held the jury could
have found that ‘‘9 seconds intervened between the apprehension of
the danger and ‘the time of collision’? is Chawkley v. Wabash Ry.
Co., 317 Mo. 782, 297 S. W: 20, 24. In that case, the fireman said
he saw the automobile 200 feet from the track and immediately told
the engineer to stop. We found there was ample evidence to show
that the driver and the occupants of the car were oblivious of their
peril ‘‘at a distance of 100 to 200 feet of the track’’ and that the
fireman knew it. Both the train and the automobile were moving
slower than in this'case. A case in which it was held that an engineer’s
duty to act in a humanitarian negligence case did commence 500 feet
south of the crossing at which a collision occurred is McCall v.
Thompson, 348 Mo. 795, 155 S. W. (2d) 161. There the train was
going faster, and the automobile slower, than in this case; but there
the engineer said’ he ‘‘determined the automobile was not going
to stop when the train was 500 feet or more from the crossing’ and
“then put on the emergency brakes’? and whistled. However, there
was evidence that the brakes were not applied at that time and also
that, if they had been, the collision could have been avoided. We held
the evidence sufficient ‘‘to make a case for the jury under the humani-
tarian doctrine on negligent failure to stop or slacken the speed of the
train after the engineer realized that the driver of the automobile,
by reason of apparent obliviousness, was in imminent peril from the
approaching train.’’ We also said the engineer was not entitled to
assume that the automobile would stop, although it was beyond
stopping distance from the track, because ‘‘the engineer, in his own
mind and from his personal observation, determined that the automo-
“pilé, by reason of the apparent obliviousness of its driver, was not
going to stop and that its occupants were in peril from the approach-
ing train.’’ Certainly the jury could reasonably place that inter-
pretation on the testimony of the engineer in this case and find that
it did so appear to him when he was 500 feet south of the crossing.
“(See also Zumwalt v. Chicago & Alton R. Co., Mo. Sup., 266 8. W. 717
where the fireman said he knew there was going to be a collision
when he first observed the automobile approach considerably beyond

the distance in which it could have been stopped; Alexander v. St.

Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 327 Mo. 1012, 38 S. W. (2d) 1023 where it was
held a humanitarian negligence case was made on failure to slacken
speed by action of the engineer between 365 to “435 feet from the
crossing; Willhauck v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 382 Mo. 1165, 61
8. W. (2d) 336 holding case made on failure to stop or slacken speed
when plaintiff’s peril could have been observed 600 feet from the
crossing; Lynch v. Baldwin, Mo. Sup., 117 8. W. (2d) 273, where thé
fireman ‘observed a truck going’ between 10 and 20 miles per hour
200 feet from the:crossing and it was held a case was made on failure
to warn, the speed of the train being 50 to 60 miles per hour; Bebout
v. Kurn, 348 Mo. 501, 154 8. W. (2d) 120, where the engineer had
a clear view for 910 feet and it was held a case was made on failure
to stop; See v. Wabash R. Co., 362 Mo. 489, 242 S. W. (2d) 15 where
it was held the jury could reasonably have found the truck was 11
seconds away [931] from the crossing and the train 1100 feet away
when the truck driver’s obliviousness became apparent.) In noné of
the above cases was the motor vehicle as far away in distance (although
it was farther away in time in the See case) from the track, as was
the truck in this case, when the engineer’s duty was considéred to-
have commenced (if the jury believed the evidence most favorable to
defendants) ; but, neither was the motor vehicle in any of those
cases approaching at the speed of the truck in this case. However,
the decisive question in this case as to when the engineer’s duty
(under the humanitarian rule) would begin is: What were the
reasonable appearances of the situation as to thé driver’s oblivious-
ness and his intent to continue into the path of the train? Consider-
ing the engineer’s own testimony as to his observation of the ap-
proach of the truck, the appearances of the situation to him and his
concern about the driver’s eonduct, together with his admission that
an emergency application of the brakes 500 feet from the crossing
could have permitted the truck to pass over it in front of the train,
we cannot say as a matter of law that he had no duty to take such
action at that time. We, therefore, hold there was a case for the jury
on failure to slacken speed.

Hl . As to failure to warn, one defect i in’ ‘defendants’ “ease is the
lack of any evidence as to stoppitig distance of the truck at the speed
it was traveling. However, from general knowledge of usual stopping
distances, and the engineer’s testimony as to his reliance upon such
knowledge, we have no doubt that a sufficient showing to make a case
on failure to warn can be supplied on retrial. Defendants did have
substantial evidence that no whistle was sounded before the engine
reached the crossing; and that, in any event, no adequate timely
warning was given. Even the testimony -of' the engineer was that he
did. not whistle between the time of the whistle he said he made when
on the curve; and first saw the truck, and the:time-when- he started.

“ a

the nine second. crossing whistle. Certainly the jury could find that
Burich was in a position of imminent peril, requiring a warning,
prior to the time they could find the regular crossing whistle was
given, which the engineer said began between 250 and 300 feet from
the crossing. It is true that the engineer said the bell was ringing
during the last half-quarter mile of the approach to the crossing.
However, the bell was not heard by the other witnesses and certainly
the jury could reasonably have found that the bell alone was not an
adequate warning. The brakeman in the engine at the time said the
bell could not be heard inside the cab when the engine is working
hard but that he could hear the whistle.

Hi Plaintiff argues that Bunch was not in imminent peril and
did not give any indication of obliviousness until he passed the drive-
way 210 feet from the track, at which point he said that, after look-
ing north, he pushed down on the accelerator. Plaintiff says Bunch
then gave the first indication of obliviousness by increasing his speed
at that point. However, this ignores the engineer’s testimony (which
the jury could believe) concerning the high speed at which the truck
was traveling; that such speed was never slackened; and that the
appearances indicated to him an absence of any knowledge of the
danger before the truck reached that point. Furthermore, Buneh said
he was not coasting when he pushed down on the accelerator at that
point and a picture in evidence indicates that the road from the
driveway to the crossing was upgrade. Therefore, the jury could
have found that more gas was needed to maintain the same speed to
the crossing from that point. (This is a very different situation from
that in Cable v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., Mo. Sup., 236 S. W. (2d)
828 where the driver slowed down, practically stopped, changed.
gears and then moved forward.) Our conclusion is that defendants
made a submissible humanitarian negligence case and are entitled
to have a submission on proper instructions.

-The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. All concur.

Outverre E, Van, (Plaintiff) Appellant, v. Crry or Sr. Louts, a
Municipal Corporation, (Defendant) Respondent, No. 45102—
289 8..W, (2d) 7.

; Division One, March 12, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, April 9, 1956,

Ackerman & Schiller and Timothy R. Veal for appellant.

ity Counselor, and John J. Shanahan, As-
soviate City Counselor, for respondent.

[9]° VAN’ OSDOL, C.—This is an appeal rom. a judgment of
dismissal of plaintiff’s action for injunctive relief, and for a judg-

ment declaring that she has the right to conduct a funeral establish-
ment in her property located at 4311 Page Boulevard in St. Louis
by virtue of an occupancy Permit No. $4567 issued by the Building
Commissioner of the City of St. Louis.

For many years plaintift’s property was used as a residence, and
there was evidence that its value as a residence is approximately
$12,500, but that its value equipped as a funeral establishment is ap--
proximately $21,000. Consequently, the money value of the relief
sought by plaintiff, if granted, would be in excess of $7,500, exclusive
of costs. This court has appellate jurisdiction of the case. Const. Art.-
V, § 3, V.A.MS.; Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., 363 Mo. 305, 251
S.W.2d 8,

The case involves questions of the application of the doctrine
of res judicata; and of the construction of provisions of the Building
Code, Part I of the Revised Code of St. Louis, and of Ordinance No.
45309, approved April 25, 1950, effective thirty days thereafter.

May 13, 1950, the Building Commissioner had issued ‘an alteration
Permit No. $4566 granting plaintiff permission to alter her two-
story brick building on Page in accordance with the provisions of the
City Ordinances and application filed with the Building Commis-
sioner, ‘‘said building to be used as Funeral Home.’’? On the same
day, May 18th, the Building Commissioner had issued occupancy
Permit No. $4567. Under the old Zoning Ordinance No. 35003 (as
amended by Ordinance No. 35009), effective May 26, 1926, plaintiff’s
property had been zoned for commercial use, but, as stated, the
property had been used as a residence for years. Under Ordinance
No. 45309, a new ‘‘Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance,’’ sometimes
hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘Zoning Ordinance,’’ the property
was rezoned and classified as ‘‘C’? Four-Family Dwelling District.

August 17, 1950, Block Unit 48 (property owners and residents, of
the 4800 block on Page) filed an appeal with the Board of Adjust-
ment of the City of St. Louis requesting the revocation of Permit
No. $4566. In the application for appeal it was recited that the
permit was issued May 18, 1950, under Ordinance No. 35009. And
on September 13, 1950, the appeal was considered by the Board. In.
the record of the appeal, the name of plaintiff, Olivette E. Veal, was
nowhere mentioned, but the proceeding progressed as if plaintiff’s
husband, Timothy R. Veal, were the owner. The Board of Adjust-
ment sustained the appeal having found ‘‘that the 1950 ordinance
(Ordinance No. 45309) has placed this property in the ‘C’ four-
family dwelling district, and the holder of the permit has not
expended an appreciable sum of money to carry out the work for
which it was issued, and has not established nonconforming use. To
allow the permit to remain in force would be a distinct detriment. to
this predominately residential neighborhood.’’ .

“ a

In a subsequent proceeding on certiorari for the Cireuit Court re-
view of the decision of the Board of Adjustment, plaintiff joined with
her husband. In the application for the writ, it was stated, inter
alia, that the Building Commissioner had granted alteration Permit
No. $4566 and oceupancy Permit No. $4567; that the applicants had
offered into evidence the Permits Nos. $4566 and $4567 at the hear-
ing before the Board of Adjustment; that on or about the 17th day
of August, 1950, the Secretary of the Board of Adjustment had
written the Building Commissioner advising that the appeal had
been filed and inquired of the Building Commissioner ‘‘as to his
action on such matter’’; and that the Building Commissioner had
refused to revoke Permit No. $4566. On certiorari, the, Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis reviewed and affirmed the decision of
the Board of Adjustment, and on subsequent appeal to the St. Louis
Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court’s judgment affirming the
decision of the Board of Adjustment was affirmed. Veal vy. Leim-
kuehler, Mo. App., 249 §.W.2d 491. *

Subsequently, plaintiff herein, joining with her husband
Timothy R. Veal, filed in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis
their motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis to set aside
the Circuit Court’s former judgment affirming the decision of the
Board of Adjustment, in which motion it was alleged that the Board
of Adjustment did not have jurisdiction to revoke either a building
permit or a certificate of occupation lawfully issued, and that, had
the court been apprised of the assertedly applicable ordinances, the
Circuit Court would have set aside the decision of the Board of Ad-
justment. The Cireuit Court dismissed the (coram nobis) motion,
and upon appeal to the St. Louis Court of Appeals the judgment of
dismissal was affirmed. Veal v. Leimkuehler, Mo. App., 267 8.W.2d
387.

In the latter opinion, the St. Louis Court of Appeals recognized
that the appeal in the original proceeding was from the action of the
Building Commissioner in refusing to revoke permits for the
establishment of a commercial use in a residential district, in violation
of Section 5A(1) of Ordinance No. 45309; and the reviewing court
further observed that the Board had jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and that jurisdiction over the parties had not been questioned.
In reviewing the case, the St. Louis Court of Appeals examined the
contention of plaintiffs-appellants in that case that, under the Build-
ing Code, the Board of Adjustment did not have jurisdiction to render
the particular decision, and that the trial court would not have
affirmed the judgment had it known of the provisions of the Building
Code. However, the reviewing St. Louis Court of Appeals ruled it
could not follow the contention for the reason. that to do so would
amount to nothing more than to countenance ‘‘the use of the motion

in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis to correct errors of
law . . ..’? (267 S.W.2d at page 390)

Herein, ‘plaintiff. -appellant renews her contention that the Board
of ‘Adjustment had no jurisdiction or power to act in the revocation
of the alteration of Permit No. $4566. And she further contends herein
that the decision of the Board of Adjustment and subsequent judg-
ments of the Circuit Court on certiorari and of the St. Louis Court
of Appeals on appeal were void; and that, inasmuch as occupation
Permit No. $4567 has not been: expressly revoked, both permits are
now validly outstanding.

| | It is contended by defendant-respondent City that the decision
of the Board of Adjustment, as reviewed by the Circuit Court
and in turn by the St. Louis Court of Appeals (Veal v. Leimkuehler,
supra, 249 S.W. 2d 491), is res judicata of the issues of the instant
ease, and with this contention we agree.

In arriving at this conclusion we have examined Section 19 of
Ordinance 45309 with reference to appeals to the Board of Adjust-
ment, in which Section 19 (in subsection ‘‘C’’ thereof) it is provided
that appeals to the Board of Adjustment ‘‘may be taken by any
person aggrieved or by any officer, department, board or bureau

. affected by any decision of the Building Commissioner

. « «7? See also Section 89.100, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. We have also
examined subsection ‘‘D’’ of Section 19, providing that the Board of
Adjustment shall have the power to ‘‘hear and decide appeals where
it is alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision or de-
termination made by the Building Commissioner . . . in the en-
forcement of this ordinance,’’ and that the Board of Adjustment may
“in conformity with the provisions of law, reverse or affirm, wholly or
partly, or may modify the order, requirement, decision or determina-
tion appealed. from, and may make such order, requirement, decision
or determination as ought to be made, and to that end shall have all
the powers of the Building Commissioner . . ..’’ See also Section
89.090, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. And we have examined Sections 27,
28, 29 and 41 of Part I (Building Code) of the Revised Code, of St.
Louis, which Sections are in part as follows,

“See. 27. PERMITS REQUIRED- —Except for minor repairs
as hereinafter defined no [11] sign, booth, structure, device,
apparatus or equipment of any nature which is governed by the
requirements of this Code, shall be installed, altered, repaired,
erected, moved, removed or demolished, until application for
permit therefor shall have been made to and approved by the
building commissioner or designated official and a permit issued
by him for inspection of the premises, if he deems such necessary.

"See. 28. COMPLIANCE WITH ZONING ORDINANCE
REQUIRED.—No permit shall be issued for the erection of any -

structure until application for a certificate of occupancy or use
shall have been filed with the building commissioner and approved
by him as covering an oceupancy for use complying with the
requirements of the zoning ordinance and of this Code, nor
_ shall such structure be occupied or used prior to the issuance of
such ‘certificate... .
_ “See. 29. CHANGE IN OCCUPANCY.—There shall be no
change in the type of occupancy of any structure except in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Code. . . .
“See. 41. OCCUPANCY PERMIT.—Upon completion or al-
teration of a structure in conformity with this Code, the building
commissioner shall issue to the owner, upon application, an oc-
eupaney permit under which the structure may be used, . . ..’”
As this court stated in Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., supra,
363 Mo. 305 at pages 315-316, 251 S.W.2d 8 at page 15, both the
Building Code and the Zoning Ordinance cover the construction and
occupancy of uew buildings in the City of St. Louis (to which we
now add that both the Building Code and the Zoning Ordinance also
cover alteration, and the occupancy of altered buildings). It seems
that only the Building Code expressly provides for the issuance of
building or alteration permits and fixes their duration; but the
Building Code and Ordinance 45309 both expressly provide for the
issuance of certifieates of occupancy. Sections 28 and 41, Building
Code, supra; Section 20, Ordinance No. 45309 (Zoning Ordinance).

Under the general regulatory provisions of the Zoning Ordinance,
in Section 5 thereof, it is provided,

“Al. No building or land shall be used for a use other than
those permitted in the district in which such premises are located.
unless (a) such use is permitted by other provisions of this Sec-
tion or by Sections 18 (Use, Height, and Area Exceptions) or
19 (Board of Adjustment) or (b) such use existed prior to the
effective date of this ordinance.

“‘A2. No building shall be erected, placed, enlarged or struc-
turally altered unless such action shall make the premises upon ©
which it shall stand conform to the regulations for the district
in which the premises are located, unless authorized by the pro-
visions of Section 18 (Use, Height and Area Exceptions) or Sec-
tion 19 (Board of Adjustment) or B.4 of this Section.”
Addressing ourselves to Sections 27, 28, 29 and 41 of the Build-

ing Code, and also particularly to the quoted subparagraphs Al and
A2 of Section 5 of the Zoning Ordinance, we believe the Building
Commissioner, when acting in the issuance of permits for the erection
or alteration as provided in the Building Code, has the dual duty
of ascertaining that the contemplated use of the building to be
erected or altered is in compliance with the Building Code and the
Zoning Ordinance. At least it would seem the quoted provisions of

the Sections of the Building Code are in pari materia with the’ zoning
for ‘‘use’’ provisions of the Zoning. Ordinance. As stated, the Build-
ing Code and the Zoning Ordinance both provide for occupancy
permits and provide for their issuance by the Building Commissioner.
Herein we have a question primarily’ of zoning for. use, .and -the
building or alteration permit and the occupancy permit for a-particu-
lar use must of necessity comply with the provisions of the Zoning
Ordinance. And it would seem that, in this connection at least, neither
the building or alteration [12] permit for-the erection or alteration
of a building in contemplation of a particular use nor the oceupancy
permit for occupancy in such use are valid, if in conflict with the use
provisions of the Zoning’ Ordinance; that either or both may be. re-
voked by the process of administrative procedure. provided in the
Zoning Ordinance; and that, from a practical administrative or regu:
latory standpoint and legally, neither should be considered to. be
validly outstanding if one is determined to be in conflict with the
zoning provisions of the Zoning Ordinance.

HH In the Building Code an appeal is provided to the Board ‘of
Building Appeals whenever the Building Commissioner rejects or re-
fuses to approve the mode or manner of construction proposed to be
followed, or materials to be used in the erection or alteration of .a
building or structure, or when it is claimed that an equally good or
more desirable form of construction can be employed in any specific
case, or that the provisions of the Building Code do not apply, or that
the. true meaning of the Code, or any regulations thereunder, have
been misconstrued or wrongfully interpreted. Section 2354,.Part I
(Building Code), Revised Code of St. Louis. The same Section ex-
pressly provides that ‘‘no such appeal may be taken from any order
or ruling from which an appeal lies to the board of adjustment estab-
lished by the Zoning Ordinance.’’ It should follow that when ques-
tions of the propriety of the administration of the Zoning Ordinance
are in issue, as, for example, where the nonconforming use of property
is brought into issue, the appeal from some act of the Building Com-
missioner affecting the zoning provisions of the Zoning Ordinance is
to the Board of Adjustment.

«Tt is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that sections
and acts in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed
together, and compared with each other. No one act, or portion of all
the acts, should be singled ‘out for consideration apart. from all the
legislation on the subject.’ 50 Am. Jur. 343, Statutes, See. 348.. “Under
the established ‘rules of statutory construction where there are two
laws relating to the same subject they must be read together and the
provisions of the one having a special application to a particular sub-
ject will be deemed to be a qualification of, or.an exception to, the
other act general in its terms.’ Eagleton v. Murphy, 348. Mo. 949, 156

“ a

8.W.2d 683, 685,'138 A.L.R. 749.’? Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty
Co., supra, 863 Mo, 305, 251 8.W.2d 8.

. With this principle of construction in mind, and having a regard
for the provisions of the Building Code and Zoning Ordinance quoted
supra; we hold: the Board of Adjustment had jurisdiction and the
power to review the act of the Building Commissioner in refusing to
revoke the alteration permit, in this case where the real issue was
whether or not plaintiff should have the right to a use different from
that for which the property was zoned in the subsequently enacted
Zoning Ordinance. ~

Plaintiff-appellant has relied:on Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty Co.,
supra, 363 Mo. 305, 251 S.W-2d 8, in support of her contention that
occupancy Permit No. $4567 protects her in her use of her property as
a ftineral establishment. In the Fleming case this court ruled that the
subsequently enacted Zoning Ordinance, in itself, effected no express
or implied revocation of a building permit validly outstanding at the
time the Ordinance took effect. It is important to notice that in the
Fleming case the permit had not been revoked by administrative
Procedure provided in the Zoning Ordinance.

= We have expressed the opinion that the revocation (by the
Board of Adjustment) of the alteration permit (on the theory that the
alteration of the building was for a contemplated use different from
that for which the property was zoned in the subsequently enacted
Zoning Ordinance) was, in effect, also a revocation of the occupancy
permit. Yet it may be conceded that more appropriate procedure
would have expressly revoked both permits. However, as stated, the
application for the writ of certiorari, in which application plaintiff
joined with her [13] husband, recited that both permits were in evi-
dence before the Board of Adjustment. We have examined the record
of the original proceeding ‘before the Board of Adjustment, which
record discloses that evidence was introduced tending to refute and
support plaintiff’s right to use her property as a funeral establishment
in nonconformance with the subsequently enacted Zoning Ordinance.
The evidence introduced at the hearing has been correctly summarized
by the St. Louis Court of Appeals (249 8.W.2d at pages 493-494).
As we see it, the ultimate issue decided by the Board of Adjustment
‘was the right to usé plaintiff’s building as a funeral establishment, and
the underlying or ‘supporting issues were ‘whether plaintiff had ac-
quired a vested right to such use by making substantial expenditures
in reliance on the permit, and whether plaintiff had established a
nonconforming use prior to the effective date of the new compre-
hensive Zoning Ordinance. Veal v. Leimkuehler, supra, 249 8.W.2d
491. Seé also Vol. 8, MeQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed., §§
25.156 and 25.157, pp. 270-274; Vol. 1, Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning
and Planning, 3d Ed., p. 907.

Now, as we have stated supra, plaintiff Olivette E. Veal, the owner
of the property at 4811 Page Boulevard to whom alteration’ Permit
No. $4566 and occupancy Permit No. $4567 were issued, apparently,
did not actually appear as a party in the proceeding before the Board
of Adjustment. Nevertheless, as stated, she joined with her husband
in an application for the writ of certiorari to review the decision of
the Board of Adjustment, Obviously her participation or intervention,
in the proceedings was in the protection of her rights and interests
as an owner of the property and holder of Permits Nos. $4566 and
$4567. And nowhere in the original proceeding or in any subsequent
review thereof was any question raised as to jurisdiction over plaintiff
as a party. Veal v. Leimkuehler, supra, 267 S.W.2d 387. Conse-
quently, in this case, we have the opinion that her right or interest in
the subject matter of the proceeding must’ have been: voluntarily sub-
mitted by her to the consideration of the Board of Adjustment and of
the Cireuit Court on certiorari, and that the affirming judgment of the
Cireuit Court affirmed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals (249 8.W.2d
491) was conclusive on her. Leahy v. Mercantilé Trust Co., 296 Mo.
561, 247 S.W. 396; State ex rel. Kern v. Stone, 269 Mo. 334, 190 S’W.
601; Wood yv. Ensel, 63 Mo. 193; Vol. 50, C.J.S., Judgments, -§ 784,
pp. 320-321.

It is our conclusion that plaintiff’s right to use’her property as a
funeral establishment has been finally adjudicated adversely to her.

The judgment should be affirmed.

It is so ordered. Coil and Holman, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM:—The -foregoing opinion by Van .Ospot, C.,. is
adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Bazrvetpt & Honte Construction Company, a Missouri Corporation,
Respondent, v. Louis R. Szomparay and Aticn P. Szompatuy,
Appellants, No. 44761—289 8. W. (2d) 116.

Division One, March 12, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing Before Court en Banc Overruled, April 9, 1956...

CONTRACTS: ‘Trial: Erroneous Instruction Not Cured, Plaintiff’s
erroneous instruction was not cured by defendants’ instruction covering
the elements omitted ‘from plaintiff's instruction. The two instructions were
in conflict

* Witbun B. Jo ‘ones, Sam Blson and Norman 8. London for defendants-
appellants; Salkey & Jones of. counsel.

Meyer, Hoester & Coleman by Robert G. J. Hoester for plaintiff
respondent.

[117] COIL, C—The Baerveldt & Honig Construction Company,
a corporation (plaintiff below), had verdict and’ judgment for
$10,295.72 against defendants (appellants here), Louis R. and Alice P.
Szombathy, representing the principal and interest thereon of a
balance allegedly due plaintiff for materials and labor furnished by
plaintiff in the construction of a building for defendants. Defendants
contend that the trial court erred in giving instructions.

Plaintiff, engaged in the construction business, erected a one-story,
concrete block building for defendants: Defendants had priorly agreed
to, and did, lease that building for ten years to the United States as a’
post office in Berkeley, St. Louis County, Missouri. The contract or
understanding between the parties pursuant to which the building was
constructed was oral, but there were written plans and specifications.
Construction began in September 1951 and the building was occupied
on January 5, 1952.

Plaintiff’s petition sought recovery on quantum meruit of a balance
due for the reasonable value of the labor and materials performed and
furnished which went into the completed building, and prayed that
the amount found due be adjudged a mechanic’s lien on the building.
Defendants’ amended answer pleaded, in effect, noncompletion of the
building’ and that the completed building was defective because of
eracks in the foundation walls. Defendants averred in their amended
answer that these defects arose ‘‘either from defective or insufficient
materials or defective workmanship or both.’’? The evidence at the
trial took a wide range and plaintiff, as will more fully appear, con-
trary to the averments of its petition, submitted its case to the jury on
the theory that it was entitled to recover the amount fixed by the terms
of an oral contract between plaintiff and defendants. Defendants
adduced evidence, without objection by plaintiff, which, also contrary
to the averments of their amended answer, supported a possible find-
ing that the cracks in the foundation walls were due to defective plans
for the result of which plaintiff was liable, and submitted their case
by an instruction which did not exclude the theory (the only theory

eT

supported by defendants’ evidence) that defendants were not liable
to plaintiff for the amount it would cost to remedy the defects in the
foundation walls resulting from defective plans.

A-proper disposition of this appeal does not require a detailed re-
view of much of the evidence contained in a long transcript. We
shall, however, indicate enough of the evidence to make clear the trial
theories of the parties and the basic disputes between them.

Plaintiff’s evidence tended’ to show that the oral contract as to the
cost of the building was this: plaintiff was to receive the cost of all
labor plus 10% thereon for taxes and insurance, the cost of all
materials furnished either directly or through subcontractors, plus
10% on the total figure (labor and. materials) thus arrived at for over-
head and profit. Defendants’ evidence as to the pertinent details of
the cost arrangement was this: plaintiff was to construct the building
on a cost-plus-10% basis with a ceiling on the total cost of $25,280.

Plaintiff’s evidence further showed that the statement attached to
its petition correctly reflected the status of the account between the
parties in accordance with plaintiff’s version of the oral agreement.
That statement indicated that the total cost was $27,881.33 (not in-
eluding an item of $1,680 for the installation of the heating system
which, by agreement, was done by defendant, Louis Szombathy, whose
business was heating, ventilating, and sheet metal, and for which
defendants were to receive credit against either the total cost, from
plaintiff’s standpoint, or against the [118] ceiling price, from defend-
ants’ standpoint). The statement further showed that defendants had
made payments on account in the total sum of $16,814.83, leaving a
balance due in the sum of $11,066.50.

Defendants did not substantially dispute that the labor and ma-
terials.reflected on plaintiff’s itemized statement had in fact gone into
the building (although they may have questioned the propriety of a
few of the charges with which we are not here concerned). Defend-
ants’ position was that the building was not completed or properly
constructed and that the cost to defendants of completing the building
and replacing -the defective portions should be offset against any
amount which was due from defendants to plaintiff. To support that
position, defendants adduced evidence to the effect that they had ex-
pended the sum of $235 for waterproofing and painting which work
should have been done by plaintiff but which plaintiff had refused to
do when requested, and that the concrete foundation walls had
eracked due to insufficient reinforcing steel in them and that to replace
the east and south foundation walls would cost $6,000 to $6,500.

Other evidentiary details will be discussed in connection with our
consideration of instruction 1 which was: ‘‘The Court instructs the
jury that if you find and believe from the evidence that the work and
labor as charged for in the plaintiff’s bill of items as shown in evi-
dence, was done and performed by the plaintiff and its employees,

under and pursuant to an oral contract by and between plaintiff and
defendants, if you so find, and if you further find that the said con-
tract was a cost plus 10% contract, for a maximum amount of
$25,280.00 plus $1,000.00 for any changes in plans, if you so find,
and if you further find that at the instance and request and with
the consent of the defendants, there were extra items of material
and labor furnished by the plaintiff in the amount of $2,167.63,
then you will find for the plaintiff in the amount of $25,280.00,
adding thereto the reasonable value and worth of any extra items
of labor and material, as shown in evidence, not to exceed $2,167.63,
and from said total amount you will déduct $18,494.88 as a credit
to the defendants, as shown in evidence, and you will then award the
plaintiff the net amount with interest at the legal rate of 6% per

It should be noted that plaintiff, by the foregoing instruction,
partially adopted defendants’ version of the price contract, ie.,
plaintiff hypothesized that a ceiling price of $25,280 was the basic
price agreement.

Hl Defendants here contend that the foregoing instruction was
erroneous because it omitted the requirement of an essential finding
prerequisite to plaintiff’s recovery, viz., that the building: was eom-
pleted in a workmanlike manner. Plaintiff contends that such a find-
ing was not essential to plaintiff’s recovery under the evidence in the
instant case.

Defendants correctly assert that in every contract to perform work
there is an implied agreement that the work will be done in a skillful
and workmanlike manner. See: 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §. 329, p. 781;
Brush v. Miller, Mo. App., 208 S.W. 2d 816, 818[1]; Kennedy v.
Bowling, 319 Mo, 401, 417, 4 $.W. 2d 438, 445[9, 10]; John O’Brien
Boiler Works Co. v. Sievert, Mo. App., 256 S.W. 555, 557[1-5].
Defendants say, therefore, that the disputed issue was whether the
building was completed properly or defectively; and that plaintiff’s
instruction 1, in effect, directed a verdict for plaintiff without requir-
ing any finding on that issue.

Plaintiff answers by asserting, in effect, that all the evidence showed
that the building was constructed in exact accordance with plans and
specifications approved by both plaintiff and defendants as well as
by the postal authorities; more specifically, that the exact kind and
quantity of steel reinforcing called for by the agreed plans was placed
in the concrete foundation walls in a workmanlike manner, and that,
therefore, there was no issue for the jury as to whether the work was
properly done.

Tt does appear, as plaintiff suggests, that both plaintiff’s and de-
fendants’ evidence [119] showed that the building was constructed
according to plans and specifications which were drawn (with the ex-
ception of the plans for the heating installation concededly drawn by

be

defendant Louis Szombathy) by plaintiff’s agent; that those plans
were approved, generally at least, by defendants and by the prospec-
tive lessee, the United States; that defendants did not offer evidence
at the trial to the effect that the building had not been constructed in
accordance with those plans; that defendants offered no evidence to
the effect that the actual work performed under the plans was not
done in a workmanlike manner in the sense that the steel reinforcing
rods were improperly placed or that the concrete was improperly
poured; and it appeared that the building was in fact occupied by the
United States for the purpose for which the building was constructed.

Thus, as we view it, the issues made by the evidence (ignoring the
pleadings for the moment) were: 1. whether the building was com-
pleted, i.c., whether everything was done that was called for either by:
the plans or by an agreement between the parties; and, 2. whether
the plans under which the building was constructed were defective
plans in the respect that they provided for insufficient steel in the
foundation walls, and, if so, whether such defective plans resulted in
defective foundation walls by reason of the cracks which appeared
therein; and the additional connected issue, not submitted, as to
whether, in any event, plaintiff was legally liable for the result of the
defective plans, ie., whether plaintiff impliedly agreed that the plans
he furnished would result in foundation walls without any shrinkage
eracks, and, if so, whether defendants, with actual or constructive
knowledge of the amount of reinforcing steel called for by the plans
and because of defendant Louis Szombathy’s familiarity with con-
struction, waived reliance upon the implied undertaking of plaintiff
to furnish plans which would result, in foundation walls without
shrinkage cracks. See 17 O.J.S., Contracts, § 515b and.c, pp. 1107-
1109 ; Kennedy v. Bowling, supra, 4 S.W. 2d 444[8]; Simpson Bros.
Corp. v. Merrimac Chemical Co., 248 Mass. 346, 142 N.E. 922; McCon-
nell v. Gordon Const. Co., 105 Wash. 659, 178 P. 823; Sandy Hites Co.
y. State Highway Commission, 347 Mo: 954, 963[1], 149 S.W. 2d 828,
833[1]; note in L.R.A. 19150, p. 671.

If the only error contained in the instruction were its failure to have
submitted the issue of whether the building was in fact completed, we
could effectively cure it by ordering a conditional remittitur. This,
because, as we have noted, defendants’ only evidence as to expenditures
made by them in completing the building was that they had spent $235
for waterproofing and painting. Consequently, defendants would be
entitled to no more than a credit for the amount of that item against
the amount of the judgment. There is, however, as we shall demon-
strate, a more serious deficiency in the instruction.

It is true, as plaintiff suggests and as we have noted, that defendants
did not offer evidence at the trial that the foundation walls were not
constructed in accordance with the plans. It is also true that those
plans called. for.a certain amount of reinforcing steel to be placed in

the concrete foundation walls. And defendants did-not offer evidence
that the prescribed amount of.steel of proper quality was not used
therein or that plaintiff did not place the steel in, or pour, the founda-
tion walls in a proper, skillful, and workmanlike manner. Defendants”
position, so far as concerned any issue made by their evidence, was,
and had to be essentially, that the plan itself did not call for. enough
steel and that the plan itself was, therefore,.defective and that the
building so constructed was defective by reason of foundation wall
eracks resulting from defective plans. Defendants. offered expert
testimony to the effect that standard practice: called for the use of
twice as, much steel as was called for by the instant plans, and that
certain foundation -wall cracks that appeared after the instant.
building was completed were caused by not having enough steel in the
foundation to prevent such cracks; which cracks, in the. absence of
sufficient steel, would appear because of the shrinkage of the conerete;
[120] and that the ‘‘only. way you could get rid of the cracks is by
removing the wall and rebuilding’’, and that it would cost between
$6,000 and $6,500 to replace the east and south walls.

(We. are not. presently concerned with the question of whether.
defendants’. pleading and evidence were sufficient to justify its in-
struction 3 which permitted the jury to offset against any amount due
plaintiff the total cost of replacing the east and south walls. Certainly
defendants’ evidence did not go so far as to show whether the cracks
which did appear and which plaintiff thereafter tuck-pointed were
such as to make the. foundation defective. in the sense. of not. being
structurally sound, or whether the.cracks were defects only from the
standpoint of appearance. And no instruction submitted the possibly.
relevant question of whether plaintiff was legally bound to do other
than follow the approved plans, even though such plans were drawn
by plaintiff’s agent.)

Our purpose in reviewing defendants’ position and portions of their
evidence is only to demonstrate that whatever may be said as to its
sufficiency, as an affirmative basis for.a particular monetary offset, it
may not be said: that the effect of defendants’ evidence was to concede
or remove from. controversy the questions of whether the building was
completed and whether the completed building was-in fact nondefee-
tive in any. respect for which plaintiff would be legally liable.

- And even if defendants were held strictly to the allegations of their
amended answer, heretofore noted, viz.,.that the cracks in the founda-
tion walls were due to defective materials or defectiye workmanship,
or both (there was no pleading that defective.plans caused the cracks),
and even though defendant offered no evidence to. sustain those aver-
ments, still (in the absence of affirmative evidence by defendant con-
ceding that nondefective materials were used and conceding that such
materials were applied in a workmanlike manner and in the absence of
defendants otherwise- eliminating those issues),, plaintiff would. need

to include’ as essential findings prerequisite to recovery that plaintiff
complied with the implied provisions of its contract, viz., that the con-
tract was performed and that the performance thereof was’ accom-
plished in a workmanlike manner. Brush y. Miller, supra, 208 $.W.
2d 818[1], 820[7]. This, because plaintiff had the burden to prove
those matters as conditions precedent to its right to recover on the
theory which it adopted, and defendants were, therefore, entitled to
have the jury pass upon the credibility of plaintiff’s evidence even
though defendants offered no evidence to the contrary. Cluck v. Abe,
328 Mo. 81, 84, 40 S.W. 2d 558,°559[1-3]. And, as we have pointed
out heretofore, :defendants’ evidence was not such as to concede or
otherwise eliminate the pleaded issues, and thus make inapplicable
the usual rule stated in Cluck v. Abe, supra. Rogers v. Thompson, 364
Mo. 605, 615, 265 9. W. 24 282, 287[1].

Examining plaintift’s instruction 1 in the light of all the foregoing,
it appears that, except for matters not presently pertinent, the instruc-
tion-required the jury to find only the essentially undisputed fact that
the work and labor (materials are not mentioned) reflected by plain-
tiff’s itemized statement ‘‘was done and performed by the plaintiff
and its employees, under and pursuant to an oral contract by and be-
tween plaintiff and defendants.’’ The only finding, however, as to any
terms of the mentioned oral contract related to its price feature.
Essentially, then, the instruction told the jury to find a specified
amount for plaintiff if the stated work and labor was performed. Now,
as indicated, plaintiff was not entitled to recover the amount specified,
under the issues made either by the pleadings or the evidence, unless
the jury also found that the building was fully completed in accord-
ance with the oral agreement of the parties and that such completed
building was substantially nondefective (ie. one which had been
constructed in a workmanlike manner), or, if defective, not so in any
respect for which plaintiff was legally liable. It may well be that
plaintiff’s instruction would have sufficiently [121] submitted those
issues, from plaintiff’s standpoint, by simply requiring the jury to
find that the building was completed’ and, if so, that the completed
building was one which had been constructed in a workmanlike manner.
But, in any event, plaintiff, by failing to include any language re-
quiring a finding of the mentioned facts, omitted the requirement to
find facts necessary to its recovery and the instruction was thereby
erroneous, ‘Blackwell v. Union Pac. R. Co., 831 Mo. 84, 42[8, 4], 52
S.W. 24 814, 816[3, 4]; McDonald v. Kansas City Gas Co., 382 Mo.
856, 364, 59 S.W. 2d 37, 40[6-9]; and see John O’Brien Boiler Works
Co. v. Sievert, supra, 256 S. W. 557[1-5].

Defendants’ instruction 3 may have sufficiently submitted

_ the isstes omitted from instruction 1. Instruction 3 directed that if
the ‘jury found that’ ‘plaintiff failed to construct and complete
properly’? the building in question and that ‘‘it has or will cost the

defendants in order to complete the Post Office building in a good and
workmanlike manner’’ then such cost should be offset against any
amount the jury found was due from defendant, and if the jury found
that the cost to defendant was greater than the amount due, then the
jury was authorized to return a verdict for defendant. It is es-
tablished, however, that, ordinarily at least, the omission of an .essen-
tial fact from a verdict-directing instruction which purports to cover
the entire case (from the standpoint of one of the parties) is not
cured by an instruction of the other party which requires a finding
of the omitted fact. Blackwell v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra, 52 S.W.
2d 816[5]; Cantley v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 353 Mo. 605,
617, 183 S.W. 2d 123, 129[10]; John O'Brien Boiler ‘Works vy. Sievert,
supra, 256 S.W. 557[6, 7].

Instruction 1 authorized the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff
in the amount of $10,295.72 (the exact verdict which the jury re-
turned) without finding the necessary facts heretofore noted. As-
suming that defendants’ instruction authorized the jury to make
findings on the issues omitted from plaintiff’s instruction, it then
authorized the jury to either return a smaller verdict for plaintiff
than that directed by instruction 1 or return a defendants’ verdict.
The two instructions, 1 and 8, were, therefore, in such conflict that
we may not say that by reading them as a single charge, the jury
made the essential findings of fact prerequisite to plaintiff’s right
to recover the amount stated in instruction 1.

It follows that the error was prejudicial to defendants and the
case, therefore, must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

We need not rule defendants’ other attack on instruction 1 or
their attack on plaintiff’s instruction 2. Plaintiff may wish to con-
sider defendants’ additional criticisms of those instructions in the
event of another trial.

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Van Osdol and Holman, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Com, C., is adopted a as
the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Crry or Sprineriexp, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. CHARLES
Ray Brown and the Ammurican Bonpine Company or Bavrmortt,
Respondents, No. 45012—289 8. Ww. (2a) 48.

"Division One, April 9, 1956.” ”

Gerald W. Gleason for appellant.

nm, Mann, Mann, Walter &G Powell and E. H. Mob y
for respondent American Bonding Company.

[48] HOLMAN, C.—In this action plaintiff sought to recover the ,
full penalty of $10,000 specified in the official bond given by Charles
Ray Brown, as principal, with the American Bonding Company of
Baltimore, as surety. The defendants filed separate but identical
motions to dismiss which were sustained by the trial court. From the
judgment dismissing the cause plaintiff has duly appealed.

At the time of the oceurrence of the events hereafter related the
plaintiff was a city of the second class and was operating under the
provisions of Chapter 75 (all statutory references are to RSMo 1949,
V.A.M.S.) with a commission form of government. It is alleged in
the petition that defendant Brown was elected Commissioner of
Streets and Public Improvements on April 4, 1950. The instant bond
was given in compliance with Section 75.490 which provided that
“each commissioner shall give bond to the city in the sum of ten
thousand dollars, or such larger sum as may be required by ordinance,
for the faithful performance of the duties of his office, and the com-
missioner of the department of revenue shall give bond in such larger
sum as is herein provided.’’ The condition of the bond given was that
the principal would ‘‘well and faithfully perform all and singular
the duties incumbent wpon him by reason of his election or appoint-
ment as aforesaid, and honestly account for all moneys coming into
his hands according to law.’’

Defendant Brown took the required oath and assumed the duties
of the office on April 17, 1950, and remained in office until May 12,
1953, when a new council was sworn in under the provisions of a
constitutional charter which had apparently been [49] adopted by the
voters of the City of Springfield.

The legislative body of a city operating under Chapter 75 is a
council consisting of the mayor and four commissioners. Section
75.090. In addition to his legislative duties defendant Brown was the
officer in charge of the streets, public grounds and other public
property of the city. Section 75.450.

The breach of the conditions of the bond of which plaintiff complains
in the petition relates to the legislative duties of Mr. Brown. It is
alleged that said defendant, ‘‘in the performance of his official duties
as a member of the City Council of the City of Springfield, Missouri,
did on or about the 18th day of June, 1951, cast his ‘aye’ vote to
authorize the Mayor to execute the City of Springfield’s contract

dated June 18, 1951, with the engineering firm of Russell & Axon of
St, Louis, Missouri, for.a survey of the city’s sanitary sewage system,
and that the said defendant, Charles Ray Brown, did thereafter on or
about the 5th day of June, 1952, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
accept from one James H. Warren, attorney and agent of the afore-
said firm of Russell & Axon, a payment in the amount of $1,000 made
in consideration of his favorable vote cast as aforesaid.’’ It is further
alleged that as a consequence of said acts Brown was indicted and
convicted of bribery and sentenced to serve a term of two years in the
State Penitentiary ‘and that the said judgment of conviction was
affirmed by this court. State v. Brown, 364 Mo. 759, 267 S. W. 2d 682.
There is no allegation that plaintiff sustained any financial loss by
redson of the aforementioned conduct of said defendant.

Defendants’ motions to- dismiss are based upon the following
grounds, ‘‘(1) the petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted; (2) the bond sued upon is an indemnity bond, as distin-
guished from a penal bond and is, therefore, not a bond under which a
forfeiture for the entire principal of the bond could be declared be-
cause of the alleged acts or omissions of the principal, Charles Ray
Brown; and (8) the alleged acts and omissions of this defendant,
Charles Ray Brown, principal in the bond sued upon, which are
alleged to constitute grounds upon which a forfeiture of the
bond may be declared, do not constituté a breach of the conditions of
the bond or a failure on the part of defendant Charles Ray Brown to
faithfully perform the duties of his office.’’

The parties agree that the sole question for our determination is
whether the instant bond is one of forfeiture or of indemnity. Plain-
tiff frankly concedes that if the bond is one of indemnity the city is
not entitled to recover upon the petition herein.’ This appears to be
the first case in this state in which the contention has been made that
the bond of a public official is a penal or forfeiture bond. Indeed, it
is said that there is only one reported case in the United States in
which such a recovery was sought:’ See Annotation in 4 A.L.R. 2d
1848. That case is State ex rel. v. Overturff, 239 Iowa 1039, 33 N. W.
2d 405, which we will hereafter discuss.

As we have indicated plaintiff contends that it is entitled to recover
the entire ainount of the bond under an allegation that the defendant
Brown failed to faithfully perform’ the duties of his office in the fore-
going respects, without regard to any loss sustained. The principal
ease plaintiff relies upon is State v. Wipke, 345 Mo. 283, 133 S. W.
2d 854. That case involved the'bond given by a licensee for the sale of
liquor by the drink under what is now Section 311.090. The statute
reqtired a bond conditioned upon ‘‘the faithful performance of all
the requirements of this law.’’ Defendant violated certain provisions
of the Liquor Coxitrol Act and it was held that the State could recover
the full penalty of the bond. °

It should be noted, however, that in State v. Vienup, 847 Mo. 382,
147 S. W. 2d 627, this court held that a bond given by a licensee to
sell liquor in the original package, under Section 311.230, was an in-.
demnity bond. That statute provided that said. bond require that the
licensee ‘‘keep at all [50] times an orderly house, and that he will not
sell, give away or otherwise. dispose of, or suffer the same to be done
about his premises, any intoxicating liquor in any quantity to any
minor, and conditioned that he will not violate any of the provisions
of this law and that he will pay all taxes, inspection and license fees
provided for in this chapter, together with all fines, penalties and
forfeitures which may be adjudged against him under the provisions
of this law.’ .

We have concluded that. neither of the foregoing cases are of much
help to us in the solution of.the problem here presented. This, for the
reason that they do not deal with bonds of public officials. On ‘the con-
trary they involve the highly, regulated liquor traffic, wherein it-is
often, considered necessary to, invoke various penalties in order to ob-
tain compliance with the many laws and. regulations which control
that industry.

For reasons that will hereafter briefly. appear, we have decided
that the legislature, in the enactment of Section 75.490, intended to
provide that the commissioners give an indemnity bond rather than
a forfeiture or penal bond.

It will be noted that Section 75.490 provides that each. commissioner
give a bond in the sum of $10,000 ‘‘or such larger swm as may be re-
quired by ordinance.’’ If this bond was intended to provide a penalty
for the failure of said official to faithfully perform the duties of his
office, is.it reasonable that the council be permitted to fix the maximum
amount thereof? If so, the result would be that the punishment of a
commissioner for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office might be $10,000
in Springfield while a similar, official might forfeit $50,000 in J oplin
for the same misconduct. °

It should be further noted that under the provisions -of Sections
75.490 and 93.390 the minimum bond of the commissioner of revenue
is fixed at twenty-five per cent of the estimated annual gross revenues
of the city. It is said that at the time in question the bond of this
official exceeded one million dollars. If the contention of plaintiff is
upheld, it would follow that if the commissioner of revenue had been
convicted of this act of taking a bribe (and assuming that such was a
breach of the conditions of the bond), the plaintiff could have recovered
the sum of one million dollars as a forfeiture for such misconduct,
which would clearly have been an wnreasonable penalty.

Plaintiff argues that the bond required of commissioners by Section
75.490 relates to their legislative duties, and that such is penal, while
commissioners whose duties require them to handle city funds are re-
quired by Sections 75.590 and 93.390 to give a separate, special, in-

demnity bond to cover that phase of their duties. We see no reasonable
basis for this construction of the applicable statutes and accordingly
rule that this contention is without merit.

* Moreover, if the bond of public officials is held to be penal in nature,
we anticipate that great practical difficulties would be encountered
in determining the degree of malfeasance or nonfeasance required
for forfeiture. It would be impossible for officials or sureties to
reasonably determine the probability of liability. For example; would
the bond of a commissioner be forfeited if, without a reasonable ex-
euse, he failed to attend a meeting of the council, or, would he forfeit
$10,000 or more if he neglected his duties for a week or perhaps a
month, or would forfeiture result from a minor act of malfeasance?
All of these examples and the matters discussed in the foregoing
paragraphs should clearly demonstrate that the legislature must have
intended to provide for an indemnity bond.

It appears to be generally accepted that prosecution under the
eriminal laws and ouster proceedings are adequate provisions for
punishing officers found guilty of misconduct or neglect in office. The
official bond is for the purpose of indemnifying those suffering loss or
injury by redson of such official malfeasance or nonfeasance. We are
supported in our views by the case of State ex rel. v. Overturff, supra,
which held that the bond of a sheriff was [51] an indemnity bond and
was not subject to forfeiture for malfeasance in office. 7
* Plaintiff makes no contention that recovery may be had, in any
event, for nominal damages and, in fact, its brief seems to disclaim
any desire for a ruling on that question. Therefore, we will not con-
sider that possibility, nor will we decide whether the alleged act of
defendant Brown would constitute a breach of this bond even if it
were construed to be a penal or forfeiture bond.

The judgment is affirmed. Van Osdol and Coil, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Horman, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Srarz or Missouri at the Relation of Lester Simcrn, Sr., Davin L.
Suerrrey and Commprcz Trust Company, as Trustees under
Trust Agreement of Fiorencn Harzrenp, Deceased, Euise B.
Suurrrey, Luan Wor, Firorence Suan, Lesrer Smer, Sr.,
Individually, Frmepa Sreern, Marsorre Simcrt Mavran, ‘and
Lusrer Simenn, Jr., Relators, v. Honorasie Duvan P. Srroruer,
Juper or ran Circurr Courr or Jackson Country, Missouri, at

Kansas City, Division No. 4, Respondent, No. 45178—289 8, W.
(2a) 73.

. Court en Bane, April 9, 1956.

John H. Lathrop and Richard 8. Righter for relators: Lester
Siegel, Sr., David L. Sheffrey and Commerce Trust Company, Trustees ;
Paul Barnett and David Sheer for relators David L. Sheffrey, Trustee,
and Elise B. Sheffrey, Leah Wolf and Florence Shane; and Herman
M. Langworthy and Clyde J. Linde for relators Lester Siegel, Sr.,
Individually, Frieda Siegel, Marjorie Siegel Mavran and Lester
Siegel, Jr.

man for respondent.

- [75] HOLLINGSWORTH, J.—This is an original proceeding
seeking ‘to prohibit respondent as a Judge of the Cireuit Court of
Jackson County, at Kansas City, from proceeding in alleged excess
of the jurisdiction of that court to hear and determine in an action
brought primarily to contest the will of Florence Harzfeld, de-
ceased; an alternative count in equity to annul an inter vivos trust
agreement to which reference is made in the will, and a further
alternative count to void the sale of certain corporate stocks made
pursuant to the provisions of said trust agreement and for an
accounting.. Respondent’s return to our preliminary rule admitted
all facts pleaded in relators’ petition, denied the conclusions of law
pleaded therein and pleaded and sought discharge of our rule on
grounds hereinafter discussed. Relators thereupon filed motion for
judgment on the pleadings. The cause was briefed, argued and sub-
mitted upon the facts and issues pleaded in the petition and return.

The action out of which this proceeding arose is Cause No. 564,934,
in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, at Kansas City, and is en-

titled ‘(Leslie Seidenbach et al. plaintiffs,:v.- Lester Siegel, “Sr:,
David’ L. Sheffrey and Commerce Trust Company, 'a corporation,’
as executors and as trustees under’ purported last will and téstamentt’
and purported trust agreement of Florence Harafeld, ‘decease’ .
al., defendants.”’ forts

Florence Harzfeld, whose will and: ‘trust agreemerit ‘ave in ebm’
troversy, died | on January 17, 1952. On J June 24, 1950, she executed

vasiduary clause thereot (Item ITI):
‘All the rest and residue of my ‘property; real, personal, 4
mixed, I will, devise and bequeath to Commerce Trust Company;"'-
Lester Siegel and David L. Sheffrey, all ‘of Kansas City; Jackson"
County, Missouri, as Trustees under’a certain ‘Consolidating aid’
Amending Trust Agreement’ dated the 12th day of May, 1950, by «
and between Florence Harzfeld as Grantor and Commerce Trust "

Company, Lester Siegel’ and David‘L: Sheffrey as Trustees, to be- “+
come a part of the trust estate described in said Consolidating-and -*'

- Amending Trust Agreement and to be held, administered and

distributed by them upon and in accordance with all.the’ trusts,”
terms and conditions set forth in said agreement.’*!i - tui os
On March 25, 1952, following trial in the probate court, that court
found and adjudged ‘that: the purported will of June-24, 1950,-and:
the purported trust agreement of May 12, 1950, ‘‘do constitute the
Last Will and Testament of Florence Harzfeld, deceased, and said
instruments are hereby allowed and admitted to probate: as such Last
Will and Testament.” oa]
In the action filed by plaintiffs in the ‘¢rial court, Count. L attacks
the will and trust (treating the trust.as part of the will). on!:the
ground of fraud and undue influence on the part-of two of the
relators Herein, Lester Siegel; Sr., and David L. Sheffrey. A verdict
on this count would hold that said will and trust instrument severally
or collectively do or do not constitute the last will of the deceased.
This count does not attack the trust: as @ trust—but only, as-a will.
Count II adopts the charges set forth in Count-I. and attacks only,
the will, as such, exclusive of thé trust instrument. Count-III ‘adopts:
the [76] charges set forth:in Count I and offers for- probate an in-
strument dated December 13; 1951, as the last will of deceased. Count
TV offers for probate a codicil thereto, dated’ December 19,1951. Both
of these instruments were rejected by the: probate court. Count. -V;
adopts the charges set forth in Count I and, in the alternative, at-
tacks the trust as a trust, seeks cancellation thereof, the voiding of a
sale of certain shares of stock made thereunder by the trustees, and
demands an accounting’ of benefits allegedly. accruing to Lester-
Siegel, Sr.; pursuant to such action. Count VI likewise adopts the
charges of Count I and makes an alternative -attack only on. the, pro:

vision of said. trust, granting to Lester Siegel, Sr., an option to pur-
chase certain corporate stocks, seeking cancellation thereof, the voiding
of action taken thereunder by the trustees subsequent to the probate
of.the will, and demands an accounting of benefits by Siegel.

The relators herein, as defendants in that suit, filed a motion
seeking, among other things, a dismissal of Counts V and VI, which
are counts in equity, on the-ground that Counts I, IJ, III and IV of
the. suit are a, will contest, and therefore cannot be joined with any
other or different kind of action. This motion, as to said two counts,
was overruled, and in the order overruling the motion, respondent,
then, being. the assignment judge, sent the case back to the general
docket. :

The trust agreement was executed and acknowledged before a
notary public as .a trust and not as a will signed, published and de-
elared in the presence of witnesses.as required by law for the execu-
tion of, wills. Its provisions are those of a trust (not a will), reserving
the income from corpus’to the grantor, Florence Harzfeld, for her
life, creating the trustees’ rights and limitations, reserving to grantor
the right of revocation and right of withdrawal of corpus during her
life, providing for liquidation and distribution after her death, and
for termination thereafter.

In this court, relators contend that the Circuit Court of Jackson
County exceeded and threatens further to act in excess of its juris-
diction by-treating Counts V and VI as properly joined in the same
action as Counts I.to IV, inclusive, on the grounds that a will con-
test in the circuit-court operates as an appeal from the probate court,
that the jurisdiction of the cireuit court in such an action is therefore
derivative, and’ that its jurisdiction is limited to the issues authorized
by the statute authorizing such contest. Respondent contends that
such a will contest is not an appeal from the probate court and,
thérefore, is not limited by the same rules as an appeal. Thus is pre-
sented the essential issue on the merits.

H Before consideration of. the case on the merits, however, it
is‘necessary that. we consider a challenge made by respondent to our
jurisdiction. He says+:(1) that we have no right to issue and deter-
mine an original writ in prohibition in. the absence of service of pro-
cess upon a proper party respondent; (2) that the only proper party
respondent is a judge who is exceeding or threatening to exceed his
legal Jurisdiction ; and (3) that respondent is not the proper party
réspondent since he has no jurisdiction to act further i in the cause.
Of these in order:

(1). It must’ be conceded, in fact, we do not understand relators
to question that ‘‘[a] writ (of prohibition) which is final in form
and effect’and is granted -without any preliminary notice whatever to
the prohibited court and parties is void for want of due process. ?
42 Am. Jur., Prohibition, §°48, p. 178,

(2) and (3). In support of his contention that the only proper’
party respondent in prohibition is a judge who 1s exceeding” ot
threatening to exceed his legal jurisdiction, he cites: State ex rel.”
Phillips v. Barton, 300 Mo. 76, 254 S.W, 85, 87; State ex rel. Powers
v. Rassieur, Mo., 184 8.W. 116, 118; and State ex rel. Stroh v. Klene,
276 Mo. 206, 207 S.W. 496, 497. ‘These cases furnish little aid to
respondent in his assertion that this court has not, by the method’
pursued in this case, acquired jurisdiction over the Circuit Court ‘of
Jackson [77] County. The Barton case, supra, merely holds. that
prohibition lies only against the exercise of judiciéll powér and may!
not be used to prohibit a’ ministerial act even if the act be done by a
judge pursuant to statute. The Rassieur case, supra, holds'that a
party Htigant i is an improper respondent ina prohibition proceeding*
and that, in the absence of proof, a mere allegation in a petition that
the respondent judge was about to put into force a judgment rendered’
in an.election contest while a motion for new trial was pending, which
allegation the judge denied, presehted no basis for a judginent. The
Klene case, supra, has no bearing whatever on the question here in-
volved. It held, as did the Rassieur case, that a party litigant ‘was
not a proper party respondent in prohibition and thereupon made
absolute its preliminary rule issued against two judges who had
presided over litigation pending in a Division of the Cirenit Court of
St. Louis.

Before passing these cases, however, , it ‘is, well to note that the
Rassieur case, 184 8.W. 116, 117, states: ‘“* * * the writ rims
from a court of superior to a court of inferior jurisdiction, solely
to prevent the inferior court from assuming a jurisdiction it has’
not, or from exceeding a jurisdiction it has.’? And further, Le
118: ‘“* * * the judge or the tribunal * * * whose action is sought

* to be halted and annulled is ordinarily the only necessary party
defendant in an action in prohibition.’ (Emphasis ours.) These
statements would clearly indicate that if sérvice of our preliy
writ upon respondent constituted lawful notice to the Circuit Court
of Jackson County, at Kansas City, ‘whose action (by this’ procéed-
ing) is sought to be halted and annulled’’, then that court is properly’
before us for a final determination of the writ under the jurisdiction
vested in us by Article V, § 4, of the Constitution. ,

Respondent also asserts that under the rules of the Cireuit Court of
Jackson County respondent is not a proper party’ respondént sincé
he has no jurisdiction to act further in this case. He ‘says, first,
that under said rules respondent’s jurisdiction, as judge of Division
4 of the Cireuit Court, over the suit under consideration was ter-
minated by its transfer and assignment back, to the General “Docket,

‘‘where it has rested ever since’’, and that ‘under said rules juris.
diction of the case is in the presiding judge. These assertions ‘may
be taken as correct, but they do not answer the question of whether

y..the, service of our preliminary writ upon respondent we have
acquired, jurisdiction over the Circuit. Court of Jackson County,
at Kansas City. As to this ‘question, respondent says: ‘‘It is true
that the writ. operates upon the court, but of necessity it is directed
to the judge of that court (for the time being) as a living’ person
capable ‘of being served with process and brought into the higher
court to account for a threatened usurpation of the jurisdiction of
that. court. It is comparable to-the necessity of serving a living person
with process intended for a corporation. In each instance the living
person legally. represents the entity for the purpose. The jurisdic-
tion, or lack of jurisdiction of Division No.-4 is indistinguishable from
the jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction of Respondent as, its Judge,
and. the applicable law governs regardless of which is considered.’’
Insofar as we are advised, the question posed by respondent is one of
first impression in this State and no direct authority has been cited
by either. of, the parties hereto.

Our jurisdiction to issue original writs of prohibition is declared
by Art. V,, § 4, of the Constitution giving us ‘‘general superintending
control over all inferior courts’? in this State and vesting us with a
discretionary right to issue and determine original’ remedial writs.
Section: 530.030 RSMo 1949, V.A.MS., (All statutory references are
to. RSMo 1949, VAMS., uiless otherwise noted.) provides. that
procedure in prohibition shall conform as nearly as practicable to
the code of civil procedure and in the case of State ex rel. St. Louis
& Kirkwood R. Co. v, Iirzel, 187 Mo. 435, 449, 87 8. W. 921,.924,
cited by respondent, it was [78] held that the provisions of the code
applied as far as it was properly applicable to a prohibition proceeding
in the Supreme. Court. But, in later cases, it has been consistently
held that “Tp]roceedings of this sort which originate in this court
are governed, not by the code, but by the general law on the subject. ”
State-ex rel.. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n. v. Eby, 170 Mo. 497,
527, 71 S.W. 52, 62; State ex rel, Burton vy. Montgomery, 316 Mo.
658, 664, 291 S.W. 472, AT4, .

“It has been a frequent and, insofar as we are advised, a heretofore
unquestioned practice in the issuance of writs directed by this court
to lower courts with multiple judges to direct such writs to the judge
who had made the order challenged as being beyond jurisdiction of
that court and which order,.on its face, bespoke the purpose of that
court thereafter to exercise jurisdiction i in conformity with the order.
State ex rel.. Massman Const. Co. v. Buzard, 346 Mo. 1162, 145 8.W..
2d /355, 356: State ex rel. Nat. Refining Co. v. Seehorn, 344 Mo. 547,
127 S.W. 2d 418; and State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo.
1029, 238 §.W. 2d 393, That practice has also been followed by the
Kansas Gity Court of Apneals. State ex rel. Cockrum v. Southern,
229 Mo. App. 749. 83 S.W. 2d 162; and State ex rel. Alisky v. Bird,
43 S. W. 2d 817, 818. . .

Furthermore, it is the practice that notice of the writ be served
upon counsel for the party seeking to uphold action sought to be pro-
hibited and for such counsel also to represent the judge- or court
against whom the writ is sought. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine
prejudice resulting by reason of naming as respondent the judge
whose order was alleged to exceed the jurisdiction of the court and
whose order, on its face, constituted a threat to put into execution
further action allegedly beyond jurisdiction of the court. Certainly,
no such prejudice is here alleged or shown. To follow any other
plan would place an onerous, vexing and sometimes unsolvable
burden upon litigants in courts with multiple judges. A statement
in the brief of relators is illustrative of.the uncertainties which would
flow from any other practice: ‘Otherwise, there is no judge upon
whom process can be served. The case is now on the general docket,
which means that it is before no judge unless application is made for
a further order. Judge Buzard, who was the judge of the assignment
division when the petition for prohibition was filed, did nothing to-
ward the further exercise of the pretended jurisdiction authorized
by the order of Judge Strother. Upon the day when respondent's S
return was filed, Judge Terte was the assignment judge. -Nobody
now knows what judge will preside over the trial after. the case is
assigned.’’ If respondent’s contention is adopted, it would follow.
that any prohibition proceeding against a multiple judge court, if
brought with assurance of a hearing on the merits, would have to be
prosecuted against all of the judges.

The real question on this phase of the case is solely that of proper
party and proper notice. If both are present, we may dispose of the
proceeding on the merits; if not, then, we must discharge respondent
from our preliminary writ.

“(T]he right to the writ of prohibition implies that a wrong is about
to be committed, not by the parties litigant as in the case of injunc-
tion, but by the person or court assuming the exercise of judicial
power and against whom the writ is asked.’’ State ex rel. Terminal
R. Ass’n v. Tracy, 237 Mo. 109, 140 S..W. 888, 890. There is no rule,
no statute. designating any person or judge of a multiple judge
court as the service agent of that court. Common sense tells us the
judge whose act is alleged to be illegal and to constitute a threat of
further action in excess of the jurisdiction of the court of which he is
a judge is the person to whom the writ should be directed, unless,
possibly, for good cause shown such would not be the’case. ‘In State
ex rel. Spencer v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 214 Ind. 551;
16 N.E, 2d 888, 889, it was noted that it was the uniform practice in
Indiana to make judges.and other parties [79] who might be expected
to act upon the authority of the court’ respondents in the writ of ‘pro-
hibition, but, it was further stated: ‘‘The statute * * * provides
for the issuing of writs of prohibition against courts. It does not

mention judges. “Without being named in the writ, or being miade

parties to the proceeding, all judges * * * who have notice of the

writ, are bound by writs of prohibition against courts, and are pro-

hibited from acting upon authority of the prohibited court just as

effectively as though they had been made parties to thé action and the
writ.’’ The rule is sound.

HI Now, the final question is: Does the practice of this court, as
exemplified in this case, constitute due process of law? As stated, we
have been cited to no case that is decisive of the question, but we are
convinced and hold upon principle that the probability of notice to,
all of the judges of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, at Kansas
City, of the isstance of the writ herein, the purpose for which it was
issued, and of the judgment eventually rendered herein on the merits
is so reasonably certain that the requirements of due process are
fully met. Our general statute in civil actions bolsters the conclusion
thus reached. One of the methods of service authorized by it is by
leaving a ‘copy. of the summons and of the petition at the dwelling
house or usual place of abode of the defendant with some person of
his family over the age of fifteen years. That statute is held valid and
enforcible upon the theory that the close association between the de-
fendant and the person served will cause the defendant to receive
knowledge of the service of process. In this case, we think the proba-
bility of notice to all of or any of the judges of the Cireuit Court of
Jackson County who may hereafter be called upon to act in the suit
now pending in that court is just as great as in the aforesaid service
statute. The prevailing party or parties herein will see to that.

| | Respondent further asserts that prohibition does not lie be-
cause the action taken by respondent was complete and there was
nothing further to be done. He cites: State ex rel. Kansas City v.
Burney, 324 Mo. 363, 23 8.W. 2d 117, 119; State ex rel. Strother v.
Broaddus, 234 Mo. 358, 187 S.W. 268, 269; Klingelhoefer v. Smith,
171 Mo. 455,.71 S.W. 1008, 1009. All of those cases deal with a final,
order or judgment of the court. They are not in point. This proceed:
ing seeks to prohibit the circuit court from permitting joinder of a
will contest along with an equitable action to set aside a living trust.
Prohibition is available and proper where a court is proceeding in
excess of its jurisdiction and something further is to be done pursuant
thereto, State ex rel. Hillis v. Creech, 364 Mo. 92, 259 S.W. 2d 372, 375.

Hn Respondent next contends that prohibition does not lie be-
cause relators have an adequate remedy, at law or no remedy is
néeded, They say that the remedy of severance and separate trial of
claims is available under §§ 507.040, 507.050 and 510.180, as imple-
mented by §.Ct. Rule 3.29, allowing separate appeals from separate
judgments in separate claims joined in one action. This contention
will be answered by determination of the essential question presented

on the merits by relators’ petition, as will respondent’s further general
‘contention that “‘this is not even a proper question for prohibition’’.

HJ This brings us to the merits: Does a will contest filed in the
circuit court operate as an appeal from thé probate court, making the
jurisdiction of the circuit court derivative, and thereby limit its
jurisdiction to the issues prescribed by the statute authorizing such
contests? The statute in question, § 468.580, provides:

“Tf any person interested in the probate of any will shall appear
within one year after the date of the probate or rejection thereof, and,
by petition to the circuit court of the county, contest the validity of
the will, or pray to have a will proved which has been rejected, an
issue shall be made up whether the writing produced be the will of the
testator or not, which shall be tried by a jury, or if neither party [80]
require a jury, by the court; * * *’’ (The above section, in. effect
when the action here under consideration was filed, has been repealed
and re-enacted with changes not here material. Laws 1955, p. —, now
§ 478.083.)

The right to contest a will is entirely dependent upon the forego-
ing section. Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 189
S.W. 2d 935, 936, 129 A.L.R. 816. Apparently, however, respondent
proceeds upon the theory that § 509.060 of the civil code authorizes
the joinder of other issues and claims with a suit to contest a will.
That section authorizes the joinder either as independent or alternate
claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as the plaintiff
may have against an opposing party and a like joinder if the require-
ments of §§ 507.030, 507.040 and 507.060 are met. We are convinced
for the reasons hereinafter stated that § 509.060 is not applicable to
such suits.

The civil code, although ‘of geteral application to suits in the circuit
court, does not apply to all civil actions. Section 1 of the Code, Laws
1943, pp. 353, 356, repeals specific sections of the general procedural
statutes then in force and enacts a new code ‘‘in liew of?’ those sec-
tions. It does not repeal any statute providing a special remedy.
Section 2 of the Code (§ 506.010) makes the code applicable to all
suits and proceedings of a civil nature ‘unless otherwise provided
by law’’. Obviously, it does not change the law relating to will con-
tests. S.Ct. Rule 3.02 (a) provides that if any special ‘procedural
statute (the will contest statute is unquestionably a special procedural
statute) refers to or adopts the provisions of the code, then the sub-
stitute procedure prescribed shall be employed. The statute authoriz-
ing will contests (§ 468.580) does not refer to or adopt the provisions
of the code. To the contrary, it prescribes, to the extent therein stated,
its own procedure by fixing the conditions upon which’a ‘will contest
may be maintained, the sole issue: to be tried, the forum in which it
must be tried and declaring it to be an action at,law. Corisequently, it
cannot be persuasively argued that the provisions of the code relating

to’ permissive joinder destroy or broaden the single issue defined in
the statute authorizing such contests and the method therein pre-
seribéd for its determination:

Article V, § 16, of the Constitution vests original jurisdiction of all
matters pertaining to probate business in the probate court and
significantly vests it in no other court. The statutes (old §§ 468.440-
468.560—new §§ 473.047-473.080) provide that the probate court
takes the proof of wills and grants a certificate of their probate or
réjection. Its action is a final judgment (unless reopened under new
§ 473.077) unless and until a contest is filed under § 468.580 (new
§ 478, 083), and no contest can be filed until the probate court has
acted upon the will. Callahan vy. Huhlman, 339 Mo. 634, 98 S.W. 2d
704, 705-706 ; Breeding v: Pack, Mo., 164 sw. 2d 929, 930.

In Breeding v. Pack, supra, lc, 980, this court quoted with approval
from Callahan v. Hublman, supra: ‘‘Since the contest of a will, or a
‘suit to establish a will in the circuit court after rejection in the pro-
bate court, is to be considered, in effect, as an appeal from the probate
court, it follows that there could be no jurisdiction in the circuit court
to entertain such suit or appeal until there is a judgment, probating
or rejecting the will in the probate court. * * * The circuit court has
no jurisdiction to determine such question until the probate court has
determined it one way or the other. * # ® A will cannot be probated
in the first instance in the cireuit court.’’ And in Callahan v. Huhbl-
man, supra, Lc. 706, this court quoted with approval from another
ease: ‘If any person desires to appeal from the action of the probate
court in the probating or rejection of a will, he must do so ‘by peti-
tion to the circuit court.’ ’? Thus, it is consistently held that the juris-
diction of the cireuit court is derivative. Johnson v. Brewn, 277 Mo.
392, 210 S.W. 55, 56; State ex rel. ‘Callahan v. Hess, 348 [81] Mo.
888, 153 S.W. 2d 718, 714; Callahan v. Huhlman, 339 Mo. 634, 98
S.W, 2d 704, 706; Benoist v. Murrin, 48 Mo. 48, 52.

_ When the contest is filed, the question of probate or rejection of the
will, ‘‘will or no will’’, is transferred from the probate court to the
circuit court. Byrne v. Byrne, 289 Mo. 109, 283 S.W. 461, 466;
Johnson v. Brewn, 277 Mo. 392, 210 8.W. 55, 56; McCrary v. Michael,
:238 Mo.App. 797, 109 S.W. 2d 50; Stobie v. Stobie, Mo.App., 183 S.W.
2d 609, 617-618; Fletcher v. Henderson, 833 Mo, 349, 62 S.W. 24.849,
851. Subject fo the right of the circuit court to determine whether the
contestants are ‘‘interested parties within the meaning of the statute’,
Ewart v. Dalby, 319 Mo. 108, 5 8.W. 2d 428, 481, the sole issue for
trial is ‘‘whether the writing produced be the will of the testator or
not”, and any issue further seeking ‘to void the will i is ‘‘wholly foreign
to the action’? and will not be considered. Weaver v. Allison, 340 Mo.
815, 102 §.W..2d 884, 885, 110 A.L.R. 672; Canty v. Lehmkulil, Mo.
App., 164 8, W. 2d 182, 134. See also Cox v. ‘Cox, 101 Mo, 168, 13 S/W.
1055; Van Raalte. v. ‘Graff, 299 Mo, 518, 253 S.W. 220; ‘Weber v.

P| ‘879
a .
Strobel, Mo., 225 S.W. 925; Lilly v. Tobbein, 108 Mo. 477, 13 S.W.
1060; Teckenbrock v. MéLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533, 108 S.W: 46 ; j MeCarthy
v. Fidelity Nat. Bank, 825 Mo. 727, 80 S.W. 2d 19, 22.

There are three Missouri cases, cited by respondent as being’ in
conflict with the rule announced in the above vases, In Lueitt’'v.
Toohey’s Estate, 338 Mo. 348, 89 S.W. 2d 662, it was held that an
order of the probate court setting aside its former order admitting’&
will to probate was not appealable under the’ genéral statuté (old’§
467.010—new § 472.160) enumerating the detisions of the probate
court'from which appeals would be allowed. During the course of its
discission, the court said, lc. 664: ‘‘This court has held that no appeal
lies ftom an order of the probate court approving or rejecting’ a will,
but that the statutory method for reviewing such’ ordets by independ-
ent action in the circuit court operates in the nature of in appeal from
the order of the probate court, and transfers the’contest from the pro-
bate to the circuit court. Speaking to’ that question’ in “Johnson v.
Brewn, 277 Mo. 392, 396, 210 S.W. 55, 56, we ‘said: “It has always
been held, in the early and late cases, that when a suit to contest'a
will is filed in the circuit court * * *, the suit operates in the nature
of an appeal from the order of the probate court probating’ the will.
“The Legislature may undoubtedly ‘provide other modes: besidés ‘the
ordinary form of appeal, by which the controlling power of ‘the' cir-
cuit court may be exercised.’’ Dickey v: Malechi, 6 Mo. [177] loc.cit.
182 [34 Am.Dee. 130]. ‘There was no appeal in form, but the fesult
of the process was the transference of the contest from an inferiot'to'a
superior court.’’ Benoist'v. Murrin, 48 Mo. [48] loc.cit. 52.’ ’’? Another
case, In the Matter of Milton Duty’s Estate, 27 Mo. 48,-is quite similar
to the Lucitt case. It holds that a duly proven will can'be contested
only in a proceeding instituted under the statute authorizing such
contests and that an appeal does not lie from the ordér of the probate
court granting probate under the general statute authorizing appeals
from the probate court. These ‘cases'do not aid respondent. In fact,
the Lucitt case strongly supports the right of relators to the relief
herein sought.

In the case of Snyder v. Toler, 179 Mo.. App. 376, 166 sw. 1059, a
petition filed in the circuit court alleged in one ‘count the invalidity
of a will and in a second count sought to recover under‘ a trust created
by.the will. The court, on motion of defendant, held the counts incon-
sistent and required plaintiff to elect, whereupon plaintiff was allowéd
to, dismiss the count alleging the will’s invalidity: It is readily
apparent that the court either overlooked the many decisions of our
appellate courts holding that a will contest cannot be’ dismissed,
Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W. 24 935,
938, 129 A.L.R. 316, or, because of the fact that no point was made ‘as
to the wrongful dismissal of a will contest as such, chose to ignore it
by saying, [82] ‘Overlooking other considerations, we hold the motion

—

(to elect) was properly sustained on its merits.’’ (Emphasis ours.)
Such a ruling could not be considered as authority supporting respond-
ént’s contention,

Respondent’s further contention is that ‘“‘because both (the will
‘and inter vivos trust) were probated as the last will of decedent”’ he
is entitled, on the ground of fraud and undue influence, to challenge
the validity of the trust as an integral part of the will. O£ course, the
fact that the probate court ordered probate of the trust agreement as
a part of the will did not and could not constitute a judgment affecting
the validity of an inter vivos trust that had been executed and put
into operation prior to the execution of the will and independently
‘of it; and the trial court’s jurisdiction being derivative, its jurisdic.
tion was likewise limited to. the duty of adjudging the sole issue of
will. or no ‘will, Weaver v. Allison, 340 Mo. 815, 102 $.W. 2d 884.
“ [I]t (the cireuit court) cannot inquire into matters which the
statute (authorizing will contest’) does not specifically delegate to
ite? Canty v. Lehmkuhl, Mo.. App., 164. S.W. 2d 182, 184. The conten-
tion is overruled.

We hold that a will contest operates as an appeal from the probate
court and that jurisdiction of ‘the cixeuit court to determine the issue
provided by the statute is derivative; that Counts V and VI of the
petition could not lawfully be joinéd with it; and that the court would
therefore act in excess of its jurisdiction in proceeding with the trial
of said Counts V and VI as being counts properly pleaded in the
action.

Prohibition is not a writ of right ; its issuance in a given case is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In this case, respond-
ent definitely erred in refusing relators’ motion to dismiss Counts V
and VI. Appeal from that order was unavailable because no final or
appealable interlocutory order was rendered. The order of the court
overruling the motion in and of itself constitutes a threat that the
Cireuit Court of Jackson County, in excess of its jurisdiction, will
order the trial of said counts as counts properly pending before it in
the suit to contest the will. Obviously, an! intermingling of issues and
evidence pertinent to Counts V and VI with the sole proper issue and
evidence pertinent to the -will contest would involye great expense,
the trial of burdensome and perhaps matters prejudicial to the issue
of “will or no will’; No good result could possibly fow from a dis-
charge of the rule at this stage of the proceeding (after jurisdiction of
the vause has been accepted and it has been briefed, argued and sub-
mitted on the merits)., Under such circumstances, prohibition is a
proper and the only adequate remedy. State ex rel. Taylor v. Nangle,
“Mo., 227 8.W. 24 655, 657; State ex rel. Nat. Refining Co. v. Seehorn,
344 "Mo. 547, 127 S.W. 2d ‘418, 425 ; State ex rel. Ellis v. Creech, 364
Mo.,92, 259 S.W, 2d 372, 375,

. The rule, is made absolute. , _ All concur.

Barpara Awn Exqiort, (Plaintiff) Appellant, v. Herman HE. Jomns-
vON, (Defendant) Respondent. Cumrorp Exuiorr, (Plaintiff)
Appellant, y. Harman BE. Jonnston, (Defendant) Respondent.
Currrorp Euiiorr and Barpara ANN Exuiort, (Plaintiffs) Ap-
pellants, v. Herman BE. Jonnsron, (Defendant) Respondent.
Cumrrorp Exiiorr and Barpara Ann Exziorr, (Plaintiffs) Ap-
péllants, v. Hurman E. Jounston (Defendant) Respondent.
Mary ‘Ann -Exuiorr, by her parents and natural guardians
Currorp Extiorr and Barpara Ann Exuiorr, (Plaintiff) Ap-
pellant, v. Herman E. Jounsron, (Defendant) Respondent.
Rusy Maz Exuiort, by her parents and natural guardians
Cumrorp Exiiorr and Barpara Ann Exwiorr, (Plaintiff) Ap-
pellant, v. Herman E. Jounston, (Defendant) Respondent, Nos.

, 44866, 44867, 44871, 44870, 44869, 44868—292 S. W. (2d) 589.

Division Two, April 9, 1956.

_Pote Farabi and Edward U. Sweeney for appellant.

ing and Boyd Ewing for respondent.

[590] BARRETT, 0.—The Circuit Court of Vernon County re-
fused to accept jurisdiction of these six actions for damages for per-
sonal injuries and loss of services, resulting from a collision of auto-
mobiles, and, upon separate motions to quash service, entered judg-
ments dismissing the actions. The questions for’ determination upon
this consolidated appeal are whether, in the unique circumstances of
these records, thé plaintiffs, citizens and residents of Kansas, are en-
titled as a matter of right to prosecute the actions in Missouri against
the defendant, also a citizen and resident of Kansas, and whether
the court abused its discretion in dismissing the actions.

The plaintiffs are Clifford and Barbara Elliott, of Mulberry, Craw-
ford County, Kansas, and their daughters, Ruby Mae and [591]
Mary Ann, fifteen and eleven years of age. The defendant, Herman
E. Johnston, is a resident of Fort Scott, Bourbon County, Kansas.
‘On February 11, 1958, according to the allegations of the petitions,
Mr. Elliott, with his wife and daughters as passengers, was driving
his 1951 Chevrolet sedan in a southerly direction on U. S. Highway
“69, about six miles north of Arma, in Crawford County, Kansas,
‘when it was involved in a collision with a 1947 Cadillac sedan driven
by Herman E. Johnston. It is alleged in the petitions that Johnston
was negligent in that he was driving his automobile on the wrong side
of the highway, failed to yield the right of way, failed to maintain a
vigilant lookout, was driving at a high and reckless speed, and at-
tempted to pass another vehicle in a ‘‘no-passing’’ zone. It is charged
that Johnston’s conduct was wilful and wanton and in the six actions
actual and punitive damages ‘are claimed in the sums of $121,500 and
$40,000 respectively. The husband’s action’ is in three counts, the
first praying actual and punitive damages for his personal injuries
in the total sum of $50,000, the second for the loss of his wife’s serv-
ices for which he asks $10,000 and the third, $1400 for the destruction
of his automobile and $100 for the loss of its use. The wife’s action
seeks the recovery of $50,000 actual and punitive damages for her
personal injuries. Each of the daughters, by their parents as natural
guardians, pray for $20,000 actual and punitive damages for their
personal injuries and there are two suits by the husband and wife
each asking $5000 damages for the loss of their daughters’ services
and for their medical expense.

In each of the actions timely motions to quash the service were
filed and, after a full hearing upon the motions, the Cireuit Court of
Vernon County made a detailed finding of fact and ‘‘of its own
motion’’ refused to accept jurisdiction of the six actions and entered.
judgments of dismissal. Thus, for the first time in Missouri, the ques-
tion is presented whether, in the absence of specific statutory authori-
zation, the rather recent ‘‘doctrine of forum non conveniens’”’ is
applicable to this transitory nonstatutory tort action and, if so,
whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to accept jurisdic

tion. The rule or doctrine of forum non conveniens, as applied to
strictly, domestic actions, has had its recent widespread genesis in this
country in the following law review articles and annotated reports:
annotation 32 A. L. R. 6; 29 Col. L. R. 1 (1929); 44 Har. L. R. 41
(1981) ; 85 Cal. L. R, 380 (1947) and are all collected in the footnotes
“to Gui Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 67S. Ct. 839, 91
L. ed. 1055. ‘The comparatively recent development of the doctrine as
now understood and applied in actions of the type involved here is
noted because there have been several Missouri cases which involved
the doctrine but the fact was not recognized or fully appreciated and
the cases were not plainly disposed of upon the applicability or non-
applicability of the rule. In those cases the court spoke of ‘‘comity’’
,and, for the most part, was concerned with fraud in the procurement of
the service of process or fraud in foisting jurisdiction upon the court
and, as will be noted, there were other distinguishing factors, but
the court did not consciously apply the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. The leading cases, are Newlin v. St. Louis & 8. F. BR, Co.,
(1909) 222 Mo. 375, 121 S. W. 125; Lessenden v. Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co.,, (1911) 288 Mo. 247, 142 S. W. 832; State ex rel. Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm) (1912) 239 ‘Mo. 185, 143 S. W. 483; Gold
.Issue. Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., (1916)
267 Mo. 524, 184 S. W. 999, and Bright v. Wheelock, (1929) 323 Mo.
840, 20 8. W. (2) 684. whe first time the phrase or maxim was con-
sciously applied in Missouri was in State ex rel. Southern Railway Co.
v. Mayfield, (1949) 359 Mo. 827, 224 8. W. (2) 105, and that case
arose under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and except for its
‘applicable analogies and, certain constitutional implications suggested
-by the Supreme Court of the United States, is now distinguishable as
a matter [592] of principle from this transitory nonstatutory tort
action. Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U. 8. 1, 71 8. Ct. 1, 95 L. ed. 3, and,
finally, State ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield, (1951) 362
Mo. 101, 240 S. W. (2) 106.
-These actions were instituted and service of process was had upon
the defendant, Johnston, in Vernon County, Missouri, in these cireum-
-stances: About three months after the collision and injuries Mr. Pete
Farabi, an attorney with offices in Pittsburg, Crawford County,
Kansas, notified, by telephone and letter, another firm of lawyers in
Pittsburg who were representing a liability insurance company and
under the terms of the policy Mr. Johnston, that he had been employed
to represent the Elliotts in their claims for damages and that any
future negotiations were to be conducted through him and that they
‘were not-to go out‘and talk with his clients.’’ Some weeks later and
ten or twelve days before the suits were filed Mr. Farabi made a trip
to Fort Scott and called, on Mr. Johnston at his home. He says that
he did not take a statement from Mr. Johnston or discuss the merits
of his cases-with him, but.he told him that he had the cases and was

going to sue him but that he “would rather-sue him in’ Missouri than
in Bourbon County, Kansas but didn’t tell him the reason.”’ He said,
“T just told him I represented the plaintiffs and I was going to sue
him and just asked him if he ever had occasion to go to Missouri and
he said he did; he said he went over there occasionally ; I said I could’
sue you here but I would like to sue you over there and he said I go
over there once in a while to Missouri.’’ Johnston testified that on the
occasion of Mr. Farabi’s visit he said, ‘“Yes, he asked me if I would
like to be tried in Missouri and I told him I didn’t eare; in fact I’d
rather be tried there because I just didn’t want to be tried in Fort
Scott or Pittsburg.’”? Mr. Farabi did not talk to Johnston again but
he ‘‘had a fellow who had been keeping check on this boy’ as to his
whereabouts, where he was going,’’ and on the day the suits were filed
his informant telephoned that Mr. Johnston was going to Nevada,
Missouri, on that date. Mr. Farabi had already prepared his petitions,
leaving the name of the county blank, and upon recéiving the tele-
phone call, drove to Nevada and filed the six suits. He waited while
the clerk prepared the petitions and summonses and took them to the
sheriff. He accompanied the sheriff to the Thomas Pharmacy, a block
or so from the court house, and there pointed out Mr. J ohnston as the’
man to be served. The sheriff served the petitions and simmonses on
Johnston and, accordingly, made his return of personal service in
Vernon County, Missouri.

The court found, as urged in the motions to quash, that
there was fraud in the procurement of service of process. But, lay-
ing to one side for the time being whether there was improper col-
lusion between Mr. Farabi and Johnston, there was no fraud in its
true meaning in the filing of the suits in Vernion County and the pro-
curement of the service of process. See, for example, Bowman v. Neb-
lett, (Mo. App.) 24 8. W. (2) 697. The defendant, Johuston, may
have voluntarily appeared in Vernon County to be ser'ved but he did
not enter his ‘‘voluntary appearance’ to the suits under V.A.MS.,
Sec. 506.110. The plaintiffs had existing claims against Jc ‘olnston-
“onder the law of another state’’ and could therefore institute their
actions in “Missouri, providing they were able to obtain service of
process upon the defendant. V.A.M.S., Sec. 507.020. The action was
transitory, the defendant, Johnston, was a nonresident of Missouri
and, therefore, the venue of the actions was ‘‘in any ‘county in this
state’’ in which he could be found and served with process. V.A.MS.,
See. 508.010. It has been said that Section 507.020, providing for
actions in Missouri upon claims existing by reason of the law of
another state, is a legislative declaration of comity (Newlin v. St.
Louis & 8. F. R. Co., supra), and that ‘‘It is not a fraud to do what
the law permits,”’ that is, institute an action meeting the require-
ments [598] of these statutes. Lessenden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co;
238 Mo., lc. 259, 142 8. W., Le. 335. So, there was appropriate venue

and personal service of process and the Circuit Court of Vernon
County had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter and
consequently of the actions (State ex rel. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Grimm, supra; Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire
Ins. Co., supra), but it does not follow that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens may not apply, as some of these Missouri cases may indi-
cate, ‘‘Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply
if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue. * * * In all
cases in which the doctrine of forum non conyeniens comes into play,
it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable
to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.
Lhe principle of forwm non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is au-
thorized by the letter of a general venue statute.’’ Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U. S., Le. 504, 506-507, 67 S. Ot., Le. 841, 842, 91 L. ed.,
Le, 1060, 1061-: 1062. .

HHI So, in these cases, the questions are what are the appropriate
factors and criteria to be considered in determining whether the ends
of justice require a trial of these actions in Missouri or in what the
court deemed a more appropriate forum. Koster v. Lumbermens
Mutual Cas. Co., 330 U. 8. 518, 527, 67 S. Ct. 828, 833, 91 L. ed. 1067,
1077. As indicated, the plaintiffs had the right, as a matter of comity,
to institute these actions in Vernon County, Missouri, but comity,
is a courtesy, the granting of a privilege (Newlin v. St. Louis & 8. F. R.
Co., supra) and their right is not one of the absolutes of the law so as
to compel retention of jurisdiction and the trial of’ the causes in
Missouri. 14 Am. Jur., Sec. 182. The parties are all nonresidents, the
actions or claims are upon a foreign transitory nonstatutory tort and
the court had the inherent discretionary power to retain or to decline
jurisdiction of these actions transplanted from their ‘‘natural forum,”’,
and the meritorious question is whether in the particular cireumstarices
the forum is inappropriate and whether the court abused its discre-
tion. Annotation 32 A. L. R., Le, 33-40; 85 Cal. L. R., Le. 386, 402;
44 Har. L. R 41; Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, supra; Burt v. Isthmus
Development Co., 218 F. (2) 358, 856.

The basic factors in these cases are that the claims or actions
arose in Kansas and both the plaintiffs and the defendant are citizens
and residents of Kansas and another court has jurisdiction of the
parties and the actions and the plaintiffs are not without a remedy.
14 Am. Jur., Sec. 182; 29 Col. L. B., Le. 32-33. In these particular.
cases the basic consideration is the public factor of convenience to the
court and for that reason emphasis is fairly placed wpon residence and
the place where the causes of action accrued. 35 Cal. L. R., le. 410;
Gulf Oil Corp. y. Gilbert, supra. It does not appear, in selecting a
forum, ‘that Mr. Farabi ever consulted his clients as. to the advisa-
bility or feasibility of filing the suits in Missouri or, that their desires

or preferences were considered. They did ‘not testify upon the motions
and_so far as the record is concerned their lawyer, for reasons of his
own, selected the forum. Mr. Farabi said that the reason he did not
want to file the suits in Bourbon County, Kansas, where Johnston
resided was, ‘‘Because of some unhappy experiences I have had in
Bourbon County is all.’’? But a traditionally inquisitive clerk. said,
‘«# * * most generally I_kinda glance over them to see who they are
from and stuff like that and I seen that they was from Kansas so, I.
asked him about why he had filed them over in Missouri, if he liked
our courts better over here.’”? Mr. Farabi replied, ‘‘ ‘Yes.’ He said
he liked the nine-man verdict better than he did the twelve over in
Kansas.’’? While the latter reason for filing suits in Missouri is not’
novel and may not be a significant factor in applying the doctrine of,
forum non conveniens (Lessenden vy. Missouri [594] Pac. Ry.. Co.,
supra), it is.a fair inference, from Mr. Farabi’s testimony and the
record, aside from any supposed advantages in procedure, that he
may have been influenced in his choice of a forum by ‘‘the reputed
largesse’’ of Missouri juries as compared with Kansas juries. Collins
y. American Automobile Ins. Co., 128 F. Supp. 228, 229.

Mr. Johnston said that he could see what Mr. Farabi had in mind
and that he ‘‘wanted to be tried in Missouri—well, for different
reasons.’’ He said to the court, ‘“‘I’ll tell you the truth, about it.
I work in a club over there—I work.in the V.F.W, Club over there
and I didn’t want to be tried in Fort Scott so I thought it would
be easier for me to come over here. * * * It was because I didn’t
want to be tried in Kansas in my home town.’’ It appears, at least
inferentially, that Johnston had had some previous experiences with
Kansas courts and as Mr, Farabi said of this particular’ incident,
“‘this man was arrested for negligent driving and paid a fine.’’

In this connection it should be noted that.Mr. Johnston, likewise,
did not consult the lawyers representing the Uability insurance
company and thereby him as to the advisability of Kansas or Missouri
as appropriate forums for the trial of these. actions. The suits are
for sums far in excess of the insurance coverage and Johnston, was
not represented by a lawyer of his own choosing. While these motions
were filed on behalf of Johnston, the lawyers appeared in the Mis-
souri courts under a reservation of rights. agreement, and, upon ‘oral
argument, stated that insurance company had filed. a “suit "for a de-
claratory judgment in a United States District’ Court in Kansas
questioning, by reason of his conduet, whether there was any obliga~
tion under the policy to defend and represent him at all. These
facts are noted because they indicate that the real parties in interest,
the contestants (Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., supra), in
so far as the immediate problems are concerned, are not the individual
plaintiffs, but their counsel and the defendant on one side and the
insurance carrier and their counsel on the other side, These cireum-

™ a
stances also point up the fact, previously indicated, that the basic
consideration here is the public factor of convenience to the court.

It is a fair inference from ‘the record that Mr. Farabi and Johnston
understood one another and that there was some tacit understanding,
if not collusion. In its findings, the court said, ‘‘If these cases were
tried it would require at least twelve days of trial work, all at the
additional expense of the taxpayers of Vernon County. These cases
acerued in Kansas—the plaintiff(s), the defendant and all the wit-
nesses reside in’Kansas. Should the taxpayers and the Courts of
Missouri be burdened with nonresident lawsuits just because our
procedure is different from other states? This court does not think so.
Our Missouri dockets and that of Vernon County are already over-
loaded with cases ready for trial.’”

While the courts of Kansas and Missouri have long since become
inured to the unrewarding task of enforcing and predicting one
another’s laws (Lessenden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., supra), it was
proper for the court, in exercising its discretion, to consider the enu-
merated factors even though, standing alone, they may not be conclu-
sive. Annotation 82 A. L. R., le. 44; 29 Col. L. R., Le. 20-27; Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra. When these records ‘are carefully
examined and the conveniences balanced, it is obvious that these
cases have but little, if any, ‘‘nexus’’ with Missouri and its courts.
29 Col. L. R., Le. 18. In transplanting this litigation from its ‘‘natural
forum”? plaintiffs’ counsel neither points to nor claims any’ incon-
venience or injustice to his clients in jurisdiction’s being declined.
Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., supra. ‘His only reasons,
apparently, are personal and in the hope of securing some real or
fanciful tactical advantage. Annotation 82 A. L. R., he. 26. The trial
court appropriately [595] applied the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens and, all the circumstances considered, it may not be said that
the court abused its discretion in dismissing the actions.

Hl There is no absolute compulsion in the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Constitution of the United States (Art. IV,
See, 2) upon the courts of Missouri to accept jurisdiction of foreign
transitory nonstatutory tort actions (Missouri v. Mayfield, ‘supra),
the restrictions and limitations, it is believed, are upon ‘‘unreason+
able discriminations.’? 35 Cal. L. R. Le. 392; Canadian Northern R.
Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S, 553, 40 8. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed.'713; Douglas v.
New York, N. H. & H. RB. Co., 279 U. 8. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. ed.
741. An arbitrary denial to a citizen of another state of the right
to maintain an action in Missouri would not be permitted, but in the
circumstances of these cases a distinction or denial based in part
not upon citizenship but upon residence has some basis and validity
and is not wholly unreasonable. Annotation 32 A. L. R., Le. 18, 25;
17 Har. L. R. 1. In this connection there is another factor which
was not taken into consideration in either the Mayfield, Lessenden,

a .

Gold Issue Mining & Milling Company and State ex rel. Pacifie Mutual
Life Insurance Company cases. As stated, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in its present full import was not consciously. applied in
those cases, and, in addition, there was present one significant factor
which gave all of those cases some nexus with Missouri and its courts.
In the Lessenden case the railroad was a Missouri corporation operat-
ing a railroad in Missouri and in Jackson County where the action
was instituted. In the Mayfield case; as well as in Bright v. Wheelock,
823 Mo. 840, 20 S. W. (2) 684, the railroads either operated lines in
Missouri or had appointed service agents in Missouri, in the Bright
case in St. Louis, and so if they were not in point of fact citizens
and residents of Missouri, they were residents for the purpose of
suit. In the Gold Issue and Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company
cases the defendants were insurance companies who, by reason of
transacting business in Missouri or by reason of compliance with Mis-
souri’s Insurance Code, had authorized service of process upon the
superintendent of insurance and, again, were residents of Missouri
for some purposes. But ultimately, it is not believed that the applica-
tion of the doctrine of forum nén conveniens and the disthissal, in the
particular cireumstances, of these actions results in such arbitrary
discrimination or manifest injustice to thesé parties as to infringe
any ‘‘fundamental rights’? they may have under either the Missouri
Constitution or the Constitution of the United States. Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, supra; Mayfield v. Missouri, supra; annotation 32 A. L. R.

Accordingly the judgments of dismissal are affirmed. Bohling and
Stockard, CC., concur. .

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Barrer, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur. .

|
Marearer Scanwnen, Respondent, v. Fuuton Iron Works Company,
Inc., Appellant, No. 45094—289 8. W. (2d) 122.

Division Two, April 17, 1956.

ee

Renderer, N olde & Kleinschmidt for appellant.
Bartley and Bartley ‘for respondent.

[123]. BOHLING, C—This appeal involves an award of the
Industrial Commission of Missouri under the Workmen’s Compensa-
tion law. Ch. 287—statutory references, unless otherwise. indicated,
are to RSMo 1949, VAMS, The case was transferred to this court
by the St. Louis Court of Appeals on the ground ‘‘the amount in
dispute’? exceeded $7,500. Mo. Const.,. Art. V, §§ 3, 13; § 477.040.
We outline the facts stated by the Court of Appeals (280 S. W. 24
484) :

James M. Scannell, an “employee of the Fulton Iron Works Com,
pany, Ine, appellant here, upon a finding that he, sustained a.per-
manent total disability by reason of an oceupational disease arising
out of and in the course of said employment, was awarded medical
aid of $309, and compensation ‘‘$25.00 per week for 300 weeks, and
thereafter $14.98 for life . . . Total Unknown.’’ The award further
stated. ‘Said payments to begin as- of February 14, 1949, and to be
payable and be subject to modification and review as provided by
said law.’? James M. Scannell died May 9, 1951, we understand,
from a cause not connected with the occupational disease.

(It is stated in the employer’s brief that the above award was ap-
pealed by the employer'to the Circuit Court.of the City of St. Louis.
The employee died while the appeal was pending in the circuit court.
Upon the suggestion of the death of the employee and application for
substitution of Margaret Scannell (respondent) as party claimant, the
cause, upon motion of the employer, was remanded to the Industrial
Commission to determine the right of Margaret Scannell to be sub-
stituted. We do not find these facts established in the record before
us, and statements ini the briefs to-that effect do not establish facts for
jurisdictional purposes).

On February 27, 1952, the Industrial Commission found that
Margaret Scannell was the sole and total dependent, the widow, of
James, M. Scannell, and entered its order substituting Margaret
Scannell-as claimant. No.appeal was taken from said order.

Proceeding under § 287.500, Margaret Scannell filed in the Cirenit
Court of the City of St. Louis certified copies of the order of the In-
dustrial Commission of February 27; 1952, and the final award of
the Commission. On March 31, 1953, or April 1, 1958 (there appears
to be some confusion with respect to dates in’ the record), judgment
was entered on said award and order in favor of Margaret Scannell
and against the employer for medical aid in the sum of $309, and
for permanent total disability in the sum of $25 per week for 300
weeks, plus interest and costs.

The employer, on or about April 20, 1953, filed its ‘‘Motion to Set
Aside Judgment’’ on the alleged ground that the employer was
located in St. Louis County; that the disability must have occurred
in St. Louis County, and that the Cireuit Court of St. Louis County
had jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Circuit Court of the City of
St. Louis. This motion was heard and, after consideration on sub-
mission, was denied on April 9, 1954. The employer appealed from
the judgment denying its ‘‘Motion to Set Aside Judgment.” .

The statutory provisions relating to compensation for temporary
total disability (§ 287.170; 2 Laws 1947, p. 440, § 8703) and temporary
partial disability (§ 287.180; 2 Laws 1947, p. 440, § 8704) carry ex-
press limitations that the compensation shall be paid ‘‘for not more
than four hundred weeks during the continuance of such disability’’
(§ 287.170) or ‘‘compensation shall be paid during such disability but
not for more than ore hundred weeks’’ (§ 287.180).

The statutory provisions relating to compensation for permanent
partial disability -(§ 287.190; 2 Laws’ 1947, p. 440, § 3705) and
permanent total disability (§ 287.200; 2 Laws 1947, p. 442, § 3706)
provide for compensation based on a percentage of the employee’s
average annual earnings, but not less than $8 nor more than $25
per week for the number of weeks therein authorized, not, how-
ever, to exceed 400 weeks (§ 287.190), or, based as above, ‘‘during
three hundred weeks *,’? and ‘‘thereafter * * for life, but not less
than eight dollars nor [124] more than eighteen dollars per week’’
(§ 287.200). The Commission, under the stated conditions in § 287.-
470, may ‘‘review any award and on such review may make an
award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously
awarded.’’

The Court of Appeals reviewed Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co.,
834 Mo. 508, 66 S. W. 2d 147, 148, and Hardt v. City Ice & F. Co.,
840 Mo. 721, 102 S. W. 2d 592, 593, and reasoned, as we read the
opinion, that since under §§ 287.170 and 287.180 the termination of
the disability prior to the expiration of the stated period of weeks
also terminated the employer’s obligation, such awards, although final,
in nature, were to be considered not for any definite or fixed amount,
the statutes conditioning payment upon the continuance of disability ;
whereas like limitations of duration were not incorporated in the

statutes covering awards for nanent partial (§ 287.190) or perma-
nent total (§ 287.200) disability, and awards under §§ 287.190 and
287.200 constituted an indefeasible claim. Hence, the instant claim of
$25 for 300 weeks, plus $309 medical aid, or $7,809, vested appellate
jurisdiction in this court.

Section 287.230(1) provides that the death of the injured employee
shall not affect the liability of the employer for compensation ‘‘so far
as such liability has accrued and become payable at the time of the
death,’’ and that such compensation shall be paid to his dependents
without administration, or other persons entitled thereto, ‘‘but such
death shall be deemed to be the termination of the disability.’’

And paragraph 2 thereof, involved here, provides: ‘‘Where an em-
ployee is entitled to compensation under this chapter for an injury
received and death ensues for any cause not resulting from the injury
for which he was entitled to compensation, payments of the unpaid
unacerued balancé for such injury shall cease and all liability therefor
‘shall terminate unless there be surviving dependents at the time of
such death.’? In Nations v. Barr, Mo. App., 43 S. W. 2d 858,
861[3], and Henderson v. National Bearing Division, Mo. App., 267
S. W. 2d 349, 351[8], it was considered and ruled that under § 287.-
230(2), ‘‘the right of the employee to compensation for disability,
accrued and unacerued, survives to his dependents,’’ but that such
right dies with the employee if he has no dependent.

‘We think the applicable law is well stated in Ewing v. Kansas City,
350 Mo. 1071, 169 8. W. 2d 897, 900[8-5]: “‘ “Whenever necessary
to preserve the constitutional integrity of this court, we have reserved
to ourselves the right to pierce the shell of the pleadings, proofs,
record, and judgment sufficiently far to determine that our proper
jurisdiction is not infringed upon, or improper jurisdiction is not,
foisted upon us by design, inadvertence, or mere colorable, and not
real, amounts.’ * * [Citing authority.] In other words, our jutis-
diction depends upon live issues being presented on matters within
our jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction is to be determined ‘from the
issues really existing in the cause and not from sham or colorable
issues as to the amount in dispute,’ or as to a constitutional question.
* * [Citing authority.]’’ See cases there cited; Jackson v. Merz,
858 Mo. 1212, 219 S. W. 2d 820, 321[1, 2]; Heuer v. Ulmer, Mo., 273
8. W. 2d 169, 170; Gillespie v. American Bus Lines, Mo., 246 S. W.
2d 797; Kansas City v. National Eng. & Mfg. Co., Mo., 265 8S. W. 2d
384, 885[2]; Emerson v. Treadway, Mo. App., 270 8. W. 2d 614,
616[1].

An unappealed final award of the Industrial Commission under the
Workmen’s Compensation law, whether right or wrong upon a fact
issue within the jurisdiction of the Commission, is an adjudication
of the rights of the parties and as effective and impregnable to col-
lateral attack as a judgment of a court. § 287.490; State ex rel.

Brewen-Clark 8. Co. v. Missouri Workmen’s Comp. Comm., 320 Mo.
893, 8S. W. 2d 897, 900[8]; Wors v. Tarlton, 234 Mo. App. 1178, 95
S. W. 2d 1199, 1204|1-3], certiorari quashed, 343 Mo. 945, 124 S. W.
2d 1072; Row v. Cape Girardeau Foundry Co., Mo. App., 141 8. W.
2d 118, 1I15[1]; Brashear vy. Brand- Dunwoody Milling Co., Mo. App.,
218. W. 24 191, 193[3].

[125] The instant proceeding is under § 287.500 for a judgment to
enforce an unappealed award of the Industrial-Commission. It is
not an appeal under § 287.490 involving the merits of the award. The
sole issue presented in appellant’s ‘‘Motion to Set Aside Judgment”’
was that the Cireuit Court of the City of St. Louis was without
jurisdiction. Under the award compensation paynients were to begin
as of February 14, 1949. Up to the time of the judgment March 31,
19538, or April 1, 1953, the $309 for medical aid and the $25 weekly
compensation for approximately 215 weeks, $5,375, total $5,684,
had not been paid. Said amount, together with interest, iy not suffi-
cient to vest appellate jurisdiction here. There was no appeal from
the order of the Commission substituting Margaret Scannell as
claimant, and no. issue of real substance exists with respect to her
rights to the unpaid accrued weekly payments upon this review.
Eliminating said amount, $5,684, any balance remaining is insuffi-
cient to vest appellate jurisdiction here.

‘We are not in accord with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals
for the vesting of appellate jurisdiction here. .

The instant case does not involve a death benefit under § 287.240(2)
(2 Laws 1947, p. 442, § 8709), which provides for ‘‘a single total
death benefit.”? We have appellate jurisdiction in death’ benefit
cases where the death benefit awarded exceeds $7,500 because the
statute authorizes the recovery of a single total death benefit, al-
though the award is payable in installments. Shroyer v. Missouri
Livestock Comm. Co., 332 Mo. 1219, 61 S. W. 2d 718, 716; Platies v.
Theodorow Bakery Co., 334 Mo. 508, 66 S. W. 2d 147, 148.

Section 287.200 does not provide (as does § 287.240(2)) for a
single permanent total disability benefit, but provides for 300 weekly
payments of a specified amount and additional payments for’ life.
Hohlstein v. St. Louis Roofing Co., 328 Mo. 899, 42 8. W. 2d 573, 576;
Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co., supra.

Under § 287.280(1) the death of the injured employee is deemed to
be the termination of the disability, arid Nations v. Barr, and Hender-
son v. National Bearing Division, supra, hold that if death i is not the
result of the compensable injury the surviving dependents, if any,
sueceed to the employee’s rights under § 287. .230(2). Margaret
Scannell, respondent, the widow of the employee, was his sole and
total dependent. Her rights, had her husbanil’s” occupational disease
caused his death, would cease upon her death or remarriage. § 2
240(2, 4 a). The first clause of § 287.240, reading “If the injuty

causes death, either with or without disability, the compensation
therefor shall be as provided in this section,’’ is held to make § 287.240
‘independent of every other section of the law except the sections
referred to in section’’ 287.240. Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer
Oo., 325 Mo. 677, 29 S, W. 2d 128, 132[6]. Pfefer v. Winer & Saroff
Comm. Co., 227 Mo. App. 280, 226 Mo. App. 1131, 49 S. W. 2d 293,
holds an award of a death claim to a sole dependent minor daughter
survived, on the daughter’s death, to her personal representative.

In Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co., supra, the judgment was for
$20 a week for not more than 397 weeks during the continuance of
such disability. In Hardt v. City Ice & F. Co., 340 Mo. 721, 102 8. W.
2d 592, the award was $20 a week for 300 weeks —$6, 000; thereafter,
for life at $18.50 per week—Unknown. In each instance the award
aided the court in determining the amount in dispute independent
of all contingencies. Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co., supra, quotes
the following from Stuart v. Stuart, 820 Mo. 486, 8 S. W. 2d°613,
614: ‘We are on firmer ground in holding, as we do, that the appel-
late jurisdiction of this court, on the ground of the amount in dispute,
attaches when, and only when, the record of the trial court affirma-
tively shows that there is involved in the controversy, independent. of
all contingencies, an amount exceeding $7,500, exclusive of costs.”’
[126] See also Jenkins v. Jenkins, Mo., 251 8. W. 2d 248, 2453, 4];
Baer v. Baer, 364 Mo. 1214, 274 8. W. 2d 298, 303; Higgins v, Smith,
346 Mo. 1044, 144 8. W. 2d 149, 151, 152. On compensable disability
claims the Commission, under § 287.470 (not referred to in § 287.240),
on its own motion or on application ‘‘on the ground of a change in
condition,’’ may ‘‘make an award ending, disminishing or increasing
the compensation previously awarded.’’ Notwithstanding an unap-
pealed final award of the Commission for permanent total disability is
of the effect of a judgment, it is subject to the provisions of § 287.470
as much as a final award and judgment, say, for $20 a week for not
more than 397 weeks, during the continuance of the disability.
Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co., supra. In each instance the contin-
gency is based on statutory provisions. In one instance the effect of
the statute shows on the face of the award or judgment. In other in-
stances it may not be so disclosed but the contingency is as effectively
preserved by the law. The instant award expressly stated the compen-
sation was ‘‘to be subject to modification and review as provided by
said law.’’ We think it should not be said that in the circumstances of
record this award involves an amount exceeding $7,500 independent
of all contingencies.

In Powers v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., Mo. Avp., 261 8. W. 2d
512, 514[1], there was an award for medical aid of $483.50 and for
permanent total disability of $25 a week for 300 weeks. and thereafter
$14 per week for life. The Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction,
stating whether the judgment would exceed $7,500 was contingent

on the continuance of the life of the employee. We think this result
is correct. Where such a right is not enforceable at all events for any
definite length of time, its value i is contingent. Platies v. Theodorow
Bakery Co., ‘supra.

The cause is transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Barvett
and Stockard, OC., coneur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bouning, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. Hager and Leedy, IS, corieur 5 "Storokman,
J., concurs in result,

“Caanwick H. Buers and Exzanor Brurs, Appellants, v. Ami Louise
Truur, Respondent, No. 44890-—290 8. W. (2d) 76. ©

Division One, April 9, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, May 14, 1956. ,

Rufus

w

s for appellants.

Warren S. Earhart for respondent.

: Hall, Bresler &iCohn and Harry A: Hall amicus -euriae. :

79] HOLMAN, C—In this action to try and determine the respec-
tive, rights of.-plaintiffs and defendant..in regard to certain real
estate-the plaintiffs sought, a decree to the effect that they, were .en-
titled to purchase the said, real estate, in accordance with an option
privilege hereinafter more fully deseribed, and a decree of specific per-
formance to effectuate said-right.. Plaintiffs also,prayed that they be
awarded as damages ‘‘the reasonable, monthly rental value pf said
ses, from. this date until the possession thereof is delivered to
2} Plaintifis appeal from the order and. judgment of the court
dismissing their amended petition upon the motion of defendant which
alleged that said petition ‘‘does not state a claim or, cause of. action
upon which relief can be granted.’’ Since the petition sought a, trans-
fer of the title to,certain real estate from, defendant to plaintiffs our
jprisdiction is obvious,  Auticle..V, Section 3, Constitution of. Missouri,
1945, VAM. os 5 , Ct Cae

; , Plaintiffs’ petition rather fully states the facts upon which they
rely. However, to a limited extent, we may state some facts appearing
in various exhibits attached to said pleading. Under Seetion 509.130,
RSMo 1949, V.A.MS., such exhibits are a part of the petition for vall
purposes and may be considered in passing upon the sufficiency
thereof, Corbin v. Hume-Sinclair Coal, Mining Co., 361 “Mo. 888 237
8. W. 2d 81. —

It appears in the petition that the property inyolved herein is
located in a residential subdivision in Jackson County called ‘Lake
Lotawana.’’ The tract of 1500 acres which was utilized for,this sub-
division was owned by the Lake Lotawana Development Company.
This company, in about 1928 or shortly prior thereto, constructed a
dam and created a large lake which covered an area of about 600 acres.
In developing the surrounding area for recreational and homesite uses,

_roads were built and all but three blocks were subdivided, thus pro-
viding more than 1800 lots. Many of.these lots have been, sold and
more than 500 dwelling houses have been built thereon,

As a part of the plan of development certain restrictive covenants
were included in every conveyance made by the Development Com-
pany. The issue to be determined on this appeal involves one of the
restrictive provisions contained in said deeds, as follows: ‘‘No sale of
said lots shall be consummated without giving at least fifteen. days’
written notice to GRANTOR and the owners of-the two lots adjoin-
ing said. lot on the sides, of the terms thereof; and’ any-.of them shall
have the right to buy said lot on such terms. Such notice shall be per-
sonally served if service can-be made on the subdivision; if any per-
son entitled to service cannot be found on the subdivision, notice
shall be mailed to such person at his address last known to the GRANT-
OR. Affidavit of the person making service shall be sufficient evi-
dence thereof to protect a purchaser. State laws govern.’’ It is also
provided in the deeds that the covenants. and restrictions. ‘“‘shall run
with the land and bind all subsequent owners of said ldt-unti] and
including January 1, 1948,’’ and that ‘‘said restrictions may be ex-
tended beyond said twenty-year period, for a-new period, not exceed-
ing twenty years, by an instrument ‘executed by: the then owners’ of
majority of the front feet in said subdivision and duly acknowledged
and recorded in the recorder’s office of said Jackson County before
the expiration of said twenty-year period; and further extensions
may be effected in like mamner.’”

It is further alleged that the said restrictions-and covenants were
extended for an additional period of 20 years from and after January
1, 1948, by an instrument filed for record’ on October 7,'1947; which
was signéd by plaintiffs and defendant and others owning in ‘the
aggregate, at that time, a majority of the: front feet'in the whole of
said subdivision.

Tt further appeared that plaintiffs owned all of Lots 22, 23, and
40 exéept the west 40 ‘feet of Lot 23, all in Block ‘‘B”’. Defendant
‘owned the ‘west 40 feet of Lot 23 and all of Lots 24 and 39 also in
Block “B”’. Lots 22, 23, and 24 were adjoining [80] lots on the south
side of Shore Drive and Lots 89 and 40 were located almost directly
across the street therefrom. It will therefore be seen that plaintiffs’
Lot 40 adjoins the east side of defendant’s Lot 39 and that plaintiffs
and defendant each own a part of Lot 23 on the south side of the
drive so that plaintiffs own the 60 feet east of the division line (Lot
22 and east 10 feet of Lot 23) and defendant owns 90 feet to the west
of said line (Lot 24'and west 40 feet of Lot 23). Plaintifts formerly
owned all of Lot 23 and had sold the west 40 feet thereof to defendant.

Plaintiffs further alleged that defendant, on September 21, 1954,
entered into a written contract to sell all of her above-described real
estate to Marshall and Betty ©. Long for the sum of $9,000. The
‘eoutract provided for the payment of $1,000 upon the signing thereof
and that the-balance be paid upon delivery of the deed. Other pro-
visions therein were about the same as those usually found in such
contracts except the following: ‘‘Seller retains an estate in such
property consisting ‘of the right to visit such property during the
next ten years and to oceupy a bedroom alone duiing her visits to
such property. Buyers in addition to the cash consideration above
described agree to furnish the seller her meals during such visits and
to treat“her cordially. ‘The right in seller to so visit the property
shall be'vested-in her alone and cannot be assigned.”

* It was alleged’ that on October 7, 1954, plaintifs received formal
notice from defendant of said contract of sale as follows: ‘‘You are
hereby notified that I have contracted to sell the west 40 feet of
Lot 28, all of Lot 24, and all of Lot 39, all in Block B, Lake Lotawana,
a subdivision in Jackson County, Missouri, according to the recorded
plat thereof, to Marshall Long and Betty C. Long, a copy of such
‘contract being attached hereto and made a part hereof.’’ Immediately
thereafter, on said date, plaintiffs gave notice’ to defendant and to the
purchasers that they were exercising the option given them’as ad-
joining lot-owners to purchase the said lots on the same terms as con-
tained in said contract and delivered to defendant the sum of $1,000,
the down’ payment provided for in the contract. It is then alleged that
defendant has failed and refused to deliver to plaintiffs the abstract
of title or to make and deliver a warranty deed conveying the said
lands to-plaintifs or. to-otherwise consummate the said sale, and that
plaintiffs are ready, willing and able to pay the balance of the pur-
‘chase price to defendant upon her compliance with the said agreement.

The contract in question, when considered in connection with the
provisions of the foregoing restrictive covenant or option, is unusual
jn two respects, i.e., (1) there are three lots, or portions thereof, sold
as a unit for one total consideration instead of such being separately

stated as to each lot, and (2) defendant reserved a limited personal
use of the residence with the purchasers to furnish her certain serv-
ices of a somewhat personal nature. .

Hl Defendant's first point is that the petition does not state a
claim because a court of equity will not decree specific ‘performance
of a contract to render personal services and hence there is no mutual.,
ity of remedy. It is, of course, a well-established general rule that
equity will not ordinarily decree specific performance ‘of a contract
for personal services. Richardson v. Ozark Airlines, Mo. Sup., 270
S. W. 2d 8. However, we do not deem it necessary to determine,
whether defendant could obtain a decree of specific performance, of
plaintiffs’ agreement to furnish her room and board upon.her visits
to her former home. This, for the reason that mutuality of remedy is
not always essential to a decree of specifie performance. Rice v.
Griffith, 349 Mo. 378, 161 S. W. 2d 220. We think it clear that the
instant case is one where plaintifis, as a requirement for the decree
sought, need not show that specific performance is obtainable by each
of the parties to the contract.

Hl As will hereafter more fully appear, we think the restrictive,
covenant in question is reasonable and. valid. It should be made.
clear at the outset that many of the arguments advanced by defend-
ant for [81] the nonenforceability of the so-called option arise from’
the unusual nature of the contract defendant entered into with the
Longs. It may be assumed that she understood that the said covenant’
constituted a restraint upon her right to sell the property to any
person of her choosing and that such difficulties might arise as a re-
sult of a contract of this nature. In a proper case it might be held’
that a property owner in this subdivision, by purchasing property’
subject to these restrictions, has lost the right to enter into a contract
ag unusual and out of the ordinary as the instant one. Provisions of
that nature could be so repugnant to the average adjoining lot owners’
as to effectively destroy, for all practical purposes, the right to pur-
chase. However, we need not reach that question in this case as
plaintiffs allege that they are willing to purchase on the terms agreed
to by the Longs. We do say, however, that this contract was of de-'
fendant’s own making and equity will not permit her to say: that’
plaintiffs may not have specific performance thereof because .of
difficulties that may arise by reason of the peculiar provisions she
saw fit to place therein.

HI The next point briefed by defendant is that the’ alleged option
to purchase is invalid and unenforceable for six reasons therein
stated, We will attempt to discuss each of these contentions as
briefly as reasonably possible.

Preliminary to a consideration of these contentions it should be’
stated that the right to purchase provided for in the foregoing
covenant may not accurately be referred to as an option. It isa right.

of pre-emption. As stated in American Law of Property, Vol. VI,
Section 26.64, p: 507: ‘‘A pre-emption differs materially from an
option. An option creates in the optionee a power to compel the owner
of property to sell it at a stipulated price whether or not he be willing
to’ part with ownership. A pre-emption does not give to the pre-
émptioner the power to compel an unwilling owner to sell; it merely
requires the owner, when and if he decides to sell, to offer the property
first to the person entitled to the pre-emption, at the stipulated price.

Upon receiving such an offer, the pre-emptioner may elect whether
he will buy. If he decides not to buy, then the owner of the property.
may sell to anyone.”

Hl Defendant argues that ‘‘the alleged option is an unreasonable
restraint on the aliénation of such land.’’ As we view this question,
the effect of a pre-emptive right to purchase, as a practical restraint
on alienation, depends upon the manner of fixing the price. It would
appear that a pre- emption for a fixed price, without reference to any
future increase in value, might well operate as an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation. Kershner v. Hurlburt, Mo. Sup., 277 8. W. 2d
619. However, the instant provision in no way restrained defendant
from the free alienation of her land. She could negotiate a sales
contract at the highest price obtainable. She merely had to offer to
the Development Company and adjoining lot owners the prior right
to buy upon the terms fixed. This amounts to no more than a right
in these interested parties to buy the property at the market price
whenever defendant decided to sell. They could not force her to sell
and she could not make them buy. Under the provisions of that
particular covenant the only way they could prevent her from selling
to anyone was for one of them to buy the property upon the same
terms. It is our view that the provision in question is no unreasonable
restraint on alienation. Restatement, Property, Chap. 30, Section
413 (1), p. 2441; American Law of Property, Vol. VI, Section 26.65,
pp. 507, 508,

In connection with this point defendant also argues that it is
obvious that plaintifts could not possibly perform this contract be-
cause it provides that she be entertained in the home by the Longs
and that entertainment by the plaintiffs would not ‘be the same. We
will dispose of this contention by simply saying that defendant knew
that plaintiffs would have the right to purchase, and hence substitute
for.the Longs in furnishing these services, and, therefore, she must
have entered into the contract ‘with the idea that she would be [82]
willing to accept performance from them. Also, in connection with
this point, defendant asserts that the covenant in question is void be-
cause repugnant to the grant of a fee simple title. The cases upon
which she relies are factually different from the case at bar. What we
have already said will indicate our view that this provision is not
inconsistent with the vesting of a fee simple title. The granting

clause in the deed and the Provision regarding sale are equally ‘clear
and can be harmonized.

Hi It is next contended by “defendant that the provision: under
consideration violates the rule against -perpetuities. We see no merit
in this point. The restriction was limited to a period of 20:years with
a manner providing for an extension for a new period, not éxceeding
20 years, by an instrument executed by the then owners of a majority
of the front feet in the subdivision. Since the original restriction was
limited to 20 years, and the new period, requiring a new agreement,
could not exceed 20 years, it would seem that the arrangément would
not violate the rule against perpetuities. Moreover, .a somewhat similar
provision has been held not to violate the rule, even though not limited
in time, since the pre-emptive right..constituted: no-impediment to the
transfer of the property. Weber v. Texas’ Co:,’83'F."2d 807.

- EB In connection with general allegations in. the-petition concern:
ing the early development of ‘this subdivision plaintiffs stated that
“the development was new-and untried in the community and the
proprietors :thereof were endeavoring to attract’-ownets who ‘would
develop the homesites, thereby increasing the. values of: adjoining
properties.’’ Defendant now contends that her contract to sell to the ©
Longs-is in harmony. with the stated objective but that the purpose
of plaintiffs, in seeking to compel a sale to them, is in- conflict-with
the expressed purpose of the deed provision as they obviously cannot
use or develop two homesites. She further asserts that it is apparent
that plaintifis seek.to buy the property for speculation and ‘that a
court of equity should not aid them ‘in accomplishing ‘an objective
which is contrary to that which the deed provision was intended to
accomplish. We can think of many reasons that may have motivated
the Development Company in placing the instant provision in the
deeds... There’ is no requirement that ‘plaintifis:allegé any of these
reasons in their petition. ‘The quoted allegation was: preliminary and
historical in nature. If plaintiffs have a right to “purchase this
property the court will not inquire into their reasons for. desiring: to
do so unless, perchance, it should appear that they seek it for-a pur-
pose that:is unlawful or against-public policy.

HI Next, defendant contends that the provision for purchase. is
invalid and ‘unenforceable because: its terms. are so-indefinite and un-
certain as to be ambiguous and meaningless. An examination. of the
provision discloses no uncertainty .when applied. to the facts inthe
instant case. Buit: defendant hypothesizes several: situations of fact
that might possibly occur in another case and’ which ‘perhaps might
present difficult problems for solution. For example, she suggests.that
all three of the possible purchasers might ayailthemselves of the right
to purchase at the same time.:and inquires: further as to the effect
of the provision on judicial sales and other related problems. It would
seem sufficient: to observe that none of these questions are presented

by the facts of this case and they may never arise. We limit our
decision in this case to the facts now presented and pretermit hypo-
thetical. situations until such questions actually arise.

‘ -As previously noted defendant sold all of her lots as a unit
and. for one total consideration. She now asserts that plaintiffs are
not entitled.to a decree of specific ‘performance because they had no
option (pre-emption) to purchase part of the land involved. In this
connection. her first point is that since plaintiffs’ east 10 feet-of Lot
23 was not described in the instrument extending the: restrictions,
their right to purchase the. west 40 feet of said [83]. lot expired on
January 1,.1948, While we need not decide the point it would appear
that all property: in the subdivision is bound by the extension. It is
sufficient: for present purposes to say that plaintiffs signed the instru-
ment and obviously initended to include the said 10-foot strip as their
land was described as having a frontage of 60 feet which would in-
clude Lot 22 and the 10-foot strip of Lot 23.

- The.contention relating to Lot 24 is more- troublesome. Defendant
argues that since plaintiffs do not own a lot adjoining Lot 24° they
donot.have a right to purchase said lot. We agree with her contention
that ordinarily: the court must decree specific performance of the con-
tract as written or not at all. A court cannot make a contract for-the
parties.and then decree its performance. P.R.T. Inv. Corp. v. Ranft,
363 Mo, 522, 252 8. W. 2d 315; Drake v, Hicks, Mo. Sup., 249 8. W.
2d 358, .

We think it élear that plaintiffs had a right to purchase Lot 39 and
the west 40 feet of Lot 23. While they owned a part of Lot 23 (which
lot adjoined Lot 24): they: did not own the part that lay adjacent to
Lot 24. However, we have decided that we need not determine what
plaintiffs’ rights would have been if only Lot 24 had been sold. The
fact is that defendant has elected to sell all three parcels as one unit.
Plaintiffs are not complaining of this manner of sale: They are not
seeking to require her to sell the parcels separately or not at all. As
we view the situation defendant cannot be permitted to nullify the
right of plaintiffs to purchase Lot 39 and part of Lot 23 by including
in a contract of sale another lot about which plaintiffs’ right to pur-
chase may be in question. Having elected to sell them all as a unit
she appears to have recognized plaintiffs’ right to purchase in that
manner -when she served the required notice upon plaintiffs and other
adjoining owners. The giving of such’ notice would have been futile
indeed unless défehdant intended to. initiate the 15-day period for
pre-emption within which adjoining owners had the right to acquire
the instant property upon the same térms as the proposed sale to the
Longs. In this situation defendant cannot now be heard to say that
plaintiffs do not have the right to purchase the property as a whole
in the same manner’ and on the same terms she chose for the sale to
the Longs. In support‘of a contrary assertion defendant cites De Witt

v. Stotts, Mo. Sup., 265 8. W. 2d 398; Andrews v. Washington Nat.
Ins, Co. of Illinois, Mo. App., 93 8. W. 2a 1045; Phoenix Powder Mfg.
Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., 101 Mo. App. 442,.74 8. W..492; De Castro v:
Board of Com’rs of San Juan, 136 F.2d 419. We have examined these
cases and are of the view that they do not support the defendant’s
contention.

HE The final reason advanced by defendant, under Point II of
her brief, for the invalidity of the’ so-called option privilege, is the
rather tenuous one that the enforcement of the option is barred by the
Statute of Frauds. The case cited in support ofthis contention is
Casner v. Heaton, Mo. App., 237 8. W. 1042, which holds that the
purchaser of property subject to a deed of trust cannot be held to
have assumed the indebtedness unless it is in a manner that complies
with the Statute of Frands. In the instant case the contract of sale
and the pre-emptive privilege to purchase are both in writing. The
original deeds from the Development Company provide that the
latter provision or restriction shall. run with the land arid bind all
subsequent owners. We assume that it is defendant’s contention that
the petition should have alleged that she had.assumed in writing the
obligation of these restrictions and thereby agreed to be bound by the
same. We see no merit in this contention. Moreover, it should be
noted that it appears from the petition and exhibits attached’ thereto
that defendant signed the ‘‘Extension of Restrictions.’’

In view of the decision we have reached in connection with the
foregoing assignments, it is unnecessary to review certain other points
briefed. It is our conclusion that the petition states a claim upon
which relief could be granted and it follows that [84] the court
erred in sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss.

The judgment is reversed and cause remanded. Van Osdol., and
Coil, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Houman, G, is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Everyn F. Layson, Respondent,’ v. JacKsow' County, Missouri,
Appellant, Kansas: Crry, Missourt, a Municipal Corporation,
Intervenor-Respondent, No. 45054290 S. W. (2d) 109:

Division One, April 9, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, May 14, 1956.

- J: Marcus Kiriley,-County Counselor, and Lowis Wagner, Assistant
County Counselor, for appellant. ,

Benj. M.. Powers, City Counselor, and J. ‘L. Par ks, Assistant tity
Counselor, for intervenor-respondent. :

. [109] . COIL, C—The question _presented is whether. Jackson
County was obligated to pay the entire compensation of the judges
and clerks who [110] served in the City of Kansas City at the
November 4, 1952, general election or whether the, county and city
each was obligated to pay.one half; at which general election. Kansas
City submitted to its voters four charter amendments and one munici-
pal bond proposal.

Respondent, plaintiff below, was . the assignee, of ‘seven ‘warrants,
each in the sum of $8.00, drawn by the Board of Election Commis-

sioners of Kansas City, each payable to one of seven judges of election
and directed to the treasurer of Jackson County for payment. Jack-
son County refused to pay the warrants when presented for the
reason that, in the county’s view, they were illegally drawn and void
because each such draft represented the full amount due the respec-
tive judge of election rather than one half the amount so due.

The City of Kansas City intervened as a party defendant and is
a respondent here. We have jurisdiction for the reason that Jackson
County i is a record party. Article V, Section 3, Constitution of Mis-
souti 1945, 'V.A.M.S.

The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff for the face amount
of each warrant. Jackson County has appealed and contends, in effect,
‘that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for plaintiff because
the county was liable for only one half the amount due each judge
of election. ©

The question as presented here calls for the construction of certain
languagé contained in these two’ sections of Chapter 117, RSMo 1949,
8V.AMS.:

“*[417.140] In all cities to which this chapter applies the salaries
of the election commissioners and assistants shall be paid one-half
by the city and one-half by the county, or in the case of cities located
in more than one county, such salaries shall be paid as is provided
in section 117.150. The election commissioners shall each receive
a salary of three thousand dollars’ per year, payable monthly. The
menibers of the board designated as the chairman and the secretary,
respectively, shall be paid an additional salary of six hundred dollars
per year, payable monthly. The chief assistant employed by‘ the
board shall receive a salary not to exceed four thousand dollars per
year, payable monthly. Other assistants, not exceeding three in
‘nuniber, shall receive a salary of not to éxceed three thousand two
hundred dollars per-year, payable monthly. Other assistants, not
exceeding ten in number, shall receive a salary of not to exceed two
thousand nine hundred dollars per year, payable monthly; all other
additional assistants, if any, shall receive not to exceed eight dollars
per day for the time actually’ employed. Compensation for over-
time services necessarily and actually performed by any persons em-
ployed at the office of the board may be paid at the rate of such
employee’s regular pay. Precinct judges and clerks shall receive as
pay eight dollars for each day or part of day while on duty, except
pay shall be allowed only for those days mentioned in this chapter.
All expenses incurred by said board of election commissioners and all
costs and expenses of registration and election in such cities shall
be: paid one-half owt of the city treasury and one-half out of the
county treasury, or in the case of cities located in more than one
county all such expenses shall be paid as is provided by section
117.150.” (Our italics.)

“«1117.170] At all general, county, state or other elections. which
include officers elected throughout .a- whole county, although other
than state or county officers are also elected, and at all special elec-.
tions for a county or state officer or member of congress.or member.
of the legislature, each such county shall pay the judges and clerks
of election for their services under this chapter in connection with
the election held within each such respective county.”’

It is apparent that the dispute is essentially between Kansas City
and Jackson County and resolves itself.into whether the: following-
language of Section 117.140, supra, or the following language of See-
tion 117.170, supra, was applicable to the facts: ‘‘{117.140] AlL
expenses incurred by said board of election commissioners and all
[111] costs and expenses of registration .and election ‘in such cities.
shall be paid one-half out of the city treasury and. one-half out of the.
county treasury, * * *.’’ ‘*[117.170] At all general, * * * elections
which include officers elected throughout a whole ‘county, ‘although
other. than state or county officers are also elected, * * *. each such
county shall pay the judges and clerks of election for their services
we RD

Jackson County contends that compensation: of judges and clerks
is an expense of election within the language of Section 117.140,
supra, while Kansas City contends that the November 4, 1952, election,
being a general election which included officers elected throughout
Jackson County, was controlled by the provisions of Section 117.170,
supra, in so far as concerned payment of judges and clerks.

We bear in mind that these statutes relating to the payment of
judges and clerks of election must be read in pari materia and, if
possible, effect given to. each clause--and provision, Davenport -v.
Teeters, Mo. App., 278 8.W. 2d 506, 510[1,.2]; that where one, statute
deals with a subject in gerieral.and comprehensive terms and another,
deals with the same subject in a more minute and definite way,.the two
should be read together and harmonized if possible, with a. view. to
giving effect to a consistent legislative policy, but that to.the extent of
any repugnancy between them the definite prevails over the general,
State ex rel. Buchdnan County v. Fulks, 296 Mo. 614, 626, 247 S.W.
129, 132; and that we must, if possible, reconcile any apparent con-
flict in these two statutes with the general legislative. purpose, State:
ex rel. McKittrick v. Carolerie Products Co.,.346 Mo. 1049, 1059,,
144 S.W. 2d 153, 155[2, 3].

“We have no difficulty in harmonizing the provisions of the
above-quoted sections’ and in arriving at the conclusion. that; the
provisions of Section 117.170 were applicable to the instant facts.
‘We agree with the county that the language of Section 117.140, {ie.,
the words ‘‘expenses of * * * election’’), standing alone, included
the compensation of judges of elections,. and that there ‘existed a
seeming conflict between that séction and Section 117.170 which

specifically provided for the.county to pay’ the expenses of the judges
of election at all general elections. But when other relevant matters,
including other sections of the same chapter of the statutes, are con-
sidered, we think that seeming conflict disappears.

Section 117.050 provided for the creation of a board of election
commissioners in Kansas City and,’ among other things, prescribed.
their powers and ‘duties. Subsection 6 of Section 117.050 gave the
board of election commissioners thé power to make rules and regula-
tions. for ‘‘the registration of voters and the conduct of elections.’’
(Our italics.) Section 117.250 provided that the- board of election
commissioners “shall provide all necessary ballot boxes and all regis:
try records, poll books, tally sheets, ballots; blanks and stationery of
every: description, * ** and: other equipment necessary and proper
for the registry of voters and the conduct of such elections * * *,””
(Our italics.) Those expressions, ‘‘registration of voters’’ and ‘‘con-:
duet of elections’, used in other sections of the same chapter con-
sidered in connection with the specific provision in Section 117.170
as'to the payment of judges and clerks by the county, makes it likely
that the language (‘‘All expenses incurred by said board of election
comniissi ers and all costs and expenses of registration and election
in such ‘cities”) was intended to cover and provide for the payment”
of the expenses of election incident to the election board providing the
equipment anid paraphernalia’ in connection with registration of voters
and ‘the conduct of elections in Kansas City. In other words, it would
appear that Section 117.140‘ provided for the payment of general ex-
penses incident to the conduct of an election other than those expenses
which were otherwise provided for in another section. .

- This-construction is not only called for by the language of the
sectioris so far mentioned, but is made more ‘certain when Section 117.-
160’ (‘the section immediately preceding Section 117.170) is considered.
[112] That section provides: ‘‘At all city élections, general or special,
though other than city officers may be elected at the same time with
suclicity officers, and at all special elections in any part of the city,
at which a city officer is elected, such city shall pay such judges
and ¢lerks of ‘election for ‘their: services under this chapter.’ It is
apparent that the legislature specified by that section (117.160) and
by the following section (117.170) the kind of election for which the
city in one instance, and. the county in the other; was to pay the.
salaries of the judges and clerks of election.

We are fortified ‘inthe foregding conclusion by considering
the significance of the amendments 'to both Sections 117.140 and 117.-
170 made: by the 68th General Assembly (8 V.A.MS., Pocket Parts,
§§ 417.140, 117.170). The amendment of Section 17. 140 related -to
matters ‘not here ‘pertinent ‘but significantly the legislature left un-
changed the language of that section’ with which we are here con-
cérned; ‘ie, the section as amended contains the same clause: “All

expenses ‘incurred by said board of election commissioners and all
costs and expenses of registration'and élection in such cities~shall
be paid one-half out of the city treasury and one-half out of the
county treasury.’’? The’ amendment to Section ‘117:170, ‘however;
consisted of the addition of this proviso to that section: ‘except
that when such city submits any bond proposals, constitutional or
charter’ amendments, or other propositions at any election provided
by this section, the salaries of such judges and clerks of elections
shall be paid one half out of the city treasury and one half out of
the county treasury.’ "The amendments as made -constituted a clear
indication by the legislature that the section which priorly had dealt:
specifically with the question here presented’ was Section 117.170
rather than’ Section 117.140. Otherwise it would seem ‘that the sub-
stance of the proviso would have been’added to Section 117.140 rather
than to Section 117.170. And it would further appear, just-as clearly, .
that the legislature by the fact of and the language of the Section
117.170 amendment recognized that, Section 117.170 as it-had existed
prior to the amendment required the county to pay the salaries of.
judges and clerks of elections serving in Kansas’ City even though,
at such elections, propositions were voted on which affected only
Kansas City and upon which only the voters of Kansas City were
eligible to, vote.

HB Jackson County contends in its brief that the principle of
practical construction of a statute by administrative public officers
for a long period of time is here applicable. It is said that the
Board of Election Commissioners of Kansas City, prior to the
November 4, 1952, election, had always paid, without question, one
half the salaries of clerks and judges who served at general elections
wherein city proposals were also submitted. There is nothing in the
record to support that statement. And Kansas City, while recogniz-
ing the fact that the record does not support any conclusion as to the
matter noted, nevertheless, contends thatthe fact is exactly contrary
to the county’s contention. Under the circumstances, we, of course,
may not and do not consider any prior construction by administra-
tive officials because there i is nothing before us to, support either as-
sertion, ©. °

HB Jackson County also argues that the effectof Section 117.170
was. to provide that the only event in which the salaries of judges
and clerks were to be paid solely by the county was when city officers
were elected, along with state and county officers; that the provisions
of Section 117.170 had no application to a general election at which |
local propositions (other than the election of city officers) were sub-
mitted; and that the general provisions of Section 117.140 .-were
thereby applicable (as to the payment of. judges and clerks) .in an.
election at which local propositions (not involving the election of
city officers) were submitted. We agree with appellant that Section

117.170 before it was amended did not specifically mention general
elections at which local propositions (such as charter amendments and
bond proposals) were also submitted to a limited group of the county
voters. However, the language of Section 117.170, before amendment,
provided in effect that the county was to pay the judges [113] and
clerks ‘‘ At all general, county, state and other elections which include
officers elected throughout a whole county * * *.’’ It would appear,
therefore, that even though the submission of local propositions was
not mentioned, nevertheless, Section, 117.170 dealt more specifically
and minutely with the matter of who was to pay judges and clerks at
such an election than did Section 117.140, and it further appears
that there can be no doubt that the November 4, 1952, election was
a, general election which included officers elected throughout the
whole county and thus that election was covered by the language of
_ Section 117,170. And we point out again that the 1955 amendment of
Section 117.170 was.a positive recognition by the legislature that
the section before amendment, in the legislature’s opinion, resulted
in an inequitable distribution of the cost.of judges and clerks serving
in.Kansas City at general elections at which the city submitted local
propositions, and, as we see it, the amendment was for the very pur-
pose of changing that situation.
Appellant, as Point VI of its ‘‘Points and Authorities”, states,
“To Hold the Taxpayers of Jackson County Liable for the Entire
Cost Would Be Violative of Their Constitutional Rights.’’ The
record demonstrates that no constitutional question was raised
in the lower court, either in the pleadings, the evidence, or in
defendant’s motion for new trial. No constitutional question
having been. mentioned in defendant’s motion for new trial, none is
here for appellate review. State v. Powers, 350 Mo. 942, 944, 169 $.W.
2d 877, 378[6]. A.brief may not supply deficiencies in a motion for
new trial. State v. Davis, Mo., 251 S.W. 2d 610, 616[5-7].

We are of the opinion, that the provisions of Section 117.170,
as they existed in November 1952, were applicable to instant facts,
and that therefore Jackson County was liable to pay the entire com-
pensation for judges and clerks serving in Kansas City at the Novem-
ber 4, 1952, general election. It follows that the trial court correctly
ruled that the warrants in question were. valid and that plaintiff
should recover their face-amounts from defendant.

- Ef Intervenor-respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal (taken
with the case) on the ground that appellant’s brief violated Supreme
Court Rule 1.08 is overruled.

- The judgment is affirmed. Van Osdol and Holman, OC., concur.

“PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Com, C., is adopted as
the opinion of the court. All the judges coneur.

Watrer J. McCormack et al., Plaintiffs (Respondents), v. Ropzrr
Sranuuy Berxine, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of
Loriva McCormack et al., Defendants (Appellants), No. 44975—
290 8S. W. (2d) 145. .

Division One, April 9, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, May 14, 1956.

— :

Walter A. Raymond and William M, Day for appellants.

Albert L. Bi om, Be, rn & Rendlen and Charles B. Blackmar
for respondents . ot a aa :

[146] HYDE, J.—Will contest, involving title to real estate;
verdict and judgment for contestants and proponents have appealed.
The only issue on, this appeal is whether contestants. made a sub-
missible case on undue influence. We will, therefore, state the ‘facts
shown by, the evidence most favorable to contestants.

. Mrs... Luella (also called Lula) McCormack, hereinafter, referred -
to as testatrix, made two wills; one was dated January 8, 1931, with
similar provisions .to one made by her husband, Henry ‘MeCormack, at
that time; the other will was made December 1, 1949, after the death
of her husband who died December 7, 1946. The judgment adjudged
that the writing of December 1, 1949, was not the last. will of the
testatrix, in accordance. with the verdict ofthe jury; and, reciting that.
it had been. stipulated that the writing of January 8, 1931.had been
duly exeeuted and witnessed, adjudged “that: writing to be the last
will of testatrix. .

By the 1981 will, testatrix left ‘all of her property to her “husband
if he survived her but if he did not survive her, by one calendar
month, then 2/3 of her estate was to go to,her brother-in-law, Walter
J, MeQormack and 1/8 to her sister, Laura Douds., Her sister died
in 1947 and contestants other than Walter, J..MeCormack were her
brother, a niece and two nephews, children of. deceased brother.
The 1949 will, left all of testatrix’s property to Robert Stanley Berk-
ing (hereinafter referred to as Stanley) and provided that. if he did
not survive -testatrix then all.of her -property should go to: his wife
Alice L, Berking. Stanlev was.a nephew-of testatrix’s husband, a son-
of his, deceased sister. The 1949 will. appointed Stanley executor
without bond and authorized him to- sell, the property of the estate
‘fapon, such terms and for such consideration as he may ,approve.’”

Testatrix was married about 1903 to Henry McCormack. His family
apposed, their marriage except his younger: brother Walter. Stanley’s
mother and the other brothers and sisters never had friendly relations.
with testatrix and her hysband and ‘“‘never buried the hatchet.’?

However, relations were very friendly between testatrix and her hus-
band and Walter McCormack and his wife, called ‘‘Mame’’ by testa-.
trix, who lived. in Hannibal. The families visited in each others
homes throughout the years and kept up correspondence between
them. Testatrix and her: husband both originally lived in Hannibal
but, after their marriage, went to Kansas City, where he worked for
a.railroad. In 1922, Stanley and his wife [147] moved'to Kansas
City and he also engaged in railroad work. In 1925, Stanley lost a
leg in an accident for which he brought suit and received a settlement.
He remained in Kansas City until 1930, being employed by an arti-
ficial limb manufacturer and a law firm. In 1930, he moved to New
London where he bought and operated a drug store. Stanley and his
wife both said that during the time they lived in Kansas City, they
were very friendly with testatrix and her husband and visited with
them frequently, seeing them about every week.

’Testatrix and her husband later moved from Kansas City to a place
on Highway 50 near Lee’s Summit. George Beard and his wife Hattie
Beard lived across the street from them and Mr. Beard and Henry
MeCormack were employed by the same railroad, In 1945, Henry
McCormack’s health failed and he finally becanie mentally deranged.
Mr. and Mrs. Beard helped testatrix take care of him. He died
Décember 7, 1946 and was buried December 9th. Walter and Mame
McCormack and Stanley came for the funeral. Aftér the funeral
Stanley drove deceased’s Ford car back to New London and Walter
and Mame McCormack rode back with him. Stanley told testatrix
he could get a better price for the car in New London than she could.
get in Kansas City. However, she had one offer of $400.00 and another
offer ‘of $500.00; but, in April 1947, she got Stanley’s check for
$200.00 for it. Stanley first said this check was mailed to her but
when it appeared that the check had been cashed in Hannibal he de-
cided it had been delivered to her when she was there taking care of
her sister Laura Douds. Testatrix had written Walter and Mame
McCormack in January 1947 saying she had not heard from Stanley
about the car and that she was sorry she let him take it. She wrote,
them later telling them about offers she had for the car and saying
that she did not give the car to Stanley and that if hé thought so he
was ‘‘very much mistaken.’’ There was also testimony that testatrix
said Stanley took all of her husband’s tools. In one of these letters,
testatrix said she called Stanley to come when Henry was so bad say-
ing: ‘‘I was so much in trouble I did not know who to call.’”’ It was
also shown that testatrix opened, a joint savings account for herself
and Stanley on December 3, 1946 at the Traders Gate City, National
Bank of Kansas City, where she did all of her banking business. This
account stated’ it was ‘‘as joint teriants, payable to either of them or
the survivor of them.’’ Stanley said testatrix asked him to goon
this account after her husband’s death and that he had gone home

a i

after the funeral and: come back again before-this was done. His only
explanation of the fact that the account was shown to have been
opened before Henry McCormack’s death was that the ‘bank record
‘was untrue. This account was closed November 7, 1949 and the
balance of $4,221.32 transferred to a new savings account. in. testa-
trix’s name only. Prior to that time a joint checking account. had been
opened, on October 27, 1949, in the names of testatrix and Mrs. G. 8.
Beard. (This was at the time testatrix went to the Bethany Hospital
concerning what turned out to be her last illness.) This joint check-
ing account was closed January 28, 1950, a new joint checking account °
having been opened January 26, 1950, in the names of testatrix-and
Stanley, after she was in the Research Hospital. These joint checking
accounts were for the purpose of getting bills paid during the illness
of testatrix ; balances of between $400.00 and $800.00 were maintained.
Early in 1947, testatrix went to Hannibal to take care of her sister
Laura Douds, who was afflicted with cancer and .died.that summer.
After her sister’s death, testatrix stayéd three weeks with Walter and
Mame McCormack, during which time she consulted with ‘Walter con-
cerning business papers in the strong box she had with her arid gave
Mame a diamond stick pin. She discussed her will, made in 1931,
showed them a copy (they had been told about it before) and told
them ‘‘if anything ever happened, to get here as soon as we could and
then contact Mr. Thice in regard to the will.’ Mr. Thice was the
lawyer who drew the will and the original had been [148] left with
him. After she went home, she thanked them several times in‘letters
with such expressions as: ‘‘I don’t’ know what I would have done
without you and Walter. You were so good to me. I will never forget
you. You are the dearest ones I have left and may God bless you
both’’; and ‘‘I think of you and Walter so-maniy times and how good
you people was to me when poor Ruby. was'so bad: I don’t know what
I would have done without you.’’? According to Stanley, he and his
wife drove over and visited testatrix, perhaps a dozen times, while
she was in Hannibal in 1947, and’ on July 4th she spent thé day with
them in New London. In 1948, testatrix decided: to buy a house in
Kansas City and move there. She had Walter and: Mame come up and
look at the house before she bought it; and she moved into it in the
fall of 1948. During 1948 and 1949, she wrote them friendly letters,
with invitations to visit her, and also would call Mame by telephone.
In the summer of 1949, testatrix’s lealth failed and she becamé very
ill that fall. She could not retain food and‘it developed that shé had
an abdominal cancer. Mrs. Beard was usually ‘with her in the daytime
and another woman stayed with her at night. Testatrix had much
pain from her condition and took much medicine for relief. ‘She lost
fifty pounds of ‘weight during Her lmess. On October 25, 1949, she
called Mame McCormack and asked her to come to: Kansas’ City and
she came the next day. Mame gaid testatrix said to her oh the’phone:

“When you-come up don’t tell-the Berkings.I am’ sick,.do not. Jet
them -know you are in Kansas City.or coming, promise the that.”
After Mame arrived she: had: the following conversation with -testa-
trix, who said: ‘‘Did you tell the Berkings? and I said ‘no £ did not.’
She said, ‘Did you tell anybody because I-don’t want them in-my
house’,.and I said ‘yes, I only told my sister.’ She says, ‘She will tell
them.’ ’’ Testatrix went to Bethany Hospital where the doctors wanted
her to stay for about three weeks. However, she. only. stayed: from
October 26th ‘to’ November Ist. ;Mamie- said she intended to-go heme

’ for a few days, get Walter settled comfortably and come back:- How-
ever, when she and Mrs. Beard went to the hospital, testatrix'said she
had made the doctors dismiss -her and was going. honie. She said:./‘T
am afraid to leave my house empty. -I am-afraid the Berkings-will
come. I don’t want, the Berkings to come and get in my house while
Iam away.’’.Mame went ‘home in a few days leaving. self-addressed
postcards td be sent to her about testatrix’s. condition.‘ These were
sent to her by Mrs. Beard during November., The Beards said testa-
trix told them ‘‘not to. tell the Berkings she-was' sick and not to give
them the keys’’ (to her house) ; and also said'to them: ‘‘ Whatever you
do, don’t give these keys to Stanley Berking, or call him.’’ Mr, Beard
also said testatrix told him she did not want Stanley up there; and
that “if he comes, he would make her do whatever he wanted her -to
do.”

The Berkings did arrive about November 27th and stayed: until
December 5th’: The will leaving everything to them was executed on
December Ist. W. M. Day, the lawyer who prepared it, and with his
wife witnessed it,.said someone at the Traders Bank (he did not ‘re-
member who it was) told him that testatrix wanted to see him. He
said he made an appointment to seé her the next morning (November
30th) and stopped and talked to her for about 30 minutes, seeing nd
one else in the house at that time. He went back the next morning
(December Ist) and the will was signed by testatrix, and that he aiid
his wife signed as witnesses. ‘He.said testatrix then folded it up and
put it in her pocketbook. Mrs. Berking was ‘in the back part of the
house and testatrix called her in after the will was executed and intro-
duced her. As they were going out the front door Stanley came in.
Thereafter, Stanley. had the will and the abstract to testatrix’s house
in New London and'ldter brought the will to Kansas City-and delivered
it to Mr. Day, who had prepared it, and he had it when testatrix diéa.
Stanley’s explanation of his ‘possession of it- that as he and his
wité were starting to drive back to' New Loidow on December 5th,
testatrix brought out the abstract to -hér house and put it in the bi
seat of his car; and that’ they put: [149] the abstract in their stro
box when they’ got home. The Berkings said they did not know the
will had-been-made and did not ‘learn about it until Januarv 1950
when' they visited testatrix at’ the hospital and she askéd them’ if they

' kX  *

had found the will, When they said ‘‘no’’,.she told them she had put
it inthe abstract and when they went home they found it there, hav-
ing never seen it before. Walter McQormack said that after testatrix
died Stanley said Mr. Day. had her. will and suggested they go down
and have him read it. He stated he said: ‘‘How do you know Mr.
Day has got a will?’’ and that Stanley-said; ‘I called him up and told
chim to come out and make one.’’ (This was denied by Stanley.) Mame
McCormack said Stanley said to her about testatrix: ‘‘Lulu hasn’t
known what she has been doing for the past six months.’’ Mrs. Beard
also expressed the same opinion abont.testatrix. Mrs. Beard also said
that after the Berkings went -home' in December 1949, testatrix told
her ‘‘Stanley brought a.lawyer and his wife out and had her will
fixed’; and that testatrix also told her ‘‘she ‘wasn’t satisfied. with
that will * * * didn’t want it fixed up” and said ‘‘when she got well,
she was going to make out a.new-will.’ :

_ After the Berkings went home in December 1949, ‘the Beards con-
tinued to care for testatrix. They said about the, last of December
She got very bad and the doctor said she shold be in the hospital.
She said they did not want the responsibility and tried to call Mame
but couldn’t get her., The Beards said testatrix did not want them to
call Stanley but they finally called him. .After he arrived, testatrix
went, to. the Research Hospital December 30, 1949 and died March.

1950. The Berkings moved into her home and stayed there during

that time except for, two short trips home. Qn admission to the Re-
search Hospital, testatrix was described as “‘a. senile, white female
anpearing acutely ill.’ The final diagnosis showed adenocarcinoma,
involving the entire abdominal, thoracic and genito-urinary. systems,
arteriosclerotie heart disease ‘and general arteriosclerosis, two: large
gallstones, terminal azotima (a blood: disease) and terminal broncho-
pneumonia. and pulmonary complications. Walter and Mame McCor-
mack came to Kansas-City in February 1950 and stayed about a-week.
They said the Berkings made them feel wnweleome and ‘that; Mrs.
Berking told ‘Walter to take Mame: home, ‘saying she didn’t’ want her
there because she might get sick.and she would have her on-her hands
too, They said Mame’s health was good. While they were in Kansas
City, the Berkings would take them to-the hospital to see testatrix
but would never leave them alone with her. They. also said that
while they were there Stanley often sang, whistled.or -hummed the
song ‘‘Everything’s Going My Way”’. It was also shown-that Stanley
painted the bedrooms and put a new lineoleum’in the bathroom dur-
ing his stay there before testatrix died. -On the day’ they-left,.Mame
said they went to the station’ early and-she took a -taxi.to the hospital
and got to see testatrix-alone. She said testatrix said: ‘I am glad
you are here because I want to tell. you.something * * * T ‘thawe to
change that will. * * * T have to get’ Rubv’s name off that will.”
(Ruby was,her deceased sister who was named only in the 1981 will.)

The 1949 will was filed for probate on March 1, 1950, the same day
that testatrix died. Testatrix was 76 at the time of her death;
Walter McCormack was near the same age, having worked for his
company (International Shoe) 55 years at the time of the trial, and
Stanley Berking was 62 at that time. .

Stanley denied having had anything to do with making the will or
kmowing anything about it until testatrix told him in January 1950
that it was in the abstract he had in New London. He had the testimony
of a neighbor of testatrix that she had given her Stanley’s address
and telephone number and said if anything happened to her to call
the Berkings immediately; and also said she wanted Stanley to have
everything she had. He also had the testimony of another woman, a
friend of testatrix, that testatrix told her that she and her husband
were leaving their property to each other and the last one was to
leave it [150] to Stanley, saying: ‘‘He is the only one that does any-
thing for us or looks after us’’; and also showed her Stanley’s name
on her bank account. He also had the testimony of a nurse at the
Research Hospital, who said testatrix told her how grand Stanley was
to her ‘‘and how much she depended on him to do things for her.’’
Stanley said one day in January 1950, testatrix (at the hospital)
said: ‘‘I have done you a grave injustice and I just feel kind of bad
about it.’? He asked her what it was and she said: ‘‘I had you taken
off that checking—that savings account of mine.’’ He said: “TI asked
her how she come to do it and she said my Aunt Mame had her take it
off.’? He said he and his wife stayed in testatrix’s house, while she
was in the hospital, at her request; and that she gave them the key.
He also said Walter and Mame McCormack were alone with testatrix
at the hospital several times during their visit in February 1950.

Hl Defendants correctly say that the law favors freedom in the
testamentary disposition of property and that the burden was on con-
testants to prove the 1949 will did not represent the will of the testa-
trix but was the result of propronents’ undué influence. However,
as defendants concede, undue influence need not be shown by direct
evidence but can be shown by circumstantial evidence as a reasonable
inference from other facts and circumstances. They also correctly
say that statements and declarations of testatrix do not constitute
proof’ of facts stated therein (the jury was so instructed) but.only
are admissible to show her state of mind and susceptibility to in-
fluence. (State ex rel. Smith v. Hughes, 356 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. (2d)
360 and cases cited, le. 361.) However, we cannot agree with their
contention that there was no evidence that testatrix was in such mental
and physical condition as to be susceptible to undue influence. They
cite Beckmann y. Beckmann, 331 Mo. 183, 52 S. W. (2d) 818 (where
the will was made five years prior to the testator’s death and the
ailment shown was only during the last three years of his life);
Bushman vy. Barlow, 316 Mo. 916, 292 S. W. 1039 (where there was

a .

not an unequal division, although shares were placed in trust, and
the will was substantially the same as a former will as to which no
undue influence was claimed) ; Larkin v. Larkin, Mo. Sup., 119 8S. W.
(2d) 851 (where testator 68 made his will before going to the hospital
for an operation for appendicitis and the evidence showed him to be
a man of strong mind and will and ‘‘not old enough to be debilitated
by reason of old age’’) ; Snell v. Seek, 863 Mo. 225, 250 8. W. (2d)
886 (where testatrix was 88 but contestants’ evidence did not show
nature of illness or impairment of mental faculties and most of her
property was left to her husband instead of adopted children.) In
none of these cases were there, as.in this case, declarations of the
maker of the will showing anxiety over the likelihood of being in-
fluenced by the person charged with undue influence or an admission
of such person that he had called the lawyer who made the will and
told him. to come out and make one. Even Stanley’s testimony that
testatrix told him that his Aunt Mame had had her take his name off
the joint savings account indicates susceptibility to influence. Cer-
tainly the evidence of the character of testatrix’s illness (wide spread
eancer which kept her in pain, required drugs for relief and made it
difficult for her to retain food) and her condition at the time the will
was made (senile, with arteriosclerosis) is very different from any-
thing shown in the cases cited. (See Powell v. Raleigh, Mo. App.,
244 8. W.' (2d) 387.) While it is true, as defendants state, there was
no evidence of mental incapacity, nevertheless our conclusion is that
the declarations of the testatrix and contestants’ other evidence was
sufficient to show a state of mind susceptible to influence, if accepted
as true by the jury. .

Hl Defendants’ main contention is that the evidence is insufficient
to show that they exercised undue influence in the execution of the
will amounting to force, coercion or over-persuasion, which destroyed
the free agency and will power of the testatrix, citing Gibony v.
Foster, 230 Mo. 106, 180 8. W. 314; Hayes v. Hayes, 242 Mo. 155,
[151] 145 S. W. 1155; Webster v. Leiman, 328 Mo. 1282, 44S. W. (2d)
40; Larkin v. Larkin, Mo. Sup., 119 8S. W. (2d) 351; Look v. French,
846 Mo. 972, 144 8. W. (2d) 128; Walter v. Alt, 348 Mo: 53, 152 8. W.
(2d) 185; State ex rel. Smith v. Hughes, 356 Mo. 1, 200 8. W. (2d)
360; Buckner v. Tuggle, 856 Mo. 718, 203 8. W. (2d) 449; Wright v.
Stevens, Mo. Sup., 246 8. W. (2d) 817; Snell v. Seek, 363 Mo. 225,
250 8. W. (2d) 336; Michaelson-v. Wolf, 364 Mo. 356, 261 S. W. (2d)
918 ; Glover v. Bruce, Mo. Sup., 265 8. W. (2d) 346; Aaron v. Degnan,
Mo. Sup., 272'S. W. (2d) 216. In this connection defendants say the
disposition made in the 1949 will was not unnatural because testatrix,
at that time, had no blood relatives with whom she had any close
relations ;'and they also say the evidence did not show a fiduciary
relationship between Stanley and testatrix. (Since there was no joint
bank account of testatrix and Stanley at the time the will was made

we will consider that no fiduciary relatiotiship was in existence at that
time.) It has frequently been held that the proof of a confidential
fiduciary relationship and-wnusual activity in the preparation of a
will.by one who profited greatly from it over others.for whom equal
regard had been expressed by the-maker of the, will, made without the
advice: of a wholly ‘disinterested persou, the making of which was
concealed by the one who profited by it, and made ivhen the maker
was susceptible to his influence is, with corroborating circumstances,
a sufficient basis for a. finding of undue influence. (Machens v.
Machens, Mo: Sup.,-263 8. W. (2d) 724; Bohnsack v..Hanebrink,
Mo. Sup., 240 . (2d) 903; Loehr v. Starke; 332 Mo.-131, 56 S..W.
(2d) 772.) Wowever, a finding. of undue influence does not absolutely
depend upon the establishment.of fiduciary relationship but can be
based on other: facts and circumstances.

| | It is true, as the authorities cited by defendants ‘hold, that a
finding that testatrix’s will was the result of their undue influence
cannot rest solely upon suspicion, speculation.and conjecture; rior .is
a.showing of motive, opportunity to-exercise undue influence and an
unjust result enough to make a jury case; and to make a case of undue
influerice ‘on: cireumstanial evidence, thé circumstances must be of a
sufficiently substantial nature to sustain an inference that the Berk-
ings dominated:and controlled testatrix’s mind in making the will
so that it stated their wishes and not her's. (See State ex rel. Smith -v.
Hughes, supra; 200°S. W. (2d), le. °863- and cases cited.) In the
Smith case, we said: ‘‘The circumstances in evidence are just as much
lacking:in this respect as is the direct evidence -because they .do-not
show that Anna (charged with undue influence) had-anything to do
with the wiaking of the will, or knew’ it.was to be wiade or knew, at the
time, it had been made:’’ (In many-of defendants’ above cited cases
there was no evidence of activity in making the will.) That is not the
situation in’ this case, becatise there were ciréumstances to show what
we said was lacking in. the Smith case, namely: that the Berkings were
in testatrix’s home when the will was made and had been alone with
testatrix there.for‘several days before it was made; that Stanley said
he called the lawyer and told him to come out and make the will; that
Stanley took the will, and ‘the abstract fo’ testatrix’s house,: with him
wheh he'welit homé a few days after it was made ‘and concealéd the
fact of ‘its existence from the’ McCormacks: that the Berkings took
over teStatrix’s house when. she went ‘to:th¢ hospital and prevented
the McCormacks fiom being alone with her; and that the will was
filed for probate on the-very day ‘that testatrix died These facts. con-
sidered: with the lettcr's and statemerits oftestatrix’ showing her-con-
tinting close relations, gratitude and affection‘ toward the McCorniacks

d her distrust of-the Berkings, together with’ the -facts that the will
was'made during testatrix’s last illness (of the kind it was and: with a
condition of senility shown), that it completely changed the long

standing testamentary plan of her 1931 will (to leave most of her
property to Walter McCormack) without any apparent. reason and
against her previously expressed desires, and that there was evidence
of her susceptibility to influence, we think makes a. substantial basis
to sustain [152] an inference that the will was the result of undue
influence by the Berkings. We think the facts’ and circumstances
herein shown are very different from those in the cases upon which
defendants rely and make as strong a case of circumstantial evidence
of undue influence as those in Welch v. Welch, 354 Mo. 654, 190 S. W.
(2d) 936 and Norris v. Bristow, 358 Mo. 1177, 219 S. W. (2d) 367, in
each of which there was activity.in making the will but no showing
of a fiduciary relationship and in each of which we held there was a
jury case. Of course, these facts and: circumstances were far from
conclusive, and while they were denied their truth was for the jury,
but since the jury accepted them as true our conclusion is that the
jury could reasonably infer from them that the will was the result of
undue influence. We, therefore, hold the case was properly submitted
to the jury. y
~The Judgment i is. affirmed. All coneur. .

Wiuiiam Karivas, Plaintift- Appellant, v: Mrs. J. ©. Havox, Defend-
ante. Appellant, No. 44933290 8. Ww. ea) 94. .

Division One, May 14, 1956,

Ward-A. Dorsey and Alan F. Wherritt for appellant.

John J. Hasburgh for defendant-appellant; Watson, Ess, Marshall
& Enggas of counsel. *

[96] HOLLINGSWORTH, J.—This is an action for specific per-
formance of a written instrument executed by defendant, Mrs. J. C.
Hauck, wherein she granted plaintiff, William: Kalivas, an option to
purchase a tract of approximately 75 acres of farm land iw Platte
County, Missouri, upon conditions in said agreement set forth. The
trial court found the issues generally: in favor of plaintiff, but refused
specific performance, and, in lieu thereof, awarded plaintiff damages
in the sum of $2,000. Both parties have appealed. Plaintiff says the
court erred in refusing specific performance or, in the alternative, if
specific performance was properly denied, that the court erred in re-
fusing plaintiff the right.to amend. his ‘petition to include specific
averments of his damage and to direct an inquiry on that issue. instead
of arbitrarily assessing such damage at the sum of $2,000, Defendant
says the instrument constituted at most an agreement to, negotiate a
contract for the sale of said land and was unenforceable both because
it is incomplete and is violative of the statute. of frauds, .§ 432.010
RSMo 1949, V.A.MS. Title to real estate is involved and jurisdiction
of the appeal is vested in this court. Article:V, § 38, Constitution of
Missouri, V.A.M.S.

Mrs. Hauck, hereinafter called defendant, owned and, with her
daughter, Mrs. Olga Bailey, resided upon the farm involved. At
sometime prior to the execution of the agreement in question, defend-
ant had ‘‘listed’’ the farm for sale with the Suiter Farm Company,
Ine., of Kansas City, Missouri, of which company William L: Suiter
was the principal officer and Mrs, Ruth Wood was an employee. Wil-

liam Kaliyas, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, was interested in
buying land for development into a residential area., Through Mrs.
‘Wood, he learned of defendant’s-desire to sell her farm and went to
talk with her and.view the farm. They had several discussions about
the sale of it. During these conversations, both parties learned (1)
the purpose for which. plaintiff wanted ‘the land; .(2) that Mrs.
Hauck wanted to reserve from the sale the residence, surrounding out-
buildings, and five acres of the land upon which they were situate;
(3) that the sale price of the land was $40,000; (4) that a portion of
the farm had a crop of corn growing thereon under a sharecrop rental
agreement with a nearby farmer, the landlord’s share of which
would be reserved to defendant; and (5) that there were other
matters yet to be agreed io before a sale of the farm could be consum-
mated. Pursuant to the aforesaid conversations, plaintiff prepared
and defendant signed the instrument in question, to-wit:
“In consideration of the Sum of Two Hundred Dollars paid
“to me by Wm Kalivas Receipt hereby is acknowledged.. I do here-, ”
by grant to Wm Kalivas an option to purchase the west half of.”
the Northeast quarter of section 29, twp. 51, rg 33, except Be:
ginning at the Southwest corner of the NE 1 [4 of See. 29 in Twp,

51 rg 33 and running E with the S boundary line of said 1/4

sec 24 rods thence N 8 rods thence W 24 rods to the W boundary

liné of said 1/4 section thence S$ 8 rods to the place of beginning
* containing ‘one ‘acre and thirty-two square rods. With the ex- ©
ception of 5 acres which will be designated later where ‘house now

‘stands. ©

" “The purchase price is $40,000 (Forty Thousand) im which

the Two Hundred is to be applied if this option is used in the next
* 30 days when it becomes Null and Void if a standard contract of

sale has not been signed. ‘This is approximately 75 acres. signed *

the 14th of July, 1954. *

(S) - Mrs. J. C. Hauck’’
|| Defendant was paid ‘the two hundred dollars’ mentioned i in
the instrument.

Plaintiff testified : ‘On August 6, 1954; he called defendant arid told
her that he and his attorney, ‘Ward Dorsey, wanted to confer with her
and ‘‘write in the terms of the contract”. Defendant said she would
like to’ have Mr. Suiter present, whereupon plaintiff called the Suiter
‘Agency. Pursuant to arrangements made with Mr. ‘Stiiter, plaintiff
and Mr. Dorsey met with defendant and Mrs. Wood at defendant’s
home on. Saturday afternoon, August 7, 1954. Defendant’s daughter,
Mrs. Bailey, was also présent. Prior to tliat meeting there had been no
agreement'reached as to or discussion of the terms of the real estate
contract. At the meeting, defendant said she wanted the barns in-
cluded in the five acre tract; that she wanted ‘‘possibly ‘to connect
on to the gas and water and Tights and wanted to connect on to the

streets if it was worked out with the engineers and how it would work
out’. There was a discussion as to when-the corn -erop could'be re-
moved and as to ‘‘when [we] would be able to go'in and start to try
to prepare the land for grading operations.’’

“*Mrs. Woods brought up the subject she. thought we cowld put
down forty thousand dollars with the Suiter Farm at that time, and
Mr. Dorsey said that the option didn’t state anything about it, * * *
that we wouldn’t even have to put down any money whatsoever to
enter into the real estate contract to be able to examine the abstract.

“*Q. Did you or your attorney indicate your willingness to agree
to put down any money at the time and. sign the | real estate contract?
A. We did.

-“Q. How much? A. Ten per cent.’’

Plaintiff further testified: Defendant said nothing 4 in reply to this

suggestion. Later on that occasion, defendant said shé was: glad
‘plaintiff was getting the property: Plaintiff had: Mr. Dorsey prepare
a sales contract agreement which was stbimitted -to thé Suiter Com-
pany and by it disapproved. A second contract was prepared and
signed by plaintiff. He and Mr. Dwfty (associated with Mr. Dorsey)
took it, with a certified check for $3,800, to defendant on Friday,
August 18th, and tendered. both to defendant, which. she declined,
saying that Mr. Suiter had adyised,her to do so. Both the check. and
the contract were left-in the home, and an executed copy of the con;
tract was sent to the Suiter Agency. ;Plaintift further testified that
.at that time he was in.a. position to pay the balance of the purchase
price in cash if the title to the property was good. On ecross-examina-
tion, plaintiff said he meant that he “had access to forty thousand
dollars’’, meaning, he said, ‘‘I had ten thousand dollars and three
of,my partners had the other ten, thousand dollars apiece.”’
_ On further cross-examination, plaintiff denied he told Mrs. Hauck
prior, to.execution of the option agreement that he was unable to « “pay
the- entire purchase price. He admitted, however, that after it was
signed he told her he was not prepared to pay the, purchase price and
suggested to.her several different ways in which, the deal might be
financed, ‘including a suggestion that she join in the development
enterprise, -all of which: she refused; admitted that-prior-to. his call
upon defendant on August 7, 1954, ‘‘there had been no agreement
reached between [them] as to the terms of the real estate contract”,
but insisted that they did come; to-an agreement on that date; admitted
that the contract was to include all of the terms discussed and agreed
upon at the meeting; and that a part of the terms “agreed to be put
in the real estate contract’’ pertained to roads and utilities on the
acres that were to be conveyed under the contract; admitted that in a
deposition priorly given by him he had stated that “the down pay-
ment was never mentioned. * * * I don’t believe .we ever discussed
it.” But, on further. cross-examination, he also testified :

“°Q. Let me ask you this question with reference to your deposition. :

“Question: Prior to the date of ‘the option agreement, Mr.

Kalivas, did Mrs. Hauck make any statement to.you concerning the
forty thousand dollars purchase price being put into escrow?

“Answer: With Mrs. Ruth Wood, real estate agent.

“Question: When was it to be done?

“‘Answer: When the real estate contract. was agreed upon.”’

At the trial, however, he denied that it was ever agreed that the
$40,000 was to be put in escrow and stated that there was never any
mention of an escrow of the $40,000.

The first contract tendered by plaintiff to defendant contained
clauses reading as follows:

“Also to be excluded from the West Half of the Northeast Quarter
of Section 29, Twp. 51, Rge. 33 is a tract containing 5 acres of land on
which is located the home and out-buildings of the seller. The
boundary lines of said tract are to be determined by a survey to be
prepared. at the expense of the seller.

a ke &

«The seller shall have the right to connect onto and tie into all roads
and utilities which the buyer may in the future establish or cause to
be furnished to the above described tract of land hereby conveyed.”’

There was also a clause to the effect that the buyer should have
possession on date of delivery of waranty deed, subject to the right
of seller’s tenant to harvest the corn erop thereon, but in no event
should the right of the tenant to come upon the premises extend be-
yond November 1, 1954. (It does not reserve to defendant the land-
lord’s share of said corn.)

A further clause provides:

“The purchase price of said land to be paid to the seller by the
buyer is Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000) to be paid by the buyer
as follows: .........00eee ee Dollars at the signing of this contract,
the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged by the seller and which
is deposited with the Suiter Farm Cornpany, 3810 Broadway, Kansas
City, Missouri, as a part of the consideration of the sale; the balance
to be paid in cash on delivery of deed as herein provided.’’ .

Plaintiff admitted that the amount of the down payment was
omitted from the contract in accordance with his instructions to his
attorney. .

The second contract, a copy of which is attached to the petition as
the instrument upon which plaintiff bases his action, was tendered ‘to
defendant on August 18, 1954. It was signed by plaintiff. It réserved
to defendant the landlord’s share of said corn crop, and further pro-
vided: ‘‘The purchase price is Forty Thousand and no/100 dollars,
$40,000.00, which the buyer agrees to pay as follows: Four Thousand
and 'No/100 Dollars, $4,000.00 at the signing of this contract, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged by the seller and which is

deposited with Suiter Farm Company, Inc. 3810 Broadway, Kansas
City, Missouri, as part of the consideration of the sale; the balance
to be paid in the following manner: Thirty-Six Thousand and No/100
Dollars, $36,000.00, cash on delivery of deed as herein provided,
and - --’’ The only reference to the five acre tract to be reserved to
defendant is : ‘‘[E]xcept a tract of five acres surrounding the home
and out-buildings of the seller the boundary lines of which tract will
be later designated from a survey’’; and there is no provision whatever
as to any right granting defendant access to roads, streets or utilities.

Genevieve Weir, a realtor of 16 years experience, residing in Park-
ville, Missouri, and holding positions of trust in Platte County and
the Missouri Real Estate Associations, testified that there were three
printed forms of real estate sales contracts in general use in Platte
County, which are very similar in content. She identified three of
such forms and stated that the ‘‘Demaree’’ form was most commonly
used in “‘our area’.

| | (The form used in preparing the contract upon which plain-
tiff seeks specific performance is not the ‘‘Demaree’’ form, but is one
used by the Kansas City Real Estate Board.)

William L. Suiter, called as a witness for plaintiff, testified that
within the 30 day period fixed by the option agreement the first of the
proposed contracts was presented to his office and that prior to the *
date it was presented he, or his corporation, acting as agents for
defendant had signed a contract with one Mr. Webb, of the Metro-
politan Savings & Loan Association, for the sale of the farm to him,
for the sum of $42,000, conditioned upon failure of consummation
of the Kalivas option agreement; and that the Webb contract provided
for a payment of only $2,000 upon its execution; which sum is on
deposit with the Suiter Company; that he advised defendant not to
sign the first contract tendered by plaintiff because it was not signed
by plaintiff and no money had been tendered under it; and that the
second contract was left at his office by an attorney for plaintiff, but
defendant had not sought his advice as to whether she should sign it.

Defendant testified: When the option agreement was signed, it
was agreed between her and plaintiff that the entire $40,000 was
to be deposited in escrow with the Suiter Agency. On this occasion,
plaintiff told her he did not have the money and wanted to know if
she would let him build roads and curbing without any money being
paid down. She told him, ‘‘No’’. He later wanted her to let him
build houses on the farm and give her part of the money. Again she
said, ‘‘No’’. Then he asked if she would give him a year’s option if
he put up $5,000, to which she said, ‘‘No’’. He then asked about buy-
ing only ten acres, which she declined to consider.

Defendant further testified: When plaintiff and Mr. Dorsey came
out to diseuss the terms of the contract referred to in the option agree-
ment, Mr. Dorsey and Mrs. Wood did most of the talking. They

|

agreed the contract would provide that defendant would have the
right to connect the five acre tract reserved by her with the utilities,

roads and water. Plaintiff was to pay $40,000 in escrow within 30

days. No money was tendered defendant when the first contract was
proffered to Mr. Suiter and it was not signed by plaintiff. When the
second.contract was brought to her home by plaintiff and Mr. Duffy,
defendant was in the kitchen. She came into the room where they
were. They had placed the contract and $3,800 check on the table
and defendant knew nothing about it until they had left. Her
daughter told her it did not mention the utilities or water, and ‘‘so I
couldn’t sign it’’. She is willing to return the $3,800 and, perhaps,
the $200,

On eross-examination: She never saw printed forms of real estate
contracts, such as those exhibited to her by counsel, before the ‘‘one
they brought’’. She complained to plaintiff several times that the first
contract did not obligate him ‘‘ever [to] build roads or bring water
up there’’. Plaintiff has never asked her to return the $200 or the
$3,800 check, and she has never offered to do so. She at all times
knew about the contract made with Mr. Webb.

Mrs. Olga Bailey corroborated in general the testimony given by
her mother, the defendant, and, in further detail testified: Her
mother told plaintiff that the acreage she was to convey to him would
surround three sides of the five acres reserved by her and that in the
deal to be completed, he must put the utilities and’roads there and
agree that ‘‘we would have a right and a way to get to these roads
and utilities and that we wouldn’t be shut off from them, when it
was platted and divided’’. On August 13th (when the second con-
tract was brought to defendant’s home), Mr. Duffy and plaintiff
handed witness the contract and check, both of which she examined.
After doing so, she said to them, ‘‘There is nothing in the contract
respecting the roads or the utilities’’, to which Mr. Duffy replied,
“That will have to be written in.’’? She told them there was nothing
to sign and returned the check and contract to Mr. Duffy, who, in
turn, delivered them to plaintiff with instructions to lay them upon
the table, which plaintiff did.

[100] On cross-examination, witness said her mother always in-
sisted upon the payment of the entire purchase price within 30 days
and that the purpose of ‘the option agreement was to give him that
much time to raise the money.

Mrs. Ruth Wood testified: Plaintiff asked witness to help him
raise $40,000. She tried to do so, was unsuccessful and so advised
him. Defendant repeatedly told plaintiff he would have to pay the
$40,000 before the expiration date of the option; it was to be placed
in escrow with Suiter. Plaintiff never made any definite reply to
these demands. Defendant also told plaintiff she would require an
easement on the property.so that she would be able to ‘‘tie in to the

property’? he was purchasing and that unless he so agreed, she
would not sell. Plaintiff said ‘‘it was agreeable with him * *’’,

Mr. Duffy testified in rebuttal: He went to defendant’s home on
August 13, 1954, to deliver the second contract and the $3,800. He was
advised by Mrs. Bailey that defendant was not well. He discussed
the contract with Mrs Bailey. Defendant then came into the room
and he again went over it with her. In both instances, there was a
refusal to sign the contract and it was placed on the table.

The trial judge wrote a lengthy ‘‘Memorandum Opinion and
Judgment”’. He found that subsequent to the signing of the option
agreement, to wit, on August 7, 1954, plaintiff met, with defendant
and her agent in defendant’s home and discussed preparation of ‘‘a
standard real estate sales contract’, but that ‘‘no agreement was
reached as to the contents of the sales contract’’; that ‘‘the parties
did discuss the question.of roads and utilities, but the evidence is
unsatisfactory * * *”’, The opinion then sets forth at length quota-
tions from many sources relating to specifie performance and the
discretionary right of the trial court to refuse specific performance
of a valid contract and to award damages in lieu thereof. He found
that the option agreement was ineptly drawn but was sufficient to
meet the demands of the statute of frauds; that ‘‘defendant’s hands
here are not very clean’’, because of the contract she made with
Webb. The opinion then recites, ‘‘I find the issues for the plaintiff’’,
but it makes no finding as to the essential facts in controversy. The
opinion further recites: ‘‘As already indicated, the Plaintiff ought
to prevail, but if Specific Performance were decreed the Court ‘would
have to determine what five acres was excluded and would have to
supervise the survey. In addition, the Plaintiff admitted that if and
when he developed the tract and when the utilities were brought in
and the roads built, these developments would be available to the
defendant.** * * I find that because some of the terms of this
Option Agreement are not clear, specifically the five-acre exclusion,
a Court would be required to supervise this matter for some time in
the future, if Specific Performance were decreed. It is therefore a
proper case on the facts for the Court to deny Specific Performance
and award the Plaintiff a money Judgment for damages which will,
I believe, give prompt and complete equity to both ‘parties.

“Now, the defendant has received $200 from the Plaintiff. I as-
sume that the $3,800 certified check, which was not cashed, is no
longer ecashable. The defendant has already contracted to sell this
property for $42,000, which is $2,000 above the contract price to
Plaintiff. I therefore find for the Plaintiff in the sum of $2,200 and
costs.’? Judgment was rendered accordingly, with a further .ad-
judication voiding the $3,800 check in possession of plaintiff.

Hl In determining the issues in an equitable action for specific
performance, we weigh the evidence and make our own findings,

deferring, however, when we may consistently do so, to the findings
of the chancéllor’ on disputed issues of fact that turn upon the
credibility of witnesses who appeared before him. Glauert v. Huning,
Mo. ‘Sup., 266 S.W. 2d 653; 662. But, as stated, the chancellor’s
memorandum makes no spécifie finding of any completed agreement
reached by the parties. To the contrary, he finds that ‘‘some of the
terms of [101] this option agreement are not clear, specifically the
five-acre exclusion * * *??,

‘We are unable. to attach any significance beneficial to plaintiff
in the phrase in the option agreement relating to a standard con-
tract of sale. As the phrase is used in the agreement, we construe it
to, mean, as did the parties, that a binding and finally enforceable
contract yet remained to be negotiated; and that, if it be not
negotiated and signed within 30 days, the option, by its terms,
became void. The Supreme Court of Illinois considered a somewhat
similar situation in a case wherein the trial court had denied specific
performance. In that case, London v. Doering; 325 Ill. 589, 156 N.E.
793, a preliminary agreement describing properties to be exchanged
and naming the. purchase price, contained the further provision,
loc.cit. 794: ‘Frank Waisman, broker, authorized to bring the two
parties together for signing a regular real estate contract within
three days.’’ In disposing of the appeal, that court affirmed the
action of the trial court, saying, loc.cit. 795: ‘‘It appears to us no
other understanding of the contract can be arrived, at than that the
parties were to come together again for the purposé of making a
definite agreement as to the terms and conditions of the exchange of
properties.’’ To the same effect is Lippman v. Featherston, 247 Mich.
158, 225 NW. 489, wherein the contract provided that the premises
were to be sold under a ‘‘uniform standard land contract governing
the sale of farms’’.

Hi ‘We therefore agree with the decision of the trial court re-
fusing specific performance, but we are convinced that the judgment
must be reversed in its entirety because of our conclusion that no
final, complete, valid and binding agreement whereby defendant was
obligated to consummate the option agreement was ever reached.

A court of equity cannot make a contract for the parties. Terry v.
Michalak, 319 Mo. 290, 3 8.W. 2d 701; P.R.T. Investment Corp. v.
Ranft, 363 Mo. 522, 252 S.W. 2d 315. To make a contract there. must
be a meeting of the minds of the parties. Negotiations, proposals
‘and preliminary steps leading’ up to, but not becoming a part of the
actual final agreement, do not constitute the contract. The proposi-
tion or .propositions suggested by the one must be accepted as
tendered; and if the acceptance omits, enlarges or modifies the terms
of the proposition made, then neither party is bound. Dobbins v. City
Bond & Mortgage Company, 348 Mo. 1001, .124 S.W. 2d 1111, 1115;
Tn re Franz’s Estate, Mo.Sup., 242 8.W. 2d 490, 494.

Despite plaintift’s testimony at the trial that there was no mention
of escrow of the $40,000 purchase price, the record definitely reflects
that defendant was insisting, even prior to the signing of the option
agreement, that the entire purchase price bé assured to her before
she entered into any contract binding her to a sale of her land. And,
although plaintiff testified that at the time he téndered the second
contract on the last day of the option period (August 18, 1954) he had
“‘access’’ to $40,000, he admittedly did not have it when he signed
the option agreement, and, during the attempts to negotiate a com-
pleted contract, he repeatedly importuned defendant to enter into
some sort of a modified agreement that would enable him to’ obtain
title to ‘her land or part of it without paying the ‘entire purchase
price of $40,000. (Such conduct on his part may explain the contract
made by defendant with Webb.) Furthermore, when the parties met
on August 7th and defendant demanded that a ‘‘down payment”’ of
$40,000 be provided ‘for in the contract, plaintiff demurred .and
offered a down payment of $4,000, and there is no evidence that de-
fendant then or thereafter agreed to that proposal, other’than the
testimony of plaintiff that during the negotiations of ‘that date de-
fendant said she was glad he was getting the property. However, it
is worthy of note that the contract tendered defendant as a result
of the August 7th negotiations, at the express direction of plaintiff,
contained no provision for any down payment whatever; clearly
indicating that even plaintiff [102] did not understand that he and
defendant had agreed to a $4,000 down payment. And, when the
second contract finally was tendered, it provided only for a down
payment of $4,000 (including the $200 paid upon execution of the
option) and that the balance of the purchase price was to be paid
upon delivery of the warranty deed, without contractual proffer of
escrow or other assurance whatsoever given defendant that plaintiff
had succeeded in obtaining ‘‘access’’ to $40,000° with which to pay
the purchase price, as defendant had unremittingly demanded he
must make available to her during the option period. We are con-
vinced there was never any meeting of minds .as to the inethod and.
time of payment of the purchase price.

Furthermore, the first’ proposed contract provided that the boundary
lines of the five acre tract were to be determined by defendant and
also gave her the right to connect on to all roads and utilities which
the ‘‘buyer may in the future establish * * *’’, This was not a
compliance with defendant’s demand that plaintiff obligate himself
absolutely to provide such connections (which, of course, would also
require him to proceed with the development project he had described
to defendant when he offered to purchase her farm). The second
proposed contract provided only that the lines of the five acre tract
“will be designated from a survey’. (Query: ‘By whom and at
whose direction and cost would the survey be made?) Neither did

it contain any provision whatever giving defendant access to roads
or utilities, as plaintiff qualifiedly admitted he had agreed to do.
(In this connection, it is of no aid to plaintiff that, at the trial, he
stated his willingness to make available to defendant any roads and
utilities in existence if and when he developed the tract.) Clearly,
there was never any meeting of minds on these matters during the
thirty day period fixed by the option. Obviously, all were matters of
grave significance to defendant. ,

HM Neither can defendant’s rights be denied to her upon any”
theory of ‘‘unclean hands’’. She has not invoked equity. Rather
does she stand, as she has a right to stand, upon the strict terms of
the instrument by which plaintiff seeks to establish her liability.

HH Our conclusion is that the option agreement, in and of itself,
was never an enforeeable agreement and that it became void when
the parties failed to complete a sales contract within 30 days. It
follows that defendant has no right to retain either the $200 or the
$3,800 check delivered her by plaintiff. The judgment is, therefore,
reversed with directions that, upon deposit by defendant of said sum
of $200 and the $3,800 check or the proceeds thereof with the clerk
of the circuit court for delivery to plaintiff within 15 days after
issuance of the mandate herein, this cause be dismissed with preju-
dice to and at the cost of plaintiff; and that defendant failing to
deposit said $200 and said check or its proceeds within the time
aforesaid, judgment for the total of said sums be rendered in favor
of plaintiff against defendant, which shall constitute a lien upon de-
fendant’s said land, for which special execution may issue, together
with all costs of this action. All concur.

Marcus Hears, Fuossm Hearn, Marvin Hears, ANNE CATHERINE
Hearn, Avsorr Furr, d/b/a Hinorssr Drive In, Respond-
cents, v..Momion Prorure Macuinr Oprrators Union No. 170,
1402 Main Street, Kansas City, Missouri, ANruony Bapamt,
President, Gzorar Barrurr, business representative of the above
Union No. 170, and Joun Doz, as individuals and. representatives
of that class of individuals associated together in the above Union,
Appellants, No. 45026—290 S. W. (2d) 152.

Division One, May 14, 1956,
Ee

9835

Bugene A. Farris, Alan F. Wherritt and William J. Turpin for
appellants. ° .

Robert F. Sevier and William E. Turnage for respondents.

[153] COIL, C.—Plaintiffs, who claimed ‘to be the joint owners
and operators of the Hillcrest Drive In Theater, located about a mile
north of Gashland on Missouri Highway 169, opened that theater for
business on June 4 or 5, 1954. Hither on June 4 or 5, 1954, and for
[154] several nights thereafter, members of defendant union, acting
on the order of defendant George Barrett, the union’s business agent,
and with the knowledge and approval of defendant Anthony Badami,
the union’s president, caused the theater to be picketed. Members of
the public arriving at the entrance were informed by signs carried by
the pickets that the theater did not employ union operators affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor, and, perhaps, by a sign
stating that the theater was unfair to organized labor, Motion
Picture Machine Operators Union No. 170.

Plaintiffs successfully prosecuted their action to enjoin that
picketing and defendant union and its president, Anthony Badami,
and its business representative, George Barrett, as individuals and
as representatives of the class consisting of the members of Local
Union No. 170, have appealed. They contended in the trial court
and contend here that prohibition of picketing under the facts and
circumstances in evidence denies to them their constitutional right
of free speech. Under all the circumstances shown in the record, we
are of the opinion that this case involves the construction of the
Constitution of the United States within the meaning of Article V,
Section 3, Missouri Constitution of 1945, and is thus within the
jurisdiction of this court. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199,
1203[1], 159 S.W. 2d 291, 292[1-4].

The evidence showed that the theater was a local enterprise not
engaged in interstate commerce and there was no evidence adduced
which would support a reasonable inference that the controversy
here involved affects interstate commerce to any substantial degree.

| In our view, decisive of our disposition is the fact question
as to what status plaintiff Albert Flippin occupied with respect to the
other plaintiffs and with respect to the conduct of the business known
as the Hillcrest Drive In. We shall, therefore, review in some detail
the evidence pertaining to that question.

Plaintiff Mareus Heath was the owner of the Plaza Theater in
Liberty, Missouri. He there employed plaintiff Albert Flippin as the
operator of the projection machine. Flippin was not and never had
been a member of defendant union or of the international with
which defendant was affiliated. Marcus Heath and his wife Flossie
purchased 83.37 acres of land in April 1953, apparently as a site for
an open-air theater. Thereafter, during the latter part of 1953 and
during 1954, Marcus Heath, with the assistance of his son, Marvin

S

Heath, built the Hillerest. Marvin, according to the testimony, had
put into the equipment and construction of the theater (exclusive
of the ground) $5,000 cash and a year’s uncompensated labor.
Mareus furnished all but $2,000 of the additional capital consumed
in the construction and installation of the theater which, when com-
pleted (including Flippin’s investment to be noted hereafter),
represented a total cost of $100,000, as we understand, exclusive of
the cost of the real estate. In March 1954, Marcus Heath engaged
in a conversation with Flippin in which the subject of the cost of
the Hillerest was discussed. Heath indicated that he had spent more
money than he had anticipated, but expressed the opinion that he had
to proceed to completion. Flippin suggested that he could furnish
$2,000, and Heath indicated that the $2,000 would help in the pay-
ment of some bills. As a result, Heath and Flippin met a short time
later in the ‘‘Sweet Shop’’ operated in connection with the Plaza
Theater, and there Flippin paid to Heath $1,500 in cash and Flippin’s
check dated March 6, 1954, for $500. In the meantime, Heath had
written the following memorandum which was signed by Flippin and
both Marcus and Marvin Heath at or shortly after the time the $2,000
was paid: ‘‘In consideration of $2,000 invested in Hillerest Drive In
but not in the real estate: Albert Flippin will share in 1/50 of the
net profits. M.S. Heath and Marvin Heath shall have the first option
of buying my 1/50 interest at any time after one year for $2000.

“Tf we refuse, Albert Flippin can sell to any person he desires to.’’

.It appears that the entire transaction between Heath and Flippin
consumed a period [155] of 30 to 40 minutes and that Flippin ob-
tained the cash from its location in a watch repair shop which he,
Flippin, operated in Liberty. Marcus Heath testified that he used
the $1,500 cash to pay bills for materials and equipment which went
into the drive-in theater and that the check was deposited in his
account approximately a month after the date the check bore, and that
the $500 obtained from the check was also used for the payment of
bills in connection with the theater.

It was developed on cross-examination that Marcus Heath con-
sidered that, upon the signing of the memorandum, Flippin was a
partner or a co-owner of the business, and that, while Flippin had
“no interest in the real estate, he did have a one-fiftieth interest in the
buildings and other structures. Marvin Heath testified that he was
a partner or co-owner of the theater except as to the real estate.
Flippin testified that he understood he was one of the owners of the
Hillerest but that his sole duty was to run the’ projection machine;
that he further understood that he, Mareus, and Marvin were the
co-owners; and that while the profits from the snack bar probably
were included by the terms of the memorandum, he did not claim an
interest in the profits from that operation. He also said he was to
get $80 per week for running the projection machine in addition to

his one-fiftieth interest in the profits; that he had not received the
$80 per week to the time of trial; that he was to get the $80 only if
the business made it; and that the only money he had received was
$100 which he had to have.

It further appeared that a bank account was maintained under the
name of Hillcrest Drive In Theater and a separate account undér the
name of Hillcrest Snack Bar; that each of the three men could write
checks on the Hillerest Drive In account; that the insurance policies
on the theater were in the names of the five plaintiffs and that the
account which was kept for the purpose of determining the excise ‘tax
due the United States was in the name of the five plaintiffs; and that
no persons were listed as employees. It also appeared that the wives
of the two Heaths claimed no interest in the proceeds of the theater
operation.

The evidence further showed that it was not until May 1954 that
defendant Barrett, on behalf of Local 170, talked with Heath or any-
‘one connected with the Hillcrest operation, and it thus would appear
that the transaction between the Heaths and Flippin was completed
two months prior to any conversation of the present plaintiffs with
any representative of defendant union. The evidence clearly es-
tablished the fact that both Marvin Heath and Albert Flippin recog-
nized that Marcus Heath was the ‘‘boss’’ in determining the policies
and in carrying out the details of the theater’s operation.

The trial court found as facts that the five plaintiffs were the
owners of the theater and that plaintiff Albert Flippin was the
operater of the projection machine. Defendants contend that the
finding of the court below that Albert Flippin was a co-owner is
against the weight of the eredible evidence. They say that there was
no legitimate partnership among the five plaintiffs, that the terms
of the memorandum executed indicated that Flippin’s participation
in the project could be limited to one year, that such fact plis the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement and the
payment of the money indicates that the arrangement was a fictitious
one for the express purpose of permitting, in the event of any dis-
pute with a labor union, the claim that Albert Flippin was a c6-
owner.

It is true, as defendants contend, that the exact relationship
among the five plaintiffs was to a large extent a vague and indefinite
one and perhaps so vague and indefinite as to defy a declaration of
the legal relationship created in so far as concerned many questions
which migbt arise as among the parties. It would appear, however,
that the sole question we need to determine is whether by virtue of
the executed memorandum and the understanding of the parties,
Flippin was in the position (in so far as concerned defendant union)
of a co-owner [156] or coproprietor of a business who was engaged
in the self-operation of one of the tasks connected with the operation

of that business. If we assume, for the present, that the testimony
pertaining to Flippin’s status and the manner of its acquisition is
true, then we are of the opinion that Flippin occupied a position
which, for instant purposes, placed him in the same category as a
bona fide partner who was entitled to the same immunity, if any,
accorded to a one-man business in which the businessman-proprietor
performed all of his work without the assistance of employees.

. The question of whether the testimony pertaining to the circum-
stances of the creation of Flippin’s status is to be accepted as true
depends entirely on the credibility of the witnesses who appeared in
the trial court. We have noted the sequence of events shown in
evidence, the testimony that Flippin obtained $1,500 in cash which
he had on hand at his watch repair shop and gave it to Mareus
Heath, the testimony that Flippin’s $500 check was held for a month
before its deposit, the rather casual manner in which this one-fiftieth
interest in a $100,000 enterprise was acquired by Flippin, the prior
relationship of employer and employee between Marcus Heath and
Flippin, the lack of a definite understanding among the parties with
respect to many aspects of the conduct of the theater, and other cir-
cumstances shown by direct and cross-examination of plaintiffs. All
of those matters tend to create a doubt in the mind of one reviewing
this cold record.as to whether the arrangement between Flippin and
the other plaintiffs was a legitimate, bona fide one. That is to say,
-whether Flippin was in fact a co-owner and co-operator of the
theater or whether the entire arrangement was a fictitious scheme,
studiously entered into for the purpose of avoiding the employer-em-
ployee relationship between the Heaths and Flippin with its attendant
responsibilities and obligations. As we have noted, however, that
doubt must be resolved, as we see it, by a determination. of the
credibility, of the witnesses who testified on the subject. If their
testimony was credible, then it is apparent that it furnished a sub-
stantial basis for the conclusion that Flippin in good faith purchased
and became the owner of a one-fiftieth interest in the theater long
before any controversy with a labor union appeared or was in pros-
pect, and that the arrangement was entered into without contempla-
tion of the instant or any other subsequent controversy with represent-
atives of labor, and was not the result of a studied attempt to avoid
the responsibilities and obligations of an employer-employee relation-
ship. The findings in those respects, as we have said, depended upon
the credibility of witnesses who appeared before the trial chancellor ;
we should, therefore, and we do defer to the trial chancellor’s findings
of fact as to the status of Flippin. State ex rel. Taylor v. Anderson,
363 Mo. 884, 893, 254 S.W. 2d 609, 615[7-10]. So deferring, we hold
that plaintiff Albert Flippin was a bona fide co-owner of the Hill-
crest. Drive In. It follows that when Flippin operated the projection
machine at the theater he occupied the status, for present purposes,

of-a bona fide partrier of Marcus and Marvin Heath in the business
enterprise. ©

We find from al the evidence in the record that the instant
picketing was peaceful; that it was conducted by only two persons at
any one time ; that there was no misconduct on the part of the individ-
ual pickets; that the message communicated by the signs was, from”
the standpoint of the pickets, truthful; and that there was no act of
violence or intimidation’ on the part ‘of any picket. The evidence

* further shows that the avowed objective of the picketing was to make
. known to those persons of the public who were prospective patrons
that a union projectionist was not employed and to thereby attempt
to induce the employment of a union projectionist. As we shall point
out, that objective was in reality, under instant facts, to induce the co-
owner of the theater not to operate the projection machine but to cease
such self-operation and hire a union member in his place and stead: ©

| | The rules of defendant union, while not specifically excluding
an owner-operator from membership, did exclude an owner-operator
[157] from effective membership in that an owner-operator had no
voice or vote in such union. And, we find that the most reasonable
inference from the testimony of the business agent and other union
members who testified was that an owner-operator would not be
admitted as a member of defendant Local 170 if he occupied’ an
owner’s status at the time he initially applied. It would appear that
if one were a picture machine operator and a member of defendant
union and thereafter became a theater owner and continued to
operate a projection machine, he probably would be permitted to con-
tinue a nominal membership in the union without voice ‘or vote
therein; but, as stated, one’ would not be admitted to the union for
the first time in the status of an owner-operator. Consequently, it is
fair to say that Flippin, being an owner-operator (as we have deter-
mined he was) and not having priorly belonged to defendant union,
was ineligible for membership therein.

It was the policy of defendant union to oppose the practice
of a theater owner operating his own projection machine and to use’
all lawful methods to prevent that practice. We are not concerned
with’ the reasons for that policy except as they may affect the question *
of whether the effectuation of it was a legitimate labor objective. We
may note, however, that the union’s idea was that, but for the policy,
fictitious and sham co-ownerships would be created and that, in any
event, a theater owner’s legitimate function could not be properly
exercised in a projection booth; that an owner should be so located
as to be able to properly perform his administrative and, good-will’
functions. .

Under the instant facts, then, we need determine only this narrow
question: Should members of defendant labor union be permitted to
picket the theater when the avowed ptirpose of the picketing is to in-"

duce the owner-projectionist to cease and desist from operating his
own projection machine and to hire a union member to replace him?
Hl Picketing is a form of communication, but it ‘cannot dog-
matically be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom
of speech.’’ Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474. A picket
line by its very nature exerts ‘‘influences, and it produces conse-
quences, different from other modes of communication. The loyalties
and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those
flowing from appeals by printed word.”’ Hughes v. Superior Court of
California, 339 U.S. 460, 465. Picketing, even though properly con-
ducted in all respects, may be enjoined if its objective is unlawful
as, violative of the public policy of a state, either legislatively or
judicially declared. And the enjoining of unlawful-objective picket-
ing does not constitute a denial of the constitutional guaranty of free
speech. Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490; Hughes
y. Superior Court, supra, 339 U.S. 466, 467. But a state may ‘‘not
proseribe picketing merely by setting artificial bounds, unreal in the
light of modern circumstances, to what constitutes an industrial re-
lationship or a labor dispute’’, Teamsters Union v. Hanke, supra,
389.U.S. 479, 480, or prohibit picketing when there is no reasonable
justification for the breadth of the restriction, American Federation
of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321.
Did the avowed objective of the instant picketing violate the
policy of this state and thereby make the objective an unlawful one?
The Fourteenth Amendment has been construed as including within
the fundamental rights conferred by it an individual’s right to earn
a livelihood at any common occupation. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
41. Labor union members have, under the constitutionally protected
freedom of speech, the right to lawfully communicate the facts to the
publie concerning the conduct of another’s business. So that it is not
a conclusive answer to the instant question to-say [158] that the fact
that the picketing in the instant case (through which members of
the public were informed that a union operator was not employed
at the Hillcrest) was unlawful solely because it might affect adversely
or even destroy one’s constitutional right to earn a living with his
own hands. That is because the basic right to work as one chooses
may coexist with the right of others to communicate the facts con-
cerning how one is exercising his right to work as he chooses. There
is no longer any doubt that a state may permit picketing with the
same objective as that of the picketing in the instant case without
denying a proprietor-worker any right, guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Senn vy. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468. But on the
other hand, the Fourteenth Amendment does not ‘‘prevent a State-
from denying the.means of communication that picketing affords
in a fair balance between the interests of trade unionism and other
interests of the community.’’ Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,

580 (concurring opinion); Teamsters Union v. Hanke, supra, 339
US. 478, 479. .
Thus, to determine whether the objective of the instant picketing
was lawful or unlawful, it is necessary to balance the right of a union
and its members to improve their economic position through the form .
of communication known as ‘‘picketing’’ against the constitutional
right of an owner to perform work with his own hands to his own
best advantage in the conduct of his own business. That problem was
discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Teamsters Union v.
Hanke, supra, 339 U.S. 475-476, where the court said in part: ‘“‘Here
we have a glaring instance of the interplay of competing social-
economic interests and viewpoints. Unions obviously are concerned
not to have union standards undermined by non-union shops. This
interest penetrates into self-employer shops. On the other hand, some
of our profoundest thinkers from Jefferson to Brandeis have stressed
the importance to a democratic society of encouraging self-employer
economie units as a counter-movement to what are deemed to be
the dangers inherent in excessive concentration of economic power.”

‘There is a widespread belief. . . that the true prosperity of our
past came not from big business, but through the courage, the energy
and the resourcefulness of small men . . . and that only through

participation by the many in the responsibilities and determinations
of business, can Americans secure the moral and intellectual develop-
ment which is essential to the maintenance of liberty.’ Mr. Justice
Brandeis, dissenting in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 580.

‘Whether to prefer the union or a self-employer in such a situation,
or to seek partial recognition of both interests, and, if so, by what!
means to secure such accommodation, obviously presents to a State
serious problems. There are. no sure answers, and the best available
solution is likely to be experimental and tentative, and always sub-
ject to the control of the popular will.’”’

There is no unanimity of opinion on the question posed. See An-
notations, 2 A. L. R. 2d 1196 and 13 A. L. R. 2d 642, where cases re-
flecting the views of the courts of the various states are collected_on
questions like and similar to that involved in the instant case. 7

After careful consideration, we are of the view that striking a
balance between ‘‘the constitutional protection of the element of
communication in picketing and ‘the power of the State to set: the
limits of permissible conduct open to industrial combatants’ ”’ r
quires the conclusion that the picketing in the instant case is not per-
missible conduct on the part of the members of defendant union. That.
conelusion results from a consideration of various relevant. matters.
We have taken, into account the apparent relatively slight improve-
ment in the union members’ economic positions to be accomplished by
picketing under the factual situation in the instant case, the element
of unfairness inherent in the proposition that the union’s policy may

not be satisfied by [159] the owner-operator joining the union, the
importance to our economy of encouraging the self-employer—the
one-man business; and, most important, the fact that in many readily
apparent situations the effect of picketing, under facts like the instant
ones, may be the total elimination of the businessman-worker by rea-
son of the fact that to replace himself as a worker may ‘make the
continuation of his business economically impossible. We are of the
opinion, therefore, that it is against the public policy of this state to
permit the picketing under the instant facts.

Plaintiffs rely upon Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Machine
Operators, 282 Mo. 304, 221 S. W. 95. That case involved the same
fundamental question as here on almost identical facts. In Hughes,
a moving-picture projection machine was operated by one who claimed
to be a theater owner. Picketing of that theater was by members of the
same local union which is here involved. In a 4-to-3 decision, the
court'en bane reversed the lower court (which had dissolved a tem-
porary restraining order) and ordered a permanent injunction entered
enjoining the picketing. While we have not relied on the Hughes case
as a decisive precedent in our disposition of the instant case, we have
considered the result there reached and the views there expressed in
determining what is or should be the policy of this state with respect
to picketing under the circumstances there and here existing. We
think the result in Hughes was correct on the facts as the majority
opinion determined them to be, but as a careful reading of the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Hughes will demonstrate,
there is language employed which makes it uncertain upon what
principle or principles the majority opinion proceeded to its correct
result.

Hl Point IIi in defendant’s brief is: “The judgment in this case
cannot include all of the members of the Union as a class because
plaintiffs did not offer evidence to comply with Supreme Court Rule
No. 807A.’’ It is true, as defendants contend, that plaintiffs did not
comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 3.07(a) in that
they did not specifically aver facts which showed that the alleged
class representatives (or any other named defendant) had been fairly
chosen and adequately and fairly represented the whole class (mem-
bers of the union), nor did plaintiffs prove such by means other than
the admissions of the defendants who were served. In our view, how-
ever, we need not determine that contention because, although plain-
tiffs alleged that defendant Motion Picture Machine Operators Union
170 was ‘‘a voluntary organization,’’ defendant union (and no other
defendant) raised ‘‘by specific negative averment’’ the issue of the
eapacity of defendant union to be sued as it was required to do by
Section 509.140, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. Thus the judgment against
the union bound its members and consequently the union members
were properly within the prohibition of the injunction.

HI The judgment entered prohibited picketing so long as the
plaintiffs operated the theater as co-owners. The judgment should
be modified to prohibit picketing so long as a bona fide owner or co-
owner of the theater operates the projection machine at such theater.

The case is remanded with directions to modify the judgment and
decree in accord with the views above expressed and, as so modified,
the judgment is affirmed. Van Osdol, C., concurs in result; Holman,
C., concurs.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Com C., is adopted as
the opinion of the court. All concur except Westhues, J., who concurs
in the result and adopts the opinion of Van Osdol, C., as his separate
concurring opinion.

Msmoranpum on Concurrence iv Rusuur

Hi VAN OSDOL, C.—The well-written opinion of Judge Coil rules
that picketing under the facts of the instant case is against the public
policy of this state. See bottom page 10 and top of page 11. The re-
sult is reached by striking a balance between the constitutional pro-
tection of the [160] element of free speech involved in picketing and
“the power of the State to set the limits of permissible conduct open
to industrial combatants.’’ Page 10. The various relevant matters
which are specifically considered in arriving at the result include
the ‘‘element of unfairness inherent in the proposition that the
union’s policy may not be satisfied by the owner-operator joining’ the
union.’’? Page 10. This element or ‘‘relevant matter,’’ as I under-
stand it, relates to the evidence and inferences recited and deduced in
the first complete paragraph on page 7.

In studying the entire opinion I believe that Judge Coil would have
dissolved the injunction had the owner-operator been eligible to join
the union and by so joining he could have continued to operate his
own projection machine. But I am not ready to agree that (in deter-
mining what is the public policy of this state in a factual situation
otherwise like that in this case) the fact that an owner-operator may
or may not join the picketing union (whatever may be the union’s
policy with respect to permitting an owner-operator union member
to operate his own projection machine) is a decisive or even a relevant
matter. So I concur in the result only.

Anne C. Brown, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of
Roszrr L. Brown, Deceased, Appellant, v. M. E. Morris, Direc-
tor of Revenue, State of Missouri, and Auperr S. ArENson,
Collector of Revenue, Division of Collection, Department of
Revenue, State of Missouri, Respondents, No. 45349—290 8S. W.
(2d) 160.

Court en Bane, May 14, 1956.

|

Robert L. Brown and John B. Sharpe for appellant..

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Robert R.. Welborn, Assist-
ant Attorney General, for respondents.

[162] STORCKMAN, J—This declaratory: judgment action at-
tacks the constitutionality of the Missouri cigarette tax law which
was approved by the voters at an election held on October 4, 1955,
pursuant to a referendum ordered by the general assembly. The act
imposes a tax for public school purposes at the rate of oné mill per
cigarette upon the sale of cigarettes in the State of Missouri. Chapter
149, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. The plaintiffs appealed, from an adverse
judgment.

The plaintiffs, a husband and wife co- partnership, were engaged
in the selling of cigarettes at wholesale and retail in the City of St.
Louis. The plaintiff Robert L. Brown died after the appeal was
taken and his right of action has been revived, so that Anne C. Brown
individually and as administratrix of the estate of Robert L. Brown,
deceased, is now the appellant. The defendants, being the director of

revenue and the collector of revenue, respectively, were sued in their
capacities as state officers and are the respondents on this appeal.

The relief requested in plaintifi’s amended petition is that the
cigarette tax law be declared unconstitutional, void and of no effect

. on the ground that the legislative bill was not signed by the speaker
of the house of representatives in accordance with the provisions of
§ 30 of Art. III of the 1945 Constitution* and on the further ground
that the original legislative bill ‘‘became lost’? and an authenticated
and certified copy of the bill in lieu of the original was’ passed by the
general assembly. The appellant states the question involved on
appeal is ‘‘whether or not the signing of a legislative, bill by the pre-
siding officers of each of the houses of the general assembly is manda-
tory before the bill shall become a law.’’

[163] The cigarette tax law had its genesis in Senate Bill No. 351
which was introduced in the senate of the 68th Missouri General As-
sembly on April 5, 1955. One’ section of the bill provided for its sub-
mission to the qualified voters of the state for their approval or dis-
approval at a special referendum election ordered to be held on October
4, 1955. The bill was read for the third time and passed by the senate
on May 9, 1955: The bill was.then transmitted to the house of represen-
tatives where the events occurred that give rise to this litigation. .

There was a House Committee on Taxation and Revenue, the. func-
tion of which was ‘‘to consider and report on all, bills pertaining to
the administration of taxation and revenue laws.’’ However, Senate
Bill No. 851, after being read twice, was referred. by the speaker of
the house to the House Committee on Governmental Organization and
Related Matters. The purpose of this committee, as shown by the
rules of the house, was to ‘‘consider and report upon all matters relat-
ing to the reorganization, consolidation and abolition of boards, bu-
reaus, commissions and all other. offices and departments of state,
county and township governments; public buildings of the state in-
cluding the Division of Public Buildings and the capitol grounds;
and state libraries and the legislative library.’’

The speaker delivered possession of the original bill to the committee
chairman, Joseph Tanner, representative of the second district of
Jackson County. Mr. Tanner testified that he left Jefferson City on
the evening of May 11, after receiving the bill, and that he did not

1All constitutional references will be to the 1945 Constitution of Missouri
unless otherwise noted. The entire text of Section 30 is: “No bill shall be-
come a law until it is signed by the presiding officer of each house in open
session, who first shall suspend all other business, declare that the bill shall
now be read and that if no objection be made he will sign the same. If in
either house any member shall object in writing to the signing of a bill, the
objection shall be noted in the journal and annexed to the bill to be con-
sidered by the governor in connection therewith. When a bill has been
signed, the secretary, or the chief clerk, of the house in which the bill
originated shall present the bill in person 'to the governor on the same day
on which it was signed and enter the fact upon the journal.”

return until the morning of May 80, which was the day before the
general assembly was required to adjourn by virtue of constitutional
provision. The chairman had set hearings on the bill for May 24 and
May 30, but no committee hearings were held and thete was no com-
mittee action.

On May 18 the house of representatives by a vote of 79 to 33 re-
lieved the committee of further consideration of Senate Bill No. 351
and placed it at the top of the house calendar entitled ‘‘Senate Bills
for Third Reading.’’ The original of the bill could not be found and
an authenticated copy was used in its stead. On May 19 Senate Bill
No. 351, as amended, was read for the third time and passed. The
house journal shows ‘‘The speaker declared the bill passed.’’ :

On May 24 the bill was returned to the senate with a request for
concurrence in House Amendment No. 1. After once refusing to do
so, the senate concurred on May 31, the last day of the session. The
Senate Committee on Bills Truly Agreed To and Finally Passed
thereafter reported that the bill had been duly enrolled and correctly
printed. The bill was signed by the president of the senate and trans-
mitted to the house.

The speaker of the house refused to affix his name in the blank pro-
vided for such purpose on the enrolled copy of the bill, but did attach
to said bill a statement which he signed, ‘‘Roy Hamlin, Speaker of
the House,’’ reading as follows: ©

“‘T have returned the attached purported Senate Bill No. 351
unsigned for the reason that Senate Bill No. 851 as passed by the

Senate and sent to the House has not been read in the House on

three successive days as required by Section 21, Article III of the

Constitution. Same was read the second time, assigned to the

Committee on Governmental Organization and Related Matters

and said bill is still in the possession of the Chairman of said Com- .

mittee, and has not at any time been passed by the House of Repre-

sentatives as required by the above section of the constitution.’

The original enrolled bill and the original perfected copy of Senate
Bill No. 351 were delivered to the office of the secretary of state. The
attorney general furnished the secretary of state with a ballot title
which he certified to the county clerks and the election’ commissioners.
Publication of the notice of the special election which included a
complete copy of the bill was made in 212 newspapers in the state.
Proof of such [164] publication was received by the secretary of state
and introduced in evidence.

At the referendum election held on October 4, 1955, 230,851 votes
were cast in favor of the measure and 95,717 were cast against it.
This result was certified by the secretary of state to the governor and
on October 26, 1955, the governor issued his proclamation declaring
the measure approved upon the referendum.

No legal action was taken prior to the election, but this action for’ a
declaratory judgment was filed on October 8, 1955.

_ The speaker of the house and the committee chairman both testified
at the trial of this case. The speaker testified that he did not see the
pill from the time he delivered it to Chairman Tanner on May 11 until
the morning of June 1, which was the day after the legislature ad-
journed. In the meantime he had talked on the telephone with Chair-
man Tanner who was in the State of Kansas and had been told that
the original bill was in the chairman’s possession in Jefferson City.
However, a search of the chairman’s office failed to reveal the bill.

"Chairman Tanner testified that when he left Jefferson City on May

“ 11 he locked the original bill in a filing cabinet; that he received in-
quiries as to the whereabouts of the bill when he was in the State of
Kansas, and that he returned to Jefferson City on May 30 but that he
did not remove the bill from his office until June 1 when he delivered
it to the chief clerk’s office. ~

The committee chairman and the speaker of the house were
doubtless under the misapprehension that no action could be taken
on the pending’ bill because of the failure of the committee to hold
its hearings and to report on the bill. Sec. 27, Art. IV of the 1875
Constitution did provide that ‘‘no bill shall be considered for final
passage unless the same has been reported on by a committee.’’? How-
ever, this provision has been eliminated entirely and § 22 of Art. IIT
now provides that ‘‘one-third of the elected members of the respective
houses shall have power to relieve a committee of further consideration
of a bill and place it on the calendar for consideration.’’? By this
authority the house relieved the committee but the chairman and the
house speaker evidently continued under the misguided notion that
the house could not proceed without the original bill. This means of
plocking legislation, commonly known as ‘“‘sitting on the bill,” is the
very practice these constitutional changes were designed to prevent.
In the face of the chairman’s, perverseness in retaining the original
bill, the house was justified in proceeding with an authenticated copy.
No question was raised as to its correctness.

Hl It is generally recognized that the purpose of requiring legis-
lative enactments to be signed by the presiding officers is to provide
a “mode of authentication’’ evidencing the fact that a particular bill
has been passed in due form by the legislative body involved. Field
y. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671, 12 8.Ct. 495, 36 L. Hd. 294. The appellant
does not deny that the bill in question passed both houses of the
general assembly, but only contends that the speaker of the house did
not sign the bill and that signing by him was a mandatory prerequisite
of the bill’s validity.

As a general rule, after a legislative measure has been passed by the
general assembly, approved by the voters on referendum and pro-
claimed by the governor to be in full force and effect as a law of the
State of Missouri, the courts will not hold such act invalid because
of procedural errors or defects occurring during the course of its

adoption. Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W.2d 657, 663; State
vy. Burns, 351 Mo. 163, 172 S.W.2d 259, 265; § § 31, 52(b), Art. III,
1945 Constitution of Missouri. In the Moore case, the secretary of
state was enjoined from printing a proposed constitutional amendment
on the ballot because the proposed amendment contained more than
one article. The court held the defect complained of was one of
procedure which could not be attacked after approval of the measure
referred, stating, 165 S.W.2d Le. 663: [165] ‘We therefore hold said
requirements of Secs. 12287 and 12289 are not substantive, and that
an amendment cannot be held void after adoption because such re-
quirements were disregarded.’’ State v. Burns, a prosecution for
signing a spurious name to an initiative petition, approved the hold-
ing in the Moore case, and further stated, 172 S.W.2d le. 265:
‘# * ® if the petition were not challenged on that ground and were
submitted to vote and adopted, the amendment would be valid (as re-
gards that point) notwithstanding the legal insufficiency of the peti-
tion.’”

Cases from other states so holding are: Hernandez v. Frohmiller,
68 Ariz. 242, 204 P. 24 854, wherein the court held that the civil
service act was not unconstitutional because the secretary of state,
in certifying the same to the board of supervisors, abbreviated the
title, stating, 204 P. 2d le. 865: ‘We do not condone but rather con-
demn the failure of the seeretary of state to follow strictly the con-
stitutionally prescribed procedure herein; but after a statute has
been passed by a vote of the people and promulgated as the law, this
court’s sphere of inquiry is and should be whether the law itself in
its final form is constitutional ag to its provisions, and not whether
there was a ‘constitutional defect in the proceedings leading to its
final passage. * * * There was a time to raise procedural questions,
but it was before the votes were cast and not after the law had been
proclaimed to be the law of the state.’’ State ex rel. Graham v. Board
of Examiners, 125 Mont. 419, 239 P. 2d 283, being an action attacking
a measure submitted and adopted at an initiative election on the
ground that the petitions were insufficient in form and lacked sufficient
signatures. The court held that these procedural questions could not
be raised after the election approving the measure, stating, 239 P. 2d
Le. 289: ‘But after the people have voted on the measure and a great
majority of the voters throughout the state have expressed their ap-
proval, the courts presume that the public interest was there and
technical objections to the petition or its sufficiency are disregarded.’’
The opinion in this case collects and discusses a number of other simi-
lar decisions.

Our next inquiry, then, is to determine whether signing of
bills by the presiding officer, as provided in § 80, is a substantive and
mandatory part of legislative proceedings, as contended by the appel-
lant, or whether the lack of such authentication is directory only and

ws a

a procedural defect that is cured by approval of the act on referendum,

The language of § 30, standing alone, gives plausibility to appel-
lant’s argument. She also cites the cases of State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266, and State ex rel. Schmoll v. Drabelle,
261 Mo. 515, 170 8. W. 465, in support of ler contention. The Mead
case dealt with § 37 of Art. LV of the Constitution of 1875 and pur-
ported to hold that the requirement that ‘‘No bill shall become a law
until the same shall have been signed”’ by the presiding officers of the
two houses was mandatory and that the other provisions of the section
were directory only. The Drabelle case repeated and approved what
was said in the Mead case. However, neither of these cases involved
a situation in which the presiding officer of either of the houses of the
Missouri General Assembly had failed to sign a bill and therefore
what they said on that precise question is dictum.

Appellant also cites cases from other states and the annotation in
95 A.L.R. 278 on the effect of the failure of officers of the legislature
to sign bills as required by constitutional provision. Extended discus-
sion of these cited cases is unnecessary, however, because of material
changes made by the 1945 Constitution in the legislative article. Old
§ 88, Art. IV, provided that ‘‘When the bill has been signed [by the
presiding officers], as provided for in the preceding section”’ it shall
be presented to the governor and if approved by him it ‘‘shall become
alaw.’’ The revised section, now § 31, Art. III, provides: ‘‘AIl bills
and joint resolutions passed by both houses’’ shall be presented to the
governor and when approved by him ‘‘shall become a law.’’ (Emphasis
ours.) It will be noted that the [166] language ‘“‘passed by both
houses’? has been substituted for ‘“‘when the bill has been signed’’ as
a prerequisite for presentation of the bill to the governor for his con-
sideration. For convenient reference the old and new sections are set
out below?

Thus it affirmatively appears from § 31 of Art. III of the present
constitution that passage of a bill by the general assembly plus its
approval by the governor produces a validly enacted law. The con-

2Gonst. 1875, § 88, Art, IV: “When the bill has been signed, as provided
for in the preceding section, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the
Senate, if the bill originated in the Senate, and of the Chief Clerk of the
House of Representatives, if the bill originated in the House, to present the
same in person, on the same day on which it was signed as aforesaid, to
the Governor, and enter the fact upon the journal. Every bill presented
to the Governor, and returned within ten days to the House in which the
same originated, with the approval of the Governor, shall become a law
unless it be in violation of some provision of this Constitution.”

Const, 1945, § 31, Art, III: “All bills and joint resolutions passed by
both houses shall be presented to and considered by the governor, and
within fifteen days after presentation he shall return them to the house
of their origin endorsed with his approval or accompanied by his objections.
If the bill be approved by the governor it shall become a law. When the
general assembly adjourns, or recesses for a period of thirty days or more,
the governor may return within forty-five days any bill or resolution to the
office of the secretary of state with his approval or reasons for disapproval.”

stitution, Art. ITI, expressly provides substitutes for the governor’s
approval, such as passage by the general assembly over the governor’s
veto, § 82, failure of the governor to return a bill presented to him,
§ 33, or approval by the people on referendum, § 52(b), and still the
measure will ‘‘become a law.’? However, the constitution provides
no alternative for passage by the general assembly. What constitutes
final passage of a bill is defined by § 27 as follows: ‘‘* * *, nor shall
a bill be finally passed, unless a vote by yeas and nays be taken and a
majority of the members elected to each house be recorded as voting
favorably.’’, It will be noticed that this definition of passage does not
include signing by the presiding officers.

‘We should undertake to harmonize and give effect to all constitu-
tional provisions, but in doing so we cannot read into § 31 the re-
quirement of § 30 that the bill be signed by the presiding officer
because in so doing we would be restoring to the section a provision
which was specifically elininated when the new constitution was
adopted. The change is substantial and significant and the new
language must be given its plain, ordinary and usual sense unless the
context suggests otherwise. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Orear, 277
Mo. 308, 210 8.W. 392, 394 [2].

Furthermore, such interpretation would tend to restrict the legisla-
tive power and "would impose a greater limitation upon the legislative
department than § 31 provides. A constitutional provision limiting or
restricting legislative power is strictly construed so as to favor the
power of the legislature and not to extend the limitation beyond its
terms. State ex rel. Hussmann Refrig. & Supply Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 319 Mo. 497, 5 S.W.2d 1080; State ex rel. United Rys. Co. of
St. Louis v. Public Service Commission of Mo., 270 Mo. 429, 192 S.W.
958; State v. Wilson, 265 Mo. 1, 175 S.W. 603. The rule that the ex-
press mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another would
also weigh against the inclusion of the. additional restriction since,
where special powers are expressly conferred or special methods are
expressly prescribed for the exercise of power, other powers and
procedures are excluded. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 341 Mo, 62, 73, 106 $.W. 2d 435, 439 [7]. .
Section 31 clearly provides that’ constitutional requirements for
action by the legislative body have been met when a bill has ‘‘passed
both houses’”’ of the general assembly. The bill is then ready for
consideration by the executive.or the voters [167] on referendum.
Section 31 is a complete formula and its provision that a bill shall
become a law when its terms are satisfied is positive and mandatory.
If § 80 is construed to mean that signing by the presiding officer is
also mandatory and the sine qua non of a valid bill, then a conflict
with § 31 would exist. -

Rules of construction which are helpful in this regard are found
in the case of Kane y. Kansas City F. S. & M. Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 34, 39,

20 S.W. 582, 583, wherein it is stated: ‘It is a recognized rule of
rational interpretation of laws that, where two interfere in their
application to particular facts, we should follow that which is recom-
mended by the most beneficial reasons. * * * It is proper to inquire
into the consequences of any proposed interpretation of a law in de-
termining what’ was the probable intention in its enactment. * * *
That the letter of a statute must occasionally be cut down to conform
to its evident spirit and intent is a maxim of interpretation which is
not new in Missouri.’’ These holdings of’ the Kane case have been
approved in these more recent cases, among others: Bragg City
Special Road Dist. v. Johnson, 323 Mo. 990, 20 S.W.2d 22, 25; City
of St. Louis v. Christian Bros. College, 257 Mo. 541, 165 S.W. 1057,
1059; McGill v. City of St. Joseph, 225 Mo.App. 1033, 38 S.W.2d 725,
727; St. Louis County v. Marvin Planing Mill Co., 228 Mo.App.
1048, 58 S.W.2d 769, 770. Constitutional provisions are subject to
the same rules of construction as statutes except that consideration
should be given to the broader purposes and scope of constitutional
provisions. State on inf. of Dalton v. Dearing, 364 Mo. 475, 263
§.W.2d 881, 386 [3].

We must also keep in mind that where a statute is attacked as
unconstitutional it will be sustained if there is any reasonable theory
upon which it may be upheld and it will not be held unconstitutional
unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional
provision. State on inf. of Dalton v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 365 Mo. 1, 275 S. W. 2d 225, 234 [23]; Hickey v. Board of
Education of City of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 1039, 256 S.W.2d 775, 778
(11].

Due regard for a coordinate branch of the government would like-
wise require that any doubt as to the power of the legislature be re-
solved in favor of the general assembly and against nullifying or re-
stricting its power of operation. Bohrer v. Toberman, 360 Mo. 244,
227 S.W.2d 719, 723-24 [6, 7].

If the failure of the speaker of the house to sign invalidates this
otherwise duly enacted law, then such presiding officer would be more
powerful than the governor whose right of veto does not extend to
measures referred to the people. Sec. 52(b), Art. III. The general
assembly may pass a bill over the governor’s veto, but, if the appel-
lant’s contention is correct, the particular house would be helpless if
its own presiding officer by ‘tailing to sign in effect vetoed a bill finally
passed,

Section 31 makes it clear that the indispensable step is final passage
and it follows that if a bill, otherwise duly enacted as a law, is not

. attested by the presiding officer, other proof that it has ‘‘passed both
houses’? will satisfy the constitutional requirement. Sutherland
Statutory Construction, 8rd Ed., Vol. I, p. 221, § 1804, advances this
reasoning’ as to the function and necessity of the signature of the pre-

siding officer: ‘‘In sum the signature of the presiding officer is only a
certificate to the governor that the bill has passed the requisite num-
ber of readings and has been adopted by a constitutional, majority of
the house over which he presides. If this information is available to
the governor and to the courts by journals which are recognized ad-
missible in evidence, the procedural protections set by the constitution
have been complied ‘with, and the bill should be enforceable as a prop-
erly enacted statute.’’

In Missouri, legislative journals are not only admissible in evidence
but the courts may judicially notice the history of legislation as re-
flected by the record [168] thereof in the legislative journals. State
ex rel. Karbe v. Bader, 336 Mo. 259, 78 S.W.2d 835. It is quite ap-
parent that neither the governor nor the courts are dependent upon
the certificate of the presiding officer. They may determine from the
legislative journals whether a bill has ‘‘passed both houses.’’ Thus we
can notice that Senate Bill No. 351 was read for the third time and
passed in the house of representatives on May 19, 1955, by a vote of
80 ayes to 12 noes, and that such vote was the requisite constitutional
majority for final passage. State ex rel. McCaffery v. Mason, 155 Mo
486, 55 S.W. 636, 641; § 27, Art. ITI, 1945 Const. of Mo.

We hold that the provisions of § 30 that no bill shall become a law
until it is signed by the presiding officers of both houses, under the
facts of this case, is directory only and the failure of the speaker of
the house to sign Senate Bill No. 351 is a procedural defect or error
which has been cured by the approval of the voters on referendum.
This is ‘‘the evident spirit and intent’’ of the pertinent constitutional
provisions. The holding conforms to the rules of law and standard of
construction noted. 82 O.J.8. 258, § 148, states the general rule as
follows: ‘‘ After an initiative measure has been passed by a vote of the
people and promulgated as a-law, alleged constitutional defects in the
proceedings leading to its final passage will not be considered. Also
statutory provisions governing initiative and referendum procedure
may be considered mandatory when attacked. before an election, but
after an election it has been held that they will be considered directory
only.’’

Hl Appellant further contends that the trial court ‘should have
declared that the measure was not enacted as other bills are enacted
and thus there was a-failure to comply with the Constitution and the
people voted upon invalid bill.’ Special reference is made to §
52(a) of Art. III which provides that a referendum may be ordered
by petitions ‘‘or by the General Assembly, as other bills are enacted.”’
It is contended that the bill was defective in that it was not signed
by the speaker of the house of representatives and also by the gover-
nor. This is a slightly different approach to the same question we
have decided. The order by the general assembly for the referendum
was a part of Senate Bill No. 351 and what we have said with

“ a

reference to the bill likewise applies with respect to the provision for
the referendum and the special election.

The respondents also urge that the signature of the speaker of
the house upon his written objections attached to the bill should
be construed as a signing by him within the meaning of § 30 for all
purposes. However, since we have held that the signature of the
presiding officer is not required in the present circumstances, a
decision of this contention is unnecessary,

The fact that the bill was not signed by the governor and,
in fact, was not presented to him for signature, was not pleaded or
presented to the trial court for its decision. It cannot be presented
here for the first time unless it can be said to be such a constitutional
question as necessarily inheres in the cause. Thompson v. St. Louis-
San Francisco R. Co., 384 Mo. 958, 69 S.W.2d 936, 942 [5]. As-
suming without deciding that it is such a question, it clearly appears
that the governor’s signature was not necessary to constitute the
bill a valid enactment since the measure was referred by the general
assembly and was approved by the people on referendwnu.

See. 52(b) of Art. IIL provides that ‘‘The veto power of the
governor shall not extend to measures referred to the people.’’ By
§ 49, Art. III, the people ‘‘reserve power to approve or reject by
referendum any act of the general assembly’? with exceptions not
here important. The veto power of the executive should not be con-
strued to restrict the power of the general assembly or the people
unless such intent clearly appears. Its nature and function is thus
stated in 82 C.J.S. 85 § 52: ‘‘The authority of an executive to set
aside an enactment of the legislative department is not an inherent
power, and can be exercised only when sanctioned by a constitutional
provision, and only in the manner and [169] mode prescribed. The
executive’s veto power is a power conditionally to prevent legislation,
but is not the power to enact new laws or to recall or modify old
laws. The veto power is in derogation of the general plan of the state
government, and provisions authorizing it must be strictly construed,
so as to limit its exercise to the powers expressly enumerated or
necessarily implied.’”

We construe the limitation on the governor’s veto power as set out
in § 52(b) to be applicable before a referendum measure is sub-
mitted to the people as well as after the act has been approved by the
voters.

We rule against appellant’s contentions and find the act is
not unconstitutional. The judgment should be affirmed and it is so
ordered. All concur.

Kansas Crry Trust Company, a Missouri Banking Corporation,
Respondent, v. Mayriowsmr Sates Company, a Missouri Corpora-
tion, Appellant, No. 44926—291 8. W. (2a) 51.

Division Two, May 14, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, June 11, 1956.

q

Phineas Rosenberg and Paul Barnett for appellant.

Hilary A. Bush, Fred’ A. Murdock and Johnson, Lucas, Bush &
bson for respondent.

[51] BOHLING, C.—Action on a guaranty and wholesale repur-.
chase agreement. The Kansas City Trust Company, a banking corpora-
tion, herein designated plaintiff, sued the Mayflower Sales Company,
a corporation, herein designated defendant, in’ two counts and had
a judgment for $21,693.23 on Count I and for $1,796.47 on Count II.
Defendant appeals; contending the negotiable instruments involved,
endorsed without recourse by defendant, were not subject to said
written agreement, and that certain testimony was inadmissible. De.
fendant offered no witness. The case was tried to the court without,
a jury.
Defendant was engaged in business as a wholesaler of electrical
appliances. In May, 1950, negotiations were conducted at plaintiff
bank by M. B. Lasky, President, M. E. Davis, Credit Manager, of
defendant’s St. Louis office, and G. Claiborne, Manager of defendant’s.
Kansas City office, on behalf of defendant, and Robert J. Campbell
and C. E. James, Vice-presidents of plaintiff. Thereafter, the May-
flower Sales Company, St. Louis, Missouri, by its President, addressed
the following letter to defendant, dated June 1, 1950:.
“Kansas City Trust Company

1822 Main Street

Kansas City, Missouri Re: Wholesale Repurchase Agreement.
“Attention: Mr. Robert Campbell
‘Dear Mr. Campbell:

“Undersigned desires to have you purchase acceptable promissory
notes, drafts, acceptances, conditional sales contracts, chattel mort-
gages, bailment leases or trust receipts, herein called, ‘Wholesale In-
struments,’ covering the sale of Wholesale Norge, Emerson, or
Dumont merchandise bearing a model and serial number of each .
piece of merchandise, by persons, firms or [52] corporations herein
called, ‘Dealers’, whose credit and financial responsibility is acceptable
to you in connection with the purchase of said equipment from Un-
dersigned at Wholesale.

“Tn consideration of your purchasing such Wholesale Instruments,
Undersigned unconditionally guarantees that such Wholesale In-
struments executed by Dealers of the Undersigned with respect to
the purchase of said equipment, and/or the renewals or extensions
thereof, will be-paid by Dealers obligated thereon in full when due,
in accordance with the terms of such Wholesale Instruments, and
that in the event of the failure of any Dealer to pay at maturity such,
Wholesale Instruments or extensions or renewals thereof, Under-
signed will, upon demand, pay the entire unpaid balance owing on
any such Wholesale Instruments, together with interest thereon after
maturity, and any attorneys, fees, court costs and other expenses
paid or incurred by you in enforcing or attempting to enforce pay-
ment: of such Wholesale. Instruments, or in repossessing or attempting
to repossess the equipment covered thereby, or in the-prosecution

or defense of any action or any matter arising out of or connected
with such Wholesale Instruments.

‘This contract may be caneélled by either party upon written
siotice.’”

Thereafter, on’ June 12, 1951, defendant, by its President, for-
warded ‘an identical lettér to plaintiff, with the exception that at the
close of the'sécond patagraph a proviso, of no materiality here, was
added. to the’ effect that defendant’s liability should not exceed $80,
000."

On December 1, 1951, M. B. Lasky, President of defendant, sent
the following telegram to plaintiff:

‘Have advised our Kansas City office not to give your bank any
more floor plan paper unless you sign new agreement sent to you.
Use this notice not to accept any more paper until I receive new
agreement.?’

‘On December 20, 1951, plaintiff and defendant executed a new
guaranty agreement. It reads (date and signatures omitted) :

“Tt is understood and agreed that the Kansas City Trust Company
(herein called Lending Agency) may finance transactions involving
the sale of appliances by Mayflower Sales Company, Inc. (herein
ealled Distributor) to various dealers selected and approved by
Distributor and Lending Agency.

“Tn connection with any such loan or extension of credit made
hereunder, the Lending Agency shall require in advance a minimum
down’ payment equal’ to not less than ten (10%) percent of the
Dealers purchase price of such appliances.

. ‘The initial terms of any such loan or extension of credit shall be
+ninety (90) days or less. The Lending Agency may make as many
as three (3) renewals, each renewal subject to not less than a ten
(10%) ‘percent reduction payment. If the dealer should default on
any such loan or extension of credit, made hereunder, and the Lending
Agency be forced to repossess said merchandise, the Distributor will
repurchase such néw merchandise on hand with said Dealer, from
the Lending Agency within tei (10) days after receipt of written
notice from the Lending Agency. The repurchase price shall be the
amount of the unpaid balance due the Lending Agency on said
merchandise, plus costs of repossession, if performed by the Lending
Agency or its agent, on the unpaid balance. In no event shall the
repurchase obligation of the Distributor exceed the actual billing
price of said merchandise when financed. ~

“‘Wither party hereto may cancel this Agreement at any time upon
thirty days notice in writing of its intention to cancel.. Termination
of thiy Agreement shall in no means affect the obligations of Distribu-
tor as to equipment covered by wholesale paper purchased or acquired
by Lending Agency prior to the effective date of termination of this
Agreement.’’

On June 25, 1952, M. E. Davis, defendant’s, credit manager, St.
Louis, Missouri, wrote plaintiff, ‘‘Re: Jenkins Furniture Co., Neo-
desha, Kansas,’’ as follows:

“ Abtached you will find our check in the sum of $556, 86 which
pays your Bank on [53] the entire Wholesale. outstanding balance
on the above mentioned dealer.

“This check covers items sold by this dealer and not paid for by
them.’’

Defendant contends the court. erred. in failing. to sustain its
motion to strike plaintiff’s reply on the ground said reply set forth a
different claim than that alleged in the petition and constituted a
fatal departure from the claim pleaded in the petition.

Plaintiff says it seeks no recovery onan oral guaranty; that de-
fendant’s answer raised the affirmative defense that by reason of the
‘‘without recourse’? endorsements defendant’s offers. of, guaranty
were revoked and not applicable; that a reply was proper (Cordner
v. Roberts, 58 Mo. App. 440); that, plaintiff. did not abandon .the
claim pleaded in the petition but pleaded the facts upon which it
based the plea of estoppel in its reply. We take the issue as submitted.

Defendant does not differentiate between, Counts I and II. The
same legal theories of recovery on the part of plaintiff and of defense
on the part of defendant are presented with respect to all Wholesale
Instruments sued on. A statement of the pleadings and facts
covering the issues in Count I. fully presents, the issues and there is
no occasion to detail the pleadings and facts with respect to the in-
strument sued on in Count IT.

Plaintiff alleged in its petition:

“2, That on or about June 1, 1950, plaintiff and defendant entered
into a written contract whereby defendant agreed that if plaintiff
purchased from defendant certain acceptable promissory notes * *
[naming the instruments specified in the contract to be executed by
“‘dealers’’], therein called ‘Wholesale Instruments,’ * *; that, in
consideration thereof, defendant agreed unconditionally to ‘euarantee
that such ‘Wholesale Instruments,’ executed by dealers of defendant
* *, including renewals or extensions thereof, would be paid by the
dealers obligated thereon, in full when due * *, [et cetera]. * *

“4. That, pursuant to said contract, plaintiff from time to time
purchased from defendant certain ‘Wholesale Instruments’ * *;
that thereafter certain renewals or extensions of said ‘Wholesale In-
struments’ were made; that thereafter the makers of said ‘Wholesale
Instruments’ * * failed and refused to pay the. amounts due and
payable as provided in said ‘Wholesale Instruments’ and plaintift
made demand on defendant * * [et cetera].

“5. That the final extension or renewal of. said "¢Wholesale In-
struments’ purchased by plaintiff from defendant, pursuant to said
contract, which were not paid by makers when due are more fully

described as follows: [Here plaintiff describes different ‘‘promissory
notes and conditional sales contracts payable to defendant””—plain-
tiff’s Exhibits C through 0.]’’

Attached to plaintiff’s petition as exhibits were the aforesaid
letters of June 1, 1950, June 12, 1951, and December 20, 1951 (Ex-
hibits A, B and P, respectively), and the ‘Wholesale Instruments sued
on in Count I (Exhibits C through 0) and Count II (Exhibit Q).

Defendant admitted in its answer its execution and delivery of the
written contract of guaranty; admitted that from time to time plain-
tiff purchased from defendant Wholesale Instruments executed by
defendant’s dealers ‘identical in form with Exhibits C through 0, ‘‘in-
eluding defendant’s endorsement thereon ‘without recourse’ ’’; ad-
mitted that renewals of said instruments were made; admitted that
the makers defaulted in payment; admitted that plaintiff made de-
mazd on defendant to pay, with interest et cetera; admitted that de-
fendant refused and still refuses to pay; and denied that the demand
for payment and refusal to pay were pursuant to said contract of
guaranty.

Defendant also alleged in said answer that all of the Wholesale
Instruments were endorsed by defendant ‘‘without recourse’; that
by reason of said endorsement, defendant’s offers in said contract of
guaranty were revoked and were inapplicable to said [54] instruments
sued on; denied that the Instruments sued on were purchased by
plaintiff pursuant to defendant's offer of guaranty; and alleged that
defendant’s offer of guaranty was the only offer of guaranty made by
defendant to plaintiff that could possibly be applicable to the instru-
ments described in Count I of plaintiff’s petition, and that any oral
offer of guaranty by defendant to plaintiff, or oral modification of
such guaranty, was contrary to § 432.010, RSMo 1949, VAMS, and
wholly void. »

Plaintiff alleged in its reply that following the guaranty offer,
plaintiff purchased many Wholesale Instruments of defendant’s
dealers from defendant, ‘including those sued on; that plaintiff and
defendant agreed; understood and intended that, despite defendant’s
“‘non-recourse endorsement,’’ all of said instruments were purchased
pursuant and subject to the terms of said guaranty agreement; that
certain customs and practices developed and were followed to facilitate
handling said transactions; that defendant would take a Wholesale
Instrument covering 90% of the purchase price of merchandise sold
“to a dealer and collect from the dealer 90 days interest thereon and
10% of the purchase price; that defendant thereafter would endorse
said instrument ‘‘without recourse,’’ deliver it to plaintiff, together
with the advance interest, and plaintiff would credit defendant’s
account in an amount equal to the principal obligation on said instru-
ment; that if the dealer had not sold the merchandise when said
instriment became due, defendant secured a renewal of said instru-

ment, collected additional interest from the dealer, and delivered the
xenewal and the additional interest to the plaintiff; that if the dealer
made default in payment, defendant would pay to plaintiff the full
amount due, with interest, and proceed to take such action as defend-
ant saw fit to protect its interest; that upon default occurring on the
Wholesale Instruments mentioned in Count I (Plaintiff’s Exhibits C
through 0), defendant, pursuant to the terms of the guaranty agree-
ment and in accordance with the custom and practice, advised plain-
tiff it would pay in full, with interest, the amount due on all such in-
struments; that defendant repossessed the property given as security
for said instruments, sold the same for its own account, and dealt
with such property as though it had the right, power and obligation
under the guaranty agreement to take the property, sell it, and pay
plaintiff the unpaid balance due on such instruments, and in so doing,
asked for and received the full cooperation of plaintiff in reducing
its loss; and that by reason of said facts, defendant was estopped to
deny that the Wholesale Instruments sued on in Count I were de-
livered to plaintiff pursuant to and subject to the terms of the guaranty
agreement.
-. “In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
irmatively * * estoppel * * and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.’’ § 509.090. The substance of plain-
tiff’s reply was that defendant by reason of the facts alleged was
estopped in plaintiff’s action upon the guaranty from relying upon
the defense that the Wholesale Instruments had been endorsed by de-
fendant ‘‘without recourse.’’ This was a defensive plea to new matter
in defendant’s answer and did not constitute a departure from the
claim stated in plaintiff’s petition. Swanson v. Georgia Casualty Co.,
315 Mo. 1007, 287 8. W. 455, 462[7]; Reid v. Brotherhood of Rd.
Trainmen, Mo. App., 232 8. W. 185, 188[8, 5]; Ellyson v. Missouri
P. & L. Co., Mo. App., 59 S. W. 2d 714, 717[3-5]. Defendant’s cases
to the effect a plaintiff must recover upon the claim stated in the peti-
tion, if at all, and not upon a different claim stated in the reply are
not applicable. City of Columbia v. Malo, Mo. App., 217 S. W. 625,
628[5]; Mathieson v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 219 Mo. 542, 552, 118
8. W. 9, 12; Jennings v. Cherry, 301 Mo. 321, 257 S. W. 438, 441[11],
among others.

Speaking to an amendment of a petition under our new code and
departure from the original claim pleaded, we said in White v.
Sievers, 359 Mo. 145, 221 8. W. 2d 118, 121[3]: ‘We expressly hold
that the rule against departure is no longer to be enforced. It has
been abrogated by the new [55] code.’’ O’Neal v. Mavrakos Candy Co.,
Mo. App., 255 S. W. 2d 188, 142[5]; Kearns v. Sparks, Mo. App.,
260 8. W. 2d 353, 357[1].

Hl Under the Negotiable Instruments law endorsements with
‘recourse’? impose liability on the endorser according to the provisions

of said law (Industrial Bk. & Trs. Co. v. Hesselberg, Mo., 195 S. W.
2d 470, 476[22]); and endorsements ‘‘without recourse’? exempt
the endorser from liability as endorser, except that under said law he
yemains chargeable with certain implied warranties (§§ 401.038;
401.065 ; Friedman v. Schneider, 238 Mo. App. 778, 186 S. W. 2d 204,
208; Arthur v. Rosier, 217 Mo. App. 382, 266 S. W. 2d 737, 738[3];
Bank of Hughesville v. Fricke, 215 Mo. App. 614, 256 S. W. 1097,
1099[5]; 10 C. J. S. 702, § 214 b(2); 8 Am. Jur. 60, §§ 825, 540).
. IB Defendant, as endorser without recourse, remained a vendor of
the negotiable instruments; and, although relieved of certain obliga-
tions under the Negotiable Instruments law (Annotation, 134 Am. St.
Rep. 993; 2 ALR 220, 91 ALR 402), was not protected by said law
against obligations under a separate agreement as vendor of the paper
(38 C. J. S. 1195, § 46, nn. 63, 64). We know of no rule of law pro-
hibiting the vendor and purchaser of such paper contracting in
writing with respect to the liability of the vendor. Plaintiff is not
suing on the negotiable paper. The action is on defendant’s written
guaranty, and defendant’s endorsements of the paper are not neces-
sarily controlling. Under the record, the Wholesale Instruments were
offered by defendant for acceptance by plaintiff (1) on the basis of
the endorsement alone or (2) on the basis of the offer of guaranty.
Defendant’s telegram of December 17, 1951, to plaintiff stated :
‘Have advised our Kansas City office not to give your bank any more
floor plan paper unless you sign new agreement sent to you.’’? The
new agreement of December 20, 1951, was for the purpose of having
plaintiff finance transactions of defendant with its dealers; that is,
purchase ‘‘floor plan paper’’ of defendant’s dealers payable to defend-
ant. No oceasion existed for the telegram or for the new agreement
if defendant were exempt from all liability connected with the trans-
actions by reason of its ‘‘without recourse’’ endorsements; and the
telegram and new agreement, in words, contemplated the continuance
of defendant’s existing obligation to repurchase its dealer’s paper.

. While counsel was questioning about all notes purchased by plaintiff
from defendant, including notes not sued on, defendant’s counsel
objected on the ground such testimony was inadmissible for several
reasons; but he also stated notice had been served on defendant to
produce “a lot of original notes and one thing and another,’’ and, to
avoid a continuance, they agreed that secondary evidence might be
used as to all such matters, subject to defendant’s objections on any
ground except the ground that it was secondary evidence. As stated,
defendant admitted that plaintiff purchased from time to time
Wholesale Instruments identical in form to the ones sued on, includ-
ing the without recourse endorsement. Plaintiff established that notes
of the Jenkins Furniture Company from defendant, were all en-
dorsed without recourse; and defendant’s letter of June 25, 1952,
enclosed a $556.86 check in payment of the ‘‘entire Wholesale out-

standing balance’’ of said Jenkins Furniture Company. This is an
acknowledgment by defendant in writing that some instruments en+
dorsed by defendant without recourse to plaintiff were within defend:
ant’s offer of guaranty. Citizens’ Bk. v. North End St. Bk., 116 Kan.
303, 226 P. 998, 1000[3], 35 ALR 1109, discussing Northrup Nat. Bk.
v. Yates Center Nat. Bk., 98 Kan. 568, 159 P. 403, 405(2]; First Nat.
Bk. v. Willis, 128 Kan. 681, 280 P. 782, 784[2], discussing the above
two cases; First St. Bk. v. Southwest Nat. Bk., 127 Okla, 10, 257 P.
382, 383[1, 2].

The instant action is between original parties. Defendant desired
that plaintiff “purchase acceptable promissory notes’’’ et cetera of
defendant’s dealers. Nothing is said in the offer about the endorse-
ment, and what was ‘‘acceptable’’ to plaintiff was [56] not defined.
The offer was a continuing one and when plaintiff purchased ar
acceptable note under the offer that particular purchase was per-
formed by plaintiff. .

Laclede Const. Co. v. Moss Tie Co., 185 Mo. 25, 62, 84 8. W-
76, 87, 88 (quoting Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 279, 16 S. W.
198, 200), speaking to the interpretation of a written contract, statés:
“When the subject-matter to which such a writing refers is not
entirely definite and clear, it is permissible, and obviously just, to re
ceive in evidence a description of the circumstances of its execution
that the court may be placed, as near as may be, in the situation of
the contracting parties with a view the better to adjudge in what
sense the language used was probably intended by them.’ ** *
“* * * Tn order to ascertain the relation of the ‘words of a document
to facts, every fact may be proved to which it refers, or may have
been intended to refer, or which identifies any person or thing men-
tioned in it.’ ’”’ . . Lo.

Great Western Printing Co. v. Belcher, 127 Mo. App. 188, 189, 104
8. W. 894, 895[7], an action against a guarantor, states: ‘‘While it
is true, parol evidence may not be introduced to alter or vary the
writing, nor to add to or piece out-an insufficient memorandum under
the statute so as to supply substantial provisions. not present in the
writing, the law is settled to the effect that parol may be resorted to
for the purpose and to the extent of informing the court of the situa-
tion of the parties and the circumstances under which the writing was
made, in order to indue the court with the knowledge of the facts
and circumstances surrounding and immediately connected with the
transaction and the true situation of the parties at the time of con-
tracting, to the end that the court may know and understand to what
the terms of the contract shall apply.’’

-Parol evidence has been held proper to identify the notes involved,
the subject matter of the contract. Thornton v. Crowther, 24 Mo. 164,
166; Welsh v. Edmisson, 46 Mo. App. 282, 287, and see.Snip v. City
of Lamar, 239 Mo. App. 824, 201 S. W. 2d 790, 798[6].

HH The parol evidence in the instant case established the facts
pleaded in plaintiff’s reply. For instance, and briefly, it established,
among other things, that plaintiff would finance defendant through
the purchase of floor plan paper of defendant’s dealers only under
an unconditional guaranty and repurchase agreement of defendant
and would not service the paper of the dealers; that it was understood
plaintiff would rely wholly on the repurchase agreement and pur-
chase notes endorsed by defendant without recourse. Defendant’s
Mr. Claiborne brought defendant’s offer of June 1, 1950, to plaintiff’s
Mr. James. They again discussed how the transactions would be
handled and the paper would be endorsed. Mr. James explained plain-
tiff had defendant’s financial statement, was relying on defendant’s
credit, was not setting up credit files on defendant’s dealers and
was not interested in their financial condition, and was relying solely
on defendant’s repurchase agreement. The first business was brought
in by Mr. Claiborne, who endorsed the notes in suit. The proceeds
of the notes would be credited to defendant’s account and defend-
ant would transfer the money to St. Louis by check. Defendant
serviced the notes—collections, renewals, repossessions, et cetera, as
though owner of the paper. Plaintiff purchased many notes from
defendant, all, except one, endorsed without recourse. When a dealer
defaulted, as several did, defendant repurchased the paper, in two
instances making remittance by checks executed by its President in
excess of $20,000 to take up notes of dealers endorsed by defendant
without recourse.

The findings and judgment were for the right party. The judgment
is affirmed. Barrett and Stockard, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Borne, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Srare or Missourr ex rel. Stare Hiesway Commission, Appellant,
v. Harry A. Cnevencer and Hurrm J. Cuevenepr, Respondents,
No. 45056—291 8. W. (2d) 57.

. Division Two, May 14, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Banc Overruled, June 11, 1956.

Robert L. Hyder, Ralph H. Duggins and Minor C. Livesa
appellant.

nd William EH. Turnage for respondents.

[58] EAGER, P.J.—The State Highway Commission, as: relator,
instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire lands in. Clay County
for the relocation of a portion of Highway 69 as a limited access -high-
way. We are coricerned here only with the land and interests of Harry
A. Clevenger and his wife. They were awarded $4,400 by the commis-
sioners, filed timely exceptions, and were thereafter- awarded $15,000
by a jury. The relator has appealed. For convenience, the parties
will be referred to'as relator and defendants. We have Jurisdiction
because of the amount involved.

Defendants owned a farm of 176.88 acrés in a somewhat itregular
shape; it is bounded on the west by Fishing ‘River, on the south
largely by the old channel of that river ‘(it having been diverted at
that point in a previous highway project), and on the east by a county
road. The north boundary is immaterial here. The drainage on this
farm was largely to the south. No farm buildings have been. physically
disturbed. The old Highway 69; a two-way route, bordered the farm
on the south for a distance of approximately 150-200 feet, extending
westerly from the east line to a-ditch, The Highway Department has,
‘as indicated in the petition, established Highway 69 at this point as a
‘limited access highway, using the old route for eastbound traffic and
‘establishing a new roadway for westbound traffic; the latter lies
north of the old road, and runs generally northeast.and southwest.
For this project relator has appropriated 9.27 acres of defendants’
land for the new right of Way and for a relocation of the county road;
in addition, 1.38 acres are to be used under a temporary construction
easement for a ‘‘borrow-pit.’’ The strip thus taken for the new road-
way is approximately 2,000 feet in length and includes a drainage
easement north of the roadway, extending from the relocated county
road to the west line of the property. A drainage ditch will run along
this easement to the old channel of Fishing River, defendants” west-
erly boundary. No culverts are ‘provided under.the new roadway.
Approximately nine acres of defendants’ land are left between tlie old
and new roadways of the highway. These nine acres are.also bisected
by the relocated county road, which now runs southwesterly from a
point on defendants’ east line.for approximately 1,000 feet (north-of
the new roadway, but within its right of way), thence across the new
roadway and southerly to a point where it intersects the old roadway
of Highway 69 at defendants’ south line. The relocated county road
serves as an access road for defendants’ property throughout its entire

length, but access to the highway proper is otherwise denied defend-
ants, as specified in the condemnation petition. The new westbound
roadway ‘is approximately 5 to 6 feet above the ground level of de-
fendants’ adjacent land, and the relocated county road gradually
slopes downward from that roadway, reaching the old ground level
at its intersection with old 69. It was agreed that 220 rods of new
fencing would be required to separate defendants’ remaining land
from the highway. The numerous other details of the construction
need not be mentioned. .

Defendants had owned and occupied this farm for many years.
There was wide divergence in the testimony on valuations, both as
to the value of the land taken and the damage to the land remaining;
or, putting the matter in another way, in the difference between the
fair and reasonable market value of the land before and after the
taking. We cannot go into the details of all this testimony. The wit-
nesses for defendants fixed the total damages at figures varying
-from $11,800 to $20,990 ; these witnesses (aside from defendant Harry
Clevenger). were nearby real estate dealers and neighboring farmers.
They fixed the original value of the farm at figures varying from
$44,000 to $52,800:. Two of relator’s witnesses fixed the total [59] net
damages (considering special benefits) at $2,294.50 and $2,960, re-
spectively, and the other testified that defendants derived a net benefit
of $2,230: Apparently defendants’ witnesses thought there were no
resulting special benefits. The disparity in the resulting views of the
total damages was caused in part by the completely opposite views as
to the value of the nine acres left between the two roadways and also
bisected by the new county road. Defendants’ witnesses attributed to
this tract a greatly depreciated value, while relator’s witnesses thought
it now very valuable as commercial property because it would pre-
sumably be available as a site for one or more filling stations, and
perhaps for other commercial development’; they explained that such
amprovements could (subject to a re-zoning) be constructed at the
access point where the county road intersected the new west roadway,
though necessarily they would face the county road. We find it un-
necessary to discuss the details of this controversy. One witness for
relator, employed by an oil company, testified specifically that in his
opinion the nine acre tract was worth $8,500 after the new construc-
tion, because of the limited number of access sites available. Defend-
ants’ witnesses emphasized the obstruction of the drainage and the
possibility of flooding, the necessity of new fencing, the inconvenience
of farming the separated tracts and of passage between them, the
‘limitation of access to the new highway, and thé good quality of the
land taken, -Other features of the evidence will be discussed. herein-
after: . .

One of the points made here by appellant, and certainly not
the least important-or troublesome, is that the court erred in permit-

ting defendants’ witnesses to testify to an item of damage resulting
from the ‘‘limitation of access’? from defendants’ land to the new
route of the highway, and in submitting this to the jury as an element
of damage. As a corollary, relator also insists that the court erred in
refusing its Instruction A, which would have instructed the jury that
it might not consider any limitation of defendants’ right of access to
any part of the highway not in existence at the time of the appropri-
ation. This raises a question new to the jurisprudence of Missouri,
and one which is relatively new elsewhere. We shall discuss all those
vases cited by relator which we deem sufficiently in point.

We note first that § 29, Art. IV, Mo. Const., 1945, gives to the State
Highway Commission full ‘‘* * * authority * * to locate, relocate,
* * maintain * * construct and reconstruct state highways, * *
and * to limit access to, from and across state highways where the
public interest and safety may require, subject to such limitations
and conditions as may be imposed by law.’’ The powers of the High-
way Commission are set out generally in Chapters 226 and 227, RSMo
1949, V.A.M.S. In the case’ of State ex rel. State Highway Commis-
sion v. James, Bane, 356 Mo. 1161, 205 S.W. 2d 534, this court held:
that the power of eminent domain was inherent in sovereignty; that
under the above constitutional provision and the existing statutes the
Commission had full power to condemn easements in land for rights
of way, and also to extinguish easements of access held by abutting
owners, which in themselves were interests in land; that the aforesaid
provision declared that such limitation of access was a proper subject
for, and purpose of, condemnation proceedings, subject to such limita-
tions as the general assembly might impose. That case is of little
specific help on our present question, for the actual decision there
merely required the circuit court to accept and exercise jurisdiction
of all the issues thus tendered, including the power of the Commission
to limit access by condemnation. The admeasurement of damages was
not actually an issue in this court. The court did say: ‘‘Existing law,
both statutory and constitutional, already limit and condition the
taking of any interest in land by providing that just compensation
must be ascertained and paid in the manner provided by statute.”’
From the opinion it is difficult, to say the least, to compare the factual
situation of the property [60] owners there with that of the defend-
ants in the present case; this fact will be further demonstrated in the
following discussions. The authorities there relied on would seem to
indicate that what the court had in mind was the extinguishment of
an existing easement of access to an existing roadway.
~ Essentially, the Commission contends that since the new westbound
toadway was never in existence, actually or potentially, until the
appropriation was made, defendants could not possibly have had any
previous right or easement of access to it; and, since the right of
access was restricted by the very same appropriation, no easement of

access ever arose, except as permitted thereby; further, that such
supposed and nonexistent right of access was a wholly improper ele-
ment of damage to the land remaining.

This principle has been adopted in several California cases, although
the facts therein differ somewhat from ours. Thus, see: Schnider v.
State. (Calif. Sup.), 38 Calif. 2d 439, 241 P. 2d 1, City of Los Angeles
v. Geiger, 94 Calif. App. 2d 180, 210 P. 2d 717; People v. Thomas,
108 Calif. App. 2d 832, 239 P. 2d 914. Those cases hold generally that
if there was no roadway adjacent to defendant’s premises in which
he had an easement of access prior to the appropriation, then the
appropriation and limitation effected no disturbance of an existing
right; and that there was no loss which would constitute special dam-
age. Another California case held that there was no damage for the
disturbance of an existing easement where access was thereafter al-
lowed along an outer service road (People v. Schultz, 123 Calif. App.
2d 925, 268 P. 2d 117), although California apparently recognizes the
right to compensation for the extinguishment or substantial impair-
ment of an existing easement of access (People v. Loop, 127 Calif.
App. 2d 786, 274 P. 2d 885). Defendants say that these California
cages.are inapplicable because based upon a ‘‘peculiar statutory con-
struction.’’? The statutes (Dearing’s California Codes, Streets and
Highways, Vol. 1, § 100.1 et seq.) authorize the construction of ‘‘free-
ways,’? and the making of any existing highway into a freeway;
also, (§ 100.3) they declare that a declaration creating a freeway
shall not affect previous rights of access, and that any such rights
taken or damaged shall be acquired as provided by law. The Schnider
case, supra, merely held that the latter section referred only to rights
which existed prior to the establishing of the freeway. We see nothing
peculiar in this construction which would make the principle of the
California cases inapplicable.

In the case of State, By and Through State Highway Commission
vy. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783, this question arose under cireum-
stances very similar to ours; the relocated, nonaccess highway ran
through defendants’ land, separating it into two tracts. The trial
court instructed the jury that at the time of the appropriation the
defendants had no right of access, that the state was not taking
any easement, and that no damages should be allowed for the loss of
any such supposed right of access. A statute permitted the con-
demnation of ‘‘any and all rights of access’’ in highway proceedings,
upon determination of the damages. The Supreme Court of Oregon
held that since the statute did not apply exclusively to the acquisition
of new land for nonaccess highways, it did not show an intent that
payment need be made in all cases, although payment should be made
where an existing easement in an existing road is condemned. It
further held: that the proceedings there did not create, and then
immediately extinguish, an easement of access; that Oregon law only

required compensation for the taking of an existing easement and
here there was none, and consequently no taking; that there was no
servient tenement, as required for the existence of an easement, at the
time of the appropriation; and that the situation was substantially
the same as though defendants had sold this strip of land to a private
individual, in which event they would retain no easement of access.
To this extent the court followed, generally, the California [61] cases.
But it held, further, that although no special item of damage could
be allowed where there was no existing easement to be taken, never-
theless, the jury might consider the nonaccess character of the high-
way on the issue of the damage to the property remaining, and be-
cause, by its very nature, this appropriation might be a ‘‘more
complete severance.’’ In the course of the opinion, the court said in
part, (265 P. 2d, 1. ¢. 794-5, 796): ‘‘Our conclusion that there was
no easement of access and that none was condemned is not decisive
of the further question as to whether the non-access character of the
highway was relevant on the issue of consequential or severance
damages to the remaining property. The effect which the unique and
total character of the condemnation may have upon the market value
of the property not taken, presents an issue which is not dependent
upon the existence of an easement. We again quote from the article
in Stanford Law Review, cited supra:

“As a final case, consider the situation where the right-of-way
purchased runs right through B’s land. In the case of a normal, un-
restricted-access highway, B will be paid for the land actually
taken and also ‘‘severance’’ damage for the separation of the prop-
erty. If the highway is to be of limited-access design, with B having
no right of access, the severance of the two parcels will be more com-
plete. B should be, and is, paid for this more complete severance,
but this is on the basis of severance damage alone and not on any
theory of right of access being denied.’ 3 Stanford Law Rev., Free-
ways, p. 308.

‘# # * In any event, whether the market value of the land not
taken was affected by the ‘more complete severance’ resulting from
the character of the highway appropriated, was a question to be de-
termined by the jury upon the evidence. * * * *

«e * * Tt follows that the damages awarded to a landowner
may include an element of loss by reason of a depreciation in the
market value of the remaining land by reason of the peculiar nature
of the appropriation.’’ We do not regard any differences between
the cited Oregon Statutes (as there construed) and the Missouri law
as controlling. In Carazalla v. State of Wisconsin et al., 269 Wisc.
593, 71 N.W. 2d 276, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin discussed and
followed generally the Burk case, supra, though. apparently regard-
ing the limitation of access as an exercise of the police power.

As indicated in the Burk opinion, there are two law review

articles containing instructive discussions of limited access highways,
their desirability, and the legal implications to adjacent owners.
See: 3 Stanford Law Review 298 (1951) ; 27 Wash. Law Review 111
(1952) ; and see also the earlier article in 13 Mo. Law Review 19,
which. is more in the nature of a forecast of things to come. The
purport of these (and particularly of the Stanford article) is: that
an adjacent owner is ordinarily entitled to compensation for the
extinguishment of an easement of access to an existing road, but with
a possibility of no damage if he is given a service road; where a new
freeway is established adjacent to one’s land and access concurrently
denied, the landowner never had an easement of access, and no com-
pensation should be awarded; if such freeway goes through the land;
he’‘has lost no access rights to a highway, but the severance may thus
be more complete and the severance damage greater, and this should
bé considered, but not upon thé theory of a denial of or loss of access.
The author of the article in 27 Wash. Law Review 111, regards the
restriction of access as merely taking away ‘‘the value which the
construction of the road created.’’ (Le. 123)
- Some authorities hold that there is no special damage for the
deprivation of access to a freeway, as such, if reasonable access
is provided by way of a service or outer roadway, although this ac-
cess be somewhat moré circuitous. Carazalla v. State ‘of Wisconsin
ét al.; 269 Wise. 593, 71 N.W. 2d 276; People v. Schultz, 123 Calif.
App. 2d 925, 268:P. 24 117; State ex rel. Merritt et al. v. Linzell,
168 Ohio St. Rep. 97, 126 N.B. 2d 53; 27 Wash. Law Rev. 111.

[62] The cases of Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn, 48, 19 N.W. 2d
894’; Smick et al. v. Commonwealth et al. (Ky.), 268 S.W. 2d 424, and
Rothwell v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. Rep- 517, 127 N.B. 2d 524, cited
by relator, do not appear to be material to our precise question.
In St. Louis Electric Terminal Ry. v. MacAdaras, 257 Mo. 448, 166 S.
W. 307, also cited, it was held that a landowner, defendant in con-
demnation proceedings, had no right to additional damages based
upon an enhanced value of his property due to the construction of the
improvement itself. That principle, while somewhat analogous, is
not directly in point here.

As we ‘construe the record, defendants made no claim for any
loss of access to the old roddway of Highway 69, being the eastbound
line, which was adjacent to the south end of their farm for a short
distance. The relocated county road now joins the eastbound lane
there. The matter was’ mentioned at least once, casually, but no
witnesses were asked concerning a supposed valuation, and no:such
item was included in Instruction No. 2 explaining defendants’ theory
of damages. If such a claim was in the case at all, it was abandoned:
Tt is entirely possible that the access to thé south along the relo-
cated county road is substantially as good as it was previously: We

shall disregard that feature as a possible element of damages and we
specifically call attention to this.

We are, therefore, interested only in the claitn for damages for
limiting defendants’ access ‘‘from defendants’ land * * to certain
portions of said westbound lane.’’ In the evidence there was much
confusion, both"in questions and answers, between the supposed
right of access to ‘the road, and the inconvenience of access from
one part of the farm to the othér, after the location of the new
highway. Certain of the witnesses were apparently thinking, in
part, of the latter element, but the transcript ‘specifically shows
that some of the witnesses testified that the loss of access to
the road was worth $1,000; when this first ocetred, the court
sustained an objection and stitick ‘out the evidence as an improper
element of damage; shortly thereafter, however, the court reversed
this ruling, and specifically so instructed the jury, Thereafter,
both in hypothetical questions and in specifié questions to defendants’
witnesses, this element was included and in the answérs it was con-
sidered. Instruction No. 2, given at the request of the defendants,
‘told the jury that it might take into consideraion in determining the
damages, if any, the limitation of access to the westbound. lane of the
highway, i in addition to the separation of the different tracts, and the
inconvenience of getting from one part of the farni to another. It
is clear that the supposed taking of’ an easement of access was thus
included and stressed as a specific element of damage in addition to
such other elements.

We approve the view expressed in the case of State, By and
Through State Highway Commission v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.
2d 788; there could be here no taking of an easement of access to the
new roadway, because no prior right of access existed; thus, the
supposed deprivation of a right ‘of access to the road itself could
not constitute a compensable element of damage. But we further
hold that evidence of the manner, nature and extent of the taking,
the separation of defendants’ land into different tracts, and the
added inconvenience, if any, in going about the farmi, may properly
be considered by the jury in assessing the ‘total net damages to the
land, together with any other siniilar cireumistandes. And, certainly,
evidence of the presence of the new roadway, the modes of ‘access pro-
vided, the relocated county road, and the reasonably probable uses of
the remaining property, may and should be considered in deter-
mining the question of special benefits, if any, to defendants.

This ruling, we think, is not out of harmony with the deci-
sion in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. James, Bane,
856 Mo. 1161, 205 §.W. 2d 534. At another trial the jury will
presumably, consider the entire taking, balancing what defendants
owned prior to the appropriation against what they own thereafter,
and will compensate them in full for the’ difference in fair market

value, less any special benefits. Since the element of access to the
road was so thoroughly injected into this case as a [63] specific and
additional item of damage, we deem it necessary to reverse and

- remand the case for retrial. It is impossible to say what the verdict
of the jury would have been upon a trial conducted as suggested
herein, This is apparently the first instance in which our appellate
courts have been required to determine this particular question, and
‘since, it will presumably arise in hundreds of cases hereafter, we feel
that a specific and logically correct rule should be established.

From what we have said it necessarily follows that Instruc-
tion No. 2, given for defendants, was erroneous; relator also contends
that it was erroneous because it listed various elements of damage
in argumentative fashion. Except for the inclusion therein of the
element of limitation of access, a very similar instruction was ap-
‘proved in the case of State ex rel. State Highway Commission v.
‘Haid et al., Band, 332 Mo. 606, 59 §.W. 2d 1057. A somewhat simi-
lar instruction was held erroneous in Kansas City, 0.0. & St. J. Ry.
Co. v, Couch, Mo., 187 8.W. 64, but that case is distinguished in
the Haid case; another, somewhat analogous, was held erroneous in
State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Day et al., 226 Mo. App.
884, 47 S.W. 2d 147, but that ruling was distinguished in State ex
zel. State Highway Commission v. Caruthers, Mo. App., 51 S.W. 2d
126. See also: Siemers v. St. Louis Electric Terminal R. Co., 348
Mo. 682, 155-S.W. 2d 180, 187; Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Bruns, Mo.
App., 239 S.W. 2d 546, 558. At another trial counsel may be guided
by. the other criticisms of this instruction and the authorities cited by
relator, if so advised, for it seems that these objections might rather
easily be remedied.

‘At the trial one of relator’s witnesses, Gerald G. Green, a real
estate dealer, produced and presented a written contract to purchase
for, $7,500 the 9.246 acres of defendants’ land lying between the west-
bound and eastbound roadways; he had executed this as the proposed
purchaser, but he had not previously presented it to the defendants.
He.also presented a cashier’s check for $1,000, the down payment
recited in the contract. This witness was examined largely out of the
presence of the jury, he stating that he was then openly making the
offer, though admitting a little later that he had made no investigation
of property values on that highway and in that vicinity. On objection
that the offer had not previously been communicated to defendants
and that it did not tend to prove the reasonable value of the land,
the offers were excluded. Relator insists that this was error, though
admitting that ‘‘oral and not binding’’ offers are inadmissible as evi-
dence of value, because easily made and refused and easy of fabrica-
tion. Missouri Public Service Co. v. Hunt, Mo. App., 274 S.W. 2d
27, 81; City of St. Louis v. Gerhardt Realty Co., 328 Mo. 103, 40 8.W.
2d 661. ‘The purpose here, of course, was to establish a substantial

valuation for this tract, and, in part, to rebut the depreciated values
given by defendants’ witnesses. The insistence now is that this offer,
was not hearsay and that it was made in binding form. The only
Missouri case which plaintiff cites, Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Walsh,
197 Mo. 392, 94 S.W. 860, merely held that evidence of an offer by the
defendant to sell his property for a certain sum was admissible as an
admission against interest, contrary to the general rule of exclusion
of offers. We need not examine the cases cited from other states. In
School District-of Clayton v. Kelsey, 355 Mo. 478, 196 8.W. 2d 860,
it was held that a fully executed but unconsummated contract for the
sale of neighboring property was inadmissible; the court said that to
admit such would open the door to contracts made in bad faith. We
agree with this rule of exclusion. Such offers and contracts are sus-
ceptible of improper use even though bona fide in a given case. De-
fendants here had no opportunity to investigate the person making
this offer or his status, and the contract was certainly not one made or
negotiated in the usual course of business. The offer was properly
rejected,

Hl It will not be necessary to consider in detail relator’s asser-
tions of error in the [64] admission of evidence, but a few suggestions
may be appropriate in view of a retrial. The principal claim is that,
the court erred in permitting defendants’ counsel, after. he had asked
complete hypothetical questions on valuations before and after the
appropriation, to ask some of his witnesses if they had taken into con-
sideration certain specific items of damage, such as fencing and loss
of access, and in permitting answers placing values on such items; it
is further claimed that this tended to build up the damages and to
cause an assessment of ‘‘double damages.’’ This was, apparently done
upon the theory that these witnesses were ‘‘confused.’’ Some of this
evidence was likely to be misleading; counsel did not establish a
foundation for cross-examination on the-ground:of surprise. A wit-
ness may properly be asked’ to explain how he arrived at a total
valuation given, or at the difference in valuations before and after,
thus permitting him to explain what items he considered; indeed,
counsel for relator followed this course in their cross-examination.
Defendants suggest that the total damages fixed, by the respective
witnesses thus involved were in each instance less than the verdict of
the jury. It would be difficult to say, and we need not determine,
whether this evidence resulted in any double damages or constituted
reversible error. It further appears that the trial court received at.
one point in evidence a stated valuation of $600 per acre on the 9.27.
acres of land taken which the witness said he fixed because the land
was being taken for road purposes. The court rejected similar
evidence from other witnesses and the reception mentioned was
probably inadvertent. That basis of valuation is improper, as the
court recognized and stated.

" a

In view of the action now taken, it is wholly unnecessary to pass
upon the contention that the verdict was so excessive as to indicate
bias and prejudice. The judgment will be reversed and the cause
remanded for a new trial in accordance with the views expressed in
this opinion. It is so ordered, All concur. .

Ran A. Crark and Rupa ‘Wrson, Administratrices of the Estate of

Tuenta D. Autumn, Deceased, Respondents, -v. Lusvwoop Hors,
Ine., Appellant, No. 44860—291 8. W. (2d) 102.

Division One, May 14, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, June 11, 1956. -

‘

Clyde J. Linde, Robert B. Langwo: and Billy 8.
appellant; Langworthy, Matz & Linde of counsel.

A. E. Margolin, F. Philij irwan orold. H. Croghan for
respondents ; Margolin & Kirwan of counsel . .

[103] HOLLINGSWORTH, J.—Mrs. Thenia D. Allen was injured
as she attempted to alight from an automatically operated passenger
elevator maintained by defendant in its apartment hotel. Her peti-
tion, predicated on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, alleged that as a
direct result of negligence of defendant the elevator suddenly moved
upward as she attempted to leave it, which caused her to fall and sus-
tain grave personal injuries, for which she asked damages in the sum
of $50,000. Prior to trial, Mrs. Allen died of a cause not attributable
to her injuries. Two of her daughters, Rae A. Clark and Reba Wil-
son; were appointed as co-administratrices of her estate and as such,
upon motion, were substituted in her stead. Upon trial, the jury
returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial
was sustained on the ground the trial court had erred in giving de-
fendant’s Instruction No. 6, submitting an issue of Mrs. Allen’s
contributory negligence. Defendant has appealed from that order
as being erroneous and also asserts that Mrs. Allen’s injuries ‘‘oc-
curred notwithstanding the exercise of due care by defendant and res
ipsa loquitur does not apply’’.

The Cornell Hotel, operated by defendant, has six floors and is
equipped with the passenger elevator in question. Mrs. Allen resided
on the fourth floor and had been a resident tenant of the hotel about
twelve years. The elevator had been manually operated until 1947,
at which time it was converted to an automatic or semi-automatic
type by the defendant owner. The power machinery that controls the
hoisting, lowering and stopping of the cage is in a penthouse atop the
hotel. The cables from which the cage is suspended are not within
the view of passengers. An interlocking system, consisting of seven
interlocks, performs an important function in the elevator’s opera-
tion. One of these interlocks is in the cage and one is at the door of
each of the six floors. Hach of these is enclosed in a box or cover. All
of the aforesaid equipment is in the exclusive control of defendant.
The elevator has no levelling equipment and does not always stop
exactly at floor level; it may [104] stop two or three inches above or
below the floor. Mrs. Allen operated it frequently after the change
over. She knew it was electrically operated by the use of push buttons
and the extent to which it usually functioned when operated by such

buttons, but was otherwise totally ignorant of its mechanism, The
elevator is inspected monthly by the Rafiner Elevator Works. A
regular inspection had been made on the morning of the day on which
Mrs. Allen was later injured. The report made on this inspection
showed the elevator to be in good condition. It was again inspected
by the same inspection service on that day and within an hour after
Mrs. Allen was injured and again reported in good condition. The
inspectors who made the foregoing reports testified as to the extent
of their respective examinations; that their reports correctly stated
the result of their inspections; and that the elevator would not operate
with the doors open, either before or after Mrs. Allen was injured.

- Mrs, Allen’s deposition was read in evidence by plaintiffs. She
testified: To go by elevator from the fourth floor to the first floor, a
button is pushed; the elevator comes to the fourth floor; the outside
door is pushed open by the passenger, who then pushes open an inside
lattice door (affixed to the cage) and enters. Both doors are closed
and a button in the cage is pushed for the floor desired. The elevator
moves automatically to the first floor. When it reaches the first floor,
the passenger pulls the lattice door open and then pulls open the out-
side door. On all of the floors except the first floor, both doors close
when released. On the first floor the outside door can be pushed back-
until it catches and holds, stays open.

At about one o’clock, p.m., on the day she was injured, Mrs. Allen
was advised there was a package for her at the desk on the first floor.
“‘T went down to the elevator and pushed the button, got in the eleva-
tor, closed the doors and then pushed the inside button for the first
floor. The elevator went down to the first floor and stopped. I pulled
back the inside door, pushed the outside door back until it clicked
or stayed, then just as I was ready to step out of the elevator into the
lobby, just like that (indicating), it jumped, the why or wherefore I
don’t know. * * * *-[JJust as I was stepping out or ready to step
out, the elevator gave a lurch like that (indicating) and, of course,
it threw me straight out into the lobby floor. * * * * Just ready to
step, as I thought, on the level with the floor, step from the elevator to
the floor before anything could occur, and it just gave that lurch
* * ® it threw me practically into space, you know. It just threw me
out because it was right under my feet and I wasn’t expecting it.
ch oe

‘When asked if she could remember with any particularity just what
happened prior to the time the elevator lurched, she answered: ‘‘No,
you don’t observe things, you didn’t expect anything. It is something
you did divers times during the day. You are not looking for acci-
dents or things to occur.’’? She knew that it did not always stop level
with the floor. ‘‘Q. Now, before it jumped, do you know whether it
was level with the first floor, whether the floor of cage was level with

the first floor? A. Well, I couldn’t say it was just accurate but it
evidently was level enough that I thought I could step out of it.’

In response to a question as to whether or not the stop which the
elevator made at the first floor appeared to her to be normal, she
stated: ‘‘Well, truthfully speaking, you give it so little consideration
about anything being unusual, you get in the elevator, ride to the
floor, it stops; you make the necessary procedure to hold back your
doors and step out, all of which was correct and just as I was ready
to step out, that elevator jumped—there is no question about that, it
did it for some reason that I wouldn’t know.’”

A duly qualified expert, in response to a hypothetical question pro-
pounded by plaintiffs’ counsel, in which he outlined the mechanical
structure and method of operation of the elevator as described by
defendant’s witnesses, stated that in his opinion ‘‘it would be possible
for this elevator to lurch or jump six or eight inches with both the
elevator ‘car gate and the lobby door open.”’

Hl The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only ‘‘when (a) the
occurrence resulting [105] in injury was such as does not ordinarily
happen if those in charge use due care; (b) the instrumentalities in-
volved were under the management and control of the defendant; (c)
-and the defendant possesses superior knowledge or means of informa-
tion as to the cause of the occurrence.’’ McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo.
527, 46 S.W. 2d 557, 559, 92 A.L.R. 641. It frequently has been held
and we have no hesitancy in again holding that a sudden and unusual
movement of an elevator, the instrumentalities of which are under
the exclusive control of defendant, warrants an inference of somé
negligence on. the part of defendant. Stroud v. Booth Cold Storage
Co., Mo.App., 285: 8.W. 165, 166; Meade v. Missouri Water & Steam
Supply Co., 318 Mo. 350, 300.S.W. 515; Bartlett v. Pontiac Realty
Co., 224 Mo.App. 1234, 31 §.W. 2d 279, 280; Warner -v. Terminal R.
Ass’n of St. Louis, 363. Mo. 1082, 257 S.W. 2d 75, 79-80.

. | | But defendant says.its evidence-of inspections made by quali-
fied experts both shortly before and shortly after Mrs. Allen was in-
jured, in the reports of which defendant was assured the elevator was
in good condition, shows that defendant exercised all possible pre-
cautions; was therefore guilty of. no want.of care in the performance
of its duty, and cannot be held liable. In so asserting, defendant mis-
conceives the true meaning and extent of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
A prima facie showing of negligence under that doctrine raises a
substantial factual inference of defendant’s negligence which amounts
to evidence, as distinguished from a mere procedural presumption,
that does not disappear, upon the submission of evidence tending to
exculpate defendant, but remains in the.case as evidence sufficient
to support an affirmative finding for plaintiff. Harke v. Haase, 335
Mo. 1104, 75 8.W. 2d 1001; 1003; Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co., 346 Mo. 28, 142 8.W. 2d 455, 460; Whitaker v. Pitcairn, 351 Mo.

848, 174 S.W. 2d 163; 169; Maxie-v. Gulf, M. & O. R. Co., 356 Mo.
633, 202 S.W. 2d 904, 911; Bartlett v. Pontiac Realty Co., 224 Mo.
App. 1234, 31 S.W. 2d 279, 281; Duncker v. St. Louis Pub. Service
Co., Mo.App., 241 S.W. 2d 64, 67; Conser v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., Mo.Sup., 266 8.W. 2d: 587, 590:

|] Defendant also contends that inasmuch as Mrs. Allen was
operating the controls (the push buttons and-the doors) at the time
she was injured, defendant was not in exclusive control of the elevator
and is therefore not liable under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The
argument is not realistic. Mrs’ Allen had uo control over the elevator
other than to attempt to cause it to function in a certain manner; she
had ‘neither control nor knowledge of the method of control of the
mechanical forces that came into play when’ she had pushed the button
by which the elevator started its descent to the first floor, or when she
opened the exit doors upon arrival at the first floor. These mechanical
forces were hidden from her and were exclusively under thé control
of defendant. Once they started to function in a manner other than
that for which they were intended, she was helpless; and, as we have
hereinabove held, a movement of the elevator’ brought about by an
erratic operation of these forces, to wit: the upward lurch after the
elevator had stopped, would be so unusual as to warrant an inference
of some'negligence on the part of defendant. We hold that a submis-
sible case of negligence. under the reg ipsa loquitur ‘doctrine was
made against defendant.’ See Cruce v. Gulf, M.& 0. R. Co. 358 Mo.
589, 216 S.W. 2d 78, 80.”

| Instruction No, 6, given at the request of defendant, ‘and upon
which the trial court sustained plaintifis’ motion for new trial,
directed a-finding for defendant ‘‘if you’ believe and find from the
evidence that [Mrs. Allen] did not watch her step as she alighted
from the elevator and * * * that she thereby failed to use ordinary
care * * *, and that such failure * * *, if so, directly contributed
to her fall’’, ete. Defendant says that Mrs. Allen did not observe and
did not know whether the elevator was level with the first floor when
she attempted to step from it and that such evidence justified sub-
mission of contributory negligence on her part, as hypothesized in
Instruction No. 6.

[106] In support of its contention, defendant relies strongly upon
the case of Ross v. Sisters of Charity, etc., 141 La. 601, 75 So. 425, as
being ‘‘squarely in point’’. In that case, plaintiff entered an automatic
elevator and pushed a button to descend to the first floor. Upon
arrival, she thought it had stopped and undertook to leave, but her
witness ‘‘said very positively that the elevator did not stop at the first
floor’’. The court then disposed of the case in this manner, loc.cit.,
426: ‘‘It therefore appears that the plaintiff, who desired to stop, at
the office floor, and who had arrived at that floor, thought that the
elevator came to a stop, and undertook to open the door and leave the

elevator while it, the elevator, was still in motion. In so doing she
stood on a ledge, or sill, which was stationary; and the descending
elevator caught and crushed her, very severely injuring her. As the
elevator did not stop at the office floor, when plaintiff desired to leave
it, she should have remained in the elevator, which was a perfectly
safe and sane thing to have done until it did stop. * * * *”

The case is similar to the instant case only in that it involves an
automatic elevator and a passenger seeking to operate it so as to en-
able her to alight at the first floor. The only evidence in the instant
case as to the movements of the elevator and the action of Mrs, Allen
is that given in her deposition, as above set forth. Her testimony was
that the elevator came to a stop and so remained until she had opened
the lattice door, pushed the outer door open until it ‘‘clicked’’ or
“‘stayed’’, and attempted to alight by starting to step from the ele-
‘ator; a step she never took, because, before she could do so, the
elevator suddenly lurched upward and threw her from it. So, even
if it be assumed that Mrs. Allen was guilty of negligence in not ob-
serving whether the elevator was at the level of the first floor when
she started to step from it (there was no evidence that it was not in
fact at such level while it remained stopped—which, of itself, would
leave unanswered the question of her alleged negligence being a
proximate cause of her injuries), yet, according to her testimony, the
upward lurch of the elevator interrupted and made impossible the
taking of any voluntary action on her part, which, if taken, could
have convicted her of negligence. Her testimony, therefore, negatives
contributory negligence as a proximate cause of her injuries. Con-
sequently, there was no evidence upon which to base Instruction No. 6.
The court did not err in sustaining the motion for new trial. Gleason
v. Texas Co., Mo.Sup., 46 S.W. 2d 546, 547; Pearrow v. Thompson,
843 Mo. 490, 121 8.W. 2d 811, 815; Thompson v. Byers ‘Transporta-
tion. Co., 362 Mo. 42, 239 S.W. 2d 498.

The order of the trial court granting a new trial is affirmed and the
cause is remanded. All concur,

E. E. Suepusep, Jr., Rura Saepumrp, Ex Ginerkich and Jani
Gincericu, Plaintifis-Respondents, v. L. D. Spurezon and’A. D.
‘Van Horn, Defendants-Appellants, No. 45074—291 S. W. ‘(2d)
162. .

Division One, May 14, 1956. © .
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, June 11, 1956.

Charles N. Pettit and Jayne & Jayne for appellants.

L, F. Cottey for respondents.

[162] VAN OSDOL, C.—This is an action to try, ascertain and
determine title to 300.77 acres of described land in Schuyler County.
The issue is the validity of a recital in a deed conveying the property,
by which recital the business use of the land is restricted. Plaintiffs
sought a determination that the restriction is void, and a decree de-
termining title free of the cloud of the restrictive recital. The trial
court found and rendered judgment in favor of Plaintifis Defend-
ants have appealed, .

The case was submitted to the trial court on an agreed statement
of facts.

It was stipulated that the facts were that Hale Reeves and. Myrel
Reeves, his wife, were the owners of the described land on and for
some years before September 4, 1941, and on that day. conveyed the
land to plaintiffs, E. H. Shepherd, Jr., and. Ruth Shepherd, his wife,
by warranty deed in which the grantors, Reeves and wife, reserved to
themselves ‘‘their heirs and assigns the right to the possession, use,
income, and benefit’’ of one acre ‘‘for a term of one hundred years,
with full right to alienate and convey the same.’’ The deed further:
provided that all ‘‘buildings and other improvements now on said
(one) acre tract are reserved from this conveyance absolutely. Gran-
tors reserve the right to place additional improvements, buildings and
fixtures thereon and remove the same therefrom, which said right
will pass to the grantees and assigns of grantors.’’ The deed also
contained the recital (which is primarily the subject of the instant
litigation)’ as follows, ‘‘As part of the consideration hereof it is
agreed that no building, booth, or enclosure within the lands herein
conveyed shall ever be used for business purposes, and none shall be
erected or leased for such purpose.’’

The north line of the described tract is approximately one mile in
length and is parallel with the boundary line between the ‘states of
Missouri and Iowa. The north line of the. tract is separated from the
state line by an east-west public highway sometimes [163] known as
the Iowa Line Road which serves rural communities east and west of
the tract. U.S. Highway No. 63 is the principal north-south highway
in Schuyler County. U.S. Highway No. 63 divides the described tract
into two parcels so that approximately one fourth of the area of the
tract lies on the west side of that Highway and approximately three
fourths on the east side. The portion or parcel on the west side has a
frontage of approximately one-fourth mile and the parcel on the east
side has a frontage of approximately three fourths of a mile on U.S.
Highway No. 68. The one-acre plot or lot (the possession, use, in-
come, and benefit of which was reserved in the Reeves deed to the
Shepherds) lies-in the southwest quadrant formed by the intersection
of U.S. Highway No. 63 and Iowa Line Road.

The whole ‘of the described tract lies in a territory devoted. to
agricultural pursuits. It is miles distant from any town, city or in-
dustrial area. There are no parks or playgrounds and no buildings
in the territory except farmhouses and ancillary buildings.

September 4, 1941, when Reeves and wife conveyed the described
land with the stated reservations and restriction, the Reeves farm-
house, barn and other outbuildings were located near the southeast
corner of that portion of the described tract west of U. 8S. Highway
No, 63, and a small frame building, in which a previous owner had
engaged in the sale of 3.2% beer, was located on the one-acre lot.

Reeves had enlarged the frame building and thereafter had operated
a filling station, restaurant. and neighborhood grocery store.

Plaintiffs, Shepherd and wife, having acquired title to the de-
scribed tract on September 4, 1941, as stated, immediately entered
into possession of the tract,'a farm, except the reserved one-acre lot.
Soon thereafter, that is, on October 29, 1941, Reeves. and wife con-
veyed their reserved interest in the one-acre lot to defendant L. D.
Spurgeon. On later dates; not shown in the record, defendant Spurgeon
conveyed one half of his interest in the one-acre lot to defendant A. D.
Van Horn; and plaintiffs Shepherd and wife conveyed the portion or
parcel of the deseribed farm. lying west of U.S. Highway No. 63 to
plaintiffs Eli and Janie Gingerich.

When defendants Spurgeon and Van Horn acquired their interest,
in the one-acre lot, they dismantled the small frame business building
and erected a larger building in which they have engaged, through
sublessees, in operating a filling station, restaurant and public dance
hall and, from which building, they sell at retail groceries including
oleomargarine, cigarettes, 8.2% beer, fir eworks, gasoline, oil, and
automobile accessories.

Further facts were stipulated as follows,

“11. That because of the location of said business, adjacent to
the Iowa-Missouri-state line and fronting both on U.S. Highway
No. 63 and on the aforesaid Iowa Line Road,-a large and profita-
ble proportion of its revenue is derived from commerce with
tourists and travelers using said highways, and, because of higher
license fees and taxes and other statutory regulations on the sale
and consumption of oleomargarine, cigarettes, fireworks, beer and
gasoline in Iowa, an additional large proportion of the revenue of
said business is derived from persons residing in Iowa who find
it more economical and convenient to purchase and enjoy those
commodities in the State of Missouri, and that, as a result’of those
factors and as a result, also, of recent improvements in the charac-
ter of U.S. Highway No. 68 in the vicinity of said tract of land
and of a steady increase in the volume of traffic over said highway
at said point, the right to conduct various kinds of business near
the intersection of the aforesaid highways and on the Missouri
side of said state line is a valuable one, and the plaintiffs (the
Shepherds and Gingerichs) desire to enjoy and exercise that right.

“12. That on the basis of the foregoing facts the defendants
(Spurgeon and Van Horn) contend that the plaintiffs have no
right to use any building, booth or enclosure [164] within the
lands conveyed for business purposes, and none shall be erected
or leased for such purpose for a period of 100 years from Septem-
ber 4, 1941; that they, the defendants, have the exclusive right
to engage in business at that location, and that the nature and
extent of the business in which defendants are entitled to engage

-is unrestricted, except that it must be confined to said one acre
lot; and that the purported restrictive covenant quoted above was
inserted in the deed for the purpose of enabling the said Hale
Reeves and Myrel Reeves, and the defendants as their grantees,

. to engage in business on said one acre-lot without having a com-
petitor on the remaining portions of said farm.’’

. Plaintiffs assert no claim adverse to defendants’ interest in the one-
acre plot; and: the trial court in its decree found that defendants
“are the owners as tenants in common of the unexpired portion of:
said: leasehold, and, by virtue thereof, they and their grantees are
entitled to the possession, use, income and benefit of said one acre
parcel until September 4th, 2041 - - -.’’ With respect to the effect of
the reservations, and the quoted recitation in the Reeves deed of
September 4, 1941, in restricting the use of the rest of the described
300.77-acre tract, the trial’court found that the purpose and effect
of the restrictive recital was to vest in ‘Reeves and wife ‘‘and their
grantees and assigns a monopoly of business and trade in the neigh-
borhood of said.real estate; that said provision in said deed consti-
tutes an unreasonable, unlawful and inequitable’ restraint upon the
use and enjoyment of said real estate by the plaintiffs, and that its
purpose and effect is to restrict and unreasonably to-restrain trade
and: commerce contrary to the best interests of the public and in
violation of public policy, for which reasons said recitation and pro-
vision: in said deed is void ‘and unenforceable; that the same con-
stitutes a cloud upon the title of thé plaintiffs and impairs its mar-
ketability and prevénts its free use and development, and that such
eldud should be removed - - -.’’ :

HHI Defendants-appellants, in seeking to uphold the validity of
the réstrictive recital, cite Andrews v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 849 Mo.
927, 163 S.W.2d 1024; Meder v. Wilson, Mo. App., 192 S.W.2d 606;
Proetz v. Central Dist. of Christian & Missionary Alliance, Mo. App.,
191 S.W.2d 273; Pappas -v. Hight Hundied Realty Co., Mo. App.,
138°S.W.2d 762; and Hickey vy. Greengard, Mo. App., 176 S.W.2d
661: These cases involve restrictions of the use of land for business
purposes or of the sale.of a particular commodity where the object
ofthe various restrictive covenants was to create pleasant and whole-
some residential areas. Having that main purpose or object, such
restrictions generally have been upheld. Dean v. Monteil, 361 Mo.
1204, at page 1209, 239 S.W.2d 337, at page 340.

| It-was stated by this court in the Dean case that, generally
speaking, restrictions in derogation ofthe fee are not favored, This
court quoted:from 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 162b,- page 508, as follows,
“Since restrictions on the use of land are repugnant: to trade and
commerce, contrary to the well recognized business policy of the
country, and in derogation of common law, negative easements or
conditions, or covenants or limitations, restricting the use of property,

are not favored in law.’’ In the Dean case a restriction age
business use of thirty-five acres (which restriction was impose
to create a business monopoly in favor of an adjoining five acres) was
held to be against public policy and void. In that case, as in the in-
stant case, the restriction (in that case to continue for twenty or more,
years) was against the establishment of any kind of business. It was
held, as stated, that the purpose of the restrictive agreement or
covenant was to create a monopoly. It was imposed for the purpose
and with the intent of aiding or enabling the covenantee and those
claiming under him to create a monopoly in the-development of real
estate for commercial and business purposes.-

In deciding the Dean case, this court observed that contracts in
restriction of trade are regarded with suspicion by, the courts, as
their effect usually is to create [165] a monopoly, and before any one
of them will be upheld, it should clearly appear that no monopoly is
created by it; that its enforcement will not prejudice the public; that
it is reasonable as to time, space and person, not oppressive or injuri-
ous, and that the contract is founded on a good. consideration, and
that its enforcement will be useful and. beneficial to the promisee.’ See
now the language of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Mallinckrodt
Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 88 Mo. App.: 6, at page, 16, id,, 169 Mo.
388, 69 S.W. 355.

Tn the Dean case, this court also cited. Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553.
(The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Oliver v. Hewitt, 191
Va. 163, 60 S.H.2d 1, differentiated the Oliver case from the Tardy
case on the facts, The restriction in the Oliver case was but a partial
and reasonable restraint.) In the Tardy case, however, one Tolbert
conveyed five and one-half acres of land to Tardy. In the deed éon-
veying this small tract, Tolbert undertook to impose broad.-restrictions
upon the use by himself, and successors in title, of a three hundred
sixty-eight acré tract retained by him and adjoining the small tract
he conveyed to Tardy. The land was located in and around a junction
of railroads, The Tolbert covenants in the deeds to Tardy amounted
to a commitment by Tolbert that he would abstain from engaging in
any and all sorts of business on the land (368 acres) retained by him,
including the abstention of the right to sell any merchandise, and the
covenants also were to so restrict his heirs and assigns. The covenants
were held to constitute a general restraint of trade, and void so far as
they affected the lands in a successor to the title of Tolbert.

Hl In the instant case the reservations, and the recital prohibiting
the construction, lease and use of any structure for business purposes,
in their combined effect, were to insure’ in thé grantors-covenantees,
Reeves and wife, and their heirs and assigns, the use.of the one-acre
plot for business purposes for a century without or exclusive of any
business competition whatsoever on the part of the grantees or any
other subsequent owners of the remainder of the land:. And grantors-

TT

covenantees could and did assign all their interest in the one-acre lot
soon after thie sale of their farm in 1941. It would seem the restriction,
drafted to apply to the relatively large area in favor of whatever
owner of the small plot for so long a time, was not designed merely
for the reasonable protection of the grantors-covenantees, personally,
in their business on the one-acre lot when they sold their farm in 1941.
Apparently the reservation and recital provisions were a device main-
ly designed and fabricated to establish a business monopoly in any
owner of the interest in the one-acre plot for a hundred years, and
definitely such provisions do have that obviously restrictive effect.
If the restrictive recital is upheld, plaintiffs, their heirs and assigns,
are and will’ be restricted in the title and use of their land, and com-
munity development in some measure will be retarded, the owners of
the farm being obliged to utilize or convey the land entirely for farm-
ing, although, as stipulated, it is the fact that their land, in its
peculiar location, advantageously may now be to some extent used to
the benefit of themselves in affording the benefit of convenient and
cotapetitive trade to the local and traveling public, all of which det-
rimental restraints are in derogation of common law and offend this
country’ s generally recognized public policy.

It is our opinion that the trial court was right. To uphold the
validity of the recital as affecting plaintiffs’ title and use of their
land, in the circumstances of this case, would be to sanction an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade.

The judgment should be affirmed.

It is so ordered. Coil and Holman, CC., concur.

"PER .CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Van Ospou, C., is
adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Propucurs Propuce Company, Respondent, v. Inpusrrian Commis-
sion or Missourt Drviston or Empnoyment Sscurrry et -al.,
Appellants, No. 45190—291 S. W. (2d) 166.

“ Court en Bane, May 14, 1956.
Rehearing Denied, June 11, 1956.

George Schwartz, Lloyd G. Poole and Howard L. McFadden for
appellants.

Glenn A. Burkart, Frank C. Mann and Mar n, Mann, Walt r
Powell for respondent. . :

[168] DALTON, J.—This is an appeal by the Industrial Com-
mission of Missouri, Division of Employment Security, from a judg-
ment of‘ the circuit court of Greene County reversing certain findings
and final awards of the Commission in favor of named claimants for
unemployment benefits. The judgment was entered as the result of a
proceeding instituted in the circuit court by the employer, Producers
Produce Company, for a judicial review of the findings and final
awards of the administrative agency. Section 288.190 RSMo 1949,
amended Laws 1951, p. 564, Section 288.210 VAMS.

Nine separate appeals in cases involvixig unemployment benefits
claimed by employees of respondent Producers Produce Company
under the Unemployment Compensation Law (now known as’ the
Missouri Employment Security Law, Laws 1951, p. 564) have been
consolidated by agreement ‘on the theory that the issues involved in
each of the appeals are the same and that they have the same factual
basis. The appedls were taken to the Springfield ‘Court of Appeals

and that court reversed the judgment of the circuit court as to each
of the claimants in each of the consolidated cases and ordered the
final awards of the Industrial Commission as to each claimant rein-
stated. Producers Produce Company vy. Industrial Commission (Mo.
App.) 281 8. W. 2d 619. Reference is had’ to the first two pages of
that opinion for a preliminary statement of the facts. The cases have
been transferred to this court by order of the Springfield Court of
Appeals because of the general interest and importance of the ques-
tions involved.

Appellants say ‘‘the principal question presented is whether
striking employees are ineligible for unemployment benefits so long
as they remain on strike, in spite of evidence, and a finding by the
Industrial Commission, that the ‘stoppage of work’ at the employer’s
establishment originally caused by the strike no longer exists.’’
Respondent says that ‘‘these cases involve 537 separate claims for
benefits’ under the Unemployment Compensation Law made by two
hundred individuals, who received some $60,000, in. toto, by way of
benefits under said act as a result of awards made by administrative
tribunals in the administration of the Law’’; and that ‘‘the general
question is whether a striker is entitled to unemployment compensa-
tion benefits while he is actively engaged in picketing the employer’s
plant, and the further question is whether an employer must finance
a strike against his own plant with funds he has set aside for the
benefit of his employees * * *.’’ Appellants reply that ‘‘such was
not the question, the issue being simply whether these claimants,
after having been replaced in their jobs while on strike, were entitled
to benefits if they complied with other pertinent provisions of the
Employment Security Law, including among others, the one re-
quiring them to be available for work.’’ Respondent’s interest in
the cases arises from the fact that unemployment benefits paid are
chargeable to the employer’s ‘‘account’’, and the aggregate of such
charges, in its relation to the contributions previously paid into the
fund, may prevent a reduction or bring about an increase in the
employer’ 's future contribution rates. Sections 288.050 and 288.060
RSMo 1949. The record presented here consists of 23 volumes, plus
a supplemental [169] transcript of proceedings in the cirenit court,
in all a total of over 4800 pages. We shall determine the issues
presented as if on original appeal to this court. Art. V, See. 10,
Const. of Missouri 1945. No new briefs have been filed in this court.
The, appeals have been argued here and submitted upon the same
briefs and records as filed in the Court of Appeals.

The evidence common to all of the claims shows, among other
things, that respondent Producers Produce Company is a Missouri
corporation, organized under the Agricultural Cooperative Marketing
Act and affiliated with the Missouri Farmers Association. It is en-
gaged in the processing of the eggs, poultry and other products of its

member exchanges and others at Springfield, Missouri, and it handles,
grades and ships, hides, wool and mohair. On June 3, 1950,
respondent had 340 employees on its payroll. On that date, Local
172 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutter and Butcher Workers of North
America, an A.F.L. affiliate, represented all of the respondent’s pro-
duction workers in contract negotiations which had been going on
for some time. prior to that date, and such negotiations involved
wage scales and other terms of employment, including the renewal
of a contract with the Meat Cutter’s Union. On Saturday, June. 3,
1950, the Union called a strike and the claimants, along with other
production workers, failed to report for work and instead established
a picket line outside the employer’s plant. The picket line was con-
tinuously thereafter maintained by the Union until January 19,
1951, when an agreement was reached between respondent and the
Union for termination of the strike. Respondent’s plant was not in
operation on June 3, 5, and 6, 1950, but thereafter respondent com-
menced hiring replacements on June 7th and ultimately resumed
“activities, production or service’ to the extent hereinafter stated.
Shortly after the, commencement of the strike, a considerable
number of striking employees initiated claims for benefits under the
Unemployment Compensation Law (Sections 288.010 to 288.270
RSMo -1949). Deputies of the Division of Employment -Security,
charged under the statute with the responsibility for the.making of
determinations in the first instance on benefit claims (Sec. 288.150,
subsection 2, RSMo 1949, amended Laws 1951, p. 564, Section 288.070
VAMS), allowed some claims and denied others on the basis of facts
presented., Some. of the claimants so denied benefits appealed to the
appeals tribunal (also referred to as ‘“‘Appeals Referee’’).,. The
respondent appealed to the appeals tribunal from the determinations
made by the deputies which allowed claims for benefits. -

Pursuant to the aforementioned appeals, taken by both the claim-
ants and the respondent herein, hearings were held before an Appeals
Referee of the Division of Employment Security. Sec. 288.150, sub-
section 4, RSMo 1949, amended Laws 1951, p. 564, Sec. 288.190
VAMS. Thereafter, the appeals referee rendered decisions in which
he denied benefits with respect to claims made for weeks prior to
July 9, 1950,.on the basis of his finding that in such weeks the
claimants were unemployed due to a ‘‘stoppage of work’’ in existence
because of the labor dispute at the employer’s establishment. He
allowed benefits with respect to the claims which were made for
weeks subsequent to July 8, 1950, except in cases where he found
the claimants to have been unavailable for work and hence ineligible
on that ground (See, 288.110(3) RSMo 1949). In allowing benefits
to, those individuals who claimed them for weeks subsequent to July
8, 1950, and who were not found to be unavailable for work, the
referee did so on the basis of his finding that the claimants’ unem-

ployment in such weeks was not due to a “stoppage of work’? in
existence because of the labor dispute at the employer’ 's establishment,

The referee made other findings on issues of fact common, to “all

of the claimants, in substance, as follows :

(1) that claimants, in withholding their services “from re
spondent during the strike, did not intend to sever the
employment relationship, but instead, ‘‘each claimant [170]
has, by his persistent interest in the labor dispute and by .
his participation in the picket line, kept the employer ©
indirectly advised. of his continued interest in working

, after satisfactory negotiations are concluded’’ and, there- ~
fore, they did not leave their work’ voluntarily within the .
meaning of the Unemployment Compensation. Law; and.
that, the claimants’-participation in the labor dispute was’
-not of such a nature as to render the claimants unavailablé
for work; that the picketing duties performed by the
claimants were not of such extent as to render them unavail-_
able for work within the meaning of the Act; and that the
claimants were unemployed and available for. work, :

‘By agreement, these findings (with others) were by reference ine
corporated in and made part of the decisions relating to the individ:

. ual cases. wherein there was,a finding that the claimant had ‘Deen,
actively seeking work and was available for work.

Respondent took timely appeals to the Industrial Commission’ of
Missouri from each of the decisions of the appeals tribunal in which
benefits were allowed, as aforesaid. Laws 1951, p. 564, Section 288.-
200 VAMS. The Industrial Commission denied all of, stich. appeals
and affirmed the decisions of thé Appeals Tribynal. (Appeals Referee).
Thereafter, respondent instituted the necessary . proceedings for
judicial review of said decisions. Laws 1951, p. 564, Sec. 288.210
VAMS.

As stated, the circuit. court ordered reversed, as to each and
every: one of the claimants, the several decisions (Findings and,
Awards) of the Appeals Referee, as approved by the Industrial
Commission, and the Industrial Commission appealed., .

While the Industrial Commission is appellant as far as the judg-
ment of the circuit court reversing’ the awards to the several claim-
ants is concerned, the employer (respondent) had _ presented, the
cases to the cireuit court by petitions for reyiew and’ in’ reversitig
the final decisions and awards of the Industrial Commission'as made
to the several claimants, the trial court had acted upon specific issues
presented .to it for. decision. Therefore, the primary and ésseritial
questions presented on this appeal concern the validity of the findings
and awards of unemployment benefits, as made by the Appeals
Referee and. approved by the Industrial Commission, in view of
specific issues presented to the cirenit court by respondent.

(2

The trial court filed a memorandum opinion and much of appel-
lants’ brief is devoted to an attack upon the position and views ex-
pressed therein, but we are not here particularly concerned with the
reasons assigned by the court for its order reversing’ the findings and’
awards, because if the decision is correct it will not be disturbed be-
cause the court gave a wrong or insufficient reason therefor. Holland
Bank v. Republic’ Nat. Bank, 328 Mo. 577, 41 S.W. 2d 815, 820;
Brown v. Moore (Mo. Sup.), 248 S.W. 2d 558, 556.

In the petition for review, as filed in the circuit court by the
respondent-employer, it complained that the Appeals Referee and
the Commission erred in finding that claimants’ unemployment after
‘July 8, 1950, was not due to a ‘‘stoppage of work”’ existing at em-
ployer’s establishment due to a labor dispute, and, in further finding
that ‘‘any failure to produce at a normal rate after that time may
well have been due to factors other than the labor dispute.’’? Re-
spondent charged that the evidence showed that there was a sub-
stantial diminution of activity, service, production and efficiency in
employer’s establishment due to the labor dispute long after said
date. Error was also assigned on the finding that the employer actually
terminated claimants’ employment by obtaining replacements and
continuing in production without their services; and on the finding
that these claimants were available for work and were eligible for
unemployment benefits. Substantially the same contentions-are now
urged by respondent in this court. The Court of Appeals disposed of
these fact issues with a statement that the findings of the Appeals
Referee, approved by the Commission were supported by substantial
evidence. [281 8. W. 2d 619, 624(1)].

Appellants’ position here on the first point clearly rests unon the
finding that [171] claimants were permanently replaced by other em-
ployees of respondent and substantially full production resumed at re-
spondent’s plant so that there was no ‘‘stoppage of work’’, after
July 8, 1950, because of a labor dispute. That this factual question
is vital to the law issue presented is well illustrated in the opinion of
the Court of Appeals, as follows: ‘‘The issue here presented is one of
law as to whether claimants, who in the first instance are ineligible
to receive benefits where their original unemployment was due to a
stoppage of work because of a labor dispute at the plant of respondent,
are later entitled to receive benefits when the employer’s plant is
operating at full production, claimants have been permanently re-
placed, a full force of workers are employed at employer’s plant, and
where claimants are still actively engaged in picketing resnondent’s
plant because of the labor dispute.”’ (281 8.W. 2d 619, 624).

Appellants in this court seek to support the findings of fact and
the awards of benefits by the Commission. Appellants. say ‘‘it is
undisputed that a substantial diminution of the activities normally
carried on at the respondent’s plant occurred following commence-

ment, of the strike on June.3, 1950,’’ but, that ‘‘the referee could
reasonably have drawn the inference that normalcy in the employer’s
operations was restored by * * * July 6, 1950.’? Appellants con-
cede that ‘‘in rendering the decisions in which it allowed benefits to
striking employees of the. respondent, the Industrial Commission, of
necessity had to find (1) that they were not unemployed due to a
‘stoppage of work’ in existence because of the labor dispute, and (2)
that they were ‘available for work.’’’ Appellants. argue that the
legislature intended that the disqualification by reason of a labor
dispute was not to apply where the employer was able, through the
employment of replacements or by any other means, to continue or
resume his normal production, activities.or services. :

Section 288.010 RSMo 1949, provided that. ‘‘ ‘stoppage of work’
as used in Section 288.120 means a substantial diminution of the
activities, production or service at the establishment, plant, factory
or premises of the employing unit.’’ (See Laws 1951, pp. 564, 575,
now Sec. 288.040 VAMS). Further, Sec. 288.120.2 RSMo 1949 (see
Laws 1951, p. 564, now Sec. 288.040.4 (1) VAMS) expressly pro-
vided for the denial of benefits to unemployed workers under certain
circumstances, to wit, that ‘2. An individual shall be disqualified
for benefits under the following conditions * * * (1) For any week
with respect to which the division finds that his total or partial
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work -which exists because of
a labor dispute in the factory, establishment or other premises in
which he is or was last employed * * *.’?

Respondent here contends that the Commission’s finding (that the
unemployment of claimants, after July 8, 1950, was no longer due
to a stoppage of work because of a labor dispute at respondent’s
plant) is not ‘‘supported by competent and substantial evidence upon
the whole record.’’ Art. V, Sec. 22, Const. of Missouri 1945; Section
288.190 RSMo 1949; Laws 1951, p. 564, Sec. 288.210 VAMS. . Re-
spondent insists that claimants failed to produce competent and sub-
stantial evidence to sustain their burden of proof to free themselves
from the express disqualification and failed to-show that there was
no ‘‘stoppage of work’? at respondent’s plant because of a labor dis-
pute or that substantial normal production had been attained. A re-
view of the evidence on the issue is required.

By agreement of the parties, the employer first offered its evi-
dence tending to show that the cause of the stoppage of work was the
labor dispute in which claimants participated. This testimony tended
to show that prior to June 8, 1950, the day the strike began, the-em-
ployer had 340 employees on the payroll. The total number of em-
ployees varied somewhat according to the season, the volume would
go up or down and the number of employees would vary in relation
to the season. The bulk of respondent’s business was-poultry and
eggs, ‘a, seasonal operation,’’ but hides; [172] wool and mohair were

handled, graded and“shipped. Eggs were candled and processed,
some’ marketed in shells, some separated from the shell, canned and
frozen, and some dried and marketed in that manner. The key to the
whole operdtion was the candling room, which had not assumed
norinal operation on ‘September 19, 1950, when the witness testified.
The then émployees in that work hadn’t had sufficient experience to
be classed as*good egg candlers. The work was slow, as candling eggs
is a technical matter requiring a good deal of training. Approximately
20 per cent of respondent’s egg business was ‘‘shell eggs’’, 30 per
cent was frozen eggs, and 50 per cent powdered eggs. Live poultry
was graded, weighed, fed a few days, then slaughtered and picked,
cooled and processed in different ways for niarketing purposes.
Approximately 60 to'70 per cent of the poultry business was ‘‘New
York dressed’” poultry and the balance eviscerated poultry. About
two-thirds of ‘respondent’s business was egg’ business and one-third
poultry: Egg receipts usually hit their peak in March and April,
poultry its’ peak sometime in June, July or August. All eggs offered
under normal conditions ‘could be handled, if experienced employees
were available. The limiting factor in poultry is the picking room.
‘Shortly after the strike, about June 7th the employer began
taking applications for employment in an effort to resume operations.
As to progress’ ‘‘made in building up the operation of the plant
and following the strike’’, the evidence tended to show that the
drying départment opeitied first, as it required less employees, then
the plant began receiving poultry from the Farmers’ Exchanges in
a‘limited way, and began killing, picking, cooling and packing
poultry, later the egg candling began and still later the eviscerating
aud cutting up of poultry began. No time was fixed as to when these
departments began to function even on a limited basis. The new em-
ployees were not trained or experienced. In June and July large
quantities of ‘spring chickens, more than normal, were offered but
the ‘‘picking room wasn’t built wp’? and the employer had to re-
strict the deliveries through to July’ 15 or 20th, because not in a
position to handle them. The picking room was ‘‘the bottle neck
on the spring chicken operation.””

- No incoming eges from M.F.A. egg exchanges were turned away,
they were stored elsewhere arid were processed by September 19, 1950.
By'the middle of July the plant was receiving about the normal quan-
tity of poultry. All‘restrictions on’ deliveries of live poultry were
removed by July 15 or 20th, 1950. Solicitations of orders for dressed
poultry was curtailed during the strike and it was along the middle
or the latter part of July before the volume of poultry business got
up'to where respondent was able to take care of the same volume of
this type basiziess that it was taking care of before the time of
the strike: “Respondent had sonie poultry and eggs in cold storage at
the time of the strike and that continued to be moved afterwards.

Most of the departments ” were _ operating normally on September
19, 1950.

At the request of claimants the payroll records ‘as to number
of ‘employees were produced and offered, indicating the record ‘of
man-hours worked. The records showed more man-hours were worked
in the weeks ending June 22 and June 29, July 6, and July 18 than
inthe week before the strike, but’ because of the inexperience of em-
ployees, ‘more man-hours were required. The records (exhibit 5)
indicated that on Friday, June 2, 1950, there were 840 workers em-
ployed at respondent’s place, about 325 on the regular payroll; that
in the week ending June 8, 1950, 161 workers were hired;’ that
respondent continued to hire workers in substantial nwihbers through
the week ending July 6, 1950, but that in the week ending July 18.
1950, it hired only one worker, while laying off 87 and that in the
following week respondent laid off 60 workers. No évidence as to the
teason for the lay offs was offered. No'actual production figures for
yespondent’s plant during the period’of the’ strike were offered “in
evidence. No one from the production department testified. The total
number of employees on the payroll at some time during the successive
weeks [178] ending June 8, to July 27, 1950, inclusive, was as follows:
501, 405, 419, 450, 426, 416, 360, 300. A total of 127 individual
workers ‘‘quit’’ between June 7 and July 27.

“:On this record the Appeals Referee found: ‘‘The number of work-
érs hired and retained would indicate an effort to resume nomial out-
put by increased production, * * * the claimants’ unemployment
through July 8, 1950, was due to a stoppage of work existing at the
-employer’s establishment. After July 8, 1950, the eniployer did not
hire new workers in substantial numbers, and, in fact, laid off many
workers in the week ending July 13, and in the following week. Since
it appears that efforts toward increased production would have com-
pelled the use of these workers for any services they might have per-

. formed, t appears that any failure to produce’at a normal rate after
that tine may well have been due to factors other than the labor
dispute. The Referee finds that after July 8, 1950 there was no sub-
stantial diminution of activities in the employer’ 's plant due to the
labor dispute, and that the claimants’ unemployment after July’ 8,
was not due to a stoppage of work existing at the employer’s establish-
ment due to a labor dispute.’’ (Italics ours).

The burden of proof to establish the right of the claimants to
bene! its under the Unemployment Compensation -Law rested upon
the claimants. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,
353 Mo. 540, 183 8.W. 2d 77, 81. Claimants were eligible for benefits
only if the commission found, from’ competent and substantial evi-
dence, that the required conditions have been. met and that claim:
ants were qualified. Section 288. 120. RSMo 1949 [now See. 288.040.-
(1) VAMS], expressly provided that unemployed workmen’ should

be disqualified for benefits ‘‘For any week with respect to which the
division finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a
stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute in the
factory, establishment or other premises in which he is or was last
employed.’’ And see other provisions of said section.

It is admitted that the labor dispute in question at respond-
ent’s plant extended from June 3, 1950 to January 16, 1951. The ex-
press disqualification provided by Sec. 288.120, supra, was not a mat-
ter of defense. It was not a matter of a statutory exception to a
general rule granting benefits, but it was an express disqualification.
The burden was on claimants to show they met the conditions required
for benefits. The appellant Commission and the Appeals Referee recog-
nized the necessity for an express finding that these claimants were
not subject to the express disqualification provided by said section _
before being entitled to receive unemployment benefits. We have set
out the evidence and the finding of the Referee, approved by the
Commission. This court may not substitute its judgment on the evi-
dence for that of the administrative tribunal, but it must decide
whether upon the whole record the appellant, Industrial Commission
could reasonably have made its findings and reached its result.
Meyer v. Industrial Commission (Mo. App.) 223 S.W. 2d 835, 839.
The evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to the
finding together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom, but the ultimate responsibility rests upon this court in
this case to determine whether the Commission’s finding that there
was no stoppage of work at respondent’s plant because of a labor
dispute after July 8, 1950, is supported by competent and substantial
evidence upon the whole record. 8.8. Kresge Co. v, Unemployment
Compensation. Commission, 849 Mo. 590, 162 S.W. 2d 888, 840; See-
tion 288.190 RSMo 1949, now Section 288.210 VAMS; Laws 1951, p.
564; Article V, Section 22, Const. of Missouri 1945. To sustain that
finding it must appear that there was no substantial diminution of
the activities, production or service at respondent’s plant after the
date mentioned. Section 288.020 (18) RSMo 1949. We think the
evidence presented in the record is wholly insufficient to support
the finding made.

It is admitted that claimants were respondent’s production workers
on strike. Respondent was primarily engaged in the [174] production
of powdered and frozen eggs approximately two-thirds of its business
was egg business and 80 per cent of its egg business was powdered and
frozen eggs., One-third of respondent’s business was the production of
dressed poultry. Clearly, respondent was engaged primarily in pro-
duction-and not in such activities as the buying and selling and hand-
ling of hides, wool and mohair. Respondent was not engaged in the
furnishing of services. It is admitted that no actual production fig-
ures were in evidence, or any evidence expressly dealing with pro-

duction at respondent’s plant during the period of the strike. Further
the Appeals Referee made no direct finding that there was no sub-
stantial diminution of prodwetion at respondent’s plant after July
8, 1950, and no direct finding that any diminution of production
was not due to the labor dispute. Instead, the Referee found that
“ony failure to produce at a normal rate after that time may well
have been due to factors other than the labor dispute.’’ (Italics
ours). This finding was insufficient to support the further finding
that there was no stoppage of work due to the labor dispute. No
issue of credibility is presented since there was no other testimony
(other than that reviewed) from which an inference could be drawn
to support a finding that there was no substantial diminution of
production at respondent’s plant (the employing unit) because of
a labor dispute and, therefore, no ‘‘stoppage of work.’? Appellants
say that the facts concerning the strike’s effect on respondent’s
production were peculiarly within the knowledge of respondent, how-
ever, such fact did not relieve claimants from the burden of proof
resting upon them to avoid the express disqualification provided by
the statute. We find no substantial evidence in this record to sup-
port a finding that claimants’ unemployment after July 8, 1950,
was not due to a stoppage of work because of a labor dispute in
respondent’s plant.

Respondent further contends that the Commission’s finding
that claimants were available for work and had been actively seeking
work during the periods covered by their claims is not supported by
substantial evidence. Respondent’s theory is that the employer did
not terminate claimant’s employment by obtaining replacements;
that claimants remained respondent’s employees on strike; that
claimants were not unemployed, or the employer-employee relation-
ship terminated during the period of the strike; and that claimants
were not available for work elsewhere. ‘Appellants admit that ‘‘the
mere fact that the claimants were found not to be unemployed due to
a ‘stoppage of work’ which ‘exists because of a labor dispute’ in
respondent’s establishment after July 8, 1950, did-not, of itself, en-
title them to benefits. They still had the burden of establishing that
they were available for work within the meaning of Sec. 288.110
RSMo 1949.’? See Wagner v. Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission, 355 Mo. 805, 198 S.W. 2d 342. Section 288.110 RSMo 1949
(now See. 288.040 VAMS) expressly provided that to be eligible
for benefits the claimant must be able to work and available for
work and further provided that ‘‘no person shall be deemed available
for work unless he has been actively seeking work.’

- The picket line, which was established at the commencement of
the strike, was continuously maintained until January 19, 1951, when
an-agreement was reached between respondent and the Union for the
termination of the strike. Appellants summarize this evidence as

follows: ‘‘Throughout the existence of the labor dispute, the striking
workers devoted varying periods of their time to picket ‘duty, the
majority being assigned regular schedules involving their presence
at the lot (strike headquarters) for periods of from tio to six hours
daily. These persons were actually on the picket line for’a small por-
tion of the aforementioned periods but customarily remained at or
near the lot between turns on the picket line. There was no evidence
of any rule or requirement by the Union that the claimants report
for picket duty, remain during the entire schedule to’ which they
might be assigned, or remain at headquarters while not’ actually on
the line. It was conceded that the claimants were free to seek work
at times when they were not actually doing picket duty.’’

[175] It was admitted’ by the agreement which settled the strike
on January 16, 1951, that the company ‘‘has filled with permanent
employees all jobs vacated by said striking employees,’ but when that
was done does not appear from any evidence. It was also admitted
that’ a. coritroversy’ existed at that time between the respondent and
the Union on the issue ‘‘as to whether the members of the Union still
have the status of employees, or the right of re-eniployment or re-in-
stalement,”” :

In addition to the above evidence relating to the issues common
to all claims, the Appeals Referee and the Commission considered the
testimony, of the respective claimants concerning their individual ef-
forts to find work during the progress of the strike. This evidence
in most instances consisted of completed bi-monthly questionnaires and
téstimony tending to show claimaxit would not have refused work, or
have been prevented from accepting any offer of suitable work; and
that, despite their participation in the picketing, each one was mak-
ing an independent search and inquiry for work and had registered for
work with the public employment office maintained by the Com-
mission. Respondent refers to this evidence on, behalf of the several
claimants concerning their’ activities in seeking work as ‘‘stereotyped
and repetitious.”

The Appeals Referee found, and his finding” was approved by
the Commission: ‘‘The evidence establishes that the claimants did
not withhold services on June 8, 1950, and thereafter, with any inten-
tion of abandoning work. * * * the employer actually terminated
the claimants (employment) by obtaining replacements and con-
tinuing in production without their services * * * the claimants did
not leave work voluntarily * * ® the claimants’ participation in
the labor dispute is not of such a nature as to render the claimants
unavailable for work. The picketing’ duties performed by the
claimants are in concert with many other workers * * * by picketing
éach one ‘represents himself in the’ dispute with the employer.
Virtually all of the workers, who withheld their services after June
3, 1950, have continued to show their interest in the dispute by

participating in the picket line. * * * In the instant case * * *
the employer has resumed production without the ‘services of the
claimants and actually there is no ‘evidence that the clainiants’ jobs
are’vacant. Therefore, in the instant case the claimants’ participation
in the picket line may constitute evidence of the claimants’ willingness
to work but under the circumstances does not of itself appear to con-
stitute an active search for work. It does appear, however, that if the
claimants did avail themselves of the opportunities they had during
the weeks in question to look for another job in the reasonable
manner, they may be considered available for work.’’ It will be noted
that there is no finding that claimants have been permanently re-
placed, rather the finding is that ‘‘actually there is no evidence that
the claimants’ jobs are vacant.’’ Ori the basis of these and the other
findings by the Appeals Referee, the claims of claimants for unem-
ployment benefits were allowed.

In support of the ‘contention that there is no substantial evidence
to support the Commission’s finding that claimants were available for
work, the respondent points to the Commission’s findings ‘‘that the
clainiants did not withhold services on June 3, 1950, and thereafter,
with any intention of abandoning work’’; that ‘‘virtually all of: the
workers who withheld their services after June 3, 1950, have continued
to show their interest in the dispute by participating in the picket
line’’; and that ‘‘each claimant has, by his persistent interest in the
labor dispute and by his participation in the picket line, kept the
employer indirectly advised of his continued interest in working
after satisfactory négotiations are concluded.”’ ‘Respondent insists
that these findings are inconsistent, with, contradictory of and destruc-
tive of the Commission’s finding that claimants were available for
work elsewhere. Respondent insists the testimony of the claimants
shows they were doing everything in theit power to promote, foster
and participate in the strike, by picketing and staying around strike
headquarters for as much as three hours per day, six and seven days
per week and that the evidence clearly shows claimants’ predominant
interest ‘in the’ strike rather than in actively seeking bona fide eni-
ployment elsewhere. Respondent contends that ina legal sense these
[176] claimants were not ‘“‘available for work’? while actively partici-
pating in the strike against their employer to obtain wages and

- working conditions satisfactory to them.

Appellants admit that, ‘“In the case of the “abor dispute’, the
withdrawal of services is ‘but tentative, with the ‘expectation that the
employer-employee relationship will be resumed when the differences
between the employeés and their employer are ironed out. Thus, the
view has been expressed by courts of other jurisdictions having similar
statutes * * * that a labor dispute involves only a temporary sus-
pension of the, employer-employee ‘relationship, a8 distinguished from
the definite, or unequivocal termination which occurs when a worker

simply quits his job.’’ Appellants contend however that ‘‘the test
to be applied in determining whether picketing strikers are available
for. work is whether they are willing to take work, are in a position
to accept work, and are actively seeking work’’; and that ‘‘the fact
of part-time participation in picketing does not in and of. itself justify,
much less compel, a finding of non-availability for work.’’

The circuit court, when ordering the findings and awards of the
commission in the several cases reversed, did not find it necessary
to expressly rule the question raised by respondent in its petition
for review and now urged, as to whether or not a person actively
engaged in picketing part of each work day is available for employ-
ment and actively seeking employment within the meaning of the
act. The trial judge placed his decision on other grounds which we
need not consider.

This court in Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,
853 Mo. 540, 183 S.W. 2d 77, 82, drew the conclusions that, ‘‘in
providing that ‘an unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive
benefits with respect to any week only if the commission finds that
* ® ® he ig able to work, and available for work’, the Legislature re-
quired a sufficient showing of evidence to, support a finding by the
commission, and a finding by the commission, that the claimant-was
during said week ‘capable of being used to accomplish a purpose’
for work; that he was ‘at disposal; accessible or attainable’ for work;
and that he was ‘ready, handy, convenient, usable and obtainable’
for work.’’ See also Donnelly Garment Co. v. Keitel, 354 Mo. 1138,
193 S.W. 2d 577. But, after the decision of the Haynes and Donnelly
Garment Co. cases, ‘‘available for work’’ was given a more positive
construction of meaning by legislative enactment. See Section 288.110
RSMo 1949, amended Laws 1951, p. 564 (new Sec. 288.040 VAMS)
which provides ‘‘that no person shall be deemed available for work
unless he has been and is actively secking work.’’ ‘‘So it is required
that a person able to work (and ‘available for work’ as defined in the
Haynes case) must (in order to be deemed ‘available for work’ as
now construed in ‘accordance with legislative mandate) have been
and be ‘actively seeking’ work, that is, not passively available and
waiting for work, but actively ‘in search of’ work.’? Wagner v. Un-
employment Compensation Commission, supra, 198 8.W. 2d 342, 343.

Clearly it is admitted that there was a labor dispute; that claim-
ants, together with all of the employees, went on strike and
participated in the picketing at the employer’s plant until the labor
dispute was settled; that claimants had no intention of abandoning
work or-terminating their employment, but of resuming it with
satisfactory wages and working conditions on-settlement of the strike ;
and that claimants were replaced by respondent’s employment of
other permanent employees at some time prior to the settlement of
the strike. As stated, the Commission held that under these facts

the relationship of employer-employee still existed; that the employ-
ment was terminated (at some date) by the act of employer employing
others and resuming production without the services of claimants;
and that this did not amount to leaving work voluntarily without
good cause attributable to claimants’ employment. We think the
Commission’s findings, applicable to all claimants, that ‘‘the evidence
establishes that the claimants did not witlihold services on June 8,
1950 and thereafter, with any intention of abandoning work’’ was
directly contrary to, in conflict with and destructive of the Com-
niission’s finding that claimants were unemployed and available
[177] for work. In other words, the Commission’s holding that
claimants remained respondent’ Ss employees on strike; and that ‘the
claimants in withholding services from the employer did not intend
to abandon work’? and the Commission’s position that the strike
simply suspended the employer-employee relationship and did not
terminate it as far as claimants are concerned is directly in conflict
with the finding that claimants are unemployed and available for
work, It is true that the finding that claimants in withholding their
services ‘“‘June 8, 1950, and’ thereafter,’ had no ‘mtention of
abandoning work or terminating their employment is well supported
by evidence. The strike and picketing activities of claimants was
clearly directed to obtaining wages and working conditions satis-
factory to them. The findings in the individual cases that claimants
were actively in search of work is also supported by evidence, if
we assume the search was in good faith, as the findings would indicate.
But the findings of the Commission are in conflict. A claimant cannot;
have an intention to stay (retain his employment) and an intention
to leave at the same time. So long as claimants had no intention of
terminating the employer-employee relationship with respondent and
so long as claimants were actively and directly participating in the
strike to resume their former positions suspended by the strike, and
to resume their employment with wages and conditions of employment,
satisfactory to them, they were not available for’ work within the
provision of the Missouri Employment Security Law.

In this connection respondent argues that ‘‘at all times auring
the pendency of these claims, claimants were free to return to their
work at respondent’s plant, if they so desired,’’ and we have noted
that there is no finding to the contrary. The finding is that ‘‘there
is no evidence the claimants’ jobs are vacant,’’ but this is not a
finding that their positions had been filled.

“The term ‘available for work’ is not defined in the statute * * *
and it is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt an inflexible defi-
nition of the term in this case.’? Wiley v. Carroll (Mo. Sup.),
201 S.W. 2d 320, 321. And see Haynes v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Commission, supra; Wolpers v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission, 353 Mo. 1067, 186 8.W. 2d 440, 441. Availability differs

upon the peculiar facts in each case and no set rules can be made to,
cover the variety of circumstances that may be presented in individual
cases. Jacobs v. Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 27 Wash. 641,
179 Pac, 24 707, 718(6); Leonard v. Unemployment Comp. Board
of Review (Ohio) 75 NE. 2d 567, 568. Clearly the claimant must
have a genuine attachment to the labor market and be able, willing
and ready to accept suitable work. Reger v. Administrator, Unems,
ployment Comp. Act, 182 Conn. 647, 46 A. 2d 844.

In Milne Chair Co. v. Hake (Tenn.), 230 S.W. 2d 393, where
claimants indicated ‘‘they, would thereafter picket the company’s
plant, if requested’’ the court said: ‘‘In this situation, we would not
be justified in holding, contrary to the findings of the Board, that,
the short time consumed in picketing makes these people unavailable
for employment. The contrary would seem to be the truth. Nor can
we assume that any of these employees would either be requested to
picket or would continue to serve on the picket line if it interfered
with any eniployment made available.’’? The intention, if any, of
claimants to maintain the employer-employee relationship with re-
spondent, as employees on strike, was not considered. In, Clinton v..
Hake, (Tenn.) 206 S.W. 2d 889, where claimants. were participating
in a labor dispute and employed taking their turns in the picketing:
activity, the evidence was held sufficient to sustain a finding that
claimants were fully employed and not available for work.

We hold that so long as claimants intended to maintain the em-
ployer-employee relationship with respondent and resume their
positions on settlement of the strike, and so long as their positions.
were vacant and they were actively participating in the strike, claim-
ants were not available for work elsewhere, as their availability for
work was unduly limited, although the formality of an active search
for work might appear. .

[178] We have examined the other contentions of respondent as
urged against the findings and awards of benefits to the claimants,
but find them without merit.

The judgment in so far as itr reverses the. findings and awards
of the Commission to the several claimants is affirmed, but the cases
are remanded to the Commission for. amended findings as to the date
on which the stoppage of work ended; if prior to the settlement of the
strike, when the employer-employee relationship of claimants ter-
minated, whether the claimants were. available for work and actively:
seeking work as herein mentioned, and for other proceedings not
inconsistent with the views herein expressed. See Section 288.190.3
RSMo 1949, Section 288,210 VAMS. -

All concur.

Stary. or Missouri ex rel. Josep M. Bonz, Prosecuting Attorney.
of Audrain County, Missouri, Relator, v. HonoraBue  Grores
P. ApaMs, Judge of the.Cireuit Court of Audrain County, Mis-.
souri, Respondent, No. 45298—291 8. W. (2d) 74. .

Court en-Bane, June 11, 1956.

Joseph M. Bone per se. Ce Fee

Van Matre & Van Matre for respondent.

[75] HYDE, J—Mandamus to require respondent Judge to ac-
cept jurisdiction of the misdemeanor case of State v. Hitz, filed in
the Magistrate Court of Audrain County and certified to the. Circuit
Court wpon an application and affidavit for a change of venue under

the provisions of Section 517.520. (All statutory references ‘are to
RSMo. and V.AMS.) The question for decision is the constitu-
tionality of the provision of Section 517.520 for certification’ of a
case to the Circuit Court for trial, upon the filing of an affidavit re-
questing ‘change of venue on the "grounds stated in Section 517.510
for disqualification of the magistrate, in the event there is no other
magistrate in the county.

Section 543.160 authorizes a change of venue in misdemeanor
cases in ‘magistrate courts under the same conditions as provided
for a change of venue from magistrate courts in’ civil cases and pro-
vides that the sime procedure shall be followed. (See Sec’s. 517.510,
517.520, 517.530.) It is admitted in the pleadings that ‘defendant
Hitz was charged with a misdeameanor on an information filed in the
Magistrate Court of Audrain County; that Hitz filed an application
atid affidavit for change of venue on the ground of the magistrate’s
bias and prejudice; and that the case was certified to the Cireuit
Court of Audrain County and a transcript filed in the office of the
Cireuit Clerk. It is stipulated that: there’ is only one’ magistrate in
Audrain County. It was also admitted that the case was docketed
in the Circuit Court but the Judge indicated he would rule that the
Cireuit Court had no jurisdiction and intended to order the [76]
ease remanded to the Magistrate Court. It is contended on behalf
of réspondent that Sections 5 and 6 of Article V of the 1945 Con-
stitution and Rule 11.05 promulgated by this Court under the
authority of Section 6 subsequent to the enactment of Section 517.520
has wholly and completely replaced the provisions of that section
for transfer of cases from magistrate courts to circuit courts, relying
upon Pogue v. Swink, 364’Mo. 306, 261 S. W. (2d) 40 and State ex
rel. Creamer v. Blair, 364 Mo. 927, 270 S. W. (2d) 1. It is said that
these cases have ruled that the above cited constitutional provisions
‘abrogated all existing change of venue statutes to the extent that
such statutes provide for change of venue for ‘the sole purpose of
effecting a change of judge.”’

However, these cases consider statutes relating to cireuit courts
(See’s. 508.090, ‘508.100, 508.140) and were based not merely on the
‘provision of Section 6, Article V, giving the Supreme Court authority
to make temporary transfers of judicial personnel and establish rules
with respect thereto. Instead they mainly relied on the new provision
of Section 15, Article V authorizing any circuit judge to sit in any
other cireuit at the request of a judge thereof and the repeal of the
old provision of Section 29, Article VI of the 1875 Constitution
(limited to circuit courts) for the General Assembly to make such
additional provision for holding court as may be found necessary in
any: case where the. judge cannot preside. (261 8. W. (2d), Le. 44.)
These statutes concerning change of venue in circuit courts, when a
change of judge was sought, which we held were in conflict with the

1945 Constitution, were enacted under this provision of our former
Constitution. Thus the situation was that the former constitutional
provision for these statutes was repealed and replaced by new consti-
tutional provisions for substitution of a judge either by direct request
of the cireuit judge to another circuit judge or by asking the
Supreme Court to transfer a judge. We held this new all-inclusive
plan for transfer of judges, which replaced the provision of Section
29, Article VI of the 1875 Constitution, authorizing the Legislature
to make necessary provisions for holding court under such cireum-
stances, was a repeal by implication of ‘these statutes based on that
repealed constitutional provision. (270 8S. ‘W. (2d), Le. 6.) How-
ever, we pointed out (270 8. W. (2d), le. 6) that ‘‘this does not
mean that the Legislature has no authority over the subject of change
of venue or that the statutes stating grounds for change of venue or
disqualification of judges have been repealed.’’

The situation in this respect as to magistrate courts is very
different: from ‘that of the cireuit courts. In the first place, there
is no constitutional provision authorizing a magistrate to sit in any
other magistrate court at the request of another magistrate. Thus
there is no new all-inclusive. plan provided for change of judge for
magistrate courts as there is for cirenit courts. Furthermore, no
previous constitutional provision as to magistrate courts was repealed
by the 1945° Constittition because magistrate ‘courts were created
for the first time by the 1945 Constitution. .(Sec’s. 18-21, Art.
V.) Moreover, by that Constitution, the Legislature is authorized to
provide by law (consistent ‘with the Constitution) ‘‘the practice,
procedtire, administration and jurisdiction of magistrate courts’’
(See. 20, Art. V), which was to be the same as previously provided ‘by
law for justices of the peace until otherwise provided by the Legis-
lature. Clearly this authorized the Legislature to provide the proce-
dure for’ change of judge on application of a party as well as the
grounds therefor. Likewise, Section 14, Article V,1945 Constitution
gives the Legislature authority to make provisions concerning the
jurisdiction of circuit courts in both criminal and civil cases. Thus
it is apparent that the General Assembly had ample authority to enact
Section 517.520 and the questioned certification. provision thereof un-
less it is in conflict with sonie constitutional provision. Respondent
contends the conflict is with our authority, under Section 6, to make
rules concerning temporary transfers of judicial personnel and Rule
11.05 we have made thereunder.

[77] It is true as respondent contends that a rule of practice and
procedure established, by this Court under the authority of Section
5 or a rule concerning temporary transfers of judicial personnel es-
tablished under the authority of Section 6 (Art. V, Const.) would
prevail over a previously enacted statute, if there was a direct con-
flict. (See Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 Atl. (2d) 406;

George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 874, 86 Atl, (2d) 8.) The auth-
orities cited by relator (14 Am. Jur., p. 857, See. 152; 15 O.J. See.
288, p. 909; State ex rel. Plummer vy. Gideon, 119 Mo. 94, 24 S. W.
748, 41 Am, St. Rep. 634; Hermann Savings Bank v. Kropp, 266 Mo.
218, 181 S. W. 86; State ex rel. Pedigo v. Robertson, 181 S. W. 987)
do not refer to rule making power authorized by the Constitution and
are not in point. While there are definite limitations on our power
to make rules of practice and procedure under Section 5 (and the
Legislature is given power to annul or amend them) there are no
such limitations on our power to make rules under Section 6. Since
we have made no rules.under Section 5 concerning change of venue
or change of judge in magistrates courts, on application and affidavit
of a party, there is no issue in this case as to statutory conflict with
anything we have done under Section 5. Rule 11.05, adopted under
Section 6 (adopted Nov. 14, 1949), which respondent says is in con-
flict with Section 517.520 (enacted in 1946, see Laws 1945, pp. 765,
789), is as follows: ‘‘Under Section 6 of Article 5 of the Constitution
the Supreme Court may temporarily transfer to the Probate Court
or Magistrate Court of any county either a circuit judge, a probate
judge, a judge of a magistrate court or a probate judge who is also
judge of the magistrate court of his county. When a judge is so
transferred he shall have the same powers and responsibilities as
judge of the court to which he is transferred and may hold court
at the same time either with or separately from the regular judge
or judges of said coprt.’”

Our conclusion is that this rule was not intended to supersede and
does not conflict with Section 517.520, which was in effect at the
time we promulgated it. This Rule merely states our discretionary
power to transfer judges to magistrate courts, specifies what judges
we will transfer and establishes the rights, powers and responsibilities
of judges so transferred. It does not state the specific situations
or cases in which we-will order a transfer; and it does not even
purport to establish any conditions, practice or procedure to entitle
a party to obtain a change of judge. While we, no doubt, have
authority to do that under Sections 5 and 6, we have not done so
and until we do the practice and procedure enacted by the Legisla-
ture is certainly valid and continues in full force and effect. There
are many situations, other than on application and affidavit of dis-
qualification made by a party, in which it would be necessary or ad-
visable for this Court to temporarily transfer a judge to a magistrate
court. Some of them are voluntary disqualification by the judge of
the magistrate court, his temporary absence or illness, his call to
military service in war time which occurred in some courts during
‘World War II, an unfilled vacancy in the office due to death or
resignation, or an overloaded ‘docket which requires additional
judicial: manpower to make it current. Rule 11.05 is adequate to

authorize transfers in all of these situations and many others. In
short, Rule 11.05 covers situations in which we may exercise our
discretionary power of transfer. Section 517.520 covers a specific
situation of change of venue as a matter of right on application of a
party; Rule 11.05 covers all discretionary transfers of judicial
personnel as the interest of justice requires. Whatever our power
may be to provide mandatory methods and procedure for change of
judge for cause on application of a party, in magistrate courts, we
have not undertaken to exercise it and thus the only method and
procedure therefor is that provided by Sections 517.510 and 517.520.
(We have provided such procedure for criminal cases in circuit courts
by Rule 80, particularly 30.12, 30.18, 30.14, and.in the St. Louis Court
of Criminal Correction, 30.15.) We, therefore, hold that Section
517.520 is constitutional [78] and valid and vests jurisdiction in the
Cireuit Court in the situation herein involved.

The alternative writ requiring respondent to assume jurisdiction
is made peremptory. All concur. .

Aurrep Evens Fave, by Next Friend, Guorez Favent, Appellant,
y. Wixt1am Warner Wasnam, Respondent, No. 44874—291 8. W.
(2d) 78.

Division Two, June 11, 1956. °

1022

Errol Joyce and Hess & Collins for appellant.

Nolan M. Chapman, Don Chapman and Nolan M. Chapman, Jr., for
respondent. noe

[80] STORCKMAN, J.—This is a suit for damages in the sum of
$50,000 for personal injuries which plaintiff alleges he suffered when
an automobile operated by the defendant collided with plaintiff’s
automobile which was on a public highway’ in a damaged and disabled

condition. The case was tried and submitted on the theory of humani.
tarian doctrine negligence. “The verdict was for the defendant and
the plaintiff has appealed from an adverse judgment.

‘Phe accident oceurred October 15, 1953 at about 1:45 a.m. on a
‘pridge over the Hast Fork of the Chariton River at a point on U. 8.
Highway 86 about 2.7 miles west of Macon, Missouri. The bridge,
865 feet long, had side railings made of two inch iron pipe. From the
east end of, the bridge, guardrails 40 feet in length angled out onto
the shoulders. The highway and floor of the bridge were 20 feet
wide and made of concrete. East of the bridge the highway ran
straight for about 1800 feet to the top of a hill about 53 feet higher
than the elevation at the bridge site. For about 350 feet east of the
east end of the bridge the highway was practically level. The night
was dark and clear and the pavement dry. .

The plaintiff, a young man 21 years of age at the time of the trial,
had spent the evening with friends in and around Macon. He testified
that he had one bottle of beer during that time. Shortly before the
accident he left Macon alone driving west on U. 8. Highway 36.
His automobile was a 1941 Mercury of a dark green or olive drab color
with white sidewall tires. As he approached the East Fork Bridge
he dozed off to sleep and his car veered to the left aiid stiuck the guard-
rail ‘and bridge railing on the south side of the highway. It was
traveling between sixty and sixty-five miles per hour at the time and,
in addition to the guardrail, plaintiff’s automobile tore down 105
feet of the bridge railing and came to rest crosswise of the highway on
the bridge with the plaintiff inside. All of the automobile’s lights
were extinguished by the collision. The front end of the damaged and
disabled car was headed generally south and the rear end of the ear
was close to the north railing of the bridge.

The plaintiff testified that he received no injuries as a result of his
car striking the guardrail and bridge railing, but as he was getting
out, his automobile was struck on the left front side by the right rear
portion of defendant’s car and that he, the [81] plaintiff; then
received serious injuries, principally to his right foot and leg.

The defendant was retwning from St. Louis to his home in Mar-
celine, Missouri. His automobile, which he was driving, was a 1953
Buick Roadmaster four-door sedan equipped with power brakes. With
him in the car were four women including his wife and her mother and
a Miss Wycoff who was killed in the accident. After stopping at a
filling station in Macon the defendant drove west on U. 8. Highway: 36.
As he approached the East Fork Bridge he was driving about sixty to
sixty-five miles per hour with his headlights on ‘“‘high’’ or ‘‘bright.”?
When-he saw plaintiff’s wrecked automobile on the bridge, defendant
applied his brakes and swerved to the left to avoid striking it, with
the result that his automobile fell from the bridge and came to rest on
its left side headed west at a point about even with and south of the

Mercury and with its headlights still burning. Defendant testified he
did not think the Buick struck the Mercury before it leftthe bridge,
although his answer admitted a paragraph of plaintiff’s petition con-
taining an allegation that ‘‘defendant’s 1953 Buick automobile col-
lided with plaintiff’s 1941 Mercury automobile.”’

Other necessary details of the evidence will be given in connection
with our consideration of the questions preserved for review.

Hl Plaintiff first complains of the giving of Instruction No. 5 which
reads as follows: ‘‘The Court instructs the jury that the defendant
had a right to assume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that
plaintif’’s automobile, would not be stopped on the public highway,
in the night time, that is, a half an hour after sunset and a half an
hour before sunrise, to-wit: about 2 o’clock A.M., without a red light
on the rear thereof plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet
to the rear, if you find it was so stopped on said public highway and
withoul a red light on the rear thereof ; and the Court further instructs
you that there was no duty on the part of defendant, William Warner
‘Washam, to stop, or change the course of his automobile until he saw,
or, in the exercise of the highest degree of care, could have seen that
plaintiff’s automobile was so stopped upon said public highway and
that plaintiff was in imminent peril of being injured, if so; and the
Court further instructs you, that if you find and believe from the evi-
dence, that the defendant did not see and in the exercise of the highest
degree of care could not have seen the perilous position of the plaintiff,
if any, until the automobile of the defendant, William Warner Wash-
am, was so close to the automobile of plaintiff so stopped on said high-
‘way, that the automobile of the defendant could not, by the exercise
of the highest degree of care, with the brakes and aplliances at hand
on defendant’s automobile and with safety to defendant and the other
occupants of his automobile, besstopped, or the course thereof changed,
in time for defendant to avoid striking defendant’s automobile, then
your verdict must be for the defendant.’’ . ce

Emphasis in the above-quoted instruction has been supplied, as will
be all other italics within quotations unless otherwise noted.

The first part of this instruction in effect tells the jury that the de-
fendant discharges his duty to keep a lookout if he looks with such
care that he will be able to discover automobiles that have taillights
complying with statutory requirements, and further gives the impres-
sion that the plaintiff can be charged with antecedent and contributory
negligence if there is not such a rear light on plaintiff’s automobile.
‘We have concluded that the instruction is prejudicially erroneous in
that it misstates the applicable law and is otherwise misleading.

Hl The humanitarian rule in Missouri has been extended to dis-
coverable as well as discovered peril at places and under circum-
stances where there is a duty on the operator of the instrumentality to
keep a lookout. In Mayfield. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 387 Mo.

79, 85 S.W.2a 116, 123.[6], these pertinent rules of law are stated:
“Tt-is prejudicial error, in an instruction submitting humanitarian
negligence, [82] to inject therein primary negligence of the defend-
ant or contributory negligence of the plaintiff; to require considera-
tion of any antecedent negligence of either plaintiff or defendant
which existed prior to the time that the humanitarian doctrine properly
commenced to operate; or to predicate recovery wpon any different
facts than those which actually existed at the time the peril arose and
was discovered, or, if there was a duty to keep a lookout, when it was
discoverable by the exercise of the required degree of care.’’

Hl The rule as to whether defendant was required to keep a look-
out and, if so, the degree-of care required is also stated in the Mayfield
case as follows, 85 S.W.2d 116, 128-124: ‘In the case of automobiles
operating upon public streets and highways, the operator has imposed
upon him the continuous statutory duty to exercise the highest degree
of care at all times and all places thereon to keep a lookout for persons
thereon and in every other respect.’’ See also Frandeka v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 245, 234 §.W.2d 540, 548 [15], and
Wright v. Osborn, 356 Mo. 382, 201 S.W.2d 935, 987-938 [2]. It
is a statutory duty. § 304.010, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., Anderson v.
Prugh, 364 Mo; 557, 264 S.W.2d 358, 364.

The kind of watch required is further described in Chenoweth v.
McBurney, 859 Mo. 890, 224 S.W.2d 114, 118 [8] as follows: ‘‘It
was the duty of defendant to keep a careful watch ahead for other
vehicles on the highway ; and to fulfill this duty he was required to look
in such an observant manner as to enable him to see what a person in
the exercise of the highest degree of care for the safety of himself and
others would be expected to see under similar circumstances.’ .

Hl Is this positive statutory duty satisfied by the charge in the
instruction ‘‘that the defendant had the right to assume, in the absence
of notice to the contrary, that plaintiff’s automobile, would not be
stopped on the public highway, in the night time’’ without a red light
thereon plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear?
We do not think so. An instruction approving a lookout for auto-
mobiles stopped on the highway with a ‘‘red light on the rear thereof
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear’’ sug-
gests and permits the exercise of ordinary care or something less
than the minimum standard of the highest degree of care and the
continuous lookout required of operators of motor vehicles. Such a
direction to the jary is erroneous and misleading.

As heretofore indicated, the humanitarian rule operates upon
the facts as they actually existed at the time the peril arose and was
discoverable in the exercise of the highest degree of care. The absence
of lights on the wrecked car, in proper perspective, is but one of the
‘evidentiary facts going to the question of when plaintiff’s position of
peril was discoverable. It is one of several factors, affecting the visi-

pility.of the automobile. As used in the instruction, it savored of a
charge of antecedent or contributory negligence not available in a
humanitarian case. Since it was likely.to be so understood by the jury,
it was also erroneous for this reason. ..Klecka v. Gropp, Mo., 278 S.W.2d
790, 795; Catanzaro v. McKay, Mo., 277 S.W.2d..566, 570; Wolfson v.
Cohen, Mo., 55 S.W.2d 677, 680 [8].

* The. instruction, in the particular complained of, was not sufficiently
related to the time when defendant was obliged to take action to avoid
injuring the plaintiif to justify the treatment it received. ‘The over-
emphasis of this evidentiary fact gave it the status of a:controlling
rule of law.

The use of these “entitled to assume’? instructions have, been
criticized and‘condemned. In Branson y. Abernathy Furniture Co.,
844 Mo. 1171, 130 S.W.2d 562, 571, this court stated: ‘‘In this con-
nection, however, we think that it, would be better for such an;in-
struction to state only when the defendant’s duty commenced, instead.
of prefacing such a statement with what the defendant ‘had:a right
to assume.’ While we do not consider this prejudicial per se, if the
trial court had granted a new trial [83] on the ground that it was
an_overemphasis of the matter, we would be inclined (as in case of
a new trial granted because of ‘overemphasis of the burden of proof)
to defer to its judgment.’’

The instruction is subject to the further vice that the use of
the term ‘‘in the absence of notice to the gontrary’’ denotes actual
notice, which, even if the instruction were otherwise correct, would
bring it under the ruling of Wilt v. Moody, Mo., 254 S.W. 2d 15, 21,
wherein the court stated: ‘Instructions telling the jury a motorist
has the right to asswme another approaching motorist will obey: the
law and keep to his own side of the road, and that he owes no duty
to the latter until the contrary becomes apparent to him, do not accord
with the strict requirement of our motor vehicle law, Section 304.010
RSMo 1949, V.A.MS., that ‘Every person operating a motor vehicle
on the highways of: this state shall drive the same in a careful and
prudent manner, and shall exercise the highest degree ‘of care * * *,’
[Italics ours.] The word assume or ‘assumption’. means. the ‘act
of taking for granted, or supposing without proof that a thing is
true.’ Webster’s New International Dictionary. That is precisely
what our law forbids. He cannot assume away the:duty of vigilance.’’

In, defense of the instruction. defendant cites several cases where
these ‘‘entitled to assume’’ instructions were considered. Generally
these cases deal with the acts of persons entering or leaving positions
of peril, illustrated by what’an engineer who.observes a person. ap-
proaching a railroad crossing or upon the railroad track may expect
the person to do as it relates to the time when the duty arises to take
action: ta avoid injuring the person.. Among the. cases ‘cited are:
See v. Wabash R. Co., 362 Mo. 489, 259 S.W.2d 828; Branson.y. Aber-

nathy Furniture Co., 344 Mo. 1171, 130 S.W.2d 562; Stanton v. Jones,
332 Mo. 631, 59 S.W.2d 648; Janssens v. Thompson, 860 Mo. 351, 228
8.W.2d 748, 747; Poague v. Kurn, 346 Mo, 153, 140 8.W.2d 18, 18.
The cases cited do not deal with the kind of lookout and degree of care
required to discover a person in peril whose presence, however, is un-
known to the operator of the instrumentality. None of the cited cases
contain a positive misstatement of the law as we have found in this
case. .

HI The defendant further contends that the instruction ‘could
not be construed by the jury as injecting into the case the contributory
or primary negligence of plaintiff because plaintiff’s instruction num-
ber 6 specifically excepts from their consideration as a defense, any
acts or omissions, if any, of plaintiff directly contributing to his get-
ting into or being in the aforesaid position of peril.’ We find no In-
struction No. 6 in the transcript, but there is an Instruction No. 3 given
at plaintiff’s request which is probably the one intended. This con-
trary direction does not cure but tends to emphasize the conflict and
confuse the jury as to which direction should be followed.

Since the case will have to be retried it should also be noted
that defendant’s Instruction No. 4 is also a converse humanitarian
instruction with some cautionary directions and covers in many re-
spects the same subject matter as Instruction No. 5. Ordinarily a
party is not entitled to another instruction on a subject matter that
has been once covered. Also it will be noted that the last sentence of
Instruction No. 5 has the phrase ‘‘in time for defendant to avoid strik-
ing defendant’s automobile.’? Obviously plaintiff’s automobile was
intended. This should be corrected to avoid possible confusion.

Defendant contends that the court should have sustained de-
fendant’s motion for a directed verdict and that any errors are there-
fore immaterial. He first specifies that ‘‘plaintiff’s injuries could have
béen caused either by a collision with defendant’s automobile, or by
plaintiff’s collision with steel guard rail and iron railing of bridge.”’
Cited are the cases of Vietmeier v. Voss, Mo., 246 8.W.2d 785, 787, and
Zimmerman v. Young, Mo.App., 280 §.W.2d 457, 461 in support of the
general proposition that plaintift’s evidence must remove his case from
the field of conjecture [84] and establish it by substantial evidence
of probative value, and that where the question of liability or the cause
of the injuries can be attributed with equal likelihood to two or more
causes, a case for the jury has not been established. The facts of this
ease take it out of the purview of these rules.

The plaintiff positively testified that he was not injured in the col-
lision with the guardrail and bridge railing and was getting out of
his car when the Buick car hit him. Against this is the physical evi-
dence of the terrific impact of the plaintiff’s car with the guard and
bridge railings and the extent and nature of the damage to plaintiff’s
automobile. Plaintiff’s credibility was for the jury and the question

of whether the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a collision between
the two automobiles was properly submitted to the jury under defend-
ant’s Instruction No, 6. - : on 7

HI Defendant also contends that according to plaintiff’s own
testimony he ‘‘was not in imminent peril because he knew of the dan-
ger and could have escaped by his own efforts as he had ample time to
do so.’? Defendant cites the cases of Clark v. A.T. & 8.F. Ry. Co., 319
Mo. 865, 6 S.W.2d 954; Melenson v. Howell, 344 Mo. 1137, 180 §.W.2d
555; and Stanton v. Jones, 332 Mo. 631, 59 S.W.2d 648 in support: of
the general rule that a person is not in imminent peril who is aware
of his danger and has the means and ability to escape therefrom. , We
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff had the time -or
ability to escape. He testified at the trial that he had come in collision
with the bridge about 30 or 40 seconds before the Buick car hit him,
and that he had the left front door of his car open and was just getting
out when he heard the screech of the brakes of defendant’s car. On the
other hand, the defendant undertook to prove by plaintiff’s admis-
sions that he had been in his car three or four minutes before the de-
fendant’s car came along. There was conflicting evidence about plain-
tiff’s condition after the first accident. Defendant contended the
plaintiff had been drinking more than he admitted and was intoxicated.
The humanitarian rule is designed to take care of the oblivious, how-
ever caused. Under all the evidence, this question was likewise for
the jury. or fag al

HM The plaintiff on his appeal makes three other allegations of
error. Since the case is to be remanded for a new trial it will not be
necessary to consider the plaintiff’s contention that defendant’s closing
argument was highly inflammatory and commented upon plaintiff’s
conduct and contributory negligence in an improper and prejudicial
fashion. The same argument is not likely to be made again. Counsel
should be further guided in the next trial by the criticisms made.

Nor do we need to consider plaintiff’s objections to permitting
the defendant to testify that there was no collision between his car and
that of the plaintiff when his answer contained an admission of the
collision. Tihis; likewise, is not likely to be a question in the next trial.

HH The appellant also alleges reversible error in the use on cross-
examination of the ‘‘Missouri Drivers Guide’? which contains a chart
showing distances within which automobiles may be stopped traveling
at various speeds. The record shows that Roy Willey, plaintiff’s ex-
pert witness on stopping distances, was cross-examined by defendant’s:
counsel with respect to his knowledge of the tables shown in the ‘‘Mis-
souri Drivers Guide’’ and its general content.

Generally a. wide latitude is allowed in the cross-examination of ex-
pert witnesses in order to test their qualifications, and for this purpose
the contents of suitable publications properly identified may be used.
to test the witness’s familiarity with the subject matter, although the,

1032

publication would not be admissible as independent evidence. Wiener
v- Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 Mo. 673, 179 S.W.2d 39, 44. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting this cross-examination.
Defendant’s witness, Robert Herschell, an expert on stopping
distances, stated during cross-examination by plaintiff’s counsel that
his answers were based [85] upon statistics taken from the National
Safety Council. ‘The court overruled the plaintiff’s motion to strike
the witness’s testimony on the ground that it was based on hearsay.
Other evidence of: the witness’s qualifications is in evidence. The mat-
ter was within-the court’s diseretion and there was no error in the
court’s ruling. The weight of the witness’s testimony was for the jury.
For the error in giving Instruction No. 5, the judgment should be
reversed and the cause remanded. It is so ordered. All concur.

Scare or Missouni, at the Relation of Sr. Louis Pusiic Szrvice Com-

pany, a Corporation, Appellant, v. Pusiic Servicr Commission

’ or tas Stare or Missourt and Tyrm W. Burron, Henry McKay

Cary, Cuarnus L. Henson, E: L. McCumvrocx, and M. J. Mo-

QuEEN, as Members of said Public Service Commission, Respond-

ents, and Crry or Surewssury, a Municipal Corporation, Inter-
vener-Respondent, No. 44777—291 S. W. (2d) 95.

Court en Bane, June 11, 1956

Gaylord C. Burke for appellant.

Glenn D, Evans, General Counsel, and Frank J. Ive sistant Gen-
eral: Counsel, for Public Service Commission of Missouri and Tyre W.
Burton et al., June R. Rose for Intervenor-Respondent, City of Shrews-
bury. . " .

[97] COIL, C.—This appeal is to review an order of the Public
Service Commission (hereinafter called Commission) denying the
application by the St. Louis Public Service Company (hereinafter
called Company) to abandon its Mackenzie-Shrewsbury bus line. That
line came into existence as the result of two prior Commission orders.
A 1951 order in case No. 12,137 pertained to the Mackenzie ‘‘leg’’ and
a 1953 order in case No. 12,550 dealt with the Shrewsbury ‘‘leg.’’
While the Commission’s reports and orders in those prior cases are
not a part of the instant record, we take judicial notice of them be-
cause the instant case and the two prior cases are so related and inter-
dependent as to make it necessary to refer to those prior cases for a
proper understanding of the present case. .

In case No. 12,187, as a result of a hearing on the complaint of, some
530 persons alleging lack of adequate publie transportation to serve
a St. Louis and St. Louis County area in the vicinity of Watson and
Mackenzie Roads, the Commission found that that area was ‘‘in need
of and entitled to reasonable public transportation service and that
the St. Louis Public Service Company should render such service’’
and ordered the Company on or before June 17, 1951, to establish
reasonable motorbus service over Watson Road for a distance of .72
of a mile between ihe points of intersection of Watson and Jamieson
and Watson and Mackenzie. As a result of that order, the Company
inaugurated a shuttle service between the points directed and at all
times herein mentioned has continued to operate the Mackenzie ‘‘leg.’”

In case No. 12,550, on application of the City of Shrewsbury, a
hearing on June 18, 1953, resulted in Commission findings ‘‘that public
convenience and necessity requires the establishment of service over
the route proposed,’’ that such service should be rendered by the St.
Louis Public Service Company, and an order that the Company in-
augurate and operate passenger bus service over the routé therein de-
seribed; provided, that if such service was to be a ‘‘shuttle service”’ it
should be rendered at not less than 30-minute headways in each direc-
tion, but that if the service was to be rendered by the extension of an
existing line, the Company would conform its headways and service
to those in existence on the line extended; and, provided further,
that the service ordered was to continue ‘‘for an experimental period
of 90 days and thereafter until this Commission shall otherwise order,
and during the said period the said St. Louis Public,Service Company
shall make a written report at least every 30 days to this Commission
and to the Mayors of Shrewsbury and Webster Groves showing the
revenues and expenses of this operation exclusive of administration

and depreciation expenses.’’ Jurisdiction was retained to permit the
Company to be heard after the expiration of the 90-day experiment on
the proposition of a discontinuation of the service ordered.

As a result of that unappealed order, the Company chose to extend
the Mackenzie service over the Shrewsbury route directed and thus in
compliance with Commission’s order, rendered that service on the
same headways and schedules as those then in existence on the Mac-
kenzie ‘‘leg.’’? Consequently, since January 9, 1954, there has been in
existence the 2.95-miles-long Mackenzie-Shrewsbury bus line over this
route: From Watson Road and Mackenzie Road, east on Watson Road
to Chippewa Street, thence continuing east on Chippewa Street to
Jamieson Avenue, northwardly on Jamieson Avenue to Lansdowne
Avenue, west on Lansdowne Avenue to Murdoch [98] Cut-off,
thence continuing west on Murdoch Cut-off and Murdoch Avenue to
Laclede Station Road, northwardly on Laclede Station Road to Big
Bend Boulevard, southwestwardly on Big.Bend Boulevard to Lock-
wood Avenue, westwardly on Lockwood Avenue to Bompart Avenue,
southwardly on Bompart Avenue to Big Bend Boulevard, northeast-
wardly on Big Bend Boulevard to Lockwood Avenue, thence returning
over the same route.

The seven-days-a-week service rendered included: Sunday service
on. 30-minute headways from 1:15 p.m. to 7:15 p.m., Saturday service
on 80-minute headways from 5:45 a.m. to 7:30 p.m., and Monday
through Friday service on 30-minute headways from 5:45 a.m. to 7:30
p.m., except for 15-minute headways from 6:15 a.m. to 8:45 a.m. and
from 4:45 p.m. to 6:15 p.m.

The Company’s application in the instant case, filed May 19, 1954,
after’ the service had been rendered for more than 120 days, alleged
that the operation demonstrated that there was no public need for the
entire Mackenzie-Shrewsbury bus line; that, because of operating losses
sustained and being sustained, the continued operation of the line was
an unreasonable burden on the Company’s entire transit system; and
that, because the Company was not making a fair return on its proper-
ty used in public service, continued operation of the line amounted to
a confiscation of the Company’s property in violation of federal and
state constitutional provisions. The prayer of the application asked
authority to abandon the Mackenzie-Shrewsbury line ‘‘and for such
other and further relief as may be meet and proper under the circum-
stances * * #,??

: We first note the Company’s contention that the Commission’s
instant report and order do not conform to the requirements of Section
586.090 of the Administrative Procedure Act (all section references
are to RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.) in that the report does not include sep-
arately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law or a concise
statement of the findings on which the Commission based its order.
Section 536.090 does, as the Company contends, require that the order

in a case like the instant one shall contain or be accompanied by sep-
arately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law, including a con-
cise statemerit of the findings on which the Commission based its order.
The report contains the words, near its beginning, that ‘‘From the rec:
ord made in this proceeding we find the following facts: * * *.’”
Interspersed among those findings, however, is a general review of the
evidence adduced. Thereafter, the report proceeds under the’ head-
ing ‘‘Conclusions,’’ which contains the Commission’s observations but
which includes the findings of the essential facts wpon-which the Com-
mission based its order. Those conclusions included whatever ‘conclu-
sion of law was necessary (if there was any conclusion of-law necessary
in this particular proceeding as distinguished from a.conclusion in the
nature of one of mixed law and fact).' For our purposes, the decisive
matter is that we have no diffienlty in determining from the Commis-
sion’s report and order the. findings upon which that order was based,
and, consequently, we hold that the report and order in this case, con-
sidered as a whole, are sufficient for our review and that no purpose
would be served by remanding to the Commission for a more formal
and literal compliance with the provisions of Section 536.090.

- As a matter of fact, the Company does not dispute or object to the
finding of any evidentiary fact made by the Commission for, indeed,
the essential evidentiary facts so found were undisputed and were
substantially the facts presented by the Company to support its appli-
cation. -Company’s basic’ contentions are that there was no finding or
conclusion by the Commission that public convenience and necessity re-
quired the continued operation of the bus service, and that there could
not have been any such lawful or reasonbale conclusion or finding
based upon the evidentiary facts found by the Commission. Ais we
shall later demonstrate, those contentions are untenable under the par-
ticular issues presented by this appeal.

The view we take of this appeal makes it unnecessary for us to set
forth a resumé of the evidence. It is sufficient for our purposes [99}-
to summarize the Commission’s ultimate factual conclusions, ‘based, as
we have said, upon essentially undisputed evidence: Although the
Commission did not set forth its findings and conclusions in the form
in which we now summarize them, yet there is no doubt: that these were
the Commission’s essential conclusions, and that each of them sub-
stantially appears in the Commission’s report and order.

The Commission made these findings and reached these conclusions:
(1) that the application before it raised no issue (and obviously: not)
involving the matter of Company’s system-wide rates including the
question of zone fares for the Mackenzie-Shrewsbury line ;.(2) that the
Mackenzie-Shrewsbury line operated at a loss during the period Jan-
uary 9, 1954 (its inauguration) to, May 31,'1954, and that the: loss
was such that the revenue received was not sufficient to provide even
the actual out-of-pocket cost of the service, much less to provide enough

revenue to cover the total cost of the service of the line’s proportionate
share of the cost of the Company’s entire operation; (3) that the cost
of furnishing service on the Mackenzie-Shrewsbury line is now being
paid in part by the Company’s patrons who are transported by Com-
pany’s profitable lines; (4) that the evidence did not cause the Com-
mission to believe that any change in the mode or method of providing
essentially the same service would result in an increase of revenue
sufficient to equal the Company’s out-of-pocket cost, and that, conse-
quently, the continued operation of the line in the foreseeable future
would-remain a loss operation; (5) that the Company’s rate of return
for its entire operation, depending upon the method used to arrive at
the figures upon which that rate of return was based, was either 3.11%
or 4.74% or 5.1% ; (6) that, based upon the evidence adduced at the
hearing and taking into account the Commission’s knowledge of the
Company’s problems, the Company’s operation of a particular line
which results in an wnreasonably disproportionate loss should either be
so changed in method of operation as to substantially reduce the loss
to a point where that loss is no longer prohibitively disproportionate,
or the particular operation abandoned arid service thereby discontin-
ued, and this, even though such might result in some serious incon-
venience to a relatively few people who, under different circumstances,
would be entitled to transportation service by the line abandoned; (7)
that the operation of the Mackenzie-Shrewsbury line at the time of the
hearing showed an annual loss, based upon the excess of out-of-pocket
expense alone over revenue; of $16,000 a year; that the Company’s
evidence showed’ that such loss might be reduced to approximately
$9,000 annually by curtailing or reducing the service furnished (ie.,
by eliminating the rush-hour 15-minute headways and furnishing
service on 30-minute headways only, and by eliminating all Sunday
service) ; that whether the present loss would in fact decrease to any
particular amount would depend on entirely speculative and pres-
ently undeterminable factors; (8) that if the loss were reduced suffi-
ciently, then, taking into account only the small segment of the entire
system under present consideration as opposed to a consideration of
system-wide rates, the same public convenience and necessity (there-
tofore found to exist in the unappealed orders in cases Nos. 12,137
and 12,550) still existed and might require the continuation of the
reduced service even though the rendering of that service would
continue .to be a loss operation; (9) that the proposed curtailment
of service would not substantially affect the adequacy of transporta-
tion-service for the areas in question; (10) that the best way to
determine with’ any degree of certainty the over-all effect of the
curtailed service on the line’s operation was to experiment for a
further-minimum period of 90 days, after which, if the Company so
desired, the Commission, based upon all the. evidence at that time,

would deterniine the basie question of’ abandonment or no abandon-
ment.

. As we view it; the Commission’s instant report and order
were in reality a method or process used by the Commission to obtain
additional evidence by further experimental operation under cur-
tailed service. This additional evidence, so obtained, -was to be con-
sidered by the Commission in any final determination of the issue-as
to the [100] Company’s contention that the service should be dis-
continued. Thus, it would appear that we need to determine whether.
the Commission had the authority to enter such an order, ie., to use
such a method, and, if so, whether it was unreasonable for the Com-
mission to postpone a final decision-on the abandonment issue ‘until.
it had before it the results of the 90-day experimental operation under
curtailed service. True, the application to abandon was denied,. but
it is clear that the denial was not in the nature of a final denial. The
Commission said to the Company, in effect, we are not ready to-finally
determine whether you are entitled to an order permitting you to
abandon the line because, in our opinion, additional relevant evidence
will be available on. that issue as a result of at least 90 days further
experimental operation under curtailed’ service.

Hl If the Commission’s. general regulatory authority as ‘to the.
Company contemplated such an order as incidental and necessary to
the exercise of the Commission’s jurisdiction to authorize or deny
an abandonment of one of the Company’s lines, then we should reach
the apparent conclusion that to require a further 90-days’ experi-
ment could not have been unlawful or unreasonable. This, because
whether a final order denying abandonment would or would not be
unlawful as constituting confiscation of the Company’s property and
denying it due process and whether such final order would or would
not be unlawful and unreasonable because not supported by the
weight of the evidence, it is abundantly clear that merely requiring
the Company to operate a small segment of a total transit system
for 90 days under changed conditions of serviee and for the very
purpose of gathering additional evidence to finally determine the
very matters which .involve Company’s instant contentions could
not, in any view, be unlawful or unreasonable. In this connection,
however, we point out that we are cognizant of the fact that the Com-
mission could, by the device of successive orders for additional ex-
perimental operations, so indefinitely postpone any final determination
and review as to make the very procedure unlawful, unreasonable,
and unduly burdensome to the Company ‘by requiring a succession of
hearings. No such issue is before us in this case.

We are of the opinion that the Commission may, within the limita-
tions of lawfulness and reasonableness suggested above and undoubted-
ly others, enter an order like the instant one .for the purpose of ob-
taining additional evidence upon' which to base a subsequent order

authorizing or denying abandonment of a bus line. True, there is
no provision of the law under which the Commission operates which
spells out in exact words that authority. But the Commission is
eliarged generally and specifically with supervision and regulation
of the Company and ‘‘it is within the powers and jurisdiction of the
public service commission, under the powers granted that body by
the Legislature, to grant to or withhold from a street railroad the
tight and power to abandon a part or spur of its existing line, * * *.’’
State ex rel. City of Kirkwood v. Public Service Commission, 330
Mo. 507, 518[1], 50 S.W. 2d 114, 118 [1-3]. It follows that the Com-
mission, in the exercise of the power to grant or-deny Company’s
application to abandon, must have authority to effectively perform
that duty through an order like the instant one. State ex rel. and to
Use of Public Service Commission v. Padberg, 346 Mo. 1183, 1187[3],
145 S.W. 24150, 151[8]. (See also State ex rel. Campbell Iron Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 317 Mo. 724, 781, 296 S.W. 998, 1000
[1, 2], as to validity of ‘‘test orders’’ as the best way to determine
the reasonableness of rates fixed by the Commission, and State ex rel.
Pitcairn v. Public Service Commission, 232 Mo, App. 535, 549, 111
S.W. 2d 222, 230[8], where the court held that an order in the nature
of an experimental test order to determine whether applicant’s pro-
posed extension of a bus line would result in imereased revenue
sufficient to insure a profitable operation and meet requirements of
public convenience and necessity, was a proper exercise of the Com-
mission’s authority.)

| | Company also contends that the instant order was in excess
of the Commission’s authority in that it ‘‘invaded the province of
management’’ by directing the [101] details of the service to be
rendered. It is Company’s position that while the Commission is
authorized by statute to prescribe the details of service such as head-
ways, type of equipment, etc., in cases in which the Commission itself
has investigated, or someone has complained of, the adequacy of
existing service, there is no authority conferred upon the Commission,
in a ease where the issue is whether abandonment of service is justi-
fied, to order, in the event of denial of abandonihent, the details of
future service to be rendered.

‘What we have said heretofore with reference to the-true nature of
the instant order in effect disposes of this contention. If, as we have
said, the purpose of the order was to discover the result of a particular
type of service to furnish a further evidentiary basis for a final
determination as to abandonment, then, clearly, the Commission’s
order to be effective must have required the particular service which
was to be the subject of the experimental operation.

We, therefore, do not reach or decide the question of whether
the Commission may in an order finally denying abandonment pre-
scribe the details of the future service the Company is to render. (We

do point out, however, that in the instant case the curtailed service
ordered was in the nature of ‘‘relief’’ to the Company [it was less
than that being rendered], and that Company’s application prayer
was not only.for authority to abandon, but also ‘‘for such other and
further relief. as may be meet and proper under the circumstances.’’)

The view we have taken of this case makes it unnecessary to
discuss generally the scope of judicial review of orders of the Public
Service Commission, even though clarification of that entire question
would appear desirable in a case squarely involving that issue. We
do, however, consider it appropriate at this time to point out that -
some of the statements, pertaining to the scope of judicial review,
appearing in a per curiam opinion in the case of Kansas City v.
Rooney, 863 Mo. 902, 254 S8.W. 2d 626, are erroneous. In that case
the effect of this language of Article V, Section 22, Mo. Const. 1945.
(providing for a judicial review of decisions, findings, rules and
orders of administrative officers and bodies) was considered: ‘‘and
such review shall include the determination whether the same are
authorized by law, and in cases in which a hearing is required by
law, whether the same ‘are supported by competent and substantial
evidence upon the whole record.’’ It was held-in Rooney that the
scope of review so provided was preclusive and that Wood v. Wagner
Blectrie Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 197 S.W. 2d 647, had held that ‘‘all
previous statutes are amended by substituting the provisions of See-
tion 22, Article V, for any scope of review previously stated, because
the constitutional standard of review ‘is mandatory and requires no
legislation to put it into effect.’ ’’? 254 S.W. 2d 627[1].

And it was further stated in Rooney that review of the decisions
of a county court ‘‘are now on the same basis as review of awards of
‘Workmen’s Compensation or orders of the Public Service Commis-
sion. As we recently pointed out in Michler v. Krey Packing Co.,
Mo. Sup., 253 S. W. 2d 136, 142, decisions of administrative tribunals
are not reviewed de novo because courts have no authority to make
findings of fact in such cases.’? 254 S.W. 2d 627 [2, 3].

An examination of the Wood case, supra, will demonstrate that
it did not hold that ‘‘all previous statutes are amended by substituting
the provisions of Section 22, Article V, for any scope of review pre-
viously stated.’? On.the contrary, Wood specifically recognized and
so stated that the provision in Section 22, Article V, 1945 Constitution,
was a ‘‘minimum standard”’ for judicial review. That holding was
correct. In other words, Wood correctly recognized that, irrespec-
tive of what scope of judicial review of administrative decisions was
provided by existing or future statutes dealing with specific agencies,
the scope of review would in any event be as broad as that minimum
review provided for by the constitution. And Wood, again correctly,
held that any statute providing for a narrower scope of review was
no longer effective because of the constitutional provision noted. Wood

did not say or imply that an existing or future statute providing for
a broader scope [102] of judicial review than that stated in Article
V, Section 22, was or would be invalid.

It would seem too plain for serious question that the legislature

had and has the power and authority to provide for any scope of
judicial review it may desire, so long as the provisions made are not
in conflict with or repugnant to the federal and state constitutions.
And so it is, that the second statement from the Rooney case quoted
above is also, in part, clearly erroneous because, for the reasons noted,
it is not true that the same scope of judicial review is applicable to
the decisions of all administrative agencies.
- However, what we Have'said does not mean necessarily that Rooney
was incorrect in the’é¢onclusion there reached that Section 49.230,
applicable to county courts when they were judicial courts, does not
determine the scope of review on appeals from county courts’ since
their change in status under the 1945 Couistitution.

The effect of ‘Article V, Section 22, Mo. Const. 1945, is, that every
judicial review of a decision, & finding, rule, or order of an administra-
tive officer or body ‘mentioned therein shall be at least as broad in
scope as the minimum. standard there prescribed, to wit: ‘‘shall in-
elude the determination whether the same are authorized by law, and
im cases in which a hearing is required by law, whether the same are
supported: by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole
record.’’? The scope of review there provided is not preclusive and,
therefore, does not mean that a broader scope of judicial review of an
administrative decision may not be otherwise provided by law.

- For the reasons heretofore stated, the judgment of the Circuit
Court affirming’ the Commission’s order is affirmed.

.PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Com, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the Court en bane. -All concur.

SHo-Mz Powsr Corrorarion, a Corporation, Respondent, v. A. Fann,
Brunam Pann et al., Appellants, No. 45191—292 S. W. (2d) 91.

- Division One, July 9, 1956.

M. J. Huffman and Haymes & Haymes for appellants.

” Gregory Stockard, Garner Moody, Green & Green, Will H. D. Green
and H. D. Green for respondent. . .

[92] WESTHUES, C.—The Sho-Me Power Corporation instituted
a condemnation proceeding for’a right of way 100 feet in width across
the land of the defendants A. Fann and Buelah Fann, husband and
wife, and other landowners. The suit was filed in Webster County.
Commissioners appointed to assess damages filed a report fixing defend-
ants’ (A. -Fann and Buelah Fann) damages at’ $2,000. Exceptions
were filed by the ‘anns [93] and they are the only defendants
initerested in this particular suit. Thereafter, a change of venue was
granted and the case was transferred to Hartville, Wright County,
Missouri. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict of $11,000 in favor of
the defendants. The trial court granted a new trial and defendants
appealed.

The trial court sustained plaintiff’s motion for new trial ‘fon ground
No. 1 of Plaintiff’s Motion for new trial.’’ Ground No.:1 of the motion
was directed at the method of selecting the regular panel of jurors
from which the trial jury was chosen. The assignment is rather lengthy,
covering two typewritten pages. It contains the following ‘state-
ment: ‘‘After the trial of this action plaintiff, it’s officers and counsel
learned for the first time that the regular panel of jurors from which
was chosen the jury before whom this action was tried, was not selected
according to law.’’ It was particularly set forth in the motion that
Judge Crain, the Circuit Judge of that circuit, was not. present when
the panel was selected; that Judge Crain had not had sufficient notice
of the date to select the panel; that the county, court refused to give
Judge Crain an opportunity to be present; that when Judge Crain ar-
rived at Hartville, the jury panel had been selected. . We need not
mention other matters set forth. An attorney. for plaintiff made an
affidavit stating that the facts set forth in the motion concerning the
jury panel were true to his best knowledge and information.

| The trial judge heard evidence on the motion which, in our
opinion, brought to light either a misunderstanding of the ‘statutes
governing the selection of jury panels or a disregard of such statutes.
The controlling statutes in this case are Sections 494.230, 494.240, and
494,250, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.

The case was tried during the June, 1955, term of court. The Cir-
euit Clerk of Wright County was called as a witness on the hearing on
the motion for new trial. In answer to questions asked by the trial
judge, the clerk testified that when the panel for the June term, 1955,
was selected, one of the judges of the county court drew the slips
carrying the names of jurors from the jury box and she, the clerk,
recorded the names, This method was in violation of the provisions of
Section 494.250, supra; 50 C.J.S. 892, Sec. 165. We so held in State
v. McGoldrick, Mo., 236 S.W.(2d) 306, le. 307 (1-8). We deem it
sufficient to refer to that case and the authorities cited therein. The
statute should be followed. In Section 494.250, supra, .it is clearly
stated, ‘‘The clerk of the board of jury commissioners, so situated as
to be unable to see the names on such slips, shall, publicly, in the pres-
ence of said board of jury commissioners, proceed to draw out names
separately and singly from one. township until-he. gets the number of
names required from such township .for petit jurors and an
equal number as alternate jurors to serve on petit juries if .sum-
moned: * * #,”?

The evidence of the clerk disclosed a ‘finthe ‘disregard of the
statute (Sec. 494.240, supra) which provides in part that ‘The board
of jury commissioners of each county not less than thirty days before
the commencement of the circuit court or other court having civil and
eviminal jurisdiction, or civil or criminal jurisdiction, shall -select
names of not less than four hundred persons having all requisite quali-

fications of jurors; * * *.’’ The clerk’s evidence was that four hun-
dred names were placed in the jury box on January 18, 1955. That
was mere than thirty days before the February, 1955, term of court.
Sec. 478.807, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. The panel for the February term
was drawn from that number. The clerk testified that no names -were
added for the June term. Note the evidence of the clerk on this point:

“*Q. Do you know when the names in those envelopes had

been selected by the Jury Commission?
“AL Yes.
(a “Q. Was it just before the jury was selected? -

You mean for the whole year?
Yes, ma’am.

“A, No, that was back in January.

“Q. And no new names had been added?

“A. Certainly not.’?

The statute contemplates and provides that when a panel of jurors
for a term of court is to be selected that there be four hundred names of
persons qualified for jury service in the jury box. Selecting four
hundred names at the beginning of the year to be used for thé entire
year and not adding any thereto at the following terms of court is not
a compliance with the statute.

HE The evidence of the clerk disclosed a further irregularity: The
following are questions by the trial judge and answers by the clerk:

“Q. This list of names that went to make up the jury panel
which was selected back in January, did you make up the list
from the three townships?

“A, Yes.

“*Q. What township did you make it wp from?

“A. Montgomery, Van Buren and Clark.

“Q. From what sources did you obtain those names?

““A. From the poll books.

“*Q. From the poll books?

“A. Um-hmm.

“*Q. Where were the poll books?

“A. In Little’s office.

“Q. Did you go in there and examine the books?

“A, T think I took them in my office.

“Q. Were any of the other members of the Jury Commission
present when you did that? ‘

“*A, No, I don’t think go.” . .

Section 494.230, supra, provides that the clerk of tlie cireuit court
shall be a member of the board of jury commissioners and that such
clerk shall be the clerk of the board in the performance of the clerical
part of their work. The portion of Section 494.250, quoted supra, says
that the clerk ‘shall, publicly, * * * draw out names’? from the jury

“

lists. (Emphasis ours) It is our opinion that by Section. 494.240,
supra, the legislature did not intend for the.clerk of the jury com-
mission to select names to make up the list of four hundred for jury
service. Furthermore, by Section 494.250, supra, the legislature made it
mandatory that the clerk of the jury commission draw the names from
the list of four hundred (drawn pursuant to Sec. 494.240) to make up
the panel of jurors to serve for the next term of court. In the case
before us, both sections of the statute were violated as is shown by the
lerk’s testimony. In our opinion, the legislature has prescribed an
excellent method of selecting jurors. It has provided safeguards that
should not be disregarded. State v. Rouner, 333 Mo. 1236, 64 S.W.(2d)
916, 92 A.L.R. 1099; 50 C.J.S. 875, 876, Sec. 155.

HM The evidence further disclosed that Judge Crain requested that
the board meet sometime between January 20 and January 24, 1955.
The request was denied and the meeting date was set for January 18.
The judge notified the clerk that he could not be in attendance on that
date and asked that the matter be postponed to January 20. This re-
quest was not granted and the meeting date was not changed. The
judge, however, did appear on January 18 about 9:00 a.m., and found
that the clerk was then copying the list of jurors. The names had been
previously selected and the clerk had been instructed to type the names
on January 18. The circuit judge [95] was not given an oppor-
tunity to participate in . selecting the four hundred names placed in the
jury box.

The purpose of the statute is that the cireuit judge, as well as the
county judges, take part in selecting jurors. The board should attempt
to fix dates for the transaction of business when all members can
attend.

HI Defendants say in their brief that the ‘question of whetaer
there was any substantial irregularity in selecting the jury panel is
one of law, so the granting of a new trial in this case does not fall
within the rule of the exercise of sound- -judicial discretion:”” There
can be no question or doubt in this case, and we so hold, that there was
a substantial irregularity. ©

_ Defendants say that there was no showing of prejudice. The trial
court granted a new trial which indicates that the judge was of the
opinion that there was prejudice. In such circumstances, this court
defers to the ruling of the trial court. Woodworth v. Kansas City
Publie Service Co., Mo., 274 S.W.(2d) 264, Le. 270,271 (4-7). Dé-
fendants say further that ‘‘Plaintiff failed to prove that knowledge
of any irregularity came to it only after trial.’’? The allegations as
to this matter in the motion for new trial were sworn to by an attorney
for plaintiff and they were not controverted. The trial court was
evidently satisfied with the showing made. The case of McCormack
v. McNamee, Mo., 274 8. W. (2d) 272, le. 275° (4, 5), cited by defend-

ants, recognizes the rule that a party may raise for the first time, after
trial, any irregularity in the selection of a jury if knowledge thereof
became known to him after trial.

The order granting a new trial is hereby affirmed. All. concur.

Roszrt A. Hererorp et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ta Unknown
Hus, Grawruzs or Successors of Apert THoLozan, Deceased,
et’ al., Defendants-Respondents, Brnoist Saneurner et al., De-
fendants-Appellants, Rnusin Saneuivet et al., Intervenors-Appel-
Jants, No. 45385—292 9. W. (2d) 289.

Court en Bane, July 9, 1956.

Stamm, Millar, Neuhof & Campbell by David Y. Campbell for
plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert Ebert for defendants-appellants John Sanguinet and Reubin
Sanguinet.

“Lhompson, Mitchell, Th son & Douglas, Richard P. Conerly,
Charles M. Spence and Robert A. Hamilton for respondent Locust
Realty Company and Frank’s Inc., Henry Ebenhoh for respondent
St. Louis Title & Abstract Company.

.[290] HOLLINGSWORTH, J.—This appeal arises out of a suit
brought in six counts. Count One seeks construction of the will of
Adelle Tholozan, deceased. Counts Two, Three, Four and Five seek to
quiet title to four tracts of real estate owned by testatrix at the time
of her death. Count Six seeks partition of said real estate. It appear-
ing to the parties and to the court, following a pretrial conference, that
an adjudication of the issues presented under Count One would be
basically determinative of the remaining five counts, it was ordered
that Count One be separately tried and that a final and appealable
judgment be rendered thereon prior to trial and adjudication of all
other issues in the case. From the final decree rendered on Count One,
plaintiffs and certain of the original defendants have joined in an
appeal and certain intervening defendants have joined in another ap-
peal. This court has jurisdiction both because title to real estate is
involved and the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds $7,500.
Article V, § 38, Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S.

Adelle Tholozan, a widow, executed the will in question on December
9, 1862. She died on April 2, 1877, without having remarried and
without issue. Her will, consisting of two handwritten pages, a photo-
static copy of which is in evidence, was duly admitted to probate in the
Probate Court of the City of St. Louis.

. [291] Item First thereof forgave all indebtedness owing testatrix by
her-niece, Adelle Phillips, and ordered the evidences thereof can-
eelled-and delivered up by the executors named in Item Fifth.

Item Second devised ‘‘about one hundred & fifty four arpens’’ (ap-
proximately 154 acres) of land in St. Louis County, in equal shares,
per stirpes, to testatrix’s brother, Charles Sanguinet, her sisters,
Caroline Cozens and Mary Garnier, and the two children of a de-
ceased sister, Bulalie Bright, to wit: Charles Bright and Hulalie Page.

Item Third devised a life estate in the western half of a lot in the
City of St. Louis (hereinafter referred to as the Hebert Street prop-
erty) to.Bridget Healy, whom, the will says, testatrix ‘‘raised”’,

Tiem Fourth, on which the issues presented by this appeal turn,
reads as follows: .

“Tt is my will & desire, & I hereby give, grant, devise & bequeath
all the balance & remainder of my property & estate of every
nature & kind whatsoever unto Louis V. Bogy & William C. Jami-
son as joint tenants & Trustees, for the Sole, separate &exclusive
use, benefit & behoof of. Adelle Philips my niece, during her nat-
ural life, and at & after her death, then for the sole, separate &
exclusive use, benefit & behoof of Eulalie Philips only daughter of

said Adelle Philips & all other children of said Adelle Philips, if

_ any should be born hereafter, share & share alike, & if the said

Eulalie Philips & the other children of said Adelle Philips, if any

- there should be, shall die, without having married, or-without issue

living, then the said property as aforesaid, & such portion thereof

_—— XT ™”

as shall then be on hand, shall go to & vest in fee simple in the

said Sisters and brother of said Adelle Tholozan & their legal

representatives, according to law, the Statutes of descents.and dis-
tributions.’

Testatrix’s brother and sisters named in Item Second of her will died
prior to 1900, Adelle Phillips, the person named in Items First and
Fourth, was a daughter of testatrix’s brother, Simon Sanguinet. She
was 28 years of age when the will was executed. She diéd February
28, 1920, at the age of 85 years, leaving surviving as her only child,
Bulalie Phillips, the person named and referred to in Item Fourth.
(The only other child of Adelle Phillips, a son, died in infancy prior
to the execution of Mrs. Tholozan’s will.) Hulalie Phillips, aged three
years when the will was executed, died testate on March 19, 1950, at
the age of 90 years. She had never rmharried-and left no issue, either
natural or adopted. Defendant Arthur P. Luchesi was named executor
of her estate.

The total value of testatrix’s estate, at time of probate, was approxi-
mately $100,000. It consisted of personal property of an approximate
value of $15,000, the tract of real estate devised by her in Item Second,
which tract is not here in controversy, and the four parcels described
in the petition. These four parcels hereinafter are referred to as the
Olive Street property, the Hebert Street property, the Walnut Street
property and the Locust Street property.

By deed dated March 22, 1901, Adelle Phillips and Bulalie Phillips
conveyed all their right, title and interest under testatrix’s will in the
‘Walnut Street property to James P. Maginn, who, in turn, deeded said
property to defendant Maginn Investment Company.

The Hebert Street property was taken in condemnation by defend-
ant City of St. Louis under a condémnation suit filed on August 5;
1922. The sum of $1600 was awarded as damages for such condemna-
tion, which sum was paid into the registry of the St. Louis Circuit
Court 6n March 23, 1927, by defendant City of St. Louis, where it
remainéd at the time of trial. Tlie City of St. Louis denied any in-
terest in the issues here presented.

On May 29, 1944, Bulalie Phillips quiteluimed the Locust Street
property to defendant Locust Realty Company for an [292] ex-
pressed consideration of $100. Plaintiffs offered: to show that the
actual consideration was $11,000,-which offer the trial court, on objec-
tion of certain of the inidividual defendants, refused. - On. February
18, 1947, defendant Locust Realty Company leased said property to
defendant Frank’s, Inc., for a period of ten years ending February 28,
1957, at an annual rental of $9,000.: On June ‘17, 1947, defendant
Locust Realty Company executed a deed of trust on the Locust Street
property to secure an indebtedness for borrowed money in the amount
of $30,000. On June 2, 1952, defendant’ St. Louis ‘Title and Abstract
Company acquired said deed of trust and the remaining principal note

secured thereby, in the amount of $23,250, which note was due on June
17, 1952.

In a memorandum opinion, the trial court found that Item Fourth
should be construed ‘‘in accordance with the contentions of counsel for
Locust Realty Company’’, which, as we understand the record, are, in
the main, also the contentions of such of the other defendants as claim
under Hulalie Phillips, including defendants Maginn Investment
Company, Frank’s, Inc., and St. Louis Title and Abstract Company,
the latter two of whom have joined with Locust Realty Company in a
respondents’ brief filed in support of the finding and decree of the
trial court. The decree rendered herein, after recital of the substance
of the aforesaid facts, was:

“9. That the true intent, meaning and legal effect of Item Fourth
of the will of said Adelle Tholozan, deceased, * * * were to create
* # ® [in the four tracts of property referred to in said Item Fourth]
* * ® 4 life estate in said Adelle A. Phillips and a fee simple absolute
in said Bulalie A. Phillips and all other children of said Adelle A.
Phillips, if any should be born, and an alternative substitutional devise
in fee simple absolute in said Caroline Cozens, Mary Garnier, Charles
Sanguinette and Eulalie Bright and their legal representatives, accord-
ing to law, which said latter devise was to take effect only if Bulalie
Phillips and all other children of said Adelle A. Phillips, if any should
be born, died without issue and without having married prior to the
death of her mother Adelle A. Phillips. .

“10. That by virtue of said Hulalie A. Phillips surviving and
being the only child of her mother, said Adelle A. Phillips, said Bulalie
A. Phillips became vested with a fee simple absolute in the property
* * * [described in Item Fourth] * * * and the said alternative sub-
stitutional devise to plaintiffs and certain of the defendants as surviv-
ing legal representatives of the said Caroline Cozens, Mary Garnier,
Charles Sanguinette and Hulalie Bright failed.”

The respective interests and titles of the many parties herein were
thereupon determined and adjudged in accord with the portions of the
decree above quoted.

The appellants (with the exception of intervenor-defendants John
Sanguinet and Reubin Sanguinet) are the descendants and successors
of testatrix’s brother and three sisters mentioned in Item Second of the
will. (Henceforth, we will refer to these parties, consisting of the
plaintifis and such of the defendants whose interests are in common
with those of plaintiffs, as ‘‘the appellants’, unless we specifically
otherwise so state.) They contend that testatrix did not devise a fee
simple title to Hulalie Phillips and that they, as the residuary devisees
named in Item Fourth, were invested with fee simple title upon the
death of Eulalie Phillips.

The executor of Eulalie Phillips’ estate and her heirs and residuary
devisees contend that Item Fourth devised a remainder in fee to

Eulalie, and, in the alternative, that Item Fourth violates the rule
‘against perpetuities and is void, resulting in intestacy as to the real
estate involved in this suit.”

[298] The appellant-intervenor-defendants, John Sanguinet and
Reubin Sanguinet, are descendants and successors of Frederick Paul
Sanguinet, who was not made a beneficiary under the will of testatrix,
although he was a son of testatrix’s brother, Simon Sanguinet, and a
brother of Adelle Phillips. They contend that the provisions of Item
Fourth violated the rule against perpetuities and that testatrix ‘‘died
intestate as to any remainder she attempted to devise”’ to her sisters
and brother named in Item Second of her will; and that they are there-
fore entitled to take of her estate such share-in said property as would
inure to them under the statutes of descent and distribution.

The contentions of respondents Locust Realty Company and others
claiming under Eulalie Phillips (to whom we willrefer as ‘‘the re-
spondents’’ unless other respondents are specifically designated) are
that the decree of the trial court declaring that an. indefeasible fee
simple title to said four parcels of real estate vested in Bulalie Phillips
as the sole surviving’ child of Adelle Phillips is sound and should be
affirmed. . :
The infinite variety of expressions and the differing shades of
meaning so often attached to identical words or phrases when employed
by the makers of wills in a context and under cireumstances peculiar
to the context of the will of each testator and the circumstances under
which it.was written make prior decisions construing similar words
or phrases of far less value as precedent than those in other fields of
litigated controversies. Scullin v. Mercantile-Commetce Bank & Trust
Co., Mo. Sup., 234 8.W. 2d 597, 602; Housman: v. Lewellen, 362 Mo.
759, 244 S.W. 2d 21, 28. But, funddmentally and always, the para-
mount rule in construing wills is the ascertainment of the intent of
the testator, which is to be determined, if possible, from a consideration
of the instrument asa whole. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kelley, 855
Mo. 924, 199 S.W. 2d 344, 349. While a will-speaks from the death of
the testator, yet when its true intent and meaning is under considera-
tion the court, if necessary, will also consider the situation of and
circumstances surrounding the testator whén it was executed. If, from
such an examination, the intent is ascertainable, auxiliary rules. of
construction are not to be resorted to. If, however, the language is
ambiguous and the intent not clear from a consideration of the instru-
ment as a whole and in the light of the situation and circumstances
under which it was written, then recourse to such rules is permissible.
Shackelford v. Fifer, Mo.Sup., 269 8.W. 2d 30, 83. -.

Hl Appellants say that, contrary to the conclusions reached by the
trial court, the entire plan of disposition, the circumstances under
which the will was written, and the language employed ‘in it show-that
testatrix intended Evlalie not take a fee simple title. They argue that

by virtue of Item Fourth testatrix wanted only to insure the support
of her niece, Adelle Phillips, and Adelle’s child, Eulalie, and any other
children born to Adelle, so long as any of them lived, and did not in-
tend to give them full ownership of the property. They assert that
the giving of the legal title to the residuary estate to trustees for the
“sole, separate & exclusive use, benefit & behoof’’ of Eulalie, after
Adelle Phillips’ death, is insufficient to create a fee in Hulalie. They
concede, however, that the determination of the sufficiency, of the lan-
guage used therein to create a fee in Eulalie ‘‘is, of course, primarily
a question of intent’’, That legal title was vested in the trustees is
admitted, and the will expressly states it was placed there for the sole,
separate and exclusive use and benefit of Bulalie and any other chil-
dren thereafter born to Adelle, share and share alike. There is no
limitation, other than Adelle’s life estate, to the extent or duration of
the benefits accruing to Hulalie and any other children thereafter born
to Adelle. The trustees were invested with no control and no duties
other than, perhaps, the duty, if more than one child should-be born
to Adelle, to see that all should ‘‘share [294] & share alike’’. Cer-
tainly the trust, in effect, became dry upon Adelle’s death with no
child other than Eulalie having been born to her subsequent to execu-
tion of the will.

“A vested interest is one in which there is a present fixed right,
either of present enjoyment or of future enjoyment. Where, under the
terms of the gift, there is an ascertained person’ in existence who could
take the remainder in possession immediately upon the determination
of the particular estate whenever and however it may determine, the
estate is vested.’’ Painter v. Herschberger, 340 Mo. 347, 100 S.W. 24
582, 585 [4]. The fact that the legal title was placed in trust did not
prevent the vesting of title in Eulalie upon Adelle’s death, she being
the only child born to Adelle. Painter v. Herschberger, supra.

HI The instant case is readily distinguishable from the cases of
Humphreys v. Welling, 341 Mo. 1198, 111 9.W. 2d 128, and Cross v.
Hoch, 149 Mo. 325, 50 8.W. 786. In each of those cases, the will, con-
sidered as a whole, was held to reveal a definitely ascertainable intent
to withhold investiture of the fee until determination of the contin-
gency therein provided. That is not the situation here presented and
appellants, in effect, so admit by further suggesting that the photo-
static copy of the will gives evidence it was written in haste and that
“it is almost an irresistible conclusion that the scrivener, by mere
clerical error in his haste, left out the words ‘during her natural life’
in the provision for the use and benefit of Eulalie, the same as those
words appeared just previously in the otherwise identical provision
for the use and benefit of Adelle Phillips.”’ -

‘We are convinced that the language employed in Item Fourth was
sufficient to vest equitable title to the remainder in said property in

Bulalie Phillips (subject to admission of any other child or children
thereafter born to Adelle).

But appellants also say that the will and the civeumstances 1 re-
flected therein show that testatrix intended to give her property to
preferred relatives named in Item Second (and the life estate given
Bridget Healy in Item Third), subject only to a desire to. insure the
support of her niece, Adelle, and the latter’s child, Eulalie} that the
trust created and the words employed in the devise show such: an
intent; that the use of the words in Item Second, ‘‘unto the said de-
visees & to their heirs & assigns forever in fee simple’’, the use of the
phrase ‘‘during her natural life’’ in referring to the devise to. Bridget
Healy and to Adelle Phillips, ‘‘followed by a gift: to Bulalie of the
right to oceupy and enjoy the property after the first life beneficiary’s
death, with no mention whatever of a gift of the fee to Bulalie, al-
though immediately thereafter, and in the same clause testatrix finally
provided that her property ‘shall go to and vest in fee simple’ in ap-
pellants upon the contingency provided,’’ are strongly indicative. of
an intent to withhold a fee from Eulalie. It is worthy of note that
by stressing other phraseology peculiar to Item Fourth respondents
attach an entirely different meaning to said Item. They direct our
attention to the fact that in defining the interest devised to Adelle
Phillips, Item Fourth specifies that it be for life, whereas no. stich
limitation appears in the-provision for Eulalie, which, except in that
respect, is identical with the provision for Adelle. They then argue
that if the draftsman meant only 4 life estate for Bulalie, it would have
been natural and ordinary for him to say so; and that when ‘he used
language that effectively created a fee simple estate, his language
should be construed to mean what it says. A careful perusal of the
will does not convince us that appellants’ contention that testator in-
tended only a life estate for Eulalie is more persuasive than respond-
ents’ contention that the omission of such a phrase is due to a desire on
the part of testatrix not to limit the estate devised to Eulalié ‘during
her natural life’.

Appellants next suggest that the ‘‘provision in trust for the use and
benefit of [295] Hulalie Phillips, * * * when followed by a devise
in fee simple in appellants if Eulalie died ‘without having married, or
without issue living’, is strongly indicative of an intent to provide for
Bulalie an estate for life only’’, citing Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368,
28 S.W. 2d 999. In that case, the will devised the residue of testator’s
estate to his daughter ‘‘ ‘as long as she remains single, and ifshe marry
it is my will that she share equally with the other heirs’’’. The court,
loc.cit. 1000, held, first, that the provision was not obnoxious to the rule
against restraint of marriage, and, second, that ‘‘‘as long as she re-
mains single’ ”’ were words of limitation and marked the period which
was to determine the estate and created at most a life estate. “An
estate so limited may last for life and is therefore -a life estate, al-

though it terminates upon the marriage of the donee. > That case does
not sustain appellants’ contention.

HB Finally; appellants say: “If, on the other hand, it were
proper to construe the entire-provision, not as a life estate for Bulalie,
putas a devise of the fee to her and her issue, but in default of issue
living at her death to appellants, the resultant error in the Trial
Court’s decree is the same. Under such construction, the language
would: have created a fee tail at common law, limited by exeeutory
dévise upon definite failure of issue. If it be assumed.that such was
thle intended meaning of testatrix’ language, then it must also be pre-
suméd that téstatrix knew that the legal effect thereof, by the statute
néw Section 442.470, R.S. Mo., 1949, was to create a life estate in
Eulalie:and' a remainder in fee in her issue, contingent upon their
surviving Bulalie, with executory devise thereafter to appellants.
This; too, shows. testatrix’ intention that Hulalie Phillips’ interest
terminate at her death.’’ In support of this contention appellants
cite Pixlee v. Petty,*Mo. Sup., 274 S.W. 2d 257. In that case, after
devise of a life estate to his wife and a power of sale of certain proper-
ty, testator: gave his residuary estate to his only living daughter and
to-her bodily heirs, and stated, ‘‘ ‘If she should ‘die without leaving
bodily heirs, then Tt give and devise the remainder which would go to
said. bodily heirs, if’ such existed, to my brothers and sister, in fee
simple, * * *. If my said daughter should die‘prior to the death of my
said. wife, then possession of the real estate in this clause given to such
devisees: is: postponed until the death of my wife.’ ’’ The case is too
Jong to here review. Sutfice to say the court decided that the language
used negatived any intent to create an absolute estate in the first in-
stance; that by force of the statute abolishing estates tail the éffect
was.to create in the daughter a life estate with a remainder in fee.in
er: bodily: heirs, contingent wpori there being such bodily heirs in esse
when she died. A full review of the case shows it tobe further dis-
tinguishable from the instant case on account of the contents of the
will and the circumstances and surroundings under which it was
written.

-Testatrix undertook, primarily, to devise her estate to (1) her
sisters and brother and the children of the deceased sister specifically
named in. Item Second; (2) Bridget Healy, not related; and (3) the
niece aud grandniece, respectively, Adelle Phillips and Bulalie Phil-
lips, and other children, if any, born of Adelle Phillips, Other pro-
visions. seem ‘to have been secondary and incidental only to avoidance
of: possibility of partial intestacy. Respondents contend that the fur-
ther provision that if Hulalie should die without having married and
without issue,-“‘then the said property as aforesaid, & such portion
théreof as shall then be on hand,’’ should go tothe brother and sisters
(and children: of a deceased sister) in fee simple was the result of an
atterthought, ‘the afterthought being the possibility of the death of

Bulalie prior to that of testatrix and of Adelle Phillips;.and that the
only purpose of the ‘“‘afterthought’’ provision was to vest title-in the
preferred beneficiaries named in Item Second, tather.than to permit
the property to pass under the laws of intestacy to all of [296] - testa-
trix’s heirs if the fee devised to Hulalie failed by reason of her death
unmarried or childless prior to the deaths of testatrix and’ Adelle Phil-
lips. The argument is logical and strong legal precedent leads to the
conclusion that the will is to be so construed.

- The case of Owens v. Men and Millions Movement, 296. Mo. 110, 246
§.W. 172, decided in 1922, followed by other cases-of similar import, is
decisive of the question here presented. In the Owens case, the testa-
tor, in paragraph 7 of his will, devised the residue of: his. property
jointly to his daughter and son-in-law in fee. In paragraph 8, he pro-
vided that in case of their death the residue was to go to his grand
daughter; and in paragraph 10; the will continued: ‘‘It-is my will:
in case my said daughter and son-in-law and: granddaughter .should
all die without leaving any issue, then in such event all-of my said-
property * * * shall be divided * * * and * * * shall goto * * *
{mamed beneficiaries, including Men and Millions Movement].’’ (Hm-
phasis ours.) The daughter and son-in-law survived the testatorand
the court held that ‘‘die without leaving any issue’’ meant death with-
out issue during the lifetime of the testator. Accordingly; the court
held that by surviving the testator the daughter and son-in-law took
an absolute fee; and in so doing rejected the contention (here also
made) that they took a fee terminable upon their death without issue
at any time. In so holding the court, loc.cit. 174, stated: ‘‘But the
great weight of authority supports the rule that, when real estate is
devised in terms denoting an intention that the primary devisee shall:
take a fee on the death of the testator, coupled with a devise‘over in
case of his death without issue, the words refer to a death without
issue during the lifetime of the testator, and the primary devisee sur-
viving the testator takes an absolute estate in fee simple. The intention
of the testator is presumed to be to prevent a lapse. [Cases cited.]
The rule just stated is in accord. with the settled policy of the courts of
both this country and England, that words of doubtful meaning will
be so construed as to favor the heir; as to give an estate of inheritance
to the first devisee; as to vest the title to any estate so that it will not
remain in abeyance. [Cases cited.]’?

In the later (1928) case of Ewart v. Dalby, 319 Mo. 108, 5 S.W. 2d
428, the will provided, loc. cit. 429: ‘‘Bequeath to my beloved wife,
Frances, all personal property and real estate * * * and at her death
* * “ to my daughter, Esther Frances * * * and if she dies single
and unmarried and without issue, to my brother, Pinkney W. Sublette,
if living, and at his death if single and unmarried and without issue,
I bequeath said property to my next of kin on my father’s side.’?
(Emphasis ours.) The court, following the rule announced in. the

Owens case, supra, construed the provision ‘‘and if she dies single and
unmarried and without issue’’ to refer to the death of Esther Frances
single and unmarried and without issue prior to the death of the
testator or the life tenant, testator’s widow, Frances.

In the Ewart case it was further argued, as appellants here argue,
that the double contingency of the death uf both the life tenant and
the death of Esther Frances single and without issue distinguished it
from the rule laid down in the Owens case. The court, after an ex-
tensive review of authorities, rejected that argument and held the will
could only: be construed as referring either to the death of the daughter,
Esther Frances, during the lifetime of testator or the lifetime of the
life tenant widow; that under either rule of construction, Esther
Frances, having survived both the testator and the life tenant (as did
Bulalie Phillips in the case at bar), became vested with an absolute and
indefeasible fee, and that the devise over to Pinkney Sublette was
inoperative and ineffective. The doctrine announced in both the Owens
and Ewart cases has been consistently followed. See Kindred v. An-
derson, 357 Mo. 564, 209 S.W. 2d [297] 912. It also is the majority
rule elsewhere. See Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests
(1956), §§ 588, 540.

It follows we must hold that Eulalie Phillips, having survived
both testatrix and the life tenant, Adelle Phillips, took an indefeasible
estate in fee; and that the provisions of the will relating to disposition
of the property on death of Bulalie unmarried or without issue was
substitutional only and became ineffective when Bulalie survived both
testatrix and Adelle Phillips. The construction we have placed on the
will makes unnecessary any discussion of the rule against perpetuities.
So construed, the will could not be violative of that rule.

The judgment of the trial court, being for the right parties, is
affirmed. All concur.

Srarz or Missouri, Respondent, v. Rosrrr Burnert, Appellant, No.
45052—293 S. W. (2d) 335.

Court en Bane, July 9, 1956.
Rehearing Denied July 81, 1956.

Joseph-Noskay for appellant.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Grover C. Huston, Assistant
Attorney General, for ondent.

[837] DALTON, J.—Defendant has appealed from a conviction
and sentence for murder in the first degree, where the death penalty
was imposed. .

The offe: was alleged to have been committed in the City of
St. Louis on December 20, 1954. An indictment charging appellant
and one Sterling Quinn with murder the first degree of one Abe
Levitt was returned and filed on February 4, 1955. Thereafter, ap-

pellant was arraigned and’ entered a plea of not: guilty. Appellant
was granted 4 severance and a trial was had before a jury. On April
18, 1955, the juty returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first
degrbe as. charged in: the indictment, and fixed the punishment at
death: A motion for’ a new trial was filed and overruled, and appellant
was; thereafter, on June 6, 1955, duly sentenced to suffer death by
the administration of lethal gas.

. On this appeal the appellant has not favored us with a brief and it
is necessary: for us to examine the assignments of érror in his motion
for anew trial. Supreme Court Rule 28.02; State v. Pierce (Mo.
Sup.); 286 S.W. 24 314.

» The’ evidence shows that Abe Levitt was shot and killed by appellant
while appellant was attempting to perpetrate a robbery. The cause
of death was shown to be a ‘‘bullet wound in left chest.’’ Levitt owned
and-operated a grocery store on the southwest -corner of the inter-
section of Maffitt and Newstead avenues in the city of St, Louis. Ap-
pellant' and Sterling Quinn entered the store about 7:30 p.m. on the
evening: of ‘December 20, 1954. At that time Abe Levitt, Robert:
Farmer and: his grandson Michael and a customer, Miss Fredia
Tumpkins, were in the ‘store. Appellant carried a 7.65 millimeter
semi-automatic pistol of German make, which used .82 caliber Reming-
toi shells. Appellant subsequently described the gun as a .82-auto-
matic: Appellant advised Levitt that it was a’holdup and demanded’
Levitt’s money and ordered him to open the cash register. Levitt
refused and an extended argument followed. Appellant finally backed
Levitt against the basement door and shot him in the chest. Appellant
and‘Quinn then ran from the store and left in an automobile which
had been parked in an alley near the store. Robert Farmer recognized
appellant by his voice and testified that both Quinn and appellant
had been in the store on previous occasions. Quinn was not masked,
brit appellant had'a dirty pocket’ handkerchief over the lower part
of his face:

“Appellant and. Quinn were subsequently arrested at the Sylvan
Beach Airport and, onDecember 26, 1954 appellant gave the police
officers: a written statement, in qitestion ‘and answer form, concerning:
the-attempted robbery ‘and murdér. The statement was identified,
offered and received in evidence. Appellant said he had been residing’
with Quinn at 5175 Kensington avenue and that they owned a gray
1939 Buick automobile in partnership. About 3:00 p.m., on the
afternoon, of December 20, 1954, they planned a holdup, but had not
located a place They. got lost while driving around looking for a
suitable place, but finally drove by the Levitt store and appellant
stated.that the other stores were closed. Quinn said ‘‘Let’s go in and
get Zen.” The ‘automobile was parked in an [838] alley and the two
entered. Both were carrying guns, appellant had the ‘‘.32 automatic”
with the safety. off, while Quinn had ‘‘a cap gun, it was in no good

condition.’? Appellant had taken a bloody handkerchief off of’ his:
sore hand and had tied it over his face. When appellant. entered the
store he saw the owner of the store, the old man (Farmer). and the
boy. Appellant further stated the facts as follows: ‘‘I went in, the
store and went to the back and the man asked what I wanted.and I
told him, ‘I want the money,’ just like that. And: he-said, ‘You:

don’t get nothing here.’ I said, ‘Why?’ He said, ‘because I ain't.
going to give you none.’ He said, ‘You. going to shoot me?’ I said
‘I hope I don’t have to.’ He said, ‘You want to kill me?’ And I said,.
‘I don’t want to.’ And he reached for my pistol and I got. out: of the
way of him and stepped back and shot him. Q,-.And then what;
happened? A. I ran into the alley and got in the car. *.* *. Q.. What
was the-conversation he had with you again, Robert? A. I told him I.
wanted some money, ‘Open the cash register.’ He -said, ‘You-ain’t:
going to get nothing here.’ He said ‘You won’t shoot me,-you don’t
want to kill me, do you?’ I told him, ‘No, I hope I. don’t have to.’,
And he run around there and went to grab my pistol and. he made a:
miss-grab and I stepped back and shot him. *** * Q. You pulled:
away and shot him? A. Yes. * * * How long would you say you:
were in there, Robert? A. About’ twenty-five or thirty-five minutes.
Q. In the store? A. Yes. Q. I don’t think you could have been there,
that long? A. We argued. Q. How long did you argue? A. About.
ten minutes. I don’t know how many minutes—it was quite a while’
* * ® Q. Did you get any money from Mr. Levitt? A: No, sir. Q.
But you went there with the idea of holding him up: and getting
money? A. Yes. Q. Robert, had you been drinking--prior to that
time? A. No, Sir.”

In a fur ther written statement appellant said he told the: s police that
he had left the city after the shooting and had taken the gun to his.
father’s home at Wyatt, Missouri. He-gave certain officers permis-.
sion to get the gun. The officers flew down and recovered the gun and:
others and returned that afternoon. The guns.were then exhibited to
appellant and he identified the gun he had used to -shoot-Mr: Levitt.”
He said he knew ‘‘it by the handles.’

Other ‘evidence on behalf of the state tended to show that police.
officers arrived at the Levitt store shortly after the attempted robbery
and shooting. Mr. Levitt was taken to a hospital, but-he was dead on
arrival and a few minutes thereafter his body was removed. to ‘the.
city morgue, where an autopsy was performed and the bullet -re-
moved from the body. In the store where the shooting occurred a dis-
charged .32 caliber Remington shell was found and the shell and the
mentioned bullet were both delivered to a ballistic expert, together’
with the semi-automatic pistol recovered by the police and: identified
by appellant as the gun he had used to shoot Mr. Levitt. The expert
fired a test shot from the gun and recovered both the shell and the
bullet and then compared, under a miéroscope the marking on the:
two shells and the marking on the two bullets. He testified that both

shells had been fired in and ejected from the same gun and that the
two bullets had been fired from the same gun. He also testified that
it was impossible for the rifling in two guns to be exactly the same.

Appellant testified in his own behalf at the trial, as follows: [839]
‘When I went in the store I walked to the back. When I walked to
the back Mr. Levitt walked out from behind the meat counter and he
asked me what for me. I told him this was a holdup. The Court: You:
what? A. I told him this was a holdup. He said, ‘I am sorry, I ain’t
going to give you nothing, get on out of my store.’ And he grabs me.
When he grabs me, me and him was tussling over the pistol. I had
my gun in my hand. He said, ‘ain’t nobody going to hold me up.’
‘We tussled around and my elbow hit the wall and the pistol went
off.’ On cross-examination appellant testified: ‘‘Q. Did you go in
that place intending to hold up Mr. Levitt? A. In that place to ....
Q. Did you intend to go in there? A. Yes, I went in to hold him up,
yes, sir. The Court: How is that? A. I went in to hold him up. * * *
Q. There is no question in your mind that you carried the pistol in
there with the idea that you would be able to carry out the holdup,
isn’t that correct? A. Yes, sir. * * * Q. In other words, you carried
the pistol in the idea that you would be able to make him do whatever
you wanted him to do in so far as handing over that money, isn’t that
right? A. That is right. Q. The pistol was also taken there with the
idea that by having a pistol you would be able to make an escape
with the money? A. That is right.’? Appellant was 20 years old at
the time of the trial.

Hi Some of the thirty assignments in the motion for a new trial
refer to matters which, if they occurred, are not shown by the record.
We are bound by the record presented for review and, therefore,
assignments which are based upon matters not shown by the record
eannot be considered or determined. State v. O’Brien (Mo. Sup.),
249 S.W. 2d 438, 434(7) ; State v. Quilling, 363 Mo. 1016, 256 $.W.
2d 751, 754(5) ; State v. Marlin (Mo. Sup.), 177 S.W. 2d 485, 487(2).
Certain other assignments, as we shall see, wholly fail to comply with
Supreme Court Rule No. 27.20 which, in part, requires that ‘‘a
motion for a new trial shall be in writing and must set forth in detail
and with particularity, in separate numbered paragraphs, the specific
grounds or causes therefor.’’

Le It is contended that the court erred in failing to sustain de-
fendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s
case, and erred in failing to sustain a similar motion at the close of
the entire case, because ‘‘there was no evidence of wilful, deliberate,
premeditated and with malice aforethought homicide.’? The record
shows that appellant’s counsel requested a judgment of acquittal
at the close of the State’s case. The request was denied. Appellant
thereafter testified in his own behalf and the request for a judgment
of acquittal was not renewed at the close of all the evidence. The

motion tendered at the close of the State’s case was intended to pre-
sent the issue of whether as a matter of law the evidence offered by
the State was sufficient to support a conviction under the charge in the
indictment. Supreme Court Rule 26.10. On the record presented,
the motion was correctly ruled. Although, no motion for judgment
of acquittal was offered at: the close of all the evidence, this failure
would not foreclose the question as to whether there was any sub-
stantial evidence to support the verdict, if such question had been
properly raised in the motion for a new trial, but the matter has not
been raised. State v. Ellis (Mo. Sup.), 159 S.W. 2d 675, 676(2);
State v. Clark, 353 Mo. 470, 182 S.W. 2d 619, 622(6). However,.on
this record the evidence, as we shall see, was amply sufficient to sustain
the verdict of the jury. |

Section 559.010 RSMo 1949, provides: ‘‘Every murder which
shall [840] be committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or
by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing,
and every homicide which shall be: committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate any *.* * robbery * * * shall be deemed mur-
der in the first degree.’’ Where the theory of the state is that the
erime is murder in the first degree, because committed in perpetrating
or attempting to perpetrate a robbery, the state must of course prove
by direct or circumstantial evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the offense before the jury may inflict the death
penalty. State v. Conway, 351 Mo. 126, 171 S.W. 2d 677, 681(9). On
the record presented here there was substantial evidence to authorize
the submission of the case to the jury. State v. Meadows, 330 Mo.
1020, 51 S.W. 2d 1033, 1037 (9-12) ; State v. Morefield, 8342 Mo. 1059,
119 S.W. 2d 315, 316(1); State v. King, 342 Mo. 1076, 119 S.W. 2d
822, 825 (4). The evidence heretofore reviewed fully supports the
verdict of the jury. State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199, 33 8.W. 2d 905, 906;
State v. Kauffman, 335 Mo. 611, 73 S. W. 2d 217, 220; State v. Mabry,
324 Mo. 239, 22 S.W. 2d 639, 642(9).

Hl Exvor is assigned on the verdict as being ‘‘against the weight of
the evidence.’’? The assignment fails to comply with Supreme Court
Rule 27.20 and presents nothing for review. State v. McHarness (Mo.
Sup.), 255 S.W. 2d 826, 830(12) ; State v. Grubbs, 358 Mo. 828, 214
S.W. 2d 435, 437(7).

Error i is assigned on the court ‘‘not. considering the facts of
the case in determining the punishment’? and ‘‘in not taking the
responsibility of attempting to assess the punishment’in the event of
a plea of guilty, rather than following the recommendation of the
circuit attorney.’’ These assignments are without support in the record
and nothing is presented for review. The record does show cértain
remarks by the court and counsel from which we infer that an effort
may have been made to determine what punishment the court would
be disposed to impose if appellant entered a plea of guilty, but the

record is wholly inadequate for a determination of the questions
presented.

Error is assigned on the court not disqualifying himself in this
ease when he expressed the opinion that there should be more death
sentences in robbery cases’? and ‘‘when he said ‘It looks like the
Publie Defendant-is trying to help these boys.’ ’’ No such statement
or-expressions of opinion appear in this record and the assignments
may not be-consideréd.

Error is assigned on the courts ‘‘prejudicial attitude to the de-
fendant and defendant’s counsel throughout the case’? and ‘‘in
hharrassing and hurrying defendant’s counsel throughout the trial.’’
‘No such matters appear from the record and nothing appears therein
to sustain an inference or conclusion that any such matters transpired
at’ the trial.

Error is assigned on ‘the court ‘‘not sustaining defendant’s
oral motion for a'change of ‘venue’, “in not permitting the defendant
to file a change of venue’’, and in not granting to the defendant
time in which to file a motion for a change of venue.’’ On the record
presented no offer to file an application for change of venue was made
or refused. The record does show that on Thursday, April 7, 1955
the cause was assigned to Division No. 12 for trial. On Monday, April
11; 1955, defendant appeared with the ‘‘Public Defender’’. and was
‘granted a severance and, before the impaneling of the jury began,
counsel orally moved the court ‘‘to disqualify himself from serving
as trial judge of this case for reason of bias and prejudice of the
court.’’ The oral motion was overruled and counsel stated it was
11:25. a.m: and asked time until 2:00 p.m. ‘‘to prepare a change of
venue.’’? Counsel said the court had stated that ‘‘what we have to
do in this type of case is to give death penalties.’’ In reply the court
indicated: that in chambers that morning (apparently while con-
sidering [841] a possible plea of guilty) he had remarked ‘‘to the
effect that the punishment must, be extreme in these cases if we want
to stop this series of holdups.’’ The court further stated: ‘‘It might
be prejudicial if it (the punishment) is left with me, if he pleaded
guilty and left it to the court; as I stated before, it is-up to the jury
to fix punishment.’’? The court overruled the oral application for
time ‘‘to prepare a motion for change of venue’’ apparently on the
theory urged against it by the state that the application for time was
‘not timely made, The jury was not sworn to try the case until 9:30
aim, of thé following day. The record presented for review fails to
show either that the judge was prejudiced or that he had been dis-
‘qualified as provided by Supreme Court Rule 30.12, or that any proper
application in writing was made as pr ‘ovided.in Supreme Court Rule
30.02. These proceedings were not in the presence of the jury. No
prejudicial error appears from the record to Support any of these
‘assignments.

Hl. Grror- is-assigned on the court ‘‘allowing evidence during the
course of the trial of firearms taken from defendant’s. home, other
than the one allegedly uscd -in the perpetration ‘of the’ crime.’ ‘The
matter complained .of appeared in one of appellant’s statements to
the police, however, the statement was adinitted without objection.
The statement contained the following questions and answers: ‘‘Q.
‘We are showing you three guns, one 12 gauge shotgun, one .25 caliber
‘automatic, and one .82 automatic, that the officers mentioned :above
‘recovered from the homé of your father in Wyatt, Missouri, will
‘you point to the one that you used in this shooting? A. “Yes, six. It
was this one. Q. Are -you:sure this is the gun? A. ‘Yes, I know
it by the handles and that it is just the gun.’’ There was other evidence
concerning the two automatics which were brought back from ‘ap-
pellant’s home in order to determine which had been used by appellant
in the commission of the crime. This evidence also came into thie
record without objection. The alleged error in the admission. of the
‘evidence has not beem preserved for review. State v. Campbell: (Mo.
Sup.); 262 S.W. 2d 5, 6(2); State v.'Nettles (Mo. Sup.), 280 :°S/W.
2d 61, 63(2) ; Supreme Court Rule 28. 01; Section 510.210 RSMo 1949.

Error i is assigned on the giving oft Instructions 1 and 2 on.the
gromd that the word: ‘‘feloviously’’ is omitted in paragraph three
(8) of Instruction-No. 1, in the definition of murder in ‘the first dé-
gre, also, in the second to the last paragraph of Instruction’ No.1
dealing with murder in the first degree and, also; in paragraph one
(1) of Instruction No. 2 in subinitting murder in the first:.degree
while attempting to perpetrate a robbery. It was unnecessary: to-use
the word ‘‘feloniously’’ in the instructions since the instructions .stib-
mitted a finding of all facts necessary to constitute murder ‘in’ the
first degree and all facts necessary to constitute a felony and establish
that in law the acts submitted were feloniously done. State v. Hille-
brand, 285 Mo. -290, 225 S.W. 1006, 1007(1); State v: Frost (Mo.
Sup.), 289 S.W. 895, 897(5) ; State v. Warden, 831 Mo. 566, 56°S.W.
2d_595, 598 (5); State v. Helton, 234 Mo. 559, 565, 137 S.W. 987%

Error is further assigned on the giving of Instruction No.1,
because in the last paragraph it used the words, you will assess his
punishment at death, instead of you may assess his punishment‘as
‘death. The instruction closed with these words: ‘‘If you retina
Werdict of murder in the-first degree, you will assess his punishment
‘at death, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary! for and during. the
remainder of his natural life.’’ The words used -closely follow the
‘words of the statute, See. 559.030 RSMo 1949 which fixes the punisli-
ment for murder in the first degree and which provides ‘‘* * *; and
‘persons convicted of murder in the first degree shall [342]: suffer
death, or be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary during
their natural lives are The words used in the: instruction .con-

: ate

form to the statute and the instruction is not erroneous but is in
proper form.

_ Error is assigned on 1 the giving, of Instruction: No. 1 because,
in xing the time of the offense, it used the words ‘‘at any time prior
to the finding of the Indictment herein’’ and because it did not in-
form the jury as to the date of the finding or filing of the indict-
ment. The assignment is without merit because the instruction re-
cited: ‘‘The State of Missouri, by the indictment in this case, which
was filed in this court on the 4th day of February 1955, charges
* * *? Burther the date of the offense is submitted by Instruction
No. 2 as ‘‘on or about the 20th day of December, 1954,’’ which was
prior to the stated date of the filing of the indictment. Instructions
must of course be read together and are sufficient if they properly
present the law..of the case when so considered. State v. Sapp, 356
Mo. 705, 208 S.W. 2d 425, 430(5).

- EE Error is assigned on the giving of Instruction No. 8, in that
in‘ paragraph two (2) the court ‘‘did not correctly define attempted
rdbbery.”? The assignment is insufficient because it fails to point out
in what respect the definition of attempted .robbery is erroneous.
‘Supreme Court Rule 27.20; State v. Weston (Mo. Sup.), 202 S8.W.
2d 50, 58(9). However, in.a éase of this nature, it was not necessary
for the court to define the term. See State v..Messino, 325 Mo. 743,
30 S/W. 2d 750, 761(19); State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397, 207 S.W.
809, 816(20). The assignment is further insufficient because Instruc-
tion. No. 8 contains no definition of attempted robbery, but the term
is correctly defined in Instruction No. 2. See Sections 560.120 ‘and
556.150 RSMo 1949; State v. Scarlett (Mo. Sup.), No. 44855, 291
S.W.'2d 188 (not reported in the State Reports); State v. Bersch,
supia.

Error is assigned on the giving of Instruction No. 2 on the
theory that it ‘‘is outside the scope of the pleadings and allegations,’’
the indictment having charged murder in the first degree using the
terms ‘‘feloniously, wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with
malice. aforethought,’’ while Instruction No. 2 ‘‘instruets on the
killing of a human being while attempting to perpetrate a robbery.”’
There is no merit in the assignment. Section 559.010 RSMo 1949,
provides that ‘‘every murder which shall * * * be committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any * * * robbery * * * shall
be deemed murder in the first degree’’ and clearly. it is the approved
practice in this state to charge murder in the first degree in the usual
language and then be permitted to prove that the homicide occurred
during a robbery or attempted robbery, although that fact was not
charged, avid for such proof, in view of Section 559.010, to support
the giving of an instruction such as Instruction No. 2 wherein the
court: instructed the jury, as follows: ‘‘Murder in the first degree
is the killing of a human being wilfully, feloniously, deliberately,

premeditatedly and with malice aforethought, or the killing of a
human being while attempting to perpetrate a robbery.’’? The court
further instructed the jury, in part, as follows: ‘‘* * * that if you
find and believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant, Robert Burnett, either acting alone or
jointly with another or others, in the, city of St. Louis, State of
Missouri, on or about the 20th day of December, 1954, wilfully,
deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought, shot
and wounded one, Abe Levitt, while attempting to perpetrate a
robbery upon him, the said Abe Levitt, and if you further find
* # #7 See State v. Bradley, 361 Mo. 267, 234 S.W. 2d 556, 558(1) ;
State v. Conway, supra, 171 S.W. 2d 677, 679(8); State v. White,
330 Mo. 737, 51 S.W. 2d 109, 112(1, 2); State v. Long (Mo. Sup.),
253 8.W. 729, 732(6) ; State v. Jackson (Mo. Sup.), 258 8.W. 734,
736(6) ; State v. Messino, supra, 30 S.W. 2d 750, 75911); State v.
Nasello, 825 Mo, 442, 30 [848] S.W. 2d 132, 136(1, 2). It is further
established that in the absence of other evidence from which the jury
can infer the elements, deliberation and premeditation, these and
other constituent elements of murder, in the first degree can be in-
ferred from proof that the homicide was committed in the perpetra-
tion or attempted perpetration of robbery. In the case of State v.
Bradley, supra, 234 8.W. 2d 556, 558(1) the court said: ‘‘* * * the
proof that the homicide was committed in the perpetration of robbery
was tantamount to proof of the constituent elements of the crime of
murder in the first degree.’? And see State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188
S.W. 2d 43, 189. 8.W. 2d 541; State v. Meadows, supra, 51 S.W. (2d)
1033, 1037(11); State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221, 274 S.W. 2d 304,
308 (4).

Error is assigned on the giving of Instruction No. 4, dealing
with the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, and con-
taining the words: ‘‘but a doubt to authorize an aquittal on that
ground ought to be a substantial doubt.’’ It is argued that the word
“‘substantial’’ has been perverted by common usage to mean a large
amouut or a great deal; and that it carried such meaning to the jury. ~
There is no evidence in the record to support the claimed usage or
meaning of the word “‘substantial.’’ We cannot take judicial notice
that the word has any such meaning or usage, or that the jury so
understood the term. The instruction is in approved form and not

* erroneous on the ground claimed. State v. Hutsel, 357 Mo. 386, 208
S.-W. 24-227, 232(11, 12).

Error is assigned on the court’s action in not instructing
(1) on murder in the second degree; (2) on manslaughter; (3) on
accident; and (4) on self-defense. These assignments present nothing
for review since they fail to comply with Supreme Court Rule 27.20,
An assignment which merely states that the court erred in giving
a particular instruction, or in refusing to give a particular instruc:

tion, or in refusing to instruct on a particular matter such as murder
in the second degree have been held insufficient in not stating ‘in
detail. and with particularity’’ the specific grounds or causes of
complaint in the motion for a new trial. State v. Harmon (Mo. Sup.),
243 SW. 2d 326, 382(12); State v. Gaddy (Mo. Sup.), 261 8.W. 24
65, 67(2); State v. Powell, 889 Mo. 80, 95 S.W.-2d 1186, 1189(4) ;
State-v- Grubbs,"358 Mo. 828, 214 S.W. 2d 435, 437(8). However,
there was no evidence in the record to sustain the giving of instruc-
tions on any of these matters, because the state’s evidence, confirmned
by the testimony of appellant, tended to show the offense charged was
committed in the perpetration of an attempted robbery. On the facts
shown the jury could be authorized to find only ‘one of two verdicts;
namely, a conviction of murder in the. first degree, or an acquittal.
State v. Conway, supra, 171 S.W. 2d 677, 679(5) ; State v. Bradley,
supra, 234 §.W. 2d 556, 563(21) ; State v. Jackson, 340 Mo, 748, 102
S.W..2d 612, 617; State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W. 2d 632,
638(9).- It was immaterial that the shot may have been fired unin-
tentionally or‘by accident. State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278, 287; State
v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W. 2d 1049,°1053(1) ; State v. Meadows,
supra,-51 §.W. 2d 1038, 1087(9) ; State v. Cole, supra, 189 S.W. 2d
541 (2) ; State v. Bradley, supra, 234 S.W. 24 556, 563(21). Likewise,
there was no issue of self-defense. State v. Hart, 292 Mo. 74, 237
S.W:-473, 482(28); State v. King, 842 Mo. 1067, 119 S.W. 2a 822,
327(8) ; State v. Hamilton, 387 Mo. 460, 85 §.W. 24 35, 87(4); State
vy. Kenyon, 348 Mo, 1168, 126 S.W. 24 245, 249(3).

‘THI The record shows that during the jury’s deliberation they
sent to the court the following question: ‘‘Your Honor: On the
verdict of life imprisonment in the State Penitentiary, is. there
any possibility of a parole at some future date? Foreman F. P.
Leahy.’’ To the above question the Court replied: ‘‘Members of the
Jury: [844] -The Court has instructed you on all the law in ‘the
case; hence I cannot answer your attached question. Wm. 8. Connor,
Fudge. ”

‘Error is assigned on ‘the court’s action (1) ‘‘in considering the
question sent up by the jury relating to parole’; (2) ‘‘in taking’ as
long as two and one-half (2%) hours in attempting to answer the
question’’; and (3) in‘attempting to answer the question with the
two statements used, which in combination “denote an affirmative
answer to the question of parole.’’ Appellant further argues that ~
“the jury intended to give the defendant life imprisonment but by
considering the question of parole they were afraid that he would
be later released as exemplified by the question to the Court so that
the verdict was not the intention of the jury because of the errot ‘of
the Court.’ ©

The first of these assiguiments is hnisufficient under Supreme Court
Rulé 27.20 because it is too general. The use of the word ‘“consider-

ing’’ as used specifies no ground of error and presents nothing for
review. The second assignment has no support in the record, since
there is nothing in the record to show any appreciable lapse of
time in sending the answer to the question. The recital in the unveri-
fied motion for a new trial concerning the lapse of two and one-half
hours may not be considered as it did not prove itself. State v. Brewer
(Mo. Sup.), 286 8.W. 2d 782, 784(6). As to the third assignment,
the record fails to show that any objection or-protest was made to the
action of the court in sending an answer to the question or in sending
the particular answer. In such situation there is no support in the
record for this assignment.of error. See Supreme Court Rule 28.01;
Sec. 510.210 RSMo 1949; State v. Smith (Mo. Sup.), 261 9.W. 2d
50, 57(10) ; State v; Leonard (Mo: Sup.), 182 8.W. 2d 548, 551(2).
There i is no showing that appellant had no opportunity to object.

The argument that the jury intended to give the defendant life
imprisonment and that the verdict returned was not the verdict in-
tended ‘‘because of the error of the court’’ in forwarding the reply
to the question, is not supported by the record. The allegation does
not prove itself. Further, no protest or objection was interposed
+o the action taken by the. court and there is no- support for such an
assigninent of error.

_ The last assignment. or comment of the motion for a new
trial is that, ‘‘the verdict was such as to constitute eruel and unusual
‘punishment and as such is against the Constitution of the State of
Missouri and the Constitution of the United States.’’. The assign-
ment is insufficient as the error. is not specified or ground stated,
however, the punishment assessed by the jury in the verdict returned
was within the provisions of Section 559.030 RSMo 1949, which in
part provides that ‘‘persons convicted of murder in the first degree
shall suffer death, or be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary
during their natural lives.’’ The record clearly shows a case of homi-
cide in the perpetration of an attempted robbery. The essential facts
are not in dispute. Fixing the punishment for the crime was a
legislative matter. The legislature has provided that such a crime
shall constitute murder in the first degree and has further fixed
the range of punishment. The jury assessed the punishment within.
the limits provided. and it .cannot be adjudged, excessive,. cruel or
unusual. State v. McGee, 361 Mo. 309, 234-8. W. 2d 587, 590; State v.
Copeland, 335 Mo. 140,71 8.W. 2d 746, 752.

We have further examined the information and find it sufficient,
the verdict was:in proper form and. responsive. Allocution was
afforded, and judgment and sentence were duly pronounced.

Finding no errors in the record, the judgment should be affirmed.

- It.is so ordered. Al concur.

Date of execution.fixed for, Friday, August 24, 1956,

Starz or Missouri, Respondent, v. Rout Laster, Appellant, No.
: 44919-—293 §. W. (2d) 300.

Court en Bane, July 9, 1956.
Rehearing Denied July 31, 1956.

Thomas P. Rose for appellant.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and W. Don
Attorney General, for respondent.

[301] EAGER, J.—Defendant and six others were indicted jointly
on November 23, 1954, for the murder of Walter Lee Donnell, who
was slain during the riot at the Missouri Penitentiary on the evening
of September 22, 1954. All of the defendants were inmates of the
penitentiary, as was Donnell. On December 6, 1954, cowisel was
appointed for this defendant. That counsel assiduously prepared the
defense, ably tried the case and now prosecutes this appeal. A
severance was granted this defendant on motion; certain other motions
were filed and overruled, but no point is made ‘here on those rulings. .
At the trial on January 24-27, 1955, defendant was found guilty
by the jury and the death penalty was assessed. A motion for new
trial was filed, heard and overruled, defendant was duly sentenced,
and this appeal was regularly taken. .

In view of the limited scope of the points made on this appeal, it
will not be necessary to review all the evidence in detail. It is not
contended here that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion. Donnell and James Creighton, another inmate, had been con-
fined for two months or more in cells on death row, for their own
protection. Defendant and .one Stidham were confined’ there about
July, 1954, to break up and separate a group of prisoners because,
as the warden said, there was ‘‘trouble brewing.’’ Death row con-
sisted of thirty-two cells, located in’ the basement of ‘‘B’’ Hall;
the same building contained both ‘‘B’’ and ‘‘C”’ Halls, located,
respectively, on opposite sides of the entrance. All the premises de-
scribed were within the walls of the penitentiary, in Jefferson City.
A minute description will not be necessary, but three heavy gates’
or doors made of steel bars separated death row proper from the
main part of the building.

Comparatively early on the evening in question approximately
780 inmates of B and C Halls were released in a manner which is
largely immaterial here. Many of them apparently niilled around,
inside and [802] outside, some destroying much property; a group
estimated as consisting of 150 to 500 men descended into ‘‘B’’ base-
ment between 6 ;00 and 7:00 P.M., and after the lapse of considerable”
time, and by employing various implements, it succeeded in battering

open all three doors leading into death row. What was done to and
with the guard there is a separate and lengthy story, but the cell
keys were obtained, and all inmates there who so desired were released
from their cells, including Laster and Stidham. ‘By this time many of
these inmates had in their possession sundry miscellaneous weapons,
including’ knives, filed-down screw drivers, ice picks, hammers, clubs,
crow bars, iron rods and a large, long-handled sledge hammer. : Con-
siderable animosity had developed during confinement between Laster
and Stidham on'the one hand and Creighton on the other; and, right-
fully or not, it is. apparent that both Creighton and Donnell were
regarded by some as ‘‘snitches’’; however, the outspoken. vituperation:
and threats seem to have been directed at Creighton. Almost imme-
diately after the opening of the cells on death row several of the
inmates tried to get into Creighton’s cell, but he had succeeded..in
jamming the lock and he also managed to poke and beat’them away
with a wooden club and a piece of iron. Defendant Laster was in that
group.

At some time thereafter during the evening and certainly prior
to 10:30 P.M., Donnell’s cell was entered, the:door being opened.
with a key, and he was murdered there‘in’a horrible manner. His’
body bore sundry stab wounds, front, back and elsewhere, at least:
two of these going clear through his heart; there. were knife wounds
on his neck, and his skull was partially crushed from a -heavy blow,
apparently made by the bloody sledge hammer found in his cell;
there were other miscellaneous wounds and injuries on the body too
numerous to deseribe. In addition.to defendant’s confession, which
contained a direct admission that he stabbed Donnell several times
in the chest while another inmate held his arms, there was-oral testi-
mony substantially tending to implicate defendant in the murder.

The three points made here are: (a) that the confession of Laster
was inadmissible because not voluntary; (b) that the argument of the
prosecuting attorney was so ‘inflammatory as to require that the
court declare a mistrial, even inthe absence of objection;.and (¢)
that the trial court should have reduced, and that ‘this court-should
now reduce, the punishment to life imprisonment. .

Hl We first address ourselves to the admission of the confession.
For that purpose it will be necessary to review more of the facts:
‘When the state indicated that the confession was to be offered the
court conducted a hearing thereon outside the presence of the jury.
A St. Louis police Heutenant testified to the details of the inter-
rogation of defendant; five other officers were present, all armed;.
defendant was handenffed until he started to write the-confession..
This witness testified: that there were'no threats, no promises, and no: ;
physical violence; that after defendant had been questioned for 15-20
minutes he indicated that he would make the statement-and did so,
first orally and then in writing. Certain corroborating evidence of

us a

subsequent oral statements of defendant was also offered. Defendant
presented no evidence at this preliminary hearing. At the resumption
of the trial all six witnesses who were present at the time of the making
of the confession testified in substance: that there were no threats,
promises or physical violence; that after defendant had been inter-
rogated for perhaps 15-25 minutes, during which time the officer in
charge told him that they had a statement from another inmate (which
the officer stated at the trial to be true) and told him, also, of certain
details of the murder which they knew, defendant indicated a willing-
ness to talk and proceeded to make an oral statement; that the hand-
cuffs were then removed and defendant [803] himself wrote out the
confession without dictation, taking perhaps 20-30 minutes to do so,
and then signed it; that he was thereafter questioned further for per-
haps 15-20 minutes about other features of the riot and fires, and he
was then returned to a cell; that the whole interview lasted from an
hour and a half to approximately two hours. There was some testimony
that defendant was advised at the time that the statement might be
used against him. There was evidence that he had been interrogated on
perhaps three previous occasions for relatively short periods, one
being for ‘‘an hour or so,’’ but that he had then given no information ;
also, that at the last of these interviews he had been rather ‘‘bold and
threatening,’’ but had finally indicated that he wanted to ‘‘think it
over.’’ One officer testified without objection to highly material parts
of the oral statements made by defendant just prior to his writing of
the written confession. These were to the effect that he and two others
killed Donnell and that he, Laster, stabbed the victim while one
Kenton held him; these statements included also details of the in-
juries inflicted by the others. Objection was made to the written con-
fession on the ground that it was not shown to have been made
voluntarily and without threats, force, compulsion or promises of
leniency.

Defendant’s own testimony was to the effect that he was inter-
rogated twice, once from between 3:00-4:00 A.M. until perhaps 10:00
A.M. on Friday, September 24, in the ‘‘classification’’ room, and next
for two or three hours on Monday morning, September 27, in the
*‘glubhouse,’? a building where athletic equipment was kept, and
which was entirely separate from the other buildings. He testified
that on each occasion he was struck, knocked down, kicked and beaten
intermittently, if not continuously, by various officers; that after he
was thus forced to write the statement he said that it was a “pack
of lies’? and was struck again; that he bore large bruises for two
weeks. One inmate testified that he saw discolored places on de-
fendant’s left arm and back on September 29th; two others testi-
fied that from their place of confinement 300-400 feet away they
recognized him and saw him removed from the “‘club-house,’’ (pre-
sumably after the last interrogation), and that he was being supported

by officers, that his head was down on his chest, and his feet were
dragging’; another testified that he saw defendant with his arm and
back discolored after the first interrogation. Defendant, with the
six co-defendants, was transferred to the Federal Medical Center at
Springfield, Missouri, on September 29, 1954. He was stripped and
examined when he was admitted there and the examining physician
testified that he made no complaints, but that he found ecchymosis
(i.e. a condition similar to a black eye) on his left arm, right buttock
and both legs; that he had no independent recollection of these, but
that they must have been as large as or larger than a quarter or a
half dollar to have been noted; that they were from one to ten days
old and were not medically serious.

Defendant’s evidence showed that he was in the group which was
trying to force Creighton’s cell, that he helped put the death row
guard into a cell on death row, and that he later helped to move him
upstairs to another cell; also, that defendant had an ice pick in his
possession ‘‘that night,’’ until he ‘‘lost it.’’ He specifically denied,
however, all participation in the death of Donnell.

Since the defendant chose not to introduce any evidence at the
preliminary hearing, and the state made a prima facie case on the
voluntary nature of the confession, the court necessarily ruled it
admissible. State v. Gibilterra, 842 Mo. 577, 116 S.W. 2d 88, 93.
In some instances our courts have considered also the evidence ad-
duced before the jury in making a final ruling on the admissibility
of a confession. State v. Gibilterra, supra; State v. Ramsey, 355 Mo.
720, 197 S.W. 2d 949, 954. Here [304] there was no motion to strike
the confession at the conclusion of all the evidence. We rule the
confession admissible, however, on the broader ground that on all
the evidence there was no showing sufficiently strong to convince the
court conclusively, or as a matter of law, that the confession was in-
voluntary. The question was one for the jury, and an adequate in-
struction was given on this subject. Counsel cites the cases of State
v. Powell; 258 Mo. 239, 167 8.W. 559; State v. Powell, 266 Mo. 100,
180 S.W. 851, and Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62. In the
Powéll cases the facts were much different, it appearing from the
state’s evidence that a young and rather ignorant negro was kept
under questioning by relays of officers for approximately eleven hours,
and that suggestions were made to him which could well incite a
hope of leniency if he confessed. It further appeared that there was
a complete absence of any proof of guilt without the confession.
Those cases, as does the Turner case, supra, merely stand for the prop-
osition that a prisoner may be subjected to such continuous or re-
peated mental pressure or torture as to make a confession involuntary,
though without physical abuse. In the present case we do not think
that principle applicable, if any credence be given to the state’s
witnesses. Moreover, in defendant’s own testimony he relied specifi-

cally and entirely on physical abuse and beatings as forcing his.con-
fession, and he can hardly change his theory now to mental pressure,
The two theories are dissimilar and, in a measure, conflicting. Counsel
lays considerable stress on the following question to and answer of
Lieut. Walter Eitzman who conducted much of the questioning: ‘‘Q
And in the same length of time Mr. Laster told you all the statements
voluntarily and wanted to reduce them to writing? A He didn’t
want to. He offered to after I asked him. _He was willing, very
eooperative.’’? This was followed, however, by an explanation that
defendant only began to talk after the witness explained to him in
detail what they already knew, including the information that he,
Laster, had gone into Donnell’s cell and, who had gone in with him,
to which defendant replied: ‘‘Well, it looks like, you know what you
are talking about,’’ It thus appears that the words ‘‘he didn’t want
to’”’ were actually intended to mean that defendant only decided to
talk after he found that the officers already had much of the informa-
tion, but that he then did so of his own volition. We rule that the con-
fession was admissible. Under our system of jurisprudence it is
generally left to the jury to determine whether a confession was
voluntary, unless the contrary appears so conclusively that the con-
fession, must be held involuntary as a matter of law. State v. Sanford,
364 Mo. 998, 1006, 193 S.W. 2d 37, 38.

‘We shall consider next the contention that the trial court
erred in not reducing the punishment to life imprisonment and that.
this court.should now do so.. This point was expressly raised in the
motion for new trial. Counsel argues here that the maximum penalty
was imposed because of the prejudice of the jury engendered by the
enormous property damage done in the riot, the state of fear and un-
rest aroused locally by the riot, and the highly inflammatory argu-
ment of the prosecuting attorney, the latter of which will next be
considered. Counsel, suggests that we have the power to reduce the
punishment, citing State v. Rizor, 353 Mo. 368, 182 S.W. 2d 525, 529.
That case merely recognized the right of the court under our statute,
now § 546.430, RSMo., V.A-M.S., to reduce the punishment assessed
by a jury, if deemed excessive; but the court deferred there to the
ruling of the trial court on.the question and recognized the usual
rule that the assessment of the punishment is primarily the function
of the trial jury. We note also Criminal Rule 27.04; which is identical
with the statute. The paucity of reported cases in which this statute
has been availed [805]. of exemplifies the studied and persistent in-
clination of our courts to leave the fixing of the punishment to the
trial jury. In the following cases this court has refused to reduce
allegedly excessive punishments: State v. Mahan, Mo., 226 S.W. 2d
598; State v. McHarness, Mo., 255 8.W. 2d 826; State v. Burton, 355
Mo. 792, 198 S.W. 24 19. In these cases, and others, it was held: that
punishment will not be deemed excessive or the result of passion and

-f

prejudice merely because it is the maximum fixed by statute; and that
it is primarily the jury’s function to fix the penalty, within the statu-
tory limits, subject to the trial court’s discretionary power to re-
duce it. To justify our interference at this stage, we must be able
to say that passion and prejudice so clearly appear from the record
that we may ‘‘confidently say that the trial court abused its discre-
tion’’ when it declined to reduce the punishment to life imprisonment.
State v. Mahan, Mo., 226 S.W. 2d 593. We cannot so state, and we,
therefore, decline to exercise this highly extraordinary power. In
so ruling we. have considered also the arguments of the prosecuting
attorney covered in.the next point, as well -as appellant’s sugges-
tions concerning the comparative guilt of others, and the life sen-
tences imposed on’ each of the six other co-defendants. The latter
information is no part of the record here, but even if it were, it
should not change our ruling in this case. We suggest that if any
relief is to be granted because of the inequality in punishment, it
must come through executive clemency.

The remaining point concerns the arguments of the prose-
euting attorney to the jury. No objections were made to these
arguments, but appellant’s counsel relies upon the duty of the trial
court, of its own initiative, to declare a mistrial for argument so prej-
udicial and inflammatory as to prevent a fair trial. Of course, a
trial court does have the right, and the duty, to intervene in a criminal
case. without objection being made, when it appears that such grievous
error is being committed as to prevent a fair trial. State v. Rhoden,
Mo., 243 8.W 2d 75; but, it is not always imperative that the court
declare a mistrial when and if it sees fit to intervene, as counsel now
suggests it should have done here. The strict limitations of this doc-
trine of intervention are ably discussed in the case of State v. Morris,
Mo., 248 S.W. 2d 847. The principle has been recognized in Rule 3.27
of our Rules of Civil Procedure, but we find no counterpart in our
eriminal rules.

Counsel complains first of'a portion of the prosecutor’s ‘argument
in which he described the. fear in the heart and mind of Donnell
and the brutal manner in which he was slain. This part of the argu-
ment was not complained of in the motion for new trial, and, regard-
less of the matter of objections at the trial, we are precluded from
considering ‘it here under Rule 27.20. Counsel next urges reversible
error in the argument of the prosecutor to the effect that the de-
fendant was an incorrigible, that he tried to escape from Algoa and
was transferred to the penitentiary, and that he was thereafter ‘‘out’’
only long enough to rob someone and get put back in jail. In some
eases this argument might well be erroneous. Here, however, this
“evidence iad been brought out in defendant’s own testimony and vol-
untarily, © apparently to keep the state from introducing it as im-
peachment; moréover, defendant’s counsel ‘had, in argument, strenu-

ously and with repetition invited the prosecutor to give ‘‘one good
reason’’ why the defendant would voluntarily confess to this crime,
after refusing to do so on prior occasions, and thus ‘‘give himself
a ticket to the gas chamber or to life imprisonment.’’ The prosecu-
tor took up the challenge and the argument complained of above is
part of his answer; completing the context, the prosecutor argued
that the defendant was defiant and incorrigible, that he considered
himself a great leader among the inmates of the penitentiary, that
he was continuously in disciplinary trouble, that he was actually
proud of everything he had done in the [306] penitentiary, including
his part in this affair, and that his confession was an act of pride and
defiance. There was some evidence to justify such an argument.
We consider the above argument as retaliatory, and thus not erroneous.
State v. Tiedt, 8360 Mo. 594, 229 S.W. 2d 582, and cases there cited.

‘The last part of the argument complained of was as follows: ‘‘* * *
but here is the first one and here is the first jury and everybody is
going to be watching what this jury does. * * * What is this man
here? What can you do with him? Are you going to put him in
the penitentiary for life? This cop hater, so he can rag the bulls
and punks, be incorrigible and incite other riots, burn guards off
their towers with gasoline? I say that what you do to this man is
going to determine how the rest of the inmates in that penitentiary
shall live in the future. If you say to those 3,000 or more inmates
out there that you can kill a man in a riot, you can start riots, you
can live incorrigibly, burn guards off towers with gasoline, destroy
buildings out there so you can kill one guy you don’t like, is that what
you are going to say or are you going to say by your verdict to those
people out there in the penitentiary that the people in Cole County
aren’t going to stand for that and they will put an end to anybody
who does it, and I am asking this jury and I think the evidence
fully justifies it, that we shall put an end to Rollie Laster by putting
him in the gas chamber and bringing law and order to the peniten-
tiary.’’? No objection or motion was directed at this argument, but
counsel insists that it was so inflammatory that the court should have
declared a mistrial of its own initiative. We, therefore, consider the
argument.

It has long been held that so long as a prosecutor stays within the
record and its reasonable inferences, he may legitimately argue the
necessity of Jaw enforcement as a crime deterrent, and he may ar-
gue also that the responsibility for the suppression of crime and the
protection of the public rests upon the trial juries. State v. Nasel-
lo, 825 Mo. 442. 80 S.W. 2d 132, 142, 143; State v. Lynn, Mo., 23
S.W. 2d 139, 141; State v. Marshall, 317 Mo. 413, 297 S.W. 63, 69;
State v. Lucas, 316 Mo. 904, 292 S.W. 714, 717; State v. Murray, 316
Mo. 81, 292 8. W. 434, 488. And the authorities also hold that it is
permissible for the prosecutor to draw and state his reasonable in-

ferences concerning the eftect which may result from the jury’s failure
in this regard. See the cases just cited. It has been held entirely
proper for the prosecutor to ask for a severe penalty as a deterrent
to crime, if the jury believes the defendant guilty. State v. Leonard,
Mo., 182 8.W. 2d 548; State v. Fletcher, Mo., 244 S.W. 2d 98; State v.
Martin, Mo., 56 S.W. 2d 187. And it is not reversible error for the
prosecutor to tell the jury that the community or the people will be
watching the result of the trial. State v. Londe, 345 Mo. 185, 182
S.W. 2d 501, 507; State v. Carter, 345 Mo. 74, 131 8.W. 2d 546, 548.
Such remarks have been characterized as a mere ‘‘rhetorical appeal.’’
State v. Dipley, 242 Mo. 461, 147 S.W. 111, 117.

Looking at the foregoing argument in the light of these author-
ities, we hold that, in essence, it was a plea for the most severe punish-
ment if the jury found defendant guilty, both as a deterrent to further
erime in the penitentiary and as a protection to the community; this
was coupled with a stated inference of the effect of a failure by the
jury to impose the severe penalty requested. As such we do not think
that the argument constituted reversible error. We hold that the in-
ferences so drawn were permissible; much of the evidence on which
they were based came from the defendant’s own testimony, some of
it voluntary; he had admitted the imposition of sundry disciplinary
procedures, including solitary confinement and the ‘‘hole,’’ for
various infractions, some of which he could not even recall; he also
admitted one escape and one attempt to escape; he admitted that he
and two others threw gasoline on a guard [807] tower in an attempt
to escape; a state’s witness had testified that defendant was ‘‘bold
and proud’? to tell the story and of his accomplishment, and another
testified that he had told during an interrogation how ‘‘he hated
cops’? and stated that ‘‘if he could get a gun he then would shoot his
way out of there.’’ As to his present incarceration, defendant had
testified that: ‘‘I just held up a place in St. Joe and got caught.’’
While there was no direct evidence that defendant had assisted in
planning’ or inciting this riot, we cannot say that an inference as to
the possible inciting of future riots was unreasonable upon this whole
sordid record.

Defendant cites the case of State v. Tiedt, Bane, 357 Mo. 115, 206
S.W. 2d 524. We think that the argument there was much more in-
flammatory than the one here, and the prosecutor there persisted in
similar, or worse, arguments after the court had sustained several
objections. A casual reading of the arguments in that case will dem-
onstrate the distinctions. There was little or nothing in the present
argument which the jury did not already know from the evidence;
the legitimate argument of murder cases on such a record as this
cannot always be effectively couched in polite or gentle language.
‘We do not recede from what was said in the Tiedt case as to the
restraint which should be exercised by prosecuting officials in cases

such as this, but we do not consider that case as sufficiently analogous:
to be controlling here.

The point now urged is simply that the trial court should have
declared a mistrial. Even if we should assume that the argument was
erroneous, it would not follow. that the only proper action: would be
to declare a mistrial; the trial court has much discretion in- such
matters; it has seen and heard the witnesses and opposing counsel ;.
it has heard the full arguments and has seen, in so far as such may
be seen, their effect on the jury. The court might well have-determined,
even had it intervened on its own initiative, that a caution to the jury
or some action other than a mistrial, would have been sufficient. We
cannot, therefore, hold the court in error for not declaring 4 mistrial.
The instructions were full and adequate and none of them are attacked’
here. The trial court considered this alleged error when the motion
for new trial was presented, and it overruled the motion, We cannot
say that the argument complained of was reversibly erroneous, and
certainly we cannot confidently say that it was so prejudicial and.
inflammatory that the trial court abused its discretion in not acting
upon its own initiative in declaring a mistrial. We have examined
the entire record, and since we find no reversible error, the judgment
and sentence will be affirmed. It is so ordered. All concur.

Date: of execution fixed for Friday, August 24, 1956.

C. Riczarp Contins and Fuoyp Conmns, d/b/a Contains BrorHers
Om Company, a Partnership, Appellants v. Pusiic Srrvioe Com-
MISSION oF Missourr, Respondent, Lacteps Gas Company, Co-
Respondent, No. 45179—293 8. W. (2d) 345.

Court en Bane, July 9, 1956.
Rehearing Denied, September 10, 1956.

1087

J.J. Middleton, Craig & Craig, Howard W.'Campbell, Fordyce,
Mayne, Hartman, Renard i&. Stribling, Nelson W. Hartman, Joseph
R. Long and John.P. Baird, Jr., for C. Richard Collins. and. Floyd
Collins, d/b/a Collins-Bros. Oil Co., appellants.

Assistant

Commission ; Thomp-
y A. Thompson, James M.
espondent Laclede Gag

Comp: any.

[346] WESTHUES, J—On August 29, 1953, the Laclede Gas
Company of St. Louis, Missouri, filed application with the Public
Service Commission seeking authority to exercise the power of emi-
nent domain, as provided for in Sections 1-10A, Laws 1953, pp. 518-
517 (Sections 393.410-393.510, RSMo 1949, V.A.MLS.), to acquire sub-
surface rock formations underlying 6,000 acres of land in St. Louis
County and in St. Charles County, Missouri, for the purpose of
storing gas therein for distribution and sale. On February 2, 1954,
an amended application was filed. A number of intervening petitions
were filed in objection to the application. One of these was filed by
C. Richard Collins and Floyd Collins, doing business as Collins
Brothers Oil Company, a partnership. Their application for inter-
vention was allowed. Other such petitions were also sustained and
an extensive hearing was had before the Public Service Commission.
The Commission granted the application of the Laclede Gas Company.
Collins Brothers Oil Company instituted review proceedings in the
Cireuit Court of Cole County. That court affirmed the order of the
Commission and Collins Brothers Oil Company appealed to this court.

Collins Brothers alleged they held valuable oil and other mineral
rights under lands affected by the proposed gas storage; that they had
commercially producing oil wells thereon. That was the ground upon
which they were allowed to intervene.

In the course of the opinion we shall refer to Collins Brothers Oil
Company as appellants, to the Laclede Gas Company as Laclede, and
to the Public Service Commission as the Commission.

Appellants briefed four questions seeking a reversal of the judg-
ment of the Cole County Cireuit Court affirming the order of the
Commission. They are as follows (omitting citations of authorities) :

“J, The Commission’s order that it is in the public interest
for Laclede to exercise condemnation is contrary to the law and
the evidence, and this Court may review the evidence unhampered
by the findings of fact by the Commission, and, thereupon may
enter a lawful order on the Record.

“II. The Storage Act delegates to the Commission its power
to determine when eminent domain shall, be exercised without

. fixing any standard or criteria to guide the action of the Com-
mission, and the aid (Act) therefore is unconstitutional as an
unlawful delegation of legislative powers.

“III. The Storage Act authorizes the taking of property for
private use and without compensation.

“IV. The classification of property subject to condemnation
under the Storage Act is unjust, the selection of persons by the
Commission who may exercise condemnation is arbitrary, and
the Act is unconstitutional under the State and Federal Con-
stitutions as discriminatory, denying equal privileges and im-
munities due process of law.’’

We shall dispose of these points in the order stated.

Laclede is a public utility subject to the regulation of the Commis-
sion. Its business is selling gas to the public in the City of St. Louis
and in St. Louis County, Missouri. At the time of the hearing before
the Commission, Laclede was selling about 90% of the fuel for cook-
ing and 87% of the fuel for heating homes. There were on file with
Laclede about 25,000 applications of home [347] owners desiring gas
for heating their homes. The gas supply to Laclede was limited and
therefore the Commission had by order curtailed Laclede’s sales of
gas for heating homes. Laclede was forced to refuse service to many
applicants. Desiring to furnish its product to all applicants, Laclede
sought ways and means to obtain a larger supply of gas for this pur-
pose. It investigated the laying of additional pipe lines to points
where gas was available. It was found that the cost of installation was
exorbitant. The Mississippi River Fuel Corporation supplied the
natural gas used by Laclede. The amount, however, was limited to
800,000,000 cubic feet per day. This was more than needed during
the summer months. However, during the winter months, especially
in zero weather, the peak load was so great it was insufficient to supply
the demand. Laclede studied various methods in attempting to meet
the demand for more gas. These investigations disclosed that storing
the surplus gas not needed during the summer months and drawing
on that supply in the winter was a method of meeting the situation.

Dr. Edward L. Clark, the Missouri State Geologist, was consulted.
Then Max and Douglas Ball, and Carl A. Bays and Associates, oil
and gas consultants, were employed to conduct explorations and
determine the feasibility of storing gas underground in the St. Louis
area.

These men, Dr. Clark, Max Ball, Douglas Ball, and Carl A. Bays,
all experts in the matter of storage of gas underground, testified for
applicant-Laclede at the hearing before the Commission. From their
evidence, we learn that underneath an area of about 6,000 acres in
the northern portion of St. Louis County and in a small portion in St.
Charles County gas may be safely stored about 1200 feet or more
below the surface of the land and the Missouri River. It is referred
to as the ‘‘Lange area’’—so named because the first test drill was
made on land belonging to a man named Lange. A sandstone stratum
referred to as the St. Peter formation is located about 1100 to 1400
feet below the surface. It has an anticline or saddleback position or
formation thereby creating a dome or trap. The St. Peter formation

is overlaid by three strata impermeable to gas. They are, as stated
by witness Car] A. Bays: ‘‘The St. Peter reservoir is overlain by
three formations, the Joachim, Plattin, and Decorah, all of -which
are impermeable to gas, having been impermeable to chemical mingl-
ing of waters and: significant pressure differences for long periods
of geologic time. The strata form multiple sealing beds: with much
more than adequate caprock for the reservoir.’’? Above the Decorah lies
the Kimmswick formation from which appellants are obtaining oil.
All of these strata are more than 500 feet below the surface and do
not contain any of the products enumerated in Section 393.460 of the
Gas Storage Act, supra. These witnesses testified that approximately
29 billion cubic feet of gas may be stored in this St. Peter dome
formation. The method to be used is t6 pump gas into the St. Peter
sandrock displacing the water or forcing it back. The three strata
lying. above the St. Peter, as above-mentioned, will hold the gas in
the dome from whence it may be released through pipes when needed.
Note the evidence of Douglas Ball ‘as to the requirements for safe
storage of gas:. “Three chief things are required for a safe and
successful storage field: first, a reservoir bed, usually sandstone or
limestone, porous enough and-thick enough to contain an appreciable
percentage of fluids per unit volume of itself, and permeable enough
that fluids can move readily through it; second, a cap rock or sealing
bed, such as clay shale, overlying the reservoir, impermeable enough
and continuous enough that fluids cannot move through it to escape
from the-reservoir ; third, a trap, a structure or condition of the rocks
that. confines a gas accumulation to a relatively small lateral area
of the [848] reservoir. The traps easiest to find and most commonly
known are closed anticlines, rocks folded to form domes.

‘Natural gas fields have all these requisites and in addition have
a nature given supply of gas in the reservoir. Where the natural
fluid is water, the reservoir is known as an aquifer. Man stores gas
in an aquifer by drilling into the reservoir at the top of a structure
and displacing some'of the water with the stored gas simply by pump-
ing the gas in against the water’s pressure.’’

. The cost of the original ‘expldration was at the time of the hearing
about $800,000. - . .

The first hearing was held before the Commission on March 19,
1954. The intervenors requested that they be given time to study
the evidence of the wituesses and asked for a postponement of the
hearings to a futtire. date at wliich time they desired to cross-examine
each witness. The request was granted and the date for further
hearing -was set for April 19. The several intervenors through their
counsel at that time cross-examined each witness at length as to
evety material matter. and many immaterial matters on the issues
involved. Carl A. Bays, Douglas Ball, and Max Ball were cross-
examined about the Herscher storage field located in northern Illinois

and used for gas storage to supply Chicago with gas. They, as well
as Dr. Clark, were cross-examined in detail about every phase of the
proposed storage in the St. Peter sandstone. It is our opinion that
these cross-examinations strengthened rather than weakened Lae-
lede’s contention that gas may be stored profitably and safely in the
Lange area. Appellants introduced evidence showing that at the
Herscher storage field, gas had been leaking and coming to. the’ sur-
face ever since it had been used; that water supplies had been con-
taminated; that the gas company, owner of the storage, had supplied
farmers and also the village of Herscher with water. Appellants also
introduced evidence by an expert, a Mr. Mylius, that in all probability
the Lange dome would leak. The expert. witnesses for Laclede testified
that the Lange area contained a better dome for gas storagé than the
Herscher field; that the overlying stratum, specifically the Joachim,
which lies immediately above the St. Peter rock was impermeable to
gas. ‘These witnesses further testified that the ILlerscher storage, even.
with the leaks, was not unsuccessful.

Appellants in their reply brief stated that ‘There is no rule of
law which permits any Court, much less a Commission which is an
administrative body, to categorically accept as true the testimony of
witnesses for a Plaintilf or to consider their testimony alone as credit-
able. To the contrary, the testimony of such witnesses for the Plain-
tiff who must. sustain the burden of proof, should he scrutinized most
carefully in determining the weight of the evidence.”’

Hl We agree that the evidence of witnesses for a plaintiff should
not be categorically accepted as true. There are certaizi rules govern-
ing the credit to be given to any witness whether he is a witness for
plaintiff or for any other party interested in a controversy. The
Commission, in its opinion filed with the order disposing of the case,
considered at length the evidence of the witnesses for Laclede and
the evidence offered by appellants. Jn passing on the credibility of
the evidence and the weight to be given thereto, the Commission com-
mented as follows with reference to the expert witnesses: ‘‘On the
one hand we have the opinions of consultants and geologists who have
directed and supervised the exploratory drilling and have made
studies of drilling samples, cores, water pressures, insoluble residues
and have observed, considered and studied outcrops, earthquake
history and driller’s logs, electric logs and every source of informa-
tion known to science. Each gives it as. his positive and unqualified
opinion that the proposed reservoir has all of the three prerequisites
of an adequate, [349] feasible and safe reservoir bed for the storage
of gas and that natural gas stored in such reservoir bed will not leak
or escape therefrom.

“On the other hand, and for the interveners, we had Mr. Mylius,
Mr. Firebaugh and Mn. McCole, none of whom had the opportunity
to examine or study the drilling samples, cores, water pressures, in-

soluble residues or any other products of such exploratory wells, or
observed driller’s logs, electric logs or other subjective drilling opera-
tions in this area. Mr. Mylius and Mr. Firebaugh each gave it as
their opinion that this storage reservoir will ‘probably leak,’ but de-
clined to give it as their positive opinion that it will leak. Mr. McCole
supplied that by giving it as his opinion that the storage reservoir
will leak.’’

The opportunity of a witness to observe and to acquire knowledge
of the facts given in evidence should always be taken into considera-
tion in weighing the evidence. 70 C.J. 766-769, Sec. 929, notes 35, 36,
and 87, and cases there cited.

Appellants introduced evidence that there is in fact no
shortage in fuel in the area; that there is a sufficient amount of coal
and oil available to heat all the homes in the trade territory served
by Laclede. The Commission took those facts into consideration. Of
course, there is a difference of opinion as to what fuel is most de-
sirable for heating. The evidence in this case showed beyond a doubt
that thousands of persons desire gas wherewith to heat their homes
and it cannot be supplied. Laclede, being a public utility, should
make an effort to supply that demand. It has done so. Under the
statutory law enacted by the legislature of 1953, referred to supra,
Laclede could by private contract purchase underground storage
space for the storage of gas and in that way supply its customers.
If such space cannot be had without condemnation, then the law re-
quires that permission must be obtained from the Commission. The
sole issue to be determined by the Commission in such a case is
whether it would be in the public interest to grant the right of con-
demnation. Section 393.440, supra. The Commission, after an ex-
haustive hearing pro and con, determined that Laclede should be
granted the right of condemnation to acquire underground storage
space in the Lange area; that such right will be in the public interest ;
that all of the prerequisites prescribed by the underground storage
of gas act have been fulfilled. On the subject of ‘‘What is a Public
Use’’ see 29 O.J.S. 828-828, Sec. 31, and cases cited under note 36;
also see Bowman v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 14, 233 S.W.(2d) 26, Le. 32,
33 (11).

Appellants say in their brief that ‘‘ ‘Public interest’ is not synony-
mous with either ‘public use’ or ‘public necessity.’ It is something
Jess than ‘public necessity’ and ‘public use.’’? Appellant cited 29
O.J.S. 823 as authority for that statement. We cited that same au-
thority supra. A reading of Section 31 of 29 C.J.S. will disclose that
what is there said does not help appellants. See also 29 C.J.S. 845,
See. 57. Whatever term appellants desire to apply, we think that
the facts of this case justify a finding that the object sought to be
attained by Laclede comes within the term ‘‘public interest.’? We
therefore rule that the finding of the Commission was correct in its

order .granting to Laclede the right to condemn land within the’
Lange area ‘‘in the public interest.’? That was the only question be-
fore the Commission.

HE We do not think it necessary to discuss at length the question
presented by point II in appellants’ brief. Point II, as set forth
above, does not present any particular question for discussion, We
therefore examined appellants’ argument to determine what ‘they
desired to present. Therein appellants quoted the following from 18
Am. Jur. 663, Sec. 86: ‘‘It is to be observed that the courts dis-
tinguish between a use which is [850] public and an interest which
is public. Where there is simply a public interest, as distinguished
from a public use, the power of eminent domain cannot be exercised.’’
We believe that appellants have misconceived the nature of the pro-
ceeding before the Commission. The sole question before the Commis-
sion was whether it would be in the public interest to grant Laclede
the right to acquire underground storage space in the Lange area
by condemnation. That was:simply a question of fact to be deter-
mined from the evidence presented to the Commission. It is all that
is required by Section 393.440 of the Act, supra. Section 393.430 of
the Act reads in part as follows: ‘‘Any gas storage company desir-
ing to acquire by condemnation land or any interest therein or a
temporary license pursuant to this section, may to that end proceed
as provided by, and subject to the provisions of chapter 523, RSMo,
the provisions of which chapter are hereby made applicable in such
case, but subject, further, to the limitations and provisions provided
in sections 393.410 to 398.510.’ (Emphasis ours)

Section 523.010, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., authorizes condemnation
proceedings for the taking of property ‘‘for public use.’? The Gas
Storage Act of 1953 placed a further limitation on the right of con-
demnation by requiring a gas company, such ag Laclede, to obtain
permission from the Commission before instituting condemnation.
See also Art. I, See. 26, Constitution of Missouri, 1945. Whether the
taking of property is for a public use or not is a judicial question
which was not determined by the Commission. Appellants’ conten-
tion that the term ‘‘in the public interest’’ was not defined and there-
fore no standard to guide the Commission was fixed by the legisla-
ture must be denied. We ruled on that question in State ex rel. Con-
sumers Public Service Co. v. Public Service Commission, 352 Mo.
905, 180 S.W. (2d) 40, Le. 48 (11, 12). See also National Broadcast-
ing Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 87 L.Hd. 1344, Le. 1367, 1368;
New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 77
L.Ed. 138, Le. 145, 146.

HI What we have heretofore said fully disposes of point III of
anpellants, wherein they say, ‘‘The Storage Act authorizes the taking
of property for private use and without compensation.’’ We desire
to add a few comments, however. Appellants in the argument say,

“The language used in the Act is so broad that a proposed condemnor,
having once received the stamp of approval from the Public Service
Commission, under the guise of ‘public interest’ has authority which
is paramount to the state government or any political subdivision
thereof.’’ Laclede, having obtained permission to institute condemna-
tion proceedings from the Commission, is not free to go forward: un-
hampered or unrestricted by the laws governing condemnation. As
above-noted, the Storage Act expressly subjected such a proceeding to-
the provisions of Chapter 523, supra. Nothing in the Act even sug-
gests the taking of property for private use and without compensa-
tion. On the contrary, the Act contemplates the taking of private
property for public use for a price to be determined in a condemna-
tion proceeding.

Hj im point IV of appellants’ brief, they say that the Storage
Act is discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. It is argued
that ‘‘formations containing non-potable waters are allowed to be
condemned while those containing potable waters are prohibited.’’
The State Legislature may authorize condemnation of certain classi-
fied :property and withhold from condemnation other property. See
Kansas & T. Coal Ry. Co. v. Northwestern Coal & Mining Co., 161 Mo. |
288, 61 S.W. 684. If the classifications are not arbitrary, no con-
stitutional rights are violated. Ballantine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164
S.W. (2d) 878, Le. 888 (16-18), and cases there cited. The classifica-
tion made cannot be said to be arbitrary.

Our conclusion is that the Commission was justified in finding
from the evidence [851] presented that it would be in the public
interest to permit Laclede to acquire storage space to the end that it
may better and more adequately serve the inhabitants of St. Louis
and of the surrounding territory with fuel gas.

In the condemnation proceedings (if one is to be instituted), all
rights of the property owners whose property is to be taken may be
protectéd. * .

The judgment cf the Cireuit Court’ of Cole County approving the
order of the Commission is hereby affirmed. All concur.

a m

In THe Marrer or rae Guapsronz Sporn Roap Disrricr or Chay
County, Missourt, Respondent, v. Tus Counry Courr or Chay
County, Missourr, Jupes L. M. Bywarsrs, Jupen Noam Harr
and Juper Forp Wurrr, Jupexs or raz County Court or Chay
County, Missouri, Appellants, No. 45038—293 S. W. (2d) 352.

Division Two, July 9, 1956.
Rehearing Denied, September 10, 1956.

Francis @. Hale and Robert HE. Coleberd for appellants; Arthur RB.
Kincaid, William B. Waters and Martin E. Lawson of counsel.

Williams & Norton for respondent,

[352] BOHLING, C.—This is a declaratory judgment action by
the Gladstone Special Road District of Clay County, Missouri,
against the County Court of Clay County, Missouri, Judge L. M.
Bywaters, Judge Noah Hart and Judge Ford White, Judges of the
County Court of Clay County, Missouri. The boundaries of plaintiff
coincide with-the boundaries of the City of Gladstone; and the issue
presented by the parties is whether it is the duty of the county court
to credit and pay to plaintiff four-fifths of the road and bridge taxes
collected unon property within plaintiff’s boundaries, as contended
by plaintiff, or only one-fourth of said four-fifths, as contended by

defendants. The judgment was for plaintiff. Defendants have ap-
pealed.

The case involves ‘‘the construction of the revenue laws of this
state’’ and we have appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const. Art. V, § 8;
Lamar Township v. City of Lamar, 261 Mo. 171, 177, 169 8. W. 12,
Ann. Cas. 1916D, 740; Wright County v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bk.,
Mo., 80 8. W. 2d 82, 33[1]. See also T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Allen, 318
Mo. 440, 300 S. W. 486[1].

The case was submitted on the following stipulation (formal recitals
omitted) :

‘1. That defendants L. M. Bywaters, Noah Hart and Ford White
are the Judges of the County Court of Clay County, State of Missouri.

“2. That Gladstone Special Road District of Clay County, plaintiff
herein, was duly organized and formed April 7, 1954, under Sections
233.010 to 233.165 M. R. S. 1949; that said Special Road District is
confined geographically to the city limits of the City of Gladstone, a
fourth class city ‘which was incorporated November 19, 1952, under
the laws of the State of Missouri; that said city will be completely sur-
rounded by the City of Kansas City, Missouri, on January 1, 1959, and
thereafter.

“3, That 80 per cent of the taxes collected under Section 233.125
M. R. S. 1949 in said Special Road District to February 28, 1955,
aggregate the sum of $9138.88 ; that 25 per cent thereof, namely: The
sum of $2284.72 has been set aside by the county treasurer in Special
Road District No. 6 Fund, which is plaintiff Special Road District;
that 75 per cent of said fund, namely: The sum of $6854.16 has been
deposited in an escrow account by said county treasurer to await the
outcome of this particular litigation.

“4. That plaintiff herein has demanded that defendants herein pay
over to plaintiff the aggregate amount of said taxes, namely: The
sum of $9138.88; that defendants have refused to comply with plain-
tift’s request.”

We quote (emphasis ours) §§ 233.125, 137.555, 233.095 and 233.100.
(Statutory references are to RSMo 1949, VAMS, unless otherwise in-
dicated.)

Section 233.125 provides: ‘‘In all counties in this state where a
special road district, * * has * * been organized * * under sections
233.010 to 233.165, and where money shall be collected for road and
bridge purposes under the provisions of section 137.555 upon property
within such special road district * * or where money shall be collected.
for pool [853] or billiard table licenses upon any business within such
special road district, * * the county court shall, as such taxes or
licenses are paid and collected, apportion and set aside to the credit
of such special road district * * from which said taxes were collected,
four-fifths of swch part or portion of said road and bridge tax so
arising from and collected and paid upon any property lying and

being within any such special road district, * * and also one-half of
the amount collected for pool and billiard table licenses so collected
from such business carried on or conducted within the limits of such
special road district; aad the county court shall, upon application by
said commissioners of such special road district * * draw warrants
upon’ the county treasurer, payable to the commissioners of such
special road district * * or the treasury thereof, for four-fifths
of such part or portion of said road and bridge tax so collected upon
property lying and being within such special road district, * * and
also one-half of the amount collected, for pool and billiard table
licenses so collected from such business carried on or conducted with-
in the limits of such special road district * *.’”

- Section 187.555 provides: ‘‘* * the county court * * may levy an
additional tax, not exceeding thirty-five ceuts on each one hundred
dollars assessed valuation, all of such tax to be collected and turned
into the county treasury, where it shall be known * * as ‘The Special
Road and Bridge Fund’ to be used for road and bridge purposes and.
for no other purpose whatever; provided, however, that all that part
or portion of said taw which shall arise from and be collected and paid
upon any property lying and being within any special road district
shall be paid into the county ireasury and four-fifths of such part or
portion of said tax so arising from and collected and paid upon any
property lying and being within any such special road district shall
be placed to the credit of such special road district from which it arose
and shall be paid out to such special road district upon warrants of
the county court, in favor of the commissioners or treasurer of the
district ag the case may be; provided further, that * * the one-fifth
part retained in the county treasury may, in the discretion of the
county court, be used in improving or repairing any street in any
incorporated city or village in the county, if said street shall form
a part of a continuous highway of said county leading through such
city or village.’’

Section 233.095 provides: ‘‘Said board shall have authority to ex-
pend not more than one-fourth of the revenue * * paid into its
treasury for the purpose of grading and repairing any roads or streets
within the corporate limits of any city within said special road dis-
trict in conformity with the established grade of said roads and streets
in said cities and for the purpose of constructing and maintaining
macadam, gravel, rock or paved roads or streets within the corporate
limits of any city within the said special road district in conformity
with the established grade of said roads and streets in said city * *.’’

Section 233.100 provides: ‘‘Said boards may repair, grade, gravel,
macadamize or pave any road in its district but nothing herein shall be
taken or construed as enlarging the powers of the boards to expend
money upon roads and streets within the corporate limits of any city
within said special road district as limited by Section 233.095.’’

The court found, so far as material here, that under Section 233.125
the county court was required to pay to plaintiff four-fifths of the road
and bridge tax collected upon property within plaintiff district and
one-half of the pool and billiard table licenses collected. within plain~
tiff district; that the enforcement of Sections 233.095 and 233.100
against plaintiff would cause an absurd result in that plaintiff. would
accumulate large sums of money without any possible means of using
the same; that Sections 233.095 and 233.100 were not applicable to
plaintiff ‘‘because they are ambiguous and doubtful in [854] their
application to this plaintiff and said sections clearly contemplate ‘a
road district containing a rural area, which is not existent in this in-
stance,’’? and that plaintiff could spend its entire income on grading
and repairing roads and streets in the City of Gladstone: Judgment
was entered ordering defendants to-pay to plaintiff the $6,854.16 held
in escrow.

‘We agree with the trial court that. Sections 283.095 ana 233.100

“clearly contemplate a road district containing a rural area, which
is not existent in’? plaintiff, But, Section 233.095 is the only section
authorizing any expenditure by such. special road districts on ‘‘any
roads or streets within the corporate limits of any city within said
special road district,’ which authority is subjected to. compliance
“with the established grade of said roads and streets in said cities.”
In addition, Section 233.100 emphasizes that any authority to expend.
such funds on city roads and streets is restricted to that conferred by
Section 233.095.

A basie issue of plaintiff’s right of recovery is the ‘authority of
special road districts under Sections 233.010 through 233.165 to
expend all of their funds on city roads and streets, as urged by plain-
tiff. Plaintiff directs our attention to no provision of thé law to that
effect. Supreme Court Rule 3.27. authorizes the consideration of plain
errors affecting substantial rights on appeal in the discretion of the.
court, though not raised in the trial court'or preserved for review,
when deemed proper to prevent manifest injustice. Nelson v. Kansas
City, 8360 Mo. 143, 227 8. W. 2d 672,.674[4].° .

The special road district law here involved. first appeared as Laws
1895, p. 258. We refer to certain provisions, not mentioned supra, of
the original act and as they now exist so far as pertinent here.

The original act, according to its title, was “‘to provide for work-
ing and improving the public roads, by the organization of special read.
districts of territory not more thari six miles square, in which .is lo-
cated a city of the third or-fourth class, except cities of the third class
organized under special charter * *.’? Laws 1895, p. 258: We do not
find the title changed by subsequent legislation. *

Original Section 1, conforming to.said title, provided that territory
“not exceeding six miles square wherein is Toeated a town or city of
the third or fourth class, except cities ‘of the, third: élass organized’

under special charter’’ could be organized into a special road dis-
trict. Laws 1895, p. 258. Said section (following changes by Laws
1908, p. 260, 261; Laws 1909, p. 765, and Laws 1945, p. 1494) now
reads: ‘‘Territory not exceeding eight miles square, wherein is
located any city, town or village containing less than one hundred
thousand inhabitants * *’’ may be so organized. Section 283.010.

The three commissioners constituting the ‘“‘board’’ are appointed
by the mayor and members of the city council of any city or town
within such district, together with the members of the county court
of the county in which the district is located. Section 233.040; Laws
1895, p. 258, Section 2. State ex inf. v. Meyer, 321 Mo. 858, 12 8. W.
2d 489, 490, The mayor and members of the council of a town ninety
per cent within and ten per cent outside of the boundaries of such
special road district may not participate in the selection of the com-
missioners of the district, because ‘‘ ‘within’ as employed in the statute
was not intended to permit the mayor and board of aldermen of a
town partly within and partly without or substantially within the
territorial limits of the road district to vote in the selection of the .
district’s commissioners.’’ Town of Alexandria v. Clark County, Mo.,
231 S. W. 2d 622, 624[/4].

“Said board shall have sole, exclusive and entire control and
jurisdiction over all public highways within its district outside the
corporate limits of any city or village therein to construct, improve
and’ repair such highways’’ et cetera. Section 233.070, unchanged
[855] from Laws 1895, p. 254, Section 9. Cities of the fourth class have
“exclusive control over all streets, alleys, avenues and public highways
within the limits of such city.’’ Section 88.670(3) ; Laws 1895, p. 84,
Section 85. The statutes mentioned do not create two distinct munici-
pal corporations to exercise the same powers, jurisdiction and priv-
ileges coincidentally. See Wellston Fire Protection Dist. v. State Bk.
& T. Co., Mo. App., 282 8. W. 2d 171, 175 [7]. Public highways within
special road districts ‘‘outside the corporate limits of any city or vil-
lage therein’’ are the highways over which the district’s board has
jurisdiction. The authorization of the expenditure of funds of the
district on city streets was incidental to the improvement and use of
the highways outside of the city limits. As first enacted, now Section
233.095 disclosed an expressed legislative intent to restrict the ex-
penditure of ‘‘one-fourth’’ of the district’s funds on streets of cities
within the district to ‘‘extensions or continuations of similar roads
already constructed outside of such corporate limits.’? Laws 1903, p.
261, H. B. 613; Laws 1911, p. 370, 8. B. 241. Section 233.095 was put
in its present form by Ist Bx. Ses. 1921, p. 169, H. B. 22. At the same
session, the Legislature added the provision in now Section 233.100
restricting the powers of such special road districts to expend money
upon city roads and streets to that conferred by Section 233.095.
Ast Ex. Ses. 1921, p. 171, H. B. 25.

Construing Sections 233.010 through 233.165 from the words used,
and seeking their plain and rational meaning, the promotion of their
objects, and their manifest purposes, considered historically (Union
EL Co. v. Morris, 359 Mo. 564, 222 S. W. 2d 767, 770[2]), the intent
of the Legislature appears to be plain that such special road districts
should embrace a rural area. The act as a whole, as well as Sections
233.095 and 233.100, contemplates a road district having a rural area,
‘The boundaries of plaintiff road district and the City of Gladstone, a
city of the fourth class, coincide. Plaintiff road district has no rural
area. It follows that plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judg-
ment that Sections 233.095 and 233.100 are not applicable to expendi-
tures of special road district funds on city roads and streets or a judg-
ment that defendants are required to pay plaintiff four-fifths of the
road and bridge taxes et cetera, as prayed by plaintiff.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions
to enter judgment in conformity hereto. Barrett and Stockard, CC.,’
eoneur.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Bourne, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Carotins Baprr Vest and Mary Baper Orvrs, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
y. 8. Jamus Branson, Trustee, Defendant-Appellant, and TxavsL-
urs INDEMNITY Company, Defendant-Respondent, No, 44539—
293 S. W. (24) 369.

Division One, July 18, 1956.
Rehearing Overruled in Per Curiam Opinion Filed, September 10, 1956.

Le!
ee
B Cc. Bi for plaintiffs-appellant:

rp :ppellants.

Douglas H. Jones and Thomas F. McDonald for defendant-respond-
ent.

- [872] TWYDE, J.—Action to remove trustee of a testamentary
trust, seeking an accounting and to surcharge the trustee with a judg-
ment against him and the- surety on his bond. Plaintiffs have ap-
pealed from a decree dismissing their suit and making allowances for
the trustee’s expenses and attorneys’ fees.

"EEE Defendants raise the question of our jurisdiction, pointing out
that the petition asks for no specific amount. It is true, as they state
(citing Juden v. Houck, Mo. Sup., 228 8. W. 2d 668) that a recital in
briefs as to amount involved is not sufficierit to give this: Gourt juris-
diction. However, in this case the petition states the basis of plaintii
claim and asks judgment for amounts to be determined on that basis;
and the evidence in the record affirmatively shows these amounts total
more‘than $7,500.00. (See Bates v. Clark, 349 Mo. 1087, 163 8S. W-
2a ‘975; Townsend v. Maplewood Inv. & Loan Co., 351 Mo. 738, 173
S.. Wy 24° 911, 167 8. 'W. 2d 98; Bates v. Bates, 343 Mo. 1018,
124 W. 2d 1117; Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co.,
319- Mo. 337, 4 S.’W. 24-776.) The petition asked that the trustee
be surcharged with the full amount which he has received as com-
pensation since 1948, which the record shows was $5,780.11 at the
tinie of the trial; and also asked that he be surcharged with the dif-
ference between the sale price’ of an apartment building on Russell
Street in St. Louis and the capital invested therein, which plaintiffs’
evidence ‘showed ‘was $3,468.13. In addition, plaintiffs asked a sur-
charge: of income loss on the corpus invested in this property which
they compute at 8% on the basis of their evidence as $1,677.18; and
in an amended petition, which they sought to file, asked [873] a sur-
charge on an alleged loss of $2,722.50 on another apartment building
claimed to have been purchased for more than its real value. Also
involved are additional allowances to the trustee for expenses of $1,-
817.80 and-for attorneys’ fees of $5,000.00.. Thus it affirmatively ap-
pears from ‘the record that the amount in dispute exceeds the sum
of $7,500.00 (Sec. 8, Art. V, Const.) so that we have: jurisdiction.

Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground of violation of Rule 1.08 in failing to make a fair and concise
statement of the facts without argument. We have decided that the
interests of justice require a decision on the merits although plain-
tiffs’ statement contains some improper paragraph headings and com-
ments which are argumentative in nature. Properly such matters
only should be in the part of the brief provided in the rule for “‘an
argument’’, The motion to dismiss is overruled.

The trust involved was established by the will (executed December
4, 1943) of plaintiffs’ mother who died December 12, 1943. It was
drafted by defendant Bialson (hereinafter referred to as defendant)
who was named therein as executor and trustee. There was a will con~
test by plaintiffs on the grounds of mental incapacity and defendant’s
undue, influence, but there was no trial on these issues and the valid-
ity of the will was upheld. The trust was to continue until plain-
tiffs (daughters of testatrix) reached the age of 85; Mary was born
February 21, 1923 and Caroline January.25, 1926. It was also pro-
vided that if either daughter died during the trust period leaving a
minor child or children, the trust continued during minority. The
trustee was given (by III(a) of the will) the following investment
powers: ‘‘To hold, possess, manage and control said trust estate
and every part thereof, with full power to sell, transfer, convey
and dispose of the same upon such terms and in such manner, and
for such prices, as to the said Trustee shall seem meet and proper.
Said Trustee shall have, and is hereby given and granted, full power
and authority to invest and reinvest all or any part of said trust
estate in such manner, and in such loans, bonds, stocks, securities or
other property, personal or real, and wpon such terms and for such
lengths of time, as to the said Trustee shall seem meet and proper,
and without his being restricted to a class of investments which a
Trustee is or may hereafter be permitted by law to make; it being
intended hereby to give said Trustee full and complete authority to
hold, possess, manage, control, sell, convey, exchange, encumber,
pledge, lease, invest, and re-invest the whole and every part of said
trust estate according to his sole judgment and discretion, without
any limitation upon his power and authority so to do. The trustee
may employ counsel and other agents in the discharge of his duties
and determine and pay to them a reasonable compensation.’’

The duty and discretion of the trustee as to the beneficiaries (by
TIT(b) and (£) of the will) was as follows: ‘‘(b) The trustee shall
hold the trust estate in trust for the benefit of my two daughters. Mary
Bader Otts and Caroline Bader and shall pay over and distribute the
entire net income derived therefrom in equal monthly or other con-
venient installments unto my said daughters Mary Bader Otts and
Caroline Bader, each to receive one-half of said amount, share and
share alike, until they reach the age of thirty-five (35) years.’’

“(f) The said Trustee, at any time during the continuance of the
trust, in the exercise of his sole discretion, may encroach upon the
principal of the trust estate for the support, maintenance and educa-
tion, of any of the beneficiaries of the trust. The necessity and
propriety of any such encroachment upon principal, and the amount
thereof, shall be determined by said Trustee, and his determination
shall be final.’’ .

The will (IV) provided: ‘‘The Trustee shall receive as compensa-
tion for his services hereunder, fifteen (15%) percent upon the gross
income aceruing each year to the [874] trust estate and five (5%)
percent upon the fair market value of the principal of the trust
estate, as and when the same is dispersed or distributed free from
trust. In no event the Trustee shall receive less than fifty ($50.00)
Dollars per year as his minimum. compensation. ’”

The corpus of the trust estate in 1945 consisted of corporation
stocks with a market value of more than $15,000.00; unencumbered
real estate on South Broadway valued at $12,250.00 (testatrix had paid
that amount for it in 1948) ; real estate on Accomac Street (subject to
a $3,750.00 trust deed) valued at $5,000.00 (which was also subject
to Caroline’s homestead rights until she became of age in 1947) ; and
$2,272.47 cash at the end of the year. Defendant sold most of these
stocks in 1946 and 1947; and they were sold at a profit over the value
as of the date of testatrix’ death so that a capital gains tax was paid
for the trust estate. Defendant invested the money received in two
apartment buildings (one on Miami Street and one on Russell Street)
so that by the end of 1947 all of the corpus was in real estate. One
of the principal charges made against defendant is that by investing
all of the corpus in real estate he failed to maintain a prudent diversi-
fication of investments and recklessly concentrated the risk of loss
of trust assets. It is also contended that defendant acted recklessly,
without due care, skill and caution in making these two purchases,
that he was guilty of a breach of trust in failing to maintain the trust
real estate in proper repair and that he invested in the Russell Street
apartment with the improper motive of increasing his commission
(computed on gross income) a motive which conflicted with the in-
terest of the beneficiaries. The following facts concerning these invest-
ments appear from the record.

Miami Street Apartments. Defendant contracted to purchase this
building consisting of three apartments on May 3, 1946 for $9,250.00
from Peter Kintzele, a real estate broker who also dealt in real estate
on his own account. The deal was closed June 1, 1946. -Kintzele
bought this property for $5,750.00 in February, 1946 and made re-
pairs costing $1,200.00. It also had been sold for $5,750.00 to Kintzele’s
vendor. It had three apartments, subject to Federal rent controls and
a first floor unit not subject to rent control, rented as a tavern.
This property was sold in July 1958 for $9,500.00 out of which a sale

commission of $475.00 was paid and with adjustments the net amount
realized for the trust was $9,056.33. Thus the corpus loss was about
$200.00. Defendant said that before making this purchase he had the
property checked by a real estate man, J. P. Texier, who collected
rents for him on the Broadway property. He also said plaintiffs were
requesting more money and he thought he could increase the income of
the estate by investing in real estate. He did raise the rent on the
tavern from $35.00 per month to $70.00 and after relaxation of Federal
control requirements, in July 1947, obtained 15% rent increases
on the apartments. Plaintiffs had expert testimony to the effect that
the property was not worth $9,250.00 in 1946 but no value was fixed
and it was stated by their witness that $5,750.00 did not reflect its
value but that at that price ‘it was awful cheap’”’ and ‘‘a hell of a
good bargain.’’ The gross income, expenses and net income on this
property was shown by the trustee’s reports to be, as follows:

YEAR GROSS INCOME EXPENSES NET INCOME
1946 $ 571.68 (7 mo.) $311.08 (7 mo.) $260.60 (7 mo.)

1947 1113.50 834.46 279.04
1948 1340.40 498.39 842.01
1949 1880.40 392.92 987.48
1950 1460.40 598.77 861.63
1951 1467.30 . 491.39 975.91
1952 1488.00 345,32 1142.68

[875] These expenses included $120.00 interest annually after 1947,
which should have been charged to the Russell Street property because
this was interest on $3,000.00 borrowed to pay on the Russell pur-
chase. However, defendant’s 15% commission on the gross income is
not deducted from the income shown. Nevertheless (considering these
factors) it appears that, after 1947, the net income on the $9,250.00
invested was always in excess of 8% (not considering depreciation)
and averaged about 10% for 1949 to 1952 inclusive. There was evi-
dence that Miami was built between 1910 and 1912. Some repairs
were required in 1947 which was the reason for the low net income
that year.

Russell Street Apartments. On September 25, 1947, defendant con-
tracted to purchase from Kintzele an apartment on Russell Street
(built in 1914) with seven apartments, including one in the basement,
and completed the purchase on October 28, 1947. He said he also ad-
vised with Texier before making this purchase. At that time, the
trust had three unencumbered properties (Accomac, Broadway, and
Miami), the trust deed on Accomae having been paid in August.
The Russell Street purchase was set up by defendant in his trustee’s
report as a $29,250.00 deal. However, the Accomac property (two
apartments) was traded in at $7.250.00 so that the cash involved was

$22,000.00. This was the price Kintzele had paid for the property
earlier in the year so that his profit was whatever the Accomac
property was worth, estimated as $4,500.00 by defendant and $5,000.00
by plaintiffs, the price textatrix paid for it in 1948. (Accomac re-
quired extensive repairs which Kintzele made before he sold it, esti-
mated by him at $3,500.00 including value of his own labor.) The
$22,000.00 was paid by defendant assuming a trust deed of $14,000.00
borrowing $3,000.00 on a trust deed on the Miami property and
paying $5,000.00 in cash from estate funds on hand. ($500.00 was paid
down and closing check was $4,358.00 due to adjustments.) This
investment was increased by $1,701.63 by paying out of corpus in
1949 and 1950 the cost of a new heating plant (and water heater) so
that gas could be used and operating expenses reduced. The property
was subject to Federal rent control and remained subject to it until
it was sold in 1953 for $26,500.00 out of which a real estate commission
- of $1,000.00 was paid. (Defendant received a check for $11,090.87
for the cash proceeds of the sale, making adjustments for rents,
interest, taxes, insurance, ete.) Thus considering the Accomac prop-
erty worth only $4,500.00, total investment in the property was $14,-
201.63 (not including the $14,000.00 trust deed) while the net amount
received (after payment of the trust deed debt) was $11,500.00 (plain-
tiffs figuring on the basis of the closing checks, and valuing Accomac
at $5,000.00, fixes the investment at $14,559.00 and the net receipts at
$11,090.87 making the corpus loss $3,468.18). Certainly, even on the
basis of defendant’s figures there was a corpus loss of about $2,700.00.
Defendant’s income figures on this property were as follows:

YEAR GROSS INCOME EXPENSES NET INCOME
1948 $2974.40 $3020.09 $ 45.69 loss
1949 3345.60 2584.24 761.36
1950 3425.60 2656.34 769.26
1951 3399.70 2704.24. 695.46
1952 3494.50 2486.40 1008.10

The 1948 income loss was due partly to roof repairs and partly be-
cause rents were not increased until late in that year. (Plaintiffs
say rents could have been increased a year earlier with proper dili-
gence by defendant, since a 15% increase was authorized.) However,
to reflect the true situation, these expenses should include an addition-
al [376] $120.00 annually for interest on the $3,000.00 borrowed to
purchase the Russell property, which was secured by .a trust deed on
the Miami property. Defendant’s 15% commission on gross income
should also be considered to determine the actual income for distribu-
tion to the beneficiaries produced by this property. Considering these
factors, the income left from the Russell property to be divided
between the beneficiaries, was as follows:

Expenses

Including

Trustee’s Remaining

Commissions net income

and $120 for

Gross interest on distribution to Yield on

Year Rentals $3,000 loan —- Beneficiaries Investment
1948 $2,974.40 $3,586.19 $611.79 loss (none)
1949 3,345.60 3,206.08 189.52 1.08%
1950 8,425.60 8,289.74. 135.86 9%
1951 3,399.70 3,334.20 65.50 5 %

1952 8,494.50 3,130.23 364.27 2.5 %

Total Net Income Available for

Distribution to Beneficiaries

iS $93.36  (705.15—611.79)

Plaintiffs’ calculation shows that at 8% the corpus invested in
the Russell property (figured at $12,858.00, 1948-1949 and at $14,-
559.00, 1950-1952 after replacing the heating plant), deducting
trustee’s commissions on the amount that 3% would have produced,
the total amount of $1,770.54 (for these five years) would have been
available for distribution to them. ($327.88 annually, 1948-1949 and
$371.26 annually, 1950-1952.) This is the basis of plaintiffs’ claim:
for a surcharge of $1,677.18 for income loss caused by investing in
the Russel] property ($1,770.54—$93.36 actually available.) ’ Plain-
tiffs also calculate from the trustee’s reports that the amount and
proportion of the trustee’s commissions on gross income from the Rus-
sel property and the other properties was as follows:

Commissions
from Broad- Russell
Trustee’s Commissions way and Commissions
Total Income from Russell Miami Prop- % of Total
Year Commissions Property erties Commissions
1948 $1,082.27 $§ 446.16 $ 586.11 43%
1949 1,117.68 501.84 615.84 45%
1950 1,202.30 518.84 688.46 43%
1951 1,186.15 509.95 676.20 43%
1952 1,209.35 519.17 690.18 42%
$5,747.75 $2490.96 $3256.79 43%

Broadway Property and Other Matters Concerning Real Estate.
The Broadway property (built before 1875) was the best net income
producer of the three properties (netting more than’the combined
net of the other two 1948-1952 inclusive) and was sold at a profit of

$2,750.00 over the price testatrix had paid for it in 1943, which also
was the inventory price. Broadway consisted of two buildings with
three commercial units and 15 three room flats. All rentals on all
properties were collected for defendant by real estate agents who got
5% of the collections for their services, which [877] included manage-
ment services. (This charge was reduced to 3% in 1952 on Miami
and Russell.) Plaintiffs complain that defendant failed to make
necessary repairs on any of the buildings and permitted them to
deteriorate in value. They had considerable evidence concerning
their condition, including photographs, records of the City Building
Inspector and the Police Court concerning inspection, notices to re-
pair and complaints, records of complaints to the real estate company
collecting the rents as defendant’s agent, and testimony of tenants
and plaintiffs and their real estate expert. Defendant said he main-
tained them on as minimum a basis as he could to produce the maxi-
mum income. As the trial judge commented, this was a common con-
dition under rent control and there is no evidence to show repairs
would have increased the value of the buildings by the amount of
their cost. Defendant took the position that it was plaintiffs’ duty
to maintain Accomac during the homestead period and it got into
such condition that it was necessary either to dispose of it or spend
at least $2,000.00 for repairs. Defendant says that he sold the
corporate stocks and invested the corpus in real estate for the purpose
of increasing the income of the estate because of plaintiffs’ claim that
they needed more money. He says that by investing in real estate
he did increase the net income available for distribution to them and
shows that the net income and rate of return on $31,000.00 assets,
after deduction of trustee’s commissions on gross income, was as
follows :

Periods in which assets were not invested 100% in Real Estate for

full yearly periods.
12-14-43 to 12-31-45—2 years—2343.24 net income

1- 1-46 to 12-81-46—1 year —164943 ” 7 —5.32%
1- 1-47 to 12-81-47—1 year — 557.87 7 7 —1.80%
Total —4 years—4550.54 = 1137.65 average income
per year.

Periods in which assets were invested 100% in Real Estate for
full yearly periods.

1-1-48 to 12-31-48—1 year—1659.78 net income—5.35%

1-1-49 to 12-31-49—1 year—1903.01 7 6.138%

1-1-50 to 12-31-50—1 year—2603.34  ” 8.39%
1-1-51 to 12-31-51—1 year—2369.08 ” " —T.64%
1-1-52 to 12-81-52—1 year--2766.51 " °? 8.92%
Total —5 years 11301.67 = 2260.38 average income
per year.

However, as hereinabove shown, the Russell property added very little
to this return. Furthermore, the low income of 1947 was partly due
to the fact that expenses at both Miami and Broadway were higher
that year than in any other year of the trust. (Due to more than
$1200.00 repairs on Broadway and over $350.00 on Miami.) Moreover,
no income from Accomae then went into the trust estate because of the
homestead rights. Plaintifis lived upstairs in Accomae at the time it
was traded for Russell. They were both married at the time and they
moved into one of the third floor apartments in Russell for which
they paid defendant $35.00 per month. This was not increased when
rent controls were relaxed and later plaintiffs sublet this apartment
for $65.00 per month and retained the difference. Plaintiffs had paid
no rent at Accomac, because of Caroline’s homestead rights there un-
til shortly before Russell was purchased, and also retained the rent
on the first floor apartment under such rights but did pay the interest
on the trust deed debt during that period; Mary was Caroline’s
guardian during that period.

[378] Distributions to Beneficiaries and Trustee’s Commissions.
The amount and payment of trustee’s commissions and the distribu-
tion to beneficiaries from income and corpus was as follows:

One year Trustee Paid to Total Pay-
periods Trustee Commis- Paid to Beneficiaries ments to
ending Commission sion Pay- Beneficiaries from Benefic-
as shown Earned ments. from Income Corpus diaries
12-31-45 864.80 700.00 2843.24 859.44 3202.68
12-31-46 573.66 164.80 1649.48 150.57 1800.00
12-31-47 768.77 973.66 557.87 1282.18 1840.00
12-31-48 1063.28 368.77 1659.78 620.22 2280.00
12-31-49 1119.03 363.28 1903.01 26.99 1930.00
12-31-50 1202.30 963.28 1680.00 seeseee 1680.00
12-31-51 1186.15 2058.05 1680.00 1680.00
12-31-52 1209.35 1186.15 1840.00 1840.00

1953 1209.35

7987.34. 7987.34 18318.33 2939.35 16252.68
Defendant retained 5% commission on these payments from corpus.
It will be noted that the full amount of net income for 1950, 1951 and
1952 was not distributed to the beneficiaries. The undistributed ex-
cess for each year was 1950-—$923.34, 1951—$689.08, 1952—$926.51,
a total of $2,538.88. These amounts were shown on the trustee’s re-
ports for each of these years as transferred to corpus. Defendant
did this on the theory that he could replace from current income the
distributions to beneficiaries from corpus made in prior years. Plain-
tiffs contend this was in violation of paragraph III(b) of the will
and ask that the trustee be surcharged for interest on these undistri-
buted amounts at 6% which they calculate would total $428.18. This,

total amount of $2,538.88 of net income withheld was ordered by the
trial court on March 16, 1955 to be distributed to plaintifis. This
was the date on which plaintiffs’ motion for new trial was overruled
and the interest claimed by plaintiffs as the basis for this surcharge
is figured to that date.

As a result of the sales of the three parcels of real estate (all made
in 1958 after this suit was commenced) defendant received move than
$32,000.00. At the time of the trial, the corpus of the trust consisted
of $30,000.00 face value U. S. 2 5/8% Certificates of Indebtedness
and $2,746.65 in cash. At the end of each year, defendant made and
sent to plaintiffs detailed reports showing all his annual receipts and
disbursements. The accuracy of these reports is not questioned and
they are the basis for all figures and calculations supra. (Included
in the corpus figures, at the time of the trial, was the undistributed
income of $2,538.88. withheld on the theory that previous corpus
distributions could be replaced from subsequent income.) Other facts
will be stated in connection with rulings hereinafter made.

The trial court’s decree makes the following findings: ‘‘1. That the
evidence adduced herein does not show any reckless or improperly
motivated acts or conduct on the part of the Trustee herein. 2. That
such Trustee was not guilty of any incompetency requiring his re-
moval. That the beneficiaries accepted the benefits of the investments
made by the Trustee over a long period of time and beneficiaries con-
sulted with and had the benefit of counsel practically all during
the period of the administration of the trust by the Trustee. 4. That
the Trustee was given broad powers under the trust instrument and
that said Trustee did not violate his duties or any of the terms of
said trust instrument. 5. That the Estate sustained no loss, and the
beneficiaries [879] have been paid a substantial income. 6. That the
Trustee should not be ordered removed, and further finds that the
evidence fails to show that he should be surcharged with any
amounts. ”?

In this kind of case, while it is our duty to pass on the weight
of the evidence and make our own findings, we accord due deference
to the Chancellor’s determination of factual questions which it is
necessary to determine from’ conflicting oral evidence of witnesses who
appeared before him. (Shelton v. McEaney, 343 Mo. 119, 119 8. W.
2d 951 and cases cited; Sec. 510.810 RSMo. V.A.M.S.) Therefore,
we will accept the court’s finding of fact that there was no reckless
or improperly motivated acts or conduct by defendant, in the sense
of no dishonest motive or intentional violation or grossly negligent
disregard ‘of duties. Some of the other findings are not findings of
fact hut instead are conclusions of law. However, there is one finding
of fact that we cannot accept on the basis of the whole record, namely,
the finding that the estate sustained no loss, because the evidence
conclusively shows there was a loss on the Russell transaction.

While it is true that the total value of the corpus was sub-
stantially the same at the time of the trial as it was in 1945 when the
administration of the trust began, this is true mainly because ‘the
profit (over inventory value) on Broadway was equal to the loss on
Russell. (There was also some gain in the market value of the stocks
sold.) ‘The trustee who has incurred liability by reason of a breach
of a duty regarding investments cannot reduce his liability by proving
that be has made a profit for the trust by other legal or illegal conduct
in the trust administration.’’ (Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 702;
see also Restatement of Trusts, See. 213, comments a and b; Scott
on Trusts, See. 213.1; Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N. B. 761;
State ex rel. Bottcher v. Bartling, 149 Neb. 491, 31 N. W. 2d 422;
King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76; Schuster v. North American Mertgage
Loan Co., (Ohio), 65 N. E. 2d 667; Cuyler’s Estate, 5 Pa. D & C
317; Murphy-Bolanz Land & Loan Co. v. MeKibben, (Tex.), 236 8. W.
78; Annotation, 171 A.L.R. 1422.) Russell was certainly an un-
fortunate investment from the standpoint of producing any substential
net income for the beneficiaries as well as from the corpus loss sus-
tained. The trial judge in a memorandum filed with the deerce said:
“The investment in the Russell Street property at the time it was
made does not appear to have been too well considered’’; but he
thought there was no loss because of the price placed on Aceomac in
the deal. However, the price of Russell was inflated by the same
amount as the inflation in the Accomac price so that there was no
gain to the estate from that. (See analysis of the cash transaction,
supra.) Thus we must find that there was a corpus loss of $2,700.00
on the Russell transaction and also that Russell never produced any
substantial net income (after expenses and trustee’s fees) available
for distribution to plaintiff's prior to the commencement of this action.
(Less than $100.00 total 1948-1952 inclusive.) .

However, these facts alone do not show breach of trust, because
a trustee is not an insurer nor required to be infallible in his judg-
ment. (Boland v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 849 Mo.
731, 163 S. W. 2d 597; Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust
Co., 335 Mo. 860, 73 8S. W. 2d 248; Restatement of Trusts, See. 204;
Scott on Trusts, Sec. 204.) As stated in the Boland case (163 8. W.
2d, 1. ¢. 602); ‘‘In making investments of trust fimds the trustees
must consider first the question of the safety of the investment
(Cornet v. Cortiet, 269° Mo. 298, 316, 318, 190 8. W. 333) and second
the matter of diversification of such investments io distribute the
risk of loss. (Restatement of Law of Trusts, Sec. 228.)’? Tn the
Boland case as in Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S. W. 2d 29,
we approved as the rule in this State Sec. 227, Restatement [380] of
Trusts, as follows: ‘In making investments of trust funds the trustee
is under a duty to the beneficiary (a) in the absence of provisions in
the terms of the trust or of a statute otherwise providing, to make

such investments and only such investments as a prudent man would
make of his own property having primarily in view the preservation
‘of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be de-
rived.’’ (For matters to be considered in selecting investments in
addition to safety and amount and regularity of income see comment
m under Sec. 227, Restatement of Trusts; Scott on Trusts, Sec.
227.12.) By the terms of the trust, defendant had wide investment
powers and was unrestricted as to class of investments, with invest-
ment in real estate being expressly authorized; and authority to
encumber trust real estate was also expressly authorized. The validity
of these trust provisions was established in the will contest and cannot
now be questioned.

Nevertheless, although defendant was given the widest discretion
in making and managing investments, that does not mean he is beyond
all control and accountability. ‘‘A court of equity will never favor
a construction that confers on the trustee absolute and uncontrollable
powers.’’ (Garesche v. Levering Inv. Co., 146 Mo. 436, 447, 48 S. W.
658 ; See also Plummer v. Brown, 315 Mo. 627, 659, 287 8. W. 316, 327
and Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 187 and See. 227.) Sec. 187 says:
“Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the
exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court,
except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion.’’ (For
remedies for abuse of discretion, see Scott on Trusts, Sec. 187.1; See
also Lyter v. Vestal, 355 Mo. 457, 196 S. W. 2d 769; Koplar v. Rosset,
355 Mo. 496, 196 S. W. 2d 800; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Sec.
560.) As stated in comment i under See. 187, ‘‘Although discretion
is conferred upon the trustee as to the choice of investments, he cannot
properly invest in hazardous securities.’’ Likewise as said in comment
v, See. 227, ‘‘An authorization by the terms of the trust to invest in a
particular type of security does not mean that any investment in
securities of that type is proper. The trustee must use care and skill
and caution in making the selection. * * * Where by the terms of
the trust discretion is conferred upon the trustee to make certain in-
vestments, he is subject to liability if he abuses the discretion (see
Sec. 187). Thus, if the trustee is permitted to invest in a particular
security or type of security in his discretion and the circumstances
are such that it would be beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment
to make the investment, the trustee is subject to liability if he makes
it.’’ Furthermore, a trustee is in a fiduciary relation to the beneficiary
and ‘‘is under the duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust
solely in the interest of the beneficiary.’’ (Emphasis ours.) (Re-
statement of Trusts, Sec. 170.) This is the primary duty of any
trustee and must be the principal guide to be considered in the con-
struction of any powers given him by the trust instrument and the
propriety of his acts under them. ‘‘He is not permitted to place him-

self in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his
duty to the beneficiaries.’’ (Scott on Trusts, Sec. 170.)

| | While we construe the trust provisions as giving defendant
sole and complete discretion as to class of investments, nevertheless,
this did not authorize speculative or hazardous investments in any
class or dispense with all requirements of care, skill, caution and
reasonable diversification of risk. Certainly such requirements are not
specifically excluded. Although real estate was an authorized invest-
ment under the provisions of this trust and the trust owned Broadway
and Accomac when it began, nevertheless, the fact that real estate
was an authorized investment did not necessarily make it prudent to
have the entire corpus invested in real estate. (See Bogert, Trusts
and [381] Trustees, Sec. 678.) When the trust began, about half of
the corpus value was in corporate stocks, which provided some
diversification of investments. The sale of these stocks at a profit, the
payment of the mortgage on Accomac and the purchase of Miami, un-
der the evidence, cannot be held to be an abuse of discretion in view
of the trial court’s findings and our own view of the evidence. How-
ever, the purchase of Russell put all the trust corpus in real estate and
Russell had no commercial units, free from rent control, as did the
other two. Moreover, on the basis of probable operating expenses,
which the evidence shows could have been estimated, it was apparent
that it would produce very little net income available for distribution
to the beneficiaries as long as it was subject to the existing rent con-
trols. Thus it was essentially a speculative investment, both as to
probable net income and future value, dependent upon early termina-
tion of rent controls which the evidence shows was anticipated by
defendant. To purchase this property, subject to a $14,000.00 mort-
gage, and to encumber Miami for $3,000.00 to obtain part of the
purchase price, incurred an indebtedness of $17,000.00 against the
trust estate with annual interest charges of $680.00. (This was 4 of
the gross Russell rentals; another 4 went for commissions; trustee’s
commissions, 15%, and rent collection agent’s commissions, 5%.) It
is true that Accomac, in which Caroline’s homestead had just expired,
required extensive repairs if it was to be kept; but Russell also re-
quired repairs which reduced net income and increased the corpus
investment. (After repairs Accomac was sold for $8,000.00 by
Kintzele.) We must, of course, consider this transaction upon the
basis of the circumstances existing at the time it was made and not
upon subsequent events. (Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 227, comment m,
p. 652; Scott on Trusts, Sec. 227.12, p. 1224; 54 Am. Jur. 296, Sec.
877; 90 C.J.S. 575, Sec. 835.) Nevertheless, so viewing it, we must
agree with the trial court’s view that this transaction ‘‘at the time
it was made does not appear to have been too well considered.’’ It
does not appear as a prudent investment either from the standpoint
of producing income available for distribution to the beneficiaries or

of safety of corpus invested (incurring a $17,000.00 debt on a $26,-
500.00 purchase, see Scott on Trusts, Sec, 191) as well as resulting in
lack of diversification in class of investments.

Furthermore, there is another important factor to be con-
sidered, namely, that under the circumstances the trustee permitted
himself to be placed in a position in which there was a conflict of
interest between himself and the beneficiaries. This was due to the
fact that he would receive 15% of substantial gross income regardless
of whether this investment produced any net income available for the
beneficiaries, Thus a substantial return to him was certain while
income for the beneficiaries was highly speculative. (‘The result was
that from 1948 to 1952 inclusive defendant received $2,490.96 com-
mission on Russell gross income, while the total net available for
distribution to beneficiaries was $93.36.) Therefore, the risk of loss
of income was placed almost entirely on the beneficiaries. While we
do not mean to hold that this was defendant’s motive or purpose in
making this investment, we do hold that it was a failure to comply
with his duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries and amounted to an abuse of discretion in making this
investment, when considered in connection with all of the other cir-
cumstances hereinabove discussed. No doubt, he had great hope for
considerable increase both in income and in value from early termina-
tion of rent controls but that indicates the speculative character of
the transaction. Our conclusion, under all these circumstances, is
that defendant should be subject to liability for the corpus loss on
this investment and we hold that he should be surcharged in the sum
of $2,700.00. This surcharge is not much more than defendant re-
ceived in commissions on the gross Russell income [3882] and the result
will be that he will not gain anything from the Russell transaction ;
and as hereinabove shown plaintiffs did not gain anything substantial
from. it.

Hl We must further hold that defendant failed to comply with
the terms of the trust (III(b) of the will) providing that the trustee
‘‘shall pay over and distribute the entire net income derived there-
from (the trust estate) in equal monthly or other convenient install-
ments unto my said daughers’’ (naming plaintiffs). This is manda-
tory (McMillan v. Barnard Free Skin & Cancer Hospital, 304 Mo.
635, 264 S. W. 410) and defendant’s retention of part of the net
income for the years 1950, 1951 and 1952 was unauthorized, although
done on the theory that he could replace previous corpus distributions
from subsequent income. (See Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 182; Scott
on Trusts, Sec. 182.) Defendant points to no provision of the will
authorizing such replacement and we hold there is none. This was
recognized by the trial court and, as noted, defendant was ‘ordered
to pay this withheld income to plaintiffs and has done so. Plaintiffs
contend defendant should be surcharged with interest for the period

this income was withheld but since this question does not appear to
have been previously decided, we will not hold defendant accountable
for interest. However, defendant should not have been allowed a 5%
commission on this distribution of income (which the court ordered
eredited on the allowance made to him for preparation for trial, here-
inafter discussed) because it was not corpus and did not become
corpus by being improperly retained to replace corpus distributions.
Plaintiffs urge that, regardless of whether or not there are
other grounds, the long standing’ ill-will and hostility between the
trustee and the beneficiaries requires his removal. The trial court’s
memorandum states: ‘‘There is no doubt that a strong personal an-
tagonism has developed between the beneficiaries and the trustee .but
fortunately the trustee has assured that he will resign after he has
proven that he has not defrauded the beneficiaries and after his hand-
ling of the estate has been proven to be such that he is not guilty of
the charges laid against him.’’ The trial court thus recognized that it
would be in the best interest of the trust estate to have a new trustee
and in its final decree provided that the additional allowance which
the court made for defendant was to be paid to him ‘‘upon resignation
and turning over the assets of the estate to his successor trustee.”’
Hostility between a trustee and beneficiaries generally does not in
itself constitute a ground for the removal or discharge of the trustee;
but it is a factor to be taken into consideration; especially where the
exercise of discretion by the trustee requires personal relationship be-
tween the trustee and the beneficiary, and under some circumstances
may require removal of the trustee even though he has been without
fault in the administration of the trust. (54 Am. Jur. 112, Sec. 182;
90 C.J.8. 191, Sec. 282; Annotation 45 A.L.R. 831; Restatement of
Trusts, Sec. 107; Scott on Trusts, Sec. 107; Shelton v. McHaney, 343
Mo. 119, 119 S. W. 2d 951; Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S. W.
2d 387; Gartside v. Gartside, 118 Mo. 348, 20 8. W. 669; Gaston v.
Hayden, 98 Mo. App. 683, 73 S. W. 938.) In this case, hostility started
at the beginning of the trust, when plaintiffs contested the will on the
ground of defendant’s undue influence. It continued during the
period when Caroline had a homestead at Accomac and Mary was her
guardian. They were represented then by a different lawyer than. the
one who brought the will contest and there was controversy about
maintenance and repairs at Accomac, about their need for money,
and other matters. Their attorney tried to work things out with--de-
fendant during that period; and during that period most of the ad-
vances from corpus were made. Plaintiffs were both married while
living at Aecomac and each had a daughter. Each was separated from
her husband at the [883] time of the trial and they were working to
support themselves and small children. When they moved from Ac-
comae (where they had seven rooms) to Russell, plaintiffs and their
husbands lived together in one five room apartment on the third floor.

‘There was controversy about the condition of this apartment and
about getting on a lower floor; also about heat, repairs, hospital bills
when the children were born, and other matters; and remarks were
made by plaintiffs to defendant and by defendant to plaintiffs that.
were very much resented. Certainly we cannot say that defendant
was without fault in the creation of this situation of hostility, which
“was. not improved by his action in withholding part of the income of
the years 1950, 1951 and 1952 when the trust provisions required him
to distribute it to plaintiff. It seems clear from the record that there
is such resentment and hostility between the parties as to prevent the
trust purposes from being carried out by defendant in the manner
obviously intended. Considering all these matters together with the
Russell transaction and the conflict of interests permitted to be created
thereby, our conclusion is that the removal of the trustee is required.

: We further hold that, under these cirewmstances, the court
should not have made allowances to defendant of $1,650.00 for addi-
tional fees for preparation of his defense, $167.80 for expenses and
$5,000.00. for attorney’s fees or for any additional amount for such
purposes. (See Re Drake, Minn., 263 N. W. 439, 101 A.L.R. 801 and
annotation 806; 54 Am. Jur. 408, Sec. 513.) The trust provision for
defendant’s compensation was most generous. (See Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees, Sec’s. 974, 975.) As hereinabove shown, defendant had re-
ceived up to the time of the trial $7,987.34 in commissions while plain-
tiffs. together had received only $13,313.33 from income; and even with
the. $2,538.88 withheld income, later ordered paid to them, they re-
ceived only $15,852.21 or $7,926.10 each. Thus, defendant received
as much-from the estate in commissions as each of the plaintiffs re-
‘ceived from income. Certainly under the circumstances and result
reached herein, we do not think he is entitled to any more from this
rather modest'sized estate for the period up to and including the trial.
Defendant filed a motion for new trial and notice of appeal from the
order allowing fees, on the ground that the allowances made were in-
adequate, but has not perfected this appeal and it is now dismissed.

It is said: ‘‘ Allowance of compensation to a trustee who has
committed a breach of trust, upon a finding that the trustee was not
incompetent or chargeable with actual. bad faith or fraud, is largely a
matter-of judicial discretion and will not ordinarily be disturbed on
appeal. In the case of minor faults of a trustee, resulting only in
partial losses of trust funds for which his account has been surcharged,
a court, in ‘its discretion, may diminish the amount of the trustee’s
compensation.’’? (54 Am. Jur. 424, Sec. 539; see also Annotation 110
A.L:R. 566, 577, citing Garesche v. Levering Inv. Co., 146 Mo. 436, 48
S. W. 653 and.Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 8S. W. 383.) See.
243 Restatement of Trusts, states: ‘‘If the trustee commits a breach
of trust, the court may in its discretion deny him all compensation or
allow him a reduced compensation or allow him full compensation,’’

(For matters to be considered see comment ¢ under Sec. 243 and Scott
on Trusts, Sec. 243.) It is there said by Scott: ‘‘The trustee is liable
for any loss resulting from his breach of trust; and even if the court
allows him compensation, his liability for breach of trust cari be-set
off against his claim for compensation or his compensation withheld
until he has made good the loss.’’ Since we accept the finding of the
trial court that there was no fraud, dishonesty, bad faith or reckless
conduct on the part of defendant, we overrule the contention that he
should be allowed no compensation and surcharged with the amount he
has received. [884] We, therefore, hold that defendant may retain
what he has received and set off against the $2,700.00 surcharge, for the
Russell loss, the 15% commissions which he would be entitled to re-
ceive on income collected during and after 1953 and the 5% commis-
sion on the corpus to which he would be entitled on final settlement ;
provided, however, that he shall account for the 5%, collected on. the
withheld income for the years 1950, 1951 and 1952, distributed’ to
plaintiffs in 1955, to which commission we hold he is not entitled.

The decree and judgment is reversed and remanded with directions
to enter decree and judgment in accordance with the views herein ex-
pressed. All concur.

On Motion for Rehearing

PER CURIAM.—Defendant says he accounted for the 5%
commission on the corpus distributions to the beneficiaries in his 1953
report. (Made after the trial herein.) Of course, if he has done so the
trial court may take that into consideration in its final decree.

Other matters raised in the motion reargue rulings made in
our opinion and we adhere to these rulings for the reasons stated there-
in. However, we note one argument made by defendant as follows:
“The annual interest charge of $120.00 on the $3,000.00 deed of trust
put on the Miami property to get funds to buy the Russell property
cannot be considered (as the Court erroneously did) as a charge on
the Russell property income and at the same time the principal amount
of $3000.00 be considered as money invested in the Russell Avenue’
equity. If the loan is to be treated as a purchase money mortgage for
the Russell property with the interest charged against Russell proper-
ty income, the corpus invested in Russell is only $9500.00. The assets
of the trust invested in the Russell property, were the Accomac prop-
erty, valued at $4,500.00, and cash in the sum of $5,000.00, The Court,
simultaneously charged $120.00 interest against Russell income and
computed the yield from the investment on the. basis of $12,500.00
investment. ’” .

The only bearing this matter has is in fixing the amount of the
investment in Russell for the purpose of figuring the annual percent
of yield produced by it. Actually our mistake was that, in computing
this yield, we failed to consider the $14,000.00 mortgage on Russell in-

|

determining the total investment therein. (Plaintifis’ attorney had
likewise failed to consider it in figuring the yield.) Actually the total
investment in Russell was $26,500.00 ($17,000.00 borrowed funds—
$9,500.00 estate funds) ; and, to give the true figure, the yield should
be figured on $26,500.00 because the trust estate was obligated for the
$17,000.00 debt and had to earn and pay the interest on it. The fal-
lacy of defendant’s argument is shown by the fact that, under his
method of computation, any yield would be 100% if he had borrowed
the entire $26,500.00 to buy Russell.

It should also be said that it is not true as suggested that there
would be a conflict of interest between trustee and beneficiary in every
case in which the trustee’s compensation was fixed as a percentage of
gross income. The determination of a real conflict would depend on
the percentage involved, the proportion of the net income to gross in-
come, and the way in which the estate was managed with reference to
increasing gross income disproportionally to net income.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

Mrs. Berry Norma Lesowen Pusups, Suzanne L. Naunupim, AMY
L. Moorz, Epna H. Lescunn, Joun A. Lescuen, II, Winu1aM F.
Lescumn, and Mary G. Rorsuine, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Taz
Warson-Stituman Company, a Corporation, Defendant-Appel-
lant, No. 45015—293 8. W. (2d) 429.

Division Two, September 10, 1956.

for defendant-appellant;
ng of couns

Thomas 8S. McPheeters, E. C. Hartman and Thomas S. McPh
Jr, for plaintiffs-respondents; Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & Me-
Roberts and Hariman & Guilfoil of counsel.

[481] BARRETT, C.—Pursuant to the provisions of the General
Business Corporation Law, the A. Leschen and Sons Rope Company,
a Missouri corporation, was merged or consolidated (V.A.MLS., Secs.
351.410-351.450) with the defendant, Watson-Stillman Company, a
New Jersey corporation, on July 30, 1953. The plaintiffs, seven
minority stockholders, having duly objected to the consolidation, in-
stituted this statutory proceeding (Matter of Fulton, 257 N. Y. 487,
492, 178 N. E. 766, 768) to have the ‘‘fair value”’ of their shares
determined ‘‘as of the day prior to * * * such merger,’’ July 29,
1958, and paid by the surviving corporation, the defendant-appellant.
V.A.MS., Sec. 351.455.

The A. Leschen and Sons Rope Company was founded in 1857 and
incorporated in 1886. The company manufactured wire rope and
related products, and its ‘‘Hereules’’ wire rope was internationally
famous for its quality. On July 29, 1953, there were 28,022} shares
of common stock issued and outstanding out of an authorized 30,000
shares with a par value of $100 a share. Prior to June 1953 all of
the outstanding shares were owned by fifty-six people, many of them
descendants of the original founders of the company. The stock was
not listed upon any stock exchange, had no over-the-counter market,
and so, in the semantics of the market place, was a ‘‘close corpora-
tion.” Through his almost wholly owned holding company, H..K.
Porter Company, Mr. Thomas M. Evans of Pittsburgh, Pa. acquired
by purchase approximately 70% of the outstanding shares of stogk
of A. Leschen and Sons Rope Company for the agreed price of $75
a share, eventually acquiring 20,116} shares for the total price of
$1,515,637.50 (which included 276 shares of .employee-owned, stock
for which he was required to pay $100 per share). Included, in-
cidentally, in those who sold majority control for $75 a share were
three of the plaintiffs who sold 1184 of their shares. Thereafter, when
it was proposed by the new majority stockholders, in effect H. K.
Porter Company, to merge the A. Leschen and Sons Rope Company

with the Watson-Stillman Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of
H. K. Porter Company, the seven plaintiffs, owners of 7,846 shares
of the capital stock of A. Leschen and Sons Rope Company, objected
to the merger and, upon consummation of the merger on July 30,
1953, instituted this proceeding to have the ‘‘fair value’? of their
stock determined and paid. At the instigation of the defendant the
proceeding was referred to a referee who, after certain adjustments,
found the fair value of the 7,846 shares to be $184.80 a share. The
finding of the referee was affirmed by the Cirenit Court of the City of
St. Louis and the defendant, Watson-Stillman Company, has ap-
pealed from the final judgment fixing the value of the 7,846 shares
at $1,598,318.07 and the award to the referee of $30,000 for his
services,

In their amended, petition the plaintiffs asserted that the fair value
of their stock was $231.76 a share. They arrived at that figure by
establishing the net asset value of the company on July 29, 1953, to
be $6,494,531, which divided by the total number of shares outstand-
ing,- 28,0224, produced a per share value of $231.76. The net asset
value was determined by first establishing from the company’s balance
sheet of July 31, 1958, the stockholders’ equity in the company of
$5,492,477, capital stock of $2,802,250 plus retained earnings of
$2,690,277. To the stockholders’ equity there was added to the in-
ventory the sum of $1,017,717 by reason of the conservative ‘‘Lifo’’
method of accounting, $17,551, the value of a subsidiary and the sum
of $225,783 representing excess of appraised value of real estate over
the amount shown in the balance sheet—all for a total of $6,753,478.
From this sum was deducted $232,000 for an inventory loss, estab-
lished after July 31, [432] and a discount of $26,947 allowed on, ac-
counts receivable, thus establishing a net asset value of $6,494,531 or
a per share value of $231.76. As stated, the referee made certain
adjustments in these computations and reduced the net total assets
to $5,178,512.95, thus arriving at the adjudged per share value of
$184.80. The referee was of the opinion that these figures were un-
challenged and therefore was of the view that he could not alter them
or the values produced by these computations.

This method of arriving at the per share value of stock, which
the referee and the trial court employed, is known as the ‘‘net asset
theory” of valuation and throughout the trial of the proceedings and
here the plaintiffs have urged its validity and applicability to the
particular circumstances of this case. We cannot agree with the plain-
tiffs that any jurisdiction or authority, except in very limited in-
stances, has adopted or advocated this method of arriving at the
fair value of minority stock under statutes permitting majority merger
or consolidation. As urged by the plaintiffs and applied by the trial
court, asset value was employed in its narrow meaning of ‘‘liquida-
tion value,’’ and while asset value is an important factor for con-

a ™

sideration, the most significant in the particular circumstances of this
case it may be noted, it is rarely if ever the exclusively determinative
factor. Annotation 88 A. L. R. (2) 442, 446. American General Corp.
y. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 Atl. 225, is often referred to for the em-
phasis it apparently placed upon net asset value. Aside from the vast
difference in appellate review—deferring to the finding of appraisers
and altering an award for errors of law only; the Maryland court
recognized that the determination of fair value of dissenting stock
was ‘‘a special problem in every particular instance.’’ In that case
the merged corporations were engaged in the business of purchasing
and selling shares of stock, bonds and mortgages, consequently their
assets were liquid and quickly convertible into cash. The appraisers
in that case examined earnings and market value but gave them no_
consideration because of their lack of weight in the particular cir-
cumstances. In this case subsequent events have demonstrated the
liquidity of certain of A. Leschen and Sons Rope Company’s assets.
Accounts receivable, some inventory and some real estate were con-
verted into cash within a few months and $1,800,000 cash has been
transferred from the Leschen Company assets to the Watson-Stillman.
Company. In this respect there is some analogy in the circumstances
of the two cases, accounting, in part, for the weight to be attributed
to net asset value, but not the 100% weight given by the trial court.
Despite the analogy and even its possible advisability, the A. Leschen
and Sons Rope Company was not in point of fact liquidated (V.A.MS.,
Sees. 351.460-351.480), it was merged or consolidated under the stat-
utes (V.A.MLS., Sees. 351.410-351.455) and the dissenting stock must
be valued accordingly. Another startling example of liquid assets
is Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 Atl. 452, where
$21,658,694.02 of assets consisted of over three million dollars in
cash, three million dollars in short term securities and notes and over
fifteen million dollars in stocks and bonds. But in that case too much
emphasis was placed upon quoted market value with the result that
the appraisers’ report was rejected. Ahlenius v. Bunn & Humphreys,
358 Ill. 155, 192 N. H. 824, is also often cited for its supposed emphasis
on net asset value. But the Supreme Court of Illinois pointed out
that the stock was to be valued ‘‘by the fair market value of the
corporate property as an established and going bus’ness,’’ and said
that ‘‘Precise rules for determining the value, whatever the descrip-
tive term used, cannot be laid down.’’ The court pointed out in great
detail the factors to be considered even though ‘‘The.very nature
of most cases precludes proof of value and damage with the precision
of mathematical computation. A situation is presented [433] which
calls for the exercise of judgment upon consideration of every relevant
evidential fact and circumstance entering into the value of the cor-
porate property and reflecting itself in the worth of corporate stock.’’
The basic difficulty with’ the net asset theory is that it ignores the

policy and purpose of the statutes permitting majority consolidation
arid the valuation of shares of dissenting minority stockholders. Chica-
go Corp. v. Munds, supra; Ballantine, Corporations, Sec. 289, p. 681;
45 Har. L. R. 283; 82 Col. L. R. 607

In the various statutes the terms ‘‘value,’’ ‘‘fair value,’’ ‘‘fair
cash value’? and ‘‘fair market value’’ are abstract and in a sense
perhaps meaningless (2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property, p. 827);
they nevertheless have the same general meaning and purposefully if
not wisely establish a flexible general standard for fixing value be-
tween parties who are either unable or unwilling to voluntarily agree.
Ballantine, Corporations, Sec. 299, pp. 704-706 ; Anderson y. Interna-
tional Minerals & Chemicals Corp., 295 N. Y. 348, 67 N. EB. (2) 5738.
As previously noted, there is no simple mathematical formula and
each case presents its particular problem, but in general some of
the factors to be considered and weighed are asset value, earnings,
dividends, management and ‘‘Every relevant fact and circumstance
which enters into the value of the corporate property and which re-
flects itself in the worth of corporate stock * * *.’? 45 Har. L. R., Le.
262; Austin v. City Stores Co., 89 Pa. D. & OC. 57; annotation 38
A. L. R. (2) 442. It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt a
further enumeration of the factors, tangible and intangible, which
ultimately constitute the ‘‘opinion’”’ or ‘‘matter of judgment,’’ it is
sufficient to say, in addition to the factors specifically noted, that the
following list of cases indicate in broad general outlines-not only the
policy and purpose of the statutes but the factors to be considered
in determining the fair value of dissenting minority stock: Atistin v.
City Stores Co., supra; Ablenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, supra;
Application of Behrens, 61 N. Y. S. (2) 179; In Re Silverman, 122
N. Y. 8. (2) 812; Root v. York Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 351, 50 Atl. (2)
52; Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 528, 74 Atl. (2)
71; Teller v. Munsingwear, Ine., (Del.) 98 Atl. (2) 774 and see the
annotation 88 A. L. R. (2) 442.

Hl Im general, the appellant contends that these cases indicate
the appropriate factors. In their brief there is this summary: ‘“* * *
in the case of stock of a close corporation without a market requires
the consideration and proper weighting of many factors. These factors
include the earnings history of the company, its dividend record,
its net asset value and working capital at the statutory critical date,
the trend of its operation, the company’s position in the industry,
its prospects as a going concern at such date without regard to the

“The other numerous and invaluable law review articles, many of them
placing special emphasis upon, if not urging, some particular factor or
theory, are cited in the cases, annotations and texts and for that reason are
not cited in this opinion. They, as well as brochures and texts, both popular
and technical, have all been read and only the ill-advised would ignore them
in approaching the problems of minority stock valuation under the statutes.
See also annotations 87 A. L. R. 597; 162 A. L. R. 1287; 174 A. L. R. 960.

a ™

effect of the proposed merger, its investment value as a going concern,
its investment yield, the prospects of its growth or decline within the
industry, its cash position, its management, and the price upon which
a willing purchaser and a willing seller would agree if no merger
had been contemplated.’’ It is not’necessary to say whether this state-
ment is precisely accurate in all respects, it is sufficient to say that
upon this record the appellant’s argument is rather academic than
practical. The appellant’s expert or opinion witnesses. valued the
plaintiffs’ shares at $65.00 to [484] $76.20. In arriving at these values
the witnesses adhered to these tests and factors, if at all, in a very
vague manner. In substance they examined two or three comparable
companies, some of them integrated as the Leschen Company was
not, and, after arriving at their-sales, profits, earnings, dividends, et
cetera, over a period of years arrived at a per share market value for
the stock of those companies. These computations were then’ ‘‘re-
lated’’ to the A. Leschen and Sons Rope Company’s balance sheets
and operating statements and thus a per share “‘hypothetical market
value’’ of $65.00 to $76.20 was established for the plaintifis’. stock.
Comparison with other companies may provide a valuable check or-dén
analogy and supporting evidence (Austin v. City Stores Co., 89 Pa:
D. & C., Le. 71), but it was stipulated in the beginning that this stock
had no market value and in the circumstances the ‘‘hypothetical
market value’’ established in this manner was not the true measure of
its value. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, supra. The appellant’s witnesses
gave no independent consideration to net asset value, they did:con:
sider ‘‘book value’’ and from the eight factors considered attributed
to that value a weight of one-eighth.

HM The plaintiffs contend, whatever the appropriate tests. and
factors but again with especial emphasis upon liquidation of the
Leschen Company’s assets, that the fair value of their shares is
$184.80. The appellant urges that it is for this court first to establish
the standard of valuation and second, it.is suggested, not accepting
the values contended for by the parties, that this court evolve a
formula and appraise the stock’s fair value. In this connection’ it is
suggested that the formula employed in the Munsingwear case, 98
Atl. (2), Le. 777, should be given some consideration. But as of
course a caveat should go with that and similar formulas, as the
Delaware court specifically pointed out. Austin v. City Stores Co.,
supra; Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., (Del.) 93 Atl:.(2):° 107
The formula was peculiarly appropriate to the circumstances of that
case and by more or less arbitrarily changing the weight to be at-
tributed to the four factors of asset, market, dividend and ‘earnings
values the court altered the appraisers’ value from $23.20 per share
to $20.08 a share. In the case of In Re General-Realty & Utilities
Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 Atl. (2) 6, other factors were not of suf-
ficient importance for consideration in assessing the.value of preferred

stock and the formula was again applied, the court reducing the
appraisers’ value of $120 to $108 per share. In Application of
Behrens, supra, the court in valuing preferred stock carefully con-
sidered all the relevant factors and reduced the appraisers’ award
of $28.45 per share to $20.00. In valuing R. Hoe & Co. stock in Ap-
plication of Silverman, supra, the New York court again considered
all the pertinent factors but in conclusion rather summarily increased
the appraisers’ award of $7.50 to $10.00 per share. In short, what-
ever the type of stock to be valued, we have found no case in which
there was such disparity in values as there is in this case. The plain-
tiffs have no opinion evidence and insist upon the valuation of
$184.80, emphasizing, as indicated, net asset if not liquidation value,
while the appellant’s opinion evidence, based on ‘‘hypothetical market
value,’’ indicates a value of $65.00 to $76.20 a share, it is tacitly con-
ceded, for the purposes of argument only, that a precise application
of the Munsingwear formula would produce a fair value ‘‘of some-
thing between $79.84 and $109.98 per share,’’ depending upon the
multipliers employed. Accepting the maximum produced by the
Munsingwear formula there remains a minimum difference of $74.52
per share, a difference of $584,593.92.

This proceeding, having been tried before a referee, is subject to
review in this court ‘‘upon both the law and the evidence as in suits of
an equitable nature.’’ V.A.MLS., See. 510.310(4) ; Nieberding v. B. M.
Stivers Co., (Mo. App.) 227 S. W. (2) 462; Baerveldt & Honig Const.
Co. v. Dye [485] Candy Co., 357 Mo. 1072, 212 S. W. (2) 65. The
rule and our duty in this respect, however, presuppose a record and
evidence from which the court can perform this function with some
degree of confidence in the reasonableness, fairness and accuracy of
its final conclusion. Leggett v. Mutual Commerce Cas. Co., (Mo.) 250
8. W. (2) 995. All the facts and circumstances have been carefully
considered, the formulas have been tentatively tested, repeatedly we
might add, and any final appraisement by this court of the fair value
of this stock upon this record would certainly not be an ‘‘intelligent
judgment’? or an ‘‘informed opinion’’ but sheer speculation and for
that reason the cause upon its merits is reversed and remanded. Prid-
more v. Whiting Corp., 268 Ill. App. 592.

Hl And now we are confronted with the unrewarding task of
passing upon the reasonableness of the $30,000 fee allowed the referee.
Recognizing its inadequacy, the parties waived the statute governing
the fees of referees (V.A.MLS., Sec. 515.220) and left the fixing of
the fee to the trial court. The following is the referee’s resume of
his services: ‘‘At the time I was appointed Referee in this matter in
July, 1954, I endeavored to familiarize myself with the pleadings
and statute involved. I read some outside articles prior to the hearings
that were held before me as Referee. * * * I think there was some
twelve sessions all told before the Referee, one of them included the

oral argument. I believe there was eleven in which an official record
was made. There was some 600 pages of testimony and I think there
was approximately 60 exhibits presented either by the Plaintiffs or
Defendant. Printed briefs were furnished by the Plaintiffs and De-
fendant, and those respective briefs, as they were furnished in addi-
tion to a few textbooks cited—probably cited some 70 or 80 cases. I
did not examine all of the so-called 70 or 80 cases, but I did examine
those cases that I considered to be what might be termed leading cases
on both sides of the question. * * * I came to the conclusion that
throughout all of these cases, what was probably one clear cut threat,
and that was that all of these cases probably have to be decided on
their own salient facts, and that the most difficult case to decide is
the type we are presented with, or, namely, a closed or family cor-
poration. * * * I would say I put in approximately 300 hours, in
connection with the report I drafted some three or four times. Cutting
it down—cutting it down, and finally I tried to draft a report that
would leave the parties absent any adverse comment of mine or in-
cluded in the report anything that would bolster it up. * * * If I
approach it from the standpoint of days (and Justice McReynolas
says 5 hours was a competent professional day) it would be a matter
of 60 days.’’

Despite our disagreeing with the referee’s conclusion upon the
merits of the proceeding, it is obvious from the record and his report
that he thoroughly appreciated the issues and problems and performed
his duty in a most creditable manner. The proceeding involves a
large sum of money, the problems are intricate, novel and difficult,
nevertheless, by any standard, the $30,000 allowance is obviously ex-
cessive in the sum of $18,000. 76 C. J. S., Sees. 220-225, pp. 316-321;
45 Am. Jur., Sec. 20, p. 556.

Accordingly, the judgment as to the referee’s allowance is reversed
and remanded. with directions to enter a judgment for $12,000 and,
as indicated, the judgment upon the principal proceeding is reversed
and the cause remanded. Bohling, C., concurs in result; Stockard, C.,
concurs.

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Barrert, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Harr-Barruerr-Srurrevanr Gram Company, a Corporation, Plain-
tift-Appellant, v. Anrwa Insurancr Company et al., Defendants-
Respondents, No. 44944—293 S. W. (2d) 913.

Division One, September 10, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, October 8, 1956.

Ralph M. Jones, Ch
Midgley, Jones & Eager appellant.

Donald N. Clausen, ry Depping and Joseph R. Hogsett for
respondents; en, ah G Ma and Hogsett, Houts, James,
Randall: & Hogsett of counsel.

[915] V:iAN OSDOL, C.—This is an action on three certificates of
insurance issued to plaintiff, the lessee-operator of the River-Rail
Elevator located in Kansas City, Kansas. The certificates were issued
by Underwriters Grain Association for and on behalf of the forty-
eight defendant-respondent insurance companies which participated
in the coverage for loss of grains and loss due to interruption of
business, the measure of recovery for loss due to interruption of busi-
ness being the directly resulting reduction of gross earnings. The
certificate insuring the grain, contents of the elevator, was in the
provisional amount of $5,000,000. Plaintiff sought recovery on this
certificate in Count I of its petition. The coverage for loss of earnings
was in two certificates, each in the amount of $342,000—(1) covering
reduction in gross earnings for such length of time as would be re-
quired to rebuild, repair or replace such part of the elevator facilities
as might become damaged or destroyed commencing with the date of
damage or destruction, and (2) covering reduction of gross earnings
for such length of time as would be required to resume normal opera-
tions commencing with the date of restoration. Plaintiff declared on
these certificates in Count II of its petition. The three certificates
contained identical extended coverage endorsements by which, for an
additional premium, coverage was extended to include direct loss by
“explosion.’?

The trial court submitted the issues of plaintiff’s case.to the jury.
One decisive supporting issue was whether plaintiff’s losses were due
to explosion, or explosions. The jury found for the plaintiff, assessing
its whole loss, with interest, in the total amount of $769,522.74; how-
ever, the trial court sustained defendants’ motion for judgnient in
accordance with their motion for a directed verdict, set aside the ver-
dict and judgment for plaintiff, and entered judgment for defendants,

" but overruled defendants’ motion for a new trial. The trial court in
sustaining defendants’ motion for judgment specified the grounds:
(1) the evidence conclusively shows that all of plaintiff’s loss was

caused. by flood (a hazard not insured against), not by any explosion;
(2) there is no evidence on which a jury could base a verdict for
plaintiff on the explosion issue without resorting to guesswork, specu-
lation, conjecture and surmise; and (3) it has previously been ju-
dicially determined that the very occurrences in the case at bar were
not explosions,.and therefore plaintifi is estopped from relitigating
that question. Plaintiff has appealed.

The River-Rail Elevator is owned. by the City of Kansas City,
Kansas. It is located [916] about a thousand feet from the Missouri
River: bank in the public levee area known as the Fairfax District,
and is connected to a public wharf by a gallery with grain conveyor
so that grain may be received and delivered from and to barges. It
it also served by tailroads and trucks.

- The structure of the elévator, consists of a “headhouse (containing
much of the elevator-operating machinery and bins, including at least
one ‘‘dryer bin’’ at the basement level), and of two batteries of round
and interstice or ‘“‘star’’ bins, one battery consisting of ninety-five
bins and the other of eighty-cight. The round bins each have an
inside diameter of nineteen feet and a capacity of 24,400 bushels of
grain. The interstice bins (comprising the spaces between the exterior
walls of round bins) each has a capacity of 5,500 bushels. The bins
are approximately one hundred five feet in height with walls of con-
erete six inches thick. The whole of the two batteries. of bins is sur-
mounted by a one-story structure called the ‘‘Texas floor.’’ A rela-
tively small, square aperture in the top of each and all of the bins of
both batteries opens through the floor of the Texas floor. The bottoms
of the bins are at the approximate ground level and constitute the
ceiling of the basement of the elevator structure. July 13, 1951, all of
the round and interstice bins, except nine, contained grain in some,
quantity. The grains were wheat, corn, and grain sorghums.

A ‘‘draw-off”? hole five feet in diameter is located in the center of
the base or bottom (concrete ‘‘slab’’ one foot thick) of each bin. The
slab is ‘‘hoppered’’ in a thirty-six degree slope down to the ‘‘draw-
off’? hole. This conical upper side of each slab bin-base is called the
“‘conerete hopper.’? Octagonal ‘‘metal. hopper bottoms’’ are fixed
below to receive grain passing through the holes in the concrete hop-
pers. The hopper bottoms are attached to the concrete on the under
side of the base of each bin. The hopper bottoms are ‘‘funneled”’
down at various angles and are connected with elongated rectangular
metal ‘‘draw-off’’ spouts angling off at various degrees, through.
which, by opening slides or gates controlled by ratchets, grain may
be permitted to flow from the bins through the holes in the concrete
hoppers and on‘ down through the hopper bottoms and connected
spouts onto belt conveyors. The hopper bottoms of all of the forty-
three bins with which we are directly concerned are alike in shape
and size, except one—the rectangular metal hopper bottom of a dryer

bin—this metal bottom is bolted directly to the under side of the con-
crete base of the bin.

Friday, July 18, 1951, the flooding waters of the Kaw River inun-
dated areas of the “wndustrial districts of Kansas City, Kansas, and in
the late afternoon of July 14th, the waters broke through the river
levee and inundated the area wherein the elevator is located. During
the night of July 14th, waters came into the basement of the elevator,
flooding everything therein, including the spouts and hopper bottoms,
and rose until the waters had reached a level of ‘‘slightly more than
two feet’’ within the concrete hoppers of all of the bins. On the fol-
lowing day, July 15th, the waters began receding from the pavement
and ground in the elevator area, but the basement of the elevator
remained filled with water. Limited pumping-out operations were
commenced on Monday, July 16th. The grains in the concrete hoppers
had been wetted by the floods, however, and in the morning of July
17th grain was noticed on top of the water in the basement—it was
ascertained that the hopper bottoms (‘‘tanks’’) of some of the round
and interstice bins were ‘‘down,’? permitting quantities of grain to
come down through the five-foot draw-off holes into the water.

Each of the octagonally-shaped metal hopper bottoms had been held
in place against the under side of the ‘‘slab’’ bottom of a bin by
sixteen ‘‘clips,’’—strips of low-carbon hot-rolled ductile steel, one-
fourth inch thick, two inches wide, and‘six inches long; however, the
contact between the [917] metallic hopper bottoms and the slab was
not airtight, watertight, or gastight. The sixteen clips had been fixed
at only approximately equal intervals around the periphery of the
draw-off hole in the base of a bin. Each of the clips had been fixed
by a nut with washer to a five-eighths-inch bolt embedded in the con-
erete of the bin-base, the bolt passing through the clip two inches
from one end, and the other end (‘‘moment arm’’) of each and all
of the sixteen clips of each bin lay under and supported the 2/’x1-14”
angle-iron flange (%4¢” thick) riveted to the top of the sheet metal
of each hopper bottom.

There was evidence that forty-two of the hopper bottoms of the
round and interstice bins which had contained grain had been com-
pletely detached or expelled by some force or forces occurring after
the inundation and partial recession of the flood waters; the draw-off
spouts were bent or crushed and bracing hangers pulled or jerked
and detached. And a corner of the rectangular hopper bottom of the
dryer bin had become fissured or ruptured—the hopper bottom of the
dryer bin had a ‘‘split’’ down one corner, ‘‘I would say approximately
18 inches. - - - I would say it was between 2-44 and’3 inches wide at
the widest point. Of course, it was narrowed down at each end.”
These occurrences had permitted large quantities of” grain to" pass
down into the water in the basement.

It was and is plaintiff’s theory that the wet, grain within the hopper
bottoms and bases of the bins expanded, and the expansion of the
grain with its ensuing pressure was augmented by the generation of
gases with increasing pressure resulting in the sudden and violent
expulsion of the hopper bottoms; but, that, whatever occasioned the
pressure in the bases of the bins, the hopper bottoms of the forty-two
bins were displaced as a result of high-pressure force or forces, and
that such expulsion of these hopper bottoms (and the, splitting or
rupture of the metal bottom of the dryer bin) and resulting loss of
grain and of gross earnings were due to explosion within the mean-
ing of the word ‘‘explosion,’’ as used in the extended-explosion-cover-
age endorsements. .

On the other hand, it was the theory of defendants (xespondents-
insurers) that none of plaintiff’s damage or loss was caused by ex-
plosion. Defendants contended, and now contend, that the only rea-
sonable conclusion which may be arrived at from the evidence is that
the disengagements of the hopper bottoms were due to the slow and
gradual swelling of the grain; that the grain, having absorbed the
floodwaters, had taken on a slowly-increasing swelling’ and pressure,
which pressure, together with the weight of the grain, caused the metal
elips supporting the hopper bottoms to bend slowly, gradually disen-
gaging the hopper bottoms and allowing them and the grain to fall by
the force of gravity; and that the same slow and gradual swelling
and pressure similarly caused the split in the hopper bottom of the
dryer bin. Defendants assert that no substantial evidence tended to
support a conclusion that plaintiff’s losses were due to explosion;
indeed, defendants say that ‘‘uncontradicted and undisputed evi-
dence’’ is conclusive in demonstrating that the occurrences were not
explosions.

Hl An explosion has been defined as ‘‘a violent bursting or ex-
pansion, with noise, following the sudden production of great pressure;
as in the case of explosives, or a sudden release of pressure, as in the
disruption of a steam boiler; - - -.’’ (Our italics.) Webster’s New
International Dictionary, 2d Ed., p. 898. American Paper Products
Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 208 Mo. App. 87, 225 S.W. 1029 (writ
of certiorari quashed in Continental Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 290 Mo.
362, 235 S.W. 88), dealt with a clause excluding’ coverage of the
hazard of ‘‘explosion.’? A waterhammer had blown off the cap of
a “‘hot-well.’’? Plaintiff in that case would have had the meaning of
the term ‘‘explosion’’ limited to those oceurrences caused by com-
bustion or fire. Of [918] course, an explosion is frequently caused
by combustion, but not necessarily so. The term is to be given its
ordinary and accepted meaning. In St. Louis Gaslight Co. v. Ameri-
can Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 33 Mo. App. 348, the reviewing
eourt, quoting Webster, spoke of an explosion as a ‘‘sudden bursting
with noise.’ The witnesses had assumed the term ‘‘explosion’’ meant

a rending force caused by the instantaneous and violent expansion of
the mixture of gas and air, distinguishable from a mere deflagration
of the gas. In Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Bank
of Georgia, 5 Cir, 197 F.2d 455, a waterhammer ruptured a fire
hydrant. The occurrence was held an explosion within the purview
of a policy insuring against damage by explosion. It was said that
an explosion is a rapid, sudden, and violent expansion of air or re-
linquishment of energy, causing a rupture and accompanied by a
loud noise, not necessarily extremely loud. Perhaps the principal
» eause of explosions is fire, but they may be produced without the aid
of fire. A flywheel may explode from excessive speed. A severe frost
may cause trees to explode. The occurrence constituting’ an explosion
within the meaning of the extended-coverage provision of an in-
surance policy must be determined from the language of a policy,
the ordinary uses of the word, the common experience of men, and
their general notions in matters of this sort. And see L. L. Olds Seed
Co. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 7 Cir, 179 F.2d 472, wherein
water from a break 2-14’ in length and 14’’ wide along a 2/’ water
pipe due to waterhammer damaged merchandise in insured’s base-
ment. It was said the word ‘‘explosion’’ is not one that lends itself
to a precise definition. General characteristics may be described, but
the exact facts which constitute what we call an explosion are not
susceptible of such statement as would always distinguish such an
occurrence (Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Empire Coal Min. Co., 8 Cir.,
80 F.2d 794). See also Lever Bros. v. Atlas Assur. Co., Lid., 7 Cir.,
131 F.2d 770 (the theory of insured was that water at the bottom
of a cottonseed-oil tank had become superheated and converted into
steam, resulting in an explosion) ; Bower v. Aetna Ins. Co., D.O.N.D.
Tex., 54 F. Supp. 897 (in the absence of insured, water in the hot-
water-heating system of insured’s house froze, and’ in the process of
freezing expanded so as to explode, or burst the pipes, with resultant
water damage) ; Crombie & Co., Inc. v. Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. of
Boston, Tex. Civ. App., 250 §$.W.2d 472 (the sudden emission of
refrigerating ammonia through a valve packing; it was thought the
evidence supported the finding of explosion, ‘‘though the intensity
or degree was much less than in great eruptions we often think about,
but nevertheless an explosion’’); 35 O.J.8., Explosion, pp. 215-216;
and Vol. 154, Words and Phrases, Perm. Hd., Explosion, pp. 478, et

We shall consider the evidence pertinent to the issue of ex-
plosion from a standpoint most favorable to plaintiff.

There was evidence that in the morning of Tuesday, July 17th,
grain was noticed on top of the water in the elevator basement. Plain-
tiff’s grain mixer, Byrd, and weighmaster, Shafer, went to the Texas
floor to make soundings. A sounding is accomplished by lowering
a measuring tape with weighted end down into a bin. The soundings

showed there was definitely grain in the basement. While Byrd and
Shafer were making soundings they heard noises. They were not sure
where the noises came from. Byrd testified the noises were ‘‘all
similar,’’ except the last one, which was much louder. The sounds
heard came from ditferent parts of the elevator. When Byrd and”
Shafer came directly above Bin 101, which contained 24,006 bushels
of corn, they heard a noise. It sounded more like ‘‘you’d hit some-
thing real hard, like a drum. But there was a vibration of the floor
that we were standing on - - -.’? The last noise—the one from Bin
101—was a ‘‘sudden noise.’’ Shafer described the noise as being ‘‘like
a metal barrel that had been in the sun, that [919] had a sudden
expansion of the barrel, with a sharp click to it.”? It was a sharp
noise, ‘‘very sharp.’’ ‘‘There was vibration there.’? The noise was
like pushing the bottom of a dishpan in and out. The witnesses im-
mediately went down to the ground level, moved their automobiles
from the vicinity of the elevator, and thrust a pole through the base-
ment window beneath Bin 101. There was dust floating on the water,
and ‘‘I touched grain. The grain was right up against the ceiling.’’
There was also some testimony that when those ‘‘tanks went out, why
that broke some of the (basement) windows and closed some of the
(basement) windows (which were open).’’

A consulting mechanical engineer, witness for plaintiff, testified that
photographs of the bottoms of bins from which the metal hopper
bottoms had been detached or expelled disclosed that the metal clips,
although they had not been uniformly set around the peripheries of
the five-foot holes, seemed nevertheless to have been quite uniformly
bent down. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 65, reproduced herewith.)
‘*. . . it appeared [920] that the hoppers had been expelled directly
down without shifting to one side or the other, as they left the slab,
and from that it was one of the things that influenced me to believe
that the hoppers must have been forced off quite rapidly or explosive-
ly, because that is characteristic of the forces that remove it. In
other words, there are two forces that set that hopper in motion, or
rather that have to be overcome before the hopper will leave that.
One is the restraint on the clips themselves. In other words, the things
that hold it, and the other thing is the force that has to give it the,
energy to move.’’ The witness also spoke of the way several of the
““draay-oft’’ spouts were crumpled or buckled. ‘(See Plaintiff’s Ex-
hibit 61, reproduced herewith.) He said ‘‘the angles appear to sub-
stantiate the fact that they went directly down - - -.’’

Experiments tended to demonstrate, and a witness for defendants
testified, the clips of ‘‘bendable,’’ ductile steel would bend back and
forth several times before they would break. One shock or one steady
push would not break them. They would bend ‘‘no matter how fast

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 65

that one shock was.’’? A witness for plaintiff testified that tests (sub-
jecting steel of like ductile quality as the metal of the clips to in-
creasing pressure) showed that, after the maximum strength of the
metal was reached, it ‘‘bent with a jerk. - - - a sharp, snapping
sound.’? . oa
* All expert witnesses testified that grain expands when wet. Expand-
ing grain when contained exerts great pressure. If the pressure is

partially eased, the mass of wet grain increases and the pressure builds
up again. One of plaintifi’s experts testified that the swelling is

‘ rapid for the first twenty hours, then the expansion slows up, and at
the end of fifty hours there is no further swelling.

[921] An expert testified an experiment demonstrated a clip of
mild, low-carbon steel would begin to bend when subjected to pressure
of 1000-1100 pounds, and upon continued and increased pressure
“somewhat greater’? than 2000 pounds the clip would bend to the
point of maximum strength, at which time the clip would completely
yield. The witness was of the opinion that the expansion of the wet
grain with its pent-up pressure ‘‘deformed these clips io a certain
point,’’ after which the continued expansion forced the clips through
their maximum strength—‘‘that state of metastable equilibrium’’;
they then suddenly failed; and the ‘‘hopper bottoms must have ex-
pelled rapidly.’’ It was not just a question of merely dropping off,
but of being expelled by these tremendous pressures within. (It was
said it is not to be assumed that the weight of grain in a bin bore
down entirely on the hopper bottom or on the bin-base. The grains
in contact or friction between grains and with sidewalls have a
tendency to ‘‘arch or bridge’’ in accordance with the generally ac-
cepted Janssen’s Formula.) A witness for defendants testified that
one clip would support approximately 540 pounds before it surpassed
the yield point, and the maximum strength would be 950-970 pounds
for one clip.

Expert witnesses also explained the anaerobic process of fermenta-
tion which starts when grain is under water. In this process, when
the grain begins to ferment, gases are generated—carbon dioxide and
hydrogen. One hundred pounds of wheat could liberate 16.8 gallons
of gas in three days, when submerged in distilled water at a tempera-
ture of 86 degrees. These gases are capable of exerting great pressure.
The hydrogen element makes the mixture inflammable when mixed
with oxygen, although it is purely conjectural that such a gas mixture
could have been ignited under the conditions obtaining at the time
of the instant questioned occurrences.

A witness for defendants testified experiments had shown that wheat
soaked in water for seven days imbibed water to the extent of 44.4
percent, corn 41.0 percent, and sorghum 35.4 percent. With respect
to the generation of gases, an experiment conducted by the witness
showed the appearance of gas eighteen hours after the grain was
soaked in water—the production of gas was rather low until thirty
hours had elapsed, after which gas was evolved at an ever-increasing
rate. The experiment was conducted up to ‘‘72 hours, three days.’’
This witness, however, was of the opinion that the gases produced in
the bin bottoms of the River-Rail elevator had no effect ‘‘on the

forcing-off of the hopper bottoms,’’ for the reason, he said, wet grain
is quite permeable to gases, and the gas production during the time
of the immersion, as well as for sometime afterward, was at a con-
siderably lower rate than the amount of gas which could permeate or
move and become diffused through the wet columns of grain in the
bins. Yet there was evidence that soaked grain ‘‘mushes down,’’ and
thus the interseed spaces that ordinarily would permit gas to escape
would be greatly reduced. And the witness had reported an experi-
ment indicating that the initial wetting of wheat when trapped air
was removed over a period of forty-five minutes caused an increase
of volume from 40 to 48 cubic centimeters; after soaking for thirty
hours the-volume rose to 59 cubic centimeters; and after seventy-two
hours a volume limit of 69 cubic centimeters appeared to have been
reached. An experiment treated with wet grains contained in three
glass test tubes. Thirty-six hours after the wetting the kernels were
flattened and distorted. The grain in a tube containing corn expanded
to the extext of pressure that it broke the glass. The rubber stoppers
of the other two tubes were forced off by the expansion.

Except in respects immaterial here, insurers’ policies did not limit
the coverage [922] for ‘‘explosion’’ to explosions by ignition or com-
bustion or expansion of gas, or to any explosion due to any particular
cause. We therefore consider the coverage contemplated any explosion
within the meaning of the term as commonly accepted. See the au-
thorities cited supra treating with the meaning of the term ‘‘ex-
plosion.’*

In view of the evidence in this case that when confined pressure
due to imbibition is partially eased, the mass of wet grain will expand
and build up pressure again, we do not wish to say as a.matter of law
that a slight initial easing or pressing, if so, of the hopper bottoms
away from the slab means that any or all of the forty-three occurrences
could not culminate in sudden releases of pressure which could be
said to be explosions as the term ‘‘explosion’’ is ordinarily understood.

There was evidence of conditions potential to the evolving of gas
by an anaerobic fermentation. But, whether or not there was sub-
stantial evidence that high-pressure gas evolved and whether or not
such gas, by ignition or expansion, caused or helped to cause the de-
tachment of the hopper bottoms, there is no ‘dispute between the
parties or disagreement between their repective witnesses that grain
when wetted expands and that expanding grain when confined has
great pressure force. Defendants have said in their brief, ‘‘Both the
Grain Company and the insurers are in agreement that swelling grain
exerts tremendous pressure on any container in which it is held.’’
Plaintiff had only the burden of proving there was an explosion.
Plaintiff didnot have any burden of proving in what particular ‘way

the explosion was caused. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Empire Coal
Min. Co., supra.

The reviewing court in Crombie & Co. v. Employers’ Fire Ins. Co.
of Boston, supra, remarked, ‘‘A soda pop bottle blows the cap, or
breaks the glass in a weak spot, so may the medicine bottle in the
cabinet and the vinegar bottle in the pantry and it is said they
explode.’’ An expert witness in the instant case said a hopper-bottom-
capped bin could be compared to an inverted corked bottle. The cork
“would blow before you break the bottle.’’ Of the force within,
another (lay) witness said, ‘‘- - - just like canned things. Many a
time, say, well, a jar has blown up in the basement, I didn’t get it
right see, air and fermentation take place and blew the thing up.”
This reminds us of the testimony of an expert, defendants’ witness,
whose experiment with wetted grains in three test tubes indicated
the pressure due to imbibition forced out the stoppers of two of the
tubes and broke the glass of the third. Should some high-pressure
phenomenon in whatever contents of a stoppered bottle slowly start
the stopper from its seat and then suddenly and violently force the
stopper completely out with a pop, we think one ordinarily would
say there was an explosion.

Although in large measure plaintiff was necessarily relying upon
circumstantial evidence to show the alleged explosions, there were
facts and circumstances shown in evidence which were premises for
reasonable inferences and an ultimate conclusion that the hopper
bottoms were suddenly and violently expelled.

(The cases of Allen v. Insurance Co. of North America, 175 Pa.
Super. 281, 104 A.2d 191; Hicks v. New York Fire Ins. Co., 266 Wis.
186, 63 N.W.2d 59; and Bauman v. Midland Union Ins. Co., 261 Wis.
449, 53 N.W.2d 529, cited and greatly relied on by defendants, have
been of little value to us here, In the Allen case, the appellate court.
reviewed the trial court’s finding for defendant, which finding in that
case had the force and effect of a jury verdict. In affirming the judg-
ment, the appellate court did not examine the case from the standpoint
of determining if the evidence supported a verdict for plaintiff. In
the Hicks case, the expert witness testified three factors must exist
simultaneously in order to produce excessive pressure, but there [923]
was no substantial evidence that, at the time plaintiff’s radiator broke,
any of the factors existed; therefore, the expert’s opinion that the
break in the radiator was due to the buildup of pressure was based
on his own unwarranted assumptions. In the Bauman case, the ques-
tion on the issue of explosion was solely whether there was any
credible evidence sustaining a jury’s finding that an explosion of
carbon dioxide gas occurred within plaintiffs’ silo causing it to burst.
Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses admitted that carbon dioxide will per-
meate loose vegetable matter and rise and escape through any open-
ing. They would not venture an opinion as to whether such gas

would, or would not, permeate through silage and’ escape through
cracks between wooden doors of the chute, or out the open window
at the top of plaintiffs’ silo. Neither would they venture any opinion
that the accident was caused by the pressure of the gas. The testimony
of defendant’s experts did not aid plaintiffs’ case.)

The clips of the ‘‘tanks’’ including those that were ‘‘in the base-
ment’? would give way suddenly, when forced to their maximum
strength. The clips of those tanks that were in the basement were
forced down equally, indicating, according to plaintiff’s consulting
mechanical engineer, that the tanks had been forced off rapidly or
explosively. In this connection we note the evidence tending to show
that the spouts of hopper bottoms which had been expelled were
buckled in such fashion as to indicate that the hopper bottoms had
gone ‘‘directly down.’’ There was evidence of conditions potential in
the creation of high-pressure gas within the bin-bases and hopper
bottoms, and of occurrences and an occurrence manifested by sounds
and a vibration timed to the approximate hours when the pressure
of such gas, if present or evolving, would have been of increasing or
of climactic pressure-force, according to the expert witnesses. The
presence of tremendously high-pressure force due to imbibition is con-
ceded. The sounds were not especially loud, and a vibration was not
felt elsewhere than when witnesses were directly over a bin (101),
the hopper of which it may be reasonably inferred was at that time
expelled. Forty-three noises or reports were not heard, but a jury
could reasonably resort to the other shown circumstances of the large
conerete elevator structure consisting of walled-in bins and the sound-
muffling waters remaining in the basement as plausible reasons why
possible sounds or reports of the other events were not heard by per-
sons not on the Texas floor when the events occurred. The absence of
evidence tending to show forty-three distinct reports having been thus
rationalized, the jury could then fall back upon and give decisive
probative effect to the conceded circumstance of the presence of tre-
mendous high-pressure force or forces, the shown uniformly bent
clips, the peculiarly crumpled spouts, the ruptured fissure, and the
experts’ opinions indicating the hopper bottoms were explosively ex-
pelled or ruptured. Of course, it is not the province of the appellate
court to weigh the evidence or to determine what inferences and
what conclusion should have been drawn; but these observations we
believe are pertinent here as illustrating legitimate mental processes
jurors may use in reasoning and reaching a reasonable conclusion
from facts or circumstances which the evidence was substantial in
tending to show.

‘We believe we could not write a better summary statement
of law applicable in treating with the sufficiency of the evidence in
this case than the statement made by this court in Hardwick v. Kansas
Gity Gas Co., 355 Mo. 100, at page 107, 195 S.W.2d 504, at page 508,

wherein, as herein, it was urged that a jury’s verdict was based on
speculation and conjecture, and that no evidence supported the ver-
dict. It was said, ‘‘It is true that much of the evidence is cireum-
stantial and that some of the inferences must be drawn by choosing
between the conflicting opinions of experts. But this is not to deprive
the jury of its right and function to find [924] some of the facts,
even some facts essential to the plaintiff’s case, by reasoning upon
the evidence, even circumstantial evidence, and inferring from such
evidence that a certain required thing or fact existed or was true.
Thayer, Preliminary Treatise On Evidence, pp. 193, 194; Van Brock
v. First Nat. Bank, 349 Mo. 425, 481-434, 161 S.W.2d 258, 260-261.’’
See also Stephens v. Kansas City Gas Co., 354 Mo. 835, 191 S.W.2d
601; Brawley v. Esterly, Mo. Sup., 267 S.W.2d 655; Helton v.
Huckeba, 365 Mo. 98, 276 $.W.2d 78; Lever Bros. v. Atlas Assur.
Co., Litd., supra.
Generally, the assertedly ‘‘uncontradicted and undisputed’’
evidence, which defendants say is conclusive in demonstrating that
the questioned occurrences were not explosions, was the testimony of
millwrights, defendants’ witnesses, employees of a company plaintiff
had engaged to clean up the elevator and to restore it to operating
condition. One witness came to the elevator location on July 21st, the
other on July 28th. They stated that for several days after their
arrival many of the hopper bottoms of such of the bins that contained
grain and the bottoms of which had not become disengaged or ex-
pelled were slowly ‘‘creeping’’ down. ‘‘You would go in there one
day and go back the next day and they would be a quarter of an
inch where they were creeping, - - -.”’
Actually, the jury was not obliged to believe the testimony of de-
fendants’ witnesses. In examining the question whether there was
substantial evidence to justify a submission, or the question whether
the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict, the appellate court
considers only the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, and the infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom, and disregards the evidence of defendant
unless it aids plaintiff’s case. Stephens v. Kansas City Gas Co.,
supra. But if the jury believed the testimony of these witnesses, the
jury was not obliged to draw the inference that the source of the
pressure which caused the hopper bottoms to slowly creep down was
the same or of the same force that some days before caused the hopper
bottoms in issue to become detached or expelled and ruptured. But
for the moment assuming the verity of the testimony of these wit-
nesses for defendants that the hopper bottoms were slowly creeping
down several days after July 17th, we have noted that these witnesses
also said that, when the hopper bottoms were ‘‘creeping’’ down, ‘‘they
would creep from the back first, - - - I mean you would get an opening
in the back of the bin (‘where this big part of the hopper is’) before
you would from the front.’’ This testimony that hoppers several days

after July 17th were creeping down unevenly tends to support plain-
tiff’s factual theory that, because the hopper bottoms herein involved
left their settings evenly, they were expelled explosively.

Hl it is further urged that “‘undisputed documentary evidence”’
also sustained defendants’ theory of no explosion. One of these ‘‘docu-
ments,’’ introduced by plaintiff, was a letter dated August 24, 1951,
from a testing laboratory. The letter contained the laboratory’s
classification of explosions and the laboratory’s view of the process
and effect of explosions brought about by various causes. The letter
also contained the statement, inter alia, that ‘“‘it cannot be stated
that any explosion took place within the hoppers or bin bottoms,’’
and the letter continued by giving the laboratory’s theory of the
way the hopper bottoms were detached. Another letter from an
architect-engineer dated August 24, 1951, was introduced by plaintiff.
The writer expressed the view there was no evidence whatsoever ‘‘that
these spouts had been forced loose by an explosion.’’ The writer also
advised that workmen ‘‘were also taking down the spouts that had not
blown down.’’ (Our italics.) The other document, introduced by de-
fendants, was an undated ‘‘Computation of Loss Due to Flood of July
14, 1951,’’ compiled under the supervision of plaintiff’s secretary-
treasurer, The computation included grain lost, [925] the loss of much
of which plaintiff seeks to attribute to explosion. These letters and
the computation, of course, were not, as a matter of law, conclusive
in demonstrating that no part of the loss sustained was due to ex-
plosion. The ‘‘documents,’’ and their weight and probative effect,
were matters for the consideration of the jury on the issues of the
case. Likewise, the circumstance that one or more electric lights in
the basement remained burning three days after the basement was
flooded; and the circumstance that the glass-encased 100-watt light
bulb of a lamp, with an enameled metal shade, attached to the ceiling
of the basement by a ball-and-socket swivel fixture within a foot or
So of an expelled hopper bottom, had not been shattered, were in-
conclusive on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence in tend-
ing to support the issue of explosion. These circumstances and the
opinions and explanations of and concerning them by the parties’
witnesses were for the jury’s consideration.

Hl Defendants further contend that plaintifi’s evidence as to
damages or the amount of loss failed to separate those losses admitted-
ly attributable to the flood alone from the loss sustained because of
explosion. This contention is also developed in support of assignments
of error in defendants’ motion for a new trial, which motion the
trial court overruled. Herein, in urging the propriety of the trial
court’s sustention of their motion for judgment, and in alleging error
of the trial court in overruling their motion for a new trial (Hughes
v. St. Louis Nat. League Baseball Club, 359 Mo. 993, 224 S.W.2d
989), defendants contend and had assigned error of the trial court

in submitting the issue of damages. It was assigned in the motion
for a new trial and is asserted herein that the evidence failed to sup-
port a separation of damages; that the damages were excessive; and
that no evidence ‘supported the instructions.

Plaintiff had the burden of proving prima facie (and of establish-
ing) the amount of its loss due to explosion alone. Niagara Fire Ins.
Co. v. Muhle, 8 Cir., 208 F.2d 191; General American Ins. Co. y.
Thompson, Tex. Civ. App., 78 $.W.24 727.

Plaintiff’s secretary-treasurer, and others, testified ot plaintifi’s
work in the ‘‘cleanup’’ and restoration of the elevator to operation.
This was accomplished by September 21, 1951. Plaintiff’s current
inventories showed the amount of grains—wheat, corn, and grain
sorghums—on the date of the flood of July 18th. ‘‘Weighups’’ dur-
ing and subsequent to the cleanup determined the amount of the
grain not damaged or destroyed. Plaintiff’s secretary-treasurer was
able to cause and supervise the computation of the quantity and
market value of the respective types of all of the grains which were
damaged or destroyed and to compute the approximate quantity and
market value of the respective types of grain which would have been
damaged in the bottoms of the bins had none of the grain been
damaged or destroyed by occurrences other than the flood. It was
computed that the total loss in grains due to the flood ‘‘and these
other casualties’? was $402,014.91. The loss that would have taken
place had nothing occurred but the flood was computed in the amount
of $75,992.76; the latter amount subtracted from the total loss left
a balance of loss purportedly due to explosion in an amount of $326,-
022.15. In arriving at the amount of the loss ($75,992.76) attributed
to the flood—by one computation, the percentage of the different
grades of all grain loss having been determined, it was assumed the
same ratio of grades was flooded and damaged in the bin bottoms had
there been no other casualty; by another computation, the number of
bins which had contained each grade of grain was ascertained, and,
the total of the approximate number of bushels of each grade per
bin which would have been damaged had no other casualty occurred
was determined. The number of bushels per gtade so determined was
multiplied by the price per bushel per grade. There was little differ-
ence in the results obtained by the two [926] computations. Obviously,
these computations would not show such ratio of loss between grades
with precision, but in the circumstances that no exact separation could
be shown, we are satisfied these computations provided a way for
the jury to determine the separation with reasonable certainty.

Plaintiff was able to salvage quantities of damaged grain. Some
was sold to farmers for use as feed for livestock. The original amount
received for this salvaged grain was $20,818.46 ; from this sum receipts
for salvage, which it was said would have been wetted and damaged
had no casualty occurred other than the flood, were deducted, leaving

an amount to be credited in the sum of $17,175.23. As stated, the
computations were made under the. direction of plaintiff’s secretary-
treasurer, who verified their correctness. These computations reflecting
the result, $308,846.77, plus interest, comprise the amount of the
jury’s computations and verdict on Count I.

Hl Plaintift’s secretary-treasurer testified that had there been no
casualties other than flood, the elevator could have been put in op-
erating condition in approximately ten days, and although there was
very little business that could have been done in the first ten days
after the flood, things ‘‘began to get going again’’ after ten .(or
fifteen) days. He doubted there would have been any appreciable
reduction in plaintiff’s gross earnings had there been no damage
other than by the flood, because plaintiff within a few days could
have cleaned, disinfected and used its installations and exploited the
then current harvest and storage of grains. The witness spoke of
other elevators which had not been damaged and which enjoyed ‘after
the flood ‘‘a very excellent business as a result.’’ In effect, the testi-
mony was that plaintiff would not have suffered any substantial re-
duction of gross earnings had there been no explosion. Consequently,
the amount of reduction of gross earnings had been computed by.ac-
countants by subtracting plaintiff’s gross earnings for the fiscal
year ending April 30, 1952, from plaintiff’s average gross earnings
enjoyed and experienced in its business during the three immediately
preceding fiscal years ending April 30th of 1951, 1950, and 1949, and
to the result there was added $59,007 for monies expended in bringing
the elevator into operating condition, or, as plaintiff would say, in
reduction of the period of interruption of business (an item within
the coverage of the insurance certificates); and $10,052.79, received by
plaintiff in sales of salvaged grains consummated since the institution
of this action, was deducted. The ultimate apparent result of these
computations, as found by the jury, was °$332,422.21, which sum,
plus interest, comprised the amount of the jury’s award on Count II
of plaintiff’s petition.

The computations which we have summarized seem to: afford bases
for a fairly certain separation of damages, save and except the item
of $59,007, and interest thereon, which quite apparently was allowed
by the jury in reimbursing plaintiff for expenses ‘‘necessarily in-
eurred by plaintiff for reduction of the loss due to such interruption
of business by explosion - - -.”’? We are of the opinion an amount
of the verdict equaling this item, and interest thereon, should. not
have been allowed. In plaintift’s cleanup and restoration operations,
regardless of whether a hopper bottom of a bin had been detached,
all grain bad to be taken out of the bin. The undamaged grain had
to be removed from all of the bins and all bins were required to be
cleaned and disinfected, and the good grain returned to the.cleaned
and disinfected bins. In the instances where the hopper bottoms were

not expelled, holes were cut in the metal of the hopper bottoms and
a draw-off ‘‘sleeve jacked through the grain that had been wetted and
since crusted over.’? The undamaged grain was then drawn from
the bins by a screw conveyor; but the caked or crusted and damaged
grain had'to be dug out with pickaxes; the holes in the metal hopper
bottoms were of necessity replaced by replating [927] or welding.
Other substantial restorations and repairs, too numerous to enumerate,
were not made necessary by any casualty other than flood. It seems
clear that plaintiff did not and could not separate those expenses
for restorations and repairs made necessary by flood in effecting the
resumption of its business from those expenditures made necessary by
explosion. We consider this failure to prove that part of the $59,007
expenditures made necessary by explosion amounted to a failure of
proof as to that whole item, and that the trial court erred in sub-
“mitting the ‘‘reduction of loss’’ issue. However, we see no reason
that such error may not be corrected by remittitur.

(In connection with the contention of defendants that the
trial court erred in overruling defendants’ motion for a new trial,
defendants assert error in ignoring or failing to submit the applica-
tion of a contribution clause contained in the certificates covering
loss due to business interruption. It would seem defendants have
the laboring oar on this appeal in alleging and supporting the al-
legations of error in overruling defendants’ motion for a new trial.
“Hughes v. St. Louis Nat. League Baseball Club, supra. The particular
point relating to the contribution clause is not included in defendants’
points and authorities supporting defendants’ allegations of error.
It is merely mentioned in the printed argument without development
and without citations of authorities as required by rule.)

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in ruling, and de-
fendants contend the trial court correctly ruled, that plaintiff was
estopped to relitigate the issue of explosion. These contentions in-
volve questions governed by principles of the doctrine of res judicata.
The contentions require the examination of the record of a case tried
in the United States District Court, District of Kansas. That case
involved an action instituted by plaintiff against its lessor, City of
Kansas City, Kansas, and lessor’s assignee, The Minnesota Avenue,
Inc., hereinafter sometimes also referred to as ‘‘lessor,’’ to recover
on lessor’s covenant to repair. The lease also contained a provision
requiring lessors to use for repairing all the proceeds, if necessary,
received from any insurance policy covering a hazard causing damage
to the elevator installations. After the institution of the instant action,
‘defendants-lessors had by leave brought in insurers (defendants in
the instant case) as third-party defendants. Although plaintiff had
originally alleged damages to the elevator installations were due to
‘flood and explosion, plaintiff amended its original complaints to allege
the damage was due to flood and otherwise, Plaintiff was not the

insured in the policies issued to lessors indemnifying for damage to
the elevator facilities due to explosion, and the issue of explosion
was not essential to plaintift’s recovery on its claim against lessors.

Insurers, third-party defendants in the Kansas case, filed answer,
and counter-claim and cross-claim in two counts. In Count I the
insurers sought a judgment against plaintif’ and lessors declaring
that damage was not due to explosion. The prayer for relief was as
follows,

“.. ., Third-Party defendants pray for a declaratory judg-
ment adjudicating that no damage claimed in plaintiff’s complaint
and amended complaint was caused by explosion; that Third-
Party defendants are not liable on policies of insurance referred
to in Third-Party complaint and amended Third-Party complaint,
and that plaintiff and the Third-Party plaintiffs, and each of
them, be enjoined from prosecuting any claim against Third-
Party defendants, or any of them, in respect to the above-referred
subject matter; and for such other and further relief as is just
and proper.’’ (Our italics.)

In Count II of their counterclaim and cross-claim, insurers sought
a judgment against plaintiff declaring there was no explosion [928]
and no liability to plaintiff under the policies which are involved in
the instant action.

Plaintiff had been objecting to the third-party procedure. Plaintiff
was also, in effect, contending the jurisdiction of its case against
insurers was in the Cireuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, where-
in the instant action was then pending. Plaintiff was further urging
it should not be required to make common cause with lessors on the
issue of explosion, inasmuch as lessors in their original answer to
plaintiff’s original complaint and in their original third-party com-
plaint denied that any of the alleged damage referred to in plaintiff’s
complaint was in fact caused by explosion.

The District Court ordered a trial of the issues of plaintiff’s claim
against defendants-lessors, of the issues of lessors’ claim against the
insurers, and of the issues of insurers’ claim stated in Count I of their
counterclaim and cross-claim against plaintiff and lessors. It was
further ordered that trial of the issues raised in Count II of the coun-
terclaim and cross-claim, ‘“‘and further consideration of the question
whether any trial should be had in this cowrt (as to Count II), will
be deferred until after trial of the issues referred to in the preceding
paragraph of this order.’’ (Our italics.)

Upon trial of the issues so ordered, plaintiff introduced evidence
tending to support its claim; lessors introduced evidence tending
to defeat plaintiff’s claim and tending to support their claim
against insurers; and insurers introduced evidence tending to defeat
lessors’ claim against them and tending to support their claim for
a declaratory judgment against plaintiff and lessors. At this stage
of the trial proceedings, plaintiff filed a motion for a directed verdict

\.

in its favor on Count I of insurers’ counter-claim and cross-claim.
After argument on the motion, the District Judge questioned in-
surers’ counsel, as follows, ‘‘But the question now is you are asking
apparently in your first count of the cross-claim in effect for a judg-
ment against the grain company which did not purchase the policy
and apparently has no interest in the policy.’’ Insurers’ counsel dis-
claimed any such intention. The judge remarked, ‘‘Of course we are
under the main issue in the case. We are certainly trying the issue
of liability of the insurance companies to the City and Minnesota
Avenue, Inc., under thé policies of insurance issued to them. That
is all we are trying, isn’t it?’? Whereupon the court was about to
sustain plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict, but insurers’ counsel
asked leave to amend Count I ‘‘so that it confines the counterclaim
to those policies under that-count (Count I) that were issued to. the
City and Minnesota Avenue and as to the other count (Count II)
which you are not trying now, that that is confined of course, to the
policies issued to the grain company. - - - Let me withdraw that
from the pleading. - - - I would prefer to withdraw it from the plead-
ing so it would not necessitate having that kind of an order based on
a pleading that apparently there was a mistake in, and I would like to
correct that and that would eliminate the necessity of any order on it.””
The prayer of Count I of insurers’ counter-claim and cross-claim was
subsequently amended by leave so as to pray for the relief, as follows,
‘*. . ., Third-Party Defendants pray: for a declaratory judg-
ment adjudicating that no damage claimed in Third-Party Plain-
tiffs’ complaint and amended complaints was caused by explosion ;
that Third-Party Defendants are not liable on policies of in-
surance referred to'in Third-Party complaint and amended Third-

Party complaints, and that the Third-Party Plaintiffs, and each

of them, be enjoined from prosecuting any claim against Third-

Party Defendants, or any: of them, in respect to the above-referred

subject matter; and for such other and further relief as is just

and proper.”’

At the conclusion of the trial, factual issues having been submitted
to a jury, a [929] verdict was returned for plaintiff against lessors
for an amount which the court modified, and judgment was rendered
for plaintiff for $95,032.88 on plaintiff’s claim against lessors. The
jurors had not agreed upon an answer to the special question sub-
mitted—‘‘Did any explosion or explosions oceur following the in-
filtration of flood waters into the River Rail Elevator in July of 19617’
—however, the District Court thereafter sustained insurers’ motion
for judgment in accordance with their motion for a directed verdict
ixiterposed at the close of all the evidence as to lessors’ claim against
insuters—a ruling, in effect, that lessors had failed to make out a case
‘on their third-party complaint against insurers. for logs due to ex-

plosion—and judgment was rendered in favor of insurers and against
lessors on their claim for insurance.

We.are of the opinion the judgment rendered in favor of insurers
and against lessors on lessors’ claim concluded: neither the ultimate
issue of liability nor any essential supporting issue of plaintiff’s claim
or cause of action against.insurers on the policies involved in the
instant case. A judgment is not generally a bar under the doctrine
of res judicata to the further prosecution of claims or demands which
were excluded by the court, and, therefore, were no part of the verdict
and judgment. Neither is a question concluded by a judgment'if it
was withheld, or, although originally in issue or involved in an action,
if it was excluded, withdrawn or ruled out by the court and which,
therefore, was not a part of the verdict or finding and final judgment
in a ease. Patterson Oil Terminals v. The Port Covington, 3 Cir, 205
F.2d 694; Duval v. Duval, 316 Mo.. 626, 291 S.W. 488; Cox v. Imes,
Mo. App., 219 S.W. 399; Vol. 2, Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed.,
§§ 703-704, pp. 1483-1488; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 729, pp. 217-218.

It is true that in the trial of the issues of lessors’ claim ot :cause of
action against insurers an essential issue was ‘‘explosion.’’ Defendants
herein urge that whether or not plaintiff and lessors in the Kansas
case were in direct privity, plaintiff was ‘‘sufficiently close’’ to lessors
to be bound by the adjudication of ‘‘no explosion,’ in the District
Court’s adverse ruling on lessors’ claim against insurers. And again
defendants say the true reason for holding an issue concluded by
res judicata does not necessarily depend on privity, ‘“but on the policy
of the law to end litigation by preventing a party who has had .one
fair trial of a question of fact from again drawing ‘it into coh-
troversy.’’ Taylor v. Sartorious, 180 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089. As
we have noticed, the District Court in considering’ the sustention of
plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict was of the view that: plaintiff
had no interest in the policies issued to lessors; and the judge also
expressed the opinion that, apparently, there was no privity of con-
tract claimed or asserted under which plaintiff.would have any rights
under’the policies of insurance issued to lessors. Clearly plaintiff
would have had no property right in any proceeds of such policies.
The best that can be said for lessors on this phase of the argument, is
that lessors were obligated by their lease to use, if necessary, any
proceeds of lessors’ policies in the repair of their own elevator facilities
leased to plaintiff. We think this is not of sufficiently ‘‘close’’ con-
tractual relationship as to conclude plaintiff by the adjudication
adverse to lessors on the issue of explosion in the situation here. We
have also ascertained from the record of the Kansas case that plaintiff,
after insurers had amended Count I, did not introduce evidence in
refuting insurer’s evidence tending to show ‘‘no explosion’’; and,
as we see it, there was no judgment entered adverse to plaintiff from
which plaintiff could have perfected an appeal. It could hardly be

said that plaintiff had a trial of that issue in the Kansas case. This,
because we think the District Court withheld the issues of plaintift’s
claim herein from the [980] trial and judgment entered in that case.
Of course, it is the policy to end litigation where a party has had a
fair trial on factual issues; but policy does not go so far as to deny
a plaintiff a fair trial of issues supporting his separate claim.

As we have seen, insurers in Count I as originally drafted had
prayed for a declaratory judgment affecting plaintiff on the issue of
explosion, also a decisive or essential issue of a trial of plaintiff’s
claim or cause of action on its policies of insurance involved in the
instant case. According to insurers’ counsel, the original draft de-
signed to affect plaintiff, was an inadvertence, and counsel requested
the District Court to withdraw the issue and was granted leave to
amend so that the issue of ‘‘no explosion’’ purportedly raised against
plaintiff was withdrawn or eliminated; whereupon plaintiff and in-
surers, if ever, were no longer adversary parties on the issue in the
separate trial of the issues as ordered by the District Court. The
District Court for the time had put aside the consideration of insurers’
cross-claim (Count IT) against plaintiff as to the policies involved in
the instant case. It is our conclusion that insurers’ counsel, when con-
fronted with a probable adverse ruling, requested the withdrawal of
the explosion issue by amendment in so far as the issue affected plain-
tiff; and that the District Court permitted the amendment and re-
served or withheld or limited the effect of the trial of the issues in
the District Court with respect to plaintiff so that the judgment for
insurers against lessors did not affect or har plaintiff’s claim or cause
of action and right of recovery on the policies involved in the instant
action.

The judgment for defendant should be reversed, and, if plaintiff
will within fifteen days enter a remittitur of $71,005.12 ($59,007 plus
$11,998.12, interest thereon to the date of the original judgment for
plaintiff, February 4, 1955), the original judgment for plaintiff should
be affirmed for $698,517.62 as of the date of the entry of such original
judgment; otherwise, the cause should be remanded for a new trial.

It is so ordered. Coil and Holman, CC., concur.

PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Van Ospon, C., is
adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.

Frorence Baxer, Appellant, v. Esrarz or Mary CaTHerrve Brown,,
Dercuasep, Respondent, No. 45119—294 8. W. (2d) 22.

Division Two, September 10, 1956.
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Bane Overruled, October 8, 1956.

|

CO. MW. Hulen, C. M. Hulen, Jr., and Hess & Coi

Raymond L. Falzone, W. F. Daniels and James Glenn for respond-
ent.

[24] STORCKMAN,;, J.—The plaintiff, Florence Baker, filed a claim
in the Probate Court of Randolph County against the estate of Mary
Catherine Brown, deceased, in the sum of $29,760 based on nursing
services, washing and ironing and board and room furnished Mary
Catherine Brown over a period of almost three years prior to her
death. In the probate court the claimant recovered $16,500 and the
estate appealed. On trial de novo in the Circuit Court of Macon
County, where the case was sent on change of venue, the jury returned
a verdict of $7500 in plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial was overruled and she appealed. Plaintiff will sometimes be
referred to as the claimant and the defendant as the estate.

Since the plaintiff sued for $29,760 and recovered $7500 and plain-
tiff’s motion for a new trial alleging inadequacy of the jury’s verdict
was denied, the supreme court has jurisdiction of plaintiff’s appeal
because the amount in dispute is the difference between the amount
sued for and the recovery. Constitution of Missouri 1945, Article ‘V,
§ 3; Hemminghaus v. Ferguson, 358 Mo. 476, 215 S.W.2d 481,
482 [1]; Conner v. Neiswender, 360 Mo. 1074, 232 8. W.2d 469,
470 [1].

The principal question on this appeal is whether the verdict of the
jury is responsive to the evidence and instructions of the court and
is so inadequate as to show a mistake of the jury ora disregard of
the evidence and instructions.

Mary Catherine Brown and her sister, Amanda Brown, both
spinsters, lived together on their farm about a mile or two southeast of
Cairo in Randolph County until the death of Amanda. Mary Catherine,
sometimes known as Catty, was then about 82 years of age and unable
to take care of her needs and look after herself properly. Within
two days after Amanda’s funeral on November 11, 1950, Mary
Catherine, at her request, moved to the home of her cousin, Florence
Baker, the claimant herein, where she lived until she died. The date
of her death is not shown but she was buried on November 3, 1953.

Florence Baker lived in the country about six miles east of Cairo.
Her bachelor son, Harland Baker, 38 years old at the time of trial,
lived with her. There were no toilet facilities in the Baker home and
the evidence shows that Mary Catherine Brown ‘‘never set foot on
the ground’’ from the time she went to live with the claimant. She
was assigned a room in the house and was cared for from that time
on by the claimant, Florence Baker, with the assistance of her son,
Harland Baker.

Mary Catherine was feeble and nested assistance at all times while
she lived at the claimant’s home. During the early part of her stay she
was able to come to the table but food had to be put on her plate.
During the greater part of the time, however, she was confined to her
bed and lost control of the functions of her bowels and kidneys. She

had to be kept in diapers and her condition necessitated washing of
bedclothes and garments two or three times a week.

_ The claimant, Florence Baker, performed all services with respect
to the care of Mary Catherine Brown with some assistance [25] from
‘her son Harland. The claimant’s evidence tended to prove that she
‘was in attendance on her charge or subject to call 24 hours a day.
It is not disputed that the claimant cared for Mary Catherine Brown
in a commendable fashion. She kept the patient and her bed clean,
washed and ironed the soiled clothing, prepared and served meals.

Mrs. Baker’s claim against the estate consists of these items:

To 156 weeks of washing and ironing for the

deceased, at $5.00 per week $780.00
To nursing deceased:
8 months (240 days) at $20.00 per day 4,800.00
28 months (840 days) at $25.00 per day 21,000.00
To board furnished deceased :
For 1,040 days, at $1.50 per day 1,620.00
To room furnished deceased :
For 156 weeks, at $10.00 per week 1,560.00

Defendant pleaded payment and its evidence tended to prove that
claimant, Florence Baker, had entered into an express agreement with
Mary Catherine Brown to furnish her a home and to take care of
her for the sum of $100 a month and that current payments were
made. Claimant denied the express agreement or that the money she
received was in payment of her services. She based her claim on the
reasonable value of her services. These issues were submitted to the
jury.

Plaintiff’s motion for new trial, not having been submitted
to the trial court within 90 days after it was filed, was deemed over-
ruled by operation of § 510.360, RSMo 1949, on the 90th day after
its filing and this appeal was timely taken. The plaintiff contends
in this situation that “‘it is the duty of this court to pass upon the
weight of the evidence, and to pass upon the question of the adequacy
of the verdict’? because the trial court did not have ‘‘the opportunity’’
to do so. Appellant cites no authority for her contention and the
question appears not to have been previously determined by this court.

Section 510.360 provides: ‘‘If the motion for new trial is not passed
on within ninety days after the motion is filed, it is deemed denied
for all purposes.’’ This section of the Civil Code has been supple-
mented by Supreme Court Rule 3.24 dealing primarily with when
a judgment becomes final for the purpose of ascertaining the time
within which an appeal must be taken. The purpose of fixing a limited
period for acting upon motions for new trial was to speed up litigation
by eliminating unreasonable delay in the trial court after judgment.
Kattering v. Franz, 360 Mo. 854, 231 S.W.2d 148, 149.

_ The question presented by appellant’s contention is whether -a
different method or scope of appellate review pertains where a motion
for new trial is deemed denied by operation of the statute than results
where the motion is submitted to the trial court and overruled in the
conventional manner. In determining the meaning and application
of the provisions of the statute to the question presented, the court
should ascertain the legislative intent from the words used if that is
possible, and in so doing give to such words their plain and ordinary
meaning so as to promote the object and manifest purpose of the
statute. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission,
Mo., 277 S.W.2d 544, 545 [3].

The statute says that the motion for new trial is denied ‘for all
purposes.’’ The word ‘‘all’’ is sometimes said to be the most compre-
hensive in the English language; it denotes the ‘‘wholé number of,’’
‘each’? and ‘‘every.’? State v. Hallenberger-Wagner Motor Co., 341
Mo. 771, 108 S.W.2d 398, 401. The use of these all-inclusive terms
indicates an intent to accomplish by operation of law each and every
purpose achieved by a formal order of the trial court, [26] timely
made, overruling a motion for new trial. The act was not intended
to change the method or scope of appellate review.

““The purpose of a motion for new trial is to call the ‘trial court’s
attention to the alleged erroneous rulings upon which the movant
relies, and thus give the court an opportunity to correct its own errors,
if any.’? Banner Iron Works v. Ray R. Rosemond Co., Mo., 107
S.W.2d 1068, 1070 [4]. The statute does not deny the trial court the
opportunity to pass upon the motion for new trial; it only limits the
time in which it may be done. In fact, § 510.370 expressly provides
that the court, within 30 days after judgment, may of its own initia-
tive order a new trial and, of course, the trial court may, within the
90-day period, set a hearing on the motion and pass on the motion
personally. When a motion for new trial is denied by operation of
the statute it must be presumed that the trial court and counsel knew
and intended the consequences of their failure to act.

‘We must consider the questions raised on this appeal as if the
motion for new trial had been duly submitted and a formal order had
been entered by the trial court overruling the motion.

Hl Plaintiff’s principal complaint, in effect, is that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence as to damages since an assignment
in a motion for new trial that the verdict is inadequate goes to the
weight of the evidence. Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines, Mo., 245 S.W.2d
8, 10 [1]; O’Shea v. Pattison-McGrath Dental Supplies, 352 Mo. 855,
180 $.W.2d 19, 23 [12]; King v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 850 Mo.
78, 164 9.W.2d 458, 464, [7].

Tn reviewing the ruling in the trial court denying plaintiff’s motion
for new trial on the ground of inadequacy of the verdict, the appellate
court will not ordinarily undertake to weigh the evidence on the

OO

issue of plaintiff’s damages but will examine the record to determine
whether there is substantial: evidence to support the amount of
damages awarded by the verdict.- Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public
Service Co.,:361 Mo. 1066, 288 S.W.2d 426, 431 [12]; Murphy v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 350 Mo. 1186, 171 S.W.2d 610, 613
[8, 9]. :

Upon appeal from the overruling of plaintiff’s motion for new trial
on the ground that the verdict of the jury was wholly inadequate,
the appellate court will consider the evidence and all inferences there-
from most favorably to the verdict which the trial court let stand.
Combs v. Combs, Mo., 284 §..W.2d 428, 426 [8]; Hoffman v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., Mo., 255 8.W.2d 786, 744 [17]; Henderson v.
Dolas, Mo., 217 8.W.2d 554, 557 [8].

La Plaintiff, on the issue of damages, testified that the rental
value of the room occupied by Mary Catherine Brown was $10 per
week, the reasonable value of her washing and ironing services was $5
per week and her nursing services were reasonably worth $25 per day.
There was no evidence as to the reasonable value of the patient’s
board. Other evidence in plaintiff’s case as to the value of nursing
services was: Mrs. Thomas Bragg, $25 to $30 per day; Sadie Briscoe,
$30 per day; Mrs. Evelyn Bartlett and Mrs. Bthel Rice, $24 per day.

For the defendant, Dr. E. T. Whittaker, proprietor of a hospital

in Moberly, testified a reasonable charge for caring for a woman in
Mary Catherine Brown’s condition would be approximately $200 per
month including board, and that the beginning ‘pay for a practical
nurse is ‘‘one hundred dollars a month, and one thirty-five.’’ Mrs.
Evelyn Shepard, operator of a nursing home in Moberly, testified the
usual charge for taking care of an elderly woman in Mary Catherine
Brown’s condition in a nursing home, including constant nursing,
board, washing and ironing, would be $100 per month.
- Oscar ‘Brown, administrator of the estate and a brother of Mary
Catherine, testified [27] that he was present at a conversation between
the plaintiff and Mary Catherine Brown wherein the plaintiff agreed
to take care of Catty for $100 per month and that the plaintiff told
hini later that Catty was paying her by means of checks.

The law implies a promise to pay the reasonable value of the
services rendered when the amount of compensation is not stipulated.
Emerson v. Treadway, Mo.App., 270 8.W.2d 614, 624 [27]; Muench
y. South Side National Bank, Mo., 251 §.W.2d 1, 4 [1]. This is the
quantum meruit doctrine upon which plaintiff submitted her claim
to the jury. The reasonable value.of these services would be the price
usually and customarily paid for such services or like services at the
time and in the locality where the services were rendered. Wagoner
Undertaking Co. v. Jones, 1834 Mo.App. 101, 114 8.W. 1049, 1051;
Gray v. Cheatham, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 762, 764; 58 Am.Jur.,
Work & Labor, § 10, p. 518; 71 C.J., Work & Labor, § 135, p. 162.

Hy The question of the qualifications of the witnesses who testified
as to the value of the services was for the court and the weight of
such evidence was for the jury. Kimpton v. Spellman, 351 Mo. 674,
173 §.W.2d 886, 892 [11]. Since no attack is made upon the com- -
petency of the witnesses, the jury had the right to consider all evi-
dence that tended to throw light upon the reasonable value of
plaintiff’s services.

If the jury believes that the opinions of witnesses as ‘to the value
of personal services are unreasonable, it may disregard such evidence.
Hull v. City of St. Louis, 188 Mo. 618, 40 S.W. 89; Buckalew v.
Railway, 107 Mo.App. 575, 81 8.W. 1176; Norton v. Lynds, Mo.App.,
24 §.W.2d 183, 186 [9]. This is in keeping with the general rule that
a jury may believe all of the testimony of any witness or none of it,
or may accept it in part or reject it in part, just as it finds the same
to be true or false when considered in relation to the other testimony
and the facts and circumstances of the case. Hutchison v. Thompson,
Mo., 175 S.W.2d 908, 911 [9, 10]; Williams v. Ricklemann, Mo., 292
§.W.2d 276; Combs v. Combs, Mo., 284 $,W.2d 423, 426 [6].

A verdict may be responsive to the issue of damages although ~
it does not find an amount precisely in accordance with the claim of
either of the parties. Wilson v.. Buchanan County, 318 Mo. 64, 298
S.W. 842, 848 [8]; Salmons v. Dun & Bradstreet, 849 Mo. 498, 162
S.W.2d 245, 252 [11]; Commercial National Bank v. White, Mo.,
254 S.W.2d 605, 609 [4]; Peppas v. H. Ehrlich & Sons Mfg. Co., 228
Mo.App. 556, ca S.W.2d 821, 824 [4].

It may be readily demonstrated that the finding of the 5 jury is within
the range of the evidence as to reasonable value. Plaintiff’s contention
that there is no dispute about $3900 being a reasonable charge for
room and board, washing and ironing, overlooks material evidence.
Mrs. Shepard testified that the usual and customary charge for taking
eare of an elderly woman in Mary Catherine Brown’s condition in
a nursing home, including the rendering of all the services in question,
was $100 per month. Dr. Whittaker testified that the reasonable
charge for all these services would be approximately $200 per month.
This evidence throws light on the reasonable value of the services
and could be considered by the jury. Giving effect to the evidence
most favorable to the verdict, the jury could return a verdict’ on Mrs.
Shepard’s testimony of $3600 and on Dr. Whittaker’s testimony the
award would be $7200. This does not take into consideration any
question of payment on account, whick issue was submitted. An award
in excess of the minimum which the jury could have found, though
less than the value claimed by plaintiff, would not constitute error of
which plaintiff could complain. The error, if any, would [28] be in
plaintiff’s favor and not to her prejudice. We cannot say that the
jury was mistaken or, disregarded the law and the évidence in return-
ing a verdict for $7500, or that the verdict is not. responsive on the

issue of damages. In Hull v. City of St. Louis, 188 Mo. 618, 40 S.W.
89, the plaintiff and eleven other witnesses estimated the reasonable
value of plaintiff’s services as an appraiser at $3250. Five defense
witnesses testified the services were worth from $1000 to $1200. The
jury’s verdict was $1188 and on plaintiff’s appeal the judgment was
affirmed.

The appellant contends that this appeal is ruled by Busse v. White,
before this court on three occasions and reported as follows: 302 Mo.
672, 259 S.W. 458; 274 S.W. 1046; and 287 S.W. 600. The Busse
plaintiffs were awarded verdicts successively of $1,000, $2096.77 and
$1,000 in an action for damages for fraudulent misrepresentations in
the exchange of farm lands when all of the evidence in the case showed
that plaintiffs’ damages, if any, were in excess of $55,000. The court
held that the verdict showed either a mistake by the jury or a dis-
regard of the court’s instruction with respect to damages. The Busse
case and others cited by plaintiff are distinguished by the lack of
substantial evidence to support the award under the facts of those
particular cases.

There are two other allegations of error which plaintiff makes
without citation of authority. One is that ‘‘The court erred in per-
mitting defendant’s counsel to inquire into the amount of Harland
Baker’s claim, and alluding to the same in his closing argument.’’ On
the direct examination, the witness Harland Baker testified that he
had assisted his mother in caring for Mary Catherine Brown and that
he had filed a claim against the decedent’s estate for services rendered.
On cross-examination defendant’s counsel was permitted to bring out
that the amount of the claim was $6280. The extent of cross-examina-
tion is largely within the discretion of the trial court and unless clearly
abused the appellate court will not interfere. Wilcox v. Coons, 362
Mo, 381,241 8.W.2d 907, 915 [20]. We find no error in the court’s
ruling, especially in view of plaintiff’s introducing the subject matter
on direct examination.

| | The plaintiff further charges error ‘‘in permitting defendant’s
counsel to argue and present to the jury, in his closing argument,
checks which were identified but were not admitted in evidence in the
ease.’’? The transcript fails to disclose that any checks were exhibited
to the jury during argument. However, there is testimony by plain-
tiff and plaintiff’s son that during the period in question a number
of checks on Catty’s bank account were cashed and that most of the
checks were for $200. They further testified that the cash proceeds
were placed in a bag to which both plaintiff and Catty had access.
Plaintiff made no accounting for the expenditure of this money except
the general assertion that it was all spent for Catty on items such as
special food and clothes. After the death of Mary Catherine Brown
none of this money was delivered to the administrator of her estate

or credited on plaintiff’s account. This testimony was properly in

evidence in support of defendant’s plea of payment and there was no

error in permitting defendant’s counsel to refer to it in his argument.
The judgment should be affirmed and it is so ordered. All concur.

*
Srare wx rev. Joun M. Daron, Attorney General of Missouri, Re-

lator, v. Sam C. Buair, Judge of the Fourteenth Judicial’ Circuit,
Respondent, No. 45522—294 8. W. (2d) 1.

Court en Bane, October 16, 1956.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Russell 8. Noblet, Assistant
Attorney General, for relator.

James J. Rankin for respondent.

[2] WESTHUES, J.—This is a proceeding by certiorari to review
a judgment entered in a habeas corpus case (No. 3412) in the Cole
County Cireuit Court.

The facts are: In February, 1947, Arthur Joseph Berne, entered a
plea of guilty in the Cireuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, to a
charge of burglary second degree and larceny. The court assessed a
punishment of four years for the burglary and three years for the
larceny. The pertinent portion of the sentence reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in consideration of the plea of guilty heretofore en-
tered herein it is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that
the defendant be and is hereby sentenced to a term of four (4) years
for burglary and three (3) years for larceny, said sentences to run
consecutively, in the Missouri State Penitentiary * * *.’”? Berne was
taken. to the penitentiary and began serving his time. He was taken
from the penitentiary to St. Louis, Missouri, and in the Cireuit Court
there entered a plea of guilty to seven charges of burglary second
degree. On April 28, 1947, he received a sentence of seven years on
each charge. The seven sentences were to run concurrently. However,
the court made the following order in each case which is the subject
matter of this proceeding: ‘‘It is further ordered by the Court that
this sentence commence at the expiration of sentence imposed in No.
8412, on the 18th day of February 1947, in the Circuit Court of Cole
County, State of Missouri.’’ Berne was then returned to the peniten-
tiary. On August 29, 1952, he was released on parole. On February
4, 1954, his parole was revoked and he was returned to the peni-
tentiary.

The records of the penitentiary show that Berne completed his Cole
County sentence on May 18, 1952, and that his imprisonment under the
St. Louis sentence began May 18, 1952, so-that his release date would
be January 17, 1959. The time Berne was out on parole was not con-
sidered as imprisonment.

On May 8, 1954, Berne filed a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus
in the Cireuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, claiming that the order
of the St. Louis Circuit Court, above set out, was ambiguous and.
indefinite because it used the word ‘‘sentence”’ in the singular instead
of the plural word ‘‘sentences’’; that because of this ambiguity the
seven St. Louis sentences should run concurrently with the sentence
imposed on him in Cole County.

On August 31, 1954, the Cole County Cireuit Court denied the writ
put held that the order of the St. Louis Circuit Court was ambiguous

and the court made an order that the St. Louis sentences should begin
at the end of the four-year sentence imposed on Berne for the burglary
in Cole County. Under that order Berne would be entitled to his
release on October 17, 1956. .

We call attention to the fact that the order of the Cole County
Cireuit Court [8] was made on August 31, 1954. The present cer-
tiorari proceeding was not filed until March 26, 1956, and the case
was submitted on briefs in this court on October 2, 1956.

‘We see no ambiguity in the order made by the Cireuit Court of
the City of St. Louis. It is apparent that the word ‘‘sentence’’ as
used in the order had reference to the punishment assessed against
Berne in case No. 3412 in the Cireuit Court of Cole County. Section
560.110, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., makes it mandatory in cases where a
person who is found guilty of burglary is also found guilty of larceny
in connection with the burglary that a punishment for the larceny
shall be assessed in addition to the punishment for the burglary. There
must be a separate time of imprisonment fixed for each offense and the
court is powerless to order the imprisonment for the larceny to run
concurrently with the time of imprisonment for burglary. State v.
Huff, 852 Mo, 1161, 181 S.W.(2d) 518. The punishment assessed
in burglary and larceny cases have been regarded and spoken of as
one sentence. Note that this court in the case of State v. Breeden, 180
S.W.(2d) 684, Le. 685, referred to a sentence of imprisonment in that
case as ‘‘a judgment imposing a sentence of twenty-five years’ im-
prisonment’’ for burglary and larceny. A jury had by a verdict
assessed a punishment of twenty years for burglary and five years for
larceny,

In the case before us, the Cireuit Clerk of Cole County, Missouri,
certifying to the correctness of the transcript of the record used the
following language: ‘‘I * * * hereby certify the above and fore-
going is a full, true and correct copy of the original judgment and
sentence * * *.?? (Our emphasis) We rule that in a burglary and
larceny case, such as the one before us, there is in fact but one case.
The statute, Section 560.110, supra, so contemplates. It plainly says,
“Tf any person in committing burglary shall also commit a larceny,
he shall be prosecuted for both offenses in the same count or in sep-
arate counts of the same indictment, * * *.’’ The effect of the statute
is that a charge of burglary and larceny is but one case. The order
of the St. Louis Cireuit Court reads that the sentences there imposed
on Berne ‘‘commence at the expiration of the sentence imposed in
No. 8412, on the 18th day of February 1947, in the Cireuit Court of
Cole County, State of Missouri.’’ That order can have no other mean-
ing than that Berne was to begin serving the seven sentences he re-
ceived in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis at the expiration
of the imprisonment he received in case No. 3412 in the Cole County
Cireuit Court. In 24 0.3.8. 114, See. 1585, we find a rule applicable

Le

to the present case. Note what is there said: ‘‘A sentence must be
construed as any other judgment and the usual canons of construction
should be applied. It must be reasonably construed in accordance
with the intent of the trial court if the language discloses such in-
tent clearly and without doubt or obscurity. The language should be
given its ordinary meaning and should be construed to give effect to
the intention of the judge who imposed it if possible.’’ See also 15
Am. Jur. 123, Sec. 465.

We therefore rule that Berne’s imprisonment under the sentences
imposed on him in the Cireuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri,
commenced at the expiration of the seven years he received in the
Cole County Circuit Court in case No, 3412.

It is ordered that the order of the Cole County Cireuit Court in
the habeas corpus proceeding which is the subject matter of this case
be and the same is hereby quashed, All concur.

Marearnr Srreicure Wivxen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leo SrreicH=r
et al., Defendant-Respondents, No. 45566—295 S. W. (2d) 56.

Court en Bane, November 12, 1956.

Everett Paul Griffin and M. E. Clinton for appellant.

Earl G. Smith and Earl Q. Smith for respondents.

[57] HYDE, J—Action to construe the trust provisions of a will
and for a deeree requiring the trustee to make payments plaintiff
contended were required by the will. The Court construed the will
contrary to plaintiff’s contentions and plaintiff appealed to the St.
Louis Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decree. (Winkel v.
Streicher, 287 S. W. 2d 389.) We transferred the case here on ap-
plication of plaintiff.

The will to be construed is the will of Elizabeth Streicher, who
was a sister of the father of plaintiff and her sister Lillie Streicher
(the beneficiary of the trust involved), and was executed August 9,
1950. Elizabeth Streicher died August 30, 1950. The trust was created
by Article Fourth of her will, the material part being as follows:

“T give, devise and bequeath my real estate located at 1514 Ferguson
Avenue, St. Louis County, Missouri, to Fred A. Rottman, in trust
nevertheless for the following uses and purposes to-wit:

““(1) The trustee shall have the power to buy, sell, rent, lease, mort-
gage, invest and reinvest the trust estate.

“*(2) The trustee shall pay the net income and any part of the
corpus of the estate, as he in his sole discretion deems necessary, to
my niece, Lillie Streicher or her guardian or to any person or corpora-
tion caring for her, for the support and maintenance of my said niece.

“<(3) The trust shall terminate upon the death of my niece, Lillie
Streicher, and at that time the corpus of the trust estate, including
any accumulated income, shall be transferred, paid and delivered as
hereinafter provided in Article Fifth of this will.”’

Article Fifth disposed of the remainder of her estate, dividing it
into two equal parts, and giving’ one part as follows:

“*One-half thereof to my nephews and nieces by blood related to me,
who are surviving at the time of my death, in equal shares, share and
share alike, provided the share of my niece, Lillie Streicher, if she
be living shall be paid to the trustee hereinbefore named in Article
Fourth of this will, subject to the terms of said trust.’’

More than a year after the death of Elizabeth Streicher, Isabelle
Streicher, the mother of plaintiff and Lillie, made her will on Novem-
ber 14, 1951 and she died February 4, 1953. Her will gave one dollar
[58] cach to plaintiff and Lillie and gave all of her property to her
husband if he survived her. However, since he did not survive her,
all of her property went to plaintiff by the Seventh Article of her
will; but the next article provided: ‘‘Highth: In consideration of this
bequest to my daughter Margaret Streicher Winkel, it is understood
that she will pay for the support and maintenance of my daughter,
Lillie Streicher, as long as she may live.’

Lillie was kept in the Emmaus Home at Marthasville, Missouri, at
the time her aunt’s will was made in 1950 and has been there ever
since. The amount of her share under residuary Article Fifth of her
aunt’s will was about $1500.00, after deducting the State inheritance
tax; and this fund was first used for her support by the trustee. After
this money had all been used, payments for her support were made
from the trust fund income. The amount paid to the Home by the
trustee was $60.00 per month, which he paid until after final settle-
ment of her mother’s estate in June 1954. The trust fund was $8000.00
principal (apparently the real estate had been sold) ‘‘and approxi-
mately $500.00 income’’ (unused by the time of the trial) so there had
been no encroachment on the corpus, except the part thereof that
came from the residuary estate. It was alleged that plaintiff’s mother’s
estate was approximately $28,000.00, but it was not definitely shown
what amount, if any, was received by plaintiff, although -her attorney
thought she might have received $18,000.00. It was agreed by stipula-
tion prior to the trial that the trustee would continue to pay $60.00
per month to the Home until the court rendered a decree.

The will of Elizabeth Streicher was prepared in the office of the
trustee (her nephew, who took care of her business and investments)
by an attorney called by him. Over the objection of -plaintiff, the
Court admitted testimony of the trustee concerning her statements
made prior to the preparation of the will expressing concern that
there would not be sufficient funds left by William and Isabelle
Streicher (parents of Lillie Streicher) to properly provide for Lillie;
that ‘‘she further stated that in the event there was not she would
like to take care of Lillie Streicher’’; and that ‘‘again she reminded
me that in the event there were no funds for Lillie’s provision, that
I should use any or all the income and even the corpus of the estate

to pay for her keep whether it be at Emmaus, and at that time she was
at Emmaus, or at any other place.’’ Reference is made to the opinion
of the Court of Appeals for other facts.

We agree with defendants’ contentions that sole discretion
vested in a trustee by a will is a matter of his own personal judgment
which a court cannot control and exercise for him but may only
prevent abuse of discretion, arbitrary or fraudulent action; that in
construing a will the Court must determine the intent of the testator
from the whole will; and that, in case of doubt as to the construction
of a will, evidence of surrounding circumstances, subject matter and
persons to be benefited may be considered. The authorities cited in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals fully support these propositions.
However, we do not agree that as a part of the surrounding cireum-
stances it is proper to admit the statements of the testatrix concerning
the intent and meaning of the language used in the will, because in
effect this would be adding to a will a provision that is not there. The
parol evidence rule does not permit this even to vary a contract be-
tween persons who are living and present at the trial. (Bank of
Mountain View v. Winebrenner, 355 Mo. 79, 195 S. W. 2d 486 and
authorities cited.) The oral direction of the testatrix sought to be
added to the will would provide a limitation, not stated therein, on
the authority given to the trustee, namely the limitation that he should
only use the income or corpus for Lillie’s support in the event there
were no funds for that purpose from any other source, when the will
at least left this to the trustee’s discretion. [59] In a recent case en
Bane, Bernheimer v. First National Bank of Kansas City, 359 Mo.
1119, 225 S. W. 2d 745, we said: ‘“‘The written will cannot be im-
peached by proof of what the testatrix said her objectives were’’,
citing annotations 94 A.L.R. 81, 34, 112, 114, 116, 119; Wooley v.
Hays, 285 Mo. 566, 576-577 (2,3), 226 S. W. 842, 844 (2,3), 16
ALR. 1; Neibling v. Orphans Home, 315 Mo. 578, 596 (7), 286 S. W.
58, 65 (12), 51 A.L.R. 639; First Trust Co. v. Myers, 351 Mo. 899, 907
(2), 914 (5), 174 S. W. 2d 378, 380 (4), 3885. In Wooley v. Hays,
supra, it is said that to admit parol testimony of what the testator
said as to his intention ‘‘would be to permit wills to be made by parol
and would, in effect, repeal the statute requiring them to be in
writing.’’

This rule has been recently restated in Evans v. Volunteers of
America, Mo. Sup., 280 8. W. 2d 1, 5, as follows: ‘‘ ‘The general rule
is that parol evidence as to the testator’s declarations concerning
his intention, whether made before, at the time of, or subsequent to,
the execution of his will, are incompetent upon the question of the con-
struction to be given the language employed in the instrument. This for
the reason that the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the
will itself, considered in the light of relevant, extrinsic circumstances
where the language used is ambiguous; and were parol evidence of the

testator’s verbal declarations to be admitted, not only would the
result be to subject the question of his intention to evidence of declara-
tions which he, being dead, could not dispute, but it would also, in
effect, be violative of the statute which requires all wills. to be made
in writing.’’’ (See also Marr v. Marr, 342 Mo. 656, 117 8. W. 2d
230, 284; Bpstein v. Kuvin, N. J., 95 Atl, 2d 753, 36 A.L.R. 2d 1320.)
However, in the Evans case (280 S. W. 2d Le. 5) we pointed out that
such declarations were admissible where necessary to resolve a latent
ambiguity as to the identity of a beneficiary; and such declarations
are also held to be admissible to determine the identity of property,
ambiguously described, or ‘‘to rebut a resultant trust or some other
equity or presumption.’’? (57 Am. Jur. 711, Sec. 1111; See also an-
notation 94 A.L.R. 292; 69 C.J. 149, See. 1179.) Our conclusion from
all the authorities must be that this evidence was inadmissible and it
will not be considered by us in our review of this case.

Considering now the meaning of paragraph (2) of Article
Fourth of Elizabeth Streicher’s will as written (‘‘The trustee shall
pay the net income and any part of the corpus of the estate, as he in
his sole discretion deems necessary, to my niece, Lillie Streicher or
her guardian or to any person or corporation caring for her, for the
support and maintenance of my said niece.’’) defendants say if there
had been a ‘‘comma’’ between the words ‘‘income’’ and ‘‘and’’, to
separate the clause concerning the corpus from the reference to net
income, ‘‘then said language could be clearly interpreted to mean
the trustee must pay all of the net income and may pay any part of
the corpus to said niece.’’ We do not think it is reasonable to decide
the meaning of this provision solely on the basis of punctuation” or
lack of it. It is said in 57 Am. Jur. 758, Sec. 1155: ‘‘ Although the
testator’s punctuation and capitalization may be taken into cqnsidera-
tion in construing his will, the natural sense in which words are used,
as it appears from judicial inspection, prevails over both punctuation
and capitals, and punctuation must give way whenever it interferes
with the proper and reasonable construction of a will.’’ (See also
Smoot v. Harbur, 357 Mo. 511, 209 S. W. 2d 249.) More important, it
seems to us is the fact that, to get the meaning for which defendants
contend, it is necessary to transpose the words ‘‘any part of’’ so that
the sentence would read: ‘‘The trustee shall pay any part of the net
income and the corpus of the estate etc.”’ (It is pertinent to note that
these words are thus transposed in [60] the oral direction of the
testator as stated by the trustee in his testimony, namely: “that in
the event there were no other funds for Lillie’s provision that I should
use any or all of the income ete.’’) The sehtence does not read that
way but instead commences with a clear direction that ‘‘the trustee
shall pay the net income and any part of the corpus, ete.’? Thus, as
written, the words ‘‘any part of”’ apply to the corpus and not to the
net income. OS

Furthermore, we think the reasonable construction of the will con-
sidered as a whole with the relevant surrounding circumstances in
evidence, is that there was no discretion given to the trustee as to
payment of the income. The trust was for Lillie’s support and main-
tenance and terminated at her death. What remained was to go then
to the persons designated in the residuary article of the will, who had
already received as much of the residuary estate as she had. While
“any accumulated income’’ is mentioned as going with the corpus,
certainly the purpose of the trust was not to accumulate income but to
support Lillie. Of course, there might be some accumulated income,
at any time before it was spent for that purpose, and to provide that
it went with the corpus would prevent any claim to it by the bene-
ficiary’s administrator. Moreover, the surrounding circumstances
were that when this will was made, the will of Lillie’s mother, Isabelle
Streicher, had not been made and there is nothing to show that Eliza-
beth Streicher had any reason to know what if any provision she
would or could make for Lillie; and Isabelle Streicher’s will was
not made until after Elizabeth Streicher died. It also appears that
Lillie was in the Emmaus Home before this will was made and that
testatrix knew where she was when she made this will. Undoubtedly
she knew about her condition and something about the cost of her
maintenance there. It further appears that the trustee did pay the
cost of Lillie’s maintenance at the Home for some time before her
mother died, because he testified that he had done so for three or
four years prior to June 1954, and Lillie’s mother died February 4,
1953. (Three years would be before her mother made her will.) There-
fore, he did not dépend upon Lillie’s mother to support her but in-
stead construed the will as placing that obligation on him to be paid
out of the trust estate even during her mother’s lifetime. Our con-
clusion is that the reasonable construction of this will is that it leaves
no discretion as to the payment of the income of the trust estate for
Lillie’s support and maintenance but instead positively directs that
the income shall be used for that purpose.

As to use of the corpus, it is apparent that the trust income
alone is insufficient for Lillie’s support and it would be necessary for
the trustee to use corpus for that purpose unless he may consider
the other means of support provided for her in her mother’s will in
determining the question of necessity. There is conflicting authority
on the question of whether a beneficiary is entitled to support out of
the corpus of a trust fund when he has other resources. (See Annota-
tion 2 A.L.R. 2d 1481; Annotation 101 A.L.R. 1465; Bogert on Trusts,
See. 812, especially cases under note 52, cumulative Pocket Part.) The
question is still an open one in this State. It is really a question of
interpretation of the trust provisions to determine the intent of the
testator or settlor. In Scott on Trusts, 2d Hd., Sec. 128.4, it is said:
««Where the trustee is directed to pay to the beneficiary or to apply

for him so much as is necessary for his maintenance or support, the
inference is that the settlor intended that he should receive his sup-
port from the trust estate, even though he might have other re-
sources.’ (Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 128, comment e, likewise says:
“The inference is that he is so entitled.’’) However, the author of the
annotation in 2 A.L.R. 2d, 1481, 1482, says: ‘“‘By the weight of au-
thority, unless the language of the trust instrument affirmatively’
reveals an [61] intention to make a gift of the stated benefaction re-
gardless of the beneficiary’s other means, the trustee should consider
such other means in exercising his discretion to disburse the principal
for the purpose. An authority to invade the principal if necessary
in his judgment for a stated purpose, or if required or needed for
the purpose, is construed broadly as referring to the pecuniary cir-
cumstances of the beneficiary as well as to the amount otherwise re-
quired, not narrowly as referring to the cost of the purpose considered
apart. On the other hand some courts, especially in the case of a
provision for support and maintenance, reverse the inference and
presume that where the word ‘necessary’ is used and not otherwise
explained, the necessity referred to is a necessity to accomplish the
purpose except as the income of the fund may be sufficient, the bene-
faction intended being complete in itself and so not conditional upon
the beneficiary’s financial circumstances otherwise.’’? In the recent
ease of In re Ferrall’s Estate, 258 Pac. 2d 1009, the Supreme Court
of California divided on this question, the majority following the
rule of considering the beneficiary’s other means of support (her
husband’s income) stated to be the majority rule in the annotation’
2 ALR. 2d 1432 (quoting it) while the minority relied on the
Restatement rule (of the inference being that the beneficiary was en-
titled to receive support from the trust estate regardless of other
means) quoting the statement from Scott on Trusts, supra.

The question to be determined has clearly been stated by the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut, in Hoops v. Stephan, 38 Atl. 2d 588, 591,
as follows: ‘‘ ‘The primary question in this class of cases always is,
Does the will constitute an absolute gift of support and maintenance
which it makes a charge upon the income from the estate and upon
principal? If so, then the private income of the beneficiary cannot’
be considered. If, however, the gift is of income coupled with a pro-
vision that the principal may be invaded in case of need, the private
income of the beneficiary must be considered in determining whether
such need exists.’’’ In that case, the Court held the gift of main-
tenance and support was an absolute gift, basing this conclusion upon
the language of the will and the surrounding circumstances, which all’
the authorities agree properly may be considered. We think it is un-
doubtedly true, as stated by the author of the annotation 2 A.L.R. 2d
1481 that ‘“‘owing to the many possible variations in language, cir-

cumstances, and properties, no general rule is available other than that
the intention of the trustor must govern in each particular case.’’

In this case the surrounding circumstances have not been very
fully developed. We do not know how old Lillie was or what her con-
dition was when her aunt’s will was made. (We do know she was being
kept at the Emmaus Home at that time.) Neither do we know what
the condition and resources of her mother and father were at that
time, or whether they had been paying for Lillie’s maintenance at
the Home or who had done so. However, we do know (as hereinabove
stated) that the trustee did pay the full amount of Lillie’s main-’
tenance at the Home for a considerable period during her mother’s
lifetime and used the part of the corpus derived from the residuary,
estate for that purpose. Whatever estate her mother had, the trustee
did not consider that it was to be used before he made these payments ;
and we do not think her testimentary disposition of her estate has
any bearing whatever on the construction of this earlier will. (The
provision made by her will could only be considered by the trustee if
we construed the will herein involved as giving him discretion to
consider other means provided for Lillie’s support in determining
the amount to be used from this trust fund corpus for that purpose.)
We are inclined to regard the rule stated by Professor Scott and the
Restatement as the better rule because we believe that [62] language
directing a trustee to pay to a beneficiary so much as is necessary for
his support would ordinarily be understood by a testator to mean
that the beneficiary was to receive his full support from the trust
estate. A testator usually knows the circumstances of the beneficiary
he designates and if he desires any other resources or obligations for
his support to be taken into consideration in determining the amounts
to be paid to him he easily could so indicate. (See Lyter v. Vestal,
855 Mo. 457, 196 8. W. 2d 769, 2 A.L.R. 2d 1375 where the testator
limited use of corpus to emergencies.) Therefore, we think it rea-
sonable to say when this kind of language is used the inference (in
the absence of some indication to the contrary) is that the intent was
for the beneficiary to receive his full support from the trust estate.
Our conclusions, under the language of this will, the surrounding cir-
cumstances shown and the action of the trustee pursuant to it prior to
the death of Lillie’s mother, are that this trust provision of the will
should be construed as an absolute gift of support and maintenance
for Lillie; that the discretion of the trustee is limited to the determi-
nation of the amount necessary for that purpose; and that the trustee
is not authorized to withhold what is reasonably necessary for that
purpose because of the provision made for Lillie in the subsequent
will of her mother.

While this subsequent will is not before us in this case for construc-
tion, we point out that it has been held in this state, as noted by the
Court of Appeals (287 S. W. 2d, lc. 393) in Simpson v. Corder, 185

Mo. App. 398, 170 S. W. 357 that such a provision creates an obliga-
tion in the nature of a trust. (See also 1 Bogert on Trusts 236, 242,
See. 31; Restatement of Trusts, Secs. 10 and 481; Scott on Trusts,
See’s. 10-16.6.) It would not seem unreasonable to believe that Lillie’s
mother, knowing about the trust under the previous will, the amount
involved and how it was being used by the trustee, intended to provide
either for the time when that fund was exhausted or to supplement it
in some way. Upon the conclusions we have reached the judgments in
the decree upon the stipulation and as to attorneys’ fees should be
set aside and these matters adjusted in the new final decree required.

The decree and judgment is reversed and remanded with directions
to enter a decree in accordance with the views herein expressed. All
concur.

Srare or Missourt at the Relation of Ropsrr Bou, Relator, v. Noam
Wauwstrm, Judge of the Cireuit Court of St. Louis County,
Missouri, Respondent.

Starz or Missourr at the Relation of Roserr Bown, Relator, v.
Epwarp T. Eversonz, Judge of the Cireuit Court of Jefferson
County, Missouri, Respondent, Nos. 45253 and 45258—295 8. W.
(2d) 62.

Court en Banc, November 12, 1956.

EE :
Le

James F. Koester for relator.

Dearing & Richeson and Samuel Richeson for respondent.

[64] EAGER, J.—Hach of these consolidated cases is an original
proceeding in this court. The first is in prohibition and the second in
mandamus; they arise out of the same facts. These facts are shown
by the respective petitions and returns and the attached exhibits. The
relator in each case has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The question, therefore, is one of law.

Robert Boll filed suit in St. Louis County against Springlake Park,
Inc., for damages for personal injuries. That defendant is a Missouri
corporation having its principal office in Jefferson County, Missouri;
it has no office or place of business in St. Louis County. The Sheriff
of St. Louis County made return of an alias summons, showing that
he had served one A. J. Koller, President of the defendant corpora-
tion, in St. Louis County. After the lapse of 30 days plaintiff’s
counsel had a default entered and had the cause set for trial; how-
ever, before the trial date was reached, defendant, appearing only
for the purpose of the motion, filed its motion to quash the return
and service, and to dismiss the action because of improper venue and
lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant; it was stated in
that motion that the cause of action did not accrue in St. Louis County
and that defendant did not have or keep an office or agent in St. Louis
County for the transaction of its usual and customary business. At
the hearing of this motion it was admitted, in substance, that these
facts were true, and that the cause of actior accrued [68] in Jefferson
County. The plaintiff there contended, as relator does here, that
any objection to improper venue had been waived by the failure to
file such a motion within 30 days after service, under § 509.340 (all
statutory references herein are to RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.). That sec-
tion provides that a party waives all objections then available to
him by motion by failure to assert them by motion within the time
limited by § 509,330, with certain exceptions not material here. The
circuit court entered an order overruling the motion ‘‘to the extent
that it attacks the return of service on defendant,’’ and sustaining
it ‘‘to the extent that it attacks the venue of this court.’’’ And there-
upon the court ordered the cause ‘‘transferred’’ to the Circuit Court
of Jefferson County. Thereafter copies of the .various pleadings,
orders and other papers were duly certified and sent to the Circuit
Clerk of Jefferson County, and they were filed there on October 6,
1955. At the time of the entry of the above order the court filed a
memorandum, stating that the service on the President of defendant
was in accordance with § 506.150 (8), but that the venue was im-
proper under § 508.040; the court further said that it would be
‘presumed that the court impliedly granted defendant leave to file
its motion out of time for good cause’’ under § 506.060 (2), which
provides that the court may permit an act to be done out of time
where the failure was the result of excusable neglect. No further
proceedings were had in St. Louis County and no action has been

taken in the Jefferson County Cireuit Court, except to file the papers.
The petition for prohibition, filed here on October 19, 1955, sought to
prohibit Judge Weinstein from sending the case to Jefferson County
“in order that it may be docketed and tried’’ in St. Louis County;
upon finding that the ‘‘removal’’ had already been effected, relator
then filed here, on October 25, 1955, his petition for mandamus asking
this court to instruct Judge Eversole, of the Circuit Court of Jeffer-
son County, to order the return of the cause to St. Louis County for
trial. .

Relator insists here that the question is solely one of venue, and
that the defendant in the cause waived any defect in venue by failing
to raise it by motion within 30 days after service of summons; also
that the service was sufficient under § 506.150 (3). Counsel for
respondents assert that the venue was improper, and that this was not
waived, but that the Cireuit Court of St. Louis County had ‘inherent
power”’ to transfer the case.

Hl {t seems entirely clear that the venue here was improper. Sec
tion 508.040 is the applicable venue statute when a corporation is
the sole defendant. State ex rel. C. H. Atkinson Paving Co. v. Aron-
son, 345 Mo. 937, 188 8.W. 2d 1; State ex rel. Henning v. Williams,
Bane, 345 Mo. 22, 181 S.W. 2d 561; State ex rel. Clay County State
Bank et al. v. Waltner, 346 Mo. 1138, 145 S.W. 2a 152. It provides
that suits against corporations shall be instituted either in the county
where the cause of action acerued, or in any county where such
corporations ‘‘shall have or usually keep an office or agent for the
transaction of their usual and customary business.’? It is admitted
here, as stated, that the cause of action accrued in Jefferson County,
and that defendant has no office or place of business in St. Louis
County. We may presume from this record that defendant does not
keep an agent in St. Louis County for the transaction of its usual
business, for the facts indicate the contrary, and the return does not
so state; a return of service may not be aided by presumptions or
intendments, and it must show on its face that every requisite of the
statute has been complied with. Carter v. Flynn, 232 Mo, App. 771,
112 S.W. 2d 364, 369; Stanley v. Sedalia Transit Co., 186 Mo. App.
888, 117 S.W. 685. The return here merely stated that the sheriff
served the summons on defendant by delivering a copy of the sum-
mons and petition ‘‘to A. J. Koller, pres. of the said defendant cor-
poration.”

The issue here is something more than a mere question of
venue. We hold [66] that, the venue being improper, the court ac-
quired no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the pur-
ported service on its president in St. Louis County. The service
statutes and the venue statutes are necessarily construed together.
State ex rel. Minihan v. Aronson, 850 Mo. 309, 165 S.W. 2d 404;
State ex rel, Henning v, Williams, Banc, 845 Mo. 22, 181 S.W. 2d

561; Hankins v. Smarr et al., 345 Mo. 978, 187 S.W. 2d 499. In State
ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, Bane, 361 Mo. 1029, 2388 S.W. 2d 393,
the proceeding was one in prohibition, and a lack of jurisdiction over
one defendant in a pending suit was asserted; plaintiff lived in Jack-
son County and both defendants lived in Platte County. One defend-
ant was served in Jackson County when found there, but the other
defendant was served in Platte County. The court held that the venue
was improper as to the defendant who was not found in Jackson
County, and said, 1. c. 395: ‘** * * the venue statute must be met
and complied with as to each defendant. Proper venue is necessary,
before the service of process will confer jurisdiction over the person
of a defendant. Yates v. Casteel, 329 Mo. 1101, 49 S.W. 2d 68, 70;
Hankins y. Smarr, 345 Mo. 973, 137 8.W. 2d 499, 501; State ex rel.
Minihan v. Aronson, 350 Mo. 309, 165 S.W. 2d 404, 407. * * * The
provisions of the Code with reference to service of process are sub-
ject to statutory venue requirements.’’ As considering, also, such a
question as one of jurisdiction, see: State ex rel. St. Joseph Lead Co.
vy. Jones, Bane, 270 Mo. 230, 192 8.W. 980; Hankins v. Smarr, 345
Mo. 978, 187 S.W. 2d 499; Robinson v. Field, 342 Mo. 778, 117 8.W.
2d 308; Lieffring v. Birt, Mo. App., 154 8.W. 2d 597; Mahan vy. Baile,
358 Mo. 625, 216 S.W. 2d 92. We have read the cases cited by relator
and find nothing to the contrary. Holding, therefore, that the ques-
tion is one of jurisdiction, we consider the supposed waiver.

We need not decide whether there may ever be a waiver of
improper venue by a failure to raise the objection by motion in ac-
cordance with § 509.340. We do think, however, and so hold, that in
order to waive an existing want of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, there must be some overt act constituting a general ap-
pearance, by virtue of which the defendant submits himself or itself
to the jurisdiction of the court; Mahan v. Baile, 358 Mo. 625, 216
S.W. 2d 92. Various instances of such appearances are cited in that
opinion; and see, for further examples: Lieffring v. Birt, Mo. App.,
154 8.W. 2d 597; Robinson v. Field, 342 Mo. 778, 117 S.W. 2d 308.
In the Lieffring case, supra, the court referred to the requirement
of a ‘‘voluntary act such as would constitute a general entry of ap-
pearance.’’ In the present case the defendant filed only its motion
raising the lack of jurisdiction over it, and attacking the venue; that
motion was filed upon a special appearance, and was, we think, a
proper method by which to raise these questions. We are unwilling
to hold that a defendant, by merely staying out of court, for either
a specified time or indefinitely, thereby waives his or its objection
to the fact that no proper service has been had. In other words, when
there has been no valid service, the defendant certainly waives nothing
by not appearing; and not having waived anything at the expiration
of 80 days after the invalid service, he certainly does not waive any
defect by filing a motion, on special appearance, attacking the juris.

diction and venue after the expiration of 30 days. In short, we hold
here that there was no waiver of the lack of jurisdiction over the per-
son of defendant. In this view of the case we need not consider §
506.060 (2), for we do not rely in any sense upon a presumed leave to
file the motion or upon any extension of time. Defendant was simply
not in the case at all, except by its special appearance.

Hl We have no statutory provisions whatever for the transfer of
a cause, such as was made here, from a court of improper venue to the
court of the proper venue. Perhaps it could be done by consent under
§ 508.080, for that would constitute an affirmative [67] waiver and
entry of appearance. There was no consent here. The defendant cer-
tainly did not apply for a change of venue under § 508.090, which,
so far as the disqualification of the judge is concerned, has now been

. supplanted by the provisions of §§ 6 and 15 of Art. 5, Constitution

of 1945 (State ex rel. Creamer v. Blair, Banc, 364 Mo. 927, 270 8.W.
241), nor did the court attempt to disqualify and change the venue
under § 508.100, which has been similarly supplanted. Counsel for
respondents argue that the court could order this transfer in the exer-
cise of an ‘‘inherent power.’’? We can hardly conceive that a court
should be permitted thus to change procedures established ‘by stat-
ute, or thus to supply omissions in an established procedure. No au-
thority is cited, and we think no applicable authority can be found.
We hold that the transfer of this case was in excess of the authority
and jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County.

HE Generally, when there is no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, prohibition will lie to prevent further action. Respondents,
however, raise two further questions. They say that the order of Judge
Weinstein transferring this case is not subject to collateral attack by
prohibition, citing two cases involving attacks on judgments by pro-
ceedings subsequently filed. The cited cases are not applicable. The
theory suggested is generally applied in attacks on judgments. We
think it has no application here. Prohibition is an original, direct
proceeding, the writ being directed to the judge himself, and it reaches
his very jurisdiction and authority to proceed. (State ex rel. Termi-
nal RR Ass’n. v. Tracy, 287 Mo. 109, 140 S.W. 888.) In a few in-
stances, prohibition has been referred to as a “‘collateral proceeding.”
(State ex rel. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Falkenhainer,
309 Mo. 224, 274 S.W. 758.) Those opinions must be confined to their
own factual situations, as, for instance, an attempt to nullify a default
judgment when the trial court had, on the facts, found that it had
jurisdiction. In the present case we have solely a question of law, and
there is no judgment. And see: Davison v. Hough, 165 Mo. 561, 65
S.W. 731; State ex rel. Woolman v. Guinotte, 221 Mo. App. 466, 282
8.W. 68. The proceeding in prohibition is a constituent part of our
common law (73 C.J.S., Prohibition, § 2(a), p. 10), and it is recog-
nized by our constitution (§ 4, Art. 5) and our statutes (Ch. 580) as

[|

a primary means by which this court may exercise its superintending
control over the inferior courts, as such. In such a situation as the
present, it is by no means a collateral attack on an order of the trial
court.

Hi Finally, counsel say that prohibition will not issue to stop an
act which has already been accomplished, citing State ex rel. Templeton
y. Seehorn, Mo. App., 208 S.W. 2d 789; State ex rel. Kansas City
y. Burney, Bane, 324 Mo. 363, 23 S.W. 2d 117; and State ex rel.
Strother v. Broaddus et al., 234 Mo. 358, 187 S.W. 268. Generally,
those cases hold that prohibition is a preventative remedy and cannot
be used, as a substitute for an appeal, to undo or annul erroneous
judicial proceedings which have already been fully accomplished. The
principle is sound, but the authority of those cases is not controlling
here. There is abundant authority that the remedy is available when
a judicial body is proceeding without jurisdiction and when some
part of its action remains to be performed. State ex rel. Taylor v.
Nangle, Banc, Mo., 227 S.W. 2d 655, 657; State ex rel, Ellis v. Creech,
Bane, 364 Mo. 92, 259 S.W. 2d 872 (where the court dissolved an in-
junction which had been issued without jurisdiction). By virtue of
our writ of mandamus this cause will be returned from Jefferson
County, where it was never properly lodged, to St. Louis County ; and
our writ in prohibition may properly be directed to the latter court,
for its future guidance. We are not completely circumscribed by the
prayer of relator’s petition in prohibition, which was filed before the
order of transfer was made; the essential object of that petition, how-
ever, was to require respondent Weinstein to keep and try the case.
[68] Since we are sending it back, we deem it entirely proper to limit
his future action. ‘To hold otherwise would simply require relator to
file another petition for the writ, after this opinion is filed; we decline
to rule the case on such a narrow and useless ground.

| | The alternative writ of mandamus will be made peremptory;
the preliminary rule in prohibition will be made absolute; by the writ
of mandamus respondent Eversole will be directed to enter an order
transferring this cause to Division No. 3 of the Circuit Court of St.
Louis County; by the writ of prohibition respondent Weinstein will
be prohibited from taking any further action in the cause, when re-
turned to him, except to dismiss it for want of proper venue and lack
of jurisdiction over the defendant. It is so ordered. All concur.

Luz Cunisry, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pavu Peravs, d/b/a Sours Sm
Auto Parrs, Defendant-Respondent, No. 44994—295 S. W. (2d)
122.

Court en Bane, November 12, 1956.

Albert J. Yonke for appellant.

RC. Tucker, C. Thomas Carr and Tucker, Murphy, Wilson & Sid-
dens for respondent.

[123] HOLMAN, C.—Action for damages wherein plaintiff sought

“to recover $7,500 actual and $10,000 punitive damages for his alleged
_wrongful discharge by his employer, defendant therein. At the com-
mencement of the trial defendant objected to the introduction of any
evidence in support of the allegations in the petition for the reason
‘that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
‘granted. At that time he also called attention to his previously filed
written motion to dismiss based upon the same ground. The court
sustained both the objection and the motion and entered judgment for
‘defendant upon both counts of said petition. Plaintiff has duly ap-
pealed.

Plaintiff alleged that he had been employed by defendant as a
machinist; that on June 6, 1952, he sustained an injury in the course
of his employment; that plaintiff filed a claim for compensation under
the provisions of the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law, Chapter
287 (all statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to RSMo
1949, V.A.M.S.) ; that as a direct result of plaintiff filing said claim
and further exercising his rights under said law, defendant discharged
plaintiff, and plaintiff has since been unable to obtain employment as
a machinist and has been otherwise damaged.

It was alleged that the conduct of defendant in so discharging
plaintiff was in violation of Section 287.780, which reads [124] as
follows : ‘‘Every employer, his director, officer or agent, who discharges
or in any way discriminates against an employee for exercising any
of his rights under this chapter, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not
less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment
in the county jail for not less than one week nor more than one year,
or by both such fine and imprisonment.’’

The rule is well established in this state and elsewhere that in
the absence of a contract for employment for a definite term or a
contrary statutory provision, an employer may discharge an employee
at any time, without cause or reason, or for any reason and, in such
case, no action can be maintained for wrongful discharge. Culver v.:
Kurn, 354 Mo. 1158, 193 S. W. 2d 602, 166 A.L.R. 644; Forsyth v.
Board of Trustees of Park College, 240 Mo. App. 622, 212 S. W. 2d 823;
Bell v. Faulkner, Mo. App., 75 8. ,W. 2d 612; Odell v. Humble Oil &.
Refining Co., 201 F. 24 128. It therefore becomes apparent that plain-
tiff’s petition does not state a claim for relief unless it may be said
that the foregoing statute, in addition to providing that the employer
violating same shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, also gives the employee
a claim for the recovery of personal damages arising from the alleged:
wrongful discharge. That is the sole question for our determination:

At the outset it should be made clear that there is no analogy:
between the statutc before us and the cases wherein it is held that:
violation of a duty prescribed by a statute is negligence per se. That
rule is based on the underlying theory that in such cases a standard:
of care has been fixed by law and, therefore, failure to conform to such
standard is negligence as a matter of law. Neither should we.consider
as applicable the many situations where an act is made criminal by.
statute and the injured party has an existing civil action independent
of the statute (assault, embezzlement, etc.). In those cases the statute
does not create the civil right of action, nor does its enactment preclude’
the injured party from maintaining his private action. In the instant
case we must determine whether the violation of a criminal statute’
providing a penalty for the discharge of an employee for the reason
specified gives rise to a claim for damages by the employee, where no
such claim existed independently of the statute.

Section 287.780 was enacted in 1925 as a part of the original Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation Law. Since that time the provisions of
that section have never been interpreted by the appellate courts of
this state. As far as we can determine it has never been cited or re-
ferred to. Counsel have apparently been unable to find any similar
statute among the laws of other states. No case has been cited in which
this precise question has been determined and we have been unable to
find any.

In support of his contention that the instant section gave him a
claim for damages for the alleged wrongful discharge, plaintiff relies
mainly on the decisions construing the ‘‘service letter’ statute, Sec-
tion 290.140, which he argues is analogous. That section is as follows:
‘*Whenever any employee of any corporation doing business in this
state shall be discharged or voluntarily quit the service of such cor-
poration, it shall be the duty of the superintendent or manager of said
corporation, upon the written request of such employee to him * * *
to issue to such employee a letter, duly signed by such superintendent
or manager, setting forth the nature aud character of service rendered
by such employee to such corporation and the duration thereof, and
truly stating for what cause, if any, such employee has quit such ser-
vice; and if any such superintendent or manager shall fail or refuse
to issue such letter to such employee when so requested by such em-
ployee, such superintendent or manager shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor * * *,’? Since the decision in [125] the case of Cheek
v. Prudential Ins. Co., Mo. Sup., 192 8. W. 387, that section has been
construed as giving the former employee a right of action for damages
against the corporate employer whose officer refused to issue the re-
quested letier.

Although the Cheek case contains some statements that tend to sup-
port plaintiff’s position, it should be noted that the provisions of the
“service letter’? statute are materially different from those contained
in the section before us. For that and other reasons we have concluded
that the ‘‘service letter’’ statute and the cases construing it should
not, by analogy, control our decision on the issue before us. In the
Cheek case the court placed great emphasis on the fact that the statute
there under consideration enjoined upon the corporate official a posi-
tive, affirmative duty to issue the letter and concluded that damages
could be recovered for a breach of said duty. In a later case this court
again considered that statute and indicated that the first part of the
section, relating to the duty of issuing the letter, is remedial and is the
basis for the damage action against the employer, and the latter portion
is penal and may be enforced by the prosecution of the corporate su-
perintendent or manager. State ex rel. v. Hughes, 350 Mo. 869, 169
8. W. 2d 328. It therefore becomes significant to note that the instant
section has no provision relating to any positive duty, but merely

provides a criminal penalty in the event the employer shall discharge
an employee for the reason stated. :

It may be of interest to note that the court, in the Cheek case, in
considering the remedial nature of the ‘‘service letter’’ statute, recog-
nized the historical reasons for the enactment of that law. It was
stated that a great public evil had arisen in relation to the method
used by employers in obtaining information from previous employers
of their applicants for employment, and that the statute was enacted
to regulate this custom which had resulted in great injustice and op-
pression upon large numbers of laboring people. By way of contrast,
it may be stated that there does not appear to have been any. great
remedial need for the instant section. The Workmen’s Compensation’
Law was just being enacted and there could not have been any custom
or practice in existence in this State, relating to the discharge of
workmen’s compensation employee-claimants, which needed to be reg-
ulated or corrected. The section was obviously of a preventive rather’
than remedial nature.

It is well settled that statutes in existence at the time and place of
making a contract, and at place of performance, which affect the valid-
ity, construction and enforcement of said contract, enter into and form
a part thereof as if expressly incorporated therein. Curators of Cen-
tral College v. Rose, Mo. Sup., 182 8S. W. 2d 145. In construing the
“service letter’ statute the courts have recognized and applied this:
rule. For example, see the case of Brink’s, Inc. v. Hoyt, 8 Cir., 179 F.
2d 355, 358, in which the rule was stated and applied as follows: ‘‘The
above quoted statute was:.on the statute books at and for a long time
prior to the time plaintiff entered the employ of the defendant Brink’s,
Ine. It therefore became a part of the contract of employment so that
the action cf plaintiff was in the nature of an action for damages for
the breach of his employment contract.’

The date of plaintiff’s employment does not appear in the petition.
We will assume that it was subsequent to the enactment of Section 287.-
780 and that said section, if applicable, became a part of the employ-
ment contract. As indicated, a reading of the instant section‘ will
reveal that it is quite different from the ‘‘service letter’’ statute..-As
heretofore stated, we have construed that statute as being divisible
into two parts, the first part, imposing a duty to issue the service
letter, being remedial and forming a basis for enforcement by an action
for damages, and the second part, being penal, [126] to be enforced.
by prosecution of the superintendent or manager of the corporation.
(State ex rel. v. Hughes, supra.) It is significant that the instant sec--
tion is only comparable to the second part of the ‘‘sérvice letter’ stat-.
ute. No provision appears therein which places any affirmative duty
upon the employer. Actually, it contains no words-which prohibit
the employer from discharging an employee for the stated reason.
The section simply deals with the consequences in the event an em-

ployee is so discharged. It provides, ‘‘Every employer * * * who
discharges * * * an employee for exercising any of his rights under
this chapter shall be deemed guilty * * *.’’ Since this section con-
tains no provision comparable to the portion of the ‘‘service letter’’
statute which has been held to authorize an action for damages, it
would seem that the cases construing the ‘‘service letter’? statute
should not be considered as authorities supporting plaintift’s right to
maintain a civil action based upon his discharge for the reason stated
in Section 287.780.

In construing the instant section in order to determine whether it
gives plaintiff a claim for damages, as he contends, our important task
is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers, and to do so, if possible,
from the language used. Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,
334 Mo. 672, 66 S. W. 24 920. We should give the language its plain
and rational meaning and an unambiguous statute can rarely, if ever,
be construed to be something other than it was written to be. City of
Charleston v. McCutcheon, 360 Mo. 157, 227 8. W. 2d 736.

We think it may be correctly stated that a statute which creates a
criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation, will not be
construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of
the common law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear im-
plication to have heen the legislative intent. Everett v. Littleton
Const. Co., 94 N. H. 48, 46 A. 2d 817; Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass.
238, 118 N. E. 2d 356; Hayman v. Morris, 36 N. Y. 8. 2d 756; Ward
v. Severance, 7 Cal. 126; Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F. 2d 875. While
the case of Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, may appear to approve
a somewhat different rule, we think it must be assumed, irrespective of
what may have been said in that opinion, that the court, in recognizing
the historical reasons for the enactment of the ‘‘service letter’” stat-
ute and in considering the specific language used therein, must have
found a legislative intent to create a civil cause of action in the em-
ployee.

It is, of course, conceded that the instant section does not expressly
provide that a discharged employee have a claim against the employer
for damages resulting from his discharge for the reason specified there-
in.” We are unable to find anything in the wording thereof, or in the
historical background of the statute, to indicate any legislative intent
to create a new civil claim of this nature in the discharged employee,
In the absence of any indication of such legislative intent, we feel con-
strained to assume that had the legislature desired to provide for en-
forcement of this section by civil action, as well as by criminal prose-
cution, such a provision would have been incorporated therein.

‘We should bear in mind that the section under consideration was
not énacted alone but was one of seventy-nine sections that made up
our original Workmen’s Compensation Law. Laws of Missouri, 1925,
pages 375 to 407, inclusive. Therein, the legislature specified in minute

detail the rights and liabilities of employees, employers and insurers
in relation to the vast industrial field encompassed in that Act. We
can hardly conceive of the legislature making such careful provision
for the rights and compensation of injured employees covered by the
Act and yet omitting a specific provision for recovery of damages for
wrongful discharge if there had been any intent to create such a right.
[127] It is not unusual for the legislature to make specific provision
for the recovery of damages and penalties by injured parties. A casual
examination of our statutes will disclose many such instances, and in
some of them criminal punishment is also provided. For example, in
Chapter 409 it is provided that certain securities not be sold in this
State unless registered with the supervisor of corporation registration.
In the event of a sale in violation of such provisions, it is provided in
Section 409.240 that the purchaser may recover from the seller the
full amount paid for such securities, together with costs and a reason-
able attorney fee. In Section 409.300(3) the same violation is made
a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. Other sections
wherein specific provision has been made for recovery of damages and
penalties by those injured as a result of the violation thereof, include
the following: Section 28.200 (which provides for recovery of a penal-
ty for neglect of duty from the Secretary of State, by a person ag-
grieved) ; 30.380 and 30.420 (which provide penalties to be recovered
by the State from the State Treasurer for failure to perform certain
duties, and further providing that such failure be a misdemeanor) ;
140.280(2) (providing for collection of a penalty from a purchaser at
delinquent tax sale who fails to pay his bid) ; 290.080 (which makes
it a misdemeanor for certain employers to fail to pay employees at
least semimonthly and to furnish statement showing amount of de-
ductions) and 290.090 (providing for employees to collect a penalty
by civil action in event employer fails to pay wages at least every fif-
teen days) ; 290.100 (providing for collection of a penalty by civil ac-
tion by every employee whose wages are reduced by a corporate em-
ployer without said employer giving thirty days’ prior notice thereof) ;
290.110 (which provides for collection by an employee from corporate
employers of a penalty in the event unpaid wages are not paid within
seven days after discharge of employee); 290.180 (which provides
an action for wrongful discharge where employment is for a definite
period of time and employee is discharged without cause before expira-
tion thereof) ; 875.420 (providing for collection of 10% penalty and
a reasonable attorney fee for vexatious refusal by an insurance com-
pany to pay loss) ; 442.340 (which provides for forfeiture of $100 to be
recovered by person injured from any person who shall neglect to ap-
pear when served with subpoena and testify relating to act of wit-
nessing certain insiruments) ; 443.370 (providing for collection of
double the amount of an overcharge made by trustees for compensa-
tion for selling property at auction under deed of trust or similar in-

strument) ; 508.170 (providing that circuit clerk shall forfeit $100
to party aggrieved if he shall fail to immediately prepare transcript
after order of change of venue and transmit to clerk of court where
removed) ; 537.260 (which makes railroad liable irrespective of negli-
gence for the value of animals killed where right of way is unfenced) ;
587.340, 587.350 and 587.370 (providing for the collection of double
and treble damages for certain acts damaging realty) ; 537.390, 537.400
and 560.590 (which provide for collection of penalties by person
damaged from person who shall wilfully set fire to woods or prairies,
and further providing that such act be deemed a misdemeanor) ; 537.-
410 (which provides for collection of damages and a reasonable at-
torney fee from any person constructing a boom across any stream and
thus causing damage arising from overflow) ; 537.420 (providing for
collection of treble damages for waste committed by life tenant) ; and
545.630 (providing for collection by the State of a penalty not exceed-
ing $500 from court clerk failing to perform certain duties in relation
to change of venue in criminal cases).

It is our view that the fact that the legislature has, in so many in-
stances, made specific provision for such recoveries lends some weight
to our conclusion that such a provision would have been included in
the instant section had it been intended that [128] discharged em-
ployees be provided a recovery for damages resulting from their dis-
charge for exercising any of their rights under Chapter 287.

One Missouri case has been cited which we think, by analogy, strong-
ly supports our decision herein. It is Bell v. Faulkner, supra, which
involved what is now Section 129.080. That section makes it a felony
for any employer to discharge an employee because of his political
opinions or through eny unjust or unlawful means to attempt to pro-
cure such employee to vote or refrain from voting for any candidate
for public office. The plaintiff therein filed a suit for damages alleging
that the defendant discharged him because he would not vote for cer-
tain candidates in a city election. The court denied recovery, holding’
that such a cause of action did not exist prior to the enactment of said
statute, and since there was no provision therein for civil liability,
no such action could be maintained. That section was distinguished
from the ‘‘service letter’’ statute, the court pointing out that it did
not place a positive duty on the employer but was purely prohibitive
in character and concluded that its violation could be punished only
by imposing the criminal penalty.

Plaintiff has called our attention to the rule that the Workmen’s
Compensation Law should be liberally construed in favor of the em-
ployee. We have considered that rule and concluded that it should
not cause us to reach a different decision in this case.

The foregoing will indicate our view that the trial court properly
sustained the motion to dismiss and entered judgment accordingly.

The judgment is affirmed,

PER CURIAM :—The foregoing opinion by Houmay, C., is adopted
as the opinion of the Court en Banc. All concur, except Hyde, J., who
concurs in result.

Le
Cart Davis, Plaintift-Respondent, v. Bess Davis Rosmrrs, Mariuyn
Davis Freppricss, Aton Davis Hanan; Russenn Tompson,
James A. Zrpr, and Cromia Marm TwituMeme, Defendants. -Ap-
pellants, No. 44942—295 S. W. (2d) 152.

Gourt en Bane, November 12, 1956.

Thomas R. McGinnis, Aleaander & Robertson and Ernest E. Baker
for defendants-appellants.

Jesse E. Bishop for plaintift-respondent.

[154] DALTON, J.—Action in equity to establish a resulting trust
in described real estate in the City of St. Louis and, in the alternative,
if a resulting trust be denied, plaintifi asked that the interest of
the defendants in the described property be charged with all advance-
ments made by plaintiff in the payment of the principal and interest’
on, certain notes secured by deeds of trust on the described realty
and for all taxes, repairs and upkeep paid. Defendants claimed
fractional interests in the property, denied plaintiff’s claim of result-
ing trust and filed a cross-action to determine title and for partition.

The court found the issues for plaintiff; that plaintiff was in truth
and in. fact the owner of the deseribed real estate by reason of a,
resulting trust; and that defendants had no interest in the Property.
Partition was denied and defendants appealed.

Since the action is one to establish a resulting trust in real estate,
title to real estate is directly involved and this court has jurisdiction
of the appeal. Warford v. Smoot, Mo. Sup., 287 S.W. 2d 184; Art.
V, See. 8, Const. of Mo. 1945.

Hl Respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal for failure of ap-
pellants to comply with Supreme Court Rule 1.08. Counsel should
comply with this rule, which is intended to aid both counsel and the
court. Appellants’ brief is subject to severe criticism, but the defects
in the brief are insufficient to require the harsh penalty of dismissal.
The motion is overruled.

| | Appellants complain that the amended petition, on its face,
negatives plaintifi’s right to a decree establishing a resulting trust.
They further insist that the facts alleged show that plaintiff ‘‘is not
entitled to a resulting trust for more than the proportionate part of-
the purchase price paid by him at the time of the sale.’’ It will not
be necessary to discuss this assignment at length, or separately from
the merits of the case, because more facts are pleaded than the evi-
dence establishes. It is sufficient to say that the petition was not at-
tacked in the trial court; that the petition states a claim upon which
equitable relief may be granted; and that it is immaterial that certain
facts are stated which show that plaintiff is not entitled to all of
the relief he asks. The rule is well settled that when a petition,
which states a claim (although defectively) upon which relief may
be granted, is not assailed in the.trial court, it is too late-to challenge
the sufficiency for the first time on appeal. Stephenson v. Stephenson,
851 Mo. 8, 171 S.W. 2d 565, 569(19). In essential respects, however,
the evidence conforms to the pleadings and a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the relief granted will fully
dispose of the assignment.

There is little direct conflict in the evidence. Defendants relied
chiefly upon the cross-examination of plaintiff’s witnesses and de-
fendants’ evidence: was principally directed to matters affecting the
eredibility, weight and value of the testimony of these witnesses. In
view of the trial court’s finding in plaintiff’s favor, we should defer
and do defer to that finding in so far as it concerns the credibility
of the witnesses. Accordingly, we shall direct our attention to certain
facts which we think the record satisfactorily establishes.

Respondent is the son of Josh Davis and Lonah Hayden Davis. Ap-
pellants include respondent’s three sisters and the son of a deceased
sister. ‘These four respondents claim a one-fifth interest each in the
property, which consists of a house and lot located at 2910 Victor
Street in the City of St. Louis. It is admitted that the property can-
not be partitioned in kind. Legal title to the described real estate
was acquired by Josh Davis and Lonah Hayden Davis, his wife, by
warranty deed dated October 24, 1942. The deed recited a considera-
tion of $1.00 and bore canceled U.S. Internal Revenue [155] stamps
in the sum of $5.50. Josh Davis was 72 years of age at that time.
He died in November 1947. Lonah Hayden Davis, his wife, survived
and died April 11, 1949. Both parents died intestate. This action
was instituted in the cirenit court of the City of St. Louis on August
17, 1950; and the decree was entered February 14, 1955.

Respondent handled all of the matters connected with the purchase
of the property. He had an associate inspect several properties that
he had under consideration. He obtained a check or draft for $1,000
from a company with whom he had business connections in order to
make the down payment and his parents executed notes and deeds of
trust for the balance of the purchase price. The first deed of trust
on the property was dated October 29, 1942, and secured a $3,000
note and 6 interest notes. The second deed of trust was dated the same
date and secured 25 notes for a total of $1,000. The notes for the
balance of the purchase price were payable at the office of the real
estate company handling the sale of the property. Respondent con-
ducted all negotiations concerning the purchase of the property
through the real estate company and he subsequently paid off the 25
notes secured by the second deed of trust by obtaining monthly. checks
from the company from whom he had obtained the $1,000 check or
draft to make the down payment on the property. While only the
respondent appeared at the office of the real estate company, all
notices were mailed from that office to Josh Davis concerning the
payment of interest on the notes and taxes on the property and the
original title deed was also.mailed to him. After the property was
purchased, the resporident, his mother, father and nephew resided in
the property. Taxes on the property were assessed to the record
owners and Josh Davis took credit in his 1943 and 1944 United States
income tax returns for taxes paid and for the interest paid to the real

estate company on the notes secured by the first deed of trust. Sub-
sequent to the institution of the present action, respondent purchased.
the $3,000 note and certain interest notes secured by the first deed
of trust on the property.

There was evidence tending to show that respondent was the pur-
chaser of the property; that his parents made no contribution to the
purchase price; and that his parents did not have any money to so
contribute. The witness admitted, however, that Josh Davis-was em-
ployed by ‘‘the National Stockyards on the East Side’’ where he had
been employed as a hog salesman and later as a hog inspector or
“‘docker.’’ Defendants’ evidence tended. to show that his income from
his employment was $1925 in 1948 and, $1979.89 in 1944. There was
evidence that Mrs. Davis had said to one of her daughters that Carl
(respondent) bought the property and that it was Carl’s, and there
was evidence that Mrs. Davis had told her niece (a Mrs. Faddis)
“that Carl bought the property and put it in our name, but of course
Carl paid for the property’’; and that she. (Mrs. Davis) was going
to put it back in Carl’s name. Some two weeks before her death, Mrs.
Davis again told Mrs. Faddis that she was going to put the property
back in Carl’s name.

At the time the property was purchased, respondent was buying
and selling stock at the National Stockyards in Illinois, and the busi-
ness in which he was engaged was a ‘‘kind of a gambling affair’’ in
which one could lose money. There was evidence that respondent, in
the presence of a Mr. Hegger, on whose advice he was acting in pur-
chasing the property, had asked his parents if he could put title to
the property in their names for the reason that he was doing business
over at the stockyards, where one could lose quite a bit of money,
and ‘‘he thought this property would be better in his father’s and
mother’s names.’’

After the death of his mother, respondent paid her burial expenses
and the cost of a headstone. The amount of these expenditures does
not appear from the record, nor is it clear that there-was no ad-
ministration on her estate.

[156] Defendants offered evidence tending to show that plaintiff
did not get along well with his father and that, on one oceasion, an
argument took place (in the first part of 1947) wherein Josh Davis
aceused Carl of owing him $3,000 and ‘‘Carl says, you can get out,
both of youse, and grandpa say, you can get out * * * we give you
this place if you give us this three thousand dollars you owe us, you
can have it.’’

‘HEE In support of the decree, respondent points to his $1,000 cash
payment on the purchase price of the property, to his subsequent pay-
ment of the notes secured “by the second deed of trust, which deed of
trust was executed by his parents after the property was purchased,
and to his purchase of the notes secured by the first’ deed of trust.

Respondent also relies upon the oral testimony tending to show that
he was the purchaser and true owner of the property; that title was
taken in names of his parents for the reasons hereinbefore specified ;
and that his parents consented to the arrangement and recognized
his ownership of the property. Respondent cites the case of Padgett
vy. Osborne, 359 Mo. 209, 221 8.W. 2d 210, 212, and relies upon certain
well recognized rules of law stated therein, to wit: ‘‘The presumption.
where a child furnishes the money and title is taken in the name of
the parent is that a resulting trust arises in favor of the child unless
a different intent is manifested and a presumption of a gift or an
advancement does not arise from the relationship. * * * Logically,
the existence of a resulting trust arising from the acts of the parties
is strengthened and fortified, not weakened and destroyed, by con-
sistent oral expressions of the parties manifesting their intentions,
understandings, and agreements that the grantee is seized and holds
in trust for the purchaser and true owner although the agreement
be void and unenforceable as an express trust because it relates to
land and is not in writing. »» While the rules stated are well estab-
lished and they apply in this case, they are insufficient to sustain the
decree. Other applicable rules must be considered.

“A resulting trust, as distinguished from an express trust, is one
implied by law from. the acts and conduct of the parties and the
facts and circumstances which at the time exist and attend the trans-
action out of which it arises.’’ Little v. Mettee, 388 Mo. 1223, 93 S.W.
2d 1000, 1009(8); James v. James, Mo. .Sup., 248 S.W. 2d 623,
627(10).

““As between strangers, a purchase-money resulting trust arises
against the grantee of real property in favor of the payor of the
purchase money unless it was the payor’s intent that no such trust
should arise; but the presumption of a resulting trust is rebuttable
* * * This presumption is based upon the sound principle that,
absent evidence to the contrary, it is not the intent of any such payor
to make a gift to the grantee.’’ Ferguson v. Stokes, Mo. Sup., 269
S.W. 2d 655, 659. And see Parker v. Blakeley, 388 Mo. 1189, 93 S.W.
2d 981, 988; Jankowski v. Delfert, 356 Mo. 184, 201 S.W. 2d 331,
334; James v. James, supra, 248 S.W. 2d 628, 627; Carr v. Carroll,
Mo. Sup., 178 S.W. 2d 435; Decker v. Fittge, Mo. Sup., 276 S.W. 2a
144, 147(2). The rule applies in this state where the purchase-money
is supplied by a child, the ‘‘money so advanced is not presumed to
be a gift, the status of the child being the same as that of a stranger,
at least where no legal obligation rests on the child to support the
parent.’? Adams v. Adams, 348 Mo, 1041, 156 S.W. 2d 610, 614(1) ;
54 Am. Jur. 160, Sec. 205.

On the record presented in this case it clearly appears that at the
time the warranty deed to the property in question was executed and
delivered to respondent’s parents, respondent had paid only $1,000

on the $5,000 purchase price of the property; and that the balance of
the purchase price was paid, not by respondent, but by notes executed
by respondent’s parents and secured by deeds of trust [157] on the
property. There is no evidence that respondent was under any legal
obligation of any kind to pay the balance of the purchase price of the
property. The test of the right to establish a resulting trust is the
true ownership of the consideration upon which the title rests. Purvis
v. Hardin, 343 Mo. 652, 122 S.W. 2d 936, 938(3). Respondent’s
payment on the purchase price, at the time title vested in his parents,
was limited to the $1,000 payment. While the respondent subsequently
paid off the 25 notes secured by the second deed of trust (for a total
of $1,000) and also purchased the $3,000 note and certain interest
notes secured by the first deed of trust, these facts do not aid the
respondent on the issue of a resulting trust. 89 O.J.S. 961, See. 112.
The fact that respondent purchased, rather than paid, the notes se-
eured by the first deed of trust is further evidence that he did not
consider the notes for the balance of the purchase price to be his
personal obligation and he had assumed no unconditional obligation
to pay any of these notes. Adams v. Adams, supra, 156 8.W. 2d 610,
616 (10) ; Jacobs v. Jacobs, Mo. Sup., 272 S.W: 2d 185, 189; 89 C.J.8.
975, Sec. 121. Further, it is well settled that ‘‘a resulting trust must
arise, if at all, at the instant the deed is taken. Unless the transaction
is such that the moment the title passes the trust results from the
transaction itself, then no trust results. It cannot be created by sub-
sequent occurrences.’’? Bender v. Bender, 281 Mo. 478, 220 S.W. 929,
930, and authorities there cited; Hiatt v. Hiatt, Mo. Sup., 168 8.W.
2d 1087; Parker v. Blakeley, supra; Lehr y. Moll, Mo. Sup., 247 S.W.
2d 686; 89 C.J.S. 950, Sec. 102e.

Respondent’s payment of some of the purchase-money notes and
the purchase of others after legal title to the property was vested in
his parents, under the facts shown, was insufficient to give rise to a
resulting trust. Adams v. Adams, supra; Jacobs v. Jacobs, supra;
Clubine v. Frazer, 346 Mo. 1, 189 8.W. 2d 529, 532(12); 89 C.J.S.
951, Sec. 102e; 89 C.J.8. 973, See. 120.

Respondent insists that the facts in Padgett vy. Osborne, supra, are
very similar to the one at bar; and that that case is controlling. The
Padgett case was an action to set aside a conveyance of real estate
as having been made in fraud of creditors. Relief was denied because
there was no proof of fraud and, further, erroneously we believe, on
the theory of a resulting trust. The evidence in that case shows an
express oral trust which was fully performed by a conveyance, which
conveyance was not in fraud of the ecreditor’s rights. The opinion
states the facts as follows: ‘‘It was decided that Frances (Osborne,
defendant) should purchase the property. The family discussed sev-
eral times how the papers should be made out. Due to the fact that
real estate values were uncertain at the time and the possibility of

further declines, or the loss of the property by foreclosure, a deficiency
judgment on the $2,750 note, which conceivably could be collected
of Frances, and Frances’ desire to assure her parents of a home should
something unforeseen oceur and she predecease them, it was agreed
the title should be taken in the names of John F. Osborne and Fannie
E. Osborne, husband and wife. Frances Osborne paid $500 and her
brother George L. advanced the additional $500 to make the $1,000
cash payment. The vendors conveyed by warranty deed, dated Sep-
tember 9, 1938, to ‘John F. Osborne and Fannie B. Osborne, husband
and wife,’ and said grantees executed and delivered their $2,750
purchase price note and deed of trust against said real estate securing
said note. This note was paid by Frances on March 1, 1940. Dorsey
M. testified that his sister Frances asked him to accompany her when
she paid off the note; and she took some money from a safety deposit
vault, and she also had some Government bonds and some cash in her
possession; that they proceeded to the Wilson D. Wood Mortgage
Company’s office where Frances paid the $2,750 note and [158] re-
ceived the note and deed of trust. * * *. Frances purchased many
articles for the household (stoker, refrigerator, carpets etc.), paid
for the repairs on the property, maintained the home and provided
for her parents therein. * * * On July 28, 1944, the mother executed
the deed here attacked, transferring the Van Brunt property to the
daughter, reserving a life estate in herself. The recited consideration
was $1.00 and other valuable considerations. The mother died Feb-
ruary 26, 1947 * * * The evidence on behalf of defendants was
sufficient, if believed, to sustain the finding and judgment (for de-
fendants). * * * When Fannie E. Osborne deeded the property to
Frances Osborne, the purchaser, she executed the trust under which
she held the legal title.”’

While the opinion in the Padgett case proceeds to the theory of a
resulting trust aud perhaps reached a correct result on the facts
stated, no such trust could have resulted therein, except in the pro-
portion that the $500 paid down by Frances Osborne bore to the total
purchase price of the property. To the extent to which the opinion
in that case conflicts with the opinion in this case, it should be over-
ruled.

Respondent’s right, therefore, to a resulting trust is limited to the
payment of $1,000 on the $5,000 purchase price of the property or to
a one-fifth interest in the described real estate. The applicable rule
is‘as follows: ‘“Where one person pays the whole or a part of the
purchase price of land, and the contract or title is taken in the name
of a third person, a resulting trust is created in behalf of the person
paying said purchase money, in proportion to the amount so paid.’”’
Price v. Rausche, Mo. Sup., 186 §.W. 968, 971; Stevenson v. Smith,
189 Mo. 447, 466, 88 S.W. 86; Shelby v. Shelby, 357 Mo. 557, 209 8.W.

2d 896, 899; Decker v. Fittge, supra; Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 454;
89 O.S.S. 975, Trusts, Sec. 122.

Respondent of course is also the owner of a one-fifth interest in
the remaining four-fifths interest in the described property by in-
heritance from his mother and he may have other rights for future
consideration in the partition proceeding. The pleadings and record
in this case are insufficient to determine respondent’s rights, if any,
to an accounting for advancements or to be subrogated to the rights
of the former holder of the notes secured by the second deed of trust.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further pro-
ceedings in. partition not inconsistent with this opinion. All concur.

Huew Mannon, Appellant, v. Wintiam Y. Frick, Stinuman Beary

and Fiwenrry anp Casuauty Company or New York, a Corpora-
tion, Respondents, No. 45192—295 8. W. (24) 158.

Division Two, November 12, 1956.

BR. M. Gifford for appellant.

L. F. Cottey and P. M. Marr for respondents.

[160] EAGER, P. J—The present suit is one for damages, actual
and punitive, in which it is alleged that the defendants wrongfully
and fraudulently conspired to, and did, extort money from the plain-
tiff under a threat of prosecuting him for statutory rape. Defendant
Frick was then the Prosecuting Attorney of Putnam [161] County,
having been appointed shortly prior to the occurrences in question,
and defendant Beary was the Sheriff of that county; the corporate
defendant had executed the sheriff’s bond. The trial court directed
a verdict for the sheriff and the corporate bondsman, and the jury
returned a verdict in favor of defendant Frick. In the view we take
of the case it will not be necessary to review the evidence in detail.
Suffice it to say that defendant Frick testified that he accepted money
from plaintiff in partial settlement of a civil claim for damages for
alleged slander, and that he returned it when he severed his connec-
tions with the prospective plaintiff. In fairness to the plaintiff, who
was 71 years of age at the time of trial, we note that the evidence
in this case did not tend to show that he was guilty of the crime
referred to.

We are met at the outset with a motion to dismiss the appeal
affirm the judgment for the insufficiency of appellant’s brief un-
der Rule 1.08, both in its statement of facts and in the points relied
on. Respondents’ counsel have chosen to stand on that motion and
have filed no brief here on the merits. That practice is in nowise to
be commended and we trust that no other member of the bar will
adopt it. It has certainly not been helpful to the court here. The
statement of facts in appellant’s brief leaves much to be desired;
certain of the points relied on are insufficient under the rule, but
others, which group themselves into two classifications, are considered
sufficient. The motion is overruled, and we shall proceed to consider
those points which we deem properly raised.

Hi The first of these is that the court erred in admitting certain
evidence of the proceedings before a grand jury convened in Feb-
ruary, 1954, in Putnam County, which apparently investigated
charges against these officials. This evidence consisted of: the identifi-
eation of copies of two documents which were produced before the
grand jury and which were subsequently lost, after being taken away
by an Assistant Attorney General; the opinion of the latter that a
signature on the original of one of these documents was that of the
plaintiff; and testimony to the effect that certain other papers were
also produced before the grand jury. The defendant Frick had pro-

duced for the grand jury both of the exhibits which were subsequently
lost, and, of course, they were never returned to him. The official
court reporter, the Assistant Attorney General, defendant Frick, and
one of plaintiff’s former attorneys gave testimony concerning the
lost exhibits and the correctness of one or both of the copies.

Counsel for plaintiff made various and sundry objections to the
use of any and all evidence concerning matters which transpired in
the grand jury room, as violative of the secrecy of such proceedings;
he apparently takes the view that in no event may anyone testify. to
any such matters unless required to do so in court in a subsequent
criminal proceeding. First, we shall examine the applicable statutes;
all references herein are to RSMo, V.A.M.S., unless otherwise speci-
fied. Section 540.110 provides for and sets out the oath to be ad-
ministered to witnesses appearing before a grand jury; therein he or
she swears that he (or she) will not divulge the fact that the matter
or matters in question are being considered or any other fact or thing
there transpiring, ‘‘wnless lawfully required to testify in relation
thereto.’’ Section 540.120 provides a penalty for the violation of that
oath. Section 540.105 provides for the oath of the official reporter,
and does not contain the specific exception of § 540.110. The purport
of § 540.300 is that members of the grand jury may be required by
any court to testify whether the testimony of a witness before such
court is consistent with his or her prior testimony before the grand
jury, and that they may also be required to testify similarly upon
any complaint against a grand jury witness for perjury; § 540.320
provides, in substance, [162] that members of the, grand jury shall
not disclose any evidence given or the names of any witnesses, ‘‘ex-
cept when lawfully required to testify as a witness in relation there-’
to’’ and that they shall not disclose the fact that an indictment has
been found until the defendant has been arrested. A violation of the
last provision is made a misdemeanor.

The reasons for the policy of secreey in connection with grand
jury proceedings are fully discussed in. Vol. VIII, Wigmore on Evi-
dence (8rd Ed.), § 2860. In somewhat less detail, ‘these are generally
said to be: to protect the jurors themselves; to promote a complete
freedom of disclosure; to prevent the escape of a person indicted
before he may be arrested; to prevent the subornation of perjury in’
an effort to disprove facts there testified to; and to protect the reputa-
tions of persons against whom no indictment may be found. 24 Am.
Jur., Grand Jury, §47. Some of these reasons have since been con-
sidered as of somewhat decreased importance, as in Ex parte Welborn,
237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 81, 34; State v. Thomas, 99 Mo. 235, 12 S.W.
643; and, indeed, the statutes themselves have considerably eroded
the strict common law rule.

In the very early case of Tindle v. Nichols (1855), 20 Mo. 326,.the
court held that a grand juryman should not be permitted to testify

in a civil slander suit as to what the defendant said before the grand
jury; this, for the reason that he might only testify to the matters
expressly provided in the statutes, which were then and are now.sub-
stantially the same; further, the court held (when we transpose the
section numbers) that § 540.820 did not broaden the provisions of
§ 540.300, or in other words, that a grand juryman may only testify
to the matters provided in our present § 540.300. It may be that the
court there held that a grand juryman could only testify in a sub-
sequent criminal case. There has been much discussion as to what
this case really means (State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 705, 85 P.
784). That opinion was followed in the cases of Beam v. Link, 27
Mo. 261, and Kennedy v. Holladay, 105 Mo. 24, 16 S.W. 688, neither
of which added anything material by way of discussion. Plaintiff
also cites the cases of State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480, 22 S/W. 463,
State v. Salmon, 216 Mo. 466, 115 S.W. 1106, and Conway v. Quinn,
Mo. App., 168 S.W. 2d 445. The Johnson case involved an effort to
invalidate an indictment by showing irregularities in the grand jury
proceedings; and this, by offering evidence of grand jurymen and
admissions of the prosecuting attorney ; it was‘held that such eviderice,
and also evidence as to the reasons for the voting of ‘the indictment,
could not be received by way of impeachment. Similarly, in the
Salmon case the essential question was whether an indictment was
vitiated by the unauthorized presence of a stenographer, who was
also a witness, and who took notes in the grand jury room and read
them back to the jury. (The statute providing for an official grand
jury reporter was adopted in the Laws of 1951, p. 461. The court held,
on a plea in abatement, that the indictment was invalid; objections
were made to the evidence when offered, but on the appeal the facts
seem to have been conceded (115 8.W., Lc. 1121) and the admissibility
of the evidence was not decided. In the Conway case the court held
that the Judge of the Criminal Court of the City of St. Louis could
not lawfully require a stenographer, designated by the prosecuting
attorney to take notes in the grand jury room, to furnish a transeript
to the court; by the express terms of the statute under which the
stenographer was appointed, -he could only make disclosure to the
prosecuting attorney or by testifying in open court. These cases are
certainly not controlling here, and indeed the factual situations were
so different that they are hardly persuasive on any feature. At best,
they express mere generalities, so far as we are concerned here.
[163] Many of the states have statutes similar, in general, to those
of Missouri. From our examination of the decisions in other states
and of the works of text writers, it is our conclusion that the original
rule of common law secrecy has been substantially modified, not only
by the enactment of statutes, but by court decisions as well. Our
statutes in themselves constitute a limitation of the common law
rule, and an expansion of the right of disclosure. While there is

1208 {|
es

still considerable diversity of opinion on the subject, the weight of
authority seems to be that, since ‘the original rule of secrecy was
adopted to protect and promote the public welfare, the law may,
through its constituted tribunals, dispense with the observance of
secrecy, and in the furtherance of justice require a witness or wit-
nesses to testify to certain of the proceedings before a grand jury;
and that such disclosure may be required either in the general public
interest or in the protection of private rights. Some disclosures are
still generally forbidden as, for instance, the votes of the respective
grand jurymen, and their deliberations or expressions of opinion.
(See § 540.810.) For expressions generally in accord with this view
see the following cases: State v. McPherson, 114 Ia. 492, 87 N.W.
421; State v. Brewster, 70 Vt. 341, 40 A. 1037; State v. Putnam, 53
Or. 266, 100 P. 2; Hinshaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334, 47 N.B. 157; State
v. Brumfiel, 188 Ind. 584, 125 N.H. 40; State v. Campbell, 73 Kan.
688, 85 P. 784; Metzler v. United States (C.A. 9th Cir.), 64 F. 2d
203; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-4,
84 L. Hd. 1129; and see also: Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.), Vol.
VIII, §§ 2360-2368, inclusive; 24 Am. Jur., Grand Jury, §§ 49, 50,
and particularly the annotations in the Cumulative Supplement;
Annotation in 127 A.L.R., pp. 272-312. Some courts have based a
relaxation of the rule, in part at least, upon the fact that the pur-
pose of the grand jury investigation has been accomplished and that
the reason for secrecy no longer exists. 24 Am. Jur., Grand Jury,
§§ 48, 49, pp. 866-7; Metzler v. United States, supra; Wigmore,
supra, § 2362, p. 725. Some courts have held, however, that this cir-
cumstance does not justify a voluntary disclosure. United States v.
Amer. Med. Ass’n. (D.C.), 26 F. Supp. 429. Of course, it is inherent
that a disclosure may not be ordered in contravention of existing
statutes.

It seems also that a broader scope of disclosure is generally per-
mitted, and indeed required, of witnesses who appeared before the
grand jury, than of the grand jurymen themselves. This may be large-
ly on account of existing statutes. See, however: Wigmore, supra,
§§ 2362, 2363; 24 Am. Jur., Grand Jury, § 49, p. 867; and cases col-
lected in the annotation at 127 A.L.R., pp. 276-278. Indeed Wigmore
states (supra, § 2362, p. 725): ‘‘There remain, therefore, on principle,
no eases at all in which, after the grand jury’s functions are ended, the
privilege of the witnesses not to have their testimony disclosed should
be deemed to continuc.’’? We find no statutory restriction in Missouri
concerning disclosure by a grand jury witness, except for the statutory
oath itself. Indeed in some states no secrecy is imposed upon grand
jury witnesses. The oath required of witnesses by § 540.110 contains
the express words ‘‘unless lawfully required to testify in relation
thereto’’; and there is no statute designating certain things which

1209
[|
witnesses may disclose as §§ 540.300 and 540.320 do in the case of grand
jurymen.

In Ex parte Welborn, 237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 31, it was held that
a witness who had testified before a grand jury might be required to
give his deposition, since this was equivalent to being ‘‘lawfully com-
pelled to testify.” We may assume that the taking of the deposition
would, in effect, disclose what the witness had testified to before the
grand jury for we may not presume that he would testify differently.
The court there indicated a considerable relaxation of the old rules
of strict secrecy. [164] On the latter point see also: State v. Thomas,
99 Mo. 235, 12 S.W. 643. In the case of State v. Grady, 84 Mo. 220, 12
Mo. App. 861, the testimony of the prosecuting attorney was received
to show that the grand jury had heard no evidence, although the court
indicated that the testimony of members of the jury could not be re-
ceived for that purpose. Cramer v. Barmon, 126 Mo. App. 54, 103
S.W. 1086, was a civil suit for false arrest and malicious prosecution ;
a grand juror was there held competent to testify as to what the de-
fendant had said before the grand jury, since this bore on the ‘‘consist-
ency’’ of the defendant’s testimony under the statute (§. 540.300).
This decision may run counter to the ruling in the case of Tindle v.
Nichols, 20 Mo. 326. We certainly cannot accept plaintiff’s contention
that the subsequent testimony of a witness before the grand jury must
be limited to criminal cases. See: Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Hd.),
Vol. VIII, §§ 2362, 2363 ; 24 Am. Jur., Grand Jury, § 50, p. 867. More
frequently, however, such testimony is actually required in criminal
cases, from the very nature of the situation. Whether the subsequent
testimony of a grand juryman is now so limited under §§ 540.300 and
540.320 we need not decide.

We note here that the strict rule announced in the case of Tindle v.
Nichols, 20 Mo. 326, has been questioned and criticized. Wigmore,
supra, § 2363, note 7; State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 85 P. 784. If
we assume that it confines all subsequent testimony of a grand juryman
to the occasions mentioned in § 540.300 and to criminal cases, we need
not decide here the propriety of that ruling. We are dealing with
other classes of persons, i.e., witnesses, an Assistant Attorney General,
and the reporter. We prefer here to say, that so far as we are now
concerned, the rule of the Tindle case should be confined strictly to
the facts there disclosed. The disclosure made in the present case
essentially concerned only the identification of copies of two executed
receipts, the originals of which had been used before the grand jury
and had subsequently been lost, and the testimony of a witness that in
his opinion the signature of plaintift on one of these receipts was his
genuine signature. Both of these exhibits had been in defendant
Frick’s possession and had been produced by him before the grand
jury. It was the defendants who offered this testimony to prove up
their secondary evidence. There was certainly no urgent secrecy about

this evidence which, as a matter of public interest, would prevent its
disclosure; the situation did not even involve the repetition of any
oral testimony given before the grand jury. We hold that the evidence
was properly received. We have some question of the propriety of
the action of the reporter in giving to defendant Frick in advance of
the trial a copy of one of these exhibits prepared from her notes. (See
Conway v. Quinn, Mo. App., 168 S.W. 2d 445.) Mr. Frick was not
then acting in his capacity as prosecuting attorney. However, the
copy was furnished, produced, and fully identified at the trial, and
under the circumstances no prejudice to the plaintiff resulted; this,
because the reporter could have been required at the trial of the
present case to read and transcribe her notes and there construct a
similar copy.

Tm all such matters as we have been discussing, much must neces-
sarily be left to the sound discretion of the trial court; indeed, the
burden is not on the witness to say whether he shall testify, but strict-
ly on the trial court to determine whether, under all the circumstances
present, and weighing the reasons for seerecy against the present need
for disclosure, the witness shall be required to testify; in the present
case, though only private rights were involved, we do not think this
discretion was abused.

Hf The remaining assignments which we shall consider are: that
the court erred in not acting, of its own motion, to disqualify the sher-
iff ‘from performance of any act’’ in the case because the sheriff was
aparty; [165] and that it also erred in overruling plaintiff’s motion
to quash the jury panel. These will require a brief statement of addi-
tional facts. The motion in question was heard and overruled by the
Hon. George P. Adams who was assigned by order of this court, made
on Feb. 25, 1955, to hear this case. Motions and amended motions to
dismiss had been filed, and answer was not filed until July 19, 1955, so
we assume that there was no trial setting until approximately that
time. The motion to quash was filed on July 26, 1955, the day before
the trial began; the grounds recited therein were that the sheriff was
a party defendant and that the act of the sheriff in summoning any
juror was illegal and prejudicial. The court heard evidence on that
motion, immediately before the actual trial began. The only witnesses
were the sheriff, Stillman Beary, and the coroner, Charles Fowler. It
there appeared that Mr. Beary had summoned the regular jury panel
in May, 1955; these jurors served and were discharged to appear later
if notified; the sheriff testified that as best he recalled, he had later
notified two of the jurors to appear on July 29th, telling them that-
there would be court that week; he further testified: that he thought
a felony case was to be tried on that date, and that he did not then know
that his case was set for that week, because he thought a motion was
still pending; also, that he had summoned no one since the Special
Judge had been there during the week preceding the trial. (We gather

es 1211
a :

from this evidence that the court then disqualified the sheriff, at least
orally, and instructed the coroner to perform his functions, but no
order of disqualification appears in the transcript.) Some effort was
made on cross-examination to show that the sheriff had summoned more
of the jurors, but that evidence is so vague as to be largely, meaning-
less. Mr. Fowler had summoned all of the regular and alternate jurors
for the trial on instructions from the court.

Counsel for plaintiff insists that the sheviff was disqualified under
§§ 58.190 and 476.080, RSMo, V.A.M.S. because he was a party. The
purport of these statutes is that the coroner shall perform the duties.

_ of the sheriff when the sheriff is a party or is interested or disqualified,
and that, in certain instances the court may appoint a process server.
‘We may concede that a sheriff is not qualified to act in his own case.-
Probably this is not a discretionary matter, as is the disqualification
of a sheriff for interest generally. Sec State v. Stewart, 274 Mo. 649,
204 S.W. 10; State v. McDonald, 342 Mo, 998, 119 S.W. 2d 286; State
v. Boesel, Mo., 64 S.W. 2d 248; State v. Young, 314 Mo. 612, 286
S.W. 29. .

The only thing that the sheriff seems to have done here to cause
complaint was to tell two jurymen, whom he saw in town, to report
for jury duty during the week in question. So far as the transcript
shows this was before any affirmative steps were taken to declare his
disqualification. His action appears to have been entirely innocent,
and indeed, appellant’s counsel states in his brief: ‘‘It is not con--
tended by thé plaintiff that the sheriff exerted any influence or at-
tempted to discuss the matter with any of the members of the
panel * * *.”? Thereafter, the entire panel was regularly summoned
by the coroner for the trial of this case. Under these circumstances
we cannot see that any prejudice resulted to plaintiff. Had he desired
an earlier disqualification he should have taken some action; it does
not appear that the trial court ever had before it a motion to dis-
qualify the shériff ; nor does it appear that plaintiff made any objection
to any individual juror. In fact.he does not now complain of the jury,
collectively or individually. The case of State ex rel. Finch v. Duncan,
195 Mo. App. 541, 193 S.W. 950, is cited; there a deputy sheriff of
Buchanan County served upon his own wife (purportedly both as
deputy sheriff and as an individual) the jurisdictional notice in an in-
sanity proceeding which he himself had instituted in such county;
further, it appeared that the service [166] was made in Jackson
County where she presumably resided. The court there held the
notice void. The action was one in prohibition, and a motion to quash
service of the notice was filed at the very outset. Thus the jurisdiction
of the court was directly attacked. The case was primarily determined
on the question of residence, but the court also held that service by a
deputy outside his county was void, and that the husband, a party

directly interested, could not legally serve the original, jurisdictional
process on which the whole proceeding was based. That case upon its
facts is so different from ours that we think no further discussion is
required. If there was any error in overruling the motion to quash
the panel in the present case, it was certainly not prejudicial.

We are not impressed with the argument that the court should, of
its own motion, have disqualified the sheriff. A special judge had
been ordered to sit in this case; it was hardly incumbent upon him to
search out independently and in advance the relationships, official .
positions or actions of the parties. Such matters should normally be
called to his attention by motion. Moreover, this point was not raised
in the plaintiff’s motion for new trial and is not properly for our
consideration.

Certain of the remaining points made are really immaterial, such
as the one concerning the sufficiency of the petition, and one stating
that public officials are answerable in damages for acts done beyond
their duties, but under a ‘‘cloak of immunity.’’ The statement that.
“the court erred in admitting incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant
evidence prejudicial to the plaintiff,’? means nothing under our rule.

The remaining assignment included in the points and authori-
ties is: ‘‘The Court erred in sustaining the separate motion of defend-
ants Beary and Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York for a
directed verdict at the close of all of the evidence.’’ We deem this
insufficient to raise the question under our Rule 1.08 (d). We assume
that counsel means that he thinks plaintiff made a submissible case
against those defendants, but counsel makes no pretense of outlining
the elements necessary in his proof or claimed to have been proved;
nor is there any pretense of stating otherwise ‘‘why’’ the ruling was
erroneous. Our cases have been very plain in holding that this rule
contemplates a particularization. To this effect see: Haley v. Hd-
wards, Mo., 276 S.W. 2d 158, 162; Berghorn v. Reorganized School
Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W. 2d 573; Holmes v. Simon, Mo., 287
S.W. 2d 877; Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Rideout, 346 Mo. 787, 142
§.W. 24 1055 ; Majors v. Malone, 339 Mo. 1118, 100 8.W. 2d 300; Scott
v. Missouri Pacific RR Co., 833 Mo. 374, 62 S.W. 2d 834; Gelhot v.
Stein, Mo., 174 S.W. ‘2d 174; Aulgur v. Strodtman, 329 Mo. 738, 46
S. W. 2d 172, Here, there was a comparatively long record; no reasons
were given of record by the trial court when it made the questioned
ruling: Counsel has, indeed, added little to this point in his argument,
relying principally therein upon plaintiff’s testimony that defendant
Beary said he received $500. We do not take issue with plaintiff’s
counsel on his assertion that controverted fact issues resting on oral
testimony are for the jury ; we merely say. here that under our rules no
point of error has been sufficiently preserved on the direction of a ver-
dict in favor of the two defendants in question.

Po 1218
P|
Finding no reversible error in any matters properly preserved for
review here, the judgment is affirmed.

Storckman, J., and Broaddus, Special Judge, concur; Leedy, J.,
not sitting. .

Srarz or Missourt, at the Relation of State of Missouri, Srare Park
Bosrv or Missouri, and Joan M. Daron, Attorney General of
Missouri, Relators, v. Josspa T. Tarn, Judge of Thirty-second
Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Respondent, No. 45415—295 S. W.
(2d) 167.

Court en Banc, November 12, 1956.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Aubrey R. Hammett, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, for relators.

Leo A. Politte for respondent.

[167] WESTHUES, J—The Sandy Ford Ranch, Inc., a Missouri
corporation, filed a partition suit in the Cireuit Court of Franklin
County, Missouri, seeking to partition two 40-acre tracts of land.
The defendants named were the State of Missouri, the Missouri State
Park Board, and John M. Dalton, Attorney General [168] of Mis-
souri. It was alleged that plaintiff owned an undivided one-half
interest in one tract and the State of Missouri owned a one-half in-
terest; that plaintiff owned a one-fourth interest in the other tract and
the State of Missouri owned the other three-fourths interest. .

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
this was a suit against the State and since the State had not given its
consent, the suit could not be maintained. The trial judge, Joseph T.
Tate, sustained the motion to dismiss as to the Attorney General, John
M. Dalton, but overruled the motion to dismiss the case as to the State
of Missouri and the State Park Board. The case was set for trial
for May 8, 1956. After the ruling on the motion to dismiss, a proceed-
ing in prohibition was instituted in this court by the defendants seek-
ing to enjoin the respondent, Joseph T. Tate, Judge of the Thirty-
second Judicial Cireuit, from proceeding with the case. This court
issued its preliminary rule in prohibition; respondent fled a return;
-and relators filed a reply. The case was submitted on briefs in this
court on September 28, 1956.

[J The vital question here presented is whether a suit in partition
may be maintained in a case where the State has acquired and owns an
undivided interest in the land sought to be partitioned. It is a well
established rule that a state by reason of its sovereign immunity can-
not, unless it has given its consent, be sued in its own courts. 81
©. J. 8. 1800, See. 214. :

Is a partition suit wherein a plaintiff alleges that the State
owns an undivided interest in the land sought to be partitioned a
suit against the State? A test to determine whether a suit is against
the State was stated in People of Colorado v. District Court, 207 F.
(2d) 50, Le. 56 (2), where the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
said: ‘‘Whether a suit is one against a state is to be determined, not
by the fact of the party named as defendant on the record, but by the
result of the judgment or decree which may be entered.’’ See also
81 0.J.8. 1311, Sec. 216.

It has been ruled that an action for a declaratory judgment which
does not seek any claim or affirmative or coercive relief against the
state is not an. action against the state. Town of Ohio v. People, 35
N.Y.S. (2d) 107, 264 App. Div. 220. In State ex rel. State Tax Com-
mission v. Chavez, 44 N. M. 260, 101 P.(2d) 289, the court held that a
suit by a city to foreclose paving assessment liens against property
owned by the state was not a suit against the state.

A partition suit filed by a cotenant, as authorized by Section 528.030,
RSMo 1949, V.A.MLS., is a proceeding having for its purpose a division
of the land among the tenants in common or if a sale be had, a dis-
tribution of the proceeds among its co-owners. It is a proceeding in
rem and not in personam. 68 C.J.S. 31, Sec. 20 Each owner of an un-
divided interest in an estate owned by tenants in common has the
absolute right to file a partition suit to have the land divided in kind
or if that be impracticable, to have it sold and the proceeds divided
among the owners. See Stewart v. Stewart, 277 S.W.(2d) 322, le.
324 (1, 2), where Judge Stone of the Springfield Court of Appeals re-
viewed the law applicable to partition suits. We approve what was
there said.

A grantee of an undivided interest of one tenant in common acquires
all of his grantor’s rights and interests and also takes the interest in
the land subject to the rights of the other cotenants. 86 C.J.S. 533, Sec.
120¢; see also 86 C.J.8. 370, See. 8b. It follows that at the time the
State of Missouri acquired an undivided interest in the land sought
to be partitioned in this case, it acquired the interest of its grantor,
no more no less. It also follows that the State holds title subject to
the rights of the other cotenant, the plaintiff in this case. If this were
not so, then an [169] owner of an undivided interest in land could
by transferring his interest to the State virtually destroy the value of
the interest of his cotenants. The plaintiff, Sandy Ford Ranch, Inc.,
does not seek any relief against the State. Ownership of an undivided
interest in the State is admitted. All plaintiff.seeks to do by the par-
tition suit is to separate the common interest into distinct portions of
the land to be held by the respective owners in severalty. Or if that
be not practicable, to have the land sold and each cotenant take its
share of the proceeds. .

‘We hold that the present partition suit is not an action against the
State and therefore not barred by the immunity rule. 49 Am. Jur. 807,
See, 94.

Relators cite the case of Kentucky State Park Comm. v. Wilder, 76
§.W.(2d) 4, as holding that a partition suit may not be maintained
against a state. That case so holds. See 76 8.W.(2d) Le. 5 (4). The
court then goes further and suggests a remedy, as follows: ‘‘This,
however, does not mean that if appellees, in fact, have an interest in
the property in controversy, they are wholly without remedy. It
would be an anomalous situation indeed if the commonwealth, by ac-

a . 1217
a

quiring a small interest in real estate, could deprive other owners of
their right of property therein. This would be an absolute power over
the property of the individual, a power which our Bill of Rights de-
clares does not and cannot exist under a republican form of govern-
ment, As appears from the record, the state has taken private property
for public use without compensating some of the joint owners therefor.
Section 18 of our Constitution, which is included in the Bill of Rights,
forbids such a taking and section 242 of the Constitution likewise pro-
vides that just compensation shall be made for private property taken,
injured, or destroyed for public use. Under these express provisions,
an appropriate action will lie against the commonwealth’ as well as
against corporations or individuals for damages growing: out of the
taking, injuring, or destroying of private property for public pur-
poses. ’”

‘We do not consider the reasoning and the result reached in that case
to be sound. Is not a suit for damages wherein a state is named a
defendant an action against the state? We deem it a better rule for
preserving the rights of all the co-owners of land to permit a suit in
partition to be maintained even if the State has in some way acquired
an undivided interest therein. In such a suit, the interests of all par-
ties are protected and preserved ; no judgment can be entered against
any of the cotenants; therefore no judgment can be entered against
the State. It is simply a suit to divide the property among the co-
owners.

Hl It follows that our preliminary rule in prohibition should
be and is hereby quashed. All concur. .

Frora B. Trrornsperry, Respondent, v. Stare Deparrment or Pusnic
Heats anp Wenrarn, Appellant, No. 45416—295 8. W. (2d) 372.

Court en Banc, November 12, 1956.

John M. Dalton, Attorney General, and Harld L. Volkmer
sistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Ee . tag

Claude T. Wood for respondent. : '

[373] HYDE, J.—This is an appeal from the judgment of the Cir-
euit Court of Camden County reversing and remanding for redeter-
mination the order of the Director of the Department of Public Health
and Welfare (hereinafter called Director) removing Flora B, Thorns-
berry (hereinafter called claimant) from old age assistance rolls.
The Springfield Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with di-
rections to affirm the Director’s order, two of the judges concurring
only in the result and stating that they believed some of the findings

were arbitrary and unreasonable. (Thornsberry v. State Department
of Public Health and Welfare, 285 8S. W. 2d 77.) The case was trans-
ferred here on application of claimant.

Claimant had been on the rolls since 1938, receiving $44.00 per
month, and. was removed February 8, 1954, Claimant was 85, crippled
from a paralytic stroke, and lived in Richland with her daughter, Mrs.
Fay Thomas, whose husband died in 1944 leaving her with two children
(claimant’s grandchildren) to support. In 1954 Mrs. Thomas’ daugh-
ter. was 16, a junior in the Richland High School, and her son was 21,
a third year engineering student at Missouri University. Mrs. Thomas
owned the house in which they lived; and she was employed by the
Richland Municipal Utilities. Investigation was begun by the Division
of Welfare (hereinafter called Division) toward removing claimant
from the rolls when it was learned that Mrs. Thomas received a salary
increase of $25.00 commencing in 1954 and that Old Age and Sur-
vivor’s Insurance of $18.80 per month was being received for her
minor daughter because of her father’s death. The reason given for
the Division’s action of February 8, 1954 was that ‘‘income from em-
ployment of daughter (of claimant) * * * is sufficient to meet all
expenses of the entire household group’’. This action was based on a
budget prepared by a case worker, showing three members of the
household and considering the son self-supporting. After claimant
appealed the budget was revised to consider a household of four, but
including in the family income the son’s earnings from summer em-
ployment. These budgets, claimant’s evidence as to income and ex-
penses, and the Director’s finding of facts, are set out in the opinion
of the Court of Appeals and we adopt them as a part of this opinion.
Other facts will be mentioned in connection with the rulings herein-
after made.

Hl The Director’s conclusion from the facts found was that “there
is sufficient income in the home to meet the needs of the family of claim-
ant’s daughter and to furnish [874] claimant a subsistance com-
patible with decency and health.’’ Claimant contends this decision is
arbitrary and unreasonable on two grounds, namely that the Director
used and applied standard budget items without regard to the actual
need of the family and that he refused to consider the needs of the son
while attending Missouri University. These were the grounds stated
by the Circuit Court for reversing’ the Director’s order. The Cireuit
Court, as does claimant, relied on Hagy v. State Department of Public
Health & Welfare, Mo. App., 259 8. W. 2d 101 as holding that stand-
ard budget items could not be used. Although, in that case, there.is
criticism of the use therein of the standard item for food (which criti-
cism really seems to involve failure to allow for transportation) the
real basis of that decision was that ‘‘the decision of the director was
arbitrary and uireasonable in following the budget prepared by the
case worker and ignoring the undisputed facts in this case.’’ As we

read the Hagy opinion, most of the undisputed facts concerned the
amount of income involved, which was overestimated (259 S. W. 2d,
1 103), although taxes, repairs and some other items were listed in the
budget as less than they actually were. In any event, Section 208.010
(statutory references are to RSMo. and V.A.M.S.) has been amended.
since the decision in the Hagy case (Laws 1953, p. 644) so that it now
contains the following provision: ‘‘* * * The amount of benefits when
added to all other income, resources, support and maintenance shall
provide such persons with reasonable subsistence compatible with de-
cency and health in accordance with standards develéped by the Divi-
sion of Welfare. * * *”” This italicised clause added by this amend-
ment unquestionably provides the authority to develop and use reason-
able standards for some usual essential expense items such as food and
clothing. .

The reason for granting such authority has been pointed out by the
Supreme Court of Washington in thus stating the problem of admin-
istering old age assistance: ‘‘In essence it is the problem of meeting,
within the limits of a fixed fund established by biennial appropriations,
the varying public assistance needs of an unpredictable number of
recipients. The fund is static, but the number of recipients and the
needs of each vary as they are affected by the impact of constantly
changing economic and social factors. Not only must the administra-
tive system established by the legislation cope with this problem, but
it must do so in such manner that public assistance will be rendered on
a fair and uniform basis, without undue delays, and within reasonable
limits as to administrative expense.

“It is very evident that the desired results could be achieved only
by conferring upon the administrative agency a large measure of power
to find facts, establish standards and exercise discretion, controlled
only by very general statements of legislative policy. This allows for
the ascertaining and utilization of information which could not possibly
be available to the legislature or people generally. It also makes pos-
sible the adjustment, from time to time, of the over-all program and
its application to certain categories and situations, to take into account
changing case loads, variations in average income and living require-
ments as affected by time, geographical location and other factors, and
current prospects as to the sufficiency of funds.’”’ (Senior Citizens
League v. Department of Social Security, 228 P. 2d 478, 489.)

Review in this case is on the record of the proceedings had be-
fore and certified by the Director. (Sec’s. 208.100 (4) and 208.110).
Reversal and remand to the Director is authorized by Sec. 208.100 (5)
if his decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. (The only ground
claimed herein.) We have held that only if the Director’s decision is
not based on substantial evidence, can his findings of facts and order
based thereon .be characterized as arbitrary or unreasonable and his
determination [875] reversed for that reason. (Ellis v. State De-

|
| partment of Public Health & Welfare, Mo. Sup., 285 S. W. 2d 634 and
cases cited.) Therefore, the only question to be determined herein is

whether the findings and order are supported by substantial evidence.
The Division has Rule 47 (offered in evidence herein) concern-

ing budgets which is as follows: ‘‘Hach budget shall include provi-
sions in an amount per month as established by the Division of Welfare
for the following items which are determined to be essential in accord-
ance with rules and regulations 48 to 61 inclusive: food, clothing,
personal expense, school expense, life insurance, household incident-
als, transportation, medical and dental expense, shelter, fuel, light,
refrigeration, water, and special items.’’? The standard item used in
the budgets in this case covered the first three listed in Rule 47; and
the testimony of Mrs. Thomas did not indicate that the standard
estimate for these was unreasonable. However, the standard item for
school expense of fifty cents per month ($6.00 per year) seems subject
to the criticism made of it in the separate concurring opinion in the
Court of Appeals (285 8. W. 2d, Le. 86) since the Division’s evidence
was that it was not bound by that amount for a highschool student
but could allow true expenses if they were reasonable. Neverthe-
less, in making the budget, no effort was made to determine what the
true highschool expense was. As to shelter, the only items considered
were real estate taxes and fire insurance premiums, allowing nothing
for repairs and maintenance, which was allowed even in the Hagy case.
Although Rule 47 mentions medical and dental expense, the evidence
indicates a policy not to include it unless a member of the family is
under treatment at the time the budget is made. While the estimate
of expenses made by Mrs. Thomas was apparently greater than actual
expenditures (since they amounted to more than the family income
although there were no unpaid bills because they got along on what
they received) nevertheless, there were some inaccuracies in the budgets
prepared by the Division. In particular, the salary of Mrs. Thomas
was overestimated by erroneously considering that she was paid $100.00
every two weeks when her salary was actually $200.00 per month
($196.00 after FICA tax) paid on the first and fifteenth of each month.
Consideration of the above matters certainly shows that the authorized
20% Income Margin item, for expenses not allowable in the budget,
did not exist. We have not considered the claimed $16.00 earnings of
the granddaughter because this was not shown to be regular continu-
ing income. (See Sec. 208.010 as to irregular, casual or unpredictable
income.) Furthermore, the Division offered in evidence Rule 46.1, as
follows: ‘‘In Old Age Assistance cases, all income of the following
persons who are in the household shall be considered in determining
whether the applicant or recipient is in need, and if so, the amount of
that need: applicant or recipient; spouse of the applicant or recipient ;
father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, and spouse of the father,
mother, son, daughter, brother, or sister (so long as the father, mother,

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son, daughter, brother, or sister to whom spouse is married continues
to be a member of the household.)’’ This says nothing about consider-
ing income of a grandchild and in Achor v. State Social Security
Commission, Mo. App., 191 S. W. 2d 259 it was held to be arbitrary
and unreasonable to consider the earnings of an adult grandchild
(living at home) as a resource of the applicant when they were not
contributed to the family.

| | However, what really makes the difference between income suffi-
cient to meet the needs of the family of claimant’s daughter and claim-
ant, and insufficient income for both purposes, is whether Mrs. Thomas
was using such an amount of her income to aid her son in completing
his [876] education at the University so as to have left an insufficient
amount for her family and claimant. This matter was not even con-
sidered by the Division or the Director; but instead they only con-
sidered and used a standard allowance for one of his age living: at
home with the family and contributing his summer earnings to the
family. The obligation of an adult child to support a parent is a moral
and not a legal obligation. (Howlett v. Social Security Comm., 347
Mo. 784, 149 8. W. 2d 806.) We thus commented on this obligation in
the Howlett case: ‘‘The moral duty of the child to support his parents
is conditioned on his financial ability and on the presence or absence
of a paramount duty to support his wife and child. Neither the courts
nor any executive agency of government is competent to investigate
and determine all of those delicate family relationships and moral du-
ties here involved. The enforcement of the duty must, therefore, be
left to the sanctions of religion and the persuasive force of public
opinion.’’

We held in the Howlett case (149 8. W. 2d, Le. 812) that our statute,
now See. 208.010 (6), must be construed as ‘‘denying assistance to
otherwise qualified persons who are receiving periodically gratuities
which enable them to live in decency and health.’’ This is not a case,
like the Howlett case, where a child was contributing to the support
of a parent and sought to have the State relieve him by granting old
age assistance. The question here is whether claimant, who had been
receiving state assistance, would receive gratuities from her daughter
to replace it. This depends both on what her daughter is financially
able to do and what she is willing to do with such resources as she has.
There does not seem to be any question about the fact that Mrs. Thomas
did to some extent provide part of the money for her son’s education
at the University. Her testimony was that his expenses amounted to
$90.00 per month ($45.00 for board and room, $20.00 for tuition, books
and laboratory fees and other expenses of $25.00) and the evidence of
the Division shows ihat he made less than half of it. There is no claim
that this was an unreasonable amount and the other half had to come
from Mrs. Thomas. If she used her income for that purpose it would
appear that she did not have enough left for her mother’s support.

1224 |
a

Certainly she had the right to make her own choice, as to which of
these purposes (both of which were moral obligations) she would apply
her income and the Division could not make it for her. The Division’s
evidence showed that its budget was first made on the theory that the
son was in the University under the G.I. program so that Mrs. Thomas
did not have to pay any part of his expense. However, when this was
found to be incorrect, he was included in a new budget and considered
as living at home, using his income from summer employment for the
family, which was not the actual fact even on the Division’s evidence.
We recognize that a claimant has the burden of proof and that the
fact finding agency passes upon the credibility of witnesses and may
decide a claim solely upon a finding of lack of credibility of uncon-
tradicted and wnimpeached testimony in support of the claim. (Hllis
v. State Department of Public Health & Welfare, Mo. Sup., 285 8. W.
2d 634, 640.) However, the Director’s decision in this case indicates
that it was not based on credibility of claimant’s evidence and, in. fact,
the Division’s evidence was all based on information obtained from
caimant’s daughter, much of which was verified by the case worker.
Therefore, since it appears the budgets were made on mistake of facts
as to the available income of Mrs. Thomas (on her pay being on a two
weeks basis instead of twice a month) and as to her son being self-
supporting (in the G.I. Program), ignoring the part of his University
expense paid by her, and leaving out such items as repairs and mainte-
nance and her daughter’s actual highschool expense, we think it may
properly be held that the [877] decision is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed and the cause is re-
manded to the Director of the Department of Public Health and Wel-
fare for redetermination of the issues. All concur.

Connm Pizzo, Respondent, v. Don F. Pizzo, Jon Pizzo and Ross Pizzo,
Appellants, No. 44762—295 8. W. (2d) 877.

Court en Banc, November 12, 1956.

for appellant.

Edward H. Tenney, Jr., and Joseph J Howard for respondent;
Tenney, Dahman & Smith and Cook, Fairfield, Howard & Murphy of
counsel,

[378] DALTON, J.—On March 81, 1954, plaintiff instituted an
action in four counts against defendant Don F. Pizzo in the cireuit
court of St. Louis County. In count one (on the theory of a resulting
trust) plaintiff sought to be declared the owner of an undivided one-
half interest in particularly described real estate and personal property
located in St. [379] Louis County; in count two she asked for an
order for partition of the described property ; in count three she asked
damages for breach of promise of marriage; and in count four she
asked actual and punitive damages for personal injuries resulting
from a assault and battery. Thereafter, on April 12, 1954, defendant
transferred the deseribed real estate by warranty deed to Joe Pizzo
and Rose Pizzo, his uncle and aunt, with whom he resided. On May 7,
1954, plaintiff filed an amended petition joining Joe Pizzo and Rose
Pizzo as additional parties defendant and she added a fifth count in
which she asked the court to set aside the said conveyance to Joe Pizzo
and Rose Pizzo on the ground that the conveyance was without con-
sideration and in fraud of creditors. Defendant Don F. Pizzo filed a

Po 1227
a

general denial as to all of the counts of the amended petition, while

the other defendants filed an answer to count five admitting the con-

veyance to them, but denying other allegations.

On November 20, 1954, the record shows: ‘‘Trial by court on
counts 1, 2 and 5 of plaintiff’s petition.’? Thereafter, the court filed
a document showing its findings on each of said counts. Hach para-
graph disposing of a count recites that the ‘‘Finding, Judgment and
Decree’? is in favor of plaintiff on the particular count and against the
defendants and it sets forth the relief granted, all in accordance with
the relief asked in counts one, two and five of the amended petition.
Immediately thereafter the record shows a ‘‘Memorandum of Court’’
setting out the court’s finding of particular facts, the court’s theory
of the case and the authorities relied upon. On December 27, 1954, an
order was entered of record entitled ‘‘Decree of Court.’’ The ‘record
under this heading shows the court’s detailed findings of fact on each
of the three counts and the particular relief granted. All of the issues
raised by the pleadings in counts one, two and five are fully disposed
of in favor of plaintiff and all costs are taxed against the defendants.
After motions for new trial were filed and overruled, the defendants
filed notice of appeal. ‘For convenience, we shall continue to refér to
respondent as plaintiff. ~

Hl The issue has not been raised by the parties, but it is our duty
to determine whether a separate, final appealable judgment has been
entered on counts one, two and five of the petition. Hammonds v.
Hammonds, 364 Mo. 517, 263 S.W. 2d 348, 350(4) ; Deeds v. Foster,
Mo. Sup., 235 8. W. 2d 262, 265(1). We think this issue turns entirely
upon the construction to be placed upon Supreme Court, Rule 3.29,
which we shall presently consider.

The right of appeal is purely statutory. Tucker v. Miller, 363 Mo.
820, 253 S.W. 2d 821, 823(1); Stith v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,
363 Mo, 442, 251 S.W. 2d 693, 695(1). Further, Section 512.020 RSMo
1949, permits an appeal ‘‘from any final judgment in the case’’; that
is, from ‘‘the final determination of the right of the parties in the
action.’? See Section 511.020 RSMo 1949. While an appeal is au-
thorized by Section 512.020 RSMo 1949, ‘‘from any interlocutory
judgments in actions of partition which determine the rights of the
parties,’’ in the case under consideration the question of plaintift’s
right, title and interest in the described property was settled by the
determination of the issues raised in counts one and five of the peti-
tion, which determined plaintiff’s ownership of a one-half interest
in the property sought to be partitioned and set aside the purported
conveyance thereof. °

The general rule is that a judgment to be final and appealable must
dispose of all parties and all issues in the case and leave nothing for
future determination. Bennett v. Wood, Mo. Sup., 239 8.W. 2d 825,
327 (3) ; State ex rel. Thompson v. Terte, 357 Mo. 229, 207 S.W. 2d 487,

1228 |
es :

489(2) ; Deeds v. Foster, supra. In the Deeds case it was said: ‘‘The
rule applies except for separate final judgments [380] expressly or-
dered under Supreme Court Rule 3.29.’’ (Italics ours). The purpose
of the general rule is to prevent the piecemeal presentation of cases
on appeal, or in detached portions. Weir v. Brune, 364 Mo. 415, 262
S.W. 24 597. Further, Section 511.130 RSMo 1949, provides that
“only one final judgment shall be given in the action,’’ but this section
has been modified by Supreme Court Rule 3.29. And see Sections
507.040, and 507.050 RSMo 1949.

Supreme Court Rule 3.29: provides: ‘“When a separate trial of any
claim * * * is ordered in any case and a jury trial thereof is had,
the separate judgment entered upon the verdict therein shall be
deemed a final judgment for the purposes of appeal within the mean-
ing of Section 126 (now Section 512.020 RSMo 1949). When a
separate trial of any such claim is had before the court without a jury,
the court may order a separate judgment entered which shall be
deemed a final judgment for the purposes of appeal within the mean-
ing of Section 126; or the court may enter a separate interlocutory
judgment and order it held in abeyance until other claims, counter-
claims or third party claims in the case are determined, in which
event appeal shall not lie until a complete judgment disposing of all
claims is entered. In case a separate final judgment is entered the
court may stay its enforcement until other or all final judgments in
the cause are entered and may prescribe such conditions as are neces-
sary to secure and protect the relative rights of all parties.’’ (Italics
ours).

With regard to non-jury trials, the rule clearly gives the court dis-
cretion to order a separate judgment on the separate nou-jury trial
of a claim and provides such separate judgment shall be deemed a
final judgment for the purposes of appeal. Carr, Missouri Civil
Procedure, Vol. IT, Sec. 860, p. 47. The discretion to ‘‘order a separate
judgment”’ is a discretion to be exercised by the trial court and not by
the appellate court. It is of vital importance to litigants and their
counsel for the purpose of appeal to be able to know when a final,
appealable separate judgment has been entered. See Supreme Court
Rule 3.24, Its importance to litigants is well illustrated by the de-
cision in Readenour v. Motors Insurance Corporation, Mo. App., 287
S.W. 2d 185, decided by the Kansas City Court of Appeals on Jan-
uary 9, 1956, holding that the trial court’s decision of the separate
trial of an equity count of a petition requesting reformation of an
insurance contract (relief which was important to the trial of the
second count at law to recover on the policy), was a separate judg-
ment, final and appealable and, therefore, not reviewable on a sub-
sequent appeal after final judgment on the second count. On ap-
plication of defendant-appellant, that case has been removed to this
court for final determination. And see Winn v. Farmers Mutual Fire

Insurance Co., 83 Mo. App. 123. The mere fact that the cireum-
stances in a particular case are such that the court may find it
necessary to separately try the issues of a particular count in equity,
or in a jury waived case at law, does not mean that the disposition
made by the court of the issues of that count is immediately in-
tended as a final appealable separate judgment within the meaning
of the Rule 8.29, however, we are here only concerned with the par-
ticular judgment entered in this case on counts one, two and five.

In Amitin v. Izard, Mo. App., 252 S.W. 2d 635, 640(1), the court
considered an order for a separate trial to be an order for a separate
final judgment. The opinion in Weir v. Brune, Mo. Sup., 256 8.W.
2d 810, 811, lends credence to this view. And see Lightfoot v. Jennings,
363 Mo. 878, 254 S.W. 2d 596, and Harper v. St. Joseph Lead Co.,
361 Mo. 129, 283 S.W. 2d 835. In the case of Mothershead v. Milfeld,
361 Mo. 704, 236 S.W. 2d 348, 344(1), there was a stipulation and
special circumstances attending a separate non-jury trial and a sepa-
rate judgment on the first count of a petition from which this court
reached the [881] conclusion that the judgment as to title, which was
the underlying issue in the other untried counts, was intended to
finally adjudicate that issue and it was considered a separate, final
judgment for the purpose of appeal. And see Weir v. Brune, supra,
262 S.W. 2d 597, 599(3), wherein it is stated: ‘‘Broadly, our rule
3.29 authorizes the entry of a final judgment, in an appealable sense
under Section 512.020, when a separate trial of any ‘claim, counter-
elaim, or third party claim’ <s ordered im any case.’’ (Italics ours).
Apparently, it is not possible to reconcile these divergent holdings
and general statements on the theory that some are in jury cases and
others non-jury cases. However, in this case we are seeking to de-
termine whether the authority to order a separate judgment has been
exercised in this non-jury case, where the court did not designate
the judgment a separate judgment, nor indicate that the judgment
was intended either as final or interlocutory.

Should the judgment disposing of all of the issues presented by
counts one, two and five be deemed final and appealable, prior to the
disposition of the other counts of the petition, which counts purport
to state independent causes of action at law? This is a multiple cause
of action case. It is apparent that the disposition of counts three and
four is not dependent in any respect upon the outcome of or final dis-
position of counts one, two and five, yet counts three and four of the
petition do represent further controversies between the same plaintiff
arid defendant Don F, Pizzo, all of which controversies are related
as hereinafter stated.

In this case, as stated, there was no express order for a separate
judgment on counts one, two and five and, while these counts were in-
fact tried separately from the other counts, such trial clearly resulted
because counts one and five asked affirmative relief which only a

court of equity could grant and the decision on count two depended
upon the outcome of counts one and five. However, the court did enter
a separate judgment disposing of all the issues presented by counts
one, two and five and only plaintiff and defendant Don F. Pizzo are
interested in the remaining counts.

Since thé plaintiff’s right to relief on count two was dependent
upon her obtaining the relief prayed for in counts one and five, con-
sidering the record as a whole, it is apparent that only one judgment
was intended to dispose of these three counts and that such judgment
was intended as a judgment separate and apart from any relief that
might thereafter be given on the two remaining counts. The record
indicates the exercise of discretion in favor of a separate judgment.
and nothing appears to indicate an intention that the judgment
should be interlocutory or that its enforcement should be stayed, ‘‘un-
til other or all final judgments in the cause are entered.’’? In such
situation we think the separate judgment entered on these counts
should be construed as an order for a separate judgment within the
meaning of Supreme Court Rule 3.29 and, accordingly, it must ‘‘be
deemed a final judgment for the purposes of appeal within the mean-
ing of?’ Section 512.020 RSMo 1949. If the trial court wanted this
judgment to be interlocutory or held in abeyance, or its enforcement
stayed, it should have so provided.

We are next confronted by respondent’s motion to dismiss the
appeal for alleged violations of Supreme Court Rule 1.08 in that ap-
pellants’ statement is brief and inadequate and there are few refer-
ences to the transcript of the evidence. The statement is subject to
severe criticism in the respects mentioned, but in view of the con-
clusions we have reached we will rule the case on its merits.

‘We have jurisdiction of the appeal because title to real estate is
directly involved. The decree sets aside a conveyance and sustains
(on the theory of a resulting trust) plaintiff’s claim to ownership
[882] of a one-half interest in the described real estate. Article V,
Section 8, Constitution of Missouri 1945.

Since plaintiff relies upon her personal relationship with defendant
Don F. Pizzo (hereinafter referred to as Don) as corroborative of
her testimony and the defendants rely upon the same facts as ma-
terially affecting plaintiff’s credibility and the weight and value of
her testimony, we shall state these facts in some detail.

Plaintiff was fifty-one years of age at the time of the trial and Don
was thirty-seven. They had been married in January 1938 and
divorced in July 1947. Thereafter, in 1948, they began having dates
and Don asked plaintiff to re-marry him and they were engaged. He
proposed that they go to Louisville, Kentucky for the purpose of
getting married and to see the Kentucky Derby. Plaintiff agreed and
Don told plaintiff’s daughter by a prior marriage that they were going
to Kentucky to get married. When plaintiff and Don reached Louis-

ville, they registered at the hotel as man and wife and resumed.
marital relations. The following morning Don refused to go ahead
with the marriage, but he agreed to do so later on. These promises
were to be repeated at various times during the next five years. The
parties remained in Kentucky a few days and then returned to St.
Louis and by agreement announced to their friends and relatives
that they had re-married while in Kentucky. Plaintiff claimed that
she was tricked into going to Kentucky, but in any event the parties
continued to reside together as husband and wife after that time, ex-
cept for brief intervals, until September 1953, when they were finally
separated after quarrelling over Don’s attentions to another woman,
whom he subsequently married.

Don testified that the parties had resumed sexual relations within
six weeks after their divorce; that he had never at any time promised
to remarry the plaintiff, but that she had requested re-marriage on
many occasions. He admitted that they attended the Kentucky Derby
together and, on their return, agreed to and did announce to their
friends and relatives that they had been married; and that, there-
after, they continued to live together as man and wife, except for brief
separations, until their final separation in September 1953. He denied
that he told plaintiff’s daughter they were going to Kentucky to be
married. After their final separation, Don wrote plaintiff a letter
wherein he told her he loved her and blamed their difficulties on his
ill health. The letter was signed ‘‘Your Husband.’’

From August 1950 to January 1952, Don was in the U.S. Navy.
During this time Don made a claim for dependents and plaintiff re-
eeived an allotment from the government. Don was stationed in
Florida and plaintiff followed him there and they lived together in
the same quarters. Don, however, took the allotment checks and sent
them to St. Louis where they were deposited in his personal account
in the Baden bank. Don admitted making the claim for dependents
and securing an allotment from the government during this period.
In Florida, plaintiff had a ‘‘pass to and from Naval Station, Green
Cove Springs, Florida,’’ as Don’s wife.

On one occasion during 1949, plaintiff saw Don in company with
a young lady at a tavern. When plaintiff subsequently protested, she
was beaten up and kicked on the ankles and the parties separated for
atime. Don, however, denied that he ‘‘beat her up.’’ Thereafter, early
in 1950, Don contacted plaintiff and offered to buy a house and
furnish it, if plaintiff would come back to him. He agreed that he
would marry her, ‘‘after we get the house.’’ He told her, however,
that he would have to have some money for a down payment. She
said she knew he didn’t have any money and so she agreed to furnish
the money she had gotten for their furniture after the prior divorce.
He was going to buy the house for her and take title as husband and
wife. She didn’t know that it couldn’t be done when they were [883]

not married. However, the parties selected a lot in a new subdivision
in St. Louis County. The price for the house, when completed, was
to be $12,800. Don admitted that plaintiff accompanied him when
the property was finally selected, and that both went to the real estate
office when the contract for the house was signed, but he denied that
he told plaintiff he was buying the property for her. He said she
went along for the ride and he claimed that she knew he was buying
the house ‘‘alone.’’ The real estate company issued a receipt, dated
January 8, 1950, in part as follows: ‘Received of Don F. Pizzo and
Connie, his wife, Twenty-five and no/100 Dollars ($25.00). As earnest
money deposit and part purchase money for thie purchase of property
located at 9246 Astoria, Lot 102 Hathaway Hills #2. An additional
$975.00 earnest money is to be paid on or before 1-22-50 at which
time sales contract, etc. are to be executed * * *.”? This receipt
further shows the husband’s full name, residence, place of employ-
ment and his income per month and also his wife’s (Connie’s) place
of employment and income. The receipt shows purchase price $12,-
800.00 and it was signed by the real estate company and Don Pizzo,

Plaintiff testified that, while she was in the real estate office, she
signed a couple of papers for the house, but she did not read them,
and, after that, she didn’t know what happened. She said, however,
that-Don decided that another house in the subdivision was more
desirable and she viewed the house and agreed to the exchange (note
the amended receipt). She said they ‘‘switched’’ the down payment
to the second house. Later, Don told her she was not to sign the
papers, she did not know why.

It will be noted that the additional payment was to be made and
another contract signed on or before January 22, 1950. On January
17, 1950, plaintiff withdrew $1010.71 from her account in the Bank
of St. Louis. She testified that, within two days thereafter, she gave
this money to Don for the down payment on the property which they
had selected. On January 20, 1950, the real estate company issued a
receipt to Don for $975.00, ‘‘as earnest money’’ on the property in
question, located at 9246 Astoria Hills. However, the sale contract
for the property, like the receipt for the $25.00, was signed by Don
FP. Pizzo alone. On the sales contract the real estate company
acknowledged the receipt of $1000 ‘‘as earnest money on account of
above sale January 16, 1950.’’’ The contract further provided for a
total cash payment of $3800, with a $9000, 20 year, G. I. loan. On
the ‘‘Harnest money contract Information’’ sheet, dated 1-16-1950,
the words ‘‘and Connie Pizzo, wife,’ have been stricken with a pen.
There was evidence the contract date was incorrect. All subsequent
papers connected with the purchase of the particular property appear
to have been signed by Don F. Pizzo, and the title deed was issued
to him. Don testified that he told the real estate salesman he was
single, He said he first paid $1000 on the property and, later, $2905.50

Es . 1233
|

to complete the down payment; and that he, subsequently discharged
the $9000 loan on the property. There was evidence that the $2905.50
was paid to the real estate company on April 14, 1950, when the 20
year loan took effect, and there was evidence showing the payment was
made April 19, 1950. Plaintiff said Don told her he borrowed the
$2905.50 from his mother. As to when plaintiff gave Don ‘‘that
$1000,” Don said ‘‘it was around the period we were buying the
house.’’ He didn’t know whether it was $1000, he guessed it ‘‘was
part’’ of the $1000 he paid to the real estate company on January
20, 1950. He was also ‘‘pretty sure,’’ he had used part of the money
from the sale of a lot in Normandy Park. The latter lot was acquired
by Don and plaintiff, as husband and wife, in 1945 before the divorce,
and it was later sold by them on April 18, 1950 after the divorce, and
they executed and acknowledged the deed as husband and wife. The
Normandy Park lot was sold for $1500.

[384] Plaintiff first knew that Don had taken the title to the prop-
erty in his own name when the deed was mailed to the house several
months later. She protested, but there was little she could then do
about the matter, as they were living together and their friends and
relatives believed they were married. She did not loan Don any
money. She gave it to him to put on the house they were buying. She
never asked to get it back and didn’t expect to get it back. Don also
testified that she had not asked for her money back. The parties later
purchased furniture for the house and the bill of sale for the furniture
was made to Don and he made the monthly payments thereon. She
didn’t question it. Plaintiff left Don and moved out of the house
after ‘‘the other woman in the case’’ telephoned her, told her she
didn’t own the house and wasn’t married to Don and ordered her to
get out,

Don testified that he transferred the house and lot to his uncle
and aunt in April 1954 upon the down payment of $2500 in cash in
big bills, tens, twenties and fifties, some hundreds, and that he kept
the money in a drawer behind his clothes at his aunt’s house. The
balance was paid by note and deed of trust on which payments were
being made to him. The total consideration for the sale does not ap-
pear from the record presented here, but the deed shows U.S. Revenue
Stamps for $14.85. Rose Pizzo said they paid $2500 in cash as a down
payment on the property; that the matter was handled by the real
estate company; and that the balance was being paid by check at
$71.50 per month. Mrs. Pizzo admitted she had a checking account,
but she made the down payment in cash, she had the money at home.
Joe Pizzo testified to signing the note and deed of trust for the balance
of the purchase price of the house. As to the checks received by Don
from his aunt on the note, Don said he gave them to his girl friend
to deposit in the bank in her name, but they both had money in the

[| : .

account. He stated that he deposited money in this account after he
sold the house to his uncle and aunt.

The court found that plaintiff and Don had been married and
divoreed; that Don had subsequently proposed re-marriage; that on
reaching Louisville he had refused to go through with the marriage,
but had promised to marry plaintiff later on; that the parties re-
turned and said they had been married and they had lived together ;
that, after a subsequent separation, Don requested plaintiff to return
to him and promised to buy a house ‘‘for them’’; that plaintiff con-
tributed approximately $1000 toward the purchase of the selected
property, upon Don’s promise that title would be taken in both their
names; that after obtaining plaintiff’s money, ‘‘defendant, Don
Pizzo, without plaintift’s knowledge or consent decided to take title
to the property in his own name alone, which he accomplished very
easily because of plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of such transactions’’;
that a trust resulted in plaintiff’s favor and plaintiff became the
equitable owner of a one-half interest in the property described in
plaintiff’s said petition; that, on learning that title had not been
taken as agreed, plaintiff protested, but the parties continued to live
together; that, after the present action was filed, Don conveyed the
real estate to Joe Pizzo and Rose Pizzo, his wife; that said grantees
were not innocent purchasers for value; that the conveyance was in
fraud of plaintiff’s rights and to defeat her claim; that the grantees
had constructive knowledge of plaintiff’s claim; that the grantees
took the property ‘‘subject to plaintiff’s equitable interest in the
property which was created as a resulting trust in her favor’; that
the grantees were the owners of a one-half interest in the property
subject to an unpaid encumbrance .held by Don; and that plaintiff
was the owner of the other one-half interest free and clear from the
encumbrance. The decree contains the necessary provisions to grant
the relief prayed; it divests Joe Pizzo and Rose Pizzo of a one-half
interest in the property and declares such one-half interest to be vested
in plaintiff, it determines the title to the remaining half interest and
orders the property [885] sold for the purpose of making partition.

Appellants contend that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of
proof to establish ‘‘a resulting trust by evidence so clear, cogent and
convincing ag to remove any reasonable doubt as to its existence’’;
and that the judgment is ‘‘contrary to the weight of the evidence
and the law.’’ Appellants also point out that, ‘‘where transfer of
property is made to one person and part of the purchase price is paid
by another a resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom
such payment is made in such proportion as the part paid by him
bears to the total purchase price, unless he manifest contrary inten-
tion,’’ citing Shelby v. Shelby, 357 Mo. 557, 209 S.W. 2d 896, 899.

In a case such as this we are, not bound by the chancellor’s
findings, but must review the evidence de novo and reach our own

Le 1235
|

conclusions as to its weight and value. However, we usually defer to
the chancellor’s findings when the case turns upon the credibility,
weight and value of the oral testimony of witnesses who have ap-
peared personally before him, unless we are satisfied that the find-
ings should have been to the contrary. Suhre v. Busch, 343 Mo. 679,
123 S.W. 2d 8, 19; Beach v. Beach, Mo. Sup., 207 S.W. 2d 481, 486.

Appellants insist that in this case, ‘‘where each party categorically
denies the statements of the other,’’ we should consider the actions of
the parties. Appellants refer particularly to plaintiff’s personal con-
duet in living with a man to whom she was not married. Appellants
say that no date was set for the marriage and that plaintiff may have
been unlearned in real estate transactions, but she knew a ceremony
was necessary ‘‘to pronounce individuals man and wife.’’ Appellants
insist that her conduct ‘‘belies her oral testimony that appellant
(Don) agreed at any time to place property in her name.’’ Appellants
further point to the fact that Don made the $25.00 deposit and that
the final sales contract, dated January 16, 1950, shows Don Pizzo,
single and unmarried, as purchaser. Appellants contend that plain-
tiff’s purpose in contributing to the down payment was to reduce
the amount of the monthly. payments and that it had no reference to
any agreement as to title.

The trial chancellor saw and heard the witnesses and was in a far
better position to determine the credibility, weight and value of their
personal testimony than we are from a review of the cold record, and
deference should be given to his views. Carr v. Carroll, 352 Mo, 301,
178 S.W. 2d 487. When we consider the long association of the prin-
cipal parties, we can only say that such association appears to have
been upon a mutually agreeable basis, although plaintiff did obtain
the divorce and Don’s letter to plaintiff after their final separation
indicates his desire for her return. The court in its decree reviewed
the evidence and found that it clearly corroborated the plaintift’s
claim that she contributed to the purchase of the property upon the
agreement that it would be owned by both parties. ‘The court’s con-
clusion was that ‘‘the situation clearly showed that a resulting trust
was created when the defendant took (title to) the property in his
own’name and that the plaintiff is entitled under the law to a half
interest in the property * * *,’”

It is well settled that ‘‘a resulting trust must arise, if at all,
at the instant the deed is taken. Unless the transaction is such that
the moment the title passes the trust results from the transaction
itself, then no trust results. It cannot be created by subsequent oc-
eurrences.’’ Bender v. Bender, 281 Mo. 473, 220 8.W. 929, 930, and
authorities there cited; Hiatt v. Hiatt, Mo. Sup., 168 S.W. 2d 1087;
Lehr v. Moll, Mo. Sup., 247 8. W. 2d 686; 65 C.J. 871, Trusts, Sec. 145.

Hl 1: is further well settled that to establish a resulting trust an
extraordinary degree of proof is required; dnd that vague or shadowy

evidence or a preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient. The
evidence [886] must be so unquestionable in its character, so clear,
cogent and convincing that no reasonable doubt can be entertained
as to its truth and the existence of the trust. Aronson v. Spitecaufsky,
Mo. Sup., 260 S.W. 2d 548, 549; Mays v. Jackson, 346 Mo. 1224, 145
S.W. 2d 392, 398.

‘We need not again review the detailed facts shown by this rec-
ord. It is conceded that the parties had separated and in arranging
to resume living together they selected a lot upon which a new house
was being constructed. They were both present when the purchase
was initiated. Don joined in signing the $25.00 receipt from the real
estate company which named both parties as having made the pay-
ment and showing their respective employments and income. This
document corroborates the plaintiff that both were buying the prop-
erty. It is true that the prior oral agreement rests upon plaintiff’s
testimony and only her testimony supports her statement that she
signed several other papers in the real estate office and that Don told
her she did not need to sign further. However, it is clear that the
preliminary agreement to purchase was shifted from one lot to an-
other and that Don handled and signed all subsequent papers. It
appears to be conceded that plaintiff furnished a portion, if not all,
of the $975 down payment on the property and the documentary evi-
dence and admitted facts fully corroborate her in that regard. Con-
sidered as a whole, we think the record clearly shows that plaintift’s
contribution to the purchase price, prior to the execution and de-
livery of the deed to Don, was made-upon the understanding and
agreement that both parties were to own the property together as

husband and wife; and that, without plaintiff’s prior knowledge or’

consent, Don took title in his own name. In such situation, and in
view of the relationship of the parties, a trust resulted and plaintiff
became the equitable owner of a one-half interest in the property and
we find no subsequent waiver by plaintiff, nor any consent to Don’s
sole ownership of the property.

Hl Appellants, however, say that ‘‘surely a court of equity is not
going to award (sic) the respondent for her conduct by giving her
one-half of a piece of property, which was paid for by the appellant
in the sum of $12,800.00, rather than give her her portion as that part
applies to the purchase price.’’

It is immaterial to any of the pleaded issues in this case that Don’
has paid the balance of the purchase price of the property. The
manifest intention of the parties, as we have held, was that title to
the property was to be taken in the names of both parties, as husband
and wife. Plaintiff’s contribution was upon that basis, but, after
obtaining plaintiff’s money and applying it to the down payment on
the purchase price, Don took title in his own name. In such situation,

Shelby v. Shelby, supra, 209 S.W. 2d 896, and Baumgartner v. Guess-°

feld, 38 Mo. 36, the cases relied upon, do not control. Plaintiff’s
equitable title to a one-half interest in the property by way of a
resulting trust was unaffected by Don’s payment of the balance of
the purchase price.

The third and final assignment under points and authorities
is that, ‘‘The court failed to make any finding as to the personal prop-
erty involved in this suit.’’ No authorities are cited, no argument is
made. Nothing appears in appellants’ brief except the mere statement.
of a fact. The assignment does not conform to Supreme Court Rule
1.08(a) (3) and (d). However, we think the record sufficiently shows
that plaintiff abandoned the issue of a resulting trust in the furniture
in the course of the trial. Plaintiff’s payment was intended to be
applied on the purchase price of the real estate. While both parties
purchased the furniture, the bill of sale was made to Don and he
paid for it.

Appellants do not complain of the decree in any other respects.
The judgment is affirmed. All concur, except Westhues, J., concurs in
result in separate opinion filed.

WESTHUES, J. (concurring'’)—I concur in the result reached
in this case. However, I do not think it was necessary to discuss the
question of whether the judgment entered was final and appealable.

Counts 1, 2, and 5 constituted a distinct and separate cause of
action having no connection with issues presented in counts 8 and 4.
In fact, the parties are not the same. The court, as the opinion states,
tried the case made up of counts 1, 2, and 5 separately. That was
proper procedure. The court made a final disposition of the case and
nothing was left to be done except to partition the property. The
result of a trial on either count 3 or on count 4 could in no way
affect the judgment appealed from in this case.

‘When the trial court tried this case separately, the result was a
complete severance of it from the other cases which were joined in
the same petition. I do not believe that Supreme Court Rule 3.29 has
any application to this kind of a situation. That rule, which provides
that a court may enter a separate interlocutory judgment and order
it held in abeyance until the other claim, counterclaims, or third party
claims in the case are determined, has application to those claims of
which the resulting judgment may affect the judgment held in abey-
ance. If the rule were applied to a situation as now before us and the
judgment were held in abeyance awaiting the outcome of the two
other cases, the result would be utter confusion. Suppose that were
done and a final judgment entered after the trial of the other cases,
that is, counts 3 and 4, and suppose plaintiff obtained a judgment in
each for $2,000, appellate jurisdiction of which would be in the Court
of Appeals. Would those two cases ride on the coattail of. the suit
to try title to this court which has appellate jurisdiction of title

eases? Would not three distinct and separate cases be presented on
one appeal? I do not find any case previously decided that even sug-
gests that Rule 3.29 has any application to this kind of a situation.
In all the cases where the question was discussed, the judgment en-
tered on one count had some connection with the counts not tried.
Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878, 254 8.W.(2d) 596, lc. 597 (1-4) ;
Deeds v. Foster, Mo., 235 S.W.(2d) 262; Bennett v. Wood, Mo., 239
8.W.(2d) 325, Le. 327 (1, 2); Hammonds v. Hammonds, 364 Mo.
517, 263 S.W.(2d) 348, lc. 350 (2).

It is my opinion that where two or more separate and distinct
causes of action are joined in one petition and where, as in this case,
the one cannot have any effect on the judgment in the other, then a
separate trial of one case, as ordered by the trial court, separates
that case from the others for all purposes including appeal. It is
my opinion that our Rule 3.29 would not have authorized the trial
court to have entered an order holding the judgment appealed from
in abeyance.

I, therefore, concur in the result.

Lenpett Can, Employee, Respondent, v. Ropinson Lumprr Com-
pany, Employer, Hieuway Casuauty Company, Alleged Insurer,
Appellant, No, 44829—295 S. W. (2d) 388.

Court en Banc, November 12, 1956.

Luke, Cunliff & Wilson for appellant; Dearing & Matthes of
counsel.

Samuel Richeson and Edgar & Edgar for employer.

[889] LEEDY, C. J.—This workmen’s compensation case was
consolidated for the purposes of argument. with Harris v. Pine
Cleaners et al., No. 44878, concurrently decided herewith. Here the
Industrial Commission made an award in favor of the employee Cain
and against appellants O. A. Robinson and R. B. Robinson, d/b/a
Robinson Lumber Company as employers and Highway Casualty
Company as insurer. The insured claimed that the policy covering
the liability of the employers had. been cancelled prior to the acci-
dental injury. The Commission found to the contrary. The Cireuit
Court affirmed, and the employer and insurer appealed to the St.
Louis Court of Appeals where the judgment of the Cireuit Court
affirming the award was reversed and remanded with directions. See
273 S.W. 2d 741.

The opinion in the Harris case on the present submission settles
the jurisdictional question (which prompted transfer of the case to
this court), and sustains the holding of the St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals that the Commission had the power and authority to determine
whether or not the policy had been cancelled; but in view of the
employers’ supplemental brief in this court, which more fully de-
velops the question on which the opinion of the Court of Appeals

Po . 1241
[|
turned, we are constrained to disagree with the action of the Court
of Appeals in upsetting the finding of the Commission that the policy
had not been cancelled.

The policy was issued as of September 13, 1951, for a period of one
year. It provided that the premiums were based on the entire re-
muneration paid to the employees of the insured. The amount of
the premium was to be paid in quarterly installments, and was sub-
ject to adjustment to be made quarterly. The original policy stipu-
lated that it was subject to the following conditions, among others:

““Mhis policy may be canceled at any time by either of the parties
upon written notice to the other party stating when, not less than
ten days thereafter, cancelation shall be effective. The effective date
of the cancelation shall then be the end of the Policy Period. * * *
Notice of cancelation shall be served upon this Employer as the law
requires, but, if no different requirement, notice mailed to the address
of this Employer herein given shall be a sufficient notice, and the
check of the Company, similarly mailed, a sufficient tender of any
unearned premium.’’

Appended to the policy was a ‘‘Periodical Premium Adjustment
Endorsement,’’ reading as follows:

“Effective September 13, 1951, and notwithstanding anything con-
tained in the policy to the contrary, it is understood and agreed that
the premium stated in the policy to which this endorsement is at-
tached, is an estimated advance deposit premium which the Assured
agrees to pay on or before inception date of the policy and is to
guarantee prompt payment of the earned premiums for each period
designated herein. The advance deposit premium will be retained by
the Company until termination of the policy, at which time the ad-
vance deposit premium will be credited to the last and final settle-
ment only. In consideration of the advance deposit premium stated,
it is understood and agreed that this policy is issued and accepted by
the Assured subject to a quarterly premium adjustment based
upon payrolls expended during each three month period from the
effective date of the policy, the first report is to become due on the
13th day of December and future reports to become due on [890] the
last day of each following third month. Payroll reports must reach
the Company on or before the 15th of the month following the close
of each reporting period for the purpose of computing the earned
premium during such period, and the Assured shall immediately pay
to the Company the premium earned thereon, based upon the rate
or rates stated in the policy.

“Tf the Assured shall fail to make such statement of wages ex-
pended or pay such earned premiums as provided. in the foregoing
paragraphs such failure entitles the Company, at its option, and wpon
proper written notice to the Assured, to cancel the policy.

fe

1242 Po
Ee

“Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter or
extend any of the Delarations, Schedule of Coverages, Insuring Agree-
ments, Exclusions and Conditions of the policy mentioned in this en-
dorsement, other than as above stated.’’? (Emphasis ours.)

The cancellation is claimed to have been made January 8, 1952,
effective January 14, 1952, ‘‘for non-payment.’’ The accident oc-
eurred February 21, 1952.

On December 1, 1951, the insurer mailed the employers a form
called ‘‘Audit Adjustment’’ covering the period from September 13,
1951, to December 1, 1951,’’ whereon were blanks to be filled in show-
ing the amount of the actual payroll and the amount of the earned
premium computed according to the rate (a certain percentage) shown
thereon, and directing that the same be completed, signed and re-
turned ‘‘with check to cover earned premium within ten days.’’? On
December 20, 1951, the insurer mailed the employers a ‘‘Warning
Notice”? calling attention to the fact that the audit was past due,
and stating that unless the same was received on December 26, 1951,
“notice of cancellation will be sent.’’ It not having been received,
on January 8, 1952, the insured mailed to the employers a ‘‘Cancel-
lation Notice’’ reciting that the policy (describing it) ‘‘is hereby
cancelled as of 12:01 A.M., Standard Time, the 14th day of January,
1952, * * * REASON: Non-payment.’’

It is unnecessary to further develop the facts, but reference is made
to the opinion of the Court of Appeals for a more detailed statement
thereof. That opinion, however, does not make reference to the cancel-
lation provisions of the ‘‘Periodical Premium Adjustment Endorse-
ment’? (which we deem controlling), but the tuling now under ex-
amination appears to have been based on the provisions of the original
policy hereinabove set forth.

It is to be noted that under the express provisions of the endorse-
ment, pay roll reports were timely if received by the insurer ‘‘on or
before the 15th of the month following the close of each reporting
period’ (the earned premium thus computed being then ‘‘imme-
diately’? payable). The close of these particular employers’ first
reporting period was fixed by the endorsement as the 13th of December
and future reports were to become due on the last day of each follow-
ing third month, so that (insofar as the present controversy is con-
cerned) January 15, 1952, became the critical date for creating
defaults on the part of the employers under the contract; but notwith-
standing this fact, the purported cancellation occurred prior to the
expiration of such time.

| | This is a proper case for the application of these familiar
principles governing insurance contracts: First, that the courts will
attempt to construe the policy and the endorsements thereon as one
contract, and, if possible, give effect to each and every provision there-
of. Soukop v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp., 341 Mo. 614, 108

S.W. 2d 86; 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 298, p. 1196. Second, that if the
language used in an endorsement and that used in the general pro-
visions of the policy on the same subject are in conflict, the language
in the endorsement will prevail. Barnett v. Prudential [891] Ins. Co.,.
239 Mo. App. 670, 194 S.W. 2a 317; Givens v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
(Mo. App.) 59% S.W. 2d 761; Linenschmidt v. Continental Cas. Co.,
356 Mo. 914, 204 S.W. 2d 295; Marshall’s U. 8. Auto Supply v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 354 Mo, 455, 189 S.W. 2d 529. Third, if there is doubt
or uncertainty as to the meaning of the language used, and it is
susceptible of two interpretations, one favorable to the insured and
the other favorable to the insurer, the former will be adopted. Corbin
v. Fidelity Health & Acc. Mut. Ins. Co., (Mo. App.) 265 S.W. 2d
440; Soukop v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp., supra; 44 O.J.S.,
Insurance, § 297 (¢), p. 1166.

Hl We agree with the contention of the employers, and accord-
ingly hold that the proper construction of the cancellation provisions
here involved is that the insurer may cancel according to the procedure
outlined in the conditions stipulated in the original policy at any time
for the reasons permitted in the endorsement, and cannot cancel un-
less and until the conditions precedent set forth in the endorsement
arise. There having been no default whereon to effect cancellation
based on the non-payment provisions of the endorsement, it follows
that the attempt so to do was abortive and wholly ineffectual because
premature and unwarranted.

| | The award included the following: ‘‘For Medical Aid (See
attached Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law), the sum of $Un-
known.’’ There was no evidence of any medical expense, and so the
Court of Appeals properly held the finding in this regard was not
supported by the evidence, and not being for any determinable amount
was therefore unenforceable.

To meet the situation created as a consequence of the latter holding,
the judgment of the circuit court should be and it is reversed, and
the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to reverse the
award and remand the cause to the Industrial Commission with diree-
tions to said commission to enter a new award in favor of the claimant
to be in all respects the same as the one heretofore entered except that
portion thereof in relation to medical aid, which shall be deleted. All
concur,