State: Florida
Volume: 160
Term: 1948-1948
Jurisdiction(s): Florida
Source: https://static.case.law/fla/160.pdf

A. A. BECK and JOE GRIFFIN, et al., v. GAME AND FRESH WATER
FISH COMMISSION of the State of Fiorida, et al.

383 So. (2nd) 594 June Term, 1947
January 6, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied February 2, 1948

Mary Schulman, Bell & Bell and Whitaker Brothers, for
appellants.

Earl D, Farr and Mabry, Reaves, Cartion, Anderson, Fields
& Ward, for appellees.

2

ADAMS, J.:

In this case the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
filed a bill in equity against A. A. Beck and Joe Griffin, et al.,
seeking to declare certain acts of the Legislature unconstitu-
tional. The State Board of Conservation was allowed to inter-
vene. A final decree was entered for the plaintiff on the plead-
ings. The appeal raises the question of whether the legisla-
ture has the power to enact laws inconsistent with rules of the
plaintiff Commission affecting the waters of Lake Okeechobee
and certain portions of the St. Johns River.

The plaintiff Commission came into existence by virtue of
Article IV, Section 30, being an amendment added in 1942.
Heretofore we have commented upon the history, purpose and
wide ‘scope of its power. Sylvester v. Tindall, 154 Fla. 663,
18 So. (2nd) 892. In 1944 the Commission adopted rules de-
signed to prevent commercial fishing insofar as fresh water
fish were concerned and particularly in Lake Okeechobee and
the St. Johns River. In 1947 the Legislature enacted several
statutes. House Bill No. 922, in substance, declared certain
waters in the St. Johns River in Putnam County to be in fact
salt water, thereby removing the area from the jurisdiction of
the plaintiff Commission and placing it under the State Board
of Conservation. A similar act was also passed in reference
to Lake Okeechobee. See House Bill No. 1166. House Bill No.
1190 was also passed which levied an excise tax upon crappie
and bream taken from said waters, which tax was to be paid
to the State Board of Conservation.

The question is squarely presented—whether the Legisla-
ture can oust the constitutional Commission from control over
fresh water fish in Lake Okeechobee and the St. Johns River
by making a legislative finding that said waters are salt.

In Price v. City of St. Petersburg, 158 Fla. 705, 29 So.
(2nd) 753, (3rd headnote) we held:

“The constitutional provision creating a Game and Fresh
Water Fish Commission and vesting in it exclusive power to
regulate game and fresh water fish industry of State divested
Legislature of power to regulate or control the taking of fresh
water fish in the state. F.S.A. Const. Art. 4, S 30.”

The case of State v. Sullivan, —.... Fla. ..... 30 So. (2nd)
919, settled the correctness of this decree beyond doubt.

We do not overlook the contention that the Legislature has
from time immemorial classified the waters of the state either
salt or fresh; that when this amendment was adopted certain
of these waters were actually classed as salt waters. The
Constitutional amendment expressly provides, however, that
all existing laws inconsistent herewith shall no longer remain
in force and effect.

The decree is affirmed.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, BUFORD, SEBRING and
BARNS, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C, J., and CHAPMAN, J., not participating.

a
H. B. HARRELL v. RAYMOND L. BISHOP, and MARGET H.

BISHOP, his wife.

83 So, (2nd) 152 June Term, 1947
January 6, 1948 En Bane

3

H. L. Pringle, for appellant.
Walter Warren, for appellee.
BUFORD, J.:

In a suit for commission earned as a real estate broker the
declaration was in four common counts and one count on con-
tract claiming 644 per cent commission on a sale in which the
purchase price was $25,750.00 or $1,609.37.

Defendants filed pleas of never was indebted as alleged to
the common counts and plead as to fifth count,

“1. That they did not promise as alleged and .

“2, That the plaintiff did not procure a purchaser ready,
able and willing to purchase defendants’ property upon terms
and conditions agreeable to the defendants,”—and then plead,

“And for further plea to the first, fourth and fifth counts of
plaintiff’s declaration and each of them severally, defendants
say:

“1. That plaintiff did not furnish the services as alleged.”

On the declaration and such pleas, trial was had.

There was evidence to show the purchase price, for which
plaintiff found and procured to defendant, was $25,750.00;
there was evidence tending to prove that plaintiff was entitled
to recover 5% of the purchase price under the common counts,
and evidence tending to prove that plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover 614% of the purchase price under the fifth count.

There was no evidence tending to prove that plaintiff (if
entitled to recover at all) was entitled to recover less than 5%
of the purchase price agreed upon. ,

The jury returned a verdict and judgment was entered
thereon for $250.00.

Plaintiff appealed.

There is found no basis in the record for the amount of the
verdict returned by the jury. If the plaintiff was entitled to
recover at all he was entitled to recover either 5% or 644% of
the agreed purchase price.

There must be some rational predicate for a jury’s verdict.
Allen v. Powell, 152 Fla. 448, 12 So. (2nd) 378; Miller v.
Mariner’s Church, 7 Mo. 51; 20 Am. Dec. 341; Hackett v.
Pratt, 52 Ill. App. 346.

For the reason stated, the judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded for new trial.

So ordered. : :

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ.,
concur,

SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

BARNS, J., dissenting:

Plaintiff-appellant was a broker and had a listing on de-
fendants’ property, which had been cancelled, but defendants,
on being advised by plaintiff that he had a prospect, invited
negotiations which resulted in the defendants-appellees-owners
entering into a contract with special terms relating to a sale.

It had not been made to appear whether either the vendor or.
the vendee has been put in default under this contract of sale,
but it has been made to appear that the sales contract has not
been consummated and that there is a controversy between
the sellers-defendants and the prospective purchaser.

A provision of the contract between the vendor and vendee
was as follows:

“Said deferred payments shall be secured by a first Mort-
gage on the above described property and so long as the total
unpaid amount of the purchase price exceeds $12,875.00,
Buyer shall maintain on deposit with First National Bank of
Leesburg, Florida, as Escrow Agent, negotiable securities
having a current market value equal to the difference between
said $12,875.00 and the total of unpaid purchase price, Buyer
shall have right of substitution as to such securities and when
unpaid balance of purchase price shall have been reduced to
$12,875.00 or less all such securities shall be released to Buyer
(or his nominee) and said Escrow shall thereupon terminate
and end.” (Italics supplied).

The evidence shows that the vendee wishes to take ad-
vantage of the foregoing provision and tendered or offered
some Mt. Vernon Preferred Stock, the exact identity of which
is not established by the record. The vendor refused to accept
this stock, which resulted in a stalemate insofar as the closing
of the sale was concerned. The contract called for the sub-
stitution of “negotiable securities having a current market
value equal to the difference between said $12,875.00 and the
total of unpaid purchase price.” If it had been established
that the Mt. Vernon Preferred Stock had a current market
value of the specified amount and, if the amount had been
sufficient, it might have then been as well assumed that the

appellant here and plaintiff below had found a purchaser
ready, able and willing to buy, and that the vendor was in de-
fault with his purchaser, and the liability, according to the ex-
pressed contract, would have been established. However, as it
is now, it appears to me that plaintiff has failed to establish
that he has found a purchaser ready, able and willing to buy
and that the verdict of $250.00 was in equity and good
conscience and law adequate compensation for the payment of

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his services rendered pursuant to an expressed contract which
has not been fully performed. To state it otherwise, if the de-
fendant-vendor had appealed the case instead of the plaintiff-
appellant, it appears that we would have been compelled to
reverse the case. It is clear that the only reason that the
vendor did not appeal is because he is willing to pay $250.00
to rid himself of the suit, which is of course the exercise of
good judgment. If the plaintiff has recovered $250.00, when
the evidence shows he is not entitled to anything, he has no
grounds for complaint in this court.

««.. That in general assumpsit the cause of action is
never based upon an express contract no matter whether there
was an express contract or not. The recovery is based upon
the implied contract to pay. The contract will prevent the
plaintiff from recovering beyond the contract price, but cannot
be used by him to prevent the defendant from proving miti-
gating facts under this count...’” (Italics supplied).

Hazen v. Cobb, 96 Fla. 151, 163.

‘The plaintiff here, according to the evidence has brought a
bill of interpleader against both vendor and vendee in respect
to funds in his hands representing the down payment on the
contract.

The plaintiff has sued on the common counts and on a
special count.

As to the common counts, or general assumpsit, they are
often referred to as “equity counts” and the defendant is held
liable to the extent to which in equity and good morals he
ought to pay. In this respect, it is stated in R. C. L. as fol-
lows:

“The action of general assumpsit is an equitable one, being
in the nature of a bill in equity, and therefore is subject to the
rule of moral obligation, which binds the conscience. The
plaintiff must show that everything is fair and honest on his
part, and it is a general rule, and where the consideration is a
valuable and conscientious one, a promise to pay on it will not
only be binding, but will also remove any legal bars which
the undertaker previously had in his favor against a recovery.
‘Thus if in conscience a defendant ought to pay, a promise to
pay, when there is a consideration, will give a remedy.”

2R.C.L, p. 746.

The leading case on the common counts in this State seems
to be that of Hazen v. Cobb, 96 Fla. 151, 117 So. 853, Headnote
14 of which reads as follows:

“Where there has been a special contract, and the plaintiff
brings general assumpsit, the special contract is not the
ground of plaintiff’s right of recovery, though it may in many
cases be admissible in evidence as pertinent to the amount of
such recovery, as bearing upon such questions as the value of
services actually performed or materials furnished by the
plaintiff and accepted by the defendant.”

The case of Hazen v. Cobb, supra, was a case which dealt
with the sufficiency of the declaration based on the common

counts and a special count growing out of an alleged breach of
a written contract.

SEBRING, J., concurs.
| eee eee)

GRACE DeSALVO v. BYRON T. CURRY and MARY MARTHA

CURRY, his wife.
33 So. (2nd) 215 June Term, 1947
January 9, 1948 Division A.
Rehearing denied February 5, 1948 7

00

John M. McNatt, Harry T. Gray and Francis P. Conroy, for
appellant. .

Howell, McCarthy, Lane & Howell, for appellees.
CHAPMAN, J.: .

This controversy grows out of a collision between two
automobiles at the intersection of San Juan Street and Cassatt
Avenue on the late afternoon of November 16, 1946. This
street intersection is situated outside the incorporate limits of
the City of Jacksonville. Cassatt Avenue runs north and
south, while San Juan Street runs east and west. Byron T.
Curry, accompanied by his wife, Mary Martha Curry, was
traveling east in a Chevrolet automobile on San Juan and Mrs.
Grace DeSalvo was traveling south on Cassatt Avenue, driving
a Chrysler. The proximate cause of the collision, Mr. and Mrs.
Curry charged, was due to the negligence of Mrs. Grace De-
Salvo. Mrs. DeSalvo denied the negligence and in a counter
claim charged that the negligence of Byron T. Curry was the
proximate cause of the collision.

The plaintiffs, Byron T. Curry and wife, Mary Martha
Curry, in a single count of a declaration, alleged that on the
16th November, 1946, they were riding in an automobile driven
by Byron T. Curry at the intersection of San Juan and Cassat
Avenue and the defendant, Grace DeSalvo, at and near the
aforesaid intersection negligently ran an automobile into,
against and upon the automobile of the plaintiff, Byron T.
Curry, and as a result each of the plaintiffs sustained serious
and permanent injuries. Attached thereto was a bill of par-
ticulars. The defendant, Grace DeSalvo, filed to said declara-
tion a plea of not guilty.

The counter claimant, Grace DeSalvo, filed a counter claim
and charged negligence against plaintiff, Byron T. Curry, con-
sisting of three’counts: (1) the plaintiff, Byron T. Curry, neg-
ligently operated his automobile at the aforesaid street inter-
section and as a result thereof collided with the automobile

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driven by the counter claimant; (2) the plaintiff Curry negli-
gently failed to observe the stop sign on the road approaching
the intersection and as a result his automobile collided with
that of the counter claimant; (3) that the failure to observe
the road signs by Curry was the proximate cause of the co-
lision; (4) that the rainy weather and approaching darkness
required lights on the automobile nearing the said intersec-
tion but the plaintiff Curry failed to have the lights on his car
burning and as a result his automobile collided with that
driven by the counter claimant. The failure to have the light
burning on the Curry car was the proximate cause of the
collision. The injuries sustained by the counter claimant are
set forth in each count of the counter claim.

The plaintiff Curry filed pleas of not guilty and contribu-
tory negligence and traversed some of the allegations in de-
scribed portions of the counter claim and on these several
issues the disputes and conflicts in the evidence were sub-
mitted to a jury, which resulted in a verdict favorable to Mrs.
Grace DeSalvo as to one of the plaintiffs, Byron T. Curry, but
a verdict against her in the sum of $8,000.00 for the other
plaintiff, Mary Martha Curry. The jury found against Mrs.
DeSalvo on the three counts of her counter claim against
Byron T. Curry. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judg-
ment were made and denied and over objections of the de-
fendant the court permitted the filing of amendments to the
amended declaration. The defendant below appealed.

Counsel for appellant pose here for adjudication some four-
teen questions. Questions one and two are simplified and dis-
cussed in the brief under topics: (a) negligence will not be
presumed; (b) no negligence has been shown. The authori-
ties cited in the brief to sustain the sevéral contentions made
have been considered along with the logic and reasons ad-
vanced to sustain the conclusion reached. We fully agree with
the first contention of counsel that the burden of proof under
the law in the case at bar rested on the plaintiffs below and
that negligence cannot be presumed. The second contention
to the effect that no negligence on the part of the appellant
was established. must be answered by the testimony in the
record. The plaintiffs testified that they approached the in-

10

tersection, when Byron T. Curry stopped his car before enter-
ing the intersection and then looked to the left and to the
right, and, seeing no one approaching, placed his car in second.
gear and entered the intersection. We do not overlook the
fact that this testimony was sharply contradicted by the testi-
mony of witnesses adduced by the defendant. The courts are
powerless under our judicial system to invade the province of
the jury and decide disputes and conflicts in the testimony.

Appellant’s questions three and four are argued together.
The contention is made that Section 317.42, F.S.A., is here
controlling; that it was the duty of Byron T. Curry under this
provision, when approaching Cassatt Avenue from the west
on San Juan, to stop his automobile as directed by the road
sign, “Stop,” and that it was his duty to yield the right of way
to other vehicles which had entered the intersection or to
vehicles then approaching the intersection so closely as to
constitute an immediate hazard. We are requested to hold as
a matter of law, which cannot be done under the law, that
Byron T. Curry, from the facts in the record, violated the
terms and provisions, supra, and that the judgment entered in
behalf of his wife, Mary Martha Curry, be set aside and held as
naught. It is argued that the instructions given by the trial
court as to the rights of motorists at arterial highway inter-
sections were not clear but confusing and misleading. The
applicable rule is that alleged erroneous instructions must be
considered in connection with all other charges appearing in
the record as given by the trial court.

Questions, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 are discussed
under one assignment and topics are viz: (a) in general; (b)
the first entry rule does not apply where there is a stop sign;
(c) statutes and rules giving driver on right the right of way
do not apply to stop streets; (d) the charge of the first entry
rule was manifestly erroneous because plaintiffs admitted they
were not proceeding lawfully; (e) last clear chance doctrine
not applicable; (f) the charges are erroneous, conflicting and
prejudicial. We have given careful consideration to the many
contentions in appellant’s brief in their discussion of the above
questions.

The verdicts rendered by the jury found against the claims
of (a) Byron T. Curry against Mrs. Grace DeSalvo; (b) the
counter claims of Mrs. Grace DeSalvo against Byron T. Curry;
and (c) a verdict in the sum of $8,000.00 and judgment there-
on as entered against Mrs. Grace DeSalvo in favor of Mary
Martha Curry, and the several arguments supra, are directed
to the Mary Martha Curry judgment. It does appear that the
verdicts, supra, put at rest many of the contentions presented
under (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (£), supra. The cited cases
have been examined, but let us assume, arguendo, that Byron
T. Curry was negligent, as here contended, in entering the
street intersection, then, may we inquire, how does his (the
husband-driver’s) negligence affect the right of recovery on
the part of his wife then riding in the car with him? It ap-
pears that the question is answered by the rulings in Seaboard
Air Line Ry. Co. v. Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716; Hernan-
dez v. Pensacola Coach Corp., 141 Fla. 441, 193 So. 555;
Peninsular Telephone Co. v. Marks et vir.; 144 Fla. 652, 198
So. 330. :

The trial court, in commenting on the negligence of Mrs.
Mary Martha Curry and her right to recover, in the order
denying the motion for a new trial, in part, said:

“The evidence in-this case, to my mind, clearly shows that
the driver Curry was negligent and it also shows that the
driver of the other car, Mrs. DeSalvo, was negligent as she
drove her automobile South on Cassatt Avenue. There was a
vacant lot on the Northwest corner of Cassatt Avenue and San
Juan Avenue and she could have seen the car going Hast on
San Juan Avenue which was driven by the plaintiff Curry.
The facts in this case very clearly show that both Mrs. De-
Salvo and Curry were negligent. Mrs. Curry was not charge-
able with the negligence of her husband. There is nothing in
the evidence to put her on notice and to require that she
should protest to her husband. The evidence shows that Mrs.
DeSalvo did not see Curry’s automobile until the collision
occurred.”

The contention is made by appellant’s counsel that it was
the trial court’s duty, under the law, to direct a verdict for
the appellant upon the theory that she was free from negli-

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gence at the time of the impact; that the collision occurred at
a place where Section 317.42, F.S.A., applied; that the appel-
lant was driving at a moderate rate of speed with her lights
on and was protected by a stop sign; appellant looked at the
intersection but did not see a vehicle approaching; that the
plaintiff failed to observe the stop sign on the road; that he
entered the intersection without stopping or observing appel-
lant’s car; that disinterested witnesses saw plaintiff’s vehicle
approach and enter the intersection without lights and with-
out slowing down or stopping; that appellant had the right of
way because she was traveling a through street.

Counsel for appellee, in response, argue that plaintiff
Curry stopped his car before entering the intersection and
looked to his right and to his left on Cassatt Avenue; that he
started his car off in low gear and shifted to second gear; that
he entered the intersection at the rate of eight or ten miles per
hour; the intersection was eighteen feet wide and Curry was
hit by Mrs. DeSalvo’s car wen in the center; witnesses saw
Curry’s car enter the intersection but Mrs. DeSalvo failed to
see it; that the Curry car was hit on the left front door be-
tween the front and rear fenders; the impact drove the Curry
car some forty or fifty feet; the DeSalvo car, after the impact,
was headed north; Mrs. DeSalvo stated she did not see Curry
before she hit him or was in the intersection; that the impact
caused the right hand door of the Curry car to open and Mrs.
Curry fell out and was rendered unconscious.

It is our view that the disputes and conflicts in testimony
were for the jury, under appropriate instructions from the
trial court. The instructions given from Toll v. Waters, et
vir, 138 Fla. 349, 189 So. 393; City of Tallahassee v. Ashmore,
158 Fla. 78, 27 So. (2nd) 660, and Section 317.42 F.S.A.,
have not been shown to be erroneous. We do not believe the
jury’s verdict is excessive.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

13

STATE OF FLORIDA AND THE TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS
AND CITIZENS OF SAID CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, INCLUD-
ING NON-RESIDENTS OWNING PROPERTY OR SUBJECT TO
TAXATION THEREIN, v. THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,

FLORIDA.
88 So. (2nd) 218 June Term, 1947
January 9, 1948 Division A

Murray Sams, for appellant.
J. Velma Keen, Curtis H. Gardiner and Mitchell and Persh-
ing (New York, N. Y.) for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

In October 1947, the City Commission of Daytona Beach
adopted ordinance 47-143 providing for the issuance of
$1,350,000. Recreational Facilities Bonds for the purpose of
paying the cost of constructing and equipping recreational fa-
cilities within the city. The said bonds were subject to an
approving vote of the freeholders and were designed to pro-
vide the following facilities: (1) auditorium, estimated to cost
$750,000., (2) Stadium, estimated to cost $250,000., (3) Boat
basin, estimated to cost $250,000., (4) Negro recreational cen-
ter, estimated to cost $100,000."

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An election was held after being properly called and ad-
vertised, a majority of the freeholders participated and the
said issue of recreational facilities bonds was approved by an
overwhelming vote of the freeholders. The City Commission
then adopted Resolution 47-179 providing for the issuance of
said recreational facilities bonds for the purposes and in the
amounts heretofore stated. Pursuant to Sections 143 and 160
of the City Charter, as amended by Chapter 24467, Special
Acts of 1947, the City Commission granted gas and electric
franchises to the Florida Power and Light Company. The
ordinances granting these franchises were approved by the
qualified electors of the city in an election called and held for
that purpose. The foregoing with other facts were before the
chancellor and were considered on the issue-raised in the peti-
tion to validate. This appeal is from a final decree validating .
said bonds.

The first question proffered for our determination is:

“Did the submission at an election, as a single proposition
of issuing $1,350,000. Recreational Facilities bonds of the
City of Daytona Beach ‘for the purpose of paying the cost of
constructing and equipping Recreational Facilities within the
city consisting of an auditorium, the estimated cost of which
is approximately $750,000., a stadium, the estimated cost of
which is approximately $250,000., a boat basin, the estimated
cost of which is approximately $250, 000, and a Negro Recrea-
tional Center, the estimated cost of which is approximately
$100,000. ‘violate the provisions of Section 6 of Article IX of
the Constitution of Florida?”

This question turns on whether or not the four purposes
for which the bonds are proposed are distinct and unrelated
or, on the other hand, fall in the category of those being so
related as to be for a single purpose. The law is well settled
that if bonds are proposed and issued for two or more pur-
poses that are so related as to amount to a single purpose, they
may be combined and voted on as a single issue, otherwise
each proposition must be submitted so that it can be voted on
separately. Lewis v. Leon County, 91 Fla. 118, 107 So. 146;
State v. Dade County, 144 Fla. 448, 198 So. 102; Antuono v.
City of Tampa, 87 Fla. 82, 99 So. 324. A search of the de-

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cisions from many jurisdictions reveals no departure from the
doctrine of these cases.

In this final decree the chancellor found that Daytona
Beach is a year around vacation and resort center, whose
economy is dependent primarily on tourist and vacation trade,
this kind of trade constituting four-fifths of all business done
in the city. The city has heretofore provided a golf course,
swimming pools, beaches, playgrounds, parks, band shells,
shuffle board and lawn bowling, that the construction of an
auditorium, stadium, boat basin, and a Negro recreational
center will supplement the existing facilities and provide ad-
ditional recreational opportunities as a part of a city-wide
recreational program designed to enhance the attractiveness
of the city as a resort center.

The finding of the chancellor finds ample support in the
record and we think offers a complete affirmative answer to
the question presented, whether or not the four objects for
which the recreational facilities bonds as proposed are so
related that they amount to a single purpose and were prop-
erly submitted and voted for in a single issue. The unanim-
ity with which the electorate approved them removes any
room for confusion on their part as to the purpose of the
bonds. Section 139 of the Charter of the City of Daytona
Beach (Chapter 19768, Special Acts of 1939) as amended by
Chapter 24473, Special Acts of 1947, is ample authority on
the part of the city to issue the bonds in question for the
purpose stated.

The second question brought up for determination is as
follows:

“Does the City of Daytona Beach have power to pledge for
payment of principal and interest on said bonds, which bonds
are general obligations of the city and for the payment of
which the city is required to levy annually a sufficient tax on
all taxable property in the city, the amounts payable in each
fiscal year under the provisions of the ordinances granting
gas and electric franchises to the Florida Power & Light Com-
pany, such annual tax levy to be reduced in any fiscal year by
the amount paid to the city in the preceding fiscal year under
such franchises?”

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Unquestionably the bonds in question are general obliga~
tions of the city for which the full faith and credit of the city
is pledged and their issuance was approved by a majority of
the votes cast in an election in which a majority of the free-
holders participated, as required by Section 6, Article IX of
the Constitution. It is also shown that Section 95 of the City
Charter requires the annual levy of a tax on all taxable
property sufficient to pay interest on the city’s indebtedness
and to create a sinking fund to retire the principal thereon.
In addition to this, a tax without limit may be imposed for the
general purposes of the city.

‘The ordinances granting gas and electric franchises to the
Florida Power & Light Company agree to make annual pay-
ments to the city and these payments become a part of the.
general revenues for the payment of its obligations. Ordi-
nance 47-143 and resolution 47-179, pledge the latter funds for
the payment of principal and interest and provide a sinking
fund to retire the Recreational Facilities Bonds. The annual
tax required to retire said bonds is reduced each year by the
amounts placed in the sinking fund the preceding fiscal year,
and which remains to the credit of the fund at the time the tax
is imposed.

Sections 21 and 93 of the City Charter and Section 169.01.
Florida Statutes 1941, afford additional relief and impose
other requirements pertinent to the question under review and
it is shown that these requirements are in all respects being
met so there can be no doubt that the City of Daytona Beach
is authorized to pledge its receipts from the gas and electric
franchises of the Florida Power & Light Company to retire
the Recreational Facilities Bonds according to the tenor and
effect of the ordinance and resolution authorizing their issue.

It is accordingly our conclusion that the City of Daytona
Beach had ample power to issue the $1,350,000. Recreational
Facilities Bonds in the manner proposed, that question two
and each question presented was correctly answered by the
chancellor, so his decree of validation should be and is hereby
affirmed in toto.

Affirmed. :
THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

CARDELLE W. BROWER and J. M. BUCHANAN v. PUTNAM
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, by the
Board of Bond Trustees of Putnam County, Florida.

33 So. (2nd) 220 June Term, 1947

January 9, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied January 31, 1948

17

H. E. Merryday and Walton & Walton, for appellants.
Dowda & Millican and R. W. Irwin, Jr., for appellee.
BUFORD, J.:

Putnam County, at the instance of the State Road Depart-
ment instituted condemnation proceedings for the purpose of
acquiring right-of-way on which to relocate and reconstruct
apart (less than four miles) of original Road No. 3, now Road
No. 15, in Putnam County, so as to eliminate dangerous right-
angle turns and inconvenient curves.

Appellants contested the proceedings, challenging the au-
thority of the State Road Repartment to relocate and re-
construct the part of road contemplated.

aE eps

The old road and the proposed relocation is shown on the
plat here inserted which is drawn to scale of 14 inch to
1000 feet.

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The court below rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff
and defendants appealed.

The record shows that the locus in quo is a part of the
Federal Aid Highway System and was so designated and ap-
proved by the joint official action of the State Road Depart-
ment and Public Roads Administration, Federal Works

_ Agency, in 1945 and 1946 by resolution of State Road De-
partment and approving letters by L. E. Boykin, Acting Com-
missioner of Public Roads.

Section 1 of Chapter 10269, Acts of 1925, contains the fol-
lowing:

“Also 45 miles to be designated by the State Road Depart-
ment and Federal Government as part of the Federal Seven
Per Cent System and such further mileage of roads as may
be in the future allowed, allotted and designated by the State
Road Department and Federal Government as part of the
Federal Seven Per Cent System.” .

Section 341.24 Florida Statutes 1941 (same F.S.A.) pro-
vides:

“The State Road Department shall maintain the State
Roads and protect and preserve the same from trespass and
injury and prevent such use of, and traffic on said roads as is
or will be liable to injure or destroy the same, and is or will be
liable to endanger the comfort and safety of public travel on
said roads. Said department shall make and maintain said
roads safe for the use of sober, law-abiding citizens who desire
to travel over the same.”

Chapter 23,786 Acts of 1947, which is:

“An Act Regulating the Repair, Reconstruction, Reloca-
tion and Alterations of State Roads and State-Aid Roads; Re-
quiring the Construction and Designation of Detour Roads for
the Convenience of the traveling Public; Imposing Certain
Duties upon the State Road Department, its Contractors,
Agents and Representatives.”—in Section 5 thereof provides:

“This Act shalf*hot apply in cases of emergency highway
work caused by Act of God or other sudden, unexpected event;
nor is the Act intended to preclude the necessary relocation,
reconstruction, alteration or repair of state roads where
deemed necessary by the State Road Department provided

such work is performed within the provisions of this Act.”

So it appears to us that, regardless of any other statutory
‘provisions, all of which must be read in paria materia with the
provisions above referred to, the State Road Department has
the power to relocate this particular section of Public road and
to reconstruct the same in the interest of public welfare and
as a part of authorized “further mileage of roads . . . allotted
and designated by the State Road Department and Federal
Government as part of the Federal Seven Per Cent System”
and as a part of the State Road System.

Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN, SEBRING and BARNS, J.J.,
concur. :

TERRELL and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.
ADAMS, J., dissenting:

We are called upon to review a judgment in condemnation.
The action was brought by Putnam County, at the request of
the State Road Department, to secure a right of way to con-
struct a section of State Highway No. 3. The appellants de-
fended the action on the theory that State Road No. 3 was
located, constructed and subsequently officially designated by
the legislature in 1923. (Chapter 9511). The evidence shows
‘that the State Road Department surveyed this road and super-
vised its construction upon a fifty foot right of way at an aver-
age distance of approximately one quarter of a mile away
from the right of way now sought and in somewhat a parallel
position. Thereafter the State Road Department maintained
and supervised the road. The gist of the defense to the judg-
ment lies in the claim that no plat was filed in the office of the
Clerk of the Circuit Court formally accepting the road.

Each party relies on the case, Enzian v. State Road De-
‘partment, 122 Fla. 527, 165 So. 695. The question here is
Somewhat as stated there, to-wit: Had the road department
located and established the road? The evidence is convincing
that the department had in fact theretofore located and estab-
dished the road which they are now, by implication, seeking to
abandon. There appears yet another compelling reason to de-

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feat the move. The evidence shows, subsequent to the survey
and construction of this road pursuant to lawful authority,
the legislature in 1923 formally designated the road. (Chap-
ter 9311). It must be borne in mind that this move is not
merely to remove a dangerous curve or eliminate a local
hazard but involves building several miles of new road.
Neither can it be claimed to be an actual location of the legis-
lative declaration of the road. This road was in existence
when designated. .

The record is replete with evidence that the road was sur-
veyed and located by the State Road Department. It was built
under state supervision, at the expense of the state, and the
cost was shared by the United States Government by repre-
sentation of the state that it was a state highway. The only
thing left undone, according to the road department, is their
failure to file the plat. Surely this was little more than a
ministerial function to evidence the doing of that which now
conclusively appears was done. The effect of the filing could
only have given prima facie evidence of vesting title in the
state to the road. The statute indicates nothing in the way of
a penalty for failure to file the plat.

CLYDE B. SIMPSON, as Tax Collector of Duval County, Florida, and
J. M. LEE, as Comptrolier of the State of Florida, v. SCOTT M.
LOFTIN and JOHN W. MARTIN, as Trustees of the property of
Florida East Coast Railway Company.

33 So. (2nd) 230 June Term, 1947,
January 9, 1948 Division A

21

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, T. Paine Kelly, Assist-
ant Attorney General, J. Henry Blount, County Attorney, for
appellants.

Russell L. Frink and Samuel Kessewitz, for appellees.
TERRELL, J.:

Appellees as complainants filed their amended bill of com-
plaint in the Circuit Court of Duval County to restrain ap-
pellants, as defendants, from collecting taxes levied and as-
sessed by them against certain tangible and intangible per-
sonal property held by complainants on the first day of Janu-
ary, 1942 in their capacity as Trustees for the East Coast
Railway Company. Epitomizing from the amended bill of
complaint, the chancellor in his final decree catalogued said
assessments as follows:

“(1) 1942 Intangible Property tax:
Value Amount of Tax

Class A. -$ 2,311,110.00 $ 115.55
Class B 769,150.00 769.15
Class D 557,030.00 557.03
Total .... $1,441.03
“((2) 1942 Tangible Personal Property Tax
10% Penalty (Failure to Value Amount of Tax
the Return) ---$2,4.00.00 $36.01

Total _.........

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and for the years 1943, 1944 and 1945 as follows:
“(3) 1943 Intangible Property Tax:

Class A’

766.220.00 766.22
941,870.00 941.87

-$2.074.37

Value Amount of Tax
$18,330,140.00 $ 916.50
766,330.00 766.33
1,061.920.00 1,016.92

$2,699.75

“(5) 1945 Intangible Property Tax:
Value Amount of Tax
$24,121,520.00 $1,206.08
759,270.00 759.27
1,252,950.00 1,252.95

Class A ...
Class B
Class D

Total $3,218.30”

Motions to dismiss the amended bill were overruled and
separate answers were filed by each defendant in which all
material allegations were denied. The answer of the comp-
troller denied that the intangible personal property held by
the plaintiffs as trustees were assessed by him as a comp-
troller or by the Railroad Assessment Board of which he was a
member. A Master was appointed to take testimony and
make findings of law and fact. In one of the most compre-
hensive reports we have had occasion to examine the master
found both law and fact to be in favor of the plaintiffs and
held the assessments to be illegal and void.

Exceptions to the master’s report were overruled and a
final decree was entered by the chancellor confirming the mas-
ter’s report. The final decree not only adjudicated the in-
tangible personal property assessments for the years 1942,
1943, 1944 and 1945 to be illegal and void, it enjoined the Tax

23

Collector of Duval County from issuing any process or other-
wise attempting the collection of said taxes. This appeal is
from the final decree.

It may be stated at the outset that there is no attempt here
to evade payment of the taxes in question, neither is there any
dispute about the amount or classification of the taxes. It ap-
pears admitted that the amounts assessed are perhaps correct.
The whole controversy here revolves around that of who
should legally impose and collect the taxes in question, the
taxing officers of Duval County, or the Comptroller or the
Railway Assessment Board.

The Comptroller was made a party to the amended bill of
complaint because the original bill prayed cancellation of the
second item listed above, being a $36.01 assessment on personal
property. The said property was furnishings in the general
offices of the Trustees for the East Coast Railway Company
and their Counsel in the Graham Building in Jacksonville.
Section 200.40. Florida Statutes 1941, contemplates that
when personal property of this class is in litigation on account
of taxes, the comptroller be made a party thereto and there
was no objection to making him a party to this suit. In his
report the Master held that the tangible personal properties
represented by item 2 above, were owned and held by the East
Coast Railway exclusively for railroad purposes and under the
law were assessible by the Comptroller on the Railway Assess-
ment Board. The Chancellor approved the Master’s findings
and in his final decree voided the assessments, no assign-
ment of error having been based thereon, the Chancellor’s de-
cree became final as to this item.

The question of taxability of the item of tangible personal
properties being concluded, there remains nothing to be ad-
judicated but the assault on the assessment of intangible per-
sonal properties detailed in items one, three, four and five
above. In our view these items represent properties held and
used exclusively for operating purposes and the taxes on them
must be assessed and imposed by the Comptroller or the Rail-
road Assessment Board, and the County taxing authorities of
Duval County have no authority whatever to impose taxes on
them.

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This affirmation is predicated on Section 195.01, Florida
Statutes 1941, under which what is commonly known as the
unit system from taxing railroad properties was inaugurated.
In so far as applicable here, this act requires every “railroad
company or street railroad company or sleeping or parlor car
company, or the receiver thereof, whose car, track or roadbed,
or any part thereof is in this state, shall annually, on or before
the first Monday in March, return to the Comptroller of the
state, under their oath, the total length of such railroad, the
total length and value of such main track, branch, switch and
spur track, and side track, lots or parts of lots not leased or
rented, and terminal facilities, in this state, and the total
length and value thereof in each county, city or incorporated
town in this state as of the first day of January. They shall
also make return of the number and value of all locomotives,
engines, passenger, sleeping, freight, parlor, platform con-
struction and other cars and appurtenances (including shop
equipment, tools), stock in warehouse and other personal
property used or to be used in connection with the construc-
tion, operation or maintenance of the property of the com-
pany...”

The act further provides that if such returns are not made
to the Comptroller in the manner provided, then the Comp-
troller, Attorney General and the State Treasurer (Railroad
Assessment Board) shall assess the properties from the best
information available and specify the value thereof to each
county and the value of the locomotives, engines, passenger,
parlor, freight, platform, construction and other cars and ap-
purtenances shall be apportioned by the comptroller, prorata
to each mile of main track, branch, switch, spur track and side
track and the Comptroller shall notify the County Tax Asses-
sor of each county through which such railroad runs, the num-
ber of miles of track and the value thereof, and the propor-
tionate value of the personal property taxable in their respec-
tive counties, special school districts, special road districts
and other special districts that may exist.

The gist of the unit system if taxation as so defined, re-
quires that the value of the railroad system as a whole, be first
determined and such value is then apportioned or distributed

25

on the basis outlined to the counties, districts, municipalities,
and other governmental units. Its purpose is to treat the
physical properties, intangible properties, and capital stock
of the railroad as a unit for taxation and to distribute the as-
sessed value thereof to the counties and other units of govern-
ment in proportion to milage. Such a system is in general use
throughout the country and is approved by all the Courts of
last resort, including the Supreme Court of the United States.
State Railroad Tax Case, 92 U.S. 575, 23 L. ed. 663; Bloxham
v. Consumers Electric Light & Street Railway Company, 36
Fla. 519, 18 So. 444; Ellis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 68 Fla. 160,
66 So. 1005; Atlantic Coast Line v. Amos, 94 Fla. 588, 115
So. 315; Lee Comptroller v. Atlantic Coast Line, 145 Fla. 618,
200 So. 71; Columbus Southern Railway Company v. Wright
et al., 151 U.S. 470, 38 L. ed. 238, 14 Sup. Ct. 396.

These decisions proceed on the general theory that there
is nothing in the constitution prohibiting such a method of
assessing railroad taxes and that it is the best means yet de-
vised by which fairness and uniformity of assessments may be
approached. It would hardly be reasonable to contend that a
public service corporation like a railroad company with its
lines extending over a multitude of taxing entities with as
many theories of taxation should be put to the annoyance and
expense of treating with each of them separately. The Fed-
eral decisions uphold the unit system on the theory that it is
the best method yet devised to promote equity and ‘uniformity
of taxation as contemplated by the constitution. Some phase
of it has been in effect in this State for more than seventy-five
years.

If the railroad company owns leased or rented properties
or properties not used in the operation of its railway system,
the local taxing authorities may assess and impose taxes on
them, but as to all properties used in and which are essential
to its operation, Section 195.01, Florida Statutes 1941, is a
complete and exclusive method for taxing them. The statute
withdrew the power to tax such properties from the local tax-
ing entities and placed it in the hands of the comptroller or
railway assessing board, in order that the properties be
treated as a unit and taxed as such.

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Chapter 199, Florida Statutes 1941, relating to intangible
taxes, is in the same category in so far as it affects intangibles
of the railroad companies held and used exclusively for rail-
road operating purposes. Section 192.03, Florida Statutes
1941, defining personal property for the purpose of taxation,
includes “debts due or to become due from solvent debtors
whether on assessment, contract note or otherwise, and all
public stocks or shares in incorporated or unincorporated com-
panies.” This language is ample to cover the assessments in
question. In so far as intangible personal property is owned
and held by railroad companies for operative purposes, we do
not think the intangible tax act made any change in its status.
This appears to have been the view of the comptroller and the
railway assessing Board and we think it correct.

The Special Master reached a similar conclusion and sup-
ported it on the further ground that the intangibles involved
in this case have been held and owned by the Hast Coast Rail-
way Company for many years. Advances on them were made
many years ago and their existence and ownership by the
railroad company have been reported annually in their state-
ments to the Interstate Commerce Commission of the Florida

“ Railroad Commission for years. They were matters of public
record, known to every one, and no attempt has previously
been made by the taxing authorities of Duval County to im-
pose taxes on them.

Provision for special rate on intangible personal property
was first placed in the constitution as an amendment to Sec-
tion 1, Article IX, and Chapter 15789, Acts of 1931, was the
first act classifying intangibles and authorizing the comp-
troller to prescribe rules for the administration of the act.
The 1931 Act was amended by Chapter 20,724, Acts of 1941,
but neither of these acts show any intent whatever to depart
from the long established rule requiring the comptroller to
assess as a unit all property of railroads “used in connection
with their construction, operation or maintenance.”

We have not attempted to detail the manner and purpose
for which the intangibles in question were acquired. This is
fully set out in the bill of complaint. It is enough to say here
that the allegations of the bill show that they are used solely

be
27

for railroad operating purposes as contemplated by Section
195.01, Florida Statutes 1941, and may be assessed only by the
Comptroller. The assessment of them by the Tax Assessor of
Duval County is therefore void. .

‘We have examined the cases and the argument relied on
by appellants but we do not think they overcame the theory
advanced herein to support the authority of the Comptroller
and the Railroad Assessment Board. When a system has been
in use as long as the unit system of assessing railroad proper-
ties has been, and is as universally applied, we would not be
authorized to overthrow it except by plain word of the legis-
lature, so providing. This is all the more true when to do so
would confuse and revolutionize the whole system of railroad
assessments.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

FLORIDA ATHLETIC & HEALTH CLUB, a non-profit corporation or-
ganized under the laws of the State of Florida, and R. G. SMILEY,
duly authorized officer of Florida Athletic & Health Club, v. C. E.
ROYCE and AUDREY S. ROYCE, his wife.

33 So. (2nd) 222 June Term, 1947
January 9, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied February 4, 1948

iS]
o

W. Kenneth Barnes and A. W. Brubaker, for appellants.
Dayton, Dayton & Dayton and H. Lane Coachman, for ap-
pellee.
UPON REHEARING GRANTED
BARNS, J.:
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from an adverse judg-
ment in unlawful entry proceedings.

In the trial court the appellants-plaintiffs complained:

“.,. that C. E. Royce and Audrey S. Royce, his wife, have
unlawfully turned it and its membership out of possession,
and against its and its officers’ consent, and withholds from
it and its membership possession of certain real estate...”

The defendants-appellees filed a plea of not guilty and,
upon a hearing before the judge, with jury trial waived, the
judge entered a judgment of dismissal, and thereupon plain-
tiffs appealed, and the errors assigned are substantially as fol-
dows:

(a) That the trial court, in determining appellants’ right
of action, erred in considering and giving weight to title,
which was irrelevant to plaintiffs’ right of action.

(b) That the court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ petition
at the close of their testimony in chief, after proving that
within three years the defendants did unlawfully: enter and
take possession of the land at a time when such land was in
‘the actual and exclusive possession of appellants, such entry
being unlawful in that it was without appellants’ consent and
‘was not given by law.

The applicable statutory provisions are as follows:

“82.01. UNLAWFUL ENTRY AND FORCIBLE ENTRY
DEFINED. No person shall enter into any lands or tene-
aments but in case where entry is given by law, nor shall any
‘person, where entry is given by law, enter with strong hand or
with multitude of people, but only in a peaceable, easy and
open manner.

“82.02. UNLAWFUL ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DE-
TENTION DEFINED. No person who shall, without consent,
enter in a peaceable, easy and open manner into any lands or
tenements, shall hold the same afterwards against the consent
of the party entitled to possession thereof.

“82.05. QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THIS PROCEED-
ING. No question of title, but only a right of possession and
of damages, shall be involved in the action.”

FS. 1941, F.S.A.

The elements of plaintiffs’ actions are: (1) The plaintiffs
rust have been in possession; (2) must be ousted of posses-

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sion; (3) the defendants withhold possession from the
plaintiffs and without their consent; (4) the plaintiffs were
deprived of possession within three years of the filing of the
suit.

The facts established are that the plaintiff corporation’s
actual occupancy and possession continued until the defend-
ants, without permission of the plaintiff corporation and with-
out having instituted legal proceedings to acquire possession
of the premises, moved and took possession of the premises;
that, while the plaintiff corporation was in possession with
its furniture on the premises, the defendants moved their
furniture onto the premises, and took possession, without the
permission of the plaintiff corporation and without the as-
sistance of any writ of possession or similar judgment result-
ing from a proceeding in any court.

The appellants-plaintiffs had a caretaker on the premises
who yielded to the directions of the appellees when they took
possession. The appellee, Royce, was a member of plaintiff
club and was charged with knowledge of the caretaker’s au-
thority.

Our court held that our State statute is similar to the
English statute, and its use is:

“|. to provide a summary legal remedy for restoring
possession to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the
peace, which would likely ensue if no summary legal remedy
existed, and the parties undertook to continue to resort to
their own private common law means for enforcing their
rights in such cases.

“The action... was designed to compel the party out of
actual possession, whether the real owner and entitled to a
present right of possession or not, to respect the actual posses-
sion of another, wrongful though it might be, by requiring
him to resort to the law alone to obtain the possession he
claims to be his.. Notes 19 Am. St. Rep. 544, 121 Am. St. Rep.
8371, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 426; Iron Mountain & H.R. Co. v. John-
son, 119 U.S. 608, 7 S. Ct. 339, 30 L. ed. 504.”

Hewitt, Judge, v. State ex rel. Palmer, 108 Fla. 335, 146.
So. 578, at page 579.

31

See also Goffin v. McCall, 91 Fla. 514, 108 So. 558, at bot-
tom of page:

“... The procédure rested upon actual possession by the
injured party. That possession the law protected against the
forcible or otherwise unlawful entry of the landlord or the
person claiming the right of entry. The owner of the title or
a trespasser who had gone into possession peaceably could be
the wronged party; the circumstance of whether he was the
wrongdoer or the injured party depending upon the fact of
actual or unlawful act of the other. See 1 Cooley on Torts
(8rd Ed.) 77.”

This Court, in Benjamin S. Liddon, et al., v. Hartwell
Hodnett, 22 Fla. 271, at page 275, defined the two classes of
entry as:

“*... (1) Where another enters in any case where entry is
not given by law. (2) Where another enters with strong hand
or multitude of people . . . The first and second classes are
unlawful entries, the second differing from the first in that the
latter is made unlawful by the fact of its being with strong
hand or multitude of people, ...”—-and at page 278:

“

. . where there has been an unlawful entry, whether
forcible or otherwise, the detention under it is of course un-
lJawful and a continuation of the wrong, ...”—and at bottom
of page 278:

“,,. It makes no difference under our statute whether or
not there are any manifestations of force or any threats of
violence in the withholding possession, if the action be either
for an unlawful entry, or for a forcible entry...”

The Florida statute divides the action into two parts, one
part, “unlawful entry,” is applicable where the entry is with-
out force but without due process of law and without the con-
sent of the party in possession, and the other, “forcible entry,”
where the entry is accompanied by force or with a multitude
of people, to-wit:

“No person shall enter into any lands or tenements but in
case where entry is given by law, nor... (balance refers to
forcible entry). (82.01, supra) .—and,

[|
32

“No person who shall, without consent enter in a peace-
able, easy and open manner into any lands or tenements, hold
the same afterwards against the consent of the party entitled
to possession thereof.” (82.02, supra).

Appellants contend that in the instant case, the lower
court erred in dismissing the cause at the close of plaintiffs’
testimony in chief, after plaintiffs had shown such possession,
entry, eviction and withholding without permission.

Under the common law the unlawful detainer was forcible
detainer, and unlawful entry was forcible entry, but under our
statute we have both such actions, either with or without
force.

It appears that the trial judge considered and gave weight
to evidence relating to title, and our statutory provision is
that:

“No question of title, but only a right of possession and of
damages, shall be involved in the action.”

Sec. 82.05, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

The “right of possession” referred to in this Section of the
statute has reference to the present right of possession, and
not the ultimate right. It has reference to the right of pos-
session to be determined under the issues made by the plead- .
ings prescribed by the statute and not the ultimate right of
possession as might be determined by a suit in ejectment.

This Court has held that such proceedings:

“... cannot be used in a place of ejectment or trespass to

’ try title to land in a proceeding brought in the county court.

Perry Naval Stores Co. v. Griffin, 57 Fla. 133, 49 So. 554.”

And, as to the ultimate right of possession, it has been pro-
vided that such rights would not be affected by judgment in
unlawful entry or detainer by providing in respect thereto
that:

“No judgment rendered either for plaintiff or defendant
shall bar any action of trespass for injury to the property, or
ejectment, between the same parties respecting the same
property in question; nor shall any verdict be held conclusive
of the facts therein found, in any action of trespass or eject-
ment.”

Sec. 82.17, FS. 1941, F.S.A.
The judgment appealed from is reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD, CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ.,
concur,
ADAMS, J., dissents.
TERRELL, J., not participating.
ESTHER SCHWENOK, by her guardian and next friend, LOUISE
SCHWENCK, v. HARRY JACOBS, IDA JACOBS and SHIRLEY

JACOBS by her guardian, Harry Jacobs, and CHARLES G. HAN-
NOOK.

33 So. (2nd) 592 January Term, 1948
January 18, 1948 En Banc

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Ginsberg & Pilafian, for appellant.

McKay, Dixon, DeJarnette & Bradford, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

The final judgment entered in this case was as follows:

“This cause coming on to be heard before me upon the
Demurrer of the defendants, Harry Jacobs, Ida Jacobs and
Shirley Jacobs, by her guardian, Harry Jacobs, to the plain-
tiffs’ second amended declaration, and after argument of
counsel for the respective parties, and the court being duly
advised in the premises.

“IT IS THEREUPON ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
the said demurrer be and the same is hereby sustained.

“TT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
plaintiffs take nothing by their writ in this cause, and that the
defendants, Harry Jacobs, Ida Jacobs, and Shirley Jacobs by
her guardian, Harry Jacobs, go hence without day and that
the said defendants have judgment against the plaintiffs for
their costs in this behalf expended.”

Thereupon the plaintiffs-appellants prosecuted an appeal
and the appellees-defendants filed their motion to dismiss the
appeal upon the ground that such judgment is not such a final
judgment as is appealable, as provided by Section 59.02 (1),
Ch. 22854, Acts 1945.

Whether a judgment entered by the trial court is such a
final judgment as will support an appeal depends largely upon
its legal effect. If it is one final in nature and wherein time
has commenced to run, whereby the trial court will lose juris-
diciton to further consider or reconsider, then for purposes of
appeal or writ of error it is a final judgment.

Of course an order that the demurrer be sustained, that a
non-suit be granted, or that defendant have judgment, is in-
sufficient; in these instances more is required.

The limitations for taking an appeal or writ of error are
with the object that the successful party will know when his
litigation has ended and, also, that it be ended.

In Cook v. Cook, 18 Fla. 634, the plaintiff's case was dis-
missed by the Clerk for his failure to file a declaration, and
the trial judge denied a motion of plaintiff to set aside judg-
ment of dismissal, and it was held that same constituted a
final judgment of dismissal, and it was held that same consti-
tuted a final judgment to support a writ of error to a final
judgment.

A judgment non prosequitur that “plaintiff take nothing”
and “suit stand dismissed” held to support writ of error to
final judgment.

Hewitt v. International Shoe Co., 110 Fla. 37, 148 So. 533.

A non-suit without an order of dismissal is not sufficient
to support a writ of error to a final judgment.

Goldring v. Reid, 60 Fla. 78, 53 So. 503.

“Where in a suit at law it is determined by the Judge of the
Circuit Court in which the case has been instituted that such
Court is without jurisdiction to proceed therein, and that the
cause should therefore be dismissed at plaintiff’s costs, and
an order of dismissal is accordingly entered, dismissing the
suit at law solely because of the Circuit Court’s finding of its
own lack of jurisdiction and for no other cause, such an order
being final in its nature, may submit a writ of error....”

. State ex rel., George P. Garrett v. John B. Johnson, Circuit
Judge, 112 Fla. 112, 113, 150 So. 239, 151 So. 315.

Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court may attach only after a
judgment final in its nature has been entered by the trial court
and after time has commenced to run when the trial court
will not longer have power to exercise its jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the judgment.

When the judgment appealed is a judgment on demurrer
to a declaration as is final in its nature and is such as to end
the pendency of the case in the trial court as between the ap-

35

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pellant and the appellee, then it is such a final judgment as is
appealable. The rule stated in Ropes v. Lansing (1903), 46
Fla. 231, 35 So. 863, does not apply because therein there was
no final judgment.

The judgment appealed as between the parties to the ap-
peal is a final judgment ending the pendency of the case in the
trial court as between the parties to the appeal.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

THOMAS, C. J.. TERRELL, BUFORD, CHAPMAN,
ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

‘ CURTIS NEEL and his wife MATTIN NEEL v. M. B. RUDMAN and his

wife JOSEPHINE DAVIS RUDMAN, HARRY SUSMAN and
JAMES G. ALLISON.

33 So. (2nd) 234 January Term, 1948
January 13, 1948 En Banc

James H. Finch, for appellants.
B. L. Solomon, for appellees.
BUFORD, J.:
The amended bill of complaint, among other things, al-

» leged in effect that plaintiff, being the owner of certain lands

in Jackson County, Florida, on November ist 1943, executed
an oil and gas ten year term lease to Sun Oil Company for the
sum of $75.00 or 25c per acre rental. A copy of the lease is
attached to the bill and is in conventional form. That on
August 23rd 1944, while said lease was in full force and effect,
“the defendant M. B. Rudman, called at the home of the
plaintiff, near Grand Ridge, Florida, and introduced himself
to the plaintiffs as being the agent of the said Sun Oil Com-
pany, and then and there stated and represented to the plain-
tiffs that the said Sun Oil Company, which he then repre-
sented, had more money than it knew what to do with, and de-
sired to invest some of its surplus moneys in purchasing from
the plaintiffs, and from other lessors to said Sun Oil Company,
a one-half share of the 1% royalty which the plaintiffs and
other lessors to said Sun Oil Company had reserved to them-
selves in their leases to Sun Oil Company, and that he, the
said Rudman, was then and there ready to purchase of and
from the plaintiffs a one-half share of such 4% royalty so re-
served by the plaintiffs in their said lease to Sun Oil Company,
and that he, the said Rudman, would pay to plaintiffs then and
there the sum of 50c per acre, or the sum of $150.00, for such
share of said royalty. And the said Rudman then and there
withdrew from his brief case a printed form of instrument
for the plaintiff Curtis Neel to examine, and handed the same
to him; and the plaintiff Curtis Neel did read over the same,
and found nothing in the printed form contrary to the repre-
sentations made by said Rudman to plaintiffs as hereinafter
set out, and the said Rudman, after the plaintiff Curtis Neel
had looked over the form handed him, took up from the plain-
tiff Curtis Neel the form which he the said Rudman had of-
fered for examination, and thereafter withdrew from his brief
ease another printed form which he, the said Rudman, pre-
sented for execution by the plaintiffs.

That the plaintiff Curtis Neel acting for himself and his
wife, then and there inquired of the said Rudman if the instru-
ment which he, the said Rudman, had and held in his hand and
offered to plaintiffs for execution, when executed by plaintiffs
would in anywise reduce or affect the annual rental which the
plaintiffs had been receiving and expected to continue to re-

37

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ceive from their lease to Sun Oil Company, and further in-
quired of said Rudman as to how long a period of time the
instrument so offered to plaintiffs for execution would run or
Jast, and further inquired of said Rudman if the instrument
which he had offered the plaintiffs for execution would or did
cover or include anything other than the 4% royalty which the
plaintiffs had reserved in their said lease to Sun Oil Com-
pany. :

IM That the said Rudman did then and there, in response
to the said inquiries of the plaintiffs, in order to induce the ”
plaintiffs to execute the said instrument so offered by him to
them for execution, (and which the plaintiffs did thereafter
execute), stated and represented to the plaintiffs the following
material facts, as an inducement to the execution of said
instrument, to-wit: .

(a) That the said instrument was only for the purchase of
a.one-half share of the royalty which the plaintiffs had re-
served in their lease to Sun Oil Company, as aforesaid: (b)
that the said instrument covered nothing else than the pur-
chase of a one-half share of plaintiffs said 4 royalty; (c) that
he, the said Rudman, was then and there the agent of the
said Sun Oil Company; (d) that the life of the said instru-
ment which he, the said Rudman, offered for execution would
be the same as the life of the lease to Sun Oil Company,—that
the said instrument would expire or run out as and when the
lease aforesaid should run out; (e) and that by the plain-
tiffs executing the said instrument so offered the annual
rents from the said Sun Oil Company would not in any man-
ner be reduced or affected.—that plaintiffs would continue to
receive the full rentals provided for in their lease to Sun Oil
Company.

That the plaintiff had found their dealings with the said
Sun Oil Company entirely satisfactory, and the introduction
by said Rudman of himself as agent of that company tended
to create and did create in the plaintiffs a feeling of confidence
in the said M. B. Rudman and a feeling of confidence or faith
in the truthfulness of the aforesaid representations which the
said Rudman had made to the plaintiffs; and the’ terms and
consideration and effect of the said instrument so offered to

plaintiffs for execution as stated by said Rudman appearing
to be fair and just to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs having
at the time been without any experience in the reading and in-
terpretation of written contracts, leases and deeds, and being
without the ability to understand and construe such docu-
ments as oil and gas and mineral deeds, the plaintiffs believed
the said material representations of fact so made to the
plaintiffs by the said Rudman, as above stated, to be true and
relied upon such representations as being true, and so believ-
ing and so relying upon the truth of such representations, and
having no notice or knowledge that such representations were
untrue, the plaintiffs signed and executed the instrument as so
presented to them as aforesaid and deliveréd the same to said
M. B. Rudman and received of and from said Rudman the con-
sideration for such instrument in the sum of $150.00.

Plaintiffs aver that said instrument of which Exhibit B is
a copy, was duly filed for record and recorded in the public
deed records of Jackson County, Florida, in Deed Book 373,
page 170, on Sept. 5, 1944, and a certified copy of said instru-
ment, marked Exhibit B, is hereto attached and by reference
made a part hereof.

Plaintiffs further aver that after the said instrument,
Exhibit B, was executed and delivered to said Rudman, he, the
said Rudman, gathered up and took away with him all printed
forms of said instrument and left the plaintiffs no copy what-
ever, but such circumstances did not, however, at the time,
cause any suspicion on the part of the plaintiffs.

That the plaintiffs did not have any knowledge or notice
of the true character of the instrument which they had exe-
cuted until after the next annual rental payment from Sun
Oil Company to plaintiffs became due and payable; and the
plaintiffs then found and were advised that only one half the
annual rental was remitted to the plaintiffs, and that one half
of such rental payment had been made to said M. B. Rudman,
and his assignees.

39

I That sometime thereafter the plaintiffs employed an
attorney, and procured from the Clerk’s office a copy of the
said instrument, Exhibit B, labeled MINERAL RIGHT AND |

PC
“40

ROYALTY TRANSFER. That upon obtaining a copy of said
instrument the plaintiffs were advised by their attorney, and
now allege the fact to be, that the said instrument (Exhibit
B) so executed by plaintiffs to said M. B. Rudman was not and
is not the instrument so explained and represented by the
said Rudman to the plaintiffs to be, but that on the contrary
the said instrument does cover and include an assignment of
one-half the annual rentals payable to the plaintiffs under the
terms of their said lease to Sun Oil Company, and does further
contain an outright grant or conveyance in perpetuity of a
one half share or interest in all oil, gas and other minerals. on,
in or under the lands of the plaintiffs aforesaid, described in
Section 2 of this amended bill, and that the said instrument
constitutes a perpetual encumbrance on and limitation of the
fee simple title to said lands of the plaintiffs, and seriously
and injuriously affects, for all time to come, unless the said
instrument be cancelled, the value, the loan value and the
marketability of the plaintiffs’ said lands.

Plaintiffs further aver that the aforesaid representations
of material facts stated and made to the plaintiffs by the said
Rudman, as an inducement to the plaintiffs to execute the said
instrument, of which Exhibit B is a copy, as representations
of such facts as are set forth in paragraph 1 of Section 5 of
this amended bill, were each and every one of them false,
fraudulent and untrue, and were at the time the said represen-
tations were made by said Rudman by him known to be false
and untrue; that the said representations of material facts so
made by said Rudman to plaintiffs as aforesaid, were relied
on and believed by the plaintiffs to be true at the time they
executed the said instrument to said Rudman, represented by
Exhibit B, and such false and material representations of fact
had the effect of inducing, and did induce, the plaintiffs to
execute the said instrument, Exhibit B, which the plaintiffs
would not have executed but for said false representations of
material facts and the plaintiffs’ reliance on such representa-
tions as being true.

Plaintiffs further aver that at the time of the execution of
the said instrument, Exhibit B, the said M. B. Rudman and
the plaintiffs did not stand upon equal footing, in this, to-wit:

that the said Rudman at such time was trained and experi-
enced in the understanding and interpreting of contracts,
leases and deeds relating to oil, gas and other minerals, and
for a long time prior to the execution of said instrument,
Exhibit B, the said Rudman had been engaged as a business in
taking leases, mineral rights and royalty transfers, and other
like instruments from various and sundry people, and in mak-
ing transfers of all kinds involving oil, gas and mineral rights
in lands, and the said Rudman then and there knew the legal
effect of the said instrument which he procured the plaintiffs
to execute, whereas the plaintiffs, at the time of making said
Mineral Right and Royalty Transfer had no knowledge of or
experience in the making of leases, contracts or deeds relating |
to oil, gas or other mineral rights, and were incapable of in-
terpreting or understanding the legal effect of the instrument
which they executed, represented by Exhibit B.” It was then
alleged that Rudman and his assigns have since said trans-
action, received one-half of the annual rentals paid by Sun Oil
Company for said lease.

It is alleged that Rudman and wife have assigned certain
interests in said minerals to one Susman and to one Allison
who, with their respective wives, are joined as defendants.
The plaintiffs offer to return to Rudman sufficient of the con-
sideration paid them which with the payments made by Sun
Oil Company to Rudman will equal the amount paid by Rud-
man to plaintiffs in this transaction.

41

It must be borne in mind that a conveyance of a royalty
interest and the conveyance of minerals in place are two en-
tirely different documents and convey entirely different inter-
ests, but that to the average man with no experience in such
matters they appear so much alike as for one to be easily sub-
stituted for the other.

The chief difference in these two documents is that a
royalty deed provides:

“That I or we ..... .--, Grantor, of way LOY
and in consideration of the sum of .. -- ($ ) Dollars
cash in hand paid by .... Grantee, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, and for other valuable con

Le
42

siderations do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto
said Grantee ... -_ .» aS same may be produced and
saved, of the oil and gas in or under the following described
land in the county of State of -, to-wit:
(description) ”

And also:

“However, if oil or gas be produced from said lands by
Grantor or by any other in paying quantity, then there shall
be paid to Grantee, his heirs, personal representatives or
assigns, the above and foregoing part of the total saved pro-
duction; namely, thereof, as royalty, according
to this Deed.”

While the mineral Deed provides:

“That I, or we, .... a
for and in consideration of the sum of . ($ )
Dollars cash in hand paid by ....... Grantee, receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, and for other valuable con-
siderations do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto said
Grantee the following described interest in the oil and gas and
other minterals, to-wit:
comprising a acres, more or less; together with the
rights of ingress and egress for making geological investiga-
tions and exploring for oil and gas and other mineral possi-
bilities, and of erecting structures of any needful kind for pro-
ducing, saving, storing and transporting oil and gas and other
mineral, as, if and when produced on the premises, and to do-
any and every matter and thing incident to such operation;
with the right to remove any and all property of whatsoever
kind or character placed on the said land.” —

And also:

“Wither party hereto having an interest in the oil, gas or
other minerals under the terms of this deed, his heirs, assigns
or personal representatives may lease the lands herein de-
scribed for the exploration of oil, gas and/or other minerals
and thereupon the parties hereto shall be bound by the terms
of such lease and the parties hereto shall share in the proceeds
of such lease in proportion to the interest of each in such oil,
gas or other minerals, as fixed by this Deed; provided, how-

ever, no lease shall be made for less than a one-eighth royalty
in addition to such cash payments or rentals as may be re-
quired of Lessee.”

These are matters so generally known that courts may
take judicial cognizance of them.

Our conclusion is that the amended bill of complaint states
equitable grounds for the relief prayed as against Rudman and
wife but fails to show such guilty knowledge on the part of
their alleged assignees. So the order dismissing the cause as
to Rudman and wife is reversed but such order as to Susman
and Allison is affirmed.

So ordered.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

43

Es
BERT BRUNKE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
33 So. (2nd) 226 January Term, 1948
January 13, 1948 Division A

Chas. E. Flynn, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowne, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.
SEBRING, J.:
The appellant, Bert Brunke, was jointly tried with one
Frank J. Vachevicz under a criminal information in five

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44

counts, in the Criminal Court of Record for Duval County.
After all of the evidence was in the County Solicitor aban-
doned two of the counts and the case went to the jury on the
remaining three counts. These counts, framed on a set of
facts growing out of a single and related transaction, charged
armed robbery, larceny of a taxicab, and the kidnapping of
the driver contrary to section 805.01 Florida Statutes 1941.
The jury found the appellant Brunke guilty as to each of the
three counts and the trial court entered its judgment and sen-
tence on the verdict. Brunke has taken an appeal from the
judgment and sentence.

We are of opinion that the evidence adduced was sufficient
to sustain the verdict and judgment as to each of the three
counts submitted to the jury. The only real question before
us, therefore, is whether the trial of the defendant was free of
prejudicial error. .

There is no merit to the contention that the judgment
should be reversed because of orders made by the trial judge
refusing to grant motions for continuance and for a severance.
The rule is that an application for continuance is one ad-.
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and an order
made thereon will not be reversed unless there has been a
palpable abuse of judicial discretion. See Acree v. State, 153
Fla. 561, 15 So. (2nd) 262. The same rule obtains with refer-
ence to motions for severance. Ballard v. State, 31 Fla. 266,
12 So. 865; Samuels v. State, 123 Fla. 280, 166 So. 743. We
fail to find in the record any evidence of an abuse of discretion
by the trial judge in entering the orders that he did.

On this appeal it is contended for the first time by the ap-
pellant that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial
awarded, because the court failed to charge the jury in respect
to the weight and consideration to be given an extra-judicial
confession made by the appellant to one of the arresting of-
ficers prior to trial and used at the trial by the prosecution.
It is said that the charge should have been given, even though
not requested by the defendant.

From the record it appears that during the course of the
trial certain evidence with respect to the voluntariness of the
confession alleged to have been made by the appellant was

first heard by the trial judge out of the presence of the jury.
In this preliminary inquiry, the appellant offered no testimony
on the issue but did object to the evidence adduced by the
State, on the ground that when he was interrogated the ap-
pellant “was under the influence and coercion of these officers
at the time he made any such statement.” The objection was
overruled; the trial judge determining, as a matter of law,
that the alleged confession was admissible. After this ruling
the jury was brought back to the box and all testimony in re-
spect of the confession was narrated by the interrogating
officer to the jury. No objection was made at that time to the
testimony given, nor was any countervailing testimony offered
by the appellant.

At the close of all the evidence and the argument of coun-
sel the trial judge proceeded to charge the jury but gave no
instruction concerning the weight to be given an alleged con-
fession. The appellant did not request any instruction on this
point, nor did he raise any objection to the fact that no such
instruction had been given by the trial judge of his own mo-
tion; and when at the close of the instructions the trial judge
directed an inquiry to appellant’s counsel as to whether or not
in respect of the charge given there were “any objections on
the part of the Defendants,” the answer of counsel was “No,
Your Honor.” Subsequently, the appellant filed his motion
for a new trial, and even then did not raise the objection. It
was only when the appeal was taken and grounds of appeal
were filed that appellant saw fit to raise the objection for the
first time.

It is argued by the appellant that his failure to make
timely objections to the failure to give the instruction, or to
request such a charge on his own motion, does not affect the
fact that he is entitled to a reversal of this judgment, even
though no such instruction was requested by him. The ap-
pellant relies on Harrison v. State, 149 Fla. 365, 5 So. (2nd)
703, to support this position. .

It is true that in Harrison v. State, supra, this court held,
in a case involving the death penalty, that “It was the duty of
the trial court under the circwmstances of this case to so
charge the jury, whether requested so to do by counsel or

45

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46

not.” (Italics supplied). But we think that the underlying
facts of that case are so at variance with the facts of the case
at bar as to afford no substantial basis for the appellant’s posi-
tion.

In the Harrison case, as has been indicated, the defendant
was indicted for first-degree murder and was found guilty
without a recommendation of mercy. During the course of
the trial, objections were seasonably made by his counsel to
the reception in evidence of a purported confession given by
him prior to trial. In addition to the purported confession,
certain testimony was given at the trial by one of the deputy
sheriffs who had the defendant in custody during the trial,
with reference to incriminating statements made by the de-
fendant while he was being transported from the courtroom
to the jail under guard. Upon objection, these statements
were excluded by the trial judge and the jury was instructed
to disregard the statements. Without the confessions there
could have been no conviction of the defendant; and it could
not be fairly said that the statements made by the deputy
sheriff on the witness stand, even though the jury was in-
structed to disregard them, did not subconsciously weigh with
the jury in arriving at the verdict rendered.

Section 924.32 (2) Florida Statutes, 1941, make it the
duty of this court “Upon an appeal from the judgment by a de-
fendant who has been sentenced to death . . . to review the evi-
dence to determine if the interests of justice require a new
trial, whether the insufficiency of the evidence is a ground of
appeal or not.” In considering the Harrison case on the ap-
peal this court reviewed the evidence in the light of this
statute, and came to conclusion that under the circumstances
of the case the interests of justice required a new trial. It
would appear, therefore, that the quoted statute was just as
implicit in the decision of the court as though it had been
written in the opinion verbatim; and the decision reached by
the court might well have been put squarely on that ground
without reference to the question of the failure of the trial
judge to give an instruction concerning confessions, when not
requested to do so.

With reference to the case at bar no such situation obtains
as existed in the Harrison case, for even without the testimony
relating to the confession the evidence still would have been
sufficient to have sustained a conviction on the three counts
charged.

Section 918.10 Florida Statutes 1941 as amended by Chap-
ter 22775, Sec. 1, Laws of Florida, 1945, requires that “The
presiding judge shall charge the jury only upon the law of the
case at the conclusion of argument of counsel, and must in-
clude in said charge the penalty fixed by law for the offense
for which the accused is then on trial.” (Italics supplied). No
legislative definition is contained in the statute as to what
shall be comprehended within “the law of the case,” but we
think a reasonable guide may be found in section 54.17 Florida
Statutes, 1941, which applies to cases and proceedings at law
and which prior to amendment applied also to criminal pro-
ceedings. See Secs. 4363 and 8397, C.G.L. 1927. As indicated
by Section 54.17, supra, to charge upon “the law of the case” _
is to charge “upon some points of law arising in the trial of
said cause.” The statute places this duty upon the trial judge
and, except in capital cases, the charge need not be in writing
but “shali be taken by the court reporter, transcribed by him,
and filed in the cause.” See Sec. 918.10 (a) Florida Statutes
1941. If in the opinion of a defendant points of law other
than these comprehended within “the law of the case” are
given by the trial judge, the defendant may protect himself on
the record by objecting thereto “before the jury retires to con-
sider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he ob-
jects, and the grounds of his objection.” See Sec. 918.10(4)
Florida Statutes 1941.: On the other hand, if defendant is of
opinion that the trial judge may not, or will not, give adequate
charges on all phases of “the law of the case,” it is his duty
“At the close of the evidence, or at such earlier time during
the trial as the court reasonably directs . . . to file written re-
quests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth
in the requests.” See Sec. 918.10(3) Florida Statutes 1941.
And in the event the trial judge refuses to give the charge pre-
cisely as requested, the defendant may save the point by
making his objections. See Sec. 918.10(4) Florida Statutes,
1941.

at

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It follows from the conclusions we have reached that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
a

©. ‘A. MIRACLE and ©. A. MIRACLE, JR., Co-Partners, trading and
doing business as Mac’s Bar & Liquor Store, and Mac’s Liquor Store
& Bar, v. HERBERT M. KRIENS.

38 So. (2nd) 644 January Term, 1948

January 16, 1948 En Banc
Rehearing denied February 16, 1948

Evan T. Evans and P. Guy Crews, for appellants.
John T. Teate, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.: . .
C. A. Miracle and C. A. Miracle, Jr., as copartners, were the
owners of a combination cocktail lounge and barroom known
as Mac’s Bar & Liquor Store, operated for the entertainment
and pleasure of white patrons only. They had in their employ
one Dorsey, who is admitted by the pleadings to have been
acting within the scope of his employment in regard to the
matters hereinafter narrated. The barroom was separated
‘from the cocktail lounge by a partition wall running through -
the center of the building from front to back, and partition

openings at front and rear led from one side of the establish-
ment to the other. Along the partition wall on the cocktail
lounge side, booths were built for the use of patrons. A front
door opened from the cocktail lounge into the public street.
On the barroom side, doors opened into the front street and
into the alley or areaway at the rear of the building.

One Saturday evening while the appellee, Herbert M.
Kriens, and a female companion whom he afterwards married
and whom we shall refer to as Mrs. Kriens, were seated in a
booth in a cocktail lounge drinking beer, the employee, Dorsey,
was shot by a former negro employee then on the premises.
The bullet fired by the negro passed through the body of
Dorsey and struck Kriens, inflicting serious injuries. There-
upon Kriens sued the two Miracles and the jury gave him a
verdict for damages. A motion for new trial was denied and
judgment was entered. The defendants below have taken an
appeal from the judgment and question the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain recovery.

The plaintiff below attempts to defend his judgment for
damages entered against the defendants upon the theory that
the proximate cause of his injury was an unlawful and feloni-
ous assault committed by the employee, Dorsey, upon a peace-
able negro then lawfully upon the premises of the defendants,
thereby provoking the negro, in the necessary and justifiable
defense of his person, into shooting the employee with a
pistol he was carrying concealed upon his person, with the
result that the bullet passing through the body of the em-
ployee struck the plaintiff and inflicted injuries.

Whatever may be the legal soundness of the plaintif’s
theory—a matter which in our opinion need not be decided
upon this appeal—the evidence does not support it. The plain-
tiff’s version of what transpired while he and his companion
were seated in the booth is most completely narrated by Mrs.
Kriens, the only eye-witness to the event produced by the
plaintiff, who testified on behalf of her husband as follows:
“Well, I was facing the street in the booth . . . I was looking
out in the street when I saw Dorsey and this fellow through
the left door just behind the booth into this annex part, and
they were arguing, and they took a few steps toward the door,

49

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50

and the colored man was backing up and Dorsey was walking
toward him, and just when I saw them arguing, then, they
made about three or four steps and then I saw Dorsey start to
strike the colored man on the head with something; I do not
know, it looked to me like a club. He struck him the first lick,
and then I saw the gun and then I saw it fire and that is about
all there was to it, and the colored man rushed out the door...
I would say [that Dorsey hit the negro] three or four times...
I said to my husband ‘Oh, he shot that man,’ and at that
instant I looked at my husband and he had a blank look on his
face, and had turned back around then and ducked down
under the table, and of course, then, I realized that he had
been hit too...”

The plaintiff Kriens could add nothing of particular mo-

ment to the testimony given by his wife. His material state-
ments on the issue were: “Well, there was a commotion, which
was in back of me, and I turned around in my seat. I saw
Dorsey, the bartender, in the act of striking this other person,
and that is about the last I know, because about that time I
got the bullet in my head... . The fight actually started—the
argument started in the barroom and the actual fight hap-
pened in the annex.” The plaintiff testified, further, on cross-
examination, that he did not know what caused the argument
between Dorsey and the negro, what had occurred between
them previous to the argument, or who was the initial aggres-
sor in the ensuing encounter.
_ Upon this testimony the trial judge denied a motion for
instructed verdict which contained the ground that the evi-
dence failed to show the liability of the defendants for the
injury sustained; and the defendants thereupon offered evi-
dence in support of their version of the transaction.

This evidence was given by the employee Dorsey, who
testified that the negro who fired the shot had formerly been
employed in the place but had been dismissed by Dorsey on
Wednesday prior to the shooting. At the time of his dismissal
the negro had become angry and had told Dorsey in a threat-
ening tone that “he would come back.” On the following
Saturday night Dorsey had seen the negro come into the bar-
room from the rear door of the building. Dorsey immediately

approached the negro and told him to leave the premises. The
negro made some statement to Dorsey in an impertinent tone,
the exact words used not being clearly heard by Dorsey; and
then instead of leaving the place turned and walked through
the partition doorway into the cocktail lounge, where Mr. and
Mrs. Kriens and other customers were sitting. As the negro
went into the cocktail lounge he was wearing a hat and puffing
on a cigar.

The material features of the remainder of Dorsey’s testi-
money are quoted from the record, as follows: “When he re-
fused to go out the way I told him to, he went in the cocktail
lounge where he wasn’t supposed to be .. . and I picked up a
billy and went around the other way and went in the cocktail
lounge. He was standing in the middle of the floor right
where everybody was sitting around in the booths, and I told
the negro there and then I had asked him out, that I didn’t
want him in there, and he said something smart and... he
acted like he reached for his pocket and I didn’t know what
he was after, and the first thought I had was to put the negro
out as quick as I could and get out of the way, because I
didn’t know what he was up to. So I hit him with the billy,
and about the second time . .. he outs with a 25 and shoots me
before I could get my hands on it . . . It knocked me about
halfway around, and I finished the circle and went back toward
him and... he turned and ran out the door... [The negro]
never flashed [the gun] until he went for his pocket, and I
thought that was what he was after. After he had been
smart, I thought he was up to something . . . I walked up to
him. I seen him standing there and I told him I had told him
to get out, and he made some smart remark, and said that he
would get out when he got ready to, and I said he would get
out now, and he reached for his pocket and that is when I hit
him.”

The statement made by Dorsey to the effect that the entire
affair beginning with the verbal argument and ending with
the exchange of blows took place in the cocktail lounge, and
did not begin in the barroom, as‘contended by the plaintiff,
finds some substantiation in the testimony of one of the de-
fendants who was tending bar at the time of the occurrence.

BL

|
52

He testified: “I didn’t even see the negro at the start; the first.
thing I knew, I saw Dorsey walk around the front of the bar
and pick up this blackjack from under the counter and go to
the other side, and I kept on serving them, figuring he could
take care of the situation ... and the next thing I knew...
‘Dorsey came back in there holding his side, and I said ‘What.
is the matter,’ and he said, ‘I am shot,’ and about that time Mr.
Kriens came in behind him and he fell to the floor...”

If only the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is accepted as
credible, the plaintiff has failed to prove his case; for all that.
he has shown is the fact of an encounter between an employee
of the defendants and a negro then and there in an establish-
ment catering to white patrons only, during the course of
which he, the plaintiff, was injured by a stray bullet fired
from a gun which the negro had had secretly concealed upon
his person. The fact that such an encounter occurred, even °
though the employee was seen to strike the first blow, does
not in and of itself prove that the employee “unlawfully as-
sault the negro who was then lawfully on the premises”—as
is maintained by the plaintiff in the theory of his case.

On the other hand if the evidence offered on behalf of the
defendant is entitled to credence, a much greater reason is
shown for denying recovery. Although the proprietor of a
liquor saloon or other place where intoxicants are sold is not
an insurer of the safety of his patrons, as against outsiders,
other patrons, or even his own servants, he certainly is bound
to use every reasonable effort to maintain order and discipline
among his patrons, his servants, or those who, while not.
necessarily in search of drink or pleasure, come upon the
premises and are likely to produce discords or disorders to
the injury or inconvenience of patrons lawfully in his place of
business. .

It seems reasonably clear from the evidence that the
former negro employee did not come into the defendants’ place
of business for the purpose of drinking with the patrons. In-
deed, had such been his purpose he would certainly have
come forewarned that he would not be welcome there; for it
was known to him that the place run by the defendants catered
to white patrons only. The fact that the negro came in the

53

rear door, not the front door, was carrying a concealed
weapon, and truculently refused to leave the premises when
requested by Dorsey, clearly points to the fact that in all
likelihood he was there to maké trouble, or at least to cause
embarrassment to the defendants; and in all probability an-
ticipated and invited forcible ejection so that he might have
what doubtless seemed to him lawful grounds to use his
weapon. The fact that he did use his gun at the very thresh-
hold of efforts to eject him after he had refused to leave
lends considerable support to the supposition that such must
have been his purpose.

When all of these facts are considered it appears to us
that Dorsey’s actions were entirely commensurate with the
degree of care which the defendants owed to their patrons
lawfully on the premises. It seems apparent that Dorsey took
every precaution that it was possible for a reasonable person
to take in a similar situation. Under the circumstances as
they then were presented, it would have been impracticable for
the police to have been called to eject the former employee,
for the uncontradicted evidence is that the negro reached for
his gun the moment Dorsey approached him for the purpose
of telling him the second time to leave the premises.

The plaintiff below having failed to prove his case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the judgment appealed from
Should be reversed.

_ It is so ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
BUFORD, CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ., dissent.
BUFORD, J., dissenting:
I think the question of weight and credibility of evidence

was for jury. I think Mrs. Kriens testimony made a case for
recovery.

BARNS, J., concurs.

EDWARD J. SINGER, REBA SINGER (His wife), SAMUEL KULOK
and CONSTANCE KULOK (his wife), as partners doing business
under the firm name of NATIONAL HOTEL and WILLIAM H.
SIMON, v. BEN HOW REALTY, INC., a Florida corporation, MOR-

|
54

RIS SCHWARTZ, J. Y. GOOCH CO., INC., a Florida corporation,
GEORGE E. BUNNELL, INC., a Florida corporation, GEORGE E.
BUNNELL, NORMAN FERDARKO, W. L. McKINLEY and PHILIP
E. ELLIS.

383 So. (2nd) 409 January Term, 1948
January 20, 1948 Division B

Broad & Cassel, Vincent C. Giblin and John D. Marsh, for
appellants.

Abe Schonfeld and Kunkel & White, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

This is an appeal from a final decree wherein the chancel-
lor sustained a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’-appellants’ bill of
complaint. The bill alleges that:

“The plaintiffs, Edward 8. Singer, Reba Singer (his wife),
Samuel Kulok and Constance Kulok (his wife), as partners,
are the lessees and are in possession of” certain lots in Miami
Beach and “a certain hotel building (designated and known
as the National Hotel) and other improvements located on
such lots. As such partners they operate and manage such
hotel. The hotel is twelve stories in height and contains one
hundred and fifteen guest rooms. The plaintiff partners also:
operate and manage, in connection with their hotel operations,
a large swimming pool and twenty-two cabanas (which are
also located on the described lots) .”

The bill further alleges that the defendants are now en-
gaged in the construction of a building adjoining the property

of the plaintiffs and that in such construction work now in
progress a gasoline operated crane, pile drivers, excavators,
jackhammers, drills and other similar equipment and appara-
tuses are being employed; that such construction work is.
being done within fifty feet of the nearest point of the
National Hotel building; that in fact, it is being done within
five feet of such point; that such work is, and has been con-
tinuously since it began on November 18, 1947, causing loud,
intense and extremely annoying noises; that such work is be-
ing done, and has been done, daily between the hours of eight
o’clock in the forenoon until five o’clock in the afternoon.
Such work and the noises emanating therefrom have caused,
and are causing, substantial and irreparable financial loss and
damage to the plaintiffs.

The bill further alleges that:

“On December 4, 1946, approximately one-half of the one
hundred and fifteen rooms of the National Hotel were occu-
pied by guests. On the day of the filing of this bill only
fifteen of such rooms are occupied by guests. The loss of
patronage is due entirely to such work and such noises. Since
such work began many guests have left such hotel to procure
other and more desirable accommodations because of the an-
noyance occasioned by the dust and noises caused by such
work; and because of such conditions many prospective
guests, who otherwise would have patronized the National
Hotel, have sought and obtained lodgings elsewhere. On No-
vember 17, 1947, the day before such construction work began
meals were served in the hotel dining room to one hundred and
fifteen patrons. Because of such dust and noises not more
than eighteen persons, including hotel employees, have their
meals in such dining room.”

The bill further alleges that in 1937 the City of Miami
Beach enacted a certain ordinance, to-wit: Ordinance No. 497,
which said ordinance is in full force and effect, material por-
tions of which are as follows:

“SECTION 3: RESTRICTED NOISES: Other noises, be-
cause of their nature and characteristics shall be grouped as
follows for the purpose of control and restrictions:

BB

De
56

“Group “A”: Steam, Gasoline or oil operated cranes, pile-
drivers, dredges, ditchers and all other similar machinery; one
cylinder steam or internal combustion engine (horizontal or
vertical) ; air compressors and pneumatic riveting machines,
jack-hammers, drills and other similar air equipment; power
band and circular saws working in the open; hand hammers on
steel or iron (structural, rivets or otherwise) and all other
noises of similar intensity and/or annoyance.

“Group “B’: Stationery or portable concrete mixers
(engines multi-cylindered and properly muffled) ; power band
and circular saws, sanders, planers, grinding machines, drills,
parbenders and cutters and similar machinery when enclosed;
hand operations in connection with plumbing, electrical, roof-
ing and framing work in the open.

“SECTION 4: (Amendment No. 637) PERIODS: For the
purpose of controlling ‘Restricted Noises,’ the year shall be
divided into two periods as follows:

“Period No.1. Period No. 1 shall begin with and include
November 16th and shall include and end with March 31st;
which period being the months of greatest population shall be
most restricted.

“SECTION 5: The ‘Restricted Noises’ set forth in Section
3 of this ordinance are hereby prohibited at a location and at
any hour on Sundays and the hours on week days during
which said ‘Restricted Noises’ of the various classifications,
regardless of location, are hereby prohibited, are as follows:

“Amendment No. 787 Group “A” Group “B”
During period 1 from 5:30 P.M. 5:30 P.M.
to 9:00 A.M. 9:00 A.M.

During period 2 from 6:00 P.M. 11:00 P.M.
to 7:00 A.M. 7:00 A.M.

“SECTION 6: The ‘Restricted Noises’ included in Group
‘A’ and ‘B,’ as set forth in Section 3 of this ordinance, are
hereby prohibited within fifty feet of the nearest point of any
building occupied as a Hotel or apartment as defined in Ordi-
nance No. 289 of the City of Miami Beach, Florida, at all hours
during the period of time referred to and described in Sec-
tion 4 of this ordinance as Period No. 1 (Amendment No.
787).”

The plaintiffs by their prayer sought an injunction en-
joining the violation of the said ordinance by the defendants
and prayed that the court accord to the plaintiffs such other
and different relief as they may be entitled to under the
circumstances.

The matter came on before the chancellor, upon the motion
to dismiss, and the chancellor’s decree was as follows:

“The Court is of the opinion, however, after hearing the.
arguments of counsel, that Section 6 of such ordinance is un-
reasonable and void, and for that reason it is accordingly or-
dered and decreed that the plaintiffs’ bill of complaint be, and
it is, dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs.”

It is our opinion that there is equity in the bill and that the
said ordinance is not per se void and unconstitutional.
Whether or not the defendants’ constitutional rights would be
violated by the enforcement of said ordinance is a matter to
be determined after the defendants have answered or upon a
more particular showing.

57

The decree appealed is reversed.
THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
a

EDWARD J. SINGER, REBA SINGER (his wife) SAMUEL KULOK
and CONSTANCE KULOK (his wife), as partners doing business
under the firm name of NATIONAL HOTEL, and WILLIAM H.
SIMON, v. BEN HOW REALTY, INC, a Florida corporation,
MORRIS SCHWARTZ, J. ¥. GOOCH CO., INC., a Florida corpora-
tion, GEORGE E. BUNNELL, INO., a Florida corporation, GEORGE
E. BUNNELL, NORMAN FERDARKO, W. L. McKINLEY and
PHILIP E. ELLIS.

34 So. (2nd) 553 January Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 En Bane

Broad & Cassel, Vincent C. Giblin and John D. Marsh, for
appellants.

Abe Schonfeld, for appellees.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
BARNS, J.:

After this cause was submitted to Division B for decision
and opinion was rendered by such “division,” it was suggested
that the appeal should not be concluded by a ‘“‘division” but
that it should be considered and determined by the Court en
bane.

Our Constitution, in respect to such matters, provides:

“Section 4. (a) The Supreme Court may hear, consider and
determine cases and exercise all its powers and jurisdiction as
a single body in which case a majority of the members of the
Court shall constitute a quorum for the dispatch of business;
or it may exercise its powers and jurisdiction in divisions.

“(b) ...A division shall consist of three members of said
court exclusive of the Chief Justice, and the judgment of a
division concurred in by the Chief Justice shall be the judg-
moent of the Court unless such case involves . . . the determi-
nation of a State or Federal constitutional question wherein
shall be brought into controversy the constitutionality of a

Federal or State statute, rule, regulation or municipal ordi-
nance ... whereupon it shall require the consideration of two
divisions and the Chief Justice.”— (Article 5, Florida Constitu-
tion).

Section 4(b) of Article 5 places a limitation on a division’s
considering some constitutional questions but leaves it within
the power of a division to consider other constitutional ques-
tions.

The Constitution provides that:

“The judgment of a division concurred in by the Chief
Justice shall be the judgment of the court unless such case in-
volves the determination of a State or Federal question where-
in shall be brought into controversy the constitutionality of a
Federal or State statute, rule, regulation or municipal ordi-
nance, whereupon it shall require the consideration of two
divisions and the Chief Justice.”*

The language of the Constitution dealing with a “consti-
tutional question” wherein the constitutionality of a Federal
or State statute, rule, regulation or municipal ordinance “has
been brought into controversy” was prompted by the Federal
Act conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court
of the United States, as follows:

“A final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court
of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had...
where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any
State, on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitu-
tion, treatises, or laws of the United States, and the decision is
in favor of its validity, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
upon a writ of error.”

28 U.S.C.A., See. 344 (a).

Under our Constitution the appellate “case” presenting the ~
question of the constitutionality of a statute, rule, etc., does
not depend upon a “decision in favor of its validity” in the
lower court. It provides in effect that when the party

59

*(The Chief Justice is spoken of as a unit and a division is likewise
spoken of as a unit. This was necessary because of the provision that a
division should consist of three members exclusive of the Chief Justice.
The Constitution excluded the Chief Justice from a “division,” therefore
he had to be added in order to exact his consideration).

a
60

aggrieved by a holding in favor of or against the validity of
such statute, rule, etc., procures its review by the Supreme
Court, then such constitutional question “brought into contro-
versy” by the assignments of error on appeal cannot be re-
viewed by a “division” alone.

Ordinarily the “case” made on appeal in order to “involve
the determination of a constitutional question” wherein “the
constitutionality of a statute, rule, etc.,” is “brought into.
controversy” must depend upon the lower court’s holding such
statute, rule, etc., either valid or invalid and the party ad-
versely affected must have an assignment of error invoking’
the review of such ruling in order that it may be “brought
into controversy” on appeal.

Constitutional questions—by “division”—when.

It will be noted that this section of the Constitution leaves
open for consideration by a division any question for the con-
struction and interpretation of any clause of the Constitution,
as well as of a statute, rule, regulation or municipal ordinance.

When the case involves the constitutionality of the statute,
rule, regulation or ordinance and also questions independent of
such constitutionality, and the decision of the lower court is
not shown to have been adverse to the constitutionality of the
statute, rule, regulation or ordinance, then there arises the
question of whether or not the case on appeal involves the
constitutionality of such statute, rule, regulation or ordinance.

Under such circumstances the Court will be confronted
with difficulties similar to those experienced by the United
States Supreme Court when the decision of the lower court
rests upon both a Federal and a non-Federal question. (See
Am. Jur., U. S. Court’s Sec. 171.5, p. 802).

The Chancellor, in making his ruling herein, specifically
held the ordinance “void” and appellant assigned as error
that:

“The Court erred, to the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiffs, and each of them, by the order appealed from, in
holding that section 6 of ordinance numbered 497 of the City
of Miami Beach is unreasonable and void.”

Section 4(a) supra of our Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court may “exercise its powers and jurisdiction” as
a “single body,” in which event a majority of four may consti-
‘tute a quorum or it may “exercise its powers and jurisdiction
in divisions” and the “judgment of a division concurred in by
the Chief Justice shall be the judgment of the court,” unless
the appellate case involves the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance.

Since the equity of the bill does not depend upon the va-
lidity of the ordinance and inasmuch as the case as submitted
has had the consideration of four members of this Court who
have all concurred and the merits of the appeal have been
fully considered by all of them, which would satisfy the ex-
actions of the Constitution in the form and substance if the
hearing had been in the name of and as a single body, the
petition for rehearing is denied.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and
SEBRING, JJ., concur.

61

DAPHNE PEARSON DUNCAN v. ANDREW CHARLES DUNCAN

34 So, (2nd) 437 January Term, 1948
January 20, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied March 23, 1948

Carl A. Hiaasen, and McCune, Hiaasen, Fleming & Kelley,
for appellant.

Loftin, Anderson, Scott, McCarthy & Preston, and Tyrus
A. Norwood, for appellee.
‘PER CURIAM:
The decree appealed from is affirmed.

THOMAS, C.J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

es
62

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM:

The Circuit Court of Broward County, on June 13, 1947,
entered its final decree in a proceeding involving a direct at-
tack upon a decree of divorce. By the final decree the chancel-
lor decreed that “the final decree of divorce entered July 9th,
1946, in that certain cause lately pendirig in this court between

Daphne Pearson Duncan, as plaintiff, and Andrew Charles
Duncan, as defendant, Chancery No. 11,620, and recorded in
Chancery Order Book 130 at page 512, public records of
Broward County, Florida, be and the same is hereby set aside
and vacated, and shall be held for naught. Costs of Court are
assessed against the plaintiff.”

Daphne Pearson Duncan took an appeal and this court af-
firmed the decree of the chancellor, without a written opinion.
Upon petition for rehearing the appellant has requested ‘this
Court to “declare the status of the case upon the mandate
coming down, so that the parties can comply therewith.”

It was and is our opinion that the final decree setting aside
the divorce decree had the effect of disposing of the divorce
suit and grounds for divorce stated in the bill of complaint in
said divorce suit, and that if appellant has other or further
grounds for divorce against her husband she must institute
her suit anew.

The petition for rehearing, therefore, should be denied.
It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur. ,

ADELAIDE DONOVAN, a widow; ADELAIDE DONOVAN, as the sur-
viving member of the Board of Directors and Trustees of Donovan.
Holding Company, a dissolved Florida corporation; and COCONUT
GROVE BOAT WORKS, INC,, a Florida corporation, v. ARMOUR &
COMPANY, an Mlinois corporation.

33 So. (2nd) 601 January Term, 1948:
January 20, 1948 . Division B

Hall & Hedrick, for petitioners.
Bouvier, Heliwell & Clark, for respondent.

BARNS, J.:

This, matter is before the Court upon a petition for rehear-
ing. .

The question for decision upon certiorari is whether or not
the chancellor erred in overruling and denying the appellants’
-defendants’ motion to dismiss appellee’s-plaintiff’s bill of
complaint. Is there any equity in said bill?

On December 5, 1946, appellee-plaintiff filed a creditor’s
bill against appellants-defendants, alleging that one T. E.
DONOVAN, in 1926, transferred his property to two corpora-
tions, THE DONOVAN HOLDING COMPANY and THE
COCOUNT GROVE BOAT WORKS; that thereafter, in, 1928,
he became indebted to ARMOUR & COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation, said corporation becoming a creditor of said
DONOVAN;; that said ARMOUR & COMPANY, of Delaware,
brought suit against DONOVAN in 1939, and obtained a judg-
ment in Duval County in 1939; that the said judgment was
assigned to ARMOUR & COMPANY, an Illinois corporation,
and that the said T. E. DONOVAN died in the early part of
1946; that the defendants, ADELAIDE DONOVAN and
PAUL C. McGARRY, latter being now deceased, constituted
the surviving members of the now dissolved DONOVAN
HOLDING COMPANY, which was dissolved allegedly on or
about May 11, 1942, at the direction of T. E. DONOVAN, with
its assets transferred to the defendant, and to the COCONUT
GROVE BOAT WORKS, which is still an existing corporation.

Po

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64

T

The fraud alleged in the bill is that the said DONOVAN
transferred his property to said corporations without con-
sideration and caused the stock therein to be issued to his wife
and other persons; that he held himself out as the active
owner and operating head of said corporations, to the knowl-
edge of the said Adelaide, and that she made no effort to assert
or indicate any interest in the affairs of said corporations,
which are alleged to have been managed by her said husband.

The pertinent facts are that the plaintiff, ARMOUR &
COMPANY, of Illinois, was not the creditor at the time when
the fraud is alleged to have been committed; that.T. E. Dono-
van died fourteen or more years after the time of the commis-
sion of such alleged fraud and, although the acts are alleged
to have been fraudulent, same do not appear to be sufficient,
especially under the circumstances, to support a plaintiff’s
bill against a motion to dismiss. When the alleged acts of
fraud are considered, together with the fact that it was not
the plaintiff who was defrauded, and the further fact that T.
E. Donovan has died and that more than fourteen years have
elapsed between the time of the alleged fraud and the filing
of the bill, we fail to find “any equity in the bill.”

It is our conclusion that the bill affirmatively shows laches
and fails to charge any actionable fraud of which the plaintiff
could complain:

To characterize an act as done with a fraudulent intent is
sufficient as an allegation of the “intent,” but the facts plead
as fraudulent must be sufficient, if true, to constitute a fraud.
Merely to characterize acts as fraudulent is futile, unless such
are sufficient to constitute fraud in fact under the circum~-
stances. The allegations of the bill are insufficient in this re-
spect.

It is ordered that certiorari be granted; that the order
denying the motion to dismiss stand quashed; that the origi-
nal opinion stand withdrawn and that rehearing be denied.

THOMAS, C.J., BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

is

ot

ADDIE C. RICHARDSON, joined by her husband, JOSIAH RICHARD-
SON, v. SAM HOLMAN.

33 So. (2nd) 641 January Term, 1948
January 20, 1948 Division A.
Rehearing denied February 24, 1948.

Mabry, Reaves, Carlton, Anderson, Fields & Ward, for
appellants.

Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, for appellee.

On June 24, 1910, Eugene Holtsinger, by warranty deed,
conveyed to Tampa and Sulphur Springs Traction Company a
certain. described parcel of land, with the following reserva-
tion:

“Provided however, and this conveyance is made subject
to and upon the express condition that should the party of the
second part cease to use the foregoing land for railroad pur-
poses, then and in that event the title to said property shall
revert to and vest in the said Eugene Holisinger and his heirs
and assigns.”

On December 26, 1910, Eugene Holtsinger and his wife, by
warranty deed, conveyed to G. A. Henderson and Monroe C.
Gaither, all of Government Lots 1-25-28. The description in
this deed included the lands conveyed by Holtsinger to Tampa
and Sulphur Springs Traction Company and contained the fol-
lowing reservation:

“This deed is made subject to a certain deed from the
parties of the first part to the Tampa and Sulphur Springs
Traction Company, a corporation, dated the 24th day of June,
A. D. 1910, and recorded in Deed Book 128 on page 35 of the
land records of Hillsborough County, State of Florida.”

* Sometime in 1945 or 1946, the Tampa and Sulphur Springs
Traction Company, hereinafter referred to as the Traction
Company, ceased to operate street cars and abandoned the
property in question. The appellants have by mesne convey-
ance become successors in title to Henderson and Gaither,
instituted suit in ejectment to recover title and possession of
the premises. The appellee, as defendant, demurred to the
declaration, his demurrer was sustained, the suit was dis-
missed and plaintiffs prosecuted this appeal.

As frequently occurs, the parties are not in accord as to
what questions are brought up for determination. Appellants

urge two questions and appellee urges three, but in our view,
they all turn on that of whether or not the reservation in the
deed by Holtsinger to the Traction Company left any right of
reverter in the grantor that he could assign and if so, did he
assign it to Henderson and Gaither by the deed he executed
to them.

Appellants contend that the reservation in the deed to the
Traction Company created an estate in fee simple determin-
able, while appellee asserts that it created an estate upon con-
dition subsequent. It seems to be admitted that if it creates
an estate upon condition subsequent, the power reserved to
terminate under the common law, was personal to the grantor
and his heirs and was not assignable, while if it created a fee
simple determinable, then there was the possibility of reverter
which might or might not be assignable under the common
law.

Appellee contends that whether or not a fee simple de-
terminable or an estate upon condition subsequent is created,
depends upon the words employed by the grantor in the con-
veying instrument. The words employed are of course a very
important determining factor, at the same time words or
phrases in isolation will not be permitted to defeat the pur-
pose of the grantor when that may be unmistakably gleaned
from the four corners of the instrument.

‘We do not think it essential to the disposition of the ques-
tion here, to participate a discourse in semantics on the differ-
ence between a fee simple determinable and estate on condition
subsequent, when a possibility of reverter is or is not alien-
able, or when a fee is qualifiied, what constitutes a nakid pos-
sibility, a conditional limitation, or any other uncertain inter-
est in lands. These old common law concepts had much to do
with conveyance in their day, but even in States like Florida,
where the common law is in effect except as repealed or sub-
stituted by statute, many of them have become obsolete or
have been set aside.

Some of the text books say, that the distinction between a
fee simple determinable and an estate on condition subsequent,
is that as to the former, the words creating it limit the con-
tinuation of the estate to the time preceding the happening of

67

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68

the contingency, while in the latter, the words creating the
condition do not originally limit the term, but merely permit
its termination upon the happening of the contingency. The
main difference is whether the estate automatically expires
upon the occurrence of a stated event, whether the conveyor
has the power to terminate it upon the happening of the event
if he desires to do so.

Appellee reviews a great many cases from different juris-
dictions to show that the reservation in the deed from Holt-
singer to the Traction Company created an estate on condition -
subsequent which properly construed, left no assignable inter-
est in the grantor, and being so, he contends that no right of
reverter passed to appellants by virtue of having acquired
their title through Henderson and Gaither.

A review of the cases cited in both briefs discloses that
even under the common law, some of them hold that a possi-
bility of reverter attached to a fee simple determinable and
may be alienated, while others interpret the same rule to the
contrary. Some of these cases hold that the rule in the United
States is different because the reasons that actuated the com-
mon law rule have vanished. In our view, the sounder rule
supported by Blackstone, Kent and a wealth of decisions is
that the operation and effect of a deed depends less on arti-
ficial rules than it does on the application of common sense
and sound equity to the object and purpose of the contract
under review.

We do not think there is any escape from the conclusion”
that the reservation in the deed from Holsinger to the Trac-
tion Company withheld the possibility of reverter which ma-
terialized when the traction company ceased to use the lands
for street railroad purposes. The words of reverter “The title
to said property shall revert to and vest in the said Eugene
-Holtsinger and his heirs,” could hardly be more conclusive as
to his purpose. The record discloses that this deéd conveyed
a strip of land 222 feet long by 65 feet wide, and that six
months later the second deed by the same grantor to Hender-
son and Gaither conveyed the same with other lands, subject
to the reservation in the deed to the Traction Company.

Subject to the reservation in the deed to the traction com-
pany, the deed to Henderson and Gaither carried the usual
covenants of warranty, seisin and possession, and we think
-vested in the grantees all of Holtsinger’s title, including his
right to reverter, preserved in the deed to the Traction Com-
pany. The language used in both deeds is not materially dif-
ferent from that used under similar circumstances, in convey-
ing to Churches, schools, lodges and other institutions for
benevolent or public purposes, and when not used for the pur-
pose of the grant, the lands so conveyed have been held to re-
vert.

As heretofore pointed out, the final test to determine .
whether the language in a deed creates an estate upon con-
dition subsequent, or.an estate in fee simple determinable, is
whether the language used provides for automatic reverter
when the determinating event takes place, or whether under
the terms used, the grantor or his heirs were clothed with the
right immediately to step in and declare a reverter. The
language employed in the reservation in the deed to the trac-
tion company is consistent with, and we think sufficient to ac-
complish an automatic reverter.

In the latter holding we do not overlook appellee’s conten-
tion supported by numerous authorities to the contrary, but
we think that both the statutes and the philosophy of convey-
ancing in Florida, rule the point against him. We think the
reservation in the deed to the transaction company contained
a possibility of reverter to Holtsinger and that it materialized
when the traction company ceased to use the lands for street
railway purposes. It is also our view that Holtsinger parted
with his right of reverter, including all other interest he had
‘in the lands, when he executed the deed to Henderson and
Gaither.

We are not unmindful of the fact that the case law is in
hopeless conflict on the point of whether or not a possibility
of reverter may be assigned. Some of this confusion arises
from a muddled view as to what constitutes an estate upon
conditions subsequent and what constitutes a fee simple de-
terminable. Some of it arises on account of statutes affecting
these concepts, some of it arises from confusing it with other

69

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70

common law rules, and concepts. Notwithstanding the con-
fusion, there is a line of well reasoned cases that supports the
assignment of this and other uncertain interest in land.
Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 157 Miss. 284. 127 So. 302;
Caruthers v. Leonard, (Tex.) 254 S.W. 779; Juif v. Dillman,
287 Mich. 35. 282 N.W. 892; Battistone v. Banulski, 110 Conn.
267, 147 Atl. 820; American Law institutes restatement of the
law of property.

The statutes of Florida abrogates many of these old feudal
concepts and contemplates that any interest in land may be
the subject of conveyance. Section 689.01, Florida Statutes
1941, provides that “No estate or interest of freehold, or for a
term of more than one year, or an uncertain interest of, in, or
out of any messuages, lands, tenements or hereditaments,
shall be created, made, granted, transferred or released in any
other manner than by instrument in writing, signed in the
presence of two subscribing witnesses by the parties creating,
making, granting, conveying, transferring or releasing such
estates, interest for a term more than one year.” Section
731.05, Florida Statutes 1941, and other statutes with refer-
ence to passing by will is of similar import, so it appears that
in Florida all restraints on alienation have been removed. A
possibility of reverter is an uncertain interest in land that
may under our law be conveyed or devised, regardless of what
the common law rule was.

The foregoing and other statutes are the product of a
growing liberal philosophy in the matter of land conveyancing
coupled with a purpose to shake off the old restrictions of the
common law, such as livery of seisin and sale of pretended
titles sometimes spoken of as maintenance. The latter has.
never had a place in the law of this country and our system of
recording deeds rendered the former obsolete. Under the
feudal system possession was an indispensible prerequisite to
alienation, but at present the tendency is to permit one to
alienate any interest in lands he may claim. It will be noted
that our statute, among other things, permits the alienation of
“hereditaments” which under the common law of England in-
cluded lands and tenements, whether corporeal or incorporeal,
real, personal or mixed.

var

In fine, the right of contract so rigidly canalized by the
common law, has, by the constitution and statutes, been
liberalized till at the present any citizen who is sui juris may
enter into any contract that is not illegal, fraudulent, immoral
or contrary to public policy. Under the common law a right
of action, choses in action, future or contingent interests, pos-
sible and existing estates or interests, were not assignable,
but all of these are now assignable by statute or in equity. In
view of the law as thus reflected in this state, we see no escape
from this conclusion.

It is accordingly our view that Holtsinger’s deed to the
traction company reserved a reversionary interest in the lands
in question which he conveyed to Henderson and Gaither and
they in turn assigned it to their successors in title. It follows
that the order sustaining the demurrer to the declaration was
erroneous.

Reversed.
THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

W. POOSER v. JACKSON COUNTY, a political sub-division of the
State of Florida.

33 So. (2nd) 602 January Term, 1948
January 20, 1948 Division B

W. Pooser, in Proper Person, for appellant.

Clyde Mayhall, for appellee.
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed on authority of Kirkland v. State, 86 Fla. 64, 97
So. 502 (headnotes 9 and 10) ; County of Okeechobee, et al. v.

Florida National Bank of Jacksonville, 112 Fla. 309, 150 So.
124 (4th headnote).

So ordered.

THOMAS, C. J.. BUFORD, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., con-
cur.

es
72

JOSEPH: SCHUPLER and MARY YETTA SCHUPLER, his wife, v.
EASTERN MORTGAGE COMPANY, a Florida corporation.

33 So. (2nd) 586 January Term, 1948
January 23, 1948 . En Bane

£. B. Donnell and Moses Schupler, for petitioners.
A. 8. Bussey, for respondent.
BARNS, J.:

Petitioners-defendants seek certiorari to review an order
of the chancellor granting plaintiff’s-respondent’s motion to
strike Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of a joint and several answer*

1 “Answer:

“5. That in answer to paragraph six (6) of plaintiff’s bill of com-
plainant, the defendants have no knowledge of the allegations therein
contained and request that the plaintiff be held to strict proof thereof.

“6, That in answer to the allegations contained in paragraph seven
(7) of the plaintiff's bill of complaint, these defendants have no knowl-
edge of the allegations therein contained and request that the plaintiff
be held to proof thereof.

“T, That these defendants have no knowledge of the allegations con-
tained in paragraph eight (8): of the plaintiff's bill of complaint and
request that the plaintiff be held to proof thereof.

“g, That in answer to paragraph nine (9) of the plaintiff's Bill of
Complaint that as to Joseph Schupler, he stated that said note is more
than twenty (20) years old and comes within the statute of limitations
for sealed instruments and therefore said note is of no force.

|
4

filed by them, addressed to Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the bill?
of complaint and an order granting a motion to strike a coun-
ter claim. The bill seeks the foreclosure of a purchase money
mortgage executed by the defendants.

It is important for petitions for certiorari to show with
particularity the harmful error. If the matters supporting
the charge of error are too lengthy to be copied into the
petition in haec verba, then they should be plead according to
their tenor and effect with appropriate page references to the
record.

The petitioners’ answer to the Bill as contained in Para-
graphs 1 to 10 goes to a traverse of bill and no wise attempts
to set up any facts in the nature of an avoidance, nor does the
“answer” (in form) attempt to set up any facts relating to a
superior right in the defendants over the rights of the
plaintiff.

Within the “answer” is contained a claim in the “form” of
a counterclaim, the substance of which goes directly to the
avoidance vel non of plaintiff’s bill. The chancellor sustained
the plaintiff’s-appellee’s motion to strike this “counterclaim,”
of which review is likewise sought.

2 “Bill of Complaint:

“6, That thereafter and on or about the 29th day of August, 1928,
W. H. Tunnicliffe as receiver of and for the said First American Bank
and Trust Co., by an instrument in writing given under his hand and seal
for a valuable consideration therein expressed, duly assigned said mort-
gage and the notes secured thereby to the Central Farmers Trust Com-
pany, as Trustee. ... (Recordation recited).

“{, That thereafter and on or about the 18th day of November, 1937,
the Central Farmers Trust Company as Trustee, by an instrument in
writing given under its corporate name and seal for a valuable con-
sideration therein expressed, duly assigned said mortgage and the notes
secured thereby to the K-H-J Corporation. (Recordation recited).

“g, That on or about the 3rd day of July, 1946, the said K-H-J
Corporation, by an instrument in writing given under its corporate name
and seal for a valuable consideration therein expressed, duly assigned
said mortgage and the notes secured thereby to the Plaintiff, Eastern
Mortgage Company, a Florida Corporation, which is now and has been
since the owner and holder thereof. (Recordation recited).

“9, (Substaitially states that Note “1” in the sum of $10,666.66, due
on or before one year after date, became due and payable on about
March 16, 1926, but was not paid except for $5,000.00 paid on or about
March 19, 1926, on principal, and $2,666.66 paid July 10, 1926, on princi-
pal, and that balance is owing and unpaid).”

From 1915 until the adoption of the “1931 Chancery Act
(Ch. 63, F.S.A.) a motion to strike was permitted as a means
of testing the sufficiency of an answer presenting an affirma-
tive defense or counter-claim, viz:

“Tf an answer set up by an affirmative defense, set off or
counterclaim, the plaintiff may, upon five days’ notice, or such
further time as the court may allow, test the sufficiency of the
same by motion to strike out. If found insufficient, but
amendable, the court may allow an amendment upon terms or
strike out the matter.”—Sec. 3122, R.G.S.

For a decision under the statute, see Dougherty et al. v.
Commercial Credit Holding Company (1932), 104 Fla. 595,
140 So. 470 (per Justice TERRELL).

But we now have zo such practice, and our statute pro-
vides that: :

“The defendant in his answer shall in short and simple
terms set out his defenses to each claim asserted by the bill,
... —See. 63.34, F.S., 1941, FSA.

Our statute law relative to striking portions of either a
Bill or an Answer provides:

“Exceptions to bills, answers and other pleadings for scan-
dal, impertinence or irrelevancy are abolished, but the court
may, upon motion to strike or upon its own initiative, strike
out any redundant, impertinent, irrelevant or scandalous and
impertinent matter which is prejudicial to the opposing party,
upon such terms as the court shall think fit.”—Sec. 63.23. F.S.,
1941, F.S.A. .

“Matter should not be stricken from a pleading under the
foregoing statutes unless it is wholly irrelevant, or is other-
wise improper, and can have no bearing on the equities of the
case and no influence upon the decision either as to the relief
to be granted or the allowance of costs. . . .”’—Kooman’s Flor-
ida Chancery Pleading and Practice,” p. 251.

And for more authorities see the notes to Section 23 of
Florida Chancery Act, annotated by McCarthy.

In equity, matter relevant and material to the equities may
be stated in an answer, and it is error to strike such matter
even though it would affect the equities only to the extent of

xGy

De
%

the assessment of costs. The test is not whether the answer
states a defense but whether the matter is relevant or ma-
terial:

“If the matter contained in an answer in an equity cause
is relevant, or can have any influence in the decision of the
subject matter of the controversy, it is not impertinent.”—
‘Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Root, 58 So. 371, 63
Fla. 666; Jones v. Hiller, 65 Fla. 532, 62 So. 583; Cummer Co.
v. Yager, 75 Fla. 729, 79 So. 272; Boca Grande Inv. Co. v.
Blanding, 77 Fla. 536, 81 So. 886.

“Where the part of an answer excepted to is relevant, or
can have influence in the decision of the suit, either as to the
subject matter of the controversy, the particular relief, or as
to the costs, it is not impertinent.’”—Robertson v. Dunne, 45
Fla. 553, 33 So. 530.

“Answer is not impertinent which is relevant or can in-
fluence the decision of the suit either as to the subject, matter,
the particular relief, or as to costs.—Holzendorf v. Terrell, 52
Fla. 525, 42 So, 584,

The stricken Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Answer do not
appear as redundant, impertinent, irrelevant, or scandalous,
or such matter as would wrongfully impair the determination
of the equities of the parties concerning the controversy. In
striking same, we conclude the chancellor erred.

Re: Striking counterclaim:

The defendants, after having stated their defense to the
Bill by “Answer” presented further pleadings in the “form” of
a counterclaims The matters contained in this pleading hav-

8 Counterclaim of the Answer:

“And for affirmative relief it is alleged that the notes and mortgage
were issued to the First American Bank and Trust Company as security
for part of the purchase price of the above stated real estate by Joseph
Schupler and that a good fee simple title to said real estate was obtained
by Joseph Schupler in the name of Joseph Schupler, a true copy of such
deed is hereby attached to this answer as a part hereof.

“That Mary Yetta Schupler being the wife of Joseph Schupler signed
the notes and mortgage to give a release of her dower interest, in said
property and for no other reason, as said notes and mortgage where
purchase money notes and mortgage of Joseph Schupler and Mary Yetta
Schupler could therefore have no other interest in said real estate.

7

ing the “form” of a counterclaim are in substance matters re-
sponsive to the Bill in the nature of an avoidance which might
properly have been set forth in the Answer.

The chancellor struck a part of defendants’ answer de-
nominated as a “counterclaim” wherein defendants admit the
execution by the defendants, Schupler and wife, of the pur-
chase money mortgage and notes plead by the bill of fore-
closure (in which transaction the husband, Schupler, acquired
title) and pleads that such, as a contract, was of no binding
force and effect on the wife except as a release of dower;* that
Joseph Schupler lost his title by a tax foreclosure by Palm
Beach County, pursuant to Ch. 194, FS. 1941, F.S.A.;° that

“That the signing of said purchase money notes and mortgage by
Mary Yetta Schupler was not necessary to release her dower as she had
no interest and obtained no interest whatever in said real estate.

“That the signing of the notes and mortgage by Mary Yetta Schupler
being purchase money notes and mortgage of Joseph Schupler did not
add to the mortgage, and therefore Mary Yetta Schupler was and is not
liable in any manner under or through said mortgage or notes.

“That Mary Yetta Schupler was under the coverture of marriage
and could not enter into a valid contract, and therefore, was and is not
in any manner liable, under or through said notes and mortgages.

That Joseph Schupler was divested of all interests that he may have
had in said property when the County Palm Beach acquired said
property for taxes owed against said property. That the County of
Palm Beach, in 1945, obtained a fee simple title to said property free of
all liens by purchasing said property at a tax foreclosure sale as provided
in Florida Statutes 194.21 and 194.53, Laws of 1941.

“That Mary Yetta Schupler out of her separate estate purchased said
property from the County of Palm Beach at public sale as provided for
by Florida Statute 194.55, Laws of 1941, and received a deed to said
property in fee simple from the County of Palm Beach; which deed is
recorded in Deed Book 740, page 283, for Palm Beach County, a true
copy of which is attached to and made a part of this answer to the
plaintiff's Bill of Complaint. That the purchase of this real estate by
Mary Yetta Schupler gave her a fee simple title free and clear of all
prior liens as she took the same title as vested in the vendor, the County
of Palm Beach.

“Wherefore, the Court is prayed:” .

4 Section 3813, R. G. S, 1920, then in effect, was as follows: “3813.
(2472). Marriedwomen’s covenants. A married woman who joins with
her husband in executing a conveyance or mortgage of real property, or
of any estate therein, may enter into any covenants as to the title or
against encumbrances or of warranty, but such covenants shall have no
other effect than to estop her and all persons claiming as her heirs, or
by or through her, in the same manner as if she were not married.”

5 “Upon issuance of a tax deed to any property, under the provisions
of this chapter, all right, title, interest in or liens upon said property,
except liens for general taxes of equal dignity with county taxes, shall
be cut off and forever declared null and void.” Sec. 194.53, F.S. 1941,
FSA”

78

the wife, out of “her separate estate” purchased the property
from the county and thereby acquired a title free and clear of
all prior liens, ©

In our practice the “motion to strike” parts of an answer
is a substitute for an “exception.” See Sec. 63.23, F.S.A.,
supra. It should not be treated as a demurrer because under
the former practice, as well as under the present practice, a
demurrer to answer was a thing unknown to chancery prac-
tice.

“Objections to affirmative defense. Exceptions to the
answer do not perform the office of a demurrer in presenting
the question whether the facts averred in the answer consti-
tute a defense to the case made in the bill; and as it is not per-
missible to file a demurrer to an answer, if it is desired to sub-
mit the case on the questions of law arising on the answer, the
only method is by setting down the case for hearing on bill and
answer. If the defense is not good, the proof of it will be of
no avail, and the complainant will have the full benefit of his
objections at the hearing.”—Fletcher’s “Equity Pleading and
Practice,” p. 354.

Two-fold Nature of Answer:

" “An answer in cases where relief is sought, properly con-
sists of two parts, and serves a double purpose; First, that of
answering the case as made by the bill; and, secondly, that of
stating to the court the nature of the defense on which the
defendant means to rely.”—Fletcher’s “Equity Pleading and
Practice,” p: 318.

It appears very evident that the pleader has confused de-
fensive matters in avoidance with counterclaim, when, in fact,
the distinction is great.

Upon motion of plaintiff, the court struck the counter-
claim. Our statute for testing the sufficiency of a counter-
claim provides:

“.,. if an answer asserts a counterclaim and prays affirma-
tive relief any cross-defendant may, upon due notice, test the
sufficiency of the same by motion to dismiss the counterclaim.
If found insufficient but amendable the court may allow an

79

amendment upon terms, or dismiss the counterclaim.” —Sec.
63.41, F.S.A.

“Motions to strike have long been recognized as one means
of attacking pleadings for frivolity and impertinence and for
palpable and serious defects in form. . . .”’—~Kooman’s “Flor-
ida Chancery Pleading and Practice,” p. 250.

“... But a pleading in proper form should not ordinarily
be stricken for insufficiency. Its sufficiency should be tested
by motion to dismiss or other appropriate proceedings. ...”—
Kooman’s “Florida Chancery Pleading and Practice,” p. 252.

Motion to Strike—Motion to Dismiss—distinguished:

“.., A motion to strike a bill of complaint or counterclaim
should be distinguished from a motion to dismiss and the two
remedies should not be indescriminately applied as they are
governed by essentially different rules of procedure. A bill or
counterclaim in proper form duly filed should not be stricken
for insufficiency. Its sufficiency as a pleading should be tested
by motion to dismiss. The summary disposition of pleadings

by motion to strike is the exercise of a necessary but delicate
power which should be cautiously applied. A motion to dis-
miss goes to the bill or counterclaim as an entirety for in-
sufficiency, while a motion to strike is applicable to such
pleadings where the whole or any part thereof is wholly ir-
relevant or for any reason improper... .’—Kooman’s “Florida,
Chancery Pleading and Practice,” p. 253.

In equity, maxims governing the action of the chancellor
are that “a court of equity ought to do justice completely, and
not by halves” and that “equity will not enter a partial or in-
complete decree.”

“The rule is that equity will not enter a partial or incom-
plete decree. Having taken cognizance of a cause for any
purpose, a court of equity will ordinarily retain jurisdiction
for all purposes, decided all issues which are involved by the
subject matter of the dispute between the litigants; award re-
lief which is complete and finally disposes of the litigation ...”
—i19 Am. Jur., Equity, Sec. 127, pp. 126-127. See also key
number series on Equity Key No. 39.

Le
80

“Tt is a settled principle of equity that once it takes juris-
diction it will retain the same for all purposes to give full,
complete and adequate relief as between all parties touching
the subject matter involved therein. The powers of a court of
equity are and should be coextensive with the rights of the

_ parties in the subject matter involved.”—Deggs v. First State
Bank of Eustis, et al., 145 Fla. 438, 441, 199 So. 564. (Per
Justice ADAMS). ,

In order that equity might do complete justice, defenses
should be fully stated:

“Besides answering the case made by the bill, the defend-
ant must state in his answer all the circumstances of which he
intends to avail himself by way of defense; for he is bound to
apprise the complainant by his answer of the nature of the
case he intends to set up, and he cannot avail himself of any
matter which is not stated in his answer, even though it should
appear in his evidence. A complainant has a right to be in-
formed by the-answer, not only of all the facts to be proved,
but of the use to be made of them, and of the nature of the
conclusions intended to be drawn from them.”—Fletcher’s
“Equity Pleading and Practice,” p. 323.

“In deciding whether matters objected to are pertinent or
not, all substantial doubts are to be resolved in favor of their
pertinency, and nothing should be expunged which the de-
fendant has a right to prove, and which, if proved, can have
any influence either in deciding whether the complainant is en-
titled to any relief to which he may be entitled, even down to
the question whether he shall have relief with or without
costs.” —Fletcher’s “Equity pleading and Practice.” p. 344.

When Cross-Bill (or Counterclaim) improper:

“Where the matters of the cross-bill are equally available
as against the complainant by an answer to the original bill
a cross-bill is unnecessary. Sanderson’s Adm’rs. v. Sander-
son, 17 Fla. 820, 834; 16 Cyc. 327.”—Herrin v. Abbe, 55 Fla.
769, 772, 46 So. 183.

“This is subject matter of defense to the original suit, and
not the proper subject for a cross-bill. 14 Ga. 167; 20 Ga. 472;
3 Sand. Chy. 273; 34 Ala. 15. Sanderson’ 's Adm’rs. v. San-

derson, 17 Fla. 820, 834.

Our statute provides that:

“The defendant in his answer shall in short and simple
terms set out his defenses to each claim asserted by the
bill. .. . "Sec. 63.34, F.S., 1941, F.S.A.

At one time it was necessary to file cross-bill or counter-
claims in order to present affirmative defenses, but, as the
courts and statutes became more liberal in allowing all de-
fenses to be presented by “answer,” they naturally became
more strict in allowing cross-bills or counterclaims. It is evi-
dent that it is a better public policy to have two pleadings
than four, on the same controversy. .

Taylor v.. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, 141° Fla.
703, 193 So. 758, seems to have been given some consideration
as applicable. That case as presented to this Court was on
appeal of a decree granting a writ of assistance to the mort-
gagee-purchaser at foreclosure sale upon a hearing upon a rule
to show cause, and the defendant’s answer. It was an ad-
judication of the equities after the procedural process leading
to the hearing had been completed. The respondent made her
“answer” setting forth her claim in respect to plaintiff's claim.
No motion to strike the answer was involved there, as it is
here. .

In the case at bar, the stricken pleadings of the defendant.
appear to allege the only title on which plaintiff, if he be suc-
cessful, can impose his mortgage lien, and these same stricken
pleadings allege as a predicate for their establishment by evi-
dence the title and claim which the defendant’s wife has as
against the plaintiff’s bill.

The questions before the chancellor and before this Court
are of necessity the same. It is not a question of what are the
equities as between the parties, for that cannot be determined
on the paper pleading, viz: A “motion to strike.” The ulti-
mate equities have not been decreed. There has been no final
hearing on final decree.

Of course the substantive law will be taken into considera-
tion in passing upon procedural matters but the procedural
process is only a means of arriving at a pleading statement of
the parties, in order that each may be advised of adversary
claims and also to advise the chancellor. The law does not

8L

a
82

exact that sufficiency of an answer of a defendant in equity
which, if proven, would require a decree in favor of the de-
fendant. This is not true as to pleas in law actions and there
are no demurrers to answers in equity as to pleas in law.

We are not now and cannot at this time with propriety
pass on the ultimate equities. The cause should be allowed to
proceed on the pleadings before the chancellor for the adjudi-
cation of Mrs. Schupler’s equities. After the chancellor passes
on them at final hearing, as was done in the Taylor case, then
we might, but not before; we must be patient and let this
cause proceed as did the Taylor case.

Equity regards the substance, and not the form:

“The maxim, ‘equity regards substance rather than form,’
is expressed in various ways and stresses the intent or spirit
of the case. ‘A court of equity,” it is said, ‘will look to the
circumstances and not to the form of the transaction.’ Again:
‘Equity looks to the substance and not the shadow, to the
spirit and not the letter... It seeks justice rather than tech-
nicality, truth rather than evasion, common sense rather than
quibbling.’ And again: ‘It has always been recognized as the
right, if not always as the absolute duty, of a court clothed
with the equitable jurisdiction which is here properly invoked,
to apply its x-rays to all masks and covers and see through to
the real substance.’”—19 Am. Jur., Equity, Sec. 459.

If such is to be a guiding principle for the determination of
the substantive rights of the parties, equity, moved by the
same principle, might as well lend a like hand concerning pro-
cedural processes. Under the former practice, upon the over-
ruling of a “plea,” the chancellor was permitted to order that
such plea stand for an answer. (See Fletcher, (Ib.) 313).
“Equity seeks to do justice.”

Prompted by the circumstances and the maxim “equity re-
gards substance rather than form” in ruling on the motion to
strike the so-called counterclaim, it would have been appro-
priate for the chancellor to have denied the motion and to
have ordered that the same stand as a part of the answer un-
less said defendants should within a spécified time file an
amended counterclaim.

For the Court to have allowed the so-called counterclaim
to stand as a part of the defendants’ “answer” would not have
been to adjudicate it to be a defense to the Bill of Complaint,
and we do not so adjudicate it. The sufficiency of the answer
as a defense may be tested by setting the cause down for a
hearing on a “motion for decree on bill and answer” as pro-
vided by Sec. 63.40, F.S.A., upon which hearing the allegations
of the answer, according to their legal effect, will predominate
and control over the allegations of the bill. See Whitaker v.
Eddy, 109 Fla. 535, 147 So. 868.

It was error to strike the counterclaim, and certiorari is
granted and said other quashed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.

LEATHA M. FREEMAN v. JAMES T. VOCELLE, as Director of the
State Beverage Department of the State of Florida.

83 So. (2nd) 602 January Term, 1948
January 23, 1948 Division B

Thomas H. Anderson, for petitioner.
Patton and Kanner, for respondent.
PER CURIAM:

The answer to the question propounded is denied because
the question does not come within the purview of Rule 38 of
this Court. ,

THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ.,

83

concur.

JAMES OHESNUT v. NORMA H. CHESNUT
33 So. (2nd) 730 January Term, 1948
January 28, 1948 Special Division B

Rehearing denied February 23, 1948

J. Harry Schad and Zach H. Douglas, for appellant.
J.C. Adkins, J. C. Adkins, Jr., and Clayton, Arnow & Dun-
can, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

Appellant and appellee were married in July 1943. The
blare of the wedding bells generated frictions which blossomed.
into separation within a score of months. In July 1946, ap-
pellee filed suit for separate maintenance. Appellant coun-
tered with an answer and a cross bill, wherein he prayed for
divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. On final hearing
appellant’s prayer for divorce was denied but appellee’s prayer
for separate maintenance was answered with an award of
$85.00 per month. This appeal is from the final decree.

The question with which we.are confronted, is whether or
not the record justifies the refusal of appellant’s divorce and
the award of appellee’s alimony. .

Both the parties were of good character and repute, but
neither had previously pledged banns at the alter of Eros.
The appellant had attained Man’s Biblical allotment—three
score years and ten (Ps. 90-10). The appellee was two score
years and six. Both were “set” like concrete in their social
attitudes which criss-crossed so that she was a pain to him

and he was a bore to her. The strain was so acute that he
became seriously ill, she contracted a bad case of nerves and
‘the presence of the one got to be mental torture to the other.
The big trouble was total incapacity on the part of either for
domestication. Seventy-five per cent of successful marriage
depends on tact to cushion and bypass domestic frictions. It
is much better than meeting them head on and bearing the
‘scars they leave. When the bride and the groom are both de-
‘void of a yen for domestication the marital bark puts out to
sea with its jib pointed to the rocks.

In the bill and answer the parties charge each other with .
various and sundry derelictions but we find little in the record
to support them but their own testimony. It is not disputed
that he is a man of modest means, and that she has held a re-
sponsible job and supported herself for many years. In per-
sonal leanings, the one was the antithesis of the other. He
loved a dram and she could not tolerate liquor on the place.
He was something of a society-man while she preferred the
company of her family and friends and visited with them
when he went wheeling to satisfy his social urge. She ap-
parently preferred her job to being his helpmate as she held to
it despite the connubial experiment. He says she did not re-
turn home for the midday meal and often did not prepare the
evening meal. She says he was given to frequent outbursts of
temper and paid court to another woman, seventy-five years
old, who was a tenant in one of his apartments. Must have
been flat philandering but despite this and other strains, the
case was one in which two-way pecadillos created a species of
marital frustration that reacts to no present known social
prophylactic.

‘The chancellor thought the trouble was incompatibility but
we think the record reveals a complete allergy to the give and
take essential to successful marriage. A man that is tactless

- enough to hang around the house and stimulate a domestic
spat when he might take refuge in the office, the shop, the field
or the grove, is minus what it takes to steer the home on an
even keel. Likewise, the wife who is tactless enough to prefer
the company of others to that of her husband, and gets more
joy from her job than she does from the whoop of children,

85

86

the romance of sewing on buttons and darning socks, is minus
what it takes to make the home aglow with domestic felicity.
Such in essence is what the chancellor was confronted with
and we see no basis on which the parties could compose their
differences. It is therefore our view that appellant should
have been granted a divorce. The mere fact of being tied to-.
gether under such pressure will fray the nerves and undermine.
the health. We think the chancellor properly imposed the
cost of the litigation on appellant, but we do not find support.
for the amount awarded for alimony. Neither of the parties
showed the least susceptibility to domestication. Her position
had not ben materially changed, she has the same job she had -
before, she is earning more, there were no children and the
union produced nothing that might have been reasonably ex-
pected from it. Alimony is not a thing to be picked up like
the manna that was miraculously supplied in the wilderness.
It is awarded on the theory that marriage is a partnership to
which the wife has contributed and when she withdraws from.
it she is entitled to reimbursement that she may not become a
public charge. .

We accordingly find no objection to that part of the final
decree imposing the cost of the litigation and attorneys fees.
for appellee on the appellant, but think the amount awarded.
for alimony was excessive. While we think appellee was en-
titled to a modest award, we think it should be in the nature
of a lump sum or a property settlement. If the parties can
make such a settlement amicably, it should be approved by the
chancellor, but if they fail to do so, the court should make it
for them. Chapter 23894, Acts of 7947, contemplates that this
may be done.

The judgment is accordingly reversed with directions to
grant the appellant a divorce, require him to pay the cost of
this litigation, including attorneys fees for appellee, and for
an award of alimony in line with the views herein expressed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

8

OSCAR PARIS v. HELEN G. BARFIELD, et al.
88 So. (2nd) 713 January Term, 1948
January 27, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied February 24, 1948

Walton, Hubbard, Schroeder, Lantaff & Atkins, for appel-
land.

Harold Turk, Joseph A. Wanick, Louis Jepeway, and 8.
Errol Mestrezat, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

The appellees, Helen G. Bartfield, et vir, brought the suit
for negligence Oscar Paris, Sidney Schulman, and John Dud-
Jey Edwards, resulting in a verdict in favor of Edwards and a
verdict against Paris in favor of the plaintiff wife for $5,-
000.00 and in favor of the plaintiff husband for $2,500.00. The
verdict was silent as to Schulman. Motion for new trial was
denied and the defendant-appellant brings this his appeal, and
one of his assignments of error is as follows:

“The Court erred in denying to the defendant, Oscar
Paris, three peremptory challenges to the Jury.”

The question resolved by the appellant as raised by this as-
signment of error is:

“Should the defendant, Oscar Paris, have been allowed
three peremptory challenges of the jury as empanelled in the
cause (Sec. 54.11, Fla. Stat. 1941) ?”

Supreme Court Rule 20, relating to briefs, prescribes that
the argument addressed to the “question” should follow the
statement of the question. The purpose of this is to present
the “question” and argument together, for convenience, and to
avoid the necessity of stating the question more than once.
The question need be stated but once, but it should be with the
argument addressed to it.

“Questions” are in the nature of argument, and somewhat
secondary. “Questions” grow out of and are only created by
the assignment of error, and the said Rule 20 prescribes that:

“Specific assignments of error from which the questions
arise should be stated, and, if any reference to the transcript
is made, the page should be given.”

[|
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89

The assignment of error giving rise to this question was
not copied into the brief. It is the better practice to support
the “question” by copying into the brief the assignment of
error which creates the question. It is important that ap-
pellant present in his brief the acts which support the allega-
tions of fact as charged in the assignment of error. The ap-
pellate court wishes to know what actually happened in re-
lation to errors assigned and argued. The factual basis of an
assignment of error should be presented in the brief of ap-
pellant, with such particularity as the circumstances permit
and with appropriate page references.

The particulars as to the foregoing assignment of error
were as follows:

At trial and before the jury was accepted and sworn and
during the voir dire examination of the jurors and after the
plaintiff had tendered the jurors called to the box, counsel for
defendant-appellant made inquiry of the presiding trial judge
as follows:

“Mr, Atkins: Do you tender the jury, Mr. Turk?

“Mr. Turk: Yes—tender the jury.

“Mr, Atkins: Your Honor, as a matter of procedure— .
There are three defendants. Do I understand that each has
three peremptory challenges? I represent two of them and
Mr. Jepway and Mr. Mestrezat represent one.

“The Court: I didn’t so understand it. It is just the same.

“Mr. Atkins: You mean all three only have three alto-
gether?

“The Court: I believe so.

“Mr. Atkins: They are separate defendants. I represent
two, and Mr. Mestrezat represents the third. Not that I think
we will need them, but— .

“The Court: My understanding is that that does not call
for separate challenges for each defendant.

“Mr. Atkins: You think the three of us are limited to a
total of three?”

“The Court: Yes.”

(The jurors were thereupon examined further on their
voir dire).

90

Appellant submits that this was a ruling and that it was
contrary to the prescription of the statute. The statute was
cited but not copied into the brief. It is as follows:

. “54.11. CHALLENGE OF JURORS: PEREMPTORY—
On the trial of any civil cause in any court, each party shall
be entitled to three peremptory challenges of jurors em-
panelled in said cause.” —F\S., 1941, F.S.A.

The appellee contends that such was not a ruling, and, if
so, that it was harmless error.

Whether or not the statement of a judge is to be con-
strued as a ruling need not be confined to the judge’s act. The
circumstances under which he acted are often as material as
what he did. To weigh the language of the attorney and the
judge alone would hardly leave the inference that the judge
was making a ruling; but, when it is considered that the deter-
mination of the question was then and at the very moment of
importance to the defendant, we can come to no conclusion
other than such act of the judge was properly taken and ac-
cepted as an adverse ruling of the judge.

The judge’s ruling appears to have been that the two de-
" fendants who had been sued in tort were not entitled to three
peremptory challenges each. See Section 54.11, supra. We
find this was reversible and harmful error. See S.A.L. v.
Parks, 89 Fla. 405, 104 So. 587.
Another assignment of error is that the court erred in re-
fusing to give defendant’s-appellant’s requested charge, as fol-
lows:

“The mere fact that an accident occurred and that injury or
damage was suffered by the plaintiff, Helen G. Bartfield, in the
accident, does not carry with it any presumption of negligence
and does not mean the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. Proof
of injury cannot substitute for proof of negligence. To en-
title the plaintiffs to recover damages from the defendants,
Oscar Paris and Sidney Schulman, the plaintiff, Helen G. Bart-
field, must not only prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that she was injured or damages; but must also prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant, Sidney
Schulman, acting in his capacity as employee of the defendant,

Oscar Paris, was negligent, and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of injury or damage, if any, to the said
plaintiff. Unless you find that the plaintiffs have carried this
burden of proof, your verdict should be for the defendants,
Oscar Paris and Sidney Schulman.”

The first sentences of such requested charge, reading as
follows:

“The mere fact that an accident occurred and that injury
or damage was suffered by the plaintiff, Helen G. Bartfield,
in the accident, does not carry with it any presumption of
negligence and does not mean the plaintiffs are entitled to re-
cover. Proof of injury cannot be substituted for proof of
negligence,” would have been proper.

The third sentence of the charge contains matter going to
the proof that Sidney Schulman was “acting in his capacity as
employee of the defendant, Oscar Paris.”

When we examine the pleadings and find that the only
pleas are those of “not guilty” and of contributory negligence
and consider that portion of Common Law Rule 32, as follows:

“.,. where in the declaration the breach of duty or wrong-
ful act is alleged to have been committed by defendant
through the agency of any other person or thing the alleged
relationship between the defendant and that other person or
thing shall not be put in issue by the plea of not guilty,”—
it appears that the trial judge was not in error in refusing said
charge. Doubtless in considering whether or not-to give this
requested charge he tested it by the thought of whether or not
if given it might likely lend support to a motion for a second
trial in event the verdict was adverse to the plaintiff.

There was no issue in the pleadings to support the whole
of this third sentence and neither was there an issue in the
trial to support the third sentence. There is serious doubt as
to the property of giving the whole charge.

Although it is not unusual, and more or less customary, to
conclude a charge with the language “unless you so find, your
verdict will be for the defendant,” or “if you so find your ver-
dict will be for the defendant” or “if you so find, your verdict
‘will be for the plaintiff,” this is especially true when the

91

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charges are drafted by the attorneys representing the liti-
gants.

Often the charges appear more favorable to the plaintiff or
to the defendant when in one series of charges such terms as
above quoted are used repeatedly as to the plaintiff and in
another series of charges the terms are repeated as to the de-
fendant. The use of such terms can well be limited or avoided
by the trial judge. The law directs that the charge to the jury
be on the Jaw and such terms are not’essential to charging on
the law.

Our statute relating to charges to juries in civil cases pre-
scribes that it should be “on the law of the case in the trial”
as follows: ,

“At trial of any civil action or proceeding at law in the
courts of this state, the judge presiding shall charge the jury
on the law of the case in the trial at the conclusion of the
argument of counsel.” —Séc. 54.17, F.S., 1941, F.S.A.

Although the charges to the jury were meager, and there
is doubt that the proper portions of the requested charge
were adequately covered by the other charges, it is our con-
clusion that it was not error to have refused to give the whole
charge. .

The judgment appealed from is reversed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., agrees to conclusion.

BUFORD and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

BUFORD, J., dissenting:

I think appellants have failed to show any harmful error as:
it does not affirmatively appear that appellants either chal-
lenged or wished to challenge any of those tendered as jurors.

ANTHONY FLORIO v. COLQUITT HARDWARE COMPANY, INO, a.
Georgia corporation.

33 So. (2nd) 722 January Term, 1948

January 27, 1948 Division A.

Rehearing denied February 24, 1948

Hendricks & Hendricks, for petitioner.

Redfearn & Ferrell and HE. O. Simon, for respondent.
CHAPMAN, J.:

The record in this case discloses that the Colquitt Hard-
‘ware Company, Inc., on December 28, 1946, pursuant to order
shipped over the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company’s road
one car load of lumber from Bainbridge, Georgia, to Anthony
Florio at Miami, Florida, with a bill of lading attached to a
sight draft on Florio and the same was deposited for collec-
tion with the Florida National Bank & Trust Company of
Miami. The lumber reached Miami in due course but Florio
did not pay the draft nor accept the car load of lumber. Then
on February 3, 1947 the sight draft was withdrawn from the
bank and placed in the hands of counsel for the Colquitt Hard-
ware Company.

De
94

On January 27, 1947, Anthony Florio filed a common law
action against the Colquitt Hardware Company in the Civil
Court of Record of Dade County, Florida, and in an affidavit
for attachment asserted that the Colquitt Hardware Company
was due him the sum of $1,573.60. An attachment bond was
filed and the Sheriff of Dade County, Florida, on January 27,
1947, attached the car load of lumber. On March 3, 1947,
Anthony Florio filed his declaration in the cause, consisting of
the common counts in which he claimed the Colquitt Hardware
Company was due him the sum of $1,573.60 as set out supra
in his affidavit of attachment.

On February 5, 1947, the Colquitt Hardware Company, un-
der Section 76.18, F.S.A., filed with and had approved by the
Sheriff of Dade County, a forthcoming bond in the sum of
$3,147.20, which bond bore the name of Colquitt Hardware
Company, Inc., a Georgia Corporation, as principal, and the
Maryland Casualty Company, as surety. The condition of the
bond was viz: ,

“The condition of this obligation is such that WHEREAS,
the Sheriff of Dade County, Florida, has levied an attachment
on a car load of lumber owned by the defendant, consisting of
the following:

“Car No. and Int. A. T. S. F. 188724
12,201.50 B. R. 2/32 Oak Flooring at 175 M .....
2,477.00 B. F. No. 3 Oak Flooring at $100 M ....

$2,135.26
247.70

$2,382.96
and the defendant wishes to re-claim the property and have
the same restored to him; now if the said Colquitt Hardware
Company, Inc., shall have the said property forthcoming on
the final determination of the cause, hereinabove stated and
abide the final order of the court, then bond to be-void, else to
remain in full force and effect.”

Upon the approval by the Sheriff of the forthcoming bond
the lumber was by the Sheriff delivered to the Colquitt Hard-
ware Company, or its agents, attorneys or representatives. ~

Two motions to dissolve the attachment on various
grounds were filed in the cause and heard by the court on

February 21, 1947, when an order was entered dissolving and
dismissing the writ of attachment previously issued in behalf
of Anthony Florio. A petition for rehearing was filed by
Florio and heard by a judge of the Civil Court of Record and on
March 19, 1947, an order was entered denying the petition for
rehearing.

On March 3, 1947, the Colquitt Hardware Company filed a
special appearance in the cause for the sole and limited pur-
pose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over its per-
son and over the subject matter of the suit. The special ap-
pearance is viz:

“COMES NOW the defendant and files this its statement
of grounds of its special appearance heretofore filed herein,
and its motion to quash, as required by law, as follows:

95

“1. There has been no service of process upon defendant
as required by law.

“2. There has been no valid writ of attachment issued and
executed as required by law to give the court jurisdiction over
the defendant or jurisdiction over the subject matter.

“3, The Court has no jurisdiction herein.

“4, Said suit was commenced by attachment and was dis-
solved on motion before appearance to the action by order
entered herein on the 21st day of February, 1947, and said suit
thus did abate and was dismissed from court as by law pro-
vided.”

On March 19, 1947, the Judge of the Civil Court of Record
entered an order holding that no valid writ of attachment
issued in the cause and the same was dissolved by a previous
order before an appearance was filed and that the said suit was
thereby abated and dismissed by ‘operation of law; that the
court was without jurisdiction and that the special appearance.
of Colquitt Hardware Company was sustained.

The following appears in the transcript of the record:

“STIPULATION OF ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT. IT IS STIPULATED by counsel for the
respective parties to this case:

96

“1, That on December 28th, 1946, defendant shipped to
plaintiff car number and initial A. T. S. F. 188724. That a
draft, ‘At sight order notify,’ payable to the order of Colquitt
Hardware Company, Inc., Bainbridge, Georgia, for $2,016.00,
was drawn on plaintiff and set to the Florida National Bank in
the City of Miami, Florida, for collection.

2. That on the 27th day of January, 1947, the Sheriff of
Dade County, Florida levied an attachment upon the carload
of lumber described in the preceding paragraph.

“3, That on the 3rd day of February, 1947, the defendant
instructed the Florida National Bank to deliver to Redfearn
& Ferrell, its attorneys, the Order Bill of Lading.

“4, That on the 5th day of February, 1947, the defendant
gave a forthcoming bond for the carload of lumber, described
in the first paragraph of this stipulation, took possession of
said carload of jumber and used the same as its property.

“5, That said carload of lumber hereinabove described has
at all times from the date it arrived in Miami, Dade County,
Florida, until the date that the same was reshipped by the de-
fendant as its property, remained on the railroad track of
Seaboard Air Line Railway Company.”

An appeal was perfected by the original plaintiff (Anthony
Florio) to the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, from
the order dissolving the attachment dated February 21, 1947,
and the order dated March 19, 1947, sustaining the special
appearance of the Colquitt Hardware Company and the dis-
missal of plaintiff's cause of action. Several other adverse
orders were assigned as error on the appeal, but, after due
consideration, the several orders complained of were duly af-
firmed by the Circuit Court. The original plaintiff, by his
petition for a common law writ of certiorari filed in this Court,
contends that the order of affirmance as entered by the Circuit
Court of Dade County is and does now constitute a departure
from the essential requirements of the law and should there-
fore be quashed by appropriate orders and decrees of this
Court. |

The contention is made that the issuance of the writ of at-
tachment by the Civil Court of Record and the seizure there-

under by the officers is void ab initio and prohibited by the
terms and provisions of Section 103 of Title 49, U. S. C. G.,
which is viz:

“103. Attachment, etc., of Goods Delivered to Carrier.—
If goods are delivered to a carrier by the owner or by a person
whose act in conveying the title to them to a purchaser for
value in good faith would bind the owner, and an order bill is
issued for them, they can not thereafter, while in the posses-
sion of the carrier, be attached by garnishment or otherwise
or be levied upon under an execution unless the bill be first
surrendered to the carrier or its negotiation enjoined. The
carrier shall in no case be compelled to deliver the actual pos-
session of the goods until the bill is surrendered to him or im-
pounded by the court.”

We have examined the numerous authorities relied upon to
sustain the contention. The record discloses that the order of
bill of lading was delivered by the Florida National Bank &
Trust Company on February 3, 1947, at the direction of the
Colquitt Hardware Company of Bainbridge, Georgia, to its at-
torney in Miami, Florida, and no issue was made as to the
ownership of the order of bill of lading and the Seaboard Air
Line Railway Company is not here complaining because the _
order of bill of lading was surrendered to it by counsel for
the Colquitt Hardware Company upon the delivery of the lum-
ber. It is our conclusion, after careful consideration, that
Section 103, supra, is not authority for dissolving a writ of
attachment issued by a State Court and holding the same void
ab initio, as was done in the case at bar. See Chicago, & N. W.
Ry. Co. v. Durham Company, 271 U.S. 251, 46 S. Ct. 509; 70
L. ed. 930; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. State National Bank,
280 Ky. 444, 183 S.W. (2nd) 511, 283 Ky. 443, 141 S.W. (2nd)
869, 130 A.L.R. 1306.

It is not disputed that the Colquitt Hardware Company on
February 5, 1947, gave a forthcoming bond as prescribed by
statute for the car of lumber, which was approved by the
Sheriff of Dade County, and the possession of the lumber de-
livered to its counsel. The second motion to dissolve the at-
tachment on different grounds was filed on February 17, 1947.
When the cause was orally argued by counsel at the bar of

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98

this Court the statement was made and not challenged that
“the forthcoming bond was filed and approved on February 5,
1947, prior to the filing of the two motions to dissolve the at-
tachment by the Colquitt Hardware Company.”

Section 76.27, F.S.A., provides that the appearance of the
defendant shall be entered upon the day of filing the declara--
tion. If the property be retaken by the defendant, such re-
taking shall be considered as an appearance by the defendant
as of the rule day next succeeding such retaking (to-wit' the |
rule day in March, 1947) and the plaintiff shall be held to file
his declaration upon the said rule day or that next succeeding.
The signing by the defendant, Colquitt Hardware Company, of
the forthcoming bond, the-delivery thereof and approval by
the Sheriff of Dade County, and the retaking of the lumber
previously attached, gave the Civil Court of Record juris-
diction of the defendant and the subject matter of the suit.
See State ex rel. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Burnside, 153
Fla. 599, 15 So. (2nd) 324.

The contention: is made that this Court is powerless to
hear and determine the merits of the petition for writ of
certiorari because there is no final judgment adjudicating the
rights of the parties. The answer thereto is our previous
ruling in Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 151 Fla. 62, 9 So. (2nd)
553, when this Court, speaking through our now retired Mr.
Justice ARMSTEAD BROWN, in part said:

“The general rule is that this court will not, on certiorari,
quash a judgment of the circuit court rendered in the exer-
cise of its final appellate jurisdiction unless such judgment is
a final adjudication of the case, or so final in its nature as to
amount to a final adjudication. But there are certain well
recognized exceptions. These are: Where the judgment of
the Circuit Court is rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction; where the judgment of the circuit court is a
palpable miscarriage of justice; or where the result of such
judgment would constitute a substantial injury to the legal
rights of the petitioner; or where the judgment sought to be
reviewed is illegal or essentially irregular and violative of
established principles of law, the violation of which by the
judgment has resulted, or reasonably may and’ probably will

result, in substantial injury to the legal rights of the peti-
tioner, and for which no other adequate remedy is afforded
by law. In such cases the common writ of certiorari will
lie...”

See Janet Realty Corporation v. Hoffman’s Inc., 154 Fla.
144, 17 So. (2nd) 114.

For the reasons above stated, the writ of certiorari is
granted and the judgment of the Circuit Court presented here
on petition for certiorari and accompanying the transcript is
hereby quashed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Leer eres)
CORA AKINS, G, W. BETHEA, OPAL KNOWLES, and EULA
WILDER v. L. B. BETHEA and THE PERRY BAKING COMPANY
33 So. (2nd) 638 January Term, 1948
January 27, 1948 : Division A

99

|

David Lanier and T. J. Swanson, for appellants.

Davis, Davis & McClure, Charles E. Davis and Declan
O'Grady, for appellees.

SEBRING, J.:

Cora Akins, G. W. Bethea, Opal Knowles, and Eula Wilder
instituted a suit in equity against L. B. Bethea and The Perry
Banking Company to set aside several property conveyances
alleged to have been made by J. J. Bethea to L. B. Bethea as 7
the result of undue influence exerted over the grantor in the
conveyances. At final hearing the chancellor granted the re-
lief sought as to one of the conveyances, denied relief as to
the remainder, and adjudicated that “The costs of this suit
are taxed against the defendants the same to be caluculated
by the clerk of this Court.”

The plaintiffs entered an appeal from the decree, for the.
purpose of procuring appellate review of that portion of the
decree which denied them relief as to all of the conveyances
brought in question. Subsequently, the defendant, L.’ B.

- Bethea, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that “at the time of taking such appeal the said original
plaintiffs had not paid all costs that had accrued in or about
said suit up to the time the appeal was taken.” It is urged
that the failure of the plaintiffs in this particular is violative
of section 9 of chapter 22854, Laws of Florida, 1945, and war-
rants the dismissal of the appeal for failure to comply with
conditions precedent.

‘ Chapter 22854, Laws of Florida, 1945 was enacted for the
purpose of consolidating, revising and amending chapters 59
and 67 of the Florida Statutes 1941, relating to appellate pro-
ceedings generally, to the end that conflicts between statutes
and subsequent Supreme Court rules on the subject should be
rectified and that a uniform procedure should prevail for ob-
taining reviews by appellate tribunals of inferior court judg-
ments and decrees, except where otherwise expressly pro-
vided by statute. With this salutary purpose in view, the

legislature consolidated, renumbered and amended chapters
59 and 67 of the Florida Statutes, 1941; abolished the distinc-
tion between writs of error and appeal; abrogated those pro-
visions of law relating to bills of exceptions; and enacted
other features within the framework of chapter 22854, supra,
designed to insure uniformity and simplicity of appellate pro-
cedure.

101

In respect to the payment of costs, the legislature
amended section 59.09, Florida Statutes, 1941, which there-
tofore had applied only to appeals in actions at law, and pro-
vided that “No appeal may be taken by the original plaintiff
in any suit or proceeding until he shall pay all costs which
have accrued, in or about the suit, up to the time the appeal is
taken.” See section 9, chapter 22854, Laws of Florida, 1945.
The question presently before us on the motion to dismiss the
appeal is whether, and to what extent if any, section 9 of the
1945 act was meant to be binding upon an original plaintiff in
an equity suit in which a portion of the relief sought is de-
nied, where the costs of. suit have been taxed by the chancellor
against a defendant who has succeeded in defeating at least a
part of the relief sought in the bill filed by the original plain-
tiff.

Since territorial days it has been the statutory require-
ment in this jurisdiction that the payment of costs by an
original plaintiff in a common law proceeding is a condition
precedent to his suing out of a writ of error to an adverse
judgment. See Union Bank of Florida v. McBride, 2 Fla. 23;
Callison v. A.C.L. Ry. Co., 82 Fla. 516, 90 So. 619; Busch v.
Goodno, 99 Fla. 517, 128 So. 825; Walker v. City of Jackson-
ville, 154 Fla. 893, 19 So. (2nd) 372. But such has never been
the statutory requirement in respect to appeals in chancery;
unless it be that section 9 of chapter 22854, Laws of Florida
1945 now makes such action necessary. See Williams v. Hii-
ton, 25 Fla. 608, 6 So. 452.

It has long been a fundamental rule of equity jurispru-
dence that in a chancery cause costs should be awarded as the
justice of the case may require. Wilhelm v. Adams, 102 Fla.
669, 136 So. 397; News Journal Corporation v. Gore, 147 Fla.

EE
102

217, 2 So. (2nd) 741. Accordingly, a court of equity, in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion, may decree that the
costs shall follow the result of the suit; may apportion the |
costs between both parties; or may require that all costs shall
‘be paid by the prevailing party. In either situation, an ap-
pellate court will not disturb the ruling of the chancellor, un-
less a clear abuse of discretion is made to appear.

As equally well-settled as the rule with reference to costs
in an equity proceeding in the rule that a party may not ap-
peal from a judgment or decree in his favor, unless irregu-
larities have intervened rendering the decree invalid or nuga-
tory, or unless the court, without his consent, has committed
error prejudicial to him of such nature that he has sustained
injury thereby. See Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So.
‘768. ,

It must be assumed that these rules of law were known to
the Legislature at the time it enacted section 9 of chapter
22854, supra; for every citizen is charged with knowledge of
the domestic law of his jurisdiction. This being the case, we
cannot ascribe to the legislature an intent to depart so far
from those well-established principles as to require an origi-
nal plaintiff in an equity suit to pay costs taxed against the
adverse party as a condition precedent to taking an appeal,
thus requiring him to surrender, in effect at least, that por-
tion of the decree rendered in his favor by the chancellor in
the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, for the privilege of
securing an appellate review of the remaining portions of the
decree which mitigates against him. Had the law-making
body intended such a result, we think it quite plain that
clearer and more explicit language would have been employed.
in the statute revealing such intent and describing the method
by which the accrued costs taxed by the chancellor against
parties other than the original plaintiff should be discharged
as a necessary condition to an appeal taken by him.

Our conclusion is, therefore, that while in the passage of
section 9 of chapter 22854, Laws of Florida, 1945, the legis-
lature may have intended that as a condition precedent to
taking an appeal in an equity suit an original plaintiff should
be required to pay all costs that had accrued in and about the

; 108

suit up to the time the appeal was taken, and which had been
taxed against him by the chancellor, or which by law he was
required to pay, it was not the legislative intent that as a
condition precedent an original plaintiff in an equity suit
should be required to pay costs taxed by the chancellor
against his adversaries in the proceeding.

It follows from the conclusions reached that the motion
to dismiss the appeal upon the ground stated should be de-
nied.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

IN RE: ESTATE OF ELLSWORTH C. WARNER
83 So, (2nd) 728 January Term, 1948
January 30,1948 Division A

Rehearing denied February 24, 1948.

W. F. Maurer, for appellants.

Jos. D. Farish and Rogers, Towers & Bailey, for appellees.
TERRELL, J.:

In an opinion treating another phase of this case, filed

November 18, 1947, not yet reported, a statement of the
pertinent facts will be found. The sole question adjudicated

104

in that opinion was, what portion of the record is necessary
to review an order of the Circuit Court dismissing an appeal
from the probate court, because it was not taken within the
time prescribed by law.

It is admitted that the time prescribed by law for taking
such appeals is thirty days. The point for determination in
the instant case is, when the thirtieth day for taking such ap-
peals falls on Sunday, does the appellate court acquire juris-.
diction of a cause when the appeal is taken on a date subse-
quent to the expiration of the thirty day period?

Appellants contend that this question should be answered.
in the affirmative and rely on our interpretations of common
law Rule 5, formerly Common Law Rule 63, the essential part.
of which is as follows: “In all cases in which any particular
number of days ... is allowed ... the same shall be reckoned
exclusive of the first day and inclusive of the last day unless
the last day shall fall on Sunday ...” - We have given due
consideration to the cases cited by appellants applying this
rule, but we do not think they apply to this case. We have
also considered appellants’ contention as to the effect of the
four days allowed for filing the petition for rehearing but we
do not think that of itself extends the time for taking the ap-
peal. . ‘

The salient facts to guide us to a conclusion here are
these: The Probate Court entered his order, from which ap-
peal was taken, to the Circuit Court April 18, 1947. Appel-
lants filed their petition for rehearing May 8, 1947. No stay
or supersedeas was directed to the petition for rehearing,
which was denied May 14, 1947. The notice of appeal di-
rected to the final decree of the probate court, dated April
18th, was entered May 19, 1947. The Circuit Judge granted
the motion to dismiss the appeal on authority of Simmons v.
Hanne, 50 Fla. 267, 39 So. 77, because it was not taken within
thirty days as required by law, and being so, he was without
jurisdiction of the appeal.

Section 732.16 (2) Florida Statutes 1941, is the governing

law and provides that an appeal to the Circuit Court from an
order or judgment of the County Judge in a probate matter:

must be taken within thirty days from the date on which the
order or judgment appealed was filed in the office of the
County Judge. The statute gives no criterion for counting
the period “within thirty days from the date on which the
order or judgment appealed was filed in the office of the
County Judge.”

105

The word “from” as used in the quoted statute may be
said to indicate when the appeal period begins to run. It
means away from, contact with or proximity to, out of, as re-
leased from, etc. So we might in reason hold that within
thirty days from the date of the order includes the date the
order is filed. With the view to liberality however, we exclude
the date the order is filed and hold that the time begins to run
the following day, which would be April 19th. In so holding,
the time for taking the appeal expired on the 18th day of May,
so an appeal taken on the 19th was beyond the time limit and
conferred no jurisdiction on the appellate court, there being
nothing whatever in the act to show that Sundays and holi-
days are excluded in continuing the period. We understand
the general rule to be that when counting the time within
which an appeal must be taken, the day on which the decree
was rendered should be excluded and the last day of the ap-
peal period should be included. American Jurisprudence, Sec-
tion 423. Simmons v. Hann, supra.

We are convinced that appeals like this are governed by
the provision of the chancery act as above cited, and that the
Common Law Rules have no application. We are also con-
vinced that filing a petition for rehearing does not enlarge
the period for taking the appeal unless the court so orders.
Gasque v. Ball, 71 Fla. 237, 71 Booth v. Spencer, 145 Fla. 264,
199 So. 256. Section 71 of the Chancery Act in terms pro-
vides that “No petition for rehearing shall operate to stay the
proceedings unless so ordered by the Court.”

It follows that the order of the Circuit Court dismissing
the appeal must be and is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

106

CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, a municipal corporation, v. FRANK
FIORE, single; ROBERT EMMETT LEE and WEST COAST
TITLE COMPANY.

33 So. (2nd) 852 January Term, 1943
January 30, 1948 Division A

Lewis T. Wray, Harry I. Young and Frank D. McDevitt,
for appellant.

Harris & Kooman, for appellees. -

SEBRING, J.:

The plaintiff below, Frank Fiore, purchased three vacant
‘lots of land in St. Petersburg in 1940. Previous to’ the pur-
chase the lots had been used by the prior owners as a place
for storing and selling firewood. The plaintiff contracted to
sell the property in 1946 to one Robert Emmett Lee. At the
time for closing the deal it was discovered that the City of
St. Petersburg claimed a lien on the real property for certain
tangible personal. property taxes assessed against firewood.

which had been stored on the premises prior to acquisition of
title by Fiore. The prospective purchaser being in doubt as to
whether the asserted claim for taxes constituted a lien on the
real property, a portion of the purchase money sufficient to
pay the personal property taxes was placed in escrow to await
a judicial determination of the question; the remainder of the
purchase price was paid to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff
executed a deed conveying the lots to the purchaser. Then the
plaintiff instituted a suit in equity to determine the question,
naming as parties defendant the City of St. Petersburg, the
purchaser of the property, and the escrow agent.

In his bill of complaint the plaintiff set forth the facts
which we have mentioned; quoted the provisions of the Char-
ter Act under which the City asserted its claim of lien against
the real property; and prayed that the Court find that the
personal property tax claim did not constitute a lien upon the
real property and that it enter a decree on such finding
cancelling the City’s claim of lien as a cloud on the title of the
plaintiff and his successor in title.

The City of St. Petersburg, in its answer filed to the bill,
admitted that it claimed a lien upon the real property for
tangible personal property taxes assessed for the years in
which the personal property and the real property were owned
by the predecessor in title; denied that it claimed a lien for
the one year in which the real property and personal property
were not owned by the same person; and disclaimed any lien
on the real property for any year in which the realty and the
personalty were not in the same ownership.

107

The answers filed by the purchaser and the escrow agent
disavowed knowledge of the validity of the contentions made
by the disputing parties and averred willingness to abide by
and comply with any competent order or decree rendered by
the Court having jurisdiction.

The contention between the respective parties being thus
put in issue, the plaintiff moved for a final decree on bill and
answers. The motion was granted and the court entered its
final decree adjudicating that the tangible personal property
taxes did not constitute a lien on the real property involved

Le
108

and that any claim of lien thus asserted by the City should
be cancelled as null and void.

The City of St. Petersburg has taken an appeal, assigning
as ground of error the entry of the final decree.

The decision on this appeal depends upon the construction
to be given certain sections of the Charter Act of the City per-
taining to the real and personal property taxation powers
given by the legislature to the municipality. See Secs. 14(d),
(i) and (aa), Chapter 15505, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of
1931.

The applicable portions of sections 14(d), (i) and (aa) of
the Charter Act of the City of St. Petersburg provide, respec-
tively, as follows:

“(d) The assessment of personal property shall be made
separate from the assessment of real estate, but personal
property shall be responsible for the taxes on real estate and
the real estate shall be responsible for taxes on personal
property, when owned by the same person.”

“(i) ... All taxes imposed pursuant to this charter and the
laws of the State of Florida shall be a first lien superior to all
other liens on any property against which such taxes have
been assessed which shall continue in full force until dis-
charged by payment, and shall be a lien of equal dignity with
the liens for State and County taxes.” .

“(aa) Delinquent taxes on personal property shall be col-
lected substantially in the same manner as provided by gen-
eral State law for the collection of State and County taxes;
provided that the taxes on personal property for the preceding
yéar shall become delinquent on April 1st of each year.”

The City of St. Petersburg contends that the words appear-
ing in section 14(d), supra, providing that “the real estate
shall be responsible for taxes on personal property, when
owned by the same person” creates in favor of the City a lien
on real estate within the boundaries of the City for all tangible
personal property taxes assessed against the owner of such
real estate.

We cannot agree with the contention. A tax is not a lien
even upon the property against which the tax is assessed un-

less made so by statute; a tax lien being merely a security
established by statute of which the tax collector may avail
himself in default of payment of taxes. It being solely a
creature of statute, the intention to create the lien, or to
extend it to any particular species of property, must clearly
appear in the statute. Moreover, .a tax lien will not be ex-
tended by implication, or enlarged by judicial construction.
It will exist or attack only in accordance with such terms and
conditions as are prescribed by the statute creating it. 51 Am.
Jur. 881, Taxation Sec. 1010. Therefore, in the absence of a
statute extending a lien for personal property to real property
owned by the taxpayer, such real property may not be
charged, in default of the payment of such personal property
taxes.

The meaning of the charter provisions involved in this
litigation is perfectly plain, so far as they pertain to the as-
sessment, levy, and collection of tangible personal property
taxes. Section 14(i) of the Charter, though creating a lien
in favor of the City as security for the payment of taxes im-
posed pursuant to the Charter, restricts the lien thus created
to the personal property against which such taxes have been
assessed. By providing that “real estate shall be responsible
for taxes on personal property,” where the ownership of the
personal property taxed and real estate are in the same per-
son, section 14(d) of the Charter evidences a clear legislative
intent that the ultimate satisfaction of the tax is not to be
confined solely to personal property of the tax debtor—as is
the case now in respect of State and county tangible personal
property taxes levied undér general statutes—but is to extend
to all property owned by him, in the event the tax is not paid
and the personal property upon which the tax lien is imposed
by the charter is not sufficient to liquidate the tax debt. Sec-
tion 14(aa) prescribes the manner in which the Tax Collector
shall proceed with the collection of personal property taxes,
and given to this tax official the remedies available to State
and County tax officials under the provisions of general law.

Whether by force of the language used in section 14(d)
of the Charter providing that “real estate shall be responsible
for taxes on personal property,” a remedy to enforce the per-

109

110

sonal property tax against real property is available to the
City tax collector by suit in equity, or otherwise, is a matter
not before us on this appeal.

The decree appealed from is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C., J., TERRELL, and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

| erences!
MARTE WILLIAMS v. DR. P. PHILIPS & SONS, INC., a Florida

corporation,
33 So. (2nd) 637 . January Term, 1948
January 30, 1948 : Division A.

W. K. Whitfield, for appellant.
Akerman, Dial'& Akerman, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.:

The plaintiff below has appealed from a judgment sustain-
ing a demurrer to his declaration. The declaration alleges, in
brief, as follows: One C. M. Robertson, a citizen and resident
of Ohio, by and through his duly authorized agent, one H. J.
Kirkland, a citizen and resident of Florida, listed a certain
Florida citrus grove for sale with the plaintiff, who was and is
a licensed real estate broker under the laws of Florida; and
contracted with the broker that if the latter would produce to
him as agent for the owner a purchaser who would purchase
the property for $200,000 net to the owner, the broker could
add to said price such reasonable sum for his services as
broker in producing such purchaser as the broker might fix.
In reliance upon said contract the plaintiff advertised the

grove for sale at and for the price of $213,000; the sum of
$13,000 to constitute a brokerage commission for the broker.

11

As a direct result of said advertisement the plaintiff pro-
cured Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc., a corporation, as a pur-
chaser for the property and produced the prospect to Kirk-
land, the owner’s agent. Thereupon the owner, through his
agent Kirkland, dealt directly with Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc.
and sold the property to the corporation for $200,000 cash,
even though all parties had knowledge at the time that plain-
tiff had actually interested the corporation in the purchase of
the property and had produced the purchaser to the agent of
the owner of the property.

The declaration also alleges that “Said purchaser was fi-
nancially able to pay $213,000 for said property and ready and
willing to buy said property at the net price of $200,000 fixed
by the owner.”

The declaration alleges, further, that in the transaction
the said Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc., acting through its presi-
dent, Dr. P. Phillips, and said Kirkland, the agent for the
owner, willfully conspired to cheat and defraud the plaintiff
“of his earned brokerage commission” by taking advantage of
the services of the plaintiff in bringing the property to the at-
tention of the prospective purchaser; by falsely representing
to the owner and to the plaintiff that the plaintiff had not pro-
cured the Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc. as a purchaser for the
property; by thereby persuading the owner to reduce his ad-
vertised price of the property from $213,000 to $200,000; and
by closing the sale on an all-cash basis for $200,000 without
notifying the plaintiff and thus giving him opportunity to pro-
tect himself in the collection of his commission by the legal
remedies of attachment or garnishment or otherwise.

It is also averred in the declaration that the plaintiff has
been injured and damaged by this fradulent conduct of the
defendant and the owner’s agent, in that the owner was and
is a non-resident of the State of Florida, has no property
therein, and has not been in the State of Florida since the
transaction so as to give the plaintiff opportunity to serve him
personally with process; as a consequence of which the

112

plaintiff has been deprived of all legal remedy in this State
against the said Robertson, the owner of the property.

While the right of a party to a contract to sue a third
person in tort for wrongful interference with his contract
rights has been upheld in several jurisdictions, we do not find
that the right has ever been recognized where the contract is
not exclusive or has not been fulfilled by the contracting party
by at least partial performance; or where the contracting
party has failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation
of being able to perform the contract, in accordance with its
terms and conditions, had not the acts of the third person
intervened. :

As appears from the face of the declaration in the case at
bar, the listing given by the owner Robertson, through his
agent, Kirkland, to Martie Williams, the broker, was that the
latter should procure a purchaser ready, able and willing to
purchase the property at such figure as would assure to the
owner a net price of $200,000 for the property, together with
such additional sum as would give to the broker a reasonable
commission for his services. The allegations of the declara-
tion make it plain that the broker did not produce the type
prospect called for by his listing. While it is alleged in the
declaration that the defendant Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc. was
financially able to pay $213,000 for the grove property, it is
not alleged that the corporation was ready and willing to
close for such price, or for any price in excess of the $200,000 ©
which it eventually paid in its dealings directly with the
owner. Neither is it shown by the pleading that but for the
action of the defendant in dealing directly with the owner,
the broker could have persuaded the defendant to purchase
the property for $213,000; or that he had the reasonable ex-
pectation of procuring another prospect who would have been
ready, able, and willing to purchase the property for the price
of $213,000 fixed by the broker. The total absence of some
such allegation, or allegations, from the declaration is suf-
ficient to render the declaration bad on demurrer, even though
it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that with such allega-
tions present a case would have been stated to warrant re-
covery against the purchaser.

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
Le :
STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. John C. Smith v. WALTER R. CLARK,
Sheriff of Broward County, Florida.
83 So. (2nd) 721 January Term, 1948
January 30, 1948 Special Division A.

118

Davis & Lockhart and J. Lewis Hall, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Sumter Leitner,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The appellant, John C. Smith, was taken into custody and
held by the officers of Broward County, Florida, under a war-
rant issued by Honorable Millard F. Caldwell, Governor of
Florida, upon the demand of the Governor of the State of
Iowa. The information lodged with the Governor of Florida
by the Governor of Iowa charged that John C. Smith, on the
26th day of April, 1947, with two others, did break and enter
the building of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks,
located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, with the intent to commit the
crime of larceny.

The appellant, by petition filed in the Circuit Court of
Broward County, Florida, contended that he was 4 fugitive
from justice, nor was he within the State of Iowa during the
month of April, 1947, and that the various legal steps re-
quired by applicable statutes and controlling decisions author-
izing his extradition on the charge preferred had not been
taken or observed by the States of Iowa and Florida. The re-
turn to the writ as made by the Sheriff of Broward County

Le
114

joined issue on the allegations of the appellant’s petition to the
effect that “he was not within the State of Iowa in the month
of April, 1947, the time represented by the police officers” as
the time of the commission of the alleged crime-or at any
other timie thereafter to the present date and that petitioner
was not within the State of Iowa at any time during the year,
1947. .

On the issues made a hearing was held in the court below,
when the parties appeared and were heard by counsel; testi-
mony adduced and arguments made, after which the trial
court entered an order quashing the writ previously issued and
remanded John C. Smith to the custody of the Sheriff of
Broward County, Florida, with directions that he be delivered
to an agent of the State of Iowa to be returned to Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, to stand trial on the crime of larceny. On June
18, 1947, an order was entered allowing. an appeal by the.
petitioner to the Supreme Court of Florida.

Counsel for appellant pose here six questions for adjudica-
tion, each of which have been studied and the cited authorities
examined. It is our conclusion that the controlling question
presented by the record is whether or not the appellant was in
the State of Iowa on the evening of April 26th and the morn-
ing of April 27th, 1947. The evidence in the record discloses
that the building in question was entered on the night of April
26, 1947, and money taken therefrom; that the appellant was
seen about the building a few hours before it was entered; he
had agreed with others to enter the building and take the
money; some of his confederates assisted in having a skeleton
key made with which to unlock the door. The record fails to
establish the petitioner’s presence in the State of Iowa after
the entry of the building. We fail to find error in the record.
See Sections 941.01 to 941.37, F.S.A.

Affirmed.
TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, BUFORD and SE-.
BRING, JJ., concur.

KATIE L. DINGMAN, a widow, by her next friend, B. D. BRAD-
DOCK, v. J. A. ARD, CORA LEE ARD, his wife, et al.

33 So. (2nd) 718 January Term, 1948

January 30, 1948 Division A.

J. Ollie Edmunds, for appellant.

Katz & Katz, for J. A. Ard and Cora Lee Ard, his wife, and
John Allen Tatem and Vernall Hazel Tatem, his wife, and
Rogers, Towers and Bailey and Elmer Norton for George L.
Whitley and Ida E. Whitley, his wife, appellees.

PER CURIAM:

On appeal here we are requested to reverse for enumerated
reasons the decree of the Chancellor, which, as shown by a
careful study of the record, appears to have been based largely
on disputes and conflicts in the evidence. We have given all
the testimony appearing in the transcript careful considera-
tion; the briefs filed in the cause have been read, and the au-
thorities cited examined. It is our view, and we so hold, that
we are not justified, as a matter of law, in interfering with
the decree appealed from and accordingly the same is affirmed.
See Travis v. Travis, 81 Fla. 309, 87 So. 762; Webb v. Webb,
145 Fla. 267, 199 So. 343; Windham v. Windham, 152 Fla. 362,
11 So. (2nd) 797.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

115

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, upon the relation of ROBERT JAMES
CARROLL, v. JIMMY SULLIVAN, Sheriff of Dade County,
Florida.

33 So. (2nd) 735 January Term, 1948

February 3, 1948 En Bane

|
116
es

Oppenborn, Mincer & Ropes, for relator.

Norris McElya, for respondent.

BARNS, J.:

This cause comes on before this Court upon the Return to
a Writ of Habeas Corpus issued upon a Petition therefor re-
citing that petitioner had been illegally committed by the
Chancellor for contempt because on the non-payment of ali-
mony, in that:

“(a) The term of arrest or incarceration, as specified in
said order, is vague, indefinite and uncertain in that it con-
tains a provision that the relator, Robert James Carroll, be
held by the respondent and imprisoned for a period of ‘thirty
days, or until further order of this Court.’

“(b) An alleged violation of two orders of the Circuit
Judge, which are ‘void, illegal, oppressive and in violation of
the provisions of due process of law.’

“(c) That one of the orders referred to in (b) supra is
‘vague, indefinite, and uncertain, either as to amount, or as to
time of payment, and which said expenses had not, in fact,
at the time of entry of the said order become due and over
which no provision whatsoever was thade as to either the
amount thereof, or time of payment; said provisions being
left solely to the discretion of the plaintiff, her counsel of
record, and such of the doctors, nurses, and hospitals as might
later become therein involved.

“(d) That there nowhere appears in the said orders any
findings based upon the matters therein related, declaring a
violation of the said orders for which a commitment for con-
tempt could be based; it appearing, on the contrary, from the.

117

said orders, that certain portions thereof were impossible of
compliance.

“(e) That he is destitute and unable to perform such or-
ders of the chancellor.”

The petitioner was before the Chancellor as a defendant
in a suit for divorce. A hearing was had and a decretal order
was entered by the Chancellor exacting alimony payments
from the petitioner for the benefit of the wife and, in a subse-
quent hearing, he was ordered committed because of the non-
performance of the Chancellor’s order.

In order to properly review the action of the Chancellor we
will be compelled to review the record of the proceedings be-
fore him. It is not before us in such form as is conducive to
a proper review.

The petitioner has been found guilty of an indirect civil
contempt. It was indirect because it was not in the presence
of the court and because proof thereof was necessary in order
that the chancellor be advised of the facts going to the de-
termination of the contempt.

It was civil because it was for the benefit of the wife and
the chancellor’s order was for coercive purposes, to-wit: Per-
form his obligations to his wife, relative to maintenance and
support. °

We are familiar with the decisions of this Court, notably
Miller v. Miller, 91 Fla. 82, 107 So. 251; (See also Culpepper
v. Culpepper, 103 Fla. 390, 1388 So. 799; Hamilton v. State ex
rel., 148 Fla. 551, 4 So. (2nd) 660) holding that orders like
the one now under study may not be reviewed by certiorari.

We now recede from that position and hold that such pro-
cedure may be employed, a view which we consider justified
by our Rule No. 34, as follows:

“(a) Interlocutory Appeals to Be By Certiorari. All ap-
peals from interlocutory decrees as authorized by statute in-
cluding orders or decrees after final decree, shall be prosecuted
to this court by certiorari in the manner provided by the rules
relating to the constitutional writ of certiorari. This rule
shall not preclude the review of such orders and decrees on
final decree, if found more expedient.”

SO

Le
118

So we discharge the writ heretofore issued and remand
the petitioner to custody, without prejudice to the petitioner's.
bringing the challenged order here by petition for certiorari.
supported by a record in proper form.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
BUFORD, ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

ADAMS, J., dissenting:

I concur in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Sebring
with the further observation that it is not necessary for us to
recede from our former decision in order to decide this case
unless we hold that review may be had under Rule 34 to the
exclusion of a review by Habeas Corpus. We have no right to
abrogate the Writ of Habeas Corpus vouchsafed by the funda-
mental law of the land.

If the majority opinion leaves the two methods of review
open then an election has been made and it becomes our duty
| to decide the case. Especially is this so when the time has,
| perhaps, expired to afford adequate review by appeal or certio-
rari.

It is not sufficient to simply say, as in the majority opinion,
that “It is not before us in such form as is conducive to a
proper review.” The fact of the matter is that all the record is
here which could be presented by certiorari or appeal: i. e., the
pleadings, testimony and orders adverse to petitioner.

BUFORD, J., concurs.

SEBRING, J., dissenting:

I cannot agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice
BARNS in the above case. Although Supreme Court Rule 34
may authorize the review of a contempt order by interlocu-
tory certiorari; I am of opinion that such remedy is not ex-
clusive, but is concurrent with, the remedy afforded by habeas
corpus. . .

The petitioner before us has elected to proceed by habeas
corpus, the writ has been issued, and the respondent has made
his return. The controversy, therefore, is ripe for a decision
upon the merits.

119

Having elected to test the order complained of by habeas
corpus, the petitioner has the burden of showing the illegality
of his detention. See McCall v. Lee, 66 Fla. 14, 62 So. 902. He
has failed to sustain the burden. He should therefore be re-
manded. .

BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

PAULINE P. BURNS v. FREDERICA LUCIAN, as sole heir at law and
Executrix of Estate of LEONORA FORNEY BUCKHART, de-

ceased.
33 So, (2nd) 652 January Term, 1948
February 3, 1948 Special Division B

W. J. Kelley and McCune, Hiaasen, Fleming & Kelley, for
appellant.

A. C. Franks, for appellee.
ADAMS, J.:

Pursuant to a legal notice the City of Fort Lauderdale
offered to sell certain real estate for nonpayment of city taxes.
At 12:00 o’clock noon, on the appointed sale date, the property
was duly offered and sold to the appellant in this case. After
the sale, but prior to the issuance of the tax deed, the appellee
(being the record owner) appeared and offered to redeem the
property. The city declined to allow the redemption and
executed and delivered its tax deed.

Thereupon appellee prosecuted a suit in equity and pro-
cured a final decree allowing her to redeem the property.

On this appeal we are called upon to construe the following
statutes:

Section 194.02, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.

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120

“Any person ... may redeem the same at any time after
such sale and before a tax deed is issued...”

Section 17, Chapter 21234, Special Acts of 1941 provides
for a redemption only until date of sale.

The special act must control. See Ferguson v. McDonald,
66 Fla. 494, 63 So. 915. The line of cases decided under the
general statute are of no avail here. Ferguson v. McDonald,
supra. :

There is no ambiguity in either of the statutes. The
language is simply different. It is clear and we have no right
to assume that the legislature meant otherwise. Further-
more, it may be easily seen that the local statute is framed so
as to avoid difficult situations. The time of sale as fixed is
definite and certain. It fixes by law a definite time and place
which may be known and relied upon by all. The time of issu-
ance of tax deed must yield to the abilities and often to the
convenience of-the city officials. If we cherish the reign of
law then the statute, which does fix a definite and certain time
within which the record owner may redeem his property, must
surely have a salutary effect. We, as a court, have no alterna-
tive other than to interpret the statute as it is plainly written.

The decree is reversed with directions to dismiss the bill.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and BUFORD, JJ., concur.

NAPOLEON B. BROWARD DRAINAGE DISTRICT, a public corpora-
tion, etc., et al, v. CERTAIN LANDS UPON WHICH taxes due,

et al. :
38 So. (2nd) 716 January Term, 1948
February 6, 1948 Special Division A

Rehearing denied February 27, 1948

121

Davis & Lockhart, for appellants.

English, Lester & O’Bryan, Rogers, Morris & Griffis and
Abbott & Smith, for appellees.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The Napoleon B. Broward Drainage District was created
by Chapter 8871, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1921. On
May 12, 1947, it filed in the Circuit Court of Broward County,
Florida, a suit to foreclose delinquent tax certificates owned
by it and then two years or more of age, which had been
levied and assessed against certain lands situated within the
drainage district, which lands were accurately described and
set out in the bill of complaint. This suit was filed and prose-
cuted to a final decree under the several provisions of Chapter
19134, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1939.

Section 4 of Chapter 19134 supra, under which the fore-
closure in the case at bar was prosecuted to a final decree, in
part, provides that at least thirty days prior to the filing of
such bill in chancery to foreclose in rem public notice of in-
tention to file the same shall be published once in a newspaper
published in Broward County, Florida. At least thirty days
prior to the filing of any such suit in chancery written notice
of intention to file the same shall be sent by registered mail
to the last known address of the holder of the record title . . .
upon each tract of land to be included in said bill in chancery;
such notice shall briefly describe the particular lot or parcel
of land, shall state the amount of tax certificate and/or

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122

special assessment liens sought to be enforced and shall warn
said owner or holder of liens and mortgages that on or after
the day named said bill to enforce the same will be filed, un- «
less paid on or before said date. A certificate of the attorney
shall be attached to the bill of complaint to the effect that
said written notice has been given and such certificate shall
be prima facie evidence that the provisions of the act (Section
4 of Chapter 19134, supra) have been complied with.

Section 4, supra, in part, further provides:

“Jurisdiction of said lands, and of all parties interested
therein, have any claim thereto, or lien thereon, in a proceed-
ing in rem shall be obtained by publication of a notice to be
issued as of course by the Clerk of the Circuit Court upon the
filing of such Bill, once a week for four consecutive weeks,
directed to all persons and corporations interested in or hav-
ing any lien or claim upon any of the lands described in said
notice and said Bill. Such notice shall describe briefly each
parcel of land involved, and shall require all parties to appear
and defend such suit on or before a Rule Day specified in said
Notice, which shall not be less than twenty-eight days after
the first publication of such notice... .

“YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED to appear and make
your defenses to said Bill of Complaint on or before the ..........
day of .... A. D, 19...., and if you fail to do so on or

* before said date the Bill of Complaint will be taken as con-
fessed by you, and you will thereafter be barred from con-
testing the said suit; said respective parcels of land will be
sold by decree of said Court to satisfy the amounts charge-
able in favor of said District against said lands, together with
interest, penalties, attorneys’ fees and costs, and upon such
sale you will be thereafter barred and foreclosed from as-
serting any interest in, claim to, lien upon, or right of re-
demption against such lands.

“In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
affixed the seal of said Court, this —..... day of
A.D. 19...

Clerk of the Circuit Court.”

123

The above quoted provision of the statute specifically pro-
vides that the notice to appear be made returnable to a rule
day. It is admitted that the notice to appear in the case at
bar as signed and published by the Clerk was made return-
able to a day other than a rule day of the Circuit Court of
Broward County, Florida, to-wit, June 12, 1947. A final de-
cree based on the above published notice was entered on June
17, 1947. Under this foreclosure decree the Columbia Realty
Company became the purchaser at Master’s sale of described
lands and by petition for a writ of assistance prayed for an
order of the Court placing it in possession of said lands. The
owner, and tenants holding under him, resisted the order on
the ground that the foreclosure decree was void for want of
jurisdiction. The Court below held that the order of publi-
cation as made in the cause was faulty, irregular, and failed
to follow the statute and therefore the Court was without
jurisdiction to enter the final decree dated June 17, 1947. The
Columbia Realty Company appealed.

In the case of Fisher v. Guidy, 106 Fla. 94, 142 So. 818,
we in part said:

“A decree that is shown by the record of the case to be
absolutely void because the court did not have jurisdiction of
the subject-matter or of the parties, may be collaterally as-
sailed. Goodrich v. Thompson, 96 Fla. 327, 118 So. 60. The
judgment of a court having jurisdiction over both subject-
matter and parties, cannot be collaterally impeached for mere
irregularity or error. The scope of the inquiry upon col-
lateral attack is confined to jurisdictional infirmities which
would render the judgment void. Fiehe v. R. E. Householder
Co., 98 Fla. 627, 638, 125 So. 2; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Hogan, 102 Fla. 196, 135 So. 825; Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla.
709, 109 So. 677 .

Watkins v. Johnson, 189 Fla. 712, 191 So. 2:

“A judgment that is absolutely null and void—a mere
brutum fulmen—can be set aside or stricken from the record
on motion at any time and may be collaterally assailed. See
Kroier v. Kroier, 95 Fla. 865, 116 So. 753...”

It was the view and holding of the court below that-the
order of publication supra relied upon to give the court juris-

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124

diction of the parties and subject matter was fatally defective
and there was not a substantial compliance with Section 4
supra when the plaintiff failed or omitted’to make the return
day of the order of publication on a rule day. The case of
Sharman v. Bayshore Investment Co., 99 Fla. 193. 126 So.
282, involved an order of bublication based upon a statute re-
quiring that the return day in the order be on a rule day,
which was not observed, and we held that the publication.
order was fatally defective and failed to give the court juris-
diction. See Seaboard All-Florida Ry. Co. v. Leavitt, 105 Fla.
600, 141 So. 886; Johnson v. Clark; 145 Fla. 258, 198 So. 842.
It is established law that when substituted or constructive
service is substituted in place of or for personal service a
strict and substantial compliance with the provisions of said
statute must be shown in order to support the judgment or
decree based on such substituted or constructive service.
Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and exercised on the general
ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the power
of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the requisites
of the controlling statute have been complied with and such
compliance appears of record. The fact that the defendant
had actual knowledge of the attempted service can not be
relied upon to justify the failure of the plaintiff to strictly
observe and substantially comply with a statute authorizing
service by publication. West 132 Feet etc., v. City of Orlando,
80 Fla. 229, 91 So. 369; Smetal Corporation v. West Lake In-
vestment Co., 126 Fla. 595, 172 So. 58, 42 Am. Jur. 55, par. 66.

Affirmed. .
TERRELL, BUFORD and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

CHARLES S. CONE, et al., v. LOTTIE K. BENJAMIN, et al.
33 So. (2nd) 722 : Januaty Term, 1948
February 6, 1948 En Bane

James H. Finch, for appellants.
Carey & Harrison, for appellees.

125

PER CURIAM:

On consideration of petition for certiorari to review an
interlocutory order requiring further testimony to be taken
and limiting the time for taking such testimony, certiorari is
denied without prejudice to the court below to extend the
time for taking the testimony as to such matters as the
chancellor may indicate to counsel he wishes to hear further
testimony or such other testimony as the parties may wish to
present.

So ordered.

TERRELL, BUFORD, SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., con-
cur.

THOMAS, C. J., and ADAMS, J., think the petition for
certiorari should be denied outright and agree only to the

conclusion.

ROBERT & COMPANY, INC., a corporation, v. J. A. MORTLAND

33 So. (2nd) 732 January Term, 1948
February 6, 1948 . Division A

126

Miles H. Draper, for appellant.
Fowler, White, Gillen, Yancey & Humkey, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

In 1938, the. City of Tampa promulgated plans for the
construction of a “Master sewer project,” the cost of which
was estimated at $4,000,000.00. Appellant hereafter referred
to as defendant, became interested in securing the contract
to perform the engineering work on this project. Appellee,
hereafter referred to as the plaintiff, was also interested in
securing the same contract, but later found that he was not
financially able to undertake a project of that magnitude.
After investigating the responsibility of a number of engi-
neering firms, plaintiff decided that defendant was the best
qualified firm in the field for the job. Through a mutual
friend plaintiff contacted defendant and as a result of this
contact, defendant sent its representative to Tampa to confer
with plaintiff. Immediately after this conference plaintiff
commenced performing services for defendant which we shall.
speak of more in detail later.

There was no written contract between the parties, but’
there are about one hundred communications in the record
covering the period from January 1939 to March 1941, which
give a very good idea of the services performed by the plain-
tiff, that were voluntarily accepted by defendant. The de-
‘fendant and its agents made many requests of the plaintiff for
reports and information as to developments in Tampa and all
were promptly responded to. Much advice besides informa-
tion was given the defendant and when the engineering con-
tract for constructing the Master sewer system was awarded,
defedant was the successful applicant, the fee agreed on being
8.7 per cent of the cost or a maximum fee of $148,000.00.

|

A great deal of work was done but on account of financial
stress the City of Tampa in 1947 exercised its option to cancel
its contract and paid defendant $33.014.22 for services. In
1943, after the Master sewer contract was entered into, the
City of Tampa entered into contract with defendant for engi-
neering service in connection with the construction of a water
supply system. It is alleged that this contract was secured
as the result of services performed by plaintiff for defendant.
This contract was also canceled at the same time the Master
sewer contract was canceled and defendant was paid $55,-
000.00 for services. On both contracts defendant was paid
$88,014.22 for engineering services, but has so far declined
to pay plaintiff for services rendered.

127

Plaintiff alleges that a reasonable fee for his services
would be ten per cent of the amount collected by defendant so
he filed his declaration to recover such an amount or quantum
meriut. Later he filed a bill of particulars detailing the
services alleged to have been performed.

Defendant filed, (1) a plea of never was indebted, (2) a
plea of never promise as alleged, (3) a plea of payment and
(4) an amended plea wherein it was alleged that the plaintiff .
was paid $519.99 for engineering services by defendant,
which constituted full payment and satisfaction of all sums
due him. There was a replication to the fourth plea. On the
issues so made, the trial resulted in a verdict for $4,801.42,
with interest, to which a remittitur of $1,500.00 was required
by the trial court. The remittitur was duly entered and a
final judgment for $3,301.42, plus interest and costs, or a total
of $4,867,20 was entered. Defendant has applied from the

* final judgment and plaintiff has cross appealed from that
part of the final judgment requiring the remittitur.

It is not denied that plaintiff did perform a great deal of
promotional and other service for defendant with the view of
helping it secure the contracts in question, but the latter con-
tends that his services were illegal and no contract to pay
them can be enforced because (1) the Master sewer contract
was with a public agency, and the compensation for plaintiff’s
services was entirely contingent. (2) The means used to

De
128

secure the contract with the City were personal or political
and contrary to public policy, and being so, the plaintiff is
precluded from recovery.

The plaitiff is a very reputable engineer, residing in the
City of Tampa and the defendant is a very reputable engineer-
ing firm with its principal place of business in the City of
Atlanta. It is not disputed that plaintiff rendered the ser-
vices in question, that defendant knowingly accepted them,
and that in the main, they consisted in (1) keeping defendant
advised as to the local situation. (2) Contacting civic or-
ganizations and leaders and convincing them why defendant
should be awarded the Master sewer contract. (3) Keeping
defendant advised of developments in Tampa and directing
his representatives whom to contact there. (4) Responding
to defendant’s requests for information, ‘advice and opinions
which required unending search and the writing of approxi-
mately one hundred letters and opinions.

At the conclusion of the testimony on the issues made by
the pleas, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that the contract was illegal for the reasons hereto-
- fore stated. This is the first time the legality of the contract
had been challenged.. We do not think that such a defense
can be raised by the pleas entered, because the rule is well
settled that if a contract is legal on its face, its illegality must
be specially pleaded and proven. Edwards v. Miami Transit
Co, 150 Fla. 315, 7 So. (2nd) 440; Givens v. Vaughin-Griffin
Packing Co. 146 Fla. 575, 1 So. (2nd) 714; Logan v. Board of
Public Instruction, 118 Fla. 184, 158 So. 720; Janett Realty
Corporation v. Hoffman, 154 Fla. 144, 17 So. (2nd) 114; Lee
v. Clearwater Growers Association, 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722.

Appellant counters the charge of illegality with the con-
tention that he did not know the contract was illegal till the
evidence was in and could not raise that defense earlier. He
also contends that he had never admitted making a contract
with the plaintiff and did not know the elements of his alleged’
contract till the trial came on. Finally he says that the
illegality of the plaintiff’s alleged contract consists more in
the manner in which it was performed than it does in sub-

stance and this was unknown to him till the evidence was in.
Williston on Contracts, Section 1761 is relied on to support
this contention.

This might be a good defense under proper circumstances
but the facts in this case do not warrant such a defense. The
predominating weight of the evidence is to the effect that de-
fendant is a very responsible engineering company, fully
capable of handling the contract in question. It has per-
formed contracts of this character in different parts of the
country and enjoys a national reputation as good and respon-
sible contracting firm. When plaintiff found that he could
not handle the contract, he offered his services to defendant
because of its standing and reputation as a contractor.

It is quite true that a small number of letters introduced
in evidence recite suggestions that are disgusting and point
to a low nauseating standard of professional conduct, but
when read as a whole they are mere piffle and had no influence
on letting the contract. The decided weight of the evidence
shows that defendant was employed because it had the where-
with in character and material goods to execute the contracts
and that the real purpose of plaintiff's employment was to ac-
quaint the city officials of defendant’s assets and convince
them that it was to the city’s interest to contract with de-
fendant. It was on this showing that the trial court de-
termined that plaintiff had a contract with defendant. Both
sides admitted that its legality was a question of law and we
think the trial court was correct in so holding. What has
been said as to political influence applies as well to the charge
that plaintiff's contract was had because his compensation
was contingent. It is quite true that if the contract with a
public body is secured as a favor in exchange for personal or
political influence, it is contrary to public policy and cannot
be enforced. There is not the slightest showing here that
the contract in question was induced by favor or reward, nor
is it shown that any corrupt influence was used or that any-
thing more than competency and square dealing induced plac-
ing the contract. .

Appellant relies on Wechsler v. Novak, 157 Fla. 703, 26
So. (2nd) 884, and similar cases, but we think these cases

129

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130

clearly support the rule announced in the previous paragraph.
We understand the general rule to be that an employment in
which compensation is contingent on success in securing con-
tracts from public officials is not illegal on its face. It must
be shown that it was induced by favors or corrupt means. 46
A.L.R. 196. Edwards v. Miami Transit Co. 150 Fla. 315, 7
So. (2nd) 440. The record in this case is devoid of any show- °
ing that plaintiff had any personal or political influence or
that the contract was induced by illegal influence. There is
no showing that the city officials ever had knowledge of the
piffle that was passed between plaintiff and defendant. The
trial judge discarded it and we find no reason why we should
take it seriously.

We have not overlooked what appellee says in support of
his cross assignment of error, but we find no reversible error
either as to the main or cross appeal.

Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

STAR FRUIT COMPANY, a Florida corporation, v. EAGLI] LAKE
GROWERS, ING,, a Florida corporation.

38 So. (2nd) 858 ~ January Term, 1948

February 10, 1948 : En Bane

|

31

Paul Ritter, Gunter Stephenson, John Wigginton and T. T.
Turnbull, for appellant.

Bentley & Shafer, for appellee.
BARNS, J.:

Appellee sued appellant for ‘the alleged conversion of 721
boxes of tangerines. The lower court entered a judgment
against appellant in the amount of $2,163.75, and this appeal
is from that judgment.

On Wednesday, December 19, 1944, appellee delivered 721
field boxes of tangerines to appellant’s packing house under
an agreement whereby appellant was to grade, pack, ship and
sell for account of appellee. On Sunday following, appellee,
knowing that there was an embargo on all citrus shipments.
and having learned that appellant had not packed or shipped
the fruit, sent its trucks to pick up the fruit and, upon ar-

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132

rival at the packing house, its driver was informed by two
men that the tangerines had been carried off and dumped.

There is evidence to support the conclusion that the
appellee-owner was not notified by appellant that it could riot
handle the fruit or that it would be dumped. Appellant’s
excuse for not packing the tangerines was that they were
not fit to ship; that they were badly plugged from being
pulled from the trees instead of being clipped. On December
17th and 18th, preceding delivery of the 721 boxes on the
19th, the appellant sold 686 boxes of tangerines from the
same crop of which the 721 boxes were a part for a net sum
of $2,606.65.

Appellant claims that it did not recover anything from
the tangerines; that by turning them over to a dairyman it
merely saved the cost of hauling them. The fruit was de-
livered to the dairyman, who hauled it away for use as cow
feed. This was the manner in which the appellant disposed
of its culls.

It was the duty of the appellant, having received the fruit
for packing and sale for the account of the plaintiff-appellee,
when it found that it could not do so, to notify the plaintiff-
appellee, in order that it might use its own judgment as to
how it might best dispose of its property.

“Essential elements of a conversion is a wrongful depriva-
tion of property to the owner.”—Wilson Cypress Co. et al. v.
Logan, 120 Fla. 124, 162 So. 489.

“The gist of a conversion has been declared to be not the
acquisition of the property of the wrongdoer, but the wrong-
ful deprivation of a person of property to the possession of
which he is entitled. A conversion consists of an act in dero-
gation of the plaintiff’s possessory rights, and any wrongful
exercise or assumption of authority over another’s goods, de-
priving him of the possession, permanently or for an indefi-
nite time, is a conversion.”—53 Am. Jur., p. 822.

The wrongful destruction or disposal of personal property
by a bailee, contrary to the terms, terminates the trust and
works a disseisin of the true owner, and action for conversion
will lie.

183

In a general sense the law of conversion is as follows:

“Let us now note a few judicial utterances which serve to
make clear the exact nature of that disseisin of chattels which
is called conversion. ‘What,’ says Lord Holt, ‘is a conversion,
but an assuming upon one’s self the property and right of dis-
posing of another’s goods?’ The technical meaning of con-
version, says Martin, B., in Burroughs v. Bayne (1860), is
the ‘detaining goods so as to deprive the person entitled to
the possession of them of his dominion over them.’ Such ex-
pressions as ‘interference with the dominion of the true
owner,’ ‘exercise of dominion to the exclusion and in defiance
of the plaintiff’s right,’ and “unauthorized assumption of the
powers of a true owner,’ are familiar forms in which the gist
of this wrong is described. Not a bad definition of conversion.
is that approved by Bramwell, B., in Hiort v. Bott (1874),
viz., ‘an unauthorized act which deprives another of his
property permanently or for an indefinite time.’ If we should
say ‘deprives another of the dominion of his property perma-
nently or for an indefinite time,’ this definition would per-
haps be all that could be desired. However, the language be
framed it is obvious that the gist of conversion is found in
the disseisin of the owner or in an interference with legal
rights which are incident to ownership, such’ as the right to
have possession.”—Street’s “Foundations of Legal Liability,”
Vol. I, p. 233, 234. : ;

“The expression, “with intent to deprive the true owner,’
or ‘with intent to convert,’ is sometimes incorporated into
definitions of conversion, as if the elements of intention were
a universal qualification of the wrong. But really it is only
material when the act complained of does not speak for it-
self.” —Ib., p. 236.

“There must be some positive overt act of adverse do-
minion.”—Ib., p. 236.

“Tf I drink up your wine, or consume your substance with-
out authority, I thereby, of necessity, disseise you, and am
guilty of a conversion. If the chattels are not immediately
‘consumable, an appropriation to one’s own use and purpose is
quite as effective a disseisin as is a direct consumption.”—
Ib., p. 238.

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134

“A total destruction of personal property, like the impair-
ment of its value, if accompanied by a disseisin of the owner’s
interests, amounts to a conversion, otherwise not.”—Ib., p.

~The appellant’s first question presented is as follows:

“Is it harmful error for the trial court to instruct the jury
that where the evidence on an issue is evenly balanced their
finding should be for the party upon whom the burden of
proof rests?”

- It is submitted that this question is covered by Assign-
ment of Error No. 1. It is proper that counsel for appellant
copy into its brief the assignment of error creating the ques-
tion. An assignment of error is the plaintiff's declaration
against the trial judge, charging harmful error.

“Questions” are in the nature of argument, and somewhat
secondary. “Questions” grow out of and are only created by
the assignment of error, and the said Rule 20 prescribes that:

“Specific assignment of error from which the questions
arise should be stated, and, if any reference to the transcript
is made, the page should be given.”

It is important that appellant present in his brief the acts
which form the basis and support the allegations of fact as

- charged in the assignment of error.

The appellant here has supported the assignment of error
by copying into its brief the subject matter thereof, to-wit:
the charge of the court to the jury, as follows:

“If the evidence for the issue and against the issue are
evenly balanced, then you should find for the person upon
whom the burden is placed to prove his case by a preponder-
.ance of the evidence and the person whose duty it is to prove
the case has proved his case whenever he has produced suf-
ficient evidence to preponerate—when he has produced a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.”

The appellee suggests that this portion of the transcript
of the trial proceedings, as certified to by the court reporter,
-was in error; however, there is no suggestion in the record
that any attempt has been made in the court below to have

185,

the record speak the truth, of same be erroneous. There is no
order of the circuit judge correcting same as erroneous.
Under such circumstances, the record will stand as correct
and we find that the charge was harmful error. Notwith-
standing that, there were numerous other charges to the con-
trary and in conflict therewith.

Another question presented by appellant is as follows:
“May a jury assess damages against a party for the con-

version of goods where there is no evidence of the value of the
goods at the time of the alleged conversion?”

And it is suggested that this question is raised by Assign-
ment of Error No. 5, which we find to be as follows:

“The court erred in denying defendant’s motion for new
trial, and thereby holding, among other things, that there
was any evidence from which the jury could have found the
tangerines involved to be of any value.”

It is apparent from the evidence that the jury has used
the value of the tangerines shipped earlier in the week as a
basis for the value of the tangerines involved in this suit; and
it is very doubtful that tangerines, badly plugged, and in a
packing house at a time when the packing house is over-
loaded, and during a car shortage, would be of equal value to
fruit which was handled at a time when these conditions did
not exist.

There was no evidence introduced concerning value, ex-
cept the returns on prior shipments and sales.

By reason of the premises, it is our conclusion that the
judgment appealed should be, and is hereby reversed for a
new trial.

BUFORD, CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, C. J., and ADAMS, J., concur specially.
TERRELL, J., dissents. ©

THOMAS, C. J., and ADAMS, J., concurring specially:

We concur in the judgment of reversal but are of the
opinion that the evidence does not make a case of conversion.

ee
136

W. J. PIOWATY vy. REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL CREDIT CORPO-
RATION OF WASHINGTON, D. C. AND CARL PIOWATY v.
REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL CREDIT CORPORATION OF
WASHINGTON, D. ©.

34 So. (2nd) 94 January Term, 1948
February 13, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied March 16, 1948

137

J. Thomas Gurney and Joseph P. I. 2a, Jr., for appellants.
Giles F. Lewis, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

This is a case wherein the appellants were defendants be-
low. The appellee-plaintiff sued the defendants on a con-
tractual obligation which had the form of an ordinary
promissory note, together with the following provisions:

“The advances represented by this note are made to fi-
nance the production of the quantity of essential war crops
specified in the makers’ application on Form RACC-RP3,
which bears the same identification number (preceded by the
letter W) of this note.

“The makers shall be personally liable for the full amount
of such advances, subject to the condition that, if the United
States Departmet of Agriculture War Board of the county
identified by the state and county code appearing in the
identification number on this note (or such other agency or
person as the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of
Washington, D. C., may designate to make the certification.
herein required) certifies that” —-(Here follow the five con-
ditions fully set forth in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice
BUFORD).

And plaintiff’s-appellee’s declaration of one count alleges
the execution and non-performance of the contract, and
further alleges:

“That, pursuant to the provision contained in the said
note or obligation permitting the plaintiff to designate some
other agency or person to make the required certification,
Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of Washington,
D.C., on July 2, 1943, designated the District Vice President
of the plaintiff corporation to certify, upon the recommenda-
tion of the County War Board, as to compliance by the de-
fendant and other borrowers with the conditions set out in

EE
138

the note or obligation herein sued upon and in similar notes
and obligations; that thereafter the defendant applies to the
District Vice President of Regional Agricultural Credit
Corporation of Washington, D. C., through the County War
Board of Orange County, Florida, for cancellation of the
balance of his obligation, but after consideration of the de-
fendant’s application, the said County War Board refused to
recommend that the balance of the said advances be cancelled,
and has not recommended and still refuses to so recommend;
and the plaintiff’s District Vice President thereupon refused
to certify that defendant had complied with the conditions
set out in the said note or obligation and has not certified and
still refuses to so certify.”

The trial judge overruled a demurrer to this declaration
and this ruling is assigned as error.

The following provisions of said promissory note, to-wit:

“The makers shall be personally liable for the full amount
of such advances, subject to the condition that, if the United
States Department of Agriculture War Board of the county
identified by the state and county code appearing in the iden-
tification number on this note (or such other agency or per-
son as the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of Wash-
ington, D. C., may designate to make the certification herein
required) certified that”—are provisions inserted in the note
for the benefit of the promissors, defendants-appellants, and
the benefits thereof in no wise flowed to the promisee. It was
not necessary, yet not improper, for the plaintiff-appellee to
plead matters which relate to discharge, and the plaintiff
might have denied the discharge thereof generally.

The quoted language was not a “condition precedent” to
the fixing of liability, but it was a “condition subsequent” for
the promissors’ benefit, and relating to discharge or excuse
for non-performance, only to be taken advantage of in some
affirmative manner by the promissors. Like all other matters

‘relating to discharge, it was for the defendants to plead
and prove and the recital thereof and of the acts of the par-
ties relating thereto in no wise affected the quality 0 of plain-
tiffs declaration.

189

This assignment of error not well founded.

The contract specified that upon the promissors procuring
a specified certificate the obligation would be discharged.
This contemplated that the named agency which was to de-
termine whether or not the “conditions subsequent” had
transpired would determine same fairly and on a rational
basis, and the promissors, in making the promise, had a right
to rely upon “fair play.” For the promissors not to receive
“fair play” would work an implied fraud upon them.

Appellant’s second assignment of error complains that:

“The Court erred in entering its order dated September 9,
1946, recorded in Minute Book LL, page 305, sustaining the
demurrer of the plaintiff to the Third and Fourth Pleas of the
defendant, and granting the motion to strike portions of the
pleas.”

And the question presented in argument of this assign-
ment is:

“QUESTION 2. In an action on a special advance made
by one party to another an agreement, which provided for
the cancellation of the balance due, upon the certification of
named conditions by a designated agent, is the lack of such a
certificate merely prima facie evidence of the non-compliance
with the conditions, or is it necessary to allege and prove that
in addition to compliance with the conditions, the agent acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to execute the cer-
tificate.”

Appellant states: “This is the heart of the case.”

This seems to be correct. For the promisee to perform the
“conditions subsequent” and for the agency named to then
withhold the certificate, after undertaking to act, would
amount to arbitrariness and capriciousness and be an implied
fraud upon the promissors, but such is an affirmative defense
which must be plead, as the defendants in this case did, by
their fifth and sixth pleas.

Plaintiff's declaration alleges that in accordance with the

provisions of the contract the promisee designated the “Dis-
trict Vice President of the plaintiff corporation to certify” as

ee
140

to the promissors’ performance of the condition subsequent,
but the plea sets up that “the United States Agricultural War
Board of Orange County, being the county identified by the
State and County Code appearing in the identification number
on the note sued on, the same being the agent of the plaintiff
herein for such purpose, did wrongfully, arbitrarily, and
without justification, fail and refuse to certify that this de-
fendant had, in all respects, complied with the conditions...”

This assignment of error not well founded. The settle-
ment of the issues of fact was for the jury to determine and
not a question-of law for the court.

The act of the trial judge in sustaining a demurrer to the
third and fourth pleas, which merely alleged performance of
certain “conditions subsequent,” (without excusing absence
of certificate) appears not to have been error; the parties to
the contract provided more, and, for the defendants to receive
the benefit of the contractual provisions relating to discharge,
more was required to be plead and proven. This they at-
tempted to do in their fifth and sixth pleas. That part of the
assignment of error relating to striking a part of defendant’s
pleas is not argued, therefore abandoned.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur. .

TERRELL, BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.
BUFORD, J., dissenting:

On appeal the two above styled cases have been consoli-
dated for consideration and, therefore, we dispose of both
cases in one opinion.

In 1948, each of the appellants, wishing to engage in the
production of beans near Zellwood, Florida, for market, con-
tacted the appellee through its duly authorized agents for the
purpose of procuring a Government loan to aid in the pro-
duction of such crop and, as evidence of their respective
promises to repay the amount of the said advances, executed
a contract, which contract thereafter had endorsed upon it
the dates and amounts of the advancements made under such
contract.

BS

141

The instruments so executed, after the entries aforesaid,
are in the following form, to-wit:
“Special War Crop Advance :
$4,225.00

Zellwood Florida March 10, 1943
City State Date

“On or before June 30th 1948, for value received, I, we’
and each of us, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the
order of the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of
Washington, D. C. at its office in Kansas City Missouri, Four
Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-five and No/100 Dollars,
with interest at the rate of 5 percent per annum from date
hereof payable at maturity.

“In the event this note is placed in the hands of an at-
torney for collection or suit is brought on the same, or any
portion thereof, or if collected by any court proceedings, I, we
and each of us, jointly and severally, further agree to pay
such reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of collection as may
be permitted by law to be charged.

’ “The makers and endorsers of this note severally waive
presentment for payment, demand, protest and notice of non-
payment thereof, and all defenses on the ground of any ex-
tension of the time of payment that may be given by the
holder or holders to them or either of them.

“The advances represented by this note are made to
finance, the production of the quantity of essential war crops
specified in the makers’ application on Form RACC-FP3,

“ which bears the same identification number (preceded by the
letter W) as this note.

“The makers shall be personally liable for the full amount
of such advances, subject to the condition that, if the United
States Department of Agriculture War Board of the county
identified by the state and county code appearing in the
identification number on this note (or such other agency or
person as the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of
Washington, D. C., may designate to make the certification
herein required) certifies that—

ee
“142

“1. The makers have used the amount advanced for pro-
ducing the crops for the production of which the advances
were made;

“2. The makers have provided for insurance on such
crops to the extent and in the manner required by the
Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of Washington, D.
C. to protect its interest in.such crops;

“3, The makers in good faith have diligently applied
principles of good husbandry to the production of such crops;

“4, The makers have applied to the repayment of the ad-
vances an amount equal to all proceeds of such crops, in-
cluding the proceeds of any incentive or other similar pay-
ments made by the United States on such crops and the pro-
ceeds of any insurance on such crops; and

“5. Such amount has been insufficient to repay the ad-
vances in full, then the Regional Agricultural Credit Corpora-
tion of Washington, D. C., will not look to the other assets of
the makers for the repayment of that part of the advances
which exceeds such proceeds but will cancel the makers obli-
gation for the balance of the advances.

“This note is secured by a lien instrument dated March
10, 1943, bearing the same identification number (preceded
by the letter W) as this note.

W. J. Piowaty
W. J. Piowaty

W. J. PIOWATY

Date INTEREST PRINCIPAL

Amount Paid to—Advances Payments Balance
8-17-43 $1225.00 $1225.00
4-1-43 1000.00 2225.00
5-8-43 1000.00 3225.00
5-17-43 * 995.75 4220.75,

5-19-43 4,25 4225.00

“I, (we) hereby guarantee payment of this note, or any
renewal or extension thereof, and all expenses of collection
thereof, or in the enforcement of this guarantee, including
reasonable attorney’s fee, and I (we) waive, presentment, pro-
test, demand and notice of every kind.”

After the payment to the appellee by the appellants of the
total amount received by each of them as the proceeds of the
said crop, less necessary costs of packing which was charged
by packing house operators, the appellants applied to the
Agricultural War Board of Orange County, Florida, for a cer-
tificate showing that the makers of the instruments above
referred to had .

“... used the amount advanced for producing the crops
for the production of which the advances were made;

“... provided for insurance on such crops to the extent
and in the manner required by the Regional Agricultural
Credit Corporation of Washington, D. C., to protect its iter-
est in such crops;

“... Diligently applied principles of good husbandry to
the production of such crops;

“... applied to the repayment of the advances an amount
equal to all proceeds of such crops, including’ the proceeds ‘of
any incentive or other similar payments made by the United
States on such crops and the proceeds of any insurance on
such crops; and

“Such amount has been insufficient to repay the advances
in full, then the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of
Washington, D. C., will not look to the other assets of the
makers for the repayment of that part of the advances which
exceeds such proceeds but will cancel the makers obligation
for the balance of the advances.”

—
144

But, the said Agricultural War Board of Orange County,
Florida, and also the District Vice President of Regional
Agricultural Credit Corporation failed and refused respec-
tively to recommend and make the certificate required under
the contract and, thereafter, on the 27th day of June, 1945,
appellee, as plaintiff, filed its suits in Orange County, Florida
against the respective appellants as defendants for the un-
paid balance of the respective advances made under said re-
spective contracts.

After demurrers and motions had been ruled upon the
cases were at issues upon amended declarations and pleas.
In the pleas the defendants averred in effect that they had
fully complied with each and every of the requirements con-
tained in the respective contracts and were, therefore, en-
titled to have the obligation for the unpaid amount of the ad-
vancements cancelled, and that plaintiff’s agents had arbi-
trarily, capriciously and without any showing that the re-
spective defendants had not performed each and every of the
acts and things required of them to be performed to entitle
them to cancellation of the obligation to pay the balance of -
the amount of the advancements, failed and refused to make
the required certificates. On these issues the cases went to
trial and resulted in judgments for the plaintiff. From these
judgments appeals were perfected.

There appears to have been much confusion in the trial of
the cause as to whether or not in the absence of fraud on the
part of the agents of the plaintiff who were designated by
plaintiff to make the certificates above referred to, the de-
fendants could. interpose and prevail under the defenses
stated.

It will be observed that there is nothing in the contract
which makes the action or non-action of the agents desig-
nated to certify performance final. The law appears to be
well settled in this regard as was stated by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Franklinville Realty Co. v.
Arnold Construction Co., 120 Fed. (2nd) 144, as follows:

“In the absence of specific provision in a contract such as
this that architect’s certificates are to be final, such certifi-

145

cates do not have conclusive effect, but are merely prima facie
evidence of their contents. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hensey,
205 U. S. 298, 27 S. Ct. 585, 51 L. Hd. 811, 10 Ann. Cas. 572,
and cases cited; Duval County v. Charlestown Engineering
Co., 101 Fla. 341, 184 So. 509; Mississippi Fire Ins. Co. v.
Evans, 153 Miss. 635, 120 So. 738; Abercrombie v. Vandiver,
126 Ala. 518, 28 So. 491.”

See also Duval County v. Charlestown Engineering Co.,
101 Fla. 341, 134 So. 509.

From a perusal of the record, it appears to us that each
of the defendants in the court below, appellants here, had
complied with each and every of the conditions stated in the
respective contracts to entitle them respectively to the cancel-
lation of the obligation to repay the balance left after having
deducted the amount that was received for the respective
crops and paid over to the plaintiff, appellee here.

It is true that there was an insignificant amount of the
proceeds of each crop paid for services of packing house
operator for packing the beans, but it appears that no point
was ever made of this by the plaintiff until after the institu-
tion of its suits. The agents designated by the plaintiff to
certify to the performance by the defendants have never at
any time pointed out to, or advised, either of the defendants
the matter or thing which plaintiff claimed that defendants
had failed to do to entitle them to cancellation, nor has the
plaintiff shown by proof reflected in the record here that de-
fendants failed to perform each and every act required by
the contract to be performed which would entitle each of
them to cancellation of the obligation for the amount of the
unpaid balance of the respective advancements.

It is our conclusion that when the defendants showed by
uncontradicted evidence that they each were entitled to have
the certificates required by the contract and that those
charged with the duty of executing such certificates had
failed and refused to execute the same, these facts were
sufficient to show that such agents in so doing acted arbi-
trarily, and capriciously against the interest of the defend-
ants. Such action or non-action on the part of the agents,

a
146

above referred to, made it unnecessary for the defendants to
have such certificates in order to have cancellation of the un-
paid balance of the advancements.

It is a matter of general and common knowledge of which
courts may take judicial cognizance that the Federal Govern-
ment at that time was making such cash advancements as are
here considered for the purpose of encouraging farmers to
produce food crops and, to do that the Government advanced.
such money as was considered necessary to enable the farmer
to plant, produce and save crops with the understanding and
agreement, in effect, that if the farmer planted and produced
a crop and used due diligence and recognized efficient prac-
tices in doing so, the Government would look to the crop to
satisfy and repay the amount of advances so made. It
further agreed that if the farmer having produced and gath~
ered and disposed of the crop and applied the receipts there-
from to repaying the advances and such receipts from the
crop were insufficient to repay all the advances made the
Government, and not the farmer, should sustain the loss of
the unpaid balance.

“It is conclusively shown that in the cases now before us
the respective farmers complied with every part of the con~
tract and in their endeavor in this regard each lost consider-
able more money than the Government will lose when the bal-
ances claimed on these obligations are cancelled.

From the record before us it appears that the trial court
entertained the view that it was necessary for the defendants
not only to show that they had complied with all conditions
stated in the contracts necessary to have the balance of the
obligations for advancements cancelled, but also necessary for
them to prove by some additional evidence that the action of
the agents who were designated to certify to such perform-
ance had been arbitrary and capricious, which view appears
to have been reflected in the verdict of the jury.

Our conclusion is that the evidence that the defendants
had complied with the terms of the contracts was sufficient to
establish that the agents above mentioned acted arbitrarily

Le
| .
147

and capriciously in failing and refusing to make and deliver
such certificates.

For the reasons stated, I think the judgments should be
reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

ALEXANDER THOMPSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA
384 So. (2nd) 36 : January Term, 1948
February 18, 1948 Division A

Rehearing denied March 6, 1948

Roach -& Hoyl, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Reeves Bowen, Assist-
ant Attorney General, and Rebecca Bowles Marks, Special As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.: :

Appellant was tried on an indictment charging murder in
the first degree and was convicted of manslaughter. On ap-
peal he contends that the judgment imposed on him should
be reversed because the jury box was fouled, that error was
committed by the trial court in refusing the introduction of
evidence as to threats by deceased against the life of appel-
lant, and that the evidence made such a strong showing of
self defense that it precluded a verdict of manslaughter.

The question as to the validity of the jury box we consider
without merit.

a
148

The evidence as to threats against the life of appellant and
as to self-defense, was a matter for the jury to resolve. Taken
as a whole, a perfectly reasonable deduction from it is, that
appellant was smarting inside because of an altercation he
had with the deceased the night before the homicide, and

_ Went to his place of business voluntarily and renewed the row
which resulted in the homicide. He certainly did nothing to:
evade it. The evidence of self-defense is far from conclusive
and the fact that appellant voluntarily went to the place of
business of deceased and killed him, weakens his contention
as to threats against his life by the deceased. At any rate,
the jury considered all these conflicts and its verdict of man-
slaughter gave appellant the “breaks.” The evidence would
have supported a higher degree of homicide, so he is not in
position to complain.

Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

EMMA CROSSMAN, as Administratrix of the Estate of John Novak,
otherwise known as John Novark, deceased, v. ALICE NAPHTALL
and DADE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF
MIAMI.

38 So. (2nd) 726 January Term, 1948
February 13, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied February 27, 1948

Blackwell, Walker & Gray, for appellant.
Williams, Salomon & Katz, for appellee.
BUFORD, J.:

Appellees instituted suit seeking to have determined the
right of ownership of a certain deposit in Dade Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association which was evidenced by a certifi-

149

cate of membership together with the duly executed applica-
tion for membership made by John Novak, now deceased, and
Alice Naphtali.

The application for membership was as follows:

“Joint Account. _ Account No. 8297.
()” Novark John ;
(Surname) (First Name) (Middle Name)
(2) Naphtali Alice

“The undersigned hereby apply for a membership and for
a Savings Share Account in the DADE FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MIAMI and for the issuance
of evidence of membership in the approved form and in the
joint names of the undersigned as joint tenants with the right
of survivorship and not as tenants in common. Receipt is
hereby acknowledged of a copy of the charter and by laws of
said association. Specimens of the signatures of the under-
signed are shown below and the association is hereby author-
ized to act without further inquiry in accordance with writ-
ings bearing any such signature; it being understood and
agreed that anyone of the undersigned who shall first act
shall have power to act in all matters related to the member-
ship and may share account in said association held by the
undersigned, whether the other person or persons named in
the certificate be living or not. The repurchase or redemption
value of any such share account or other rights relating
thereto may be paid or delivered in whole or in part to anyone
of the undersigned who shall first act, and such payment or
delivery of a receipt or acquitance signed by any one of the
undersigned shall be a valid and sufficient release and dis-
charge of said association.

“Signature (1) John Novark (2) Alice Naphtali
Street Address 251 N.E. 2nd St. 251 N.E. 2nd St.
City and State Miami, Florida Miami, Florida
Telephone .............. Occupation
Dated Nov. 3, 1941 Introduced by

*The certificate issued pursuant to this application for mem-

bership of joint holders must be filled out by inserting in the
first blank space the names of the joint holders; for example:

a
150

John Doe and Richard Doe, immediately followed by the
words: as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and
not as tenants in common. Joint tenants with the right of
survivorship constitute one member as a partnership consti-
tutes one member.”

The certificate of membership was as follows:

“DADE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION OF MIAMI, MIAMI, FLORIDA

“Certificate No. 8297

“SAVINGS SHARE ACCOUNT

“This.certifies that John Novark and/or Alice Naphtali is
a member of Dade Federal Savings and Loan Association of
Miami and holds a Savings Share Account of said Association,
subject to its character and by laws and to the laws of the
United States of America.

“Witness the authorized signature of officer or employee
this 29 day of October 1941..

“DADE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIA-

TION OF MIAMI
Carolyn Schaefer
Authorized signature.”

The application for membership and the certificate of
membership must be read and construed together as constitut-
ing the contract between the parties.

‘When so read the contract under which the moneys were
deposited provided for “a Savings Share Account in the Dade
Federal Savings and Loan Association of Miami and for the
issuance of evidence of membership in the approved form in
the joint names of the undersigned as joint tenants with the
right of survivorship and not as tenants in common.”

We think this language is insufficient to create a gift in
presenti or a gift inter vivos because John Novak never sur-~
rendered dominion over the certificate or over the deposits
made pursuant to the certificate. The language was also in-
sufficient to create an estate and ownership of the entire de-
posit in the survivor after the death of one of the depositors.

The court below decreed:

‘

151

“4, The deposit in the Dade Federal Savings and Loan As-
sociation of Miami, defendant herein, being share savings ac-
count No. 8297, which was opened on or about October 29, 1941,
by John Novark and converted on or about November 2, 1941,
into a joint account with Alice Naphtali, is decreed to be the
absolute and sole property of the plaintiff, Alice Naphtali, and
the defendant Dade Federal Savings and Loan Association of
Miami is directed to pay the present balance reflected by this
account to the said Alice Naphtali, or to her order, less, how-
ever, $250.00 of the same to be paid to H. H. Taylor, as Special
Master, as herein ordered.”

Appellant appealed.

The decree should be reversed on authority of Webster v.
St. Petersburg Federal Savings and Loan Association, 155 Fla.
412, 20 So. (2nd) 400 and cases there cited.

So ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., cooncur.

W. L, FREELAND and HELEN C. FREELAND, his wife, v. THE P. P.
& BR. COMPANY, a Florida Corporation.

33 So. (2nd) 857 January Term, 1948
February 13, 1948 Division A.
Rehearing denied March 5, 1948

W. L. Freeland, for appellants.

a
152

Walton, Hubbard, Schroeder, Lantaff & Atkins, for
appellee.
TERRELL, J.:

Appellee as complainant filed its bill and amended bill of
complaint to quiet title to a parcel of land in Dade County.
Both bills alleged that complainant deraigned title to said lands
by tax deed dated December 11, 1940, recorded in deed book
2116, page 209, Public Records of Dade County, and that the
former title owners were appellants here. A motion to dis-
miss was overruled, answer was filed and on final hearing the
chancellor decreed the complainant to be the owner in fee of
the property. This appeal is from the final decree.

The first question presented is whether or not the descrip-
tion of the lands in complaint’s tax deed is sufficient to
identify and locate them.

The description in the tax deed is as follows: Tract 4,
Block 4, Section 5, Township 54 South, Range 40 East, con-
taining 10 acres more or less in the County of Dade, State of
Florida. .

This court has repeatedly held that “the description of
property in a tax deed must be certain in itself, or at least
capable of being made certain, by matters referred to in the
deed itself as relating to the description, and evidence aliunde
not referred to in the deed cannot be used to ascertain the
land intended to be conveyed.” Schouten et ux v. Hunt, 146
Fla. 323, 200 So. 922 and cases therein cited.

Appellee contends that Section 5 was surveyed and plated
as “Section 5,” by Richardson-Kellett Land Company on June
4, 1910, and that the plat thereof filed in the Clerk’s office of
Dade County is sufficient identification of the lands. To call
a subdivision “Section 5” is so out of the ordinary and the
designation “Section 5” in our rectangular system of
Jand surveys has sucm a different connotation, that without
more it would never be taken as the name of a particu-
lar subdivision. The material witness testified that with-
out the plat they could not locate the lands. For this
reason and the fact that there is nothing in the tax deed de-
scription to connect the lands with the plat, we think, under

the case last cited, the description was insufficient and the
tax deed was void.

It seems, therefore, that it is unnecessary to discuss the
other point in the case.

Reversed. .

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Lee
OLIVER LEE LASTER vy. STATE OF FLORIDA

83 So. (2nd) 728 January Term, 1948
February 13, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied February 27, 1948

Sam EH. Murrell, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

| |
BUFORD, J., dissenting:

Appellant was convicted under an information charging
him with the commission of the crime of manslaughter by
means of the unlawful and culpable negligence in the driving
of an automobile.

From judgment of conviction he has perfected his appeal.

The record shows that while appellant was lawfully driving
along a paved highway a little girl, who with her parents had
alighted from another automobile for the purpose of gather-
ing wild flowers, suddenly attempted to run across the high-
way (from the side where her father was with her to the
other side where her mother was gathering flowers) immedi-
ately in front of the on-coming automobile driven by appellant
and was struck and killed by such automobile.

The evidence fails to show that appellant in the driving of
the automobile was guilty of driving same in an unlawful
manner or that he was then and there guilty of culpable
negligence as defined by us in Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107

153

BR

54

So. 360, 361. See also Franklin v. State, 120 Fla. 686, 163 So.
55; Pitts v. State, 134 Fla. 626, 184 So. 646; Ehrens v. Miami
Transit Co., 155 Fla. 394, 20 So. (2nd) 261.
It, therefore, follows that I think‘the judgment should be
reversed. .
BARNS, J., concurs.

freee
JAMES L. GAVAGAN v. TOM MARSHALL, RAY GREEN, JOE ©.
HAMMOND, ROBERT D. GORDON, and W. HOWARD BELOTE,
as County Commissioners of Duval County, Florida.

33 So. (2nd) 862 January Term, 1948
February 13, 1948 En Bane

Evan T. Evans, for appellant.
J. Henry Blount, for appellees.
BARNS, J.:

The material portions of the record on appeal are: (1) The
alternative writ of mandamus; (2) respondent’s motion to

quash; (3) order quashing the alternative writ; (4) entry of
appeal; (5) assignments of error. When these matters were
certified to there was no occasion for the record containing
more, and all other matters need only have been recited.

The appellant-relator procured an alternative writ of
mandamus reciting that, as Justice of the Peace of the fifth
District of Duval County, he held a coroner’s inquest making
inquiry as to the cause of the death of Hal William Skinner,
who died under circumstances giving rise to a good reason to
believe that his death was caused by the criminal act of
another and prompted thereby held such inquest as provided
by his constitutional power and the laws of this State relative
thereto; that he filed with the County Commissioners of such
county his requisition for the correct amount of costs, in the
sum of $14.65, which requisitior. was disapproved and dis-
allowed by said Board because “no direction from the Judge,
the prosecuting atterney or some assistant prosecuting at-
torney of a court having trial jurisdiction of felonies com-
mitted in Duval County, Florida, was attached to said cost bill,
as purported to be required by the provisions of Section 946.03,
F.S.A.” (Section 3 of Chapter 21965, Acts of 1943).

The alternative writ further recited that “the said Section
936.03, F.S.A., known also as Section 3 of Chapter 21965, Acts
of 1943, is unconstitutional, invalid and void and of no force
or effect whatsoever; that in consequence of the invalidity of
said statute, the respondents have no lawful rights or author-
ity to withhold approval for payment of relator’s cost bill.”

The trial judge, upon a hearing of respondent’-appellees’
motion to quash said alternative writ, granted same and there-
upon petitioner brought this appeal.

The Constitution vests the judicial power of the state in
specified courts, including justices of the peace. (See Art. 5,
Sec. 1, Constitution of State of Florida). And provides as to
jurisdiction that:

“... Justices of the Peace shall have the power to hold’
inquest of the dead... . ”’—Sec. 22, Art.-5, Constitution of
State of Florida.

The statutory provisions as to when an inquest shall or
may be held, and when compensable, are as follows:

155

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156

“Justices of the peace within their respective districts.
shall hold inquest of the dead when so directed as provided
in Sec. 936.03, and to that extent shall be deemed coroners. In
case the justice of the district in which the death occurs or
the dead body is found shall for any reason be unable to hold.
an inquest, it shall be held by the county judge of the county
in which the death occurs, or where the dead body is found, or
by a justice of the peace of one of the adjoining districts of the
county. (As amended, Laws 1943, c. 21965, Sec. 1.)—Sec.
936.01, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

“Inquests may be taken:

“(1) Of all violent, sudden and casual deaths where there
are no eyewitness or eyewitnesses to the killing or cause of
death, and such deaths occur under circumstances indicating
that death was caused by some criminal act or was the result.
of criminal negligence;

“(2) Of all sudden deaths in prison or other state, county,
municipal and such public institutions, without an attending
physician;

“(3) Of all dead bodies found within the county, whether
of persons known or unknown, when there are no known eye-
witness or eyewitnesses and it is apparent, from the body
or the surrounding circumstances, that death was caused by
some criminal act or was the result of criminal negligence, or
when the deceased died or disappeared under circumstances
indicating foul play; and,

“(4) When otherwise ordered by a court of record having
jurisdiction of felonies, upon petition of the prosecuting at-
torney thereof. (As amended, Laws 1943, c. 21965, Sec. 2.—
Sec. 936.02, F.S. 1941, F.S.A. .

“(1) Every coroner, as soon as he knows or is informed
that the dead body of any person, supposed to have come to.
his death under any of the circumstances mentioned in sub-
section (1), (2) or (3) of Sec. 936.02 has been found within
his district, shall forthwith make a preliminary investigation
into the facts and circumstances surrounding the death and
ascertain the names and addresses of all persons having
knowledge thereof, and report the same to the judge, the
prosecuting attorney or some assistant prosecuting attorney

of any court having trial jurisdiction of felonies committed in
the county where the dead body of such deceased person is
found. If, upon consideration of such report and upon such
further investigation of the facts and circumstances surround~-
ing the death as such judge, prosecuting attorney or assistant
prosecuting attorney may deem necessary, the said judge,
prosecuting attorney or assistant prosecuting attorney finds
that there is reasonable ground for believing that such death
was caused by the criminal act or the criminal negligence of
another, and further finds that an inquest is necessary, he
shall direct that the coroner forthwith cause a coroner’s jury
to be summoned to be and appear before him, at a specified
time and place, to inquire, after a view of the dead body, how
and in what manner and by whom the deceased came to death.

. The coroner shall, forthwith upon being directed as aforesaid,
or when directed pursuant to subsection (4) of Sec. 936.02,
make out his warrant, which warrant shall state the grounds
upon which it is believed that death was caused by the crimi-
nal act or criminal negligence of another and recite the order
and direction for impaneling a jury and be directed to the
constable of the district, if there be one, and if not, then to
any constable of the county or to the sheriff, directing that he
forthwith summons a coroner’s jury to be and appear before
the said coroner, at the time and place therein to be named,
inguire how and in what manner and by whom the deceased
came to his death.

“(2) The report of the preliminary inquiry, by the coro-
ner to the judge, prosecuting attorney or assistant prosecuting
attorney, may be made by mail, by telephone or by telegram
confirmed by mail, and the direction for holding the inquest
may likewise be given. A copy of the direction for holding the
inquest shall be attached to the coroner’s cost bill and no cost
bill shall be approved or paid unless and until a copy of such
direction is attached as aforesaid.” (As amended, Laws 1943,
c, 21965, Sec. 3.) Sec. 936.03, FS. 1941, F.S.A.

Concerning compensation to public officers, this Court, in
the case of Rawls et al., as County Commissioners, v. State
ex rel. Nolan, 98 Fla. 103, 122 So. 222, headnote 1, has held:

“Public officers have no claim for official services rendered,
except when, and to the extent that, compensation is provided

157

Dt
158

by law, and when no compensation is so provided rendition of
such services is deemed to be gratuitous.”

The above case was decided in 1929, and in a later case,
State ex rel. Landis v. Reardon et al., 114 Fla. 755, 154 So. 868,
decided in 1934, this Court quoted with approval the exact.
language quoted above from Nolan case.

In the Nolan case, supra, quoting from the opinion, this.
Court further said:

“It is competent for the Legislature to prescribe that the
compensation of county officers shall be confined’ to that
allowed for services rendered the public, as in assessing or
collecting one class of taxes without any allowance for as-
sessing or collecting other classes of taxes.”

Also in the much later case of State ex rel. May v. Fussell,
et al, 157 Fla. 55, 24 So. (2nd) 804, this Court again used the
same language quoted above from the Nolan case, and further
said: .

“The duties of a public officer may be exacted without
specific compensation” —and

“Such statutes are strictly construed...”

A somewhat related statute to the one here under con~
sideration is to be found in Section 939.14, F\S.A., which we
quote:

“When a committing magistrate holds to bail or commits
any person to answer a criminal charge in a county court, a
criminal court of record, or a circuit court, and an informa-
tion is not filed nor an indictment found against such person,
the costs of such committing trial shall not be paid by the
county, except the costs for executing the warrant.”

The above statute was under attack in the case of Barrow
et al. v. State ex rel. Campbell, 77 Fla. 773, 82 So. 293, and
this Court upheld the same. Pertinent parts of the opinion in
said case, we quote:

“Under the Constitution, the compensation of a county
judge is provided by law. Where a county judge acts as a
committing magistrate, he is by the Constitution entitled to
his ‘legal costs’ ‘under such regulations as shall be prescribed

159

by law.’ The law prescribes the ‘legal costs and expenses, in-
cluding the fees of officers,’ that in ‘criminal cases are prose-
cuted in the name of the state,’ ‘shall be paid by the counties
where the crime is committed,’ and payments thereof are re-
quired: to be made ‘under such regulations as may be pre-
scribed by law.’ These organic provisions contemplate the
payment to a committing magistrate only such fees as shall
be prescribed by statute. This being so, the statute is not in-
valid because it excludes fees in certain matters.” (Under-
scoring supplied). 7

In 43 American Jurisprudence, Page 134, we find the fol-
lowing:

“In considering constitutional and statutory provisions re-
lating to the compensation of public officers, certain principles
derived from the common law must be kept in mind. It is
necessary to have in view the nature of a public office, and not
to lose sight of the fact that an office is usually not regarded
as a contract or as a vested property right, but rather as a
public trust to be exercised for the benefit of the public. It
embraces the idea of tenure, duties, and emoluments. But
compensation is not indispensable to a public office; it is not
part of the office but merely incident thereto, and attaches to
the office itself and not to the officer, except as he is an officer
de jure. Whatever salary or emoluments may be attached by
Jaw to a public office do not belong to the incumbent because
of any supposed legal duty resting upon the public to pay for
the services rendered by him. In fact, it is sometimes ex-
pressly provided that certain officers shall receive no compen-
sation, and a law creating an office without any provisions for
compensation may carry with it the implication that the ser-
vices are to be rendered gratuitously.”

The origin and development of the office of Coroner is of
interest. Webster defines it as follows:

“Orig., in England, an officer (called custos placitorum
coronae), established by an ordinance of 1194, whose duty
was to keep (a record of) the pleas of the crown in a county
and guard the royal revenues arising from them. Now, by a

. gradual change of function, a public officer whose principal
duty is to inquire by an inquest held in the presence of a jury

a
160

(called a coroner’s jury) into the cause of any death which
there is reason to suppose is not due to natural causes. By
statute in some of the United States and in some British
colonies his duties have been changed or the office abolished,
a medical examiner taking his place in some jurisdictions.”

American Jurisprudence states:

“A coroner was known in the Latin of the Middle Ages as
“coronator,” from corona, the Crown, and was so called be-
cause he took cognizance only of the pleas of the Crown and
was the principal servator of the peace. He had the power at
that time to hear and determine felonies, and therefore his
court was analogous to the ordinary courts of law. His
powers were later abridged, however, by Magna Charta.
Under the early common law, the office of coroner was one of
great dignity, the coroner being, next to the sheriff, the most
important civil officer in the county. His powers and duties
were both judicial and ministerial. His judicial authority ex-
tend to inquiries concerning the manner of death of any per-
son slain, or who died in prison, or who otherwise came to a
violent or sudden death. He was only entitled to do this super
visum corporis and for such purpose the coroner’s court was
considered a court of record. As a part of his judicial powers,
however, the coroner also had authority to make inquiries re-
specting treasure-trove and shipwreck. His ministerial office
was simply to act as the sheriff’s substitute—that is, to per-
form the duties of that officer whenever the latter was dis-
abled from doing so. The coroner’s principal duty, however,
was to inquire into the manner in which persons came to their
deaths where there was any reason to suppose that death
might not have been due to natural means. The general
nature of the office of coroner is the same today, but his
duties and authority are specifically defined by statute and he
ean only act within the limit of his statutory authority. Un-
der statutes in some jurisdictions, where the coroner is absent
from the county or is unable to attend, his duties may be per-
formed by a justice of the peace, and in such case the justice
has the usual powers of the coroner.”—13 Am. Jur., p. 106.

161

The development of the office is fully reflected by quota-
tions from Holdsworth, found in the footnote.+

To hold an inquest is a service to the State. It is for the
public interest and public welfare and, when compensable, is
paid for by the public. It is within the State’s power, acting
through the Legislature, to prescribe when an inquest shall
be held and when it shall be compensable.

The statute in question (Sec. 936.03, F.S.A.) merely pro-
vides a method by which the burden of determining whether
an inquest shall be held shall be borne by the Justice of the
Peace and those charged with the prosecution of crime or
judges of courts where those charged with crime may be tried.
It is well recognized that when one has a pecuniary interest in
a determination of a matter that he is not as impartial as he
would be if he had no such interest. See Tumey v.. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510. .

7 “We have seen that the powers of the sheriff in the twelfth century
were very great; and it is clear from the Inquest of Sheriffs (1170) that
the crown was already viewing them with some suspicion. To put an
official by the side of the sheriff to check his powers, and safeguard the
interests of the crown was an obvious expedient. It is probable that
this was the reason for the institution of the coroner who had, by the
end of the twelfth century, become a definitely recognized official. .. .
—Holdsworth’s History of English Law, Vol. 1, p. 82.

“Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there were
usually four coroners for each county, who must be resident and have
sufficient land in their county to answer the king and people. They
were elected in tke county court, and, like other mediaeval officials.
they were obliged to serve without remuneration, till, in Henry VII's
reign, a fee of 13s. 4d. for every inquest of death was established.
Hence it is not surprising to find that persons got royal grants of ex-
emption from liability to undertake the office. Modern statutes have
put the office on quite a different basis. In 1844 the counties were
divided into coroner's districts; in 1860 a fixed salary was provided; and
in 1888 their appointment and the fixing of their salary was transferred
to the county councils,

“The duties of the coroner were originally wide. The office was
established for the purpose of safeguarding the pecuniary interests of
the crown, and more especially its pecuniary interests arising from the
administration of the criminal law. He must keep a roll which was of
great value to the justices in eyre, because it enabled them to check the
verdicts of the juries of the hundreds, and to provide for the king a
plentiful crop of amercements. He must execute process in the sheriff's
stead ‘when there is just exception taken to the sheriff’—on the ground,
for instance, that he was party to the case. He had many various duties
to perform in relation to the criminal law. Thus he must receive and
enter the appeals or criminal accusations of those who wished to ac-
cuse another of felony; he must receive the declarations of approvers;
he must keep a record of outlawries; he must receive the confession and

De
162

For the State to determine by means of law when it shall
invoke the power of its Justice of the Peace to hold a coroner’s
inquest is not to impair the exercise of judicial discretion in
any such inquisitorial proceeding.

Since an inquest is for the benefit of the sovereign, and not
for private interests, and is to be paid for by the public, it fol-
lows that the sovereignty may prescribe conditions precedent
for the holding of an inquest for pay and the conditions under
which such an inquest may be dispensed with or excused.

The judgment appealed is affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.

abjuration of criminals who had taken sanctuary. His services were
useful in securing the appearance of suspected persons. He could cause
such persons to be arrested; and, in 1554, he was required to put into
writing the effect of any material evidence given at the inquest held by
him, ox was empowered to bind over witnesses appearing at the
rial. (*

(*) See statute of Philip and Mary, Holdsworth’s History of English
Law, p. 296, and Sec, 936.10, F.S.A.

“The duty which was imposed upon the coroner to hold an inquest
followed from the fact that he was especially bound to safeguard the
rights of the crown. In order to safeguard these rights, he was obliged,
in many cases to impanel a jury and hold a court, which was a court of
record, to enquire into their existence. Thus he must hold inquests as
to wreck, as to royal fish, as to the finding of treasure trove, and as to
unexplained death, because in all these matters the crown was
pecuniarily interested. By its prerogative it was entitled to wreck,
royal fish, and treasure trove; and the death of a man might bring the
crown revenue in many ways. The hundred was liable to a fine if Eng-
lishry could not be proved; (**) the thing which caused the death was
forfeit to the crown as a deodand; the chattels of the man, if a suicide
or convicted of celony, were likewise forfeited. . . .

(**) The offense was to kill a Norman and the penalty was avoided
by proving the corpse to be that of an Englishman, and it was made a
prima facie presumption in law that the corpse was that of a Norman.

“Changes in the judicial system and changes in substantive law ren-
dering obsolete many of the duties of the coroner. When the general
eyre ceased, his rolis ceased to be of such great importance to the
itinerant justices; and the abolition of criminal appeals, approvers, sanc-
tuary, and abjuration, and the practical abolition of outlawry took away
many of his duties.’ The Coroner’s Act of 1885 expressly abolished
others. Thus Section 44, after repeating the old prohibition against
holding the pleas of the crown, goes on to provide that he shall not ‘hold
inquests of royal fish or of wreck, nor of felonies, except felonies on
inquisition of death; and he shall not enquire of the goods of such as by
the inquest are found guilty of murder or manslaughter, nor cause
them to be valued and delivered to the township.” His chief surviving

|
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163

ADAMS, J. dissenting:

I think the statute as framed is calculated to coerce the
exercise of judicial opinion. The question of whether to hold
an inquest frequently requires the exercise of judicial discre-
tion and is just as important as actually holding ‘the inquest.
The Constitution vests that discretion in the Justice of the
Peace. Article V, Section 22, Florida Constitution. To say
that this constitutional officer cannot receive his usual and
lawful fees, unless and except in cases where he first pro-
cures the approval of a person who in no sense shares the ju-
dicial responsibility, can have no other effect than to coerce
the judgment of the Justice of the Peace. ‘

Nothing is more abhorrent than to rest the exercise of
judicial functions upon the contingency of remuneration. See
Rollo v. Wiggins, 149 Fla. 264, 5 So. (2nd) 458. There is no
better establishment concept of American jurisprudence than
the plan that the three branches of our government shall re-
main separate from eich other. We, as other courts, have
said that the legislative branch cannot exercise judicial func-
tions. Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742. Inas-
much as the legislature cannot exercise judicial functions it
follows, therefore, that it may not delegate the functions to its
agency. This statute, by indirection, gives the executive
branch of the government judicial functions.

We have held more than once that the legislature is with-
out power to interfere with the exercise of judicial, power.
Ruff v. G. S. & F. Ry. So., 67 Fla. 224, 64 So. 782; State ex rel.
Cartmel v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 84 Fla. 128, 92 So.
871.

BUFORD, J., concurs.

duty is to act for the sheriff in executing process in cases where the
sheriff has as interest in the proceedings; and the chief functions per-
formed at his court are to hold inquests in cases of unexplained death,
and as to the concealment of treasure trove. The holding of the former
kind of inquest is by far his most important function; and it is a curious
illustration of how a procedure, invested for one purpose, has come, in
a changed order of society, to be used for another. Such inquests are
now.held, not to safeguard the pecuniary interests of the crown, but to
aid the administration of justice by careful enquiry into the circum-
stances of any suspicious death.”

ee
1c4
JOHN NEWTON YANDELL v. DOROTHY ELIZABETH YANDELL

33 So. (2nd) 869 January Term, 1948
February 17, 1948 Division B

J. Lewis Hall and Murrell, Fleming & Flowers, for peti-
tioner.

. Cushman & Woodward, for respondent.
BARNS, J.:

This cause come on before this Court on a petition for
certiorari under Rule 34 to review an interlocutory decree in
equity.

Since the petition in certiorari is to advise the Court and in
order that injustice not go without relief, the contents of the
petition are very important and, further, it is important that
the allegations in the petition be supported by page references
to the record. The petitioner should present in his petition
such of the proceedings as he desires to have reviewed. At
times material exhibits may appropriately be attached to the
petition, or else they should be plead according to their tenor
and effect or, if short in length, copied into the petition, with
proper page references.

[|
[|
165

A statement of the error forming the ground of complaint
is required to be stated in the petition according to the essen-
tial rules of pleading, for the ascertainment of the precise
point in controversy. As distinguished from mere allegations,
the petition for certiorari must disclose or show merit and in
making out a statement of the case there must be such full-
ness and certainty in the averments as will show what the case
really was, that some material error or injustices has been
done the petitioner. It must point out some injury or in-
justice that has been done and of what such injury or injustice
consists. .

The only pertinent portions of the record involved in these
proceedings are: (1) The award of alimony, under date of
January 20, 1947; (2) the testimony before the Chancellor, on
August 21, 1947; (3) the order of commitment, of like date.
All other matters in the transcript might as well have been
omitted, inasmuch as the rule provides that, as to the record
to accompany a petition for certiorari, it shall be “a certified
transcript of the record of the proceedings the petitioner seeks
to have reviewed or so much thereof as is essential.” (Su-
preme Court Rules 28 and 34).

It appears that the Chancellor below, on the 21st day of
January, 1947, made an order decreeing that the defendant-
petitioner-pay to the plaintiff-respondent the sum of $75.00 per
week, for the maintenance and support of herself and her two
minor children; that on the 21st day of August, 1947, a hear-
ing was had before the Chancellor involving the nonpayment
of alimony according to the order of January 21, supra, and
that the Chancellor, at the conclusion of the hearing, adjudged
the petitioner in contempt of court by reason of his failure to
pay to the plaintiff the sum ordered to be paid upon the
award.

There was no formal rule or citation directed to the
petitioner to show cause why he should not be adjudged in
contempt for the non-performance of the court’s decree; how-
ever, the parties were before the court and the hearing was
had concerning his default, which accomplished all that a rule
to show cause would have accomplished if it had issued.

CU
166

Upon a rule to show ause for the non-payment of alimony,
the burden of proof and of proceeding rests upon the one who
is in default after it has been established that the payments
had not been made in conformity with the previous award.

Upon the evidence on the hearing before the Chancellor it
.was established that the petitioner was making $135.00 per
month and that he had sold his automobiles and applied the
proceeds to the payment of liens upon them and paid the rest
to the wife. It appears from the record that there had been
previous hearings concerning the non-payment of the alimony
and that the proceedings before the chancellor involving con-
tempt were more in the nature of an inquisition, prosecuted
by the wife, as to the ability of the husband to pay, which
inquisition failed to reveal that the inability of the alleged
contender to obey the court’s decree was voluntarily brought
upon himself, or due to his own fault, and it likewise failed to
reveal that the alleged contemner was able to perform the de-
cree of the court.

Upon the showing made by the record before us, it appears

* that the Chancellor erred in adjudicating the petitioner in
contempt and thereupon it is ordered that certiorari issue and
that the order of August 21, 1947, be, and the same is hereby,
quashed. .

THOMAS, C. J. BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
|

EDMUN REALTY CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, v. BELLA
WEINER and SAMUEL WEINER, husband and wife.

33 So. (2nd) 867 January Term, 1948
‘February 17, 1948 . Division B

167

Roland W. Granat, for appellant.
George Chertkof, for appellees.
BUFORD, J.:

The appeal brings for review an order dismissing bill of
complaint upon the ground that the notice published for con-
structive service was insufficient to vest the court with juris-
diction of the unnamed defendants.

The notice published for the required period was as fol-
lows:

“NOTICE TO APPEAR
IN PROCEEDINGS TO RE-ESTABLISH LOST INSTRU-
MENTS.
TO: BELLE WEINER and SAMUEL WEINER husband
and wife;
AND ALL OTHER PERSONS INTERESTED:

“YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED to appear before the
Honorable Judge Ross Williams of the above Court, in the
Dade County Courthouse at Miami, Florida, at 2 P. M. on July
10, 1947, and then and there show cause why the instruments
hereinafter described should not be reestablished.

“The Petitioner, EDMUN REALTY CORP., a Florida cor-
poration, seeks to re-establish a Promissory Note and
Mortgage dated the 1st day of April, 1946, made by BELLA
WEINER and SAMUEL WEINER, her husband, to the
Petitioner, securing the payment of One Hundred Thousand
($100,000.00) Dollars in payments as set forth in said note,
encumbering the following described property in Dade County,
Florida, to-wit:

The North 50 feet of Lots 21, 22 and 23, and the South

¥ of Lot 24, of Block 2 of SECOND OCEAN FRONT

SUBDIVISION, according to the amended plat thereof

recorded in Plat Book 28 at Page 28 of the Public

Records of Dade County, Florida; together with the

buildings and improvements thereon and the furniture,

fixtures and equipment therein contained together with

a
168 :

any and all replacements, substitutions or additions

thereto;
which mortgage was recorded on the 3rd day of April, 1946,
in Mortgage Book 1645 at page 437 of the Public Records of
Dade County, Florida.

E. B. LEATHERMAN
Clerk of the Circuit Court
By: (S) R. H. Rice, Jr.,

, Deputy Clerk.”

The statute providing for substituted service by publica-
tion is sub-paragraph (2) of Sec. 71.07, Fla. Statutes 1941
(same F.S.A.) and reads as follows:

“(2). PUBLICATION AND SERVICE OF THE NOTICE.
—The clerk shall also cause to be published notice to all
persons named and not served, and to all other persons
interested to appear in said court and show cause as aforesaid
on a day to be named in the notice, not less than twenty-eight
nor more than sixty days from the first publication of said
notice.

“The notice shall contain a brief statement of the sub-
stance of the petition, and of the copy attached to it, and shall
be published once each week for four successive weeks in a
newspaper published in the county in which the proceedings
are taken.”

It will be observed that the published notice did not con-
form to the statutory requirements in that such notice did not
contain a brief statement of the substance of the petition and
of the copy attached to it. .

The notice only stated the relief which petitioners sought
and did not state briefly, or otherwise, the substance of the
petition. It is too well established to require at this time the

- citation of authorities that in cases where substituted service
is authorized by statute and it is attempted to acquire juris-
diction by such substituted service, the statute must be
strictly followed.

Our latest expression in this regard is contained in the
opinion in the case of Napoleon B. Broward Drainage District
et al. v. Certain Lands, etc., filed at this Term of Court.

For the reasons stated, the decree is affirmed.
So ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

169

Leeper |
ARTHUR EUGENE WILLIAMS alias EUGENE WILLIAMS v.
NATHAN MAYO, Florida State Prison Custodian.

38 So. (2nd) 861 January Term, 1948
February 17, 1948 Division B

Arthur Eugene Williams, in proper person.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Ernest W. Welch,
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

BUFORD, J.:

This cause is before us on writ of habeas corpus and return
thereto.

The.record shows that the same factual conditions exist in
this case as existed in the case of Scott v. Mayo, 159 Fla. 816,
32 So. (2nd) 821.

Therefore, on authority of the opinion and judgment in
that case we do not discharge the petitioner but, under the
provisions of Sec: 924.34, Fla. Statutes 1941 (same F.S.A.)
remand him to the custody of respondent with directions that
petitioner be presented to the Criminal Court of Record of
Duval County, Florida, for judgment and sentence as is pro-
vided in Sec. 775.09, supra, which said offense is included
within the offense charged in the information under which
petitioner was convicted.

Remanded with directions.

So ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

CLYDE WILSON, as State Attorney in and for the 12th Judicial Circuit
of Florida v. CAROL CREWS, individually and as Constable in and
for Justice of the Peace District No. 1, in DeSoto County, Florida.

34 So. (2nd) 114 January Term, 1948

February 17, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied March 12, 1948

nd

172

Halley B. Lewis and J. Lewis Hall, for appellant.
H. G. Jones, for appellee.
PARKS, Associate Justice:

In 1931 the County Commissioners of DeSoto County
divided it into two Justice of Peace Districts agreeable to the
power vested in them by Article 5, Section 21 of the Constitu-

-tion. The Districts so constituted have remained undisturbed.

Carol Crews, Constable of District No. 1, was reelected at
the general election of November 5, 1946, for the ensuing term
of four years to begin the first Tuesday after the first Monday
in January, 1947. Chapter 23, 249, Special Act of the Legis-
lature of 1945, abolishing all existing Justice Districts con-
ditioned that it be effective upon its approval at referendum
by a majority vote ofthe qualified electors of the County par-
ticipating, was submitted for their approval at the same elec-
tion in accordance with its provision and the mandate of the
amendment to Article 5, Section 21 of the Constitution adopted
at the general election of 1944. The abolishing of the Justice
Districts, if effectual, ipso facto, abolished the offices of
Constable for the Districts. Article 5, Section 23 of the
Constitution.

On December 17th following the election, Crews filed his-
petition for declaratory judgment (Section 87.01-87.13,
Florida Statutes, 1941) praying that the Circuit Court de-
clare Chapter 23249 unconstitutional and void because
amended Article 5, Section 21 of the Constitution did not em-
power the Legislature to abolish all Justice Districts without
contemporaneously reestablishing a minimum of two Dis-
.tricts; that the referendum election be declared ineffectual to
vitalize the Act because a majority of the electors partici-
pating in the election did not vote for its approval; that hav-
ing been elected for the ensuing term the Court declare him
entitled to a Commission. By amendment the County Com-
missioners and the State’s Attorney were made defendants.
Separate answers: were duly filed by them denying the in-
validity of the Act and its alleged failure of approval at the

173

referendum election and denying that Crews was entitled to a
new term of office. Conformance of the proceedings with the
requirements of the declaratory judgment act is not ques-
tioned.

The Circuit Judge in express term made no disposition of
the contention that the Act was not approved by a majority
vote in the election. However, it is apparent that his judg-
ment assumed such approval. An examination of the record
discloses approval and we so find. He thought that the amend-
ment superseded the provisions of Article 5, Section 21 except
its requirement that there be not less than two Districts in the
County; consequently the Act purporting to abolish all Dis-
tricts was void and unconstitutional. His judgment so de-
clared and granted the relief prayed. From this judgment the
State’s Attorney appealed.

The original Article 5, Section 21 of the Constitution
reads:

“The County Commissioners of each county shall divide
it into as many Justice Districts, not less than two, as they
may deem necessary. There shall be elected one Justice of
the Peace for each of the said districts. He shall hold his
office for four years.”

The Legislature at its regular session of 1943 by Senate
Joint Resolution No. 419 proposed that Article 5, Section 21 of
the Constitution be amended, the Resolution reading:

“BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF FLORIDA:

“That the following amendment to Section 21 of Article V
of the Constitution of the State of Florida be and the same is
hereby agreed to, and the same shall be submitted to the quali-
fied electors at the general election in 1944 for ratification or
rejection:

“Section 21. There shall be not more than five Justice
Districts in each county, and there shall be elected one Justicé
of the Peace for each Justice District, who shall hold office
for four years. Existing Justice Districts are hereby recog-
nized, but the Legislature may, by special Act, from time to
time change the boundaries of any such District now or here-

a
174

after established, and may establish new or abolish any such
District now or hereafter existing.’

“Providing however that any such changes shall be sub-
mitted to the people of any county so effected, by referendum
at the next ensuing general election.”

This section and the amendment involve a specific subject
matter unrelated to other provisions of the Constitution ex-
cept Article 5, Section 23, as hereinabove noted. Upon adop-
tion, the amendment became the dominant law of its subject
matter. To the extent that the amendment is inconsistent
with and repugnant to the original, that provision is modified
or superseded. To measure the-extent of its repugnancy and
inconsistency we must look to and construe together the
original and the amendment. The principles of construction
of the Constitution and amendment thereto with respect to
any change effected by such amendment were clearly ex-
pounded by this Court in the following cases, which rather .
than paraphrase, we rewrite here:

“Where there is a repugnancy between a constitutional
amendment and some provision in the original, which cannot
be so construed as to have them both stand and leave to each a
legitimate office to perform, the original must be deemed to
have been repealed by the amendment... .

“An amendment of a constitution repeals or changes some
provisions in, or adds something to, the instrument amended.
Where an amendment is the last expression of the will and
intent of the law making power duly exercised, such amend-
ment is controlling, and prior provisions inconsistent with or
repugnant to the amendment are modified or superseded to the
extent of the inconsistency or repugnancy. While implied re-
peals or amendments of constitutions or laws are not favored,
yet the primary consideration is to give effect to the intent of
the lawmaking power as duly expressed, and this should be
done even if it results in a repeal or modification of older in-
‘consistent or repugnant provisions. Where an amendment ~
contains no express repeal or modification of existing pro-
visions of law the old and the new provisions should stand and
operate together if it can be done without contravening the

intent of the lawmaking power as duly and fairly expressed
in the later provision; but to the extent that a fair construc-
tion or interpretation of the new provision discloses incon-'
sistency with, or repugnancy to an older provision, the later
provision controls to effectuate the law making intent....”

Board of Public Instructions of Polk County v. Board of
County Commissioners of Polk County, 58 Fla. 391; 50 So.
574,

“Implied repeals, amendments and modifications of organic
provisions occur only when the provisions as adopted are posi-
tively and irreconcilably repugnant to each other, and then
only to the extent of the repugnancy. . . . District provisions
of the constitution are repugnant to each’ other only when
they relate to the same subject, are adopted for the same
purpose and cannot be enforced without material and sub-
stantial conflict. ...”—-T. F. West v. J. Turner Butler, 70 Fla.
102; 69 So. 771. °

The companionate principle of construction to ascertain
the meaning of the language employed in the Constitution and
amendment was enunciated by this Court in City of Jackson-
ville v. Glidden Co., 124 Fla. 690; 169 So. 216.

“The words and terms of a Constitution are to be in-
terpreted in their most usual and obvious meaning, unless the
text suggests that they have been used in a technical sense.
The presumption is in favor of the natural and popular mean-
ing in which the words are usually understood by the people
who have adopted them.

“Tt has been said that, as statutes are hastily and unskill-
fully drawn, they need construction to make them sensible,
but Constitutions import the utmost discrimination in the use
of language, that which the words declare is the meaning of
the instrument. It must be very plain, nay, absolutely certain,
that the people did not intend what the language they had em-
ployed in its natural signification imports before a court
should feel at liberty to depart from the plain meaning of a
constitutional provision. ...”

In the light of these principles of construction we must de-
cide the effect the amendment had on the original provisions
of Article 5, Section 21.

175

a
176

The language of the amendment “There shall be not more
than five Justice Districts in each county” expressly fixed the
maximum number of districts-permitted, but did not fix a
minimum number. The expression “not more than five” as
used here means beyond or in excess of five. It does not
within itself cannote any requirement of a minimum number,
nor is there anything in the context of the amendment imply-
ing that there shall be a minimum number. This language
does not require the existence of any District. Such provision
is, therefore, repugnant to and inconsistent with the original
provision that the County Commissioners “shall divide it into
as many Justice Districts, not less than two.” This meaning
becomes more apparent when construed with the succeeding
language of the context vesting in the Legislature the power
to establish or abdlish any or all Districts and change their
boundaries.
~The language of the clause “and there shall be elected one
Justice of the Peace for each Justice District, who shall hold
office for four years” is identical in meaning with that of the
original provision and, as will be seen, is the sole provision of
the amendment consistent with the original. The clause
“Existing Justice Districts are hereby recognized” is no more
than a formal acknowledgment and approval of all Districts
and their boundaries as constituted on the date the amend-
ment was adopted. No intention to inhibit the abolishing of
any Districts existing on that date or changing their boun-
daries may be implied from this language.

The language “but the Legislature may, by Special Act,
from time to time change the boundaries of any such District
now or hereafter established, and may establish new or abol-
ish any such District now or hereafter existing” means that
the Legislature shall have the power to establish new or abol-
ish Districts and change their boundaries by Special Act;
“from time to time” means that such Act may be passed at
any time while the Legislature is in session; “change the
boundaries of any such District now or hereafter established”
includes the boundaries of all Districts as constituted at the
date the amendment was adopted or thereafter established
by the Legislature under its authority; the word “any” as

LITT

used in the context of “any such District now or hereafter
established” and “any such District now or hereafter existing”
means one or all, one or more, indiscriminately of the total
number; the words “now or hereafter” include those Districts
existing at the time of the adoption of the amendment, as well
as those established thereafter by the Legislature, and like-
wise include the boundaries of such Districts. This phrase
excludes the thought that the power of the Legislature to
change the number of Districts or ‘District boundaries is
limited to those established after the adoption of the amend-
ment, .
Under the amendment, so construed, the County Commis-
- sioners were divested of all express power to divide the
County into Districts, as well as the implied power to estab-
lish, abolish or change the boundaries of Districts, generally
exercised by them prior to the adoption of the amendment.
The provisions of the amendment expressly vested the ex-
clusive power in the Legislature to establish or abolish Dis-
tricts and change their boundaries, subject however to the
approval of the people at referendum. To hold that the Com-
missioners and the Legislature have concurrent power to
establish new or abolish old Districts or change boundaries,
whether such Districts existed at the time of or formed
after the adoption of the amendment, or that the Commis-
sioners continued to retain power to divide the County into at
Jeast two or more Districts and fix or change their boundaries,
would inevitably, in practice, lead to a struggle between the
Commissioners and the Legislature relative to the exercise of
such power. A construction so permitting the attendant con-
fusion and impairment of the stability of Districts and their
boundaries is to be avoided as not being the intent of the
amendment.

Viewing the interrelated provisions in perspective, the
changes in the provisions of Article 5, Section 21 wrought by
the amendment clearly evince the intent to completely revise
the fundamental law governing the establishment of Justice
Districts and the fixing of their boundaries.

The over-all effect of these changes is to vest in the Legis-
lature the exclusive power to determine by Special Act at any

Fn

PC
178 |

time either that there be no District in the County or divide it

into and establish any number of Districts not to exceed the

prescribed maximum of five; to fix or change boundaries of or

abolish any District existing in the County at the time of

passage of the required Special Act, whether such Districts
have been established prior or subsequent to the adoption of
the amendment; that the method to be employed by the Legis-
| lature shall be by Special Act which may be enacted at any
time while it is in session and such Act may include one or all, :
one or more, indiscriminately of the total number of Districts, |
| to become effective upon its approval by a. majority of the
electors participating in a referendum at the ensuing general
election.

In this view the field of operation of the provisions of
Article 5, Section 21 is preempted by the provisions of the
amendment and it must be held that such amendment super-
sedes the original. Under the amendment the Legislative
power and the power of the people to approve at referendum is
constant and may be exercised recurrently. Chapter 23249 is
a valid and constitutional enactment. The cause is reversed.

THOMAS, C. J.. ADAMS, SEBRING and BARNS, JJ.,
concur. oo

TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissent.

TERRELL, J., dissenting:

I think the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
As originally embraced in the constitution of 1885, Section 21
of Article V read as follows:

“The County Commissioners of each county shall divide it
into as many Justice Districts, not less than two, as they may
deem necessary. There shall be elected one Justice of the
Peace for each of the said districts: He shall hold his office
for four years.”

As amended in 1944, Section 21 of Article V reads as fol-
lows:

“There shall be not more than five Justice Districts in each
county, and there shall.be elected one Justice of the Peace for
each Justice District, who shall hold office for four years.
Existing Justice Districts are hereby recognized, but the

Legislature may, by special Act, from time to time change the
boundaries of any such District now or hereafter established,
and may establish new or abolish any such District now or
hereafter existing. Provided however, that any such changes
shall be submitted to the people of any county so affected, by
referendum at the next ensuing general election.”

Casual inspection discloses that original Section 21, Article
V. authorized the County Commissioners to divide each county
into “as many Justice Districts, not less than two, as they may
deem necessary.” By the 1944 amendment the maximum
number of Justice Districts was fixed at five but the minimum
was not changed. The 1944 amendment specifically recog-
nized “existing districts” and gave the legislature power to
“change the boundaries of any such district now or hereafter
established, and may establish new or abolish any such dis-
‘trict now or hereafter existing,” but there is not a word in the
amendment withdrawing from the County Commissioners
power to divide the County into Justice Districts.

The majority opinion reads this power out of the constitu-
tion by implication. The rule is well settled that repeals by
implication are not favored. Here this rule is supported by
the fact that the County Commissioners have for more than
sixty years been clothed with the power to divide the County
into Justice Districts. It is the place where such power
logically resides, and there is not a word in the 1944 amend-
ment that can be reasonably construed as withdrawing that
power from them. The resolution adopted by legislature sub-
mitting the 1944 amendment to the electorate speaks of it as

n “amendment” and not as a substitute for the original. The
General practice in submitting constitutional amendments to
the people by the legislature, is to use the word “amend” or
“amended” when nothing more is intended, but when the
purpose is to repeal or substitute a new or different provision
for the old, then the word “repeal” and “substitute for” or
words to that effect are employed. There is no showing what-
ever to do more than amend here.

‘When the 1944 amendment in terms recognized “existing
Justice Districts,” it could have reference to none other than
‘those created by the County Commissioners, and when it was

179

180

authorized to change the boundaries of “such” districts and to
establish new, or abolish any “such district, it could have
reference to none other than those created by the County Com-
missioners. In construing amendments to a statute or the
constitution, Courts are without power to strike down the
original instrument by implication unless the terms of the
amendment are the direct antithesis of the original instru-
ment, or are so opposed to it in meaning, that they cannot be
reconciled on any reasonable basis. Since the resolution pur-
ported to do nothing more than amend, there certainly should
be positive showing of an intent to strike down a provision,
the import of the one stricken here.

I think the majority opinion ignores this cardinal rule of
interpretation and in doing so, reads out of the constitution
by implication a power vested in the County Commissioners
that was not contemplated by the people. ,

I think the chancellor’s conclusion was correct and should
be affirmed. I therefore dissent.

CHAPMAN, J., concurs.
: ||
STATE OF FLORIDA on the relation of C. B. REESE, doing business
as TEMPLE TERRACE PUBLIC SERVICE, v. JERRY W.
CARTER, WILBUR ©. KING, and RICHARD A. MACK, as and
constituting the FLORIDA RAILROAD AND PUBLIO UTILITYES
COMMISSION.

84 So. (2nd) 35 January Term, 1948
February 20, 1948 En Banc

ee
J. D. Hobbs, for relator.
Lewis W. Petteway, for respondents

ADAMS, J.:

This cause comes on for final hearing upon motion for a
peremptory writ notwithstanding respondents’ return.

181

Petitioner held a permit from the respondents to operate a
taxicab business in the unincorporated community of Sulphur
Springs, adjacent to the City of Tampa. In 1947 the Legisla-
ture enacted Chapter 24922, a special act to create a taxicab
commission for the City of Tampa, with power to supervise
and regulate the operation of taxicabs over the public high-
ways of said city and the adjoining suburban territory to a
distance of three miles from the city limits. Because of this
act the respondents refused to renew petitioner’s permit.

We consider the question of whether the statute may be
upheld as a police measure. We must recognize as a first
premise that the taxicab business was not lacking in super-
vision or regulation in the affected area inasmuch as the
general law placed that duty upon respondents. Can we then
say that this attempted manner of regulation bears any re-
lation to the public safety, health, morals or welfare? We
think not. These-taxicabs did not enter the corporate limits
of the city; therefore, the special act is inapplicable to the
territory outside the corporate limits of the city when applied
as here to an operation exclusively outside the corporate
limit. This situation is different from the cases where the
outside regulation was essential to preserve order and restrain
a nuisance within the confines of the city. This is not a case
where the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end. See
State ex rel. Sweat v. Turpentine & Rosin Factors, Inc., 112
Fla. 428 So. 617; State ex rel. Municipal Bond & Investment
Co., Inc., v. Knott et al., 114 Fla. 120, 154 So. 143; Board of
Trustees of Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush (Ky.) 660; Town of
Gower v. Agee, 128 Mo. App. 427, 107 S.W. 999; White v. City
of Decatur, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873, 86 A.L.R. 914; Malone
v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798, 121 Am. St. Rep.
1002; 55 A.L.R., page 1182, (text page 1183).

It follows that the ‘return by the Railroad Commission
setting up the existence of the statute and urging it as a
defense for not renewing the permit, is not sufficient; and that
consequently the peremptory writ should be granted.

182

So ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, BUFORD, CHAPMAN,
SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., concur.

‘ETHEL L. CRAWFORD v. JULIAN SADLER, Chairman; ©. ©.
BURTON; SAMUEL WILLIAMS; GEORGE W. JOHNSON and
MRS. L. F. BLANKNER, as and constituting the Board of Public
Instruction for the County of Orange, State of Florida; and JUD-
SON B. WALKER, as County Superintendent of Public Instruction
for said County.

34 So. (2nd) 38 January Term, 1948

February 24, 1948 En Bane

Parks, Sanders & McEwan, for appellant.
Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, for appellees.

TERRELL, J.:

The point in this case is whether or not Chapter 18743,
Special Acts of 1937, relating to Tenure Employment of
Teachers in the public schools of Orange County, confers upon
its beneficiaries such rights as are immunized from repeal or
modification by the Due Proces Clause, Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution and Sections 12 and 17, Dec-
laration of Rights, Constitution of the State of Florida. It is
admitted that Chapter 18743 was revised by House Bill 116, .
Acts of 1947, which is now in force, but there is no showing of
an attempt to enforce it arbitrarily or capriciously.

The court below answered this question in the negative on
the theory that Chapter 18743, Acts of 1937, did nothing
more than declare the public policy of the state, in the matter
of teacher tenure, there being nothing in the act to express an
intent to create a legislative contract. The opulent terms of

the act touching this point amply support the chancellor's

holding which is affirmed on authority of State of Indiana v.

Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 82 L. ed. 685; State ex rel McKenna v.

Milwaukee, 243 Wis. 324, 10 N.W. (2nd) 155; Taylor v. Board

of Education 31 Cal. App. (2nd) 734, 89 Pac. (2nd) 148.
Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. BUFORD, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING and BARNS, JJ., concur.
 peermemee
LOTTIE MARTIN v. W. H. BURNEY; JAMES WILLIAMS v. W. H.
BURNEY.

34 So. (2nd) 36 January Term, 1948
February 24, 1948 Division B

183

Harry Goodmark, for appellants.

Newman T. Miller, and Morehead, Pallot, Smith, Green &
Phillips, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

This appeal involves like proceedings in each of the above
named suits, one brought by James Williams against Lee R.
Wright and W. H. Burney and the other brought by Lottie
Martin against Lee R. Wright and W. H. Burney. The pro-
ceedings had below were identical and, therefore, the rulings
here in one appeal will govern the other.

We will deal with the Williams case, in which the defend-
ants were sued by reason of injuries received by the plaintiff
while a passenger in a taxicab, resulting from a collision be-
tween a cab owned by Burney and a car driven by Wright.

Le
184

After the suit was commenced, Williams executed the follow-
ing instrument:

“KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that I,
James Williams, of West Palm Beach, Florida, for my heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns for and in
consideration of the sum of $250.00 to me paid, the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, by this instrument AGREE
TO FOREVER REFRAIN from instituting, procuring, or in
any way aiding any suit, cause of action or claim against Lee
R. Wright, Georgia R. Wright and Gulf Insurance Company,
and all persons, firms and/or corporation for whose acts or to
whom said party or parties might be liable, for damages, costs
or expenses growing out of an accident occurring on or about
the 5th day of January, 1946, at or near North Olive Avenue
and 4th Street, West Palm Beach, Florida, and to save HARM-
LESS and INDEMNIFY the parties aforesaid from all loss
and/or expense resulting from any such suit, cause of action
or claim.

“EXPRESSLY RESERVING to the undersigned, how-
ever, all right to proceed against any person or persons other
- than the parties aforesaid.

“AND FOR THE CONSIDERATION AFORESAID, I do
further covenant and agree with the said Lee R. Wright,
Georgia R. Wright and Gulf Insurance Company that in the
event that I release or settle my claim for the said injuries
against the said W. H. Burney I will execute and deliver to
said Lee R. Wright, Georgia R. Wright and Gulf Insurance
Company, legal release for said injuries.

“Signed, sealed and delivered this 7th day of February,
1947.

James Coy Williams (SEAL)”

Thereafter a stipulation was entered into between the at-
torneys and an order entered thereon by the court, as follows:

“STIPULATION
“It is hereby stipulated by and between attorneys for

plaintiff and for the defendant, Lee R. Wright, that the
above entitled cause of action be dismissed with prejudice at

the cost of the plaintiff as to the defendant, Lee R. Wright.
“This 7th day of February, A. D., 1947.
T. Harold Williams,
Attorney for Defendant
Harry Goodmark,
Attorney for Plaintiff”

“ORDER

“This cause coming on to be heard upon stipulation of
counsel, and the Court being advised in the premises,

“IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE that the
above entitled cause of action be and the same is herewith
dismissed against Lee R. Wright only with prejudice to and at
the cost of the Plaintiff.

“DONE AND ORDERED this the 8th day of February,
1947.

185

Jos. B. White,
Circuit Judge.”

At pre-trial conference upon the foregoing facts, the trial
judge entered the following judgment:

“FINAL JUDGMENT

“The parties appeared before the Court at Pretrial Con-
ference, and certain agreements were made and recorded by
the Court Reporter, one of which being that this cause be
consolidated for trial with Case No. 10,148, between James
Williams, as Plaintiff, and W. H. Burney, as Defendant.

“Tt is the view of the Court that the circumstances agreed
to by the parties and relating to the entry of the order of
dismissal, with prejudice, against one of the defendants, show
a retraxit, and bar further litigation on the subject matter
of this suit. See 17 Am. Jur., Sec. 38, p. 80; Sec. 2, p. 57;
and Sec. 65, p. 91; Turner v. Fleming, 37 Okla. 75, 130 Pac.
551, 45 L.R.A. (NS) 265.

“Thereupon, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
plaintiffs in each of said cases, take nothing by their writs,

186 :

and that defendants go hence without day. Court costs are
assessed against the plaintiffs.
“DONE AND. ORDERED this 21st day of July, 1947.
Jos. B. White,
Circuit Judge.”

Upon the foregoing judgment the plaintiffs prosecuted
this appeal, the cases having been consolidated for trial and
the error assigned is as follows:

“The final judgment entered herein is contrary to law.”

The question is as to the effect of the execution of the fore-
going instruments and the stipulation of the parties and order
of the court. It appears that the act of the plaintiff in sign-
ing the stipulation was not a “retraxis,” operating as an open
and voluntary renunciation of right of action, whereby the
plaintiff forever lost his cause of action. It is true that the
plaintiff stipulated that his cause of action be dismissed “with
prejudice.” The force and effect of dismissing an action at
Jaw “with prejudice” is unknown to the practice in actions on
the law. The stipulation will be construed as giving effect to

. the covenant not to sue, and the judgment will not be given
the force and effect of a retraxis. It was not that much.

The release of one joint tort feasor is the release of all, the
trial judge treated the foregoing transaction as a release by
retraxit. We consider it only a covenant not to sue, therefore
the judgment is—

Reversed.
THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

DOROTHY LEE WARRELL, and PECOLA MOORE, v. STATE OF
FLORIDA.

84 So. (2nd) 241 January Term, 1984

February 24, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied March 23, 1948

187

W. J. Ferguson and J. B. Hodges, for appellants.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee. .

TERRELL, J.:

This case grew out of a fracas that was a perfect replica
of what often takes place when a flock of negroes congregate
at a negro jook where beer and other species of “fire water”
are dispensed. One Clyde Roberson, was killed in the fracas.
Dorothy Lee Harrell, Pecola and Eli Moore were indicted for
murder in the first degree, Pecola and Eli Moore were also in-
dicted as accessories before the fact. At the trial Eli Moore
was acquitted and Dorothy Lee Harrell and Pecola Moore
were found guilty of manslaughter. They were sentenced to
serve six and four years respectively in the State penitentiary,
and came here beseeching us to reverse that judgment.

Their essential contention is that the trial court com-
mitted error in refusing to permit appellants to prove and
argue to the jury that at the time of the homicide, Dorothy
Lee Harrell was bloody and that the blood was running down
her face. The purpose of this evidence was to show the
physical aspect of appellant when Clyde Roberson was killed.

The record discloses that shortly before the homicide
Dorothy Lee Harrell engaged in an encounter with the wife of
the deceased, in which she was bruised and beat up, but that
the deceased was not present and had no part in this brawl.
These were the bruises that caused the blood on her face, and
since the deceased was not present, and had no connection
with the encounter, the trial court refused to let evidence as
to appellant’s condition resulting from it, go to the jury. It
is common knowledge that bruised heads, black eyes and slits
to the neck or jaw are the usual product of such affrays.

At the trial the burden of the evidence was directed to the
point of who was the agressor in the fracas and whether or
not the deceased assaulted the appellant with a knife. The
jury resolved this question against appellant and’ we find

ee
188

ample evidence to support their conclusion. The weight of
the evidence is to the effect that appellant inflicted the deadly
wound with a “cutter,” an instrument that was introduced
into these parts with the turpentine industry and soon dis-
‘placed the razor and the Winchester as an instrument of de-
fense and offense about the “Quarters.”

If the deceased had been present aiding or abetting the
affray in which appellant’s face was bruised and bloodied, or
had been shown to have had any part in it, a different picture
might be presented, but the judge who tried the case has an
unusually clear understanding of the general behavior of
humankind, black and white, and to reverse him in this case
would amount to nothing short of substituting our judgment
for his, which we are not authorized to do. The degree of the
verdict in the light of the whole picture presented admonishes
us that the jury knew what they were doing.

The main effort of the defense at the trial was to prove
the deceased was attempting to stab appellant when she
struck the fatal blow. The jury disposed of this issue when
it found against the defendant, so the fact of a fight between
defendant and deceased’s wife in which the former got beat
up and blooded, became immaterial here.

In a case as academic as the facts were in this one, we see
no reason to disturb the verdict and judgment.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD, ADAMS, SEBRING and
BARNS, JJ., concur.

CHAPMAN, J., dissents.
[|

EX PARTE: FRANK STODDARD

34 So. (Snd) 92 January Term, 1948
February 24, 1948. En Bane

189

Schad & Snarr, for petitioner.

. T. E. Dincan, State Attorney, J. Tom Watson, Attorney
General, and D. Fred McMuilen, Assistant Attorney General,
for respondent.

CHAPMAN, J.:

It has been made to appear by this record that a warrant
issued out of the County Judge’s Court of Alachua County,
Florida, charging Frank Stoddard with the violation of Sec-
tion 562.02, F.S.A. The pertinent language of the warrant is,
in part, viz: Whereas, Fred Hollomon has this day made oath
before me that on the 25th day of September, A. D. 1947, in
the County aforesaid (Alachua), one Frank Stoddard being
the owner of the ‘KIT KAT CLUB,’ a licensed place for the
selling of beer, did unlawfully permit others to bring on said

Le
190

premises and consume on said premises, intoxicating liquors
not permitted under a beer license, contrary to the statute in
such cases made and provided, and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Florida.”

In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus presented to the:
Circuit Court of Alachua County, Florida, Stoddard repre-
sented that he was unlawfully restrained and deprived of his
liberty in that the affidavit and warrant under which he was
then held by the Sheriff of Alachua County (1) failed to
charge an offense under the laws of the State of Florida;
and (2) Section 562.02, F.S.A., under which the affidavit and
warrant were drawn was void and contrary to many pro-
visions of the Constitution of Florida. The trial court heard
the petitioner (Stoddard) and entered an order remanding
him to the custody of the Sheriff of Alachua County.

Pertinent recitals in the order of remand are viz:

. the court having heard the testimony and the argu-
ment ‘of counsel for petitioner and the State, finds as follows:

“I, Petitioner holds a beer license and owns and operates
an attractive place of business on the outskirts of Gainesville
in Alachua County, Florida, a ‘dry’ county, where patrons
dine and dance.

“2. Petitioner was arrested under a warrant issued Sep-

" tember 25, 1947, substantially charging him with having per-
mitted others to possess and drink liquor on said premises,
contrary to Section 12, Chapter 23746, Laws of Florida, 1947
(amending Section 562.02, F.S. 1941).

“3. In this proceeding petitioner challenges the legality
of his detention upon the ground that said Section of the
Beverage Act is unconstitutional. He argues that it is arbi-
trary, unreasonable and illegally discriminates as between
him and the operators of other eating places in Alachua.
County which are not licensed to sell beer.

“4, The Court is not convinced of the unconstitutionality
of said Section of the Beverage Act, so petitioner should be
remanded.”

From the remand order an appeal has been perfected here,
but the evidence referred to in the lower court’s order has not.

been certified here and our review therefore is limited solely
to questions of law authorized by our adjudications. Section
562.02 supra makes it unlawful for a licensee under the Bever-
age Act to have in his possession at or in his place of busi-
ness beverages containing more than one per cent of alcohol
by weight and is not permitted to be sold by such licensee
under Section 561.34, F.S.A. The petitioner contends that
Section 562.02 is unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal and in its
application discriminates between him and the owners and
operators of similar eating places situated in Alachua County
and for these several reasons said Section is unconstitutional
and void.

* 194

It is generally recognized that the sale and possession of
intoxicating liquors are in a class by themselves since it is
. affected with a public interest and the manufacture, sale and
possession become lawful only by expressed legislative au-
thority. The petitioner accepted a license to sell beer at his
restaurant with a full knowledge of the power of the Legis-
lature to regulate the sale and possession of alcoholic liquors.
If he surrendered the license to sell beer in his place of
business then much of the potency of his contention as to
discrimination would evaporate.

It is within the power of the Legislature to declare an act
a crime regardless of the intent or knowledge of the viola-
tion thereof. The doing of the act inhibited by the statute
makes the crime and moral turpitude on purity of motive and
the knowledge or ignorance of its criminal character are im-
material circumstances on the question of guilt. The only
question to be determined is whether or not the defendant vio-
lated the statute. See United States v. Balint, 285 U.S. 250,
66 L. ed. 604, 42 Sup. Ct. 301, 14 Am. Jur. 768, par. 16.

In the case of Coleman v. State ex rel. Jackson, 140 Fla.
772, 193 So. 84, we in part said:

“It is fundamental that habeas corpus is not a remedy for
relief against imprisonment under a warrant or indictment
that charges a criminal offense defectively or inartificially.
See Bass v. Doolittle, 93 Fla. 992, 112 So. 892; Ex Parte
Garvey, 84 Fla. 539, 94 So. 391; Ex Parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112

192

So. 289; Lehman v. Sawyer, 106 Fla. 396, 143 So. 310. Like-
wise it is well established that while habeas corpus is not a
remedy against a warrant or indictment that charges a
criminal offense defectively or inartificially, yet it may be
used as’a remedy where the charge made does not constitute
a crime under the laws of Florida by reason of the statute
under which the charge is made being unconstitutional or
when the charge wholly fails to allege a crime” See Lewis v.
Nelson, 62 Fla. 71, 56 So. 436; Cooper v. Lipscomb, 97 Fla.
668, 122 So. 5;.State ex rel. Claire v. Coleman, 129 Fla. 880,
177 So. 288; Martin v. State, 123 Fla. 143, 166 So. 467; State
ex rel. Cacciatore v. Drumright, 116 Fla. 496, 156 So. 721.”

We are committed to the rule in equity, as well as at law,
that every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the
ruling of the trial court and it is the duty of the party re-
sorting to this Court to make errors complained of clearly to
appear. Moss v. Sperry, 147 Fla. 86, 2 So. (2nd) 123. It is
our conclusion that the appellant has failed to carry the
burden by law cast upon him and accordingly the judgment
appealed from is affirmed.

TERRELL, BUFORD, ADAMS, SEBRING and BARNS,
JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., dissents.

PENSACOLA TRANSIT, INC., a Florida corporation, and the CITY OF
PENSACOLA, v. W. B. DOUGLASS, as Chairman, JERRY W.
CARTER and WILBUR ©. KING, as members of and constituting
THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
now known as FLORIDA RAILROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION; TESHE GREYHOUND LINES, a corporation,
MODERN COACH CORPORATION, a corporation, and CAPITAL
MOTOR LINES, a corporation, v. W. B. DOUGLASS, as Chairman,
JERRY W. CARTER and WILBUR OC. KING, as members of and
constituting the Railroad Commission of the State of Florida.

34 So.. (2nd) 555 January Term, 1948
February 24, 1948 Division A

193

Yonge, Beggs & Lane for Pensacola Transit, Inc., and
F. Churchill Mellen, for City of Pensacola, petitioners.

Fisher, Fisher, Hepner & Fitzpatrick, for Teche Grey-
hound Lines, a corporation, Modern Coach Corporation, a
corporation, and Capital Motor Lines, a corporation, petition-
ers.

Lewis W. Petteway, R. Clyde Simmons and J. Kenneth Bal-
linger, for respondents.

Jones, Latham & McLane, T. Franklin West and Philip D.
Beall, Jr., as Amicus Curiae.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The petitioners, Pensacola Transit, Inc., City of Pensacola,
Teche Greyhound Lines, Modern Coach Corporation and Capi-

Fn

Le
194

tal Motor Lines, seek an order of this Court quashing and
holding as naught an order of the Railroad Commission of the
State of Florida dated May 28, 1947, entered pursuant to
notice and after a hearing in which considerable testimony
was taken, and further identified as Order No. 2019. The
effect of this order was to grant to Frank Petelinski and Red
Ball Motor Lines a certificate of public convenience and ne-
cessity as a common carrier of passengers and light express,
newspapers, mail and baggage in motor vehicles over certain
specified routes in the vicinity of Pensacola, Florida.

It is contended that.the order providing for the issuance
by the Florida Railroad Commission of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity authorizing the transportation of
passengers and property in motor buses on designated sched-
ules over specified routes is not only contrary to law but can-
not be supported by the substantial testimony appearing in
the transcript certified to this Court. The routes are viz.

“1, From Pensacola, Florida, to the Florida-Alabama
State Line over U. S. Highway No. 29 and Florida State High-
way No. 95, via Gonzalez, Florida Pulp and Paper Company,
Cantonment, Cottage Hill, Quintette, Molino, Pine Barren,
Bogee, McDavid, Bluff Springs, Century and South Flomaton,
and return over the same route, with the right to serve all
intermediate points. .

“2. From Pensacola, Florida, To Pensacola Beach Casino
and Gulf of Mexico, over Florida State Highway No. 30 and
U.S. Highway No. 98 and that certain un-numbered highway,
and return over the same route with the right to serve all in-
termediate points.

“3, From Pensacola, Florida, to Riverview, Florida, over
U. S. Highway No. 90, via East Pensacola Heights and Gull
Point, and return over the same route with the right to serve
all intermediate points, for sightseeing and charter parties,
solely.

“4, From Pensacola, Florida, to Saufley Field in Escambia
County, Florida, over U. S. Highway No. 90 to the intersec-
tion of U. S. Highway No. 90 and the Saufley Field Road,
thence over the Saufiey Field Road to Saufley Field and re-

195

turn over the Saufiey Field to the intersection of the Belleview
Road, thence over the Belleview Road to its intersection with
U.S. Highway No. 90; thence over U. S. Highway No. 90 back
to Pensacola, Florida, via Brownsville and West Pensacola.

“5. From Pensacola, Florida, to Riverview, Florida, and
Escambia County River, in Escambia County, Florida, over
State Highway No. 291, via Brent, Ferry Pass, Clark’s Store
and Ellyson Field and return over same route, with the right
to serve all intermediate points.

“6. From the intersection of highway U. S. 90 alternate
and State Highway No. 291, to the intersection of U. 8. High-
way No. 90 Alternate and State Highway No. 95, which high-
way is also known as U. S. Highway No. 29, and return over
the same route, with the right to serve all intermediate points.
There is no bus service over this route.

“T, From Clark’s Store at the intersection of State High-
ways No. 291 and 290 over State Highway No. 290, to the
intersection of State Highway No. 290 and State Highway No.
95 which highway is also designated as U. S. Highway No.
29, and return over the same route, with the right to serve all
intermediate points.

“8, From the intersection of Brent Lane with State High-
way No. 291 to the intersection of Brent Lane with U. 8S.
Highway No. 29 and State Highway No. 95, and return over
the same route, with the right to serve all intermediate points.

“9, From Pensacola, Florida, to Corry Field in Escambia
County, Florida, over State Highway No. 294 and return over
the same route with the right to serve all intermediate points.

“10. From Pensacola, Florida, to Gulf Beach in Escambia
County, Florida, over County Highway known as Gulf Beach
Highway, and also over State Highway No. 295, via Warring-
ton, Pensacola, Naval Air Station, Pleasant Grove and In-.
terarity Point, and return over the same route, with right to
serve all intermediate points.

“41, From Pensacola, Florida, to the Perdido Bay and Para-
dise Beach over U. 8. Highway No. 90 and State Highway No.
298, via Myrtle Grove and Mill View; and also to the Dog
Track of the Pensacola Kennel Club over State Highway No.

Ss
196

297 and return over the same route, with the right to serve
all intermediate points.

“12. From the intersection of State Highway No. 298 and
State Highway No. 297 to Pensacola Naval Air Training
Base over State Highway No. 297; County Highway known as
the Gulf Beach Highway; and over State Highway No. 295,
via Pensacola Kennel Club Dog Track and Pleasant Grove,
and return over the same route with the right to serve all
intermediate points.

“13. From Pensacola, Florida, to Warrington, Florida,
over County Highway known as the Warrington Highway, via
Bayou Chico and return over the same route, with the right
to serve all intermediate points.

“14. From West Pensacola, in Escambia County, Florida,
over State Highway No. 295, to the Pensacola Naval Air
Training Base, thence continuing over State Highway No. 295
to the intersection of State Highway No. 295 with Gulf Beach
Highway.

“15. From Pensacola, Florida, to Gulf Beach over the
Admiral Murray Boulevard, State Highway No. 295 and Gulf °
Beach Highway, via Warrington, Pleasant Grove, Interarity
Point and colored Beach beyond Pleasant Grove, and return
over the same route with the right to serve all intermediate
points.”

The Pensacola Transit, Inc., and the City of Pensacola con-
tend, first, that the issuance of a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity, under the testimony adduced and the
applicable law, was clearly erroneous as to the territory situ-
ated wholly within the city limits of Pensacola and its ad-
joining suburban territory and these routes are identified in
the challenged orders as (b), (d), (e), (g), (bh), (i), (1),
-(m) and (n). Second, that the challenged order should be
amended to require the Red Ball Motor Line to operate with
closed doors inside the City of Pensacola and its adjoining
suburban territory and to restrict the transportation of pas-
sengers to or from points outside of the suburban territory or
from fixed terminals within the City of Pensacola and ad-
joining suburban territory. This contention applies to routes

|
197

identified in the order as routes (a), (c), (j) (k) and (0).

The petition of the Teche Greyhound Lines, the Modern
Coach Corporation and Capital Motor Lines present the con-
tention that the Railroad Commission in its order failed to:
take into consideration Section (3) of Section 323.03, which
is viz:

“(3) Disposition of Application At the time specified in
said notice, or at such time as may be fixed by the commis-
sion, a public hearing upon said application shall be held by
the commission. At or after such hearing the commission
may issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity, as
prayed for or refuse to issue the same, or may issue the same
with modifications, or upon such terms and conditions as in
its judgment the public convenience and necessity require;
provided, that the commission in granting any such certificate
shall take into consideration the effect that the granting of
such certificate may have upon transportation facilities with-
in the territory sought to be served by said applicant, and also
the effect upon transportation as a whole within said terri-
tory....

“When application is made by an auto transportation com-
pany for a certificate to operate as a common carrier in a ter-
ritory or on a line already served by a certificate holder, the
commission shall grant same only when the existing certifi-
cate holder or holders serving such territory fail to provide
service and facilities which may reasonably be required by
the commission.”

It is not clear to the writer, after a careful study of the
transcript and briefs, the exact portions of the order that is
sought to be quashed here, but apparently the contentions are
directed to routes (a), (c), (j), (xk) and (0) of the chal-
Jenged order. It is reasonable to assume that the petitioners
named in Case No. 2, supra, object to and now protest the
issuance by the Railroad Commissioners of Florida of certifi-
cates of convenience and-necessity to the applicant to operate
as a common carrier over each of the routes leading out of
the City of Pensacola and adjoining suburban territory over
which routes the petitioners now operate as certificated car-
riers.

EE
198

The transcript discloses a resolution of the Board of
County Commissioners of Escambia County adopted under
date of March 25, 1947, which recites (1) that the Commis-
sioners are familiar with and have knowledge of the proposed
routes in Escambia County over which the applicant intends
to operate as a common carrier; (2) the several Commission-
ers express the unanimous view that the proposed service
offered by the applicant is needed by the residents and visitors
of Escambia; (3) the Board of Commissioners of Escambia
County requested the Railroad Commissioners of Florida to
grant to the applicant authority to operate as a common
carrier of passengers and property over the several routes de-
signated in the petition.

The Railroad Commission, from the evidence adduced he-
fore it by the respective parties, pursuant to notice and hear- _
ing, made certain findings of fact and incorporated the same
in the order sought to be quashed here by petition for certio-
rari, and the same, in part, are viz:

“4, Pensacola Transit, Inc., is not a certified carrier oper-
ating under the jurisdiction of this Commission, but operates

" exclusively under a franchise granted to it by the City of

Pensacola. Said transit company has extended some of its
routes beyond the city limits of Pensacola and is serving some
of the surburban territory immediately adjacent to said city.
However, such operations beyond the city limits of Pensacola

chave not been authorized by this Commission and it does not

appear that the city of Pensacola has been granted extra ter-
ritorial jurisdiction by the Legislature.

“2. Florida Pulp and Paper Company has a paper mill in
the immediate vicinity of Cantonment on U. S. Highway 298
between Pensacola and Century. There are employed at this
paper mill approximately 825 laborers, also approximately
125 officer personnel. 57 houses are provided in the immedi-
ate vicinity for white employees and 25 houses for colored
employees. These employees are housed in a subdivision
owned by the paper mill known as Harvester Village which is
presently being enlarged. The population of this village is
approximately 287, not counting those living in privately
owned houses. Approximately 2000 people live within a

199

radius of two miles of the paper mill. Because of the inade-
quate common carrier bus transportation service between the
paper mill and Century and between the paper mill and Pensa-
cola, Florida Pulp and Paper Company has been forced to
operate 5 buses to take care of their own employees. Repre-
sentatives of the paper company testified that these five buses
were not adequate but that they would be discontinued in the
event the present application was granted. This company
appears to have requested additional transportation service
from existing common carriers and they requested Pensacola
Transit Company on numerous occasions to take over the
transportation service between Pensacola and Cantonment
and the Pensacola Transit Co. refused to do it. A considerable
number of employees of the paper mill live in and around
Pensacola and between Pensacola and the mill. Many others
live in and around Century and Flomaton and between there
and the mill. In transporting its own employees, the paper
mill company has transported approximately 200 persons per
day one way and has operated its own transportation system
for the past six years. The company has three regular shifts
each day, at 7 A. M.,3 P.M. and 11 P.M. In addition, it has
day workers that come to work at 7 A. M. and leave at 3:30
P. M., making an additional shift at 3:30 P.M. At these par-
ticular times there is a considerable demand for transporta-
tion to and from the paper mill. The paper mill company
operates three buses between Pensacola and Cantonment and
two between Century and Cantonment.

“3, The Alabama Pulp and Paper Company also main-
tains a paper mill at Cantonment and its transportation needs
are approximately the same as those of Florida Pulp and
Paper Company in its movements of employees to and from
the mill.

“4. The gulf beaches are located some eighteen miles
west of Pensacola and a little south of the Gulf of Mexico. At
present there is no regular and dependable common carrier
motor transportation service for passengers between Pensa-
cola and the gulf beaches. Pensacola Transit Co. operates
five and one half miles out in this direction to Navy Point,
but on the remainder of the eighteen miles there is no service.

Dt
200

Many people live between Pensacola and the beaches and
there are approximately 800 houses in the immediate vicinity
of Navy Point and there is considerable demand for public
transportation between Pensacola and the gulf beaches over
this part of the proposed route. The gulf beaches are the
principal beaches and recreation center for the city of Pensa-
cola. Pensacola Transit Co. presently serves Pensacola Beach
but holds no certificate for that operation from this Commis-
sion.

“5. A Dog Track is located west of the city of Pensacola
and there is considerable demand for public transportation
between Pensacola and said dog track.

“6. Saufley Field is located northwest of Pensacola, west
of U. S. Highway No. 90 and there is considerable demand for
public transportation between said field and Pensacola.

“{, There are a considerable number of people living on
nine-mile road north of Pensacola and on Davis Street High-
way and Palafox Highway running north from Pensacola,
who require public transportation to and from Pensacola.

“8, The charter service rights applied for by applicant
contemplate the following:

“a. The transportation of school children and adults by
charter party on picnics between Pensacola and the particular
resort or locality within the State of Florida where said picnic
may be held.

“b, The transportation of sightseeing trips to historical
points and beach resorts and other points in the State of
Florida from Pensacola on irregular ad seasonal schedules.

“c, The transportation by charter party of athletic teams
and athletic organizations from Pensacola to points and
places in the State of Florida where such teams or organiza-
tions are to play a scheduled game.

“d. The transportation by charter party of groups of
people to and from funerals between Pensacola, Florida, and
other points and places in the State of Florida.

“e, Transportation of school children by charter party to
and from school and recreational activities.

201

“f. The transportation by charter party of workers and
employees to and from their homes and places of employment.

“From the evidence it appears that there is a public de-
mand for the aforesaid types of charter service.

9. The applicant is fit and able financially and otherwise
to render the transportation service contemplated in and by
said application.

“10. There is a considerable demand for public transpor-
tation in motor buses over and along the proposed routes and
public convenience and necessity require that the applica-
tion be granted as to the fixed routes hereinbefore set out.

11. There is also considerable demand for charter service
such as that described hereon and public convenience and ne-
cessity require that the application for authority to transport
charter parties as outlined in the application, be granted.”

It is established law that in certiorari proceedings to re-
view an order of the Florida Railroad Commission the
petitioner has the burden of showing that the order com-
plained of was illegal or unauthorized and failed to accord
with the essential requirements of the law controlling the
particular matter being reviewed. Great Southern Truck-
ing Co. v. Douglas, 147 Fla. 552, 3 So. (2nd) 526; Miami
Bridge Co. v. Railroad Commission, 155 Fla. 366, 20 So. (2nd)
356.

The Supreme Court of Florida will not disturb the findings
of fact on the part of the Railroad Commissioners when based
on conflicting testimony. It will, on the presentation of a
justifiable question, determine the legal effect of the evidence,
whether the order as made deprives the respondent of a cons-
titutional or statutory right or for any reason which is con-
trary to law. State ex rel. Burr v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.,
93 Fla. 104, 111 So. 391. If there is substantial, competent
evidence that is legally sufficient to support the findings and
conclusions of the Railroad Commission, and no rule of law
was violated in the proceedings and the whole record does not
disclose an abuse of authority or arbitrary action, the findings
and conclusions of the Railroad Commission will not be set
aside on certiorari, although the reviewing Court might have

|
202

reached different conclusions on the evidence. Florida Motor
Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Commission, 101 Fla. 1018, 132 So. 851;
Florida Motor Lines Corp. v. Douglas, 150 Fla. 1, 7 So. (2nd)
843.

The Pensacola Transit, Inc., is not a certificated carrier
but has operated as such under a franchise issued to it by the
City of Pensacola for the past several years. The length of
the routes now served by it situated in the vicinity of Pensa-
cola are viz:

“East Pensacola Heights, a total one way distance.of 3.85
miles, of which 2.45 miles lie wholly within the City.

“The Ellyson Field Route, a total one-way link of eleven
miles, of which 1.9 miles lie wholly within the City.

“The Ensley Route, along U. S. Highway 29, a total one-
way length of 9.6 miles, of which 1.9 miles lie wholly within
the City.

“The Saufley Field Route, a total length of ten miles, of
which 2.4 miles lie wholly within the City and 5/10ths mile
lies wholly in the Government reservation.

“The Myrtle Grove Route, a total one-way length of 7.7
miles, of which 2.65 miles lie wholly within the City.

“The Corry Field Route, total one-way length 5.8 miles, of
which 2.9 miles lie wholly within the City and 7/10ths of a
mile lies wholly in the Government reservation. The Navy
Point Route, the total length of seven miles, of which 2.9
miles lie wholly within the City.

“The Naval Air Station and Fort Barrancas Route, total
length one-way—in all cases, on these routes of 9.5 miles of
which 2.8 miles lie wholly within the City and 3.1 miles
wholly on the Government reservation.

“The dog track Route being a particularly seasonal route,
during the racing season of twelve miles, of which 2.8 miles
lie wholly within the City.

“The Pensacola Beach service, which passes the Gulf
Breeze Post Office, of a total length of nine miles of which 3.2
miles lie wholly inside the City.

203

“The argument is presented to the effect that the City of
Pensacola, at the present time and for many years past, has
regulated the transportation of passengers within its limits
and adjoining suburban territory by granting franchise
privileges to the Pensacola Transit, Inc. That the Florida
Railroad Commission is without jurisdiction over the routes
above set out within the incorporate limits of the City of
Pensacola and adjoining suburban territory. The following
provision of Section 323.29, F.S.A., is relied upon: “There
shall be further exempted from the provisions of this Chap-
ter and from Commission jurisdiction and control person or
persons operating motor vehicles within the corporate limits
of any city or town or the adjoining suburban territory.”

The answer to this contention is that the Railroad Com-
mission found as a matter of fact that the Pensacola Transit,
Inc., and the City of Pensacola failed to provide transporta-
tion for persons living beyond the city limits and adjoining
suburban territory along the proposed routes of the appli-
cant. It is clear that the Pensacola Transit, Inc., is unregu-
lated over the portions of the routes supra and as a result the
people residing in the designated areas are denied transporta- ©
tion facilities, which was never intended by the Legislature.
If we hold that the Railroad Commission is without juris-
diction to regulate these routes, then the serving carrier may
at will select and serve the profitable routes and decline trans-
portation services to those along non profitable routes.
Tampa Transit Lines v. Matthews, 157 Fla. 875, 27 So. (2nd)
377.

The contention is made that the Railroad Commission
failed and omitted to proceed according to the essential re-
quirements of the law in the entry of the order dated May 28,
1947, as being in derogation of and in conflict with Senate
Bill No. 989 which became effective as a law several days
after the date of entry of the challenged order. On this as-
signment we decline to rule or express an opinion, as the
contention was not ruled upon by the Commission below.
The rights of the parties under Senate Bill No. 989 are not
adjudicated, considered or passed upon by this court in this
proceeding.

_ _
204

The petitions for certiorari are each denied.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

STATE.OF FLORIDA AND THE TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWN-
ERS AND CITIZENS OF THE CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, IN-
CLUDING NON-RESIDENTS OWNING PROPERTY OR SUB-
JECT TO TAXATION THEREIN, v. THE CITY OF DAYTONA

BEACH, FLORIDA.

34 So. (2nd) 309 January Term, 1948
February 27, 1948

En Banc

205

Murray Sams, for appellants.

Curtis H. Gardiner, City Attorney, and Mitchell & Persh-
ing (New York, N. Y.), for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

This appeal is from a decree validating Water and Sewer
Revenue Bonds, series of 1948, City of Daytona Beach, is-
sued pursuant to Chapter 23240, Special Acts of 1945, better
known as the Daytona Beach Sewer Revenue Bond Act. It is
admitted that the bonds were issued in the manner and form
provided by Ordinance No. 48-9, City of Daytona Beach, and
their form is not challenged.

It is first contended that said bonds are void because they
were issued without an approving vote of the free holders as
required by Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution.

The question is concluded contrary to the contention of
appellants in State v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 726, 27 So.
(2nd) 118, wherein we were confronted with a decree vali-
dating an issue of sewer revenue bonds to construct a sewer
disposal system in the City of Miami. In the case at bar the
bonds proposed are to be used for the construction of a sewer
disposal system and a system of sanitary sewers sometimes

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206

called sewer improvements, by which name they will here-
after be designated. They are to be paid solely from the
revenues derived from the utility constructed with the bonds
and they are in no way secured by a mortgage or lien on the
utility or a pledge of the proceeds of taxes or special assess-
ments by the City.

It is shown that a small portion of the proposed bonds are
to be used for refunding some outstanding water revenue
bonds of the City, but in no event are they secured directly
or indirectly by mortgage or lien on the waterworks or the
sewer system, nor can the sewer service charges by which
they are retired become a-lien on the properties they supply.
This being the case, it is not necessary that they be approved
by a vote of the freeholders as required by Section 6, Article
IX of the Constitution. The fact that we are confronted here
with bonds for the construction of sewer improvements and a
sewer. disposal system does not relieve them from the rule
prescribed in State v. City of Miami previously cited.

Questions two and three charge that the collection and
enforcement of rates, fees and charges for the use of sewer
improvements, based upon the rates charged for water, as
provided by ordinance No. 48-9, are unfair and inequitable
and are in violation of Sections one and twelve, Declaration
of Rights and Section 30, Article XVI, Constitution of Flor-
ida.

We do not think there is any merit to this contention.
Sewer improvements and a sewer disposal system are comple-
mentary and we held in State v. City of Miami, heretofore
cited, that the water discharged is a fair basis of charge for
the use of the sanitary sewer system. Since sewer improve-
ments and a sewer disposal system are complementary, it fol-
lows that if the amount of water used is a fair basis of charge
for the use of the sewer disposal system, then it must be a
fair basis of charge for the use of sewer improvements.

Appellants next contend that the sewer service charge is
‘void because separate schedules were not adopted for the use
of the sewer disposal system and the sewer improvements,
and being so, they are unfair to those who have sanitary
sewers already installed and paid for by special assessments.

207

The record discloses that the sanitary sewers alluded to
were constructed with the proceeds of general obligation
bonds of the City, for which all taxable properties in the area
served by them are bound. It appears that these sewers are
totally inadequate and were originally designed to empty into
Halifax River instead of a sewer disposal plant, many of them
have deteriorated to that extent that they are past repair, so
if special assessments have been paid, benefits have likewise
been received and the beneficiaries have been spared the ex-
pense of providing septic tanks. Enforcing the collection of
the sewer service charges by discontinuing the water service
to the property owners was approved in the Miami case and
is authorized by the Daytona Beach Sewer Revenue Bond
Act.

It is finally contended that Section 502 of ordinance No.
48-9 is violative of Section 12, Declaration of Rights, consti-
tution of Florida, in that it requires the owner or occupant of
each parcel of land abutting on a street served by the sewer
improvements or the sewer disposal system, to connect their
premises with the sewer improvements and to cease the use of
any other methods for the disposal of sewage waste.

In the Miami case several times alluded to, we held that
the reasonableness, vel non, of such ordinances depends
largely on the local terrain and the means deemed essential
to protect the health and morals of the City. The city may
exercise all reasonable means to protect the health and
morals of its people and is usually the sole judge of the means
to be employed. When the city, as in this case, is authorized
to adopt and enforce such ordinances their acts will be upheld
unless shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable. City of
Leeds v. Avram, 244 Ala. 427, 14 So. (2nd) 728; Nourse v.
City of Russellville, 257 Ky. 525, 78 S.W. (2nd) 761;
Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta, 227, U.S. 303, 33 Sup. Ct. 290,
57 L. ed. 520,

It follows that the City of Daytona Beach is clothed with
ample power to issue the proposed Water and Sewer Reve-
nue Bonds, series of 1948. The taxing power of the city is in
no sense involved in their retirement, so the decree validat-
ing them must be and is hereby affirmed.

208

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING and BARNS, JJ., concur.

G D. LOLLIE, MOLLE LOLLIE, CHRISTINE LOLLIE and
FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, v. GENERAL AMERI-
CAN TANK STORAGE TERMINALS AND THE TRAVELERS IN-
SURANCE COMPANY. .

34 So. (2nd) 306 * January Term, 1948
February 27, 1948 “Bn Banc

209

O. H. Bourke Floyd, for G. D. Lollie and Walter E. Rown-
tree, for Florida Industrial Commission, appellants.

C. R. Mathis, Thomas Sale and John J. Faissler (Chicago,
Illinois), for appellees.

TERRELL, J.:

While in the employ of appellee, Arnold D. Lollie was
killed in the course of his employment, February 11, 1945.
At the time of his death he was several months under eigh-
teen years of age and appellants, G. D. Lollie, his father,
Mollie Lollie, his mother, and Christine Lollie, his sister, were
dependent on him for support. The deceased was unmarried
and was earning fifty-eight dollars and eight cents ($58.08)
per week.

The Deputy Commissioner entered an order requiring the
employer-carrier to pay the dependents of Arnold D. Lollie
twenty-two dollars per week compensation. The Deputy
Commissioner also required the employer to pay said depen-
dents a like sum because of the alleged violation of Section

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210

232.08, Florida Statutes 1941. The order also required that
attorneys for the dependents be paid $500.00 attorneys fees,
one-half by the employer and one-half by the carrier, and
that the employer-carrier pay medical, ambulance and hos-
pital bills.

On review by the Industrial Commission the award of the
Deputy Commissioner was affirmed and the dependents’ at-
torney was awarded an additional fee of $150.00, one-half
payable by the employer and the other half payable by the
carrier. On appeal to the Circuit Court a final decree was
entered affirming that part of the award of the Industrial
Commission as to compensation, funeral expenses and at-
torneys fees, payable by the employer-carrier, but limited the
funeral expenses to $150.00, the maximum allowed by law,
and the compensation to Five Thousand Dollars, ($5000.00).
The Circuit Court reversed that part of the Industrial Com-
mission’s award imposed on the employer. This appeal is
from the final decree.

The main point for determination is whether or not the
trial court committed error in reversing the Industrial Com-
mission as to that part of the award imposed on the employer,
the basis of which was that “No employment or age certifi.
cate was issued in Bay County where the deceased was living
and employed at the time of his death.”

The Industrial Commission predicated that part of the
award appealed from on Section 440.54, Florida Statutes
1941, which in effect provides that compensation and death
benefits shall be double the. amount otherwise payable if the
Commission determines that the injured employee was a
minor at the time of the accident and was being permitted to
work in violation of any of the Child Labor Laws of Florida.
The employer alone is required to carry the extra burden and
he is forbidden to insure against it. .

The pertinent part of Section 450.04, Florida Statutes
1941, provides that no minor between sixteen and eighteen
years of age shall be permitted to work at any gainful em-
ployment except domestic service unless the employer “shall
procure and keep on file at the place of the minor’s employ-

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ment, an age certificate.” Such certificates are granted by
Section 232.08, Florida Statutes 1941, and when applied for
in writing may be issued by the County Superintendent or an
attendance assistant, or principal of a school authorized by
the County Superintendent to do so. The Industrial Commis-
sion found that the age-certificate in question was not pro-
cured but the trial court found that such finding was not sup-
ported by the evidence.

On examination of the pertinent statutes, Sections 232.03,
232.07, 232.08, 450.04, 440.54 and perhaps others, shows that
the only purpose of the age or employment certificate is to
establish the age of minors who be legally drawn into gain-
ful employment. Section 450.04, Florida Statutes 1941, in
terms makes them “conclusive evidence of the age. of the
minor for whom issued.” This statute also requires the em-
ployer to “procure and keep on file at the place of the minor’s
employment, “an age certificate as provided by Section
232.07, Florida Statutes 1941. Since this is a mandatory re-
quirement, we do not think one challenging the fact of
whether or not such a certificate has been procured is re-
quired to look further than the “place of the minor’s employ-
ment,” if not found there or produced by the employer when
challenged the court may presume that it has not been se-
cured. If the minor’s age is material it may then be proven
by birth certificate or such other evidence as may be ad-
missible.

The Industrial Commission based its award on Section
440.54, Florida Statutes 1941, which provides that compensa-
tion and death benefits shall be double the amount otherwise
payable if it is determined that the injured employee was a
minor, working in violation of the Child Labor Laws. We are
convinced that Section 440.54 must be read in connection with
section 440.20, Florida Statutes 1941, which provides that the
“total compensation payable under this Chapter for disability
and death shall in no event exceed the sum of $5000.00 in ad-
dition to any benefits under Section 440.13 for medical
services and treatment, and under subsection (1) of Section
440.16, for funeral expenses.”

212

The total award by the Industrial Commission in this case
was $10,000.00, plus funeral expenses, medical treatment and
attorneys fees, the double feature or that part imposed on the

. employer was imposed on the ground that no age certificate
was found at the place of deceased’s employment. In our
view, Section 440.20, above quoted, was a clear limitation of
$5000.00 on the amount of compensation or benefits that may
be allowed in any case, to which may be added the cost of
medical treatment and funeral expenses. Sections 440.54 and
440.20 were not enacted at the same time but were parts of
the same statute and when the legislature employed the
language, “Shall in no event” the compensation exceed
$5000.00, the Industrial Commission was powerless to award
more.

This view is further supported by the well settled prin-
ciple that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor
of the person against whom the penalty is imposed. There
can be no question that Section 440.54 imposes a penalty on
the employer. Even though if read with Section 440.20, it
could be said to be ambiguous, which we find no basis for,
it would be our duty to construe it strictly in favor of the one
against whom the penalty is imposed. Here the Commission
imposed a penalty of $5000.00 for failure to secure an age
certificate which should be had on request. Its procurement.
had no relation to the employee’s death and the penalty im-
posed has no causal or other relation to the offense, so any
other interpretation’ would render the act imposing it invalid
as to the employer in this case. Peremptorially to impose a
penalty of $5000.00 on one and not permit him to open his
mouth in his defense is contrary to every element of due
process. Rudy v. McCloskey & Company, 348 Pa. 401, 35 Atl.
(2nd) 250..

The only other point necessary for us to determine is
whether or not the employer is estopped to question the
constitutionality of any part of the Workman’s Compensa-
tion Law, no notice of non-acceptance of its provisions having
been given by him.

The rule is well settled in this country that when one ac-
cepts the general benefits of an act he is not estopped to chal-

lenge the constitutionality of any separable portion thereof
under which he has not given or accepted benefits. Kristanik
v. Chevrolet Motor Co. 335 Mo. 60, 70 S.W. (2nd) 890; Echlin
v. Superior Court in and for San Mateo County, 13 Cal. (2nd)
368, 90 Pac. (2nd) 63. We think Section 440.54 is well within
this rule ad being so, the employer may question its consti-
tutionality. In this holding we do not overlook the rule pre-
seribed in Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford 206 Ala. 447, 90
So. 803; Booth Fisheries Co. et al. v. Industrial Commission
of the State of Wisconsin et al., 46 Sup. Ct. 491, 261 U.S. 208,

70 L. ed. 908; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct.
255, 61 L. ed. 678.

It follows that the decree appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. BUFORD, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING and BARNS, JJ., concur.

213

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ELIZABETH JOHNS, et al, v. F. M. TOWNSEND, et al.
34 So, (2nd) 565 January Term, 1948
February 27, 1948 Special Division B

Rehearing April 22, 1948

Brannon & Brown, T. J. Swanson and Hal Y. Maines, for
appellants.

Walton & Walton, for appellees.
WISEHEART, Associate Justice:

This appeal is from a fina] judgment dismissing a bill for
declaratory decree on the grounds that said bill is vexatious
and presents no justiciable issue. The bill alleges that ap-

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214

pellants are in doubt as to the true construction of the will
and codicils, especially the following paragraphs of the will.
dated December 7, 1943, concerning the termination of the
trust, to wit:

“SWIFTH (4). The trust herein created shall terminate
and be determined upon the death of my beloved wife, Lola
M. Townsend, or of my son, F. M. Townsend, or of my son,
W. C. Townsend, or of my daughter, Elizabeth Johns, or of
my daughter, Christeen Warren, or of my daughter, Winnie
L. Platt, whichever shall last occur.’

“SIXTH. Upon the termination of the trust, herein
above created, the corpus of the trust fund, if any then re-
main, shall vest in and be distributed per stirpes among my
lineal descendants then in being, i. e. the then surviving issue
of deceased children shall take their deceased parent’s share
by right of representation.’’””—and the following paragraph
in the first codicil dated April 18, 1944,-to wit:

“ ‘SIXTH. I ratify and confirm the devise of my said last
will and testament “SIXTH” in all respects, except that it is
my will and I direct that, upon the termination of the trust
fund as herein provided, my granddaughter Viola Patterson,
or the heirs of her body then surviving her, take such share
as she or they would take if she were my daughter rather

09

than my granddaughter’.

“The necessity that a construction be made contrary to
the allegation of the petition will not require the dismissal
thereof. The judge of the lower court found, however, “that
the date of the termination of the trust created in the will is
as plain as the English Language can make it and for this
reason is not subject to judicial construction.”

In this we cannot say that he committed error.
The judgment of the lower‘court is therefore—
Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

215

THE STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. F. E. HANSON v. J. M. MORQUS,
as President of the City Countil of the City of Arcadia, and J. L.
NEWTON, J. C. RALLS, GUS DICKHART, and LEWIS BISHOP,
as members of the City Council of the City of Arcadia.

34 So, (2nd) 113 January Term, 1948
February 28, 1948 _ En Bane
Rehearing denied March 20, 1948

Rosin & Paderewski, for appellant.
George Leitner, for appellees.
BARNS, J.:

The Legislature, by House Bill No. 1374, provided for the
abolishment of the City of Arcadia and the creation of the
“Arcadia Municipal District” in its stead. The Bill provided
for a referendum to the electors of Arcadia and that the law
should become of full force and effect upon its being approved
by the electors. No election was called by the respondents.

A Writ of mandamus was issued against the City Council
of the City of Arcadia, requiring it to call a referendum elec-
tion, as provided in House Bill No. 1374, or show cause. To
this alternative writ of mandamus, the City Council answered
that it had refused to call an election according to the terms
of the Bill, on the following grounds: (1) That “the County
Commissioners of DeSoto County, Florida, are authorized and
empowered to levy the millage on, and the Tax Assessor of
DeSoto County, Florida, to assess all of the property within
the said proposed ‘Arcadia Municipal District’ for municipal
purposes and no official of the said ‘Arcadia Municipal Dis-
trict’ is given any power or authority to assess any property
within the said ‘Arcadia Municipal District’ for municipal

216

purposes; contrary to Article 9, Section 5 of the Constitution
of the State of Florida,” and (2) “it seeks to regulate the
jurisdiction and duties of a class of officers other than mu-
nicipal officers, to-wit, the County Commissioners of DeSoto
County, Florida; County Judge of DeSoto County, Florida;
Tax Assessor of DeSoto County, Florida; Clerk of the Circuit
Court of DeSoto County, Florida; the Sheriff of DeSoto
County, Florida; and the Tax Collector of DeSoto County,
Florida, or one of them, contrary’ to Article 3, Section 20, of
the Constitution of the State of Florida;” (3) that the said
Bill calls for an election by the voters of the present City of
Arcadia, and not by the voters of the County of DeSoto; (4)
that “it attempts to by a special or local law regulate the
practice of a court of justice, to-wit, the County Court of
DeSoto County, Florida, contrary to Article 3, Section 20 of
the Constitution of Florida.”

The said City likewise filed its motion to quash the al-
ternative writ of mandamus upon the grounds set forth in its
answer. :

The trial judge sustained the motion to quash and the
alternative writ of mandamus, whereupon the petitioners ap-
pealed said order. .

It is apparent from a reading of the Bill that the Legisla-
ture provided for abolishing the present City of Arcadia and
re-created the same area into another municipality, to be
known as the “Arcadia Municipal District,” retaining for the
new municipality the ordinances of the former city. The said
Bill provided that certain municipal functions should, upon
the Bill’s becoming effective, be discharged by the County
Commissioners, and the Sheriff of DeSoto County, and that
the State Board of Administration should serve as the fiscal

“agent of the newly created municipality. The provision that
County officers should discharge municipal functions did not
convert them from municipal to county functions. Such
county officers, in discharging municipal functions, act as ex
officio officers of the municipality.

We find no constitutional prohibition against the Legisla-
ture’s providing for the discharge of municipal functions by

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217

county officers and, upon the showing made before this Court,

we are unable to conclude that the said Bill is unconstitu-

tional upon the ground stated in the motion to quash.
Wherefore the order quashing said alternative writ is re-

versed. :

TERRELL, BUFORD, CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ.,

concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and ADAMS, J., dissent.

J. TOM WATSON, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, v. E.
N. CLAUGHTON and LILLIAN C. CLAUGHTON, his wife, et al.

34 So. (2nd) 248 January Term, 1948
February 28, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied March 23, 1948

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Sumter Leitner and
Fred M. Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, for Petitioner.
Hunt & Salley, Julius F. Parker and Ward & Ward, for
respondents.
BARNS, J.:

The history of this suit is that the Claughtons, as plain-
tiffs, brought a bill to quiet the tite to certain lands in Dade
County, making the City of Miami and the Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Fund parties defendants; the Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Fund filed their answer, setting
forth their claim to the lands in question and, having
answered said bill, filed a counterclaim wherein the said Trus-
tees prayed for a.decree of the Court confirming and quieting
title in said Trustees to certain lands claimed by the plain-
tiffs, Claughtons, and that the Court decree the said Claugh-
tons and the City of Miami to have no right, title or interest
in and to the lands claimed by the Trustees.

The Attornney General of the State of Florida filed his
“Answer and Motion to Dismiss,” wherein the said Attorney
General in and by his Answer states that the bill of complaint
involves the constitutionality of Chapters 8305 and 11616,
Acts of Florida, 1919 and 1925. The substance of Chapter
8305 is substantially stated in its title, as follows:

“An Act to Grant Certain Water Front Riparian Rights
and Submerged Lands in Biscayne Bay East of the City of
Miami, Florida, to the City of Miami, in Dade County, Flor-
ida.”

And the substance of Chapter 11616 is likewise substan-
tially stated in its title, as follows:

“An Act to Grant Certain Lands Submerged and Partly
Submerged, in Biscayne Bay, East of the City of Miami, Flor-
ida, to the City of Miami, in Dade County, Florida,”—some of
which land affected by the two Chapters in the subject mat-
ter of Claughton’s bill of complaint. The Attorney General
‘by his Answer “admits” the validity of both of said Chapters
as vesting the land in the City of Miami as against the claim
of Claughton and the unconstitutionality of said Chapters.
After having answered the Bill, the Attorney General moves
the Court for its dismissal.

The Attorney General also filed a reply to the counter-
claim of the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund,

219

wherein he reiterates the validity of the said Chapters 8305
and 11616 and the rights of the City of Miami over those of
the paintiff, J. N. Claughton, and denies the title to said land
to be vested in the Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund, as in and by said counterclaim of the said Trustees
alleged and set forth and likewise moved to “dismiss said
counterclaim.”

The Trustees filed a motion to strike the purported
“Answer and Motion to Dismiss” and the purported “Reply
to a Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim” filed by the said At-
torney General upon the following ground:

“That on the 6th day of August, A. D., 1947, this Hon-
orable Court, after full hearing and consideration of the in-
tervention petition of the said J. Tom Watson, entered an
order rejecting and denying the said petition for interven-
tion; that said order stands unsuperseded and unreversed,
and is entited to receive and be accorded the respect and
obedience of all parties whomsoever, including the said J.
Tom Watson, to whom the said order is particularly and ab-
solutely res adjudicata.”

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220

And upon the ground that all right, title and interest of
the State of Florida in and to the subject matter of the in-
stant litigation was being‘represented by the Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Fund, and that the said peadings filed
by the Attorney General should be stricken, which motion to
strike was on the same day granted, and the Chancellor, in
making such order striking same, therein recited:

“The Court having examined the Motion to Strike herein
filed by the defendant and cross-complainant Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida, and find-
ing that certain documents entitied ‘Answer and Motion to
Dismiss’ and ‘The Attorney General’s Reply to and Motion to
Dismiss Counterclaim’ were submitted and filed in this cause
on, to-wit: August 29, 1947, by J. Tom Watson, the Attorney
General of Florida, contrary to and in derogation and de-
fiance of, a prior order of this Court entered herein on, to-
wit: August 6, 1947, wherein this Court rejected and denied
the petition of the said J. Tom Watson for leave to intervene
in the instant action; and, it appearing that, notwithstanding
the aforesaid order of this Court denying said intervention
petition, the said order standing at this point unsuperseded
and unreversed, the said Watson heedlessly, improperly and
defiantly submitted and filed herein on August 29, 1947, the
purported pleadings aforesaid, without approval, sanction or
authority of this Court;...”

From the foregoing order the said Attorney General
prosecutes this review by a petition to this Court for certio-
rari.

The interests which an Attorney General represents are
those of the people, and it has been well stated by the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey as follows:

“The petition of the Attorney General was made in his
representative capacity. As such he is the chief officer of the
state and is concerned with certain of the legal affairs of the
entire community. In this instance his was the duty to vindi-
cate, in his capacity of principal law officers of the state, the
statutes under attack. These statutes manifestly, since the
time of their enactment, PL 1930, c. 65, NJISA 53: 1-12 et seq.,

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221

became ancillary to the administration of our criminal law, a
matter of supreme importance to the people. Certainly the
sovereign state is concerned when its laws of this character
are challenged. The state has entrusted its Attorney General
the management of its legal affairs and the validity of this
statute is a matter of cardinal importance and interest to the
state. In England the Attorney General is a necessary party
to all proceedings affecting the crown (3 Enc Brit 63) and
enjoys high prerogative rights (State ex rel. Lamb v. Cun-
ningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35, 17 L.R.A. 145, 35 Am. St.
Rep. 27, compare Attorney General v. Delaware & B. B. R. Co.
38 N.J.L. 282; 3 B.L. Com. 27). The duty of an Attorney
General is essentially a public one.”—Van Riper v. Jenkins,
140 N.J. 99, 163 A.L.R. 1343, 1344-45, 45 A2d 844.

“In the instant case the people have an interest in the
subject matter of the suit. This is a suit of a public nature,
emerging as it does from an indictment. If the order or de-
cree settles the rights of the parties to this litigation and the
rights and interests of the people of the state are necessarily
involved, then they are entitled to be represented. The At-
tarney General is the people’s attorney and is properly in
court to represent the State.”—-Van Riper v. Jenkins, supra.

The Attorney General predicates his right to file pleadings
upon Chapter 87 F.S. 1941, F.S.A., Chapter 21820 (Acts
1943), which substantially follows what is known as the “Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act.”

“Declaratory Decrees” are to be distinguished from
others:

“The distinctive characteristic of a declaratory judgment
is that the declaration stands by itself; that is, no executory
process follows as of course. In other words, such a judg-
ment does not involve executory or coercive relief.’—16 Am.
Jur., Declaratory Judgments, Sec. 3, p. 275.

We have held that:

“Except for the coercive element in the judgment or de-
cree we understand that there is no difference between a de-
claratory judgment or decree and any other judgment be-
tween opposing parties.”—Headnote 11, Sheldon v. Powell
et al., 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258.

222

The purpose of such statutes has been well stated, as fol-
lows:

“Thus, it has been said that their primary purpose is to
relieve litigants of the common-law rule that no declaration
of rights may be udicially adjudged unless a right has been
violated for the violation of which relief may be granted and
render practical help in ending controversies which have not
reached the stage where other legal relief is immediately
available.”—16 Am. Jur., Declaratory Judgments, Sec. 7, p.
782.

And we have held:

“In its inception the purpose of the declaratory judgment
was to ‘serve as an instrument of preventive justice,’ to ren-
der ‘practical help’ in determining issues and to adjudicate
the rights or status of parties without the peril of committing
a crime or resorting to violence or breach to put the legal
machinery in motion.”—Headnote 3, Sheldon v. Powell et al.,
supra.

The specific section of said Chapter 21820 (Chapter 87
FS. 1941), upon which the Attorney General relies, is:

“87.10—Parties. When declaratory relief is sought, all
persons may be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would he affected by the declaration, and no declaration
shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the pro-
ceedings. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a
municipal ordinance, or franchise, such municipality shall be
made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, ‘and if the
statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitu-
tional, the Attorney General of the State of Florida or the
state attorney of the judicial circuit in which the action is
pending shall also be served with a copy of the proceedings
and be entitled to be heard.” (Laws 1948, c. 21820, Sec. 10).

It will be noted that this Section does not prescribe that
the Attorney General shall be a necessary party when the
constitutionality of an act is assailed. It only provides that
he shall be “heard,” and it is left to the sound judicial dis-
cretion of the Chancellor as to what action should be had
upon the hearing. Neither does 87.10, supra, prescribe the

223

duties of the Attorney General as to what he ‘should present
to be “heard.” .

It is evident that the intent and purpose of this Section
87.10, supra, was to provide an avenue for the interests of
the State to be represented contingent (1) upon the Attorney
General’s concluding that the State’s interests should be rep-
resented in such proceedings and (2) upon the Attorney
General’s making a showing before the Court sufficient to
warrant the Chancellor, in the exercise of sound discretion, in
making an order permitting it. It was not the purpose to per-
mit the Attorney General to “enter into private litigation
where a statute is assailed as unconstitutional . . . but where
the rights of the State or the welfare of the people are in-
volved the situation is patently different.” (See Van Riper v.
Jenkins, 140. N.J. 99, 45 A. (2nd) 844, 163 A.L.R. 1343).

There is no statutory provision governing the matters
which the Attorney General should present, nor is there a
stated standard to guide the Chancellor in passing upon the
matters which the Attorney General might present; both are
left open, to be governed by the facts and circumstances and
for the exercise of sound discretion in the discharge of their
respective duties and functions of office.

Upon the presentation of his petition for intervention, the
Attorney General was “heard” within the contemplation of
the law. The Chancellor in the exercise of a judicial discre-
tion refused leave for the Attorney General to intervene. The
latter acquiesced in such ruling in that he never sought an
appellate review of it, and such order has now become final.

To hold, as we are asked to do, that the Attorney General
had the right to ignore the order and had the right “as of
course” to subsequently file an answer and motion to dismiss,
the Court’s order to the contrary notwithstanding, would in
such instance have the effect of divesting the court if its ju-
dicial function and impairing the sound exercise of judicial
discretion vested in the court concerning suits before it.

If the Legislature had intended to provide that the At-
torney General would be permitted to intervene as a party,
with the privilege of filing such pleadings as he might see fit,

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224

it is reasonable to suppose that the statute would have so pro-
vided. It did not. The statute provides that he should be
“heard,” which means that he should be heard according to
the merits of what he presented at the hearing and that he
should be amenable to the Court’s rulings, as are other peti-
tioners. .

We hold, therefore, that the petition for certiorari be de-
nied.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.
TERRELL, J., not participating.

ADAMS, J., dissenting:

E. N. Claughton and wife brought a bill to quiet title and
for a declarative decree against the City of Miami and the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. The
suit brought into question the constitutionality of certain
Acts of the Legislature.

The Attorney General, Honorable J. Tom Watson, peti-
tioned to intervene but his petition was denied. Later he filed
an answer and a motion to dismiss the bill. These papers
were stricken and that order is brought here for review pur- ©
suant to our Rule 34.

The Attorney General bases his right to be heard upon
Section 87.10, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., which reads:

“When declaratory relief is sought, all persons may be
made parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall preju-
dice the rights of persons not parties to the proceedings. In
any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal
ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a
party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the statute,

. ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the

attorney general of the. State of Florida or the state attorney
of the judicial circuit in which the action is pending shall
also be served with a copy of the proceedings and be entitled
to be heard. Laws 1943, c. 21820, Sec. 10.”

EE
be
225

By the enactment of this statute the Legislature, very
wisely, concluded that when any statute was brought into
question the State should be represented. No copy of pro-
ceedings were served upon the state attorney or the Attorney
General. It was error to proceed with the cause without
complying with the statute.

This section of the statute is substantially the same as
Section 11 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. See
Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 9, page 215.

The Alabama Court has held that failure to join a neces-
sary party in a declarative judgment action is not only error
but is jurisdictional. Holland v. Flinn, 239 Ala. 390, 195 So.
265. :

The courts generally have held it necessary to allow the
Attorney General to be heard. See Cummings v. Shipp, 156
Tenn. 595, 3 S.W. (2nd) 1062; Parr v. City of Seattle, 197
Wash. 53, 84 Pac. (2nd) 375; Day v. Ostergard, 146 Pa. Super
27, 21 Atl. (2nd) 586; Application of Van Syckle, 118 N.J.L.
578, 194 Atl. 284; Johnson v. Board of Adjustment and town
Councol of Westville, 15 N.J. Misc. 283, 190 Atl. 782 Annota-
tion in 163 A.L.R. 1346,

I think the writ should be granted and the order striking
the answer and motion should be quashed.

BUFORD, J., concurs.
| ceeeereee eee

IN RE: ESTATE OF CARRIE F. EVERS; ALICE POTTS, et al., v.
AMERICAN LEGION HOSPITAL FOR CRIPPLED CHXLDREN.
34 So. (2nd) 561 January Term, 1948
. March 2, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied April 22, 1948

L. P. Hardee for Alice Botts, et al. (heirs of Carrie F.
Evers, deceased) and Hd W. Harris, for The Florida National
Bank of Jacksonville, as Administrator of the Estate of
Carrie F. Evers, deceased, appellants.

Austin L. Richardson and William B. Tippetts, for ap-
pellee. .

WISEHEART, Associate Justice:

Carrie F. Evers died in Pinellas County, Florida, on No-
vember 25, 1945. No will being found, the county judge
duly appointed an administrator of her estate.

On December 21, 1945, the American Legion Hospital for
Crippled Children filed a petition in the proceedings, which
petition alleged that on May 7, 1945, Carrie F. Evers was of
sound mind and memory and, not acting under duress or re-
straint, executed and caused to be witnessed her last will and
testament and that a true copy of the will was attached to the
petition; that diligent search and inquiry had been made,
but that the original will could not be found, that same was
lost or destroyed by accident or design.

The petition further alleged that the will had not been re-
voked, annulled, or canceled, and prayed that the copy at-
tached be established and admitted to probate as a copy of a
missing last will and testament. .

The heirs and the administrator filed answer, denying the
material allegations of the petition and alleging that the will
was revoked by the deceased in some manner authorized by
law during the time she was ‘mentally sound.

The cause was heard before the county judge, and after
hearing the evidence he found that the evidence did not sus-
tain a finding of accidental loss or destruction and neither did
it sustain a finding of fraudulent destruction thereof, and, by
the entry of his order denying the prayer of the petition,

227

necessarily found that the will was destroyed by the deceased
in some manner authorized by law at a time when she was
mentally sound. . .

The county judge, in dismissing the petition of appellees,
recognized and applied the presumption that a will known to
have been executed and retained in the possession of testatrix
and not found after her death was presumptively destroyed
by the testatrix for the purpose of revocation.

An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Pinellas
County, and after hearing counsel and considering the cause,
that court reversed the order of the county judge and di-
srected that the copy attached to the petition be admitted to
probate as the last will and testament of Carrie F. Evers,
deceased.

The circuit Court, in reversing the county judge after re-
viewing the evidence, recognized the presumption, but held
that it did not apply in this case for the reason that, accord-
ing to his findings, the will was actually in existence at the
time the testatrix became mentally incompetent and incapable
of revoking the will.

The circuit court, in appeals from the probate court, is not
authorized to pit its judgment as to the probative value of
the evidence against that: of the probate judge. If there is
substantial evidence to support the findings of the probate
judge and he did not misinterpret the legal effect of the evi-
dence as a whole his decree should be affirmed.

The probate judge found that the record did not justify

a finding that the will was accidentally lost or destroyed;

_ neither did the record justify a finding that the will was wil-

fully and fraudulently destroyed. He impliedly found, by his

order of dismissal, that there was ample opportunity for the

' testatrix, while the will was in her possession and while she

was mentally sound, to destroy the will for the purpose of

revocation. Having so found, he recognized and applied the
presumption. .

After review of all the record we find ample competent evi-

dence to support the findings of the probate court and he did
not misinterpret the legal effect of the evidence as a whole.

Le
228

The judgment of the lower court is therefore—

Reversed. .

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.
Lee eee

JOHN E. WHITE v. RUTH ANN WHITE
34 So. (2nd) 311 January Term, 1948
March 2, 1948 Special Division B

Martin J. Pearl, J. L. Cogdill, and John E. Lake, all of
Jacksonville, for appellant.

Lloyd Bass, of Jacksonville, for appellee.

It is further ordered that the appellant pay to the appellee
the sum of Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars as her rea-
sonable atttorney’s fees for this appeal.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., and JACKSON,
Associate Justice concur.

| peer ;
DAVID HOYT STONE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
84 So. (2nd) 305 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 En Bane

Walter G. Arnold, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Ernest W. Welch,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

WISEHEART, Associate Justice:

The appellant, while a member of the armed forces, was,
on. October 6, 1942, declared insane, with a diagnosis of de-
mentia Praecox. In November, 1942, he was granted a medi-
eal discherge, and placed in jail in Eastman, Georgia, for

_ commitment to a mental institution. Relatives intervened,
and appellant was placed in their care and permitted to go to

229

Jacksonville, Florida, where he was employed by various
dairies at menial jobs. .

On August 24, 1943, the appeallant was informed against
in the Criminal Court of Record of Duval County, Florida, and
charged with “breaking and entering a dwelling house with
intent to commit a felony” and “assault with intent to rape.”

The trial court, on September 7, 1943, adjudicated the ap-
pellant insane and committed him to the Florida State Hos-
pital for the Insane for maintenance and treatment. Appel-
lant was confined in the hospital until he was discharged on
December 19, 1946, and was returned to Duval County to
stand trial on the information against him. To this informa-
tion pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity
were interposed.

After waiving trial by jury, appellant was placed on trial
before the court and was found guilty under both counts .of
the information.

‘Appellant contends that the evidence with regard to his
sanity at the time the offenses were committed is not legally
sufficient to support the verdict and judgment. This conten-
tion is attempted to be maintained because the appellant, hav-
ing been released from the army on a diagnosis of dementia
praecox, paranoid type, a presumption that he was insane to
the point of not being legally responsible for his criminal acts
should prevail. "The diagnosis of the army doctors did not
create a conclusive presumption that the appellant did not
know right from wrong, and such presumption as might have
been raised has been overcome because the medical testimony
in the case is sufficiently clear that the appellant did know
what he was doing and knew right from wrong at the time of
the commission of the offenses charged.

Had this case been tried before a jury, the issue of sanity
at the time of the commission of the offenses would have been
for the jury to determine. The appellant waived trial by
jury; the issue was therefore one for determination by the
court from the evidence presented, which evidence was legally
sufficient.

It follows, therefore, that the judgment appealed from
should be—

230

Affirmed.
TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, C. J., and SEBRING, J., dissent.
Leer
STATE OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA STATE IMPROVEMENT COM-
MISSION, an Agency of the State of Florida.

34 So. (2nd) 443

January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948

En Bane

231

L. Grady Burton, for appellant.

B, A. Meginnis, John U. Lloyd, M. R. McDonald and W. R.
Slaughter, for appellee.

Giles J. Patterson, for amicus curiae.
SEBRING, J.:

This is an appeal from a final decree validating certain
Florida State Improvement Commission revenue bonds and
approving the plan by which the bonds are to be liquidated.
The bonds in question are to be issued to finance the construc-
tion of a road connecting State highways, to be built in High-
lands County at the request of the Board of County Commis-
sioners of the County. They are dated October 1, 1947, bear
interest “at the lowest rate obtainable when the same are sold
at par or better,” and are to be completely paid off and dis-
charged by October 1, 1954.

As a means of procuring revenues to pay the principal and
interest on the bonds, and to defray the costs incurred in con-

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232

nection with their issuance, the State Improvement Com-
mission has entered into an agreement with the State Road
Department whereby the latter has agreed to lease and pur-
chase the road for a sum of money sufficient to meet all bond
requirements, the money to be paid from surplus gas taxes a¢-
eruing to the credit of Highlands County under section 16,
Article IX of the Constitution.

All of these negotiations have been conducted pursuant to
chapter 23758, Laws of Florida, enacted by the 1947 session
of the legislature. This statute empowers the Florida State
Improvement Commission, upon the application of any county
evidenced by resolution of its Board of County Commission-
ers, to acquire or to construct within the county any road or
bridge connecting State highways within such county, and to
finance the acquisition or construction of such project
through the issuance and sale of revenue certificates and
bonds, in accordance with the provisions and requirements of
Section 420.06 Florida Statutes 1941, as amended by Chap-
ter 22821, Laws of Florida, 1945. It also empowers the Im-
provement Commission to lease or sell the road or bridge so
acquired or constructed to the State Road Department, upon
such terms and conditions, and for such sum of money, as will
assure to the Improvement Commission sufficient revenues to
pay all costs incurred in connection with the acquisition or
construction of the road or bridge and as will represent the
fair market value of the improvement for leasehold and pur-
chase purposes. By the terms of the statute the State Road
Department is authorized to pay the rental or purchase price
of the road or bridge “from the surplus gasoline taxes which
may in the future accrue to the credit of the county or
counties in which the road or bridge is located, under the
provisions of Section 16 of Article IX of the Constitution of
Florida, or from other State Road funds.”

The lease-purchase agreement entered into between the
Improvement Commission and the State Road Department,
pursuant to Chapter 23758, supra, contains the following
pertinent provisions:

“ . That for and in consideration of the sum of one
($1.00), Dollar this day paid by each party hereto to the

ee
Le
233

other, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and in
further consideration of the mutual and dependent covenants
of the parties hereto and other good and valuable considera-
tions as hereinafter set forth, the said Lessor does by these
presents lease to the said Department, its successors and
assigns:

“That certain road in Highlands County Known as State
Road No. 59 from State Road No. 8 in DeSoto City to a point
at or near Sunnyland School, a distance of approximately
twelve (12) miles, all to be constructed by or under the direc-
tion of the Department,’—-said lease to take effect from the
date of the completion of the construction of said road and to
extend for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until all of
said bonds hereinafter described, or any refunding issues
thereof, have been paid in full. .

“The said Lessor further agrees that it will, at the earliest
possible date, after having complied with all legal require-
ments, offer for sale and sell to the highest and best bidder
$525,000 FLORIDA STATE IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION
SERIES 3 HIGHLANDS COUNTY ROAD REVENUE
BONDS, and that, immediately upon receipt of the funds from
the successful purchaser and after payment of all necessary
expenses in connection with the preparation, issuance and
sale of the bonds, including the fee of its fiscal agent, it will
turn over the remainder of all monies received to the Depart-
ment, said funds to be used by said Department exclusively in
the construction of said State Road No. 59 as hereinbefore de-
scribed, and for the purpose of paying principal and/or
interest charges on said bonds accruing prior to the date of
completion of said road. :

“The Department, on its part, agrees to accept said funds
from the Lessor and to immediately proceed with the con-
struction of said State Road No. 59 together with necessary
bridges, in accordance with its standard state road specifica-
tions, and guarantees to complete said road as quickly as is
reasonably possible. The Department further agrees that in
the event any principal and/or interest of any Florida State
Improvement Commission Highlands County Road Revenue
Bonds shall become due and payable prior to the completion

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234

of said road, the Department will pay such principal and/or
interest.out of these funds or from the proceeds of the 80%
surplus gasoline tax accruing to Highlands County, to the
State Board of Administration, not less than twenty (20)
days prior to the dates upon which such principal and/or
interest shall be come due and payable.

“The Department further declares that the necessary
surveys for the construction of the road has been made by
said Road Department and that the amount to be derived
from the sale of the revenue bonds in the sum of $525,000 is
sufficient to cover the estimated cost of the construction of
said road. In the event that there is a deficiency between the
amount of funds-available from the revenue bonds and the
amount necessary to complete the project, the State Road De-
partment agrees that it will pay from its own funds any
such deficiency and that the road will be completed in accord-
ance with the standard plans and specifications of the Depart-
ment. oe

“In consideration of this lease, the Department does
hereby promise and agree to and with said Lessor as follows:

“The Department will pay as rentals on said lease, not
less than twenty (20) days prior to the dates on which any
of the principal and/or interest of Florida State Improvement
Commission Highlands County Road Revenue Bonds shall
become due and payable, such sum or sums of money as shall
be equal and sufficient to pay the said principal and interest
upon said bonds as they severally became due, so long as any
of such bonds or interest thereon (or refunding issues there-
of) shall be outstanding and unpaid. Such rentals agreed to
be paid by the Department shall be paid by the Department
from Highlands County surplus gasoline tax fund as and
when such surplus gasoline tax funds accrue, pursuant to the
authority of Chapter 20555, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1941,
and Section 16(c) Article IX of the State Constitution. Said
rentals shall be paid by the Department directly to the State
Board of Administration for administration and disposition in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21853, Laws of
Florida, Acts of 1943. The Department agrees that its cove-
nants herein to pay said rentals shall be construed as a first.

ee
; —
235

charge or prior commitment or lien upon and against said
surplus gasoline tax funds which shall have priority over all
other or subsequent charges, claims or commitments upon or
against said funds.

“In addition to the payments outlined herein-above, the
Department will, upon completion of the construction of said
road, pay to the State Board of Administration any funds
which it may have on hand, either in the construction fund or
in the 80% surplus gasoline tax funds credited to Highlands
County, and it shall from time to time pay to the State Board
of Administration any and all funds which it may receive
from surplus gasoline tax funds to be credited to Highlands
County. These payments shall be made to the State Board of
Administration as soon as received, and the payments shall
continue until there shall be in the hands of the State Board
of Administration a sum of money equal to the total amount
of the principal and interest which shall fall due in the cur-
rent fiscal year plus the total amount of the principal and
interest which shall fall due in the two ensuing years, and
after such an amount has been paid to the State Board of Ad-
ministration the Department will thereafter pay as rentals on
said lease, not less than twenty (20) days prior to the dates
on which any of the principal and/or interest on Florida
State Improvement Commission Highlands County Road
Revenue Bonds shall become due and payable, such monies re-
quired to pay such principal and/or interest, and will at the
same time these payments are made pay any additional
amount which may be necessary, so that there will be at all
times in the hands of the State Board of Administration suf-
ficent funds to pay current principal and interest plus a sum.
equal to the total bond principal and interest requirements for .
the two ensuing years.

. —2—

“It is mutually agreed that said rentals covenanted to be
paid and the other considerations agreed to be performed by
the Department represent the fair rental and market value of
said road.

3

“The Department will, solely at its sxpense out of state

—
236

road funds, at all times during the continuance of this agree-
ment maintain said road in good repair and in sound operat-
ing condition and will make all necessary repairs, renewals,
reconstruction and replacements.

a a

“When the Department shall have performed all the
covenants hereunder and shall have paid the rental herein
provided for, for the full term of the lease, and all the in-
debtedness, including interest, represented by said $525,000

_ Florida State Improvement Commission Highlands County
Road Revenue Bonds has been paid and satisfied, then the
title and absolute ownership to all the property included in the
lease shall thereupon immediately be vested in the State of
Florida in fee simple; and the Lessor covenants and agrees to,
and will thereupon deliver to, the Department such deeds and
conveyances as may be necessary or convenient to vest full
title and ownership of all said property in the State of Flor-
ida.”

With respect to the security pledged by the State Improve-
ment Commission for the payment of the bonds, each bond
recites on its face:

“This bond . . . is payable and redeemable only from
revenue accruing to the State Improvement Commission under
and by virtue of its contract of lease-purchase with the State
Road Department, together with all other bonds of the issue
of which this bond is one, is secured by a first, exclusive and
closed lien on the income and revenue derived from said lease:
purchase agreement, all as in said Resolution provided.

“This instrument is an obligation of the Florida State Im-
provement Commission in its corporate and representative
capacity and is secured only by such revenue as shall be
pledged as security for its payment and it is not an obligation
of the State of Florida, nor of any County of the State of
Florida and will not and cannot be paid, redeemed, satisfied
nor liquidated with tax funds of the said State of Florida nor
of any County of the State of Florida, except that the fore-
going limitations shall not apply to any tax funds or other

funds paid or agreed to be paid by the State Road Depart-

fp

|
a
237

ment to the Florida State Improvement Commission pursuant
to authority of law as rentals, charges on purchase payments
which tax funds or other funds so paid or payable have been
set forth in the face of this bond.”

The authorizing. resolution enacted by the Improvement
Commission, which, by reference, is made a part of each bond
recites:

“|, . The Revenue Bonds hereby authorized shall be legal
obligations of the Commission but secured only, however, by
the pledge of the revenue accruing to said Commission under
said lease-purchase contract with the State Road Depart-
ment. They shall not be obligations of the State of Florida
nor of Highlands County and will not and cannot be paid,
redeemed, satisfied or liquidated with tax funds of the State
or of Highlands County; nor shall the State of Florida, or
Highlands County, be obligated to levy a tax or make any ap-
propriation for the payment of said bonds except as herein
provided.

“SECTION 11. The rentals or payments that will accrue
to the Commission and that will be paid to it under and by
virtue of its lease-purchase contract with the State Road De-
partment shall be paid by that Department out of eighty
(80%) percent surplus two-cent gasoline tax appropriated
to it by Section 16, Article IX of the Constitution of Florida,
for the construction of roads in Highlands County and shall
be paid directly to the State Board of Administration in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Chapter 21853, Laws of
Florida, 1948, said Board shall hold all monies received by
it as aforesaid as a sinking fund in trust solely for the pay-
ment of principal and interest maturing on the Revenue
Bonds herein authorized, for the account of the Commission
in order to secure the payment of the contract obligations of
the Board evidenced by said Revenue Bonds herein author-
ized and any bonds that may be issued by the Commission to
refund the same or any part thereof. Any sums at any time
in the hands of the State Board of Administration in excess
of the amounts required to pay currently maturing principal
and interest shall be held in trust by it solely for the benefit

PC
238 :

of the holders of outstanding and unpaid revenue bonds of
this issue bat may be invested by it as authorized by law.
Any investment so made shall also be held in trust and the
same, or proceeds thereof, used solely for the payment of the
bonds herein authorized.. All deposits of said funds shall be
continuously secured as required by the law of Florida and
shall not be withdrawn or used for any purpose other than
those herein designated.”

The ultimate question upon the appeal is whether or not
Chapter 23758, Laws of Florida, 1947, which authorizes the
State Road Department to lease-purchase the road involved
with surplus gas taxes accruing in the future for road and
bridge construction in Highlands County, and which em-
powers the State Improvement Commission to pledge the
“rentals” received to pay bonds to be issued to finance con-
struction, is violative of sections 6 and 16 of Article IX of
the Constitution. A secondary question is whether, assuming
the statute to be constitutionally valid, the road which is the
subject matter of the lease-purchase agreement is the type or
kind of project for which surplus gas tax proceeds accruing
under Section 16, Article IX of the Constitution may be
validly expended by the State Road Repartment.

At the outset we think it must be recognized that though
the written agreement between the State Improvement Com-
mission and the State Road Department is, in form, a con-
tract for the long term lease of a public highway with title
to vest in the State at the end of the term, it is, in fact, a-con-
tract by the State Road Department for the construction of a
state road within Highlands County to be paid for out of
present and future surplus gasoline tax proceeds to be re-
mitted by the State Board of Administration of the State
Road Department for the purpose of constructing roads and
bridges in Highlands County. We think, also, that even
though the bonds to finance the project are to be issued as the
sole obligations of the Improvement Commission “in its cor-
porate and representative capacity and secured only by such

- revenues as shall be pledged as security for the payment
thereof,” the State Road Department has in reality agreed to
pay the bonds—at least indirectly—to the extent of the fund

ee
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239

it will receive from surplus gas tax proceeds accruing to the
benefit of Highlands County under Section 16, Article IX of
the Constitution; because the “rentals” which are to be paid
to the State Improvement Commission until the bond obliga-
tions are paid in full, constitute the only source of revenue
pledged, or which may be pledged as security for the retire-
ment of the bonds. Frank recognition of these facts, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that by reason of their
existence, the legislative scheme or devise for acquisition of -
the road must be declared null and void.

It is well-settled by previous decisions of this court that,
revenue bonds issued by the State Improvement Commission
under authority of Chapter 22821, Laws of Florida, 1945, to
finance public projects which the Commission is authorized to
acquire, construct, maintain or operate, are not state bonds ©
within the contemplation of section 6, Article IX of the
Constitution, where the security for the payment of the bonds
is confined exclusively to rents, tolls, or fees realized from the
use of such projects, and are not derived from State tax levies
or paid from state tax funds. Hopkins v. Baldwin, 123 Fla.
649, 167 So. 677; Brash v. Tuberculosis Board, 124 Fla. 652,
167 So. 827, 169 So. 218; State v. Florida State Improvement
Commission, (Fla.), 30 So. (2nd) 97. As was pointed out in
State v. Caldwell, 156 Fla. 618, 23 So. (2nd) 855:

“The Act ... provides in terms that the obligations and
securities undertaken shall not under any theory bind the
State of Florida and ‘shall be solely and only the obligations
of the Florida State Improvement Commission in its corpor-
ate and representative capacity and shall be secured only by
‘such revenues as shall be pledged as security for the payment
thereof.’ . . . It would hardly be possible to express the non-
liability of the State more conclusively.

“.,. The law is settled in this state that evidences of debt
secured solely from rents and facilities of the Commission
are not bonds that must be approved by the freeholders as
required by Section 6, Article 9 of the Constitution ...”

See also State v. Florida State Improvement Commission,
(Fla.) 31 So. (2nd) 548.

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240

We hold, therefore, that the bonds proposed to be issued
in the present cases cannot be State bonds; unless it be that
by the indirect method proposed for their payment, state tax
money constitutionally usable only for strictly State purposes
is in fact to be used to liquidate and discharge them.

That such cannot be the fact has been definitly settled, we
believe, at least in principle; by the decision of this court in
State v. State Board of Administration, 157 Fla. 360, 25 So.
(2nd) 880. In the cited cases there was involved the financ-
ing and construction of certain toll bridges and highways by
Overseas Road and Toll Bridge district in Monroe County.
The original bonds issued to finance the project had provided
for their payment exclusively “from the tolls and other
revenues of any nature whatsoever received from the opera-
tion of the toll bridges and toll highways, and any other
property of the district.”

The bonds were sought to be refunded under a plan
whereby the toll roads and bridges were to be sold to the
State Road Department. As consideration for the purchase,
the Road Department agreed to pay as the purchase price
“all amounts received for tolls from said toll bridges and toll
highways and all funds from the eighty per cent gasoline sur-
plus available to Monroe County, pursuant to Section 16(c)
Article IX of the Constitution.” The bonds were refunded on
this basis; the refunding bonds pledging not only the tolls and
revenues to be received from the operation of the facilities,
but also the “funds from the eighty per cent surplus gas tax
proceeds available to Monroe County,” agreed to be paid by
the State Road Department as part of the purchase price in
the acquisition of the toll roads and bridges.

On appéal it was held that the scheme or plan divested for
paying off the refunding bonds was perfectly lawful and
proper; and that no new or additional source of revenue was
being pledged by the district as security for the payment of
the refunding bonds, inasmuch as surplus gas tax proceeds to
be credited to the account of Monroe County were usable for
no purpose other than road and bridge acquisition and con-
struction within the County and hence so closely partook of

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241

the nature of property belonging to Monroe County as to
authorize their inclusion in the bond pledge. as “other prop-
erty of the district.”

This holding of the Court to the effect that future surplus
gas tax proceeds, accruable under Section 16 Article IX of
the Constitution, could be thus pledged to service bonds pay-
able in the future, necessarily excluded any conclusion that
such gas tax proceeds were “state funds” within the purview
of section 6 Article IX of the Constitution and therefore ex-
pendable only when in hand, for current expenses of state
government or for bonds to repel invasion or suppress insur-
rection. See Advisory Opinion to Governor, 94 Fla. 967, 114
So. 850, which points out the manner in which strictly state
funds must be expended.

The conclusion reached by the Court in State v. State
Board of Administration, supra, is entirely consonant with
the purposes for which section 16 Article IX was adopted as
a part of our Constitution. Section 16, Article IX converted
the statutory Board of Administration then in existence un-
der Chapter 14486, Laws of Florida, 1929 into a constitutional
body, specifically incorporated in the Constitution provisions
for a two-cent gas tax levy for a period of fifty years, appro-
priated the proceeds of that tax to the credit of the counties
for the retirement of their road and bridge obligations, and
made available a continuing surplus for road construction
within each of the counties. The section expressly author-
izes the Board thereby created to pledge a county’s share of
the gasoline tax levied by it to secure payment of bonds
issued. Subsection (c) mandatorily requires the Board to
pay the bonds described therein as they mature, to create a
fund to meet subsequent maturities in years where it is esti-
mated receipts will not be sufficient, and to divide any balance
remaining; 80 per cent of the State Road Department and
20 per cent to the County Commissioners. It orders that the
80% appropriated to the State Road Department be used
solely for “the construction of state roads and bridges” and
for the “lease or purchase of bridges connecting state roads.”
The tax is levied for a period of fifty years and the legisla-
ture is expressly prohibited from reducing the rate, or from

242

changing the method of distribution or the purposes for
which the proceeds may be used. All of these requirements
were designed to stabilize the credit of the counties, to assure
a means of liquidating the road and bridge obligations of the
counties, and to provide to the counties an appropriate and
secure means to enable them, through the State Road Depart-
ment, to extend the state system of roads and bridges within
their territorial boundaries. Under this Constitutional plan
the surplus gas tax proceeds which will be remitted to the
State Road Department, in trust for the use of each of the
counties, are fixed definite and certain—at least to the extent
that the funds will be or become available for road and bridge
construction or acquisition for a period of fifty years from
the adoption of the amendment, cannot be withdrawn from
the purpose, and cannot be transferred or shifted by the
Legislature to any other state purpose.

It has been suggested that even though the surplus gas
tax proceeds are held in trust for the counties, still no au-
thority exists within the Constitution provision for antici-
pating future tax funds for building present projects, even
though such a program might be presently beneficial. The
argument is that because the Constitutional amendment is
entirely silent as to the manner or method by which the State
Road Department is to discharge the responsibility imposed.
on it by the Constitution of carrying on needed road construc-
tion within the counties with funds which are, in effect, trust
funds of the counties, only two courses of action are open to
the State Road Department: (1) to build only such portions
of public roads as can be constructed from year to year with
funds accruing to each of the counties during each fiscal year
throughout the life of the amendment, or (2) to wait until
such time in the future as there shall be sufficient funds on
hand to build such projects in toto.

Manifestly the pursuit of the first course suggested would
result in piecemeal construction of public highways—a course
which can hardly be said to be economically sound; while the
pursuit of the second might well result in the loss of a link
in the state highway system that may be sorely needed at the
present for the proper economic expansion of the county

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affected. Neither course, in our view, would be productive of
the results designed to be accomplished by the constitutional
amendment, in extending the facilities of the State highway
system.

The funds accruing from the eighty per centum surplus
gas tax proceeds being fixed, definite and certain as to avail-
ability and, therefore, being, in a sense, in esse; and the
same not being State tax funds within the contemplation of
Section 6 Article IX of the Constitution; and Section 16,
Article IX containing no express or implied provisions as to
the plan or method by which they shall be expended; we think
it entirely competent for the legislature to prescribe, by
statute, the plan or method by which they may be utilized by
the State Road Department for the benefit of the counties in
procuring either present or future additions or extensions to
the State Highway system.

Any statute enacted, however, if it is-to be constitutional,
must neither divert the eighty per cent gas tax surpluses to
purpose other than a state purpose, nor to a purpose or
project not particularly authorized by section 16(c) Article
IX of the Constitution. It must not attempt to specify the
use that shall be made of tax funds in the hands of the State
Road Department, other than the eighty per cent gas tax
surpluses accruing to the use of the counties. It must not
obligate the taxing power of the State or any of its political
subdivisions or agencies, except as to the eighty per cent
surplus gas tax proceeds, or authorize the incurring of obli-
gations except as shall be payable only and exclusively from
such proceeds.

Chapter 23758, Laws of Florida, 1947 appears to comply
with all these requirements; except as to that provision of the
statute which attempts to authorize the State Road Depart-
ment to pay to the State Improvement Commission, as rentals
under the lease-purchase agreement, not only surplus gaso-
line taxes to the credit of the counties, but also “other State
Road Funds.” As to funds other than the eighty per cent gas
tax surpluses, we are of the view that the legislature was
without power to authorize the State Road Department to
obligate them for this purpose.

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The only other questions raised by the appellant on this
appeal are with reference to whether or not, assuming the
statute to be constitutionally value, the road which is the
subject matter of the lease-purchase agreement is the type or
kind of project for which surplus gas tax proceeds accruing
under section 16 Article IX of the Constitution may be law-
fully expended by the State Road Department.

It is pointed out by the appellant that while section 16(c)
Article IX authorizes the expenditure of surplus gas taxes for
“the construction or reconstruction of State roads and bridges
within the county” it does not authorize the expenditure of
such funds for the lease or purchase of roads, and hence that
the statute authorizing the State Road Department to “rent”
the road and pay the rentals with gas tax surpluses, is an in-
valid attempt to divert the tax surpluses to a use not
contemplated by the Constitution. It is also pointed out that
though the Constitution specifically directs that the gas tax
surpluses are to be used only “for the construction or recon-
struction of State roads and bridges within the county or for
the lease or purchase of bridges connecting State highways
within the County” the statute authorizing the lease-purchase
agreement between the parties provides that part of the
“rentals” are to be used by the Improvement Commission to
pay interest on its revenue bonds; and that this is an un-
authorized attempt to divert the proceeds.

We think that under the view we have taken of the real
nature of the lease-purchase agreement between the parties,
as being essentially a contract for the construction of a
needed State highway connecting with other State highways,
neither contention is tenable. Under the contract the State
Road Department is to do the planning, surveying and actual
construction of the highway with money raised by the sale of
the bonds issued by the Improvement Commission. It is to
maintain and repair the road throughout the course of the
contract. The construction of the road has been found, by
authorization resolution, to be necessary as an extension of
the State highway system. There has also been a finding that
the sums of money to be used as rentals represent the fair
market value of the road for leasehold and for purchase pur-

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poses. Under these conditions it cannot be said that the
State Road Department is not lawfully “constructing” the
road within the contemplation of the Constitution. This
being the situation, it is our view that the payment of interest
on the bond proceeds is merely a legal and necessary incident
to that venture.

The extent to which interest may be paid on bonds issued.
by the Improvement Commission is fixed by Section 420.06
Forida Statutes, 1941, as amended by Chapter 22821, Laws of
1945. That statute authorizes the State Improvement Com-
mission to borrow money and issue bonds for their repay-
ment, but with the provision that “In no case shall any such
bonds, notes or certificates mature later than thirty years
from date of issue, or bear interest at a rate greater than six
per cent per annum, or be sold at such price that the net
interest cost to the commission shall exceed six per cent to
the respective maturities thereof.” It may be well to call at-
tention to the fact that in the present case the bonds recite
that they are to bear interest “at the lowest rate obtainable
‘when the same are sold at par or better.” It must be under-
stood, therefore, that if “the lowest interest rate obtainable”
on the bonds exceeds the statutory provision for interest, the
bonds to that extent will be unenforceable.

From the conclusions we have reached with respect to the
nature of the lease-purchase agreement, the purposes for
which the eighty per cent surplus gas tax proceeds may be
used, and of the power of the Legislature with respect there-
to, it follows that the decree appealed from must be, and the
same is hereby, affirmed.

It is so ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

TERRELL, J., concurring:

‘The ultimate question presented by this appeal is whether
or not the revenue bonds validated by the decree appealed
from may be construed as obligations of the State in violation
of that part of Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution pro-

—
246

hibiting the issue of State bonds except for designated pur-
poses.

The answer to this question turns on the interpretation of
Chapter 23758, Acts of 1947, as applied to Section 16, Article:
IX of the Constitution. It is not denied that the validated
bonds and the contract between the State Road Department
and the State Improvement Commission were executed in
compliance with Chapter 23758, Acts of 1947, the purpose of
which was to enlarge the powers of these two state agencies
within the purview of Section 16, Article IX, particularly
with reference to the construction of state roads and bridges
in the different counties. Section 16, Article IX converted the
Florida State Improvement Commission into a constitutional
Board and imposed the “second gas tax,” a period of fifty
years, for the payment of outstanding bonds or certificates of
indebtedness issued by the counties. Another provision of
the amendment required that any remaining balance of the
proceeds of said tax be allocated, eighty per cent to the State
Road Department and twenty per cent to the counties. Chap-
ter 23758 is concerned with the use of the eighty per cent
allocated to the State Road Department for road and bridge
purposes in the Counties.

The test of whether a bond is a State obligation is whether’
or not the taxing power of the State may be called on to
service and discharge it. Chapter 23758, Acts of 1947, does
not purport to create an obligation against the State. It
negatives any such charge, in that it puts the world on notice
that neither the taxing power of the county nor the state can
be called on to pay the bonds. Section 2 requires that the
following provision be a part of each bond:

“This instrument is an obligation of the Florida State
Improvement Commission in its corporate and representa-
tive capacity and is secured only by such revenue as shall be
pledged as security for its payment and is not an obligation
of the State of Florida, nor of any County of the State of
Florida and will not and can not be paid, redeemed, satisfied
nor liquidated with tax funds of the said State of Florida nor
of any County of the State of Florida, except that the fore-
going limitations shall not apply to any tax funds or other

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. 247

funds paid or agreed to be paid by the State Road Department
to the Florida State Improvement Commission pursuant to
authority of law as rentals, charges or purchase payments
which tax funds or other funds so paid or payable have been
set forth in the face of this certificate.”

Since under the lease contract between the State Road De-
partment and the State Improvement Commission the bonds
in question are discharged with funds allocated to the Road
Department under Section 16, Article IX of the Constitution,
it seems to me that there is no theory under which they could
be said to be State bonds or create a state obligation within
the meaning of Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution. Sec-
tion 16 of Article IX was added to the Constitution in 1942,.
and must have contemplated the prohibition in Section 6,
Article IX. Section 6, Article IX does not prohibit a transac-
tion like that involved here, Chapter 23758 authorizes it, and
similar contracts between state agencies were approved by °
this Court, absent the approval of the freeholders in State v.
State Improvement Commission, 158 Fla. 743, 30 So. (2nd)
97. See also State v. State Board of Administration, 157 Fla.
360, 25 So. (2nd) 880.

The contract here is further immunized from the charge
of creating an obligation against the State in that the funds
pledged the State Road Department to support it are limited
to those allocated to it by Section 16, Article IX, for the con-
struction of roads in Highlands County. If these funds
should be insufficent to satisfy the bonds, there is no direct or
implied power by which the bondholders can fall back on the
State or County to protect them from other tax sources.

Some aspects of this case place it in a different category
from those last cited, but given this interpretation, I find
nothing in Chapter 23758 or the contract made under it, that
creates an obligation against the State. I think the primary
purpose of Chapter 23758 was to provide ways and means to
deal with certain of the funds and conditions created by the
adoption of Section 16, Article IX ‘of the Constitution and
that no approving vote of the freeholders as required by Sec-
tion 6, Article IX was essential to the validity of bonds issued
thereunder. I think the contract between the Florida State

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248

Improvement Commission and the State Road Department
was made within the terms of the Act, that the lease contract
was binding on the State Road Department and may be en-
forced by the bondholders only as to funds received by it
under Section 16, Article IX of the Constitution, or such as
may be contemplated by Chapter 23758 which negatives any
purpose to hold the State liable.

I have given careful consideration to the dissenting
opinions of Mr. Justice ADAMS and Mr. Justice BARNS but
I am convinced that on the theory here stated the validity of
Chapter 23758 may be upheld and the validating decree af-
firmed. For these reasons I concur in the opinion and judg-
ment of Mr. Justice SEBRING.

ADAMS, J., dissenting:

The writer is of the view that Chapter 23758, Acts of 1947,
is unconstitutional; that these are state bonds and should not
be validated by reason of Section 6, Article IX, Florida Con-
stitution. The bonds are issued by a State agency; they are
payable from excise taxes levied by the people of Florida when
Section 16, Article IX was adopted in 1942. It is immaterial
whether the taxes were levied and by what authority, that
is—by the legislature, the people or the agency of either.
When this type of public financing was begun the validity of
the bond hinged upon whether public funds, not rents, etc.,
were pledged. See Hopkins v. Baldwin, 123 Fla. 649, 167 So.
677, and similar cases. In later cases dealing with the Board
of Administration we were not treating questions involving
taxes. In State v. Escambia County, Florida, 153 Fla. 282,
14 So. (2nd) 576, we were dealing with county bonds wherein
the holder was limited in the relief which he might demand
and that had no reference to coercing state fnuds.

Here the test is whether the holder of these bonds may
coerce the state’s taxing power. It is patent from this record
and has been stated from the bar of the court that the holders
of these bonds may coerce the channeling of the monies here-
in pledged until these are finally paid in satisfaction of these
obligations. The holder of these negotiable bonds can pro-
claim to the world that he holds an obligation which may be
enforced in the courts of the land against a state wide excise

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249

tax. The character of the tax, i. e., ad valorum or excise tax,
would naturally be immaterial.

Did the people, by adopting the 1942 amendment, intend
to alter the limitation against state bonds in Section 6, Article
IX? The intent to do so has never been manifest. If these
bonds are to be validated because the tax has been levied
then the prohibition in the Constitution could be circumvented,
when the legislature meets, by levying an excise tax and pro-
viding for the issuance of bonds against the levy and thereby
obtaining immediate cash. In this fashion there would be no
end to the abuse which the Constitution sought to prevent. In
other words a tax may be levied by the people, as in this
amendment, or it may be levied by the legislature. In either
event its nature is the same insofar as we may anticipate
future revenue. The purpose of the limitation is to safeguard
the future welfare of the state. See Vol. XX, Virginia Law
Review, page 701. It may be said in favor of the majority
view that there is a limitation to the extent of the tax levied
in the Constitution. It is easy to imagine, however, that all ~
of this may be exhausted and expended in advance—resulting
in still another source of revenue being lost to future needs.

It follows that this writer is of the opinion that the -
statute is bad in toto. If not completely bad, it surely is bad
in that part which authorizes the Board to pledge other state
funds.

BARNS, J., dissenting:

It appears to me that the proposed bonds are either State
bonds or county bonds and cannot be validated. Our Consti-
tution, in section 6, Article IX, in respect to State bonds,
provides:

“The Legislature shall have power to provide for issuing
State bonds only for the purpose of repelling invasion or sup-
pressing insurrection.”

And in respect to County bonds that:

“The Counties . . . of the State of Florida shall have
power to issue bonds only after the same shall have been ap- .
proved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which
a majority of the freeholders who are qualified electors re-
siding in such Counties .. . shall participate, to be held in the

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250

manner to be'prescribed by law; but the provisions of this Act
shall not apply to the refunding of bonds issued exclusively
for the purpose of refunding of the bonds or the interest
thereon of such Counties.”

It is proposed that the bonds be executed by the State Im-
provement Commission and that the bonds be secured and
paid from the proceeds of the “Second Gas Tax” from the
80% portion appropriated to the State Road Department, for
use in relation to “State roads.”

If the bonds are to be State bonds they cannot be vali-
dated, because to do so would be violative of the constitutional
provision against State bonds. If the bonds be County bonds
they must be approved by an election, as provided by Section
6 of Article IX, supra. They have not been approved as_
specified.

Bonds payable from the proceeds of a sales tax on gaso-

_line cannot be distinguished from bonds payable from an ad
valorem tax on real property. The source of revenue is from
taxation in: both instances. If they are bonds payable from
taxation they comie within the scope of the provisions of sec-
tion 6 of Article IX, supra. These proposed bonds cannot be
decreed to be valid because to issue them would be violative
of said section, whether they be State bonds or County bonds,
and they partake of one class or the other or of both classes
of such bonds.

In a limited way, the 80% funds were treated as “county
funds” in the Overseas Highway case, 157 Fla. 360, 25 So.
(2nd) 880, and the Hester case, 158 Fla. 567, 30 So. (2nd)
356.

The people, by the adoption of Section 16 of Article IX
levied this two (2c) cents “Second Gas Tax” and appropriated
the proceeds thereof and, by Section 16(d) of said Article,
among other things, specified that:

“The Legislature shall . . . not enact any law having the
effect of withdrawing the proceeds of said two (2c) cents of
said taxes from the operation of this amendment.”

The status of the two (2c) cents “Second Gas Tax” levied
by the Constitution and appropriated by the Constitution was

es
— ;
251

somewhat determined by State ex rel. Hester v. State Board
of Administration, 30 So. (2nd) 356.

The appropriation of the proceeds of the “Second Gas
Tax” involved here is controlled by the words of Article IX,
section 16 (c), as follows:

“|. and third, any remaining balance out of the pro-
ceeds of said two (2c) cents of said taxes shall monthly dur-
ing the year be remitted by said Board as follows: Eighty
(80%) per cent of the State Road Department for the con-
struction or reconstruction of State roads and bridges within
the county, or for the lease or purchase of bridges connecting
State highways within the County, and twenty (20%) per
cent to the Board of County Commissioners of such county
for use on roads and bridges therein.”

It is fundamental that no act of the Legislature can impair
the operation of the Gas Tax Amendment according to its
tenor and effect. Chapter 23758 and the proceedings now
before us involve only the “80%” fund payable to the State
Road Department and not the “20%” payable to the county.
The words of the Amendment are that “any remaining bal-
ance... shall monthly during the year be remitted... as fol-
lows: Eighty (80%) per cent of (to) the State Road Depart-
ment” for the stated uses within the County “and twenty
(20%) per cent to the Board of County Commissioners” for
the stated uses of the county.

This “Second Gas Tax” was created for the purpose of re-
lieving the counties of the burden of their bonded debt.
Bonds had issued during prosperous times and there was a
general default among the counties during the depression of
the ’30s. Both the bondholder and taxpayer needed help and
it was this that prompted the adoption of Section 16, supra.
It is now proposed that bonds be issued by the State Improve-
ment Commission and the proceeds of this “Second Gas Tax”
be pledged to pay such bonds. True, neither the County nor
the State Road Department is to issue the bonds, but the tax
money is pledged to pay such bonds.

The tenor and effect of the operations under Chapter 23758
would be to permit the securing of bonds by the pledge of

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252

future tax revenues for present expenditures, which, if not
violative of section 16 of Article IX, is violative of section 6
of Article IX, supra.

It seems clear that the intent of the Gax Tax Amendment
was that the money would, when received, be available for
use for the functions of the State Road Department as to the
80% and to the County Commissioners as to the 20%, and
such uses cannot be unreasonably impaired.

The 80% of the surplus to each of the counties was ap-
propriated to the State Road Department for use within the
several counties but the State Road Department may not be
bound by the proceedings now before this Court, inasmuch as
the State Road Department is not a party.

The constitutional provisions for the use of this surplus
gas tax should be liberally construed, but the 80% has been
appropriated for specified uses by the State Road Department,
which includes construction and reconstruction of “State
roads” of the county.

Since 1923 a “State road,” for certain purposes, has been -
legislatively defined:

“The term ‘state road’ used in this chapter shall be con-
strued to mean any road or part of road which has been or
may be established, declared and designated by the legisla-

_ ture as a state road, and of which the location of the line
and right of way has been surveyed and fixed upon by the
department or its duly authorized engineers and representa-
tives. ... "—Sec. 341.28, F.S, 1941, F.S.A.

We are not now required to determine whether the road to
which the funds may be applied must be a road within this
definition.

The Overseas Highway case (State v. State Board of Ad-
ministration, 157 Fla. 360, 25 So. (2nd) 880) is not con-
trolling as a precedent for the question now before us inas-
much as that case involved the use of the 80% funds for
the lease and purchase of a toll bridge, and Section 16 of
Article IX expressly authorizes the use of the 80% funds by
the Road Department:

De
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253

“... for the lease or purchase of bridges connecting state
highways within the county,”—which serves to remove any
doubts as to the validity of the proceedings then under con-
sideration. :

The instruments sought to be judicially determined to be
valid have all of the essential characteristics and attributes
of bonds and the faith and credit of the state or county are
pledged to their payment from the 80% fund of the “Second
Gas Tax” and to issue them is violative of Section 6 of Article
IX of the Constitution, inasmuch as some are of the class of
bonds within the scope of said Section 6.

Lee

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, et al. v. FLORIDA STATE IMPROVE-
MENT COMMISSION, an Agency of the State of Florida.

34 So, (2nd) 455 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 En Bane

Phil O’Connell and Dwight L. Rogers, Jr., for appellants.

B. A. Meginniss and John U. Lloyd, for appellee.

Giles J. Patterson, as amicus curiae.

SEBRING, J.:

The decree appealed from is affirmed on authority of the
decision in State of Florida v. Florida State Improvement
Commission, (Highlands County), rendered by this court on
the 5th day of March, A. D. 1948, and reported in 160 Fla.
229, 34 So. (2nd) 443.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

| eee

STATE OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA STATE IMPROVEMENT COM-
MISSION, an Agency of the State of Florida.

34 So, (2nd) 455 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 En Banc

A. K: Black, for appellant.

ee
254

B. A. Meginniss, John U. Lloyd, M. R. McDonald and W. R.
Slaughter, for appellee.

Giles J, Patterson, as amicus curiae.

SEBRING, J.: :

The decree appealed from is affirmed on authority of the
decision in State of Florida v. Florida State Improvement.
Commission, (Highlands County) rendered by this court on
the 5th day of March, A. D. 1948, and reported in ...... Fla. ...-.,
ww So. (2nd) -.....

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

Le
BESSHE MAE MINGO v. WILLIE CAIN
84 So, (2nd) 456 January Term, 1948.
March 5, 1948 . Special Division B

Rehearing denied March 23, 1948

255

Johnson & Johnson, for appellant.
E. M. Baynes, for appellee.
BARNS, J.:

The appellant, as plaintiff below, brought a bill seeking
to have a deed adjudicated a mortgage, and for redemption,
and, on the final hearing, the Chancellor dismissed the bill,
sustaining the defense of res judicata. Whereupon plaintiff
appealed, assigning as error the finding that the defense of res
judicata was established by the proof.

Subject to errors and omissions as to details, which are
not now important, it appears that Randolph and Annie’
Washington were husband and wife and that they had several
transactions concerning several pieces of property, one of
which transactions was with one Parrish, another with Willie
Cain. The properties involved in the latter transactions were
encumbered by mortgages. There is a question as to whether
these transactions were mortgages, which question we do not
now determine, but, for present purposes, they will be re-
ferred to as mortgages. Domestic trouble brewed between
Randolph and Annie and the mortgagee of a mortgage in form
and substance and which was not in dispute became impatient
for his money, which resulted in a $1,500.00 mortgage being
satisfied for $1,000.00, with Parrish conveying to Willie his
interest in the piece of property, the subject matter of the
prior transaction between Parrish and the Washingtons
(hereafter referred to as the “Parrish property’) and Willie
paying to Parrish $448.00 (a Washington debt?). At the
same time, Annie and Randolph gave to Willie their quit claim
deed to the same property, and Willie in turn gave to Annie
an instrument entitled “Option to Purchase Land.”

(Prior suit). As a result of the domestic troubles between
Randolph and Annie, she (Annie) got possession of the “Par-

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256

rish property” and Randolph agreed to give her a deed, which
he did after some delay, but, after giving her a deed to the
property, he moved in and dispossessed her and two weeks
later brought a suit’ against Willie for the purpose of having
the court decree the deed to be a mortgage and establishing
the deed as such, and for the purpose of redemption. To this
bill of complaint Willie answered, setting up that Randolph
had parted with all right and interest in and to the property;
that he had wrongfully ousted Annie and that she had suc-
ceeded to his interest therein and that her right to possession
was by permission of Willie and pursuant to an agreement be-
tween Willie and Annie, in which the plaintiff had no part
interest.

In this prior suit, a final decree was rendered against the
plaintiff, Randolph, to which proceedings Annie was not a
party.

Subsequent to the prior proceedings, Annie died, and the
present suit is brought by the appellant as the only heir of
Annie Washington, and the prior decree was plead, offered
and found to be res judicata as to the issues here.

When the facts as plead in the answer of Willie Cain in
the prior suit are considered, and it is further considered
that Annie was not a party to that suit and that Annie and
Randolph had then been divorced, it appears to us that the
learned Chancellor has erred in finding the defense of res
judicata to have been established by the proof. Annie was
not a party to the prior proceedings and does not claim an
interest acquired from any party to the said proceedings after
the proceedings were had; and Willie’s answer in the prior
suit reflects a knowledge of Annie’s interest at that time,
which is consistent with the present plaintiff's claim of
Annie’s interest. .

Reversed for further proceedings and determination of
the equities of the parties. |

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, JJ., and JACKSON, Associate
Justice, concur.

BARNS, J.:

257

BARNS, J.:

Appellee, on petition for rehearing, complains that the
record on appeal fails to contain all the evidence and, for that
reason, that the decision reversing the Chancellor is in error,
and submits in support of his position that the law as hereto-
fore announced is as follows:

“No error predicated on lack of evidence to sustain de-
cree was shown, where testimony introduced before trial
court was not included in transcript.”—-Yearwood v. Welch,
107 Fla. 143, 144 So. 308. . ,

“Assignment that court erred in entering final decree
could not be considered where chancellor’s certificate showed
all evidence was not included in transcript, nor could assign-
ment that court erred in finding that allegations of bill were
supported by evidence and that equities were with com-
plainant be considered.”—Perry v. Perry, 109 Fla. 299, 146 So.
914.

The foregoing decisions were rendered before the adoption
of the present rules, in 1942, which are more strict as to what
the record should contain but more liberal as to supplying
omissions.

The present Supreme Court Rules relating to the record on
appeal provide:

“(10) Record Presumed to Contain Everything Material.
Upon appellant proceedings it shall be presumed unless the
record shows to the contrary, that such record transmitted to
the appellate court contains all proceedings in the trial court -
material to the questions presented for decision by the ap-
pellate court.’—Supreme Court Rule 11 (10).

And that:

“.,. all pleadings, evidence and other matters not essen-
tial to the decision of said question (assignment of error)
shall be omitted .. . "Supreme Court Rule 11 (2) (a).

For violation of the rules of this Court, our Rules pro-
vided:

“(b) Penalty. Failure on the part of counsel or others to
abbreviate the record on appeal as thus required will subject
them to the payment of such costs as this Court may deem
proper to impose.”—Supreme Court Rule 11 (2) (b).

258

And that:

“(11) Powers of Lower Court. After the entry of an
appeal and before the record on appeal is filed in this court the
things required to he done, including the fixing or extension of
time within which they shall be done, shall be under the
supervision of the lower court, subject to the control of this
court.”-—Supreme Court Rule 11 (11).

And to mitigate the perils and hazards of errors and
omissions, our rule provides that:

“(8) (b) Material Omissions Supplied. If anything ma-
terial to either party is omitted from the record on appeal by
error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipu-
lation, or the trial court, either before or after the record is
transmitted to the appellate court, or the appellate court, on a
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the
omission or misstatement shall be corrected, and if necessary
that a supplemental record shall be certified and transmitted
by the clerk of the trial court. No other proceedings shall be
necessary in event of a suggestion or diminution of the
record.”—Supreme Court Rule 11 (8) (b).

And:

“(8) (c) Appellate and Trial Court May Make Record
Speak Truth. Both the appellate and the trial court shall have
power to rule on objections to the contents of the record on
appeal and to make such order as unto it shall appear proper

- to promote the administration of justice and in order to re-
duce the volume of the record without injustice and yet pre-
sent to the appellate court the matters complained of.”—
Supreme Court Rule 11 (8) (c).

When it develops that the Chancellor is about to be're-
versed and matters presented to the Chancellor have been in-
advertently omitted from the record on appeal or omitted
through error of judgment and it is made to appear even as
late as upon rehearing, omitted matters may then be supplied,

as provided by Supreme Court Rule 11 (8) (b), supra; but,

after decision has been rendered on appeal and it is suggested
on rehearing that matters were presented to the Chancellor
and omitted from the record, it must be made affirmatively to

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259

appear, before this Court will concern itself with such
omission, that such omitted matters are material to a determi-
nation of the errors assigned and, if supplied, would result in
a change in the decision of this Court. A mere omission is
not enough. .

Since the Court’s rules are strict as to requiring a reduced
or abbreviated record, it will be liberal in allowing the record
to be supplemented with such material matters which have
been omitted. :

The appellee submits that the record fails to contain the
proceedings had in circuit court concerning the law in ques-
tion—“Case No. 12,184”—wherein Annie Washington was
plaintiff and Rudolph Washington was’ defendant. The
present case is between Bessie Mae Mingo, as the sole heir of
Annie Washington, and Randolph Washington, concerning the
same land, but neither the materiality of “Case No. 12, 184”
nor any particular portion thereof has been made to appear.
Until some matter within “Case No. 12,184” is made to appear
material to this appeal, relevant to the equities and necessary
to promote a better administration of justice, it will be con-
sidered otherwise.

Rehearing denied.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, J., and JACKSON, Associate
Justice, concur.

a
ORANGE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, v.
GAYLE DAVIS FORDHAM, et al.
34 So. (2nd) 438 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied April 8, 1948

iS
fond
Lo

Fishback, Smith & Williams, Calvin Johnson and R. W.
Ervin, Jr., for appellant.

H. M. Voorhis, Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, for Gayle Davis
Fordham, Claude L. Gray and Dorothea M. Watson, for
Howard B. Lovell and Hedwig S. Lovell, his wife, Charlotte
B. Mayer, Antonio Endilcata and Frances Endilcata, his wife,
Robert J. Pleus and Warren H. Edwards for Joseph R. Fiorita
and Helen M. Fiorita, his wife, and Frances M. Baker and
John R. Baker, her husband, Alex Akerman, Jr., for The First
National Bank, Executor of Estate of Charlotte B. Mayer,
deceased, appellees.

CHAPMAN, J.:

Chapter 9311, Acts of 1923, Laws of Florida, designated
and established State Road No. 22 extending from Orlando to
Indian River City, via Ft. Christmas; also from Orlando to
Crystal River via Winter Garden, Clermont, Mascotte, Grove-
land, Bushnell and Inverness. The Act provided further that
Road 22, with many other named and numbered Roads, shall
constitute the system of State Roads of Florida, and when
located and constructed by the State Road Department shall
become the property of the State of Florida. Section 7 of
Chapter 9313, Acts of 1913, Laws of Florida, defines a State
Road as a road or part of road which has been established or
designated by the State Road Department or the Legislature
as a State Road and the location thereof duly authorized.
State Road No. 22 has recently been renumbered as State
Road No. 50.

ee
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261.

The State Road Department of Florida on May 16, 1946,
by appropriate resolution, functioning in behalf of the public
interest, approved a location and survey of a part of State
Road No. 22 situated in Orange County extending from
Minerville 8.658 miles to junction with Road No. 2 in the City
of Orlando. A map of such location and survey supra was
duly certified by the officials of the State Road Department
and filed in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of
Orange County, Florida. The resolution, in part, recited
“that it is the judgment of the department that the construc-
tion of said portion of said section is necessary, practical and
to the best interest of the State and that it is necessary that
the right of way for the road bed, ditches and borrow pits for
said portion of said section be acquired.”

The State Road Department authorized and requested the
County of Orange, at its own expense, to secure by gift,
purchase or condemnation the lands necessary for the right
of way for the road bed for said portion of said section con-
sisting of 8.659 miles and identified in the record as Section
7505. The Board of County Commissioners of Orange County,
on June 6, 1946, pursuant to the request of the State Road
Department, by a resolution acceded to said request and
undertook to acquire at the expense of Orange County the
road bed for the construction of the 8.658 miles of State Road
situated in Orange County, although a part or portion of the
road bed was situated in the City of Orlando. The resolution
of the Commissioners authorized its acquirement by gift,
purchase or by condemnation proceedings in the name of
Orange County, Florida.

The Board of County Commissioners of Orange County,
pursuant to its previous adopted resolution and in accordance
with its agreement with the State Road Department, caused.
to be filed in the Circuit Court of Orange County its petition
in condemnation for the purpose of acquiring title to de-
scribed lands situated within the City of Orlando to be used
as a part of State Road No. 22, identified in the record as a
part of Section 7505. The described lands are situated along
Colonial Drive, a street running east and west through the
City of Orlando. The described lands were necessary for

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262

rights of way and easements for State Road No. 22 through
the City of Orlando along Colonial Drive as located by the
State Road Department in behalf of the public interest and
was so declared by the resolution adopted by the State Road
Department of Florida and the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Orange County prior to the institution of the suit.
The trial court dismissed the petition in condemnation, there-
by holding that Orange County was not authorized, as a
matter of law, to maintain the condemnation suit seeking to
acquire the described lands for road purposes situated in the
City of Orlando, but entered judgments for attorneys’ fees
against the petitioners in behalf of each defendant, and the
plaintiff below appealed.

The separate answers of the defendants to the petition in
condemnation as presented by the Honorable Claude L. Gray
are identical except as to the description of the lands sought
to be condemned. Paragraph 2 of the answers denies the
allegation of the petition in condemnation to the effect that
the acquisition of the described property by the County of
Orange in behalf of the State Road Department of Florida
for the improvement of State Road No. 22 along Colonial
Drive in the City of Orlando was in the public interest or for
the best interest of the people of Florida.

Paragraph 3 of the answers sets out that the described
property is situated with the city limits of the City of Or-
Jando ‘and does not abut any street which has been designated
by lawful authority as a connecting link for the proposed
highway. State Road No. 22 through the City of Orlando
has heretofore been designated and the route established and
as designated has by the State Road Department been main-
tained for a period of four years, and more, prior to the insti-
tution of the present suit. The State Road Department hav-
ing once exercised the power and authority conferred by
statute in the location and designation of State Road No. 22
as it passes through the city limits of Orlando has exhausted
its power and authority conferred by statute and for this
reason the plaintiff and the State Road Department of Florida
do not now have any lawful power or authority to alter,
change or interfere with the previous designation of Road

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No. 22 as it now passes along the streets of the City of Or-
Jando.

Paragraph 4 of the answers sets out that the proposed
change in the connecting link of State Road No. 22—along
Colonial Drive through the city of Orlando—has not been
lawfully designated by competent authority. The State Road
Department is without statutory authority to designate
Colonial Drive as a connecting link through the City of Or-
Jando and said city has not adopted an ordinance or resolution
approving the proposed connecting link, and therefore the
County of Orange cannot maintain the case at bar. The
County of Orange is without power to expend public funds,
property of the taxpayers of Orange County, to pay for the
property sought to be condemned. It affirmatively appears
that the case at bar was not brought in good faith. The ex-
penditure of the taxpayers’ money for the described property
is not a county purpose for which public funds can be law-
fully expended. The City of Orlando is the only party in law
authorized to maintain the condemnation suit for the acquisi-
tion of the lands for the improvement of State Road No. 22
through the city of Orlando.

Paragraph 5 of the answers sets out that the defendants,
as a matter of law, are entitled to have the real party in
interest maintain the case at bar for the reason that they are
entitled to a judgment-against the petitioners for the value of
their property and the present proceeding is wholly invalid
to condemn the property situated within the City of Orlando
and described in the answer, even though a valid enforceable
agreement now exists between the County of Orange and the
City of Orlando providing for the funds with which to pay for
the described property. The trial court sustained paragraphs
2, 8, 4 and 5 of the answers supra against motions to strike
and demurrer.

Presented here is the quaere: May Orange County, at the
request of the State Road Department of Florida to furnish
it a right of way for widening and reconstruction of a city
street as a part of its highway system and as a connecting
link of State Road No. 22 (renumbered No. 50), maintain a

264
suit for condemnation of such right of way inside the incorpo-
rated limits of the City of Orlando?

The question posed may be considered under two divisions
viz: First, the power of a county to maintain a suit in con-
demnation to acquire lands for right of ways for the use of a
State Road; and, second, if such power exists, may lands
situated within the limits of a city necessary for a State Road
be acquired by a proceeding in condemnation? The power of
a municipality to maintain a condemnation suit to acquire
land to be used as a right of way for a State Road or Highway
in behalf of the State Road Department of Florida was upheld
by this Court in Meyer v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 Fla. 859,
80 So. (2nd) 354.

It is generally conceded that a Legislature in delegating
the powers of eminent domain must limit or restrain the tak-
ing of property for a public use as distinguished from a
strictly private use and the courts usually apply a strict con-
struction to such statutes. If the power of Orange County
to maintain the suit at bar exists, then it must clearly and
affirmatively appear that such power has by statute been
conferred by the Florida Legislature on the several counties

- of Florida in connection with the construction of a system of
State Roads in behalf of the public interest. We hesitate to
hold that such power is conferred by implication.

Section 341.21, F.S.A., provides that the power of eminent
domain is confirmed, vested and granted unto the State Road
Department of Florida to condemn all necessary lands and
property for the purpose of securing right of ways for State
Roads and all bridges in connection therewith and said De-
partment shall have due power to condemn any material and
property necessary and useful for road building purposes...
and the State Road Department is vested with power and
authority to pay such judgment or compensation awarded in
any such proceeding out of funds coming into the hands of
said Department for State Road construction.

Section 341.22, F.S.A., authorizes the several conties of the
State of Florida to furnish to the State Road Department the
necessary right of ways for State Roads in or through their
respective counties and to that end we are vested with the

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265

power of eminent domain to condemn all necessary lands for
the purpose of securing right of ways for said State Roads,
and such condemnation proceedings shall be brought, main-
tained and prosecuted as prescribed and set out in Chapter 73
of the Statutes ... the counties are authorized to enter into
contracts to furnish right of ways to the State Road Depart-
ment and to make bond to idemnify the State Road Depart-
ment against expenses incurred by it in securing such right
of ways ... if the county fails to procure the same.

Section 341.23, F.S.A., authorizes counties to maintain
condemnation proceedings to acquire lands for right of ways
for State Roads as conferred in Section 341.22 supra, and may
be exercised ‘by the several counties of the State upon the re-
quest of the State Road Department and condemnation pro-
ceedings, where necessary, shall be brought and maintained
in the name of said county; provided that nothing in Sections
341.21-341.23 supra shall empower any county to acquire by
purchase, condemnation or otherwise any lands for right of
ways for State Roads, except the same shall be first surveyed
and located by the State Road Department in said county or
counties .. . the counties may use any road funds coming into
their hands for the purpose of acquiring by purchase or con-
demnation any such lands required for right of ways of State
Roads. In light of the foregoing statutes, it is our conclusion
that the County of Orange has full authority and statutory
power to maintain the present suit.

Having concluded that the County of Orange has the
authority and statutory power to maintain a suit in condem-
nation to acquire lands for State Road purposes, then an
answer to the second division of our original question is
necessary viz: may lands situated within the limits of a city
necessary for a State Road be acquired in condemnation pro-
ceedings by a county? For an answer we again examine the -
pertinent Florida statutes throwing light upon the issue.

Section 341.47, F.S.A., provides, in part, that “the State
Road Department may determine and fix the lines and lo-
cations of such roads between the cities and places thereon”
and “the State Road Department shall have all the power
and authority with respect to the roads therein named and

OS

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266

declared that it had on June 8, 1923, with respect to State
Roads designated and established by said Department, pro-
vided the said Department shall not hereafter have the power
to designate and establish State Roads ... that the Road
Department may survey and locate the lines or routes of any
State Road or section of any State Road numbered and desig-
nated in the preceding section whenever in the judgment of
said department the doing of such work shall be found to be
practicable and to the best interest of the State.” (Emphasis
supplied).

Section 341.64, F.S.A., was enacted by the 1941 session of
the Legislature as Chapter 20218, Laws of Florida. The title
to the Chapter is viz, “An Act Relating to City and Town
Streets and Roads or Portions thereof, Viaducts and Bridges,
that Constitute the Route of Connection Between or Exten-
sion of State Road in the State Highway System; Declaring
that such Serve a State purpose; Providing for Their Desig-
nation by the State Road Department; Authorizing and Re-
quiring the State Road Department to Maintain and Repair
Such Streets and Roads Under it Supervision and Control
and to Construct and Reconstruct Such Streets and Roads
Under Certain Conditions and Authorizing it (State Road De-
partment) to Exercise Certain Powers With Respect to
Same.” (Emphasis supplied).

Section 341.64 supra provides:

“341.64. Certain Streets Designated as State Roads—
(1) It is hereby expressly recognized and declared by the”
legislature of the State of Florida that city and town streets
and roads, or portions thereof, viaducts and bridges, that
constitute the route of connection between or extension of
state road in the state highway system, and referred to and
-named in and by this section as municipal connecting link
roads, have served, do now serve and will in the future serve
a state purpose, and are for the general benefit of the state;
that it is a proper and legitimate state function and expense
to designate such municipal connecting link roads and to
undertake and provide the cost of maintenance, repair, con-
struction and reconstruction of same.

267

“(2) The state road department, not later than October
Ast, 1941, shall designate such streets, viaducts and bridges
_ as are the municipal connecting link roads in each city and
town,. and thereafter shall designate municipal connecting
link roads for new or additional state roads in the state high-
way system at the time such state roads are opened for travel.
The state road department shall keep a record of such mu--
nicipal connecting link roads, so designated, and forthwith
shall furnish to each city and town a statement of the mu-
nicipal connecting link roads, so designated, in such city or.
town. .
“(3) From and after October Ist, 1941, the state road
department is authorized, empowered, directed and required
to maintain and repair under its control and supervision, such
designated municipal connecting link roads; to make appro-
priations and expenditures out of its funds for such purpose;
and is authorized to enter into any and all contracts, inclusive
of agreements with cities and towns, and with any federal
agency of the United States of America authorized and em-
powered so to do, for such purpose. Provided nothing herein
contained shall require the state road department to sweep,
sprinkle or light said municipal connecting link roads.

“(4) That the state road department. whenever it here-
after constructs or reconstructs any state road which enters
or passes through any city or town, shall construct or recon-
struct the municipal connecting link of such road to conform
to the same type of construction used in such road...”

When the pertinent language of Section 341.47 supra viz:
“the state road department may determine and fix the lines
and location of such roads between cities and places therein”
and “the state road department shall have all the power and.
authority with respect to the roads therein named and de-
clared that it had on June 8, 1923, with respect to state roads.
designated and established by the said department, provided
that such department shall not hereafter have the power to
designate and establish state roads” and “provided further
that the state road department may survey and locate the
line or route of any state road or section of any state road
numbered and designated in the preceding section, whenever

—
268

in the judgment of said department the doing of such work
shall be found to be practicable and to the best interest of the
State,” is considered in connection with the several pertinent
provisions of Chapter 20218, Acts of 1941, Laws of Florida
(Section 341.64, F.S.A.) the conclusion is inescapable that
the Legislature intended to have constructed within the limits
of the municipalities of Florida connecting links of Florida
State Roads so as to give the general public a system of good
roads within the limits of municipalities the same as between
the several cities.

The next argument presented is that under the guise of
making a survey and locating the line or route of an estab-
lished road the State Road Department has not the power to
designate or establish an entirely new road. One of the
answers to the argument is that the Legislature of Florida
withdrew from the State Road Department many years ago
the power “to designate and establish State Roads.” Section
341.47, F.S.A. But the power to survey and locate the line or
route of any State Road or section of any State Road previ-
ously designated and established was left to the sound judg-
ment and discretion of the State Road Department. Section
341.47 supra. The general trend of the decisions of this Court
sustains the conclusion that the relocation and construction of
a section of a previously established temporary designated
road is not the location and construction of an entirely new
road by the Road Department within the meaning of the cited
statutes. See Enzian v. State Road Department, 122 Fla. 527,
165 So. 695; Morrison v. Farnell, 126 Fla. 385, 171 So. 528;
Sibley v. Volusia County, 147 Fla. 302,2 So. (2nd) 578;
Brower v. Putnam County, opinion filed January 9, 1948, and
not yet reported.

The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and a new
trial awarded.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
. eer

JOE WATTS v. STATE OF FLORIDA

34 So. (2nd) 429 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 Division A

Lloyd Bass, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Ernest W. Welch,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The appellant, Joe Watts, was informed against in the
Criminal Court of Record of Orange County, Florida, in two
counts. The first count charged the appellant Watts with
breaking and entering a described building situated in Orange
County on March 19, 1947, the building entered being the
property of John L. Hoover. It is charged that he broke and
entered the building with the intent to commit a felony,
to-wit, grand larceny. The second count charged Watts with
the crime of grand larceny in that he unlawfully took personal
property of John L. Hoover of the value of $1,095.01. The ap-
pellant was placed upon trial on the information and was by
an Orange County jury convicted under count two of the
crime of grand larceny but was found not guilty as to count
one, which charged breaking and entering a building with the
intent to commit a felony, to-wit, grand larceny. From a
judgment and sentence of four years in the State Prison at
hard labor imposed under count two an appeal has been per-
fected here.

It developed during the progress of the trial, as reflected
by the record, that the store of John L. Hoover, situated near
the City of Orlando, was broken into on the night of March
19, 1947, and several cases of whiskey taken therefrom valued
at a sum of more than one thousand dollars. The whiskey
was easily identified by names appearing on the paper wrap-
pers about the whiskey. A portion of the whiskey was later

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taken from a garage at the home of a state witness, Jimmy
Fekany, situated about four blocks from the store alleged to
have been unlawfully entered. The whiskey taken from the
garage was returned to the owner and Jimmy Fekany testified
for the State he paid the appellant $368.00 for the whiskey at
his (Fekany’s) home about 3:00 or 4:00 o’clock A. M. March
19, 1947. It was delivered to him by the appellant and placed in
the garage. Jimmy Fekany identified the appellant and the
automobile that the whiskey was transported in, but two
other men in the car with the appellant were unknown to him.
The appellant in his testimony denied the taking of the
whiskey and stated that at the time the store was entered he
was in the City of Jacksonville. He testified that he and the
state witness, Jimmy Kekany, had had some trouble and were
not on good terms.

The record discloses that the appellant took the witness
stand and testified in his own behalf and was cross examined
by the County Solicitor. Some of the questions propounded
were objected to by counsel for appellant and presented to
the trial court for a ruling and the objections so made were
overruled and denied by the trial court. It is contended here
that the following proceedings constitute reversible error:

“GROSS EXAMINATION. BY MR. ELLARS: Q. Have
you ever been convicted of an offense? MR. MURRELL: I
object to that as being highly improper, we haven’t put his
reputation in issue. THE COURT: Overruled. Exception
noted. A. Yes. Q. How many times? MR. MURRELL: I
object to that. THE COURT: Overruled. Exception noted.
A. Yes, sir, I have been convicted of crime. Q. Do you remem-
ber how many times? A. Yes, twice. Q. When? Mr. MUR-
RELL: I object to that, as being irrelevant and immaterial,
and highly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. THE
COURT: I think it is limited to asking him whether he has
ever been convicted and what for. That’s all. (Exception).
Q. Do you remember what for? A. Yes, sir. Q. What for?
A. I wrote about a $14.00 check the first time and I got six
months for that in Georgia, and I served that. Q. Weren’t
there three of those checks? A. Yes, but they only gave me
six months for the whole business. MR. MURRELL: I object

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to any further testimony along this line. THE COURT: Over-
ruled. Exception noted. Q. What was the other offense for?
A. Unarmed robbery, my wife and baby were hungry back in
1939, I couldn’t get a job, and I went out and took $10.00 from
a whiskey store, the man gave me change for $10.00, you
know how they deliver it to you, I called up and said ‘Send me
change for $10.00, I got six years for that. Q. How long have
you been living in Orlando? A. I haven’t lived in Orlando. I
have lived in Winter Park. Q. How long have you been living
there? A. For the past—up until I left, something just a
little over a year. Q. About a year ago? A. I went there in
Decernber, 1945, and I left there in January, 1947. That’s
about thirteen months.”

Counsel for appellant contends that certain arguments
made to the jury by the County Solicitor were not justified by
the record and were prejudicial to the right of the appellant,
but we do not find them to have been so prejudicial as to war-
rant reversal on that ground.

The first question posed here for adjudication by counsel
for appellant is viz: Where a defendant in a criminal case took
the stand and testified in his own behalf and on cross exami-
nation admitted that he had been previously convicted of
crime, was it permissible under Section 90.08, F.S.A., and
adjudications, to allow the inquiry to go so far as to disclose
the details of the crime for which the defendant was convicted
as reflected by the above quoted portions of the record?

Section 90.08 Supra provides that no person shall be dis-
qualified to testify as a witness in any court of this State by
reason of conviction of any crime except perjury, but his testi-
mony shall be received in evidence under the rules as any
other testimony, provided however evidence of such convic-
tion may be given to affect the credibility of the said witness;
and such conviction may be proved by questioning the pro-
posed witness or, of he denies it, by producing a record of his
conviction . . . Our adjudications disclose that we have con-
sidered and ruled upon many cases brought to this Court in
which it was contended that the above statute was violated.

It must be observed that the appellant (defendant below)
was on trial under two counts of an information (1) breaking

ee
272

and entering a building with the intent to commit a felony,
to-wit, grand larceny; and (2) grand larceny. The appellant
was qualified under Section 90.08 supra to testify as a witness
in his own behalf and the testimony as given would be re-
ceived and considered along with other testimony. The staute
authorizes that evidence of a conviction (of crime) may be
given to affect the credibility of the witness by questioning
the witness and that such conviction may be proved by ques-
tioning the proposed witness or if denied then by producing a
record of his conviction.

In the case of Martin v. State, 86 Fla. 616, 98 So. 827, when
considering a similar assignment we held that it is not a
question of what crime a witness may have committed and
for which he has been convicted, but whether he had been
convicted of any crime. If he has a criminal record, the
theory of the statute is that it would affect his credibility
although it does not affect his competency unless the crime
was perjury. It will be observed that under this rule the fol-
lowing testimony was improper: “Q. For what? A. I wrote
about a $14.00 check the first time and I got six months for
that in Georgia and I served that. Q. Weren’t there three of
those checks? A. Yes, but they only gave me six months for
the whole business.” :

In the case of Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 519, 98 So. 603
we in part said that “it was erroneous and unnecessary to
press the inquiry as to the conviction of crime to the point
where the particular offense was named; because such course
seems to be for a purpose different from that on which the
question is allowable as to a witness’ former conviction of
crime. It is to discredit him as a witness, but to press the
inquiry as to the character of the particular crime that it may
be shown to be of a similar character to that for which he is
being tried is to use the rule for an improper purpose and to
secure for the State an advantage which it does not desire.”
We do not overlook our holdings in Wilson y. State, 134 Fla.
199, 183 So. 748; Madison v. State, 138 Fla. 467, 189 So. 832;
Collins v. State, 155 Fla. 141,19 So. (2nd) 718.

Counsel for appellant contends that the evidence adduced
is legally insufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant

273:

under count two of the information. We have repeatedly held
that disputes and conflicts in the evidence are for a jury under
appropriate instructions and this Court cannot substitute its
judgment and conclusion on the facts in issue for that of the
jury. For the error committed it is our duty to reverse the
judgment and award a new trial.

Reversed. ;

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

NATHAN MAYO, as Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of
Florida, and E. R. SESSIONS, v. THE MARKET FRUIT COM-
PANY OF SANFORD, INC., a Corporation.

34 So. (2nd) 543 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 Special Division B

William C. Pierce and Rodgers & Kirkland, for appellants.
Garland W. Spencer, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

This is an appeal by each of the above named appellants
from an adverse judgment in common law certiorari proceed-
ings instituted in the circuit court of Seminole County by the
appellee to have reviewed an order of the Commissioner of
Agriculture, which order was made pursuant to proceedings
held under Sections 596.13-.14, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

274

The Commissioner’s order was against the appellee “Fruit
Company,” with its principal place of business in Seminole
County. Hearings upon the complaint against the “Fruit
Company” were held in Polk and Orange Counties, but the
order of the Commissioner was made in, and effective as if
made in, Tallahassee, Leon County.

The proceedings were on the complaint of Sessions, of
Orange County, and it will be assumed that the fruit involved
was of Orange County.

The Commissioner made answer to the writ of certiorari
and in his answer made a motion to quash the writ upon the
ground that the circuit court of Seminole County was not the-
proper court for such review and that the circuit court of Polk
or Leon County was the only proper and competent court for
such review. The motion to quash was not granted.

The question presented is not strictly one of jurisdiction,
but of venue. It was not waived by proceeding without ob-
jection. : .

If the suit had been directed to acts of the Commissioner
occurring in Seminole County, then it might be that such
county would be the proper venue, but such is not the case.

The Commissioner, through his representative, very
properly held his hearings against the “Fruit Company” in
the places more convenient to the witnesses but, when the
hearings were completed, the order against the “Fruit Com-
pany” was effective as of Tallahassee, the seat of government,
and Leon County is the proper venue for the review of acts
done in Leon County.

The judgment appealed is reversed, with directions to sus-
tain the motion to quash based on the ground that such court
was not the proper court for such review.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, J., and WISEHEART, Associ-
ate Justice, concur.”

W. R. JOHNSON, v. ELLA E. JOHNSON
84 So. (2nd) 563 7 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied April 22, 1948.

275

S. M. Preacher and W. W. Flournoy, for appellant.
A. L. Johnson, for appellee.
PER CURIAM:

The record and the briefs in this cause have been examined
and the judgment appealed from is affirmed on authority of
Jones v. Jones 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836.

Affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SEBRING and BARNS,
JJ., concur. .

THOMAS, C. J., dissents.

JAMES L. HOWLAI . I. I. CATES:

34 So. (2nd) 562 January Term, 1948
March 9, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied April 20, 1948

Sam E. Murrell, for appellant. .

Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, M. W. Wells and Ernest F.
Householder, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

After a careful consideration of this controversy the con-
viction is ‘reached that the issues formed by the declaration
and pleas should have been submitted to the jury and that
the court was not justified in directing a verdict; therefore
the cause is remanded for a new trial.

THOMAS, C. J. TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., dissent.
ADAMS,J., dissenting:

Le
276

This was an action for wrongful death. The case was.
tried on pleas of not guilty and contributory negligence.

When the evidence of both plaintiff and defendant was in,
the court indicated that a motion would be granted for a
directed verdict whereupon plaintiff elected to take a non- suit
with bill of exceptions.

The question for us to determine is whether decedent’s
conduct, in some appreciable manner, contributed to her own
death.

We presume that the action of the lower court is correct.
Stevens et al. v. Tampa Electric Company, 81 Fla. 512, 88 So.
303.

The injury occurred in the City of Winter Park on a state
highway where traffic is heavy. At that point the road is 40
feet wide. Decedent was crossing the road around 8 o’clock
in the evening. Defendant’s car had passed through a green
traffic light almost 200 feet away, traveling about 20 miles
per hour but as it approached it gained speed. Decedent was
elderly but suffered no physical impairment which would
preclude her from apprehending and avoiding danger. She
was not crossing at a regular crossing for pedestrians. At

‘the time she apparently sensed danger as she grasped the
hand of her ‘sister who accompanied her and they began to
run but failed to clear the path of the oncoming car.

The trial judge heard the witnesses and was convinced.
that the decedent’s own carelessness contributed to her un-
timely death. In view of the entire evidence, we cannot say
that the lower court was clearly in error. Ordinarily con-
tributory ‘negligence is a jury question. This, however, pre-
sented a factual picture to the trial judge where reasonable
men could not entertain a contrary opinion that the unfortu-
nate lady failed to exercise reasonable care for her own safety
and that because of that neglect she thereby contributed to
her untimely death.

BARNS, J., concurs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. THOMAS N. CURINGTON, JR., v. O. P.
SWOPE, as Chairman of the Florida Real Estate Commission, and
O. PB. SWOPE, H. BRYANT MERRITT, and JOHN R. WRIGHT, as
and constituting the Florida Real Estate Commission.

34 So. (2nd) 429 January Term, 1948
March 12, 1948 * Division A

Hoffman & Durant, for relator.

277

W. H. Poe, for respondents.
SEBRING, J.:

This matter is before us on a motion to quash an alterna-
tive writ of mandamus issued by this court. The sole ques-
tion raised by the writ and motion is whether a person who
has not yet reached the age of twenty-one years, but who has
obtained a decree removing his disabilities of non-age, under
the laws of this State, is entitled to file an application, under
section 475.17, Florida Statutes, 1941, and be examined as to
his qualifications to become a real estate salesman.

In the case of State ex rel. Lamson v. Baker, Circuit Judge,
25 Fla. 598, 6 So. 445, it was held that a minor who had his
disibilities of non-age removed by decree of court was en-
titled to be examined for a license to practice law, under a
practice act which required as one of the conditions of ad-
mission to practice that such applicant should be at least
twenty-one years of age. We can see no difference in prin-
cipal between that situation and the one confronting us in the
proceeding at bar.

The motion to quash is therefore denied and the respon-
dent is hereby required to file its answer or return to the al-
ternative writ within ten days from the adoption and entry of
this opinion and judgment; and in default thereof it is ordered
that a peremptory writ be issued in accordance with the
prayer of the alternative writ.

a
278

It is so ordered,
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
 ereepmrreree!

PAUL EGHIGIAN of the State of Michigan, doing business as VER-
MONT TOOL & MANUFACTURING COMPANY, in the City of
Detroit, Michigan, v. E. M. RICE,

34 So, (2nd) 432 January Term, 1948

March 16, 1948 Special Division B

Donald Walker, for appeallant.

J. Thomas Gurney and Joseph P. Lea, Jr., for appellee.
JACKSON, Associate Justice:

Plaintiff in count one of the declaration sues the defendant
for the return or refund of $1,000.00 alleged to have been paid
by the plaintiff on the purchase of a No. 2 Universal Cutting
Machine.

Plaintiff in count two of the declaration sues the defend-
ant and avers an oral agreement alleged to have been entered
into between the parties herein, whereby plaintiff seeks to re-
cover for materials and labor furnished in an attempt to re-
build the said Universal Cutting Machine. It is not necessary
as this time to set forth the other counts of the declaration.

The defendant in his pleas to count one denies the alleged
agreement and in substance pleads a confession and avoid-
ance, and avers facts similar to those pleaded by the defend-
ant by: way of counterclaim. Defendant also pleaded “never
promised as alleged” and “non assumpsit.” The defendant’s -
pleas to count two of the declaration deny the oral agreement
and the agreement to furnish labor and materials in an at-
tempt to rebuild the cutting machine,

279

The defendant also filed counterclaim in this cause against
the plaintiff in several counts in which it is substantially
alleged that defendant had developed and patented a certain
Universal abrasive cutting machine, made for the specific pur-
pose of cutting steel rods of small diameter; that he was con-
tacted by a representative of the United States Government,
Naval Ordinance Department, with the request that the de-
fendant come to Detroit to explain the operation of the ma-
chine to a prospective purchaser who supposedly had a con-
tract with the War Department for cutting steel casings in
making rockets; at Detroit defendant advised plaintiff that
the machine as then made and built was designed and built
for the purpose of cutting small steel rods, but that the ma-
chine, if properly re-tooled, could and would cut five-inch
steel tubing as desired; that the plaintiff agreed to purchase
the machine for $4,800.00, $1,000.00 down and the balance of
$3,800.00 to be paid when the plaintiff had properly re-tooled.
the machine according to specifications given by defendant;
that plaintiff failed to retool the machine according to speci-
fications or advice of defendant, etc.; hence, the plaintiff be-
came obligated to pay the balance due on the purchase price
of the machine. To the counts of the counterclaim the plain-
tiff pleaded that “he did not promise as alleged,” “non as-
sumpsit” and “never was indebted as alleged.”

At the close of the case and before the jury retired, de-
fendant moved the Court for a directed verdict as to the count
two of plaintiff's declaration, which motion was granted by
the trial Court. The case was submitted to the jury after
hearing the charges of the Court and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant on his counterclaim.

IM The first question before the Court on appeal is “Did
the Court err in directing a verdict for the defendant on the
second count of plaintiff's amended declaration wherein plain-
tiff claims as an element of damages labor performed and ma-
terials furnished and used in an attempt to re-tool the ma-
chine in question?”

At the time and place of the delivery of the machine it
does not appear from the record before the Court that there
was any binding agreement between the parties which would

280

obligate the defendant to pay for labor and materials. It does
appear from the record, however, that the time of and
after delivery of the machine certain specifications, advice
and directions were given by the defendant for putting the
machine in working order. From a close perusal of the record
we fail to find in these directions the element of certainty to
create a valid and binding contract which would obligate the
defendant to pay for the re-tooling job. It is indefinite as to
consideration and as to other essentials that must be definitely
agreed upon to make the contract complete. A statement
that certain conversions should be made on a machine, or the
giving of directions or offer of assistance, to make the me-
chanical device properly function, is not essentially a promise
to pay for labor and materials, which would create a con-
tractual obligation.

‘We are of the opinion that the trial Court did not err in
directing a verdict as to the second count of plaintiff’s decla-
ration.

MI The next question’ respectively urged by appellant
have reference to portions of the Court’s charges and to cer-
tain charges requested by appellant and denied by the trial
Court.

In determining the sufficiency of charges, the charges
given must be considered as a whole, and if the charges suf-
ficiently apprise the jury of their providence under the issues,
so that they can fairly and impartially arrive at a verdict, the
charges should be considered ample.

We can find no error in the charges that would be preju-
dicial. McDonald v. Stone, et al., 114 Fla. 608, 154 So. 327.

As regards the requested charges which were denied and
assigned as error, we:are of the opinion that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in denying said charges.

It will also be observed from the record in this case that
the attorneys for the respective parties explained the issues
to the jury. .

No reversible error being made to appear, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, and BARNS, JJ., concur.

[|
281
FONTAINE LeMAISTRE v. HERMAN LEIFERS, et al.
34 So. (2nd) 434 January Term, 1948
March 16, 1948 Special Division B

W. B. Shelby Crichlow, of Bradenton, for appellant.

Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt and J. A. Franklin,
all of Fort Myers, for appellees.

PER CURIAM:

WHEREAS, the judgment of this court was entered on
June 24, 1947 affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for
Lee County, Florida in the above styled cause, and

WHEREAS, the judgment of this court was on certiorari
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States Febru-
ary 2, 1948 and the cause was remanded to the Supreme
Court of Florida for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States,

WHEREAS, the mandate of the Supreme Court of the
United States in this cause has been lodged in this court; and
on consideration whereof, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the judgment of this
court affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for Lee
County, Florida be now reconsidered and that the judgment
be reversed with directions to the Circuit Court for Lee
County, Florida to vacate its order, judgment and decree bear-
ing date December 12, 1946 entered in this cause in Chancery
Order Book 23 at page 293, records of said Circuit Court and
proceed to hear and determine said cause pursuant to law; it .
is further ordered that the sum of $12.00 costs in this court,
be and the same is hereby taxed against the appellees; it is
further ordered that the cost of transcript of proceedings and
other proper costs in the said Circuit Court reasonably in-
curred in this cause be taxed in said Circuit Court pursuant
to rule 24 of this court; it is further ordered that the appel-
Jant, Fontaine LeMaistre, recovered from said appellees
$270.15 for his costs expended in the proceeding in certiorari
in the Supreme Court of the United States and that appel-
lant have execution for all of said costs.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ.,

concur.

282

DELANO HOTEL, INC, a Florida Corporation, and BEN HOW
REALTY, INC,, a Florida Corporation, v. COLEY OF MIAMI BEACH,
a Municipal Corporation, EDWARD J. SINGER, REBA SINGER
(his wife), SAMUEL KULOK, and CONSTANCE KULOK (his
wife), as partners doing business under the firm name of
NATIONAL HOTEL, and WILLIAM H. SIMON.

34 So, (2nd) 459 January Term, 1948 °
March 19, 1948 Division B

Abe Schonfeld, Kunkel & White and R. EH. Kunkel, for
‘appellants.

_ Ben Shepard, Broad & Cassel and Vincent C. Giblin, for
appellees.
BARNS, J.:

The appellants, having filed their bill of complaint, the ap-
pellees filed their motion to dismiss, and, upon hearing, the
chancellor sustained the motion to dismiss and dismissed the
bill, whereupon the appellants bring this, their appeal.

Upon an inspection of the bill, it appears that it is not
entirely without equity; wherefore the decree appealed is re-
versed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

PC
THOMAS A. SPIERS v. SARAH GLENN SPIERS
34 So. (2nd) 484 January Term, 1948
March 19, 1948 . -" ‘Bn Bane

Lyle D. Holcomb and Dante B. Fassell, for appellant.
Jack Moore, for appellee.
PER CURIAM:

From a careful consideration of the'record this court con-
cludes that the chancellor was too generous to the appellee in
fixing alimony payments; so the same are reduced from $50
monthly to $25 monthly until further order of the chancellor,
and the decree in other respects is—

Ll
——
288

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ.,
concur.

CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ., dissent.
CHAPMAN, J., dissenting.

It is my view that the facts adduced do not justify a de-
cree for alimony in any amount the eighty year old husband.
The record discloses that he now possesses only a small sum
of money accumulated over the years to be used to sustain
him in his declining years or to pay the costs of burial in the
event of death. He has no income whatsoever and his ad-
vanced age precludes his earning a livelihood. The wife, on
the other hand, sued him for alimony about six months after
their marriage and it appears that she enjoys reasonably good
health, is now sixty-seven years of age and capable of making
her own living.

BARNS, J., concurs,

SAMUEL WEISS and SOL GEWANTER, Co-Partners, d/b/a COOPER
LIQUORS, v. JOSEPH MARCUS and AL COLDMAN,

34 So. (2nd) 550 January Term, 1948
March 19, 1948 Division B

Murrell, Fleming & Flowers, for petitioners.
Louis M. Jepeway & 8. Erroll Mestreazat, for respondents.
BARNS, J.:

‘This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 34 to review an
interlocutory order in chancery.

Petitions for certiorari to review trial court’s rulings must
designate particular order or decree of which review is sought
and also show with particularity alleged harmful error, and,
if matters supporting charge of error are too lengthy to be
copied into petition in haec verba they should be pleaded ac-
cording to their tenor and effect with appropriate page refer-
encces to the record.

The plaintiffs below filed a bill, to which the defendants
filed their answer and thereupon the plaintiffs set the cause
down for hearing on “motion for decree on bill and answer”
pursuant to Section 63.40 F.S. 1941, F.S.A. And upon the’
hearing the chancellor decreed as follows:

“It is hereby ordered that the plaintiff's motion for decree
on bill and answer be and the same hereby is denied. In ac-
cordance with the provisions of Section 40 of the 1931
Chancery Act the plaintiff shall have the right to proceed to
trial notwithstanding the denial of said motion for decree on
bill and answer.”

This decree petitioners now seek to have reviewed. Plain~
tiffs’ position in their petition for certiorari is that:

Le
Le
285

“The plaintiffs made a motion for decree on bill and
answer, and the decree appealed from denied this motion and
gave the plaintiffs the right to proceed to trial. The plaintiffs
do not care to go to trial inasmuch as all of the facts are set
forth in the pleadings of the plaintiffs admitted by the de-
fendants or in the pleadings of the defendants, or in the or-
ders of Court.”

Of course upon hearing on bill and answer the only mat-
ters to be considered by the chancellor are the plaintiffs’ bill
and the defendants’ answer, and the facts found by the court
in its preliminary order upon a hearing upon application for
a temporary injunction are of no consequence at such a hear-
ing.
The last construction of this Court of the foregoing Sec-
tion will be found in the case of Schupler v. Eastern Mortgage
Co., 33 So. (2nd) 586, 592, wherein it was stated:

“The sufficiency of the answer as a defense may be tested
by setting the cause down for a hearing on a ‘motion for de-
cree on bill and answer’ as provided by Sec. 63.40, F.S.A., upon
which hearing the allegations of the answer, according to
their legal effect, will predominate and control over the alle-
gations of the bill. See Whittaker v. Eddy, 109 Fla. 535, 147
So. 868.”

Upon a hearing upon bill and answer it is appropriate for
the Court, subject to further proceedings provided for by
Section 63.40, supra, to enter an order for or a final decree,
in accordance with the equities, being guided by the alle-
gations of the pleadings and the effect thereof on such a hear-
ing. See Whittaker v. Eddy, supra.

The petition is granted and the order quashed.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, and SEBRING, JJ.,
concur. .

CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur specially.

ADAMS, J., concurring specially:

I concur in the opinion, conclusion and judgment but am
also of the opinion that the suit should be dismissed pursuant
to authority of Baker v. Hi Hat 159 Fla. 286, 31 So. (2nd) 275.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, CHAPMAN and SE-
BRING, JJ., concur.

a
286

DEAUVILLE CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, v. IVY T.
BLOUNT, as Trustee; DEAUVILLE CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation, v. IV¥ IT. BLOUNT, as Trustee and CHARLES A.
CARROLL; DEAUVILLE CORPORATION, a Delawaie Corpora-
tion, v. IV¥ T. BLOUNT, as Trustee, and FRANK 0. PRUITT.

34 So. (2nd) 537 January Term, 1948
March 19, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied April 23, 1948

Charles Danton, Redfearn & Ferrell and James Lathero,
for appellant.

Murrell, Fleming & Flowers for Ivy T. Blount, Walter
Humkey for Frank O. Spain, George J. Baya for Charles A.
Carroll and Thomas H. Anderson, for Frank O. Pruitt, ap-
pellees.

ADAMS, J.:
This appeal relates to the propriety of an award of fees
to a receiver and the attorneys for the receiver.

A receiver was appointed for the Deauville Corporation.
Upon review to this court we held in Deauville Corporation v.
Blount, 157 Fla. 753, 26 So. (2nd) 884:

“Tt is our view that the opinion and judgment if this Court
dated April 16, 1946, was determinative of the cause and the

ee
[|
287

only order to be entered in the lower court was one of dis-

missal. Therefore the petition for interlocutory -certiorari

is hereby granted and the order dated May 20, 1946, as en-

tered below is hereby quashed, without prejudice to the entry

of appropriate orders for the payment of costs and expenses
" lawfully incurred to date hereof.”

In the meantime the receiver and his attorneys had ren-
dered varied and substantial services for the corporation for
which the lower court made an award and ordered same to be
paid by the corporation.

It is urged that the award should not have been made and
also that if proper the amount decreed was excessive.

The rule is well established in this state that the cost in
equity cases does not always fall upon the loser as a matter of
course. A general rule, supported by good authority, is
stated in 45 Am. Jur., Sec. 290, Page 224:

“Courts generally are vested with large discretion in de-
termining who shall pay the cost and expenses of receiver-
ships. The court may assess the costs of a receivership
against the fund or property in receivership or against the
applicant for the receivership, or it may apportion them
among the parties, depending upon circumstances.”

Application of the rule would be otherwise in cases where
the court appoints a receiver without jurisdiction. Here the
court had jurisdiction on both parties and subject matter, but
simply erroneously exercised same.

In this case the chancellor was confronted with a situation
where the receiver and his attorneys had rendered a valuable
service which redounded to the financial benefit of the corpo-
ration in receivership. In other words, the factual situation
presented a case to support a decree against the corporation
in receivership.

As to the amount being excessive, we are unwilling to put
the chancellor in error because there is ample evidence, mostly
uncontradicted, to sustain the amount of the decree.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J. CHAPMAN, J., and JACKSON, Associate
Justice, concur. .

288

STATE OF FLORIDA v. JAMES H. SMITH, also known as ROBERT

G. SMITH.
34 So. (2nd) 533 January Term, 1948
March 23, 1948 Division A.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Jame H. Smith, in proper person, for appellee.
SEBRING, J.:

On September 4, 1947, an information was filed in the
Criminal Court of Record of Duval County against the Ap-
pellee Smith, charging him with having twice been convicted

Le
Le
289

of felony contrary to Section 775.09 Florida Statutes 1941. A
motion to quash the information was filed by the appellee.
Thereafter, the trial judge made his order sustaining said
motion to quash. The State of Florida, under authority of
section 924.02 and 924.07, Florida Statutes 1941, has taken
an appeal from the order.

The information charged in substance that on May 29,
1945, in Duval County, the appellee was convicted of the
larceny of an automobile and sentenced to serve a term of
five years in the State Prison; that while serving the sen-
tence he escaped from the State Prison and returned to Duval
County where, on July 20, 1947, he committed another felony
and subsequently on August 26, 1947 was duly tried and
found guilty thereof and was sentenced by the Criminal Court
of Record of Duval County to serve a sentence of three years
therefor, the sentence to commence after the expiration of the
sentence therefor imposed for the first offense committed;
that both the judgments are in full force and effect and there-
fore the appellee has been duly convicted of two felonies con-
trary to the provisions of section 775.09 “Florida Statutes,
1941.

“The reason given by the trial judge for quashing the mo-
tion is contained in his order. The order recites, that it is
“Ordered and adjudged that the information on file herein
and each and every count thereof be and the same is hereby
quashed for the reason that it affirmatively appears from the
information that the Defendant has not had an opportunity
for reformation after the conviction of the first felony
charged in the information and that the Defendant has not
completed the punishment prescribed for the first felony
charged in said information.”

The first question raised by the State on appeal is whether
or not the information which was quashed was sufficient to
charge the offense denounced by section 775.09, Florida
Statutes, 1941; that is to say, the second conviction of a
felony.

Section 775.09, supra, provides that “A person who, after
having been convicted within this state of a felony or an

290

attempt to commit a felony ... commits any felony within
this state is punishable upon conviction of such second offense
as follows: If the subsequent felony is such that upon a first
conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment
for any term less than his natural life then such person must
be sentenced to imprisonment for a term no less than the
Jongest term nor more than twice the longest term prescribed
upon a first conviction.”

It will be observed that the requirements of the statute
with regard to second offenders are (1) that the accured be
convicted of a felony; (2) that such person, after said con-
viction, commit another felony of this state; and (3) that he
be convicted of such second felony. The information filed in
the case at bar fully meets these requirements.

The second question raised on the appeal is whether or not
the law requires that the alleged second offender shall have
fully completed the punishment prescribed for the commission
of the first felony before he can be sentenced as a second
offender.

The circumstances under which a person may be punished
as a second offender are prescribed by statute; and our statute
contains no requirement that a second offender must have
completed his sentence for the first crime, or any part there-
of, before he can be sentenced as a second offender after’ hav-
ing been duly convicted of a second felony. What the statute
requires is that the accused commit and be convicted of a
seccond felony in Florida “after having been convicted .. . of
a felony.” The word “convicted,” as used in the statute,
means the adjudication by the court of the defendant’s guilt
and the pronouncement by the court of the penalty imposed
on the defendant upon the acceptance of a plea of guilty or
upon a verdict of guilty, or a finding of guilty by the court.
See Secs. 921.01 and 921.05 Florida Statutes 1941. It has
nothing to do with the actual service of imprisonment as the
result of the sentence imposed pursuant to the adjudication
of guilt. See Smith v. State, 75 Fla. 468, 78 So. 530; Timmons
v. State, 97 Fla. 23, 119 So. 393.

The order appealed from should be reversed.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C, J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

291

JAMES T. VOCELLE, as Director of the State Beverage Department
of the State of Florida, his agents, employees, and all those claim-
ing by, through or under him, v. JOHN MALESZEWSKIL, JR.

34 So. (2nd) 436 January Term, 1948

March 23, 1948 Special Division B

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and D. Fred McMullen,
for appellants.

W. W. Flournoy, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

The appellee held a beer license which was revoked after a
hearing before the appellant, whereupon the appellee brought
a suit in equity to restrain the revocation of the beer license.

The appellant filed his answer to the bill and a final hear-
ing the chancellor entered a final decree enjoining the revoca-
tion of the license by the Director.

Appellant has assigned as error the action of the chancel-
lor in denying appellant’s “motion to dismiss” plaintiff's ap-
pellee’s bill.

This raises the question of whether or not the bill has
equity. The only material allegations of the bill are that ap-
pellee has spent $11,000 in the purchase and improvement of
his place of business; that he was a holder of a license to sell
beer and that the Director-apellant gave him notice of revoca-
tion of his beer license upon specific charges; that pursuant
thereto a hearing was had before the Director and the Direc-
tor revoked the license “without any basis in fact or in law.”

A suit in equity cannot be used for the purpose of procur-
ing a review of the proceedings of a board, commission or
commissioner. Common law certiorari is the appropriate
method of judicial review of such proceedings when there is
no prescribed method. See State Beverage Department v.
Willis, 32 So. (2nd) 580, and other authorities therein cited.

|
292

The bill is without equity, and the decree appealed is re-
versed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

JOSEPH M. SAUCER, et al, v. CHRIST EFSTATHION, as Executor,

ete., et al.
84 So. (2nd) 435 January Term, 1948
March 23, 1948 En Bane

Fred 8. Rizk, for appellants.
Walton & Walton, for appellees.
CHAPMAN, J.:

On June 14, 1946, the Circuit Court of Putnam County,
Florida, in the case at bar, enered a declaratory decree and in
part held that Joheph M. Saucer and Jamily Mallen were en-
titled to the immediate possession of described homestead
property, with the rents, issues and profits derived or received
therefrom, or the value thereof, since the death of Marti Ellis
Saucer on March 14, 1943, and the defendants were required
to surrender the immediate possession of the described home-

stead property and make an accounting to the Court for rents,
issues and profits derived or received therefrom. The decree
on appeal was affirmed by this Court. See Efstathion v.
Saucer, 158 Fla. 422, 29 So. (2nd) 304.

Counsel for plaintiffs below, on April 28, 1947, after our
mandate went down, filed in the cause a petition for an ac-
counting in which it was contended that they were entitled to
rents after March 14, 1948, the date of Martha Saucer’s death,
until March 1, 1947, in the total sum of $1,080.00. On August
18, 1947, an order was entered allowing rents from the date of
the entry of the declaratory decree on June 14, 1946, until
March 1, 1947, in the total sum of $191.25, and disallowed the
claim for rents from March 14, 1948, until June 14, 1946.
Plaintiffs appealed.

293

The following question is posed for adjudication: Does
not the declaratory decree of the Circuit Court, judicially de-
termining the appellants to be owners in fee simple of the
homestead property involved, and of 2/3 interest in the

corner-stone involved, since March 14, 1943, and declaring
.them entitled to the rents, issues and profits derived by the
appellees or the value thereof, since said date, when fully
affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal, become the law of
the case, which the lower court in subsequent proceedings
may not alter, change or modify?

It is the contention of counsel for appellants that the law
of the case was established on the former appeal and the
Chancellor below was without authority to alter or change the
law of the case. Numerous authorities from this court are
cited to sustain this view. We are in full accord with the au-
thorities cited and relied upon, but we are not fully convinced
that they are here controlling. The Chancellor below, when
entering the order challenged on this appeal, was doing noth-
ing more or less than construing or interpreting the decree by
him entered in this cause under date of June 14, 1946. It is
true that the rights of the plaintiffs accrued on the death of -
Martha Saucer on March 14, 1943, but the rights of the
plaintiffs were not judicially determined or established until
the entry of the final decree dated June 14, 1946.

P|
294

In the case of Atkinson v. Schilman, 60 Fla. 301, 53 So.
844, we held that judgments and decrees are to be construed.
with reference to the subject matter before the Court pro-
nouncing them. On appeal here the burden of establishing
error rests on the one asserting it. It is our view and con-
clusion that the plaintiffs have failed to carry the burden
cast upon them by law.

Affirmed.
TERRELL, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, C. J., and SEBRING, J., dissent.

. a

T, BL SURRENOY v. WINN & LOVETT GROCERY COMPANY, a
corporation.

34 So. (2nd) 564 January Term, 1948

March 23, 1948 En Banc

|
295

Will O. Murrell, for appellant.

Howell, McCarthy, Lane & Howell, for appellee.
BARNS, J.: ‘

After the settlement of the pleadings, the appellees-
defendants sought to take the deposition of the appellant-
plaintiff, the plaintiff refused to submit himself for question-
ing, the court dismissed plaintiffs suit, and the plaintiff ap-
pealed.

The basis for taking the deposition of the plaintiff by the
defendant was Chapter 24041, Acts 1947, being Section 91.30,
F.S.A., as follows:

“An Act Relating to Depositions in Chancery and Civil
Cases.

“Be It enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

“Section 1. Depositions in Chancery and Civil Cases in
the courts of the State may be taken and used under the same
circumstances and conditions and for the same purposes and
according to the same procedure that depositions are per-
mitted to be taken and used in the District courts of the
United States under and pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. :

“Section 2. The procedure authorized by this Act shall be
deemed cumulative and in addition to all provisions of law and
rules of court now in force governing the taking and use of de-
positions in Chancery and Civil Cases in the courts of the
State, and shall be applicable in all cases now pending or here-
after instituted.

“Section 3.\ This Act shall take effect immediately upon
becoming a law.”

A comparable situation was created by the enactment in

1828 of the original Act of what is now Section 62.15, F.S.
1941, F.S.A., as follows:

EE
296

“62.15. Practice in chancery in absence of statute or
court rule.—In the abence of provisions of the law or rules of
practice of this state, the rule of practice in the courts of
equity in the United States, as prescribed by the Supreme
Court thereof, under the Act of Congress of the 8th of May,
one thousand, seven hundred and ninety-two, shall be rules for
the practice of the courts of this state when exercising equity
jurisdiction; and when the rules of practice so directed by the
Supreme Court do not apply, the practice of the courts shall
be regulated by the practice of the high court of chancery of
England.” :

It will be observed that this chapter in question which will
be hereinafter referred to as “Section 91.30,” like 62.15, supra,
relates to adjective or procedural law, and not to substantive
law. It is remedial in its nature and for that reason should
receive a liberal interpretation.

Section 91.30, supra, is a “reference statute” and in refer-
ence to such statutes, American Jurisprudence states:

“Statutes which refer to other statutes and make them
applicable to the subject of the new legislation, are called
‘reference statutes.’ The purpose of such practice is to in-
corporate into the new act the provisions of other statutes by
reference and adoption, and thereby to avoid encumbering the
statute books by unnecessary repetition. In the absence of
constitutional restrictions reference statutes are frequently
recognized as an approved method of legislation. ..”—50 Am.
Jur., 57—Statutes—Sec. 36.

The foregoing authority cites the case of Van Pelt v.
Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, L.R.A. 1918E 639, for au-
thority. :

In the construction of Section 62.15, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.,
this Court has held such Act to be ambulatory and that the
practice would change with the change of the adoption pro-
cedure. See Farrell v. Forest Investment Co., 73 Fla. 191, 74
So. 216. -

Rule 26 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure en-
titles the defendant in such a case in the District courts of the
United States to take the deposition of the plaintiff.

297

When a plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of a court and
seeks to avail himself of it he does so with the understanding
that he must abide by all lawful statutes, rules and orders
applicable to him, and the court has inherent power to impose
the sanction of dismissal, for its coercive effect. Ray v.
Williams, 55 Fla. 723, 46 So. 158; State v. Tedder, 123 Fla.
188, 166 So. 595.

Appellant complains that Chapter 24041 violates Section
16 of Article III of the Constitution, which requires that each
act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed
in the title. We find the act to be in compliance with the
Constitution in this respect.

The act is constitutional, the defendant had the right to
take the deposition of the plaintiff according to the provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the trial judge
did not err in imposing the sanction of dismissal.

The judgment of dismissal is not on the merits and there-
fore not res judicata.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and
SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Leeper see
GEORGE T. BAKER v. J. D. STETSON COLEMAN
34 So. (2nd) 588 January Term, 1948
March 28, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied April 24, 1948

Thomas H. Anderson, Herbert L. Nadeau, for appellant.

McKay, Dixon, DeJarnette & Bradford, for appellee.
TERRELL, J.:

Appellee sted appellant for breach of the following op-
tion to purchase five hundred shares of capital stéck of Na-
tional Air Lines, dated April 29, 1941:

“In accordance with your request, I am pleased to give you
an option to purchase 500 shares of the common stock of
.National Airlines, Incorporated, at $7.50 a share provided you
exercise this option at the same time I exercise the option I
hold to purchase 100,000 shares of the common stock of this
Company. “In any event, this option to you shall be wholly
void and of no effect after April 1, 1944. It will be necessary
for you to keep me advised by registered mail of any changes
of address and in the event this is not done, your option will
be void.”

The declaration was in three counts. After alleging the
option, the first count among other things, alleged that on or
about December 15, 1943, the plaintiff gave defendant the fol-
lowing notice of his intention to exercise the option:

“Enclosed please find copy of letter to my agent Mr. Paul
R. Scott of Miami, Fla. regarding my opinion on five hundred
shares of Nat. Airlines Stock at ($7.50) seven dollars fifty
cents per share issued to me by you as part of your option on
ten thousand shares. Mr. Scott has in his possession my
power of attorney giving him full and legal authority to act
in my name. I hereby state it is my intention to exercise said
option and that Mr. Scott has the right to act in my name.”

Le
a
299

There was a demurrer and a motion for compulsory
amendment to the declaration. A motion to strike the de-
murrer was denied, the demurrer was overruled, pleas were
filed and the case was tried before the Court without a jury.
A motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the plain-
tiff’s case was overruled, and final judgment was entered for
the plaintiff, appellee-here. This appeal was prosecuted from
the final judgment.

Several questions are urged but the only question we feel
impelled to answer is whether or not appellee exercised his
option in the time and manner required by its terms. If this
question requires an affirmative answer the stock should be
delivered to him on payment of the price, otherwise his suit
should be dismissed.

The lower court answered in the affirmative, apparently on
the theory that the option was a continuing offer to sell
subject to call at the discretion of appellee. The effect of this
holding was to construe the transaction to be a bilateral
agreement and any time appellee notified appellant that he
was ready to exercise the option the stock should be delivered
to the purchaser, the consideration to be forthcoming on re-
ceipt of the stock.

In Acheson v. Smiths Inc. 110 Fla. 240, 148 So. 576, this
court held an option to be a continuing offer on the part of the
optioner to sell, and if limited to a certain time, it is essential
that it be accepted by the optionee within that time by com-
pliance with its terms, and if not accepted within the time
specified, the right to do so is lost. Such an option is accord-
ingly an executed unilateral contract and not an executory
one. It may be converted into an executory contract by com-
pliance with its terms.

The option in question is so clear on this point that it de-
fies interpretation. It was executed without consideration,
and gave appellee the privilege of purchasing 500 shares of
common stock of National Airlines, Inc. at $7.50 per share.
There is the proviso that it be exercised at the same time the
optionor exercised a certain other option he holds to purchase
100;000 shares of common stock of the same company, but
this proviso is limited by the second proviso, “in any event,

300

this option to you shall be wholly void and of no effect after
April 1, 1944.” The second proviso qualifies the option as a
whole by voiding it if not taken up.on or before the date
named. The first proviso faded out of the picture after that
date. It would hardly be possible to cut off the period for
exercising the option in clearer terms. .

On December 15, 1943, as shown by the notice here quoted,
appellee advised appellant that Mr. Paul R. Scott, a very
reputable attorney of Miami, had his power of attorney, giving
him full and legal authority to act in his name, that it was
his “intention” to exercise the option and that Mr. Scott was
authorized to act, for him. There followed some correspon-
dence about the option, including instructions to Mr. Scott as
to how to raise the money and call the option, but at no time
did appellee or his agent come forward with the considera-
tion and demand delivery of the stock.

We find nothing in the record that comes closer to exercis-
ing the option than the statement that it was appellee’s “in- _
tention” to do so. “My intention to exercise said option,” im- .
plies a date to do so at some time in the future, but there is
no indication when, nor was it accompanied by the considera-
tion for the stock. It is perfectly evident that the option
could ‘not be exercised after April 1, 1944, and then by ap-
pellee offering the consideration and making demand on ap-
pellant for the stock, which was never done. It may be in-
ferred from the record that Mr. Scott did not exercise the
option because he could not find it in appellee’s files. Appel-
lant did not deny giving the option, but stated that he had
no recollection of doing so.

The terms of the option were such that there was no room
for negotiation as to the amount required to take up the
stock. Five hundred shares at $7.50 per share was simple
to calculate and Mr. Scott might have as well been advised to
close the transaction when he was clothed with power of at-
torney by appellee. We do find where Scott was instructed on
December 15, 1943, to “borrow the money to take up the stock
and then sell sufficient to pay off the loan.” But we do not
find where any other instructions were given him or that any
other effort was made to exercise the option prior to April 1,

301

1944. In fact there is no showing to this date that tender in
cash or its equivalent has been made to appellant and delivery
of the stock demanded.

Appellee attempts to neutralize the foregoing with the
contention that appellant’s letter of April 29, 1941, and ap-
pellee’s letter of December 15, 1943, constitute an executory
bilateral contract, in that each party promised the other
something and each was bound by his promise. The conten-

- tion is based on the familiar rule that when one buys personal
property at a stipulated price and no time of payment is
stated, the law presumes that the price will be paid at the
time of delivery. In other words, the transaction is for a cash
consideration and when this is the case, payment and delivery
of the goods are concurrent.

There can be no quarrel with this rule under circum-
stances where it may be properly invoked, but no such circum-
stances exist in this case. The time for exercising the option
here was as definite as words could make it. From the in-
structions given Scott we must assume that appellee was
aware that his time was limited to April 1, 1944, whether ap-
pellant exercised his option to buy the ten thousand shares or
not. It is no answer to say that appellee was no more re-
quired to trust appelant, than appellant was required to trust
appellee. The point is that appellee had an option to purchase
that expired on April 1, 1944, and the only way he could exer-
cise it was to put the cash “on the barrel head” and demand
delivery of the stock. He cannot, after the time expires, sub-
limate an inadequate offer devoid of the essence of the con-
tract, into a bona fide offer to exercise his option within the
time required.

It is also charged that appellant was responsible for ap-
pellee’s inaction, in that he repudiated the contract and
waived the date for performance. It is a fact that appellee
was in the foreign military service when he gave Scott his
power of attorney to exercise the option and when he re-
turned to this country, there was considerable correspondence
on the point of whether or not appellee had an option, but this
all took place after the time limit for exercising expired and
since nothing more than an “intention” had been shown to

a
302

exercise this negotiation, is not material. It might have been
a generous jesture on the part of appellant to have extended
appellee’s time to exercise his option for a period after he
returned to the States, but the law does not so require and
time was the essence of the option. .

An “intention” to exercise an option of this kind does not
meet the requirements of the law. Such options are strictly
construed and can be satisfied only by a positive and un-
equivocal declaration to accept. Orlando Realty Board Cor- -
poration v. Hilpert, 93 Fla. 954, 113 So. 100; Bullock v. Har-
wick, et al., 158 Fla. 834, 30 So. (2nd) 539; Christian-Feigen-
span v. Popowska, 75 N.J. Eq. 342, 72 A. 1003; Grey v. Nickey
Brothers, Inc. 271 Fed. 249.

We think the option in question was tantamount to a fully
executed unilateral contract and required appellee or his
agent to tender the purchase price for the stock on or before
April 1, 1944. We do not think the charge of repudiation or
waiver is well grounded because the pertinent circumstances
transpired after the time limit for exercising the option, and
failure in this voided the option, so the trial court committed
error in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
Obviously the circuit judge felt that the present case was con-
trolled by our decision in Coleman v. Baker, 157 Fla. 344, 25
So. (2nd) 862, an appeal from the circuit court of Duval
County wherein the merits of the declaration were tested.
Holding that conviction he endeavored faithfully to follow
what he considered to be the law of the case but this was an
appeal from a final judgment rendered after a trial before the
judge on.the facts.

The judgment appealed from is accordingly reversed with
directions to dismiss the action.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

CHAPMAN, J., dissenting:

I am unable to concur in this opinion and judgment be-

cause I believe it is in conflict with our previous holding when

the cause was considered and an opinion and judgment pre-
pared by Mr. Justice ADAMS. See 157 Fla. 344, 25 So. (2nd)
862.

BARNS, J., concurs.
BARNS, J., dissenting:

In this case jury trial was waived and the trial judge |
entered a judgment for the plaintiff on June 10, 1947. :

On June 24, 1947, the defendant filed a “motion to vacate
the judgment” which was denied on July 29, 1947.

On July 29, 1947, the defendant filed a motion for new
trial, which motion plaintiff moved to strike, both of which
motions were denied.

The appellee has filed a motion to strike the stenographic
report of the trial proceedings, commonly known as a “bill of
exceptions,” upon the ground that a motion for new trial was
not filed within four days and for that reason the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the judgment cannot be brought
into question.

One purpose of a Motion for New Trial is to procure a
ruling of the trial court on matters which have not been con-
sidered and adjudged by it under the circumstances existing
when the motion is made. It is not the purpose of a Motion
for New Trial to merely procure a second ruling on the same
subject matter as previously presented and ruled upon with-
out a material change in the circumstances.

Our Common Law Rules provide:

_ “Rule 74. Exceptions Unnecessary.

“(a) Adverse rulings.—Upon all appellate proceedings in
actions at law the appellate court shall review, without ex-
ception having been taken in the trial court, any question of
law involved in any adverse ruling, order, instruction or thing
whatsoever said or done at the trial or prior thereto or after
verdict, which thing was said or done after objection made
and considered by the trial court, and which affected the sub-
stantial rights of the party complaining and which is as-
signed as error and thereupon the appellate court may re-
verse, affirm or modify the judgment or order appealed from,
and may set aside, affirm or modify any and all the proceed-

303

304

ings subsequent to or dependent upon such judgment or order,
and may, if proper, order a new trial.

And before the adoption of the foregoing Rule in 1936 this
Court had held: :

“Where charge directing verdict duly excepted to when
given, motion for new trial and ruling thereon not necessary.
Greenblatt v. J. R. Bissell Dry Goods Co., 85 Fla. 83, 95 So.
302.” . se

Want of Motion for New Trial does not preclude Supreme
Court from reviewing rulings of Circuit Court, exceptions to
which, duly taken during trial, are properly embodied in
record. Holstun v. Embry, 124 Fla: 554, 169 So. 400.

Section 54.24 F.S. 1941, F.S.A., among-other things pro-
vides:

“Tt shall not be necessary to incorporate, in motions for
new trials, any matters in pais previously excepted to, for the
purpose of having the same reviewed by an appellate
court....” :

Except for good reason, when jury is waived and the trial
judge enters judgment, a motion for new trial is not neces-
sary in order for the Supreme Court to consider the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. *

Since exceptions to adverse rulings are allowed by rule of
court as of course and since the reason for requiring a motion
for new trial, when the issues of fact are tried by a jury, are
not applicable when a jury trial is waived, the errors of a
trial judge or issues of fact tried by him may be considered
by this court without the necessity of a motion for new trial.
One harmful error on the same point’ under like circum-
stances is sufficient for appellate purposes.

The bill of exceptions is very material to this appeal. ‘ It
is authenticated as provided for by Supreme Court Rule
11(3) and the motion to strike should be denied.

As stated in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice TER-
RELL, what we are impelled to answer is “whether or not ap-
pellee exercised his option in the time and manner required
by its terms.”

305

The option given by Baker is set forth in haec verba in
the case of Coleman v. Baker, 25 So. (2nd) 862, and the pur-
ported exercise of this option is likewise set forth therein.
Coleman’s letter was plead as an exercise of such option and
this Court was called upon to adjudicate whether or not the
appellee, Coleman, had exercised the option, and this Court,
after quoting the offer and acceptance, held the declaration
stated a cause of action. The declaration in this suit is sub-
stantially the same as in Coleman v. Baker (supra) and the
trial judge found for plaintiff upon the declaration and de-
fendant’s pleas.

The option seems to have been without consideration,
therefore could have been withdrawn ‘before acceptance. It
was not withdrawn before the purported acceptance.

If Baker had seen fit to require the option to be exercised
by the tender of cash, he could have so specified. After the
offer was made and accepted it became an executory contract,
subject to either’ party’s placing the other in default as to
performance in accordance with the principles of law set
forth in Sandford v. Cloud, 17 Fla. 532.

Coleman, in his letter of acceptance of Baker's offer or
exercise of his option dated December 15, 1943, did state:
“.. Ido hereby state it is my intention to exercise said op-
tion...” If this was subject to a construction of a future
intention or a present intention, then in the prior case it was
given the latter construction, wherein this Court stated that
“the plaintiffs letter was ‘an election.’” If we are to now
conclude that it was not, we must give a better reason.

The ruling in Coleman v. Baker, supra, was only con-
clusive as to the sufficiency of the declaration. It was in this
case subject to proof and defensive peadings and proof.

The trial judge found the issues upon the pleading to have
been established in favor of the plaintiff, Coleman, and if the
judgment is to be reversed it must be on the ground that the
evidence fails to support the issues on behalf of the plaintiff-
appellee, and that it was thereupon error to enter judgment
for plaintiff. I fail to find that the appellant has carried
this burden.

CHAPMAN, J., concurs.

Le
306

RUFUS E. SMITH v. THE CETY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation,
and GEORGE N. SHAW, as Direotor of Finance of The City of
Miami, a municipal corporation.

34 So. (2nd) 544 January Term, 1948
March 23, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied April 10, 1948

307

Mi

R. K. Bell, for appellant.

J. W. Watson, Jr., Franklin Parson, Keen, O’Kelley &
Spitz, J. Velma Keen and Chas. H. Spitz, for appellees.

SEBRING, J.:

Rufus E. Smith is a retail merchant in the City of
Miami. He has brought this suit for a declaratory decree
and seeks to have his rights defined under two certain ordi-
nances of the City of Miami which attempt to levy and im-
pose an excise tax on tobacco products sold within the cor-
porate limits of the City.

In his bill of complaint the plaintiff alleges that he oper-
ates a drug store in the City of Miami for the retail sale of
drugs and other merchandise including cigarettes and other
tobacco products; that he holds an occupational license as
issued for the separate classification of drug stores under

ee
308

the Charter of the City of Miami which authorizes him to
sell tobacco products at retail and that he also holds a State
occupational license for the retail sale of such products.
The plaintiff also alleges that the City of Miami- enacted
Ordinance No. 3140, on July 25, 1946, imposing an excise
tax on the retail sale of tobacco products, under which a
tax amounting to one cent for each ten cents, or the frac-
tional part thereof, of the retail price of tobacco products
was imposed, to be paid by the “seller” of tobacco products,
as defined in the ordinance. The plaintiff alleges, further,
that thereafter, on October 2, 1946, the City amended its
original tax ordinance by adopting Ordinance No. 3191, un-
der the title of which the tax is to be paid by “every dealer
in or seller of” tobacco products, in the alternative, but un-
der the terms of the body of which the tax is required to be
paid by “every dealer or other agent,” as defined by the
ordinance.

The plaintiff charges that the excise tax on tobacco
products attempted to be imposed by Ordinance No, 3140 as
amended by Ordinance No. 3191, nullifies his right under
his occupational license privilege for which he has paid,
and that the City of Miami lacked charter or statutory au-
thority to impose the tax levied under the ordinances.

The answer of the City of Miami traverses the allega-
tions of the bill of complaint under which it was contended
that the ordinances were unenforceable and sets forth the
provisions of the charter under which the City claimed to
derive its power to enact the ordinances which the plaintiff
sought to invalidate.

At final hearing based on the bill, answer, and a stipu-
lation of the parties as to certain facts material to the con-
troversy, the Circuit Court entered its final decree holding
that the ordinances in question were valid. The plaintiff
has taken an appeal from the decree of the chancellor.

Ordinance No. 3140 was adopted by the City of Miami
on July 25, 1946. It amended chapter 52 of the City Code.
by adding thereto eleven new sections, numbered 41 to 51
inclusive. These eleven sections made provisions for the levy,
imposition and collection of an excise tax upon the retail sale

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of tobacco products in the municipality, to be paid by the
“seller,” defined by the ordinance to be any person “engaged
in the business of selling tobacco products who transfers title
or in whose place of business title to any of such products is
transferred within the corporate limits for any purpose other
than resale.”

Subsequently, on October 2, 1946, the City adopted Ordi-
nance No. 3191. This later ordinance amended section 41, 43,
44 and 47, but did not disturb section 42, chapter 52, brought
into the code through the enactment of Ordinance 3140.

Section 41 of Chapter 52 of the Code, as now amended by
Ordinance No. 3191, defines the various terms with which we
are concerned on this appeal, as the same are used in sections
41 to 51 inclusive, as follows:

“(£) The words “tobacco products’ shall mean and include
cigars, stogies, tobies, cigarettes, smoking tobacco, chewing
tobacco, snuff, and any other product of the tobacco plant,
prepared by drying and manufacturing processes, and used by
human beings either for smoking, or for chewing, or as snuff,
irrespective as to whether or not tobacco in any such product
is flavored, adulterated or mixed with any other ingredient.”

“(g) The word ‘sale’ shall mean and include every act or
transaction irrespective of the method or means employed ...
whereby title to any tobacco product shall be transferred from
the sellers . . . to any person within the corporation limits of
the City... ;”

“(h) The word ‘seller’ shall mean and include every person
engaged in the business of selling tobacco products who trans-
fers title or in whose place of business title to any such
products is transferred within the corporate limits of the City
for any purpose other than resale;”

“(i) The word ‘dealer’ shall mean and include every manu-
facturer, jobber, wholesale dealer or other person who sup-
plies a seller with tobacco products;”

“(j) The word ‘agent’ shall mean and include every dealer
and other person who shall be authorized by the Director of

Finance to purchase and affix stamps to tobacco products,

under the provisions of Section 43 of this Chapter;”

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310 :

“(k) The word ‘purchaser’ shall mean and include every
person to whom the title to any tobacco product is transferred.
by a seller within the corporate limits of the City;”

Section 42 of Chapter 52, which was enacted into the Code:
by Ordinance No. 3040 and which, as we have said, was not.
amended by Ordinance No. 3191, provides: “That, in addition
to all other taxes of every kind now imposed by law . . . there
is hereby levied and imposed by the City upon each and every
sale of any tobacco product ... an excise tax, the amount.
whereof, to be paid by the seller in the manner hereinafter
prescribed, shall be one cent (1c) for each ten cents (10c) or
fractional part thereof, of the retail price at which any such
tobacco product is sold, exclusive of such excise tax.”

Section 43 of Chapter 52 of the Code, as now amended by
Ordinance No. 3191, prescribes that “the-excise tax imposed
... Shall be paid by every dealer or other agent by affixing a.
stamp or stamps, or causing a stamp or stamps to be affixed,
to each and every package of tobacco products in the manner
and at the time hereinafter stated. Every dealer in the City
shall have the right to buy and affix such stamps as an agent,
and the Director of Finance may appoint, in addition to
dealers, such other persons as agents for the purpose of buy-
ing and affixing stamps as he may deem necessary; provided,
however, that a seller shall not be entitled to be appointed as
an agent.”

Section 44 of Chapter 52 of the Code, as now amended by
Ordinance No. 3191, provides for the mandatory purchase of
the stamps by dealers and the affixture of, such stamps to each
package of tobacco products prior to their delivery to the
seller. It requires every seller to examine all packaged to-
bacco products prior to exposing them for sale and to ascer-
tain that the proper excise stamps have been affixed. It pro-
vides that if upon such examination unstamped or improperly
stamped packages are discovered the seller shall notify the
dealer of the fact, who, in turn, shall either affix the required
stamps or replace the packages properly stamped. It pro-
vides, also, that if a seller obtains or acquires possession of

unstamped or improperly stamped packages from persons
other than a dealer, he shall notify the Director of Firiance of

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the fact, and the Director shall thereupon designate an agent
to affix the stamps, the purchase thereof to be with funds
advanced to the agent by the seller.

Section 47 of Chapter 52 of the Code, as now amended by ©

Ordinance No. 3191, defines the violations of the Act, and
‘makes it a violation for any person to perform, or fail to per-
form, any act for the purpose of evading the payment of the
tax, or for any dealer or seller to fail or refuse to perform
any of the duties imposed on him under the provisions of sec-
tion 44 of the chapter.

As the first question raised on the appeal the appellant
poses the following: Does the City of Miami have charter
power to levy both an occupational tax for regulatory pur-
poses and occupational tax for revenue purposes as a prece-
dent to or for the privilege of selling tobacco products at retail
or wholesale?

Section 5 of Article IX of the Constitution of Florida pro-
vides that: “The Legislature shall authorize the . . . incorpo-
rated cities or towns in the State to assess and impose taxes
for ... municipal purposes...” In pursuance of this pro-
vision of the Constitution the legislature has enacted section
167.43 Florida Statutes, 1941, which provides that “The City
or Town Council may raise . . . by license on professions, busi-
ness and occupations carried on within the corporation, all
sums of money which may be required for the improvement

“and good government of the city, and for carrying out the
powers and duties herein granted and imposed; and enforce
the receipt and collection of the same in the manner now pro-
vided by the laws of the state for the assessment and collec-
tion of state taxes and licenses.”

The legislature has also placed in the Charter Act of the
City of Miami the following provisions:

“See. 3. The City of Miami shall have power:

(a) To raise annually by taxes and assessments in said
city, such sums of money as the commission . . . shall deem
necessary for the purpose of said City, and in such manner as
shall be hereinafter provided for, and in accordance with the
constitution and laws of the State of Florida and the United
States;...”

312

“(bb) To license and tax privileges, business, occupations
and professions carried on and engaged in within the city
limits, and the amount of such licenses and the amount of
such license taxes shall not be dependent upon a general state
revenue law.”

“Sec. 49. In providing for licensing and regulating per-
sons, corporations and associations engaged in business, occu-
pations, professions and trades the commission may by ordi-
nance classify businesses and arrange the various businesses,
occupations, trades and professions carried on in the City
into such classes as may be just and proper and fix by ordi-
nance the license fee payable by each, without regard to the
State law fixing such fees.”

“Sec. 84. All general laws of the State, applicable to mu-
nicipal corporations, heretofore, or hereafter enacted and
which are not in conflict with the provisions of this charter or
with the ordinances or resolutions hereafter enacted by the
commission pursuant to authority conferred by this charter,
shall be applicable to said city; provided, however, that noth-
ing contained in this charter shall be construed as limiting
the power of the commission to enact any ordinance or resolu-
tion not in conflict with the constitution of the state or with
the express provisions of this charter.”

“Sec. 109. The enumeration of particular powers in this
charter shall not be deemed or held to be exclusive, but in
addition to the powers enumerated herein, implied thereby, or
appropriate to the exercise thereof, the said City shall have
and may exercise all other powers which are now, or may
hereafter be, possessed or enjoyed by cities under the Consti-
tution and. general laws of this State, and all the powers of the
City, whether expressed or implied, shall be exercised and
embraced in the manner prescribed in this‘ charter, or when
not so prescribed, then in such manner as may be provided by
ordinance or resolution of the Commission. (italics supplied)
See chapter 10847, Laws of Florida, 1925.

Under the provisions we have quoted, it is our view that
ample power is given the City to impose license taxes on
privileges, businesses, professions or occupations exercised or
carried on within the municipality, for the purpose of raising

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revenue as well as for the purpose of regulation. Section
167.43, supra, specifically authorizes the cities and towns of
the state to raise money required for improvement and good
government, through licenses on professions, businesses and
occupations. Section 3(bb) of its Charter Act empowers the
City of Miarhi not only to license but also to taw privileges,
businesses, occupations, and professions within the munici-
pality, and provides that the amount of the licenses and the
amount of the license tax shall not be dependent upon a
general state revenue law. Under these provisions it seems
entirely plain that the legislature intended that the city
should have the power to resort to licensing for revenue pur-
poses as well as for regulation, for otherwise it would not
have given the city the power “to tax” as well as to license
such activities. As stated in Lachman v. Walker, 52 Fla. 297,
42, So. 461, which involved the construction of charter pro-
visions very similar to the ones now under consideration: “To
hold that the power granted is a power to license merely, with
no revenue feature would be to ignore entirely the rest of the
sentence wherein the term ‘license’ is clearly shown to involve
the broader idea of a ‘license tax,’ which is further empha-
sized by special and added power given to this municipality
over others that the amount of such tax shall not be depen-
dent upon the general state revenue law.”

The next question posed by the appellant in his brief is
this: Where the taxing authority of a City is limited to the
levy of an occupational license tax as a condition precedent
to engaging in business, do not two levies, one for regulatory
purposes and the other for revenue purposes, result in the
breaking down of the single taxing privilege into its constitu-
ent elements and amount to double taxation?

The question is bottomed upon the mistaken assumption
that the City of Miami is limited by its charter, and the
general statutes pertaining to municipalities, solely to the
imposition of a license fee as a condition precedent to engag-
ing in business, but such is not the case. As the contention
that the tax imposed by the ordinance results in the breaking
down of the single taxing privilege into its constituent ele-
ments, thus amounting to a double taxation, we are unable to

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follow the argument of counsel. Subsection of section 41 of
the ordinance, which defines “tobacco products,” includes
within its definition all products of the tobacco plant used by
human beings for smoking, chewing, or for snuff. The ordi-
nance, therefore, is based on the whole of a general classifica-
tion of a taxable item rather than on the individual items
constituting the general classification.

“The appellant has failed to point out in his briefs how,
or in what manner, the tax imposed constitutes double taxa-
tion. The mere fact that the business of the plaintiff may be
taxed under two or more different classifications will not
thereby invalidate the tax on such business, either on the
ground of double taxation or any other ground. Such, in ef-
fect, was the holding of the chancellor who fully considered
and properly answered the contentions made, we think, in the
following appropriate language:

“In the first place, the express authority granted to the
City by its charter is not limited to imposing such a license
fee. The authority under Section 3(bb) is ‘to license and tax
privileges, business, occupations and professions carried on
and engaged in within the City limits...’

“Moreover, this tax does not represent an effort to place a
separate excise on an incident of a business. This tax is an
excise levied on persons who conduct a business properly
given separate classification for the purpose. The fact that
the amount of the tax is measured by the quantity of the
merchandise handled, and the fact that its rate is based on a
retail price prevailing for the product, and administrative
features, which do not serve to take the tax out of the
category of an excise tax on business engaged in within the
City limits, for the imposition of which authority is given ex-
pressly by the Charter. It adds up to the same thing, whether
you call it an excise tax on the business engaged in, or an
excise tax of engaging in the business. .. .”

“Paragraph 6 presents several questions. It is contended
there that payment of a retail dealers’ license tax under the
plaintiffs’ business classification of a druggist (which includes
authority for dealing in tobacco products), precludes the im-
position of this additional excise on the sale of such products;

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that classification of dealers or sellers of tobacco products for
such an additional tax is unreasonable and discriminatory;
and that the holding of a state occupational license for sale
of such products precludes the additional tax in question.

“Section 49 of the City charter gives express power for
the classification of businesses for the purpose of occupational
taxes. There is ample authority for separate classification of
persons in the business of selling tobacco products for the
purpose of imposing an excise tax thereon, and also for the
purpose of regulation of such business event to the point of
excluding the sale of such products entirely. Classifying such
business separately for an excise tax is not unreasonable or
discriminatory.

“Having the authority to levy an excise tax on such
business the City is not limited to the initial license charge.
There is no restriction in the law as to the amount of license
or occupational excise tax which can be thus imposed. Sec-
tion 3(bb) of the charter expressly provides that the amount
of such excise taxes shall not be dependent upon a general
state revenue law.

“There is no showing here that the amount of the tax is
such as to constitute confiscation. Just as the amount of the
tax could be enlarged in a single tax, the total desired could be
reached by separate imposts relating to the classified busi-
ness. There is nothing improper in having one tax or portion
of the tax represented by flat fee, as in this case, and an ad-
ditional excise on persons conducting the same business on a
graded scale depending on the volume of sales made in the
business. All dealers or sellers of these products on whom
the tax is imposed are treated alike so that there is no denial
of equal protection of the laws. The claim of double taxation,
in this same situation, has been rejected when it has arisen in
other States. The existence of a State excise on such business
does not preclude imposition of an excise tax by the City. In
fact the State laws make provision therefor.”

_ See also State ex rel. Goodwin v. Milburn, 118 Fla. 211,
158 So. 884; Bentley-Gray Dry Goods Co. v. City of Tampa,
187 Fla. 641, 188 So. 758; Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla, 285, 94 So.
615; Klemm v. Davenport, 100 Fla. 627, 129 So. 904.

316

The appellant states. as his final question the following:
Where a tax is levied against the retailer or the wholesaler,
in the alternative, with the result that the one escapes the
tax if the other pays it, and where the levy further provides
that the wholesaler must purchase stamps as evidence of pay-
ment of the tax and affix the stamps to the product before it
can be sold to the retailer, does not such a levy in effect coerce
the retailer to make his purchases from the local wholesaler,
and unlawfully channel trade through the wholesaler, and
further tend to create a monopoly?

We are unable to understand how it can be said that the
tax tends to create a monopoly, or how, by reason of its im-
position, the retailer is coerced into making his purchases
from a local wholesaler. The tax under the ordinance is levied
equally on all tobacco products, whether purchased by the
seller from without the municipality or furnished to him by a
local dealer. When tobacco products are brought in from out-
side the municipality, the seller is held responsible for seeing
that the stamps are properly affixed to the packages after
such articles have been received here and have been delivered
out of the flow of inter-state commerce. When the products
are purchased from the local dealer, the seller is forbidden
from offering them for sale unless they bear the package
stamp required by the ordinance. In either event the respon-
sibility for selling only stamped packages rests upon the
seller. .

The appellant also submits the contention that under our
ruling in City of Miami v. Kayfetz, (Fla.) 30 So. (2nd) 521,
the ordinance may not be upheld as valid. We are unable to
find anything that was said in that case pertinent to the issues
then before the court that is at variance with the views which.
we have expressed in this decision.

The decree appealed from should be affirmed, and it is so
ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

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CLARENCE E. TURNER v. CITY OF MIAMI, a Municipal Florida
corporation, and B. & B. STORES, INC., a Florida corporation.

34 So, (2nd) 551 January Term, 1948

March 23, 1948 Division A.

Louis M. Jepeway and Errol 8. Mestrezat, for appellant.

J. W. Watson, Jr., and John E. Cicero for City of Miami,
and Choate & Sinclair for B & B Stores, Inc., appellees.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The record in this case discloses that the appellant,
Clarence E. Turner, plaintiff below, operated a liquor package
store at 3596 N.W. 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida. He filed in
the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, a bill in equity and
therein prayed for a restraining order against the City of
Miami from the issuance of a similar license to operate a
liquor package store to B & B Stores, Inc., on the ground the
proposed location was less than 2500 feet from the Turner’s
package store place of business and fell within the inhibi-
tions of Ordinance No. 2896 of the City of Miami. On final
hearing the injunction was denied and the bill dismissed. An
application to amend the bill was by an appropriate order de-
nied and the plaintiff below appealed.

It is within the power of the officials of the City of Miami
to determine whether or not the proposed location of the
package store of B & B Stores, Inc., is within 2500 feet of an
existing licensee, to-wit, the package store of Clarence E.
Turner, located at 3596 N.W. 27th Avenue in the City of
Miami. If the proposed location is more than 2500 feet then a

318

license may be issued under Ordinance No. 2896. One of the
essential questions presented here is the authority or right of
Clarence E. Turner to maintain this suit in equity against the
City of Miami as its objective unquestionably is to prevent or
stifle competition within the trade area. It is generally held
that a license to operate a package store for, the sale of
whiskey is at most a mere personal and temporary permit or
privilege to be enjoyed so long as its conditions and restric-
tions are fully complied with—it authorizes to be done that
which could not be done without it. Its issuance is a matter
not of right but of legislative grace and may be extended,
limited or denied. City of Miami Beach v. Patrician Hotel
Co., 145 Fla. 716, 200 So. 213; Am. Jur. 296, par. 73.
Authorities have not been cited to show that the plaintiff
below, as a holder of a license to operate a package store
issued by the City of Miami, has the right to maintain a suit
in equity to restrain the city from issuing a similar license to
a potential competitor.

The case of Baker v. State ex rel. Hi-Hat Liquors, Inc.,
159 Fla. 286,31 So. (2nd) 275, was a mandamus proceeding to
require the State Beverage Department to revoke a retail
liquor package store license previously issued to Cliff Baker
on the ground that his place of business was within three
hundred feet of a school site, in violation of the statute.
Baker and Hi-Hat hold identical licenses and Hi-Hat’s place
of business was beyond the prescribed 300 feet zone, while
Baker’s was within the prescribed 300 feet zone. These par-
ties are competitors in the sale of intoxicating liquors and.
the purpose of the suit was to eliminate Baker as a competitor.

We held that Hi-Hat did not have such an interest in the

. controversy as would permit it to maintain a mandamus suit

to eliminate a potential competitor. We in part said (text 31
So. (2nd) page 276) ; .

“Neither licensee had anything more than a permit to
engage in the liquor business. Hach had the same right and
privileges. The law did not restrict competition beween them,
nor were they allotted any exclusive territorial areas. The
profits or commercial advantages which Hi-Hat might gain in

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the elimination of Baker’s competition are too elusive and
uncertain to sustain the action.”

The order dismissing the bill of complaint entered in the
lower court is affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
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TURNER FLEMING v. STATE OF FLORIDA

84 So, (2nd) 742 January Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied April 28, 1948

A. @. Campbell, Jr., and W. W. Flournoy, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

Turner Fleming was convicted of larceny of a bull by a
jury of Okaloosa County, Florida, and from a judgment and
sentence of two years in the State Prison has perfected an
appeal here. He contends that the evidence adduced by the
State failed to establish that the bull was taken animo furandi
as is essential to conviction within our holding in Kemp v.
State, 146 Fla. 101, 200 So. 368, and similar cases. The testi-
mony has been carefully studied and analyzed in light of
this contention and it is our conclusion that the felonious
taking, if any, of the bull was a question of fact for the jury.
Groover v. State, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, 26 A.L.R. 375.

On the point in issue the Court charged the jury, in part,
viz:

“The Court charges you, gentlemen, that any taking and
carrying away of the property of another, in order to consti-

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tute a crime, must be felonious, that is, with evil intent. An
open taking, and a peaceful taking, without an attempt to
conceal the taking of the property involved, raises a presump-
tion that there was no felonious intent. An honest taking, an
honest belief on the part of the one doing the taking and
charged with the crime, would not constitute larceny. An
honest belief that one has the right to take the property must
be not only honest, but it must be reasonable, a belief that a
reasonable, honest, and prudent and cautious man would be
justified in entertaining at the time of the taking. In other
words, the belief and the profession of the belief that the
taking was in good faih and honest, must not be a mere pre-
tense, but must, as I have said, be one that would be enter-
tained by a reasonable and cautious business man.”

It is our view that the requested instructions identified as
1, 2, 3 and 4 under our system must be considered in con-
nection with the istructions as given on this point by the trial
Court. See Hysler v. State, 132 Fla. 209, 181 So. 354.
Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur-
ring.

LOUISE TITCOMB v. SOLOMAN F. TITCOMB

34 So. (2nd) 742 January Term, 1948
April 2, 1948 . Division A.

321

Hubbard & Carr and David B. Newsom, for appellant.
W. Dow Woodward, for appellee.
CHAPMAN, J.:

The appellant, Louise Titcomb, filed in the Circuit Court of
Dade County, Florida, her suit for separate maintenance, un-
connected with divorce, under the provisions of section 65.07,
F.S.A. The relief prayed for was viz: (1) the right to live
apart from her husband in the home owned by her husband;
(2) the appointment of a receiver for her husband’s property;
(3) temporary and permanent alimony; (4) the possession
of her husband’s automobile; and (5) suit money and counsel
fees. The defendant husband answered the wife’s bill of com-
plaint and specifically denied the alleged grounds for separate
maintenance and by counter-claim prayed for a divorce or for
an annulment of the marriage.

The record discloses that the parties married April 19,
1945, and at the time the husband was a widower and 84
years of age and the wife was 44. The husband by trade was
a butcher and resided in Chicago, and at the age of sixty
retired and moved to Miami, Florida. It appears that he was
thrifty and industrious; bought a home in Miami valued at
some $10,000.00 and furnished it. He had on deposit with a
bank some $16,000.00, owned an automobile and invested some
of his money in Miami real estate, and a potential profit ob-
tainable on this investment was not disputed. The estimated
value of the husband’s property was about $30,000.00.

The wife worked as a real estate agent in Chicago and
earned around $125.00 per month; had a son by a former
marriage, and was earning about $200.00 per month as a prac-
tical nurse after moving to Miami from Chicago a few months
prior to her marriage. It does not appear that she had ac-

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‘cumulated much property at the time of the marriage. They
lived together a few months and friction arose when she re-
fused to sign a deed with her husband for the sale of some
real estate owned by her husband when she married him. The
husband testified that he had a profit of $2,500.00 but his wife
refused to sign the deed—suggesting at the time that cottages
should be built on the lots and an income obtained. The hus-
band offered her $900.00 to sign the deeds but she refused.

Pertinent findings of the Chancellor are viz:

“5, That the purported marriage between the parties liti-
gant was in fact not a marriage under the laws of this State,
either in fact or in spirit, having been, one the one hand, never
consummated by cohabitation, and on the other hand, con-
ceived, designed and initiated by the plaintiff, not because of
any deep-rooted love or abiding affection for the defendant
(cross-plaintiff), but obviously because of an ambitious de-
sire to obtain the security and comforts of a home plus
profitable and continuous employment in her chosen field
(practical nursing) during the lifetime of the aging defendant
(cross-plaintiff) plus the inheritance of his estate upon his
death.

“6. That the plaintiff is approximately 44 years of age,
enjoys reasonably good health, is well experienced in busi-
ness (office work), and as a practical nurse, by virtue of all
of which she is obviously fully capable of self support; that
the defendant (cross-plaintiff) is approximately 86 years of
age, is in failing health and unable to work, has no means of
support whatsoever other than by the constant dwindling of
the limited savings effected by him long before his acquaint-
anc with the plaintiff.”

The decree challenged on this appeal’ (1) annulled the
marriage between the parties; (2) denied the wife alimony;
(3) removed the wife and her personal effects from the
-husband’s home; and (4) allowed her counsel fees in the sum
of $600.00 and suit money. It appears that the Chancellor
settled the disputes and conflicts in the testimony and we find
ample testimony in the record to support his conclusions. The
burden of showing error was on the appellant and in light of

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the entire record it cannot be said that error affirmatively
has been made to appear.

The appellant wife by petition applied to this Court for an
order requiring her husband, the appellee, to pay a reasonable
sum as compensation for her counsel incident to this appeal.
Orders of this nature have been entered in similar cases when.
a valid marriage has been established; the necessities of the
wife and the financial ability likewise have been made to ap-
pear; and the wife now lives apart from her husband through
his fault. In the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 122 Fla.
300,-165 So. 46, we held that where a wife litigated and lost
in the Court below the allowance of attorney fees, suit money
and temporary alimony on appeal is not ‘allowed by the
Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of course.

In Phifer v. Phifer, 124 Fla. 223, 168 So. 9, we held that
after a final decree denying the wife a divorce as plaintiff
below, and she appeals, the burden is upon her to show that
she is acting in good faith and has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that her appeal will be successful before an award of
counsel fees, suit money or alimony will be allowed in this
court. The application for counsel fees is addressed to the
sound discretion of the appellate court. Troeger v. Troeger,
127 Fla. 53, 172 So. 473; Phillips v. Phillips, 142 Fla. 270, 194
So. 786; Wright v. Wright, 142 Fla. 580, 195 So. 201.

The petition for an allowance of attorney fees for services
rendered in this Court is denied and the decree appealed from
is affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

RUTH E. NEAL v. JAMES CLIFTON NEAL

34 So. (2nd) 741 January Term, 1948
April 2, 1948 En Bane

Branch & Goff, for appellant.
James Henry Taylor, for appellee.
BARNS, J.:

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Plaintiff filed her bill in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough
County and by answer the defendant raised the question of
his right to be sued in Duval County where he resided and
where plaintiff’s cause of action, if any, accrued. See Section
46.01 FS, 1941 F.S.A. .

The Chancellor found upon defendant’s claim of privilege
that Duval County was the proper venue for such action.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissent.

ED C. WRIGHT, AL ROBERES, JR., and Ruth KIRBY, individually,
and as former Directors and Statutory Trustees for Stockholders
of ED C. WRIGHT AND CO., a dissolved corporation, v. OETY OF
ANNA MARIA, a Municipal Corporation, Wyatt Blassingame,
FRANK H. SPENCER, BINFORD THORNE and JOHANNA

SWANN.
34 So. (2nd) 737 January Term, 1948
April 2, 1948 Division A.

Rehearing denied denied April 28, 1948

|

Wylie & Warren and W. L. Kimball, for petitioners.

G. P. Smythe and E. Clinch Kavanaugh, Jr., for re-
spondents.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The Town of Anna Maria, a municipal corporation, by its
City Commission, adopted Ordinance No. 25, which provided
for and authorized the issuance of municipal bonds in the
sum of $40,000.00 or municipal purposes. An election was
called and the question of the issuance of the bonds was sub-
mitted to the voters of the municipality for their approval or
disapproval. As a result of the election and a canvass of all
the votes it was disclosed that a majority of the qualified
voters of the Town of Anna Maria favored the issuance of the
bonds. Subsequently the Commission of the town, sitting as
a Board of Canvassers to canvass the returns of the election,
concluded that a majority of the free-holders and qualified
voters of the town of Anna Maria favored the issuance of the
bonds and the Canvassing Board certified and so declared
that it was the will of a majority of the qualified electors of
the town that the bonds be issued. The certificate was signed
by the Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Town Clerk.

The Town of Anna Maria, ‘through its officials, filed or
caused to be filed in the Circuit Court of Manatee County,
Florida, its petition representing to the Court and all statu- .

a
326

tory provisions required by law essential and necessary to
make the bond issue of $40,000.00 a lawful and binding obli-
gation of the municipality had been adequately and fully com-
plied with. The Town'of Anna Maria in its petition for vali-
dation prayed for an order declaring the bonds to be legal and
valid obligations of the petitioner. It prayed for, an order of
publication and: that the State Attorney of the Highteenth
Judicial Circuit be required to show cause why the bonds

“ should not be confirmed and validated. The order issued as

prayed for and G. B. Knowles, State Attorney, in behalf of
the State of Florida, answered the petition of the Town of
Anna Maria and in part said: “... he finds and knows of no
reason why said bonds should not be validated as provided for
by said petition and that therefore the State of Florida has
no objection to the validation of said bonds and hereby con-
sents to the same and to such other orders as the Court thinks
proper to expedite and facilitate the issuance of said bonds.”

On October 11, 1924, the Circuit Court of Manatee County,
Florida, entered a final decree of validation and pertinent
parts thereof are viz: “This cause coming on to be heard upon
the petition of the Town of Anna Maria, Florida, .. . and the
answer of the State’s Attorney of the Highth Judicial Circuit
of Florida, and it appearing to the Court that publication was
made-according to law, said publication being addressed to
the tax payers of the Town of Anna Maria, Florida, requiring
them to show cause, if any they have, why said bonds should
not be validated and confirmed; and if appearing to the Court
that all of said proceedings are in every way regular accord-
ing to law and fully complete, it is therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGER AND DECREED That the
“bonds sought to be validated by said petition, to-wit: A Forty
Thousand ($40,000.00) Dollar bond issue, for municipal pur-
poses, the same being fully explained as set out in said peti-
tion and the exhibits hereto, be and the same are hereby vali-
dated, confirmed and approved by this Court, and that the
said bonds when so issued shall be a lawful and binding obli-
gation upon the Town‘of Anna Maria, Florida.” The bonds
were sold and the petitioners hereto are now holders and

ee
Le
327

owners of certain designated bonds issued by the Town of
Anna Maria, Florida.

The Town of Anna Maria, after changing its name to the
City of Anna Maria (Chapter 11,305, Acts of 1925, Laws of
Florida), and certain taxpayers of said city, filed in the
Cireuit Court of Manatee County an amended bill of com-
plaint against the respondents as owners of bonds previously
issued by the Town of Anna Maria. The amended bill alleged
that the bonds as issued by the Town of Anna Maria and held
by the defendants were void and unenforceable for various
reasons, largely because of the failure and neglect to observe
and follow the several statutes applicable to the approval and
validation of bonds.. The prayer of the bill sought a decree
declaring null and void the bonds described in the amended
bill previously issued by the Town of Anna Maria and that
the owners thereof be permanently enjoined from suing the
Town of Anna Maria on the bonds or from taking any legal
steps whatsoever having as their objective the enforced col-
lection of the bonds.

The defendants below, petitioners here, filed in the Circuit
Court a motion to dismiss the amended bill of complaint as
filed by the City of Anna Maria and named taxpayers thereof,
on various grounds of which the following are a part: (1)
that the amended bill of complaint is without equity; (2) the
facts alleged are insufficient to state an equitable cause of
action; (3) that the plaintiffs below, respondents here, are
estopped to assert the invalidity of the bonds. The Chancellor
overruled the motion to dismiss the amended bill of com-
plaint and fixed a day for the defendants to answer, and-as-
signed as his reason for overruling the motion to dismiss the
following: the amended bill alleges that the city charter pro-
vided that the City of Anna Maria may issue ‘bonds for mu-
nicipal purposes, and requires that all such bonds must be
signed by all members of the City Commission; that it alleges
that the bonds held were not executed and signed by the City
Commission as required by law and the motion to dismiss ad-
mits the truth of the allegation and therefore the bill of com-
plaint was good as against the motion to dismiss. The re-

328

spondents, defendants below, petitioned this Court under Rule
34 for an interlocutory writ of certiorari.

An answer to the following question should be determina-
tive of this controversy. May the City of Anna Maria, a
municipal corporation, and its taxpayers, approximately
twenty years after the issuance, sale and delivery of the bonds
pursuant to a decree of validation, in light of the provisions
of Section 75.09, F.S.A., and our adjudications, now be heard
on the question of whether said bonds should have been
signed by the members of the City Commission or some other
officials of the City of Anna Maria? Section 75.09, F.S.A.,
Provides: “Effect of Final Decree.—In event the decree of the
circuit court validates such bonds or certificates, which may
include the validation of the political district on subdivision
itself and any taxes and assessments affected, and no appeal
is taken within the time above prescribed, or if taken and the
decree of the circuit court is affirmed, such decree shall be
forever conclusive as to all matters adjudicated against the
petitioner and all parties affected thereby, including all
property owners, taxpayers and citizens of the petitioner, and.
the validity of the said’ bonds or certificates, and any pro-
ceedings or remedies provided for their collection, shall never
be called in question in any court.”

In Thompson v. Frostproof, 89 Fla. 92, 103 So. 118, we
held that the purpose of a decree validating bonds is to put in
repose any question of law or fact that may be raised affect-
ing the validity of such bonds. In Weinberger v. Board of
Public Instruction, 93 Fla. 470, 112 So. 253, we held that our
bond validating statute, when the essential requirements were
observed, cured statutory or procedural defects and operated
to estop the same person from further litigating as to all
matters, organic or otherwise, that were duly adjudicated in
the validating proceedings. In Town of Boynton Beach v.
State of Florida, 108 Fla. 92, 145 So. 858, we held that validat-
ing decree set at rest forever any defenses based upon the
ground or irregularity or illegality of their issue, including
questions of both law and fact, so far as those matters or
things could be authorized by the Legislature to be put in
repose by a judicial proceeding. In State ex rel. Duval County

329

v. Thomas, 125 Fla. 274, 169 So. 684, we held that after a
validation decree was entered the validity of bonds could
never be questions in any of the courts of Florida on account
of the validity or irregularity thereof when said validating
decree had been entered pursuant to law and has not been at-
tacked by appeal.

In construing Section 75.0 supra in State ex rel. Harring-
ton v. City of Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610, Mr. Justice
Whitfiield, speaking for the Court, in part said:

“The purpose of the statute, Sections 5106 (3296) et seq.,
C.G.L., providing for judicial validations of bona fide issues
of duly authorized governmental bonds and certificates of in-
debtedness, is to facilitate bona fide sales of valid duly author-
ized bonds and certificates by means of authorized judicial de- °
crees conclusively adjudicating the validity of such duly
authorized bonds and certificates as issued, unless it appears
by statute or by the bonds or certificates, or by the duly re-
quired record of the validating proceedings or by the record
duly required to be made and kept of the advertisement, elec-
tion or other proceedings required for issuing such duly
authorized bonds or certificates, that some express or implied
command, prohibition or limitation of the State or Federal
Constitution was violated in validating or in issuing such duly
authorized governmental bonds or certificates of indebted-
ness. State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739,
37 A.L.R. 1298; Weinberger v. Bd. of Pub. Ins., 93 Fla. 470,
112 So. 523; Brown v. City of Lakeland, 61 Fla. 508, 54 So.
716.” .

It is not disputed that the bonds now owned by the
petitioners were issued by the Town of Anna Maria pursuant
to the validation decree of the Circuit Court of Manatee
County, Florida, but it is alleged in the amended bill of com-
plaint that the bonds were invalid because the charter of the
city required that they be signed by the several members of
the Commission of the town rather than by the mayor and
city clerk. It is our view and conclusion that this alleged
irregularity was forever foreclosed and placed at rest by the
terms of the validation decree dated October 11, 1924. It
therefore follows that the interlocutory writ of certiorari do

330

now issue and the order dated January 16, 1948, be quashed
with directions to enter an order dismissing the amended bill
of complaint.

THOMAS, C. J.. TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. ESTELLE HARDWICK v. FRANK .
MITCHELL, as Chief of Police of the City of Miami.

34 So. (2nd) 744 January Term, 1948
April 13, 1948 Special Division A

G. A. Worley and Jack Kehoe, and Ernest E. Roberts, for
appellant.

J. W. Watson, Jr., for appellee.”
PER CURIAM: .

The judgment appealed from is affirmed on authority of
Wright v. Worth, 83 Fla. 204, 91 So. 87.

THOMAS, C. J.. TERRELL: and CHAPMAN, JJ., and
WHITE, Associate Justice, concur.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA v. CITY OF WINTER PARK, FLORIDA

34 So. (2nd) 740 January Term, 1948:
April 13, 1948 Division A.

Murray Overstreet, for appellant.
Waldo H. Plympton, for appellee.
TERRELL, J.:

The appeal is from a final decree validating sewer Revenue
Bonds of the City of Winter Park, issued for the purpose of
purchasing and constructing improvements and additions to
the sanitary sewer of the City, the principal and interest of
said bonds payable solely from the gross revenues derived
from the operation of the sewer system and in addition there-
to the net proceeds of a utility service tax, and from no other
source.

It is first contented that the City cannot pledge the gross
revenues derived from the sewer system to the payment of
the sewer Revenue Bonds without an approving vote of the
freeholders as required in Section 6, Article IX of the Consti-
tution. :

There is no merit to this contention. The Sewer Revenue
Bonds were issued pursuant to Chapter 24,992, Special Acts
of 1947. The act and the resolution providing for their issue
declare that they are not bonds as contemplated by Section 6,

. Article IX of the Constitution, that they do not constitute an
indebtedness of the City of Winter Park and that no holder
or holders of said Sewer Revenue Bonds or any coupon at-
tached thereto can under any circumstances compel the exer-
cise of the taxing power on real or personal property within
the City to pay said bonds or the interest thereon. Board of
County Commissioners of Pinellas County v. Herrick, 123 Fla.
619, 167 So. 386; Brash v. State Tuberculosis Board, 124 Fla.
652, 169 So. 218, and many other cases upheld the validity of
similar bonds.

It is next contended that the Sewer Revenue Bonds in
question are violative of Section 6, Article IX of the Constitu-
tion, because they pledge the net proceeds of the utility
service taxes for their payment and have not been approved
by a vote of the freeholders.

This question might have appropriately been treated with
the first question. The utility service tax is an excise tax

we

Ee
332

which the City is authorized to impose on each and every
purchase of electricity, metered or bottled gas, water service,
telephone or telegraph service in an amount not exceeding
ten per cent of the sum received from the purchaser within
the City. Such taxes are derived from the proceeds of the
utility and they are controlled by the same resolution as the
taxes discussed in the preceding paragraph. The following
eases treated and upheld bonds serviced by a similar tax:
State v. Florida State Improvement Commission, 159 Fla. 350,
31 So. (2nd) 554; Prescott v. Board of Public Instruction of
Hardee County, 159 Fla. 663, 32 So. (2nd) 731; State v. State
Board of administration, 157 Fla. 360, 25 So. (2nd) 880;
State v. Escambia County, 153 Fla. 282, 14 So. (2nd) 576.

It follows that the Sewer Revenue Bonds validated by the
decree appealed from were expressly authorized by Chapter
24,992, Acts of 1947, that they do not constitute bonds within
the contemplation of Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution,
because they are not secured by a pledge of the taxing power
on any property or utility of the City. They expressly state
that no lien is created by them on any real or physical assets
of the city. They are limited obligations of the City payable
solely from the sources discussed in this opinion and no
others.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed. :

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

: Es
FLORIDA ATHLETIC & HEALTH CLUB, a non-profit corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Florida, and R. G. SMILEY,
duly authorized officer of Florida Athletic & Health Club, v. C. EB.

ROYCE and AUDREY S. ROYCE, his wife.

33 So. (2nd) 222 June Term, 1947
September 30, 1947 June Term, 1947
Rehearing denied February 4, 1948 Division B
Affirmed.
LOUIS W. KOCH v. EMMA WEY, a widow
33 So. (2nd) 442 June Term, 1947:
September 30, 1947 Division B

Rehearing denied February 4, 1948
Certiorari denied.

“333

IN RE: COMPLAINT OF JAMES P. MELSER for Declaratory Decree
and Judgment.

82 So. (2nd) 742 June Term, 1947
November 25, 1947 Division B
Affirmed.

ISTOKPOGA CONSOLIDATED SUB-DRAINAGE DISTRICT, a Florida
Drainage Corporation, et al., v. G. C. WESTERVELT.

35 So. (2nd) 15 June Term, 1947

December 2, 1947 Division A

Rehearing denied April 28, 1948

Certiorari denied.

FRED HALL, D. 0. RYALS, J. W. JETER, ALLEN McLEOD, JOHN
DANIELS, 0. F. BROOKS and J. I. MA'THIS, v. FLOYD ELLIS, as
Sheriff of Lee County, Florida.

33 So. (2nd) 162 . June Term, 1947

December 2, 1947 En Bane

Petition for certiorari is denied.

FINNEY P. LYNCH, trading and doing business as U-DRIVE AUTOS,
v. DAVID L. WALKER.

88 So, (2nd) 238 June Term, 1947
December 9, 1947 En Bane
Rehearing denied January 12, 1948

Affirmed.

FINNEY P. LYNOM, trading and doing business as U-DRIVE AUTOS,
v. FRANCIS P. WARREN.

83 So. (2nd) 162 June Term, 1947
December 9, 1947 En Bane
Rehearing denied January 12, 1948

Affirmed.

CITY OF PUNTA GORDA, FLORIDA, a Municipal Corporation, et al.,
vy. BARRON COLLIER, JR., et al.

383 So, (2nd) 162 June Term, 1947

December 9, 1947 Special Division B

Affirmed. °

334

CECILE P. ANDERSON v. CHARLES W. WILLIAMS, MARILYN
HICKS, TRUETT WILLIAMS, JOHNNIE WILLIAMS, and ANN
WILLIAMS and ELAINE WILLIAMS, minors, by their next friend
MEDA WILLIAMS.

38 So. (2nd) 162 June Term, 1947
December 12, 1947 Division A
Rehearing denied January 9, 1948

Affirmed.

THE CITY ICE & FUEL COMPANY, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Ohio and authorized to do
business in the State of Florida, v. BRAXTON GILL.

83 So. (2nd) 162 June Term, 1947
December 16, 1947 Division B
Affirmed.

JAMES B. NORTH, SR., MARION L. NORTH, JAMES B. NORTH, JR.,
and BYRON J. NORTH, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. PHIL
O'CONNELL, AS STATE ATTORNEY IN AND FOR THE FIF-
TEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.

83 So. (2nd) 162 June Term, 1947
December 16, 1947 Division A
Affirmed.
BEN CAULEY vy. STATE OF FLORIDA
83 So. (2nd) 238 June Term, 1947
December 19, 1947 Division B
Affirmed.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, on the relation of M. HESSELTON, v. E.
E, ALTMAN, J. A. SAPP, H. R. PIERSON, 0. M. POOLE, and G.
W. GUNTHARP, as and constituting the City Commission of the
City of New Smyrna Beach, Florida, a municipal corporation in Vo-
lusia County, Florida; HOLMES TREZEVANT, JR., as City Clerk
of the City of New Smyrna Beach, a municipal corporation in Vo-
lusia County, Florida, and JOHN C. FERRIS, as City Manager of
the City of New Smyrna Beach, a municipal corporation in Volusia
County, Florida, and THE CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH, a
municipal corporation in Volusia County, Florida.

38 So. (2nd) 163 June Term, 1947

December 19, 1947 Division B

Affirmed. °

[|
335
HARWELL TYSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA
38 So. (2nd) 163 June Term, 1947
December 19, 1947 Division B
Affirmed.
REMIGIO SQUARCIA v. J. E. GROovER
38 So. (2nd) 163 June Term, 1947
December 19, 1947 Division A
Rehearing denied January 12, 1948
Affirmed. :
pees!

GINO FRANSCHINI and HARVEY B. EBY v. M. C. MARTIN, Indi-
vidually and CASEY PROPERTIES, INC., a corporation under the
laws of Florida.

33 So. (2nd) 162 : June Term, 1947
December 19, 1947 . Division B
Affirmed.
Lace

HAMILTON C. FORMAN v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG

‘ June Term, 1947
December 19, 1947 Division B

Rehearing denied January 6, 1948
Affirmed.
ee

ECONOMY CAB COMPANY of Jacksonville, a corporation, v. JOHN O.
DAVIS.

83 So. (2nd) 162 June Term, 1947
December 19, 1947 Division B

Affirmed.

a
GEORGE BROWN v. STATE OF FLORIDA

32 So. (2nd) 432 January Term, 1948
January 20, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied February 16, 1948

Affirmed.

COOPER BROS. and CASUALTY RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE v. E.
JESSE REESE and FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

32 So. (2nd) 432 January Term, 1948
January 20, 1948 Division A

Affirmed.

336

“M. ©. IZLAR v. HATTIE B. REYNOLDS, individually, and as Admin-
istratrix of the Estate of M. L. Reynolds, deceased.

34 So. (2nd) 40 January Term, 1948
January 23, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied February 24, 1948

” Affirmed.

A. NASH and ERNEST RODLER v. SAMUEL LEVY

82 So. (2nd) 482 : January Term, 1948
January 23, 1948 . Division A
Affirmed.

AL. HARTMAN v. A. 0. ANDREU, individually and as Sheriff of Brad-
- ford County, Florida and FRANK LANDRUM, individually and as
Prosecuting Officer of and for the Court of the County Judge of

. Bradford County, Florida.

32 So. (2nd) 432 January Term, 1948
January 23, 1948 Division B

Affirmed.

JAMES HALL v. ANN MARIE LYNCH and JAMES HALL v. ANN
MARIE LYNCH. .

82 So. (2nd) 432 January Term, 1948
January 23, 1948 Division B
Affirmed. ;

STATE OF FLORIDA v. ONE 1939 BLACK’ FOUR-DOOR FORD
SEDAN AUTOMOBILE, ENGINE NO. 18-4807549 and WILLIAM
O. HARVEY and MRS. W. 0. HARVEY.

34 So. (2nd) 40 January Terms, 1948
January 27, 1948 Division B
Affirmed.

LOUIS N. POKRESS v. REGINALD LALOW

34 So. (2nd) 40 January Term, 1948
January 27, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied February 20, 1948

Affirmed.

337

WILLIAM YOUNG and CLEVEDALE YOUNG, also known as CLEVA-
DELL YOUNG, his wife, v. SAUL GREIDFF.

34 So. (2nd) 40 January Term, 1948
January 30, 1948 Division B
Affirmed. —

JACK DORN v. GERTRUDE DORN
January Term, 1948

January 30, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied February 17, 1948
Affirmed.

PETER WASILEWSKI, alias PETER PHISKUNOFF, v. THE STATE
OF FLORIDA.

84 So. (2nd) 40 . January Term, 1948
February 8, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied February 24, 1948
Affirmed.
a

CUMMER SONS CYPRESS COMPANY, a corporation, v. LEVY
COUNTY LAND COMPANY, a corporation, and M. & M. TUR-
PENTINE COMPANY, a corporation.

34 So. (2nd) 40 January Term, 1948
February 3, 1948 Bn Bane
Rehearing denied February 25, 1948
Affirmed.
WILLIAM T. DYKES v. STATE OF FLORIDA
34 So. (2nd) 40 January Term, 1948
February 3, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied February 23, 1948.
Affirmed.
MILTON BURNETT v. MAUDE A. BURNETT .
84 So. (2nd) 40 January Term, 1948
February 6, 1948 Division A
Affirmed. °

JOSEPH A, LARIVIERE, ANTOINETTE LARIVIERE, PASQUALE
SILVANO and MARCELLE SILVANO v. HOWARD M. HOOK and
LILYAN B. HOOK.

338
84 So. (2nd) 40 January Term, 1948
February 10, 1948 Division B

Affirmed.

 capeempepenenmen!
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHN J. DOWD, Deceased. ~

34 So. (2nd) 121 January Term, 1948
February 18, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied March 5, 1948

Affirmed.

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA, a municipal corporation in
Duval County, Florida, et al, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel.
HARRY JAFFA.

84 So. (2nd) 121 » January Term, 1948
February 13, 1948 Division B
. Affirmed.
Le)

ETHEL ROSMAN, a minor, joined by her father and next friend,
LOUIS ROSMAND, v. HEDWIG SALL and WILLIAM W. SALL,
husband and wife.

84 So. (2nd) 121 January Term, 1948
February 13, 1948 Division A
Affirmed. :

WATROUS & COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, v. CARL B. WALS-
INGHAM, et al.

84 So. (2nd) 121 January Term, 1948
February 17, 1948 Division B
Affirmed.
Lee rer

ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, a Corporation, v.
EDDIE McGILL and S, H. CLARK.

84 So. (2nd) 312 . January Term, 1948
February 20, 1948 En Bane
Affirmed.

ABE KOMINERS v. G. BERNIE BENSEL, as executor and as trustee
under the last will and testament of Willis E. Walker, deceased;
DELLA V. WALKER, a widow; LYDIA WALKER, a single woman;
NORMAN MIRSKY and SADYE M. MIRSKY, his wife, JOSEPH B.
MIRSKY, a single man; DELLA V. WALKER and G. BERNIE

a
be
339

BENSEL, constituting a majority of the last surviving Board of
Directors and as trustees for the stockholders of H. T. Cummings,
Iné., a dissolved Florida corporation.

84 So. (2nd) 312 January Term, 1948
February 24, 1948 * Division A
Affirmed.

GEORGE WALTER SELBY, JR., v. ROBERTA SELBY, individually
and as one of the Administratrices of the Estate of G. Walter Selby,
deceased.

34 So. (2nd) 459 January Term, 1948

February 27, 1948 En Banc

Rehearing denied March 23, 1948

Affirmed.

FRANK WHITEHURST v. STATE OF FLORIDA
34 So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948
February 27, 1948 Special Division B

Affirmed.

WILLIE G. WALL v. STATE OF FLORIDA

84 So, (2nd) 312 January Term, 1948
February 27, 1948 : Division A
Affirmed.

ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, v.
MARCO CAMPBELL. .

34 So. (2nd) 312 January Term, 1948

February 27,1948 * Special Division B

Certiorari is denied.

CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation in Dade County, Florida, et
al, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel., BARTOLOME LLADO and
OMER CANONGE.

84 So. (2nd) 312 January Term, 1948
February 27, 1948 Special Division B
Affirmed.

A. J. PARRINO v. MARK B. HAIRELSON
34 So. (2nd) 571 . January Term, 1948
March 2, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied April 2, 1948
Affirmed.

340

WOLF WILENSKY and RAY WILENSKY his wife, and NATHAN
STRAUSS v. MORRITZ YOUNG, doing business as YOUNG'S.
SANDWICH SHOP.

34 So. (2nd) 312 _January Term, 1948:
Mareh 2, 1948 Division A
Affirmed. - .
Le

MARY P. FINLAYSON and D. A. FINLAYSON, Her Blusband, v.
TOWN OF MONTICELLO, A Municipal Corporation.

34 So. (2nd) 312 January Term, 1948.
March 2, 1948 Special Division B.
Affirmed.

. WILLIE PETTWAY v. STATE OF FLORIDA

34 So. (2nd) 312 January Term, 1948
March 2, 1948 Division A:
Affirmed.
Leese
VICTOR V. STEAKLEY v. ARETHA MAE (STHAKLEY) SEUBERT
34 So. (2nd) 312 January Term, 1948
March 2, 1948 Special Division B
Affirmed.
| rere

NEW BERK and LEON RUDD, doing business as NEUL BERK ASSO-
CIATES, v. SAMUEL RITTER and A. J PLOTKIN, individually,
jointly, and as Trustees of the S. and J. Realty Corporation, a
Florida corporation, dissolved January 4, 1945.

34 So. (2nd) 459 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 En Bane
Affirmed.
Le

CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation located in Dade County
Florida, v. CLYDE O. ELLISON.

84 So. (2nd) 459 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.

 eememareeareeeraes
J. W. HAMM, et al., v. FLORIDA LAND HOLDING CORPORATION,
a Florida corporation. .
84 So. (2nd) 312 January Term, 1948
March 5, 1948 . Division A
Rehearing denied March 22, 1948

Affirmed.

Le
341
H. BR. BRUST v. ALFRED LEDFORD and CLYDE E. LOWRY
34 So. (2nd) 571 January Term, 1948
March 12, 1948 Special Division B
Affirmed.

ROBERT F. EUBANKS v. VIRGINIA R. EUBANKS

84 So, (2nd) 571 January Term, 1984
March 12, 1948 Special Division B
Affirmed.

OATHERINE BOUCHLAS, et al., v. COSTAS BESSIS, et al.

34 So. (2nd) 571 January Term, 1948
March 16, 1948 Division A

Rehearing denied April 3, 1948

Affirmed.
HOMER HILLMAN v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
34 So. (2nd) 571 January Term, 1948
March 16, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.
Lt

FRANK ELLYSON BAARS, HENRY BAARS and LELIA C. BARES,
a widow, v. THE CITY OF PENSACOLA.

84 So. (2nd) 571 January Term, 1948
March 16, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.

IN RE: ESTATE OF J. J. GREGG, BEATRICE PATENAUDE and
LILLIE UNKEFER v. MARY B. JAMES HERIN and MRS. LILY
ALLISON.

34 So. (2nd) 571 January Term, 1948
March 16, 1948 Special Division B.
Affirmed.
Lee
BURTON WINGATE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
34 So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948
March 19, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied April 10, 1948
Affirmed.

342
CHARLES OPPENHEIMER v. CITY OF MIAMI
84 So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948:
March 19, 1948 Division A.
Affirmed.

FRANK 0. PRUITT v. IVY T. BLOUNT, as Trustee, and DEAUVILLE:
CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation.

35 So, (2nd) 15 . January Term, 1947
March 19, 1948 Special Division B.
Rehearing denied April 23, 1948 :

Affirmed.

THORVALD HANSON v. VIOLA MOONEY, unmarried

84'So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948
March 19, 1948 Special Division B.

Affirmed.

|

RUSSELL JOHNSON and AUDREY GRIGSBY alias AUDREY JOHN-
SON v. STATE OF FLORIDA.

34 So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948
March 23, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.

HUDGINS FISH ©O., INC., a Florida Corporation v. VERNON
THOMPSON, SR., and HUDGINS FISH CO., ING., a Florida Cor-
poration, v. VERNON THOMPSON, JR., an infant, by VERNON
THOMPSON, SR., as his father and next friend.

84 So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948
March 28, 1948 . Division A
Affirmed.

W. J. VON BEHREN, individually, CLARENCE J. OHMER, individually,
and W. J, VON BEHREN and CLARENCE J. OHMER as THE RE-
MAINING SHAREHOLDERS OF ALL THE ASSETS OF SUB-
URBAN DEVELOPERS, a dissolved Florida corporation, v. GIL-
BERT A. BELL, individually, and as EXECUTOR of the Estate of
Alida Bell, deceased.

"84 So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948

March 28, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.

bc |
[|
343

HOWARD EDWARD COOPER v. PHILLIPS PLUMBING COMPANY,
NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION, and FLORIDA IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

35 So. (2nd) 15 January Term, 1948
March 23, 1948 Division B
Affirmed.

B. A. KIRKLAND, trading as “Quin-Se-Willa,” 3847 West Beaver
Street, Jacksonville, Florida, v. JAMES T. VOCELLE, as Director
of the State Beverage Department of the State of Florida.

34 So. (2nd) B71. January Term, 1948
March 23, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied April 9, 1948

Affirmed.

MAGNOLIA BOLDEN JOHNSON v. MARGARET BOLDEN, as Ad-
ministratrix of the Estate of Robert Bolden, deceased.

34 So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948
March 28, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied April 10, 1948

Affirmed.

SYDNEY ROBINSON v. EDITH COPELAND, joined by her husband,
J. 8. COPELAND, and JESSE ROBINSON. .

34 So. (2nd) 572 January Term, 1948
March 28, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied April 2, 1948.

Affirmed.

ALBERT FINSTON v. ROSLYN S. FINSTON

84 So. (2nd) 745 January Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 Division A

Affirmed.

FLORENCE PRIDE PAXTON v. HARRY BURGER

384 So. (2nd) 745 January Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 Division A

Affirmed.

344

GEORGE MAX v. ANNA INGLIS MAX; JAMES HENRY WILLOCK
and MARION BROOKS v. ANNA INGLIS MAX; ANNA INGLIS
MAX v. GEORGE MAX, JAMES HENRY WiLCOX, MARION
BROOKS and SOPHIE AVERY.

34 So. (2nd) 745 January Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.
Le
FRANK H. FEDDON v. KATHERINE F. FEDDON
34 So. (2nd) 745 January Term, 1948
April 2, 1948 Division A

Affirmed.

A. C. WRIGHT v. D. H. SLOAN, JR., as Olerk of the Circuit Court in
and for the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Polk County, Florida.

34 So. (2nd) 745 January Term, 1948

April 2, 1948 Divisi

Affirmed.

T. M. LLOYD, President State Board of Funeral Directors and Em-
balmers for State of Florida, et al, v. ©. K. SIMON and E. EARL
SMITH, Owners and Operators of LAKE WORTH FUNERAL
HOME, INO,, et al.

34 So. (2nd) 745 January Term, 1948
April 2, 1948 Special Division B

Affirmed.

[|
MARGARET ANDERSON v. J. C. ANDERSON

35 So. (2nd) 15 January Term, 1948
April 9, 1948 Special Division B

Affirmed.

MRS. H. B. CARTWRIGHT v. SAM’S SERVICE STATION, INC., a
corporation in its own right and for the use and benefit of WEST-
ERN CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, a corporation, and for
the use and benefit of JOHN W. WARD.

35 So. (2nd) 15 January Term, 1948

April 13, 1948 Special Division A

Affirmed.

Le
345
0. A. SCOTT v. CHRISTINE VAMVAKS, et al.
85 So. (2nd) 15 : January Term, 1948
April 13, 1948 Division A

Affirmed.
Le

ROSWELL K. PENNEY v. HELEN NEFF PENNEY

January Term, 1948
April 26, 1948 Special Division B
Affirmed.

348

WALTER GILL v. MARY K. RHOMBERG, et al.
35 So, (2nd) 12 . January Term, 1948
January 27, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied March 12, 1948

M. A. Rosin and J. Lewis Hall, for appellant.
Wilbur W. Whitehurst, for appellees.
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed. .
CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, C. J., and BUFORD, J., dissent.
TERRELL, J., not participating.
BUFORD, J., dissenting:

_ I think the time limit attempted to be enforced by appellee
was unreasonably short and that Gill acted with reasonable
diligence and is entitled to relief.

CHARLOTTE GOLDEN, LUCY ANN McNISH, HARRIETT SINGLE-
LON and NISI McNISH v. H. McL. GRADY.

84 So. (2nd) 877° Jaanuary Term, 1948

February 6, 1948 Division A

Rehearing denied May 7, 1948

349

J. B. Hodges, for appellants.

Brannon & Brown, for appellee.
TERRELL, J.:

In September 1946, appellee, hereafter referred to as the
plaintiff, instituted suit in ejectment to remove appellants,
hereafter referred to as defendants, from the South West
quarter of the South West quarter of Section 9, Township 7
South, Range 17 East, in Columbia County. Plaintiff says he
deraigned title by deed from the Trustees of the Internal Im-
provement fund, dated October 6, 1948, the title to said lands
having reverted to the State for non-payment of taxes. It is
also contended that defendants had no title or color of title
because their predecessors in title, Henry McNish and wife,
conveyed said lands to High Springs Bank December 13, 1913,
and the bank never reconveyed to them.

Defendants filed pleas and bill of particulars showing
title deraigned from Joseph Goodbread by deed dated January
10, 1905. Objections were sustained to said pleas by motion
to strike and defendants filed amended pleas with a new bill
of particulars. These were likewise held to be insufficient and
a default was entered against defendants. Additional pleas
with a third amended bill of particulars were then proffered
but. were overruled and final judgment was entered for the
plaintiff. This appeal was prosecuted from the latter judg-
ment.

350

The gist of the defense proffered to overcome plaintiff's.
claim of title is that defendants are the widow and daughters
of Henry McNish, that they have owned and occupied the
lands in question as their homestead for forty years, that said
lands were acquired by Henry McNish from Joseph Goodbread.
and were deeded to the High Springs Bank in December 1913,
but that defendants never surrendered possession of them.
Defendants further allege that in January 1939, defendant,
Harriett Singleton, applied to the clerk of the Circuit Court.
of Columbia County to pay all unpaid taxes on said lands and
paid him $15.29 for cancellation of tax certificate No. 77, sale
of 1918, and tax certificate No. 2041, sale of 1933, that notice
was given and said certificates with all other tax liens then
due were canceled and all subsequent taxes on the lands
covered by said certificates have been paid to date. Defend-
ants further allege that through error of the clerk of the
Circuit Court, defendant Harriett Singleton was permitted to
take up and pay the taxes on the South East quarter of the
South East quarter of Section 8, Township 7 South, Range 17
East, which is immediately West of and adjoins the lands
heretofore described. Defendants further allege that Harriett
Singleton was acting for all said defendants, that she relied on
the clerk of the Circuit Court, made an honest effort to clear
up the taxes to her lands and has in fact paid all taxes on her
homestead for the years involved but one, that plaintiff’s tax
deed is based on tax certificate No. 568, sale of 1934, and tax
certificate No. 409, sale of 1936, covering said lands, but that
defendants have continually since January 1905 used and
occupied said lands as their homestead, that such possession
and occupation has been actual, open, notorious, adverse, hos-
tile, public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted and peaceable,
that they have farmed, improved. and kept said lands inclosed
by a substantial fence and that the possession and occupation
of defendants and their predecessors in title ripened into title
by adverse possession long before any of the taxes involved in
this suit became a lien on said lands prior to January 1, 1933.

Out of this state of the controversy the bald question that
emerges, is whether or not the lands in question were the
homestead of appellants and was error committed when the

351

trial court struck their pleas and bill of particulars, thereby
depriving them of the right to prove this defense?

This question was permitted to become involved in a tangle
of procedural sparring, much after the fashion of which a fly
plunges into a spider’s web and in the twinkle of an eye is
bound helpless and shunted away to fortify the spider's
hunger. Procedural law was not designed to work this way.
Its purpose is to lead litigants to righteous conclusions. It
should never be permitted to become more than a means to
that end. ,

We recognize the provision of Common Law Rule 85-a, re-
quiring the defendant in a case like this to file a “bill of par-
ticulars, stating and specifying how and when their claim
originated and the facts upon which such claim is based.” We
think the pleas and bill of particulars filed in this case met
the requirement of the rule. It is quite true that they are
somewhat prolix but they allege that defendants are the
widow and heirs of Henry McNish, that they had lived on the
lands as their homestead for 40 years, that Henry McNish
died intestate, that appellants in due course and in good faith
applied to the clerk of the Circuit Court and the County Tax
Collector to pay the taxes on said lands, but through error of
said officers they paid the taxes on the adjacent lands, and
later when their mistake was discovered, they paid on the
lands in question.

We think appellants should have been given a chance to
prove these allegations. Such was the doctrine approved by
this court in Shuptrine v. Wohl Holding Corp., 147 Fla. 185,.3
So. 2nd 624, where we held without equivocation that when
the owner of an interest in land applies in good faith to the
proper officer to pay his taxes and is prevented from doing so
by the mistake, wrong, or fault of the officer, such an attempt
is equivalent to tender, at least so far as to invalidate any
subsequent sale of the property for such taxes.

We are convinced that the foregoing is ample to conclude
this case, but we are also convinced that appellants are pro-
tected by Section 192.36, Florida Statutes of 1941. The sale
was made under the Murphy Act, Chapter 18296, Acts of 1937,

352

the tax deed was issued less than ten years after the sale of
the tax certificate on which it was based, and appellants claim
the land as their homestead. Stewart v. Powell, et al., 158
Fla. 420, 28 So. 2nd, 879. The very purpose of the last cited
statute was to place one’s homestead in a preferred status and
give the owner every opportunity to preserve it within ten
years if sold under the last named act.

Appellee further contends that defendants have no stand-
ing in this case because they have no record title to the lands
in question since Henry McNish and his wife conveyed them
to the High Springs bank, and so far as the record discloses,
they have never been disposed of by the bank or reconveyed
to defendants.

We do not think the.bank’s alleged title has a thing to do
with this case. To pplead the Rule in Shelley’s case would be
equally as effective. the bank is not here complaaining and
appellants not only allege 40 years adverse possession, but
they say that more than twenty years of such possession was
subsequent to the deed to the High Springs Bank. It is also
alleged that when the tax deed was issued to appellee it was
well known that appellants were living on the land and claim-
ing it as their homestead, yet no effort was made to give them
notice of the application for the tax deed and that they in
fact knew nothing about it. In our judgment when one lives
on land 40 years, improves it by building a house and a sub-
stantial fence and makes a living on it, he ig able to show a
mighty strong color of title. .

For the reasons so stated the judgment appealed from is
reversed with directions to reinstate the cause and Proceed as
indicated in this opinion.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

ESTHER SOHWENOK, by her Guardian and Next Friend, LOUISE
SOHWENOK, v. HARRY JACOBS, IDA JACOBS and SHIRLEY
JACOBS by her Guardian, Harry Jacobs, and CHARLES G. HAN-
NOCK.

35 So. (2nd) 123 ' January Term, 1948

March 12, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied May 7, 1948

Ginsberg & Pilafian, for appellant.
McKay, Dixon, DeJarnette & Bradford, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

The plaintiff-appellant brought suit against Harry Jacobs,
Ida Jacobs and Shirley Jacobs, by her guardian, Harry Jacobs,
and Charles G. Hannock. A demurrer to the plaintiff's
amended declaration was filed on behalf of all the Jacobses,

354

which was sustained, and final judgment rendered thereon,
whereupon the appellant brought this appeal, wherein the rul-
ing on the demurrer is assigned as error.

The first count of the second amended declaration states
that Shirley Jacobs, the daughter of Ida Jacobs, while driving
a motor vehicle owned by Ida Jacobs, with Esther Schwenck,
a school child being driven to school, as a passenger, crashed
into the rear of the motor vehicle in front of her and, as a
proximate result thereof, the said Esther Schwenck was
severely bruised, lacerated, etc.

The second count of said amended declaration is similar
to the first, but is only as against the defendant, Charles G.
Hannock, for alleged negligent stopping of his car.

The third count is somewhat similar to the first, but fails
to allege any actionable negligence.

The fourth count is similar to the first and attempts to
state a cause of action against the Jacobses and Charles G.
Hannock; the allegations against Hannock are not ultimate
facts, but only conclusions of the pleader.

The fifth count is similar to the first, as against the
Jacobses. .

In each of said counts it is alleged that the mother’s auto-
mobile was being driven by Shirley Jacobs with her knowledge
and consent and with the knowledge and consent of Harry
Jacobs, Shirley’s father and guardian.

There is no actionable negligence stated in any of the
counts as against Harry Jacobs, so the trial judge’s order as
to him was without error.

Only the first, fourth and fifth counts appear to state a
cause of action as against the owner-defendant, Ida Jacobs,
and Shirley Jacobs, and the order and judgment as against
them appear to have been in error.

The fashion and style by which Shirley is named as a de-
fendant is as follows: “Shirley Jacobs, by her guardian, Harry
Jacobs.” This is somewhat anomalous, but more need not be
said now.

The second and third counts fail to state any cause of ac-
tion as against any of the Jacobses.

a
Le
355

Section 320.59 F.S.A. was passed for the benefit of the
operators of automobiles carrying guest passengers, but the
proviso “that nothing in this section shall apply to school
children or other students being transported to or from
schools or places of learning in this state” was placed within
the statute for the benefit of those named within the excep-
tion. According to the declaration, Esther Schwenck was of
the class within the exception.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and costs ordered
taxed against appellant.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and SEBRING, J., dissent.

STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SOUTH
FLORIDA CONSERVANCY DISTRICT v. MILLARD F, CALD-
WELL, Governor, et al.

35 So. (2nd) 642 January Term, 1948

March 16, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied June 24, 1948

Ce
356 .
ee

Herbert 8S. Sawyer, Thos. McE. Johnston, Evans, Mershon,
Sawyer, Johnston & Simmons, for relator.

Julius F. Parker, Leo L. Foster, John T. Wigginton, T. T.
Turnbull, Parker, Foster & Wiggington, for respondent.

BARNS, J.:

The case as presented by the relator and as made by the
alternative writ and respondent’s answer is as follows:

South Florida Conservancy District was created in 1919
by legislative enactment (Chapter 7975) to drain and reclaim
the lands within the District and render the same suitable
for settlement and agricultural purposes. By the Act creat-
ing the District the Legislature levied an annual acreage tax
upon the lands within the District to pay for the improve-
ments. Bonds were issued by the district and sold to finance
the works of construction.

The Legislature, in 1921, provided for and created an Agri-
cultural Experiment Station on such lands in the Everglades
as the Trustee of the Internal Improvement Fund might direct
and required the Trustees to set apart lands for the station
and to “provide and construct all canals, drains and other
reclamation works that may be required to completely protect
and secure the lands from overfiow.” (Chapter 8442). The
Trustees could have located the station anywhere in the Ever-
glades, but they chose to locate it in South Florida Conserv-
ancy District on Section 3, which section was then owned by
the Trustees. The Acts relating to South Florida Conservancy
district then provided, and have ever since provided, that the
lands within the district held by the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund should be subject to South Florida Con-
servancy District taxes and authorized and directed the
Trustees to pay such taxes out of any monies in their posses-

|
a
357

sion. Section 5, Chapter 7975, Acts of 1919; Section 6, Chap-
ter 17258, Acts of 1935; and Section 6 (a), Chapter 20477,
Acts of 1941.

The Act creating the Experiment Station further | pro-
vided that the lands on which the station was established
might be added to. Section 3 of the Act reads:

“The Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund are
hereby authorized and directed to set aside and withdraw
from sale, any lands now or hereafter owned by the State,
necessary for the use and conduct of the said Agricultural
Experiment Station, and to’ provide and construct all canals,
drains and other reclamation works that may be required to
completely protect and secure the said lands from overfiow.
The said lands shall be as suitably and conveniently located as
possible and shall not be less than 160 acres, which may be
added to as the needs demand.”

The lands comprising the station were added to in 1931 by
conveyance direct to the State Board of Education from one
Nellie D. Cannon of Section 10, immediately south of said
Section 8. Both of said sections had been, by statute, subject
to the taxes of the District when the works of drainage were
constructed and the bonds of the district issued. Respondents
deny that the taxes were lawfully assessed as to the lands
owned by them and occupied by the Experiment Station. The
Trustees in 1931 conveyed said Section 3 to the State Board of
Education. There was no specific legislative authority for the
Trustees to convey the Experiment Station lands to the Board
of Education and it was and is the position of the relator that
the conveyances were illegal and were made by the Trustees
in an attempt to escape the obligation placed upon them by
statute to pay the South Florida Conservancy District taxes
upon the land.

The South Florida Conservancy District taxes consist of
“Bond Tax” and “Maintenance Tax.” The Bond Tax for each
of the years 1935 through 1946 were levied by legislative enact-
ment in the amount of $1.25 for each of said years. The
Maintenance Tax for each of the years 1935 through 1940
was also levied directly by the Legislature in the amount of
$1.75 per acre for each of said years. The Legislature in 1941.

358

’ authorized the Board to levy Maintenarice Taxes in an amount
not to exceed $2.50 per acre per year and the Board, pursuant
thereto, levied $2.25 per acre for each of the years 1941
through 1946. Such levy constituted a legislative determina-
tion that the lands would be benefitted in an amount at least
equal to the taxes levied. Martin v. Dade Muck Land Com-
pany, 95 Fla. 530, 116 So. 449. There was also a specific find-
ing of benefits by the Legislature. Sec. 12, Chapter 17258,
Acts of 1935. Such taxes were levied and imposed and di-
rected to be levied and imposed upon all lands within the
District, including said Sections 3 and 10. Statements for the
South Florida Conservancy District taxes upon said sections
for the years 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940, were each
year forwarded to the Trustees but they did not pay the state-
ments, and finally, although requested by the District, refused
to pay the taxes.

‘Thereupon, at the next session of the Legislature of Flor-
ida a statute reading in part as follows was thereupon enacted
into law and is now the law of the State of Florida: (Chapter
20477). .

“That the lands in said District used or held by, for or in
connection with agricultural experiment station in the Ever-
glades or any branch thereof shall be subject to the taxes
levied by or pursuant to the provisions of this Act, notwith-
standing whether the title to or ownership of such lands shall
be vested in said Trustees, the State Board of Education or
any other State Agency, and the Trustees of the Internal Im-
provement Fund are authorized and directed to pay out of
any monies in their hands derived from the sale of lands or
otherwise, all South Florida Conservancy District taxes here-
tofore levied and assessed, or which may hereafter be levied
and assessed, upon such lands.”

It was provided by Chapter 17258 which levied and im-
posed South Florida Conservancy District taxes for the year
1935 and subsequent years:

“That all taxes levied hereunder are hereby declared, and
‘shall be considered and construed, to be special drainage as-
sessments for benefits to said lands, and are to be used for the

purposes herein specified and authorized, ...”—(Sec. 9, page
1102, Acts of 1935).

It is important to keep in mind the distinction between
special assessments and taxes for the upkeep of government.

“Such assessment or charges are, as stated in the acts, to
provide means to accomplish the purposes set out in these
acts, and is a peculiar species of taxation distinct from the
general burden imposed for state, county and municipal pur-
poses in that it is a local or special charge placed upon the
land situated in the drainage district to pay for public im-
provements proposed to be made therein, on the theory that
such property thereby derives a special benefit, and therefore
such charges constitute a special assessment.”—Lainhart v.
Catts, 73 Fla. 735, 75 So. 47.

The levees constructed by South Florida Conservancy
District around the District have protected and are protecting
said Sections 3 and 10 from excess waters outside the Dis-
trict and the canals and pumps of the District which for many
weeks have been continuously operated day and night have
discharged and are discharging from the lands within the
District excess water which falls upon and seeps into the Dis-
trict. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund have

. been and are utilizing the works of the District to discharge
the function placed upon them by law to protect said Sections
3 and 10 from excess waters.

The statute is not unconstitutional and the disposition of
the Internal Improvement Fund in the manner prescribed is
within the discretion of the Legislature. Trustees of the In-
ternal Improvement Fund v. Bailey, 10 Fla. 112, Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Fund v. Root, 59 Fla. 648, 51 So.
535. It is lawful for the Legislature to provide for the use of
the Internal Improvement Fund in aid of and for drainage.
Everglades Sugar and Land Company v. Bryan, 81 Fla. 75, 87
So. 68. :

The State of Florida by its Attorney General and the Trus-
tees of the Internal Improvement Fund, by suits filed in the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit against Everglades Drainage Dis-
trict, Lake Worth Drainage District and Napoleon B. Broward
Drainage District in January, 1944, sought declaratory de-

359

360

crees that the statutes under which said Districts operated,
which required the Trustees to pay drainage district taxes on
State owned lands, were unconstitutional. The decisions,
both in the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court, were ad-
verse to the contentions of the plaintiffs in those cases. This
Court in its opinion on appeal, stated:

“The fact that state lands may be assessed for drainage
and that the lien for drainage taxes may be made of equal
dignity with the lien for state and county taxes is too well
settled to require discussion,’—and

“The lands of the State were included in the tax program
on the theory that they should bear their just portion of the
burden of reclamation.”—State v. Everglades Drainage Dis-
trict, 155 Fla. 403, 20 So. (2nd) 397; State v. Napoleon B.
Broward Drainage District, 155 Fla. 407, 20 So. (2nd) 399;
State v. Lake Worth Drainage District, 155 Fla. 408, 20 So.
(2nd) 399.

The opinion of this Court prepared by Mr. Justice TER-
RELL in those cases, when studied in connection with the few
but pertinent authorities cited in the opinion, demonstrates
the sufficiency in law of the alternative writ in this cause. It
is of interest to recall that no question was raised concerning
the constitutionality of the statute, Chapter 7305, Acts of
1917, which provided that lands sold for nonpayment of Eiver-
glades Drainage District taxes should be struck off to the
Trustees and that the Trustees should pay Everglades Drain-
age District taxes on lands held by them. See Judge Strum’s
opinion in Rorick v. Board of Commissioners of Everglades
Drainage District, 57 Fed. (2nd) 1048. This Court construed
the statute not to require the Trustees to pay for tax certifi-
cates issued upon privately owned land “bid off” to the Ever-
glades Drainage District until such land had been sold or re-
deemed. State v. Sholtz, 150 So. 878, 112 Fla. 756,

Although no further discussion is required, we cannot re-
frain from quoting from an annotation styled “Special As-
sessments’—Public Property’—90 A.L.R. 1146:

“A state clearly has the right, by positive legislative en-
actment, to declare that its property may be assessed for local
improvements, and a constitutional exemption of the property

361

of the state from ‘taxation’ does not prevent such a grant.
Hassan v. Rochester (1876) 67 N.Y. 528, wherein it was said:
“As these are considered under the decisions as benefits to the
property assessed, increasing its value, and not as a tax, no
valid reason exists why the state, any more than individuals,
should be exempted from paying for the advantages con-
ferred. A different rule would compel individual lot owners
to pay assessments levied for improvements which were a
benefit to the state lands without any adequate advantage,
and in many instances impose a burden which would be ex-
tremely onerous and produce great injustice. This could not
hhave been intended.’ ...

There is no reason why the other landowners of the dis-
trict should bear the burden of paying for the benefit derived
and being derived by the Experiment Station lands from the
water control works and operations of the District, when the
people, speaking through the Legislature, have clearly ex-
pressed themselves that the landowners in South Florida Con-
servancy District should not be so burdened.

Reliance is placed in respondents’ brief upon the decision
of this Court in the case of Southern Drainage District v.
State, 93 Fla. 672, 112 So. 561. That was a suit by the State
Board of Education to quiet title to the 16th Section, the title
to which had become vested in the State under the provisions
of the Act of Congress of the United States of March 3, 1945,
5 Stat. 788. Southern Drainage District had been created by
Special Act (7599, Acts of 1917), but the procedure for the
levy and enforcement of taxes of the District was the same as
that provided by the General Drainage Act, now Chapter 298,
Florida Statutes, 1941. The District had levied taxes upon a
16th Section and when the taxes were not paid the section had
been included by the district in a suit for foreclosure. The
Court in that case did not have before it and did not discuss
the levy of taxes upon any lands other than the 16th Section
lands.

This case is to be distinguished from the Southern Drain-
age District case, in that in this case the lands were acquired
by the Board of Education after the land had become actually
charged with a levy and subject to periodical assessments

362

thereafter and with a legislative direction to the “Trustees”
to pay such. In the Southern Drainage case a sixteenth
(16th) section was involved and the rights and exemptions of
the Board of Education had already attached before the
drainage district was formed—the reverse of the case at bar.

Section 5, Article XII, is not involved, for the statute does
not provide for the payment of any money from the School
Fund. It directs that payment be made of the taxes by the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.

Since it is not likely that the ordinary process for the en-
forcement of taxation against public lands is available,
mandamus is the proper method of enforcing payment when
such lands are subject to taxation.

“Property owned by a county, and held for public pur-
poses, cannot be sold to satisfy the lien of an assessment.
Payment of such assessment is to be enforced by proceedings
in mandamus, to compel the officers of a county to pay the
amount of the assessment out of the county funds; ... ”—
Page and Jones on Taxation by Assessment, Vol. 2, Sec. 1075,
page 1783. .

The. motion for peremptory writ notwithstanding the
answer is granted.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ.,.
concur. .

CHAPMAN, J., dissents.

| eral
ALLEN P. STEELE v. MIAMI TRANSIT COMPANY, a Florida corpo-
ration, and ELLA MAE STEELE, as Administratrix of the Estate
of Raymond A. Steele, deceased, v. MIAME TRANSIT COMPANY,

@ Florida corporation. .

84 So, (2nd) 530 January Term, 1948.
March 19, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied April 14, 1948

363

W. C. Kemp and Cushman & Woodard, for appellant.
Worley, Gautier & Cannon, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.: .

Raymond A. Steele, a minor seventeen years of age, was
fatally injured while riding in an automobile which came into
collision with a motor bus being driven by an employee of
Miami Transit Company. Allen P. Steele, the father of the
deceased, brought suit against the Transit Company to re-
cover damages for loss of services and for mental pain and
suffering of the parents, resulting from the negligent acts of -
the corporation. At the same time Ella Mae Steele, the
mother of the deceased, in the capacity of personal adminis-
tratrix, brought suit against the corporation to recover dam-
ages to the estate of the decedent.

After the cases were at issue on the pleadings, the de-
fendant corporation filed a motion to consolidate the cases for
trial, and an order of consolidation was entered by the trial

364

judge. When the cases came on for joint trial the defendant,
after the jury had been sworn, withdrew its pleas and ad-
mitted liability; whereupon the cases were submitted to the
jury upon the question of damages only. At the conclusion of
the evidence presented on this limited issue the jury returned
a verdict in favor of the father for $1,000, and a verdict in
favor of the personal representative for $10,000.

A motion for new trial on the ground of the inadequacy of
the verdict was filed by the father within four days and dur-
ing the term at which the verdict was rendered. In the case
brought by the mother as personal representative of the
estate, the defendant corporation filed a motion for new trial,
because of the excessiveness of the verdict. The latter mo-
tion was filed within four days but after the expiration of the
term in which the verdict was rendered.

" Subsequently, both-motions for new trial were argued by
counsel representing the parties. In the suit brought by the
father, the court entered an order denying the motion for new
trial. In the suit brought by the mother as personal repre-
sentative, the court entered an order that a new trial would
be had unless a remittitur of $7,000 were filed by the plaintiff
within thirty days from the entry of the order.

In due course the father, Allen P. Steele, took an appeal
from the judgment in the case wherein he had sued as plain-
tiff. At the same time the mother, Ella Mae Steele, as per-
sonal representative.of the estate, entered an appeal from the
order of the court granting a new trial unless a remittitur of
$7,000 be entered by the plaintiff. Pursuant to a stipulation
of the parties an order was entered by this court directing
that only one transcript of record be filed and issued in both
appeals, and that the appeals be consolidated for considera-
tion and disposition by this appellate tribunal. Both appeals
are now before us for decision.

It is our view that the motion for new trial filed by the
father should have been granted, on the stated ground that
the verdict rendered by the jury was inadequate. The statute
‘under which the action was brought authorizes a suit by the
father in the case of the death of a minor child caused by the
wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any cor-

ba |
Le
365

poration or its employees. Damages that may be awarded in
such a suit are to include not only compensation for loss of
services of the deceased during his minority, but also damages
for the mental pain and suffering of the parent, or parents, if
either one of them survive him. Sec. 768.03 Florida Statutes,
1941,

The defendant corporation argues that the evidence shows
that the deceased son was virtually a stranger to his parents,
having for several years before his death been out of school
and away from home in the service of the navy, and else-
where; and that consequently the award made by the jury
for the loss of his services during minority, and for the pain
and suffering of the parents due to his death, was ample. We
cannot follow the argument. The love of father and mother
for their child cannot be measured or weighed by any tangible
standards. Though the child may he ever so inclined to way-
wardness, he will not by reason of that fact have a smaller
place in their hearts and minds than will the obedient one who
is always present at the family fireside. Indeed, common ex-
perience so often proves the contrary to be the fact that the
argument advanced by counsel with the respect to the proofs
must be rejected as failing to point the way to any real
criterion for the admeasurement of damages for mental pain
and suffering in the case of the wrongful death of an infant.

While we are always loathe to disturb an order of the trial
judge denying a motion for new trial, we think that in the
present case the jury did not allow sufficient compensation for
pain and suffering, and that consequently we have no alterna-
tive. A new trial, therefore, is hereby ordered.

The remaining question on this appeal is with respect to
the verdict for $10,000 rendered in the suit brought by the
personal representative against the defendant corporation.
The issue is whether the trial judge had the power to enter an
order granting a new trial unless the plaintiff submitted to a
remittitur of $7,000, because of the excessiveness of the ver-
dict.

Counsel for the personal representative maintains that
-whatever the general merits of the defendant’s claim might
have been with respect to the amount found by the jury the

366

trial judge had no authority to disturb the original verdict,
even though exorbitant, for the reason that the motion for
new trial, though filed by Miami Transit Company within four
days after rendition of the verdict, was not filed within the
term in which the verdict was rendered, nor was an order en-
tered within the term extending the time for the filing ¢ and
presentation of the motion.

Section 54,24 Florida Statutes, 1941, specifically requires
that “Motions for new trial in civil cases . . . shall be made

- within four days after the rendition of the verdict and during
the same term...” The purpose of the statute is to require
the motion for the new trial to be made during the term at
which the trial was made. Nickels v. State, 86 Fla. 208, 98 So.
497. See also Williams v. State, 18 Fla. 883; Palatka & LR.
Ry. Co. v. State, 23 Fla. 546, 3 So. 158; Citizens Bank of
Williston v. Williams, 91 Fla. 589, 110 So. 252; DeSoto Hold-
ing Co. v. Boyer, 85 Fla. 517, 97 So. 205; State ex rel. Mel-
bourne State Bank y. Wright, 107 Fla. 178, 145 So. 598.

It is apparent from the decisions cited that the order made
by the trial judge, granting a new trial except upon condi-
tions that the plaintiff remit $7,000, was entered without au-
thority; the motion for new trial not having been filed within
the term at which the trial was held, and no order having
been entered within the term extending the time for filing the
motion. The contention of the appellant with respect to the
motion is therefore well taken.

Under the conclusions we have reached we have before us
the suit of the father who is entitled on the record to a new
trial because of the inadequacy of the verdict, and suit of the
personal representative who is entitled to have the full
amount of her judgment entered in her favor due to the fact
that a motion for new trial, which otherwise might have been
granted, was not filed within the time required by statute.

It was argued at the bar of this court that where two cases
are consolidated for trial and tried together and thereafter, on
appeal, one of the cases is reversed for new trial, a new trial
should be granted in both cases, and the cases sent back and
tried anew. The argument was based on the supposed applica-
bility of our holding in Radiant Oil Co. v. Herring, 146 Fla. 154,

[|
367

200 So. 376, to the facts of the case at bar. In that case it was
held that where a suit by a minor child injured by a motor
truck and a suit by the father of the child for the recovery of
medical expenses and loss of services of the child are consoli-
dated and tried together, and the court grants the child a new
trial because of the inadequacy of the verdict in his case, the
court errs in limiting the new trial to the question of damages
in that case alone, since if a new trial is to be had both suits
should be tried together, inasmuch as both are infected by a
mutual dependence upon each other.

The rule of Radiant Oil Co. v. Herring has no application
here under the facts presented. The motion for new trial in-
terposed by the Miami Transit Company was not filed in time,
and hence the trial judge was without jurisdiction to disturb
the verdict in favor of the personal representative. There was
before us for review on appeal, therefore, only the judgment
entered in favor of the father of the decedent, and that verdict
is found to be inadequate.

It follows from the conclusions we have reached that the
judgment in favor of Allen P. Steele must be reversed for a
new trial; and that the order granting the new trial in the
action brought by Ella Mge Steele, as administratrix of the
Estate of Raymond A. Steele, deceased, must be set aside and
reversed and a judgment entered in favor of the personal rep-,
resentative for the full amount found by the jury in its
verdict.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

Lara cree
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. TOM B. STEWART, JR. v.
NATHAN MAYO, as Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of
Florida,
85 So. (2nd) 13 January Term, 1948

March 23, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied May 11, 1948

Tom B. Stewart, Jr., for relator.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, T. Paine Kelly, Assist-
ant Attorney General, and William C. Pierce, for respondent..
TERRELL, J.:

Summarized the alternative writ commands the Commis-
sioner of Agriculture, (1) to inspect all citrus fruit required
by law to be inspected as to maturity, and certify on pre-
scribed forms that said fruit meets all legal requirements as
to standard of quality to which artificial coloring may be
added, and (2) that in making such inspection and testing, all
juice used in conducting the test shall be extracted by hand,
absent the use of any mechanical devise.

Respondent moves to quash the alternative writ on the
ground that it seeks to coerce performance of its command in
a manner contrary to law.

The answer to this question turns on the interpretation of
Section 594.09, Florida Statutes 1941, as amended by Chapter

369

22519, Acts of 1945. Relator contends that the color added
inspection requires compliance with Chapter 22519, and that
the terms of said act as to use of standard test should be read.
into Sections 597.18 and 597.19, Florida Statutes 1941, while
respondent contends that Chapter 22519, and Sections 597.18
and 597.19 are separate statutes, dealing with different phases
of the citrus fruit business, and may be construed as in pari
materia, but that the requirements of the former may not be
read into the latter., Relator also contends that no fruit may
have color added except that which passes the maturity test,
and being so, Chapter 22519 should be construed to require
that juice tests for color added be made in the manner pre-
scribed by Sections 597.18 and 597.19, Florida Statutes of
1941.

We have given careful consideration to relator’s contention
but we are not convinced that we should pronounce it the law.
Section 594.09, as amended by Chapter 22519, Acts of 1945,
(maturity test) has to do with determining the total soluble
solids of citrus fruits under citrus maturity law, while sec-
tions 597.18 and 597.19, Florida Statutes 1941, (color added
standard) have to do with standards that citrus fruits must
come within, before color may be added. Both have to do
with kindred but different phases of the citrus fruit business,
the one with fixing standards of quality and maturity, and the
other with packing, processing and marketing, but we cannot
see that Chapter 22519 was designed to affect other than the
maturity standard test.

The title of Chapter 22519 is “An act to amend Section
594.09, Florida Statutes 1941, relating to the methods to be
used and followed by citrus fruit inspectors in determining
the total soluble solids of citrus fruit under the citrus ma-
turity law.” The main purpose of the act was to authorize the
use of a reamer extractor in making juice extractions for
tests under the maturity law. It makes extraction of the
juice by hand the standard test, but provides that “it shall be
permissible for a reamer extractor to be used in the making of
juice tests, required under this Chapter, conditioned that in
case the results of any such juice test made by use of a reamer
extractor be challenged or disputed, a further juice test be

PC
370 :

made by the standard method of hand extraction,” and the
results of such test “shall be deemed determinative.” From
this it necessarily follows that the use ofa reamer extractor
for maturity test is final unless challenged. The use of the
reamer extractor amounted to nothing more than an alterna-
tive method of juice extraction.

Under Section 597.18, Florida Statutes 1941, no fruit can
be colored except that which passes maturity test prescribed
therein which on its face does not appear to be materially
different from that prescribed by Chapter 22519, Acts of 1945,
except in the latter the use of the reamer extractor is per-
mitted. If the use of the reamer extractor is not seasonably
challenged its use is conclusive and the maturity test secured
could be appropriately employed in the application of Sections
597.18 and 597.19, Florida Statutes 1941. If the use of the
reamer extractor is challenged the standard test must be em-
ployed. .

There is no claim here that it was challenged or disputed.

Question two challenges the right of the relator to bring
this suit, because no damage to him personally is shown to
have resulted from the alleged non performance of the acts
complained of, and question three alleges that since the acts
sought to be coerced are those of an Administration Board,
said Board should be made a party.

There is no merit to this contention. The Florida Citrus
Commission is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
to'secure both maturity and color added tests. The Commis-
sioner of Agriculture is authorized to enforce these rules and
regulations and is the only necessary party respondent. The
relator seeks to enforce the performance of a duty by the
Commissioner of Agriculture, on the ground that he is a citrus
grower and citizen of the State of Florida, and that is suf-
ficient. . .

In view of the answer given to questions one, two and
three, other questions raised become unimportant and are not
treated. The motion to quash is therefore granted.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

P|
, 3871
PENELOPE SEAVER FOWNES v. HENRY GAITHER FOWNES
34 So. (2nd) 875 January Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 Special Division B

Rehearing denied May 6, 1948

Patterson & Lloyd and Saunders, Buckley & O’Connell, for
appellant.

Horner C. Fisher and Edwin T. Osteen, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

This is a case wherein the appellant has failed to establish
to the satisfaction of this Court any assignment of error, and
the decree appealed is affirmed.

Appellant wife has filed in this Court an application for the
allowance of additional attorneys’ fees. After a wife has had
a full and complete hearing before the Chancellor and he has
rendered his final decree upon the equities as between the
parties, there arises a presumption of correctness of the
Chancellor’s decree and, when the decree is appealed and af-
firmed, the appellant wife will not be granted an additional
allowance for attorneys’ fees after she has already been
granted a reasonable allowance by the Chancellor merely be-
cause she appealed his decree.

3872

To procure an additional allowance from this Court, it
must be shown that there is in equity and good conscience a
reason why the husband should be further taxed the expense
of financing his wife’s appeal, notwithstanding the presump-
tion that a proper decree has been entered. See Woodward v.
Woodward, 122 Fla. 300, 165 So. 46; Phifer v. Phifer, 124 Fla.
223, 168 So. 9; Troeger v. Troeger, 127 Fla. 53, 172 So. 473;
Phillips v. Phillips 142 Fla. 270, 194 So. 786; Wright v.
Wright, 142 Fla. 580, 195 So. 201. It must be made to appear
that she has not brought a record here in violation of the
rules of this Court, particularly Supreme Court Rule 11 (2)
(a) and (b), as follows:

“(a) Guide to Preparation of Record on Appeal. The ques-
tions raised or the grounds of appeal and cross-appeal as re-
flected in the assignments of error shall control the content of
the record on appeal. All pleadings, evidence and other mat-
ters not essential to the decision of said question shall be
omitted. Formal parts of all exhibits and more than one.copy
of any document, shall be excluded. Documents shall be
abridged by omitting all irrelevant and formal parts.

“(b) Penalty. Failure on the part of counsel or others to
abbreviate the record on appeal as thus required will subject
them to the payment of such costs as this court may deem
proper to impose.”

If any doubt arises as to what the record on appeal should
contain, such questions may be presented to the lower court
for a ruling in accordance with the policy fixed by Supreme
Court Rule 11(8) (c), as follows:

“(c) Appellate and Trial Court May Make Record Speak
Truth. Both the appellant and the trial court shall have power
to rule on objections to the contents of the record on appeal
and to make such order as unto it shall appear proper to pro-
mote the administration of justice and in order to reduce the
volume of the record without injustice and yet present to the
appellate court the matters complained of.”

And Supreme Court Rule 11 (4) (b) and-(c) and 11 (11),
relating to records on appeal.

EE
fe
373

The application for an additional allowance for attorneys’
fees is denied.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

bt
ANNA INGLIS (MAX) v. SOPHIE AVERY
35 So. (2nd) 121 . January Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied May 20, 1948

W. Dow Woodward, for appellant.
M. C. Vann, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

The appellee has filed a motion to dismiss because the
judgment appealed from is not one applicable in law. She
bases her motion upon Section 59.02, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., which
provides:

“Appeals in cases at law lie only from final judgment, ex-
cept as specified in Sections 59.03, 59.04 and 59.05 of these
statutes.”

An examination of the transcript shows that the final judg-
ment in ejectment was entered on May 23, 1946, in favor of
the appellee, Sophie Avery, and against the appellant, Anna
Inglis (Max) ; that thereafter a writ of possession was issued
under date of September 17, 1946, and executed, by placing
Sophie Avery in possession; that proceedings in equity were
had, wherein Anna Inglis (Max) sought relief concerning the
proceedings had in the ejectment suit; and, on September 29,
1947, appellant, Anna Inglis (Max) filed her motion in the
ejectment suit for a reinstatement, which motion was predi-
cated upon the proceedings had in equity and which motion
for reinstatement was denied. It is this order denying rein-

374

statement that is now brought here by appeal, which the ap-
pellee, Sophie Avery, has moved to dismiss.

The record before us fails to show any error in the pro-
ceedings in the ejectment suit. Anna Inglis (Max) went into
equity seeking relief against the judgment at law, and it is the
equity suit that she must look for her relief, if any.

The appeal is dismissed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and ADAMS, J., agree to the conclusion
only because the motion does not present the questions of
error vel non in the ejectment action.

Lee
PINK HOLLIDAY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
35 So. (2nd) 4 January Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 En Banc

Rehearing denied May 10, 1948

Fisher, Fisher, Hepner & Fitzpatrick, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Ernest W. Welch, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Lucille Snowden, Special Assist-
ant Attorney General, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

On appeal here it is contended that the evidence adduced
on the part of the State is legally insufficient to support a
verdict and judgment of manslaughter. We have examined
the transcript of ‘the record and briefs and have concluded
that the appellant has not carried the burden of proof estab-
lishing reversible error, as required by law, and accordingly
the judgment of the court below is affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, SEBRING and ADAMS, JJ.,
concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and BARNS, J. dissent.
BARNS, J., dissenting:

I dissent because the evidence fails to establish defendant’s

375

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is fairly well established
that the accused first shot at the deceased in self defense when
the deceased was very near the accused and cutting at him
with a knife. The accused states he then shot at the de-
ceased three times. This is corroborated. There were three
wounds on the left side of deceased. There is evidence that
the accused shot at the deceased while pursuing the deceased.

There were three wounds in the back of deceased, but the
evidence fails to establish whether the bullets entered from
the rear or front. So there is no conclusive evidence that all
six wounds were made by three bullets penetrating the body.

I find the evidence is not sufficient to establish the defend-
ant’s guilt beyond, and to the exclusion of, a reasonable doubt.

THOMAS, C. J., concurs.

[|

THE TRAVIS ©O., a Florida corporation, v' TULLY MAYES and
MARY LOU MAYES, his wife, et al.

36 So. (2nd) 264 June Term, 1948
March 30, 1948 En Bane
On rehearing granted July 18, 1948

Louis Schwarzkopf, for appellant.
Price & Price, for appellees.

376

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

TERRELL, J.:

In January 1941, appellant filed its bill of complaint to
foreclose a mortgage on Lot 4, Block 16, J. W. Erickson’s Sub-
division, Miami, Florida. Appellee Anna Engle filed her
answer and motion to dismiss, alleging that she had a tax
deed to the property which gave her superior title to that of
appellants. The motion to dismiss was denied by the chancel-
lor which was on appeal affirmed by this court.

On going down of the mandate the answer was amended,
testimony was taken and of final hearing the Master found
that the mortgage and note were not barred by the 20 year
Statute of Limitations and that appellee’s tax deed was void
on its face, that it was not admissible in evidence as color of
title and that while the Statute of Limitations had not run
against appellant’s mortgage, the foreclosure suit was barred
by laches. The Master further found that the mortgage ac-
count was not closed by the Dade County Security Company,
appellant’s assignor, until January 14, 1931. Appellants and
appellee filed exceptions to the Master’s report. In his final
decree the chancellor approved the Master’s. report, taxed all
cost against appellants and dismissed the suit. This appeal
is from final decree. °

_ Counsel are at. variance as to what. question we should
answer. Most of the argument is directed to the point of
when the Statute of Limitations begins to run and whether or
not laches may be invoked in view of the Statute of Limita-
tions. Stated another way we are concerned with the point of
whether or not a default mortgage and note may be barred
for laches before the Statute of Limitations runs or when it
appears that the Statute of Limitations has not run against it.

The law is well settled that the Statute of Limitations
begins to run against a mortgage at the time the right to fore-
close accrues. Special Tax School District No. One, Orange
County v. Hillman, 131 Fla. 725, 179 So. 805; Bourns v. State

377

Bank of Orlando and Trust Co., 106 Fla. 46, 142 So. 810;
Nevitt v. Bacon, 32 Miss. 212, 86 Am. Dec. 609; Buss v. Kemp
Lumber Co., 23 N.M. 567, 170 Pac. 54; Wiltise Mortgage Fore-
closure, 3rd Ed. Vol. 1, page 111. The rule is also settled that
when a mortgage in terms declares the entire indebtedness
due upon default of certain of its provisions or within a rea- .
sonable time thereafter, the Statute of Limitations begins to
run immediately the default takes place or the time inter-
venes. Central Trust Co. v. Meridian Light and R. Co., 106
Miss. 431, 63 So. 575, 64 So. 216; Perkins v. Swain, 35 Idaho,
485, 207 Pac. 585, Miles v. Hamilton, 106 Kan. 804, 189 Pac.
926.

It is not disputed that the note and mortgage in question
were executed February 8, 1916, and were made payable seven
years after date of execution, or February 3, 1923. The pres-
ent suit was instituted January 18, 1941, which appellants
contend is well within the 20 year period of the Statute of
Limitation. Appellees contend on the other hand that if no
payment was made within three months after February 3,
1916, or by May 4th, following, the mortgage was in default,
the Statute of Limitations commenced to run and on May 4,
1936, twenty years thereafter, the right of foreclosure was
barred. This contention is predicated on the following pro-
visions of the original mortgage:

“AND WHEREAS, it is agreed that time is an essential
in this contract, and if default shall be made in any of the
aforementioned payments for the term of three months, or if
any of the agreements, covenants or conditions herein con-
tained, shall be violated by said mortgagor, or either of them,
then the whole sum secured hereby shall become due and pay-
able and the company shall have the right to immediate fore-
closure, with reasonable attorneys’ fees, and such taxes, as-
sessmerits and insurance premiums payable by grantor, but
paid by grantee, ... .

In respect to the mortgagor’s default and when the statute
of limitations commenced to run the Master made the follow-
ing finding being all the answer we make to this point.

With the previous ledger page, or pages, missing, I am un-
able to find the condition of the mortgage with respect to de-

378

fault prior to that time (1928) ... Neither am I able to find
when the mortgage actually went into default.”

Since the Chancellor disposed of the case on the ground of
laches, we will proceed to consideration’ of the point of
whether or not laches may be invoked in view of the Statute
of Limitations. Before considering this point it is not amiss
to suggest that appellant contends that the acceleration pro-
vision is of no effect here because it was not invoked by the
mortgagee. Appellant also contends that payments were
made on the mortgage as late as 1928, but appellees dispute
this.

The Master and the Court found the plaintiff to be guilty
of laches on these facts: The suit to foreclose was brought
25 years after the mortgage was executed and 17 years after
the date of its maturity. The defendant had been in posses-
sion fifteen years under an alleged tax deed. At the time he
went into possession the building on the lot was in bad repair,
the foundation was crumbling, the roof was leaking, the house
had never been painted and had no bath room. The defendant
repaired the foundation, put a new roof, installed plumbing
upstairs and down, wired the house for electricity, paid all
taxes thereafter assessed against the lands and is still in
possession. Since going in possession, defendant has paid
$2416.75 in taxes and improvement liens on the property and
during the same period he has paid $2328. in repairing the
building.

Defendant also averred that she was in actual possession
of said lands for four years after she secured her tax deed.
and that no suit to recover possession was brought within
that time. It is alleged that defendant went into possession
of the lands described in the bill of complaint, in June 1926,
and had been in actual continued adverse possession for more
than seven years next prior to filing the bill of complaint and
that within one year after taking possession returned said
property for taxation and has each year thereafter paid the
taxes thereon, including all improvement liens.

The plaintiff has offered no excuse or explanation of the
long delay in asserting its claim. The Dade County Security
Company, through whom it secured title, was aware of the

facts recited in the preceding paragraph and having taken the
mortgage without recourse can assert no greater right than
its assignor. It is further contended that the property has
enhanced materially in value due to improvements made by
defendant and that plaintiff should not now be permitted to
assert any claim to the property. It is also alleged that
plaintiff secured a large number of other mortgages with the
mortgage in question, that it paid the sum of one dollar for
the latter, that the assignor and the assignee both had knowl-
edge of the facts on which the chancellor predicated his judg-
ment and the further fact that taxes for the year 1922 and
subsequent years had not been paid and that there was a tax
deed outstanding.

It may be stated with confidence that ordinary delays will
not defeat the Statute of Limitations but under a state of
facts like that presented here it would be highly inequitable
to permit the plaintiff to enforce its claim against defendant.
Marked changes in the condition and relation of the parties
connected with delay in asserting claims have been held as a
bar to asserting them. Smith v. Daffin, 115 Fla. 418, 155-So.
658; Sharrow v. City of Dania, 181 Fla. 641, 180 So. 18;
Norton v. Jones, 73 Fla. 81, 90 So. 854.

In this holding we do not overlook Jordan v. Sayre, 24 Fla.
1, 3 So. 329 and Holiday v. Wade, 117 Fed. (2nd) 154, relied
on by appellant. These cases and cases from other states

“relied on follow the general rule which we approve, but here
the special reasons detailed are ample to take the case out
of the general rule and support our conclusion that equity may
sometimes follow laches rather than the Statute of Limita-
tions. The note and mortgage were twenty-five years old, ap-
pellee was in possession in due course, had paid taxes on the
property for twenty-six years, had restored it from a prac-
tically worthless asset to one of value and appellant asserted
no right in it till conditions caused it to spiral in value.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, SEBRING and ADAMS, J.J. concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and BARNS, J. dissent.

HOBSON, J., not participating.

379

380

ROBERT J. WELSH v. HELEN H. WELSH
35 So. (2nd) 6 January Term, 1948
April 13, 1948 Division A

Rehearing denied May 11, 1948

Pat Whitaker and J. Lewis Hail, for appellant.
Oliver C. Maxwell and H. C. Crittenden, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

On May 27, 1947, the Circuit Court of Polk County, Flor-
ida, entered a final decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony
previously existing between Helen H. Welsh, the plaintiff

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381

below, and her husband, Robert J. Welsh, the defendant. The
final decree adjudicated the claims and disputes of the parties
with respect to certain property rights and the controversy
on this appeal is limited to the correctness of the rulings of
the Chancellor below on questions of law and fact, but no con-.
test or assignment of error is made by either party as to the
provision of the final decree which dissolved the bonds of
matrimony between the parties.

Provision (e) of the final decree recited that the parties
had a joint bank account in the approximate sum of $2,800.00,
and the sum was paid as the initial payment on a home where
the agreed amount of the purchase price was $10,500.00. The
title thereto was taken in the name of one of the husband’s
corporations and the corporation signed the necessary papers
showing the balance due on the purchase price of the home.
The Chancellor concluded that the corporation held thé
property as trustee for the appellant and his wife and when
the corporation conveyed the property back to Robert J.
Welsh, then the plaintiff below and the defendant owned the
home as an estate by the entireties or as tenants in common.

Provision (f) recites that the husband, Robert J. Welsh,
on March 25, 1937, when the parties hereto married, was in-
debted, with mortgages outstanding against his property, and
the value of his equity at the time (consisting largely of a
drug store situated at Winter Haven) was not in excess of
$7,500.00. That the wife assisted her husband in the opera-
tion of the drug store and actively contributed to the accumu-
lation of property and assets now by him owned and addi-
tional thereto discharged fully all her domestic duties.

Provision (g) recites that the plaintiff (wife) has sepa-
rate property acquired by inheritance of the approximate
value of $19,000.00. The plaintiff worked the vacation period
and at other times in Welsh’s Drug Store and in Key Drug
Store and received no compensation therefor; she procured
good lines of cosmetics for both stores, and her efforts, labor
and skill substantially contributed to the defendant Welsh’s
accumulation of property, the value of which was decreed at
the sum of “not less than $75,000.00.” The plaintiff-wife was
entitled to an equitable interest (a) as a tenant by the en-

382

tireties or (b) as a resulting cestui que trust, and, as a matter
of law, was entitled to have her petition for partition of her
husband’s property granted, irrespective of any tenancy (a)
by the entireties or (b) being cestui que trust of a resulting
trust in the home.

Provision (h) recites that the wife purchased the furni-
ture and placed the same in the home out of her separate
property; that the value of the home was fixed at the sum of
$15,000.00, and the equity of each found to be $7,500.00; that
the plaintiff wife provided the furniture for the home in the
sum of $2,500.00 and the husband expended therefor the sum
of $500.00.

Provision (i) recites that as a minimum award to plaintiff
wife to equalize the property between her and the husband,
Welsh, plaintiff wife should be granted title to the real estate
hereinafter described, free of the mortgage, and in addition
thereto should be awarded the sum of $5,500.00, independent
of any allowance for alimony or other allowance to her.

Provision (4) of the final decree divested the husband,
Robert J. Welsh, of the home and vested the same in fee
simple in the wife, Helen H. Welsh, thereafter known as Helen
Henderson. Provision (5) decreed that the interest or title
of Robert J. Welsh to any or all the furniture, furnishings and
fixtures located in the residence or out-buildings on the premi-
ses “be and the same is hereby divested from the husband and.
vested in the wife, Helen Henderson.”

Paragraph 5-a, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the decree are viz:

“5-a, That the defendant, Robert J. Welsh, be, and he is
hereby ordered and directed to pay to First Federal Savings
& Loan Association of Winter Haven, a corporation, any bal-
* ance remaining unpaid on the mortgage held by them covering
the real estate, aforedescribed, and obtain a full satisfaction
thereof, and deliver such satisfaction to the plaintiff, or her
attorneys of record; that the defendant, Robert J. Welsh,
forthwith pay to the plaintiff, or her solicitors of record, the
additional sum of $5,500.00, and in default thereof, by said
defendant, that the plaintiff, Helen H. Welsh, be, and she is
hereby given and granted an adequate lien upon all stock of
Winter Haven Pharmacy, Inc., a corporation, owned by the

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883

defendant Welsh, and all fixtures, equipment and merchandise
in the drug store known as Winter Haven Pharmacy, located
at 15 - 5th street N. W., Winter Haven, Florida, to secure the
payment of the cash mortgage payment and cash award, here-
inbefore allowed to plaintiff, which said equitable lien, the
plaintiff is hereby granted leave to foreclose against the de-
fendant Welsh. ©

“6, That the defendant Welsh be, and he is, hereby re-
strained and enjoined from selling, or attempting to sell, the
shares of stock, aforementioned, and the defendant Welsh is
hereby restrained and enjoined from selling, or attempting to
sell, the fixtures, equipment and merchandise situate in
Winter Haven Pharmacy in bulk, and except by sale of mer-
chandise at retail in due course of business, until the said de-
fendant, Robert J. Welsh shall have paid the mortgage bal-
ancé, aforementioned, to First Federal & Loan Association of
Winter Haven, and shall have paid the cash award of $5,500.00
herein granted to the plaintiff, or her solicitors of record.

“7, That the awards herein made the plaintiff of and from
the property of the defendant Welsh, when cash awards shall
have been paid by him as ordered herein, shall constitute a

* full and complete settlement of property rights between the
defendant Welsh and the plaintiff, and shall be in lieu of and
in full settlement of all future claims for alimony or other
allowances to plaintiff from said defendant, hereafter.

“8, That any claims of the defendant in and to the sepa-
rate property of the plaintiff, Helen H. Welsh, be, and the
same are, hereby set aside, cancelled and for naught held, and
title to the separate property of plaintiff be, and the same is
quieted against any future claims of the defendant, Welsh.

“9, That the defendant, Robert J. Welsh, and all persons
claiming by, through or under him, since the filing of the bill
of complaint herein, do forthwith surrender possession of the
real estate hereinbefore described, and all furniture, furnish-
ings and fixtures, located in the residence or out-buildings on
the real estate aforedescribed, owned by plaintiff or defendant
Welsh, on the date of the filing of the bill of complaint herein,
except wearing apparel and other strictly personal effects of

a
384

the defendant, Robert J. Welsh, to the plaintiff or her solici-
tors of record.”

After a careful study of the record and an analysis of the
final decree entered below, coupled with an examination of
the authorities cited, the conclusion is inescapable that con-
fusion exists as to the proper principles of law applicable to
this controversy. Section 65.08, F.S.A., provides that in every
decree of divorce in a suit by the wife the court shall make
such orders touching the maintenance, alimony and suit
money of the wife, or any allowance to be made her, and if
any, the security to be given for the same, as from the circum-
stances of the parties and nature of the case may be fit,
equitable and just; but no alimony shall be granted to an
adulterous wife. Section 65.08 supra was amended by Chap-
ter 23,894, Acts of 1947, Laws of Florida, by the re-enactment
of Section 65.08 and adding the words, “In any award of
permanent alimony the court shall have jurisdiction to order
periodic payments or payment in a Jump sum.”

Chapter 23,894 supra became effective as a law subsequent
in time to the filing of the bill of complaint in this cause and
the entry of the final decree and no language appears therein
to indicate that the Legislature intended that the Act should
operate retroactively and we therefore hold that the Act as
amended supra is inapplicable to this controversy. Compare
Van Loon v. Van Loon, 132 Fla. 535, 182 So. 205.

Permanent alimony is a continuous allotment of sums of
money payable at regular periods. Phelan v. Phelan, 12 Fla.
449. Permanent alimony is in the nature of an obligation or
duty due a stranger. Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla. 1081, 111 So. 382.
Permanent alimony is not a sum of money or specific portions
of the husband’s estate given absolutely to the wife but is a
continuous allotment of a sum payable at regular periods for
her support from year to year. Heckes v. Heckes, 129 Fla.
653, 176 So. 541.

The basis for the allowance of permanent alimony is the
necessities of the wife and the financial ability of the husband
to supply the necessity. Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629,
21 So. (2nd) 145; Collins v. Collins, 153 Fla. 10, 13 So. (2nd)
445. In a suit for temporary alimony we held that if it should

be made to appear that the wife’s income from her separate
estate is sufficient to provide for her maintenance her applica-
tion will be denied. Floyd v. Floyd, 91 Fla. 910, 108 So. 896;

Phelan v. Phelan, supra.

Section (g) of the final decree supra granting the wife’s
petition for partition of her husband’s property on the theory
that all the property of the husband was held by the parties as
tenants by the entireties or as a resulting cestui que trust or
that the wife had by her labor acquired an equitable interest
in all of the husband’s property and that the same should be
partitioned and lawfully awarded was bottomed on the case
of Engebretsen v. Engebretsen, 151 Fla. 372, 10 So. (2nd)
322. It is quite clear that the learned Chancellor miscon-
strued our holding in the latter case and it is not necessary to
point out the distinguishing features of the two cases. The
case of Gaffny v. Gaffny, 129 Fla. 172, 176 So. 907, has but
little, if any, influence on this controversy.

The doctrine of a special equity in the property of a hus-
band on the part of the wife was recognized and sustained by
this court in the case of Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla. 253, 83 So.
87. It appeared that she was the mother of the appellant’s
six children; she had generously contributed in funds and by
her personal exertion and industry through a long period of
time to the acquisition and development of his home and other
property and the establishment of his fortune.

In Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796, this Court
applied the doctrine of a special equity in behalf of the wife
where it was established that she contributed materially in
funds and industry through a period of years to the husband’s
holdings and business. Such an allowance is not alimony and
is only warranted by special facts and circumstances in favor
of the wife for the wife’s contributions of money and services
to the husband’s property accumulations, above and beyond
the performance of marital duties.

The special equity doctrine was applied by this Court in
Windham v. Windham, 144 Fla. 563, 198 So. 202, where it was
shown that the parties lived together for thirty-five years.
The husband owned at the time of the marriage twelve or
thirteen acres of land and a four room house and a few acres

385

PC
” 386

had been cleared and set to fruit trees. The wife inherited
seventeen head of cattle which she brought on the place and
the cattle increased and the parties cleared more land and set
out additional fruit trees and with their money additional
property was acquired and the property accumulated after
marriage was subject to a special equity for the wife. This
rule was reaffirmed in Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So.
(2nd) 727. The facts involved in Dupree v. Dupree, 158 Fla.
439, 28 So. (2nd) 907, are quite different from the facts pre-
sented on the record here. °

The record discloses that the parties lived together from
March, 1937, until the latter part of 1945, a period of about -
eight years, and no children were born to the marriage. There
is no claim that she contributed her funds or money to the
drug business of her husband but that he owned a drug busi-
ness in March, 1937, at the time of the marriage. The wife
expressed the view that her husband was worth around
$7,500.00 at the time of the marriage and the husband testi-
fied that his net worth at the time was $25,000.00. The wife’s
claim for a special equity in her husband’s property rests on
her work and labor about the hushand’s drug store. It is not
denied that she worked or that she was instrumental in plac-
ing in the store for sale a special line of cosmetics; also that
she cooked some hams about the home and the same were
sold to the customers of the business. It is contended that
this service increased the business of the store and resulted
in the husband’s property increasing in value many thousands
of dollars during the eight years she-was about the store.
Experienced druggist testifying in the case contradicted the
claim that the sale of this line of cosmetics or ham sandwiches
were very profitable lines about a drug store although the line
yielded a 3314 % profit. Other testimony is to the effect that
cosmetics and ham sandwiches were sold about the store prior
to Mrs. Welsh’s appearance in 1937 and since she left in De-
cember, 1945, and the line is now handled by one of the regu-
lar clerks and requires no extra skill. It is the writer’s view
that the evidence showing a special equity in béhalf of the
wife and husband’s property for the services rendered falls
far short of the requirements set out in our adjudications.

p

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387

Prior to the marriage in 1937 the wife was employed and
monthly earned some money. After marriage she received
$50.00 per month in the management of an orange grove. Ac-
cording to her testimony she owns a one-fifth interest in a 40
acre grove and its value was appraised at $44,000.00, and is
now free from liens. The profits from the grove were invested
in government securities and the value of the property owned
in her own right on May 27, 1947, was fixed by the Chancellor
at the sum of $19,000.00. We find substantial testimony in
the record to sustain this conclusion. The wife testified that
she was forty years of age and in good health. The husband
testified that the value of his property was $48,650.00 and his
net annual income $4,500.00 or more. He admits his financial
ability to pay alimony if the wife can by competent testimony
establish her necessity therefor.

It is our view and holding that the husband should pay to
the wife (a) the sum of $1,400.00, with interest, shown to
have been taken from their joint account and paid as a first
payment on the home; (b) the value of her services about the
drug business of the husband from March, 1937, until Decem-
ber, 1945; (c) the sum of $150.00 per month as alimony and
the first payment to be made within thirty days after the
filing of our mandate in the lower court; (d) that the furni-
ture now in the home or the several pieces thereof be awarded
to the party hereto who establishes by competent proof to
the satisfaction of the Chancellor that his or her money paid
for said piece or pieces of furniture.

It is our conclusion that the Chancellor below applied the
improper principles of law to.the portion of the final decree
which attempted to adjudicate the property rights of the
parties to this suit and the law requires a reversal thereof for
further proceedings in the court below not inconsistent with
the opinion and views herein expressed. The costs of this ap-
peal are taxed against the appellant.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Le
388

‘THE STATE OF FLORIDA and the taxpayers, property owners and
citizens of North Bay Village in Dade County, Plorida, including
non-residents owning property or subject to taxation therein, v.
NORTH BAY VILLAGE, a municipal corporation in Dade County,

Florida.
34 So. (2nd) 876 January Term, 1948
April 20, 1948 Division A

Glenn C. Mincer, for appellant.
Hoffman & Durant, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

The legislature of 1945, enacted Chapter 23,427, Special
Acts of that session, creating the Village of North Bay Island,
a small community adjacent to the City of Miami. The legis-
lature of 1947 enacted Chapter 24,734 of said session, chang-
ing the name of North Bay Island to North Bay Village.
Proof of publication of notice of intention to apply for enact-
ment of the latter act was certified by the Secretary of State
and introduced as evidence herein without objection. These
acts authorized North Bay Village to issue bonds and impose
taxes to service them. This ‘appeal is from a final decree
validating an issue of bonds by North Bay Village for munici-
pal improvements.

It is first contended that North Bay Village is a community
of not more than twenty-eight persons who are freeholders,
and that the legislature is without power to create a munici-
pality of so limited a number and authorize it to issue bonds
and impose taxes to service them when the major portion of
the land to be taxed is owned by non-residents of the munici-
pality. :

It is shown that the bond issue in question was approved
by the vote of the freeholders as required by Section 6, Article
IX of the Constitution. North Bay Village was created by
the act of the legislature pursuant to authority vested in it
by Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. The evidence
shows that, the tax millage will not be greater than it was
before the bond election and that the improvements made
with the proceeds of the bonds will result in a material reduc-
tion in fire insurance rates. It will also result in the develop-
ment of lands near the City of Miami and Miami Beach which
will result in a general increase in assessments. All the lands
in the municipality are accessible for municipal services.

It is next contended that North Bay Village is neither a
city nor a town as contemplated by Section 5, Article IX of
the Constitution, relating to the power of the legislature over
municipalities and cannot be authorized to issue bonds and
impose taxes to service them.

It is true that Section 5, Article IX limits the power of the
legislature to authorize the assessment of taxes for municipal
purposes to “incorporate cities or towns” but North Bay
Village is mcorporated and Section 180.01, Florida Statutes
1941, extends the term “municipality” to include any city,
town or village duly incorporated under the laws of the State
of Florida. North Bay Village is within the terms of this
act but even though it were not so, the act creating it is suf-
ficient to remove either objection on this point.

The decree validating the bonds is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
De

AGNES R. BARCO v. CLAUDE R. BARCO

389

84 So. (2nd) 879 January Term, 1948
April 20, 1948 : Division A

390

Worley, Gautier & Cannon, for appellant.
Zach H. Douglas, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a final decree granting a divorce
and awarding alimony, etc., to the wife, the appellant in this
controversy. We have studied the record in light of the con-
tentions of counsel for the respective parties but have failed
to find error in the record. The disputes and conflicts in the
testimony as settled by the final decree have not been shown
to be clearly erroneous. It is our conclusion that the cause
should be affirmed on authority of Stewart v. Stewart, ......
Fila. -....., 29 So. (2nd) 247.

The appellant through counsel has filed a petition for the
allowance of counsel fees for services rendered incident to
this appeal, and, after consideration thereof, the same is
granted and the amount thereof fixed at the sum of $350.00.

Affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SEBRING and BARNS,
JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., dissents.

Leerssen)
MEEKY COTTRELL v. MARTHA AMERKAN

85 So. (2nd) 383 January Term, 1948
April 20, 1948 Special Division B

391

Hail & Hedrick, and Ausley, Collins & Truett, for appellant.
Cushman & Woodard, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

These proceedings are pending on petition for certiorari
under Rule 34, and respondent has sought to dismiss such
proceedings because the order sought to be reviewed was an.
order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s bill of
complaint when the petitioner had suffered the entering of a
final decree against him before the presentation of the petition
for certiorari, which final decree was not effectively appealed.

Authorities relied upon by the respondent for the dismissal
of the certiorari are as follows:

Stockton v. Harmon, 32 Fla. 312, 13 So. 833, was a case
heard upon a motion to vacate supersedeas. In this case an
appeal was taken from interlocutory orders after the dis-
missal of the bill and the court held that an appeal taken
under such circumstances would be dismissed. Burnham v.
Driggers, 44 Fla. 168, 32 So. 796, was heard upon a motion to
dismiss the appeal, which appeal was from that part of the
decree dissolving the injunction and which appeal was taken
after a final order dismissing the bill had been entered and
the appeal was dismissed upon authority of the case of Stock-
ton v. Harmon, supra.

Wilder v. Dunn, 45 Fla. 662, 33 So. 508, was an appeal
from an interlocutory order after a final decree had been ren-
dered dismissing the bill, and the appeal was dismissed upon
the authority of the Burnham and Stockton cases, supra.

Stanley v. Standard Cypress Company, 54 Fla. 583, 45 So.
478, was a case similar to the Stockton, Burnham and Wilder
eases in one respect, in that the appeal was from an interloc-
utory order after the entry of a final decree, and the appeal
was dismissed upon the authority of three preceding cases,
but the opinion fails to state whether or not the final decree
rendered was an order dismissiing the bill or otherwise ad-
verse to appellant.

392

Banks v. Guinyard, 63 Fla. 334, 58 So. 229, was an appeal
from an interlocutory order. The appeal was taken after the
entry of a final decree, which did not dismiss the bill but
adjudicated the equities. The appeal was dismissed upon the
authority of Stanley v. Standard Cypress Company, supra.

Oneida Land Company v. Richards, 72 Fla. 116, 72 So. 646,
was a case wherein the appellant appealed from the interlocu-
tory order striking the answer of the appellant. The appeal
was taken after the entry of a final decree against appellant.
It was dismissed upon the authority of Stanley v. Standard
Cypress Company and Banks v. Guinyard, supra.

Willey v. Hoggson, 89 Fla. 446, 105 So. 126, was an appeal
from an interlocutory-order sustaining a general demurrer to
the bill of complaint and motion was made to dismiss the ap-
peal upon the ground that subsequent to the entry of the
interlocutory appeal the lower court dismissed the bill of com-
plaint and no appeal was taken from such final decree. The
motion to dismiss the appeal was denied.

Dixon v. Gregg, 124 Fla. 177, 168 So. 2, was an appeal from.
an order striking the answers of defendants. The appeal was.
taken after the entry of a final decree and was dismissed upon.
the authority of each of the foregoing cases.

Alderman v. City of New Smyrna, 132 Fla. 74, 180 So. 516,
was an appeal from an order directing the issuance of a writ
of assistance after the entry by final decree and the appeal
was dismissed upon the authority of Willey v. Hoggson, supra.

It is one thing to dismiss a plaintiff’s appeal of an inter-
locutory order when he appeals after the entry of an order
dismissing his bill, but it does not follow that a defendant’s
appeal of an adverse interlocutory decree will be dismissed be-
cause he had also suffered a final decree against him which
has not been appealed. Their situations are quite different.
and distinct.

After the chancellor has adjudicated that the plaintiff’s
bill has no equity and this decree is to be acquiesced in and
accepted as final, then prior adverse rulings are usually of
little consequence to the plaintiff's rights. But when a de-
fendant suffers an adverse final decree it is dependent upon
the plaintiff’s bill having equity. The defendant in this in-

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393

stance suffered a final decree against him after he had suffered
an adverse ruling on his motion to dismiss bill. The final
decree is dependent upon the bill’s having equity, which fact
defendant challenges here on certiorari, and he did below, by
motion to dismiss.

The holdings of the Court in the Stockton, Burnham and
Wilder cases were based upon the sound reason that after the
plaintiff’s bill has been dismissed he cannot procure a review
of interlocutory decree or any other decree when he allows
the decree of dismissal to stand unimpeached. An appeal will
not be allowed to settle mere abstract questions but only to
correct errors injuriously affecting the right of the appellant.
3 Am. Jur. 308.

It is clear that in the three cases above referred to the
correctness of the chancellor’s orders made on or before final
decree became moot in those cases as they might affect the
plaintiff’s-appellant’s rights if the chancellor’s decree of dis-
missal was to be acquiesced in by the plaintiff-appellant.

From the foregoing cases there has been deduced a general
principle that:

“An appeal in an equity cause, taken subsequently to the
rendition of a final decree therein, solely and expressly from
an interlocutory order therein, that does not bring up such

" final decree or review cannot be considered by the appellate
court and will be dismissed.”—Headnote 2—Stanley v. Stand-
ard Cypress Co., 54 Fla. 583, 45 So. 478.

As deduced from the three cases first mentioned, this
general statement, which we now modify, has been subse-
quently applied without regard to other facts, such as pre-
sented in the first three cases,

It appears that the decisions subsequent to the Stanley
case have accepted the general statement in the headnote in
the Stanley-Standard Cypress Co. case rather than the three
cases cited as its authority.

It is not incumbent upon the court to apply legal principles
deduced from decisions relating to procedure when the rea-
sons for application fail. When reasons for the law fail, the
law should fall, particularly so when the law was supplied by

— Es
394

the decisions of the court and relate to procedure and not to
substantive rights. Courts are not required to await legisla-
tive action to change their rulings on matters of procedure.
The rule of reason is supposed to be applied:

“While the rule ‘stare decisis’ is not so binding in mere
matters of practice as in those of substantive law, a well-
settled rule of practice which has been silently acquiesced in
will not be set aside where it would probably cause great in-
convenience and confusion in the practice and where it can
easily be changed by the legislature if there is any necessity
therefor.”—14 Am. Jur. 288 —-Courts—Sec. 68. .

When a defendant has suffered a final adverse decree be-
fore filing his petition for certiorari to review an order deny-
ing his motion to dismiss plaintiff’s bill of complaint, such
petition will not be denied or dismissed merely because he did
not appeal the final decree.

The petition for rehearing is denied.
.THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

HERBERT A. FRINK, et al., v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA ON THE
RELATION OF HAROLD TURK.

35 So. (2nd) 10 January Term, 1948

April 23, 1948 En Banc

Ben Shepard for all appellants except Ralph Pole and E. F.
P. Brigham, for Ralph Pole, appellants.

Evans, Mershon, Sawyer, Johnson & Simmons, Herbert 8.
Sawyer, Walter C. Kovner, Joel P. Newman and Joseph A.
Wanick, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

This appeal is from a final judgment in mandamus wherein _
698 absentee ballots, cast in a municipal election, were held
void because the prerequisite affidavit was not made according
to the statute and also that the statute, Section 101.07, F.S.A.,
was unconstitutional.

Section 101.07, F.S., 1941, F.S.A., provides:

“Any qualified elector, who expects to be absent from his.
home county on the day of any election hereafter held, may
apply in person to the county judge of his home county, or
to the clerk of the municipality in case of municipal elections,
for an official ballot to be used at his voting precinct or ward
at such election, and all county judges in this state, and the
several clerks of the municipalities in the state, in case of mu-
nicipal elections, shall furnish one such official ballot to each
elector so applying therefor at any time not more than fifteen
days nor less than three days next prior to the day of such
election, upon satisfactory proof to such county judge or mu-
nicipal clerk, as the case may be, that the applicant therefor
is qualified to vote at such election and upon such elector
taking and subscribing to the following oath or affidavit which
is to be printed upon the front of large envelopes to be fur-
nished the several county judges and municipal clerks for that.
purpose, to-wit:

PB

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396

“ State of Florida, County of
I, the undersigned, do hereby solemnly swear that I have
resided in the State of Florida for one year and in the County,
City or Town of ...... ... for six months, that I
am a duly qualified voter in precinct or ward No. . of
said county or municipality; that I am a citizen of the United
States and a qualified elector under the laws of the State of
Florida; that I expect to be absent from my home county of
_ on the occasion of the -......
election to be held in .... on the day o:
A.D. 19.....; that I will not have an opportunity to vote there-
at personally and will not attempt to do so.’”
The ballots in question here were cast in a municipal elec-
tion in Miami Beach, Dade County, Florida. The affidavit
executed by the electors was as follows:

“STATE OF FLORIDA)

COUNTY OF DADE)

I, THE UNDERSIGNED, do hereby solemnly swear that I
have resided in the State of Florida for one year and in the
City of Miami Beach for six months, that I am a duly qualified
voter in Precinct No. .. .... of said municipality; that I
am a citizen of the United States and a qualified elector under
the laws of the State of Florida; that I expect to be absent
from my home City of Miami Beach on the occasion of the
election to be held on the day of
+) A. D, ......, that I will not have an oppor-
tunity to vote thereat personally and will not attempt to do so.

Elector

‘ Sworn to and subscribed before me this the
of

City Clerk’ ”

It is readily apparent that the affidavit was defective in
that the elector swore he expected to be’ absent from the City
whereas the statute required that he state his expectation to
be absent from the county. There is a difference. The legis-
lature did not suggest a form of affidavit, but specifically

|
fe
397 -

stated, in detail, the substance and unmistakably prescribed
the manner of its execution to apply to both state and mu-
nicipal elections. Section 9, Article VI, of our Constitution
provides that “The Legislature shall enact such laws as will
preserve the purity of the ballot given under this Constitu-
tion.” The drafters of our Constitution took notice of the
need of laws to safeguard elections and the right of suffrage.
Heretofore we have had occasion to refer to its several pro-
visions. See State ex rel. Whitley v. Rinehart, Jr., 140 Fla.
645, 192 So. (2nd) 819.

This court and the legislature know that in many counties
we have several municipalities. The statute here must have a
strict interpretation because: First, the statute was not en-
acted to grant the right to vote but rather to serve as a means
to vote in a manner not recognized at common law; Second,
the privilege was granted by the legislative body with full
consciousness of its constitutional responsibilities for the
purity of elections and the sanctity of the ballot. The lan-
guage of the statute is clear and the failure to comply with it
renders the ballots of no effect. It is not a case of disfran-
chising a voter; he failed to comply with the law and for that
reason his ballot was properly rejected.

‘We now address the question regarding the constitutional-
ity of the statute. From what we have said it is apparent
that the judgment must be affirmed and there is no reason
to pass upon the validity of the statute. Inasmuch as the
lower court also held the statute unconstitutional we are of
the opinion that it would obviate a misunderstanding on a
question involving great public concern for us to state that
we are affirming the judgment for failure to comply with the
statute and we are not passing upon the constitutionality of
the statute. It is a well known rule that we will not hold a
statute bad unless it becomes necessary to do so in order to
dispose of the case. Therefore, we disapprove of so much of
the judgment appealed from as it relates to the validity of the
statute.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. TERRELL, CHAPMAN, SEBRING and
BARNS, JJ., concur.

Le
398

J. TOM WATSON, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, v.
MILLARD F. CALDWELL, as Governor of the State of Florida,
et al., etc. as and composing the Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Fund of this State, et al., etc.

35 So. (2nd) 125 . January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Division A

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Sumter Leitner and
Ernest W. Welch, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.

Ausley, Collins & Truett for State Board of Education of
the State of Florida, Parker, Foster & Wigginton for Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida and
Will M. Preston, for Everglades National Park Commission,
appellees.

TERRELL, J.: .

Appellant instituted this suit by bill in equity against the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund and the State Board
of Education, (from here on out called the Trustees and the
Board) praying for cancellation of the following deeds: (1)
Deed from the Board to the Trustees, dated June 3, 1947, con-
veying 7680 acres of school land. (2) Deed from the Trustees
to the Board, dated June 3, 1947, conveying 7680 acres of
swamp and overflowed lands. (3) Deed from the Trustees to
the United States of America, dated June 3, 1947, conveying
the same lands described in the deed first mentioned in
this paragraph. The Everglades National Park Com-
mission, was permitted to intervene and become a party de-
fendant to the bill of complaint. A motion to dismiss was
granted and the plaintiff appealed. =”

It is first contended that the conveyance from the Board to
the Trustees and in turn the conveyance from the Trustees to
the Board were void and of no effect because there was no at-
tempt to comply with Section 270.07, et seq. Florida Statutes
1941, requiring that such lands be advertised and sold to the
highest and best bidder. The third deed from the Trustees to
the United States was never delivered so is not further con-
sidered.

There is no merit to appellant’s contention, because, (1)
Section 270.07, et seq. control the sale of public lands in the

400

open market and have no application to an exchange by the
State or its agencies unless so stated by the terms of the act.
59 C.J. Section 653: This was not a “sale” but an exchange
in kind to effectuate a definite legislative purpose which we
shall now discuss more fully. (2) The legislative purpose or
policy that the exchange was designed to aid was the estab-
lishment of the Everglades National Park, authorized by
Chapter 20,996, Acts of 1941, Section 264.01 et seq., Florida
Statutes 1941. Chapter 13,887, Acts of 1929, Chapters 16,995,
16,997, Acts of 1935, Chapter 17,903, Acts of 1937, Chapter
19,319, Acts of 1939, Chapters 20,669, 20,998, Acts of 1941, and
Chapters 23,616, 23,617, 23,670, 23,910, Acts of 1947 have to do
with different phases of the same project. None of these acts
require the exchange to be advertised, because the legislature,
the policy making arm of the State Government, was so
thoroughly committed to the Everglades National Park proj-
ect that it was never considered that the lands would be other
than a donation to assist in perfecting the overall scheme.

The Trustees and the Board had ample power to sell and
convey lands held by them. Sections 253.02 and 229.08,
Florida Statutes 1941. The legislature had ample power to
contribute lands to the Everglades National Park project held
by the Trustees and the Board in the manner proposed by the
Park acts. In fact the primary question is one of complying
with these acts and we think the legislature devised a lawful
plan to do so. No one was in position to resist land donation
to it by the State but the Federal Government and it is not
here complaining. The Act, Section 264.09, Florida Statutes
1941, in terms authorizes the Trustees “in their discretion”
to fix the terms of sale of the lands held by them but here
they were proceeding under the acts relating‘ to the establish-
ment of the Everglades National Park which clothed them
with plenary power.

It is next contended that lands held by the Board are
school lands held in trust for the benefit of the State school
fund and cannot be disposed of except by advertisement and
sale'to the highest bidder as provided in Section 270.07 et
seq., Florida Statutes 1941.

Section 229.08, authorizing the Board to sell and dispose

of school lands and to “fix the terms of sale” is a complete
answer to this question. We construe the language of this
act to empower the Board to sell for cash, on terms, or it may
exchange for other lands in kind. An exchange in kind to aid
the Park project is involved here. There is not the slightest
suggestion that the land received in exchange by the Board
was not of equal value to the lands disposed of, so the school
fund was not in the slightest depleted, and being so, this con-
tention fades out of the picture. What has been said in
answer to this question may be considered in supplement to
the answer to the first question. .

It is further argued that the net result of the whole trans-
action participated in by the Trustees, the Board, the State
and the United States, is to divest the State of its school lands
without compensation.

It is quite true that there is no express provision in the
acts relating to the park project, authorizing the conveyance of
school lands for that purpose, but there can be no doubt that

- such an exchange and conveyance as we here approve was im-
plied by the clear terms of the acts recited. They create the
Everglades National Park Commission and clothe it with
power to acquire and and exercise the power of eminent do-
main. Other provisions empower the Trustees to exchange
land outside the Park for private lands within the Park, both
the Park Commission and the Trustees may convey land to
the United States, the counties within the Park area may con-
vey to the United States and the State may surrender its
jurisdiction over the Park. It was known to the legislature
and all the State officers who participated in this transaction,
that school lands were witthin the Park area. It was also
provided that all lands within the Park area be conveyed ‘to
the United States. The Trustees, the Board and the State
officers construed the acts to authorize the exchange of school
lands for the purpose stated and we cannot say they were in
error.

No single project in the State had been given more pub-
licity than the creation of the Everglades National Park, that
the lands comprising it were to be furnished the Federal
Government free of charge and that the policy of the State

401

Le
402

has been to encourage the project. The integrity of the school
fund has been rigidly observed, no constitutional mandate has
been shown to have been violated nor is there the slightest
showing of lack of power on the part of the legislature to en-
gage in and participate in the project in the manner shown.
Such projects have been generally approved throughout the
country.

There is no showing of the exercise of unlawful authority
on the part of any one concerned, so the decree appealed from
is affirmed. .

Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
be
ELBERT EUGENE HARPER, alias ELBERT E. ELLISON, v. STATE
OF FLORIDA.
85 So. (2nd) 4 January Term, 1948
April 26, 1948 En Banc

Manuel M. Glover, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.:
Appellant was indicted for the crime of murder in the
first degree. Upon arraignment he entered a plea of not

403

guilty and subsequently at the time of trial withdrew the plea
by leave of court and tendered a plea of guilty to the offense
eharged. The presiding Judge accepted the plea and there-
upon proceeded to hear evidence to determine the degree of
the offense and the punishment to be imposed. At the con-
clusion of all the evidence and the argument of counsel the
court adjudged the appellant to be guilty of murder in the *
first degree and sentenced him to death by electrocution.

An appeal has been taken from the judgment and sen-
tence and for grounds of appeal the appellant assigns, that
the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for con-
tinuance made after arraignment but prior to trial; that the
trial court erred in adjudging the appellant guilty of murder
in the first degree without allowing him mercy; and that the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, judgment and
sentence of the trial court.

The appellant was indicted on August 21, 1947 for a mur-
der alleged to have been committed on August 8, 1947. On
the same day counsel was appointed to defend the appellant,
and upon arraignment a plea of not guilty was voluntarily
entered. The case was set for trial on August 28, 1947 with-
‘out objection from counsel. At the opening of the trial on
August 28, 1947 the appellant made a motion for continuance
upon the grounds (1) that the appellant could not have a
fair trial at the time because of the great and intense feeling
and animosity against the appellant in the minds of the in-
habitants of the county, in which the crime was committed;
and (2) that the appellant had not been afforded sufficient
time to prepare his defense.

The motion for continuance did not comply with the re-
‘quirements of statute prescribing that such motions be sworn
to by the applicant. Section 916.04 Florida Statutes 1941.
Moreover, there was no affidavit as to the truth of the aver-
ments of the motion; the only affidavit being an affidavit of
good faith made by appellant’s counsel. But even if the
motion had been sufficient as to form, its allegations as to
lack of sufficient time to prepare the defense would have been
insufficient because no facts were alleged to show why the

a
404

appellant could not have fully prepared for trial between the
date of arraignment and the date of trial. Compare Jarvis v.
State, 115 Fla. 320, 156 So. 310..

Despite these insufficiencies in form appearing in the mo-
tion for continuance, the trial judge gave the appellant an op-
portunity to prove the averments of his motion. To establish
the allegations the appellant called as a witness the Sheriff of
the county in which the crime was committed and the trial
was to be conducted. This testimony wholly failed to estab-
lish that the appellant had not been afforded sufficient time
to prepare his defense, or that a fair trial could not be had
because of the attitude of the people of the county toward the
appellant. The trial judge ruled correctly, therefore, in de-
nying the motion for continuance.

The remaining grounds of appeal question the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment, and to
sustain the sentence imposed by the trial court at the con-
clusion of the proceedings.

“The record filed on appeal has been given close study. The
evidence clearly and unequivocally establishes beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of murder in the
first degree, as charged in the indictment. Not one single
mitigating fact of extenuating circumstances was shown
which could have impelled the trial judge to reach a con-
clusion, judgment or sentence different from that determined
by him to be proper under the case presented.

From a careful consideration of the records and briefs we
are of conclusion that no error was committed in the court
below, and that the interests of justice do not require that a
new trial be had. See section 924.32 (2) Florida Statutes,
1941. The judgment and sentence appealed from are there-
fore—

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and
HOBSON, JJ., and WHITH, Associate Justice, concur.

fe
405

GUSTAV J. NICHOLS and MATBILDA NICHOLS, his wife, v.
KELLEY HOLDING COMPANY, a Florida corporation, et al.

35 So. (2nd) 299 June Term, 1948

April 27, 1948 Division A.

Rehearing denied May 31, 1948

Davis & Lockhart, for appellants.

J. Henry Buttram for Mamie Freeman, L. H. Strother and
Janie Strother, his wife, Otis Farrington for Ethel Toler,
formerly Ethel Freeman and Guardian Ad Litem for Joe
Freeman, a minor, C. #. Farrington for Kelley Holding Com-
pany, appellees.

PER CURIAM:

The contentions of counsel for a reversal of the final de-
cree entered in the Court below have been carefully con-
sidered and we have reached the conclusion that these conten-
tions are without merit and the record is free from error. See
Shuptrine v. Wohl Holding Corp., 147 Fla. 185, 3 So. (2nd)

524.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

Le

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, 'v. JOHN E.

HARGROVE.
35 So. (2nd) 1 January Term, 1948
April 27, 1948 Division A

Rehearing denied June 2, 1948

=

406

McKay, Dixon, DeJarnette & Bradford, for ® appellant.
Perry A. Nichols, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

The Florida, Power and Light Company contracted with
Midland Construction Company to repair and replace worn
out or damaged equipment, such as poles, crossarms, insula-
tors, power lines, transformers, lightning arresters, braces
and fuses. Appellee was employed by Midland Construction
Company to assist in making repairs and replacements, and
while working on a pole and crossarm, along which a power
line charged with 7620 volts was strung, he came in contact
with the energized metal brace and was severely burned. He
sued appellant in an action at law, grounded on negligence,
and recovered a judgment for $50,000.00. We are urged to
review and reverse that judgment.

The main ground relied on for reversal was the refusal of
the trial court to grant defendant’s motion for directed ver-
dict, because of the uncontradicted evidence supporting its
third plea as follows: “That at the time and place described
in plaintiff’s declaration, the plaintiff was employed and en-
gaged as a workman to assist in repairing and replacing
equipment and that he received an injury through a piece of
equipment that he was required to replace.”

J
be
407

At the time of his injury appellee was being assisted by
another workman named Farnsworth. It is not disputed
that both were experienced linemen, that they were employed.
to make repairs and replacements on appellant’s equipment,
that at the time appellee was injured he and Farnsworth were
on the pole some distance above the ground and that appellee
was injured by contact with the energized wire. If the injury
had been caused by the negligence of appellee or Farnsworth,
or by the combined negligence of both, the circumstances
might have been such that appellant would not be liable. It
does not necessarily follow however, that because appellee
was injured with “a piece of equipment that he was required
to replace” that his negligence caused the injury. Whose
negligence precipitated the injury is the very nub of the con-
troversy. The evidence was in conflict and the jury resolved
the conflicts against appellant.

Appellant contends that the line was energized by appellee
or Farnsworth or both in releasing the insulator from the
crossarm that was defective and was being replaced. Other
evidence is to the effect that the crossarm to which the insula-
tor was-attached was so defective that the insulator peg had
dropped or slipped down so that the insulator was resting on
the crossarm. It was also contended that the metal braces
supporting the crossarm were improperly attached to the
latter, that the improper attachment drew the energized wire
too near the metal attachment and caused the injury or that it
could have been caused by the tie wires that fasten the ener-
gized wire to the insulator, coming in contact with the attach-
ment when released.

Several witnesses who were men of long experience as
linemen, testified that the pole on which the injury took place
was improperly rigged, in that the metal brace supporting the
crossarm, was bolted to the metal lightning arrester, that it
was never good practice to attach one piece of iron to another
when a non-conductor was available. Appellee contends that
on account of the pole being improperly rigged and the ener-
gized line being improperly attached to the inside of the insu-
lator, it was too close to the energized wire and shorted with
the metal lightning arrester. This condition was aggravated

Le
408

by the fact that the wooden pin which supported the insulator
on which the energized line was strung had settled so as to
bring the energized line too close to the lightning arrester
attachment. Appellee contends that this condition produced
a continuous flow of electricity into the crossarm brace and
caused his injury. _

It is also shown that there was a convenient switch where-
by the line could have been de-energized, but the foreman on
the job did not open the switch because the men were fur-
nished with “hot sticks” to work the line and were instructed
by defendant not to close the switch. All the witnesses were
expert linemen. A great deal of the evidence was of highly
technical nature and required expert advice and opinion to
clarify it. It is admitted that the case could hardly have.been
presented to the jury without expert opinion.

Epitomized, these were the primary factors given the
jury from which they were to determine whose negligence
was responsible for appellee’s injury, so the issue is not so.
simple as appellant would have it. Appellant insists that
these factors were so obvious that appellee, being an experi-
enced workman, was bound to know them and was accord-
ingly charged with the responsibility to protect himself. We
do not agree with this contention. It is shown that appellee
was brought to the job from a foreign state. He may have
observed that the pole was rigged differently from what the
custom was where he had worked, but he was not on notice
that it was rigged contrary to approved local practice. These
and other factors in the chain of circumstances leading to the
injury were unquestionably jury questions.

The second, third, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth ques-
tions have to do with giving or refusal to give certain charges
by the trial court. We have examined these questions care-
fully in the light of the general charge given, and we fail to
find any harmful error. .

Questions four, five, six, fourteen and fifteen have to do
with the admission: or the rejection of evidence. These ques-
tions have likewise been carefully considered, but in our
judgment, they are devoid of harmful error.

ee
: [|
409

Several other questions are raised and have been con-
sidered but the only one we deem necessary to treat is the
concluding one challenging the judgment as being excessive.

At the time of the accident in which appellee was injured,
he was forty-three years of age, in good health and was earn-
ing approximately $125.00 per week, or $6,500.00 per year.
His life expectancy was twenty-five years. His right hand
and arm were so seriously burned that his hand had to be re-
moved. Some weeks later, in order to relieve pain and suf-
fering from his injury, the forearm was removed just below
the elbow. There was also a serious burn on the right leg
above the knee, five or six inches long, three inches wide and
two and one-half inches deep. The latter burn required
several skin grafts, the trimming of burnt flesh, a constant
cleansing of the burnt area and the overall result was a dis-
tinct shock to the nervous system.

Incident to these physical discomforts, the evidence shows
constant pain in the “phantom hand,” more than four months
spent in the hospital, impaired circulation in the right arm
and leg, atrophy and loss of the use of the right arm, in-
ability to write and clothe himself, constant embarrassment,
loss of earning capacity, permanent disability, and, though
injured more than eighteen months before the trial, appellee
had not been able to secure employment on account of his dis-
ability and lack of training in any other life.

Such was the problem confronting the jury. There is not
the slightest intimation that it was prejudiced or that it was
influenced by improper motives. All presumptions favor the
correctness of the verdict, and since Dade County has what is
known as the “blue ribbon jury system,” and is credited with
selecting juries of a high level of intelligence, the usual pre-
sumption would be fortified to that extent. It would be trite
to argue that this Court is not authorized peremptorily to set
a verdict aside because it would have awarded a different
amount. It must be shown to be without justification in the
record, and we find no such showing here.

Earning capacity, life expectancy, dependability, what a
dollar will buy and provincial economy are the primary fac-
tors that actuate a jury in formulating its verdict. It may be

a
410

. that in years to come this formula will become antiquated and
thrown to the discard, but since it is at present the criterion
to guide us, we cannot say that the verdict is excessive. It
will be considerably reduced when appellee*returns his ex-
pended compensation and medical expenses to the Workmens
Compensation Carrier. When this is done and we take into
consideration the fact that appellee had been an experienced
line man for twenty-five years, has twenty-five years to go,
knows no other trade, has a fourth grade education and will
experience many vicissitudes before he is economically re-
orientated, he will of necessity, in the years ahead, be forced
to spread the butter mighty thin with the amount awarded.

The verdict in a case like this is at best but a feeble at-
tempt to place the injured person back in the shoes he wore
before the injury. In many cases, as in this one, it cannot be
done. If it were possible to do so, none of us would be willing
to step into appellee’s shoes and take his judgment with his
handicap on condition that he step in our shoes physically
normal as we are. The elements that enter into a judgment
like this are so diverse that it often requires more of humility
than it does of law properly to assess them. The Judge who
overlooks the fact that the lineman, the yard man, the
plumber and the cook are made of the same common clay that
he is, is not equipped to do so.

No error being made to appear the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

DORA MILLER and HAROLD M. DAVIDSON, and the STATE OF
CALIFORNIA v. SAMUEL NELSON, Executor of the Estate of
OLOF ZETTERLUND, Deceased, and other interested heirs, et al.

85 So. (2nd) 288 . January Term, 1948

April 30, 1948 Division A

Rehearing Denied May 30, 1948

John C. Sullivan and Redfearn & Ferrell, for appellants.

Carl A. Hiaasen, McCune, Hiaasen, Fleming & Kelly, for
twenty heirs and distributees (Samuel Nelson and Nineteen
others) and Lewis H. Tribble, for C. M. Gay, Comptroller of
the State of Florida, appellees.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The State of California, by its Comptroller, Harry B.
Riley, and Dora Miller and Harold M. Davidson, by separate
petitions filed in the County Judge’s Court of Dade County,
Florida, prayed for an order declaring Olof Zetterlund to have
been a resident of the State of California at the time. of his
death at San Gabriel, California, on the 21st day of August,
1945. Attached to the petitions were a copy of the Last Will
and Testament and codicil thereto of Olof Zetterlund for pro-
bate and ancillary proceedings in said court. The State of
Florida, through its Comptroller, J. M. Lee, and the devisees

412 -

and legatees of the Last Will and heirs and other interested
parties filed answers and considerable testimony was adduced
on the issue of whether Olof Zetterlund was a resident of the
State of California or the State of Florida at the time of his
death, and was the administration of the Zetterlund estate in
Dade County, Florida, to be an original administration or an
ancillary administration. .

The County Judge hearing the testimony and considering
the many exhibits introduced into evidence concluded, and so
held, that Olof Zetterlund, on the 21st day of August, 1945,
the date of his death in the State of California, was not a resi-
dent thereof but was a resident and citizen of.the State of
Florida. The petitions of the State of California, Dora Miller

“and Harold M. Davidson were each accordingly denied and
the probate proceedings thereon would continue and pro-
ceed as an original and domiciliary administration in the

County Judge’s Court of Dade County, Florida. On appeal’

said order was affirmed by an order of the Circuit Court of
Dade County, Florida, and from said order of affirmance an
appeal has been perfected here.

Posed for adjudication in this Court by counsel for appel-
Jants are four questions based in a measure on the construc-
tion or interpretation of the evidence and exhibits adduced
by the parties and considered or construed in the Courts be-
low and certified here. The questions are viz:

1. Did the evidence show that Olof Zetterlund, once a resi-
dent of the State of Florida, had left the State of Florida and
had gone to California on a rest trip and while in California or
Oregon he formed the intention to change his residence from
Florida to California, and thereafter returned to California
and purchased a home in which he lived until his death?

2, Were the legatees, devisees, and heirs at law of Olof
Zetterlund who appeared in this cause as petitioners for pro-
bate of the will in Dade County, Florida, and who were served
with notice of the proceedings to probate the will in Cali-
fornia, estopped to apply to the Court of Dade County, Flor-
ida, for the probate of the will in Dade County?

8. Was the executor who is named in the orignal will of
Olof Zetterlund which was offered for probate in Dade County,

EE
P|
413

Florida, and who was not the executor named in the codieil to
said will executed by Olof Zetterlund in the State of California
and who was not related to said testator, a party with such
interest as authorized him to contest the probate of said will
and codicil and have ancillary proceedings instituted in Dade
County, Florida.

4. Is the payment of an intangible tax or the presence of
the name of a taxpayer on the intangible list in Dade County,
Florida, evidence to prove domicile?

The case of Watts v. Newport, 149 Fla. 181, 6 So. (2nd) 829,
involved a purported will alleged to have been made by Mrs.
Letitia V. Graham. The questions presented were: (1) was
the alleged will dated August 20, 1937 forged; and (2) did
Mrs. Graham on the date of execution have or possess the
testamentary capacity to make a will? For and against these
questions considerable testimony was taken and in construing
or interpreting the same we, in part, said (text 149 Fla. 185):

“To answer the question, this Court will first examine the
record to determine whether or not the chancellor followed
the correct rule of decision. The rule of decision is that if
there is substantial competent evidence to support the findings
of the probate judge and he did not misinterpret the legal
effect of the evidence as a whole, his decree should be affirmed.
In re: Donnelly’s Estate, 137 Fla. 459, 188 So. 108; Wilkins
Estate, 128 Fla. 273, 174 So. 412; Alkire’s Estate, 142 Fla. 862,
144 Fla. 606, 198 So. 475; Thompson’s Estate, 145 Fla. 42, 199
So. 352.”

The law makes it our duty on this appeal to examine the
evidence and exhibits and determine if there is substantial
competent evidence to support the findings of the Probate
Judge and that he did not misinterpret the legal effect of the
evidence as a whole. If as a result of the examination it is
found that there is no substantial competent evidence to sup-
port the findings of the Probate Judge and that he miscon-
strued the evidence taken as a whole, then the findings of the
Probate Court must be reversed, otherwise affirmed. Our re-
cital of the evidence is therefore restricted to the pertinent
and substantial portions reflected by the record.

Le
414

Olof Zetterlund was born in Sweden on December 17, 1858.
He died in San Gabriel, California, on August 21, 1945, be-
tween 86 and 87 years of age. He came to America about
the year 1880 and was later employed by Henry Flagler in ac-
quiring the right-of-way for the Florida East Coast Railway
Company, and about fifty years ago acquired an interest in
two and one-half miles‘ of ocean front land in then Dade
County, but now in Dade and Broward Counties. During
World War I he married Mrs. Jeanette Weaver, a widow, and
they lived together as husband and wife until 1932, when a
divorce was obtained and the former wife died during the year
1940. There were no children born to the marriage, but Mrs.
Zetterlund had a daughter, Elsie Z. Weaver, by her first
marriage. It is not disputed that Olof Zetterland resided con-
tinuously in Dade County, Florida, for half a century preced-
ing the Fall of 1941. He established a home at 1702 South
Bayshore Drive, Miami, Florda, where he resided for many
years, but in 1936 he moved from his Bayshore home to the
Oceanic Hotel in Miami Beach. In 1927 he employed Dora
Miller as his housekeeper and she served as such, and in other
capacities, continuously from the date of employment in 1927
until his death on the 21st of August, 1945. In 1941 he sold
his Bayshore Drive home.

In the Summer of 1941 Olof Zetterlund went to a sani-
-tarium for his health at Battle Creek, Michigan, and corre-
sponded with his employees, Mrs. Ellen Burdet and Dora
Miller, his housekeeper. On July 1, 1941, Olof Zetterlund
wrote Mrs. Ellen Burdet from Battle Creek, Michigan, re-
questing Mrs. Burdet to induce Dora Miller to spend her vaca-
tion in Michigan rather than California. On July 9, 1941, he
wrote Dora Miller in Los Angeles, California. On July 28,
1941, he wrote Mrs. James Burdet and said: “I am here for
my health, but what to do I don’t know. I wish to be home.
I don’t know how Mrs. Dora Miller lives in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia.” On October 16, 1941, Dora Miller wrote from Los
Angeles to Olof Zetterlund and, in part, said: “I would like to
come home about October 25th, though I will let you know
definitely when I will arrive at Miami. Please do not forget
that you shall get ready to go back with me in November to

415

Los Angeles.” In November, 1941, Dora Miller took Olof
Zetterlund, then about 83 years of age, to California on a
vacation trip to improve his health. Olof Zetterlund and Dora
Miller, his housekeeper, resided in Los Angeles from Novem-
ber, 1941, until January, 1942, and then went to Santa Fe,
New Mexico, where they lived until May, 1942. From May,
1942, through August, 1942, they lived at Manitou Springs,
Colorado, and in September returned to Santa Fe, New
Mexico, and resided there until January, 1943, and then went
to Ashland, Oregon, where they remained until September,
1943. They returned in October, 1943, to Baldwin Park, Cali-
fornia, and there lived until December 1943, and from Janu-
ary, 1944, until August 21, 1945, the date of his death, they
lived at San Gabriel, California. The record fails to show any
letters or communications personally signed by Olof Zetter-
lund from the date of his arrival in California in 1941, until
his death in August, 1945, but that such letters, documents,
communication or checks bearing his signature were each
signed by Dora Miller.

On November 17, 1941, Dora Miller wrote from Los An-
geles, California, to Miss Freida Elvers about Mr. Zetterlund
viz: “He wants to go home and attend to it.” “Please don’t
forget that miracles have yet to happen about his memory.”
On November 25, 1941, she wrote the same party in part: “I
know that Mr. Zetterlund will get his perfect memory again,
but it will take time. It is more than two years since he is
disturbed and it will take several months for improvement. I
know he will not be home by January 28th (meaning Miami
Beach, Florida). On December 10, 1941, she wrote: “He is
improving but slowly.” On December 14, 1941, she wrote in
part viz: “How I long to hasten the improvement of Mr. Zet-
terlund, but we have to be patient. This turmoil of war only
the Presence can protect us. We just can’t go home as yet
as all this effort would be fruitless. He would not stay away
from office at home and only away from the office he will get
back to his normal way.” On January 16, 1942, Dora Miller,
in a letter to Miss Elvers, in part said: “Father is improving
but let’s say about 20% and we have 80% yet to go.” On
March 11, 1942, Dora Miller wrote Mrs. Burdet, Miami Beach,

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416

Florida, from Santa Fe, New Mexico, in part viz: “He could
not take care of his office as yet and we have to try to keep
him away longer. He is ready to go home any day but what
good would it do him or his business?”

On November 9, 1942, Dora Miller, writing from Santa Fe
to Mrs. Burdet in Miami Beach, in part said: “It seems that
I am at a standstill at what to do with father as he always
wants to go home. We may go home after Christmas. I do
not get any help from the doctors. All they have to say is
that it is his age.” On January 9, 1948, Dora Miller, writing
from Santa Fe to Mrs. Burdet at Miami Beach, in part said:
“When I think of going back to Miami, in about three months
it gets hot there. Doctors urge that I have to take father
away from disturbing matters. He does not remember the
people at home but he surely knows that he has a hotel at
Miami.Beach. That’s what made it so bad when we traveled,
as he wanted to go to Miami. We hardly could bring him to
Battle Creek as he has to have some one with him every
minute, day and night, and I know he would receive plenty of
dope to keep him quiet.” On August 3, 1943, she wrote in
part as follows; “I had to sign it as father just can’t write
with ink that any one could make out his name.” On October
24, 1943; she wrote: “Father cannot write his name any more
and the bank wants his signature. Mr. Zetterlund has begged
me many times not to send him to the hospital or sanitarium.
He suffers with kidney trouble since last November. A whole
year already and he has not found a remedy yet. The M. D.
gives him only dope, which makes it worse.” In December,’
1943, she wrote that, “Father gave me a power of attorney of
the company. Father would have to sign papers and he does
not sign at all at the present.” In January, 1944, she wrote:
“Father could write in the Summer but not now. I hold his
hand but it does not look like his signature. Father cannot
sign his name.” In September, 1944, she wrote that “Mr.
Zetterlund at the present has difficulty in walking and the
doctor advised to keep-him off his feet as much as possible.”
The capital stock returns of the two corporations owned by
Olof Zetterlund viz: Hallond Land Company and Elsinore
Beach Corporation, were filed with the Secretary of State of

the State of Florida on September 11, 1944. Dora Miller
affixed the signature of Olof Zetterlund and herself to each
of these returns. The same were sworn to by Dora Miller and
Olof Zetterlund. The address of each as President and Secre-
tary of the corporations was given as 528 Collins Avenue,
Miami Beach, Florida. The permanent address of Dora Miller
and Olof Zetterlund was given as Miami Beach, Florida. Her
testimony is to the effect that Mr. Zetterlund changed his
domicile from the State of Florida in June, 19438, to the State
of California. It is not disputed that she was some 33 years
younger than Zetterlund. The power of attorney from Olof
Zetterlund to Dora Miller is dated January, .1944, and it re-
cites that Zetterlund was a resident of the State of California.

Counsel for appellants emphasize given portions of ‘the
testimony of Dora Miller: that Zetterlund told Dora Miller
and Ellen Burdet that he loved California and after the pur-
chase of a home in January, 1944, in San Gabriel, California
he told Dora Miller, “I love this house very much. It is a
small house. You can take care of my house and take care of me
as long as I live. This shall be my home and as long as you
will take care of me and be good to me as you have always
done, and when I leave this world the same shall be your
house. I would like to live here as long as I live. When the
time comes I am selling out everything in Florida.” On Janu-
ary 26, 1944, in the signing of the power of attorney to Dora
Miller it recited: “I, Olof Zetterlund, of San Gabriel, County
of Los Angeles...” Mr. Zetterlund decided when they were
in Ashland, Oregon, that he was going to California to make
it his home and said: “This is the best climate we have seen.
When we go back, I am going to buy a home and live there as
long as I live.”

Ellen Burdet testified that Mr. Zetterlund told her that he
would be happy to go to California because the climate was
better than Miami Beach; that he would love to go out and
that he was very happy and he wanted to buy a home and he
wanted to be comfortable. He told George Sennett in Decem-
ber, 1943, that he intended to make California his home and
that he would love to spend the rest of his days in California
and that he bought a home and moved into it around the 1st

417

Ee
418

of January, 1944. His speech had failed him but he knew
what he was doing and how to handle his business; that in the
last years of his life no one could dominate or influence him.
Philomena Sennett, wife of George Sennett and sister of Dora
Miller, assisted in the purchase of the home for Mr. Zetter-
lund. Mr. Zetterlund signed a codicil to his will under date
of August 3, 1945, in California and died approximately three
weeks thereafter.

Circuit Judge Holt, of Dade County, Florida filed a con-
curring opinion to the order of affirmance and listed certain
facts sustaining Mr. Zetterlund’s domicile in Florida at the
time of his death rather than the State of California, viz:

“1. Deceased had resided in Florida for nearly fifty years.

“2. The sole purpose of his trip to California in 1941 was
occasioned by his health. (He died August 21, 1945).

“3. Numerous letters in evidence indicated his continuous
and abiding intention to return to Florida.

“4, All of his property and the source of all of his income
was located in Florida.

“5, The only property possessed by the deceased in the
State of California at his death were two suits of clothes,
some shirts, socks and shoes. He did not own any real
property in that State. .

“6. His corporate stock in various corporations in which he
was interested were situated in Florida.

“{. His last Will and Testament was in Florida.

“8, The bank account which he used throughout his stay in
California was situated in Florida (First National Bank of
Miami) where he was listed as a resident of Miami Beach.

“9. The telephone directory and the business and city di-
rectory listings of deceased until his death were in Miami
Beach, Florida, and there were none in the State of California.

“10. All of the personal effects of deceased, including
clothes, heirlooms, etc., were situated in Florida, and never in
California.

“11. Throughout the entire period he maintained a busi-
ness office in Miami Beach, Florida.-

“12. His stationery listed his address as Miami Beach,
Florida.

“13. He held various offices in his Florida corporations
until June, 1945, and drew salaries as such until that time.

“14. Corporate returns to the State of Florida of two of
his corporations stated his Post Office address to be Miami
Beach, Florida.

“15. Intangible personal property taxes of deceased were
paid in Florida.

“16. The absence of a communication to his office in Flor-
ida or to his attorneys or agents in Florida announcing any
change in residence.

“17. The deceased retained a room in the Oceanic Hotel
which he or his corporation owned.

“18. The deceased maintained a bank safe deposit box in
Florida the entire time he was in the State of California.

“19. All of the living expenses of deceased were paid by
check drawn on the First National Bank of Miami, Florida.

“20. He arrived in California a sick man and remained in
such condition until his death, consequently did nothing ex-
cept rest and attempt to regain his health.

“21, Made communications in which he stated his inten-
tion to return to the State of Florida.”

Mr. Zetterlund was in bad health in the Summer of 1941,
and for that reason went to a sanitarium at Battle Creek,
Michigan. He went to California in the Fall of 1941 with
Dora Miller to regain his health. They left California for
Santa Fe, New Nexico, for a higher elevation or altitude, and
in the Summer went from Santa Fe to Manitou Springs, Colo-
rado, then back to Santa Fe and from there to the State of
Oregon. In June or September of 1943 Mr. Zetterlund, when
in the State of Oregon, decided on California, as his future
domicile and a home was purchased by him in 1944 and title
taken in Dora Miller. It is not disputed that Mr. Zetterlund had
been suffering from numerous senile ailments and under treat-
ment by physicians since 1941. Talking and writing were
difficult for him. Valuable property and lifetime accumula-

419

Le
420

tions located in the Miami area were never transferred to Cali-
fornia. Accounts with banks in both New York City and
Florida were never changed. He paid through Dora Miller in
1944 an intangible tax on his Florida corporations to the
Comptroller of Florida and gave his permanent address and
that of Dora Miller as Miami Beach, Florida. The soundness
of Mr. Zetterlund’s mind due to senile ailments from 1941 to
1945 was not definitely established. A person of unsound
mind does not have the ability to acquire a new domicile. Mr.
Zetterlund gave Dora Miller a power of attorney reciting
therein that he was a resident of California, and shortly there-
after was by a California court adjudged an incompetent.

An adult of unsound mind, who by reason of his mental
status cannot acquire a new domicile for himself, cannot have
his domicile changed for him by being in fact carried by
another person, no matter how closely related to him, to an-
other place. One’s mind may be so weak, whether by nature
or by extreme age, as to be unable to form a settled intent to
change his home and in that case cannot change his domicile.
Under these circumstances a person without legal proceedings
taking charge of the dependent person carinot change his domi-
cile. Beale on Conflict of Laws, Volume One, page 225.

Beale on Conflict of Laws, pages 132-133, states the rule of
domicile thusly: The domicile of origin is assigned to a per-
son by operation of law, without any concurring will of his.
He cannot by his own will or act change this domicile until he
becomes legally capable by the exercise of his own will. When
legally capable it is within his power to change his domicile.
A person who is a normal adult may change his domicile and
thereby acquire a domicile of choice. As the Domicile of
origin is presumed to continue, the burden of proof rested on
the petitioners below to establish (1) that Mr. Zetterlund
abandoned his domicile of origin in Florida; and (2) that it
was his intention to change his domicile from Florida to the
State of California; and (3) that Mr. Zetterlund had and pos-
sessed sufficient mental capacity to form and have the
requisite intent to change his domicile from the State of Flor-
ida to the State of California. The rule supra is not in con-
flict with our previous holdings in Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla.

be
421.

764; 75 So. 35, L.R.A. 1917E 490; Gipson v. Gipson, 151 Fla.
587, 10 So. (2nd) 82, and similar cases. See Texas v. Florida,
306 U.S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817, 121 A.L.R. 1179,
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 62 S. Ct. 608, 86
L. Ed. 885

Pertinent language of the order of dismissal is viz: “and
having carefully considered the petitions filed, and each and
every of the answers filed, the testimony and exhibits, and
after a due consideration thereof, finds that Olof Zetterlund,
deceased, was at the time of his death, on to-wit, the 21st day
of August, 1945, a resident and citizen of the State of Florida
and the County of Dade, and that his said last Will and Testa-
ment was lawfully admitted to probate in Dade County, Flor-
ida on September 6, 1945.” Observing the rule enunciated in
Watts v. Newport, supra, it is our conclusion that there was
substantial competent evidence to support the findings of the
probate Judge and that he did not misinterpret the legal effect
of the evidence as a whole.

We have not overlooked the four questions posed for ad-
judication by counsel for appellants, which have been exhaust-
ively and thoroughly presented by their briefs and ably
argued at the bar of this Court. We fail to find error in the
record.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

JOSEPH E. TOPPER v. ALCAZAR OPERATING COMPANY

35 So. (2nd) 392 January Term, 1948
May 4, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing denied May 31, 1948

422

Thomas H. Anderson and Herbert L. Nadeau, for appellant.
Evans, Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston & Simmons, W. O.
Mehrtens and M. L. Mershon, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

On May 16, 1946, the Alcazar Operating Company leased
to Topper and Drory the concessions to operate for a period
of ten years (a) the coffee shop situated on the ground floor
and (b) the dining room and bar situated on the thirteenth
floor, with furniture and fixtures therein, of the Aleazar Hotel
located on Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida. The rentals
for the first year were based on a percentage of the business
transacted, with a minimum guarantee of $10,000 and $15,000
per annum for the subsequent years. The lessees were re-
quired to deposit with the Alcazar Operating Company as se-
curity for the performance of the lease the sum of $15,000 viz:
the sum of $5,000 on the execution of the lease and an ad-
ditional $5,000 on the commencement of the lease and $5,000
on the beginning of the second year of the lease. The elec-
tricity consumed was to be paid by the lessees.

The Alcazar Operating Company, on June 17, 1946, by
separate instrument leased the cocktail bar situated on the
ground floor of the hotel to Topper and Drory. The lease was
for a period of one year and yielded rentals in the sum of
$20,000, payable as follows: $7,500 on the execution and the
further sum of $7,500 four months after the date the cocktail
bar was ready for operation, and $5,000 eight months after
the cocktail bar was ready for operation. A clause providing
for a renewal of the lease for nine years was incorporated in
the lease, and the annual rentals under the new lease were for
the sum of $20,000, payable monthly, plus a percentage of
the business transacted in excess of $75,000 in-any one year.

La
|
423

The lessees stipulated to pay extra for electrical current con-
sumed. Ernest M. Drory, in October, 1946, assigned his
interest in both leases to Topper and the latter became the
sole lessee and operator under the terms of both leases.

On June 6, 1947, the Alcazar Operating Company and
Joseph E. Topper by mutual consent agreed to cancel the lease
dated May 16, 1946, and each signed a written instrument by
the terms of which each of the parties released and discharged
the other from any claim, liability, suit or action because of
said lease, thereby rendering the same void and without legal
effect. Some of the witnesses testified that the Alcazar Oper-
ating Company forgave the lessee Topper the sum of $3,600 in
defaulted rents under the terms of the canceled lease. The
witnesses for lessee Topper dispute this testimony and con-
tend that the consideration for the cancellation of the lease
was an oral agreement by the Alcazar Operating Company to
execute a lease to Joseph E. Topper on the cocktail lounge on
the ground floor of the hotel.

Joseph.E. Topper filed in the Circuit Court of Dade County,
Florida, a suit for declaratory decree, accounting, specific
‘performance and other relief against the Alcazar Operating.
Company. It was-alleged that during the month of June,
1947, Topper proposed to the Alcazar Operating Company
that he would cancel his lease on “the dining room and the
bar on the top floor of the Alcazar Hotel and the hotel would
cancel an alleged claim of $6,000 for rents and the hotel would
grant Topper a new lease on the coffee shop on the ground
floor and a new lease for the operation of the cocktail bar on
the ground floor, and, in part performance of said agreement,
Topper surrendered the dining room and bar on the top floor
of the hotel, and that a new lease be given him on the coffee
shop and the cocktail lounge on the ground floor.” The Al-
cazar Operating Company refused to carry out its agreement
and executed the leases according to its agreement. The
plaintiff does not owe the defendant any sum of money as
rents but the defendant has in its possession a sum of money
of the plaintiff in an amount in excess of the total amount due
by the defendant for all commissions covering all peridds of
time prior to filing suit.

424

Paragraph VI of the bill of complaint was amended and
alleged therein that the lease which the defendant agreed to
give the plaintiff and under which the plaintiff was to operate
a cocktail lounge on the ground floor of the Alcazar Hotel was
to be on the same terms and conditions as in the existing lease,
except the amount thereof was to be determined by the
plaintiff and the defendant after the determination by them
as to what gross receipts of the business to be conducted by
the plaintiff on the premises were and the rents to be paid
to the defendant were to be a reasonable sum of money based
upon the gross receipts which it was estimated that the
plaintiff would derive from the operation of the cocktail bar.

It was alleged that the lessee Topper had an option to re-
new the lease as set out in his Exhibit No. 2, which recited
that the “lessor does hereby give and grant to the lessees the
option to renew this lease for the balance of the term of the
lease dated the 2nd day of November, 1945, from Anna
Brodsky and others to the Alcazar Operating Company...
provided that if the lessees elected to renew this lease, then
they shall do so at least 60 days prior to the expiration of the
_one year term hereof and in that event a new lease shall be
drawn and executed by the lessor and lessees embodying the
terms and conditions of this lease,” ete. The plaintiff Topper
alleged that he gave proper notice and requested a renewal of
the lease within the 60 day period prior to September 12, 1947.
The bill prayed for (a) a specific performance of the agree-
ment of the parties for a renewal of the lease of the coffee
shop and the cocktail bar situated on the ground floor; (b)
an accounting; (c) if specific performance be denied of the
agreement for a lease as described in paragraph VI of the bill,
then the defendant be required to specifically perform the re-
newal option set out in plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 2.

The Alcazar Operating Company in its answer denied the
material allegations of the bill of complaint and alleged that
the plaintiff lessee did not elect to renew the lease sixty days
prior to September 10, 1946, neither has he deposited or of-
fered to deposit the sum of $10,000, or any other sum, as se-
curity for the performance by the lessee of the terms and con-
ditions imposed by the lease, and that the lessee has not of-

425

fered to perform the conditions and provisions of the renewal
option set out in plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 2. The answer denied
specifically the allegations of the bill of complaint to the effect
that a verbal agreement had been made for a new lease on the
cocktail lounge on the ground floor of the Alcazar Hotel.

Testimony of the parties was heard by the Chancellor on
the issues made by the pleadings and on final hearing the
court held (1) that the equities of the cause were in favor of
the defendant wherein the plaintiff sought specific perform-
ance of an alleged oral contract to make a new lease on the
cocktail lounge on the ground floor of the Alcazar Hotel; (2)
that the plaintiff was entitled to a renewal of the lease on the
cocktail bar under the option to renew as set out in plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 2, after compliance with the enumerated con-
dition and provisions of the lease; (3) that the Alcazar Oper-
ating Company was indebted to the plaintiff lessee in the sum
of $1,425.39. The plaintiff below appealed.

In the case of Daubmyre v. Hunter, 86 Fla. 326, 98 So. 69,
we held that specific performance of a contract for the sale or
lease of land is not a matter of right in either party, but a
matter of sound discretion in the court, controlled by settled ~
principles of law and equity applicable to the particular facts,
and the discretion of the chancellor in refusing specific per-
formance of a contract for the sale or lease of real estate will
not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Richard-
son v. Varn, 80 Fla. 517, 86 So. 503, and similar cases. Like-
wise, it is fundamental that specific performance will not be
enforced where the contract is not definite and certain as to
essential terms and provisions and is incapable of being made
so by the aid of legal presumption or evidence of established
customs. Rhode v. Gallat, 70 Fla. 536, 70 So. 471; Maloy v.
Boyett, 53 Fla. 956, 43 So. 243.

The case of Camichos v Diana Stores Corporation, 157 Fla.
349, 25 So. (2nd) 864, involved the fdllowing renewal pro-
vision of a lease viz: “12. It is agreed by and between the
parties hereto that the lessee shall have the refusal of the
property for an additional term at a rental and term to be
agreed upon between the parties.” We held that this pro-
vision of the renewal lease was too indefinite to be enforced

426

in an action for specific performance. See Gulf Theatres Inc.
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 157 Fla: 428, 26 So. (2nd) 188.

It is established that specific performance will not be en-
forced where the contract is not definite and certain as to es-
sential terms and provisions and is incapable of being made so
by the aid of legal presumption or evidence of established
customs. Rhode v. Gallat, supra. The basis for this ruling
is that courts are not authorized to write contracts for liti-
gants and supply material terms or provisions omitted by the
parties. Section 725.01 F.S.A. (being the statute of frauds),

. requires certain instruments to be in writing. Plaintiff Topper
testified that the extension of the lease on the cocktail bar on
the ground floor was part of the consideration for the cancel-
lation of the ten year lease on the top floor: I was to get a new
lease on the bar that was to be based on the terms of the old
lease with the exception of the rental and the rental was to be
based on how much business the bar did.” Mr. Morris said:
“We will go over the books and see how much business you
did for the year and we will come to an agreement on the
rent; we will see how much you can pay.” Plaintiff's witness
“Wexler testified on this point to the effect: “There wasn’t any
determined rent other than the fact that he (Morris) said
wait until your lease is up and we will see what business you.
have done and then we’re going to base the rentals on that.”

The testimony of the plaintiff and witness Wexler is.
disputed and contradicted on the point in controversy by Mr.
Morris, of the Alcazar Operating Company. He testified viz:
“Q. What was the conversation about in your office at that
conference? A. I told him that the Variety Club wanted to
make a lease direct (with) the Alcazar Operating Company;
and to do that I would have to get a release from him of the
18th floor; that I would be willing to take his release, even
though there is a loss of rental of about $4,000. I told him
that the Variety Club only offered $6,000 rent, while he was
paying $10,000 and that in the subsequent years he had to pay
fifteen. I said rather than have a bad tenant, I will take that
$4,000 loss, and give them a lease direct, and give him a lease
for the coffee shop, to take the place of the original lease; that.
I would also cancel whatever indebtedness. there is between

ee
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427

us at the time. I computed that to be around $6,500 or $7,000.
I wasn’t sure of the amount, because I didn’t have any figures
before me. Mr. Topper then said, ‘Well, what about the bar?’
I said, ‘I don’t care to discuss the bar with you; the bar is a
separate lease, and each lease stands on its own bottom.’ He
hung his head and said, ‘I haven’t got much choice in the
matter.” I said, ‘You haven’t; you either take my proposi-
tion or forget about it.’... Q. I will get you to state whether
or not you and Mr. Topper at that conference agreed on the
cancellation of the dining room and coffee shop lease, and the
writing of a new lease for $5,000 a year on the coffee shop?
A. We did. Q. You stated that he had asked ‘What about the
bar room?’ A. That’s right. Q. And what did you state to him?
A. I said, ‘I do not care to discuss it with you; each lease stands
on its own bottom.’ There are two separate leases. Q. I will
get you to state whether at that time you agreed to make him
a new lease on the cocktail bar? A.I did not.... Q.I will
get you to state whether or not you had a conversation with
Mr. Topper in the cocktail bar. A. When? Q. In June of
1947—May, or June? A.I did not. Q. Did you at any time
have a conversation with him in the bar, where you discussed
the cocktail bar lease, or a renewal of it? A.I did not. Q.
Were you ever in the bar talking to Mr. Topper when this Mr.
Wexler was in the bar? A. I haven’t been there; I never saw
Mr. Wexler in the bar. Q. Did you at any time make any
agreement, or offer to Mr. Topper to extend or renew the lease
to the cocktail bar? A. I did not.”

The Chancellor failed to recite reasons for the conclusions
reached and expressed in the final decree, but, it is reasonable
to assume that the record will support the inferences or deduc-
tions viz: (1) the testimony adduced by the plaintiff below to
establish the amount of the monthly rentals for the new lease
on the cocktail lounge was too vague, indefinite and uncertain
to conform to our adjudications and: requirements of the
statute of frauds; (2) that the cancellation of the lease on
the top floor of the hotel was not a consideration, in part, for
a new lease on the cocktail lounge but the lease was cancelled
by Morris so that a tenant able to pay the rents could be ob--
tained; (3) that Mr. Topper had not been able to make a.

428

profit out of the top floor; (4) that Mr. Topper by education
and training was a lawyer and not a successful concession
operator; (5) the facts offered by the plaintiff to sustain a
decree of specific performance were legally insuficient; (6)
the Chancellor saw the witnesses on the stand and heard them
testify and in the exercise of his discretion elected to believe
the testimony of the witness Morris rather. than Topper and
Wexler; (7) there is substantial testimony in the record that
the plaintiff Topper was behind on his rents on the top floor
and the hotel forgave him around $3,600 when the lease was
cancelled by the joint writing of the parties; (8) there is sub-
stantial evidence iin the record to the effect that the cancella-
tion of the top floor lease was not the consideration for the
new lease on the cocktail lounge on the ground floor; (9) other
sound reasons may be offered in support of the final decree
entered in the lower court.

Counsel for appellant contends that the testimony adduced
will support a decree for the plaintiff in the sum of $12,280.05
rather than the sum of $1,425.39 and the decree of the Chan-
cellor is contrary to the weight of the testimony. The
plaintiff and defendant produced their respective bookkeepers
and evidence of. accounts between the parties rests on this
testimony and records. The Chancellor made a finding on
this point and set out the balance in the decree. It cannot be
said, when all the testimony is carefully weighed and con-
sidered on the point in controversy that error has been made
to appear.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, J., and WHITE, Associate
Justice, concur.

a
‘. D. FLETCHER, a Tax Payer of Gadsden County, Florida, v. BOARD

OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF GADSDEN COUNTY, FLORIDA,

FOR AND ON BEHALF OF SPECIAL TAX SCHOOL DISTRICT

NO. 5 OF GADSDEN COUNTY, FLORIDA.

35 So. (2nd) 121 January Term, 1948
May 4, 1948 Division A

Po

A. M. Towles, for appellant.
D. M. Johnson, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

This appeal is from a final decree validating a bond issue
proposed by Special Tax School District No. 5, of Gadsden
County, for the purpose of constructing and equipping a gym-
nasium and a bandroom. It is shown that the bonds were ap-
proved by a majority vote of the freeholders of the district in
an election called and held as required by Section 6, Article
IX of the Constitution. The appellant, H. D. Fletcher, a tax
payer in the district, was permitted to intervene and became
a party to the validation proceedings. He filed an answer in
which he challenges the validity of the bonds for grounds
which we shall now discuss.

He first contends that the resolution of the Board of Public
Instruction calling the election to approve issuing the bonds
inadvertently provided that two of the annual payment in-
stallments be in sums less than three per cent of the total
issue and that this error could not be subsequently corrected
to conform to the requirements of the constitution.

Section 17, of Article XIII of the Constitution requires
that each annual installment of bonds of the kind in question
“shall be not less than three per cent of the total amount of
the issue.” The amended resolution changed the annual in-
stallments maturing January 1, 1966 and January 1, 1967,

[|
430

from $1000. each to $1500. each to meet the requirement of
the constitution. The resolution and the validating decree
were seasonably amended to conform to this change. The fact
that these things were done after the approving vote of the
freeholders was not material. The approving vote of the
freeholders was for the purpose of consenting to the total
issue. The matter of fixing the schedule of maturities as re-
quired by the constitution was for the Board of Public In-
struction and could be done at any time before the bonds were
sold. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County et al. v.
State, 156 Fla. 719, 24 So. (2nd) 105; State v. Board of
Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, 158 Fla, 412, 28
So. (2nd) 865.

It is next contended that the bonds in question cannot be
lawfully delivered to the purchaser after January 1, 1948,
because Special Tax School District No. 5 which issued them
was on that date consolidated with Special Tax School Dis-
trict No. 1, embracing all of Gadsden County.

There is no merit to this contention. Section 230.34,
Florida Statutes 1941, authorizes the consolidation of special
tax school districts. The legislature of 1947 amended this act
to provide that after January 1, 1948, all special Tax School
Districts in each county including territory not previously
within them, shall be consolidated in one school district to
be known as Special Tax School District No. 1, the boundaries
thereof to coincide with those of the county. This act also
provides that obligations incurred prior to consolidation re-
main the obligation of the area which incurred it.

The bonds in question were issued and validated prior to
January 1, 1948, by special tax school district, No. 5, so the
date of their delivery makes no difference. They were the
obligation of the District that issued them. State v. Orange
County, 153 Fla. 43, 18 So. (2nd) 805, and State v. Special
Road and Bridge District No. 9, Polk County, Florida, 153
Fla. 44, 13 So. (2nd) 801, are persuasive but not directly in
point. .

‘The validating decree was free from error and is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

431

M. J. CARROLL CONTRACTING COMPANY v. JAMES G. SMITH and
DALTON SMITH.

35 So. (2nd) 385 January Term, 1948
May 7, 1948 Division A

H. M. Voorhis, W. H. Poe and Maguire, Voorhis & Wells,
for appellant.
Walter G. Walker and Curtis Basch, for appellees.

TERRELL, J.:
Stated in epigram this case arose from the following facts:

In December 1941, plaintiffs, appellees here, leased a large
tract of land in Volusia County for pasture, inclosed it with a
three strand wire fence and placed 700 or 800 cattle on it to
graze. The defendant, appellant here, had recently entered
into contract with the State Road Department to build a
public highway that crossed the North side of the pasture.
The highway was constructed in 1942 and 1943 and in doing

432

so the contractor removed plaintiffs’ fence along the South
boundary of the right of way. Plaintiffs contend that when
the fence was removed their cattle strayed upon the highway *
and some were killed, while others disappeared and were
totally lost to the plaintiffs.

To recover damages for the alleged negligent destruction
of their fence and the loss of their cattle, plaintiffs sued de-
fendant in an action at law. The declaration was filed August
18, 1943, and was in three counts. The first and third counts
alleged wilful and malicious trespass. The second count al-
leged a trespass absent the element of wilfulness. Plaintiffs
abandoned the third count and elected to stand on the first
and second counts. A demurrer to the declaration was over-
ruled and the case went to trial on the following pleas:

(1) Not guilty. (2) Denial that plaintiffs were in lawful
possession of the close. (3) Right of plaintiffs to enter the
close as agent of the State Road Department. (4) Plaintiffs
had notice that defendant had a contract with the State Road
Department to build a public highway through the close, but
neglected to remove their fences and protect their cattle by an
inclosure. The case was tried July 18, 1947, and resulted in a
verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for $4,995.
The defendant appealed. .

It is first contended that the declaration proffers an action
of trespass quare clausum fregit, otherwise described in the
statute as an action of trespass to lands, but that when the
trial came on defendant was confronted with the issue of
negligently removing plaintiffs’ fence and depasturing their
cattle, when there was not a word in the declaration to import
such an issue. .

It is quite true that there is a distinction between trespass
and case. It is also true that negligence is a different class of
action from either, but the declaration, while alleging tres-
pass and other delicts also, alleges that appellant “broke down
fences, freed plaintiffs’ cattle from said pasture into and upon
a heavily traveled main highway, directly causing many of
said cattle to be killed and destroyed on said highway, causing
plaintiffs great expense in gathering, trying to gather, and
finding many of said cattle straying from said pasture.”

ee
a
433

To this declaration there was attached a bill of particulars
which more specifically described the cattle that were alleged
to have been lost by defendant’s negligence in tearing down
the fence. We do not consider the declaration a paragon of
pleading, but we are convinced that, if read with the bill of
particulars, it was sufficient to put the defendant on notice
that the gist of the action was the removal of the pasture
fence and the loss of the cattle.

In this holding we do not overlook appellants contention
that they were taken by surprise and that the proof did not
conform to the allegations of the declaration. It is true that
the declaration is ineptly drawn but it was not fatally defec-
tive. The defendant had a right to enter the close but he had
no right to destroy the fence or leave it down and expose the
plaintiff’s cattle. His contract with the State Road Depart-
ment did not give or imply any such right, neither did the fact
that the country was at war relieve from the trespass. We
think the declaration and the bill of particulars were ample
to put defendant on notice that loss of cattle from negligently .
removing the pasture fence and leaving it open was the real
gravamen charged. In fact there was nothing to support tres-
pass.

The second and only other question urged has to do with
the size and legality of the verdict and judgment.

Appellees contend that they lost forty-nine head of cattle
as a result of appellant’s carelessness in negligently removing
and destroying their fence and permitting their cattle to go
on the highway. It is contended that two of these cows were
Brahma bulls valued at $250. each. The others were a good
grade of stock cattle of the Brahma breed, worth from $50.00
to $110.00 each, the lower priced ones being calves. It is clear
from the evidence that a small number of these cattle strayed.
on the highway and were killed but the evidence does not con-
nect the major portion of them with the description in the bill
of particulars or show any connection with their killing and
the grounds alleged in the declaration. In other words, it is
shown that appellees had some cattle missing but the fact that
they were missing was not shown to have been due to the
destroyed fence.

434

There is evidence to the effect that some of the plaintiffs’
cattle were carried away by truck, but there is not the slight-
est suggestion that the trucks belong to defendant. For all
the record discloses these cattle and those which escaped and

* were not found dead on the highway may still be at large. At
the time the declaration was filed, these cattle had been on
the range for two years or longer and it is common knowledge
that range cattle do not leave the range unless they be driven
away. It is also well known that young cattle and sometimes
older ones, will slip through a three strand wire fence and
stray off. There is evidence which shows that some of the
cattle died from natural causes which would necessarily fol-
low in a herd as large as this.

The evidence conclusively shows that a few of plaintiffs’
cattle were killed on the highway as a result of defendant’s
negligence in removing the fence, that plaintiffs expended un-
necessary sums for labor hunting cattle that escaped as a re-
sult of defendant’s negligence, but in the main the evidence is
vague and inconclusive and the verdict rests on conclusions
from the evidence. The evidence should show that some or all
the cattle enumerated in the bill of particulars were killed on
the highway or escaped from the pasture as a result of de-
fendant’s negligence and to what extent the gaps left open or
fences left down by defendant’s servants were responsible for
the escape of plaintiffs’ cattle. The-mere fact that plaintiffs
Jost some cattle is not enough to support a verdict in their
favor. It must bé shown that they were lost in the manner
alleged in the declaration.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and a new -trial
awarded.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

a
STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. EDWARD M. NORMAN, v. CARL

HOLMER, JR., as Supervisor of Registration for Dade County,

Florida.

85 So. (2nd) 396 . January Term, 1948
May 7, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied May 31, 1948

435

Abe Arnovitz, Philip Medvin, Leo Sheiner, Harold Tannen
and Herman Wepman, for appellant.
George C. Simpson, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The relator-appellant, Edward M. Norman, filed a petition
in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, and alleged that
he was a resident and citizen of Dade County, over the age of
21 and on January 15, 1948, registered as an elector and asa ©
member of the Democratic Party with Carl Holmer, Jr.,
Supervisor of Registration of Dade County, Florida. That it
was the relator’s desire to change his party affiliation from a
imember of the Democratic Party to a member of the Peoples
Progressive Party, and under the provisions of Section 14 of
Chapter 22,971, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1945, filed with the
Supervisor of Registration of Dade County a written request
for a change in party affiliation.

The written request is viz:

“Supervisor of Registration
Dade County
“Miami, Florida
“Dear Sir:
“The bearer of this paper is hereby constituted my agent
and as such is authorized to file this with you. Such bearer is

“Miami, Florida
February 28, 1948

|
436

also authorized to receive from you the certificate contem-
plated by Section 14 of the Dade County Registration Act.
“I desire to change my political party affiliation from the
Democratic Party to the Peoples Progressive Party and hereby
request tliat you record such change upon my official registra-
tion cards. Sincerely,
EDWARD M. NORMAN.”

“STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

2-28-48

“On this day personally appeared before me, the under-

signed authority, EDWARD M. NORMAN, known to me to

be said person, who upon being first duly sworn deposes and.

says that he has heretofore registered in Dade County as a

member of the Democratic Party, that he has not changed his

residence since such registration, and he acknowledges that

he executed the foregoing request for the purpose therein ex-

pressed,

(NOTARIAL SEAL)

MARTIN L. RABINOWITZ

Notary Public, State of Florida

at Large.

My Comm. exp. Feb. 17, 1951.”

It is alleged further that the petitioner had fully complied
with every term, condition and provision of Chapter 22,971
supra entitling him to change his party affiliation and receive
from the Supervisor of Registration a card or certificate
showing that he was a member of the Peoples Progressive
Party and eligible to cast a vote as a member of said party
in the election to be held in Dade County, Florida. Section 14
of Chapter 22,971 supra provides:

“Section 14. CHANGES OF PARTY AFFILIATION—
That any person who, having registered hereunder, shall de-
sire to change his affiliation with a political party, may have
such change recorded upon his official registration cards by
filing his written request therefor with the Supervisor of
Registration at least thirty (30) days before the date of the
next State or County primary election. Upon receipt of such

be
as
437

written request, the Supervisor of Registration shall note the
change of party affiliation upon all pertinent registration
records and shall furnish to the person filing such request a
certificate to such effect. All such written requests shall be
retained on file in the office of the Supervisor of Registration.”

The petition alleged further that under Section 14 supra it
became the official duty of the Supervisor of Registration of
Dade County, upon receipt of the written request to note upon
the records in said office the change in party affiliation as re-
quired by the act and to issue and deliver a certificate to such
effect. It is the Supervisor’s interpretation of said Act that
when such a change of party affiliation is desired, as here re-
quested, the elector must file such request in person. The
terms of the Act do not permit or allow a change in party af-
filiation as here attempted as the same cannot legally be con-
summated through an agent or through the mails.

The petition prayed for an alternative writ of mandamus
commanding the Supervisor of Registration to receive and ac-
cept such written request for the change in party affiliation to
the Peoples Progressive Party, notwithstanding the fact that
the request was not filed in person, and to note upon all perti-
nent registration records such changes as by law required. An
alternative writ was issued and served upon the Supervisor.

The respondent Supervisor answered the alternative writ
and set out that he could not allow the change in party af-
filiation because of the following pertinent portion of Section
6 of the Act:

“.,, At the time of the registration of each person quali-
fied to register under the provisions hereof, an original and
duplicate copy of the official registration card shall be filled
out by appropriate entries made thereon in his presence, and
he shall thereupon take and subscribe to the oath printed upon
such card and, for the purpose of recording his party affilia-
tion, shall inscribe thereon immediately following his signa-
ture the first letter of the name of the political party to which
he belongs. ...”

Likewise the pertinent portions of Section 5 of the Act are
viz:

De
438

“Section 5. POWERS AND DUTIES OF SUPERVISOR
OF REGISTRATION. That the Supervisor of Registration is
hereby empowered and directed to perform all the duties. and
functions and to exercise all the powers of Supervisor of
Registration as recited herein, including the adoption and em-
ployment .of methods of registration procedure not incon-
sistent with any of the provisions of this Act, and the estab-
lishment, promulgation and enforcement of such rules and
regulations relating to registrations and elections and to the
maintenance, filing and preservation of registration and elec-
tion records as may be necessary or appropriate in the ef-
fectuation of the provisions and purposes of this Act...”

The case was heard in the court below on a motion for a
peremptory writ of mandamus, the return notwithstanding,
when an order was entered denying the motion for a peremp-
tory writ and the cause by an appropriate order was dis-
missed. The plaintiff appealed and poses here for adjudica-
tion several questions. On several occasions this Court has
held that in construing an Act its history will be considered,
the evil, if any, sought to be corrected, the intention of the law
making body, the subject regulated, and the object to be at-
tained. Scarborough v. Newsome, 150 Fla. 220, 7 So. (2nd)
821. Mandamus is a legal remedy which is not awarded as a
matter of right, but in the exercise of sound judicial discretion,
and then only when based upon equitable principles. It is not
granted except on a showing of a clear legal right thereto in
the relator. State ex rel. Dixie Inn, Inc. v. City of Miami, 156
Fla. 784, 24 So. (2nd) 705.

The Supervisor of Registration, under Section 5 of Chapter
22,971 supra is empowered and directed to perform all the
duties and function recited in and set forth by the terms of
the entire Act. In effectuating the intent of the Legislature
broad powers were granted, including “the establishment of
such rules and regulations relating to registrations and elec-
tions” as the conditions and circumstances may reasonably
require. He is charged under said Section with the duty of
preserving and maintaining an accurate, honest and depend-
able registration and election record.

Section 6 of the Act, in part, provides that the Supervisor

439

at the time of the registration of all persons qualified to regis-
ter under the Act to make an original and duplicate copy of
the official registration card and the card shall be filled out by.
appropriate entries made thereon in the presence of the Super-
visor of Registration and the elector. shall take and subscribe
to the oath printed on the card, for the purpose of recording
the elector’s party affiliation and shall inscribe on the card im-
mediately following his signature the first letter of the name of
the political party to which he belongs.

Section 13 of the Act provides the method of transfer of
the voter’s legal residence from the voting precinct in which
he is registered to another voting precinct of Dade County
and before any transfer can be lawfully obtained the elector is
required to appear in person at the office of the Supervisor of
Registration in order to effectuate such transfer of registra-
tion. Section 18 imposes a penalty on the Supervisor or any
Deputy Supervisor or others when convicted for the violation
of the Act.

It is strenuously contended that Section 14 authorizes a
change in party affiliation as attempted by the relator. This
contention (1) clearly ignores the rule making power of the
Supervisor; (2) the duty to maintain and preserve accurate
registration records; (3) the over-all intention of the Legisla-
ture in requiring the personal presence of the elector at the
office of the Supervisor of Registration when important
changes of the record are desired; (4) the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the rule can not be raised in a mandamus
proceeding.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Pe
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, et al., v. CHARLES H. CRANDON, et al.,
as and constituting The Board of County Commissioners of Dade
County, Florida.
35 So. (2nd) 285 January Term, 1948
May 7, 1948 : En Bane
Rehearing denied June 2, 1948,

Edward L. Semple, Thomas H. Anderson and William G.
Ward, for appellants.

Hudson & Cason, for appellees.

Robert H. Anderson, Tyrus A. Norwood and Bruce L. Bar-
field, for amicus curiae.

SEBRING, J.:

The 1947 session of the legislature enacted chapter 24468,
Special Acts of Florida 1947. The act is entitled “An Act Re-
quiring the County Commissioners of Dade County, Florida to
Submit to the Electors of Said County at the Second Primary
Election to be Held in May, 1948 the Question of Whether or
not Joint Resolution No. 407 Consolidating the County of
Dade and the City of Miami Shall be Submitted to the Electors
of the State of Florida at the General Election to be Held in
November, 1948.” The act provides, in part, as follows:

“Section 1. The County Commissioners of Dade County,
Florida shall submit to the electors of Dade County, Florida
at the Second Primary Election held in May, 1948 the follow-
ing question:

ee
be
441

“Shall there be submitted to the electors of the State of
Florida at the General Election to be held on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November, 1948 for ratification or
rejection Joint Resolution No. 407 relating to the consolida-
tion of the County of Dade and City of Miami?’

“Section 2. The results of said election shall be de-
termined by the Canvassing Board as is now provided by law -
and the same shall be certified by the Supervisor of Registra-
tion to the Secretary of State of the State of Florida within
ten days after said election. If a majority of the qualified
electors as herein provided shall have voted in favor of sub-
mitting said Joint Resolution No. 407 to the electors of the
State of Florida at the General Election to be held in Novem-
ber, 1948, then the Secretary of State shall place said Joint
Resolution No. 407 on the ballot to be voted on at the General
election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday
in November, 1948, for ratification or rejection.”

Eighteen municipalities of Florida located in Dade County,
and P. L. Watson, a citizen, resident and taxpayer of Dade
County, have instituted a suit in equity against the members
of the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County seek-
ing to restrain the Board from submitting the question con-
tained in Chapter 24468, supra, to the electors of Dade County
at the second primary election to be held in May, 1948.

The bill of complaint in the suit recites that the Board
proposes to submit the question to the electors of Dade
County in accordance with Chapter 24468, supra, but that the
threatened action on the part of the Board is illegal, and the
act under which the Board purports to be authorized to per-
form its alleged duty thereunder is void and unconstitutional,
because (1) the purported act imposes a duty upon the Board
which it is forbidden by law to exercise; (2) the question to
be submitted to the electors under the act is vague, indefinite,
uncertain and misleading in that it fails to note the excep-
tions to the effectiveness of the act as created by Joint Resolu-
tion No. 407; (3) the Joint Resolution is violative of Section
1 of Article XVII, Constitution of Florida, in that it requires
the submission of the resolution to the electors of Dade

—
442

County as a condition precedent to it being submitted to the
electorate of the State at large in the General Election; (4)
the Joint Resolution contains amendments to several sections
of the Constitution of Florida and is, in effect, a series of
separate amendments and is not being submitted separately
to said electors, as required by section 1 of Article XVII of the
Constitution of Florida; (5) the Joint Resolution attempts to
set up a separate and autonomous sovereignty in Dade County
with the power to enact laws contrary to the provisions of the
Constitutions of the State of Florida and of the United States;
(6) the provisions of the Joint Resolution are severally viola-
tive of Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution of Florida;
(7) the provisions of the Joint Resolution as affected by chap-
ter 24467, Special Acts 1947, are unconstitutional in that it
mandatorily requires the adoption of a charter by the people
of Dade County at the expense partly of the people of Dade
County and contrary to-the expressed will of the people of
Dade County.

The prayer of the bill is that the Court will construe the
meaning and effect of said chapter 24468, supra, and the
amendment to the Constitution proposed under Joint Resolu-
tion No. 407, and will issue a temporary injunction restraining
the defendant Board from submitting the question to the elec-
torate of Dade County or holding an election for the purpose
of balloting upon said question.

In due course the defendant County Commissioners filed an
answer to the bill of complaint and incorporated in their
answer a motion to dismiss the bill. When the matter came
on for hearing before the chancellor the parties to the suit
stipulated that there were no facts in dispute requiring the
submission of testimony and that as only matters of law were ©
involved the hearing should be a final hearing and the ruling
of the court should operate as a final decree. Upon the stipu-
lation and the pleadings the chancellor entered a final decree
finding the equities of the cause to be with the defendants,
and upon such finding denied the application for injunction
and dismissed the bill of complaint at the cost of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs have taken an appeal from the decree.

Several questions with respect to the validity of Joint

|
be
443

Resolution No. 407 were raised by the parties at the final
hearing and answered by the chancellor in the final decree ap-
pealed from. The same questions have been propounded by
appellants in briefs filed in this court upon the appeal. How-
ever, we are unable to see the relevancy or materiality of these
questions in this litigation wherein the only real issue between
the parties is whether or not the Board of County Commis-
sioners should be restrained from proceeding, under chapter
24468, supra, to submit the question contained in the act to
the electors of Dade County as directed by the legislature.
Our view is that the only proper question arising out of this
issue is whether chapter 24468, Special Acts of Florida, 1947,
is unconstitutional and void because it requires the Board of
County Commissioners of Dade County to submit to the
voters of the only county to be affected by a proposed consti-
tutional amendment, at a primary election, the question of
whether or not such proposed amendment shall be placed upon
a state-wide ballot for ratification or rejection by the electors
of the State at large at the general election.

The appellants contend that the question should be
answered in the affirmative, because of the fact that chapter
24468, supra, requires the Board of County Commissioners to
perform a duty which they are forbidden by law to exercise,
and contemplates the illegal expenditure of tax money for
such purpose.

We fail to see wherein the act is subject to the ground
upon which it is assailed. Section 1 of Article IIT of the
Constitution of Florida vests the lawmaking power in the
legislature of the State. By section 21 of Article III the
legislature is empowered to pass special or local laws with re-
spect to all matters or cases not specifically prohibited by the
terms of section 20 of Article III; the only restriction upon
the power to pass special or local laws being “that no local or
special bill shall be passed, nor shall any local or special law
establishing or abolishing municipalities, or providing for
their. government, jurisdiction and powers, or altering or
amending the same, be passed, unless notice of intention to ap-
ply therefor shall have been published in the manner provided
by law where the matter or thing to be affected may be situ-

444,

ated, .. . Provided, however, no publication of any such law
shall be required hereunder when such law contains a pro-
vision to the effect that the same shall not become operative or
effective until ratified or approved at a referendum election to
be called and held in the territory affected in accordance with
a provision therefor contained in such bill, or provided by
general law.”

Clearly, the special or local law in question does not fall
within the prohibitions or limitations contained in sections 20
or 21 of Article III, nor is it repugnant to any other section
of the constitution to which our attention has been directed.
The act, therefore, is not subject to the grounds upon which it
is challenged.

The fact that the law may have been enacted to give the
electors of Dade County an opportunity to express their ap-
proval or disapproval of Joint Resolution No. 407 prior to the
general election of 1948, to the end that the electors of the
State qualified to vote in the general election might know
whether or not the people of the area to be affected were in
favor of or opposed to the proposed constitutional amendment,
does not render the act invalid; for under section 1 of Article
II of the Constitution the legislature may exercise any law-
making power that is not forbidden by the organic law of the
State. “The Constitution does not grant particular legisla-
tive powers, but contains specific limitations of the general
lawmaking power of the Legislature.” Stone v. State, 71 Fla.
514, 71 So. 634. “Our state constitution is a limitation upon
power, and unless legislation duly passed be clearly contrary
to some express or implied prohibition contained therein, the
courts have no authority to pronounce it invalid.” Harry E.
Prettyman, Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 92 Fla.
515, 109 So. 442. See also State v. Board of Public Instruction
for Dade County, 126 Fla. 142, 170 So. 602.

We do not deem it to be within the scope of any issues
which could be lawfully raised between the parties to this liti-
gation to determine what effect should be given Joint Resolu-
tion No. 407 in the event the question submitted to the elec-
tors of Dade County under chapter 24468, supra, is, or is not,.

445

carried by an affirmative vote; whether or not it will become
the legal duty of the Secretary of State to place, or refrain
from placing, the constitutional amendment proposed by Joint
Resolution No. 407 on the general election ballot, in the event
the majority vote of the electors of Dade County is for, or
against, the question submitted under chapter 24468, supra;
or whether, without regard to the result of any vote on the
‘question to be submitted to the Dade County electorate at the
primary election, the Joint Resolution proposing the consti-
tutional amendment is, or is not, in violation of the State or
Federal Constitution. These questions are premature and
may not be decided on this appeal between these parties.

The conclusions we have reached are solely with respect
to whether or not chapter 24468, Special Acts, 1947 is un-
constitutional and void, upon the grounds asserted, and
whether by reason thereof the Board of County Commission-
ers of Dade County should be restrained from proceeding
thereunder. As to this question we hold that the act is consti-
tutional and that the chancellor acted correctly in entering
his decree dismissing the bill of complaint.

To the extent of the chancellor’s ruling on the only proper
point in issue, the decree appealed from is—

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ.,
concur.

ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., not participating.

a
STATE OF FLORIDA on the relation of Seaboard Air Line Railroad
Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Virginia, v. CLARENCE M. GAY, as Comptroller for the State of
Florida.

35 So. (2nd) 403 January Term, 1948
May 7, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied June 1, 1948

3 Wy Il

Ausley, Collins & Truett, for petitioner.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, D. Fred McMullen and
Fred M. Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, and Lewis H.
Tribble, for respondent. -

448

SEBRING, J.:

The relator, Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company (here-
inafter referred to as the New Company) is a Virginia corpo-
ration duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida.
Under a Plan of Reorganization approved by the Federal
Courts in 1943 it has succeeded to the properties and equip-
ment of Seaboard Air Line Railway Company (hereinafter
referred to as the Old Company), which had been in the hands
of Federal Court receivers since 1930. The properties and
equipment are situated in six southeastern States, including
the State of Florida.

Under the: Plan of Reorganization there was constituted a
Reorganization Committee empowered to consummate the re-
organization. Prior to the approval of the Plan of Reorgani-
zation various other committees had been formed for the pro-
tection of holders of bonds and other securities of the Old
Company, and these committees, in turn, had appointed de-
positaries to receive deposits of such bonds and securities and
to issue certificates of deposit therefor.

Pursuant to the Plan of Reorganization the properties and
equipment of the Old Company were sold under a foreclosure
decree entered by the Federal Courts, and the Reorganization
Committee became the purchaser. The reorganization Com-
mittee then entered into an agreement to convey these assets
to the New Company upon the latter agreeing to issue bonds
secured by mortgages upon the property, to or upon the order
of the Reorganization Committee, to be exchanged, through
the appointed depositaries, for the certificates of deposit
issued by the latter for bonds and other securities of the Old
Company.

In the execution of the Reorganization Plan the Reorgan-
ization Committee conveyed the property to the New Com-
pany and the latter made two mortgages to trustees, each
bearing date January 1, 1946, and covering the property to be
conveyed, to secure the payment of the bonds contemplated to
be issued by the New Company in exchange for preexisting
obligations of the Old Company. One of the mortgages in the
principal sum of $32,500,000, and described as the “First
Mortgage,” was made to Maryland trustees. The other mort-

a
a
449

gage, in the principal sum of $52,500,000, and described as
the “General Mortgage,” was made to New York trustees.

None of the bonds issuable by the New Company was
actually exchanged under the Plan of Reorganization for se-
curities of the Old Company until after August 14, 1946.
Subsequent to August 14, 1946 and prior to the institution of
these proceedings, both First Mortgage bonds and General
Mortgage bonds were issued to holders of securities of the
Old Company as such creditors became qualified to receive
them in exchange for certificates of deposit. As of August
14, 1946 the bonds deliverable to residents of Florida who
were entitled to receive them under the Plan of Reorganiza-
tion, were as follows: First Mortgage Bonds, Series A, in the
principal amount of $250,987.94 and General Mortgage Bonds,
Series A, in the principal amount of $473,917.18. These bonds
were delivered to Florida residents subsequent to August 14,
1946 and prior to the institution of these proceedings.

On August 14, 1946, the trust mortgages executed by the
New Company were presented to the proper recording officials
in Florida for recordation. Upon the advice of the State
Comptroller, the recording officials refused to admit the
mortgages to record until there had been paid a 2-mill Class
C intangible personal property tax on the $85,000,000
mortgage obligations, calculated on the proportionate value
which the Florida real property bore to all the realty em-
braced in the two mortgages.

In order to get the mortgages recorded and thus perfect
the mortgage liens on Florida property, and in anticipation
of a refund under applicable statutes, the relator paid the
taxes demanded, but under protest, the grounds of the pro-
test being (a) that no bonds secured by the mortgages had
been delivered to persons entitled thereto prior to the presen-
tation of the mortgages for recordation and hence a tax could
not be lawfully levied under applicable statutes until the de-
livery of the bonds was completed; (b) that if, as, and when
the bonds should be finally delivered to persons entitled to re-
ceive them, said bonds, if coming within the tax jurisdiction
of the State of Florida, should be classified and taxed in the
hands of the holders thereof as Class B intangibles; (c) that

De
450

more than 99 per centum of the bonds secured by the
mortgages were deliverable to citizens and residents of states
other than the State of Florida and accordingly the State of
Florida had no tax jurisdiction over them, the bonds having
neither a domiciliary nor a business situs in this State for
tax purposes.

After payment of the taxes under protest, the relator
promptly instituted a mandamus proceeding for the purpose
of securing a refund of the taxes paid. Upon a petition setting
up the facts which we have recited, and containing the ad-
ditional averment that if any Class C intangible tax was
leviable at all under the circumstances the maximum amount
thereof was measurable only by the aggregate principal
amount of bonds deliverable to residents of Florida on August
14, 1946, this Court issued an alternative writ of mandamus
directed to the Comptroller of the State of Florida, command-
ing him to refund the amounts paid under protest or, show
cause why he should not do so.

A motion to quash the alternative writ was filed by the
Comptroller, and the matter is now before us for decision on
the questions raised by the motion.

The first ground of the motion to quash is that mandamus
is not the proper remedy to secure a refund of the taxes. It is
said by the Comptroller that under the statutes authorizing
refunds and prescribing the procedure to be followed in pro-
curing them, the Comptroller is necessarily required to exer-
cise a considerable degree of discretion in making the judicial
or quasi-judicial determination of whether or not the tax
should be refunded, and that hence the duty of allowing or
rejecting the disputed tax claim cannot be controlled by a pro-
ceeding in mandamus.

Chapter 199 Florida Statutes, 1941, contains the statute
law of the state specifically relating to the levy, collection and
refund of intangible personal property taxes. Section 199.31
provides that all intangible personal property tax money col-
lected by the various tax collectors of the State shall be re-
mitted to the State Comptroller to be placed in a special fund
designated as the “intangible tax fund.” The section provides
that “When money has been paid into the intangible tax fund

in payment of any intangible personal property taxes, whether
payment was made voluntarily or involuntarily, the Comp-
troller is authorized and directed to refund to the person who
paid same, or to his heirs, personal representatives or assigns:
(a) Any overpayment; (b) Payment where no tax was due;
and (c) Where a bona fide controversy exists between the tax
collector and the taxpayer as to the liability of the taxpayer
for the payment of the tax claimed to be due; the taxpayer
may pay the amount claimed by the tax collector to be due
and if it is finally adjudged by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion that the taxpayer was not liable for the payment of the
taxes, or any part thereof, the Comptroller shall make such
refund as the Court may direct.... There is hereby appro-
priated annually, out of funds coming into the Comptroller’s
hands under the provisions of this chapter, an amount neces-
sary to make such refunds.”

The language of the statute is mandatory in its nature,
particularly as regards the duty of the Comptroller-to make
tax refunds in cases involving bona fide controversies in which
courts of competent jurisdiction have directed that tax re-
funds be made. Certainly, the present dispute between the
parties has been bona fide since its inception. The taxes were
paid by the relator under protest and with the avowed inten-
tion of seeking a refund. Before proceedings were instituted,
demand was made on the Comptroller for the return of the
money paid, on grounds going to the constitutional and statu-
tory right of the Comptroller to exact the tax payments. The
claim for refund was denied by the Comptroller on the ground:
that under the statutes relied on by relator, the taxes, as a
matter of law, became due and payable as a‘ condition prece-
dent to the recordation of the mortgages. No questions of
fact but only questions of law were, or are, involved in the
ultimate determination of the controversy. Under the law as
applied to the admitted facts of the case, the Class C in-
tangible property tax is either payable in its entirety, is pay-
able only as to bonds issuable to Florida residents, or is not
payable at all; the liability or non-liability of the relator for
the payment of the tax being entirely dependent upon the ulti-
mate construction to be given the statutes by a court of

451

452

competent jurisdiction. If under the statutes no authority
exists for the imposition of the Class C intangible property
tax, either in whole or in part, under the facts stated in the
alternative writ of mandamus and admitted by the motion to
quash, then a clear legal duty is imposed upon the Comptroller
to “make such refund as the Court may direct,” out of a fund
expressly established by the legislature and appropriated for
that purpose. In essence, therefore, the accuracy or legality
of the disputed claim is fixed by law and not dependent upon
facts requiring the exercise of a discretion or determination
as to the truth or falsity of the claim asserted.

Under modern practice the use of the writ of mandamus
hhas been very generally expanded far beyond the ancient
limitations of matters formerly thought to be justiciable in
mandamus, and the writ has been frequently employed where,
as here, the speedy determination of the purely legal ques-
tions involved will not only put the dispute between the
parties at rest but also will furnish an authoritative guide for
the conduct of the Comptroller in respect of like matters in
the future. See 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus, Sec. 81, pp. 870, 871;
Kittredge v. Boyd, State Treasurer, 136 Kan. 691, 18 P.
(2nd) 563, 93 A.L.R. 574. As a matter of fact, the writ has
been frequently employed in this jurisdiction for such pur-
pose; although we cannot say that in any of our cited de-
cisions the right to the use of the remedy has been challenged
by motion, as is the case in the proceeding at bar. However,
be that as it may be, we are of opinion that mandamus is the
appropriate remedy to settle the purely legal question existing
between the parties, and that the motion to quash the alterna-
tive writ on the ground asserted must be denied.

The next question raised by the motion to quash is with
respect to the nature of the tax imposed by the statutes, and
the property against which the tax is leviable. The re-
spondent contends that under the applicable statutes the tax
imposed as a condition precedent to recordation is upon the
mortgages sought to be recorded, the amount of the tax being
measurable by the debt or obligation secured by the mort-
gage; and that the mortgages being as to Florida real estate, it
is without consequence that the bondholders, who are the own-

P|
|
453

ers of the debt or obligation, are nonresidents of the State of
Florida. In opposition to this contention the relator corpora-
tion maintains that under the Constitution of the State, and
the statutes, the tax authorized to be imposed is upon the debt
or obligation for which the mortgages were given as collateral
security, and that consequently the domicile or business situs.
of the holders of the bonds is the controlling factor in de-
termining whether or not the State of Florida may levy and
impose a Class C intangible property tax and require it to be
paid as a condition precedent to the recordation of the mort-
gages.

At the time of adoption of the Constitution in Florida an
advalorem tax on intangible personal property was not con-
templated. Such a form of tax was subsequently brought into
the tax structure of the State by virtue of the adoption of
section 1, Article IX of the Constitution, as amended in 1924
and 1944. Intangible property taxes are in no way affected by
the provisions of Sections 2 and 5 of the Constitution relat-
ing to excise, license, or ad valorem taxes, the whole law for
their imposition, collection and distribution being compre-
hended within Section 1 Article IX as amended. See State
ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 157 Fla. 62, 24 So. (2nd) 798, 163
ALR. 862.

“Section 1 Article IX of the Constitution, as amended, is as
follows:

“The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal
rate of taxation, except that it may provide for special rate or
rates on intangible property ... ; provided, that as to any
obligations secured by mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien,
the Legislature may prescribe an intangible tax of not more
than two (2) mills on the dollar, which shall be payable at the
time such mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien is presented
for recordation, said tax to be in lieu of all other intangible
assessments on such obligations ...” (Italics supplied).

It is perfectly plain from the language employed in section
1 of Article IX of the Constitution, to the effect that the
legislature may prescribe an intangible tax on obligations se-
cured by mortgages and collect the same at the time the
mortgages are presented for recordation, that it is the obli-

454

gations or debts which are to be taxed under the Constitution,
and not the mortgages securing them. It is perfectly plain,
furthermore, that the obligations or debts which are to be
taxed and the tax paid when the mortgages are presented for
recordation (instead of on January Ist of each year as in the
case with other intangible property taxes) are to be only
those obligations or debts which are secured by written liens
on Florida realty, for as to mortgages on lands not situated in
Florida, there would be no occasion or authorization for re-
cording such mortgages in the public record books of Florida.
It seems equally as plain that the debt or obligation on which
the tax may be imposed and collected at the time the mortgage
to secure it is recorded, must be a debt or obligation over
which the State of Florida has acquired taxing jurisdiction
through reason of the fact that the owner of the debt, or the
written evidence of the debt itself, has acquired a domicile or
business situs in this State for tax purposes; for it has long
been the established rule of this jurisdiction, even prior to the
constitutional amendment, that in contemplation of law, in-
tangible personal property accompanies the person of the
owner and is taxable at his domicile, unless it has acquired a
business situs for taxation purposes elsewhere. See Hunt v.
Turner, 54 Fla. 654, 45 So. 509; State v. Beardsley, 77 Fla.
803, 82 So. 794; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Amos, 94 Fla.
588, 115 So. 315; Henderson v. Usher, 118 Fla. 688, 160 So. 9;
Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville v. Simpson, 136 Fla.
809, 188 So. 636; Starkey v. Carson, 138 Fla. 301, 189 So. 385;
Wood v. Ford, 148 Fla. 66, 3 So. (2nd) 490; Smith v. Lummus,
149 Fla. 660, 6 So. (2nd) 625.

What we have said with regard to Section 1 Article IX of
the Constitution is likewise true with respect to the statutory
law enacted pursuant to Section 1 Article IX.

Chapters 20724, 21943 and 28867, Laws of Florida, enacted
respectively in 1941, 1943 and 1945, pursuant to Section 1,
Article IX, contain the entire statutory law of this State with
regard to intangible personal property taxes. This law now
appears in Chapter 199 Florida Statutes, 1941. The taxes im-
posed under Chapter 199 are ad valorem taxes imposed against
intangible personal property.

Intangible personal property is defined by section 199.01 as
being “all personal property which is not in itself intrinsically
valuable but which derives its chief value from the thing
which it represents.” By section 199.02, such property is
classified, for the purpose of taxation, as Class A, B, C and D
intangible personal property. Class C intangible personal
property is defined by statute as being “all notes, bonds and
other obligations bearing date subsequent to December 31,
1941, for payment of money which are secured by mortgage,
deed of trust or other liens upon real property situated in
Florida; provided that only that part of the value of the
mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien, the real property of
which is located within the State shall bear to the whole value
of the real property described in said obligation shall be in-
cluded.” See Sec. 199.02 (3). Section 199.11, as amended,
provides that on and after January 1, 1942 there shall be
levied and assessed on all Class C intangible personal property
two mills on the dollar of the taxable value of such property
“which taxable value shall be the principal amount of the in-
debtedness, evidenced by such obligation, which tax shall be
due and payable when the mortgage, deed of'trust or other
lien is executed and shall be paid to the county tax collector
before the mortgage, deed of trust or other lien securing such
indebtedness is presented for recordation. Every person who
shall take, receive or record any mortgage, deed or trust or
other written specific lien in the nature of a mortgage upon
real property situated in Florida shall pay the tax prescribed ©
by this subsection in respect to the debt or obligation secured
thereby. ...”

The statutes from which we have quoted levy and impose
the Class C intangible property tax authorized by the Con-
stitution upon a debt or obligation, or, at least, upon the
written evidence of such debt or obligation in the form of
notes, bonds, or other like promises to pay, as distinguished
from a mortgage which may be given as collateral security
for the debt or obligation.

It has been suggested by the respondent, in connection
with this ground of his motion, that if the statutes cannot be
construed as imposing a tax upon the mortgage, the tax may

455

456

be construed as a registration tax for the privilege of record-
ing the mortgage, and that with such a construction placed
upon the statutes the demand for the tax refund must
necessarily be denied. The answer to this proposition is that
the obligation of a citizen to pay taxes being purely of statu-
tory creation, taxes can be lawfully levied, assessed, and col-
lected only in the express method pointed out by statute. 51
Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec. 651, p. 617. An act, therefore, may
not be construed to impose a tax unless its terms definitely so
provide. The controlling statutes involved in the proceeding’
at bar are entirely devoid of any clear or express words of an
intent to impose a tax for the privilege of recording the
mortgages. See Jefferson Realty Co. v. Board of Commission-
ers, 156 Fla. 141, 23 So. (2nd) 274; Florida Industrial Com-
mission v. Growers Equipment Co., 152 Fla. 595, 12 So. (2nd)

889; Lovett v. Lee, 141 Fla. 395, 193 So. 588. The legislature
has denominated the tax an intangible property tax, that is to
say, an ad valorem tax on personal property, and not a license
or excise tax for the privilege of recording the mortgages. It
has placed the tax upon the debt or obligation, or written evi-
dences thereof, as required by Section 1 Article IX of the
Constitution, and not upon the mortgages. For us to construe
the tax as being of a nature other than that plainly desig-
nated by the legislature under its power derived from the
Constitution; or to construe it as being one imposed upon a
privilege and not upon property, or as imposed upon one type
of property when the legislature has said that it should be
imposed upon another, would amount to our reframing the
statutes, not construing them. This we are not authorized to
do; our only proper function being to interpret the law as it
has been written by the legislature, not to recast it in the mold
which we, perhaps, might like to have seen it written had we
been responsible for its promulgation.

Having reached the conclusion that the tax imposed is
upon the debt or obligation, or written evidences thereof, and
not upon the mortgage, the next question is whether the debt
or obligation—or at least so much thereof as is not repre-
sented by bonds deliverable to Florida residents—may be
taxed under the Class C classification with respect to in-

Es
[|
457

tangible personal property, where the debt was contracted in
another state, the bonds which are the written evidences of
the debt are held by nonresident bondholders, and neither the
bondholders nor the bonds have ever acquired a domicile or
business situs in the State of Florida.

As we have said before, generally speaking, intangible
personal property is taxable only at the domicile of the owner.
In contemplation of law it accompanies the person of the
owner and is taxable at his domicile. An essential and in-
dispensable feature of the power of taxation is that either the
owner of personal property be a resident, or that the property
be situated within the district attempting to exercise the
power to tax. See Hunt v. Turner, 54 Fla. 654, 45 So. 509;
State v. Beardsley, 77 Fla. 803, 82 So. 794; Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Amos, 94 Fla. 588, 115 So. 315; Henderson v. Usher,
118 Fla. 688, 160 So. 9; Atlantic National Bank of Jackson-
ville v. Simpson, 136 Fla. 809, 188 So. 636; Starkey v. Carson,
138 Fla. 301, 189 So. 385; Wood v. Ford, 148 Fla. 66, 3 So.
(2nd) 490; Smith v. Lummus, 149 Fla. 660; 6 So. (2nd) 625.
The fact that the indebtedness may be secured by a mortgage
on real property situated in a State other than the domicile or
business situs of the owner of the debt, will not give the in-
debtedness a tax situs in the state where the real property is
located. See 26 R.C.L., Taxation, Sec. 253, p. 289; Cooley on
Taxation, 19th Hd. Secs. 455 and 458. We conclude, therefore,
that with respect to so much of the mortgage debt as was evi-
denced by bonds or other like obligations in the hands of or
deliverable to nonresident bondholders, the State of Florida’
‘was without power to impose the Class C intangible tax and
collect it at the time the mortgages were presented for
recordation. .

The final question confronting us is whether the bonds of
the relator corporation in the principal amount of $725,905.12,
which were deliverable to Florida residents on August 14,
1946, and which were secured by the mortgages on all the
properties of the relator corporation, including the properties
in Florida, could be taxed as Class C intangibles and the tax
collected at the time the mortgages were presented for
recordation. It is asserted by the relator corporation in briefs

PC
458 :

that even though bondholders of the Old Company may have
been entitled to receive bonds of the New Company on August
14, 1946 the bonds were not actually delivered until later; and
that consequently no “obligations secured by mortgage” were
in existence at the time the mortgages were presented for
recordation and hence there was nothing upon which the Class
C intangible tax could be lawfully imposed and collected.

As we understand the record, three different and distinct
types of bonds were authorized to be issued by the New Com-
pany under the Plan of Reorganization, to persons entitled
thereto by reason of the fact that they held either bonds of
the Old Company or certificates of deposit issued by the ap-
proved depositaries in exchange for bonds of the Old Com-
pany. The two types of bonds secured by the First Mortgage
were either, to bear date as of January 1, 1946, or without
regard to the date of delivery to persons entitled to receive
them, were to bear interest as of January 1, 1946. While it is

_not entirely clear from the record just when the bonds to be
secured by the General Mortgage were to be dated, or from
what date they were to bear interest, it does appear from the
language of section 2 Article One and section 1 Article Two of
the General Mortgage that under certain specified conditions
the entire authorized amount of $52,500,000 of bonds could be
lawfully issued, on request, to bear date and interest as of
January 1, 1946.

While it may be that as of the date that the mortgages
were presented for recordation bonds under these mortgages
had not actually been delivered to bondholders of the Old
Company who were residing in Florida, the fact cannot be con-
troverted that as of that date an indebtedness or obligation
to pay existed in favor of such bondholders against the New
Company. This obligation was secured by the mortgages on
Florida property, and other property, to the extent of such
indebtedness. The amount of such indebtedness was fixed
definite and certain, and arose as the result of the acquiescence
or consent of creditors of the Old Company in and tothe Plan
of Reorganization whereby the New Company became owners
of the mortgaged property subject to the claims of said credi-
tors. For aught that appears in the record to the contrary,

459

bonds of the New Company, bearing date prior to the recorda-
tion of the mortgages, were at that time in the hands of the
depositaries for delivery to bondholders of the Old Company”
upon demand being made for such delivery. Whether upon
the date the mortgages were recorded the bondholders of the
Old Company had in their hands bonds of the Old Company,
or certificates of deposit issued by the approved depositaries
entitling them to bonds of the New Company, such creditors
undoubtedly had upon that date a lien or claim, to the extent
of their ownership in the aggregate debt, which was enforce-
able against the assets taken over by the New Company
through the conveyance from the Reorganization Committee;
and to that extent, at least, were holders of written obliga-
tions for payment of money, secured by mortgages on Florida
property.

Therefore, under the peculiar facts of the case presented
by the record, we hold that as of the time of the presentation
of the mortgages for record there was due and owing and col-
lectible as a condition precedent to recordation an intangible
personal property tax on such of the bond obligations as were
deliverable to bondholders in Florida in exchange for bonds of
the Old Company or certificates of deposit representing bonds
of the Old Company. To the extent, therefore, that the al-
ternative writ of mandamus seeks a refund for the Class C in-
tangible property tax paid at the insistence of the Comptroller
on bonds deliverable to residents of Florida on or before
August 14, 1946, the motion to quash the alternative writ
must be granted and the relief denied; but as to the tax paid
under protest on bonds delivered or deliverable to persons
who were not residents of the State of Florida, or who had no
business situs here, motion to quash the alternative writ must
be denied and the respondent required to answer.

It isso ordered. |
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and BARNS, JJ., concur.
CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.

EE
460

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ELLSWORTH OC. WARNER,
DECEASED.

35 So. (2nd) 296 January Term, 1948
May 7, 1948 : Division A
Rehearing denied June 8, 1948

W. F. Maurer, for appellants.

Earnest, Lewis & Smith, in propria personae, Farish &
Farish and Rogers, Towers & Bailey, for executors, appellees.

461

TERRELL, J.:

This case grew out of the administration of the estate of
Elisworth C. Warner. Harold L. Warner, a son and one of the
heirs to said estate, was first represented in its administra-
tion by the law firm of Evans, Mershon and Sawyer, who later
withdrew and were succeeded by Earnest, Lewis and Smith.
After rendering the services for which they were employed,
Earnest, Lewis and Smith billed Harold L. Warner for their
compensation which was not paid, so they filed their petition
in the probate court, alleging the non-payment of their fee,
that it was earned by representing Harold L. Warner,
Katherine Warner and Maurice Warner, another brother, in
the administration of the estate of Ellsworth C. Warner.

The petition also pointed out that distribution of the estate
was about to be made, that Harold L. Warner had assigned
his legacy to the First National Bank of Minneapolis, a foreign
corporation, that the beneficiaries were all non-residents, and
that petitioners would be without remedy if settlement was
made and the assets of the estate transferred to another juris-
diction. On consideration of the petition the probate court
directed the executors to withhold $2100. from the legacy
payable to Harold L. Warner for payment of his counsels’
fees. The legacy to Katherine Warner and Maurice Warner
was allotted to them and their fee was paid, so they are no
longer parties to the litigation. This order was entered
February 1, 1946, and no appeal having been taken, as author-
ized by law, it became final. On April 15, 1947, the probate
Court adjudicated a lien for attorneys fees in favor of Harn-
est, Lewis and Smith and directed the executors to pay them
from the funds of Harold L. Warner in their custody. On ap-
peal the Circuit Court held that the Probate Court was with-
out jurisdiction to adjudicate a lien for attorneys fees, but
directed the executors to hold the sum of $2500. to satisfy the
claim of Earnest, Lewis and Smith when a judgment for it
was secured in an appropriate action. This appeal is from
the decree of the Circuit Court.

Several questions are proffered but the pith of the contro-
versy is whether or not, when a reputable attorney is em-

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462

ployed by a nonresident legatee to represent him in the ad-
ministration of an estate, and such legatee fails or neglects to
pay said attorney for his services, may the Probate Court
direct the executor to withhold sufficient funds from the
legacy, and order them paid to the attorney for his services?

The parties will hereafter be referred to as “Warner” and
“attorney.” There is no dispute as to Warner and the at-
torney having entered into the contract for the performance
of the services, neither is it charged that the services were not
well and faithfully performed. It is shown on the other hand,
that they were entirely satisfactory and that the fee charged
was reasonable. The gist ‘of Warner’s contention is that the
Probate Court is one of limited jurisdiction and that there is
no authority under the law to pay attorney for the services
rendered. Section 17, Article V of the Constitution relied on
to support this contention is as follows:

“The County Judge shall have jurisdiction of the settle-
ment of the estates of decedents and minors, to order the sale
of real estate of decedents and minors, to take probate of
wills, to grant letters testamentary and of administration and
guardianship, and to discharge the duties usually pertaining
to courts of probate.”

It is also contended that section 38 of the Probate Act
which paraphrases the provision of the constitution just
quoted, does not authorize the payment of attorneys fees in
administration proceedings. It is true that the constitution
and the statute as referred to, do not in terms authorize pay-
ment of an attorney’s fee for representing a legatee, but
Section 734.01, Florida Statutes 1941, dealing with the same
subject matter, authorizes the payment of attorneys fees for
the “care, management and settlement of the estate.” More-
over, since the decision in McCollouch v. Maryland, the doc-
trine of implied powers has been as much a part of the law of
this country as the written law itself if the terms of the
statute or the constitution relied on are such that we may
reasonably assume that the power implied was in the legis-
lative mind and that it is essential to effectuate the powers
-which are expressly granted.

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463

It may be admitted arguendo that there is no express
grant of power to pay the attorneys fees brought in question,
but certainly there is an implied power to pay them. The
attorney was hired in good faith by non-resident clients. His
labors were well and faithfully performed and there is reason
to infer that Warner set out to give him the runaround and
evade payment. He refused to pay when paytime came, he
assigned his legacy to the First National Bank of Minneapolis
which was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and this con-
duct on his part precipitated the petition to withhold certain
of Warner’s legacy to secure payment of the fee.

The constitution makes no attempt to treat specific cases.
It confers “jurisdiction of the settlement of the estates of
decedents and minors.” This is a broad grant of power and
clothes the probate court with plenary power to adjudicate
any matter arising in the “settlement” of a decedent’s estate.
If a legatee hires a lawyer to represent him and refuses to
pay, it follows as a matter of course that power resides in the
probate court to protect the lawyer out of the proceeds of the
estate adjudicated to the legatee. As pointed out in the
previous paragraph, there is no question here about the
amount of the fee or the fact that it was earned. This view
is further supported by section 4, Declaration of Rights, giv-
ing remedy by due course of law to those injured in person,
goods, lands or reputation. Due course of law contemplates
the shortest cut to justice consistent with reason and sound
practice.

Courts in this country have consistently protected the
rights. of attorneys growing out of services performed by
them when there is an attempted evasion to pay. Vosges
Syndicate, Ltd. v. Everglades Club Co. 122 Fla. 267, 164 So.
881. It is contrary to all human experience to contend that
after a litigant has hired an attorney and secured the fruits
of his labor and then refuses to pay, that a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction in control of its processes and judgment is
helpless to grant relief against a litigant who is attempting
to escape with the proceeds of his attorneys labor. Courts
were created to resolve conflicting claims and they are clothed
with power to do so. To hold otherwise the law is nothing

464

more than an effete system of abstract rights by which one
may accomplish his designs and snap his finger in the face of
the court and bid the law au revoir.

The law is settled in this jurisdiction that a litigant should
not be permitted to walk away with his judgment and refuse
to pay his attorney for securing it. Randall v. Archer, 5 Fla.
438; Miller v. Scobie, 152 Fla. 328, 11 So. (2nd) 892; Forman
v. Kennedy, 156 Fla. 219, 22 So. (2nd) 890; Chancey v. Bauer,
97 F. (2nd) 283. It is further consistent with law that an at-
torney’s lien in a case like this be enforced in the proceeding
where it arose. The parties are before the court, the subject
matter is there, and there is no reason whatsoever why they
should be relegated to another forum to settle the controversy.

In this case the attorney not only brought the legacy into
court, he brought a sizable sum as interest with it. It was
perfectly competent for the court to withhold payment of the
legacy before the attorney’s claim was satisfied, when every
asset Warner had was about to be transferred to a foreign
jurisdiction. The constitution was not designed to be a step
by step blue print for the court to stalk. It was designed as
a diagram with numerous interstices for the Court to supply
if clearly implied. When the probate court was vested with
“jurisdiction of the settlement of the estates of decedents and
minors” he was empowered to adjudicate attorney’s fees that
properly arise in the course of such settlement. True, he does
so by what may be termed interstitial legislation, so often ap-
proved as to have become common place, and so essential here
to effectuate the power expressly granted. It is equally as es-
sential to keep the law apace with the justice of the case and
the morals on which it is predicated. His order is of course,
subject to review in the usual way.

In our view the contract of employment between Warner
and attorney was sufficient to authorize the court to protect
attorney in the manner shown. We are also of the view that
there was ample showing for the relief awarded by summary
proceedings. The fund was in custodia legis and there was no
dispute about the reasonableness of the claim. The Circuit
Court was therefore in error in his conclusion that the’ probate

465

court was without jurisdiction to grant the relief petitioned
for.

The decree appealed from is therefore reversed with direc-
tions to affirm the judgment of the Probate Court.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

T. W. ROWLAND and ALPHA HOLDING CORPORATION, a corpora-
tion organized and existing under the Laws of the State of Florida,
et al, v. THE TIMES PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation
organized and existing under the Laws of the State of Florida.

35 So. (2nd) 399 January Term, 1948
May 7, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied May 31, 1948

W. G. Ramseur, B. K. Roberts and Keen & O’Kelley, for
appellants.

Bussey, Mann, Simmons & Fielding, Austin L. Richardson
and Arthur R. Thompson, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The record in this case discloses that the Alpha Holding
Corporation, on January 8, 1932, acquired a Master’s Deed to
certain described land situated in the City of St. Petersburg,
Florida, on which was located a building known as the Hall

466

Office Building. The deed recites a consideration of $65,-
000.00. The charter of the Alpha Holding Corporation au-
thorized the issuance of 2,000 shares of common stock of the
par value of $100.00, but all the stock never issued and a few
shares were purchased from time to time with its funds and
placed in the name of Alpha Holding Corporation. Paul
Poynter, or his corporations, held 863 shares; some 494 were
never issued until about January 17, 1946 and some 600 shares
were sold to and owned largely by the tenants of Alpha Hold-
ing Corporation. These tenants for many years were elected
officers and directors of Alpha Holding Corporation. The
ownership of the several shares of stock in Alpha Holding
Corporation became material only for the years 1945 and
1946.

Paul Poynter owned the stock of the Times Publishing

» Company, except a few shares, and in 1945 or 1946 did not

enjoy good health and was advanced in years. Nelson Poynter
son of Paul Poynter, in 1938 became identified with his
father’s business interests. As a witness he testified that he
was the executive Vice-President of the Times Publishing
Company, and the father, Paul Poynter, confirmed his son’s
testimony on this point. The Paul Poynter stock interest in
Alpha Holding Corporation, in the early part of 1946, was as-
signed or transferred to the Times Publishing Company..

Nelson P. Poynter, in the latter part of 1945, listed for
sale with a realtor of St. Petersburg the Hall Office Building
for the sum of $200,000.00. The realtor interested Weil-Maas
Company, of Tampa, operator of a department store, in the
building, resulting in an agreement to purchase the building
for the sum of $200,000.00, less a realtor’s commission in the
sum of $10,000.00 to the stockholders of Alpha Holding Corpo-
ration, thereby netting to them the sum of $190,000.00. The
proposed purchaser contemplated the conversion of the office
building into a department store and tenant stockholders of
the office building would’be dispossessed if the sale was con-
summated. An argument was made to the effect that if Weil-
Mass Company acquired the building and opened a depart-
ment store the advertisement account to the St. Petersburg
Times would approximate $30,000.00 annually.

The directors of Alpha Holding Corporation challenged the

authority of Nelson Poynter to sell the office building and
dispossess the tenants, and accordingly, they met with Paul
Poynter and apprised him for the first time of the contem-
plated action of his son, Nelson Poynter. Paul Poynter ex-
pressed the view that the sale of the building was unwar-
ranted and advised the directors to protect their interests.
Nelson Poynter, by letter as Vice-President of the Times Pub-
lishing Company, requested T. W. Rowland to call a stock-
holders meeting for the purpose of removing the directors and
electing new directors. T. W. Rowland declined to call a meet-
ing of the stockholders and so advised Nelson Poynter. The
Directors of Alpha shortly thereafter held a meeting and
caused to be issued and delivered to R. F. Crego 325 shares of
unissued stock of Alpha Holding Corporation at the sum of
$105 per share. The 325 shares of stock of R. F. Crego, coupled
with other shares of stock, constituted a majority of the stock
of Alpha Holding Corporation and the issuance and sale there-
of to Crego in effect made The Times Publishing Company a

‘ minority stockholder. The majority stockholders and direc-
tors, at a subsequent meeting, adopted a resolution canceling
the commitment to sell the Hall Office Building for the sum of
$200,000.00, and the 325 shares of stock owned by Crego
voted for the resolution.

On February 5, 1946, The Times Publishing Company
filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida,
against the directors of Alpha Holding Corporation and
charged that they connived and conspired with R. F. Crego, a
minority stockholder, to upset and destroy the then equality
of outstanding stock in Alpha Holding Corporation for the
purpose of obtaining control thereof and thereby prevent a
possible sale of the Hall Office Building, and in furtherance of
their common plan or scheme, on the 17th of January, 1946,
unlawfully and without authority did sell’ and issue to R. F.
Crego 325 shares of the common stock and R. F. Crego entered
into an agreement with the minority stockholders to vote with
them and to maintain the directors in office. That it was the
lawful duty of the directors, acting in a fiduciary capacity for
all the stockholders, to act in the utmost good faith and if the
‘business policy of the corporation required a sale of any of its

467

468

unissued stock, then other stockholders of the corporation
had, as a matter of law, a pre-emptive right to purchase their
pro rata share thereof rather than to sell the same to an out-
sider. The prayer was for a cancellation of the sale of the
stock to Crego and setting aside the several acts and doings
of the stockholders aided by the vote of 325 shares of stock
owned by Crego and by him unlawfully acquired.

The answer denied pertinent allegations of the bill of com-
plaint and further alleged that Nelson Poynter only owned ten
shares of stock in Alpha and was not authorized by his father
to represent him in the sale of the Office Building; that the
dispute and controversy were with the officers and directors
on the one part and Nelson Poynter on the other, and the
interest of Alpha had been uppermost in the minds of the
officers and directors; that the answering defendants were
willing to purchase the Office Building on a basis of $200,-
000.00; that Noel Carol Corporation was able and willing to
pay $250,000.00 for the Office Building. The defendants re-
quested the taking of testimony and a conclusion of the court
therefrom that the plaintiff was in court with unclean hands.

In an amendment to the amended answer the defendants
alleged that Nelson Poynter was never authorized by the
stockholders and directors to vote or control the stock in
Alpha Holding Corporation; that he was not authorized to ne-
gotiate for a sale or to sell the Hall Office Building; that he
was without authority from the directors to represent the
Times Publishing Company or to vote the stock of Alpha Hold-
ing Corporation and because of this lack of authority on the
part of Nelson Poynter there was no dispute within the Alpha
Holding Corporation that could confer jurisdiction on a court
of equity to grant the relief prayed. Considerable testimony
was adduced by the respective parties and a decree entered
below cancelling the 325 shares of stock of Alpha sold to R. F.
Crego upon the theory that the issuance and sale thereof were
unlawful. The defendants appealed.

It appears by the record that a motion for the entry of a
decree favorable to the defendants below on various grounds
was presented to the Chancellor and, after argument, was de-
nied. On pages 819 and 820 there is an exchange of views be-

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469

tween the Chancellor and counsel for the appellant as to the
controlling question viz:

“THE COURT: Before you start your argument to this
motion, I want to say to you again something that I said
earlier in this proceeding. There isn’t but one main question
in this case. It isn’t a question of whether the Hall Building
should be sold to Weil-Maas or sold to Noel Carol Corporation
or anybody else. It is simply this question: Was this trans-
fer of so-called unissued stock or trustees’ stock made under
such circumstances and conditions as to be invalid or illegal?
All these other questions which have arisen and which ap-
parently a great many people seem to think the Court has
before it, do not actually exist. The question of whether Mr.
Poynter’s idea of selling that building was wise or whether it
was fair or unfair to the minority stockholders could easily be
determined in a suit for that purpose but this suit is primarily
for the purpose of determining whether the change of status
of the: plaintiff as a majority stockholder was legally ac-
complished. Everything goes from that. I just want you
to keep that in mind. That is the real issue as I see it.

“MR. RAMSEUR: I believe there are three issues, if the
Court please.

“THE COURT: There may be a dozen but I am talking
about the real issue.” (Emphasis supplied) .

Counsel for appellants pose here for adjudication some
seventeen questions but apparently the overshadowing one is
the allegedly inequitable or unconscionable conduct of the
plaintiff below, which precludes it from any right whatsoever
for relief in a court of equity. The contention is presented
under the familiar maxim of equity that “he who comes into
a court of equity must come with clean hands.” Presumably
the basis of this argument centers largely around the follow-
ing: (a) the activity of Nelson Poynter in listing for sale with
a realtor the Hall Office Building at a time when he owned
only a few shares of stock in Alpha Holding Corporation; (b)
the agreement to sell same to a corporation having to let a
contract for a newspaper advertisement valued at $30,000.00
annually; (c) the total disregard of the rights of the several
tenants of the Hall Office Building; (d) the apparent losses to

470

the appellant stockholders in Alpha if the sale to Weil-Maas.
is consummated; (e) the abuse of the fiduciary relation in
the sale of the office building for $200,000.00 to Weil-Maas
when an existing bona fide offer in the sum of $250,000.00 is.
refused; (£) the denial of the rights of the minority stock-
holders to buy the office building for $200,000.00; (g) the
minority stockholders, as represented by the appellants, are
entitled, as a matter of law, to receive for the several shares
of their stock compensation on the valuation of $250,000.00
and not be paid on a valuation of the proposed sale to Weil-
Maas. Other arguments are made in support of the conten-
tion but the pertinent ones are listed supra from (a) to (g),
inclusive. Our ruling in Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So.
419, and reaffirmed by us in Van Woy v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189,
14 So. (2nd) 185, has not been overlooked.

Section 612.26, F.S.A., in part, provides that, unless other-
wise provided in the certificate of incorporation or amend-
ments thereof, every stockholder of record of a corporation
shall be entitled at each meeting of stockholders thereof and
on each proposal presented at such meeting to one vote for
each share of stock standing in his name on the books of the
corporation .. . Section 612.20, F.S.A., in part, provides that
unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation
or amendment thereof, every stockholder of a corporation
shall upon the sale for cash of any new stock of such corpo-
ration of the same class as that he already holds, has the right
to purchase his pro rata share of such stock at the price which
it is offered to others, which price, in the case of stock having
par value, may be in excess of par if the Board of Directors
shall so determine.

Presented here is purely a question of corporate policy of
the Alpha Holding Corporation. It was the view, during the
year 1945 and prior years, of a majority of the stockholders
that the Hall Office Building should be sold when the sum of
$200,000.00 could be realized therefor. The majority of the
stock was at the time owned by Paul Poynter or one of his
corporations, and because of bad health and advanced years
the management thereof was placed with the owner’s son, Nel-
son Poynter. The opposite faction, or the view of the minor-

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. ity stockholders, was to the effect that the sum of $200,000.00
was an inadequate price; that a bona fide offer had been made
for the Office Building in the sum of $250,000.00, and if the
sum of $200,000.00 was to be accepted for the building, then
minority stockholders should be given an opportunity to pur-
chase the same. The board of directors was composed of
minority stockholders. They adopted a resolution cancelling
the agreement to sell the building upon the theory that they
had the lawful power so to do.

The case of Luther v. Luther Company, 118 Wis. 112, 94
N.W. 69, 99 A.S.R. 977, involved unissued stock and about the
same question as presented on this record. The directors as
minority stockholders caused to be sold “unissued stock” of
the corporation for the purpose of placing in friendly hands
the power to vote the shares favorable to the corporate policy
advocated by them and thereby render the opposite faction a
minority group of stockholders in the corporation. The “un-
issued stock” was considered as subject to the control of the
directors, like other property or assets of the corporation, and
to sell at prices most favorable to all the stockholders of the
corporation, in the honest exercise of the discretion and trust
vested in them. Their duty with reference thereto is fiduciary;
they are bound to act in the best of faith for all stockholders.
To dispose of or manage property of the corporation to the
end or for the purpose of giving to one part of the cestuis que
trustent a benefit or advantage over, or at the expense of,
another part, is a breach of duty, especially when the directors
belong to the benefited class.

The court, in cancelling the transfer of the “unissued
stock,” in part said (text 99 A.S.R. 980-981) :

“It cannot matter how this result is accomplished, nor
what the form of the undue benefits conferred or acquired.
The benefit to the one class or the injury to the other need not
be pecuniary. While the ultimate purpose of most stock cor-
porations is money profit, the right of proportionate voice and
influence in selection of policy and method of accomplishing
that result is most important to each shareholder. It is as
fundamental and vital as the right of suffrage under a repre-
sentative government. While a governmental act may not

—
472

take away from any class of citizens property or physical
liberty, yet, if, contrary to the fundamental law of organiza-
tion, it abates their suffrage, it would be held void. Each
holder of a share of stock has the right that, by convincing
the holders of a certain number of other shares, his policy
of business be followed. Any invasion of that right is an
injury to him which, from his point of view, may be greater
than very considerable present money loss to the corporation.
While this right must yield to a power over it given by the
terms of the association, still he has the right to insist that
such power shall be exercised for the purposes of the whole
association. It is not so when exercised for the direct purpose
of depriving him of his proportionate voice and influence.
That is not a legitimate manner for those temporarily vested
with power to perpetuate the policy which they favor. Noth-
ing can be more fallacious in corporate or in popular govern-
ment than the argument that because they honestly believe
their policy right, and another dangerous, they may rightfully
invade the field of the suffrage upon which policy rests, and
disfranchise, in whole or in part, those who disagree with
them...”

See Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 137, 77 Atl. 698; L. E. Fos-
gate Co. v. Boston Market Terminal Co., 275 Mass. 99, 175
N.E. 86; Kullgreen v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454,
185 Pac. (2nd) 1007; Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa.
510, 103 Atl. 340; Way v. American Grease Co., 60 N.J. Eq.
263, 47 Atl. 44.

It is our conclusion that the legal rights of the appellants
as minority stockholders in Alpha Holding Corporation with
reference to the commitment for sale of the Hall Office Build-
ing to Weil-Maas for the sum of $200,000.00, as well as the ap-
pellants having as directors on file with them a bona fide offer
to buy on the part of Noel Carol Corporation the Hall Office
Building for the sum of $250,000.00, are questions not con-
sidered or adjudicated on this appeal but these questions are
left-open for subsequent consideration and adjudication.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

473

JEWEL L. SAWYER v. ERA M. HINTON as Administratrix of the
Estate of Albert L. Hinton, deceased.

85 So. (2nd) 294 January Term, 1948
May 11, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied June 2, 1948

Sam E. Murrell, for appellant.
Giles F. Lewis, for appellee.

BARNS, J.: :

The appellant-plaintiff went to trial on count X of her
declaration and the pleas filed thereto by defendant. Plaintiff
was coerced to suffer a non-suit upon the announcement of the
trial judge that he would grant defendant’s motion for a di-
rected verdict made after plaintiff and defendant had closed
the case for offering evidence. Thereafter a final judgment
was entered and plaintiff appealed. Our statute provides:.

“59.05. Writ of Error; from Order of Nonsuit, Bill of Ex-
ceptions.—When, from any decision of the court on the trial
of a cause in any court, it may become necessary for the
plaintiff to suffer a nonsuit, the facts, points or decisions may
be reserved for the decision of the appellate court by bill of
exceptions as in other cases.”

Pg]

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474

Appellant-plaintiff assigns as error that the trial court
erred in overruling motion to strike and demurrer to defend-
ant’s 7th, 8th and 9th pleas, which were as follows:

“(7). That the claim for $500 cash paid by the plaintiff
to the defendant’s intestate Albert L. Hinton was not filed in
the County Judge’s Court of Orange County, Florida, against
the estate of Albert L. Hinton within eight months after the
first publication of notice to creditors of the said Albert L.
Hinton by this defendant as administratrix.

“(8) That the plaintiff did not bring suit on the claim for
$500 cash alleged to have been paid to defendant’s intestate
on May 3, 1945, within two months after the alleged filing of
said claim in the County Judge’s Court and the filing of objec-
tions of the defendant thereto, and service on plaintiff of copy
of such objections,

“(9) That the plaintiff did not file in the County Judge’s
Court or bring suit on said alleged claim of $500 cash set up
in said count alleged to have been paid to defendant’s intestate
on May 3, 1945, within twelve months from the first publica-
tion of the notice to creditors and is barred by limitation of
twelve months for the institution of suits on claims filed
against the estates of decedents and objected to by any one in
interest.” . :

Plaintiff’s amended count X(filed January 16, 1947), to
which these pleas were filed, alleged the payment to Hinton by
plaintiff of $500.00 and $325.90 to be applied on the purchase
of real estate for her but that Hinton converted said sum of
$825.90 to his own use; that the defendant was appointed as
administratrix of Hinton’s estate; that before the commence-
ment of this suit plaintiff filed her claim in the County Judge’s
Court of Orange County, as provided by law, but that the de-
fendant here objected to said claim and refused to pay it.

Section 733.16, F.S. 1941, F.S.A. (Sup. 1945) required
that any claim against the estate of a decedent shall be filed
within eight months from the date of the first publication of
“notice to creditors” and Section 733.18 F.S. 1941, F.S.A.
(Sup. 1945) prescribes that in event of an objection to the
claim that claimant shall have “twelve calendar months from

ATS

the first publication of notice to creditors in which to bring
appropriate suit” but that if claimant is served with notice
of objection as prescribed by Section 733.18, supra, that
claimant shall have “two calendar months from the date of
such service within which to bring appropriate suit,” but that

“No suit, action or proceeding shall be brought against
any personal representative after the time limited above.”

Plaintiff complains that the pleas are insufficient against
demurrer because they relate to only $500.00 of plaintiff’s
claim of $825.90. If any portion of the claim of a plaintiff is
barred by a statute of non-claim, a plea to such part is good
against demurrer and motion to strike.

The assignments of error relating to the overruling of -
motion to strike and demurrer to such pleas are not well
founded.

The appellant-plaintiff also assigns as error that the trial
judge erred in ruling that the defendant was entitled to a
directed verdict in favor of the defendant and thereby coerc-
ing plaintiff to take a nonsuit.

Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict because there had
been filed no proof of claim with the County Judge’s Court for -
the payment of $500.00 to the deceased and that plaintiff had
not proved the payment to Hinton of the $500.00.

The first publication of notice to creditors was published
July 13, 1945.

The substance of the plaintiff’s claim first filed in the
County Judge’s Court on July 18, 1945, was as follows:

“July 17, 1945. Account due the undersigned by reason
of five Government checks delivered to Dr. A. L. Hinton for
the purpose of cashing, two each in the amount of $73.46,
and three each in the amount of $59.66, making a total of
$325.90.

“July 17, 1945. Check drawn on Florida Bank at Orlando,
payable to First National Bank, dated May 3, 1945, in the
amount of $500.00. Total $825.90.”

After this suit was commenced plaintiff filed in the County
Judge’s Court amended claim which was objected to and

476

thereafter amended count X was filed in this cause; however,
the amended claim insofar as it related to the $500.00 was of
the same tenor and legal effect.

Plaintiff's proof of the $500.00 item of her claim is at
such variance with the claim as filed with the County Court
as not to permit recovery therefor in this suit and if pleas 7,
8 and 9 had been the only pleas it would doubtless have-been
proper for the Court to have directed a verdict for the de-
fendant upon the issues before the jury, notwithstanding
that a default judgment for $325.90 would have been in order.

“If defendant’s plea fails to answer the whole of the sub-
stantial allegations in any one count, or omits to plead to any
count in declaration, plaintiff has a right to take judgment
as to so much of declaration as was not covered by plea, as
upon nil dicit.”—Charles v. Young, 76 So. 869, 74 Fla. 298.

“At common law, ‘judgment nil dicit? may be taken
against defendant who omits to plead or answer whole or any
separable substantial portion of declaration.” -Clonts v. Spur-
way, 139 So. 896, 104 Fla. 340.

However there were other pleas going to a traverse of the
whole of the Count and there was an issue before the jury as
to $325.90 of plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff's proof of this
portion of her claim was sufficient to preclude a directed ver-
dict for the defendant. If the trial judge had directed a ver-
dict for the plaintiff for $325.90, it would have been supported
by the record.

The two items of $500.00 and $325.90 forming the basis of
plaintiff's claim are separate items but they have some rela-
tion to the same transaction and are not so distinct and
several as to place plaintiff’s claim without the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court. Plaintiff by Count X has plead such a re-
lation of these two payments as permit composite claim for
the aggregate amount. The $500.00 portion of plaintiff's
claim is barred by the statute of nonclaim but plaintiff estab-
lished a prima facie case as to the $325.90.

We find that the trial judge erred in ruling that defendant
was entitled to a directed verdict in her favor.

Reversed. .

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

a
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477

HARRY A. CORNBLUM v. DORA EISENBERG, joined by her husband,
JULIUS EISENBERG.

36 So. (2nd) 211 January Term, 1948
May 14, 1948 En Bane

McKay, Dixon, DeJarnette & Bradford and Keen &
O’Kelley and Charles H. Spitz, for petitioner.
Hoffman & Durant, for respondents.

PER CURIAM:

A rehearing having been granted in this cause and the
cause having been further considered upon the record and the
briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties; it
is thereupon ordered and adjudged by the court that the
opinion and judgment of this court filed in this cause on De-
cember 16, 1947 be and is hereby reaffirmed and adhered to on
rehearing.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., and
WISEHEART, Associate Justice, concur.
TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissent.

A. L. PERPER v. JOSEPH EDELL and FRIEDA EDELL, his wife, and
HARRY GROSSINGER and JENNIE GROSSINGER, his wife.

385 So. (2nd) 387 January Term, 1948
May 14, 1948 Division A.

rs

18

Thomas J. Ellis, J. Kenneth Ballinger, Harold Turk and
Turk & Newman, for appellant.
Williams, Salomon & Katz, for appellees.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The appellant, A. L. Perper, filed a common law action in
the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, against Joseph
Edell and wife, Frieda Edell, and Harry Grossinger and wife,
Jennie Grossinger, for the purpose of collecting a realtor’s
commission in the sum of $25,000 for obtaining a purchaser of
the Grossinger Hotel then ready, able and willing to purchase
for the sum of $725,000 net to the defendant owners, pur-
suant to a listing thereof given to the plaintiff by the de-
fendants.

479

The amended declaration alleged that the plaintiff was a
licensed real estate broker and on or about March 3, 1945,
found for the defendants bona fide purchasers viz: Max Fein-
stein and two associates who were ready, willing and able to
purchase from the defendants the Grossinger Hotel, situated
in Miami Beach, fully furnished and equipped, for the sum of
$725,000 net to the defendants and pay the plaintiff a com-
mission of $25,000, over and above the sum of $725,000...
the purchasers were obtained pursuant to a listing of the
hotel property previously given the plaintiff by the defend-
ants. The defendants refused or declined to make the sale
and thereby deprived the plaintiff of his commission in the
sum of $25,000. .

The defendants pleaded (1) never was indebted as alleged;
(2) not guilty; (3) denied the plaintiff was a licensed broker;
(4) denied plaintiff found bona fide purchasers able, ready
and willing to purchase the property; (5) denied the listing
of the property; (6) denied depriving the plaintiff of a com-
mission of $25,000; (7) the defendants at the trial relied
upon the contention that Joseph Edell was temporarily insane
when he gave a listing to the plaintiff for the sale of the
Grossinger Hotel. The record discloses that—after the jury
had heard all the evidence of the parties, argument of counsel
and instructions of the court upon the law of the case and
retired to consider their verdict—the following occurred: “Mr.
DeJarnette: Comes now the defendant and amends plea No.
5 by adding the following: ‘for that at the time of the alleged
listing on February 18, 1945, and of the alleged offer on March
3, 1945, Joseph Edell, who is alleged to have given the listing
and received the offer, was insane and incapable of making
the contract, and was for several weeks prior to February
18th, 1945, and several weeks subsequent to March 3, 1945, in-
sane and incapable of making the contract and of receiving
the offer.’ ” ;

Pertinent instructions given to the jury by the trial court
are viz:

“Tf the jury finds that Mr. Edell was authorized by his wife
and his partners, the Grossingers, to list the Grossinger Hotel _
with real estate brokers, and that Mr. Hdell did authorize the

480

plaintiff, Mr. Perper, a real estate broker, to find a purchaser
at $760,000.00 gross, all cash above a $300,000.00 first mort-
gage, or at $725,000.00 net, all cash above a $300,000.00 first
mortgage, and that on either of those propositions, the sellers
would, for the convenience of the purchasers, arrange for a
second mortgage of $125,000.00, and that Mr. Perper did find
purchasers who were ready, willing and able to purchase at
$725,000.00, all cash above a $300,000.00 first mortgage, and
that said purchasers agreed to pay Mr. Perper a commission
of $25,000.00 on consummation of the sale, and that Mr. Per-
per did so advise Mr. Edell, but Mr. Edell refused to go
through with the deal, then the jury should return a verdict
for the plaintiff, in the sum of $25,000.00, if Mr. Edell was
competent to contract with the plaintiff. (The underscored
words were added to the above charge by the Court and were
not a part of the charge as requested by counsel for plaintiff.)

“The Court (continuing): The defendant has requested
certain charges, which will be given, as follows:

“I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that there are two
types of real estate listings. One is a listing to procure a
purchaser and another is a listing to effect a sale.

“Tf you find from the testimony in this case that this was a
listing to effect a sale, then I charge you that the broker, in or-
der to receive a commission, must not only have produced a
purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy, but also must have
procured from his customer a written contract which the seller
could enforce, leaving nothing for the seller to do but to exe-
cute, at the proper time, the necessary transfer of the title to
the property. Therefore, if you find in this case that the
listing was to effect a sale rather than to procure a purchaser,
then'I charge you that it was Mr. Perper’s duty to have de-
livered to the defendants a written binding contract signed by
the proposed purchasers and containing the exact terms of
the listing.

“T charge you further that even if you believe from the
evidence that Mr. Edell had the sole and full authority to
negotiate for the sale of this hotel, if you further believe from
the evidence that on the date of the alleged listing and on the
date of the alleged tender of performance, that is to say, on

a
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481

the 18th of February, 1945, and the 3rd of March, 1945, that
Mr. Hdell was mentally incapable of entering into a contract,
then under such circumstances the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover and your verdict must be for the defendants.”

A motion for new trial was made on several grounds, in-
cluding the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict
for the defendants below; the insanity issue presented by a
special plea at the conclusion of defendants’ case; charges of
the court upon the law of the case; the refusal to admit testi-
mony as to the financial ability of plaintiff's prospective pur-
chasers; the order of the trial court in denying plaintiff’s mo-
tion for a directed verdict, etc. The trial court denied the
motion for a new trial and entered a judgment for the defend-
ants on the verdict of the jury and plaintiff appealed.

The record discloses that counsel for defendants at the
close of the plaintiff's testimony, moved the court for a di-
rected verdict on grounds (1) the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff was legally insufficient; (2) that the alleged listing
of the hotel was for the sale thereof and not for procuring a
purchaser ready, willing and able to perform; (3) the de-
fendants were sued as individuals and the testimony adduced
established a partnership; (4) there was no showing that the
purchasers were ready, willing and able to perform the con-
tract of purchase. The trial court properly denied defendants’
motion for a directed verdict. The evidence adduced by the
defendants below went almost exclusively to the sole question
of the insanity of Joseph Edell prior and subsequent to the
date of the alleged listing of the property with the plaintiff,
as shown by the testimony of Dr. Kushner and Dr. Anderson.
The defendants did not take the witness stand nor any one in
their behalf, other than the two physicians.

The adjudications of this Court are to the effect that,
where a broker procures a customer willing, ready and able
to purchase property offered for sale according to the terms
of the offer and the transaction is defeated on account of some
fault of the principal, the broker is entitled to his commis-
sion, although the transaction is not consummated. Hutchins
& Co. v. Sherman, 82 Fla. 167, 89 So. 430; Camp Lumber Co.

ee

482

v. Tedder, 78 Fla. 183, 82 So. 865; Walker v. Chancey, 96 Fla.
82, 117 So. 705. The trial court in denying defendants’ mo-
tion for a directed verdict made at the close of plaintiff’s case
held that the plaintiff by competent evidence had established
prima facie the material allegations of his amended declara-
tion.

The sanity or insanity of Mr. Edell on February 18, 1945,
and March 3, 1945, unquestionably, was the controlling issue
before the jury under the following charge: “If you believe
from the evidence that Mr. Edell had the sole and full au-
thority to negotiate for the sale of this hotel, if you believe
from the evidence that on the date of the alleged listing and
on the date of the alleged tender of performance, that is say
on the 18th of February and the 3rd of March, 1945, that Mr.
Edell was mentally incapable of entering into a contract, then
under such circumstances the plaintiff is not entitled to re-
cover and your verdict must be for the defendants.”

In the case of Sheppard v. Cherry, 118 Fla. 473, 159 So.
661, we held that complete insanity of one of the parties to a
contract is not sufficient reason for setting it aside where it
was entered into in good faith, without fraud or imposition,
for a fair consideration, without notice of the infirmity and
before an adjudication of insanity, and has been executed in
whole or in part, unless the parties can be restored to their
original position.

In Farrior v. Hughes-Law Lumber Co., 113 Fla. 209, 151
So. 377, we in part said:

“‘According to the weight of authority, however, where
there has been no inquisition or adjudication of insanity, a
contract entered into upon an adequate consideration of which
the insane person has had the benefit, and made by the other
contracting party in good faith, without fraud or undue in-
fluence, and without knowledge of the insanity or reason to
suspect it, will be upheld against the insane person or his
representatives, and it cannot be avoided by them, where the
parties cannot be put in status quo. The liability under the
contract in such a case will be upheld, not so much upon the
theory of enforcing the promise as upon the idea that the in-

483

sane person ought not to enjoy the full, adequate and irre-
storable benefit of a contract ordinarily merely voidable, with-
out himself complying with the terms thereof; and such lia-
bility is imposed also on-the principle that, where a loss must
be borne by one of two innocent persons it shall be borne by
him who occasioned it.’”

See Douglas v. Ogle, 80 Fla. 42, 85 So. 243; Hassey v.
Williams, 127 Fla. 734, 174 So. 9; Sommers v. Apalachicola
Northern R.R. Co., 85 Fla. 9, 96 So. 151; Gabel v. Simmons,
100 Fla. 526, 129 So. 777.

The contracts of an insane person not under guardianship
that are voidable in character may be ratified or rescinded.
They may be ratified by the insane party in a lucid interval or
upon recovering mental capacity. It is not necessary that the
ratification be made by expressed words; it may be evidenced
by any intelligent act or conduct of the party, made with a full
knowledge of the facts, which clearly shows an intention to be
bound by the contract. If the insane person knowingly ac-
cepts the benefits of the agreement he may be held to have
ratified it. Retaining the property received under the con-
tract after one has recovered his mind may amount to a rati-
fication. It is the act of disaffirmance which destroys voidable
contracts or deeds. Elliott on Contracts, Vol. 1, pp. 590-1,
par. 381.

Elliott on Contracts, Vol. 1, pp. 594-8, treats the questions
thusly:

“Sec. 884. Restoration of Consideration—As a general
rule the contract of a person of unsound mind that is fair and
beneficial to him and made in good faith without knowledge of
his mental infirmity cannot be avoided unless the other party
is placed in statu quo. Under such circumstances if the in-

" sane person does not offer to, or cannot place the other party
in his former position the contract is binding. The reason
given for this rule is that, ‘if a merely voidable contract can
be repudiated by one of the parties, even though he be a luna-
tic, and a recovery can be defeated in the face of these circum-
stances simply because the party who made the purchase was
of unsound mind, though not at the time adjudged to be so,
the loss would fall upon a confessedly innocent person, instead

Le
484

of on the one who received and used the article delivered in
good faith under the contract.’ A lunatic who causes the loss
must be made to bear the consequences of his infirmity as he
must bear his misfortune.

“Sec. 385. Ilustrations of the Rule—Thus an insane
grantor not under guardianship and not known to be non
compos mentis cannot avoid his deed without offering to re-
store the consideration received therefor, or in case he pur-
chases land and gives a note and mortgage in payment there-
for he cannot retain the land and avoid his note and mortgage.
Contracts concerning personal property are controlled by the
same principles. The compromise of an insane person before
he has been adjudged non compos mentis can only be avoided
by placing the other party in statu quo. Thus it has been
held that where an employe while mentally incompetent
signed a release of liability for personal injuries and subse-
quently recovered judgment in an action for the injury, the
amount received under the release should be deducted from
the judgment. If the insane person did not derive any bene-
fit or receive any part of the consideration, he may rescind
without making restitution or placing the other party in statu
quo. Thus where the consideration is given a third person
there need be no restitution made by the insane party. The
same is true where he executes a negotiable instrument as
surety or becomes an accommodation indorser.

“Sec. 386. Restoration as a Condition Precedent.—If the
agreement is harsh or oppressive, or is detrimental to the
interest of the insane party, it may be disaffirmed in a proper
case without placing the party in statu quo. Should one party
know or have reasonable cause to believe the other to be in-
sane the person non compos mentis may rescind without
being required to make restitution. One dealing with a per-
son known to be insane is not entitled to be placed in statu
quo as a condition precedent to an avoidance of the agree-
ment. This does not mean, however, that there need be no
restitution in any case; it merely means that restitution is not
a condition precedent. So much of the consideration as re-
mains in the hands of the insane party must be restored by
him upon rescission.”

Ernest Mayer Briel, an agent or representative of Dunn &
Bradstreet, a commercial rating agency, was produced by the
plaintiff and interrogated as to the financial ability of a Mr.
David Fox, of Philadelphia, one of the purchasers produced by
the plaintiff. The witness, as a representative of Dunn & Brad-
street located in Miami, obtained through their Philadelphia
office information as to the financial ability of Mr. Fox. The
trial court sustained an objection to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay. A broker producing a purchaser
financially able is not required to show that the purchaser is
then standing outside of the office door with all the cash in
hand required to pay for the property. If the purchaser is
financially able to pay for the property within the time stipu-
lated it is sufficient. (Financially) “able” means that the
proposed purchaser is able to command the necessary money
to close the deal on reasohable notice or within the time stipu-
lated by the parties. McCabe v. Jones, 141 Wis. 540, 124 N.W.
486. Evidence based on the financial responsibility and busi-
ness standing of a proposed purchaser is admissible.

It is our conclusion that the trial court erred in its instruc-
tions to the jury on the law of the case. The defendants below
should be permitted or allowed to submit to the trial court,
and obtain a ruling thereon as to its legal sufficiency, a plea in
lieu of their amended plea No. 5, which is hereby stricken be-
cause of its legal insufficiency. The judgment is reversed and
a new trial awarded.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. FONS A. HATHAWAY, v. CARL B.
SMITH, CONLEY BROOKS and DANIEL W. MILLAN, as and te-
gether constituting FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

485

35 So. (2nd) 650 . January Term, 1948
May 31, 1948 Special Division A

Frank D. Upchurch and Bedell & Bedell, for relator.
Parker, Foster & Wigginton and B. T. Coleman, for re-
spondents.

TERRELL, J.:

October 27, 1947, the Florida Industrial Commission, here-
inafter referred to as the Commission, adopted a resolution
setting up what it elected to call a retirement policy in which
all its employees are retired at the age of 65, with the con-
dition that on appropriate showing the Commission in its “ab-
solute discretion” may continue any employee in service from
year to year but in no case shall such employment be con-
tinued after the age of 70. Pursuant to this policy the Com-
mission adopted a resolution April 12, 1948, retiring relator as
Director of the Florida State Employment Service, effective
May 31, 1948.

This is an original proceeding in mandamus by which rela-
tor seeks to coerce the Commission to cancel and rescind its
resolution of April 12, 1948, A return to the alternative writ -
raises four questions but they all turn on the question of
whether or not the Commission is authorized to set up and en-

487

force a policy retiring relator and other employees from the
service at the age of 65.

It is also admitted that relator was appointed director of
the Florida State Employment Service under the Merit Sys-
tem, that the Merit System Council recommended the retire-
ment policy outlined in the forepart of this opinion and that
the authority for its adoption is contained in Section 443.12
(4) Florida Statutes 1941, the pertinent part of which is as
follows:

“The Commission shall establish and enforce fair and
reasonable regulations for appointments, promotions and de-
motions based upon rating of efficiency and fitness and for
terminations for cause.”

‘We understand that respondents rely entirely on the pro-
visions of the law so quoted, the provisions of Section 238.07,
Florida Statutes. 1941, relating to the retirement of teachers
and various other State and Federal Civil Service laws affect-
ing age retirement to support their general retirement policy
adopted October 27, 1947.

The Legislature undoubtedly has authority to set up a
general retirement policy for all employees similar to that for
teachers previously alluded to, but Section 443.12 (4), quoted
and relied on here, does not attempt to do so. It deals entirely
with “appointments, promotions and demotions based upon
rating of efficiency and fitness and for terminations for cause.”
The primary reliance of respondents here is on the phrase
“terminations for cause,” but when read with the context
these words refute the interpretation proposed for them. Re-
moval for cause or terminations for cause is employed fre-

‘It is admitted that the Federal Employment Service was set up
under an Act of Congress known as the Wagner-Peysén Act (48 Stat.
114-29 USCA 49 (c), one of the provisions of which was that in order to
secure the benefits thereof the respective states shall create a state
agency clothed with power to cooperate with the Federal Employment
Service. The legislature of Florida created the Florida Industrial Com-
mission, (Chapter 18,402, Acts of 1937, Section 443.12 (4), Florida
Statutes 1941, and authorized it to accept all Federal funds and co-
operate with the Federal Employment Service in the administration of
the Wagner-Peysen Act. One of the conditions for participation in
Federal Funds was the creation of a Merit System to govern the per-
sonnel of the State Employment Service. «

Ee
488

quently in statutes and constitutions relating to the removal
of officers and employees and has a well settled connotation.
It imputes removal or termination for misconduct, some viola-
tion of the law or delict of duty on the part of the officer or
employee affected. Stringer v. Stringer, 273 Ky. 251, 116
S.W. (2) 324, 327. American Jurisprudence, Vol. 43, Public
Officers, Section 205, same subject R.C.L. Vol. 22, Section 284,
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition Vol. 36, page 865,
McChem on Public Offices, page 286 et seq. and many other
text books and decisions support this view and a wide search
of authorities reveals no holding to the contrary.
~ This holding is not alone supported by universal authority,
it is supported by logic and good conscience. ‘Terminations
for cause” is a very different matter from retirement for age.
If the legislature has-prescribed no policy for retirement, then
retirement is the voluntary act of the person who retires and
cannot be coerced. We do not find a word in Chapter 18,402,
Acts of 1937, or other statutes relied on, that can be remotely
construed as authorizing the Commission to prescribe any
policy retiring employees from the service for age alone.

Respondents contend that the real purpose of a compulsory
retirement policy is to create a more efficient public service,
but we think it contemplates more than this. Efficient public
service is secured by encouraging a high standard of qualifica-
tion on the part of the employee, insuring his tenure and a
chance for promotion. One attaining this status acquires an
interest in his job that he may be deprived of for cause, but
not on account of his age alone when not so provided. When
secured under the Merit System, one’s right to a job is akin to
his right to land or other property. The legislature of course,
may impose reasonable age retirement but the Commission
has no authority to do so unless in terms so authorized. Ad-
ministrative agencies, when empowered to do so, may make
and enforce regulations to carry out powers definitely con-
ferred on them, but they are not permitted to do more. The
legislature cannot clothe them with more, neither may they
assume to do more.

Another element refuting respondent’s contention that in
the instant case the Commission is acting “for cause,” is that

489

“terminations for cause” generally contemplate notice and a
chance to be heard somewhere along the line, but in this case
every factor of due process was skipped and relator was given
the bounce without recourse. This was not in keeping with
the courtesy that our form of democratic society accords the
individual. “Fair and reasonable” and “efficiency and fitness”
were the criteria that respondents had to guide them. -

So we are driven to the conclusion that the regulation com-
plained of was void and unenforceable because respondents
were without power to promulgate it, hence the return to the
alternative writ should be quashed and the motion for peremp-
tory writ granted.

It is so ordered.

CHAPMAN, SEBRING and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

a
JOE MONTERESI v. STATE OF FLORIDA *
35 So. (2nd) 582 January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 . Special Division B

William C. Pierce and Cyrus W. Fields, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

This appeal is from a conviction, under Sec. 812.11, Fla.
Stat., 1941, F.S.A., for receiving certain money with knowl-
edge that same was embezzled. The only question is whether
the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

—
490

The evidence presents an ugly picture demonstrating how
vice and gambling will destroy legitimate business in a com-
munity if permitted to carry on its evil trade. Here a trusted
employee, over a period of years—from day to day, misappro-
priated about $9,514.30 of his employer’s money and gave it
to appellant to play a number game commonly known as
Bolita. Appellant would call upon the employee just before
or after the usual working hours to get the money. The sums
ranged from one to three hundred dollars per week. In the
meantime all winnings were played back into the game.
Finally the employer was called to meet an over-draft and
learned, for the first time, of the embezzlement.

It was necessary for the State to show that appellant knew
or knew of such facts as would put a man of ordinary in-
telligence and caution on inquiry that the money was em-~
bezzled. In this regard this statute is similar to the com-
panion law of receiving stolen property. Sec. 811.16, Fla.
Stat., 1941, F.S.A.

We find a total lack of evidence to meet the announced
rule. We cannot attach guilty knowledge to appellant simply
because the money was passed to him out of the usual hours of
business and out of the presence of others. The evidence, in
its present state, is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The
judgment is reversed and a new trial is granted.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and BARNS, JJ., concur.

|
IN RE: Authority of the Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County,.
Florida, to purchase for Educational Purposes land Adjacent to but

without the Geographical Limits of Alachua County, Florida; JOBIN
M. SCOTT, ADOLPHE L. VIDAL and ©. D. GUNN, Interveners.

JOHN M. SCOTT, ADOLPHE L. VIDAL and ©. D. GUNN v. THE
BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF ALACHUA COUNTY,
FLORIDA, a body corporate.

35 So. (2nd) 579 . January Term, 194°

June 1, 1948 Special Division A

Howell, McCarthy, Lane & Howell, Charles Cook Howell.
and Hazard & Thames, for appellants.

Jordan, Lazonby & Dell, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

In August 1947, the Board of Public Instruction of
Alachua County filed its petition in the proper form ‘alleging
that the War Assets Administration was offering for sale
certain lands in Clay County, known as the Crystal Lake Site,
that petitioner was in need of said lands for educational pur-
poses and was willing and able to purchase them, but being in
doubt of its authority to do so, prayed the Court to determine
by declaratory decree whether it had authority under the law
to purchase said lands in aid of the public school program of
Alachua County.

At final hearing the Court answered petitioner’s prayer in
the affirmative and determined that it might pay for said
lands with public funds of the County. John M. Scott, Adolphe
L. Vidal and C. D. Gunn, resident citizens and taxpayers of the
County then filed their bill of complaint, seeking a review of
the declaratory judgment so entered and prayed for an order
restraining petitioners from expending public funds to

purchase said lands. By stipulation the bill of complaint was.

Le
492

treated as a bill for intervention which was granted, an
answer was filed and on final hearing the Chancellor decreed
that defendant had authority to purchase the Crystal Lake
Site, with public funds, even though it was located beyond the
boundaries of Alachua County. This Appeal was prosecuted
from the final decree.

The question for determination is whether or not the
Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County is authorized
to purchase and take title to lands outside the geographical
limits of the county for the purpose of administering its
public school program.

Appellants contend that this question should be answered
in the negative. To support this contention they rely on cer-
tain provisions of Chapter 230, Florida Statutes 1941, particu-
larly, sections 230.22 and 230.23, defining the powers and
duties of Boards of Public Instruction. They also rely on
First National Bank v. Board of Public Instruction, 93, Fla.
182, 111 So. 521, and Harvey v. Board of Public Instruction,
101 Fla. 273, 183 So. 868. They contend that said statutes and
decisions restrict the power of the Board of Public Instruc-
tion in the exercise of its school program to the county over
which it exercises jurisdiction and that it is without authority
to enter another county or to purchase lands beyond its
borders for any purpose.

Prior to the enactment of Chapter 19,355, Acts of 1939, as
amended by Chapter 23,726, Acts of 1947, hereafter referred
to as the School Code, this contention might have been upheld,
but as this Court pointed out in Taylor et al. v. Board of Pub-
lic Instruction of LaFayette County, 157 Fla. 422, 26 So.
(2nd) 180, the School Code “enlarged materially the scope of
public school programs, public school plants, and public school
activities.” An adequate public school program is no longer
limited to exploiting the three R’s and acquiring such facilities
as are necessary to do so. It contemplates the development of
mental, manual and other skills that may not derive from
academic training. It is predicated on the premise that a per-
sonality quotient is just as important as an intelligence
quotient and that training the character and the emotions is

|
[|
493

just as important as training the mind if the product is to be a
well balanced citizen.

The purpose of the School Code was to make such a school
program possible. Section 227.04 requires that it be liberally
construed to effectuate this purpose. Section 230.03 imposes
the organization and control of the public school system of the
county on the County Board of Public Instruction. Section
227.17 provides that the State school system shall include
health services, vocational rehabilitation and other special
services that are essential to promote, improve and protect the
adequacy and efficiency of the state system. It also makes the
county school system a part of the state school system. Sec-
tion 230.23, among other things, authorizes the County Board
of Public Instruction to assume such responsibilities as may
be vested in it by law, or as may be required by the State
Board of Education or as in the opinion of the County Board
of Public Instruction are necessary to provide for the more
efficient operation of the County school system in carrying out
the purposes of the School Code. As to property ownership,
the latter section provides that the County Board of Public
Instruction shall retain possession of all property to which
title is not held by the County Board and to attain possession
of and accept and hold under proper title all property which
may at any time be acquired by the County Board for educa-
tional purposes in the County.

Appellants place peculiar emphasis on the words, “in the
County” in the preceding paragraph. If these words were the
sole guide to our conclusion, we might be constrained to agree
with their contention, but when read with the other provisions
of the School Code, referred to in the same paragraph, in--
cluding the injunction imposed on us to construe it liberally,
we are driven to the conclusion that an adequate school pro-
gram as contemplated by the School Code cannot stand on
such a limited interpretation. It is certain that Alachua
County has no authority to interfere with the administration
of the schools in Clay County, but if it needs lands in that
county to effectuate its school program, we think it may ac-
quire them for that purpose. Municipal Corporations of all
classes are granted this power and we think the School Code

494

clearly contemplates that Boards of Public Instruction may
exercise it if necessary to carry out the public school program.
It is not at all clear that the legislature intended the words “in
the county” to limit land purchase to lands in the county. It
would be just as reasonable to conclude that the intent was to
authorize the purchase of lands anywhere they might aid the
county’s school program.

" The reason for purchasing the lands in question was to
provide a camp and a recreational ground to aid the educa- °
tional program of Alachua County. It was situated on a lake
across the county line in Clay County but within easy reach
of the schools of Alachua County. It is shown to be well
adapted for that purpose and was being offered at a nominal
price. Competitive sports are now a recognized part of the
public school program. Eminent psychologists proclaim the
doctrine that competitive sports contribute more to one’s per-
sonality quotient and ability to work with people than any
other school activity. Athletic coaches and physical directors
tell us that the Olympic Games and other forms of physical '
competition have done more to put an end to class hatred and
promote international harmony than the United Nations As-
sembly. The reason being that they are conducted by a strict
moral code that insures just treatment to all who participate
in them.

This is a mere incident to the manner in which the public
school program has been bounced out of its traditional groove
and invaded by new experiments in education. An adequate
school program is now as diversified as an experimental farm
program and the very purpose of the school code was to give
sanction to such a program. The progenitors of the three R’s
would doubtless have “thrown a fit” if the school Board had
talked about purchasing lands for a recreational center. The
barn yard and the woodpile filled the need of a recreational
center for them. It met the challenge of the time but its ex-
ponent, the three R’s and the little red school house that sym-
bolized it, now reposes in the museum of modern education.
What we are concerned with is a system to cope with this ma-
chine age that we are in danger of becoming victims of if we
do not become its masters.

Ll
495

We have learned that the public school program has a
definite relation to the economy of our people, that the great
majority of them must make their living with their hands and
that those who do so must acquire different skills and trades
from those who pursue the learned professions, various busi-
nesses and specialized activities. We have also learned that
while skill in the three R’s was adequate for a rural de-
mocracy when the nearest neighbor was three miles away and
it was sometimes three hundred yards from the front door to
the front gate, but that it is entirely inadequate for an urban
democracy where you speak to your neighbor through the
window and sometimes live with a flock of them under the
same roof. A democracy in which we cultivate our farms
with machines, travel by automobile, send our mail by air
plane and flip a gadget to warm the house, start breakfast and
relieve much of the day’s drudgery. Such is the social era
that the public school program must prepare the citizen for
and the School Code was designed to provide the wherewith
for such a program. County lines may be treated as a fiction
rather than a barrier to such a program.

It follows that the question confronting us impels an af-
firmative answer. To construe the School Code otherwise
would render it impossible to bring about a public school pro-
“gram adequate for the needs contemplated by the legislature.
So the fact that the lands in question were without the geo-
graphical limits of Alachua County is not material if they are
essential to carry out its public school program:

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Lt

CAMP MONTGOMERY, a corporation not for profit, v. THE BOARD
OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA.

85 So. (2nd) 582 January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 Division A

Charles Cook Howell, for petitioner.
Jordan, Lazonby & Dell, for respondent.

496

PER CURIAM:

This is a companion case to:

IN RE: Authority of the Board of Public Instruction of
Alachua County, Florida, to Purchase for Educational Pur-
poses Lands Adjacent to but without the Geographical Limits
of Alachua County, Florida. JOHN M. SCOTT, ADOLPHE L.
VIDAL and C. D. GUNN, Interveners. JOHN M. SCOTT,
ADOLPHE L. VIDAL and C. D. GUNN, Appellants, v. THE
BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF ALACHUA
COUNTY, FLORIDA, a body corporate, Appellee.

The ultimate question in this case is not materially different
from the last cited case. It follows that application for cer-
tiorari is denied.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,

JJ., concur.
cern ee
SCOTT M. LOFTIN and JOHN W. MARTIN, as Trustees of the
property of the Florida East Coast Railway Company, a corporation,
v. MADELYN SAXON, as Administratrix of the Estate of G. M.
Saxon, Deceased.

35 So. (2nd) 716 ; January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied June 15, 1948 °

497

Russell L. Frink, Samuel Kassewitz and William J. DeHoff,
for appellants.

Bedell & Bedell and T. J. Lewis (Atlanta, Georgia) for
appellee. .

SEBRING, J.:

The appellants maintain and operate a railway switch yard
‘at New Smyrna, Florida, in connection with their interstate
commerce transportation movements. Five of the switch
tracks numbered 1 to 5, inclusive, and known as the West
Yards, lie west of and parallel to the southbound main line of
the appellants. Certain switch tracks known as the Hast
Yards lie east of and parallel to the northbound main line of
the appellants. Immediately to the west of Track No. 5, West
Yards, the Fruit Growers Express Company maintains and
operates an office from which it transacts its business in con-
nection with shipments of commodities loaded into its re-
frigerated cars and transported from New Smyrna over the
railway lines of the appellants.

G. M. Saxon was a member of a switching crew employed
by the appellants. The crew consisted of yard foreman,
Eugene White, an engineer, a fireman, and two switchmen
including Saxon. On the morning of October 29, 1945, Saxon
was killed by being struck by Engine No. 309 which was being
operated by the appellants on Track No. 1, West Yards. At
the time of his death only two engines were in operation in
the yards—Engine No. 309, which had just come from the
repair shops after an extensive overhaul, and Engine No. 268
which was being operated by the crew of which Saxon was a
member.

Some few minutes prior to his death Saxon had been sent
by yard foreman White from the east side of the East Yards
to the office of Fruit Growers Express Company to ascertain

498

whether certain refrigerated cars were ready for moving. In
order.to reach the office Saxon had to cross over the East
Yard Tracks, the two main line tracks, and the five tracks of
the West Yards, all of which ran in a northerly and southerly
direction. While he was engaged in this errand, Engine No.
268, which was headed north, was backing south on the
Southbound main line track, pulling ten or eleven tank cars
behind it. In the meantime, Engine No. 309 was being
“broken in” on Track No. 1, West Yards, by its crew consist-
ing of an engineer and fireman. The “breaking in” process.
consisted of running the engine back and forth along the track
for eight hour periods until the new parts with which it had
just been repaired had become properly adjusted and were in
smooth running order.

When Saxon first went across the tracks to the office of
Fruit Growers Express Company, Engine No. 309 was com-
pleting a run to the south end of the West Yards and was
some three thousand feet or more south of the point where
Saxon crossed over. After finishing with his errand Saxon
recrossed four of the West Yard Tracks and came to a pause
upon Track No. 1 West Yards. There he stood on the east end
of a tie for about 30 seconds, for the apparent purpose of
waiting for the tank cars being pulled by Engine No. 268
southward to pass by him on the Southbound Main Line
Track, and then of continuing on across the yards to where
Yard Foreman White was standing. ,

While Saxon was standing on Track No. 1 West Yards he
was struck by the tender of Engine No. 309 which had re-
turned from its trip to the south end of the yards and was
backing in a northerly direction. Saxon was thrown to the
tracks and the engine passed over him, killing him instantly.

Mrs. Madelyn Saxon, the personal representative of the
estate of the decedent, brought suit for damages against the
trustees of the railway company, in an action instituted under
the Federal Employers Liability Act. The amended declara-
tion upon which the trial was had contained a general allega-
tion of negligence to the effect that Saxon, the deceased em-
ployee, “was negligently run into, stricken, knocked down,
run over and instantly killed by an engine of the defendants

499

then and there being operated over said track by their agents,
servants and employees.” It also contained specific allega-
tions of negligence to the effect that the engine which struck
Saxon was being operated at a negligent rate of speed; that
defendants’ employees in charge of the engine negligently
failed to ring any bell, blow any horn or whistle, or give Saxon
any notice or warning of its approach; and that said em-
ployees on said engine negligently failed to keep a proper
look-out and negligently failed to apply the brakes and stop
the engine before running over Saxon.

The defendants filed a plea of not guilty to the amended
declaration and the parties went to trial. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $25,000.
Subsequently, a motion for new trial filed by defendants was
denied and a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff
for the amount awarded by the jury. The defendants have ap-
pealed from the judgment and ask for a reversal of the judg-
ment on the ground that the trial court committed reversible
error (1) in refusing to grant the defendants’ motion for
directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiff's case in
chief, (2) in refusing to grant the defendants’ motion for new
trial filed after verdict, and (3) in refusing to give certain
instructions to the jury at the request of the defendants.

The Federal Employers Liability Act, under which the suit
‘was instituted, provides that every common carrier engaged
in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages to any per-
son suffering injury while employed by such carrier in such
commerce, or, in case of death, to the personal representative
‘of such employee for the benefit of the surviving widow and
children of such employee, “for such injury or death resulting
‘in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents or employees of such carrier.” It provides, also, that
in all actions brought under the Act “the fact that the em-
‘ployee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall
not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the
jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable .
to such employee;” and that in any such action “such em-
ployee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his em-
ployment in any case where such injury or death resulted in

|
500

whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents or employees of such carrier.” See Federal Employers’
Liability Act, Sections 51, 53, and 54, Title 45, U.S.C.A.

The primary question in the case is whether the death of
Saxon resulted “in whole or in part from the negligence of any
of the officers, agents or employees of [the] carrier,” by which
he was employed, as charged in the declaration, or whether
Saxon came to his death solely through his own negligence.

Our conclusion upon this question is that while the evi-
dence as to what transpired immediately prior to and at the
time Saxon was struck by Engine No. 309 was conflicting,
there was sufficient evidence submitted to authorize a finding
by the jury that the death of Saxon resulted, in part, at least,
from the negligence of the employees of the railway company
by which he was employed, either in the operation of Engine
No. 309 at a negligent rate of speed under the circumstances;
in the negligent failure of the crewmen of Engine No. 309 to
warn the decedent of the approach of the engine; or in the
negligent failure of the crewmen of the engine to keep a
proper look-out or to apply the brakes and stop the engine be-
fore running over Saxon.

Succinetly stated, there was evidence, if the jury saw fit to
believe it, that upon its return run northward on Track No. 1,
West Yards, Engine No. 309 was being operated at an esti-
mated speed of 20 or 25 miles an hour, when a much less speed
would have been ample for “breaking in” the engine; that the
tracks were straight, the day was clear, and the grade was
level; that the engineer of Engine No. 309 saw Saxon’ come
on to Track No. 1 when the engine was at least 1000 yards
from him; that Saxon then passed out of the line of vision of
the engineer, yet the engineer did not slacken speed or make
any effort to determine whether or not Saxon had stopped on
Track No. 1 to await the passing of Engine No. 268 on the
Southbound main line track or had stepped eastward into the
narrow space intervening between Track No. 1 and the South-
bound Main Line Track on which Engine 268 was approaching
Engine No. 309; that when Saxon passed out of the engineer’s
line of vision, the latter did not blow his whistle, or make the
slightest effort to determine from his fireman, who was on the

Le
Le
501

opposite side of the cab, whether Saxon had remained on the
track or had continued on across it out of danger. There was
evidence that as Engine No. 309 was approaching Saxon the
fireman was in his seat, was looking northward along the
track, and could and should have seen the decedent in ample
time to have warned the engineer that Saxon was standing on
Track No. 1 apparently oblivious of the fact that the engine
was bearing down upon him. There was evidence from the
fireman of Engine No. 268, which had just passed Saxon as it
went southward on the Southbound Main Line Track, that he
saw Saxon standing on Track No. 1 and sensing that he was
unaware of the approach of Engine No. 309 sprang to the
engineer’s side of his cab and blew the engine whistle one
sharp blast (which was a danger signal requiring all engines
in motion to come to an emergency stop), and that after
blowing the whistle he returned to his own side of the cab and
observed that the tender of Engine No. 309 was still some 30
yards south of Saxon and that no apparent effort had yet been
made by the crewmen of Engine No. 309 to bring the engine
to a stop or to otherwise prevent a collision with Saxon or to
warn him of its presence. There was also evidence that after
Engine No. 309 struck Saxon it traveled northward some 180
feet before coming to a full stop. .

From this evidence the jury was within its lawful rights
in concluding that the crewmen of Engine No. 309 were
negligent in the premises, and that the material allegations of
the declaration had been proven.

That Saxon was guilty of contributory negligence in not
observing the approach of Engine No. 309 in time to move out
of its path, there can be no doubt, but his was not the sole
negligence in the matter and consequently his contributory
negligence did not bar the right of recovery but was a factor
to be considered by the jury only upon the question of diminu-
tion of damages.

The jury awarded the personal representative of the estate
of the decedent in the sum of $25,000 for the benefit of the de-
cedent’s widow, who was his sole dependent. Taking into con-
sideration the age of the decedent, his life expectancy, and

EE
502

other essential factors to be weighed by the jury, it is our
view that the award made by the jury was not excessive.

The appellants have assigned error with respect to the
failure of the trial judge to give certain charges requested by
them. In the light of the charges which were given by the
trial judge, we are unable to find that the refusal to give the

. requested charges constituted reversible error.

Other questions raised on the appeal have been duly con-
sidered and we find them to be without merit.

From the conclusions we have reached, we are of opinion
that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, and BARNS, JJ.,
concur.

THOMAS, C. J., dissents.

R. E, WELLS AND FLORENCE WELLS v. PALM BEACH KENNEL
CLUB, et al.

35 So. (2nd) 720 January Term, 1948

June 1, 1948 Division A

Rehearing denied June 30, 1948

503

Paty, Warwick & Paul, for appellants.
Earnest, Lewis & Smith, for appellees.

TERRELL, J.:

R. HE. Wells and Florence Wells, husband and wife, sued
Palm Beach Kennel Club in a law action for personal injuries,
the first count of the declaration alleging in substance that
defendant operates a dog race track in Palm Beach County,
and that on April 17, 1946, plaintiffs were patrons of said
track. After viewing the races from the grandstand they pro-
ceeded to leave the premises which defendants were required
to keep in good and reasonably safe condition, yet notwith-
standing such duty, they did carelessly and negligently per-
mit an empty bottle to be in the aisle of the grandstand that
defendants knew, or could have known by the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence, that it was there, that plaintiff Florence
Wells stepped on said bottle which rolled from under her foot
causing her to fall to the floor with great force, and, as a
result of said fall, she did injure her body, arms, legs, shoul-
ders and lower spine.

The second count is not materially different from the first,
It seeks to recover damages in behalf of the husband for
expenses incurred, loss of consortium and loss of his wife’s
services and companionship as a result of her injuries. The
case went to trial on the plea of (1) Not guilty, and (2) con-
tributory negligence. At the conclusion of plaintiff's testi-
mony a motion for directed verdict in favor of the defendant
was granted. Motion for new trial was overruled, final judg-
ment was entered for the defendant and the plaintiffs ap-
pealed.

The only question we are required to answer is whether or
not the trial court committed error when he took the case
from the jury and instructed it to return a verdict for the
defendant.

The motion for an instructed verdict appears to have been
made and granted on the theory that the evidence in a case
like this must show that the owners of the race track or

Le
504

their agents must have had actual or constructive knowledge
of the presence of the bottle from which plaintiff was injured,
and that if constructive knowledge is relied on, the evidence
must show that it had been there a sufficient time for the
owners, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, to
have found and removed it. They contend that the evidence
in this case is completely devoid of any such showing.

It is true that such a rule has been imposed on stores,
banks, shops and other business places of that character, but
we think a different rule. applies to a place of amusement like
a race track where patrons go by the thousands on invitation
of the proprietors, and are permitted to purchase and drink
bottled beverages of different kinds and set the empty bottles
anywhere they may find space to place them. It is charged that
the day that plaintiff was injured was the last day of the
racing season, that the crowd was large and that many
patrons were directed to sit in the exit aisles, permitted to
drink from bottles and deposit the empty bottles anywhere
they could find space for them.

Places of amusement where large crowds congregate are
required to keep their premises in reasonably safe condition
commensurate with the business conducted. If the owner
fails in this, and such failure is the proximate result of injury
to one lawfully on the premises, compensatory damages may
be recovered if the one injured is not at fault. J. G. Christo-
pher Co. v. Russell, 63 Fla. 191, 58 So. 45, text 47. One operat-
ing a place of amusement like a race course where others are
invited is charged with a continuous duty to look after the
safety of his patrons. Both sanitary and physical safety of
its patrons require that receptacles be provided for bottles and
that they be so placed.

We do not mean to imply that they are insurers of the
safety of their patrons, but we do say that reasonable care as
applied to a race track requires a higher degree of diligence
than it does when applied to a store, bank or such like place
of business. Numerous cases support this conclusion. Lona-
tro v. Palace Theatre Company, 5 La. App. 386; Bouchee v.
Paramount-Richards Theatres Inc. ...... La. , 80 So. (2nd)

211; Branch v. Klatt, 165 Mich. 666, 131 N.W. 107; Boechling

Le
[|
505

Co. v. Slattery, 26 Ohio App. 261, 160 N.E. 99; Thompson v.
Lowell, Lawrence & Haverhill Street Railroad Co. 170 Mass.
577, 40 L.R.A. 345.

It is charged that defendants permitted the exit aisles of
their grandstand where patrons were seated to become littered.
with empty beverage bottles, that the crowd was large, the
aisles were filled with people, all of which added to the diffi-
culty of walking surefootedly. Under such circumstances the
question of whether or not defendants exercised ordinary
care to protect its patrons, was a question for the jury under
appropriate instructions,

For these reasons we think the trial court applied the
wrong rule of law to the evidence so his judgment is reversed
and a new trial awarded.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
De |

RENATA L. MAHAN v. J. N. LUMMUS, JR., County Tax Assessor of
Dade County, Florida, and EARNEST OVERSTREET, Tax Collector
of Dade County, Florida.

35 So. (2nd) 725 January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 Division A

506

HM

Hall & Hedrick, for appellant.
Worley, Gautier & Cannon and Weintraub, Martin .&
Schwartz, for appellees.

507

SEBRING, J.:

Renata L. Mahan, formerly Renata L. Reynolds, a Florida
resident, instituted a suit in equity against the Tax Assessor
and the Tax Collector of Dade County, seeking a decree can-
celing an intangible personal property tax assessment against
her beneficial interest arising under a certain trust instru-
ment wherein she is named as beneficiary. The defendants
filed their motions to dismiss on the ground that the bill of
complaint was without equity, and when the cause came on
for hearing the Circuit Court of Dade County entered an order
granting the motions with prejudice to the plaintiff. Renata
L. Mahan has taken an appeal from this final order.

The trust instrument involved in this cause was executed
in the State of Michigan. The trustee under the instrument is
a corporation existing under the National Bank Act, with its
principal place of business in Muskegon, Michigan. The
corpus of the trust is held by the trustee in Michigan, in trust
for and during the lifetime of ‘Renata L. Mahan, under the
following express conditions set forth in the trust agreement:

“DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME—During the continuance
of this trust, the Trustee shall remit to Renata L. Reynolds,
the Donor, the net income of the trust monthly.”

“DEFINITION OF ‘NET INCOME’—By the terms ‘Net In-
come’ used in this instrument is intended the gross income
collected by the Trustee hereunder, less all taxes, assessments,
fees, costs and incidental expenses incurred or paid by the
Trustee in respect of the trust estate or income therefrom. . ..”

“DISTRIBUTION OF PRINCIPAL—The trust hereby cre-
ated shall continue during the natural lifetime of Renata L.
Reynolds, the Donor, and upon her death shall be paid to the
issue of her body surviving her, share and share alike, but
issue of her body shall not include any adopted child or chil-
dren, and in the event that she shall die leaving no issue of
her body surviving her then the said trust estate shall be paid
to Helen L. Cox, sister of the Donor, if she shall survive the
said Donor, and in the event she shall not survive the said
Donor then the trust estate shall be paid to such person or
persons as may be entitled to the personal estate of said Helen

fn

Le
508

L. Cox according to the intestate laws of the State of Michi-
gan then in force and in such proportion to each as said
intestate laws shall specify.”

“PROVISIONS AGAINST ASSIGNMENT—It is designed
by this agreement to establish a trust fund, the income of
which shall be applied to the maintenance and support of the
beneficiary herein named or designated, and it shall not be
diverted to any other purpose. It is expressly stipulated that
the principal and income of the trust herein created shall be
free from the interference and control of the creditors of the
beneficiary herein named or designated, and neither the
principal nor income shall be anticipated by assignment,
pledge, order, or hypothecation or otherwise by the bene-
ficiary hereunder. If the beneficiary shall attempt to antici-
pate such principal or income by assignment, pledge, order,
hypothecation, or otherwise, the Trustee is authorized and
empowered to withhold payment or distribution thereof until
such assignment, pledge, order, hypothecation or other instru-
ment shall be withdrawn, surrendered or cancelled, in such
manner as shall be satisfactory to the Trustee. It is the in-
tention of this agreement that payments of income or princi-
pal of the trust hereby created shall be made only to the
beneficiary entitled thereto under the terms hereof, and not to.
her assigns, pledgees or others. It is understood, however,
that the Trustee shall not be responsible for the use of the
application by the beneficiary of any sums paid to her by way
of income or principal under this agreement, but her receipt to
the Trustee for any payments so made shall absolve the
Trustee from any further liability in connection therewith.”

“IRREVOCABILITY—The trust hereby created is to be
irrevocable and shall not be set aside during the period as
herein stipulated for its duration, nor shall the same be sub-
ject to amendment, alteration or change.”

“EMERGENCY PAYMENTS—In case the beneficiary,
Renata L. Reynolds, should require sums in addition to the
net income of the trust estate, as herein provided, because said
Renata L. Reynolds becomes incapacitated on account of sick-
ness, general disability, or any other reason whatsoever, to

509

the extent that she is unable to maintain herself; the Trustee
is hereby authorized and directed to meet such emergency or
emergencies, from time to time as they may arise, for the
support, care, maintenance, and general welfare of the said
beneficiary, and for said purpose to advance sum or sums of
the principal of the trust estate as may be necessary and ad-
visable for the purposes above described. The Trustee shall
not be liable for any dimunition of the trust estate for any of
the disbursements made under the provisions as in this para-
graph specified, nor shall the beneficiary be required to repay
such disbursements so made.”

The question upon the appeal is whether the beneficial
interest of the plaintiff Mahan is taxable under the intangible
personal property tax laws of the State of Florida.

For the purposes of state taxation, intangible personal
property is defined as “all personal property which is not in
itself intrinsically valuable but which derives its chief value
from that which it represents.” Sec. 199.01 Florida Statutes,
1941, F.S.A. Class B intangible property is defined as “the
beneficial interest of residents of Florida in trust estates of
all kinds when the trustee resides outside of the State of
Florida, or if the trustee is a corporation and has its principal
places of business outside of the State of Florida.” Sec.
199.02(2) 1945 Supp. to Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A. The
“beneficial interest” referred to in the statute as beitig sub-
ject to intangible personal property taxation means a “present
vested beneficial interest” in a trust estate; and a Florida
resident having such an interest may be regarded as the
owner thereof for authorized taxation purposes, even though
the trustee resides, and the corpus of the trust is located, out-
side of the State of Florida. See Wood v. Ford, 148 Fla. 66, 3
So. (2nd) 490; Burrows v. Hagerman, (Fla.) 33 So. (2nd) 34.
However, if the present vested beneficial interest of a Florida
resident in a trust estate amounts to nothing more than the .
mere naked right to receive income from the estate, such an
interest is not subject to taxation under the laws of Florida;
for a tax on such a bare interest so closely partakes of a tax
on income as to be tantamount to a tax on the income itself,
and hence in contravention of section 11 of Article IX of the

|
510

Constitution which forbids a tax on incomes. See Owens v-.
Fosdick, 153 Fla. 17, 18 So. (2nd) 700.

As we construe the trust instrument naming the appellant
as life beneficiary, the interest or estate presently held by the
appellant is not subject to taxation under the intangible per-
sonal property tax statutes of Florida. Under the trust cre-
ated by the instrument the trustee is given the absolute man-
agement and control of the trust assets, consisting of stocks
and bonds, the situs of which is outside of the State of Florida.
The trust is irrevocable and cannot be set aside, amended,
altered or changed throughout the period of its duration. The
net income from the trust is to be paid monthly to the bene-
ficiary for her maintenance and support for and during her
lifetime and is not to be diverted to any other purpose. The
appellant is expressly prohibited from anticipating or alienat-
ing any interest she may have in the trust corpus or its pro-
ceeds, either by assignment, hypothecation, order or pledge,
and in the event of any attempted anticipation or alienation
by the beneficiary, the trustee is authorized and empowered to
withhold payment or distribution until such assignment,
hypothecation, order or pledge is withdrawn, surrendered or
cancelled; it being the intent of the trust agreement that pay-
ments of income or principal of the trust are to be paid only to
the beneficiary and not to her assigns, pledgees, or others. The
beneficiary has no power of appointment by will or otherwise
thereunder. Upon the death of the appellant the principal of
the trust is to be paid to her issue, and if she should die with-
out issue surviving, then to her sister. If the appellant dies
without issue surviving, and the sister predeceases her, the
principal is to be paid to the person or persons entitled to the
personal estate of the predeceased sister in accordance with
the intestate laws of the State of Michigan.

Except as the “Emergency Payments” provision contained
in the trust agreement, which we have quoted above and
which we shall presently consider, may operate to enlarge or
extend the interest or estate of the appellant held under the
remaining portions of the trust instrument, it is our view that
the present vested beneficial interest of the appellant under
the trust agreement amounts to nothing more than a mere

naked right to receive net income during her lifetime; the
term “net income” being defined in the trust instrument as
“the gross income collected by the Trustee hereunder, less all
taxes, assessments, fees, costs and incidental expenses in-
curred or paid by the Trustee in respect of the trust estate or
income therefrom.”
‘The Emergency Payments section of the trust instrument
provides for encroachment upon the principal of the trust only
under certain stated conditions. This portion of the trust
agreement provides that if at any time during the life of the.
appellant she should require sums in addition to the net in-
come of the trust because of the fact that she has become “in-
capacitated on account of sickness, general disability or any
other reason whatsoever, to the extent that she is unable to
maintain herself, the Trustee is hereby authorized and di-
rected to meet such emergency or emergencies from time to
time as they may arise, for the support, care, maintenance,
and general welfare of the said beneficiary, and for said pur-
pose to advance sum or sums of the principal of the trust
estate as may be necessary and advisable for the purposes
above described. The Trustee shall not be liable for any
dimunition of the trust estate for any of the disbursements
made under the provisions as in this paragraph specified. ..”
It is obvious that under the Emergency Payments pro-
vision three things or conditions must occur before the Trus-
tee will be warranted in encroaching upon the trust corpus
for the benefit of the life beneficiary; First, the life beneficiary
must’ become incapacitated on account of sickness, general
disability or other reason. Plainly, the word “incapacitated”
as employed in this trust provision relates to physical or men-
tal disability or disease, or disability resulting from infirmity,
disease or other cause rendering one incapable of earning a
livelihood. See Hudson County National Bank v. Flora, 114
N.J. Eq. 135, 168 A. 241; 20 Words and Phrases 397; secondly,
the incapacity must be of such a nature or degree that due
thereto the appellant cannot maintain herself. As used in
this connection, the word “maintain” clearly means “to bear
the expense of; to support; to keep up; to supply with what is
needed; as, to maintain one’s life. See Webster’s New Inter-

511

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512

national Dictionary; 26 Words and Phrases 83, 84; thirdly, the
appellant, because of such incapacity, must require for sup-
port, care, maintenance and general welfare certain sums of
money in excess of the amounts she is receiving, or is entitled
to receive, monthly from the net income of the trust and as
she may be earning or receiving, or may be entitled to receive,
from other sources. When these three enumerated conditions
concur, then, and only then, is the trustee in the exercise of a
lawful discretion authorized and directed to supplement the
- income of the beneficiary from all sources by an encroachment
upon the principal of the trust estate; such encroachment
upon principal to continue only for the duration of such period
of incapacity and only to the extent that it is necessary to
supplement the income from the trust and appellant’s other
income for her “support, maintenance and general welfare.”

The provisions for emergency payments from the corpus
do not give the beneficiary any absolute right, power or
authority to demand and receive payments from principal, or
to determine when such payments shall be made; the decision
in the matter being one to be exercised by the trustee in his
studied discretion and then only when necessary conditions
precedent concur, and subject to accountability to remainder-
men of the trust estate in the event the discretion of the
trustee is improperly, arbitrarily or capriciously exercised.

It is manifestly plain that the language employed in the
Emergency Payments provision of the trust agreement does
not operate to enlarge the present vested beneficial interest of
the appellant in the trust estate (which now consists only of a
present vested beneficial life interest or estate in net income)
so as to make the trust interest or estate of the appellant
liable for the payment of intangible personal property taxes
under the laws of Florida. For such interest as the appellant
has in and to the trust res, under the Emergency Payment
provision of the trust agreement, is a contingent interest con-
ditioned upon the happening of an event in the future, which
may never happen and which lies entirely outside the control
of the appellant to bring about with certainty. “Estates like
remainders are either vested or contingent. An estate is
vested if at all times during its continuance it becomes a

Es
[|
Bis

present estate whenever and however the preceding freehold
estates determine; in other words, it is an estate by which a
present interest passes to the party, though to be enjoyed in
the future, and by which the estate is invariably fixed to re-
main to a determinate person after the particular estate has
been spent. An estate is contingent if, in order for it, to be-
come a present estate, the fulfillment of some condition prece-
dent other than the determination of the preceding freehold
estate is necessary.” See Story v. First Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. in Orlando, 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101. “If the estate is to
arise, or be enlarged upon the performance of the condition,
then the condition is said to be precedent . . . In other words,
the condition is precedent when it must be performed before
the estate can commence...” See Seitter v. Riverside
Academy, 144 Fla. 69, 197 So. 764.

We have given due consideration to the argument of the
appellees that under the trust instrument before us for
construction the life beneficiary is also the settlor of the trust
and that under such a settlor-beneficiary trust the beneficiary
should be held to be the owner of the trust res as well as the
owner of the income.

Whatever may be the true rule with respect to such trust
agreements generally, we do not think that it obtains under
the facts of the case at bar. It is only in the role of life bene-
ficiary that the appellant has any interest in the trust and
that interest is limited to the net income, save only as to the
contingent interest in the corpus based upon the happening
of a condition precedent. It is only as to the life interest in
the net income, therefore, that the appellant has a present
vested beneficial ownership or estate. The appellant has no
interest in the trust res by way of any reserved power of revo-
cation but, on the contrary, the trust by express terms is ir-
revocable. The trust instrument clearly shows the intent of
the donor to vest in the remaindermen interests and estates
beyond the power of the beneficiary to defeat, for by its
express provisions the trust instrument cannot be altered,
changed or amended, and the settlor-beneficiary has made no
provision for reserving to herself any power of appointment.

The interest created under the Emergency Payments sec-

514

tion of the trust instrument being.so clearly a contingent, not
a present vested, interest or estate in the corpus, this pro-
vision of the trust instrument does not operate to enlarge the
present vested beneficial life estate or interest of the appellant
which now is only with respect to the net income derivable
from the trust, even though the life beneficiary may also have
been the settlor of the trust in the first instance. Hence, the
interest or estate in the trust, held and owned by the appel-
lant, is not presently susceptible to intangible personal prop-
erty taxation, under this Court’s interpretation of the appli-
cable law,:as enunciated in Owens v. Fosdick, 153 Fla. 17, 13
So. (2nd) 700.

It follows from the conclusions reached that the appellant
is entitled to the relief prayed for in her bill, and that in dis-
missing the bill of complaint on motion the court below com-
mitted reversible error. The decree appealed from should
therefore be reversed, and it is so ordered.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J.,° TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

CORA AKINS, G. W. BETHEA, OPAL KNOWLES and EULA
WILDER, v. L. B. BETHEA and the PERRY BANKING COM-
PANY, a corporation.

35 So. (2nd) 583 January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 Division A

515

David Lanier and T. J. Swanson, for appellants.

Davis, Davis & McClure, Chas. E. Davis and Declan
O’Grady, for appellees.

PER CURIAM:

It appears by this appeal that a chancery suit was brought
to cancel two deeds and a bill of sale executed by the late J. J.
Bethea to one of his sons, L. B. Bethea, on the grounds of in-
adequacy of consideration, undue influence, senility, infirmity
of mind and body, and other equitable grounds. The Chancel-
lor cancelled the deed, dated May 25, 1946, as to forty acres of
the land for equitable reasons stated in the final decree, but
denied the prayer for other relief. An appeal by the plaintiffs
below has been perfected here. The appellants seek a reversal
of the decree denying them certain relief, while the appellees
seek a reversal by cross-assignment of that portion of the final
decree which cancelled the deed dated May 25, 1946.

We have studied the record in light of the contentions of
the respective parties. The late J. J. Bethea, for reasons
satisfactory to himself, saw fit to give to the son who provided
for him a home, supplied the common necessities, along with
medical attention and care and administered to his wants dur-
ing the last days of his life, a greater portion of his bounty
than was given to his other sons and daughters. We know
of no law placing a limitation on the action as was taken by
the late Mr. Bethea in connection with his property, as re-
flected by this record.

‘We are not authorized to substitute our conclusions for
those of the Chancellor on disputes and conflicts in the evi-
dence unless the challenged decree is clearly shown to be
erroneous. See Hoffman Construction Co. v. Ward, 97 Florida
530, 121 So. 800. We do not feel justified in disturbing any
portion of the final decree entered below. Failing to find error
in the record, the decree is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

EE
516

B. L, SATER v. STENOR, INC., a Florida Corporation, and SIDNEY
STEARNS.

35 So. (2nd) 584 January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 Division A

G. A. Worley and Jack Kehoe, for appellant.
Hoffman & Durant, for appellees.

TERRELL, J.:

By her amended declaration B. L. Sater sued Stenor, Inc.,
a Florida Corporation and Sidney Stearns in a law action to
recover a commission for the sale of real estate. At the con-
clusion of all the testimony motion for directed verdict in
favor of defendant was granted, final judgment was entered
and the plaintiff appealed.

The record discloses that appellees listed certain property
in Miami Beach, known as the Village Hotel Properties, with
appellant for sale at a stated consideration. Appellant con-
tacted Irving Greenfield, who made an offer to purchase the
property, for less than the price for which it was listed.
Appellees first agreed to sell at the price offered, then declined
to sell, but later entered into an agreement with Greenfield for

a ninety-nine year lease on the property. After negotiation
Greenfield the lessee agreed to advance $12,000. for payment
of Sater’s commission on condition that it be credited on his
lease rentals over a period of years. Before the transaction
was completed appellees again changed their minds and re-
fused to execute the ninety-nine year lease.

The declaration was in five counts. The first count for
commission on the sale was abandoned, the second count
claimed $12,000. commission for procuring a lessee ready, able
and willing to lease the property for ninety-nine years, the
third, fourth and fifth counts were Common Counts in as-
sumpsit. The case went to trial on the plea of never was in-
debted to the Common Counts and the following pleas to the
second count: (1) Did not promise as alleged. (2) Plaintiff is
not a qualified real estate broker. (3) Defendants did not
list the property with appellant for lease. (4) Greenfield did
not agree to lease the property. (5) Greenfield was not ready,
able and willing to lease the property, and (6) defendants did
not agree to pay plaintiff for finding a lessee ready, able and
willing to lease. At the trial the plaintiff offered evidence to
prove the allegation of the declaration. Defendants put in
evidence a copy of the proposed ninety-nine year lease and
rested. A motion for directed verdict in favor of defendants
was granted and the plaintiff appealed.

Appellees contend that the final judgment should, be af-
firmed because there was a fatal variance between the allega-
tions of the declaration and the proof, in that, (1) the decla-
ration seeks to recover commission from the lessors while the
proof showed that the lessee agreed to pay the commission.
(2) The terms of the ninety-nine year lease agreed on were
different from the terms of the lease made a part of the decla-
ration. (3) The declaration claimed damages against de-
fendants jointly, but the proof failed to show any liability on
the part of the defendant Stearns.

In support of the last contention, appellees rely on Rentz
v. Live Oak Bank, 61 Fla. 403, 55 So. 859, wherein we held
that when two parties are sued jointly ex contractu the proof
must‘show a joint and not a several liability. “It appears’ how-

* ever, that this rule was later changed by section 45.08, Florida

517

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518

Statutes 1941, which provides in effect that the court may
order the name of any misjoined defendant stricken any time
before trial on such terms as he may deem proper. Meyer v.
Mator Holding Co., 102 Fla. 689, 136 So. 636. No motion or
reason was presented at the time for striking the name of
either defendant.

In answer to the second contention it is sufficient to say
that there was, in substance, no material difference between
the lease agreed on and the one quoted in the declaration.

The first ground urged for affirming the final decree had
to do with whether the lessors or the lessee agreed to pay the
commission. The evidence on this point would seem to indi-
cate that Stearns agreed to pay the commission and that
Greenfield agreed to advance it to Stearns on condition that it
was returned to him over a period of years in reductions on
lease rentals. There is a clear showing that appellant pro-
duced Greenfield as a lessee and that he was ready, able and
willing to lease the premises at the price agreed on. If Green-
field agreed to advance the money to pay the commission and
the appellees or either of them agreed to pay it, the question
presented was one for the jury to determine. At any rate, the
evidence is such that different reasonable inferences might be
drawn from it and when this is the case, it should not be taken ©
from the jury. Williams v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 270, 9 So. (2nd)
369.

The judgment is accordingly reversed and a new trial
awarded. : a

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

IN RE: ADOPTION OF JERRY McDANIEL, a Minor

35 So. (2nd) 585 January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied June 15, 1948

ee
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519

Donald Walker, for appellant.
David J. Lewis and H. M. Voorhis, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

On January 16, 1947, Wilbur Everly and wife, Viola Bliza-
beth Everly, filed in the Cireuit Court of Orange County, Flor-
ida, their petition, under Chapter 21759, Acts of 1943, Laws
of Florida, praying for an order of adoption of a male child
born in Orange County, Florida, on December 13, 1946. The
petitioners obtained the custody of the child from-its mother,
when it was ten days old. Attached to the petition was the
written consent of the mother to the court proceedings, includ-
ing the final order of adoption. The petitioners agreed with
the mother to support, educate, rear, protect and care for
the child as their own until 21 years of age, whom they named
Jerry Rogers Everly.

The State Welfare Board on April 8, 1947, in its written
report represented that the petitioners were suitable persons
to whom the child should be committed and approved the pro-
posed adoption order, but in light of the information then
before it suggested that the petitioners be awarded a tem-
porary custody of the child for a period of five months and
that the Welfare Board be given notice of the time and place .
of hearings on the petition for adoption. Service of process
on the father of the infant was obtained by publication and on
August 4, 1947, the court below by interlocutory order set the
matter down for hearing on the question of a final decree of
adoption, some 41 days after August 4, 1947. The temporary
custody of the child was awarded to the petitioners for three
months from September 8, 1947, until December 9, 1947, upon
recommendation of the State Welfare Board.

520

On November 3, 1947, the State Welfare Board, after in-
‘vestigations, made additional recommendations with refer-
ence to the proposed adoption of the child: (a) one of the
petitioners, Viola Elizabeth Everly, recently died; (b) Wilbur
Everly, as a single man, is not in a position to give the needed
eare and attention to the infant; (c) the natural mother has
revoked her consent as previously given to the adoption of the
child; (d) it is now her desire that the child be placed for
adoption with a licensed child placing agency; (e) the care
and attention now given the child by Wilbur Everly was in-
adequate and since the death of his wife is not.a suitable per-
son to have the custody of the child, although he had its care
‘since it was ten days old.

The report, in part, recited, “From observation and facts
secured the child has been given good physical care. He is
‘learning to walk and now knows the difference in persons. He
needs supervision, love and affection of a mother so that he
can be given proper training. According to the information
secured, he has recently shown tendencies toward temper,
which is evidence of insecurity. He is an attractive child who
makes friends easily, is alert and responsive for his age, and
according to the statement of the physician has developed
‘normally physically.” Thus it appears to thé writer, from a
study of the report, that the child is now developing physically
as a result of appropriate care and attention given by Wilbur
Everly.

On November 25, 1947, a motion was made to dismiss the
petition for adoption on grounds viz: (1) the natural mother
consented to the adoption order but since has withdrawn and
“now repudiates the consent as previously given; (2) since giv-
ing her consent to the adoption of the petitioners, Viola Eliza-
beth Everly, died; (3) Wilbur Everly as a single person is not
-in a position to care for and give it the necessary training;
(4) the natural mother is now opposed to the order of adop-
‘tion on the part of Wilbur Everly. The court below, on De-
cember 10, 1947, entered an order dismissing the petition for
adoption.

Counsel for the parties by stipulation supplemented the
original record by (a) filing a copy of the petition for rehear-

521

ing; and (b) a copy of the petition filed on the part of Wilbur
Everly and Pauline R. Everly, it being made to appear that
Wilbur Everly and Pauline Raymond married on December 7,
1947. The petition for a rehearing was denied on December
22, 1947, and the temporary custody of the child awarded to
Wilbur Everly until an appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida
was heard and determined. It is assumed that this order dis-
missed the petition filed by Wilbur Everly and wife, Pauline R.
Everly, as an appeal was taken therefrom and the order supra
dated December 10, 1947.

Section 15 of Chapter 21759, supra, provides that “all pro-
ceedings herein shall be as in chancery and shall be governed
by the same rules as in other chancery causes, except as may
be herein expressed, changed or modified. Sections 63.08 to
63.18, F.S.A., authorize courts of chancery to make additional
parties in the administration of justice but we fail to find in
the transcript an application of the new wife, Pauline R.
Everly, to be made a party to the cause and it appears that
the lower court never ruled upon her right to become a party
or to be heard in the matter, although her name is signed to
the petition and by her and her husband sworn to before an
officer.

Chapter 21,759, Acts of 1943, as amended by Chapter
23,721, Acts of 1947, Laws of Florida, confers considerable
discretionary authority upon the Circuit Courts of Florida in
adoption proceedings and it is with trepidation that we inter-
fere with the power as embodied in the court order or decree.
The affection of Wilbur Everly for his foster son, Jerry
Rogers Everly, cannot be lightly cast aside or held for naught
as the record reflects good faith and the best of motives in an
effort to support and care for the child, inclusive of obtaining
a final decree of adoption. It is a reasonable inference from a
study of the record that such a decree would have been entered.
had not death removed his first wife, Viola Elizabeth Everly.

If it is determined, after a careful investigation, that Wil-
bur Everly’s home since his second marriage is a proper home
for the infant and the consent and approval of Mrs. Pauline R.
Everly is obtained, after she is made a party to the suit, then
these factors should be considered and weighed, with other

a
522

conditions and circumstances, prior to the entry of an order
on the merits. It is our view that the dismissal order should
be reversed for further proceedings in the court below not
inconsistent with the views herein expressed.
Reversed. .
" ‘THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, 3, concur.

Es
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOSE PEREZ LORENZO, Deceased

35 So. (2nd) 587 . January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied June 45, 1948

W. B. Shelby Crichlow and Mabry, Reaves, Carlton, Ander-
son & Fields, for appellants.
Martin Caraballo and John G. Graham, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The controlling question presented on this appeal is the
domicile of Jose Perez Lorenzo on May 9, 1947, the date of his
death. The appellants contend that the evidence clearly shows
that the deceased’s domicile was in Manatee County, Florida,
on said date, while the appellee contends that the evidence

unequivocally established his domicile in Hillsborough County,
Florida, on the date of his death. The County Judge’s Court
of Hillsborough County, Florida, heard evidence on the issue
and held that Lorenzo was domiciled in Hillsborough County
on May 9, 1947, and on appeal the Circuit Court affirmed the
ruling of the County Judge’s Court. The case is here on ap-
peal from the order of affirmance entered by the Circuit Court
of Hillsborough County.

On appeal here in this class of litigation, it is our duty to
examine the evidence and all exhibits and determine if there
is substantial competent evidence to support the findings of

- the Probate Court and that he did not misinterpret the legal
effect of the evidence as a whole. If as a result of the exam-
ination it is found that there is no substantial competent evi-
dence to support the findings of the Probate Judge and that
he misconstrued the evidence taken as a whole, then the find-
ings of the Probate Court must be reversed, otherwise af-
firmed. See In re: Donnelley’s Estate, 187 Fla. 459, 188 So.
108; Wilkins Estate, 128 Fla. 273, 174 So. 412; Alkire’s
Estate, 142 Fla. 862, 144 Fla. 606, 198 So. 475; Thompson’s
Estate, 145 Fla. 42, 199 So. 352; Miller v. Nelson, Fila. -..., 4
opinion filed April 30, 1948, not yet reported.

We have carefully studied the record certified to this
Court; the briefs have been read; the cited authorities have
been examined; oral arguments have been heard at the bar of
this Court, and we find that the appellants have failed to
establish error as required by our adjudications, therefore it
is our duty to affirm the order of the Circuit challenged on
this appeal.

Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

523

Le
WILLIE MILES, alias JO, v. STATE OF FLORIDA
386 So, (2nd) 182 January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 _ _En Bane
Rehearing denied July 29, 1948

on

24,

J. M. & H. P. Sapp, and Joseph 8. Ray, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Ernest W. Welch,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

WHITE, Associate Justice:

Appellant was convicted of arson. He contends first that
the information is fatally defective because it charges in a
single count that the accused “burned” and “procured to be
burned” the dwelling house in question. Appellant argues
that the Legislature, by the use of the disjunctive “or” in the
statute upon the subject, intended to define two or more
separate and distinct crimes; that, hence, by the use of the

a
be
525

conjunctive “and” in the information, two crimes, inconsistent
in character, are charged in a single count, in violation of the
rule condemning duplicity.

That position is untenable. The style employed in draft-
ing the information has been approved by this Court. See
Billings v. State, 89 Fla. 309, 103 So. 628 (1925) ; Hamilton v.
State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89, 112 A.L.R. 1013 (1939) ; Hol-
den v. State, 136 Fla. 880, 187 So. 781 (1939).

Next, appellant argued that there was no proof of the
corpus delicti when the trial court permitted “confessions” to
be given in evidence. To establish the corpus delicti, there
must be proof of the criminal agency of another as the cause
of the occurrence. The corpus delicti may be shown as well
by circumstances as by direct evidence. Smith v. State, 135
Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939).

In the case at bar, a large two-story frame dwelling house
located in Panama City was damaged by fire at approximately
five o’clock in the morning. It had been remodelled to provide
several apartments as additional living quarters for shipyard
workers and their families. It was insured against loss or
damage by fire, one Hodges, as owner, and one Dean, as
mortgagee, being the beneficiaries.

Evidence that a burned building is covered by insurance is
relevant in a case such as this. See Sawyer v. State, 100 Fla.
1603, 132 So. 188 (1931) ; Duke v. State, 184 Fla. 456, 185 So.
422 (1938).

_ The chief of the fire department testified that when he
arrived in answer to the fire alarm the house was “burning
from the first floor up and was breaking through the roof”;
that the fire “was very stubborn to put out. You would knock
it down but it wouldn’t stay and would flash and come back
again”; that he noticed the odor of kerosene on the first floor
but not on the second; that after subduing the fire he found
on the first floor near the foot of the stairs kerosene in the
water which he was able to scoop up with his hands; that
there were two oil stoves in apartments on the second floor
but the oil tanks were missing; that no kerosene was found
in that area; that he saw the accused at the scene of the fire
during its progress.

|
526

‘The accused was employed as a domestic servant there and
lived upon the premises.

Those facts sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. See
Smith v. State, supra.

Next, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict. The trial judge rejected the same con-
tention in the lower court in denying appellant’s motion for
new trial. .

A verdict of a jury may not be disturbed by this Court on
the ground that the evidence is insufficient if there is found in
the record substantial, competent evidence of all facts essen-
tial to conviction. That principle is so well established as to
require the citation of no authority in its support.

Evidence is substantial if “a reasonable mind might accept
(it) as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edi-
son Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) ; NLRB v. Colum-
bian Co., 306 U.S. 92, 300 (1939). Applying‘the “substantial
evidence” rule to the verdict of a jury one finds that the ver-
dict of a jury must stand if the conclusion is one which would
have been reached by reasonable men. See “Review of Find-
ings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis.” 58 Harv. Law Rev. 70 (1944).

In the case at bar the State’s witness, C. C. Bivins, testi-
fied that following the fire he travelled with Dean by automo-
bile from Columbus, Georgia, to Panama City, and to the
burned premises; that upon arrival accused approached the
automobile and stated: “ ‘Well Mr. Dean, I done what you
told me to do, I burned it up. Didn’t do as good a job as I
intended to do because I got confused about pouring the kero-
sene and gasoline I had mixed,’ and he said whenever he went
in the place he was to pour kerosene on one side and set it and
go back and pour on the other side and set it, and instead of
that he poured it all on one side and like to got burned up
doing it and come on down, and Mr. Dean told him he ought to
kill him for talking like that.before anybody.”

-Whether or not Bivins was testifying truthfully or falsely
is not for this court to decide. That was a question for de-
termination by the jury.

When it is assumed that Bivins was testifying truthfully
and that the accused actually and in fact made the statement,
then that admission itself is substantial evidence of guilt, and
appellant’s argument must be rejected.

Next, appellant urges that the trial court committed preju- _
dicial error in neglecting to charge the jury sua sponte re-
specting the weight to be given by the jury to “confessions.”

In addition to the statement made by defendant to the wit-
ness, Bivins, just related, the state’s witness, Walter Avery,
testified that in a conversation with defendant after the fire
the defendant stated: “ ‘Look here what I got. I got five
hundred dollars to burn the house,’ ‘I give my woman fifty
dollars. and if you would like to you can get yourself fifty
dollars.’ ”

In support of his argument, appellant relies upon Harrison
v. State, 149 Fla. 365, 5 So. (2nd) 703 (1942), wherein this
court declared it to be the duty of the trial court, whether
requested or not, to instruct the jury that “confessions” should
be acted upon with great caution. That case cannot be placed
in the same category with this one. There the defendant had
been sentenced to death, and upon a review of the evidence
the court concluded that his conviction rested on his confes-
sion. Despite the fact that this testimony against himself
was indispensable to a conviction, no charge was given with
reference to the manner in which the confession should be re-
ceived and considered by the jury. The importance of this
omission is magnified in the light of Section 924.32 (2) Florida
Statutes, 1941, (F.S.A.), where the appellate court is admon-
ished to review the evidence, in a case resulting in a sentence
of death, “to determine if the interests of justice require a
new trial, whether the insufficiency of the evidence is a ground
of appeal or not.”

In adverting to such a situation in Brunke v. State, 33 So.
(2nd) 226, Mr. Justice SEBRING wrote that “the quoted
statute was just as implicit in the decision of the court [in
Harrison v. State] as though it had been written in the
opinion verbatim...”

By reason of the circumstances surrounding the making

527

Le
528

of the “confessions” there was no occasion for giving a charge
such as that referred to in Harrison v. State, supra.

Other questions raised have been examined and found to
reflect no harmful error.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and
SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Le

RE: Estate of Z. R. Gilbert, deceased, MARY L. GILBERT, v. BRAD-

FORD GILBERT, as Administrator of said Estate.

36 So. (2nd) 213 January Term, 1948
Tune 4, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied June 16, 1948

Cecil A. Rountree, for appellant.
James N. Daniel, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

Mary L. Gilbert, the decedent’s widow, on December 17,
1946, filed in said County Judge’s Court her verified petition
showing that she was without money or property except her
interest in said estate; that it was necessary for her support
that the widow's allowance provided by Section 733.20, F.S.
1941, F.S.A., be made for her and prayed that such allowance
be made. After due notice, hearing was had thereon and, at
said hearing, the County Judge entered order directing the
Administrator to pay the widow $100.00 on January 1, 1947,
and a like amount on the same day of each month thereafter,

with the provision that not more than $1200.00 should be paid
the widow under said order. The Administrator paid the
widow eight monthly payments of $100.00 each pursuant to
said order.

Mary L. Gilbert filed in said County Judge’s Court her
election to take dower in the estate of her husband, Z. R.
Gilbert, deceased; thereafter the widow’s petition for assign-
ment of dower was filed, order of said County Judge’s Court
was entered adjudging the widow’s right to dower and ap-
pointing dower commissioners, the dower commissioners
qualified by taking oath, performed their duties and filed in
said County Judge’s Court their report showing they had
allotted and set off to the widow as her dower real property
having an appraised value of $10,890.00 and constituting one-
third in value of the real property of said estate and personal
property having an appraised value of $1183.71 and constitut-
ing one-third in value of the personal property of said estate.

Upon the widow’s application for confirmation of the
dower commissioner’s report and the administrator's applica-
tion to charge against the widow’s dower the $800.00 previ-
ously paid the widow under the order of said County Judge’s
Court of December 28, 1946, referred to above, and to dis-
continue the monthly payments being made under said order,
the said County Judge’s Court entered its order confirming the
dower commissioner’s report as to the real property and
vesting in the widow the fee simple title to said land, requiring
the administrator to pay over.to the widow $1464.21, as dower
in personal property and mesne profits, denying the adminis-
trator’s application to charge the widow’s dower with the
$800.00 paid her under the order of December 28, 1946, afore-

. Said and discontinuing further payments under said order.

The widow was given possession of said real property and
$646.21 of her dower in personal property (and mesne profits)
was paid over to her, the administrator, by agreement of the
parties, retaining possession of the remaining $800.00 until
such time as the question of who is entitled thereto is de-
termined on appeal.

Upon appeal to the Circuit Court it was decreed that + the
above mentioned order be:

529

530

“reversed and set aside, and the said County Judge is
hereby directed to enter an order in said cause authorizing
and directing the said administrator to charge the said sum
of $800.00 to the said Mary L. Gilbert and to deduct said sum
‘from the amounts payable to her for dower and mesne
profits.” So

Whereupon the judgment of the Circuit Court was brought
here for review by this appeal.

Since 1864 we have had statutory provisions relating to
the widow’s rights of quarantine and other provisions relating
to personal property to be set aside to her for the benefit of
the widow and her dependents. See Secs. 5497-5498, C.G.L.

The “F. S. 1941,” as did the Probate Act of 1935, failed to
carry forward Sec. 5497-5498, C.G.L., but Sec. 733.20 (d)
“PS. 1941,” as amended in 1945, provides:

“733.20 Order of payment of expenses of administration
and claims against the estate.

“(d) Class four. If necessary for support, a family allow-
ance of one year’s support for the widow or minor children of
said decedent, or both, in addition to the homestead and
exempt personal property. Upon petition of the widow, if
any, or of the legal guardian or of the person having the care
and custody of a minor child or children, upon notice to the
personal representative, a reasonable allowance shall be fixed
‘by the county judge in personal property or money, or both,
for the support of said widow and minor children, considering
the needs of the family and the value of the estate. Said
allowance or the portion thereof payable in money shall be
payable in equal periodic payments to be fixed by the county
judge and shall be payable to the widow, if any, for the sup- .
port of herself and the minor child or children, if any. If
there is no widow, then the same shall be payable to the legal
guardian or to the person having the care and custody of any
minor child or children. Upon the petition of any person
interested in the estate, the county judge may increase, de-
crease, discontinue or modify the allowance; but in no event
shall such allowance exceed the sum or value of twelve
hundred dollars.”

531

And in 1945 it was also provided by law that:

“The widow of an intestate shall be entitled to receive and
retain all wearing apparel and such household goods and
farming utensils, provisions and clothing as may be necessary
for her maintenance and that of the family, to be set apart by
the county judge either upon her petition or upon the petition
of the personal representative, with citation or notice to the
other, special regard being had for the ability of the widow
and children to provide for and maintain themselves. Such
articles shall not be considered as part of the widow’s dower
or inheritance in any case. As amended, Laws 1945, c. 22783,
Sec. 1."—Sece. 731.36, F.S.A. 1941, F.S.A. (Supp.)

The foregoing statutes were an outgrowth of and based”
upon the same reason as was the widow’s right of quarantine
at common law.

‘Woerner states:

“Quarantine of Dower. Under the provisions of Magna
Charta, a widow ‘shall tarry in the chief house of her husband
by forty days after the death of her husband, within which
days her dower shall be assigned to her .. . And she shall have
in the meantime her reasonable estovers of the common.’ Lord
Coke interprets this language to mean that dower shall be
speedily assigned, ‘to the end the widow might not be without
livelihood;’ and that estovers signifies ‘sustenance, or aliment,
or nourishment; .. . that is, things that concern the nourish-
ment or maintenance of man in victu et vestitu, wherein is
contained meat, drink, garments, and habitation.’ Lord Coke
says that it was certainly the law of England before the Con-
quest, that the woman should continue a whole year in her
husband’s house.”

‘Woerner states, in reference to the provisions for alimony
for the family of a deceased husband, that it:

“... is the right of the surviving members of his family
to the necessary means of subsistence, raiment, and shelter
during the period immediately succeeding his death, which the
law enforces not only against any inconsistent testamentary
disposition, but equally against creditors, heirs, and distribu-
tees, whose rights, like those of legatees, are controlled by and

532

postponed to the provisions made for the surviving family in
this respect.”

That:

“They owe their existence to a humane and benevolent
consideration of the distress and helplessness of widows and
orphans newly bereft of their protector and supporter, and to
a wise public policy, recognizing the true relation of the State
to the family as its organic, constituent element. ‘By the en-
actment of such laws,’ says BATCH, J. of the Supreme Court
of Utah, ‘the legislature, under a wise public policy, seeks to
guard and protect the family which constitutes the foundation
of the State itself, during the trying period of affliction and

“need caused by the death of the one who directed the family
affairs.”

That:

“These provisions for the protection of the family consti-
tute no gift to the widow to repair any seeming injustice in
the Statute of Distribution or the will of her husband, but are
intended to furnish to her and her minor children the means
of temporary maintenance out of the estate of the deceased
husband until their interest therein can be sent out to them,
not only protecting so much against the claims of creditors,
but also against the heirs, or distributees, legatees, and per-
sonal representatives. .. . The beneficiaries are ‘entitled to an
allowance as a matter of right, on grounds of public policy.’
These allowances do not come to the widow or family by in-
heritance through the deceased’s estate but from the law
through the order of court. Neither do they form part of the
widow’s distributive share as next of kin, unless so expressed
by the statute.”—Sec. 77—Woerner’s “The American Law of
Administration (Including Wills) —p. 234-5-6.

“Nature of Allowance.—The widow’s allowance is some-
times treated as a debt of the deceased and is usually accorded
a preference over certain other claims against the estate. The
-view has also been taken that the allowance to the widow is
one of the expenses of the administration rather than an in-
terest in the estate of her deceased husband. It is not, strictly
speaking, under homestead or exemption laws. With some ex-

ceptions, it has been generally held that where there is pro-
vision for only one form of allowance for the widow, this will
not be deducted from her distributive share of her husband’s
estate, and where there are several different forms of allow-
ance, at least one of these (though often several, or all of
them) will not be deducted from the widow’s distributive
share of the estate. It has also been held that the right to an
allowance may be accorded to the widow in addition to her
right of dower.”—21 Am. Jur. 560-61—Ex. & Adm.—See. 315,
citing an annotation in 98 A.L.R. 1325.

“Out of What Property Allowance Made.—The allowance
to a decedent’s widow or family is normally payable out of
the assets of his estate and is usually made from the personal
property of the estate.”— (Ib.) —Sec. 320—p. 563.

“A widow’s statutory right of quarantine, which is, in
some jurisdictions, an incident of dower and existent only
until dower is assigned, expires when her right to have dower
assigned is lost by lapse of time.”— (Ib.) —Sec. 321—p. 564.

Under the law the widow is entitled to dower in her de-
ceased hushand’s estate and is also entitled to such alimony or
allowance from the estate as may be awarded by order of
court. The question is: What effect will the “carry over”
award have on the award of her dower?

Neither the County Judge nor the Circuit Court ruled, nor
is it contended on this appeal, that the widow was entitled to
an allowance after the award of her dower.

The purpose of the statutory provisions was to provide
for the widow and dependents during the emergency and until
they might receive their share of the estate, and the statute
has very wisely provided that:

“Upon the petition of any person interested in the estate,
the county judge may increase, decrease, discontinue or
modify the allowance; but in no event shall such allowance ex-
ceed the sum or value of twelve hundred dollars.”

The widow was entitled to a dower interest of one-third of
the personal property of her husband’s estate and also, when
allowed by order of court, a “carry-over” allowance. Both are
statutory allowances. It was not the intent of the law that
same be an advancement against her dower, neither was it the

533

5384

intent of the law that this burden be borne entirely by those
receiving the remainder of the estate. Any allowances pur-
suant to Section 733.20, supra, were independent of dower.
After payment of such alimony allowances they should be de-
ducted from the corpus out of which her dower is due and the
dower calculated, using the remainder after the deduction as.
a basis. When the personal estate has been depleted by the
widow’s applying for and receiving a portion of the estate,
under Section 733.20, supra, she will be estopped to complain
that the dower is calculated after deduction of such payments
to her. :

It does not appear that the County Judge did err by his
judgment, and the Circuit Court judgment appealed from be
and it is reversed, with directions that judgment of the
County Judge be revised so that dower will be computed on
the net estate after the deduction of the amount allowed for
quarantine money.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissent.

Lo
HERMAN SELINSKY v. ESTHER ANSHEN SELINSKY
85 So. (2nd) 716 January Term, 1948
Tune 4, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied July 2, 1948

Cushman & Woodard, Keen, O’Kelley & Spitz, for ap-
pellant.
Ross & Reinhardt, and John H. Yates, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

Appellant filed a bill for divorce charging his wife with a
violent and ungovernable temper and cruelty. The wife
answered by charging, in substance, the same.

535

The cause was referred to a special master who found the
hhusband’s charges proven; the wife’s without proof and
recommended a divorce for the husband. He also found that
while the parties were previously residents of New York a de-
cree in favor of the wife had been entered from bed and board
and as to that decree the husband was in default several hun-
dred dollars. Accordingly the master recommended the pay-
ment of $25.00 per week alimony until the further order of
the court.

The chancellor was of the opinion that the husband’s own
wrongful conduct induced the wife’s misbehavior. He over-
ruled the master’s recommendation and denied relief to both
parties.

We are confronted with a situation where the master, who
saw and heard the witnesses, came to one conclusion and the
chancellor reached another. We have most carefully con-
sidered the entire record and we are unable to find reasonable
justification in the chancellor’s conclusion to reject the
master’s findings.

The decree is therefore reversed with directions to enter a
decree not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ., and WISE-
HEART, Associate Justice, concur.

THOMAS and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

G. ©. WESTERVELT v. ISTOKPOGA CONSOLIDATED SUB-
DRAINAGE DISTRICT, a Florida Drainage Corporation, et al.

35 So. (2nd) 641 June Term, 1948
June 4, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied June 25, 1948

536

Lewis E. Purvis and J. Lewis Hall, for petitioner.
Mabry, Reaves, Carlton, Anderson, Fields & Ward, for
respondents.

PER CURIAM:

The Chancellor has denied plaintiff’s motion to strike cer-
tain portions of defendant’s answer, and plaintiff now seeks to
have the order reviewed on certiorari.

The petitioner bases his motion for reversal of the order
of the Chancellor upon the ground that the matters sought
to be stricken do not constitute a defense and are contrary to
the law of the case established by the decision in this same
case on a prior appeal, as reported in 158 Fla. 214, 28 So.
(2nd) 859.

In finally disposing of the former appeal and in order that
the law of the case might not be applied by reason of the re-
ported opinion this Court decreed that its opinion should be:

“... without prejudice however to leave of the appellees to
file an amended answer and counterclaim going to the equities
of the cause.” (Underscoring supplied).

Relative to answers in equity, this Court in Gossett v.
Ullendorff, 114 Fla. 159, 154 So. 177, 179, stated:

“The motion to strike from an answer any part of it which
may be deemed to be redundant, impertinent or scandalous is
controlled by the rule which requires the denial of the motion
unless the matter sought to be stricken is wholly irrelevant,

537

can have no bearing upon the equities and no influence upon
the decision either as to the relief to be granted or the allow-
ance of costs. See Sec. 23, Chap. 14658, Acts 1931, known as
the Chancery Act.”

The principles of equity pleading above enunciated have
recently been re-affirmed by the case of Schupler v. Eastern
Mortgage Co., 160 Fla. 72, 33 So. (2nd) 586.

The petition for certiorari is denied. This will save and
reserve unto the petition all the benefits and advantages of
any insufficiencies of the answer which are defensive in na-
ture. It is further observed that by reason of the probability
of another appeal to this Court from the final decree and by
reason of the complications involved it appears that it would.
be a great saving of expense and time if the Chancellor, when
entering the decree, should make a finding of fact on the ma-
terial matters affecting the equities of the parties.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and SEBRING, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part.
JOHN McCLUSKEY v. J. HAROLD KLOCK

35 So, (2nd) 646 June Term, 1948
Tune 4, 1948 Special Division A.

Daniel L. Ginsberg and Pace & Ammerman, for petiti
Leonard G. Egert, for respondent.
BARNS, J.: :

The respondent (petitioner below), pursuant to Sec. 84.23,
FS. 1941, F.S.A., sought and procured a.rule to show cause,

Le
538

addressed to the petitioner here, requiring him to show cause
“why he should not be required to enforce the Claim of Lien.

The Chancellor, upon a hearing on the return to the Rule,
decreed:

“1, The Respondent, John McCluskey, is hereby ordered
and directed to commence an action for the foreclosure of the
claim of lien filed by him on December 31, 1947, under Clerk’s
File No. W-105286 of the Public Records of Dade County,
Florida, within 30 days of the date of this order.

“2, In the event that the Respondent fails to commence an
action of foreclosure as above directed then upon the affidavit
of the Petitioner, or his attorney herein, the Clerk of the court
is hereby ordered and directed to record a cancellation of the
said claim of lien.”

Thereafter the respondent-petitioner moved for an order
cancelling the Claim of Lien upon the following ground: ,

“2. To date the defendant has failed to commence an ac-
tion of foreclosure as directed by said order and instead there-
of instituted an action of Summary Proceeding under Chapter
86.06 of the Florida Statutes 1941.”

Which motion was granted and the claimant now seeks
review by certiorari.

Since the parties were already before a court having juris-
diction to enforce liens, it appears it might have been appro-
priate for the claimant to have filed his foreclosure proceed-
ings in the case wherein he was cited. However, the law gives
him the right to proceed pursuant to Sec. 86.06, F.S. 1941,
F.S.A., and this he did within the time fixed by the Chancel-
Jor’s order. The order entered did not prescribe that claimant
should proceed in equity, and it is doubtful that the Chancel-
lor could have properly governed the forum for enforcement
proceedings.

It is our conclusion that the claimant has sufficiently com-
plied with the law and that the Chancellor erred in cancelling
the recorded Claim of Lien.

The petition is granted and decree is quashed.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, CHAPMAN and SE-.
BRING, JJ., concur. . .

STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. STONE’S LIQUOR STORES, INC., a
Florida corporation, v. JAMES T. VOCELLE, as Director of the
State Beverage Department of Florida.

539

35 So. (2nd) 649 January Term, 1948
June 4, 1948 En Bane

Hoffman & Durant, for relator.
William Joe Sears and Eli H. Fink, for respondent.

ADAMS, J.:

We issued an alternative writ of mandamus directing re-
spondent to approve an application for a license to sell liquor
or show cause. Respondent answered and relator has now
moved for a peremptory writ notwithstanding the answer.

Relator held a license from the City of Miami and also a
state and county license to operate a package store. He found
it necessary to move his location to an immediate adjacent
location. On his application the City of Miami granted his
license for the new location. Respondent’s refusal is based
upon Chapter 24706, Special Acts of 1947, the effect of which
is to limit the number of licenses, except in certain instances,
to one license to each 1500 persons in the City of Miami.

We are asked to hold the special act unconstitutional. It is
our conclusion that the relator is entitled to the relief asked
without a declaration that the challenged act is void. For
that reason we make no commitment as to the constitutional-
ity of the act. The act contains a proviso: (Chapter 24706,
Special Acts, 1947.)

“|, that the limitation provisions of this Act shall not
apply to the licenses in effect and which were issued by the
City of Miami to retail vendors of intoxicating beverages
during or for the license year beginning October 1, 1946, and

540

which comply with the laws of the City of Miami and all
licenses in effect and which were properly issued for or during
the license year beginning October 1, 1946, and which comply -
with the laws of the City of Miami shall from year to year
hereafter, upon payment of the requisite license fees therefor,
-be renewed and reissued by such city for the continuation of
the same type of business being conducted by such vendors
and at the same location specified in such licenses: ...”

Relator’s case comes under this proviso and was entitled
to have his state and county licenses. The City of Miami evi-
dently so recognized his right and so should the state. Under
general law the annual renewal of licenses shall be granted
as a matter of course unless same are revoked or the holder
is disqualified. Sections 561.27, 561.28, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A.
Provision is also made for the licensee to move his location.
Section 561.33, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. In this case the move would
not call for an increase in the number of licenses in the City
of Miami.

For the reasons stated the peremptory writ is ordered.

So ordered.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and WHITE, Associate Justice, dissent.

HOBSON, J., not participating.

MORRISON CAFETERIA COMPANY, of West Palm Beach, a Florida
Corporation, v. R. W. SHAMHART, doing business under the firm
name and style of PEARSON PHARMACY.

35 So, (2nd) 842 June Term, 1948
June 8, 1948 En Bane

ee
[|
Bad

Loren D. Simon, for appellant.

Newman T. Miller, Wareing T. Miller and Bezoni & Mc-
Cord, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

The decree here in question was entered pursuant to our
mandate in the case of Shamhart v. Morrison Cafeteria, 159
Fla. 629, 32 So. (2nd) 727.

Several questions are argued but we find no reason to treat
any except the challenge addressed to that part of the decree
reading:

“.. . that defendant provide sufficient space upon its
premises to accommodate its patrons waiting to be served at
defendant’s said cafeteria, so that it will not be necessary for
said patrons to stand in line upon the public sidewalk in front
of the entrances to plaintiff’s place of business at the corner
of Datura Street and Olive Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida,
while waiting to be served at defendant’s said cafeteria....”

It is argued at the bar of the court that this is too broad
and will not permit the cafeteria management to place an at-
tendant outside its place to supervise the line of customers in
a manner so as not to block appellee’s entrance. Counsel on
the other side also stated at the bar that no objection would
be made to a modification in this respect. Such a change will
in no way prejudice the relief granted because the gist of the
relief, sought and granted is to afford the public ingress and
egress to the drug store. No doubt the chancellor would have
made the change had it been requested.

We find no merit in the other questions and the decree is
affirmed with the quoted part modified simply to enjoin ap-
pellant from blocking passage to and from appellee’s store.

So ordered.

THOMAS, C.J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

BARNS, J., concurs specially.
HOBSON, J., not participating.

a
542

BARNS, J., specially concurring:

Upon remand of the prior appeal (Shamhart v. Morrison
Cafeteria, 159 Fla. 629, 32 So. (2nd) 727) from a final decree
of dismissal, the Chancellor entered a final decree for the
plaintiff, containing the following, to-wit:

“|... that defendant provide sufficient space upon its
premises to accommodate its patrons waiting to be served at
defendant’s said cafeteria, so that it will not be necessary for
said patrons to stand in line upon the public sidewalk in front
of the entrance to plaintiff’s place of business at the corner of
Datura Street and Olive Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida,
while waiting to be served at defendant’s said cafeteria. “It
is further ORDERED AND DECREED that plaintiff do have
and recover of and from the defendant, damages in the sum
of $2,896.57, plus $129.84, interest from April 26, 1946, to this
date, and $775.51 court costs.”

_ It is now proposed to purge the final decree of the quoted

injunctive features of the final decree but to allow thé im-
position of damages on the Cafeteria in the sum of $3801.92
to stand.

I concur in the opinion and judgment about to be entered
herein but not on any confessions of error. I do not think the
statements of counsel at the bar of the Court were sufficient
to warrant the Court to draw such a conclusion.

Since the final decree is to be purged of the injunctive
effect of the final decree, I think the final decree should also
be purged of the following paragraph of the decree, awarding
$3801.92 damages, to-wit: ,

“Tt is further ORDERED AND DECREED that plaintiff
do have and recover of and from the defendant, damages in
the sum of $2,896.57, plus $129.84, interest from April 26,
1946, to this date, and $775.51 court costs.”

Some of the factors forming the basis for the foregoing
conclusion as to the damages are the findings of fact by the
Master, as follows:

“That the plaintiff herein had conducted its cafeteria
business in an orderly, reasonable way and done nothing to
increase the crowds of waiting persons except to endeavor to
give satisfaction to its customers.

“That the plaintiff had done no affirmative act to create
lines of waiting patrons.

“That the plaintiff used no special advertising or signs
to attract large crowds of people.

“That the plaintiff operated its place of business so as to
handle the largest number of people in the shortest possible
space of time.

“That the plaintiff had arranged the interior of its
premises as efficiently as possible.

“That for the plaintiff to open its doors for longer hours or
to keep serving lines open for longer periods would not correct
the crowded condition at conventional meal hours.

“That the plaintiff held only a short term lease upon its
premises and that it would be unreasonable to require the
plaintiff to reconstruct or enlarge its premises at a dispropor-
tionate expense in order to provide a large waiting room.”

Furthermore, the basic facts for the award of the damages
are so speculative and uncertain as not to be sufficient to sup-
port a judgment for damages in this amount.

The principle that every person must so use his property
as not to injure others, must always be considered and ap-
plied in the light of the other principle that every man has a
right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property,
and that if while lawfully in the enjoyment of such use, with-
out negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss
occurs to his neighbors, such loss is damnun absque injuria.

ELLIE WATSON SOMMA v. WALLACE E. DAVIS, as Executor of the
Estate of Consolato Somma, deceased; NONA MOORE: WESSIE,
WALTERS; and JOHN SGROI, JR.

543

35 So. (2nd) 648 January Term, 1948
June 8, 1948 Division A.

Clark W. Jennings, for appellant.
W. T. Davis, for appellees.

544

PER CURIAM:

The controlling question presented on this appeal is the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a common law marriage
alleged to have existed between Ellie Watson and Consolato.
Somma within the meaning of Thompson v. Harris, 148 Fla.
329, 4 So. (2nd) 385, and similar adjudications. We do not
overlook the adverse rulings by the Chancellor below on the
admissibility of evidence challenged on this appeal. We have
studied the record, read the briefs, examined the authorities,
heard oral argument at the bar of this Court, and it is our
view and conclusion that reversible error has not been made
to appear and therefore the order dismissing the bill of com-
plaint or final hearing is free from error.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,

JJ., concur.
emma!

‘W. P. HARRELL v. ANTHONY J. SCHLEMAN, as Tax Collector of the
County of Hilisborough, and C. M. Gay, as Comptroller of the State
of Florida.

36 So. (2nd) 431 June Term, 1948.

June 8, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing granted July 2, 1948

Hall & Farnsworth, for appellant.
James 8. Moody and Lewis H. Tribble, for Anthony J.
Schleman, as Tax Collector of Hillsborough County, Florida

EE
be
545

and C. M. Gay, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, ap-
pellees.

BARNS, J.:

This is a suit wherein the plaintiff-appellant sought an in-
junction against appellees to enjoin the defendants from im-
posing and collecting license taxes upon plaintiff's stamp vend-
ing machines, according to the provisions of Sec. 205.63 and
205.02, F.S, 1941, F.S.A.

The bill was filed on January 29, 1947, and was heard on a
“motion to dismiss” on October 18, 1947. In the meantime,
Chapter 23,740, Acts of 1947, became effective. This 1947 Act
exempts stamp machines from payment of excise or license
taxes. It is very likely that the enactment of Chapter 23,740
was not known to the parties or to the Chancellor.

The decree appealed should be and it is reversed.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

TERRELL and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.

SEBRING, J.:

W. P. Harrell instituted suit in the Circuit Court of Hills-
borough County, on January 29, 1947, to restrain the tax col-
lector of Hillsborough County, and the Comptroller of the
State of Florida, from enforcing the collection of county
license taxes due for the year 1946-47, upon certain postage
stamp vending machines owned and operated by the plaintiff.
The bill alleges that sections 205.63 and 205.02 of the Florida
Statutes, 1941, under which the taxes are imposed, are un-
‘constitutional insofar as they apply to the postage stamp
vending machines operated by the plaintiff, for the reason
that such sections unjustly discriminate against such ma-
chines by classifying them with other machines of a different
character, and that the tax imposed under the sections of the
statute is so burdensome, arbitrary, oppressive and unreason-
able that it substantially deprives the plaintiff of his right to
earn a livelihood without due process of law.

The defendants filed their motions to dismiss the bill of
complaint on the grounds, among others, that the bill was
without equity, and on October 18, 1947, the Court granted the

Le
546

motion and dismissed the bill. The plaintiff has taken an
appeal from that order.

Our attention has been called to the fact that after the
institution of suit but before the entry of the order appealed
from, the Legislature of Florida enacted chapter 23740, Laws
of Florida, 1947, exempting postage stamp vending machines
of the class and character here involved from further taxa-
tion. It is suggested by one of the parties to this appeal that
the appeal has become moot by virtue of the enactment of the
above law.

We do not understand that the enactment of chapter
23740, supra, had the effect of rendering moot the appeal
which came to us after the passage of the statute by reason of
the entry of the order sustaining the motions to dismiss the
bill of complaint. In the bill of complaint the plaintiff sought
relief against license taxes already imposed and due and pay-
able as of October 1, 1946 for the tax year 1946-1947. Chap-
ter 23740, supra, could not apply to the license taxes past due
and payable at the time of its passage, for it makes no attempt
to invalidate or cancel any license taxes legally due and pay-
able prior to the date of its enactment. .

As to such taxes, it is our opinion that the bill of complaint
states no grounds for relief. The power to impose the license
tax complained of was in the legislature and we cannot say
that the tax was discriminatory or was so arbitrary or op-
pressive as to amount to a denial of due process, equal protec-
tion of the laws, or other constitutional property right of the
plaintiff. See Rackley v. Stoutamire, 132 Fla. 33, 180 So. 375.

No question is before us as to the power or authority of
the taxing officials to impose and collect license taxes on the
machines involved for taxing years subsequent to the enact-
ment of chapter 23740, supra, and we think it fair to assume
that no attempt will be made to impose such taxes in the face
of the 1947 statute which forbids the imposition of license
taxes on the use of such machines after its passage.

From the conclusions reached it follows that we should
now recede from the opinion and judgment heretofore ren-
dered reversing the order appealed from, and that the order
brought here for review should stand affirmed.

It is so ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and
BARNS, JJ. +, concur.
HOBSON, J., not participating.
Lene
AMY C. NECKER, a widow, v. RAYMOND EDWARD GALLINGER, As
Administrator of the Estate of Milton Stewart, also Known as Fran-
ces Milton Elliot, deceased.
35 So. (2nd) 647 June Term, 1948

June 11, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied June 25, 1948

W. H. Mizell, for appellant.
James Nemec, for appellee.

E. M. Baynes, R. G. Hamilton and Albert C. Fordham, as
amicus curiae.

CHAPMAN, J.:

On November 3, 1947, the appellant, plaintiff below, filed
an amended declaration (with bill of particulars attached) in
three counts substantially as follows to-wit:

“Count One: That on January 25th, A. D. 1947, while the
plaintiff was residing at her home at 728—46th Street, in the
City of West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, that
on said date, one Milton Stewart, also known as Frances Mil-
ton Elliot, for whose estate the defendant, Raymond Edward
Gallinger, has been appointed Administrator, wilfully, inten-
tionally, maliciously, and with the intent to do bodily harm
to and murder the plaintiff, did then and there assault the
plaintiff with a loaded revolver, which he then and there held ~
in his hand, and which he then and there intentionally, wil-
fully, and wickedly aimed and discharged at and against the
plaintiff, shooting her several times, inflicting various injuries
upon the plaintiff, wounding the plaintiff in the mouth, arm,
and chest, thereby seriously injuring the plaintiff’s mouth,

547

548

face, chest, and arm; and thereby disfiguring plaintiff's face
and causing the loss of the use of her arm, and thereby maim-
ing her, from which she will suffer the balance of her life; .
permanently injuring the plaintiff, rendering it impossible for
her to perform her daily duties, and thereby causing the
plaintiff to expend various sums of money for hospital bills,
doctors’ bills, and medical treatment to the amount of Seven
Hundred Sixty-nine Dollars and Twenty-two Cents (769.22) ;
that the plaintiff will be compelled to spend further sums to
cure herself, all to the great damage of the plaintiff.

“That after the commital of said wrongful act, the said
Milton Stewart, also known as Frances Milton Elliot, shot and
killed himself, and that the defendant, Raymond Edward Gal-
linger was duly appointed Administrator of his estate and duly
qualified, and is now acting as such Administrator of said
estate.”

“Count Two: That on January 25th, A. D. 1947, while the
plaintiff was residing at her home at 728 46th Street, in the
City of West Palm Beach County, Florida, that on said date,
one Milton Stewart, also known as Frances Milton Elliot, for
whose estate the defendant, Raymond Edward Gallinger, has
been appointed Administrator, wilfully, intentionally, malici-
ously, and with the intent to do bodily harm to and murder
the plaintiff, did then and there commit a trespass vi et armis
upon and against the person of the plaintiff with a loaded re-
volver, which he then and there held in his hand,...” (same
allegations as set out in Count One, supra).

“Count Three: That the decedent for whose estate the de-
fendant, Raymond Edward Gallinger, has been appointed Ad-
ministrator, on or about January 25th, A. D. 1947, in the
County of Palm Beach, Florida, with force of arms, made a
trespass vi et armis on and against the person of the plaintiff
with a loaded revolver which he wilfully, intentionally, and
maliciously caused to be fired and discharged against and
upon the person of the plaintiff, then and there bruised,
wounded, and iil-treated her; and other wrongs to the plaintiff
then and there did; against the peace of the people of this
state, and to the damage of the plaintiff of Ten Thousand Dol-
lars ($10,000.00).

Le
be
549

“That after the committal of said wrongful act, the said
Milton Stewart, also known as Frances Milton Elliot, shot and
killed himself, and that the defendant, Raymond Edward
Gallinger, was duly appointed administrator of his estate and
duly qualified, and is now acting as such Administrator of said
estate.

“Wherefore, plaintiff sues, attaches hereto her Bill of Par-
ticulars, and claims damages in the sum of Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000.00).”

The trial court sustained a demurrer and motion to strike
directed to each of the three counts of the amended declara-
tion upon the theory that the cause of action under Section
45.11, F.S.A., did not survive and the suit could not be main-
tained against the legal representative of the deceased. The
case of Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 745, 26 So. (2nd) 218, is
cited in one of the Court’s orders copied into the record.

It is our conclusion, and we so hold, that the cause of ac-
tion did survive under the provisions of Section 45.11, F.S.A.
See Waller v. First Savings & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So.
780; State ex rel. Wolfe Construction Co. v. Parks, 129 Fla. 50,
175 So. 786; Kahn v. Wolf, 151 Fla. 863, 10 So. (2nd) 553, and
similar holdings. It is our view that the able Judge below
misconstrued our recent ruling in Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla.
745, 25 So. (2nd) 218.

The judgment appealed from is reversed with directions to
enter an order overruling the demurrer and motion to strike
directed to each count of the amended declaration and fix a
date for the defendant-appellee to plead.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur. °

[|
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, THE TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWN-
ERS and OYTIZENS OF PINELLAS COUNTY, including NON-
RESIDENTS owning property or subject to taxation therein, v.
PINELLAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of State of Florida.
36 So. (2nd) 216 June Term, 1948
June 11, 1948 . En Bane

8
ww . .

Chester B. McMullen, State Attorney, and Don Geiger, As-
sistant State Attorney, for appellants.

John C. Blocker, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

The legislature enacted Chapter 24,819, Acts of 1947,
authorizing Pinellas County to acquire sites, offices and build-
ings outside the county seat for the purpose of housing officers
and agencies of the County, to pay the cost thereof from
moneys apportioned to the County under the provisions of
section 550.13, Florida Statutes 1941, as amended and sup-
plemented, and from fees, commissions and charges which we
shall later discuss, to issue revenue bonds payable from the
funds so designated, and to define the duties and powers of the
county officers in relation to said county buildings. This ap-
peal is from a final decree validating an issue of “County
Building Revenue Anticipation Bonds,” herein after referred
to as “County bonds,” proposed and issued for the purpose of
acquiring lands and constructing a building to be known as
the County Building as contemplated by Chapter 24,819.

It is first contended that the title to Chapter 24,819, is
violative of section 16, Article III of the Constitution in that
it attempts to legislate on more than one subject. matter.

EE
552

There is no merit to this contention. The title is in essence
embraced in the first paragraph of this opinion and, as therein
shown, the sole purpose of the Act is to acquire lands and
construct a county building at some point in the county out-
side the county seat. The Act shows on its face that the
county has been expending large sums annually in rents and
betterment to house county officers and agencies at St. Peters-
burg in order that they may more adequately serve the needs
of the people and the purpose for which they were created.
We find nothing in the title or body of the act that points to
any other objective.

It is true that Section 6 of Chapter 24,819 contains a pro-
vision authorizing the County Commissioners to redistrict
Justice of the Peace districts in the area, affected so that the
dividing line may run through the building in such a way as to
enable them to have and maintain offices therein. It is also
true that Section 21, Article V of the Constitution provides
the method for creating and defining the boundaries of Justice
of the Peace districts. It may be that this method is exclusive
but it is not necessary to decide that question at this time,
because no Justice of the Peace is here complaining. When
that contingency confronts us, if we conclude that Section 21
of Article V is controlling, the invalid part of Section 6 may be
severed as provided in Section 5 and the balance of the act
permitted to stand.

It is next contended that Chapter 24,819 is violative of
Section 17, Article III of the Constitution, in that the manda-
tory requirements for its passage through the legislature were
not observed.

A complete transcript of the record of its passage through
both houses of the legislature is properly authenticated and
made a part of the transcript. It reveals that the proposed
act was read by its title on first reading, and its reading on
three separate days was dispensed with by two-thirds of the
members present, that on second reading two-thirds of the
members present waived the requirement that it be read by
sections and that it was read in full on final passage. The
record also shows that the bill was passed by yea and nay
vote which was entered in the journal and that it was duly

signed by the presiding officer and secretary of each house.
Appellants point out no provision of Section 17, Article II,
which was not complied with and our search of the legislative
journal reveals none.

It is next contended that Chapter 24,819 violates Section
20, Article III of the Constitution in that it is a local law and
attempts to regulate the duties and fees of county officers
which may be done only by general law.

As already pointed out the main purpose of Chapter 24,819
is to authorize the construction of a county building outside
the county seat for the accommodation of county officers and
agencies. Such duties as are imposed by it on the county
officers are incidental to the main purpose of the act and do
not violate the constitution. Jackson Lumber Co. v. Walton
County, 95 Fla. 632, 116 So. 771. We find nothing in the act
which regulates the fees or duties of county officers so as to
render it invalid.

It is next contended that Chapter 24,819 violates Section
4, Article VIII of the Constitution in that it is a local law and
attempts to remove the county seat of Pinellas County from
Clearwater to St. Petersburg which can be done only by
general law.

It is sufficient answer to this contention to say that Sec-
tion 3 of the Act in terms disclaims any such purpose and a
careful perusal of the act does not reveal a word that could by
fair implication be construed as an attempted removal of the
county seat. It is shown that a very large metropolitan popu-
lation was concentrated around St. Petersburg and that the
plan proposed would result in a very material reduction in the
cost of serving this population.

It is next contended that Chapter 24,819 is violative of Sec-
tion 6, Article IX of the Constitution in that it proposes, ab-
sent an approving vote of the freeholders, to issue county
bonds for the construction of a county, building and to service
said bonds with (1) moneys apportioned to Pinellas County
under the provisions of Section 550.13, Florida Statutes 1941,
as amended, and (2) from excess fees collected by the county
officers, and placed in what is commonly known as the
“County Officers Excess Fee Fund.”

553

554

Section 2 of Chapter 24,819 provides that “such revenue
anticipation bonds shall be payable solely and only from the
portion of such fees, commissions and charges and such
moneys apportioned and distributable as aforesaid, as may be
recited in such resolution and it shall be plainly stated on the
face of each such bond that same does not constitute an in-
debtedness of said county and that no ad valorem taxes shall
ever be required to be levied for the payment of either princi-
pal or interest.” The resolution of the county commissioners
contains substantially the same language and the face of such
bond not only contains similar language but the further
guarranty from the County Commissioners that a. special
fund will be provided from the two sources designated to
service the bonds. Nothing in the act under review or the
proceedings leading to the issuance of the bonds could be con-
strued as requiring that said bonds be serviced by the imposi-
tion of ad valorem or other county taxes.

The question of whether or not funds raised under Section
550.18, Florida Statutes 1941, may be used to service bonds
for a project of this kind was foreclosed’ by Posey v. Wakulla
County, 148 Fla. 115, 3 So. (2nd) 799, and Prescott v. Board
of Public Instruction of Hardee County, 159 Fla. 663, 32 So.
(2nd) 731. We have not yet been confronted with a case in
which excess fees received by the county from the County
Officers Excess Fee Fund, may be appropriated to service
bonds in the manner proposed, but such funds represent col-
lections for services rendered by the County Officers and do
not possess the attributes of a tax. They do not arise unless
the fees imposed surpass the maximum salaries of the county
offices. In that event they are subject to appropriation by the
legislature.

Here it is proposed to appropriate such excess fees as ac-
cumulate in Pinellas County to service bonds for constructing
a county building at St. Petersburg to extend the services of
various county officers and agencies in order that they may be
more economical and expeditiously performed. It is shown
that all such services are county governmental services.
‘There is no merit to the contention that said funds cannot be
appropriated for an anticipated service. Pinellas County v.

Herrick, 123 Fla. 619, 167 So. 386; Trudnak v. Gustafson,
et al., 133 Fla. 834, 183 So. 494,

It is contended that the resolution of the, County Commis-
sioners for issuance of the bonds not only binds the funds
raised under Section 550.13 and the county officers excess fees
to service them, but provides in addition that they may be
serviced by “fees, commissions, charges and moneys received
by said county and regularly deposited in the fines and forfei-
ture fund.” It is true that the original bond resolution carried
the latter provision but the record discloses that it was
stricken, the Chancellor eliminated it and: the validating de-
cree recognized the two funds discussed in this opinion as the
sole source for servicing said bonds. Such was the theory on
which the appeal was brought to this court. Neither counsel
contended that the bonds could be serviced from any other
source and the bond form in terms provides that “this bond,
including interest thereon, is payable solely from said fund
and does not constitute an indebtedness of the said county,
nor shall ad valorem taxes ever be required to be levied for
the payment of either interest on or principal of this bond.”
It necessarily follows that on this point the only funds that
may be used to service the bonds are those raised under Sec:
tion 550.13 and the County Officers Excess Fees and we so
hold.

It is last contended that Chapter 24,819 violates Section 4
of Article XVI of the Constitution in that it requires all
county officers to keep their offices and their official records at
St. Petersburg rather than Clearwater which is the County
Seat of the County.

We think this contention is equally without merit. Chap-
ter 24,819 disclaims any purpose to remove county officers or
records to St. Petersburg in a manner to violate the constitu-
tion. Its purpose is to provide a county building at St. Peters-
burg where certain county agencies now operating there and
certain county officers may offer an auxiliary service to the
people of the county where all these agencies and offices may
be collected under the same roof in the interest of economy
and efficiency. The nature of the service rendered is govern-
mental and we find nothing in the constitution inhibiting the

555

|
556 -

construction of a building by the county in the manner pro-
posed. The mechanics, population and physical conditions of
the county generally support the act.

Other questions argued have been considered but we find
no reversible error so the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

HOBSON, J., concurs specially.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

HOBSON, J., concurring specially:

T not only agree fully with Mr. Justice Terrell’s opinion in
this case and his treatment of the contention that Chapter
24,819, Acts of 1947, is violative of Section 6, Article IX, of
the Florida Constitution, but I wish to make it very clear that
I am of the opinion that said Section 6, Article IX, of our
Constitution is not and cannot be applicable in connection
with obligations or bonds of the character of those proposed
bonds which are before this Court in the instant case.

The provision of Section 6, Article IX, of the Florida
Constitution which requires a majority vote of the free-
holders before any county, district or municipality of the
State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds has reference
only to bonds which are to be serviced by ad valorem taxa-
tion (ie. a direct tax upon real property). It is true that the
word “bonds” is used but said word must be construed in con-
nection with the remaining language of the section and it is
particularly true that some definite meaning must be given to
the word “free-holders.” This word connotes landowners and,
to my mind, clearly furnishes the key to a proper construc-
tion and interpretation of said Section 6, Article IX of our
‘Constitution. The obvious purpose of the framers of this
section was to make sure that bonds which would be serviced
by levying and assessing taxes against real property should
not be issued unless the free-holders, those who were ulti-
mately to be charged with the payment of such obligations,
should approve the creation and issuance of such obligations.
By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the bonds
contemplated by Chapter 24,819, Acts of 1947, are to be

es
be}
557

serviced by ad valorem taxation. In the light of this writer’s
conception of the proper construction and interpretation to be
given Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution of Florida,
there is no place here for the contention that these bonds are
to be issued in violation thereof.
BARNS, J., dissenting: .

The Resolution of the County Commissioners authorizing
the County bonds involved here is in part as follows:

“NOW, THEREFOR, Be It and It Is Hereby Resolved
and Ordered by the Board of County Commissioners of
Pinellas County, Florida, as follows:

“SECTION 1. That (1) the moneys apportioned and dis-
tributed to Pinellas County under the provisions of Section
550.13 of the Florida Statutes, as amended and supplemented;
(2) the fees, commission, charges and moneys received by
said county and regularly deposited in the Fines and Forfei-
ture Funds; and (3) excess fees received by said county from
county officials are, in the order named and to the extent here-
inafter provided hereby pledged to the “County Building
Revenue Anticipation Bond Fund,” hereinafter created for the
purpose of paying the interest on the principal of the County
Building Revenue Anticipation Bonds, as herein authorized.
(Italics supplied).

“SECTION 2. That in anticipation of the collection of
said fees, commissions, charges and moneys apportioned and
distributable as referred to in Section 1 hereof and for the
purpose of paying the cost of acquiring a suitable office build-
ing and a site therefor as referred to in the preamble hereof,
there are hereby authorized to be issued the negotiable
County Building Revenue Anticipation Bonds of Pinellas
County, Florida, in the principal amount of $400,000.00.”

Section’ 6 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution pre-
scribes:

“|. the Counties, Districts or Municipalities of the State
of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the same
shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
election in which a majority of the freeholders who are quali-
fied electors residing in such Counties, Districts, or Munici-

. _
558

palities shall participate, to be held in the manner to be pre-
seribed by law; .

The decision in Leon County v. State, in a case similar to
this was as follows:

Section 2384, C. G. L. (now Sec. 135.01, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.)-
authorized the County Commissioners of any county for not
more than five years to levy a five mill tax per annum to build-
ing county jails and courthouses.

The County Commissioners of Leon County passed a reso-
lution for such purposes and brought proceedings to have
validated the issuance of bonds wherein the proceeds of this
five mill tax were pledged for their payment and upon an ap-
peal of a decree denying validation this Court in construing
the power to issue such bonds found that such act came within
the prohibition of Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution
(supra) and stated:

“Any contractual device for the present funding of tax
revenues contemplated to be raised or made available for re-
imbursement in future years, contrived to be issued as en-
forceable legal security to the obligee, or his assignee, by
means of which such obligee or his assignee will acquire a
legal or equitable right to coerce by judicial processes the re-
payment of a sum of money advanced on the strength thereof,
together with interest for the hire of the amount advanced,
however calculated or provided to be paid upon the sums so
involved, it is contemplation of Amended Section 6 of Article
IX of the Constitution of Florida a “bond” and within the pur-
view of the specific provisions and limitations of that section
as to issuance of “bonds.” This is so, only because any scheme
of public financing, directly or indirectly, immediately or con-
tingently calculated to obligate the future taxing power of the
obligor, is within the scope of the Florida constitutional limi-
tation on the issuance of “bonds,” but because such con-
templated obligation of the powers of future taxation can no
more be afterwards repudiated as forming no part of the
present transaction for a funding of the future public re-
sources, than a mortgage executed as security for a note can
be subsequently disregarded as forming no part of the con-
tractual arrangement evidenced by the negotiation of the

as
559

same.”—The County of Leon v. State, 122 Fla. 505 507-8, 165
So. 666.

“The purpose of Amended Section 6 of Article IX of the
Constitution was to impose a constitutional limitation on
county, district and municipal financial operations in so far as
the same might involve any form of direct or indirect con-
tractual obligation of anticipated future tax revenues to
presently raise funds for county, municipal or district pur-
poses, that would have to be repaid in future with interest, to
the parties advancing same in anticipation of a redemption of
the contractual obligation so incurred. The limitation so im-
posed must be construed to mean that no financial obligation
in the form of a present funding of future tax anticipation
shall be made, whether general or limited, direct or contingent
in form, unless the assumption of the obligation of same be
first approved by a favorable vote of a majority of the county,
municipal or district freeholders as provided for in said
constitutional section and article.” 7

This court held in this Leon County case that such bonds
could not be validated until same were approved at an election
and pointed out the avenue for procuring it, to-wit: Chap.
14,715, Acts 1931 (now contained in Section 103.02-103.08,
FS, 1941, F.S.A.).

The circuit judge by his validating decree makes reference
to the race track tax revenue of the county and the excess fee
fund of the county only and is silent as to the fine and forfei-
ture fund.

It is my conclusion that the proposed Pinellas County
bonds come within the prohibition of Section 6, Article IX of
the Constitution, prohibiting the issuance of such bonds until
approved by popular election.

THOMAS, C.J., and ADAMS, J., concur.

Es
0. L. MILAM v. STATE OF FLORIDA
85 So. (2nd) 723 June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 Special Division A

Rehearing denied June 30, 1948

a
ee
560
Bentley & Shafer, and Oxford & Oxford, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Ernest W. Welch,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The appellant, O. L. Milam, was informed against by the
County Solicitor of Polk County, Florida, in two separate
counts. In the Criminal Court of record of Polk County the
information was number 6632, The first count charged O. M.
Milam, on the 5th day of June, 1946, with forging the name
of M. M. Launt on the back of a check drawn by the Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Company and made payable to the said
M. M. Launt in the sum of $122.55. The second count charged
O. M. Milam with falsely uttering and forging as true the
aforesaid check to J. C. Penny Company and to Raymond P.
Ammerman, Jr., which check was made payable to M. M.
Launt, and obtaining the sum of $122.55 because of the forged
instrument.

Information number 6633 was filed by the County Solici-
tor of Polk County, Florida, against O. M. Milam and charged
that on the 15th day of June, 1946 he unlawfully altered and
counterfeited a certain receipt for money, to-wit, a receipt for
the delivery of pay checks of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad.
Company, a true copy is attached and falsely making and
counterfeiting the signature of M. M. Launt. For the purpose
of trial the two cases were consolidated and upon trial re-
sulted in verdicts of guilty under the two informations. . A
motion for new trial was denied and the defendant sentenced
to serve a period of five years at hard labor in the State
Prison, but the two sentences were to run concurrently. The
defendant below appealed.

One of the questions argued here is the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the verdict of guilty under the second
count of information number 6632. It cannot be questioned

that the burden of proof under the law rested on the State to
establish each material allegation of the three counts of the

- two informations. We have carefully studied the evidence
offered by the State to prove that O. M. Milam uttered and
forged as true the check issued by the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company and made payable to L. L. Launt in the
sum of $122.55 to J. C. Penny Company and to Raymond
Ammerman, Jr. The testimony of Raymond Ammerman fails
to show that the appellant presented the alleged forged check
to him for payment when he was a salesman in the Penny
store. The young man took the check to his father for ap-
proval prior to payment and the testimony of the young man
and that of his father failed to identify the appellant as the
party presenting for payment the alleged forged instrument.
The judgment as to the second count of information number
6632 must be reversed as the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the verdict.

The judgment entered below under information number
6632 is hereby reversed for further proceedings but affirmed
as to the judgment entered under information number 6633.
It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

561

HATTIE VIRGINIA FIELDS v. L. T. FIELDS, SR.

35 So. (2nd) 722 June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 Division A

James H. Finch and Philip D. Beall, Jr., for petitioner.
J.M. & H. P. Sapp and Charles 8. Isler, for respondent.

TERRELL, J.:

Appellant filed her bill of complaint against appellee pray-
ing for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. The bill
further alleges that the home in which they live is owned by

De
562

them as an estate by the entireties and prays that it be par-
titioned. Permanent alimony, suit money, attorneys fees, the
restoration of amounts paid for medical attention, hospital
bills including moneys and other personal property that de-
fendant borrowed and is withholding from plaintiff is also
prayed for.

On application of the plaintiff an amended bill of com-
plaint was filed wherein she set up additional claims for com-
pensation against defendant and made L. T. Fields, Jr., a
party defendant to the cause on the theory that he claimed
some interest in the home alleged to be owned by plaintiff and
defendant as an estate by the entireties. On motion of defend-
ant the amended bill of complaint was “stricken and dis-
missed.” This is an appeal by certiorari from that decree.

The only queston we are required to answer is whether or
not the chancellor committed error in dismissing the amended
bill of complaint.

It appears from the briefs that the amended bill of com-
plaint was dismissed on the theory that the matter introduced
therein amounted to a new and different cause of action which
could not be litigated with the original suit for divorce.

It may be admitted that the claim of a third party in the
home alleged to be owned by the entireties complexes the
situation but this is not a recognized basis for dismissing the
bill. It is an impressive example of the complicated human
relations that are now precipitating suits of this kind that the
rules of procedure should be equal to and not be permitted to
break under. It would not be difficult to generate two law
suits from the situation but the divorce, the title to the home,
the matter of alimony and the matter of restitution are all so
involved that the same evidence may have to do with each of
them so there is every reason why they should be adjudicated
in one suit and we are shown no reason why they should not
be considered together. Allegations of the amended bill are
sufficient to show merit.

The law is a medium for adjusting conflicting interests
that may constantly arise from more and more complicated
social relations. It should not be permitted to become a code
of abstract rules leading to confusion and dismay in the ad-

563

justment of these relations. The court has repeatedly ad-
judicated property rights along with the marital status. If
there is any theory under which one law suit will suffice there
is no reason for generating another. It may well be that when
the evidence is all in there will be no support whatever for the
claim of L. T. Fields, Jr., in the home. If this is the case the
chancellor may so adjudicate but if he finds otherwise it will
then be time to make an appropriate order to adjudicate his
claim of title.

Certiorari is granted and the judgment appealed from is
quashed with directions to reinstate the amended bill and pro-
ceed accordingly.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

SAM WHITE and WILBURN WHITE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
35 So. (2nd) 724 June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 Special Division B |

Carrol W. Fussell and J. C. Getzen, Jr., for appellants.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Ernest W. Welch, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Lucille Snowden, Special As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

All questions raised on this appeal have been duly con-
sidered and found without merit; the judgment is affirmed.

Counsel in the case are to be complimented for abbreviat-
ing the evidence in narrative form which has greatly helped
the court in considering the case.

We believe, however, that the crimes of which defendants
were respectively adjudged guilty were not sufficiently defined
in the judgment so, on that point alone, the judgment is re-
versed with directions to impose a proper judgment and sen-
tence.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ.,
concur. ,

a
564

LEE §S. TUCKER and LONEY P. TUCKER, his wife, and W. M.
TUCKER and HATTIE LOU TUCKER, his wife, and LEE S.
TUCKER and W. M. TUCKER, as co-partners doing business as
TUCKER MORTGAGE REALTY CO., v. EDWARD OC. LACEY.

35 So. (2nd) 724 June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 2, 1948

Cleveland, Sibley & Davis and John F. Allison, for appel-
lants.

Harry Gordon, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

In February, 1944, appellee, Edward C. Lacey, placed $550
earnest money in the hands of appellants, Lee S. Tucker and
W. M. Tucker, real estate brokers, with the request that they
purchase for him Lots 1 and 2, Block 21, Altos Del Mar, a sub-
division in Miami Beach, at a price of $5,500.00. Appellants
immediately commenced negotiations to purchase said lots as
per instructions but found that they could not be purchased
without the purchase of other lots. They ultimately suc-
ceeded in purchasing them along with Lots 11 and 14,
Normandy Beach, another subdivision in Miami Beach, and
Lot 12, Block 52, north of the City of Miami for $6,800.00 and
took title to all of said lots in their individual names. They
later sold said lots for $16,000.00.

This suit was instituted by bill in equity on the part of
Lacey naming appellants as defendants. It detailed the fore-
going facts and prayed that a trust be imposed upon the
funds and other assets in the hands of defendants in favor of
the plaintiff, that an accounting be ordered to determine the
sums due plaintiff by defendants and that defendants be re-

565

quired to pay plaintiff all damages suffered by them by reason
of the sale of the properties described in the bill of com-
plaint. At final hearing on bill and answer the chancellor
found that appellants should account to appellee for the
profits derived from the Altos Del Mar property, the Nor-
mandy Beach property and the City of Miami property. This
appeal is from the final decree so entered.

The point for determination is whether or not the court
committed error in requiring appellants to account for profits
on all the properties purchased by defendants or should the
accounting have been limited to the Altos Del Mar property.

Appellants and appellee all rely on the principles stated
in Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 809, 113 So. 420, 54 A.L.R. 1173
and Van Woy v. Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So. (2nd) 185, to sup-
port their contention. The essential facts are not in dispute.
It appears that appellee was interested only in the Altos Del
Mar property. He turned his money over to appellants to
purchase that property and no other property and knew noth-
ing of the negotiations that resulted in the purchase of the *
other property. It was entirely unrelated to the other proper-
ties so it would seem to follow that no fiduciary duty passed
from appellants to appellee in relation to any other property.

The master was correct in his finding that a fiduciary rela-
tion existed between the parties and that appellants should ac-
count to appellee for profits on the Altos Del Mar property.
The chancellor should have so decreed or in the event the
evidence was not sufficient on which to predicate such a decree
he should have recommitted the cause to the master for
better statement of an account as to profits on the sale of the
Altos Del Mar property. The decree appealed from is there-
fore affirmed as to profits on the Altos Del Mar properties but
it is reversed as to the profits on the Normandy Beach
property and the City of Miami property.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

—
566

W. F. KNUDSEN v. ROY GENE HANLON, a minor, by R. R. BROWN,
as his next friend.
TWO CASES CONSOLIDATED
W. F. .KNUDSEN v. EDWIN BALDERSTON, a minor, by R. R.
BROWN, as his next friend.

86 So. (2nd) 192 June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 Division A.

Milam, McIlwaine, Carroll & Wattles, for appellant.
Will O. Murrell, for appellees.

567

SEBRING, J.:

The appellees, Hanlon and Balderston, were injured while
guests in an automobile owned by the appellant Knudsen. At
the time of the accident Hanlon, Balderston, Knudsen and one
Lalk were occupants of the car, which was being driven by
Lalk in the presence of Knudsen. Hanlon and Balderston sued
Knudsen, as owner of the car, in separate actions for damages,
alleging gross negligence in the manner of the operation of -
the vehicle. To the declaration filed in these separate actions
Knudsen interposed identical pleas of not guilty, assumption
of risk amounting to contributory negligence, and that the
four occupants of the car were engaged in a joint enterprise at
the time of the accident. Demurrers were over-ruled to the
pleas and the cases were consolidated for trial. At the close
of the evidence offered at the trial the jury returned a verdict
of not guilty. Subsequently, Hanlon and Balderston filed mo-
tions for new trial which were granted, the trial court being
of the opinion that a new trial should be had in each case be-
cause of the fact that a charge requested by the defendant
pertaining to the duty imposed on a guest riding in an auto-
mobile which was being negligently operated by another was
erroneous; that a charge requested by the defendant with re-
spect to joint adventure should not have been given; and that
under the evidence as a whole, as a matter of law, the plaintiff
could not be held to be a joint adventurer.

Knudsen has perfected an appeal in each of the cases, as-
signing as error the order granting a new trial. By stipula-
tion of the parties, the appeals have been consolidated in this
court and have been argued together.

The appellees in this appeal have attempted to argue in
briefs the alleged error of the trial court in overruling the de-
rourrer to the plea of joint adventure in each of the cases.
The rulings of the trial court in this particular are matters
of record which may not be considered on this appeal, as a
motion for new trial extends only to alleged errors with re-
spect to matters in pais for which a new trial should be
granted. See Florida Common Law Practice, Crandall, Sec-
tions 482, 483, 489. Hence, the only proper matter arguable
on this appeal in the propriety of the trial court’s orders

568

granting new trials for alleged errors in pais, and in this re-
spect we are confined solely to a review of the three grounds
upon which the motions for new trial were granted. - See Sec-
tions 59.07 (4), 1945 Supp. to Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A.;
Thomas v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 129 Fla. 155, 176 So.
122; Gulf Coast Title Co. v. Walters, 125 Fla. 427, 170 So. 130;
Hart et vir. v. Held, 149 Fla. 33, 5 So. (2nd) 878.

One of the grounds assigned by the trial court for granting
the new trial was “that under the evidence as a whole, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff could not be held to be a joint ad-
venturer.” Whatever may be the correct rule with respect to
imputing the negligence of the driver of an automobile to the
occupants thereof engaged in a joint adventure with him,
where a suit for resulting injury is brought by one of the occu-
pants of the car, not against the driver-but against the owner
of the vehicle who is likewise engaged in the joint adventure,
we are unable to find that the trial court abused its judicial
discretion in awarding a new trial on the grounds stated.
Such evidence as was adduced at the trial by the defendant on
the issue of a joint adventure was slight, to say the least, and
appears to have been of that doubtful quality with respect to
proof of the essential elements necessary to constitute a joint
adventure that the trial judge who observed the witnesses and
heard them testify was doubtless of the view that in the
interest of justice a new trial should be awarded. “Where a
new trial is granted and there is such a conflict in the evidence
that this court cannot say that the trial judge abused his
discretion in. granting such new trial, his ruling will not be
disturbed.” Carney v. Stringfellow, 73 Fla. 700, 74 So. 866;
Gulf Refining Co. v. Howard, 82 Fla. 27, 89 So. 349; Lockhart
v. Butt-Landstreet, Inc., 91 Fla. 497, 107 So. 641; Kight v.
American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 131 Fla. 764, 179
So. 792.

Another ground upon which the trial court based its order
granting a new trial was the giving of a charge requested by
the defendant that “It is the duty of a guest riding in an auto-
mobile to take observations of dangers and to avoid them if
practicable by suggestion or protest, so if you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in this case that the plaintiffs were

De
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569

riding as guests in the automobile of the defendant, W. F.
Knudsen, taking no heed of danger from the rate of speed the
ear was being driven, made no protest as to the manner in
which the car was being driven, then the plaintiffs cannot re-
cover and your verdict should be for the defendant.”

We are of the opinion that the charge as given very likely
conveyed to the jury the impression that a much greater duty
is imposed upon a guest riding in an automobile operated by
another to use care for his own safety than is actually im-
posed by law; hence, we cannot hold the trial court to have
abused its judicial discretion in granting a new trial because
of the giving of the charge. As we understand the law, a
guest riding in an automobile is entitled, save under excep-
tional circumstances, to trust the vigilence and skill of his.
driver, unless such occupant knows, or by the exercise of ordi-
nary and reasonable care should know from the circumstances.
of the occasion, that the driver is not exercising that degree
of care in the operation of the vehicle compatible with the
safety of his passenger. In such case it becomes the duty of
the guest to make some reasonable attempt through sugges-
tion, warning, protest or other means,suitable to the occasion,
to control the conduct of the driver. However, before the
duty to warn, protest, or take other such action suitable to
the circumstances of the case, arises, it is necessary that the
occupant should know or have reason to know that it is rea-
sonably essential to his own safety to attempt to warn or to:
control the conduct of the driver, and there must be sufficient
time and opportunity for the guest to give warning or make
protest before the happening of the accident; for a guest in
an automobile may know at a particular time what the driver
is doing, yet have no reason to realize that it is necessary
that he intervene for his own safety. See Restatement of the
Law, Volume II, pp. 1282-1284, 1230-1231, 1262; Huddy’s
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 9th Ed. pp. 257, 258, 265.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

Le
570

MILTON WEISS, H. 0. COLLINS, JAMES HENDERSON, H. 0. LAS-
SETER and R. P. TERRY as and constituting the Board of Public
Instruction of Dade County, under the Jaws of the State of Florida,
v. HERBERTA LEONARDY and JOSEPH KRUTITULIS individu-
ally and for and on behalf of the classroom teachers of Dade
County, Florida, similarly situated.

36 So. (2nd) 184 June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 En Banc

TERRELL, J.:

The appellees are teachers in the public schools of Dade
County. They brought this as a class suit under Section 87.01,
Florida Statutes 1941 to secure a declaratory decree adjudi-
eating their salary status, under Chapter 23726, Acts of 1947.
Two classes of teachers are involved in the controversy. (1)
Those in the service who were re-employed on or before the
commencement of the fiscal year July 1, 1947, and (2) those
employed after the beginning of the fiscal year, July 1, 1947.

As to the first class the chancellor held that complainants
were entitled to their salary in twelve equal installments for
the fiscal year, beginning July 1, 1947 and ending June 30,

1948. As to the second class the chancellor held that they
were entitled to their salary in equal monthly installments
from the date of employment to the end of the fiscal year.
The Board of Public Instruction appealed.

-As to the first class, the question may be stated as follows:
Does the law require the Board of Public Instruction to pay
them their salary in twelve equal installments at the end of
each month during the fiscal year 1947-1948? As to the
second class, the question may be stated as follows: Does the
law require the Board of Public Instruction to pay them their
salary in equal monthly installments from the date of em-
ployment to the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1948?

The chancellor held that employment ran with the fiscal
year as to the first class, but answered both questions in the
affirmative: Appellants contend that the chancellor was in
error because Sections 8, 9 and 10, Article XII of the Constitu-
tion require that all county and district school funds be used
exclusively for school purposes and that the contracts in ques-
tion propose to pay appellants in the first class their salary for
July and August before any services are rendered. They say
that payment for services not rendered amounts to the use of
school funds for other than an exclusive school purpose.

We do not think there is any merit to this contention. It
is true that the contract in question provides for an annual
salary to be paid in twelve equal installments at the end of
each month. The contract was made pursuant to Section 27,
Chapter 23726, Acts of 1947, amending Section 236.02, Florida
Statutes 1941, the pertinent part of which is as follows:

“provide written continuing contracts for all personnel
entitled to such contracts as prescribed by law; provide
each other member of the instructional staff, at least one
month before schools begin, or before assuming his position
if he is now employed until after that date, with a written
contract providing for the payment of a definite salary as pre-
scribed by law, require twelve calendar months of service for
such principals and other special instructional personnel as
prescribed by regulations of the State Board, and ten calendar
months of service for all other members of the instructional
staff, any such service on a twelve months basis to include

571

572

reasonable allowance for vacation or further study as pre-
scribed by the county board in accordance with regulations of
the State Board; and pay all instructional personnel whether
employed on a ten or twelve months basis over a period of
twelve calendar months except as otherwise authorized by the
State Board.”

Chapter 23726 revised many provisions of Chapter 236,
Florida Statutes 1941, better known as the Florida School
Code. Among other things, it provides that the school fiscal.
year shall begin on July ist and close June 30th. It created
the Foundation Program Fund to finance the public school
program, made a large appropriation for its support and de-
fined the requirements for each county to participate therein.
Apportionments are made to the Foundation Program Fund
on a twelve months basis and instructional personnel whether
employed on a ten or twelve months basis are paid on the
twelve months basis. The act by its terms was made effective
July 1, 1947. This and other provisions relating to budgetary
requirements, the emphasis on written contracts, the powers
vested in the State Board of Education and the County Boards
of Education and requirements as to professional training,
amply support the holding of the chancellor.

In addition to the literal terms of Chapter 23726, it is not.
amiss to point out that one of its purposes was to effectuate
the recommendation of the Florida Citizens Committee on
Education. This committee was appointed by the Governor
pursuant to Senate concurrent Resolution No. 3, approved at
the 1945 session of the Legislature. The committee after a
two year study of the educational system of Florida made a
comprehensive report to the Governor, the Legislature and the
people in which it recommended many improvements, those
pertinent to this case having to do with teacher personnel,
salaries, method of employment and compensation. Other
recommendations made by the committee to raise the stand-
ard of the teaching staff, school system and school administra-
tion, were: (1) Minimum salary of $2400. annually for hbe-
ginning teachers with four years of professional preparation,
(2) compensation sufficient to attract and hold competent.
teachers and administrators. (3) Provision for a planned.

be
a
573

system of school work and teachers competent to execute the
plan. (4) Requirement that principals, guidance councellors,
librarians and other special instructional personnel serve the
year round; (5) Payment of teachers on a twelve months
basis and serve at least one month when school is not in regu-
lar session for the purpose of planning and executing a satis-
factory school program.

In addition to the foregoing the committee made other
recommendations leading to professional improvements, but
they are not pertinent to a decision of the question here.
Chapter 23726 covers about fifty pages in the Act of 1947, and
an examination of its provisions reveals repeated instances in
which the legislature was attempting to enact the Committee’s
recommendations into law. So both the terms of the act and
the circumstances leading up to its enactment support the
chancellor’s holding. Paying teachers on a’ twelve months
basis is not a new experiment in this county. It has been
tried and approved repeatedly. Dupay v. Board of Education
of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 533, 289 Pac. 689.

There is nothing in our law against it and in view of the
service time exacted of the teacher, including professional
demands over and beyond school room duties, it is not
amenable to the objection that it amounts to a disbursement
of school funds for other than a strictly school purpose.

It may be admitted arguendo that some of the provisions
of Chapter 23726 are not as clear as they might be, but when
read in connection with the report of the Citizens Committee
on Education and other factors that induced it, there is no
reason for doubt that its overall purpose was to raise educa-
tional standards by removing deficiencies in the public school
system, enlarging the educational program to comport with
the present and future needs of the State, give it ample
financial support and enlarge the economic status of the
teaching staff by salary payment on a twelve month basis.
We might, as was done by appellants, rationalize the naked
contract to a different conclusion, but it would amount to
nothing more than a treatise on semantics and a result foreign
to the legislative intent.

Le
574

After all, no school system can hope to rise above the
character and quality of its teaching staff. That is its very
life blood, the source from which its inspiration must arise,
yet we have permitted it to languish and run down at the heels
from economic anemia and failure of the wellsprings of moral
and financial support. There is no better specific for economic
anemia than a “shot” of filthy lucre. The legislature sensed
the pathology and provided a perennial program in labor and
pay for the teaching staff to remove the cause. In this it
took the first step to accomplish the main objectives of Chap-
ter 23726. It was a long stride in the direction of a “new
freedom” for the teaching staff. She may now hope to acquire
all the degrees the system requires, sleep between two sheets
while she pursues them, thumb McCalls with assurance and
have an apartment on the right side of the tracks with all the
gadgets good taste will permit, but she is not to forget that.
the primary purpose of these accessories is not her comfort
but to enlarge her capacity to supply the spiritual needs of the
school children. One cannot read the report of the Citizen’s
Committee and not be impressed with the fact that Florida
school children have subsisted too long on a low vitamin moral
and spiritual diet and the purpose of Chapter 23726 was to
provide the means to improve it. It is a challenge to parent
and teacher for a better balanced intellectual, emotional and
moral citizenry.

‘So much for the answer to question one. It is likewise a
sufficient answer to question two. Chapter 23726 does not
specify the time teachers in the second class employed after
July 1, 1947, shall be paid, but, like the chancellor, we con-
clude that they should be paid in equal monthly installments
from the date of their employment to the end of the fiscal
year.

It follows that the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN, ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ.,
concur. :

SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

BARNS, J., dissenting:

The effect of the Chancellor’s final decree was to require
the Board:

“(a) As to those teachers employed before the beginning
of the fiscal year (July 1) to pay them forthwith 2-12ths of
their annual salary, which would in effect pay them for the
months of July and August when their work commenced Sep-
tember ist (two months later). .

“(b) As to those teachers employed after the beginning of
the fiscal year, to pay them ‘to the end that their entire annual
salaries may be paid during the fiscal year” (Before July
1)”

This of course would result in teachers employed at the
same annual salary being paid in installments not identical.
A teacher employed on June 30th would be paid differently
from one employed July 2nd, even though their annual salaries
be the same, for work to commence on September 1st and to
continue for 10 months.

The contractual promises of the teacher to the local school
board and the promises of the Board to the teacher appear to
be on a form of contract approved by the State Board of Edu-
cation, being Form 1-2 bt, and reading as follows:

“This CONTRACT, entered into between the Board of
Public Instruction of Dade County, the party of the first part,
and Herberta Leonardy, the party of the second part,

“WITNESSETH:

“1. That the party of the first part agrees to employ the
party of the second part in the position of teacher, at Ponce
de Leon School, for a period of 10 calendar months beginning
September 1, 1947, and to pay the party of the second part an
annual salary of $3600.00, in 12 equal installments, payable at
the end of each calendar month of the period. ...

“Given under our hands and seals this 6th day of June,
1947, at Miami, Florida.”

Neither party complains of any ambiguity in language nor
is there any controversy between the parties as to perform-
ance. Both seem to understand its terms, which have been
specified with clarity.

575

De
576

No member of the bench or bar nor any of the parties have
made any contention concerning the uncertainty of the terms
of the language used in any particular.

The specific law of the school code applicable to the con-
tracting parties, as quoted (in part) and relied upon by the
Court as the guide for the controlling opinion, is:

Section 236.02, Florida Statutes, 1941, as amended:

“236.02. Requirements for Participation in Foundation
Program Fund. Each county which participates in the Foun-
dation Program Fund, as hereinafter prescribed, shall provide
evidence of its effort to maintain an adequate school program
throughout the county and shall meet at least the following
requirements: ...

“(3) Employment Policies for Instructional Personnel.
... ten calendar months of service for all .. . members of the
instructional staff... and pay all . . . instructional personnel
«+. over a period of twelve calendar months except as other-
wise authorized by the State Board... .

“(6) Salary Schedules. Expend funds for instructional
salaries in accordance with a salary schedule or schedules
adopted by the county board in accordance with the pro-
visions of law and regulations of the State Board.

“(7) Budgets. Observe fully at all times all requirements
of law relating to the preparation, adoption and execution of
budgets for the county school system.’—Sec. 27, Chapter
23726, Acts of 1947.

Sections 27 and 33 of Chapter 23726 (Secs. 236.02 and
236.09, F.S. 1941, as amended) relate to the means by which
the county school system may participate in a subsidy by the
State from the Foundation Program Fund and have no ‘direct
effect upon the contracts between the local Boards and the
teachers which they employ. Likewise the teacher, as such, in
the payment of her compensation, must look to the terms of
her contract and is not required to concern herself with the
fiscal affairs of the County Board, and particularly as to the
source of the revenue of the Board. The affairs of the em-
ployer are not the affairs of the employee, except as covered
by the terms of their contract.

Some statutory law governing the expenditure of school
funds by the board is as follows:

“Each and every official and employee of the county board
who is in any way responsible for collecting, depositing,
budgeting, or expending school funds, or for purchasing ma-
terials or services for school usage, or is in any manner re-
sponsible for school funds, shall see that these funds are fully
and properly safeguarded at all times; Proper safeguards are
to be evidenced not only by accurate and complete accounting,
observance of all legal requirements, preparation of all
required reports, but also by exercising every diligence to see
that value has been received for any funds which are ex-
pended.” (Emphasis supplied) Sec. 237.29, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

. The county superintendent shall recommend pay-
ment “from school funds only after he has exercised due
diligence in assuring himself that such payments are lawful,
are provided for in the budget, are reasonable, and are for
goods received in good order or for services properly rendered
and for which payment has not been made.”—Par. (6) of Sec.
237.02, F.S., 1941, F.S.A.

Mrs. Leonardy’s contract recites that she was employed
by said Board “for a period of 10 calendar months beginning
September 1, 1947,” and that said Board agreed to pay her for
said services “an annual salary of $3600. in 12 equal install-
ments, payable at the end of each calendar month of the
period.”

These contracts do not authorize or require Mrs. Leonardy
or any of the other teachers to perform any services during
July and August, 1947. These contracts recite that the teach-
ers’ service shall commence on September 1, 1947, and end on
June 30, 1948.

Plaintiffs’ bill of complaint did not allege that Mrs.
Leonardy, or any of these teachers, performed any services
for said Board in July or August, 1947. Defendants’ answer
averred that neither Mrs. Leonardy, nor any of these teachers,
performed any services for said Board in July or August,
1947.

These contracts say nothing about payment in advance for
services to be rendered in the future. These contracts recite

577

578

that the annual salaries are payable “in 12 equal installments,
payable at the end of each calendar month of the period” com- .
mencing September 1, 1947.

It appears that if said Board is required by this Court in
this cause to pay to said teachers alleged wages or salaries for
the months of July and August, 1947, at a monthly rate of
1/12th of their respective existing annual wages or salaries,
said Board will be required to pay out approximately $1,-
000,000.00 in advance of the time provided for by the present
contracts between said teachers and said Board, and that is
not authorized by said official budget; that such advance pay-
ment to said teachers of said sum of approximately $1,000,-
000.00 has never been authorized or approved by the Budget
Commission of Dade County, Florida, and that, if defendants
are required by an order of the court in this cause to so pay
said sum of approximately $1,000,000.00 to said teachers, for
the months of July and August, 1947, that it would be con-
trary to the provisions of sub-paragraphs (6) and (7) of Sec.
236.02, as amended, and Sec. 237.29 of F.S., 1941; that one
hundred and fifteen teachers in the public schools of Dade
County, who, between June 1, 1947, and January 13, 1948,
entered into contracts with said Board to teach in said schools
for a period of 10 months commencing on September 1, 1947,
and whose annual salaries under said contract totalled $338,-
345.00, resigned or died prior to February 11, 1948 (the date
of the Board’s answer).

It is clear that if the Board on its own behalf should pro-
pose and pursue a policy, as now sought to be judicially
coerced, of making payments of the public’s money for
services to be rendered in the future, the members thereof
would subject themselves to an injunction suit and indictment
for misappropriation of public funds and also to removal-from
office by the Governor.

It appears that the teacher is not so much wanting to be
paid for two months services before she commences work as
she is desirous of being paid promptly when she has com-
pleted her services.

The contract between the teacher and the Board is as
authorized by the State Board of Education. The State Board

of Education is authorized to approve a form whereby the
teacher for ten months’ services will be paid her annual salary
in 10 equal installments. See Sec. 236.02 (3) F.S., 1941
(supra). The law directs payments in (12) installments, as
provided by Mrs. Leonardy’s contract “except as otherwise
authorized by the State Board.” It is likely that if the teach-
ers prefer that payments not be deferred that the State Board
will authorize or permit payments to be made without defer-
ment.

I think the contract should be allowed to stand as written.

Pt

FRANCIS P. CONROY, et al, ete., v. CARDELL BROWER, et al., etc.

36 So. (2nd) 190 . June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 En Banc

Edwin C. Coffee, for appellant.
Austin Miller, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

At the oral argument this case and the case of Milton
Weiss, et al. v. Herberta Leonardy, et al., were consolidated
and argued together.. The latter case was decided this date.
The parties were different and both cases arose from a dif-
ferent source but they were prosecuted under Section 87.01,
Florida Statutes 1941, for a common purpose and’a similar
decree resulted. The questions raised in this case are similar
to those presented in Milton Weiss, et al., v. Herberta Leo-
nardy, et al., so the judgment appealed from is affirmed on
authority of the latter case.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN, ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ.,
concur.

SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., dissent.
BARNS, J., dissenting:

I dissent upon the basis stated in my dissenting opinion in
Milton Weiss, et al., v. Herberta Leonardy, et al., this day
decided.

579

580

Cc. B. SMITH, M. J. FOLEY and DANIEL W. MILLAN, as members of
and constituting the FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, an
agency of the State of Florida, v. ROSS WILLIAMS, as Judge of
the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade
County, Florida, ROYAL H. WILSON, et al.

85 So, (2nd) 844 June Term, 1948 _
June 18, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 2, 1948

John T. Wigginton and Walter E. Rountree, for petition-
ers.

A. C. Franks, and H. H. Eyles, for respondents.

SEBRING, J.:

The petitioners seek to prohibit the respondent Circuit
Judge of Dade County from entertaining a suit in equity
brought by twenty-two separate corporations, partnerships
and individuals who own and operate private employment bu-
reaus and agencies in Dade County and elsewhere in the State
of Florida. The question presented on objections to the issu-
ance of a writ of prohibition by this court relates solely to the

be
a
581

jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Dade County to enter-
tain the equity suit and decide the issues presented.

On September 2, 1947 certain persons, firms and corpo-
rations representing themselves to be engaged in the business
of conducting and operating private employment agencies in
Miami and other places in the State of Florida under licenses
duly issued to them for the conduct of such business by the
Florida Industrial Commission, filed in the Circuit Court of
Dade County a bill for declaratory decree and injunction, to
which the petitioners, as members of and constituting the -
Florida Industrial commission, a State agency, were made
parties defendant. The bill alleged that the defendants in the
cause have jurisdiction of and are charged with the official
duty of supervising and controlling employment agencies in
the State of Florida pursuant to chapter 24080, Laws of
Florida, 1947; that in purported pursuance of their said
official duties the defendants have adopted a certain resolu-
tion and rules providing for the governance of employment
agencies, to become effective September 1, 1947; that the reso-
lution and rules so adopted are without authority of law and
in contravention of chapter 24080, supra, and operate to annul
and abrogate certain provisions of the statutory law under
which private employment agencies are authorized to operate
and by which such agencies are to be regulated by the Com-
mission; that the Commission has advised the plaintiffs that
if they do not conform to the resolution and rules so promul-
gated by the Commission they will be arrested and prosecuted
and their licenses canceled for such violation. The prayer of
the bill is that a decree of the Circuit Court of Dade County
be entered declaring said resolution and rules to be null and
void and beyond the power and authority of the Commission
to promulgate, and that the defendant Commissioners, their
agents and servants be restrained from any attempt to enforce
them as against the plaintiffs within Dade County.

Upon the ex parte application of the plaintiffs the Circuit
Court of Dade County, on September 3, 1947, entered a tempo-
rary restraining order against the defendants, enjoining them,
their agents and servants from enforcing said resolution and
rules until the further order of the court. On September 19,

582

1947, the defendants filed a motion to dissolve the temporary
injunction and to dismiss the suit, on the ground that “It
affirmatively appears from the bill of complaint filed herein
that this is a suit for declaratory judgment, attacking the
validity of certain rules and resolutions promulgated by the
Florida Industrial Commission, a State instrumentality and
administrative board, with its chief headquarters in the
eapitol city of Tallahassee, Florida, and that the temporary
injunction restrains the Florida Industrial Commission, its
agents, etc., from the enforcement of such rules, and this
Court is without jurisdiction to maintain such suit and/or
grant relief by injunction pursuant thereto, such jurisdiction
being vested in the Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida.”
At a hearing on the motion to dissolve the injunction and
dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction the Circuit Court of
Dade County entered an order denying the motion as to each
ground thereof and gave the Florida Industrial Commission
30 days within which to plead further in the cause. The de-
fendants in the suit then instituted a proceeding in this court
to prohibit the Circuit Court of Dade County from entertain-
ing jurisdiction in the pending suit on the ground that said
court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues pre-
‘sented. In answer to a rule nisi in prohibition issued by this
court the Circuit Judge who entered the order on the motions
has filed his return and has set forth as his reason for taking
jurisdiction of the cause and for entering the order on the
motion, that the suit was instituted by residents of Dade
County and involves the property rights of said parties in
Dade County; that the laws of Florida vest in the Circuit
Court of Dade County the jurisdiction to hear and determine
the issues presented; that no legal objections have been made
by the defendants in the cause to the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court of Dade County over the parties and the sub-
ject matter involved; and that the motion to dismiss the bill
and dissolve the temporary restraining order operated as a
waiver of privilege to being sued in Leon County if, in fact,
a legal right to be sued in such county ever actually existed.
‘The matter is now before this Court for decision on the
issue raised by the return filed by the respondent circuit judge

to the rule nisi in prohibition and a motion of the petitioners
that a writ of prohibition be issued the return of the Circuit
Judge to the contrary notwithstanding.

The petitioners base their demand for a writ of prohibi-
tion upon what they conceive to be the applicability of the
rule enunciated in the case of Game and Fresh Water Fish
Commission v. Williams, 158 Fla. 369, 28 So. (2nd) 431, to the
facts of the case at bar; while the Circuit Judge against whom
prohibition is sought contends that the principles announced
in State ex rel. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry. Board v.
Atkinson, 136 Fla. 528, 188 So. 834, and State’ex rel. Dade
County Security Co. v. Barns, 99 Fla. 1258, 128 So. 860, are
controlling.

Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Williams,
supra, was an original proceeding instituted in this court by
the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission to prohibit the
Circuit Court of Dade County from proceeding in an equity
suit then pending in said court wherein one H. G. Stewart
was plaintiff and the members of the commission were de-
fendants. The bill in the suit alleged, in substance, that the
plaintiff Stewart was a citizen and resident of Moore Haven,
Glades County, Florida, and ran a wholesale fish business
there; that as a wholesale fish dealer he transported and sold
fish taken from the waters of Lake Okeechobee to persons in
Dade County and other counties in the State; that he held a
license to engage in said business from the Board of Conserva-
tion of Florida which state agency by virtue of the Constitu-
tion and laws of Florida had and exercised jurisdiction over
the taking for sale of fish from Lake Okeechobee; that despite
the prior and continuous exercise of jurisdiction by the Board
over said waters, the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
of Florida, another state agency, was attempting, without
power or authority, to oust the Board of Conservation of juris-
diction and itself to assume and exercise jurisdiction; that to
that end the Commission had promulgated certain rules pro-
hibiting the taking of fish from Lake Okeechobee except by
means of hook and line, bob, spinner, troll or trotline, and pro-
hibiting the transportation and sale thereof commercially;
that even if the Commission did have authority to exercise

583

Le
584

jurisdiction over said waters, the rules promulgated by it
Were unjust, unreasonable and unfair to plaintiff and others
of like situation and discriminated against persons engaged in
the taking, transportation and sale of fish from the lake for
commercial purposes; that in the attempted exercise of pre-
tended jurisdiction the Commission had threatened to arrest
the plaintiff, his agents and servants if in violation of the
said rules the plaintiff endeavored to transport, deliver or sell
fish taken from said lake, to customers in Dade County or
elsewhere in violation of the rules so promulgated. The
prayer of the bill was that the Commission be enjoined from
enforcing its rules within Dade County and from exercising
jurisdiction over the waters of Lake Okeechobee.

It will be readily observed from the allegations of the bill
of complaint that the equity suit was one brought by a non-
resident of Dade County who did not even maintain his
principal business establishment in the judicial circuit of
which Dade County was a part. The suit had as its primary
purpose the determination of the basic question of the validity
and enforceability of certain rules promulgated by a state
agency that even if found to be valid and enforceable could
not directly affect. any personal or property rights of the
plaintiff in Dade County but would affect his personal and
property rights, if at all, only in Glades County where the
business establishment of the plaintiff was located and where
fish acquired by him in the first instance were loaded for de-
livery elsewhere; that the enforcement of the challenged rules
within Dade County would, at most, be only incidental to and
in aid of the enforcement of the rules of the Commission pro-
hibiting the initial taking of fish from the waters of Lake
Okeechobee—a matter as to which the Circuit Court of Dade
County would, in general, have no power to grant relief inas-
much as Lake Okeechobee is situated beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Dade County and the
venue of an action instituted for such purpose would ordi-
narily be laid in another judicial circuit; that consequently,
as to the plaintiff Williams who could not validly claim the
direct or threatened unlawful invasion within Dade County of
any lawful right, the suit was one which essentially involved

585

only the abstract question of the relative powers of the State
Board of Conservation and the Game and Fresh Water Fish
Commission over the waters of Lake Okeechobee and, assum-
ing the Commission to have the paramount power of regula-
tion, whether the rules promulgated by it were enforceable
against persons engaged commercially in the transportation
and sale of fish taken from Lake Okeechobee in violation of
such rules. Under the set of facts thus presented this court
was of opinion that the Circuit Court of Dade County did not
have jurisdiction of the subject matter in the issue or that if
it did, the case was one of the class of which the said court
ought not to exercise such jurisdiction, and that the suit was
one which, if maintanable at all, should have been maintained
in the Circuit Court of Leon County where the headquarters
of the Board and the Commission were located and the
challenged rules were promulgated.

Broadly speaking, there are two types or classes of cases
in which rules and regulations promulgated by state agencies
may be brought into question in suits properly instituted for
such purpose. The first is the type or class in which the pri-
mary purpose of the litigation is to obtain a judicial interpre-
tation or declaration of a party’s rights or duties under such
rules and regulations, where no unlawful invasion of a lawful
right secured to the plaintiff by the Constitution or laws of
the jurisdiction is directly threatened in the county where
suit is instituted. The second is the type or class in which the
primary purpose of the litigation is to obtain direct judicial
protection from an alleged unlawful invasion of the constitu-
tional rights of the plaintiff within the county where the suit
is instituted, because of the enforcement or threatened en-
forcement by a state agency of rules and regulations alleged
to be unconstitutional as to the plaintiff, and where the
validity or invalidity of the rules and regulations sought to be
enforced comes into question only secondarily and as inci-
dental to the main issue involved.

Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Williams,
supra, comes clearly within the first type or class mentioned
in the preceding paragraph. The present equity suit now
pending in the Circuit Court of Dade County comes within the

ee
586 :

second type or class mentioned; for it has as its primary
purpose something more than an attempt to raise mere ab-
stract questions involving the construction of rules and regu-
lations of a state agency, as was essentially the case in Game
and Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Williams, supra, which
was before a court which in effect had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter involved and which could not properly have
given the wide relief asked for, inasmuch as no constitutional
rights of the plaintiff were being invaded in Dade County and
the Circuit Court of Dade County had no jurisdiction over the
waters of Lake Okeechobee. In the proceeding at bar it is
shown that the plaintiffs maintain places of business in Dade
County. Their personal and property rights are directly
threatened with infringement or curtailment in Dade County
by the enforcement there of rules promulgated by the Florida.
Industrial Commission which are asserted by the plaintiffs to
be unconstitutional and in direct violation of the statute con-
ferring the rule-making power on the Commission with re-
spect to the businesses of the plaintiffs in Dade County sought
to be regulated. Whether the plaintiffs are correct in their
contention that their constitutional rights in Dade County are
being or will be unlawfully invaded by the enforcement of
rules promulgated by the Commission is not before us for de-
termination. Whatever the true facts may prove to be, the
plaintiffs do have the right to have this question presented by
their bill judicially determined in a suit instituted for-that
purpose in the jurisdiction where the alleged wrong is
threatened and to seek and have relief from the operation of
unconstitutional acts of the Commission which may be shown
to have been committed in that jurisdiction. See State ex rel.
Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board v. Atkinson 136 Fla.
528, 188 So. 834. As is recognized in State ex rel. Dade
County Security Co. v. Barns, 99 Fla. 1258, 128 So. 860, a state
officer or state agency may perform official acts throughout
the state and may be amenable to the jurisdiction of the
courts where official acts, the subject of litigation in such
courts, have been performed.

The court recognized the soundness of the policy that in
order to promote orderly, efficient, and economical govern-

587"

ment, controversies involving the proper interpretation to be
given rules and regulations promulgated by state agencies
ought to be concentrated at the seat of state government
where such state agencies are located, where such rules and
regulations are promulgated, and where such suits can be de-
fended at a minimum expenditure of effort and public funds.
Such concentration of litigation manifestly makes for uni-
formity of interpretation of rules and regulations promul-
gated by such state instrumentalities and prevents conflicting
judicial rulings in different jurisdictions resulting in decrees
binding only in the counties where rendered and serving only
to protect parties to the suits from the operation only of un-
lawful acts shown to have been actually committed within
such particular jurisdictions. To accomplish this salutary
purpose the legislature has the undoubted power with respect
to the first type or class of cases we have mentioned, that is to
say, suits brought primarily for the purpose of securing in-
terpretations of rules and regulations promulgated by state
agencies, to designate the headquarters of such state agencies
as the venue where such suits shall be laid. When the legis-
lature has thus acted the venue for suits of such nature will
be in the county directed by such legislative designation; the
action of the legislature in this respect amounting to a legis-
lative fixing of the residence of such governmental agency for
the purpose of suit. If, after the venue has been thus fixed, a
suit involving primarily the interpretation of rules or regula-
tions of a state agency is instituted in a jurisdiction other
than that designated by the legislature the state agency af-
fected has full means for requiring such suit to be brought in
the county of its headquarters by filing timely objections in
the pending cause and claiming the privilege of being sued in
the form designated by the legislature; or the state agency
may waive such privilege by contesting the merits, thereby
submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the court in which the
suit has been instituted. Through either procedure exercised
in the manner indicated, the state agency has adequate au-
thority to control the venue of actions brought primarily for
the purpose of securing a construction of such rules and regu-
lations, were the unlawful invasion of the fundamental rights

588

of the plaintiff within the county of suit is not directly in-
volved.

As has been stated, the pending equity suit in Dade County
is one brought primarily to secure judicial protection of per-
sonal and property rights of plaintiffs located in Dade County
from the allleged threatened unlawful enforcement in Dade
County of a resolution and rules of the Commission charged
by the plaintiffs to be unconstitutional. The principles enun-
ciated in State ex rel. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry
Board v. Atkison, 136 Fla. 528, 188 So. 834; State ex rel. Dade
County Security Co. v. Barns, 99 Fla. 1258, 128 So. 860, are
therefore controlling with respect to the question of the un-
lawful infringement of constitutional rights of the plaintiffs
within Dade County.

It follows from the conclusions reached that the rule nisi
in prohibition should be discharged and the proceeding in
prohibition dismissed.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

BERTHA LEE McDOWELL, alias BERTHA LEE McDOWER, v.
STATE OF FLORIDA.

36 So. (2nd) 180 June Term, 1948
June 18, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 9, 1948

589

P. Donald DeHoff, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The appellant, Bertha Lee McDowell, alias Bertha Lee Mc-
Dower, and Richard Jefferson, alias Willie McKinley, were
convicted in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Florida, for the
crime of grand larceny and each was by the trial court sen-
tenced to serve a period of two years in the State Prison at
hard labor. Bertha Lee McDowell, alias Bertha Lee Mc-
Dower, has perfected an appeal here.

Counsel for appellant contends that the judgment should
“be reversed because: First, the testimony of the State is
vague, indefinite and legally insufficient to show that the ap-
pellant received the $323.00 of Sol Dunston. The answer to
the contention is that the appellant and her witnesses testi-
fied that she did not receive the money at Orange Park from
Dunston about 1:30 P. M. on January 3, 1947. The witnesses
for the State testified that she did receive from Dunston the
$323.00 and simultaneously presented him with a receipt for
the money and the receipt was admitted in evidence. There
are presented disputes and conflicts in the evidence for a jury
under proper instructions.

Second, it is contended that the identity of the appellant
was not sufficiently established. We find abundant evidence
in the record to establish the identity of the appellant as the
person receiving from Dunston the money. It is nothing more
or less than a question of fact for the jury. What has by us
been said as to the second question posed is applicable to the
‘third question argued in the brief.

It is contended that the trial court erred in receiving into
evidence statements and admissions made on the part of
Richard Jefferson, alias Willie McKinley, over the objection of
counsel. The information charged the appellant as principal
and further charged that Richard Jefferson, Alias Willie Mc-
Kinley, and W. W. Turner, alias John Doe, as accessories and

—
590

that they were present, assisting, counseling and aiding in the
commission of the crime. It is true that an admission or con-
fession made by an accessory could not be admitted against
the appellant when it appears that the admission or confes-
sion was not made in her presence. Counsel for the appellant,
as shown by the record, was by the trial court given an oppor-
tunity to approve or disapprove the proposed charges or in-
structions for the jury and he approved the same.

Counsel for appellant points out that the information in
the case at bar should have been drafted under Section 817.01,
FS.A., or Section 811.01, F.S.A., and not under our grand
larceny statute. It is possible that the information could have
been drafted and the cause prosecuted under either of the
cited Sections but the prosecution, as shown by the record,
elected to prosecute under a different Section. The course
pursued by the State Attorney in the court below is sustained
by our adjudications. See Campbell v. State, 155 Fla. 359, 20
So. (2nd) 127; Haynes v. State, 147 Fla. 713, 3 So. (2nd) 385;
Fitch v. State, 135 Fla. 361, 185 So. 435, 125 A.L.R. 360;
Bussart v. State, 128 Fla. 891, 176 So. 32.

We fail to find error in the record and accordingly the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

JAMES DUDLEY BRAGG, a minor, by J. D. BRAGG, as his next
friend, v. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DUVAL
COUNTY, FLORIDA.

36 So, (2nd) 222 June Term, 1948
June 18, 1948 Special Division B

De
Le
5O1

Will O. Murrell, for appellant.
Edwin C. Coffee, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

James Dudley Bragg, a minor and student in one of the
high schools of Duval County, was seriously injured by having
his right arm and hand lacerated and bruised and his fingers
severed while manipulating ari old model printing press which
the Board of Public Instruction had procured in aid of its
manual training program. He brought this action to recover
damages for his injury. A demurrer to the declaration was
sustained, final judgment was rendered for defendant and the
plaintiff appealed.

The question for determination is whether or not the
Board of Public Instruction of Duval County is immune from
liability in a tort action.

If we had previously been confronted with this question
the judgment appealed from would have been affirmed without
opinion. Appellant contends that it should be answered in the
negative and supports his contention with Section 4, Declara-
tion of Rights, Florida Constitution, Kaufman v. City of Talla-
hassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697, 30 A.L.R. 371 and similar cases.

The last cited case and others relied on by appellant have
to do with the liability of municipalities in tort and the law
is well settled that they may be required to respond in
damages for negligent injury to another.

The law may impose liability for tort on Boards of Public
Instruction but the prevailing rule in this country is that they
are not so liable unless made so by law. This is the rule be-
cause they are engaged in a purely governmental function.
The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is created
as a body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not
affect its immunity from tort. Turk v. County Board of Edu-
cation of Monroe County, 222 Ala. 177, 181 So. 436; Boice, et

592

al., v. Board of Education of Rock District, 111 W. Va. 95,
160 S.E. 566; Perkins v. Trask, et al., 95 Mont. 1, 23 Pac.
(2nd) 982; Rhoades v. School District No. 9, 115 Mont. 352,
142 Pac. (2nd) 890, 160 A.L.R. 1. In 160 A.L.R., page 38, an
exhaustive note citing many cases will be found.

The case of Swanson v. School District No. 15, Pierce
County, 109 Wash. 652, 187 Pac. 386, is similar to the case
at bar in that there was an attempt to impose liability on the
school district for injuries to a pupil while operating a ma-
chine provided for manual training. Section 230.03, Fla.
Stat., 1941, makes the county school system a part of the
state school system of education and Section 242.16, Fla. Stat.,
1941, requires that County Boards of Public Instruction include
in their course of study one or more courses in vocational
training.

The principle of immunity from tort has been approved by
indirection in Section 9 and 13, Article 12 of the Constitution
wherein the public school fund is detailed and immunized from
use for any other purpose. It was also recognized by the Legis-
lature in the passage of Section 234.03, Fla. Stat., 1941, re-
quiring County Boards of Public Instruction to carry liability
insurance against injury to school children being transported
to or from school. Immunity from tort action has long been
the rule as to county commissioners. Keggin v. Hillsborough
County, 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 372. So both the letter and impli-
cation of the law are without support for appellant’s conten-
tion.

In City of Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 180, 27 So. (2nd)
825, this court pointed out, that as to municipalities, liability
for tort has not been limited to cases in which the city was
engaged in a proprietary or corporate function. In other
words if, in the performance of a governmental function, a
city uses its instrumentalities in an unlawful, reckless or care-
Jess manner it may not in every case claim immunity from
liability. .

In this case the plaintiff was injured by a printing press
operated in the performance of a required part of the public
school curriculum. Whether the duties of Board of Public
Instruction are governmental or proprietary is not necessary

Le
a :
593

to decide. They are limited strictly to the conduct of the
public schools and they are required to use such funds as
they have for that purpose and no other. It may be that in
the years ahead the policy of spreading the damages oc-
casioned by accidents of this kind will be approved and that ~
society in this or some other way will be required to help bear
the burden but this is a legislative field that the courts are
not permitted to enter.

The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

|
LONNIE LUE TALLEY v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
36 So. (2nd) 201 June Term, 1948
June 18, 1948 . En Bane

Rehearing denied July 20, 1948

A. W. Graessle, Jr., for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Ernest W. Welch,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.: .

The appellant, Lonnie Lee Talley, was indicted by a grand
jury of Duval County, Florida, for the crime of rape alleged
to have been committed in said County on July 22, 1947. On
September 22, 1947, he was placed upon trial and a jury, after
hearing the evidence of the parties and instructions of the
Court, rendered a verdict of guilty as charged. A motion for
a new trial was made and by the trial court denied, when the
appellant was adjudged guilty of said crime and the death
penalty imposed by an appropriate sentence. An appeal has
been perfected here.

The testimony adduced discloses in substance that the
offense was committed about 2:00 or 2:30 P. M. on July 22,
1947, in the rural settlement of the Arlington section of Duval

County, about seven or eight miles distant from the court
house in Jacksonville, shortly after the prosecutrix, a house-
wife, had completed the family washing, returned to her home
and was rocking her two year old baby to sleep sitting on the
front porch of her rural home. The appellant, driving a 1940
or 1941 Chevrolet truck, passed the home and asked direction
to the B & M Poultry Farm, and after being advised that she
did not know the location of the poultry farm the appellant
drove away and returned some few minutes thereafter and
stopped his truck for the second time near the prosecutrix’s
hhome and made inquiries of her about a road branching off
from the one he had been traveling. He asked for a glass of
water and was directed to go to the pump in the rear of the
house. He was told by the prosecutrix that the husband was
away from home and she was alone with her baby. The pump
hhad to be primed and she gave the appellant a glass of water
and after handing it to him turned her back to return when
the appellant attacked her, and after considerable struggling
‘between them, the appellant threw her upon a bed and ac-
complished his purpose. .

The prosecutrix attempted to get the tag number on the
truck but found it bent from the top to the bottom and she
could not read the number. The officers were called and she
gave them a description of the assailant and of the truck
driven by him, which resulted in his arrest by a policeman of
the City of Jacksonville on the following Friday, July 25,
1947, when driving the truck about said city. He was placed
in a line of about six men by the officers and the prosecutrix
viewed each of the six men when in the line and pointed out
the appellant as her assailant. The appellant was identified
by several others when in line but on separate occasions. The
truck was identified as the one driven by the appellant when
the prosecutrix was assaulted. It was the property of Ex-
celsior Mills Corporation, 118 Hast 14th Street, Jacksonville,
with whom the appellant had been employed as a truck driver
and other duties since the Fall of 1946. The appellant’s de-
fense in the court below was that of an alibi. He was 24 years
of age, married and had about 10 or 12 months’ overseas duty
in World War IL.

595

596

It appears by the record that the appellant was at the
home of Mrs. Roxie Cason in the Arlington section on the
afternoon of July 22, 1947, and asked for directions to the
B &M Poultry Farm and later got from her a pair of pliers
with which to work on his truck and Mrs. Cason became
frightened at the appellant’s conduct and ran back in her
home and closed the door. The truck she described as driven
by the appellant was a Chevrolet green panel truck, 1939,
1940, or 1941 model. It is not disputed that the truck was the
property of Excelsior Mills Corporation and the appellant was
hired to drive the truck in July, 1947. The witness identified
the appellant in the line at the jail as the driver of the truck
in the Arlington section on the afternoon the alleged crime
was committed.

The State produced the second lady witness, who lived be-
tween Moncrief and Rebault Drive sections of the City of
Jacksonville on July 17, 1947. She testified that the appellant
passed her home on the afternoon of July 17, 1947, driving
this Chevrolet truck and stopped in front of the home and
asked the witness for a glass of water and the witness got the
water and took it to him on the front porch. When she opened
the door to give him the water he forced the door open and
went into the home and made several efforts to get hold of her-
but she fought him off and screamed for help and the ap-
pellant became frightened and left. The witness identified
the appellant in the line at the jail as the driver of the truck
and the one who attacked her in her home on the afternoon
of July 17, 1947,

The third lady witness for the State testified that about
4:30 or 5:00 o’clock P. M., July 23, 1947, near her home on
May Street in the City of Jacksonville the appellant was
sitting in the Chevrolet truck and as the witness passed the
truck—then parked along the sidewalk—he made an indecent
proposal to her and then drove away in the truck. The wit-
ness identified the appellant in a line of six men at the jail on
the following Friday morning, July 25, 1947.

The fourth lady witness for the State testified that the
appellant, on the 24th day of July, 1947, when driving the 1939
Chevrolet truck down Canal Street in a thinly populated sec-

tion of the city, accosted her and made an indecent proposal
to her and some advances but she was successful in fighting
him off, when the appellant drove away in the truck. The
witness later identified her assailant in the line at the jail.
The fifth lady witness called by the State testified that the
appellant attacked her near her home and was driving the .
1939 Chevrolet truck at the time. She identified the appellant
when seen in the line at the jail. Thus from the 17th of July
until the 24th of July, 1947, it appears from the testimony
that five assaults were made by the defendant-appellant on
women in the Jacksonville area.

It appears from the record that the defendant on approach-
ing a possible victim would ask her for a glass of water, or re-
quest information about the road, or ask for pliers or some
other tool feigned to be needed in the adjustment of the motor
or truck, with the usual question, “Is your husband at home?”
One witness saw him fold the truck tag to prevent her getting
the tag number and the prosecutrix in the case at bar made an
effort to get the tag number of the truck driven by the de-
fendant at the time she was assaulted by the defendant, but
found the tag folded, which prevented her obtaining it. From
this testimony it is reasonable to infer as follows: (a) that
the defendant-appellant intended to criminally assault each of
his victims; (b) his scheme, plan or method of approaching
each of his possible victims are shown to be similar to those
employed when contacting the prosecutrix in the case at bar;
(c) the identity of the defendant is established by height,
color, weight, wearing apparel and the 1939 or 1940 Chevro-
let truck driven on the occasion of each attack.

Counsel for the defendant below, during the progress of
the trial, objected to the admission into evidence of the testi-
mony of attacks alleged to have been made on other women
supra on the ground that each of the alleged attacks was a
separate and wholly independent offense for which the ac-
cused was not then on trial and it was impossible for him to
defend against these collateral offenses when on trial under
the present indictment and that the testimony was highly
prejudicial. It is contended on this appeal that the judgment
should be reversed because of the admission of the challenged

597

De
598

testimony. It is well established law that in a prosecution
for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or
tends to show the accused has committed another crime
wholly independent of that for which he is on trial, even
though it is a crime of some other sort, is irrelevant and in-
admissible. Coston v. State, 139 Fla. 250, 190 So. 520, and.
similar cases. The trial court recognized the cited rule but
held that a well recognized exception thereto was controlling.

The authorities recognized a well established exception to
the rule enunciated in Coston v. State, supra, but point out
that evidence tending to show the commission of other crimes
requires a close scrutiny into its relevancy. Whether it tends
to exculpate or convict, if it is relevant, it must bear a certain
relation to the crime charged so as to connect the two either
as parts of one transaction, explains or defines the character
of the act charged as to motive or intention with which the
act charged was committed, then the evidence is admissible.
Any evidence tending to throw light upon the character of the
act under investigation is admissible, such as motive, intent,
absence of mistake, a common scheme embracing the commis-
sion of two or more crimes so related to each other that the
proof of one tends to establish the other and identify the per-
son charged with the commission of the crime on trial. See
Ryan v. State, 83 Fla. 610, 92 So. 571; Wallace v. State, 41 Fla.
547, 26 So. 713; Killins v. State, 28 Fla. 313, 9 So. 711; Thomas
v. State, 132 Fla. 78, 181 So. 337; Kennedy v. State, 140 Fla.
125, 191 So. 193.

The rule enunciated by this Court in Ryan v. State, supra,
and similar cases, is sustained in other jurisdictions. Evi-
dence of an independent and ‘separate crime, while inad-
missible to prove the guilt of one on trial for a criminal

offense, is admissible where such evidence tends to aid in
identifying the accused as the person who committed the par-
ticular crime under investigation. Wharton’s Criminal Evi-
dence (11th Ed.), Vol. 1, p. 507, par. 348.

In many criminal offenses, intent is the essence of the
crime, and where not established, the prosecution fails. In
crimes malum in se, intent is presumed, but where it is not a
matter of presumption, it must be proved as any other fact.

Pe
Le
599

Where intent is material, the act, declarations and conduct of
the accused are revelant to show that intent. Hence, evidence
of collateral offenses is admissible on the trial of the main
charge to prove intent. To be admissible as relevant, such
offenses need not be exactly concurrent. If they are within
such time or show such relation to the main charge as to make
connections obvious, such offenses are admissible to show in-
tent. Evidence of collateral offenses which is inseparably
interwoven with the offense charged and which also show in-
tent is admissible. Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1
(11th Ed.), pp. 516-520, par. 350.

‘Evidence of the motive which suggests the doing of the act
constituting the crime charged is always admissible and this
is true even though such evidence tends to show the commis-
sion of another crime, or constitutes proof of the commission
of another crime, provided the time which has elapsed be-
tween the crime charged and the offense concerning which the
testimony is offered is not too remote. Evidence of similar
acts affords the surest basis for inference that the crime
charged was committed by the accused. Wharton’s Criminal
Evidence, Vol..1 (11th Ed.) pp. 523-527, par. 351.

Evidence of other crimes may be admitted when it tends to
establish a common scheme or plan embracing the commission
of a series of crimes so related to each other that proof of one
tends to prove the other, and to show the defendant’s guilt of
the crime charged. Subsequent as well as prior collateral
offenses can be put in evidence and from such system, identity
or intent can often be shown. Like crimes, committed against
the same class of persons, at about the same time, tend to
show the same general design and evidence of the same as
relevant and may lead to proof of identity. Wharton’s Crim-
inal Evidence, Vol. 1 (11th Ed.), pp. 527-532, par. 352. See
20 Am. Jur. 289-298, par. 310, 311, 312, 313, 314 and 315;
Robinson v. State, 243 Ala. 684, 11 So. (2nd) 732; Daniels v.
State, 243 Ala. 675, 11 So. (2nd) 756; Barnett v. State of
Ohio, 104 Ohio 298, 185 N.E. 647, 27 A.L.R. 351; Merritt v.
State of Georgia, 168 Ga. 753, 149 S.E. 46.

The trial court gave special instructions to the jury on the
point in issue viz:

600

“There has been permitted to go before you in the trial of
this case certain evidence showing or tending to show, if you
find such evidence to be true, that the defendant committed
certain acts against and upon other women than Sadie Loise
Pipkin, the prosecutrix named in the indictment in this case.
The defendant is. not charged in this case with the commis-
sion of any act or offense against or upon any person or per-
sons other than the said Sadie Loise Pipkin, and it is upon the
charge that he raped the said Sadie Loise Pipkin, as set forth
in the indictment in this case, and upon such charge alone
that you are sworn to try this defendant. Such evidence with
respect to this defendant and said other women, if you be-
lieve such evidence to be true, must be considered by you only
upon the question of the defendant’s identity and his plan or
design if you find from the evidence that he had a plan or
design. The court instructs you that you must consider all
the evidence in this case solely in connection with the charge
on which the defendant is being tried and no other.” ~

We hold the assignment challenging its propriety is with-
out merit.

Counsel for appellant contends that the trial court erred in
refusing the defendant-appellant’s counsel the opening and
closing arguments to the jury under the provisions of Sec-
tion 918.09, F.S.A.; Crosby v. State, 90 Florida 381, 106 So.
741, and Haddock v. State, 121 Fla. 167, 163 So. 482. We
have studied the record and re-examined the authorities cited
in light ofthe contention made. It is true that the defendant
below adduced no witnesses other than himself, but did offer
and there was received in his behalf a photograph which
tended to prove a fact in issue, i. e. whether or not the de-
fendant possessed a mustache on the date of arrest on July
25, 1947, as bearing on the question of his identity. It is our
conclusion that the photograph was testimony within the
meaning of Section 918.09, supra, and our former adjudica-
tions. The withdrawal thereof as subsequently requested by
counsel so as not to come within the provisions of Section
918.09, supra, was a matter addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court and it has not been shown that the trial court
abused this discretion.

|
Le
601

The defense below was that of an alibi and the evidence
adduced in support thereof has been carefully considered.
The prosecutrix testified that the crime was committed around
2:00 or 2:30 P. M., July 22, 1947, at her home in the Arlington
section of Duval County, Florida. Mrs. Roxie Cason testi-
fied that she saw the defendant in the Arlington Section and
a short distance from the prosecutrix’s home about the hour
of the alleged crime. Mr. Vallerchamp, an employee of Ex-
celsior Mills Corporation, testified that he sent the defendant
in the truck to deliver at a house he was constructing in the
Arlington section some materials and the defendant returned
to the place of business of the Excelsior Mills Corporation
“shortly after four or four-thirty” July 22, 1947. We find
ample evidence in the record to sustain the verdict of the jury.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, ADAMS, SEBRING and
BARNS, J.J. concur.

EDWARD BALL v. RUTH LATHAM BALL

36 So. (2nd) 172 June Term, 1948
June 18, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 29, 1948

Harrell, McCauley & Perrine, John W. Harrell and Robert
R. Milam, for appellant.

Crawford & May, J. T. G. Crawford and Philip 8. May, for
appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The record in this case discloses that Edward Ball and
Ruth Latham were married in Washington, D. C., on June 17,
1933, and shortly thereafter established a home on the St.
Johns River on the outskirts of the City of Jacksonville,
where they lived together as husband and wife until the month
of January, 1943. During the month of May, 1943, Mrs. Ball
left the home and instituted a suit for divorce in the Circuit
Court of Duval County, Florida, on the ground of mental
cruelty and in her bill of complaint prayed for a divorce and
other relief. .

On December 6, 1948, the defendant and cross-plaintiff,
Edward Bail, filed an answer to the bill of complaint and a
counterclaim in which he prayed for affirmative relief. On
May 30, 1944, the court below, on motion of counsel for Mrs.
Ball, entered an order dismissing her bill of complaint with
prejudice to her right to again maintain a suit for divorce

upon the facts alleged in the bill of complaint. In the same
order the defendant, Edward Ball, was.permitted to prosecute
his counterclaim seeking or praying for an annulment of the
marriage contract and antenuptial contract of the parties en-

tered into shortly prior to their marriage. One phase of this
litigation was considered by this Court in an interlocutory
certiorari proceeding, but our ruling therein is not pertinent
to the issues presented on this appeal. Ball v. Ball, 155 Fla.
768, 21 So. (2nd) 458.

On February 1, 1946, by leave of the Court, the cross-
plaintiff filed an amended counterclaim and, in part, alleged
that the cross-defendant and the cross-plaintiff in early 1933
became engaged to marry and frequently exchanged ideas as
to the responsibilities and obligations of marriage and the
rearing and education of children which, might be born to
them as a result of their contemplated marriage, and their
views on this point were set out in Sections Twelve and Thir-
teen of their antenuptial agreement signed by them on June
15, 1983, and are viz:

“Twelfth: It is agreed by and between the parties hereto
that in the event the parties hereto have any child or children,
that when one of the parties hereto shall have reprimanded,
admonished or punished such child or children that even
though the other party hereto may not have felt that such
reprimand, admonishment or punishment was justified, no ob-
jection shall be raised to such reprimand, admonishment or
punishment in the presence of the child or children, as the
parties hereto realize that discipline is necessary and must be
mutually enforced for the welfare and successful training
and raising of a child or children.

“Thirteenth: It is mutually agreed by and between the
parties hereto that in the event the parties hereto have a child
or children, that such child or children shall have the benefit
of a public school education up to and including the high
school and that thereafter the parties hereto shall mutually
decide whether it is desirable for such a child or children to
have any additional educational facilities.”

No child was born to the marriage.

The amended counterclaim alleges that the antenuptial
contract and the marriage between the parties are invalid and
should be anulled because of fraud practiced on the cross-
plaintiff by the cross-defendant. Some weeks prior to June.
19, 1928, the cross-defendant consulted Dr. George B. Nor-

603

604

berg, of Kansas City, Missouri, and was advised to undergo:
a surgical operation, which was performed at the Trinity
Lutheran Hospital on June 19, 1928, by Dr. Norberg. The
cross-defendant’s right ovary and the right Fallopian tube:
were removed. The left ovary was not removed but cysts.
found thereon were punctured. The left Fallopian tube was
either removed or some effort or steps taken by the surgeon
to make the same patent. The cross-defendant was sterile
on June 17, 1933, and for sometime prior thereto, and cross-
defendant knew it or had good reason to believe that she was.
sterile.

The amended counterclaim further alleged that it was the
duty of the cross-defendant, before the marriage ceremony
was performed, to make known to the cross-plaintiff the fact.
that in the year 1928 she had a surgical operation involving
her genital organs. It was her lawful duty to give to the
cross-plaintiff all the information in connection with such
matters, things and conditions as were known to her and also.
all of the knowledge and information that she could have ob-
tained by the exercise of ordinary diligence. The defendant.
failed and neglected to give the plaintiff any information
whatever regarding the surgical operation and the cross-
plaintiff did not know that the cross-defendant had ever had.
an operation involving her genital organs or that her genital
organs had been diseased. He did not know prior to marriage
or prior to the filing of her suit on the 24th of May, 1948, of
the diseased condition of her genital organs and he learned.
for the first time of the surgical operation and the diseased
genital organs after she had instituted suit against him for-
divorce.

The amended counterclaim also alleges that the cross-
plaintiff performed his full duties as the husband of the cross-
defendant, administered to her needs and wants in sickness.
and in health and transferred to her stocks and bonds and
caused the title to described interests in real estate to be
placed in her name. A bank account in the joint names of the
parties was opened and the husband deposited therein income
and earnings as provided for by the terms and provisions of
their antenuptial contract and that the cross-defendant now

Es
a
605

holds this property, because of her fraud and deception, in
trust for the cross-plaintiff as his trustee.

The counterclaim prays for a decree declaring the ante-
nuptial contract and the marriage contract void ab initio and
that all property transferred by the cross-plaintiff to the
cross-defendant in contemplation of marriage be transferred
or conveyed to him.

The cross-defendant, Ruth Latham Ball, in answering the
amended counterclaim, admitted her marriage to Edward
Ball; that she had been previously married at the age of 24
and lived with her former husband about seven years and she
had no children; she married the cross-plaintiff in good faith
at the age of 33 and he was 45, and prior to the marriage
‘ceremony she signed the antenuptial agreement referred to;
and she lived with the cross-plaintiff as his wife for approxi-
mately ten years, and no children were born to the marriage.

The cross-defendant in her answer admitted that prior to
June 19, 1928, she consulted Dr. Norberg, a surgeon at Kansas
City, Missouri, and, after an examination, he learned that
she had a cystic ovary and a diseased appendix and advised
her to undergo a surgical operation. For a short period of
time prior to the operation until several hours afterward she
was unconscious from the affect of an anaesthetic and of her
own knowledge does not know and has never known whether
her right ovary was cystic and greatly enlarged or whether
her right Fallopian tube adhered around the cyst and
stretched from its normal length of 2% or 3 inches to about
8 inches, or whether her left ovary was cystic and degener-
ated or whether her left Fallopian tube was diseased and the
fimbricated end closed as alleged; she was advised by Dr.
Norberg, shortly after the operation, that he had removed
her appendix and one ovary. She had no further knowledge
or information about the operation than as conveyed to her
supra by Dr. Norberg, except the information appearing in a
pleading to the contrary filed December 6, 1943.

Since the filing of the original counterclaim on December
6, 1943, by investigation and inquiry, she learned and believes
that in said operation her appendix, right ovary and right
Fallopian tube were removed and her left ovary was treated

a
606

but not removed, and also that her left Fallopian tube was

treated but not removed. She denied that on June 17, 1933, at

the time of her marriage to the cross-plaintiff she was sterile.

She denied that on said date, or any time prior thereto, she

knew or had good reason to believe that she was sterile, but, .
on the contrary, she alleged that she was not sterile.

Answering further she admitted the operation was per-
formed by Dr. Norberg at the Trinity Lutheran Hospital and
a record of the operation was kept by the hospital, but she
failed or omittéd to inspect the hospital record as kept on her
operation. She inquired of Dr. Norberg, after the operation
and prior to her discharge on July 3, 1928, whether she could
have a child and that he told her he saw no reason why she
could not have a child and that he thought the best thing she
could do would be to go home and have a baby. She alleged
that all that was known to her of said operation at the time
of the marriage was the removal of her appendix and one
ovary.

The answer of the cross-defendant admits that she did
not inform cross-plaintiff that one of her ovaries had been
removed in the surgical operation but prior to marriage she
did inform him that she had previously had a major opera-
tion and after marriage he knew or should have known that a
major operation involved her genital organs. That the cross-
plaintiff did not know that she was sterile because in fact she
was not and is'not sterile. After informing the cross-plaintiff
of the major operation prior to marriage, his lack of informa-
tion as to the diseased condition of the genital organs was
due solely to his failure to make inquiry after being advised
and informed of the major operation by the cross-defendant.

Cross defendant further reply to said amended counter-_
claim says “that notwithstanding the averments thereof,
which the cross-defendant has hereinbefore and here again
denies, said marriage is nevertheless valid by virtue of its
ratification by the cross-plaintiff in this: That in the early
years of their married life together she repeatedly discussed
with the cross-plaintiff her failure to become pregnant and
manifested to him her distress that she had not done so; that
the cross-plaintiff never at any such discussion, or at any

other time, voiced or otherwise disclosed any concern or
interest in, or questioned her concerning, her failure to be-
come pregnant; that he never at any time complained to her
or expressed any disappointment concerning her failure to
become pregnant; that in the early part of the year 1938, of
her own violition, she consulted a competent physician as to
why she had not become pregnant; that said physician, after
a physical examination and an investigation from which he
learned that in said surgical operation her right ovary and right
Fallopian tube had been removed, and that her left ovary had
been treated by puncturing cysts contained therein, and that her
left Fallopian tube had been treated by cutting off the
thickened sacculated end and bringing the mucosa and serosa
together, advised her that a slight operation would probably
fix her so she could have children; that she promptly told the
cross-plaintiff what the physician had said; that the cross-
plaintiff then advised her to wait and never thereafter re-
ferred to said conversation or the subject thereof; that not-
withstanding said next hereinabove alleged facts and circum-
stances the cross-plaintiff continued to live and cohabit
sexually with her as his wife until on or about January 1,
1943, and thereby the cross-plaintiff ratified said marriage.”

The Chancellor appointed Herbert Lamson as Special
Master, with instructions to take the testimony of the parties
and report the same, with his findings of law and fact. Many
hearings were had before the Special Master and several hun-
dred pages of testimony taken. The Special Master reported
to the Chancellor that the equities of the cause were with the
cross-plaintiff and a decree granting the relief prayed for
should be entered. Exceptions were made to the report of the
Special Master and, after argument before the Chancellor,
exceptions were sustained and the cross-plaintiff’s amended
counterclaim by an appropriate order was dismissed, and he
appealed.

Counsel for appellant pose here for adjudication several
questions: (1) Was Ruth Latham Ball sterile on June 17,
1933, the date of the marriage? (2) Did Ruth Latham Ball,
on June 17, 1933, know or have good reason to believe that
she was sterile? (3) Was it the duty of Ruth Latham Ball to

607

608

inform the appellant as to the diseased condition of her
genital organs, in view of her major operation on June 19,
1928, and additional information obtainable by the exercise
of ordinary diligence, prior to the signing of the antenuptial
contract and marriage with the appellant? (4) Did appellant
first learn of the major operation after suit for divorce was
filed on May 24, 1943? (5) After proving Ruth Latham Ball
sterile prior to marriage and her fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion of these facts at the time of marriage, does the law re-
quire him to prove that he desired children, and none were
born, and he was damaged by the fraud? (6) Did the appel-
lant ratify the antenuptial contract and marriage by continu-
ing to live with the appellee? (7) Was-the appellant guilty
of laches by continuing to live with the appellee? (8) If the
appellee had a Rubin’s test in January, 1944, and the test dis-
closed that she was sterile, and she knowingly concealed the
fact, would not the appellant be entitled to relief in equity
because of the doctrine of unclean hands? Other questions
are raised by the appellant, but the foregoing strike at the
tap root of this controversy.

The main questions propounded by appellee’s counsel are
viz: (1) Is a wife’s non-disclosure of a known physical con-
dition of sterility a fraud sufficient to vitiate a consummated
marriage between a grass widow 32 years old to a bachelor
45 years old, independent of any other cause, at the suit of
the husband instituted ten and a half years after marriage?
(2) Is the evidence clear and convincing that the appellee was
sterile at the time of marriage? (3) Is there support in the
evidence for the Chancellor’s conclusion that the appellant
failed to establish remedial damages? (4) Is there support
in the evidence for the Chancellor’s conclusion that the ap-
pellee had no knowledge that she was sterile? (5) Is there
support in the evidence for the Chancellor’s conclusion that
the appellant confirmed or ratified his marriage? (6) Is
there support in the evidence for the Chancellor’s conclusion
that the appellant was guilty of laches?

The case of Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836, in-
volved the annulment of a voidable marriage on the ground of
fraud. Augusta Jones married W. F. Jones when she had a

living husband and by fraud and deception induced W. F.
Jones to marry her. W.. F. Jones at the time was without
knowledge that Augusta Jones had a living husband. The
parties lived together for some time when a child was born
and shortly thereafter the husband Jones learned of his wife’s
living husband and brought suit for an annulment of the
marriage, which was granted. We held to constitue fraud the
wife must have known that her former husband was living
and not divorced at the time of her second marriage, or must
have been in possession of knowledge or facts sufficient to
have put a person of ordinary and reasonable prudence upon
notice of such facts and with such knowledge she must have,
by word or act, represented that she was competent to con-
tract marriage and the plaintiff must have married her in re-
liance upon such representations and without knowledge or
reasonable means of knowledge to the contrary. See LeBlanc
v. Yawn, 99 Fla. 328, 331, 126 So. 789; McClish v. Rankin,
153 Fla. 214, 14 So. (2nd) 714.

‘We have on many occasions ruled that to constitute fraud
a misrepresentation must be of a specific material fact that
is untrue and known to be so and stated for the purpose of
inducing another to act, upon which statement the other
relies in acting to his injury. Sutton v. Gulf Life Ins. Co.,.
138 Fla. 692, 189 So. 828; Mortgage Holding Corp. v. Summy,
97 Fla. 403, 121 So. 473; Allen v. United Zinc Co., 64 Fla. 171,
60 So. 182. There is involved in the matter of false represen-
tation as a basis for the rescission of contract the element of
resulting injury to the person seeking relief which is not sup-
plied by the bare allegation of such injury. There must ap-
pear such facts as show a connection between the represen-
tation as made and the value as affected by it. This material
element of the alleged fraud must not be left to conjecture
and averment. Stokes v. Victory Land Co., 99 Fla. 795, 128
So. 408.

On the question of the ratification of fraud by a litigant,
Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisdiction, Vol. (5th Ed.) says, if the
plaintiff is a party to the fraud to such an extent that he is
in pari delicto with the defendant, he cannot obtain relief as
equity generally does not relieve a person from the conse-

609

610

quences of his own fraud. . . If he is not in pari delicto, and is
comparatively the more innocent of the two, he may obtain
relief by doing full equity to those parties, if any, who have
sustained an injury by his partial wrong. (Par. 916, pp. 595-
96).

“RATIFICATION.—While the party entitled to relief may
either avoid the transaction or confirm it, he cannot do both;
if he adopts a part, he adopts all; he must reject it entirely if
he desires to obtain relief. Any material act done by him,
with knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, or under
such circumstances that knowledge must be imputed, which
assumes that the transaction is valid, will be a ratification.
(As said by the American Law Institute, ‘The power of avoid-
ance for fraud or misrepresentation is lost if the injured
party after acquiring knowledge of the fraud or misrepresen-
tation manifests to the other party to the transaction an in-
tention to affirm it, or exercises dominion over things restora-
tion of which is a condition of his power of avoidance... .’

“(The victim of the fraud cannot both affirm and dis-
affirm. He cannot claim under and against the fraudulent
transaction’). .

“917. — PROMPTNESS — DELAY THROUGH IGNOR-
‘ANCE OF THE FRAUD—The most important practical con-
sequence of the two principles above mentioned is the
requisite of promptness. The injured party must assert his
remedial rights with diligence and without delay, upon be-
coming aware of the fraud. After he has obtained knowledge
of the fraud, or has been informed of facts and circumstances
from which such knowledge would be imputed to him, a delay
in instituting judicial proceedings for relief, although for a
less period than that prescribed by the statute of limitations,
may be, and generally will be, regarded as an acquiescence,
and this may be, and generally will be, a bar to any equitable
remedy. 7

“To this rule there is one limitation: it applies only when
the fraud is known or ought to have been known. No lapse
of time, no delay in bringing a suit, however long, will defeat
the remedy, provided the injured party was, during all this

interval, ignorant of the fraud. The duty to commence pro-

ceedings can arise only upon his discovery of the fraud; and
* the possible effect of his laches will begin to operate only
from that time.”

On the single point that Mrs. R. S. Price, now Mrs. Ruth
Latham Ball, was operated on at the Trinity Lutheran Hos-
pital in Kansas City, Missouri, on June 19, 1928, by Dr.
George B. Norberg, assisted by Doctors Stephens and ‘Mum-
ford, and that she remained in the hospital as a patient and
was treated by Dr. Norberg until discharged by the hospital
on July 3, 1928, is not seriously disputed. The affect of the
surgical operation on the sterility of the cross-defendant-
appellee is the storm center of this controversy. It is the
cross-plaintiff-appellant’s contention that the evidence ad-
duced clearly established that the surgical operation rendered
the appellee sterille and she knew it at the time of the
marriage and the signing of the antenuptial agreement but
fraudulently concealed this information from the appellant
and to his injury. The appellee likewise contends that the
evidence adduced by the appellant is legally insufficient to
establish her sterility at the time of the marriage and the
signing of the antenuptial contract because at the time she
was sterile and the evidence is insufficient to establish fraudu-
lent misrepresentation as asserted by the appellant.

The records adduced into evidence as kept by the Trinity
Lutheran Hospital covering the period when the appellee was
a patient (from June 18, 1928 until the following July 3rd,
date of her discharge), coupled with the testimony of Dr.
Mumford, when considered alone, are strong proof of the
appellee’s sterility. The appellee answers this testimony by
stating that Dr. Mumford’s testimony stands discredited on
the record because of contradictory statements in letters by
him sent to counsel for appellee prior to the time that he was
called as a witness for the appellant and the explanations as
by him given forthe contradictions were not convincing. It
is pointed out that the explanations should be considered in
light of a per diem of $50.00, costs of transportation, and
traveling expenses for the witness and his wife from Cali-
fornia to Kansas City and return. The appellee testified that

611

|
612

she was too sick when in the hospital to keep up with the
records there made and had never seen or read them.

On this pivotal point the testimony of Dr. Norberg should *
be considered in connection with the hospital records and Dr.
Mumford’s testimony. Dr. Stephens is shown to be dead. Dr.
Norberg testified that in his career as a surgeon he had
operated on several thousand patients and it was difficult for
him to remember the details of the operation. He remem-
bered the assistance given by Dr. Stephens but was unable to
recall Dr. Mumford. From his personal record kept of opera-
tions, on July 12, 1935, he wrote Dr. Casler, of Baltimore,
Maryland, who had the appellee as a patient, viz:

“Dr. DeWitt Bellinger Casler,
13 Chase Street, West
Baltimore, Maryland.

“Dear Doctor:

“Replying to your letter regarding Mrs. Ball, who was
Mrs. Price in June 1928 when I had her for a patient.

“Our records show that she had a large ovarian cyst
(right) with a long fallopian tube that was adhered around
the cyst and stretched to the length of eight inches; the cyst
and fallopian tube were both removed.

“On her left side she had a much degenerated cystic ovary
and there was some question as to whether it should be re-
moved or not; it was left in however after puncturing the cysts
contained therein. The fimbriated end of the left fallopian
tube was entirely closed; an effort to make this patent was
done by cutting off the thickened sacculated end and bringing
the mucosa and serosa together; an appendectomy was also
done for the reason that the appendix showed considerable
pathology.

“T trust this may be of some service to you and that your
patient may realize her desire although it has been my ex-
perience that it is difficult to re-establish normal function in
a diseased fallopian tube.

“Yours very truly,
(Signed) Geo. B. Norberg
Geo. B. Norberg, M. D.”

As the writer studies the record, the above testimony was
taken by depositation and the Special Master simply studied
the record and reached conclusions. The record of the hos-
pital showed that one ovary and both tubes were removed but
according to appellant’s theory, Dr. Norberg, who performed
the operation, expressed the view that the left ovary and the
left tube were not removed. Thus was presented a dispute
and conflict in the testimony and was settled by the order of
the chancellor below.

Several eminent gynecologists were called by the appellant
and, after a study of Dr. Norberg’s letter to Dr. Casler, supra,
were asked to give or state an opinion as to the sterility of
the appellee based on the facts and information in the latter.
The majority view was to the effect that the appellee was
sterile as a result of the major operation performed by Dr.
Norberg. Dr. Casler, an outstanding gynecologist of Balti-
more, had the appellee as a patient during May, 1934, July,
1935, and March, 1938. She had requested of the Doctor his
opinion on why she was not pregnant, and, after a careful
and thorough physical examination, was unable to assign a
medical reason for her failure to become pregnant. On one of
the visits he suggested a Rubin’s test—the approved and
recognized medical method of determining the physical ca-
pacity of a woman to bear children, or whether she possessed
or did not possess the genital organs necessary for conception
and bearing children. These physicians testified as to their
custom of advising women after operations about their ca-
pacity to bear children and approved the practice of telling
them the truth—whether for or against the patient. The
testimony contradicts the appellee on the point to the effect
that Dr. Norberg told her on leaving the hospital on July 3,
1928, “I see no reason why you cannot (have a baby), and I
think the best thing you could possibly do would be to go
home and have a baby.” Dr. Norberg, when on the stand,
stated that he did not remember making said statement.

The burden of establishing fraud by law rested on the
cross-plaintiff as alleged in his amended counter claim. Le-
Blanc v. Yawn, supra. A presumption exists in the appellate
court that an order made by the lower court and assigned as.

613

—
614

error is correct and the burden of showing reversible error
rests upon the party asserting it. Markett v. Hilpert, 140 Fla.
842. 192 So. 392. Where the findings of the Chancellor are
supported by the evidence, or where the evidence is.conflicting
and there is substantial evidence to support the Chancellor’s
findings, such findings will not be set aside unless the, appel-
lant makes it clearly to appear that substantial error was
committed by the Chancellor in his conclusion, or that the
evidence clearly shows them to be erroneous. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Fla. 845, 184 So. 513.

A pertinent question presented on this record is, did the
appellee know or have good reason to believe that she was
sterile on June 17, 1933? It is not disputed that the appellee
advised the appellant that she had, during June, 1928, sub-
mitted to a major operation. The parties apparently were
content to let the matter rest, as they married and lived to-
gether for a period of approximately ten years. The appellant
had the opportunity prior to marriage to explore the extent
of the major operation by ascertaining whether or not the
operation involved her genital organs, the hospital where the
operation was performed, the names of the attending nurses,
and the name and address of the operating surgeon, and the
information was then available as was shown to have been
some ten or twelve ‘years later. It is suggested that the law
made it the duty of the appellee to voluntarily disclose to her
intended husband the several details of the major operation
and if it involved her reproduction organs, which operation it
is contended rendered the appellee sterile. Her answer in
effect was that she told him of the major operation but did
not express a view or make a statement about her possible
sterility.

_Our study of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the
appellee at the time of the marriage did not know nor did she
have good reason to believe that she was sterile. The appel-
lant simply failed, which is clearly established when con-
sidering all the evidence, to carry the burden of proof as re-
quired by law by proving as alleged that the appellee was
sterile or had good reasons to believe that she was sterile.
We do not overlook the hospital records, the explanation

thereof by the appellee, Dr. Mumford’s testimony, the
opinions of expert witnesses, and many disputes and con-
flicts in the testimony. It is the writer’s view that knowl-
edge and information of her sterility became positively known
to her, if at all, for the first time in January 1944, as a result
of the Rubin’s test as given by Dr. Te Linde.

The comments of the Chancellor below on this point are
significant and are viz:

“... Mrs Ball’s action in having the (Rubin’s) test per-
formed is of great significance to the issues in this case, in a
way overlooked by counsel, that is, her motive. Regardless
of the result of the test, she could have had but one thing in
mind when she had it performed: To prove that she pos-
sessed the organs necessary to conception. Here is a woman
charged with knowledge of her absolute sterility for more
than fifteen years and fraudulent concealment thereof for
more than ten years. What did she do when that charge was
made in defendant’s counterclaim? Her lawyer leaves to
examine a hospital record on which the charge is based and
she sets out on her own to seek irrefutable evidence that the
charge is untrue. To me, it is unimportant that the result of
the test disappointed her. What is important is that in Janu-
ary, 1944, she still did not know that she was physically in-
capable of bearing children. Certainly then, she had no such
knowledge in June, 1933. An obvious objection can be made:
She very guilefully stated that she had had the test made in
order to induce the conclusion here reached. The answer to
that proposition lies in (1) her obvious reluctance to testify
that the test was made and (2) the fact that neither shé nor
her counsel up to this time have sought to give her action the
significance here attributed to it.”

The husband by his amended counterclaim filed in the
Court below sought a decree holding void ab initio for fraudu-
lent misrepresentations by the wife an alleged voidable
marriage and antenuptial agreement of the parties. The
issues were clearly defined by the answer of the wife, and
after the taking of testimony by a Special Master, the
Chancellor on final hearing allowed the wife counsel fees. It
is contended here that the allowance was clearly erroneous

615

De
616

and not authorized by Section 65.07, F.S.A.; neither is there
a contract between the parties to sustain this allowance. The
answer to the contention is our ruling in Prine v. Prine, 36
Fla. 676, 18 So. 781, 34 L.R.A. 87, which ruling was by us re-
affirmed in Courtney v. Courtney, 108 Fla. 276, 146 So. 229.

* In the Prine case supra the husband sought to annul a
marriage entered into during a period of intoxication from
the excessive use of intoxicants and for that reason did not
know or comprehend what he was doing; he was deprived of
his power to reason; and for all intents and purposes was non
compos mentis. We held under the facts therein that a court
of chancery, independently of statute as an incident to chan-
cery jurisdiction, could make and enter an appropriate order
allowing the wife counsel fees. We fail to find merit in this

assignment.
Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Le
FREDERICK D. STEESE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
36 So. (2nd) 212 June Term, 1948
June 22, 1948 Division A

Waybright & Waybright, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.:
The appellant was tried and convicted in the Criminal
Court of Record of Orange County, Florida, for the crime of

617

bigamy. An important element in the case was whether or
not a paper writing produced by the appellant purporting to
be a certified copy of a final decree of divorce from a former
wife was genuine or forged. During the course of the trial
the prosecuting attorney, over proper objection, was per-
mitted to ask the appellant on cross examination, and the ap-
pellant was required to answer, whether or not he had ever
been convicted of crime, and if so, the character or nature of
the crime of which he had been convicted. The answer of the
appellant, which he was required to make despite objections
made by him, was that he had been convicted of forgery and
for “obtaining money under false pretenses, or various allied
misdemeanors.” The appellant has taken an appeal from the
judgment and sentence and has assigned as error the action of
the trial judge in overruling the objections to the questions
propounded on cross examination and requiring the appellant
to answer.

The judgment appealed from must be reversed and a new
trial awarded upon the ground of appeal assigned. While a
defendant in a criminal case who has taken the witness stand
in his own behalf may be questioned on cross examination as
to whether or not he has ever been convicted of crime, the
cross examination may not be pressed to the extent, if the ac-
cused admits to previous convictions, of requiring him to dis-
close the particular crimes of which he has been convicted,
unless the previous convictions have been for the crime of
perjury. See Watts v. State, (Fla.) 34 So. (2nd) 429.

The judgment appealed from should be reversed and a new
trial awarded.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

J. OTIS SIMS and MRS. J. OTIS SIMS, his wife, v. C. B. PALMER

35 So. (2nd) 841 June Term, 1948
June 22, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied July 3, 1948

Marion B. Knight, for appellants.
Wm. J. Oven, Jr., for appellee.

BARNS, J.: :

In 1926 S. H. Yon purchased the property in question and
executed a purchase money mortgage in the amount of
$750.00. After $500.00 had been paid on the principal, S. H.
Yon went into bankruptcy and abandoned the property.
Thereafter a “1942 tax certificate” was issued and acquired by
J. Otis Sims, appellant. On May 7, 1945, based on this cer-
tificate, a tax deed was issued to appellant, Sims, by the Clerk
of the Cireuit Court.

On June 4, 1945, Sims procured a quitclaim deed from
S. H. Yon, the former owner.

On December 13, 1946, the appellee, C. B. Palmer, the
holder of the purchase money mortgage, filed his bill to fore-
close his mortgage.

Upon the facts above stated the Chancellor entered a de-
cree of foreclosure and Sims appealed the decree for review.

There was no allegation or charge of fraud. The tax title
evidenced by the deed from the Clerk of the Circuit Court was
a new and independent title and the procuring of a quitclaim
deed free of fraud on the mortgagee was not sufficient to
justify the court in entering a decree of foreclosure.

The appellee places reliance for the support of the Chancel-
lor’s final decree upon the case of Torreyson v. Dutton, 137
Fla. 683, 188 So, 805, 190 So. 480. This is a case as follows:

Mollie Dutton and husband gave a mortgage to Lacy,
who assigned the mortgage to Torreyson and Torreyson as-
signed the mortgage to Douglas. While Douglas was the
holder of the mortgage, one Nason acquired a tax certificate.
Douglas was made a party to the tax foreclosure suit and pur-
suant to a decree of court the property was sold and purchased.
by Nason. A master’s deed conveyed the property to Nason,

a
a
619

who conveyed to Lowe in 1932 and Lowe conveyed to Mollie
Dutton, the original owner and mortgagor, in 1937;

In 1938 Douglas reassigned his mortgage to Torreyson,
who brought suit against Dutton, the original mortgagor, to
foreclose the mortgage;

Fraud was the basis of relief in the Torreyson case ac-
cording to'the bill, which charged:

“... Complainant would further show and allege the fact
to be that the foreclosure suit and sale heretofore described in
this suit was fraudulent and made with intent to divest and
wipe out the mortgage lien represented by the mortgage de-
scribed and that the conveyance from the said A. R. Nason to
F. S. Lowe and from F. S. Lowe to the defendant, Mollie Dut-
.ton, was all part of a scheme and collusion which the said
Mollie Dutton had devised for the purpose of acquiring the
said property free and clear of the lien of the mortgage in-
volved in this suit and of divesting the owner and holder of
said mortgage of the lien without making payment thereon as
required therein. . . . The foreclosure suit described was a
friendly suit and for the purpose of divesting the lien of said
mortgage and was not in good faith but was brought in collu-
sion with said Mollie Dutton and her husband, Ralph J. Dut-
ton, for the purpose of divesting the lien of the mortgage in-
volved in this suit....”

The Chancellor found for the defendants and was reversed
on appeal. The language of the opinion in the Torreyson case
must be considered as applied to the facts of the case before
the court. .

The irregularities relating to the validity of the tax deed
seem not to be fatal. See Adams v. Fielding, 148 Fla. 552, 4
So. (2nd) 678.

Reversed.
THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
a
JESS V. COHN v. WILLIS COHN
36 So. (2nd) 199 June Term, 1948
Tune 25, 1948 Division B

Joseph A. Wanick, for appellant.
George Wood, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.: .

This appeal questions the granting of a $1000.00 master’s
fee in an uncontested divorce action. On rehearing the chan-
cellor reduced the fee to $750.00. The award was made upon
the master’s report that:

“The Master has received no fees for his services in this
matter but would show to the Court that there have been five
or six hearings and many, many conferences with both the
attorneys for the parties and the parties themselves, both in
the presence of the counsel and at times when no counsel was
present and innumerable telephone conversations. The Mas-
ter is of the opinion that all the parties and their attorneys

- would agree that the patient and sympathetic handling of this
cause by the Master has brought about a settlement between
the parties which could not have been done if it had been
handled otherwise. Therefore the Master suggests to the
Honorable Court that he be paid a fee of not less than
$1,000.00.”

On final hearing the divorce was granted without contest
and property settlement, previously agreed upon, was ap-
proved by the court and the $1000.00 fee was awarded the
master. Upon petition for rehearing the chancellor observed:

“... The Court takes into consideration the following:

“1, The importance of this case.

P|
a
621

“2. The age of the Special Master.

“3. The ability of the Special Master.

“4, The experience of the Special Master.

“5. The wide knowledge of law of the Special Master.

“6. The responsibility assumed herein by the Special
Master.

“7, The quality of the work done by the Special Master
herein.

“8, The testimony taken on the said petition for rehearing.

“9, The purchase power of money.

“10. The financial ability of the defendant.

“11. The income of the defendant.

“12. The fact that the defendant has not testified that the
allowance herein made for the Special Master will work any
financial hardship upon him.

“13, The fact that the defendant is a leading physician
and surgeon in his specialty in this community and thereby
enjoys a large income therefrom.

“14. The fact that at final hearing of this cause, George
W. Wood, attorney for plaintiff, and Lawrence BE. Hoffman,
attorney for defendant, both stated to the Court that the said
allowance as Special Master’s fee in the final decree was rea-
sonable.

“At the hearing before the undersigned on said petition
for rehearing the Special Master in Chancery stated he would
be satisfied with a fee of $750.00. .

Thereupon the fee was reduced to $750.00 which is now as-
serted to be excessive.

The chancellor failed to apply the right principle of law.
The statute, Sec. 62.07, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A., prescribes a
standard relative to master’s compensation. From the above
quotation it is apparent that the chancellor failed to be guided
by the statute.

It is well stated by Kooman, Florida Chancery Pleading
and Practice, page 306:

. Where masters are to hear witnesses, examine and
consider evidence, try and determine controverted questions
of fact, investigate and state complicated and controverted ac-
counts, and make reports of the proceedings and results to

622

the court, it has generally been understood and practiced that
they should be allowed a reasonable compensation irrespec-
tive of schedules of fees. In such cases the court will allow
compensation commensurate with the master’s ability, ex-
perience, and fitness for the tasks assigned to him and com-
mensurate with the importance and difficulty of his work and
the responsibility it imposes upon him. But the tendency of
the court should be to keep down these charges instead of
adding to the burdensome expense of litigation. In all ordi-
nary cases of no peculiar or special difficulty, and involving no
extraordinary labor, the master should be allowed no greater
compensation than that fixed by the statute or rule of
court....”

The author has made a fair summation of our holdings in

. Mabry, et al., v. Knabb, 151 Fla. 432, 10 So. (2nd) 330; Marion
Mts. Co. v. Moorman, et al., 100 Fla. 1522, 131 So. 650.

There is no basis in this case to warrant compensation in
addition to that fixed by the statute and the decree is reversed
for another decree according to law.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

PC
CETY OF ORLANDO, a municipal corporation, v. L. A. JOHNSON, trad-
ing and doing business as WOODS FUEL ODL COMPANY, of Or-
Jando, Florida.
36 So. (2nd) 209 “+ June Term, 1948
Tune 25, 1948 En Bane

623

Campbell Thornal, for appellant.
Akerman, Dial & Akerman, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.:

An ordinance of the City of Orlando imposes an excise tax
on every purchase of fuel oil within the corporate limits of
the municipality, the tax to be paid by the purchaser at the
time of his purchase. The appellee, a dealer in fuel oil,
brought a bill of complaint for a declaration of his rights
under the ordinance, and to enjoin the City from enforcing the
collection of any tax on fuel oil. The City filed its motion to
dismiss the bill. It also entered into a stipulation of facts
with the appellee in which the parties agreed that the City of
Orlando would not file an answer but that in lieu of answer
the stipulation should be made, upon which the court should
enter its decree; that the business conducted by the plaintiff
is a competitive service operating in competition with the
service rendered by so-called liquified petroleum gas dealers
and manufactured gas dealers, both of which types of com-
petitive service are operating in the City of Orlando; that the
allegations of the complaint are factually correct but that the
legal conclusions are not admitted.

At a hearing on the bill, the stipulation, and the motion to
dismiss the bill, the court entered a decree finding that those
portions of the ordinance which purported to levy or impose a
levy on fuel oil were void because the city was without au-
thority from the legislature to levy such a tax on fuel oil; and
that the City should be enjoined from attempting an enforce-
ment of the ordinance with respect to fuel oil purchases.

The City has taken an appeal from the decree.

The City of Orlando asserts its right to adopt and enforce
the ordinance because of Chapter 22829, Laws of Florida,
1945, which the City maintains gives it that power to impose a
consumer tax on fuel oil. The statute is a law entitled “AN
ACT Authorizing Cities and Towns in this State to Impose,

EE
624

Levy and Collect on each and every Purchase of Electricity,
Metered or Bottled Gas (Natural, Liquified Petroleum Gas or
Manufactured), Water Service, Telephone Service and Tele-
graph Service within their Corporate Limits, a Tax (straight
percentage, sliding scale, graduated or other basis) in an
Amount not to exceed Ten Per Centum of the Payments Re-
ceived by the Seller of Such Utility Service for the Purchase
of such Utility Service and Providing that in every case the
Tax shall be Collected from the Purchaser and paid by the
Purchaser for the Use of the City or Town to the Seller of
such Utility Service at the time of Paying the Charge there-
for to the Seller; Provided for other Matters and things
Necessary and Incidental to effect the Purposes herein; and
Providing when this Act shall take effect.”

See section 167.43(1), 1945 Supp. to Florida Statutes,
1941.

In the body of the statute it is provided:

“(1) The several cities and towns in this state are hereby
given the right, power, and authority, by nonemergency ordi-
nance, to impose, levy and collect on each and every purchase
of electricity, metered or bottled gas (natural, liquified pe-
troleum gas or manufactured), water service, telephone
service and telegraph service in their corporate limits, a tax
(straight percentage, sliding scale, graduated or other basis)
in an amount not to exceed ten per cent of the payments re-
ceived by the seller... In the event any such ordinance im-
poses such a tax on the purchase of one of the utility services
described herein and a competitive utility service or services
are purchased in the city or town, then such ordinance shall
impose a tax in like amount on the purchase of the competi-
tive utility service or services whether privately or publicly
owned or distributed; however, telephone service and tele-
graph service shall not be required to be considered competi-
tive services.”

The appellant concedes that the quoted statute upon which
it bottoms its supposed right to enact the tax in question does
not, in express terms, authorize the imposition of a tax on fuel

_ oil. It asserts, however, that its authority derives from that
portion of section 1 of chapter 22829 which provides that “In

625

the event any such ordinance’ imposes such a tax on the pur-
chase of one of the utility services described herein and a com-
petitive utility service or services are purchased in the city or
town, then such ordinance shall impose a tax in like amount
on the purchase of the competitive utility service or services;
and that the tax may be imposed because of the fact that the
sale of fuel oil is a “competitive utility service” in direct
competition with gas and electric services.

In our view, the contention is not tenable. The purpose of
chapter 22829, supra, as expressed in its title, is to empower
the cities and towns in this state to enact ordinances impos-
ing, levying and collecting taxes on purchases of specifically
named commodities or services, namely, electricity, water and
gas and on telephone and telegraph services, such taxes to be
paid by the consumers buying these commodities or purchas-
ing these services. To construe the act as authorizing or per-
mitting a tax on fuel oil, when this commodity is not listed in
the title as one which may be taxed, and to arrive at such con-
struction merely because of the inclusion in the body of the
act of language permitting a tax with respect to “competitive
utility services,” would be violative of section 16-of Article
III of the Constitution of Florida, which requires that “Each
Jaw enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject
and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall
be briefly expressed in the title. ...”

While the title to an act need not be a complete index of its
subject matter, it must be sufficient to put the public on notice
or lead to reasonable inquiry as to its provisions. Compare
Boyer v. Black, Sheriff, 154 Fla. 723, 18 So. (2nd) 886; Town
of Monticello v. Finlayson, 156 Fla. 568, 23 So. (2nd) 843;
State ex rel. Watson v. Crooks, 158 Fla. 694, 15 So. (2nd) 675.
The act in question does not meet this constitutional require-
ment, for an examination of its title will not reveal any pro-
vision that would tend to put any fuel oil dealer, or purchaser
of fuel oil, on notice that a tax on this commodity was
covered or contemplated in the body of the act; or raise any
reasonable inference that such taxation was intended.

A final contention made by the appellant is that without
regard to the effect of chapter 22829, supra, the charter

De
626

powers of the City of Orlando are sufficiently broad to author-
ize the imposition of an excise tax on fuel oil, to be paid by
the purchaser of the product. As authority for its position
the appellant relies on the recent case of Smith v. City of
Miami, 160 Fla. 306, 34 So. (2nd) 544, wherein this court was
ealled upon to determine whether or not the charter powers of
the City of Miami were sufficiently broad to authorize the im-
position of an excise tax on a retailer or wholesaler for the
privilege of selling tobacco products. In that case the right of
the City to Impose the tax was upheld; but the decision is not
authority to sustain the validity of an ordinance such as we
have before us in the case at bar. The challenged ordinance
in the instant case attempts to impose the tax on fuel oil and
to make the tax payable by the purchaser, not by the whole-
saler or retailer as was the case in Smith v. City of Miami. So
far as we are advised, there is nothing in the charter act of the
City of Orlando which gives the City the power to impose an
excise tax on fuel oil and to require that the tax be paid by
the purchaser. Compare City of Miami v. Kayfetz, (Fla.) 30
So. (2nd) 521.

Insofar as the ordinance brought in question attempts to
levy and impose an excise tax on fuel oil, the challenged ordi-
nance is invalid and unenforceable. The decree appealed from
should therefore be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, BARNS
and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

a
E. R. SIMMONS v. STATE OF FLORIDA

36 So. (2nd) 207 June Term, 1948
June 25, 1948 En Banc

B. L. Solomon, and Robert L. McCrary, Jr., for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

WHITE, Associate Justice:

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence for viola-
tion of Statute 794.05. At the trial the lower court did not
include in its instructions to the jury the charge with respect
to the penalty fixed by law for the offense for which the ac-
cused was then on trial as required by Statute 918.10. The
failure to give the charge is the sole ground for reversal urged
by the appellant on this appeal.

Statute 918.10, enacted by the Legislature in the year 1945,
provides:

“The presiding judge shall charge the jury only upon the
law of the case at the conclusion of argument of counsel, and
must include in said charge the penalty fixed by law for the
offense for which the accused is then on trial.”

De
628

It was held by this Court in Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25.
So. 144 (1898) that, except in cases involving capital punish-
ment, where a majority of the jury may by a recommendation
to mercy in their verdict commute the penalty of death to life
imprisonment, the trial jury has no concern with the penalty
imposed by statute with respect to criminal offenses; and that

- instructions upon that subject are inappropriate. See also
Osius v. State, 96 Fla. 318, 117 So. 859 (1928). The principle
established in those cases still controls as respects the scope
of instructions to be given in a criminal prosecution, unless
Section 918.10 has abrogated the effect of the cited decisions
and now makes mandatory the giving of an instruction as to
the penalty fixed by law for the offense for which the accused
is then on trial.

In the trial of a criminal case in Florida the function of
the jury is to determine the issues of fact. The issues of fact.
embrace the disputes between the State and the defendant as
to what actually existed or occurred at the particular time
and place in question. When the State has carried the burden
which rests upon it, the jury must apply the law in charge to
the facts thus shown to be true in order to arrive at a verdict
conformable to law. Hence the sole function of the court’s
charge is properly to inform the jury concerning the rules of
law applicable to the facts in dispute. If the court is required
to depart from this course and discuss matters having no
bearing on the true function of the jury, the trial necessarily
is disconcerted and impeded.

The preservation of the inherent powers of the three
branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial
—free from encroachment or infringement by one upon the
other, is essential to the safekeeping of the American system
of constitutional rule.

This statement is found: (11 Am. Jur., p. 908)

“Any legislation that hampers judicial action or interferes
with the discharge of judicial functions is unconstitutional.”

This statement is also found: (16 C.J.S., p. 330).

“Although the legislature may regulate the procedure of
trial courts with respect to instructions to juries, it cannot

abridge the power of the judge to charge the law, and direct
a verdict where the facts are undisputed, nor can it require
the court to instruct the jury without regard to the evidence
offered.” (Underscoring supplied).

In State v. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425 (1880), a statute directed
the court, in trials upon indictments charging murder in the
first degree to charge upon the law respecting murder in the
second degree. Commenting upon the statute, the court said:

“It has always been held to be the duty of the court, in
trials for murder, if the evidence would warrant it, to instruct
the jury as to murder in the second degree, and if the above
section was meant to require such an instruction to be given,
without regard to the evidence, we do not: hesitate to say that
it is such an invasion of the province of the judiciary as can-
not be tolerated without a surrender of its independence under
the constitution. The legislature can pass any constitutional
law it may deem proper, and the courts are bound to observe
it, but it cannot prescribe for them what instructions they
shall give in a cause, unless they have previously embodied
into a legislative enactment as the law of the land the sub-
stance of such instructions.”

It will be observed that statute 918.10, in directing the
court to charge upon the penalty, uses the word “must,”
rather than “may.” If the statute be interpreted as an un-
qualified mandate that the court in every criminal case include
in the charge the penalty which might be imposed, rather than
a mere grant of the privilege to so charge, it becomes an un-
reasonable infringement of the inherent power of the court to
perform the judicial function because it burdens the court
with doing an empty and meaningless act.

In Fagan v. Robbins, 96 Fla. 91, 100, 117 So. 863 (1928),
this Court quoted with approval the following enunciation by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:

“The word ‘shall’ when used by the legislature to prescribe
the action of a court is usually a grant of authority, and
means ‘may’ and even if it be intended to be mandatory it
must be subject to the necessary limitation that a proper
case has been made out for the exercise of the power.”

629

Ll
630

It is a rule of statutory construction that an interpretation
will be adopted which will avoid objectionable consequences.
50 Am. Jur., p. 372, et seq.

The provision of the statute in question must be in-
terpreted as being merely directory, and not mandatory. It
follows that the trial judge was privileged to ignore the
statute in so far as it attempts to require the inclusion in the
charge of the penalty for the offense for which the defendant
was on trial.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

as
W. 0, PEACOCK v. ANTOINETTE PEACOCK
36 So. (2nd) 206 June Term, 1948
Tune 25, 1948 Division B

Peyton T. Jordan and Peyton T. Jordan, Jr., for petitioner.
Raymond Sheldon and Fred T. Saussy, Jr., for respondent.

BARNS, J.:

This is a proceeding in certiorari to review an interlocu-

. tory order in equity.

In 1929 petitioner filed his bill of complaint for divorce
against respondent and, in the same year, the respondent-wife
answered and thereafter, on December 30, 1929, the chancellor
entered an award for temporary alimony in the sum of $20.00
per week.

No further proceedings appear to have been had in the
divorce case and the cause was allowed to lie dormant until
July 10, 1946, when the respondent filed her petition, setting
up that there was $17,160.00 due and unpaid on the temporary
award of alimony and asking the court to fix the amount due

a
[|
631

and owing to the defendant and enter judgment and award
execution therefor. Thereupon on affidavit a publication was
had, as follows:

“W. C. Peacock,
Plaintiff,
v.
Antionette Peacock,
Defendant.
“State of Florida:
To: W. C. Peacock, whose residence is 5300 Dixie Shell Road,
City of Shreveport, State of Louisiana:

“You are hereby required to file an appearance in the
above proceeding in this court on or before the 18th day of
November, 1946, the nature of which proceeding being a
petition to reclaim back alimony.

“Done and ordered at Tampa, Hillsborough County, State
of Florida, this 16th day of October, 1946.

“Chas H. Pent
Clerk Circuit Court
By Raymond Vegue, D. C.”

And proof of publication of the foregoing notice was filed
as published for five successive weeks, ending with Novem-
ber 16, 1946. :

The notice required the defendant to file “his appearance”
on the 18th day of November, 1946. On the 25th day of
February, 1947, a purported decree pro confesso was entered.
Thereafter, on the 26th day of March, 1946, the chancellor
heard the testimony offered by the defendant below, and re-
spondent here, and entered a judgment against the petitioner
in the sum of $18,800.00, and awarded execution.

On January 12, 1948, the petitioner here moved the chancel-
Jor to vacate and declared null and void the $18,800.00 judg-
ment upon the ground that the suit had abated and on the
ground that it does not appear by the record that the pe-
titioner was duly notified of the hearing on the petition or had
an opportunity of opposing it.

If the notice of publication was for the purpose of original
process, then the order of the chancellor was in error, because

De
632

alimony cannot be awarded upon process by publication only
and, if the proceedings were based upon the respondent’s
petition as a step in the cause, then in that event the notice
was insufficient because it merely required the plaintiff “to
appear,” when he had already appeared eighteen years before
by the filing of his bill and, if it was intended as a notice of
a hearing the notice was insufficient because it did not give the
time or place of a hearing or the purpose thereof.

The petition for certiorari is granted and the decree of the
chancellor of March 26, 1947, is quashed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

a
EMMA LISK v. CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA, A MU-
NICIPAL CORPORATION.
36 So. (2nd) 197 June Term, 1948
June 25, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 13, 1948

Le]
' 633

Harry Goodmark, for appellant.

Alley, Drew, Burns & Middleton, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.: .

Flagler Park is a public park under the control and super-
vision of the City of West Palm Beach. The city maintains
benches in the park for the use of the general public, some of
these benches being located beneath cocoanut palm trees.
While lawfully occupying one of these benches, the appellant
was struck by a palm frond which broke off of and fell from
a cocoanut palm tree under which she was sitting. The ap-
pellant brought suit against the City for the resulting in-
juries, charging as negligence that the City had failed to keep
the park in a reasonably safe condition for people invited to
use the facilities provided, in that it had negligently suffered
and permitted dead cocoanut fronds to remain on the trees
extending over its park benches when it knew or should have
known that such dead fronds might break from the trees and
fall upon persons lawfully using such benches. At the close
of the evidence offered by the appellant to sustain the allega-
tions of her declaration, the trial court granted a motion for
directed verdict, and judgment was entered in favor of the
City. The appellant has perfected an appeal from the judg-
ment.

The first question which arises upon the appeal is whether
or not a municipality is liable in damages for injuries due to
negligent conditions in one of its parks open to the free use
of the public generally. It is contended by the City that in
maintaining a public park a municipality is engaged in a
governmental activity discharging a public duty, and hence is
not liable for injuries caused through negligent conditions

therein. If this contention is correct, the appellant never
had a cause of action against the appellee, and the order of

De
634

the trial judge granting the motion for instructed verdict
could not have been error.

While a sharp division exists in the authorities upon the
question of the tort liability of a municipality for injuries
growing out of alleged defects in free parks or facilities main-
tained for the use of the public, we are committed in this
jurisdiction to the rule that “where a city, pursuant to charter
power, performs a local function for its people it is held to the
same degree of care as private persons.” Ide v. City of St.
Cloud, 150 Fla. 806, 8 So. (2nd) 924. Under this rule the facts
charged in the declaration filed by the appellant were suf-
ficient to constitute a predicate for the establishment of lia-
bility against the City for its alleged negligent failure to keep
its park in a reasonably safe condition for the use of the
public. For an extended discussion of the general question
involved see annotations in 29 A.L.R. 863; 42 A.L.R. 263;
99 A.L.R. 686; 142 A.L.R. 1340.

The only other question with which we are concerned on
this appeal is whether or not the trial judge erred in direct-
ing a verdict for the City, on the ground that the plaintiff
below had failed to show that the defective condition com-
plained of in the declaration was actually or constructively
known to the City.

There is a complete absence of proof in the record of any .
actual knowledge on the part of the city, or any of its em-
ployees, of the alleged defective condition of the palm tree
which brought about the injury of the appellant. Unless,
therefore, the alleged condition complained of was so open
and obvious and had existed for such a length of time that
the city in the exercise of due care should have known thereof
and remedied it, the appellant could not be entitled to recover,
even on the theory of constructive notice. See City of St,
Petersburg v. Roach, 148 Fla. 316, 4 So. (2nd) 367; City of
Tallahassee v. Coles, 148 Fla. 606, 4 So. (2nd) 874; Johnson
v. City of Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 14, 24 So. (2nd) 717.

With respect to the question of the alleged defect in the
palm tree and notice thereof to the city the only evidence in
the record was that offered on behalf of the appellant. On
this issue the appellant testified that the frond was “brown,”

635

that “it was in pretty bad shape...” “a dried weathered
frond.” A witness, Mrs. Fabio, testified that the frond was
“brown, dead looking,” and added that she did not observe
the condition that existed with reference to the fronds where
they joined the tree. Witness Padgett testified that the con-
dition of the trees in the park at the time of the accident was
not different from that at the time of trial, and stated that,
with regard to trimming cocoanut trees “... my experience
now in having trees trimmed, cocoanut trees anywhere, you
trimmed the park today and you go back there tomorrow
and there will be some more hanging down. In other words,
a green limb will fall just the same as a dead one.” He also
stated “Well, sometimes them cocoanut limbs will hang there
for two years. I have noticed in the outskirts of the city back
where it isn’t cared for very much. Those limbs will hang
right there. Now, on some cocoanut trees they have been
hanging for two or three years. Some of them fall off and
some of them don’t.” Henry DeLoach, a witness for the
appellant, saw the cocoanut frond that struck the appellant,
immediately after the accident. He testified that it was
“brown looking”; that “there was some trash from where
the pigeons had been roosting on it.” He also stated that the
frond wasn’t rotten.”

We have set out the only evidence presented by the ap-
pellant in her attempt to show that the frond which fell from
the cocoanut palm tree was in such an obviously defective or
rotten condition that the city became charged with construc-
tive knowledge of the defect; and we do not think that the
evidence offered was even prima facie proof of the point in
issue.

According to appellant’s own witness, the palm frond
which fell to the ground was not rotten, as charged in the
declaration, but at most was merely “brown and dead look-
ing.” As to fronds of the cocoanut palm, it is stated by one
of the witnesses that green fronds will fall as easily as brown
ones and hence the fact that a frond may be brown is no
reason for believing that it will break from the tree of its own
weight and fall. There was no evidence of any defects in
the tree or of any unusual weather conditions prior to the

636

accident, such as heavy winds or the like, which might have
put the City on notice that its palm trees might be in a de-
fective condition and hence need inspecting, or, possibly,
trimming. There was no showing of the length of time that
the tree from which the fronds fell had remained in its al-
legedly defective condition prior to the accident and hence
there was no factual basis for any determination as to
whether or not the city should have known of such condi-
tion and should have taken steps to remedy it.

While a party moving for a directed verdict admits not
only every material fact stated in the evidence adduced
but also every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that
a jury might reasonably infer from the evidence, it seems to
us that if the City were to be held liable under the facts
shown by the record, the effect of the holding would be to
make a municipality virtually an insurer of the safety of all
persons who frequent its free public parks to take advantage
of the facilities offered. That a municipality cannot be held
as an insurer of those who use the public parks for their
pleasure is well settled by the authorities; the duty in such
case being only that of exercising due care under the circum-
stances of each particular case. Ordinarily the question of
due care is for the jury, under appropriate instructions from
the court. But where there is no proof offered of actual
knowledge, or circumstances from which knowledge can be
reasonably inferred, of alleged defective conditions, there can
be no factual basis for the imposition of liability because of
failure to repair or remedy such conditions and hence there
can be nothing for the jury to pass upon.

Even if all the facts stated in the evidence and every con-
clusion favorable to the appellant are admitted to he true,
there was nothing before the trial court at the close of the
appellant’s case to show actual or constructive knowledge by
the City of the alleged defective condition which caused the
injury to the appellant. Therefore, the court below did not
commit reversible error in granting a directed verdict for
the City based upon the ground assigned.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

Le
be
637

M. B. WINGATE and his wife, DARLINE B. WINGATE, v. MRS. IVA.
KAPP, a widow, H. fT. SCHULENBERGER and his wife, PHYLLIS
K. SOHULENBERGER.

36 So. (2nd) 170 June Term, 1948
June 25, 1948 Division B

Knight, Underwood & Cullen, J. L. Blackwell and Brannon
& Brown, for plaintiffs.

Marks, Gray, Yates & Conroy, Perry A. Nichols and G.
Warren Sanchez, for defendants.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Sumter Leitner and
Fred M. Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, as amicus
curiae.

ADAMS, J.:
Pursuant to Rule 38 Honorable R. H. Rowe, Circuit Judge,
has certified the following questions.

On November 10, 1947, a term of the circut court began
in Suwannee County. At the end of the second week the
panel of jurors was discharged, all cases having been tried
except this one civil case. The circuit judge wrote the at-
torneys in the case the following letter:

“As I understand it, the above cause pending in Suwannee
County, Florida, is to be tried in Live Oak on December Ist
next. :

“The criminal docket will be disposed of in Live Oak prior
to December 1st, and so far as I now know, there will be noth-
ing to try other than the above cause.

“The State would not wish to bear the expense of procur-
ing and of attendance by a jury for the purpose of trying the

—
638

civil cause. Therefore, this is to advise that the expense ‘inci-
dent to procuring and service of a jury will be taxed as costs
of the case. You will please advise the number of jurors
that you think will be needed for the trial.”

A jury was then summoned for December 1 which tried
the case and the question now arises whether the parties
or the state will pay the jury fees and the fees of the sheriff
in summoning them. The November term of court had not
been adjourned.

The answer requires a construction of Section 40.25, Fla.
Stat., 1941, F.S.A., which reads:

“The mileage and per diem of jurors summoned specially
to try any issue of facts arising in a civil cause under the laws
of this state, before any court or judge in vacation, shall be
taxed as costs, and paid by the party to the cause as other
costs are paid; and before such jury is summoned, the party
demanding the same may be required by the court or judge or
deposit an amount sufficient to cover the cost of such jury
trial.”

We have held that the phrase “in vacation” means the
same as it is used in the common law which is that period of
time from the end of one term to the beginning of another.

: Ex Parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755. :

The November term had not ended; it had only adjourned
for a recess, and the answer is that the cost of the jury must
be paid by the state.

So ordered.
THOMAS, C. J.. BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

TOWN OF HOWEY-IN-THE-HILLS, et al., v. GRANK GRAESSLE,
et al.

36 So. (2nd) 619 June Term, 1948
June 29, 1948 En Banc

639

Carl E. Duncan, Joseph P. Lea, Jr., and Bedell & Bedell,
for appellants.

Merton 8. Horrell, EH. P. Hamlin, Wallace E. Davis and
James G. Horrell, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

The appellees, as plaintiffs in the lower court, brought this
bill in- equity, seeking an injunction against the Town of,
Howey-in-the-Hills and, upon final hearing on bill and answer
and evidence, the Chancellor entered a final decree granting
plaintiffs relief, and the defendants have now appealed the
final decree.

The defendants answered, and pertinent portions of their
answer are hereinafter set forth under assignment of error
number one.

ee
640

Two of the assignments of error of the Town of Howey-
in-the-Hills and its officials, and the basic matter supporting
the assignments, were as follows: +

Assignment of error 1. (R. 342):

“The Court erred in its ruling and decision contained in its
order dated February 4, 1946, recorded in Chancery Order
Book 34, page 115, granting Plaintiffs’ motion to strike and in
striking portions of the answer of the Town of Howey-in-the-
Hills and its officials set forth in Paragraphs lettered A and
B, and in paragraphs E to U (both letters inclusive) of said
Motion.” (R. 342)

The order of Feburary 4, (R. 131, 132 refers to Motion to
strike Portions of Defendants’ Answer (R. 98 through 111).
and the motion, in turn, refers to answer of defendants (R.
21 through 33). The stricken portions of the answer are (in
part) as follows:

Answer of Defendants, Howey et al. (R. 21):

(R. 21) “... but state that they are not advised as to
whether or not said Town now contains less than 150 qualified
electors.

(R. 22) Paragraph 5: “.... but allege that such levy was
under the authority of the United States District Court,
Southern District of Florida, in the matter of Town of
Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida, debtor, and a decree of the
Circuit Court of Lake County, Florida, validating said bonds
entered November 29, 1944, in Chancery Case 7807, declaring

1 For appellant’s counsel to present his argument by brief addressed
to an assignment of errors and to the “question” (as conceived by him)
and merely to advise the Court that: “This question is raised by the
first and tenth assignments of error, R. .. ..” falls short of
properly presenting the error vel non. It merely tells the Court where
it can be found when the Supreme Court Rule so provides: “Specific as-
signments of error from which the questions argued arise should be
stated, and if any reference to the transcript is made, the page should
be given.”

The subject matter of an assignment of error should be presénted
in the brief as completely as practical, in order that the Court might
understand the pertinancy of the “question” resolved by counsel.

‘The “argument” of counsel should be addressed to the assignment
of error, and the use and purpose of the “question” is to clarify the
argument.

641

said Refunding to be the debt and obligation of all the lands
described in the 1943 Act.”

(R. 24) : “In the year 1925 under and by virtue of the Act
of the Legislature hereinbefore described the Town of Howey-
in-the-Hills, subsequent to a vote of the freeholders of said
Town, approving the issuance of said bonds, did issue Corpo-
rate Improvement Bonds in the total par sum of $300,000.00;
that pursuant to the approving vote of the freeholders ap-
proving the issuance of said bonds, the same were validated
by a Decree of the Circuit Court in and for Lake County,
Florida, and were further validated by an Act of the Legis-
lature, all as hereinbefore alleged. Said bonds became in de-
fault, and in the year 1932 a refunding issue was authorized by
the Town in the total number of $269,000.00, and said: re-
funding issue was validated by a Decree of the Circuit Court
in and for Lake County, Florida, as hereinbefore alleged. The
said Refunding bonds issued and validated in the year 1932,
because of the stress of times, became delinquent, and the
Town defaulted in the payment of interest due under said
bond issue; that because of said default, W. J. Meredith, et
al. brought a suit in the United States District Court, South-
ern district of Florida, to enforce the levy and collection of
taxes in the Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, for bond debt
service; and in the same year Palmora Corporation brought
a mandamus suit in the United States District Court, South-
ern District of Florida, to enforce the levy and collection of
taxes for bond debt services; that in the same year James
Brite brought a suit in the Circuit Court in and for Lake
County, Florida, for the same purpose; that each of the
Plaintiffs in said suits were the holders of refunding Bonds
issued by said Town, and the result of said suits was the entry
of decrees commanding the Town Tax Officials to levy and
collect taxes for bond debt .... that said Town Officials did
thereupon authorize to be issued the Refunding Bonds of
1944, which bonds have been approved by the United States
District Court, Southern District of Florida, in a proceeding
in the matter of the Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida,
debtor, Number 914, Orlando Division-Bankruptey, for the
purpose of composing its bonded debt; and said refunding

a
642

issue of 1944 was validated by a decree of the Circuit Court
in and for Lake County, Florida, as hereinbefore alleged. In
each of the proceedings wherein and whereby the original
bond issue and refunding issues were approved and validated
it does not appear that any of the Plaintiffs or anyone on
their behalf, or any person whomsoever, made any protest to
the issuance of said bonds or the refunding thereof, or the
composition thereof. Defendants therefore allege that the
Plaintiffs have delayed too long in registering this protest
and this objection to the levying and collection of taxes for
debt service, and the said Plaintiffs are therefore guilty of
laches”

R. 28) “2. That the Plaintiff, Florida Fruit Company, ac-
quired the property described as NE\% of SE of 22-20-25
through various conveyances from Montverde Development
Corporation, which owned said property at the time of said
incorporation in 1925; that said property was included in the
suit entitled: ‘Montverde Development Corporation v. Howey-
in-the-Hills, in the Cireuit Court of Lake County, Florida,
being Law Case No. 2558, in which the decree of this Court
entered December 10, 1928, was that said lands were neither
virtually nor commensurately excluded from benefits of said
municipal organization; that therefore the question raised
regarding said lands is res adjudicata; that there has been no
change in the situation of said lands with reference to such
municipal benefits since the date of said decree.

“3. That the Plaintiff, Florida Fruit Company, acquired
the property described as N. 790 Feet of the East 300 feet of
the NE% of SE, of 22-20-25 from Coleman and Turville,
who owned the same at the time of said incorporation in
1925; that said property was included in the suit entitled
‘Montverde Development Corporation v. Howey-in-the-Hills,’
in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Florida, being Law Case
No. 2558, in which the decree of this court entered December
10, 1928, was that said lands were neither virtually nor com-
mensurately excluded from benefits of said municipal organ-
ization; that therefore the question raised regarding said
lands is res adjudicata; that there has been no change in the

643

situation of said lands with reference to such municipal
benefits since the date of said Decree.”

(R. 29). “That because all of said properties were sub-
ject to said bonded indebtedness in the year 1925, and have
continued to remain subject thereto, said properties were ac-
quired by said Plaintiffs with full knowledge thereof and
Plaintiffs are charged with laches of their predecessors and
have no right at this late date to object to the levying, assess-
ment and collection of taxes for bond debt service.”

(R. 31). “On January 3, 1944, The Crummer Company,
having been granted a license or permit to sell securities in
the State of Florida, submitted a new Contract in sub-
stantially the same form as that submitted on March 15, 1943.
This Contract was adopted by the town by proper resolution
and the Town of Howey-in-the-Hills then authorized the filing
of a Petition in the United States District Court, Southern
District of Florida, for the purpose of composing its bonded
indebtedness in accordance with said Contract. Said pro-
ceedings were duly instituted and a Decree was issued by said
Court approving the Contract and approving the composi-
tion of the town debt and bonds have now been exchanged to
the extent of over 90% of all outstanding bonds.

(R. 31). “That as further evidence of the revived interest
in real estate in the Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, on both im-
proved and unimproved property, the town Tax Collector has
collected $14,524.25 of a total tax roll of $16,902.84 levied and
assessed by the Town for the year 1944, or approximately
86% of the total. The Town of Howey-in-the Hills, since the
issuance and exchange of 1944 refunding bonds, has collected
a sufficient amount of money in taxes to take care of all
interest due, and has retired $4,800.00 par value of the out-
standing principal.

(R. 32). “Further answering said Bill of Complaint, these
defendants say that this suit is in the nature of a test suit;
that if the Plaintiffs herein are successful, all other lands in-
cluded in the 1927 limits but not included in the 1933 limits
should also be relieved of taxation from the Town. The total
assessed valuation of real property now subject to taxation
for debt service is $597,731.00, of which $289,861.00, or

—
644

481% is in a like class with the lands of Plaintiffs. If said
lands were relieved of taxes, it would constitute a serious im-
pairment of the Town’s obligation to its creditors, would
place an unbearable burden of taxation upon the remaining
property, and would inevitably result in default of the debt
and financial chaos.”

Assignment of error 10. (R. 344):

“The Court erred in its ruling and decision contained in its
order dated May 5, 1947, recorded in Chancery Order Book
35, page 376, sustaining Plaintiff’s objection to the reading in
evidence, at the final hearing, of certified copies of certain de-
crees and judgments of the Circuit Court in and for Lake
County, validating certain bonds of the Defendant Town and
of the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of Florida, directing the levy and collection of taxes
to pay said bonds.”

The order of May 5, 1947, referred to, is in these words:
(R. 337) :

“This cause came on for final hearing pursuant to due
notice; and the defendant, Town of Howey-in-the-Hills and
its officials having at the final hearing offered to read in evi-
dence certified copies of certain decrees and judgments of
this court, and of the District Court of the United States for
the Southern District of Florida, and the Plaintiffs having
objected to the introduction of the said documents;

“It is now ordered by the Court that the plaintiffs’ objec-
tion to the reading of said documents in evidence be and the
same is hereby sustained.”

The offer to read Certain Documents in Evidence referred
to is found on page 296 of the record:

“Come now the defendants, Town of Howey-in-the-Hills,
and its respective officials and offer to read in evidence at the
final hearing, certified copies of Judgments and Decrees men-
tioned and described in the Answer of the Original Defend-
ants, to-wit:

“(1) Final Decree in the case of Town of Howey-in-the-
Hills v. State of Florida, entered on October 5, 1925, and re-

ee
a
645

corded in Chancery Book 10, page 451, of the records of this
Court.

“(2) Order of validation in the case of Town of Howey-
in-the-Hills v. State of Florida, entered on the 28th day of
April, 1932, and recorded in Chancery Order Book 22, page
439, of the records of this Court.

“(3) Final Decree in the case of W. J. Meredith, et al., v.
Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, et al., Case No. 147, Orlando
Civil, entered on the 3rd of October, 1939, and recorded in
the records of the United States District Court, Southern
District of Florida, at Orlando, in Civil Order Book 1, page
211.

“(4) Final Decree in the case of Palmora Company v.
Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, et al., Case No. ..........., Orlando
Civil, entered on the 24th of November, 1939, and appearing
in the record of the United States District Court, Southern
District of Florida, at Orlando, in Orlando Civil Order Book
1, page 250.”

This Court in Gossett v. Ullendorff, 114 Fla. 159, 154 So.
177, 179, stated:

“The motion to strike from an answer any part of it which
may be deemed to be redundant, impertinent or scandalous
is controlled by the rule, which requires the denial of the
motion unless the matter sought to be stricken is wholly ir-
relevant, can have no bearing upon the equities and no in-
fluence upon the decision either as to the relief to be granted
or the allowance of costs. See Sec. 23, Chapter 14658, Acts
1931, known as the Chancery Act.” (Underscoring supplied).

The principles of equity pleading above enunciated have
recently been re-affirmed by the case of Schupler v. Eastern
Mortgage Co., 160 Fla. 72, 33 So. (2nd) 586.

When the subject matter of the stricken portions of de-
fendants’-appellants’ answer and the legislative, fiscal and
juridical history of the Town are considered, with the par-
ticular allegation that the lands involved are similar to a
large portion of the other property within the municipal area;
that the principal matter involved is liability of such lands.

es
646

for taxes for debt service purposes only; that such debt is of
approximately twenty-five years’ standing; that bankruptcy
proceedings have been had wherein the taxable property of
such town would be a controlling factor in arriving at a final
determination thereof; and further considering that plaintiffs
were seeking relief in equity and that it may not be good
equity, under the facts.and circumstances alleged in the
pleadings and the parts of the answer striken as above.
quoted, now to relieve plaintiffs of all tax liability for debt
purposes and thereby shift said debt onto the lands remain-
ing in the Town, it is our conclusion that assignment of error
number one is well founded, in so far as same relates to the
portion of defendants’ answer quoted above, and that assign-
ment of error number ten, relating to proof, is likewise well
founded.

It is noted in passing that it has been made to appear that
the appellants may have been enjoined from doing that which
it appears the Federal Court has commanded them to do.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and ADAMS,
JJ., concur.

SEBRING, J., dissents.

HOBSON, J., not participating.

TOWN OF LAKE HAMILTON, in the County of Polk and State of
Florida, 2 municipal corporation; and P. D. SHUPE, as Tax Collec-
tor and Tax Assessor of said Town; and Minnie M. Sharer, a widow,
v. KERNEL HUGHES, et al.

86 So. (2nd) 260 June Term, 1948
June 29, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied July 23, 1948

647

Dewell & Dewell, for appellants.
H.C. Crittenden, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

Upon the remand of this case upon a former appeal the
Chancellor entered the decree now appealed. Appellants sub-
mit that this latter decree was rendered without notice to
them. The decree is silent in this respect.

Although notice is not always necessary, it may well be
stated that in contested adversary proceedings no decree
ought to be entered against a party who ought to have notice.
Notice should be given in order that there be fair play; that
the Chancellor be protected against error; and in order to
avoid appeals and reviews.

About three hundred years ago it was provided in Bacon’s
Ordinances that:

“Where causes come to a hearing in court, no decree
bindeth any person who was not served with process ad
audiendum judicium, according to the course of the court, or
did appear gratis in person in court.”—Fletcher’s “Equity
Pleading and Practice,” p. 1047.

And, when Adam was about to be banished from the Gar-
den of Eden, he was doubtless given an opportunity to be
heard, for it was said unto him: “Where art thou, Adam?”

Whether notice is required, or should be given, the kind of
notice and the time element of notice are dependent upon the
circumstances of each case.

Those drafting the “1931 Chancery Act” refrained from
specifying the length of notice to be given for any hearing.
The terms of the Act were “after notice,” “upon notice,”
“after due notice,” “after reasonable notice.” The length of
time of notice was left to continue according to the local prac-
tice subject to the exercise of the wisdom of the Chancellor,
to be determined in the first instance by local practice, and
any other circumstances.

The former appeal of this case, Town of Lake Hamilton
et al. v. Hughes, et al., 159 Fla. 600, 32 So. (2nd) 283, was

ee
648

from a final decree wherein the Chancellor had (1) decreed
all former tax levies and assessments against the lands of
the plaintiffs by the defendant city to be cancelled and (2)
the Town and its officials were permanently enjoined from
collecting any prior levies or assessments of taxes, and (3)
permanently enjoined the Town and its officials from there-
after levying or assessing any taxes.

Upon appeal of this decree, this Court, among other hold-
ings, held that:

“It is our conclusion that it does not appear that the
decree was in error as to taxes to be levied for general ad-
ministrative purposes; as to taxes for debt service on the
water works bond issue it is not shown that any taxes have
been levied but the injunction as issued would prevent such
levy in the event of the necessity therefor and in this re-
gard the Chancellor has erred and plaintiffs’ property is sub-
ject to be taxed for such purposes.

“The cause will be reversed with directions to enter a
decree accordingly as to taxes hereafter to be levied, with
directions that relative to taxes other than for such debt
purposes, the court retain jurisdiction of said cause to make
modifications as may appear meet and proper in event of a
change of circumstances upon a hearing after notice.”

The tenor of the holding was that the land in question
should be subject to taxation for bonded debt purposes but
that such lands should not be subject to taxation for opera-
tion or administrative purposes. The only bonded debt shown
by the record was one for water works purposes.

The appellant argues as error that portion of the final
decree as amended on November 7, 1947, as follows:

“2. That the equities in said cause are with the plaintiffs
and each of them and against the defendants, and each of
them, as to all unpaid municipal taxes levied and assessed by
said Town against the lands of Plaintiffs for the years 1946.
and prior thereto.

“3. That all unpaid municipal tax levies’ made and as-
sessed by said Town of Lake Hamilton, Florida, against the
lands of the plaintiffs, described in the amended bill, as

as
Le
649

amended, during the year 1946 and prior years, and each
parcel thereof, be, and the same are hereby, vacated, an-
nulled, cancelled and set aside;

“4, That the Town of Lake Hamilton, Polk County,
Florida, a municipal corporation, and P. D. Shupe, as Tax
Collector of said Town, and his successors in office be, and
they are hereby, permanently enjoined from collecting or
attempting to collect unpaid municipal taxes levied and as-
sessed during the year 1946 and prior years by said Town
against the lands, and each parcel thereof, described in the
amended bill of complaint, as amended.”

It is ordered that the Chancellor enter a decree striking
from the final decree of November 5, 1946, as amended on
the 7th day of November, 1947, Paragraphs above quoted, -
numbered “2,” “3,” and ‘“4.”"

It also appears that in view of the provisions of Para-
graph “5” of the final decree that Paragraph “6” should be
stricken. It is so ordered.

Reversed,

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

HARRY E. KIRK and MARGUERITE KIRK, his wife, E. R. KIRK, and
EVELYN KIRK, his wife, HENRY KIRK and ALVA KIRK, his
wife, ROY KIRK and SARAH KIRK, his wife, LILLIAN V. LEE
and KARL LEE, her husband, v. C. E. KIRK.

36 So. (2nd) 171 June Term, 1948
June 29, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied July 20, 1948

Edgar C. Thompson, Edward G. Newell and Harry T.
Newett, for appellants.

C. D. Blackwell and E. B. Donnell, for appellee.
Ll

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

ADAMS, J. dissenting:
I think the decree should be reversed on authority of
Rappaport v. Kalstein, 24 So. (2nd) 301.

BARNS, J., dissenting:

The appellee, Kirk, is the father of the appellants. The
mother died in February, 1945, and this bill, brought by the
appellee-father, was filed in August, 1946. The suit was
brought to eliminate, by judicial decree, all of the right, title
and interest in and any claim of the children to the property.
The special master’s findings were for the defendant children,
but the chancellor sustained exceptions by entering a final
decree for the plaintiff father.

The land in question was acquired by the father and
mother, in 1914, as an estate in entirety. They thereafter
lived on it, raising a large family, and the wife died in 1945.
Plaintiff-appellee-father still lives there as his home. The
mother and father conveyed title to the property to the son,
Harry E. Kirk, on November 15, 1927, but when Harry was
about to marry, in 1930, he conveyed the property to his sis-
ter, Lillian V. Kirk, who is now Lillian V. Kirk Lee. The
coercive influence which caused the original conveyance to
Harry Kirk was an assumed improvident outstanding 1925
boom-time obligation of the plaintiff-appellee-father.

There was no attempt to show in detail where the money
came from for the original purchase of the property or the
detailed contributions of the parties to its maintenance, and
there has been no attempt to detail the application of the
rental proceeds.

The record fails to disclose the ages of the parties, but
the children seem to be over fifty years of age.

YY
Le
651

It appears that during the mother’s life she, with the aid
of the daughter, Lillian, either managed the fiscal affairs of
the family or contributed much aid to the father in that re-
spect. The maintenance of the property was contributed to
by members of the family other than the father.

The record fails to show any attempt on the part of the
children to interfere with the possession of the father.
Lillian, who holds the legal title, says that she considers that
she holds it for the interest of the other children and herself;
that it ought to be that way.

When it is considered that the father seems to have about
all the interest in the property that he can actually use and
enjoy, i. e., his possession; that she has been looking after
the property since before the mother died and before and
since she married (when she was past 40); that there is
evidence that the father could not look after the property and
that the mother, who contributed greatly to the management
and maintenance of the property, was a party to placing the
title to the property in Harry, for the purposes for which
Lillian says she now holds it; and, since the conveyance of
which plaintiff complains occurred more than nineteen years
ago and it was not attacked until the wife, who was a party
thereto, died, and, since neither Lillian nor Harry (nor any
of the children) now seek to deprive the father of use or
usufruct of the property, it seems that the father still has all
he has had for nineteen years, and there seems to be no basis
or circumstance in equity to compel the Court to work a
change of the existing state of affairs unless it be for the pur-
pose of maintaining the status quo. The contributions have
been rendered under circumstances as they have existed for
nineteen years; they were rendered under circumstances not
calling for a debit and credit attitude, as would more likely
have been the case had it been reasonably contemplated that
the basis was to be changed.

The decree appealed should be reversed, with leave to the
chancellor to further the equities not inconsistent herewith
and also to consider retaining jurisdiction to manage the
matter as in the nature of a trust.

652

E. BERT RIDDLE vy. STATE OF FLORIDA
36 So. (2nd) 172 June Term, 1948
June 29, 1948 . En Bane

Rehearing denied July 15, 1948

John M. Coe, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., SEBRING, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ.,
coneur.

TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissent.

ADAMS, J., not participating.

TERRELL, J., dissenting:

I think the evidence in this case is legally insufficient to
support the conviction. Considered in sum, I think it is more
consistent with a frame-up on the defendant than it is with
his guilt. It is far short of showing a “lewd” attempt to
“fondle” the prosecutrix, and, while on trial for a felony with
a sex aspect, it is about to condemn defendant to infamy and
dishonor I am convinced that it would not be sufficient to
condemn him for chicken stealing, a trial for which would be
governed by the same rules of evidence.

Having received such a reaction from the record impels
me to dissent. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice
CHAPMAN agrees to this conclusion.

CHAPMAN, J., concurs.

MARTHA JANE LOVEJOY v. RALPH M, LOVEJOY

36 So. (2nd) 192 June Term, 1948
June 29, 1948 En Bane

William C. Pierce and D. Newcomb Barco, for appellant.
Charles A. Robinson and Forrest Hoffman, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

It is our conclusion that the chancellor did not err in find-
ing the equities to be with the appellee and against the ap-
pellant and that the grounds alleged for divorce had been
proven. See Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 188 So. 796; Mc-
Millan v. McMillan, 120 Fla. 209, 162 So. 524. It is also our
conclusion that with respect to certain property purchased
entirely with the husband’s funds and placed in the joint
names of both husband and wife, the presumption of a gift to
the wife has been overcome by conclusive evidence within the
purview of Kollar v. Kollar, 155 Fla. 705, 21 So. (2nd) 356,
and that accordingly the case, on this point, is ruled by
Hargett v. Hargett, 156 Fla. 730, 24 So. (2nd) 305.

The decree appealed from is affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SEBRING, and
BARNS, J.J., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

HOBSON, J., not participating.

THOMAS, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I cannot agree to the ruling that the estates -by the en-
tirety should be upset because the husband, 53 years old with
enough business acumen to amass a fortune, didn’t know

what he was doing.
Le
TOWN OF DUNDEE, a municipal corporation, organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Florida; C. A. HELTON, as Tax Col-
lector and Tax Assessor of said Town of Dundee; and O. F.-KLET-
ZIN v. W. 8. DORR, et al. .

36 So. (2nd) 262 June Term, 1948
June 29, 1948 * Division B

a
654 :

Dewell & Dewell, for appellants.
H. C. Crittenden, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

Pursuant to the provisions of a stipulation filed upon the
initial appeal of this cause (see same case 32 So. (2nd) 285)
and by reason of the opinion and judgment in the case of
Town of Lake Hamilton v. Hughes, this day rendered, the
decree appealed is reversed for proceedings in conformity

“and not inconsistent with the said Lake Hamilton-Hughes
ease, this day decided.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

HYMAN BERNSTEIN v. BETTY BERNSTEIN

36 So, (2nd) 190 June Term, 1948
July 2, 1948 Division A.

“655

Martin Genet and J. F. Gordon, for appellant.
Samuel Flasterstein, (Brooklyn, N. Y.), for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

In February, 1948, Hyman Bernstein sued Betty Bernstein
for divorce alleging that she was possessed of a violent and
ungovernable temper that was frequently fraught with blows
which endangered his welfare and safety. A notice to appear
was filed and copy was mailed to defendant who was non-
resident of this state. In response to this notice Samuel Flas-
terstein, defendant’s attorney, filed a letter in the court detail-
ing the facts of a support proceeding that took place in the
Domestic Relations Court of New York wherein plaintiff was
required to pay defendant $30.00 per week for support of her-
self and minor child. The chancellor treated this letter as an
appearance for defendant and gave the plaintiff until April
rules to plead.

On March 2, 1948, the chancellor having entered an order
therefor directed a writ of ne exeat against plaintiff. Rule to
show cause why he should not be adjudged in. contempt for
concealing the facts relating to the support proceeding re-
ferred to in the preceding paragraph was also directed to
complainant. A hearing on the rule to show cause was held
and the plaintiff was adjudged guilty of contempt and sen-
tenced to serve forty-five days in the county jail. The bill of
complaint was dismissed with prejudice. This appeal is from
the contempt decree and the decree dismissing the bill of com-
plaint.

In our view the chancellor was in error as to both decrees.
As to the contempt decree, it is sufficient to say that the ele-
ments as a basis for direct or constructive contempt are not
shown to be present so there was no predicate for such decree.
No disobedience of the court’s order is intimated, no disre-
spect to the court is shown and the administration of justice
was not impeded. Service was made on the defendant
promptly and so far as the record discloses she, tendered all
the defense she desired to offer.

Whether or not the letter from defendant’s counsel was
sufficient in all respects to constitute an appearance is not

ae

Le
656

necessary to decide. It was sufficient to bring to the atten-
tion of the chancellor the proceedings in the Domestic Rela-
tions Court of the State of New York and nothing else was
offered. These proceedings were appropriate matters of de-
fense and since they are before him he may feel free to con-
sider them and make such decree for the defendant as he may
deem advisable.

The suit for support and maintenance is not a bar to a suit
for divorce. Roseman v. Roseman, 155 Fla. 750, 21 So. (2nd)
215. It may be expedient in a bill for divorce to recite the
fact of proceedings in a foreign court for support and
maintenance if they are in esse but that is not essential to the
sufficiency of the bill for divorce. Such ‘proceedings are mat-
ters of defense and the chancellor is at liberty to deal with
them as the circumstances may seem meet since he has ac-
quired jurisdiction of the plaintiff.

In the trial or consideration of a legal controversy the
judge is confronted with some questions that he must take
seriously while he may be confronted with as many others
that he should toss over his shoulder. The question of con-
tempt here was in the latter class. No fraud or deception is
shown, the defendant was duly served and was given every
opportunity to defend.

It follows that the contempt order was devoid of a proper
predicate and is quashed. The order dismissing the bill of
complaint is reversed with directions to reinstate the bill and
proceed accordingly.

Reversed.
THOMAS, C.J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
| ee
TOM COOPER v. THE CITY OF MIAMI
36 So. (2nd) 195 June Term, 1948

July 2, 1948 . Division A

Roberts, Holland & Strickland, for petitioner.
J. W. Watson, Jr., and John E. Cicero, for respondent.

SEBRING, J.:

The petitioner has filed a petition to obtain a review by
certiorari of an order entered by the Circuit Court of Dade
County affirming a judgment of conviction in the Municipal
Court of the City of Miami. The record shows that the peti-
tioner was adjudged guilty in said municipal court upon a
charge that he “did then and there unlawfully set up and
keep a gambling device at which a game of chance, to-wit:
betting on horse races was then and there played for money
... in violation of Section 2 of Chapter 21 of the Code of said
City.”

The evidence upon which the conviction was based was
given by the arresting officer who stated that on several oc-
casions, at a cértain bar in Miami, he had observed the pe-

ae
658

titioner “taking bets and also paying off on winners” on cer-
tain horse races being run; that on the occasion of the arrest
he saw the petitioner receive money for a bet and hand the
better a bet slip upon which was written the amount of the
bet that had been made, the initials of the petitioner, and the
horse upon which the bet had been placed. This was all the
evidence offered by the prosecution and on this the petitioner
was adjudged. guilty of the charge preferred against him,
after denials by the trial court of motions for directed verdict
and new. trial on the ground that the evidence did not sustain
the charge and was at variance with the charge.

The gist of the charge upon which the petitioner was tried
was the setting up and keeping of a gambling device at which a
game of chance was played for money. By the weight of
authority; the term “gambling device,’ as the term is
generally employed in penal statutes or ordinances, means the
tangible means, instrument, contrivance, or thing at or by
which money may be lost or won, as distinguished from the
game itself, and includes only such instruments or contriv-
ances as are intended for the purpose of gaming, or such as
are used to determine the result of the contest on which the
wager is laid. See 24 Am. Jur. pp. 420, 424, Gaming and
Prize Contests, Section 31, 36. Such is the obvious meaning
of “gambling device” as the term is used in our own statutes
and decisions. See Sections 849.01, 849.05, 849.14-849.16,
901.19, Fla. Stat. 1941, F.S.A.; Kirk v. Morrison, 108 Fla. 144,
146 So, 215; Pasternack v. Bennett, 138 Fla. 663, 190 So. 56.
The manifest purpose and intent of a statute or ordinance for-
bidding the setting up and keeping of a gambling device at
which games of chance are played for money is to prohibit
not the gaming or gambling itself but the maintenance and
operation of a device upon or by means of which gaming or
gambling is permitted. See McBride v. State, 39 Fla. 442, 22
So. 711; Reinmiller v. State, 93 Fla. 462, 111 So. 633; Wilson
v. State, 129 Fla. 827, 177 So. 216.

It is plain from the evidence that the prosecution did not
prove the charge lodged against the petitioner but proved, at
most, an entirely different offense punishable by an entirely
different ordinance, namely, gaming or gambling by taking

bets upon a horse race without the intervention of a gaming
or gambling device of any kind. Therefore, the allegations of
the charge were not supported by the evidence, and the motion
of the petitioner for a directed verdict and for a new trial
should have been granted. Furthermore, the Circuit Court of
Dade County should have reversed the judgment entered by
the municipal court, when the matter came there on appeal,
for there was a complete absence of evidence in the record to
support lawfully the judgment of conviction that was entered
on the charge preferred.

It is so well settled as to need no citation of authority that
every person accused of crime is entitled to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against him. This right requires
that the charge be stated with such clearness and necessary
certainty as to apprise the accused of the charge he will be
called on to meet at the trial, so that he will not be misled in
the preparation of his defense and so that he will be protected
after conviction or acquittal from substantial danger of a new
prosecution for the same offense. It is equally well settled
that an accused is entitled to have the charge lodged against
him proved substantially as laid, and that he cannot be prose-
cuted for one offense and convicted and sentenced for
another, even though the offenses are of the same general
nature or character, or carry with them the same penalty.
See Penny v. State, 140 Fla. 155, 191 So. 190. There are well-
established principles for the protection of the innocent that
govern the framing of criminal accusations and the introduc-
tion of proof to sustain them. If the courts ignore these
principles in a case where it may appear that the accused is
guilty of some crime, even though the crime proven is not the
crime charged in the accusation, or a crime included within
the crime charged, the protection that the law intends to af-
ford the innocent will most certainly be destroyed and per-
sonal rights guaranteed by the Constitution will amount to
nothing.

From the conclusions we have reached it follows that a
writ of certiorari should be awarded quashing the order
brought here for review, with directions that an order be en-
tered by the Circuit Court of Dade County reversing the judg-

659

|

a
660

ment and vacating the sentence entered and imposed by the
Municipal Court of the City of Miami.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

H.R. P. MILLER v. MRS. W. M. DOSS, as Assessor of Taxes, Lake
County, Florida.

86 So. (2nd) 442 June Term, 1948
July 6, 1948 Special Division B

Paty, Warwick & Paul, for appellant.
C. E. Duncan, R. P. Hamlin and T. G. Futch, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

This appellant filed a bill seeking a declaratory decree pur-
suant to Chapter 87, Fla. Stat., 1941.

The bill was dismissed on motion because it appeared plain-
tiff had an adequate remedy at law. The bill charged that
Mrs. W. M. Doss, as Tax Assessor, had arbitrarily exempted
certain real property in Lake County from taxation for 1946
and subsequent years.

The question involved’ is whether the bill may be enter-
tained when there is an adequate remedy at law.

Reference to the statute fully answers this question ad-
versely to the decree before us. Section 87.12, Fla. Stat., 1941,
“The existence of another adequate remedy shall not preclude
a decree, judgment or order for declaratory relief... .”

The effect of this part of our statute is to obliterate any
and all distinction relative to legal and equitable rights in.so
far as they may be considered in a proceeding under this
statute. In this case the constitutionality of the statute is

es
—
661

not brought into question and we are not passing upon it. We
do point out, however, that the statute takes care of the sacred
right of trial by jury which would seem to remove any patent
invalidity.

Our conclusion is that the bill required an answer and it

” was error to dismiss same.
Reversed.
THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ., concur.
Lee

WARREN W. PEARCE v. FLAGLER MEMORIAL PARK, ING, a
Florida corporation.

36 So. (2nd) 273 June Term, 1948

July 6, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 16, 1948

Blackwell, Walker & Gray, for petitioner.
L. L. Robinson and A. M. Sandler, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is an application for certiorari under Rule 34 of the
rules of this court. It appears that petitioner filed his bill of
complaint against respondent praying for an accounting and
other relief. The chancellor granting a motion by respondent
transferring the cause to.the law side of the docket. This ap-
peal is by certiorari from that decree.

The record and the briefs have been examined and we are
convinced that the bill and the amended bill of complaint con-
tained equity and that relief by equity will be more complete
and efficacious. This is, of course, assuming that the allega-

Le
662

tions of the amended bill of complaint are proven. It was,
‘therefore, error to transfer the cause to the law side of the
docket. ,
Certiorari is granted and the judgment appealed from is
quashed with directions to reinstate the amended bill of com-
plaint and proceed accordingly. .
It is so ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,

JJ., concur.

GEORGE E. McCASKILL v. CLEY OF HOMESTEAD, a municipal
corporation under the laws of Florida, et al.

36 So, (2nd) 272 . June Term, 1948

July 6, 1948 Division A

Rehearing denied July 28, 1948

George E. McCaskill, for appellant.
Ira C. Haycock, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

On this appeal the contention is made that the Chancellor
below committed reversible error by dismissing on final
hearing the amended bill of complaint brought against the
City of Homestead seeking a decree of cancellation of assess-
ments made by the officials of the City of Homestead against
described lands of appellant for the years 1938 to 1944, both
inclusive, for various reasons, among which are the following:
(1) the city failed to ascertain each year and make a correct
record thereof the exact amount necessary to be raised by
taxation; (2) failed to select and designate a newspaper in
which to advertise for sale delinquent taxes; (3) failed to fix

a
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663

the amount to be collected by the Tax Collector; (4) fees of
15 cents and 30 cents per line for advertisement were illegal;
(5) various grounds of the illegal assessments for each of the
years supra; (6) parts of the lands described in certain cer-
tificates were by the appellant dedicated to the public and the
assessments on the lands actually dedicated should be can-
celled; (7) the lands were assessed at more than the cash
value thereof; (8) other irregularities and procedural defects
in assessments as are set out in the amended bill of complaint.

We have given careful consideration to the issues made by
the pleadings and the authorities cited and relied upon for a
reversal have been examined. It is not contended that the
city was without power to make the assessments challenged
here, but that the arbitrary manner ‘in which the power was
exercised, coupled with the irregularities or procedural de-
fects or the failure and neglect of the oficials of the city to
observe or conform to the plain requirements of the applicable
law, necessitates a reversal.

It is not disputed that the appellant by the dismissal order
is required to pay assessments on lands which appear by him
to have been dedicated to the use of the public. As to the
lands so dedicated by the appellant the value of the assess-
ments on the dedicated portions should be calculated and the
amount determined and deducted from the total amount of the
taxes found to be due.

The order of dismissal appealed from is so modified as to
authorize a calculation as above stated and a credit allowed
therefor. Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the costs
of this appeal. The order of dismissal is modified as above set
out and stands affirmed as modified.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Lt
LACY STEWART v. STATE OF FLORIDA

36 So. (2nd) 269 June Term, 1948
July 6, 1948 En Bane

ee
664

Charles R. P. Brown, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves “Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The appellant, Lacy Stewart, was by a jury of St. Lucie
County, Florida, found guilty of murder in the first degree and
by the trial court sentenced to death for the murder of Erich
Spiller in said County on October 29, 1946. The appellant is
a colored boy and about 17 or 18 years of age when the crime
was alleged to have been committed. The appellant did not
testify in the case, neither was any evidence adduced in his
behalf. It is the contention of counsel for appellant that the
evidence adduced is legally insufficient to support a verdict
and judgment of murder in the first degree.

The case comes here for the second time. See Stewart v.
State, 158 Fla. 753, 30 So. (2nd) 489, in which we remanded
the cause for a new trial. The State in the second trial ad-
duced testimony and cured many of the defects pointed out in
our original opinion. The signed confession of the defendant
offered below was corroborated by other evidence adduced on
the second trial and 24 jurors now have heard the witnesses,
observed their demeanor on the witness stand, and were satis-
fied, as shown by two verdicts, that the defendant below was
guilty as charged. We have reviewed the evidence to de-
termine if the interests of justice require a new trial and fail
to find error in the record; accordingly the judgment appealed
from is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. TERRELL, ADAMS, SEBRING, BARNS
and HOBSON, JJ., goncur.

ORANGE STATE OIL COMPANY, a Florida corporation, v. L. E.
CROSBY.

36 So. (2nd) 273 . January Term, 1948
July 9, 1948 En Banc

665

Gedney, Johnston & Lilienthal and Hudson & Cason, for
appellant.

Edwin T. Osteen and George M. Powell, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

This case has been before us once. (158 Fla. 551, 29 So.
(2nd) 634). We upheld the legal sufficiency of the bill.
Thereafter the appellant answered. On motion certain parts of
the answer were stricken. The case was then referred to a
master who took testimony and made findings for the appellee
and recommended a decree accordingly. The chancellor re-
viewed the evidence upon.appellant’s exceptions and entered a
decree for appellee reforming the lease as prayed in the bill.

On this appeal the order striking parts of the answer is
brought in question as well as the final decree on the merits.
Most of the stricken parts of the answer set forth that the
appellant’s agent, Sherwood, was without authority to make
any contract other than in the written form; that appellee had
ample time to read and inform himself of the contents of the
lease and also that the relief could not be granted because of
the statute of frauds. Section 725.01, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A.

Appellant relies on recent decisions, as well as many of the
older ones, to the effect that a motion to strike may not be
used to test the legal sufficiency of the answer. Robertson v.
Dunne, 45 Fla. 553, 33 So. 530; Holzendorf v. Terrell, 52 Fla.

ee
666

525, 42 So. 584; Schupler v. Eastern Mortgage Company,
160 Fla. 72, 33 So. (2nd) 586. Even though the attack was
by motion we will not hold the error harmful so long as the
stricken parts would not have altered the equities of the case
and that is our view.

Assuming that Sherwood was not clothed with actual au-
thority to make a lease, other than in the written form
generally used by the company, the fact is that he was ap-
pellant’s local manager who presumably possessed the usual
powers and exercised the usual authority of managing such a
business. Pursuant to the performance of his apparent au-
thority, he placed appellee in possession of the filling station
and caused him to invest considerable money which quite
obviously would not have been done if the agent had correctly
informed him of the written lease which would later be sub-
mitted to him. This part of the answer would not then consti-
tute a bar to the relief sought. If it could be said that it
might show an equity in mitigation of the relief sought it
would have been harmful error but such is not the case.

The statute of frauds constitutes no bar to this case. This
is a proceeding to reform a lease. The law of this case was
settled when we approved the bill. Appellant placed appellee
in possession of the premises and assured him that a five year
lease would be given. Appellee relied on that assurance and
invested money which he otherwise would not have done.
Thereafter the formal lease was actually signed but its con-
tents were not according to the terms under which appellee
was put in possession. The circumstances surrounding the
execution of the written lease is found in the evidence and a
consideration of that leads to the final question of whether the
bill was proven.

We have examined the testimony, the master’s report, as
did the chancellor, and find no reason to disturb the decree.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, SEBRING, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ.,
coneur.

THOMAS, C. J., and TERRELL, J., dissent.

Le
687
PHILIP WHITEHEAD, etc., et al, v. MIAMI LAUNDRY COMPANY
86 So. (2nd) 382 June Term, {948
July 9, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied July 29, 1948

Gramling & Gramling, for appellants.
L. Earl Curry and Edward P. White, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The Miami Laundry Company filed its bill of complaint in
the Circuit Court of Dade County seeking to enjoin the de-
fendants below from picketing in or about the vicinity of the
place of business of the plaintiff, or from displaying handbills,
carrying any newspaper advertising or data, or announcing by
radio or other means that the employees of the plaintiff were
on strike. At final hearing the chancellor entered a decree en-
joining the defendants, as prayed, and the defendants have
taken an appeal from that decree.

The allegations of the bill of complaint upon which the
decree was based are, in substance, viz:

Plaintiff is the owner and operator of a laundry and dry
cleaning business in the City of Miami, and has 210 persons |
employed as laundry and dry cleaning workers. The defend-
ant Whitehead is the business agent of International Laundry
Workers Union, Local No. 222, American Federation of Labor.
The other four defendants are former employees of the
plaintiff who had been discharged by him because of inef-
ficiency and lack of satisfactory service. During their course
of employment none of these former employees ever made any

De
668

complaint about working conditions, salaries, or other kindred
matters pertaining to their employment, and none of them has
ever been constituted as an employees’ committee for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining.

For some time prior to the filing of the bill the defendant
Whitehead, individually and as business agent for and on be-
half of International Laundry Workers Union, Local No. 222,
American Federation of Labor, has been attempting to en-
list the employees of the plaintiff as members of said Union by
attempting to hold meetings and to propagandize said em-
ployees by means of the mails and distribution of handbills
urging said employees to join said Union. These efforts have
continued over a period of months and have met with but
little, if any, success. Whitehead has never presented to the
plaintiff any evidence that a majority of said employees are
members of any Union or that a majority of said employees
have ever designated the defendant as the collective bargain-
ing agent, or that the majority of said employees have ever,
by a majority vote of the employees to be governed thereby,
authorized or agreed to participate in any strike, walkout or
cessation of work or continuation thereof, as covered by the
provisions of section 481.09 Florida Statutes, 1941.

On May 12, 1947, at the’time for employees to arrive for
work, the four defendants, who were former employees, ap-
peared before the plant of the plaintiff as pickets carrying
signs which read: “The Miami Laundry and Dry Cleaning
Company is unfair to their employees. We were fired for
wanting decent wages and working conditions.” These de-
fendants continued to walk to and fro in front of the building
for about 45 minutes and then ceased their picketing. They
returned again at about noontime, and still again the follow-
ing morning, and picketed in the same manner for a short
period of time.

On May 13, 1947, the defendants distributed to the em-
ployees of the plaintiff a handbill which read: “Tune in Radio
Station WINZ, 960 on the dial, 6:15 P. M. Wednesday, May
14th. Hear the truth about Miami Laundry and the Laundry
& Dry Cleaning Board of Trade, and why there is labor unrest
in Miami plants.”

De
Le
669

Simultaneously with these incidents occurring on May 12
and May 13, there appeared in the Miami Daily newspapers a
reported news release by the defendant Whitehead, indi-
vidually and in his capacity as business agent for the union,
that his local organization, purporting to act for the em-
ployees of plaintiff had actually called a strike to be effective
at 6:30 A. M. on Friday, May 16th, thereby announcing to the
public generally that a strike had been called and deferring
the time of the actual cessation of work to 6:30 A. M. of said
May 16th. Moreover, there had been distributed to the em-
ployees of the plaintiff in the street in front of the place of
business of plaintiff a handbill which carried, among other
things, the following wording: “We are ready! If you are
with us! do this. If you see a picket sign in front of the
Miami Laundry when you arrive for work. Contact one of the
Committee who will be at or near the plant. Report immedi-
ately at the address below for registration. Musicians Bldg.
542 N. Miami St. Do not go to work and do not return to your
home without first being sure to register your name and ad-
dress at headquarters.”

Despite these activities of the defendants all of the em-
ployees of the plaintiff appeared for work on May 12, 1947,
with the exception of four who were out through sickness, six
who were out of the City, and two who did not work, either
through intimidation, excitement, or fear to cross the picket
lines; that these latter two employees are recent employees
of the plaintiff who have advised plaintiff that they are not
members of the Union, and who have not participated in any
way but who, through fear of possible retaliation have been
afraid to cross the picket lines, and have indicated their desire
to continue to work. On May 13, 1947, there was no ad-
ditional absenteeism and no strike is in progress at the plant.
None of the employees have indicated to the management of
the plaintiff that they are cooperating with the Union or that
they intend to go on a strike, or reported any grievance to the
management.

The bill concludes with the charge that the defendants by
their alleged picketing, distribution of handbills, and other ac-
tivities, are attempting either to strike, to cause a strike, or to

EE
670

* invite participation in a strike, walkout or cessation of work
without said strike, walkout or cessation of work being author-
ized by a majority vote of the employees to be governed there-
by, as required by section 481.09 Florida Statutes, 1941, and
that they are pursuing such illegal activities for the purpose of
inducing membership in their Union; but that since there can
be no legal strike under the circumstances the actions of the
defendants amount to an illegal invasion of the property rights
of the plaintiff, contrary to the Florida statutes. It charges
further that the newspaper articles, the purported radio
propaganda, and the distribution of handbills together with
the alleged picketing and threats of a strike for Friday, May
16, 1947, are all done as a part of the illegal conspiracy on the
part of the defendants to interfere with the orderly operation
of plaintiff’s business, to create a disturbance, and through the
fears and intimidations incident to any alleged labor disturb-
ance to force both the public, who are the general customers
of the plaintiff, and the satisfied employees, to believe that
there is a labor disturbance or that there will be a cessation
of work or a strike to be called.

A motion to dismiss the bill was filed by the defendants
and denied by the chancellor. Thereafter the defendants filed
their answers admitting the identity of the defendants as
stated, the wording of the signs and handbills, and the hours
of picketing, and denying the remaining material allegations
in the bill of complaint. Upon the issues raised by the bill and
answer testimony was taken before a master, and at final
hearing the chancellor entered the decree appealed from.

The final decree entered by the chancellor found that the
defendants picketed and distributed handbills, as alleged in
the bill and admitted in the answer; that there were news-
paper and radio announcements made by or through the Union
agent that a strike was to occur on May 16, 1947. Asa result
of the picketing, distribution of handbills, newspaper and radio
announcements, all except a few of the employees of the
plaintiff went to work; there were none who stayed away to
strike or to register with the Union. The activities of the de-
fendants had a certain detrimental influence on plaintiff’s
business through upsetting employees, disrupting their work,

and, to some degree, by discouraging customers. The pickets
- were working with and at the instigation of the Union agent
and were drawing some compensation for their part in the
proceedings and their activities were tied in with the Union’s
attempt to organize the employees of the plaintiff. The em-
ployees do not belong to the Union and there has been no vote
by a majority to authorize a strike or work cessation. The
presence of the picket signs was the previously announced
signs for the strike sought to be induced. Defendants, in act-
ing together for the plainly expressed purpose of bringing
about a cessation of work at plaintiff’s place of business, were
acting in a manner prohibited by State law, because to strike
or to foment or induce a strike in the absence of employee
majority vote for it is barred by statute. While the picket
signs themselves did not so state, the advertisements and
public announcements were acts calculated to aid. the effort.
Viewed together all of the activities engaged in by the de-
fendants acquired the character of the prohibited object
which their same made up and consequently the defendants
must be enjoined under section 481.09 Florida Statutes 1941.
The injunction order entered by the chancellor based upon
these findings was that “the defendants, and each of them,
their servants, agents and employees be and they hereby are
enjoined and restrained (under section 481.09(3) F.S.A.), in
the absence of any authorizing vote of a majority of plaintiff’s
employees, from resuming, continuing or repeating the acts
complained of in the bill or any other such acts inviting, in-
ducing, signalling or advertising or announcing a strike or
cessation of work at plaintiff's place or places of business.”
On this appeal the appellants pose three questions for ad-
judication. These questions are, viz: |
1. Is section 481.09(3) F.S.A. providing that “It shall be
unlawful for any person: (3) to participate in any strike,
walkout or cessation of work or continuation thereof, without
the same being authorized by a majority vote of the employees
to be governed thereby; provided that this shall not prohibit
any person from terminating his employment of his own voli-
tion,” contrary to Amendments I, V, VIII, XIV, and XV of the
Constitution of the United States of America?

671

Le
672

2. Is the said section 481.09(3), supra, a constitutionally
valid prohibition against a threat of strike, or against efforts -
to organize, or a prohibition against, picketing or against a
strike by a minority of employees?

3. Is the right by former discharged employees to picket
an employer for the purposes of protesting peremptory dis-
charges and of cooperating, with a union in an organizational
drive and to require employer to negotiate with union repre-
sentatives pertaining to contract, guaranteed by the Federal
constitution as an exercise of freedom of speech, freedom of
press and lawful assembly?

We do not think that section 481.09 (3) F.S.A. has any
application to the facts of the case at bar. That statute pur-
ports to make it unlawful for any person “to participate in
any strike, walk-out, or cessation of work or continuation
thereof without the same being authorized by a majority of
the employees to be governed thereby,” but none of the
necessary elements are present in the case at bar to bring the
case within the statute. There is no strike, walkout, or cessa-
tion of work being engaged in by employees of the plaintiff,
nor the slightest evidence that one is contemplated, either with
or without a majority vote of the employees to be governed
thereby. That the defendants, as union representatives, are
attempting by means of peaceful picketing and the display of
handbills to persuade the employees of the plaintiff to join
their union and thereafter to make demands for higher wages
or better working conditions, and, perhaps, to strike to en-
force such demands, does not in and of itself make out a case
of breach of the statute, or bring the defendants (who are
not employees of the plaintiff) within its operation. A care-
ful study of chapter 481 of the Florida Statutes, and particu-
larly subsection 12 and 13 of Section 481.09, Florida Statutes,
1941 (F.S.A.) suggest the conclusion that the Legislature
recognized the right of peaceable picketing as provided for in
our fundamental law, by the enactment of subsections 12 and
18, viz: It shall be unlawful for any person. ... (12) To picket
beyond the area of the industry within which a labor dispute
arises. (13) To engage in picketing by force and violence, or
to picket in such a manner as to prevent ingress and egress to

and from any premises, or to picket other than in a reasonable
and peaceable manner.

While the chancellor found as a matter of fact that a ma~
jority of the members of Local 222, A. F. of L. had not voted
in favor of a strike by the employees of Miami Laundry Com-
pany at the time of filing the bill of complaint, we think that
this finding was immaterial because the facts of the case were
not sufficient to invoke the terms and conditions of section
481.09(3), Florida Statutes, supra, and that statute was not
material to a settlement of the controversy between the
parties.

It follows that the issuance of an injunction on the finding
that section 481.09(3) was applicable is erroneous, and that if
the injunction order appealed from is to be upheld it must be
on other and applicable recognized equitable grounds. Our
conclusion on this point makes it unnecessary for us to con-
sider or answer questions 1 and 2 set out above, for they are
not responsive to the true issues presented by the pleadings.

Counsel for appellee contends that without regard to sec-
tion 481.09(3) Florida Statutes, supra, the challenged decree
should be sustained under our holding in Retail Clerks Union
Local 779, et al. v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 140 Fla. 865, 193 So.
529, decided in December 1939, rehearing denied Feb. 19, 1940.
Counsel for the appellants maintain that the Lerner case does
not control the case at bar for the reason that subsequent to

- the Lerner case the Supreme Court of the United States has
rendered decisions on the Federal Constitutional aspects of
cases similar to the one before us, which have the effect of
abrogating the holding of the Lerner case, on Federal Consti-
tutional grounds. We think that the contention of the ap-
pellants is well founded.

The case of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 84 L. .Ed.
1093, 60 S. Ct. 736, decided April 22, 1940, involved a convic-
tion under an Alabama statute forbidding “loitering and
picketing.” It was shown that Thornhill was a member of a
picket line located close to the place of business of his em-
ployer and with others formed a picket line about the plant of
employer. Mr. Thornhill, when on picket, stated they “were
on a strike, and did not want anyone to go up there to work.”

673

De
674

It was a peaceable picketing. The court in holding the statute
invalid, said:

“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss pub-
licly and truthfully all matters of public concern without
previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. . . .
Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function
in this nation, must embrace all issues about which informa-
tion is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period.

“In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of in-
formation concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be re-
garded as within that area of free discussion that is guaran-
teed by the Constitution. ...

“The merest glance at state and federal legislation on the
subject demonstrates the force of the argument that labor
relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. .
Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the
causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular gov-
ernment to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.
The issues raised by regulations, such as are challenged here,
infringing upon the right of employees effectively to inform
the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this
larger problem. We concur in the observation of Mr. Justice
Brandeis, speaking for the Court in Senn’s case (301 U.S. at
478, 81 L. ed 1236, 57 S. Ct. 857) : ‘Members of a union might,
without special statutory authorization by a State, make
known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.’

“Tt is true that the rights of employers and employees to
conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for
a share in the products of industry are subject to modification
or qualification in the interests of the society in which they
exist...”

“Tt is not enough to say that Section 3448 is limited or re-
stricted in its application to such activity as takes place at the
scene of the labor dispute. (The) streets are natural and
proper: places for the dissemination of information and

ee
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675

opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place...”

In the case of American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312
U.S. 321, 85 L. Ed. 855, 61 S. Ct. 568, decided in 1941, the Su-
preme Court of the United States reversed an injunction de-
cree entered by the Illinois Supreme Court. The decree had en-
joined peaceful picketing by a group of union members hecause
there was no immediate employer-employee relationship or
dispute involved. In reversing the Illinois decree the Court
said:

“All that we have before us, then, is an instance of ‘peace-
ful persuasion’ disentangled from violence and free from
‘picketing en masse or otherwise conducted’ so as to occasion
‘imminent and aggravated danger.’ Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
US. 88, 105, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 1104, 60 S. Ct. 736. We are asked
to sustain a decree which for purposes of this case asserts as
the common law of a state that there can be no ‘peaceful
picketing or peaceful persuasion’ in relation to any dispute be-
tween an employer and a trade union unless the employer’s
own employees are in controversy with him.

“Such a ban of free communication is inconsistent with the
guaranty of freedom of speech. That a state has ample power
to regulate the local problems thrown up by, modern industry
and to preserve the peace is axiomatic. But not even these
essential powers are unfettered by the requirements of the Bill
of Rights. The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
confined by the notion of a particular state regarding the wise
limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those
limits be defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the
state. A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully
exercising the right of free communication by drawing the
circle of economic competition between employers and work-
ers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly
employed by him. The interdependence of economic interest
of all engaged in the same industry has become a common-
place. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209, 66 L. Hd. 189, 199, 42 S. Ct. 72, 27
A.L.R. 360. The right of free communication cannot there-

676

fore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with
an employer, even though they are not in his employ. Com-
munication by such employees of the facts of a dispute,
deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, can no more
be barred because of concern for the economic interests
against which they are seeking to enlist public opinion than
could the utterance protected in Thornhill’s Case...” See
also Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 85 L. Ed. 836, 61 S. Ct. 552; Bakery Drivers
Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 86 L. Ed. 1178, 62 S. Ct. 816.

It is our considered view that inasmuch as section
481.09 (3) Florida Statutes is not applicable, and the plaintiff
has not shown itself entitled to an injunction under the facts
presented by the record, as ruled by the governing decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States on the Federal ques-
tions involved, the decree entered by the chancellor must be
reversed and the bill of complaint dismissed.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

TERRELL, ADAMS, and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

TERRELL, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., dissenting:

We dissent because we are of opinion that the decree
should be affirmed on authority of Retail Clerk’s Union Local
v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 140 Fla. 856, 193 So. 529.

DELL SIMMONS v. STATE OF FLORIDA

36 So. (2nd) 262 June Term, 1948
July 9, 1948 Division A

617

A. L, Johnson, for appellant. .

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Ernest W. Welch, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Lucille Snowden, Special As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The appellant, Dell Simmons, was tried in the Circuit
Court of Santa Rosa County, Florida, under an indictment
charging the crime of murder in the first degree. The jury,
after hearing the evidence, argument of counsel and the in-
structions of the trial court, returned a verdict of manslaugh-
ter. A motion for a new trial was made and denied, when the
defendant below was sentenced to serve a period of seven
years at hard labor in the State Prison. The defendant below
appealed.

Three grounds are argued here for a reversal of the judg-
ment, one of which is that reversible error was committed by
the trial court in admitting into evidence, over seasonable ob-
jections of counsel, an alleged dying declaration identified as
State’s Exhibit No. 1. The other two grounds go to the legal
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and judg-
ment, emphasis of counsel being placed on certain physical
facts about the place of the homicide, which it contended
should control rather than the testimony of certain witnesses.
adduced by the State.

The record discloses that the gun shot sustained by the
deceased completely severed his spinal cord and death was
inevitable, but the exact time, in the opinion of the attending
physician, was to him uncertain. The deceased prior to his;
death signed a written statement prepared for his signature
by the State Attorney, which during the progress of the trial

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678

was offered in evidence by the State and objected to by counsel
for the defendant on the ground that it had not been estab-
lished that the defendant entertained no hope of recovery or
that death was imminent at the time the deceased signed the
statement. The pertinent part of the record is viz:

“THE COURT: I assume that those elements are con-
tained in his statement. The Court has not seen it, and does
not know what is in it.

“MR. HOLSBERRY: They are in there.

_ “MR. JOHNSON: We further object on the ground that
it is couched in the language of the State Attorney, and ap-
pears to us on its face that it is the language of the State At-
torney, as put to the deceased by him, and therefore does not
appear to be a statement made at a time when the deceased
knew and had every reason to believe that death was immi-
nent.

“THE COURT: The dying declaration will be admitted.”

The dying statement contained recitals by the deceased to
the effect that he was in a dying condition and are viz:

“I, Calvin Simmons, desiring to give information relative
to the shooting of myself by my wife, Ebbie Dell Simmons,
and knowing and believing that I am on my death bed, and
believing that I am dying from the effects of the bullet wound,
do hereby make a statement under oath before J. Edwin Hols-
berry, State Attorney of the First Judicial Circuit of Florida,
and after swearing to tell the truth and nothing but the trust,
so help me God, I do swear as follows, to-wit: ...”

We fail to find in the record any statement by the deceased
at the time of signing the dying declaration, independently of
the statement adduced, to the effect that the declarant knew
death was imminent and inevitable and that he entertained no
hope of recovery. Appellant’s counsel contends that the
ruling of the trial court admitting into evidence the statement
fails to conform to our adjudications and is clearly erroneous.

It is established law that to render a dying declaration ad-
missible it must be shown that the declarant entertained no
-hope of recovery and realized that death was imminent. The

declarant must have known and believed he was on the
threshold of death. Johnson v. State, 113 Fla. 461, 152 So.
176. It must be shown that the declarant was sufficiently
rational at the time of making the statement to understand
the import of his words. Frier v. State, 92 Fla. 241, 109 So.
334. It is a mixed question of law and fact for the Judge to
decide before permitting the introduction of a dying declara-
tion. Morris v. State, 100 Fla. 850, 130 So. 582.

The trial court, at the time of the challenged ruling, had
before it the testimony of Dr. John Turberville to the effect
that the deceased could not recover, and death occurred
shortly after signing the dying declaration. These facts,
coupled with the quoted portion of the statement, supra,
constituted a sufficient legal showing to admit the same for
the jury’s consideration. The preliminary showing made by
the State for the introduction into evidence of the dying decla-
ration was sufficient to meet the requirements of our adjudi-
cations and the ruling was free from error.

The evidence shows that the defendant shot her husband,
Calvin Simmons, in their home in the early morning of No-
vember 4, 1947. Their son, Forrest Simmons, was arrested
by the officers and lodged in the Escambia County jail and a
demand was made on Calvin Simmons for the money neces-
sary to obtain the son’s release from custody. It appears from
the record that the husband did not have the money necessary
to obtain the son’s release. The “under and over gun” used
by the defendant was obtained by her on the day previous to
the shooting. She placed the gun at a certain place about the
home and, according to her testimony, was in the act of
dressing preparatory to her trip to Pensacola when attacked
by her husband with a stick. She simply seized the gun and
shot her husband in self defense. Her testimony was corrobo-
rated by that of her children then about the home.

The theory of the State was that the husband was shot by
the defendant as he rested on a cot in the living room of the
home at a time when their youngest child was near him. The
State contended that the deceased was right-handed and,
being so, it was physically impossible for him to have as-
sSaulted the defendant with a stick because his right hand

679

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was too near the corner of the room to permit the raising of
a stick and then advance on the defendant. Some of the wit-
nesses testified that the deceased was right-handed and other
to the effect that he was left-handed.

It is contended that the verdict of manslaughter as re-
turned by the jury cannot be supported by the State’s testi-
mony as it is contradictory to certain physical facts which are
conclusive and cannot be reconciled with the verdict. Counsel
for appellant cited authorities to sustain this contention. We
have examined the cases cited but hold that they are inap-
plicable to the facts appearing in the record. The jury by its
verdict of manslaughter settled the conflicts and disputes in
the testimony and the burden of showing error rested on the
appellant.

The next contention is that the testimony adduced by the
State was legally insufficient to support the verdict and judg-
ment of the lower court. The answer. to this contention is
that the evidence is not only legally sufficient to sustain the
verdict and judgment but would support a higher degree of
murder than found by the jury in the court below. We fail to
find error in the record.

Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Le

STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. FLORIA NELL HICKS v. R. P. CAIN
and ALMA CAIN.

36 So. 275 June Term, 1948
July 13, 1948 En Bane

B. L. Solomon, for appellant.
Clyde R. Brown, for appellees.

681

PER CURIAM:

This is a habeas corpus proceeding instituted for the pur-
pose of adjudicating the custody of James Ferrell Cain, a boy
child about two years of age. Shortly after its birth and until
about two years of age the child was kept in its paternal
grandparents home in Washington County, Florida. The
parents of the child lived in the same home, where the
grandfather supplied his son, the father of the child, the sum
of $100.00 per month upon which to live as he was at the
time in poor health and died when the child was only a few
months of age. The mother remained in this home for a while
but went to Columbus, Georgia, to study beauty culture, and
while there married the second time and gave birth to a
second child. The court heard all the evidence and thereafter
awarded the custody of the child to its paternal grandparents.
We are requested on this appeal to reverse the order of the
lower court and award the custody of the child to the mother.
We have studied the record in light of the contention and it
has not been made to appear that the Court below committed
reversible error in the order challenged here. See Fielding v.
Highsmith, 152 Fla. 837, 18 So. (2nd) 208.

Affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SEBRING, BARNS
and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., dissents.

FLORA BELL WRIGHT JOYNER, et al., v. J. C. BERNARD
36 So. (2nd) 364 . June Term,. 1948
July 13, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied July 29, 1948

Randolph Calhoun, for appellants.
John Fite Robertson, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

This is a mortgage foreclosure suit originating in the
Circuit Court of Sarasota County, Florida, on June 6, 1938.
The note and mortgage involved were for the sum of $15,000.00
and dated November 6, 1926, bearing interest at the rate of
8%, which became due and payable monthly, after maturity,
on the 5th of each month, along with the sum of $400.00 on the
principal, for a period of 29 months, and the remaining
amount of the principal in the sum of $3,400.00 became due
and payable on May 5, 1929. The case comes here for the
third time. See Joyner v. Bernard, 148 Fla. 649, 6 So. (2nd)
533, and Joyner v. Bernard, 153 Fla. 372, 14 So. (2nd) 724.
Many of the points adjudicated and put at rest on the two
former appeals are argued as error on this, the third appeal.
This contention ignores the doctrine of the “law of the case”
previously adopted and enunciated by this Court on many oc-
casions. See Oates v. New York Life Insurance Co., 144 Fla.
744, 198 So. 681, and similar cases.

We have defined “the law of the case” as the points adjudi-
eated by an appellate court upon a writ of error or upon ap-
peal and are no longer open for consideration. The rule is
inapplicable to and not decisive of points presented on a
second appeal that were not presented upon the former ap-
peals. The record discloses that on former appeals we ruled
upon the questions of usury, estoppel and bigamous marriage,
but sent the cause back to the court below for a further hear-
ing and determination of the exact amount due the plaintiff on
the note and mortgage after allowing all lawful credits.

For the purpose of determining the exact amount due
under the note and mortgage involved in this controversy we
entered an order of reversal and, in part said (text 153 Fla..
378) :

|
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683

“The mortgagee should be allowed to adduce testimony
establishing with reasonable certainty the number of rental
houses taken over by it subject to the mortgage and the total
amount of money received as rents and profits and the period
of time the property was in its possession. Likewise these
issues may be controverted by competent evidence to be ad-
duced by the mortgagor and in addition thereto evidence as
to a reasonable rental value of the mortgaged premises
possessed by the mortgagee and the exact houses and the
period of time mortgagee was in possession. ...”

On the going down of our mandate the cause was again
referred to Honorable Glover E. Ashby, as Special Master,
who heard the evidence of the respective parties and reported
the same to the Chancellor below, with recommendations as to
the terms of a final decree. The cause again was heard by
the Chancellor on exceptions to the Special Master’s report
and on motion for a final decree and on June 11, 1947, decreed
that the defendants were due to the plaintiff on the note and
mortgage the sum of $14,397.39 and an attorney fee in the
sum of $1,250.00, making a total amount due in the sum of
$15,647.39—less two credits—one in the sum of $3,975.18 and
the other for the sum of $1,590.04; total amount of credits
$5,565.22, leaving the total amount due the plaintiff on June
11, 1947, at the sum of $10,082.17.

An analysis or breaking down of the sum of $14,397.39 de-
creed to be due on June 11, 1947, discloses the sum of $6,398.84
as interest at the rate of 10% per annum from May, 1939, to
June 11, 1947, on a balance due as principal in the sum of
$7,998.55. On November 30, 1930, the balance due as princi-
pal on the note and mortgage was the sum of $8,721.50. An
allowance of $100.00 per month as credit for rents from No-
vember 30, 1930 to March 7, 1938, and charging the mortgagor
with advancements by the mortgagee for taxes, insurance and

“repairs in the sum of $1,046.98 and allowing the mortgagors
eredit for the sum of $3,302.72 for rents collected after March,
1938, the unpaid amount of principal in May, 1939, was found
to be in the sum of $7,998.55, plus the sum of $6,398.84,
making the amount set out in the final decree in the sum of
$14.397.39.

a
684

Careful consideration has been given to all the evidence in
the record bearing on the rental value per month of the
several buildings described in the mortgage from the month
of November, 1930, until the 7th day of March, 1938. The
special master reported to the Chancellor that the sum of
$100.00 was the correct monthly value—the property being in
the possession of the mortgagee during the period—and the
Chancellor so decreed. The writer has studied the testimony
pertinent to this issue but just cannot reconcile the allowance
of $100.00 per month with the testimony of Fred D. Palmer
and J. Irvin Walden, who placed the monthly rentals of the
property at the sum of $200.00 per month. We fail to find in
the record pertinent testimony on the issue discrediting the
testimony given by these two witnesses.

It is our conclusion that the minimum monthly allowance
as rentals for the period between November, 1930, and March
1938, on the houses described in the mortgage should be fixed
at the sum of $200.00 per month so as to conform to the
weight of the testimony appearing in the record, but all other
terms and provisions of the challenged decree are free from
error. The decree is reversed with directions that a credit of
$200.00 per month, with interest, be allowed the mortgagors
as a credit on the note and mortgage rather than the sum of
$100.00 as stated in the final decree. Reversed for further
proceedings in the court below not inconsistent with the views
herein expressed.

TERRELL, SEBRING, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and ADAMS, J., dissent.

[|
STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. M. ©. O'Farrell v. CURTIS HIXON, as
Mayor of the City of Tampa; H. J, HICKEY as Chairman of the
Civil Service Board of the City of Tampa; H. W. (JACK) PEN-
DOLA, L. E. McELDOWNEY, GIBBS W. HARRIS, and ANGUS
WILLIAMS as Members of the Civil Service Board of the City of

‘Tampa.
36 So. (2nd) 371 June Term, 1948
July 13, 1948 Division B

Forrest O. Hobbs, for appellant.
Karl E. Whitaker and Ralph A. Marsicano, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

We have examined carefully the transcript of record in
this case and have ascertained that the questions presented
find their complete answers in the case of Nelson v. Quigg,”
156 Fla. 189, 23 So. (2nd) 186 and cases therein cited.

An examination of the transcript of the record discloses
that the ruling made by the Civil Service Board of the City of
Tampa and affirmed by Circuit Judge Parks is sustained by
substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, BARNS and HOBSON, J.J., con-

cur.

FLORENCE OITRUS GROWERS ASSOCIATION, HARDWARE
MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY and FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION, v. JAMES PARRISH.

36 So. (2nd) 369 June Term, 1948

July 13, 1948 Special Division B

Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, and Walter HE. Rountree, for
appellants.

Oxford & Oxford and H. E. Oxford, for appellee.

686

WISEHEART, Associate Justice:

This is a workmen’s compensation case. The claimant,
James Parrish, was working for Florence Citrus Growers As-
sociation on April 20th, 1946, on which date he received an
injury to his leg arising out of and in the course of his em-
ployment.

Medical treatment was furnished by putting his foot in a
east and later splinting his leg, and compensation was paid
“until June 17th, 1946, at which time he returned to work for
his employer and did light work, from grading potatoes to
painting knots, until October 28th, 1946. He was again paid
compensation from the later date to November 12th, 1946. _

The deputy commissioner held that the claimant was not
entitled to further compensation. This ruling was sustained
by the full commission. The circuit court reversed the order
of the deputy commissioner and the commission and ordered
that the employer and the carrier pay to the claimant com-
pensation at the rate of $22.00 per week during his disability,
not to exceed the period fixed by law for his injury. The cir-
cuit court further ordered that there be paid to the claimant
the sum of $726.00, that being the sum the court found to be
due from the last payment to the date of the order of the
circuit court.

In his order reversing the order of the deputy commis-
sioner and the commission, the circuit judge reviewed all the
evidence, and the order now on appeal was based on a dif-
ference in the conclusions drawn from such evidence. The
circuit judge wrote a full and fair summary of the evidence
and his conclusions, which we find to be well supported.

It is first contended by the appellant that where the injury
to the workman is of such character as to require medical
testimony and such medical testimony is to the effect that the
workman had fully recovered, the circuit court is bound by
such testimony. This question was fully answered in the
case of Star Fruit Company v. Canady, 159 Fla. 488, 32 So.
(2nd) 2, wherein this court, ‘speaking through Mr. Justice
CHAPMAN, said:

“We find no testimony in the record contradictory of the
_testimony of the claimant on the point of his permanent dis-

|
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687

ability other than the opinion of the doctor to the effect that
Canady was physically able to work after sustaining the
injury in 1946. The Circuit Judge had a right, as a matter of
law, to accept the opinion of the Tampa physician on this
point or to reject it and base his conclusions on the testimony
of the claimant Canady. We have held that the findings of
fact on conflicting testimony in the court below will usually be
sustained if supported by substantial evidence. Cone Brothers
Contracting Co. v. Massey, 145 Fla. 56, 198 So. 892.”

It is finally contended that since there is no testimony
applicable to the condition of the claimant later than the
date of the hearing before the deputy commissioner, the cir-
cuit court was not authorized without the taking of further
testimony to allow compensation beyond the date of the hear-
ing before the deputy commissioner. In this we see no merit.
All compensation orders are extended to and do run into the
future. That is one of the purposes of the act. If it were
otherwise it would necessitate the continued holding of hear-
ings for the payment of claims under the act.

On appeal it is within the authority of the circuit court to
affirm, reverse, modify or remand the cause to the commission
for further proceedings. Here the circuit court reversed the
order of the commission and directed payment of all past due
compensation to the claimant.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.

| reece

WILLIAM F. THOMAS v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC & MFG.
COMPANY, a Corporation, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COM-
PANY, a Corporation, and FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION.

36 So. (2nd) 377 June Term, 1948

July 13,1948 En Banc

Rehearing denied July 29, 1948

|
688 ; .

Parks, Sanders & McEwen and Donald Walker, for ap-
pellant.
Heskin A. Whittaker, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:°

On the 2nd day of August, 1943, the claimant was em-
ployed by Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company
and on said date was injured in a collision between an auto-
mobile in which he was a passenger and a United States Army
truck. As a result of said accident claimant suffered a com-
pound fracture of the right humerus, fractures of the eighth,
ninth and tenth ribs on the left side, multiple skull fractures,
concussion and cerebral hemorrhage, and other internal in-
juries. The carrier, Travelers Insurance Company, took upon
itself payment of compensation and medical expenses, there
being no question as to the accident’s having been in the
course of the claimant’s employment.

The carrier voluntarily paid claimant for the period from
the accident to October 31, 1943. The last draft, dated May 1,
1944, in the amount of $24.67, was apparently a delayed pay-
ment for a period ending October 31, 1943. The last payment
of any kind made by the carrier in behalf of claimant was a
medical bill in the sum of about $141.00, paid June 30, 1944.

The claimant returned to work in November, 1943, but
thereafter found it necessary to stop work. No claim for com-
pensation had at this time been filed with the Florida In-
dustrial Commission and no claim for such compensation was
so filed until September 18, 1946.

After being relieved by an encephalogram operation in
1946, claimant, on September 18, 1946, by letter to the Florida
Industrial Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, filed claim for
compensation and, pursuant to this claim, hearings were con-
ducted. The carrier contested payment of the claim because
of Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, 1941, which requires that

fe
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689

claims be filed within one year from the date of the accident or
within one year of the last date of payment of compensation.
Claimant maintained that it was not necessary for him to
have filed his claim within that period because of subsection
8 of Section 440.19, Florida Statutes, 1941, which subsection
provides that:

“If a person who is entitled to compensation under this
chapter is mentally incompetent, . . . the provisions of subsec-
tion (1) shall not be applicable so long as such person has no
guardian or other authorized representative. ...”

Before the accident claimant had averaged an income for
several years of approximately $300.00 per month, plus
expenses, in the X-ray Division of Westinghouse, owned a
home in Orlando, worked regularly, and lived in a normal
manner with his wife and children.

Since claimant’s injuries from said accident, he has done
many queer things which indicate his mental incompetence.
For example, on one occasion he was arrested and put under
a $200.00 bond for being drunk and driving recklessly, when
he had not been drinking. This was soon after the accident,
on November 2, 1943. He would leave Orlando with a definite
town as his destination and end up somewhere else without
knowing why he was there. His employer found that he could
not “keep his ducks in a row.” He purchased materials to im-
prove his home that were not suitable and were not used.

After the accident and shortly after being released from
the hospital he tore down the chimney on his home and tore a
big hole in the wall, took down one partition and tore out the
wall on one side, went out and bought lumber and left it on
the ground, leaving his home in a spoiled condition. He
quarreled with his wife and children without due cause, so
that they had to walk around on tiptoes.

Upon returning to work after the accident he became weak
and lost about forty-five pounds in six weeks. He had begun
to do queer and unusual things. At this point the carrier
made an appointment for claimant with a brain specialist, Dr.
J. G. Lyerly, of Jacksonville, Florida, who advised claimant to
get off of the road and rest.

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690

In April, 1944, he went to Jacksonville from his home in
Orlando and ended up in New Orleans, without reason or
explanation. He returned in an old 1932 or ’33 dilapidated
car, having left his good car in Panama City. “He wasn’t
right”; he dug his orange trees out of his yard by the roots
and had them destroyed without reason; he sold his property,
all of it, except that he allowed his wife to keep her sewing
machine, toaster, waffle iron and electric iron; be bought a
baby grand piano for $1200.00 while his finances were at such
a low ebb.that he could not pay for it, and the Company had
to take it back; he bought his wife expensive linens and silver
without regard to cost; he abused his credit.

In December, 1944, he suddenly took his family to visit his
wife’s mother, in Wichita, Kansas. During this visit his ac-
tions were such that on Christmas. day her mother ordered
him out of the house, saying that he was crazy and that she
was not going to have him around. Her mother had always
liked him and their previous visits with her had always been
pleasant, but on this occasion he found fault with the room
they occupied, accused her mother of picking on the children
and insisted that he wanted to occupy an apartment belonging
to her mother and wanted her to turn the tenants out of it
and turn it over to them.

When they left her ‘mother’s home they went to a tourist
camp and stayed about ten days. He then announced to his
wife that he was going to Hawaii. She tried to talk him out
of this but he told her that he thought it would be best for
him to be away from the faniily; that he was in the way, and
of no use to them, since he couldn’t make a living for them,
and that he was going to get out. So he left for Hawaii, early
in 1945, but was not able to do satisfactory work there. She
.did not hear anything from him for a while. He sent,her some
money, three checks, while he was there, and she finally re-
ceived a cable from him saying that he was coming home.
When he returned home he was not able to work at all and
was confined to his bed.

At this point, on April 27, 1945, claimant wrote the carrier
for any benefits he might be entitled to receive. This letter

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691

was answered by the carrier (Exhibit 4, T. 117) and further
answered (Exhibit 8, T. 122).

In June of 1945 they returned to Florida and went to In-
verness and took over a hunting and fishing lodge there.
While there his mental condition grew worse; he would have
periods of forgetfulness and did not seem to be able to think
through on anything. He would say he was going to do one
thing and would start it but would not stick to it and would
start something else. At times he did not seem to know
where he was and did not recognize her and the children. He
‘was very nervous and would go into a rage over nothing. On
one occasion a neighbor was going to take him to a meeting
and the neighbor’s child got sick and was threatened with
pneumonia and the neighbor came over to explain why he
could not take him to the meeting and his wife offered to go
over and help with the child. After the neighbor left he ac-
cused her of doing everything she could to keep him from
going to the meeting. |

Although they had had to.allow their insurance to lapse, as
they were not able to pay the premiums, he told her that the
only way he could see to provide for his family was for him
to commit suicide in such a way that it would appear to be
an accident, so that she could collect this insurance.

Mrs, Adams, a welfare worker, interviewed claimant about
December 4, 1945, and observed that he had little coordination
or motivation and was at a loss to know why he was in the
city, and it was necessary to call someone to help get him back
to his room. He was “in a fog”; he walked with a cane; he
was not able to carry on a very coherent interview; he was
emotionally upset; he appeared unusually irritable; he ap-
peared depressed mentally, extremely depressed; his judg-
ment was not good; he wanted to do things on too large a
scale, so that it was not reasonable.

About December 4, 1945, claimant contacted Mr. Miller, of
the Vocational Rehabilitation Service of the State Department
of Education and thereafter worked out a program merely to
keep claimant occupied so they could get him to doctors and
have him examined. He was classified as a “mental incompe-
tent”; he was not normal.

692

After examination and the encephalogram operation, Dr.
Lyerly’s conclusion was that “he was suffering from a neu-
rosis, a post-traumatic type of neurosis.” This was believed
to be on a functional basis, and not due to organic pathology,
although there was a question of some degenerative brain
pathology.

Dr. Lyerly, whose specialty is neurological surgery, in re-
ply to a hypothetical question regarding claimant’s mental
condition, answered:

“Judging from that question, and the symptoms that the
patient has at the present time, it would indicate that the
patient may be mentally unsound. All this must have
happened after I saw him in February, 1946, which was the
last time I examined him.”

Dr. Lyerly further answered, after being informed that
claimant’s queer behavior started after he was dismissed from
the hospital following the accident:

“A. You put things in that question that certainly sound
like the patient might be mentally incompetent, but, as I
stated, I don’t like to give an opinion without more informa-
tion, from direct personal examination. It was my personal
opinion, though, from my own examination, that the patient
was mentally competent.

“Q. Doctor, were these facts disclosed to you at the time
you passed that opinion that he was mentally competent?

“A. I did not have these facts before me. They were not
presented to me when I examined him. Therefore, I stated
that I thought this condition existed since my last examina-
tion; and, if so, it would be a rather long time after the acci-
dent for the injury to be responsible for it.”

Dr. Sullivan G. Bedell, a specialist in neurologic psy-
chiatry, was called as a witness for claimant. Dr. Bedell testi-
fied in substance as follows: ~

“My diagnosis is post-traumatic neurosis; and my idea of
the prognosis has undergone some change during the time
that I have been seeing the patient. When I first saw the
patient, at the request of the Vocational Rehabilitation, it was

be '
693

my impression that we might, somehow, rehabilitate this man
to the point that he would be able to follow some simple occu-
pation; something less difficult than that in which he had been
engaged previously.

“T understand that he is, at times, able to do odd jobs, but
I think that is about as much as we can hope for. He seems to
have gotten worse instead of better during the time that I
have seen him.

“I have not seen the patient since December, and-so I
would hesitate to make a positive statement of his disability
at the present date; but, judging from my earlier visits with
him and from correspondence since my last visit with him, I
would judge that he is totally and permanently disabled.

“I refer to what we term a post-traumatic neurosis; that
is, as the aftermath of a serious head injury. He has a severe
nervous state that renders him unemployable.

“Tt is my opinion that this illness is directly the result of
the head injury that occurred in the accident described in the
history. (The accident of August 2, 1943).

“I would consider that that was a part of the whole picture
of post-traumatic neurosis, of which the head injury would be
the cause.”

“Q. If these facts be true, Doctor, would you say this
patient is competent to manage his estate and affairs?

“A. No, I would not. ,

“Q. Doctor, would you say that he has ever been compe-
tent to manage his estate and affairs since said accident, based
on this hypothetical question? .

“A. No, I would say not.

“Q. Without this hypothetical question, and merely from
your observation and examination and treatment of the
patient, would you be able to state whether or not he is or was
mentally incompetent—mentally competent or incompetent,.in
your opinion?

“A. I would say that he is mentally incompetent. I would
like to add to that I have not seen him personally since Decem-
ber, but, judging from my last interview with him, I would
make that statement.

ee
694

“Q. Doctor, it appears from the patient or employee, Mr.
‘Thomas’s own testimony that he talks with apparent logic and
intelligence. Can you explain, from your medical knowledge
and experience whether or not a man can talk logically and
intelligently and still be mentally incompetent?

“A. The sort of difficulty that Mr. Thomas has had does
not have a great deal to do with the question of intelligence,
but, rather, with the emotions. Mr. Thomas, apparently, has
always been a man of more than average intelligence. He has
an unusually good vocabulary, and ordinarily expresses him-
self in a manner which is above average. A person can still
be intelligent and not able properly to put their intelligence to
use because of emotional disturbance, and because of poor

+ judgment.

“And I might just say, aside, that at any State hospital
many of the patients who have been legally adjudged insane,
can carry on a very intelligent conversation, with an excellent
vocabulary.

“My idea of Mr. Thomas’s incompetence is not that he has
lost his intelligence, but that he has lost his ability to use his

" intelligence properly.

“I would like to clarify my statement a little bit, to say
that, in expressing my opinion, I don’t want to give the im-
pression that I consider Mr. Thomas insane. I do not con-
sider him insane, but I consider him incompetent to handle
his affairs with proper judgment.”

Dr. Lyerly, being a neuro-surgeon, would not be interested
from the same angle as Dr. Bedell, who is both a neurologist
and a psychiatrist. One has to bear in mind that this particu-
lar man is one of the “intelligent” mental incompetents, as ex-
plained by Dr. Bedell.

The testimony of every witness is consistent as to mental
incompetence of claimant and that his mental incompetence
originated with the accident. Dr. Bedell was the only
psychiatric neurologist who testified, and the testimony of
Dr. Lyerly, a specialist in neurological surgery (the other
witness for respondent) did not conflict with the conclusion of

Dr. Bedell.

Le
Le
695

Dr. Bedell, in 1946, had the advantage of a history of the
patient from the time the accident occurred. He had the ad-
vantage of “hind sight” and he states that the claimant is
permanently disabled and that his disability w was occasioned
by the accident.

After the brain operation, claimant’s mental condition im-
proved, but his physical condition, lack of energy and physical
exhaustion, grew worse.

It is to be noted that within six months after the en-
cephalogram was performed on the claimant, in 1946, he filed
claim with the Florida Industrial Commission. It should be
noted that such relief is expected to be of short duration.

The appellant’s witnesses were the claimant and his wife,
Mrs. Adams, a welfare worker, and Mr. Miller, a welfare
worker, and Dr. Bedell.

The appellees’ only witness was Doctor Lyerly.

Was the claimant so unsound in mind that he could not
manage his ordinary affairs of life? If there be such a de-
gree of unsoundness of mind as to incapacitate him for man-
aging his ordinary business affairs, as he had been accustomed
to do, then the claimant, under the liberal interpretation,
would be “‘mentally incompetent.”

We find that he was excused from filing a claim on account
of his being mentally incompetent.

Allegations of the claimant as to his mental incompetence
are overwhelmingly substantiated by a preponderance of evi-
dence. The evidence introduced by claimant has not been
contradicted. The finding of the Deputy Commissioner was
erroneous and clearly against the preponderance of evidence.

It is our conclusion that the assignments of error relating
to the mental incompetence of claimant are well founded and
that the findings of the Commissioner and the Circuit Court
against the claimant in this respect are erroneous, and the
judgment appealed should be reversed.

Reversed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

a
696

HOMER SHERMAN and GRACE SHERMAN as mother and natural
guardian of Corinnia Sherman, Barbara Ann Sherman and Darrell
Sherman, v, FLORIDA TAR AND CREOSOTE CORPORATION,
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY and the
FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

36 So. (2nd) 267 June Term, 1948
July 13, 1948 . . Division A

Morrice 8. Uman, for appellants. -
Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly and Walter E.
Rountree, for appellees.

TERRELL, J.: .

“The facts out of which this case emerged are not in
dispute. It is admitted that Allerson E. Sherman died of a
compensable injury April 23, 1947, at which time his weekly
wages were $41.31. He was a deaf mute, 27 years of age and
was living in’ his father’s family which consisted of father
and mother, a ‘brother Garvin, 21 years of age, a sister Oriska,

697

19 years of age, a sister Corinnia, 14 years of age, a sister
Barbara Ann, 7 years of age and a brother Darrell, 2 years of
age. The father was consistently earning about $135. per
month, which he contributed to the family budget. The
brother Garvin and the sister Oriska were on their own and
contributed regularly to the family budget. The deceased had
regularly contributed one-half of his income to his mother as
his part of the family expenses. The parents had a modest
home, the mother was the family treasurer and paid all the
bills from the sources recited.

The father and mother of Allerson E, Sherman filed their
claim for a compensation based on the contention that they
were his dependents. The claim of the mother was allowed by
the Deputy Commissioner but the claim of the father was re-
jected. The order of the deputy Commissioner was affirmed
by the full Commission and their order was on appeal affirmed
by the Circuit Court. The mother then filed claim for com-
pensation as natural guardian of the minor children, Corinnia,
Barbara Ann and Darrell, contending that they were de-
pendents of the deceased son because of his contribution to
the family funds. This claim was denied by the Deputy Com-
missioner, his order was affirmed by the full Commission and
their order was on appeal affirmed by the Circuit Court. This
appeal is by the father from the order disallowing his claim
and by the mother as guardian of the three minor children
from the order disallowing her claim in their behalf.

The question for determination turns on that of whether
or not the father and the minor children, Corinnia, Barbara
Ann and Darrell are dependents of the deceased son within
the terms of the Workmens Compensation Law.

Appellants contend that this question should be answered
in the affirmative and rely on section 440.16, Florida Statutes
1941, (Workmens Compensation Law) to support their con-
tention. It is contended in fine that since the statute last cited
makes a definite allowance to parents, brothers, sisters and
grandchildren on account of dependency, and since the de-
ceased son was contributing regularly to the common family
fund for his support the claimants are within the terms of the
act entitling them to the compensation as his dependents.

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698

In Panama City Stevedoring Co. Inc. et al. v. Padgett, 149
Fla. 687, 6 So. (2nd) 822, this Court cut the pattern to guide
it in determining who are dependents under the Workmens
Compensation Law and phrased it as follows:

“The Florida Workmens Compensation Law does not de-
fine who are dependents entitling them to compensation there-
under. The decided current of opinion on this point is to the
effect that the question of who are dependents is one of fact to
be determined by the circumstances of the case. It is settled
law that dependency is not supported by a moral or statutory
obligation of the child to support the parent. It must be shown
that the parent is from physical or mental incapacity or lack
of means dependent upon the deceased for support, that actual
and substantial support must have been received by the
claimant from the deceased, that such support must have been.
made regularly with reasonable expectation to be made in
the future and that casual gifts at irregular intervals will not
support a claim based on dependency.”

It appears that Homer Sherman, the father of the de-
ceased moved to Florida from Georgia about three years
before this litigation accrued, that he was the head of his
family, making about $135. per month. It is alleged that the
family had a budget of approximately $300. per month to
which deceased was contributing about $85., that there were
eight members in the family and that the balance of the
family budget was contributed by the father and the other
members of the family. The funds contributed by the de-
ceased were given to his mother to be expended as she saw fit.

Under this state of facts, there is no theory under which
the father could be said to be a dependent of the deceased son.
He was of normal mind and brawn, was supporting his de-
pendents and there is not the slightest suggestion that he is in
any way incapacitated. As a matter of, fact, deceased was
under no legal obligation to contribute to the family budget,
he made the contribution to his mother to pay his part of the’
family expenses and could have withdrawn it and moved away
at any time. The father is not shown to be without means
and there is no showing of support for him by deceased. The

699

following cases are in line with the case last cited and support
this view; Cross et ux. v. Sumter County, et al., 152 Fla.
864, 13 So. (2nd) 219; Stone & Stone, et al., v. Scott, et al., 151
Fla. 21, 9 So. (2nd) 168; Williams Bros. v. Hicks, 155 Fla. 44,
16 So. (2nd) 432.

What has been said with reference to the father’s depend-
ence on the deceased son applies as well to the claim of the
mother as to dependency in behalf of the three minor children.
It is not shown that the deceased contributed one thin dime
to the support or education of any of these children or ever
acknowledged any duty to do so. If perchance he contributed
more to his mother than was necessary for his support and
the minor children acquired a benefit from ‘it, the contribu-
tion was voluntary and became no part of an alleged family
“pool.” In this we do not infer that a family “pool” may not
be created by voluntary agreement of the contributors, but
what we do hold is that there is no showing here of such an
agreement nor is there any basis in the facts of the case to
create one by implication.

A family pool is a species of contract that must have some-
thing to stand on besides wishful thinking. Furthermore the
parties to it must be conscious that they are in it and con-
tributing to it, else they will not be bound by it. There is no
indication that any of the parties here knew of a family pool.
There is an old epigram which says: “He who pays the piper
is entitled to call the tune.” It sounds as if it emanated from
some old common law oracle and might appropriately be in-
cluded in the category of legal maxims but the piper in this
case was nothing more than a volunteer who felt morally
bound to pull his own weight without the thought of a tune to
call.

The chancellor found that there was no evidence to show
that the minor children were dependents of the deceased son.
We agree to this conclusion and affirm his judgment.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

|
700

AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY v. PAUL RADER,.
‘Trading as the Safety Cab Company, et al.

36 So. (2nd) 270 June Term, 1948
July 16, 1948 Division A.

Maguire, Voorhis & Wells and Carver, Langston & Carver,
for petitioner. ,

Bentley & Shafer for Paul Rader and Marks, Gray, Yates:
& Conroy, for other respondents.

TERRELL, J.:

Respondent is engaged in the taxi cab business and
operates from six to ten passenger automobiles. He made
application to have his liability insurance assigned as per the
“Florida Automobile Assigned Risk Plan.” In response to
said application it was assigned to petitioner and on October
24, 1947, it issued Policy No. 389 701, in his favor. On May
20, 1948, petitioner advised respondent by letter that said
policy was cancelled as of June 2, 1948. The order of cancel-
lation was on appeal affirmed by the Governing Committee of
the Florida Automobile Assigned Risk Plan, June 1, 1948.
Appeal was taken to the Insurance Commissioner and on June

ee
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701

4, 1948, while it was being heard, respondent, feeling ag-
grieved, left the hearing and abandoned his appeal.

This suit was instituted by respondent June 5, 1948, by bill
of complaint praying “that the court issue its temporary in-
junction restraining the American Fire and Casualty Company
from cancelling Policy No. 389 701 on this plaintiff's automo-
piles, or in the alternative, order the said defendant, American
Fire and Casualty Company, to reinstate and continue in force
said Policy No. 389 701 during the term stated therein.” The
bill of complaint is grounded on the theory that plaintiff was
denied due process in his appeals to the Governing Committee
and to the Insurance Commissioner. A temporary restrain-
ing order was granted without notice when the bill was filed.
This appeal is by certiorari under Rule 34 of the Rules of this
Court (1) from the decree granting a temporary restraining
order without notice, and (2) from a se¢ond order granted
without notice directing the petitioner to furnish the Florida
Railroad and Utilities Commission and the City of Lakeland
its certificate of insurance certifying to the fact that re-
spondent is insured against loss in accordance with the terms
of Policy No. 389 701, and that such insurance extends to the
24th day of June 1948.

The primary question presented is whether or not the bill
of complaint states a case for injunction and if it does,
whether such injunction should have been granted without
notice.

Respondent contends that it is unnecessary to answer this
and the other questions raised because they are now moot. He
bases this contention on the ground that his contract with
relator expired June 24, 1948, and since that date is long past
no further relationship between relator and respondent un-
der said contract of insurance can come into existence, except
any claim for liability which accrued prior to the date said
policy was cancelled. Respondent further contends that it is
now insured with another insurance carrier, consequently an
answer to the questions raised here would serve no useful
purpose.

In answer to this contention it is enough to say that we
reject the contention that only moot questions are raised,

Le
702

The relief sought was in the nature of a mandatory injunc-
tion. This court is committed to the doctrine that such an in-
junction will not be granted until after final hearing except in
rare cases where the right is clear and free from reasonable
doubt. Stephens v. Stephens, 87 Fla. 466, 100 So. 746. The
bill of complaint must allege definitely every fact necessary
for relief. The allegation of opinions, or legal conclusions is
not sufficient. Baker. v. McKinney, 54 Fla. 495, 44 So. 944;
Hall v. Horne, 52 Fla. 510, 42 So. 383; House v. Nash, 90 Fla.
123, 105 So. 266. .

The last quoted case is much like the case at bar and we
might rest what we have to say on the authority of that case.
Testing the bill of complaint by the rule laid down and sup-
ported in the quoted cases, relator failed to state a case for
injunctive relief; neither is there a basis for the supplemental
order appealed from. The insurance policy and the rules of
the Florida Automobile Assigned Risk Plan are the primary
basis of respondent’s complaint and neither was made a part
of the bill of complaint. We are not advised whether or not
the Insurance Commissioner has approved the latter plan.
Certainly the bill of complaint in a case like this must aver
these and other essentials.

Even if the bill of complaint has been sufficient in equity
it fails to meet the requirements of Section 63.73 F.S.A., de-
fining the prerequisite for an injunction without notice. The
bond required was inadequate. Other questions are imma-
terial and are not treated.

Certiorari granted and the judgment is reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

Len
WILLIAM HIRAM WILSON and RICHARD L. WILSON v. WAKULLA

EDGEWATER CO., a Florida corporation, and LONG BEACH RE-

SORT, INC., a Florida corporation.

36 So. (2nd) 440 June Term, 1948
July 16, 1948 Division A

703

Ausley, Collins & Truett, for appellants.
Robert M. Avent and Thomas Sale, for appellees.

TERRELL, J.:

This appeal is from a decree dismissing an amended bill
of complaint, the pertinent allegations being, that in 1943
C.B.F. Corporation, Gulf Villas Inc. and Gulf Homes Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as the Corporations) made a contract.
with the Federal Housing Administration (hereinafter re-
ferred to as FHA) whereby FHA agreed to insure certain
mortgages executed to Whatley, Davin and Company on 300
housing units to be constructed on lands in Bay County. The
apposite condition of the contract was to install a water sys-
tem adequate to serve the 300 housing units, the land on which
they were constructed being undeveloped and devoid of water
facilities. Contract for the water system was subject to ap-
proval by FHA but it advanced no money or assumed any
obligation for such construction.
‘The corporations entered into contract with appellants to
drill a well, construct a tank and install a complete water dis-
tribution system to supply the housing units. “The considera-
tion named was that the corporations would purchase water

Le
704

from appellants. during the life of the mortgage, at a rate
approved by FHA and convey appellants the land upon which
the well and tank were constructed. Appellants performed
their part of the contract but the corporations found it
necessary to, and did, dispose of all their corporate stock in
said corporations to Whatley, Davin and Company, which as-
signed its rights therein, including the stock to appellee, Wa-
kulla Edgewater Company. A deed was then executed to
Wakulla Edgewater Company conveying the sub-division or
housing units to it.

It is further alleged that while appellees had knowledge of
appellants water contract they did each conspire with the
other and did obstruct the passage of water from appellants
pumping station into the pipes leading to the various dwelling
units and did connect appellants water system with pipe line
that was run from a well owned and operated by appellee,
Long Beach Resort Inc., in defiance of appellants’ right and
have since been supplying water to said sub-division, the
result being that appellants’ water supply business is rendered
worthless and their investment of no value, that appellees
were aware of this and should in equity be required to comply
with and abide by their contract and that appellee, Long
Beach Resort Inc., should be prevented from interfering with
them. The amended bill prayed for an accounting, that the
Court determine the status of the parties and enter such in-
junctive order as may be necessary to protect complainants.

The chancellor treated the motion to dismiss as a motion
to transfer the cause to the law side of the docket, thus dis-
missing the suit in equity, on the theory that it stated no
ground for equitable relief, that the amended bill of complaint
could not be amended to state a case for specific performance
because the contract sought to be enforced “is executory and
runs for an indefinite, continuing period of time, but that the
‘allegations are sufficient to show that plaintiffs have a cause
of action enforceable in a court of law.”

The point for determination is whether or not the chancel-
lor committed error in so construing the amended bill and in
ordering the cause to the law side of the docket.

ee
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705

We are convinced that this question requires an affirmative
answer. Section 63.75, Florida Statutes 1941, provides in part
that if “it appears that a suit commenced in equity should
have been brought as an action at law, it shall be forthwith
transferred to the law court of competent jurisdiction and be
there proceeded with.” The general rule is that equity will
not assume jurisdiction of a cause if the remedy at law is
adequate but if equity affords a more complete and satisfac-
tory remedy than an action at law the remedy in equity may
be pursued. In our view equity provides the more adequate
remedy in this case because of the prayer to declare the status
of the parties, for an accounting, and to require performance

- of the contract.

The adequacy of the relief is the better test to determine
when a case should be transferred from equity to the law side
of the docket and a more liberal rule should govern such a test
than the rule by which we test the sufficiency of the bill. In
the latter case doubts as to sufficiency are construed against

* the pleader while in the former case doubts as to transfer
should be construed in his favor. When the complainant has
made out a case, his election of the forum should not be set at
nought unless shown to be clearly in error.

We are also convinced that the chancellor fell into error
in holding that the contract drawn in question “runs for an
indefinite continuing period of time.” Contracts the charac-
ter of this should be read in their environment. In other
words, the text and the context are important and both may
be considered. The amended bill of complaint alleges that
the contract extended for the life of the mortgage, which was
twenty years, and the context bears this out. Protection of
the mortgage was its essential purpose and it cannot be aban-
doned short of that time except by consent of all parties.

When Wakulla Edgewater Co. purchased the sub-division
from the Corporations it took title burdened with appellants’
water contract and was on notice of it. Appellees purpose to
push this contract out of the picture with the ease and deft-
ness that a fascinating face vanishes from the screen, but
equity will not permit its being done that way. Free trade in
goods and ideas is one of the dominant elements in a free

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706

country like ours, but when the rights of third parties inter-
vene they are as much interested in the trade as the first and
second parties and justice requires that their rights be satis-
fied. Justice is not a commodity that can be bartered with-
out heed to equal protection.

Legal remedies should keep pace with the factual com-
plexes that precipitate them, and, as in this case, if it be-
comes necessary to examine the context as well as the text of
a transaction, or convert the idiom of the craft into colloquial
dialect, courts should not hesitate to do so. When a litigant’s
primary pleading reveals a cause of action, procedural law
should conduct him to judgment by the shortest route possible.

For these reasons the judgment is reversed with direc-
tions to reinstate the amended bill and proceed in equity.

Reversed with directions.
THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
|

JOSEPH FRANCESCHINI v. MADELINE ©. SIGMOND, et al.

86 So. (2nd) 371 June Term, 1948
July 20, 1948 Special Division B

James G. Pace, Edmund D. Sigman and George Gilbert, for

appellant.
A. C. Franks, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

In this appeal the appellant challenges the propriety of
the final decree on two grounds, namely that the amount found
‘to be due on the two mortgages foreclosed was deficient and
that the fee for plaintiff’s counsel was less than should have
been allotted. We think that both contentions are sound,

PO
—
707.

‘A careful audit here of the debits charged and the credits
allowed has established that the exact amount due at the time
of entry of the final decree, 12 February 1948, was $2,116.85
instead of $908.92, as fixed by the chancellor.

The court allowed counsel $100 for filing the bill and ten
per cent of the amount found to be due, or, in round numbers
$190. Inasmuch as two suits were instituted, we think his fee
should have been $200 and ten per cent of the recovery, de-
spite the fact that the suits were eventually consolidated.

The decree is therefore reversed with directions that it be
amended by increasing the amount due mortgagee to $2,116.85
and by enlarging the fee of $200 plus ten per cent of the
amount we have determined to be due, or $411.68.

CHAPMAN, ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

MARY RAY GARRETT v. MABEL RAY POTTER

36 So. (2nd) 374 June Term, 1948
July 20, 1948 En Bane

Futch & Futch, for petitioner.
Walter Warren, for respondent.

708

TERRELL, J.:

E. B. Ray owned and occupied as his homestead lots 9 and
10, Block 1, according to the Plat of Kerl’s second addition to
Leesburg. Petitioner and respondent were the daughters of
E. B. Ray who died December 27, 1939. His wife, Elizabeth
Belle Ray, died November 30, 1945. In April 1948, petitioner
filed her amended bill of complaint alleging that she and re-
spondent now own the lands embraced in E. B. Ray’s home-
stead as co-partners, that she supported her father and
mother from July 1936 until the death of her father December
27, 1939, and that she supported her mother from the latter
date till her death November 30, 1945, that she made all pay-
ments of principal and interest on a certain mortgage against
said homestead, including taxes, insurance and the expense of

_ upkeep, repair and improvements for the period she supported
her father and mother and received no assistance from re-
spondent.

The amended bill prays for partition of the homestead and.
for an accounting of the monies expended by petitioner for
payment of principal and interest on the mortgage, for the
payment of taxes and other monies which petitioner expended
for the benefit of the said lands, and that respondent be re-
quired to make contribution to her of one-half the funds so
expended from her portion of the lands sought to be parti-
tioned. A motion to strike paragraphs three and four of the
amended bill of complaint was granted. This is an appeal by
-certiorari under Rule 34 of the Rules of this Court.

The point for determination is whether or not the chancel-
lor committed error in striking paragraphs three and four of
the amended bill of complaint.

These paragraphs detail the claim of petitioner for support
and maintenance of her father and mother, E. B. Ray and
Elizabeth Belle Ray, the payments of principal and interest
she made on the mortgage, including taxes, insurance and the
upkeep on the premises. The striking of these paragraphs
left nothing in the amended bill of complaint but the prayer
for partition, against which there appears to be no resistance.

The theory of the motion to strike and the order granting
it appears to be that petitioner should have asserted a lien on

709

the homestead for the sums so advanced, then she should have
foreclosed the lien and have sought credit for the judgment in
the partition suit. It is also contended that the motion to
strike was correctly granted because petitioner did not offer
to do equity by paying rent on the premises during the period
it was occupied by her and her family when she claims she
was supporting the father and mother.

The amended bill of complaint was instituted on the theory
that E. B. Ray and his wife were completely destitute long be-
fore their deaths and that the advances by petitioner were
made to save their home and to supply them with the necessi-
ties of life. They were alleged to be totally without income or
the means of support and would have lost their home had
petitioner not come to the rescue and saved it for them. We
think the bill of complaint contained equity and the para-
graphs in question should not have been stricken. If there
are equities available to respondent she can set them up in
her answer.

It may be that petitioner could have established and fore-
closed a lien for her claim and that she could have offered it in
the partition suit to be credited in her favor, but she did not
elect to proceed this way and should not be held in error for
proceeding as she did. To establish her claim by lien and
foreclosure would have been the most tedious and expensive
way and this was reason enough to elect the course she took.
Her election was the realistic way and will settle the matter
in one proceeding whereas the lien way will require two or
more lawsuits. We are also of the view that she elected the
practical way, the transaction ran over a long period of years,
different items were involved, all of which could be contem-
plated in suit for accounting.

We think of no more expeditious way the matter could
have been handled and this Court is committed to the theory
that one may elect the remedy that is most expeditious, com:
plete and adequate. Equity must necessarily proceed by rule
but it will not permit justice to be over burdened, submerged.
or defeated by mechanical processes devised for its adminis-
tration.

Le
710

It follows that the chancellor committed error in striking
paragraphs three and four of the bill of complaint so his”
judgment is reversed with directions to reinstate the amended
bill and proceed accordingly.

Certiorari granted and the order appealed from is quashed.

CHAPMAN, ADAMS, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and SEBRING, J., dissent.

JULIAN LEHMAN and BETTY LEHMAN, his wife, v. ELLIS GOLDIN,
DAVID GOLDIN and ETHEL MINTZER, formerly known as
ETHEL GOLDIN. .

36 So. (2nd) 259 June Term, 1948

July 20, 1948 Division B

James G. Pace, Edmund G. Sigman and George Gilbert, for
appellants.
Charles Danton, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

A demurrer having been sustained to plaintiffs’-appellants’
declaration and final judgment of respondent ouster having
-been entered, the plaintiffs appealed.

Plaintiffs’ declaration alleged that on and prior to March
16, 1946, the plaintiffs were the owners of certain land and
that on or about the 16th day of March, 1946, the defendants
falsely and maliciously published certain matter concerning

Le |
Le
TAL

plaintiffs’ title, by altering in a material manner a letter writ-
ten by one Milton F. Steinhardt to one James Goldin, making
reference to said property, by adding their signatures to said
letter and adding a description of the property in such a way
as to cause said letter to appear as a contract of sale for said
property; and, by attaching an affidavit to said letter in such
a way as to entitle it to be recorded among the public records,
did maliciously publish and record said instrument among the
public records of Dade County, Florida, and against the
property of the plaintiffs, a copy of which letter is attached to
the declaration and made a part thereof, and plaintiffs claim
special damages as set forth in the declaration. The letter as
recorded, with jurat omitted, is as follows:

“Premises in Dade County, Florida, known as Lot 3 of
Block 15 of Biscayne Point as recorded in Plat Book 14 at
page 35 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida.

“P. S. The purchase price of $11,000.00 is complete with
the lot, financing and other miscellaneous charges.

“October 4, 1945
“Mr. James Golden,
Tropics Hotel,
Miami Beach, Florida.

“Dear Mr. Golden:

“We hereby agree to build you a two (2) bedroom, one (1)
bathroom home, according to the plans of the architect, J. J.
DeBrita, on Lot 3, Block 15, Biscayne Point. The cost of the
home to be eleven Thousand Dollars ($11,000.00). To be paid
as follows:

“Twenty-two hundred and fifty dollars ($2250.00) cash.
Balance of a first mortgage of eight thousand and seven hun-
dred and fifty dollars ($8,750.00) payable to Miami Beach
First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., in accordance with
their terms and conditions:

“We will not guarantee a definite date to finish said build-
ing, but will do our utmost to complete this building as soon as
possible. When this building is completed, you will have three

(3) days in which to accept or reject said building. If you

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712

desire to reject the building, your deposit of Two thousand
dollars ($2,000.00) is to be refunded within a week.
“Very truly yours,
(s) Milton F, Steinhart

“Witnesses: (s) James Goldin

(s) David Goldin

(s) Ethel Goldin

“WE BUILT AND OWNED
“President Madison—Coral Reef—Dorset—Georgian.
Shelby—Somerset—Whitehart—Ocean Blue
Parkside—Mecca—Capri—Marissa.”

The law applicable is as stated in the Restatement, as fol-
lows:

“Sec. 624. General Rule.

“One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter
which is untrue and disparaging to another’s property, in land,
chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as
would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a
third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be de-
termined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the
other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused.

“See. 625. Intentional—Scienter—Malice.

“One who publishes matter disparaging to another’s prop-
erty in land, chattels or intangible things is subject to liability
under the rule stated in Sec. 624 although he

“(a) did not intend to influence a third person’s conduct as
purchaser or lessee of the thing in question

“(b) neither knew nor believed the disparaging matter to
be false;

“(e) did not publish such matter from ill will toward the
other or a desire to cause him loss.

“Sec. 626. Disparaging Statements of Fact.

“One who without a privilege to do so publishes an untrue
statement of fact which is disparaging to the quality of
another’s land, chattels or intangible things, under circum-
stances which would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the
conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee thereof would

713

be determined thereby, is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to
the other from the impairment of vendibility so caused.”—3
Torts, A. L. I, pp. 325-329.

See also 33 Am Jur., “Libel and Slander”—Sec. 343, et seq.,
p. 310, et seq.

It is to be observed that the defendants purport only to
have been mere witnesses to the recorded instrument.

It appears that the declaration states a cause of action.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

ere

PINELLAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, v.
ALICE D. ROACH, a widow and H. C. Arthurs.

36 So. (2nd) 364 June Term, 1948
July 23, 1948 Division B

John C. Blocker, for appellant.
Thomas & Cooper, for appellees.

PER CURIAM:

Pinellas County was denied a mandatory injunction to re-
open a road and appeals.

The decree on appeals recites:

“This cause came on to be heard upon final hearing upon
plaintiff’s complaint for mandatory injunction, the answers of
‘both defendants and voluminous evidence, both oral and docu-
mentary, presented by the respective parties to this suit,
whereupon the court finds:

“That the plaintiff’s complaint for mandatory injunction
compelling said defendants to remove the barricades ad-
mittedly constructed by them across the alleged public road

714.

is based solely on an alleged right to possession acquired by
Jong continued user by the public; that no public right by con-
demnation, acceptance of dedication, purchase or voluntary
conveyance is shown but that, on the contrary, such public
user as was shown was permissive in character rather than
adverse; that it affirmatively appears that the defendants
were not aware, nor had they any reason to be aware, of any
claim of public right during the more than fifty years during
which the road in question had existed, and that the plaintiff
has at no time during said period ever taken any official cog-
nizance of said alleged public road, .

Whereupon relief was denied to the county.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ.,

concur,

AMERICAN TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, as Trustee, OUITA T.
GAMEWELL, a widow, JOSEPH M. GAMEWELL, JR., and
JENNIE P. GAMEWELL, his wife, v. R. F. MAGUIRE, as Executor
of the Estate of JOSEPH M. GAMEWELL, deceased.

36 So. (2nd) 615 June Term, 1948
July 23, 1948 . En Bane

J. Thomas Gurney, Parker, Foster & Wigginton and
Joseph P. Lea, Jr., for petitioners.
Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The former judgment denying certiorari is adhered to.
THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, SEBRING and HOBSON, Js,
concur.
TERRELL, CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

BARNS, J., dissenting:

This is a proceeding in certiorari to review an interlocutory
order in equity wherein the Chancellor on the 17th day of
January, 1948, entered the following order:

|
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715

“ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said mo-
tion to quash be and the same is hereby denied, and the de-
fendants shall have until the Rule Day in February, 1948,
within which to file such pleadings of motions as they may be
advised.”

James A. Gamewell settled a trust in North Carolina with
the American Trust Company of that state and with the
other petitioners, who are also residents of North Carolina, as
some of the beneficiaries of the trust.

Thereafter James M. Gamewell died a resident of Florida,
leaving a will and estate in Florida of an approximate value
of $132,000. The Honorable R. F. Maguire was appointed
executor of the will.

Executor Maguire brought his bill of complaint against
(1) the beneficiaries under the will and (2) the North Caro-
lina trustee and the North Carolina beneficiaries of the trust,
wherein he alleges, among other things, that:

“SEVENTH: That the total federal estate taxes payable
on account of: property devolving and transmitted under the
terms of said Trust Indenture; on account of the insurance
upon the life of Joseph H. Gamewell payable unto Ouita T.
Gamewell, his widow; and on account of the estate trans-
mitted by said last will and testament and codicil thereto, will
be substantially in excess of $185,000.00, which tax plaintiff .
as Executor is charged with the responsibility of paying or
causing to be paid; that such total federal estate tax so re-
quired to be paid will exceed by more than $90,000.00 the total
net assets of the estate passing under said will and codicil
after allowance is made for the payment therefrom of per-
sonal debts of Joseph M. Gamewell, expenses incident to his
last illness, funeral expenses, income taxes required to be paid,
estate and transfer taxes chargeable against the estate, trans-
mitted by said will and codicil, and the costs of administering.
such estate.

“EIGHTH: That all of the net property and assets which
remained in said trust at the time of the death of Joseph M.
Gamewell are included in the gross estate of the said Joseph
M. Gamewell, deceased, under Section 811 (f), Title 26, U. S.

716

Code Annotated, and that unless the will and codicil of the
said Joseph M. Gamewell, deceased, otherwise direct, the
plaintiff as Executor is entitled to recover from said American
Trust Company such proportion of the total tax as the value
of such property held by the trust estate set forth above bears
to the sum of the net estate and the amount of the exemption
allowed in computing the net estate as authorized and re-
quired by law; that such-recovery is provided for and author-
ized by Section 826 (d), Title 26, U. S. Code Annotated, as
follows: .

“*(d) Liability of recipient of property over which de-
cedent had power of appointment. Unless the decedent directs
otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross estate upon
which the tax has been paid consists of the value of property
included in the gross estate under Section 811 (f£), the execu-
tor shall be entitled to recover from the person receiving such
property by reason of the exercise, non-exercise, or release of
a power of appointment, such portion of the total tax paid as
the value of such property bears to the sum of the net estate
and the amount of exemption allowed in computing the net
estate, determined under Section 935 (c), or Section 861, as
the case may be. If there is more than one such person the
executor shall be entitled to recover from such persons in the
same ratio.’

“NINTH: That with respect to the life insurance paid to
and received by Ouita T. Gamewell and referred to in para-
graph FIFTH hereof, unless the will of said Joseph M. Game-
well directs otherwise, the plaintiff as Executor is entitled to
recover from the said Ouita T. Gamewell as beneficiary under
the insurance policies so described, such proportion of the total
federal estate tax as such proceeds of said insurance policies
bear to the sum of the net estate and the amount of the exemp-
tion allowed in computing the net estate as authorized by law.
Such recovery is provided for and authorized by Section
826 (c), Title 26, U.S. Code Annotated, as follows:

“*(c) Liability of life insurance beneficiaries. Unless the
decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross
estate upon which tax has been paid consists of proceeds of
policies of insurance upon the life of the decedent receivable

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by a beneficiary other than the executor, the executor shall be
entitled to recover from such beneficiary such portion of the
total tax paid as the proceeds of said policies bear to the sum
of the net estate and the amount of the exemption allowed in
computing the net estate, determined under Section 935 (c).
If there is more than one such beneficiary the executor shall
be entitled to recover from such beneficiaries in the same
ratio.’

“TENTH: Plaintiff alleges that the transfer of property
rights provided under the terms of said Trust Indenture did
not finally take effect until the death of Joseph M. Gamewell,
in that, until his death he had the right, in conjunction with
another, namely, Ouita T. Gamewell, to change the bene-
ficiaries of said trust estate in whole or in part, or to revoke
the same entirely; that with respect to the making of said
trust Indenture and the transfer of property and subjecting
the same thereto by the said Joseph M. Gamewell, there was
no bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money’s worth; that the said Joseph M. Gamewell
knew that the ultimate transfer of the property in said trust
would be subject to an estate tax but expressly provided for
the defense of said trust estate against the imposition of a
gift tax; that the said Joseph M. Gamewell, before and at the
time of transferring said assets to said trust, had the right to
direct the funds and estate from which said federal estate
taxes should be paid with respect thereto, and did direct that
said taxes be paid from said trust estate, in that said Trust
Indenture expressly provides that, prior to the apportion-
ment of the several interests thereby devolved, such appor-
tionment shall be made, ‘.. . after deducting all taxes of every
kind and nature, or other items, properly chargeable against
the trust estate ...*; and that when said Trust Indenture and
said last will and testament and codicil thereto are construed
together, it is evident that the said Joseph M. Gamewell in-
tended said trust estate to pay its appropriate proportion of
the federal estate taxes upon his total net estate.

“ELEVENTH: That’ plaintiff alleges that said last will
and testament and codicil thereto of Joseph M. Gamewell,
deceased, do not direct that the estate transmitted by said will

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and codicil be used, either in whole or in part, in the payment
of federal estate taxes arising from and out of said trust
estate referred to in paragraph FOURTH hereof, or said in-
surance paid to Ouita T. Gamewell referred to in paragraph
FIFTH hereof. Plaintiff alleges that the said Joseph M.
Gamewell, deceased, did not intend any part of the estate
passing by said last will and testament and codicil thereto to
be used in the payment of such federal estate taxes because,
had such been his purpose, (a) his expressed intent in said
‘will and codicil would be wholly and totally defeated; (b) the
making of said will would have served no purpose; (c) none of
the beneficiaries named therein would receive any of the
property devolving thereby; and (d) approximately $90,000.00
over and above the total of net assets passing by said will and
codicil thereto would be required for the payment of such
federal estate taxes, and the only sources therefor would be
the trust assets and insurance hereinbefore referred to.”

The relief sought by Executor Maguire’s bill was a decree:

“(1) Construing, declaring and determining the intention
of the testator, Joseph M. Gamewell, deceased, under the pro-
vision of his will set forth above and referred to herein, and
the rights, liabilities, duties and responsibilities between the
plaintiff, on the one hand, and the defendants, and each of
them, on the other, with respect to the payment of federal
estate taxes payable upon the estate of Joseph M. Gamewell,
deceased, and their respective liabilities for the payment of
proportionate shares and the proportions thereof, of said
federal estate taxes, all in accordance with the facts alleged
above and the law in such cases made and provided.

“(2) Construing, declaring and determining the rights,
liabilities, duties and responsibilities between the plaintiff and
the defendants respectively, and between the plaintiff and the
defendants, or any of them, under the provisions of the trust
agreement referred to and described above with respect to the
payment of federal estate taxes payable upon the estate of
Joseph M. Gamewell, deceased, and their respective liabilities
for the payment of proportionate shares and the proportion
thereof, of federal estate taxes in accordance with the facts
alleged above and the law in such cases made and provided.

“(3) Direct the plaintiff with respect to his rights, status,
power and privilege in relation to the payment of said federal
estate taxes, and to instruct him particularly whether he is
-required to liquidate the total of said estate passing under the
will of Joseph M. Gamewell, deceased, and apply the same,
minus debts required to be paid, expenses incident to the last
illness of Joseph M. Gamewell, deceased, funeral expenses, and.
the cost of administering said estate, to the payment of
federal estate taxes, notwithstanding that such procedure will
require the sale of the heirlooms and the personal property
given and bequeathed as set forth in paragraph FOURTH of
said will. .

“(4) Retain jurisdiction of this cause to enable plaintiff to,
procure promptly further relief based upon such declaratory
decree, judgment, order, and directions as may be granted,
entered and given herein.”

The statutory proceedings for process by publication seem
to have been attempted as against the petitioners who are now
before this Court by petition for review by certiorari.

On the return day of the “Notice to Appear,” the petition-
ers here filed in the Circuit Court a special appearance, where-
in the petitioners suggested to the Court that no proper
service had been had over petitioners because:

“Tt affirmatively appears from the Bill of Complaint that
the trust was created in North Carolina, approved by the
courts of North Carolina, and that the Trustee is a citizen of
North Carolina; that these defendants are citizens of North
Carolina, and therefore neither the trust nor the assets, nor
the persons of these defendants have ever come within the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida, so
that that Court could render a binding decree on these parties
as beneficiaries of such trust through process by publication.”

The special appearance was captioned “Special Appearance
and Motion to Quash,” but the document contains no motion
to quash process or service of process or anything else.

Thereafter the Chancellor, on January 17, 1948, made an
order, the decretal portion of which is quoted at the com-
mencement of this opinion.

719

720

When the allegations of the bill are considered it appears
that the matters suggested in the special appearance are true
and that the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction has not been in-
voked by a case wherein any effective service process by pub-
lication can be had as against the non-resident petitioners.

The only relief sought against the petitioners is to bind
them in personam and under the due process clause of the
United States Constitution the service of process by publica-
tion is not sufficient to bind non-resident defendants in per-
sonam when such defendants are not citizens of this State.

The petition for certiorari should be granted and the order
quashed and the cause remanded for proceedings not incon-
sistent herewith.

TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

Lee
JOHN BARRIS v. STATE OF FLORIDA

86 So. (2nd) 372 June Term, 1948
July 23, 1948 En Banc

Jones, Latham & McLane, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Ernest W. Welch, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Lucille Snowden, Special As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

THOMAS, C. J.:

The information under attack in this appeal charged that
the defendant, now appellant, unlawfully removed, deposited,
and concealed a quantity of intoxicating beverage containing
more than 3.2 per cent of alcohol by weight “in respect where-
of a tax would be imposed if such beverage were manufac-
tured in accordance with the regulatory provisions of the

Beverage Laws of the State of Florida, and on which tax was
not paid, with intent then and there to defraud the State of
Florida of said tax.” He was convicted and sentenced to
serve a term in the county jail.

The section of the statute, Section 562.32, Florida Statutes,
1941, and F.S.A., denouncing the offense charged provides that
any person shall be punished who, with intent to defraud the
state, removes, deposits, or conceals a beverage in respect
whereof (1) a tax “is” imposed, or (2) “would be” imposed
“if such beverage were” legally manufactured or brought into
the State. It is obvious to this court that the information suf-
ficiently charged a violation of the second of these prohibi-
tions.

The appellant, in his effort to secure reversal here, leans
heavily upon the decisions of this court in Brown v. State, 152
Fla. 853, 13 So. (2nd) 458, and State v. Pridgen, 155 Fla. 31,
19 So. (2nd) 510, but we think these decisions, which we shall
now analyze, afford him small comfort.

In the first of these, not only was the charge couched in
the present tense, but the beverage was described as “moon-
shine whiskey,” clearly indicating that it was illegally manu-
factured. The court concluded that the information failed to
charge an offense because, from its very language, a beverage
was described on which no tax was payable. In the second,
the present tense was likewise used, and the beverage was also
described as “moonshine whiskey.” On the authority of
Brown v. State, supra, the court decided that the charge
could.not be supported in the face of the fact that the com-
modity was not taxable.

The appellant here asserts that the prosecutor in the
instant case, in preparing his information, relied upon certain
dicta in the case of Brown v. State, supra, to the effect that
had the information there alleged that the beverage was one
upon which a tax would have been imposed, had it been manu-
factured in accordance with the provisions of the beverage
act, the proof might have supported the allegations of the
pleading. Even assuming that such statements were dicta in
that particular case, there seems no reason why they would
not be sound law in this one.

721

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722

We are fully aware of the language of Chapter 21839,
Laws of Florida, Acts of 1943, enacted subsequent to the de-
cision in Brown v. State, supra, indicating that taxes on manu-
facture of liquor shall affect all persons engaged in such
manufacture, presumably whether authorized under the act or
not. It is true, however, that a majority of the court held in
State v. Pridgen, supra, that after the act was passed, the rule
announced in Brown v. State still applied. Even so, the in- -
formation here assaulted charges failure to pay a tax which
would have been due had the liquor been lawfully made, and
-Section 562.32 being still in force, the prosecutor, by using the
subjunctive, properly stated an offense under the second cate-
gory. There can be no disturbance of our holdings in the two
cases cited by ruling now that the judgment should be, and
it is,

Affirmed.

SEBRING, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.

ADAMS, J., dissenting:

Appellant was convicted and sentenced to one year in the

penitentiary under the charge that he:
. “Did unlawfully remove, deposit and conceal and was un-
lawfully concerned in removing, depositing and concealing one
and one fourth gallons of an intoxicating beverage containing
more than 3.2% of alcohol by weight for and on and in respect
whereof a tax would be imposed if such beverage were manu-
factured in accordance with the regulatory provisions of the
Beverage Laws of the State of Florida, and on which tax was
not paid, with intent then and there to defraud the State of
Florida of said tax.”

The only question necessary for us to consider is whether
-the information charged an offense. The answer is in the
“negative, because it did not charge that the beverage was“...

manufactured in or brought into this state in accordance with
the regulatory provisions thereof, with intent to defraud the
State of Florida of such tax or any part thereof,...” (Sec-
tion 562.32, Fla. Stat.) The statute has reference to bever-

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ages brought in, or manufactured, under the regulatory
statutes of Florida. It has no application to illicit beverages.
This is a revenue statute and must receive a strict inter-
pretation. This case is no different in principle from that of
State v. Pridgen, 155 Fla. 31, 19 So. (2nd) 510 and Brown v.
State, 152 Fla. 853, 18 So. (2nd) 458. Some misinterpretation
has been placed upon the language in the Brown case. Refer-
ence to the opinion shows, however, that the tax could only
have been imposed where the beverage was lawfully manu-
factured. 7

CHAPMAN, J., dissenting:

I agree with Mr. Justice ADAMS but assign different rea-
sons for my conclusion. It is quite true that the judgment is
sustained by Section 562.32 F.S.A. I think the penalty of the
statute runs counter to Section 8 of the Declaration of Rights -
of the Constitution of Florida in that it is not only unjust and
unreasonable but constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Seriding this appellant to prison for one year for this offense
simply does not square with my conception and standards of

Justice.

JOHN A. KEY v. ALL PERSONS CLAIMING ANY ESTATE, RIGHT,
TXDTLE OR INTEREST IN OR LIEN UPON THE REAL PROP-
ERTY DESCRIBED IN THE BILL OF COMPLAINT IN SAID
CAUSE.

36 So. (2nd) 366 June Term, 1948
July 23, 1948 En Banc

Alley, Drew, Burns & Middleton, for petitioner.
Ausley, Collins & Truett, for respondent.

BARNS, J.:

The petitioner seeks review by certiorari of an interlocu-
tory decree quashing service of process by publication.

The proceedings involved here were commenced by the
filing of a bill by petitioner and as stated by petitioner the
only defendants named were “all parties claiming any estate,
right, title or interest in or lien upon the real property herein
described, or any part thereof.”

The bill partially deraigns plaintiff's title to the land in-
volved and sets forth plaintiff's claim of the fee simple title

‘ thereto by reason of continued adverse possession for more

than seven years immediately prior to the institution of the
suit under color of title. The allegations do not show the as-
sertion or existence, actual, apparent, or potential, of a hostile
title or claim. On the contrary, the bill specifically alleges
that plaintiff does not know and has never been informed of
any other person who claims, or who may claim, any estate,
right, title or interest in, or lien upon, the property, or any
part thereof, adversely to plaintiff.

The bill was filed and based upon Chapter 24099, Section 1
of which provides:

“Section 1. Quieting Title to Real Property.

“Any person who claims an estate of inheritance or for
life in any real property within this state, or who has con-
veyed any such real property by warranty deed, whether in
the actual or peaceable possession thereof or otherwise, may
bring a proceeding in rem, in the circuit court of the county
wherein such property is situate, or if situate in two or more
counties, then in the circuit court of either of said counties,
against all the world for the purpose of establishing his title
to said property and to determine all adverse claims thereto,
whenever .

Section 5 of said chapter relates to constructive service
and provides:

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125

“Section 5. Constructive Service of Summons.

“(1) The summons, issued as aforesaid, shall be published
once each week for four consecutive weeks (four publications
being sufficient) in some newspaper (as defined by section
49.03, Florida Statutes, 1941) published in the county where
the suit is pending, or if there be no newspaper published in
said county and the lands in suit lie in two or more counties,
then in any county wherein the said lands lie; and if there be
no such newspaper in which to publish the same, the same
may be published by posting true copies of said summons in
three or more public places within the county, one of which
shall be the courthouse door. No order for publication of
such summons shall be necessary, nor shall any afidavit
therefor be required. Proof of publication of such summons
shall be made by uniform affidavit (section 49.04, et seq., Flor-
ida Statutes, 1941).”

The notice published was in conformity with Section 5 and
in the form prescribed by Section 4, and was as follows:
“John A. Key, Plaintiff,

v.
All persons claiming any estate, right title or interest in, or
lien upon, the real property herein described, or any part
thereof, Defendants.
“THE STATE OF FLORIDA
“TO: All persons claiming any estate, right, title or interest in
or lien upon, the real property herein described, or any
part thereof, Defendants,
“GREETINGS:

“You are hereby notified that a proceeding to quiet title
has been brought in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial-
Circuit of Florida, in and for Leon County, Florida, against
all persons claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in, or
lien upon, the following described real property, situate in
Leon County, Florida, to-wit:

(Land description)
and you are hereby required to file with the Clerk of said
Court your written appearance, personally, (or by attorney)
in said proceeding on or before the 16th day of February,

a
726

1948, and after to file with said Clerk your written defenses,

if any, to the bill of complaint at the times prescribed by law

therein setting up the estate, right, title or interest in, or lien
upon, the above described property claimed by you. Herein
fail not or judgment will be‘entered against you by default.

“WITNESS my hand and the seal of said Court at Talla-
hassee, Florida, this 7th day of January, 1948.

(SEAL) “GEO G. CRAWFORD,
As Clerk of the above
styled Court.

“ALLEY, DREW, BURNS & MIDDLETON,

Solicitors for Plaintiff,
West Palm Beach, Florida.
Jan. 8, 15, 22, 29—7373.”

Charles S. Ausley, as Guardian Ad Litem, made a Motion
to Dismiss the bill and in construing the statute the learned
Chancellor held: °

“In determining the validity of a statute and particularly

“when the statute involves due process of law, it is within the

power and is the duty of the Court to examine the statute in
its practical operation. When constructive service is resorted
to, the constitutional requirement of due process of law de-
mands that the substituted service be of such a nature as to
be reasonably calculated to give notice of the pendency of the
litigation to a reasonably cautious individual owning property
within the State, and demands that the nature of the notice
given be reasonably likely to bring actual notice of the pen-
dency of the suit to the attention of land owners whose titles
may be affected thereby. While the Courts may not arbi-
trarily substitute their judgment for the judgment of the
legislature in matters of this kind, nevertheless it is the duty
of the Court to determine whether the notice provided for in
the statute meets the minimum requirements of due process.
of law. .
“This Court is of the opinion that the statute in question
fails in this respect.

“The statute does not require that the party seeking to.
quiet title by the procedure there outlined make any investi-

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721

gation or even examine the public records to determine
whether any person, and if so, who, has or claims any adverse

- interest in the property. The statute does not require that
the notice of the pendency of the suit contain the names of
any person interested even.though the Bill may disclose the
names of persons claiming an interest in the land. The statute.
does require a mailing of notice to named defendants if their
address is known, .but if the addresses of named defendants
are unknown there is no requirement of a search or inquiry to
ascertain their addresses. The statute ignores the simple ex-
pedient, a practical and easy method of imparting notice, of
including in the published summons the names of the known
defendants. In the opinion of this Court these defects in the
statute render it insufficient to provide due process of law to
adverse claimants and insufficient to give the Court jurisdic-
tion to make a decree adversely affecting their rights.”

And decreed that: .

“The bill as filed may constitute a basis for a decree in
plaintiff's favor if service is perfected under other statutes.
For that reason the bill will not be dismissed. However, it is

“CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED by the Court that the attempted constructive service -
of process in this case under the provisions of Chapter 24099,
Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947, is void and such service is
hereby quashed and the decree pro confesso entered in this
cause is vacated and set aside.”

No justiciable issue is presented for the determination of
the Court in the case at bar. The plaintiff has been in posses-
sion of land under color of title for a longer period of time
than is necessary to establish title by adverse possession and
no one has ever made any claim adverse to plaintiff or be-
clouded his title. The proceeding is adversary in nature, yet
the bill fails to present such adversary matter as would justify
the invoking of the Court’s jurisdiction. (See Am. Jur., p.
363—Courts—Sec. 160).

In the case of Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679, in
considering the constitutionality of constructive service
statutes the Court said:

a
728

“Tf a bill of complaint, filed for the purpose of procuring
an adjudication as to clouds upon the title alleges sufficient
facts to present a justiciable matter to a court of competent
jurisdiction, and therein it is shown that the complainant is
entitled to an order of publication or notice to appear under
the laws of Florida, the provisions of section 1 of Chapter
10102, Acts of 1925, as amended by Senate Bill No. 86, Laws
of Florida, approved November 30, 1925, apply, and construc-
tive service of process in such cases may be had...”

In the case of Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 91 Fla. 345, 108 So.
178, the Court said:

“The bill of complaint must contain sufficient allegations
to show a cause of action. The allegations must not only
show title in the complaint to the lands in controversy, but
relief can be given against it. In such case not only the
writing or matter which constitutes the alleged cloud must be
shown, but the facts must be alleged which give the claim
apparent invalidity.”

Again, in the case of McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 103
So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731, the Court said:

“Proper allegations being made, a suit under Chapter 11383
will lie against known defendants to quiet against a cloud of a
known or an unknown nature; and against unknown de-
fendants to quiet against a cloud of a known nature; but a
bill seeking only to quiet a cloud, the nature and existence of
which is wholly unknown, as against defendants, who are also
wholly unknown, does not present a justiciable matter under
this statute in its present form. Such a bill neither advises
the unknown defendants of the nature of the case they are
called upon to defend, nor the court what decree it shall ren-
der, supposing the bill to be true. Welborn v. Pierce, 75 Fla.
667, 78 So. 929.”

In the case of Greene v. Uniacke, 46 F. (2nd) 916, the
Court said:

“For the bill to be maintainable against unknown defend-
ants, its allegations must show the assertion or existence,
actual, apparent or potential, of a hostile title or claim of un-

Es
be
729

known defendants, and its apparent invalidity or inferiority to
the title of the complainant. A bill seeking only to remove a
cloud, the nature and existence of which are wholly unknown,
as against defendants who also are wholly unknown, does not
present a justiciable matter under the statute. McDaniel v.
McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731.”

The bill failed to submit for determination a justiciable
matter, in that the proceedings purport to be against unknown
claimants of unknown claims and the provisions of said chap-
ter relating to constructive service of process against such un-
known claimants of unknown claims fall short of the exac-
tions of the “due process” clause of the U. S. Constitution.

The Chancellor did not err in quashing the service of
process. The petition for certiorari is denied.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, CHAPMAN, ADAMS
and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

R. E, MARINO and MARGUERITE MARINO, doing business as The
Palms Bar & Grill, v. JAMES T. VOCELLE, director, State Beverage
Department, State of Florida.

36 So. (2nd) 375 June Term, 1948
Suly 27, 1948 En Bane

Choate & Sinclair, for appellants.
Patton & Kanner, for appellee.

PER CURIAM: ~
Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

BARNS, J., dissents.

730

BARNS, J., dissenting:

Petitioners were the owners of The Palms Bar & Grill and
were duly licensed to sell alcoholic beverages. On or about
July 25, 1947, inspectors from the State Beverage Department
found nine bottles of whiskey which had a lower alcoholic con-
tent than was normal for those brands. The charges directed
against petitioners were that they:

“... did, on or before July 25, 1947, re-use and refill with
distilled spirituous liquors, for the purpose of sale, certain
bottles which had once been used to contain spirituous
liquors...”

A Hearing was had before the respondent and the
petitioners’ license was suspended for sixty days. Petitioners
then petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of certiorari,
which was denied. Petitioners now appeal from that denial.

Section 561.09 (2), Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A., (Acts of
1943) provides:

“Any person who shall re-use or refill with distilled spirit-
uous liquors for the purpose of sale a bottle or other container
which has once been used to contain spirituous liquors and to
which has theretofore been attached a stamp as required by
the beverage laws of Florida, or any person who shall will-
fully misrepresent or permit to be misrepresented the brand
of distilled spirits being sold or offered for sale in or from any
bottle or container shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
where such person is licensed under this law, is subject to
have his license revoked by the director. The possession of
such a refilled or a mislabeled bottle or other container of
spirituous liquors shall be prima facie evidence of the viola-
tion of this section. As amended, Laws 1943, c. 21839, Sec. 3.”

Petitioners were charged with refilling or re-using whiskey
bottles with distilled liquors. It is their claim on this appeal
that the evidence did not support such a charge. The evidence
went to prove adulteration, which is different from refilling or
re-using with distilled spirituous liquors, and the proof fails to
support the charge.

The judgment appealed should be reversed, with directions
that a writ of certiorari issue.

HARRY VENARDOS, JOSEPH D. REEVES, and STISSILAOS E.

ANDREADIS, doing business as the MIDNITE BAR, v. JAMES T.
VOCELLE, Director State Beverage Department, State of Florida.

731

36 So. (2nd) 377 June Term, 1948
July 27, 1948 En Bane

Dan Chappel, and Benjamin E. Carey, for appellants.
Patton & Kanner, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed on authority of Marino v. Vocelle, decided July
27, 1948.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING, and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

BARNS, J., dissents.
a

NICHOLAS BE. NICOLAIDES and ELMER SARVOY, Partners, doing
business as the ANCHOR BAR, v. JAMES T. VOCELLE, Director,
State Beverage Department, State of Florida.

36 So, (2nd) 876 June Term, 1948
July 27, 1948 En Bane

Mallory H. Horton, and Katz & Fuller, for appellants.
Patton & Kanner, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:
Affirmed on authority of Marino v. Vocelle, decided July
27, 1948.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

BARNS, J., dissents.

THERESA COLLINS v. CLIFFORD W. COLLINS

36 So. (2nd) 417 June Term, 1948.
July 27, 1948 En Bane

Reginald L. Williams, for appellant.
R. P. Terry, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

This appellant brought an action in Florida on a judgment
entered in the State of New York. The basis of the foreign
judgment was the accruals of alimony. When the accumula-
tions reached $6850.00 a motion was made to the Supreme
Court of New York to enter a final judgment for same. It is
alleged in the declaration before us that the order for pay-
ment of alimony in the first instance by the New York Court
was interlocutory; that when the last and final judgment was
entered by the New York Court process was duly served on
defendant; that said judgment was and is final, unpaid, un-
reversed and is entitled to full faith and credit.

A demurrer was sustained and upon entry of judgment.
plaintiff has appealed.

The first and controlling question submitted by both
parties is whether the court erred in taking notice of the New
York law. This record contains no allegations of the New
York law. The lower court observed:

“|. . The Court finds under New York law the judgment
herein sued on does not have the necessary characteristics to
invoke comity, and recognition of the same, and is not of the

a
Le
133

pattern to command full faith, credit and enforcement in this
jurisdiction, ...”

There may be found some authority for a court to notice
the law of a sister state. See Wigmore on Evidence, 2 Ed.
Vol. 5, page 582, Sec. 2573, and Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co.,
11 R.I. 411. But by more than a score of cases covering the
entire history of this court and without a single exception we
have held consistent with the great weight of authority that
foreign law is a fact to be plead and proven. See 20 Am. Jur.,
Evidence, page 70, Sec. 47; Tuten v. Gezan, 18 Fla. 751;
Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 19 So. 172; Cohen v. Cohen, 158
Fla. 802, 30 So. (2nd) 307, Barns v. Liebig, 146 Fla. 219, 1 So.
(2nd) 247 and a host of cases in the interim.

‘We can see no reason at this time to assume the insur-
mountable burden of ascertaining the statute and case law of
each of the several states. If we did, the contention un-
doubtedly would be made that we should also take notice of
the law of each sovereign nation. When the contrary has not
been alleged we have assumed the law of the other state to
be the same as our own. Our holdings are consistent with
settled principles of law and have served the interest of our
state well. We shall not extend or depart from them now.

This declaration contains an unqualified allegation that
the judgment is final. If for any reason the New York law
is not the same as ours in this respect the defendant should
have the opportunity of pleading such facts. In the absence
of a contrary showing we presume the New York law is the
same as our own. Duke-y. Taylor and Cohen v. Cohen, supra.
If the New York law is the same in effect as ours it would
seem that this is the kind of judgment our court would hold to
be final. Robinson v. Robinson, 154 Fla. 464,18 So. (2nd) 29.

Our conclusion is that the declaration stated a cause of
action and it was error to sustain the demurrer.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, SEBRING, BARNS and HOB-
SON, JJ., concur.

CHAPMAN, J., concurs specially.

a
734

CHAPMAN, J., concurring specially:

The appellant, Theresa Collins, sued Clifford W. Collins in
the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, and by her amended.
declaration, in part, alleged that the plaintiff-appellant was
granted an absolute divorce from the defendant-appellee on
June 13, 1935, in the Supreme Court of Otsego County, New
York, and the divorce judgment ordered the husband to pay
the sum of $50.00 per week for her support and the mainte-
nance of the children of the parties. It is further alleged that
a final judgment was obtained against the husband in the
Supreme Court of Otsego County, New York, on January 31,
1947, a copy of which is attached to the declaration and
identified as Exhibit C. The final judgment was obtained
in the New York Court after due process of law and service of
process upon the defendant-appellee, as required by said court
in the said action then pending between the parties and the
plaintiff recovered of and from the defendant a judgment in
the sum of $6,850.00, together with $10.00 costs, and execu-
tion was directed to issue; that said judgment is a valid and
subsisting final judgment of said court remaining in full force
and effect and has not been reversed, set aside, satisfied,
superseded or appealed from and that the appellee has not
paid the sums of money, or any part thereof, and refused so
to do; that the judgment entered by the New York Court is a
final money judgment.

The defendant-appellee demurred to the amended declara-
tion upon grounds: (1) the declaration fails to state a cause
of action; (2) the declaration fails to allege that the judg-
ment sued on was final and not subject to modification; (3)
that the cause of action sued upon is not entitled to full faith
and credit under the Constitution of the United States and the
State of Florida. The trial court sustained the demurrer and
entered a final judgment for defendant below and plaintiff ap-
pealed.

The court below, in ruling upon the point raised by the
demurrer, unquestionably was influenced by our holding in
Lechner v. Lechner 154 Fla. 114, 16 So. (2) 816. This suit
involved the enforcement, under the full faith and credit

735

clause of the Federal Constitution (1) of an alimony decree
rendered under the provisions of Section 1170, Civil Practice
Act of the State of New York in which the court retained the
power to modify at any time, and (2) a final judgment for
accumulated installments of alimony in the sum of $675.00
entered by the New York courts under Section 1171-b of the
New York Civil Practice Act. We held in the Lechner case

* that the unpaid installments of alimony and the final judg-
ment for alimony were each in the breast of the court and for
this reason were subject at any time to the court’s order of
modification and therefore was lacking in finality and not en-
forceable under the full faith and credit clause.

The final judgment for alimony sued upon in the case at
bar was entered in the New York court under Section 1171-b
of the Civil Practice Act of New York. Since the adoption of
our opinion and judgment in Lechner v. Lechner, supra, other
jurisdictions have ruled upon the finality, power of modifica-
tion and enforceability of similar final judgments entered
under Section 1171-b of the Civil Practice Act supra. On this
appeal we are requested, in light of these recent rulings by
other jurisdictions, to re-examine, in part, the conclusion
reached in the Lechner case as to finality, power of modifica-
tion and enforceability under the full faith and credit clause
of the judgment entered under said Section 1171-b.

-The following cases throw light on the point at issue:
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 66 S. Ct. 556, 90 L. Ed. 635;
Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 83, 65 S. Ct. 137, 89 L. Ed. 82, 157
A.L.R. 163; Appel v. Appel, 65 N.E. (2nd) 153, 78 Ohio App.
53; Cukor v. Cukor, 114 Vt. 456, 49 Atl. (2nd) 206; Durlacher
v. Durlacher, 123 Fed. (2nd) 70. The weight of authority
now sustains the view that a final judgment for alimony en-
tered under Section 1171-b of the Civil Practice Act by the
courts of the state of New York is final, not subject to modi-
fication, and is enforceable under the full faith and credit
clause of the Federal Constitution, and to this extent we re-
cede from and modify our opinion and judgment in Lechner v.
Lechner, supra. The order sustaining the demurrer by the
trial court was correct under Lechner v. Lechner prior to this:

order of modification.

736

THE TIMES PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of THE STATE OF FLORIDA, v. T. W.
ROWLAND, C. T. FELIX, FLO. B. DILLMAN, and R. F. OREGO,
each individually and as Directors of Alpha Holding Corporation, a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State
of Florida, and ALPHA HOLDING CORPORATION, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida.

36 So. (2nd) 419 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 Division A

Austin L, Richardson, for plaintiff.
W. G. Ramseur, for defendants.

PER CURIAM:

The answer to the question propounded under Rule 38 of
this court is denied because the question is not one coming
within the rule enunciated by this court in Schwob Company
v. Florida Industrial Commission, 152 Fla. 203, 11 So. (2nd)
782 and similar cases.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
Jd. concur. Es
NOAH ROTWEIN v. SAM GERSTEN and RUTH GERSTEN, his wife.

36 So. (2nd) 419 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 En Banc

John L. Nixon and Montague Rosenberg, for appellant.
James J. Marshall, for appellees.

TERRELL, J.:

The legislature of 1945 enacted Chapter 23138, Laws of
Florida, abolishing the “right of action heretofore existing to
recover sums of money as damages for the alienation of af-
fections, criminal conversation, seduction or breach of con-
tract to marry.” In October 1946, Noah Rotwein as plaintiff,
filed his declaration seeking to recover damages against ap-
pellees for alienating the affections of his wife, Janet Gersten
Rotwein. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained, the
result of which was to uphold the validity of the act. The
plaintiff appealed.

The sole question with which we are concerned is the
constitutional validity of Chapter 23138, Acts of 1945.

Appellant contends that Chapter 23138 is void and uncon-
stitutional because of the guaranties in Sections one, four and
twelve, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, and
Section one; fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. These provisions of the State and Federal Constitution
have to do with the preservation of life, liberty and property

ne

—
738

and have little if any influence on actions to recover money
for alienation of affections.

Appellant also relies on Daily v. Parker, 61 Fed. Sup. 701
and Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.H. (2nd) 464, to sup-
port his contention. These cases treat and hold void an Illi-
nois statute which apparently did not directly abolish the
cause of action drawn in question, but made it unlawful for
anyone to file a suit for alienation of affections. The Llinois
Supreme Court struck the act down because its purpose was
not briefly expressed in the title, (Section 13, Article IV, Illi-
nois Constitution) and because, in the manner cast, it placed
a premium on the violation of moral law by exempting those
who do so from punishment. (Section 19, Article II, Illinois
Constitution.)

The Florida Statute is prefaced by a declaration of policy
in which it is stated that actions for alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to
marry have been subject to grave abuses, causing ex-
treme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary
damages to many persons wholly innocent and free from
wrongdoing, that they have been exercised by the unscrupu-
lous for their own enrichment and that the best interests of the
people of Florida will be served by the abolition of such
remedies.

Under a democratic society, the legislature is the policy
making authority and the courts are expected to heed a decla-
ration like this unless clearly shown to have been promulgated
without power to do so. It is true that the Florida Statute
carries a penal section but it’ initially abolishes the remedy
and puts the world on notice that “heart balm” is no longer a
specific for alienation of affections or any of the other
remedies cataloged in the act. It appears that similar acts in
Indiana, New York, New Jersey and Alabama have been up-
held. Young v. Young, 236 Ala. 627, 184 So. 187; Hanfgarn v.
Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.H. (2nd) 47; Bunten v. Bunten, 15
N.J. 532, 192 Atl. 727; Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553,
10 N.E. (2nd) 619; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 723, 31 L, Ed. 654,

739

These cases proceed on the theory that while marriage is
a contract, it is not such a contract as is protected from im-
pairment by the State and Federal constitutions. The acts
condemned by Chapter 23138, grow out of the marriage rela- .
tion and since the legislature has plenary power to regulate
the marriage status, it follows that it may regulate, modify,
abolish any right growing out of that relation without vio-
lating constitutional guaranties. Perhaps the strongest argu-
ment in support of the act is that perverted sexual relations
are often found lurking in these cases, and when it comes to
measuring perverted chastity in terms of “heart balm,” so-
ciety has not yet set up a standard as it has with peanuts and
popcorn and other tangibles, by which it can be done. When
a moral vacuum is permitted to supplant a personal liberty or
a category of them, it is competent for the legislature to step
in and fill the vacuum.

The causes of action proscribed by the act under review
were a part of the common law and have long been a part of
the law of the country. They have no doubt served a good
purpose, but when they become an instrument of extortion
and blackmail, the legislature has the power to, and may, limit
or abolish them. Civil liberties under the law were not in-
tended to clothe one with a permit to discard approved moral
standards, they are vested in all persons in the nature of trust,
and when the trust is abused, the power that gave it may
withdraw it. :

Some of the ancient codes bear evidence of being the
genesis of much-of our law of domestic relations, and from
some of them it may be gleaned, that the right of the husband
in the wife was property such as is now protected by the
constitution. Appellant so contends, but we do not share this
view. In fact there is no such legal concept as a property
right of husband in the wife or the wife in the husband. There
is a mutual right of consortium and affection and this is the
source from which a suit for alienation of affections origi-
nates, a social or personal relation that is not protected by
the constitution.

The order sustaining the demurrer to the declaration was
correct and is affirmed.

740

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN, ADAMS, BARNS and HOB-
SON, JJ., concur.

SEBRING, J., dissents.

DIAMANTE URGA v. STATE OF FLORIDA

36 So. (2nd) 421° June Term, 1948
Tuly 30, 1948 En Bane

Whitaker Brothers and J. Lewis Hail, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Ernest W. Welch, As-

sistant Attorney General, and Lucille Snowden, Special As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

THOMAS, C. J.:

The appellant was tried in the Criminal Court of Record of
Hillsborough County and convicted of wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously using certain instruments on a female with in-
tent to procure a miscarriage. Upon appeal, the matter was
reviewed here and the judgment was affirmed. Urga v. State,
155 Fla. 86, 20 So. (2nd) 685.

Later the appellant filed a motion in this court seeking an
order authorizing the trial court to entertain and decide her
application for a writ of error coram nobis. The motion was
granted; whereupon the petition was presented to the Crimi-
nal Court of Record of Hillsborough County. Eventually a
jury was impaneled to try the issues formed by the allegations
in the petition and the pleas filed by the county solicitor on
behalf of the state. The trial culminated in a verdict “for the
Petitioner, Diamante Urga, and against the State of Florida.”

Subsequently the county solicitor filed a motion for new
trial on the three grounds that the verdict was contrary to
the law, the evidence, and the weight of the evidence, which,
after argument of counsel for the appellant and the county
solicitor, was decided, to quote the order, “in words and
figures following: Motion heard, considered and granted.”

We are presently considering an appeal from that motion,
which we have held, by denying a motion to dismiss in this
court, was an appealable order.

A careful examination of the record in this case has satis-
fied us that there was abundant testimony, if believed by the
jury, to substantiate the position taken by the appellant. It
is true that this court is always reluctant to disturb an order
of a trial court granting a new trial, inasmuch as such a mo-
tion is “addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial
court, and the presumption is that he exercised that discretion
properly.” Henderson v. State, 185 Fla. 548, 185 So. 625.
However, if substantial evidence appears to support the ver-
dict, it should stand, as “the trial court is without authority at
law to substitute his conclusions based on the evidence for the
views and conclusions of the jury impanelled and sworn to try
the controverted issues of fact.” Hart v. Held, 149 Fla. 33,
5 So. (2nd) 878. The author of the opinion in that case
further observed that a trial court might set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial if the jury had been deceived “as to the
force and credibility of the evidence, or . . . influenced by con-
siderations outside the record, but when no issue is involved
but the sufficiency and the probative force of the evidence, the
verdict should not be interfered with. It is error to grant a
new trial when the verdict set aside is supported by the testi-
mony appearing in the record and nothing can be accom-
plished except to have another jury review the cause”? (Em-
phasis supplied).

Adverting to the motion of the state and the order of the
judge, which we have quoted, we find nothing to apprise us of
the errors which were urged or the reasons that prompted the
court in ruling as he did. From the examination of the record
we have not discovered any question save what might have
arisen from conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses who

TAL

a
TA2

testified in the case, and we have reached the conclusion that
the only purpose that could be served by a retrial would be a
review of the facts by a different jury.

So we decide that the order should be reversed, with direc-
tions to enter judgment in favor of the appellant and to pro-
‘ceed accordingly.

Reversed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, BARNS and HOBSON,
JJ., coneur.

SEBRING, J., dissents.

SEBRING, J., dissenting:
This is an appeal from an order granting the State of
Florida a new trial in a coram nobis proceeding.

The appellant Urga was tried and convicted in the Crimi-
nal Court of Record of Hillsborough County of unlawfully
using certain instruments and other means in and upon one
Clara Belle Shaw, with the intent to procure the miscarriage
of the said Clara Belle Shaw, contrary to section 797.01 Flor-
ida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. The judgment was affirmed on ap-
peal. Urga v. State, 155 Fla. 86, 20 So. (2nd) 685. There-
after the appellant filed her application in this court for per-
mission to present a petition for a writ of coram nobis to the
court below, on the ground of newly discovered evidence which
it ig alleged was not known and could not have been known to
her or her. counsel at or before trial, and permission to apply
for the writ was granted by this court after full considera-
tion of the sufficiency of the petition to state a ground for
relief.. See Urga v. State, 157 Fla. 794, 26 So. (2nd) 786.
Subsequently, the lower court allowed the petition to be filed,
pleas were interposed thereto denying the material allegations
of the petition, and a trial was had on the issues presented.
At the conclusion of the evidence the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the appellant, Urga, and against the State of
Florida. Thereafter, upon motion for new trial filed by the
State, the court ordered a new trial on the ground that the
verdict was contrary to the law, the evidence and the greater

Es
be
743

weight of the evidence. The appellant has taken an appeal
from that order.

I think that the only real question on the appeal is whether
or not the trial court should be reversed for awarding a new
trial to the State of Florida after the return of a jury verdict
for the appellant based upon conflicting evidence.

The rule is established in this jurisdiction that the grant-
ing or denial of a motion for new trial is addressed to the
sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, and that an ap-
pellate court will not disturb such a ruling unless a clear abuse
of judicial discretion is shown. By the term judicial discre-
tion, as applied to the foregoing rule, is meant a discretion
exercised within the limits of the principle of law particularly
applicable to the issues presented; and before it can be found
by an appellate tribunal that there has been a clear abuse of
judicial discretion it must appear that in ruling on the motion
the presiding judge acted from mere whim or caprice, or from
a clear misconception of the evidence and the law, or in a
manner clearly arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, when tested
by the principles of law applicable to the issues involved.
Compare Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99
Fila. 987, 128 So. 241.

The appellant contends that in the instant case the record
reveals an abuse of judicial discretion in the order granting a
new trial, for the reason that in the trial proceedings in the
court below there was a sharp conflict of evidence between the
contending parties which only the jury had power to resolve,
under our system of trial procedure, and hence that the trial
judge had no power to disturb the verdict and award a new
trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the
weight of the evidence. It is ordinarily true that the respon-
sibility for weighing, and resolving conflicts in, the evidence
is not the prerogative of the trial judge but the function of the
jury, under appropriate instructions from the trial judge, but
this rule is not without exception: It is the law of this juris-
diction that a trial judge may award a new trial, even in the
face of a verdict based upon conflicting evidence, if he finds
that justice demands that the cause be submitted to another

ee
744

jury. Baker v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Company, 140 Fla. 791,
192 So. 193.

In the case at bar I find not only that the evidence offered
by the contending parties at the trial was in sharp conflict,
but also that the evidence offered by the appellant to sustain.
the allegations of her petition was conflicting and confusing
within itself. It is my view that under such circumstances it
cannot be said that the trial judge abused his judicial discre-
tion in granting a new trial. I am therefore of opinion that.
the order appealed from should be affirmed. See Knudsen v.
Hanlan, 160 Fla. 566, 36 So. (2nd) 192; Knight v. American
Eagle Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 131 Fla. 764, 179 So. 792;
Lockhart v. Butt-Landstreet, Inc., 91 Fla. 497, 107 So. 641;
Gulf Refining Co. v. Howard, 82 Fla. 27, 89 So. 349; Carney v.
Stringfellow, 73 Fla. 700, 74 So. 866.

Le
.STATE OF FLORIDA v. GENE NELSON alias EUGENE NELSON...
36 So. (2nd) 427 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 . En Bane

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Lloyd Bass, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

The appellee procured his release on July 14, 1947, because:
of the impropriety of the sentence under which he was then
held, and the State thereupon, on August 27, 1947, instituted

be
a
145

proceedings by information to have a proper sentence im-
posed.

This is an appeal by the State from an order granting de-
fendant’s-appellee’s motion to quash an information charging ~
appellee with being a second offender after the appellee had
served the sentence imposed upon conviction of the second of-
fense, which sentence was without consideration of the pro-
visions of law as to second offenders.

The controlling and determining factors involved in this
appeal are as follows:

On January 29, 1937, the appellee, Gene Nelson, was ad-
judged guilty of a felony (breaking and entering a building
with intent to commit a misdemeanor) and sentenced by the
Criminal Court of Record of Duval County to serve a term of
imprisonment; that

Thereafter, on October 30, 1939, the said Gene Nelson was
adjudged guilty of another felony (committed on October 16,
1939) and was sentenced by the same court to serve a term of
five years in the State prison; that

Thereafter, on November 2, 1939, Gene Nelson was sen-
tenced as a fourth offender, as provided for by Section 775.10,
Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., which sentence was voided as
unwarranted by judgment dated July 14, 1947, in habeas
corpus proceedings; that

On August 27, 1947, the appellee, Gene Nelson, was pro-
ceeded against by an inforniation filed in the Criminal Court
of Record of Duval County, alleging the foregoing facts, and
the said Gene Nelson was subject to the punishment as pro-
vided by law, as follows:

775.09—Punishment for second conviction of felony.

“A person who, after having been convicted within this
state of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, or under
the laws of any other state, government or country, of a crime
which, if committed within this state would be a felony, com-
mits any felony within this state is punishable upon convic-
tion of such second offense as follows: If the subsequent
felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would

a
746

be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his
natural life then such person must be sentenced to imprison-
ment for a term no less than the longest term nor more than
twice the longest term prescribed upon a first conviction.”—
Section 775.09 F.S., 1941 F.S.A.

The information charging that Gené Nelson was subject to
punishment as a “second offender” was filed on August 27,
1947, at a time after Nelson had served all lawful sentences
imposed against him.

On motion, the judge of the Criminal Court of Record, on
December 4, 1947, quashed the information charging that
Nelson was subject to punishment as a second offender, and
the State thereupon appealed said order.

This Court, in reference to the law as is now known as
Sections 775.09-775.11, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., has stated:

“The statute does not make it an offense or crime for one
to have been convicted more than once. The law simply pre-
scribes a longer sentence for a second or subsequent offense
for the reason that the prior convictions taken in accordance
with the subsequent offense demonstrates the incorrigible and
dangerous character of accused thereby establishing the ne-
cessity for enhanced restraint. Bishop, Crim. Law (9th Ed.)
Sec. 993a. The imposition of such enhanced punishment is not
a prosecution of or punishment for the former conviction.
The Constitution forbids such action. The enhanced punish-
ment is an incident to the last offense alone. But for that of-
fense it would not be imposed. . . . ’—Cross v. State, 96 Fla.
768, 119 So. 380.

This holding appears to comport with the general law on
the subject, for in American Jurisprudence it is stated:

“The charge of being a second or subsequent offender does
not involve accusation of a crime other than, or separate from,
the offense principally charged. The statutes do not create a
separate offense. The increased penalty for a second or sub-
sequent conviction is intended to be held up as a warning to
first offenders and to act as a deterrent to their criminal ten-
dencies.” (Emphasis supplied).—25 Am Jur. 260—‘“Habitual
Criminals”—Sec. 1.

TAT

We also quote from 25 American Jurisprudence 263, “Ha-
bitual Criminals,” Section 6:

“The enhanced punishment under such statutes is an in-
cident of the subsequent offense only.”

The following quotation from 24 Corpus Juris Secundum
1143, “Criminal Law,” Section 1958 (a part of Chapter 19, en-
titled “Successive Offenses and Habitual Criminals”) is also
in point, to-wit:

“However, statutes authorizing a more severe penalty to
be inflicted on one who is a persistent offender do not create
an offense, nor inflict additional punishment for the prior of-
fense, nor do they authorize a conviction on a charge of being
an habitual criminal; they merely prescribe punishment for
the subsequent offense which is to be more severe, because the
offender’s persistence in the perpetration of crime evinces a
depravity which merits greater punishment.” ,

The Attorney General submits that the governing statute,
Section 775.11, specifically provides for the filing of the in-
formation charging the two convictions “AT ANY TIME after
sentence or conviction for the second felony. We quote from
Section 775.11, as follows:

“If AT ANY TIME after sentence or conviction it appear
that a person convicted of a felony has previously been con-
victed of crimes as set forth either in Section 775.09 or Sec-
tion 775.10 the prosecuting attorney of the county in which
such conviction was had, shall file an information accusing
said person of such previous convictions...” (Capitalization
and underscoring ours).

Stated generally, the power of the Court to modify sen-
tences is as follows:

“Power of court.—It seems to have been recognized as one
of the earliest doctrines of the common law that the record of
a court may be changed or amended at any time during the
same term of the court in which-a judgment is rendered. That
this power has been often exercised by the Courts in England.
is manifest from cases in which it appears that judgments and
sentences, during the same term in which they have been en-
tered, have been vacated and others substituted without doubt

a
748

or question. This rule of the common law is substantially in
force at the present time in this country, so that during the
same term of court at which a sentence is imposed and before
the defendant has begun serving such sentence, the trial judge
may modify it either in form or substance.”—15 Am. Jur. 128
—“Criminal Law’’—Sec. 473.

“Tt seems to be well established that a trial court is with-
out power to set aside a sentence after the defendant has been
committed thereunder and impose a new or different sentence
increasing the punishment, even at the same term at which
the original sentence was imposed. A judgment which at-
tempts to do so is void, and the original judgment remains in
force.” —15 Am. Jur. 130—“Criminal Law”—Sec. 474.

Doubtless the purpose of the use of the language “at any
time,” etc., was to overcome the limitations of the general law
on the court as to term time and the limitation imposed in the
event that execution of the sentence has commenced and the
trial court had otherwise lost jurisdiction.

' The appellee, instead of commencing procéedings in the
trial court because of an improper sentence against him as an
alleged fourth offender, instituted habeas corpus proceedings
in the jurisdiction of his confinement and an appropriate judg-
ment in the habeas corpus case would have been that petitioner
be remanded to the trial court for the entry of a proper sen-
tence. However, promptly upon the entry of the judgment on
habeas corpus, proceedings were had in the trial court which
imposed the original sentence for the entry of a sentence
against the appellee as a second offender; resulting in the
judgment now on review by appeal.

Whether or not in this jurisdiction there is any limita-
tion of time on the Court’s power to impose a sentence as pro-
vided by Section 775.09, supra, it is our conclusion that under
the facts and circumstances it has not expired in this instance.
It does appear, however, that whatever sentence is to be im-
posed should be nunc pro tune, as of and for the date of Oc-
tober 30, 1939, and that the appellee-defendant should have
eredit for time served since then, as an execution thereof.

The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to
-quash.

[|
Le
749

The order appealed is:

Reversed. .

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and HOBSON,
JJ., concur.

SEBRING, J., concurs specially.

ADAMS, J., dissents.

SEBRING, concurring specially:

I concur in the judgment of reversal. It is my view, how-
ever, that under section 775.09 and 775.11, Florida Statutes,
1941, F.S.A., a person may be proceeded against as a second
offender without regard to whether he has or has not served
the sentence imposed under the judgment of conviction for
the second offense upon which the charge as a second offender
under the statute is predicated.

THOMAS, C. J., concurs.

a .
WILLIAM SPENCER, et al. v. HARRY D. SPENCER

386 So. (2nd) 424 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 Division A

750

J. Oswald Cornelius and Edwin R. Dickenson, for appel-
lants.

Jordan & Jordan, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

During the year 1910 H. D. Spencer acquired by purchase
Lots 726 and 727, Ruskin Colony Farms, situated in Hills-
borough County, Florida, comprising some ten acres, more or
less. He moved with his family upon the land, improved and
cultivated it, and thereafter made it his home. On July 1,
1922, H. D. Spencer, joined by his wife Paula R. Spencer,
conveyed to H. D. Spencer Lot No. 726 of Ruskin Colony
Farms, being five acres, more or less. (The record is not
clear as to the exact relationship between the grantor, H. D.
Spencer, and the grantee, H. D. Spencer, supra, but the writer
infers that it is that of father and son).

The father, H. D. Spencer (Sr.), and wife Paula R. Spen-
cer, resided or lived upon the property from the time of ac-
quiring a deed in 1910 until the death of the father in Oc-
tober, 1933, when the mother continued to reside and make
her home on the property after the death of her husband in
1933 until her death, which occurred in January, 1939. The
father and mother had born to them four sons and two
daughters, each of whom were reared on the property. Lot
No. 726, conveyed by the father and mother during the year
1922 to their son, H. D. Spencer, is not involved in this suit.
The title to Lot No. 727 was vested in H. D. Spencer (Sr.) at
the time of his death in October, 1933, and he was at the
time the head of a family and used the property as a home-
stead. The children are viz: H. D. Spencer (Jr.), William
Spencer, D. O. Spencer, Ed. W. Spencer, Eloise Spencer King,
and Marie Spencer Priest.

On January 12, 1935, one W. T. Williams acquired for the
sum of $63.75 a tax deed to Lot No. 727, Ruskin Colony Farms,
for the nonpayment of taxes for the years 1930, 1931, 1932,
and 1933. Some few days thereafter on, to-wit, March 14,
1935, W. T. Williams and his wife, Elma F. Williams, con-

TL

veyed by quit claim deed Lot No. 727 to Harry. D. Spencer for
and in consideration of the sum of $63.75, plus one dollar, as
recited in the aforesaid deed. Thus it will be observed that
taxes on Lot 727 became delinquent prior to the death of H.
D. Spencer (Sr.), which occurred in October, 1933.

On January 8, 1947, Harry D. Spencer filed a bill in equity
in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, against
his above named brother and sisters, alleging that since ac-
quiring a quit claim, deed from Williams in 1935 he had been
in the continuous, open hostile and adverse possession for
more than seven years of Lot 727 and had expended con-
siderable sums of money for soil drainage, fencing and other
improvements, and prayed for a decree forever quieting and
confirming his title to Lot 727 against the claims of his
brother and sisters above named as heirs at law of H. D.
Spencer, deceased. The several defendants, by an appro-
priate pleading, set out that the payment by the plaintiff of
the sum of $64.75 for and in obtaining a quit claim deed from
W. T. Williams and wife; in law, amounted to nothing more
than the payment of taxes in behalf of the several joint
tenants for the years 1930, 1931, 1932 and 1933, and the de-
fendants were willing to return to him said sum, with
interest, and otherwise offered to do equity. The Chancellor
entered a final decree in conformity with the prayer of the
bill of complaint and the joint tenants-defendants appealed.

The record reflects sharp disputes and conflicts in the
testimony by the parties to the suit and their witnesses on
the question of the adverse, hostile, open and continuous
possession of Lot 727 by Harry D. Spencer as against his
brother and sister as joint tenants. It was the theory of
the plaintiff below that his adverse possession began to run
in 1935, some four years prior to his mother’s death, when
he acquired a quit claim deed to Lot 727 from W. T. Williams
and that the statutory period of seven years had run there-
after and prior to filing the present suit in January, 1947.
We recognize the established rule to the effect that a Chancel-
lor’s ruling on disputes and conflicts in the testimony will be
sustained unless an aubuse of discretion is shown on appeal, ©
but a different rule obtains here if it clearly appears that the

Le
752

chancellor applied the wrong principle of law to the facts in-
volved in the controversy.

In the case of Williams v. Clyatt, 53 Fla. 987, 43 So. 441,
it was made to appear that Henry Pinkney and Annett
Williams each owned by inheritance from their father an
undivided one-half interest in certain land. Henry Pinkney,
in August, 1905, conveyed his interest thereto to W. W. Clyatt
and on July 21, 1905, Annett Williams obtained a tax deed to
said land and asserted ownership of the entire fee as against
her joint tenant. The Court in disposing of the contention in
part said (text 53 Fla. 998) :

“..'. A coparcener cannot acquire a tax title to lands as
against another coparcener because of their: mutual obliga-
tions and interests. If land is sold as an entirety for non-:
payment of taxes by all cotenants, and is bought by one of
the cotenants, it amounts merely to the payment of the tax,
and the purchasing cotenant has no additional right in the
land except to secure the payment of the amount paid by him
for taxes for the other cotenants. Freeman on Cotenancy
and Partition (2nd ed.), section 158; 27 Am. & Eng: Ency.
Law (2nd ed.) 956; Black on Tax Titles (2nd ed.), section
282. See also Keil v. West, 21 Fla. 508; Petty v. Mays, 19 -
Fla. 652.” ~

See Price v. McLeod 67 Fla. 171, 64 So. 769; Andrews v.
Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So. (2nd) 205.

An examination of the authorities of other jurisdictions
discloses that the rule of this Court as set out in Williams v.
Clyatt, supra, is in line with the weight of authority. 14 Am.
Jur. 123-124, par. 54, expresses the general rule viz: “When
one of several co-owners of property acquires a tax title here-

" to, his purchase amounts merely to a payment of taxes or a
redemption from the sale, and gives him no rights against his
associates except in so far as they may fail or refuse to con-
tribute to all expenditures so made. And this rule prevails
whether the tax deed’ was procured to be executed directly to
the tenant or to a third person through whom he claims as
grantee for it is generally agreed that when the common
property has been sold for taxes to a stranger, even though
the time for redemption has expired, a tenant in common can-

[|
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753

not by the purchase of such title assert it against his co-
tenant.” Exceptions to the above rule exist but such excep-
tions do not appear on this record. See 48 C.J.S. 933-934,
par. 11; Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 4 Perm. Hd., 392-
394, pars. 1860-61.

Counsel for appellee cites our holding in Wolfson v. Heins,
149 Fla. 499, 6 So. (2nd) 858, and contends that the rule
enunciated therein is applicable to this controversy. An
analysis of the case discloses that the cause was before the
court on petition for writ of certiorari going to the sufficiency
of an amended bill of complaint. We held the bill of com-
plaint and the amendment thereto legally insufficient, which
resulted in a dismissal of, the bill of complaint and amend-
ment. What we said about the rights of tenants in common
was incidental to the legal sufficiency of the bill of complaint
and the amendment if, indeed, it was not a dictum, and could
not be construed to mean that this Court had receded from
its ruling as expressed in Andrews v. Andrews and Williams
v. Clyatt, supra.

It is next contended that a fiduciary relationship was not
pleaded nor shown by the evidence to exist between the
brothers and sisters, parties to the suit and admitted heirs of
H. D. Spencer (Sr.). The answer to this contention is found
in Andrews v. Andrews, supra, when we discussed the rights
of tenants in common as incidental to an estate by the en-
tirety. We, in part, said (text 155 Fla. 657-658) :

“... Estates in coparcenary are akin both to tenancies
in common and joint tenancies, but there is no need to com-
ment on their characteristics except to say that the last cited
case seems in point because the fundamental ingredient of all
three, as well as of estates by the entirety, which prevents one
interest holder from taking advantage of the other is their
mutuality of interest and obligations .. .

“Each tenant by the entirety owes to the other the highest
degree of confidence and trust. We repeat, if a tenant in com-
mon may not take advantage of his cotenant nor a parcener
of his coparcener by purchasing a tax deed on the property
they hold, there is all the more reason why the rule should be
applied in the case of estates by the entirety...”

Ee
154

It appears by the record that Mr. Williams frequently ran
for office and was elected County Commissioner from the
Commissioners District in Hillsborough County in which the
land involved here was located. He testified that he made it
a practice to pay taxes against the lands for many of the
voters of his District and pursuant thereto purchased the de-
linquent tax certificates and obtained a tax deed to the
property involved in this suit on January 12, 1935. He con-
veyed the property by quit claim deed to the appellee some
sixty days thereafter. The appellee paid him the sum of only
one dollar more than the total amount paid by him for the
tax deed. The mother of the parties was not molested nor
evicted from the property under the tax deed, but she made
it her home until the time of her death in 1939. The relation
of tenants in common will not permit this appellee under the
circumstances of this case to acquire this quit claim deed
founded on a default in the payment of taxes and use the
same in the extinguishment of the property rights of other
cotenants by setting up an adverse title to the common prop-
erty. Williams v. Clyatt, supra; Hodgson v. Federal Oil &
Development Co., 274 U.S. 15, 71 L. Hid. 901, 47 S..Ct. 502, 45
A.L.R. 869, Annotations page 896.

The decree appealed from is reversed with directions to
dismiss the bill of complaint.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

. Le
ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, v.
ROY TIMMONS.

36 So. (2nd) 430 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 En Banc

McCarthy, Lane & Howell, for appellant.
Evan T, Evans and B. K. Roberts, for appellee.

‘TERRELL, J.: -

Roy Timmons sued appellant to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries resulting from the collision of his truck with
one of the streamlined passenger trains of appellant. Defend-
ant filed a counter claim, alleging damages of the sum of
$4407.82 to its train and tracks as a result of the collision.
‘There was a plea of not guilty to both the declaration and the
counter claim. The jury rejected the counter claim and re-
turned a verdict of $800.00 for the plaintiff. Final judgment
was entered on the verdict, a new trial was denied and the
defendant appealed.

The collision took place at Raiford, a rural community,
about eleven A. M., January 21, 1947, in clear day light where
the right of way was one hundred feet wide and straight and
devoid of obstructions to vision. The evidence shows that
the train was moving fast and perhaps above the customary
rate of speed. But the bell was ringing, the whistle was
blowing constantly, the brakes were applied and all the pre-
cautions required of defendant were observed. Timmons was
familiar with the crossing, passed over it every day and
testified that he paid no attention as he approached it. A case
might arise in which the speed testified to would be excessive,
but under the circumstances here, we do not see that it was
material.

There is no suggestion whatever that Timmons was not in
possession of his normal faculties. It would be trite to assert
that trains and trucks, good highways and good railroads
are essential to the economy and well being of the country.
If this be true, it necessarily follows that a responsibility

a
756

rests on those who operate them to take due care for the
safety of life and property, either directly or remotely in-
volved in the operation. There is no principle more deeply in-
bedded in our fundamental law than that of mutual concern
for the rights, safety and privileges accorded those engaged
as were the parties to this suit.

The record discloses that the operators of the train were
exercising every precaution that society by law and common
courtesy requires, while appellee exercised no precaution
whatever for his safety. The railroad has a right to assume
that one crossing its tracks will at least look to see if there
is an approaching train, and if.so, he will not plunge into
its pathway. Appellee did not observe that precaution.
From the time he entered the right of way, he had a clear
unobstructed view for over 4000 feet in the direction of the
train and had nothing to do but lift his eyes in that direction.
If he had taken the slightest precaution to look or listen he
could have avoided the accident.

The standard of prudence.that one must observe in ap-
proaching a grade crossing is not uniform. Some jurisdic-
tions require that one stop, look and listen, regardless of how
clear the track is in either direction. Other courts require
the traveler to look and listen, the duty to stop, depending on ©
the circumstances revealed by looking and listening. Pokoka
v. Wabash Ry. Co. 292 U.S. 98; Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v.
Goodman, 275 U. S. 66. We approve the latter rule in this
State and when, as here, it is conclusively shown that the
plaintiff did not look or listen, that there was no obstruction
whatever to the vision, that the accident took place in a rural
community where looking or listening would have avoided it,
he is guilty of negligence which was the sole proximate cause
of his injury and cannot recover.

The facts in this case are so different from those in the
cases cited that neither of them can be said to rule this one.
It is clear however, that appellee neglected to observe the
most elementary duty imposed on him to preserve his safety.
He was on notice that he. was approaching a place of danger
and must look out for the train, lest he suffer the conse-

a
[|
TST

quences. He failed in this, and in doing so, was the sole cause
of the accident.

The judgment is therefore reversed.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., concur.
CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.

HOBSON, J., not participating.

STATE OF FLORIDA, EX REL. MANUEL 'FUENTE, HARRY
CHURCH, CARL MORGAN and R. L. LONG, v. JOHN R. HIMES,
as Judge of the Criminal Court of Record of Hillsborough County,

Florida.
36 So. (2nd) 433 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 Division B

Hardee & Bucklew, Cyrus W. Fields and W. Marion
Hendry, for petitioners.
John R. Himes, in proper person, for respondent.

758

ADAMS, J.:

Petitioners seek a writ of prohibition against the respond-
ent alleging disqualification to preside in a case wherein
petitioners stand charged with a crime of operating a gam-
bling house. Suggestion was made and denied by respondent.
as Judge of the Criminal Court of Record where the case was.
pending.

The basis of disqualification relates to statements made by
respondent in political campaigns in 1936 and 1940 and an
incident which took place in open court on June 7, 1948.

As to the disqualification by reason of statements made in
1936 and 1940, we hold against petitioner. This ground of dis-
qualification, if any it was, was not presented within the time
provided by law and for that reason we will not hold respond-
ent in error.

The second ground of disqualification relates to a colloquy
occurring in open court when it became necessary to grant the
state a postponement and reset the case for trial on a later
date.

Mr, Fisher is the prosecuting attorney and Mr. Hardee is
the defense attorney. Excerpts from the record show:

“BY MR. FISHER: I have to report that the main witness,
is not present, your Honor. He has not been served. That
is the witness Dinning. The State cannot go to trial without
his presence, as the Court well knows.

“BY THE COURT: Are the subpoena witnesses here?

“BY MR. FISHER: I asked for it yesterday. I phoned the
sheriff’s office and left word that I wanted it here this morn-
ing.

“BY THE COURT: Could we have all the witness sub-
poenas, Mr. Broaddus?

“BY MR. HARDEE: Your Honor, wouldn’t it save time if
the Solicitor called his witnesses’ names while we are waiting’
on this? :

“BY THE COURT: I would like to see the witness sub-
poenas first.

“BY MR. FISHER: I left word at the sheriff's office yester--
day afternoon I wanted the return and deputy.

9

“BY THE COURT: Let’s get him up here.

“BY MR. HARDEE: I don’t believe I caught what your
Honor said.

“BY THE COURT: We are going to get the deputy sheriff
up here who made the return.

“MR. HARDEE: Who is that?

“MR. FISHER: Williams, I think is his name. I don’t
know him.

“THE COURT: Jack, call the other witnesses and see if
they are here.” ...

“THE COURT: Who are the two not here besides Din-
ning?”... .

“THE COURT: I would like to have them over here. Mr.
Hardee, how about the defendants? Are they all here?

“MR. HARDEE: Yes, sir. Will the defendants come up,
please. .

“THE COURT: Mr. Fisher, do you know anything else
about this witness?

“MR. FISHER: No, sir, except I made a search for him
myself, yesterday, I couldn’t find him.

“MR. HARDEE: Counsel for defendant is somewhat in
the dark on what’s been going on, your Honor. I would like
your Honor to brief us and let us know. Evidently some-
thing has been going on that counsel have not been informed
of and and I think that we should have the knowledge that.
the prosecution has and the Judge has.

“THE COURT: No secrets, Mr. Hardee. Just have a seat
and you will have a chance to say anything you like.

“BY MR. HARDEE: Something is going on we don’t know
anything about.

“THE COURT: Just have a seat.

MR. HARDEE: Don’t you think if your Honor knows
something that is going on, that we should know it, too?

“THE COURT: Just have a seat.

“MR. HARDEE: I think we should be informed of any-
thing the Court knows about, because we don’t have an ex
parte hearing.

“THE COURT: This witness, I understand, is a police
officer of the City of Tampa?

a
760

“MR. FISHER: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: Well, all I know about it is, Mr. Fisher
and Mr. McEwen notified me that this witness hadn’t been
served. That’s all I know about it, but I want to find out
something more about it. Chief Eddings?

“CHIEF EDDINGS: Yes, sir.

“MR. HARDEE: Are the proceedings that might go on
now, would they be such as to prejudice the jurors?

“THE COURT: I don’t think so.

“MR. HARDEE: I would like to make the request the pros-
pective jurors go out of the court room, say five or ten
minutes, however long it will take.

“THE COURT: I don’t think that is necessary. Chief,
what do you know about this?

“CHIEF EDDINGS: About what, your Honor?

“THE COURT: About this witness, Dinning, who is not
here.” ...

“THE COURT: Just a minute please, Chief, This witness
subpoena was issued on May 31, shows that it was received by
the Sheriff’s office on the same day. Do you know why he
wasn’t served before he left? .

“CHIEF EDDINGS: No, sir, I do not. I received my sub-
poena some time Thursday. I don’t know when the subpoenas
were issued or when they were delivered to the sheriff’s office,
or when it was served to the sheriff's office. All I know I can
speak for myself, I was served Thursday.

“THE COURT: Do you know where the witness is?” .. .

“THE COURT: When is he due back?

“CHIEF EDDINGS: He is due back Tuesday or Wednes-
day, next Wednesday morning, I believe it is. This next,
coming. He is due back this week sometime, Thursday or
Friday. Ten days from the 2nd, that would be the 13th, The
2nd on Wednesday, but he had ten days including that day;
due back the 12th. What day is the 12th?

“THE CLERK: Ten, would be on the 11th.

“CHIEF EDDINGS: But he had-ten days.

“THE CLERK: June 12th would be on Saturday this week.

“CHIEF EDDINGS: That is the day he is due back, eight
o’clock Saturday morning.

“THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anything else, Mr.
Fisher you wish to say?

“MR. FISHER: I don’t believe so.

“THE COURT: Now, Mr. Hardee, anything you want to
say, you may. To answer your question, they said this wit-
ness hadn’t been served. I said we would go into it this
morning. If there is anything you would like to say, I would
be glad to hear you.

“MR. HARDEE: Is there anything before the Court?

“THE COURT: There is a motion before the Court for a
continuance.

761

“MR. HARDEE: We would like for them to come within
the rule and show why this is necessary, and if they should
file a written motion for continuance and come within the rule,
just like your Honor would require us to do, we most assuredly
would not be willing for a continuance under any circum-

stances because as your Honor knows, each of us has had rea-
son for a continuance and I have asked your Honor for a con-
tinuance for my own personal reasons and your Honor said
you couldn’t do it, that you would have to try the case this
morning. I made arrangements to change all my business so
I could be here today. Mr. Fields made his so he could be here
today. Judge Hendry came back from Nashville so he could
be here today.

“THE COURT: Well, the only request that was made on
behalf of the defense was that the lawyers wanted to take a
vacation. Of course that is different from where a witness is
absent.

“MR. HARDEH: I can see, if your Honor please, where a
lawyer makes his plans and gets reservations for different
hotels and things two or three months ahead and he has to go
on a certain time or he can’t go, that that is kind of important
because you can’t change reservations and things like that.
Judge Hendry had a special reason to be in Nashville today.
He went up there for his boy’s school. He had some things
he had to transact and he came back on purpose, last night,

Es
162

to be here. As your Honor knows, Mr. Fields is going, made
his arrangements to be here today, and he is going to Athens,
Georgia, tomorrow, and he says he has told your Honor. *
Your Honor knows about that. Unless there is some more
showing, I don’t think the case should be continued on that
alone. .

“THE COURT: Well, we tried this case once before and, of
course this witness testified, so the Court has knowledge of
what his testimony was, even if I don’t remember all of it. No
doubt about his being absent, no doubt about the fact that the
State had a witness subpoena issued and turned over to the
Sheriff for service. Now, it may be that technically under the
Statute the State should file a written motion, but they can do
that during the day. This case has been pending some time;
filed October 15th, and continued once because either I was
sick or one of the defendants, I have forgotten which. It was
tried on March 22nd and resulted in a mistrial, and was set
again for today. Now, I want this case disposed of. I don’t
see how we can try it today. What is the date the next trials
are set?

“MR. FISHER: June 28th is the next week we try cases.

“MR. HARDEE: If your Honor is thinking of continuing
this case for resetting, we would like to be heard on the re-,
setting.

“THE COURT: I will hear you right now.

“MR. HARDEE: Has your Honor made up your mind to
continue the case, first?

“THE COURT: Yes.

“MR. HARDEE: If your Honor continues it, when do you
plan to try it?

“THE COURT: Well, I will hear you first.

“MR. HARDEE: I heard your Honor say something about
the 28th of June.

“THE COURT: That’s the next week we have Court.

“MR. HARDEB: The 28th of June, I have reservations for
Yellowstone Park. The 30th day of that month I go to Sun
Valley for a convention I have to be at, but I will be there
until the 4th of July. Reservations and plans have been made
for that for months. It is just as impossible for me to change

that convention or to change those reservations on that date
as it is for me to fly to the Great Beyond. I could no more be
here, I could not be here at all. I would have to give up my
representation of this case and forget it. If your Honor has
any doubt about that, I will call up my secretary and have her
bring the confirmed reservations over here for that time,
which you have to take months in advance or you can’t make
them.

“MR. McEWEN: If your Honor please, I know that is a
fact because I happen to know the convention Mr. Hardee is
attending.

“MR. HARDEE: I will not be back here until July 26. If
your Honor is going to reset the case, I would like to set it for
August.

“THE COURT: Well, we are not going to do that. I will
try to accommodate you as far as possible. How about June
21st?

“MR. HARDEE: No, sir, I can’t do it. I am leaving here
on June 2ist.

“THE COURT: Well—

“MR. HARDEE: It is absolutely impossible.

“THE COURT: I am willing to hold a special week of
Court on June—when did you say he would be back, Chief?

“CHIEF EDDINGS: June 12th.

“MR. HARDEE; My entire program is full from the time
T leave here. I have cases set every week day after today and
so has Mr. Fields. We have all got-that, all arranged. Lawyers
like we are, have more than two or three cases, have to make
plans in advance. We have got them all set. It is just im-
possible for me to try this case before I leave here. I couldn’t
do it if my life depended on it.

“THE COURT: Well, Mr. Hardee, you are just going to
have to work it in some way because I am not going to con-
tinue this case beyond June. Now, if you are leaving here on
the 21st—

763

“MR. HARDEE: May I ask your Honor why this case
seems more important to your Honor than any other‘case in
this Court?

|

—
764

“THE COURT: Mr. Hardee, when a lawyer starts to cross-
examine me, it is time for me to cut him off and I will ask you
not to attempt to ask me any more questions along that line.

“MR. HARDEE: Isn’t it proper for a lawyer to ask a judge
a question about a case if the judge seems interested? Don’t
you think that is proper?

“THE COURT: Mr. Hardee, we are going to try this case
during the week of the 14th of June. You can pick your
days.

“MR. HARDEE: Not one of us can try it. Every one of us
are busy that day. It is just absolutely impossible to try it
that day.

“THE COURT: We are going to try it during that week.
Do you have any preference during that week?

“MR. HARDEE: Yes, sir, I want to try it late enough to
where I can be in the Supreme Court of the State of Florida
that Monday morning, because I don’t think your Honor will
try this case after I get to the Supreme Court with this case.
I say to your Honor now, it is with regret that I ever say that
a Court should be disqualified. I think your Honor should
recluse yourself in this case. What your Honor has said in
this case proves to me your Honor has made your mind up and
you are prejudiced. You ought to voluntarily recluse your-
self and not cause us to file a petition in this case. I regret to
ever petition a Court to disqualify himself. I haven’t done it
in a long time, but when your Honor has taken the attitude
you have and made certain comments I can tell your Honor I
know about, it proves to me conclusively your Honor is
prejudiced. There are other judges in this State, many
judges, who are not prejudiced, know nothing about this case,
and I should be satisfied to try this before any of them. I
don’t know who it is, whether it be the judge from Pensacola
or whether it be the judge from Key West, it makes no dif-
ference. I have a very kindly feeling toward your Honor as
your Honor knows. I have always felt very kindly towards
your Honor, and I hate to say this, but I think your Honor
should voluntarily recluse himself in this case.

“THE COURT: I want you to have a chance to say all you.
want to say, Mr. Hardee.

“MR. HARDEE: That is all I have to say now.

“THE COURT: Are you through now?

“MR. HARDEE: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: I don’t intend to get into any argument
with you, Mr. Hardee. You can file any motions, writs, ap-
peals, anything you want to file. But since you have made
the statement you made, all I want to say is that it has not
been a month since you came into my office and asked me if I
were not going on a vacation soon, so you could come over
and plead these defendants guilty and get them off with a
fine.

“MR. HARDEE: Or try it.

“THE COURT: I told you I was not going on a vacation
and I am not going on one either. Now, about this case; since
you say you have no preference—

“MR. HARDEE: I do have a preference. As I say, I want
to have that Monday open because I would like to, if you are
going to set the case again, I will change my plans and set it
for June 21st, which I don’t agree to, but that is better than
any other date, because that will give me time to file my mo-
tion.

“MR. FIELDS: June 21st? Your Honor knows that I
spoke to the Court thirty days ago, explained to the Court that
I wanted to leave on the 20th for New York and be back here
on the 25th. I made reservations, hotel reservations, have
fight tickets, I am attending to other business. I made that
reservation thirty days ago, and I certainly, by reason of the
fact that the State here hasn’t got a witness, I don’t think that

because their witness has not showed up that it certainly
should not interfere with our convenience, which I have been
here every day this year to try my cases, every day that they
have been set I have been here. I have my friends up there
that I have made appointments with, want to see.

“MR. HARDEE: You wouldn’t be willing, your Honor, to
try this after July? I will push my trip up and come back
ahead of time if you will. I am supposed to be back by the
25th, but I will come back by the 20th.

“THE COURT: I am going to set this case for trial on
Wednesday, June 16th, 1948, at 9:30 a.m. I will request the

765

Le
766

defendants to be back in Court at that time without any notice.
I will ask the Clerk to swear these witnesses over here so that.
they may be recognized.” ...

“MR. HARDEE: We have a motion to make.

“THE COURT: Just a moment, Mr. Hardee. Now, I will
ask the Clerk to issue a witness subpoena for this witness,
Dinning. Make that witness subpoena returnable to the trial
date, that is, Wednesday, June 16th, 1948, at 9:30 a.m. Now,
Mr. Broaddus, I will ask the sheriff's office, to give us a return
either served or not served, on that witness subpoena Monday
morning, June 14th, 1948, by 9:30 in the morning.

“MR. BROADDUS: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: Now, if this witness returns and is served,
there will be no reason for me to believe that he won’t be here
two days later. However, if Mr. Fisher wants to apply to put
him under bond, I will consider such application if and when
it is filed. Now, if that witness subpoena is not served on
Monday morning, June 14th, there certainly will be some
reason to believe he is not coming back. So if the witness
subpoena, is not served, I will ask the Clerk, on June 14th, to
issue a warrant for the witness instanter. Now, if the witness
is not served and it appears he is not coming back, the State
can’t get him back, I don’t see where the State could be en-
titled to further continuance. But the State, if it wants to.go
ahead with the case under those circumstances, would have
the right, as I understand it, if a witness is dead or out of the
State, to use the testimony he gave on the former trial, but it

- would have to appear that the witness was outside of the State
of Florida. Furthermore, I will request the Clerk to send that
warrant to every sheriff in the State of Florida. I will ask the
sheriff if he will use every means at his disposal to serve the
warrant. I will ask the court reporter to write up the testi-
mony of the former trial, so that if the State should go ahead
with the case, that testimony will be ready. As to this missing
witness I cannot presume that anybody has sent him away.
All that appears is that his absence is not intentional, regard-
less of what any evidence might show as to carelessness. How-
ever, the circumstances of the witness subpoena being issued
on May 31st, and the witness leaving on June 2nd are unusual.

767

I will ask Mr. Fisher, if he sees fit, to conduct such investi-
gation as he might deem appropriate to determine any basis
for a charge that this witness has been forced to absent him-
self. If he finds that there is any evidence to sustain that,
then he can take such action as he might deem proper.

“Now, in reply to Mr. Hardee, I have learned to take a lot
on this bench. I will take that without ruling you for con-
tempt, but I will say that the Court reprimands you and deems
your conduct unworthy of a member of the bar, what you said
this morning and the manner in which you said it, but this
Court is big enough to take it.

“Now, you can file any motions you like, any writ or ap-
peal, motion to disqualify me or anything you wish to file. I
can truthfully say, whether you agree with it or not, that
during the eleven years I have sat on this bench, I don’t be-
lieve I have ever failed or been incapable of giving any per-
son a fair trial. I have no prejudice against these defendants,
and I am sure I can give them as fair a trial as I have ever
given any defendant, or as they can get before any other
judge. If the Supreme Court says otherwise, I will follow
their mandate....”

Our statute, Sec. 38.10, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A., relating to
disqualification of judges on the ground of prejudice refers to
prejudice to the client and not his lawyer. We have held that
in certain instances the prejudice against the lawyer might be
of such character and degree as to rob the court of that degree
of impartiality required by law. See State ex rel. v. Parks,
141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613. The question is whether this is
such a case.

From what we have quoted it appears that Mr. Hardee had
the kindest of feeling for Judge Himes. Judge Himes ex-
hibited no ill feeling or discourtesy to Mr. Hardee until it be-
came apparent the court would not postpone the case until
after Mr. Hardee’s vacation and Mr. Hardee asked why the
Judge showed an undue interest in the case. The implication
was clear and unmistakable. It was an affront to the court
if spoken in an ordinary manner. Judging from the Judge’s
reply the question was provocative in nature. A lawyer can-

ee
768

not disagree with the court and deliberately provoke an inci-
dent rendering the court disqualified to proceed further.

We hold the petition insufficient and deny the writ.
So ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

CONSUMERS FINANCE CO., a corporation, v. CONSUMER'S LOAN
SERVICE, INC., a corporation,

36 So. (2nd) 443 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 En Banc

Knight, Knight, Walrath & Peagues, for appellant.
Rogers, Towers & Bailey, for appellee.

PER CURIAM: :

The Consumers Finance Company filed its bill of complaint
in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, against the
Consumer’s Loan Service, Inc., seeking an order enjoining the
use of the word “Consumer’s” in connection with the business
activities of the defendant. The Chancellor below sustained
a motion to dismiss and a ground thereof was: “the bill is
without equity.” We have heard arguments on the merits of
this controversy, examined the applicable authorities, and
have concluded that the order of dismissal should be affirmed
on authority of Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lumber
Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 154 Fla. 367, 17 So. (2nd) 615, and
similar cases.

Affirmed. .

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., con-
eur.
THOMAS, C. J., BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., dissent.

769

BARNS, J., dissenting:

Unfair competition seems to appear from the allegations
of the bill, stating that, after the appellant corporation had
been organized under the name of “Consumer’s Finance Com-
pany” and become engaged in the small loan business, the
appellee corporation was organized under the name of “Con-
sumer’s Loan Service, Inc.,” for the purpose of becoming a
competitor of the appellant in the same city and engaged in
the same business, which purposes have, according to the
bill, been accomplished.

THOMAS, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.

IN RE: LEON L. STOLLER, Petition for Reinstatement

36 So. (2nd) 443 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 En Banc

James M. Carson and Joseph Weintraub, for pet
8. O. Carson, Assistant State Attorney, William A. Lane,
Samuel J. Kanner, Hugh Clinkscales and E. Max Goldstein, for
Circuit Court Commission, of Dade County.

770

TERRELL, J:

In May, 1944, charges of unprofessional conduct were pre-
ferred against Leon Stoller resulting in his disbarment. The
order of disbarment was affirmed by this court in Stoller v.
State, 154 Fla. 864, 19 So. (2nd) 312. In May, 1947, pursuant
to Section 8, Rule C of the rules of this court, he applied to the
Circuit Court of Dade County for reinstatement. His applica-
tion was heard en banc with the result that two judges recom-
mended that he be not reinstated while one judge recom-
mended that he be reinstated. Transcript of the proceedings
was certified to this court for review.

The sole question for our consideration is the one of
Stoller’s rehabilitation. Any concern that we may have for
his disbarment or the reasons for it is remote.

In adjudicating the question of rehabilitation punitive con-
siderations are only incidental and do not control. This
principle applies as well when adjudicating charges leading to
disbarment, the main object of which is to protect the public
and discipline the person disbarred. When Stoller was ad-
mitted to the bar his character was tested and approved. Be-
cause of unprofessional .conduct he forfeited the confidence
that was reposed in him and was disbarred and disqualified to
practice law. He now seeks restoration on the basis of the
good character and reputation he established during the
period of disbarment.

Reinstatement is more a matter of grace than of right and
is dependent upon rehabilitation and whether or not the dis-
ciplinary sanctions have been adequate. Epitomized the record
on this point shows that two circuit judges are convinced that
he has not rehabilitated himself and should not be reinstated
while one circuit judge is convinced that he has rehabilitated
himself and should be reinstated. The Grievance Committee
of Dade County Bar Association recommends that he be not
reinstated and urged its objections by briefs. The Board of
Directors of the Miami Beach Bar Association join in the
recommendation that he be reinstated. ‘The Circuit Court
Comimission of Dade County filed a report wherein it stood
neutral and declined to approve or disapprove reinstatement.
Rabbi Irving Lehrman of the Miami Beach Jewish Community

TT

Center wrote a strong letter endorsing Mr. Stoller’s reinstate-
ment and more than sixty of the leading business and profes-
sional men of Miami who knew him personally recommended
his reinstatement.

Added to this it is shown that Stoller since his disbarment,
has engaged in the real estate business; that he enjoys the
confidence of those. with whom he has dealt, that his conduct
has been good, that he has established a good credit as a busi-
ness man, that his standing in the community is good, that
many leading business men and lawyers in his home com-
munity (Miami Beach) think he has rehabilitated himself
and recommend his reinstatement.

To rehabilitate means to restore to one’s former rank,
privilege or status, to clear the character or reputation ‘of
stain, to retrieve forfeited trust and confidence. Forgiveness
and pardon are as much a part of our scheme of things as _
prosecution and punishment but the approach to it should be
through democratic processes. It, therefore, follows that an
application for reinstatement to practice law may be peremp-
torially denied; it may be granted with reservations as In Re:
Lambdin, 158 Fla. 749, 30 So. (2nd) 191, or it may be granted
unconditionally as In Re: Hurtenbach, 157 Fla..871, 27 So.
(2nd) 348, In Re: Lathero, 157 Fla. 630, 26°'So. (2nd) 677;
like disbarment, it may be complete or partial. -

Measured by the foregoing test, has petitioner rehabili-
tated himself? The answer must be found in his conduct dur-
ing disbarment, the reasons for which, if important at all, are
only incidental at this time. Does he show penance for the
acts for which he was disbarred? Does he realize that the
practice of law is a highly respectable profession, the main
business of which is administrating justice, or does he think
of it as a trade for the practice of tricks or an avenue to short
circuit those who seek his counsel? Have adequate sanctions
been exacted? Is he in accord with the thesis that character
is more important than money and that the administration of
justice should reflect democratic ideals rather than smack of
totalitarianism? If his conduct since disbarment reveals an
attitude pointing to these concepts and the best traditions of
the profession, he should be given another chance.

|
T12

In so far as directed to the point of rehabilitation the evi-
dence may be amenable to the charge of being unorthodox but
this is not an orthodox legal trial. It is a character test. The
evidence was a sample from a considerable sector of the bar
and the public, but the courts and the bar are trustees of the
public to administer justice so there can be no criticism of
the procedure. The evidence points both ways but the weight
of it shows that Stoller has acted in a way to warrant public
confidence, that he enjoys the trust of those with whom he has
dealt and that he has a new approach to his responsibility as a
lawyer. An examination of Stoller’s testimony shows that he
has an earnest desire to remove the stigma of disbarment from
his name: The best test of rehabilitation is confession of sin
and a resolve to make restitution for it.

Unanimous approval of petitioner’s application would
hardly be expected. Totalitarian trial philosophy being com-
prehended in the unrestrained command of the dictator, no
jury or court to review it, may enjoy the blessing of unanimity
but the source from which our trial philosophy derives is the
Bill of Rights and that proceeds from reason and due process.
‘The Bill of Rights was provided as a barrier to protect the
individual against the arbitrary exactions of majorities,
exécutives, legislatures, courts, sheriffs and prosecutors and it
is the primary distinction between democratic and totalitarian
processes. Any departure from the safeguards in the Bill of
Rights is apt to be an appropriation of some phase of the to-
talitarian way:

The responsibility to make this country sensitive to the
Bill of Rights is one that rests largely on the bench and bar.
When the Great Assize sets its seal of approval on individual
conduct it will not be predicated on a count of noses but on the
way we look inside. When Abraham importuned God to save
Sodom, his prayer was granted on condition that ten righteous
be found there. Petitioner makes a much better showing for
restitution than that. His Rabbi, joined by many other good
arid true men in Miami, thinks he has earned the right to
another chance. We are in agreement with them but aside
from the showing he makes and the protection accorded him
by the Bill of Rights it might be a base example of spiritual

13

ingratitude for a gentile court to shut the door in the face of a
child of Abraham, seeking forgiveness, when the “Record”
discloses that his ancestors went from the synagogue as mis-
sionaries to our ancestors and taught them the law of forgive-
ness including the spiritual concept on which the Bill of
Rights, the worth of the individual and everything worth
while in our democratic theory rests. This is the law that he
now invokes in his behalf.

We think that on the showing of rehabilitation so made the
petition requires an affirmance answer. It is, therefore,
granted with directions to the circuit court to enter an order
of reinstatement conditioned as it may deem advisable to aid
petitioner in his effort to broaden the scope of his good name
and character.

It is so ordered.

ADAMS, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and CHAPMAN, J. dissent.

SEBRING, J., not participating.

THOMAS, C. J., dissenting:

I disagree because I am not convinced that the circuit

judges acted erroneously.

LOUIS BERGER, JENNIE BERGER, EDWARD WHITE, MILDRED
WHITE, THOMAS PODOLSKY and FRANCES. PODOLSKY, v.
BEN LEFF, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of
BECKY GROSSFELD, deceased.

36 So. (2nd) 439 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 En Bane

E.F. P. Brigham and Cushman & Woodard, for petitioners.
Murrell, Fleming & Flowers and Albert 8. Dubbin, for
respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Petition for Writ of Certiorari denied.
THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SEBRING and
HOBSON, JJ., concur.
TERRELL and BARNS, JJ., dissent.

|
7114

BARNS, J., dissenting:

On April 23, 1948, the respondent, Ben Leff, was the tenant
of the petitioners and on that day brought his bill of com-
plaint for a declaratory decree and relief against the petition-
ers, his landlords. At the time of the filing of the bill there
was a suit pending, brought by the landlords against the
tenant, and the tenant, Ben Leff, procured an injunction en-
joining the prosecution of the common law suit, which was an
action of unlawful detainer commenced on the 2nd day of
April, 1948.

On the 23rd day of April the Chancellor entered an order
restraining the prosecution of the said common law suit,
which had been set for trial on April 27, 1948. The restrain-
ing order appears to have been entered without notice. There-
after, on April 26, 1948, the petitioners-defendants filed their
motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order, upon the
ground that the bill did not justify the entering of said order
and upon the ground that, the restraining order should not
have been issued without notice and without bond, which mo-
tion to dissolve was denied upon hearing by the Chancellor
and petitioners now seek to have said restraining order and
order denying the motion to dissolve said restraining order
reviewed by certiorari.

The bill of, complaint affirmatively shows that there is cer-
-tain unpaid rent due from the tenant to the landlords and said
pill fails to tender said rent into the registry of the court, to
abide the judgment of the court.

The laws relating to the granting of injunctions without
notice, as set up in the 1931 Chancery Act, is as follows:

“63.73—Injunctions; notice; allegations of bill of com-
plaint.

“In all cases of application for injunction, the judge to

. whom presented, before granting the same, shall be satisfied
that sufficient notice of the application has been given to the
party sought to be enjoined and of the time and place when
the motion is to be made, and no order for such injunction
shall be granted without such notice, unless it is manifest to
such judge from the sworn allegations in the bill or the affi-
davit of the complainant or other competent person, that the

Le
P|
115

* injury apprehended will be done if an immediate remedy is
not afforded when he may grant instanter an order restraining
the party complained of until the hearing or the further order
of the court which restraining order shall have all the force of
an injunction until rescinded or modified by the court.”—Sec.
63.78, FS. 1941, F.S.A,

Unless there are some peculiar equities, no injunction
should issue to stay proceedings at law except upon condition
that the party seeking and procuring such injunction give a
good and sufficient bond to indemnify the parties enjoined ac-
cording to the provisions of Section 64.02, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.,
together with such other conditions of the bond and otherwise
as the Chancellor might see fit to impose in the exercise of
sound discretion.

The petition for certiorari should be granted and the afore-
said orders entered are quashed.

BISBEE-BALDWIN CORPORATION, a corporation under the laws of
Florida, v. REAUBEAN ALVIS REYNOLDS and EDNA IL
REYNOLDS, his wife.

86 So. (2nd) 790 January Term, 1948
March 19, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied May 12, 1948.
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed. .

HARRY M. LORBACH v. DON D. ECKIS and ZELIA M. EOKIS, his
wife; FLORIDA QUICK-FREEZE & COLD STORAGE COMPANY,
@ Florida corporation; and JOHN A. BOUVIER, JR.

85 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948.
March 28, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied May 10, 1948.
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

RUDOLPH ANDREWS v. STATE OF FLORIDA

85 So. (2nd) 15 January Term, 1948
April 20, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

778

ROBERT E. HESS, JR. v. ELIZABETH E. HESS
35 So. (2nd) 15 January Term, 1948
April 20, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:

firmed. Pe

JEANETTE STOREY, et al., v. FORT PIERCE GROWERS ASSOCIA-
TION, et al.

35 So. (2nd) 224 7 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.
Ce

GEORGE ©. WHITE, F. M. TOWNSEND and RICHARD WARREN, as
Executors of the Last Will and Testament of J. W. Townsend, de-
ceased v. L. L. FOLSOM.

35 So. (2nd) 653 January Term, 1948
April 27, 1948 . . Division A.
Rehearing denied May 29, 048

PER CURIAM:

i a -
GIOVANNI RAMANO and ROSE RAMANO, joined by her husband,
' GIOVANNI ROMANO, for the purpose of this suit, v. GEORGE S.
WITMER and BELLE S. WITMER, joined by her husband,
GEORGE S. WITMER, for the purpose of this suit.

35 So. (2nd) 653 . January Term, 1948
April 27, 1948 i. Division A
Rehearing denied May 29, 1948

PER CURIAM:

Afizmed, —

ELEANOR BRESNAHAN v. MIAMI GARDENS, INC., a Florida cor-
poration, CHARLES H. MOYER and COL, KEN MOYER.

35 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:

Afirmed. Pe

MAMIE LARKIN STAPLETON v. SAMUEL F. STAPLETON
85 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Special Division B

PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

[|
7719

GEORGE W. GREEN v. CITY OF STUART, a Florida municipal corpo-

ration.
86 So. (2nd) 224 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied June 25, 1948 .
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

GLENN B. CURTISS PROPERTIES, INCORPORATED, a corporation,
v. WILLIAM S. PEARCE, sometimes known as W. 8. PEARCE.

35 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.
Le
MILLARD BARRON v. STATE OF FLORIDA ;
85 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed. -
a
©. L. DEESE v. STATE OF FLORIDA’
85 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM: .
Affirmed.

HELEN D. THOMAS, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mark W.
Dustin, deceased v. THE MURPHY CONSTRUCTION CO. a cor-

poration.
85 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

De
G. CLARENCE ZIEGLER v. MARY HALM :

35 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948
April 23, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

780 :
FRANK L. NOBLE v. E. F. POWERS
35 So. (2nd) 412 January Term, 1948
May 4, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing denied May 18, 1948,
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

JAMES A. WRIGHT and MARGARET Z. WRIGHT, his wife, v.
MAGGIE B. ZACHARY, widow, and F. W. WEITZEL.

85 So. (2nd) 653 January Term, 1948
May 7, 1948 Division A.
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

es
HASKELL MOODY v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA

85 So. (2nd) 653 January Term, 1948
May 11, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed. es

R. O. MIDDLETON v. SUSIE ULRICH

85 So. (2nd) 653 January Term, 1948
May 11, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

JOHN ©. HART v. STATE OF FLORIDA

35 So. (2nd) 653 January Term, 1948
May 18, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed. as

IDA K. GOLDBERG v. GEORGE GOLDBERG

35 So. (2nd) 653 January Term, 1948
May 18, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:

Afiirmed. |

MYRTLE H. SMITH, MARSHALL v. SAMSON and ANNIE M.
SAMSON, his wife, v. GEORGE W. EDGAR.

36 So. (2nd) 276 January Division A

May 21, 1948 Special Division A

Rehearing denied June 30, 1948

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

M. M. SMITH, JR., and FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION v.
ERNEST W. BURCH.

781

35 So. (2nd) 848 January Term, 1948
May 28, 1948 Division B
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed. a
A. A. PARKER v. H. L. COOPER, a minor by his next Friend, Spencer
Cooper.
85 So. (2nd) 658 June Term, 1948
May 28, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

E. W. GROOVER, doing business as GROOVER’S PHARMACY v. CITY
OF MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, a Municipal Corporation.

85 So. (2nd) 653 January Term, 1948
May 28, 1948 Bn Banc
PER CURIAM:

Affremed. |

CHAS. W. DAVIS v. THE CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation of
and in Dade County, Florida.

36 So. (2nd) 276 January Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied June 1, 1948
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed. Pe

ARTHUR G. CURREN and ETHEL W. CURREN, his wife; MARY C.
FOOTE; and E. F. SEARL, v. SYDNEY V. STRETTON and MADGE
LAIDLAW STRETTON, his wife, and NORTH WEST CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY, a Florida corporation. :

36 So, (2nd) 276 January Term, 1948

June 1, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied June 22, 1948.

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed. a
SPENCER COOPER vy. A. A. PARKER

36 So. (2nd) 224 June Term, 1948
June 1, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM: .

Affirmed.

782

' BEULAH HERMAN, A.
FLORIDA. .
36So. (2nd) 224 January Term, 1948

sIKES and JIM COPPS, v. STATE OF

June 1, 1948 Special Division B’
Rehearing denied July 1, 1948. :
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

REX “SWEAT; a8 Sheriff of Duval County, Florida, v. DONALD
._ MOORE, ox rel.

36'So. (2nd) 277 . June Term, 1948
June 8, 1948" °° . Special Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

PRICE: A’ TAYLOR, also known as P. A. TAYLOR, individually, and

MAE C. TAYLOR, joined by her husband, PRICE A. TAYLOR in-
++ dividually, v. L. W. WILSON, and JOHN F. KIRK, as Sheriff of
‘. .Palm Beach County, Florida. . :
36 So. (2nd) 277 Juné Term, 1948

June 8, 1948 _. Division A
PER CURIAM: ,

‘ EEDERAL AMUSEMENT COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, and
» CHARLES (BABE) BAKER, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, upon the
relation of Frank TUPPEN, .
36 So. (2nd) 224 June Term, 1948
June 8, 1948 ’ Division A
Rehearing denied July 1, 1948

iK 8. FISCHER, and JOSEPHINE FISCHER,

“his wife.
June Term, 1948
Division A
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

STATE ex rel. BARBARA JOYCE JOHNSON, et al, v. JACK F.
WHITE, as. COUNTY JUDGE.

36'So.,(2nd) 224 June Term, 1948
June 11, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

783
VIRGINIA HICKS v. GEORGE HICKS
36 So. (2nd) 276 June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

creeper :
NAN-CES-0-WEE HOTEL, INC., a corporation, v. MRS. SADIE KAHN,
Executor of the Estate of M. Kahn, deceased.

36 So. (2nd) 276 June Term, 1948
June 15,1948 Division A
PER CURIAM: .
Affirmed.
be

IN RE: ESTATE OF W. A. JACKSON; PURITAN MILLS, INC, a

Corporation under the Laws of Georgia v. MILTON 0. HOLLIS, JR.,

> as Administrator of the Estate of W. A. Jackson, deceased; Hills-

borough Feed & Milling Company, a corporation; and Hermitage
Feed Mills, a corporation,

36 So. (2nd) 276 June Term, 1948
June 15, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM: :
Affirmed.
P|

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a municipal corporation, v. THE H. & W. B.
DREW COMPANY, a corporation.

86 So. (2nd) 447 June Term, 1948
June 18, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM: ,

Certiorari denied.

BELEN M. WEBB, NORMAN BENNETT, DIXIE LILY MILLING
COMPANY, a corporation, and KINCHAFOONEE MILLING COM-
PANY, a corporation, v. CONE BROTHERS CONTRACTING COM-
PANY, a corporation; AND HELEN M. WEBB, NORMAN BEN-
NETT, DIXIE LILY MILLING COMPANY, a corporation, and
KINCHAFOONEE MILLING COMPANY, a corporation, v. CONE
BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, a corporation, for the
use and benefit of ANNIE BELLE HOLLIS and CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation. .

36 So. (2nd) 449 June Term, 1948
June 18, 1948 Special Division B.
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

EE
784.

WILLIAMS RESORT WEAR, INC., and IOWA MUTUAL LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE COMPANY v. DOROTHY H. WALKER and
FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

86 So. (2nd) 277 June Term, 1948
Tune 18, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied July 2, 1948
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.
a

GULF CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC., v. ERN-
EST HINTERKOPE.

36 So. (2nd) 276 June Term, 1948
June 18, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 2, 1948
PER CURIAM:
Affrmed.
a
COY JONES v. STATE OF FLORIDA.
36 So, (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948
Tune 22, 1948 Division B
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.
Le}
GEORGE JENKINS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
36 So. (2nd) 924 June Term, 1948
June 22, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

MARCELYNN D, SALISBURY v. GEORGE ROBERT SALISBURY

86 So. (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948
Tune 25, 1948 Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

E. D. VERGARA v. MOTOR FUEL CARRIERS, INC., a Florida cor-

poration. :
36 So. (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948
Tune 25, 1948 Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

785
LEWIS DAVIS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
86 So. (2nd) 447 June Term, 1948
June 25, 1948 Division B
PER CURIAM:
Atienes. Pt
CHARLES LEO CRAIG v. BEATRICE CRAIG
86 So. (2nd) 447 June Term, 1948
June 29, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied July 15, 1948
PER CURIAM:
Aflzemed. Pe
T. L, GRIFFIN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
36 So. (2nd) 447 June Term, 1948
June 29, 1948 En Banc
Rehearing denied July 20, 1948
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

RUTH BRADEN, ED BRADEN, JOHN BRADEN, LALA BRADEN
BROUGHTON, KIRKE MONROE BEALL, and GEORGE E.
MEADE, co-partners as ESCAMBIA BROADCASTING CO., v.
IRVING WELOH.

36 So, (2nd) 447 . June Term, 1948
July 2, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed. Pe

DOROTHY L. MERRILL, as Executrix of the Estate of Georgette M.
Avery, deceased v. GLADYS H. AVERY, as Executrix of the Estate
of L. West Avery, deceased.

36 So. (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948

Tuly 2, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied July 21, 1948

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

GIBSON W. CARMINE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
36 So. (2nd) 447 June Term, 1948
July 2, 1948 Special Division B.
Rehearing denied July 22, 1948
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

786

KARL LEROY HALL v. HELEN JOAN HALL
86 So, (2nd) 447 June Term, 1948
Tuly 6, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 28, 1948
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed. ©

M. H. RYAN, W. R. STIGLER, J. H. GRAHAM, ELMER H. BLANK
AND GEORGE C. BECK, as and constituting the BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA,
A political sub-division of the State of Florida, v. H. W. WORTH-
INGTON, et al.

36 So. (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948

July 6, 1948 . En Bane

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

EARL HUTCHINSON yv. EDWIN A. MENNINGER :
36 So. (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948
July 6, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 16, 1948
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

SAMUEL FOSTER HARBIN v. ROYAL AMERICAN SHOWS and
FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

36 So. (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948
July 9, 1948 . Division A
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

H.R. HUNT v. E. W. HALL and B, M. HOWARD

36 So, (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948
July 9, 1948 Division A
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

Leeper

ROBERT G. SCHLOTTER v. MARGARITE RUTH SCHLOTTER
36 So. (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948
July 13, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied July 28, 1948 :
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

Le
787
PAUL MARKS, as receiver for M. GILLER, Bankrupt, v. HARRY
LEVINE. :
86 So. (2nd) 448 June Term, 1948
July 18, 1948 Division B
PER CURIAM:
” Affirmed.

BARGE CARRIERS, INC., a corporation, v. THE PENINSULAR AND
OCCIDENTAL STEAMSHIP COMPANY, a foreign corporation do-
mesticated in the State of Florida; SCOTT M. LOFTIN and JOHN
W. MARTIN, as Trustees of the property of the Florida East Coast
Railway Company, a Florida corporation. °

36 So. (2nd) 447 June Term, 1948
July 18, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed. Pe

‘CHARLES A. BODY, and ELSA P. BODY, joined by her husband,
CHARLES A. BODY, v. LESTER McGEHEE, and RUBY I. Mc-
GEHEE, joined by her husband, LESTER McGEHEE.

36 So, (2nd) 447 June Term, 1948
July 13, 1948 : Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed. es

FRANK YOUNG v. STATE OF FLORID.

86 So. (2nd) 449 June Term, 1948
July 18, 1948 En Banc
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

“‘TRUEMAN FERTILIZER CO., a Florida Corporation, v. FRITZ STEIN
and HANS J. STEIN, as Administrator of the Estate of Hans Stein,
deceased, et al.

36 So, (2nd) 449 June Term, 1948
July 16, 1948 Division A.
Rehearing denied July 23, 1948

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.
JOSEPHINE HOPKINS v. R. B. HICKS

36 So, (2nd) 449 June Term, 1948
July 20, 1948 Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

Le
788

GEORGE McCABE, a Citizen resident and taxpayer of Fruitland Park,
Lake County, Florida, v. THE TOWN OF FRUITLAND PARK,
Lake County, Florida, etc., and KENNETH W. HANSON, as Mayor;
E. N. BALL, as Clerk, Treasurer, Assessor, and Collector; and
BEVERLY GRIZZARD, L. M. HOLLOWAY, D. E. JACOBS, KEN-
NETH L. CASSON, HAROLD DAVENPORT, H. ALVIN HILL, and
E. A. RUSER, Councilmen respectively of the TOWN OF FRUIT-
LAND PARK, FLORIDA.

36 So. (2nd) 449 June Term, 1948
July 20, 1948 Division A.
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.
Dn

JOHN LAWSEN and CARL HANSEN v. JOSEPH PATTI, commonly
called JOE PATTI.

36 So. (2nd) 449 June Term, 1948
July 20, 1948 Special Division B
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

BEN DANBAUM, INC., and HARTFORD ACCIDENT and INDEMNITY
COMPANY v. JOHN D. WALSH and FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION. .

36 So. (2nd) 449 June Term, 1948
Tuly 23, 1948 En Bane
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

EARL POPE, HOWARD JOHNSON, GAME CHANCEY AND OTIS
KENNEDY vy. STATE OF FLORIDA.

36 So. (2nd) 760 June Term, 1948
July 30, 1948 En Bane
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

JOSEPH PATTI, commonly called JOE PATTI, v. CLYDE RICHBURG,
et al.

36 So. (2nd) 760 June Term, 1948

July 30, 1948 En Bane

PER CURIAM:
Affirmed.

789

JAMES J. MARKS and CHRISTINE T. MARKS, husband and wife, v.
C. A. FIELDS and CLIFFORD B. FIELDS.

36 So. (2nd) 612 January Term, 1948
May 11, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing granted June 1, 1948

Opinion on rehearing granted July 30, 1948

Jones, Latham & McLane, for appellants.
Coe & Eggart, for appellees.

WHITE, Associate Justice:

Appellees, as plaintiffs in the lower court, recovered judg-
ment against the appellants as the result of a jury verdict.
Plaintiffs’ declaration was in one count and stated an action
of deceit. The suit arose out of a transaction wherein
plaintiffs had accepted from defendants a written lease cover-
ing a vacant lot in the City of Pensacola, which plaintiffs in-
tended to use in the sale of second hand automobiles. They
complained that defendants had orally represented that the
zoning ordinance of the city did not prohibit the use of the
property for that purpose. After acceptance of the lease
plaintiffs discovered that the representation was false.

At the conclusion of the introduction of testimony by
paintiffs at the trial, and after they had rested their case,

790

the court ruled that a verdict should be directed for defend-
ants. Plaintiffs then submitted to a non-suit and, over de-
fendants’ objection, were permitted to file instanter an
amended declaration for “money had and received.” Defend-
ants’ original pleas, notwithstanding that they were re-
sponsive to an action.ex delicto, remained as before until the
court submitted the case to the jury. At that stage defend-
ants demurred “ore tenus” to the amended declaration. Upon
an adverse ruling on the demurrer, defendants read into the
record three pleas, one of which was “never were indebted as.
alleged.” Plaintiffs followed with two replications. A de-
murrer to each was overruled and defendants then read into
the record a “rejoinder.” This all occurred while the jury
was deliberating. :

When confronted with a ruling such as was made at the
close’ of plaintiffs’ casé counsel should demand a continuance
to enable the parties to prepare to meet the new issues pre-
sented by such a fundamental change in position.

“Deceit” is a tort. The action is a form of trespass on the
case. The general issue is “not guilty.” A purchaser who
chooses to bring an action of deceit after having been induced
to accept inferior goods by fraudulent misrepresentations by
the seller, affirms the bargain and, in effect, says: “Notwith-
standing that I have received inferior goods, I elect to keep
them and I demand that I be compensated for the difference
in the value of what I actually received and what I should
have received.”

On the other hand, the plaintiff may waive the tort and
sue for “money had and received.” In that case he disaffirms
the bargain and, in effect, says: “I do not choose to keep the
inferior goods. I offer to return them and I desire that my
money be repaid to me.” Preliminary to bringing such an
action the purchaser should restore, or offer to restore, the
fruits of the bargain.

Whether the common count in Florida for “money had
and received” states an action of “debt” or “assumpsit” may
be open to question. Professor Clifford W. Crandall, for more
than thirty years an outstanding pedagogue at the University’

791

of Florida, and to whom hundreds of Florida lawyers who
have passed through his classes in “Common Law Pleading,”
are indebted for some appreciation of the Principles « of the
science, says:

“The parent volume brings out that general assumpsit is
but the action of debt in another form and was devised to
avoid the trial by wager of law. That method of trial was
abolished before our statute was enacted by Parliament, con-
sequently there was at that time no real need for general
assumpsit. Since the parent volume was written the writer
has become .convinced that in passing this statute Parlia-
ment intended to do away with general assumpsit (the intent
of the Florida Legislature must be said to be the same as that
of Parliament) and that these statutory forms, which the
bench and bar, and teachers of law, too, have for years been
terming the common counts in assumpsit, are really counts in
debt.” (Florida Common Law Practice: Crandall, 1940 Sup-
plement, p. 147).

“Debt” was a form of action at common law. “Assumpsit”
was not.. Assumpsit gradually developed from the action of
trespass on the case, which had its origin in the Statute of
Westminster II. Assumpsit at first was classified as an ac-
tion ex delicto, but as actions ex delicto and ex contractu de-
veloped distinct characteristics, assumpsit assumed “promis-
sory” features and fell into the category of an action ex con-
tractu. The general issue is “never was indebted as alleged.”

Whether or not the common count for “money had and
received” states an action of “debt” or “assumpsit” makes
no difference in the case at bar. Settlement of that question
must be left for the occasion, should it come about, when the
difference is important. Much stress is being placed in re-
cent times on rules which abolish the forms of action in
pleading. Those who see a procedural panacea in such pro-
visions should refer to a discussion on the subject entitled
“The Theory of the Case” found at page 276 of “Cases in
Common Law Pleading,” (2nd Ed.) by Charles A. Keigwin,
(Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company, Rochester,
N. Y¥.). The classical statement: ‘The forms of action we

De
792

have buried, but they still rule us from their graves,” (Mait-
land; Forms of Action, 296) is there forcefully illustrated.

At any rate, the actions of deceit on one hand and debt or
assumpsit on the other, in such a case as this, are inconsis-
tent. By one the plaintiff affirms. By the other he disaffirms.

Another distinction happened to be important in this -
instance. Deceit, being an action ex delicto, liability there-
under is several. Debt and assumpsit are actions ex con-
tractu and liability is joint. The suit here was against two
defendants, and plaintiffs, at the time they changed their
form of action, had sought to establish liability of only one
of the defendants. ;

The ruling by the lower court that plaintiffs might waive
the tort and sue in assumpsit after they had rested their case
at the trial, violated the well settled principle that liti-
gants “shall not be allowed to approbate and reprobate.”
Campbell v. Kauffman Milling Co., 42 Fla. 328, 29 So. 435
(1900) ; American Process Co. v. Fla. Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116,
47 So. 942 (1908) ; Capitol City Bank v. Hilson, 64 Fla. 206,
60 So. 189 (1912); Weeke v. Reeve, 65 Fla. 374, 61 So. 749
(1913); McCormick v. Rodeker, 119 Fla. 20, 160 So. 483
(1935) ; Gralyn Laundry, Inc. v. Va. Etc. Corp. 121 Fla. 312,
163 So. 706 (1935); Beers v. Atlas Assurance Co. (Wis.)
285 N.W. 794., 123 A.L.R. 372 (1939); Annotation, 123
A.L.R. 378; 18 Am. Jur. p. 160, Sec. 42.

In the case of Weeke v. Reeve, supra, this court said:

“Where the election of a remedy assumes the existence of
a particular status or relation of the party to the subject-
matter of litigation, the party cannot afterwards pursue
another remedy by which he assumes a different and incon-
sistent status or relation to the subject matter.”

In McCormic vy. Rodeker, supra, this court quoted with
approval from 20 C.J. 8, as follows:

“Where the remedies afforded are inconsistent it is the
election of one of such remedies which operates as a bar; but
where the remedies afforded are consistent it is the satisfac-
tion of the claim which operates as a bar.”

Es
be}
793

The reason for the rule is that courts cannot permit a.
vacillating and capricious litigant to blow hot and cold or
play fast and loose by indecision and uncertainty.

The views here expressed are not to be understood as
modifying anything said in Williams v. Robinson, 124 Fla.
422, 168 So. 644 (1936). The factual situation in the instant
case is different from that in the Williams case, and different
principles of procedure are involved.

In addition to the irregularity just discussed there is yet
another reason why the judgment cannot stand. If there was
no tort, neither was there liability for “money had and re-
ceived.” Waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit does not
create additional substantive rights as the lower court ruled.
By such a procedure there is merely an election of remedy
and exactly the same state of facts must be shown in order
to maintain either. Ann. Cas. 1913D, p. 229. Thus if the
facts relied upon would not support an action of deceit,
neither would they support an action for “money had and re-
ceived.”

The lower court might well have directed the verdict for
the defendants upon the principle that “fraud cannot be predi-
ated upon misrepresentations of law or misrepresentations
as to matters of law.” 23 Am. Jur. p. 809, Sec. 45. Or the
court might equally have directed the verdict because “a per-
‘son to whom false representations have been made is not en~
titled to relief because of them if he might readily have
ascertained the truth by ordinary care and attention, and his
failure to do so was the result of his own negligence.” 23 Am.
Jur. p. 960, Sec. 155. . .

If an action of deceit would not lie because of that ‘policy
‘of the law, then for the same reason an action for “money
had and received,” would not lie, because the reason which
prompts such a policy would be just as impelling in one form
of action as in the other.

It follows that when plaintiffs submitted to an involuntary
non-suit of their action of deceit they likewise were nonsuited
on an action for “money had and received” because “exactly
the same state of facts must be shown in order to maintain

EE
794

- either.” The change in the form of action gave them no ad-

ditional substantive rights.

Reversed.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, CHAPMAN and
ADAMS, JJ., concur.

ADAMS, J.:

On May 11, 1948, we considered this case and reversed
the judgment. On June 1, we granted a rehearing and now
proceed to a consideration of the case on rehearing granted.
A full statement of the case is made in the opinion of Associ-
ate Justice WHITE when first considered and, therefore,
further elaboration will not be made here.

Upon further study of the case we are convinced that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

The law of our state favors liberality in amendments to
pleadings. We cannot say that the trial judge abused its
discretion in allowing the change of the action from deceit to
assumpsit. Any harm which might have come to defendant
as a result thereof lay in forcing him to plead instanter and
proceed with the trial. Defendant might well have asked for
time to plead to the new action. This he did not do. He may
not then later complain because he took his chance in plead-
ing instanter and proceeding with the trial.

The doctrine of election of remedies will not avail appel-
lant. Plaintiff, in fact, had no remedy in deceit. See Capital
City Bank v. Hilson, 64 Fla. 206, 60 So. 189; Williams v.
Robineau, 124 Fla. 422, 168 So. 644,

In this case the parties contracted for the use of a
property which use was not allowed by law. Whether both or
either knew of such zoning law makes no difference because
the consideration wholly failed and the money paid for the
contract should be returned and the parties mutually re-
leased. See The American Law Institute’s Committee on Re-
statement of the Law of Contracts, Vol. II, page 677, Sec. 372.

For these reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., SEBRING, J., and WHITH, Associate
Justice, dissent.

795

WHITE, Associate Justice, dissenting: ©

I adhere to the original opinion. The record. discloses
without contradiction, that plaintiff in the lower court en-
tered into possession of the premises after acceptance of the
lease, stored some of his possessions there and, for aught that
appears, remained in possession at the time of the institution
of suit. Thus, I cannot agree that the “consideration wholly
failed.” :

THOMAS, C.J., and SEBRING, J., concur.
PC

ORLANDO TRANSIT COMPANY, a corporation, v. FLORIDA RAIL-
ROAD AND PUBLIC UTILTIES COMMISSION.

387 So. (2nd) 321 June Term, 1948
July 16, 1948 Division A
Intervention denied en banc, October 29, 1948.

Rehearing denied November 1, 1948

Baker & Thornal, for petitioner.
Lewis W. Petteway and R. Clyde Simmons, for respondent.

|
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797

On petitions for intervention:

Parker, Foster & Wigginton and Clifford T. Inglis for
Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc.; Milam, McIlwaine, Car-
roll & Wattles, for Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc.; A. Pickens
Cole for Modern Coach Corporation and for Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc.; Kitchen & Schwartz for Delcher Bros. Storage
Co., Elder Moving & Storage Co., Fidelity Storage and Ware-
house Co., Porter Transfer & Storage, Shaw Furniture &
Transfer, Inc., Suddath Moving & Storage Co., (Tampa),
‘Suddath Moving & Storage Co., Jacksonville, Washington
Storage Co., Inc., Withers Van Lines, Florida Household
‘Goods Carriers’ Bureau; Martin Sack for Petroleum Carrier
‘Corporation.

CHAPMAN, J.:

On December 6, 1947, the Orlando Transit Company, a
Florida corporation with its principal place of business in the
City of Orlando, Florida, by petition applied to the Florida
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission for a permit author-
izing it to operate two described motor busses “for hire” over
the public highways of Florida. The petition was drafted,
under the several provisions of Section 323.05, F.S.A. (See
Chapter 22, 842, Acts of 1945, Laws of Florida). On Febru-
ary 4, 1948, a public hearing on the application was held pur-
‘suant to notice and testimony received by the Commission in
‘support of the material allegations of the petition, when the
applicant closed its case. The respondent by appropriate
order sustained a motion to dismiss the proceedings and a
review of this order is sought here by petition for a writ of
common law certiorari upon the theory that the challenged
order constitutes a material departure from the essential re-
quirements of the law.

In order to obtain a clear and accurate picture of the legal
points in controversy it is necessary to set out in substance
the material allegations of the petition before the respondent
and the pertinent testimony offered in support thereof,
neither of which was disputed on the record at the time the
challenged order was entered. The petition alleged that the
applicant was a corporation: and engaged in the business of

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798

operating an auto transportation company in transporting
persons and property for compensation over the public high-
ways of Florida and had been so engaged for fifteen years. It
owns, controls, operates and manages a fleet of busses trans-
porting passengers principally in Orange County, Florida, and
particularly within the corporate limits of the cities of Or-
lando, Winter Park and Winter Garden, Florida. It holds
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity No. 209
issued to it by the Railroad Commission, which authorizes it
to operate its busses over the highways of the State of Florida
from Orlando to Winter Garden, a few miles distant.
. The petition requests the Railroad Commission to issue to
the applicant a “for hire” permit for the purpose of carrying
on a “for hire” business as defined by Section 320.01(16),
F.S.A., but not a permit or Certificate of Public Conveyance
and necessity authorizing it to operate over the public high-
ways of Florida as a common carrier. The two busses or
motor vehicles to be operated in the “for hire” service for
which the permit or “for hire” license tags were sought
under Section 323.05 supra are each fully described. The
applicant proffered to keep such records as are prescribed by
the Railroad Commission and State Comptroller, to keep
mileage records required by Chapter 323, F.S.A., agreed
to abide by the rules and regulations of the Commission as to
* type, size of equipment, safety appliances and devices, to ob-
serve the regulations as to loads which are now in effect and
to comply with all reasonable regulations and rules to be later
promulgated by the Railroad Commission. The applicant had
previously filed with the Railroad Commission a policy of in-
surance in the sum of $225,000.00 for the protection of the
public against injury caused by the applicant while negli-
gently operating the two busses “for hire” on the public high-
ways of Florida under Section 323.05 supra.

Sidney M. Swoope was sworn and testified as a witness in
behalf of the applicant. He testified that he lived in the City
of Orlando and was president and general manager of the
Orlando Transit Company and that the company for about
fifteen years had transported passengers “for hire” in Or-
lando and, under Certificate of Convenience No. 209, had

|
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799

transported passengers over the highway from Winter Garden
to Orlando. The Transit Company proposed operations viz:

“1. We propose to operate the two busses described in the
petition with proper ‘for hire’ tags.

“2. We will offer these for hire for a fixed sum to be de-
termined by hours in use and mileage. ,

“3. We propose to establish a travel bureau, which is a
power and right we have by our corporate charter, and to
use these two busses in connection with this travel bureau to
transport clients of the bureau from Orlando, Florida, to
points and places of interest throughout the State or to such
places as they may propose visiting, with no pick-ups, and re-
turn carriage to point of origin.

“4, We propose to solicit persons through personal con-
tact to visit places of interest throughout the state, and to
use these two busses to transport these persons from Or-
lando, Florida, and return for a consideration.

“5. We propose to advertise on a ‘share-expense basis’
trips by bus from Orlando to general and tourist attractions
throughout the state and return to Orlando.

“This entire operation will be carried on as contracts are
made for the use of the vehicle for each trip and not under
any general or continuing contract.

“We would not be offering public or indiscriminate trans-
portation of the public. Our service would be limited to the
busses with ‘for hire’ tags and for a consideration which
would require almost full occupancy of the bus. These busses
will be primarily ‘for hire’ equipment. If they are rented at
the time anyone sought to rent a bus, we would necessarily
have to advise the latter we did not have a bus to rent. Thus
our operation is limited by our available equipment. We are
offering, by the application applied for here and now, to con-
duct our operation under a ‘for Hire’ permit from this Com-
mission, subject to reasonable and lawful regulation by this
Commission and to pay the required mileage tax. We do,
however, object to dedicating our property to public service
as a common carrier for hire as a condition precedent to con-
ducting the operation we propose.

a
800

“Q. Do you have two busses now licensed with for-hire
tags? A. We do. Q. They are the busses described in your
application, your petition? A. Yes, sir. Q. And in the event
this permit is issued, would the Orlando Transit Company
agree to keep such records as are prescribed by the Commis-
sion of the Comptroller and keep the mileage record required
by the State of Florida and abide by rules and regulations
of the Commission as to type and size and safety appliances
and devices and regulations as to loads which might be rea-
sonably prescribed by the Commission from time to time and
within the limits prescribed by law as to such motor vehicles?
A. Yes, sir. Q. You already have on file with this Commission
insurance? A. Yes, sir. Q. That is in the amount of $225,-
000.00? A. That is right. Q. That is for the purpose of pro-
tecting the public against injury caused by negligence of your
operators or your company?, A. Yes, sir. Q. And you are
willing to comply with such other reasonable requirements
as the Commission might make relating to insurance or
bonds? A. Yes, sir.”

CROSS EXAMINATION

“Q. You spoke of two particular types of service, the first
of which is charter service and the second operation through
the travel bureau, do you propose if this is granted to deal
with groups or individuals wanting to charter either of these
busses for trips around the State of Florida? A. We don’t
propose a charter service. Q. You do propose to take move-
ments of groups to points of interest in the State of Florida?
A. That is correct. Q. That would be done by a contract made
between the company and the individuals wishing to charter
the bus? A. That is correct. Q. That would be for the use of
the bus irrespective of the number of passengers? A. That is
what we propose. Q. Does that mean, for example, that one
of the busses would be available to the Orlando Rotary Club
at a fixed rent per mile or per day to carry a group of Ro-
tarians to some specific point, such as Daytona Beach and
return to Orlando? A. Yes, sir. Q. The charge would be
based on the use of the bus and the driver and not on the per
capita of people transported? A. The charge would be on the
use of the bus. Q. What do you mean by soliciting through

fe
801

advertising? A. That we have busses for hire offered to the
general public at a rate per hour. Q. Do you mean by per-
sonal contact in connection with chartering a bus for group
movements or do you mean personal contact in securing a
passenger? A. A group of passengers. Q. Do you mean to
advertise on a specific date and hour one of your busses will
move to Daytona Beach? A. No, sir. Q. You have been in
the charter business for a number of years? A. No, sir. Q.
Have: you been renting busses for group movements for a
number of years? A. Yes, but I do not call that charter ser-
vice. Q. You did it with the authority of the Commission
with respect to each of the groups? A. Yes, sir. Q. And
with the consent of the Florida Grey Hound Lines? A. That
‘is correct. Q. On your sworn testimony ... you do not pro-
‘pose or will you solicit carriage on a per capita basis for any
definite trip and will operate only in the carriage of groups
under a contract covering the trip then an order from the
Commission could be granted limiting you to group move-
ment would be entirely satisfactory to you? A. Yes, sir.”

“Q. You would transport athletic teams under this appli-
eation? A That is right. Q. You would approach the ath-
letic director of the Orlando High School, would you not? A.
Yes. Q. You would make several trips to play football about
the State? A. Yes. Q. You would do this for a fixed charge
-and under one contract? A. Yes. Q. What would your
charges be? A. Fifty cents per mile plus waiting time if they
stayed over a day. Q. You would apply to the Rotary Club or
any other group and take parties from Orlando to any point
in Florida? Yes. Q. You would advertise a share the ex-
‘pense trip from Orlando to Bok Tower and the Ringling
Museum? A. We have not worked out the “share the ex-
pense” plan. We are not interested in that type of operation.
We are interested in renting these busses to individual groups.
If they wanted to form a party that would be alright. We
are not interested in individuals or the sale of tickets. -We
‘lease or rent the bus for a fixed price to transport a group or
groups for special trips only. We intend to use only two
busses for this class of service. We would not pick up or dis-
charge passengers going or on return, neither would we ob-

802

serve schedules, rates or routes, but would solicit business.
. The busses would be under the direction of the group renting
them. We would agree in advance with the group on place of
departure, the destination point and the time of return and
the price for the use of the bus. We make or intend to make
‘contact of carriage with a group of a unit basis and not with
an individual. Hach bus would be under a separate contract
for the particular trip. We would rent the two busses for
hire for a particular trip. Q. You know that under your
-common carriage certificate you could handle a charter group
to Pensacola or’ to any point in Florida not served by the
Florida Grey Hound out of Orlando. A. Yes. Q. You could
handlé charter groups to Ringling’s Museum, Arcadia, Bra- .
denton and all points west of Tallahassee where the point is
‘not served by the Florida Grey Hourid? A. I want a “for
hire” service in that territory.”

The order of dismissal complained of was based on
grounds viz:

“1, The evidence produced by the appellant clearly shows
that he is seeking charter’ service.

“2, That under the ruling of this Commission and the
applicable law, charter service is an inherent right given to
common carriers as an incident to the common carrier cer-
tificate.

“That in order to seek a common carrier certificate the
applicant would necessarily have to come under Section
323.03 of the Act.

“4, Under Section 323.03 Sub. 3, the law provides that
when any application has been filed and denied, that no
further or similar application can be filed within a period of
six months.

“5, In the instant case the order denying charter rights to
the applicant was entered by this Commission on the 21st day
of October, 1947, and within six months of this date and six
months of the date of filing the application.

“6, Further, there is no evidence produced here under
which the applicant could qualify for a for-hire application.

“7, Under Rule 6 it has been clearly demonstrated by this
witness and the testimony involved that what he is seeking

—
; — .
803

is not in truth and in fact a for-hire certificate but is in truth
and in fact a contract carrier which would fall under Section
323.03 of the Act.”

Chapter 323, F.S.A. (Chapter 14,764, “Acts of 1931, Laws
of Florida, as amended) authorizes the use of the highways
of the State of Florida by motor vehicles in-the transporta-
tion of persons and property for hire. The law provides for
the operation of three classes of motor vehicles over our high-
way system in the transportation of property and persons for
hire and these classes are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Florida Railroad Commission for regulation according to duly.
enacted and existing statutes. These three classes are’
common carriers; (2) contract carriers; and (3) :for hire
carriers. See Riley v. Lawson, 10 Fla. 521, 143 So. 619. .Wé
have not been favored with a statutory definition of a com-
mon carrier.

Section 323.01 (8), F.S.A., defines a private ‘contract
carrier to mean any auto transportation. company engaged in
‘the transportation of persons or property over the. public
highways of this State who is not a common carrier but
transports such persons, or property under contract for one
or more persons, for compensation over such highways,
where such carriage consists of continuous or recurring
carriage under the same contract. See Smith v. Cahoon, 288
U.S. 553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. Hd. 1264.

The “for hire” or third class of carriers is defined by See.
tion 320.01 (16), F.S.A., viz:

“(16) ‘For hire’ vehicles include all motor vehicles, or
trailers drawn by motor vehicles, when used for transporting
persons, commodities or materials for compensation; let or
rented to another for a consideration; offered for rent or
hired as a means of transportation for compensation; adver-
tised in a newspaper or generally held out as being for rent
or hire; used in connection with a travel bureau or when
offered or used to provide transportation for persons so+
licited through personal contact or advertised on a “share-
expense’ basis. When freight or passengers are transported
in a motor vehicle outside of a municipal corporation of this
state, for compensation or when freight is transported in a

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804

motor vehicle not owned by the same person owning the said
freight, so that there is identity of ownership between the
said freight and motor vehicle, such transportation shall be
deemed ‘for hire.’ The carrying of goods, wares, merchan-
dise and other personal property in motor vehicles by corpo-
rations or associations for their stockholders, shareholders
and members, cooperative or otherwise, shall be deemed
transportation ‘for hire’;” ...

See Section 323.01 (18), F.S.A.

Section 323.05, F.S.A., as amended by Chapter 22,842,
Acts of 1945, Laws of Florida, provides that no auto trans-
portation company shall operate any “for hire”. motor ve-
hicles on any public highway in this State in the transporta-
tion of persons or property for compensation without first
having obtained from the Railroad Commission a permit,
which permit shall issue as a matter of right and of course
when the provisions of this Chapter and the laws of Florida
touching such motor vehicle operations have been complied
with by the applicant. The essential details necessary to con-
form to prior to obtaining the permit are recited and clearly
‘set out under the above Section. The power to issue the permit
is, vested by law in the Railroad Commission. It cannot be
issued under the above provision without a substantial com-
pliance with the pertinent terms of the Act. We reaffirm our
previous ruling on the point as enumerated in In re: Paul
Grubb, 116 Fla. 387, 156 So. 482.

The pertinent allegations of the petition lodged with the
Railroad’ Commission and the testimony of the witness
Swiope,-adduced in support there, clearly established the in-
ference or conclusion that the petitioner was not seeking or
requesting of the respondent the issuance of a permit or a
certificate of public convenience and necessity as a “private
contract carrier”? as defined in Section 323.01 (8), F.S.A., be-
cauise there is no evidence in the record to show that the pro-
posed service “consisted of continuous or recurring carriage
under the sanie contract.” The proposed service by the evi:
dence was shown not to be regular, continuous or recurring un-
der the same contract, but, on the contrary, was to be special
and limited to. groups as distiziguished from the individual;

ee
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805

and a further consideration of the “private contract carrier”
feature of this controversy is not required by the record.

The controlling question presented here is whether the
petition and the evidence adduced in support thereof renders
the proposed service of the petitioner a special charter service
incidental to a holder of a certificate of public convenience
and necessity as a common carrier as provided for in Section
323.14, F.S.A., or a “for hire” service as defined in Section
320.01 (16) supra. See Section 323.01 (13) supra. A cursory
reading of these statutes suggest an overlapping of the two
proposed services provided for, and the case at bar possibly
is a borderline one. This incidental service of the common
carrier is a limited one and the power to exercise it must
plainly appear when construing Section 323.14 supra and
other sections of the motor transportation act in pari materia
with it.

Rules of statutory construction approved and recognized
by this court are viz: If the courts can by any fair, strict, or
liberal construction find a field of operation and can act with-
out destroying the evident intent and meaning and preserving
the force of both statutes applicable to the same subject, and
can by construing both statutes together carry out manifest
intention of the legislature, it is the duty of courts to do so.
Arnold v. State, 147 Fla. 324, 2 So. (2nd) 874. It is the
eourt’s duty to find for.conflicting statutory provisions a rea-
sonable field-of operation which may preserve force and ef-
fect of each statute and cause them to harmonize, if possible
by any fair, strict, or liberal construction. Ideal Farms’
Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So. (2nd)
234. 7

Section 323.14, F.S.A., authorized any common carrier to
depart from the route described in such certificate if com--
pelled to detour (1) on account of the closing of the road; or
(2) for the purpose of transporting by charter or excursion a
party of persons or property to a point or points not on such
route; provided (a) such charter party originated on the’.
route or at points served by such carrier, and may receive for
such service compensation as: may be agreed upon between
the.carrier and the party or parties so served; and provided:

806

(b) that when both the point of origin and destination are
served by another or other transportation companies by regu-
lar schedules, such charter or excursion parties may not be
transported by a carrier not serving both of such points. (3)
This section shall not apply to regular or recurring charter
or sightseeing trips but ‘to single or casual trips. We find
nothing in the above Sections of Chapter 323 prohibiting the
Railroad Commission from issuing a “for hire” permit as de-
fined in the same Act. The quoted Section applies to any
common carrier auto transportation company holding a cer-
tificate of convenience and public necessity issued to it by the
Railroad Commission.

Section 323.05, F.S.A., requires the Railroad Commission
to isstie “as a matter of right and of course” permits to oper-
ate “for hire” vehicles on the public highways of Florida
when the provisions of the Chapter and the laws of Florida
touching such motor vehicle operations have been complied
with by the applicant. The petitioner here simply requests a
permit to operate on the highways of Florida only two of its
fleet of forty busses, each of which is fully described in the
application, and the testimony about same is not disputed.
The Commission, like all others, is bound by the statutory
definition of “for hire vehicles.” Section 320.01 (16) F.S.A.
provides: “ ‘For hire vehicles’ include all motor vehicles .. .
when used for transporting persons, commodities or ma-
terials for compensation; let or rented to another for a con-
sideration; offered for rent or hire as a means of transporta-
tion for compensation,...” Thus it was the intention of the
Legislature to provide the general public of Florida with a
“for hire service” based on a contractual relationship to be
agreed upon between the “for hire service’ and the group or
groups accepting and willing to pay for the service, it being
optional with both the “for hire service” and the public
whether an agreement for the renting or leasing of a “for
hire” vehicle, and the’ consideration for its use, is agreed
upon. The law makes it the duty of a common carrier, within
the limits of its ability, to receive and carry all persons apply-
ing for transportation. The law makes it optional with a “for
hire service” to! carry those of the general public applying to

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807

it for passage. 37 Am. Jur. 526. A “for hire service” has no
continuous or recurring carriage under contract unless made

so by the consent of the parties. The “for hire service” de- .

fined in Section 320.01 (16), F.S.A., and set out under: Sec-

tion 323.05, F.S.A. and Chapter 22,842, Acts of 1945, Laws of -

Florida, was considered by this Court in the case of Travis v.

Fry, 139 Fla. 522, 190 So. 793. See Lawrence v. Goddard, 124 .

Fla. 250, 168 So. 13.

It is our conclusion that the respondent erred in granting
the motion to dismiss and this ruling constitutes a material
departure from the essential requirements of the law, and,

accordingly the petition praying for a writ of certiorari is .

granted and the challenged order hereby quashed, with

further directions to reinstate the petition for further pro-
ceedings in the cause not inconsistent with the views and -

judgment herein expressed.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
PER CURIAM:

The order of the Railroad Commission dated February 23, :

1948, in part, discloses the following:

“On February 4, 1948, this Commission held a public hear- ”

ing on said application in Tallahassee, Florida, pursuant to

Notice No. 1241, dated January 13, 1948, for the purpose of, -
hearing all interested parties and determining whether or not -

the authority sought is in truth and in fact properly classified

as ‘for-hire’ carriage, as distinguished from common carriers, -

contract carriage or otherwise.

“At said hearing the following appearances were entered: ‘

“John G. Baker, 402 Metcalf Bldg, Orlando, Florida, for
applicant. .

“A, Y. Milam and Wayne K. Ramsey, 1200 Greenleaf
Bldg., Jacksonville, Florida, for Florida Greyhound Lines,
Inc., protestant.

“Clifford T. Inglis, 904 Barnett National Bank Bldg., Jack-

sonville, Florida, for Southeastern Greyhound Line, pro-
testant.”

808

“A, Pickens Cole, 716 First National Bank Bldg., Tampa,
Florida, for Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., Glades Motor Lines
and Georgia-Florida Coaches, protestants.

“Perry A. Nichols, 226 Shoreland Bldg., Miami, Florida,
for Coast City Coaches, protestant.

“Jeff D. White, Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida, for
Modern Coach Company, protestant.”

The Orlando Transit Company, having been unsuccessful
before the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission,
filed in this court on 7 April 1948 a petition for certiorari to ©
review the order of the commission denying its application
for a “For Hire” permit under Section 320.01 (16), Florida
Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A. The matter came on to be heard
before this court upon the record and the briefs of Orlando
Transit Company, the petitioner, and Florida Railroad and
Public Utilities Commission, the respondent.

In due course the matter was determined by an opinion
written on behalf of this court by Chapman, J., filed 19 July
1948, and concurred in by THOMAS, C.J., and TERRELL and
SEBRING, JJ. The time for filing having been extended, the
petition for rehearing was filed 14 August 1948, and is now
being circulated according to the practice of this court.

Long after the opinion of the court had been rendered,
six petitions for “intervention,” four of them by corporations
which had appeared before the Railroad Commission and two
of them by corporations which had not, were presented in this
court. Parenthetically, three of these petitions were lodged
after the petition for rehearing was filed by the respondent,
and three of them before that date.

It is the sufficiency of these six petitions that we must now
determine. It is immediately apparent that they fall into
two important categories—those filled by corporations which
were actually heard by the Florida Railroad and Public Utili-
ties Commission and those filed by corporations which were
not heard by the commission.

We shall dispose of them in inverse order.

This court has repeatedly held that no intervention will
be allowed here. It is conceivable that an exception to this

ee
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809

rule might arise in a proceeding originally instituted in this
court, because the one seeking to be heard would not have
theretofore had that opportunity. We have held that “to the
extent that it involves the review of the proceedings of an
inferior court certiorari is an appellate proceeding, but, to
the extent that the subject-matter of the proceeding brought
before the appellate court will not be reinvestigated, tried, .
or determined on the merits as on appeal or writ of error, it
is an original proceeding.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Florida Fine Fruit Co., 93 Fla. 161, 112 So. 66. But, strictly
speaking, this is not such an original proceeding as would ad-
mit of “intervention” in this court as that term is generally
used.

Aside from the question of delay on the part of those
presenting the latter two petitions and their failure until after
the filing of the opinion of this court on the merits to make
any effort to be heard here as amici curiae, a matter which we
shall later discuss, we do not think they could “intervene”
here in a proceeding to review the order entered by the
Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission.

We consider that the petitions of those who had been
heard before the commission were not actually petitions to
intervene, but simply requests to be heard here in the review
of a proceeding in which they had participated.

We think that in all the circumstances they should have
been heard, had their requests been seasonably made. We
conclude that they were entirely too late when they waited
until the case had been determined on its merits. Having ac-
tively participated in the proceedings below, they were put
upon notice that a review of these proceedings might be
sought in this court, and upon inquiry they could have de-
termined when the petition for certiorari was presented here.
We have no requirement that notice be given them, but the
information was easily available. Upon close study we are
convinced that this is not a harsh rule. By analogy when a
litigant fails in a lower court he has only to file a notice of
appeal in order to give the appellate court jurisdiction, and it is
expressly provided that where the appeal is to the supreme

Le
810

court no actual notice of appeal shall be necessary. (Section
59.10, Florida Statutes, 1941; and F.S.A.) We cannot see
where any greater burden would be placed upon the present
petitioners to make inquiry about an effort to review an or-
der of the commission in a proceeding like the instant one
than is placed upon a litigant to inform himself whether a
notice of an appeal from a judgment of a lower court has been

- filed in the clerk’s office. This thought seems to coincide with
the one expressed by this court in Great American Insurance
Company of New York v. Peters, 105 Fla. 380, 141 So. 322-
827.

We reiterate that had the petitioners who appeared as
protestants before the Railroad Commission made timely re-
quest to be heard here, they would have been granted that
opportunity, but that their delay has precluded them from
now being heard. This conclusion, however, is without preju-
dice to any request they may make in the event the petition
for rehearing now being circulated amongst the taembers of
the court is granted.

Petitions denied.

THOMAS, C. J. TERRELL, CHAPMAN, SEBRING and
HOBSON, JJ., concur.

ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., not participating.

STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. JAMES A. YORK, v. HONORABLE W.
H. BECKHAM, as Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court in and for Dade County, Florida.

36 So. (2nd) 769 June Term, 1948
Tuly 20, 1948 Bn Bane
Rehearing denied September 21, 1948 -

William J. Pruitt, William F. Brown; Jr., and Keen,
O’Kelley & Spitz, for appellant.
A. C. Franks and H. H. Eyles, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

Florence V. Jones, on July 29, 1947, filed in the Juvenile.
and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County, Florida, her
amended petition and alleged, in part, that she was unmarried
and the mother of James Richard Jones, a child born out of
wedlock, and that the father thereof was James A. York and.
it was his legal duty to support and maintain the child, which
he failed and neglected to do. The amended petition prayed
(1) for the issuance of process; (2) that the court assume
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter; (3) that
after a hearing the court determine the paternity of the child;

* (4) that the court determine that James A. York is the father

ee
812

of the child and that an appropriate order be entered requir-
ing that he provide funds for its support and maintenance.

On the amended petition process issued out of said court
and was served on James A. York, who appeared by counsel,
and objected to the jurisdiction of the court over the parties
and the subject matter for various constitutional reasons,
and requested that the court enter an order dismissing the
proceedings. The defendant’s objections and motions were
overruled and denied, and testimony was adduced and heard
by the Honorable W. H. Beckham, Judge, in support of the
allegations of the amended petition touching the paternity
of James Richard Jones. Subsequently, on October 8, 1947, an
order was entered by the court based on the allegations of the
petition and testimony in support thereof, to the effect that
James A. York was the actual and natural father of the ille-
gitimate, and pertinent portions thereof are viz: “That the
said James A. York, defendant, for the purpose of support of
said child is the actual and natural father thereof and under a
legal duty to provide a reasonable support for said child,
James Richard Jones.” In the same order James A. York
was required to pay the sum of $15.00 per week for the sup-
port and maintenance of said child, James Richard Jones,
until the further order of the court.

‘Suggestion for a writ of prohibition was filed in the
Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, in which it was repre-
sented that the Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Dade County was without authority and power, un-
der Chapter 19597, Acts of 1939, Laws of Florida, to receive
the amended petition and issue process thereon or to compel
James, A. York to appear in said court and answer or defend
the alleged charge; that the court was without jurisdiction
to hear testimony based on the allegations of the petition and
therefrom adjudicate, and determine that James A. York was
the.actual and natural father of James Richard Jones or to
make and enter an order requiring that from and after Oc-
tober, 8, 1947, he pay each week into the registry of the court
forthe support of the illegitimate the sum of $15.00 until the
further order of the court. The rule to show cause on the
suggestion issued and Honorable W. H. Beckham, Judge,

a
a .
813

answered and filed a motion to quash on various grounds, ~
which motion was granted and the petition dismissed. An
appeal has been perfected here.

Counsel for appellant contend that the Legislature of
Florida was without constitutional authority to enact the
portions of Section 3 of Chapter 19579, supra, which author-
ized the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to entertain
the petitions, issue process, settle the pleadings, hear evi-
dence and adjudicate the paternity of illegitimates in Dade
County and by appropriate order provide for their support
and maintenance as was done in the case at bar. ‘Section 20°
of Article 3 of the Florida Constitution prohibits the enact-
ment of special and local laws in certain enumerated cases:

“Section 20.—The Legislature shall not pass special or
local laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to
say, regulating the jurisdiction and duties of any class of
officers, except municipal officers, or for the punishment of
crime or misdemeanor; regulating the practice of courts of
justice, except municipal courts; providing for changing
venue of civil and criminal cases; granting divorces; chang-
ing the names of persons; vacating roads, summoning and
empannelling grand and petit juries, and providing for their
compensation; for assessment, and collection of taxes for
State and county purposes; for opening and conducting elec-
tions for State and county officers, and for designating the
places of voting; for the sale of real estate belonging to
minors, estates of descendents, and of persons laboring under °
legal disabilities; regulating the fees of officers of the State
and county; giving effect to informal or invalid deeds or wills;
legitimizing children; providing for the adoption of children;
relieving minors from legal disabilities; and for the establish-
ment of ferries.” (Emphasis supplied).

Pertinent portions of Section 3 of Chapter 19597, Acts of
1939, are viz:

“Section 3.—Certain Juvenile Courts to be Hereafter
Known as Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts: Jurisdic-
tion Thereof.—That from and after the passage of this Act,
those Juvenile Courts now established and existing, or. here-

—
8i4

after established and existing, either by special or general
act, and presided over by a judge required to be admitted to
practice law in this State, in any of those counties of this
State which now have, or may hereafter have, a population of
over 180,000, according to any preceding official census taken’
under the authority of the State of Florida, or of the United
States Government, shall hereafter be known as the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of the county in which located.
In addition to the jurisdiction, power and authority now ex-
isting, or that shall hereafter be conferred thereon as Juvenile
Courts, such courts shall hereafter have and possess the ad-
ditional jurisdiction, power and authority to receive, investi-
gate, hear and determine complaints, render judgment, and
make lawful and reasonable orders for the enforcement there-
of, involving any of the following: Concerning the violation
of any Statutes of this State, now existing or hereafter en-
acted, for the protection of minors and involving any child
under seventeen years of age, including violations of any
statutes in which the gravamen of any such alleged violation,
complaint or proceeding, is the failure or neglect of one mem-
ber of a family to discharge any legal duty owed to another
member of such family, directly and reasonably involving the
moral or physical welfare of any child, and particularly laws
relating to non-support, withholding support, school attend-
ance, child labor, cruel treatment of children, offenses against
the person and against decency and morality, when directly
involving any child, or when contributing to the delinquency
and dependency of any child; concerning investigations to de-
termine the paternity of any child alleged to have been born
out of wedlock for the purpose of providing support thereof,
and to provide for the reasonable support of such child by any
person found to be the parent thereof, or to provide for the
care, support and disposition of such child as a dependent
child, in case such child or either parent is residing within
such county;...” (Emphasis supplied).

Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of Chapter 19597, supra, are
viz:

“Section 18.—Partial Invalidity—If any provision, sec-
tion, phrase, paragraph or portion of this Act shall be found

be |
be
815

unconstitutional or invalid for any reason, such invalidity
shall in no wise be construed as affecting the validity of the
remaining portions of this Act.

“Section 19.—Misdemeanor.—Any person wilfully violat-
ing any provision of this Act shall be subject to be prosecuted
and punished as for a misdemeanor.

“Section 20.—Contempt.—All powers for the punishment
for contempt by Juvenile Courts in any such County shall
exist and continue hereunder. :

“Section 21.—Repeal.—aAll other Acts, or parts of Acts,
whether General or Special Acts, in conflict herewith, are
hereby répealed, but it is not the intention of this Act to in
any manner repeal or change any Special or General Act
establishing any Juvenile Court in any of the Counties in the
State affected hereby, except such portions thereof as may be
in conflict with any provision hereof.”

It is admitted that Chapter 19597 supra established Juve-
nile and Domestic Relations Courts in Dade County and other
counties of Florida having a population of 180,000 or more.
These courts are given the jurisdiction and power to entertain
complaints, hear testimony and therefrom adjudicate or de-
termine the paternity of illegitimate children born in Dade
and other Counties, and make and enforce orders against the
person found to be father for the support thereof. In the
other Counties of Florida the paternity of illegitimates and
provisions for their support are controlled and determined
by the several provisions of Chapter 742, F.S.A. It is un-
necessary to distinguish or point out the .conflicts in the
several provisions of the two Acts regulating bastardy. It is
established law that the Legislature is without power to en-
act or pass Special or Local laws “regulating the practice of
courts of justice,” but such laws shall be general and of uni-
form operation in the several counties of Florida. Section 20
of Article 3 of the Florida Constitution. Section 1 of Article
5 of the Florida Constitution gives the Legislature power to
establish the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Dade
County, Florida. -

The case of Skinner v. City of Eustis, 147 Fla. 22, 2 So.
(2nd) 116, involved the constitutional validity of Section 4 of

Ee
816

Article 14 of Chapter 6683, Special Acts of 1913, Laws of
Florida, being a charter provision of said city, and is viz:
“That suits on all causes of action of whatever kind or nature,
accruing against said City of Eustis shall be instituted within
six months after the cause of action accrues.” We held the
above section void and unconstitutional because it attempted
to “regulate the practice of the courts of justice,” contrary to
Section 20 of Article 3 of the Constitution. The “practice of
courts of justice” within the statute meant the method of con-
ducting litigation involving rights and corresponding de-
fenses. In Mack v. Carter, 183 Fla. 313, 183 So. 478, we held
that the regulation of the practice of the courts of justice
meant “all that relates to the manner and time in which a
case shall be conducted and tried from its inception to final
judgment and execution.”

The Constitution of Florida does not give exclusive ; juris-
diction of bastardy proceedings to any court provided for in
Article 5 of our Constitution. It is therefore within the power
of the Legislature under Section 1 of Article 5 of the Florida
Constitution, as construed in State of Florida. v. Sullivan, 95
Fla. 191, 116 So. 255, by statute to establish courts and pre-
scribe their jurisdiction and this jurisdiction may be concur-
rent or original with the jurisdiction of those courts recog-
nized by the Constitution. The Act, however, cannot “regu-
late the practice of courts of justice,” as inferred in Section
20 of Article 3 supra and as construed by this Court. Pro-
ceedings in bastardy under the Constitution and our decisions
are required to be general and of uniform operation in each
county of Florida.

In State of Florida v. Sullivan, supra, when considering
jurisdiction we in part said (text 95 Fla. 200-201) :

“In the terminology of the law the word jurisdiction as
applied to courts has a well defined meaning and there is
nothing in its inherent nature which renders it exclusive.
That there are classifications in jurisdiction is as well known
and understood as are the classifications of nouns, verbs and
adverbs, or the classifications of trusts and corporations.
Jurisdiction may be exclusive or concurrent, original, appel-
late or final. These classifications are frequently recognized

Po
Le
817

in the Constitution and statutes of our states. An inspection
of Sections 5, 11, 17, 18 and 22 of Article V dealing with the
jurisdiction of various courts comprising our judicial system
discloses that circuit courts and the Supreme Court have
original and concurrent jurisdiction in certain matters. In
other matters a like rule applies to circuit and certain inferior
courts, while the circuit courts have ‘exclusive original juris-
diction in all cases in equity, also in all cases at law, not cog-
nizable by inferior courts, and in all cases involving the le-
gality of any tax assessment, or toll; of the action of eject-
ment and of all actions involving the title or boundaries of
real estate, and all criminal cases not cognizable by inferior
courts; and original jurisdiction of actions of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, and of such other matters as the legis-
lature may provide.’— (Section 11, Article V, Constitution.)

“Jurisdiction then ‘is not like a grant of property which
cannot have several owners at the same time.’ Two or more
courts may have concurrent jurisdiction of the same subject
matter, and the rule is well settled that when the Constitution
or the statute in specific terms vests jurisdiction in any tri-
bunal without the qualifying term ‘exclusive,’ or words of
equivalent import, the legislature may in its discretion vest
the like jurisdiction in another court or tribunal. ...”

It is next contended that prohibition in the case at bar is
an inappropriate remedy because the issues have been fully
determined and adjudicated by the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and the proper remedy is a review by an ap-
peal. This contention overlooks the power to enforce the
order to pay the sum of $15.00 per week until the further
order of the court and our many adjudications on this point..
See State ex rel. Anderson v. Parks, 94 Fla. 91, 113 So. 702;
State v. White, 40 Fla. 297, 23 So. 160; State v. Whitney, 66
Fla. 24, 63 So. 299, and similar cases. Prohibition may be
employed to restrain an excess of jurisdiction as well as to
prohibit the exercise of judicial power where none exists.
State ex rel. Marshall v. Petteway, 121 Fla. 822, 164 So. 872.

The following portion of Section 3 of Chapter 19759 viz:
“concerning investigations to determine the paternity of any

818

child alleged to have been born out of wedlock for the purpose
of providing support thereof, and to provide for the reason-
able support of such child by any person found to be the
parent thereof, or to provide for the care, support and dis-
position of such child as a dependent child, in case such child
or either parent is residing within such county;” may be de-
leted as void and unconstitutional under Section 18 of said
Chapter, being the severability clause of the Act, without
doing violence to, impairing or otherwise affecting the re-
maining portions of said Section. It was error on the part of
the lower court to discharge the rule nisi and to dismiss the
relator’s petition. The judgment appealed from is reversed
with directions for further proceedings in the court below not
inconsistent with the opinion and judgment above expressed.

THOMAS, C.J., TERRELL, ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ.,
and WHITE, Associate Justice, concur.

HOBSON, J., concurs specially.

HOBSON, J., concurring specially:

I concur in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice CHAPMAN:
It appears to me to be appropriate to observe that the corner-
stone of said opinion is laid upon the premise that Chapter
19597, Laws of Florida, 1939, is a special or local law within
the meaning and intendment of Section 20 of Article II of
the Constitution of Florida. Said Section contains a prohibi-
tion against passing ‘special or local laws in certain enumer-
ated cases. The Act here under consideration is frequently
called a general law of local application and is often referred
to as a population Act. It is included in Volume 1, Laws of
Florida, 1939, which volume carries the. designation of
“General Laws.”

Laws of this type, which sometimes questionably are
classified as general laws, at the time of their enactment
usually affect only one county and, at most, several counties,
but by no means all counties of Florida.

A proper interpretation to be given the verbiage “special
or local laws” in Section 20, Article ITI in our Constitution is
to, and I hereby do, construe it as meaning all laws which do
not operate uniformly throughout the State of Florida, i. e.

those laws which are not effective in each and every county
of this State. Such construction is consonant with the patent
purpose of Section 20, Article IIL of the Florida Constitution.

It is my opinion, therefore, that it is appropriate to treat
‘Chapter 19,597, Laws of Florida, 1939, as a special or local
law within the meaning and intendment of. Section 20 of
Article III of the Florida Constitution.

I agree with Mr. Justice CHAPMAN that the portion of
Section 3 of Chapter 19597, Laws of Florida, 1939, which he
held to be void and unconstitutional is violative of Section 20,
Article III of the Constitution of Florida. ,

Said portion of Section 3 of said law grants unto the
Juvenile Courts in counties of a population of more than
180,000 power “to provide for the reasonable support of such
child by any person found to be the parent thereof.” In all
other counties of the State the father of an illegitimate child
can only be charged for such child’s support the maximum
sum of $50.00 per year.

819

Consequently, I am further of the opinion that said por-
tion of Section 3 of Chapter 19597, Laws of Florida, 1939,
offends the equal protection of the law clause of both the
Florida and Federal Constitutions.

CLEO C. WATSON and NETTIE WATSON, a widow, v. LEO C. JONES
and HELEN CHOATE JONES, his wife.

36 So. (2nd) 788 : June Term, 1948
July 28, 1948 : Division B
Rehearing denied October 1, 1948

De
820

Tillman & McEwen and Albert D’Arpa, for appellants.
Fowler, White, Gillen, Yancey & Humkey, for appellees.

ADAMS, J.:

Appellee recovered a judgment against appellant for the
“wrongful cutting of pine trees.

The first question argued on this appeal is:

“In an action seeking damages to land by the wrongful
cutting of pine trees therefrom, is the true measure of
damages the injury done to the land to be used for a specific
purpose, namely, the erection and running of a tourist camp
and trailer park, or is the true measure of damages the differ-
ence in market value for any purpose before and after the
cutting.”

The declaration claimed special damages in that it charged
the cutting and removal of 97 pine trees, leaving the stumps
and debris; that the property had been acquired for a tourist
and trailer park; that the trees had a peculiar value for orna-
ment and shade; that considering the alleged use of the
property it had depreciated from $7500.00 to $4000.00 by
reason of the cutting. The jury found a verdict of $3500.00.
On motion for a new trial the trial court granted a remittitur
of $1000.00 in lieu of a new trial. Plaintiff entered the re-
mittitur and defendant has appealed contending that the
$2500.00 is excessive.

The general rule is stated in 15 Am. Jur., page 528, Sec.
119:

“In some jurisdictions the measure of damages for the
destruction of shade, ornamental, or fruit trees, is the differ-
ence in the value of the land before and after their destruc-
tion....”

In 161 A.L.R., page 598, it is stated:

821

“By the great weight of authority the proper measure of
damage for the destruction of or injury to ornamental or
shade trees and shrubs is the difference in the value of the
property immediately before and immediately after the act
complained of, or the amount of depreciation. With a certain
elasticity suitable to circumstances and the introduction of
evidence relevant to actual loss, not permitting duplication in
recovery for any item of damage,...”

In 161 A.L.R., page 602:

“In certain cases, upon proof of the use or contemplated
use of land or shade trees thereon for a particular purpose for
which the property has been fitted or kept, it has been held
that the rule that the measure of damage-is the difference in
value before and after the trespass should be construed or
extended to allow recovery for such elements. ...”

We cite with approval Barker v. Lewis Storage & Transfer
Company, 78 Conn. 198, 61 A. 363, 3 Ann. Cases 889; Barker
v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 94 Kan. 61, 145 Pac. 829.

- We quote with approval from Gilman v. Brown, 115 Wis.
1, 91 N.W. 227:

“.,, It must not be forgotten that recovery in trespass is
always based upon a wrongful invasion of the plaintiff's
rights, and that the rule of damages adopted should be such
as to more carefully guard against failure of compensation to
the injured party than against possible overcharge upon the
wrongdoer. An owner of real estate has a right to enjoy it
according to his own taste and wishes, and the arrangement
of buildings, shade trees, fruit trees, and the like may be very
important to him, may be the result of large expense, and
the modification thereof may be an injury to his convenience
and comfort in the use of his premises which fairly ought to
be substantially compensated, and yet the arrangement so
selected by him might be no considerable enhancement of the
sale value of the premises, it might not meet the taste of
others, and the disturbance of that arrangement, therefore,
might not impair the general market value. Hence it is ap-
parent that while the owner may be deprived of something
valuable to him, for which he would be willing to pay sub-

ee
822

stantial sums of money or which might have cost him sub-
stantial sums, yet he might be wholly unable to prove any
considerable damages merely in the form of depreciation of
the market value of the land. The owner of property has a
right to hold it for his own use as well as to hold it for sale,
and if he has elected the former he should be compensated.
for an injury wrongfully done him in that respect, although
that injury might be unappreciable to one holding the same
premises for purposes of sale... .”

In the case at bar the plaintiff pled the nature and extent.
of his injury and damage. We find sufficient evidence to sus-
tain the verdict of $2500.00.

Appellant argues that the judgment should be reversed
for a new trial because the jury reached its verdict in ten
minutes and the'trial court in fact disapproved the verdict by
the act of reducing it to $2500.00. We have duly considered

- this contention, but in the light of the whole record we cannot.
say that the ruling of the trial court was clearly erroneous.
_All other questions have been duly considered and found
without merit. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed. | .
THOMAS, C.J., BARNS, and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

ROSE LeVEINE and DORIS LeVINE, v. JOHN I. ROBINSON, as Ex-
ecutor of the Estate of ‘David Nissenbaum, deceased.

36 So. (2nd) 774 . June Term, 1948

July 23, 1948 En Banc

Rehearing denied September 21, 1948

Martin D. Von Zamft, Von Zamft, Simon & Lake and Eric
C. Van Enter, for appellants.

Walter C. Kovner, for appellee.
PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, BARNS and HOBSON,
JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

SEBRING, J., dissenting:

Although I agree that the equities of the cause are with
the plaintiff below, it is my view that the Chancellor should
have ordered a conveyance of the property involved to the
plaintiff instead of requiring the purchase price of the prop-
erty to be repaid by the appellants and decreeing that it
should constitute a lien against the property. Therefore, I
dissent from the judgment of affirmance entered by this.

court.

GRADY LEE McHUGH v. STATE OF FLORIDA
36 So. (2nd) 786” June Term, 1948
July 23, 1948 : En Bane

Rehearing denied September 27, 1948

Cushman & Woodard, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Ernest W. Welch,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

This appeal presents a question of former jeopardy.

Appellant drove an automobile into a motor scooter and
killed two news boys riding thereon.

Under Sec. 782.07, Fla. Stat., he was informed against and
charged with manslaughter for killing one of the boys
through culpable negligence. He was also charged, under Sec.

EE
824 ,

860.01, Fla. Stat., with manslaughter for killing the other’
boy by operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

On the former charge he was acquitted and when the
other case was called for trial a plea of former jeopardy was
interposed. This plea went out on demurrer and upon a plea
of not guilty a trial was had resulting in conviction. Section
12, Declaration of Rights, “No person shall be subject to be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense... .”

Elaborate briefs have been filed which reveal numerous
cases in hopeless conflict.

In this jurisdiction the identical question has not been
passed upon. We are of the opinion that the plea of former
jeopardy was not tenable and the action of the court in sus-
taining a demurrer to it was proper. Our reasons are that
this view is supported by the great weight of authority. See
note in 172 A.L.R., page 1062 following a report of our de-
cision in State v. Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30 So. (2nd) 744. Also
People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E. (2nd) 397, 308 U.S. 511,
84 L, ed. 436, 60 S. Ct. 182; Fleming v. Com., 284 Ky. 209, 144
S.W. (2nd) 220; Com. v. Maguire, 313 Mass. 669, 48 N.E.
(2nd) 665; State v. Freedlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353,
113 A.L.R. 215; Fay v. State, 62 Okla. Crim. 350, 71 P, (2nd)
768; Lawrence v. Com. 181 Va. 582, 26 S.E. (2nd) 54; State
v. Taylor, 185 Wash. 198, 52 P. (2nd) 1252.

Double jeopardy applies to the offense, not the act causing
the criminal offense. The gist of this offense is the unlaw-
ful homicide of which there were two. There is an’offense for
each unlawful homicide. It is not difficult to imagine a case
where a defendant might by criminal negligence cause an
explosion which would annihilate a number of persons. Great
difficulty might arise on proving the actual death of one par-
ticular individual, yet it would be a travesty on justice to say
that the wrongdoer could not then be again arraigned for the
criminal killing of some other named victim. In the two
imaginary cases the evidence would be different thereby ob-
serving the distinction noted and discussed in Driggers v.
State, 187 Fla. 182, 188 So. 118 and other cases cited there.

825

One of the tests often required by this and other courts is
whether the evidence will be the same in each prosecution.

It is well to point out here that in addition to the differ-
ence in identity of the’ victims the stattite requires different
proof in other respects. In one case the state was required to
prove culpable negligence. Intoxication, instead of culpable
negligence, is required in the other. See State v. Bacon,
supra. Hach is a separate offense. For an identical case see
People v. Trantham, 24 Cal. App. (2nd) 177, 74 P. (2nd) 851.
See also Culpepper v. State, 44 Ga. App. 351, 161 S.E. 849.

We have considered the other assignments of error and
find them without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., con-
eur.

THOMAS, C.J., and SEBRING, J., agree to conclusion.
De
BERNARD ROBBINS v. AIDA ROBBINS

36 So. (2nd) 786 June Term, 1948
July 27, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied October 1, 1948

Arnovitz, Weinkle & Arnovitz, for appellant.
Cushman & Woodard, for appellee.

PER CURIAM: .

We find from a careful examination of the record before
this Court that the final decree entered by the Chancellor is
sustained by substantial evidence except as to the allowance
of $2500.00 Master’s fee.

Le
826

With reference to the continuation of alimony pendente
lite in the sum of $65.00 per week during the pendency of this
appeal without crediting it upon the award for permanent ali-
mony, we will not assume that the Chancellor will fail to enter
an equitable order when he ultimately rules upon this ques-
tion.

The decree appealed from should be modified by reducing
the fee of the Special Master from the sum of $2500.00 to the
sum of $1200.00. When so modified, the decree shall stand
affirmed.

It is so ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., con-

cur. .

| FRANKLYN WHEELER and VARIAN JOHNETTE WHEELER,
husband and wife, v. FRANK E. LAUTZ, CHARLES L. YUILLE, R.
J. SCHNEIDER, M. H. DAWSON, J. NORMAN DRUCK, suing for
their own use and for all persons likewise affected, and MIAMI
SHORES VILLAGE, a Municipal Corporation.

a

36 So. (2nd) 915 June Term, 1948
uly 30, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied October 12, 1948

Smathers, Thompson, Maxwell & Dyer, for appellants.

Mitchell D. Price, Zaring, Florence & Barfield, for ap-
pellees. . : .

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

BARNS, J., dissents.

[|
Le
827
BARNS, J., dissenting:

In the lower court, complainants-appellees sought to en-
join defendants-appellants from completing an apartment
house under construction on Lots 7 and 8 of Block 20, Section
1, of Miami Shores Village, and from using said building for
apartment house purposes, by virtue of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
certain restrictive covenants contained in deeds to property
of both complainants and defendants from common grantor,
Bessemer Properties, Inc., hereinafter referred to as “Besse-
mer,” and from completion and use of said building for apart-
ment house purposes under a variance permit authorized by
the Board of Adjustment, and issued by the Village Manager.

A zoning ordinance restricted this section for the con-
struction of one-family residences, but provided machinery
whereby variances would be allowed where a literal enforce-
ment of the provisions of the ordinance would result in un-
necessary hardships.

The. pertinent Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the restrictive
covenants provided for masonry constructed buildings, the
plans for which should be approved by the grantor, limited to
one residence building (for one family only) and one private
garage, with further provision that no building should be
used for business or commercial purposes, including the
operation of hotels, apartment houses and tearooms.

A Special Master in Chancery was appointed to determine
the equities, whether the restrictive covenants in question
were for the benefit of all landowners within the area, or for
the sole benefit of the grantor, and whether the ordinance was
violated by the variance allowed in this instance. The Special
Master found that the restrictive covenants, if enforceable at
all, were personal to the grantor and enforceable by him only,
not by the grantees, because of the lack of a general building
scheme and consequent lack of mutuality, and that this was
a valid variance, not in violation of said zoning ordinance.

This Court finds that the lower court acted erroneously in
overruling the Special Master’s report and in entering the
final decree enjoining the use of the building for apartment
house purposes.

a
828

It is a general rule of law that:

“Where the owner of a tract of land subdivides it, and.
sells distinct parcels to separate grantees, with restrictions
on its use, pursuant to a general plan of development, such re--
strictions may be enforced by one grantee against any other
grantee with notice.”—26 C.J.S.—P. 548.

But here it appears that though Bessemer owned many
lots in Section 1, Miami Shores Village, in which Block 20 lies,
its lots were interspersed with lots owned by other companies.
Bessemer did not obtain the lots it eventually owned in Sec-
tion 1 at the same time; there was no tract or contiguous.
body of land for it to subdivide to impose the restrictive cove-
nants in question. The lots owned by other development.
companies in Section 1 were sold with allegedly similar re-
strictive covenants contained in their deeds, but there is no.
showing that these were included pursuant to any general
plan agreed to by and between the land companies. The lots:
owned by Bessemer were scattered throughout Section 1, not.
contiguous, and, as testimony established in the record, at
least several of the lots sold by Bessemer have ultimately be-
come sites for two-story garage apartments. In Osius v. Bar-
ton, 109 Fla, 566, 147 So. 862, this Court has said:

“But the right in equity of grantees from a common.
grantor to enforce, inter sese, covenants entered into by each
with the grantor, or running with the land as emanating from
the common grantor, is ordinarily confined to cases where the
scheme of restriction contemplated by the deeds is universal
or reciprocal, as the consideration for the obligation to ob-
serve the restrictions isthe imposition of the same or kindred
restrictions on other lots similarly situated. Klein v. Sisters
of ‘Charity of St. Blizabeth, 101 N.J. Eq. 761, 189 A. 174;
Foreman v. Sadler’s Ex’rs., 114 Md: 574, 80 A. 298; Trustees.
of Columbia ‘College v. Thatcher, 87 NY. 311, 4 Am. Rep.
365; 18 C.J. 394, 395.”

Relative to the zoning ordinance, the transcript discloses
the Special master’s findings of fact, the same facts which.
were considered by the Board. of Adjustment when it granted.
the variance building permit: vay :

829

“Lots 7 and 8 of Block 20, being the lots on which the
building in question is constructed, are just across a very
narrow alley from a block of business buildings or stores at
the southwest corner of 96th Street and 2nd Avenue; these
lots being on the south side of 96th Street and just west of
the business buildings facing 2nd Avenue: One of the build-
ings is occupied by a drugstore which serves food; the garb-
age cans and packing cases of this drug store are immediately
across the narrow alley of Lot 7, in block 20.. Just south, in
the same block of business buildings, facing northeast 2nd
Avenue, there is a grocery store which handles perishable
foods and maintains garbage cans in the rear, where they
dispose of spoiled vegetables. All of the store buildings in
the block facing 2nd Avenue, between 95th and 96th Streets,
have rear entrances at which they receive deliveries of mer-
chandise through the alley above mentioned, and large num-
bers of trucks use the alley for delivery purposes. Across the
street from the lots in question is a building, which at the
time of the hearings was used in part for offices and stores and’
in part for sleeping apartments or hotel rooms; a number of
cars are regularly parked-around the business buildings, and
particularly along the south side of 96th Street by people who
are going into the drug store or attending to other matters
in that location. All of the blocks facing eastward on 2nd
Avenue have lots running from east to west for a depth of 130
feet, which have been zoned for business purposes and on
which are located business structures of one sort or another.
None of the lots in the blocks in this immediate vicinity, just
west of that portion of the blocks zoned for business, have
‘been built on although the subdivision is now approximately
twenty years old; that is to say, Lots 6 and 23 of Block 17,
Lots 6 and 23 of Block 18, Lots 6 and 23 of Block 19, Lots 7
and 24 of Block 20, Lots 9 and 15 of Block 32, Lots 9 and 15
of Block 31, Lots 9 and 15 of Block 30, and Lots 9 and 16 of
Block 29, have remained vacant...” ,

This Court has dealt before with the matter of’ variances.
In State v. Danner, 33 So. (2nd) 45, 159 Fla. 874:

“... Variance. Experience has established that often
after an over-all zoning ordinance has been enacted, it de-

ee
830

velops that its application would result in practical difficul-
ties and unnecessary hardships. To avoid this, such ordi-
nances often provide for exceptions or departures: from the
general provision, when such prescribed standards for a vari-
ance have been established. before the proper board or com-
mission. This is often referred to as ‘spot-zoning’.”

_ In “Zoning,” by Bassett, on page 130, the author has this
to say:

“A class of variances to which conditions are nearly al-
ways attached are those issued for buildings at or near
boundaries of districts. In many cases this boundary will be
between a business district and a residence district... Of
course, the board of appeals will not allow every variance re-
quested. Most border-line cases involve injury. to adjoining
residential buildings. A view of the premises by the board of
appeals and the public hearing will usually disclose in what.
cases a variance on conditions will make the situation better
.instead of worse.”

On page 122 of the same text, Mr. Bassett speaks concern-
ing Variances, related to uniformity:

. Blanket resolutions by boards of appeal, stating
what variances they will make, are always futile. The build-
ing inspector cannot base permits on such a resolution or on
a prior variance. The legislative acts of a local legislature
cannot be reviewed or adjusted by the courts. Within its
jurisdiction such a body has equal standing with the courts
and its acts are final .

The chancellor erred in sustaining the exception to the
Master’s Report and in enjoining the use of the building for
apartment house purposes and in restraining the use thereof
to one family residential purposes only.

The decree appealed should be reversed.

PER CURIAM:
Petition for rehearing denied.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN; ADAMS, SE-
BRING, JJ., concur.
BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur with opinion.

831

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING—DENIED
BARNS, J.:

On November 5, 1942, appellants acquired two lots in
Miami Shores and at the time this property was acquired it
was limited to one-family residences, by Ordinance 92, Article
1, as adopted December 12, 1939.

On October 38, 1944, appellants applied for a permit to
build an apartment house on the said premises. This permit
was rYefused and, on the same’ date, appellants applied to the
Board of Adjustments (hereafter called the Board) for a
variance permit. On October 6, 1944, this appeal was heard
and the Board unanimously agreed that. the permit should
issue.

The building was constructed but the use for other than
-one-family residential purposes was enjoined by final decree,
‘which was appealed.

The question raised is whether the Board acted within
the authority granted it.

“In Tau Alpha Holding Corporation ‘v. Board of Adjust-
ments of Gainesville, 126 Fla. 858, 171 So, 819 (1937) it was
held, under the facts of that case, that the power given to
the Board to grant variances was not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, thus overcoming a major ob-
jection.

We have held that: .

“Zoning, generally. Lawful zoning is the exercise of the
police power and must be based upon and have substantial
relation to either public health, safety, morals, comfort, con-
venience, or -general welfare, and must not be unreasonably
discriminatory. ; .

“Zoning regulations usually must relate to the nature of
the structure or the nature of the use. The purpose of regula-
tions in respect to the quality of a structure will likely be
quite different from the purpose of regulations respecting its
use. The public purpose to be served in each instance will
likely. be different.

“A permit for the pailding of a structure would not of ne-
cessity be a permit determining the right to its use. Zoning -

832

problems usually relate to nonconforming use of a non-
conforming building, or both.

“Non-conforming use or building. A problem is created
when an area is zoned and there is already within such area
property being used in such a manner as not to conform to the
zoning regulations. Usually such use is allowed to continue
subject to certain conditions. This is done in an effort to se-
cure a reasonable exercise of the police power for the in-
terest of the community against the interest of private
owner so as not to interfere with existing conditions more
than necessary for the public welfare.

“Variance. Experience has established that often after
an over-all zoning ordinance has been enacted, it develops
that its application would result in practical difficulties and
unnecessary hardships. To avoid this, such ordinances often
provide for exceptions or departures from the general pro-
vision, when such prescribed standards for a variance have
been established before the proper board or commission.
This is often referred to as “spot-zoning.’—State v. Danner,
159 Fla. 874, 33 So. (2nd) 45, 47.

The statutory law authorizing variance from a municipal
zoning ordinance is as follows: :

“176.08 Board of Adjustment

“The governing body of the said municipality may pro-
vide for the appointment of a board of adjustment, and in the
regulations and restrictions adopted pursuant to the author-
ity of this chapter may provide that the said board of adjust-
-ment may, in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate
conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the
terms of the ordinance in harmony with its general purpose
-and intent and in accordance with general or specific rules
.therein contained.”—Sec. 176.08, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

The Board of Adjustment for Miami Shores as authorized
by Ordinance 92, Article 14, as set forth in appellants’

*Miami Shores Village Ordinance No. 92, Article XIV, provides:

That the Planning Board of Miami Shores Village shall, from and
after the passage of this Ordinance, be and it is hereby declared a Board
of Adjustment so that where there are practical difficulties of unneces-
sary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of the pro-

be
be
833

answer, adopted in pursuance of Chapter 176, F.S. 1941,
F.S.A., provides in part:

“|. . so that where there are practical difficulties or un-
necessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict
letter of the provisions of the ordinance, the Board of Adjust-

“ ments shall have power in specific cases, after due notice, and
investigation, to determine and vary such provisions in har-
mony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning ordi-
nance.”

Section 176.13, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., provides:

“The board of adjustment shall fix a reasonable time for
the hearing of the appeal, give public notice thereof, as well
as due notice to the parties in interest, and decide the same
within a reasonable time...”

In comparing the ordinance with the general law, it is
apparent that the notice required by the ordinance is insuf-
ficient to meet the requirements prescribed by Section 176.13,

supra. An ordinance adopted under statutory authority
should follow the statute. There has been no effectual hear-
ing before the Board.

visions of this Ordinance, the Board of Adjustment shall have power in
specific cases, after due notice, and investigation to determine and vary
such provisions in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the
Zoning Ordinance so that public health, safety and general welfare may
be secure and substantial justice done and the said Board may among
other matters:

(a) Hear and decide appeals from any order, requirements, decision
or determination of an administrative officer in the enforcement of this
Ordinance.

(b) Hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of this Ordi-
nance and the authority of which is conferred upon said Board of Ad-
justment by this Ordinance.

(c) Authorize upon appeal, in specific cases, such variances as will
not be contrary to the public interest, when, owing to special conditions,
a literal enforcement of the provisions of this Ordinance will result in
unnecessary hardships, and so that the spirit of this Ordinance shall be
observed and substantial justice done.

(d) That nothing in this article, or in this Ordinance shall in any wise
take from nor deprive the Planning Board of Miami Shores Village of
authority, duties, responsibilities and jurisdiction as the same has been
constituted, maintained and operated prior to the adoption of this Ordi-
nance, the powers, duties and jurisdiction granted in this article and
this Ordinance to the Planning Board being supplementary to and
cumulative of functions thereof heretofore exercised by said Board.

ee
834

In this case, there was no notice of any kind given and
about the only point on which the Board met the require-
ments of the statute was in deciding the appeal within a rea-
sonable time.

168 A.L.R. 13 contains an elaborate annotation on “Zon-
ing” and at page 107 thereof will be found a brief discussion
of the requirement of notice on appeals before the Board.
-Statutes concerned with notice should be substantially com-

plied with. f
The decree appealed is affirmed and petition for rehearing
is denied.
HOBSON, J., concurs.
|
ARTHUR EDWARD BERRY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
86 So. (2nd) 784 June Term, 1948

July 30, 1948
Rehearing denied September 27, 1948

En Banc

Le
a .
835

John R. Parkhill, for appellant. .

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Ernest W. Welch, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Lucille Snowden, Special As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee. .

ADAMS, J.:

Arthur Edward Berry was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death. He has appealed, and the questions sub-
mitted relate to:

1. The qualification of a juror; 2. Prejudicial conduct of
the sheriff, a principal witness for the state; 3. The propriety
of admitting evidence of a physical examination of the ac-.
cused after arrest; 4. The sufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain the sentence.

The deceased, a fourteen-year-old girl, was living with
her aunt, in Pasco County, and on the morning of the homi-
cide the two of them were there alone. The two parted after
breakfast, the aunt going about two hundred yards from the
house to work in her garden. She left the deceased in the
house to wash some clothes. After the aunt had been in the
garden some time she heard someone running in a citrus
grove which adjoined her house. She observed a man (this
appellant) running in her direction; however, he apparently
did not observe her until he was in her immediate presence.
The first thing she noticed was that he was bloody and ex-
cited, and upon her inquiry he, the appellant, related that
when he approached the house he heard screams in the grove
and then discovered a negro making an attack upon deceased;
that he presently attacked the negro, struggled with him,
and finally chased the negro away; that in the affray the
negro was armed with a knife and cut appellant on his
hands. Appellant went in company with the aunt to a neigh-
bor’s house, where appellant called the sherif by telephone.
The sheriff came, met appellant, and proceeded to investigate
the crime.

Appellant related substantially the same story ‘to the
sheriff. When the sheriff failed to find footprints to corrobo-
rate appellant’s story, he arrested him and lodged him in jail,

|
836

where he was subsequently questioned and examined for
physical bruises. His clothes were examined, which disclosed
blood on his trousers and shorts.

When the state rested its case appellant’s father testified
that his son was left-handed. The evident purpose was to
indicate that the mortal wound was inflicted not by a left-
handed person but by a right-handed person.

Appellant offered a physician as a witness, who testified
to cuts on appellant’s fingers. Appellant did not testify.

Upon motion for a new trial it was claimed that one of the
petit jurors in the case was disqualified because the juror,
Kelly, was a brother-in-law to one of the state’s principal
witnesses; that the juror had qualified by stating that he had
no opinion of the accused’s guilt, whereas, in truth, the juror
lived a short distance from his brother-in-law; that he had
heard the case discussed and in fact had formed an opinion
that the accused was guilty.

Upon this part of the motion for a new trial the court
took and heard evidence and resolved the issue against appel-
lant. We have carefully considered all of the said evidence
and are of the opinion that this question was decided cor-
rectly.

A new trial was also sought because, it was charged, after
the sheriff testified he was excused from the rule and there-
after attended the jury by looking after their food and hotel
accommodations and so on. On this question testimony was
likewise taken, from which the trial judge ruled that the
conduct of the sheriff was legal and proper. In this we find,
from our study of the case, that the ruling was proper.

‘The third question relates to a physical examination made
of the accused and the result of same being introduced in evi-
dence. When the sheriff first came to the scene of the tragedy
he observed that the zipper to appellant’s trousers was down,
and, in response to the sheriff’s question, appellant said the
zipper was busted by the negro kicking him. For that and
other reasons a physical examination of appellant was made,
and no bruises were found. The purpose of this was to re-
fute appellant’s story that he had engaged in an altercation

|
Le
837

at the scene of the tragedy. The accused was under arrest
and in jail at the time. He did not object to removing his
clothes and submitting to the examination. We find no error
in the ruling of the trial court. See Touchton v. State, 154
Fla. 547, 18 So. (2nd) 752.

The last question goes to the sufficiency of the evidence.
It is argued that the. victim was not raped and there is no
motive shown for the crime. There is no doubt that the crime
stems from the sex impulse. It is also true that the victim
was not raped. The only explanation we have from appellant
is the one first given the sheriff. When the sheriff could find
no evidence of the alleged struggle and no footprints to cor-
roborate the story, despite the fact that the conditions of the
ground were such that the tracks, if made would be clearly
visible, we must draw our own conclusion, as did the court
below, that appellant and no one else could have committed
the murder.

What was his motive? What emotions must have raced
through his excited mind, once he made his first advance to
the girl, we can only surmise, as those thoughts and feelings
are his alone. It is evident that the struggle began in the
house. The latch to the screen door was torn loose. Some
blood was in the house, broken glasses were found, and a
waste basket was mashed. A knife was missing from the
kitchen and never found. Tracks of appellant and deceased
went into the grove a short distance from the house to where
her body was found, and only appellant’s tracks led away.
Blood and male semen were found inside appellant’s trousers
and on his shorts. He explained the blood came from the
girl while he was struggling with the negro. Expert evidence
showed, however, that the blood did not come from the ex-
terior of his trousers.

Most of the girl’s body was exposed; she had several cuts
and scratches about the face and arms. The fatal cut was in
the jugular vein in the left side of the neck.

We have carefully considered the entire evidence, the in-
dictment, the charge of the court, and it is our opinion and
judgment that the evidence is sufficient and there is no error

838

of ‘law in the record which would authorize us to disturb the
“judgment.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

THOMAS, C.J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and BARNS, JJ.,

concur.
HOBSON, J., not participating.
Le
MORRIS GORDON v. MIRIAM GORDON
86 So. (2nd) 774 June Term, 1948
Tuly 81, 1948 - Special Division B

Rehearing denied September 24, 1948

Blackwell, Walker & Gray, for appellant.
Rosenhouse & Rosenhouse, for appellee.

839

HOBSON, J.:

This is a divorce action wherein the appellee was the
plaintiff below and the appellant the defendant. On January
18, 1946, appellee instituted an action for divorce, on the
ground of indignities to her person, against appellant, in the
Court of Common Pleas in and for Cambria County, Pennsyl-
vania, a court of record having jurisdiction to grant the re-
lief sought in said suit. Thereafter, she caused process to be
duly and regularly served upon appellant, who did then ap-
pear in said action and did, on May 27, 1946, file his answer
to her libel or bill of complaint therein, and thereupon said
cause was then at issue and ready for trial.

On approximately June 25th, 1946, appellee journeyed to
Miami Beach, Florida, and, on September 30, 1946, notwith-
standing the pendency of her aforesaid action for divorce in
the Court of Common Pleas in Cambria County, Pennsyl-
vania, she instituted this suit at bar and filed in the Circuit
Court in and for Dade County, Florida, her verified bill of
complaint for divorce against the appellant. The appellant,
after service of process had been obtained upon him by publi-
cation, filed his appearance in this action on October 30, 1946,
and thereafter, on December 4, 1946, he did file his answer to
plaintiff's bill of complaint.

The appellant having filed his answer in this suit at bar,
and said suit being at issue, a Special Master was appointed
to take the testimony of the parties.

On May 5, 1947, the appellee filed her petition in the Com-
mon Pleas Court in and for Cambria County, Pennsylvania,
for leave to discontinue her said action for divorce then pend-
ing in said court, and on May 13, 1947, after argument on said
petition and the appellant’s answer thereto, her said petition
to dismiss her Pennsylvania action was not granted but was
dismissed, and on said date, May 13, 1947, upon the motion of
appellant filed in said Pennsylvania action, a Master was ap-
pointed by the court.

On May 28, 1947, the Special Master appointed in this
suit at bar having heard the testimony and received the evi-
‘dence of the parties thereto, filed his report, in which he

ee
840

stated that although the appellee, in and by her said bill of
complaint, charged the appellant with extreme cruelty, ha-
bitual indulgence by him of violent and ungovernable temper
and continuance of willful, obstinate and continued desertion
of her for one year, he found that the testimony of appellee
and her witnesses failed to support either the charge of
habitual indulgence in violent and ungovernable temper on
the part of appellant or the charge of willful, obstinate and
continued desertion of her by the appellant and that the
gravamen of the appellee’s case rested upon her charge of
extreme cruelty and the Special Master recommended that
appellee be awarded a decree of divorce on the last mentioned
ground.

On due notice given the respective parties in the said
Pennsylvania action, the Master appointed in said action did,
on May 27, 1947, hold a hearing in the said City of Johns-
town, Pennsylvania, at which said hearing the appellee did
not appear and was not represented by counsel. The appel-
lant and his witnesses did appear and voluminous testimony
was taken and evidence was offered and received relevant to
the issues involved in said action, and upon the conclusion
of said hearing the said Master, on June 16, 1947, after due
notice to counsel for the parties in said cause, filed therein
his report wherein he recommended that the prayer of the ap-
pellee for a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii be refused
and that her libel or bill of complaint be dismissed, ten days
being allowed to each of said parties to file exceptions to said
report. No exceptions to the said report being filed, the said
court, on June 28, 1947, made and entered a final decree in
said suit wherein and whereby the findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and the recommendations of the said Master
were adopted by the court and the libel or bill of complaint
of the appellee was dismissed at her cost.

Thereupon the appellant did, on July 9, 1947, file in this
suit at bar his motion to dismiss the bill of complaint of
the appellee on the grounds set forth in said motion, and
particularly on the ground that the matters in issue in this
action at bar had been adjudicated and finally determined by

the said final decree made and entered in said Pennsylvania
suit, and that said final decree is conclusive upon the appellee
in this suit at bar, and that the final decree made and entered
in said Pennsylvania action is entitled to and must be given
full faith and credence in conformity to the provisions of Sec-
tion 1 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States,
the laws of the United States and the judicial decisions of the
Supreme Court of Florida; and the appellant did attach to, as
“Exhibit A” and make part of his said motion an exemplified
copy of the record of said Pennsylvania action, including the
final decree of the said Common Pleas Court adopting the
findings, conclusions and recommendations.of the Master and
dismissing the appellee’s libel or bill of complaint filed in
said action.

On July 11, 1947, the appellee filed in the suit at bar her
motion to strike the appellant’s motion to dismiss her bill of
complaint as aforesaid and thereupon appellant did, on July
14, 1947, file in this action his motion for leave to amend
Paragraph 12 of his answer filed in said cause by adding
thereunto an additional unnumbered paragraph containing
the allegations set forth in said motion, pleading said final
decree entered in said Pennsylvania suit and facts which ap-
pellant contends, if proven to be true, would require the said
Circuit Court to give full faith and credence to said decree of
said Pennsylvania Court and dismiss the bill of complaint in
this suit at bar, the exemplified copy of the record of said
Pensylvania action being by reference made a part of said
motion; and on July 18, 1947, the Chancellor granted the ap-
pellant leave to amend his answer as aforesaid and on July 21,
1947, the appellant filed his amendment of his answer in the
particulars set forth in his said motion for leave to make said
amendment.

On July 24, 1947, the appellee filed in the suit at bar
her motion to strike the said amendment of appellant’s answer
and thereafter, on July 31, 1947, the Chancellor made and
entered an order denying the appellee’s motion for better par-
ticulars, granting her motion to strike appellant’s motion to
dismiss her bill of complaint, and granting the appellee’s mo-

841

EE
842

tion to strike the said amendment of appellant’s answer.
Upon the same date the Chancellor entered a final decree of
divorce in the said action denying the exceptions to the
Special Master’s report filed by the appellant, adopting the
Special Master’s report, findings and recommendations, and
granting a final decree of absolute divorce in favor of the
appellee against appellant and terminating and dissolving the
bonds of matrimony theretofore existing between them.

The question before this Court for determination is:
whether the Chancellor erred in failing to give full faith and
credit to the final decree entered by the Pennsylvania Court.
Appellant contends that the Pennsylvania ‘decree is a proper
predicate for the defense of res adjudicata and constitutes a
bar to the instant action. Appellee maintains that said
Pennsylvania decree cannot be pleaded in bar because at least
one of the essential elements of res adjudicata—identity of
the causes of action—is not present. In support of this con-
tention appellee cites Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496, 50 So. 868;
Bagwell v. Bagwell, 153 Fla. 471, 14 So. (2nd) 841; Coleman.
v.,Coleman, 157 Fla. 515, 26 So. (2nd) 445, and other cases.

Counsel for both parties recognize the rule that “the test
of identity of causes of action for the purpose of determining
the quéstion of res adjudicata is the identity of facts essential
to the maintenance of the actions.” Bagwell v. Bagwell,
supra. The ground for divorce invoked by appellee in the
Pennsylvania suit was “Indignities to the person.” In the
Florida action ‘the appellee relied upon several grounds,
among them “extreme cruelty.” It is this ground with which
we are concerned because the Special Master recommended a.
divorce only upon that ground.

This Court has recognized two types of “extreme cruelty”
—one physical, the other mental. Apparently Pennsylvania,
through its legislative body, has also given cognizance to this:
distinction by providing separate grounds for divorce, to-wit:
“indignities to the person” and “Cruel and barbarous treat-
ment” which endangers the life of the injured and innocent
spouse. The former ground appears from the adjudications
of the Pennsylvania Courts to fall into our classification of

mental cruelty and the latter into the category of physical
cruelty. Taylor v. Taylor, 16 Atlantic (2nd) 651.

The Special Master in his report in this case made the
‘definite statement, “There is no suggestion in this case that’
any actual physical cruelty was ever visited upon the plain-
tiff by the defendant or attempted.” The appellee in her com~
plaint or libel filed in the Pennsylvania Court set forth no
facts but only charged, in the language of the statute, that
“the réspondent herein named, did on or about the 23rd day
of November, 1944, and many times previous to said date,
offer such indignities to her person as to render her condition
intolerable and her life burdensome.”

843

The character of testimony produced by appellee in the
instant case is essentially the same as that which she would
have been required to present to establish her charge of “in-
dignities to the person,” had she pursued her action in
Pennsylvania where she was given ample notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard. Consequently, we hold that the learned
Chancellor erred in granting appellee’s motion to strike the
amendment to the appellant’s answer and in entering a final
decree of divorce in favor of appellee. Full faith and credit
should have been accorded the final decree of the Pennsyl-
wvania Court.

’ There is no merit to the contention that the Judge of the
Common Pleas Court of Pennsylvania should have granted
appellee’s petition for leave to discontinue her said action
‘for divorce which was pending in said court. Her remedy
was by appeal from that Court’s order denying her petition.

The Chancellor was correct in denying appellant’s motion
to dismiss appellee’s bill of complaint because a final decree,
as well as the law of a foreign jurisdiction, must be pleaded
and proved.

The cause is reversed and remanded for future proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, J., and WHITE, Associate
Justice, concur.

844

STATE OF FLORIDA ex rel. CECIL H. CONNOR v. JIMMY SULLI-
VAN, as Sheriff of Dade County, Florida.

' 36 So, (2nd), 828 . June Term, 1948
7 September 23, 1948 Special Division A

Hubbard & Carr, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Sumter Leitner, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Rebecca Bowles Marks, for
appellee. '

CHAPMAN, J.:

‘ The appellant Cecil H. Connor, was indicted by a grand
jury of Dade County, Florida, for the crime of murder in the
first degree. In a habeas corpus proceeding he applied to the
Circuit Court of Dade County for an order releasing him from
custody on bail, but he was remanded to custody without bail
and from this order an appeal has been perfected here.

Counsel for appellant contended that the evidence relied
upon-by the State fails to establish ‘all the elements that are
essential in law to constitute the crime of murder in the
first degree. Likewise, the evidence relied upon by the State,
‘when considered as a whole, shows only a probable guilt of
murder in the first degree and therefore it cannot be said that
the proof is evident or the presumption great that the peti-
tioner is guilty of a capital offense.

- Oral argument has been heard at the bar of this court and
a careful study or analysis has been made of all the evidence
and it is our conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to an
order discharging him from custody upon giving bond in such
an amount as shall be reasonable and just as shall be de-
termined in thé court below. See Section 9 of the Dedlaration
of Rights of the Constitution of Florida; Ex- parte Nathan

a
||
845

(Fla.) 50 So. 38; Ex parte Tully, 70 Fla. 1, 66 So. 296; Russell
v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27.

Reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

BR. W. BRACK v. JERRY W. CARTER, et al., as and constituting the
Railroad & Public Utilities Commission of the State of Florida, and
AIRLINE SERVICE, INC., a corporation.

37 So. (2nd) 89 June Term, 1948

September 28, 1948 En Band

Rehearing denied October 28, 1948

John E. Mathews and P. Guy Crews, for petitioner.

Lewis W. Petteway, for respondents.

D. Byron King and Clifford T. Inglis, for Airline Service,
Inc., intervenors. .

846

PER CURIAM:

The Petitioner, R. W. Brack, operating under the name of
Airport Limousine Service, between the Municipal Airport of
the City of Jacksonville and various points in said city, is
under contract with Eastern Airlines, Delta Airlines and
Florida Airways, to transport passengers, baggage and per-
sonnel of the airlines from the airport to various points in the
City of Jacksonville, and from various points in said city to
the airport. He had been rendering this service for a num-
ber of years, and used limousines of more than seven passen-
ger capacity, excluding the driver.

On March 1, 1948, the Florida Railroad & Public Utilities
Commission brought a bill in equity seeking a permanent in-
junction to prohibit Brack from carrying on his transporta-
tion service between the Jacksonville Municipal Airport and
points in the city, alleging that he was violating the pro-
visions-of Section 323.01 and Section 323.22, Florida Statutes
Annotated.

- After the original bill of complaint seeking permanent in-
juaction was filed, Airline Service, Inc. intervened in the suit
and prayed for a temporary injunction or restraining order.
Thereafter the Commission joined with the Airline Service,
Tne. and asked for a temporary restraining order.

“In duie course Brack filed sworn answers to the bill of com-
plaint, and also to the application of Airlines Service, Inc. for
temporary injunction.

After a hearing upon the joint application for a temporary
restraining order, the court entered the following order:

“1, The Clerk of this Court be, and he is hereby, ordered
and directed to issue temporary restraining order under the
seal of this Court directed to the defendant, R. W. Brack,
his agents, servants, drivers, and employees, and each and
every of them, enjoining and restraining the said persons
from transporting persons or property for compensation to,
from and between the Jacksonville Municipal Airport and
points: within the City of Jacksonville until the further order
of this Court.

847 °

“2. This temporary restraining order being granted upon
the motion and application of The Florida Railroad and Pub-
lic Utilities Commission no bond is required of the plaintiffs
cherein.””. .

It is this order which is sought to be reviewed by Certio-
rari.

Petitioner Brack contends that he is exempt from the
jurisdiction and control of the Florida Railroad & Public
Utilities Commission by virtue of the provision of Section
323.29 F.S.A. 1941, which we quote:

“ ... There shall be further exempted from the provisions
of this chapter and from commission jurisdiction and control,
persons operating motor vehicles within the corporation
limits of any city or town or the adjoining suburban territory -
... where such business of carriage is regulated by the legis-
lative body of such cities or towns.” .

We are of the opinion the record discloses that Brack’s
service is not such as is contemplated by the above exemption.

It is our view that this exemption was intended to apply
to “persons operating motor vehicles. within the corporate
limits of any city or town or (within) the adjoining suburban
territory... where such business of carriage is regulated by
the legislative bodies of such cities or towns...” when such’
persons operate within the city or town and as an incident
thereto operate within the adjoining suburban territory. If
we were to give the words “or the adjoining suburban terri-
tory” their customary and usual meaning we would hold, be-
cause of the use of the disjunctive “or,” that this exemption
would apply to persons operating vehicles exclusively within
suburban territory which adjoins some city or town. Clearly,
such was not the intention of the legislature. There would be
no legal justification for any city or town to regulate the
operation of motor vehicles of this character where such
operation was entirely outside of the corporate limits. We
must consider said verbiage in connection with the pro-
vision “where such business of carriage is regulated by the
legislative body of such cities or towns.” So it is we construe
said exemption to mean primary operation within any city or °

ee
848

town and casual or incidental operation within adjoining
suburban territory. Moreover, we are constrained to the view
that the exemption set forth in Section 323.29 F.S.A. contem-
plates a transportation service for the general public from
place to place within a city or town and fortuitously within
its adjoining suburban territory.

Brack’s operation is not within the city limits and inci-
dentally within the adjoining suburban territory. His ve-
hicles do not pick up passengers and take them to different
points within the city, nor do they collect passengers and
transport them to different points within the adjoining subur-
ban territory. He does not serve the people living along his
routes but operates under contract on a fixed schedule be-
tween various points within the city and the municipal air-
port. Counsel for both petitioner and respondents recognize
that said municipal airport is located about three-quarters of
a mile north of the city limits of the City of Jacksonville. In-
deed, the lower court should, and may, have taken judicial
notice of the fact that an area within three-quarters of a
mile of the city limits of a city the size of Jacksonville, and
adjacent to a broad, heavily traveled, through thoroughfare,
is adjoining suburban territory. Everybody in Duval County
where this case was heard knows the foregoing fact. The
Court is presumed to know what everyone knows. Counsel
for the respondents do not contend seriously, nor could they,
that the municipal airport is not located within “adjoining
suburban territory.” Furthermore, the sworn answer filed by
R. W. Brack alleges the airport to be located in an area which
“is suburban territory adjoining the said City of Jackson-
ville.”

It is unnecessary to return this case to the lower court for
the purpose of determining whether the municipal airport is
situated within area which is adjoining suburban territory.
Regardless of the fact that the municipal airport is located
within area which is adjoining suburban territory, the peti-°
tioner still does not come within the exemption set forth in
Section 323.29 F.S.A. The record fails to disclose any as-
sumption of jurisdiction on the part of the city over the ad-

849

joining suburban territory or any effective municipal regula-
tion of the petitioner’s operations within the adjoining subur-
ban territory for the benefit of the traveling public, nor can
we envisage any such regulation in any case with a factual
situation similar to that presented by this record. The Rail-
road & Public Utilities Commission of the State of Florida
has jurisdiction to regulate the operations of the petitioner,
(Tampa Transit Lines, Inc. et al. v. Matthews et al., 158 Fla.
875, 27 So. (2nd) 377).

The petition for writ of certiorari should be, and is, de-
nied.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, ADAMS, SEBRING, BARNS
and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

CHAPMAN, J., dissents.

CHAPMAN, J., dissenting:

The Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission
filed its bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Duval County,
Florida, against R. W. Brack under the provisions of Section
323.24, F.S.A., and alleged the defendant, R. W. Brack, is an
auto transportation company within the meaning of the term
as defined by Section 323.01, F.S.A., but does not hold a cer-
tificate or permit from the plaintiff commission authorizing
the transportation of persons and property for compensation
over the public highways of Florida as required by Section
323.02, F.S.A.

“The defendant, Brack, it is alleged, is engaged in the trans-
portation of passengers for hire in motor vehicle limousines
of a passenger carrying capacity of from seven to nine per-
sons over the public highways of Florida between the Jack-
sonville, Florida, Municipal Airport and the City of Jackson-
ville without appropriate authority from the Commission and
contrary to the provisions of Section 323.02, supra. The area
and territory, it is alleged, between the Municipal Airport
and the City of Jacksonville and the operations thereon by
the defendant are subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission.

The defendant Brack, as an auto trarisportation company
within the meaning of Section 323.01, F.S.A., is now, and for

a
850

some time past has been, engaged unlawfully as a common
carrier of passengers for hire between the Jacksonville Mu-
nicipal Airport and the City of Jacksonville in that he oper-
ates between fixed terminii and on regular schedule between
said points, contrary to Sections 323.02 and 323.03, supra.
The defendant has operated said motor limousines over the
highways of Florida for hire without registration with the
plaintiff Commission and without displaying number plates or
stickers as required by Section 323.22, F.S.A. The defendant
has not paid to the State of Florida a mileage tax for the
operation of motor vehicles over the highways of Florida as
prescribed by Section 323.15, F.S.A. He has failed to obtain
public liability and property damage insurance as required by
Section 323.06, F.S.A. The plaintiff Florida Railroad and
Utilities Commission prayed for an injunction, both tempo-
rary and permanent, from transporting persons or property

. for hire over the highways of Florida in violation of the pro-
visions of Sections 323.01, 323.02, 323.03, 323.06, 828. 15, and
823.22, F.S.A.

On March 25, 1948, an order of intervention was entered
in behalf of Airline Service, Inc., permitting it to become a
plaintiff to the cause, and pursuant thereto represented to the
Court that the Airline Service, Inc., was a holder of a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity No. 324 issued to it
on January 26, 1948, by the Florida Railroad and Public
Utilities Commission and it alone is authorizéd to transport
passengers from Jacksonville to its Airport and return. The
defendant Brack, it is alleged, is operating a competitive
transportation service between the points supra, contrary to
Jaw and the operation thereof is in derogation of the rights
and privileges of the intervenor, Airline Service, Inc.

The answer of the defendant Brack admitted the allega-
tion that he did not hold a certificate or permit from the Rail-
road and Public Utilities Commission and denied that he was
operating a transportation service for hire within the mean-
ing of Section 323.01, F.S.A. The answer set out that he was
operating under a license issued to him by the City of Jack-
sonville and the City of Jacksonville had the exclusive right

and power to regulate the transportation of passengers from
the City to the Municipal Airport and return. It was not
necessary to obtain from the Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission a certificate or permit to operate over the terri-
tory because the area fell within the exemption set forth in
Section 323.29, F.S.A., viz, “there shall be further exempted
from the provisions of this Chapter and from the Commis-
sion jurisdiction and control persons operating motor vehicles
within the limits of any city or town or the adjoining subur-
ban territory, or ... ” Defendant Brack’s answer recites
that his transportation business falls within the exemption
and therefore the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission
has no jurisdiction over his business, because the arport is
situated within the area of the adjoining suburban territory” _
to the City of Jacksonville and his business is regulated by
the City of Jacksonville and not the Florida Railroad and
Public Utilities Commission and he has complied with all
charter and ordinance requirements of the City of Jackson-
ville and holds a permit from it and is operating his business
under this permit. The motor vehicles operated for hire by
the defendant over the ‘territory are not taxicabs but are
authorized by Section 323.29, supra.

The Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission and
Airline Service, Inc., jointly applied to the Chancellor below
for a temporary restraining order upon a sworn bill of com-
plaint and supporting affidavits, and the defendant’s answer
and amendments thereto were considered as counter affidavits
in opposition to the application. A temporary restraining
order issued restraining the defendant from transporting per-
sons and property for compensation to, from and between the
Jacksonville Municipal Airport and points within the City of
Jacksonville until a further order of the court. On petition
for interlocutory certiorari we are requested to quash the
temporary restraining order.

851

Paragraph 4 of the bill of complaint is viz: “The area and
territory between the Municipal Airport, aforesaid, and the
City of Jacksonville, Florida, and the operation of the de-
fendant herein as above described are subject to the jurisdic-

Se
852

tion of the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commis-
sion.” ‘The last two sentences of paragraph 3 of the defend-
ant’s answer are viz: “Defendant further alleges that he has.
complied with all the rules and regulations of the City Council
of the City of Jacksonville with reference to for hire cars oper-
ated within the city limits of the City of Jacksonville. Defend~
ant further says that the area from the city limits of Jackson-
ville to the Municipal Airport is approximately three-quarters
of a mile and is suburban territory adjoining the said City of
Jacksonville.” It is admitted by the pleadings that the Munici-
pal Airport is situated approximately three-quarters of a mile
from the city limits of the City of Jacksonville and is situ-
ated, it is contended, within the adjoining suburban terri-

_ tory to the City of Jacksonville. The controlling question
here is, does the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Com-
mission have jurisdiction and power to regulate the operation
of transportation companies within the area, or is that power
and authority by statute. vested in the City of Jacksonville?
The Chancellor below in entering the restraining order held.
as a matter of law that the power and authority was vested
in the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission and
not in the City of Jacksonville.

The defendant-petitioner contends that his motor vehicle
operation is exempted from the Commission's jurisdiction be-
cause of the following language found in Section 323.29,
FS.A., viz: “There shall be further exempted from this Chap-
ter and from the Commission’s jurisdiction and control per-
sons operating motor vehicles within the corporate limits of
any city or town or the ‘adjoining suburban territory’ .. .
where such business of carriage is regulated by the body of
such cities or towns.” It is clear that the Legislature by the
employment of this language intended that “adjoining subur-
ban territory” should be considered and dealt with on the
same basis, terms and conditions as the area located within
the corporate limits of the municipality. These areas by
statute are regulated by the legislative body of the cities or
towns but not by the Railroad Commission.

We have not been favored with a statutory definition of
“adjoining suburban territory,” but Webster defines “suburb”

Le
[|
853

as “a district or region near or adjoining the boundaries of a
city; a village or town so near as to be suitable for a place of
residence for persons regularly employed in a city; in the
plural, environs; confines; surrounding territory.” Section
323.05, F.S.A., as amended in 1945 by Chapter 22,842, related
to “for Hire” vehicles and authorized the Railroad Com-
mission to hold hearings to determine what is suburban terri-
tory, and the language is viz:

“... The commission upon complaint or upon its own
motion may hold public hearings to determine what is the
suburban territory immediately adjacent to any municipality
within the limits of the above definition, and at such hearing
it shall be presumed that such adjacent suburban territory
includes all that territory lying within a radius of five miles
of the corporate limits of municipalities of ten thousand
population or less, together with an additional mile for each
additional fifty thousand population or fraction thereof of
said municipality according to the last federal census.” (Em-
phasis supplied).

Webster defines “adjoining” to mean “Joining to; con-
tiguous; adjacent; as, an adjacent room”. “Synonyms: ad-
jacent; contiguous; near; neighboring; abutting; bordering.”
Where the charter of a water company authorized it to supply
water for a certain city “and the town adjoining” and it ap-
peared that the only municipal corporations whose borders
touched the city were townships, the charter gives a right to
supply such townships, since the word “adjoining” implies
contact and excludes intervening space. Plainfiield-Union

, Water Co. v. Inhabitants of City of Plainfield, 84 N.J.L. 634,
87 Atl. 448.

The exemption from the jurisdiction of the Railroad Com-
mission referred to in our statute by the phrase as “adjoining
suburban territory” to the limits of any town “where such
business is regulated by the legislative body” should be con-
strued and given its usual, familiar and generally understood
meaning as used in everyday life. It is clear that the sta-
tutory exemption, supra, extends from the limits of the City’
of Jacksonville in the general direction of the Municipal Air-
port, but we are unable to hold on this record that the Airport

854

is situated within the area referred to as “adjoining suburban
territory”, but on the point an adversary hearing should be
had and thereafter a decree entered adjudicating the contro-
verted issue. We hold that the phrase “the adjoining sub-
urban territory” of any city or town “where such carriage is:
regulated by the legislative body,” referred to in Section
323.29, F.S.A., as an exemption from the jurisdiction of the
Railroad Commission involves a judicial question consisting
of both law and fact to be heard and determined upon the
merits of each controversy. In the light of our construction
of the phrase “adjoining suburban territory,” if the Chancel-
lor below, after hearing testimony, concludes that the Muni-
cipal Airport is now situated within the area of “Adjoining
suburban territory” to the incorporate limits of the City of
Jacksonville, then the bill of complaint should be dismissed
as the territory would not be within the jurisdiction of the
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, otherwise a perma-
nent injunction should be entered on final hearing.

The majority opinion fails to consider Section 2 of Chapter
23912, Acts of 1947, Laws of Florida, and paragraph three
of defendant-petitioner’s answer filed March 30, 1948, in which
a denial-is made that he operated an auto transportation com-
pany within the meaning of Sections 323.01 and 323.02, F.S.A.,
but was operating motor vehicles limousines of a passenger
carrying capacity of seven to nine passengers between the
Municipal Airport and different points within the City of
Jacksonville and the governing authorities of the City of
Jacksonville granted him a permit or license No. 6139 for a
period of one year after October 13, 1947, after a full
compliance by the defendant with all charter and ordinance
provisions of the City of Jacksonville and laws of Florida
applicable thereto.

Section 323.01, F.S.A., defines an auto transportation com-
pany viz: “(7) ‘Auto transportation company’ means all per-
sons, their lessees, trustees, or receivers, owning, controlling
or managing any motor. propelled vehicle not usually operated
on or over fixed rails, used in the business of transporting
persons or property for compensation over any public high:
ways in this state and shall specifically include; ( (a), (b),.

Le
be
855

and (c) ).” Section 323.02, F.S.A., provides that: “No aito
transportation company shall operate any motor vehicle for
the transportation of persons or proerty for compensation
on any public highway in this state without first having ob-
tained from railroad commission a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity or a permit as hereinafter provided.”

Sections 323.01 and 323.02, F.S.A., must be weighed and
considered in light of the pertinent provisions of Chapter
23912, Acts of 1947, because the defendant-petitionér’s an-
swer set out that he was operating motor vehicle limousines
of a capacity of seven to nine passengers and applied to the
City of Jacksonville for a license or permit so to do and ob-
tained license or permit No. 6139 on October 13, 1947. (See
Paragraph 3 of defendant’s answer filed March 30, 1948.)

Paragraph 5 of the-bill of complaint is viz:

“R. W. Brack, the defendant herein, as an auto transporta-
tion company as defined by Section 323.01, Florida Statutes,
1941, is now and has been engaged in unlawful common
carrier passenger transportation for compensation between
the Municipal Airport of the City of Jacksonville, and the City
of Jacksonville in that he operates between fixed termini and
on regular schedule between said points without proper au-
thority therefor contrary to Sections 323.02 and 323.03,
Florida Statutes, 1941.”

The defendant’s answer thereto is viz:

“5. Answering paragraph number five, this defendant
denies that he is operating an auto transportation company
within the meaning of the laws of the State of Florida and
alleges that he is not operating from fixed termini and on-
regular schedules, but he is required to transport passengers
to various places within the City of Jacksonville and to no
particular place, and he is required to transport them after
they arrived at the Municipal Airport, which on many oc-
casions, is not at any fixed time.”

The power and authority to regulate the transportation of
passengers from the Municipal Airport to points within the
City of Jacksonville “by motor vehicles having 4 capacity of
over seven (7) passengers and operated over regular routes
on fixed schedules” under Section 2 of Chapter 23912, Acts of

856

1947, was placed within the jurisdiction of the City of Jack-
soniville.

Chapter 22842, Acts of 1945, which amended Section
323.05, F.S.A., defines a taxi cab as follows:

.“.. . Provided, further, that the term ‘taxi cab’ as used
herein shall be construed to include every motor vehicle of
seven passenger capacity or less, subject to municipal license
and regulation, engaged in the general transportation of per-
sons ‘for hire’, not on regular schedule or between fixed
termini or over regular routes, but over the streets generally
of said municipality, with occasional trips beyond the boun-
daries thereof...”

Paragraph 3 of the bill of complaint alleges that the de-
fendant was engaged in the transportation of passengers “for
hire in motor vehicle limousines of a passenger capacity of
from seven to nine passengers over the public highways of this
state between the Jacksonville, Florida, Municipal Airport
and the City of Jacksonville.” It is admitted that Brack now
holds license or permit No. 6139 issued to him by the City of
Jacksonville on October 13, 1947. Likewise, it is not an issue
that Brack failed to comply with the ordinance, charter pro-
visions and the applicable state law of the City of Jacksonville
in obtaining the permit. The Railroad Commission by statute
can issue permits to taxi cab operators transporting pass-
engers for hire by motor vehicles of seven passengers or less.
It is alleged supra and admitted that Brack’s limousines have
a capacity of seven to nine passengers.

I think the restraining order complained of was errone-
ously entered and I therefore dissent.

a
J. T, THOMPSON v. MRS. EDNA GUNTNER
36 So. (2nd) 826 June Term, 1948
September 28, 1948 En Bane

J. M. & H. P. Sapp, for appellant.
Mercer P. Spear, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

This is a suit in replevin having substantially the following
factual background: The plaintiff, J. I. Thompson, on De-
cember 27, 1946, owned and operated the Montgomery Motor
Company, of Montgomery, Alabama, and was a dealer in au-
tomobiles. Louis F. Spurlock lived in Troy, Alabama, and
Mrs. Edna Guntner, at the time of the filing of this suit, lived
or resided in or near Panama City, Florida. Mr. Spurlock
and Mrs. Guntner, on December 27, 1946, traveling together in
a 1941 DeSoto sedan owned by Mrs. Guntner, went to the place
of business of the Montgomery Motor Company, in Mont-
gomery, Alabama, and requested a trade of the 1941 DeSoto
in which they were traveling for an Oldsmobile 4-door sedan.
The several details of the trade of the cars were handled by
Mr. R. H. Howell for the Montgomery Motor Company in the
presence of the owner, Mr. Thompson.

The 1941 DeSoto owned by Mrs. Guntner was subject to a
lien in the sum of $205.00 in favor of Eaton Finance Company
of Panama City, Florida. The Montgomery Motor Company
paid the amount of said lien and accepted a transfer of the
title certificate from Mrs. Edna Guntner of the 1941 DeSoto
automobile at an agreed trade-in value of $250.00, and the
agreed purchase price of the 4-door 1946 model Oldsmobile
was the sum of $2500.00. The terms of the trade required
payment to the Montgomery Motor Company in the sum of
$2250.00, plus the amount of the lien of $205.00, making a

a
858

total of $2455.00. Louis F. Spurlock gave a check for said
amount and received from the Montgomery Motor Company
@ bill of sale to the Oldsmobile and both drove away in it.

The Spurlock check proved worthless and he was later
arrested, informed against, and, on arraignment entered a plea
of guilty and was by the trial court in Montgomery sentenced
to serve in the State Prison of the State of Alabama for a
period of three years for the giving of this worthless check.
The Oldsmobile was located or found in the posession of Mrs.
Edna Guntner, of Panama City, Florida. The Montgomery
Motor Company filed a suit in replevin in the Circuit Court of
Bay County, Florida, for the- possession of the Oldsmobile
and upon the trial of the issues in the court below she con-
tended that she was a,bona fide purchaser of the Oldsmobile
from Mr. Spurlock for value and without notice of any prop-
erty interest of the Montgomery Motor Company in the Olds-
mobile.’ A verdict and judgment in her favor were entered
in the court below and the plaintiff appealed.

Section 78.18, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., provides that when judg-
ment is for plaintiff and when he has the goods he may re-
cover damage only for the taking and costs.

Section 78.19, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., provides that when judg-
ment is for plaintiff and defendant has goods the plaintiff may
take judgment for goods and damage or a money judgment
for goods and damage eacept when plaintiff’s interest is (a) a
lien, or (b) some special interest, in which event “judgment”
shall be for amount of lien or special interest “duly estab-
lished” and:

“.,, after the rendition of the judgment, the plaintiff may,
at his option, sue out a writ of possession for the property,
and execution for his costs, or sue out execution against the
defendant and his sureties for the amount recovered as afore-
said and costs.”

Section 78.20, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., provides that when judg-
ment is for the defendant and he has the goods he may recover
only the damage for the taking and costs.

Section 78.21, F.S. 1941 F.S.A., provides that when judg-
ment is for the defendant and the plaintiff has the property

859

that judgment “shall be entered against plaintiff for the prop-
erty and against him and his sureties for the value and costs
in the same manner as provided in 78.19 for judgment in
favor of plaintiff, and defendant shall have the same election
as in said section accorded to the plaintiff.”

In Evans v. Kloeppel, 72 Fla. 267, 73 So. 180, the Court
allowed judgment to stand upon pleadings different from
those now before the Court, wherein the amount of the down
payment by defendant was offset by the damages to the plain-
tiff by reason of the detention of the chattel by the defendant,
the adjustment of values and damages being as if in rescission
of the contract.

Upon the facts established by the evidence, the plaintiff
should have received a favorable verdict; however, the ver-
dict of the jury was for defendant. It appears that under Sec-
tion 52.11, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., the defendant might have been
entitled to interpose a counter-claim for the value of her ad-
vancement of the net value of her DeSoto in the exchange,
(which exchange in effect seems to have been rescinded)
subject to being offset by damages suffered by the plaintiff
by reason of any depreciation of the Oldsmobile between the
time of the original transaction and the recapture by the writ
of replevin.

One of the pleas allowed to stand was as follows:

“2, That the actual value of the automobile described in
the Declaration is not Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($2500), but that the actual value thereof is Three Thousand
and Two Hundred Dollars ($3200).”

This plea was not sufficient to state a defense and it was
error to allow it to stand against demurrer.

The judgment appealed is reversed and a new trial
awarded, subject to such amended pleas as the trial judge may
permit to be interposed.

THOMAS, C. J., BARNS and HOBSON, JJ. concur.

TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

ADAMS, J., not participating.

|

De
860
BEATRICE E. BRUNNER v. E. C. BRUNNER
36 So. (2nd) 827 June Term, 1948
September 28, 1948 En Bane

Thomas H. Anderson, for petitioner.
Jackson L. Peters, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

It is true that the master made a finding that the appellant
had in his possession Government Bonds in the sum of
$2500.00 and it was stated by the master that’ they “would be
considered as owned by the parties as an estate by the en-
tireties.”

One of the several exceptions of the plaintiff-appellant-
husband respecting the masters report was:

“Said conclusions should be that the charge of adultery is
sufficiently proven and sustained by competent proofs offered.
Said $2,500.00 in bonds in possession of plaintiff, having been
purchased with the money of plaintiff, is his separate prop-
erty and should be retained by him as an offset pro tanto of
government bonds and cash squandered by defendant.”

The Chancellor by his final decree recited that

“(4) The report of the Special Master in Chancery, John
C. Gramling, is accepted, approved, ratified and confirmed,
except as to the portion of the same which is overruled in this
decree”—and did thereupon “decree” among other things that

“(2) the report of the special master in Chancery, John
C. Gramling, is accepted, approved, ratified and confirmed,
except as the same is overruled and departed from herein.”

Le
—
861

It appears from such decree that the Chancellor made no
order and intended to make none, disturbing Dr. Brunner’s
possession of the $2500.00 in U. S. Bonds. He had them when
the suit started and the Chancellor did nothing to interfere
with his possession of what he claimed his money paid for.
To change his legal status in respect thereto a specific decree
was essential. The decree being silent on the point, the mas-
ter’s report with respect to the disposition to be made of the
bonds was “overruled and departed from” in the decree.

The Chancellor’s final decree was appealed by the wife and
was affirmed except as to an enlargement of alimony. See
Brunner v. Brunner 159 Fla. 762, 32 So. (2nd) 736. This act
of enlargement of alimony was not made conclusive for all
time but prompted by equitable consideration of the tran-
sitional shift in the affairs of her life then transpiring by
reason of the divorce decree.

The petition for rehearing is denied.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, BARNS, SEBRING and
HOBSON, JJ. concur.

THOMAS, C. J., dissents.

EZELLA SCOTT, as Administratrix of the Estate of John Scott, de-
ceased, and CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, corporation,
v. MILLARD F. CALDWELL, as Governor of the State of Florida,
for the use and benefit of the County of Bay in said State.

37 So. (2nd) 85 . June Term, 1948
October 1, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing denied October 25, 1948

862

J.M. & H. P. Sapp, for appellant.
James N. Daniel and L. D. McRae, for appellee.

CHAPMAN, J.:

Millard F. Caldwell, as Governor of Florida, for the use
and benefit of Bay County, Florida, filed a bill of complaint in
equity against Ezella Scott, the legal representative of John
Scott, deceased, who, prior to his death, held the office of
Sheriff of Bay County, and Continental Casualty Company, a
bondsman of the deceased. The bill of complaint alleged that
the deceased, as Sheriff of Bay County, was short in his
accounts and had failed to pay over to Bay County certain
sums of money received by him as Sheriff as required by law.

The State Auditing Department, it was alleged, audited
the office of Sheriff of Bay County during the year 1945, cov-
ering a period of time beginning August 1, 1943, and ending
January 1, 1945, and certain official transactions from Janu-
ary 1, 1945 to April 25, 1945. A certified copy of the Audit
Report No. 2738 as made by W. R. England, Assistant State
Auditor, and filed with the State Auditor, was attached to the
bill of complaint. The report contains itemized statements of
the accounts of the late John Scott, as Sheriff of Bay County,
and shows the sum of $23,183.02 due by John Scott at the
time of his death to the County of Bay.

It was further alleged that the accounts of the said John
Scott, reflecting his indebtedness to Bay County, are com-
posed of numerous items and involve extensive and compli-

Le
——
863

eated accounts, and a great number of transactions, among
them being approximately six hundred bond estreatures and
for money collected by him on approximately one hundred
fines in criminal cases. The deceased failed to keep any
record of income and income receipts were established by
records outside of his office and other outside sources; all cash
bonds were not entered on the bond register of the Sheriff's
office; for many of the cash bonds no duplicate receipts could
be located; that it was the lawful duty of Scott, as Sheriff, to
render an accounting of the administration of his office, and
likewise his legal. representative failed to render an account~-
ing of the affairs of the office as Sheriff of Bay County.

The plaintiff prayed for an accounting of the money re-
ceived and disbursed by John Scott as Sheriff of Bay County,
Florida, and an accounting of the money due said County by
John Scott at the time he ceased to be Sheriff of said county
and at the time of his death; that a court of equity hear evi-
dence on the many claims involved in favor of Bay County
against the estate of John Scott, deceased; and that a judg-
ment be entered against Ezella Scott, as administratrix of
the estate of John Scott, deceased, for such amount, with in-
terest thereon, and against the deceased’s surety, Continental
Casualty Company. :

The defendants moved the court to dismiss the bill of com-
plaint on grounds (a) there was no equity in the bill; (b) the
allegations were vague and indefinite and failed to state
grounds for equitable relief; (c) it affirmatively appeared that

_ the plaintiff had a full and adequate remedy at law; (d) a
commingling of funds or any common property of the parties
was not alleged; (e) fiduciary relations were not shown or
alleged. The motion to dismiss by an order of the lower court
was denied. This order was reviewed here by interlocutory
certiorari under Rule 34 and by this Court denied on July 12,
1946.

The defendants answered the bill of complaint and either
admitted or denied paragraphs and pertinent allegations
thereof. They admitted that the administratrix had failed to
render an accounting of the administration of the affairs of
the office and were without knowledge as to whether certain

864

allegations in the bill of complaint were true or false and de-
manded strict proof thereof. They denied a fiduciary relation-
ship now exists or has ever existed between the defendants or
either of them and Bay County. They were not in possession
of the records of the Sheriff’s office of Bay County as kept by
John Scott and have no knowledge as to the manner or method
of keeping the said official records during the period John
Scott occupied the office of Sheriff of Bay County.

W. R. England testified for the plaintiff below to the effect
that he has been an Assistant State Auditor and had been
employed in such capacity continuously since 1933 and his
duties were to check and audit County and State officials of
the State of Florida. He was a licensed Public Accountant
from 1931 to 1933 and at the present time is a certified Public
Accountant. England examined copy of Report No. 2738, the
number given it by the State Auditing Department, and after
an examination stated that he made up the accounts and
records of John Scott as Sheriff of Bay County, Florida, from
August 1, 1943 and ending January 1, 1945, and the report
was dated June 1, 1945. The witness testified that he began
the audit on March 20, 1945, and completed it on June 1, 1945,
and actually worked on the assignment a period of fifty-nine
days. In making the audit he referred to and used the same
records as made by the Sheriff’s office. He checked’ the
records of cases in the County Judge’s office and conviction
records as kept in the Clerk’s office.

Counsel for- plaintiff below offered in evidence the certified
copy of the report. of the audit, which was identified as
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. It was offered in evidence to estab-
lish the amount due by John Scott to Bay County, Florida, at
the time of his death. Objections on various grounds were
made to its introduction by the plaintiff below and the objec-
tions were sustained by the Special Master and counsel for
plaintiff filed several exceptions to the report as made by the
Special Master. The Chancellor on final hearing sustained
plaintiff's exceptions to the Special Master’s report and ad-
mitted into evidence a copy of the auditor’s report and entered
a final decree for plaintiff below in the sum of $25,911.67, and
defendants appealed.

* 865

Counsel for appellants contend (1) that a court of equity
is without jurisdiction to entertain a suit for accounting, as
was done in the case at bar: (2) that it has not been alleged,
proven or established that a fiduciary relation existed between
the parties; (3) that the court below committed reversible
error in receiving into evidence, over seasonable objections
of the defendant below, a certified copy of the audit identified
as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1; (4) that the court erred by its
order denying the defendants’ motion to strike paragraph 6
of the bill of complaint. Counsel for appellee contend that the
suffciency of the bill of complaint was fully sustained and the
law of the case established when this Court on July 12, 1946,
denied the petition for a writ of interlocutory certiorari under
Rule 34.

Arguendo, let us concede that in sustaining the bill of com-
plaint on the former appeal against an attack on motion to
dismiss for want of equity, the bill contained equity. We then
turn to the question: has a court of equity jurisdiction to
entertain a suit for accounting as was held in the court below?
The record discloses two items alone—first, some 600 bond
estreatures and, second, 100 fines, and the proceeds thereof
paid into the Sheriff’s office. Counsel for appellants would
have the State in the case at bar institute suits at law to
recover the 700 contested items, and have a jury decide ques-
tions of fact incident thereto. Our adjudications recognize
a distinction between equity jurisdiction and law, especially
where a full, complete and adequate remedy exists at law.
An answer to the contention may be found in our own adjudi-
cations. See Escambia County v. Blount Const. Co., 66 Fla.
129, 62 So. 650; R. O. Holton & Co. v. Hull, 140 Fla. 687, 192
So. 229; Campbell v. Knight, 92 Fla. 246, 109 So. 577.

Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 1 (5th ed.) 267-268,
par. 186a, when discussing concurrent jurisdiction of equity
and law, states the rule viz:

“Accounting—The most important, comprehensive, and
multiform remedy of the concurrent jurisdiction which re-
sults in pecuniary recovery is that of accounting (see Sec.
1420). The variety of its uses and possible applications is

|
866°

practically unlimited; it can be adapted to all circumstances
and relations in which an account is necessary for the settle-
ment of claims and liabilities, and for the doing of full justice
to the litigant parties...”

See Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 4 (5th ed.)
1076-1081, par. 1420-21-22; 1 Am. Jur. 298; 1 C. J. 613-619.

Emphasis is placed on the contention that the record fails
to disclose an existing fiduciary relation between the parties
so as to confer jurisdiction of the subject matter on a court
of equity. The answer to the contention is that the voters of
Bay County elected John Scott to the office of Sheriff of said
County. The deceased prior to his death assumed and per-
formed the duties of the office for a period of time. The 600
bond estreatures were made during the time he held the office
as Sheriff and some 100 fines were imposed by the courts of
Bay County. The bond estreature moneys and fines, accord-
ing to the audit admitted in evidence, were paid to John Scott,
as Sheriff of Bay County. Our statutory law made it the duty
of the officer receiving the money honestly and faithfully to
account for the same, make a proper record thereof and to
place it with the official or bank as the statutes direct. He
was without lawful authority to retain these sums, or any
part thereof, but was charged with the statutory duty not
only to receive but to disburse the same. The law imposes
the duty on the officer when holding office ta account for
official moneys and if he fails so to do, then he or his legal
representative may be required in a proper forum to perform
the statutory obligations. °

Counsel for appellants contend that the court erred in ad-
mitting in evidence a certified copy of the audit report No.
2738 identified as Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1, reflecting a short-
age in Sheriff Scott’s office in the sum of $23,183.02. The pre-
liminary evidence for its admission, as shown by the record,
was given by Mr. English, the Assistant State Auditor, and
Mr. Weaver, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Bay County. It is
pointed out that no statutory authority exists for its admis-
sion in evidence and the case of McDaniel v. State, 103 Fla.

a
Le
867

529, 187 So. 702, cited and relied upon in the lower court is
not in point. Section 21.01, F.S.A., created a State Auditing
Department for the State of Florida and consists of one State
Auditor and ten Assistant State Auditors. Section 21.02,
F.S.A., authorizes the Governor of Florida to appoint these
auditors, whose term of office shall be for four years, but “no
one shall be appointed State Auditor or Assistant State Audi-
tor who is not a qualified accountant.” Section 21.03 supra
makes it a duty of an Auditor or an Assistant’ Auditor to
“promptly report any delinquency or shortage on the part of
any State or County officer, whose books, and papers have
been audited by him”; he gives bond and subscribes to ari
oath that he will well ‘and faithfully discharge the duties of
his office. Section 21.06 supra provides a penalty for making
a false report. Section 21.11 makes it the official duty of any
Auditor when discovering a shortage, misappropriation of
funds, or delinquencies by any officer, or any office, institution,
board or commission at once to make a complete and detailed
report thereof to the State Auditor, and then the State
Auditor shall at once furnish the Governor a copy of such
report, and a duplicate copy to the Comptroller of the State of
Florida. ,

In Bell v. Kendrick, 25 Fla. 778, 6 So. 868, we held that
official records kept by public officers and in which they
entered their official transactions as a convenient and ap-
propriate mode of properly discharging the duties of their
office are admissible in evidence, although there is no statute
expressly authorizing or requiring such registers to be kept.
This rule has been reaffirmed by this Court in several cases.
See Branch v. State, 76 Fla. 558, 80 So. 482; White v. State, 78
Fla. 52, 82 So. 602. In Sweat v. Waldon, 123 Fla. 478, 167 So.
363, we held that fees collected by a Sheriff represent a charge
made by the Sheriff for his services and the excess is paid into
the treasury, and the Sheriff becomes the trustee of the State
to collect and properly account for these funds. Likewise, the
law requires the State Auditor to audit the books and report
any delinquency in such collection and a penalty is imposed‘on
any county officer who fails to produce his records and books
to be audited.

Le
868

It is the rule in many States of the Union to give the
findings of an Auditor as set-out in his report the same effect
equivalent to the report of a master in chancery. See Wig-
more on Evidence, Vol. 5 (3 ed) 694-729, pars. 1672-23.
Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2 (11 ed), par. 1104, states
the rule viz: “When pertinent and essential facts can be ascer-
tained only by an examination of a large number of entries ifi
books of account, an auditor or an expert accountant, who has
made examination and analysis of the books and figures, may
testify as a witness and give summarized statements of what
the books show as a result of his investigation, provided the
books themselves are accessible to the court and parties. See
Tribble on Florida Evidence 1022, par. 4538.

The statutes supra creating the employment or office of
State Auditor and ten Assistant State Auditors, prescribing
their duty, requiring the making of a $5,000.00 bond by each,
conditioned for the faithful discharge of duty and subscribing
to an oath in effect that he will “faithfully discharge the du-
ties of his office,” coupled with other pertinent provisions of
the statutes supra, are sufficient to bring the State Auditor or
an Assistant State Auditor within the rule expressed in Bell
v. Kendrick supra, and a statute permitting or admitting in
evidence a certified copy of the State Auditor’s report of the
Sheriff’s office of Bay County in the case at bar as contended
for is not required. The certified copy of the State Auditor’s
report should be received as prima facie evidence of the cor-
rectness of the condition or affairs of the office for the period
of time covered by the report and then contradictory evidence
may be received by the trial court if offered.

We fail to find error in the record.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

|
GRADY PEADEN v. R. J. ESTES and wife, CATHERINE ESTES and

T. J. ESTES.

86 So. (2nd) 928 June Term, 1948
October 1, 1948 Special Division B

Philip D. Beall, Jr., for appellant.
Parker, Foster & Wigginton, and Woodrow M. Melvin, for
appellees.

ADAMS, J.: .

We affirmed the decree here on appeal without opinion and
have since granted a rehearing.

The controlling question is whether the holder of a tax
deed in this case is entitled to the benefit of Section 196.06,
Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A., which provides:

“When the holder of a tax deed goes into actual posses-
sion, occupancy and use of the land embraced in such tax deed,
and so continues for a period of four years, no suit for the re-
covery of the possession thereof shall be brought by a former
owner or other adverse claimant, unless such suit be com-
menced within, or prior to, the said period of four years after
the holder under such tax deed has entered into the actual
possession, occupancy and use of the land embraced in said
tax deed;

The chancellor found:

“The defendants, R. J. Estes and J. T. Estes and their
predecessors in title, have enjoyed the actual possession, oc-
cupancy and use of the lands.in question, beginning in Janu-
ary, 1937, and continuing until about September, 1942, at
which time turpentine operations on said property ceased due
to the fact that Lamar Estes, who is a brother of the de-
fendants and was by them employed to carry on such turpen-
tine operations, was called into the Armed Forces of this na-
tion. The court further finds from the evidence that from
September, 1942, until the institution of litigation, the de-
fendants used the property for the growth of pine timber
and kept the same under their control and supervision. The
defendants, through their agent and servant, J. E. Estes, were

Le
870

in possession of the property, and were engaged in cutting
and removing pulp wood therefrom when such possession was
terminated on February 1, 1947, by a restraining order issued
by the Commissioner of this Court at the suit of Grady
Peaden, which order was in force at the time of the filing of
the above entitled cause.” ~

Appellant insists that Sanvorn v. South Florida Naval
Stores Company, 75 Fla. 145, 78 So. 428, compels a reversal of
this decree. In the cited case the showing of possession was
only that of paying taxes and taking turpentine from the
trees. From the quoted findings of the chancellor the char-
acter of possession in this case is much stronger.
_ We, therefore, adhere to our former judgment of af-
firmance.

So ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and BARNS, JJ., concur.

ROBERT DANIEL SMITH v. MYRTLE HARMON SMITH, as Custod-
jan and Natural Guardian of the Person of AGNES CAROLYN
SMITH, 2 minor.

36 So. (2nd) 920 June Term, 1948
October 1, 1948 Special Division A

Gregory & Towles, for appellant.
Gardner & Lines, for appellee.

871

CHAPMAN, J.:

From an order awarding ‘the custody of a girl child, Agnes
Carolyn Smith, born May 26, 1939, to its mother eleven
months of the year and one month to the father, an appeal has
heen perfected here by the father. Counsel for appéllant con-
tend that in awarding the custody of the child preference
should be given to the father where each parent is found to be
a suitable person to have the custody thereof. Counsel cite
and rely on our holdings in Miller v. Miller, 38 Fla. 227, 20 So.
989; Maddox v. Barr, 49 Fla. 182, 38 So. 766; Lee v. Lee, 67
Fla. 396, 65 So. 585; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 84 Fla. 500, 94 So.
157; State ex rel. Bonsack v. Campbell, 134 Fla. 809, 184 So.
332, and similar cases.

The lower court considered and ruled upon the following
evidence as stipulated to by counsel of record:

“Myrtle Harmon Smith and Robert Daniel Smith were
married to each other in South Carolina in 1938. On May 26,
1939, a daughter, Agnes Carolyn Smith, was born of this
marriage. The family lived together until about May, 1945,
except for a few months early in 1944, during which Robert
Daniel Smith served in the United States Navy.

“About the month of May, 1945, while the wife and child,
without the consent of the husband-father, were temporarily
in Cleveland, Ohio, attending a convention of ‘Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses’ (a faith adopted by the wife after the marriage over
the objections of her husband), the husband left the home and
the parties have not lived together since. The cohabitation
of the parents ceased at that time.

“For some time prior to the separation of Myrtle Harmon.
Smith and Robert Daniel Smith, the latter had been engaged
in the jewelry business in Woodruff, South Carolina, and had
in his employ a lady by the. name of Mrs. Everette Gilmore
Williams. In September, 1946, Mr. Smith and Mrs. Williams
each secured a divorce in Augusta, Georgia, at the same term
of Court and represented by the same attorney. Both divorces
were secured on constructive service and the notices ran con-
currently in the newspapers. Mr. Smith testified that he
established a residence in Georgia ‘In the summer of’ and, at '
another time ‘In May’, 1945. The notice for constructive serv-

|
872

ice was running in March, 1946. Mr. Smith also testified that
he satisfied both his lawyer and the Georgia Court that he
had established sufficient residence in Georgia to secure a
divorce there.

“Mr. Smith and Mrs. Williams were married to each other
very shortly after their respective divorces and are now living
together as husband and wife. The present Mrs. Smith,
formerly Mrs. Williams, did not testify or appear before the
Court in these habeas corpus proceedings.

“Within a few months after his second marriage Mr. Smith
disposed of his jewelry business in Woodruff, South Carolina
and established a similar business in Havana, Gadsden
County, Florida, where he, his present wife, and a ten year
old daughter of the latter by her first husband, have since
lived. .

“After the separation of Myrtle Harmon Smith and Robert
Daniel Smith, Myrtle Smith, who retained custody of their
child, Agnes Carolyn Smith, moved with the child to Green-
ville, South Carolina, and secured employment in a textile mill
where she earned $40.00 per week. Mr. Smith contributed
fairly regularly and fairly substantially to the support of the
child.

“This situation continued until October 1947, at which
time Mr. Smith went to Greenville and, without the mother’s
knowledge or consent brought the child to Havana, Florida.
A few weeks later the mother, Myrtle Harmon Smith, without
the knowledge or consent of the father, took the child from
Havana, Florida, and carried it to the home of her married
sister, who had two children, the approximate age of Agnes
Carolyn, out in the country from Woodruff, South Carolina,
about forty miles from Greenville. She testified that she
left the child with her sister in order to prevent the father
retaking it and that she visited it frequently on week-ends.
However, in February, 1948, the father again went to South
Carolina, took the child from the school it was attending and
brought it back to Havana, Florida. The mother then insti-
tuted habeas corpus proceedings to secure legal custody of
the child.

873

“The evidence shows that when Agnes Carolyn Smith was
brought to Florida from the home of her aunt she was in poor
health, but rapidly improved; that her teeth needed consider-
able attention and this was provided by the father. There is
no evidence as to the physical condition of the child when first
taken from the mother in Greenville in October, 1947.

“The evidence in no way reflects upon the moral character,
habits, or conduct of either parent. Apparently the principal,
if not the only objection the father has to the mother as a
proper custodian of the child, is that she is rearing the child
to believe in the tenets of ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses’, a religious
sect of which the father strongly disapproved, he is not a
member of any church but sometimes attends the Baptist
Church. .

“Both parents appear to love the child and to strongly de-
sire its custody.

“The father is now in the jewelry business in Havana
Florida, making about $400.00 a month. The mother’s earn-
ings are about $40.00 per week.

“Myrtle Harmon Smith testified that if awarded custody of
the child she would return with it to her home in Greenville,
South Carolina, and keep it with her there. The home is de-
scribed in a confidential report of the Welfare Department
which will be certified to the Supreme Court.

“The evidence shows that when the child was with her,
Mrs. Smith had an arrangement for the care of the child by a
neighbor while she was working and at other hours gave the
child her personal attention.

“That Myrtle Harmon Smith had complete care, custody
and control of the said minor child, Agnes Carolyn Smith,
from the time of the separation of the parents in 1945 until
this controversy arose.”

The Court below held both the father and mother fit and
proper persons to have the custody of the child but a sub-
stantial reason exists for placing the child with its natural
mother for eleven months and the father one month of each
year. It was not clear to the lower court that the interest and
welfare of the child would be safeguarded by awarding it to
the father, thereby placing it in a home presided over by a

874

stepmother and cause it to be associated with her child by a
former marriage with whom no natural bonds exist. The
moral and religious atmosphere of their home for some reason
was not clearly developed by the testimony. Courts in award-
ing the custody of minor children are motivated by the best
interest and welfare of. the child rather than perpetuating
some of the ancient law rules wherein the father was per-
ferred over the mother as set out in the cases cited by counsel
for appellant. .

Tn Green v. Green, 137 Fla. 359, 188 So. 355, Chief Justice
THOMAS, speaking for the Court on the point now before us,
in part, said: “Nature has prepared a mother to bear and rear
her young and to perform many services for them and to give
them many attentions for which the father is not equipped.”
In Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 1 So. (2nd) 480, the
Court speaking through Mr. Justice TERRELL, said:

“So the ultimate test of guardianship in this State is
the spiritual and moral well being of the child. With these
factors in mind, the chancellor may award it to the father,
the mother, or a stranger to the blood as the circumstances
require or he may do as he did in this case, make an award
to both parents. The idea that the father has a right superior
to the mother is a dogma long since obsolete and as dead as
the law of primogeniture. It departed the way of many old
common law rules that served the purpose at one time but fail
completely to respond to present concepts of justice.”

See Baxter v. Baxter, 158 Fla. 886, 30 So. (2nd) 492. _

We fail to find error in the record.

Affirmed. .

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

Let
STATE OF FLORIDA v. WILLIE BELL, alias PUNK CARLISLE,
alias POMPIE CARLYLE UTSEY, alias CALI BELL, alias CAR-

LISLE BELL.

37 So, (2nd) 95 June Term, 1948

October 5, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied October 27, 1948.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Ernest W. Welch, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Lucille Snowden, Special As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Lloyd Bass, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:
The State has appealed from an order entered in a criminal
case vacating a life sentence and quashing the information.
In 1941, an information was filed against appellee at-
tempting to charge conviction of four felonies. Two con-
victions were alleged dated August 28, 1930. <A third convic-
tion was alleged in 1937 and a fourth in 1941. A plea of

876 .

guilty was entered and life sentence imposed. In 1947, ap-
pellee filed a motion before the court which imposed the life
sentence to vacate the conviction and sentence. The trial
court granted the motion and also quashed the information.
The State has appealed and asserts error was committed by
quashing the information because while the information was
insufficient to charge a fourth conviction it was sufficient to
charge a second offense.

No one questions that the information was insufficient
to charge a fourth offense under our holding in Joyner v.
State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So. 2nd 304. Likewise no point is
raised of the, want of authority in the trial court to entertain
the motion.

Addressing the main question, we are convinced that the
information was sufficient to charge a second offense. Appellee
contends the contrary because the information did not allege
‘positively and directly that after appellee was first convicted -
he thereafter committed another felony. He relies upon our
opinion in State v. Smith, 160 Fla. 288, 34 So. 2nd 533. It is
true that the information does not, by direct allegation, make
such a charge however the facts which are alleged show be-
yond any question that a conviction was had in 1930, one in
1937 and another in 1941. It did not wholly fail to allege a
second conviction. The only question now is whether it is so
defective as to charge no offense.

It was error to discharge appellee and quash the informa-
tion. He should have been sentenced as a second offender.
Mowery v. Mayo, 159 Fla. 185, 31 So. 2nd. 249; Scott v. Mayo,
159 Fla. 816, 32 So. 2nd 821; Williams v. Mayo 160 Fla. 169,
33 So. 2nd. 861; Joyner v. State, supra; Sections 775.09,
924.34, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A.

The State also questions the authority of the trial court
to entertain the motion in appellee’s absence. This contention
rests upon Sections 775.09, 775.10 and 775.11, Fla. Stat., 1941,
F.S.A. We fail to find harmful error in this contention. The
Statute at most is directory and for defendant’s benefit. In
this case, too, it was stipulated that appellee was in the State
Prison and obviously he could not be present without an order

Le
Le
877

of court. The absence of appellee was not jurisdictional and
this contention of the State is not well founded.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for
imposition of a proper sentence.

Reversed.
THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
[|
RICHARD FIELDS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
36 So. (2nd) 919 June Term, 1948.
October 5, 1948 En Bane

M. 8. McGregor, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Ernest W. Welch,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

ADAMS, J.:

We review a conviction of assault with intent to murder.
The evidence disclosed that the appellant’s wife summoned a
deputy sheriff to come to their home and arrest her husband

878

because he had violently assaulted her and was trying to kill
her. The wife at that time showed evidence where she had
recently been violently assaulted by her husband. Without
a warrant the deputy sheriff proceeded to the home of the
appellant and upon entering informed him that he was under
arrest. Appellant knew the deputy sheriff was an officer. He
pointed to his wife and stated that she was the cause of his
trouble. Without provocation appellant assaulted the deputy
sheriff and in the struggle seized the officer’s pistol and a pro-
longed struggle followed for the possession of the weapon. In
the course of the struggle appellant told the officer that he was
going to kill him. Finally, the officer secured possession of
the pistol and threw it in the yard. Appellant ran for the pistol
and the officer fled from the scene. When appellant was next
seen, some three days later, he was arrested in an adjoining
county. |
Appellant claims that the officer had no authority to arrest
him inasmuch’as he had no warrant for his arrest and that
no crime was committed in his presence. This is beside the
point. The question is whether the appellant made an un-
lawful assault upon the officer as charged. Under the evidence
of the state, which the jury had the right to believe, the ap-
pellant was the aggressor in the altercation and made the as-
sault accompanied with threats that he would kill the deputy.
_He was not resisting an unlawful arrest but on the contrary
he provoked the difficulty and was the aggressor. It, there-
fore, is immaterial whether the officer had technically made
a lawful arrest, or was about to make one. The fact that an
officer may be momentarily exceeding his lawful authority
(which we do not hold was the case here) in the discharge
of his duty does not justify an unlawful assault upon him.
There is frequently presented in cases of this character’a
twilight zone of whether the officer is acting with or without
authority to make an arrest. The law of this state by statute
makes the sheriff and the deputy sheriff officers to conserve
the peace and authorizes them to make arrests. See Section
30.15, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A. (Cumulative supplement.)
This is merely a restatement of the common law. In this in-
stance the officer was summoned by the wife of the appellant

be
879

to go to their home and to protect her from being killed. There
was every indication that she had met with violence from her
husband. Under these circumstances the officer was making
a lawful arrest. See Presley v. State, 75 Fla. 434, 78 So. 532,
1918D L.R.A. 975; Cortes v. State, 135 Fla. 589, 185 So. 323;
Rogers v. State, 158 Fla. 582, 30 So. 2nd 625. There were con-
flicts in the evidence however we have accepted the findings
of the jury which we find substantiated by ample evidence.

On cross-examination appellant was asked, “State whether
or not on October 3, 1938 you were convicted on a charge of
armed robbery and sentenced for ten years?” This question
was not objected to and no motion was made to strike the
question or answer. The law is settled that in the absence of
such precaution taken we will not put the lower court in error
in that regard.

Affirmed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ.,
concur.

SEBRING, J., agrees to the conclusion.

THOMAS, C. J., dissents.

Le

MATTHEW CORBETT and FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

v. GENERAL ENGINEERING & MACHINERY COMPANY and

GLENS FALLS INDEMNITY COMPANY.

87 So. (2nd) 161 June Term, 1948
October 12, 1948 . En Banc
Rehearing denied November 19, 1948 "

880

Morrice C. Uman and Walter E. Roundtree, for appellants.
Fowler, White, Gillen, Yancey é Humkey, for appelles.

ADAMS, J.: :

This appeal relates to limitation of claims in workmen’s
compensation cases and presents this question:

“The question involved is whether or not Chapter 23908,
Acts of 1947, had the effect of extending the statute of limita-
tions to two years as to claims not barred on July 1, 1947.”

The injury occurred in August, 1946. The claim was filed
in October, 1947. The legislature amended the law by enact-
ing Chapter 23908, Acts of 1947, Section 440.19, Fla. Stat.,
1941, F.S.A., which provides:

“The right to compensation for disability under this chap-
ter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within two
years after the time of injury, and the right to compensation
for death shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within
two years after the death, ...”

The only change made by the amendment was to extend
the period from one year to two years. The amendment is
silent as to whether it will apply to claims then in existence;
although it does in fact repeal the former act and all others
in conflict. Since the one year statute was repealed there
was no law to bar the claim other than the newly enacted two
year’s law.

The general rule of law is well stated in 34 Am. Jur., Sec.
29, page 35.

“Since limitation laws prescribing the time within which
particular rights may be enforced relate to remedies only, it is
well settled by the authorities that the legislature has the
power to increase the period of time necessary to constitute
limitation, and to make it-applicable to existing causes of ac-
tion, provided such change is made before the cause of action
is extinguished under the pre-existing statute of limitations,
and provided further that no agreement of the parties is vio-
lated. A statute of limitations enlarging the time within

ee
Le
881

which an action may be brought as to pending cases is not
retroactive legislation and does not impair any vested right.”

One of the leading cases more elaborately states the rule.
Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Accident Commission, 198
Calif. 631, 246 Pac. 1046, 46 A.L.R. 1095:

- It is clear from the decisions of the courts of this state
as well as those of other jurisdictions that a person has no
vested right in the running of a statute of limitations unless it
has completely run and barred the action. Before the action
is barred by the statute, the legislature has absolute power to
amend the statute and alter the period of limitations pre-
seribed therein, subject only to the requirement that a rea-
sonable time must be allowed for the prosecution of an action
or proceedings after the passage of an amendment shortening
the period .. . It is equally well settled that an amendment to
a statute of limitations enlarging the period of time within
which an action can be brought as to pending causes of action
is not retroactive legislation, and does not impair any vested
right... .”

Our holding in related cases has not been out of line with '
the above general rules. See Buck v. Triplett, 159 Fla. 772,
82 So. 2nd. 753 and authorities therein cited.

Therefore the judgment is reversed for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, SEBRING and BARNS, JJ.,
concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and HOBSON, J., dissent.

Le)

ELMER VAN ARSDALL, et al., v. CITY OF WINTER HAVEN, a mu-
nieipal corporation of Florida, et al.

87 So. (2nd) 164 June Term, 1948
October 15, 1948 Special Division B

P. R. Porter, for appellants..
Harry E. King and Robert L. Staufer, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

The plaintiffs-appellants brought their bill and have at-
tempted to lay a predicate for its being treated and considered
as a class suit. The chancellor sustained defendant’s motion
to dismiss and thereupon plaintiffs prosecuted the appeal.

The only factual matters presented by the bill are that
plaintiffs’ property was without the corporate limits except
for the provisions of Chapter 11301, Laws of Florida, 1925,
and that plaintiffs’ land lies within that area which was in
1934 by quo warranto adjudged to be excluded from the muni-
cipality, as reported in State ex rel Landis vs. City of Winter
Haven, 114 Fla. 199, 154 So. 700.

Plaintiffs further alleged that after the passage of Chap-
ter 11301, supra, and before the exclusion by the adjudication

. in the quo warranto action, viz in 1925, the defendant City
placed special improvement liens against the property of
plaintiff. Without the allegation of any additional facts
going to any equity, the plaintiffs charge that the liens are
invalid.

The chancellor was correct in holding that plaintiffs’ suit
was not a class suit. See City of Lakeland v. Chase National
Company, 159 Fla. 783, 32 So. 2nd 833. The chancellor
properly sustained the motion to dismiss.

The decree appealed is affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J.,.ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

EE
ADELINE M. DORNER, a single woman, v. RED TOP CAB AND

BAGGAGE O0., a Florida corporation, for the use and benefit of

VIRGINIA FONTAINE and UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND

GUARANTY COMPANY, a Maryland corporation authorized to do

business in the State of Florida,

87 So. (2nd) 160 June Term, 1948
October 15, 1948 Division A

George J. Baya, for appellant.
E. F. P. Brigham, and Cushman & Woodard, for appellees.

TERRELL, J.:

Appelles recovered a judgment against appellant, in which
was included the sum of $272.73 taxed as costs of the litiga-
tion. A portion of the latter amount was for attorneys’ fees
incurred in taking depositions on behalf of defendant. Appel-
lant moved to quash that part of the execution relating to at-
torneys’ fees. His motion was overruled and this appeal was
prosecuted. . The items to which the motion to quash was di-
rected were, (1) $35.00 awarded Allaben & Wiarda, At-
torneys of Grand Rapids, Mich., for representing plaintiff in
the taking of depositions, (2) $50.00 awarded a Mr. Chase,
Attorney of California for a similar purpose and (3) $50.00
awarded Gay & Behrens, New York Attorneys for a like
purpose. .

The point for determination is whether or not attorneys’
fees for the taking of depositions to be used as evidence in a
‘case may be taxed as costs.

This court is committed: to the doctrine that attorneys’
fees cannot be taxed as costs in any cause unless provided for
by contract, agreement or by terms of the statute. Webb v.
Scott, 129 Fla. 111, 176 So. 442; State v. Barrs, 87 Fla. 168,
99 So. 668. No express provision of statute and no contract is
‘shown to support the amounts allowed as attorneys’ fees here.

It is also contended that the item of $13.00 expended in
taking the deposition of J. A. Fite in behalf of appellees should

a
884

be rejected because it was not placed in evidence at the trial
and was never made a part of the record. In our view the
position of appellant on these points is well taken and finds
ample support in the cases cited.

The judgment appealed from is accordingly reversed as to
the items complained of. In all other respects it is affirmed.

Reversed in part, affirmed in part.
THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
. a
RUSSELL PINKNEY v. STATE OF FLORIDA

87 So, (2nd) 157 June Term, 1948
October 15, 1948 . Division A

George W. Scofield, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.:

This case is before us on a motion to dismiss an appeal
taken from a judgment and sentence entered pursuant to a
voluntary plea of guilty to a criminal information charging
the unlawful possession and sale of lottery tickets. At the
same session of the Court in which the appellant, in the
presence of his counsel, entered his plea of guilty, the trial
judge adjudicated his guilt and consequently thereon ordered
“that the passing of sentence herein be continued from day to
day and from term to term until finally disposed of.”

At a term of court held approximately two years and
seven months later, the trial judge caused the appellant to be
brought before him for the purpose of imposing sentence for
the crime to which he had previously plead guilty. At the
hearing and before imposition of sentence the appellant, by
and through his attorney, requested leave of the court to
present evidence to show that at all times after the date of
the proceedings at which the suspension of the imposition of
sentence was ordered the appellant had been on good behavior
and hence that no valid ground for the imposition of sentence
existed. The request to make such showing was denied by the
trial judge and a three year sentence in the state prison was
imposed upon the appellant. Thereupon the appellant entered
his appeal to this court assigning as grounds for reversal (1)
that the criminal information upon which the plea, judgment
and sentence were entered was so defective as to fail to allege
any criminal offense or to protect the appellant against a
second prosecution for the same alleged offense; and (2)
that the order deferring the imposition of sentence amounted,
in legal effect, to an order placing the appellant on probation,
which could not be revoked without according to the appel-
lant a hearing on the question of good behavior subsequent to
the entry of the order. .

a
886

The attorney general has moved to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that the appeal is wholly without merit.

It takes but a cursory examination of the record to ascer-
tain that the information upon which the judgment and
sentence is based is framed in substantially the language of
the statute and that it does charge an offense under the crimi-
nal laws of the State. The appellant, in the presence of his
counsel, appeared in open court and entered a plea of guilty
when arraigned on the information. The judgment was, in
effect, a voluntary judgment by confession; for the appellant
makes no contention that the plea was not entered freely and
voluntarily by a person of competent intelligence with a full
understanding and comprehension of the nature and effect of
the charge and of the fact upon which it was grounded. Un-
der such circumstances the appellant cannot now be heard to
question for the first time the sufficiency of the information.

By the remaining ground of his appeal the appellant at-
tempts to question the power of the trial court to impose sen-
tence without first according the appellant a full hearing on
the question of good behavior during the period intervening
between the plea and the sentence.

There is nothing in the record to support the contention
of the appellant that he was entitled to a hearing on the -
question of good behavior. The order suspending the imposi-
tion of sentence could not possibly have been construed as an
order for probation. For had it been the intention of the trial
judge to place the appellant on probation some finding to that
effect would undoubtedly have appeared in the transcript of
the proceedings and an order would have been entered by the
trial judge placing the appellant under the supervision and
control of the parole commission for the period of probation.
See Sections 948.01-948.06 Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A.

Neither could the order entered by the trial judge have
been construed as an order suspending the imposition of sen-
tence during the good behavior of the appellant, or on other
like terms, such as was the case in Brill v. State, (Fla.) 32
So. (2nd) 607; for by the order of the trial judge imposed no
terms or conditions upon the appellant, nor did the trial judge

Pp
a
; _ 887

agree to any, as a basis for deferring the pronouncing of sen-
tence at any time in the future.

It has always been the law of this jurisdiction that, except
in cases involving suspension of the imposition of sentence
on terms and conditions to be kept or observed by a defend-
ant, or of cases involving probation under the statutes, a
trial judge who has deferred the imposition of sentence upon
a defendant may proceed to impose sentence upon him at any
time, either during the term in which guilt is admitted or
established or at a later term, without the necessity of first
according to the defendant a hearing on the question of his
good behavior. See Ex parte Williams, 26 Fla. 310, 8 So. 425;
Tanner v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203, 45 So. 459; Ragland v. State,
55 Fla. 157, 46 So. 724; Carnagio v. State, 106 Fla. 209, 143
So. 162; Campbell v. State, 131 Fla. 185, 179 So. 187; Bronson
v. State, 148 Fla. 188, 3 So. (2nd) 873.

Tnasmuch as the questions attempted to be raised on this
appeal are so clearly untenable as to require but a bare in-
spection of the record and grounds of appeal to determine
their want of merit, it is our view that the motion to dismiss
the appeal should be granted.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
a

B. B. LANE, v. H. E. WILLIAMS, as Chief of Police of Jasper, Florida

87 So. (2nd) 163 June Term, 1948
October 19, 1948 Division B

PC
888.

Lazonby & Dell, J. Lance Lazonby, for appellant.

F. B. Harrell, for appellee.

Castle, Brintlinger & Carey (Chicago, Illinois) as amicus
curiae.

ADAMS, J.:

B. B. Lane was convicted of peddling in the City of Jasper
without first procuring an occupational license. The convic-
tion was reviewed in the circuit court upon habeas corpus.
He was remanded to custody and allowed this appeal.

Lane is an employee of Jewell Tea Company located in
Jacksonville. Lane’s duties are to solicit orders for merchan-
dise from regular customers. His practice is to follow a regu-
lar route every two weeks and to call upon regular customers
only. He solicits orders for delivery on his next trip. Samples
of merchandise are carried for inspection. The controlling
question here arises by reason of occasional sale on the spot
of shopworn samples or refused merchandise. These sales
are made only to regular customers and in no instance do they
exceed five per cent of the gross sales for any trip. The City
insists that these “spot sales” call for a peddler’s license
whereas Lane claims that they are only an incident to his
business. Without question the ordinance has no applica-
tion except for the “spot sales.” See Duffin v. Tucker, 113
Fla. 621, 153 So. 298; Farris v. Hall, 115 Fla. 433, 156 So.
114. “... If itinerant selling is purely an incident of an-
other principal business, then it is not peddling. ...”—40 Am.
Jur., Sec., 13, page 918.

The authorities have not clearly defined peddling. Indeed
it would be difficult. At most it can little more than be de-
scribed. The very idea suggests something quite different
from what Lane was doing. To peddle suggests a sale and
delivery to whom ever the occasion presents and an immedi-
ate consummation of the transaction. See City of Mt. Sterling
v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 155 S.W. (2nd) 237;
Haller.Baking Co. v. Borough of Rochester et al., ‘118 Pa.
Super 501, 180 Atl. 108; National Baking Co. v. Zabel, 227
Wis. 93, 277 N.W. 691; State v. Amick 171 Md. 536, 189 Atl.
817.

|
[|
889

The invalidity of the ordinance is suggested. However
our conclusion is that it is inapplicable to Lane and therefore
we will not pass upon its validity.

The judgment is reversed.

Thomas, C. J.. BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

ROBERT A. BUONANNO and ALL FLORIDA SURETY COMPANY,
a Florida corporation v. MILLARD F. CALDWELL, as Governor of
the State of Florida, suing for the use and benefit of CARMINA M.
BUONANNO. .

87 So, (2nd) 159 June Term, 1948
October 19, 1948 Division A

Clyde W. Atkinson, O. B. White and J. Malcolm Johnson,
Jr., for appellants.

W. F. Maurer, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

In May 1947, a final decree was entered in the Circuit
Court of Broward County commanding Robert A. Buonanno
to pay his wife Carmina M. Buonanno certain sums for tempo-
rary alimony, attorneys fees and permanent alimony, the lat-
ter commencing May 31, 1947 and to be paid in monthly in-
stallments. A ne exeat bond was executed and filed May 13,
1946 as required by order of the Court. Its purpose was to
insure the presence of the defendant in Court when the final

a
890

judgment was entered and will be discussed more fully in the
latter part of this opinion.

In October 1947, action was instituted by appellee against
appellants to recover the amounts recited in the final decree,
the basis of the action being that the conditions of the ne
exeat bond were violated in that Robert A. Buonanno had
failed to pay the sums of money awarded his wife. A motion
to strike portions of the declaration was denied and a de-
murrer thereto was overruled. Pleas tending various de-
fenses were then filed and went out on motion to strike. The
court then entered a final judgment against the surety on the
ne exeat bond, All Florida Surety Company, for $840., tempo-
rary alimony, $750., solicitors fees, eleven installments of
$35. each ,and one installment of $25., permanent alimony,
and costs with interest at six per cent from August 16, 1947.
This appeal is from the interlocutory orders and the final
judgment so entered.

The point for determination is whether the ne exeat bond
did more than bind Robert A. Buonanno to appear at the next
regular or special term of the Circuit Court in response to the
writ of ne exeat.

Appellants contend that this question should be answered
in the negative while appellee contends that the ne exeat
bond not only bound the defendant to be present at the next
term of the Circuit Court of Broward County, but that it re-
quired him to perform the final judgment that might be en-
tered against him. The pertinent part of the ne exeat bond
is as follows: “The condition of this obligation is such that
if the said Robert A.’ Buonanno shall appear at the next
regular or special term of the Circuit Court of Broward
County to be held in and for said County to answer writ of
ne exeat and shall appear from day to day and term to term
of said Court and not depart the same without leave, then
this obligation to be void, else to remain in full force and
virtue.” .

The pertinent part of the writ of ne exeat requires Robert
A. Buonanno to post a bond in the sum of $2000. conditioned

sol

“to be and appear when required by the order of the Court to
answer judgment entered therein, and in default thereof he
shall be kept in your custody until the said order shall have
been complied with.” Appellee contends that the quoted pro-
vision of the writ of ne exeat and the quoted provision of the
bond should be read together, and when so read, the bond
not only binds Buonanno to appear but it binds him to pay or
perform the final judgment imposed on him.

It is quite true that a subsequent provision of the ne exeat
required defendant to enter “into bond required as aforesaid
in the sum of $2000., not to depart the state without the order
of the Court, to answer any judgment that may be made
therein and in default thereof to confine him in the common
jail of Broward County.” Read in isolation this provision
might be construed to secure payment of the final judgment .
but the previous provisions of the writ of ne exeat to which it
is tied does nothing more than require defendant to be on
hand to “answer any judgment entered therein” and the terms
of the bond could be construed as nothing more than an ap-
pearance bond.

There is no assault on the form, timing or service of the
ne exeat. The bond to support it is in the usual form, that
is to say, defendant will not depart the jurisdiction of the
Court and that he will be present to obey its lawful orders
and decrees. In some jurisdictions he may be bound to ap-
pear and perform the decree of the Court and pay the sums
imposed on him or to render himself amenable to any process
that may be issued to enforce the decree, American Juris-
prudence, Vol. 38, page 628, but the bond here does not go this
far. The decisions seem to distinguish between a bond con-
ditioned to perform a judgment and one conditioned to be
present to answer a judgment. In the latter case the surety
is not bound for performance, he is only bound for the
presence of the defendant to perform. This case is in the
latter class.

The rule seems general that a bond in support of a writ of
ne exeat, conditioned on the presence of the defendant when
directed to answer any order that may be made in the cause

es
892

is not violated by his failure to pay the amount ordered in
the final decree. American Jurisprudence, Vol. 38, page 629..

The bond in this case being nothing more than an appear-
ance bond, the chancellor was in error in holding that it bound.
appellants to pay the judgment imposed on them.

Reversed. :

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

A. J. OLEARY v. DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, @ political subdivision of
the State of Florida, et al.

87 So. (2nd), 248 June Term, 1948
October 19, 1948 Special Division B

ee
a
898

Loftin, Anderson, Scott, McCarthy & Preston and Tyrus
A. Norwood for appellant,

J. W. Watson, Jr., for City of Miami, and Hudson & Cason
and G. M. McNutt for Dade County, appellees.

HOBSON, J.:

We have before us an appeal by A. J. Cleary, plaintiff be-
low, wherein and whereby he seeks to review an order of the
Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit which order
was one dismissing his bill of complaint. The appellant, in
and by said bill of complaint, sought to enjoin the City of
Miami from transferring property known as Jackson Me-
morial Hospital, and from executing a deed thereto, to Dade
County, Florida. He further attempted to enjoin said County
from accepting said deed and property and operating the
same as a hospital as proposed and contemplated by Resolu-
tion unanimously passed by the City Commissioners of the
City of Miami.

The agreement to convey said hospital property to Dade
County, which was made and entered into by and between the
City of Miami and the Board of County Commissioners of
Dade County, provides, among other things, that the County
shall continue with the operation of said hospital and hospital
facilities and shall “provide for, take care of and accept full
responsibility for the care of the sick, and indigent, and all
charities and welfare cases” of all of Dade County, including
the City of Miami. In addition thereto, Dade County agrees
to assume existing indebtedness of the hospital and agrees,
subject to a referendum, to make extensive additions and im-
provements. This agreement contains a reverter clause, viz:

“In the event the County fails to operate a hospital on
said premises or on other premises within Dade County offer-
ing comparable hospital facilities, the above described prop-
erty and facilities shall revert to the City.”

The appellant challenges the transfer of Jackson Me-

morial Hospital from the City to the County upon four
grounds. First, he contends that the City may not legally

a
894.

transfer said property to the County in the absence of specific

- legislative authority and suggest that no such authority ex-
ists. In the second place, he asserts that the charter of the
City of Miami expressly forbids the sale of any of its public
properties .except by an ordinance adopted by an affirmative
vote of four-fifths (4/5) of the members elected to its City
Comniission ‘and that the City, therefore, may not authorize a
transfer of the hospital property by resolution, as was at-
tempted in this instance. His third objection is that the City
is undertaking to make this transfer, or sale of its property
without advertising for sealed bids as is required by a City
Ordinance which provides that all contracts for more than
$5,000.00 shall be advertised at least once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City calling for sealed bids to be
received by the Commission on a date not earlier than ten
days from the date of its publication. The final fault which
he finds with this transaction is that the City is endeavoring
to delegate its power and duty to provide for the care, support
and maintenance of sick, aged, insane or indigent persons to
the County of Dade.

The answer to the appellant’s first objection is found in
the City Charter of the City of Miami in Section 3(£), which
provides as follows:

“To acquire by purchase, gift, devise, condemnation or
otherwise, property real or personal, or any estate or interest
therein, within or without the city and for any of the pur-
poses of the city, and to improve, sell, lease, mortgage, pledge
or otherwise dispose of the same or any part thereof.”— (Un-
derscoring supplied).

Counsel for both appellant and appellees agree that this
proposed transfer is not a sale; the former contends that it
cannot, be a Sale because there is no consideration flowing
from the vendee to the vendor. On the other hand; the ap-
pellee’s counsel assert that it is not a sale because it is merely
a transfer by one governmental agency to another of the hos-
pital and its facilities which properties will be operated and
maintained after the transfer by the transferee, to-wit: the
County, which is fully capable and duly qualified under the

law to assume the responsibility of operating the hospital for
the benefit of all of the people of Dade County, in which the
City of Miami is located. Clearly, this is not an ordinary
run-of-the-mill sale of real property. It is a transfer of the
assumed responsibility for the operation of the hospital from
one governmental unit which derives all of its power and
duties, indeed its very existence, from the State acting
through its legislative body, to a governmental agency which
is merely an arm of the State Government and which is
charged by statutory law and Constitution of Florida with
the obligation of caring for the sick, aged, or indigent persons
who live within its borders. If this were a sale in the ordi-
narily accepted sense of the word, we find that it should not
be condemned for want of consideration. There is ample
consideration flowing to the City in that the County by taking
over full responsibility for the operation of the hospital will
relieve the City of an annual deficit which has averaged over
the last five years, One Million Dollars per year, and in the
making of valuable improvements and additions to said
property. There is no suggestion of fraud or bad faith in
connection with this transaction. We hold that there is ample
authority for the proposed transfer in Section 3(f) of the
City Charter in the language “or otherwise dispose of the
same.” (Underscoring supplied).

In the case of State v. City of Miami, 150 Fla. 270, 7 (2nd)
So. 146, this Court approved an agreement between the City
of Miami and the County of Dade as being authorized by
law, which agreement, although less direct and more compli-
cated and involved than the present arrangement, neverthe-
less, had as its ultimate purpose the conveyance of this same
hospital property to the County. See also Hickey v. Burke,
78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E. (2nd) 33; City and County of San
Francisco v. Boyle, 191 Cal. 172, 215 Pac. 549.

With reference to the appellant’s second objection we hold
his contention that the hospital property here in question is a
public place within the meaning of Section 73 of the Charter
of the City of Miami is not well taken. We quote said section
as follows: .

895

De
896

“No right, title or interest of the City of Miami or any
part thereof, in and to the water front, wharf property, pub-
lic landings, wharves, docks, streets, avenues, parks, bridges
and other public places and its gas, water, electric and other
works, shall be sold except by authority of an ordinance
passed by a recorded affirmative note of four-fifths (4/5) of
all the members elected to the commission, and under such
other restrictions as may be imposed by law.”

Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis the words “other
public places” are limited by the words “the water front,
wharf property, public landings, wharves, docks, streets, ave-
nues, parks, bridges” which immediately precede that phrase.
It is clear from a reading of the City Charter that it was not
intended to extend the provisions of Section 73 of said Chap-
ter to include all public places or property by use of the words
“other public places.” On the contrary, the enumeration of
specific properties followed by the general words or phrase.
“other public places” was intended to connote properties of
the same kind. Children’s Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107
So. 345.

The third contention of appellant is without merit. An
examination and careful consideration of Section 30 of Chap-
ter 2 of the Code of the City of Miami discloses that it has
reference to contracts involving personal property and ser-
vices and to purchases of personalty, but has no connection
whatsoever with contracts for or the sale or purchase of real
property. Furthermore, this is not a purchase by the City
nor is the agreement before us actually a contract for more
than $5,000.00; certainly it is not within the intendment of
Section 30 of Chapter 2 of the Code. :

The appellant’s fourth objection to this agreement to
transfer the hospital property from the City of Miami to the
County of Dade is predicated upon the assumption that the
City will delegate or attempt to delegate its authority and
duty to provide for the care, support and maintenance of sick,
aged, insane, or indigent persons to the County. Section
3(e) of the Charter of the City of Miami provides as follows:

EE
be
897

“The City of Miami shall have the power to provide for
the care, support and maintenance of the orphan, dependent,
delinquent or defective children, and of sick, aged, insane or
indigent persons.”

This section of the charter empowers or authorizes the
City “to provide for the care, support and maintenance .. . of
sick, aged, insane or indigent persons” and does not expressly
make same an oblightion or duty of the City. On the other
hand, paragraph 4 of Section 125.01 Florida Statutes Anno-
tated, in defining the powers and duties of the Board of
County Commissioners recites: “to have care and provide for
the poor and indigent people of the County.” It may be said
that since the City has seen fit to exercise the power granted
to it in Section 3 (e) of its Charter it assumed the duty of
continuing such care, support and maintenance. Whether
this is a duty resting upon the City or merely a power, appel-
lant contends that the City cannot delegate this power or
divest itself of this duty. The reply to such contention is
that by the proposed transfer the City is not attempting to
delegate its power to or impose its duty upon the County.
The County needs no delegation of such power, It has both -
the authority and the duty to care for the indigent, sick and
poor in all of Dade County by virtue of the statute above re-
ferred to and by the provisions of Section 3 of Article XU of
the Constitution of Florida, which reads as follows:

“Section 3. The respective counties of the State shall
provide in the manner prescribed by law for those of the in-
habitants that, by reason of age, infirmity or misfortune, may
have claims upon the aid and sympathy of society.”

It is clear that since the County has both the prerogative
and obligation to care for the infirm and aged within the
entire County, it is unnecessary that such power and duty be
delegated to it by the City.

It is our conclusion that the execution of the agreement
now before the Court between the City of Miami and the
County of Dade is fully authorized by law and that the people
of the City of Miami and of Dade County as a whole will bene-

Ee
898

fit from a transfer of the hospital, its facilities and its opera-
tion to the jurisdiction of Dade County.

The order of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit dismissing appellant’s bill of complaint should be and
it is hereby affirmed.

THOMAS C. J., CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

| reer

LEATHA M. FLEEMAN v. JAMES T. VOCELLE, as Director of the
State Beverage Department of the State of Florida.

87 So. (2nd) 164 June Term, 1948
October 19, 1948 Special Division B

Thomas H. Anderson, for appellant.
Patton & Kanner, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.:

This is an appeal from an order granting a motion to dis-
miss a bill for declaratory judgment, entered by the Circuit
Court of Dade County in favor of the State Beverage Director
and against the appellant.

In the bill of complaint it is averred that the appellant is
the owner and operator of a restaurant in a building located *

899

on the boundary line separating the territorial limits of the
City of Miami and the unincorporated area of Dade County.
All of the building lies outside the city limits and in the
County, with the exception of a small combination dining
room and bar of approximately 16 x 24 feet in dimensions,
which lies within the City. This combination dining room
and bar is 2100 feet from an established school.

Section 561.44(1) Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. grants
to incorporated cities and towns the power to establish zoning
ordinances restricting the location wherein vendors may con-
duct businesses for the sale of intoxicating beverages. Pur-
suant to such statute the City of Miami has enacted a zoning:
ordinance which permits the issuance of a beverage license
for the sale of intoxicating beverages on the premises where
such premises are not less than 300 feet from an established
school. By virtue of this ordinance the appellant holds a li-
cense issued by the City of Miami and the State Beverage De-
partment for the sale of intoxicating beverages. The appel-
lant desires to sell and serve intoxicating beverages, not only
to persons in the combination dining room and bar lying
within the City but also to persons who may be frequenting
other parts of the building, and to set up a “service bar” for
such purpose in that portion of the restaurant lying in the
unincorporated area of Dade County. The State Beverage Di-
rector has refused to grant the appellant permission to sell

. alcoholic beverages to patrons in the restaurant building at
places other than the combination dining room and bar, be-
cause of the existence of a statute of the State of Florida
which provides that “No license . . . shall be granted to a ven-
dor, in the territory lying without the limits of incorporated
cities or towns, whose place of business is within twenty-five
hundred feet of an established church or school . . .” Section
561.44(2) Florida Statutes: 1941, F.S.A. .

We find no error in the ruling made by the trial court
under the facts set forth in the bill of complaint. It is ad-
mitted by the pleadings that the entire building in which the
appellant’s restaurant business is being conducted is located
within 2500 feet of an established school, and that only that
small portion which houses the combination dining room and

Le
900

bar is inside the corporate limits of the City of Miami. The
plain meaning of section 561.44(2) Florida Statutes 1941,
F-.S.A. is that no liquor license shall be issued to a vendor in
territory outside the limits of an incorporated city or town
where the, business to which the license is to apply is within”
2500 feet of an established church or school. That portion of

‘the building housing the appellant’s place of business to which

she desires to extend the sale and service of intoxicating bev-
erages is within such prohibited distance.

A municipality possesses only such power with respect to
the regulation and control of alcoholic beverages as is given
such a municipality by the legislature. Except for the fact
that under section 561.44(1), supra, incorporated cities and
towns are vested with the power to adopt zoning regulations
restricting the location of vendors of alcoholic beverages and
that under such law the City of Miami has adopted an ordi-
nance authorizing. the issuance of licenses to vendors within
the municipality whose places of business are less than 2500
feet from an established church or school, the appellant would
not be entitled to a liquor license even for that portion of the
building now occupied as a combination dining room and bar.
There being nothing in section 561.44(1) supra, to indicate
that the legislature intended that a city should have power to
extend the license privilege to a place of business lying wholly
or partially outside its corporate limits and within an area
prohibited by section 561.44 (2), supra, the existence of such
power will not be presumed.

The decree appealed from is affirmed.

. ‘It is so ordered.
; THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS, and BARNS, JJ., concur.

STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel., KENT CORPORATION, a corporation of
Florida v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BROWARD
COUNTY, FLORIDA, a body corporate, et al.

87 So (2nd) 252 June Term, 1948
October 22, 1948 Division B

Ross & Williams and English, Lester & O’Bryan, for ap-
pellant. .

Patterson & Lloyd, John U. Lloyd and Linwood Cabot, for
Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, Florida,
et al, and Ellis & Spencer for L. C. Hansen, as County Tax
Assessor, appellees.

ADAMS, J.:

‘We have for review a final judgment in mandamus read-
ing:

“This cause came on for final disposition under the plead-
ings, testimony and argument of counsel.

By this proceeding relator seeks to secure an evaluation of
all taxable property in Broward County upon a basis of ‘full
cash value.’ Relator contends that the Tax Assessor has
acted improperly in that he has systematically evaluated
property at much less than its ‘full cash value,’ resulting in a
discrimination in favor of owners of ‘homesteads.’ The com-
plaint is, not that the Tax Assessor has refused to act, but
that he has acted incorrectly.

At the outset, the question arises as to whether or not
mandamus is an available remedy. That question is the sub-
ject of an annotation at 131 A.L.R. 360. The evaluation of
property in the process of assessing ad valorem taxes involves
the exercise of discretion on the part of the Tax Assessor.
Resort may be had to mandamus to compel a public officer to
act, 131 A.L.R. 368, but never to compel the exercise of discre-
tion in a particular way. The principle applies to compelling
discretion in evaluating property for taxation. 131 A.L.R.
371; State ex rel Waterbury etc. Co. v. Kilduff, (Conn) 25 Atl.

|
902

(2) 62 (1942); Central Realty Co. v. Martin, (W. Va.), 30
S. E. (2nd) 720 (1944)

It follows that mandamus will not lie in a case such as
this.”

Much argument is addressed to the question whether man-
damus was the proper remedy. From the quoted judgment
the inference may be drawn that the court below held outright
that it was not a proper remedy. We are not convinced that
such was the intent of the lower court. The judgment, in
terms, states that it will not lie in such a case as this. This
language requires an inquiry as to the circumstances of this
case. From an examination of the record we find considerable
testimony relative to property values on the tax roll. Relator
and the tax assessor disagreed upon values and also upon the
method of arriving at cash value. . The court considered this
testimony and doubtless was not persuaded that the assessor
had arbitrarily and deliberately failed to assess at full cash
value. It is a fair inference that the lower court considered
the evidence rather than simply holding as a matter of law
that mandamus would not lie because if the latter had been
the case the alternative writ would not have issued in the first
instance or would have been quashed on motion instead of
requiring an answer.

If the neglect of duty is arbitrary and capricious and no
other adequate method of review is afforded mandamus is a
proper remedy. See Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294, N. W.
237, 181 A.L.R. 335.

Relator claims that properties were arbitrarily assessed
at less than 25 percent of their actual cash value thus dis-
criminating in favor of the home owner who enjoyed an
exemption up to $5000.00 under the Constitution, Article 10,
Section 7. The assessor offers evidence that his assessments
are in keeping with actual cash value. He admits, as charged
‘by relator, that properties have sold for much more than their
assessed value. He is an elected constitutional officer and
‘doubtless familiar with the wide range of fluctuating values in
real estate. While his opinion is not conclusive by any means,
it is entitled to great weight; especially so in this case where

903

it bears the approval of the trial court. He has, no doubt,
witnessed times when purchasers would seldom buy at the
assessed value and in recent years owners would seldom sell
at the assessed value. Between these wide ranges in prices
the assessor must strike a value of full, actual cash value to
conform to the statute. This case presents a conflict between
the relator and assessor in not only the actual value but the
means employed in arriving at it.

We are unable to say that the assessor acted arbitrarily,
eapriciously or discriminatorily and, therefore, the judgment
is not erroneous.

Affirmed. . :

THOMAS, C. J., BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

a

STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. KENT CORPORATION, a corporation
of Florida v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a municipal corpora-
tion of Florida, et al.

87 So. (2nd) 253 June Term, 1948
‘October 22, 1948 . Division B

Thomas O. Berryhill, for appellant.
Ross & Williams and English, Lester & O’Bryan, for
appellees. .

PER CURIAM:

This judgment is affirmed upon authority of State of Flor-
ida, ex rel., Kent Corporation, a corporation of Florida v.
Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, a body
corporate, et al., this day filed.

THOMAS, C. J.. ADAMS, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ.,

concur.

ANNIE HAHR PAWLEY v. WILLIAM D. PAWLEY
37 So. (2nd) 247 June Term, 1948
October 22, 1948 En Banc

Redfearn & Ferrell and Ward & Ward, for appellant.
Loftin, Anderson, Scott, McCarthy & Preston, for appellee.

BARNS, J.: .

The appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal for failure
of counsel to comply with Supreme Court Rule 20, relating to
briefs to be filed by an appellant.

We find in the case at bar thirty-eight pages addressed to
the “history.” The brief contains ninety pages. It appears
that the material matters of record are the bill, answer, coun-
terclaim, master’s report, exceptions thereto, order on excep-
tions, final decree, appeal and assignments of error. An
examination of appellant’s brief reveals that the “history”.
portion of it contains much argument and undue elaboration.
relating to the matters placed in controversy.

The provisions of Supreme Court Rule 20 relating to “his-
tory of the case” have reference to the proceedings hadi in the
lower court preceding the appeal.

The rule prescribes:

History of the Case—Appellants. “The history of the case
should be limited to a concise recital of the essential facts.
without argument or undue elaboration. It should state the
purpose of the litigation, should contain a chronological
enumeration of the pleadings (and if necessary, a summary
thereof), the issues made, and the judgment of the trial court
with appropriate reference to applicable pages of the tran-
seript....”

It is contemplated that the “history” should be confined to
such matters as are not the subject of controversy and that
material controversial matters be presented under “argu-
ment.” In the event the appellee conceives the “history,” as
stated by appellant, to be deficient, or in error, it is provided:

905

“. ., The appellee in his brief may point out any error in
the brief of appellant and make such additions to the history
of the case as recited in the brief of appellant as he may deem
essential to the disposition of the questions raised, with refer-
ences to the pages of the transcript which he claims support
his position.”—Supreme Court Rule 20.

That part of the statement ofthe facts dealing with the
pleadings, motion, rulings on motions, and the instructions of
the lower court are comparatively simple to state. A discus-
sion of the evidence does not belong in the statement or his-
tory of the case. Its place, when properly included in the
brief, is in the argument.

The “history” should be a short general narrative of the
steps taken in the progress of the suit in the trial court. The
details which are material should be presented under “argu-
ment.” The purpose of the “history” is merely to introduce
the case to the appellate court, wherein the proceedings in
the trial court should be stated only generally, and not in de-
tail. ;

An appellate court is primarily interested in the assign-
ment of errors and the argument addressed thereto, and the
service of stating the “history of the case” is quickly to orient
the appellate court with reference to them.

The “history of the case,” specified to be stated in appel-
lant’s brief, is not to be confused with matters relating to
“argument” addressed to the assignment of errors and “ques-
tions” presented in argument of the merits of the assign-
ment of errors.

The Court, when considering a brief, assumes that argu-
ment has been placed under “argument.” An appellant should
not expect the justices of the appellate court to look at mat-
ters in the “history” for “argument” addressed to errors. °
Often the “history of the case” is so simple that it will not be
necessary for the appellate court to examine counsel’s state-
ment of the “history,” especially when it appears prolix,
discursive, and without the rule. Argument and discussion, of
the controversy in the “history” instead of under “argument”
may often serve to conceal it.

906

: Although it may be beside the point, we are prompted to
address ourselves to the rule relating to “questions involved”
which is synonymous with “points involved.”

It often happens that such “questions” are stated at such
length and in such detail as to serve no useful purpose. The
rule does not contemplate that a briefer, in stating a “ques-
tion” will attempt to import into the question such details as
will make the “question” so imponderable as to destroy its
usefulness. “Questions” which cannot reasonably be retained
in the mind are useless. The purpose of a “question” is to
convey « thought rather than to serve a mechanical purpose.
The subject matter of a question or point need not be placed
in one sentence nor all in one paragraph.

The statement of the subject matter or hypothesis may
follow the interrogatory portion of the “question.” If the
question is of much length, the subject matter is read with
more interest when the reader is first advised of its intended
application.

As to the purposes, functions and correlation between
“Questions” and assignments of error, see Town of Howey-
in-the-Hills v. Graessle, 36 So 2nd 619.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied but the brief is
stricken and the appellant allowed thirty days within which to
file appropriate brief.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SEBRING and HOB-
SON, JJ., concur

THOMAS. C. J., dissents.

J. F. BATEMAN vy. CIETY OF WINTER PARK, a municipal corporation,
MRS. PANSY DAVIS, as city clerk of the City of Winter Park, and
B. R. COLEMAN, as Mayor-Commissioner, and JAMES KEEZEL,
HAROLD MUTISTAUGH, MARDON E. COOK, and ROBERT R.
MILLER, City Commissioners.

36 So. (2nd) 362 June Term, 1948
October 26, 1948 Division B

Sam E. Murrell and Sam E. Murrell, Jr., for appellant.
Waldo H. Plympton, for appellee.

-BARNS, J.:
The appellant brought his bill seeking an injunction
‘against the appellee to enjoin the municipality and its authori-
ties from molesting or interfering with the operation of a
. business wherein intoxicating liquors were proposed to be sold
for consumption either on or off the premises. The plaintiff’s
bill alleged that he had been issued a license in the State for
such purposes and had tendered his license tax to the proper
municipal authorities, which tender had been refused by them.

The defendants answered, admitting the issuance to the
plaintiff of the change in license by the State of said beverage
license, on January 28, 1948, which license was from a package
store to a bar, and stated that it refused to accept the
license tax from the plaintiff because it alleged that the
license issued to plaintiff by the State was contrary to Section
561.34, Florida Statutes, as amended by c. 23746, Laws of Flor-
ida, 1947, subsection 4, because the City of Winter Park has a
population of approximately seven thousand persons, accord-
ing to the last official census; that on May 24, 1947, there were

a
908

‘seven licenses for the sale of intoxicating beverages in said
City of Winter Park; that when said last mentioned act be-
came effective, it restricted such licenses to one license for
each twenty-five hundred residents or major fraction thereof,
and that it is not legally permitted to issue any new licenses
because of the restrictions contained in said act, and that to
change the license from the package store to consumption on
the premises would be, in effect, licensing a new business.

The pertinent statutory provision is as follows:

“(4) No license under subsections 3 to 8, inclusive, of
Section 561.34, Florida Statutes, 1941, shall be issued so that
the number of such licenses within the limits of any incor-
porated city or town or in the territory of any county lying
outside of such cities and towns therein shall exceed one such
license to each 2500 residents, or major fraction thereof,
within such county outside of the limits of such city or town
as shown by thé last census, either Federal or State, of such
county or city or town; provided, however, that such limita-
tion shall in no event be such as to prohibit the issuance of at
least two such licenses in any such cities or towns or not less ©
than three such licenses in any county as to territory lying
without the limits of such cities or towns.”—Section 561.20,
F.S: 1941, F.S.A., as amended by c. 23746, Acts 1947.

At final hearing the chancellor entered a final decree dis-
missing the bill, with the thought:that under the law the
plaintiff could not lawfully be issued a license by the State for
a bar as distinguished from a package store, and a renewal of
plaintiff’s license therefor, for the sale of intoxicating liquors.

Section 561.36 Florida Statutes, provides as follows:

“Each incorporated city or town in the state may levy and
collect a license tax on each ... vendor . . . within the cor-
porate limits of such city or town, not to exceed 50 per cent
of the state and county license tax herein provided, but if such
city or town provides and collects such license tax the. . .
vendor ... paying such license tax shall be entitled to a reduc-
-tion in his state and county license tax, of the amount so paid
for such city or town license tax, upon exhibiting to the

|
[|
909

County Tax Collector a receipt for the payment of such city or
town license tax.”

It will also be observed by reading the applicable ordi-
nances of the City of Winter Park, attached to the bill of
complaint, that there is no ordinance of said City against
operation by the plaintiff of a business for consumption of
beverages upon the premises,

In Volume 30, American Jurisprudence, Page. 296, Para-
graph 73, it is said: on

“In general, a license is a permit or authorization to do
what, without a license, would not be lawful.” aa .

In Paragraph 74 of the same volume and page, it is said:
“The difference between a liquor license fee and a tax may be
thus stated: Where the fee is imposed for the purpose of
regulation, and the statute requires compliance with certain
conditions in addition to the payment of the prescribed sum,
such sum is a license proper, imposed by virtue of the police
power; but where the fee is exacted solely for revenue pur-
poses, and payment of such fee gives the right to carry on the
business without the performance of any other conditions, it
is a tax.”

A perusal of the City Ordinances of the City of Winter
Park, attached to the bill of complaint, fails to disclose that
the operation of a bar would be in violation of such ordi-
nances, provided his license tax was paid. Under the circum-
stances of this case there can be no question but that the city
has no authority to refuse to accept the license tax tendered
to it by a person engaged in the sale of intoxicating beverages,
who has been licensed by the State to engage in such business.

Since it does not affirmatively appear that there is any
restriction in law against the issuance of a bar license by the
State to the appellant in lieu of a package store license, and
since the State has issued a bar license, it appears that it i$
the duty of the city to accept the tender of payment of the tax,
and that an appropriate injunction should issue.

The decree appealed is reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

a
910,

SEABOARD..AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, v.
CARRIE BOLES, as Administratrix of the Estate of Nathan G.
Boles, Deceased. :

87 So, (2nd) 578. - June Term, 1948
October 36, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing denied December 17, 1948

Clayton, Arnow & Duncan, for appellant.
Evan T. Evans and T. BE. Duncan, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

_Nathan G. Boles was injured in a railroad crossing acci-
derit at Waldo, Florida, September 20, 1946, The defendant,
Seaboard Air Line Railroad, runs North and South at the
crossing where the accident took place. The depot was North
and the City Ice and Fuel Company plant was South of the
crossing. The railroad company had three tracks, the first
was called the house track, the second was called the main
line track and the third was known as the pass track. The
distance from the house track to the main line track, on
which the accident occurred, was twenty-two and four tenths
feet. Boles was traveling easterly by automobile and was
struck by a freight train locomotive, pulling twenty-one cars
as he was crossing the main line track. It was little past six
in the morning, the weather was foggy and the day was break-

|
Le
out

ing. The train was traveling South at slow speed and Boles
was moving slowly. Camp cars were parked on the house
track on both sides of the crossing. The evidence is in con-
flict as to whether the head light on the. locomotive was
burning, the bell was ringing or the whistle was blowing. At
the trial Boles recovered a verdict and judgment for $15,500.
plus costs and the defendant appealed.

A number’ of questions are urged for adjudication but
stripped of useless verbiage, the only point necessary to de-
termine is, who was negligent and whether or not the judg-
ment awarded was excessive.

In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Timmons, de-
cided July 30, 1948, not yet reported, this Court defined the
standard of prudence required of one approaching a grade
crossing like that involved in this case. He is first required
to look and listen and if the way is clear he may proceed.
Circumstances may require him to stop, look and listen. He
is not required to reconnoiter but if he had done so here the
accident might not have occurred. Plaintiff testified that he
stopped, shut off his motor, looked and listened and hearing
nothing, proceeded across the house track and was struck by
the locomotive as he started to cross the main line track, little
more than twenty-two feet from the house track. After he
crossed the house track his view was unobstructed except by
the fog and twilight incident to the fact that day was just
breaking. If plaintiff had halted when he crossed the house
track or had looked after he crossed it he could not have
missed seeing the approaching train.

The jury found the defendant guilty of negligence and,
while the evidence on this point is in conflict, it is ample if be-
Yieved to support the finding. We are also convinced that the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence. It may be that the jury at-
tempted to apportion the damages, but if it did the amount
awarded was excessive.

We base this finding on these facts revealed by the evi-
dence: Plaintiff was sixty years of age at the time he was
injured, to one of his legs the injury was twelve per cent
permanent, he was laid up about thirteen months and

Le
912

died a few months after he recovered. There is no sug-
gestion that death was due to his injury. His doctor’s bill
was $250., his hospital and ambulance bill was $281.85 and
his automobile was badly damaged. The dependable evidence
as to his earning capacity shows that it was not exceeding
eighty dollars per month. It is true that during the recent
war he made considerably more than this for a short time,
but he had been separated from that for a long time and no
other evidence shows that he ever made more than eighty
dollars per month.

It is accordingly our view that the record in this case will
not support a judgment in excess of one-half the amount
awarded, so if the plaintiff will enter a remittitur for. that
amount, the judgment will stand affirmed as to the balance,
otherwise, it will be and is hereby reversed for a new trial.

Affirmed on condition of remittitur. .

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

DANIEL LYDON v. FELICE LYDON

87 So. (2nd) 364 June Term, 1948
Oct. 26, 1948 Division A.
Rehearing denied Nov. 23, 1948,

Anna A. Krivitsky and Bezoni & McCord, for appellant.
Fowler, White, Gillen, Yancey & Humkey, for appellee.

PER CURIAM: .

The appellant having failed to show reversible error, the
decree appealed from should be ‘affirmed and the appellee
should be allowed the sum of $250.00 as an attorney’s fee for
her attorney in defending this appeal.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and SEBRING,
JJ., concur.

913

INLAND WATERWAY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation,
et al v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a Municipal corporation.

37 So. (2nd) 333 June Term, 1948
October 29, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing filed

William D. Jones, Jr., for Inland Waterway Development.
Company, and George EH. Turner and James R. Boyd, Jr., for
Jacksonville Baseball Exhibition Company, appellants,

W. M. Madison and Inman Crutchfield, for appellee.

SEBRING, J.:

The appellant, Inland Waterways Development Company,
has filed in this Court a suggestion that an appeal taken by it
from an adverse judgment rendered in an eminent domain
proceeding has become moot and should be dismissed because
of the failure of the plaintiff in the proceeding to pay into
.the registry of the court below, within ten days after the
rendition of the judgment, the full compensation awarded by
the jury for the property sought to be appropriated.

Ce
914

The City of Jacksonville, a municipal corporation, insti-
tuted a proceeding under its power of eminent domain against
Inland Waterway Development Company for the purpose of
acquiring the fee simple title to a tract of land in which Jack-
sonville Baseball Exhibition Company claimed a subsidiary
interest. On June 18, 1948, a jury impaneled pursuant to
section 73.10 Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A. “to try what com-
pensation shall be made to the defendants forthe ‘property
sought to be appropriated,” returned a verdict “that the com-
pensation to be made for the taking of the property above
described is the sum of $165,000.00 together with the sum of
$10,000.00 as a reasonable attorney's fee for the defendant’s
attorney.” On the same day the trial court rendered its judg-
ment that the tract of land involved in the proceeding “be
and the same is hereby appropriated to and vested in the
petitioner, City of Jacksonville, a municipal corporation, upon
the petitioner paying or securing by a deposit of money. the
total compensation found by the above verdict of the ‘jury
and also costs herein taxed at §: .. . to be paid into
this Court within ten days after rendition of” this judgment,”
and that “the compensation to be made for. the taking of the
property above described is the sum of $165,000.00; together
with the sum of $10,000.00 as a reasonable attorney’ 'S fee for
the Defendant’s attorney.”

Within ten days after the rendition of the judgment the
City of Jacksonville paid into the registry of the trial court
the said sum of $175,000 directed to be paid as a condition
precedent to the acquisition of the property. However, it did
not pay to the clerk of the court within said ten-day period
certain commissions in the amount of $887.50 which it is
claimed accrued to the clerk subsequent to the rendition of
the judgment and to which he became entitled under sec-
tion 28.24 Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. for receiving and
paying out the compensation and attorney’s fee awarded by
the jury.

The appellant contends that inasmuch as the applicable
statutes require the payment of all costs by the-petitioner in
an eminent domain proceeding and inasmuch as the petitioner

|
a
915

below failed to pay within the ten-day period fixed by
statutes for compliance with the judgment the commissions
accruing to the clerk for receiving and paying out the com-
pensation awarded by the jury, but paid only the sum of
$175,000 from which the clerk became entitled to withhold or
deduct his commissions before paying over the remainder to
the defendant, there had not been a deposit with the clerk of
the full compensation awarded by the jury and hence the
appeal had become moot because based upon a judgment that
had become null and void by reason of a default in payment.
Compare Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v, Bear, 43 Fla. 319, 31 So.
287.

The pertinent portions of the statutes governing payment
of compensation and costs in eminent domain proceedings
provide as follows: “The verdict of the jury shall state:
First, an accurate description of the property taken; second,
the compensation to be made therefor, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee for the defendant’s attorney...” Sec. 73.11
Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. “The judgment shall recite
the verdict in full and shall be that the property therein de-
scribed be appropriated to the petitioner in fee simple... .
upon the petitioner paying or securing by deposit of money
the compensation found by the verdict of the jury...” Sec.
73.12 Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. “The petitioner, within
ten days after the rendition of the judgment, shall pay into
the court for the use of the defendant the compensation ascer-
tained by the jury, or else the proceedings shall be null and
void, unless, for good cause, further time, not exceeding thirty
days, be allowed by the court...” Sec. 73.13 Florida
Statutes, 1941, F.S.A. “All costs of proceedings shall be paid
by the petitioner .. . except the costs upon the appeal taken
by a defendant, in which the judgment of the circuit court
shall be affirmed.” Sec. 73.16 Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A.
“The compensation of the clerk of the Circuit court, as clerk
or recorder, shall be entirely by fees and, unless otherwise
provided, shall be as follows: . . . moneys, receiving into
registry, and paying out first $500.00, per cent 1. Each sub-
sequent $100.00, per cent 14.” Sec. 28.24 Florida Statutes
1941, F.S.A.

916

We cannot agree with the contention that the appeal
should be dismissed on the ground stated. Though section
73.16, supra, does require that all costs, except certain appeal
costs, shall be paid by a petitioner in a condemnation pro-
ceeding (which section is doubtless broad enough to include

_ commission according to the clerk subsequent to judgment
for receiving and paying out the compensation awarded by
the jury) section 73.13, supra, which deals with the proposi-
tion of paying the jury award into the registry of the court,
contains no requirement that costs be paid within the ten-day
period in order to prevent the proceedings from becoming null
and void.

While it would have heen quite proper for the trial court
to have included in its judgment the exact amount of costs
which had accrued up to the date of the rendition of the judg-
ment with a provision requiring that said costs and such
other costs as might accrue subsequent to judgment should
be paid by the petitioner within ten days after rendition of
the judgment as a condition precedent to appropriating the
property, the trial judge did not do so but instead taxed the
cost at $............”. No objection was made by the defendant
in the court below, within the ten-day period, that costs had
not been computed and taxed by the trial court in its judg-
ment. No showing is made by the defendant that any request
for payment of his commission has been made by the clerk,
or that he has refused to pay the entire amount of the award
over to the defendant without the deduction of commissions.

While statutes giving the rights to appropriate private
property for public use are to be construed strictly, a substan-
tial compliance with their provisions is held to be sufficient.
See Florida Cent. P. R. Co. v. Bear, 43 Fla. 319 31 So. 287;
Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527, 65 A.L.R.
488; Seaboard All-Florida Ry. v. Leavitt, 105 Fla. 600, 141
So. 886. The judgment entered by the trial court was framed
exactly as required by section 73.12, supra. The defendant
made no objection to the judgment as entered. The petitioner
conformed to the judgment entered by the trial court to the
very letter of its terms by paying into the registry of the
court the sum of $175,000. Under the circumstances it is our

P|
|
917

view that the defendant has waived its rights, if any it had,
to insist that the non-payment of clerk’s commissions ren-
dered the proceedings in the court below nuil and void; conse-
quently, the motion to dismiss the appeal should be denied.
It is so ordered.
TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, CHAPMAN and
BARNS, JJ., concur.

Le
STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel, J. Tom Watson, Attorney General,
Dewey J. Wilcox, J. R. Merritt, J. B. Brewer, Lane H. Jennings, and
Jimmie Barry, v. CLIFFORD F. SCOTT, Angus Summer, George
H. Reid, W. ©. Pedrick, Jr., and James B. Rock.

87 So. (2nd) 330 June Term, 1948
October 29, 1948 En Banc

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Raymond Ford, Wal-
lace Sample and EH. O. Dennison, for co-relators.

Smith, McCarthy & Brown and Carlton, Ellis & Wilson,
for respondents.

SEBRING, J.:

This is a proceeding in quo warranto brought by the At-
torney General to ascertain by what right or authority the
respondents claim, hold and exercise the liberties, privileges
and franchises of a county budget commission for St. Lucie
County, Florida. The respondents have filed their answers

. to the information and the matter now stands for decision
on demurrer to said answers.

Chapter 24866, Laws of Florida, 1947, providing for the
creation of a budget commission for St. Lucie County, was
duly and regularly enacted by the legislature. Section 19 of
the act provided, among other things, “that this Act before

Le
918

taking effect shall be ratified and approved by a majority of
those qualified electors of St. Lucie County, Florida, voting
at the next general or special election held in St. Lucie
County, at which time the provisions of this bill shall be sub-
mitted to the people for their ratification or rejection.”

The answers of the respondent show that on April 20,
1948, the Board of County Commissioners of St. Lucie
County, by a motion duly and unanimously adopted, directed
that the question of establishing a budget commission under
the provisions of chapter 24866, supra, be included on the
ballot for the primary elections to be held in the County on
May 4, 1948 and that in pursuance of said motion provision
for the ratification or rejection of the act was placed only
upon the official primary election ballots of the Democratic
Party and Republican Party.used in the primary election held
in St. Lucie County on May 4, 1948. The answers further
show that at said primary election held on May 4; 1948, and
by means of the Democratic and Republican Party ballots
furnished for the purpose, 1605 votes were cast in favor of
the ratification of the act and 1282 votes were cast in favor
of rejection.

The whole question is whether the allegations of the
answer are sufficient to show that this election constituted a
“General or special election” at which the provisions of the
bill were “submitted to the people for their ratification or re-
jection,” as was required by chapter 24866, supra; for if it did
not, then the respondents are holding office entirely without
authority.

We do not think the allegations of the answer are suficient
to show that there has been a valid compliance with the
provisions of chapter 24866 with respect to an election to be
held to ratify or reject the proposal to create a budget com-
mission. It might have been perfectly proper, in the interest
of economy and convenience, for the county commissioners of
St. Lucie ‘County to have called a “special election” for the
purpose of enabling all the registered voters of the county to
vote upon the question of ratifying or rejecting the act and
to have made the date of such election fall on the same day

919

that had been set for the party primary election, Had such
a “special election” been held it doubtless would have ful-
filled the requirements of the statute, even though the same
polling places had been used for both elections, and the same
clerks and inspectors employed for the purpose of receiving
and canvassing the ballots; provided, that ballots separate
and apart from the political party ballots used for voting
upon party candidates had been made available, without re-
gard to party affiliations, to all registered voters of the
county. However, a party primary election at which, from
the very nature of the election being conducted, only Demo-
crats and Republicans were eligible to procure ballots could
not have been a valid “special election” within the contempla-
tion of the terms of Section 19, chapter 24866, supra. For it
cannot be assumed by this court that at the time such pri- ~
mary election was held all duly registered voters in St. Lucie
County were members either of the Democratic or the Re-
‘publican Party. Neither can it be assumed that such duly
registered voters of the county as were not Democrats or Re-
publicans and hence were deprived of their right to vote on
the issue of ratification or rejection because of the fact that
ballots would not have been available to them, were.less in
number than the majority by which the statute was pur-
portedly ratified at the Democratic and Republican primary
party election called and held on May 4, 1948.

In a quo warranto proceeding instituted on behalf of the
State to test the right to hold an office great particularity is
required of the answer.- Town of Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla.
128, 10 So. 740. The answer not only must be responsive to
the information but it must also show full title in the re-
spondent. State ex rel. Smith v. Anderson, 26 Fla. 240, 8 So. 1.
These requirements have not been observed in the present
case. When the answers are construed most strongly against
the respondents—as such pleadings must be when tested by
demurrer—the respondents have failed to show a valid elec-
tion within the requirements of chapter 24866, supra. A valid
election not having been shown, it follows that the appoint-
ment of each of the respondents to the office of budget, com-
missioner was without authority of law.

Le
920

The ‘demurrer to the answers filed by respondents should
be and the.same is hereby sustained.

It is so ordered.

BARNS, J., and TAYLOR, Associate Justice, concur.

HOBSON, J., concurs specially.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, CHAPMAN and
ADAMS, J. Jy, dissent.

HOBSON, J., concurring specially:

Although Chapter 24866, Laws of Florida, 1947, is ap-
parently a valid enactment of the legislature, the record be-
fore us discloses that Section 19 of said Act, providing for a
referendum “in which the qualified electors of St. Lucie
County shall take part” to the end that said bill be submitted
to “the people for their ratification or rejection,” was not fol-
lowed by the Board of County Commissioners in submitting
this Act for ratification or rejection.. It is my view that dis-
crimination against all qualified electors other than those
who are members of either the Democratic Party or the Re-
publican Party is apparent. In the operation or carrying out
of the provision of Section 19 of the Act an invalidity was
created when certain qualified electors were disfranchised.
Consequently, such discrimination exists as to bring the law
in its operation under the condemnation of the equal pro-
tection clause of our Constitution.

The right of all the people who are qualified electors to
vote in a referendum election such as the one in question here,
is not only guaranteed to them by our Constitution as a neces-
sary and integral part of a law which provides for such re-
ferendum, but it is also protected when in the carrying out or
operation of the law that right has been abridged. It is not
enough to say that a qualified elector, who was unaffiliated
with either major party, might have coerced the election
officials to have permitted him to vote. Provision should
have been made for him to exercise his right of franchise as it
was for other qualified electors. The act provided for, indeed
required that all qualified electors be given an opportunity to
vote. It thus escaped inherent invalidity. It is as fatal for

9g2t

the officers charged with the duty of providing for the elec-
tion to effectually disfranchise a qualified, voter as it is for
the Act to fail to protect his fundamental constitutional right.

The method adopted by the County Commissioners in
carrying out the provisions of section 19 of the Act was
clearly discriminatory and, therefore, should be condemned,
regardless of the fact that the County Commissioners are
parties as co-relators to this proceeding in Quo Warranto.
The State of Florida on relation of the Attorney General
instituted the suit and joined the County Commissioners as
co-relators. This was not necessary. It is still a suit brought
by the State of Florida on relation of the Attorney General
and any principle of estoppel as against the County Commis-
sioners is not controlling. However, it is not my conclusion
that officials who have apparently failed to carry out their
duties as prescribed ‘by law should be estopped, when they
realize their dereliction, from attempting to correct their error
and perform again and in a lawful manner their express
duties. .

I concur in the order sustaining the demurrer to the
answers,

ADAMS, J., dissenting:

This writer is unable to agree with the opinion and con-
clusion reached by the majority opinion.

The general law is that courts are reluctant to set aside
the results of an election once the results are tabulated and
filed. The rule has been universal that the courts would not
interfere in the basence of fraud or where some duly quali-
fied elector was not permitted to cast a ballot. Long ago this
court deélared in Carn v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 76 So. 337:

“... Our election laws, like all others, contain two classes
of requirements and prohibitions. Over one the elector can
exercise no control, over the other he can. He should be held
to strict accountability for such things as are within his con-
trol, but not for those things which public officials are re-
quired to do. A voter may sacrifice his right to have his
ballot accepted and counted for wrongful or illegal acts on his

P|
922

part, but he is not to be deprived of his constitutional rights
by the néglect or wilful wrong of a public officer charged with
the duty of supplying him with the means or the opportunity
of expressing his choice. The attack on this election, is
purely technical, as no fraud was established, nor was it
shown that a single voter was prevented from expressing his
choice, or that had the ballots not been printed as they were,
the result would have been different... .”

We have many times differentiated irregularities in mat-
ters of procedure leading up to the election and irregulari-
ties transpiring in and about the conduct of the election. See
Pearson v. Taylor 159 Fla. 775, 32 So. (2nd) 826 and cases
there cited. '

The case now before us presents a highly technical matter
which in no way affected the manner in which the election
was held neither did it affect the results. No elector is com-
plaining. No one was disfranchised. Apparently every quali-
fied elector voted his choice as desired. No fraud or even ir-
regularity is charged in conducting the election. The returns
were made and respondents were duly appointed, qualified
and proceeded to discharge their duties. At this juncture the
co-relators, County Commissioners, institute this proceeding
in the name of the Attorney General seeking to impeach their
own official act. To thus state the case is to decide it. If
there ‘can’ be a case where the law of estoppel applies this is
it. See the law of estoppel in election cases, 18 Am. Juris.,

Sec. 280.

DAN DURLEY v. NATHAN MAYO, State Prison Custodian

37 So. (2nd) 320 . June Term, 1948
October 29, 1948 Division B

a
Le
. 923

Dan: Durley in proper person.
J, Tom Watson, Attorney General, and Reeves Bowen, As-
sistant Attorney General, for respondent.

BARNS, J.: .

We have submitted to us a petition for writ of .error
coram nobis. It having been made to appear that the case
wherein the petitioner was tried, convicted and adjudged
‘guilty was not appealed to this Court and that this Court is
without jurisdiction to act, and that the proper court would
be the trial court:

Whereupon it is ordered that said petition be denied and
the petition filed herein be returned by the Clerk to the pe-
titioner.

THOMAS, C. J.. ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

L. E. EDWARDS v. MIAMI SHORES VILLAGE, a Municipal Corpora-

tion.
87 So. (2nd) 320 June Term, 1948
October 29, 1948 Special Division A

Hudson & Cason and J. Mark Wilcox, for appellant.
Thomas H. Anderson, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:
This is an appeal of an order granting a new trial wherein
the appellant has made three assignments of error, two of

De
924

which relate to the order of the court granting a new trial and
the third of which assignments of error relates to an order,
as follows:

“It is thereupon considered, ordered, adjudged and de-
creed that Miami Shores Village has the legal right and au-
thority to maintain the present condemnation proceeding;
that the purpose for which said property is sought to be con-
demned is a public purpose;, and the cause is ordered to pro-
ceed to trial before a jury for the purpose of assessing the
damages to be awarded to the present owner of the property
so sought to be condemned.”

There has been no appeal of such quoted order and, as
such, it is not appealable. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 126 Fla. 736, 171 So. 808.

Appellant has in his brief presented the following ques-
tion in argument, to-wit:

“TT,

“Miami Shores Village-is without constitutional or legal-
rights to maintain this condemnation suit for the appropria-
tion of the respondent’s property for the use and benefit of a
membership club.”

Appellant fails to specify to which assignment of error
the question relates, but it doubtless refers to the third one
quoted above. .

The appellee has moved to strike that portion of appel-
lant’s brief relating. to the quoted question or point, on ‘the
ground that it is impertinent to any matter before the court
for adjudication.

We find the motion well founded and it is granted; and.
the Clerk of this Court is ordered to cancel the matter of such
brief relating to such question.

TERRELL, Acting Justice, CHAPMAN and SEBRING, -
JJ., concur.

925

NASH MIAMI MOTORS, INO., a Florida Corporation, and PETER
CURTIS v. LOUIH BANDEL, as Receiver for the A. A. AUTO
SALES-RENTALS, INC., GENERAL ACCEPTANCE CORPORA-
TION and SID RISER.

87 So (2nd) 366 June Term, 1948
November 2, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing denied December 4, 1948

Daniel L. Ginsberg, for petitioners.

Louis Bandel for receiver, Mallory H. Horton for General
Acceptance Corporation, and George S. Okell for Sid Riser,
respondents.

HOBSON, J.:

On May 5th, 1948, the Respondent, General Acceptance
Corporation, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court,
Dade County, Florida, against A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc.
and others wherein it was alleged that A. A. Auto Sales-

a
926

Rentals, Inc. was indebted to the respondent, General Accept-
ance Corporation, by virtue of certain floor plan chattel
mortgages covering numerous automobiles given as security
for said indebtedness to the Respondent. The defendant A.
A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc. is a used car dealer in the City of
Miami, Florida.

The bill of complaint alleges that the chattel mortgages
sought to be foreclosed were duly filed for record in the office
of the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Dade County, Florida.

On May 5th, 1948, a Receiver was appointed for the de-
fendant, A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc. and the Receiver im-
mediately went into and took possession of the defendant’s
used car business.

On the 7th day of May, 1948, the Petitioner filed its peti-
tion for the return of four automobiles which had been taken
by the Receiver following his appointment. The petition was.
set down for hearing before the Court’on the 11th day of May,
1948, and at the same time the Receiver filed his petition for a
confirmation of the sale of all of the automobiles on the de-
fendant’s lot, incliiding the four claimed by the petitioner.
The Court denied the petitioner’s claim to the four automo-
biles and confirmed the Receiver’s sale for the sum of $14,-
375.00 covering nineteen automobiles.

The Respondent, General Acceptance Corporation, has
never made any claim of interest in two of the four automo-
piles alleged to have been owned by the Petitioner. However,
the Respondent did claim a lien upon two of these automobiles
by virtue of floor plan chattel mortgages executed to it by the
A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc. A petition for rehearing was
filed on June 3rd, 1948, by Nash Miami Motors seeking a re-
hearing of its original petition claiming the four cars sold by
the Receiver.

There appears to be no dispute concerning the fact that
the petitioner placed the four automobiles in question which
it claimed to own in the custody and on the used car lot of
the defendant A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc., with no transfer
of title having been made to A. A. Auto-Rentals, Inc., and no

evidence of a lien having been given by A. A. Auto Sales-
Rentals, Inc. to the petitioner.

On the 14th day of May, 1948, petition for rehearing on
behalf of the petitioner was granted insofar as it pertained to
a priority of claim on two automobiles and as to the other
two automobiles claimed by the petitioner, its request was
denied.

‘There was also an order entered on July 12th, 1948, by
the Circuit Court enjoining the petitioner from pursuing cer-
tain actions in the Civil Court of Record to replevin the auto-
mobiles in question from Trail Motor Sales, the purchaser,
from the Receiver. .

The Petitioners are asking this Court to review the order
of July 12th, 1948, in the nature of an injunctive order and
the order of July 14th, 1948, denying the petitioners’ claim
to a priority on two of the four automobiles in question.

It is contended by Respondents that where an owner en-
trusts an automobile to a dealer with implied authority to
sell but with title reserved in the owner until the payment of
the purchase price, a purchaser or creditor for value with-
out notice receives a good title or valid lien as against the
owner. We agree, in part, with their position. .

Had the A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc. sold the four auto-
mobiles in question the purchaser for a valuable considera-
tion without notice of the terms or conditions of the original
delivery of the cars to A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc., would
have obtained a good title as against the original owner Nash
Miami Motors, Inc. See Glass v. Continental Guaranty Cor-
poration, 88 So. 876, 81 Fla. 687. However, the two auto-
mobiles in question here were not sold to General Acceptance
Corporation. On the contrary, General Acceptance Corpora-
tion loaned money to A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc., and se-
cured from said corporation a lien represented by floor plan
chattel mortgages. A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc., under
authority of the Glass case, supra, in view of all existing con-
ditions, had the implied authority to sell the automobiles
which had been delivered to it by Nash Miami Motors, Inc. but
there is no principle of law with which we are familiar which,

927

928

under the circumstances, would give to A. A. Auto Sales-
Rentals, Inc. the implied authority to encumber said personal
property.

This Court in the case of Glass v. Continental Guaranty
Corporation, supra, said: “The mere possession of personal
property is only prima facie evidence of title.... ... But
where an owner consigns personal property to a dealer in such
goods with express or implied authority to sell, or delivers or
consigns to another personal property with indicia of owner-
ship, or of authority to sell but with title reserved in the
owner until the payment of the purchase price, a purchaser
who pays value for such goods and gets possession thereof
without notice of the terms or conditions of the original de-
livery, consignment or sale, obtains a good title as against
the original owner, which will in general prevail against the
Jatter’s reserved title.” (Underscoring supplied)

The principle above enunciated appears to be a modifica-
tion of the old common law rule to the effect that a sale in
market overt confers a title upon a bona fide purchaser,
though the seller had no title whatever. Both principles are
predicated upon the theory that a dealer selling any specific
type or types of personal property is known to the public
generally, including those from whom he secures his stock,
as one who sells openly to any prospective purchaser the
goods and chattels in which he deals. Because of this a per-
son purchasing such personalty should not be confronted with
the task of ascertaining his title or authority to sell. It does
not appear logical to extend such implied authority to sell to
authority to encumber. It is one thing for a person to pur-
chase and take possession of personal property under such
circumstances and in so doing to be relieved of investigating
the right of the dealer to sell; but itis another and different
thing for one to advance money upon the strength of a lien on
such personal property without investigating the express or
actual authority, if any, of the dealer to encumber the
chattels. The commonly known and primary business of A.
A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc. is the sale of used cars. If it en-
eumbers its stock such action is incidental to its real business

929

and is not a matter of such common knowledge as to justify
implied authority to encumber property which has been con-
signed or delivered to it for sale.

It is our opinion that there was a duty upon the Respond-
ent, General Acceptance Corporation, to have investigated
the authority of A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc. to give a valid
lien upon the automobiles in question. It would have been a
simple matter for said respondent to have ascertained who
held the legal title to said automobiles, by inquiry made to
A. A. Auto Sales-Rentals, Inc. or to have secured such infor-
mation from the office of the State Motor Vehicle Commis-
sioner. It follows that the principle of law relied upon by
respondent, that where one of two innocent parties must suf-
fer through the act or negligence of a third party the loss
should fall: upon the one who by his conduct created the
circumstances which enabled the third party to perpetrate the
wrong or cause the loss, cannot be invoked by General Ac-
ceptance Corporation, respondent herein.

The petition for writ of certiorari should be and it is
hereby granted and the challenged orders reversed with direc-
tions to the lower court to proceed with this case in a manner
not inconsistent with this opinion.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

LAUDERDALE BY THE SEA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Florida
Corporation, et al, v. LAUDERDALE SURF AND YACHT ES-
TATES, INC., a Florida Corporation, et al.

87 So. (2nd) 364 . June Term, 1948
November 5, 1948 Special Division A

Roach & Hoyl, for appellants.

James M. Crum and McCune, Hiaasen, Fleming & Kelley,
for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeals on the
grounds that they were not entered within the limitation of
time prescribed by Section 59.08, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

Under date of April 1, 1948, the chancellor, on final hear-
ing upon the plaintiffs’ bill, defendants’ answer counterclaim
and testimony, entered a final decree whereby the defendants
were enjoined and restrained from interfering with plaintiffs’
enjoyment of certain property adjudged to be the property
of the plaintiffs and were enjoined from removing sand from
the beach between the plaintiffs’ property and the water, and
denied the defendants’ counterclaim but, it said final decree,
provided, however, that:

“The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause to settle all
questions that the Court has jurisdiction to settle under the

~ pleadings and the proceedings in this case not settled by this
decree, and to make such other and further orders and decrees
herein as shall be necessary to make the same effectual.”

Thereafter, on April 17, 1948, the defendants filed a peti-
tion for rehearing.

Thereafter, on April 22, 1948, the plaintiffs filed a motion
for taxation of costs.

Thereafter, on May 12, 1948, the chancellor, is passing
upon said motion for rehearing and said motion for taxa~-
tion of costs, ordered and decreed as follows:

“Tt is ordered and decreed that defendants’ petition for
rehearing is denied; the motion to strike filed March 8, 1948,
is denied; the petition for an order granting the benefits of
the final decree to certain individuals is denied; Court costs
amounting to $176.10 are assessed against the defendants.”

Thereafter, on July 9, 1948, the defendants entered their
notice of appeal (1) to review the final decree of May 12,

ee
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931

1948, and (2) to review the judgment and decree dated April
1, 1948.

We now have before us for adjudication the appellees’ mo-_.
tion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal was.
not prosecuted to this Court within the time allowed by law,
to-wit: Sixty days, as provided by Section 59.08 F.S, 1941
F.S.A. (Laws 1945) as follows:

“59.08 Time for Taking Appeals or Filing Petitions for
Certiorari:

“Appeals, including petitions for review by certiorari, on
proceedings in the nature of certiorari, shall be taken or filed
within sixty days from and after the entry of the order, de-
cision, judgment, or decree appealed from.”

The decree of April 1, 1948, purported to and did adjudi-
eate the equities between the parties. It was a judgment on
the merits of the controversy. It was not interlocutory in
character or quality. Upon its entry the time began to run
when the Supreme Court could acquire jurisdiction. It was
subject to appeal. The time began to run when the circuit
court would lose jurisdiction as to the matters adjudicated,
subject, however, to being upset in the event of the granting
of a rehearing by the chancellor at a time when he had juris-
diction for such purpose.

The mere filing of a petition for rehearing will not stay
the effect of the final decree or arrest the operation thereof
so as to stop the running of time. More is required. . There
was no stay of the decree by order of the chancellor, as au-
thorized by Section 63.71, F.S. 1941, F.S.A. The Statutes on
rehearing and the effect of the filing of a petition therefor
are as follows:

63.70 Rehearings

“Hivery petition for rehearing shall contain the special
matter or cause on-which such rehearing is applied for, shall
be signed by counsel, and the facts therein stated, if not ap-
parent on the record, shall be verified by the oath of the
party, or by some other person. No rehearing shall be

932

granted uiless the petition is filed within twenty days after
the recording of the decree.”

63.71 Petition for Rehearing as Stay
“No petition for rehearing shall operate to stay the pro-
ceedings unless so ordered by the court. The court in grant-
ing any such stay of proceedings, may fix the term and con-
ditions of such stay. The court on ex parte application may
grant a stay on such petition for a period not exceeding five
days, but no stay for a longer period shall be granted except
" on notice previously given to the opposing party.”—Sec. 63.70-
63.71, F.S, 1941, F.S.A.

The petition for rehearing of the decree of April 1, 1948,
was filed April 17, 1948, and was denied on May 12, 1948. The
appeal was entered on July 9, 1948, which was not within the
sixty days limitation as prescribed by Section 59.08, F.S.

' 1941, F.S.A., as amended (1945).

It appears that appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal of
the decree of Appeal 1, 1948, is well founded, and the motion
is granted.

The appellants also on July 9, 1948, entered their appeal
of the decree of May 12, 1948, wherein and whereby the
chancellor decreed that “court costs amounting to $176.10 are
assessed against the defendants.”

The question of taxing court costs was reserved by the
chancellor in his decree of April 1, 1948, and the taxing of
costs in nowise affected the equities as decreed on April 1,
1948. The equities of the subject matter of the first decree
were in nowise modified or altered by the latter decree. Both
were final in effect and became res judicata unless reversed
or modified on appeal.

The appeal of the latter decree of May 12, 1948, was within
the time limitation as fixed by Section 59.08, supra, and the
motion to dismiss the appeal of such decree is denied.

TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, CHAPMAN and SE-
BRING, J.J., concur. *

ee
[|
. 933

EDNA BOND, by her next friend, EDWARD BOND, and EDWARD
BOND v. PALM BEACH LANDSCAPE COMPANY, a Florida cor-
poration.

87 So. (2nd) 586 June Term, 1948

November 12, 1948 En Bane

Rehearing denied December 8, 1948

Harry Goodmark, for appellants.
Earnest, Lewis & Smith, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., SEBRING, BARNS and HOBSON, JJ.,
concur.

TERRELL, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.

CHAPMAN, J., dissenting:

The Court below held the two counts of an amended decla-
ration fatally defective because each count failed to state
a cause of action. Judgment final was entered and plaintiff
appealed. Count one in viz:

“Comes now your plaintiff, Edna Bond, by her under-
signed attorney, and sues Palm.Beach Landscape Company, a
Florida corporation, for that on July 17, 1947, your plaintiff
was riding as a passenger at approximately 4:15 P. M. ina
1941 Chevrolet sedan on Florida State Highway No. 7, going
north, which highway is located approximately one-quarter
mile south of Deerfield Road No. 810.

“That on said date your defendant owned a 1937 Inter-
national motor truck and that. on said date on said Florida
State Highway No. 7, approximately one-quarter mile south

934

of Deerfield Road No. 810, outside of any municipality, your
defendant, through its duly authorized agent, negligently and
carelessly stopped and parked the aforesaid 1937 Inter-
national motor truck on said Florida State Highway and per-
mitted the aforesaid truck to stand in the highway with all of
its wheels on the pavement in the line of traffic in which the
ear plaintiff was riding in was traveling; that defendant
placed no warning device or signal on flag nor did anything to
indicate, as required by law, that the said truck was parked
in the road aforesaid; that your plaintiff was without knowl-
edge as to the defendant’s having parked his truck as afore-
mentioned and as a proximate result of the negligence and
carelessness of the defendant, the driver of the car in which
plaintiff was riding did not realize that defendant had parked
as aforesaid until the car was in dangerous proximity to the
truck and the driver was unable, though driving carefully and
cautiously, to prevent the car in which plaintiff was riding
from colliding with defendant’s truck, and the car in which
plaintiff was riding did collide with plaintiff’s truck without’
fault on your plaintiff’s part.

That as a proximate result of the aforesaid negligence
of your defendant your plaintiff was violently thrown out of
the seat in the car against the inside front part of the car in
which the plaintiff was riding and as a proximate result your
plaintiff sustained numerous and sundry injuries in and about
her body necessitating various stitches, causing her to have
two fractured ribs, a dislocation of her shoulder, pulled liga-
ments, tendons, as well as other internal injuries and your
plaintiff suffered severe mental and physical pain as a result
of said injuries and continues to suffer from said injuries so
negligently caused.”

‘Pertinent allegations of count two on the part of the
husband are very much like those of count one, except that
he sought to recover for the loss of consortium, doctor bills,
medicine, hospital expenses and other items flowing from
the alleged negligent injury.

Allegations of negligence of counts one and two are identi-
cal, They charged that the defendant negligently and care-

[|
Le
935

lessly stopped and parked the truck on the highway with all.
wheels on the pavement; that it placed no warning device,
signal or flag, nor did anything to indicate, as required by
statute, the truck was parked on the highway. Section
317.67, F.S.A., is cited and relied upon as requiring the afore-
said warnings. In the case of Allen v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458,
171 So. 513, we held that the violation of traffic laws is prima
facie evidence of negligence, but that prima facie evidence
may be overcome by proof of surrounding circumstances and.
conditions which will eliminate the character of negligence
from the transaction. Therefore, when it is shown that the
traffic law has been violated it is a question for the jury to
determine from all the facts and circumstances whether or
not the prima facie evidence of negligence is overcome by
other evidence of existing facts and circumstances. This rule
was reaffirmed by this Court in C. W. Zaring Co. v. Dennis,
155 Fla. 150, 19 So. (2nd) 701. See DeSalvo v. Curry, 160
Fla. 7, 33 So. (2nd) 215; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Wat-
son, 94 Fla. 571, 118 So. 716, Hernandez v. Pensacola Coach
Corp., 141 Fla. 441, 193 So. 555; Peninsular Telephone Co. v.
Marks, 144 Fla. 652, 198 So. 330.
It is my conclusion that the declaration states a cause of

action.

ROSLYN S. FINSTON vy. ALBERT FINSTON

87 So, (2nd) 423 June Term, 1948
‘November 12, 1948 Special Division B

936

Leonard G. Egert and Loftin, Anderson, Scott, McCarthy
& Preston, for petitioner.
Patton & Kanner, for respondent.

TERRELL, J.:

In a suit brought for that purpose the parties to this
cause were divorced and property rights at issue between
them were adjudicated March 30, 1948. Finston v. Finston,
84 So. (2nd) 745, not yet reported in Florida Reports.

In August 1948, respondent filed a petition for supple-
mentary final decree in the same cause, wherein he seeks to
require petitioner to release her rights as beneficiary in cer-
tain insurance policies upon respondent’s life, to execute a
waiver of her right in a tax refund of approximately $8000.00
which the United States Government has credited to her, and
further require her to account for the disposition of certain
personal property, household furnishings and books which
had been in storage for several years. A motion to dismiss.
the petition on the ground of res adjudicata was overruled.
That order is here for review under Rule 34 of the Rules of
this Court.

The primary point for determination is whether or not the
property rights which respondent seeks to bring in issue in
this case were adjudicated in Finston v. Finston, 34 So. (2nd)
745, 160 Fla, 343. :

a
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937

We think this question requires an affirmative answer.
‘The rule seems well settled that a final decree in a equity suit
settles all property rights of the parties and bars any action
thereafter brought by either party to determine the question
of property rights. Knabb v. Duner, et al., 143 Fla. 92, 196
So. 456; Town of Boca Raton v. Moore, 122 Fla. 350, 165 So.
279; Zellner v. Zellner, 155 Kan. 530, 127 P. (2nd) 428. See
also Section 63.35, Florida Statutes 1941, requiring counter-
claims to be set up in the original suit. It further appears
from the pleadings in the main suit that the property rights
in question were before the Court when the final decree was
entered and were adjudicated, so the doctrine of res ad-
judicata was a proper defense to raise here and should have
been permitted.

Respondent contends that since the Circuit Court retained
jurisdiction of the cause “for the purpose of making such
further orders herein as may be found necessary to carry out
the purposes and objects of the decree,” he purposely reserved
jurisdiction to adjudicate property and other rights that may
arise in connection with the case.

The only effect of reserving jurisdiction in this manner is
to promulgate such orders as are necessary to effectuate the
judgment but this does not make‘it any less a final judgment.
The application of any other principle would mean that there
would be no end to litigation. Our statute Section 63.35,
Florida Statutes 1941, relating to compulsory counter-claims
in equity contemplates the course that was pursued in the
main case.

Respondent also contends that petitioner confuses the rule
of res adjudicata with the doctrine of “law of the case.” The
doctrine, law of the case, may be invoked by either party as
to such questions as were actually considered and decided on
the first appeal, while the doctrine res adjudicata means that
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction directly
rendered upon a particular issue, is conclusive as to the
parties and the issue decided in the same or any other contro-
versy.

EE
938

Inspection of these doctrines discloses that “law of the
case” is a limited application of the doctrine of res adjudicata.
Some of the courts so hold but we think the question here
was ruled by res adjudicata. It follows that the trial court
was in error in overruling the motion to dismiss.

The application of petitioner to require respondent to pro-
vide her with attorney’s fees has been considered but it seems
that this application should be denied on authority of Vinson
v. Vinson, 139 Fla. 146, 190 So. 454.

The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment
appealed from is quashed.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

M. RB. HALL v. HONORABLE MILLARD F. CALDWELL, Governor of
the State of Florida, et al.

87 So (2nd) 421 . * June Term, 1948
November 12, 1948 Division A

Paty, Warwick, & Paul, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, and T. Paine Kelly, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellee.

TERRELL, J.:

This appeal is from a final decree restraining appellant,
defendant below, from taking fish or any seafoods from the
salt waters of Florida by means of seines, nets, traps or other
methods than hook and line and selling them to wholesale
dealers, retail dealers, hotels, restaurants or public eating
places without having procured a license as a wholesale sea-

food dealer as required by section 374.31, Florida Statutes
1941.

The point for determination is whether or not a com-
mercial fisherman is required to procure a wholesale seafood.
dealer’s license to dispose of his catch.

There is no dispute about the facts. It is admitted that
a commercial fisherman is one who is engaged in the business
of taking the various species of seafood from the salt waters
by other means than hook and line and disposing of his catch’
to wholesale dealers, retail dealers, restaurants, hotels and
other public eating places. It is also admitted that appellant
is a commercial fisherman.

939°

Whether or not appellant, a commercial fisherman, is re-
quired to procure a wholesale dealer’s license to dispose of
his catch, turns on the interpretation of sections 374.30,
374.31 and 374.32, Florida Statutes 1941. The point is not
without its difficulties. The pertinent part of section 374.31
defines a wholesale seafood dealer as any one dealing in fish,
seafoods or salt water food products of any kind and who sells
such products to wholesale dealers, retail dealers, hotels,
restaurants, or other public eating places. Retail seafood
dealers are defined by the same act as those who sell such
foods direct to the consumer.

Section 374.32, requires wholesale seafood dealers to pro-
cure a permit as a prerequisite to securing a license, defines
the penalty for violation of the act and carries this additional
proviso: “Provided that nothing contained in this section
shall be construed to apply to the sale and delivery to con-
sumers of such products by licensed retail dealers in ordinary
retail transactions or to the sale and delivery of his own
catch or products, to a Florida licensed dealer by any person
catching or gathering the same or to persons exempt from the
payment of a license tax.”

The chancellor construed section 374.31 to require com-
mercial fishermen to procure a wholesale seafood dealer’s
license to dispose of their catch but when chapter 19611 from
which sections 374.30, 374.31 and 374.32 were taken, is read

PC
940 ‘

in sum, we do not think it so requires. It does not in terms
do so, and since it imposes a substantial tax on the whole-
sale dealer it should not be construed to fasten that tax on the
commercial fisherman unless the words of the act in terms or
by direct implication impose it.

A commercial fisherman is not a retailer unless he sells
his catch direct to the consumer. Neither is he a wholesaler
unless he buys and sells to the wholesaler. The mere fact that
he sells his catch to the wholesaler does not make him a
wholesaler. These were the conditions under which the Con-
servation Commission held that he was not required to pro-
cure a seafood dealer’s license to sell his catch and we think
he was correct. He (commercial fisherman) is required to
pay a license on his boat and when he sells his catch direct to
the wholesaler, we do not think the act contemplates that he
procure a wholesaler seafood dealer’s license. Any other in-
terpretation reads the proviso quoted herein, and other clear
implications, out of the act.

It cannot be said that the terms of the act are not ambigu-
ous, but this interpretation is more consonant with reason
and what we think the makers of the act intended. To im-
pose a wholesale seafood dealer’s license tax on the com-
mercial fisherman amounts to at least three taxes the con-
sumer must pay before the seafood is on his table, two of
which .are wholesale seafood dealers license taxes, and we do
not think the law makers so intended.

The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed.

Reversed, :

THOMAS, C. J.. CHAPMAN and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

BR. C. LOBMEYER, and his wife, MRS. R. C. LOHMEYER, v. ROSS
WILLIAMS, ef al, and LETA 8. DAWSON.

87 So. (2nd) 419 June Term, 1948
November 12, 1948 En Bane

. 941
Cleveland, Sibley & Davis, Montague Rosenberg, and J. C:
Howell, for petitioners.

Hoffman & Durant, for respondents.

BARNS, J.:

This matter is on certiorari to review a circuit court judg-
ment which affirmed on appeal a judgment of the Civil Court
of Record.

The plaintiff-appellee, Dawson, a real estate broker, sued
the defendant-appellant, Lohmeyer, for services alleged to
have been rendered on or about June 15, 1946, in finding a
purchaser ready, able and willing to buy the Lohmeyer
property. Plaintiff alleges that Lohmeyer had listed the
property with her.

The listing was solicited by the plaintiff, or her agent, who
procured one Burke, interested in purchasing.

About June 17, 1946, the plaintiff caused to be tendered
to the defendant a proposed contract of purchase and sale
signed by Milton M. Burke, as purchaser, and a check for
$2000, payable to “Leta S. Dawson, Escrow Agent,” also an
inventory of furniture which Lohmeyer was requested to ac-
knowledge by signing, as a condition of the offer and as a part
of the consideration for the sales price of $35.000. The ten-
dered contract called for closing within thirty days. :

Lohmeyer refused the tendered offer on the ground that
(1) the inventory contained items of furniture which were
not to be included in the sale; (2) because the check was
made payable to the broker instead of to him; and (3) 'be-
cause the closing date was thirty days instead of September
15, 1946, as previously specified by him.

Le
942

Since there is evidence without conflict supporting the
petitioner as to (1) and (2) supra and only slight conflict as
to (3) supra, it appears that the certiorari should be, and
same is hereby, granted, and the judgment of the Civil Court
of Record and the Circuit Court judgment of affirmance are
quashed and the cause remanded to the Civil Court of Record
for further proceedings.

TERRELL, ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

HOBSON, J., concurs specially.

THOMAS, C. J., and CHAPMAN, J., dissent.

HOBSON, J., concurring specially:

I concur in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice BARNS.

On page 22 of the transcript of record filed in this Court
we find that Mr. Lohmeyer, one of the petitioners herein,
testified as follows:

“Q. After this had been delivered to the purchaser or the
broker who signed it, was it ever tendered back to you signed
by the purchaser?

“A. Mrs. Dawson came back to my office; I think it was
on a Thursday, about five o’clock.

“Q. In the afternoon?

“A. Yes, sir; and she brought this contract along, with an
inventory of the furniture and furnishings that she contended
was to go with the house. I noticed at that time that there
was this change for a thirty-day closing instead of the way
it had originally been written, for possession until September
15, 1946, and I noticed a lot of things included in the inven-
tory that there was no understanding on my part to be in-
cluded in the sale. We were willing to let practically all of
the furniture go, and the only thing was she included a lot of
items there that there was no intention to let go.

“Q. Now when she brought that contract with that inven-
tory of furniture that was not covered by your contract, did
she insist upon the signing of that contract in its present
condition, as well as your approval of the inventory?

“A, She did, absolutely.

EE
, [| :
943

“Q. And why did you refuse to sign that contract at that
time?

“A, Because the contract was at variance with the terms
that we had discussed with each other, as to the possession
and also as to the inventory and also another provision
I think, she had a check there that was payable to her as
broker; that was another objection that I didn’t agree to.

“Q. What did you tell her in reference to—why did you
refused to sign that contract at that time?

“A, Because this contract was at variance with the terms
that we had previously discussed. ,

“Q. And at variance with the terms of your contract that
originally had been delivered to him?

“A. Yes sir.

“Q. And because they requested you to sign an-inventory
of certain personal property to go with the contract?

“A, That’s right.

“Q. And you don’t agree in the contract to convey any of
the personal property?

“A. According to the terms of the contract itself, there
was no furniture.

“Q. She insisted upon you signing that inventory along
with the contract; is that correct?

“A, She did.

“Q. And that is why you refused to sign it?

“A, Absolutely, sir.” (Underscoring supplied).

That part of the above testimony which deals with the in-
ventory of furniture and the inclusion of certain items of
furniture in the sale is nowhere contradicted either by direct
or by rebuttal evidence. When the broker brought this signed
contract to Mr. Lohmeyer together with an inventory of
furniture that was not covered by the contract a counter-
offer, indeed a new and different contract was proposed to
said Lohmeyer. He then had the legal right to refuse to
enter into this new contract at variance with the terms of the
one which he had prepared. Regardless of the fact that Miss

a
944

Dawson contended through counsel in the court below that
she was only employed to find a purchaser, she is not entitled
to recover because she did not find a purchaser ready, able
and willing to purchase upon the terms fixed by Lohmeyer if
his uncontradicted testimony is.to be believed.

‘When Miss Dawson returned with the signed contract and
the inventory of furniture she submitted a counter-offer on
behalf of the prospective purchaser and to that extent and for
that purpose she was acting as the agent of said prospective
purchaser. See Webster Lumber Co. v. Lincoln, 94 Fla. 1097,
115 So. 498; McCay v. Seaver, 98 Fla. 710, 124 So. 44.

For the reasons stated, I am of the opinion that the writ of
certiorari should be granted and the judgment of thé Civil
Court of Record and the Circuit Court judgment of affirm-

ance quashed.

FRANK RAY EDDY v. DOROTHY M. STAUFFER

87 So (2nd) 417 June Term, 1948
November 12, 1948 : En Bane

Walker & Walker, and Keen O’Kelly & Spitz, for petitioner.
Harry E. King, for respondent.

HOBSON, J.:

This case is before the Court upon a petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to review and set aside an interlocutory order
entered by the Hon. Don Register, Circuit Judge, in and by
which order said Judge determined that the Circuit Court of
Polk County, Florida, had jurisdiction to determine the ques-
tion of custody of Frank Ray Eddy, Jr., the minor son of the
parties hereto. After determining the question of jurisdic-
tion, the learned Judge awarded the custody of Frank Ray
Eddy, Jr., to his mother, Dorothy M. Staufer, until further
order of the Court.

The petitioner takes the position that the lower court
wrongfully and erroneously assumed jurisdiction of this cause
and of Frank Ray Eddy, Jr., the child whose custody is in
question. Petitioner asserts several reasons for his position.
His most serious contention, and the only one which we con-
sider worthy of discussion, is that the Superior Court of Cook
County, Illinois, first assumed jurisdiction of the minor, in a

divorce suit in that Court, and entered an order awarding cus-
tody to his father and granted the right of reasonable visita-
tion to the mother, including the full right to have said minor
with her for a period of four weeks out of each summer vaca~
tion and that although the boy was in Polk County, Florida,
in the lawful and authorized custody of his mother at the
time of the institution of this suit, the Superior Court of Cook
County, Illinois, has exclusive jurisdiction of its ward, to-wit:
Frank Ray Eddy, Jr.

With this contention we cannot agree. It would serve no
useful purpose to discuss the numerous cases cited in the
briefs of counsel. Counsel for petitioner cite respectable au-
thority to sustain their contention that full faith and credit
should be accorded the decrees of sister States in cases involv-
ing the question of custody of minors, not necessarily as an in-
cident to the so-called full faith and credit clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution but certainly upon the basis of comity. The
decided authorities are in conflict on this question. Some of ©
this Court’s decisions appear, upon a cursory examination, to
lack consistency but, upon detailed examination, do not appear

ee
946

to be subject to such criticism. However, there is approxi-
mate unanimity of opinion to the effect that the Courts of a
State where a child may be residing, even temporarily, have
jurisdiction to make such orders concerning the child’s cus-
today as his welfare may from time to time require. This is al-
most uniformly the rule if the court of original jurisdiction
may modify its custody decree. The courts of Illinois may do
so, as is clearly demonstrated by the transcript of proceedings
had in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois. See Peo-
ple of the State of New York ex rel Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.
610, 91 L, Hd. 1133 (1947); Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S.
254, 264, 35 L. Ed. 464, 467; Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469,
149 So. 483.

This young man whose custody is in question is approxi-
mately fifteen years of age. The transcript of record of the
proceedings in the Stiperior Court of Cook County, Illinois,
reveals the fact that said minor was but six years of age at
the time that Court originally granted his custody to the fath-
er. Subsequently, said Court, on July 22nd, 1943, and again
on May 23rd, 1946, modified its decree with respect to custody.
By the latter order the Illinois Court approved and confirmed *
the Master’s Report and supplemental report, and ordered
“that the plaintiff should have the full right to have said chil-
dren with her for a period of four weeks out of each summer

‘ vacation.” That record further shows the Master and the
Court gave marked consideration to the expressed desire of
the minors (one of whom is Frank Ray Eddy, Jr.) to remain
in the custody of their father. We quote from the Master’s
Report and findings:

“In accordance with the agreement hereinbefore men-
tioned, the Master had a talk with both boys at length. They
appeared to be average youngsters and exhibited manners
which speak well for the training and supervision they re-
ceive. They are of sufficient age and intelligence to express
their preferences. Fortunately, or otherwise, they both have
developed certain likes and dislikes... .

6. That said children are both of sufficient age and intelli-
gence to be able to express a sound preference.

Es
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947

7. That both children have expressed unqualifiedly their
desire to remain in the care and custody of their father.” (un-
derscoring supplied)

Judge Register stated in his Order that this young man
expressed to him “an unqualified preference to remain in the
custody” of his mother.

Although the minor’s preference is never controlling, the
‘desire of a strapping six-foot boy of high school age should be
given great weight. (Fielding v. Highsmith, 152 Fla. 837, 13
So. (2nd) 208; State ex rel Cline v. Cline, 91 Fla. 300, 107 So
446; Marshall v. Reams, 82 Fla. 499, 14 So. 95.) It is our
opinion that the passage of time has wrought such a change of
conditions as to justify the application of the almost universal
rule that the Court where the minor is found may make an
interlocutory order when intervention is necessary for the
welfare of the child. This child is passing through a crucial
period. His immediate welfare is at stake. Indeed, the course
of his life may be affected adversely by a refusal of the Flor-
ida Courts to consider his unquestioned preference. He has
reached an age when, unperturbed, he should have and exer-
cise reasonable discretion. The Illinois Court had that view in
1946. The Chancellor before whom he appeared in person in
the instant case likewise entertained that view. It is not sug-
gested that the respondent mother is not a fit and proper per-
son to have her elder son’s custody. The mother, her present
husband, their home and its milieu have received the stamp of
approval from both the Illinois Court and the Circuit Court
of Polk County, Florida. In fact, a careful examination of
the transcript of record of proceedings in the Illinois Court
leads us to the conclusion that if this instant controversy
were now before that Court the pivotal point would be the
“unqualified preference” of Frank Ray Hiddy, Jr.

The lower court was not in error in assuming jurisdiction
nor in entering the interlocutory order granting custody to
the respondent. The Court’s action in so doing should be
commended rather than condemned by reversal.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be and it is
hereby denied.

©

48

TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SEBRING and BARNS,
JJ., concur.
THOMAS, C. J., dissents.
; P|

CHARLES PEMBROKE, joined by his wife, MARY PEMBROKE v.
JAY CAUDILL and EMMA CAUDILL. ©

37 St. (2nd) 538 June Term, 1948
November 16, 1948 Division A.

James T. Smith and George 8. Saltsman, for appellants.
Forrest Hoffman, for appellees.

SEBRING, J.:

Charles Pembroke and Mary Pembroke, his wife, instituted
on action against the appellees for the recovery of liquidated
damages under a written agreement for the purchase and sale
of real property entered into by and between the parties to
this appeal. A demurrer to the third amended declaration
was sustained and the plaintiffs declined to plead over. There-
upon the trial court entered a final judgment in bar of the ac-
tion. The plaintiffs have prosecuted an appeal from the
judgment and question the decision of the trial court in sus-
taining the demurrer.

The written agreement upon which the plaintiffs predicat-
ed their action contained the following pertinent provisions:

“Received of Jay Caudill and his wife Emma Caudill, here-
inafter called the purchaser, $6200.00 . . . Cash, check, as
earnest money and in part payment on account of the pur-
chase price of the following .. . Property known as El Mirasol
Apartments located at 1206 Oak Street, Northeast, in the City
of St. Petersburg, including all furnishings and furniture now
in and on premises according to inventory, the total purchase

a
950

price being $67,500.00 . . . Payment to be made as follows:
Cash, earnest money as acknowledged ‘above, $6,200.00, cash.
upon closing deal, $34,400.00, balance of $26,900.00 covered by
two mortgages in amounts of $19,400.00 and $7,500.00, respec-
tively, to be assumed by purchaser at present rate of interest
and amortization payments.

“Said earnest money is acknowledged and funds are to be
held by the broker, subject to the following conditions:

“1. That Parham and Son (the brokers) shall hold said
earnest money and act as escrow agent until closing of the
deal; that one days shall be given for obtaining the owner’s
acceptance; and, in event of the owner’s non-acceptance, the
amount of the earnest money shall be promptly returned to
the purchaser.

“2, That abstract certified to date, or title insurance com-
mitment showing good and merchantable title, shall be de-
livered to the purchaser, and it is agreed that this transaction.
shall be closed and the purchaser shall pay the balance of the
money due under this contract, and execute all papers neces-
sary for the completion of the purchase within five days from
the delivery or tender to him of abstract'or title insurance
commitment .

“3, That the property shall be conveyed by waenty deed.

. That possession will be given upon passing of title .

“5, That in case of the failure of the purchaser to tnake
either of the payments, or any part thereof, or to perform any
of the covenants on his part made or entered into, this con-
tract shall, at the option of the Seller, be terminated and
voided and the purchaser shall forfeit said earnest money; and
the same shall be retained by the Seller as liquidated damages,
and the escrow agent is hereby authorized by the purchaser to:
pay over to the seller the said earnest money.

“6. That time is an essential part of this agreement...”

The third amended declaration to which the demurrer was
sustained recited, in substance, that at the time of the execu-
tion of the contract and as evidence of the cash payment to be
made “as earnest money” the appellee, Jay Caudill gave to
Parham & Son, the real estate brokers who were acting as

951

agent for the sellers, his check drawn on an out-of-state bank
in the sum of $6200.00; that said agents immediately placed
the check with a local bank for collection but before the
check could reach the out-of-state bank for payment, Jay
Caudill stopped payment on the check and subsequently re-
fused to perform or complete the contract to purchase the
property; that the sellers thereupon “exercised their option
and elected to sue the defendants for their promise to pay the
stipulated damages” agreed upon in the contract.

The trial court sustained the demurrer to the third
amended declaration on the ground that the clause in the
contract was one providing for a penalty and not liquidated
damages and that hence there could be no recovery without
pleading and proof of the sustainment of actual damages. We
shall confine and proof of the sustainment of actual damages.
We shall confine ourselves to the single question of law upon.
which the trial court based its ruling.

Whether the sum stipulated in a contract to be paid in the
event of a breach will be considered as a penalty or as liqui-
dated damages is always a question of law to be determined
by the court in each particular case. The real purpose in per-
mitting a stipulation for damages to stand as compensation.
for a breach being “to render certain and definite that which
appear to be uncertain and not easily susceptible of proof,”
Chace v. Johnson, 98 Fla. 118, 123 So. 519, the fact that a
stipulation denominates a sum to be paid for breach of a
contract as “liquiated damages” or as a “penalty” will not in
and of itself be conclusive. The courts will always look to the
nature of the contract, the terms and purposes of the whole
instrument, the natural and ordinary consequences of a
breach and the peculiar circumstances attending each case, to
determine its real character and purpose. Smith v. Newell, 37
Fla. 147, 20 So. 249; Greenblatt v. McCall & Co., 67 Fla. 165,
64 So. 748; Arnold v. First Savings & Trust Co. of Tampa, 104
Fla. 545, 140 So. 660, 141 So. 608.

Though no fixed or settled rule can be stated by which the
courts may always determine whether a stipulation for the
payment of a fixed sum should be treated as a penalty or as
liquidated damages, there appears to run throughout the

952

many cases in which the question has been considered the fol-
lowing controlling principle: Where Compensation for injury
resulting from a breach of contract is reasonably susceptible
of measurement by some adequate and approved legal stan-
dard, a stipulation providing for the payment of an amount
which may easily be excessive with reference to the terms,
nature and purpose of the contract, making it a matter held
in terrorem over either party, should be construed as a pen-
alty, even though it be specifically designated as liquidated
damages. Greenblatt v. McCall & Co., 67 Fla. 165, 64 So. 748.
Where the actual damages contemplated when the contract
was made are in their nature uncertain and may so depend
upon extrinsic considerations and circumstances as to be in-
capable of ascertainment with any reasonable degree of exact-
ness, and the fixed sum stipulated to. be paid is not dispropor-
tionate to the probable injury likely to result from a breach of
the contract, effect should be given to the stipulation as one
for liquidated damages, without regard to its designation or
the amount of injury actually suffered as the result of the
breach. Southern Menhaden Co. v. How, 71 Fla. 128, 70 So.
1000. :

All this is. but another way of saying that in the final
determination of the question whether or not a stipulation
should be construed as providing for a penalty or for liqui-
dated damages the guiding principle for the courts to observe
should be that of “just compensation” for injury resulting
from the breach of the contract, and the controlling object
should be to place the injured party in as advantageous posi-
tion as he would have occupied had his contract not been
broken. So long as the contracting parties keep this principl:
in view the courts will very generally allow them too agree
upon such a sum as will probably be the fair compensation for
the breach of a contract. But when they go beyond this, and
undertake to stipulate, not for compensation, but for a sum
entirely disproportionate to the measure of liability which the
law regards as compensatory, the court will refuse to give
effect to the stipulation and will confine the parties to such
actual damages as may be pleaded and proved. See Sedgwick
on Damages, 9th Ed. p. 779, Sec. 406; also compare Smith v.

953

Newell, supra; Greenblatt v. McCall & Co., Supra; Southern
Menhaden Co. v. How, supra; Atlantic & Gulf Ferilizer Co. v.
Mayo, 97 Fla. 1, 119 So. 513; Poinsettia Dairy Products Inc. v.
Wessel Co., 123 Fla. 120, 166 So. 306.

In every case involving a contract providing for a fixed
sum to be paid in the event of a breach, the real issue in-
volved, therefore, is whether the contract adheres to the
fundamental rule of “just compensation” which we have
stated and whether the parties intend that the sum named
shall be paid over to the injured party for the particular
breach which has occurred, Moses v. Autuono, 56 Fla., 499, 47
So. 925; Arnold v. First Savings & Trust Co. of Tampa, 104
Fla., 545, 140 So. 660.

Under the contract involved in this appeal the parties
agreed that the appellees should pay as the purchase price of
the property the sum of $67,500.00. They agreed that the
appellees, at the time they signed the contract .of purchase,
should pay the sum of $6200.00 “as earnest money and in part
payment on account of the purchase price” and should pay the
balance of the purchase price at the closing of the transaction.
They agreed that in paymént of the balance of the purchase
price the appellees should assume two subsisting mortgages of
the face amount of $26,900.00, at their then rates of interest
and amortization payments, and pay in cash the sum of
$34,400.00. They agreed that possession of the property
should not be surrendered to the appellees until the passing of
title. They agreed that the transaction should be closed and
that the appellees should pay the balance of the money due
under the contract, and execute all papers necessary for the
completion of the purchase within five days from the de-
livery of abstract of title or title insurance commitment.
Finally, they agreed that time should be of the essence of the
contract and that if the appellees failed “to make either of
the payments, or any of the covenants on (their) part entered
into,” the “earnest money” should be forfeited and retained by
the sellers as liquidated damages.

In our view the contract clearly provided for a penalty-and
not for liquidated damages.

Le
954

There was nothing in the transaction which could have
rendered the damages which might reasonably have been ex~-
pected to flow from a breach of the contract uncertain, con-
jectural or speculative. ‘The only real damages which could
have been sustained by the sellers as the result of the pur-
chasers failing to go through with the contract were the
profits to be realized from the sale. As to these, they were
definitely ascertainable in accordance with settled legal prin-
ciples for the admeasurement of damages; the measure of the
sellers’ damage ordinarily being in such cases the difference
between the agreed purchase price and the actual value of
the property at the time of the breach of the contract of
purchase, less the amount paid, Smith v. Newell, 37 Fla. 147,
20 So. 249; Woods-Hoskins-Young Co. v. Dittmarr, 102 Fla.
1000, 136 So. 710. The brokers’ commissions could not have
been an element of damage taken into consideration by the
parties at the time the contract was made, because the broker
would have been entitled to his commission only in the event
he had sold the property or had produced a purchaser ready,
able and willing to purchase upon the terms and conditions
fixed by the sellers. Obviously, in the case of a breach of the
terms or conditions of a contract whereby the prospective pur-
chaser fails to go through with the deal, a real estate broker
neither sells the property nor produces a purchaser ready, able
and willing to buy and hence will not become entitled to a com-
mission from the owners of the property for services rendered.
No question of damages by reason of the purchasers being in
possession of the property could have been within the minds
of the parties at the time the contract was executed, for by the
terms of the contract the buyers were not to be let into posses-
sion until the entire purchase price had been paid and all
papers signed necessary to the completion of the purchase.

Furthermore, by the strict and literal terms of the con-
tract the sellers were privileged to declare the contract at an
end and the “earnest money” forfeited upon the failure of the
purchasers to comply with any one of several covenants in
the contract, including the covenant requiring the purchasers
to pay the balance of the purchase price and to execute all
papers necessary for the completion of the purchase “within

955

five days from the delivery or tender of abstract or title in-
surance commitment.” The fact that the parties entered into
an agreement which placed the sellers in the position that
they could bring the contract to an end and yet retain the
“earnest money” if even as little as one day’s delinquency
occurred in paying. the balance of the purchase money and
executing papers necessary to complete the purchase was in
and of itself enough to require the trial court to hold that
liquidated damages were never intended by both parties to the
contract and hence that the stipulation should be construed as
a penalty authorizing the recovery of actual damages only.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

It is so ordered,

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

F. E. HUNT v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF EVERGLADES
DRAINAGE DISTRICT. .

87 So. (2nd) 534 June Term, 1948
November 19, 1948 En Bane

Rogers, Morris & Griffis and Elbert B. Griffis, for ap-
pellant.

Wideman, Caldwell, Pacetti & Robinson, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:
The plaintiff by his bill alleged title in himself to certain
lands by virtue of a deed from the Trustees of the Internal

Le
956

Improvement Fund of the State of Florida dated the 24th day

of July, A. D., 1947, and filed for record, said deed having been

issued by authority of Section 192.38, F.S. 1941, F.S.A., con-

veying lands which had reverted to the State of Florida by .
reason of non-payment of taxes thereon.

Plaintiff in his bill charged that the defendant, Board of
Commissioners of Everglades Drainage District, claims the
legal title by reason of the reversion or vesting of the title to
the said lands in the said Board for non-payment of Ever-
glades Drainage District taxes for the years 1930, 1937, 1940,
and 1941; and that by reason of the provisions of ch. 298 App.,
Section 1530(113), F.S. 1941, F.S.A., the title to the lands.
above described became vested in the Board of Commissioners
of Everglades Drainage District by reason of non-payment of
taxes aforesaid.

Plaintiff's ‘bill was one to quiet his title as against the
claims of the defendant. Upon defendant’s motion to dismiss,
the chancellor entered a final decree dismissing plaintiff's bill
and thereupon he appealed.

The section of the Murphy Act through which the plaintiff
claims his title is as follows:

192.38—I. I. Board title to certain tax certificate lands ~
vested in state (Murphy title)

“At the expiration of two years from the date chapter
18296, acts of 1937, became a law, the fee simple title to all
lands in this state, against which there remained outstanding
tax sale certificates which, on the date said act became a law,
were more than two years old, became absolutely vested in
the state and every right, title or interest of every nature or
kind whatsoever of the former owner of said property, or any
one claiming by, through or under him, or any one holding a
lien thereon, ceased, terminated and ended and the state
through the trustees of the internal improvement fund may
sell said lands'to the highest and best bidder for cash at such
time and after giving such notice and according to such rules

- and regulations as have or may be fixed and adopted from
time to time by said trustees of the internal improvement
fund. No court of this state, either federal or state, shall

|
Le
|
957

have jurisdiction to entertain any suit brought by the former
owner of said lands or any one claiming by, through or under
him for the purpose of questioning or in any way litigating or
contesting the title of the state or its grantees to said lands.

(Italies supplied). :

Sec. 192.38, F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

The section of the Murphy-like statute under which de-
fendant claims absolute title as against the claim of absolute
title by the plaintiff is as follows:

Sec. 1530 (113) (i) Everglades Drainage District (Murphy-
like) title to Everglades Dainage District.

“This section shall remain in full force and effect for
two (2) years from the date this Act shall become a law and
at the expiration of such two (2) year period then the fee
simple title to all lands against which there remains out-
standing any such tax sale certificates, or tax liens, shall be-
come absolutely vested in the Board of Commissioners of
Everglades Drainage District and every right, title or interest
of every nature or kind whatsoever of the former owner of
said property, or any one claiming by, through or under him,
or any one holding any lien thereon shall cease, terminate and
be an end, and ‘the Board of Commissioners of Everglades
Drainage District shall be authorized and empowered to sell
the said lands as provided by law. Laws 1941, c. 20658,
Sec. 15. (Italics supplied.)

Ch. 298 App., Sec. 1580 (118) (i), F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

The title of the Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund, pursuant to the provisions of 192.38, became vested be-
fore the title, if any, of the Everglades Drainage District,
pursuant to Section 1530(113) (i), supra. This gives rise to
the question as to whether or not the Everglades Drainage
District could under the circumstances and under the law
acquire a title as against the state. The same act of the
Legislature, to-wit: Ch. 20658, which provided for the Ever-
glades Drainage District “Murphy-like” title, also provided as
follows:

“Lands within Everglades Drainage District held by
Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund shall be subject to all

De
958

taxes levied and authorized to be levied by this Act, in the
same manner as privately owned lands, and the said Trustees,
in furtherance of the trusts upon which such lands are held
shall pay the said taxes out of any moneys in their hands de-
rived from the sale of lands, or othersies. Laws 1941, c.
20658, Sec. 9 (Italics supplied).

Ch. 298 App., Section 1530(10b), F.S. 1941, F.S.A.

It is our conclusion that since the Legislature has directed
that the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund should
pay the taxes due the Everglades Drainage District, it was
not the legislative intent that the state’s lands would be sub-
ject to forfeiture under Sec. 1530(113) (i) of ch. 298, supra.

If the Everglades Drainage District wishes to avail itself
of ch. 20658, Acts of 1941, it will be noted that the proper
method to enforce payment of taxes on public lands is by
mandamus. See State ex rel Board of Sup’r’s of South Florida
Conservancy District v. Caldwell, et al, 35 So. (2nd) 642.

_ “Property owned by a county, and held for public purpose,
cannot be sold to satisfy the lien of an assessment. Payment
of such assessment is to be enforced by proceedings in man-
damus, to compel the officers of a county to pay the amount of
the assessment out of the county funds; ...”

. Page and Jones on Taxation by Assessment, Vol. 2, Sec.
1075, page 1783. .

The Legislature directed the Trustees to pay the taxes. It
was to be assumed that they would do so. The statute was en-
acted in the light of the settled law of the State that the Trus-
tees are subject to suit to require performance of duties pre-
scribed by statute. Hampton v. State Board of Education,
90 Fla. 88, 105 So. 323, and the cases in which this Court has
required performance by the Trustees of duties placed upon
them by law. Trustees v. Gleason, 15 Fla. 384; Trustees v.
Root, 59 Fla. 648, 51 So. 535.

It is our conclusion that the bill of complaint is not with-
out equity.

The decree appealed is reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN, ADAMS, SE-
BRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur

Le
959
DAISY TEE SALIBA v. THOS. ELIAS SALIBA
87 So. (2nd) 536 June Term, 1948
November 19, 1948 En Bane

. EH. Walker and R. 8. cé, Jr., for appellant.
z L. Solomon, for appellee.

HOBSON, J.:

Although the appellee made no allegation of adultery
against his wife (appellant), and Chancellor found her guilty,
and because of such finding, dismissed her bill of complaint.
The evidence of indiscreet conduct on the part of appellant
falls far short of being proof of adultery when measured by
the yardstick prescribed by this Court in McMillan v. Mc-
Millan, 120 Fla. 209, 162 So. 524; Engebretsen v. Engebretsen,
151 Fla. 372, 11 So. (2) 233 and cases therein cited.

We have not overlooked the pronouncements of this court
in those cases which hold that the Chancellor’s order or de-
cree will not be reversed simply because his findings were er-
roneous if the order or decree is found to be without error.
However, in the instant case the Chancellor’s order shows
clearly that he predicated the ewercise of his discretion di-
rectly upon the finding that both the wife and husband were
shown by the evidence to have been guilty of adultery. The
-order of dismissal is interwoven so conclusively by the Chan-
cellor with his finding as to cause said finding to be an integral
part thereof.

The cause should be reversed with direction that a decree
of divorce be granted to appellant and with leave to the Chan-

a
960

cellor to further consider any other equities presented by the
pleadings.

It is so ordered. .

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, CHAPMAN and BARNS,-JJ.,
coneur. .
ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., dissent.

HL. W. ROBARTS, as President of the City Council of the City of Ar-
cadia, and J. L. NEWTON, GUS DICKHART, JOHN B. YORK and
DAVID BROWDER as members of the City Council of the City of
Arcadia v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. S. C. SMITH.

87 So. (2nd) 577 June Term, 1948
November 19, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied December 17, 1948.

George Leitner and Lewis E. Purvis, for appellants.
Rosin and Paderewski, for appellee.

BARNS, J.:

The circuit court issued an alternative writ of mandamus
to appellants-respondents requiring them to canvass the re-
turns of a referendum election on the adoption of ch. 24379,
Acts 1947, relating to the City of Arcadia, or show cause for’
noncompliance. .

The appellants answered said writ to the effect that on
May 11, 1948, a purported referendum election having to do
with “consolidation” was held in the City of Arcadia, pursuant

961.

to an order of the circuit court on the question of approval of
ch. 24379, Special Laws of 1947; that the Mayor of the City
of Arcadia announced and had published a proclamation call-
ing said special referendum election and by his proclamation
set up an additional polling place in the negro quarters in the
City of Arcadia and appointed three additional inspectors
of election and one additional clerk to preside at the additional
polling place set up by him; that such additional polling place
and the appointment of the inspectors and clerk for such
polling place were without authority of law; that a majority
of the voters at the regular and customary polling place
within the City of Arcadia voted to reject said consolidation,
but the voters at the additional polling place voted for the
consolidation in a sufficient majority to override the majority
vote cast at the regular voting place; that on May 21, 1948,
the City Council of the City of Arcadia, Florida, met to con-
sider the matter of the canvass of the referendum election
returns and, upon motion duly made and carried in open
meeting, declared the said referendum election void and di-
rected the calling of a new referendum election to be held in
accordance with the laws of the State of Florida and Muni-
cipal Ordinances.

Upon relator-appelle’s motion for a peremptory writ not-
withstanding the answer, the circuit court granted the mo-
tion to the effect that the votes at both polls should be can-
vassed, of which final judgment the respondents now seek re-
view by this appeal.

It affirmatively appears from the answer that the City
of Arcadia consists of only one voting precinct and no author-
ity has been shown authorizing the Mayor to create addi-
tional precincts. It thus appears that the election was so ir-
regularly conducted as to justify the City Council to order the
eall of another election. The time for such election as pre-
scribed by the statute has passed, but time was not of the
essence of the act. The law was directory as to “time” for
holding the election. However, a properly conducted election
is of the essence, and the failure to properly conduct an elec-
tion within the prescribed time will not be allowed to defeat
the legislative intent.

Le
962

The judgment appealed is reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ.,
concur.

CHAPMAN, and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.

WILLIAM E. LEE v. TODD TUCKER, as Sheriff of Pinellas County,
Florida,

37 So, (2nd) 582 June Term, 1948
November 23, 1948 . Division A

Whitaker Brothers and Joseph E. Gillen, for petitioner.

J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Sumter Leitner, Reeves
Bowen and Rebecca Bowles Marks, Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, for respondent.

SEBRING, J.:

This is a habeas corpus proceeding in which the petitioner
challenges the sufficiency of a criminal information drawn
under section 806.06 Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. which
provides, in part, that any person “who wilfully and with in-
tent to injure or defraud the insurer . . . causes to be burned,
or... counsels or procures the burning of any building .. .

which shall at the time be insured . . . against loss or damage
by fire, shall be guilty of a felony...”

The first count of the information charges, in substance,
that the petitioner, on August 11, 1947, wilfully and with in-
tent to injure and defraud an insurance company, unlawfully
caused a certain building insured by said company to be
burned, by counseling and procuring one Allen to set fire to
and burn the building and that Allen in furtherance of said
counseling and procuring by the petitioner hired one Mitchell
to burn the building, which the latter did on August 25, 1947.
The second count charges, in substance, that the petitioner,
on August 11, 1947, wilfully and with intent to injure and
defraud an insurance company, unlawfully counseled and pro-
cured the burning of a certain building insured by said com-
pany, by counseling and procuring one Allen to set fire to and
burn the building and that Allen in furtherance of said coun-
seling and procuring by the petitioner hired one Mitchell to
burn the building, which the latter did on August 25, 1947.

The question in the case is whether the information
charges the petitioner with the commission of any crime
under the statute, or advises him of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.

It is a fundamental principle of law that he who procures
a felony to be committed is himself a felon, though the crim-
inal act done is by the intervention of a third person. Mc-
Daniel and Others, Foster’s Crown Law p. 121. However,
before one may be held accountable for a crime committed by
another it must appear that there has been some communica-
tion between the persons involved sufficient to establish the
fact of a criminal connection between such persons and that
the crime was committed by the counsel, procurement or in-
stigation of the first mover. As illustrative of the principle, it
is held that if A counsels or procures B to precure some third
person to commit a crime, A will be liable for the acts done
by such third person, even though A does not know who such
third person is to be. Rex v. Cooper, 5 Car & P. 535; Rex v.
Kirkwood, 1 Moody Cr. Cas 304; 22 C.J.S. 165, Criminal Law
Sec. 93; 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law, 339, 11th. ed; 1 Chitty’s
Criminal Law 262; 1 Brill’s Cyclopedia Criminal Law p. 437,

963

es
964

Sec. 241. And, on principle, it would seem that A would be
liable where he counsels or procures B to cause a certain crime
to be committed and B procures C to commit the crime; or
where he procures B to commit a certain crime and B, in pur-
suance and execution of a general understanding or arrange-
ment between himself and A growing out of the counselling
and procuring by A that such a crime will be committed hires
or procures C to assist in or actually commit the criminal
physical act—although we do not decide the point. While
in each of these situations A may not know the third person
who actually executes the criminal physical act, a sufficient
criminal connection would seem to exist between C and A
to establish the fact that the crime was committed by C at
the instigation of A, even though the criminal physical act
was done by the intervention of B, the intermediate agent.

No sufficient criminal communication or connection be-
tween the petitioner and Mitchell is averred in the counts of
the information under attack. The gist of the first count is
that the petitioner caused a certain building to be burned by
counseling and procuririg one Allen to burn it and that Allen
hired Mitchell to commit the act. The gist of the second
count is that the petitioner counseled and procured one Allen
to burn the building and that Allen hired Mitchell to do the
act. In néither count is it made to appear that Mitchell was
induced to burn the building as the result of any act, counsel,
procurement or command of the petitioner.

Because of the total lack of appropriate allegations show-
ing or tending to show a causal relation between the original
felonious intent of the petitioner to defraud the insurance
company and the subsequent act of Mitchell in burning the
building, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the plead-
ing charges the petitioner with having been the instigator of
the criminal act committed by Mitchell.

Accordingly, the petitioner should be discharged from cus-
tody under the said information by virtue of which he is held,
because of the fact that it fails to charge the petitioner with
the commission of a crime under the statute.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.

—_— |

965

JACK F. WHITE, as County Judge of PINELLAS COUNTY, FLOR-
IDA and BLANCHE JOHNSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel.
BARBARA JOYCE JOHNSON, et al.

87 So. (2nd) 580 June Term, 1948
November 23, 1948 . Special Division B
Rehearing denied December 17, 1948 .

M. H. Jones, Anna A. Krivitsky and Bezoni & McCord, for
appellants.

Joseph W. Nichols and Archie Clement, for appellees.

BARNS, J.:

This is an appeal of a final judgment in prohibition wherein
a peremptory writ is issued.

The first appearance of the subject matter of this case was
in Johnson v. Johnson, 158 Fla. 315, 28 So. 2nd 438.

The second appearance was a mandamus proceeding in the
circuit court, seeking to have the court direct the manner in
which the county judge should proceed, which mandamus was
denied by the circuit court and affirmed by this court—State ex
rel. Johnson v. White, 160 Fla. 782, 36 So. 2nd. 224

The real party in interest to the present proceedings is
Blanche Johnson, appellant. Appellee, Barbara Joyce John-
son is the same party who brought the first appeal, who also.
brought the mandamus action, and who later sought prohibi-
tion to prevent the county judge from further proceedings by
the taking of testimony ata hearing upon the issues presented
and recited in Johnson v. Johnson, supra.

a
966

Respecting the use of prohibition, this Court, in the Lo-
renzo-Murphy case, cited with approval the prior holdings,
to-wit:

“In the case of Peacock, County Judge, et al. v. Miller de-

- cided February 28, 1936, as reported in 123 Fla. 97, 166 So. 212,
this court held: ‘Prohibition does not lie to prevent or correct
commission of errors on part of court that is proceeding
within its jurisdiction.”””—Lorenzo v. Murphy, 158 Fla. 315,
82 So. 2nd 521, 423.

And also:

“In the case of Adams et ux v. Lewis et al., decided Feb-
ruary 18, 1941, as reported in 146 Fla. 177, 200 So. 852, 853,
this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice ELWYN THOMAS,
-said:— ‘... proceedings in prohibition should be restricted

_ to the field for which they were meant and not become a
vehicle for the determination of questions involving the cor-
rect or incorrect decisions of another court in matters in
which that court has the authority to act.’ ”—Ibid.

It affirmatively appears that the county judge had juris-
diction over a case of the class then before him and over the
parties to the proceedings and that the jurisdiction of the
court: had been properly invoked. The trial court has juris-
diction to proceed, and such errors as may actually occur may
be reviewed only in the ordinary and regular manner. Juris-
diction naturally includes the power to err, which of course is
not to be anticipated, but, even if correctly anticipated,
neither the mere fear of error nor reasonable certainty of .
error in the exercise of jurisdiction will impair jurisdiction.

The judgment appealed is reversed.

THOMAS, C. J., CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

FLORIDA COSTAL THEATRES, INC. v. SARA BELFLOWER, Joined
by her husband, CARL BELFLOWER, and CARL BELFLOWER.

87 So. (2nd) 508 June Term, 1948
November 30, 1948 . En Banc

967

Harry T. Gray, Marks, Gray, Yates & Conroy, for ap-
pellant.
Laura H. Hyde, for appellees.

PER CURIAM:

The evidence is found sufficient to support the verdict and
no error of law found in the trial, the judgment is affirmed.
See Florida Costal Theatres, Inc., v. Belflower, et al, 159 Fla.
741, 32 So. 2nd 738 for former appearance of this case.

TERRELL, ADAMS, SEBRING BARNS and HOBSON,
JJ., concur.

THOMAS, C. J., and CHAPMAN, J., dissents.

FAUD H. HANNA and MARGARET ALICE HANNA, his wife v. KATE
HAVLIN MARTIN, joined by her husband, W. WALTER MARTIN,

37 So. (2nd) 579 June Term, 1948
November 30, 1948 Division A.

R. K. Bell, for appellants.
Owen W. Pittman, for appelles.

CHAPMAN, J.:

The plaintiffs and defendants to this suit own adjacent
lots situated on the waters of Biscayne Bay. The defendants-
appellants’ property is situated north of the plaintiffs-ap-
pellees’ property and a five foot easement separates the lots, as
the parcels are located in different subdivisions. The appel-
lants extended their lot eastward into Biscayne Bay by filling
in some 200 feet but failed to bulkhead the fill on the south
boundary line, which is the north boundary line of appellees
property. The effect of the fill, in the absence of a bulkhead on

968

the dividing line of the two parcels of property, caused the ap-
pellees’ submerged lands to become partially submerged, and
will continue so to be unless bulkheaded or the fill removed.

The plaintiffs-appellees obtained a restraining order
against further encroachment by the defendants-appellants
and on final hearing the temporary restraining order was
made permanent and the defendants below appealed. We have
studied the record, examined the briefs of counsel and heard
oral argument at the bar of this Court, and we fail to find
error in the record. See Holland v. Ft. Pierce Financing &
Const. Co. 157 Fla. 649, 27 So. (2nd) 76; Freed v. Miami
Beach Pier Corp., 93 Fla. 888, 112 So. 841, 52 A.L.R. 1177;
Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. R. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491, LRA
1918E 718; Sections 27101 and 309.0, F.S.A.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C..J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.

MELVIN M. BERNSTEIN v. FLORENCE BERNSTEIN

36 So. 2nd 190 Fall Term, 1948
July 18, 1948 . Division A
Rehearing denied Sept. 28, 1948.
Affirmed. .
a

JOHNNIE WILLIAMS, 2 minor, WINN & LOVETT GROCERY COo.,
et al .
36 So. 2nd 790 Fill Term, 1948

July 16, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied Sept. 21, 1948

Affirmed. Ps
CENTRAL TRUCK LINES, INC., a corporation v. LOTTIE MARION
86 So. 2nd 790 Fall Term, 1948
July 23, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied Sept. 22, 1948

Affirmed. Pe

GEORGE JAY SIMONS v. A. BENJAMIN WILKES

86 So. 2nd 790 Fall Term, 1948
July 23, 1948 Division A

Rehearing denied Sept. 21, 1948
Affirmed.

969

S. C. CRENSHAW, J. E. LAMB, G. F. BRAZELL, C. R. TRULOOK,
JACK STACEY and V. L. ROGERS, Individually and as Represent-
ing the Members of the Orlando Police Relief Club, an unincor-
porated Association composed of permanent employees of the City
of Orlando, Florida, who are members of the Police Department
thereof; and as representing the permanent employees of the City
of Orlando, Florida, who are members of the Police Department
thereof v. D. A. LAYTON, D. E. HORST, L. L. FLETCHER, R. B.
GRIFFITH, FRANK ©. WELCH, WILLIAM BEARDALL, ©. W.
MeDANIELS, J. C. STONE, as Chief of the Police Department of
the City of Orlando, Fiorida, MAXIE G. BENNETT, as Chief of the
Fire Department of the City of Orlando, Florida, and CITY OF
ORLANDO, FLORIDA, 2 Municipal Corporation created and exist-
ing under and by virtue of the Laws of the State of Florida.

36 So. 2nd 790 Fall Term, 1948
July 23, 1948 En Bane.
Rehearing denied Sept. 24, 1948

Affirmed.

: |
RUTH 0. FOGG v. E. ©. FOGG, JR.

36 So. 2nd 790 Fall Term, 1948
July 27, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied Sept. 24, 1948

Affirmed.

ADAM HOLLINGER v. STATE OF FLORIDA

36 So. 2nd 924 Fall Term, 1948
September 24, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.

JESSIE LEE WATSON, alias WILLIE LAMAR, JR. v. STATE OF
FLORIDA .

86 So. 2nd 924 Fall Term, 1948
September 24, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.

WYMIE SWERLIN, LIBBY SWERDLIN, and THE MIAMI BEACH
FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. DAVE BEHRMAN.

Fall Term, 1948
October 1, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing denied Oct. 25, 1948

Affirmed.
Le

970
LOUIE D. TOMLIN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
87 So, (2nd) 166 June Term, 1948
October 1, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing start Oct. 21, 1948 .
Affirmed.
, a
LEON TAUNTON v. STATE OF FLORIDA
87 So. (2nd) 166 June Term, 1948
October 1, 1948 _ Special Division B
Affirmed. :

GENE & OLSEN v. SAMUEL GOLDMAN, REVAN RICHARDSO!
GREENFIELD VILLAGES, INC., a Florida corporation; GUAR-
ANTY TITLE AND ABSTRACT CORPORATION, a Florida cor-
poration; and THOMAS BLAKE, PAUL J. COLLINS, ROSARIO
ST. PIERRE, DANIEL R. GREENE, and J. A. MULLAR, on their
own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and
AIRLINE EMPLOYEES’ HOUSING COMMITTEE, an unincor-
porated non-profit association.

37 So. (2nd) 166 June Term, 1948
October 1, 1948 Division A
Rehearing denied Nov. 1, 1948

Affirmed.

M. C. IZLAR v. MARION COUNTY, et al

87 So. (2nd) 166 June Term, 1948:
October 5, 1948 Special Division A.
Affirmed.

STATE OF FLORIDA, EX REL. E. B. HULL v. R. M. HARRIS, as
County Judge of Hendry County; JOHN L. HALL, as Supervisor of
Registration of Hendry County; and J. 0. DAVIDSON, as Chairman
of the Board of County Commissioners of Hendry County; as the
County Canvassing Board of Hendry County, Florida.

87 S. (2nd) 369 June Term, 1948
October 12, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing denied Nov. 3, 1948

Affirmed.

971

STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. ASA TOWNSEND v. R. M. HARRIS, as
County Judge of Hendry County; JOHN L. HALL, as Supervisor of
Registration of Hendry County; and J. 0. DAVIDSON, as Chairman
of the Board of County Commissioners of Hendry County; as the
County Canvassing Board of Hendry County, Florida.

87 So, (2nd) 369 June Term, 1948
October 12, 1948 Special Division A
Rehearing denied Nov. 3, 1948

Affirmed.

MEEKY COTTRELL v. MARTHA AMERKAN

87 So. (2nd) 167 Fall Term, 1948
October 15, 1948 Special Division B

Certiorari denied.

THELMA CALLAHAN v. JOHN W. CALLAHAN

87 So. (2nd) 368 June Term, 1948
October 15, 1948 Division A

Affirmed. :

ADELAINE KOCH v. LEILA T. FERGUSON

87 So. (2nd) 542 June Term, 1948
October 19, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied Nov. 15, 1948

Affirmed.

THRIFT CABS, INC., a corporation v. VIRGINIA BACON and E. 0.
BACON, her husband.

87 So (2nd) 542 June Term, 1948
October 29, 1948 Division B
Affirmed.
M. N. CAIN and his wife, MARY D. CAIN v. G. A. ZELLER, et al
87 So. (2nd) 542 June Term, 1948
October 29, 1948 Division B

Affirmed.

972

VERA HARDEN, and R. T. HARDEN, her husband v. HAZEL WoO-
TON, trading and doing business as WOOTON FIBRE COMPANY,
(not incorporated).

37 So. (2nd) 840 Fall Term, 1948
October 29, 1948 En Banc
Rehearing denied Dec. 1, 1948
Affirmed. :
|
IN RE: ESTATE OF SARAH J. DUNBAR, AN INCOMPETENT
87 So. (2nd) 840 Fall Term, 1948
November 5, 1948 Division B
Affirmed.
W. H. TEAGUE v. F. H. WARE
387 So. (2nd) 840 Fall Term, 1948
November 12, 1948 Division B
Affirmed.
Le

MELVIN J. RICHARD v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal cor-
poration, DAVE M. BENDER, JACK S. BENDER, ALBERT A.
ROSEN and RHODA ©. ROSEN, his wife, MAX GORDIS and

FRANCES GOODIS, his wife.
. Fall Term, 1948

November 12, 1948 Division B
Rehearing denied Dec. 4, 1948
Affirmed.
; Le
‘NELSON LANIER v. STATE OF FLORIDA.
37 So. (2nd) 840 Fall Term, 1948
November 19, 1948 . : Division B
Affirmed.
a
CITIES TRANSIT, INC., a Florida Corporation v. HARRY BURCH.
37 So. (2nd) 840 Fall Term, 1948
November 28, 1948 Division A
Affirmed. .

BURGOYNE LUMBER COMPANY, INC., a corporation v. JOHN C.
MANNING.

37 So. (2nd) 840 Fall Term, 1948

November 23, 1948 Division A
Affirmed. ;

973

CYRUS F. WICKER and GRACE W. WICKER, his wife v. P. C. MAYS
and MARIE MAYS, his wife.

87 So. (2nd) 840 Fall Term, 1948
November 23, 1948 Division B
Affirmed.
NOLAN GATES v. J. L. HILLMAN
37 So. (2nd) 840 Fall Term, 1948
November 30, 1948 Division A
Affirmed. .

W. R. HAFEMAN and VIOLET N. HAFEMAN, his wife v. CHARLIE
HEMPLE, a single man ALEN L. SKIPPER and COCONUT
GROVE EXCHANGE BANK, a banking corporation.

Fall Term, 1948

December 3, 1948 : Division A
Affirmed.
C. K. CHARLES v. MARY W. WOOD, et al
88 So. (2nd) 138 Fall Term, 1948
December 7, 1948 Special Division B
Affirmed.
a
IRENE NEWSOME v. LESLIE NEWSOME
88 So. (2nd) 138 Fall Term, 1948
December 7, 1948 Special Division A
Affirmed.
ALMA BOYCE v. WILLIAM E. BOYCE
88 So. (2nd) 138 Fall Term, 1948 .
December 10, 1948 Special Division B
Rehearing denied January 10, 1949 :
Affirmed.
HOTEL HOLDING COMPANY v. JOE G. MYERS and RAY LENNON
88 So. (2nd) 188 Fall Term, 1948
December 14, 1948 Division B

Affirmed.

|
974

B. G. ORNDORFF AS EXECUTOR OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTA-
MENT OF HELEN M. COCHRANE, DECEASED v. WALLACE
S. COCHRANE, ET AL.

88 So. (2nd) 188 Fall Term, 1948
December 21, 1948 En Bane
Rehearing denied Jan. 18, 1949

Affirmed.

J. TOM WATSON, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, and P.
B. McCormick, individually v. LOCAL DIVISION NO. 1267 OF THE
AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC
RAILWAY AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA;
W. 0. FRAZIER; THOMAS L. McBRAYER; MIAMI TRANSIT
COMPANY; and R. D, FREEMAN.

38 So. (2nd) 224 Fall Term, 1948

December 21, 1948 Division A
Affirmed.

JENNIE WOOD v. FRANK M. BRYAN and RUBY E. BRYAN, his
wife.

38 So. (2nd) 221 Fall Term, 1948

December 21, 1948 En Bane

Affirmed.