State: Pennsylvania
Volume: 639
Term: 2016-2017
Jurisdiction(s): Pennsylvania
Source: https://static.case.law/pa/639.pdf

159 A.Bd 443

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, Appellee

ve

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Philadelphia Commission
on Human Relations, Appellants

No. 10 EAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
ARGUED: September 18, 2016

DECIDED: April 26, 2017

bo

Martin C. Cunningham, Esq., PA Human Relations Commis-
sion, Kathy Weaver Morrison, Esq., for Pennsylvania Human
Relations Com’n, Appellant Amicus Curiae.

Kelly Susan Diffily, Esq., Richard Gerson Feder, Esq., for
City of Philadelphia and Philadelphia Com’n on Human Rela-
tions, Appellants.

Andrew A. Chirls, Esq., Fineman Krekstein & Harris, Mary
Catherine Roper, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of

PCC‘
Pennsylvania, Thomas William Ude Jr., Esq., Mazzoni Center,

for American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania and Maz-
zoni Center, Appellant Amicus Curiae.

Gino J. Benedetti, Esq., Katharine Virginia Hartman, Esq.,
Patrick Michael Northen, Esq., Dilworth Paxson, L.L.P., for
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT

JUSTICE MUNDY

This case comes to us for a second time to determine if the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEP-
TA) is exempted from the jurisdiction of the City of Philadel-
phia (the City) via the Philadelphia Commission on Human
Relations (Philadelphia Commission) and the provisions of the
Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (FPO). We previously
remanded this case to the Commonwealth Court to ascertain
the legislative intent regarding this issue by employing the
analysis set forth by this Court in Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v.
Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, 505 Pa. 614, 488 A.2d 448
(1984). See Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. City of
Philadelphia, et_al., 627 Pa. 470, 101 A.38d 79, 90-91 (2014)
(SEPTA III). On remand, the Commonwealth Court deter-
mined that, applying the Ogontz test, the language and statu-
tory scheme of the relevant statutes revealed the legislature’s
intent to exempt SEPTA from actions brought under the
FPO. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. City of
Philadelphia, et _al., 122 A.3d 1163, 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)
(SEPTA IV). For reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of
the Commonwealth Court.

This Court recounted the early procedural history of this
case in our SEPTA III opinion, which we set forth again here.

This case has its origins in seven administrative proceedings

against SEPTA that individuals instituted with the Philadel-

aS

phia Commission from July 2007 through April 2009, alleg-
ing violations of the FPO. At least two of the administrative
complaints included claims of types of discrimination against
which the FPO offers protection, but that the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act (“PHRA”)* does not cover, SEPTA
filed a motion to dismiss each of the administrative cases for
lack of jurisdiction, and the Philadelphia Commission denied
the motions,

While all seven administrative proceedings were still pend-
ing! SEPTA instituted this civil action against Appellants
seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief. SEPTA
maintained in its complaint ™ that because it is a Common-
wealth agency, and Appellants are a political subdivision and
a municipal agency, respectively, the FPO does not apply to
it, and the Pennsylvania Constitution barred Appellants
from exercising jurisdiction over it.)

Appellants filed preliminary objections demurring to SEP-
TA’s complaint. Appellants argued that because Philadel-
phia’s powers under the First Class City Home Rule Act’
[(FCCHRA) ] extend to enacting and enforcing anti-dis-
crimination laws, the FPO applied to SEPTA and the Phila-
delphia Commission had jurisdiction over it. Appellants
further contended that an original action for declaratory and
injunctive relief was inappropriate because SEPTA had to
await final agency decisions in the individual administrative
cases against it before it could seek appellate review in
court. In response, SEPTA pointed out that the statute
authorizing the creation of metropolitan transportation au-
thorities, such as SEPTA, provides that such an authority
“shall exercise the public powers of the Commonwealth as
an agency and instrumentality thereof,” 74 Pa.C.S.
§ 1711(a), and asserted that Philadelphia’s authority as a
home-rule jurisdiction extends only to the regulation of its
municipal affairs. In its brief in opposition to the prelimi-
nary objections, SEPTA did not rely upon, or refer to in any
manner, the section of its enabling legislation pertaining to
sovereign and official immunity, 74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(¢)(8). The

Pr C“(‘;.COC;SR
trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dis-
missed SEPTA’s complaint."

SEPTA appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which re-
versed. SEPTA v. City of Philadelphia, 20 A.8d 558 (Pa.
Cmwlth, 2011) (en bane) [ (Septa II)]. A majority of the
court concluded that the Philadelphia Commission lacked
jurisdiction because SEPTA is an “agency and instrumental-
ity” of the Commonwealth and therefore within the jurisdic-
tion of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (the
“State Commission”). The majority noted that the State
Commission is responsible for the administration of the
PHRA, which bans any “employer” from engaging in certain
forms of discrimination. 43 P.S. §§ 955, 956(a). Because the
PHRA defines “employer” as including “the Commonwealth
or any political subdivision or board, department, commis-
sion or school district thereof,’® and because neither the
PHRA nor the FPO explicitly grants the Philadelphia Com-
mission jurisdiction over SEPTA, the majority concluded
the State Commission—and not the Philadelphia Commis-
sion—had jurisdiction over SEPTA, The Commonwealth

Court did not base any portion of its reasoning upon the
section of SEPTA’s enabling legislation pertaining to sover-
eign and official immunity. 74 Pa.C.8, § 1711(¢)(8). Because
the majority considered the State Commission’s jurisdiction
over SEPTA to be clear, and a Commonwealth instrumen-
tality’s challenge to “the scope of a governmental body’s
action pursuant to statutory authority” through a declarato-
ry judgment action to be proper, the majority also conclud-
ed that SEPTA had no duty to exhaust its administrative
remedies before seeking relief in court. SEPTA [II], supra
at 568,

{] Judge Dante Pellegrini dissented. He concluded that
SEPTA is not a Commonwealth agency, and even if it were,
it would still be subject to the provisions of the FPO and the
jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commission. The dissent
stated that the General Assembly had enacted the portion of
SEPTA’s enabling act that provides that a metropolitan
transportation authority such as SEPTA is “an agency and

ee
instrumentality thereof’ merely to avoid constitutional and
statutory questions, such as limitations on local govern-
ments’ acquisition of debt. 74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(a). The dissent.
opined that the cited language was not intended to render
SEPTA a state agency for all purposes.

The dissent then concluded that even if SEPTA were part of
the Commonwealth government, it nonetheless would be
subject to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commission
under Commonwealth v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Associa-
tion, 505 Pa. 614, 488 A.2d 448, 452 (1984). In that case, the
Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”)—which we charac-
terized as “an agency of the Commonwealth”—applied to
the City of Philadelphia for the permits needed to build a
facility for the mentally handicapped. Id, at 449-50. The
City denied the permits on the ground that the proposed
facility did not comply with use and other restrictions under
the Philadelphia Zoning Code. On review in this Court, we
rejected the notion that DPW was immune from local land
regulations because it had the power to condemn property
to establish the facility it sought to construct. We reasoned
that because the General Assembly had established both the
City and DPW, and had fixed the extent of each entity's
powers, we would need to examine the enabling act of each
entity to determine which entity’s authority the legislature
had intended to prevail for purposes of the parties’ contro-
versy. Because the applicable statutes did not clearly state
which entity the legislature had intended to be “preemi-
nent,” we applied the rule of statutory construction that a
court may determine legislative intent by considering “the
consequences of a particular interpretation.” Id. at 455
(citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6)). Because Philadelphia’s zoning
scheme would have been frustrated if DPW were to have
prevailed, while subjecting DPW to local zoning rules and
restrictions would not necessarily have frustrated DPW’s
mandate to establish mental health facilities, we concluded
that the legislature had intended the City to have priority in
the circumstances at issue.

ee |
The dissent here applied the principles we set forth in
Ogontz and concluded that, as in Ogontz, the relevant
statutes were ambiguous as to which entity was intended to
have priority. The dissent therefore considered the effect of
holding each entity preeminent and determined that ruling
in SEPTA’s favor would frustrate the legislature’s intended
scheme. Characterizing the PHRA as granting the State
and Philadelphia Commissions’ “concurrent jurisdiction,”
the dissent explained that deeming SEPTA “preeminent”
over Appellants would thwart the legislatively established
system of shared jurisdiction. The dissent explained that, on
the other hand, treating Appellants as “preeminent” would
not interfere with SEPTA’s purpose of providing public
transportation. The dissent stated, “All the consequence of
the City’s and the [State Commission’s] preeminence means
is that SEPTA would still have to respond to complaints,
like private companies, of those choosing to file their claims
of unlawful discrimination with [the Philadelphia Commis-
sion].” SEPTA [IIT], supra at 569 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
2 In general terms, the FPO protects against discrimination:
in employment based upon a person’s race, ethnicity, color,
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, national
origin, ancestry, age, disability, marital status, familial sta-
tus, genetic information, or domestic or sexual violence
victim status; in public accommodations based upon race,
ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity,
religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, marital status,
familial status, or domestic or sexual violence victim status;
and in housing accommodation, commercial property and
other real estate opportunities based upon race, ethnicity,
color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, na-
tional origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, age, source
of income, familial status, or domestic or sexual violence
victim status, Phila. Code §§ 9-1103, 1106, 1108.

3 48 P.S, §§ 951-968. The PHRA protects most, but not all,
of the categories of individuals covered by the FPO. In
general terms, the PHRA protects against discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodation because of

Cs
race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, handi-
cap or disability, age, sex, and national origin. In addition, it
prohibits discrimination based upon the use of a guide or
support animal because of the blindness, deafness or physi-
cal handicap of the user or because the user is a handler or
trainer of support or guide animals.

758 PS, §§ 18101-13157.

° 48 PS. § 954.

SEPTA IIT, 101 A.38d at 82-84 (some citations and footnotes
omitted),

In reviewing the Commonwealth Court’s SEPTA II deci-
sion, we held that the Commonwealth Court's reliance on the
status of SEPTA as a Commonwealth agency, was not disposi-
tive of the issue of preemption. Citing Ogontz, County of
Venango v. Borough of Sugarcreek, 584 Pa, 1, 626 A.2d 489,
490 (1993), and Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Zoning Hearing
Ba,, 566 Pa. 180, 778 A.2d 1205, 1210 (2001), we explained that
a governmental entity, that derives its existence from the
legislature, does not possess inherently superior powers over
another such legislatively created entity by virtue of its type
or the entity’s respective designation as “Commonwealth” or
“municipal.” SEPTA III at 87. Rather, the question must be
resolved through an inquiry into the legislative intent as
revealed by the pertinent enabling legislation, Thus, we reject-
ed SEPTA’s structure-based argument that for a Municipal
Authority to exercise jurisdiction over a Commonwealth agen-
cy, it was necessary for the legislature to expressly so provide.
Id, at 87-88. We similarly rejected the Appellants’ argument
that the presumed validity afforded Home Rule enactments
resolved the issue of legislative intent. Id. at 88, We, therefore,
held that the Commonwealth Court should have pursued an
inquiry into the legislative intent in accordance with the
stepped analysis first enunciated in Ogontz.

As identified in Hazleton, our opinion in Ogontz, supra sets

forth the analytical process a court is to follow to determine

ee
which entity the legislature intended to have preeminent
powers over a given area of regulation.
The first step requires the reviewing court to determine,
through examination of the statutes, which governmental
entity, if any, the General Assembly expressly intended to
be preeminent, Id. In the event there is no such express
legislative mandate, the second step requires the court “to
determine legislative intent as to which agency is to
prevail .... turn[ing] to the statutory construction rule
that legislative intent may be determined by a consider-
ation, inter alia, of the consequences of a particular
interpretation.”

Hazleton, supra at 1210 (quoting Ogontz, supra at 455

(citing in turn 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6))) (emphasis omitted).
Id, at 87. In essence, we rejected the Commonwealth Court’s
status-based analysis and remanded for it to ascertain the
legislative intent by applying the Ogontz test to the entities’
respective enabling legislation.’ Id.

On remand, a majority of the Commonwealth Court sitting
en bane addressed the first prong of the Ogontz test, which it
phrased as “determin[ing] whether one legislative scheme was
intended to have priority over the other.” SEPTA IV, 122 A.3d
at 1168. Looking at the respective legislative schemes, the
Majority noted the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities
Act (MTAA) established that SEPTA is a Commonwealth
agency and instrumentality. Id. at 1169. (quoting 74 Pa.C.S,
§ 1711(a)). It further noted the MTAA afforded SEPTA sover-
eign and official immunity. Id, at 1169-70 (quoting 74 Pa.C.S,
1, Chief Justice Castille and Justice Eakin filed concurring and dissent-

ing opinions expressing the view that Ogontz should not have applica-

bility beyond the land use and zoning issues involved therein. SEPTA

IL, 101 A.3d at 92-93 (Castille, C.J. concurring and dissenting); Id, at Id, at

97 (Eakin, J. concurring and dissenting). Chief Justice Castille opined

that the Commonwealth Court sufficiently reviewed the relevant statu-

tory language and properly concluded it precluded enforcement of the

FPO against SEPTA, “No remand to assess legislative intent is called

for in this matter because the Commonwealth Court appropriately

ascertained and effectuated the General Assembly’s intent by looking to,

and applying, the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions,”
Id, at 95; accord Id. at 98 (Saylor, J. dissenting).

ee

§ 1711(¢)). The Majority observed that 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310 pro-
vides that agencies with sovereign immunity may only be sued
“where the legislature has ewpressly waived immunity.” Id, at
1170 (quoting Ebersole v, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp.
Auth., 111 A.8d 286, 289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (emphasis added
in SEPTA IV)). The Commonwealth Court then reviewed the
PHRA, which expressly waives immunity of Commonwealth
agencies from actions initiated under it, Id. (citing 43 P.S.
§ 954). In contrast, the Majority concluded the FCCHRA,
which is the source for the City’s authority to enact the FPO,
does not contain an express waiver of the immunity accorded
to Commonwealth agencies. Id. at 1171. The Majority ex-
plained that the FPO authorizes private claims, including
potential awards for compensatory damages, punitive damages
and attorney fees. Id., (citing PHILA. CODE §§ 9-1105, 9-
1107). It, therefore, distinguished the provisions of the FPO
from the land use and traffic regulation enforcement disputes
that were the subjects of earlier cases. Id. at 1171-1172. “The
penalties authorized by the [FPO] require an express waiver
of sovereign immunity, and none has been expressed by the
General Assembly.” Id. at 1172,

The Majority rejected the City’s argument that Section 12?
of the PHRA accomplishes a waiver of sovereign immunity
relative to the FPO. It noted that the legislature waived
SEPTA’s immunity only as to the jurisdiction of the State
Commission, and that such waivers are to be narrowly con-

2. The relevant section provides as follows.

(a) The provisions of this act shall be construed liberally for the
accomplishment of the purposes thereof, and any law inconsistent
with any provisions hereof shall not apply.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), nothing contained in this act
shall be deemed to repeal or supersede any of the provisions of any
existing or hereafter adopted municipal ordinance, municipal charter
or of any law of this Commonwealth relating to discrimination
because of race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, age,
sex, national origin or handicap or disability[.] ... In the event of a
conflict between the interpretation of a provision of this act and the
interpretation of a similar provision contained in any municipal
ordinance, the interpretation of the provision in this act shall apply to
such municipal ordinance.

43 P.S. § 962(a), (b).

©

strued. Id., at 1172-78 (citing Dean v. Dept. of Transp., 561
Pa, 508, 751 A.2d 1180, 1184 (2000))*

Judge Pellegrini filed a dissent in which he argued an
interpretation of the statutory language as revealing the intent
of the legislature to subject SEPTA to the jurisdiction of the
FPO, Id, at 1176 (Pellegrini, J. dissenting). Judge Pellegrini
argued that the designation of SEPTA as a Commonwealth
agency does not afford it equivalency with the Commonwealth
for all purposes, ‘citing cases holding SEPTA’s status as a
Commonwealth agency is related to the reasons for its cre-
ation. Id. at 1177, He notes SEPTA is an “authority” tasked
with providing a commercial service. Id. He noted the subject
matter in question here, anti-discrimination enforcement, is
removed from SEPTA’s fundamental transportation function.
That is, SEPTA provides a service, not the governing function
that appertains to municipalities. Id. Judge Pellegrini viewed
the authority afforded the City through the FCCHRA, and
section 12 of the PHRA, which permits local governments to
concurrently promulgate and enforce anti-discrimination ordi-
nances, as revealing a statutory scheme where the City pre-
dominates over SEPTA in the arena of enforcing anti-discrimi-
nation laws. Id, at 1183. He concluded “{there is nothing in
the legislative scheme that would suggest that SEPTA’s inter-
ests should predominate over the Commonwealth’s; every-
thing suggests [the City’s] governmental interest predomi-
nates.” Id, at 1179, Judge Pellegrini also argued that, to the
extent SEPTA may be protected by sovereign immunity, such
was limited to monetary damages but does not extend to other
forms of relief the Philadelphia Commission has at its disposal.
Id. at 11824
3. Acknowledging in light of its holding that it was unnecessary to reach

the issue, the Commonwealth Court Majority also proceeded to deter-

mine that under the second prong of the Ogontz test a review of the
consequences of the competing interpretations of the statutes favored

the same conclusion relative to the legislature's intent. SEPTA IV, 122
A.3d at 1175.

4. Judge Simpson authored a separate dissent declaring his view that
the matter should be remanded to develop a record about the effects
enforcement of the FPO would have on SEPTA’s ability to attend to its
core functions. SEPTA IV, 122 A.3d at 1185 (Simpson, J, dissenting).

12

Appellants contend that, in SEPTA III, this Court resolved
the first prong of the Ogontz test in their favor, and that the
Commonwealth Court erred in ignoring that holding, Appel-
lants’ Brief at 24. Appellants argue that the Commonwealth
Court Majority “revives the very presumption in favor of
SEPTA that this Court directed that it avoid.” Id, at 25, In
line with its arguments in the prior appeal, Appellants empha-
size that the FCCHRA grants the City authority to legislate
for its municipal functions as fully as could the Common-
wealth’s legislature, absent an explicit or implicit preemption
by the General Assembly. Id., (citing Warren v. City of
Philadelphia, 882 Pa. 880, 115 A.2d 218, 221 (1955)), This
includes the authority to enact the FPO. Id. at 26 (citing
Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 580 Pa. 564, 862 A.2d 1284
(2004)). Appellants also rely on the provisions and history of
the PHRA, which contemplates concurrent, and perhaps more
stringent, local regulation and enforcement in the anti-discrim-
ination arena. Id, at 27, Additionally, Appellants reference the
presumptive validity of a municipality's enactments under the
Home Rule powers. Id, at 28, Appellants assert that the
FCCHRA contains no indication that SEPTA should be ex-
cluded from the purview of the Philadelphia Commission’s
jurisdiction.

Appellants dispute the Commonwealth Court Majority’s
conclusion that the language and statutory scheme of the
MTAA evinces an intent that SEPTA is excluded from the
jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commission and the FPO.
Appellants assert that the MTAA’s provisions conferring sov-
ereign immunity upon SEPTA “do[ ] not speak to the authori-
ty of a municipality to enforce validly-enacted and generally
applicable local anti-discrimination legislation against SEP-
TA,” or to legislative intent on the issue, Id. at 81. Appellants

Judge Pellegrini agreed that the record was underdeveloped and would

also remand, He further expressed his reasons why he deems the

Majority's conclusion, that the impact of such enforcement would be

daunting, to be “specious.” Id, at 1183, Because we agree that, under

the first prong of the Ogontz test, the legislative scheme reveals an
intent to shield SEPTA from the FPO, we do not reach, and express no

opinion about, the impact on the respective entities of enforcement or
non-enforcement under the second part of the Ogontz test,

Se °

claim the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning adopts the ratio-
nale in Chief Justice Castille’s dissent, which they assert we
rejected in SEPTA III. Id. at 31-32. Appellants argue that
relying upon the grant of sovereign immunity in this instance
essentially resurrects the presumption and status-based ap-
proach favoring Commonwealth agencies that this Court dis-
approved. Appellants note that the fact SEPTA enjoyed sover-
eign immunity was not dispositive in Ogontz, where we held
SEPTA was not exempt from the City’s enforcement of its
zoning regulations. Id. at 33-34,

Appellants next argue that the fact that the legislature
expressly waived SEPTA’s immunity in the PHRA is unavail-
ing to SEPTA because legislative intent as to priority is not
discerned by a determination of whether or not a third entity
has a role to play, and because the scope of protections
afforded by the FPO are greater than those afforded by the
PHRA. Id. at 34-35. Finally, Appellants suggest that, to the
extent SEPTA’s sovereign immunity acts as a bar to enforce-
ment of the FPO against it, it does not implicate all of the
enforcement tools available to the Philadelphia Commission.
Id. at 37. Sovereign immunity, they point out, has been held to
pertain to awards of monetary damages, but not other forms
of equitable and declaratory relief. Id, at 88-39.° “To argue,

5. Appellants cite the following cases in support of this contention,
See Legal Capital, LLC. v. Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe
Loss Fund, 561 Pa. 336, 750 A.2d 299, 302-03 (2000) (sovereign
immunity did not bar action seeking equitable relief or a declaratory
judgment that plaintiff's assignee was entitled to direct payments
from the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, a
Commonwealth executive agency); Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass’n
By and Through Harder v. Com,, 535 Pa. 425, 636 A.2d 134, 137
(1993) (“suits which simply seek to restrain state officials from
performing affirmative acts are not within the rule of immunity”);
Fawber v, Cohen, 516 Pa, 352, 532 A.2d 429, 433-34 (1987) (‘‘suits
which ... seek to restrain state officials from performing affirmative
acts are not within the rule of [sovereign] immunity”—thus, action,
which seeks to restrain the Secretary of Welfare and declare his
regulations invalid, is not an action for which the Secretary enjoys
sovereign immunity); Finn v. Rendell, 990 A.2d 100, 105 (Pa,
Cmwilth, 2010) (“sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory
judgment action or injunction seeking to prohibit state parties, ie.,
state agencies or employees, from acting”); Stackhouse _v. Com.
Pennsylvania State Police, 892 A.2d 54, 59-60 n.6, 61 (Pa. Cmwlth,

based on sovereign immunity, that the General Assembly has
expressly abrogated all of the [Philadelphia] Commission’s
jurisdiction, ignores that the bulk of the [Philadelphia] Com-
mission’s work is essentially investigatory and administrative.”
Td, at 40.

The State Commission filed an amicus brief in support of
Appellants. It advances the argument that the PHRA express-
ly provides for concurrent jurisdiction and liberal construction.
The State Commission’s Amicus Brief at 2. It argues SEPTA
meets the definition of a local employer under the PHRA and
notes that cases favor “robust” application of anti-discrimina-
tion laws. Id. at 4-5. The State Commission argues that its
interpretation of the PHRA is entitled to deference as the
agency charged with implementing the statute. Id. at 6-7
(citing Office of Admin. v. Pa, Labor Rels. Bd., 591 Pa. 176,
916 A.2d 541, 549 (2007)).

American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania (ACLU)
and the Mazzoni Center Legal Services (Mazzoni Center) filed
a joint Amicus brief. They reiterate the provisions of the
PHRA allowing local ordinances to provide concurrent and
greater enforcement. ACLU and Mazzoni Center’s Amicus
Brief at 22-28, They note that the PHRA and the FCCHRA
predate the MTAA which created SEPTA. They argue the
enactment of the MTAA did not alter the dual jurisdiction
paradigm. Id, at 24, They further argue the MTAA did not
meet the criteria under the Statutory Construction Act for
repealing those earlier enactments, because it did not consti-
tute a revision of all statutes on a subject, or purport to
establish a uniform and mandatory system over the subject
matter at issue. Id. at 25-26.

2006) (“sovereign immunity [does not] bar[] claims... seeking pro-
hibitory injunctions to restrain state action” or “‘a mandamus action
to compel an agency or officer to perform a ministerial or mandatory
statutory duty”); McGriff v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and
Parole, 127 Pa.Cmwlth. 167, 561 A.2d 78, 80 (1989) (Govereign
immunity was not a proper defense to parolee’s mandamus petition
seeking to compel Board of Probation and Parole to vacate its
recommitment order after parolee’s original sentence had been vacat-

ed).
Appellants’ Brief at 37-38.

PE C—C“C;is‘SSCSCstés

SEPTA refutes Appellants’ argument that the Common-
wealth Court Majority did not properly apply the Ogontz test
to the pertinent statutes in this case, SEPTA’s Brief at 10. It
argues that the Commonwealth Court did not resurrect a
status-based priority of SEPTA over the City. Rather, it
asserts the Commonwealth Court focused on the intent of the
legislature relative to the City’s exercise of jurisdiction over
SEPTA. Id. at 10-11. SEPTA counters Appellants’ assertion
that the broad powers afforded the City under the FCCHRA
support an inference of the legislative intent respecting pre-
emption. SEPTA argues it ignores our holding in SEPTA IIL
where we stated the presumption of validity is relevant to the
authority to act, and not “whether the municipality may
enforce ordinances and regulations against a Commonwealth
agency or instrumentality.” Id, at 16 (quoting SEPTA III, 101
A.3d at 88). SEPTA argues that the MTAA plainly establishes
that SEPTA is afforded sovereign immunity. Id. at 18. It notes
such immunity must be expressly waived to permit suits
against it. Id. at 19 (citing Powell v. Drumheller, 589 Pa. 484,
653 A.2d 619, 621 (1995); Tork—Hiis v. Com., 558 Pa. 170, 735
A.2d 1256, 1258 (1999)). SEPTA notes such a specific waiver is
present in the PHRA, but not in the FCCHRA. Id. at 20,

SEPTA argues that, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the
Commonwealth Court did view the Ogontz test “through the
lens of the specific municipal ordinance... sought to be en-
forced,” and did not hold that sovereign immunity creates a
per se exemption from all municipal jurisdiction. Id. at 21-22.
Thus, SEPTA asserts the distinction drawn by the Common-
wealth Court between the land use issues, applicable in
Ogontz, and the regulations present in the FPO, which include
rights of private action and the award of damages, is valid. Id.
at 24-25. SEPTA argues Appellants’ parsing of the potential
enforcement remedies available under the FPO to support an

6. Again, in light of our disposition, we do not address the Amici’s
arguments related to the second prong of the Ogontz test.

2

inference of legislative intent to permit the Philadelphia Com-
mission’s partial jurisdiction over it is inapposite. Id. at 338-34.
HE Appellants sought allowance of appeal, which we grant-
ed for decision on the following question, as framed by Appel-
lants:
Did the General Assembly, when it gave Philadelphia gener-
al police powers as expansive as [those] of the General
Assembly and specific authority to enact local anti-discrimi-
nation laws, intend to exempt SEPTA from compliance with
those laws, when the consequence of conypliance would not
materially disrupt SEPTA’s core transportation function
and the consequence of non-compliance would leave hun-
dreds of thousands of Philadelphia passengers and employ-
ees without a remedy against many forms of discrimination?
SEPTA y. City of Phila., 685 Pa, 194, 188 A.8d 292 (2016).”

A

Initially, we address Appellants’ assertion that this Court
essentially resolved the first prong of the Ogontz test prior to
our remand to the Commonwealth Court in SEPTA III. That
assertion is mistaken. Ogontz is implicated when a question
arises as to legislative intent respecting competing interests
between distinct entities created by the legislature. In SEPTA
II, we held SEPTA was “wrong in asserting that, in order for
a local governmental agency to prevail over a Commonwealth
agency or instrumentality, the legislature must have clearly
stated its intent in that regard.” SEPTA III, 101 A.3d at 87.
Rather, we explained “we have applied the Statutory Con-
struction Act in order to discern the legislature’s intent,” Id.
We further held that SEPTA’s status-based argument and the
City’s reliance on the presumptive validity of homerule enact-
ments did not provide such an express directive, Id, at 88.
Therefore, we held that it was incumbent upon the Common-
wealth Court to apply the two-part test set forth in Ogontz. Id.
7. As in our earlier review of this case, the issue before us is one of

statutory interpretation. “Our standard of review of such a question of

statutory interpretation is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
SEPTA IH, 101 A.3d at 87 (citing Hazleton, 778 A.2d at 1213),

eS

at 90. The first prong of that analysis requires an examination
of the overall language of the legislation to discern if the
General Assembly expressly intended one or the other to be
preeminent. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455. While it is undisputed
that neither enabling statute contained an explicit provision
directly addressing the issue, that fact did not preclude the
possibility that an examination of the statutes as a whole
would reveal such a clear intent. Our holding merely recog-
nized that the Commonwealth Court in SEPTA II did not
perform a review to discern the legislature’s intent because it
relied on the status of SEPTA as a Commonwealth agency,
treating the competing entities in a hierarchical manner. SEP-
TA III, 101 A.8d at 87. We also noted that, as of the time of
the appeal in SEPTA III, SEPTA had not relied on the
sovereign immunity provisions and the Commonwealth Court
did not base any of its reasoning thereon. Id. at 83, According-
ly, we did not determine the first prong of the Ogontz analy-
sis, and the Commonwealth Court, on remand, correctly en-
gaged in an independent review of the enabling statutes to
determine if the relevant legislative intent was therein ex-
pressed.®

B.

We next address Appellants’ arguments that are reflected in
Judge Pellegrini’s dissent. Appellants adopt an approach that
focuses on the core functions of the respective entities. This
reliance on the core functions of SEPTA and the City, and
Judge Pellegrini’s distinction between an “authority” provid-
ing a service and a municipality with governing authority,
essentially turns the status-based analysis of the Common-
wealth Court in SEPTA II on its head. Instead of prioritizing

8. Similarly, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the SEPTA III majority
did not reject Chief Justice Castille’s analysis of the legislative intent,
His position that Ogontz should not apply beyond its facts was not
agreed to by the majority, but the majority did not reach or opine on
whether or not legislative intent was clear in the language of the
statutes, The Court instead remanded for the Commonwealth Court to
address the issue in the first instance, under the proper standard. As
such, at most, the majority position was that Chief Justice Castille’s
analysis was premature, See SEPTA III, 101 A.3d at 87-88,

a

Commonwealth agencies over municipalities absent an express
contrary intent by the legislature, Appellants would prioritize
based on the governing versus the service-providing function
of the respective entities. This is merely a different version of
the status-based approach we rejected in SEPTA III. “In a
series of cases beginning with our decision in Ogontz, supra,
this Court has held that a Commonwealth agency's challenge
to a municipality’s exercise of authority over it does not
represent a contest between superior and inferior governmen-
tal entities, but instead a contest between two instrumentali-
ties of the state.” Id. at 87 (quoting Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 452)
(other citations omitted). The considerations reflected in Ap-
pellants’ arguments may be relevant in the performance of the
second part of the Ogontz analysis, if necessary, but are not
indicative of the legislature’s intent in the first part, which
focuses on the language of the pertinent statutes. See id,

Cc.

Hl We turn then, to our de novo review of the authorizing
statutes to discern if the legislature has expressed an intent to
exempt SEPTA from enforcement of the FPO. Reviewing the
legislation establishing the City’s authority under Home Rule
and the legislation creating SEPTA, we note several facts are
undisputed. Respecting SEPTA, it is clear the MTA provides
that SEPTA exercises its public powers as an agency of the
Commonwealth. 74 Pa.C.8. § 1711(a). It is equally undisputed
that the MTAA extends sovereign immunity to SEPTA. Id. at
§ 1711(e) (referencing 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310, which states that
sovereign immunity continues until “specifically waived” by
the General Assembly); see also Frazier v. W.C.A.B. (Bayada
Nurses, Inc.), 616 Pa. 592, 52 A.38d 241 (2012) (holding subro-
gation claim against SEPTA under the Workers Compensa-
tion Act was barred on the basis of sovereign immunity),

The authority of the City to enact the FPO and to enforce
its provisions within Philadelphia is also not contested. That
authority stems from the FCCHRA, which grants broad pow-
ers to the City to legislate in any non-prohibited field perti-
nent to its municipal functions. See 58 P.S. §§ 18101-18157.

Ss ©
Additionally, the PHRA specifically provides that its provi-
sions do not interfere with the authority of a municipality to
pass appropriate ordinances and enforce anti-discrimination
provisions concurrently with the State Commission. See 43
PS. § 962(a), (b).

Hl As recognized by the Commonwealth Court majority,
these clear provisions show the legislature intended to shield
SEPTA from entities initiating suits against it. The general
authority of the City to legislate in this area, simply does not
address the issue of its jurisdiction over SEPTA. In contrast,
the sovereign immunity provisions do create an express limita-
tion on any entity in bringing suit against SEPTA. We recog-
nize that the legislature specifically waived sovereign immuni-
ty for Commonwealth agencies for purposes of enforcement of
the PHRA, 48 P.S. § 954. It does not follow that the waiver of
immunity piggybacks to the FPO merely because local munici-
palities are permitted to exercise concurrent enactment and
enforcement authority with the State Commission with respect
to the subject matter at issue. Rather, Section 954 is an
explicit expression of the legislature’s intent to grant the State
Commission exclusive jurisdiction over Commonwealth agen-
cies in anti-discrimination matters. As noted above, any waiver
of sovereign immunity must be specifically enacted by the
legislature. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. No such waiver appears in the
City’s Home Rule authorization or SEPTA’s enabling legisla-
tion. The fact that the FPO has an array of enforcement
options does not provide a basis to infer the legislature
intended only a partial exemption. As SEPTA suggests, this
would require a selective reading of the FPO!

In conclusion, the Commonwealth Court did not err in its
determination that, under the first prong of the Ogontz analy-
sis, the statutory language and legislative scheme of the

9. Our holding does not do harm to our deference to the State Commis-
sion in matters of statutory interpretation under its purview. First, such
deference must give way to clear language of the legislature. Com.,
Office of Admin, v, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 591 Pa. 176, 916
A.2d 541, 550 (2007). Second, the source of the statutory language
evidence the General Assembly's intent on this issue stems from the
MTAA, over which the PHRA has no interpretive function.

I

a

enabling legislation disclosed the legislature’s intent to exclude
SEPTA from the jurisdiction of the FPO. We, therefore,
affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Baer join the opinion.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Wecht file concurring
opinions.

Justice Donohue files a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Todd and Dougherty joins.

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR, Concurring

I join the lead opinion, subject to the proviso that I agree
with Justice Wecht’s comments about the relevant analytical
framework. In this respect, I also note that sometimes, the
mechanical formulation and heralding of a specific test—such
as what the Court has dubbed the “Ogontz test”—has unin-
tended consequences.

Here, I agree with Justice Wecht, that the “Ogontz test”
reflects nothing more than a conventional application of princi-
ples of statutory construction. As such, and since the discrete,
tiered analysis appears to be generating disharmony, I would
prefer to abandon the label at this juncture. In its place, I
would simply refer directly to the Statutory Construction Act.

JUSTICE WECHT, Concurring

I concur in the result reached by the learned opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court (“OAJC”), I write
separately to endorse an alternative application of the Ogontz
test. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogonte Area
Neighbors Ass'n, 505 Pa. 614, 488 A.2d 448 (1984) (“Ogontz”).

In SEPTA v. City of Philadelphia, 627 Pa, 470, 101 A.3d 79,
88 (2014) “SEPTA III”), this Court recognized that, where a
Commonwealth agency challenges a municipality’s exercise of
authority, the Ogontz test applies to resolve the conflict be-
tween the two instrumentalities of the state. See Ogontz, 483
Ad at 452 (holding that conflict between Commonwealth
agency and municipality is “not a contest between superior

©

and inferior government entities, but instead a contest be-
tween two instrumentalities of the state.”). We have explained
the test as follows:

The first step requires the reviewing court to determine,

through examination of the statutes, which governmental

entity, if any, the General Assembly expressly intended to
be preeminent .... In the event there is no such express
legislative mandate, the second step requires the court “to
determine legislative intent as to which agency is to prevail

... turn[ing] to the statutory construction rule that legisla-

tive intent may be determined by a consideration, inter alia,

of the consequences of a particular interpretation.”

Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 566 Pa. 180,
778 A.2d 1205, 1210 (2001) (quoting Ogontz, 488 A.2d at 455)
(citations omitted). This two-part test embraces the process of
statutory construction, with which this Court is deeply famil-
jar. We look first to the legislation’s plain language. If that
language is ambiguous, we apply other principles embodied in
our rules of statutory construction, which include a consider-
ation of “[t]he consequences of a particular interpretation.” 1
Pa.C.S. § 1921.

In my view, the first prong of the Ogontz test requires the
Court to look to the language of the enabling statutes of both
SEPTA and the City of Philadelphia in order to determine
only whether the General Assembly included in either statute
an express statement that one entity or the other has priority
in the event of a conflict. In this case, we would review the
Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act (“MTAA”), 74
Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-85, and the First Class City Home Rule Act
(“Home Rule Act”), 58 P.S. §§ 18101-157, for a statement
such as “SEPTA is exempt from local regulations,” or “Phila-
delphia may exercise jurisdiction over entities created by an
act of the Commonwealth.” Because the statutes offer no such
language, the first prong of the Ogontz test is inconclusive.

I respectfully disagree with the OAJC’s conclusion that the
sovereign immunity provision contained in the MTAA, 74
PaC.8. § 1711(¢)(8), represents an explicit statement that
SEPTA has priority over Philadelphia in the area of anti-

2 ee
discrimination legislation under the first prong of Ogontz. The
OAJC agrees that “neither enabling statute contain[s] an
explicit provision directly addressing the issue,” but concludes
that the lack of an express directive, “[does] not preclude the
possibility that an examination of the statutes as a whole [can]
reveal such a clear intent.” Maj. Op. at 17, 159 A.8d at 45211
believe that the comparative assessment of the statutory
scheme “as a whole” should occur at the second stage of the
analysis. Otherwise, the inclusion of a sovereign immunity
provision in an entity’s enabling statute would always give the
entity priority over a local authority as to any type of local
regulation, an outcome this Court expressly rejected in SHP-
TA II, 101 A.8d at 89 n.18 (“[Whhen presented with two
competing absolutes—here sovereign immunity and the au-
thority of Philadelphia to enforce its ordinance, we employ the
tools of statutory construction and interpretation to resolve
the conflict.”). As explained in greater detail below, I believe
that SEPTA’s priority in this particular scenario stems from
the fact that the local regulation in question, the Philadelphia
Fair Practices Ordinance (“FPO”), directly undermines the
General Assembly’s intention to shield SEPTA from the haz-
ards of litigation.

The second Ogontz prong requires the Court to assess the
consequences of each party’s proffered interpretation of the
statutes. Although particular circumstances may require the
development of a factual record in order to apply the second
prong, this is not necessary in every case. For instance, in
Ogontz itself, this Court considered the consequences of allow-
ing the Commonwealth to build a mental health facility on
Commonwealth property in contravention of a local zoning
ordinance. The Court concluded as a matter of law that
allowing the facility to be built in the proposed location, a
residential zone, would frustrate the purpose of the local law,
while upholding the zoning ordinance would not prohibit the
1, The OAIC explains that the first step in the Ogontz analysis “requires

an examination of the overall language of the legislation to discern if

the General Assembly expressly intended one [entity] or the other to be
preeminent,” Maj. Op. at 17, 159 A.3d at 452. The OAJC’s review of the

legislation’s “overall language” under the first prong of Ogontz could be
interpreted as an attempt to ascertain the implied intent of the General

Ss °

Commonwealth from constructing the facility elsewhere. The
Court did not need a developed factual record to assess these
consequences and to reach the conclusion that enforcing the
zoning ordinance caused less disruption to each statutory
scheme.

Likewise, in the present case, we can apply the second
prong of Ogontz without remanding the case for fact-finding.
We can evaluate the purely legal consequences of each party’s
suggested interpretation of the MTAA and the Home Rule
Act, which includes an appraisal of their overall statutory
schemes. With regard to Philadelphia’s argument that SEP-
TA’s core transportation function will not be upset by requir-
ing it to comply with the FPO, we need not consider how much
it will cost SEPTA to comply with the ordinance and to defend
itself from claims of discrimination. Rather, we can look to the
MTAA’s provisions and ascertain the extent to which those
provisions would be upset by subjecting SEPTA to the FPO.
Similarly, we can consider the effect that exempting SEPTA
from the FPO will have on Philadelphia’s Home Rule authori-
ty and the efficacy of the FPO.

By including Subsection 1711(¢)(8) in the MTAA? the Gen-
eral Assembly expressed its will to shield SEPTA from most
types of lawsuits, absent a specific waiver, ostensibly so that
SEPTA could provide public transportation without enduring
the financial and temporal costs of litigation. See Sci. Games
Intl, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 620 Pa. 175, 66 A.8d 740, 755
(2018) (“The constitutionally-grounded, statutory doctrine of
sovereign immunity obviously serves to protect government

Assembly rather than its expressed intent, as the first step of Ogontz
requires,
2. Subsection 1711(c)(3) provides as follows:

It is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that an
authority created or existing under this chapter, including any au-
thority established under the former provisions of Article 112 of the
Pennsylvania Urban Mass Transportation Law or the former provi-
sions of Chapter 15, and the members, officers, officials and employ-
ees of any of them, shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official
immunity, as provided in 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310 (relating to sovereign
immunity reaffirmed; specific waiver), and shall remain immune
from suit except as provided by and subject to the provision of 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 8501 (relating to definitions) through 8528 (relating to
limitations on damages).

74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(c)(3)

‘ee
policymaking prerogatives and the public fisce.”); Mullin v.
Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 582 Pa, 127, 870 A.2d 778,
779 (2005) (“[I]mmunity provisions were enacted to insulate
the Commonwealth and its agencies from liability except in
certain specified circumstances, so that state governmental
revenues are not subject to unnecessary depletion.”) (citation
omitted); Stackhouse v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police, 892
A.2d 54, 62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (“The purpose of absolute
sovereign immunity [is] to insulate state agencies and employ-
ees not only from judgments but also from being required to
expend the time and funds necessary to defend suits.”). Were
we to interpret the FPO to apply to SEPTA with full force, we
would frustrate the General Assembly's intent that SEPTA be
subject to only certain types of litigation, inasmuch as the
FPO provides for an individual private right of action accom-
panied by damage awards. See Phila. Code § 9-1122,
Conceding that the MTAA’s sovereign immunity provision
bars individuals from bringing private suits against SEPTA,
Philadelphia claims that it nonetheless may selectively enforce
the FPO against SEPTA by seeking only injunctive and
collaborative remedies. However, even such selective enforce-
ment involves administrative investigations and hearings,
which may result in cease and desist orders, injunctive relief,
attorneys’ fees, and costs for expenses incurred by the Phila-
delphia Commission on Human Relations (“the Commission”),
See Phila, Code § 91107. The FPO also establishes criminal
penalties for non-compliance with orders of the Commission.
Phila. Code § 9-1121(1)-(2). Although these latter proceedings
and remedial orders may not result from a lawsuit or implicate
damage awards,’ they nonetheless present the burdens associ-
ated with litigation that the General Assembly sought to
preclude by granting SEPTA sovereign immunity.! The inclu-
3. Such proceedings may fall outside the scope of sovereign immunity,
See Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass’n v, Commonwealth, 535 Pa. 425,
636 A,2d 134, 137 (1993) (“{S]uits which simply seek to restrain state

officials from performing affirmative acts are not within the rule of
immunity,”),

4. Cf. Dissenting Op. at 37, 159 A.3d at 465 (‘‘SEPTA is obliged to
participate in these processes including attendance at mediations and

a

sion of a sovereign immunity provision in SEPTA’s enabling
statute, in the absence of any other relevant statutory lan-
guage, evinces the legislative will to minimize SEPTA’s litiga-
tion-related burden. The question presented in this case is
whether the General Assembly intended that Philadelphia
exercise authority over SEPTA in the manner prescribed by
the FPO. Selective enforcement or severability of the FPO is
impossible because the General Assembly has either given
Philadelphia such authority or it has not.

Even if Philadelphia’s enforcement of the FPO was limited
to prohibitory injunctive relief, Philadelphia nonetheless con-
structively could usurp SEPTA’s authority over its core trans-
portation mission and burden SEPTA substantially. For exam-
ple, SEPTA might plan to change its routing to severely
diminish services to a particular neighborhood with an unusu-
ally high concentration of riders protected by the FPO but not
protected by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”). Absent some legal bar, Philadelphia then could
seek @ prohibitory injunction alleging discrimination based
upon the disparate provision of services, Under the FPO,
Philadelphia, if it prevailed, could obtain an injunction pre-
venting SEPTA from rerouting or rescheduling certain buses
or trains away from that neighborhood, effectively telling
SEPTA how to fulfill its mandate.® Thus, subjecting SEPTA to
the FPO would undermine the MTAA. The MTAA, and partic-

conciliations in furtherance of the relief sought, and compliance with
investigative subpoenas ....”). I do not suggest that sovereign immuni-
ty extends beyond suits for damages, recovery of property, or mandato-
ry injunctive relief, I do conclude, based upon the General Assembly's
express will that SEPTA not be subjected to litigation—as evinced by
the inclusion of Subsection 1711(c)(3)—that exempting SEPTA from the
FPO is more consistent with the General Assembly's intent than subject-
ing SEPTA to the FPO.

5. The Dissent notes that an order to correct existing underservice
would require a mandatory injunction, which clearly would be defeated.
by SEPTA's sovereign immunity. Dissenting Op. at 38-39 n.6, 159 A.3d
at 466 n.6. By contrast, the remedy hypothesized above describes a
prohibitory injunction issued to prevent a diminution in service, a
remedy that falls outside the realm of sovereign immunity but that
necessarily impinges upon SEPTA’s ability to make transportation-
related decisions. The same can be said of other FPO remedies such as
conciliation agreements or cease-and-desist orders.

ularly its sovereign immunity provision, evinces the General
Assembly’s intent to allow SEPTA to avoid litigation, an intent
that would be frustrated if SEPTA is subjected to the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission under the FPO.’

The learned Dissent maintains that the PHRA reveals some
policy on the part of the General Assembly to disfavor all
types of discriminatory conduct, not just those enumerated in
that statute, and that “SEPTA’s core mission is to provide
public transportation without engaging in discriminatory con-
duct.” Dissenting Op, at 88, 159 A.38d at 465 (emphasis re-
moved). The Dissent goes on to argue that SEPTA impliedly
is prohibited from discriminating against those classes protect-
ed by the FPO but not by the PHRA because “[nJo language
in any of the relevant legislation suggests any intent by the
General Assembly to permit SEPTA to engage” in such
discrimination. Id, at 38, 159 A.8d at 466. No legal authority
supports this prohibition-by-implication approach to statutory
interpretation. We are bound to glean the General Assembly's
intent from its words when those words are clear. In unmis-
takable terms, the PHRA protects from discrimination only
those classes enumerated therein. Hupressio unius est exclu-
sio alterius."

6. The Dissent contends that I “insist{] that SEPTA’s sovereign immuni-
ty makes [compliance with the FPO] functionally impossible.” Dissent-
ing Op. at 33, 159 A.3d at 463. I do not. It is entirely possible for
SEPTA to be subjected to the FPO. But this is for the General Assembly
to do by legislation rather than for this Court to do by judicial law-
making. Nothing precludes the legislature from acting. The General
Assembly's codification of SEPTA’s sovereign immunity does not sug-
gest any current legislative inclination to subject SEPTA to the quasi-
litigation scheme imposed by the FPO. Nor do I “attempt[] to expand
the protections of sovereign immunity exponentially,” as the Dissent
asserts. [d. Expansion and contraction are legislative functions. I inter-
pret the law based upon the available evidence of the General Assem-
bly’s intent, I recognize and understand the limits of sovereign immuni-
ty as discussed by the Dissent. It is emphatically not my position that
sovereign immunity, in and of itself, expressly prevents application of
the FPO. Were that my belief, I would join the OAJC, and decide this
appeal based upon the MTAA’s plain language. I conclude only that the
General Assembly did not intend here to subject SEPTA to the jurisdic-
tion of a Philadelphia administrative body when it exempted SEPTA
from litigation by conferring sovereign immunity upon it.
|. See Atcovite v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d
1218, 1223 (2002) (“[U]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio

x

eS ©

The Dissent correctly interprets my position as
“amount[ing] to an assertion that the General Assembly in-
tended to require SEPTA to comply with some anti-discrimi-
nation laws (i.e, those in the PHRA relating to discrimination
based upon, inter alia, race, color, religious creed, ancestry,
age or sex, 43 P.S. § 956(a)), but to be free from any obli-
gation to comply with other anti-discrimination laws (i.¢., those
in the FPO relating to discrimination based upon, inter alia,
gender identity or sexual orientation, Phila. Code § 9~-
1108(1)).” Id. at 88, 159 A.38d at 466, I am compelled to draw
that conclusion because I fail to see how we can take the
liberty of inferring any other legislative intent. Speaking
generally, and relative to the instant context, state action that
is not prohibited by the federal or state constitution, or by
binding statute or precedent, necessarily is permitted.’ In the
PHRA, the General Assembly affirmatively chose to prohibit
certain types of discrimination while affirmatively declining to
prohibit others.

The deliberation behind the General Assembly’s conspicuous
omission of protections for those discriminated against based
upon gender identity and sexual orientation is thrown into
stark and glaring relief when viewed in a national context.
Numerous other states have enacted legislation that, in rele-
vant part, differs from our own PHRA only in the particular
that, like Philadelphia’s FPO and markedly unlike Pennsylva-
nia’s PHRA, these states prohibit discrimination on the basis

alterius, the inclusion of a specific matter in a statute implies the

exclusion of other matters.”). As Justice Harlan observed in the federal
context:

[When] the question relates to matters of public policy ... Congress
alone can deal with the subject; [a] court would encroach upon the
authority of Congress if, under the guise of construction, it should
assume to determine a matter of public policy .... [The opponents of
a statute] must go to Congress and obtain an amendment ... if they
think [it wrong] .... [T]his court cannot and will not judicially
legislate, since its function is to declare the law, while it belongs to
the legislative department to make the law.

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 102, 31 S.Ct.

502, 55 L.Ed, 619 (1911).

8. No constitutional claim has been made in this case. Importantly,
SEPTA would remain subject to federal and state anti-discrimination
laws such as Title VII and the PHRA, as discussed herein.

Se

of gender identity and sexual orientation.’ This distinction
cannot have been lost upon our legislature, which as recently
as 2015 has considered and declined to pass proposed legisla-
tion that would bring Pennsylvania into step with those states
that have added the LGBT community to the classes protected
against discrimination.” This Court may not override that
choice by seeking to improve upon or read into the PHRA
what cannot fairly be inferred under our rules of statutory
construction." Absent further developments in constitutional
or federal law, only our General Assembly has the power to
align Pennsylvania with Philadelphia and our numerous sister
states that have chosen to provide legal protections to persons

9, Unlike Pennsylvania, the following states and the District of Columbia
have enacted laws that prohibit discrimination based upon sexual
orientation and gender identity: California (Cal. E. Code § 1101; Cal.
Civ, Code § 51 et. cet,), Colorado (C.R.S. 24-34-402; 24-34-601),
Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46a-60, 46a~-64), Delaware (Del. S.B,
121 (2009); Del. S.B, 97 (2013)), District of Columbia (D.C. Code §§ 2~
1402.11, 2-1402.31), Hawaii (Haw. Rev, Stat. §§ 378-2, 489-3), Illinois
(775 ILCS 5/2-102 (2005), Iowa (lowa Code §§ 216,86, 216.6a, 216.7
(2007), Maine (5 Me. Rev. Stat, §§ 4571, 4572, 4591, 4592 (2005),
Maryland (Md. §,B, 212 (2014)), Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws, ch.
151B, § 4, ch, 272, § 92A (1989)), Minnesota (Minn, Stat. §§ 363A.08,
363A.11 (1993)), Nevada (Nev, A.B, 311 (1999); Nev. A.B, 211 (2011);
Nev, S.B. 207 (2009); Nev, S.B. 331 (2011)), New Hampshire (N.H.
HB. 421 (1997), New Jersey (N.J. Stat, §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-12), New
Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann, § 28-1-7), New York (N.Y. S.B. 720 (2002)),
Oregon (Or, S.B. 2 (2007)), Rhode Island (R.I, Gen. Laws. §§ 11-24-2,
28-5-7), Utah (Utah S.B, 296 (2015)), Vermont (9 Vt. Stat. § 4502; 21
Vi. Stat. § 495), Washington (Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49-60-180, 49-60-
215 (2006), Wisconsin (Wis. Stat, §§ 106.52, 111.321, § 111.322,
§ 111.36 (1982)).

10, See House Bill 1510 (2015) (‘Pennsylvania Fairness Act’’) (referred
to State Government Committee) (proposed amendment to PHRA to
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or
gender expression); see also Claire Sasko, Why Pennsylvania's Hate
Crime Laws Still Lack LGBT Protections, Phila. Mag., June 21, 2016,
http://M1Fwww.phillymag.com/news/2016/06/21/pennsylvania-hate-
crime-laws/ (reporting that Pennsylvania Fairness Act stalled in the
House State Government Committee because the majority chairman
considered the bill “ ‘dangerous’ and that debate on the issue is ‘futile’
because he believes the bill will not win [a legislative] majority”) (last
reviewed Mar, 22, 2017),

11, As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote, “[I]f my fellow citizens
want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.” Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J. Laski, (Mar. 4, 1920), in Holmes
Laski Letters, at 249 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., vol. 1) (1953).

ee °

who suffer discrimination on the basis of their gender identity
or sexual orientation,

Returning to the issue at bar, while subjecting SEPTA to
the FPO is at odds with the MTAA’s sovereign immunity
provision, prohibiting Philadelphia from exercising jurisdiction
over SEPTA under the FPO would not upset Philadelphia’s
local authority or the purposes of the FPO generally. Philadel-
phia’s contention that SEPTA—as the city’s largest transpor-
tation provider—is a major public accommodation and target
of the FPO is well taken. However, it is hardly the only public
accommodation in the city. Our ruling does not prohibit Phila~
delphia from enforcing the FPO against any number of public
and private entities that serve the public. As in Ogontz, where
we explained that the Commonwealth could effectuate its goal
by constructing the mental health facility in a different loca-
tion, Philadelphia can carry out the purpose of the FPO by
enforcing it against numerous other individuals and entities
located within the city.”

Comparing the consequences of each party’s proffered in-
terpretation of the statutes, SEPTA’s interpretation more
effectively harmonizes the MTAA and Philadelphia’s Home
Rule Authority to enforce the FPO. As the OAJC emphasizes,
the sovereign immunity provision expressly limits any entity
from bringing suit against SEPTA. Maj. Op. at 19, 159 A.8d at
454. Although sovereign immunity does not prohibit any and
all local regulation of SEPTA, in purporting to subject SEPTA.
to an administrative scheme that mimics the rigors of litiga-
tion, the FPO contradicts the General Assembly's choice to
immunize SEPTA from suit.

12, L agree with the Dissent that “{tJhe aim of the FPO is not to protect
some, but rather all, Philadelphians from the types of discrimination
identified in the ordinance.” Dissenting Op. at 39, 159 A.3d at 466, I
agree as well with the Dissent’s conclusion that the General Assembly
has ‘“‘cede[d] local control over the extension of protections against
discrimination for additional categories of citizens,” Dissenting Op. at
36, 159 A.3d at 464. Our decision in this case will leave all Philadel-
phians protected by the FPO, including “additional categories of citi-
zens”—except when SEPTA is the entity alleged to be discriminating,
because the General Assembly has not ceded local control over SEPTA.
Elimination of this patent discrepancy is the prerogative of the legisla-
ture, not the judiciary,

Le

Finally, like the OAJC, I reject Philadelphia’s claim that the
PHRA waives SEPTA’s sovereign immunity as to claims
brought under the FPO. It is well-established and undisputed
that sovereign immunity must be waived specifically by the
General Assembly, 1 Pa.C.S. § 2810 (“[T'Jhe Commonwealth
... Shall... remain immune from suit except as the General
Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity ....”), and
that we must construe exceptions to sovereign immunity nar-
rowly. See Dean v. Dep't of Transp., 561 Pa. 508, 751 A.2d
1180, 1182 (2000) (“T]he exceptions to immunity are to be
strictly construed.”), Notably, the PHRA specifically waives
sovereign immunity for claims brought before the Pennsylva-
nia Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”). See 48 P.S.
§ 954(a) (defining “person” to include “the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and all political subdivisions, authorities, boards
and commissions thereof”); 43 P.S. § 954(b) (defining “em-
ployer” to include “the Commonwealth or any political subdivi-
sion or board, department, commission or school district there-
of”). The PHRA also provides that “[t]he legislative body of a
political subdivision may, by ordinance or resolution, authorize
the establishment of membership in and support of a Local
Human Relations Commission,” 48 P.S. § 962.1(a), and that
“legislative bodies of political subdivisions shall have the au-
thority to grant to local commissions powers and duties similar
to those now exercised by the [PHRC] under the provisions of
[the PHRA].” 43 P.S. § 962.1(d), Philadelphia argues that, by
granting local authorities “powers and duties similar to those”
of the PHRC, the General Assembly effectively expanded the
PHRA’s waiver of sovereign immunity to the FPO and PHRC.
However, the language of Section 962.1 does not speak specifi-
cally to waiver of sovereign immunity. As I read and consider
Section 962.1, I am unable to discern the specific and clear
language required to allow for importing the PHRA’s waiver
to the jurisdiction of local authorities. Should the General
Assembly wish to enact such language, it may do so. We may
not engraft such language onto a statute that lacks it through
an act of judicial fiat.

©

As I survey the statutory landscape, I do not find the
lawmakers’ express will that SEPTA be subject to Philadel-
phia’s jurisdiction under the FPO or equivalent local regula-
tions, Similarly, I cannot locate any legislative mandate to
exempt SEPTA from all forms of local regulation. The stat-
utes are ambiguous. Accordingly, to ascertain the General
Assembly’s intent, we are constrained to fall back upon our
familiar rules of statutory construction. Relying upon Ogonte’s
formulation, I conclude that the intent of the General Assem-
bly to shield SEPTA from litigation by granting it sovereign
immunity is incompatible with subjecting SEPTA to Philadel-
phia’s FPO. On this basis, I would affirm the order of the
Commonwealth Court prohibiting Philadelphia from enforcing
the FPO against SEPTA.

JUSTICE DONOHUE, Dissenting

In my view, proper application of the two-part test set forth
in Commonwealth, Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neigh-
bors Ass’n, 505 Pa. 614, 488 A.2d 448 (1984), reveals the
Legislature’s intent to subject SEPTA to the jurisdiction of
the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations (“Philadel-
phia Commission”) and to the Philadelphia Fair Practices
Ordinance (“FPO”). The opinion announcing the judgment of
the Court (“OAJC”), pursuant to its interpretation and analy-
sis of Ogonte’s first analytic prong, reaches a contrary conclu-
sion. Justice Wecht, based upon an analysis of Ogonta’s second
analytic prong, also finds that SEPTA is exempt from the
anti-discrimination provisions of the FPO. Both the OAJC and
Justice Wecht’s Concurrence reach their conclusions based
upon SEPTA’s sovereign immunity, but in so doing overstate
the scope and breadth of the protections that sovereign immu-
nity provides. Properly understood, sovereign immunity poses
no obstacle to subjecting SEPTA to the jurisdiction of the
Philadelphia Commission in all cases not seeking monetary
damages or mandatory injunctive relief! Accordingly, I re-
spectfully dissent.

1, A mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive
act while a prohibitory injunction enjoins the performance of an act.

a

I join in Justice Wecht’s discussion of the analytic frame-
work required by Ogontz. Ogonte's first analytic prong re-
quires the Court in this case to look to the language of the
Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act (“MTAA”) and
the First Class City Home Rule Act (“Home Rule Act”)—
SEPTA’s and the Philadelphia Commission’s enabling stat-
utes, respectively—to determine whether either contains an
express statement that one entity or the other has priority in
the event of a conflict. Concurring Op. (Wecht, J.) at 21-22,
159 A.8d at 455-56, As the Concurrence explains, no express
statement exists in either act, making the first prong of the
Ogontz test inconclusive. Id.

I likewise agree that the OAJC’s examination of the first
prong erroneously extended beyond consideration of the en-
abling legislation to the statutory language of the Pennsylva-
nia Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). 48 P.S. § 954(b). More-
over, and more importantly, I disagree with the OAJC’s
analysis of that statutory language. Pursuant to the MTAA,
SEPTA is a Commonwealth agency and has sovereign immu-
nity. 74 Pa.C.S.A. § 1711(a), (c)(8). As a Commonwealth agen-
cy, however, SEPTA has no sovereign immunity with respect
to compliance with the PHRA. 48 P.S. § 954, SEPTA is thus
within the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission (“PHRC”) and subject to the PHRA’s anti-dis-
crimination provisions, which forbid various forms of discrimi-
nation, including discrimination based upon race, color, reli-
gious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or non-job
related handicap or disability. 48 P.S, §§ 955, 956(a). In con-
trast, the FPO provides additional anti-discrimination protec-
tions, including, inter alia, discrimination based upon gender
identity, sexual orientation, ethnicity or marital status. Phila.
Code § 9-1108(1)?

See sereraly Mazzie v. Commonwealth, 495 Pa, 128, 432 A.2d 985, 988

2. The Home Rule Act grants broad powers to Philadelphia to legislate
with respect to its municipal functions. See 53 PS. §§ 13101-13157. It
is not contested that Philadelphia is permitted to legislate in the field of
anti-discrimination law.

ES «

According to the OAJO, “{slection 954 is an explicit expres-
sion of the legislature’s intent to grant the State Commission
exclusive jurisdiction over Commonwealth agencies in anti-
discrimination matters.” Jd. I cannot agree, as in my view an
“explicit expression” of the legislature’s intent for the PHRC
to have exclusive jurisdiction over Commonwealth agencies in
anti-discrimination matters would include some language to
that effect. The PHRA does not provide for the exclusive
jurisdiction of the PHRC in anti-discrimination matters involv-
ing Commonwealth agencies. If the legislature had so intend-
ed, it could have said, simply, “the PHRC has exclusive
jurisdiction over Commonwealth agencies in anti-discrimina-
tion matters,” or words to that effect. It did not do so. A
directive that Commonwealth agencies are subject to the
jurisdiction of the PHRC does not imply that they are not
subject to the jurisdiction of any other tribunals. The totality
of legislative intent in this regard is that SEPTA, as a
Commonwealth agency, must comply with the PHRA, That
point, however, is neither controversial nor relevant to wheth-
er SEPTA is also subject to the jurisdiction of the Philadel-
phia Commission.

Ogontz’s second analytic prong requires the Court to assess
the consequences of subjecting SEPTA to the FPO and,
conversely, of prohibiting the Philadelphia Commission from
enforcing the FPO against SEPTA. With respect to subjecting
SEPTA to compliance with the FPO, Justice Wecht’s Concur-
rence insists that SEPTA’s sovereign immunity makes this
functionally impossible. Concurring Op. (Wecht, J.) at 22, 159
A.8d at 456. The Concurrence bases this conclusion on an
extremely broad view of the scope of the protections afforded
by sovereign immunity. This Court has repeatedly held that
sovereign immunity acts as a shield against lawsuits in two
discrete circumstances: those seeking money damages or the
recovery of property, and those requesting mandatory injunc-
tive relief to compel affirmative actions. See, eg., Fawber v.
Cohen, 516 Pa. 352, 582 A.2d 429, 488-84 (1987). Conversely,
sovereign immunity does not shield Commonwealth agencies
from lawsuits seeking declaratory relief or prohibitory injunc-

eee

tive relief, Legal Capital, LLC v. Medical Prof. Liab. Catas-
trophe Loss Fund, 561 Pa. 336, 750 A.2d 299, 302-08 (2000), or
bar actions in mandamus to require a state agency to perform
a ministerial or mandatory statutory duty. Finn v. Rendell,
990 A.2d 100, 105 (Pa. Commw. 2010); Kee v, Pa. Tpk.
Comm’n, 685 A.2d 1054, 1059 (Pa. Commw. 1996).

Justice Wecht, however, attempts to expand the protections
of sovereign immunity exponentially, contending (without cita-
tion to any statutory language) that the General Assembly, in
providing SEPTA with sovereign immunity, intended to shel-
ter SEPTA from having to incur “financial and temporal costs
of litigation.” Concurring Op. (Wecht, J.) at 28, 159 A.38d at
456. According to the Concurrence, the legislative intent in
granting sovereign immunity to SEPTA was to shield it from
the rigors of discrimination litigation generally, outside of the
PHRC context. Jd. at 24 n.4, 159 A.3d at 457 n.4 (stating that
the General Assembly indicated its “express will that SEPTA
not be subjected to litigation”). The Concurrence thus claims
that SEPTA’s protection from complaints brought before the
Philadelphia Commission for alleged violations of the FPO
must be complete, and thus to effectuate the “legislative will to
preclude subjecting SEPTA to local administrative proceed-
ings of whatever nature,” Justice Wecht concludes that the
Philadelphia Commission may not be permitted to exercise
jurisdiction over SEPTA at all—including jurisdiction over
claims for which SEPTA’s sovereign immunity offers it no
protection. Id.

The Concurrence’s legislative intent argument rests on an
extremely broad view of the protections afforded by sovereign
immunity, and one not grounded in our prior decisions defin-
ing the scope of the doctrine. Contrary to Justice Wecht’s
contention, a grant of sovereign immunity carries no concomi-
tant privilege to be free of all costs of litigation. It is true that
in cases that fall within the protections of sovereign immunity,
litigation expenses may be kept to a minimum, as these claims
may be dismissed at the outset. Justice Wecht cites to two
such cases: Sci. Games Int'l, Inc. v. Com., 620 Pa. 175, 66
A8d 740 (2018) and Mullin v. Commonwealth, Dept. of

PS CCsC‘“(‘SCCOC(#;(C
Trams., 582 Pa. 127, 870 A.2d 773 (2005). The Concurrence
cites to no Pennsylvania case, however, holding that sovereign
immunity protects its holder from the “financial and temporal

costs of litigation” in cases where the doctrine does not
provide its holder with immunity from suit.

The Concurrence likewise directs us to no statutory lan-
guage in the MTAA stating, or even suggesting, that by
granting sovereign immunity, the legislature also intended to
preclude local administrative bodies from exercising jurisdic-
tion over SEPTA. Section 1171(¢)(8) of the MTAA, the provi-
sion granting sovereign immunity to SEPTA, provides no
exclusions from the jurisdiction of any tribunal, including but
not limited to no exclusions from the jurisdiction of local
administrative bodies like the Philadelphia Commission. With-
out any mention of any jurisdictional exceptions, section
1171(€)(8) merely states that authorities created under the
MTAA and their members, officials, officers and employees
“Shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity.” 74
Pa.C.S. § 1171(¢)(8). The grant of sovereign immunity is en-
tirely irrelevant to the issue of whether the PHRC has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over Commonwealth agencies like SEPTA*

3. The Concurrence also cites to a Commonwealth Court decision,
Stackhouse v. Com., Pennsylvania State Police, 892 A2d 54 (Pa,
Commw. 2006), that involved a request for declaratory relief. The trial
court dismissed it on preliminary objections based upon sovereign
immunity. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, concluding that the
request for a declaration of rights was sought only to provide “the legal
predicate for a damage or other immunity-barred claim.” Id. at 62.

4. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense to liability, and by rule
it must be raised in new matter. Pa.R.C.P. 1030; Brimmeier v. Pennsyl-
vania Tpk. Comm’n, 147 A.3d 954, 960 (Pa. Commw. 2016). Important-
ly, the availability of sovereign immunity as a defense does not go to the
jurisdiction of the tribunal. Chem, Nat. Res., Inc. v. Republic of Venezue-
la, 420 Pa, 134, 215 A.2d 864, 867 (1966) (‘Sovereign immunity is in
the nature of an affirmative defense; (a) it does not go to jurisdiction
and (b) it can be waived.”), When a plaintiff asserts a cause of action
that falls within a defendant's sovereign immunity defense, the tribunal
does not lack personal jurisdiction over the defendant or subject matter
jurisdiction over the defendant's claim. Instead, the tribunal must
dismiss the claim because, as a matter of law, the defendant is immune
from liability for the cause of action in question. Justice Wecht’s
conclusion that the availability of the sovereign immunity defense

Justice Wecht also contends that the General Assembly’s
decision not to amend the PHRA to include anti-discrimination
protections for, inter alia, gender identity and sexual orienta-
tion, at the state-wide level evinces a legislative intent not to
require Commonwealth agencies to comply with local regula-
tions that do contain these protections. This reliance on the
General Assembly's silence, however, is misguided, as it re-
flects nothing more than the legislature’s intention to cede to
local control over the extension of protections against discrimi-
nation for additional categories of citizens. In declining to
amend the PHRA, the legislators were well aware that local
ordinances providing additional anti-discrimination protections
existed in various political subdivisions throughout Pennsylva-
nia, including in Philadelphia. If the General Assembly had
any intention to preclude Commonwealth agencies from abid-
ing by such protections in local ordinances, or to confer to the
PHRC exclusive jurisdiction over Commonwealth agencies
with respect to anti-discrimination matters, it certainly could
have amended the PHRA to do so,® Instead, the General
Assembly has not passed any legislation usurping the power of
political subdivisions to enact and enforce anti-discrimination
provisions beyond those set forth in the PHRA.

The only legislative intent that may be properly gleaned
from SEPTA’s grant of sovereign immunity is that the legisla-
ture intended for SEPTA to enjoy the recognized legal protec-
tions associated with a grant of sovereign immunity. Contrary
to Justice Wecht’s concerns about SEPTA’s ability to provide
transportation services if it is compelled to submit on occasion

implicates a tribunal's jurisdiction is contrary to these well-established
principles.

5. Other states have done so. See, e.g., Ark, Code Ann. § 14-1-403 or
ACA. § 14-1-403 (“A county, municipality, or other political subdivi-
sion of the state shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution,
rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits dis-
crimination on a basis not contained in state law.”’); Tenn, Code Ann.
§ 7-51-1802 or T.C.A. § 7-51-1802 (“No local government shall by
ordinance, resolution, or any other means impose on or make applica-
ble to any person an anti-discrimination practice, standard, definition,
or provision that shall deviate from, modify, supplement, add to,
change, or vary in any manner from ... types of discrimination
recognized by state law but only to the extent recognized by the state.”’).

ee °

to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commission, no serious
conflict exists. The FPO provides that actions are instituted by
the filing of a complaint, to which the respondent files a
written answer. Phila, Code § 9-1112~13. When a complaint is
filed against SEPTA that includes claims for money damages
or mandatory injunctive relief, SEPTA may assert its sover-
eign immunity in its answer—at which time all such claims
must be immediately dismissed. For claims that do not seek
money damages or mandatory injunctive relief, however, SEP-
TA’s sovereign immunity provides no protection. With respect
to these claims, the FPO provides that the Philadelphia Com-
mission may perform an investigation, hold hearings, conduct
mediations or conciliations, and order non-monetary relief,
including the issuance of cease and desist orders to prohibit
SEPTA from engaging in conduct that is unlawful under the
FPO. Phila. Code §§ 9-1105-1118. In this regard, SEPTA is
obliged to participate in these processes, including attendance
at mediations and conciliations in furtherance of the relief
sought, and compliance with investigative subpoenas issued by
the Philadelphia Commission. Phila. Code §§ 9-1113-1116.
Sovereign immunity provides no bar against SEPTA’s involve-
ment in these FPO proceedings, including no shield against
cease and desist orders, administrative investigations, or medi-
ations and conciliations. SEPTA likewise has no sovereign
immunity protection against the costs and expenses of partic-
ipation in such litigation, including its attorneys’ fees and costs
associated therewith,

Having concluded that SEPTA is not immune from all FPO
litigation, the comparison of consequences resulting from sub-
jecting SEPTA to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commis-
sion, or, conversely, of exempting it from compliance with the
FPO, weighs strongly in favor of allowing the Philadelphia
Commission to exercise jurisdiction over SEPTA. The only
consequence of subjecting SEPTA to the jurisdiction of the
Philadelphia Commission is that it places SEPTA and the
Philadelphia Commission on equal footing in lawsuits seeking
available relief, SEPTA has the right to due process in
proceedings before the Philadelphia Commission, including the

right to present a defense to all allegations of wrongdoing.
SEPTA also has the right to seek judicial review from orders
of the Philadelphia Commission to any court of competent
jurisdiction within thirty days of their entry. Phila. Code §§ 9-
1105-1119.

Moreover, subjecting SEPTA to the jurisdiction of the
Philadelphia Commission does not interfere with its core
transportation mission. SEPTA’s core mission is not merely to
provide public transportation. As explained hereinabove, while
the General Assembly granted SEPTA sovereign immunity, it
also waived that grant of immunity with respect to compliance
with the anti-discrimination provisions of the PHRA. See
supra at 82-38, 159 A.3d at 462. Accordingly, legislative intent
reflects that SEPTA’s core mission is to provide public
transportation without engaging in discriminatory con-
duct. Requiring SEPTA to comply with the FPO is thus
entirely consistent with its core mission. In this regard, I
cannot agree with the Concurrence’s contention that it was the
General Assembly’s intent to preclude SEPTA from any par-
ticipation in litigation of the type envisioned by the FPO. Such
a contention amounts to an assertion that the General Assem-
bly intended to require SEPTA to comply with some anti-
discrimination laws (i.e., those in the PHRA relating to dis-
crimination based upon, inter alia, race, color, religious creed,
ancestry, age or sex, 43 P.S. § 956(a)), but to be free from any
obligation to comply with other anti-discrimination laws (i.e.
those in the FPO relating to discrimination based upon, inter
alia, gender identity or sexual orientation, Phila. Code § 9-
1103(1)). No language in any of the relevant legislation sug-
gests any intent by the General Assembly to permit SEPTA
either to engage in the types of discrimination specified in the
FPO or to avoid litigation in connection therewith. SEPTA has
offered no basis on which to conclude that while it can fulfill
its core public transportation mission in compliance with the
PHRA (and incurring associated litigation costs), it would be
unable to do so if required to comply with the incremental
additional anti-discrimination provisions of the FPO.*

6. I likewise find unpersuasive the Concurrence’s assertion that compli-
ance with the FPO would interfere with SEPTA’s core mission because

PF CC(;‘;:sSCtsC(‘iésaX

On the other hand, serious consequences result from hold-
ing that SEPTA is exempt from the FPO, as the interests of
entire classes of individuals otherwise protected by the FPO
will have no protection from various forms of discrimination by
Philadelphia’s largest transportation provider. The Concur-
rence’s position that this consequence is substantially mitigat-
ed because Philadelphia can carry out the purpose of the FPO
by “enforcing it against other individuals and entities,” Con-
curring Op. (Wecht, J.) at 29, 159 A.8d at 460, misses the
mark. The aim of the FPO is not to protect some, but rather
all, Philadelphians from the types of discrimination identified
in the ordinance. Exempting SEPTA from the jurisdiction of
the Philadelphia Commission and compliance with the FPO
will interfere with the accomplishment of this purpose.

For these reasons, I dissent.

Justices Todd and Dougherty join this Dissenting Opinion.

the Philadelphia Commission could, hypothetically, assert a claim alleg-
ing discrimination on the basis that a neighborhood with a population
of members of a protected class is underserved and then issue, as a
remedy, a prohibitory injunction preventing SEPTA from re-routing
buses or trains to or from that neighborhood. Concurring Op. (Wecht,
J.) at 25-26, 159 A.3d at 457-58. An order as hypothesized by the
Concurrence, i.e., to correct existing underservice to a particular neigh-
borhood by re-routing service would require a mandatory injunction
and would be defeated by SEPTA’s sovereign immunity, if asserted.

159 A.8d 466
Kevin PITTMAN, Appellant
ve

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE, Appellee

No. 56 MAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

SUBMITTED: November 22, 2016
DECIDED: April 26, 2017

~
&

Peter Rosalsky, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia,
for Amicus Curiae.

Dean M. Beer, Esq., Timothy Peter Wile, Esq., Montgom-
ery County Public Defender’s Office, Raymond David Roberts,
Esq., for Appellant.

Kara W. Haggerty, Esq., John Craig Manning, Esq,, Alan
Matthew Robinson, Esq., Pennsylvania Board of Probation &
Parole, for Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

es
OPINION

JUSTICE BAER

In this appeal, we consider whether the Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) abuses its discretion
where it fails to consider whether to grant a convicted parole
violator (“CPV”) credit for time spent at liberty on parole. We
also consider whether the Board must provide a contempora-
neous statement explaining the rationale behind its decision to
grant or deny credit to a CPV. For the reasons that follow, we
hold that the Board abuses its discretion in failing to consider
whether to grant CPVs credit for time spent at liberty on
parole under the plain language of Subsection 6188(a)(2.1) of
the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6188(a)(2.1).1 Additionally, in
order to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly in
enacting Subsection 6188(a)(2.1), we further hold that the
Board must provide a contemporaneous statement explaining
its rationale for denying a CPV credit for time spent at liberty
on parole. In this ease, we conclude that because the Board’s

1. Subsection 6138(a) provides as follows:
§ 6138. Violation of terms of parole
(a) Convicted Violators.—
(1) A parolee under the jurisdiction of the board released from a
correctional facility who, during the period of parole or while delin-
quent on parole, commits a crime punishable by imprisonment, for
which the parolee is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to
which the parolee pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time
thereafter in a court of record, may at the discretion of the board be
recommitted as a parole violator.
(2) If the parolee’s recommitment is so ordered, the parolee shall be
reentered to serve the remainder of the term which the parolee would
have been compelled to serve had the parole not been granted and,
except as provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be given no credit for
the time at liberty on parole.
(2.1) The board may, in its discretion, award credit to a parolee
recommitted under paragraph (2) for the time spent at liberty on
parole, unless any of the following apply:
@ The crime committed during the period of parole or while
delinquent on parole is a crime of violence as defined in 42 Pa.C.S. .
§ 9714(g) (relating to sentences for second and subsequent of-
fenses) or a crime requiring registration under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 97
Subch. H (relating to registration of sexual offenders).
i) The parolee was recommitted under section 6143 (relating to
early parole of inmates subject to Federal removal order).
61 Pa.C.S. § 6138 (footnote omitted).

Ss °
decision to deny Kevin Pittman (“Appellant”) such credit was
based upon its erroneous belief that Appellant was automati-
cally precluded from receiving credit under Subsection
6188(a)(2.1), the Board abused its discretion. Accordingly, we
vacate the Commonwealth Court’s order, vacate the decision
of the Board, and remand to the Board for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

The material facts underlying this matter are undisputed. In
2010, following his guilty plea to possession with intent to
deliver (“PWID”),? Appellant was sentenced to two to four
years of imprisonment, with a maximum sentence date of
December 9, 2018. On December 12, 2011, the Board released
Appellant on parole. Prior to his release, Appellant signed a
form detailing the conditions governing his parole, which
included the following:

If you are convicted of a crime committed while on pa-

role/reparole, the Board has the authority, after an appro-

priate hearing, to recommit you to serve the balance of the
sentence or sentences which you were serving when pa-
role/reparoled, with no credit for time at liberty on parole.
Certified Record of the Board (“C.R.B.”), Tab 3, at 11.

In 2018, while still on parole, Appellant was arrested and
charged with various criminal offenses. He ultimately pled
guilty to PWID and was sentenced to one to three years of
imprisonment. Appellant subsequently waived his right to a
parole revocation hearing and admitted that he violated his
parole by committing a crime. C.R.B., Tab 7, at 42. The Board
accepted Appellant’s admission and recommitted him in accord
with his original 2011 sentence. The Board’s hearing report
form, which details the circumstances surrounding an inmate’s
parole revocation, includes the following line: “BOARD
ONLY—Credit time spent at liberty on parole: [] No [] Yes
(excluded offenses on pg. 8).” C.R.B., Tab 7, at 386. The Board
checked “No” on Appellant’s report form, thus denying him
credit for time spent at liberty on parole. Consequently, the
Board directed that Appellant serve the entire balance re-

2, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)30).

ee
maining on his original sentence and recalculated his maxi-
mum sentence date as October 21, 2015. Importantly, the

Board offered no explanation for its decision not to award
Appellant credit.

Appellant subsequently filed a pro se letter with the Board,
in which he sought credit for time he spent on parole. The
Board, which deemed Appellant’s letter to be a petition for
administrative review from its recalculation of his maximum
sentence date pursuant to 87 Pa. Code § 78.1(b),* declined to
award him credit, stating in its responsive letter to Appellant
that “as a convicted parole violator you automatically forfeited
eredit for all of the time that you spent on parole.” C.R.B.,
Tab 10, at 50 (citing 61 Pa.C.S, § 6188(a)). This conclusion,
however, conflicts with Subsection 6138(a)(2.1), which states
“Cthhe [Bloard may, in its discretion, award credit to a [CPV].”
61 PaC.S. § 6138(a)(2.1\(supra, pg. 42 nl, 159 A.Bd at 468
nd!

Appellant filed a petition for review with the Commonwealth
Court, arguing, inter alia, that the Board abused its discretion
in failing to award him credit for time spent at liberty on
parole, Specifically, Appellant took the position that the Board
abused its discretion where, as here, it failed to exercise any
discretion whatsoever because it denied him credit based upon
the mistaken belief that he automatically forfeited his right to

3, Subsection 73.1(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(b) Petitions for administrative review:
(1) A parolee, by counsel unless unrepresented, may petition for
administrative review under this subsection of determinations relat-
ing to revocation decisions which are not otherwise appealable
under subsection (a), Petitions for administrative review shall be
received at the Board’s Central Office within 30 days of the mailing
date of the Board's determination, When a timely petition has been
filed, the determination will not be deemed final for purposes of
appeal to a court until the Board has mailed its response to the
petition for administrative review. This subsection supersedes 1
Pa,Code § 35.226,
37 Pa, Code § 73.1(b)(1) (emphasis in original),

4, Importantly, prior to 2012, consistent with the Board’s statement, a
CPV was not eligible for credit for time spent at liberty on parole, As
will be discussed in detail infra, the General Assembly amended the
Parole Code in 2012 to make credit for CPVs discretionary with the
Board.

SS  ‘

receive credit as a CPV. Citing Gillespie v. Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing,
886 A.2d 317 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), Appellant argued that com-
pletely failing to exercise discretion, in and of itself, consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion. Moreover, Appellant claimed that,
when the Board initially denied him credit by checking the
“No” box on its hearing report form, it erred in failing to issue
a written statement explaining its reasoning for denying him
credit.®

Before the Commonwealth Court, the Board argued that by
checking “No” on Appellant’s hearing report form, it did, in
fact, exercise its discretion to deny him credit for time spent
at liberty on parole pursuant to Subsection 6188(a)(2.1). Addi-
tionally, the Board maintained that nothing in the plain lan-
guage of Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) requires it to provide reasons
as to why it decided not to award credit to a CPV

Hl The Commonwealth Court, sitting en bane, affirmed
the Board’s decision to deny Appellant credit. Pittman v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 181 A3d 604
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), In the majority opinion, the Common-
wealth Court determined that Subsection 6188(a)(2.1) gives
the Board broad discretion when considering whether to grant
a CPV credit for time spent at liberty on parole and that the
Board properly exercised that discretion by checking “No” on
Appellant’s hearing report.’ Additionally, the Commonwealth

5. As was noted by the Commonwealth Court, Appellant did not make
any argument that the particular facts and circumstances leading to his
recommitment warrant awarding him credit. Rather, Appellant focused
on the Board's proffered reason during the administrative review phase
that he “automatically forfeited” credit as a CPV and argued that
remand was necessary so that the Board could exercise its discretion in
accordance with Subsection 6138(a). Additionally, he maintained that,
on remand, the Board should explain the basis for its decision.

6. In its brief to the Commonwealth Court, the Board failed to address
its statement during the administrative review phase that as a CPV,
Appellant “automatically forfeited” credit for time spent at liberty on
parole.

7. Initially, the Commonwealth Court sua sponte addressed whether it
had jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision to deny Appellant credit,
The court noted that parole is a matter of legislative grace and that
decisions by the Board regarding parole are generally not subject to

es

Court held that nothing in Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) requires the
Board to issue a statement of reasons explaining its decision.

Regarding Appellant’s contention that the Board abused its
discretion when it denied him credit for time served while on
parole, the Commonwealth Court noted that the Board’s dis-
eretion under Subsection 6188(a) is twofold. First, the Board
must decide whether to recommit a parole violator. Next, if
recommitment is so ordered, then the parolee shall be recom-
mitted to serve the remainder of his original term, but the
Board may, in its discretion, award the parolee credit for time
spent at liberty on parole. The Commonwealth Court further
observed that, under unrelated sections of the Parole Code,
namely Section 6187 (relating to the Board’s power to parole

appellate review. See Rogers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 555 Pa. 285, 724 A.2d 319, 322 (1999) (‘“{T]he courts of the
Commonwealth do not have statutory jurisdiction to conduct appellate
review of a decision of the Board, since such a decision does not
constitute an adjudication.”), However, the Commonwealth Court de-
termined that, when a prisoner challenges the Board’s computation or
calculation of his maximum sentence date pursuant to Subsection
6138(a)(2.1), the prisoner's appellate rights include an administrative
appeal to the Board and a statutory appeal therefrom to the Common-
wealth Court pursuant to Section 763 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 763 (relating to direct appeals from governmental agencies). Accord-
ingly, the Commonwealth Court concluded that it had appellate juris-
diction over the Board's decision following Appellant's administrative
appeal. Neither party challenges the intermediate court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over this matter and this Court’s grant of allowance of
appeal was limited to consideration of the Commonwealth Court's
statutory interpretation of Subsection 6138(a). Nonetheless, we note
that we agree with the Commonwealth Court that a prisoner may file
an administrative appeal from the Board's decision regarding the
computation or calculation of a maximum sentence date and may
subsequently file a statutory appeal to the Commonwealth Court. Unlike
cases involving the grant, denial, or conditions of parole where review
is unavailable, see Rogers, 724 A.2d at 322 (holding that the Common-
wealth Court lacked statutory jurisdiction to review the Board's order
to deny a prisoner parole) and Wheeler v. Board of Probation and Parole,
862 A.2d 127, 130 (Pa, Cmwith. 2004) (holding that the Board’s
imposition of a condition of parole was not an adjudication from which
an appeal could be taken), the Board’s decision to deny Appellant credit
pursuant to Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) extended Appellant’s maximum
sentence date. Such a decision is properly subject to appellate review.
See McMahon v. Board of Probation and Parole, 504 Pa. 240, 470 A.2d
1337, 1337-38 (1983) (allowing for appellate review when a prisoner
challenges the Board’s calculation of his maximum sentence date based
upon subsequent criminal convictions).

Se ©

and reparole), the General Assembly set forth criteria to guide
the Board in exercising its discretion. See, ¢g., 61 Pa.C.S.
§ 6187(h)(1) (Setting forth, inter alia, that the Board must
consider the benefit to the inmate and the interests of the
Commonwealth when deciding whether to recommit a paroled
inmate).

In contrast to those provisions, however, Subsection
6138(a)(2.1) simply states that the Board “may, in its discre-
tion, award credit” without setting forth any criteria to guide
the Board in exercising its discretion. Thus, the Common-
wealth Court concluded that, under the plain language of
Subsection 6188(a)(2.1), there are no statutory standards by
which an appellate court can evaluate the Board’s decision to
grant or deny credit for time spent at liberty on parole.
Pittman, 181 A8d at 611 (citing Commonwealth v. Rieck
Investment Corp., 419 Pa, 52, 218 A.2d 277, 282 (1965) (“[Ilt is
not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a statute, a
requirement which the legislature did not see fit to include.”)),

The Commonwealth Court further determined that Appel-
lant’s reliance on its decision in Gillespie is misplaced. In
Gillespie, after the Department of Transportation requested a
continuance in a license suspension appeal, the trial court
denied the continuance based on its established policy of
continuing cases only when both parties agree to do so. 886
A.2d at 318-19, On appeal, the Commonwealth Court held that
the trial court abused its discretion because its “[b]lind adher-
ence to an established policy” did not constitute an exercise of
discretion at all. Id. at 819-20. Conversely, in this case, the
Commonwealth Court concluded that the Board did not shirk
its responsibility in deciding whether to grant Appellant credit
by adopting a blanket policy for CPVs. Rather, according to
the Commonwealth Court, the Board affirmatively chose to
deny Appellant credit after considering the record before it.
Accordingly, the court held that, by checking “No” on Appel-
lant’s hearing report form, the Board properly exercised its
broad discretion under Subsection 6188(a)(2.)8
8. Again, the majority did not focus on the Board’s statement during the

administrative review phase that Appellant “automatically forfeited”
credit as a CPV,

es

Turning to Appellant's argument that the Board was re-
quired to provide a statement of reasons for denying him
eredit, the Commonwealth Court held that Subsection
6188(a)(2.1) contains no such requirement. Again contrasting
Subsection 6188(a)(2.1) with portions of Section 6137 (relating
to the Board’s power to parole and reparole), which expressly
require that the Board provide a contemporaneous written
statement explaining its rationale for its parole decisions, the
Commonwealth Court determined that the General Assembly
did not intend to require the Board to issue a statement of
reasons as it relates to the Board’s decision to grant or deny
eredit for time spent at liberty on parole, Pittman, 181 A.3d at
613-14 (citing, inter alia, Fonner v. Shandon, Ine., 555 Pa.
370, 724 A.2d 908, 907 (1999) (“[W]here the legislature in-
cludes specific language in one section of the statute and
excludes it from another, the language should not be implied
where excluded.”) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Com-
monwealth Court found no error in the Board’s decision and
affirmed the denial of credit.

Then-President Judge Pellegrini authored a dissenting
opinion, which was joined by Judge Leavitt. In the dissent’s
view, Subsection 6188(a)(2.1) requires the Board to give a
reason as to how it exercised its discretion to grant or deny a
parolee credit against his original sentence for time spent at
liberty on parole, The dissent compared the failure of the
Board to provide such an explanation to a sentencing court’s
obligation to consider the factors set forth in Subsection
9721(b) of the Sentencing Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)
(setting forth general principles that sentencing courts must
consider when choosing among the available sentencing op-
tions); see also Commonwealth v. Artis, 294 Pa.Super. 276,
489 A.2d 1199, 1208 (1982) (“At the threshold, this court must
be able to determine that a sentencing judge in fact exercised
diseretion[,]”) (citations omitted).? The dissent would have

9. The majority, however, observed that Subsection 9721(b), unlike the
instant statute, expressly requires that the sentencing judge “make as
part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing,
a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed,” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

eS «

imposed a similar requirement here, opining that a one sen-
tence explanation for the Board’s denial of credit would be
sufficient. In the dissent’s view, a statement from the Board
indicating its reasoning for denying a CPV credit would, inter
alia, inform the parolee that the issue was considered by the
Board and that the Board has complied with the legislative
mandate to exercise its discretion. Moreover, the dissent noted
that, in denying Appellant administrative relief, the Board
indicated its erroneous belief that Appellant automatically
forfeited credit as a CPV." Thus, the dissent would have foun
that the Board committed both an error of law and an abuse of
its discretion under the Parole Code when it denied Appellant
credit for time spent at liberty on parole. Accordingly, the
dissent would have vacated the Board's decision and remanded
to the Board for reconsideration of Appellant’s request for
credit with an accompanying explanation for its decision.

This Court granted Appellant’s petition for allowance of
appeal to consider the following question: “Did the Parole
Board abuse its discretion by summarily denying [Appellant]
eredit against his maximum sentence for time that he spent at
liberty on parole following his recommitment as a convicte
parole violator?” Pittman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole, 685 Pa, 418, 187 A.3d 572 (2016).

It is unnecessary to explain in detail the parties’ arguments
to this Court, as both parties largely present the same sub-
stantive arguments that they presented to the Commonwealth
Court. Stated succinctly, Appellant contends that the Board

10. As noted supra, Section 6138 delineates between CPVs, who commit
crimes while on parole, and technical parole violators, who violate the
terms and conditions of parole. Prior to July 5, 2012, Section 6138
provided that technical parole violators received credit for time served
on parole, while CPVs were statutorily barred from receiving such
credit. However, the General Assembly amended Subsection 6138(a),
effective July 5, 2012, to allow CPVs to receive credit at the discretion
of the Board. The dissent below suggested that the Board’s statement
during its administrative review that Appellant automatically forfeited
credit was simply failure on its part to realize that the General Assem-
bly changed the law and that the Board, seemingly, mistakenly applied
the pre-2012 version of the statute. In response, the majority observed
that the dissent’s conclusion in this regard calls for speculation unsup-
ported by the record.

erred by denying him credit based upon its mistaken belief
that he automatically forfeited credit for time spent at liberty
on parole as a CPV. Thus, Appellant argues that the Board
abused its discretion by failing to exercise any discretion
whatsoever. Moreover, Appellant argues that the Board was
required to provide a statement of reasons explaining its
decision to deny him credit.

Adopting the posture of the Commonwealth Court majority,
the Board contends that the plain language of Subsection
6188(a)(2.1) demonstrates that: the Board has broad discre-
tion in deciding whether to grant a CPV credit; there are no
standards by which an appellate court can evaluate the
Board’s exercise of discretion; and the Board is not required
to provide a contemporaneous statement of reasons explaining
its decision.

Hl Im order to answer the question presented in this
appeal, we must interpret Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) of the Parole
Code. This Court’s interpretation of all statutes is guided by
the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.8. §§ 1501-1991. Pur-
suant to the Statutory Construction Act, the object of all
statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the Gen-
eral Assembly's intention. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When the
words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the
letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext
of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), Further, we observe
that issues of statutory interpretation present this Court with
questions of law; accordingly, the Court’s standard of review
is de novo, and its scope of review is plenary. See Pennsylva-
nia Pub. Util, Comm’n v. Andrew Seder/The Times Leader,
635 Pa. 570, 189 A.38d 165, 172 (2016).

With these standards in mind, we reiterate the crucial
statutory language at issue here, which provides as follows:

§ 6188. Violation of terms of parole

(a) Convicted Violators.—

() A parolee under the jurisdiction of the board released
from a correctional facility who, during the period of
parole or while delinquent on parole, commits a crime

a «

punishable by imprisonment, for which the parolee is
convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which
the parolee pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time
thereafter in a court of record, may at the discretion of
the board be recommitted as a parole violator.
(2) If the parolee’s recommitment is so ordered, the
parolee shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the
term which the parolee would have been compelled to
serve had the parole not been granted and, except as
provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be given no credit
for the time at liberty on parole.
(2.1) The board may, in its discretion, award credit to a
parolee recommitted under paragraph (2) for the time
spent at liberty on parole, unless any of the following
apply:
(i) The crime committed during the period of parole or
while delinquent on parole is a crime of violence as
defined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g) (relating to sentences
for second and subsequent offenses) or a crime requir-
ing registration under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 97 Subch. H
(relating to registration of sexual offenders).
(ii) The parolee was recommitted under section 6143
(relating to early parole of inmates subject to Federal
removal order).
61 Pa.C.S, § 6138 (footnote omitted),

HM As an initial matter, we hold that Subsection
6188(a)(2.1) clearly and unambiguously grants the Board dis-
cretion to award credit to a CPV recommitted to serve the
remainder of his sentence, except when the CPV is recommit-
ted for the reasons stated in Subsections 6188(a)(2.1)() and
i). In this case, Appellant was not recommitted for reasons
enumerated in Subsections 6138(a)(2.1)(@) and (ii). Thus, con-
trary to the Board’s proffered rationale during the administra-
tive review phase that CPVs automatically forfeit credit, the
Board unquestionably had the discretion to grant Appellant
credit if it so desired. Accordingly, based upon the record
before us, the Board abused its discretion under Subsection

2
6188(a)(2.1) by concluding that it had no discretion and, consis-
tent therewith, denied Appellant credit without conducting any
individual assessment of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding his parole revocation. See Zappala v. Brandolini
Property Management, Inc., 589 Pa. 516, 909 A.2d 1272, 1284
(2006) (“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but occurs only where the law is overridden or
misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreason-
able, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as
shown by the evidence or the record.”) (citation omitted).

Wl However, our analysis does not end here. Having
concluded that the Board erred in finding that Appellant
forfeited his right to credit as a CPV, we turn to whether
Subsection 6188(a)(2.1) requires the Board to articulate a basis
for its decision, an issue for which there was sharp disagree-
ment in the Commonwealth Court. Initially, we recognize that
the Board has the broadest of discretion over many decisions
regarding parolees and that the Board’s description of the
statute is accurate in so far as there is no explicit requirement
that the Board must provide a contemporaneous statement
explaining its decision in Subsection 6188(a)(2.1). However,
Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution grants all
persons the right to appeal from an administrative agency to a
court of record, Pa. Const. Art. 5, § 9 (“... there shall also be
aright of appeal from a court of record or from an administra-
tive agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the
selection of such court to be as provided by lawf,]”), This is
consistent with inherent notions of due process. To the extent
Appellant has a right to appeal, an appellate court hearing the
matter must have method to assess the Board’s exercise of
discretion. Accordingly, we hold that the Board must articu-
late the basis for its decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for
time served at liberty on parole,

The Commonwealth Court below determined that, while it
had statutory jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision,
simply checking “No” on a standard hearing form constitutes
a proper exercise of the Board’s discretion because Subsection
6138(a)(2.1) does not set forth specific statutory guidelines or

a

include an express requirement of a contemporaneous state-
ment. Its holding, however, renders appellate review a mere
empty formality as, under this view of Subsection 6138(a)(2.1),
any decision by the Board must be affirmed, even if the Board
acts arbitrarily or, as here, misinterprets and misapplies the
law." As said, this comports neither with the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s grant of review by a court of record, nor with
basic notions of due process. Accordingly, contrary to the
Board’s position, and the majority below, we conclude that the
General Assembly did not intend to allow the Board’s deci-
sions pursuant to Subsection 6188(a)(2.1) to evade all appellate
review and to insulate the Board’s decisions from reversal
when it enacted Subsection 6188(a)(2.1).

Indeed, this case is a prime example of why a contempora-
neous statement is necessary. As noted, had the Board not
stated during the administrative review phase that it denied
Appellant credit because he “automatically forfeited” credit as
a CPV, we would not know that its reason for denying him
credit was improper. Therefore, in order to effectuate the
dictates of the Pennsylvania Constitution, to honor the basic¢
notions of due process, and to comport with the intent of the
General Assembly in enacting Subsection 6188(a)(2.1), we hold
that the Board must provide a contemporaneous statement
explaining its reason for denying a CPV credit for time spent
at liberty on parole.”

For the reasons set forth above, we find that the Board
abused its discretion when it denied Appellant credit for time
spent at liberty on parole based upon its incorrect belief that
all CPVs automatically forfeit credit under Subsection
6188(a)(2.1). Accordingly, we vacate the Commonwealth
11. Here, such misapplication was only revealed once Appellant filed for

administrative review and the Board, at that juncture, stated the basis
for its denial.

12. Our ruling in this regard should not be read as limiting the Board’s
broad discretion over decisions affecting parolees, including whether to
grant credit to CPVs. Moreover, as was noted by the dissent below, the
reason the Board gives does not have to be extensive and a single
sentence explanation is likely sufficient in most instances.

ee
Court’s order, vacate the decision of the Board, and remand to
the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justices Todd, Donohue and Dougherty join the opinion.

Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion in which
Justice Todd joins.

Justice Mundy files a concurring and dissenting opinion in
which Justice Wecht joins.

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR, Concurring

I join the majority’s holding that the Board erred in its
failure to exercise discretion in addressing the matter of
credit, as well as the associated reasoning.

As to the requirement of a “contemporaneous statement”
from the Board explaining the reasons for its decision, Majori-
ty Opinion, at 52-53, 159 A.3d at 474-75, I note that this Court
has concluded that parole revocation determinations are sub-
ject to the Administrative Agency Law. See Goods v. PBPP,
590 Pa. 182, 142, 912 A2d 226, 232-88 (2006).! As relevant
here, such enactment requires that “[alll adjudications of a
Commonwealth agency shall be in writing [and] shall contain
findings and the reasons for the adjudication ....” 2 Pa.C.S.
§ 507. My only potential difference with the majority opinion
lies in the extent to which the opinion may be read to diverge

1. I observe that the definition of “adjudication,” for purposes of the
Administrative Agency Law, does not apply, at least by its own terms, to
parole-related orders. See 2 Pa.C.S. § 101. While unfortunately Goods
does not address this definition, the salutary effect of the decision is to
reconcile the treatment of decisions of the Board that implicate a
constitutionally guaranteed right of direct appellate review with the
treatment generally afforded under the Administrative Agency Law,
thus establishing the procedural framework supporting meaningful
judicial review,

Parenthetically, and as the majority explains, there are a wide range of
the Board’s decisions that do not implicate a constitutionally guaran-
teed appeal right. See Goods, 590 Pa. at 142, 912 A.2d at 232 (citing
Rogers v. PBPP, 555 Pa. 285, 292-93, 724 A.2d 319, 322-23 (1999)
(holding that routine parole denial decisions do not affect an existing
enjoyment of liberty and, thus, do not implicate a constitutionally
guaranteed right of appellate review)). Notably, the Court has not
channeled such decisions into the Administrative Agency Law. See id.

Se

from this statutory requirement concerning the timing and/or
content of written explanations by the Board.

Justice Todd joins this concurring opinion.

JUSTICE MUNDY, Concurring and Dissenting

I join the Majority’s conclusion that in this case the Penn-
sylvania Board of Probation and Parole abused its discretion
by failing to consider whether to grant Appellant, a convicted
parole violator (CPV), credit for time spent at liberty on
parole pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S. § 6188(a)@.1). However, be-
cause I do not agree that the Board must now, in all cases,
provide a contemporaneous written statement explaining its
rationale for denying a CPV credit for time spent at liberty on
parole, I dissent.

In the instant case, the Board erroneously failed to exercise
its discretion when it denied Appellant credit for time served
on parole based on its belief he was automatically precluded as
aresult of his status as a CPV under Subsection 6188(a). The
Board’s error was brought to light in its written response to
Appellant’s petition for administrative review filed pursuant to
87 Pa. Code § 78.1(b). Section 73.1 requires the Board, follow-
ing a timely administrative appeal by a prisoner, to provide a
response for the Board’s denial of credit for time served.
Section 78.1 provides:

(b) Petitions for administrative review.

(1) A parolee, by counsel unless unrepresented, may petition
for administrative review under this subsection of determi-
nations relating to revocation decisions which are not other-
wise appealable under subsection (a). Petitions for adminis-
trative review shall be received at the Board’s Central
Office within 30 days of the mailing date of the Board’s
determination. When a timely petition has been filed, the
determination will not be deemed final for purposes of
appeal to a court until the Board has mailed its response to
the petition for administrative review. This subsection su-
persedes 1 Pa.Code § 35.226.

:
87 Pa, Code § 73.1(b)(1). As the Majority also states, a
prisoner may then exercise a statutory right to appeal the
Board’s administrative review to the Commonwealth Court.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 763; Maj. Op. at 45-46, n. 7, 159 A.3d at 470,
n7

Herein, the Commonwealth Court, in an en banc opinion,
affirmed the Board’s decision, determining that the Board had
exercised its discretion by checking “No” on Appellant’s parole
hearing review form. Pittman v. Pennsylvania Board of Pro-
bation and Parole, 131 A.3d 604, 616 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), The
Commonwealth Court majority essentially disregarded the
Board’s response to Appellant’s petition for administrative
review, where the Board admitted to exercising no discretion
by following a misguided belief that Appellant was automati-
eally precluded from receiving any credit for the time he spent
on parole. Therefore, I agree with the Majority that the
Commonwealth Court erred in concluding the Board did not
abuse its discretion by determining Appellant automatically
forfeited credit for time served on parole. Accordingly, for the
reasons set forth in the Majority Opinion, I agree that the
Commonwealth Court’s order must be vacated, the Board’s
decision vacated, and the matter should be remanded for the
Board to exercise its discretion and determine whether Appel-
lant should be granted credit for the time he spent on parole.

However, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that
Subsection 6188(a)(2.1), of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S.
§ 6188(a)(2.1), requires the Board to provide a contemporane-
ous statement explaining its rationale for denying a CPV
credit for time spent at liberty on parole. Hence, I dissent. On
appeal, the Board maintains its position that under the plain
language of Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) it is not required to pro-
vide a written statement of its reasons for denying credit.
Further, the Commonwealth Court in its opinion reached this
same conclusion by looking to the statutory language of Sub-
section 6188(a)(2.1). Finally, the Majority concedes “the
Board’s description of the statute is accurate in so far as there
is no explicit requirement that the Board must provide a
contemporaneous statement explaining its decision in Subsec-
tion 6188(a)(2.1).” Maj. Op. at 52, 159 A.3d at 474, Therefore,
there is a consensus that the statutory language of Subsection

Se

6138(a)(2.1) does not support requiring the Board to issue a
written statement.

Nevertheless, the Majority now requires, based on the
necessity of creating a reviewable record for the Common-
wealth Court following a denial of a prisoner’s administrative
appeal that a written statement be issued contemporaneously
with the Board’s initial decision. Because a mechanism for
explaining and reviewing the Board’s exercise of discretion
already exists via the Board’s response to an appellant’s
petition for administrative review, I cannot agree with the
addition of a requirement unsupported by the statutory lan-
guage of Subsection 6188(a)(2.1).

Upon receiving notice that the Board has denied credit for
time spent at liberty on parole, a prisoner may file an adminis-
trative appeal to the Board. Subsection 73.1(b), as discussed
above, requires the Board to issue a response to a prisoner’s
timely filed petition for administrative review. A prisoner may
then exercise the right to file an appeal with the Common-
wealth Court. Following this established procedure for appel-
late review, the Board’s error presented itself in the Board’s
response to Appellant’s petition for administrative review, and
was properly before the Commonwealth Court for correction?
In my opinion, this review process is the appropriate vehicle
for reviewing the Board’s determinations. Therefore, I do not
agree that the error in this case requires this Court to insert
new language into Section 6188(a)(2.1) to require the Board to
1, In the instant matter Appellant was advised of this procedure in the
Board’s “Notice of Decision” letter which stated the following.
If you wish to appeal this decision, you must file a request for
administrative relief with the Board within thirty [days] of this order.
This request shall set forth specifically the factual and legal basis for
the allegations, See 37 PA Code 73. You have the right to an attorney
in this appeal and in any subsequent appeal to the Commonwealth
Court.

Notice of Decision Letter, 11/22/13.

2. The circumstances of this case illustrate the question of what consti-
tutes an exercise of discretion was ambiguous, However, this Court's
opinion clarifies that a complete failure to exercise statutory discretion
is itself an abuse of discretion, and the Board, and the Commonwealth
Court, are now informed that the Board must exercise its discretion
pursuant to Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) in every case,

Se
state in writing its specific reasons for denying credit at the
time of the initial decision.

As a final matter, the Board may wish to revise its parole
hearing report form to include two separate areas to check,
one to determine if a parolee is automatically precluded from
receiving credit for time spent at liberty on parole, and a
second to state “yes” or “no” if the Board has discretion on
whether it has granted credit for time served. Further, the
Board certainly has the opportunity to indicate at the time it
determines whether to award credit, the basis for exercising
its discretion to deny credit. Nevertheless, imposing a require-
ment that the Board must now articulate a written reason in
all cases is an extreme remedy, and outside the plain language
of the statute.

Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.

Justice Wecht joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.

159 A.3d 478

Jean Louise VILLANI, Individually and in her Capacity
as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Guerino Villani, Deceased

Vv
John SEIBERT, Jr. and Mary Seibert
Frederick John Seibert, Jr. and Mary Seibert

ve
Jean Louise Villani and Thomas D, Schneider, Esquire
Appeal of: Frederick John Seibert, Jr. and Mary Seibert

No. 66 MAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
ARGUED: December 6, 2016
DECIDED: April 26, 2017

g

Jeffrey B. Albert, Hsq., for Nicholas 0, Brown, Amicus
Curiae,

Anthony Salvatore Cottone, Esq., Burns White, LLC, for
The Professional Liability Defense Federation, Amicus Curiae,

H, Robert Fiebach, Esq., Cozen O’Connor, for Pennsylvania
Bar Ass’n, Amicus Curiae.

Bruce Richard Beemer, Eisq., PA Office of Attorney Gener-
al, Joshua D, Shapiro, Esq., for Attorney General’s Office,
Participants.

Peter Michael Newman, Esq., Mark William Tanner, Esq.,
Feldman Shepherd Wohlgelemter Tanner Weinstock & Dodig
LLP, for Mary Seibert and Frederic John Seibert, Jr., Appel-
lants,

Guy Anthony Donatelli, Esq., Lamb McErlane, PC, for Jean
Louise Villiani, Appellee.

=  -°

Paul Christopher Troy, Esq., Kane, Pugh, Knoell, Troy &
Kramer, L.L.P., for Thomas D. Schneider, Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

In this interlocutory direct appeal by permission, we consid-
er whether a legislative enactment recognizing a cause of
action for wrongful use of civil proceedings infringes upon this
Court’s constitutionally prescribed power to regulate the prac-
tice of law, insofar as such wrongful-use actions may be
advanced against attorneys.

The underlying litigation arose out of a land-ownership
dispute between Jean Louse Villani, who was a co-plaintiff
with her late husband until his death, and defendants John
Seibert, Jr. and his mother, Mary Seibert (“Appellants”).
Appellants prevailed in both an initial quiet title action and
ensuing ejectment proceedings. During the course of this
dispute, the Villanis were represented by Thomas D. Schneid-
er, Esquire (“Appellee”),

Subsequently, Appellants notified Mrs. Villani and Appellee
that they intended to pursue a lawsuit for wrongful use of civil
proceedings based upon Mrs. Villani’s and Appellee’s invoca-
tion of the judicial process to raise purportedly groundless
claims. In November 2012, Mrs. Villani countered by com-
mencing her own action seeking a judicial declaration vindicat-
ing her position that she did nothing wrong and bore no
liability to Appellants. Appellants proceeded, as they had
advised that they would do, to file a complaint naming Ms.
Villani and Appellee as defendants. The declaratory judgment
complaint having been lodged in Chester County, but the
ensuing wrongful-use action being filed in Philadelphia, a
decision was made to coordinate the matters in the Chester
County court.

_ —_—

Appellee interposed preliminary objections to Appellants’
complaint. As is relevant here, he contended that the statutory
scheme embodying a cause of action for wrongful use of civil
proceedings, commonly referred to as the “Dragonetti Act,” is
unconstitutional.” Appellee relied on Article V, Section 10(c) of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, which invests in this Court the
power to prescribe general rules “governing practice, proce-
dure and the conduct of all courts,” as well as “admission to
the bar and to practice law,” while directing that “[a]ll laws
shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent
with rules prescribed under these provisions.” Pa. Const. art,
V, § 10(c). He also stressed that this Court has characterized
its constitutional and inherent powers to supervise the conduct
of lawyers as being exclusive. See, ¢g., Pa.R.D.E. 103; Com-
monwealth v, Stern, 549 Pa, 505, 510, 701 A.2d 568, 570 (1997).

Centrally, Appellee portrayed the Dragonetti Act as an
unconstitutional incursion by the General Assembly upon the
Court’s power under Article V, Section 10(c). Given this as-
serted defect, he claimed that attorneys should be immunized
from any liability under these statutory provisions. In support,
Appellee referenced a series of cases in which this Court had
stricken legislative enactments on the basis that those statutes
intruded on the Court’s constitutionally prescribed powers.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Preliminary Objec-
tions in Seibert v. Villani (“Defendant’s Memorandum”), No.
2012-09795 (C.P. Chester), at 7-9 (citing Beyers v. Richmond,

1. Act of Dec, 19, 1980, P.L, 1296, No, 232 (codified at 42 Pa.C.S.
8§ 8351-8354) (the ‘“Dragonetti Act” or the ‘‘Act’’).
Notably, Appellants had not specifically referenced the Dragonetti Act
in their complaint. As the proceedings have developed, however, it has
become clear that Appellants are relying upon the enactment.

2. The record reflects that Appellee served a copy of the preliminary
objections upon the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, as is required in
instances in which “an Act of Assembly is alleged to be unconstitution-
al” by a civil litigant. Pa.R.C.P. No. 235, The Attorney General, howev-
er, apparently did not seek to intervene as a party or otherwise make a
presentation in defense of the legislative enactment, as would be expect-
ed ordinarily. See 71 P.S. § 732-204(a)(3) (“It shall be the duty of the
Attorney General to uphold and defend the constitutionality of all
statutes so as to prevent their suspension or abrogation in the absence
of a controlling decision by a court of competent jurisdiction.”),

=

594 Pa, 654, 987 A.2d 1082 (2007) (plurality), Shaulis v. Pa.
State Ethics Comm’n, 574 Pa. 680, 888 A.2d 123 (2008),
Gmerek v. State Ethics Comm’n, 569 Pa. 579, 807 A.2d 812
(2002) (equally divided Court), Stern, 549 Pa. 505, 701 A.2d
568, Snyder v. UCBR, 509 Pa. 488, 502 A.2d 1282 (1985),
Wajert v. State Ethics Comm’n, 491 Pa. 255, 420 A.2d 439
(1980), and In re Splane, 128 Pa. 527, 16 A. 481 (1889)).

Appellee also observed that, in defining the contours of
liability for wrongful use of civil proceedings, the Legislature
fashioned a “probable cause” standard that permits a lawyer
acting in good faith to proceed with litigation, where he or she
“reasonably believes that under [the supporting] facts the
claim may be valid under the existing or developing law.” 42
Pa.C.8. § 8852(1). According to Appellee, however, such pre-
scription clashes with the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct promulgated by this Court, which authorize attorneys
to advance good faith arguments for “extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.” Pa.R.P.C. § 3.1 (emphasis added).
It was his position that the asserted difference “surely repre-
sents an intrusion by the legislature into the exclusive power
of the judiciary that is prohibited under Article V, Section
10(c).” Defendant’s Memorandum at 11.

Furthermore, Appellee took issue with the Dragonetti Act’s
incorporation of subjective standards. See, @9., 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8352(8) (defining another contour of “probable cause” as
encompassing a good-faith belief that litigation “is not intend-
ed to merely harass or maliciously injure the opposite party”).
He contrasted such subjectivity with the more objective litmus
established under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1. Pa.R.P.C.
8.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.” (emphasis added)), Appellee opined that the
statute’s focus on subjective motivation “means, as a practical
matter, that summary disposition is exceedingly difficult.”
Defendant’s Memorandum at 12. He concluded that, “[o]nce
again, the legislature violates Article V, section 10(c) by

“ a
purporting to regulate attorney conduct through different
standards than those selected by the Supreme Court.” Jd.

In a similar line of argument, Appellee claimed that the
Act’s prescription for monetary damages should be viewed as
a further intrusion into this Court’s exclusive province. In this
regard, Appellee explained that the Rules of Disciplinary
Enforcement, also promulgated by this Court, establish the
procedures for addressing violations of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, encompassing all stages from the investigation
of an allegation of inappropriate conduct to the final disposi-
tion of a complaint by this Court, as well as delineating all
available forms of discipline. See Pa.R.D.E. 204-208. Appellee
commented that: “Nowhere do the disciplinary rules permit
an opposing party to seek monetary damages from an attor-
ney.” Defendant’s Memorandum at 12. According to Appellee,
the only tribunal authorized to address any and all grievances
against attorneys is the Disciplinary Board, which functions
under the Supreme Court’s oversight. See id. (citing Pa.
R.D.E, 205-207). “In short,” he proclaimed, “the concept of a
lawsuit against an attorney for money damages based on his
conduct in a civil case is repugnant to Article V, section 10(c).”
Defendant’s Memorandum at 13; accord id. (“It is for the
judiciary to sanction attorneys for bringing an action that is
purportedly baseless or for engaging in other inappropriate
conduct”),

In response, Appellants defended the Dragonetti Act as
substantive remedial legislation designed, for the benefit of
victims, to redress wrongs committed by those pursuing frivo-
lous litigation. Appellants explained that it has long been the
law of the Commonwealth that a lawyer may be liable for
tortious conduct committed in his professional capacity. See
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Preliminary
Objections in Seibert, No. 2012-09795 (“Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum”), at 5 (citing Adelman v, Rosenbaum, 133 Pa.Super. 386,
891-92, 3 A.2d 15, 18 (1938), for the proposition that the
defendant in a common law action for malicious use of process
“cannot invoke the plea of privilege as an attorney acting for a
client” because “malicious action is not sheltered by any

—

privilege”); accord Dietrich Indus. Inc. v. Abrams, 309
Pa.Super. 202, 208, 455 A.2d 119, 128 (1982) (“An attorney who
knowingly prosecutes a groundless action to accomplish a
malicious purpose may be held accountable in an action for
malicious use of process.”).>

Appellants further offered that the Dragonetti Act was
fashioned after Section 674 of the Second Restatement of
Torts, which indicates as follows:

One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation

or procurement of civil proceedings against another is sub-

ject to liability to the other for wrongful civil proceedings if

(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a

purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication

of the claim in which the proceedings are based, and

(b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have

terminated in favor of the person against whom they are

brought.

RESTATEMENT (Szconp) Or Torts § 674 (1977). Moreover, Ap-
pellants alluded to comment d to Section 674, which provides:
If [an] attorney acts without probable cause for belief in the
possibility that [a] claim will succeed, and for an improper

3. Parenthetically, Pennsylvania courts recognize a distinction between
the common law torts of abuse of process and malicious use of process.
See Dietrich Indus., 309 Pa.Super. at 206-07, 455 A.2d at 122. See
generally Russet J. Davis, 2 Summ. Pa. Jur 2D Torts § 19.1 (2017) (“An
abuse of process, either civil or criminal, arises where a party employs
it for some unlawful object rather than for the purpose that the law
intends it to effect; in other words, a perversion thereof, in distinction
from malicious use of process, either civil or criminal, wherein the
tortfeasor intends that the process have its proper effect and execution
although it is wrongfully instituted.” (footnotes omitted)), Some other
courts, however, have found the distinction between the two torts to be
confounding and cumbersome and, accordingly, have combined them.
See, e.g., Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92, 344 S,.E.2d 414, 417-18 (1986),
superseded by statute as recognized in Great W. Bank v. Se. Bank, 234
Ga.App. 420, 507 S.E,2d 191, 192-93 (1999), Indeed, the Dragonetti Act
may be regarded as encompassing aspects of both common law torts,
given that, under its definition of “probable cause” which will support
the legitimate procurement, initiation, or continuation of civil proceed-
ings, such cause is lacking either in the absence of a reasonable belief
that the claim may be valid, see 42 Pa.C.S, § 8352(1), or without an
attorney’s good faith belief that the cause is not intended merely to
harass or injure the opposing party, see id. § 8352(3),

—

purpose, as, for example, to put pressure upon the person
proceeded against in order to compel payment of another
claim of his own or solely to harass the person proceeded
against by bringing a claim known to be invalid, he is
subject to the same liability as any other person.

Id., cmt. d.

Appellants noted that the Superior Court had repeatedly
cited and adopted Section 674 and referenced comment d
relative to actions brought against attorneys, see Plaintiffs’
Memorandum at 6 (citing Gentzler v. Atlee, 443 Pa.Super. 128,
185 n.6, 660 A.2d 1878, 1882 n.6 (1995), Meiksin v. Howard
Hanna Co., 404 Pa.Super. 417, 420-21, 590 A.2d 1308, 1805
(1991), and Shaffer v. Stewart, 326 Pa.Super. 135, 140-43, 473
A.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1984)), and that no appellate court had
ever concluded that the Dragonetti Act is unconstitutional.
Additionally, they asserted that “[t]he fact that the common
law claim for wrongful use of civil process was codified in 1980
does not render the claim unconstitutional.” Id. at 8. Accord-
ing to Appellants, none of the cases cited by Appellee in which
this Court had declared other statutes to be unconstitutional
bore any relevance, since none pertained to the prescription
for substantive redress for victims considering the harm
caused by a lawyer’s tortious conduct.

Appellants also differed with Appellee’s depiction of the
legislative purpose underlying the Act as being to regulate the
practice of law. Rather, they contended that the primary
objective was to codify the common law cause of action for
malicious prosecution, while adjusting it to eliminate the re-
quirement of seizure or arrest and substitute gross negligence
for malice as a liability threshold. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum
at 7 (citing Nw. Nat? Cas. Co. v. Century III Chevrolet, Inc.,
863 F.Supp. 247, 250 (W.D. Pa. 1994)); accord Walasavage v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 806 F.2d 465, 467 (8d Cir. 1986). See
generally 42 Pa.C.S. § 8851(b) (“The arrest or seizure of the
person or property of the plaintiff shall not be a necessary
element for an action brought pursuant to this subchapter.”).

— «

According to Appellants’ position as stated from the outset,
the Dragonetti Act does not conflict with Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.1, which was never intended to govern civil liability
or otherwise grant or curtail remedies to third parties harmed
by an attorney's tortious conduct. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum
at 7-8 (citing the Scope provision from the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct for the propositions that “violation of a Rule
should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer
nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a
legal duty has been breached” and that the rules “are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability”). Along these lines,
Appellants also referenced Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper,
Hamilton & Scheetz, 529 Pa. 241, 602 A.2d 1277 (1992), in
which this Court chastised the Superior Court for “badly
confus[ing] the relationship between duties under the rules of
ethics and legal rules that create actionable liability apart
from the rules of ethics.” Id. at 255, 602 A.2d at 1284 (empha-
sis added). In light of this essential distinction between ethical
regulation and substantive remedial laws, Appellants main-
tained that the Dragonetti Act “supplements, but does not
interfere with, the operation of those rules.” Plaintiffs’ Memo-
randum at 8,

The common pleas court granted Appellee’s preliminary
objections grounded on his constitutional challenge to the
Dragonetti Act, for essentially the reasons that he had ad-
vanced. Citing to decisions that Appellee had referenced in
which this Court has suspended statutes per its Article V,
Section 10(c) powers, the county court observed that the
“Supreme Court has long asserted its authority over the
conduct of attorneys.” Villani, No. 2012-09795, op. at 4 nt
(C.P. Chester Aug. 27, 2015). The court further reasoned that
the “Dragonetti Act goes to the heart of what an attorney is
trained and called upon to do, exercise legal judgment about
the existence of probable cause under the law as it presently
exists or is developing.” Jd. at 5 n.1. In this regard, the court
of common pleas credited the position that the Act conflicts
with Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 by adopting a more
restrictive standard and in grounding liability upon subjective

* _
beliefs. See id. (“[Tyhe legislature violates Art. V, § 10(c) of
the Pennsylvania Constitution by attempting to regulate attor-
ney conduct through standards other than those selected by
the Supreme Court.”), Additionally, the court agreed with
Appellee that the imposition of monetary damages under the
Act, see 42 Pa.C.S, § 8853, represented a further transgres-
sion, since no disciplinary rule promulgated by this Court so
provides. The court of common pleas concluded, again, essen-
tially echoing Appellee’s arguments:
The only tribunal authorized by the Supreme Court to
address grievances against an attorney is the Disciplinary
Board. Pa.R.D.E. 205. The concept of a lawsuit against an
attorney for money damages based on how a civil case is
conducted is repugnant to the system of discipline estab-
lished by the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. V, § 10(c) of
the Pennsylvania Constitution.
eR OH

For the reasons stated, the Dragonetti Act is a legislative
attempt to intrude upon the Supreme Court’s exclusive
authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys in the prac-
tice of law. It is for the judiciary to sanction lawyers for
bringing actions that are baseless or for otherwise engaging
in inappropriate conduct. The Dragonetti Act, as it pertains
to lawyers, is unconstitutional and unenforceable.

Id. at 6-7 n.1,

Hl Appellants sought permission to appeal on an interloc-
utory basis,' initially in the Superior Court, which was granted
after the proceedings were transferred to this Court. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 722(7) (vesting exclusive original appellate jurisdic-
tion in the Supreme Court over a final order holding a
Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional), Our review of a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a duly enacted statute is
plenary. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 632 Pa, 36, 49,
117 A.3d 247, 255 (2015).

4, The claim against Mrs. Villani remained to be resolved in the com-
mon pleas court.

= -°

Presently, Appellants maintain their core contention that
the Dragonetti Act constitutes a substantive remedial law
designed to provide an essential remedy to third parties
harmed by abusive litigation, and not a misguided effort by
the General Assembly to usurp this Court’s regulatory power
over attorneys.

Appellants supplement this position with a number of obser-
vations and arguments that they did not specifically present to
the county court. In addition to referencing cases from the
Superior Court, Appellants relate that this Court has acknowl-
edged the Dragonetti Act on several occasions. See Brief for
Appellants at 28 (citing Stone Crushed P’ship v. Kassab
Archbold Jackson & O’Brien, 589 Pa. 296, 299 n.1, 908 A.2d
875, 877 n.1 (2006), and McNeil v. Jordan, 586 Pa. 413, 488-39,
894 A.2d 1260, 1275 (2006)). In the McNeil decision, Appel-
lants elaborate, this Court found that the Dragonetti Act
served as a useful aid in interpreting the Rules of Civil
Procedure governing pre-complaint discovery. See McNeil,
586 Pa. at 438-89, 894 A.2d at 1275. From this, Appellants
draw the conclusion that “the Dragonetti Act comports entire-
ly with the duty of the litigant, whether party or attorney, to
demonstrate good faith and probable cause ‘in the procure-
ment, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings’ and to
conduct discovery in conformity with these basic principles.”
Brief for Appellants at 26-27 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 8851(a));
see also id. at 27 (“In other words, this Court has extolled the
Dragonetti Act, which codified centuries of common law, as a
necessary and appropriate basis for relief for victims of abu-
sive litigation conduct.”).

Next, Appellants explain that this Court previously consid-
ered the constitutionality of a segment of the Dragonetti Act,
at least, when it suspended its provision for attorney certifica-
tions and civil penalties for violations. See Pa.R.C.P, No.
1028.1(e) (reflecting the suspension of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8855).
According to Appellants, by suspending Section 8355, while
leaving intact the remaining sections of the Act, this Court
“tacitly endorsed Sections 8851 through 8854 as constitution-
al.” Brief for Appellants at 28, Appellants also highlight the

_—

explanatory note to Rule 1028.1, referencing the Act as provid-
ing “additional relief from dilatory or frivolous proceedings.”
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028.1, Note; see Brief for Appellants at 29
(“The explanatory comment to Rule of Civil Procedure 1023.1,
which refers directly to the Dragonetti Act as a viable cause of
action, is further evidence that the Supreme Court has for
several decades approved of the Dragonetti Act as a supple-
mental remedy for victims of frivolous civil proceedings.”),

Appellants additionally argue that Rule 1023.1 sanctions do
not adequately compensate the victims of frivolous claims. In
this regard, Appellants quote Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799
A.2d 776 (Pa. Super. 2002), as follows:

[The Dragonetti Act defendant] argues] that [the plaintiff's]

interests would be vindicated adequately via sanctions im-

posed by the federal district court. However, the damages

[the plaintiff] seeks are distinct from the various types of

penalties that may be imposed by a court as sanctions

against a tortfeasor. Sanctions, including monetary sanc-
tions paid to an adversary in the form of fees or costs,
address the interests of the court and not those of the
individual. A litigant cannot rely on a sanction motion to
seek compensation for every injury that the sanctionable
conduct produces, Rather, an injured party must request
tort damages to protect his personal interest in being free
from unreasonable interference with his person and proper-
ty.

eke

The main objective of Rule 11 is not to reward parties who

are victimized by litigation; it is to deter baseless filings

and curb abuses. While imposing monetary sanctions under

Rule 11 may confer a financial benefit on a victimized

litigant, this is merely an incidental effect on the substantive

rights thereby implicated. Simply put, Rule 11 sanctions

eannot include consequential damages and thus are not a

substitute for tort damages. In light of the foregoing, we

conclude that [the plaintiff’s] right to seek tort damages for
his alleged injuries exists independently of, and in addition

= °

to, any rights he might possess to petition for sanctions
from the federal district court ....

Id. at 784-85 (citations omitted); accord Perelman v. Perel-
man, 125 A.3d 1259, 1269-72 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Appellants further take issue with the distinction drawn by
the common pleas court and Appellee between the Dragonetti
Act’s probable cause requirement and the standard set forth
in Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1. In this regard, Appellants
again cite McNeil as clarifying that “the term ‘probable cause’
is sufficiently well defined and understood in Pennsylvania law
to ensure an objective, unified standard ....” McNeil, 586 Pa.
at 438, 894 A.2d at 1275. Furthermore, Appellants explain that
in the decades throughout which the Dragonetti Act has been
in existence, no Pennsylvania appellate court has ever inter-
preted the enactment to require that the term “developing
law,” as it appears in the enumeration of the probable cause
standard set forth in Section 8352(1), should not include an
argument for extension, modification or reversal of exiting
law. See Brief for Appellants at 34 (“What, after all, is a
‘developing law’ if not a law that is the subject of legal
argument and debate, including debate over the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law?”).

In terms of the subjective-objective distinction drawn by the
county court and Appellee, Appellants asserts that this rests
on a misinterpretation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1,
which recognizes the necessity of “good faith” in argumenta-
tion, Pa.R.P.C. 3.1. Appellants also posit:

Whether charged with a violation of [Rule] 3.1 or a violation
of the Dragonetti Act, an attorney would defend with the
same evidence upon which the attorney based his or her
good faith belief that there was a basis in law and fact to
bring or defend the underlying civil proceeding. In either
case, the finder of fact would be charged with determining
whether the lawyer’s belief was objectively reasonable, i.¢.,
whether the lawyer had acted in good faith by relying upon
creditable facts and a non-frivolous legal argument for
purposes of probable cause to pursue a claim.

® Se

Brief for Appellants at 35. In this line of argument, Appellants
note that the governing standards, as they have developed in
the decisional law, are highly deferential relative to attorney
judgment. See, ag., Perelman, 125 A.8d at 1264 (“Insofar as
attorney liability is concerned, ‘as long as an attorney believes
that there is a slight chance that his client’s claims will be
successful, it ig not the attorney's duty to prejudice the case,’ ”
(quoting Morris v. DiPaolo, 980 A.2d 500, 505 (Pa. Super.
2007). To the degree that an assessment of a lawyer’s beliefs
is necessary, Appellants do not agree with the common pleas
court and Appellee that this unnecessarily complicates the
summary judgment process.

Appellants also relate that there are other legislative reme-
dial schemes that operate to authorize compensation to victims
of wrongful, injurious acts committed by attorneys. For exam-
ple, Appellants reference the Loan Interest and Protection
Law,® which imposes civil liability for collection of interest or
charges in excess of those otherwise permitted under the
enactment. See 41 P.S. § 502. They indicate that this Court
recently confirmed, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
that attorneys are not excluded from the category of persons
subject to liability under the act. See Glover v. Udren Law
Offices, P.C., 685 Pa. 620, 629, 189 A.8d 195, 200 (2016).
Appellants draw supportive significance from the absence of
any mention, in Glover, of a conflict between the enactment
under review and Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.

Finally, Appellants explain that this Court previously has
rejected constitutional challenges to other statutes that impose
ethical and professional requirements upon groups that in-
clude attorneys. See Maunus v. State Ethics Comm’n, 618 Pa.
592, 544 A.2d 1324 (1988) (disapproving an attack upon an
Ethics Act requirement for all employees of the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board, which included attorney-employees, to
file statements of financial interest), Appellants highlight the
Maunus Court’s observations that: the challenged enactment
was not targeted solely at lawyers; the statute did not impose

5. Act of Jan, 30, 1974, P.L, 13, No, 6 (as amended 41 P.S, §§ 101-605).

= °

a duty upon every attorney admitted to practice law in the
Commonwealth; and the duty imposed was not inconsistent
with the professional and ethical obligations arising from
directives of this Court. See id. at 600, 544 A.2d at 1828.
Indeed, responding to the assertions of the county court and
Appellee that the imposition of civil liability upon attorneys is
repugnant, Appellants express the contrary position that “im-
munization of lawyers who have engaged in the wrongful use
of civil proceedings is repugnant.” Brief for Appellants at 44.

In support of Appellants, amicus curiae Nicholas O.
Brown—who is a plaintiff in a pending Dragonetti action
lodged against an attorney-defendant—invokes Article I, Sec-
tion 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Pa. Const, art. I,
§ 11 (All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law ....”). Amicus views the form of
lawyer immunity envisioned by Appellee to be fundamentally
inconsistent with this constitutionally prescribed right to a
remedy. Furthermore, he believes that nothing in Article V,
Section 10(c) was ever intended to invalidate the Legislature’s
core power to fashion substantive law, inter alia, by compen-
sating persons harmed by abusive and frivolous litigation.

Appellee, for his part, opens his brief with an extensive
array of waiver-based arguments, mainly contending that,
since Appellants failed to present most of the arguments
advanced in their appellate brief during the course of the
proceedings in the common pleas court, those are unavailable
for this Court’s present review. For example, Appellee asserts
that Appellants failed to reference Rules of Disciplinary En-
forcement 204 though 208 or to provide a developed argument
with regard to Rule of Professional Conduct 3,1. Indeed,
according to Appellee’s parsimonious view of what was pre-
sented to the county court, the sole argument that Appellants
preserved for appellate review “is the irrelevant and inaccu-
rate claim that the Dragonetti Act ‘recodified’ Section 674 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” Brief for Appellee at 8
nl,

_ —_—

On the merits, Appellee reiterates the arguments that pre-
vailed in the common pleas court, while highlighting some of
this Court’s more doctrinaire expressions of the principle of
separation of powers. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474
Pa, 256, 262, 878 A.2d 780, 788 (1977) (pronouncing that “any
encroachment upon the judicial power by the legislature is
offensive to the fundamental scheme of our government,”
while invalidating provisions of a statutory scheme attempting
to extend leniency to persons convicted of certain misdemean-
or drug offenses).

To the list of the seven cases which he presented to the
common pleas court, Appellee adds the opinion in support of
affirmance in Lloyd v. Fishinger, 529 Pa. 518, 605 A.2d 1198
(1992) (equally divided Court) (determining, by operation of
law, that a statute intended to curtail attorney solicitations of
hospitalized persons represented an infringement upon the
Supreme Court’s exclusive power to regulate attorneys). He
also references the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Heller
v. Frankston, 76 Pa.Cmwith, 294, 308, 464 A.2d 581, 586 (1983)
(finding a statute attempting to regulate attorneys’ fees to be
invalid on separation of powers grounds). It is Appellee’s core
position that “the Dragonetti Act is yet another attempt by
the legislature to trod on turf belonging exclusively to this
Court.” Brief for Appellee at 31.

In this respect, Appellee notes that the Act makes specific
reference to attorneys, see 42 Pa.C.S. 8852(8) (discussing
probable cause in terms of the good-faith belief of an “attor-
ney of record”), and plainly purports to regulate them in legal
endeavors, including “tak[ing] part in the procurement, initi-
ation or continuation of civil proceedings against another.” Id.
§ 8851. Appellee further distinguishes the scenario from those
under consideration in decisions such as Gmerek, Shaulis, and
6. We note that several Justices, as well as other judges and commenta-

tors, have expressed substantial discomfort with decisions, such as

Suiley, which have evaluated legislative social policy judgements having

broad-scale, substantive impacts mainly in terms of a concern for

judicial power. See, e.g., Friends of Pa. Leadership Charter Sch. v. Chester

Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 627 Pa, 446, 463-64, 101 A.3d 66, 76
(2014) (Saylor, J., concurring, joined by Todd, J.).

=

Beyers, where at least some Justices did not regard the core
functions of legal representation as necessarily being at stake.
See Brief for Appellee at 34 n4 (discussing this author’s
responsive opinions in Gmerek, Shaulis, and Beyers ).

Appellee also contrasts the monetary sanctions authorized
under the civil procedural rules—“an order to pay a penalty
into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effec-
tive deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of
some or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other ex-
penses incurred as a direct result of the violation,” Pa.R.C.P.
No. 1023.4(a)(2)(ii), (iii)—with the Dragonetti Act’s authoriza-
tion of damages for harm to reputation and emotional distress,
as well as punitive damages. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 88538(2), (5), (6).
Moreover, Appellee takes comfort in the fact that a judge
determines what, if any, sanctions to impose under Rule
1023.4, while expressing apprehension that Dragonetti claims
that surmount the summary disposition stage are submitted to
lay juries. According to Appellee, it was this Court’s intention
to prevent the Legislature from “inventing” monetary reme-
dies and permitting juries to consider awards of damages
against lawyers. Brief for Appellee at 39.

In terms of the argument that the Dragonetti Act is sub-
stantive and remedial in nature, Appellee points to the Stone
Crushed Partnership decision, in which this Court indicated
that the enactment “punishes” an attorney who brings a
wrongful civil action. Stone Crushed P’ship, 589 Pa. at 299 n.1,
908 A.2d at 877 n.1. Moreover, because the “Dragonetti Act
makes attorneys the target of lawsuits by their opponents in
civil cases,” Appellee discerns a “regulatory—indeed, inhibito-
ry—effect on plaintiffs’ attorneys.” Brief for Appellee at 41. To
the degree that the Act would be found to have remedial
attributes, it is Appellee’s position that Article V, Section 10(c)
makes no exception for remedial considerations.

Additionally, Appellee undertakes to provide some assur-
ance that other remedies will be available to injured litigants,
upon this Court’s disapproval of the Dragonetti Act. For
example, Appellee explains that plaintiffs will retain the ability
to sue laypersons under the Act, as well as laypersons and

—

attorneys for the common law tort of abuse of process. In the
latter regard, Appellee accepts that attorneys are properly
subject to substantive common law lawmaking by this Court,
in spite of his position that the Legislature cannot supplant
the common law pertaining to lawyers, as is otherwise its
prerogative in the broader sphere. See generally Sternlicht v.
Sternlicht, 588 Pa. 149, 163, 876 A.2d 904, 912 (2005) (recogniz-
ing the primacy of the General Assembly in the substantive
Jawmaking arena). Appellee also highlights that plaintiffs re-
tain the ability to seek monetary sanctions against attorneys
under the Rules of Civil Procedure. See, eg., Pa.R.C.P.
1028.1(d). In this segment of his argument, Appellee relates
that plaintiffs (albeit not Appellants at this stage) have the
ability to ask this Court to adopt the Second Restatement’s
Section 674 or some variant as remedial measures, per its
common law decision-making authority.”

With respect to the issues raised by Appellants’ amicus,
Appellee explains, inter alia, that amici cannot raise issues
that have not been preserved by the litigants. See, e.g., Hosp.
& Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa. v. DPW, 585 Pa. 106, 114 n.10,
888 A.2d 601, 606 n.10 (2005).

Appellee’s merits position is supported by amici the Profes-
sional Liability Defense Federation and the Pennsylvania Bar
Association, both of which present a series of policy arguments
to the effect that the Dragonetti Act represents bad policy.
See, eg., Brief for Amicus Profl Liab. Def. Fed’n at 13
(asserting that “attorneys are dis-incentivized from arguing
for changes or reforms to existing law,” infringing on access to
the court system for citizens); id. at 16 (indicating that the
Act imposes punishment that is “superfluous and inappropri-
ately magnifies an already steep set of consequences appropri-
ately set forth by law”); id. (suggesting that the Dragonetti
Act discourages the voluntary settlement of actions); Brief for
Amicus PBA at 19, 25 (portraying the Act as encroaching on
‘7. Appellee has applied for leave to file a surrebuttal brief, the consider-

ation of which was deferred to the merits stage of our review, That

motion is now granted, albeit that the discrete discussion of waiver

precepts contained in the brief is not of great relevance to our decision
here. See infra Part I.

= °

“an attorney's ethical duty to advocate vigorously for his or
her clients,” since the “prospect of facing a jury trial stands in
tension with the lawyer’s ethical and fiduciary duties to repre-
sent each client zealously within the bounds of the law and to
act in the client’s best interests”); id, at 29 (contending that
the Act “tends to undermine the mutual respect and civility
with which Pennsylvania lawyers treat each other”); id. at 29
(suggesting that “Dragonetti threat letters have now become
routine and may be employed as a tactical weapon to leverage
a premature dismissal or unfair settlement with impunity”).

L Waiver

HH In response to Appellee’s claim that Appellants have
preserved solely an argument that the Dragonetti Act aligns
with Section 674 of the Second Restatement of Torts, and
thus, that they have waived any and all defenses of the Act’s
constitutionality, we disagree. While plainly Appellants’ advo-
cacy could have been sharper from the outset, we believe that
a fair reading of their presentation to the common pleas court
encompasses the position that the Act should be regarded as a
broadly applicable substantive, remedial scheme within the
province of the General Assembly, and not as a legislative
regime targeted to lawyer regulation.

Considered as such, it was never necessary for Appellants,
for example, to discuss the specifics of the Rules of Disciplin-
ary Procedure. In this regard Appellants’ defense of the
statute does not depend on the particulars of Rule 204’s
prescription for eight forms of discipline; Rule 205’s delinea-
tion of the structure, power, and duties of the Disciplinary
Board; Rule 206’s provision for hearing committees and spe-
cial masters; Rule 207’s designation of the power and duties
of Disciplinary Counsel; or Rule 208’s enumeration of the
procedures, including informal proceedings, formal hearings,
review and action by the Disciplinary Board and the Supreme
Court, and emergency temporary suspension orders. See Pa.
R.D.E. 204-208. Simply put, Appellants have not disputed the
fact that this Court has implemented a comprehensive regula-
tory regime governing the professional conduct of lawyers;

—

rather, they merely have maintained that the Act should not
be regarded as transgressing the Court’s authority in such
arena.

I For these reasons, we believe that this appeal can be
fairly resolved by this Court based on the core arguments
presented, and without a lengthy digression into the extensive
waiver discussion presented by Appellee. Moreover, in the
common pleas court and before this Court upon our de novo
and plenary review, Appellee bore—and bears—the heavy
burden of establishing that a duly-enacted and presumptively
valid statute clearly and palpably violates the Constitution,
with any doubts being resolved in favor of the statute’s
validity. See, eg., Payne v. DOC, 582 Pa. 875, 383, 871 A.2d
795, 800 (2005). We deem the presentations both in the county
court and here to be sufficient to permit our present review of
whether Appellee has done so

8. In any event, we do not find it necessary, in our own merits analysis,
to rely on many of the minor premises within Appellants’ presentation,
For example, we do not see the line of Appellants’ “tacit acceptance”
arguments as being particularly useful. Cf Maloney v. Valley Med.
Facilities, Inc., 603 Pa. 399, 417, 984 A.2d 478, 490 (2009) (rejecting
the position that, because a particular legal approach had been accept-
ed by an intermediate court for a lengthy period of time it therefore
should be deemed to have been accepted by this Court, while observing
that “{flor very good reasons, our decisional law generally develops
incrementally, within the confines of the circumstances of cases as they
come before the Court”).

Parenthetically, in terms of such minor premises, we also observe that
the applicable Rule of Appellate Procedure is framed in terms of
“issue” preservation. See Pa.R.A.P, 302 (“Issues not raised in the lower
court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”),
See generally United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 339-40 (3d Cir.
2013) (offering an interesting discussion of the difference between
“issues” and “arguments” centered on the suppression context), Al-
though certainly this Court has deemed various “arguments” waived
with reference to Rule 302, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ballard, 622 Pa,
177, 210, 80 A.3d 380, 400 (2013), the interests of justice would not be
well served were a court of last resort deciding matters of statewide
public importance to forbid appellants any latitude to make adjustments
to the supporting rationales offered in the hierarchical review process.
For example, a previous reviewing court's expression of its own ratio-
nale may legitimately impact upon the focus of ensuing appellate
presentations, by substantially narrowing and/or focusing the subject
matter.

a "
Il. Merits

Hl We begin with the notion that the powers accorded to
this Court under Article V, Section 10(¢) are exclusive. There
are several reasons why this assertion must be considered
with great circumspection.

For example, this Court promulgated and maintains a set of
evidence rules per its rulemaking authority under Article V,
Section 10(c), see Pa.R.E. 101(b), while also expressly recog-
nizing that some of the law of evidence is appropriately
governed by statute. See id., comment; see also Common-
wealth v. Olivo, 683 Pa. 617, 685-36, 127 A.3d 769, 780 (2015).
Furthermore, this Court enforces procedural provisions of
statutes, such as the Post Conviction Relief Act. See 42
PaCS. § 95452 ~

The Court also has acknowledged that many subjects of
legislation and/or judicial rulemaking possess both attributes
implicating this Court’s rulemaking power and substantive-law
characteristics which are suited to the province of the political
branch. See Olivo, 127 A.3d at 777 (“We have often recognized
that the distinction between procedural and substantive ac-
tions engenders little consensus.” (citation omitted); see also
Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 496 Pa. 52, 57,
436 A.2d 147, 150 (1981) (indicating that procedure and sub-
stance are often “interwoven” and incapable of “rational sepa-
ration,” and the lines of demarcation are “difficult to deter-
mine” and “shadowy” (citations omitted). Notably, moreover,
per the very provision of the Constitution which Appellee
invokes, this Court simply is not permitted to access its
rulemaking power to “enlarge nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant.” Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c) (emphasis

The appropriate degree of such latitude afforded to appellants to alter

arguments can be most sharply determined in cases—unlike this one—

in which the Court disagrees with a main thrust of the presentation that

was rejected in the prior reviewing court or courts, albeit that this
Court might agree with a supplemental argument offered on appeal.

9. Notably, this Court has acted to suspend certain procedural provi-
sions of this statute, see 42 Pa.C.S, § 9545(d)(2) (suspended), but it has
not suspended others, such as the requirement for a signed certification
as to each intended witness, see id. § 9545(d)(1). These sorts of differ-
ences, implemented by predecessor Justices, are, to the present comple-
ment of the Court, difficult to explain.

* a

added); of Sutley, 474 Pa, at 264-65, 878 A2d at 784
(alluding to the Legislature’s power to “promulgate all of the
substantive law for this jurisdiction”).

Accordingly, in the multitude of mixed-faceted lawmaking
and rulemaking ventures, some discerning judgment obviously
must be brought to bear to sort through the pervading power
questions, Indeed, even the most inflexible of this Court’s
decisions historically have recognized that the separation of
powers doctrine contemplates “a degree of interdependence
and reciprocity between the various branches.” Sutley, 474 Pa,
at 262, 378 A.2d at 788,

With respect to the Dragonetti Act, notwithstanding the
dictum from Stone Crushed Partnership, we agree with Ap-
pellants that the statute manifests a legislative purpose to
compensate victims of frivolous and abusive litigation and,
therefore, has a strong substantive, remedial thrust. See
Dooner v. DiDonato, 601 Pa, 209, 231, 971 A.2d 1187, 1201
(2009) (explaining that tort laws “necessarily perform an im-
portant remedial role in compensating victims of torts,” albeit
in the context of a common law tort (emphasis added)); accord
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S, 229, 284, 112 S.Ct. 1867,
1871, 119 L.Hd.2d 84 (1992) (“Remedial principles ... figure
prominently in the definition and conceptualization of torts.”).
It is also important, in our estimation, that the law is of
general application and is not specifically targeted to legal
professionals, See Mawnus, 518 Pa. at 600, 544 A.2d at 1828.
10. Such prescription provides context to the explicit boundaries of the

Rules of Professional Conduct. See Pa.R.P.C., Scope (“Violation of a

Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor

should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has

been breached” and that the rules “are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability"), See generally Maritrans, 529 Pa. at 255, 602 A.2d at

1284 (stressing the difference between duties under rules of profession-
al conduct and substantive liability standards),

11, Notably, this Court has previously recognized the Legislature’s de-
sire to supplant the substantive common law remedial scheme. See, e.g.,
Matter of Larsen, 532 Pa. 326, 340, 616 A.2d 529, 587 (1992) (“[T]he
common law tort of malicious prosecution has been codified and
modified as a statutory cause of action.”).

12, Appellee references an opinion in support of affirmance from the
Gmerek case as reflecting that the significance of broad scale applica-

—

There is no question that the enactment has a punitive
dynamic, since it authorizes the award of punitive damages
“according to law,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8858(6), and that it embodies
disapprobation of a specified range of conduct by attorneys,
Both of these aspects may bear closer review in future cases
that are framed more narrowly. For example, there may be an
argument to be made that punitive damages awards should
not be available against attorney-defendants in Dragonetti
cases, given that this Court has specifically provided for
sanctions to deter violations. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028.4(a)(1).
And it may also be that, in an appropriate case, the Court
might invoke Article V, Section 10(c)—in a fashion more
restrained than according blanket immunization to lawyers
from the effects of a substantive-law statute—to construe
Dragonetti Act liability as unwarranted in instances in which a
claim was pursued based on a good faith argument that the
existing law should be changed. Potentially, the principle that
statutes should be afforded a constitutional construction might
come into play in such a case. See 1 PaC.S, § 1922(8).

There is no directed challenge to the punitive damages
aspect here, however, and no assertion that Appellee had been
vying, in good faith, for a reversal of precedent when the
underlying land-ownership litigation was commenced and pur-
sued. Rather, a far broader lawyer-immunity focus has been
engrafted onto this case."* Responding to the matter as so
framed, we decline to recognize generalized attorney immunity
from the substantive principles of tort law embodied in the
Dragonetti Act. Accord Pa. R.C.P. No. 1023.1, Note (depicting

tion is limited to a particular factual paradigm. See Gmerek, 569 Pa, at

589, 807 A.2d at 818 (Zappala, C.J., Opinion in Support of Affirmance)

(positing that Maunus “was limited to the situation presented therein,

that being the imposition of regulations by an employer of an employ-

ee/attorney”). Although that opinion correctly described the context of

Maunus, in our considered judgment the significance of whether sub-

stantive lawmaking is targeted to attorneys or has broader application
transcends scenarios involving lawyer-employees.

13. Cf. Gillian E, Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 Corum.
L. Rev. 873, 881 (2005) (observing that a litigant makes “a partial facial
challenge” by arguing that “‘a statute is unconstitutional in a particular
range of applications, even if not unconstitutional in all or most”).

* Se
the Dragonetti Act as providing “additional relief from dilato-
ry or frivolous proceedings”).

In this regard, this Court frequently acknowledges the
Legislature’s superior resources and institutional prerogative
in making social policy judgments upon a developed analysis.
See generally Seebold v. Prison Health Servs. Inc., 618 Pa.
682, 652-54 & n.19, 57 A.Sd 1232, 1245-46 & n.19 (2012). In
exercising the common law decision-making function, this
Court lacks the tools available to the Assembly—such as
investigations and the self-directed gathering of empirical
evidence at public hearings—and is confined to the adversari-
al, record-based system of judicial adjudication. Accordingly,
judges plainly stand at a disadvantage in the substantive
lawmaking process, which also, quite frankly, is often steeped
in difficult political judgments, including choices among vital
competing interests.

Hl Consistent with these observations, we find that the
policy arguments of Appellee and his amici are better pre-
sented to the Legislature. While this Court clearly retains a
residual, common law role in substantive lawmaking, the
Court cedes such power when the Assembly chooses to exer-
cise its own constitutional prerogative to enact substantive
legislation. See, e.g., Sternlicht, 583 Pa. at 168, 876 A.2d at
912." In relation to the prior decisions referenced by the
litigants, the judicial philosophy of this opinion may differ
from predecessor ones, but we find nothing in the precedent
that precludes our present holding.

In conclusion, in our considered judgment, Appellee has
failed to establish that the Dragonetti Act clearly and palpably

14. In terms of the arguments pertaining to the legislative decision to
adjust the liability standard to subsume gross negligence, this Court's
rules are not intended as a safe harbor for attorneys who cause harm to
others via such elevated heedlessness. Similarly, while the Rules of
Professional Conduct may describe lawyers’ ethical obligations in a
more objective fashion than is reflected in the Dragonetti Act’s liability
threshold, the interests of justice do not favor immunizing conduct
undertaken with a subjectively wrongful state of mind. Indeed, the
common law liability standard of malice certainly has subjective attrib-
utes.

—

violates the Pennsylvania Constitution, or that this Court
should per se immunize attorneys, as attorneys, from the
application of the substantive tort principles promulgated by
the political branch in the Dragonetti Act.”

The order of the common pleas court is reversed, and the
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

Justices Baer, Todd, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.

Justices Baer and Todd file concurring opinions.

Justice Wecht joins the substance of Justice Baer’s
concurrence but does not join the majority opinion.

Justice Donohue files a dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE BAER, Concurring

I agree with the majority that Appellee has failed to estab-
lish that the Dragonetti Act clearly and palpably violates this
Court’s Article V, Section 10(c) authority to regulate the
practice of law. I write separately, however, to distance myself
from the majority’s apprehension over the exclusivity of our
constitutional power in this regard. See Majority Opinion at
79, 159 A.8d at 490 (stating that we should consider with
“great circumspection” the notion that the powers accorded to
this Court under Article V, Section 10(c) are exclusive). Con-
sistent with Justice Donohue’s dissenting opinion, I find that
our Article V, Section 10(¢) authority is exclusive. See Dissent-
ing Opinion, Donohue, J., at 87-88, 159 A.8d at 495-96 (citing
well-established case law and a rule of disciplinary enforce-
ment recognizing the exclusive nature of this Court’s Article
V, Section 10(c) authority).

15. In light of our disposition, we need not address the Remedies Clause

issue raised by Appellants’ amicus, which, in any event, had not been
presented by Appellants.

1, While I appreciate the maj 's concern that there have been topics
upon which both statutes and judicial rules have spoken, see Op, at 79,
159 A3d at 490 (referencing evidentiary rules and post-conviction
practices under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-
9546), these joint expressions need not be interpreted as limitations on

s Le

That is not to say, however, that our Article V, Section 10(¢)
power is unlimited as the plain language of the constitutional
provision denies this Court the authority to prescribe rules
modifying the substantive rights of a litigant. See Pa. Const,
art. V, § 10(c) (affording this Court “the power to prescribe
general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of
all courts ... and for admission to the bar and to practice law
... if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and
neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of
any litigant ....”). Pursuant to this constitutional mandate,
we have held that the threshold inquiry in determining wheth-
er a particular statute violates Article V, Section 10(¢), is
whether the challenged legislation is procedural or substantive
in nature. Commonwealth v. Payne, 582 Pa. 875, 871 A.2d 795,
801 (2005). Generally, “substantive law is that part of the law
which creates, defines and regulates rights, while procedural
laws are those that address methods by which rights are
enforced.” Commonwealth v. Olivo, 127 A.38d 769, 777 (Pa.
2015) (citing Payne, 871 A.2d at 801).

Without hesitation, I agree with the majority that the
Dragonetti Act “manifests a legislative purpose to compensate
victims of frivolous and abusive litigation and, therefore, has a
strong substantive, remedial thrust.” Op. at 80, 159 A.8d at
491. As further referenced by the majority, the statute is of
general application and is not targeted specifically to legal
professionals, Jd. It appears that the General Assembly, in
enacting the Dragonetti Act, did what this Court cannot do by
procedural rule, ie, created substantive rights benefitting
litigants targeted by abusive litigation. See Pa.R.P.C., Scope
(‘Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of
action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption
in such a case that a legal duty has been breached;” the rules
“ave not designed to be a basis for civil liability”),

Because I agree with the majority that the statutory provi-
sions challenged herein are clearly substantive, I find that the
Legislature did not encroach upon this Court’s Article V,

this Court’s Article V, Section 10(c) power but, rather, as a recognition
that certain topics have both substantive and procedural aspects.

—

Section 10(c) exclusive authority.’ Accordingly, I agree with
the majority's mandate to reverse the order of the trial court,
which declared the Dragonetti Act unconstitutional, and re-
mand for further proceedings,

JUSTICE TODD, Concurring

I join the Majority Opinion in full, but write to make two
additional points.

First, while I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the
Dragonetti Act is not unconstitutional as applied to attorneys,
I underscore the issues the majority notes “may bear closer
review” in a future case—specifically, whether an attorney
could be liable under the Act for an award of punitive dam-
ages, and whether an attorney could be liable despite a good
faith argument that existing law should be changed. See
Majority Opinion at 80-82, 159 A.8d at 491-92. Because the
present challenge concerns a claim that attorneys have gener-
alized immunity to Dragonetti Act claims—an assertion we
reject—and because neither of the above more narrow issues
are implicated by the facts of this case, the majority appropri-
ately does not address them. Yet, these questions focus on
aspects of the Dragonetti Act which, in my view, are most
starkly in tension with our exclusive authority to regulate the
practice of law under Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution and will deserve close review when properly
before our Court.

My second observation also relates to Appellee’s concern
that an attorney’s good faith argument that existing law
should be changed could lead to Dragonetti Act lability,
Section 8352 of the Act sets forth three scenarios under which
a person has probable cause for commencing or advancing
litigation, and, thus, is not subject to liability.’ It states:

2, As this case involves only a generalized challenge to the Dragonetti
Act as applied to attorneys, the majority's discussion regarding the
“punitive dynamic” of the legislation and the “disapprobation of a
specified range of conduct by attorneys,” Op, at 81, 159 A.3d at 491,
need not be considered at this time. This Court can examine the
contours of specific provisions of the Dragonetti Act when so chal-
lenged in an appropriate case,

1, A prerequisite to liability under the Act is that the person act “in a
ges negligent manner or without probable cause.” 42 Pa.C.S.

8351,

_ —_—

A person who takes part in the procurement, initiation or
continuation of civil proceedings against another has proba-
ble cause for doing so if he reasonably believes in the
existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and
either:
(1) reasonably believes that under those facts the claim
may be valid under the existing or developing law;
(2) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice of
counsel, sought in good faith and given after full disclosure
of all relevant facts within his knowledge and information;
or
(8) believes as an attorney of record, in good faith that his
procurement, initiation or continuation of a civil cause is not
intended to merely harass or maliciously injure the opposite
party.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8852. The concern forwarded by Appellee herein
implicates the first scenario, as Appellee offers that an attor-
ney who seeks an “extension, modification or reversal of
existing law” as ethically permitted under the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct? might nonetheless be subject to Dragonetti
Act liability because such a claim might not be viewed as
having been based upon a reasonable belief that “the claim
may be valid under the existing or developing law,” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8352(1) (emphasis added). See Appellee’s Brief at 9. Howev-
er, regardless of whether we might, in a future case, construe
“developing law” to encompass claims for an “extension, modi-
fication or reversal of existing law” and, thus, preclude Drago-
netti Act ability under Section 8352(1) on that basis, subsec-
tion (8) would appear to provide a safe harbor to attorneys in
such situations (as well as in other situations). It specifically
protects an “attorney of record” who believes “in good faith
that his procurement, initiation or continuation of a civil cause
is not intended to merely harass or maliciously injure the
opposite party.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8352(3). To Appellee’s concern, I
2. See Pa.R.P.C. § 3,1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law

and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”).

= «

would be hard-pressed to envision a scenario in which an
attorney who seeks, in good faith, the reversal of governing
law would be liable under the Act because he or she is
nonetheless found to have “intended to merely harass or
maliciously injure the opposite party.”

JUSTICE DONOHUE, Dissenting

This appeal presents a facial challenge’ to the Dragonetti
Act's constitutionality as applied to attorneys, and requires
that we decide whether the legislation violates this Court’s
exclusive authority under Article V, Section 10(c) of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution to regulate the conduct of attorneys
practicing in the courts of this Commonwealth. The Majority
proposes that we disavow any claims to such exclusive consti-
tutional authority. This, to me, is an incorrect and revolution-
ary proposition. Article V, Section 10(c) of our Constitution
entrusts the regulation of attorneys practicing law in this
Commonwealth exclusively to this Supreme Court. Because
the Dragonetti Act constitutes an impermissible legislative
encroachment into this Court’s exclusive domain, it is uncon-
stitutional. I must therefore dissent.

The Majority contends that the “notion” of this Court’s
exclusive power under Article V, Section 10(c) to regulate the
conduct of attorneys “must be considered with great cireum-
spection.” Majority Op. at 79, 159 A.8d at 490, Until now, this
Court has not considered its exclusive power to regulate the
conduct of lawyers as a mere “notion” requiring any “cireum-
spection,” but rather as an undeniable statement of constitu-
tional fact. In adopting the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary
Enforcement, for example, this Court declared that “it has
inherent and exclusive power to supervise the conduct of
attorneys who are its officers (which power is reasserted in
1, Ido not disagree with the Majority’s characterization of this appeal as

a “partial” facial challenge, as it is limited to application of the statute

to a certain class of defendants (attorneys). See Majority Op. at 81 n.13,

159 A.3d at 492 n.13; see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern

New Eng. 546 U.S. 320, 328-329, 126 S.Ct. 961, 163 L.Ed.2d 812

(2006) (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in

a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer, for

example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute,

while leaving other applications in force.”’)

_ —_—

Section 10(c) of Article V of the Constitution of Pennsylvania)
and in furtherance thereof promulgates these rules.” Pa.
R.D.E, 108. Similarly, in our decisional law, we have repeated-
ly acknowledged our “inherent and exclusive power to govern
the conduct of those privileged to practice law in this Com-
monwealth,” Wajert v. State Hthics Comm'n, 491 Pa. 255, 420
A.2d 489, 442 (1980), and have insisted that no other branch of
our state government “may impose duties applicable to every
attorney admitted to practice in the Commonwealth.” Mawnus
v, State Ethics Comm'n, 518 Pa, 592, 544 A.2d 1824, 1825-26
(1988); see also Shaulis v. Pa, State Ethics Comm’n, 574 Pa.
680, 888 A.2d 123, 129-82 (2003); Commonwealth v. Stern, 549
Pa, 505, 701 A.2d 568 (1997); Laffey v. Cowrt of Common
Pleas of Cumberland Cty., 503 Pa. 108, 468 A.2d 1084, 1085
(1983); Kremer v, State Ethics Comm’n, 508 Pa, 358, 469 A.2d
598, 595 (1988); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini,
504 Pa. 271, 472 A.2d 186, 187 (1983); Beyers v, Richmond,
594 Pa. 654, 987 A.2d 1082, 1091 (2007) (plurality); Lloyd v.
Fishinger, 529 Pa. 518, 605 A.2d 1198, 1197 (1992) (plurality);
Gmerek v. State Ethics Com’n, 569 Pa, 579, 807 A.2d 812, 817
(2002) (Saylor, C.J.) (Opinion in Support of Reversal) (“Cer-
tainly, this Court’s responsibility and authority with regard to
regulation of the general practice of law are: firmly grounded
in [Article V, Section 10(¢)]; supported by the concept of
inherent powers, see Pa.R.D.E. 103; and as a function of the
doctrine of separation of powers, guarded by the assertion of
exclusivity.”).

Prior to 1968, the Pennsylvania Constitution did not include
an express statement regarding this Court’s rulemaking au-
thority. In ve 42 Pa.C.8. § 1708, 482 Pa. 522, 394 A.2d 444, 447
(1978). Nevertheless, in In re Splane, 128 Pa. 527, 16 A, 481
(1889), this Court struck down an 1887 statute that purported
to establish standards for application for admission to the
Pennsylvania bar. In so doing, we rejected any suggestion that
the Legislature has any constitutional power to regulate the
conduct of attorneys or the practice of law in this state. We
held that “[i]f there is anything in the constitution that is clear
beyond controversy, it is that the Legislature does not possess

= °

judicial powers. They are lodged exclusively in the judiciary as
a co-ordinate department of the government.” Id. at 483.

Tn 1968, an explicit statement of this Court’s rulemaking
authority was set forth in Article V, Section 10(c) of the newly
amended Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides as follows:

(ce) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe

general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct

of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers serving
process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any
court or justice of the peace, including the power to provide
for assignment and reassignment of classes of actions or
classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of
justice shall require, and for admission to the bar and to
practice law, and the administration of all courts and super-
vision of all officers of the Judicial Branch, if such rules are
consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, en-
large nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant, nor
affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the
jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace, nor suspend
nor alter any statute of limitation or repose. All laws shall
be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with
rules prescribed under these provisions. Notwithstanding
the provisions of this section, the General Assembly may by
statute provide for the manner of testimony of child victims
or child material witnesses in criminal proceedings, includ-
ing the use of videotaped depositions or testimony by
closed-circuit television.

Pa, Const. art. V, § 10(¢).

The Majority, apparently, is of the view that our authority
under this constitutional provision to regulate the conduct of
attorneys practicing in this Commonwealth is not exclusive,
but rather is shared concurrently with the General Assembly.
A careful examination of this constitutional language demon-
strates that there is no basis for such a contention.’ To begin,
2, Article V, Section 10(c) was adopted as part of the Pennsylvania

Constitution of 1968, It was amended in November 2003 to add the
concluding sentence relating to child witnesses,

3. In conducting this analysis, we must employ an unstrained analysis,
one that “completely conforms to the intent of the framers and which

_ —_—

under the principle of separation of the powers of government,
no branch of the government (executive, legislative, or judicial)
may exercise functions exclusively committed to another
branch. See, ¢.g., Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328
Pa, 225, 195 A. 90, 93 (1987); Bailey v. Waters, 308 Pa. 309,
162 A. 819, 821 (1982). This Court, as the ultimate interpreter
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, has the responsibility to
“determine whether a matter has been exclusively committed
to one branch of the government.” Stern, 701 A.2d at 570
(citing Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 498, 375 A.2d 698, 705
(1977).

Article V of our Constitution, “The Judiciary,” establishes
the judicial branch of our tri-partite government. It delineates,
among other things, the structure and composition of the
various courts within the Commonwealth’s unified judicial
system. The supervisory power for administration of the judi-
cial branch is vested in the Supreme Court by virtue of
Section 10 of Article V, which is broadly titled “Judicial
Administration.” Pa, Const. art. V, § 10. Section 10(¢)
straightforwardly confers all judicial authority upon this
Court: “The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of
all courts...” Id. This grant of authority explicitly includes
the power to prescribe all rules relating to the “supervision of
all officers of the Judicial Branch.” Jd. All attorneys practicing
in this Commonwealth are “officers of the Judicial Branch.”
See, eg., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zdrok, 538 Pa, 41,
645 A.2d 880, 834 (1994),

The breadth of the Supreme Court’s authority is manifested
by the identification of three discrete areas of influence re-
served to the Legislature in Article V, Section 10(c): the
power to determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice of
the peace, the right to set statutes of limitation and repose,

reflects the views of the ratifying voter.” In re Bruno, 627 Pa. 505, 101

A.3d 635, 659 (2014) (quoting Jubelirer v. Rendell, 598 Pa. 16, 953 A.2d

514, 528 (2008). In other words, “the constitutional language controls

and ‘must be interpreted in its popular sense, as understood by the

people when they voted on its adoption.’” Id. (quoting Stilp v. Com-
monwealth, 588 Pa. 539, 905 A.2d 918, 939 (2006)).

=

and the authority to provide for the manner of testimony of
child witnesses. Jd. Given these specific, limited grants of
authority to the Legislature,‘ there is no reading of Article V
of our Constitution that leaves room for an interpretation that
this Court’s supervisory and rulemaking authority overlaps
with the Legislature’s authority.

With respect to our rulemaking powers, this Court has
previously recognized that “there is simply no substantial
support for the proposition that the grant of authority in
Article V, Section 10(¢) is anything other than exclusive.”® In

4, Other sections of Article V of the Constitution grant the General
Assembly certain additional powers not relevant to the present analysis.
For example, the General Assembly has the power ‘“‘to establish classes
of magisterial districts” based on constitutionally designated factors
and to “fix the salaries to be paid justices of the peace in each class.”
Pa. Const. art V, § 7(b). The General Assembly also has the power to
“establish additional courts or divisions of existing courts, as needed, or
abolish any statutory court or division thereof.” Pa, Const. art V, § 8.
These sections are germane to the point that any legislative authority
within the judicial branch was limited and defined by the citizens,

5. In support of its contention for the Legislature’s concurrent authority
to engage in judicial rulemaking, the Majority refers to this Court's
recognition that the Legislature may promulgate rules of evidence, see
Commonwealth v. Olivo, 633 Pa. 617, 127 A.3d 769 (2015), and to our
failure to suspend a particular procedural provision in the Post-Convic-
tion Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, specifically section 9545(d)(1),
which requires a signed certification as to each witness expected to
testify at an evidentiary hearing. Majority Op. at 79, 159 A.3d at 490.
Tn Olivo, we addressed the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S, § 5920, which
by its terms allows the introduction of expert testimony in certain cases
involving sexual offenses to “assist the trier of fact in understanding the
dynamics of sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence and the
impact of sexual violence on victims during and after being assaulted.”
Id, Olivo dealt with the distinct issue of whether the Legislature may
enact substantive laws relating to the admissibility of certain forms of
evidence in trials involving alleged violations of particular criminal
statutes, As such, our decision there was unrelated to the issue present-
ed here, namely whether this Court has the exclusive authority to
regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing law in this Commonwealth.
To my knowledge, a litigant has never challenged the constitutionality
of section 9545(d)(1) of the PCRA under the separation of powers
doctrine. Regardless, our failure to suspend section 9545(d)(1) of the
PCRA in no way diminishes the exclusive nature of our Article V,
Section 10(c) rulemaking powers.

There may be circumstances not identified by the Majority where this
Court turned a blind eye to legislative encroachment into the Supreme
Court’s exclusive powers under Article V, Section 10(c). This Court

° Le

ve 42 Pa. C.S. § 1708, 894 A.2d at 448. In so concluding, we
emphasized that Section 10(c) also expressly provides this
Court with the authority to suspend any acts of the Legisla-
ture that are inconsistent with our rules, a power that would
be “incongruous with a scheme in which the Legislature
exercised concurrent rule-making authority.” Id. “[A] power
does not adhere to the legislature if it has specifically been ...
entrusted to another co-equal branch of government.” Id.
(quoting Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 378 A.2d 780,
788 (1977)).

This Court has consistently recognized its exclusive authori-
ty to regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing law in this
Commonwealth. In Wajert, for example, a former common
pleas judge filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
declaration that section 8(e) of the State Ethics Act, 65 P.S.
§ 408(e), was inapplicable to him as a former member of the
judiciary. Wajert, 420 A.2d at 440. Section (8)(e) prohibited
former officials or public employees from representing a per-
son on any matter before the governmental body with which
he or she had been associated for one year after leaving the
position. Jd. Noting that the Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty promulgated by this Court addressed precisely the same
issue, we decided that section (8)(e) “constitute[d] an infringe-
ment on the Supreme Court's inherent and exclusive power to
govern the conduct of those privileged to practice law in this
Commonwealth.” Id. at 442.

Long before the Ethics Act was enacted, this Court adopted
the Code of Professional Responsibility enunciating the
standards governing the professional conduct of those en-
gaged in the practice of law in this Commonwealth, In the
rules enforcing that Code, this Court had made it abundant-
ly clear that supervising the conduct of an attorney, includ-
ing that of a former judge, before the courts of this Com-
monwealth was a matter exclusively for this Court.

should be faulted for any sporadic dereliction in exercising or enforcing
the dictates of Article V, Section 10(c). Falling short of our constitution-
al mandate on occasion, however, does not result in its relinquishment.
We have no authority to dilute the tri-partite system of government
established by the citizens of this Commonwealth,

= *
Id.; see also Maunus, 544 A.2d at 1826 (“[T]his Court is the
only governmental body entitled to regulate and discipline the
professional class of attorneys. No other component of our
state government may impose duties applicable to every attor-
ney admitted to practice in the Commonwealth, nor may
another Commonwealth entity admit to practice or discipline
an attorney.”).

Similarly, in Stern, we unanimously held that section
4117(b)(1) of the Crimes Code, which made it a crime for a
lawyer to compensate or give “anything of value to a non-
lawyer for recommending or securing employment by a
client,” was unconstitutional. Stern, 701 A.2d at 569. Section
4117(b)(1) was a “word-for-word restatement” of Rule 7.2(c) of
our Rules of Professional Conduct, and had the effect of
“criminaliz[ing] the conduct of attorneys in their practice of
law.” Id. at 572-78. In striking down the statute, we did not
question the Legislature’s own exclusive power to establish
and classify crimes, but determined that the Legislature could
not, as a co-equal branch of government, promulgate a statute
that regulated in an area within this Court’s exclusive authori-
ty, namely the regulation of attorney conduct.

We have seen fit to prohibit the practice of attorneys paying

for referrals in the exercise of our exclusive authority to

supervise the conduct of attorneys. This involves a matter

entrusted solely to the Supreme Court under Article V,

Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. We hold,

therefore, that § 4117(b)(1) is unconstitutional because it

infringes upon this authority.
Id. at 573.

Pursuant to our exclusive authority under Article V, Section
10(c), this Court has promulgated Rules of Professional Con-
duct, Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, and Rules of Civil
Procedure, all of which bear directly on the professional
conduct of attorneys and the manner in which they may
practice law. Any statute encroaching on our Article V, Section
10(c) powers, including our power to regulate the professional
conduct of attorneys, “must be regarded as a vain attempt by
the Legislature to exercise a power which it does not possess.”

X a
In ve Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 235, 240 n.14 (1974). This
Court has a clear duty to “invalidate legislative action repug-
nant to the constitution.” Zemprelli v. Damiels, 496 Pa. 247,
436 A.2d 1165, 1169 (1981).

In 1980, the General Assembly created a statutory cause of
action for the “wrongful use of civil proceedings,” commonly
referred to as the Dragonetti Act, that proscribes certain
types of tortious litigation conduct. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8351—
8354.6 Pursuant to the Act, an attorney (or any other person)
“who takes part in the procurement, initiation or continuation
of civil proceedings against another” may be liable under
described circumstances for a variety of damages, including,
inter alia, harm to reputation, emotional distress, pecuniary
losses, attorney fees, and punitive damages. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8353.
The plaintiff must show that the underlying proceedings were
terminated in his or her favor and that the attorney (or other
person) acted “in a grossly negligent manner or without
probable cause” and “primarily for a purpose other than that
of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or adjudi-
cation of the claim in which the proceedings are based.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 8851(a). Section 8352 of the Dragonetti Act provides

6. Given the Majority’s attempt to characterize the legislative process as
superior to this Court's adjudicative process in making substantive law,
Majority Op. at 81-83, 159 A.3d at 491-93, the history behind the
Dragonetti Act deserves some discussion. In addition to the fundamen-
tal problem that the Legislature has no power to act to define miscon-
duct by attorneys, in my view, any deference to the Legislature because
of its deliberate fact gathering before promulgating legislation is entire-
ly misplaced here, as the Legislature reportedly acted hastily to enact
this statute—at the behest of a single aggrieved litigant (Joseph Drago-
netti), See Pa. L, Journal, 164th General Assembly, No. 70, Reg. Sess.,
2634-35 (Nov. 19, 1980) (characterizing the process of enacting the
statute as rushed and “last minute,” despite a lack of urgency) (state-
ment of Rep, Spitz). Mr. Dragonetti apparently led a “one-man cru-
sade” to ensure the Act’s passage. See id. (stating that one individual
“has been the moving factor behind this legislation”) (statement of Rep.
Kukovich). His crusade, ultimately successful, was focused on abolish-
ing the “old English rule”—a requirement that this Court had recog-
nized, for more than a hundred years, as an essential element of the
common law cause of action for malicious use of process, discussed in
more detail infra. See Publix Drug Co. v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 347 Pa.
346, 32 A.2d 413, 415 (1943); Johnson v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co.,
329 Pa. 241, 198 A, 23, 24 (1938); Farmers’ Bank v. McKinney, 7 Watts
& Serg. 214, 215 (1838).

—

that an attorney defendant has probable cause in the underly-
ing proceeding if he or she “reasonably believes in the exis-
tence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and either,
reasonably believes that under those facts the claim may be
valid under existing or developing law” or believes “in good
faith” that his or her action was “not intended to merely
harass or maliciously injure the opposite party.” 42 Pa.C.S
§ 8352(1),(8)."

The Dragonetti Act indisputably and notoriously regulates
the conduct of attorneys engaged in the practice of law. This
conclusion is not contested, even by the Majority, which
acknowledges that the Dragonetti Act “embodies disapproba-
tion of a specified range of conduct by attorneys.” Majority
Op. at 81, 159 A.3d at 491. This Court has prescribed Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement and
Rules of Civil Procedure that specifically address precisely the
same conduct the Legislature attempts to regulate under the
Dragonetti Act. Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
provides that an attorney “shall not bring or defend a proceed-
ing, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.” Pa.R.P.C 8.1. Rule 208 of the
Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement sets forth the procedures,
from investigation to final disposition, for enforcing violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct (including Pa.R.P.C 3.1),
and Rule 204 lists the types of discipline that may be imposed
for said violations, from permanent disbarment to private
informal admonition. Pa.R.D.E. 204, 208.8 Rule 1023.1 of the
7. Under Section 8352, a different probable cause standard applies to

clients who rely on the advice of counsel. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8352(2).

8. Pursuant to our Article V, Section 10(c) powers, we have established a
comprehensive system for disciplining attorneys which functions effec-
tively absent any interference by the Legislature. Our disciplinary
system is comprised of a Disciplinary Board made up of appointed,
uncompensated attorneys and non-attorneys and Hearing Committees
made up of appointed, uncompensated attorneys. Acceptance of an
appointment as a member of the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court or as a hearing officer requires hundreds of hours
of uncompensated service to the legal profession, The Board’s work is

_ —_—

Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the signing, filing,
submitting or later advocating of any document constitutes a
certification that the document is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as harassment or delay; that the
claims, defense and legal contentions set forth therein are
warranted by the existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or
the establishment of new law; that the factual allegations have
evidentiary support or will have evidentiary support; and that
denials have evidentiary support or are reasonably based on a
lack of information or belief. Pa.R.C.P. 1028.1(c). Rule
1028.1(d) provides that sanctions may be imposed for viola-
tions of subsection (c). Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1(d).

In its written opinion in support of its ruling that the
Dragonetti Act is unconstitutional, the trial court discussed in
some detail the specific inconsistences between the Dragonetti
Act and these rules. Trial Court Opinion, 8/27/2015, at 5-6. In
my view, it is not necessary to identify the precise inconsisten-
cies, as such an effort serves only to highlight the fact that the
Legislature should never have encroached on this Court’s
exclusive authority to regulate in this area. See Stern, 701
A2d at 78, The Dragonetti Act purports to regulate the
conduct of attorneys that only this Court, pursuant to Article

dedicated to the application of the Rules of Professional Conduct
promulgated by this Court, which serve as the polestar for the practice
of law, the protection of clients and the integrity of the courts of this
Commonwealth,

‘The Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court maintains
an Office of the Secretary and Office of Disciplinary Counsel, both
employing a range of paid staff members. Attorneys admitted to prac-
tice in our Commonwealth fund the operation of our disciplinary
system through a fee structure imposed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. All of these entities operate under our exclusive authority. The
dedicated manner in which our disciplinary system operates is evi-
denced by the fact that, in 2016 alone, the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel received 3,900 complaints regarding attorney conduct and
resolved 3,667 complaints, of which 240 resulted in discipline. Each
proposed order of discipline is meticulously reviewed by the justices of
this Court before it is entered. See Annual Report, The Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2016, available at http://
www.padisciplinaryboard.org/about/annualreports.php (noting that a
disciplinary matter involving a single attorney may consist of multiple
complaints).

Pe "
V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, is empow-

ered to regulate.’ In so far is it applies to attorneys, the
Dragonetti Act is unconstitutional.

A finding that the Dragonetti Act is unconstitutional as
applied to lawyers would not deprive litigants of a remedy in
the face of tortious litigation conduct. I emphasize that a
finding of unconstitutionality in no way immunizes attorneys
from civil suit. As was true before the Dragonetti Act, litigants
may bring civil suits against attorneys asserting claims for
malicious use of process or abuse of process, two common law
causes of action this Court developed and blessed in recogni-
tion of the need for a remedy for legal injuries inflicted by
aberrant attorneys under our watch.

Long before the General Assembly enacted the Dragonetti
Act, this Court recognized a tort for the malicious use of
process which could be brought against an attorney. See
Farmers’ Bank v. McKinney, 7 Watts & Serg. 214, 215 (Pa.
1888) (stating that when “practitioners at law” used process
“maliciously and with design to oppress,” they “could be sued
by the party aggrieved ... upon general principles of policy
and justice”). To maintain an action for malicious use of
process at common law, a plaintiff had to prove (1) that the
defendant initiated legal process against him in the underlying
action, (2) without probable cause and with malice, and (8) that
the action against him or her was unsuccessful. See Publin
Drug Co. v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 347 Pa, 846, 82 A.2d 413,
9, The Majority’s attempt to carve out constitutional space for the

Dragonetti Act by virtue of it being substantive and remedial in nature

is unavailing. These traits do nothing to mitigate the fact that it sets

forth rules of conduct and discipline governing each and every attorney
admitted to practice in the courts of this Commonwealth. I do not
question the Legislature’s authority to create substantive laws, general-
ly, but any such laws must withstand constitutional muster. See Stern,
701 A.2d at 572. As described herein, a legislative enactment that

regulates the conduct of attorneys, regardless of its substantive (as
opposed to procedural) features, is unconstitutional,

10. The Dragonetti Act could still be used to hold a non-lawyer liable for
the wrongful use of civil proceedings. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1925, Pursuant to
1 Pa.C.S, § 1925, “a statute may be invalid as applied to a certain class
and still be generally valid.” Com., Dep't of Ed. v. First Sch., 471 Pa,
471, 370 A.2d 702, 705 n,11 (1977).

_ —_—

415 (1948); Johnson v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 829 Pa,
241, 198 A. 28, 24 (1988). The plaintiff also had to prove that
there had been a seizure or interference with his person or
property in the underlying proceeding. Id. This latter element,
dating back to thirteenth century England, is known as the
“old English rule.” See Pa. L. Journal, 164th General Assem-
bly, No. 70, Reg. Sess., 2634-35 (Nov. 19, 1980) (statement of
Rep. Spencer).

An attorney can also be sued at common law for the
separate and distinct tort of abuse of process. McGee v. Feege,
517 Pa. 247, 585 A.2d 1020, 1023 (1987); see generally G.
Bochetto, D. Heim, J. O’Connell & R. Tintner, Wrongful Use
of Civil Proceedings and Related Torts in Pennsylvania (1st
ed. 2016) (citing cases and distinguishing between the two
common law torts), An action for abuse of process can be
brought to hold a person liable for “the improper use of
process after it has been issued.” McGee, 585 A.2d at 1023.
Unlike a malicious use of process suit, an abuse of process suit
alleges that civil process was employed “for some unlawful
object, not the purpose which it is intended by the law to
effect; in other words, a perversion of it.” Id.; see also Mayer
v. Walter, 64 Pa. 288, 286 (1870). Abuse of process need not
relate to the initiation of proceedings and does not require
either a lack of probable cause or that the underlying action
was resolved in the plaintiffs favor. Id. Moreover, the “old
English rule” was never an element of abuse of process.
McGee, 535 A.2d at 1022.

In the proper case, a future litigant could argue to convince
this Court to abolish the “old English rule,” the aspect of the
common law that Mr. Dragonetti found objectionable when he
took his entreaty to the Legislature. See supra, note 6. We
have explained that “(there is not a rule of the common law in
force today that has not evolved from some earlier rule of
common law, gradually in some instances, more suddenly in
others.” Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 628 Pa. 296, 104 A.3d
828, 858 (2014). Moreover, developing the common law is one
of this Court’s equitable powers. See id. at 352 (noting our
“authority to modify the common law forms of action to the

—

right involved”). When the Dragonetti Act was enacted, a
majority of our sister states had already done away with the
“old English rule,” and section 674 of Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1977) reflects this trend while also eliminating the
common law requirement to show malice. See G. Bochetto, D.
Heim, J. O’Connell & R. Tintner, Wrongful Use of Civil
Proceedings and Related Torts in Pennsylvania, § 1-1, at 5
(1st ed. 2016). We have, in the past, been convinced by logic
and the interests of justice to adopt a section of the Restate-
ment that differs from our common law. See Tincher, 104 A.3d
at 354 (cautioning that “[a]s with any other common law rules,
the normative principles of an ‘adopted’ section of a restate-
ment are properly tested against the facts of each case”). Any
change in common law tort claims imposing liability on attor-
neys for the manner in which they practice law, including
bringing and litigating lawsuits, must come from this Court
through the exercise of our equitable power to develop the
common law. This Court is not only uniquely constitutionally
qualified to engage in any such transformative process (given
our expertise developed as a result of our supervisory authori-
ty in this realm), we are constitutionally the exclusive branch
of government empowered to do so.

Enactment of the Dragonetti Act was an impermissible
intrusion into this Court’s exclusive province to regulate the
conduct of attorneys in the practice of law in this Common-
wealth. I would therefore rule that it is unconstitutional and
unenforceable as applied to lawyers. Accordingly, I dissent.

a

as
159 A.3d 503
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
v
Raghunandan YANDAMURI, Appellant
No, 710 CAP
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
SUBMITTED: October 20, 2016
DECIDED: April 26, 2017

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Stephen G. Heckman, Esq., Henry S. Hilles III, Esq.,
Standby Counsel for Appellant.

Raghunandan Yandamuri, pro se.
Daniel Clase Bardo, Esq., Robert Martin Falin, Esq., Mont-
gomery County District Attorney’s Office, Kevin R. Steele,

Esq., Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, for
Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION
JUSTICE BAER

Appellant Raghunandan Yandamuri, acting pro se, appeals
from two sentences of death imposed by the Montgomery
County Common Pleas Court after a jury convicted him of two
counts of first-degree murder and related offenses for the
kidnapping of a ten-month-old baby and the murders of the

baby and her grandmother. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm Appellant’s sentences of death.

I. Background

Appellant is of Indian decent, is not a citizen of the United
States, and holds an advanced degree in electrical and comput-
er science engineering.” On October 20, 2012, Appellant at-
tended a party with his wife in the Marquis Apartments
located in King of Prussia, Montgomery County. Also present
at the party were Chenchu and Venkata Venna, who had a
ten-month-old daughter, Saanvi (hereinafter, “Baby”). Ger-
mane to this appeal, Baby’s mother, Chenchu, was called
“Latha” (hereinafter, “Latha” or “Mother”) by close friends
and family members, while Baby’s father, Venkata, was called
“Shiva” (hereinafter, “Shiva” or “Father”). During the eve-
ning, Mother told party goers that she had recently returned
to work, and discussed the topic of grandparents babysitting
the children of working parents. Mother also spoke about the
gold jewelry that Baby was wearing. At one point during the
party, Appellant held Baby.

Two days later, on October 22, 2012, Appellant returned to
the Marquis Apartments wearing aviator glasses and a black
hooded sweatshirt and knocked on the door of the Vennas’
apartment. Baby’s paternal grandmother, Satyavathi Venna
(hereinafter, “Grandmother”), opened the door. Upon entering
the apartment, Appellant brandished a four-inch knife in an
attempt to kidnap Baby and hold her for ransom. When
Appellant picked up Baby, a struggle ensued between Appel-
lant and Grandmother, During the scuffle, Appellant fatally
stabbed Grandmother in the throat so severely that the knife
struck the bone three times.’ To silence Baby’s cries during
the altercation, Appellant removed a handkerchief from his
pocket and stuffed it in her mouth. When the handkerchief
1, This Court automatically reviews direct appeals from the imposition

of death sentences pursuant to 42 Pa,C.S. § 9711(h)(1).

2, Appellant's nationality and citizenship are germane to issues raised in
this appeal.

3, As discussed infra, the medical examiner testified that Grandmother
also sustained stab wounds in her chest.

would not stay in place, Appellant removed a hand towel from
the bathroom and tied it around Baby’s head to prevent the
handkerchief from falling out.

Appellant then went to the bedroom, removed a blue suit-
ease from the closet, and collected all of the gold jewelry,
including the gold bangles from Grandmother's wrists. Appel-
lant also placed Baby into the suitcase and exited the apart-
ment, ultimately leaving Baby in the men’s sauna inside the
gymnasium in the Marquis Apartments. After showering at
his apartment, Appellant discarded the suitcase in a dumpster
at the Lafayette Valley Forge Apartments in King of Prussia.
He then discarded some of the stolen jewelry by throwing it in
the river and placed the rest of the jewelry in a bag, which he
concealed behind a vending machine in his office building.

Meanwhile, during her lunch break, Mother attempted to
call Grandmother, but got no response. Father returned home
to investigate and found Grandmother’s dead body and that
Baby was missing. Father called the police who discovered ten
copies of a ransom note, strewn across the floor of the
apartment. The ransom note addressed “Latha” and “Shiva”
(Mother and Father, respectively) as opposed to the Vennas’
formal names, and stated, “Shiva, your daughter has been
kidnapped. If you report this to cops your daughter will be cut
into pieces and found dead.... By 8 p.m. today, Lata [sic]
alone should get $50,000.00 cash and come to Baja Fresh at
Acme store complex.” Commonwealth Exhibit C-26; N.T.,
Sep. 30, 2014, at 44. Under police supervision and wearing a
body wire, Mother proceeded to the Baja Fresh store as
instructed, but the kidnapper never made contact. Law en-
forcement searched the apartment complex multiple times, but
did not find Baby.

To determine the identity of the kidnapper, detectives asked.
the Vennas for a list of individuals who used their informal
names of “Latha” and “Shiva.” The Vennas provided such list,
which included Appellant’s name. Detectives Paul Bradbury
and Andrew Rathfon attempted to interview Appellant on
October 25, 2012, three days after the kidnapping, when
Baby’s whereabouts were still unknown. They discovered that

Appellant was at the Valley Forge Casino and made contact
with him by asking casino security to escort him from the
casino floor to a hallway where the detectives were waiting.
The detectives, dressed in plain clothing, asked Appellant if he
would accompany them to the Upper Merion Police Station to
help with their investigation to find Baby. Without hesitation,
Appellant voluntarily agreed and travelled to the station in
Detective Bradbury’s unmarked vehicle. The detectives in-
formed Appellant that, after the questioning, they would re-
turn him to the casino to retrieve his car.

Upon arrival at the police station at 3:15 p.m., Appellant and
the detectives proceeded downstairs to an office in the Detec-
tive Division. There was no security in the room and the door
was closed for privacy reasons, but was not locked. The
detectives told Appellant that they were seeking help in their
investigation into Baby’s kidnapping and informed him that he
was free to leave and was not under arrest. The detectives
also offered Appellant food and water and told him that he
could go to the restroom unaccompanied when necessary. He
accepted water, but not food.

Prior to the questioning, Detective Bradbury asked Appel-
lant if he would consent to a search of the contents on his cell
phone, Appellant agreed, executed the standard Montgomery
County consent form, and gave his phone to the detectives.
Appellant gave his first written statement between 3:27 p.m.
and 6:08 p.m. pursuant to a question/answer format. He stated
that on October 22, 2012, he had gone to work, went home for
his lunch break around 11:30 a.m., and again returned home
for the day around 1:80 p.m. after his wife had informed him
of the incident. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-32; N.T. Sep.
80, 2014 at 108. He denied knowing who was responsible for
the kidnapping and murder. During this questioning period,
Appellant also consented to the search of his vehicle, which
had been left at the casino. When the first written statement
was completed, as occurred in connection with all subsequent
written statements, Appellant was given an opportunity to
review the statement, make corrections and/or additions, ini-
tial each page, and sign the document,

At approximately 6:30 p.m., upon the detectives’ request,
Appellant gave a second statement in a free flow format,
which he later amended, describing his whereabouts and
activities on the day of the murder with more detail than in his
first statement. Commonwealth Exhibit C-34; N.T., Sep. 30,
2014, at 119. At about 7:30 p.m., Appellant executed a consent
form, permitting a swab of the inside of his mouth to obtain a
DNA sample. Appellant gave a third non-incriminating state-
ment during the period from 7:37 p.m. to 8:07 p.m., which was
conducted in a question/answer format, where the detectives
asked Appellant follow-up questions regarding what he did at
home during his lunch break on October 22, 2012. Appellant
was reminded that he was free to leave and was not under
arrest. Appellant took numerous breaks during the question-
ing, at which time he spoke about subjects unrelated to the
offenses, including his Indian culture and his father. After
each break, the detectives reminded Appellant that he was
free to leave. Appellant never stated that he wanted the
questioning to stop or that he desired counsel.

Appellant’s fourth written statement was given from 8:50
p.m. through 9:25 p.m. Once again, Appellant was advised that
he was free to leave and was not under arrest. Detectives
asked him how he had cut his finger. Appellant responded that
he scratched it while cleaning the trunk of his car the night
before the incident and that his wife asked about his cut when
he came home for lunch the next day. It was at this point that
detectives asked Appellant to consent to a search of his
apartment and to have his body photographed. Appellant
agreed and executed the requisite consent forms at approxi-
mately 9:36 p.m.

Subsequently, during the period from 10:21 p.m. to 10:47
p.m., Appellant gave a fifth non-incriminating statement, ex-
panding upon his previous comments regarding what occurred
during his lunchbreak on October 22, 2012, At some point
during the questioning, Detective Bradbury learned that Ap-
pellant’s wife, who was pregnant at the time, contradicted his
explanations of his whereabouts during the time the crimes
were committed. Specifically, Appellant’s wife told investiga-

tors that he did not come home for lunch on October 22, 2012,
and that she was unaware of any cut on Appellant’s finger, His
suspicion raised and out of an abundance of caution, Detective
Bradbury read Appellant Miranda‘ warnings at 11:08 p.m.
Appellant waived his Miranda rights, both orally and by
executing a written waiver form.

Shortly thereafter, Detective Bradbury told Appellant that
either he or his wife had lied about his whereabouts on the
afternoon of the murder and kidnapping. Appellant then asked
for a pen and pad of paper to write down his thoughts and sat
in silence on the other side of the office for approximately
fifteen to twenty minutes. He drafted a sixth written state-
ment between 2:04 am. and 2:17 am., wherein he wrote
numerous times that he loved his wife, that he was completely
helpless, and that people should believe him in the future if
something happens to him. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-39;
N.T., Sep. 30, 2014, at 162-68. At this point, Detective Brad-
bury asked for consent to search Appellant’s computer, ipad,
and flash drive. After executing the requisite consent forms,
Appellant returned to the other side of the room and sat there
by himself for several minutes.

Both detectives then walked over and confronted Appellant
with the inconsistencies between his statements and the ac-
count given by his wife. Appellant repeatedly told the detec-
tives that his wife must have been mistaken about his where-
abouts on the day of the murder. In response, Detective
Bradbury placed his hand on the bible and swore on his
parents’ grave that Appellant’s wife was telling the truth. He
then showed Appellant a picture of Baby, after which Appel-
lant became emotional. At 3:45 a.m., Appellant asked Detec-
tive Bradbury to call his wife and inform her that he was okay.
Detective Bradbury complied with this request. After the
4. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694

(1966) (providing that prior to custodial interrogation, the suspect must

be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says

can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to

counsel, and that if he cannot afford counsel one will be appointed to
him).

phone call, Detective Bradbury told Appellant that it was time
for him to tell the truth.

Questioning resumed in a question/answer format, which
resulted in Appellant’s final written statement given during
the period of 4:12 a.m. to 6:34 a.m., in which he confessed to
the crimes. N.T., Sep. 80, 2014, at 171-87. Appellant stated
that he did not intend to hurt anyone, but planned to kidnap
Baby to get money from her parents because he knew they
were both working. He explained that he had printed ten
ransom notes from his office computer. Appellant stated that
he entered the Vennas’ apartment wearing a black hooded
sweatshirt and black aviator glasses and carried a four-inch
knife from his kitchen that had a black handle and a silver
blade. He indicated that he threw the ransom notes in the
Vennas’ hallway and stabbed Grandmother in the throat with
his right hand because she came at him while he was holding
Baby. Appellant indicated that Baby was wearing a white
dress and that he tried to get her to stop crying by placing a
handkerchief in her mouth and a bath towel around her head
to keep the handkerchief in place. Appellant disclosed that he
then placed Baby in the blue suitcase along with the jewelry
he had stolen from the apartment and left via the fire escape.
He stated that he placed Baby in the steam bath portion of the
men’s room in the apartment complex gym and disposed of the
suitcase, knife, and clothing worn during the attack in a large
green dumpster at the Lafayette Valley Forge apartmenis.
Appellant indicated that he returned to work and stayed there
until his wife called when she heard about the incident, at
which time he went home to her. Finally, Appellant stated that
he threw some of the stolen jewelry into the river near Route
422 West, and placed the remaining jewelry in a bag behind a
Coke machine in the fourth floor cafeteria of his work place.

At the conclusion of his written statement, Appellant con-
sented to having the statement both video and audio-recorded,
which began at approximately 7:11 am. and concluded at
approximately 7:31 a.m. During the video, Appellant reiterated
the information given in his written statement and demon-
strated how he stabbed Grandmother while using a plastic

knife. See Commonwealth Exhibit 48. He explained that the
stabbing of Grandmother happened accidentally, and he ex-
pressed remorse. Following the video, Appellant was given the
opportunity to speak with his wife, who was brought to the
police station.’

After the video statement, Appellant was taken to a holding
cell at the police station where he requested to speak to
Detective Bradbury. Appellant thereafter told Detective Brad-
bury for the first time that two “white guys,” one of whom was
named “Josh,” had followed him from the casino and forced
him to participate in the kidnapping. Detective Bradbury did
not ask Appellant any further questions, but merely left the
cell, Later that afternoon, a criminal complaint was filed
charging Appellant with two counts of first-degree murder,
two counts of second-degree murder, kidnapping, burglary,
robbery, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, and abuse of
a corpse, At about 3:15 p.m. that afternoon, Appellant was
arraigned.®

Three days later, on October 29, 2012, Appellant called
Detective Bradbury from prison to again tell him that the two
white men were the actual killers. Contrary to his statement
in the holding cell, Appellant stated that he did not know
either of the white men’s names. He reiterated that the men
had guns and a key to his apartment, and that they threatened
to harm his wife if he did not cooperate in the kidnapping.
Appellant subsequently wrote Detective Bradbury a twenty-
four page letter, repeating the same claim. Commonwealth
Exhibit 44; N.T., Sep. 30, 2014, at 208-83. In the letter,
Appellant indicated that the two white men needed someone
familiar to the Vennas to gain entrance into the residence.
Appellant identified one of the white men only as “Matt” who
5. After obtaining Appellant’s confession, police searched the men’s

sauna at the Marquis Apartments and found Baby’s dead body. They

also searched behind the vending machine at Appellant's workplace
and retrieved the Vennas’ stolen jewelry. Finally, the police went to the

dumpster where Appellant said he discarded the items used in the
crimes, but found no evidence as the trash had already been retrieved,

6. Following his arraignment, Appellant was given the opportunity to
speak with the Indian consulate office.

was purportedly tall and had a bald head and glasses. Not-
withstanding that Appellant had previously identified one of
men as “Josh,” Appellant did not reference “Josh” in the
lengthy letter, but rather only described the second man as
having had gold hair and a beard. Appellant further stated in
the letter that he confessed to the crimes only out of fear that
the real perpetrators would harm his wife if he told the truth.

Appellant subsequently filed various pre-trial motions in-
cluding a motion to suppress the several statements he made
to the detectives as well as his consents to search. Suppression
hearings were held on December 30, 2018, January 2, 2014,
and January 18, 2014, during which the trial court heard
testimony from Detective Bradbury and Appellant. The trial
court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress by order dated
April 21, 2014, and incorporated those findings of fact and
conclusions of law that the court articulated on the record
during the proceeding conducted on April 17, 2014.

Specifically, the trial court found that: Detective Bradbury’s
testimony was “completely credible” and his questioning meth-
ods were not improper; Detective Bradbury read Appellant
his Miranda rights and Appellant waived such rights validly;
and Appellant did not invoke his right to silence or ask for an
attorney. N.T., Apr. 17, 2014, at 77~78. The trial court also
found that throughout the entire questioning, Appellant never
appeared to be overcome by exhaustion, emotion, or any kind
of adverse physical effects and that Detective Bradbury did
not threaten, make promises, or use force to obtain Appel-
lant’s cooperation but, rather, treated him with courtesy and
respect. The trial court concluded that Appellant was not
placed in custody until after he completed his confessions to
the murders, at which time Miranda warnings had already
been administered and Appellant had validly waived them. Id.
at 80. Accordingly, the trial court held that the police legally
obtained the written statements taken throughout the day, the
video statement, and the various consent forms Appellant
executed. Id. at 81.

Appellant thereafter filed a motion for waiver of counsel and
a motion to proceed pro se, alleging that he was unsatisfied

with his counsel’s representation and believed that he could
better represent himself. Following a hearing and colloquy on
May 16, 2014, the trial court concluded that Appellant know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel
and permitted him to proceed pro se. The court appointed
Attorney Stephen G. Heckman as standby counsel and Attor-
ney Henry S. Hilles, ITI, remained as penalty phase counsel.”

At trial, which began on September 25, 2014, the Common-
wealth presented the testimony of Detective Bradbury, who
explained in great detail Appellant’s questioning, his voluntary
cooperation, and his ultimate confession to the offenses, The
Commonwealth presented evidence corroborating specific as-
sertions made in Appellant’s confession, such as testimony
establishing that Baby’s body was recovered in the men’s
sauna at the Marquis Apartments, that ten ransom notes were
found at the crime scene, and that the Vennas’ stolen jewelry
was discovered behind a vending machine in Appellant’s office
building. Further, the Commonwealth presented the testimony
of Dr. Paul Hoyer, a forensic pathologist who performed the
autopsies of the victims and opined that the victims’ deaths
were consistent with the manner of death described by Appel-
lant in his confession. Finally, relating to motive, the Common-
wealth presented testimony that Appellant had borrowed mon-
ey from friends shortly before the murders to obtain visiting
visas for his in-laws, but later lost a large sum of money
gambling at the Valley Forge Casino.

Appellant testified on his own behalf in narrative form as he
was acting pro se. Appellant denied killing the victims and,
instead, suggested that two white men had robbed him and
forced him to assist in the commission of the crimes.® He
admitted that he was forced to: disclose the Vennas’ informal

7. Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, the trial court
informed Appellant that standby counsel was prepared to represent him
and again explained the information contained in the waiver of counsel
form. N.T., Sep. 25, 2014, at 5~22. Thereafter, Appellant again indicat-
ed that he desired to represent himself and signed the waiver of counsel
form, Id. at 22.

8. Appellant referenced one of the men as “Matt,” but did not elaborate
on his identity.

names of “Latha” and “Shiva,” N.T., Oct. 7, 2014, at 185; write
the ransom note, id. at 182; take the two white men to the
Vennas’ apartment through the fire escape, id. at 188; and
remove the gold bangles from Grandmother’s body after the
stabbing. Id. at 158, 221. Appellant insisted that he did not kill
either victim, but rather observed one of the two white men
stab Grandmother, He further provided the jury with his
account of the questioning conducted by Detectives Bradbury
and Rathfon, suggesting that his statements were not made
voluntarily as he only confessed because he feared the real
killers, feared his wife may be arrested, and did not under-
stand the Miranda warnings or the consent forms. Appellant
explained that he tried to inform the detectives about the real
killers, but the detectives would not believe him. Additionally,
Appellant presented character evidence establishing that he
has a good reputation for being a law-abiding, peaceful, and
nonviolent individual.®

Following trial, the jury convicted Appellant of two counts
of first degree murder, kidnapping, burglary, robbery, and
abuse of corpse. Following the penalty proceeding, during
which Appellant was represented by counsel, the jury re-
turned two verdicts of death. For the first-degree murder of
Baby, the jury found four aggravating circumstances and
three mitigating circumstances and concluded that the former
outweighed the latter.” Relating to the first degree murder of

9. Forensic evidence presented at trial neither excluded nor confirmed.
Appellant as the perpetrator. The parties stipulated that, pursuant to
DNA analysis, Appellant could not be excluded as a potential male
contributor to the DNA obtained from Grandmother's fingernails; N.T.,
Oct. 2, 2014, at 139; no latent fingerprints were recovered from the
crime scene, id. at 142; and three hairs found on the ransom note and
on Baby’s body and dress could not have come from Appellant. Id. at
143.

10. The four aggravating circumstances found in relation to Baby's
murder were: holding the victim for ransom, 42 Pa,C.S. § 9711(d)(3);
commission of the killing during the perpetration of a felony, id.
§ 9711(d)(6); conviction of another federal or state offense, committed
either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence
of life imprisonment was imposable, id. § 9711(d)(10); and the victim
was a child under twelve years of age, id, § 9711(d)(16). The mitigating
circumstances found were: no significant history of prior criminal
convictions, id. § 9711(e)(1); extreme mental or emotional disturbance,

Grandmother, the jury found two aggravating circumstances
and concluded that they outweighed the same three mitigating
circumstances found in relation to Baby’s murder." The trial
court formally sentenced Appellant to death on November 20,
2014. By opinion dated February 20, 2016, the trial court
rejected the twenty issues Appellant presented in his Pa.
R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal.

Il. Sufficiency of the Evidence

HH Although not challenged by Appellant, as in every
case where a death sentence has been imposed, we begin by
conducting an independent review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the convictions for first-degree murder.
Commonwealth v. Woodard, 634 Pa. 162, 129 A.8d 480, 489
(2015); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d
987, 942 n.8 (1982). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at
trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact finder to
conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the ele-
ments of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Woodard,
129 A.3d at 489-90 (citing Commonwealth v. Fears, 575 Pa.
281, 836 A.2d 52, 58-59 (2008)). It is well-established that the
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof by means of
wholly circumstantial evidence and the jury, while passing
upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evi-
dence, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

id. § 9711(@)(2); and any other evidence of mitigation concerning

Appellant's character and record and the circumstances of his offense.
Id. § 9711(e)(8).

11, The two aggravating circumstances found in relation to Grandmoth-
er’s murder were: commission of the killing during the perpetration of
a felony, id. § 9711(d)(6), and conviction of another federal or state
offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue,
for which a sentence of life imprisonment was imposable. Id.
§ 9711(d)(10). The jury found the same mitigating factors as it found
for the murder of Baby. See n.10, supra.

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 684 Pa. 517, 180 A.3d 697, 709
(2015).

HMM First-degree murder is an intentional killing, a “will-
ful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a),
(d). To prove first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) a human being
was killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing;
and (8) the defendant acted with malice and the specific intent
to kill. Poplawski, 180 A.2d at 709, The jury may infer the
intent to kill based upon the defendant’s use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body. Commonwealth v.
Sanchez, 623 Pa. 253, 82 A.3d 948, 967 (2018).

Hl Upon careful review of the record, we conclude that
the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence at Appel-
lant’s trial to support his convictions for the first-degree
murder of Baby and Grandmother. When viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the
evidence establishes that Appellant confessed to the killings in
a written statement as well as a video-taped statement, where-
in he confirmed that he entered the Vennas’ apartment with
an intent to kidnap Baby and hold her for $50,000 ransom,
stabbed Grandmother in the throat when she showed resis-
tance, and silenced Baby’s cries by stuffing a handkerchief in
her mouth, tying a bath towel around her head to keep the
handkerchief in place, putting Baby in a suitcase, and ulti-
mately abandoning her in the sauna.

The testimony of Dr. Paul Hoyer, the forensic pathologist
who performed the autopsies of the victims, established that
the victims’ causes of death were consistent with the descrip-
tions given by Appellant in his confession. Dr. Hoyer opined
that Grandmother's cause of death was multiple cut, stab, and
chop wounds to the neck inflicted by a knife, and that the
manner of death was homicide. N.T., Oct. 2, 2014, at 158. He
explained that Grandmother sustained three different wounds
to her neck, with the knife travelling three inches, resulting in
three “chops” to her spinal column, id. at 159, that severed
vital areas of her body including her carotid arteries, jugular
arteries, trachea and esophagus. Id. at 161. Further, Dr,
Hoyer stated that Grandmother also suffered at least three
chest stab wounds, which had been inflicted later in time than

the neck wounds. Id. at 165-66, Based on the injuries ob-
served, he opined that the type of knife used in the attack was
a single-edged, ordinary-sized knife. Jd. at 167. He also identi-
fied defensive wounds on Grandmother's hands. Jd. at 167-68,

Dr, Hoyer further testified that the cause of Baby’s death
was asphyxia or an inability to breathe and that the manner of
death was homicide. Id. at 171, 175, He found that there was a
soft suffocation, meaning that there was some sort of mechani-
cal obstruction to breathing such as something pressing on the
child’s chest, or mouth, or that something was in her mouth
that prevented her from breathing. Jd. at 172. Dr. Hoyer
indicated that a soft suffocating death could arise if one put a
handkerchief in the child’s mouth, wrapped a towel around the
child’s head, and then placed the child in a suitcase. Id. 178-
74, He opined that Baby had died three days prior to when
her body was found, which would have been the day of the
kidnapping. Id. at 174. Dr, Hoyer confirmed that all of his
opinions were given to a reasonable degree of medical certain-
ty. Id. at 175.

As noted, the Commonwealth additionally presented evi-
dence corroborating specific details of Appellant’s confession,
such as testimony establishing that Baby's body, clad in a
white dress, was recovered where Appellant had confessed to
leaving it, in the men’s sauna at the Marquis Apartments,
N.T., Oct. 1, 2014, at 198-99; N.T., Oct. 2, 2014, at 42; that
ten ransom notes were found at the Vennas’ apartment, id. at
12-18; and that the jewelry stolen during the incident was
found behind a vending machine in Appellant’s office building.
N.T., Oct. 8, 2014, at 99-100. Finally, the Commonwealth
presented testimony that Appellant had borrowed money from
friends shortly before the murders to obtain visiting visas for
his in-laws, but later lost a large sum of money gambling at
the Valley Forge Casino.

When this evidence is viewed in the proper light, it is
sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Baby
and Grandmother were killed, that Appellant was responsible
for the killings, and that he acted with malice and the specific
intent to kill both victims. While the jury was free to believe

Appellant’s theory that two men forced his limited partic-
ipation in these crimes, its verdict indicates that it did not do
so.”

‘We now turn to the various issues presented in Appellant’s
brief.

III. Standard and Scope of Appellate Review

HM As the majority of Appellant’s contentions chal-
lenge the trial court’s suppression ruling, we begin by empha-
sizing that our standard of review in addressing a challenge to
a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the factual findings are supported by the
record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Woodard, 129 A.38d at 498, We are bound by
the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are
supported by the record; our standard of review on questions
of law is de novo. Commonwealth v. Galvin, 608 Pa. 625, 985
A.2d 783, 795 (2009). Where, as here, the defendant is appeal-
ing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only
the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evi-
dence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Poplawski,
130 A.3d at 711. Our scope of review of suppression rulings
includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
evidence elicited at trial. In the Interest of L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79
A.8d 1078, 1085 (2018)."

12, The subject of the two white men identified by Appellant only as
“Matt” and “Josh” was explored when Appellant called Detective
Bradbury as a defense witness and asked him why he failed to follow up
on leads that Appellant had given him regarding the “real killers.”
Detective Bradbury responded, “I would have chased Matt and Josh to
the gates of hell if I thought they were involved in this, but there was no
evidence then, there’s no evidence now, and there never will be any
evidence that they were involved.” N.T., Oct. 6, 2014, at 118,

13. When this Court decided LJ. on October 30, 2013, we declared that
our holding, limiting the scope of review of a suppression ruling to the
suppression hearing record, was to be applied prospectively, 79 A.3d at
1088-99, Appellant's suppression hearings occurred thereafter in De-
cember of 2013 and January of 2014. While Appellant offers no objec-
tion to prospective application of the Court’s decision in L.J., he claims
that L.J. was wrongly decided as it prevents a defendant from relying on
trial evidence to establish that the Commonwealth presented false
evidence during the suppression hearing. To the extent Appellant's

—
IV. Suppression Based on Illegal Arrest at Casino

Appellant contends that his initial encounter with Detectives
Bradbury and Rathfon at the Valley Forge Casino on October
25, 2012, constituted an illegal arrest unsupported by probable
cause and, thus, all statements resulting from the subsequent
police questioning should have been suppressed." In support
thereof, Appellant asserts that the detectives: had casino
security personnel and a state policeman escort him from a
gaming table to a private hallway restricted for casino employ-
ees; precluded him from cashing in his chips; failed to return
his casino player’s card; prohibited him from driving to the
police station in his own vehicle; held his cell phone during the
drive to the police station; and denied his requests to call his
pregnant wife and answer her incoming call. Appellant argues
that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would
not have felt comfortable terminating the encounter at the
casino and, instead, would have complied with the detectives’
request to accompany them to the police department solely
out of fear. Accordingly, he contends, all evidence stemming
from the illegal detention at the casino, including his inculpato-
ry written and video-taped statements given later at the police
station, should have been suppressed.

The Commonwealth refutes Appellant’s claim that he was
illegally arrested at the casino. It submits that Appellant was
not in custody until he was formally arrested after he complet-

argument is preserved, considering that he did not forward such
contention in the trial court, we find his interpretation of L.J. flawed as
that decision does not preclude a defendant from challenging a sup-
pression ruling at trial based upon evidence that was unavailable when
the suppression hearing took place. See id., at 1084 (acknowledging an
exception to the generally limited scope of review of a suppression
ruling pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. $81(J), where evidence that was not
available at the time of the suppression hearing can be admissible at
trial to challenge a prior adverse suppression ruling). Accordingly,
while we address and ultimately reject Appellant's false evidence claim
infra at 526-27, we note at this juncture that Appellant's challenge to
LJ. does not entitle him to relief in this appeal as it is based on a flawed
interpretation of that decision.

14, Although Appellant invokes both the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions in connection with his suppression claims, he does not
argue that a different standard should be applied under the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution.

——————

ed his voluntary confession to police at approximately 7:31
a.m. the following day. The Commonwealth characterizes what
occurred at the casino as a mere encounter as Appellant
agreed voluntarily to assist in the investigation of Baby’s
kidnapping. The Commonwealth concludes that, because Ap-
pellant was not in custody or deprived of his freedom in any
way at the casino, his subsequent statements should not be
subject to suppression on this basis.

The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth, expressly
crediting Detective Bradbury’s suppression hearing testimony.
The court found that two casino security officers and a Penn-
sylvania State Policeman made contact with Appellant at the
blackjack table and asked him to come into the hallway; that
Detective Bradbury then asked Appellant if he would help in
the investigation of Baby’s kidnapping by coming to the police
station to answer questions; that without hesitation, Appellant
said yes; that none of the officers told Appellant that he was
required to speak with them, none of them were in uniform,
and no badges or weapons were displayed; that prior to
exiting the casino, Appellant asked to cash out his chips, which
a casino employee did for him; that the detectives informed
Appellant that they would drive him to the police station and
return him to his vehicle when the questioning was concluded;
that Appellant was not restrained while travelling in Detective
Bradbury’s unmarked vehicle; and that Appellant consented
to Detective Bradbury holding his cell phone during the ride
and the phone was returned to him upon arriving at the police
station without the detectives examining its contents. Based on
the totality of these circumstances, the trial court concluded
that Appellant was not under arrest or otherwise in custodial
detention as a reasonable person in his circumstances would
have felt free to decline the detectives’ requests,

HM Upon careful review, we conclude that the facts as
found by the suppression court are supported by the record
and that the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. We agree with the trial court that Appellant was not
arrested or illegally detained at the casino, and thus, the trial
court did not err by refusing to suppress his subsequent

a

statements made to the detectives at the police station, as they
were not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 88 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968)
(holding that, where the police detained and arrested a person
without probable cause, the detention and arrest were illegal
and all statements and evidence collected as a result of the
illegality must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree).

MMMM “The standard for determining whether police
have initiated a custodial interrogation or an arrest is an
objective one, with due consideration given to the reasonable
impression conveyed to the person interrogated rather than
the strictly subjective view of the troopers or the person being
seized.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 585 Pa. 210, 634 A.2d
1078, 1085-86 (1998). An arrest exists when the police intend-
ed to take the defendant into custody and the defendant was
subjected to the actual control and will of the police. Common-
wealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa, 665, 450 A.2d 975, 978 (1982). A
person is in custody when he is physically denied his freedom
of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in
which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or
movement is restricted by the interrogation. Woodard, 129
A8d at 499 n.10 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 615 Pa.
354, 42 A.3d 1017, 1028 (2012)).

As the trial court emphasized, Appellant agreed, without
hesitation, to accompany the detectives to the police station to
assist in the investigation of Baby’s kidnapping, N.T., Dec. 30,
2018, at 22, and none of the officers told Appellant that he was
required to speak with them, none of the officers were in
uniform, and no badges or weapons were displayed. Id. at 16.
The fact that casino security personnel and the plainclothes
state trooper initially asked Appellant to come to the hallway
where the detectives were located did not impede Appellant’s
freedom of movement or suggest that he was required to
comply with the detectives’ request. Similarly, that the detec-
tives drove Appellant to the police station in an unmarked
vehicle, briefly held his cell phone during the ride to the
station, and possessed his casino player’s card, did not individ-
ually, or in the aggregate, suggest that Appellant was under

| CC trCiéiaee
formal compulsion to respond." Accordingly, the trial court’s
conclusion that Appellant was not in custody or arrested at the
casino was correct. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 5389 Pa,
61, 650 A2d 420, 427 (1994) (holding that the defendant’s
freedom of movement had not been restricted and that he was
not in custody when police officers asked him to accompany
them and give a statement); Edmiston, 684 A.2d at 1086-87
(holding that the defendant’s voluntary appearance at the
police barracks to answer questions regarding a missing child
constituted a mere encounter in which he was under no official
compulsion to respond).

V. Suppression Based on Absence of Miranda Warnings

HM As noted, Appellant arrived at the Upper Merion
Police Station at approximately 3:15 p.m. and was not advised
of his Miranda rights until 11:08 p.m. He argues that because
he was subjected to custodial interrogation during this time
without receiving Miranda warnings, the various statements
he gave to detectives (which outlined his whereabouts at the
time of the murder/kidnapping, but did not expressly inculpate
him in the crimes) should have been suppressed. He concedes
that the detectives repeatedly advised him that he was not in
custody and that he was free to leave. Appellant contends,
however, that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates
that he was unable to leave because the detectives retained his
car keys and cell phone and a police officer’s badge was
required to exit the building. He further submits that, during
this period, the detectives denied his numerous requests to
call his pregnant wife, which rendered him “incommunicado by
blocking contact with the outside world.” Brief for Appellant
at 40. In Appellant’s view, no reasonable person in his situa-
tion would have felt free to leave. See Brief for Appellant at 42
(citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 473 Pa, 562, 875 A.2d 1260,

15. The record does not establish that the detectives seized Appellant’s
casino player's card from him, but suggests only that the detectives
failed to return the card after casino personnel had taken it from
Appellant and given it to police. See N.T., Jan. 2, 2014, at 108-10
(referencing Appellant’s suppression hearing testimony establishing that
casino personnel had taken his player’s card and had given it to the
police).

| 1265 (1977), for the proposition that an extended station house

interrogation creates a reasonable belief in the person being
interrogated that his freedom of action is restrained); see
also Brief for Appellant at 39 (citing Commonwealth v. Di-
Stefomo, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001), for the proposi-
tion that an officer’s statement that the defendant could leave
if he told the truth did not preclude a finding of custodial
interrogation where the defendant could not leave as a prac-

tical matter as the police possessed his car keys).

The Commonwealth disputes Appellant’s contention that he
was subject to custodial interrogation during the period at
issue and reiterates that Appellant was not in custody until he
was formally arrested several hours later, following his volun-
tary confession. It emphasizes that Appellant: was not hand-
cuffed during the questioning; was repeatedly reminded that
he was free to leave; was permitted to roam around the
unlocked room; was offered food, water, and access to the
restroom; did not indicate any discomfort while being ques-
tioned; and, indeed, confirmed that the officers had treated
him well. Thus, the Commonwealth concludes that the trial
court did not err in denying suppression of the statements
made during this period based upon the absence of Miranda
warnings.

The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth, again cred-
iting Detective Bradbury’s suppression hearing testimony. The
court found: that Appellant’s questioning did not occur in an
interrogation room, but rather in an office with two desks;
that the door was closed for privacy reasons, but was not
locked; that Appellant was offered food and drink; that
Appellant was permitted to leave the room unaccompanied to
use the restroom; and, significantly, that Appellant was not
restrained and was repeatedly advised that he was free to
leave and was not under arrest. While the court did not
address specifically the retention of Appellant’s car keys and
cell phone, it acknowledged that, during this period, Appellant
consented to searches of his car, cell phone, apartment, laptop,
and flash drive as well as a DNA buccal swab and photograph-
ing of his body.

The court emphasized that Appellant never indicated that
he wanted to leave, never asked for an attorney, and never
requested that the officers stop the questioning. It further
noted that Appellant was given an opportunity to review each
statement and make corrections or additions, and he initialed
each answer and signed the bottom of every page. The court
found that there were several breaks in the questioning where
Appellant and the detectives discussed topics unrelated to the
kidnapping/murder, such Appellant’s Indian culture and his
father. The trial court noted that Detective Bradbury’s inter-
rogation approach changed when he received information that
Appellant’s wife contradicted his statements concerning his
whereabouts during the time of the murder, leading Detective
Bradbury to advise Appellant of his Miranda rights at 11:08
p.m, Based on the totality of these circumstances, the trial
court concluded that Appellant was not subject to custodial
interrogation from 8:15 p.m. through 11:03 p.m. and, thus, all
statements given during that time were voluntary and gratu-
itous.

HE The United States Supreme Court has held that,
before law enforcement officers question an individual who has
been in taken into custody or has been deprived of his
freedom in any significant way, the officers must first warn
the individual that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed. Mi-
randa, 884 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602. However, these
special procedural safeguards are required only where a sus-
pect is both taken into custody and subjected to interrogation.
Commonwealth v. Bland, 681 Pa. 644, 115 A.3d 854, 857 (2015)
(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct.
1682, 64 L.EHd.2d 297 (1980)). In determining whether a sus-
pect is in custody, two discrete inquiries are essential: (1) an
examination of the circumstances surrounding the interroga-
tion; and (2) a determination of whether, given those circum-
stances, would a reasonable person have felt that he or she
was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. J.D.B.

oe
v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270, 181 S.Ct. 2394, 180
L,Ed.2d 810 (2011) (citations omitted), As noted, a person is in
eustody for Miranda purposes only when he is physically
denied his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed
in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom
of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation.
Woodard, 129 A3d at 499 n.10, Statements not made in
response to custodial interrogation are classified as gratuitous
and not subject to suppression for lack of Miranda warnings.
Commonwealth v. Whitley, 500 Pa. 442, 457 A.2d 507, 508
(1988), Whether an encounter is deemed “custodial” must be
determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.
Edmiston, 634 A.2d at 1086.

HH nitially, we agree with Appellant that a law enforce-
ment officer’s statement to the suspect that he is free to leave
does not, in and of itself, preclude a finding that the suspect is
in custody. See Brown, 875 A.2d at 1265 n.6. (stating that the
mere fact that the defendant was told that he was not under
arrest did not mean that he was never subjected to custodial
interrogation), We reject, however, Appellant’s contentions
that he could not exercise his freedom of movement because
the detectives had retained his car keys and cell phone, he
could not exit the building without an officer’s badge, and he
was precluded from contacting his wife.

A reasonable person in Appellant’s situation would not view
the detectives’ acquisition of his car keys and cell phone as
restricting his freedom to end the encounter because Appel-
lant himself provided these items to the detectives and execut-
ed voluntary consent forms permitting the officers to search
his cell phone and car.* Notably, Appellant cites to no portion
of the record establishing that the detectives denied his re-
quests for the return of his cell phone and car keys so that
Appellant could stop the interview and leave the police station,
To the contrary, the record indicates that Appellant never
stated that he wanted to leave, never asked to stop the
questioning, and never refused to answer questions, N.T., Dec.

16, Appellant does not present an issue in this appeal challenging the
consensual searches of his cell phone and car.

30, 2018, at 90, 100, 102, 108; N.T., Jan. 2, 2014, at 5. Had
Appellant made such requests and been refused, an examina-
tion of the totality of the circumstances may have supported a
finding of custodial interrogation. See Commonwealth v, Di-
Stefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001) (finding that the
defendant was held in custodial interrogation where the defen-
dant was detained at the police station for eleven hours over
night, his vehicle keys were taken and not returned, and he
indicated a desire to leave, but was refused).

Additionally, Appellant’s contention that he could not exit
the police station without displaying an officer’s badge is
unsupported. The record establishes that the door to the office
in which Appellant was being questioned was closed for priva-
ey reasons, but not locked. Further, while the record suggests
that the detectives and Appellant entered the police station
through a private back door, see N.T., Jan. 2, 2014, at 111-12;
N.T., Jan. 18, 2014, at 56, Appellant points to no evidence
establishing that a badge was required to leave the building or
that the private back door was the exclusive exit. Finally, we
do not view Appellant’s purported inability to call his wife as a
significant restriction on his freedom of movement as the
circumstances indicate that Appellant could have heeded the
detectives’ directive that he was free to leave and gone home
to speak with his wife or check on her welfare.

Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding
Appellant’s questioning during the period from 3:15 p.m.
through 11:02 p.m., we conclude that, consistent with Detec-
tive Bradbury’s repeated directive that Appellant was free to
leave and was not under arrest, a reasonable person would
have felt that he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and leave. Accordingly, we hold that the record supports the
trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances sur-
rounding Appellant’s interrogation and that the trial court was
correct in concluding that Appellant was not in custody during
the challenged time period, thus, his statements to the detec-
tives were gratuitous and not subject to suppression for lack
of Miranda warnings.

VI. Suppression Based on Illegal Arrest at 11:03 p.m.

HE Appellant next argues that he was arrested without
probable cause at 11:08 p.m. when Miranda warnings were
administered and that his subsequent confession must be
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution as the product of this illegal arrest. In
support of this contention, Appellant asserts that he had been
subjected to eight hours of questioning by this time and had
told the detectives that he wanted to go home and/or speak
with his wife, but was not allowed to leave or call his wife. He
reiterates his previous claims that he did not have possession
of his car keys and cell phone, was never provided food, and
could not exit the police station without a badge. Appellant
further places great emphasis on an inconsistency between
Detective Bradbury’s suppression testimony and the detec-
tive’s trial testimony regarding whether the detective held a
subjective, unexpressed belief that Appellant was free to leave
after Miranda warnings were given.” From these allegations,
Appellant concludes that he was under arrest at 11:03 p.m.
when Miranda warnings were administered, which arrest was
unlawful as there was no evidence revealed at that time
establishing that he had engaged in any criminal activity.

Appellant further asserts that the administering of Miranda
rights was insufficient to purge the taint of the Fourth
Amendment violation resulting from the illegal arrest. See
Brief of Appellant at 52-58 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442
US. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (holding that,
while an ineulpatory statement given after Miranda warnings
may be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment’s privilege

17. During the suppression hearing, Detective Bradbury testified that
when Miranda warnings were administered at 11:03 p.m., Appellant
‘was not under arrest and was free to leave. N.T., Dec. 30, 2013, at 92.
When questioned on direct examination by the Commonwealth at trial,
the detective reiterated that Appellant was not in custody after Miranda
warnings were given. N.T., Sept. 30, 2014, at 156. However, when
called as a defense witness by Appellant, Detective Bradbury stated for
the first time that he did not believe Appellant was free to leave after
Miranda warnings were given. N.T., Oct. 6, 2014, at 83. Detective
Bradbury did not testify that he informed Appellant of this particular
belief at any point during the interrogation.

against self-incrimination, the statement violates the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures if the defendant’s arrest was illegal and there was an
insufficient attenuation between the unlawful arrest and the
statement)). The Commonwealth’s only rebuttal to this issue is
its assertion that Appellant was not arrested until he volun-
tarily confessed to the offenses several hours after Miranda
warnings were given.

The trial court found that Appellant’s Fourth Amendment
claim was belied by the record because, even after providing
him with Miranda warnings, the police continuously reminded
Appellant that he was free to leave. Further, the court con-
cluded, the physical environment did not change in any way
after Appellant waived his Miranda rights in that he was still
unrestrained and able to take breaks unaccompanied by the
detectives. Thus, the trial court concluded, a reasonable per-
son in Appellant’s position at that point in time would have
continued to feel free to end the interrogation and leave the
police station, notwithstanding the detectives’ cautionary pro-
vision of Miranda warnings. The trial court rejected Appel-
lant’s reliance upon inconsistencies in Detective Bradbury’s
suppression testimony and trial testimony, holding that Detec-
tive Bradbury’s subjective view as to whether Appellant was
free to leave was irrelevant to the inquiry of whether a
reasonable person in Appellant’s position would have felt free
to leave. The trial court concluded that even if Appellant was
under arrest at that time, he was advised of his Miranda
rights and voluntarily and intelligently waived them.

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. Having
already concluded that Appellant was not in custodial interro-
gation for purposes of Miranda immediately prior to 11:08
p.m., we agree with the trial court that the administering of
Miranda warnings at that time did not transform the detec-
tives’ noncustodial questioning of Appellant into an arrest.
Even after the officers informed Appellant of his Miranda
rights, Appellant was offered food and drink, went to the
restroom unaccompanied, was free to leave and was not under

arrest, and never indicated that he wanted to leave or stop the
questioning. N.T., Dec, 30, 2018, at 74, 79, 90, 92.

Additionally, the trial court was correct in holding that
Detective Bradbury's trial testimony regarding his unex-
pressed subjective belief as to whether Appellant was free to
leave after Miranda warnings were administered has no rele-
vance to the custody inquiry. See Stansbury v. California, 611
US. 818, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Hd.2d 298 (1994) (holding
that a law enforcement officer’s unarticulated subjective belief
as to whether the person being questioned is a criminal
suspect is irrelevant to the custody determination because a
custody assessment depends on the objective circumstances of
an interrogation). Further, consideration of Detective Brad-
bury’s trial testimony is outside this Court’s scope of review-
ing a suppression ruling. See In the Interest of L.J., 79 A.3d at
1085 (limiting appellate scope of review of a suppression ruling
to the record of the suppression hearing).

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant was not placed
under arrest until he completed his confession the following
day, after having waived his Miranda rights, Thus, the prem-
ise underlying the instant suppression claim, i.¢., that Appel-
lant was illegally arrested at 11:03 p.m., is false and suppres-
sion of Appellant’s subsequent inculpatory statement on
Fourth Amendment grounds is unwarranted.

VU. Suppression Based on Involuntariness
of Confession

While we have determined that Appellant was not in custo-
dial interrogation when he made his statements to the detec-
tives, his confession may still be deemed inadmissible on the
ground that it was not voluntarily given. See Commonwealth
v. Nester, 551 Pa, 157, 709 A.2d 879, 882 (1998) (citation
omitted) (recognizing that it is possible for a non-custodial
interrogation to result in an involuntary confession); see also
J.D.B., 564 U.S, at 268, 181 S.Ct. 2894 (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 98 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1978)) (holding that due process precludes admission of a

confession where a defendant’s will was overborne by the
circumstances of an interrogation).

HH Appellant contends that his confession should have
been suppressed as involuntary because it was the result of
“psychological manipulation, coercion, promises, and threats.”
Brief for Appellant at 57, In support of this claim, Appellant
reiterates his previous assertions that the detectives illegally
detained him, held his car keys and cell phone, declined to
allow him to call his wife, and did not provide food. Appellant,
further asserts that his confession was involuntary because
Detective Bradbury: continuously questioned him throughout
the approximately 16-hour detention period (from 8:15 p.m. on
October 25 through 7:31 am. the following day); did not
offer him an opportunity to sleep; promised on the bible and
his dead parents’ graves that Appellant was lying about his
whereabouts at the time of the murder; threatened that his
wife could be arrested if she gave false information to the
police; threatened that Appellant could be arrested for possi-
ble insurance fraud in connection with an unrelated car acci-
dent; placed Baby's pictures in front of him to elicit an
emotional response; and promised Appellant that he could
meet with his wife and have breakfast with her if he confessed.
He contends that his written statements during the question-
ing demonstrated that he was in an altered psychological state
as he indicated that he was “completely helpless” and that
people should believe him in the future if something happens
to him. As further evidence of the involuntariness of his
confession, Appellant cites the fact that he expressed unwill-
ingness to cooperate with the detectives by sitting silently on
the floor in the corner of the room for an extended period of
time.*

The Commonwealth responds that the facts as found by the
suppression court, which are supported by the record, estab-
lish that Appellant’s statements were freely and voluntarily
18. Finally, Appellant contends that his statement was involuntary due

to an unnecessary delay between his arrest and arraignment. For the

reasons set forth in Part X infra, we find that any delay in Appellant's
arraignment did not affect the voluntariness of his confession.

aT

given to the detectives and were not derived from illegal police
misconduct or undue delay. Under the totality of the cireum-
stances analysis, the Commonwealth maintains, nothing about
Appellant’s interactions with the police indicates coercion as:
he was notified that he was free to leave at the beginning of
the interview and was repeatedly informed so as the interview
continued; he voluntarily answered questions and was not
arrested until after confessing to the crimes; he was not
questioned during the entirety of the time spent in the police
station; his movements were not restricted; he was adminis-
tered and waived his Miranda rights; he provided written
consent prior to recording the video statement; and he admit-
ted in his statement that the detectives had treated him well
throughout the entire interview.

The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth and held
that Appellant’s confession was voluntarily made. It relied on
the facts demonstrating that: Appellant’s questioning was not
continuous and numerous breaks were taken during which
Appellant discussed unrelated topics; Appellant was not in-
jured or ill during his interview; he was offered both food and
drink, although only accepted water; and he was not abused
or threatened with abuse. It emphasized that Appellant never
asked to speak to an attorney, never refused to answer
questions, and never requested that the questioning stop. The
court acknowledged that, at some point, Appellant had retreat-
ed to a corner of the room for about fifteen to twenty minutes,
and wrote down numerous times that he loved his wife.”

The court found that, thereafter, Detective Bradbury con-
fronted Appellant with what he believed were lies regarding
his whereabouts at the time the crimes were committed,
placed his hand on the bible, and swore on his parents’ graves

19. Appellant also wrote and later crossed out the phrase “three people
who should.” At trial, he maintained that this language was inserted to
inform the detectives of three people who should be investigated as
suspects, but that Detective Bradbury directed him to cross out that
phrase in his statement. To the contrary, the trial court credited
Detective Bradbury's testimony that he never directed Appellant to
cross out any words in his statement. Trial Court Opinion, dated Feb.
10, 2016, at 29 (citing N.T., Dec. 30, 2013, at 154).

a
that Appellant's wife, and not Appellant, was telling the truth.
Detective Bradbury did not, however, change his tone or
speak in a threatening manner. The court noted that the
detective then displayed pictures of Baby, at which time
Appellant became emotional. Detective Bradbury ultimately
called Appellant’s wife at 8:45 a.m., upon Appellant’s request,
to let her know that he was alright. The trial court explained
that, after Detective Bradbury spoke to Appellant’s wife, the
detective indicated that it was time for Appellant to tell the
truth. Shortly thereafter, at approximately 4:00 am., the
question and answer statement began that resulted in Appel-
lant’s confession.

The trial court found that none of the tactics employed by
the detectives rose to the level of physical or psychological
coercion that would render Appellant’s statement involuntary.
Trial Court Opinion, at 31. In support of its finding of volun-
tariness of Appellant’s confession, the trial court further em-
phasized that Appellant, a highly intelligent 26 year-old with a
master’s degree in electrical and computer science engineer-
ing, was informed of his Miranda rights prior to his confes-
sion and signed the Miranda waiver form, reviewed and
signed the written confession, and executed a consent to have
his statement audio and video recorded. The trial court ob-
served that in Appellant’s videotaped confession, which took
place after the lengthy period of questioning, Appellant ap-
pears calm, cooperative and exhibited no signs of physical
exhaustion or injury. Based on the totality of these circum-
stances, the trial court concluded that Appellant’s statements
were voluntary and not subject to suppression.

Hs It is well-established that when a defendant alleg-
es that his confession was involuntary, the inquiry becomes
“not whether the defendant would have confessed without
interrogation, but whether the interrogation was so manipu-
lative or coercive that it deprived the defendant of his ability
to make a free and unconstrained decision to confess.” Com-
monwealth v. Sepulveda, 618 Pa. 262, 55 A3d 1108, 1187
(2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Templin, 568 Pa. 806, 795
A.2d 959, 966 (2002)), The voluntariness of a confession is

determined from a review of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the confession, Nester, 709 A.2d at 882, The
Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant confessed voluntarily. Id.

When examining the voluntariness of a statement
pursuant to the totality of the circumstances, a court should
consider: the duration and means of the interrogation; the
defendant’s physical and psychological state; the conditions
attendant to the detention; the attitude exhibited by the police
during the interrogation; and all other factors that could drain
a person’s ability to resist suggestion and coercion. Common-
wealth v. Perez, 577 Pa, 860, 845 A.2d 779, 787 (2004) (citation
omitted). Additional relevant factors include: the accused’s
age and level of education and experience; his extent of
previous experience with the police; whether the accused was
advised of his constitutional rights; whether he was injured,
ill, drugged, or intoxicated when he confessed; whether he
was deprived of food, sleep or medical attention, and whether
he was abused or threatened with abuse, Id, at 787.

Applying this jurisprudence to the totality of the cireum-
stances, we find that the suppression court’s findings are
supported by the record and its conclusion that Appellant’s
confession was voluntary is correct. A review of the duration
and means of the interrogation reveals that while Appellant
was present at the police station for at least thirteen hours
before he confessed (from approximately 3:15 p.m. to some-
time after 4:00 a.m.), he was not subjected to overbearing
physical or mental coercion and, instead, made a free and
unconstrained decision to confess after having been advised of
his rights. Detective Bradbury’s suppression testimony, which
the trial court credited, acknowledged that during the ques-
tioning, he confronted Appellant with what he believed were
lies regarding Appellant’s whereabouts at the time of the
murder, N.T., Dec. 30, 2018, at 96, swore on the bible and his
dead parents’ graves that Appellant was lying, id. at 156;
displayed pictures of Baby, N.T., Jan. 2, 2014, at 21-22;
discussed insurance fraud in an unrelated matter and in-
formed Appellant that it was a crime to lie to an insurance

company regarding a claim; id. at 29-80; and indicated to
Appellant that he could have breakfast with his wife after the
questioning. Id. at 40. We agree with the trial court that,
under the totality of the circumstances of this case, these
tactics did not amount to manipulative or coercive conduct that
deprived Appellant of his ability to decide to confess voluntari-
ly. See Nester, 709 A.2d at 884 (holding that not all psychologi-
eal persuasion is prohibited)” We emphasize that the trial
court credited expressly Detective Bradbury's testimony that
he made no promises or threats to garner Appellant’s confes-
sion. See N.T., Dec. 80, 2018, at 108.

While Appellant is not an American citizen and may have
been unfamiliar with police practices, he is a highly-educated
adult, holding a master’s degree in electrical and computer
seience engineering, which would enable him to understand
the clear directives given to him by the detectives regarding
his rights under the law. Moreover, the trial court had the
opportunity to observe Appellant's demeanor extensively dur-
ing the suppression hearing to assess whether his personality
is one likely to be overborne. We further note that Appellant
examined each of his written statements, made corrections
thereto and signed off on each statement, N.T., Dec. 30, 2018,
at 89; indicated that he understood his Miranda rights when
read to him by Detective Bradbury, and voluntarily signed the
Miranda waiver form as well as execute a consent to video
tape his confession. Jd. at 98-94. Finally, there was nothing in
Appellant’s video-taped confession to suggest that he was
under compulsion to confess or that he was physically or
mentally compromised as Appellant appeared calm and ration-
al, indicated that he was treated with courtesy and respect
during the questioning, and stated that he had no complaints
with the detectives. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to estab-
20. Further, that Appellant indicated in one his statements that he felt

helpless and wished others would believe him if something happened in.

the future does not establish that the detectives coerced his confession.

That particular statement was made after the detectives confronted

Appellant with inconsistencies between his version of the events and

that of his wife, Appellant’s sentiment could merely reflect his realiza-
tion that he may be found criminally liable for the offenses at issue.

lish that his confession was involuntary and should have been
suppressed.

VIII. Suppression Facts Unsupported by Record

Overlooking that this Court views any discrepancies in the
evidence in favor of the party who prevailed at the suppres-
sion hearing, Appellant maintains that the suppression court’s
findings of fact were erroneous because that court ignored
material facts that were favorable to the defense. He enumer-
ates twenty-two “erroneous” factual findings, which, Appellant
believes, impacted adversely the trial court’s legal conclusions
on the suppression issues. See Brief of Appellant at 23-26."
He argues that there was a systematic pattern in the trial
court’s errors because each fact that the court ignored impli-
cated either a restraint on his freedom, perjury by the prose-
cution witnesses, or threats, promises, coercion and deception
that occurred during his interrogation.

The Commonwealth does not respond substantively to this
claim, contending instead that the issue is waived because
Appellant failed to identify where in the record he raised this
claim. See Brief for Appellee at 7 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e),
which requires an appellant to identify where in the record he

21, The topics of the allegedly erroneous findings include: Detective
Bradbury's subjective belief regarding whether Appellant was free to
leave upon the administration of Miranda rights; whether detectives
kept Appellant's casino player's card; whether he could drive himself to
the police station; whether the casino area where he met Detective
Bradbury was unsecured; whether Appellant received incoming calls
on his cell phone while being questioned; whether he was precluded
from calling his wife during the interview; whether the police station
was locked; when the phone and car searches were completed; when
the detectives discovered a contradiction regarding Appellant's where-
abouts at the time of the offenses; whether Detective Bradbury stated
that his wife could be arrested for making false statements to police;
whether the detectives stated that Appellant could be arrested for
insurance fraud; whether the detectives questioned Appellant continu-
ously or took breaks; whether the detectives displayed Baby’s photos;
whether Appellant indicated he was “completely helpless” in one of his
statements made prior to his confession; whether the detectives prom-
ised Appellant that he could see his wife; whether Detective Bradbury
promised on his dead parents’ graves that Appellant was lying; and
whether Appellant sat on the floor during the interrogation to avoid
questioning,

preserved an issue for appellate review). The trial court
addressed the contention, finding that all of its findings of fact
were supported by the record as it found Detective Bradbury’s
testimony to be credible and resolved discrepancies in Appel-
lant’s testimony against him. Trial Court Opinion, at 37.

Viewing Appellant's claim as merely a supplement to his
suppression challenges and not a separate issue, we conclude
that Appellant is not entitled to relief. In resolving the sup-
pression issues herein, we have already addressed Appellant’s
various challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law and have concluded that the record sup-
ports all material facts found and that the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts were correct.

IX. Presentation of False Evidence

Appellant next contends that the Commonwealth engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct during the suppression hearing by
presenting false evidence and by withholding exculpatory evi-
dence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 873 U.S. 88, 88 S.Ct.
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Similar to his previous claim
challenging the trial court’s factual findings, Appellant argues
that both the false evidence and the withheld evidence impli-
cated whether he was in legal custody when questioned by
detectives and, thus, affected adversely the trial court’s legal
conclusions on his suppression issues. In support of this issue,
in his pro se brief, Appellant compares the suppression testi-
mony of Detective Bradbury to his trial testimony and/or to
documentary evidence presented at trial, finds eighteen incon-
sistencies, and concludes summarily that such inconsistencies
prove as a matter of law that the suppression hearing testimo-
ny was false and that the prosecution knowingly presented
perjured testimony in violation of Appellant’s due process
rights
22. The topics of the alleged inconsistencies in the detectives’ testimony

include: Detective Bradbury's subjective belief regarding whether Ap-

pellant was free to leave upon the administration of Miranda rights;

Appellant's requests to call his wife; the phone calls Appellant received

during the interview; the surveillance of his car at the casino; whether
Appellant sought to drive his own car to the police station; when his

HM The Commonwealth does not respond to the sub-
stance of this claim, alleging instead that the trial court
deemed it waived. A review of the record indicates that the
trial court found only the Brady portion of the claim waived
due to Appellant’s failure to identify what evidence the prose-
eution withheld. Trial Court Opinion, at 37-88, The trial
court’s finding in this regard is correct. Similarly, Appellant
has not identified in his appellate brief the particular evidence
allegedly withheld by the prosecution. Accordingly, we deny
relief on the Brady component of this claim based on waiver.
See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 480, 12 Abd 291, 326
n.84 (2011) (deeming a Brady claim waived for lack of develop-
ment).

TM Examining the remaining allegation that the Com-
monwealth presented false evidence at the suppression hear-
ing, we conclude that Appellant has failed to demonstrate
entitlement to relief. Appellant cites only discrepancies in the
detective’s testimony and offers nothing to support his serious
allegation that the prosecution knowingly presented false evi-
dence. We decline Appellant’s invitation to reweigh the sup-
pression evidence against the trial evidence to conclude that
the former was false,

HH While Appellant was free to use any inconsistencies
between the detective’s suppression and trial testimony for
impeachment purposes on cross-examination at trial, such
inconsistencies, in and of themselves, do not constitute false
evidence. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.8d 282,
294 (2010) (citations omitted) (holding there is no claim of
purposeful prosecutorial misrepresentation where the record
fails to reveal any indication of deceptive tactics on the part of

cell phone was downloaded in connection with the consensual search
and where that search occurred; when the detectives found out about
his wife’s inconsistent statement; whether the detectives possessed
Appellant's phone records and when such records were analyzed; at
what time Appellant made his handwritten statements; how many
photos of Baby were displayed; the name of the two white men who
Appellant indicated committed the murder/kidnapping; whether there
was audio or visual recordings made in Appellant's holding cell; and
whether Appellant spoke to Detective Bradbury after arraignment,

the prosecution; minor discrepancies in the Commonwealth’s
case will not be considered false evidence).

X. Improper Jury Instruction on
Voluntariness of Confession

HMM Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing
to charge the jury with the optional language from the sug-
gested standard jury instruction on the voluntariness of a
confession set forth at Pa. SSJI (Crim) 8.04(C). The optional
language provides that the length of delay between arrest and
arraignment should be considered in determining the volun-
tariness of the defendant’s confession. This time period (be-
tween arrest and arraignment) has legal relevance as this
Court previously held in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa.
278, 370 A2d 301 (1977), overruled by Commonwealth v.
Perez, 577 Pa. 360, 845 A.2d 779 (2004), that if a defendant was
not arraigned within six hours after his arrest, the statements
made after his arrest were inadmissible at trial. Davenport's
bright-line six-hour rule was adopted to guard against the
coercive influence of custodial interrogation and to ensure that

23. Included in his argument on this issue is a separate claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, alleging that the prosecutor improperly bol-
stered the credibility of one of its witnesses during closing argument at
the suppression hearing. See Brief for Appellant at 21 (citing N.T., Jan.
31, 2014, at 39-40). Appellant does not elaborate on how the trial
court’s deliberation process was prejudiced by the challenged comment
during a pretrial proceeding, In any event, we deny relief on the ground
that the issue is waived because Appellant has failed to demonstrate
where in the record he preserved this claim and our independent
review discloses no contemporaneous objection. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e)
(requiring an appellant to identify where in the record he preserved an
issue for appellate review).

24, The relevant portion of Pa. SSJI (Crim) 3.04(C), with the omitted
optional language in brackets, provides as follows:

The facts and circumstances to be considered include the age, intelli-
gence, personality, education, experience, and mental and physical
state of the defendant, how the defendant was treated before, during,
and after questioning, the time, place, and conditions under which
the defendant was detained and questioned, the motives and attitudes
of the police who questioned [him] [her] and what was said and done
by the police, the defendant, and anyone else present during the
questioning. [You should consider any delay by the police in bringing
the defendant before a magistrate for arraignment and whether the
delay was unnecessary,]

the accused is afforded the rights to which he is entitled at his
arraignment without unnecessary delay. Davenport, 370 A.2d
at 805.5

This Court in Perez abrogated the bright-line rule of inad-
missibility of statements made more than six hours after
arrest in favor of a totality of the circumstances approach, but
held that unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment
remains a factor to consider in the voluntariness analysis. See
id. at 787 (explaining that “[ilf delay [between arrest and
arraignment] exceeds six hours, it is not grounds to suppress,
but is one factor that must be considered in determining
whether, in the totality of circumstances, coercion resulted in
the challenged evidence”).

In denying Appellant’s request to include the optional lan-
guage directing the jury to consider the delay between his
arrest and arraignment, the trial court found that Appellant
never challenged the timeliness of his arraignment at trial,
and, thus, there was no factual determination to be made by
the jury in this regard. See N.T., Oct. 8, 2014, at 30-31. The
court found that inclusion of the charge given the state of the
record would merely confuse the jury. Trial Court Opinion, at
54, The trial court concluded that, when read in the context of
the charge as a whole, the instruction on the voluntariness of
Appellant’s statements was thorough and clear. Id.

Appellant contends that, contrary to the trial court’s finding,
he presented trial evidence of unnecessary delay in arraign-
ment. Rather than citing a particular portion of the trial
record in which arraignment delay was referenced, Appellant
alters course and retreats to his already rejected contention
that he was arrested at 11:08 p.m. on October 25, 2012, when
the detectives read him his Miranda warnings. See Part VI,
supra. Based on this false premise, he makes the following
25. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 519(A)(1) provides that a

person who has been arrested “‘shall be afforded a preliminary arraign-

ment by the proper issuing authority without necessary delay.” Pa.

R.Crim.P. 519(A)(1), Further, Pa.R.Crim.P, 540(F) requires the issuing

authority to read the criminal complaint to the defendant at his arraign-

ment to inform him of the nature of the charges against him, his right
to counsel, and his right to reasonable bail.

unsupportable assumptions: (1) that he has established a
sixteen-hour delay between his arrest at 11:03 p.m. and his
arraignment at 8:15 p.m. the following day; (2) that his
confession occurred after his arrest and before his arraign-
ment and resulted from the delay in arraignment; and (8) that
the jury should have been directed to consider the delay in
arraignment when considering the voluntariness of his confes-
sion. Appellant concludes that the trial court committed re-
versible error by failing to so charge the jury. See Brief for
Appellant at 66 (citing Commonwealth v. Coach, 471 Pa. 389,
370 A.2d 358 (1977) (holding that where there was a nineteen-
hour delay between the defendant’s arrest and arraignment.
before a magistrate, the trial court committed reversible error
in refusing the defendant’s request to charge the jury that any
unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment is a factor
to be considered by the jury in determining the voluntariness
of the confession).

The Commonwealth responds that there was no undue delay
between Appellant’s arrest and arraignment that warranted
the requested jury charge. It interprets our case law as
holding only that the jury instruction at issue is required in
cases where an undue delay between arrest and arraignment
is actually present. See Brief for Appellee at 24 (interpreting
Commonwealth v. Coach, supra). Accordingly, the Common-
wealth concludes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to charge the jury that it must consider that factor in
the instant case.

HM Trial courts have broad discretion in crafting jury
instructions, and this Court will uphold an instruction so long
as it clearly and accurately presents the law to the jury.
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 620 Pa. 60, 66 A.38d 253, 274
(2013). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to administer an optional suggested standard jury
instruction untethered to facts presented at trial. Unlike the
defendant in Coach, supra, Appellant made no post-arrest
ineulpatory statements that were subject to suppression based

on a delay in arraignment.® As we have already concluded,
Appellant was arrested after he completed his video-taped
confession at approximately 7:31 a.m. on October 26, 2012, and
was arraigned later that day at approximately 3:15 p.m.

While several hours passed between Appellant's arrest and
arraignment, his confession was made prior to his arrest and,
thus, could not have been the result of any delay in bringing
Appellant before a magistrate. Under these circumstances, the
trial court was correct in concluding that the omitted instruc-
tion had no relevance to any factual determination to be made
by the jury. Additionally, upon review, we agree with the trial
court that when read in the context of the charge as a whole,
the instruction on determining the voluntariness of Appellant’s
statements was thorough and clear. See N.T., Oct. 8, 2014, at
188-86, Appellant is, therefore, not entitled to relief on this
claim.

XI. Statutory Review

Finally, this Court must affirm the sentence of death unless
we determine that: (i) the sentence of death was the product
of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; or (ii) the
evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggrava-
ting circumstance. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(8)()~(ii). After review-
ing the record below, we conclude that the sentence imposed
was not the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbi-
trary factor, but rather was based on the evidence presented
at trial. We further conclude that the evidence supports at
least one aggravating circumstance for each of the murders
committed.”

26, We further find no evidence suggesting that any delay between

Appellant's confession and his arraignment was indicative of improper

pre-confession police tactics. See Coach, 370 A.2d at 361 (referencing

that post-confession delay prior to arraignment may be relevant to the
extent such delay reveals pre-confession police tactics),

27, As noted, the jury found four aggravating circumstances in relation
to Baby's murder; holding the victim for ransom, 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9711(d)(3); commission of the killing during the perpetration of a
felony, id. § 9711(d)(6); conviction of another federal or state offense,
committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which
a sentence of life imprisonment was imposable, id. § 9711(d)(10); and

XII. Conclusion

The judgment of sentence is affirmed, and the Prothonotary
is directed to transmit the record to the Governor. See 42
PaCS. § 9711).

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Todd, Donohue,
Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.

159 A.3d 928
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent,
v.

Jonathon HAMLETTE, Petitioner
No, 283 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 17, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

the victim was a child under twelve years of age. Id. § 9711(d)(16), The
two aggravating circumstances found in relation to Grandmother’s
murder were: commission of the killing during the perpetration of a
felony, id. § 9711(d)(6), and conviction of another federal or state
offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue,
for which a sentence of life imprisonment was imposable, Id.
§ 9711(d)(10). At the penalty phase, the parties did not largely dispute
the existence of the aggravating factors, but rather contested the weight
to be given such factors in light of the evidence of mitigation.

159 A.3d 928
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Joseph BENTON, Petitioner
No. 281 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 17, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 928

Roy J. BURKETT Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Nannie
Burkett, Deceased and in His Own Right, Respondent

v

ST. FRANCIS COUNTRY HOUSE, Catholic Healthcare Services
and Archdiocese of Philadelphia, Petitioners

No. 162 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 17, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court’s
order is VACATED. The matter is REMANDED for proceed-
ings consistent with the decision in Taylor v. Extendicare, 637
Pa. 163, 147 A.3d 490 (2016).

159 A.3d 929
Sandra A, CHRISTMAN, Administratrix of the Estate
of Esther I. Strause, Deceased, Respondent.
Vv.

MANOR CARE OF WEST READING PA, LLC, d/b/a ManorCare
Health Services—West Reading North, and ManorCare Health
Services, Inc. and HCR ManorCare, Inc. and ManorCare Inc.
and HCR HealthCare, LLC, and HCR II HealthCare, LLC, and
HCR Ill HealthCare, LLC, and HCR IV HealthCare, LLC,
Petitioners

No. 97 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
DECIDED: October 17, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17" day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the Superior

Court is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with our
holding in Taylor v, Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc. 687
Pa, 168, 147 A.8d 490 (2016).

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

159 A.3d 929

Lorraine F, BROSIUS, as Executrix for the
Estate of William B. Brosius, Deceased

ve

HCR MANORCARE, LLC, Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC,
d/b/a Manorcare Health Services-Lancaster, Manorcare Health
Services, Inc. a/k/a Manoreare Health Services, LLC, Manor
Care, Inc., HCR Manorcare, Inc., HCR IV Healthcare, LLC,
HCR Ill Healthcare, LLC, HCR I Healthcare, LLC, HCR
Healthcare, LLC, HCRMC Operations, LLC, HCR Manorcare
Operations II, LLC, Heartland Employment Services, LLC,
Select Medical Corporation, Select Medical of Pennsylvania,
Inc., Select Specialty Hospitals, Inc., Select Specialty Hospital-
Camp Hill, Inc., and Select Specialty Hospital-Central Pennsyl-
vania, L.P. f/k/a Select Specialty Hospital-Camp Hill LP, d/b/a
Select Specialty Hospital-York

Petition of: HCR Manorcare, LLC, Manor Care of Lancaster PA,
LLC, d/b/a Manorcare Health Services-Lancaster, Manorcare
Health Services, Inc. a/k/a Manorcare Health Services, LLC,
Manor Care, Inc., HCR Manorcare, Inc., HCR IV Healthcare,
LLC, HCR II Healthcare, LLC, HCR II Healthcare, LLC, HCR
Healthcare, LLC, HCRMC Operations, LLC, HCR Manorcare
Operations II, LLC, Heartland Employment Services, LLC

No. 354 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
DECIDED: October 17, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court’s
order is VACATED. The matter is REMANDED for proceed-

ings consistent with the decision in Taylor v. Extendicare, 687
Pa, 168, 147 A.8d 490 (2016).

159 A.3d 980
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Hasan COLLIER, Jn., Petitioner
No. 477 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 17, 2016

PER CURIAM

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 980
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent

ve

Elvin John LAMEY, Petitioner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v

Elvin John Lamey, Petitioner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Elvin John Lamey, Petitioner

No, 460 MAL 2016

No. 461 MAL 2016

No. 462 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 17, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

169 A.8d 980
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
Vv.

Andrew James PUDUP, Petitioner
No. 383 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 17, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 931
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Terrence M. LEWIS, Petitioner
No. 233 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.Bd 981
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Roberto R. LAUREANO, Petitioner
No, 398 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter,

159 A.8d 981
MING WEI, Petitioner
vy.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania Pennsylvania, Department
of Health, Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, Vero-
nica Urdaneta, Stephen Ostroff, and Tiffany Burnhauser, Re-
spondents

No. 402 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 982
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Alex Leroy LOVEJOY, Petitioner
No. 395 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal and Application to File Supplement to
Petition for Allowance of Appeal are DENIED.

159 A.38d 932
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Gary Lee GERBER, Jr., Petitioner
No. 829 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 932
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Kenneth L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner
No. 382 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 18, 2016

155

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for

Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 932
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Eric Nigel TAULTON, Petitioner
No. 284 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 933
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
Vv
Jerry L. GANT, Petitioner
No, 421 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 983
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent

v.
Jordan Elias KORN, Petitioner
No. 443 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 18, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 983
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Jacob A. MORRONI, Petitioner
No. 467 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 983
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Guillermo ALMANZA-GONZALEZ, Jr., Petitioner
No. 419 MAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 934
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Marcellus OLIPHANT, Petitioner
No. 411 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 18, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 934
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Otis Lee BOYD, Petitioner
No. 300 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 19, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A8d 984
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Carlos Lamont JONES, Petitioner
No, 284 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

159 A.8d 984
Steven David SHICK, Petitioner

v

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD
OF REVIEW, Respondent

No, 232 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 985
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
v.

Davon Terrell WYATT, Petitioner
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Davon Terrell Wyatt, Petitioner

No. 225 WAL 2016
No. 226 WAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 19, 2016

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 935
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
James Paul FINNECY, Petitioner
No. 215 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 19, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

= °
159 A.3d 935
Daniel KING, Petitioner
ve

RIVERWATCH CONDOMINIUM OWNER’S
ASSOCIATION, Respondent

Daniel King, Petitioner
Vv.
Riverwatch Condominium Owner’s Association, Respondent

No, 409 MAL 2016
No. 410 MAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.38d 936
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.
ve
Joanne R. RICCI, aka Joanne R. Pilchesky
Petition of: Joseph W. Pilchesky
No. 487 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 19, 2016

164
ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

159 A.8d 936
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Paul Nelson HANSEN, Petitioner
No. 406 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 19, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 936
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Zakary James WALLS, Petitioner
No. 423 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 987
JUNSAI XU, Petitioner

ve

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD
OF REVIEW, Respondent

No. 394 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 19, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 987
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Brian PARNELL, Petitioner
No. 481 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 19, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

169 A.3d 987
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Lorenzo DYER, Petitioner
No. 391 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.38d 987
Robert RAMIREZ, Petitioner
vy.
Nancy GIROUX (SCI Albion Superintendent)
No. 323 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 19, 2016

_
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 938
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Paul ADAMS Jr., Petitioner
No. 367 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 938
Robert FENNELL, Petitioner
ve

Jaclyn GROVE, William Henry Dreibelbis, T. Sunderland,
C. Wright and Jon D, Fisher, Respondents

No. 376 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 938
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
Y
William PLUMMER, Petitioner
No, 287 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 19, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 938
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
Vv.

Joey I. DIXON, Petitioner
No. 275 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 939
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Raleigh Nathan GRANT, Petitioner
No. 381 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 19, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 989
IN the INTEREST OF: J.B.
Petition of: J.F., Natural Father
No. 198 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
October 20, 2016

oa
ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO the issue
set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining
issues. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the termination
of the biological father’s parental rights by the biological
mother would best serve the needs and welfare of the minor
child, where the proposed adoption by the maternal step-
grandfather would not create a new, genuine parent-child
relationship and/or establish a new family unit[?]

The Order of the Superior Court is REVERSED. See In re
Adoption of M.R.D., 636 Pa. 509, 145 A3d 1117, 2016 WL

4541129 (2016),

159 A.3d 939
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Richard KELLY, Petitioner
No. 303 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 24, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

159 A.3d 940
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Rosha Charles WILLIAMS, Petitioner
No. 248 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 24, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal and Application to Stay Remainder of
Sentence Pending Appeal are DENIED.

159 A.3d 940
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
George WILLIAMS, Petitioner
No. 639 EAL 2015
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 24, 2016

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Donohue did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

159 A.3d 940
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Ramon WALL, Petitioner
No. 324 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 24, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A8d 941
MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS, LLC
ve
Aliya Tasha BASIL, Aliya’s Little People, LLC, Occupants
Petition of: Aliya Basil
No. 306 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 24, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 941
ESTATE OF Margaret Nagy MCFADDEN, Deceased

Petition of: Ronald McFadden
No, 314 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 24, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 941
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
v
Billy GIBSON, Petitioner
No. 299 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 24, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

— ~
159 A3d 941
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner
ve
Ollie THOMPSON, Respondent.
No, 292 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 24, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 942
Robert DUNCAN, Petitioner
v.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Department
of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, Respondent

No, 270 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 24, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 942
Debbie HUGHEY, Petitioner
v.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (ANDORRA
WOODS HEALTHCARE CENTER, aka—Lyric Health Care,
aka—Encore Healthcare, aka—Rest Heaven, Esis Northeast
WC Claims, Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Ace American
Insurance Company and Pennsylvania Uninsured Employers
Guaranty Fund), Respondents

Debbie Hughey, Petitioner
Vv.

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Andorra Woods Health-
care Center, aka—Lyric Health Care, aka—Encore Healthcare,
aka—Rest Heaven, Esis Northeast WC Claims, Gallagher Bas-
sett Services Inc., Ace American Insurance Company and Penn-
sylvania Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund), Respondents

Debbie Hughey, Petitioner
ve

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Andorra Woods Health-
care Center, aka—Lyric Health Care, aka—Encore Healthcare,
aka—Rest Heaven, Esis Northeast WC Claims, Gallagher Bas-
sett Services Inc., Ace American Insurance Company and Penn-
sylvania Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund), Respondents

No, 259 EAL 2016

No. 260 EAL 2016

No, 261 EAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 24, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal, Application for Relief, Application to
Expedite, and Application for Leave to File Post-Submission
Communication are DENIED.

159 A.8d 943
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Ronald West HARSHMAN, Petitioner
No. 456 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 24, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 943
IN RE: The ADOPTION OF L.G.LS., a minor

Petition of: C.P. and P.E.P.
No, 343 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 943
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Krista EVELAND, Petitioner
No. 258 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, his 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 944
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
Vv.

Jerome Robert SMITH, Petitioner
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Eileen Rifka Smith, Petitioner

No. 262 WAL 2016
No, 263 WAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 944
AVALON COUNTRY CLUB AT SHARON, INC., Petitioner
Vv.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Bureau of Health
Promotion and Risk Reduction, Respondent.

No, 214 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 25, 2016

a
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

169 A.3d 944

Destiny GRESART, a Minor, by and through her Mother Dedra
Gresart, her Natural Parent and Guardian, and Dedra
Gresart, Individually, in her own right, Petitioners

v

BUFFALO & PITTSBURGH RAILROAD, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; Genesee & Wyoming, Inc., a Delaware Corpo-
ration; and James Murdock, an Individual, Respondents

No, 235 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

— ©
169 A.3d 945
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Terrell Lamont CHILDS, Petitioner
No. 238 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 945
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Thomas C. ZELLER, Petitioner
No. 189 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

184 |
ORDER

PER CURIAM |

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 945
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Khalil Otha ABDUL HAKIM, Petitioner
No, 210 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 945
Stanley J. CATERBONE and Advanced Media Group

v
LANCASTER CITY POLICE, et. al.
Petition of: Stanley J. Caterbone
No, 496 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.8d 946
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Leron Frank HARRIS, Petitioner
No. 555 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

159 A.3d 946
Stanley J. CATERBONE, Petitioner
ve

RESIDENTS OF THE COUNTY OF LANCASTER
PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

No. 495 MAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

159 A.3d 946
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Robert HARES, Petitioner
No, 445 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 123
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE
ve
Michael BRISTOL and RCC, Inc.
Petition of: Michael Bristol
No, 439 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

December 29, 2016

a
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 29th day of December, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, rephrased
for clarity, is:

In uninsured motorist claims subject to mandatory arbitra-

tion, is the statute of limitations tolled only by the com-

mencement of an official judicial action, or may extra-
judicial actions also toll the statute of limitations?

160 A.3d 123
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE
ve
Michael BRISTOL and RCC, Inc.
Appeal of: Michael Bristol
No. 124 MAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

ARGUED: May 10, 2017
FILED: May 24, 2017

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2017, the order of
December 29, 2016 is amended to provide as follows:

The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED to
consider the following issue, as originally framed in the Peti-
tion for Allowance of Appeal:

By affirming its Opinion in Hopkins v. Erie Insurance Co.,

65 A.3d 452 (Pa. Super. 2018), and ruling that:

(1) a claimant seeking uninsured or underinsured motorist
benefits must file a Complaint or a Petition to Compel
Arbitration if the claim does not resolve within four years
of the date of the underlying accident, and,

(2) a claimant must file a Complaint or Petition to Compel
Arbitration, contrary to the plain language of the Arbitra-
tion Act of 1927, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7804(a), which requires a
claimant to file a Complaint or Petition only when “an
opposing party refuse[s] to arbitrate,”

did the Superior Court create a new rule that is contrary to

prior decisions of this Court and inconsistent with the plain

language of the Arbitration Act?

This Court understands this issue to encompass a determi-
nation of the time at which a cause of action accrues—thereby
triggering the commencement of the statutory period for
bringing a claim—in the specific context of an insurance
contract containing a mandatory arbitration provision. Nota-
bly, this particular issue has not been waived, was advanced in
the Petition for Allowance of Appeal, and has been briefed by
both parties, without objection. As such, no further briefing is
necessary,

Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring statement in which
Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join.

Justice Wecht files a dissenting statement.

CONCURRING STATEMENT

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

I write in response to Justice Wecht’s dissenting statement,
which chides the Court for amending an original grant order
to conform with the precise wording presented by the appel-

lant in the first instance, and for purportedly accepting review
of a waived issue.

First of all, this Court’s original grant order restyling the
statement of the question presented was not a limited one—
rather, the issue was merely and expressly “rephrased for
clarity.” Brie Ins. Exch, v. Bristol, 639 Pa. 187, 160 A.3d 123,
2016 WL 7475709 (2016) (per curiam). In joining that order, I,
for one, had no intention of limiting a pivotal substantive
question out of the case. Accordingly, I regard the Court’s
present action not as some extraordinary “retroactive ex-
pan{sion],” Dissenting Statement at 192, 160 A.3d at 125, but
rather, as an appropriate correction which, importantly, con-
forms entirely with the briefs submitted to this Court by the
litigants.

Second, as to the waiver concern, running throughout Ap-
pellant Bristol’s submissions in the common pleas and inter-
mediate courts is the assertion that “Erie’s claim that this
matter is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is
without merit because, by agreeing to resolve this matter
through arbitration, there was no need for and mo legal or
contractual requirement that Michael Bristol file a Complaint,
Petition to Compel Arbitration or any other pleading.” Defen-
dant’s Motion for Summary Judgement in Erie Ins. Exch. v.
Bristol, No. 2013-12947, 2014 WL 11770053 (C.P, Montgom-
ery), at 6-7 (emphasis added).! Although it would have been
best for Appellant to forthrightly indicate in the common pleas
court that he understood that the court was bound by prevail-
ing Superior Court precedent concerning the timing of the
commencement of the limitations period, but that he wished
nevertheless to preserve a challenge for purposes of potential
1. The dissent’s assertion that the case substantively was always and

entirely about equitable tolling overlooks Appellant's contention—also

advanced in the petition for allowance of appeal—that there was no
legal requirement to act in the first instance. See Petition for Allowance
of Appeal at 11 (contending that “the event that triggers a party’s
obligation to seek judicial intervention, i.e, the refusal to arbitrate,
never occurred here’); see also id. at 12 (“By agreeing to resolve this
matter through arbitration, there was no need for and no legal or
contractual requirement that [Appellant] file a Complaint, Petition to
Compel Arbitration, or any other pleading.”), In the absence of an

underlying legal requirement to affirmatively preserve a cause of action,
there is no predicate for equity to intervene, and nothing to be tolled.

appellate review, I believe that his arguments have been
phrased broadly enough to substantively subsume the com-
mencement issue.

Significantly, moreover, nowhere in Appellee’s present brief
does the company contend that the commencement issue is
waived. Indeed, Appellee repeatedly invites this Court to
review the issue and to institutionalize the prevailing Superior
Court precedent on the subject. See, ¢9., Brief for Appellee at
27 (“{TJhis Court should uphold the Hopkins rule that pro-
vides a sensible and easy to establish time for the statute of
limitations to begin to run.”). In my view, the sua sponte
scouring of trial records to identify waiver concerns—when all
litigants agree that an important issue is presented that
should be resolved by this Court—can be disruptive. In this
regard, I have often commented on the prudential roots of the
waiver doctrine, and, from my perspective, its proper applica-
tion through discerning judgment.

Finally, attempting to decide a tolling question in the ab-
sence of a settled understanding as to when the applicable
limitations period commences is fraught with difficulties. For
instance, it may be that the Court would find tolling appropri-
ate only if the statute runs from the date of injury, as the
intermediate-court precedent holds. Tolling, in this regard,
could be viewed as compensation for an underlying approach
to commencement with which the Court disagrees. Were the
Court to proceed on such a basis, it would issue a decision
having application only within an underlying framework of the
Superior Court’s design, which could later be rejected by this
Court. Our decision, of course, would need to be carefully
crafted with all the necessary disclaimers to avoid adoption of
a regime that this Court has never previously addressed.

I see no reason that such abstractions need to come into
play here. Rather, I regard the Court’s present amendatory
order as an appropriate one.

Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join
this concurring statement.

DISSENTING STATEMENT

JUSTICE WECHT

Today’s learned Majority is eager to decide the point at
which a cause of action should accrue in the context of an
uninsured motorist coverage dispute; so eager, in fact, that
the Majority takes the unusual step of retroactively expanding
and resculpting the scope of our December 29, 2016 allocatur
grant. This is ill-advised.

The Majority begins by purporting to adopt the issue
statement “as originally framed in [Bristol’s] Petition for
Allowance of Appeal,” but then proceeds to venture that it
“understands this issue to encompass” arguments regarding
when “a cause of action accrues—thereby triggering the com-
mencement of the statutory period for bringing a claim.” Per
Curiam Order at 189, 160 A.38d at 128-24, The provenance of
this understanding is unknown. Indeed, one may search
through Bristol’s petition for allowance of appeal all day long
but in vain for any objection concerning the time at which his
cause of action accrued. The issue that Bristol raised in his
petition concerns what a claimant must do to toll the statute of
limitations, The Majority’s willingness now to reach back in
time and reshape the case suggests a “build to suit” approach
that is jurisprudentially unsound and antithetical to principles
of judicial restraint,

Michael Bristol has waived the issue that Today’s Majority
desires to resolve. One need not “scour[] ... trial records to
identify waiver” here.’ This case is and always was about
tolling; even a casual reading of the lower court opinions
suffices to make this clear. In the trial court, Bristol never
took the position that the four-year statute of limitations
governing uninsured motorist claims begins to run only when
an insurer explicitly rejects the claim. To the contrary, Bristol
conceded that the applicable limitations period commenced on
the date of the alleged vehicle accident. See Bristol’s Answer
to Erie’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 10/10/2014, at 2 122

1, Concurring Statement at 190-91, 160 A,3d at 124-25.

(admitting that the limitations period in this case commenced
on July 22, 2005),

Bristol’s sole argument in opposition to Erie’s motion for
summary judgment was that Erie “should be estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense” because; (1)
Bristol notified Erie that he intended to pursue an uninsured
motorist claim “within four years of the date of the accident;”
and (2) Erie agreed to proceed to arbitration and then ap-
pointed an arbitrator?

Consistent with his position at the trial level, Bristol raised
the following issue on appeal to the Superior Court:

Does the four-year statute of limitations under 42 [Pa.C.S.]
§ 5525 bar a claim for uninsured motorist benefits when:

The parties had agreed to arbitrate the claim in accor-
dance with the terms of the policy;

The parties had selected their respective arbitrators, but
had not yet agreed upon the selection of a neutral arbitra-
tor;

The claimant had provided a statement under oath to the
insurer;

The insurer does not allege, and the trial court does not
find, that the insurer was prejudiced by any delays in
proceeding to arbitration?

2. Bristol's Answer to Erie's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 9
(emphasis added); see also Notes of Testimony, 3/11/2015, at 14 (coun-
sel for Bristol arguing that Bristol would have been required to file a
petition to compel arbitration if Erie had not appointed an arbitrator),
Bristol's contention that “there was no need for and no legal or
contractual requirement that [he] file a Complaint, Petition to Compel
Arbitration[,] or any other pleading” is entirely consistent with his
argument that the parties’ extra-judicial acts tolled the statute of limita-
tions. Bristol’s Answer to Erie’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7.
Chief Justice Saylor seems to suggest that this vague sentence ‘“sub-
sume[s] the commencement issue.” Concurring Statement at 190-91,
160 A.3d at 124. Respectfully, it does not. Lest there be any doubt, the
language appears just two pages after Bristol’s concession that the
statute of limitations began to run on July 22, 2005, and three pages
before Bristol takes the position that his claim is not time barred
because he informed Erie that he was pursuing an uninsured motorist
claim “within four years of the date of the accident,” Id. at 2, 9.

a

Superior Court Opinion, 1119 EDA 2015, at 4 (quoting Bris-
tol’s Superior Court brief).

In other words, Bristol did not dispute that the four-year
limitations period commenced on the date of the accident.
Instead, he argued that the above facts tolled the statute of
limitations. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that this Court’s
December 29, 2016 Order granting Bristol’s petition for allow-
ance of appeal focused upon whether “extra-judicial actions,”
such as an informal demand for arbitration or the appointment
of arbitrators, can “toll the statute of limitations.” 689 Pa. 187,
160 A.3d 128 (2016).*

Under prevailing Superior Court precedent, Bristol’s cause
of action against Erie accrued when his right to payment
under the insurance contract vested (i.¢., on the date of the
vehicle accident). See Boyle v. State Farm Mut, Auto. Ins. Co.,
810 Pa.Super. 10, 456 A.2d 156, 162 (1983). I have no objection
to this Court, in an appropriate case, adopting a different rule.
But this is not an appropriate case. Even if one assumes that
this Court has leeway to rewrite an issue statement after the
parties have briefed and argued a case (and I do not so
assume),! the fact remains that Bristol has waived the issue
that the Court—after today’s order—is poised to decide.

It is not simply that “it would have been best” for Bristol
“to preserve a challenge for purposes of potential appellate
review.” Concurring Statement at 190-91, 160 A.3d at 124.
Rather, it was mandatory. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not
raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 Pa.
498, 151 A.8d 121, 124 (2016) (“Typically, an appellant waives

3. It is true that Bristol, in his brief to this Court, now takes the position
that his cause of action against Erie never even accrued. See Brief for
Bristol at 10, But that does not mean that the Court should decide an
unpreserved issue. If anything, rewarding Bristol for briefing an issue
outside the scope of our allocatur grant will only encourage future
litigants to do the same.

4, This is, of course, distinct from the situation in which the Court
rephrases an. appellant's issue statement at the allocatur stage, usually
in an effort to promote clarity or to discourage the parties from briefing
extraneous maiters,

any claim that is not properly raised in the first instance
before the trial court and preserved at every stage of his
appeal.”); City of Phila. v. Lerner, 637 Pa, 605, 151 A.8d 1020,
1026 (2016) (Saylor, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]his Court,
of course, has moved far away from [the waiver doctrine’s]
prudential roots in the direction of strict enforcement of
waiver”).

With regard to the suggestion that the practice of assuming,
but not deciding, the correctness of an intermediate court
decision is “fraught with difficulties,” Concurring Statement at
190-91, 160 A.8d at 124-25, the obvious answer is that this
Court should simply decline to review cases that will require
such maneuvering. Notably, however, this Court often has
little difficulty resolving appeals while avoiding unpreserved
issues of first impression. See eg., Duffey v. W.C.A.B. (Trola-
dyne, Inc.), 688 Pa. 55, 152 A.8d 984, 986 n.4 (2017) (assuming
“the validity of the Commonwealth Court’s precedent”); Com-
monwealth v. Kingston, 636 Pa. 488, 148 A.8d 917, 922 n8
(2016) (assuming, without deciding, that prevailing Superior
Court precedent is correct).

If adhering to our own rules of appellate procedure is too
“disruptive,” Concurring Statement at 191, 160 A.8d at 125, it
seems to me that we should seek to amend them. Selective
enforcement is not the solution. At that point, rules become
mere suggestions. And we can then dispense with the notion
that equity is cabined by law. “This is a court of review, not a
tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit ... dispensing
justice according to considerations of individual expediency.”
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 387 U.S. 1, 11, 69 S.Ct. 894, 98
L.Ed. 1181 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

a
160 A.8d 127
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
ve
Marcel Emanuel JOHNSON, Appellant
No. 711 CAP
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
ARGUED: December 6, 2016
DECIDED: May 25, 2017

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John J. Fioravanti Jr., Esq., Law Offices of John J. Fiora-
vanti, Jr., for Marcel Emanuel Johnson, Appellant.

Joanna Rose Dombrowski, Esq., Matthew D. Weintraub,
Esq., Bucks County District Attorney’s Office, Amy Zapp,
Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Stephen B. Harris, Esq.,
for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE

In June 2015, Marcel Emanuel Johnson (“Johnson”) was
convicted of killing Ebony Talley (“Talley”), her unborn child,
and her four-year-old daughter, R.R. He was sentenced to
death for R.R.’s murder. In this automatic direct appeal,’
Johnson raises nine issues for our review. Following our
thorough consideration of these issues and for the reasons set
forth below, we affirm his convictions and the imposition of the
death sentence.

1, 42 PaCS. § 9711(h)(1).

In November 2013, Talley was living in Apartment 604 of
the Avalon Court Apartments in Bristol Township, Bucks
County with R.R Early in the afternoon of November 25,
2018, Talley’s mother and sisters arrived at Avalon Court to
visit. Talley, who was twenty weeks pregnant, and her mother
left briefly to obtain a money order for a partial amount of
Talley’s rent. Upon their return, Johnson arrived at the
apartment. Johnson and Talley were friends and he was well
acquainted with her visiting family members. Johnson was
storing some of his belongings in the apartment and Talley
occasionally allowed him to stay overnight. Johnson socialized
with Talley and her family that afternoon. When Talley’s
mother and sisters left at approximately 2:30 p.m., Johnson
remained.

Shortly thereafter, around 8:00 p.m., a fire was detected in
Talley’s apartment, The fire emitted a thick, black smoke that
made it difficult for the responding firefighters to gain entry.
Once inside, firefighters discovered Talley’s lifeless body in
the bedroom. Talley was lying face-down with numerous stab
wounds to her head, neck and body. A plastic bag was also
wrapped tightly around her head. Small, empty yellow wax
bags stamped in red ink with “#1 way to go” were found
scattered around Talley’s body. More of these distinctive
empty wax bags were found in a shoebox in the bedroom. In
the living room, the firefighters found an unresponsive R.R. in
a pool of blood beneath an overturned couch. R.R. had been
stabbed in the chest and bled profusely. She was rushed to the
hospital, but pronounced dead soon after her arrival. Minutes
before the fire was detected, a resident of Avalon Court
observed Talley’s vehicle speed out of the parking lot, hitting
2. The apartment belonged to a woman named Gisele Ucci. At the time

of these events, Ms. Ucci was temporarily residing in Argentina. She

allowed Talley to stay in her apartment and use her vehicle, a maroon

Cadillac, while she was away, For ease of reference, we refer to the

apartment as Talley’s residence and the maroon Cadillac as Talley’s
vehicle.

3, Talley was also found to have been hit in the face with such force that
one of her front teeth was knocked out.

another vehicle in its haste. The resident noticed that vehicle
was being driven by a black male.

While emergency responders were still at the scene of the
fire, Johnson placed a series of calls to Talley’s cousin, Britta-
ny Coles, Ms. Coles, who had been alerted to what was
happening at Talley’s apartment and was in a frantic state,
told Johnson about the fire. Because she was at work and
could not leave, she implored Johnson to return to the apart-
ment complex to obtain more information. Johnson refused,
explaining that he wanted to avoid the police because there
were outstanding warrants for his arrest. Later that after-
noon, Johnson called Talley’s sister, Paulina Burke. Ms. Burke
informed Johnson that both Talley and R.R. had died. She
asked Johnson to turn Talley’s vehicle over to the police and
otherwise aid in the police investigation. Again, Johnson re-
fused, citing the outstanding warrants as the basis for his
refusal,

In these phone conversations, Johnson indicated that he was
calling from a friend’s home in the Levittown Trace Apart-
ment complex.! Based on this information, the police proceed-
ed to the Levittown Trace Apartments at approximately 6:00
p.m. and located Talley’s vehicle in the most remote portion of
the apartment complex’s parking lot. When the police ap-
proached the vehicle, they found it was vacant. They also
noticed that the license plate had been changed, but the VIN
number, which is visible through the windshield, verified that
it was Talley’s vehicle. Shortly after 7:00 p.m., Johnson en-
tered the vehicle and began to leave the parking lot. The
police immediately stopped him, utilizing a “felony stop” pro-
cedure. During a felony stop, the police officers remain shield-
ed by their vehicles and, with weapons drawn, they instruct
the motorist to exit his car, demonstrate that he does not
possess a weapon, and lay on the ground before they ap-
proach. The police then transported Johnson to their head-
quarters for questioning, A subsequent search of Talley’s
4. Both Ms. Coles and Ms. Burke testified that they knew Johnson's

phone number but on the day in question, he called from a phone
number that they did not recognize,

vehicle revealed, among other items, a bundle of eight empty
wax packets stamped in red with “#1 way to go,” in the ash
tray. These packets were identical to the packets found around
Talley’s body and in her bedroom.

At the police station, Johnson waived his Miranda rights
and agreed to speak with investigators. He explained his
friendship with Talley and acknowledged that he was at her
apartment earlier that day. He stated that he left Talley’s
home on foot and met up with a friend named Eric Stahl, who
was driving Talley’s vehicle, and that Stahl gave him the keys
later that day. After being confronted with evidence that
conflicted with this account, Johnson changed his story and
admitted both to taking Talley’s car and her Xbox gaming
system and hitting another vehicle as he did. When asked why
he did not come to the scene of the fire or the police station at
Talley’s family’s requests, he reiterated his concern about the
arrest warrants. The police arrested Johnson that evening on
charges of possession of drug paraphernalia based on items
found in his possession when the police stopped him in Talley's
vehicle.6 That night, while he was in custody, the police
obtained and executed a warrant for samples of Johnson’s
DNA, fingernail scrapings, hair samples and clothes.

In January 2014, Johnson was charged with the murders of
Talley, R.R., Talley’s unborn child and related crimes. While
detained in the Bucks County Correctional Facility, Johnson
admitted to another inmate that he killed Talley and that he
killed R.R. because she could identify him as her mother’s
killer. Also while incarcerated, Johnson phoned his brother,
Marquis Johnson, and told him that he hid “evidence” in a
precise location at the Levittown Trace Apartments and asked
him to retrieve it, admonishing that the items should never see
the light of day. Marquis did as his brother requested and
retrieved a blue plastic glove containing 167 packets of heroin,
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694

(1966).

6. Specifically, the police found in his pocket a bundle of small, clear,
plastic Ziploc baggies commonly used to package controlled substances,
N.T., 6/1/2015, at 87.

all in wax packets stamped in red with “# 1 way to go,” and a
money order for eighty dollars.

A jury trial commenced in May 2015, at the conclusion of
which Johnson was convicted of the first-degree murders of
both Talley and R.R., third-degree murder of Talley’s unborn
child, arson (endangering people), and possessing instruments
of crime.” During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth pre-
sented evidence of four aggravating factors as to Talley:
torture; conviction of another murder at the same time of
Talley’s murder; involvement in the sale of narcotics at the
time of the murder; and knowledge of Talley’s pregnancy.
N.T., 6/8/2015, at 192-95. The Commonwealth pursued three
aggravating factors with regard to R.R.: that R.R. was a
witness to a murder and was killed to prevent her from
testifying; conviction of another murder at the same time as
R.R.’s murder; and that R.R. was less than twelve years old.
Id. at, 197-200.

Johnson presented evidence in support of four mitigating
factors: his lack of a significant history of prior criminal
convictions; extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the
time of the murders; and the fact that he was twenty-one at
the time of the murders.” Jd. at 200. Johnson also presented
an assemblage of evidence under the catchall mitigating fac-
tor, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8), including evidence that Johnson’s
life up until the time of the murders was characterized by
chronic and pervasive abuse, neglect and abandonment; that
he suffered brain damage and had been diagnosed with vari-
ous mental illnesses; cycles of placement in and out of treat-
ment programs; and a complete lack of any semblance of
stability or permanence. The jury ultimately sentenced John-
son to death for R.R.’s murder and life in prison for Talley’s
murder."

7. 18 Pa.C.S, §§ 2502(a),(c), 2603(a), 3301, 907.
8. 42 Pa. C.S, § 9711(d)(8), (11), (13), (17).

9. 42 Pa.C.S, § 9711(d)(5), (11), (16).

10. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(@)(1), (2), (4).

11. Johnson also received consecutive sentences of twenty to forty years
of imprisonment for third-degree murder and ten to twenty years of

The trial court denied Johnson’s post-sentence motions,
after which Johnson filed this timely appeal. He presents
several issues for our review, challenging the denial of his
motions to suppress, evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the
evidence, the trial court’s refusal to allow Johnson to present
certain mitigating evidence, the trial court’s jury instruction
during the penalty phase, the denial of his motion to preclude
the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty, and the
constitutionality of the three statutory aggravating factors
presented by the Commonwealth in connection with R.R.’s
murder.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

HH sIn all death penalty cases, this Court reviews the
sufficiency of the evidence to ensure that it supports the
verdicts of first-degree murder, whether or not the appellant
raises the issue. Commonwealth v. May, 584 Pa. 640, 887 A.2d
750, 753 (2005). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, we consider whether the evidence presented at trial,
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed
in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
winner, support the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 625 Pa. 104, 91 AS8d 55, 66
(2014). The determination of whether sufficient evidence exists
to support the verdict is a question of law; accordingly, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary. Id.

HMMs To establish first-degree murder, the Commonwealth
must prove that a human being was unlawfully killed, the
defendant perpetrated the killing, and the defendant acted
with malice and a specific intent to kill. Jd. “Specific intent to
kill may be inferred by the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital
part of the body, and the Commonwealth may prove the
specific intent to kill necessary for first-degree murder wholly
through circumstantial evidence.” Id.

imprisonment for arson, and a concurrent sentence of two and a half to
five years for the possessing instruments of crime conviction.

I The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, establishes these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, To begin, Johnson admitted to killing both
Talley and R.R., thereby establishing that they were unlawful-
ly killed and that Johnson killed them. In his confession, he
stated that Talley “made [him] kill her[,]” and acknowledged
killing R.R. so that she could not identify him as her mother’s
killer N.T,, 6/1/2015, at 230, 2338-35,

Substantial evidence also demonstrated that both victims
were killed by the use of a deadly weapon on vital parts of the
victims’ bodies. Dr. Ian Hood, a forensic pathologist, testified
that Talley suffered thirty-five stab wounds to her head, neck,
chest and abdomen. N.T., 5/28/2015, at 205. One wound perfo-
vated the common carotid artery in her neck and two others
entered her chest cavity, causing a collapsed lung and internal
bleeding. Jd. at 206-08, While Talley was incapacitated from
blood loss, a plastic bag was secured over her head, “providing
terminal asphyxia as a final mechanism of death[.]” Id. at 232.
R.R. was stabbed in the upper chest, just below her collar-
bone, Id, at 194-95,

There was also circumstantial evidence of Johnson’s guilt,
Talley’s mother and sister testified that when they left Talley’s
home, Johnson remained in the apartment with Talley and
RR. N.T., 5/28/2015, at 271; N,T., 5/27/2016, at 112. Fires
were set on or immediately beside the incapacitated Talley
and R.R., N.T., 5/27/2015, at 186-88, and were discovered
approximately half an hour after Talley’s mother and sister
left, just minutes after Johnson was observed fleeing the scene
at a high rate of speed in Talley’s vehicle. N.T., 5/29/2015, at
300. This evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, places Johnson in the apartment at the
relevant time, Moreover, Talley’s DNA was found under John-
son’s fingernails, which, according to expert testimony, was
not the result of casual contact with Talley. Id. at 186-87. Dr.
Hood testified that Talley’s body bore multiple defensive
wounds and that the relatively shallow depth of many of the
stab wounds was the result of Talley’s struggle against her
assailant. N.T., 5/28/2015, at 205, 210, Johnson was observed to

have recent lacerations on his hands and fingers just a few
hours after the murders, and he had changed his clothes. N.T.,
5/29/2015, at 283, 237-38.

Johnson raises a single challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, claiming that it is insufficient to establish that he
was the person who killed Talley and R.R. and set the
apartment on fire. Johnson’s Brief at 87, Notably, Johnson
does not dispute the evidence detailed above. Instead, he
directs our attention to other evidence. For instance, Johnson
acknowledges that he fled Talley’s apartment complex in a
hurry, but argues that flight alone does not establish guilt, Jd.
at 38, He suggests that other people involved in the drug
trade could have wanted to harm Talley, and presents an
alternative scenario in which he arrived at the apartment only
to find that it had been set on fire and fled in a panic. Id. at
88-89. He also points to the lack of blood found on his clothes
and body, that his blood was not found in Talley’s apartment,
and that his DNA was not found on Talley. Jd, at 39-40,

‘These alleged deficiencies of physical evidence were, howev-
er, offset by other evidence, For example, although Johnson
points to the lack of blood on his clothing, there was testimony
that Johnson changed his clothes between the time of Talley’s
family’s visit and his apprehension by the police a few hours
later, N.T., 5/27/2015, at 118; N.T., 5/29/2015, at 41. Likewise,
Johnson’s focus on the absence of incriminating blood or DNA
at the scene of the crime may be explained by testimony from
a Commonwealth witness that the blood and DNA samples
recovered from Talley’s apartment proved to be unsuitable for
testing. N.T., 5/29/2015, at 122-126,

More importantly, Johnson does not genuinely contest that
the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, when viewed in
the light most favorable to it, was legally sufficient to prove
his guilt. Instead, his arguments seek to vitiate the weight of
the evidence supporting his convictions and to undermine the
credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Seen in this
light, Johnson’s arguments are addressed to the weight of the
evidence supporting his convictions, not the sufficiency of the
evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281-

82 (Pa. Super. 2009). Johnson has not raised a weight of the
evidence claim in this direct appeal, and as such, it has not
been preserved for appellate review. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see
also Commonwealth v. Freeman, 5783 Pa. 582, 827 A.2d 385,
402 (2003).
IL. Suppression Issues

HE Johnson raises two issues in connection with the trial
court’s denial of his motions to suppress his statement to the
police and evidence of him selling drugs with Talley. Our
standard of review for such claims provides that we may
consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of
the defense’s evidence as remains uncontradicted when read in
the context of the record as a whole. Commonwealth v. Arter,
637 Pa. 541, 151 A8d 149, 158 (2016). Where the record
supports the suppression court’s factual findings, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Id. As an appellate
court, however, we are not bound by the suppression court’s
conclusions of law. Id.

HM Johnson first argues that the trial court should have
suppressed his statement to the police because the police did
not inform him that they were going to question him about the
deaths of Talley and R.R. until after he waived his Miranda
rights. Johnson’s Brief at 25. Johnson protests that he had no
indication as to the purpose of the interrogation and was
under the reasonable (but mistaken) assumption that he was
stopped by the police and brought in for questioning because
of outstanding arrest warrants issued for summary, non-traffic
citations, Id. at 28,

Hs A waiver of Miranda rights is valid where the
suspect is aware of the general nature of the transaction
giving rise to the investigation. Commonwealth v. Diuon, 475
Pa, 17, 379 A.2d 558, 556 (1977). “[O]nly when such knowledge
is possessed by a suspect ... can [he] be said to understand
the consequences of yielding the right to counsel.” Id. This is
because “(i]t is a far different thing to forgo a lawyer where a
traffic offense is involved than to waive counsel where first

degree murder is at stake.” Conumonwealth v. Collins, 436 Pa.
114, 259 A.2d 160, 163 (1969). When a defendant challenges
the validity of his Miranda waiver on this basis, the Common-
wealth must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant was aware of the reason for the interroga-
tion. Diwon, 379 A.2d at 556. The Commonwealth can meet
this burden through evidence of the circumstances surround-
ing the interrogation, such as “the fact that the interrogation
follows hard upon the criminal episode and there is no cireum-
stance lending ambiguity to the direction and purpose of the
questioning.”Id.

In the present case, the trial court found that substantial
evidence supported Johnson’s awareness that the police in-
tended to question him about the fire and murders rather than
warrants for non-traffie summary offenses. Trial Court Opin-
ion, 3/23/2016, at 16-17. This evidence included: Johnson’s
knowledge of the fire and of Talley’s and R.R.’s deaths, his
understanding that the police wanted to inspect Talley’s vehi-
cle as part of the investigation, and his possession of that
vehicle. In light of these facts and the tight timeline between
the murders and the police taking Johnson into custody, it was
“completely illogical” for Johnson to think that a number of
officers would “swoop down on him, [and] tak{e] him into
custody in a car that was owned by a homicide victim or
potential homicide victim ... for some old summary citations,
basically what amounts to a dispute between himself and the
local [dlistict [clourt.” N.T., 11/26/2014, at 19.

HM The trial couri’s factual findings are supported by
evidence of record. Talley’s cousin, Brittany Coles, testified
that she knew Johnson through Talley. N.T., 11/25/2014, at 27.
At about 4:30 p.m. on the day of the murders, Ms. Coles told
Johnson that there was a fire in Talley’s apartment and that
she could not get in touch with Talley. Jd. at 31. Talley’s sister,
Paulina Burke, testified that while she was at the hospital on
the day of the fire, she received a phone call from Johnson.
During this conversation, she told him that Talley and R.R.
died. N.T., 9/16/2014, at 6; N.T., 6/30/2014, at 134. Ms. Burke
knew that Johnson was driving Talley’s car, and when she

asked him to bring it to the police station for their investiga-
tion, Johnson refused, citing his outstanding warrants. N.T.,
9/16/2014, at 6-7. At approximately 7:30 that evening, only a
few hours after being told of the fire and Talley’s and R.R.’s
deaths, uniformed police officers stopped Johnson while he
was driving Talley’s vehicle, the plates on which had been
changed. N.T., 6/80/2014, at 123. When brought to the police
station following this felony stop, Johnson was taken to an
interview room to be interrogated by Detective Slattery and
Detective Fuhrmann. Jd. at 100-01, In consideration of these
facts,” we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that
Johnson was aware that the police intended to question him
with regard to what occurred in Apartment 604 of the Avalon
Court Apartments.

Johnson argues that his case is factually indistinguishable
from Dizon. We disagree. In Dixon, a local magistrate con-
victed the defendant of malicious mischief and ordered her to
pay restitution at the rate of fifty dollars a month, beginning
in March 1978, until the $500 judgment was satisfied. Dixon,
879 A.2d at 555, The magistrate pointedly told the defendant
that if she defaulted on her payments, a warrant would be
issued for her arrest and police officers would be sent to
arrest her, Jd. The defendant failed to make even one pay-
ment, and as a result, a warrant for her arrest issued. Id.

That summer, the body of the defendant's young son was
discovered in a wooded area and a police investigation ensued.
Id, at 554, On August 14, 1978, three police officers appeared
at the defendant’s home and asked her to go with them to the
police barracks, Jd. The officers had in their possession the
arrest warrant related to defendant's restitution delinquency,
but because the defendant agreed to go with them, they did

12, The record developed at trial established that the officers performed
a felony stop when taking Johnson into custody, N.T., 6/1/2015, at 25,
and that the felony stop procedure is more confrontational than a traffic
stop. Id, No such evidence was presented during the suppression phase
of these proceedings, and so we may not consider it in our review of
this suppression issue. See, eg., In re L.J., 622 Pa, 126, 79 A.3d 1073,
1085 (2013) (holding that this Court’s scope of review for suppression
rulings is limited to the record developed at the suppression hearing).

not show it or mention it to the defendant. Jd. at 555, The
officers did not tell the defendant why they wanted to speak
with her. Id. at 554, At the barracks, the defendant was placed
in an interrogation room and asked whether she knew why the
officers wanted to speak with her. Jd. at 555. The defendant
responded affirmatively and executed a Miranda waiver.

The police immediately began to question the defendant
about her son’s death, to which she quickly confessed. Jd. On
appeal following her conviction for her son’s murder, the
defendant argued that her Miranda waiver was not knowing
and voluntary because she believed that the police appeared at
her house because of her failure to make restitution payments.
Id. This Court agreed, concluding that the circumstances
exhibited that a “palpable ambiguity” existed as to the defen-
dant’s understanding of why she was being questioned. Id. at
557. Because the interrogating police officers took no meas-
ures to dispel the ambiguity before obtaining her waiver, the
defendant’s waiver could not be deemed to have been know-
ingly and intelligently made. Jd.

It is Johnson’s position that, just like the defendant in
Dixon, he knew that there were outstanding arrest warrants
for him on summary citations. Johnson’s Brief at 28. He also
points out that he was apprehended in a vehicle that was not
his, thus creating another ambiguity as to the topic of the
interrogation. Id. at 29. Johnson’s arguments, however, entire-
ly ignore all of the other above-reviewed information he
possessed at the time of his arrest and interrogation. In
Dison, the ambiguity stemmed, in large part, from a magis-
trate’s explicit warning that the defendant would be arrested if
she did not comply with the terms of the restitution order (and
her knowledge that she had not made any payments). Dixon,
879 A.2d at 557. Here, in significant contrast, Johnson’s knowl-
edge of relevant events at the time of his arrest and interroga-
tion do not support a finding of any such ambiguity.

HE For his second suppression issue, Johnson claims
that no probable cause existed to support the issuance of a
warrant for samples of his DNA. Johnson’s Brief at 31.

Generally, to be valid, a search warrant must be issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate and supported by probable
cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Pa. Const, art. 1 § 8; Com-
monwealth v. Lyons, 622 Pa. 91, 79 A.3d 1058, 1063-64 (2018),
Probable cause exists where the totality of the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit provide a fair probability that evi-
dence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Lyons, 79
A.8d at 1064, The issuing magistrate must apply this “totality
of the circumstances” test in a practical, common-sense, and
not overly-technical, manner. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 615
Pa. 354, 42 A.3d 1017, 1031 (2012). When a trial court reviews
an issuing authority’s decision to issue a search warrant, it
must affirm unless there was no substantial basis for the
issuing authority’s decision. Lyons, 79 A.3d at 1064. In turn,
on appeal, this Court will affirm the decision of the trial court
unless we conclude that it committed an error of law or made
a factual finding without record support. Id.

Here, the application for a search warrant and accompany-
ing affidavit of probable cause were filed by Detective Fuhrm-
ann at 1:33 a.m. on November 26, 2018, within hours of the
end of the interrogation of Johnson. The warrant application
sought, inter alia, DNA samples by means of oral swabbing,
swabbing of both hands, fingernail scrapings from both hands,
and hair samples.”® Application for Search Warrant,
11/26/2018, at 1. In the affidavit of probable cause, Detective
Fuhrmann detailed the fire in Apartment 604 and discovery of
the bodies of Talley and R.R.; the determination that Talley
had multiple stab wounds, including some that looked to be
defensive wounds; and the conclusion that the fire appeared
suspicious in nature. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/26/2013,
at 1-2. He stated that based on his training and experience, he
was aware that “arson is sometimes used to destroy or conceal
evidence of a crime.” Id, at 2. Detective Fuhrmann stated that
Nigeria Gary, a resident of the apartment complex, observed
Talley’s vehicle speed out of the parking lot approximately ten
13. Beyond this biological evidence, the warrant also sought to collect

Johnson’s clothing and to photograph his body. Application for Search

Warrant, 11/26/2013, at 1. Johnson does not challenge the seizure of his
clothes or photographs of his body,

minutes before the fire was detected. Id. at 3. Detective
Fuhrmann also explained that earlier that evening, Paulina
Burke informed the police that Johnson was at the Levittown
Trace Apartments, and as a result, the police found Johnson
there, in possession of Talley’s vehicle, the license plates on
which had been changed. Id. at 2. Detective Fuhrmann further
explained that in his interview with Johnson earlier that
evening, Johnson admitted to being with Talley and R.R. just
prior to their deaths and to taking the Cadillac from Avalon
Court, and that he “gave conflicting accounts as to his possible
involvement.” Id. The detective also indicated that Johnson
had a cut that appeared recent on the outside edge of one of
his fingers. Id.

The magistrate issued the search warrant based on these
sworn allegations. The trial court found the warrant sufficient-
ly supported by probable cause, reasoning as follows:

The probable cause affidavit ... set forth the facts regard-

ing the time and place of the fire, the death of [Talley] and

R.R. and the stab wounds observed on the bodies. The

affidavit also set forth facts regarding [Johnson’s] connec-

tion with those events. [Johnson] admitted that he was in
the apartment with the victims [on] the day of the fire.

Within minutes of the fire being detected, [Johnson] fled the

scene in a Cadillac at a high rate of speed, striking a parked

car in the process. Within four hours of the fire, [Johnson]
was stopped driving the Cadillac. At that time, the Cadillac
displayed a license plate that did not belong to the vehicle.

Just hours after the murders, police observed a cut on

{Johnson’s] hand. When he was questioned by the police as

to his whereabouts at the time of the murders, [Johnson]

gave conflicting accounts. [Johnson’s] presence at the scene
both before and after the fire started, his hasty flight from
the scene in the apartment owner's car, his inconsistent
statements to police and the injury to his hand provided
sufficient circumstances, when viewed in a practical, com-
mon sense and realistic fashion, for the issuing authority to

conclude that there was a fair probability that evidence of a

crime would be found on [Johnson’s] person. The motion to

—

suppress ... for failure to set forth probable cause was,

therefore, properly denied.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/2016, at 20-21.

Based upon our standard of review, we find no error in the
trial court’s ruling. The trial court’s findings are grounded in
the affidavit’s allegations and the trial court applied the prop-
er legal standard, as it considered whether the allegations
established a fair probability that evidence that could tie
Johnson to these crimes could be found through his DNA.

Johnson complains that while the allegations might establish
that he was present at Talley’s apartment and then fled,
neither of these facts by themselves establishes probable
cause for a warrant related to his involvement in the murders,
Johnson’s Brief at 34~85. To begin, Johnson’s argument ig-
nores many of the other substantive allegations set forth in
the affidavit of probable cause, such as that he was found in
possession of Talley’s vehicle; the change of license plates;
the cut on his hand and Talley’s defensive wounds; and the
inconsistent nature of his answers to police questions. More-
over, allegations amounting to probable cause need not be
considered in isolation; rather, a probable cause determina-
tion is based on the totality of the circumstances. Lyons, 79
A8d at 1064. Consideration of these facts, in addition to
Johnson’s admitted presence in Talley’s home immediately
before the fire was detected (and his frenzied flight from the
apartment), all coalesce to establish a sufficient basis for the
issuance of the search warrant.

HE Johnson further claims that there was no basis for
the issuance of a nighttime warrant. In addition to probable
cause, an application for a warrant for a nighttime search
must also show “some reason why the search cannot wait until
morning.” Commonwealth v. Bowmaster, 101 A.8d 789, 794
(Pa. Super. 2014); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 203(E) (“No search
warrant shall authorize a nighttime search unless the affida-
vits show reasonable cause for such nighttime search.”), This
additional requirement is in recognition of the long-established
doctrine that a nighttime intrusion imposes a greater burden

=

on a person’s privacy interests. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 208(H), Omt.
This enhanced burden on an individual’s privacy, however, is
not implicated when the subject is in police custody. See
Commonwealth v. Cross, 508 Pa. 822, 496 A.2d 1144, 1149
(1985) (finding a challenge to issuance of nighttime warrant
failed because appellant was in custody); Commonwealth v.
Berkheimer, 57 A.3d 171, 179 n.10 (Pa. Super. 2012) (same).
Furthermore, with regard to a nighttime warrant for the
collection of biological evidence, this Court has held that
where a defendant has been lawfully arrested and is in police
custody, the seizure of hair samples and fingernail scrapings is
“so minor an imposition as to constitute only the slightest
intrusion, if indeed such constituted an intrusion,” especially in
light of the fact that “the hair and fingernails could easily have
been washed and brushed clean of any traces of relevant
evidence.” Cross, 496 A.2d at 1150.

We face a similar scenario here. In addition to Johnson
being in police custody, the transient nature of the evidence
sought to be collected supports the trial court’s determination.
The trial court fairly concluded that the requisite reasonable
cause for a nighttime warrant existed because “[i]nvestigators
were searching for trace evidence on [Johnson’s] person,
evidence that is easily lost by the simple act of washing or the
mere passage of time.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/2016, at 21.
For these reasons, we find no trial court error on this issue.

III. Prior Bad Acts

Hs Johnson challenges the trial court’s decision to
introduce evidence relating to his drug dealing partnership
trade with Talley pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Pennsylvania
Rule of Evidence.“ This evidence included the empty, clear
Ziploc baggies found on his person at the time of his arrest as
well as the bags of heroin retrieved by Johnson’s brother,
Marquis, at Johnson’s request from the Levittown Trace
Apartments laundry room. Johnson’s Brief at 44, 46. The bags
14, We review these claims mindful that the admission of evidence is

within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb its

rulings absent an abuse of discretion, Commonwealth v. Weiss, 565 Pa.
504, 776 A.2d 958, 967 (2001).

-

retrieved from Levittown Trace Apartments were stamped
“# 1 way to go” and were identical to bags found in Talley’s
car (used by Johnson when hastily leaving Talley’s apartment),
and scattered around Talley’s head at the murder scene. Jd. at
46. The trial court also permitted the introduction of state-
ments made by Johnson to Marquis in which he admitted to
selling drugs with Talley. Jd. Finally, the trial court allowed
the introduction of various electronic evidence of Johnson’s
drug sales conducted with Talley, including text messages
between them and a videotaped drug buy executed by a
confidential informant in Talley’s apartment. Id. at 44, 46.

The trial court rejected Johnson’s contention that this evi-
dence of prior drug dealing activities was inadmissible under
Rule 404(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence, which
prohibits the use of evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act
... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). The trial court ruled that the
evidence was admissible under one or more of the exceptions
to Rule 404(b)(1) in order to prove “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and identity.” Trial Court
Opinion, 3/23/2015, at 25 (citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2)). On appeal,
Johnson argues that no exceptions in Rule 404(b)(2) apply in
these circumstances because there was no logical connection
between the admitted evidence and the murders. Johnson’s
Brief at 52. Johnson argues that there was no actual proof as
to when the heroin bags were hidden in the laundry room or
that they were stolen from Talley’s apartment. Id.

HE sn its written opinion, the trial court presents a
general statement of the decisional law relating to Rule 404(b),
including citation to appellate decisions applying various of the
Rule 404(b)(2) exceptions in specific factual scenarios. Trial
Court Opinion, 3/23/2015, at 24-26. In ruling that the disputed
evidence was admissible under one or more of these excep-
tions, however, the trial court did not conduct a principled
analysis of any of the Rule 404(b)(2) exceptions. For example,
while the trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible to
prove “identity,” it failed to acknowledge that the “identity”

exception under Rule 404(b)(2) requires proof that the bad
acts and the crime on trial share “an almost uncanny similari-
ty in all the details,” Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 114
A.2d 334, 337 (1955), and be “so nearly identical in method as
to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused ... like a
signature.” Commonwealth v. Rush, 588 Pa, 104, 646 A.2d 557,
560-61 (1994) (quoting McCormick, Evidence, § 190 (1972 2d
ed.); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 515 Pa. 478, 580 A.2d 88, 86
(1987). Of course, Johnson’s prior drug selling activities with
Talley were plainly not “signature crimes” at all vis-a-vis his
alleged crimes on November 25, 2013 (e.g., arson and murder).
These were not “signature crimes.”

Instead of attempting to analyze whether the contested
evidence fit into one of the Rule 404(b)(2) exceptions, the trial
court. focused on whether it was admissible circumstantial
evidence that Johnson committed the crimes with which he
was charged. In connection with its “identity” analysis, the
trial court determined that “heroin was inextricably inter-

twined with the murders of [Talley] and her children and the
fires that were set inside their apartment.” Trial Court Opin-
ion, 3/23/2015, at 25. Reviewing the challenged evidence, the
trial court then concluded that it demonstrated that Johnson
“was the individual who took the heroin, killed the victims and
then lit two fires, making the death of the victims and the
destruction of the evidence certain.” Id. at 25-26. On appeal,
the Commonwealth likewise insists that the evidence in ques-
tion was admissible, but not because it was propensity evi-
dence allowable under a Rule 404(b)(2) exception. Instead, the
Commonwealth argues that the evidence was circumstantial
proof that Johnson committed the crimes with which he was
charged, as it was “inextricably linked with the murder of Ms.
Talley and the fire set inside her apartment.” Commonwealth’s
Brief at 45.

HM s(Despite the lack of a cogent argument to support
the trial court’s decision to permit the introduction of the
evidence, we nonetheless conclude that there was no error in
admitting the evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), although we
do so for reasons other than those relied upon by the trial

— LF

court.> To begin, Rule 404(b)(2) sets forth nine exceptions to
Rule 404(b)(1)’s prohibition against the use of propensity
evidence."® The official Comment to Rule 404 explains that this
list of exceptions is non-exhaustive. Pa.R.E. 404, Comment. As
such, courts are not restricted to the nine exceptions expressly
listed in Rule 404(b)(2) when exercising their discretion to
permit the admission of evidence of prior crimes, wrongs and
acts, so long as the evidence is used for purposes other than to
prove character or a propensity to act in accordance with
traits of character,

Although not specifically referencing Rule 404(b), this Court
identified one such additional exception in our decision in
Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa, 826, 446 A.2d 583 (1982).
In Stanley, the appellant objected to the introduction of
evidence to prove his prior first-degree murder conviction
while on trial for a violation of 18 Pa.C.8. § 6105, which
prohibits an individual convicted of a “crime of violence” from
possessing firearms. Id. at 588. The appellant argued that
introduction of this evidence was prejudicial, particularly in
light of his willingness to stipulate to the conviction. Jd. The
Commonwealth disagreed, arguing that section 6105 required
proof of the commission of a separate prior crime, and that as
a result it was entitled to introduce evidence of the separate
prior crime in order to prove the crime presently at issue. Id.
This Court agreed with the Commonwealth, ruling that “ap-
pellant’s murder conviction was undisputedly material and
relevant to proving that he committed a ‘crime of violence,’”
Id. As a result, it was “proper” evidence that the Common-
wealth was entitled to use to prove its case. Id.

15, “We may affirm a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if we deem it to
have been correct on grounds other than those specified by the court
itself, particularly where the additional reason is apparent from the

record,” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 588 Pa, 151, 903 A.2d 1139, 1157
n.19 (2006).

16. “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.”
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).

ll
HH Accordingly, our decision in Stanley confirms that
where proof of an offense with which a defendant is charged
requires proof of another crime or wrong, evidence of the
other crime or wrong is necessarily admissible.” In the pres-
ent case, the Commonwealth charged Johnson with, inter alia,
two counts of second-degree murder, alleging that the mur-
ders of Talley and R.R. were committed in the course of a
robbery of Talley’s heroin.® See N.T., 6/2/2015, at 165-66, As a
result, the Commonwealth was entitled to introduce evidence
that was relevant to, and probative of, Johnson’s alleged
robbery of Talley’s heroin—even if the introduction of that
evidence disclosed Johnson’s prior bad acts to the jury.

The evidence challenged by Johnson was in fact all directly
relevant and admissible to prove that Johnson stole heroin
from Talley during the course of events leading to her murder
and that of her daughter. Evidence of Johnson’s collaborative
drug selling activities with Talley (including his statements,
the electronic evidence and the videotape) were all relevant
and admissible to prove his knowledge of her heroin supply,
including the quantities she possessed and where they were
located in her apartment. The bags of heroin that Marquis
recovered from Levittown Trace Apartments at Johnson’s
direction, in packaging identical to those found in Talley’s
apartment, were relevant and admissible to prove that John-
son had stolen these drugs from Talley.

Accordingly, although we do so for reasons other than those
relied upon by the trial court, we conclude that there was no
error in connection with the admission of this evidence. The
evidence was relevant and admissible to prove that Johnson
committed a robbery in connection with the murders of Talley
and R.R., and was therefore admissible to prove the second-
degree murder charges.

17, See also 1 Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 2:11
(2005) (explaining that evidence of an uncharged act is admissible
where “the proponent can characterize the act as part of a discrete
event charged[;]” for instance, where “[t]he charge is robbery, but the

predicate proving the force is the rape. ... the prosecutor is entitled to
prove the rape as an essential part of the charged event.”),

18, The jury acquitted Johnson of these charges,

IV. Statement to Marquis

HM Johnson next challenges the admission of certain tes-
timony by his brother Marquis. Johnson’s Brief at 55. Marquis
testified that during a conversation with Johnson “no more
than five days” before the murders, Johnson told him, “I’m
willing to do anything to make a come up.” N.T., 6/1/2015, at
63-64. Marquis further stated that his brother said that
“anything” included his willingness to “shoot someone ... or
be involved with anything[.]” Id. at 64. Marquis indicated that
he understood “make a come up,” to refer to “coming up with
income.” Id. Over objections by Johnson that this testimony
was not relevant and constituted impermissible “prior bad
acts” evidence that did not fit within any of the exceptions
provided in Rule 404(b)(2), the trial court disagreed, ruling
that this testimony was admissible to “establish motive, identi-
ty, intent and premeditation.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/2016,
at 27, Johnson raises the same objections here.

Rule 404(b) has no applicability in this context. On prior
occasions, this Court has ruled that extrajudicial statements
relating to a specific “crime, wrong or act” may be admissible
so long as they do not constitute impermissible hearsay. See,
@g., Commonwealth v. May, 584 Pa. 640, 887 A.2d 750, 762
(2005); Commonwealth. v. Simmons, 541 Pa. 211, 662 A.2d
621, 685 (1995). Here, however, Marquis’ testimony regarding
Johnson’s alleged statements were not evidence of any partic-
ular “crime, wrong or act” by Johnson. Rather, they constitut-
ed mere statements of his desire to make money (or, more
generally, to attain success) and his willingness to do anything
(even to kill) to accomplish this end.

Hs As 2 result, Marquis’ testimony was not inadmissi-
ble under Rule 404(b), as this rule was not implicated. More-
over, the trial court did not err in denying Johnson’s relevance
objection, as the testimony was clearly relevant evidence. Rule
401 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provides a broad
definition of relevant evidence, as evidence is relevant if it
“logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends
to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports a

—————— ~

reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence
of a material fact.” Commonwealth v. Hawk, 551 Pa. 71, 709
A.2d 378, 376 (1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 583
Pa. 1, 617 A.2d 696, 699 (1992)). Even evidence that merely
advances an inference of a material fact may be admissible. Id.
Marquis’ testimony describing Johnson’s alleged statements is
an example of such an inference, as one of the Common-
wealth’s theories at trial was that Johnson’s expression of his
intention to “make a come up” provided him with a motive to
kill Talley and steal her heroin supply. See N.T., 9/16/2014, at
91-92; N.T., 6/2/2015, at 108-09,

Importantly, Johnson did not assert at trial or present here
on appeal, any hearsay objections to Marquis’ testimony about
his (Johnson’s) extrajudicial statements. Accordingly, whether
this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay or, conversely,
satisfied one or more exceptions to the hearsay rule, is not
before this Court.

VY. Unconstitutional Limitation of Mitigating Evidence

HMM Section 9711(e) enumerates eight mitigating cireum-
stances for which a defendant may present evidence during
the penalty phase of a capital prosecution. See 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9711(e). Section 9711(e)(8), sometimes referred to as the
“catchall” mitigator, permits a capital defendant to present
evidence “concerning the character and record of the defen-
dant and the circumstances of his offense.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9711(e)(8). Under section 9711(e)(8), Johnson sought to have
his mitigation expert, Carol Krych,* testify to “a multi-genera-
tional history of ... continuous abusive, neglectful behavior,”
as well as chronic poverty, drug abuse and mental illness
suffered by Johnson’s grandparents, parents, and aunts and
uncles. Johnson’s Brief at 62.”” Johnson sought to introduce
19, Ms. Krych described herself as ‘‘a capital mediation specialist, as

well as a licensed alcohol and drug counselor” and “also a private
investigator.” N.T., 6/5/2015, at 5.

20. Johnson identifies the following areas of Ms. Krych’s testimony as
wrongfully excluded: allegations of abuse; neglect or drug abuse
spanning three generations of Johnson’s family (as substantiated by
court or agency records); the lack of “consistent supportive resources”

|

such evidence in support of his “concept” that due to the
pervasiveness of abuse in his extended family’s history, abu-
sive and criminal behavior had become normalized and “he ...
never had a chance to get out of this environment[.]” N.T.,
6/5/2015, at 19,

WE The trial court limited the admission of this evi-
dence Drawing a boundary, the trial court reasoned that
testimony regarding “any event in a relative’s life that was
somehow made part of the family structure or that was made
known to [Johnson], and therefore could be said to have had
an impact upon him, would be relevant and admissible[,]” *
but that “[elvidence from generations past regarding events at
which [Johnson] was not present or of which he had never
been made aware is not relevant or material to the personal
history or character of [Johnson]” and were therefore inadmis-
sible. Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/2016, at 86-88. Heralding that
the Eighth Amendment requires a jury to “consider and give
full mitigating effect to any relevant mitigating evidence[,]”
Johnson argues that the trial court’s ruling was an unconstitu-
tional infringement on his right to present mitigating evidence.
Johnson’s Brief at 68.

Hit is unconstitutional for a court to bar the presenta-
tion of relevant mitigation evidence during the penalty phase
of a capital trial, Commonwealth v. King, 554 Pa, 331, 721
A.2d 768, 776 (1998) (discussing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S, 586,
98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 978 (1978); Saffle v. Parks, 494
US. 484, 490, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Hd.2d 415 (1990); Hddings

throughout the large family due to “poverty, extreme dysfunction and
arrests;” multi-generational reports of mental health issues, sibling and
parental animosity, corporal punishment; and involvement with the
criminal justice system, Johnson's Brief at 66,

21, The admission of mitigation evidence is within the discretion of the
trial court, See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143, 84 A3d
657, 674 (2014).

22, It is noteworthy that the trial court permitted testimony regarding
Johnson's mother’s turbulent life not only prior to his birth, but also
prior to her relationship with Johnson’s father, as well as substantial
testimony regarding the violent, dysfunctional and deeply unstable
relationship that existed between Johnson’s parents before he was born.
See N.T., 6/5/2015, at 27-45.

A Sl
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982)),
This pronouncement only applies to mitigation evidence that is
relevant. Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 148, 84 A8d
657, 674 (2014) (providing that evidence of mitigating circum-
stances must satisfy the threshold requirements of being both
relevant and admissible). As a general matter, evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is
of consequence in determining the action. Pa.R.E. 401.

Johnson attempts to establish the relevance of the excluded
evidence based upon a comment to the American Bar Associa-
tion Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of De-
fense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 10.7 (“Guideline 10.7”).
Johnson’s Brief at 63-64, Guideline 10.7 provides that when
developing mitigation evidence, defense counsel should seek
records and information “concerning not only the client, but
also his parents, grandparents, siblings, cousins and children”
because “[a] multi-generational investigation extending as far
as possible vertically and horizontally frequently discloses
significant patterns of family dysfunction and may help estab-
lish or strengthen a diagnosis or underscore the hereditary
nature of a particular impairment.” Jd. at 64 (quoting Guide-
line 10.7, Cmt.). Based on this comment, Johnson declares that,
his evidence of three generations’ worth of “trauma inducing
bio-psycho-social risk factors” and agency intervention in the
family should have been deemed relevant and admissible. Id.
at 65.

Johnson argues that this Court has recognized this concept
in two prior cases, Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1, 896
A.2d 1191 (2006), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 581 Pa. 57,
868 A.2d 505 (2004). Johnson’s Brief at 65. A review of these
eases, however, indicates that this Court has never endorsed
Guideline 10.7 as a basis for the admission of evidence in death
penalty cases. In Spotz, we acknowledged only that Guideline
10.7 recognizes that defense counsel’s duty to pursue mitiga-
tion evidence extends to investigating prior convictions that
could be used as aggravating circumstances. Spotz, 896 A.2d at
1226. In Williams, Chief Justice Saylor cited to Guideline 10.7

eT

(among other guidelines) for the same proposition in a dissent.
Williams, 868 A.2d at 528 (Saylor, J., dissenting). Notably,
Chief Justice Saylor acknowledged that this Court “has not
endorsed or adopted [the ABA Guidelines] on a wholesale
basis.” Id, at 527 n.6,

Beyond drawing our attention to Spotz and Williams, John-
son does not articulate a principled argument for the adoption
of the comment to Guideline 10,7 as a reason for the admission
of evidence. On its face, the comment is merely a prescriptive
for capital defense counsel’s obligation to thoroughly investi-
gate mitigation evidence. It is, for lack of a better term, advice
to defense counsel recommending potentially fertile sources of
mitigation evidence. It does not, as Johnson now contends,
provide any substantive basis to establish a per se rule
requiring the admissibility of every type of evidence refer-
enced in the comment. The comment does not address the
issue Johnson raises here, specifically whether all evidence of
a family history of abusive and neglectful behavior, poverty,
drug abuse and mental illness—suffered by Johnson’s grand-
parents, parents, and aunts and uncles, and of which Johnson
had no knowledge or familiarity—is admissible even if he
cannot establish that it had any material effect on his charac-
ter, his record, or the circumstances of his offense. See 42
Pa.C.8. § 9711(e)(8).

We cannot say that, in a future case, we might well find that
the type of “family history” evidence that Johnson sought to
offer into evidence is admissible. Here, however, we hold that
Johnson has failed to provide any persuasive argument or
advocacy for this Court to adopt his position.

VI. Penalty Phase Jury Instruction and Verdict Slip

Johnson asked the trial court to address each discrete
mitigating circumstance that he offered under section (e)(8)
separately when instructing the jury and to list them separate-
ly on the verdict slip.” The trial court denied this request, but
provided the following charge to the jury:

23, Johnson identifies the following discrete mitigating circumstances:
his history of mental illness for which he was not medicated at the time

The defense has alleged and presented evidence to sup-
port various mitigating circumstances. They are also defined
by statute, and I will go through those now. First, that the
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convic-
tions. Second, that the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the
killing. Third, the age of the defendant at the time of the
crime. Specifically, the defense has offered by way of miti-
gating that the defendant was [twenty-one] years old at the
time the crimes were committed.

And fourth, this has been referred to as the catch-all, but
it is actually more specific than that. The fourth area of
mitigation circumstances ... alleged by the defense is any
other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and
record of the defendant and the circumstances of his of-
fense.

Now, under that mitigating cireumstance[,] the defense
has made a number of arguments regarding the character
and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the
offense. They have argued that he has impaired neurological
functioning. They have argued lack of stability. They have
argued maternal neglect or general neglect. They have
argued maternal rejection. They have argued physical
abuse. They have argued that the defendant lost his father.
They have argued that his family was involved in the
criminal justice system in [sic] various criminal conduct.
They have argued institutional failure. They have argued
the effect of multiple adverse childhood experiences on the
defendant. They have argued that he suffers from mental
illness and was not medicated at the time of the crime. They
of the crimes; the physical/psychological trauma he has endured since
childhood; impaired neurological functioning; lifelong neglect, verbal
and physical abuse (including torture); the death of his father, the only
person to whom Johnson felt attached, at age seven; his immediately
family's severe dysfunction, including extensive involvement with the
criminal justice system; institutional failure; the effect of chronic stress
and multiple adverse childhood experiences, which created a high risk

of developing maladaptive behaviors; and evidence that he “wanted to
do well.” Johnson’s Brief at 56-57.

|

have argued that the defendant desires to do well in his life

and that there are other circumstances you may consider.

All of those arguments, all of those arguments relate to
the mitigating circumstance number four, That is one miti-
gating cireumstance. But you may consider all of those facts
in support of that mitigating circumstance.

I want to be clear. One, what I have just listed for you is
not an exhaustive list of what the defendant argued under
that mitigating circumstance. It will be for you to recall
everything that Mr. Fioravanti has presented and argued to
you that would support that mitigating circumstance. I also
want to be very clear that neither I nor Mr. Fioravanti—my
instructions or Mr, Fioravanti’s arguments should limit you
in terms of what you can find as a mitigating circumstance
or mitigating evidence under that catch-all mitigating cir-
cumstance, Any other mitigating factor relating to the char-
acter and record of the defendant and circumstances of his
offense may be—should be considered by you. There is no
limit to the mitigation that you may find under this factor so
long as it arises from the evidence,

N.T,, 6/8/2015, at 201-04,

Johnson argues that the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions requires a jury to consider all mitigating factors,
and that grouping all non-statutorily defined mitigating evi-
dence under one category creates the risk that the jury will
not give the evidence of each non-statutory mitigating factor
separate and equal consideration. Johnson’s Brief at 58-60,
Johnson contends that the failure to address each factor
individually in the jury instruction and to include each mitigat-
ing circumstance separately on the verdict slip could have led
the jury to “discount” their importance during deliberations.
Id. at 58-61.

This Court recently rejected the argument that Johnson
now advances, The defendant in Commonwealth v. Mattison,
628 Pa, 174, 82 A.8d 386 (2018), asked the trial court to charge
the jury separately on each of the seven claims of mitigating
evidence that he presented under section 9711(e)(8) and for

the verdict slip to reflect them separately. The trial court
declined to do so, instead instructing the jury that it could find
as a mitigating factor “any evidence of mitigation concerning
the character and record of the [d]efendant and the cireum-
stances of [d]efendant’s offense.” Id. at 398, On appeal, the
defendant argued that the trial court’s refusal to give his
requested instruction caused the jury to give less consider-
ation to the evidence he presented of non-statutory mitigation
factors. Id. at 399, Rejecting the argument, this Court ex-
plained that there is no authority or sound legal basis for
requiring a trial court to enumerate, either in jury instructions
or on verdict slips, every discrete category of catch all mitiga-
tion evidence presented, Id. at 400,

The defendant in Mattison candidly admitted that no Penn-
sylvania statute or case law supported his argument, and he
instead directed us to federal cases prohibiting state courts
from restricting a capital defendant’s presentation of relevant
mitigating evidence. Jd. at 399 (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
US. 398, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Hd.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct, 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1
(1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71
L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct, 2954,
57 L.Ed.2d 978 (1978)). This Court reasoned, however, that
the defendant’s claim confused the distinction between allow-
ing a jury to consider mitigating evidence and guiding its
consideration of the mitigating evidence. Id. at 400. The
federal cases at issue involved instances in which the trial
court either restricted the type of mitigation evidence present-
ed or advised the jury to ignore non-statutory mitigation
evidence. Id, at 399-400. We concluded that where a trial court
allows the contested, non-statutory mitigation evidence to go
to the jury and guides its consideration by instructing the jury
in conformance with the language of section 9711(e)(8), there
is no error in the trial court’s instruction. Id. at 400 (discuss-
ing Commonwealth v. King, 554 Pa. 881, 721 A.2d 768, 777
(1998)).

HMM Our decision in Mattison disposes of Johnson’s

—

claim. When a defendant presents mitigation evidence under
section 9711(e)(8), the trial court must instruct the jurors only
in conformance with the language of section 9711(e)(8), A trial
court is not required to instruct the jury as to each theory of
mitigation raised under the broad banner of section 9711(e)(8),
and the verdict slip is not required to reflect each such theory
separately.

Vil. Denial of Motion to Bar Death Penalty
Due to Nature of Crimes

Hs Johnson argues that the Commonwealth should
not have been permitted to pursue the death penalty because
the “nature and brutality” of the crimes would overwhelm the
jury and negate its ability to impartially consider the mitiga-
tion evidence he put forth, thereby violating his constitutional
right to have the jury “consider and give effect to all mitigat-
ing evidence.” Johnson’s Brief at 72-73.* Johnson asserts that
the death penalty is intended for only the worst offenders and
the very worst crimes, and argues that the jury here was
predisposed to place him in that unenviable category because
of the nature of the crimes. Id. at 69-73.

24, Johnson acknowledges Mattison but does not discuss it except to
concede that this Court rejected the argument he presently advances
therein. Johnson's Brief at 56 n.6.

25. The trial court's instruction as reproduced above did identify many
of the specific claims of mitigation that Johnson raised under section
9711(e)(8). This jury instruction therefore went well beyond the instruc-
tion the trial court was required to give, and was far more detailed than
the instruction in Mattison.

26. In his discussion of this issue, Johnson also argues for a “categorical
ban” on the death penalty based upon various United States Supreme
Court decisions that hold certain categories of offenders may not be
subjected to the death penalty. Johnson's Brief at 72-73, 78 (discussing
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct, 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525
(2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct, 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1
(2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S, 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d
335 (2002)). Johnson did not raise this issue before the trial court or in
his statement of matters complained of on appeal; as such, it is waived.
Hairston, 84 A.3d at 672 (finding issue waived in capital case where
defendant failed to include it in his statement of matters complained of
on appeal); Freeman, 827 A.2d at 402,

——— *

The trial court found this argument meritless, reasoning
that “the ultimate question with regard to this claim is wheth-
er the jurors would be able to put aside any bias, sympathy,
prejudice or emotion” and decide the case based upon the
evidence and the jury instructions. Concluding that voir dire
revealed that a “fair and impartial” jury was seated, that it
repeatedly instructed the jury “to make a dispassionate evalu-
ation of the evidence[,]” and that the jury found that mitigat-
ing factors outweighed aggravating factors with regard to
Talley’s murder (but not R.R.’s murder), the trial court deter-
mined that the jury properly considered the mitigating evi-
dence. Trial Court Opinion, 8/23/2016, at 35-36,

We agree that there is no merit to this claim. Johnson’s
argument is that the Commonwealth should not have been
permitted to pursue the death penalty because the particularly
brutal nature of his crimes would blind the jury to its duty to
consider and weigh mitigation evidence. Taken to its logical
conclusion, Johnson’s position would result in the anomalous
situation in which the more heinous the crime, the less likely
that its perpetrator would be eligible for the death penalty
because of the overmastering influence the circumstances
could have on the jury’s impartiality. Criminals who commit
the most egregious crimes would be effectively exempt from
the death penalty, when the death penalty has been reserved
for precisely such crimes. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407, 420, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (“[Clapital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit a
narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose ex-
treme culpability makes them the most deserving of execu-
tion.”). This would be a bizarre and irrational outcome, and we
do not endorse it.”

VII. Constitutionality of Aggravating Factors
Hl In his final argument, Johnson alleges that three
statutory aggravating factors the jury found in relation to the

27, The jury did find multiple mitigating factors as to both murders. See
Talley Sentencing Verdict Slip, 6/18/2015, at 3-4; R.R. Sentencing
Verdict Slip, 6/18/2015, at 3, This is strong evidence that the jury was,
in fact, able to consider and weigh the mitigating evidence.

murder of R.R., sections 9711(d)(5), (11), and (16), are uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. Johnson’s Brief at 78. To
survive such a challenge, an aggravating cireumstance must be
found to “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others
found guilty of murder.” Commonwealth v. Bawmhammers,
625 Pa, 354, 92 A.38d 708, 788 (2014). Johnson does not explain
how the provisions he has challenged fail to meet this stan-
dard. Instead, without discussing the three factors individual-
ly, he offers a blanket statement that these aggravating
circumstances fail to adequately define what constitutes a
circumstance that would fall under each of them, and there-
fore “fail to provide any meaningful basis for distinguishing
those few cases in which the death penalty is imposed from
the many cases in which it is not.” Johnson’s Brief at 80. We
disagree.

Section 9711(d)(16) establishes as an aggravating factor the
fact that the victim was a child under twelve years of age. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(16). This Court rejected a vagueness chal-
lenge to section 9711(16) in Commonwealth v. Bardo, 551 Pa.
140, 709 A.2d 871 (1998), concluding that the provision “is
abundantly clear and merely reflects the legislative judgment
that killing a person under the age of twelve is a particularly
heinous crime” and that “[i]f anything,” it is a “model of
clarity.” Id. at 878-79. Johnson offers no persuasive basis on
which to depart from our prior decision in Bardo.

We have similarly rejected two prior vagueness challenges
to section 9711(d)(11), which provides as an aggravating factor
the fact that where “[t]he defendant has been convicted of
another murder committed in any jurisdiction and committed
either before or at the time of the offense at issue.” 42 Pa.C.S,
§ 9711(d)(11). In Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 580 Pa. 403, 861
A.2d 898 (2004), we concluded that

this aggravating circumstance clearly narrows the class of

persons eligible for the death penalty by excluding those

individuals who have not been convicted of another murder.

Moreover, the “multiple murder” aggravator reasonably

justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence because,
based upon their risk of danger to general society, those
individuals convicted of multiple murders warrant a harsher
punishment, As such, the “multiple murder’ aggravator
comports with the necessary requirements of the Highth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.

Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 580 Pa. 408, 861 A.2d 898, 918
(2004). Relying on Fletcher, we reached the same result in
Baumhammers. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d at 737-88, As with
section 9711(d)(16), Johnson has failed to provide any princi-
pled reason for this Court to deviate from its prior decisions in
Fletcher and Baumhammers:

HM Section 9711(d)(5) provides an aggravating circum-
stance where “[t]he victim was a prosecution witness to a
murder or other felony committed by the defendant and was
killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the
defendant in any grand jury or criminal proceeding involving
such offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(4)(5). As with sections
9711(d)(11) and 9711(d)(16), this provision includes a precisely
tailored description of the criteria that must be met for the
invocation of this aggravator. Moreover, the legislative intent
for including this aggravator should be clear, namely that
committing a subsequent crime (a murder) to avoid punish-
ment for a prior crime merits a harsher sentence. Johnson
provides no refutation to these conclusions, and we will not
construct an argument on his behalf. Commonwealth v. John-
son, 604 Pa, 176, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (2009) (“It is not the
obligation of this Court, even in a capital case, to formulate
[the] [alppellant’s arguments for him.”)."

28. We note that Chief Justice Saylor, in a dissenting posture, has
expressed his “continuing reservations” with this Court’s interpretation
of section 9711(d)(5) as applying to potential prosecution witnesses,
indicating that, based on his reading of the provision, “a relevant
prosecution [must] have preceded the killing.” Commonwealth v. Dan-
iels, 628 Pa, 193, 104 A.3d 267, 321 & 322 n.3 (2014) (Saylor, J.
dissenting). Johnson has not raised that issue in this appeal. Notably,
moreover, for purposes of our statutory review, the jury found other
aggravating circumstances; as such, consideration of this particular

question is presently unnecessary. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(ii) (“The
Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines

—

IX. Review of the Death Sentence Pursuant
to 42 PaCS. § 9711(h)

HE This Court is required to review every death sentence
to ensure that it was not imposed as a result of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor and that there is
evidence to support the jury’s finding of aggravating circum-
stances, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(n)(1), (8); Commonwealth v. Har-
ris, 572 Pa. 489, 817 A.2d 1033, 1058 (2002). The death penalty
was imposed for the murder of R.R. The jury found as
aggravating circumstances the fact that she was under the age
of twelve, that she was a witness to her mother’s murder and
was killed to prevent her from identifying Johnson as her
mother’s killer, and that Johnson was convicted of committing
another murder. Murder of the First Degree of [R.R.] Sen-
tencing Verdict Slip, 8/16/2015, at 3. There is ample evidence
to support the jury’s finding of these aggravating factors,
much of which has been detailed hereinabove.

HI The sound factual predicate for the aggravating fac-
tors bolsters a conclusion that the sentence was not the result
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Indeed, the
jury also found three mitigating circumstances,” but in its
ultimate calculus decided that they were outweighed by the
aggravating factors. The record reveals nothing but a meas-
ured and sober deliberation. Accordingly, we must affirm the
sentence of death. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(8).

Conclusion

Having found no reversible error, we affirm Johnson’s
convictions and judgment of sentence. The Prothonotary is
hereby directed to transmit to the Governor the complete
records of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence
and review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, pursuant
to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711().

that ... the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one

aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d).”).

29, These were Johnson's age, his lack of prior convictions, and “catch
all [sic] [] mitigation concerning [his] character. Murder of the First
Degree of [R.R.] Sentencing Verdict Slip, 8/16/2015, at 3.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Todd, Dougherty
and Wecht join the opinion, and Justice Mundy joins the
majority except for Part III where she concurs in the result.

160 A.8d 158
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant
ve
1997 CHEVROLET AND CONTENTS SEIZED FROM
James YOUNG [Elizabeth Young], Appellee
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant
ve

The Real Property and Improvements Known
as 416 S, 62nd Street, Philadelphia, PA
19143 [Elizabeth Young], Appellee

No, 29 EAP 2015
No. 30 EAP 2015

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

Argued: May 11, 2016
Decided: May 25, 2017

an

TL

a Wey

Ronald Eisenberg, Esq., Jonathan Michael Levy, Esq., Ed-
ward F. McCann Jr., Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's
Office, Rufus Seth Williams, Esq., Office of the District Attor-
ney of Philadelphia County, Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., for
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant.

Heather F, Gallagher, Esq., Lehigh County District Attor-
ney’s Office, for Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association,
Appellant Amicus Curiae.

Jennifer Anne Peterson, Esq., PA Office of Attorney Gener-
al, for Office of Attorney General, Appellant Amicus Curiae.

Jessica Moltisanti Anthony, Esq. Jason A. Leckerman,
Esq., Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, L.L.P., Lisa Bolotin
Swaminathan, Esq., Ballard Spahr LLP, for Elizabeth Young
and 1997 Chevrolet and Contents Seized From James Young
and 416 §. 62nd Street, Appellee.

Ellen C. Brotman, Esq., Griesing Law, LLC, Elayne Bryn,
Esq., for Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers, Appellee Amicus Curiae.

Susanna Rachel Greenberg, Esq., Louis 8. Rulli, Esq., Penn
Legal Assistance Office, Martha Meredith Tack-Hooper, Esq.,

Se
for ACLU of PA, CLS, Philadelphia NAACP, PLA, Philadel-
phia VIP, SeniorLAW Center, Appellee Amicus Curiae.

Matthew David Lee, Esq., Blank Rome LLP, for Phila Bar
Ass’n, Hispanic Bar Ass’n of PA, Barristers’ Ass’n of Philadel-
phia, Appellee Amicus Curiae.

Susan Mon-Yi Lin, Esq., David Rudovsky, Esq., Kairys,
Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, LLP, for Institute for Jus-
tice, Appellee Amicus Curiae.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE TODD

The Kighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees citizens protection against the government by lim-
iting its power to punish. In this appeal by allowance, we
consider, inter alia, the constitutional limitations on civil in
rem forfeiture in Pennsylvania under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, where the government
attempts to seize through forfeiture a home and vehicle not
based on any criminal conduct by the property owner—here, a
71-year-old grandmother—but upon the illegal conduct of a
third party—her adult son. In doing so, we attempt to recon-
cile the uncertain constitutional jurisprudence underlying civil
in vem forfeiture and provide clarity and uniformity regarding
the appropriate constitutional standard to be applied to exces-
sive fines challenges to civil in vem forfeitures in our Com-
monwealth,

As more fully explained below, we find the proper constitu-
tional construct in determining whether an in rem forfeiture
violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
requires an initial determination regarding the relationship
between the forfeited property and the underlying offense—
the instrumentality prong. If this threshold prong is satisfied,

1, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” U.S, Const, amend. VIII,

the next step of the analysis is a proportionality inquiry in
which the value of the property sought to be forfeited is
compared to the gravity of the underlying offense to deter-
mine whether the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the
gravity of the offense. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
the order of the Commonwealth Court, which remanded the
matter to the trial court, for further proceedings consistent
with our decision,

I, Factual and Procedural Background

Appellee Elizabeth Young is a 71-year-old grandmother
who owned and resided at a house at 416 South 62nd Street in
West Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.” Appellee owned her house
for four decades, since the 1970s. In 2006, Appellee purchased
a 1997 Chevrolet Venture minivan to meet her transportation
needs. In October 2009, Appellee suffered two blood clots in
her lungs and was hospitalized through November 2009. Upon
her release, Appellee was placed on bedrest and prescribed
several medications. During this time, Donald Graham, Appel-
lee’s son, then age 50, and two of her grandchildren, resided
with her at the house.

On November 10, 2009, Officer Robert Billups, a member of
the Narcotics North Division of the Philadelphia Police De-
partment, was conducting an investigation in relation to illegal
drug sales from Appellee’s house. On that date, Officer Billups
and his partner, Officer Kevin Williams, met with a confiden-
tial informant who subsequently was observed giving Graham,
who was exiting the house, $40 in pre-recorded money in
exchange for a small bag of marijuana. Four days later, on
November 14, 2009, the officers, with the confidential infor-
mant, observed Graham arrive at the house in a grey Chevro-
let vehicle, later determined to be Appellee’s minivan. After
exiting the vehicle, Graham gave the informant another small
2. As explained below, the oddity in civil in rem forfeiture is that the

subject of the forfeiture, and the focus of the litigation, is on the

property sought to be forfeited; however, as owner of the subject

property, Appellee is the party of interest, and, thus, is the active
participant in these proceedings.

bag of marijuana in exchange for $40. A similar transaction
occurred two days later on November 16, 2009.

On November 19, 2009, members of the Narcotics North
Division served and executed a search warrant on the house.
During the course of their search of the premises, the officers
confiscated a letter addressed to Graham, a scale, numerous
new and used plastic packets, and six baggies of marijuana.
While Graham was not present at the house when the search
was executed, Appellee was present. The officers explained to
Appellee, who was provided with a copy of the search warrant,
that her son had sold drugs from the house and used a vehicle
in connection with the sales on several occasions. The officers
did not, however, arrest Graham on that date, and he was not
charged with a crime based upon these sales.

On December 4, 2009, Officer Nathan London was conduct-
ing an investigation of drug dealings from the house and
observed an informant approach it. The informant met with
Graham at the door of the house, where the informant provid-
ed Graham an unknown amount of currency. Graham momen-
tarily re-entered the house, and then handed the informant
certain small objects, which later tested positive for marijuana.
Approximately one month later, on January 5, 2010, a similar
transaction occurred: after an informant met with Officers
McClain and Coaxum, he went to the house, Graham exited
the side door of the residence, and both men entered Appel-
lee’s vehicle. Thereafter, the informant exited the van with a
small item which contained a green weed substance. The next
day, Officer London returned to the house with Officer Coa-
xum and observed a similar transaction take place. Specifical-
ly, an informant knocked on the door of the house, Graham
answered, and allowed the informant to come into the house.
Graham exited the house, went to Appellee’s van, remained in
the vehicle for several minutes, then exited and returned to
the house. Shortly thereafter, the informant left the house and
provided the officers with a baggie containing small objects
which testing later identified as marijuana.

The next day, January 7, 2010, at approximately 4:40 p.m.,
Officer McClain met with an informant who approached the

PC Csi‘
house, and a similar drug transaction occurred resulting in the
informant providing officers with two baggies containing mari-
juana. Immediately thereafter, at 4:45 p.m., Officer Robinson
approached Graham and arrested him, Officer Robinson recov-
ered a sandwich bag containing 4.6 grams of marijuana, one
cellular telephone, $176.00 in unmarked currency, and $60.00
in pre-recorded currency. The police also took from Graham
the keys to Appellee’s van. The officers then executed a search
warrant on the house and recovered 1.3 grams of marijuana
from the living room and 8.5 grams from the van. Graham
pled guilty to possession of marijuana and possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver, and was sentenced to 11 to 28
months house arrest. 85 P.S. §§ 780-118(a)(16), (80).° The trial
court imposed no fine on Graham.!

While the Commonwealth never charged Appellee with any
crime, on October 20, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a petition
for the forfeiture of Appellee’s house and her vehicle under
the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act (“Forfeiture Act”).
42. Pa.C.8. §§ 6801-6802. On May 1, 2012, the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas held a hearing, and ultimately
ordered the forfeiture of Appellee’s house and vehicle.

The trial court determined that the Commonwealth estab-
lished a nexus between the seized house and the violations of
the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act
(“Drug Act”). In doing so, the court reasoned that, in deter-
mining whether a nexus existed, forfeitures are allowed where
the Commonwealth demonstrates that the property owner
facilitated the sale of drugs or stored the drugs and parapher-
nalia on his or her property. The court found that Appellee’s
house and vehicle were used to facilitate illegal drug sales, as
the police had observed several drug transactions inside or
around Appellee’s house and van, and Appellee’s son Graham
3. The specific charges filed against Graham are not contained in the

record,

4. Appellee asserts Graham was also charged with criminal use of a
communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a), but this offense does not
justify forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act.

5. 35 PS. §§ 780-101 et seq.

as

was selling illegal drugs on a regular basis, and, thus, forfei-
ture of the property was proper.

The trial court also rejected Appellee’s statutory innocent
owner defense afforded by the Forfeiture Act because, after
the police notified Appellee of Graham’s drug activities,
through the service of search warrants on the property and
personally informing Appellee of the activities, she “refused to
take any proactive measures or steps to demonstrate her lack
of consent to this illegal activity.” Trial Court Opinion,
4/3/2018, at 11-12. Further, the trial court offered that Appel-
lee did not leave or vacate the property, or restrict her son’s
access to her property. Moreover, the court concluded that
Appellee “either knew of or consented to her son’s illegal
activities on the subject properties... [and at best] turned a
blind eye to her son’s illegal conduct on the property and
allowed it to continue over a prolonged period of time.” Id. at
14, The court explained that it observed Appellee’s demeanor
and behavior during the hearing and “simply did not believe
[Appellee’s] testimony due to blatant inconsistencies.” Id.

Additionally, the trial court ruled that the forfeiture did not
violate the Highth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion as the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of Graham’s offenses, and the court had already found
Appellee failed to sustain her burden of establishing an inno-
cent owner defense. In doing so, the court relied upon this
Court’s case law, discussed below, and looked to the penalty
imposed as compared to the maximum penalty allowed, wheth-
er the violation was part of a pattern of unlawful behavior, and
the harm resulting from the crime charged. The court rejected
as irrelevant that Appellee herself was not charged with or
convicted of a violation of the Drug Act; it found that for the
relevant offenses Graham theoretically could have been
charged with, he faced maximum criminal penalties of $80,000,
which, according to the trial court, exceeded the combined
appraised value of Appellee’s home and vehicle, The court
noted that, for several years, Graham had continually sold
illegal drugs from the property, and that this activity put “not
only Mr. Graham’s neighbors in harm’s way, but also the

a ~

officers investigating his unlawful activities and serving war-
rants in connection with that illegal conduct.” Jd. The trial
court deemed this relevant time period as beginning in No-
vember 2009 and continuing until April 2011.° Thus, the trial
court rejected Appellee’s statutory defense and constitutional
challenge to its order allowing forfeiture of her house and
vehicle,

Appellee appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which re-
versed the trial court, concluding that the lower tribunal
applied an erroneous standard for determining whether the
forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment, and that it failed to
consider all relevant circumstances in rejecting Appellee’s
innocent owner defense. Thereafter, we granted review on
both issues, which we discuss in turn.

IL. Analysis

A. Forfeiture
1. Legal Background

Hl Before reviewing in full the Commonwealth Court’s
decision below, it is advantageous, and indeed, necessary, to

6. Over a year after the initial arrest, on April 25, 2011, Officer Jeffrey
Walker conducted a third investigation involving Appellee’s house. On
that date, another individual who was not related to Appellee was
observed selling marijuana from the premises, ultimately resulting in
the search of the premises and the discovery of marijuana and packag-
ing paraphernalia, These events were initially part of the Common-
wealth’s forfeiture action as set forth above. However, on October 9,
2013, on appeal before the Commonwealth Court, Appellee applied for
extraordinary relief on the basis that Officer Walker, whose testimony
had been credited by the trial court, had been indicted on corruption
charges that involved planting drugs on suspects. As Officer Walker had
conducted the April 25, 2011 search of Appellee’s house, the court
believed that “fairness” required a remand so that the trial court could
re-examine its prior decision, Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 106
A.3d 836, 847 (Pa, Cmwith. 2014), The Commonwealth opposed the
application for extraordinary relief, claiming that the testimony of
Officers Billups and London regarding Graham’s seven controlled buys
was sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of Appellee’s house. On Febru-
ary 19, 2014, the Commonwealth Court listed the appeal for an en banc
oral argument and, thereafter, the court denied Appellee’s application
for extraordinary relief. Before our Court, the Commonwealth takes the
position that it is not relying upon the events surrounding the third
investigation involving Officer Walker, who pled guilty in federal court
to crimes committed while on duty as a police officer.

consider the legal background of the Eighth Amendment with
respect to forfeitures, including the United States Supreme
Court’s two foundational decisions upon which its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is grounded, as well as our Court’s
pronouncements in this area of the law.’

HMM The historical underpinnings of forfeiture law and
the Excessive Fines Clause as it has been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court as well as our Court provides a
rich, but yet not entirely lucid, backdrop regarding the consti-
tutionality of property forfeiture. Generally speaking, forfei-
ture involves a taking of property through a forfeiture statute
which provides that, when an item is possessed or used in
violation of the law, private ownership of the property ceases,
and the government becomes the owner of the property, Caleb
Nelson The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 Yale L.J.
2446, 2456 (2016) (hereinafter “Nelson”). Forfeitures fall into
two broad categories: criminal in personam forfeitures and
civil in rem forfeitures. Criminal in personam forfeitures arise
from criminal proceedings in which the property owner is
convicted of a crime. In contrast to the ancient concept of civil
in vem forfeiture, criminal in personam forfeiture is a more
recent legal means by which to confiscate property, with the
first federal criminal forfeiture statute being the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963. Conversely, civil in rem proceedings, which maintain a
centuries-old focus on the property as the offender, do not
require a criminal conviction, or even a criminal charge, as
demonstrated in the case sub judice.’ Thus, criminal in per-
sonam and civil in rem forfeiture are a powerful means by
which the state can seize private property. While, in this
matter, the forfeiture concerns a civil in rem proceeding, the
7. The Highth Amendment, and, specifically, the Excessive Fines Clause,

is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman

Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Bd.2d
674 (2001).

8, Indeed, because the focus in civil in rem forfeiture is on property,
legal proceedings arising from this fiction often come with odd cap-
tions, such as United States v. 144,774 Pounds of Blue King Crab, more
or less, 410 F.3d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir, 2005), or the caption in this case.

distinction between the two types of forfeiture has played, and
continues to play, an important role in this area.

HH The type of property at issue, at least to some
extent, informs a forfeiture analysis. “Contraband” connotes
property that is inherently illegal, the mere “possession of
which, without more, constitutes a crime.” One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 698, 699, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14
L.Ed.2d 170 (1965). Forfeiture of contraband is not subject to
Eighth Amendment scrutiny, as removal of such illegal or
dangerous property from society is deemed to be purely
remedial in nature. See United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361
(1984), Conversely, property that is “tainted” by unlawful use,
but which is not otherwise illegal to possess, has come to be
known as an “instrumentality” of the offense, and, as dis-
cussed below, has been a subject of contention as to whether
such property is subject to Kighth Amendment protections.
Whether property is an instrumentality is determined by
evaluating the relationship of the property to the underlying
criminal offense.

As noted above, the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits, inter alia, the government im-
posing excessive fines upon the citizenry. It states: “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend.
VIII. While the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause has
generated a significant amount of litigation, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Excessive Fines Clause
only on rare occasions, and, for many years, that Clause with
respect to civil in rem forfeitures went unexplored.

In 1998, however, in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,
118 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1998), the United States
Supreme Court considered the Excessive Fines Clause in the
context of a civil in rem forfeiture, finding such forfeiture is
subject to the limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment
if it is punitive in nature. In that matter, Richard Lyle Austin
was indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota’s drug

laws. After Austin pled guilty to one count of possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven
years imprisonment, the United States filed a civil in rem
proceeding seeking forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and
auto body shop, under the applicable federal forfeiture statute.
The forfeiture was based upon Austin bringing two grams of
cocaine from his mobile home to the auto body shop where he
sold the cocaine to a buyer. The high Court granted certiorari
to determine whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause applied to civil in rem forfeitures,

Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun rejected
the United States’ assertion that the Highth Amendment does
not limit the government’s conduct in civil proceedings unless
the challenged governmental action would have been recog-
nized as a criminal punishment at the time of its adoption and
unless that proceeding is so punitive that it must be consid-
ered criminal. The Court first noted that, unlike other provi-
sions found in the Bill of Rights, the Highth Amendment by its
terms was not limited to criminal cases. The Court proceeded
to consider the purpose behind the Eighth Amendment, which
it stated was to “limit the government's power to punish,” and
that punishment applied to both civil and criminal law. Austin,
509 U.S, at 609-10, 118 S.Ct. 2801. Thus, the Court found that
the focus was on whether the forfeiture was punishment.

After tracing the three kinds of forfeiture established in
England at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified—
deodand, forfeiture upon conviction for a felony or treason,
and statutory forfeiture—the Court reasoned that each was
understood as imposing punishment, at least in part. Tracing
its prior case law, the Court found that it had recognized for
some time that statutory in rem forfeiture imposed punish-
ment, along with the legal fiction that the “thing is primarily
considered the offender.” Jd. at 615, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (quoting
JW. Goldsmith, Jr-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
511, 41 S.Ct. 189, 65 L.Ed. 876 (1921)), Indeed, this fiction
enabled courts to expand their reach as, in situations typically
arising in admiralty proceedings, courts lacked in personam
jurisdiction over the owner of the property, Austin, 509 U.S.

at 616, 118 S.Ct. 2801 (citing Republic National Bank of
Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87, 118 S.Ct. 554, 121
L.Hd.2d 474 (1992). Yet, the Court observed that the fiction
that the object was the offender rested upon “the notion that
the owner who allows his property to become involved in an
offense has been negligent.” Austin, 509 US, at 616, 113 S.Ct.
2801. Thus, the Court reasoned that, even though it had
rejected the “innocence” of the owner as a common-law de-
fense to forfeiture, it had recognized that forfeiture generally,
and statutory in rem forfeiture specifically, had historically
intended, at least in part, to punish the owner. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the drug offense forfeiture statutes
at issue constituted punishment.

The United States argued that the forfeiture statutes at
issue were not punitive, but were remedial, because they
removed the “instruments” of the drug trade, thus, protecting
the community from ongoing drug dealing. Accordingly, the
United States maintained the statutes were not subject to
Eighth Amendment scrutiny, The Supreme Court, however,
rejected any extension of the idea of a statute being remedial
beyond the application to the contraband seized. Consistent
therewith, the Court went on to find the mobile home and auto
shop at issue, like the automobile at issue in its earlier
decision involving the transportation of illegal liquor, not
immune from Excessive Fines Clause examination. Austin,
509 U.S. at 621, 113 S.Ct. 2801; One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,
880 U.S. at 699, 85 S.Ct. 1246,*

9. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, where an automobile, carrying 31 cases
of liquor not bearing Pennsylvania tax seals, was stopped without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the United States Supreme
Court determined that, while technically a civil proceeding, the forfei-
ture in substance and effect was criminal in nature; rejected the
argument that the exclusionary rule applied only to criminal prosecu-
tions and was not applicable in forfeiture proceedings; and concluded
that the exclusionary rule was applicable to such forfeiture proceedings,
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S, at 702, 85 S.Ct. 1246. In doing so,
the high Court specifically rejected the Commonwealth's contention
that the automobile was contraband, finding “[tJhere is nothing even
remotely criminal in possessing an automobile. It is only the alleged use
to which this particular automobile was put that subjects [the property

Ultimately, the Court reasoned that forfeiture that “consti-
tutes ‘payment to a sovereign as punishment for some of-
fense’” is subject to the protections and limitations found in
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Aus-
tin, 509 U.S. at 622, 118 S.Ct. 2801. Critically, however, the
Court declined to establish a definitive test for determining
when a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive, but remanded
the matter, leaving the development of the applicable consid-
erations for evolution in the lower courts.

Important to our Commonwealth’s experience in interpret-
ing the Excessive Fines Clause, and our analogous Pennsylva-
nia Constitution provision, Justice Antonin Scalia penned an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He
first explained that, at the time of the drafting of the Highth
Amendment, fines were understood to be a payment to a
sovereign as punishment for some offense, and that the taking
of lawful property must be considered, in part or in whole,
punitive. Justice Scalia, however, went further than the major-
ity and offered that, in his view, the test for constitutional
excessiveness was straight forward. He opined that whether
in vem forfeiture violated the Highth Amendment turned
solely on whether the confiscated property had a close rela-
tionship to the offense. As discussed in greater detail below, in
Justice Sealia’s view, the value of the property was irrelevant,
and if there existed a close enough relationship between the
property and the offense, the forfeiture passed constitutional
muster.

Five years later, in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
821, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 814 (1998), the high Court
again spoke to the Excessive Fines Clause, albeit in the
context of a criminal in personam forfeiture statute. In that
matter, Hosep Bajakajian attempted to leave the United
States with $357,144 in currency without reporting the funds
as required by federal law. See 81 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A)
(requiring the reporting of the transfer outside of the United
States of monies in excess of $10,000). Federal forfeiture law

owner] to its possible loss [as compared to the forfeiture of the illegal
liquor itself].” Id. at 699, 85 S.Ct. 1246.

a ©

provided that an individual convicted of willfully violating the
reporting provision should forfeit to the government “any
property ... involved in such offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).
The United States sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144, and
Bajakajian challenged the forfeiture as violative of the Exces-
sive Fines Clause. The federal district court determined that
the entire amount was subject to forfeiture, as it was “involved
in” the offense, even though the funds were not connected to
any other crime and even though they were being transported
to repay a lawful debt. The district court, however, determined
that such forfeiture would be “extraordinarily harsh” and
“grossly disproportionate to the offense in question,” and,
thus, violated the Excessive Fines Clause. Bajakajian, 524
US. at 326, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Instead, the court ordered the
forfeiture of $15,000.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. The circuit court reasoned that a forfeiture must
fulfill two conditions: first, the property forfeited must be an
instrumentality of the crime committed, and, second, the value
of the property must be proportional to the culpability of the
owner. The circuit court concluded that the currency was not
an instrumentality of the reporting crime, as it was the
withholding of information, rather than the possession of the
money, that ran afoul of the law. According to the circuit
court, the forfeiture statute involving currency could never
satisfy the Excessive Fines Clause, and thus it was unneces-
sary to consider the proportionality condition. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the per se nature of the
court of appeals’ holding, which invalidated a portion of the
statute.

In a 54 decision, with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for
the majority, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, The
high Court first made clear that the forfeiture of currency
pursuant to Section 982(a)(1) constituted punishment, thus
implicating the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 329, 118 S.Ct.
2028, The Court reached this conclusion by tracing the history
of forfeitures, and concluding that, because in rem forfeitures
were traditionally viewed as non-punitive, and the conduct of

the property owner irrelevant as the focus of the action was on
the property, they were not encompassed by the Excessive
Fines Clause. The Court went on, however, to find that the
forfeiture in the matter before it “does not bear any of the
hallmarks of traditional civil in vem forfeitures,” id. at 331,
118 S.Ct. 2028, but, rather, was born from a criminal in
personam forfeiture, and imposed at the culmination of crimi-
nal proceedings. Thus, for purposes of the threshold issue of
Eighth Amendment protection, the Court reasoned that, while
instrumentalities were historically considered a form of
“guilty” property, here, the forfeiture was a criminal in per-
sonam proceeding; thus, it was irrelevant whether Bajakaji-
an’s currency was an instrumentality.” The Court concluded,
however, that, in any event, the currency was not an instru-
mentality. Rather, the Court found that the forfeiture was
punitive, and that being the case, the test for excessiveness of
a punitive forfeiture involved “solely a proportionality determi-
nation.” Id, at 8838-84, 118 S.Ct. 2028.

The Court explained the proportionality concept by offering
that “[t]he amount of the forfeiture must bear some relation-
ship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish,”
and, more specifically, “a punitive forfeiture violates the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the
gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Jd, at 834, 118 S.Ct. 2028,
Finding that neither the text of the Excessive Fines Clause,
nor the history behind it, identified how proportional to a
criminal offense the fine must be, the court went on to find
“particularly relevant” two factors to be considered in divining
constitutional excessiveness: first, judgments about the appro-
priate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to
the legislature; and, second, any judicial determination regard-
ing the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inher-
ently imprecise. Together, these considerations counseled
against requiring any strict proportionality between the
10, The Court noted, however, that, because recent forfeiture laws

blurred the civil in rem and criminal in personam distinction, a modern

statutory forfeiture is a “fine” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment if

it constitutes punishment, even in part, regardless of its label, citing
Austin. Bajakajian, 524 U.S, at 331 n.6, 118 S.Ct. 2028.

amount of the punitive forfeiture and the gravity of the
criminal offense, leading to the adoption of the grossly dispro-
portionate standard. Id, at 336, 118 S.Ct, 2028,

Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the forfei-
ture of the entire $357,144 would have been excessive, as
Bajakajian’s crime was merely one of a failure to report, and
his violation was unrelated to any other criminal activity. The
Court looked to the sentencing guidelines, offering that the
maximum sentence Bajakajian faced under the federal sen-
tencing guidelines was six months imprisonment and the
maximum fine was $5,000. Jd. at 388, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Indeed,
the Court rejected the United States’ argument that the
proper approach focused on the maximum statutory penalty
permitted, and, its argument that the forfeiture was not
excessive, as Congress authorized a maximum fine of $250,000
plus five years imprisonment for willfully violating the report-
ing requirements. Instead, the Court reasoned that the fact
that the maximum punishment that Bajakajian faced under
the guidelines was but a fraction of the penalties authorized by
the statute demonstrated his culpability relative to other
potential violators of the reporting provision—such as “tax
evaders, drug kingpins, or money launderers”—was small. Id.
at 889, n.14, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Further, the Court offered that
the harm that Bajakajian caused was minor, as it impacted
only the government, and in relatively minimal fashion, Thus,
the Court concluded that, when comparing the gravity of
Bajakajian’s crime with the $857,144 sought by the govern-
ment for forfeiture, such a forfeiture would be grossly dispro-
portionate. Finally, the Court rejected the United States’
reliance upon early statutory enactments requiring full forfei-
ture of goods involved in customs offenses, as such statutes
were not considered punishment for a criminal offense because
they rested upon the theory of guilty property; thus, according
to the Court, they revealed nothing about the proportionality
of the punitive forfeiture at issue in the matter before it.

It is these two United States Supreme Court pronounce-
ments considering the Excessive Fines Clause that serve as
the bedrock constitutional foundation regarding forfeiture

from which any analysis must be based. With these decisions
in mind, we turn to the decisions of our Court which have
applied them.

After Austin, but prior to Bajakajian, this Court decided In
ve King Properties, 585 Pa. 321, 635 A.2d 128 (1998). In an
opinion authored by Justice John Flaherty, we considered the
question of whether Article I, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution—our Commonwealth’s excessive fines clause—
mandated that owners of real property forfeited under the
Forfeiture Act be permitted to redeem their property in order
for the statute to pass constitutional muster." In In re King
Properties, police found a large sum. of cash and items com-
monly used in the selling of illegal drugs in Coy King’s home.
The Commonwealth sought the forfeiture of the house, and,
while the trial court found that King’s entire interest in the
house was subject to forfeiture, it granted King the right to
redeem the property for $30,000. On appeal, the Common-
wealth Court reversed, finding the trial court was not author-
ized to permit King’s redemption.

In contemplating this question of authority on appeal, our
Court first considered whether redemption is required by our
Constitution’s prohibition on excessive fines. The Court noted
the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 were virtual-
ly identical, and, thus, looked to federal treatment of the
United States Constitution’s excessive fines provision. Our
Court, relying upon Austin, determined that the forfeiture
before it, which was similar to that at issue in Austin, was
punitive, and, thus, subject to the protections of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution. Turning to consideration of what factors
were appropriate under Article I, Section 13, the Court
adopted Justice Scalia’s standard for determining whether a
forfeiture was excessive—that the inquiry does not concern
the value of the property forfeited, but, rather, the nexus
between the offense and the subject property. Placing the
burden on the Commonwealth to establish the relevant pat-
11. Redemption refers to the right of the former property owner to

regain ownership of his or her property through payment to the
Commonwealth.

tern of criminal conduct, the Court found that there was “clear
and convincing evidence that King was involved in an ongoing
drug business for which he used his house as a base of
operations. King admitted involvement in unlawful drug sales
and was in the possession of large amounts of cash, drugs, and
drug paraphernalia, all of which were found either in his house
or his car.” 635 A.2d at 183. This, according to the Court,
established a sufficient connection between the criminal con-
duet in question and King’s house, and, thus, the forfeiture of
this property (without the right of redemption) was not an
excessive fine under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”

A decade later, after the United States Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Bajakajian, our Court revisited this
area of the law in Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce Street, 574
Pa, 428, 882 A.2d 396 (2008). In 5444 Spruce Street, with
Justice William Lamb writing for the Court, we considered
whether the civil in rem forfeiture of a house in Philadelphia
owned by Elizabeth Lewis, who pled guilty to a single charge
of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and
who was sentenced to two years probation, was unconstitution-
al. Again, accepting that Article I, Section 18 of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution was coextensive with the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, the Court analyzed the
issue under our state constitution using Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Court surveyed our prior decisions, noting
that they turned on whether the forfeited property was signifi-
cantly related to the underlying criminal activity. Specifically,
the Court drew the distinction, based upon pre-Bajakajian
case law, that we had allowed forfeiture when the property
forfeited was “significantly related to the criminal offense,”
but disallowed it when the property forfeited was “not signifi-
cantly related to the criminal activity.” Id. at 400. Recognizing
that Bajakajian involved a criminal in personam forfeiture,
the Court nevertheless considered whether the Bajakajian
gross disproportionality test applied to a punitive civil in rem
12. Moreover, the Court found that there was no statutory language

permitting redemption, and, thus, that the only way for one to obtain
the forfeited property was by purchasing it at a subsequent sale. Id.

forfeiture “where the government has established a significant
relationship between the property sought to be forfeited and
the underlying criminal offense.” Id.

After tracing the legal construct adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Bajakajian, our Court offered that
both Bajakajion and our decision in In re King Properties
began at the same point—that forfeitures are fines for Highth
Amendment purposes if they constitute punishment for an
offense, regardless of whether the action is characterized as in
rem or in personam. The 5444 Spruce Street Court continued.
that the next step was consideration of whether the fine—
here, the forfeiture—was excessive. We noted that the Baja-
kajtan Court found that the amount of the forfeiture must
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is
designed to punish, ultimately determining that a punitive
forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of a defendant’s offense. In
conducting this disproportionality analysis, we interpreted the
Bajakajian Court as placing the primary emphasis on the
culpability of the defendant, rather than on the severity of the
crime in the abstract. Id. at 401.

The high Court’s analysis, we explained, warranted consid-
eration of three factors, each of which were focused on the
conduct of the defendant: “the penalty imposed as compared
to the maximum penalty available; whether the violation was
isolated or part of a pattern of misbehavior; and, the harm
resulting from the crime charged.” Id, at 402, Ultimately, our
Court did not adopt specific factors to be considered in an
excessiveness analysis, concluding that the question of the
proper approach had not gone through the “sharpening and
annealing process of litigation in the lower courts.” Id. at 402
n.7, Nevertheless, we held that Bajakajian’s gross dispropor-
tionality test applied to all punitive forfeitures regardless of
the form of the underlying proceedings, and overruled In re
King Properties to the extent it held otherwise.

Hs (Deconstructing the above seminal decisions by the
United States Supreme Court and our Court, we observe that

certain concrete principles emerge, while other issues remain
open. Specifically, it is now accepted that the Highth Amend-
ment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil in rem forfei-
tures that are punitive and criminal in personam forfeitures.
Austin; Bajakajian. With respect to criminal in personam
forfeitures, an Excessive Fines Clause inquiry focuses on
proportionality, and, specifically, to survive an excessiveness
challenge, the amount of the forfeiture must bear some rela-
tionship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to
punish. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 834, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Whether a
criminal in personam forfeiture is excessive requires consider-
ation of whether the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional” to
the gravity of a defendant’s offense. Jd. With regard to the
gross disproportionality standard, the Bajakajian Court
warned that judgments regarding the appropriate punishment
for an offense belong initially to the legislature, and judicial
determinations regarding the gravity of an offense will be
“inherently imprecise.” Jd. at 336, 118 S.Ct. 2028, In applying
the gross disproportionality standard, the amount of the for-
feiture is compared to the gravity of the offense, and if the
amount is grossly disproportionate, it is unconstitutional. In
judging the gravity of the offense, we look to the culpability of
the defendant rather than the severity of the crime in the
abstract. 5444 Spruce Street, 832 A.2d at 401. In Pennsylvania,
the gross disproportionality test is applicable to all punitive
forfeitures, including civil in rem proceedings. Id. at 408. In
this regard, the following three, non-exhaustive, factors have
been considered: the penalties that the legislature has author-
ized compared to those to which the defendant was subjected;
whether the violation was isolated or part of a pattern of
misbehavior; and the nature of the harm caused by the
defendant. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 388-89, 118 S.Ct. 2028;
544 Spruce Street, 882 A.2d at 402,

In the wake of Bajakajian and 5444 Spruce Street, however,
certain issues remain open. First, answering the question of
whether, as part of the excessiveness analysis, a court must
find as a threshold matter that the property sought to be
forfeited is an instrumentality of the underlying offense is not

clear cut. Further, federal and state courts have adopted a
variety of considerations in determining whether a forfeiture
is constitutionally excessive. Critically, while many courts have
relied, in whole or in part, on the factors articulated in
Bajakajian, no definitive set of factors has emerged to be
used in making the grossly disproportionate analysis. Id. at
402.

2. Commonwealth Court Decision

With this background in mind, we turn to the Common-
wealth Court’s decision in the matter sub judice. On Decem-
ber 17, 2014, an en banc Commonwealth Court, in a published
opinion authored by then-Judge, now President Judge Mary
Hannah Leavitt, and over a dissent, reversed the trial court’s
granting of the Commonwealth’s petition for forfeiture. Com-
monwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.8d 836 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

The court initially set forth the factual predicate for both
the criminal activity underlying the forfeiture, and the testi-
mony regarding Appellee’s role as property owner. The court,
noting that the Eighth Amendment serves to limit the power
of the government to punish its citizens, offered that the
central question in the appeal was whether the forfeiture of
Appellee’s home and vehicle imposed an excessive fine on her.
The Commonwealth Court went on to survey the above case
Jaw from the United States Supreme Court as well as our
Court’s decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment. Recon-
ciling these decisions, the Commonwealth Court found that,
for a civil forfeiture brought under the Forfeiture Act to
survive an Eighth Amendment challenge, the Commonwealth
must show, initially, that the forfeitable property was the
instrumentality of the offense. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at
858-59, 866. The Commonwealth Court also found it necessary
to consider the property owner’s level of involvement—culpa-
bility—in the criminal activity, relying upon the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ decision in von Hofe v. United States,
492 F.3d 175 (2d Cir, 2007), discussed below. 1997 Chevrolet,
106 A.3d at 859-862, 866.

a

Next, the court noted that the Commonwealth must show
that the amount of the forfeiture, or punishment, is propor-
tional to the gravity of the offense, determined by using what
the Commonwealth Court characterized as the Bajakajian
“three-prong test,” id. at 850, 863-64—that is, “the penalty
imposed as compared to the maximum penalty available;
whether the violation was isolated or part of a pattern of
misbehavior; and, the harm resulting from the crime charged.”
5444 Spruce Street, 832 A.2d at 402.

The Commonwealth Court went on to reconsider the meth-
od for establishing the gravity of the offense aspect of the
analysis, as well as how to apply the Bajakajian test where
the owner of the forfeited property was not charged with, or
convicted of, a crime. After considering, and rejecting, its own
decisional law, the Commonwealth Court opined that the
amount of the forfeiture—the value of the property—is not the
“penalty” for the assessment of the first factor in determining
the gravity of the offense. Rather, the penalty in this context,
is the criminal penalty actually imposed for the related of-
fense. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.8d at 864. The court reasoned
that it is only after the gravity of the offense is established
that the actual amount of the forfeiture is compared to the
gravity of the offense. Thus, the court found the Common-
wealth must present evidence as to Graham’s actual criminal
history, ie., the charges filed against Graham, the actual
penalty imposed, and the maximum penalty on the charges for
which Graham was convicted. Id. at 863. Turning to the second
factor, the court found the trial court needed to consider
whether Graham’s conduct was extensive in space and time
and had to relate the misbehavior to the subject property.
Additionally, the trial court was instructed to consider to what
extent Graham’s pattern of misbehavior was due to the police
sending its informant to Appellee’s house, rather than a
distinct location. Further, regarding the third factor, the court
concluded that evidence is required of the specific harm
caused by the offense, including the type and quantity of
drugs sold, the use of illegal drugs by purchasers, and the
impact of the sales upon the neighborhood, without reliance

upon general or “self-evident” harm, Ultimately, the Common-
wealth Court rejected the trial court’s gravity of the offense
analysis and determined that a proper Highth Amendment
analysis required an initial assessment of instrumentality,
Appellee’s culpability, and a determination of the gravity of
the defendant’s offense by analyzing the actual penalty im-
posed upon the defendant, the extensiveness of the defen-
dant’s conduct, and the actual harm caused by the illegal
conduct. As there was insufficient evidence of record regard-
ing this approach, and the trial court did not analyze the
excessive fines inquiry in these terms, the Commonwealth
Court remanded for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion.

Judge Robert Simpson authored a dissenting opinion, joined
by Judge Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter. The dissenters object-
ed to what they believed to be the overruling of the court's
prior en banc decision in Commonwealth v. 542 Ontario
Street, 989 A.2d 411 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), and would have
embraced that decision’s approach, which examines the prop-
erty owner’s conduct and the value of the property in compari-
son to the maximum statutory penalty for the underlying
criminal conduct. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.8d at 882 (Simpson, J.,
dissenting).

HAs noted, we accepted allocatur to address the appro-
priate standard for determining whether a civil in rem forfei-
ture violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the United States
Constitution. This constitutional issue raises a pure question of
law, and, thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. 5444 Spruce Street, 8832 A.2d at 398. We
begin by reviewing the parties’ respective arguments,

13, Then-President Judge Dan Pellegrini penned a concurring opinion
offering that the Commonwealth should meet its burden in a forfeiture
case by clear and convincing evidence, rather than the preponderance
of the evidence standard, but acknowledged that answering that issue
was unnecessary to the resolution of the appeal. The majority did not
address the issue, as it was not squarely raised. As the issue was not
addressed below, and not challenged on appeal, we decline to address
any change in the current preponderance of the evidence standard.

8. Argument of the Parties

As Appellant, the Commonwealth initially stresses that Ap-
pellee owned the property from which her adult son repeated-
ly sold marijuana, and that, after the police informed her of
this activity, she did not take any steps to terminate the sales,
justifying the forfeiture of her home and vehicle. The Com-
monwealth characterizes the Commonwealth Court’s decision
below as inventing a new test for an excessive fine analysis
under the Eighth Amendment, and, like the dissent below,
accuses the lower court of imposing “new, baseless standards
for reviewing a challenge to a statutory forfeiture under the
Excessive Fines Clause .... [and claiming the] Common-
wealth Court’s real agenda is to imperil civil forfeiture in the
absence of a criminal conviction, contrary to settled law.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 14. The Commonwealth emphasizes
that, while forfeiture statutes have certain punitive aspects,
they also serve non-punitive goals such as encouraging owners
to properly manage their property, ensuring that it is not used
for illegal purposes, and ensuring that persons do not profit
from illegal activities. The Commonwealth warns that the
lower court’s undermining of civil forfeiture law will be suf-
fered by “the innocent neighbors of drug peddlers.” Id.

Specifically, the Commonwealth maintains that the Exces-
sive Fines Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions are coextensive, and that the United States
Supreme Court in Bajakajian found forfeiture to be constitu-
tionally impermissible only if the forfeited amount was grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the offense on which the
forfeiture was based. Stated another way, the Commonwealth
asserts that the Constitution permits civil in rem forfeiture if
the res is an instrumentality or its value is not grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the underlying offense. The
Commonwealth contends that our Court has applied the Baja-
kagianm standard to all punitive forfeitures, and made this the
exclusive test in Pennsylvania, citing 5444 Spruce Street. Ac-
cording to the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court in Bajaka-
jtan specifically rejected a requirement that the forfeited
property had to be an instrumentality of the crime. Thus, the

Commonwealth claims that the appropriate standard as articu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court, and our Court, is
that a statutorily-permitted forfeiture is constitutional if the
property is either an instrumentality of the crime committed—
that is, the forfeiture is non-punitive and, thus, not subject to
constitutional scrutiny as it is remedial in nature—or satisfies
the gross disproportionality test. The Commonwealth goes on
to argue that the Commonwealth Court improperly limited
Bajakajian’s rejection of the property having to be an instru-
mentality of the underlying offense to criminal in personam
forfeitures, and asserts that, to the contrary, the Bajakajian
approach applies to both civil in rem and criminal in person-
am forfeitures, which was made clear by our Court in 5444
Spruce Street. Thus, the Commonwealth urges that, consistent
with Bajakajian, our Court should reiterate that a civil in rem
forfeiture passes constitutional muster if the property is either
an instrumentality or the forfeiture is not grossly dispropor-
tional to the gravity of the offense.

With respect to the gross disproportionality test, and, spe-
cifically, consideration of the culpability of the property owner,
the Commonwealth develops that the Commonwealth Court’s
standard is unworkable, and accuses the Commonwealth Court
of legislating by imposing a culpability requirement that re-
quires direct knowledge and active participation in the under-
lying offense by the property owner. More precisely, the
Commonwealth offers that justification for civil in rem forfei-
ture of non-instrumentalities rests on the notion that the
owner of the property is negligent. Thus, in the Common-
wealth’s view, where the property owner has done all that he
or she can reasonably do to prevent the criminal use of his or
her property, forfeiture should be denied. This standard,
according to the Commonwealth, would induce the owner to
exercise greater care in allowing his or her property to be
used by those who may commit a crime. Moreover, the
Commonwealth offers that owner culpability is accounted for
in the Forfeiture Act through the innocent owner defense, as
the property is exempt from forfeiture if the owner did not
know about or consent to the properties’ illegal use. 42 Pa.C.S.

§§ 6801(a)(6)Gi), 6802(j). Accordingly, the Commonwealth con-
tends that it would be duplicative to make relative culpability
a factor in the Bajakajian balancing analysis where the inno-
cent owner defense is available, and maintains that, where the
innocent owner defense has been defeated, the constitutionally
mandated level of negligence has been established.

The Commonwealth also argues that von Hofe, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decision relied upon by the Common-
wealth Court which introduced consideration of owner culpa-
bility, is inapplicable to the extant circumstances, and should
not have been adopted by the Commonwealth Court, as, here,
the property owner was willfully blind to the drug activity on
her property, thus, satisfying the requirement of at least
negligence. Further, the Commonwealth claims that the Com-
monwealth Court actually expanded the von Hofe construct,
requiring it to establish that the property owner “participated
in the offense” prior to forfeiture, 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at
862, and that such participation was significant. Common-
wealth’s Brief at 27. In this regard, the Commonwealth main-
tains that Appellee had the ability to “prohibit the drug sales
from her property, but chose to permit them instead, even
after being warned by a police officer” of her son’s activities.
According to the Commonwealth, rather than doing what “she
reasonably could under the circumstances, she did nothing. By
failing to responsibly exercise control over her property, [Ap-
pellee] forfeited her right as the owner.” Jd. at 28. The
Commonwealth asserts it had an “enforceable interest” to
protect “the truly innocent property owners in the neighbor-
hood from [Appellee’s] enablement of drug peddling.” Zd.*

Moreover, the Commonwealth challenges the Common-
wealth Court’s introduction of a subjective test for constitu-
tional excessiveness. Specifically, the Commonwealth offers

14, We discuss this “innocent owner” defense below.

15, The Attorney General writing in support of the Commonwealth also
takes the Commonwealth Court to task, suggesting that, in its opinion,
it “re-writes the controlling test for excessive fines” and warns that the
detrimental effects of the lower court’s decision will include the “likely
increase in the number of sham or strawman owners in forfeiture
cases,” Attorney General’s Brief at 8. The Attorney General also points

a

that our Court, in 5444 Spruce Street, recognized various
approaches to the United States Supreme Court’s balancing
test: “(1) a ‘multi-faceted measuring’ of the value of the
property to the gravity of the offense; (2) a comparison of the
value of the property to a ‘subjective estimation of the gravity
of the offense;’ (8) a ‘more objective standard’ which ‘look[s]
first to the legislative body which has specified the maximum
permissible fine for a given offense, holding that if the value of
forfeited property is within the range of fines prescribed ... a
strong presumption arises that the forfeiture is constitutional,’
and (4) an outlier approach adopted in Utah that ‘considered
the effect of the forfeiture on the’ claimant and which had
been ‘specifically rejected’ in more jurisdictions than it had
been adopted.” 5444 Spruce Street, 832 A2d at 402 n.7;
Commonwealth’s Brief at 29-30.

The Commonwealth traces the experience of these tests in
the Commonwealth Court, noting that the court has rejected
its prior “objective” test, based upon statutory maximum
penalties embraced most recently in 542 Ontario Street, and
replaced it with the more subjective test followed in Utah,
State v. Real Property at 683 East 640 North, Orem, Utah,
994 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 2000). Yet, the Commonwealth
highlights that this subjective standard, which includes weigh-
ing the effect of the forfeiture on the owner, was not only
originally adopted before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bajakajian, but was similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Bajakajian which the high Court rejected. Moreover, the
Commonwealth offers, as noted above, that our Court in 5444
Spruce Street had expressed reservations about such a subjec-
tive approach, including the weighing of the effect of the
forfeiture on the owner, as it had been adopted only in a
minority of jurisdictions. The Commonwealth claims that such
an approach is not faithful to Bajakajian, which, as noted
above, offered that the appropriate punishment was initially
for the legislature, and that any determination by the courts

to the laudable goals of the Forfeiture Act, including the elimination of
economic incentives of drug-related activity and the discouragement of
such conduct.

a ©

regarding the gravity of a particular offense will be “inherent-
ly imprecise.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 88 (quoting Bajakaji-
an, 524 US. at 386, 118 S.Ct. 2028). The Commonwealth
ultimately advocates that, where the value of the property is
below the statutory maximum fine applicable to the drug
crime the property facilitated, the forfeiture is constitutional,
and this, according to the Commonwealth, places an effective
limit on forfeitures.

The Commonwealth also takes issue with the Common-
wealth Court requiring specific harm from the underlying
offense, and its suggestion that the drug sales at issue in this
appeal were not harmful due to the use of confidential infor-
mants, The Commonwealth urges that the legislature made
drug sales illegal because they harmed individuals and society
as a whole, and that such harm must have some weight in
favor of forfeiture. Moreover, the Commonwealth asserts the
Commonwealth Court’s finding of less harm due to the sale of
drugs to informants illogically assumes that in this matter
Appellee’s son sold only to buyers who were informants and
that he intended to sell only to them, rather than to others,

Consistent with this approach, the Commonwealth further
challenges the Commonwealth Court’s comparison of the fine
imposed in the underlying criminal offense to the statutory
maximum to assess the relative gravity of the crime charged
for purposes of forfeiture, and instead urges the “main”
comparison should be between the amount of the forfeiture
and the statutory maximum fine for the underlying criminal
offense, Commonwealth's Brief at 88-39,

The Commonwealth offers that the trial court, by conduct-
ing an objective balancing test, properly considered only
whether the amount of the forfeiture was grossly dispropor-
tionate to the gravity of the defendant’s offense for purposes
of constitutional challenge. According to the Commonwealth,
the amount of the forfeiture need bear only some relationship
to the gravity of the offense and not an exact one, The
Commonwealth submits that the proper balancing test com-
pares the fair market value of the forfeiture to the applicable
fine, Under this approach, the Commonwealth asserts that

Appellee’s appraisal of her house in the amount of $54,000
(which it contends is the high-end estimate) is compared to the
maximum statutory fine for the crime of possession with
intent to sell marijuana, $15,000, and the maximum imprison-
ment for the crime of five years. 85 P.S. § 780-118(£)(2).
According to the Commonwealth, this aggregate applicable
fine for each of the proven sales (seven sales) totals $105,000.
The Commonwealth submits that, even if the sales were
limited to the period of December 2009 through January 2010,
when the Commonwealth claims Appellee was on notice of her
son’s selling of marijuana from her house, the aggregate
maximum applicable fine would be $45,000 for the illegal drug
sales from the house, and an additional $15,000 for each sale
from the vehicle and the bulk marijuana found in the living
room when the search warrant was executed. These aggregate
fines were in excess of $75,000, which, according to the
Commonwealth, were substantially less than the statutory
maximums for the underlying crimes, but exceeded the value
of the house and van. Thus, in its view, this first inquiry
weighs in favor of finding the forfeiture to be permissible.

The Commonwealth turns to the second factor under Baja-
kajian, which is the connection of the property to the crime.
The Commonwealth points to a pattern of selling drugs from
Appellee’s house from November 2009 through January 2010,
that it was used to facilitate at least seven sales during two
police investigations, and that the vehicle was used for three
transactions. The Commonwealth maintains that it took multi-
ple police investigations and two search warrants to disrupt
the sale of illegal drugs from the house, which supports the
conclusion that the house was the focus of the drug trade and
substantially connected to the illegal activity, thus, weighing in
favor of forfeiture. The Commonwealth goes on to argue that
the trial court’s rejection of Appellee’s innocent owner defense
gives rise to a presumption that Appellee was responsible for
the manner in which the house was used, and, this, according
to the Commonwealth, is buttressed by Appellee’s failure to
provide any evidence that she tried to stop the sale of drugs
from her house. Moreover, the Commonwealth contends that

the trial court found sufficient evidence of substantial harm
caused by the underlying crimes, including neighbors and
police being placed in harm’s way, and the intransigent nature
of the sale of drugs from the house requiring a need for
repeated police surveillance. Additionally, the Commonwealth
presses it is proper to accept an inference of harm from drug
trafficking in a residential neighborhood, and all of these
considerations weigh in favor of forfeiture."®

Appellee counters, initially offering that the Commonwealth
Court properly required the property to be an instrumentality
of the underlying crime. First, Appellee argues that civil in
rem forfeitures, as discussed above, were historically limited
to instrumentalities of the underlying offense, stemming from
the idea that the property itself was guilty of the crime, and
that this notion persists in the United States Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, as the Bajakajian Court noted civil in rem
forfeiture proceedings subjected the property to forfeiture
because it was the actual means by which the offense was
committed. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 333 n.8, 118 S.Ct. 2028.
Appellee stresses that the instrumentality requirement serves
to maintain the distinction between civil in rem and criminal
in personam forfeitures, noting that criminal in personam
forfeitures carry with them substantial constitutional protec-
tions for a criminal defendant which a civil in rem forfeiture
property owner does not enjoy. Appellee points to Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Austin, which urged that excessiveness
for civil in rem forfeitures depended only upon the relation-
ship between the property and the underlying crime, and the
fact that the Austin majority specifically left open the issue of
an instrumentality requirement. Appellee also maintains that
the Commonwealth Court was correct when it opined that
Bajakajian did not rule out an instrumentality requirement
for civil in rem procedures, but, rather, only clarified that it
was not a consideration in criminal in personam forfeitures.
16. Amicus District Attorney's Association has also filed a brief which

largely tracks the arguments made by the Commonwealth and the
Attorney General.

Moreover, Appellee contends that the Bajakajian Court
went to great lengths to distinguish civil in rem and criminal
in personam forfeitures. As the forfeiture in Bajakajian was a
criminal in personam forfeiture, according to Appellee, the
Court found it to be irrelevant whether the currency was an
instrumentality. Regarding our Court’s case law, Appellee
argues that our Court adopted Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
In ve King Properties, 635 A.2d at 133, and contends that in
5444 Spruce Street, we premised our post-Bajakajian analysis
on the notion that an in vem forfeiture was constitutional only
if there was a “significant relationship” between the property
and the underlying criminal offense. 5444 Spruce Street, 882
A.2d at 429-80, According to Appellee, the 5444 Spruce Street
Court retained the In re King Properties “significant relation-
ship” requirement as a threshold issue, and adopted the
Bajakajian gross disproportionality test as an additional re-
quirement for Excessive Fines Clause purposes.

Appellee also offers that other courts have retained the
instrumentality requirement for civil forfeitures post-Bajaka-
jian. Specifically, Appellee points to the Second Circuit’s
decision in von Hofe in which the court required that, when
considering “the property's guilt, then, one needs to examine
the relationship between the property and the criminal of-
fense.” von Hoje, 492 F.8d at 184-85, Similarly, Appellee
points to the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Real Property
at 688 East 640 North, supra, in which the court found the
instrumentality question to be the starting point, followed by
the gross disproportionality test. Finally, Appellee adds in the
alternative that, even if not a threshold requirement, whether
the property was an instrumentality in the underlying crime is
properly considered a factor in an excessive fine analysis.

With respect to culpability, Appellee argues that the Com-
monwealth Court properly determined that the Excessive
Fines Clause requires consideration of the relative culpability
of the property owner, and not just that of the criminal
defendant, and that, here the trial court failed to engage in
such an analysis. Appellee asserts that the Commonwealth has
offered a circumscribed gross disproportionality test focusing

a

only three objective factors: the maximum penalties available,
whether the violation was related to other illegal activities, and
the resulting harm, citing Commonwealth’s Brief at 29. Ac-
cording to Appellee, our Court in 5444 Spruce Street did not
place any such limitations on what a trial court may consider,
instead allowing for further “sharpening and annealing” of
relevant factors in the lower courts, 882 A.2d at 402 n.7.
Appellee offers that the Commonwealth Court recognized the
desirability of a flexible test in ascertaining whether the
property owner deserves the punishment of forfeiture. Appel-
lee stresses that the degree of culpability of the property
owner must be considered, rejecting the Commonwealth’s
focus on a comparison of the objective value of the property
against the maximum statutory fine applicable to the criminal
activity that the property facilitated.

Furthermore, Appellee challenges the Commonwealth’s con-
tention that a property owner is culpable when merely negli-
gent and that this mandate is satisfied by a trial court’s
rejection of the statutory innocent owner defense. Specifically,
Appellee offers that, historically, courts did not consider
whether the property owner was negligent when another
person used his or her property for criminal activity, but,
rather, the criminal use of the property led ipso facto to the
conclusion that the property owner was negligent. According
to Appellee, this legal justification for forfeiture of one’s
property, however, is not synonymous with holding a property
owner culpable for purposes of the Eighth Amendment when-
ever property is used in a crime. Moreover, Appellee claims
that, an Eighth Amendment analysis is independent from any
statutory defense and that a forfeiture that survives an assert-
ed statutory innocent owner defense may nevertheless violate
the Constitution. In making this point, Appellee draws the
distinction between the legislature’s intention to protect inno-
cent property owners and the constitutional protection of an
individual against excessive punishment.

Appellee maintains the excessive fines analysis is not limited
to objective criteria as asserted by the Commonwealth, as
pure objectivity ignores the significant interest that individu-

als have in their property, upon which their livelihood often
depends. Rather, Appellee claims the excessiveness inquiry
requires a subjective proportionality analysis specific to the
erime committed and the property’s role therein. Appellee
goes on to contend that, even if the factors expressly offered |
in Bajakajian were the exclusive elements of an Excessive
Fines Clause analysis, the Commonwealth Court correctly
reversed the trial court’s application of that test. Specifically,
Appellee asserts that both our Court and the United States
Supreme Court consider the gravity of the specific offense
committed—the actual penalty imposed rather than the maxi-
mum penalty available—and not the penalty in the abstract.”
According to Appellee, the trial court did not consider that
Appellee’s son paid no fine and was subject only to house
arrest as a result of his plea deal, and Appellee urges that we
affirm the Commonwealth Court’s remand for such examina-
tion.

Appellee further offers that the Commonwealth Court prop-
erly remanded for the trial court’s consideration of whether
Appellee’s son had engaged in a pattern of misbehavior. As
noted above, the trial court’s review of the time period during
which Graham had used Appellee’s home to sell illegal drugs
was based upon evidence that the Commonwealth agrees
should not have been considered as the investigation was
tainted by Officer Walker’s involvement. See swpra note 6,
According to Appellee, at best, the trial court could have
inferred a two-month period of sales. Appellee stresses that
her vehicle was used as part of drug sales on only two
occasions.

Related thereto, Appellee argues that the trial court im-
properly relied solely on an unspecified harm to society when
conducting its analysis, and that our Court in 5444 Spruce
Street specifically rejected such a consideration. 882 A.2d at
402. Appellee takes issue with the Commonwealth’s position
17. It appears that the trial court, in considering the maximum penalty

available, considered what crimes Graham could have been convicted

of—specifically, use of communication facility—which would have add-

ed additional potential fines, even though he was not convicted of this
crime.

that general costs and risks associated with police investiga-
tions are permissible factors, as, according to Appellee, they
are akin to the “general harm to society” considerations this
Court has held to be insufficient to uphold a civil forfeiture.
Appellee’s Brief at 50. Further, according to Appellee, consid-
eration of these generic harms ignores the unrebutted testi-
mony that Appellee’s neighbors were unaware of Appellee’s
son’s sale of illegal drugs and that the only documented drug
sales were to confidential informants. Finally, Appellee asserts
that, while consideration of controlled buys, and the harm
therefrom, could constitute actual harm, the trial court here
undertook no such analysis.*

4, Forfeiture Analysis

HN We begin our analysis by recognizing the important
nature of the matter before us, as it implicates protection of
both the rights of the individual and his or her property
interests: “Individual freedom finds tangible expression in
property rights. At stake in this and many other forfeiture
eases are the security and privacy of the home and those who
take shelter within it.” United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property, 510 U.S. 48, 61, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490
(1998). Indeed, in our society, a home and a vehicle are often
essential to one’s life and livelihood. This is why “[florfeitures
are not favored; they should be enforced only when within
both [the] letter and spirit of the law.” United States v. One
1986 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 US. 219, 226, 59
§.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249 (1989). Yet, forfeiture serves laudable
goals, including the removal of illegal items from circulation in
society, as well as dislodging the property used to facilitate
illegal enterprises from the hands of criminals. The forfeiture
of property can serve as an important aid in the fight commu-
nities wage against crime and encourages property owners to
18. Amici, Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, The

Philadelphia Bar Association, The Hispanic Bar Association of Pennsyl-

vania, the Barristers’ Association of Philadelphia, The Institute for

Justice, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Community

Legal Services, Philadelphia NAACP, Philadelphia Legal Assistance,

Philadelphia Volunteers for the Indigent, and SeniorLaw Center, also
filed briefs in support of Appellee.

a

prevent their property from being used for criminal activities.
Finally, forfeiture assists in funding the costs of law enforce-
ment.” Thus, a tension exists between the undeniable goals of
protecting our citizens’ property rights and freedoms, and
deterring and terminating criminal enterprises. As noted by
courts and in academia, there is a large degree of uncertainty
regarding current excessive fines jurisprudence.” We endeay-
or to provide some clarity and uniformity to this area of the
law.

a, Instrumentality

Our first area of inquiry concerns the nexus—the relevance
and import—of the property to the offense. Specifically, we
examine whether the Commonwealth Court properly con-
strued the Excessive Fines Clause to require, as a threshold
matter, the property at issue to be an instrumentality of the
underlying offense. As noted above, the Commonwealth Court
determined that, independent of proportionality, to “survive an
Eighth Amendment Challenge, the Commonwealth must show,
initially, that the forfeitable property was the instrumentality
of the offense,” 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.8d at 854, According to

19, Indeed, in Pennsylvania, 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law
enforcement agencies. 42 Pa.C.S, § 6801(e)-(h). As a result, some have
suggested there is a financial incentive to maximize the seizure of
forfeitable property. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at 877 (Pellegrini, J.,
concurring); Leonard v. Texas, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 847, 849, 197
L.Ed.2d 474 (2017) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of
certiorari) (‘Partially as a result of this distinct legal regime, civil
forfeiture has in recent decades become widespread and highly profit-
able, And because the law enforcement entity responsible for seizing the
property often keeps it, these entities have strong incentives to pursue
forfeiture.” (citations omitted)); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 456,
116 S.Ct, 994, 134 L.Bd.2d 68 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (offering
that “[florfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel employed to
raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners ... or a tool wielded to
punish those who associate with criminals, than a component of a
system of justice”); See generally Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Review of the Department’s Oversight of Cash Seizure and
Forfeiture Activities (March 2017),

20. See, e.g., Beth A, Colgan Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 Cal.
L, Rev. 277, 295 & n.92 (2014) (describing lower courts’ treatment of
Excessive Fines Clause after Bajakajian as “disorder” and “a quag-
mire”) (hereinafier “Colgan”’).

the Commonwealth Court, only once an instrumentality rela-
tionship is demonstrated does the examination turn to whether
the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of the offense. Id. at 854, 859.

HS We begin our analysis of the instrumentality ques-
tion with a review of the historical underpinnings of the
distinctions between in rem and in personam forfeitures, then
consider relevant case law from both the United States Su-
preme Court and our Court. In personam forfeitures result
from criminal conviction, and proceed directly against an
individual. Such forfeitures “have historically been treated as
punitive, being part of the punishment imposed for felonies
and treason in the Middle Ages and at common law.” Bajaka-
Jian, 524 U.S. at 882, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Statutes that authorize
in personam forfeiture make the forfeiture part of a defen-
dant’s sentence, like the statute at issue in Bajakajian, which
directed a court, in imposing its sentence, to order the forfei-
ture of property “involved in” the offense. 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(1). As the Bajakajian Court explained, “{tJhe forfei-
ture is thus imposed at the culmination of a criminal proceed-
ing and requires conviction of an underlying felony, and it
cannot be imposed upon an innocent owner ... but only upon
a person who has himself been convicted.” 524 U.S, at 328, 118
S.Ct. 2028.

Hl In rem forfeitures are qualitatively different from in
personam forfeitures. In rem forfeitures proceed against the
property itself, are deemed to be civil in nature, are not
dependent upon a criminal prosecution, and traditionally, at
least prior to Austin, serve primarily or ostensibly remedial,
rather than punitive, ends, regardless of the impact upon the
property owner. See Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240, 246,
8 S.Ct. 846, 31 L.Ed. 748 (1888) (“[TJhe merchandise is to be
forfeited irrespective of any criminal prosecution, ... The
person punished for the offence may be an entirely different
person from the owner of the merchandise, or any person
interested in it.”); Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. 197, 210, 8
How. 197, 11 L.Ed, 559 (1845) (“In one sense, every law

aT
imposing a penalty or forfeiture may be deemed a penal law;
in another sense, such laws are often deemed, and truly
deserve to be called, remedial.”). The theory behind such
forfeitures “was the fiction that the action was directed
against ‘guilty property, rather than against the offender
himself.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 330, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Thus,
the “guilty property” concept which serves to permit the
taking by the state of property, even that of a non-offender, is
the cornerstone of in vem forfeiture.

The origins of civil in rem forfeiture may be traced to
Judeo-Christian teachings, which conceived of property itself
as committing a wrong. See Andrew Crawford, Civil Asset
Forfeiture in Massachusetts: A Flawed Incentive Structure
and its Impact on Indigent Property Owners, 35 B.C. JL. &
Soc. Just. 257, 260-61 n.82 (2015) (citing Exodus 21:28 (En-
glish Standard Version) (“When an ox gores a man or a
woman to death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not
be eaten, but the owner of the ox shall not be liable.”)).

By the 11 Century, the English Common Law, as later
noted by Sir Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone, em-
braced the notion of property committing a wrong through the
concept of the “deodands.” Id. at 261; Brent Skorup, Znsuring
the Eighth Amendment Protection From Excessive Fines in
Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases, 22 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 427,
482-33 (2012) (hereinafter “Skorup”). A jury determined that
property was a deodand if it directly caused the death of a
person and, if so, it was forfeited to the crown. Id. at 432; see
generally Barclay Thomas Johnson, Restoring Civility—the
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps To-
wards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 Ind. L.
Rev. 1045, 1047-48 (2001/2002). Deodands, as well as forfeiture
upon conviction of felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture,
served as the three primary kinds of forfeiture established in
England at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified.
While the concept of deodands laid the foundation for modern
forfeiture law, it did not become part of the common law
tradition in America. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 668, 682, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974).

a ©

Rather, common law courts exercised civil in rem jurisdiction
purely through forfeiture statutes. Id. at 688, 94 S.Ct. 2080.

The earliest civil in rem forfeiture statutes in the United
States, allowing the federal government to seize property in
the colonies, were patterned after English law. Upon indepen-
dence, civil in rem forfeiture statutes largely focused on
admiralty matters—customs offenses, piracy, and slave traf-
ficking—resulting in the forfeiture of ship and cargo. Even
early on, these forfeitures were viewed as serving, at least in
part, punitive purposes. Indeed, consistent with its ancient
origins, civil in rem forfeiture proceeded under the legal
fiction that the property used in furtherance of some criminal
activity is, itself, “guilty” of the crime, as evinced by Justice
Joseph Story’s explanation in the United States Supreme
Court’s seminal decision in The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14-15, 12
Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 531 (1827) (“The thing is here primarily
considered as the offender.... But the practice has been, and
so this Court understand the law to be, that the proceeding in
vem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any
criminal proceeding in personam.”). Thus, because it was the
“guilty” property itself that was the sole focus of the malfea-
sanee, historically, in rem forfeitures were limited to instru-
mentalities of the underlying offenses, as the property was
“subject to forfeiture because it was the actual means by
which an offense was committed.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S, at 383
n.8, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also Austin, 509 U.S. at 628, 118 S.Ct.
2801 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“{I]n the case of deodands, juries were careful to
confiscate only the instrument of death and not more. Thus, if
a man was killed by a moving cart, the cart and its horses
were deodands, but if the man died when he fell from a wheel
of an immobile cart, only the wheel was treated as a deodand,
since only the wheel could be regarded as the cause of
death.”). See generally Nelson at 2457-75.4
21, As noted above, generally speaking, America’s importation of forfei-

ture law from England did not include the common law notion of the

deodands, but, rather, our courts exercised in rem jurisdiction through

forfeiture statutes. Section 6801 of Pennsylvania’s current civil in rem
forfeiture statute states in pertinent part:

a

Indeed, this historical concentration on the tainted property
itself has a long legacy, spanning the centuries and becoming
an integral part of the appropriate excessiveness standard. As
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opined, “a page of history is
worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust Co. v. Hisner, 256
USS. 845, 349, 41 S.Ct. 506, 65 L.Ed. 968 (1921). His adage is
particularly apropos here, as the focus on the relationship
between the property and the underlying offense has deep
roots in both English and American law.

While, in Austin, Justice Scalia’s strict focus on the relation-
ship of the property to the crime did not carry the day as
discussed above, it certainly informs our analysis of the instru-
mentality question. Justice Scalia stressed that, in his view,
the Constitution has not required negligence, or any other
degree of culpability, to support a forfeiture, and to impose
such a culpability requirement would erase the difference
between traditional in rem forfeiture and traditional in per-
sonam forfeiture. Austin, 509 U.S. at 625-26, 118 S.Ct. 2801
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
He concluded that an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the

(a) Forfeitures generally. The following shall be subject to forfeiture
to the Commonwealth and no property right shall exist in them:
(6)(i) All of the following:
or
(C) Real property used or intended to be used to facilitate any
violation of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
Act, including structures or other improvements thereon, ,.. which
is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit,
or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of The Controlled
Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(6)(i)(C).
Whether there exists a common law basis for forfeiture in Pennsylvania
has not been definitively decided by our Court, and lower court pro-
nouncements have been inconsistent. Compare Commonwealth v. One
2001 Toyota Camry, 894 A.2d 207 (Pa, Cmwith. 2006) (finding common
law forfeiture exists in Pennsylvania) with Commonwealth v. Crosby,
390 Pa.Super. 140, 568 A.2d 233 (1990) (criticizing notion of common
law forfeiture, but bound to follow prior Superior Court precedent),
While we make no pronouncement on this issue in this appeal, recent
case law from the Commonwealth Court has embraced the historical
limitation on the source of civil in rem forfeiture, holding common law
forfeiture does not exist in Pennsylvania, and, thus, that the Common-
wealth has no legal basis, absent statutory authority, for civil seizure.
Commonwealth v. Irland, 153 A.3d 469 (Pa. Cmwilth. 2017).

a «

traditional limits that the Eighth Amendment permits only if
the property cannot be regarded as an instrumentality of the
offense, offering the example of a building from which an
isolated illegal drug sale occurs. According to Justice Scalia,
the forfeiture of such property would constitute an excessive
fine, as the relevant inquiry revolved around not the value of
the confiscated property, but, rather, whether the confiscated
property had a close relationship to the offense: “[TJhe rele-
vant inquiry for an excessive forfeiture under [21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4)(C)] is the relationship of the property to the
offense: Was it close enough to render the property, under
traditional standards, ‘guilty’ and hence forfeitable?” Id. at
627-28, 113 S.Ct. 2801. To make the point concrete, Justice
Scalia’s offered a “gold scales” hypothetical to illustrate his
“close enough relationship” test, opining that scales used to
measure illegal drugs were forfeitable, “whether made of the
purest gold or the basest metal.” Id.

Subsequently, in Bajakajian, while considering the Exces-
sive Fines Clause in the context of a criminal in personam
forfeiture, the Supreme Court suggested that it was not
erasing the distinctions between civil in rem and criminal in
personam forfeitures, or removing instrumentality as an ele-
ment of in rem forfeiture, as the Court referred to the class of
in vem forfeitures of “guilty property” as “instrumentality
forfeitures.” After a somewhat lengthy discussion of the histo-
ry of civil in rem forfeiture, the Bajakajian Court rejected
instrumentality only as a requirement of criminal in personam
forfeitures. Indeed, the Court found that, because the forfei-
ture before it was not in rem, it was “irrelevant whether
respondent’s currency is an instrumentality.” 524 U.S. at 383,
118 S.Ct, 2028, Thus, rather than embracing a proportionality
inquiry for all excessiveness challenges, the Bajakajian Court
seemingly preserved the critical distinctions between criminal
im personam and civil in rem forfeitures.

The Supreme Court continued to distinguish between taint-
ed property—ie., guilty property—and untainted property in
the context of the Sixth Amendment. In Luis v. United States,
— US. —, 186 S.Ct. 1088, 194 L.Hd.2d 256 (2016), a

a

criminal defendant accused of violating federal health care and
banking laws challenged, under the Sixth Amendment, a
court’s pre-trial freezing of his assets. The high Court held
such pre-trial deprivation violated the Sixth Amendment, not-
ing, “[t]he relevant difference consists of the fact that the
property here is untainted; ie. it belongs to the defendant
pure and simple. In this respect it differs from a robber’s loot,
a drug seller’s cocaine, a burglar’s tools, or other property
associated with the planning, implementing, or concealing of a
crime.” Id. at 1090. Indeed, the Lwis Court offered that it
“found no decision of this Court authorizing unfettered, pre-
trial forfeiture of the defendant’s own ‘innocent’ property—
property with no connection to the charged crime.” Jd, at 1094.
Similarly, in a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, the author
of Bajakojian, offered that the common law permitted the
government to seize tainted assets before trial, but “such
forfeitures were traditionally ‘fixed ... by determining what
property has been ‘tainted’ by unlawful use.’... So the civil in
rem forfeiture tradition tracks the tainted-untainted line. It
provides no support for the asset freeze here.” Id. at 1100.

Even more recently, Justice Thomas authored a statement.
to the high Court’s denial of certiorari in an appeal involving a
challenge to a civil forfeiture statute as violative of due
process, and therein further illuminating the continued focus
on the nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and
the underlying offense. See Leonard v. Texas, —- U.S. —,
187 S.Ct. 847, 197 L.Ed.2d 474 (2017) (Thomas, J., statement
respecting the denial of certiorari). In his statement, Justice
Thomas again emphasized the distinction between in person-
am proceedings and in vem proceedings, stressing that the
United States Supreme Court “has justified its unique consti-
tutional treatment of civil forfeiture largely by reference to a
discrete historical practice that existed at the time of the
founding,” providing for statutory forfeitures of property “un-
der the fiction that the thing itself, rather than the owner, was
guilty of the crime.” Id. at 849. Moreover, Justice Thomas
offered that, in the absence of this historical approach to
forfeiture, “the Constitution presumably would require the

Court to align its distinct doctrine governing civil forfeiture
with its doctrines governing other forms of punitive state
action and property deprivation.” Id. at 849 (citation omitted).
Indeed, Justice Thomas was clearly skeptical whether even
this historical approach was capable of sustaining modern civil
forfeiture practice, noting that early forfeiture laws were
narrower than modern statutes, and highlighting the limited
nature of the type of property covered: “only the instrumen-
talities of the crime (such as the vessel used to transport the
goods), not the derivative proceeds of the crime (such as
property purchased with money from the sale of the illegal
goods)” were forfeitable, Id. at 849-50,

Based upon the rich history of in rem forfeiture both in
England and our country, and the clear demarcation between
criminal in personam proceedings and those brought civilly in
vem, as well as more recent pronouncements by the United
States Supreme Court, it is evident to us that the “guilty
property” fiction which serves as the basis for civil in rem
forfeiture logically demands that the property sought to be
forfeited be an instrumentality of the offense,”

Our Court’s prior decisions support this view. In considering
what factors were appropriate under an excessive fines analy-
sis, our Court indicated, pre-Bajakajian, that the inquiry does
not concern the value of the property forfeited, but, rather,

22, We recognize that, in Austin, the Court indicated that the property at
issue was not an “instrument” of the underlying crime, but nevertheless
remanded the matter for consideration of constitutional excessiveness.
As emphasized by the Commonwealth, this contemplation of other
factors suggests that the question of whether property subject to civil in
rem forfeiture is an instrumentality is not dispositive of the excessive-
ness inquiry. We disagree. First, the Austin Court expressed no opinion
on the constitutional requisites of civil in rem forfeiture, expressly
limiting its decision to its conclusion that in rem forfeitures could be
subject to an Excessive Fines Clause challenge. Moreover, in offering
that the property at issue was not an instrumentality, it did so in
rejecting the government’s argument that statutes which authorized
forfeiture of “instruments” of the drug trade were “remedial,” rather
than punitive, such that the Excessive Fines Clause should not apply.
Thus, the Court was not relying upon the understanding of “instrumen-
tality” as that term would develop in subsequent cases, but was deem-
ing the property at issue—a mobile home and auto body shop—not to
be “contraband,” and, thus, subject to an Eighth Amendment challenge.

a

the nexus between the offense and the subject property, in
essence, adopting Justice Scalia’s approach in Austin. We
stated: “if the forfeited property was significantly used in the
commission of the offense, the item may be forfeited regard-
less of its value.” In re King Properties, 685 A.2d at 133. We
further opined, “[wJhere the evidence is that the criminal
incident on which the forfeiture is based is not part of a
pattern of similar incidents, there is no ‘significant’ relation-
ship between the property sought to be forfeited and the
offense,” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 547
Pa, 882, 690 A.2d 222, 227 (1997).

Ten years later, and post-Bajakajian, in 5444 Spruce Street,
our Court re-evaluated the applicable excessiveness standard,
and offered that we had not addressed the issue of whether
the gross disproportionality test adopted in Bajakajian ap-
plied to im rem forfeitures “where the government has estab-
lished a significant relationship between the property sought
to be forfeited and the underlying criminal offense,” 832 A.2d
at 480, firmly indicating that a significant relationship between
the property and the crime was a necessary prerequisite to a
constitutional forfeiture. Even further, we traced the high
Court’s pre-Bajakajian decisions, discerning a pointed distinc-
tion between forfeitures which were upheld because they
exhibited a significant relationship between the property and
the crime, and those where the property forfeited was not
significantly related to the criminal activity, and in which the
forfeiture was not upheld. 5444 Spruce Street, 882 A.2d at 429-
30. Thus, while our Court did not expressly require a nexus
23. Rather than purely a constitutional threshold, we note that the

“significant relationship” requirement is also a vestige of our Court's

interpretation of the Forfeiture Act’s requirement that the property be

used or intended to be used to “facilitate” any violation of the Con-

trolled Substance Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(6). Commonwealth v. 502-

504 Gordon Street, 147 Pa.Cmwith, 330, 607 A.2d 839, 842 (1992) (“In

interpreting the term “facilitate,” Pennsylvania courts require that the

Commonwealth show a sufficient or substantial nexus between the

property and the prohibited activity ‘to mitigate the potentially harsh

results of permitting the Commonwealth to penalize a citizen by a civil

action against his property rather than a criminal action against his
person.’” (citations omitted)). Thus, the required nexus between the

a ~

between the property and the underlying offense, through its
inventory of prior case law drawing a distinction based upon
nexus, we strongly implied that only those properties with a
significant relationship to the offense—instrumentalities—
were forfeitable, and that this was a necessary precursor to
any gross disproportionality test. Ultimately, as noted above,
while our Court did not embrace express factors to be consid-
ered in an excessiveness analysis, nevertheless, we held that
Bajakajian’s gross disproportionality test applied to all puni-
tive forfeitures regardless of the form of the underlying
proceedings, and overruled In re King Properties, but only to
the extent it held otherwise.

Further, while the United States Supreme Court in Austin
expressly limited its holding to a determination that civil in
vem forfeitures can be subject to the protections of the
Excessive Fines Clause, with respect to the nuts and bolts of
the excessiveness inquiry, however, the Court majority plainly
left open the idea that such an inquiry in the civil context
should consider the nexus between the property and the
underlying offense. Austin, 509 U.S. at 628 n.15, 118 S.Ct.
2801 (“We do not rule out the possibility that the connection
between the property and the offense may be relevant, but our
decision today in no way limits the Court of Appeals from
considering other factors in determining whether the forfei-
ture of Austin’s property was excessive”). We find this lack of
limitation on courts “from considering other factors” suggests
that the question of whether property subject to civil in rem
forfeiture is an instrumentality could be the foundation upon
which other factors regarding excessiveness would be consid-
ered, While the United States Supreme Court has not directly
addressed in vem forfeiture since Austin, post-Austin state-
ments by the high Court surely perpetuate the history, and
essential nature, of this distinction between tainted and un-
tainted property. Luis; Bajakajian.

The instrumentality requirement necessitates the establish-
ment of a “significant relationship” between the offense and

property and the underlying crime has both a constitutional dimension,
as well as a statutory one under the Forfeiture Act.

the property sought to be forfeited—the property was “signifi-
cantly used in the commission of the offense.” King Proper-
ties, 685 A.2d at 183™ This significant relationship is what
“taints” the property and renders it “guilty,” such that it
becomes subject to in rem forfeiture. Without an instrumental-
ity requirement, the distinction between civil in rem forfeiture
and criminal in personam forfeiture would be vitiated, some-
thing neither the United States Supreme Court nor our Court
has embraced. In 5444 Spruce Street, we did not reject a
threshold instrumentality determination when we adopted the
Bajakajian grossly disproportional test. Instead, as the initial
part of our analysis, we surveyed our prior case law, noting
those decisions in which the forfeiture had been upheld were
also those where there was a nexus between the property and
the offense. Finally, while, in 5444 Spruce Street, we overruled
our prior decision in In re King Properties, we did so only to
the extent that decision differed with the gross disproportion-
ality test.

HE = As established above, all forfeitures, whether crim-
inal in personam or civil in rem, are predicated upon the
commission of a criminal offense. In an in personam forfei-
ture, that offense is established by a criminal conviction
demonstrating the guilt of an individual that may be punished
by property forfeiture as a term of the sentence. In an in rem
forfeiture, however, the “guilt” of the property must be estab-
lished by proof of its illicit use. Thus, as one commentator has
observed, “[t]his distinction makes sense because, if a court
considers only proportionality, an in rem civil forfeiture be-
comes equivalent to in personam punishment by disregarding
the res—which is a legal incongruity because civil forfeiture
does not require a guilty owner of the res, only a guilty res.”
Skorup at 448-49. Instrumentality is not a necessary element
of in personam forfeitures because such forfeitures do not
24, Accord Commonwealth v. 5043 Anderson Rd., Buckingham Township,

Bucks County, 556 Pa, 335, 728 A.2d 907 (1999); Wingait Farms;

Commonwealth v. 4029 Beale Avenue, Altoona, Blair County, 545 Pa.
172, 680 A,2d 1128 (1996),

depend upon the “guilty property” fiction, but rather, upon the
guilt of the individual.

Based upon the ancestry of civil in rem forfeiture, the
teachings of United States Supreme Court and our precedent,
we find that the concept of guilty or tainted property has been
a long-standing and consistent theme with respect to civil in
rem forfeiture, and remains vital today. Indeed, if nexus were
merely a factor to be considered in determining whether the
forfeiture was excessive, the “guilty property” fiction that has
served as the cornerstone of in vem forfeiture for hundreds of
years would be nullified.

Therefore, we hold that an instrumentality analysis, which
considers the relationship between the property to be forfeited
and the underlying criminal activity, must be a threshold
inquiry in addressing an excessiveness challenge to a civil in
vem forfeiture. Accordingly, we affirm the Commonwealth
Court’s conclusion that the Highth Amendment requires a
property subject: to civil in rem forfeiture be an instrumentali-
ty of the underlying offense.

HMM Having determined that, when faced with an Exces-
sive Fines Clause challenge to a civil in rem forfeiture, courts
must engage in a threshold instrumentality analysis, we set

25. The Commonwealth revisits the idea of instrumentality being purely
remedial, and, thus, not subject to an Eighth Amendment inquiry. In
Austin, as noted above, while recognizing that the forfeiture of “contra-
band” could be characterized as remedial—as such forfeiture removed
dangerous or illegal items from society, and, thus, was not subject to
Eighth Amendment scrutiny—the Court rejected the assertion that
conveyances used to transport illegal liquor were such contraband;
accordingly, the Court found that the forfeiture of such property did not
escape review under the Excessive Fines Clause. Thus, under the
Supreme Court's case law, forfeiture of both instrumentalities and non-
instrumentalities may be punitive and subject to Excessive Fines Clause
analysis. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331 n.6, 118 S.Ct. 2028. On that
basis, we readily reject the Commonwealth’s assertion that a civil in
rem forfeiture is ipso facto constitutionally permitted where the proper-
ty is an instrumentality of the criminal offense. See Bajakajian; Austin;
In re King Properties; see also United States v. Ferro, 681 F.3d 1105,
1113-14 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding, in light of Austin, modern forfeiture
statutes served to punish the owner at least in part, and, thus, with the
exception of the forfeiture of contraband, instrumentalities are protect-
ed by the Eighth Amendment).

a

forth factors to be considered in making that determination.
To be an instrumentality, the property itself is required to be
“significantly utilized in the commission” of the offense. Win-
gait Farms, 690 A.2d at 227. Indeed, there may be property
that is connected to a crime, but is not significantly used in the
crime. Considerations regarding this “significant utilization”
assessment include: whether the property was integral to the
commission of the offense—i.e., uniquely important to the
success of the illegal activity; whether the use of the property
was deliberate and planned or was merely incidental and
fortuitous to the illegal enterprise; whether the illegal use of
the property was an isolated event, or repeated; whether the
purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the property was to
carry out the offense; and whether the illegal use of the
property was extensive spatially and/or temporally. See Unit-
ed States v. Milbrand, 58 F.8d 841, 846, 848 (2d. Cir. 1995).

HS Finally, consistent with the historical notion of the
deodands, we caution that property is divisible. Where a
significant relationship to an offense is established with regard
to only a portion of property which is “practicably divisible”
from the rest, only the offending portion of the property may
be forfeited; but if the property is not divisible, the entire
property is forfeited. 5043 Anderson Rd., 728 A.2d at 909.
Thus, in making the instrumentality assessment, a court must
closely examine not only the nexus between the property and
the offense, but the specific aspect of the property at issue,

Hin sun, an analysis of whether a civil in rem forfei-
ture violates the Eighth Amendment requires a threshold
inquiry into whether the specific property sought to be forfeit-
ed is an instrumentality of the underlying offense, If the
property sought to be forfeited is an instrumentality of the
underlying offense, the inquiry continues to an examination of
proportionality. If not, the forfeiture cannot withstand Highth
Amendment scrutiny and the inquiry ends. Having addressed

26. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir, 1994),

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this threshold inquiry, we turn to the question of proportional-
ity”

6. Proportionality

HM We begin with the premise that “[tJhe touchstone of
the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is
the principle of proportionality.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334,
118 S.Ct. 2028, Although, as noted above, Bajakajian involved
a criminal in personam forfeiture, the Court did not limit its
gross disproportionality test to such proceedings, and our
Court, in 5444 Spruce Street, expressly applied that standard
to all punitive forfeiture proceedings, including civil in rem
forfeitures. 5444 Spruce Street, 882 A.2d at 408,

Broadly speaking, when engaging in a proportionality re-
view, a court compares the amount of the forfeiture to the
gravity of the offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense, it is
unconstitutional. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 886-87, 118 S.Ct.
2028. While the overarching standard to be applied is not in
dispute, the specifics of this comparison have yet to be ex-
pressed by either the federal high Court or our Court.

Specifically, based upon the background and arguments
offered by the parties and amici, it is clear that there are no
established guidelines to be employed for a proportionality
analysis. The United States Supreme Court in Austin left it to
the lower federal tribunals to flush out the relevant factors for
determining whether a forfeiture was excessive, and, in Baja-
kojian, the Court noted that the analysis was inherently

27, Most courts have not limited the excessiveness determination to only
the instrumentality inquiry, but have utilized both an instrumentality
and proportionality test. See, e.g., Utah v. Real Property at 633 East 640
North, Orem, 994 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 2000) (“We similarly hold that
the threshold test in real property forfeitures is whether the defendant
property is an instrumentality of the offense. If instrumentality is
proven, we must then examine whether the ordered forfeiture is “gross-
ly disproportionate” to the offense.”); United States v, 6380 Little
Canyon Rd., El Dorado, Cal., 59 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Al-
though any forfeiture must meet the instrumentality test, its potentially
harsh results, when applied alone, make us hesitate to accept it as the
sole test for applying the command of Austin. We accept the propor-
tionality test as a check on the instrumentality approach.”).

subjective and imprecise. Even the factors offered in Bajaka-
jian were not prescribed as a rigid test. Moreover, our Court.
has observed that other courts have considered factors beyond
the monetary value of the property seized in determining
whether the forfeiture was an excessive fine; yet, we did not
determine what approach was preferable, but left it to the
“sharpening and annealing process of litigation in the lower
courts.” 5444 Spruce Street, 832 A.2d at 402 n.7. Indeed, since
Bajakajian was decided in 1998, various courts have promoted
flexibility, identifying various potential considerations in mak-
ing the gross disproportionality inquiry. See, eg., United
States v. Viloski, 814 F.8d 104, 110 (2nd Cir. 2016) (“Our
unwillingness in past cases to describe the Bajakajian factors
as exhaustive reflects Bajakajian itself, which never pre-
scribed those factors as a rigid test.”); Collins v. SEC, 736
F.8d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir 2018) (“[T]he four factors derived from
Bajakajion hardly establish a discrete analytic process.”);
United States v. $100,848 im Cunvency, 354 F.8d 1110, 1121
(9th Cir. 2004) (offering that, in assessing whether a fine is
excessive, courts are “not required to consider ‘any rigid set of
factors’”), Thus, we must determine what factors define the
contours of the gross proportionality examination in civil in
vem proceedings in Pennsylvania.

The Commonwealth urges the application of a constricted
standard based upon its reading of Bajakajian, with emphasis
on comparing the assessed value of the property against the
maximum statutory penalty. Yet, this approach has not been
the teaching of the United States Supreme Court or our
Court; while the excessiveness analysis looks to the propor-
tionality between the forfeited property and the gravity of the
underlying offense, it is accomplished through a more nuanced

Hs Indeed, initially, we observe that, in civil in rem
forfeitures, the owner of the property and the offender may
not be the same. The potential harshness of a forfeiture
against a property owner with no alleged criminal conduct, or
minor culpability, however, must be recognized in any exces-
siveness inquiry, and we find doing so comfortably fits within

the United States Supreme Court’s gross disproportionality
test. Therefore, we must be wary of forfeiture imposing great-
er punishment than appropriate for the underlying crime
itself. Indeed, a civil in rem proceeding can be viewed in one
way as a “super criminal” proceeding, in which a property
owner is punished through the seizure of his or her property,
but without all the safeguards associated with criminal pro-
ceedings. While Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections are
applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings, One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan, 380 U.S. at 702, 85 S.Ct. 1246 (Fourth Amendment);
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,
721, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971) (Fifth Amendment),
there is no right to counsel for individuals subjected to forfei-
ture proceedings. Further, while not presently challenged, we
note that the burden of proof on the Commonwealth for civil
forfeiture, including of one’s home, is merely the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. Finally, and critically, while we
discuss the procedures under the Forfeiture Act more fully
below, we observe that there is no presumption of innocence,
but rather, a presumption of culpability once the Common-
wealth has established a nexus between the property and the
crime, and certainly no presumption of innocence with regard
to the innocent owner defense. For these reasons, we conclude
it is appropriate to consider the harshness of the forfeiture on
the individual property owner as a part of the excessiveness
analysis, which may be manifested in an assessment of both
the value of the property and the gravity of the underlying
offense factors. Thus, we first turn to address the appraisal of
the property sought to be forfeited.

Regarding proper valuation of the property, in Bajakajian,
the property sought to be forfeited was the currency that
Bajakajian failed to report. Thus, the Court understandably
spoke in terms of the “amount” of the forfeiture, Bajakajian,
524 U.S. at 336-37, 118 S.Ct. 2028, ultimately comparing the
gravity of the offense with “the $357,144 forfeiture” sought by
the government. Id. at 839, 118 S.Ct. 2028, While our Court in
5444 Spruce Street was faced with the forfeiture of a house,
and spoke of the need to determine the “value” of the proper-

ty, 882 A.2d at 408, we did not expand upon what went into
such assessment.

In our view, in the realm of civil in rem forfeiture, both an
objective pecuniary and subjective non-pecuniary valuation of
the property is necessary. While a simple market value may
be appropriate in some instances, as noted above, certain
property—such as a residence, a vehicle, or other similar
necessities in our daily life—carry additional value to the
owner and possibly others, and, thus, call for a subjective non-
pecuniary evaluation of the property sought to be forfeited,
Such a valuation would consider whether the property is a
family residence, or is essential to the owner. See, eg., United
States v, 45 Claremont Street, 895 F.8d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004)
(noting harshness of forfeiture on property owner due to living
in residence with four young children and rental of upper-floor
apartments for supplemental income, but outweighed by own-
ers direct involvement in drug transactions).

Related thereto, we believe it proper to consider the finan-
cial or other consequences of forfeiture upon the property
owner, and any innocent third parties. See, e.g., United States
v. 6880 Little Canyon Road, El Dorado California, 59 F.3d
974 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering fair market value, subjective
value including whether family residence, and hardship to the
property owner, including effect of forfeiture on owner’s fami-
ly or financial condition); Real Property at 633 East 640
North, Orem, 994 P.2d at 1258-60 (adopting Ninth Circuit
consideration of hardship to property owner); People v. One
2000 GMC YG169852, 357 Tll.App.3d 878, 298 Ill.Dec. 854, 829
N.E.2d 487, 442 (2005) (considering the impact of the forfei-
ture on the claimant in light of the claimant’s circumstances,
noting that the claimant was “a person of limited means and
assets”).

Finally, we address one additional aspect of the value of the
property inquiry: whether the forfeiture would deprive the
property owner of his or her livelihood. Specifically, as noted
above, the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause arose
from the English constitutional tradition including Magna
Carta. See United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 111 (nd

Cir. 2016). The Great Charter which serves as the cornerstone
of our own constitutional jurisprudence, required that a fine
“should not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood.” Bajakaji-
an, 524 U.S, at 335, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (citing Magna Carta); see
also Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Keleo
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S, 257, 269 & 271, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106
L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) (noting Magna Carta’s mandate that an
“amercement”—payment to the Crown as a penalty for an
offense—“not be so large as to deprive [the wrongdoer] of his
livelihood.”).” These English roots, and the concomitant hostil-
ity to such onerous fines that would deprive one of his or her
means of living, became “deeply rooted” in Anglo-American
constitutional thought and played a significant role in shaping
the Highth Amendment. Uniied States v. Levesque, 546 F.8d
78, 84 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Colgan at 380-85 (concluding
“the idea of saving defendants from persistent impoverishment
was a guiding principle reaching back to the days of the
Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights, and enduring
through the ratification of the Highth Amendment.”); Nicholas
M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original
Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 Hastings Const. L.
Q. 833, 896-900 (2018) (offering that consideration of personal-
cireumstances—including the ability to maintain some minimal
level of economic subsistence, protection of the homestead,
and impact of a forfeiture on an individual’s children—when
undertaking an Excessive Fines Clause inquiry is grounded in
Magna Carta, consistent with Bajakajian, and should be a
core Highth Amendment norm).

We find such consideration—whether the forfeiture would
deprive the property owner of his or her livelihood, ie., his
current or “future ability to earn a living,” Levesque, 546 F.8d
at 85—to be entirely appropriate and consistent with the
teachings of Bajakajian and 5444 Spruce Street. Thus, we find
28. The Supreme Court did not answer whether this was an appropriate

inquiry in Bajakajian, because it found Bajakajian did not raise the

question and the district court made no factual findings on the issue, Id.
at 340, 118 S.Ct. 2028 n.15.

29. See also Commonwealth v. Carela-Tolentino, 616 Pa, 423, 48 A.3d
1221, 1226 n.6 (2012) (Castille, C.J., dissenting statement),

that both a pecuniary objective valuation as well as a non-
pecuniary subjective valuation are necessary to assess in full
measure the value of the property sought to be forfeited in an
excessiveness analysis. This comprehensive value of the prop-
erty must then be compared to the gravity of the offense.

Assessing the gravity of the offense has engendered wide
discussion and approaches regarding the appropriate factors
for making this determination. The United States Supreme
Court in Bajakajian, while arising in the criminal in person-
am context, set forth certain considerations in its analysis.
First, the Court considered the nature of the crime. The Court
found that, because the offense underlying the forfeiture was
merely a reporting offense, and that it was permissible to
transport money out of the country after reporting, the gravi-
ty was relatively low. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 887, 118 S.Ct.
2028. Additionally, the court considered the relation of the
violation to any other illegal activity, finding that the money
was used to repay a lawful debt, and that Bajakajian did not
fit into the class of persons for whom the statute was de-
signed, such as a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax
evader. Id. at 388, 118 S.Ct. 2028. The Court also considered
the maximum sentence and fine that could have been imposed
on Bajakajian, concluding that such penalties were a fraction
of the “penalties authorized,” and confirmed a minimum level
of culpability. Jd. at 339, 118 S.Ct. 2028 n.14, Finally, the high
Court looked to the harm that was caused. The Court found
that the failure to report the money affected only one party,
the federal government, and in relatively minor fashion. Id. at
839, 118 S.Ct. 2028.

Our Court in 5444 Spruce Street, in adopting the Bajakaji-
an gross disproportionality construct, characterized the high
Court’s approach as defendant-culpability focused, rather than
centered on the severity of the crime in the abstract. 5444
Spruce Street, 882 A.2d at 401. Our Court observed that the
Bajakajian Court enumerated three factors to measure the
gravity of the crime, but limited these to the conduct of the
defendant: “the penalty imposed as compared to the maximum
penalty available; whether the violation was isolated or part of

a ~

a pattern of misbehavior; and, the harm resulting from the
crime charged.” Id. at 402. As noted above, however, our
Court did not limit itself to these factors, or determine which
factors were to be employed.

Thus, in our view, in analyzing the gravity of the offense, a
court must consider these Bajakajian factors. In doing so, a
court must consider the essence of the crime—that is, the
nature of the underlying offense. Related thereto, the relation
of the offense to any other illegal activity and whether the
offender fit into the class of persons for whom the offense was
designed should be considered. Further, the court should take
into account the maximum penalty as compared to the penalty
imposed upon the criminal offender. In making this assess-
ment, the actual penalty imposed (sentence, fine) upon the
offender giving rise to the forfeiture is compared to the
maximum authorized sentence for the underlying offenses for
which the offender was convicted. Moreover, the regularity of
the criminal conduct must be considered, including whether
the illegal acts were isolated or frequent, constituting a pat-
tern of misbehavior. Finally, a court must take into account
the harm resulting from the crime charged. Contrary to the
Commonwealth’s argument, we find generic considerations of
harm to be largely unhelpful in this regard, as all crimes have
a negative impact in some general way to society.

Additionally, various federal and state courts have augment-
ed these core considerations with attention on the property
owner’s culpability. See, ¢g., Ferro, 681 F.8d at 1116; von
Hofe, 492 F.3d at 188-89; People v. 2010 Harley-Davidson,
407 Ill.Dec. 917, 64 N.E.3d 716 (App. 2016), appeal granted,
2017 Ill. LEXIS 199 (Jan. 25, 2017). Thus, we turn to the
propriety of consideration of the property owner’s culpability.

As detailed above, the Commonwealth contends that, under
the Excessive Fines Clause, a civil in rem forfeiture does not
require criminal culpability, but rests upon the idea that the
owner has been negligent in allowing his or her property to be
misused, and is being punished for such negligence. In this
view, where the property owner has done all that he or she
can reasonably do to prevent the use of the property for

criminal purposes, forfeiture is impermissible. Forfeiture thus
serves as an incentive to responsibly manage one’s property.
Further, the Commonwealth offers that the owner’s culpability
is accounted for under the Forfeiture Act’s innocent owner
defense, which, as discussed more fully below, exempts from
forfeiture property which the property owner did not know
was being used illegally, or did not consent to being so used.
42 PaCS. § 6802(j). According to the Commonwealth, it
would be duplicative to make relative culpability a factor in a
gross disproportionality test where it is a defense in a statuto-
ry in rem proceeding.

As noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bajakajian arose
from a criminal in personam forfeiture in which the property
owner was charged with the underlying crime. Thus, the
culpability of the property owner was established. Indeed, a
criminal conviction is a prerequisite for an im personam
forfeiture. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 828, 118 S.Ct. 2028, By
contrast, neither the commencement of criminal proceedings
nor a conviction is required for a civil in rem forfeiture.
Nevertheless, the Excessive Fines Clause is implicated be-
cause forfeiture is viewed, at least in part, as punishment.
That is, the government is seeking to punish the property
owner for criminal conduct he or she allowed to transpire in or
with the property. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622, 118 S.Ct. 2801; von
Hofe, 492 F.3d at 185, Therefore, we find the degree to which
the property owner allowed the property to be employed in
criminal activity—ie., his or her culpability—to be a factor
concerning whether the forfeiture of the owner's property is
grossly disproportional.” In this regard, we conclude appropri-
ate considerations are: whether the owner was negligent or
reckless in allowing the illegal use of the property, and
whether the owner was directly involved in the illegal activity
30. See Ferro, 681 F.3d at 1115 (“Where, as here, the person who

committed the sole crime charged which gave rise to forfeitability is not

the property’s owner, the culpability of the owner must be considered
in the analysis, We must remember that [the property owner] was not

charged with any crime, much less a crime which in some way enabled
or caused [the offender's] crime.”’),

and to what extent, See Real Property at 638 East 640 North,
Orem, Utah, 994 P.2d at 1259,

As poignantly offered by Justice Anthony Kennedy in his
concurring opinion in Austin, “[a]t some point, we may have to
confront the constitutional question whether forfeiture is per-
mitted when the owner has committed no wrong of any sort,
intentional or negligent. That for me would raise a serious
question.” Austin, 509 U.S. at 629, 118 S.Ct. 2801 (Kennedy,
J., concurring); see also id. at 617, 118 S.Ct. 2801. While a
forfeiture may be especially troubling for a completely inno-
cent property owner, contrary to the Commonwealth’s asser-
tions, the degree of culpability is significant even if the trial
court determines that the property owner did not satisfy a
statutory innocent owner defense. Constitutional protections
are independent from statutory safeguards. Indeed, the legis-
lature’s desire to protect an innocent property owner is not
necessarily co-extensive with the constitution’s protection
against excessive sanctions. As a constitutional matter, we find
that assessing the gravity of the offense includes a determina-
tion of the degree of knowledge of a property owner. Even a
property owner, while not wholly without knowledge or grant-
ing consent, may lack full knowledge of criminal activity, or
may bear only nominal or token blame for the illegal conduct
serving as the foundation for the forfeiture.

ec. Summary

In conclusion, we hold that, for purposes of an Excessive
Fines Clause challenge to a civil in rem forfeiture, a court
must first assess whether the property sought to be forfeited
is an instrumentality of the underlying offense. If the property
is not found to be an instrumentality of the criminal conduct,
the inquiry is dispositive and ends, and the forfeiture is
unconstitutional. If the property is an instrumentality, the
inquiry continues to the proportionality prong and an assess-
ment of whether the value of the property sought to be
forfeited is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the under-
lying offense. If it is grossly disproportional, the forfeiture is
unconstitutional. As discussed in detail above, and summarized

below, we find various factors to be relevant in resolving an
excessive fines challenge to a civil in rem forfeiture. We
caution, however that these factors are not meant to be
exhaustive, and that additional factors, when relevant, may be
considered by a court, depending upon the particular circum-
stances at issue.

Hsin making the instrumentality determination, a
court should consider, inter alia:
(1) whether the property was uniquely important to the
success of the illegal activity;
(2) whether the use of the property was deliberate and
planned or was merely incidental and fortuitous to the
illegal enterprise;
(8) whether the illegal use of the property was an isolated
event or repeated;
(4) whether the purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using
the property was to carry out the offense;
(5) whether the illegal use of the property was extensive
spatially and/or temporally; and
(6) whether the property is divisible with respect to the
subject of forfeiture, allowing forfeiture of only that discrete
property which has a significant relationship to the underly-
ing offense.
The factors, among others, to be considered in assessing the
value of the property are:
(1) the fair market value of the property;
(2) the subjective value of the property taking into account
whether the property is a family residence or if the proper-
ty is essential to the owner's livelihood;
(8) the harm forfeiture would bring to the owner or innocent
third parties; and
(4) whether the forfeiture would deprive the property owner
of his or her livelihood.
The factors to be considered in gauging the gravity of the
offense include:
(1) the nature of the underlying offense;

(2) the relation of the violation of the offense to any other
illegal activity and whether the offender fit into the class of
persons for whom the offense was designed should be
considered;

(8) the maximum authorized penalty as compared to the
actual penalty imposed upon the criminal offender;

(4) the regularity of the criminal conduct—whether the
illegal acts were isolated or frequent, constituting a pattern
of misbehavior;

(6) the actual harm resulting from the crime charged,
beyond a generalized harm to society; and

(6) the culpability of the property owner.

In this case, the trial court considered the three factors set
forth in Bajakajian, as discussed above, but, in doing so, first
compared the maximum penalty allowable for possession with
intent to distribute, Graham’s offense, as well as other maxi-
mum penalties for crimes which Graham could have been
convicted, with the fair market value of the property. The
court further opined that, for several years, Graham had sold
drugs from the property and that his behavior put his neigh-
bors, and police officers investigating and serving search
warrants, “in harm’s way.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/2018, at
14. Thus, the court concluded, based upon these considerations
which we now find to be flawed, that the forfeited property
was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
As the trial court did not have the benefit of our explication of
the proper proportionality assessment, we remand the matter
to the Commonwealth Court, for remand to the trial court, for
reconsideration of Appellee’s Excessive Fines Clause chal-
lenge in light of our opinion.*!

B. Innocent Owner Defense
HE We also granted allocatur to consider the statuto-
ry question of whether the Commonwealth Court erroneously

31. Of course, if the court, however, first determines that Appellee met
her burden of proving her “innocent owner defense,” discussed below,
then the court would have no reason to reach the merits of her
constitutional challenge.

interpreted the innocent owner defense and improperly re-
weighed the evidence as found by the trial court. In assessing
our standard of review over this question, we note that it
concerns examination of the findings of fact made by the trial
court to determine if they are supported by the substantial
competent evidence, and whether the trial court abused its
discretion or committed an error of law. Commonwealth v. 605
University Drive, 628 Pa. 484, 104 A.3d 411, 420 (2014), This
issue also involves, in part, a question of statutory construec-
tion, for which our standard of review is de novo, and our
scope of review is plenary. See 5444 Spruce Street, 882 A.2d at
898. Finally, forfeiture statutes are subject to strict construc-
tion. Commonwealth v. $6,425.00 Seized From Richard Esqui-
lin, 588 Pa. 544, 880 A.2d 528, 529 n.6 (2005),

HM As noted above, the Forfeiture Act allows the Com-
monwealth to petition to seize an owner’s property by meeting
certain requirements, The Commonwealth has the initial bur-
den of demonstrating that there is a “sufficient or substantial
nexus between the property and the prohibited activity,” and,
thereafter, the burden shifts to the property owner to demon-
strate that he or she did not know of the conduct giving rise to
the forfeiture; or that the unlawful use or possession of the
property was without his or her consent. Commonwealth v.
$2,528.48 U.S. Currency, 588 Pa. 551, 649 A.2d 658, 659-60
(1994); 42 Pa.C.8. § 6802().* This safeguard, known as the
“innocent owner defense,” serves as a “means of protecting a
property owner from the harsh result of forfeiture because of

32. 42 Pa.C,S. § 6802(j) provides:
Owner's burden of proof.—At the time of the hearing, if the Common-
wealth produces evidence that the property in question was unlawful-
ly used, possessed or otherwise subject to forfeiture under section
6801(a) or 6801.1(a), the burden shall be upon the claimant to show:
(1) That the claimant is the owner of the property or the holder of a
chattel mortgage or contract of conditional sale thereon,
(2) That the claimant lawfully acquired the property.
(3) That it was not unlawfully used or possessed by him, In the event
that it shall appear that the property was unlawfully used or pos-
sessed by a person other than the claimant, then the claimant shall
show that the unlawful use or possession was without his knowledge
or consent. Such absence of knowledge or consent must be reason-
able under the circumstances presented.

illegal drug use to which the owner did not consent.” 649 A.2d
at 661. .

HH With this enactment, modern forfeiture law departed
from traditional forfeiture, as historically, “an owner’s interest
in property [could] be forfeited by reason of the use to which
the property is put even though the owner did not know that it
was to be put to such use.” Bennis v. Michigan, 516 US. 442,
446, 116 S.Ct. 994, 184 L.Hd.2d 68 (1996). The innocent owner
defense reflects a balance between effective forfeiture laws
and their laudable impact on illegal trade, and the protection
of an innocent owner. $2,523.48 U.S. Currency, 649 A.2d at
661, Yet, because forfeiture proceedings are burdensome upon
the property owner, many of whom are unrepresented by
counsel, these statutes are to be strictly construed against
forfeiture, Id. at 630,

In addressing Appellee’s claim that the trial court erred in
rejecting her innocent owner defense, the Commonwealth
Court found that the trial court erred in its analysis as it did
not consider all the circumstances surrounding Appellee’s
actions. Id, at 867-70, Thus, the Commonwealth Court re-
manded the matter to the trial court for consideration of these
circumstances. In particular, the Commonwealth Court fo-
cused upon Appellee’s contention that she did not have knowl-
edge of or give her consent to the criminal activity which
served as the basis for the government’s forfeiture of her
house and vehicle. Specifically, the Commonwealth Court
found that, because the police officers informed Appellee that
her son was selling marijuana from her house and provided
her with a search warrant, she acquired knowledge of the
illegal activities. However, the court first reasoned that Appel-
lee was not required to believe the police allegations regarding
her son when they executed their search warrant at Appellee’s
house, and that the trial court made no reference to specific
allegations contained in the search warrant. Ultimately, the
Commonwealth Court concluded that the trial court failed to
consider all of the circumstances surrounding Appellee’s ac-
tions, or lack of action, in determining knowledge and consent,
to the underlying criminal activity, and whether Appellee’s

actions were reasonable. Elaborating, the Commonwealth
Court determined that it was not necessarily reasonable, as
proffered by the Commonwealth, for a parent to evict a child,
even an adult child, in order to show a lack of consent to the
child’s illegal activities. Related thereto, the court rejected the
Commonwealth’s assertion that Appellee should have invited
the police to her residence, as a property owner does not have
to become a de facto police officer to establish a lack of
consent. Thus, finding it not enough for a court to dismiss an
innocent owner defense by simply disbelieving the property
owner, the Commonwealth Court instructed the trial court, on
remand, to identify the circumstances justifying a reasonable
inference that the property owner had actual knowledge of
and consented to the criminal activities underlying the forfei-
ture.

The Commonwealth contends that the Commonwealth
Court rewrote the innocent owner defense by creating a per se
rule that an owner-parent never has to evict an adult child,
which the Commonwealth contends is contrary to the statute’s
case-by-case consideration of what is reasonable under the
circumstances.” The Commonwealth offers that it has the
initial burden of proving a nexus between the property and the
illegal activity, and, here, Appellee’s house and vehicle were
used to facilitate the sale of illegal drugs, as marijuana was
regularly sold from the house and the vehicle was used to

33. The Attorney General, as amicus in support of the Commonwealth,
offers that the Commonwealth Court's decision will result in “the
impairment of the Commonwealth's ability to prevail in any forfeiture
matter where an innocent owner defense is pursued.” Attorney Gener-
al’s Brief at 8-9. The Attorney General further contends that, although
the burden is on the property owner to establish that he or she did not
have knowledge or give consent to use the property in an illegal
manner, the Commonwealth Court, required the trial court to identify
circumstances that made it reasonable to infer that Appellee had actual
Imowledge and did not consent to the use of the property for illegal
conduct. This, according to the Attorney General, impermissibly shifts
the burden to the Commonwealth to demonstrate that the property
owner had knowledge of illegal activity. Thus, the Attorney General
avers that, contrary to legislative intent, under the Commonwealth
Court’s decision, the Commonwealth must now not only establish a
nexus between the illegal activity and the property at issue, but also is
required to essentially disprove an innocent owner defense.

a ~

store drugs. The burden of proof then shifted to Appellee to
prove an affirmative defense and to persuade the fact finder
that she did not know about the illegal drug trade on her
property or did not consent to it, and that her lack of
knowledge or consent was reasonable under the circum-
stances. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(j). Here, the Commonwealth offers
that Appellee claimed that she did not know about the sale of
drugs, but the court disbelieved that assertion based upon the
warnings offered by police. According to the Commonwealth,
the Commonwealth Court, in rejecting the trial court’s ability
to simply find Appellee’s testimony to be incredible as a basis
to dismiss Appellee’s innocent owner defense, improperly re-
versed the burden of proof by placing the burden on the
Commonwealth to establish by affirmative evidence the lack of
an innocent owner defense. Rather, the Commonwealth sub-
mits that the burden to establish an innocent owner defense is
on the property owner, that incredible testimony does not
establish an affirmative defense, and that the trial court was
within its authority to make a negative credibility finding to
reject that defense.

The Commonwealth maintains that Appellee’s action was
akin to claiming that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence, a conclusion that is only appropriate when the
verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense
of justice. As the trial court’s ruling was consistent with the
record evidence, and testimony was presented that police
informed Appellee that her son was selling illegal drugs from
the premises, the Commonwealth contends Appellee was re-
quired to establish that she expressed a lack of consent to
selling the drugs, and that she failed to do so. Further, the
Commonwealth accuses the lower court of creating a per se
rule that a parent is never required to evict a drug dealing
child, and submits that Appellee’s innocent owner defense
failed because she knew of the drug dealing and yet failed to
take any action to stop it. While in some circumstances
eviction could be an appropriate expectation, the Common-
wealth offers that it was unreasonable for Appellee to do
nothing, and the Forfeiture Act requires a property owner

who knows of drug dealing to do all he or she reasonably can
under the circumstances. Ultimately, the Commonwealth
maintains that, because it was Appellee’s obligation to estab-
lish that her lack of knowledge or consent was reasonable
under the circumstances, the trial court’s rejection of Appel-
lee’s affirmative defense was proper.

Appellee counters that the trial court erred when it required
her to establish both her lack of knowledge and lack of
consent to the unlawful use of her property, as the Forfeiture
Act requires that a property owner establish either a lack of
Imowledge or a lack of consent to the unlawful use of the
property. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(j). Specifically, Appellee high-
lights what she considers to be an inadequate review of her
innocent owner defense, as the trial court rejected it based on
the Commonwealth’s establishing that “Ms. Young either
knew of or consented to her son’s illegal activities on the
subject properties.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/2018, at 14. Ae
cording to Appellee, this distorts the statutory requirements
for the innocent owner defense, as it is unclear whether the
trial court’s resolution of that defense included whether she
consented to her son using her property to sell drugs and her
knowledge of the sale of drugs. Appellee proffers that evi-
dence which establishes knowledge does not automatically
establish consent, citing $2,523.48 U.S. Currency, 649 A.2d at
661,

Appellee maintains that, with respect to her knowledge of
her son selling drugs from her property, and whether her
actions were reasonable, the Commonwealth Court properly
remanded with instructions that all of the circumstances be
considered. She asserts that these circumstances include: Ap-
pellee’s testimony that she was on bedrest during the relevant
time period; that the police did not arrest Appellee’s son
Graham after their November search which could have im-
pacted whether Appellee actually believed Graham was selling
drugs; that the police did not show her evidence implicating
her son, despite promises to do so; the lack of drugs or drug
paraphernalia in plain view in Appellee’s home or vehicle;
neighbor testimony that there was no indication of drug

activity at her home; and Appellee’s prior experience with her
son. Appellee offers that, when multiple sources supported her
testimony that she did not know her son was selling drugs
from her home, the trial court erred by rejecting just one of
those sources in reaching its conclusion that she did have such
knowledge.

Finally, Appellee offers that she did not consent to her son
selling drugs from her property. Citing $2,523.48 U.S. Curren-
cy, Appellee contends that the innocent owner defense does
not require that a property owner take any affirmative steps
to stop the illegal use of the owner’s property, id. at 660, an
that our Court expressly rejected any suggestion that a prop-
erty owner must do everything possible to prove a lack of
consent; rather, the standard is one of reasonableness, and
what is reasonable for one property owner may not be reason-
able for another. Jd. at 558-59, 649 A.2d 658. Appellee presses
that the trial court rejected her innocent owner defense based
on its finding that she did not either force her son to move out,
or vacate the property herself. Yet, according to Appellee, the
trial court failed to consider whether either option was reason-
able, ignored her testimony that she feared inviting the police
back into her home after their November encounter, and did
not address what steps she did take, including ejecting her son
from her home when he was a teenager, asking the police for
evidence of his drug dealings, and confronting him about the
November investigation. Thus, Appellee counters that, rather
than the Commonwealth Court creating a per se rule that a
parent is never required to evict an adult child from her home,
as asserted by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Court
here merely followed our Court’s prior precedent that a trial
court must consider all the circumstances in determining
whether it was reasonable for a parent to evict a child to
demonstrate non-consent to the use of his or her property for
the illegal sale of drugs.

In $2,523.48 U.S. Currency, we construed the innocent
owner defense provision, indicating: “what is reasonable for
one property owner may not be reasonable for another. All of
the circumstances surrounding the property owner’s actions,

or lack of action, must be considered in determining if they
were reasonable.” Id. at 662. On review, we find that the trial
court did not consider all of the relevant circumstances in this
matter.

First, we reject the Commonwealth’s assertion that the
Commonwealth Court promulgated a per se rule that a prop-
erty owner never is required to evict an adult child from his or
her property; rather, we view its decision as requiring this
possibility, along with all other circumstances, be considered
in determining whether a property owner knows of, or con-
sents to, the underlying illegal activities supporting the forfei-
ture, The Commonwealth Court did not foreclose the possibili-
ty that a property owner may be required to evict an adult
child from a residence in order to satisfy the lack-of-consent
aspect of the innocent owner defense.

Hs Second, we find that, based upon the plain statuto-
ry language of the innocent owner defense, the Forfeiture Act
requires that a property owner establish either a lack of
knowledge or a lack of consent to the unlawful use of the
property. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(j) (“In the event that it shall
appear that the property was unlawfully used or possessed by
a person other than the claimant, then the claimant shall show
that the unlawful use or possession was without his knowledge
or consent. Such absence of knowledge or consent must be
reasonable under the circumstances.”), Thus, in its analysis, a
trial court must, as relevant, speak to both the knowledge of
the property owner, and his or her consent (if placed at issue
by the owner, and the court finds knowledge). Knowledge does
not establish consent. Here, we find that the trial court
seemingly blurred the two independent considerations, and, on
remand, should engage in an independent analysis of Appel-
lee’s knowledge and consent.

HI Related thereto, we conclude the Commonwealth
Court did not err when it determined a trial court, when
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support an inno-
cent owner defense, must consider all the evidence and “iden-
tify the circumstances that make it reasonable to infer that the

property owner had actual knowledge and did consent to the
violation of the Drug Act.” 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.8d at 870.
This assessment must recognize the difficult burden on a
property owner to establish a negative—that he or she had no
knowledge or gave no consent. Indeed, courts have generally
recognized the inherent difficulties in meeting this burden. See
Commonwealth v. DeHart, 512 Pa, 285, 516 A2d 656, 668
(1986) (noting the virtually impossible burden of establishing a
negative); United States v. Wilgus, 688 F.3d 1274, 1288-89
(10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing “inherently difficult” task of
proving a negative); United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1185, 1143
(8th Cir. 2006) (offering that the “law generally frowns on
requiring a party to prove a negative”). Compounding this
difficulty is that property owners may face forfeiture proceed-
ings without the assistance of counsel, inasmuch, as noted
above, there is no constitutional right to counsel in such
proceedings.

Finally, we mandate this rigorous consideration of all the
circumstances because, as in this case, a property owner’s
residence may be the subject of the civil forfeiture. In Penn-
sylvania, as elsewhere, the home is an especially significant
type of property. The loss of one’s home, regardless of its
monetary value, not only impacts the owner, but may impact
other family members, and one’s livelihood, Indeed, the home
is where one expects the greatest freedom from governmental
intrusion; it not only occupies a special place in our law, but
the most exacting process is demanded before the government.
may seize it.

Turning to the matter before us, while the trial court
generally offered that “the record in no way supports [the]
contention” that Appellee lacked knowledge of the illegal
activities in her home, and noted that the search warrant
offered to Appellee informed her of her son’s illegal activities,
we find that the court did not engage in the probing inquiry
necessary before coming to a full and reasoned conclusion.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/2018, at 11. As noted by the Common-
wealth, various parts of the record were not considered, or at
least addressed, by the trial court. Specifically, the court did

not address Appellee’s past dealings with her son when she
discovered drug usage; her contention that she did not see any
drugs in her home or van; her explanation that she only
allowed her son to return home due to her belief that he had
stopped using illegal drugs; her assertions that, if she had
found drugs in her home, she would have evicted her son; that
no neighbors or the block captain reported knowledge of drug
dealing from the home or problems with Appellee’s son; that
she requested from police some proof that her son was selling
drugs, but that no proof was ever proffered; and the failure of
the police to arrest her son after executing a search warrant
on the home in November 2009, All of these circumstances
should have been accounted for and considered by the trial
court in rendering its decision. Furthermore, the prospect of
evicting Appellee’s son needed to be contemplated in the
context of an elderly widow with serious health challenges who
relied upon her son for living assistance, The trial court should
have considered what was reasonable under these circum-
stances, See United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, Malibu,
California, 845 F.Supp. 725, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (“Parents
should [not] be shielded from the forfeiture laws; rather, it
means that the Court considers the relationship between the
parties in evaluating the gravity of the landowner’s conduct.”),

HH Ultimately, we agree with the Commonwealth Court
that it is not enough to simply reject the testimony of the
property owner if there is other evidence of record as well.
Instead, especially in this area of the law, we hold that the
trial court must faithfully identify the circumstances that
make it reasonable to infer that the property owner had actual
knowledge of the illegal use of the property or consented to
the underlying criminal activity. 1997 Chevrolet, 106 A.3d at
870. We have indicated that, in this area, exacting review is
required. See $6,425.00 Seized From Richard Esquilin, 880
A.2d at 585 (“The trial court found appellee’s evidence unper-
suasive, carefully explaining its reasons for discounting the
varied claims.” (emphasis added)). In sum, the trial court
must consider all of the circumstances before rejecting an

innocent owner defense." Therefore, we affirm the Common-
wealth Court’s order, remanding the matter to the trial court,
for consideration of all of the relevant circumstances in evalu-
ating Appellee’s evidence proffered in support of her innocent,
owner defense,

Ill. Conclusion

Thus, for all of the above reasons, we affirm the order of the
Commonwealth Court, which remanded the matter to the trial
court, for further proceedings, but consistent with our deci-
sion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Donohue,
Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.

160 A.8d 755
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Clarence Tyrone TAYLOR, Petitioner
No, 501 MAL 2015

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
Filed October 20, 2016

34, In requiring such review, we are not upsetting the statutory burdens
of proof found in the Forfeiture Act as asserted by the Commonwealth.
Rather, we are mandating compliance with that statute and our case
law, and ensuring that innocent property owners are not dispossessed
of what may be essential possessions—even though not convicted of or
even charged with a crime—without rigorous scrutiny by the courts.

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the Superior
Court is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for
proceedings consistent with Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison,
686 Pa, 395, 143 A.3d 891 (2016).

160 A.3d 755
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Caleb Daniel FOX, Petitioner
No. 343 MAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
DECIDED: October 20, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the Superior
Court is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for

proceedings consistent with Conumonwealth v. Lute-Morrison,
636 Pa. 395, 143 A.3d 891 (2016).

Justice Wecht did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 755
Bart KELLY, Petitioner
v

William C. ERBEY, Scott Anderson, and Ocwen Financial
Corp., Oewen Loan Servicing, LLC, Respondents

No. 488 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 756
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
vy.

William R. PERKINS, Petitioner
No, 433 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 756
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Rommell DOMINGUEZ-CRUZ, Petitioner
No, 428 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 756
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
y.

Nafis Antuan FAISON, Petitioner
No, 424 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 757
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Russiu STEWART, Petitioner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.
Russiu Stewart, Petitioner

No. 407 MAL 2016
No. 408 MAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 757
Renae HAMM and Alvin Hamn, Petitioners
v.
Nathan HANDWERK and Glen Handwerk, Respondent
No. 384 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 757
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Matthew Scott DIEHL, Petitioner
No. 368 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 758
Kenneth N. MILLER, Petitioner
v
STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent
No. 412 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 758
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

John Robert CAMPAS, Petitioner
No. 361 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 758
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Frankie Willie MAINES, Petitioner
No. 372 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

os
160 A.8d 758
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Darin WRIGHT, Petitioner
No. 887 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 759
John M. MORLEY Jr., Petitioner
ve
Stacey Anne COLLAZZO, Respondent
No. 327 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

———
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 759
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner
ve
Jonathon HAMLETTE, Respondent
No. 317 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Ee
160 A.3d 759
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve

Roy HOLLOWAY, Petitioner
No. 335 EAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A3d 760
Allen FEINGOLD and Ruth Wallace, Petitioners

Y.State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., Petitioners

v

STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., David Rohde, Law
Offices of David Rohde, Mare Rickles, Joseph Hankins,
and Britt, Hankins & Moughan, Respondents

No, 826 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 760
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
vy.

Ralph D, JOHNSON, Petitioner
No. 311 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 760

Leroy N. BERRY, Lawrence H. Duppins, William J. Malizia,
Jr, Aaron J. Stanford on Behalf of Themselves and All
Others Similarly Situated, Petitioners

ve
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent
No. 276 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 761
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Quran HERRINGTON, Petitioner
No. 269 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 761
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
v.

Ryan GLOVER, Petitioner
No, 265 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

a
160 A.3d 761
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
L Dean FULTON, Petitioner
No, 220 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 761
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Markea GOLPHIN, Petitioner
No. 200 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 762

Charlesretta MEADE, Robert N.C. Nix, Honorable Russell M.
Nigro, Honorable Alan K. Silberstein, Anthony Lewis, Jr., and
Molly Goldsmith, Personal Representative of the Estate of
Howard M. Goldsmith, Deceased, Respondents

ve
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Petitioner

Charlesretta Meade, Robert N. Nix, Honorable Russell M. Nigro,
Honorable Alan K. Silberstein, Anthony Lewis, Jx., and Molly
Goldsmith, Personal Representative of the Estate of Howard
M. Goldsmith, Deceased, Respondents

ve
City of Philadelphia, Petitioner

No. 87 EAL 2016
No. 120 EAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 25, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal, Cross Petition for Allowance of Appeal,
and Application to Submit Brief Reply in Support of their
Petition for Allowance of Appeal are DENIED.

160 A.3d 762
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Eric RAMBERT, Petitioner
No, 329 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 763
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Odell EPPS, Petitioner
No. 828 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 26, 2016

331

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for

Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 763
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Tony BURTON, Petitioner
No, 251 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

os
ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 763
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Jason James HARPER, Petitioner
No, 293 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 26, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 764
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
John Wesley LEGGETT, Petitioner
No, 286 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal and Application to File Supplement are

DENIED.

160 A.8d 764
CITY OF ARNOLD, Pennsylvania, Respondent,
v.

WAGE POLICY COMMITTEE OF the CITY
OF ARNOLD POLICE DEPARTMENT,
o/b/o Pamela Cimino, Petitioners

No. 238 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, rephrased for
clarity, is:

Is a dispute between a union and a municipality arising out

of a surviving spouse’s pension benefit arbitrable under the

Collective Bargaining by Policemen or Firemen Act, 48 P.S,

§§ 217.1-217.10, where the benefit was afforded to the

surviving spouse of a police officer or firefighter statutorily,

and incorporated into the parties collective bargaining

agreement?
160 A.3d 764
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Ronald Charles BACHNER, Petitioner
No. 280 WAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 765
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve.

Tommaso SCULCO, Petitioner
No. 520 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 26, 2016

335

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for

Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 765
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Isaiah §. VALENTI, Petitioner
No. 516 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

160 A.3d 765
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Donald MILES, Petitioner
No. 510 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 765
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Lenne LARUE, III, Petitioner
No. 515 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 26, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 766
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Shawntay Lee HANDY, Petitioner
No. 448 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

a
ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 766
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
James Lee TROUTMAN, Petitioner
No. 528 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 766
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Raymond Leroy ERWIN, Jr., Petitioner
No, 244 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 27, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 767
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve.

Edward L. DOMES, Petitioner
No. 252 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 27, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 767
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent

ve
Victor HOLLINGSWORTH, Petitioner
No. 280 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 27, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

160 A.3d 767
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
David THOMPSON, Petitioner
No. 267 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 27, 2016

341

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for

Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 768
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Miguel Angel PAGAN, Petitioner
No, 434 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 27, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 768
Daniel VERMEYCHUK, Petitioner
v.

PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY
COMMISSION, Respondent

No. 369 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 27, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal and Application for Leave to File a
Reproduced Record are DENIED.

=
160 A.3d 768
Debra BURKE, Petitioner

v

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD
OF REVIEW, Respondent.

No. 279 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 27, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 769
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Jermall E, JOHNSON, Petitioner
No, 289 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 27, 2016

6 ae
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal and Application for Relief are DENIED.

160 A.3d 769
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Garyling SANDERS, Petitioner
No. 801 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 31, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 81st day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

ee
160 A.8d 769
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF J.R., a Minor
Petition of: P.C., Father
No. 641 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 31, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 769

CADLES OF GRASSY MEADOWS, II, LLC, Substituted Plain-
tiff to Brown Bark I, L.P., Assignee of Sovereign Bank, Suc-
cessor by Merger to Main Street Bank, Respondent

v

BET SHAVEI-TZION a/k/a Bet Shavei-Tzion, International
and/or Bet Shavei-Tzio, Ltd., International, Petitioner

No. 475 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

October 31, 2016

a
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 770
P.M., Respondent
ve
K.W., Petitioner
No. 679 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
October 31, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

160 A.3d 770
Antonio SIERRA, Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
No. 27 WAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Notice of
Appeal is QUASHED. The Application for Relief, Application
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and Pro Se Notice to be Heard
Before a Judge are DISMISSED AS MOOT.

160 A.3d 770
D.K.D., Respondent
ve
AL.C., Petitioner
No. 330 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ve a
ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter,

160 A3d 771
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Lavelle MILLS, Petitioner
No. 200 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A8d 771
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Christopher R. WILLIAMS, Petitioner
No. 336 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal and Application of Supplemental Authori-
ty in Support of Petition for Allowance of Appeal are DE-

NIED.

160 A8d 771
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Frank LUCAS, Petitioner
No, 172 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 772
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
v.

Thomas HENDERSON, Petitioner
No. 243 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this Ist day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 772
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Larry Scott KNIPPLE, Petitioner
No. 176 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

351

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for

Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 772
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Hasan S. HARRIS, Petitioner
No. 342 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A8d 772
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
ve
$1793.00 IN CASH
Petition of: Cedric Daniels
No. 480 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

160 A.3d 778
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
vy.

Marlon GARTH, Petitioner
No, 182 EAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 773
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Robert Carl YEAGER, Petitioner
No. 337 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 773
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Keith CALDWELL, Petitioner
No. 264 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 773
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Robert A, BOGDAN, Petitioner
No. 167 WAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A3d 774
Jason Robert PAUL and Joan Paul
ve

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH; Somerset County Child Protective Services; Execu-
tive Branch of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Office of
Attorney General; and Somerset Borough Police Department,

Petition of: Jason Robert Paul
No, 255 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

rT
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 774
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Nathaniel J. MCINTYRE, Petitioner
No, 169 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 774
GERMANTOWN CAB COMPANY, Petitioner
ve
PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, Respondent
No. 215 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 775
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Willilam Lee L. BAKER, Petitioner
No, 202 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 775
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Montana NIXON, Petitioner
No. 155 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 775
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent

v.
Michael WHITMIRE, Petitioner
No. 195 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 775
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC
v
Sean KEEFE and Kim Lee

Petition of: Kim Lee
No. 489 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 776
Carol LEVY, Petitioner
ve

Robert JOHNSON and Imperial Home
Inspections, LLC, Respondents

No. 474 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

=
160 A.3d 776
John BAILEY, Petitioner

ve

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD
(COMMONWEALTH OF PA/SCI CAMP
HILL), Respondent.

No. 360 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 776
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Noel CUEVAS, Petitioner
No. 306 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this ist day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 777
PHOENIXVILLE FEDERAL BANK & TRUST, Respondent
v

Francis J. PULEO d/b/a RFJ & Associates
and Triple T Farms, Petitioners

No. 507 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

ee ©
160 A.3d 777
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Damar PARKER, Petitioner
No. 274 MAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

PER CURIAM:

And now, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal and Petitioner’s Motion to Remand to
Trial Court Pursuant to Decision of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Commonwealth v. Sean Ciccone, 2016 PA Super 149,
2016 WL 3902841 (2016), are DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 777
Thomas SIGDA, Petitioner
v.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (BUONO
BROTHERS BAKERY), Respondents

No, 286 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 778
ESTATE OF Geraldine MANTELL, Deceased
Petition of: Richard Howden
No. 503 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 778
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Michael DRAWBAUGH, Petitioner
No. 557 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 1, 2016

lS
ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 778
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Sean David O’CONNER, Petitioner
No, 427 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this ist day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.38d 779
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Kevin Mark HAGENS, Petitioner
No. 396 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 779
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Richard Allen HAINLEY, Petitioner
No. 480 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 1, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A3d 779
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
v.

Joseph Earl BAILEY, Sr., Petitioner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve

Joseph Earl Bailey, Sr., Petitioner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Joseph Earl Bailey, Sr., Petitioner

No. 260 MAL 2016

No. 261 MAL 2016

No. 262 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 1, 2016

a

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this Ist day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter,

160 A.3d 780
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Kobina A.A. ANDERSON, Petitioner
No, 358 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 2, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 780
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent

ve
Margarita GARABITO, Petitioner
No, 322 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 780
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
John E. MINNICK, Petitioner
No. 290 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 781
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Kevin BURTON, Petitioner
No. 278 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 781
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Markeith AIKENS, Petitioner
No, 268 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by
petitioner is:

(1) Did the court illegally sentence [Aikens] on unlawful

contact with a minor graded as an F-1 when it should
have been graded as an F-3?

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 781
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Ricky MALLORY, Petitioner
No, 258 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 782
Tracey Ann STERLING, Respondent
ve
Kai Ward LYMAN, Petitioner
No. 218 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

i"

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 782
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Robert E. COUSAR, Petitioner
No. 252 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 782
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve ty
Luis T. GAUTHIER, Petitioner
No. 189 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 2, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 782
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
John Joseph KOEHLER, Jr., Petitioner
No. 147 EM 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 2, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the matter is
remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
for disposition of Petitioner’s PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S,

§ 9545(a) (“Original jurisdiction over a proceeding under this
subchapter shall be in the court of common pleas.”).

160 A.3d 783

Lora Jean WILLIAMS; Gregory J. Smith; CVP Management, Inc.
d/b/a or t/a City View Pizza; John’s Roast Pork, Inc. f/k/a
John’s Roast Pork; Metro Beverage of Philadelphia, Inc. d/b/a
or t/a Metro Beverage; Day’s Beverages, Inc. d/b/a or t/a Day’s
Beverages; American Beverage Association; Pennsylvania Bev-
erage Association; Philadelphia Beverage Association; and
Pennsylvania Food Merchants Association, Petitioners

ve

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Frank Breslin, in His Official
Capacity as Commissioner of the Philadelphia Department
of Revenue, Respondents

No. 148 EM 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Motion for
Leave to File a Reply is GRANTED, and the Application for
Extraordinary Relief or the Exercise of King’s Bench Powers
is DENIED.

160 A.3d 783
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
v.

Paul Len SCHAFFER, Petitioner
No, 824 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 2, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

160 A.3d 783
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Kevin LUSTER, Petitioner
No. 296 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 2, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 784

Betty Welles CAMPBELL, Executrix of the Estate
of Samuel P. Campbell, Sr., and Betty Welles
Campbell, in her Own Right

v.

A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, in Its Own Right and as Successor
in Interest to the Clark Controller Company and A.O. Smith
Corporation; A.W. Chesterton Company; AGCO Corporation, as
Successor in Interest to Allis Chalmers Corporation; Air &
Liquid Systems Corporation, as Successor by Merger to Buffalo
Pumps, Ine; Ajax Magnethermic Corporation; Allied Glove
Corporation; American Optical Corporation; American Stan-
dard Company, Inc.; Armstrong International, Inc., Armstrong
Pumps, Inc,; Aqua-Chem, Inc., Cleaver-Brooks Division; Aurora
Pump Company; Beazer East, Inc. in Its Own Right and as
Successor to Koppers Company, Inc, and Other Related Compa-
nies Including Thiem Corporation, Beazer USA, Inc., and Beaz-
er, PLC; Blackmer Pump Company; BW/IP International Inc.,
f/k/a Borg Warner Industrial Products, Individually and as
Successor in Interest to Byron Jackson Pumps; Cashco, Inc;
Catalytic Construction Company; CBS Corporation, a Delaware
Corporation, f/k/a Viacom Inc. Successor by Merger to CBS
Corporation, a Pennsylvania Corporation, f/k/a Westinghouse
Electric Corporation; Champlain Cable Corporation, as Succes-
sor in Interest to Hercules Inc; Columbus McKinnon; Common-
wealth Edison Company; Copes-Vulcan, Inc; Crane Co;

Crown Cork & Seal Company; Dezurik, Inc.; Dravo Corporation;
Durametallic Corporation; Eaton Corporation, as Successor in
Interest to Cutler Hammer, Inc. Eichleay Corporation; Electro-
lux Home Products; Elsa Benson, Inc; Exelon Corporation;
Flowserve U.S., Inc., f/k/a Flowserve FSD Corporation, as Suc-
cessor to Durco International, Duriron Company and Durame-

tallic; FMC Corporation, Individually and on Behalf of Its
Former Peerless Pumps; Foseco, Inc.; Foster Wheeler Corpora-
tion; General Cable Corporation; Georgia Pacific Corporation;
Genuine Parts Company; Goulds Pumps, Inc; Greene Tweed &
Company; Grinnell LLC; Hedman Resources Limited; Honey-
well, Inc., Honeywell International, Inc., formerly known as
Allied Signal, Inc, as Successor in Interest to the Bendix
Corporation; IMO Industries, Inc., f/k/a IMO Delaval, Inc., f/k/a
‘Transamerican Delaval, Inc., f/k/a Delaval Turbine, Inc., Dela-
val Turbine, Inc., Devaleo Corporation; Industrial Holdings
Corporation f/k/a Carborundum Company; Ingersoll Rand; In-
sul Company, Inc.; ITT Corporation, f/k/a ITT Industries; Joy
Technologies f/k/a Joy Manufacturing Company d/b/a Joy Man-
ufacturing Company, Inc;

Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc.; Mallinckrodt US LLC, in Its Own
Right and as Successor in Interest to Imcera Group, Inc., and
International Minerals and Chemical Corporation, and as Suc-
cessor in Interest to EJ. Lavino; Marley Cooling Tower;
McCann Shields Paint Company; McCarls, Inc.; McJunkin Red
Man Corporation, in Its Own Right and as Successor in Inter-
est to McJunkin Corporation; Met-Pro Corporation and Its
Dean Pump Division Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
a/k/a Metropolitan Insurance Company; Milwaukee Valve Com-
pany; Mine Safety Appliance Company; Minnotte Contracting
Corporation; Morgan Engineering, in Its Own Right and as
Successor in Interest to Alliance Machine Company; Nagle
Pumps, Inc; Oakfabco, Inc.; Oglebay Norton Company, and Its
Division Ferro Engineering; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Phelps Dodge
Industries, Inc; Powell Valve Company; Power Piping; Premier
Refractories, Inc., f/k/a Adience, Inc, Successor in Interest to
Adience Company, LP, as Successor to BMI, Inc.; Riley Stoker
Corporation; Rockwell Automation, Inc., in Its Own Right and
as Successor in Interest to Allen Bradley; Safety First Indus-
tries, Inc., in Its Own Right and as Successor in Interest to
Safety First Supply, Inc.; Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., formerly
known as Norton Company;

Sargent & Lundy, LLC; Spirax Sarco, Inc; Square D Company;
‘Tasco Insulation, Inc., f/k/a/ the Asbestos Service Company; the
Electric Controller and Manufacturing Company; Thiem Cor-
poration, and Its Division, Universal Refractories; Treco Con-
struction Services, Inc., f/k/a the Rust Engineering Company;
Tyco Flow Control Company, LLC as Successor in Interest to

Crosby Valve; Unifrax Corporation f/k/a Carborundum; Union
Carbide Corporation and Its Linde Division; United Conveyor
Corporation; United States Steel Corporation; Washington
Group Internation, f/k/a Raytheon Engineers and Contractors,
Inc., and all Its Domestic Subsidiaries, Including the Badger
Company, Inc., Whiting Corporation; Yarway Corporation;
Yeomans Chicago Corporation, in Its Own Right and as Sue-
cessor in Interest to Morris Pumps, Inc., Zurn Industries, Inc.,
a/k/a Erie City Iron Works

Petition of: Mark Campbell, Samuel Campbell Jr., Thomas
Campbell, Christine Noonan and Deborah Sullivan

No. 304 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 2, 2016

} ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 786
Steven GARDNER, Petitioner

v

Warden Mark CAPOZZA, SCI Pittsburgh, Secretary
John E, Wetzel, Respondents

No. 278 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 786
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Demetrious Darron FLEMING, Petitioner
No. 265 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 786

ALBERT GALLATIN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Avonworth
School District, South Park School District, and West
Allegheny School District, Respondents

ve
The PENNSYLVANIA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL, Petitioner
No. 240 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 787

Earl D. HALL Sr.; Betty Jane Hall; and Earl D. Hall,
Jx., on behalf of Themselves and All Others
Similarly Situated, Petitioners

v

CNX GAS COMPANY, LLC, in Its Own Right
and as Successor-in-Interest to Consol
Gas Company, LLC, Respondent.

No. 188 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 2, 2016

* ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 787
Eric STEWART, Petitioner
v

Raymond BANACH, Lawrence Flansburg
and Westfall Township, Respondents

No. 525 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 787
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
v.

Jeffrey J. TILLMAN, Petitioner
No. 556 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

as a
160 A.3d 788
George ANTONAS, Petitioner
Y
Socrates VASSILIADIS and E. Vassiliadis, Respondents
No. 522 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 788
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Michael T. DEGILIO, Petitioner
No. 512 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 788
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent,
v.

Garrett Steven BROWN, Petitioner
No. 315 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

TT
160 A.8d 788
Jeremy ROBINSON, t/d/b/a Psu Knowhow, Petitioner

v

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, Office
of Unemployment Tax Services, Respondent

No. 897 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 2, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 789
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Hristos DIMOU, Petitioner
No. 300 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 2, 2016

es ©
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 789
Jeffrey A. WRIGHT
v

LOWER SALFORD TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL POLICE PEN-
SION FUND, Lower Salford Township Board of Supervisors,
Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund Trus-
tees and Standard Insurance Company

Petition of: Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension
Fund, Lower Salford Township Board of Supervisors and Lower
Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund Trustees

No, 294 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 2, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

s a
160 A.3d 789
K.G.M. and R.M.
ve
J.A.V. Deceased) and 8.V.
Petition of: S.V.
No. 366 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 8, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8rd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 790
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Brandon Michael WEIDOW, Petitioner
No. 298 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 8, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 790
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Raymond Franklin PEAKE, II, Petitioner
No. 454 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 790
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Ralph ROGERS, Petitioner
No, 453 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 791
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Eric Christopher HILL, Petitioner
No. 447 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 791
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Donnell RIDDICK, Petitioner
No. 527 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 8, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 791
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Ronald Stuart KAMARER, Petitioner
No. 478 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 8, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 791
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Sheldon Blair CULBREATH, Petitioner
No, 452 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 8, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 792
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Paul Joseph BEGNOCHE, Petitioner
No. 435 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 8, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 792
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
David Phillip PIERGROSSI, Petitioner
No, 401 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 2016

a
ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 792
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Respondent
ve
Francis X. MURRAY, Petitioner
No. 429 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justices Wecht and Mundy did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 798
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Charles SHIELDS, Petitioner
No. 371 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 2016

395

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for

Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 793
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
Vv.

Roscoe PARRISH, Jr., Petitioner
No. 295 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 8, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 798
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Miguel ALICEA, Petitioner
No, 296 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 793
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Marvin L. FLAMER, Petitioner
No, 255 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 8, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.3d 794
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
v.

Zamar SWIFT, Petitioner
No. 261 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 9, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 794
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Lee Herbert WAGNER, Petitioner
No. 253 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 9, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 794
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent

|

v.
Kenneth Lee BEAVER, Petitioner
No, 318 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 9, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.3d 795
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Jholy IDY, Petitioner
No, 277 EAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 9, 2016 |

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

160 A.3d 795
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Lesley A, SCOTT, Petitioner
No, 490 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 9, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2016, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

160 A.8d 795
M.A., Appellee
v
M.G., Appellant
No. 17 WAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
DECIDED: November 15, 2016

Erica Nicole Burns, Esq., Richard Ducote, PC, for M.G.,
Appellant.

Carla Schiff Donnelly, Esq., for M.A., Appellee.

ORDER
PER CURIAM
The appeal is DISMISSED as having been improvidently

granted.

160 A.3d 796
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
George Theodore REYNOLDS, Petitioner
No. 702 MAL 2015
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
DECIDED: November 15, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO Peti-
tioner’s lifetime registration issue. The Superior Court’s order
in this regard is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED
for imposition of a fifteen-year reporting requirement under
the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SOR-
NA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, pursuant to Common-
wealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 686 Pa. 395, 148 A.3d 891 (2016).
Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues.

Justice Donohue did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

160 A.8d 796

Andrew COLLINS, as Executor of the Estate
of Richard A. Collins, Deceased
v.

MANOR CARE OF LANCASTER, PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare
Health Services-Lancaster, HCR Manor Care, Inc, HCR
Healthcare, LLC, HCR Healthcare II, LLC, HCR Healtheare
I, LLC, Manorcare Health Services, Inc., Manor Care, Inc.,
Lancaster General Rehabilitation Services, Inc., d/b/a Lancas-
ter Rehabilitation Hospital, LLP, CRH of Lancaster, LLC, and
Lancaster General Health

Petition of: Manor Care of Lancaster, PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare
Health Services-Lancaster, HCR Manor Care, Inc, HCR
Healthcare, LLC, HCR Healthcare IJ, LLC, HCR Healthcare
Til, LLC, Manorcare Health Services, Inc., Manor Care, Inc,

No. 550 MAL 2015
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
DECIDED: November 15, 2016

_

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court’s
order is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for
reconsideration in light of Taylor v. Hutendicare Health Facil-
ities, Inc., 637 Pa. 168, 147 A.8d 490 (2016).

160 A3d 797

Susan J. COSGROVE and Howard G. Eshleman,
as Co-executors of the Estate of Irene M.
Eshleman, Respondents

ve

MANOR CARE OF LANCASTER, PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare
Health Services-Lancaster, HCR Manor Care, Inc., Manorcare
Health Services, Inc., and Manor Care, Inc., Petitioners

No, 549 MAL 2015
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

DECIDED: November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court's
order is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for
reconsideration in light of Taylor v. Ewtendicare Health Facil-
ities, Inc., 637 Pa, 168, 147 A.38d 490 (2016),

160 A.3d 797

Brandon HETRICK, Executor of the Estate of: William
Washington, Deceased, Respondent

ve

MANORCARE OF CARLISLE PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health
Services, Carlisle, and HCR Manorcare, Inc., and Manorcare,
Inc., and HCR Healthcare, LLC, and HCR II Healthcare, LLC,
and HCR III Healthcare, LLC, and HCR IV Healthcare, LLC,
Petitioners

No. 506 MAL 2015
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
DECIDED: November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the
Superior Court is VACATED, and this matter is REMAND-

ED to the Superior Court for further proceedings in light of
Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc, et. al, 637 Pa.
163, 147 A.3d 490 (2016).

160 A.3d 798

Lorraine L. DAVIS, Executrix of the Estate
of: John J. Hudson, Deceased

Vv.

HICR MANORCARE, LLC; Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC
d/b/a ManorCare Health Services-Lancaster; ManorCare
Health Services, Inc. a/k/a ManorCare Health Services, LLC;
Manor Care, Inc.; HCR ManorCare, Inc; HCR IV Healthcare,
LLC. HCR II Healthcare, LLC; HCR Il Healthcare, LLC;
HCR Healtheare, LLC; HCRMC Operations, LLC; Heartland
Employment Services, LLC; The Lancaster General Hospital
and Lancaster General Health

Petition of: HCR ManorCare, LLC; Manor Care of Lancaster PA,
LLC d/b/a ManorCare Health Services—Lancaster; ManorCare
Health Services, Inc. a/k/a ManorCare Health Services, LLC;
Manor Care, Inc; HCR ManorCare, Inc; HCR IV Healthcare,
LLC.; HCR Ill Healthcare, LLC; HCR II Healthcare, LLC;
HCR Healthcare, LLC; HCRMC Operations, LLC; Heartland
Employment Services, LLC

No. 210 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

DECIDED: November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the order of the
Superior Court is VACATED, and this matter is REMAND-
ED to the Superior Court for further proceedings in light of
Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc. et _al., 637 Pa.
168, 147 A.3d 490 (2016).

161 A.8d 160
CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Appellee

v

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, FORT
PITT LODGE NO. 1, Appellant

No. 18 WAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ARGUED: November 1, 2016
DECIDED: MAY 22, 2017

gs
+

Gretchen Kirstin Love, Esq. Campbell Durrant Beatty
Palombo & Miller, P.C., for Pennsylvania Municipal League,
Amicus Curiae.

Erie Carl Stoltenberg, Esq., Lightman Welby & Stolten-
berg, LLC, for Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No.
1, Appellant.

Joshua Martin Bloom, Esq., Joshua M. Bloom and Associ-
ates, P.C., for International Association of Fire Fighter, Local
No. 1, Appellant Amicus Curiae.

Wendy Kobee, Esq., City of Pittsburgh Law Department,
Alex Michael Lacey, Esq., Clifford B. Levine, Esq., Alice
Birmingham Mitinger, Esq., Cohen & Grigsby, P.C., for City
of Pittsburgh, Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether a home
rule municipality may amend its home rule charter! to elimi-
nate mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by the
Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act, commonly
known as Act 111, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10; the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Act (“PLRA”), 48 P.S. §§ 211.1-215.5; and
applicable case law.

Appellant, the Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge
No. 1 (“FOP”) is the exclusive collective bargaining represen-
tative for the police officers of Appellee, the City of Pittsburgh
(“City”), pursuant to Act 111 and the PLRA.

The FOP and the City are parties to a collective bargaining
agreement that ran from January 1, 2010 through December
81, 2014. Section 18(S) of the agreement provides, in relevant
part:

If, during the term of this agreement ... the Pennsylvania

State Legislature enacts legislation relating to ... residen-

ey requirements for police officers in cities of the second

class, the parties may reopen the contract to negotiate
and/or arbitrate under these limited conditions, The Panel
shall retain jurisdiction to address such issues if agreement
cannot be reached by the parties.

Agreement, 1/01/10-12/31/14, at 92.

The City is subject to the Policemen’s Civil Service Act (for
Cities of the Second Class), 58 P.S, §§ 28531-28540, which
prior to October 24, 2012, provided:

A person applying for appointment shall not be required to

be a resident of the city at the time of application for

original appointment. The person shall, however, be re-
quired to become a bona fide resident of the city at the time
1, The Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law (Home Rule Charter

Law), 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 2901-2984, defines “[hJome rule charter,” in

relevant part, as “[a] written document defining the powers, structures,

privileges, rights and duties of the municipal government and limita-
tions thereon.” 53 Pa,C.S. § 2902.

of the employment, and city residency must be maintained

for the entire period of employment.
58 P.S. § 28582 (repealed).

However, the General Assembly repealed the residency
mandate on October 24, 2012, through the enactment of Act
195 of 2012, which now provides, “[a] city of the second class
may require a police officer to become a bona fide resident as
a condition of employment.” 58 P.S, § 23582.

In light of Act 195, the parties met to bargain the residency
issue. Because they were unable to reach an agreement, the
arbitration panel was reconvened, and held hearings on June
28, 2018 and September 28, 2018, At the commencement of the
first hearing, the City objected to the arbitrability of the
residency issue. NT. Hrg, 6/28/18, at 5. On July 29, 2018, the
City submitted a brief to the panel on this topic. Meanwhile,
on July 28, 2018, the Pittsburgh City Council passed a resolu-
tion to place a referendum on the upcoming general election
ballot asking the voters whether the City’s home rule charter
should be amended to require all City employees and officials,
including police and fire personnel, to maintain their domicile
within the City. Voters approved the home rule charter
amendment on November 5, 2018.

On March 14, 2014, the arbitration panel issued a Supple-
mental Interest Arbitration Award, which provided that the
City-only residency requirement would immediately discontin-
ue and be replaced with the following provision: “Officers
shall be required to reside within a twenty-five (25) air-mile
radius from the City-County Building.” Supplemental Interest
Arbitration Award, 8/14/14, at 4. One member of the three-
member panel dissented.

The City filed a timely petition for review in the Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, seeking to vacate the supple-
mental award because the panel acted without jurisdiction and
exceeded its authority under Act 111.

Writing for the trial court, Judge Robert J. Colville noted
that an arbitration panel may direct a municipality to do
anything that it is lawfully empowered to do. Relying on

Township of Moon v. Police Officers of the Township of Moon,
508 Pa. 495, 498 A.2d 1805 (1985), Judge Colville determined
that residency is a term and condition of employment for
police officers and is thus a matter within the jurisdiction and
authority of an Act 111 arbitration panel. Because the Act 195
amendments placed residency within the City’s control, an
interest arbitration award could modify the residency require-
ment.

The trial court also rejected the City’s argument that the
interest arbitration award was unconstitutional because it
required the City to act in a manner contrary to the amended
home rule charter. Judge Colville noted that a home rule
charter “cannot supersede Act 111, a statewide statute.” Trial
Ct. Op., 7/9/14, at 10. In support of this conclusion, the court
relied on Section 2962(c) of the Home Rule Charter Law,
which provides that a municipality is precluded from exercis-
ing “powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of,
powers granted by statutes which are applicable in every part
of this Commonwealth.” 58 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(2). The trial
court noted that “Act 111 is a statute applicable to all munici-
palities throughout the Commonwealth.” Trial Ct. Op., at 11.
The trial court further noted that Section 2962(c)(5) of the
Home Rule Charter Law prohibits a home rule municipality
from enacting “any provision inconsistent with any statute
heretofore enacted prior to April 18, 1972 affecting the rights,
benefits or working conditions of any employee of a political
subdivision of this Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(5).
Because the General Assembly enacted Act 111 in 1968, and it
affects the rights, benefits and working conditions of municipal
employees by allowing them to bargain or arbitrate to set the
terms of their employment, the trial court concluded that the
home rule charter cannot restrict the scope of collective
bargaining issues under Act 111, including residency. Accord-
ingly, the trial court affirmed the supplemental interest arbi-
tration award.

The City appealed, and a divided en bane Commonwealth
Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Judge Bonnie Bri-
gance Leadbetter, noted that the General Assembly, through

the Home Rule Charter Law, gave home rule municipalities
broad powers “to undertake any action they desired, and that
such action should be upheld unless it was specifically denied
by the Constitution, a statute or the home rule charter itself.”
City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt
Lodge No. 1, 129 A.38d 1285, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). After
observing that a home rule charter is the equivalent of a
constitution, the court relied on Spencer v. City of Reading
Charter Bd., 97 A.3d 834, 840 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) for the
proposition that “provisions of a home rule charter have the
force and status of an enactment of the legislature.” City of
Pitisburgh, 129 A3d at 1289. The court concluded that no
statewide law prohibits the home rule charter from requiring
the City’s employees to live within its borders. It explained
that although Act 111 allows an arbitrator to impose any non-
managerial conditions and conditions of employment, unless
removed from discussion or award by other laws, “an arbitra-
tion panel can only award that which the public employer, in
this case, the City, its Mayor and its Council, have the power
to agree to and nothing more.” Id. at 1290. Because the
residency requirement is included in the home rule charter,
which “has the force and status of an enactment of the
General Assembly,” id., City officials lost the ability to bargain
away residency requirements. Accordingly, the arbitrators’
award would require the City to commit an illegal act.

In reaching this conclusion, the court partially overruled its
opinion in City of Wilkes-Barre v. City of Wilkes-Barre Police
Benevolent Association, 814 A.2d 285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), in
which it held that “[wJhen Act 111 applies, neither a home rule
charter, nor an enactment by a home rule municipality may
change the ability to bargain about residency.” Id. at 290. The
majority faulted the City of Wilkes-Barre court for failing to
recognize that a home rule charter has the force and effect of
a state statute, thus superseding general Act 111 require-
ments for bargaining over terms and conditions of employ-
ment.

Judge Robert Simpson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by
Judge Kevin Brobson and Judge Anne E, Covey, noting that

where a conflict exists between a statute of general application
such'as Act 111 and a home rule charter provision, the state
statute prevails. Judge Simpson observed that he would have
reached this result even without City of Wilkes-Barre because
the limitations placed on home rule municipalities by the
Home Rule Charter Law, and the application of the principles
of express preemption, indicate the General Assembly intend-
ed state statutes of general application to supersede inconsis-
tent home rule municipality enactments. The dissenting opin-
ion further stated that the majority erred by citing Spencer
for the proposition that a home rule charter provision is the
equivalent of a state statute. Rather, the dissenting opinion
noted that Spencer held “a home rule charter provision has
the force and effect of an enactment of the municipality’s
legislative body.” City of Pittsburgh, 129 A8d at 1298
(Simpson, J. dissenting).

We granted allocatur to consider whether a home rule
municipality may amend its home rule charter to eliminate
mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by Act 111, the
PLRA and other applicable law, and whether a municipality’s
home rule charter provision eliminating a mandatory subject
of bargaining for its police officers is preempted by Act 111.
City of Pitisburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt
Lodge No. 1, 685 Pa, 668, 189 A.38d 1257 (2016) (order).

Hl We review an Act 111 interest arbitration award under
a narrow scope of review, limited to (1) the jurisdiction of the
arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (8) whether
the arbitrators exceeded their power; and (4) whether a
deprivation of constitutional rights occurred. Michael G. Lute
Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 634 Pa. 326, 129 A3d
1221, 1227 (2015).

The FOP argues that the City is subject to several restric-
tions set forth in the Home Rule Charter Law, including
Section 2962, which provides in relevant part:

§ 2962. Limitation on municipal powers

(c) Prohibited powers.—A municipality shall not:

(2) Exercise powers contrary to or in limitation or enlarge-
ment of powers granted by statutes which are applicable in
every part of this Commonwealth.

(6) Enact any provision inconsistent with any statute hereto-
fore enacted prior to April 18, 1972, affecting the rights,
benefits or working conditions of any employee of a political
subdivision of this Commonwealth.

(e) Statutes of general application—Statutes that are uni-
form and applicable in every part of this Commonwealth
shall remain in effect and shall not be changed or modified
by this subpart. Statutes shall supersede any municipal
ordinance or resolution on the same subject.

58 Pa.C.8, § 2962(c)(2),(5) & (e).

The right of Pittsburgh police officers to engage in collective
bargaining derives from Act 111, Section 9 of which specifical-
ly defines the scope of its application to include home rule
charter municipalities.

The provisions of this act shall be applicable to every

political subdivision of this Commonwealth notwithstanding

the fact that any such’ political subdivision, either before or
after the passage of this act, has adopted a home rule
charter.
43 P.S. § 217.9, As such, the FOP asserts that Act 111 limits
municipal powers as set forth in Section 2962 of the Home
Rule Charter Law.

Here, the Commonwealth Court majority recognized that
the City’s legislative authority is limited by Section 2962, but
determined that residency is not specifically identified in
Section 1 of Act 111 or any other statute. Therefore, it is not
protected by the limitations on municipal powers set forth in
the Home Rule Charter Law. However, the FOP maintains
that the collective bargaining rights set forth in Section 1 are
intentionally broad, and do not limit police officers to bargain-

ing over specific topics such as wages or insurance. Section 1
provides;

Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of

the Commonwealth or by the Commonwealth shall, through

labor organizations or other representatives designated by
fifty percent or more of such policemen or firemen, have the
right to bargain collectively with their public employers
concerning the terms and conditions of their employment,
including compensation, hours, working conditions, retire-
ment, pensions and other benefits, and shall have the right
to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or dis-
putes in accordance with the terms of this act.

43 PS. § 217.1.

This Court has held that “residency, as a legitimate condi-
tion of employment is within the scope of collective bargain-
ing.” Township of Moon, 498 A.2d at 1818. Accordingly, the
FOP argues that by precluding bargaining over this working
condition, the home rule charter amendment interferes with
the officers’ Act 111 rights. The City, as a home rule charter
municipality, shall not enact any provision inconsistent with a
statute enacted prior to 1972 “affecting the rights, benefits or
working conditions” of its employees. 58 Pa.C.8. § 2962(c)(5).
All criteria are present here. First, Act 111 predates 1972,
having been enacted in 1968. Second, it specifically created the
right for police officers to bargain over and arbitrate for their
working conditions. Third, residency is a working condition.
See Township of Moon, 498 A.2d at 1818. Fourth, the charter
amendment is “inconsistent with” the officers’ right to bargain
or arbitrate the residency issue. Therefore, the FOP asserts
that the charter provision requiring domicile within the city
limits violates Section 2962(c)(5).

The FOP further argues that the charter provision violates
Section 2962(c)(2) of the Home Rule Charter Law, which
prohibits the City, as a home rule charter municipality, from
acting to limit “any powers granted by statutes which are
applicable in every part of this Commonwealth.” Act 111
clearly applies in every part of the Commonwealth, providing
officers with the power to bargain over and arbitrate working

conditions. The charter amendment limited these powers by
removing a working condition as a bargainable subject, and
thus is contrary to Section 2962(c)(2).

The FOP further notes that the opinion of the Common-
wealth Court fails to address the requirement of Section
2962(e) that uniform statutes of statewide application may not
be modified. Because the Commonwealth Court’s decision
permits a home rule charter municipality to divest officers of
the right to bargain over a condition of employment, contrary
to Section 1 of Act 111, the FOP asserts that the home rule
charter amendment violates Section 2962(e).

The FOP also relies on Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution which provides, in relevant part:

Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and

adopt home rule charters. ... A municipality which has a

home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any

function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule
charter or by the General Assembly at any time.
Pa. Const, art, IX, § 2,

The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that home rule
charters and amendments thereto are subservient to the limi-
tations imposed by the General Assembly. Section 2962 of the
Home Rule Charter Law, which provides that statutes of
general application, “shall not be changed or modified,” is such
a legislatively imposed limitation. Because Act 111 is a uniform
statute applicable throughout the Commonwealth, the FOP
maintains the home rule charter amendment that removes
residency as a subject of arbitration is unenforceable,

In contrast to the FOP, and consistent with the Common-
wealth Court, the City argues that adoption of a charter
provision by the electorate is equal in force and effect to a
statute. The City relies on In re Addison, 885 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d
272 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 956, 77 S.Ct. 358, 1
L,Ed.2d 816 (1957), where this Court stated, “a constitutional-
ly permissible adoption of a municipal charter is not one whit
less in dignity than a statute of the legislature granting a
charter.” Id. at 276.

The City asserts that with Act 195 the General Assembly
gave it the right to determine, as a matter of local concern,
whether to impose a residency requirement on police officers,
Once the home rule charter was amended to include a residen-
cy requirement, it insists residency was no longer a term or
condition of employment subject to collective bargaining under
Act 111. The following arguments raised by the City are all
based on this premise.

The City notes that a home rule municipality “may exercise
any powers and perform any function not denied to it by the
Constitution of Pennsylvania, by statute or by its home rule
charter.” 58 Pa.C.S. § 2961. It asserts that none of the limita-
tions on municipal powers set forth above in Section 2962 of
the Home Rule Charter Law restrict it from imposing a
residency requirement for employees.

Although the City recognizes that Act 111 is “applicable in
every part of this Commonwealth,” 58 Pa.C.S. § 9262(c)(2), it
maintains that the residency requirement is not contrary to,
and does not limit any power that Act 111 grants. The City
relies on Washington Arbitration Case, 486 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d
487 (1969), where this Court held, “[t]he essence of our
decision is that an arbitration award may only require a public
employer to do that which it could do voluntarily.” Id. at 442.
Here, the City argues the home rule charter residency provi-
sion, authorized by Act 195, did not contradict an Act 111
arbitrator’s inherent powers, which are limited by what a
public employer can and cannot do.

Likewise, the City recognizes that Act 111, which was
enacted prior to April 13, 1972, “affect[s] rights, benefits or
working conditions of any employee of a political subdivision.”
58 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(5). However, it maintains that the home
rule charter’s residency requirement for all City employees is
not inconsistent with Act 111, and, as a legitimate act of a
home rule municipality, is not prohibited under Section
2962(c)(5).

The City further posits the limitation articulated in Section
2962(e), that uniform statutes “shall remain in effect and shall

not be changed or modified by this subpart,” 58 Pa.C.S.
§ 2962(e), is inapposite because determinations about Act 111
bargaining obligations over a particular matter are case-spe-
cific inquiries. Borough of Ellwood City v. Pa. Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 606 Pa, 356, 998 A.2d 589, 598 (2010). It asserts that
a change in a statutory scheme can create a managerial
prerogative, authorize local action and thereby change bar-
gaining rights about working conditions.

The City asserts that in 2012, when the General Assembly
considered amending the explicit requirement of residency as
a condition of employment, it could have retained the “shall”
language mandating residency for police officers, 58 P.S.
§ 23582 (repealed), or deleted the “shall” provision without
further amendment; or added, as it did, the provision, “[a] city
of the second class may require a police officer to become a
bona fide resident as a condition of employment.” 53 P.S.
§ 28582, The City maintains that under the controlling princi-
ples of statutory construction, the new language must be read
as the General Assembly’s grant of authority to the City to
decide whether to require residency. The City argues that the
General Assembly authorized it, and not an Act 111 arbitrator,
to decide whether to require residency.

The City’s position can be summarized as follows; where a
home rule charter provision establishes a residency require-
ment, the subject of residency is removed from the collective
bargaining requirements of Act 111, Essentially, the home
rule charter transforms residency from a subject of bargaining
into a managerial prerogative. Accordingly, the arbitration
panel lacked the authority to order the elimination of the
residency provision. However, the FOP suggests this position
is untenable in light of the fact that resolution of this matter is
grounded in Act 195, which amended the relevant section of
the Policemen’s Civil Service Act (for Cities of the Second
Class) to provide “a city of the second class may require a
police officer to become a bona fide resident as a condition of
employment.” 58 P.S, § 23582,

ee
Hl We agree with the FOP that the provision of authority
to a municipality to take action with regard to a bargainable
subject, as Act 195 does here, does not give the municipality
the ability to place those subjects out of the reach of an
interest arbitration panel. In Chirico v. Board of Supervisors
Sor Newtown Township, 518 Pa. 572, 544 A.2d 1818 (1988), this
Court reviewed an arbitration award creating a disability
pension fund benefit equal to 65% of an officer’s final average
salary. The Township appealed the award, asserting that such
a benefit, which surpassed the 50% benefit applicable to
regular retirements, exceeded the arbitrator’s authority. The
Court focused on the Municipal Police Pension Law, 58 P.S.
§ 767-778, which governs pensions for police officers in bor-
oughs, towns and townships with three or more full-time
officers. Section 771 of the Act provides:

In the case of the payment of pensions for permanent
injuries incurred in-service and to families of members
killed in-service, the amount and commencement of the
payments shall be fixed by regulations of the governing
body of the borough, town or township,

58 PS. § 771.

HI The Law vested the township supervisors with the
authority to fix the amount and commencement of any disabili-
ty payments. This Court held that the statutory language
allowed the township supervisors to fix the disability pension
benefit at 65% of final average salary if they wished to do so.
Because the supervisors had this authority, the arbitrators
also had this authority. Chirico, 544 A.2d at 1817. Contrary to
Chirico, the City argues that the language permitting the City
to establish residency restrictions converts residency from a
bargainable subject into a matter of managerial prerogative.
However, the new language of Act 195 recognizes the modifi-
cation of residency as legal, by providing that the City “may
require” officers to become residents. Thus, where a munici-
pality has the authority to set or not to set a residency
restriction, the Act 111 interest arbitration panel has the same
authority. Accordingly, the arbitration panel did not compel

the City to engage in an illegal act when it modified the
residency requirement.

Hl The question of whether a topic is a subject of bargain-
ing or a managerial prerogative under Act 111 was analyzed
by this Court in Ellwood City, supra, where we concluded that
a matter is considered a managerial prerogative where it is
part of the public employer’s “essential managerial responsi-
bilities,” id. at 600, “such as decisions regarding the programs
of the employer, standards of services, overall budget, use of
technologies, organizational structure and selection and di-
rection of employees.” Id. at, 601. Such functions are “inherent-
ly managerial in nature.” Id, A restriction on where police
officers live is not an entrepreneurial topic. Township of
Moon, 498 A.2d at 1818. Once a subject is deemed a mandato-
ry subject of bargaining, it is only removed from the authority
of an Act 111 interest arbitration where a statute has mandat-
ed a particular result. Id.

HH (With the enactment of Act 111 in 1968, the General
Assembly provided that police officers and firefighters have
“the right to bargain collectively with their public employers
concerning the terms and conditions of their employment.” 43
PS. § 217.1. To ensure that home rule municipalities would
not abrogate this right, the General Assembly enacted Section
9 of Act 111, specifically providing that the act is applicable to
every political subdivision in the Commonwealth, regardless of
its adoption of a home rule charter. Consistent with Act 111,
Sections 2962(c)(2),(5) and (e) of the Home Rule Charter Law
place limitations on home rule municipalities. Section
2962(c)(2) precludes exercise of powers contrary to or in
limitation or enlargement of powers granted by statutes appli-
cable in every part of the Commonwealth. Because Act 111
specifically applies to every political subdivision, any act by a
municipality that is contrary to Act 111 is prohibited. Although
not specified in the statutory language of Act 111, our case law
has clarified that residency is a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. Accordingly, the home rule charter provision requiring
residency is at odds with an act of statewide application.

es

Section 2962(c)(5), which prohibits enacting any provision in-
consistent with a statute enacted prior to April 18, 1972
“affecting the rights, benefits and working conditions of any
employee of a political subdivision[,]” is implicated here be-
cause Act 111 of 1968 was enacted before that date, and
affects the rights, benefits or working conditions of employees.
As there is a patent inconsistency between Act 111, which
provides for bargaining over residency, and the home rule
charter provision that removes residency as a subject of
bargaining, the home rule charter provision violates Section
2962(c)(5). In addition, Section 2962(e) provides that statutes
that are uniform and applicable in every part of the Common-
wealth shall remain in effect, and shall not be changed or
modified. Because the home rule charter amendment changed
or modified Act 111 by removing residency as a subject of
collective bargaining, it violates Section 2962(e) as well. Thus,
based strictly on Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law,
the FOP is entitled to relief.

HM Furthermore, the right to engage in home rule flows
from Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
which permits a home rule municipality to “exercise any power
or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its
home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.”
Pa. Const. art. IX, § 2. In Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjust-
ment, 602 Pa, 88, 977 A.2d 1182 (2009), we noted, “[t]hus ‘by
constitutional mandate the General Assembly may limit the
functions to be performed by home rule municipalities.”
Spahn, 977 A.2d at 1148-44 (quoting Ortiz v. Commonwealth,
545 Pa. 279, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (1996)).

Spahn arose under the First Class City Home Rule Act, 58
PS. §§ 18101-13157. Like Section 2962 of the Home Rule
Charter Law, which applies in the instant matter, the First
Class City Home Rule Act provides, “{nJotwithstanding the
grant of powers in this act, no city shall exercise powers
contrary to or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted
by the acts of the General Assembly which are ... applicable
in every part of the Commonwealth,” 58 P.S. § 18183. Accord-
ingly, this Court concluded that “local ordinances enacted

pursuant to the local Charter are subordinate to the Home
Rule Act when the matter at issue is one of statewide concern,
and where the two conflict, then the subordination mandate of
the Home Rule Act takes precedence and controls.” Spahn,
977 A.2d at 1144,

Pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, home rule charters are subservient to limitations
imposed by the General Assembly, Section 2962(e) provides
that “statutes that are uniform and applicable in every part of
this Commonwealth shall remain in effect and shall not be
changed or modified.” 58 Pa.C.S. § 2962(e). Because Act 111 is
“applicable to every political subdivision of this Common-
wealth,” 48 P.S. § 217.9, the charter amendment modifying
rights under Act 111 is unenforceable.

HE We also granted allowance of appeal to determine
whether a municipality’s home rule charter provision eliminat-
ing a mandatory subject of bargaining for its police officers is
preempted by Act 111. As this Court noted in Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadel-
phia, 627 Pa. 470, 101 A.8d 79 (2014) (SEPTA ):

In a series of cases beginning with our decision in [Depart-

ment of General Services v.] Ogonte [Area Neighbors

Ass’n., 505 Pa. 614, 488 A.2d 448 (1984) ], this Court has

held that a Commonwealth agency’s challenge to a munici-

pality’s exercise of authority over it does not represent “a

contest between superior and inferior governmental entities,

but instead a contest between two instrumentalities of the

state.” See Ogontz, supra at 452; County of Venango v.

Borough of Sugarcreek, 584 Pa, 1, 626 A.2d 489, 490 (1998);

Hazleton Avea Sch. Dist. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 566 Pa,

180, 778 A.2d 1205, 1210 (2001). That is, because the legisla-

ture authorized the creation of both entities, and set the

limits of each entity’s authority, our task is to determine,
through an examination of the relevant statutes, which
entity the legislature intended to have preeminent powers.

Ogontz, supra at 452. In short, “[t]he problem, essentially, is

one of statutory interpretation.” Jd. Our standard of review

es

of such a question of statutory interpretation is de novo, and

our scope of review is plenary. Hazleton, swpra at 1213.

As identified in Hazleton, our opinion in Ogontz, supra sets

forth the analytical process a court is to follow to determine

which entity the legislature intended to have preeminent

powers over a given area of regulation.
The first step requires the reviewing court to determine,
through examination of the statutes, which governmental
entity, if any, the General Assembly expressly intended to
be preeminent. Jd. In the event there is no such express
legislative mandate, the second step requires the court “to
determine legislative intent as to which agency is to
prevail ... turn[ing] to the statutory construction rule
that legislative intent may be determined by a consider-
ation, inter alia, of the consequences of a particular
interpretation.”

Hazleton, supra at 1210, (quoting Ogontz, supra at 455

(citing in turn 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6)) (emphasis omitted).
SEPTA, 101 A.3d at 86.

HM Express preemption occurs “where the statute in-
cludes a preemption clause, the language of which specifically
bars local authorities from acting on a particular subject
matter.” Hoffman Mining Co., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board
of Adams Township, 612 Pa. 598, 32 A.8d 587, 593 (2011).
Here, a review of the authority previously relied upon leads us
to conclude that express preemption clearly applies in this
matter, Section 2962 of the Home Rule Charter Law contains
three explicit preemption clauses, see supra at 415-16, 161
A.8d at 165-66. Section 2962(e) prohibits home rule charter
municipalities from taking any action that changes or modifies
a uniform statute of statewide application. Section 9 of Act 111
makes clear that it is “applicable to every political subdivision
of this Commonwealth.” 48 P.S. § 217.9. Furthermore, Section
2962(e) explicitly provides that “[s]tatutes shall supersede any
municipal ordinance or resolution on the same subject.” 58
P.S. § 2962(e). By including the word “supersede,” the Gener-
al Assembly emphasizes that statutes of statewide application
predominate over enactments of home rule municipalities,

Section 2962(c) provides that a municipality may not limit
“powers granted by statutes which are applicable in every
part of this Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(c)(2). Accord-
ingly, the City’s ability to remove a subject of collective
bargaining created by Act 111 is preempted.

Section 2962(c)(5) prohibits the enactment of “any provision
inconsistent with any statute heretofore enacted prior to April
18, 1972, affecting the rights, benefits or working conditions of
any employee of a political subdivision of this Commonwealth.”
53 Pa.0.S. § 2962(c)(2). Publie sector collective bargaining
rights are set forth in Act 111, which became effective in 1968,
and the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), 43 P.S.
§§ 1101.101-1101.2801, which became effective in 1970. Thus,
the General Assembly has preempted home rule municipalities
from undermining collective bargaining rights under Act 111
and PERA.

Accordingly, the order of the Commonwealth Court permit-
ting a home rule municipality to redefine subjects of collective
bargaining is contrary to Act 111, and therefore is reversed.
The order of the trial court affirming the March 14, 2014
supplemental interest arbitration award directing that officers
shall be required to reside within a twenty-five mile radius
from the City-County Building is reinstated.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Donohue,
Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.

Justice Todd did not participate in the decision of this case.

ee
160 A3d 171
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
vy.
George Ivan LOPEZ, Appellant
No. 706 CAP
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
SUBMITTED: January 24, 2017

George Ivan Lopez, pro se.
Kelly M. Sekula, Esq., for Appellee.

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2017, the Order of the
Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED.

161 A.8d 172

GREEN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA
and Cheri Honkala, Appellants

ve

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF COMMISSIONS,
ELECTIONS AND LEGISLATION and Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, Appellees

No. 11 MAP 2017
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

SUBMITTED: February 28, 2017
DECIDED: March 3, 2017

a s
Samuel C. Stretton, Esq., Law Office of Samuel C. Stretton,
for Appellants.

Howard Greeley Hopkirk, Hsq., Kenneth Lawson Joel,
Esq., Nicole Jeanne Radziewicz, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of
Attorney General, Kathleen Marie Kotula, Esq., Pennsylvania
Department of State, Joshua D. Shapiro, Esq., for Appellees,

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8rd day of March, 2017, the order of the
Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED,

Opinion to follow.

Justices Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht dissent.

161 A8d 172
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: L.B.M., a Minor
Appeal of: J.P., Mother
In re: Adoption of: A.D.M., a Minor

Appeal of: J.P., Mother

No. 84 MAP 2016
No. 85 MAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ARGUED: December 6, 2016
DECIDED: March 28, 2017

g
|

i

30

AL

Kristin Diller Nicklas, Esq., Nicklas Law Offices, for J.P.,
Appellant.

Michael John Connor, Esq., Walker Connor & Spang, LLC,
for J.D.M., Appellee.

Kristen B, Hamilton, Esq,, Stiltner, Taccino & Hamilton, for
Guardian Ad Litem, Appellee.

Theresa M. Yaukey, Esq., MidPenn Legal Services, for
Franklin County Children and Youth Services, Appellee.

Marsha Levick, Esq., Riya Saha Shah, Esq., Lisa Bolotin
Swaminathan, Esq., Juvenile Law Center, for Juvenile Law
Center, ACLU of PA, Community Legal Srvs., National As-
soe. of Counsel for Children, et al., Amicus Curiae.

Kevin Lewis Quisenberry, Esq., Community Justice Project,
for Community Justice Project, Amicus Curiae.

Benjamin Nelson Zuckerman, Esq., Juvenile Court Project,
for Juvenile Court Project, Amicus Curiae.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

Justice Wecht delivers the Opinion of the Court with
respect to Part I, Part II(A), and Part II(C), and announces
the judgment of the Court. The opinion is joined in full by
Justices Donohue and Dougherty. Chief Justice Saylor and
Justice Todd join the opinion, except with respect to Part
II(B), and the Chief Justice files a concurring opinion, joined
by Justice Todd. Justices Baer and Mundy file separate
dissenting opinions, which they each cross-join.

OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT

This case requires us to determine whether 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2318(a), which mandates the appointment of counsel for
children involved in contested involuntary termination of pa-
rental rights (“TPR”) proceedings, is satisfied by the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) provided that the GAL is
an attorney. We hold that under the facts of the present case,

it is not, Accordingly we reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.'

I. Background

At the outset, we define the terms that provide the back-
drop for our resolution of this issue. In cases involving
children, the law acknowledges two separate and distinct
categories of interest: a child’s legal interests, which are
synonymous with the child’s preferred outcome, and a
child’s best interests, which the trial court must deter-
mine? While the best interests determination belongs to
the court, statutes and rules guide the court and channel
its discretion, For instance, in child custody cases, the
court may appoint counsel for the child, who “shall repre-
sent the child’s legal interests and zealously represent the
child as any other client in an attorney-client relationship”
and “shall not perform the role of a guardian ad litem or
pest interests attorney.” Pa.R.C.P. 1915,.11(a). Additionally,
the custody court may choose to appoint a GAL “to repre-
sent the best interests of the child,” and that GAL can be

1. The opinions presented here are corrected ones that replace those
previously filed on March 28, 2017,
2. The Comment to Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154 provides:
“Legal interests” denotes that an attorney is to express the child’s
wishes to the court regardless of whether the attorney agrees with the
child’s recommendation. “Best interests” denotes that a guardian ad
litem is to express what the guardian ad litem believes is best for the
child’s care, protection, safety, and wholesome physical and mental
development regardless of whether the child agrees.
Pa.RJ.C.P. 1154 cmt.

3. See In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 47 A.3d 817, 820 (2012) (court
must determine child’s best interests in termination of parental rights);
Inte R.IS., 614 Pa, 275, 36 A.3d 567, 573 (2011) (child's best interests
guide the court in a goal change); In re Adoption of J.E.F., 587 Pa. 650,
902 A.2d 402, 412 (2006) (child's best interest is the “paramount
consideration” in adoption); Moore v. Moore, 535 Pa, 18, 634 A,2d 163,
168 (1993) (“The primary concern in any custody case is the best
interests of the child,”); I re B.L.L,, 787 A.2d 1007, 1014 (Pa. Super.
2001) (discussing differences between custody and termination of pa-
rental rights and noting that, in termination of parental rights, child’s
legal interests are protected by representation of counsel),

either an attorney or mental health professional. Pa.R.C.P.
1915.11-2(a).

In dependency cases where the trial court is required to
appoint a GAL, the GAL must be an attorney. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6811(a). The GAL is authorized by statute to represent both
the child’s legal interests and the child’s best interests. Jd. The
GAL makes recommendations to the court regarding the
child’s placement and needs, and must advise the court of the
child’s wishes, if ascertainable. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6811(). Further,
the statute explicitly provides that any difference between the
child’s wishes and the GAL’s recommendations “shall not be
considered a conflict of interest.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6811(b)(9).’

By contrast to this statutory authorization for a GAL in
dependency proceedings, Section 2318(a) of Title 23 prescribes
a different scheme for the representation of children in termi-
nation of parental rights and adoption cases.

(a) Child.—The court shall appoint counsel to represent the
child in an involuntary termination proceeding when the
proceeding is being contested by one or both of the parents.
The court may appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to
represent any child who has not reached the age of 18 years
and is subject to any other proceeding under this part
whenever it is in the best interests of the child. No attorney
or law firm shall represent both the child and the adopting
parent or parents.

28 Pa.C.S. § 2818(a).> No other statutory provision speaks to
the appointment of counsel or a GAL in an involuntary
termination of parental rights proceeding.

4, Although Section 6311(b)(9) specifically provides that the dependency
GAL has no conflict of interest when the child’s best interests and legal
interests diverge, this Court has suggested that, in such a instances, the
GAL should request appointment of legal counsel. Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154 cmt.
Indeed, we have suspended Section 6311(b)(9) to the extent that it
conflicts with the rule, Id, cmt.

5. The comment to the statute states:

This new provision requires the court to appoint counsel for a child
when parental rights are being involuntarily terminated and, when
necessary, to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who has not
reached the age of 18 years, The guardian ad litem concept is broad

a a

With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the facts of
today’s case. J.L.P. (“Mother”) and J.D.M. (“Father”) are the
parents of A.D.M. (born March 2007) and L.B.M. (born May
2011). On July 2, 2018, Franklin County Children and Youth
Services (“CYS”) conducted a home visit with Mother. The
visit was prompted by a referral alleging that Mother was on
the verge of becoming homeless. The next day, Mother con-
tacted CYS seeking to place the children due to her unstable
living conditions. At the time, Father was incarcerated. That
same day, the trial court ordered the children to be placed
with CYS. Soon after, the children were adjudicated depen-
dent. As required by Section 6311, the trial court appointed a
GAL for the children (Attorney Kristen Hamilton) at the
beginning of the dependency proceedings.

On August 18, 2018, Mother pleaded guilty to possession of
drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to twelve months of
probation. Thereafter, Mother was incarcerated, mostly due
to probation violations, from July 5, 2018 to October 2, 2018,
October 24, 2018 to November 6, 2013, December 12, 2018 to
April 24, 2014, and May 5, 2014 to June 20, 2014.

On August 6, 2014, following Mother’s repeated periods of
incarceration, CYS filed a TPR petition. On November 25,
2014, after two hearings, the trial court issued findings of fact
and a decree. The trial court declined to terminate Mother's
parental rights, finding that Mother, while only recently re-
leased from jail, had obtained both housing and employment.
Decree, 11/25/2014, at 8, 14-16." Further, Mother had attended
almost all of her available visits with the children and had

enough to allow the appointment of a person other than a lawyer. For
example, a social worker could be appointed guardian ad litem
within this provision; in an appropriate case a nonlawyer guardian
ad litem could request appointment of counsel.

23 Pa.C.S, § 2313 Jt. St. Gov. Comm. cmt.

6, At the time of her plea, Mother already was on probation stemming
from a 2012 conviction for possession of a small amount of marijuana.

7, The trial court terminated Father's parental rights. He appealed, and
the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. In re Adoption of
A.D.M,, 94 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 7089589 (Pa. Super. June 15, 2015)
(unpublished).

engaged and bonded with them. Jd. at 8-9, 18. The court
expressed “grave concerns” about the effect that severance of
the relationship would have on A.D.M., who was “extremely
close” with Mother. Jd. at 19. The testimony reflected that
A.D.M. “desperately want[ed] to be with his mother.” Notes of
Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/3/2014, at 60; see also N.T., 10/24/2014,
at 38.

Following the first TPR hearing, Mother made significant
progress, and the children were scheduled to be reunited with
her. However, while reunification was pending, L.B.M. re-
turned from a weekend visit with Mother with bruises on his
neck and chest. Although the bruises were suspected to be
non-accidental, an investigation did not reveal their cause.
Ultimately, the trial court delayed reunification in order to
permit A.D.M. to finish the school year. Shortly thereafter, it
was discovered that Mother had again violated her probation
by living apart from her approved residence. Mother was
reincarcerated. While in jail, Mother participated in visits with
the children until her privileges were suspended after she
tested positive for suboxone.

On August 4, 2015, the GAL filed a second TPR petition,
citing both Mother's re-incarceration and the cancellation of
her visitation privileges. On August 28, 2015, Mother filed a
motion requesting the appointment of counsel for the children,
citing Section 2313(a). Mother noted that the GAL’s position
“may be adverse to the [children’s] position,” and accordingly
averred the necessity of independent counsel. Motion to Ap-
point Counsel for the Child, 8/28/2015, at 1.

On September 9, 2015, the trial court denied Mother's
motion. In its order, the trial court chose simply to skip over
the first sentence of Section 2318(a) (which mandates counsel
in contested TPR cases) in favor of that provision’s second
sentence, which “gives this Court the discretion to appoint
counsel or a GAL to represent any child who has not reached
18 years and is subject to any other proceeding under this
part whenever it is in the best interests of the child.” Order,
9/9/2015 (emphasis added). The trial court stated that, because
the GAL had an established relationship with the children, the

GAL’s representation would best suit the children’s interests.
Id.

The trial court held hearings on the TPR petition. At the
start of the proceedings, the trial judge interviewed A.D.M.
A.D.M. was equivocal about his desire to be reunited with
Mother. He testified that he knew that Mother cared about
him, but that he nonetheless was disappointed by her inability
to maintain sobriety. He further stated that he probably would
choose his foster family. N.T., 9/15/2015, at 10-11. A.D.M.
expressed his desire for a final decision and his wish that,
regardless of the outcome, he be allowed to maintain contact
with both Mother (and her family) and his foster family. Id. at
17-18, 154. A.D.M’s permanency worker testified that
A.D.M’s “first wish is always going to be with his mom.” Id.
at 161, The trial court recognized that A.D.M.’s bond with
Mother was much stronger than L.B.M.’s, and that A.D.M.
would be affected adversely by the termination. However, the
trial court found that A.D.M. also had a strong bond with his
foster parents, and that it was in A.D.M.’s best interests to
sever the bond with Mother because his most important need
was permanency. See id. at 17-18 (A.D.M. testifying that he
just wanted a decision).

The trial court filed its findings of fact and decree on
September 25, 2015. By that decree, the trial court terminated
Mother's parental rights, finding that Mother had not remed-
ied the conditions leading to the children’s placement. In
assessing the children’s best interests, the court found that
L.B.M’s primary bond was with his foster parents, whom he
considered to be his parents, although L.B.M. did have some
bond with Mother. Decree, 9/25/2015, at 18.

Mother filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(ii) and (b). Mother alleged that the trial court erred
in denying Mother’s motion for the appointment of counsel,
and that the trial court abused its disaretion in terminating
Mother’s parental rights. We first address the appointment of
counsel.

——— -

In support of its decision to deny Mother’s motion, the trial
court relied upon In re K.M., 58 A.8d 781 (Pa. Super. 2012), in
which the Superior Court held that Section 2318(a) did not
require appointment of an attorney when a GAL, who was an
attorney, had been appointed. Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/2015,
at 22-24. In K.M., the Superior Court addressed a TPR
determination involving a three-year-old child who had never
been in the parents’ care. K.M., 58 A.8d at 783-84. The trial
court elected not to appoint counsel for the child pursuant to
Section 2318(a), although a GAL, who was an attorney, had
been appointed. Jd. at 786. The mother appealed this decision.
The Superior Court identified the purpose of the section as
“protect[ing] the interests of the child. Implicit in this appoint-
ment of counsel is a recognition that the interests of the child
may be very different than or diverge from the interests of the
other parties ....” Jd. at 787.

The Superior Court concluded that Section 2313(a)’s re-
quirements were not clear and unambiguous as applied to
cireumstances when the appointed GAL was an attorney.
Even though the second sentence of the statute did not apply
to the case, the Superior Court opined that the use in that
sentence of the disjunctive “counsel or guardian ad litem”
indicated that the legislature deemed “it would be superfluous
to appoint both counsel and an attorney serving as guardian
ad litem” in most cases. Id. Further, the K.M. court relied
upon the comment to Section 2318(a), noting that a GAL could
be someone other than an attorney, to bolster its conclusion
that the legislature did not intend for both an attorney-GAL
and an attorney to be appointed. Jd. at 787-88, Finally, the
KM. court did not discern anything in the statute that pre-
cluded the GAL from acting simultaneously as legal counsel.
Id, at 788. Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the trial
court’s refusal to appoint counsel in addition to the GAL. Id.

Based upon K.M.’s reasoning, the trial court here decided
that it was not required to appoint counsel other than the
GAL; A divided panel of the Superior Court affirmed upon

8. Mother filed a separate motion to appoint counsel for each child (and
at each docket number). It is unclear to us whether Mother sought the

the basis of the trial court’s opinion. In ve: Adoption of
L.B.M., 1884 MDA 2015, 2016 WL 3080124 at *6 (Pa. Super.
May 381, 2016) (unpublished). In dissent, Judge Strassburger
opined that K.M. was distinguishable because of A.D.M.’s age
(eight at the time of the hearing) and because of A.D.M.’s
expressed wish to return to Mother, a wish which conflicted
with the GAL’s position. Id. at *33-34 (Strassburger, J.,
dissenting). Judge Strassburger also observed that Section
2313(a) “suggest[ed] that the legislature intended to differenti-
ate between legal counsel and GAL in TPR proceedings.” Id.
at *34,

Presently, Mother argues that K.M. was wrongly decided.
Brief for Mother at 7. Mother contends that the second
sentence of Section 2318(a), upon which the K.M. Court relied,
does not apply to contested involuntary TPR hearings and is
thus irrelevant to the case. If anything, Mother contends, the
second sentence proves that the General Assembly recognized
the distinct roles that a GAL and an attorney play. According-
ly, Mother argues that the use of the term counsel in the first
sentence means a “client-directed” attorney who represents
the child’s legal interests and not a GAL who happens to be an
attorney and seeks to vindicate the child’s best interests. Id. at
89

The GAL argues that, although Section 2318(a)’s purpose is
“to ensure that the needs and welfare of a child will be
actively advanced by an advocate who owes loyalty only to the
child,” a GAL, representing the child’s best interests, is able
to advocate for the child. Brief for GAL at 22 (quoting In re
Adoption of G.K.T., 75 A.3d 521, 527 (Pa. Super. 2013)). The

appointment of one attorney for both children or the appointment of

separate counsel for each child.

9. Three amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of Mother. See Brief
of Juvenile Court Project; Brief of Community Justice Project; Brief of
Juvenile Law Center, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania,
Community Legal Services, Inc., National Association of Counsel for
Children, National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, and Pennsyl-
vania Legal Aid Network, All three amici argue that Section 2313(a) is
unambiguous, highlight differences between legal and best interests and
the potential conflicts inherent therein, and provide policy justifications
for providing counsel for the child.

—

GAL asserts that the age and development of a child may
make it impossible for an attorney to be client-directed. The
GAL contends that, since the GAL often has represented the
child’s best and legal interests pursuant to the Juvenile Rules
in dependency, that dual role should continue through the
termination process. Id. at 28.

CYS also argues that, because Section 6311 contemplates
the GAL’s advocacy on behalf of both the best interests and
the legal interests of the child in dependency cases, it would
be inefficient not to extend that dual role into and through
TPR proceedings. Brief for CYS at 30-32. CYS points to
potential problems with the mandatory appointment of counsel
in addition to a GAL, such as the children’s age and capacity
to form and express preferences and the possible need for
separate attorneys for each of multiple children in a family
when children’s legal interests diverge. Id. at 82-83.

Il. Analysis
A. Appointment of Counsel

Hi Because our resolution of this issue necessarily re-
quires us to interpret Section 2318(a), our standard of review
is de novo. Gilbert v. Synagro Cent, LLC, 684 Pa. 651, 181
A.3d 1, 10 (2015).

The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the

General Assembly’s intent and give it effect. 1 Pa.C.S.

§ 1921(a). In discerning that intent, the court first resorts

to the language of the statute itself. If the language of the

statute clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative
intent, it is the duty of the court to apply that intent to the
case at hand and not look beyond the statutory language to
10. CYS suggests briefly that this appeal should be dismissed because
the issue of counsel for the children was not raised in the first TPR
proceedings and because Mother did not immediately appeal the denial
of counsel. Brief for CYS at 18, CYS cites no rule or decisional law to
support this contention. Because this request has not been developed,
we will not review it. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d
244, 262 n.9 (2011) (“This sub-claim has not been developed factually

or legally, and it is not supported with citations to relevant decisional or
statutory law ... it is waived for lack of development.”’).

o
ascertain its meaning. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the
words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the
letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.”), “Relatedly, it is well established that
resort to the rules of statutory construction is to be made
only when there is an ambiguity in the provision.” Oliver v.
City of Pittsburgh, 608 Pa. 886, 11 A.3d 960, 965 (2011)
(citations omitted).

Mohamed v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp, Bureau of
Motor Vehicles, 615 Pa. 6, 40 A.8d 1186, 1198 (2012) (citation
modified).

HM The language of Section 2318(a) at issue in this con-
tested TPR case reads, in pertinent part, “The court shall
appoint counsel to represent the child ....” “The word ‘shall’
by definition is mandatory and it is generally applied as such.”
Chanceford Aviation Props. L.L.P. v. Chanceford Twp. Bd. of
Supervisors, 592 Pa, 100, 928 A.2d 1099, 1104 (2007) (citation
omitted). When a statute is unambiguous, “shall” must be
construed as mandatory. Jd. Here, the use of “shall” is unam-
biguous and hence, mandatory. The statutory language does
not suggest anything other than the general meaning of the
word. By contrast, the statute’s second sentence uses the term
“may” in connection with “any other proceeding” (ie, any-
thing other than a contested TPR) evidencing the fact that our
General Assembly knows well how to use non-mandatory
language when it wishes to do so. The lawmakers codified a
mandatory appointment of counsel for contested TPR cases,
and, in the very next sentence, codified a discretionary provi-
sion for other proceedings." There is no ambiguity in the
statute. We may not manufacture one.

HAs well, it bears noting that the recognized purpose of
the statute is to ensure that the needs and welfare of the

11, My learned colleague Justice Mundy agrees that the first sentence of
the statute controls this case, Mundy, J., dissenting, at 457-58, 161 A.3d
at 189-90, but asserts that we are “mistakenly reading the first and
second sentences in conjunction with each other,” Jd. at 458, 161 A.3d
at 190, To the contrary, we acknowledge the second sentence only to

children involved are actively advanced.” To hold otherwise
would afford courts the discretion to deny counsel to children
involved in contested TPR proceedings, which not only would
disserve the purpose of the statute, but also would contradict
its express terms.

Hl “Counsel” also is clear and unambiguous. The second
sentence of the statute is instructive, inasmuch as it demon-
strates that the legislature recognized and understood the
difference between counsel and a GAL. In cases other than
involuntary (i.e, contested) TPRs, the General Assembly has
instructed that either counsel or a GAL adequately can repre-
sent the child’s interests. However, when a child’s relationship
with his or her birth family could be severed permanently and
against the wishes of the parents, the legislature made the
policy judgment, as is evident from the plain, unambiguous
language of the statute, that a lawyer who represents the
child’s legal interests, and who is directed by the child, is a
necessity. It is not our role to second-guess the policy choice
made and expressed by the General Assembly. Nor is the
legislative choice surprising; appointment of client-directed
counsel optimizes the protection of the child’s needs and
welfare, which form the ultimate issue that the trial court
must resolve before granting the TPR. Because the statute is
clear and unambiguous, and because the application of the
plain language gives effect to the General Assembly’s intent,

demonstrate that the General Assembly recognized the difference be-

tween counsel and a GAL.

12. In In re Adoption of N.A.G., 324 Pa.Super. 345, 471 A.2d 871 (1984),
the Superior Court explained that the statutory requirement for ap-
pointment of counsel was the legislative answer to Justice Manderino’s
dissenting statements in Matter of Kapcsos, 468 Pa. 50, 360 A.2d 174
(1976) and In re Thomas, 484 Pa, 532, 399 A.2d 1063 (1979), that,
because the legislature had not provided for the appointment of counsel
for children, the courts must do so. Id. at 874 n.2, See In re Adoption of
Hess, 386 Pa.Super. 301, 562 A.2d 1375, 1381 (1989) (‘[t]he purpose of
2313(a) is to ensure that the needs and welfare of a child will be
actively advanced by an advocate who owes loyalty only to the child.”)
(emphasis in original). Justice Mundy attempts to distinguish Hess by
quoting its invocation of the child’s best interests, Mundy, J., dissenting
at 459-60, 161 A.3d at 191. This is wholly uncontroversial, but, respect-
fully, it misses the point. The issue here is not whether or not the child’s
best interests must be served (they must), but rather whether the
General Assembly's mandate that counsel must be appointed for the
child may be subverted or ignored (it may not).

a

we hold that Section 2818(a) requires the appointment of
counsel who serves the child’s legal interests in contested,
involuntary TPR proceedings.”

B. Service of GAL as Counsel

Having determined that the court must appoint counsel to
represent the child’s legal interest, we next consider whether a
GAL may serve in that role. Because the GAL is familiar with
the case and has represented the child’s legal interests in the
dependency case to the extent permitted by Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154
and Section 6311, there is some facial appeal in pressing (or
allowing) the GAL into service as the child’s counsel for the
TPR proceedings.“ Moreover, because the Adoption Act does
not require the appointment of a GAL, it might be suggested
that the dependency GAL would not have to act as GAL
during the TPR and could serve solely as the child’s lawyer in
that latter proceeding, converting, as it were, to the “counsel”
role specified by statute. But practical concerns militate
against such dual service for the GAL. First, if the dependen-
ey GAL also was appointed as counsel for the TPR, all of

13. Justice Mundy contends that there is no reason to conclude that
section 2313(a) requires representation of “the child’s legal interests,
and not best interests.” Mundy, J., dissenting at 458, 161 A.3d at 190.
However, the General Assembly chose to use the term “counsel.” Had
the General Assembly believed that an attorney representing both best
and legal interests of the child would be sufficient to protect all of a
child's interests, it certainly could have imported language into the
Adoption Act similar to that utilized in the dependency statute, see 42
Pa.C.S. § 6111(b)(9), in which the legislature authorized a GAL to
represent both species of interests. It did not do so, signaling its clear
intention that section 2313(a) counsel must represent the child’s legal
interests.

14. The GAL only represents the child’s legal interests to the extent
permitted by rule and statute within the limited context of the depen-
dency proceedings, and only to the extent that there is no conflict with
the GAL’s determination and advocacy of the child’s best interests. In
contested TPR proceedings, per the General Assembly's directive, no
attorney is assigned to represent the child’s best interests. Respectfully,
my learned colleague Justice Baer’s desire to “‘allow[] the child to have
continuity of representation between the dependency and termination
proceedings...,” Baer, J., dissenting at 454, 161 A.3d at 188, obscures
this distinction and conflates the roles of GAL and counsel for the child.
In context, this “continuity” becomes a mechanism by which the child
is judicially divested of the independent attorney that the General
Assembly has mandated for that child.

——  «

those involved—the court, the lawyers, the parties, the agen-
cies—would have to be clear about the distinction between the
roles: to wit, that the GAL advocates for the child’s best
interests while counsel advocates for the child’s legal interests.
That change in roles, and the subtle yet important distinction
between those roles, has the potential to breed confusion for
the child as well as other parties. Second, the dependency
proceedings generally remain ongoing when the TPR petition
is filed and may well continue, as they indeed did here, in the
event that the petition is denied. To permit the dependency
GAL to serve also as the TPR counsel while proceedings in
each matter are ongoing increases the risk of confusion and
may force the attorney to take conflicting stances in the
proceedings depending on the role being performed at the
time. These concerns argue against the GAL serving addition-
ally in the distinct role of TPR counsel.

Hl We recognize that providing a new attorney as counsel
for the child carries a cost. In addition to an appointed
counsel’s fee, there may be delays while counsel prepares for
the TPR proceedings and interviews the child and any other
parties or witnesses. In some cases, the child may be too
young to express his or her wishes. In other cases, as CYS
notes, an attorney, guided by Pa.R.P.C. 1.7 (Conflicts of
Interest), may determine that he or she ethically cannot
represent multiple children in a family because the children’s
legal interests diverge. However, the language of Section
2318(a) is clear. The General Assembly has made the policy
decision that these are the costs of ensuring that a child is
represented adequately during a contested, involuntary TPR
proceeding. Recognizing the legislative will, and in view of the
risks posed by dual representation with conflicting obligations,
the dependency GAL should not be employed as the child’s
counsel in TPR proceedings.

15. Justice Baer suggests that the dependency GAL, bound by Pa.R.P.C.
1.7, could continue to represent the child in the TPR hearing because
the dependency GAL would be required to seek appointment of counsel
should there be a conflict of interest. Baer, J., dissenting, at 454, 161

A.3d at 188. This essentially would make the GAL the arbiter of the
child’s right to counsel. The right belongs to the child, That child

Here, the trial court denied Mother’s motion to appoint
counsel, citing the inapplicable second sentence of Section
2818(a) and finding that the GAL could represent the chil-
dren’s interests. The court erred in failing to appoint counsel
for the children, It was clear that the GAL was representing
the children’s best interests and not their legal interests, See
N.T., 10/24/2014, at 59 (GAL at closing of first TPR proceed-
ing stating, “So I can’t say that I don’t appreciate [A.D.M.’s]
position [that he wants to return to Mother], But I don’t
believe at this point he understands what’s best for him.”),
Section 2318(a) requires counsel to advocate on behalf of the
children’s legal interests, Counsel was not appointed here,
Therefore, the Superior Court erred in affirming the trial
court.

C. Treatment of Error

Having found that the trial court erred, we must next
determine the effect of that error. The GAL suggests that, if
error, the failure to appoint counsel was harmless. Brief for
GAL at 48-44. CYS concurs, Brief for CYS at 36, Mother does
not address the issue directly. She asserts merely that the
error justifies a new hearing. Brief for Mother at 15.

The most developed treatment of the issue lies in the
amicus curiae brief submitted jointly by the Juvenile Law
Center, the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania,
Community Legal Services, Inc., the National Association of
Counsel for Children, the National Coalition for a Civil Right
to Counsel, and the Pennsylvania Legal Aid Network (herein-
after, collectively, “Juvenile Law Center”). The Juvenile Law
Center notes that, in criminal proceedings, denial of counsel is
deemed a structural error, requiring reversal without the need

generally is not in a position to assert, much less to advocate, the

presence of a conflict of interest. By mandating counsel who represents
the child's legal interest in TPR proceedings, the General Assembly
sought to vindicate and protect the child’s right to counsel. Justice Baer
maintains that “no universal disqualifying impediment exists to prevent

a dependency proceeding GAL Attorney” from switching hats in order

to represent a child’s legal interests at a TPR hearing, But such an

impediment does in fact exist, and we are not authorized to wish it
away, It is Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act.

to demonstrate prejudice. Jd. at 27-28. The Juvenile Law
Center asserts that courts generally have extended other
criminal law protections to TPR cases because of the impor-
tance of the right involved in termination, and maintains that
we should deem the failure to appoint counsel a structural
error. Id. at 28-29, The rationale for structural error’s applica-
bility to criminal cases applies equally to TPR cases, according
to the Juvenile Law Center. To wit, it is impossible to deter-
mine the effect that counsel who was not present would have
had and to attempt to gauge the harmfulness of the failure to
appoint counsel.’® To do so would be an exercise in speculation.
Id. at 30-81. Further, the absence of counsel “calls into
question the very structural integrity of the fact-finding pro-
cess.” Id. at 81-82 (quoting In ve J.M.B., 296 Ga.App. 786, 676
S.H.2d 9, 12 (2009)). For these reasons, the Juvenile Law
Center advocates that a harmless error approach is untenable.

HSA structural error is defined as one that affects “the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply
an error in the trial process itself.” Commonwealth v. Baront,
573 Pa. 589, 827 A.2d 419, 420 (2008) (quoting Arizona v
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 118 L.Ed.2d
802 (1991)). Structural errors are not subject to harmless
error analysis. Jd. Generally, denial of counsel is a structural
error, see Commonwealth v, Martin, 607 Pa. 165, 5 A.8d 177,
192 (2010); although such error usually stems from depriva-
tion of a constitutional right to counsel. Here, by contrast, the
right to counsel is statutory. Nonetheless, we do not find that
distinction to be determinative, The same concerns are evident

16, While he agrees that failure to appoint counsel is a structural error,
Baer, J. dissenting, at 454, 161 A.3d at 188, Justice Baer nonetheless
suggests that remand is unnecessary in this case because “the record
does not support Mother's assertion that a conflict of interest existed
between A.D.M.’s legal and best interests during the second termination
proceeding,” Id, at 455-56, 161 A.3d at 189. We cannot know how the
record was impoverished by the failure of the trial court to comply with
the statute’s requirements that A,D.M. be provided with counsel
charged with representing his legal interests. Counsel representing
A.D.M.’s legal interests may have developed testimony from A.D.M. that.
was less equivocal about his wishes. It is this very speculation that
shows the impossibility of determining post hoc the effect of the failure
to appoint counsel and that compels the conclusion that this failure was
structural error,

regardless of the derivation of the right. Whether the right to
counsel is conferred by constitution or statute, the right
having been conferred must be protected.

Wl In criminal and TPR cases alike, critical rights are at
stake. With respect to the former, the framers of our Constitu-
tions, and the courts interpreting those charters, have deter-
mined that counsel was required to ensure that liberty inter-
ests and process rights are protected. With respect to the
latter, our General Assembly has decided that counsel for the
child is required because of the primacy of children’s welfare,
the fundamental nature of the parent-child relationship and
the permanency of termination. The legislature has codified a
process that affords a full and fair opportunity for all of the
affected parties to be heard and to participate in a TPR
proceeding. The denial of mandated counsel compromises the
framework of the proceedings and constitutes a structural
error. Further, as suggested by the Juvenile Law Center,
harmless error analysis would require speculation after the
fact to evaluate the effect of the lack of appointed counsel,
effectively requiring proof of a negative. For all of these
reasons, we hold that the failure to appoint counsel for a child
involved in a contested, involuntary termination of parental
rights proceeding is a structural error and is not subject to
harmless error analysis.

Because the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel
for the children, and because that error is structural, we
remand for a new TPR proceeding following the appointment
of counsel. To the extent that K.M. does not align with the
majority portion of today’s opinion, that decision was errone-
ous and is overruled. Because of the remand, we need not
reach, and we express no opinion regarding, Mother’s chal-
lenge to the trial court’s finding on the merits that Mother’s
parental rights should be terminated.

Justices Donohue and Dougherty join the opinion.

Chief Justice Saylor joins Part I, Part II(A) and Part II(C)
of the opinion and authors a concurring opinion.

=
Justice Todd joins Part I, Part II(A) and Part II(C) of the

opinion and joins the concurring opinion authored by Chief
Justice Saylor.

Justice Baer files a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Mundy joins.

Justice Mundy files a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Baer joins.

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR, concurring

I join Parts I and II(A) and (C) of the main opinion.
However, I respectfully disagree with the plurality decision, in
Part I1(B), that a guardian ad litem may never serve as
counsel, as I believe such a rigid rule is not required by either
the language of the statute or any other considerations relat-
ing to counsel’s role in legal proceedings.

Although the main opinion indicates that “the language of
Section 2313(a) ... clear[ly]” supports its holding in this
respect, Opinion, at 448, 161 A.8d at 181, in my view, that
provision reflects only that a court must appoint counsel in
termination proceedings; it is silent on who may or may not
serve in that role. A contextual reading of the passage is
similarly not dispositive. The plurality aptly explains that the
statutory scheme evinces the Legislature’s intent to distin-
guish between the respective roles of counsel, whose duty is to
further the child’s legal interests, and a guardian ad litem,
whose obligation is to advance the child’s best interests. It
does not follow, however, that the General Assembly intended
to categorically proscribe a guardian ad litem from serving as
counsel."

In my view, the propriety of permitting the same individual
to serve in both capacities should be determined on a case-by-
1. In this regard, I agree with Justice Mundy that the second sentence of

Section 2313(a), concerning discretionary appointment of a guardian

ad litem, should not be read so as to limit the first sentence, relating to

mandatory appointment of counsel. See Dissenting Opinion, at 457-58,

161 A.3d at 189-90. However, because I find resonance in the view that

the use of the word “counsel” necessarily implies an attorney who is

bound to represent a client’s legal interests, I do not find the Legisla-
ture’s failure to explicitly distinguish between a child’s legal interests

a

case basis, subject: to the familiar and well-settled conflict of
interest analysis. Thus, where zealous representation is made
impossible because of an attorney’s duties as guardian ad
litem—or, for that matter, any other reason—the court must
refrain from making the appointment and should find a suit-
able candidate, Conversely, in the absence of an actual or
potential conflict between a child’s legal and best interests, I
see no reason why a guardian ad litem may not also serve as
counsel, There are multiple scenarios in which a child’s legal
and best interests may be indistinguishable, including, most
notably, cases involving children who are too young to express
their wishes. In such circumstances, mandating the appoint-
ment of separate counsel seems superfluous and potentially
wasteful.”

Here, as the main opinion explains, in permitting the termi-
nation to proceed with the guardian ad litem as the only
attorney representing the children, the trial court understood
the appointment of counsel to be optional, rather than manda-
tory. Accordingly, as it did not recognize the diserete functions
of counsel and guardians ad litem, it could not have conducted
the requisite conflict of interest analysis, As such, I agree with
the characterization of the trial court’s order as a failure to
appoint counsel.

In sum, while I agree that the court must appoint counsel
who will advocate for the child’s legal interests, I find a per se

and best interests to be relevant, let alone dispositive. See Opinion, at
442 n.13, 161 A.3d at 180 n.13,

2, Furthermore, inasmuch as I agree with the main opinion that the
right to counsel in this setting must be as scrupulously protected as the
right to counsel in criminal cases, for purposes of assessing the result-
ing error, I would not distinguish between a court’s failure to appoint
counsel and the appointment of conflicted counsel. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa, 310, 320, 787 A.2d 292, 297-98 (2001);
accord Commonwealth v. King, 618 Pa, 405, 425, 57 A3d 607, 619
(2012) (observing that, in assessing whether the conflict of interest
resulted in a deprivation of the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, “the [United States Supreme] Court’s concern centers
primarily on the potential for an attorney to alter his trial strategy due
to extrinsic considerations stemming from other loyalties, thereby dis-
torting counsel’s strategic or tactical decisions in a manner that would
not occur if counsel's sole loyalty were to the defendant” (citing Wood
v Georgia, 450 U.S, 261, 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103-04 (1981))),

prohibition on permitting a guardian ad litem to serve as
counsel to be overly restrictive.

Justice Todd joins this concurring opinion.

JUSTICE BARR, dissenting

I join Justice Mundy’s dissenting opinion. I write separately
to explain my reasoning and to set forth a recommended
course of action for trial courts.

As has been noted, this case requires our interpretation of
Section 2818(a) of the Adoption Act:

§ 2318. Representation

(a) Child.—The court shall appoint counsel to represent the

child in an involuntary termination proceeding when the

proceeding is being contested by one or both of the parents.

The court may appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to

represent any child who has not reached the age of 18 years

and is subject to any other proceeding under this part
whenever it is in the best interests of the child. No attorney
or law firm shall represent both the child and the adopting
parent or parents.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). I agree with my colleagues that the first
sentence of Section 2313(a) requires a trial court to appoint
counsel to represent the child in a contested termination
proceeding. The question raised by this case, however, is
whether a trial court must appoint a separate attorney as
counsel for the termination proceeding or whether an attorney
then serving as the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) in the
related dependency proceedings (hereinafter, for clarity,
“GAL Attorney”) may continue to serve in a dual capacity
representing both the best interests and the legal interests of
the child, assuming the interests do not conflict.’

Notably, the first sentence of Section 2313(a) is silent as to
whether the appointed counsel may be the same individual
who serves as the GAL Attorney in the dependency proceed-
ings. I agree with Justice Mundy that the second sentence of

1, The representation provisions allowing for a GAL Attorney to serve in
a dual capacity in dependency actions are set forth infra at 450-51, 161
A.3d at 185-86,

Section 2318 does not answer this question as it instead
addresses the child’s representation in “any other proceed-
ings” under the Adoption Act other than a contested termi-
nation proceeding, which is addressed by the first sentence of
the section.

Section 2818(a)’s differentiation of the representation re-
quirements is understandable given the significance to the
child and finality of the termination of parental rights. While
the General Assembly mandates in the first sentence of Sec-
tion 2313(a) that a child be represented by counsel in a
contested termination proceeding, the second sentence of the
provision allows, but does not require, representation by ei-
ther counsel or a GAL (who does not have to be an attorney
under the Adoption Act) in other proceedings such as uncon-
tested adoption proceedings. The fact that a GAL may be
appointed in other proceedings, however, does not address
whether a GAL Attorney may satisfy the requirement that
counsel be appointed for purposes of the first sentence ad-
dressing a contested termination of parental rights proceed-
ing.

While the Adoption Act does not speak to whether a GAL
Attorney can serve as the appointed counsel under Section
2318(a) in contested termination proceedings, Section 6311 of
the Juvenile Act specifically provides for a GAL Attorney to
serve in a dual capacity in dependency proceedings. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6811. For specified categories of dependent children, Section
6811(a) requires that the court “appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the legal interests and the best interests of the
child,” and mandates that “[t]he guardian ad litem must be an
attorney at law.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6811(a).2 Subsection 6311(b)
requires that the GAL Attorney represent “the legal interests

2. In full, Section 631 1(a) provides:
(a) Appointment.—When a proceeding, including a master’s hear-
ing, has been initiated alleging that the child is a dependent child
under paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4) or (10) of the definition of “depen-
dent child’”’ in section 6302 (relating to definitions), the court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the legal interests and the
best interests of the child. The guardian ad litem must be an attorney
at law.
42 PaCS. § 6311(a).

and the best interests of the child at every stage of the
proceedings” and sets forth the duties of the GAL Attorney,
which include traditional responsibilities of legal counsel.

Significantly, Subparagraph 6311(b)(9), in its original form,
imposes on the GAL Attorney the following duty in regard to
the child’s legal interest:

(9) Advise the court of the child’s wishes to the extent that
they can be ascertained and present to the court whatever
evidence exists to support the child’s wishes. When appro-
priate because of the age or mental and emotional condition
of the child, determine to the fullest extent possible the
wishes of the child and communicate this information to the
court. A difference between the child’s wishes under this
paragraph and the recommendations under paragraph (7)
[addressing recommendations for the child’s placement and

3. In relevant part, Section 6311(b) imposes the following duties upon
the GAL Attorney that invoke standard duties of legal counsel:

(b) Powers and duties—The guardian ad litem shall be charged
with representation of the legal interests and the best interests of the
child at every stage of the proceedings and shall do all of the
following:
(1) Meet with the child as soon as possible following appointment
pursuant to section 6337 (relating to right to counsel) and on a
regular basis thereafter in a manner appropriate to the child’s age
and maturity.

Rh
(5) Interview potential witnesses, including the child’s parents, care-
takers and foster parents, examine and cross-examine witnesses and
present witnesses and evidence necessary to protect the best interests
of the child.

eee
(7) Make specific recommendations to the court relating to the
appropriateness and safety of the child’s placement and services
necessary to address the child’s needs and safety.

cers
(9) Advise the court of the child’s wishes to the extent that they can
be ascertained and present to the court whatever evidence exists to
support the child's wishes. When appropriate because of the age or
mental and emotional condition of the child, determine to the fullest
extent possible the wishes of the child and communicate this informa-
tion to the court, A difference between the child’s wishes under this
paragraph and the recommendations under paragraph (7) shall not
be considered a conflict of interest for the guardian ad litem.

42 PaCS, § 6311.

—

necessary services] shall not be considered a conflict of
interest for the guardian ad litem.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6811 (emphasis added).

Notably, this Court suspended the italicized last sentence of
Section 6811(b)(9) countenancing a conflict of interest between
the child’s wishes and the GAL Attorney’s best interest rec-
ommendations pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile
Court Procedure 1800(8). Rule 1800(8) suspended Section
6811(b)(9) to the extent it conflicted with Pa.R.J.C.P, 1151 and
1154, Rule 1151 instructs courts when to appoint a GAL
Attorney and when to appoint counsel, As relevant to this
case, a GAL Attorney should be assigned when a child “is
without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education
as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the
physical, mental or emotional health, or morals,” a classifica-
tion which corresponds to one of the definitions of a dependent
child under the Juvenile Act, Pa.R.J.C.P. 1151(A)(1); 42 Pa.
C.S. § 6802 (“Dependent Child”)(1). In turn, Rule 1154 pro-
vides the duties of a GAL Attorney, which mirror the duties
established by Section 6311 of the Juvenile Act, absent the
suspended last sentence of subparagraph 9, addressing poten-
tial conflicts of interest for the GAL Attorney.

In place of the final sentence, the comment to Rule 1154
provides, “If there is a conflict of interest between the duties
of the guardian ad litem pursuant to paragraphs (7) and (9),
the guardian ad litem for the child may move the court for
appointment as legal counsel and assignment of a separate

4. Rule 1800(3) provides as follows:

(3) The Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, 42 Pa.C.S,
§ 6311(6)(9), which provide that there is not a conflict of interest for
the guardian ad litem in communicating the child’s wishes and the
recommendation relating to the appropriateness and safety of the
child’s placement and services necessary to address the child's needs
and safety, is suspended only insofar as the Act is inconsistent with
Rules 1151 and 1154, which allows for appointment of separate legal
counsel and a guardian ad litem when the guardian ad litem deter-
mines there is a conflict of interest between the child’s legal interest
and best interest.

Pa.RJC.P, 1800(3).

Pe *
guardian ad litem ....” Pa.RwJ.C.P. 1154, emt It further
explains that “If there is not a conflict of interest, the guard-
ian ad litem represents the legal interests and best interests
of the child at every stage of the proceedings. 42 Pa.C.S,
§ 6311(b).” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154, emt. Thus, in dependency pro-
ceedings under the Juvenile Act, a GAL Attorney represents
both the best interests and legal interests of the child absent a
conflict of interest. If there is a conflict of interest, the child
must have a GAL representing her best interests and separate
legal counsel representing legal interests, This provision is
consistent with Pennsylvania’s Rules of Professional Conduct
which forbid an attorney from representing a client “if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” Pa.
R.P.C. 1,7(a) (entitled “Conflicts of Interest: Current
Clients”),

I see no obstacle to this system of representation being
applied for purposes of a child’s representation in contested
termination proceedings under the first sentence of Section
2818(a) of the Adoption Act. Indeed, as contested termination
proceedings generally arise from dependency proceedings, I
conclude that the statutory representation provisions for chil-
dren subject to both proceedings should be read in pari
materia. 1 Pa.C.S, § 1982 (providing that statutes that “relate
to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons

5. The comment to Rule 1154 provides in relevant part as follows:

Comment: If there is a conflict of interest between the duties of the
guardian ad litem pursuant to paragraphs (7) and (9), the guardian ad
litem for the child may move the court for appointment as legal
counsel and assignment of a separate guardian ad litem when, for
example, the information that the guardian ad litem possesses gives
rise to the conflict and can be used to the detriment of the child. If
there is not a conflict of interest, the guardian ad litem represents the
legal interests and best interests of the child at every stage of the
proceedings. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311(b). To the extent 42 Pa.C.s,
§ 6311(b)(9) is inconsistent with this rule, it is suspended, See Rules
1151 and 1800. See also Pa.R.P.C. 1.7 and 1.8,

“Legal interests” denotes that an attorney is to express the child’s
wishes to the court regardless of whether the attorney agrees with the
child’s recommendation. “Best interests” denotes that a guardian ad
litem is to express what the guardian ad litem believes is best for the
child’s care, protection, safety, and wholesome physical and mental
development regardless of whether the child agrees.

Pa.RJ.C.P. 1154, cmt.

or things” “shall be construed together, if possible, as one
statute”).

Indeed, reading the representation provisions consistently
allows the child to have continuity of representation between
the dependency and termination proceedings.’ As in the de-
pendency proceedings, if a conflict of interest exists between
the child’s best and legal interests, the GAL Attorney, who is
subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, must move for
the appointment of a separate individual to allow separate
representation of the best interests and legal interests, See
Pa.R.P.C. 1.7. As I conclude that no universal disqualifying
impediment exists to prevent a dependency proceeding GAL
Attorney from continuing to represent the child’s legal and
best interests in a termination proceeding, I concur with
Justice Mundy in holding that the trial court did not err in
refusing to appoint a new individual as counsel.

Nevertheless, I am troubled that an affirmance of the trial
court’s denial of the motion to appoint counsel could be
misconstrued as not requiring the appointment of counsel in
contested termination proceedings. Indeed, I agree that lack
of counsel for the child would result in a structural error in a
termination proceeding. As such, it would be a better practice
for courts in every contested termination proceeding to place
an order on the record formalizing the appointment of counsel
to highlight for all parties the responsibility for the represen-
tation of the child’s legal interests, while simultaneously per-
mitting that attorney to serve as the child’s GAL so long as
there is no conflict of interest between the child’s legal and
best interests.

6. The plurality opinion suggests that confusion could result if the GAL
Attorney from the dependency proceedings was appointed to advocate
for the child’s legal interests in the termination proceedings. Plurality
Op. at 442-43, 161 A.3d at 181, Respectfully, I fail to see how confusion
would result given that the GAL Attorney has been representing both
the legal interests and the best interests of the child throughout the
dependency proceedings. Rather than confusion, allowing the status
quo representation to continue would provide continuity for the child,
especially because the dependency proceedings, as noted by the plurali-
ty opinion, may overlap with the termination proceedings. If a conflict
of interest exists, the GAL Attorney would be obligated to seek appoint-
ment of a separate individual as occurs under the dependency proce-
dures.

—  «

As applied to this case, it would have been preferable for
the trial court to have formally appointed the GAL as the
child’s counsel for the termination proceedings and cited the
first (as opposed to second) sentence of Section 2818(a). I
refuse, however, to promote form over substance and deny
permanency to A.D.M. based upon the trial court’s technically
improper order denying the appointment of counsel. Instead, I
conclude that the trial court was correct in denying Mother's
motion because Mother sought not the appointment of counsel
generally, but instead requested the appointment of “indepen-
dent counsel.” Motion to Appoint Counsel for the Child
[A.D.M.]. As I have stated above, Section 2818(a), in my view,
does not mandate the appointment of counsel distinct from the
GAL Attorney serving in the same dual capacity in the
dependency proceedings, absent a conflict of interest between
the child’s best interests and legal interests.

Moreover, the record does not support Mother's assertion
that a conflict of interest existed between A.D.M.’s legal and
best interests during the second termination proceeding,
which would have required the GAL to move for the appoint-
ment of separate counsel. A conflict of interest may have
existed during the first termination proceeding in 2014 when
the GAL recommended that termination was in A.D.M.’s best
interest in contrast to A.D.M.’s articulated desire to be reu-
nited with Mother. However, by the time of the second
termination proceeding, A.D.M. expressed a desire to live with
his foster parents. He first noted that it was “a really hard
decision because they both care about me. But my mom
doesn’t act like it.” N.T., 9/15/2015, at 10, He then stated that
he would “probably go with” his foster parents because he felt
“ike [his] mom’s not safe because she could probably do drugs
again,” which he recognized would result in yet another re-
moval of him and his younger brother, Id, at 11. In contrast he
noted that living with his foster parents “would be pretty good
because they're a good family and they take good care of me.”
Id, at 17. He also clearly expressed his desire for permanency,
noting that he had been “in foster care for a really long time
[and had] been switching around with foster families a lot.” Id.

|
Understandably, he hoped that if he was placed with his foster
parents that his mom’s “family could connect with the [foster
family], the whole entire family.” ’ Id, at 18. Thus, I agree with
the trial court that A.D.M.’s legal interests were consistent
with the GAL’s view of his best interests during the relevant
second termination proceeding.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the remand and
would affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights.

Justice Mundy joins this dissenting opinion,

JUSTICE MUNDY, dissenting

I agree with the main opinion’s conclusion that pursuant to
28 PaCS. § 2818(a), appointment of counsel is mandatory for
children involved in contested involuntary termination of pa-
rental rights proceedings. However, because I believe an
attorney guardian ad litem (GAL) appointed to represent a
child in these proceedings satisfies Section 2818(a)’s mandate,
T dissent,

As the main opinion states, this case presents an issue of
statutory interpretation and is governed by the relevant legal
standards set forth in the main opinion. Opinion, at 439-40,
161 A.3d at 178-80. Further, it is undisputed that the manda-
tory language of the first sentence of Section 2818(a) requires
appointment of counsel in contested involuntary termination
proceedings.

§ 2313. Representation
(a) Child.—The court shall appoint counsel to represent
the child in an involuntary termination proceeding when
the proceeding is being contested by one or both of the
parents. The court may appoint counsel or a guardian ad
litem to represent any child who has not reached the age of
18 years and is subject to any other proceeding under this
part whenever it is in the best interests of the child. No

7. Likewise, he expressed a wish to maintain contact with his foster
family if placed with his mother.

attorney or law firm shall represent both the child and the

adopting parent or parents.

28 Pa.C.8. § 2818(a) (emphasis added).

In my view, the first and second sentences of Section
2318(a) address two entirely different situations. As the text of
the statute states, the second sentence of Section 2313(a)
provides that the court may appoint counsel or a GAL in “any
other proceeding” under “this part,” this part meaning, the
Adoption Act, 28 Pa,C.S. §§ 2101-2938, The Adoption Act
encompasses voluntary relinquishment proceedings, involun-
tary termination proceedings—contested and uncontested, as
well as adoption proceedings. Thus, Section 2318(a) governs
representation under all Adoption Act proceedings, and the
second sentence of Section 2313(a) has no effect on the mean-
ing of the first sentence, stating counsel shall be appointed to
represent a child in a contested involuntary termination pro-
ceeding,

The main opinion notes that the “trial court chose simply to
skip over the first sentence of Section 2818(a) (which man-
dates counsel in contested [termination of parental rights]
cases) in favor of that provision’s second sentence which ‘gives
this Court the discretion to appoint counsel or a GAL to
represent any child who has not reached 18 years and is
subject to any other proceeding under this part whenever it is
in the best interests of the child.’ ” Opinion, at 485, 161 A.8d at
176, quoting Trial Court Order, 9/9/15. Conflating the two
sentences, the trial court relied on the second sentence of
Section 2813(a) in support of its appointment of the GAL
attorney. Nevertheless, as the trial court noted in denying
Mother's motion for appointment of new counsel, the children
had an established relationship with the GAL attorney, and
her continued representation would best suit the needs of the
children, Id, In light of the statutory interpretation discussion
above, I fail to see how this contested involuntary termination
proceeding is “any other proceeding,” or how the GAL attor-
ney appointed to represent the children is not “mandated
counsel” in accordance with the first sentence. Thus, the trial
court’s continued appointment of the GAL attorney from the
dependency case satisfied Section 2318(a)’s mandate.

“s Pe

I believe that the main opinion is mistakenly reading the
first and second sentences in conjunction with each other,
which has the effect of changing the meaning of the first
sentence. The General Assembly chose in the second sentence
to say “counsel or a [GAL],” noting in the comment that the
GAL need not be an attorney. Thus, in all “other proceedings”
under the Adoption Act, the General Assembly contemplated
the possibility that a child might not be represented by
counsel at all. Contrary to the main opinion’s suggestion, the
inclusion of an option to solely appoint a non-attorney GAL in
other proceedings does not necessarily render the appoint-
ment of a GAL attorney a violation of the Section 2318(a)’s
appointment of counsel clause. Our review in this case is
limited to whether appointment of a GAL attorney satisfies
Section 2818(a)’s mandate that counsel be appointed in con-
tested involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings.
I conelude it does.

I also am troubled by the plurality’s conclusion that “the
plain language of Section 2318(a) requires the trial court to
appoint a separate, independent attorney to represent a child’s
legal interests in a [termination of parental rights] case.”
Opinion, at 481-82, 161 A.3d at 174~75 (emphasis added), The
main opinion adopts the position that Section 2313(a) specified
that appointed counsel would solely be representing the child’s
legal interests, and not best interests, without citation to
where the term “legal” was added to Section 2318(a). I do not
disagree with the main opinion’s citation to Pennsylvania
Rules of Juvenile Court regarding the role of a GAL attorney
in dependency hearings, or the distinct legal and best interests
which they must represent. See Opinion, at 433, 161 A.3d at
1%5, citing Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154. However, even in the dependency
context, Rule 1154 specifically anticipates the potential for a
conflict between a child’s wishes—the child’s legal interest,
and a child’s best interests, and that in such a case separate
legal counsel in addition to the GAL attorney may be appoint-
ed. Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154 emt.! This does not necessitate that a
1, The comment to Rule 1154 notes “[iJf there is not a conflict of

interest, the guardian ad litem represents the legal and best interests of
the child[.]” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154 cmt.

GAL attorney can only advocate a child’s best interest, or that
the General Assembly intended to preclude a GAL attorney
from representing a child under Section 2318. Nor does it
mandate two attorneys must be appointed in the absence of a
conflict of interest on the part of the GAL attorney. The
statute as drafted solely provides that “the court shall appoint
counsel.” 23 Pa.C.S. 2818(a). The appointment of a GAL
attorney certainly satisfies this requirement.

Further, as the main opinion concedes, Section 2318(a) is
the only requirement the General Assembly imposed, and “no
other statutory provision speaks to the appointment of counsel
or a GAL in an involuntary termination of parental rights
proceeding.” Opinion, at 488, 161 A.8d at 175. The main
opinion correctly notes that in custody cases when counsel is
appointed, counsel “shall represent the child’s legal interests
and zealously represent the child as any other client in an
attorney-client relationship[, and] ... shall not perform the
role of guardian ad litem or best interests attorney.” Pa.
R.C.P, 1915.11(a). And that on the contrary, in dependency
cases, a GAL attorney “shall be charged with representation
of the legal interests and the best interests of the child at
every stage of the proceedings.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6811(b). The
first sentence of Section 2318(a) does not differentiate between
representing the child’s best interests or legal interests in
mandating the appointment of counsel in contested termi-
nation of parental rights cases.” It is not the duty or role of
this Court to inject such differentiation into Section 2813(a)
that is not derived from the statutory language.

In support of its position that a Section 2318(a) attorney
should only represent the child’s legal interests, the main
opinion quotes In ve Adoption of Hess, 562 A.2d 1875 (Pa.
Super. 1989) for the proposition that “[t]he purpose of 2318(a)
is to ensure that the needs and welfare of a child will be
actively advanced by an advocate who owes loyalty only to the

2. I maintain the second sentence does not pertain to contested involun-
tary termination of parental rights proceedings.

child.” Opinion, at 441 n.12, 161 A.8d at 180 n.12, quoting id. at
1881 (emphasis in original). The next sentence of Hess, howev-
er, makes clear that although the court’s intent was to appoint
counsel that owed a loyalty to the child, it did not intend to
limit counsel to advocate solely for the child’s legal interests.
Indeed, the court was very much concerned with the child’s
best interests and stated:

Where, as in the present case, there are competing allega-
tions of the best interests of the child, and where the court,
without conducting a hearing by which it could receive
evidence so that it could make a fully informed determina-
tion of the BEST interests of the child, summarily dispenses
with one of the competing allegations of the child’s best
interests, and where no counsel has been appointed to
represent ewclusively the child’s interests, we cannot con-
clude that the BEST interests of the child have necessarily
been advocated and determined.

Hess, 562 A.2d at 1881 (emphasis in original).

The main opinion also disapproves of the Superior Court's
reliance on In ve K.M., 58 A.3d 781 (Pa. Super, 2012), overrul-
ing the pertinent holding in that case, Therein, the Superior
Court concluded the language of Section 2318(a) was not clear
and unambiguous as applied to circumstances where the GAL
was an appointed attorney. Opinion, at 437, 161 A.3d at 177-
78, Like the main opinion in this case, the K.M. court also
focused on the meaning of the second sentence of the statute
in relation to the first sentence, but nevertheless concluded
that the statute did not preclude a GAL attorney from serving
as legal counsel for the children. Upon reflection, I believe
K.M’s focus on the second sentence was unnecessary. Ulti-
mately, however, the outcome of K.M. was correct as the
appointment of a second attorney when the child was repre-
sented by a GAL attorney would be superfluous.

Based on my conclusions regarding the statutory interpreta-
tion of Section 2818, it is unnecessary to further elaborate on

the ability of a GAL attorney to represent a child in a
contested termination of parental rights matter. Nevertheless,
there are two points I wish to make. First, as noted, the
appointment of additional counsel following the appointment of
a GAL attorney is superfluous. In this matter the GAL
attorney represented the children’s interests throughout de-
pendency proceedings. Under the main opinion’s interpreta-
tion, in addition to the GAL attorney, it would have been
necessary to appoint an attorney for the first termination
hearing when CYS petitioned to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights of both Mother and Father. At that hearing,
Father’s rights were involuntarily terminated, but Mother's
rights were not. Once the petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother's rights was denied, the Section 2813(a) appointed
legal counsel would no longer be involved in the matter, and
the GAL attorney would resume her sole advocacy on behalf
of the children during the permanency proceedings. At the
commencement of the second termination hearing, it would
again be necessary to appoint Section 2313 legal counsel,
possibly the same attorney that represented the children at
the first termination hearing, perhaps a new attorney. This
legal counsel would represent the children alongside the GAL
attorney throughout the termination hearing. It is my view
such dual representation is both unnecessary and taxing to the
system, and undermines continuity of representation for the
children.

Second, the only concern articulated by the plurality regard-
ing the appointment of a GAL attorney appears to be a
conflict of interest between advocating the child’s best inter-
ests and legal interests simultaneously, Opinion, at 442-43, 161
A8d at 181. As previously noted, the GAL attorney must do
this in the dependency actions, and Rule 1154 provides a
procedure for appointing separate legal counsel from the GAL
attorney if a conflict of interest between the child’s wishes and
best interests arise. I see no basis for concluding that a GAL
attorney would be incapable of being held to the same stan-
dard in contested involuntary termination of parental rights

cases. Further, in cases involving young children or children
with limited capacity, the child may be unable to express a
separate legal interest to an independent attorney appointed
in addition to the GAL attorney, but would nevertheless be
required to have one appointed under the plurality’s interpre-
tation. Therefore, I disagree with the plurality’s holding that
the GAL attorney cannot represent the child in a contested
termination hearing.

In conclusion, by writing separately I am in no way dis-
counting the importance of the child’s interests or diminishing
the mandate of Section 2818(a)’s requirement of appointment
of counsel. A contested involuntary termination hearing is a
proceeding with the highest level of finality, and no child
should proceed into one absent representation by an attorney.
I write separately because I believe appointment of a GAL
attorney satisfies the mandates of Section 2318(a) and ensures
the needs and welfare of the child will be adequately ad-
vanced. In my opinion, a remand for the appointment of a
second attorney in this matter, when a GAL attorney already
represented the children in accordance with Section 2313(a), is
unnecessary. Accordingly, I dissent.

Justice Baer joins this dissenting opinion.

es
161 A.3d 193

ASSOCIATION OF PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE
AND UNIVERSITY FACULTIES, Appellant

v

PENNSYLVANIA STATE SYSTEM OF HIGHER
EDUCATION; Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Appellee

Association of Pennsylvania State College
and University Faculties, Appellee
ve

Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education;
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant

No. 10 MAP 2016
No. 78 MAP 2015

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

ARGUED: November 2, 2016
DECIDED: April 26, 2017

James L, Cowden, Esq., Jennifer Anne Nachamkin Esq.,

Strokoff & Cowden, P.C., for Association of Pennsylvania
State College and University Faculties.

Julie Ann Aquino, Esq., Brian P. Gabriel, Esq., Campbell
Durrant Beatty Palombo & Miller, P.C., Michael Scott Fergu-
son, Esq., Andrew Charles Lehman, Esq., Pennsylvania State
System of Higher Education (PASSHE), for Pennsylvania
State System of Higher Education and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania,

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2017, the order of the
Commonwealth Court dated January 18, 2016, amending its
order dated September 17, 2015, is affirmed.

161 A8d 193
Lonnie D. HAGGERTY, Appellant
ve

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee

No. 15 WAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 26, 2017

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2017, the order of the
Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.

160 A.3d 194
Craig SAUNDERS, Appellant.
v.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, State Correctional
Institution at Rockview, Appellees

No, 34 EAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
April 26, 2017

Craig Saunders, pro se.

Theron Richard Perez, Maria Gerarda Macus, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, 1920 Technology Parkway, Me-
chanicsburg, PA 17050, for Appellees.

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26" day of April, 2017, the Order of the
Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED,

160 A.8d 194
Mary J.B. EIDELMAN, Esquire, Appellant
v

TIMONEY KNOX, LLP, Richard L. Caplan, Esq., The Law
Offices of Todd Mosser, PLLC, Todd Mosser, Esq. IN,
and Paul Abeln, Appellees

No. 68 MAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
DECIDED: May 22, 2017

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22" day of May, 2017, the order of the
Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas dated May 31, 2016 is
REVERSED based on our decision in Villani v. Seibert, 639
Pa, 58, 159 A.8d 478 (2017), and the matter is REMANDED
for further proceedings.

The Motion to Quash is DENIED.

160 A.3d 194
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant
ve
Joey Wayne HERMAN, Appellee
No. 74 MAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: December 7, 2016
Decided: May 25, 2017

&
~~

gS
—

~~

be
ee
ee
Thomas L, Kearney III, Esq., James Edward Zamkotowicz,

Esq., York County District Attorney’s Office, for Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant.

Brian Vincent Manchester, Esq., Manchester & Associates,
for Joey Wayne Herman, Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

This is a direct appeal by the Commonwealth in a case
involving Appellee’s alleged possession and delivery of a chem-
ical compound claimed to be either a controlled substance or a
designer drug. A central issue is whether the portions of the
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act under
which Appellee was charged—relating to “analogues” of
scheduled controlled substances, as well as “substantially simi-
lar” designer drugs—are unconstitutionally vague.

I. Background

At all relevant times, Appellee owned and operated a smoke
shop in York County. On April 17, May 30, and July 11, 2018,
undercover police officers entered the shop and purchased
small packets of substances having brand names such as

—

“Winter Haze” and “V-8 Air Freshener.” Laboratory testing
performed for the Commonwealth by Michael Coyer, PhD—a
forensic toxicologist and the Commonwealth’s eventual expert
witness—revealed that these products contained the chemical
PB-22, which the prosecution alleged to be either a controlled
substance as an “analogue” of the known synthetic cannabi-
noid JWH-018,! or a designer drug. On July 15, 2018, the
police executed search warrants at Appellee’s residence and
business, At each location they seized additional packets of
substances containing PB-22, Appellee was charged, under
the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (the
“Act”)? with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance,
one count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance, and one count of possession, or possession with
intent to distribute, a designer drug. See 35 P.S. § 780-
118(a)(80), (86).

Before describing the procedural history, it is helpful to
review the legislation, including a material revision made in
early July 2018, between the second and third undercover
purchases. See Act of July 2, 2018, P.L. 242, No, 40 (“Act 40”).
In relevant part, the Act defines a controlled substance as a

1, Synthetic cannabinoids are artificial compounds that mimic the ef-
fects of natural cannabinoids found in marijuana by interacting with
the body’s cannabinoid receptors, denominated as “CB1” and “CB2.”
See generally United States v. Hossain, 2016 WL 70583, “1 (S.D. Fla.
Jan, 5, 2016) (sentencing order) (discussing the operation of synthetic
cannabinoids in the human body). Information in the record suggesis
that the CB1 receptor is responsible for the body's psychoactive re-
sponse, whereas the CB2 receptor “is associated with the immune
system and is responsible for some of the proposed therapeutic qualities
of cannabinoids.” Report of Mark S, Erickson, PhD, at 1.

2, Act of Apr. 14, 1972, P.L, 233, No. 64 (as amended 35 P.S. §§ 80-101
to 780-144),
3. Those provisions state:

(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Common-
wealth are hereby prohibited:
em
(30) ... the .., delivery, or possession with intent to ... deliver, a
controlled substance ....
ee
(36) The knowing or intentional ... possession with intent to
distribute, or possession of a designer drug, ...
35 PS. § 780-113(a)(30), (36).

= °

substance listed in Schedules I through V of the Act. See 35
PS. § 780-102.4 These are known as “scheduled” drugs. See,
eg., 40 PS. § 908-1. It defines designer drug as “a substance
other than a controlled substance that is intended for human
consumption and that either has a chemical structure substan-
tially similar to that of a controlled substance in Schedules I,
Ti or III ,.. or that produces an effect substantially similar to
that of a controlled substance in Schedules I, II or III.” 85
PS. § 780-102.° The schedules are set forth in the Act, see 35
P.S. § 780-104, although only Schedule I is relevant to this
dispute.®

Act 40 amended the description of Schedule I. In both the
pre- and post-amendment timeframes, Schedule I included
JWH-018 by name as a synthetic cannabinoid. See 35 P.S.
§ 780-104(1)(vii)(4) (2011); id. § 780-104(1)(vii)(2)(B) (2018).
In the pre-amendment version, Schedule I encompassed all
“analogues” of the named synthetic cannabinoids. See 85 P.S.
§ 780-104(1)(vii) (2011) (subsuming within Schedule I “[slyn-
thetic cannabinoids or any material, compound, mixture or
preparation which contains ... the following substances, in-
cluding their analogues ...: ... (4) JWH-018”). With the Act,
40 revisions, Schedule I now encompasses compounds which
4. The Secretary of Health has authority to add compounds to the

schedules via regulation. See 35 P.S. § 780-103. The schedules as thus

augmented are set forth in the administrative code, See 25 Pa. Code

§ 25.72. The parties do not suggest that any administrative additions to
Schedule I are relevant to this case.

5. The Commonwealth clarified at the preliminary hearing that, because
controlled substances and designer drugs are mutually exclusive catego-
ries, its decision to lodge a designer-drug count against Appellee consti-
tuted a “fallback position” in the event PB-22 was found not to be a
controlled substance, N.T., Apr. 14, 2014, at 50,

6. The analogue and/or designer drug provisions in the Act appear to be
a legislative response to underground laboratories which “have become
adept at tinkering with the molecular structure of scheduled controlled
substances while retaining the effects that those substances produce,”
United States v. Carlson, 2013 WL 5125434, at *27 (D. Minn. Sept. 12,
2013) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted); accord
Zunny Losoya, Comment, Synthetic Drugs—Emergence, Legislation, and
the Criminal and Legal Aftermath of Broad Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV,
401, 403 (2013) (noting that synthetic drugs arise when chemists
“slightly alter ... existing banned drugs to evade the law and sell
abusable drugs” (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)).

are synthetic cannabinoids falling into thirteen specified
“chemical designations,” as well as analogues of those com-
pounds. Thus, Schedule I now includes:

Synthetic cannabinoids, including any material, compound,
mixture or preparation that is not listed as a controlled
substance in Schedules I, II, III, IV and V, ... which
contains any quantity of the following substances [or] their

. analogues, ... whenever the existence of these ...
analogues ... i[s] possible within the specific chemical
designation ...

85 P.S. § 780-104(1)(vii) (2018) (emphasis added).” Only the
second specified chemical designation is potentially relevant to
this matter:

2. Naphthoylindoles or any compound containing a 3-(-I-
naphthoyl) indole structure with substitution at the nitrogen
atom of the indole ring whether or not further substituted in
the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted
in the naphthyl ring to any extent. This shall include the
following: ... (B) JWH-018....

Id. § 780-104(1)(vii)(2)(B) (2013). Notably, the Act has never
provided a definition of “analogue” or, for the designer-drug
provision, “substantially similar.”

7. The text states “if possible” rather than “is possible.” This is clearly a
typographical error: “if possible” does not make grammatical sense,
and all other subsections use the phrase “‘is possible,” see, eg., id.
§ 780-104(1)(i), as do counterpart statutes in other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 812; Ky. Rev. Star. § 218A.050.

8, There is a fourteenth, “catchall,” classification defined as “[aJny other
synthetic chemical compound that is a cannabinoid receptor type 1 [ie.,
CB1] agonist as demonstrated by binding studies and functional assays
s+. Id. § 780-104(1)(vii)(14). Appellee maintained before the county
court that the word “analogues” in Section 780-104(1)(vii) did not
apply to the catchall category in light of the qualifier, “within the
specific chemical designation.” We will assume that is true for decision-
al purposes, as the Commonwealth does not presently argue that the
catchall category is implicated. To the contrary, it concedes that no
studies on the effects of PB-22 have been undertaken, see Brief for
Appellant at 10, and hence, PB-22 has not been shown to be a CBI
agonist—i.e., that it binds to the body's CB1 receptor and triggers a
response.

Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion which included a
request for habeas corpus relief. See Commonwealth v. Hock,
556 Pa. 409, 414-15 & n.2, 728 A.2d 943, 945 & n.2 (1999)
(noting that a pre-trial habeas petition tests whether the
Commonwealth’s evidence is sufficient to make out a prima
facie case of guilt). Appellee made several discreet assertions
in support of his habeas request.

First, he argued that both controlled-substance charges
relating to dates after July 2, 20183—i.e., the third delivery
count and the possession count—should be dismissed because
PB-22 is not a controlled substance under the revised Sched-
ule I. Appellee reasoned that JWH-018 is a naphthoylindole,
whereas PB-22 is an ester.’ As the two compounds fall into
different structural classes, Appellee maintained, PB-22 could
not be an analogue of JWH-018 for purposes of the amended
Section 780-104(1)(vii), given that that version expressly clas-
sifies prohibited synthetic cannabinoids by “specific chemical
designation.” 85 P.S. § 780-104(1)(vii) (2018). In this regard,

Appellee proffered that the statutory phrase, “within the
specific chemical designation,” id., should be understood to
mean that the purported analogue must fall into the same
structural classification. See Omnibus Pretrial Motion at 2-3.
Notably, Appellee did not challenge the constitutional validity
of the analogue provision in the revised statute.

Appellee also advanced that the sole designer-drug charge
should be dismissed for two reasons. First, he argued that the
Commonwealth failed to offer any evidence that PB-22 has a
chemical structure which is substantially similar to that of
JWH-018, and that the Commonwealth’s own evidence, includ-
ing Dr. Coyer’s lab reports, indicated that the physiological

9. Both chemical types have common components, but PB-22 has an
“oxygen bridge” (an extra oxygen atom bridging two of the main
components), and two extra nitrogen atoms, which gives it different
properties. See N.T., Nov. 7, 2014, at 22-26 (reflecting Dr. Coyer’s
description of the molecular structures of JWH-018 and PB-22), See
generally United States v. Johnson, 2014 WL 7330936, at *5 (D, Nev.
Dec. 19, 2014), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at app. 51a (showing
two-dimensional diagrams of PB-22 and JWH-018). The parties’ ex-
perts agreed that the chemicals are in different structural classes. See
N.T., Nov. 7, 2014, at 47, 61.

and toxicological properties of PB-22 are unknown—thus ne-
gating any claim that its effects are substantially similar to
those of JWH-018, See Omnibus Pretrial Motion at 5. Alterna-
tively, Appellee argued that the term “substantially similar”
was void for vagueness as applied to the two compounds in
question. See id.

HM Finally, Appellee argued that, in the relevant scienti-
fie field, there is no consensus as to the definition of an
“analogue” of a chemical compound, nor is there a generally-
accepted methodology for determining whether one molecule
is an analogue of another. As applied to this case, Appellee
reasoned that, if scientists cannot agree on whether PB-22 is
an analogue of JWH-018, the average citizen could not be on
notice of such a relationship between the two chemicals and,
therefore, that PB-22 is an illegal drug. That being the case,
Appellee continued, it would offend due process, under the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, for the Commonwealth to prose-
cute him under subsection 780-113(a)(80) for delivering PB-22
as an alleged controlled substance in the pre-July 2, 2018,
timeframe. See id. at 3-4."

10, Appellee also sought a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), to test whether the method used by the
Commonwealth's expert to conclude PB-22 is an analogue of, and has a
substantially-similar chemical structure to, JWH-018, is generally ac-
cepted in the relevant scientific field. Although the hearing on the
habeas motion delved into those questions, it was not a Frye hearing, as
it did not pertain to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence, The
issue before the court was whether the provisions of the Act under
which Appellee was charged were inapplicable under the circumstances
or unconstitutionally vague as applied, Further, the court never made a
preliminary finding that the science involved was novel. See N.T., Nov.
7, 2014, at 45, See generally Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240, 253,
951 A.2d 267, 275 (2008) (observing that Frye only applies to “proffered
expert testimony involving novel science” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)),

This is not entirely a formal distinction. The proponent of novel
scientific evidence has the burden of establishing all prerequisites to
admission, including conformance with Frye, see Grady v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 576 Pa. 546, 558, 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (2003), whereas the party
advancing a constitutional challenge to a statute bears the burden of
demonstrating a constitutional violation. See Clifton v. Allegheny
Cnty., 600 Pa, 662, 702, 969 A.2d 1197, 1221 (2009). Overall, howev-
er, the Commonwealth shoulders the burden to show evidentiary

To summarize, then, Appellee made three essential conten-
tions: (1) that Section 780-104(1)(vii) was vague as applied to
PB-22 before July 2, 2013; (2) that PB-22 was not a prohibit-
ed substance under Section 780-104(1)(vii) after July 2, 2018;
and (8) that the designer-drug provision, Section 780-
113(a)(86), could not validly be applied to PB-22. Because
subsection (a)(86) predicates culpability in the disjunctive on a
substantially similar effect or chemical structure, this latter
argument had two subparts: (a) since PB-22’s effects were
unknown, they could not possibly be proved to be substantially
similar to those of JWH-018; and (b) either the Common-
wealth did not satisfy its burden to demonstrate that PB-22
and JWH-018 shared a substantially similar chemical struc-
ture, or the term “substantially similar” was vague as applied
to the structures of those two chemicals.

The common pleas court held a hearing on the habeas
motion at which Dr. Coyer testified as an expert for the
Commonwealth and two expert witnesses testified on behalf of
Appellee. Dr. Coyer opined, to a reasonable degree of scienti-
fic certainty, that PB-22 is an analogue of JWH-018. See N.T.,
Nov. 7, 2014, at 85. He conceded, however, that there was no
definition of “analogue” in the relevant scientific field, but that
he considered the term to mean a compound which “has a
similar structure but may possess different properties.” Id. at
86. In terms of methodology, Dr. Coyer indicated that he used
a four-part process to arrive at this type of expert opinion: he
visually compared two-dimensional diagrams of the molecules
in question; he compared their potency or function; he re-
viewed his colleagues’ unpublished reports, anecdotal evidence,
and peer-reviewed articles, if any; and he drew upon his
experience conducting chemical analyses in his capacity as a
forensic toxicologist. See id. at 40-42. However, Dr. Coyer was
unable to identify any peer-reviewed articles suggesting that
his methodology was a generally-accepted means for deter-
mining whether one compound is an analogue of another,

sufficiency for purposes of a pre-trial habeas motion, See Common-

wealth v. Prosdocimo, 331 Pa.Super. 51, 52, 479 A.2d 1073, 1074
(1984),

Finally, he clarified that his method did not employ a compari-
son of three-dimensional molecular illustrations. See id. at 51.

Appellee’s first expert witness was John W. Huffman, PhD,
an organic chemist and professor emeritus at Clemson Univer-
sity who had been active in the cannabinoid field for decades.
Dr. Huffman, for whom JWH-018 is named, created the
compound when conducting federally-funded research into
how such chemicals interact with the body's cannabinoid re-
ceptors. He agreed with Dr. Coyer that there was no scientific
definition of “analogue” and that PB-22 and JWH-018 were in
different structural classes. See id. at 61, 81-82. Therefore, Dr.
Huffman opined that the two compounds were not analogues
and did not have similar structures. See id. at 90-91. Referring
to a peer-reviewed scientific paper, Dr. Huffman also noted,
consistent with Dr. Coyer’s lab reports, that scientists had no
knowledge of PB-22’s pharmacological or toxicological effects,
or of whether the two chemicals have similar effects. That
being the case, he continued, there was no agreement in the
scientific community on whether PB-22 could properly be
classified as a synthetic cannabinoid, see id, at 83-84, notwith-
standing that one team of chemists had labeled it as such “a
few years ago.” Id. at 84. Dr. Huffman stated that he had
never heard of anyone else using Dr. Coyer’s four-part tech-
nique for discerning whether one molecule is an analogue of
another. He testified that such methodology was not generally
accepted in the scientific field, particularly as three-dimension-
al modeling, not two-dimensional diagraming, was the accept-
ed standard for comparative analysis of molecular structures.
See id. at 76-77, 81-82.

Appellee also presented the expert testimony of Heather
Harris, PhD, a forensic analytical chemist and chair of the
Structure Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for the
Evaluation of Controlled Substance Analogues (“ACECSA”), a
national scientific body. Dr. Harris explained that the mission
of ACECSA—which also includes members of law enforce-
ment agencies—is to develop methods for forensic chemists to
use in discerning whether one chemical is an analogue of
another. She testified that ACECSA had not yet developed

such a methodology. See id. at 96, Dr. Harris also discussed an
entity funded by the federal Drug Enforcement Agency called
the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs
(“SWGDRUG”), which publishes recommendations for chem-
ists involved in testing controlled substances. She noted
SWGDRUG includes an analogue subcommittee which had as
yet been unable to devise a methodology for determining
whether a particular chemical is an analogue of a controlled
substance. See id. at 97-98. Dr. Harris additionally related
that she had recently reviewed the scientific literature. Based
on that review, she opined that Dr. Coyer’s comparison meth-
odology was not generally accepted in the scientific field. She
added that she had been unable to locate any generally-
accepted methodology. As well, Dr. Harris testified that there
is also no commonly-accepted scientific definition of the phrase
“substantially similar,” which she viewed to be a subjective
term. Ultimately, she rendered her own professional opinion,
to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that PB-22 and
JWH-018 are not substantially similar, See id. at 102.

The common pleas court granted Appellee’s habeas motion
and dismissed all charges against him.” In its Rule 1925(a)
opinion, the court relied largely on the testimony of Drs.
Hoffman and Harris. Based on such proofs, as well as portions
of Dr. Coyer’s testimony, the court determined that the public
at large could not have been on notice that PB-22 was
prohibited as either an analogue of JWH-018 or a compound
with a chemical structure or effect substantially similar to that
of JWH-018. The court thus found the relevant portions of the
Act unconstitutionally vague as applied to PB-22. As such, it
concluded that the Commonwealth had failed to make out a
prima facie case because it could not show that the products
in question were prohibited substances under the Act. See
Commonwealth v. Herman, No, CP-67-CR-2400-2014, slip
op. at 8-9 (C.P. York May 28, 2015). See generally Common-
wealth v. McBride, 528 Pa, 158, 157-58, 595 A.2d 589, 591
11. Appellee had also been charged with criminal conspiracy and deal-

ing in the proceeds of unlawful activities. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903(a),

5111(a)(1). We need not discuss those counts separately as their viabili-
ty depends on that of the drug charges at the center of this case.

oa
(1991) (observing that, to make out a prima facie case, the
government must demonstrate a crime was committed, proba-
bly by the accused).

The county court’s decision is now on direct appeal to this
Court. See 42 Pa.C.8. § 722(7) (giving this Court exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of common pleas court decisions ruling a
statute unconstitutional). At the heart of that decision is the
court’s holding that the Act is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to PB-22.

Presently, the Commonwealth argues that the common
pleas court erred in granting relief based on a judicial finding
that the terms “analogue” and “substantially similar” were
unconstitutionally vague as applied. The Commonwealth main-
tains that the expert witnesses all confirmed that the two
compounds, JWH-018 and PB-22, had structurally similar
molecular components, albeit they differed regarding whether
the two chemicals were sufficiently similar to meet statutory
requirements, In the Commonwealth’s view, whether they are
sufficiently alike to be considered “substantially similar” or
“analogues” is a question of fact for the jury to determine
upon hearing expert testimony from both sides. In this

12. The court also briefly discussed Frye and indicated that Dr. Coyer’s
evidence was not generally accepted in the scientific community, See
Herman, No, CP-67-CR-2400-2014, slip op. at 10-11, This aspect of
the opinion can be read to suggest that the court, in retrospect, viewed.
the proceeding as a Frye hearing, at least in part. As explained, though,
the court did not find preliminarily that the scientific evidence was
novel, nor did it indicate the admissibility of Dr, Coyer’s testimony was
in issue, See supra note 10,

Separately, the court did not address Appellee’s statutory argument
that PB~22 was legal under Act 40, As the court had already found
“analogue” to be unconstitutionally vague—a question it could not
avoid relative to charges based on conduct occurring in the pre-Act
40 timeframe—it may have seen no need to address that claim,

13, The Commonwealth initially appealed to the Superior Court. Upon
recognizing the underlying constitutional basis for the common pleas
court's decision, the intermediate court transferred the matter here. See
Commonwealth v. Herman, 143 A.3d 392, 394 (Pa. Super. 2016); Pa,
R.A.P, 751 (relating to the transfer of erroneously-filed cases).

14, The Commonwealth's designer-drug argument rests solely on the
premise that a jury could find that the two compounds have a substan-

regard the Commonwealth urges that statutory words should
be understood according to their common usage, see Brief for
Appellant at 16 (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908(a)), and that, here,
the dictionary defines “analogue” as “[oJne of a group of
chemical compounds similar in structure but different in com-
position,” id. (quoting Ranpom Housz Wussrer’s Coniece
Dictionary 47 (2d ed. 2001))—a definition that juries can
comprehend and apply.

Finally, the Commonwealth points to three unpublished
United States District Court decisions rejecting a void-for-
vagueness claim in situations where the defendants were
charged under the federal Analogue Act, and the chemicals at
issue were PB-22 and JWH-018, or some variant of them. See
United States v. Hoyt, 2014 WL 5028098 (W.D. Va. Oct. 8,
2014), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at app. 27a; United
States v. Bays, 2014 WL 3764876 (N.D. Tex. July 81, 2014),
reprinted in Brief for Appellant at app. 84a; United States v.
Johnson, 2014 WL 7330936 (D. Nev. Dee. 19, 2014), reprinted
in Brief for Appellant at app. 47a."* It adds that a number of
other jurisdictions have concluded that the terms “analogue”
and “substantially similar” are not void for vagueness when
applied to other controlled substances. See Brief for Appellant

tially similar chemical structure, rather than substantially similar ef-
fects, See supra note 8.

15. The federal Analogue Act is a 1986 addition to the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (the “Federal CSA”), which
prescribes that controlled substance analogues “shall, to the extent
intended for human consumption, be treated, for the purposes of any
Federal law as a controlled substance in schedule I.” Id. § 813.

The Federal CSA defines a “controlled substance analogue” generally
as a substance whose chemical structure is substantially similar to
that of a schedule I or II controlled substance, and either: (a) “has a
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of
a controlled substance in schedule I or II,” or (b) “with respect to a
particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of
a controlled substance in schedule I or II.” Id. § 802(32). See general-
ly United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2005)
(construing the statute).

o

at 20-28 (citing cases). The Commonwealth maintains that
these other decisions provide guidance and additionally mili-
tate in favor of reaching the same conclusion to maintain
uniformity across jurisdictions. See id. at 18 (quoting 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1927 (“Statutes uniform with those of other states shall be
interpreted and construed to effect their general purpose to
make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.”)).
IL, Analysis
A. The void-for-vagueness doctrine

HM The concept of unconstitutional vagueness arises
from due process norms. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV;
Welch v. United States, — U.S. ——, ——, 186 S.Ct. 1257,
1261-62, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016) (observing that the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is grounded in the Fifth Amendment with
regard to the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with regard to the States). It prevents the government
from imposing sanctions under a criminal law that fails to give
fair notice of the proscribed conduct. See Johnson v. United
States, — U.S. ——, ——, 185 8.Ct, 2551, 2556, 192 L.Ed.2d
569 (2015) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58,
108 8.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Hd.2d 908 (1988); see also Papa-
christou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct.
839, 848, 81 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (“Living under [the] rule of
law entails various suppositions, one of which is that ‘all
persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids.’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
US. 451, 458, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939) (second
alteration in original))). Relatedly, the doctrine safeguards
against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by the gov-
ernment, see FCC v. Fou Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S.
239, 252-54, 182 S.Ct. 2807, 2317, 183 L.Hd.2d 234 (2012), as
well as jury verdicts “unfettered by any legally fixed stan-
dards as to what is prohibited by the statute.” State v.
Golsion, 67 So.8d 452, 463 (La. 2011). Still, due process
recognizes that because we are “[clondemned to the use of
words, we can never expect mathematical certainty” in legisla-
tive draftsmanship. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,

110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Hd.2d 222 (1972). Ultimately, the
inquiry is whether the law “forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application[.]” Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 885, 391,
46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed, 822 (1926).

HM «Where, as here, a vagueness challenge does not
involve First Amendment freedoms, it is “examined in the
light of the facts of the case at hand,” United States v. Powell,
423 U.S. 87, 92, 96 S.Ct. 316, 319, 46 L.Hd.2d 228 (1975)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and “the
statute is judged on an as-applied basis.” Maynard v. Cart-
wright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1858, 1858, 100 L.Ed.2d
372 (1988); Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 5, 354
A.2d 244, 245 (1976). Thus, we consider the record developed
in the common pleas court and evaluate whether Appellee met
his burden to demonstrate that the statutory terms in ques-
tion are unconstitutionally vague as applied to the chemicals
JWH-018 and PB-22. In doing so, we bear in mind that
statutes enjoys a strong presumption of validity and will only
be declared void if they clearly and plainly violate the Consti-
tution, with all doubts resolved in favor of a finding of consti-
tutionality. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 590 Pa. 480, 487,
913 A.2d 207, 211-12 (2006). See generally In re Adoption of
E.M.A., 487 Pa, 152, 155, 409 A.2d 10, 11-12 (1979) (noting
that this presumption pertains in an as-applied vagueness
challenge), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 Pa.C.S.
§ 2701(D; In re Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. 269, 281, 808
A.2d 1195, 1202 (2002). We defer to the common pleas court’s
findings of fact that are supported by the record, but we
review questions of law—including the Act’s constitutionali-
ty—de novo. See Commonwealth v. Davidson, 595 Pa, 1, 11,
938 A.2d 198, 203 (2007).

B. The controlled-substance analogue
counts prior to Act 40
HM As most of the charges against Appellee involve the
claim that PB-22 is a chemical analogue of JWH-018, and the

os
bulk of the pre-trial hearing testimony related to the term
“analogue,” we first question whether the Act’s use of the
term prior to the Act 40 amendments was unconstitutionally
vague as applied to those two chemicals,’ As an initial matter,
although the federal Analogue Act defines “analogue” in terms
of a substantially similar chemical structure, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(82)(A)(i), and a number of our sister States have legisla-
tion containing a similar definition of a controlled substance
analogue, see, ¢g., Cau, Huanra & Sarety Copg § 11401(b);
Coro. Rey. Srar. § 18-18-102(6); 720 Inu. Comp, Star. 570/401;
Kan. Star. §§ 65-4101(g), 21-5701(b); La. Ruy. Star.
§ 40:961(8); Onto Rev. Cope § 3719.01(HH); Tax. Haaura «
Sarery Cope §§ 481.002(6), 481.102, the Pennsylvania enact-
ment provides no such definition or any other express guid-
ance. Additionally, the Act defines designer drugs in such
terms and clarifies that designer drugs are not within the set
of chemicals which constitute controlled substances, See 35
PS. § 780-102. Thus, although many jurisdictions appear to
equate controlled substance analogues with a certain group of
compounds whose chemical structure is substantially similar to
that of the controlled substance in question, this type of
equivalence is not reasonably supported by the express terms
of the Act.

Such a lack of guidance would not be especially problematic
if an accepted meaning of the word “analogue” existed within
the relevant scientific community, or if there was general
acceptance that PB-22 is, in fact, an analogue of JWH-018.
However, the expert testimony for both parties at the habeas
hearing confirmed that there is no widely accepted definition
of the term “analogue” as applied to these types of organic

16. If the common pleas court had found as a fact that PB-22 was not
an analogue of JWH-018, we could potentially avoid this constitutional
issue by deferring to that finding. However, the court made no such
finding and, moreover, Dr. Coyer opined that PB-22 was an analogue
of JWH-018. See N.T., Nov. 7, 2014, at 35. That testimony must be
accepted as true for the narrow purpose of ascertaining whether the
Commonwealth made out a prima facie case. See Commonwealth v.
MacPherson, 561 Pa. 571, 585, 752 A.2d 384, 391 (2000). This, in turn,
forecloses the possibility that we can affirm the court's order based on
an appellate finding that PB-22 is not an analogue of JWH-018.

=

molecules. See N.T., Nov. 7, 2014, at 34-85 (testimony of Dr.
Coyer); id. at 82 (testimony of Dr. Huffman). The testimony
also established that JWH-018 and PB-22 are in different
structural classes, see swpra note 9, and Dr. Huffman testified
that chemicals in different structural classes are not analogues
of one another—and that, specifically, PB-22 is not an ana-
logue of JWH-018. See id. at 90-91. Dr. Huffman did clarify
on cross-examination that the more particularized term “struc-
tural analogue” is sometimes used to refer to compounds that
ean be synthesized from a common parent molecule, and that
the phrase can also refer to chemicals with the same basic
molecular structure. See id. at 88. And Dr. Coyer opined that
PB-22 is an analogue of JWH-018 insofar as its structure is
concerned. See id. at 35-87, As to whether PB-22 is a synthet-
ie cannabinoid in terms of mimicking the effects of known
cannabinoids, however, Dr. Coyer was only able to state that
some “initial testing may have been done” to ascertain its
effects as such, id. at 87, and that in informal conversations
some chemists group PB-22 together with JWH-018. See also
id. at 38 (explaining that there was “a talk” focusing on
whether a group of new compounds, including PB-22, were
synthetic cannabinoids, but he did not wish to speak about
that talk because it was only “a meeting”).

Particularly in light of the admitted lack of scientific studies
as to PB-22’s effects within the body, we find this type of
evidence to be insufficient to establish that there is any
agreement in the scientific community that PB-22 is a known
synthetic cannabinoid. Moreover—and more to the point—it
appears there is no scientifically accepted method for ascer-
taining whether PB-22 is an analogue of JWH-018. In this
respect, Appellee’s second expert, Dr. Harris, was in a unique
position to know whether, from a legal perspective, scientists
are aware of any methodology to determine whether a com-
pound under investigation can be considered an analogue of a
controlled substance. She belonged to ACECSA, a national
scientific committee specially dedicated to discovering or fash-
ioning such methods for law enforcement agencies to use. Dr.
Harris testified that, as of the date of the hearing, ACECSA

 —T

had not yet devised such a method. See id. at 96. She added
that SWGDRUG’s analogue subcommittee had been similarly
unable to formulate any such methodology, ultimately conclud-
ing that “it comes down to a subjective determination depen-
dent not only upon what you are evaluating, but also the
experience within [sic] the molecule itself.” Id. at 97.

Under these circumstances, we find resonance in the argu-
ment Appellee made in his habeas motion suggesting that
scientists in the relevant field have not been able to agree on a
method to determine analogue status and cannot agree on
whether PB-22 is an analogue of JWH-018—and if that is
true of scientists, it is difficult to see how the average citizen
can be on notice of such status. The court in United States v.
Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 282 (D. Colo, 1992), faced a similar
situation with regard to alphaethyltryptamine (“AET”), which
the government claimed was a controlled-substance analogue
of the scheduled drugs dimethyltryptamine (“DMT”) and die-
thyltryptamine (“DET”). After hearing pre-trial expert testi-
mony from both sides not unlike that adduced in the present
ease, the court stated that “[t]he scientific community cannot
even agree on a methodology to use” to determine analogue
status under the federal statute. Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
Thus, the court concluded, “a defendant cannot determine
[such status] in advance of his contemplated conduct[.]” Id.

The same observations apply to the question of whether
PB-22 is an analogue of JWH-018 under the Act (at least
prior to its Act 40 revisions). The average citizen would
necessarily have to “guess at” PB-22’s status and “differ as to
[the] application” of the analogue prohibition contained in
Section 780-104(1)(vii). Connally, 269 U.S. at 391, 46 S.Ct. at
127. Consequently, we agree with Appellee and the common
pleas court that the pre-Act 40 statute was unconstitutionally
vague as applied to PB-22 and JWH-018."

17, We pause to emphasize that the problem is made acute by the
specific wording of the Act. Unlike legislatures elsewhere, the General
Assembly has placed the substantial-similarity test—which would ordi-
narily comprise the most probable standard for determining analogue

status—within the designer drug provision, and has clarified that de-
signer drugs and controlled substances (including analogues) are mutu-

Nor are we persuaded by the Commonwealth’s assertion
that the vagueness question can be dispensed with by charac-
terizing as a jury question whether PB-22 is an analogue of
JWH-018. We need not address whether PB~22’s analogue
status could theoretically be a question for the fact-finder if
the Act were constitutional. The point here is that the Com-
monwealth’s argument starts from the assumption that the act
is not vague as applied to PB-22, which is the very issue
before this Court.

HM We also differ with the government’s suggestion that
because the Act is part of a uniform law, Section 1927 of the
Statutory Construction Act directs that it be construed uni-
formly with similar laws of other jurisdictions. Although the
Act is based on the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of
1970, see 35 P.S. Ch. 6, Table, Section 1927 does not necessari-
ly apply. For one thing, neither the Act’s title nor its provi-
sions suggest an intention to conform Pennsylvania’s drug
regulations to those of other jurisdictions. See Allegheny Cnty.
v, Rendell, 580 Pa. 149, 166 n.6, 860 A.2d 10, 21 n.6 (2004)
(explaining that Section 1927 only pertains where the substan-
tive language of the enactment indicates that it is “part of a
uniform enactment among several states”), Just as important,
many states have now adopted a later version of the uniform
act which was revised to include a definition of “controlled
substance analog” which is expressed in terms of substantial
similarity to a controlled substance, see Unir. ConTROLLED
Sussrances Act § 101(8) (1990)—in other words, which tracks
the Act’s definition of a designer drug. See supra note 17.
Other state decisions, such as those highlighted by the Com-
monwealth, are based on the 1990 definition and, as such, do
not support the Commonwealth’s uniformity argument relative
to the Act’s “analogue” provision. See, eg., People v. Lucero,
381 P.3d 436, 440 (Colo. App. 2016); State v. Barnes, 275 Kan.
364, 64 P.3d 405, 408 (2003); State v. Smith, 189 Wis.2d 496,
525 N.W.2d 264, 267 (1995). See generally Richard L. Braun,

ally exclusive categories. See supra note 5. It has done so, moreover,

without delineating any substitute standard for determining what con-
stitutes an analogue.

ae

Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1990, 18 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 365, 867 (1991) (confirming that the 1990 uniform
act’s controlled-substance analogue provision was drafted to
encompass designer drugs).

Finally, and as noted, the Commonwealth highlights several
federal decisions, including three United States District Court
opinions, which hold that, under the federal Analogue Act,
PB-22 is an analogue of JWH-018. However, those disputes
do not purport to address the salient issue before this Court
because, as with the 1990 version of the uniform act, they
relate to the federal Analogue Act’s definition of a “controlled
substance analogue” as a chemical having a substantially
similar chemical structure to a scheduled drug. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(82)(A)(i). Their present relevance, if any, is thus limited
to the designer-drug charge (discussed below) as the Act
defines designer drug in similar terms, but it provides no
definition of “analogue.”

Accordingly, we hold that in the pre-Act 40 timeframe the
analogue provision was unconstitutionally vague as applied to
PB-22 as an alleged analogue of JWH-018, That being the
case, the common pleas court acted properly in dismissing the
charges lodged against Appellee based on the April and May
2018 undercover purchases.

C. The controlled-substance analogue
counts after Act 40

HE Appellee was also charged with delivery of a con-
trolled substance (PB-22) based on the July 11, 2013, under-
cover purchase, and with a possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance based on the July 15, 2018, packet sei-
zures. Both of those charges were lodged pursuant to the Act
as amended by Act 40. As explained, Appellee never claimed
in his habeas motion that the amended statute’s use of the
term “analogue” was unconstitutionally vague as applied.
Rather, he maintained that PB-22 was not a prohibited sub-
stance inasmuch as it was excluded from Schedule I due to the
statute’s use of specific chemical designations. He asserted, in
this respect, that PB-22 is not in any of the listed designa-

———— <

tions, and specifically, is not the same chemical designation as
JWH-018. See N.T., Nov. 7, 2014, at 32-88, 108-10 (reflecting
defense counsel’s repetition at the habeas hearing of this non-
constitutional, interpretive basis for challenging the post~-July
2 controlled-substance charges). On appeal, Appellee continues
to forward this same argument as his only contention with
regard to these charges. See Brief for Appellee at 4-8,"

As described above, the statutory description of Schedule I
cannabinoids as stated in the revised Act only prohibited
certain chemicals and their analogues within thirteen enumer-
ated chemical designations—the relevant one being naphthoy-
lindoles inasmuch as it includes JWH-018, see 35 P.S. § 780-
104(1)(vii)(2)(B) (2018)—and a “catchall” category of CB1
agonists, which is not presently relevant. See supra note 8
The prosecution’s expert confirmed that PB-22 is in a differ-
ent chemical classification than JWH-018, and that it falls
within a class of compounds known as indole carboxylic acids
rather than naphthoylindoles, See N.T., Nov. 7, 2014, at 47.
This has now been confirmed by the General Assembly in its
most recent revision to the Act, see Act of June 8, 2016, P.L.
258, No, 87 (“Act 87”), in which the legislative body named
PB-22 as a scheduled controlled substance under that very
chemical designation. See 35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(vii)(2.2) (2016)
(listing PB-22 as one of a group of Schedule I controlled
substances within the chemical designation “[i]ndole carboxylic
acids”),

HM Accordingly, the Commonwealth failed to identify a
valid statutory basis on which Appellee could be charged with
delivery of a controlled substance, or possession with intent to
deliver a controlled substance, based his conduct after July 2,
2018. We therefore affirm the common pleas court’s dismissal
of the relevant counts against Appellee, although we disagree

18. The common pleas court did not speak to this issue in its Rule 1925
opinion, Instead, it held that the term “analogue” was vague as applied
without distinguishing between the pre- and post-amendment versions
of the statute, Additionally, the Commonwealth does not address the
claim in its brief, opting instead to limit its advocacy to the position that
the terms “analogue” and “substantially similar” should not be deemed
unconstitutionally vague.

with its analysis insofar as it suggested that the post-amend-
ment Act’s use of “analogue” is unconstitutionally vague.” See
Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 578 Pa. 587, 611, 854 A.2d 489,
508 (2004) (explaining that “this Court has the ability to affirm
a valid judgment or order for any reason appearing as of
record”), By reaching our holding on these grounds, we not
only resolve Appellee’s claim on the terms in which he has
framed it, we also “adhere to the sound tenet of jurisprudence
that courts should avoid constitutional issues when the issue at
hand may be decided upon other grounds.” In re Fiori, 548
Pa, 592, 600, 678 A.2d 905, 909 (1996) (citing Rescue Army v.
Mun. Court, 881 U.S. 549, 568-69, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419-20, 91
L.Ed. 1666 (1947); accord Threlkeld v. State, 558 8.W.2d 472,
474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (“This Court will not pass on the
[constitutional] validity of any part of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act which is not shown to have been violated[.]”
(citation omitted)).

D. The designer-drug count and the “substantially
similar” descriptor

WH Finally, Appellee was charged with a single count of
possession with intent to distribute, or possession, of a design-
er drug. To review, the Act prohibits the “knowing or inten-
tional ... possession with intent to distribute, or possession|[,]
of a designer drug,” 35 P.S. § 780-118(a)(36); see supra note
8, which is defined in relevant part as “a substance other than
a controlled substance that is intended for human consumption
and that ... has a chemical structure substantially similar to
that of a controlled substance in Schedules I, II or III ... or
that produces an effect substantially similar to that of a
controlled substance in Schedules I, IT or III.” Id. § 780-102.

Before the common pleas court, Appellee claimed an entitle-
ment to habeas relief on this charge solely on the basis that

19, That issue will have to await another dispute where its resolution is
material to the outcome of the case,

20. As of June 2016, PB-22 is not a designer drug because Act 37 made
it a scheduled controlled substance. See 35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(vii)(2.2)
(2016). For present purposes, we apply the Act as it existed on July 15,
2013, when the PB-22 packets were seized.

the “substantially similar” descriptor was vague. The common
pleas court agreed with Appellee and expressed its rationale in
succinct terms. The court found that “experts have been
unable to reach an agreement on a method for analyzing and
determining the similarities between the chemical structures
... of PB-22 and JWH-018.” Herman, No. CP-67-CR-2400~
2014, slip op. at 9. It concluded that “[t]his disagreement
renders the designer drug statute unconstitutionally vague.”
Id. In his appellate brief, Appellee only argues that that the
effects of PB-22 are unknown, see Brief for Appellee at 8-9,
which is not in dispute. Appellee appears to overlook that,
unlike the federal CSA, the Act’s definition of designer drug is
phrased in the disjunctive. Thus, he may still be liable under
Section 780-118(a)(86) if PB-22’s chemical structure is sub-
stantially similar to that of JWH-018. The salient issue is
whether that term—‘substantially similar’—is vague as ap-
plied to the chemical structures of PB-22 and JWH-018.

Although the bulk of the testimony at the habeas hearing
focused on the term “analogue,” the county court’s finding that
experts disagree on a method for determining substantial
similarity as between chemical structures is supported by the
record.” Initially, the experts agreed that, although the overall
molecular structures of the two chemicals were different, they
had similar components. See N.T., Nov. 7, 2014, at 25, 38-39
(testimony of Dr. Coyer), 85-86 (testimony of Dr. Huffman).
Dr. Coyer went further and opined that their components
were “very similar,” id. at 25, and his testimony as a whole
was acknowledged by Appellee as subsuming an expression
that the overall molecular structures were substantially simi-
lar. See id. at 99. The defense experts disagreed. Dr. Huffman
opined that the two molecules did not have “similar struc-
tures,” id. at 91; see also id. at 86 (“[TJhe total structures are

21, Dr. Harris’ testimony regarding efforts at the federal level to discov-
er a methodology for ascertaining whether one chemical is an analogue
of another can be construed as touching on the question of substantial
similarity in light of the federal Analogue Act’s use of that term in its
definition of a controlled substance analogue. However, it cannot be
seen as addressing only chemical-structure similarity, since the federal
definition also includes a requirement that the effects on the central
nervous system be substantially similar.

:

different.”), and Dr. Harris indicated that they were not
“structurally similar as a whole.” Id. at 99. Just as important,
both defense experts highlighted the importance of three-
dimensional comparisons in reaching a conclusion on structur-
al similarity. See id. at 77 (Dr. Huffman), 100 (Dr. Harris). Dr,
Harris continued by expressing that “substantially similar” is
not a scientific term and “substantial” means different things
to different people. Jd. at 101.

We have difficulty, however, with the common pleas court’s
ultimate holding. While the term “analogue” may be somewhat
nebulous (particularly in a scientific setting), the concept of
similarity is well known to persons of ordinary intelligence,
and we see no reason why such individuals would have difficul-
ty applying it to evidence of the molecular structures of PB-22
and JWH-018. Accord United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d
105, 108 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim that the federal
Analogue Act’s use of “substantially similar” was vague, and
explaining that “a reasonable layperson could ... have exam-
ined a chemical chart and intelligently decided for himself or
herself, by comparing their chemical diagrams, whether the
chemical structures of the two substances were substantially
similar”), judgment vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226,
117 S.Ct. 1816, 187 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997). The fact that the
parties’ experts disagreed on the ultimate issue of substantial
similarity in this case is not dispositive, particularly given the
obvious visual similarities in the two-dimensional diagrams of
the molecules.” Accord United States v. Klecker, 848 F.3d 69,

22. The statute does not articulate a particular manner of proof. As such,
it does not require that substantial similarity be proved by two-dimen-
sional diagrams, nor does it preclude proof by three-dimensional dia-
grams, models, holograms, or indeed any other evidence pertinent to
the issue. In this regard, some commentators have expressed that two-
dimensional stick-and-letter chemical structure diagrams are an inferi-
or type of evidence, as they omit relevant information such as atomic
mass and the three-dimensional structure. See Paul Anacker & Edward
J. Imwinkelried, The Confusing World of the Controlled Substance Ana-
logue (CSA) Criminal Defense, 42:6 Crim. L. Butt. Arr. 4 (2006) (hereinaf-
ter, “Controlled Substance Analogues”); cf. Bays, 2014 WL 3764876, at
*8 (referring with approval to expert testimony suggesting that two-
dimensional chemical models are useful for determining core structure,
whereas three-dimensional models are helpful in identifying attached

72 (4th Cir. 2003) (where diagrams of the two molecules at
issue revealed “considerable similarities,” holding that the
“substantially similar” standard was not vague as applied
notwithstanding that the parties’ experts disagreed on the
question of whether they were substantially similar). The
“substantial” qualifier speaks to the degree of similarity need-
ed to bring a substance within the designer drug prohibition.
Still, “substantial similarity” is not a scientific concept, accord
Controlled Substance Analogues 4, and although that adjective
may be qualitative, the Supreme Court has stressed that it
does not “doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the
application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’
to real-world conduct”—noting, further, that “‘the law is full
of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating
rightly ... some matter of degree.” Johnson, — US. at
——, 185 S.Ct. at 2561 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229
US. 878, 377, 33 S.Ct. 780, 781, 57 L.Ed. 1282 (1918)); see 21
AM. JUR. 2D § 17 (2017).

We also observe that the vast weight of authority from
other jurisdictions supports the conclusion that “substantially
similar” is not a vague term per se when used in comparing
two chemical compounds. The federal circuit courts which
have examined this question have generally found that use of
the “substantially similar” phraseology in the controlled sub-
stance arena does not suffer from unconstitutional vague-
ness.” This view is also held by most appellate courts in other
states.” As applied specifically to PB-22 and JWH-018, more-

functional groups and seeing how they are similar). Whether evidentia-
ry sufficiency to prove guilt can be predicated solely on comparing two-
dimensional diagrams is not an issue presently before the Court.

23. See Turcotte, 405 F.3d at 533; United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118,
124 (2d Cir. 2004); Klecker, 348 F.3d at 72; United States v. Granberry,
916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (Sth Cir. 1990); United States v. Orchard, 332 F.3d
1133, 1138 (8th Cir, 2003); United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1339
(11th Cir, 2002),

24. See People v. Silver, 230 Cal.App.3d 389, 281 Cal.Rptr. 354, 357
(1991); State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962, 973 (App. 2014);
abrogated on other grounds by State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 356 P.3d
368 (2015); Hooper v, State, 106 S.W.3d 270, 277 (Tex. App. 2003);
State v. Srack, 49 Kan.App.2d 761, 314 P.3d 890, 897 (2013); State v.

—

over, Appellee has not drawn our attention to any court in any
jurisdiction which has held that the substantially-similar des-
criptor is unconstitutionally vague; as noted above, the Com-
monwealth has included in its appendix three United States
District Court decisions which have held that the federal
Analogue Act—which, in relevant part, uses the same substan-
tial-similarity standard as the designer drug provision pres-
ently under challenge—is not unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied to these chemicals.

HM Additionally, unlike the controlled-substance analogue
offense, the designer drug provision has an express culpability
prerequisite whereby a defendant can only be convicted if the
government proves he acted knowingly or intentionally. See 35
P.S. § 780-118(a)(86). Scienter requirements of this nature
help alleviate vagueness concerns, both with regard to the
adequacy of notice of the proscribed conduct, see Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), and as a
means of limiting prosecutorial discretion, see McFadden v.
United States, — U.S. —-, ——, 185 S.Ct. 2298, 2307, 192
L.Ed.2d 260 (2015). The McFadden Court, which dealt with
the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as
to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the govern-
ment must show that the defendant either knew that the
substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of
his knowledge of its identity, or knew that it satisfied the
specific statutory prerequisites making it a controlled sub-
stance analogue. Those prerequisites include a substantially
similar chemical structure to that of a scheduled controlled
substance. See id. at ——, 185 S.Ct. at 2305 (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(82)(A)). The Court concluded: “A defendant who pos-
sesses a substance with knowledge of those features knows all
of the facts that make his conduct illegal[.]” Id; see also
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1198 &
n.l4 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a
scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especial-

Beaudette, 97 So.3d 600, 603-604 (La. App. 2012); State v. Shalash, 13
N.E.3d 1202, 1209 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).

ly with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant
that his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 387, 342, 72 S.Ct.
329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly”
‘mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the
argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question
would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United
States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (sum-
marizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the man-
date that the government prove the accused knew the chemi-
cal structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled
controlled substance); ef Tiplick v. State, 48 N.E.38d 1259,
1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement
in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-
substance statute).

HM There is no issue of statutory construction presently
before this Court relating to the scope of the scienter require-
ment contained in Section 780-113(a)(86). Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court’s analysis in McFadden bears upon the vague-
ness issue in the following way. Under the canon of constitu-
tional avoidance, if a statute is susceptible of two reasonable
constructions, one of which would raise constitutional difficul-
ties and the other of which would not, we adopt the latter
construction. See MCI WorldCom, Ine. v. PUC, 577 Pa. 294,
811, 844 A.2d 1239, 1249 (2004). Although the designer drug
provision does not expressly state that, to be culpable, the
defendant must know that the chemical he possesses has a
molecular structure substantially similar to that of a scheduled
drug, a narrow construction along those lines would be reason-
able. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(d) (providing generally that where
the law prescribes a particular level of scienter, it applies to all
elements of the offense in question); see also id. § 107(a)
(specifying that Title 18’s preliminary provisions—including
Section 802—apply to offenses defined in any statute). If a
broader interpretation of the statute would render it vague as
applied, the court would be obligated to adopt the narrower
construction delineated above because, under McFadden, such
a construction would alleviate vagueness concerns.

Dissenting from the above, Justice Wecht initially suggests
that an offense based on a substantial similarity of chemical
structures fails to give adequate notice of the prohibited
conduct as required by due process, because most citizens are
not organic chemists and the substances they purchase ordi-
narily are not accompanied by chemistry books or comparative
chemical-structure diagrams. See Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion at 506-11, 161 A.3d at 219-22.

While we certainly understand the concern, we are not
convinced that an ordinary citizen’s lack of expertise in organ-
ie chemistry constitutes a viable basis to conclude that the
statute is unconstitutionally vague. If it were, much of the Act
would be invalid because many drugs appearing in the sched-
ules are listed by their chemical formulae or technical designa-
tions, See 85 P.S. § 780-104 (listing such scheduled drugs as
“N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate,” “Delta-6 cis or trans tetrahy-
drocannabinol and their optical isomers,” and “2-(4~Chloro-
2,5-dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-C)”). A large part of the
federal Controlled Substances Act would likewise fall. See 21
USC. § 812 (enumerating many controlled substances by
chemical formulae). See generally United States v. Niemoeller,
2008 WL 1568863, at “4 (S.D, Ind. Jan. 24, 2003) (observing
that “it takes a chemist to understand many of the compounds
on schedule I under the Controlled Substances Act”). More
generally, any offense which is predicated on an act or circum-
stance, the understanding of which involves specialized knowl-
edge, would be at risk of invalidation under the vagueness
doctrine,

That doctrine has not developed so strictly as to impose a
blanket prohibition along these lines, and we believe it would
be misguided to invalidate substantial portions of our con-
trolled-substance legislation on the basis that compounds sub-
ject to regulation or criminalization are described by reference
to technical formulae unintelligible to the general public, Ac-
cord, eg., State v. Heinrichs, 845 N.W.2d 450, 455 (lowa Ct.
App, 2018) (“[Wle decline to find the schedule of controlled
substances is constitutionally defective because it uses scienti-
fic terms that are obscure to persons of ordinary intelligence

—— «

lacking in specialized knowledge. ‘The use of scientific or
technical terminology or terms of art common in a regulated
field does not automatically render a statute unconstitutionally
vague,’” (quoting United States v. Caseer, 899 F.8d 828, 836-
87 (6th Cir. 2005))). As one federal court noted more general-
ly:

When dealing with legislation on complex or technical mat-

ters—whether it concerns intricate corporate tax issues, the

details of electronic securities transactions, or international

trade in “dual use” technologies—Congress can expect a

person who wishes to engage in the activity to acquire the

necessary specialized knowledge to conform the person’s
conduct to law. Similarly, when dealing with the distribution
of organic chemical compounds for human consumption and
with intended or hoped-for central nervous system effects,
Congress could reasonably expect and require persons en-
gaged in that activity to possess or obtain the specialized
knowledge needed to conform their conduct to law,

Niemoeller, 2003 WL 1563863, at *4; accord State v. Shalash,
13 N.E.8d 1202, 1210 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014), In our view the
above proceeds from a reasonable conception of the scope of
discretion the legislative branch retains when it seeks to
regulate activity that is potentially harmful to the public, and
such activity can only be described using technical terminology
understandable to individuals with specialized training.

As discussed, moreover, an available interpretation of the
designer drug statute incorporates a mens rea whereby defen-
dants are only criminally liable if they act knowingly or
intentionally with regard to all elements—including, for pur-
poses of the present as-applied challenge, the alleged cireum-
stance that PB-22’s chemical structure is substantially similar
to that of JWH-018. This limitation helps ensure the statute
does not become a trap for unwitting members of the public
who have no expertise in organic chemistry. Instead, the
statute is quite reasonably aimed at those who traffic in novel
compounds which are essentially the same as scheduled con-
trolled substances but contain minor differences designed to
evade the statutory schedules. The General Assembly can

“reasonably expect and require persons engaged in that activi-
ty to possess or obtain the specialized knowledge needed to
conform their conduct to law.” Niemoeller, 2003 WL 1563863,
at *4,

In a separate line of attack, Justice Wecht acknowledges the
Supreme Court’s recent guidance in McFadden, as well as
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S.Ct. 675, 58 L.Ed.2d
596 (1979), where a statute’s lack of a scienter requirement
contributed to the Supreme Court’s finding that it was vague.
See id. at 401, 99 S.Ct. at 688. Further, he recognizes that the
Supreme Court has issued other decisions containing language
similar to McFadden’s, indicating that scienter requirements
mitigate, alleviate, or ameliorate vagueness concerns. See Con-
curring and Dissenting Opinion at 514-16, 161 A.8d at 224-25
(citing cases). He also highlights a decision of this Court
stating that “vagueness challenges fail when a statute has a
specific intent requirement because a defendant cannot com-
plain he did not understand the crime ....” Id. at 515-16 n.5,
161 A.8d at 225 n.5 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hendrickson,
5BB Pa, 277, 284, 724 A.2d 315, 819 (1999). Nevertheless,
Justice Wecht offers that the concept that a scienter prerequi-
site can help alleviate vagueness difficulties has been criticized
by commentators, and that it is in tension with the maxim that
ignorance of the law is not an excuse. See id. at 515-16, 161
A8d at 224-25,

Because the void-for-vagueness doctrine is grounded on
federal due process norms, we believe the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements are particularly germane to the resolution of
the matter before us, notwithstanding the thoughtful contribu-
tions of learned commentators. As far back as 1979, the
Supreme Court stated it “ha{d] long recognized that the
constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely relat-
ed to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of
mens rea.” Colautti, 489 U.S. at 895, 99 S.Ct. at 685. McFad-
den, in particular, is highly relevant since it dealt with a
federal statute prohibiting knowing or intentional conduct—
including possession with intent to distribute—relative to a
controlled-substance analogue which, under the federal sys-
tem, is defined using the same substantially-similar-chemical-
structure phraseology as Pennsylvania’s designer drug stat-

ute, See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(82)(A) (defining “controlled sub-
stance analogue” in terms of a chemical structure “which is
substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled
substance in schedule I or schedule II”), 841(a) (reflecting an
express “knowingly or intentionally’ mens rea); accord
McFadden, — US. at —— n.2, 135 8.Ct. at 2305 n.2 (reflect-
ing that the government had to prove, inter alia, that the
substance in question was “substantially similar in chemical
structure to a controlled substance”).

Further, if the law being enforced only prohibits knowing or
intentional conduct, any ignorance by a defendant which could
defeat culpability would not be offered as an excuse. See
generally 18 Pa.C.S. § 802(h). It would be advanced as a basis
to conclude that the Commonwealth failed to prove an element
of the offense. Thus, any perceived tension with the legal
maxim involving ignorance of the law is illusory. See, e.g.,
United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,
561-62, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700, 29 L.Hd.2d 178 (1971); Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3, 114 S.Ct. 1798, 1805 n.3,
128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens
vea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that
make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the
related presumption ... that .,. ignorance of the law ... is
no defense ....” (emphasis added)); United States v, Elias,
1999 WL 1204529, at *1 (D. Idaho Apr. 20, 1999) (explaining
that Staples and two other Supreme Court decisions “have not
altered the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse, but have only stated that knowledge is required where
the statute specifically imposes that type of requirement”); of
Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 382 (8th Cir. 1934) (in a civil
setting, distinguishing ignorance of the law from ignorance of
certain facts); Ciesielski v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 416
Pa, 146, 148, 205 A.2d 42, 48 (1964) (same).

25. Although 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) facially applies to controlled sub-
stances, under the federal Analogue Act the term subsumes controlled

substance analogues, see 21 U.S.C. § 813, the very category of chemi-
cals at issue in McFadden.

26. We note parenthetically that ignorance of the law can constitute a
basis to escape liability if the applicable legislation specifies that, to be

Finally, we differ with any suggestion that we are treating
the analogue provision and the designer drug statute in a
logically inconsistent fashion. See Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion at 517-19, 161 A.8d at 226-27 (Wecht, J.). Although a
chemical analogue of a controlled substance would most natu-
rally be understood as a molecule with a substantially similar
chemical structure, as noted above the General Assembly has
precluded that meaning by specifying that analogues and
designer drugs are mutually exclusive categories—and has
done so without providing any substitute standard for under-
standing what it intended to signify by the word “analogue.”
See supra note 17.

In summary, then, the common pleas court did not account
for the difference between the concepts of analogue and
substantial similarity, the latter of which is more readily
apprehensible to the lay citizen in the context of comparing
chemical structures; nor did it recognize that, unlike the
controlled-substance provision, the designer drug provision
includes a narrowing scienter specification. Moreover, like the
federal appellate court in Klecker, we find in this case that
there are “considerable similarities” as between the two mole-
cules based on their two-dimensional diagrams. Klecker, 348
F.8d at 72; see Johnson, 2014 WL 7830936, at *5 (concluding
that “the readily apparent similarities between the chemical
structures of 5F-PB-22 [a variant of PB-22] and the sched-
uled substances JWH-018 and AM-2201 [as reflected in two-
dimensional diagrams], are enough to put a reasonable person
on notice that 5F-PB-22 and JWH-018 are substantially
similar”),

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that predicating
criminal liability on a jury determination—perhaps assisted by
expert evidence—as to whether JWH-018 and PB-22 have
substantially similar chemical structures does not give rise to
a circumstance in which the average citizen must necessarily
guess at the types of behavior that are proscribed by Section

guilty, the defendant must have intended to violate the law. See, e.g.,
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149, 114 S.Ct. 655, 663, 126
L.Ed.2d 615 (1994).

780-113(a)(86). For the same reasons—particularly those re-
lating to the scienter provision—the discretion of government
agents is adequately circumscribed to guard against arbitrary
or discriminatory prosecutions. That being the case, this provi-
sion withstands the present void-for-vagueness challenge.”

Accordingly, we reverse the holding of the court of common
pleas as respects the designer-drug charge.

TIL. Conclusion

For reasons given above, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
jon.

Justices Baer, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.

27. Appellee claims that the Commonwealth waived the issue of whether
PB-22 has substantially similar effects to those of JWH-018 by not
including a claim along these lines in its Rule 1925(b) statement of
matters complained of on appeal. See Brief for Appellee at 8-9. As
previously noted, that question is not presently in dispute.

To the extent Appellee’s brief may be understood as asserting waiver
more generally in regard to the constitutionality of the designer drug
charge, it should be noted that the order appealed from, issued on
February 10, 2015, provided no explanation for its dismissal of all
charges. In addition, by order dated March 13, 2015, the court
directed the Commonwealth to file its Rule 1925(b) statement within
21 days, or no later than April 3, 2015. Notably, the court did not
issue its opinion until May 28, 2015, long after the deadline for the
Commonwealth’s filing had passed, and even longer after the court
had stated that it would issue an opinion. See Commonwealth v.
Herman, No. CP-67~CR-2400-2014, Order (C.P, York Feb. 3, 2015)
(indicating that the court would issue an opinion within 30 days, or
by March 5, 2015).

Under these unusual circumstances, and particularly where the habe-
as petition in question implicates multiple issues, the normal waiver
rules concerning the specificity of the contents of an appellant's
concise statement are relaxed. See Ryan v. Johnson, 522 Pa. 555, 560,
564 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1989); Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d
798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2007). See generally Commonwealth v. Hess, 570
Pa, 610, 619 n.9, 810 A.2d 1249, 1255 n.9 (2002) (citing Ryan for the
position that the rule requiring an appellant to file a 1925(b) state-
ment upon the court's directive “may not be employed as a trap to
defeat appellate review”). Here, the Commonwealth filed a timely
statement and alleged, generally, that the county court had erred in
granting Appellee’s habeas petition. This satisfied the dictates of
Ryan.

—

Justice Donohue files a concurring and dissenting opinion in
which Justices Todd and Wecht join.

Justice Wecht files a concurring and dissenting opinion in
which Justices Todd and Donohue join.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

I concur with the learned Majority’s reasoning and disposi-
tion of the first two issues presented, namely its affirmance of
the trial court’s dismissal of the counts for possession and
distribution of controlled substance analogues, both prior to
and after the Act 40 amendments to the Controlled Substance,
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101-144 (the
“Act”). With respect to the pre-Act 40 amendment counts, I
particularly agree with the Majority’s rationale that the expert
testimony did not demonstrate any agreement in the scientific
community that there is a scientifically accepted methodology
for determining whether PB-22 is an analogue of JWH-018,
or indeed if the two compounds are in fact analogues. As the
Majority properly concludes, if scientists are unable to agree
on these fundamental points, then the term “analogue” in the
Act is unconstitutionally vague because it is unreasonable to
expect the average citizen to be on notice of such status.
Majority Op. at 485-86, 161 A.3d at 206-07.

Applying precisely the same reasoning, however, I must
conclude that the definition of “designer drug” in the Act,
specifically, a substance, inter alia, with “a chemical structure
substantially similar to that of a controlled substance in
Schedule I, II or III in the Act,” 85 P.S. § 780-102 (emphasis
added), as applied to PB-22,! is also unconstitutionally vague.
As with “analogues,” the expert witnesses could not agree that
any scientifically accepted methodology existed for determin-
ing whether the molecular components of PB-22 are “substan-
tially similar” to JWH-018. The trial court found that the
1, In June 2016, the Act was amended to make PB-22 a scheduled

controlled substance. 35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(vii)(2.2). For present pur-
poses, we apply the Act as it existed on July 15, 2013.

———— ~

experts “have been unable to reach an agreement on a method
for analyzing and determining the similarities between the
chemical structures ... of PB-22 and JWH-018.” Trial Court
Opinion, 5/28/2015, at 9. Moreover, the three experts called by
the parties to testify could not agree on whether the chemical
structure of PB-22 is in fact “substantially similar” to that of
JWH-018. Dr. Michael Coyer, Ph.D, a forensic toxicologist,
testifying as an expert for the Commonwealth, opined, using
his methodology of, inter alia, visually comparing two-dimen-
sional diagrams of the molecules, that the components of PB-
22 and JWH-018 are “very similar.” N.T., 11/7/2014, at 25, 36.
John Hoffman, Ph.D, testifying for Herman, opined that PB-
22 and JWH-018 are not even in the same structural class, do
not have “similar structures,” and that three-dimensional mod-
eling, rather than two-dimensional modeling, is the appropri-
ate standard for comparing molecular structures. Id. at 81-82,
91. Heather Harris, Ph.D, a forensic analytical chemist, also
testifying on behalf of Herman, agreed with Hoffman that the
chemical structures PB-22 and JWH-018 are “not structurally
similar as a whole,” and that three-dimensional modeling,
rather than the two-dimensional modeling used by Coyer, is a
better indicator of similarity. Id. at 99, 100.

As shown, the experts could not agree on whether the
chemical structure of PB-22 is “substantially similar” to that
of JWH-018. More fundamentally, they could not even agree
on a methodology accepted in the relevant scientific communi-
ty for analyzing chemical compounds to determine whether
they are substantially similar to each other. Accordingly,
based on the same reasoning relied upon by the Majority with
respect to whether these compounds are analogues—that if
scientists cannot agree on what constitutes substantial similar-
ity, then the average citizen cannot be on notice that PB-22 is
an illegal drug—we must likewise find that the definition of
“designer drug” is constitutionally vague.

The Majority contends that “analogue” and “designer drug”
present different issues for a jury because while the term
“analogue” is not expressly defined in the Act (and is thus
“somewhat nebulous”), the concept of “substantial similarity”

is well-known to persons of ordinary intelligence, Majority Op.
at 491-92, 161 A.8d at 210. I must disagree. The lack of a
statutory definition is not an impediment to providing a jury
with a clear understanding of an undefined statutory term.
The rules of statutory construction provide that an undefined
statutory term must be construed according to its common
and approved usage. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908(a). This Court has
repeatedly indicated that dictionaries should be used as source
material to identify this “common and approved usage.” See,
2g., Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc. v. City of Phila-
delphia, 573 Pa. 189, 823 A.2d 108, 127 n.81 (2008); Fogle v.
Malvern Courts, Inc., 554 Pa, 683, 722 A.2d 680, 682 (1999);
Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 870, 548 A.2d 581, 582
(1988). Dictionaries define “analogue” as “{oJne of a group of
chemical compounds similar in structure but different in com-
position, “Random House Webster's College Dictionary 47 (2d
ed. 2001), or as “[a] compound with a molecular structure
closely similar to that of another.” Oxford English Dictionary
431 (2d. 1989).

With respect to whether chemical compounds are “ana-
logues” or have “substantially similar” chemical structures,
both require the jury to consider the same fundamental con-
cept—that of the degree of the similarity of chemical struc-
tures in question, Because experts cannot even agree on a
scientifically acceptable methodology for analyzing this con-
cept, much less demonstrate any likelihood of agreement
among themselves on the outcome of such an analysis, the
average citizen cannot be expected to be on adequate notice of
whether the possession or sale of the compounds at issue here
violated the provisions of the Act,

Therefore, I dissent from the Majority’s disposition of the
trial court's determination with respect to the count for pos-
session, or possession with intent to distribute, a designer
drug. 85 P.S. § 780-118(a)(80), (86). I would affirm the trial
court’s order in its entirety.

Justices Todd and Wecht join this concurring and dissenting
opinion,

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT

T agree with the points adeptly articulated in Justice Dono-
hue’s concurring and dissenting opinion. Like Justice Dono-
hue, I concur in the learned Majority’s disposition of the
issues regarding the classification of PB-22 as an “analogue”
of JWH-018, both before and after the Act 40 amendments to
the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35
P.S. §§ 780-101, et seg. I depart from the Majority at the
same juncture as Justice Donohue, in that I conclude that the
definition of a “designer drug”?! suffers from the same consti-
tutional infirmity as the “analogue” provision, 85 P.S. § 780-
104(1)(vii), as applied to PB-22. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.

As Justice Donohue highlights, the expert testimony pre-
sented in this case revealed a significant problem: the scienti-
fic community recognizes no accepted standard or methodolo-
gy for determining whether two substances are “analogues” or
whether their chemical structures are “substantially similar”
to each other. The inability to discern an intelligible or pre-
dictable standard for applying these concepts strikes the same
constitutional blow to the definition of a designer drug that the
Majority deems fatal to the analogue provision, I join Justice
Donohue’s opinion, and add the following.

“{TJhe void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibit-
ed and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” Commonwealth v. Mikulam, 504
Pa, 244, 470 A.2d 1889, 1342 (1988) (quoting Kolender v,

1, See 35 P.S. § 780-102(b) (defining “designer drug,” in relevant part,
as “a substance other than a controlled substance that is intended for
human consumption and that either has a chemical structure substan-
tially similar to that of a controlled substance in Schedules I, II or III of
this act or that produces an effect substantially similar to that of a
controlled substance in Schedules I, II or III”). As the Majority notes,
the Commonwealth concedes that the “effect” of PB-22 on the body is
unknown, so we here are concerned only with its “chemical structure,””

aT
Lawson, 461 U.S, 852, 857, 108 §.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Hd.2d 908
(1988)). Even more succinctly, due process requires that a
criminal statute must provide “reasonable standards by which
a person may gauge his future conduct.” Commonwealth v.
Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 882 A.2d 418, 422 (2008). A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to satisfy either the “fair
warning” prong or the “arbitrary or discriminatory enforce-
ment” prong. See Hill v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 708, 782, 120 S.Ct.
2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). In my view, as applied to PB-22
during the relevant timeframe,? the definition of a designer
drug is deficient in both respects.

The Majority concludes that, unlike the statutorily unde-
fined and “somewhat nebulous” concept of a controlled sub-
stance analogue, Maj. Op. at 492, 161 A.3d at 210, the defi-
nition of a designer drug is not unconstitutionally vague
because, inter alia, its operative language—substantially
similar—is not specialized or technical, and “the concept of
similarity is well known to persons of ordinary intelli-
gence.” Id, With that much I certainly agree. However, it
is not the statute’s call for comparison that places it out-
side the bounds of ordinary comprehension. It is the object
of that comparison—chemical structure—that is problemat-
ic. We can expect the average citizen to understand com-
mon words like “substantial” and “similar.” But the law
cannot fairly impart upon the general populace a working
knowledge of organic chemistry. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted, “we do
not impute specialized knowledge to the ‘person of ordinary
intelligence’ by whom we judge the statute’s vagueness.”
United States v. Caseer, 399 F.8d 828, 887 (6th Cir. 2005).
To predicate criminal punishment upon the application of
such knowledge raises serious due process concerns. Crimi-

Maj. Op. at 474 n.8, 480-81 n.14, 485, 161 A.3d at 199 n.8, 203 n.14,
206,

2. As the Majority notes, the definition of a designer drug specifies that
“designer drugs and controlled substances ... are mutually exclusive
categories.” Maj. Op. at 486-87 n.17, 161 A.3d at 207 n.17. PB-22 has
been added to the schedule of controlled substances. See Act of June 8,
2016, P.L. 258, No, 37; Maj. Op, at 489, 490 n.20, 161 A.3d at 208, 209
n.20, Therefore, PB-22 is now a controlled substance, not a designer

i °

nal laws apply to everyone. One must not be required to
hold a doctorate in chemistry in order to recognize the
conduct that is forbidden by those laws.*

In support of the contention that an ordinary citizen fairly
may be asked to compare the chemical structures of different
molecules, on pain of committing a criminal offense, the Ma-
jority relies upon United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105 (8th
Cir, 1996). See Maj. Op. at 492, 161 A.8d at 210. In McKinney,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Highth Circuit
rejected an argument that the term “substantially similar” in
the federal definition of a “controlled substance analogue,” 21
U.S.C. § 802(82)(A), is unconstitutionally vague. In doing so,
the McKinney court set forth the dubious proposition that “a
reasonable layperson could ... have examined a chemical
chart and intelligently decided for himself or herself, by
comparing their chemical diagrams, whether the chemical
structure of two substances were substantially similar.”
McKinney, 79 F.3d at 108. A reproduction of the diagrams of
the chemical structures at issue in the instant case demon-
strates the troublesome nature of this proposition:

drug. Accordingly, we today consider the definition of a designer drug
as it applied to PB-22 before the revision.

3. Moreover, in light of the expert testimony adduced in the instant case,
it is clear that, due to the lack of consensus in the scientific community,
even possessing a doctorate in a relevant scientific field and dedicating
extensive study to the very question at issue is not sufficient to allow
one to reach a predictable or consistent conclusion as to whether two
chemical structures are “substantially similar.” See Maj. Op. at 478-79,
491 n.21, 161 A.3d at 202, 210 n.21; Conc. and Diss. Op. at 502-03,
161 A.3d at 216-17 (Donohue, J.) (discussing the expert testimony of
Michael Coyer, Ph.D., John Huffman, Ph.D., and Heather Harris,
Ph.D.).

JWH-018 (Scheduled)

Brief for Commonwealth at 14 (reproduced from Report of Dr,
Coyer at 6).

4 4

Hg CHs

JWH-048 PR22

Brief for Commonwealth at 15 (reproduced from Report of Dr.
Huffman at 2),

Several difficulties with this approach plainly are apparent.
First, to conclude that such diagrams fairly apprise an ordi-
nary citizen of the prohibited status of a chemical, one must
assume that an ordinary citizen is able to locate, interpret, and
understand these diagrams, Surely, the typical packet of
“Winter Haze” or “V-8 Air Freshener” is not labeled with an
illustration of the chemical structure of PB-22 alongside po-
tentially “similar” controlled substances. Nor are such prod-

ucts sold with a chemistry textbook that may aid a consumer
in recognizing the nature of the various atoms, bonds, or
functional groups that, together, give the substance its identi-
ty. Second, even if the ordinary citizen is presented with these
diagrams, and can understand what they represent, there
remains no principled standard by which to compare them and
to ascertain their substantial similarity. Anyone can observe
superficial similarities between two chemical diagrams. In-
deed, the above diagrams of PB-22 and JWH-018 contain
comparable lines, symbols, and polygonal shapes that make
them appear similar at first glance. But does the additional
“O” in the diagram of PB-22 make a difference? Does the
extra “N” substantially change its structure? Is it significant
that the two hexagonal shapes at the end seem to attach to the
remainder of the structure in a different place? Absent any
accepted metric for comparison, we cannot assume that a
citizen’s determination that these substances are “substantial-
ly similar” is based upon a reasoned analysis of “chemical
structure,” rather than any number of inapt considerations,
such as the total number of atoms in the structure, the
prevalence of straight lines compared to angled lines, or each
diagram’s degree of resemblance to some other object.

From these two-dimensional diagrams of their chemical
structures, today’s Majority finds “considerable similarities”
between PB-22 and JWH-018. Maj. Op. at 492-98, 161 A.3d at
210-11 (quoting United States v. Klecker, 348 F.8d 69, 72 (4th
Cir. 2003). Respectfully, I cannot agree that these diagrams
provide sufficient information to an ordinary citizen so as to
establish “fair warning” that PB-22 is a designer drug, unlaw-
ful to possess, manufacture, or distribute. See Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 8.Ct. 2294, 88 L.Ed.2d 222
(1972) (“Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing
fair warning.”); F.C.C. v. Fou Television Stations, Inc., 567
US, 289, 182 S.Ct. 2807, 2817, 188 L.Ed.2d 234 (2012) (“A
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which
regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct
that is forbidden or required.”).

Because the chemical structure of PB-22 is the dispositive
feature with regard to the classification of that substance as a
“designer drug” within the relevant time frame, and because
that feature patently is beyond the scope of knowledge attrib-
utable to a citizen of ordinary intelligence, neither the com-
monly-understood concept of “similarity” nor the fact that the
chemical structures of PB-22 and JWH-018 can be rendered
as two-dimensional diagrams adequately cures the definition’s
indeterminacy. What remains is an overly broad description
that lacks clear parameters by which an individual may gange
whether conduct is lawful, and whereby an individual may be
guilty of a crime based upon a subjective determination for
which there is no ascertainably right or wrong answer. Conse-
quently, the definition of a designer drug is written in “terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,” which
“violates the first essential of due process of law.” Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458, 59 S.Ct, 618, 83 L.Ed. 888
(1989) (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
891, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed, 322 (1926),

Not only does the definition of a designer drug fail to
provide the general populace with fair warning that PB-22 is a
prohibited substance, but its imprecision also runs afoul of
another requirement of due process under the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine. The definition allows for “arbitrary and discrim-
inatory enforcement.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct.
1855. The same absence of recognizable standards that leaves
an ordinary citizen to guess whether PB-22 falls within the
ambit of the definition also transforms the duties of the police
officer, the prosecutor, and the judiciary into guesswork. “A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92
S.Ct. 2294. The Supreme Court of the United States further
has recognized that, although the void-for-vagueness principle
focuses upon both fair notice and the potential for arbitrary
enforcement, “the more important aspect of vagueness doc-

trine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of
the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” Kolender,
461 U.S. at 358, 108 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415
US. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 89 L.Hd.2d 605 (1974)). Rather
than specifically delineating the necessary features of a sub-
stance in a manner that provides guidelines to law enforce-
ment and allows for predictable application, the definition of a
designer drug leaves the determination of the substance’s
prohibited status to the untrained discretion of the partici-
pants in the criminal justice system.

Like the ordinary citizen, police officers, prosecutors, and
judges are not chemists. A prosecuting authority may deem a
substance to be “close enough” to a controlled substance in
one circumstance, but, because there is no standard for assess-
ing whether that determination is accurate, the identical com-
parison in another circumstance may result in a conclusion
that the substances do not share a “substantially similar”
chemical structure. Both conclusions are as reasonable as they
are inconsistent. When determining whether a given substance
is an actually-scheduled controlled substance, law enforcement,
or prosecuting authorities may submit that substance to a
laboratory, which can return a “yes” or “no” answer as to
whether that substance is prohibited.’ By contrast, whether a

4. The Majority expresses concern that, if the incomprehensibility of the
definition of a designer drug to the ordinary citizen renders it unconsti-
tutionally vague, “much of the Act would be invalid because many
drugs appearing in the schedules are listed by their chemical formulae
or technical descriptions.” Maj. Op. at 496, 161 A3d at 213. The
Majority further cautions that “it would be misguided to invalidate
substantial portions of our controlled-substance legislation on the basis
that compounds subject to regulation or criminalization are described
by reference to technical formulae unintelligible to the general public.”
Id. But this misses the point. We are not here confronted with a
challenge to any provision that identifies particular substances by their
chemical formulae. Nor can the prospect of future challenges alter our
analysis in this case. Chief Justice John Roberts famously observed that,
as an “umpire” of the law, “it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not
to pitch or bat.” Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the
Nomination of The Honorable John G. Roberts, U.S.C.J., to be the Chief
Justice of the United States, 109! Cong. (Sept. 12, 2005), http://
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR

given substance is a “designer drug” is to be determined by an
unprincipled judgment call, which allows for enforcement that
is, at best, exceptionally discretionary, and, at worst, arbitrary
or discriminatory.

The Majority relies upon the abundance of decisions from
other jurisdictions that have held that the term “substantially
similar” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to various
substances. See Maj. Op. at 493-94, 161 A.3d at 211. Many of
these decisions are lacking in persuasive value. The Majority
cites United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.
1990), upon which many federal and state courts rely in
rejecting vagueness challenges to the “substantially similar”
language, including in a number of the other decisions that the
Majority cites. See, eg., United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d
515, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d
1829, 1833-34 (11th Cir. 2002); State v, Srack, 49 Kan.App.2d
761, 814 P.8d 890, 896 (2018); State v. Shalash, 18 N.E.8d
1202, 1209 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). However, Granberry, itself,
applied the following reasoning to the federal definition of a
controlled substance analogue:

Despite Granberry’s contention to the contrary, the term

“controlled substance analogue” in § 818 is clearly and

specifically defined, in terms readily comprehensible to the

ordinary reader. It provides adequate notice of what con-
duct is prohibited, The statute makes plain that drugs which
have been chemically designed to be similar to controlled

2005091300693,html. As umpires in our own right, we cannot call a

strike as a ball simply because a strike would be the third, or because it

could change the outcome of the ballgame. But let us suppose for a

moment that our constitutional analysis should be influenced by a fear

of the potential impact upon other statutory provisions, a point I do not
concede, Even so, the available mechanisms for objectively determining
whether a given substance is a scheduled drug serve as an important
point of distinction from the indeterminate definition of a designer
drug. Unlike the subjective determination of whether two substances
share a “substantially similar” chemical structure, for which the statute
provides the authorities no guidelines, law enforcement personnel
readily can determine through chemical testing whether a given sub-
stance is, for example, “N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate.” See Maj. Op. at

496, 161 A,3d at 213, The statutory provision prohibiting that substance

does not suffer from the same absence of specificity that is inherent in

the definition of a designer drug,

substances, but which are not themselves listed on the
controlled substance schedules, will nonetheless be consid-
ered as schedule I substances if 1) they are substantially
similar chemically to drugs that are on those schedules, 2) if
they produce similar effects on the central nervous system
as drugs that are on those schedules, or 8) are intended or
represented to produce effects similar to those produced by
drugs that are on those schedules. There is nothing vague
about the statute,
Granberry, 916 F.2d at 1010. The entirety of the Granberry
court’s analysis entailed a summary of the statutory definition,
and a conclusory assertion that “[t]here is nothing vague”
about that definition. Jd. Other courts may deem this discus-
sion to be sufficient. I am not so persuaded.

In other cases that the Majority cites, the courts relied
heavily upon the federal circuit courts’ consistent rejection of
similar challenges. See, eg., Turcotte, 405 F.8d at 581 (“The
circuit courts considering this issue have unanimously held
that the ... Analogue Provision is not unconstitutionally
vague.”); State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.8d 962, 978
(App. 2014) (“There is broad agreement in the federal cireuit
courts that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.”);
Srack, 814 P.8d at 896 (“Other federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals have reached a similar conclusion.”); Shalash, 18
N.E.3d at 1209 (citing Turcotte and noting that “every federal
cireuit court that has addressed this issue has ‘held that the
... Analogue Provision is not unconstitutionally vague.’ ”).
Although uniformity in the federal circuit courts certainly is
worthy of note, I find significant that much of this consensus
can be traced to thinly reasoned cases like Granberry and
McKinney. Where, as here, faithful application of due process
principles pursuant to the void-for-vagueness doctrine reveals
clear deficiencies in a statute, I would not yield to the contrary
case law of other jurisdictions, absent persuasive analysis.

The Majority notes that “Appellee has not drawn our atten-
tion to any court in any jurisdiction which has held that the
substantially-similar descriptor is unconstitutionally vaguef.]”
Maj. Op. at 494, 161 A.8d at 211. However, in its discussion of

the analogue provision, the Majority relies upon a decision
which held precisely that. See Maj. Op. at 486, 161 A.3d at
206-07 (applying United States v. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 232 (D.
Colo. 1992)). The Majority implicitly confines its application of
Forbes to the term “analogue” only, but the court in Forbes
held that, “[aJlthough the ‘substantially similar’ language may
be generally susceptible to adequate definition, it runs afoul of
the vagueness doctrine when it is applied to ... the circum-
stances of this case.” Forbes, 806 F. Supp. at 237. Of particular
salience to the instant case, the Forbes court noted that “[t]he
scientific community cannot even agree on a methodology to
use to determine structural similarity.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Majority quotes a portion of this statement to suggest
that the absence of recognized standards precluded a determi-
nation of “analogue status.” Maj. Op. at 486, 161 A.3d at 206-
07. However, the Majority overlooks the fact that it was the
“substantially similar” descriptor that the Forbes court found
problematic. That descriptor was held to be unconstitutionally
vague in Forbes based upon precisely the same circumstance
that was revealed in the instant case—the scientific communi-
ty cannot even agree on a methodology for determining
whether a substance “has a chemical structure substantially
similar to that of a controlled substance” so as to qualify as a
designer drug. 35 P.S. § 780-102(b). Forbes certainly supports
the Majority’s conclusion that the analogue provision is uncon-
stitutionally vague, but it equally supports the same conclusion
with regard to the definition of a designer drug.

The Majority’s final reason for rejecting the vagueness
challenge to the designer drug definition is that “the designer
drug provision has an express culpability prerequisite whereby
a defendant can only be convicted if the government proves he
acted knowingly or intentionally.” Maj. Op. at 494, 161 A.3d at
211. To be sure, the Supreme Court of the United States long
has held that “the constitutionality of a vague statutory stan-
dard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a
requirement of mens rea.” Colautti v. Franklin, 489 U.S. 379,
395, 99 8.Ct. 675, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979).

[T]he requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act
may avoid those consequences to the accused which may
otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid. ...
The requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful
may not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory defini-
tion of the crime which is in some respects uncertain. But it
does relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes
without warning an offense of which the accused was un-
aware.
Id. at 395 n.13, 99 S.Ct. 675 (quoting Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 101-102, 65 S.Ct. 1081, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945)
(plurality). Today’s Majority draws support from the Su-
preme Court’s decision in McFadden v. United States, —
US. ——, 185 S.Ct. 2298, 192 L.Hd.2d 260 (2015), wherein the
Court determined that the scienter element of the statute at
issue, which prohibits an individual from knowingly manufac-
turing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute a
controlled substance analogue, does not require knowledge of
the identity of the substance, but does require either (1)
knowledge that the substance is controlled, or (2) knowledge
of the features of the substance that make it a controlled
substance analogue. Id. at 2302. The McFadden Court also
noted that the scienter requirement “ ‘alleviate[s] vagueness
concerns,’ ‘narrow[s] the scope of the [its] prohibition[,] and
limit[s] prosecutorial discretion” ” Id. at 2307 (quoting Gon-
zales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149-50, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167
L.Ed.2d 480 (2007) (bracketed material in original)).

Although the relevance of a scienter requirement to the
vagueness inquiry is well-settled under the precedents of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Court has been
careful not to suggest that the presence of a mens rea element
is dispositive. Rather, the Supreme Court has stated that a
scienter requirement may “mitigate,” City of Chicago v. Mor-
ales, 527 U.S. 41, 110, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999),
“alleviate,” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 149, 127 S.Ct. 1610, or
“ameliorate,” Hill, 580 U.S. at 7382, 120 S.Ct. 2480, constitu-
tional vagueness concerns.’ Even framed as merely a factor to

5. I acknowledge, however, that this Court has expressed the proposi-
tion in more categorical terms. See Commonwealth v. Hendrickson, 555

consider when confronting a vagueness challenge, the proposi-
tion has not gone uncriticized, because it appears to create
tension with the familiar maxim: ignorantia juris non ewcusat
(“ignorance of the law excuses not”), Professor Wayne R.
LaFave has noted:
One “knowingly” commits an offense when he knows that
his acts will bring about certain results (those defined in the
statute in question), and whether he knows that deliberately
causing such results is proscribed by statute is immaterial.
Because it is knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions
and not knowledge of the existence or meaning of the
criminal law which is relevant, it seems clear that uncertain
language in a statute is not clarified by the addition of a
scienter element.

1 Wayne R. Larave, Sussrantive Crminan Law § 2.8 (2d ed.
2008) (footnotes omitted), Another commentator has opined:
“Scienter” has frequently been found a component of the
offense created by the statute charged with indefiniteness,
and on each occasion the statute has been sustained, in part
on the notion that the requirement of guilty knowledge
clarified it. Yet it is evident that, unless the Court has been
fooling itself in these cases, the “scienter” meant must be
some other kind of scienter than that traditionally known to
the common law—the knowing performance of an act with
intent to bring about that thing, whatever it is, which the
statute proscribes, knowledge of the fact that it is so
proscribed being immaterial. Such scienter would clarify
nothing; a clarificatory “scienter” must envisage not only a
knowing what is done but a knowing that what is done is
unlawful or, at least, so “wrong” that it is probably unlawful.
One difficulty here is that it is uncertain whether the courts
which subsequently enforce the statutes which the Court
sustains will employ the same brand of “scienter” as the
Court; if not, and if “scienter” was essential to the Court’s
Pa, 277, 724 A.2d 315, 319 (1999) (‘[VJagueness challenges fail when a
statute has a specific intent requirement because a defendant cannot

complain he did not understand the crime where he has been found to
have had the specific intent of doing what is prohibited.”),

holding, then of course the statute which is constitutional is
not being administered and the statute which is being
administered is not constitutional. In any event, “scienter”
has become a recognized element of the lore of vagueness,
and represents at its best, a tool to be designedly used in
the service of other ends; at its worst, a port of entry for
the ethical predilections of the then sitting Court.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doc-
trine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 87 n.98
(1960) (citations omitted) (cited in Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 n.14, 102
8.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)).

The Supreme Court, at least on one occasion, has invoked
the proposition that a scienter requirement reduces the threat
of vagueness particularly as compared to the dangers posed
by strict liability offenses, which require no proof of mens rea
to establish guilt. See Colawtti, 489 U.S. at 895-97, 99 S.Ct.
675. In Colautti, the Court expressed the concept not only
through the positive statement that the presence of a scienter
requirement mitigates constitutional vagueness concerns, but
through the inverse, that “[t]he lack of any scienter require-
ment exacerbates the uncertainty of the statute.” Id. at 401, 99
S.Ct. 675. The Court cautioned that, “[blecause of the absence
of a scienter requirement in the provision ... the statute is
little more than ‘a trap for those who act in good faith.” Id. at
395, 99 S.Ct. 675 (quoting United States v. Ragen, 314 US.
518, 524, 62 8.Ct. 374, 86 L.Ed. 388 (1942)),

Turning to the instant case, the Majority notes that the
designer drug provision prohibits the “knowing or intentional
manufacture, distribution, possession with intent to distribute,
or possession of a designer drug.” 85 P.S. § 780-118(a)(36)
(emphasis added). The Majority explains that “[s]cienter re-
quirements of this nature help alleviate vagueness concerns,
both with regard to the adequacy of notice of the proscribed
conduct and as a means of limiting prosecutorial discretion.”
Maj. Op. at 494, 161 A.3d at 211-12 (citations omitted). As
discussed above, there is certainly precedential support for
this proposition. However, if the scienter provision of 85 P.S.

§ 780-118(a)(36) helps to rescue the definition of a designer
drug from a finding of vagueness, the same logic should apply
to 85 P.S. § 780-113(a)(80) as it relates to the term “ana-
logue,” which the Majority concludes is unconstitutionally
vague.

Admittedly, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) does not use the same
scienter language as its designer drug counterpart,’ but we
never have held that the manufacture, delivery, or possession
with intent to deliver a controlled substance is a strict liability
offense. Indeed, construing the statute in Commonwealth v.
Rambo, 488 Pa. 384, 412 A.2d 585, 587 (1980), we relied upon
the definition of “possession” provided by Subsection 301(¢) of
the Crimes Code, which defines the term as “an act, within the
meaning of this section, if the possessor knowingly procured
or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control
thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate
his possession.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 301(¢), We held that “[sluch
knowledge is required by statute and our case law in order to
prove possession of a controlled substance.” Rambo, 412 A.2d
at 587; accord Commonwealth v. Valetie, 581 Pa. 384, 618
A.2d 548, 549-50 (1992) (“In drug possession cases, the Com-
monwealth must prove that a defendant had knowing or
intentional possession of a controlled substance ....”). Fur-
thermore, Subsection 302(c) of the Crimes Code provides a
default scienter requirement where such a term is not other-
wise specified by a criminal statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c)
(“When the culpability sufficient to establish a material ele-
ment of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is
established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or reck-
lessly with respect thereto.”). Accordingly, 35 P.S. § 780-

6, The crimes are defined, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Common-
wealth are hereby prohibited:
ae
(30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, or
possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled
substance ... or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with
intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.
ane
(36) The knowing or intentional manufacture, distribution, posses-
sion with intent to distribute, or possession of a designer drug. ...
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (36).

113(a)(80) does not define the manufacture, delivery, or pos-
session with intent to deliver a controlled substance analogue
as a strict liability offense—the statute requires proof of
scienter. If the scienter requirement of 85 P.S. § 780-
118(a)(86) helps to “alleviate vagueness concerns” with regard
to the definition of a designer drug, Maj. Op. at 494, 161 A3d
at 211-12, the fact that 85 P.S. § 780-118(a)(80) also requires
proof of scienter should mitigate the vagueness of the term
“analogue” in the same manner.

Ultimately, even if the scienter requirement in the charging
statute helps to alleviate concerns about the vagueness of the
definition of a designer drug, it does not help enough. At most,
the scienter requirement may constitute a “means of limiting
prosecutorial discretion,” Maj. Op. at 494, 161 A.8d at 211-12,
in that it makes the elements of the crime more difficult to
prove, particularly if it necessitates that a “defendant must
know that the chemical he possesses has a molecular structure
substantially similar to that of a scheduled drug.” Maj. Op. at
495, 161 A.8d at 212, Nevertheless, the scienter requirement
does not aid in the provision of “fair warning” to the ordinary
citizen that a given substance falls within the definition. The
statute must allow an individual to gauge the legality of
conduct in the first place, and the words “knowing” and
“intentional” do not provide the standards that are necessary
for the definition to be made amenable to intelligible or
consistent application, by either those who are subject to it or
those who seek to enforce it. A mens rea term is not a Rosetta
Stone that enables one to decipher a statute that is inherently
indeterminate. The problem remains that “chemical structure
substantially similar to that of a controlled substance,” 35 P.S.
§ 780-102(b), is an amorphous and unduly subjective stan-
dard, which lies beyond the scope of knowledge attributable to
an ordinary citizen, and which cannot be ascertained reliably,
even by the most qualified of experts. Terms like “knowing”
and “intentional” shed no additional light upon the meaning of
that definition. In the words of Justice Anthony Kennedy:
“Scienter cannot save so vague a statute as this.” Hill, 530
US. at 774, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

I recognize that the designer drug statute is a product of
the General Assembly’s ongoing struggle to prohibit newly-
developed and potentially dangerous intoxicants. To be sure,
this area of criminal law is in constant flux. I have little doubt
that, in some secluded laboratory somewhere, almost immedi-
ately after a substance is criminalized, fiendish chemists set to
work developing a substance similar in effect, but distinct in
identity. Undoubtedly, the designer drug statute targets such
substances, even those yet to be invented. I understand that.
the General Assembly sought to get ahead of these manufac-
turers, rather than always playing catch-up to ever-changing
technology. Still, it is the General Assembly’s duty to define
the law. Although “we can never expect mathematical certain-
ty from our language,” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct.
2294, due process requires clarity and specificity in the exer-
cise of the legislative function, particularly in regard to laws
with penal effect. This Court may well be able to discern the
purpose underlying an enactment. But it is not our preroga-
tive to fill in the gaps, to improve creatively upon an unduly
vague statutory standard, in order to “get us there.”

I appreciate the import of the legislative purpose that
animates the designer drug statute. I recognize as well the
difficulty of drafting language sufficiently tailored to achieve
that worthwhile purpose. But importance of purpose and
difficulty of drafting do not relieve the General Assembly of its
obligation to define criminal offenses in a manner that enables
ordinary people to gauge whether their conduct is lawful, and
in a fashion that does not encourage arbitrary or discriminato-
ry enforcement. A statute cannot leave the definition of crimi-
nality itself to the subjective determination of a police officer,
a prosecutor, a judge, or a jury.

Many years ago, Chief Justice Morrison Waite cautioned
against the pernicious effect of such a broad grant of legisla-
tive authority:

It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a

net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it

to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully
detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to

some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative de-

partment of the government.
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875).
Because 85 P.S. § 780-102(b) defines a designer drug in an
impermissibly vague manner, it casts such an overbroad net.
Therefore, I agree with the trial court’s determination that 85
P.S. § 780-102(b) was unconstitutional as applied to PB-22,
and I would affirm the trial court’s order in its entirety. I
respectfully dissent.

Justices Todd and Donohue join this concurring and

dissenting opinion.

161 A.8d 228
Susan A. YOCUM, Petitioner
v

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA
GAMING CONTROL BOARD, Respondent

No. 74 MM 2015

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
ARGUED: April 5, 2016
RESUBMITTED; April 26, 2017
DECIDED: May 25, 2017

boy

Ld
a
Po
Ce
John J. MeNally III, Esq., Scott Thomas Wyland, Esq.,
Salzmann Hughes, P.C., for Susan A. Yocum, Petitioner.
Bruce Richard Beemer, Esq., Kenneth Lawson Joel, Esq.,
Kemal A. Mericli, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney Gen-
eral, Sharon K. Rogers, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney
General, 16th Floor, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA 1712,

for Office of Attorney General, Appellate Litigation Section
and Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, Respondent.

Joshua D. Shapiro, Esq., for Office of Attorney General,
Appellate Litigation Section, Respondent,

Richard Douglas Sherman, E'sq., Pennsylvania Gaming Con-
trol Board, for Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, Respon-
dent.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY

We consider the petition for review filed by Susan A.
Yocum, Esquire, in this Court’s original jurisdiction pursuant
to the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming
Act, 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101-1904 (the Gaming Act). Petitioner
challenges as unconstitutional certain restrictions imposed
upon attorneys who are employed by the Pennsylvania Gam-

a ©

ing Control Board (Board), and seeks declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. The Board filed preliminary objections, asserting
petitioner lacks standing to pursue her claim, her claim is not
yet ripe, and in any event, her claim fails on the merits. We
overrule the Board's preliminary objections as to standing and
ripeness, but nevertheless conclude petitioner is not entitled to
relief on the merits as the restrictions included in the Gaming
Act are constitutionally sound.

Petitioner is an attorney employed by the Board. At all
relevant times, the Gaming Act has set forth various require-
ments and restrictions applicable to Board members and
certain other persons employed by and associated with the
Board. When petitioner was first hired in 2008, the Gaming
Act prohibited Board employees from soliciting, reeommend-
ing or accepting employment with a licensed gaming facility
for a period of two years after termination of employment with
the Board.? The Gaming Act also restricted Board employees
from accepting employment with an applicant, licensed entity,
affiliate, intermediary subsidiary or holding company of an
applicant or licensed entity for one year after termination, and
appearing before the Board in any hearing or proceeding for
two years after termination.’ In 2010, the Act was amended to,
inter alia, specifically identify the executive director, bureau
directors and attorneys as types of employees prohibited from
appearing before the Board for two years after termination,
and also to extend the general one-year prohibition on accept-
ing employment with a licensed gaming entity or an affiliate,
intermediary, subsidiary or holding company of an applicant
or licensed entity to two years after termination. 4 Pa.C.S.
1, We note our review of preliminary objections in the first instance is

highly unusual, and derives from the General Assembly's vesting of

exclusive original jurisdiction in this Court “to hear any challenge to or
to render a declaratory judgment concerning the constitutionality of”
the Gaming Act. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1904; see also Pennsylvanians Against

Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275, 877

A.2d 383, 392 (2005) (Gaming Act vested Supreme Court with original

and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any constitutional challenges to
Gaming Act).

2. 4Pa.C.S. § 1201(h)(8) (amended 2006).
3. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1201(h)(13) (amended 2006).

§ 1201(h)(18) (as amended 2010). Specifically, Section 1201(h)
currently provides in pertinent part as follows:
(h) Qualifications and restrictions.—
ae ee

(8) No member, employee or independent contractor of
the board may directly or indirectly solicit, request, suggest
or recommend to any applicant, licensed entity, or an affili-
ate, intermediary, subsidiary or holding company thereof or
to any principal, employee, independent contractor or agent
thereof, the appointment or employment of any person in
any capacity by the applicant, licensed entity, or an affiliate,
intermediary, subsidiary or holding company thereof for a
period of two years from the termination of term of
office, employment or contract with the board.

ok de ea

(18) The following shall apply to an employee of the
board whose duties substantially involve licensing, enforce-
ment, development of law, promulgation of regulations or
development of policy, relating to gaming under this part or
who has other discretionary authority which may affect or
influence the outcome of an action, proceeding or decision
under this part, including the executive director, bureau
directors and attorneys:

@_ The individual may not, for a period of two years
following termination of employment, accept employ-
ment with or be retained by an applicant or a licensed
entity or by an affiliate, intermediary, subsidiary or holding
company of an applicant or a licensed entity.

Gi) The individual may not, for a period of two years
following termination of employment, appear before the
board in a hearing or proceeding or participate in activity
on behalf of any applicant, licensee, permittee or licensed
entity or on behalf of an affiliate, intermediary, subsidiary
or holding company of any applicant, licensee, permittee or
licensed entity.

ii) An applicant or a licensed entity or an affiliate,
intermediary, subsidiary or holding company of an applicant

or a licensed entity may not, until the expiration of two
years following termination of employment, employ or
retain the individual. Violation of this subparagraph shall
result in termination of the individual’s employment and
subject the violator to section 1518(c) (relating to prohibited
acts; penalties).

(iv) A prospective employee who, upon employment,
would be subject to this paragraph must, as a condition of
employment, sign an affidavit that the prospective employee
will not violate subparagraph (i) or (ii), If the prospective
employee fails to sign the affidavit, the board shall rescind
any offer of employment and shall not employ the individual.

4 Pa.C.8, § 1201(h)(8) and (18) (emphases added). Petitioner—
who holds the position of Assistant Chief Counsel III—is
subject to the restrictions identified in Section 1201(h)(8) and
(18). See 4 Pa.C.S. § 1201(h)(14.1); Petition for Review, Ex-
hibit B.

Petitioner, who now wishes to seek and accept new employ-
ment as an attorney representing gaming clients, filed this
petition for review requesting: (1) a declaration the restric-
tions of Section 1208(h) violate Article V, Section 10 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution,’ which vests in this Court the
exclusive authority to govern the practice of law; and (2) a
permanent injunction against the enforcement of the chal-
lenged restrictions. Specifically, petitioner alleges that, “[ajs a

4, In relevant part, Article V, Section 10 provides:
(c) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts,
justices of the peace and all officers serving process or enforcing
orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the peace,
including the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of
classes of actions or classes of appeals among the several courts as
the needs of justice shall require, and for admission to the bar and to
practice law, and the administration of all courts and supervision of
all officers of the Judicial Branch, if such rules are consistent with
this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substan-
tive rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly
to determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace, nor
suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose. All laws shall be
suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules pre-
scribed under these provisions... ...
PA, Const. art. V, § 10(c) (emphasis added).

current Gaming Board attorney, [she] desires to seek and

accept employment as an attorney representing gaming

clients.” Amended Petition for Review at 16. She states she is

currently “faced with two equally unappealing and untenable

options to leave the employ of the Gaming Board.” Id. at 18.
Option one is to test the Gaming Act’s employment provi-
sions by violating them, actively seeking a legal position
with a licensee, affiliate or law firm that represents licen-
sees or affiliates knowing that if Petitioner accepted a
position and left the Gaming Board, the licensee or affiliate
could be subject to administrative penalties, Petitioner’s
position, by statute, would be terminated and Petitioner
could be subject to sanction for breach of fiduciary duty to
clients for placing Petitioner’s interests before her client’s
interests. Thus, Petitioner would be risking harm to her
reputation and her ability to continue practicing law in the
Commonwealth and the licensees and affiliates would be
risking administrative penalty.
The other option for Petitioner is to forgo the practice of
law in her area of expertise, or with any law firm that
represents any licensees or their affiliates.

Id, at 199, 12 (citations omitted).

I The Board filed preliminary objections to the petition
for review, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4), alleging insuffi-
ciency of the pleading in various respects. The Board claims
(1) petitioner lacks standing to challenge so-called “post-em-
ployment” restrictions of the Act,’ as she is still employed by
the Board, and has not yet been aggrieved by their enforce-
ment against her; (2) petitioner’s claims are not yet ripe
because she is still an employee of the Board and enforcement
of post-employment restrictions against her is hypothetical
and speculative; (8) petitioner’s request for pre-enforcement
review is premature; (4) the Rules of Professional Conduct
allow protections against conflicts of interest as provided in
the Act; and (5) the Act's post-employment restrictions do not
5. We note the Board often refers to the challenged restrictions as “post-

employment” restrictions, but as we explain further infra, the provi-
sions apply while individuals are still employed by the Board.

violate the separation of powers as circumscribed in Article V,
Section 10(¢).

Hl A preliminary objection to the legal sufficiency of a
pleading (a demurrer) raises questions of law, and a court
must decide whether it is clear from the well-pleaded facts and
reasonable inferences from those facts that the claimant has
not established a right to relief. Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v.
The Architectwral Studio, 581 Pa. 454, 866 A.2d 270, 272
(2005), citing Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 557 Pa. 840,
733 A.2d 623, 624, n.1 (1999) (in determining preliminary
objections in nature of demurrer, all material facts set forth in
the pleading, and all inferences therefrom, are accepted as
true). Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a
doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Id.
at 274, quoting MacElree v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 544 Pa.
117, 674 A.2d 1050, 1056 (1996).

I. Standing and Ripeness

HMM We first consider the Board’s objections based on
standing and ripeness, We note there is “considerable overlap”
between the two doctrines, especially where the objecting
party’s claim that the matter is not justiciable is “focused on
arguments that the interest asserted by the petitioner is
speculative, not concrete, or would require the court to offer
an advisory opinion.” Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 628
Pa. 564, 83 A.3d 901, 917 (2018), citing Rendell v. Pa. State
Ethics Comm’n., 603 Pa. 292, 983 A.2d 708, 718 (2009).

Generally, the doctrine of standing is an inquiry into wheth-

er the petitioner filing suit has demonstrated aggrievement,

by establishing “a substantial, direct and immediate interest

in the outcome of the litigation.” ... In this sense, a

challenge that a petitioner’s interest in the outcome of the

litigation is hypothetical may be pled either as determina-
tive of standing or restyled as a ripeness concern although
the allegations are essentially the same. Standing and ripe-
ness are distinct concepts insofar as ripeness also reflects

the separate concern that relevant facts are not sufficiently
developed to permit judicial resolution of the dispute.

Id. (internal citations omitted). However, we have further
observed that “pure questions of law,” such as those presented
by petitioner in this case, “do not suffer generally from
development defects and are particularly well-suited for pre-
enforcement review.” Id., citing Rendell, 988 A.2d at 718 n.18.

Taking the Board’s objections in order, we first consider
whether petitioner has standing to bring her action challeng-
ing the restrictions of Section 1201(h), which the Board argues
are post-employment restrictions, and as petitioner is still
employed by the Board, she has not yet been aggrieved by
their enforcement against her. The Board further argues
petitioner knew about the post-employment rules when she
took the position and did not challenge them until now; the
Board claims this circumstance belies petitioner’s claim her
harm is “immediate.” See Brief for Respondent at 12-13.
Petitioner, however, argues the plain language of Section
1201(h)(8)—stating no employee of the Board “may directly or
indirectly solicit, request, suggest or recommend” to any
gaming entity the employment of any person for a period of
two years from the termination of the person’s employment by
the Board—binds current as well as former employees, and
thus presents a direct, immediate and substantial impediment
to her stated objective: to seek and accept employment in the
private sector, in her chosen profession, in her particular area
of expertise, i.¢., the gaming industry. See Brief for Petitioner
at 10-14. Petitioner claims the restriction prevents her from
looking for a job with a prospective employer, let alone
accepting a position for two years after she leaves the Board.
See id. She argues the General Assembly’s omission of the
word “former” from the statute’s description of affected Board
employees means the provision applies to her right now, and
she is thus presently aggrieved, notwithstanding the Board’s
reference to the statutes as “post-employment” restrictions.

HN We have described the requirements for standing as
follows:

a «

In seeking judicial resolution of a controversy, a party must
establish as a threshold matter that he has standing to
maintain the action. In Pennsylvania, the requirement of
standing is prudential in nature. ...[TJhe core concept of
standing is that a person who is not adversely affected in
any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not ag-
grieved thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial
resolution of his challenge.
Fumo ». City of Phila., 601 Pa. 822, 972 A.2d 487, 496 (2009)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “An individu-
al can demonstrate that he has been aggrieved if he can
establish that he has a substantial, direct and immediate
interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Id, citing In ve
Hickson, 578 Pa, 127, 821 A.2d 1288, 1248 (2008). Moreover,
one has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation if her
interest surpasses that “of all citizens in procuring obedience
to the law.” Id., quoting Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1248. One has a
direct interest in litigation “if there is a causal connection
between the asserted violation and the harm complained of; it
is immediate if that causal connection is not remote or specula-
tive.” Id., quoting City of Phila. v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa.
542, 838 A.2d 566, 577 (2003).

HAs stated, petitioner is still employed by the Board as
an attorney, and it is undisputed she is included among the
employees restricted by the terms of the statute. We acknowl-
edge the two-year period of restriction does not begin until
after petitioner’s employment with the Board is terminated,
but we also note the rule’s prohibition of petitioner's ability to
legally seek employment in the gaming field before she actual-
ly leaves her job and becomes a former employee. Section
1201(h)(8) specifically prohibits petitioner, as an “employee of
the Board,” from soliciting, requesting, suggesting, or recom-
mending employment with any applicant, licensed entity or an
affiliate, intermediary, subsidiary or holding company. Peti-
tioner alleges in her petition her “desire to pursue employ-
ment opportunities and to render professional legal services to
clients outside the Gaming Board.” Petition for Review at 1 23.
Petitioner further avers she has been informed by persons and

law firms who associate and represent gaming entities that the
employment restrictions in the Gaming Act will inhibit her
ability to seek and obtain employment with those potential
employers, and the employment restrictions have a chilling
effect on potential employers’ willingness to hire a person in
petitioner's position. Jd. at 1131-33.

Petitioner relies on Robinson, where this Court considered
a physician’s challenge to statutory restrictions (Act 13) re-
garding obtaining and sharing information with other physi-
cians about chemicals used in fracking operations. The physi-
cian alleged the restrictions improperly impeded his ability to
diagnose and treat his patients by forcing him to choose
between complying with the mandatory provisions of the
statute and adhering to his ethical and legal duties to report
findings in medical records and make those records available
to patients and other medical professionals. Robinson, 83 A.38d
at 923-24. Although the Commonwealth argued he did not
have standing until he actually requested information restrict-
ed by the statute and that information was not supplied at all,
or was supplied with restrictions interfering with his ability to
provide proper medical care, or indicated the chemicals posed
a public health hazard, this Court nonetheless held the physi-
cian’s interest in the outcome of the litigation regarding
constitutionality of the provisions was “neither remote nor
speculative.” Id. The Court recognized “the untenable and
objectionable position in which Act 18” placed him:
choosing between violating a Section 8222.1(b) confidentiali-
ty agreement and violating his legal and ethical obligations
to treat a patient by accepted standards, or not taking a
case and refusing a patient medical care. ... Our existing
jurisprudence permits pre-enforcement review of statutory
provisions in cases in which petitioners must choose be-
tween equally unappealing options and where the third
option, here refusing to provide medical services to a pa-
tient, is equally undesirable.

Id. at 924. Petitioner argues she similarly “must choose be-
tween equally unappealing options and where the third option

. is equally undesirable.” Brief for Petitioner at 17, citing
Robinson, 88 A.3d at 924.

Petitioner also relies on Shaulis v. Pennsylvania. State
Ethics Commission, 574 Pa. 680, 888 A.2d 128, 129 (2008).
Shaulis, an attorney with the Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue, questioned provisions of the State Ethics Act which
ostensibly applied to limit her activities as an attorney after
her public employment ended. The provision stated: “No
former public official or public employee shall represent a
person, with promised or actual compensation, on any matter
before the governmental body with which he has been associ-
ated for one year after he leaves that body.” 65 Pa.C.S.
§ 1103(g). After the State Ethics Commission confirmed Sec-
tion 1108(g) applied to limit Shaulis’s ability to practice in the
relevant tribunals, this Court determined she was aggrieved
because “if she took the actions therein proscribed, she would
expose herself to the exact ethical investigation that she was
attempting to forestall by seeking the advice of the Commis-
sion in the first place.” Shawlis, 883 A.2d at 130. Petitioner
claims this matter is similar to the pre-enforcement review in
Shaulis, where the Court recognized as untenable the attor-
ney’s choices to either “violate the law and risk an ethics
investigation or forgo practicing in Shaulis’[s] area of exper-
tise.” Brief for Petitioner at 18, citing Shaulis, 888 A.2d at
180. Petitioner claims she likewise faces objectionable options
to: (1) forego practicing law in her area of expertise; or (2)
test the law by violating it and seeking employment as an
attorney directly representing gaming entities, or with a law
firm representing gaming entities as clients, with adverse
consequences to both a potential future employer and petition-
er herself. See Brief for Petitioner at 18; see also, eg. Petition
6. Shaulis addressed both the petitioner’s standing to challenge the

employment restrictions, as well as the constitutionality of those provi-

sions. A majority of the Court, including Chief Justice Cappy and

Justices Castille and Eakin, joined the portion of Justice Newman's

opinion holding Shaulis had standing. Shaulis, 833 A.2d at 132. In

addition, a majority of the Court, comprised of Chief Justice Cappy and

Justices Castille and Lamb, joined the portion of Justice Newman’s
opinion holding the Ethics Act provision unconstitutional. Id.

a

for Review at 1131-83 (averring chilling effect of restrictions
upon potential employers).

The Board argues petitioner is in a different position than
the plaintiffs in either Robinson or Shaulis, and that those
decisions do not confer standing upon her here. The Board
avers that the choices the physician in Robinson faced are not
“even closely analogous” to the choices petitioner claims to be
facing. Brief for Respondent at 16,

Considering the facts alleged by petitioner, all taken as
true, we conclude she is in the position that if she took the
actions proscribed by Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) and tried to
obtain new employment in Pennsylvania’s gaming industry,
she would be in violation of the Act, exposing herself—and her
potential employer—to adverse consequences, including dam-
age to her reputation, and potentially instigating the loss of
her new employer’s gaming license, See 4 PaCS.
§ 1201(h)(18). Under the circumstances, we conclude petition-
er has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Gam-
ing Act’s employment restrictions.

HM We next consider the Board’s preliminary objection
alleging the matter is not yet ripe and petitioner’s challenge is
premature. The Board argues “declaratory relief is only ap-
propriate where there is an actual controversy” and the “hypo-
thetical future occurrence” of petitioner’s departure from
Board employment is speculative and not yet a proper subject
for this Court’s consideration. Brief for Respondent at 13-14.
The Board asserts it is unknown how long petitioner will stay
in her current job, and by the time she leaves that job the
statute might be amended, or the subsequent employment
petitioner might secure may not even be as an attorney or
within the scope of the statute; the Board claims the matter is
therefore not ripe for decision. Jd. at 14-15. The Board
therefore claims petitioner's request for relief is premature.

Petitioner argues the question of the constitutionality of the
Gaming Act employment restrictions is ripe for the same
reasons stated in her argument on standing. We agree the
challenge to petitioner’s claim based on ripeness is “merely a

restyling of the remoteness concern” addressed in our discus-
sion on standing. Robinson, 88 A.38d at 920 (municipalities
challenging Act 13 had standing and matter was ripe even
before enforcement; they were aggrieved even by “threatened
fundamental changes to esthetic and environmental values”).
Thus, as with our consideration of the Board’s preliminary
objections based on standing, we consider the following allega-
tions as true for purposes of determining the preliminary
objection challenging ripeness: (1) petitioner wishes to leave
her Board position and find another job in her specialty,
although she is currently still employed by the Board; and (2)
the statutory provisions facially restrict her current ability to
seek future employment opportunities in her specialty, even
though the details of her potential future departure from
Board employment are not yet known. See Bilt—Rite Contrac-
tors, 866 A.2d at 272. (standard in determining preliminary
objections is taking all petitioner’s allegations as true).

Tn any event, additional factual development of petitioner’s
claims that might result from awaiting her actual application
to or recruitment by a possible future gaming industry em-
ployer “is not likely to shed more light upon the constitutional
question of law” she has presented. Robinson, 88 A.8d at 925.
The substantive question regarding constitutionality of the
employment restrictions in the Gaming Act is clearly a ques-
tion of law and, as we have stated, such questions are “particu-
larly well-suited for pre-enforcement review.” Id. at 917. Ac-
cordingly, the question presented by petitioner is ripe for
review and the Board’s preliminary objections as to standing
and ripeness are therefore overruled.

Il. Constitutionality

HM In its preliminary objections based on the merits of
petitioner’s constitutional challenge, the Board argues peti-
tioner failed to state a claim on which she is legally entitled to
relief, because the employment restrictions at Sections
1201(h)(8) and (18) of the Gaming Act are constitutionally
sound. We reiterate, in ruling on preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer, a court’s role is to accept all well-

a

pleaded facts as true and determine if those facts are suffi-
cient to permit the cause of action to continue. See Bilt-Rite
Contractors, 866 A.2d at 272. The issue of the constitutionality
of Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) of the Gaming Act is a pure
question of law, and no material factual dispute exists. Accord-
ingly, with objections to standing and ripeness overruled, we
proceed to determine the merits of petitioner's claim. See
Robinson, 83 A.3d at 917.

Petitioner challenges the employment restrictions set forth
in Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) of the Gaming Act on the basis
they conflict with this Court’s authority under Article V,
Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution which states, in
relevant part:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
general rules governing practice, procedure and the con-
duct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers
serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees
of any court or justice of the peace, including the power to
provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of
actions or classes of appeals among the several courts as the
needs of justice shall require, and for admission to the bar
and to practice law, and the administration of all courts
and supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch, if such
rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither
abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to
determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice of the
peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or
repose. All laws shall be suspended to the extent that
they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these
provisions. ...

See PA. Const. art. V, § 10(c) (emphasis added). Section 10(¢)
specifically prohibits the General Assembly from enacting laws
that are “inconsistent with” the rules prescribed by this Court
regarding the practice of law. Pursuant to its constitutional
authority, this Court has established, inter alia, Rules of
Professional Conduct, Pa.R.P.C., and Rules of Disciplinary

Enforcement, Pa.R.D.E, pertaining to the supervision of attor-
neys who practice in the Commonwealth.

HE At the outset, we acknowledge petitioner’s burden
in challenging the constitutionality of a statute. “There is a
presumption that lawfully enacted legislation is constitutional.
Should the constitutionality of legislation be challenged, the
challenger must meet the burden of rebutting the presumption
of constitutionality by a clear, palpable and plain demonstra-
tion that the statute violates a constitutional provision.” Com-
monwealth v. Stern, 549 Pa. 505, 701 A.2d 568, 571 (1997),
quoting Commonwealth v. Kohl, 582 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 308, 315
(1992), See also Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expan-
sion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 275, 877 A.2d 383,
398 (2005) (PAGE ) (there is “strong presumption in the law
that legislative enactments do not violate our Constitution”),
citing Pennsylvania Sch. Bds, Ass’n. v. Commonwealth,
Ass'n. of Sch. Adm’rs., 569 Pa. 486, 805 A.2d 476, 479 (2002).
To be successful in her challenge, petitioner must overcome
the presumption of constitutionality with a clear, palpable, and
plain demonstration that the employment restrictions in the
Gaming Act constitute an infringement on this Court’s consti-
tutional power to prescribe rules governing the practice of
law. See PA. Const. art. V, § 10(c)., Additionally, in interpret-
ing provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, “[oJur ulti-
mate touchstone is the actual language of the constitution
itself.” Buckwalier v. Borough of Phoeniaville, 603 Pa. 534,
985 A.2d 728, 730 (2009), quoting Jubelirer v. Rendell, 598 Pa.
16, 953 A.2d 514, 528 (2008), quoting Stilp v. Commonwealth,
588 Pa. 539, 905 A.2d 918, 939 (2006). The constitutional
language must be interpreted as the average person would
have understood it when it was adopted. Stilp, 905 A.2d at 939.
Moreover, “{alll doubts are to be resolved in favor of finding
that the legislative enactment passes constitutional muster.”
PAGE, 877 A.2d at 398, citing Commonwealth v. Hendrick-
son, 555 Pa. 277, 724 A.2d 815, 317 (1999). As explained below,
we conclude petitioner has failed to overcome this presump-
tion, and Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) of the Gaming Act do not

aT

improperly invade the Supreme Court’s authority set forth in
Article V, Section 10.

HM Petitioner argues the Gaming Act contains the follow-
ing unconstitutional restrictions: (1) regulating petitioner’s
practice of law for two years as it relates to her representation
of Pennsylvania’s gaming entities and their affiliates before
the Gaming Board, as well as before any tribunal in any
jurisdiction; (2) regulating petitioner’s practice of law for two
years as it relates to her ability to obtain employment with
any law firm that represents gaming entities, both inside and
outside the Commonwealth; and (8) inhibiting the ability of
gaming entities to employ the legal talent of their choice, Brief
for Petitioner at 26-27. Petitioner further avers these restric-
tions create an unlawful ban and regulate every aspect of her
ability to practice law “as it relates to gaming entities or law
firms that represent gaming entities.” See id. at 27.

In making this argument, petitioner relies upon Wajert v.
State Ethics Comm'n, 491 Pa, 255, 420 A.2d 439 (1980), and
Shaulis, supra. In Wajert, in a challenge brought by a former
common pleas court judge, this Court examined a regulation in
the Ethics Act, at 65 P.S. § 408(e), providing “[nJo former
official or public employee shall represent a person with or
without compensation, on any matter before the governmental
body with which he has been associated for one year after he
leaves that body.” See Wajert, 420 A.2d at 440, quoting 65 P.S.
§ 408(e). Wajert argued the regulation improperly limited his
ability to practice law after he left the bench. This Court held
the provision applied to judges who had retired or resigned
from the bench. Jd. at 442, The Wajert Court further held the
prohibition in the Ethics Act against “representing” a person
in matters before the court targeted the practice of law, and
thus improperly infringed on this Court’s constitutional au-
thority to govern the conduct of attorneys. Id. at 441-42.

As in her argument on standing and ripeness, petitioner
also relies on Shawlis for her position on the merits that
Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) are unconstitutional, As stated,
Shaulis challenged an Ethics Act provision—nearly identical to

the restriction found to be unconstitutional twenty-three years
earlier in Wajert—purporting to restrict former government,
employees from “represent[ing] a person, with promised or
actual compensation, on any matter before the governmental
body with which he has been associated for one year after he
leaves that body.” Shaulis, 888 A2d at 125 ni, 132. In
striking down the provision, the Court explained “the state
legislature is not the body vested with the power to enact such
a restriction; that authority lies with this Court through the
promulgation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Con-
duet.” Jd. at 182. Petitioner argues the scope and duration of
the employment restrictions in Sections 1201(h)(8) and (13) of
the Gaming Act exceed the post-employment restrictions
found to be unconstitutional in Wajert and Shaulis, and thus
are also unconstitutional.

The Board argues the Gaming Act’s employment restric-
tions do not infringe on this Court’s authority because, unlike
in Shaulis, the post-employment regulation here restricts the
conduct of all employees and is not specifically targeted at
attorneys. The Board relies on P.J.S. v. State Ethics Commis-
sion, 555 Pa. 149, 723 A.2d 174 (1999). In P.J.S., this Court
examined whether the State Ethics Commission was barred
from investigating alleged ethical violations of an attorney
under Sections 408(a) and (£) of the Ethics Act, pursuant to
this Court’s jurisdiction to regulate the professional and ethi-
eal conduct of attorneys. Sections 403(a) and (f) provided, in
pertinent part: “No public official or public employee shall
engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest,” and
“No public official or public employee ... or any business in
which the person ... is associated shall enter into any con-
tract valued at $500 or more with the governmental body with
which the public official or public employee is associated ...”
65 P.S. § 403(a) and (f). In determining the challenged Ethics
Act provisions were not an unconstitutional violation of the
separation of powers, the P.J.S. Court held “the jurisdiction of
this [Clourt is not infringed when a regulation aimed at
conduct is applied to all persons, and some of those persons
happen to be attorneys.” P.J.S., 728 A.2d at 178.

HM Our careful review of the relevant cases reveals em-
ployment restrictions do not infringe on this Court’s authority
to regulate the practice of law when they regulate the conduct
of all employees, rather than attorneys only. See Id. (employ-
ment restriction not unconstitutional because it applies to all
employees, not just attorneys); Maunus v. Commonwealth,
State Ethics Comm’n, 518 Pa. 592, 544 A.2d 1324, 1827 (1988)
(upholding provision of Ethics Act requiring financial disclo-
sures of employees as constitutional because it applied to all
employees, not only attorneys); see also Shaulis, 883 A.2d at
181 (“an employer, in this case the Commonwealth govern-
ment, can proscribe conduct of its current employees, includ-
ing attorneys, provided that the proscription is not targeted
specifically at attorneys”). The employment restrictions set
forth in Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) of the Gaming Act clearly
apply to all Board employees, including but not limited to
attorneys, and thus do not present the constitutional problem
identified in Shaulis and Wojert.’ Instead, our holdings in
P.J.S. and Maunus apply to support our determination that
the challenged provisions do not violate Article V, Section 10.

Moreover, in arguing Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) of the
Gaming Act are unconstitutional as an infringement on this
Court’s authority to regulate the practice of law, petitioner
does not argue the restrictions apply exclusively to attorneys,
nor does she dispute the provisions apply to all employees
equally, Instead, petitioner attempts to analogize the employ-
ment restrictions in the Gaming Act to those held unconstitu-

7. We recognize the opinions in Shaulis and Wajert focused in part on
whether the restrictions applied to current or former employees. See
Shaulis, 833 A.2d at 131-32; Wajert, 420 A.2d at 442. The Gaming Act's
restrictions at issue here apply to every ‘‘member, employee or indepen-
dent contractor of the board,” § 1201(h)(8), and also to “an employee
of the board,” § 1201(h)(13); current employees are affected, as well as
former employees who are within the two-year restriction period.
However, as we explain in further detail infra, although the distinction
between current and former employees is relevant for purposes of our
discussion on standing and ripeness, it is not critical to our determina-
tion of the merits of the constitutional question, where the validity of
the restriction depends primarily upon whether it purports to regulate
the practice of Jaw or not. See P.J.S., supra; see also Shaulis, 833 A.2d
at 136 n.2 (status as former employee should not control determination
of restriction’s validity) (Saylor, J., dissenting).

a «

tional in Wajert and Shaulis by arguing the Gaming Act
restrictions are unconstitutional as applied to attorneys. Peti-
tioner essentially seeks an exemption from restrictions de-
signed to apply to all employees based on her status as an
attorney. We hold the argument fails. P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 178.
In both Wajert and Shaulis, this Court specifically found the
prohibitions in the Ethics Act were unconstitutional because
they specifically targeted attorneys, noting the provision pre-
vented a former government employee from “representing”
individuals before their government employer. See Shaulis,
833 A.2d at 182 (Section 1108(g) of the Ethics Act is unconsti-
tutional because it “targets the practice of law”) (citations
omitted); see also Wajert, 420 A.2d at 441 (statute unconstitu-
tional as it applied to restrict practice of law by former
judges). However, as stated, the employment restrictions in
the Gaming Act are not directed at attorneys exclusively, but
rather all employees of the Board.’ The impact of the employ-

8. The intended effect of these limited restrictions is obvious, and based
on a sound and salutary public policy: to prevent conflicts of interest,
or appearances thereof, in a historically controversial industry, by
restricting current Board employees of all kinds from using their
special contacts and insider expertise as a springboard to other employ-
ment opportunities in the field, at least for a closely circumscribed
period of time. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 18, quoting Pennsylva-
nia Senate Journal, 2009 Reg. Sess. No, 52 at 871 (‘[T]he Gaming
Industry brings unique difficulties along with its legalization and opera-
tion in Pennsylvania, it appears to be an industry where it is not out of
bounds for the legislature to require all former government employees
(attorneys included) to have restrictions in place to ‘prevent corruption
and malfeasance and to insure public confidence.’”’); see also Pennsyl-
vania Senate Journal, 2009 Reg, Sess. No, 52 at 872 (General Assembly
noted purpose of 2010 Amendments, which extended duration of Gam-
ing Act's employment restrictions, was 10 address “revolving door”
issues created by comings and goings of Board employees). Cf. Shaulis,
833 A.2d at 136 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (employment restriction intend-
ed to “prevent pernicious practices and the appearance of impropriety,
thereby strengthening public confidence in government by assuring its
constituents of the impartiality and honesty of its public officials”),
Such restrictions are not novel and can also be found in other indus-
tries where employees are privy to information and knowledge which
could lead to an appearance of a conflict of interest in their field post-
employment. See, e.g., In re Clader, 135 A.3d 1062, 1072-73 (Pa. Super.
2016) (denying school police officer private detective license because
use of limited police powers for private business constitutes appearance
of impropriety and conflict of interest). The restrictions are thus intend-

6

ment restrictions on attorneys is real, as we recognized in our
discussion of standing and ripeness, but regulation of the
practice of law is not the goal of the legislation, unlike the
provisions directed at attorneys, and held unconstitutional in
Shaulis and Wajert. As such, this Court’s authority over
attorneys is not infringed by the Gaming Act’s employment
restrictions applicable to all employees, only some of whom
are attorneys. See P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 178 (relying on Maunus
and noting this Court has declined to find its “exclusive
jurisdiction over the professional and ethical conduct of all
attorneys was infringed by the imposition of workplace regula-
tions on persons who also happened to be attorneys”); Mau-
mus, 544 A2d at 1827 (there is “no basis upon which to
conclude that ... employees of a state agency are entitled to
an exemption from [statutory] requirements simply because
they are attorneys”).

In determining whether the Board’s restrictions in this case
are valid, Justice Wecht would focus on whether the restric-
tion applies to current or former employees, some of whom
happen to be attorneys. The dissent concludes if a restriction
applies to former attorney-employees—regardless of whether
it is even aimed at the practice of law—that restriction auto-
matically infringes upon this Court’s constitutional authority.
The inevitable result of this interpretation is to create an
attorney-only immunity from any regulation imposed by any

ed to prevent the problematic “revolving door” of employees coming
and going from the Gaming Board and do not unconstitutionally
regulate the practice of law—either by intent or application.

In any event, petitioner herself acknowledges the limited nature of the
employment restrictions, which apply only to her ability to practice law
“as it relates to gaming entities or law firms that represent gaming
entities.” Brief for Petitioner at 27. Petitioner is not completely prohib-
ited from practicing law by Sections 1201(h)(8) and (13), Rather, the
restrictions effectuate the legislative intent of avoiding conflicts of
interest by preventing petitioner from working for a distinct subsection
of clients within this Commonwealth and before the Gaming Board,
where she has special “insider” knowledge. Although the perceived
severity of the restriction (or lack thereof) does not bear directly upon
our constitutional analysis, we simply note petitioner is not prevented
from obtaining new employment in the gaming industry in another
jurisdiction, or remaining in Pennsylvania to practice law in practice
areas other than gaming for two years,

as «

entity or institution other than this Court, on the basis of our
constitutional authority; attorneys thus attain a special privi-
lege to escape otherwise applicable laws protecting against
conflicts of interest. See Concurring and Dissenting Op. at
557-58, 161 A.3d at 250 (Wecht, J.) (stating any restriction
upon attorneys, even if lawyers represent a small percentage
of the larger workforce that is restricted, impermissibly in-
fringes on this Court’s supervisory authority and is thus
unconstitutional).

In finding the current/former employee distinction should
be the critical inquiry in our analysis, the dissent ignores the
clear holdings of this Court’s decisions in P.J.S. and Maunus,
which specifically and intentionally declined to find regulations
unconstitutional when they were aimed at all persons, some of
whom happened to be attorneys. See P.J.S., 728 A.2d at 178
(“jurisdiction of this [Clourt is not infringed when a regulation
aimed at conduct is applied to all persons, and some of those
persons happen to be attorneys”); Maunus, 544 A.2d at 1827-
28 (finding no basis to conclude employees of state agency are
exempt from complying with Ethies Act simply because of
status as attorneys). A myopie focus on the current/former
employee distinction necessarily relies on the Shaulis Court's
inaccurate description of prior case law, and overlooks the
actual holdings in both Shaulis and Wajert that the challenged
Ethics Act restrictions were impermissible because they spe-
cifically targeted attorneys and the practice of law. Shaulis,
833 A.2d at 181; Wajert, 420 A.2d at 442. The fact the Ethics
Act restrictions applied only after the attorney left govern-
ment employment was not dispositive, but merely highlighted
the restrictions’ effect of regulating the practice of law at all
times in those instances. Conversely, a careful examination of
the restrictions analyzed in P.J.S. and Maunus demonstrates
they applied to all individuals subject to the Ethics Act, and
were not specifically targeted at attorneys or the practice of
law; the restrictions thus passed constitutional muster.

In P.J.S,, the plaintiff-attorney challenged the jurisdiction of
the Ethics Commission to investigate an alleged conflict of
interest arising out of his public employment as the city
solicitor for the City of Erie while simultaneously maintaining

TT

a private practice and, in that private practice, being hired by
the City’s insurer to defend the City in a civil lawsuit. P.J.S.,
723 A2d at 175. In analyzing whether the provisions of the
Ethies Act which prohibited the attorney’s conduct violated
Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, this
Court did not consider or even mention whether the restric-
tions applied to him as a current or former public employee;
rather, the analysis turned on whether the regulation was
targeted exclusively at attorneys and the practice of law. This
Court specifically held our jurisdiction “is not infringed when a
regulation aimed at conduct is applied to all persons, and some
of those persons happen to be attorneys.” Id. at 178. Thus, the
ethics restriction withstood challenge not because it applied
only to current employees, but because it applied to all
employees, and not just lawyers. Moreover, although the
restriction arguably did affect the plaintiffs practice of law, it
was upheld because it applied equally to all public employees
of the City of Erie.

Similarly, in Mawnus, the attorney-plaintiffs challenged reg-
ulations in the Ethics Act requiring all public employees to
disclose financial interests, claiming the regulations violated
Article V, Section 10(c). In finding the regulations were consti-
tutionally sound and applicable to the lawyer-employees, the
Maunus Court did not consider their status as current em-
ployees (although they unquestionably were), but instead fo-
cused on whether the rule infringed on their practice of law,
noting there is “no basis upon which to conclude ... employ-
ees of a state agency are entitled to an exemption from
[regulations] simply because they are attorneys.” Mauwnus, 544
A.2d at 1827.

Moreover, even in Shaulis and Wajert, which facially in-
volved “former” public employees, the restrictions were actu-
ally problematic because they were aimed at individuals who
might represent a person before the government body by
which they were previously employed; the restrictions were
implicitly directed only at attorneys and their practice of law.
Shaulis, 888 A.2d at 124 n.1, citing 65 Pa.C.S. § 1108(g);
Wajert, 420 A.2d at 440, citing 65 P.S. § 403(e). The distine-

tion between current and former employees was not, as a
practical matter, dispositive in those cases, and is not disposi-
tive here.’

Nevertheless, the dissent views these cases as directing that
only current attorney-employees may be constitutionally re-
stricted in their practice of law. See Concurring and Dissent-
ing Opinion at 558, 161 A.38d at 250 (Wecht, J.) (“I believe the
current/former distinction is sufficient to dispose of the instant
matter”). It is inexplicable that a regulation could pass consti-
tutional muster when applied to current attorney-employees,
yet suddenly become unconstitutional at the moment the
attorney leaves that employment and moves on to something
else. Such an interpretation would signal an abdication of our
constitutional authority over “currently” employed attorneys,
while providing immunity to those same attorneys from any
applicable restrictions once they are “former employees.” The
answer to the query before this Court cannot logically depend
on an individual’s status as a current or former employee, but
rather on whether the restriction actually infringes on this
Court’s power to supervise the practice of law. To the extent
language in Shaulis suggests the crux of the matter is this red
herring current/former employee distinction, we disavow it,
and hold instead the decisive inquiry is whether the restriction
9. The Shaulis Court explained its use of a current/former employee

distinction as follows: “we refused to overrule Wajert in Maunus,

indicating the Maunus-P.J.S. line of cases presumes the existence of

Wajert.” Shaulis, 833 A.2d at 132. It appears this proclamation unnec-

essarily overstated the Maunus Court's constitutional analysis with

respect to Wajert; although Maunus did not overrule Wajert, there was
no call by the litigants in Maunus to do so. Instead, the Maunus Court
distinguished Wajert on the facts, noting the issue in Maunus was “not
within the category of cases which have presented the factual predicate
for concluding that our jurisdiction over the courts of Pennsylvania and
its officers has been unconstitutionally usurped by the legislature.”

Maunus, 544 A.2d at 1328. The inclusion of Wajert in a string-cite list of

distinguishable cases is the only citation to Wajert in Maunus; in

holding the regulations at issue were constitutional, the Maunus Court
simply did not engage in any analysis regarding the status of the
attorney-plaintiffs as current or former employees. Thus, a careful

reading reveals the Shaulis Court’s description of the prior case law
was simply inaccurate.

invades this Court’s authority by attempting to regulate the
practice of law, at any time."

Moreover, as a practical matter, it was not the employers
that sought to direct and control the actions of the attorney-
plaintiffs in P.J.S. and Maunus but an independent agency—
the Ethies Commission. See Mawnus, 544 A.2d at 1824 (Ethics
Commission, not employer, Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board, enforced sections of Ethics Act against employee attor-
neys); P.J.S., 728 A.2d at 175 (Ethics Commission, not em-
ployer City of Erie, investigated and enforced sections of
Ethies Act against employee attorney). Likewise, the Gaming
Board’s restrictions on both current and former employees are
meant to be executed at least in part by the Ethics Commis-
sion, See 4 Pa.C.S. § 1201(n)(14) (“The State Ethics Commis-
sion shall issue a written determination of whether a person is
subject to paragraph (18) or (18.1) upon the written request of
the person or the persons’ employer or potential employ-
er...”), Regardless of whether or not the affected attorney
has left the Board’s employ, it is not the Board which acts to
guard against the attorney’s unethical or unprofessional con-
duet.

HI Further, a thorough examination of the caselaw ap-
plying Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion reveals that Shaulis was the first—and only—case to
articulate the current/former employee distinction relied upon
by our learned colleagues in dissent. While we recognize and
acknowledge the value of Shaulis as precedent as well as the
principle of stare decisis, we also acknowledge that stare
decisis “is not an inexorable command to be followed blindly
when such adherence leads to perpetuating error.” Stilp, 905
A2d at 967, citing Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of
Highways, 479 Pa. 884, 388 A.2d 709, 720 (1978) (“[T]he
doctrine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for perpetuating error,
but rather a legal concept which responds to the demands of
10. Our holding in this regard does not undermine the validity of Wajert

and Shaulis to the extent they correctly focused on the fact the chal-

lenged regulations were specifically targeted at attorneys only. Shaulis,
833 A.2d at 131; Wajert, 420 A.2d at 442.

a °

justice and, thus, permits the orderly growth processes of the
law to flourish.”).

Sections 1208(h)(8) and (18) of the Gaming Act include
restrictions applicable to both current and former employees
of the Gaming Board. Accordingly, the matter sub judice
presents an opportunity for this Court to more closely exam-
ine the current/former distinction pronounced for the first
time by the Shaulis Court. In effecting that examination, we
come to the unavoidable conclusion that the current/former
distinction cannot be the determinative test in deciding wheth-
er a restriction infringes on this Court’s Constitutional author-
ity to oversee the practice of law. Holding, as the dissent
articulates, that the employment status of an attorney is the
seminal factor in deciding whether a restriction violates Arti-
cle V, Section 10(c) of our Constitution will perpetuate the
error articulated in Shaulis. It is regulation of the practice of
law that Article V, Section 10(c) expressly places into this
Court’s jurisdiction, and only proscriptions which are inconsis-
tent with this Court’s rules violate that constitutional provi-
sion,

Accordingly, in examining Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) of the
Gaming Act, the operative constitutional question is whether
the employment restrictions infringe on the practice of law in
a manner inconsistent with this Court’s constitutional power.
Sections 1208(h)(8) and (18) of the Gaming Act provide restric-
tions aimed at all employees, including but not limited to
attorneys, and restrict future professional activities and em-
ployment in the gaming industry, which includes but is not
limited to the practice of law. More specifically, Section
1201(h)(8) prohibits any “member, employee or independent.
contractor of the board” from making solicitations, requests,
solicitations or recommendations to any gaming board affiliate
or licensed entity for two years after employment. 4 Pa.C.S.
§ 1201(h)(8) (emphasis added). In addition, Section 1201(h)(18)
expressly applies to any “employee of the board whose duties

- substantially involve licensing, enforcement, development of
law, promulgation of regulations or development of policy ...
including the executive director, bureau directors and attor-

neys,” and restricts such “individuals” from, inter alia, accept-
ing employment from various gaming entities or “appearing”
before the Board. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1201(h)(18). As the restrictions
expressly include attorneys, among other individuals, and ap-
ply to all employees of the Board engaged in a wide array of
activities, it is without question that the restrictions are not
“specifically targeted” at attorneys. But see Shaulis, 888 A.2d
at 181; Wajert, 420 A.2d at 442. The Gaming Act restrictions
therefore do not improperly infringe on this Court’s authority
to regulate the practice of law. P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 178;
Maunus, 544 A.2d at 13824.

Moreover, unlike the restrictions in Wajert and Shaulis,
which were found to improperly regulate the practice of law
because they specifically prohibited a government employee
from “represent[ing]” an individual before government enti-
ties, the Gaming Board restrictions are broader, prohibiting
all former employees from, in part, “appear[ing] before the
board in a hearing or proceeding or participat[ing] in activity

on behalf of any applicant, licensee, permittee...” 4 Pa.C.S.
§ 1201(h)(18)Gi). Unlike a restriction on “representing,” a
restriction on making an “appear[ance]” does not necessarily
implicate the acts of an attorney taken on behalf of a client,
and therefore does not specifically target attorneys. In fact,
Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) of the Gaming Act broadly prohib-
it all individuals from several activities, which include appear-
ing before the Board in capacities which do not implicate or
involve the practice of law, for example, applying for licenses
or permits from the Board, or appearing as a lay witness on
behalf of an applicant before the Board.

We reject the argument our Article V, Section 10(¢) jurisdic-
tion mandates that attorneys may escape the employment
restrictions of the Gaming Act—which are applicable to all
employees in an effort to avoid conflicts of interest—simply
because they are attorneys. P.J.S., 728 A.2d at 178. Cf Villani
»v, Seibert, 639 Pa. 58, 159 A.3d 478, 492, 2017 WL 1489048, at
*13 (2017) (this Court should not “per se immunize attorneys,
as attorneys” from civil liability under the Dragonetti Act on
the basis of Article V, Section 10(c)). Any other interpretation

a ©

is ripe for abuse. For example, an attorney (like petitioner),
now employed by the Gaming Board, would have the luxury of
circumventing the restrictions applicable to all other employ-
ees and obtaining future employment with a private gaming
entity—whether as an attorney or in some other capacity.

In his dissent, Justice Wecht submits any conflicts of inter-
est the General Assembly might seek to regulate have already
been addressed by this Court via the Rules of Professional
Conduct, specifically Rule 1.11, which applies to avert various
conflicts of interest that may arise out of the practice of law by
former government attorneys. See Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion at 559-60, 161 A.3d at 251-52 (Wecht, J.) (noting this
Court has exercised its regulatory authority via the Rules of
Professional Conduct which contain affirmative obligations to
protect against conflicts of interest). However, Rule 1.11 is
narrower in its application than the Gaming Act restrictions
and clearly will not apply to protect against a conflict of
interest created by the former Gaming Board attorney who
goes to work in a non-attorney capacity for a gaming entity,
This is precisely the kind of situation the challenged statute
captures, and which the Rules of Professional Conduct do not.

Even if we were to assume the Disciplinary Board of the
Court has the resources to discover and redress every poten-
tial conflict of interest that may arise in this context so as to
enforce these Rules, the language of Rule 1.11, which de-
scribes “Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current

11, The most recent annual report from The Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania states that, as of December 31, 2015,
there were 64,509 active paid attorneys and 10,951 inactive paid
attorneys in the Commonwealth. See http:/www.padisciplinaryboard.
org/about/pdfs/2015~annual-report.pdf (last visited on Feb. 13, 2017)
(providing Annual Report of Disciplinary Board). Pennsylvania Rule of
Disciplinary Enforcement 219(d)(1)(ii) requires attorneys to provide the
Disciplinary Board with a current office address, but compliance with
that Rule does not provide the Disciplinary Board with an accurate
picture of attorneys changing employers in order to effectively monitor
any potential conflicts of interest; the number of attorneys changing
addresses also reflects attorneys who change physical offices yet stay
with the same employer, and attorneys who leave the practice of law
altogether. See Pa.R.D.E. 219(d)(1)(ii) (requiring attorneys to pay annu-
al fee and file a form containing “current e-mail, residence and office
addresses of the attorney”).

Government Officers and Employees,” clearly anticipates the
need for and existence of statutory provisions which also apply
to and control the conflicts of interest addressed in the rule,
See Pa.R.P.C, 1.11(d) (“Except as law may otherwise expressly
permit,” a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or
employee shall not engage in various activities); see also Id.,
note 1 (lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a
public officer or employee subject to Rules including prohibi-
tion of conflicts of interest also “may be subject to statutes
and government regulations regarding conflict of interest
...”), And, as we have illustrated above, the reach of Rule
111 is narrower than Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18) of the
Gaming Act because the Rules of Professional Conduct will
not apply to prohibit an attorney from appearing before the
Board in a non-attorney capacity, eg., as an applicant for a
license or as a lay witness, and policing of conflicts by this
Court as envisioned by the Rules is undermined if the Gaming
Board attorney moves into a non-attorney position at a gam-
ing entity. In the absence of the challenged statutes, the one-
time lawyer/now-gaming executive may enjoy blanket protec-
tion from the consequences of conflicts because she is no
longer practicing law, and therefore beyond the reach of the
Rules.

Importantly, Article V, Section 10(c) itself does not state
this Court’s authority over the practice of law or its “power to
prescribe general rules” is exclusive, but that exclusivity is
expressed in case law as well as in the Rules promulgated by
this Court in furtherance of its constitutional authority. See,
eg., Pa.R.D.E. 108 (“The Supreme Court declares that it has
inherent and exclusive power to supervise the conduct of
attorneys who are its officers (which power is reasserted in
Section 10(c) of Article V of the Constitution of Pennsylvania)
++”), The “exclusivity” of this Court’s jurisdiction refers to
the fact that no other entity but this Court has power over
attorneys qua attorneys, that is, because of their status as
attorneys. See P.J.S., 7283 A.2d at 178 (“The jurisdiction of this
court is exclusive in the sense that it applies equally to all
members of the Bar of Pennsylvania. The exclusive jurisdic-

tion of this court is infringed when another branch of govern-
ment attempts to regulate the conduct of attorneys merely
because of their status as attorneys.”).

HsIn other words, “[w)hat is contemplated by the
exclusivity provision contained in Pa.R.D.E. 108 is that this
Court is the only governmental body entitled to regulate and
discipline the professional class of attorneys. No other compo-
nent of our state government may impose duties applicable to
every attorney admitted to practice in the Commonwealth, nor
may another Commonwealth entity admit to practice or disci-
pline an attorney, These prerogatives are within this Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction.” Mawnus, 544 A.2d at 1826. There can
be no question the authority to supervise the practice of law in
this Commonwealth lies in this Court’s constitutional province,
and we affirm the command in Article V, Section 10(¢) that “all
Jaws shall be suspended to the extent” they are inconsistent
with our Rules. But such exclusivity does not have the effect
of preventing attorneys from being subject to other kinds of
liability or judicial process. See P.J.S., 728 A.2d at 178 (“Al-
though members of the Bar of Pennsylvania are uniformly
subject to the professional and ethical standards imposed and
regulated by this [Clourt, they are not, by virtue of that
membership exempt from all other professional and ethical
regulations.”), In fact, the operative constitutional provision
expressly acknowledges the General Assembly may enact laws
on the subject of attorneys as long as they are not “inconsis-
tent with rules prescribed” pursuant to this Court’s authority.
PA. Const, art. V, § 10(c) (“All laws shall be suspended to the
extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under
these provisions ...”). Cf Villani, supra; Maritrans GP Inc.
v. Pepper Hamilton & Scheetz, 529 Pa, 241, 602 A.2d 1277,
1285 (1992) (“Attorneys have always been held civilly liable for
engaging in conduct violative of their fiduciary duties to
clients, despite the existence of professional rules under which
the attorneys could also have been disciplined.”)

We conclude there is nothing to prevent attorneys from
being subject to both the Rules of Professional Conduct
promulgated by this Court under our constitutional authority,

Se

and consistent statutory provisions, such as the Gaming Act
employment restrictions that apply to all employees of the
Gaming Board. A holding that attorneys are subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct alone, and no other statutes or
legal obligations simply by virtue of their status as attorneys,
and without reference to whether the regulated activity consti-
tutes the practice of law, would place attorneys in a special
class immune to governance by any entity other than this
Court. Taken to the extreme, such a holding would invalidate
any number of civil and criminal statutes when they are
applied to individuals who happen to be attorneys, and simply
cannot be correct.

Accordingly, although we hold petitioner had standing to
bring her challenge, and that challenge was ripe for our
review, we hold on the merits that Sections 1201(h)(8) and (18)
of the Gaming Act do not improperly regulate the practice of
law in violation of Article V, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Therefore, the Board’s preliminary objections
are overruled in part and sustained in part, and the petition
for review is dismissed with prejudice.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer and Mundy join the
opinion,

Justice Wecht files a concurring and dissenting opinion in
which Justices Todd and Donohue join.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT

In determining whether the General Assembly has violated
the separation of powers by regulating the practice of law in
derogation of Article V Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania
Constitution,’ our inquiry is not confined to the question of

1, Article V, Section 10(c) provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices
of the peace and all officers serving process or enforcing orders,

whether the challenged legislation applies generally rather
than to lawyers alone. Any law that infringes upon this Court’s
supervisory authority over the legal profession violates our
Constitution, regardless of whether the provision happens to
regulate non-attorneys as well. I would not hold that what the
General Assembly cannot do solely to attorneys it can none-
theless do to attorneys, provided it does the same thing to
some number of non-attorneys as well. Our precedents require
no such rule, and the learned Majority’s forbearance may have
unintended but deleterious effects upon the judiciary and the
legal profession that will reveal themselves over time.”

In Shaulis v. Penna. State Ethics Comm’n, 574 Pa. 680, 833
A.2d 128 (2008), this Court held that where (and to the extent
that) a regulation impairs an attorney’s ability to practice her
profession after she has left government employment, that
regulation must yield to this Court’s exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law pursuant to our Constitution. In so
ruling, we made two things clear. First, we declared that our
decision in Wajert v. State Ethics Comm’n, 491 Pa. 255, 420
A.2d 489 (1980), in which we invalidated a one year restriction
on a former judge’s ability to appear before the court upon
which he had served, remained good law. Second, we empha-

judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the peace, including
the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of
actions or classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of
justice shall require, and for admission to the bar and to practice law,
and the administration of all courts and supervision of all officers of
the Judicial Branch, if such rules are consistent with this Constitution
and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the
jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter
any statute of limitation or repose, All laws shall be suspended to the
extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these
provisions. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the Gener-
al Assembly may by statute provide for the manner of testimony of
child victims or child material witnesses in criminal proceedings,
including the use of videotaped depositions or testimony by closed-
circuit television.
Pa, Const. art. V, § 10(c).

2. While I disagree with the Majority's decision to reject Attorney
Yocum’s challenge to the constitutionality of 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1201(h)(8)
and (13), I join the Majority in its analysis of standing and ripeness.

a

sized that our decisions in Mawnus v. Commonwealth, State
Ethics Comm’n, 618 Pa. 592, 544 A.2d 1824 (1988), and P.J.S,
v. Penna. State Ethics Comm’n, 555 Pa, 149, 728 A2d 174
(1999), which upheld the constitutionality of ethics require-
ments applied to government employees during their govern-
ment employment, did not affect Wajert’s validity with respect
to restrictions directed against government employees after
their departure from public employment. See Shaulis, 833
A.2d at 181-82.

Our Shaulis ruling additionally reinforced Wajert’s strong
suggestion that the reasoning it employed to strike down
practice restrictions invoked against a former judge applied
equally to invalidate post-government practice restrictions im-
posed upon attorneys. See Shaulis, 883 A.2d at 181 (“{Tyhe
issue in Wajert, like the issue in the instant matter, related to
the conduct of an attorney who was no longer a public
employee. Shaulis and the judge in Wajert have simply assert-
ed their right, absent a prohibition from this Court, to practice
their profession.”). It would be difficult to maintain that any
real doubt remains as to whether Wajert applies to former
public employees who worked as attorneys with the same
force that it applies to former judges, To the extent that the
issue does remain open, I perceive no material distinction
between lawyers and judges that would justify denying former
government attorneys the benefit of Wajert, I would hold
accordingly.

Although Shaulis determined that Wajert alone was suffi-
cient to compel our ruling in that case, effectively enshrining
what we now identify as the current/former employment dis-
tinction, we then proceeded to opine that the provision in
question also was unconstitutional under a separate test that
inquired whether the provision “targeted” those who practice
law. See Shaulis, 883 A.2d at 182, It is the latter test alone
upon which today’s Majority relies in finding the statutory
provisions at issue here constitutional. Because those provi-
sions apply putatively to a broader class of Gaming Board
employees, a class that the Majority evidently assumes con-
sists substantially of non-lawyers, they are deemed not to

“target” the practice of law. Consequently, the Majority con-
cludes, they do not offend our Constitution.

By applying this “general applicability” criterion, which
strikes me as both dubious in origin and vague in scope and
contour, the Majority effectively privileges inferred legislative
intent over statutory effect. In future cases, this will require
us to divine whether the General Assembly intended to usurp
our constitutional authority over the practice of law or merely
did so incidentally in service of some other purpose. In the
first scenario, the restriction would be invalidated as unconsti-
tutional, but in the second, we seemingly would be bound to
find no constitutional violation. In practice, this general appli-
cability criterion affords the General Assembly latitude to take
upon itself de facto authority to regulate the practice of law
provided it does not appear to intend to do so in a targeted
fashion, or at least so long as it does so in a manner that also
restricts other employees as to whom its authority is not
expressly precluded by our Constitution.

The Majority’s approach grants the General Assembly too
much airspace, allowing it to restrict attorneys in ways that
we have previously precluded, so long as its legislation is
drafted in language that sweeps up a goodly number of non-
attorneys as well.’ I would not dwell on whether what amounts
to a clear intrusion upon some number of attorneys’ ability to
practice their profession in the fashion they choose (to the
extent that it is not in violation of this Court’s rules) is an
intentional affront to our authority. When we are confronted
with a violation of separation of powers principles, legislative
intent should be immaterial,

Whether ten percent or 100 percent of the employees
restricted by a statute are attorneys, the undeniable fact in
either scenario is that some attorneys’ ability to practice law
after they depart government employment has been restrict-
3. In point of fact, the Majority leaves open a troubling practical

question concerning, ¢.g., what proportion of a legislated class of public

employees must be attorneys before a statutory restriction is no longer
generally applicable, what forms of proof may be probative of that

proportion, and when and how these proofs will be submitted and
considered,

ST
ed, And that ability will have been restricted in a way that this
Court never before has permitted, encroaching upon a prerog-
ative that our Constitution reserves to this body, as recognized
in Wajert and Shaulis. It is unclear to me how we can tolerate
a statute that does something undeniably impermissible in its
restrictive effect upon attorneys simply because the provision
hides impermissible restrictions upon the practice of law be-
hind a passel of similarly restricted non-attorneys.

Consistent with Shawlis, I believe that the current/former
distinction is sufficient to dispose of the instant matter. Be-
cause I find the generally applicable test, as employed by the
Majority, to be problematic, I would forego its application
here. Under Wajert and Shauilis, it seems clear to me that the
General Assembly lacks authority to preclude Attorney Yocum
from future employment as a lawyer dealing with the gaming
industry. Under our precedents, the statutory provisions here
are unconstitutional as applied to former government attor-
neys.!

And yet, our inquiry does not end there. Neither Wajert nor
Shaulis addressed what amount to limitations on attorneys in
the form of prohibitions or restrictions upon the solicitation of
prospective employment on one’s own behalf while still in

4, The Majority opines that I have ignored “the clear holdings of this
Court's decisions in P.J.S, and Maunus[.}” Maj. Op. at 545, 161 A.3d at
242, Both cases preceded Shaulis, and neither provides sufficient
clarity in this area of the law as it is implicated in the particular
circumstances of today’s case. As the Majority notes, Maunus did not
mention Wajert except “‘in a string-cite list of distinguishable cases[.]”
Maj. Op. at 547 n, 9, 161 A3d at 243 n, 9, Maunus and PJ.S. are
distinguishable to the extent that those holdings did not pertain to
former employees, while Wajert and Shautlis are directly relevant to the
case at bar. Confronted with a fact pattern distinct from the circum-
stances at issue in either Maunus or P.J.S., the Shaulis Court carefully
reconciled our precedents in an attempt to clarify this area of the law in
relation to former attorney-employees, who were being restrained from
practicing their profession. Like the attorney in Shaulis and the judge
in Wajert, the restrictions here purport to cabin Attorney Yocum’s
ability to practice her profession in futuro. Today's case presents an
additional wrinkle: here, the Board’s restrictions sweep up other em-
ployees (non-attorneys) in addition to attorneys. This additional feature
does not remove, cure or immunize the impact that the restrictions
have upon the practice of law, nor does it alter the fact that these
restrictions are inconsistent with our express constitutional authority.

government service. It is here that the current/former dichoto-
my becomes difficult in practice. Read literally, while Wajert
and Shaulis preclude legislation that bars Attorney Yocum’s
employment in the industry after she leaves the Board’s
employ, those decisions would leave untroubled the Board’s
prohibition on seeking employment within the gaming indus-
try while still employed by the Board. More than a few
lawyers in public service lack the financial cushion that would
allow voluntary resignation from one position before another is
assured. This aspect of Section 1201(h) is undeniably burden-
some.

In this connection, I would consider how this Court has
exercised its own regulatory authority with regard to the
private practice of former government attorneys in capacities
that leverage their prior experiences and expertise on behalf
of individuals and entities with business before the attorney’s
former public agency. Our Rules of Professional Conduct
impose upon attorneys various affirmative obligations de-
signed to protect against the conflicts of interest that can arise
when public employees approach (or are approached by) indi-
viduals or entities with interests that lie within their agency’s
jurisdiction with regard to future employment. To that end,
Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11 prevents a
current government official or employee who is an attorney
from negotiating employment with individuals and entities
who have any present interest in matters with which that
attorney is involved in her public capacity. See Pa.R.P.C.
1.11@.5 However, the commentary to the rule cites the need
5. Rule 1.11 (‘Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current

Government Officers and Employees”) provides, in relevant part, as
follows:

(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer current-
Jy serving as a public officer or employee;
ee

(2) shall not

ae
(ii) negotiate for private employment with any person who is
involved as a party or as a lawyer for a party in a matter in which
the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that
a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer
or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by

for balance, noting that “the rules governing lawyers presently
or formerly employed by a government agency should not be
so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from
the government.” Pa.R.P.C. 1.11, note 4.°

These provisions make clear that this Court already has
considered, and has taken it upon itself to provide for, the
scenarios putatively addressed by the provisions of the Gam-
ing Act challenged here, albeit somewhat less broadly than the
Act, This implies, and with good reason in light of Wajert and
Shaulis, that this Court long has viewed it as within our own
constitutionally-conferred province to dictate how and for
whom attorneys who have left government office or employ-
ment may practice. Nothing in the legal authorities, from our
Constitution down to our own Rules, suggests that the General
Assembly is authorized to intrude upon that authority, wheth-
er it applies by its terms exclusively to attorneys or sweeps up
a substantially larger class of officials and employees that is
not comprised solely or even principally of attorneys.

Rule 1,12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1,12(b)
(requiring such a law clerk first to disclose to his employer his
intent to negotiate with such a party or lawyer).

See also Pa.R.P.C, 1.11, note 1 (“A lawyer who has served or is

currently serving as a public officer or employee is personally subject to

the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against

current conflicts of interest stated in Rule 1.7. In addition, such a

lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations regarding
conflict of interest.

6. Having said that, while note 4 to Rule 1,11 is suggestive regarding the
impermissibility of proscribing in toto what we might characterize as
job-seeking by an attorney while still in government employment, it is
in undeniable tension with Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii)'s restriction regarding
with whom a government attorney may “negotiate for private employ-
ment” while “currently serving as a public officer or employee,” While
that subparagraph of Rule 1.11 captures direct and obvious conflicts,
such as arise when an attorney for a company seeking a gaming license
is in talks regarding future employment with a Board attorney who is
specifically reviewing that company's application, it leaves the door
open to future employment-related discussions with gaming entities or
law firms with a gaming practice when it is foreseeable that such entity
or firm will appear before the Board under circumstances that may fall
within the attorney's bailiwick, This naturally triggers entirely salutary
concerns as to an actual or apparent conflict of interest arising from
one’s present employment, precisely the concerns presumptively em-
bodied in the Gaming Act’s prohibitions,

To the extent that the challenged subsections of Section
1201 purport to bar a former Board employee from practicing
law in any desired sector with any desired employer after
terminating her employment with the Board, they constitute
an unconstitutional intrusion upon this Court’s exclusive au-
thority to regulate the practice of law.’ This result is com-
pelled by Wajert and Shaulis. However, to the extent that the
challenged provisions preclude a ewrrent government attorney
from seeking such employment while she is still employed by
the Board, they fall within the ambit of Maunus and P.J.S.
and do not exceed the General Assembly’s authority to provide

7. The Majority appears skeptical of our ability to police our own
disciplinary rules concerning conflicts of interest in the legal profession.
See Maj. Op. at 551 & n. 11, 161 A.3d at 246 & n, 11, I do not share this
skepticism. I believe that the Majority underestimates the efficiency of
the disciplinary system and our role in it, while overestimating attorney
violations of our Rules of Professional Conduct. While the Majority
correctly reports that more than 60,000 lawyers are in active practice in
this Commonwealth, it fails to note that the Disciplinary Board, acting
under our exclusive authority to regulate attorney conduct, received
3900 complaints in 2016 and resolved 3668 complaints, of which 240
resulted in discipline (most or all of which were the subject of lengthy
and detailed review by this Court). See Annual Report, The Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2016, available at http://
www.padisciplinaryboard.org/about/annualreports.php (noting that a
disciplinary matter involving a single attorney may consist of multiple
complaints).

‘The Majority contends that the Disciplinary Board lacks sufficient
information to monitor conflicts of interest. Maj. Op. at 551 n, 11, 161
A.3d at 246 n, 11, True it is that the Board has no obligation to track
changes of address in an effort to identify possible conflicts of interest.
The practice of law is quintessentially a self-regulating profession. As
licensed professionals, attorneys practicing law in this Commonwealth
are self-monitoring. They must personally examine their practices to
avoid conflicts of interest in representations, Attorneys also have an
obligation to report violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct to
the Disciplinary Board. Pa.R.P.C. 8.3, Explanatory Comment. Before
deciding to change employment or to accept a new representation,
attorneys practicing in this Commonwealth have an ethical obligation
to consider whether their actions are in compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Of particular significance in the present context,
an attorney departing employment with the Gaming Board must deter-
mine whether his or her subsequent employment (and representations
in connection therewith) complies with Rule 1.11, Law firms in this
Commonwealth likewise have a variety of obligations to ensure conflict-
free representations, Pa.R.P.C. 1.10.

generally applicable standards for the conduct of current
employees.®

Justices Todd and Donohue join this concurring and

dissenting opinion.

160 A.8d 253
Joseph George BRIMMEIER, III, Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Appellee
No. 104 MAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

DECIDED: May 25, 2017

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25" day of May, 2017, the order of the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is hereby AFFIRMED.

Justice Wecht did not participate in the consideration or

decision of this case.

8. To be clear, I do not believe that broad statutory restrictions upon
current employees, including attorneys who remain in government
service, are constitutionally problematic.

160 A.8d 258

David Frank CAMPEAU Jz, a Man in
his Natural Capacity, Appellant

v

Edward SANDERCOCK, as Prothonotary of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Wayne County of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania; Ruth A. Vinton, as Civil Clerk/Bookkeeper of the Court
of Common Pleas of Wayne County of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Appellees

No, 95 MAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
DECIDED: May 25, 2017

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25" day of May, 2017, the order of the
Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED,

161 A.3d 784
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Keith CALDWELL, Petitioner
No. 259 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 15, 2016

a
ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.8d 784
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
John M. MACARTHUR, Petitioner
No. 267 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 784

Donald E, TUOMI, Administrator of the Estate
of Margaret C. Tumoi, Deceased

v.

EXTENDICARE, INC., Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., d/b/a
Havencrest Nursing Center, Extendicare Health Facility Hold-
ings, Inc, Extendicare Health Services, Inc. Extendicare
Health Network, Inc. Extendicare Holdings, Inc., Kathleen
Gastan, An Individual; Kenric Manor Family Limited Partner-
ship d/b/a/ Kenrie Manor

Petition of: Extendicare, Inc., Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc.,
d/b/a Havencrest Nursing Center, Extendicare Health Facility
Holdings, Inc., Extendicare Health Services, Inc., Extendicare
Health Network, Inc., Extendicare Holdings, Inc.

No. 281 WAL 2015
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 15, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court’s
order is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for
reconsideration in light of Taylor v. Hutendicare Health Facil-
ities, Inc., 637 Pa. 168, 147 A.3d 490, 2016 WL 5630669 (2016).

Justice Wecht did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

161 A.38d 785

IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF J.D., a minor

Petition of: F.D., father
No. 648 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.8d 785
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Harold KEMMERER, Petitioner
No. 562 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 15, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.8d 785
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
vy.

Sunny ZHU, Petitioner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve

Sunny Zhu, Petitioner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
Vv.

Sunny Zhu, Petitioner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.
Sunny Zhu, Petitioner

No. 538 MAL 2016
No. 539 MAL 2016
No. 540 MAL 2016
No, 541 MAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 15, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

161 A.8d 786
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Freedle LYNCH, Petitioner
No. 513 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

a *
161 A.8d 786
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
Vv.
John NAJUNAS, Sr., Petitioner
No, 493 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 15, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

161 A.3d 786
In the INTEREST OF: C.D., a Minor
Petition of: K.S,, Mother
No. 652 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 787
GREEN TREE SERVICING MORTGAGE CO., Respondent,
vy
Gennaro RAUSO, Petitioner
No, 469 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal and Application for Substitution of
Parties Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 502 are DENIED.

161 A.3d 787
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Ismael LOPEZ, Petitioner
No, 843 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 787
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
John Robert MCCOOL, Petitioner
No, 483 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 15, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 787

CONSTELLAR CORP., Maryann Kurmlavage, and Woodland
Terrace Homeowners’ Association, Petitioners

Y

ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE CITY OF PHILA-
DELPHIA, City of Philadelphia, OAP, Inc., Azalea Gardens
Partners, LP and Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, Re-
spondents

No. 331 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

161 A.8d 788
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Christopher HILL, Petitioner
No. 307 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 15, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 788
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Brian HAMILTON, Petitioner
No. 816 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 15, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.8d 788

Tom FOSTER, Administrator of the Estate of Kenneth
W. Foster, Deceased, Respondent.

v

GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL SENIOR CARE, LLC; Erie Operat-
ing, LLC d/b/a Golden Livingcenter-Walnut Creek; Erie Acqui-
sition, LLC; GGNSC Equity Holdings, LLC; GGNSC Holdings,
LLC; GGNSC Clinical Services, LLC; GGNSC Administrative
Services, LLC; Spectra Healthcare Alliance Vi, LLC; Spectra
Healthcare Alliance Inc; Beverly Enterprises, Inc.; and Denise
Curry, an Individual, Petitioners

No. 249 WAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 17, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court’s
order is VACATED. This matter is REMANDED for pro-
ceedings consistent with the decision in Taylor v. Hutendicare
Health Facilities, Inc, 687 Pa. 168, 147 A.3d 490, 2016 WL

5630669 (2016).

161 A.8d 789
Debora A. STUBITS, Administratrix of the
Estate of Richard F. Dombrowski
Vv.

GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL SENIOR CARE, LLC; GGNSC Erie
Western Reserve, LP, d/b/a Golden Living Center-Western Re-
serve; GGNSC Holdings, LLC; GGNSC Equity Holdings, LLC;
GGNSC Administrative Services, LLC; G@GNSC Clinical Ser-
vices, LLC; Golden Gate Ancillary LLC; GPH Erie Western
Reserve LLC; GGNSC Erie Western Reserve GP LLC; Eliza-
beth Kachel, Nha; Denise Curry, RVP; Millcreek Community
Hospital; Millcreek Health System

Petition of: Golden Gate National Senior Care, LLC; GGNSC
Erie Western Reserve, LP, d/b/a Golden Living Center-Western
Reserve; GGNSC Holdings, LLC; GGNSC Equity Holdings,
LLC; GGNSC Administrative Services, LLC; GGNSC Clinical
Services, LLC; Golden Gate Ancillary LLC; GPH Erie Western
Reserve LLC; GGNSC Erie Western Reserve GP LLC; Eliza-
beth Kachel, Nha; Denise Curry, RVP

No. 250 WAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 17, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The Superior Court’s
order is VACATED. This matter is REMANDED for pro-
ceedings consistent with the decision in Taylor v. Hutendicare
Health Facilities, Inc., 637 Pa. 168, 147 A.3d 490, 2016 WL
5630669 (2016).

161 A8d 789

Patrick J. MACPHERSON, Executor of the Estate
of Richard Macpherson, Deceased, Petitioner

v

The MAGEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL FOR CONVALESCENCE
d/b/a Magee Rehabilitation Hospital, Jefferson Health System,
Inc., TJUH System, Manor Care of Yeadon PA, LLC, d/b/a
Manorcare Health Services~Yeadon, HCR Manor Care, Inc.,
Manorcare, Inc., HCR Healthcare, LLC, HCR II Healthcare,
LLC, HCR Il Healthcare, LLC, Respondents

No. 700 EAL 2015
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 17, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Donohue, Justice Wecht and Justice Mundy did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

eS
161 A.3d 790
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent

ve
Juan ANDLNO, Petitioner
No. 400 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 21, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 790

The TOWNSHIP OF SALEM, a Municipal
Corporation, Respondent

v.

MILLER PENN DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Pennsylvania
Limited Liability Company, Petitioner

No, 251 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 790
Fatimah MUHAMMAD, Petitioner
Vv.
Amjad ALI, M.D., Respondent.
No. 260 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 791
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Rashee BEASLEY, Petitioner
No. 218 WAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

161 A.3d 791

The TOWNSHIP OF SALEM, a Municipal
Corporation, Petitioner

v

MILLER PENN DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Pennsylvania
Limited Liability Company, Respondent

No. 271 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Cross
Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 791
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Donald C. EICHLER, Petitioner
No. 815 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal and Application to File Supplement to
Petition for Allowance of Appeal are DENIED.

es «
161 A.8d 792
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Mario BRANNON, Petitioner
No. 312 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter,

161 A.3d 792
Mary Jane SCHNEIDER, Petitioner
v.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
BOARD, Respondent

No. 309 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal and Petition for Leave to Append the
Text of the Statute are DENIED.

161 A.3d 792
Jon GALANTE, Petitioner
ve

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD
OF REVIEW, Respondent

No, 288 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

es «

161 A.3d 793
Samuel A. BYLER, Individually, Melvin R. Yoder, Individually,
Emanuel A. Yoder, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others of

the Old Order Amish of Sugar Grove Township, Warren Coun-
ty, Pennsylvania, Petitioners

v
SUGAR GROVE AREA SEWER AUTHORITY, Respondent
No. 284 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 793
Terry KINAVEY, Petitioner
ve

WEST JEFFERSON HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT
and Board of Directors of West Jefferson
Hills School District, Respondents

No, 278 WAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

161 A.3d 798
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
John Franklin WRIGHT, Jr., Petitioner
No. 584 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

i «©
161 A.3d 794
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.

ve
Joshua D. MCCRAE, Petitioner
No. 576 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.8d 794
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
vw
Gregory J. GRANT, Petitioner
No. 509 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

a
ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.8d 794
Anthony FRANKLIN, Appellant
v.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at Delaware
and Philadelphia Counties et al., Appellees

No. 20 EAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22" day of November, 2016, the Order of
the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to any right Appellant may have, pursuant to Fajohn
y. Com., Dep’t of Corrs., 547 Pa. 649, 692 A.2d 1067 (1997), to
seek modification of his sentence nune pro tunc in the court of

common pleas.

a m
161 A.8d 795
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Joseph D. MARCY, Petitioner
No. 505 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 795

Scott F. LINDE, as Trustee of the Scott F. Linde
Family’s Corporation Trust, Petitioner

v

Eric LINDE and Linde Enterprises, Inc., a Pennsylvania
Corporation, Respondents

No. 492 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

161 A.3d 795
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Robert Harry THOMAS, Petitioner
No, 484 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal and Motion to Answer are DENIED,

a
161 A.3d 795
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.

ye
Robert M. JENNINGS III, Petitioner
No. 464 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.8d 796
James D. SCHNELLER, Petitioner
vy.

Elizabeth CAVANAUGH-KERR and
Marjorie Zitomer, Respondents

No. 455 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal, Application for Relief of Writ of
Mandamus to the Trial Court, and Application for Relief of
Peremptory Mandamus are DENIED,

161 A.3d 796
IN RE: ESTATE OF Neva OESCHGER, Deceased
Petition of: William Oeschger
No. 446 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 796
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Tabu Nazshon PHILLIPS, Petitioner
No. 425 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

161 A.8d 797
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
Vv
Kemoh A. ROGERS, Petitioner
No. 418 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A3d 797
Erin Patricia TOKASH, Respondent
v
Jeffrey Lawrence TOKASH, Petitioner
No. 877 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

pe

161 A.3d 797
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v.

Damiyell VAUGHTER, Petitioner
No. 394 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED,

161 A8d 797
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve.

German SANTINI, Petitioner
No. 356 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

161 A.3d 798
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Erich MORITZ, Petitioner
No. 351 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 798
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent

ve
Wendy CASTRO, Petitioner
No. 310 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22" day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, rephrased
for clarity, are:

(1) In view of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 578 (1980),
and Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), did
the Superior Court err in concluding that an arrest
warrant for Earnest Moreno authorized entry into the
residence of Angel Romero and Wendy Castro for the
purpose of executing the arrest warrant?

(2) Did the Superior Court apply an erroneous standard of
review regarding the suppression court’s finding of fact
that the authorities did not have express permission to
enter the residence of Angel Romero and Wendy Cas-

tro?

161 A.8d 799
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Anthony JOHNSON, Petitioner
No. 297 EAL 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.

161 A.3d 799
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Kyle RAINEY, Petitioner
No, 294 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 Ad 799
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
v
Nafeese TURNER, Petitioner
No. 286 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.8d 799
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent
ve
Mare C. DRAPER, Petitioner
No. 249 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

November 22, 2016

ORDER
PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.3d 800
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
ve
Wilfredo MELENDEZ, Petitioner
No. 338 EAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.

161 A.38d 800

John DOE 1, John Doe 2, John Doe
3 and Jane Doe 1, Respondents

v.

FRANKLIN COUNTY, Franklin County Sheriff’s Office,
Franklin County Sheriff Dane Anthony and
Employee John/Jane Does, Petitioners

No. 431 MAL 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
December 21, 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2016, the Petition
for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. LIMITED TO the
issue set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remain-
ing issues. The issue rephrased for clarity, is:
(1) Whether the General Assembly intended to abrogate
high public official immunity when it enacted 18 Pa.
CS. § 6111@?

600

161 A.3d 800
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner
ve
Peter James QUIGLEY, Respondent

No. 30 DB 2015
No. 2262 Disciplinary Docket No. 3
Attorney Registration No. 37440 (Monroe)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ARGUED: December 6, 2016
DECIDED: June 20, 2017

Paul J. Killion, Esq., Kristin Ann Wells, Esq., Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court of PA, for Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, Petitioner.

Thomas P. Sundmaker, Esq., Law Offices of Thomas P.
Sundmaker, for Quigley, Peter James, Respondent.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

Respondent, Peter James Quigley, has filed exceptions to
the Report and Recommendation by the Disciplinary Board of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (the Board) recommend-
ing his disbarment. For the reasons that follow, we adopt the
recommendation of the Board and order Respondent's disbar-
ment.

On February 20, 2015, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
(ODC) filed a petition for discipline alleging Quigley violated
the Rules of Professional Conduct by mishandling the funds of
five clients. On July 9, 2015, a three-member Hearing Commit-
tee held a disciplinary hearing, prior to which the parties
jointly stipulated to the following facts regarding the five
matters.

Harold Woodling, a friend of Quigley for whom he had done
legal work in the past, retained Quigley to handle the adminis-
tration of his wife’s estate and a wrongful death claim follow-
ing her death in July 2012. Woodling and Quigley agreed that
Quigley’s fee would be one-third of any gross recovery from
the insurance claims. Quigley settled five insurance claims
totaling $557,705.00 and was therefore entitled to a fee of
$185,901.66, The settlement funds were deposited in Quigley’s

IOLTA account.! He made two payments to Woodling in 2012
totaling $133,500.00. Quigley withdrew funds in arbitrary
amounts from August 2012 to July 2018. On January 2, 2018,
Quigley obtained a cashier’s check for $165,000.00 drawn from
his IOLTA account in order to satisfy a lien by Attorney Mark
Primrose, with whom Quigley shared ownership of an office
building. After the withdrawal of $165,000.00, the IOLTA
account held a balance of $148,998.01 despite the fact that
Quigley had not yet disbursed the remaining $238,308.34 owed
to Woodling. In April 2018, Quigley made payment to Woo-
dling in the amount of $117,000.00. Following the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings, Quigley paid the remaining settle-
ment funds owed to Woodling. Quigley stipulated that his
conduct in this matter violated Rule of Professional Conduct
1.8, which provides, “a lawyer shall act with reasonable dili-
gence and promptness in representing a client,” and Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.15(e) which requires that a lawyer
promptly deliver to the client or third party any funds which
the client or third party is entitled to receive.

Debra Tirado retained Quigley to represent her in a person-
al injury claim following a slip-and-fall accident in January
2011. Tirado and Quigley agreed Quigley would receive one-
third of any gross recovery. The trial court directed that the
proceeds from the settlement should be distributed as follows:
attorney’s fees to Quigley in the amount of $28,750.00;
$2,560.29 for case expenses; $7,107.00 to medical providers;
$8,678.79 to satisfy a lien from the Department of Public
Welfare (the Department); and $69,892.92 to Tirado. The
Department agreed to accept a reduced sum of $6,509.09 to
satisfy its lien. However, at the close of the business day on
February 28, 2014, Quigley had not paid the Department, and
his IOLTA account had a balance of $18.80. After notification
of disciplinary proceedings against him, Quigley paid the
1. “An IOLTA Account is an income producing Trust Account from

which fands may be withdrawn upon request as soon as permitted by

law. Qualified Funds are to be held or deposited in an IOLTA account.”

R.P.C, 1.15(a)(5). A lawyer is required to hold all Rule 1.15 funds

“separate from the lawyer's own property. Such property shall be
identified and appropriately safeguarded.” R.P.C. 1.15(b).

Department $6,509.09, satisfying the payment owed. The par-

ties stipulated Quigley’s conduct violated Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.3 and 1.15(e).

Hilda Dozier retained Quigley to represent her in her
personal injury claim following her August 2018 car accident.
After Quigley settled the case and disbursed some of the
settlement funds, he informed Dozier he would hold $10,000.00
in trust for possible medical liens that might arise. Indepen-
dence Blue Cross determined that no money was owed in
relation to any insurance lien. Quigley failed to disburse the
$10,000.00 promptly, and his IOLTA account reflected a bal-
ance of $262.96 as of January 17, 2014. After disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against Quigley, he wrote to Dozier
and enclosed a cashier’s check for the $10,000.00 owed to her.
The parties stipulated that Quigley’s conduct in this matter
violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8, and 1.15(e). In
addition, the parties stipulated that Quigley violated Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.15(b), which provides, “[a] lawyer shall
hold all Rule 1.15 Funds and property separate from the
lawyer’s own property. Such property shall be identified and
appropriately safeguarded.” The parties further stipulated to a
violation of Rule 8.4(c), which states that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”

Quigley was retained by Heather Wallace to represent her
in a personal injury claim and ultimately settled the claim for
$10,000.00 in 2013. He deposited the settlement funds into his
IOLTA account. The settlement was to be disbursed as fol-
lows: $8,000.00 to Heather Wallace, $3,666.67 to Quigley for
attorney’s fees, and $8,388.38 to a third-party company for a
subrogation claim. Quigley failed to promptly disburse the
funds, and his IOLTA account had a balance of $13,78 on
February 18, 2014. He disbursed the funds due to Wallace and
the third-party company following notification of the disciplin-
ary charges. The parties stipulated that he violated Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.8, 1,15(b), and 1.15(e) in the course of
his representation in this matter.

a

Joanne Larocque retained Quigley to represent her in her
personal injury action in August 2018, and they agreed Quig-
ley would receive one-third of the settlement in attorney’s
fees, The case settled in May 2014 for $10,000.00, and Quigley
received two $5,000.00 settlement checks. One check was made
payable solely to Larocque, and Quigley forwarded her that
check. The other check was made payable to both Quigley and
Larocque. Quigley deposited the check into his IOLTA ac-
count, and withdrew $2,500.00 of the $3,388.38 in fees he was
owed. Quigley sent a check to Larocque from his IOLTA
account for $1,667.00, the remaining settlement amount to
which she was entitled. However, when Larocque attempted to
cash the check, there were insufficient funds in the IOLTA
account.” Specifically, the account had a balance of $403.30.
Prior to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, Quigley
provided Larocque with a personal check for $1,667.00. The
parties stipulated that Quigley’s behavior constituted a viola-
tion of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(b).

The ODC called three witnesses at the hearing: an auditor
investigator who testified regarding his investigation of Quig-
ley’s IOLTA account,’ Harold Woodling, and Attorney Mark
Primrose. Woodling testified that he knew Quigley for forty
years and had retained him for legal work “on and off.” N.T.,
7/9/15, at 31. Woodling explained that he retained Quigley to
handle the administration of his late wife’s estate, Quigley was
still handling it at the time of the hearing, and that Woodling
did not recall agreeing Quigley could keep or borrow any of
the money from his wife’s estate. Jd. at 31-88. On cross-
examination, Woodling testified that he had lent Quigley
$25,000.00 in 2006 which had not been reimbursed. Id. at 84—
36. During redirect examination, Woodling testified that Quig-
ley had specifically asked to borrow the $25,000.00 sum in
2. PNC Bank notified the Pennsylvania Lawyers Fund for Client Securi-

ty of the overdraft which triggered the investigation into Quigley’s
handling of the account.

3. The testimony of the auditor investigator details his investigation and
the summary he prepared for the disciplinary proceedings. See N.T.,
7/9/15, at 19-28. As noted, Quigley stipulated to the fact that he
mishandled client funds and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

2006, and Quigley did not ask to borrow any of the funds that
arose from the settlement of his wife’s estate in 2012. Id. at
38-39,

Primrose testified he and Quigley became law partners in
1988, but they dissolved the practice in the late 1990s over
concerns with money. Id. at 41-42. Primrose explained that he
and Quigley shared office space in the same building, but
Quigley started to fall behind on his share of the expenses in
2010. Id. at 44. In 2011, Primrose purchased Quigley’s one-half
interest in the office building they shared, and in 2013, Quigley
tendered a check to Primrose for $165,000.00 to be applied
toward repurchasing his interest. Jd. Primrose indicated that
because Quigley was subject to an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) lien and had other past unreimbursed expenses owed to
Primrose, that “nothing was finalized” regarding the repur-
chase.‘ Id. Primrose testified on cross-examination that Quig-
ley was a competent attorney and had “a generally good
reputation as a good trial attorney” in the community. Id. at
47, Following Primrose’s testimony, the ODC rested.

Quigley testified he began practicing law in 1982, and
detailed his career and involvement in community activities
over the course of his career. See id. at 52-58, 62. Quigley
testified that he employed his own bookkeeper from 1997 until
she moved away in April 2013, and during the time she was
employed, she managed the IOLTA account for him. Id. at 59-
61. He began to experience financial strain in 2008 and 2009
following the market collapse, and sold apartment buildings
that he owned in order to afford to maintain his practice. Id.
at 60-61. However, in 2010, the IRS began filing liens against
him because he failed to account for capital gains when he
filed his taxes, and the IRS situation “continued to worsen”
over the years. Id. at 61-64. Quigley testified that he began
taking money out of his IOLTA account in 2018 in “piecemeal”
amounts “based on need” in order to run his practice and to
4. At times during his testimony, without objection, Primrose read from

a letter he prepared for the ODC detailing his professional relationship
with Quigley, See id. at 43-44.

avoid detection from the IRS. Id. at 64, 68-69. He acknowl-
edged his handling of the funds was “improper.” Jd. at 68.

Quigley attributed his mishandling of the funds to a combi-
nation of personal circumstances in 2018. Specifically, he cited
his longtime bookkeeper leaving in the Spring of 2018, the
dissolution of a seventeen-year romantic relationship in 2012
or 2013, and a decline in business due to a misprint of his
office phone number in a phonebook advertisement which was
printed in June 2018. Id. at 71-74. He testified that when the
advertisement was corrected in the summer of 2014, his
business improved, and he began paying back creditors. Id. at
75. However, with respect to the Woodling matter, Quigley
averred that he had informed Woodling of the lien on his office
building in 2012, and Woodling agreed to lend him the money.
Id. at 82-83. He agreed it was improper to use Woodling’s
funds; however, he maintained the funds were used with the
permission of Woodling. Id. at 84. On cross-examination, he
speculated that Woodling, who was 84 years old at the time of
the hearing, was unable to recall giving permission because of
his “faulty memory.” Id. at 88-89.

John Abbruzzese, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, testified on
behalf of Quigley. He testified he has known Quigley since the
mid-1980s, and had a professional and personal relationship
with him. Jd. at 102-08. Dr. Abbruzzese met with Quigley for
approximately two and one-half hours on July 19, 2015, and
prepared a report of his conclusions based on that meeting. Id.
at 103-04, 110. He opined that if Quigley had been seen by a
psychologist in 2018 for the stressors he experienced, i.e., the
loss of his bookkeeper, the dissolution of his long-term rela-
tionship, and the misprint in his phone book advertisement, he
would have been diagnosed with depression and “some post-
traumatic stress.” Id. at 106-07. When asked by Quigley’s
counsel what effect those diagnoses would have on the mis-
management of client funds, Dr. Abbruzzese offered the fol-
lowing opinion.

Well, when a person suffers from either or both of those,

there’s no real ability to concentrate on anything. All you do

is fly as best you can maybe on one wing and that’s what

Mr. Quigley was doing, and he needed both wings to fly.

And ... that I think is why he made whatever errors he

allegedly made.
Id, at 107. He further opined that the mismanagement was not
intentionally undertaken by Quigley; rather, “he was reacting
to situations as they appeared but not as they really were, and
that’s part of the depression as well as the anxiety that goes
with itl] Zd. at 108. He expressed the belief that Quigley
could continue to practice law but would benefit from “occa-
sional therapy” to resolve emotional issues and prevent “an-
other error down the line.” Id. at 108-09, Dr. Abbruzzese
speculated that the misconduct “probably would not have
happened had there been someone to assist him. He failed to
seek out the assistance at the time which may have helped
him.” Jd, at 118.

On cross-examination, Dr. Abbruzzese emphasized that the
events Quigley attributed to his misconduct were “three fac-
tors that assisted him in making misjudgments[.]” Jd. at 119-
120. Dr. Abbruzzese indicated that there was a “causal factor”
between the events in Quigley’s personal life in 2018 and his
handling of client funds. Jd. at 119, He testified that he
believed Quigley was capable of holding client funds at pres-
ent, but Quigley would need to “work a little harder to be
more diligent about his finances and get out of debt.” Id. at
128.

A member of the Hearing Committee asked whether Dr.
Abbruzzese’s opinion would change if any of the misconduct
occurred before Quigley experienced the three stressors. Dr.
Abbruzzese replied it would alter his opinion in the matter
“because there wouldn’t have been any basis for some of the
actions that I would know of.” Id. at 127.

Lastly, Attorney Jeffrey Valender, a friend and professional
acquaintance of Quigley for approximately thirty years, testi-
fied. He praised Quigley’s performance as a lawyer and char-
acterized him as “excellent.” Jd. at 181, He testified that if
Quigley were to continue to practice law, Valender would not
find the disciplinary issues an impediment to referring clients

to Quigley because he did not believe the issue would reoccur
in the future. Jd. at 131-32.

On November 9, 2015, the Hearing Committee filed a report
and recommendation. The Hearing Committee comprehensive-
ly detailed the stipulated facts of the case and the testimony
presented. See Hr’g Comm. Report, 11/9/15, at 1-20, The
Hearing Committee also made numerous findings of fact
based on the stipulations and testimony presented including,
inter alia, the following.

72. Mr. Woodling did not consent to allow [Quigley] to

withdraw funds from his wife’s estate to satisfy [Quigley’s]

personal obligation.

78. [Quigley] did not recommend that Mr. Woodling consult,

with other counsel concerning any request for a loan. Nor is

there any paperwork or other writing documenting any

Joan.

74. [Quigley] has not fully repaid the funds that he bor-

rowed from the Woodlings in or about 2006.

75. [Quigley] cooperated in the disciplinary proceeding, as

evidenced by the extensive stipulation and admissions,
Id, at 31,

The Hearing Committee concluded that “[tJhe serious na-
ture of [Quigley’s] mishandling of client funds, the fact that
the defaleation extended over a number of years and the
associated misrepresentations warrant the extreme sanction of
disbarment.” Id. at 84, The Hearing Committee did not find
the personal difficulties Quigley experienced mitigated or di-
minished the serious nature of his conduct. Id at 35. It
highlighted that the resignation of Quigley’s bookkeeper and
the misprint in the phone book occurred after Quigley began
comingling personal and client funds and after Quigley used
the Woodling money to satisfy his lien on the office. Id.

Next, the Committee turned to Quigley’s position that his
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder warranted a
lesser disciplinary disposition. The Committee concluded this
position did not serve to mitigate his offenses on several bases.
First, it determined that the testimony of Dr. Abbruzzese did

not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that there:
was a causal connection between Quigley’s diagnoses and his
conduct as required by ODC v. Brawn, 520 Pa. 157, 558 A.2d
894 (1989). It found Dr. Abbruzzese’s testimony “uncertain
and therefore insufficient to demonstrate the requisite causal
link.” Hr’g Comm. Report, 11/9/15, at 36. Further, it highlight-
ed that Dr. Abbruzzese’s testimony revealed that he was not
fully apprised of the details and extent of Quigley’s miscon-
duct. Id. The Committee found the opinion not credible be-
cause Dr. Abbruzzese testified his opinion would differ if the
misconduct occurred prior to the onset of the three circum-
stances to which Quigley attributes his behavior, and the
record showed that the commingling of client funds began
before Quigley’s bookkeeper resigned and before the misprint
in the phone book advertisement occurred. Jd. at 36. Finally, it
took issue with Dr. Abbruzzese’s testimony because “he failed
to explain how he made the diagnosis or precisely how he
determined that [Quigley’s] misconduct related to the diagno-
sis.” Id.

The Committee found that Quigley knowingly commingled
personal and client funds for the purpose of avoiding detection
by the IRS, and not as a result of his other personal cireum-
stances. Id. at 37. Finally, the Committee rejected Quigley’s
argument that he should receive a lesser punishment because
he has made restitution to his clients. The Committee ac-
knowledged Quigley’s cooperation and admissions; however, it
noted that restitution in four of the five matters only occurred
after the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The Committee
also noted that in the instant case, the professional violations
involved a pattern of intentional misconduct involving numer-
ous clients. Jd. at 88. Therefore, the Committee unanimously
recommended disbarment.

HM Quigley filed exceptions to the recommendation with
the Board. On April 7, 2016, the Board issued a report and
recommendation agreeing with the assessment of the Hearing
Committee, concluding Quigley violated Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.8, 1.15(b) and (e), and 8.4(c), and recommending

disbarment. Quigley filed a petition for review with this Court,
and we granted oral argument.
In attorney discipline matters we exercise de novo review,
and we are not bound by the findings and recommendations
of the hearing committee or the Board, though we give them
substantial deference. The ODC bears the burden of estab-
lishing attorney misconduct by a preponderance of the
evidence. Because discipline is imposed on a case-by-case
basis, we must consider the totality of facts presented,
including any aggravating or mitigating factors.
ODC v. Preski, 685 Pa, 220, 184 A3d 1027, 1031 (2016)
(citations and some quotation marks omitted). “[T]he primary
function of the attorney disciplinary system is not punitive in
nature but is to determine the fitness of an attorney to
continue the practice of law and maintain the integrity of the
legal system.” ODC v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.8d 1231,
1238-39 (2012). The objective is to protect the public and
courts from attorneys unfit to practice law. Id. There is no per
se rule on disbarment when an attorney commingles client and
personal funds. ODC v. Monsour, 549 Pa. 482, 701 A.2d 556,
558 (1997). However, “{mJisappropriation of client funds is a
serious offense that may warrant disbarment.” Id. (citations
omitted). Indeed, “[a] client must ... rest assured that any
financial transactions carried out on the client’s behalf will be
scrupulously honest, will be accounted for at the client’s
request, and will involve and [sic] immediate payment of funds
that are due and owing to the client.” Jd. (citation omitted).

HM Quigley has stipulated to violating several Rules of
Professional Conduct; hence, the only issue is whether his
conduct warrants the most serious sanction of disbarment or
some lesser form of discipline is appropriate. See ODC v.
Christie, 586 Pa. 394, 639 A.2d 782, 786 (1994).

Quigley submits “that his mishandling of funds was more
the result of negligence, poor record keeping, and a lack of
understanding of trust account principles, rather than dishon-
esty.” Quigley’s Brief at 8. He acknowledges that Woodling
offered contradictory testimony, but maintains it was his

“belief” that Woodling indeed permitted Quigley to use settle-
ment funds for his own benefit. Jd. at 11-12,

With respect to all of his clients, Quigley argues, although
he committed ethical violations, he did not possess criminal
intent to defraud clients, and all of his clients have been paid
in full. See id. at 18, 15-17, 19-21, 26, He further notes he has
no prior history of discipline, has accepted responsibility for
his actions, and has taken remedial action to avoid misconduct
in the future. Jd. at 8, 15-16, 19. This Court is unpersuaded
that these circumstances mitigate the serious violations Quig-
ley committed, as Quigley’s misconduct involved five separate
clients over a three-year period. Further, he made full restitu-
tion to four of the clients only after disciplinary proceedings
were initiated. See ODC v. Knepp, 497 Pa. 396, 441 A.2d 1197,
1201 (1982) (disbarment ordered for attorney who mishandled
client monies and held insufficient funds in his escrow account
over a four-year period, despite no previous disciplinary ac-
tion; cooperating with investigators; demonstrating remorse;
and returning client funds following initiation of disciplinary
proceedings); ODC v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271, 472 A2d 186,
186-91 (1983) (disbarment ordered for attorney who obtained
clients’ signatures and placed them on a settlement draft
without their knowledge; mishandled and commingled client
funds for a period of two years; and misrepresented to
Disciplinary Counsel the mishandling, despite mitigating evi-
dence of recovery from alcoholism; paying back clients; re-
taining an accountant to monitor and maintain integrity of
escrow account; and the agreement of attorney’s psychiatrist
and several practicing attorneys to monitor his practice);
Monsour, 701 A.2d at 557-60 (disbarment ordered for attor-
ney who intentionally misappropriated client funds over a two-
year period, despite ultimately stipulating to the offenses;
paying clients in full after notification of disciplinary proceed-
ings; and attempting, but failing, to demonstrate a causal
connection between his misconduct and his alcohol abuse);
ODC »v. Keller, 509 Pa, 578, 506 A.2d 872, 879 (1986) (disbar-
ment ordered for attorney who mishandled client funds be-
tween 1980-1982, including depositing a check with a forged

signature, despite evidence that he was a competent member
of the bar preceding the period of misconduct; he had an
acrimonious breakup with his brother/business partner after
which he began exhibiting irrational behavior; and his psy-
chologist’s testimony in mitigation that attorney’s emotional
condition rendered him not responsible for the misconduct)’

HM Quigley also submits that his psychiatric condition was
a causal factor in his misconduct, relying on the testimony of
Dr. Abbruzzese. See Quigley’s Brief at 21-27. In order for a
psychiatric condition to be considered a mitigating factor in a
disciplinary proceeding, the respondent must demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the condition was a causal
factor to the misconduct. Brawn, 553 A.2d at 895-96; see
Monsour, 549 Pa. at 487-88, 701 A.2d at 559, The record
supports the determinations of the Hearing Committee and
the Disciplinary Board that Quigley failed to show the depres-
sion and post-traumatic stress he experienced were causal
factors in his misconduct. Dr. Abbruzzese opined that the
stressors experienced by Quigley in 2013 were a causal factor
to his mismanagement of funds; however, he did not demon-
strate an understanding of the violations or their specific
timeframes. See N.T., 7/9/15, at 108-110. Moreover, his testi-
mony was speculative, noting that had Quigley addressed his

5. We cannot agree with the Dissent’s position that the mitigation
evidence presented in the instant case was substantial. See Dissenting
Op, at 616-18, 161 A.3d at 810-11, We are not unsympathetic to the
personal hardships faced by Quigley which overlapped with his period
of misconduct. However, we cannot overlook that Quigley’s misman-
agement of client funds with which he had been entrusted pre-dated
two of the circumstances to which he attributes his misconduct, i.e., the
resignation of his bookkeeper and the misprint of his advertisement. As
we recognized in Keller,

If we were here primarily concerned with a punishment of the
individual, strong argument could be made in view of the circum-
stances surrounding the errant behavior.... However, as we previ-
ously noted, the focus is not upon Respondent but rather it is directed
to the impact of his conduct upon the system and its effect on the
perception of that system by the society it serves.
Keller, 506 A.2d at 877-78, The misuse of client funds in five separate
matters, over three years by Quigley has compromised the integrity of
the legal profession to a degree which warrants the sanction of disbar-
ment.

issues, the violations “probably” would not have occurred. Id.
at 118. Significantly, as pointed out by the Hearing Committee
and the Board, Quigley’s misconduct with regard to the Woo-
dling matter predated the resignation of his bookkeeper and
the misprint in the phone book advertisement. Dr. Abbruzzese
testified that misconduct occurring prior to the onset of the
three stressors Quigley experienced would change his profes-
sional opinion on causation. Id. at 127. Accordingly, we con-
clude Quigley failed to demonstrate a causal connection be-
tween his misconduct and a psychiatric disorder sufficient to
constitute a lesser disciplinary sanction in this matter. See
Braun, 558 A.2d at 895-96.

For these reasons, we adopt the recommendation of the
Disciplinary Board and order Peter James Quigley disbarred
from the practice of law in this Commonwealth. We further
order Quigley to comply with the provisions of Pa.R.D.E. 217,
and pay costs pursuant to Pa,R.D.E. 208(g).

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Todd and
Dougherty join the opinion.

Justice Donohue files a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Wecht joins.

JUSTICE DONOHUE, Dissenting

I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to impose
the sanction of disbarment on the record presented here. The
essential purpose of our system of lawyer discipline is “to
protect the public from unfit attorneys and to maintain the
integrity of the legal system.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel
v. Keller, 509 Pa. 573, 506 A.2d 872, 875 (1986); In re Ouman,
496 Pa. 584, 487 A.2d 1169, 1174 (1981). While the aim of the
disciplinary system is not intended to be punitive, sanctions
are a necessary means to accomplish its end and are punitive
in nature. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini, 504 Pa.
271, 472 A.2d 186, 190 (1988). At all times, we “must balance a
concern for public welfare with a respect for the substantial
interest that an attorney has in continuing his professional
involvement in the practice of law....” Office of Disciplinary

Counsel v. Kanuck, 517 Pa. 160, 585 A.2d 69, 74 (1987)
(quoting Office of Disciplinary Cownsel v. Lewis, 498 Pa. 519,
426 A.2d 1188, 1142 (1981)).

Disbarment is an extreme sanction properly reserved for
only the most egregious matters, as it constitutes a termi-
nation of the privilege to practice law without any promise of
ultimate reinstatement. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cap-
puccio, 616 Pa. 489, 48 A3d 1281, 1288 (2012). On several
occasions, this Court has held that misappropriation of client
funds may warrant a sanction of disbarment, see, eg. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Monsour, 549 Pa, 482, 701 A.2d 556,
558 (1997). Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Davis, 582 Pa. 22,
614 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1992), reinstatement granted sub nom.
Matter of Davis, 543 Pa, 818, 671 A.2d 222 (1996); Keller, 506
A.2d at 875; Lucarini, 472 A.2d at 190; Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Knepp, 497 Pa, 396, 441 A.2d 1197, 1201 (1982), and
Respondent, as a result of his egregious conduct, has thus
exposed himself to the possibility of imposition of this severe
punishment by virtue of his misdeeds.

This Court has declined, however, to create a per se rule
that misappropriation of funds must result in disbarment,
prescribing instead a standard by which we exercise our
discretion through consideration of the facts and circum-
stances of each case individually. See, e.g., Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel v. Chung, 548 Pa. 108, 695 A.2d 405, 407 (1997)
(citing Lucarini, 472 A.2d at 190); Monsowr, 701 A.2d at 558,
Accordingly, in every case this Court must conduct a de novo
review to determine whether significant mitigating factors
weigh against disbarment. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Preski, 635 Pa. 220, 184 A.38d 1027, 1031 (2016); Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Rainone, 590 Pa. 15, 911 A.2d 920,
930 (2006).

The principal issue in this case is not whether Respondent
committed multiple acts of mishandling client funds. In most
instances he has admitted his guilt, and I agree with the
Majority’s cogent analysis with respect to the Disciplinary
Board’s conclusion that Respondent violated multiple provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.
Instead, the principal issue here is whether to impose a

lengthy suspension from the practice of law or the more
extreme sanction of disbarment. The essential difference be-
tween these two sanctions is that while both sanctions involve
the withdrawal of the privilege of practicing law, a suspended
attorney may resume practice at the end of the period of
suspension upon demonstration of his fitness to practice,
whereas a disbarred attorney may not apply for readmission
to the bar for a period of five years, and

there is no basis for an expectation by the disbarred attor-

ney of the right to resume practice at some future point in

time. When reinstatement is sought by the disbarred attor-
ney, the threshold question must be whether the magnitude
of the breach of trust would permit the resumption of
practice without a detrimental effect upon “the integrity and
standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor
subversive of the public interest.”
Matter of Renfroe, 548 Pa. 101, 695 A.2d 401, 403 (1997) (citing
Keller, 506 A.2d at 875). To make this determination, we must.
consider whether sufficient mitigating factors tilt in favor of
the lesser sanction. See, ¢.9., Chung, 695 A.2d at 407 (holding
that given the attorney’s many years of significant community
service, genuine remorse, and strong character evidence, a
five-year suspension was appropriate sanction); Office of Dis-
ciplinary Counsel v. Shorall, 527 Pa. 413, 592 A.2d 1285, 1294
(1991) (“[I]n light of the evidence offered in mitigation, we
believe that the ODC’s pursuit of the extreme sanction of
disbarment is [ ] inappropriate as being too severe and unjust-
ified.”); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kanuck, 517 Pa.
160, 585 A.2d 69, 76 (1987) (holding that where the attorney
did not intend to embezzle his clients’ funds and made restitu-
tion in every instance, a five year suspension was appropriate
sanction),

Respondent refers this Court to substantial mitigating evi-
dence in support of his request for the imposition of a lesser
sanction than disbarment. He notes that he was never charged
with any crimes and denies that any of his acknowledged
misdeeds were committed with any criminal intent, Respon-
dent’s Brief at 12, 15, 17, 19, 25-26. He also denies that he

ever acted maliciously or intentionally to cause harm to his
clients, and that upon being made aware by the Disciplinary
Board of shortcomings in his IOLTA account, he immediately
took the necessary remedial steps to make each of his clients
whole and to bring his IOLTA account into trust. Id, at 2, 16,
Respondent indicates that none of his clients brought claims of
wrongdoing against him. Jd. at 4. In addition, he references
the favorable character evidence he presented, demonstrating
that he is well respected in his legal community, having
practiced for more than thirty-two years without any history
or incidents of prior disciplinary violations. Id, at 2, 4, 16, 26.
He cooperated throughout the entirety of the disciplinary
process, stipulating to the majority of the allegations against
him. Id. at 4, Finally, Respondent has expressed deep remorse
for his actions, which he fully acknowledges were “quite
disturbing,” “not becoming of a member of the bar,” and
involved “egregious misconduct.” Id. at 16, 25-26.

In contrast, in the cases cited above, including Monsour,
Davis, Keller, Lucarini, and Knepp, in which the sanction of
disbarment was imposed for the misappropriation or mishan-
dling of client funds, the attorneys typically offered relatively
little mitigation evidence. Davis blamed “careless office proce-
dures” for his intentional misconduct. Davis, 614 A.2d at 1122.
Keller offered only evidence of a disturbed emotional state,
brought on by the dissolution of his business relationship with
his brother. Keller, 506 A.2d at 877. Monsour and Lucarini
presented evidence of an untreated alcoholism condition.
Monsour, 701 A.2d at 558-59; Lucarini, 472 A2d at 187.
Knepp contended that he was driven to his misdeeds because
of “financial difficulties” and “a desire to maintain an image of
solvency.” Knepp, 441 A.2d at 1201. In addition, unlike here,
these cases involved additional misconduct, such as forging
clients’ signatures (Keller and Lucarini ), counseling clients to
undertake dishonest acts in court proceedings and deceitful
use of an affidavit (Davis), disobeying a court order (Mons-
our ), charging excessive legal fees (Knepp ), and failing to act
diligently and lying to conceal the transgression (Keller and
Knepp ).

In my view, the mitigating factors present here, including
Respondent’s immediate efforts to make his clients whole, his
length of practice without a disciplinary history, his age (six-
ty), his cooperation throughout the disciplinary process, and
his remorse and recognition of the seriousness and wrongful-
ness of his conduct, when taken together, provide a substantial
counterweight to lessen the severity of his conduct so to
justify a form of discipline less than disbarment. As a result, I
respectfully dissent from the learned Majority’s decision to
impose this sanction, and would instead suspend Respondent
from the practice of law for a period of five years.

Justice Wecht joins this dissenting opinion.

161 A.8d 811

Eugene R. YENCHI and Ruth I. Yenchi,
Husband and Wife, Appellees

ve

AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC., Ameriprise Financial
Services, Inc, RiverSource Life Insurance Company
and Bryan Gregory Holland, Appellants

No, 8 WAP 2016
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
ARGUED: November 1, 2016
DECIDED: June 20, 2017

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Kathy Kay Condo, Esq., Christopher Michael Helms, Esq.,
Babst, Calland, Clements & Zomnir, P.C., for Appellants.

Kenneth Robert Behrend, Esq., Behrend & Ernsberger
P.C., for Appellees,

David C. Harrison, Esq., for Pennsylvania Association For
Justice, Appellee Amicus Curiae.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE

In this discretionary appeal, we must decide whether a
fiduciary duty can arise in a consumer transaction for the
purchase of a whole life insurance policy based upon the
advice of a financial advisor where the consumer purchasing
the policy does not cede decision-making control over the
purchase to the financial advisor. We conclude that, consistent
with our jurisprudence, no fiduciary duty arises in such a
situation. Consequently, we reverse the Superior Court’s deci-
sion to the contrary.

In 1995, Bryan Holland (“Holland”), a financial advisor for
IDS Life Insurance Corporation, made an unsolicited tele-
phone contact, a “cold call,” to Eugene and Ruth Yenchi (the

TT

“Yenchis”) and asked to meet with them regarding their
“financial stuff.” At the initial meeting, Mr. Yenchi informed
Holland that he had a long-term disability policy, and Holland
asked him to bring it with him to their next meeting. At this
second meeting, Holland reviewed the disability policy and
advised the Yenchis to keep it, as it was a good policy and he
could not offer them a comparable product.

At a subsequent meeting in December 1995, for a fee of
$350, Holland presented the Yenchis with a financial manage-
ment proposal (the “Proposal”). The Proposal contained a
notice that it had been prepared by “your American Express
financial advisor” (Holland) and that “[aJt your request, your
American Express financial advisor can recommend products
distributed by American Express Financial Advisors and its
affiliates as investment alternatives for existing securities.”
Complaint, 11/18/2008, Exhibit 1, at 8. The Proposal offered
the Yenchis a number of general recommendations, including
that they monitor monthly expenses, consolidate their debt,
consider various savings plans, consolidate current life insur-
ance policies into one policy, review long-term care coverage,
keep accurate records for tax purposes (medical expenses and
charitable contributions), transfer 401(k) funds into mutual
funds, and continue estate planning with an attorney and their
financial advisor. Id. at 7-8. The Yenchis implemented some of
these recommendations, saving money in an investment certif-
icate and opening an IRA account.

With respect to the consolidation of life insurance policies,
the Yenchis provided Holland with relevant information re-
garding their current policies with Met Life (five held by Mr.
Yenchi and two by Ms. Yenchi). In January 1996, Holland
proposed a whole life insurance policy for Mr. Yenchi with an
initial $115,000 death benefit. In June 1996, he proposed a
similar policy for Mr. Yenchi with an initial $100,000 death
benefit, plus a $25,000 rider for Ms. Yenchi. Mr. Yenchi
purchased the latter policy, cashing out his five Met Life
policies to make the initial payment, Because Mr. Yenchi also
purchased the rider for Ms. Yenchi, she did not need to cash
in her existing life insurance policies for a new one. Instead, in

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1997 Ms, Yenchi used the proceeds from her two Met Life
policies to purchase a deferred variable annuity. In 1998,
Holland proposed that the Yenchis increase their life insur-
ance coverage to $300,000, but they rejected Holland’s advice
on this occasion, deciding that they had enough life insurance,

In 2000, the Yenchis had their portfolio independently re-
viewed, Through this process, they were advised that the 1996
whole life insurance policy Mr, Yenchi had purchased was
underfunded, destined to lapse, and that additional premiums
beyond those allegedly represented by Holland,’ at substan-
tially high rates increasing over time, would have to be paid,
They also learned that Ms. Yenchi’s 1997 deferred variable
annuity would not mature until 2025, when she was eighty-four
years old (rather than sixty-five, as had allegedly been repre-
sented by Holland).

In April 2001, the Yenchis initiated suit by writ of summons,
naming as defendants American Express Financial Services
Corporation, American Express Financial Advisors Corpora-
tion, IDS Life Insurance Company,” and Holland (collectively,

1, In their complaint, the Yenchis admitted that Holland presented them
with a “Life Protection Plus Illustration” (the ‘‘Ilustration”) that pro-
vided the essential terms of the whole life policy. Complaint,
11/13/2003, 147. These terms included: (1) an initial death benefit of
$100,000, decreasing to $90,000 at age 70, and to $80,000 at age 80;
and (2) an initial payment of $17,500, with monthly premium payments
of $240 in years one through eight, of $2390.45 in year nine, $784.65 in
year ten, and $2887 in year eleven. Motion for Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 1, Deposition of Eugene Yenchi at 105 (Dep. Ex. 2). The
Illustration included separate columns for interest at the current
(5.85%) and guaranteed (4%) interest rates, and further indicated that
there would be no surrender value at age 82. Id. In connection with the
purchase of the policy, Mr. Yenchi signed a disclosure statement which
indicated that current interest rates were not a prediction of future
policy performance, Id. at 105-07.

At his deposition, Mr. Yenchi testified that Holland represented to him
that the monthly premiums on the policy would be $240 for eight years,
at which time the policy would be paid off, Id. at 125-26, At trial, Mr.
Yenchi testified that he understood that if he paid the $240 monthly
premium, the payout would be “guaranteed.” N.T., 1/28/2014, at 720,
The Illustration was introduced at trial as Exhibit 20, Id. at 705.

2, American Express Financial Services Corporation is now known as
Ameriprise Financial, Inc. American Express Financial Advisors Corpo-
ration is now known as Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. IDS Life

“Appellants”). The Yenchis’ complaint, filed in November 2003,
asserted claims of negligence/willful disregard,’ fraudulent
misrepresentation, violation of the Uniform Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. §§ 201-
1-201-9.8, bad faith, negligent supervision, and breach of
fiduciary duty.

By order dated March 21, 2018, the trial court granted
summary judgment to Appellants on all claims relating to the
1997 purchase of the deferred variable annuity, and dismissed
the claims for bad faith, negligent supervision and breach of
fiduciary duty relating to the 1996 purchase of the whole life
insurance policy. Of relevance here, with respect to the breach
of fiduciary duty claim, the trial court held that no fiduciary
relationship was established between the Yenchis and Holland
because the Yenchis continued to make their own investment
decisions. Trial Court Memorandum, 7/28/2014, at 3. The trial
court cited to its own prior decision in Ihnat v. Pover, 146
P.L.J. 299, 308-10 (1999), in which it held that no fiduciary
duty arises between an insurance agent and a policyholder
unless the policyholder delegates decision-making control to
the insurance agent. In applying its Ihnat decision, the trial
court rejected the notion that there was any material differ-
ence between an insurance agent and a financial advisor. The
trial court further indicated that the Yenchis “knew they were
dealing with a representative of American Express who was

Insurance Company is now known as RiverSource Life Insurance
Company.

3, The first count of the Yenchis’ complaint commingles allegations
relating to both professional negligence (e.g., that Appellants breached
a duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in advising and
recommending an insurance program appropriate for the needs of the
Yenchis), and negligent misrepresentation (e.g., that Appellants failed to
disclose full, correct and material information regarding the products
being offered), Complaint, 11/13/2003, 1 190-98. At oral argument on
Appellants’ motion for summary judgment, counsel for the Yenchis
identified this claim as one for negligent misrepresentation and advised
the trial court that the Yenchis had not asserted a claim for professional
malpractice. N.T., 3/27/2013, at 7. The trial court did not grant sum-
mary judgment on this claim. At some point prior to trial, however, the
Yenchis either abandoned or voluntarily dismissed the claim, although
the case docket does not so reflect. The Yenchis raised no issues with
regard to this count on appeal.

recommending purchases of American Express investments.”
Trial Court Memorandum, 7/28/2014, at 4. While the trial
court noted that this fact may be relevant to the Yenchis’
fraudulent misrepresentation and UTPCPL claims, it did not
provide support for a fiduciary duty claim, since “a breach of
fiduciary duty claim requires a policyholder to give up con-
trol.” Id.

The case proceeded to trial on the Yenchis’ fraudulent
misrepresentation and UTPCPL claims in connection with the
purchase of the 1996 whole life insurance policy. At trial, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellants on the fraudu-
lent misrepresentation claim and, based upon the same eviden-
tiary record, the trial court found in Appellants’ favor on the
UTPCPL claim.’

The Yenchis appealed. Among the issues presented to the
Superior Court was the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary
duty claim. With respect to this issue, the Superior Court
agreed with the Yenchis that the trial court erred in focusing
exclusively on the nature of the relationship in question (that
of a buyer and seller of insurance) and the Yenchis’ retention
of decision-making authority over their investments. Yenchi v.
Ameriprise Fin. Inc., 128 A.8d 1071, 1080-81 (Pa. Super.
2015). The Superior Court acknowledged that Pennsylvania
appellate courts have always considered the existence of a

4, The Yenchis’ UTPCPL claim, like their claim for fraudulent misrepre-

sentation, required proof of common law fraud. Their UTPCPL claim,
which related to the 1996 whole life insurance policy, accrued on or
around August 15, 1996, the date Mr. Yenchi purchased the policy. At
that time, the catchall provision of the UTPCPL prohibited one from
“engaging in any other fraudulent conduct which creates a likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding.” See Prime Meats, Inc. v. Yochim,
422 Pa.Super. 460, 619 A.2d 769, 773 (1993) (quoting 73 P.S. § 201-
2(4)(vii)). On December 4, 1996, this provision was amended to
prohibit one from “engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstand-
ing.” 73 P.S, § 201-2(4)(xxi) (emphasis added). See generally Walkup v.
Santander Bank, N.A., 147 F.Supp.3d 349, 361 (B.D. Pa. 2015).
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the
pre-amendment version of the UTPCPL applied to the Yenchis’ claim,
thus requiring proof of fraudulent, as opposed to merely deceptive,
conduct. Yenchi, 123 A.3d at 1083. The Yenchis did not seek review of
that ruling by this Court.

TT

confidential relationship ® to be dependent upon the facts of
each particular case, as it cannot be “reduced to a catalogue of
specific cireumstances, invariably falling to the left or right of
a definitional line,” Id. at 1080 (citing In re Estate of Scott, 455
Pa, 429, 316 A.2d 888, 885 (1974)). As such, the Superior Court
held that the trial court’s focus on the insurance aspect of the
relationship in this case “eliminates wholesale an entire cate-
gory of commercial relationships without properly accounting
for the fact-sensitive inquiry required by our case law.” Jd. In
addition, the Superior Court held that the trial court’s insis-
tence that a fiduciary relationship may be established only
when one party cedes decision-making control to the other was
too rigid, as prior cases have recognized fiduciary relation-
ships upon a showing of an “overmastering influence,” and
thus the standard for the establishment of a fiduciary relation-
ship “can be met with evidence less absolute than a complete
cession of decision-making authority.” Id.

Judge Lazarus filed a dissenting opinion, indicating that the
“relationship created by a commercial, arm’s-length transac-
tion” is “not ordinarily confidential by law.” Id. at 1085
(Lazarus, J., dissenting) (citing Wisniski v. Brown & Brown
Ins. Co., 906 A.2d 571, 578-79 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Judge
Lazarus noted that the Yenchis knew and understood that
they were developing a relationship with an American Express
employee who sold insurance and financial products and pro-
vided fee-based financial planning advice. Id. at 1085. Because
the Yenchis made each decision to purchase a product from
Holland, as indicated by their signatures authorizing the pur-
chases, they never ceded decision-making authority to him. Id.
at 1086.

This Court granted discretionary review to consider wheth-
er the Superior Court erred in reversing the decision of the
trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Appellants
on the grounds that the Yenchis had not adduced sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case that a fiduciary
5. The terms “fiduciary relationship” and “confidential relationship”

may be used interchangeably. Stewart v. Hooks, 372 Pa, 542, 94 A.2d
756, 759 (1953).

relationship existed between the parties. Yenchi v. Ameriprise
Fin. Inc., 685 Pa. 211, 184 A.8d 51 (2016) (per curiam).’ On
this issue, Appellants contend that the Superior Court erred in
determining that the Yenchis presented sufficient evidence to
create an issue of fact as to whether a fiduciary relationship
existed with Holland. Appellants argue that in connection with
consumer transactions, fiduciary relationships may exist only
if one party cedes decision-making control to the other party.
Appellants claim that if, as the Yenchis suggest, a fiduciary
relationship may be created any time one party relies upon
the superior skill, knowledge or expertise of the other party,
then fiduciary relationships would arguably exist in virtually
every consumer transaction, including with plumbers, mechan-
ics and salespeople. According to Appellants, no such protec-
tions are necessary, since consumers have available to them
other tort, contract, and statutory remedies, including, in
particular, the UTPCPL.

The Yenchis, conversely, argue that the Superior Court did
not err, as decisions about the existence of fiduciary relation-
ships are fact-intensive inquiries. The Yenchis contend that
Appellants held themselves out as experts in financial and
retirement planning matters, and that, by contrast, they had
only high school educations and no experience working with a
financial advisor. This substantial difference of relevant knowl-
edge, the Yenchis insist, created a question of material fact as
to whether their relationship with Holland was one so marked
by dependence and inequality that it permitted him to take
advantage of them. The Yenchis claim that they reasonably
believed and trusted that Holland had prepared the Proposal,
and later recommended the purchase of the 1996 whole life
insurance policy, with their best interests in mind.

6. We also granted allocatur with respect to an evidentiary issue, namely
whether the Superior Court erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court with respect to Appellants’ motions in limine and granting the
Yenchis’ request for a new trial on their fraudulent misrepresentation
and UTPCPL claims, Yenchi v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 635 Pa. 211, 134
A.3d 51 (2016) (per curiam). Upon further review of the submissions of

the parties and the certified record on appeal, we have made a determi-
nation that the appeal as to this issue was improvidently granted.

HH soOur scope and standard of review with respect to the
grant of a motion for summary judgment is as follows:
{Slummary judgment is appropriate only in those cases
where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ Atcovitz v. Gulph
Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d 1218, 1221
(2002); Pa, R.C.P. No. 1085.2(1). When considering a motion
for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts of
record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Toy v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 593 Pa. 20, 928 A.2d 186, 195 (2007). In so doing,
the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party,
and, thus, may only grant summary judgment “where the
right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt.” Id.
On appellate review, then
an appellate court may reverse a grant of summary
judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact presents a question
of law, and therefore, on that question our standard of
review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the
determinations made by the lower tribunals.
Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 592 Pa. 458, 926
A.2d 899, 902-03 (2007) (internal citations omitted). To the
extent that this Court must resolve a question of law, we
shall review the grant of summary judgment in the context
of the entire record, Id. at 903.
Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 997 A.2d 1152,
1159 (2010).

HA motion for summary judgment is based on an evi-
dentiary record that entitles the moving party to a judgment
as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1085.2, Note. Pursuant to Rule
1035.2(2), a court must enter judgment in favor of the moving
party whenever the non-moving party, with the burden of
proof at trial, fails to produce sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to a necessary element of the

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eause of action or defense that could be established by addi-

tional discovery. Barnish v. KWI Bldg. Co., 602 Pa, 402, 980
A.2d 585, 548 (2009).

Hl in their motion for summary judgment, Appellants
contended that insufficient evidence existed to create a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether a fiduciary relationship
existed between the Yenchis and Holland. In response, the
Yenchis acknowledged that “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, typical-
ly the insurer/insured relationship is viewed as an arm’s-
length relationship and fails to create a fiduciary duty.” Brief
in Response to [Appellants’] Motion for Summary Judgment,
2/6/2018, at 20. Nevertheless, the Yenchis’ contended that “the
nature of the insurer/insured relationship changed and a confi-
dential relationship was created because [Appellants] acted as
a financial advisor providing investment planning advice for a
fee.” Id. In their response to the motion for summary judg-
ment, the Yenchis cited to scant evidence in the summary
judgment record in support of this claim. As evidence of their
trust in Holland, they referenced their decisions, based upon
his advice, to cash out their Met Life policies and to use those
proceeds to purchase the 1996 whole life insurance policy and
the 1997 deferred variable annuity policy.’ Jd. at 8. The
Yenchis’ also referenced their lack of sophistication regarding
finances or the language used in insurance policies and legal
documents, although they did not cite to any particular deposi-
tion testimony or other evidence to support this claim.’ Final-
ly, again without citing to any record support (including no
evidence that Holland ever actually told them that he was
7. Although not referenced in the Yenchis’ response to the motion for

summary judgment, in her deposition Ms, Yenchi related that she

frequently called Holland with questions after she read her monthly
statement. Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2, Deposition of

Ruth Yenchi at 52-53. She also testified that they often signed docu-

ments based upon Holland’s representations with regard to their con-

tents. Id. at 48-49 (“[H]e was my advisor and I took his word.”). Mr.

Yenchi likewise testified to trusting Holland. Id., Exhibit 1, Deposition
of Eugene Yenchi at 145 (‘[W]e trusted him that he knew the best.”).

8. Again, while not referenced in their response to the motion for
summary judgment, Mr, Yenchi testified at his deposition that he
graduated from high school. Id. at 9. Ms. Yenchi did not testify regard-
ing her educational background.

a
acting in their best interests), the Yenchis claimed that “[bly
charging a fee for independent financial advice, [they were]
justified in believing that the advice was being provided in
their best interests, and was more than an ordinary arm’s-
length transaction involving the purchase of insurance.” Id,
Notably, in their response to the motion for summary judg-
ment, the Yenchis did not contend, or cite to any evidence in
support of, any close personal relationship with Holland. From
their deposition testimony, it would appear that all of their
meetings took place either in Holland's office or over the
phone?

HE A fiduciary duty is the highest duty implied by law.
Miller v. Keystone Ins. Co., 585 Pa, 581, 686 A.2d 1109, 1116
(1994) (Cappy, J., dissenting), A fiduciary duty requires a
party to act with the utmost good faith in furthering and
advancing the other person’s interests, including a duty to
disclose all relevant information. See Basile v. H & R Block,
Inc., 568 Pa, 859, 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (2000); Young v. Kaye,
448 Pa, 885, 279 A.2d 759, 768 (1971) (“When the relationship
between persons is one of trust and confidence, the party in
whom the trust and confidence are reposed must act with
scrupulous fairness and good faith in his dealings with the
other and refrain from using his position to the other's detri-
ment and his own advantage.”); Sylvester v. Beck, 406 Pa. 607,
178 A.2d 755, 757 (1962); McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561, 192
A, 674, 676-77 (1987); In re Null’s Estate, 302 Pa, 64, 153 A.
187 (1980), see also Black’s Law Dictionary (10 ed. 2014)
(defining a fiduciary duty as “a duty to act with the highest
degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in
the best interest of the other person”). This highest duty will
be imposed only where the attendant conditions make it
9. In their appellate brief filed with this Court, the Yenchis cite to

testimony from Mr. Yenchi regarding his discussions with Holland, at

the beginnings of their meetings, regarding a variety of topics, includ-
ing golf and cigars. Yenchis’ Brief at 26 n.11. Mr. Yenchi testified that
he “would like to think he had a relationship” with Holland. Id. To the
extent that this testimony could be relevant, it was offered by Mr.

Yenchi at trial, and thus was not a part of the summary judgment
evidentiary record.

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certain ” that a fiduciary relationship exists. Leedom v. Palm-
er, 274 Pa, 22, 117 A, 410, 412 (1922) (“(‘TJhe evidence to
sustain a confidential relation must be certain; it cannot arise
from suspicion or from infrequent or unrelated acts[.]”); In re
Erdeljac’s Estate, 888 Pa. 827, 181 A.2d 97, 100 (1957); In re
King’s Estate, 369 Pa. 528, 87 A.2d 469, 472 (1952).

HE sIn some types of relationships, a fiduciary duty
exists as a matter of law. Principal and agent, trustee and
cestui que trust, attorney and client, guardian and ward, and
partners are recognized examples. See, ¢g., McCown v. Fra-
ser, 327 Pa, 561, 192 A. 674, 676-77 (1937); Young, 279 A.2d at
763. The unique degree of trust and confidence involved in
these relationships typically allows for one party to gain easy
access to the property or other valuable resources of the
other, thus necessitating appropriate legal protections.

HM Where no fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law,
Pennsylvania courts have nevertheless long recognized the
existence of confidential relationships in circumstances where
equity compels that we do so. See Darlington’s Appeal, 5
W.N.C. 529, 86 Pa. 512 (1878). Our courts have found fiduciary
duties in circumstances where the relative position of the
parties is such that the one has the power and means to take
advantage of, or exercise undue influence over, the other. The
circumstances in which confidential relationships have been
recognized are fact specific and cannot be reduced to a
particular set of facts or circumstances. Scott, 316 A.2d at 885.
We have explained that a confidential relationship “appears
when the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal
on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an overmastering
influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or trust,
justifiably reposed[.]” Frowen v. Blank, 498 Pa. 187, 425 A.2d
412, 416-17 (1981). In these cases, which have typically been
10, The requirement that evidence be “certain” is an early forerunner of

what is now referred to a “clear and convincing” burden of proof. In

some older cases, the applicable burden of proof was styled as ‘definite,

certain, clear and convincing.” See, eg., In re Swenk’s Estate, 176

Pa.Super. 513, 108 A.2d 825, 827 (1954); In re Culhane’s Estate, 133
Pa,Super, 339, 2 A.2d 567, 572 (1938).

brought in courts of equity, if a confidential relationship was
found to exist, then the burden shifts and the fiduciary has to
demonstrate that there has been no breach of trust. Id.
Transactions between persons occupying a confidential rela-
tionship are voidable, and the party seeking to benefit from
such a transaction must demonstrate that his or her actions
were at all times “fair, conscientious, and beyond the reach of
suspicion.” Young, 279 A.2d at 766; Matter of Estate of
Evasew, 526 Pa. 98, 584 A.2d 910, 918 (1990).

HE While cases involving fiduciary relationships are nec-
essarily fact specific, they usually involve some special vulner-
ability in one person that creates a unique opportunity for
another person to take advantage to their benefit. This Court
has recognized that while disease or advancing age “do not by
themselves create a confidential relationship with another,”
such limitations “may support an inference of confidentiality”
if they bear on a party’s “capacity to understand the nature of
the transaction in question.” Scott, 816 A.2d at 886. Family
relationships or close personal friendships, while also not
dispositive of the existence of a confidential relationship, have
also often played significant roles in particular determinations.
Silver v. Silver, 421 Pa. 533, 219 A.2d 659, 662 (1966) (stating
that kinship, while not dispositive, is a factor “which cannot be
ignored”).

HM Where one party lacks the ability to understand the
nature and terms of the transaction and simultaneously repos-
es their complete trust in the other party based upon well-
established relationships, this circumstance provides an oppor-
tunity for the second party to exercise undue influence over
the first and, thus, effectively control the decision-making
process to their advantage. In F'rowen, for example, the sale of
a farm for an unreasonably low price was set aside after
recognition of a confidential relationship between, on the one
hand, an elderly and infirm eighty-six-year-old widow with
little formal education and, on the other, neighbors who had
befriended her. Frowen, 425 A.2d at 415-16. Similarly, in
Brooks v. Conston, 356 Pa. 69, 51 A.2d 684 (1947), after the

a ~

unexpected death of her husband, a widow with no experience
in business matters agreed to sell the family’s business assets,
at an unfair price, to a “warm family friend” who advised her
to do so without any appraisal of their value. Id. at 687-88.

Undue influence resulting in a loss of control has also been
found to exist when one party places their complete and
unhesitating trust in the other party, and in so doing effective-
ly cedes their decision-making authority to the other party. In
Young, for example, an octogenarian (Young) with no knowl-
edge of the intricacies of state and federal tax laws, effectively
ceded control of the financial aspects of the corporation he
owned to someone (Brooks) he considered to be a close friend
and trusted advisor. Young, 279 A.2d at 761. Young routinely
signed, unquestioningly, corporate (and individual) income tax
returns, corporate financial statements, and other corporate
letters and financial documents, all prepared by Brooks. Jd.
After the IRS issued a deficiency assessment against the
corporation, Brooks advised Young that the assessment could
be avoided if he transferred all of his shares in the corporation
to him (Brooks) “for tax purposes only.” Id, Relying solely on
Brooks’ advice, Young signed a certificate transferring all
10,000 shares of the corporation to Brooks, which Brooks then
sold to a third party for $50,000. Jd. This Court held that the
transfer of the stock to Brooks was not an arm’s-length
transaction, as Young’s overwhelming reliance on Brooks’ tax
advice created a situation in which Brooks had a unique
opportunity to take advantage of Young. Id. at 763. We
accordingly reversed the equity court’s decision, voided the
Young-to-Brooks transaction, and held that Young had a
superior claim to the stock than did the third party. Id. at 760.

Conversely, even where special vulnerabilities exist, this
Court has not recognized the existence of a confidential rela-
tionship if the person continued to act on his or her own behalf
and did not succumb to any “overmastering influence” of
another. For instance, in Jenne v. Kennedy, 879 Pa. 555, 109
A.2d 807 (1954), this Court refused to void the sale of a house
by an eighty-five year old mother to her daughter, concluding
that there was not “the slightest shred of testimony that she

TT

was overpowered, dominated, or unduly influenced in her
judgments by this defendant.” Jd, at 809. In Scott, we found no
confidential relationship existed between a sister and her
brother, even though the sister, while in intensive care, had
signed a bank card giving her brother access to her funds. He
also later sold her car. Jd. at 885-86. This Court determined
that even during her infirmity, she continued to manage her
own affairs and knowingly directed her brother’s actions on
her behalf, thus negating any possibility of a confidential
relationship. Id. at 886 (“Mrs. Scott’s mental powers were
undiminished during the time she was in intensive care.”), And
in In re Estate of Dunlap, 471 Pa. 303, 370 A.2d 314 (1977),
this Court found that no confidential relationship existed
between a father and son where the evidence showed that the
father conducted his own banking business and executed the
codicil to his will in his son’s absence. Jd. at 317 (“appellant’s
evidence describes an individual independently handling his
own affairs”).

HMM The Superior Court, in the case before us, erred in
relying on our case law involving undue influence to support
its conclusion that a fiduciary relationship can be established
without evidence that decision-making power was effectively
ceded to another. Yenchi, 128 A.3d at 1080-81. Its view misses
the point that the exercise of undue influence, at its core,
indicates that an individual so influenced has lost the ability to
make an independent decision.

In the present case, the Yenchis do not claim that Appel-
lants’ roles as sellers of insurance or, more generally, as
financial advisors, created a fiduciary relationship as a matter
of law. The Superior Court did not so hold. Yenchi, 128 A.38d at
1080 (“To be clear, we do not hold that evidence of [Appel-
lants’] purported positions as financial advisors is sufficient by
itself to establish a confidential relationship.”), Moreover,
while the Yenchis indicate that they paid a fee for the financial
advice received from Holland, they do not contend that this
fact alone creates a fiduciary relationship. Answer to Petition
for Allowance of Appeal, 12/29/2015, at 9 (“It is understood.
that a fiduciary relationship does not arise simply because one

party relies and pays for specialized knowledge of the other
party.”). Instead, the Yenchis claim that a confidential rela-
tionship existed with Holland because he held a “vastly superi-
or” position to them with respect to his knowledge of insur-
ance products and financial services, and that over time, they
came to trust him and repose confidence in his advice to them.
Id, at 10. The Yenchis highlight the fact that they are only
“high school educated” while Holland is “college educated with
a CPA and securities and insurance licenses,” Id.

HM We conclude that the Yenchis’ summary judgment
evidentiary record falls far short of establishing a fiduciary
relationship with Holland. Fiduciary duties do not arise “mere-
ly because one party relies on and pays for the specialized skill
of the other party.” eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising,
Ine., 811 A.2d 10, 28 (Pa. Super. 2002), If this were the law in
Pennsylvania, “a fiduciary relationship could arise whenever
one party had any marginal greater level of skill and expertise
in a particular area than another party.” Id; see generally
Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.8d 507, 522 (6th
Cir. 1999) (“To hold otherwise would impose fiduciary obli-
gations on the seller of goods or services in the vast multitude
of ordinary arm’s-length transactions simply on the basis that
the seller possessed superior knowledge of the product being
sold.”).

HM The superior knowledge or expertise of a party
does not impose a fiduciary duty on that party or otherwise
convert an arm’s-length transaction into a confidential rela-
tionship. In this regard, the analysis is no different in a
consumer transaction than in other fiduciary duty cases decid-
ed by this Court. “[Tyhe critical question is whether the
relationship goes beyond mere reliance on superior skill, and
into a relationship characterized by ‘overmastering influence’
on one side or ‘weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably
reposed’ on the other side,” which results in the effective
ceding of control over decision-making by the party whose
property is being taken. eToll, Inc., 811 A.2d at 23 (emphasis
in original) (holding that although an advertising company was

a “trusted advisor” to a software developer, no fiduciary
relationship existed between the parties) (citing Basile v. H &
R Block, 777 A.2d 95, 101 (Pa. Super. 2001)). A fiduciary duty
may arise in the context of consumer transactions only if one
party cedes decision-making control to the other party. As
‘we indicated in Scott, “a business transaction may be the basis
of a confidential relationship only if one party surrenders
substantial control over some portion of his affairs to the
other.” Scott, 316 A.2d at 886; see also Valley Forge Conven-
tion & Visitors Bureaw v. Visitor’s Services, Inc, 28
F.Supp.2d 947, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“There is a crucial distine-
tion between surrendering control of one’s affairs to a fiducia-
ry or confidant or party in a position to exercise undue
influence and entering an arm’s-length commercial agree-
ment[.]”).

The case at bar presents an arm’s-length consumer transac-
tion in which the Yenchis accepted Holland’s advice with
respect to the purchase of the 1996 whole life insurance policy.
The Yenchis made the decision to purchase this policy, but
also decided to reject other proffered products and services.
While we recognize that the premium structure and payout
terms of the 1996 whole life insurance policy were complicated,
that fact does not change the character of the transaction in
question. The Yenchis purchased an insurance product from a
captive financial advisor with whom they had a business
relationship for a little more than a year, initiated by a cold-
call. The Yenchis’ lack of post-secondary high school edu-
cations is not indicative of a weakness, dependence, or trust,
justifiably reposed, nor is Holland’s advanced training suffi-
cient to establish an overmastering influence.

I The record here establishes that the Yenchis made
the decision to purchase Appellants’ advice and financial prod-
ucts. Reliance on another’s specialized skill or knowledge in
making the purchase, without more, does not create a fiducia-
ry relationship. We acknowledge that the Yenchis may have
become comfortable with the Appellants’ expertise before
deciding to purchase the 1996 whole life insurance policy,
which is to be expected when making a financial decision. It is

part of the development of any business relationship—consum-
er or otherwise. It does not, however, establish a fiduciary
relationship. There is no evidence to establish that the Yenchis
were overpowered, dominated or unduly influenced in their
judgment by Holland.

The Yenchis never ceded any decision-making authority to
Holland. Over the course of the relationship, they followed
some of his recommendations and rejected others. Prior to the
proposal for the whole life policy at issue, Appellants proposed
a different whole life product that the Yenchis did not pur-
chase, As to advice accepted, the Yenchis purchased the 1996
whole life insurance policy and the 1997 deferred variable
annuity. They began saving money in an investment certificate
and opened an IRA account. On the other hand, they rejected
other recommendations, including, in particular, Holland’s ad-
vice in 1998 to increase their life insurance to the $300,000
level, deciding for themselves that the 1996 whole life policy
was a sufficient amount of life insurance for their needs. The
evidence does not establish that the Yenchis were subject to
any overmastering influence by Holland. They maintained and
exercised decision-making control over their financial matters.
No confidential relationship was ever created.

HM We note that under current law and appropriate facts,
consumers have various common law tort remedies (with
burdens of proof less stringent than those required in fiducia-
ry duty cases), as well as claims for common law fraud and the
statutory relief provided by the current version of the
UTPOCPL, which provides a remedy for deceptive conduct. 73
P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi). We decline to modify the law of fiduciary
duty to encompass the particular pitfalls involved in the sale of
insurance products by commissioned agents or financial advis-
11, Q. Do you recall there being a time that [Holland] proposed to you

the possibility of buying more insurance?

A. We said no.
Q. Why is it that you said no at that time?
A. We thought we had enough insurance ....

Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2, Deposition of Ruth Yenchi at
60-61.

ors to less savvy customers.” Moreover, we do not hold that a
fiduciary duty cannot arise in a case with facts not present
here, but absent evidence that a consumer of financial services
and goods cedes control over the decision to purchase, either
explicitly or implicitly because of over-mastering or undue
influence, no fiduciary relationship arises. Because the Yenchis
have not adduced facts sufficient to establish the indicia of a
fiduciary relationship, we must reverse the Superior Court’s
decision to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judg-
ment on this issue.

For these reasons, we reverse the order of the Superior
Court in part, as it pertains to the issue of fiduciary duty. The
balance of the present appeal is dismissed as improvidently
granted, and accordingly, the remainder of the Superior
Court’s order remains intact.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer and Dougherty join
the opinion.

Justice Todd files a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Wecht joins,

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

JUSTICE TODD, Dissenting

I dissent because, unlike the majority, I find there are
sufficient indicators of a fiduciary relationship between the
Yenchis and Appellants to allow the Yenchis to avoid summary

12. In their appellate brief, the Yenchis argue that the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 40b-6, creates fiduciary obligations for registered
financial advisors to act in the best interest of those they advise.
Yenchis’ Brief at 38 (citing S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S, 180, 187, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11 L.Ed.2d 237 (1963), As Appellants
correctly note, however, this ruling and legislation have no application
here, as the present case does not involve advice regarding the pur-
chase of securities, These laws, however, illustrate the manner in which
legislative enactments can police an industry. We decline to make a
change to the common law of fiduciary duty with respect to an entire
industry. Such a sweeping change should be left to the Legislature,
based upon its consideration of the various policy concerns and the
financial implications of regulations on consumers and the industry.

judgment on their fiduciary duty claim. For the following
reasons, I would affirm the Superior Court.

As the majority recognizes, outside of the context of fiducia-
ry duties imposed as a matter of law, the existence of a
confidential relationship is, first and foremost, a fact-driven
inquiry. See Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 617 Pa. 212, 52 A.Bd
1202, 1210 (2012) (noting “the ‘intensely fact-specific’ nature of
this inquiry”); In re Estate of Scott, 455 Pa, 429, 816 A.2d 883,
885 (1974) (“The concept of a confidential relationship cannot
be reduced to a catalogue of specific circumstances, invariably
falling to the left or right of a definitional line. ... [E]Jach case
must be analyzed on its own facts.”). Moreover, the majority
cites the governing test which we have reiterated for finding a
confidential relationship: “[A] confidential relationship ‘ap-
pears when the circumstances make it certain the parties do
not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an
overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, depen-
dence or trust, justifiably reposed.’” Majority Opinion at 688,
161 A.3d at 820 (quoting Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 187, 425
A.2d 412, 416-17 (1981)). However, in applying those princi-
ples, in my view, the majority gives insufficient heed to our
admonition that “it is unhelpful to sharply deconstruct the
generalized guidance [that definition] attempted to provide.”
Basile, 52 A.3d at 1210.

In this area, I would avoid reliance on singular and categori-
cal requirements such as “overmastering influence,” “cedes
their decision-making authority”, or “surrender[ing] substan-
tial control.” See Majority Opinion at 684, 685, 636, 638, 161
A.8d at 820, 821, 822, 823, Rather, as we did in Basile, I would
emphasize the relational focus in discerning confidential rela-
tionships, which, in one formulation, is simply this: the “es-
sence of such a relationship is trust and reliance on one side,
and a corresponding opportunity to abuse that trust ... on
the other.” Basile, 52 A.3d at 1210 (quoting Estate of Scott,
816 A.2d at 885) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Frowen, 425 A.2d at 416 (“The general test for determining
the existence of [a confidential] relationship is whether it is
clear that the parties did not deal on equal terms;” it is “not
confined to any specific association of the parties” (internal

as

quotation marks omitted)); Brooks v. Conston, 356 Pa. 69, 51
A.2d 684, 688 (1947) (“a confidential relationship is not limited
to any particular association of parties but exists wherever one
occupies toward another such a position of advisor or counsel-
lor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good
faith for the other’s interest” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Basile v. H & R Block, Inc, T77 A.2d 95, 103 (Pa,
Super. 2001) (“The possibility of a confidential relationship
cannot be excluded by a concrete rule. So long as the requisite
disparity is established between the parties’ positions in the
relationship, and the inferior party places primary trust in the
other’s counsel, a confidential relationship may be estab-
lished.”); see generally Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fidu-
ciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their
Consequences, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 925, 936 (2006) (“The defining
or determining criterion should be whether the plaintiff (or
claimed beneficiary of a fiduciary duty) would be justified in
expecting loyal conduct on the part of an actor and whether
the actor’s conduct contravened that expectation.”).

Consistent with this view, I reject the majority’s reliance on
our statement in Estate of Scott that “a business transaction
may be the basis of a confidential relationship only if one
party surrenders substantial control over some portion of his
affairs to the other.” Majority Opinion at 638, 161 A.3d at 823
(quoting Estate of Scott, 316 A.2d at 886) (emphasis added).
This statement is arguably dicta! and, regardless, in my view,

1. In Estate of Scott, this Court addressed whether the relationship
between a brother and sister was a confidential one, thereby allowing
the sister to challenge the brother’s obtaining of her signature to create
a joint bank account while she was in the hospital. Although the brother
defended his actions, in part, by noting that he had previously sold his
sister's car and some of her stock at her request, there was no question.
of a business relationship between them. See Estate of Scott, 316 A.2d at
886. Thus, our imposition of a strict surrender-of-control requirement
to prove a confidential relationship in business relations was entirely
unnecessary to the disposition of that dispute between siblings. More-
over, it was in tension with the Court's earlier statement that “[the
concept of a confidential relationship cannot be reduced to a catalogue
of specific circumstances, invariably falling to the left or right of a
definitional line.” Id. at 885.

ee
it is insufficiently flexible to govern the fact-driven nature of a
fiduciary relationship analysis.

On the facts of this case, I conclude they present a closer
question than does the majority and, as a result, that sum-
mary judgment was improper. I find it significant that, early
in their relationship with Appellants, the Yenchis paid $350 for
a “Financial Management Proposal,” which was prepared by
Bryan Holland, identified on the cover of the proposal as an
“American Express financial advisor”, and, on the third-page
“Important Message,” identified as “your American Express
financial advisor”. Exhibit 1 to Deposition of Eugene Yenchi,
12/2/09 (R.R. at 296a). Except for the cover, each page of the
proposal was marked “Confidential.” Id. Critically, the recom-
mendations in the proposal were the basis for the now-
complained-of consolidation of the Yenchis’ life insurance poli-
cies in 1996. In my view, the fact that the Yenchis paid for
financial advice, independent of and prior to any decision to
purchase life insurance products from Appellants, suggests
that their relationship was not simply an arms-length one
between customer and insurance agent, but that, for their
money, they reasonably could have expected some measure of
fidelity to their interests from their self-proclaimed “advis-
or?

Moreover, there are other indicators of a confidential rela-
tionship. In their depositions, the Yenchis repeatedly indicated
that they trusted Holland, and relied on his superior expertise.
See, e.g., Deposition of Eugene Yenchi, 12/2/09, at 29 (R.R. at
248a) (“Q: How is it that you decided where [your money]
should be invested while it was at American Express? A:
[Holland] advised me to go into that.”); id. at 119 (R.R. at
265a) (“I trusted Bryan for doing it”); id. at 145 (R.R. at 272a)
(“we trusted him that he knew the best”); Deposition of Ruth
Yenchi, 12/2/09, at 87 (R.R. at 666a) (“Q: Did you ask any
questions about it of anyone, either someone from American
2. The majority seemingly discounts the solidity of Holland’s advice,

noting that he was a “captive” financial advisor. Majority Opinion at

638, 161 A.3d at 823. However, I find nothing in the record to suggest

that there were, or that the Yenchis understood there to be, advisory
limitations on Holland because of his employment.

Express or anyone else? A: No, Bryan probably said some-
thing about it, but we had just figured that Bryan knew the
insurance more than we did.”); id. at 49 (R.R. at 669a) (“He
was telling me basically what was on the pages, and he was
my advisor and I took his word.”), At the relevant times, they
stated he was the only financial advisor they ever spoke with.
See, eg., Deposition of Eugene Yenchi, 12/2/09, at 56 (R.R. at
249a); Deposition of Ruth Yenchi, 12/2/09, at 37 (R.R. at 666a),
Finally, they testified that they signed documents prepared by
Holland without reviewing them. See, e.g., Deposition of Ruth
Yenchi, 12/2/09, at 41 (R.R. at 667a) (“Q: Would you have read.
this before you signed it? A: Well, Bryan would have probably
said this is to say that you got your policy and then he would
say you can sign it right here ..., That’s the way most of it
was done.”); id, at 49 (R.R. at 669a) (“He was telling me
basically what was on the pages, and he was my advisor and I
took his word.”),

Nevertheless, I recognize there are countervailing indica-
tors as well. In particular, the Yenchis never testified that the
fee-based proposal was the basis for their trust in Holland or
Appellants, or that Holland ever stated that he was acting in
their best interests. Moreover, it appears that their trust in
him had its limits, given that, as noted by the majority, they
declined to follow his advice at times. See Majority Opinion at
625, 638, 161 A.8d at 815, 828. But, in my view, these conflict-
ing indicators only highlight the factual dispute concerning the
existence of a fiduciary relationship. Finally, while I recognize
that we have not heretofore found a confidential relationship
in a comparable consumer context, I eschew categorical limita-
tions and maintain that our focus should remain on the fact-
intensive nature of the inquiry. Accordingly, because I con-
clude there are outstanding material factual disputes and that
summary judgment was inappropriate as a matter of law, I
agree with the Superior Court that the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment to Appellants on their fiduciary
duty claim should be reversed.

For these reasons, I would affirm the order below.

Justice Wecht joins this dissenting opinion.

ES °°
161 A.3d 827
Mary Ann PROTZ, Appellant
vy.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (DERRY
AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT), Appellees
Mary Ann Protz
ve
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
Werry Area School District)
Appeal of: Derry Area School District

No. 6 WAP 2016
No. 7 WAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

ARGUED: November 1, 2016
DECIDED: June 20, 2017

2
x
s

Joshua D. Shapiro, Esq., Attorney General, Participant.

Daniel Joel Siegel, Hsq., Law Offices of Daniel J. Siegel,
L.L.C., for Pennsylvania Association Justice, Appellant Ami-
cus Curiae.

Thomas C. Baumann, Esq., Sandra Weigel Kokal, Esq.,
Abes Baumann, P.C., for Protz, Mary Ann, Designated Appel-
lant.

Michael D. Sherman, E'sq., Chartwell Law Offices, LLP, for
Pennsylvania Self-Insurers’ Association, Appellee Amicus Cu-
riae, and Greater Philadelphia Executive Claims Council, Ap-
pellee Amicus Curiae.

Amber Marie Kenger, Esq., Pennsylvania Department of
Labor & Industry, Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, for
Compensation Appeal Board, Designated Appellee.

Karl Stewart Myers, Eisq., for The Insurance Federation of
Pennsylvania, Amicus Curiae, and American Insurance Associ-
ation, Amicus Curiae.

David Harold Dille, Esq., Ira L. Podheiser, Esq., Matthew
Austin Meyers, Esq., Burns White, LLC, for Derry Area
School District, Designated Appellee,

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT

Section 306(a.2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act allows
employers to demand that a claimant undergo an impairment-
rating evaluation (IRE), during which a physician must deter-
mine the “degree of impairment” that is due to the claimant’s
compensable injury. See 77 P.S. § 511.2(1). In order to make
this assessment, the Act requires physicians to apply the
methodology set forth in “the most recent edition” of the
American Medical Association (AMA) Guides to the Evalua-
tion of Permanent Impairment. Id. In these consolidated
appeals, we consider whether this mandate violates the consti-

SS  «

tutional requirement that all legislative power “be vested in a
General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.” PA. Const. art. II, § 1. We hold
that it does.

In 2007, Mary Ann Prota sustained a work-related knee
injury. Shortly thereafter, her employer, Derry Area School
District (Derry), voluntarily began paying temporary total
disability benefits. In October 2011, Protz underwent an IRE
at Derry’s request. The IRE physician evaluated Prota and
assigned to her a 10% impairment rating based upon the Sixth
Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (the Guides ).1 Because
Protz’s impairment rating was less than 50%, Derry filed a
modification petition seeking to convert Protz’s disability sta-
tus from total to partial—the effect of which would be to limit
the duration that Protz could receive workers’ compensation
benefits? See 77 P.S. § 511.2(2) (providing that a claimant
with “a threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater
than fifty per centum” is presumed to be totally disabled); 77
PS. § 511.2(7) (limiting partial disability payments to five
hundred weeks). After holding a hearing on Derry’s modifica-
tion petition, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) ruled
that Protz’s whole-body impairment was less than 50%, and
accordingly granted the petition.

Protz appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal
Board, arguing that the General Assembly unconstitutionally
delegated to the AMA the authority to establish criteria for
evaluating permanent impairment. See PA. Const. art. II, § 1

1. When Section 306(a.2) was enacted in 1996, the Fourth Edition of the
Guides was the “most recent edition.” Since then, the Guides have
undergone two major revisions, the Fifth Edition (in 2001) and the
Sixth Edition (in 2008).

2. If an employer requests an IRE within sixty days of the claimant’s
receipt of 104 weeks of total-disability benefits, and the IRE yields an
impairment rating of less than 50%, the IRE is self-executing, meaning
that the claimant's disability status can be modified from total to partial
without the involvement of a Workers’ Compensation Judge. 77 P.S.
§ 511.2(1)-(2). Because Derry requested the instant IRE well beyond
that timeframe, Derry could not automatically modify Protz’s disability
status. See Gardner v. W.C.A.B. (Genesis Health Ventures), 585 Pa. 366,
888 A.2d 758 (2005).

(“[Thhe legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vest-
ed in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives.”). The Board rejected Protz’s
constitutional argument and affirmed the WCJ’s decision.

Protz appealed to the Commonwealth Court, where she
again argued that Section 306(a.2) of the Act violates Article
II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Common-
wealth Court, sitting en banc, reversed the Board’s decision.
The en banc panel agreed with Protz that Section 306(a.2)’s
requirement that physicians use “the most recent edition” of
the Guides violates Article II, Section 1. Writing for the four-
judge majority, Senior Judge Dan Pellegrini recited the basic
principle that the General Assembly alone has the power to
make laws, and it cannot constitutionally delegate that power
to any other branch of government or to any other body. Protz
v. WC.A.B. (Derry Area Sch. Dist.), 124 A.38d 406, 412 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2015).

The court acknowledged that, despite this seemingly broad
prohibition, “the General Assembly may delegate authority
and discretion in connection with the execution and adminis-
tration of a law to an independent agency or an executive
branch agency where the General Assembly first establishes
primary standards and imposes upon others the duty to carry
out the declared legislative policy in accordance with the
general provisions of the enabling legislation.” Id. at 413
(citing Blackwell v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Commission,
528 Pa. 347, 567 A.2d 630, 637 (1989)). The court explained
that, when the legislature chooses to so delegate, two critical
limitations apply: first, “the basic policy choices must be made
by the [Iegislature;” and second, “the legislation must contain
adequate standards which will guide and restrain the exercise
of the delegated administrative functions.” Id. (citing Gilligan
v, Pa. Horse Racing Commission, 492 Pa. 92, 422 A.2d 487,
489 (1980)).

Applying this test, the Commonwealth Court concluded that
“the Act is wholly devoid of any articulations of public policy
governing the AMA,” and that the Act lacks “adequate stan-
dards to guide and restrain the AMA’s exercise” of its delegat-

es
ed power to create a methodology for grading impairment. Id.
at 415. Instead, the court remarked, the General Assembly
bestowed upon the AMA “carte blanche authority to imple-
ment [the AMA’s] own policies and standards,” which are then
automatically adopted, sight unseen. Jd. at 416,

The court went on to explain that, even if the General
Assembly had included “adequate standards” to “guide and
restrain” the AMA’s exercise of delegated authority, Section
306(a.2) still would be unconstitutional because the AMA is a
private organization, Along these lines, the court noted that:

Unlike governmental agencies which are supposed to act

disinterestedly and only for the public good, that presump-

tion cannot be made with regard to private entities. There is
no accountability to the public, either directly through the
rulemaking process providing for public input and comment
or indirectly through the appointment and confirmation
power and the power of the purse. More simply, the key-
stone behind the prohibition against unlawful delegation is
that the General Assembly, not private bodies, enacts laws
which the government agencies implement in accordance
with the standard given to them in the enactment.

Id.

Rather than striking all of Section 306(a.2), or undertaking a
severability analysis, the Commonwealth Court declared the
Jaw unconstitutional only “insofar as it proactively approved
versions of the AMA Guides beyond the Fourth Edition
without review.” Id. Consistent with that narrow remedy, the
court remanded the instant matter to the WCJ with instruc-
tions to apply the Fourth Edition of the Guides, the version in
existence when the General Assembly enacted Section 306(a.2)
in 1996.

Judges Anne Covey and Robert Simpson each authored
dissenting opinions. In Judge Simpson’s view, Section 306(a.2)
withstands constitutional scrutiny in light of the fact that “the
General Assembly delegated initial impairment ratings to an
independent, Pennsylvania-licensed, board-certified, clinically-
active physician,” not to the AMA itself. Jd, at 417 (Simpson,

J., dissenting). Judge Simpson also maintained that, because it
would be impractical to expect the legislature to establish and
constantly revise a set of standards for evaluating physical
impairment, “the General Assembly may rely on the medical
expertise of the AMA, a well-recognized independent authori-
ty, in expressing current, best-practice medical knowledge.”
Id. at 420. Finally, Judge Simpson observed that “other states
have adopted and judicially upheld similar workers’ compensa-
tion provisions requiring the use of the most recent edition of
the AMA Guides in evaluating impairment in workers’ com-
pensation eases.” Id. at 419 (citing Madrid v. St. Joseph
Hosp., 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250 (1996) (rejecting a non-
delegation challenge involving the New Mexico legislature’s
adoption of “the most recent edition” of the Guides )). Judge
Covey joined Judge Simpson’s dissent and authored a sepa-
rate dissent addressing the majority’s alternative holding that
all delegations to private entities are unconstitutional.

Both parties filed petitions for allowance of appeal with this
Court, which we granted. Derry takes issue with the Common-
wealth Court’s conclusion that the General Assembly’s pro-
spective adoption of “the most recent edition” of the Guides
violates Article II, Section 1, whereas Protz argues that the
Commonwealth Court, after finding Section 306(a.2) to be
unconstitutional, erred in remanding her case to the WCJ for
application of the Fourth Edition of the Guides.

I We begin with the non-delegation issue, as to which
our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review
plenary. City of Phila. v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No.
5 (Breary), 604 Pa, 267, 985 A.2d 1259, 1269 n.18 (2009).
Because the parties’ arguments largely reflect the views ex-
pressed in the majority and dissenting opinions below, we
need not recite them at length. In short, Derry argues that
the General Assembly is free to adopt current and future
standards that are published by “a well-recognized indepen-
dent authority.” Brief for Derry at 28 (quoting Protz, 124 A.3d
at 420 (Simpson, J., dissenting)). Protz, on the other hand,
maintains that Section 306(a.2) violates the non-delegation
doctrine embodied in our Constitution because it gives the

Se  *

AMA unfettered discretion over Pennsylvania’s impairment-
rating methodology. See Brief for Prota at 16.

Hl Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
states that “{t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall
be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.” Pa. Const. art. II,
§ 1. That is why, when the General Assembly empowers some
other branch or body to act, our jurisprudence requires “that.
the basic policy choices involved in ‘legislative power’ actually
be made by the [Ilegislature as constitutionally mandated.”
Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 881 A.2d
198, 202 (1975). This constraint serves two purposes. First, it
ensures that duly authorized and politically responsible offi-
cials make all of the necessary policy decisions, as is their
mandate per the electorate. Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc.
v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269, 291 (1975)
(plurality opinion), And second, it seeks to protect against the
arbitrary exercise of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretion-
ary power. Id.

HM At the heart of the non-delegation doctrine, which
we have described as a “natural corollary” to the text of
Article II, Section 1, is the tenet that the General Assembly
cannot delegate “to any other branch of government or to any
other body or authority” the power to make law. Blackwell,
567 A.2d at 636; State Bd. of Chiropractic Ewam’rs v. Life
Fellowship of Pa., 441 Pa. 298, 272 A.2d 478, 480 (1971). Or, as
John Locke put it, legislative power consists of the power “to
make laws, and not to make legislators.” Joun Locks, Szconp
‘TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (R. Cox ed.1982). Indeed, the rule
is essential to the American tripartite system of representative
government. The framers of the Constitution believed that the
integrity of the legislative function was vital to the preserva-
tion of liberty. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads,
— US. —, 185 S.Ct. 1225, 1237, 191 L.Ed.2d 153 (2015)
(Alito, J., concurring) (“The principle that Congress cannot
delegate away its vested power exists to protect liberty.”); see
also The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J.

Madison) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”),

HE Although our Constitution generally forbids the dele-
gation of “legislative power,” it nonetheless permits the Gen-
eral Assembly, in some instances, to assign the authority and
discretion to execute or administer a law. Blackwell, 567 A.2d
at 687, When the General Assembly does so, the Constitution
imposes two fundamental limitations, First, as mentioned, the
General Assembly must make “the basic policy choices,” and
second, the legislation must include “adequate standards
which will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated
administrative functions.” Pennsylvanians Against Gambling
Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 275, 877
A.2d 888, 418 (2005); State Bd. of Chiropractic Hwam’rs, 272
A2d at 481 (quoting Chartiers Valley Joint Sch, v. Cty. Bd. of
Sch. Dirs, of Allegheny Cty., 418 Pa, 520, 211 A.2d 487, 492-93
(1965). This means, to borrow Chief Justice Taft's oft-quoted
expression, that the law must contain some “intelligible princi-
ple to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed
to conform.” J.W. Hampton, Jr, & Co, v. United States, 276
US, 394, 409, 48 S.Ct, 848, 72 L.Hd. 624 (1928),

In many non-delegation cases, this Court also has stressed
the importance of procedural mechanisms that serve to limit
or prevent the arbitrary and capricious exercise of delegated
power. Tosto, 381 A.2d at 208; see W. Phila. Achievement
Charter Elementary Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 685 Pa. 127,
182 A.8d 957, 966 (2016). In Tosto, for example, the statute at
issue required that the administrative agency establish neutral
operating procedures, develop standardized documents, and
give the public notice of proposed agency rules and regulations
before promulgating them. In upholding the law, we described
these elements as “important safeguard[s] against the arbi-
trariness of ad hoc decision making,” Tosto, 331 A.2d at 204,

Similarly, in William Penn, we upheld a tax enabling stat-
ute that delegated to the judiciary the power to assess wheth-
er certain local taxes were “excessive or unreasonable.” Wm.

Penn Parking Garage, Inc., 346 A.2d at 291. There, a plurality
of this Court found it significant that the General Assembly
had assigned this task to the courts, rather than to an
administrative body, because the very structure of the judicia-
ry serves to protect against the arbitrariness of ad hoc
decision making. In this regard, we emphasized that a trial
court operating under the statute “must explain the grounds
of its decision in a reasoned opinion which will serve as a
precedent to guide decisions in future cases,” and that “trial
courts are subject to careful review by appellate courts to
[eInsure the general consistency of their actions with one
another and to confine them within their proper sphere.” Id.
at 291-92,

This Court’s most recent non-delegation decision involved a
provision in the Public School Code, see 24 P.S. §§ 1-101-27-
2702, that gave a five-member School Reform Commission
(comprised mostly of individuals appointed by the Governor)
sweeping powers to improve the finances of distressed school
districts, Among other things, the law delegated to the School
Reform Commission the authority to suspend regulations of
the State Board of Education and to suspend provisions of the
Public School Code. W. Phila. Achievement Charter Elemen-
tary Sch., 182 A.3d at 959. The General Assembly placed only
minor restrictions upon the Commission’s authority. First, the
General Assembly put a few provisions of the Public School
Code beyond the reach of the Commission’s suspension power,
most of which related to local school-board elections. Second,
the General Assembly required that the Commission submit
annually a report to the Governor and the Education Commit-
tees of both the House and the Senate detailing the progress
made in fiscal and academic performance. Finally, individual
members of the Commission, as public employees, could be
removed by the Governor for “malfeasance or misfeasance.”
Id. at 971 (Baer, J., dissenting). This Court held that the law
violated the non-delegation doctrine because it did not include
concrete measures to channel the Commission’s discretion to
wield its suspension power, nor did it include safeguards to
protect against arbitrary, ad hoc decision making, such as a

requirement that the Commission hold hearings, allow for
public notice and comment, or explain the grounds for its
suspensions in a reasoned opinion subject to judicial review.

Hl By any objective measure, the authority delegated to
the AMA in Section 306(a.2) of the Workers’ Compensation
Act is even more broad and unbridled than that of the School
Reform Commission in West Philadelphia Achievement Char-
ter Elementary School. The General Assembly did not favor
any particular policies relative to the Guides’ methodology for
grading impairments, nor did it prescribe any standards to
guide and restrain the AMA’s discretion to create such a
methodology.’ Without any parameters cabining its authority,
the AMA would be free to: (1) concoct a formula that yields
impairment ratings which are so inflated that virtually every
claimant would be deemed to be at least 50% impaired; or (2)
draft a version of the Guides guaranteed to yield impartment
ratings so miniscule that almost no one who undergoes an
IRE clears the 50% threshold; or (8) do anything in between
those two extremes. The AMA could add new chapters to the
Guides, or it could remove existing ones. It could even create
distinct criteria to be applied only to claimants of a particular
race, gender, or nationality.’

3, It is not even clear that the General Assembly, within the bounds of
the Constitution, could meaningfully “guide” the AMA‘s discretion over
the Guides’ methodology. See Agency for Intl. Dev. v. Alliance for Open
Soc’y Intl., Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 133 S.Ct, 2321, 186 L.Ed.2d 398 (2013)
(holding that the First Amendment prevents the government from
forcing a private organization to profess publicly a viewpoint not held
by the organization); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567
U.S. 298, 309, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 2288, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012) (“The
government may not ... compel the endorsement of ideas that it
approves.”); Turner Broad, Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114
S.Ct. 2445, 129 L,Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“At the heart of the First Amend-
ment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence.”), Furthermore, because the use of the Guides is not unique
to Pennsylvania law (or even to workers’ compensation law generally),
it is doubiful that the AMA would take marching orders from any one
state legislature. See Am. Mp. Ass’n, Guipzs To THe EVALUATION OF
PERMANENT Impatrmenr 20 (6th ed, 2008) (‘In the United States, 44 states,
2 commonwealths, and federal employee compensation systems (in
about 90+% of US jurisdictions) either mandate or recommend using
the Guides to measure impairment in workers’ compensation claims.”),

Consider also that the AMA could revise the Guides once
every ten years or once every ten weeks. If the AMA chooses
to publish new editions infrequently, Pennsylvania law may
fail to account for recent medical advances. By contrast,
excessive revisions would likely pose severe administrative
headaches, inasmuch as the Guides automatically have the
force and effect of law once published. As these hypotheticals
illustrate, the General Assembly gave the AMA de facto,
unfettered control over a formula that ultimately will deter-
mine whether a claimant’s partial-disability benefits will cease
after 500 weeks.

Equally problematic, the General Assembly did not include
in Section 306(a.2) any of the procedural mechanisms that this
Court has considered essential to protect against “administra-
tive arbitrariness and caprice.” Tosto, 881 A.2d at 203. The
General Assembly did not, for example, require that the AMA
hold hearings, accept public comments, or explain the grounds
for its methodology in a reasoned opinion, which then could be
subject to judicial review.® Further, the AMA physicians who

4, To be clear, we have no reason to suspect that the AMA has exercised
its authority in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Cf. Amicus Brief
for The Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania & The American Insur-
ance Association at 17 (arguing that the Commonwealth Court’s opin-
ion below portrays the AMA as “some shady, untrustworthy enterprise”
and “reflects a surprising hostility towards the medical profession”).
Our Constitution restricts the General Assembly's ability to delegate
legislative authority regardless of the manner in which the recipient
wields it. That the AMA has opted to use its powers for good, so to
speak, is no antidote.

5. To the contrary, the AMA's revision process has been denounced for
its lack of transparency. In a 2004 article, a group of physicians who
authored a chapter of the Fifth Edition of the Guides offered the
following critique.
The paucity of research on the AMA system is striking, given the fact
that evaluations based on it determine the allocation of billions of
dollars in medical and wage replacement payments. In the absence of
scientific data, the AMA system relies almost exclusively on the
opinions of panels of medical consultants. Unfortunately, no details
have been published about how the expert panels were selected or the
processes they followed to reach decisions about impairment. More-
over, since several different groups of experts contributed to the AMA
Guides[,] there are significant inconsistencies throughout the text.

author the Guides are, of course, not public employees who
may be subject to discipline or removal.

Echoing Judge Simpson’s dissent, Derry argues that the
General Assembly restrained the AMA’s authority by mandat-
ing that that all IREs be performed by a Pennsylvania—
licensed, clinically active physician. See Brief for Derry at 27.
We fail to see how this does anything to prevent the AMA
from acting arbitrarily. Again, Section 306(a.2) provides that
“(t]he degree of impairment shall be determined based upon
an evaluation by a physician ... pursuant to the most recent
edition of the [AMA] ‘Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment.’” 77 P.S. § 511.2(1). Thus, the evaluating physi-
cian, who is constrained by law to follow the Guides, has no
power to limit the AMA’s delegated authority.

We also find unavailing Derry’s suggestion that the General
Assembly’s prospective adoption of future editions of the
Guides constitutes a “policy decision” to use the “the most up-
to-date medical knowledge when making impairment assess-
ments.” Brief for Derry at 29, 88 (arguing that that the
General Assembly made the “policy decision” to “apply the
most up-to-date standards reflecting the most current medical
thinking”). As an initial matter, we question Derry’s portrayal
of the Guides as merely a collection of medical knowledge, See
Ellen Smith Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation
of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evalua-
tion of Permanent Impairment, 108 HARV. L. REV. 964
(1990) (stating that the Guides, “like any impairment rating
scheme, [rest] in large part on important and difficult norma-
tive judgments”). More importantly, Derry’s contention distills
to a tautology: that the non-delegation doctrine, which exists
to prevent the General Assembly from delegating its lawmak-
ing authority, is not violated whenever the General Assembly

The combination of inadequate validation research and ambiguity
regarding the expert panels makes it difficult for us or any other
observers to determine which elements of the AMA system are well
substantiated, and which ones need significant revision,
James P. Robinson, Dennis C. Turk & John D, Loeser, Pain, Impair-
ment, and Disability in the AMA Guides, 32 J. L. Meo, & Ermics 315-16
(2004) (footnote omitted).

“decides” to delegate its lawmaking authority. Because this
reasoning would render the non-delegation doctrine a nullity,
we must reject it.

This case involves one additional wrinkle not present in
West Philadelphia Achievement Charter Elementary School
or in Tosto. Here, unlike in those cases, the General Assembly
delegated authority to a private entity, not to a government
agency or body. Conceptually, this fact poses unique concerns
that are absent when the General Assembly, for instance,
vests an executive-branch agency with the discretion to admin-
ister the law. One such concern is that private entities are
isolated from the political process, and, as a result, are shield-
ed from political accountability.’ Because of this, it is perhaps
unsurprising that our precedents have long expressed hostility
toward delegations of governmental authority to private ac-
tors. Hetherington v. McHale, 458 Pa. 479, 329 A.2d 250, 254
(1974) (holding that the Constitution “prohibits delegation to
private groups of the power to make governmental appoint-

6. With regard to the federal non-delegation doctrine, at least one
United States Supreme Court Justice rejected the notion that the
legislature can delegate authority to entities that are not accountable to
the public,

If rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or
executive powers, I foresee all manner of “expert” bodies, insulated
from the political process, to which Congress will delegate various
portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How tempting to create an
expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.’s, with perhaps a few

Ph.D.’s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, “no-win”

political issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally

funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue for research, This is an
undemocratic precedent that we set—not because of the scope of the
delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the three

Branches of Government,

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 422, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 LEd.2d
714 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Although we do not know for certain why the General Assembly
delegated to the AMA the task of creating and revising impairment-
rating standards, it is not difficult to imagine that it simply viewed the
never-ending task of adopting new impairment-rating standards as the
type of “no-win” political issue (in the nonpartisan sense) that Justice
Scalia described. See Davin B, Torrey & ANDREW E, Greenpera, West's PA,
Prac, Workers’ Compensation § 6:51.70 (suggesting that the General
Assembly sought to avoid “the thorny political issue of partial disability
determination every time the AMA issued a new guidebook”).

ments”); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. White Cross Stores,
Inc, No. 6, 414 Pa, 95, 199 A.2d 266, 267-68 (1964) (holding
that the General Assembly may delegate regulatory power to
“vesponsible governmental agencies,” but not to private per-
sons). Venerable opinions of the Supreme Court of the United
States have done so as well. See ¢.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 288, 311, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936) (“This is
legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be
and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business.”); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 558, 55 §.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1985) (remark-
ing that the National Industrial Recovery Act, which con-
ferred upon private parties the authority to promulgate rules
of “fair competition,” represented “delegation running riot”)
(Cardozo, J., concurring).

That said, our precedents to date have not unequivocally
supported the Commonwealth Court’s view that the General
Assembly cannot, under any set of circumstances, delegate
authority to a private person or entity. See Protz, 124 A.3d at
416. Notably, this Court occasionally has suggested in non-
delegation cases that the traditional constitutional require-
ments (i.e, “policy choices” and “adequate standards”) are
necessary whenever the General Assembly delegates its au-
thority “to any other branch of government or to any other
body or authority.” Blackwell, 567 A2d at 686 (emphasis
added). For example, this Court has held unconstitutional a
law that required all chiropractors seeking to renew their
licenses to attend either a two-day conference held by the
Pennsylvania Chiropractic Society (a private organization), or
another “equivalent educational conference.” State Bd. of Chi-
ropractic Hxam’rs, 272 A2d at 479. In striking down that
statute on non-delegation grounds, we recited the general rule
that the General Assembly must provide adequate standards
to guide and restrain the exercise of delegated administrative
functions. Id. at 481 (quoting Chartiers Valley Joint Sch., 211
A.2d at 492-98). Put another way, we held that the statute in

CC“ tSCtéia
State Board of Chiropractic Examiners was unconstitutional
because it delegated unchecked and unrestrained authority
over chiropractic continuing education, not because the Chiro-
practic Society was a private organization. Id, at 481.

Although we highlight this tension in our jurisprudence, we
need not resolve it today. As we have explained, Section
306(a.2) could not withstand constitutional scrutiny even if the
AMA were a governmental body. See supra, at 657-60, 161
A.3d at 884-36 (comparing the facts of this case to those in
West Philadelphia Achievement Charter Elementary School,
132 A.8d 957). We merely caution that our holding today
should not be read as an endorsement or rejection of the
Commonwealth Court’s view that the delegation of authority
to a private actor is per se unconstitutional. Nor do we
foreclose the distinct possibility that a more exacting form of
judicial scrutiny is warranted when the General Assembly
vests private actors with regulatory or administrative powers.

Wl Having determined that the General Assembly uncon-
stitutionally delegated lawmaking authority to the AMA, we
now must consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in
remanding this case to the WCJ with instructions to apply the
Fourth Edition of the Guides, Although the Commonwealth
Court’s rationale in this regard is not entirely clear, it appears
that the court’s holding was based upon the fact that the
General Assembly, when it enacted Section 306(a.2) in 1996,
could have incorporated by reference the Fourth Edition of
the Guides.

According to Protz, the Commonwealth Court should have
struck down Section 806(a,2) in its entirety. Protz notes that
“the plain language of Section 306(a.2) contains no mention of
the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides; rather [it] simply
mandates usage of the ‘most recent edition.’” Brief for Protz
at 18. Thus, Protz concludes, “the Commonwealth Court es-
sentially redrafted Section 306(a.2) in a manner that would, in
the court’s view, pass constitutional muster.” Id. By contrast,
Derry argues that the Commonwealth Court did not err in
remanding to the WCJ with instructions to apply the Fourth

Edition of the Guides. Derry underscores that the Common-
wealth Court “believed that the primary flaw in the statute
was not that it invoked [the Guides], but that there was no
policy review or guidance for determining whether the most
‘recent’ edition should be applied.” Brief for Derry at 44. Thus,
Derry believes that the Fourth Hdition of the Guides should
govern IREs moving forward.

Hs At the outset, it is important to clarify that the
non-delegation doctrine does not prevent the General Assem-
bly from adopting as its own a particular set of standards
which already are in existence at the time of adoption. Howev-
er, for the reasons we have explained, the non-delegation
doctrine prohibits the General Assembly from incorporating,
sight unseen, subsequent modifications to such standards
without also providing adequate criteria to guide and restrain
the exercise of the delegated authority. Pennsylvanians
Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc., 877 A.2d at 418.

HI In matters of statutory interpretation, the General
Assembly has instructed us to assume that it “does not intend
to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this
Commonwealth.” 1 Pa,C.S. § 1922(8), This means that, if a
statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one that
would render it of doubtful constitutionality and one that
would not, we must adopt the latter. See Bricklayers of W. Pa.
Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott’s Dev, Co., 625 Pa. 26, 90 A.8d
682, 692 (2014) (“{Clourts give statutes a constitutional inter-
pretation if that is reasonably possible.”).

As a reminder, the relevant portion of Section 806(a.2)
provides as follows:
The degree of impairment shall be determined based upon
an evaluation by a physician who is licensed in this Com-
monwealth, who is certified by an American Board of Medi-
cal Specialties approved board or its osteopathic equivalent
and who is active in clinical practice for at least twenty
hours per week, chosen by agreement of the parties, or as
designated by the department, pursuant to the most re-

cent edition of the American Medical Association

“Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.”
TT P.S. § 511.2(1) (emphasis added).

Doubtless, most would understand this language to mean
that the IRE physician must use the edition of the Guides that
is the most recent at the time of the examination. See Stanish
v. W.CAB. (James J. Anderson Const. Co.), 11 A.8d 569, 576
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (holding that the “most recent edition” of
the Guides is the most recent version in force at the time of
the IRE). But, if the above language reasonably can be
understood to mean that physicians should use the edition of
the Guides that was the most recent edition when the General
Assembly enacted Section 306(a.2) (i.¢., the Fourth Edition),
we should adopt that construction instead. Bricklayers of W.
Pa., supra.

HM Ultimately, however, we cannot accept that such a
reading is a reasonable one. It beggars belief that the General
Assembly would have used the words “most recent edition”
when it really meant “Fourth Edition.” Even more telling is
that the General Assembly, in other sections of the Workers’
Compensation Act, explicitly stated that the Fourth Edition of
the Guides should govern. See 77 P.S. § 518(8)(i)-(iii) (provid-
ing that the “Impairment Guides” should be used to calculate
the percentage of hearing impairment); 77 P.S. § 25.5 (defin-
ing the term “Impairment Guides” to mean “the American
Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment, Fourth Edition”). This is important because we
generally assume that, “where a section of a statute contains a
given provision, the omission of such a provision from a similar
section” signifies a different legislative intent. Fletcher v. Pa.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar, Ass’n, 608 Pa. 452, 985 A.2d 678, 684
(2009). The upshot of this is that we must construe the “most
recent edition” requirement to mean the most recent edition in
force at the time of the IRE, a state of affairs that, for the
reasons we have stated, violates the non-delegation doctrine.

HE Having concluded that the requirement that IRE
physicians use the most recent version of the Guides is

unconstitutional, we must decide whether it can be severed
from the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Act contains a
severability provision, 77 P.S. § 1022, and, as a rule, the
individual provisions of all statutes presumptively are severa-
ble. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1925. Nevertheless, we will decline to sever
when, after the void provisions are excised, the remainder of
the statute is incapable of execution in accordance with the
General Assembly’s intent. See Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588
Pa, 589, 905 A.2d 918, 972 (2006).

Consistent with our holding, we must, at minimum, strike
from Section 806(a.2) the unconstitutional “most recent edi-
tion” requirement. As demonstrated below, such references
are pervasive.

(1) When an employe has received total disability compensa-

tion pursuant to clause (a) for a period of one hundred four

weeks, unless otherwise agreed to, the employe shall be
‘required to submit to a medical examination which shall be
requested by the insurer within sixty days upon the expira-
tion of the one hundred four weeks to determine the degree
of impairment due to the compensable injury, if any. The
degree of impairment shall be determined based upon an
evaluation by a physician who is licensed in this Common-
wealth, who is certified by an American Board of Medical

Specialties approved board or its osteopathic equivalent and

who is active in clinical practice for at least twenty hours

per week, chosen by agreement of the parties, or as desig-
nated by the te Gepariments_pussuant te the “miost_recent

(2) If such determination results in an impairment rating
that meets a threshold impairment rating that is equal to or
greater than ity per centum impairment nader the-most

a the employe
shall be presumed to be totally disabled and shall continue
to receive total disability compensation benefits under
clause (a). If such determination results in an impairment
rating less than fifty per centum impairment under-the- most

z the employe
shal then receive partial disability benefits under clause (b):
Provided, however, That no reduction shall be made until
sixty days’ notice of modification is given.
ak Re

(4) An employe may appeal the change to partial disability
at any time during the five hundred-week period of partial
disability; Provided, That there is a determination that the
employe meets the threshold impairment rating that is
equal to or greater than fifty per centum impairment under

h ition-of the yi ut iy jiation

(5) Total disability shall continue until it is adjudicated or
agreed under clause (b) that total disability has ceased or
the employe’s condition improves to an impairment rating
that is less than fifty per centum of the degree of i impair

Medi al Assodiatio ay “Guides. 4 “he Evaluation of P manent
Tmpairment”

eR

(7) In no event shall the total number of weeks of partial
disability exceed five hundred weeks for any injury or
recurrence thereof, regardless of the changes in status in
disability that may occur. In no event shall the total number
of weeks of total disability exceed one hundred four weeks
for any employe who does not meet a threshold impairment
rating that is oar to or 7 renter ¢ than n fity Per centum
impairment a m @ a

Topeisment™ for any injury or recurrence thereof
TTP.S. § 511.2 (footnotes omitted).

Although the prevalence of the offending language, of
course, does not by itself preclude severance, excising only
this language would render the remainder of Section 306(a.2)
incomprehensible. As the above provisions make clear, the
Guides are what provide critical context to the statute’s

otherwise hollow phrases, such as “the degree of impairment.”
Id. Without the aid of the Guides (or some other similar
methodology), what could it possibly mean, for example, to say
that a person has “a threshold impairment rating that is equal
to or greater than fifty per centum impairment”? Id.

We view Section 306(a.2) as a paradigmatic example of a law
containing valid provisions that are inseparable from void
provisions. Consequently, we must strike Section 306(a.2), in
its entirety, from the Act. See 1 Pa.C.S, § 1925 (“{Plrovisions
of every statute shall be severable ... unless the court finds
that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and
inseparably connected with, and so depend upon, the void
provision or application, that it cannot be presumed the Gener-
al Assembly would have enacted the remaining valid provi-
sions without the void one.”).

HE The Pennsylvania Constitution prevents the Gen-
eral Assembly from passing off to another branch or body de
facto control over matters of policy. As we have explained, this
is exactly what the General Assembly did in Section 306(a.2),
Because we must enforce Article II, Section 1 without consid-
eration of the exigencies that arise or “how trying our econom~-
ic or social conditions become,” we affirm the Commonwealth
Court’s holding that Section 306(a.2) violates the non-delega-
tion doctrine. Holgate Bros. Co, v. Bashore, 381 Pa. 255, 200 A.
672, 675 (1988). Unlike the Commonwealth Court, however, we
hold that Section 306(a.2) is unconstitutional in its entirety,

Order affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Justices Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the
opinion.

Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion.

Justice Baer files a dissenting opinion,

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR, Concurring

I support the core legal analysis contained in the majority
opinion. At least in the absence of some sort of ongoing
legislative or administrative review or oversight, I agree that

prospective medical texts cannot be incorporated into a
scheme affecting citizens’ substantial rights. My differences
with the majority opinion are more a matter of approach than
substance, as, for example, I find it unnecessary to even
consider that the American Medical Association might concoct
anything, see Majority Opinion, at 658, 161 A.3d at 885, or that
the General Assembly may have acted on an avoidance ratio-
nale, see id. at 661 n.6, 161 A.3d at 887 n.6.

JUSTICE BAER, Dissenting

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Sec-
tion 306(a.2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S.
§ 511.2, which directs a physician to evaluate a claimant’s
degree of impairment pursuant to the most recent edition of
the American Medical Association (“AMA”) “Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,” constitutes an unlaw-
ful delegation of legislative power in violation of Article II,
Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Unlike the majori-

1, As noted by the majority, Section 306(a.2), entitled “Medical examina-
tion; impairment rating,” provides in relevant part:

(1) When an employe has received total disability compensation
pursuant to clause (a) for a period of one hundred four weeks, unless
otherwise agreed to, the employe shall be required to submit to a
medical examination which shal] be requested by the insurer within
sixty days upon the expiration of the one hundred four weeks to
determine the degree of impairment due to the compensable injury, if
any. The degree of impairment shall be determined based upon an
evaluation by a physician who is licensed in this Commonwealth, who
is certified by an American Board of Medical Specialties approved
board or its osteopathic equivalent and who is active in clinical
practice for at least twenty hours per week, chosen by agreement of
the parties, or as designated by the department, pursuant to the most
recent edition of the American Medical Association “Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.”

(2) If such determination results in an impairment rating that meets a
threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater than fifty per
centum impairment under the most recent edition of the American
Medical Association ‘Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impair-
ment,” the employe shall be presumed to be totally disabled and shall
continue to receive total disability compensation benefits under
clause (a). If such determination results in an impairment rating less
than fifty per centum impairment under the most recent edition of the
American Medical Association “Guides to the Evaluation of Perma-
nent Impairment,” the employe shall then receive partial disability

ty, I do not interpret Section 306(a.2) as delegating legislative
authority to the AMA. Rather, the challenged statutory provi-
sion delegates preliminary determinations of claimant impair-
ment ratings to board-certified physicians licensed in the
Commonwealth who are active in clinical practice. The statute
directs these physicians to utilize the most recent edition of
the AMA Guides in connection with their initial impairment
determination. There is no constitutional infirmity in this
approach as it merely evinces the General Assembly’s policy
determination to adopt the most up-to-date medical advances
as the methodology to be utilized by physicians when evaluat-
ing whether to classify a claimant as totally or partially
disabled. Stated differently, requiring the use of the most
recent AMA Guides is not delegating the authority to make
law; it is simply declaring the applicable standard by which
physicians should conduct impairment rating evaluations. Ac-
cordingly, I would uphold the constitutionality of Section
806(a.2) and reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court,
which held to the contrary.

Constitutional challenges alleging that a statutory provision
unlawfully delegates legislative power emanate from Article
II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. PA. CONST.
art. II, § 1 (stating that “[t]he legislative power of this Com-
monwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”). Section
1 has been interpreted as requiring the Legislature to make
the basic policy choices involved in legislative power, W.
Mifflin Area Sch. Dist. v. Zahorchak, 607 Pa. 158, 4 A.8d
1042, 1045 n. 5 (2010), so as to preserve the separation of
powers. Lehman v. Pa. State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 839 A.2d 265,
274 (2008). In addition to making basic policy choices embod-
ied in a law, the General Assembly must also supply adequate
standards to guide and restrain the exercise of delegated
administrative functions. Pennsylvanians Against Gambling

benefits under clause (b): Provided, however, That no reduction shall

be made until sixty days’ notice of modification is given.
77 B.S. § 511.2.

Expansion Fund v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 275, 877 A.2d
383, 418 (2005).

Section 306(a.2) does not violate these constitutional man-
dates. As observed by the esteemed Judge Robert Simpson in
his dissent below, the Legislature made the policy decision
that in the first instance, the degree of impairment determina-
tion must be made by an independently selected (or agreed-
upon), certified medical specialist, engaged in current clinical
practice, and based on a uniform, objective, current and
independent assessment standard. See Prote v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Derry Area Sch. Dist.), 124 A8d 406, 419
(Pa. Cmwlth, 2015) (Simpson, J., dissenting)? The statutory
provision clarifies that key to the impairment determination is
adherence to prevailing best-practice medical standards, which
is objectively demonstrated by licensure and board certifica-
tion, requisite clinical practice, and employment of current
AMA Guides. Id. As Judge Simpson cogently noted, “[i]t is
hard to see what other basie policy choices remain to be
made.” Id.

As did Judge Simpson below, I agree with the sentiments
set forth by the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Madrid v.
St. Joseph Hospital, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250, 256 (1996),
which examined the same issue regarding whether a workers’
compensation statute constitutes an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority by requiring the use of the most recent
edition of the AMA Guides in evaluating impairment. Id. The
court found no unlawful delegation, recognizing that “many
jurisdictions have articulated compelling rationales for allow-
ing adoption of a private organization’s standards into a
statutory scheme without finding a delegation of legislative
authority ... even when the standards are subject to periodic
revision by the private entity.” Id.

The New Mexico Supreme Court explained that “{i]t is
impractical to expect our Legislature to establish standards
for evaluating physical impairment in workers’ compensation
claims.” Id. at 258-59. Noting a possible lack of legislative

2. Judges Leadbetter and Covey joined Judge Simpson's dissent.

resources to adopt independent medical impairment stan-
dards, the court surmised that the legislature chose to utilize
objective standards established by the AMA, which is a highly
respected and impartial entity that possesses the expertise for
such a task. Id. at 259, The New Mexico High Court stated,
“[plrohibiting the Legislature from adopting the standards
developed by experts within a rapidly changing medical spe-
cialty would obstruct the Workers’ Compensation Administra-
tion’s efforts to provide accurate evaluations of impairment,”
Id. Recognizing that new scientific developments relevant to
impairment evaluation demand modification, the court con-
eluded that “[pleviodie revisions of the standard will not
transform an otherwise constitutional and non-delegatory stat-
utory provision into an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power.” Id.

Consistent with this approach, it is my view that thwarting
the Pennsylvania Legislature’s ability to incorporate medical
standards that are periodically updated due to new scientific
developments does not safeguard any constitutionally protect-
ed interest but, rather, hinders the accuracy of claimant
impairment ratings in workers’ compensation cases. Addition-
ally, I fear that the majority’s decision will have far reaching
consequences as it would apply to various other Pennsylvania
statutes that rely on the most current standards and defini-
tions promulgated by entities other than the legislature itself.
See Opening Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Derry Area
School District at 87-40 (citing to numerous statutes that
reference current standards and definitions developed by
knowledgeable and professional independent entities). Accord-
ingly, I would hold that the General Assembly’s common sense
decision to direct physicians to utilize the most current medi-
cal knowledge when making impairment determinations is a
constitutionally sustainable policy decision that should be left
undisturbed.

161 A.8d 844
IN RE: Petition of the BOROUGH OF DOWNINGTOWN

Appeal of: Friends of Kardon Park and Ann Feldman
In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown
Appeal of: Friends of Kardon Park and Ann Feldman
In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown
Appeal of: Friends of Kardon Park and Ann Feldman
In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown
Appeal of: Friends of Kardon Park and Ann Feldman
In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown

Appeal of: Borough of Downingtown, Council of the Borough
of Downingtown, Progressive Housing Ventures, LLC
and J. Loew & Associates, Inc.

In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown

Appeal of: Borough of Downingtown, Council of the Borough
of Downingtown, Progressive Housing Ventures, LLC
and J, Loew & Associates, Inc.

In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown

Appeal of; Borough of Downingtown, Council
of the Borough of Downingtown,

Progressive Housing Ventures, LLC
and J. Loew & Associates, Inc.

In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown

Appeal of: Borough of Downingtown, Council of the Borough
of Downingtown, Progressive Housing Ventures, LLC
and J. Loew & Associates, Inc.

In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown

Appeal of: Kim Manufacturing Company and Stewart Hall, L.P.
In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown

Appeal of: Kim Manufacturing Company and Stewart Hall, L.P.

In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown

No.
No.
No.

Appeal of: Kim Manufacturing Company and Stewart Hall, L.P.
In re: Petition of the Borough of Downingtown
Appeal of: Kim Manufacturing Company and Stewart Hall, L.P.

12 MAP 2016
13 MAP 2016
14 MAP 2016

. 15 MAP 2016
. 16 MAP 2016
. 17 MAP 2016
. 18 MAP 2016
. 19 MAP 2016
. 20 MAP 2016
. 21 MAP 2016
. 22 MAP 2016
. 23 MAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
ARGUED: December 7, 2016
DECIDED: June 20, 2017

19

Rey |
5

&

20
oS

Jeffrey Concini Clark. Esq., Wix, Wenger & Weidner, P.C.,
for Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors,
Amicus Curiae,

George Jugovic Jr., Esq., Kurt John Weist, Esq., Citizens
for Pennsylvania’s Future, for PA Land Trust Association &
PA Recreation and Park Society, Amicus Curiae.

Samuel C. Stretton, Esq., Law Office of Samuel C. Stretton,
for Friends of Kardon Park and Ann Feldman, Appellant.

Robert L. Byer, Esq., Duane Morris, L.L.P, Louis J. Cola-
greco Jr., Esq., Riley, Riper, Hollin & Colagreco, P.C., Robert
McCarthy Palumbos, Esq., for J. Loew & Associates, Inc and
Progressive Housing Ventures, LLC, Appellee.

David Dembe, Esq., Claudia M. Tesoro, Esq., PA Office of
Attorney General, for Office of Attorney General, Appellee.

Henry Fintan McHugh, Esq., Petrikin, Wellman, Damico,
Brown & Petrosa, P.C., for Kim Manufacturing Company and
Stewart Hall, L.P., Appellee.

Patrick C. O'Donnell, Esq., Gawthrop Greenwood, PC, Pat-
rick Michael McKenna, Esq., for Borough of Downingtown
and Council of the Borough of Downingtown, Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE,
DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE TODD

In these consolidated cross-appeals, we accepted review to
consider whether three statutory provisions—the “Donated or
Dedicated Property Act” (“DDPA”),' the “Project 70 Land
Acquisition and Borrowing Act” (“Project 70 Act”)? and the
Eminent Domain Code *—allow Appellant Downingtown Bor-
ough (“Borough”)* to sell to private housing developers—
Appellants Progressive Housing Ventures, LLC and J. Loew
and Associates, Inc. (“Developers”)—four parcels of land that,
collectively, comprise “Kardon Park,” a public community park
currently owned and maintained by the Borough, and to grant
easements over parts of the park. After review, we vacate the
order of the Commonwealth Court with respect to the Bor-
ough’s proposed sale to Developers of the two parcels de-
scribed herein as the Southern Parcels, reverse the order of
the Commonwealth Court regarding the proposed sale by the
Borough to Developers of the two parcels described herein as
the Northern Parcels, and reverse the order of the Common-
wealth Court involving the Borough’s grant of easements to
Developers over the parcels described herein, and we remand
to that tribunal for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion,

I, Background

A. Factual History

Downingtown Borough, in which Kardon Park is primarily
situated, is one of Pennsylvania’s oldest communities.’ Found-

1, 53 P.S, §§ 3381-3386,
2, 72P.S, 88 3946.1 et seq.
3. 26 Pa.C.S, §§ 101 et seq.

4, Tracking the manner in which the litigation proceeded in the lower
courts, Downingtown Borough has been designated by our Court as the
Appellant.

5. This history is derived, in part, from descriptions by the local histori-
cal society, See Downingtown Area Historical Society, History of Down-
ingtown, available at hup:/www.downingtownareahistoricalsociety.org/
History, html,

ed as a colonial frontier village in 1716, the Borough has, from
its inception, been a hub of industrial activity. An ample
number of bustling corn and grist mills operated there during
the 1700s, and it served as a vital supply depot for the
colonists during the Revolutionary War. Later, during the
Industrial Revolution in the 1800s, a number of paper mills
and various other manufacturing industries began operating in
and around the Borough. Manufacturing remained a corner-
stone of the Borough’s economy throughout the majority of
the 20" century.

Despite this industrial history, the Borough has made a
concomitant effort to acquire and reserve land for the estab-
lishment of public parks. Thus, in 1925, the Borough created
Kerr Park, a municipal park along the eastern banks of
Brandywine Creek, which was noteworthy in that it was
sustained not only by public expenditures, but by a community
subscription program in which Borough residents voluntarily
paid a monthly fee for maintenance and operation of the park.
Kardon Park, at issue herein, was likewise created by the
Borough for similar public purposes through a series of land
acquisitions in the 1960s and 1970s, explained in more detail
infra. It lies just east of Kerr Park, and straddles the north-
ern border of the Borough with East Caln Township.®

Consistent with this historical legacy of dual-purpose land
use within the Borough, some of the land on which Kardon
Park is located was formerly used for industrial activities and
as a disposal area for byproducts of those activities. In the
1930s, the property which now comprises the western part of
the park was extensively quarried for minerals by its owners,
Once the minerals were exhausted, the open quarry pits were
filled in with industrial waste generated by various industries
operating within the Borough, as well as municipal waste.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/7/10, at 5, The waste dumped into
these quarries included iron slag, heavy metals, paper, and
wood products. Jd. at 18. The waste layer that accumulated
6, Hast Caln Township does not own any of the land comprising Kardon

Park, nor does it have any maintenance responsibility for the park, and
it is not a party to this litigation.

TT

from the years of dumping, which is intermixed with soil,
ranges from 2 to 12 feet in thickness, and occupies an area of
approximately 250,000 cubic yards. Id.

Beginning in the 1960s, the Borough began acquiring,
through various means, the then-privately owned parcels of
land which now comprise the majority of the park’s total land
area. In 1962, the Borough purchased 7.6 acres of wooded
property from its owner Kathryn Meisel. This parcel, UPI 11-
4-23" (the “Meisel Parcel”), which is situated partly in the
Borough and partly in East Caln Township, contains two
manmade ponds (“Second Lake” and “Third Lake”)® which
were the remnants of the watercourse, known as a “millrace,”
used in the operation of the very first grist mill complex
erected in the Borough in the 1700s. Id. at 8.

In 1964, to address the problem of dwindling land available
for public recreation and conservation uses, and in response to
the accelerating population growth of urban and suburban
areas, the General Assembly passed the Project 70 Act which
authorized the Commonwealth to borrow up to $20 million to
provide financial assistance to local governments for the acqui-
sition of lands which were either currently being used for
recreational, conservation, or historical purposes, or which
could be put to such uses in the future, See 72 Pa.C.S.
§ 8946.2 (Project 70 Act statement of purpose); id.
§ 3946.16(a)(4) (allocation of bond monies).? The Project 70

7. UPI stands for “uniform parcel identifier” which is a statutorily
established “finite, punctuated sequence of numbers indicating the land
parcel or other interest in real estate as shown on the recorded county
tax map” which can also function, as it does in the case at bar, as the
county tax parcel number. 21 P.S. § 332.

8. Second Lake presently occupies the Southeastern corner of Kardon
Park and is connected via watercourse to Third Lake which lies
immediately to its north.

9, The Project 70 Act was enacted by the legislature to implement Article
8, § 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, entitled “Project ‘70',” which
was adopted by the voters of the Commonwealth in 1963, and which
provides; ,

In addition to the purposes stated in article eight, section seven of
this Constitution, the Commonwealth may be authorized by law to
create debt and to issue bonds to the amount of seventy million
dollars ($70,000,000) for the acquisition of land for State parks,

a ©
Act authorizes the General Assembly to furnish to the munici-
pality up to fifty percent of the cost of acquisition of such
lands. Id. § 3946.16(a)(4). In exchange for this subsidy, the
Project 70 Act requires that any deed of conveyance of
property acquired with such monies contain a restrictive cove-
nant specifying that “[tJhis indenture is given to provide land
for recreation, conservation and historical purposes, as said
purposes are defined in [the Project 70 Act].” Id.
§ 3946.20(c).”

The Borough obtained Project 70 Act funds in 1968 and
used them to finance fifty percent of the cost of two parcels of
land, which it purchased from Downingtown Paper Company:
a 14-acre tract in East Caln Township, the northern third of
which is occupied by a man-made pond known as “Fourth
Lake,” UPI 40-1.23.1; and an adjoining 7.4-acre piece of
property located in the Borough, bordering the first parcel at
its southern edge, UPI 114-18. The Borough used its own
public funds to cover the other half of the total purchase price
of $12,671.20. These two parcels were collectively designated
by the lower courts as the “Northern Parcels,” and they will
be referred to in the same manner herein. The “Deed of
Confirmation” conveying these properties to the Borough,
necessary for the release of the Project 70 Act grant funds,”
contained an indenture specifying that it was being used to
provide land “for recreation, conservation and historical pur-
poses, as defined in [the Project 70 Act].” Deed of Confirma-
tion, 10/30/68, 8 (R.R. 24102).

reservoirs and other conservation and recreation and historical pres-
ervation purposes and for participation by the Commonwealth with
political subdivisions in the acquisition of land for parks, reservoirs
and other conservation and recreation and historical preservation
purposes, subject to such conditions and limitations as the General

Assembly may prescribe.
Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 15,

10, As discussed infra, the Project 70 Act also provides, in pertinent part,
that “[nJo lands acquired with funds made available under this act shall
be disposed of or used for purposes other than those prescribed [there-
in] without the express approval of the General Assembly.” 72 P.S.
§ 3946.20(b).

11. See 72 Pa.C.S. § 3946.20.

a

In 1974, the Borough exercised its power of eminent do-
main, via ordinance, and acquired UPI 11-4-14.2, a 7.4-acre
piece of property which adjoins the Meisel Parcel immediately
to the west of Second Lake. The declaration of taking provid-
ed that the purpose of this condemnation was “to expand and
enlarge recreation places and space within the borough lim-
its.” Declaration of Taking, 11/18/74 (R.R. at 2417). The ordi-
nance authorizing the condemnation provided that the proper-
ty was being acquired for “park and recreation purposes.”
Ordinance, 11/14/74 (R.R. at 2416). In 1977, the Borough again
utilized its eminent domain authority, via passage of another
ordinance, to obtain title to an adjoining 4.3-acre wooded tract
of land immediately to the west of the first condemned parcel,
UPI 11-4-14. Just as with the first condemnation, its purpose
was “to expand and enlarge recreation places and space within
the borough limits,” and the authorizing ordinance stated that
the land was being taken for “park and recreation purposes.”
Declaration of Taking, 6/20/77 (R.R. at 2420); Ordinance
6/22/77 (R.R. at 2425). These two parcels were collectively
designated by the lower courts, and will be referred to herein,
as the “Southern Parcels.” It is these five parcels—the North-
ern Parcels, the Southern Parcels, and the Meisel Parcel—
which are the subject of the case before us.

In 1978, the Borough Council, Borough Manager, and the
Mayor of Downingtown Borough held a ceremony at which
they named and dedicated the Southern Parcels as “Kardon
Park,” and they erected a sign on Pennsylvania Avenue, which
serves as the lower boundary of the Southern Parcels, that
read “Kardon Park.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/7/10, at 8, 14.
Thereafter, in 1984, a paved, multi-use trail was constructed in
the park by the Borough, which named it the “Lion’s Trail.” It
runs along the western banks of Second and Third Lakes,
traversing the entirety of the Southern and Northern Parcels,
whereupon it exits the park and joins with the “Struble Trail,”
which is a part of the national Rails to Trails Network. At the
same time, the Borough also constructed a parking lot at the
southern end of the park near Pennsylvania Avenue for use by
park patrons. Since its opening, Lion’s Trail has been used

a

continuously by members of the public for jogging, walking,
and biking. In 2004, the Borough allowed the Crime Victims’
Center of Chester County, a non-profit crime victim’s advoca-
ey organization, to erect a permanent “Victims of Violence
Memorial,” which is the site of annual services in honor of
those who died from acts of violence. Id. at 5-6.

Since 1984, the Borough has continually performed mainte-
nance activities in the park, such as planting and mowing the
grass, caring for the trails and the area around the Victims of
Violence Memorial, and erecting signage to guide park users.
The park has been and continues to be popular with Borough
residents and other members of the public who use it for
numerous outdoor activities such as picnics, bird watching, and
family and social gatherings, and the ponds in the park are
used for fishing in the summertime and ice skating in the
winter. Id. at 5-6, 14-15. Additionally, from 1984 until 2009,
the Borough identified Kardon Park on its zoning maps as
either a “Park” or “Public Park.” Id. at 15.

In the early 1990s, the Borough began envisioning a differ-
ent use for a portion of the land in the park—commercial
development. Jd. at 6. In preparation for selling the property
to a developer, in 1999, the Borough sought and obtained a
release from the General Assembly of the Project 70 Act
restrictions on Northern Parcel UPI 11-4-18, in exchange for
the Borough’s imposition of Project 70 Act restrictions on
another parcel of land owned by the Borough, and on an
additional parcel the Borough pledged to obtain. See Act of
June 25, 1999, P.L, 220, No. 29, §§ 2-4.

That same year, the Borough sought “Act 2” clearance from
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
(“DEP”),” and it enlisted an environmental engineering firm,

12. Act 2 is the name by which our Commonwealth’s “Land Recycling
and Environmental Remediation Standards Act,” 35 P.S. §§ 6026.101-
6026,908 (Acts 2, 3, and 4 of 1995), is generally referred. This program
encourages the cleanup and re-use of polluted property by establishing
uniform remediation standards for contaminated soil and groundwater.
Once a property owner files a report demonstrating that the property
meets the required remediation standards under Act 2, and the DEP
accepts and approves the report and any ongoing monitoring plan, the

a

Golder Associates, to perform an assessment of the surface
and subsurface soil in the park, as well as the groundwater, to
identify any contaminants which were present, and to prepare
a plan for their remediation. Golder’s environmental analysis
identified various heavy metals and industrial byproducts
present in the park soil. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/7/10, at 6.
Golder ultimately concluded, though, that “risks due to poten-
tial direct contact of both park users and park groundskeepers
to contaminants in the surface soil at Kardon Park were
within limits established by the Pennsylvania DEP.” Jd. at 7.
Golder additionally conducted surveys of park users and Bor-
ough employees. Id. at 6-7, This survey revealed that 77
percent of the park’s recreational usage was by people utiliz-
ing its trails for walking, running, jogging, biking, roller-
skating, or skateboarding, and that the average length of use
was 10 minutes or less. Id. at 7. Golder included all of this
information in a report submitted to the DEP, formally re-
questing Act 2 clearance, which the DEP granted in 2000, with
the stipulation that the park property to the west of the
walking trail and extending to the park’s northern border with
East Caln Township would be restricted to commercial uses,
and the remainder of the property would be limited in use to
“non-residential park uses.” DEP Order, 1/14/00, 3-4 (R.R. at
2468a).

In July 2006, the Borough formally sought proposals from
prospective buyers who were willing to purchase and redevel-
op the park. Developers were the successful bidders, and, on
August 24, 2007, Developers and the Borough entered into a
purchase agreement pursuant to which Developers agreed to
buy the Northern Parcels, the Southern Parcels, and the
Meisel Parcel for the purpose of constructing a mixed use
development, which would include 305 individual residential
units, 40 combination residential and commercial rental units,
and 20,000 square feet of commercial space. Orphans’ Court

owner and any subsequent owner are exempted from liability for issues

arising from the prior contamination. Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Protection, Land Recycling Program (2017), available at

http://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Land/LandRecycling/Pages/default.

aspx.

Opinion, 10/7/10, at 7; Agreement to Purchase and Sell Real
Estate, 8/17/07 (R.R. at 2921a); First Amendment to Purchase
Agreement, 8/17/07 (R.R. at 1228a).

Additionally, a new environmental engineering firm, Ad-
vanced GeoServices, was retained to review the prior environ-
mental risk assessment performed by Golder. In a March 2008
report, Advanced GeoServices found “exposure to collective
concentrations of arsenic, iron and mercury encountered on
the [park] Property represents an unacceptable risk to park
users.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/7/10, at 8. Advanced Geo-
Services crafted a comprehensive plan to address the contami-
nation which called for a two-foot layer of topsoil to be spread
over the areas in which waste had historically been dumped.
The DEP approved this plan in August 2008, agreeing that the
proposed soil cap was “an equally conservative and appropri-
ate option to eliminate exposure pathways and maintain the
stability of the historic fill” DEP Letter, 8/6/08 (R.R. at
2475a). Subsequently, in March 2009, the Commonwealth De-
partment of Community and Economic Development approved
a grant of $990,000 to defray the cost of this proposed
remediation.

In January 2009, the Borough amended its municipal code
to create the “Kardon Park Redevelopment District,” which
authorized the planned development in the area occupied by
Kardon Park. Subsequently, the purchase agreement between
the Borough and Developers was modified on September 16,
2009, and, under this revised agreement, the Borough retained
ownership of portions of the park property encompassed by
the entirety of the Meisel Parcel and a part of Northern
Parcel UPI 40-1.23.1. This retained property included all
three of the park’s ponds, its trails, the parking area, the
“mmillrace”, the Victims of Violence Memorial, and “surround-
ing open space/park areas.” Second Amendment to Purchase
Agreement, 9/16/09, at 2 (R.R. at 1281a). However, with
respect to both of these parcels, the Borough granted to the
Developers:

free, uninterrupted perpetual and/or temporary (as applica-

ble) easements over, under and through the Park Property

as

as [Developers] reasonably require[] in order to (i) con-

struct any improvements and perform any work on the Park

Property shown on or required by the [Borough’s] Condi-

tional Use Approval, approved final subdivision and/or land

development plans, or by other governmental approvals,
including any environmental remediation Gi) construct or
extend utilities to serve the development of all or any part
of the remainder of the Property, Additional Property or

Option Property, (iii) discharge storm water into the ponds,

and (iv) maintain such improvements to the extent of any

ongoing maintenance responsibility of the [Developers] or of
any community association organized to maintain common
amenities of [Developers’] development.

Id.

In July 2010, the Borough’s Board of Supervisors granted
Developers conditional use approval for the construction of
their proposed development, which required that Northern
Parcel UPI 40-1.23.1 and the Meisel Parcel continue to be
public open space, but also allowed Developers the permanent
right to discharge stormwater into Fourth Lake, the pond on
Northern Parcel UPI 40-1.28.1. The Borough additionally
pledged to obtain removal of any deed restrictions mandated
by the Project 70 Act. Once the construction of the develop-
ment was complete, the Borough was entitled under the
agreement to receive a percentage of the sale price of each of
the dwelling units, and it pledged to use those monies, in
conjunction with other public funds, to build a new firehouse
in the Borough. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/7/10, at 8. This
planned disposition by the Borough of these five parcels of
parkland gave rise to the present litigation.

B. Procedural History

In January 2009, residents of the Borough, Ann M. Feld-
man, Marion Ungrich, Evelyn Hopkins, and Rosetta Tootle—
who presently live near the park property—in conjunction
with a non-profit corporation they had founded with other
Borough residents and other interested parties—“Friends of
Kardon Park”—commenced an action in equity in the Chester

a ~

County Court of Common Pleas for declarative and injunctive
relief to prohibit the Borough from carrying out the planned
sale of the park property. In February 2009, a similar action,
seeking the same prohibitory injunction, was filed in the same
court by Kim Manufacturing Company, which owns and oper-
ates a metal fabrication company adjacent to the park proper-
ty on its western side, and by Stewart Hall, L.P., which owns
the land on which Kim Manufacturing is situated. (Collectively
these parties, who are the designated appellees in this matter,
will be referred to as “Objectors”).

In March 2009, the Borough filed a petition with the Ches-
ter County Orphans’ Court seeking approval for the sale. The
petition alleged that the orphans’ court had jurisdiction of the
matter under the DDPA.” The orphans’ court, by the Honor-
able Katherine B.L, Platt, subsequently consolidated the pend-
ing action for declaratory and injunctive relief with the or-
phans’ court suit, and granted Developers leave to intervene."
In September and November 2009, the orphans’ court con-
ducted five days of hearings, and, after considering the volu-
minous evidence and arguments of the parties, issued an
opinion in October 2010 denying the Borough’s petition.

Before addressing the orphans’ court’s analysis, we briefly
discuss the DDPA. As our Court observed in the decision of
In ve Evie Golf Course, 605 Pa. 484, 992 A.2d 75 (2010), the
fundamental purpose of the DDPA, enacted by the General
Assembly in 1959, was to delineate “the fiduciary nature of
municipalities’ obligations relative to donated and dedicated
properties and provide for orderly relief therefrom in appro-
priate circumstances.” Id. at 86. As relevant to the present
matter, the DDPA deems lands situated within a political
13, The Borough also raised a claim under the Inalienable Property Act,

20 Pa.C.S. §§ 8301-8306, which the orphans’ court rejected. The Bor-

ough did not further appeal this ruling; thus, its propriety is not at
issue in the present appeal.

14, The Office of Attorney General also entered an appearance in this
matter at that time in its capacity as parens patriae, but it has taken no
position throughout the litigation as to whether the Borough should be
permitted to sell the subject property, and it has not filed a brief in the
present appeal.

8
subdivision which have been “dedicated to the public use ...
as a public facility” as “held by [the] political subdivision, as
trustee, for the benefit of the public with full legal title in the
said trustee.” * 58 P.S. § 8882. The DDPA further requires
that “[aJll such lands ... held by a political subdivision, as
trustee, shall be used for the purpose or purposes for which
they were originally dedicated ... except insofar as modified
by court order pursuant to this act.” Id. § 3383. The DDPA
sets forth the conditions and process for such court ordered
modification in Section 3384 thereof, which permits a political
subdivision to petition the orphans’ court for relief from its
obligations as trustee of property held in trust as a public
facility “{w]hen, in the opinion of the political subdivision
which is the trustee, the continuation of the original use of the
particular property held in trust as a public facility is no
longer practicable or possible and has ceased to serve the
public interest.” Id. § 3384, If the orphans’ court determines
that the political subdivision has established these criteria,
Section 3384 allows the orphans’ court to allow the political
subdivision to do the following:
(1) Substitute other lands or property of at least equal size
and value held or to be acquired by the political subdivision
in exchange for the trust property in order to carry out the
trust purposes; (2) If other property is not available, sell
the property and apply the proceeds to carry out the trust
purposes; (3) In the event the original trust purpose is no
longer practicable or possible or in the public interest, apply
the property or proceeds therefrom in the case of a sale to a
different public purpose; [and] (4) Relinquish, waive or
otherwise quitclaim all right and title of the public in and to
such land and buildings as have been apparently dedicated
but for which no formal acceptance appears of record:
Provided, only, That the court is satisfied upon hearing the
evidence that there is no acceptance by implication arising
out of public user or otherwise, the court shall also deter-
15, The DDPA defines a “public facility” as “any park, theatre, open air

theatre, square, museum, library, concert hall, recreation facility or
other public use.” 53 P.S. § 3381.

mine the consideration, if any, to be paid to the political

subdivision.
Id.

Section 3386 of the DDPA reserves to political subdivisions
a right of control over public lands** which they acquire by
purchase or condemnation:

Nothing in this act shall be construed to limit or affect the

control by a political subdivision of public lands or buildings

acquired by such political subdivision by purchase or con-
demnation.
Id. § 3386. Although this provision facially excludes from the
scope of the DDPA any lands which a political subdivision
acquires by purchase or condemnation, as discussed at greater
length herein, in Erie Golf Cowrse we did not interpret Section
3386 in that broad manner.

In the instant case, to adjudicate the Borough’s claim of
relief under the DDPA, the orphans’ court looked to Erie Golf
Course.’ The orphans’ court regarded this case as establishing
that it, not the Borough, possessed the ultimate discretion to
determine whether the park property was dedicated to public
use as required by Section 3882 of the DDPA, and whether
the Borough met the required criteria to sell the park proper-
ty as set forth in Section 3384 of that law—i.e., whether its
16. The DDPA defines lands as “all real estate, whether improved or

unimproved.” 53 P.S. § 3381.

17. In Erie Golf Course, our Court considered whether the city could
obtain authorization from the orphans’ court under the DDPA to sell a
golf course which it had purchased from a private club, and which the
city had maintained for 80 years as a public golf course as required by a
restrictive covenant in the deed of conveyance. In brief, our Court ruled
therein that the DDPA applied to all dedications of property to public
use, whether or not there was a formal record of such a dedication by
the public governing body which was responsible for administering the
property as trustee for the benefit of the public; that the DDPA
statutorily incorporated principles of the venerable common law public
trust doctrine, and, to the extent that it modified that doctrine, super-
seded it; that the orphans’ court had “‘controlling discretion” to decide
whether to permit the sale of property held in trust for the benefit of the
public; and that Section 3386 of the DDPA did not exclude from the
DDPA’s scope of coverage purchased property which is held for public
trust purposes. Erie Golf Course, 992 A.2d at 86-89 & n.14, The
Borough filed an amicus brief in that case.

original use “is no longer practicable or possible or has ceased
to serve the public interest.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/7/10,
at 18,

Noting that our Court in Brie Golf Cowrse failed to define
what constitutes a “dedication to public use” under Section
8882, the orphans’ court utilized a definition offered by the
Commonwealth Court. See White v. Twp. of Upper St. Clair,
799 A.2d 188, 198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“Dedication may be
found in a single act, such as the giving of a deed or the
recording of a plan, or it may be found from a series of acts,
all consistent with and pointing to the intention to dedicate.”),
Accordingly, to determine if the park had been dedicated to
public use, the court considered the Borough’s stated reasons
for acquiring the land to create the park—to expand the
available land in the Borough which could be utilized for
recreation activities, historical, and conservation purposes—as
well as the Borough’s lengthy history of maintaining and
making improvements to the park, and the continuous recre-
ational and other public uses of the park by the community.
Although the court noted that certain areas of the park were
used more heavily by patrons—such as the walking trail, the
areas around the Victims of Violence Memorial, the ponds, and
the parking areas—the court nonetheless concluded that the
public had always been given access to the entire park proper-
ty and used those other areas from time to time. Consequent-
ly, the court concluded that the park property, as a whole, was
dedicated to public use.

The court next considered whether the use of the park
property for public purposes had become impossible, impracti-
cable, or no longer served the public interest. Observing that
there was a complete lack of legal authority regarding the
burden of proof the Borough had to meet to demonstrate
these factors, the court chose to apply a preponderance of the
evidence standard. The court rejected the Borough and Devel-
opers’ argument that the contaminated soil in the western
portion of the park rendered the park, as a whole, unsuitable
for its continued use by the public. The court found that, even
after both environmental assessments identified the presence

of heavy metals and toxic waste imbedded in the soil, the
Borough took no action to restrict the publie’s access to the
whole park, including its western areas which were the most,
heavily polluted, and the Borough continued to maintain the
park so that it was open for the same public activities for
which it had historically been used.

Moreover, the court noted that the Golder assessment found
nothing which demonstrated that the park’s use by the pub-
lic—the majority of which, as Golder determined, was for brief
periods of time ten minutes or less—posed any substantial
health risk to patrons, even those who continued to use the
western areas of the park. Accordingly, in the court’s view,
because the evidence of record showed the public use to which
the park was dedicated remained unchanged even after the
identification of the contaminated soil, the Borough failed to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
park’s original use was impracticable or impossible, or that the
park had ceased to serve the public’s interest. Hence, the
court ruled that the Borough did not have authority under the
DDPA to sell any of the park property to the Developers.

The Borough and Developers appealed to the Common-
wealth Court, which reversed in a unanimous en bane deci-
sion.® Borough of Downingtown v,. Friends of Kardon Park,
55 A.8d 168 (Pa. Cmwith. 2012) (“Downingtown I”). While the
orphans’ court based its decision entirely on the DDPA, given
that the Borough had filed its petition seeking relief under
that act, the Commonwealth Court, of its own volition, intro-
duced the question of the effect the Project 70 Act would have
on the Borough’s right to dispose of the Northern Parcels;
and, over the opposition of Objectors, entertained an argu-
ment from the Borough and Developers that, since the Bor-
ough had acquired the Southern Parcels by eminent domain,
the Borough had the right to dispose of the Southern Parcels
under Section 310(a) of the Eminent Domain Code governing
18. Judge McCullough was the author of the decision, and she was

joined by then President Judge Pellegrini, and Judges Leadbetter, Cohn
Jubelirer, Simpson, Brobson and Covey.

a

disposition of “abandoned” property. See 26 Pa.C.S. § 310(a).*
20

With respect to the Northern Parcels and the Project 70
Act, the Commonwealth Court, noting that these parcels had
been acquired by Project 70 Act funds, concluded that the
orphans’ court erred in failing to consider the impact of the
Project 70 Act on the Borough’s right to convey the parcels
under the DDPA” The Commonwealth Court opined that
Section 3946.20 of the Project 70 Act required the express
approval of the General Assembly in order for the owner of
lands acquired through the use of Project 70 Act funds to
dispose of them. The court reasoned that neither the common
law public trust doctrine, nor the DDPA—which the court,

19. This section provides:
(a) Disposition of property.—If a condemnor has condemned a fee
and then abandons the purpose for which the property has been
condemned, the condemnor may dispose of it by sale, lease, gift,
devise or other transfer with the following restrictions:
(1) If the property is undeveloped or has not been substantially
improved, it may not be disposed of within ten years after condem-
nation without first being offered to the condemnee at the same
price paid to the condemnee by the condemnor.
(2) If the property is located outside the corporate boundaries of a
county of the first or second class and is undeveloped or has not
been substantially improved and was devoted to agricultural use at
the time of the condemmation, it may not be disposed of within 21
years after condemnation without first being offered to the con-
demnee at the same price paid to the condemnee by the condem-

nor.
26 Pa.C.S. § 310(a). Problematically, as discussed more fully herein,
the condemnations of these parcels were effective in the 1970s, and this
section is applicable only to “condemnations effected on or after”
September 1, 2006. Act of May 4, 2006, P.L, 112, No. 34§ 6.

20, The orphans’ court did not address the issue of Section 310(a)’s
applicability in its opinion, as it was not raised as a basis for relief in
the Borough’s petition in the orphans’ court; rather, it was mentioned
for the first time in a pretrial memorandum filed by Developers.
Although Objectors argued to the Commonwealth Court that this issue
was waived as, in their view, it was being presented for the first time on
appeal, the Commonwealth Court rejected that claim, and, as no party
presently asks us to revisit this question, we do not address it.

21. Although recognizing that it was raising this issue sua sponte, the
court considered its remand as adequately permitting the parties and
the orphans’ court the opportunity to fully consider this question.
Downingtown I, 55 A.3d at 174 0.14.

quoting from our decision in Erie Golf Course, found to
incorporate the “ ‘salient common-law principles’ of the public
trust doctrine”—restricted the Borough from selling Northern
Parcel UPI 11-4-18 since the General Assembly had released
it from Project 70 Act restrictions in 1999, and purportedly
“specifically authorized” the conveyance of this parcel to De-
velopers. Downingtown I, 55 A.3d at 173 (quoting Erie Golf
Course, 992 A.2d at 86),

The court also found support for this conclusion in Section
8886 of the DDPA, which provides that “[nJothing in this act
shall be construed to limit or affect the control by a political
subdivision of public lands or buildings acquired by such
political subdivision by purchase or condemnation,” 58 P.S.
§ 83386, and language in Erie Golf Cowrse interpreting that
section, where we observed that it was “most reasonable to
construe [Section 8886] as redressing a concern for the preser-
vation of such rights and interests as a political subdivision
may have acquired in connection with a purchase.” Erie Golf
Course, 992 A.2d at 88, In the Commonwealth Court’s estima-
tion, the use of Project 70 Act funds to acquire the Northern
Parcels and the General Assembly’s release of them from
Project 70 Act restrictions constituted a conferral of such
rights to the Borough that “may well be the dispositive factors
with respect to these parcels.” Downingtown I, 55 A.8d at 173
ni6. The court concluded that, because the orphans’ court.
should have considered the provisions of the Project 70 Act in
conjunction with the DDPA in determining whether the Bor-
ough had the authority to convey the Northern Parcels to the
Developer, it deemed it necessary to remand to the orphans’
court for that assessment; hence, it vacated the order of the
orphans’ court with respect to the Northern Parcels.

Regarding the Southern Parcels, the Commonwealth Court
found that the Project 70 Act did not apply since they were
acquired through eminent domain, and there was no evidence
that Project 70 Act funds were used to pay the condemnees.
However, the court observed that Section 310(a) of the Emi-
nent Domain Code permits a governmental body to sell prop-
erty acquired by condemnation if the public purpose for which

it was condemned has been abandoned, and the other applica-
ble conditions enumerated in Section 310(a) are met. Also, the
court noted that “there must be an intent to abandon the
condemned property coupled with external acts to achieve that
end; mere non-use or lapse of time is not an abandonment.”
Td. at 175, While the Commonwealth Court deemed these
determinations to be ones for the finder of fact, it observed
that, in this case, the orphans’ court failed to make any
findings regarding these matters, and did not consider wheth-
er the provisions of the DDPA would supersede the Eminent
Domain Code; thus, the court vacated the orphans’ court’s
order with respect to the Southern Parcels and remanded to
the orphans’ court for further proceedings on these questions,
The Commonwealth Court reiterated that our Court’s state-
ments in Hrie Golf Cowrse with respect to Section 3886's
potential preservation of property rights acquired by a munici-
pality, which it viewed as potentially including a right to freely
dispose of property under Section 310(a), “could be the dispos-
itive factor” with respect to the validity of the proposed sale of
the Southern Parcels to the Developers. Id. at 175 n.19,

Lastly, the Commonwealth Court found that, because the
easements granted to the Developers over the Meisel Parcel
were “ancillary to the uses on the other parcels,” it was
necessary to vacate the orphans’ court’s order with respect to
those easements and to remand for that court to consider
“whether the construction, maintenance and utility easements
as well as permission to discharge storm water into the two
lakes are inconsistent with the use of the parcel as parkland,”
Id. at 176."

22. The Commonwealth Court addressed only the question of whether
the Borough's grant of the easements over the Meisel Parcel was
permissible under the DDPA, However, while the Borough and Devel-
opers’ appeal in Downingtown I was pending before the Common-
wealth Court, the Borough and Developers filed another petition in the
orphans’ court seeking a ruling that its approval was not required for
the grant of the easements over the Meisel Parcel or the other ease-
ments on Northern Parcel UPI 40-1-23.1, Judge Platt granted the
petition, finding that the DDPA was not applicable to the easements,
reasoning that the grant of the easements “did not constitute a sale or a
change in the use of the property.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/21/13,
at 14. A panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed in a unanimous

Subsequent to the Commonwealth Court’s decision in
Downingtown I, the General Assembly enacted legislation
removing some of the Project 70 Act restrictions from North-
ern Parcel UPI 40-1-28.1.% See Act of Oct. 24, 2012, P.L.
1293, No. 162, § 6, However, this legislation required the
following additional conditions be met: the Borough receive
equal to or greater than the fair market value for the portion
of the park property on which Project 70 Act restrictions were
removed; the Borough reserve, via deed restriction, a mini-
mum of 20 acres of current park property for continued use as
a public park; the Borough deposit the revenue realized from
the sale of Project 70 Act properties into an interest bearing
account, and expenditure of monies in that account be restrict-
ed to making improvements to the park in accordance with a
development plan approved by the Department of Conserva-
tion and Natural Resources (“DCNR”); and, after five years,
the Borough disgorge any funds left in that account to the
DCNR to be used to fund general conservation and recreation
grants. Id.

On remand from the Commonwealth Court, the orphans’
court, following the Commonwealth Court’s directive, first
addressed whether the Hminent Domain Code superseded the
DDPA and, thus, permitted the Borough to sell the Southern

unpublished memorandum opinion, also authored by Judge McCul-
lough, which noted that “{alt the very least, the proposed easements
with respect to these parcels will alter the use of, or constitute an
alienation of, portions of Kardon Park, thereby implicating the DDPA
and necessitating Orphans’ Court approval.” In re Council of Borough
of Downingtown, No. 2205 C.D. 2011 at 3, 2013 WL 3156607 (unpub-
lished memorandum filed June 18, 2013), The panel remanded for
further proceedings in that case so that the orphans’ court could make
specific findings with respect to the DDPA’s application to the grant of
both easements. After remand, that case was consolidated for disposi-
tion by the orphans’ court with the cases remanded to it in Downing-
town I.

23. Although the legislation does not specifically refer to this parcel by
its UPI number, the orphans’ court, on remand from the Common-
wealth Court, credited the testimony of a professional engineer, who
had prepared the official description of the property to be released
under the 2012 legislation, that the physical description of the property
contained therein was the same as the land which constituted tax parcel
UPI 40-1-23.1. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/21/13, at 12.

Parcels without its approval. The Borough and Developers,
citing Section 102 of the Eminent Domain Code, contended
that the code provided the “complete and exclusive procedure”
governing how a municipality may dispose of condemned
lands, whereas Objectors countered that the DDPA and the
Eminent Domain Code must be construed together and that
the DDPA applied to the Southern Parcels, as they had been
condemned specifically to create a park and the land continued
to be actively used for that purpose. Orphans’ Court Opinion,
11/21/18, at 6. The orphans’ court sided with Objectors and
found that the DDPA applied, notwithstanding the purported
exclusivity language in the Eminent Domain Code.

The orphans’ court explicitly rejected the Commonwealth
Court’s suggestion in Downingtown I that Section 3386 of the
DDPA potentially precluded the application of the DDPA to
property acquired by condemnation. The court noted that, in
Erie Golf Course, our Court recognized that Section 3386,
while preserving all rights and interests a municipality ac-
quired in a piece of property through its purchase, neverthe-
less considered such purchased property to be subject to the
provisions of the DDPA. See id. at 5-6 (“We do not believe,
however, that [Section 8886] was intended to remove entirely
from the Act’s purview (and thus maintain inflexible irrevoca-
bility relative to) any and all trust property that may in any
sense of the word be said to have been purchased.” (quoting
Erie Golf Course, 992 A.2d at 88)).% The court deemed this

24. This section states: “[tJhis title provides a complete and exclusive
procedure and law to govern all condemnations of property for public
purposes and the assessment of damages.” 26 Pa.C.S. § 102.

25. While we recognized in Erie Golf Course that the General Assembly,
through the enactment of the DDPA, desired to give municipalities
additional options by which they could seek to divert public trust
property from its intended use beyond those available to them under
the common law public trust doctrine, we did not read Section 3386 of
the DDPA as excluding from orphans’ court review a political subdivi-
sion's diversion of public trust property which it initially acquired
through purchase. Rather, we considered the fact that the purchased
property had been dedicated to public use by the city after purchase as
the dispositive consideration implicating the protective provisions of the
DDPA due to the substantial public interests created by the dedication.
See 992 A.2d at 88-89,

reasoning equally applicable to property which a municipality
has acquired through condemnation; hence, it concluded that
a municipality’s rights to dispose of condemned property were
constrained by the provisions of the DDPA, and, thus, within
its jurisdiction to determine:
In this case, the parcels acquired through condemnation
were acquired for parkland purposes. As I found in the
October 7, 2010 Opinion, the DDPA applies to the disposi-
tion of the Kardon Park parcels that have been used as
parkland. Without the protection afforded public property
by the DDPA, a municipality would have unchecked power
to dispose of parkland and other trust property. The Com-
monwealth Court suggested that Section [8886] of the
DDPA gives the Borough unfettered discretion to dispose of
the Southern Parcels. 55 A.8d at 175, n. 19. This is inconsis-
tent with the Hrie Court’s reluctance to find that Section
[5536] removed “entirely from the [DDPA]’s purview” cer-
tain trust property. Hrie, swpra. With the guidance from the
Supreme Court in Erie regarding Section [8386] of the
DDPA, I find that the Eminent Domain Code does not
exempt the Southern Parcels from the applicability of the
DDPA. Accordingly, the DDPA applies and Orphans’ Court
continues to have jurisdiction in this case.

Id. at726

Next, per the Commonwealth Court’s instructions, the or-
phans’ court considered whether, in light of the Project 70 Act

26. The orphans’ court, apparently uncertain as to whether the Com-
monwealth Court’s remand order in Downingtown I also required it to
make findings as to whether the park property could be deemed
abandoned for purposes of Section 310(a) of the Eminent Domain
Code, proceeded to consider that question, utilizing the Commonwealth
Court’s two-part test for abandonment recited in Downingtown I—ie.,
the condemnor must show an intent to abandon the condemned proper-
ty, and there must be external acts to accomplish the abandonment,
other than non-use of the property or the passage of time. The orphans’
court found that the Borough had owned the Southern Parcels for more
than 21 years, and demonstrated an intent to abandon those lands as
far back as 1999, when it began preparing the park for commercial use.
The orphans’ court concluded that the Borough’s entry into the agree-
ments of sale for the lands constituted acts in furtherance of its
intention to abandon them,

releases, the Borough was nonetheless required to obtain its
approval under the DDPA for sale of the Northern Parcels,
and found that the Borough was not required to do so, The
court observed that the Project 70 Act “has specific guidelines
for disposing of property acquired with funds made available
pursuant to the Act,” and that it had not previously considered
the application of those provisions when rendering its prior
decision, inasmuch as the Borough had not argued the applica-
bility of the Project 70 Act in those proceedings. Jd. at 18. The
court, noting the Commonwealth Court’s finding in Downing-
town I that the General Assembly’s passage of legislation in
1999 releasing Northern Parcel UPI 114-18 from Project 70
Act restrictions “specifically authorizes the Borough’s convey-
ance of [that parcel] to Developers and that neither the DDPA
nor the common law public trust doctrine prohibits the sale of
parcel 114-13 to Developers,” decided that the legislature’s
2012 enactment releasing Northern Parcel UPI 40-1-23.1
from Project 70 Act restrictions likewise authorized the Bor-
ough to dispose of those parcels,” Id.

Finally, the orphans’ court addressed the question of wheth-
er the easements granted to Developers for the Meisel Parcel
were inconsistent with the use of the parcel as parkland.” The
court determined that the expert testimony it had received

‘Tangentially, the orphans’ court additionally opined that, if the Com-
monwealth Court found the Borough's right to dispose of these parcels
was exclusively conferred by the Eminent Domain Code, then the
Objectors had no standing to challenge the sale as they are not con-
demnees, who are the only parties with standing under that code to
make such a challenge. While, on appeal, the Commonwealth Court
reversed this aspect of the orphans’ court’s decision, we did not grant
allowance of appeal to review that question.

27. The orphans’ court additionally ruled that Objectors did not have
standing to seek enforcement of Project 70 Act restrictions, as only the
Commonwealth had statutory authority under 72 P.S. § 3946.20(e) to
seek enforcement relief from a court, or to pursue other remedies, On
appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed this aspect of the orphans’
court's decision; however, we did not grant allocatur to review that
part of the Commonwealth Court's decision.

28, Although, as indicated previously, see supra note 22, the orphans’
court had consolidated the case involving the easements across North-
ern Parcel UPI 40-1~23.1, inexplicably, it addressed only the easements
across the Meisel Parcel,

during the remand hearing established that the easements
would not be inconsistent with the Meisel parcel’s current use
as public parkland. Accordingly, in the orphans’ court’s view,
the DDPA was not implicated, and so it found that there was
no need for it to conduct further proceedings under that act in
order for it to determine if the conveyance of the easements
by the Borough was permissible thereunder. Given that nei-
ther party was wholly successful in obtaining their desired
relief, both parties appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

Objectors as well as the Borough and Developers filed
eross-appeals to the Commonwealth Court, which considered
the case en bane, and affirmed the orphans’ court’s rulings in
a 4-3 per curiam decision in In re Borough of Downingtown,
116 Ad 727 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (“Downingtown II”).2°
Therein, that tribunal first considered the Borough and Devel-
opers’ challenge to the orphans’ court’s determination that the
DDPA mandated that court’s approval to dispose of the South-
ern Parcels, which, as noted, had been acquired via condemna-
tion. The Commonwealth Court first observed that the DDPA
applies to “{aJll lands ... dedicated to the public use,” and
requires that “all such lands ... held by a political subdivision,
as trustee, shall be used for the purpose or purposes for which
they were originally dedicated or donated, except insofar as
modified by a court order pursuant to this act.” Id. at 734
(citing Sections 8882 and 3883). Thus, the court deemed the
DDPA to apply to the Southern Parcels because, in its view,
the evidence of record, recited by the orphans’ court in its first
opinion, established “that the Borough has committed the
Southern Parcels to public use and the public has accepted
this use.” Id, at 736,

The court deemed Section 3384 of the DDPA to govern the
Borough’s proposed sale of the Southern Parcels. The court
noted that, in order for a political subdivision to convey
property under the DDPA, it must initially meet the require-
29. The en banc panel was comprised of then-President Judge Pellegrini,

and Judges McGinley, Cohn-Jubelirer, Simpson, Brobson, McCullough,

and Covey. To the per curiam opinion, Judge Simpson filed a concur-

ring and dissenting opinion, joined by Judge McGinley, and Judge
McCullough filed a dissenting opinion.

ments of the first paragraph of Section 3884, which necessi-
tates that the political subdivision show that “continuation of
the original use of the property is no longer practicable or
possible and has ceased to serve the public interest.” Jd. at 735
(quoting Section 3384). The court agreed with the orphans’
court’s finding that the Borough could not show that the
continued use of these parcels was no longer practicable or
possible, nor could it demonstrate that Kardon Park ceased to
serve the public interest. Id.

In the court’s view, inasmuch as the Borough did not meet
Section 3384’s threshold criteria, Section 3886—reserving po-
litical subdivision’s rights in property acquired by purchase or
condemnation—was not implicated. Even so, the court consid-
ered the application of Section 8386 as it was interpreted by
our Court in Erie Golf Course. The Commonwealth Court
agreed with the orphans’ court’s extension of our Court’s
holding in that case to property acquired by condemnation.
Embracing the orphans’ court’s rationale, the court found that,
since our Court had declined to read Section 3886 as excluding
purchased property from the DDPA, it would be “illogical to
conclude that the same reasoning would not apply to property
acquired by condemnation.” Id. at 786.

Moreover, the court rejected the contention by the Borough
and Developers that Section 310(a) of the Eminent Domain
Code compelled a different result. The court considered this
section as applicable only to sales of condemned land for which
the public use of that land had been abandoned. The court
found that the purpose for which the Southern Parcels were
condemned, as offered by the Borough in its notice of condem-
nation, was “to expand and enlarge recreation places and
space within the borough limits, [and that] the Borough
achieved that purpose and Kardon Park continues to satisfy
that purpose in the present day.” Jd. at 787 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court therefore affirmed the orphans’
court’s order requiring the Borough obtain its approval for the
sale of the Southern Parcels.

Regarding the issue of whether the Project 70 Act or the
DDPA governed the Borough’s right to sell the Northern

Parcels, the court recounted that, in Downingtown I, it had
ruled that the General Assembly’s release, via legislation, of
Northern Parcel UPI 114-13 from Project 70 Act restrictions
was controlling of the question of the Borough’s right to
dispose of that parcel, and that neither the common law public
trust doctrine nor the DDPA precluded the sale. The court
agreed with the lower court’s determination that the General
Assembly’s 2012 legislative release of Northern Parcel UPI
40-1-23.1 from Project 70 Act restrictions had the same legal
effect and, thus, that the Borough could freely convey that
parcel as well, except for the portion of that parcel which the
Borough would retain as a public park in order to meet the
condition in the 2012 legislation that the Borough keep 20
acres for that purpose. The court reasoned that “[t]he releases
by the General Assembly essentially voided the dedication
required under the Project 70 Act and permit[ted] the convey-
ance of these parcels. To hold that these parcels are also
subject to the disposition requirements of the DDPA would
render [Section 3946.20 of the Project 70 Act] a nullity.” Id. at
739,

Additionally, the court viewed this conclusion as consistent
with the principle of statutory construction set forth in Section
1988 of the Statutory Construction Act *°—that whenever two
statutes are irreconcilable, the statute which is more specific
prevails—and the court, ostensibly regarding the DDPA and
the Project 70 Act as irreconcilable, found the Project 70 Act,
which specifically applied to property purchased with Project
70 Act funds, controlled over the more generally applicable
DDPA. Consequently, the court held that the orphans’ court,

30. This section provides:

§ 1933, Particular controls general

Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a
special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be
construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If the
conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the special
provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the
general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later
and it shall be the manifest intention of the General Assembly that
such general provision shall prevail.

1 PaCS, § 1933

did not err in concluding that, in light of the legislature’s
velease of the Project 70 Act restrictions on the Northern
Parcels, orphans’ court approval under the DDPA was not
required for the Borough to sell them to Developers.

Lastly, the court purported to address the question of
whether the Borough’s grant of easements to the Developers
over both the Meisel Parcel and Northern Parcel UPI 40-1-
28.1 required orphans’ court approval. In conducting its re-
view, however, the court was limited to the orphans’ court’s
findings regarding the Meisel Parcel as, in its opinion, it had
not discussed the impact of the easements on Northern Parcel
UPI 40-1-23.1." The Commonwealth Court nevertheless
found the orphans’ court’s findings to be supported by the
record, Accordingly, the court affirmed the orphans’ court’s
ruling that the DDPA was not implicated by the Borough’s
grant of the easements.”

31, As set forth supra, the orphans’ court discussed only the easements
on the Meisel Parcel.

32, Judge Simpson authored a concurring and dissenting opinion,
joined by Judge McGinley, in which he joined the majority opinion with
respect to its resolution of the issues involving the Northern Parcels and
the Meisel Parcel; however, he dissented as to the majority's ruling
regarding the Southern Parcels. Judge Simpson noted that there is a
conflict between the DDPA and the Eminent Domain Code as to which
entity has controlling discretion to decide when property held in public
trust by a governmental body is no longer being used for a public
purpose and may be disposed of. As interpreted by Erie Golf Course, the
DDPA vests such decision-making authority in the orphans’ court,
whereas, under the Eminent Domain Code, the governmental body as
condemnor retains sole authority to decide whether the public use of
the property has been abandoned, Judge Simpson suggested that, to
resolve this apparent statutory conflict, it would be proper to apply the
approach taken by our Court in Commonwealth v. Ogonte Area Neigh-
bors Ass’n, 505 Pa. 614, 483 A.2d 448 (1984), and reaffirmed in SEPTA
v. City of Philadelphia, 627 Pa. 470, 101 A.3d 79 (2014), which requires
that the statutory language first be examined to see if it can be
determined that the legislature intended one entity to have preeminent
decision-making authority. Employing this approach, Judge Simpson.
concluded that the language in Section 3386 of the DDPA—which states
that “[nJothing in this act shall be construed to limit or effect the
control by a political subdivision of public lands .,. acquired by such
political subdivision by purchase or condemnation,” 53 P.S. § 3386—
indicates that the condemning municipality should be the decision-
maker regarding public trust property acquired by condemnation.
Judge Simpson considered our decision in Erie Golf Course to be

All parties filed petitions for allowance of appeal from the
Commonwealth Court’s order affirming the orphans’ court.
We granted the joint petitions for allowance of appeal of the
Borough and Developers at 16-19 MAP 2016, and the petitions
of Objectors at 12-15 MAP 2016 and 20-23 MAP 2016, in
order to consider the following issues. See In re Borough of
Downingtown, 685 Pa. 163, 182 A.8d 978 (2016) (order).

Appeal of Borough and Developers at 16-19 MAP 2016:

1. Where a municipality has satisfied the requirement to
dispose of condemned property under Section 310(a) of the
Eminent Domain Code by abandoning the purpose for
which the property was condemned, does the [DDPA] none-
theless require judicial approval before a municipality may
dispose of that property?

2, Where a municipality intends to abandon property ac-
quired by condemnation and where that intent is coupled
with external acts to achieve such abandonment, has the
purpose of the property been “abandon[ed]” for purposes of
Section 310(a) of the Eminent Domain Code?

Appeal of Objectors at 12-15 MAP 2016 and 20-23 MAP
2016:

1. Does the removal of Project 70 Act deed restrictions also
remove all public trust interests in dedicated parkland, such

distinguishable as, given the ambiguity in the term “purchase” as used
in the DDPA, he viewed it as an attempt by our Court to protect a
political subdivision from being subject to the more restrictive pre-
existing common law public trust doctrine which more heavily cur-
tailed discretionary rights to dispose of purchased property, while not
entirely excluding such purchased property from the scope of the
DDPA’s application. By contrast, Judge Simpson discerned no ambigui-
ty in the term “condemnation” and, hence, he considered Section 3386
to clearly exclude condemned property from its ambit.

Judge McCullough joined the majority opinion in all respects except
for its affirmance of the orphans’ court decision regarding the grant of
the easements for the Meisel Parcel and Northern Parcel 40-1-23,1. In
Judge McCullough’s view, the easements violated the DDPA because
they were granted solely for the benefit of Developers so that they could
comply with the open space requirements of the Borough’s ordinance;
thus, she opined that the easements impermissibly favored a private use
of public land.

that judicial review of the sale of such parkland would no
longer be required under the [DDPA]?

2. May municipalities convey private development ease-
ments over public parkland without first obtaining Orphans’
Court approval under the DDPA?

Il. Analysis

A. Appeal of Borough and Developer *

Hl Both of the issues raised by the Borough and Develop-
ers involve the application of Section 310(a) of the Eminent
Domain Code to the question of the Borough’s right to dispose
of the Southern Parcels, because the Borough acquired title to
those parcels via condemnation. In addition, the lower courts
structured their analyses of the applicability of the DDPA to
the disposition of those parcels based on their consideration of
the interplay of the DDPA and Section 310(a). Our grant of
allowance of appeal was likewise predicated on a perceived
need to resolve the legal question of whether the Borough was
required to obtain orphans’ court approval under the DDPA to
sell these parcels, as the lower courts concluded, or whether
the Borough had the unfettered right to sell them under
Section 810(a). In their briefs to our Court, the parties’
arguments retain that focus. Critically however, after further
review, we conclude that Section 310(a) has no application to
this matter.

Section 310(a) was enacted by Act 34 of 2006, Act of May 4,
2006, P.L. 112, No. 34, which repealed, in toto, the prior
Eminent Domain Code, Act of June 22, 1964, Sp. Sess., P.L.
84, No. 6 (as amended 26 P.S. §§ 1-101 to 1-903 (repealed)),
and created the present Eminent Domain Code, codified at
Title 26 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, 26 Pa.C.S.
§§ 101-1106. Section 6(1) of Act 34 expressly provides that,
except for a provision not relevant herein, all provisions of

33. The Borough and Developers have filed joint briefs with our Court.
34, The Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors has
filed an amicus brief addressing the interplay of Section 310(a) of the
Eminent Domain Code and the DDPA.

Title 26 created by Act 34 “shall apply to all condemnations
effected on or after the effective date” of the Act, which was
September 1, 2006. Act of May 4, 2006, P.L. 112, No. 84, § 6(1)
(emphasis added). Thus, the General Assembly unmistakably
intended for Act 84 to apply prospectively, only to those
condemnations “effected” after September 1, 2006.

As recounted above, the declaration of taking for Southern
Parcel UPI 11-4-14.2 was filed by the Borough in 1974, and
the declaration of taking for Southern Parcel UPI 114-14 was
filed by the Borough in 1977. Under the provisions of the
Eminent Domain Code of 1964, as revised in 1969, which were
applicable during that time period, the filing of a declaration of
taking “effected” the condemnation. See 26 P.S. § 1-402 (re-
pealed) (“Condemnation, under the power of condemnation
given by law to a condemnor, which shall not be enlarged or
diminished hereby, shall be effected only by the filing in court
of a declaration of taking, with such security as may be
required under section 408(a).” (emphasis supplied) (footnote
omitted)).> Hence, by the explicit terms of the legislation
creating the present Eminent Domain Code, the provisions of
the current code, including Section 310(a), do not apply to the
condemnations of the Southern Parcels since the condemna-
tion of both was effected in the 1970s when the Borough filed
their respective declarations of taking. Therefore, the provi-
sions of Section 310(a) have no legal relevance to the Bor-
ough’s right to dispose of these properties.

HE Moreover, Section 310(a) is not a mere reenactment of
its statutory predecessor in effect at the time of these parcels’
condemnation. See 26 P.S. § 1-410 (repealed). Act 34 re-

35. Under the present Eminent Domain Code, a condemnation is like-
wise “effected” by the filing of a declaration of taking. See 26 Pa.C.S.
§ 302(1) (“Condemnation under the power of condemnation given by
law to a condemnor shall be effected only by the filing in court of a
declaration of taking with the security required under section 303(a)
(relating to security required).”’).

36. This section stated in relevant part:
If a condemnor has condemned a fee and thereafter abandons the
purpose for which the property has been condemned, the condemnor
may dispose of it by sale or otherwise: Provided, however, That if the

pealed and supplanted this statute entirely with Section
310(a), which contains similar, but nonetheless distinct, provi-
sions.” Therefore, it would be jurisprudentially imprudent for
us to presently interpret § 1-410 and consider its operation in
conjunction with the DDPA, based on the parties’ arguments
with respect to Section 310(a). This is particularly so given
that the Commonwealth Court and orphans’ court decisions
rested entirely on their interpretation and construction of
Section 810(a) in conjunction with the DDPA. Furthermore,
we have no advocacy from the parties on the prospectivity
question, as their arguments solely rest on the assumed
applicability of Section 310(a). We therefore find it necessary
to remand this matter to the Commonwealth Court for addi-

property has not been substantially improved, it may not be disposed
of within three years after condemnation without first being offered
to the condemnee at the same price paid to the condemnee by the
condemmor ... The condemnee shall be served with notice of the
offer in the same manner as prescribed for the service of notices in
subsection (b) of section 405 of this act, and shall have ninety days
after receipt of such notice to make written acceptance thereof,
26 P,S. § 1-410(a) (repealed) (footnote omitted).

37, Section 310(a) provides:
(a) Disposition of property—If a condemnor has condemned a fee
and then abandons the purpose for which the property has been
condemned, the condemnor may dispose of it by sale, lease, gift,
devise or other transfer with the following restrictions:

(1) If the property is undeveloped or has not been substantially
improved, it may not be disposed of within ten years after condemna-
tion without first being offered to the condemnee at the same price
paid to the condemnee by the condemnor.

(2) If the property is located outside the corporate boundaries of a
county of the first or second class and is undeveloped or has not been
substantially improved and was devoted to agricultural use at the
time of the condemnation, it may not be disposed of within 21 years
after condemnation without first being offered to the condemnee at
the same price paid to the condemnee by the condemnor.

(3) If the property is undeveloped or has not been substantially
improved and the offers required to be made under paragraphs (1)
and (2) have not been accepted, the property shall not be disposed of
by any condemnor, acquiring agency or subsequent purchaser for a
nonpublic use or purpose within 21 years after condemnation. Upon
petition by the condemnor, the court may permit disposal of the
property in less than 21 years upon proof by a preponderance of the
evidence that a change in circumstances has abrogated the original
public purpose for which the property was taken.

26 Pa.C.S. § 310(a).

tional proceedings so that the parties may present arguments
to the tribunal on this question, and for it to address, in the
first instance, what impact, if any, the resolution of this
question has on its prior conclusion that orphans’ court ap-
proval was required under the DDPA for the sale of the
Southern Parcels, even though they were acquired by the
Borough through condemnation.

B. Appeal of Objectors

We turn now to the Objectors’ appeal. Notably, our resolu-
tion of this appeal is unaffected by our conclusion that the
parties and the Commonwealth Court erroneously applied
Section 310(a) of the Eminent Domain Code in the proceed-
ings below.

1, The DDPA and the Project 70 Act restrictions *

Hl We begin with the question of whether the General
Assembly’s release of Project 70 Act restrictions on the
Northern Parcels precludes the application of the DDPA to
the Borough’s sale of these parcels. Objectors Kim Manufac-
turing and Stewart Hall (“Kim and Stewart”) argue that the
Commonwealth Court in Downingtown II misapplied our
Court’s decision in Erie Golf Cowrse by deeming the DDPA’s
application to be dependent on the manner in which the
property is acquired by the political subdivision, thereby disre-
garding the public purpose for which the property is subse-
quently dedicated, and the corresponding interest the public
acquires because of this dedication. Kim and Stewart contend
that the Commonwealth Court improperly considered the
Northern Parcels to have been dedicated when they were
acquired, in part, with Project 70 Act funds, and Project 70
Act deed restrictions were placed on the properties. Kim and
Stewart aver that the imposition of these deed restrictions was
distinct from the dedication of the property which involved a
series of actions on the part of the Borough over many years,
and included the use of federal and state grant monies to

38, Kim Manufacturing and Stewart Hall L.L.P. have filed a joint brief,
and the Friends of Kardon Park have filed their own separate brief.

undertake various improvements to the park, as well as the
Borough’s own maintenance activities and enhancements of
the park. In Kim and Stewart’s view, our Court in Erie Golf
Course held that the application of the DDPA to the disposi-
tion of dedicated public property is dependent on acts of
dedication and is not triggered merely by the insertion of
Project 70 Act-like restrictions in a deed. Consequently, ac-
cording to Objectors, the DDPA continues to apply to the
Northern Parcels, as they were dedicated to use as a public
park, even though the General Assembly removed the formal
Project 70 Act restrictions from them.

Kim and Stewart assail what they consider the Common-
wealth Court’s further disregard of our Court’s holding in
Erie Golf Course that purchased properties which are commit-
ted to the public trust should not be excluded from the scope
of application of the DDPA by Section 3886, which provides
that the DDPA does not limit or affect a political subdivision’s
control of public lands it acquires through purchase (or con-
demnation). Kim and Stewart assert the Commonwealth Court
in Downingtown I—a, decision that tribunal relied on in Down-
ingtown II for its holding regarding the Northern Parcels—
improperly found that their acquisition with Project 70 Act
funds, and the legislature’s subsequent release of Northern
Parcel 114-13 via the 1999 legislation, were the crucial fac-
tors determining their proper disposition. Instead, and again,
Kim and Stewart proffer that our Court actually held in Brie
Golf Course that it was the dedication of a property, and not
the conditions of its original purchase, which were determina-
tive of the DDPA’s applicability.

Kim and Stewart further argue that the Commonwealth
Court “erroneously pitted these laws against each other,” by
viewing the Project 70 Act as in conflict with the DDPA and
considering the provisions of the Project 70 Act to control over
those of the DDPA. Kim and Stewart Brief at 40-41. Instead,
Kim and Stewart contend, the two acts can be read consistent-
ly so as to give effect to both. Kim and Stewart argue that the
Project 70 Act and the DDPA “regulate different aspects of
the same properties.” Id. Specifically, in Kim and Stewart’s

view, the Project 70 Act establishes a contractual relationship
between the Commonwealth and municipalities—with respect
to properties acquired through those funds—via the deed
restrictions which protect the Commonwealth’s financial in-
vestment, and which only it can take legal action to enforce.
The DDPA, on the other hand, establishes a process for
disposing of properties dedicated to public use, and the public
has been granted standing to enforce these public rights. Kim
and Stewart, thus, characterize the Commonwealth’s interest
under the Project 70 Act as pertaining only to its financial
interests and not to the public trust interests protected by the
DDPA.

From Kim and Stewart’s perspective, the Commonwealth
Court’s decision nullifies the DDPA and turns the Project 70
Act into a tool by which public parks may be sold with no
judicial oversight simply because Project 70 Act money was
used in their acquisition, even if the amount of such funds was
small in comparison to the investment of other public funds in
the park by the Commonwealth and the municipality. Kim and
Stewart point out this could imperil the 500 municipal parks it
estimates have been built throughout the Commonwealth us-
ing Project 70 Act funds, and would exclude the judiciary and
the public from participation in the disposition process, as the
DDPA requires; hence, it “would signal a statewide ‘cash for
parks’ opportunity” which would undermine the land preserva-
tion goals which the Project 70 Act sought to accomplish. Kim
and Stewart Brief at 45.

In their joint brief, Objectors Friends of Kardon Park and
Ann Feldman (“Friends”), stress that the Commonwealth
Court decision is inconsistent given that the court also found
that they had standing to challenge the sale, inasmuch as the
Project 70 Act does not grant standing to citizens to challenge
removal of Project 70 Act restrictions, whereas the DDPA
does grant such standing. Thus, according to Friends, the
Commonwealth Court’s finding that they had standing was
based on an implicit conclusion that the DDPA was applica-
ple.®

39. Kim and Stewart endorse this argument as well in their brief.

Friends highlight the fact that Project 70 Act money paid
for only one half of the total cost of the acquisition of the
Northern Parcels, while the Borough paid for the remaining
half, and, subsequent to their acquisition of the parcels, the
Borough expended significant monies to improve them.
Friends claim that allowing the sale of the Northern Parcels
solely on the basis of the legislative release would disregard
these years of public investment, and the dedication and public
use of the park. Echoing Kim and Stewart’s contention in this
regard, Friends maintain that this would contravene the public
purpose for which the original Project 70 Act funds were
allocated—the acquisition and preservation of parklands for
public use. Relatedly, Friends also aver that the orphans’
court in its initial decision correctly treated the park property
as a whole—i.e,, as a single integrated park—and contend that
allowing some of the park parcels to be sold in a piecemeal
fashion would disrupt the park’s continued use as such,

Friends suggest that deeming the Project 70 Act release to
trump the requirements of the DDPA could constitute a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine under Article V,
Sections 1, 2, and 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, inas-
much as it could usurp the judiciary’s obligation to decide
whether the sale of a piece of publicly dedicated property
violates the common law public trust doctrine as embodied in
the DDPA.” Friends postulate that allowing the Common-
wealth Court’s decision to stand could result in a situation
where the orphans’ court refuses to allow the sale of a piece of
publicly dedicated property, which is also subject to Project 70
Act restrictions, but subsequent legislative release of the
property from its Project 70 Act restrictions would be given
controlling effect over this judicial decision and permit the
sale. Friends suggest that this scenario is avoidable only by
recognizing that the DDPA and the Project 70 Act can be
40. Although Friends consider the DDPA to be the vehicle by which the

public trust doctrine embodied in the Pennsylvania Constitution's Envi-

ronmental Rights Amendment—Article I, Section 27—is enforced, be-

cause, as we explain infra, we decide this case solely on statutory
grounds, we need not express an opinion on this question.

construed in pari materia, with effect given to all of the
provisions of both statutes.’

The Borough and Developers respond that the decision by
the Borough to accept Project 70 Act funds to purchase the
Northern Parcels constituted a commitment by the Borough
to use that land only for the specified Project 70 Act purposes,
in this case recreational use as a public park. Thus, the
Borough and Developers argue that the dedication was effect-
ed at the time the Northern Parcels were acquired with
Project 70 funds and Project 70 Act restrictions, not through
any later actions by the Borough or the public. Consequently,
they reason, when the legislature authorized their release
from Project 70 Act restrictions through the 1999 and 2012
legislation, and removed the restrictive covenant in the deeds,
this voided their dedication and permitted their conveyance by
the Borough. The Borough and Developers reason that, be-
cause Section 3946.20(b) of Project 70 Act limits the Borough’s
disposition of lands acquired with Project 70 Act funds to the
purposes specified in the Act, and requires the imposition of
the restrictive covenant in the deed of conveyance, removal of
these restrictions through subsequent legislation “necessarily
authorizes the municipality to ‘dispose[ ] of or use[ ] the prop-
erty’” for purposes other than those permitted by Project 70
Act. Borough and Developers Brief at 88 (citing 72 Pa.C.S.
§ 8946.20 (alterations original)). In the Borough and Develop-
ers’ view, the legislation releasing the Northern Parcels, which
was enacted while the parcels were still being used as park-
land, must be viewed as specific legislation that governs the
Borough’s right to dispose of the parcels in the manner it sees
fit, overriding any rights the public may have acquired under
the DDPA—a statute the Borough and Developer consider to
apply only to “the general category of dedicated property.” Id.

The Borough and Developers aver that there is nothing in
the Project 70 Act which requires that land acquired under
41, The Pennsylvania Land Trust has filed an amicus brief in support of

the Objectors’ suggested pari materia construction of the Project 70 Act
with the DDPA,

that act be used solely for parkland purposes, and that Section
3946.20(b) of the Act specifically contemplates “other uses” for
such property. Jd. at 41. They contend that the 1999 and 2012
release legislation specifically allowed other uses for the
Northern Parcels, and expressly conditioned the release on
the Borough placing the same restrictions on other Borough
property of identical size, thereby serving to further a funda-
mental purpose of the Project 70 Act—the conservation of
land for recreational purposes. The Borough and Developers
further note that the 2012 legislation anticipates that the
Borough will develop the park, as it placed a number of
restrictions on the sale of the property in connection with the
Borough’s planned development and the use of its proceeds.
The Borough and Developers assert that requiring the appli-
cation of the DDPA after this express legislative release will
thwart this legislative permission. The Borough and Develop-
ers discount Objectors’ position that the Commonwealth
Court’s holding will potentially jeopardize hundreds of munici-
pal parks, noting that such sales must also be approved by
local governments and the General Assembly.

HEM As the issue of the interrelationship between the
Project 70 Act and the DDPA involves a question of statutory
interpretation, our standard of review is de novo, and our
scope of review is plenary. City of Philadelphia v. City of
Philadelphia Tax Review Board ex rel. Keystone Health Plan
East, Inc., 635 Pa. 108, 182 A.3d 946, 952 (2015). In interpret-
ing the Project 70 Act and the DDPA, we are guided by the
principles set forth in the Statutory Construction Act (“SCA”),
1 PaC.S. §§ 1501 et seg. The paramount objective of our
interpretative task under the SCA is to “ascertain and effectu-
ate the intention of the General Assembly” in enacting the
legislation under review, id. § 1921(a), and the primary indica-
tion of the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the
statute, Department of Environmental Protection v. Cumber-
land Coal, 628 Pa. 17, 102 A.8d 962, 975 (2014).

The SCA directs that “[elvery statute shall be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all of its provisions” and that “[w]hen
the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,

the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), (b). However, Section
1921(¢) of the SCA provides that, if the words of a statute “are
not explicit,” then a reviewing court may consider other
factors, such as the statute’s purpose, in order to ascertain
legislative intent. Jd. § 1921(c). Additionally, the SCA also
furnishes certain presumptions which a reviewing court is
entitled to utilize, two of which are relevant in this instance:
(1) “the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be
effective and certain,” and (2) “the General Assembly intends
to favor the public interest as against any private interest.” Id.
§ 1922(2), (5).

We begin our analysis by noting that there is no provision in
the text of either the Project 70 Act or the DDPA which
indicates that the General Assembly intended either law to
have preeminence over the other in situations such as that
presented by the case at bar—i.e., where land which has been
acquired by a municipality using Project 70 Act funds to pay
one half of the cost of acquisition is then committed to public
use by that municipality, improved by the municipality using
other public monies, and devoted to continuous public use.
Indeed, neither statute speaks directly to this situation. Fur-
ther, contrary to the findings of the Commonwealth Court and
the assertions of the Borough and Developers, the 1999 and
2012 legislative enactments do not, by their explicit terms,
confer a general authorization on the Borough to sell the
Northern Parcels to Developers. These enactments merely
removed Project 70 Act restrictions from these parcels, but
the legislation contains no language exempting the Borough
from complying with the requirements of the DDPA.” Conse-
42, See Act of June 25, 1999, P.L. 220, No, 29 §§ 1, 2 (specifying that the

legislation was enacted ‘under the requirements of [Section 3946.20]”

of the Project 70 Act, and that the land was “‘to be released from Project

70 restrictions.”); Act of Oct. 24, 2012, P.L. 1293, No. 162, § 6(a)

(providing that the legislation was enacted “[p]ursuant to the require-

ments of [Section 3946,20]” and that “the General Assembly hereby

approves the release of Project 70 restrictions”). As noted previously,
see supra note 23 and accompanying text, the General Assembly did not

entirely remove Project 70 Act restrictions from Northern Parcel UPI
40-1-23.1

quently, these enactments do not control the resolution of this
issue.

HI Therefore, consistent with our overarching goal of
construing statutes to fulfill the intent of the General Assem~-
bly, we are obliged to construe the Project 70 Act and the
DDPA in harmony, if possible, so as to give effect to both.
See, ¢.9., Commonwealth v. Hansley, 616 Pa. 867, 47 A.3d
1180, 1189 (2012) (construing separate statutes, the Recidivism
Risk Reduction Act and the mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions of the Crimes Code, in accordance with their plain
language and in a manner which gives effect to both statutes);
see generally Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 58:1 (7th
ed.) (observing that courts have a duty to construe statutes
harmoniously where it is reasonable to do so); 78 Am. Jur. 2d
Statutes § 159 (“[When two statutes are capable of coexist-
ence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, to regard each as effec-
tive.”), This is in accord with the directives of the SCA, which
provides that “(s]tatutes or parts of statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same persons or things or to
the same class of persons or things,” and which mandates that
“{sitatutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if
possible, as one statute.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1982(a), (b); City of
Philadelphia, 182 A3d at 958; see also Kelly v. City of
Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A.2d 288, 245 (1955) (“{Sltat-
utes in pari materia should be considered concurrently when-
ever possible and if they can be made to stand together effect
should be given to both as far as possible.”), It is only when
the provisions of two statutory enactments are irreconcilable
that it is necessary to resort to other statutory construction
principles, such as the more specific statute governs the
general one. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1988 (when general provision in
statute “conflict[s] with a special provision in the same or
43, Because our grant of allocatur did not encompass this issue, we

need not consider the Commonwealth Court's finding in Downingtown

H that the Objectors had standing to pursue their claims under the

DDPA to be dispositive of this question, as it is seemingly in tension

with that tribunal’s ultimate holding that the DDPA does not govern the

Borough’s right to sell the Northern Parcels,

another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that
effect may be given to both. If the conflict between the two
provisions is irreconcilable, the special provisions shall pre-
vail”),

In the case at bar, the relevant provisions of Project 70 Act
and the DDPA relate to the same class of things—the disposi-
tion of governmentally owned lands used by the public for
recreation. Considering both the coextensive scope of the
Project 70 Act and the DDPA regarding the rights and duties
of political subdivisions to dispose of lands utilized for those
purposes, and the distinct, but equally important public inter-
ests both of these enactments are intended to further, we
conclude they must be read in pari materia. Therefore, we
must strive to give effect to the provisions of both statutes.

Hl Under the Project 70 Act, whenever Project 70 Act
monies are granted to a municipality for the purposes of
acquiring lands for “recreation, conservation and historical
purposes,” the deed conveying the property must contain an
indenture, ie., a restrictive covenant specifying that the land
is being acquired “for recreation, conservation and historical
purposes as said purposes are defined in [the Project 70 Act.”
72 PS. § 8946.20(c), This restrictive covenant between the
local government body and the General Assembly is intended
to protect the public fise by insuring that monies which were
borrowed by the Commonwealth, as authorized by the Project
70 Act, and granted to municipalities will only be used in strict
accord with the public purposes designated by that act. That
the paramount purpose of this provision is to safeguard the
Commonwealth’s funds is further evidenced by the significant
penalties the Project 70 Act imposes on a municipality which
violates the act by using the property in a manner inconsistent.
with the public purpose for which it was acquired, such as
conveying it to a private party. If such a violation occurs, the
municipality is obliged to return to the Commonwealth the full
amount of the Project 70 Act monies advanced to it, plus a
statutory rate of interest of six percent from the date the
monies were granted. Id. § 3946.20(d).

WH By contrast with the Project 70 Act, as our Court
recognized in Erie Golf Course, the fundamental purpose of
the DDPA is to delineate “the fiduciary nature of municipali-
ties’ obligations relative to donated and dedicated properties
and provided for orderly relief therefrom in appropriate cir-
cumstances.” 992 A.2d at 86. We further discerned that, in
enacting the DDPA, the General Assembly incorporated “sa-
lient common-law principles” of the “public trust doctrine” as
articulated in our caselaw prior to its enactment. Id. Under
that doctrine, whenever property was dedicated to public use
by a municipality, this action created a trust for the property
with the public as the beneficiary. It correspondingly required
the municipality to act in the capacity of a trustee by holding
the property in favor of the community, and restricted the
municipality from diverting it from public use, or conveying it
to a private party. Board of Trustees of Philadelphia Muse-
ums v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, 251 Pa. 115,
96 A. 128, 125 (1915); In re Petition of Acchione, 425 Pa. 23,
227 A.2d 816, 820 (1967) (once land is dedicated to a public use
by a municipality, the municipality becomes “trustee, subject
to all the duties and responsibilities imposed on any other
trustee.”), As we recounted in Philadelphia Museums, the
public trust doctrine was developed in order to protect the
significant interests the public acquires in such property
through their use of it and the expenditures of tax monies for
its care and improvement. 96 A. at 125.

Section 8382 of the DDPA codifies these legal precepts by
providing:
All lands or buildings heretofore or hereafter donated to a
political subdivision for use as a public facility, or dedicated
to the public use or offered for dedication to such use, where
no formal record appears as to acceptance by the political
division, as a public facility and situate within the bounds of
a political subdivision, regardless of whether such dedication
occurred before or after the creation or incorporation of the
political subdivision, shall be deemed to be held by such

political subdivision, as trustee, for the benefit of the public

with full legal title in the said trustee.
58 PS. § 3882.

Although the DDPA does not expressly define what consti-
tutes a “dedication” of property to public use—triggering the
requirement of orphans’ court approval for its disposition—we
noted in Erie Golf Course that, under our prior decisions
involving the common law public trust doctrine, a property is
“dedicated” to public use by a municipality whenever the
municipality has both committed the property to public use
and the public has accepted it for such use. 992 A.2d at 85
n.14; Philadelphia Musewms, 96 A. at 125; see also Appeal of
Leech, 871 Pa. 84, 89 A.2d 351, 358 (1952) (“A municipality’s
dedication to a public use of land which it owns in fee must be
accepted by the public in order to become binding on the
municipality.”), Consequently, the DDPA is facially applicable
to all property which meets these criteria, rie Golf Course,
992 A.2d at 85 n.14,

Hs Importantly, as related above, our Court held in
Erie Golf Course that property which was initially acquired via
purchase by the local government was not excluded from the
ambit of the DDPA by Section 3886, which facially excludes
purchased property. In fact, we expressly recognized that
“purchased property can be committed to the public trust.” Id.
at 88. Thus, it is the dedication of property to a public use as a
public facility, not the stated purpose for its acquisition by the
municipality at the time the acquisition takes place, which is
the pivotal factor which brings the property within the protec-
tive ambit of the DDPA. See 58 P.S. § 3881 (defining “lands”
as “all real estate, whether improved or unimproved,” and
“public facility” as “without limitation any park, theatre, open
air theatre, square, museum, library, concert hall, recreation
facility or other public use”); id. § 8882 (making a municipali-
ty the trustee of lands or buildings “dedicated to the public
use ... as a public facility” (emphasis added)). A dedication
occurs for purposes of the DDPA only when, after a property
is acquired, a municipality thereafter commits it to a public
use as a public facility, and the public accepts that use. For

a

this reason, we reject the argument of the Borough and
Developers that the imposition of a Project 70 Act restrictive
covenant, in and of itself, constitutes a “dedication” of that
property within the meaning of the DDPA.

Contrary to the assertion of the Borough and Developers,
this natural construction of the DDPA in accordance with its
terms does not result in the DDPA applying to all lands that a
municipality purchases. For instance, lands the municipality
purchases with the intention to put to public use as public
facilities, but which are not, subsequently, committed to that
public use by the municipality, have not been dedicated, so the
protective provisions of the DDPA are not triggered, Like-
wise, even if a municipality commits lands which it purchases
to public use, they may not be accepted by the public for that
use, and, again, there is no dedication of such property which
implicates the DDPA.

HM To adopt the Borough and Developers’ suggested
contrary construction—that legislative release of Project Act
70 restrictions on property which is dedicated as a public
facility, in and of itself, authorizes a municipality's sale of such
facilities to private developers—would disregard the substan-
tial public interests of the residents of a municipality who have
paid, through their local tax dollars, fifty percent of the cost of
acquisition of the property, and expended additional amounts
of their tax dollars to maintain and develop the property so
that they could use it as a public facility. Denying a municipali-
ty’s residents the judicial remedy afforded them under the
DDPA would impermissibly favor private interests over the
public interest, and thus, we are compelled to reject such a
construction. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(6). We therefore hold that the
DDPA covers all property purchased by a municipality which
has been dedicated to the public use as a public facility, and
necessarily includes property which is purchased by the mu-
nicipality, in part, with Project 70 Act funds, and thereafter
dedicated to public use as a public facility.

HM Accordingly, the requirements of the Project 70 Act
and the DDPA do not come into irreconcilable conflict, as the

=

Commonwealth Court concluded, whenever a municipality
seeks to sell property acquired in part with Project 70 Act
funds, and which is thereafter dedicated to public use as a
public facility. Rather, the requirements of both enactments
can and, indeed, must be met by the municipality. A munici-
pality that purchases property with Project 70 Act monies,
which is thereafter dedicated to a public use as a public
facility, must, in order to convey that property, seek the
General Assembly's release of the Project 70 Act restrictions
imposed in the deed of acquisition, and must also seek or-
phans’ court approval under the DDPA for the conveyance.
This effectuates the legislative purpose undergirding both
enactments since it ensures that the General Assembly’s inter-
est in safeguarding the expenditure of Commonwealth funds
will be secured when it authorizes the release of Project 70
Act restrictions, as well as protects, through orphans’ court
review, the discrete but related substantial interests the public
has acquired in such property through the expenditure of their
tax dollars to maintain and improve it, and through their use
and enjoyment of the property. The DDPA, thus, ensures that
public facilities are not sold precipitously, or for purposes that
do not serve a true public benefit.

Applying these principles in the case before us, we conclude
that the Borough was required to obtain orphans’ court ap-
proval under the DDPA before selling the Northern Parcels,
despite their release by the legislature from some of the
Project 70 Act restrictions. The Northern Parcels are an
integral part of Kardon Park, comprising slightly over half of
its total area, As the orphans’ court found in its first opinion,
and which finding is amply supported by the record, the
Borough committed this land, along with the other three
parcels which are the subject of this litigation, to public use as
a park, expressly via ceremony, and via its actions of expend-
ing public monies over the course of two decades to maintain
this land for public use and to make permanent improvements
thereon, Likewise, the orphans’ court’s finding that the public
accepted this land for this use as a park is equally well
supported by the evidence of record. As highlighted by the

orphans’ court, and recounted previously in this opinion, this
evidence shows that the public has made and continues to
make extensive use of the entire park property, which includes
these parcels, for a wide panoply of recreational activities.“
Thus, the orphans’ court’s ultimate conclusion that the North-
ern Parcels have been dedicated to use as a public facility is
supported by the record, and its approval is, therefore, re-
quired for their sale under Section 8884 of the DDPA. Conse-
quently, we reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order regard-
ing the Northern Parcels and remand this case to that court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2, Easements and the DDPA

HM We now address the Objectors’ contention that the
Borough was required to obtain orphans’ court approval under
the DDPA to grant to Developers easements conferring on
them the right to discharge stormwater into the two ponds on
the Meisel Parcel (Second and Third Lakes) and the pond on
Northern Parcel UPI 40-1-23.1 (Fourth Lake), the right to
construct and maintain utilities over these easements, and the
right to use these easements to construct and maintain im-
provements to the park property required by the Borough’s
grant of conditional use approval for the proposed develop-
ment.

In their brief, Kim and Stewart argue that these easements,
although purportedly temporary in nature during construc-
tion, will be in effect even after the construction process is
complete, and that they would transform the manner in which
the remaining parkland will be experienced by its users and
will effectively subjugate these public interests to those of the
private developer. Specifically, Kim and Stewart note that the
installation of a protective wetland barrier between the devel-
opment and the lakes would reduce park users’ access, and
that the relocation of the walking trails would result in users

44. We do not mean to suggest that these evidentiary factors relied upon
by the orphans’ court in this instance are, as a matter of law, the
necessary and exclusive ways by which commitment to a public use and
acceptance may be demonstrated.

a ~

gazing upon a gaggle of buildings rather than meadows and
trees. Moreover, Kim and Stewart point out, these easements
would ultimately be acquired by the homeowners association
(“HOA”) managing the development and would be enforceable
by it. Thus, according to Kim and Stewart, this raises the
prospect of a future conflict between the HOA and the public
over the use of the remaining parkland, with the HOA object-
ing to future park improvements on the basis that they
interfere with its private easement rights.

Kim and Stewart also emphasize that the Commonwealth
Court previously determined that it is the nature of the
intrusion onto park property, rather than the degree of the
intrusion, which is the dispositive factor as to whether a
municipality may permit any portion of parkland to be used
for other purposes; hence, to be allowable, any proposed use
must fit within the scope of the park’s fundamental purposes.
See Kim and Stewart Brief at 58 (citing, eg., White v. Town-
ship of Upper Saint Clair, 799 A.2d 188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)
(county was required to obtain orphans’ court approval pursu-
ant to the DDPA to grant a lease for the erecting of a cell
phone tower on a small part of a 200-acre park that it owned,
since it was obligated to insure that all of the parkland was
used for a recreational, conservation or historical purpose).

Kim and Stewart offer that, in the present case, the Com-
monwealth Court had previously acknowledged in its 2018
opinion, In re Council of Borough of Downingtown, see supra
note 22, that these easements would constitute an alienation of
portions of the park and, thus, orphans’ court approval under
the DDPA was needed for their conveyance. Yet, incongruous-
ly, the en bane Commonwealth Court in Downingtown IT
apparently disregarded that conclusion, finding that the
DDPA does not apply. Endorsing Judge McCullough’s dissent
in Downingtown IT, see swpra note 32, Kim and Stewart claim
that this creates a new and dangerous precedent which contra-
venes the principle that public property should not be used for
purely private purposes. In Kim and Stewart’s view, this
decision allows parkland to be used “to satisfy the private

|
needs of developers and landowners.” Kim and Stewart Brief
at 62.

Friends largely press the same arguments as Kim and
Stewart, but also stress that there is no dispute among the
parties that the lands across which these easements have been
granted are within the scope of the DDPA, and that, prior to
Downingtown II, there was no question that any alienation of
parkland required judicial approval under that act. While
disputing the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that these
easements would have minimal impact on the public’s use of
the park, Friends contend that the effect of the easements is of
no legal relevance in considering whether the DDPA applies,
Friends maintain that, under Brie Golf Cowrse, there can be
no alienation of such lands in any form to a private developer
unless the orphans’ court determines, pursuant to the DDPA,
that it is not practical to continue their use as a public park.

The Borough and Developers respond that orphans’ court
approval was not required under the DDPA because it re-
quires only that dedicated properties held in trust “be used for
the purpose or purposes for which they were originally dedi-
cated or donated,” Borough and Developers Brief at 38 (quot-
ing 58 P.S. § 8888). The Borough and Developers argue that
the orphans’ court correctly found, based on the record, that
the easements would not impact the parcels’ use for normal
park purposes. The Borough and Developers contend that,
because this finding was supported by competent evidence, the
Commonwealth Court properly upheld it. As a result, the
Borough and Developers assert that it is irrelevant that the
easements are being granted to a private party.

Upon review, we initially note that the Meisel Parcel, al-
though acquired through donation, has been dedicated by the
Borough, in its entirety, for use as a public park, and that it is,
therefore, within the scope of the DDPA. Furthermore, we
have already determined in our discussion of the previous
issue in this appeal that Northern Parcel UPI 40-1-23.1, over
which easements have also been granted by the Borough,
remains subject to the DDPA, despite the General Assembly’s
release of the Project 70 Act restrictions on that parcel. Thus,

a *

under the DDPA, both of these parcels are deemed to be “held
by [the Borough], as trustee,” for the benefit of the public. 58
B.S. § 3383.

HM Section 3383 of the DDPA specifically restricts a
municipality’s use of such public trust property:

All such lands and buildings held by a political subdivision

as trustee, shall be used for the purpose or purposes for

which they were originally dedicated or donated, except

insofar as modified by court order pursuant to this act.
Id. Following the SCA’s command that, when interpreting
statutory language, all “[wlords and phrases shall be con-
strued according to rules of grammar and according to their
common and approved usage,” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908(a), we inter-
pret the use of the phrase “all lands” as prohibiting a munici-
pality from approving use of any of the land held in public
trust for a purpose other than the public purpose for which it
was dedicated, absent judicial approval. In our view, the
requirements of Section 3383 apply even though the property
held in public trust which the municipality seeks to divert to
non-public use amounts to but a small portion of the trust
property. See White, supra (county was required to seek court
approval for lease of .428 acres of 200-acre county park for
placement of a cell phone tower). Section 3383’s proscription,
therefore, applies to the portions of the parcels which will be
used for stormwater, utility, and maintenance easements even
though they do not occupy the entire area of the parcels. The
central question, then, is whether the Borough’s granting of
the easements to the Developers constituted a diversion from
“the purpose or purposes for which [the parcels] were original-
ly dedicated,” thus requiring judicial approval.

HE Section 3888's restriction of a municipality's power
to unilaterally change the purpose for which property has
been dedicated to the public trust is a codification of a bedrock
tenet of the common law public trust doctrine, which is that
“[a] municipality cannot revoke or destroy, after dedication
and acceptance, the right of the public to the exclusive use of
the property for the purpose designated.” City of Easton v.

Koch, 152 Pa.Super. 827, 81 A.2d 747, 752 (1948). Consistent
with this principle, the common law public trust doctrine
strictly prohibits a governmental body from conveying public
Jands to an entity or person for private use. See generally
Payne v. Kassab, 468 Pa, 226, 361 A.2d 263, 268 (1976) (land
dedicated in public trust may not be diverted by governmental
officials to private use); Philadelphia Museums, 96 A. at 123-
24 (the local government “holds, subject to the trusts, in favor
of the community, and is but the conservator of the title in the
soil, and has neither power nor authority to sell and convey
the same for private purposes.”). The DDPA retains this
common law prohibition, but modifies it to afford a municipali-
ty the right to seek judicial approval for a fundamental change
in the purpose for which public trust property has been used
and dedicated.

HH It is plain to us that the conveyance of the challenged
easements to Developers would allow them to use portions of
the dedicated parcels subject to the easements for a private
purpose—namely, to effectuate the construction and mainte-
nance of a private housing development—which is distinct
from the public purpose for which for that land was dedicated,
as a park. Further, it is a well established legal principle that
an easement is “an interest in land owned by another person,
consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area
above or below it, for a specific limited purpose.” Stanton v.
Lackawanna Energy, Lid., 584 Pa. 550, 886 A.2d 667, 678 n.7
(2005). Thus, as the easements would confer on Developers the
right to control and use the portions of the parkland subject to
the easements, the Borough has ceded to a private party some
of the Borough’s exclusive rights as trustee of that land to
manage it for the public’s benefit, thereby subordinating those
publie rights to the private rights of the easement holders. For
these reasons, we conclude that the Borough was required to
seek judicial approval from the orphans’ court under Section
3384 in order to grant the easements in question. We, there-
fore, reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court on this
question, and remand this matter to it for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Il. Conclusion

Order of the Commonwealth Court with respect to the
disposition of the Southern Parcels is hereby vacated. Orders
of the Commonwealth Court regarding the Northern Parcels
and the easements across the Meisel Parcel and Northern
Parcel UPI 40-1-23.1 are hereby reversed. This case is re-
manded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings
in accordance with this Opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Donohue,
Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.