State: Idaho
Volume: 162
Term: 2016-2017
Jurisdiction(s): Idaho
Source: https://static.case.law/idaho/162.pdf

ran

393 P.3d 1027

Douglas VISSER, a married man as to
his sole and separate property,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

ve

AUTO ALLEY, LLC, an Idaho limited lia-
bility company, Calvin Visser and Vicki
Visser, as individuals and in their capac-
ity as Members and/or Managers of
Auto Alley, LLC, Defendants-Appellants,

Docket No. 43432

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: February 24, 2017
Rehearing Denied May 9, 2017

Berg & McLaughlin, Chtd., Sandpoint, for
appellants. Toby McLaughlin argued.

Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., Sandpoint,
for respondent. Brent Featherston argued.

2 Dt

HORTON, Justice.

Auto Alley, LLCO, Calvin Visser, and Vicki
Visser appeal from the Bonner County dis-
trict court’s order granting a writ of posses-
sion and quieting title to certain real proper-
ty in Douglas Visser. Douglas was awarded
the property in his divorce from Vicki in
2005, A dispute subsequently arose and in
February of 2014, the parties entered into a
stipulation that resulted in Vicki being per-
mitted to continue to occupy part of the
property known as “Lot 2.” A stipulated
judgment was entered which provided that
Douglas would convey Lot 2 to Vicki if she
completely performed a number of specific
obligations within specified time frames.
When Vicki failed to completely perform
those obligations, Douglas brought the in-
stant motion to enforce the judgment and the
district court granted his motion, Vicki time-
ly appealed. We affirm and award Douglas
attorney fees on appeal.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Douglas and Vicki were divorced in 2005.
As part of that divorce, Douglas was awarded.
the real property in dispute in this action.
The property had been used as a wrecking
yard. The property was encumbered by a
promissory note and deed of trust from
Douglas and Vicki to Joseph Lapham in the
amount of $111,500 (the Lapham debt). In
2006, Calvin Visser, Douglas’s son, rented a
portion of the property from Douglas to run
a wrecking yard. Instead of paying rent,
Douglas and Calvin agreed that Calvin would
pay the monthly payments on the Lapham
debt and the property taxes.

In 2007, Vicki moved back to Ponderay
and began to operate the wrecking yard with
Calvin. Calvin and Vicki operated the wreck-
ing yard as Auto Alley, LLO. In 2018, Doug-
Jas learned that the property taxes were
several years in arrears and that the county
had plans to take the property by tax deed.
$52,807.52 was due on taxes for 2009-2012.
Douglas paid $14,591.74 to prevent the prop-
erty from being sold. Douglas also learned
that the Lapham debt had increased from
$111,500 to nearly $800,000. Douglas filed an
action for breach of contract and waste in

2018 for Vicki's failure to make payments on
the Lapham debt and pay the taxes. The
district court entered a temporary restrain-
ing order on July 8, 2013. At an Order to
Show Cause hearing held on July 24, 2018,
the parties stipulated to continuing the Tem-
porary Restraining Order and enter into me-
diation.

On February 18, 2014, the parties submit-
ted a Stipulated Judgment to the district
court. The Stipulated Judgment was entered
by the district court on February 19, 2014,
The Stipulated Judgment allowed for the
property to be split into two lots and for
Vicki to obtain title to Lot 2 upon her fulfill-
ment of certain obligations. The Stipulated
Judgment required Vicki to pay half of the
Lapham debt, remove all of her property
from Lot 1, and commission an environmen-
tal study of Lot 1. Douglas was required to
convey Lot 2 to Vicki “ONLY upon condition
that [Vicki] ... fully and completely perform
all of the obligations as set forth hereafter.”
(emphasis in original). The Stipulated Judg-
ment also provided, “[i]f [Vicki] fail[s] and/or
refuse[s] to make payments as set forth in
the preceding section, [Vicki] must immedi-
ately vacate the premises described in Exhib-
it ‘A’ immediately and [Douglas] shall have
an immediate Writ of Possession from this
Court as set forth above.”

Almost immediately, Vicki failed to comply
with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment
and Douglas filed a Motion for Writ of Pos-
session and Judgment for Quiet Title on
April 8, 2014. The district court denied the
motion, finding that Vicki had substantially
complied with the terms of the Stipulated
Judgment. On May 7, 2014, Vicki filed a
motion claiming that Douglas had interfered
with her ability to comply with the Stipulated
Judgment. Following a hearing, the district
court declined to grant the motion. In March
of 2015, Vicki filed a motion for contempt and
Douglas filed a second motion seeking a writ
of possession and quiet title. Following a
hearing on both motions, the district court
issued its memorandum opinion and order
granting Douglas’s motion and denying
Vicki's, In its decision, the district court
found that Vicki had failed to comply with
the terms of the Stipulated Judgment and

Douglas was entitled to a Writ of Possession
as well as an order quieting title in the
property. The district court denied Vicki's
contempt motion, finding that Douglas was
not in contempt for failing to convey the deed
to Lot 2 to Vicki prior to her completion of
the terms of the Stipulated Judgment.

Vicki then filed a motion to reconsider.
Vicki argued that the forfeiture of the prop-
erty constituted an illegal penalty and that
Douglas had prevented Vicki from fulfilling
her obligations under the Stipulated Judg-
ment. After a hearing, the district court de-
nied Vicki’s motion to reconsider and entered
judgment in favor of Douglas. Vicki timely
appealed.

I, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “The general rule is that a stipu-
lated judgment is not subject to appellate
review.” Fagen, Inc. v. Rogerson Flats Wind
Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 624, 627, 364 P.8d
1189, 1192 (2016). “There is an exception to
the general rule where the appellant(s) did
not actually consent to the judgment, or the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
or the judgment was obtained by fraud, or
the judgment adversely affects the public
interest.” Id.

HM “A trial court’s findings of fact will
not be set aside on appeal unless they are
dearly erroneous.” Pinnacle Engineers, Inc.
v. Heron Brook, LLC, 189 Idaho 756, 758, 86
P.8d 470, 472 (2004), “On appeal this Court
examines the record to see if challenged find-
ings of fact are supported by substantial and
competent evidence.” Jd. “Evidence is re-
garded as substantial if a reasonable trier of
fact would accept it and rely upon it in
determining whether a disputed point of fact
has been proven.” Id.

Il, ANALYSIS

Vicki raises two substantive issues on ap-
peal. First, Vicki argues that the forfeiture
provision contained within the Stipulated
Judgment constitutes an unenforceable pen-
alty and the district court erred in enforcing
it. Vicki next argues that Douglas interfered
with her ability to comply with the judgment.
‘These issues will be addressed in turn,

3

A. Whether the forfeiture provision con-
stituted an unenforceable penalty is
not properly before this Court.

Tl Vicks first argument is that the Stip-
ulated Judgment contains an unenforceable
penalty provision and the district court erred
in enforcing it. Vicki premises this argument
on the belief that a Stipulated Judgment is a
contract. In support of this premise, Vicki
cites to Jim & Maryann Plane Family
Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 842 P.8d 689
(2015), where this Court said “[slince a stipu-
lation is a contract, its enforceability is deter-
mined through contract principles.” Skinner,
157 Idaho at 933, 342 P.8d at 646. There, we
were considering the proper way to interpret.
the language of the stipulation. Jd. Similarly
in Gueman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 318
P.8d 918 (2014), this Court again applied
contract principles to ascertain the meaning
of language in a stipulation. Gueman, 155
Idaho at 936, 318 P.3d at 926.

Here, Vicki is asserting that the Stipulated
Judgment is unenforceable. While Vicki
makes this assertion, she has not sought
relief from the Stipulated Judgment nor has
she appealed that judgment. Generally, judg-
ments must be appealed within 42 days from
the time they were entered. I.R.C.P.
88(b)(1)(A). However this Court recently
stated that stipulated judgments are not sub-
ject to appellate review. Fagen, Inc. 159
Idaho at 627, 364 P.3d at 1192.

The general rule is that a stipulated judg-
ment is not subject to appellate review.
There is an exception to the general rule
where the appellant(s) did not actually con-
sent to the judgment, or the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, or the
judgment was obtained by fraud, or the
judgment adversely affects the public in-
terest.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

In Fagen, the Defendants had stipulated
that they were liable on a breach of contract
daim but reserved the right to argue dam-
ages. Id, at 626, 364 P.8d at 1191. At the
hearing on damages, the Defendants at-
tempted to assert affirmative defenses that
would shield them from liability. Jd. When

4 Le

the district court refused to let Defendants
argue the issue of liability, they appealed. Id.
at 627, 864 P.8d at 1192, On appeal, this
Court noted that unless the Defendants could
show one of the exceptions listed above that
the stipulated judgment was not subject to
appellate review. Id. Once the Court found
none of the exceptions applied they did not
address any of the substantive issues raised
on appeal. Id. “[W]e will not address the
substantive issues raised by Defendants on
appeal. They simply seek on appeal to set
aside the judgment to which they stipulated.”
Id.

The facts of this case are similar to the
facts in Fagen. Like the Defendants in Fa-
gen, Vicki entered into a stipulated judgment
and now seeks to challenge its enforceability.
Vicki has not alleged that she did not consent
to the judgment or that it was obtained by
fraud. Vicki has not argued that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or
that the judgment affects the public interest.
Because there are no facts in the record that
would suggest any of the exceptions apply,
we will not consider Vicki’s claim that the
judgment contained an improper forfeiture
provision,

Although we do not wish to dissuade par-
ties from entering into stipulated judgments
in order to resolve their disputes, this case
should be viewed by attorneys as a caution-
ary tale, Practitioners must take particular
care when advising clients who consider en-
tering into a stipulated judgment. Attorneys
and their clients should be aware that a
stipulated judgment may be attacked only on
limited grounds, unlike a settlement agree-
ment, which is treated as a new contract,
Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 550-51,
181 P.8d 478, 476-77 (2008), and therefore
subject to traditional contract defenses.

B. Did Douglas prevent Vicki from com-
plying with the judgment?

HM Vicki also argues that Douglas inter-
fered with her ability to comply with the
judgment when he failed to convey Lot 2 to
her, Vicki supports this argument by arguing
that every contract contains a duty of good.
faith and fair dealing and that Douglas
breached this duty when he failed to convey
Lot 2 to Vicki so she could refinance her
share of the Lapham debt using Lot 2 as

collateral. The district court found that be-
cause Vicki had not fully satisfied her obli-
gations under the Stipulated Judgment,
Douglas had no duty to convey the deed to
Lot 2 to her. The district court was correct.

The Stipulated Judgment provides, “Plain-
tiff, Douglas Visser, will convey to the Defen-
dant, Vicki Visser, that portion of the real
property ... designated as Lot 2 consisting
of 6.2 acres ONLY upon condition that De-
fendants, and each of them, fully and com-
pletely perform all the obligations set forth
hereafter.” (emphasis in original). The Stipu-
Jated Judgment then identifies the conditions
that Vicki was required to satisfy in order to
receive the property. One of those conditions
was that Vicki pay her half of the Lapham
debt on or before June 80, 2014. It is undis-
puted that Vicki did not pay her half of the
Lapham debt on or before June 80, 2014, as
required by the Stipulated Judgment. Be-
cause the Stipulated Judgment specifically
provided that Douglas’s duty to convey Lot 2
would arise only upon Vicki’s performance of
all her obligations, the district court’s deter-
mination that Douglas did not interfere with
Vicki’s ability to comply with the Stipulated
Judgment is supported by substantial and
competent evidence,

C. Attorney fees on appeal.

Both parties request attorney fees and
costs on appeal. Because Vicki is not the
prevailing party on appeal, she is not entitled
to attorney fees and costs. The Stipulated
Judgment provides: “In the event of any
action to enforce the terms of this Judgment,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to a
reasonable reimbursement of fees and costs
payable by the non-prevailing party.” As the
prevailing party, Douglas is entitled to attor-
ney fees under the Stipulated Judgment.

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district
court and award attorney fees and costs on
appeal to Douglas,

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY coneur.

394 P.3d 48
Russell JOKI, individually and as Guard-
ian and Guardian Ad Litem of Peyton
Lee Gifford-Joki, a minor of age 16 en-
rolled at Meridian High School; and Sa-
rah C. Holt, individually and as Parent
and Guardian Ad Litem of Sabrina Holt
and Sophia Holt, children enrolled in
Chief Joseph Elementary School in Me-
ridian, Idaho; each Plaintiff in their
own behalf and in behalf of all parents,
grandparents, and guardians ad litem of
all school age children in grades K-12 in
the Meridian Joint School District #2,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

ve

The STATE of Idaho, The Idaho State
Legislature, The Idaho State Board of
Education, and The Honorable Tom
Luna, Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion, Defendants-Respondents,

and
Meridian Joint District #2, Defendant.
Docket No. 43907

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: April 27, 2017

a

toy

Now named West Ada School District.

The Huntley Law Firm, PLLC, Boise, at-
torneys for appellants. Robert Huntley ar-
gued,

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, attorney for respondents.
Leslie Hayes argued,

JONES, Justice
I. NATURE oF THE Case

This appeal arises from Russell Joki’s ac-
tion challenging the constitutionality of: (1)
fees charged to students of Meridian Joint
District #21; and (2) the statewide system of
funding Idaho’s public schools. Russell Joki
and sixteen other individuals (hereinafter col-
lectively referred to as “Joki”) initiated the
suit against the State of Idaho, the Idaho
State Legislature, the Idaho State Board of
Education, and the Superintendent of Public
Instruction (hereinafter collectively referred
to as the “State Defendants”), all 114 Idaho
public school districts, and one charter
school, The district court granted the State
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. On appeal,
Joki argues that the district court erred in
dismissing the State Defendants.

TL, Facruat anp Procepurat BAckgrounp

On October 1, 2012, Joki filed the initial
complaint against the State Defendants, 114
public school districts, and one charter
school. Joki sought to proceed as a represen-
tative of a class consisting of all students
eurrently enrolled in the defendant school
districts, together with their parents or
guardians, In the initial complaint, Joki re-
quested reimbursement for the damages that
he and other class members suffered, and
continued to suffer, as a result of the uncon-
stitutional fees charged by the defendant
school districts. On October 9, 2012, Joki
filed an amended class action complaint, add-
ing a second cause of action against the State
Defendants. Specifically, Joki requested a de-
claratory judgment that Idaho’s current sys-
tem of funding education is unconstitutional.
Joki cited article IX, section 1 of the Idaho
Constitution as the basis for his claims, which
provides, in pertinent part: “[I]t shall be the

Le ’

duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish
and maintain a general, uniform and thor-
ough system of public, free common schools.”
Idaho Const, art, IX, § 1.

On October 30, 2012, the State Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss, which the district
court granted on March 19, 2018. On the
same day, 58 of the 114 school districts were
voluntarily dismissed by Joki. On March 27,
2018, Joki submitted a motion to alter or
amend the order dismissing the State Defen-
dants, On June 27, 2018, Joki, Meridian Joint
District #2, and the State Defendants stipu-
lated that Joki may file a second amended
complaint, with the provision that Meridian
Joint District #2 and the State Defendants
reserved the right to seek dismissal, sum-
mary judgment, and resist class certification,
The district court granted Joki’s motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint. On
July 16, 2018, Joki filed the second amended
complaint, which sought: (1) reimbursement
from Meridian Joint District #2 or the legis-
lature of certain fees imposed by the school
districts; and (2) a declaratory judgment
against the State Defendants that the cur-
rent system of funding education in Idaho is
unconstitutional.

On July 17, 2018, the State Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint. In an accompanying memoran-
dum, the State Defendants argued that the
claims against them fell squarely within the
terms of the Constitutionally Based Edu-
cational Claims Act, Idaho Code sections 6-
2201-2216 (hereinafter referred to as the
“CBECA”), and should be dismissed accord-
ing to the provisions therein, In response,
Joki argued that the CBECA did not require
the dismissal of the State Defendants. Specif-
ically, Joki asserted that according to this
Court’s holding in Idaho Schools for Equal
Educational Opportunity v. State, 140 Idaho
586, 97 P.8d 453 (2004) (hereinafter referred
to as “ISEEO IV”), the CBECA was uncon-

2. Between 1993 and 2005, a series of five ap-
peals reached this Court involving the Idaho
Schools for Equal Education Opportunity (here-
inafter referred to as the “ISEEO”). The series of
appeals originated from an action filed by the
ISEEO seeking a declaratory judgment that the
level and method of funding for Idaho's public
schools was unconstitutional. JSEEO v. State,
142 Idaho 450, 453, 129 P.3d 1199, 1202 (2005)

stitutional as applied to his second cause of
action?

On November 27, 2018, the district court
issued a memorandum decision and order
regarding the State Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, The district court found that the
CBECA applied to Joki’s claim for fee reim-
bursement and required the dismissal of the
State Defendants. The district court rea-
soned that the CBECA applied to Joki’s
claim because, under the CBECA, a district
court may issue any order that it determines
would assist the local school district in ad-
ministering constitutionally required edu-
cational services. Further, the district court
reasoned that the State Defendants could
only be added as defendants after the follow-
ing occurred: (1) a bench trial; (2) a finding
that a school district failed to provide consti-
tutionally required educational services; (8)
the issuance of a corresponding remedial or-
der; and (4) continued noncompliance by a
school district. Joki did not comply with the
aforementioned procedural requirements; ac-
cordingly, the district court granted the
State Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Next, the district court analyzed Joki’s
request for a declaratory judgment that the
current system of funding education in Idaho
is unconstitutional. The district court ac-
knowledged Joki’s argument that in ISEEO
V this Court found the system of funding
school facilities in Idaho was unconstitutional.
However, the district court held that Joki’s
complaint failed to state a claim to enforce
ISEEO V. The district court emphasized that
ISEEO V addressed the narrow issue of
funding for school facilities, not the education
system as a whole. Because Joki’s complaint
did not allege inadequate school facilities, the
district court concluded that Joki failed to
state a claim to enforce JSHHO V. Further,
the district court reasoned that even if Joki
were to allege facts within the purview of this

(hereinafter referred to as “ISEEO V”). The ser-
ies of appeals, as they relate to the case at hand,
will be explained later in this opinion.

3. The CBECA defines constitutionally required
educational services as “services that must be
provided under section 1, article IX, of the con-
stitution of the state of Idaho.” LLC. § 6-2202.

8 [|

Court’s holding in ISEHO V, the CBECA
would nevertheless apply and require Joki to
first exhaust the remedies under the CBECA
before pursuing action against the State De-
fendants, In sum, the district court held that
the CBECA governed all of Joki’s claims, as
brought against the State Defendants, and
required dismissal.

On June 27, 2014, the district court denied
Joki’s motion for class certification due to
“concerns over the suitability of [Joki] as
representativel ] of the proposed class.” Ulti-
mately, on December 7, 2015, the district
court entered judgment in favor of Joki
against Meridian Joint District #2 in the
amount of $85. Joki appealed the dismissal of
the State Defendants,

TL. Issuzs on APPEAL

1, Whether the district court erred in dis-
missing the State Defendants.

2. Whether Joki is entitled to attorney’s
fees.

TV. Sranparp or Review

HN When this Court reviews an or-
der dismissing an action pursuant to
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), we apply the same stan-
dard of review we apply to a motion for
summary judgment. After viewing all facts
and inferences from the record in favor of
the non-moving party, the Court will ask
whether a claim for relief has been stated.
The issue is not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is
entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims.

In addition, this Court reviews an appeal
from an order of summary judgment de
novo, and this Court’s standard of review
is the same as the standard used by the
trial court in ruling on a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Ergo, a district court’s
dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) shall be reviewed de novo.

Coalition for Agriculture’s Future v. Canyon
Cownty, 160 Idaho 142, 145, 369 P.38d 920, 928
(2016) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not exr in dis-
missing the State Defendants.

In asserting that the district court erred in
dismissing the State Defendants, Joki makes
two arguments. First, Joki argues that the
general responsibilities of the State Defen-
dants demonstrate that they were proper
defendants. Second, Joki argues that the
CBECA does not apply to his action. Specifi-
eally, Joki argues that the CBECA does not
apply because: (1) the CBECA is an uncon-
stitutional amendment to the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure; and (2) the CBECA was
designed to address allegations of a public
school’s failure to provide educational ser-
vices, which he is not alleging; rather, he is
alleging that the fees levied by the school
districts are unconstitutional.

The State Defendants argue that the dis-
trict court properly dismissed the claims
against them because Joki failed to comply
with the procedural mandates of the CBE-
CA, That is, Joki failed to obtain authoriza-
tion from the district court to add the State
Defendants, In response to Joki’s claim that
the CBECA is either unconstitutional or does
not apply, the State Defendants make three
assertions: (1) in Osmunson v. State, 185
Idaho 292, 17 P.8d 286 (2000), this Court
upheld the constitutionality of the CBECA;
(2) Joki misstates this Court’s holding in
ISEEO IV, 140 Idaho 586, 97 P.8d 453; and
(8) Joki’s claims fall squarely within the pur-
view of the CBECA.

Article IX, section 1 of the Idaho Constitu-
tion provides that it is the duty of the legisla-
ture “to establish and maintain a general,
uniform and thorough system of public, free
common schools.” Idaho Const. art. IX, § 1.
The CBECA provides “a mechanism for ad-
judicating the performance of [the aforemen-
tioned duty of the legislature] when there are
allegations that public schools do not provide
educational services that they are required to
provide as part of a general, uniform and
thorough system of public, free common
schools.” I.C, § 6-2202. Idaho Code section 6-
2202 further provides that:

a constitutionally based educational claim

is defined as a claim that public schools are

a 8

not providing educational services that
they are required to provide under section
1, article IX, of the constitution of the state
of Idaho, and constitutionally required ed-
ucational services are defined as the edu-
cational services that must be provided
under section 1, article IX, of the constitu-
tion of the state of Idaho,

Id, When read in conjunction with article IX,
section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, it be-
comes clear that the “educational services”
that the CBECA mandates must be free.
Lastly, “It is the policy of [the CBECA]
whenever possible that constitutionally based
educational claims shall be settled locally
through consent agreements or plans pro-
posed by local school districts and that state
intervention in local school districts be a last
resort.” Id.

The CBECA provides three distinct types

of standing to sue. IC, § 6-2205. First,
a schoolchild, the parent or guardian of a
schoolehild, or the parent or guardian of a
child who will enter public school in the
next two (2) years has standing to sue and
may bring suit against the local school
district in which the schoolchild or poten-
tial schoolchild resides on the ground that
the local school district is not providing
constitutionally required educational ser-
vices.

Id, Second, the State “may bring an action
against a school district on the ground that
the school district is not providing constitu-
tionally required educational services.” Id.
Third, a patron from the first section may
bring a suit against the state “on the ground

4. The series of appeals originated from an action
filed by the ISEEO seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the level and method of funding for
Idaho’s public schools was unconstitutional.
ISEEO V, 142 Idaho 450, 453, 129 P.3d 1199,
1202. The ISEEO’s claim was based upon article
IX, section 1 of Idaho's constitution. In SEEO I,
this Court determined ISEEO had standing to
sue and clarified that it is the judicial branch’s
constitutional duty to define the meaning of the
Idaho Constitution and what constitutes a “‘thor-
ough system of public, free schools.” Id. (citing
ISEEO v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 583, 850 P.2d
724, 734 (1993), Thereafter, the legislature made
changes to Idaho’s public school system, such as
increasing appropriations for the public schools
and directing the State Board of Education to
create new rules. Id. In ISEEO I, this Court

that the state has not established and main-
tained a general, uniform and thorough sys-
tem of public, free common schools.” Jd, Cru-
cially, though, the third type of standing
requires that the patron first sue the local
school district and obtain authorization from
a district court to add a state defendant. Id,
“Any patron suit against the state ... not
authorized by the district court pursuant to
this section shall be dismissed.” Jd.

Our decision in Osmumson, 185 Idaho 292,
17 P.8d 286, and a series of five appeals
involving the ISEEO are relevant to Joki’s
claim that the CBECA is an unconstitutional
amendment to the Idaho Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. In Osmunson, this Court addressed
the constitutionality of the CBECA. Specifi-
cally, this Court addressed whether the
CBECA’s requirement that a patron must
first sue a local school district before suing
the state violated the open court or speedy-
remedy provisions of article I, section 18 of
the Idaho Constitution. Jd. at 294, 17 P.8d at
238, This Court upheld the constitutionality
of the CBECA, holding that “it is not unrea-
sonable for the legislature to also declare
that allegations that the required educational
services are not being furnished should first
be addressed to the local school districts
which have been given the responsibility and
authority to provide those services.” Id. at
296, 17 P.8d at 240. Osmunson also reversed
the district court’s conclusion that the CBE-
CA conflicted with certain procedural rules.
Id, at 298, 17 P.8d at 242,

Of the five appeals involving the ISEEO,
Joki specifically relies upon JSEEO IV, 140
Idaho 586, 97 P.8d 453.4 In ISEEO IV, this

determined that the changes made by the legisla-
ture did not render the lawsuit moot. Jd. (citing
ISEEO v. State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 912
P.2d 644 (1996)). The case returned to this Court
in 1998 and we determined that the new rules
created by the State Board of Education address-
ing public school facilities “met the constitution-
al requirement of thoroughness.” Jd. (citing
ISEEO v. State, 132 Idaho 559, 976 P.2d 913
(1998)), In 2003, the legislature enacted HB 403,
which imposed restrictions on actions relating to
public school funding. Id. at 454, 129 P.3d at
1203. The new legislation led to ISEEO IV,
wherein this Court affirmed the district court's
conclusion that HB 403 was unconstitutional. Jd.
(citing ISEEO v, State, 140 Idaho 586, 97 P.3d
453 (2004). Finally, in ISEEO V, this Court
affirmed the district court's “conclusion that the

10 Dt

Court addressed whether legislation enacted
in 2003 (HB 408) was constitutional. Jd. HB
408 amended certain parts of the CBECA. In
short, HB 403 was an attempt by the legisla-
ture “to legislate itself out of [ZSEHO I-III]
by rewriting the Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.” Id. at 598, 97 P.8d at 460. This Court,
found that HB 403 was “aimed at essentially
disbanding the ISEEO case and restructur-
ing it in a manner that destroys the Plain-
tiffs’ cause of action against the Legislature.”
Id, at 592, 97 P.3d at 459, This Court held as
follows: “HB 408 ... is unconstitutional as a
special law directed at one particular lawsuit
and is also violative of the separation of
powers doctrine of the Idaho Constitution,”
Id. at 597, 97 P.8d at 464. Notably, ISEEO
IV did not address whether the CBECA, as a
whole, was unconstitutional; rather, the case
addressed whether HB 403 was unconstitu-
tional.

I As a preliminary matter, Joki’s argu-
ment relating to the general responsibilities
of the State Defendants is unavailing. Joki
merely recites the wide ranging responsibil-
ities of the State Defendants, then, in a
conclusory manner, asserts that the State
Defendants are proper defendants. As men-
tioned above, the CBECA provides three
distinct types of standing to sue. LC. § 6-
2205. To properly add the State Defendants,
Joki was required to comply with Idaho
Code section 6-2205(3). He did not, Accord-
ingly, notwithstanding their various respon-
sibilities, the State Defendants were proper-
ly dismissed.

Joki’s second argument—that the CBECA.
does not apply to this action—is also unavail-
ing. Joki makes two assertions in an attempt
to support this argument: (1) the CBECA
impermissibly alters the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure by nullifying Rule 775, which pro-
vides for class actions; and (2) his claims are
not within the purview of the CBECA. These
claims are addressed in order.

HM First, Joki relies on ISHEO IV to
support his claim that the CBECA is uncon-

current method of funding as it relates to school
facilities is unconstitutional...” Id. at 460, 129
P.3d at 1209,

stitutional because it alters the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, Joki’s argument is men-
tioned in passing. He does not explain which
part of the CBECA alters the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure other than claiming that
“{tIhe Trial Court was being asked by the
Defendants/Respondents to in effect rule
that CBECA nullifies Rule [77] which pro-
vides for class actions.” One can only pre-
sume that Joki is attacking the CBECA’s
requirement that a plaintiff must first sue
the local school district before including the
state as a defendant. Joki’s reliance on
ISEEO IV is misplaced. ISEEO IV ad-
dressed the constitutionality of HB 403, not
the CBECA as a whole. 140 Idaho at 597, 97
P.8d at 464. Further, in Osmunson, this
Court specifically upheld the CBECA’s re-
quirement that a patron must first sue the
local school district and obtain district court
authorization to add the state as a defendant.
185 Idaho at 296, 17 P.8d at 240. Joki’s vague
argument that the CBECA unconstitutionally
alters the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is
unavailing.

HB Second, Joki asserts that the CBECA
does not apply because he is not claiming
that the State Defendants failed to provide
educational services; rather, he is claiming
that the State Defendants are responsible for
unconstitutional fees levied by the school dis-
tricts. This argument is unavailing. The
CBECA defines a constitutionally based edu-
cational claim as “a claim that public schools
are not providing educational services that
they are required to provide under section 1,
article IX” of Idaho’s Constitution. LC. § 6-
2202. Article IX, section 1 of the Idaho Con-
stitution requires “a general uniform and
thorough system of public, free common
schools,” Idaho Const. art. IX, § 1, (Empha-
sis added). It follows that in order for an
educational service to satisfy the CBECA it
must be free, Accordingly, Joki’s claim relat-
ing to the fees levied by the school districts
falls squarely within the definition of a con-
stitutionally based educational claim because

5. In his brief, Joki refers to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 as the Rule that addresses class
actions, It is presumed that he intended to refer
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 77, which ad-
dresses class actions. LR.C.P. 77.

the legislature’s duty is to provide free com-
mon schools.

We affirm the district court's dismissal of
the State Defendants. In Osmumnson, this
Court summarized Idaho Code section 6-
2206, stating:

Only local school districts may be sued,
initially, under the CBECA. The state, the
legislature, and any of the state’s agencies
may be sued or added as defendants only if
the district court determines that the local
school district cannot provide the constitu-
tionally required educational services with
the school district’s available resources.

135 Idaho at 294, 17 P.8d at 288. Further,
Idaho Code section 6-2205 provides that
“[alny patron suit against the state, the legis-
lature, or any of the state’s officers or agen-
cies not authorized by the district court pur-
suant to this section shall be dismissed.” Id.
Because Joki did not obtain authorization
from the district court to add the State De-
fendants, the district court’s dismissal of the
State Defendants was not in error.

B. Joki is not entitled to attorney’s fees
for proceedings at the district court
level, nor is he entitled to attorney’s
fees on appeal.

Joki argues that pursuant to the private
attorney general doctrine, he is entitled to
attorney’s fees and costs for both the pro-
ceedings at the district court level and on
appeal.

In Hellar v, Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571,
577, 682 P.2d 524, 580 (1984), this Court
noted that Idaho Code section 12-121 is the
statutory basis for awarding attorney's fees
under the private attorney general theory.
Id. Idaho Code section 12-121 provides that a
judge “may award reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party.” 1.C, § 12-121. Con-
sequently, only a prevailing party may re-
ceive attorney’s fees under the private attor-
ney general theory. Joki is not the prevailing
party against the State Defendants; there-
fore, he is not entitled to attorney’s fees at
the district court level or on appeal.

VI. Conciusion

We affirm the district court's dismissal of
the State Defendants and deny Joki’s request

11

for costs and attorney’s fees. Costs on appeal
to Respondents,

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur.

394 P.3d 54

‘Tracy TUCKER, Jason Sharp, Naomi Mor-
ley, Jeremy Payne, on behalf of them-
selves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

STATE of Idaho; C.L. “Butch” Otter, in
his official capacity as Governor of Ida-
ho; Hon. Linda Copple Trout, Darrell G.
Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Well-
man, Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder,
and Rep. Christy Perry, in their official
capacities as members of the Idaho
State Public Defense Commission, De-
fendants-Respondents.

Docket No. 43922

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: April 28, 2017

oF
al

s

16 Le

American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho
Foundation, Richard Alan Eppink, Boise, for
appellants, Jason D. Williamson argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondents Gover-
nor O.L. “Butch” Otter, Trout, Bolz, Ricks,
Winder and Perry. Michael S. Gilmore, Dep-
uty Attorney General argued.

Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Soren-
sen, LLP, Boise, for respondents Thomas
and Wellman. Daniel J. Skinner argued,

BURDICK, Chief Justice,

Tracy Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Mor-
ley, and Jeremy Payne, on behalf of them-
selves and all other similarly situated (Appel-
Jants), bring this appeal from the Ada County
District Court. Appellants filed a class action
complaint in which they alleged Idaho’s pub-
lic defense system is inadequate under feder-
al and state constitutional standards. The
district court reasoned that Appellants’
claims were not justiciable on standing, ripe-
ness, and separation of powers grounds and
dismissed the complaint, We affirm in part,
veverse in part, and remand,

1, These three entities are collectively referred to

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Appellants constitute a putative class of
criminal defendants who seek to challenge
Idaho’s public defense system. They filed a
class action complaint on June 17, 2015. Ap-
pellants allege Idaho’s public defense system
violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I,
Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution. As de-
fendants, Appellants named (1) the State of
Idaho; (2) Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter, in
his official capacity; and (8) the seven mem-
bers of the Idaho Public Defense Commission
(PDC), in their official eapacities.! Appellants
seek various forms of equitable relief, includ-
ing a declaration that Idaho’s public defense
system is unconstitutional and an injunction
requiring Respondents to bring Idaho’s pub-
lie defense system into constitutional compli-
ance,

Respondents moved to dismiss the com-
plaint, arguing the case was not justiciable
because Appellants did not sue the proper
defendants. Since the provision of publie de-
fense has been delegated to Idaho’s forty-
four counties under Idaho Code section 19-
859, Respondents maintained that Appellants
erred by not suing the counties, Appellants
countered that the State is ultimately respon-
sible for ensuring constitutionally adequate
public defense, contending they had sued the
proper defendants.

The district court held that Appellants’
claims were not justiciable and dismissed
their complaint on standing, ripeness, and
separation of powers grounds. This appeal
timely followed.

Il. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Is the State of Idaho immune from state
law claims alleging constitutional viola-
tions?

2, Do the justiciability doctrines bar this
lawsuit?

8, Are Appellants entitled to attorney fees
on appeal?

as Respondents.

TI. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “Jurisdictional issues, like standing,
are questions of law, over which this Court
exercises free review.” In re Jerome Cnty.
Ba. of Commrs, 153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d
1076, 1086 (2012). Similarly, this Court has
free review over whether dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction was properly granted. See
Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 181 Idaho 258,
260, 954 P.2d 676, 678 (1998).

Iv. ANALYSIS

We first address the two main bases of the
district court's dismissal order: immunity,
and the justiciability doctrines. We then ad-
dress whether Appellants should receive at-
torney fees on appeal.

A. Is the State of Idaho immune from
state law claims alleging constitution-
al violations?

HH Appellants sued (1) the State of Ida-
ho; (2) Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter, in his
official capacity; and (8) the seven members
of the Idaho Public Defense Commission
(PDC), in their official capacities. Against
each defendant, Appellants alleged claims un-
der the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Sec-
tion 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Concerning
immunity, the district court held that the
State was immune from the federal law
claims alleged, but not the state law claims,
The district court further held that neither
Governor Otter nor the PDC have immunity.
The only immunity issue before us on appeal
is whether the State is immune from Appel-
lants’ state law claims alleging constitutional
violations.

Respondents set forth two bases to con-
tend the State is immune, First, they contend
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(b) shields
the State from claims under state law for
injunctive relief. In relevant part, when the
complaint was filed, Rule 3(b), entitled “Des-
ignation of Parties,” provided:

2. Effective July 1, 2016, this rule no longer ex-
ists. The only “Designation of Parties” rule that
currently exists is Rule 3(c), which provides:
“Any filing party must be designated as the plain-

17

[All civil actions by or against a govern-
mental unit or agency, or corporation, shall
designate such party in its governmental
_ or corporate name only, and individuals
constituting the governing boards of gov-
ernmental units ... shall not be designat-
ed as parties in any capacity unless the
action is brought against them individually
or for relief under Rules 65 or 74.
LR.CP. 8(b) 2015).

Respondents bolster their argument with
Weyyakin Ranch Property Owners’ Associa-
tion, Inc. v. City of Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 1-
8, 896 P.2d 827, 827-29 (1995). In Weyyalin,
the plaintiff sued the City of Ketchum, seek-
ing to enjoin enforcement of a subdivision
annexation ordinance. Id. The plaintiff -ob-
tained a temporary restraining order (TRO)
enjoining the ordinance. Jd. When the City of
Ketchum, through its elected officials, failed
to comply with the TRO, the district court
held the officials in contempt. Jd, On appeal,
this Court held that the district court’s con-
tempt order violated Rule 3(b) because the
complaint named the “City of Ketchum,” not
the “elected officials individually.” Id. at 3,
896 P.2d at 829.

Respondents’ argument is unavailing.
Nothing in the plain language of Rule 8(b)
shields the State from claims under state law
for injunctive relief, Nor does Weyyakin sup-
port Respondents’ argument. Weyyakin
merely held that the district court erred by
holding the elected officials in contempt be-
cause they were not named in the complaint
“individually or for relief under Rules 65 or
74,” as Rule 8(b) required. Jd. As a result,
“[blecause the temporary restraining orders
failed to name the elected officials individual-
ly, the trial court never obtained jurisdiction
over them, and therefore did not have the
authority to find them in contempt.” Id.
Nothing similar is at issue in this case.

HM Second, Respondents argue the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity shields the State
from Appellants’ state law claims alleging
constitutional violations, “It is the general
rule that, under the doctrine of sovereign

tiff or petitioner, and any party against whom the

same is filed must be designated as the defendant
or respondent.”

18

immunity, a governmental unit can only be
sued upon its consent.” Bott v. Idaho State
Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 591, 917 P.2d 737,
748 (1996), Even so, many other jurisdictions
hold that sovereign immunity does not apply
when constitutional violations are alleged, as
a contrary rule would render constitutional
rights meaningless. See, eg., Columbia Air
Servs, Inc. v. Conn. Dep't of Transp., 293
Conn. 342, 977 A.2d 686, 645 (2009); Fla.
Dep't of Revenue v. Kuhulein, 646 So.2d 717,
721 (Fla. 1994); Corwm v. Univ. of N.C.
Through Bd. of Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 418
S.E.2d 276, 292 (1992); Ashton v, Brown, 339
Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447, 463 (Md. Ct. App.
1995); Kilgo v. Ga, Dep't of Corrs., 202 Ga.
App. 50, 413 S.B.2d 507, 508 (1991).

Hl Though we have never addressed the
issue, we have recognized that because sover-
eign immunity is a common law doctrine, the
judiciary has the power to modify it. Haeg v.
City of Pocatello, 98 Idaho 315, 317, 563 P.2d
389, 41 (1977). Were we to accept Respon-
dents’ position that sovereign immunity
shields the State from suit in this instance,
we would leave parties unable to vindicate
constitutional rights against the State. This
we decline to do. Accordingly, aligning with
our sister jurisdictions identified above, we
hold that sovereign immunity is inapplicable
when constitutional violations are alleged.

B. Do the justiciability doctrines bar this
lawsuit?

HEE The justiciability doctrines are the
second basis of the district court’s dismissal
order, The justiciability doctrines “identify
appropriate or suitable occasions for adjudi-
eation by a court.” State v. Philip Morris,
Ine., 158 Idaho 874, 881, 354 P.3d 187, 194
(2015). Before reviewing the district court’s
justiciability analysis, we take a moment to
clarify which standard of review should be
employed when justiciability challenges are
made. We note that the district court applied

3. The same is true in federal court, which results
in justiciability challenges being reviewed under
Rule 12(b)(1). B.g., Maya v. Centex Corp., 658
F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The district
court erroneously concluded that lack of Article
II standing was grounds for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for fail-
ure to state a claim.”). And, as we explained
previously, “Idaho has adopted the federal justi-

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule
12(b)(6) governs dismissal for failure to state
a claim, inquiring into the factual sufficiency
of the substantive claims alleged. The justici-
ability doctrines, however, are wholly dissim-
ilar from whether a substantive claim is ade-
quately alleged. Indeed, the justiciability
doctrines implicate jurisdiction. Z.g., Martin
v, Camas Cnty. ew rel. Bd. of Conum’rs, 150
Idaho 508, 512, 248 P.8d 1248, 1247 (2011).

Hl As such, we pronounce that justicia-
bility challenges are subject to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) since they implicate
jurisdiction? This, in turn, gives rise to a
different, standard of review than the one
Which Rule 12(b)(6) supplies. See Owsley v.
Idaho Indus. Comm'n, 141 Idaho 129, 183
nl, 106 P.8d 455, 459 n.1 (2005), The district,
court’s error in this regard, however, does
not constitute grounds for reversal. For one,
our earlier cases left the issue unsettled.
Compare Martin, 150 Idaho at 512, 248 P.8d
at 1247 (“Where a plaintiff does not have
standing it cannot be said that the ‘case or
controversy’ requirement has been satisfied;
therefore the judiciary lacks jurisdiction to
hear the case.”), with Brooksby v. Geico Gen,
Ins. Co., 158 Idaho 546, 547-48, 286 P.3d 182,
183-84 (2012) (addressing standing under
Rule 12(b)(6)). Moreover, Appellants did not
raise the issue in their opening brief. See
Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115
P.8d 756, 760 (2005) (explaining that issues
not raised in the opening brief are waived).
Thus, although we clarify which standard of
review governs, we disregard the error. See
LR.C.P. 61 (“At every stage of the proceed-
ing, the court must disregard all errors and
defects that do not affect any party’s sub-
stantial rights.”).

HM Aligning our focus back to the pres-
ent case, the district court’s order addressed
three justiciability doctrines: (1) standing; (2)
ripeness; and (8) separation of powers.!

ciability requirement.” Noh v, Cenarrusa, 137
Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002).

4. Appellants note that standing and ripeness
were “never raised, briefed, or argued by either
side,” yet the district court addressed the doc-
trines. Even so, the justiciability doctrines can be
raised sua sponte at any time. See, e.g., Campbell
v, Parkway Surgery Ctr., LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 962,

1, Standing

HI a class action, standing is met
if at least one named plaintiff satisfies the
requirements of standing against every
named defendant. Hillis v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 657 F.8d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2011);
Henry v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 223
FR.D, 541, 644 (D, Nev. 2004). In order to
have standing to seek injunctive relief, a
plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of
repeated injury or future harm to the plain-
tiff in the absence of the injunction. See City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-08,
108 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675, 684-85
(1983).

Appellants argue they have standing under
the traditional and “relaxed” analyses. Both
are discussed below.

(a) The traditional standing analysis

HH Under the traditional standing anal-
ysis, “the plaintiff must show (1) an ‘injury in
fact, (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained
of, and (8) a ‘like[lihood) that the injury ‘will
be redressed by a favorable decision,’ ” Phil-
ip Morris, 158 Idaho at 881, 354 P.3d at 194
(citation omitted).

@ Injury in fact

Hs Injury in fact requires the injury
to “be ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actu-
al or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti-
cal.’” Id, (citation omitted). The district court
concluded Appellants’ allegations did not sat-
isfy this standard, emphasizing how Appel-
Jants had not been convicted or sentenced,
nor had they pursued any appeal or post-
conviction relief.

The district court erred on two primary
bases. First, the district court erred factually
by concluding no Appellant had been convict-
ed, The complaint alleged Tucker had pled
guilty and was awaiting sentencing. An affi-
davit filed with the complaint set forth the
same information.

354 P.3d 1172, 1177 (2015) (‘‘[T]his Court has a
duty to raise the issue of standing sua sponte.”’);
Thomas v. City of N.Y., 143 F.3d 31, 34 (2d Cir.
1998) (explaining that because the “ ‘ripeness
doctrine is drawn both from Article I limita-

19

HM Second, the district court erred
by attempting to undertake case-by-case in-
quiries into Appellants’ individual criminal
cases. The district court treated Appellants’
allegations as subject to Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S, 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698-94 (1984),
which contemplates case-by-case analyses of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims by
inquiring whether (1) counsel’s performance
was deficient; and (2) counsel’s deficiency
prejudiced the defendant. Strickland author-
izes relief in individual criminal cases by, for
example, allowing courts to vacate convic-
tions due to counsel’s ineffective assistance.
The Court in Strickland was very clear about
the individualized analysis it was creating. Id.
at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Bd.2d at 695
(Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffective-
ness claim must judge the reasonableness of
counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of
the particular case, viewed as of the time of
counsel’s conduct.”). Strickland, therefore, is
inapplicable when systemic deficiencies in the
provision of public defense are at issue. Z.g.,
Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.8d 715, 746-47
@a. 2016); Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 15
N.Y.8d 8, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296, 930 N.E.2d 217,
221-22 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

HM The issues raised in this case do not
implicate Strickland. Appellants alleged sys-
temic, statewide deficiencies plaguing Idaho’s
public defense system. Appellants seek to
vindicate their fundamental right to constitu-
tionally adequate public defense at the
State’s expense, as required under the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and
Article I, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitu-
tion. They have not asked for any relief in
their individual criminal cases. Rather, they
seek to effect systemic reform. Their allega-
tions find support in both Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S, 885, 842, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795, 9
L,Ed.2d 799, 8038-04 (1963), and State v.
Montroy, 37 Idaho 684, 690, 217 P. 611, 614
(1928), which make clear that it is the State’s
obligation to provide constitutionally ade-
quate public defense at critical stages of the

tions on judicial power and from prudential rea~
sons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction,’ the
court can raise it sua sponte, and, indeed, can do
so for the first time on appeal.” (citation omit-
ted)).

20

prosecution, Alleging systemic inadequacies
in a public defense system results in actual
or constructive denials of counsel at critical
stages of the prosecution suffices to show an
injury in fact to establish standing in a suit
for deprivation of constitutional rights. Cf
Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1016-17
(11th Civ. 1988), cert, denied, 495 U.S, 957,
110 S.Ct, 2562, 109 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990).

HM As 2 result, we conclude Appellants
satisfy the injury in fact standard because
the complaint alleged actual and constructive
denials of counsel at critical stages of the
prosecution. A criminal defendant who is en-
titled to counsel but goes unrepresented at a
critical stage of prosecution suffers an actual
denial of counsel and is entitled to a pre-
sumption of prejudice, See United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S, 648, 658-60, 104 S.Ct. 2089,
2046-47, 80 L.Hd.2d 657, 667-69 (1984). As to
allegations of actual denials of counsel, Tracy
Tucker, Jason Sharp, and Jeremy Payne
were not represented by counsel at their
initial appearances. During the initial appear-
ances, bail was set. Since Tucker, Sharp, and
Payne could not afford to post bail, they
remained in jail for varying lengths of time—
three months for Tucker; two weeks for
Sharp; and five months for Payne, These
allegations illustrate violations of constitu-
tional and statutory requirements, See I.C.
§ 19-852(1)(a); Rothgery v, Gillespie Cnty.,
Tew,, 554 U.S, 191, 194, 128 S.Ct, 2578, 2581,
171 L.Ed.2d 866, 372 (2008) (“This Court has
held that the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment applies at the first
appearance before a judicial officer at which
a defendant is told of the formal accusation
against him and restrictions are imposed on
his liberty.”).

HH The complaint also alleged construe-
tive denials of counsel, A constructive denial
of counsel occurs when “although counsel is
available to assist the accused during trial,
the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully
competent one, could provide effective assis-
tance is so small that a presumption of preju-
dice is appropriate without inquiry into the
actual conduct of the trial,” Ramsey v. State,
159 Idaho 887, 891, 367 P.8d 711, 715 (Ct.
App. 2015) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60,
104 S.Ct, at 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 667-69).

Naomi Morley, though represented by coun-
sel via counsel’s video presence at the initial
appearance, had no opportunity to speak
with counsel during her initial appearance.
As to Morley, the complaint further alleged
the following additional constructive denials:

On information and belief, Ms. Morley’s
lawyer’s caseload has been so large, and
his resources so few, that he has been
unable to review Ms. Morley’s extensive
comments on the police reports in her case
or to investigate the vehicle involved in the
accident before the state scrapped it, de-
stroying that evidence. Further, Ms. Mor-
Jey has been unable to communicate effec-
tively or consistently with her attorney,
and is concerned that her attorney is pres-
suring her to plead guilty because he does
not have the time or resources to prepare
sufficiently for trial,

As to Tracy Tucker, the complaint alleged
the following constructive denials:

As of 10 days prior to Mr. Tucker's trial
date, his attorney's demanding schedule
had prevented him from conducting any
meaningful investigation into Mr. Tucker’s
ease, reviewing and explaining to Mr.
Tucker the relevant discovery materials, or
discussing trial strategy with Mr. Tucker.
On June 2, 2015, Mr. Tucker pleaded
guilty to attempted strangulation, at which
time he was released from jail. Mr. Tucker
is scheduled to be sentenced on August 8,
2015, and faces up to 15 years in prison,

As to Jason Sharp, the complaint alleged the
following constructive denials:

Mr, Sharp has been unable to communi-
cate effectively with his attorney regarding
the status of his case. For instance, despite
repeated requests from Mr, Sharp, his at-
torney has not yet provided him with a
copy of the discovery materials in his case,
leaving Mr. Sharp unclear about what evi-
dence the State does or does not have
against him, and making it impossible for
Mr, Sharp to participate meaningfully in
the development of his defense. Moreover,
aside from several motions to continue his
jury trial, Mr. Sharp’s attorney has not
filed any substantive motions on his behalf,

As to Jeremy Payne, the complaint alleged
the following constructive denials:

Unfortunately, during the five months he

was in custody, Mr. Payne was unable to

communicate with his attorney on a consis-
tent basis. In light of the many other
felony cases assigned to his attorney, Mr.

Payne only met with counsel twice at the

County Jail, both for very short periods of

time. Aside from those brief meetings, Mr.

Payne has only met with his attorney in

eourt—for even shorter periods of time—

just prior to his court appearances, and
has been unable to contact his attorney by
phone despite repeated attempts. Indeed,

Mr. Payne has spent a total of approxi-

mately 80-45 minutes with his attorney

since the inception of his case. Moreover,
to date, Mr, Payne’s attorney has been
unable to conduct any meaningful investi-
gation into his case, review the relevant
discovery with his client, or share with Mr.

Payne his thoughts with regard to trial

strategy and related matters.

Recognizing that our analysis at this
juncture is simply whether Appellants have
alleged injuries that are “concrete and par-
ticularized” and “actual or imminent,” we
conclude the above allegations meet the in-
jury in fact standard.

Gi) Causation

HH Causation requires the injury to be
“fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not
before the court.” Bennett v, Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1168, 187 L.Ed.2d
281, 298 (1997). The district court reasoned
that causation could not be shown, emphasiz-
ing that the Legislature and the counties
“ave the principal bodies with the power to
affect [sic] the policy (political) and systemic
changes Plaintiffs seek.” The district court,
however, did not conduct separate causation
analyses as to each defendant. Since causa-
tion looks at the conduct of each particular
defendant, we analyze each separately.

(1) State of Idaho

Hs Concerning the State, Appellants
satisfy the causation standard. The right to

21

counsel is “made obligatory upon the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon, 872
US. at 342, 88 S.Ct, at 795, 9 L.Ed.2d at
803-04 (emphasis added); see also Montroy,
37 Idaho at 690, 217 P, at 614, The State,
therefore, has ultimate responsibility to en-
sure that the public defense system passes
constitutional muster, While the provision of
public defense has been delegated to Idaho’s
forty-four counties under Idaho Code section
19-859, “the ultimate responsibility for fulfill-
ing the ... constitutional duty cannot be
delegated.” See Osmunson v. State, 185 Ida-
ho 292, 296, 17 P.3d 286, 240 (2000) (explain-
ing that the Legislature could delegate provi-
sion of public education to school districts,
although it could not delegate the ultimate
responsibility of fulfilling constitutional
duties), Moreover, it cannot be said that the
counties are third parties acting indepen-
dently of the State with respect to public
defense, Instead, the counties are political
subdivisions of the State. See, eg., Idaho
Const, art. XVIII, § 1; State v. Peterson, 61
Idaho 50, 54, 97 P.2d 608, 605 (1989), Because
Appellants’ alleged injuries are fairly tracea-
ble to the State, we hold that causation as to
the State is met.

(2) Governor Otter

HN Unlike the State, the causal chain
linking Appellants’ injuries to Governor Otter
is too attenuated for two primary reasons.
First, as the district court reasoned, the pro-
vision of public defense has been delegated to
Idaho's forty-four counties, I.C. § 19-859,
Appellants cite to no authority suggesting
that the counties are beholden to Governor
Otter with respect to the provision of public
defense. The counties therefore act indepen-
dently of Governor Otter, which militates
against causation as to him. Bennett, 520
US. at 167, 117 S.Ct. at 1168, 187 L.Ed.2d at
298 (stating that causation means the injury
cannot be “the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the
court.”), Similarly, although Governor Otter
appoints four of the seven PDC members,
nothing suggests the PDC members—even
those he appoints—are beholden to Governor
Otter in any way. See LC. § 19-849(1)(c).

22

Instead, the PDC is a self-governing agency.
LC. § 19-849(1).

Equally unavailing is Appellants’ position
that Governor Otter is somehow responsible
for preventing and remedying alleged state-
wide violations of the right to counsel. The
complaint alleges, “[aJs the chief executive
of the state, Governor Otter bears ultimate
responsibility for the provision of constitu-
tionally mandated services to the people of
Idaho.” Indeed, Governor Otter has the “su-
preme executive power” and is therefore re-
quired to “see that the laws are faithfully
executed.” See Idaho Const. art. IV, § 5.
Even so, the weight of authority demon-
strates that a general duty to enforce state
Jaws is not sufficient to establish a causal
connection. £.g., Women’s Emer. Network v.
Bush, 823 F.8d 987, 949-50 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“Where the enforeement power is the re-
sponsibility of parties other than the gover-
nor ... the governor’s general executive
power is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.”);
Long v. Van de Kamp, 961 F.2d 151, 152
(9th Cir. 1992),

Attempting to establish a causal nexus
with Governor Otter, Appellants cite to
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.
2014). In Kitchen, the plaintiffs challenged
Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage, suing the
governor, the attorney general, and the coun-
ty clerk. Id. at 1200-01. Only county clerks
could issue marriage licenses. Jd. County
clerks’ duty to issue marriage licenses was
“purely ministerial,” and the State of Utah
controlled the content of the marriage appli-
cation form. Id. at 1202 n.1. Although county
clerks issued marriage licenses, the Tenth
Circuit found a causal nexus with the gover-
nor, reasoning as follows:

The Governor and Attorney General have

explicitly taken the position in this litiga-

tion that they “have ample authority to
ensure that” the Salt Lake County Clerk

“return[s] to her former practice of limit-

ing marriage licenses to man-woman cou-

ples in compliance with Utah law.” This
assertion is supported by the Utah Code.

The Governor is statutorily charged with

“supervisfing] the official conduct of all

executive and ministerial officers” and

“see[ing] that all offices are filled and the

duties thereof performed.” § 67-1-1(1) &

(2). In addition, he “may require the attor-

ney general to aid any county attorney or

district attorney in the discharge of his
duties.” § 67-1-1(7).
Id. at 1202 (emphasis added).

HM Similar to Kitchen, Governor Otter
has authority to (1) “supervise the official
conduct of all executive and ministerial offi-
cers”; and (2) “see that all offices are filled,
and the duties thereof performed, or, in de-
fault thereof, apply such remedy as the law
allows; and if the remedy is imperfect, ac-
quaint the legislature therewith at its next
session.” I.C. §§ 67-802(1), -802(2). However,
those duties are discretionary. As Idaho
Code section 67-802 states, “the governor has
th[ose] powers, and may perform th[ose]
duties....” (emphasis added). Whereas the
statute in Kitchen mandated certain execu-
tive actions, here the statute simply grants
Governor Otter discretionary power. Com-
pare U.C. § 67-1-1, with LC. § 67-802. And,
unlike county clerks’ “purely ministerial”
duty in Kitchen, here the counties are left
with significant discretion in fashioning the
provision of public defense services. See I.C.
§ 19-859. Thus, Kitchen does not establish a
causal nexus with Governor Otter.

Appellants cite also to Los Angeles County
Bar Association v, Hu, 979 F.2d 697 (Oth Cir,
1992), The plaintiff in Hu challenged the
constitutionality of a statute prescribing the
number of judges on the Superior Court for
Los Angeles County, Jd. at 700. The plaintiff
alleged the statute resulted in a shortage of
judges, which, in turn, caused inordinate de-
lays in litigation, deprived access to the
courts, and violated equal protection by caus-
ing litigants in Los Angeles County to suffer
longer delays than litigants in neighboring
counties. Jd, The plaintiff sued the governor
as a defendant, evidently based on his en-
forcement of the statute at issue via his
appointment power to fill judicial vacancies.
Id. at 701, 704, The Ninth Cireuit concluded
causation was satisfied, reasoning as follows:

The chain of causation leading from a
determination by this court that the dearth
of judges in Los Angeles County is uncon-
stitutional to correction of civil litigation
delays may appear tenuous. However, it

a 2

does not at any point depend upon the
“unfettered discretion” of third parties.
Were this court to issue the requested
declaration, we must assume that it is sub-
stantially likely that the California legisla-
ture, although its members are not all
parties to this action, would abide by our
authoritative determination. See Franklin
v Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 [803-04],
112 S.Ct, 2767, 2777, 120 L.Hd.2d 686 [651-
52] (1992) (plurality). Once the legislature
authorized more judicial positions for Los
Angeles County, Governor Wilson would,
according to the Bar Association, have a
legal duty to fill those positions. Complaint
at 111 29-80, Even if the new judges were
assigned only to criminal and other high-
priority cases, the speeding of those cases
would inevitably reduce the delay in gener-
al civil litigation, We therefore conclude
that the Bar Association has adequately
demonstrated that, were this court to rule
in its favor, it is likely that the alleged
injury would be to some extent ameliorat-
ed.

Id, at 701. In short, because the governor in
Eu enforced the statute at issue by making
judicial appointments, causation was satis-
fied. See id.

Appellants fare no better under Zu. Unlike
the governor’s enforcement of the statute at
issue via his appointment power in Eu, Gov-
ernor Otter does not engage in similar con-
duct, Though he appoints four of the seven
PDC members, Governor Otter’s involvement
with public defense ends there. Additionally,
in Hu, the plaintiff challenged the statute
limiting the number of judgeships. Appel-
lants have not made any statutory challenge.
Appellants challenge instead alleged systemic
violations of the right to counsel. But, as
noted, Governor Otter’s general duty to en-
force state law does not establish causation.
E.g., Van de Kamp, 961 F.2d at 152. Accord-
ingly, Appellants do not satisfy causation as
to Governor Otter.

5. The PDC’s powers have since been expanded.

See Act of July 1, 2016, S.L. 2016, ch, 195, § 1.

However, the PDC’s expanded powers are not
relevant to our causation analysis and instead

(8) The PDC
HMM Concerning the PDC, Appellants

satisfy the causation standard. The PDC was
created on March 26, 2014. See Idaho Public
Defense Act, S.L. 2014, ch. 247, § 2. When
the complaint was filed on June 17, 2015, the
PDC was tasked with the following duties: 5

(1) The state public defense commission
shall;
(a) Promulgate rules in accordance

with the provisions of chapter 52, title
67, Idaho Code, establishing the fol-
lowing:
@) Training and continuing legal ed-
ucation requirements for defending at-
torneys, which shall promote compe-
tency and consistency in case types
including, but not limited to, criminal,
juvenile, abuse and neglect, post-con-
viction, civil commitment, capital and
civil contempt; and
Gi) Uniform data reporting require-
ments for the annual reports submit-
ted pursuant to section 19-864, Idaho
Code. The data reported shall include
caseload, workload and expenditures.

(b) On or before January 20, 2015, and
by January 20 of each year thereafter
as deemed necessary by the commis-
sion, make recommendations to the
Idaho legislature for legislation on
public defense system issues includ-
ing, but not limited to:

@) Core requirements for contracts
between counties and private attor-
neys for the provision of indigent de-
fense services and, proposed model
contracts for counties to use;

Gi) Qualifications and experience
standards for the public defender and
defending attorneys;

ii) Enforcement mechanisms; and
(iv) Funding issues including, but not
limited to:

1, Training and continuing legal edu-
cation for defending attorneys;

are discussed with respect to redressability and
ripeness. See infra Parts V(B)(1)(a)(ii)(2) &
V(B)2)(b).

24

2, Data collection and reporting ef-

forts; and

3. Conflict cases.

(c) Hold at least one (1) meeting in

each calendar quarter.
LC. § 19-850 (2015). In short, the PDC had.
three mandatory duties: (1) promulgating
certain rules; (2) making legislative recom-
mendations; and (8) holding quarterly meet-
ings,

Of those three mandatory duties, we con-
clude the PDC’s rulemaking duty satisfies
causation, As stated, the PDC’s rulemaking
duty is twofold: (1) promulgate rules govern-
ing training requirements for public defend-
ers; and (2) promulgate rules governing case~
load and workload reporting requirements,
LC, § 19-850(1)(a) (2015).6 Appellants allege
their injuries are due, in part, to a “lack of
ongoing training and professional develop-
ment” for public defenders, and public de-
fenders’ crushing caseloads, They explain
that many public defenders’ caseloads are
“well above national standards and impossi-
ble for one person to handle effectively.”
Appellants further allege that, despite the
PDC’s awareness that public defenders are
receiving inadequate training while laboring
under excessive caseloads and the PDC’s re-
sponsibility to promulgate rules related to
these issues, “no such rules have been pro-
mulgated to date.” Although Respondents
contend the PDC is not causally connected to
Appellants’ injuries because public defense
has been delegated to the counties, Respon-
dents overlook the fact that the PDC’s rules,
if promulgated, would bind the counties, See
LC. § 19-850(1)(a) (2015). Thus, Appellants’
injuries—allegedly due, at least in part, to a
lack of training and excessive caseloads—are
fairly traceable to the PDC.

However, the PDC has no other power
that would satisfy causation. The PDC’s
duties to make annual recommendations to
the Legislature and to hold quarterly meet-
ings are not causes of Appellants’ injuries,
Though Appellants emphasize that the PDC
has failed to make any legislative recommen-
dations, any legislative recommendations

6, We observe that these same rulemaking duties
still exist under the 2016 amendments. L.C. § 19-

would be simply that—recommendations,
The Legislature would not be obligated to
respond to those recommendations in any
particular way. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167,
117 S.Ct. at 1163, 187 L.Ed.2d at 298 (stating
that causation means the injury cannot be
“the result of the independent action of some
third party not before the court.”),

We hold that causation as to the PDC is
met because of its duty to promulgate rules
governing training and caseload reporting
requirements. The PDC’s failure to promul-
gate these rules illustrates that Appellants’
injuries are fairly traceable to the PDC.

(ii) Redressability

HE Standing’s redressability element
ensures that a court has the ability to order
the relief sought, which must create a sub-
stantial likelihood of remedying the harms
alleged. See Ciszek v. Kootenai Cnty. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 129, 254 P.8d 24, 30
(2011); Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1268,
1267 (9th Cir, 1982). Redressability requires
a showing that “a favorable decision is likely
to redress [the] injury, not that a favorable
decision will inevitably redress [the] injury.”
Beno v. Shalala, 80 F.8d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir.
1994), However, it cannot be only speculative
that a favorable decision will redress the
injury. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs, (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181,
120 S.Ct. 698, 704, 145 L.Ed.2d 610, 627
(2000).

HN Redressability and causation often
overlap. See, @g., Wash. Hnvtl Council v.
Bellon, 732 F.8d 1181, 1146 (th Cir, 2018),
The concepts “are distinct insofar as causali-
ty examines the connection between the al-
leged misconduct and injury, whereas re-
dressability analyzes the connection between
the alleged injury and requested judicial re-
lief. Redressability does not require certain-
ty, but only a substantial likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable judi-
cial decision.” Id. (citations omitted).

The complaint requests the following re-
lief:

850(1)(a)(i)-Gii) (2016).

A) Certify this case as a class action pur-
suant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure;

B) Declare that the State of Idaho is
obligated to provide constitutionally
adequate representation to indigent
criminal defendants, including at their
initial appearances;

C) Declare that the constitutional rights
of Idaho’s indigent criminal defen-
dants are being violated by the State
on an ongoing basis, and provide a
deadline for the State to move this
Court for approval of specific modifi-
cations to the structure and operation
of the State’s indigent-defense system;

D) Enjoin the State from continuing to
violate the rights of indigent defen-
dants by providing constitutionally de-
ficient representation;

E) Enter an injunction requiring the
State to propose, for this Court’s ap-
proval and monitoring, a plan to de-
velop and implement a statewide
system of public defense that is con-
sistent with the U.S. Constitution
and the Constitution and laws of the
State of Idaho;

F) Enter an injunction that requires the
State to propose, for this Court’s ap-
proval and monitoring, uniform
workload, performance, and training
standards for attorneys representing
indigent criminal defendants in the
State of Idaho in order to ensure ac-
countability and to monitor effective-
ness;

G) Enter an injunction barring the use of

fixed-fee contracts in the delivery of

indigent defense services in the State
of Idaho;?

Award Plaintiffs and the Class rea-

sonable attorneys’ fees and costs in-

curred during the course of this litiga-

tion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

LC, § 12-117, the Private Attorney

7. This request is moot. Idaho law prohibits the
use of fixed-fee contracts, although that prohibi-
tion only applies to contracts “entered into or
renewed on or after the effective date” of the
2014 legislation. 1.C. § 19-859(4), Respondents

25

General doctrine and other applicable
. Jaw; and
I) Grant any other relief the Court
deems necessary and proper to protect
Plaintiffs and the Class from further
harm.

The district court reasoned that “Plaintiffs
ask this Court to basically intervene and
supersede in every single case, and in every
court and county and to then make a blanket
determination that every indigent criminal
defendant’s rights are being violated.” The
district court found “[sluch relief [was] too
speculative....” The district court did not
conduct separate redressability analyses as
to each defendant. We provide that analysis
below,

(1) State of Idaho

HI Redressability as to the State is sat-
isfied. Ordering Appellants’ requested relief
against the State would create a substantial
likelihood of remedying the injuries alleged
because the State has the power—and indeed
the responsibility—to ensure public defense
is constitutionally adequate, Additionally, Ap-
pellants do not allege deficiencies in just a
handful of counties, Rather, they allege
“longstanding, statewide deficiencies in the
Idaho system, which result in actual and
constructive denial of counsel across the
state.” Given that the counties have no prac-
tical ability to effect statewide change, the
State must implement the remedy.

Unlike the district court, we do not find
Appellants’ requested relief is too specula-
tive. Were the requested relief ordered, the
State would be obligated to create a plan to
ensure public defense is constitutionally ade-
quate. That plan would cover training stan-
dards and workload limits, which, as dis-
cussed, stand at the root of many of the
injuries alleged. Entities tasked with provid-
ing and overseeing public defense would be
bound by the State’s plan. Because Appel-
lants’ requested relief, if ordered against the
State, would create a substantial likelihood of

explain that fixed-fee contracts were in place
when that prohibition was enacted, but have
since been phased out, While fixed-fee contracts
are in the record, those contracts preceded the
statutory prohibition.

26

redressing Appellants’ injuries, redressability
as to the State is satisfied.

(2) The PDC

Hs In addition, redressability as to
the PDC is satisfied. Set forth above are the
PDC’s duties as of the time when the com-
plaint was filed, See supra Part
V(B)(1)(a)Gi)@B). The PDC’s duties, however,
have since been expanded. See Act of July 1,
2016, S.L. 2016, ch. 195, § 1. The parties
agree that redressability should be examined
in light of these expanded duties. As Respon-
dents concede, “[uJnder both Federal and
State law, claims for injunctive or other pro-
spective relief are adjudicated under the law
in effect when the court decides the case, be
the case before the trial court or an appellate
court, because such relief operates in futu-
ro.” See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 278, 114 S.Ct. 1488, 1501, 128
L.Ed.2d 229, 257 (1994) (“When the interven-
ing statute authorizes or affects the propriety
of prospective relief, application of the new
provision is not retroactive.”); Adams Cnty.
Abstract Co. v. Fisk, 117 Idaho 518, 515, 788
P.2d 1886, 1888 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that
“the writ of mandate issued in this case is
subject to prospective modification based on
the 1989 statutory amendment,” notwith-
standing that the amendment was enacted
after the action was filed). We conduct our
analysis accordingly.

The Legislature amended Idaho’s Public
Defense Act, effective July 1, 2016, by ex-
panding the PDC’s authority and duties. See
Act of July 1, 2016, S.L. 2016, ch. 195, § 1.
Most notably, under the 2016 amendments,
the PDC now has the duty to promulgate
rules to ensure counties’ public defense “is
constitutionally delivered to all indigent per-
sons in this state.” IC. § 19-850(1)(a)(vi)
(2016), Additionally, the PDC itself can now
remedy public defense shortcomings in each
county if the PDC finds that the county
“willfully and materially failed to comply with
indigent defense standards.” 1.0. § 19-
862A(11)(b) (2016). If the PDC finds that the
county’s material failure to comply with indi-
gent defense standards was not willful, it can
require the county to explain how the failure

will be remedied. LC. § 19-862A(11)(a)
(2016).

Nevertheless, Respondents contend the
PDC lacks any power to redress Appellants’
injuries. We cannot agree. Ordering Appel-
lants’ requested relief against the PDC would
create a substantial likelihood of remedying
the injuries alleged. That is especially true in
light of the 2016 amendments, as the PDC
can promulgate rules to ensure public de-
fense is constitutionally adequate and, more-
over, can intervene at the county level. Yet,
even analyzing redressability under the
PDC’s former powers shows that redressabil-
ity is established. The 2016 amendments do
not alter the PDC’s duty to promulgate rules
governing (1) training requirements for pub-
lie defenders; and (2) caseload and workload
reporting requirements. IC, § 19-
850(1)(a)@)-(i). Appellants allege their inju-
ries are caused, in part, by the PDC’s failure
to promulgate these rules, Were the PDC to
exercise these powers, it would create a sub-
stantial likelihood of remedying the injuries
alleged, As such, redressability is satisfied as
to the PDC,

(b) The “relaxed” standing analysis

HHI In the alternative, Appellants argue
they have standing under the “relaxed”
standing analysis, which they contend does
not inquire as to injury in fact, causation, or
redressability. In Coeur d’Alene Tribe v.
Denney, 161 Idaho 508, 514, 387 P.3d 761,
767 (2015), this Court noted that it is willing
to “relax ordinary standing requirements in
other cases where: (1) the matter concerns a
significant and distinct constitutional viola-
tion, and (2) no party could otherwise have
standing to bring a claim.” Thus, Appellants
argue (1) the “right to counsel at issue in this
ease could not be more fundamental”; and (2)
“filf [they] cannot bring this lawsuit, there
will be no one to enforce this essential right
against continued inaction and delay by the
PDC and other government officials.”

We disagree. Though violations of the
right to counsel constitute significant and
distinct constitutional violations, Appellants
are not the only ones who could bring this
lawsuit. In fact, the complaint alleges “the
circumstances surrounding the named Plain-

tiffs’ representations are not unique to them.
Rather, they exemplify the experiences of
thousands of indigent defendants across the
State....” Because any one of those “thou-
sands of indigent defendants” could bring
this lawsuit, Appellants do not satisfy the
relaxed standing analysis.

2, Ripeness

In State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 888, 842, 127
P.2d 954, 958 (2005), we summarized ripeness
as follows:

The ripeness doctrine concerns the tim-
ing of a suit and asks whether a case is
brought too early. The purpose of the ripe-
ness requirement is to prevent courts from
entangling themselves in purely abstract
disagreements, Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
887 U.S. 186, 148 [87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18
L,Ed.2d 681, 691] (1967). Under the ripe-
ness test in Idaho, a party must show (1)
the case presents definite and concrete
issues; (2) a real and substantial controver-
sy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts);
and (8) there is a present need for adjudi-
cation. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 187 Idaho 798,
801, 53 P.8d 1217, 1220 (2002); Miles v.
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 642, 778
P.2d 757, 764 (1989),

“(In many cases, ripeness coincides
squarely with standing’s injury in fact
prong.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 220 F.8d 1134, 1188 @th Cir. 1999).
The district court’s analysis illustrates that
point. The district court concluded Appel-
lants’ claims were not ripe largely for the
same reasons it found that Appellants did not
satisfy the injury in fact standard. Specifical-
ly, the district court reasoned that ripeness
‘was not satisfied because “none of the Plain-
tiffs’ criminal cases have concluded, no ap-
peals have taken place, and no post-convic-
tion relief has been sought.” Similarly, the
district court reasoned that an injury in fact
was not demonstrated because “the Plaintiffs
have not yet been convicted of any crime in
their underlying cases, nor pursued or ex-
hausted any appeal rights, nor any post-
conviction relief.”

8. Respondents argue the relaxed standing analy-
sis implicates only the injury in fact component
of standing, not causation or redressability. Our

27

Because the ripeness analysis differs as to
the State and the PDC, we analyze each
party separately.

(a) State of Idaho

TM OBy undertaking case-by-case inqui-
ries into Appellants’ individual cases, the dis-
trict court erroneously concluded the case
was not ripe because Appellants “had not
even pursued any appeal or post-conviction
relief in their individual cases.” That analysis
‘was in error,

Appellants suffered ascertainable injuries
by being actually and constructively denied
counsel at critical stages of the prosecution,
which they allege are the result of deficien-
cies in Idaho’s public defense system. As a
result, Appellants allege as follows:

These constitutional and statutory defi-
ciencies manifest themselves in myriad
ways, including (1) failure to provide coun-
sel to indigent defendants at their initial
appearance; (2) extended and unnecessary
pretrial detention; (8) excessive caseloads
that far exceed national standards; (4) lack
of sufficient investigation; (5) lack of suffi-
cient expert analysis and testimony; (6)
lack of consistent, effective, and confiden-
tial communication between indigent de-
fendants and public defenders; (7) contin-
ued use of fixed-fee contracts for attorneys
providing indigent-defense services; (8)
Jack of public-defender independence; (9)
lack of sufficient training in the field of
criminal defense; (10) lack of informed and
consistent oversight of the provision of in-
digent-defense services throughout the
State; and (11) lack of sufficient supervi-
sion and evaluation,

According to Appellants, “[eJach of these de-
ficiencies is directly linked to the State’s
longstanding and ongoing failure to provide
the funding, supervision, and training neces-
sary to meet its legal obligations in the area
of indigent defense.”

These allegations establish ripeness by il-
lustrating that “(1) the case presents definite
and concrete issues; (2) a real and substantial

conclusion that Appellants could not satisfy the

relaxed standing analysis even if it applied obvi-
ates the need to address this argument.

28

controversy exists (as opposed to hypotheti-
cal facts); and (8) there is a present need for
adjudication.” See Manley, 142 Idaho at 342,
127 P.8d at 958, Indeed, we note that Re-
spondents do not contest that ripeness is met
as to the State. Therefore, we hold that
Appellants’ claims against the State are ripe.

(b) The PDC

HM Additionally, Appellants’ claims
against the PDC are ripe. Manley’s first two
ripeness requirements—definite and conerete
issues and a real, substantial controversy—
are met for the same reason those require-
ments are met against the State. However,
Respondents contend there is no present
need for adjudication due to the 2016 amend-
ments to Idaho’s Public Defense Act, which
took effect after this action was filed. See Act
of July 1, 2016, S.L. 2016, ch, 195, § 1. The
record before us contains no evidence con-
cerning the PDC’s conduct in light of the
2016 amendments. Thus, Respondents argue
“{njothing in this record shows that the PDC
will not carry out its new responsibilities.”

Although Respondents are correct con-
cerning the PDC’s “new responsibilities,”
they overlook that the 2016 amendments
leave in place the key parts of the PDC’s
original authority and duties it has had since
its inception on March 26, 2014, The 2016
amendments do not alter the PDC’s duty to
promulgate rules governing (1) training re-
quirements for public defenders; and (2)
caseload and workload reporting require-
ments, 1.0. § 19-850(1)(a)@)-ii). The PDC’s
alleged failure to exercise these two duties
during the initial fourteen months of the
PDC’s existence is at the heart of many of
Appellants’ allegations.® As a result, there is
a present need for adjudication. Accordingly,
we conclude Appellants’ claims against the
PDC are ripe.

3. Separation of powers

HM The final basis of the district
court’s order is the separation of powers
doctrine. The separation of powers doctrine
9, As noted, the record before us contains no

evidence that the PDC has carried out its manda-

tory rulemaking duties. As alleged in Appellants’
complaint, “no such rules have been promulgat-

prohibits “judicial review of the discretionary
acts of other branches of government.” In re
SRBA Case No, 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 261,
912 P.2d 614, 629 (1995). The separation of
powers doctrine is “embraced in art, 2, § 1 of
the Idaho Constitution, The question is
whether this Court, by entertaining review of
a particular matter, would be substituting its
judgment for that of another coordinate
branch of government, when the matter was
one properly entrusted to that other branch.”
Miles v, Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,
639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989).

The complaint’s prayer for relief can be
simplified into a request for two main reme-
dies: (1) a declaratory judgment that Idaho’s
public defense system is unconstitutional;
and (2) an injunction requiring Respondents
to fix it. Concluding the requested relief
raised separation of powers concerns, the
district court reasoned as follows:

Plaintiffs do not argue that the statute
delegating the duty to provide public de-
fense is unconstitutional. They simply ar-
gue that the county commissioners in some
or all of the counties, and the various
systems of public defense, have failed to
protect their constitutional rights to coun-
sel and a fair trial. Instead of filing suit
against those counties where they believe
their constitutional rights have been violat-
ed, they brought this action against the
State, the Governor, and the PDC, Plain-
tiffs also do not argue that the statute
establishing the PDC is unconstitutional.
They argue, instead, that the PDC is an
ineffective and inadequate response by the
legislature to redress the problem of inad-
equate or ineffective assistance of public
defense counsel. Instead of seeking to have
an act declared unconstitutional, they ask
this Court to declare the inaction to be
unconstitutional, Plaintiffs ask this Court
to declare the whole system (or lack of
system) to be unconstitutional and to then
establish standards or guidelines, based on
previous holdings of other courts, that the
Governor, the PDC, the legislature, and all
ed to date.” If the PDC were to take action,

Appellants concede their claims against the PDC.
may fail for either mootness or lack of proof.

counties (whom they have not sued at this
time), must follow. Plaintiffs ask this Court
to mandate that the Governor and the
PDC (and the legislature and counties)
must enact as legislation, ordinances, or
rules to meet those standards, and to pro-
vide adequate funding therefore. This
Court does not have the power or jurisdic-
tion to do so under the established princi-
ples of separation of powers imbedded in
the federal and state constitutions.

HMI We disagree. Our precedent in-
structs that the separation of powers doc-
trine is triggered when (1) a “textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment”
assigns the matter to a particular branch
of government; or (2) the matter impli-
cates another branch’s discretionary au-
thority. See Miles, 116 Idaho at 689-40,
178 P.2d at 761-62. For instance, in Idaho
Schools for Equal Educational Opportuni-
ty v. State (ISEEO IV), 140 Idaho 586,
594-97, 97 P.8d 458, 461-64 (2004), we
held that a statute authorizing the judicia-
ry to impose a levy violated the separa-
tion of powers doctrine because the Idaho
Constitution commits the power to tax to
the Legislature. Similarly, in Diefendorf v.
Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 688, 10 P.2d 307,
814-15 (1982), we held that the governor’s
discretion to define the “extraordinary oc-
easions” under which Article 4, Section 9
of the Idaho Constitution permits special
legislative sessions to be convened was a
discretionary act exempt from judicial re-
view.

Here, Appellants’ requested relief does not
implicate the separation of powers doctrine.
The right to counsel, which Appellants seek
to vindicate, is not entrusted to a particular
branch of government. Nor does a particular
branch of government merely have discretion
to enforce the right to counsel, a fundamental
right. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43, 88
S.Ct. at 795-96, 9 L.Hd.2d at 803-04, Re-
spondents concede they lack discretion as to
whether the right to counsel must be hon-
ored, but contend they have discretion as to
how ewactly that will be done. That argument.
misses the mark. Simply that Respondents
will exercise some discretion when deciding
which course of action to take so as to fulfill

29

their affirmative duties does not implicate
the separation of powers doctrine,

This conclusion is not altered even though
Appellants ask the judiciary to retain juris-
diction to monitor Respondents’ efforts to
bring the public defense system into consti-
tutional compliance, In Idaho Schools for
Equal Education Opportunity v State
(ISEEO V), 142 Idaho 450, 459, 129 P.8d
1199, 1208 (2005), we affirmed the declara-
tory judgment that Idaho’s public school
funding system was “simply not sufficient to
carry out the Legislature’s duty under the
constitution” to “establish and maintain a
general, uniform and thorough system of
public, free common schools.” Moreover,
ISEEO V “retain{ed] jurisdiction to consider
future legislative efforts to comply with the
constitutional mandate to provide a safe en-
vironment conducive to learning so that we
may exercise our constitutional role in inter-
preting the constitution and assuring that
its provisions are met.” Id. at 460, 129 P.38d
at 1209. Similarly, in Hellar v. Cenarrusa,
106 Idaho 571, 576, 682 P.2d 524, 529
(1984), we affirmed the declaratory judg-
ment invalidating the Legislature’s reappor-
tionment scheme, upheld the reapportion-
ment plan that the district court itself had
entered, and retained jurisdiction, Concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Shepard noted that, although the reappor-
tionment “power does not belong to nor
should it be exercised by, the judicial de-
partment of government, albeit if there be a
legislative abdication of its power and duty,
the courts will be required to act in the
legislature’s stead.” Id. at 585, 682 P.2d at
588 (Shepard, J., concurring part and dis-
senting in part), Other jurisdictions have
fashioned similar relief. Bg, Washakie
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v.’ Herschler, 606
P.2d 810, 887 (Wyo. 1980) (remanding public
school financing case to district court with
instructions to “retain jurisdiction until a
constitutional body of legislation is enacted
and in effect, taking such action as may be
necessary to assure conformity”),

Respondents consistently assume that
granting relief would require legislative ac-
tion. This, too, misses the mark. Appellants
do not challenge the statutes creating the

30

PDC or delegating public defense to the
counties. Instead, Appellants challenge Re-
spondents’ inaction, and part of that inaction
includes failures to comply with statutorily
mandated duties. Thus, Appellants’ request-
ed relief does not ask the judiciary to order
the Legislature to do anything. The New
York Court of Appeals addressed a similar
argument in Hurrell-Harring v. New York,
15 N.Y.8d 8, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296, 930 N.E.2d
217, 227 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010), when holding
that the class of plaintiffs could sue for al-
leged public defense inadequacies. As Hur-
rell-Harring explained:

It is, of course, possible that a remedy in
this action would necessitate the appropri-
ation of funds and perhaps, particularly in
a time of scarcity, some reordering of leg-
islative priorities. But this does not amount
to an argument upon which a court might
be relieved of its essential obligation to
provide a remedy for violation of a funda-
mental constitutional right.

Id, The same logic applies here. Merely that
it is possible that Idaho’s three branches of
government may collaborate when deciding
how to ensure our public defense system
passes constitutional muster does not raise
separation of powers concerns. Thus, Appel-
lants’ claims do not implicate the separation
of powers doctrine.

C. Are Appellants entitled to attorney
fees on appeal?

HE Appellants seek attorney fees on ap-
peal under both Idaho’s private attorney gen-
eral doctrine and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, As to the
private attorney general doctrine, this Court
has explained that:

[A] three-factor test [is] to be considered

in awarding attorney’s fees under the pri-

vate attorney general theory: “(1) the
strength or societal importance of the pub-

lic policy vindicated by the litigation, (2)

the necessity for private enforcement and

the magnitude of the resultant burden on
the plaintiff, (8) the number of people
standing to benefit from the decision.”

These factors indicate that there must be

some resolution of the substantive issues

before a decision on attorney fees can be
reached.

Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v.
Idaho State Bd. of Educ. (ISEEO II), 128
Idaho 276, 285, 912 P.2d 644, 653 (1996)
(emphasis added).

HM As to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, “[a] plaintiff
‘prevails’ for purposes of § 1988 ‘when actual
relief on the merits of his claim materially
alters the legal relationship between the par-
ties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in
a way that directly benefits the plaintiff’”
Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 717
F.8d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farrar
v, Hobby, 506 U.S. 108, 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566,
578, 121 L.Bd.2d 494, 503-04 (1992)).

Although Appellants prevail in part on ap-
peal, they are not entitled to fees. The merits
of Appellants’ claims still need to be ad-
dressed,

Vv. CONCLUSION

We reverse the dismissal of Appellants’
complaint as to the State of Idaho and the
PDC, but affirm dismissal as to Governor
Otter. We remand this case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion, We do
not award attorney fees or costs on appeal.

Justices EISMANN, W. JONES,
HORTON, and BRODY concur.

394 P.3d 73

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, Plaintiff-Appellant,

ve
Penny R. SILER, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No. 44139

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: April 28, 2017

Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, Idaho
Falls, for appellant. Bryan Zollinger argued.

Thomsen Holman Wheiler, PLLC, Idaho
Falls, for respondent, Ryan S. Dustin ar-
gued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS)
appeals the Jefferson County district court’s
order affirming the magistrate court’s ruling
denying MR&’s application for an award of
postjudgment attorney fees under Idaho
Code section 12-120(5). We reverse and re-
mand,

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Penny R. Siler visited Mountain View Hos-
pital and incurred a bill of $518.80. Siler was
unable to pay the bill, and Mountain View
Hospital assigned the debt to MRS for collec-
tion. In November 2018, MRS sued Siler for
recovery of the debt. Siler was served with
the summons on November 18, 2018. On
Christmas Eve, December 24, 2018, MRS
filed an application for entry of default judg-
ment, On December 80, 2018, the court en-
tered a default judgment in favor of MRS in
the amount of $1,170.98, which included at-
torney fees in the amount of $350.00.

Following the default judgment, MRS at-
tempted a garnishment of Siler’s wages,
which was returned unsatisfied because Siler,
a school bus driver who cares for her dis-
abled husband and makes an average of
$499.00 a month, did not eam enough to
garnish. Thereafter, MRS obtained an order
for examination of debtor from the court, and
counsel for MRS met with Siler on May 2,
2014, Based on Siler’s circumstances, MRS
agreed to accept $10.00 per month for pay-
ment on her judgment,

Siler paid $10.00 per month until March
2015. On March 6, 2015, Siler contacted coun-
sel for MRS and “asked what the payoff
would be.” Siler was told the payoff amount
was $1,224.88. Siler then went to MRS’s
counsel’s office and, after again being told
the payoff amount was $1,224.88, paid that
amount in cash. Six days later, counsel for
MRS filed an application for supplemental
attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-
120(5). Counsel supported the application
with an affidavit and time entries. The sup-
plemental fees totaled $843.00, which includ-
ed $114.00 for the “receipt and processing” of
Siler’s twelve $10.00 payments.

Siler did not file an objection to the re-
quest for supplemental attorney fees but did
attend the hearing. Following the hearing,
the magistrate court issued an order denying
MRS’s application for supplemental attorney
fees. In its order, the magistrate court, sua

. Sponte, found that MRS was barred by quasi
and equitable estoppel from asking for attor-
ney fees because MRS had told Siler the
“payoff amount” was $1,224.88, and MRS did

33

not inform Siler it planned to pursue addi-
tional postjudgment fees. MRS appealed the
magistrate’s decision to the district court.

The district court affirmed, finding “the
Magistrate Court retains discretion as to
whether, or what amount of, attorney fees
will be awarded,” and therefore was free to
consider any factor it deemed appropriate,
including quasi or ‘equitable estoppel, in de-
termining the amount of attorney fees, MRS
timely appeals. _

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH When reviewing a decision of a dis-
trict court acting in its capacity as an appel-
late court, this Court

reviews the trial court (magistrate) record
to determine whether there is substantial
and competent evidence to support the
magistrate’s findings of fact and whether
the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow
from ‘those findings. If those findings are
so supported and the conclusions follow
therefrom and if the district court affirmed
the magistrate’s decision, we affirm the
district court’s decision as a matter of pro-
cedure.

Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633
P.2d 1187, 1189 (1981); accord, ¢9., Losser v.
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 188 P.8d 758,
760 (2008). “[TThis court does not review the
decision of the magistrate court. ‘Rather, we
are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse
the decisions of the district court.’ ” Pelayo v.
Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 859, 808 P.8d 214, 218
2018) (citations omitted) (quoting Bailey v.
Bailey, 158 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.8d 970, 973
(2012),

IIL. ANALYSIS

A, The district court erred in affirming
the magistrate’s decision that MRS
was estopped from requesting attorney
fees under Idaho Code section 12-
12065).

HM “The decision to award attorney’s
fees is within the discretion of the trial court,
unless the award is based on the interpreta-
tion of a statute.” Grover v. Wadsworth, 147
Idaho 60, 65, 205 P.8d 1196, 1201 (2009),

34

“When the award of attorney fees depends
on the interpretation of a statute giving rise
to that award ... this Court exercises free
review.” Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 578,
576, 180 P.8d 1111, 1114 (2006).

I The district court held that the mag-
istrate court did not err in considering the
theories of quasi and equitable estoppel in
determining that MRS was not entitled to
postjudgment attorney fees under section 12-
120(5). In support of this conclusion, the dis-
trict court relied on Idaho Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 54(e)(8)(L) and Long v. Hendricks,
109 Idaho 78, 705 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1985).
However, neither Rule 54(e)(8)(L) nor Long
support the district court’s ruling.

Rule 54(e)(8)(L) states: “(8) Amount of
Attorney Fees. In the event the court grants
attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil
action it shall consider the following in deter-
mining the amount of such fees: (ql)
Any other factor which the court deems ap-
propriate in the particular case.” ILR.C.P.
54(e)(8)(L).! By its own terms, Rule
54(e)(8)(L) only applies in cases where “the
court grants attorney fees to a party....”
Id. (emphasis added). Here, the record clear-
ly shows the magistrate court declined to
grant attorney fees. Because the magistrate
court declined to grant fees, Rule 54(e)(8)(L)
is not implicated. The district court erred in
relying on Rule 54(e)(8)(L) to affirm the
magistrate court’s decision to deny MRS’s
request for postjudgment fees.

HM The district court’s reliance on
Long is similarly misplaced. In its ruling, the
district court stated, “the Magistrate Court
retains discretion as to whether, or what
amount of, attorney fees will be awarded.” In
support of this statement of law, the district
court cited Long v. Hendricks, 109 Idaho 78,
7105 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1985). Long, however,
dealt with an award of attorney fees under
Idaho Code section 12-121, not section 12-
120(6), 109 Idaho at 80, 705 P.2d at 85, Under
section 12-121, attorney fees are indeed dis-
cretionary. I.C. § 12-121 (“In any civil action,
the judge may award reasonable attorney’s

1, All citations to the LR.C.P. are to the 2015
rules, which were in effect at the time of both the

fees....” (emphasis added)), However, under
section 12-120(5), attorney fees are mandato-
ry. Idaho Code section 12-120(5) reads:

In all instances where a party is entitled
to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs un-
der subsection (1), (2), (8) or (4) of this
section, such party shall also be entitled to
reasonable postjudgment attorney's fees
and costs incurred in attempting to collect
on the judgment, Such attorney's fees and
costs shall be set by the court following
the filing of a memorandum of attorney's
fees and costs with notice to all parties and
hearing.

IC, 12-120(6) (emphasis added). The use of
the nondiseretionary shall rather than the
permissive may, indicates that the award of
postjudgment attorney fees is mandatory un-
der section 12-120(5). E.g., Rangen, Inc. v.
Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 160 Idaho 251,
256, 871 P.8d 305, 310 (2016) (“When used in
a statute, the word ‘may’ is permissive rather
than the imperative or mandatory meaning of
‘must’ or ‘shall.’” (quoting Rife v. Long, 127
Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995))).
The district court erred in relying on Long
for the proposition that the award of attor-
ney fees under section 12-120(6) is discretion-
ary.

HM Although the district court erred in
relying on LR.C.P. 54(e)(8)(L) and Long, if
the district court’s order affirming the magis-
trate court was correct, though based on an
inappropriate theory, we will affirm upon the
correct theory. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho
455, 459, 680 P.2d 1855, 1859 (1984) (“Where
an order of a lower court is correct, but
based upon an erroneous theory, the order
will be affirmed upon the correct theory.”).
‘Therefore, we examine whether the district
court should be affirmed on the grounds of
quasi and equitable estoppel.

1, The magistrate court erred in raising
the issues of quasi and equitable estop-
pel sua sponte.

Hl A claim for attorney fees under Idaho

Code section 12-120(5) must be made pursu-
ant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e),

magistrate and district court's rulings.

LR.G.P. 54(e)(8) (“Any claim for attorney
fees ... must be made pursuant to Rule
54(e) unless an applicable statute or contract.
provides otherwise.”). Under LR.C.P.
54(e)(6) any objection to attorney fees must
“be made in the same manner as an objection
to costs as provided by Rule 54(d)@).” Rule
54(d)(6), in turn, provides that any objection
to the memorandum of costs must be made
within fourteen days. I.R.C.P, 54(d)(6). Fail-
ure to timely object to the memorandum of
costs “shall constitute a waiver of all objec-
tions to the costs claimed,” Id; Conner v.
Dake, 108 Idaho 761, 761, 653 P.2d 1178, 1178
(1982); accord Allstate Ins, Co. v. Mocaby,
183 Idaho 598, 600, 990 P.2d 1204, 1211
(1999) (“The rule clearly provides that the
failure to file a timely objection to costs and
fees claimed in the memorandum of costs
constitutes a waiver of objections to the costs
claimed.”).

HE Here, it is undisputed that Siler
did not file an objection to MRS’s request for
postjudgment fees. As such, Siler waived any
defense or objection she may have had to the
award of fees, ILR.C.P. 54(d)(6); accord, eg.,
Mocaby, 188 Idaho at 600, 990 P.2d at 1211.
Notwithstanding the clear language of Rule
54(d)(6) and the equally clear case law on the
subject, the magistrate court sua sponte
raised the defenses of equitable estoppel and
quasi estoppel. This was error.

Hsin Deon v. H&J, Inc., we ve-
viewed various cases where the Court held
that it was error for the trial court to sua
sponte raise affirmative defenses and con-
cluded that it was also error to sua sponte
raise the defense of collateral estoppel. 157
Idaho 665, 668-70, 389 P.3d 550, 5538-55
(2014). Estoppel, generally, is an affirmative
defense. I.R.C.P. 8(¢) (listing estoppel as one
of the affirmative defenses that must be
raised in a response to a pleading), Although
not strictly required to be raised in an an-
swer or other filing, affirmative defenses
must be raised before trial to give the oppos-
ing party notice and an opportunity to ad-
dress the defense. See Patterson v. State,
2. The only recognized exception to this rule is

judicial estoppel. Deon v. H & J, Inc., 157 Idaho

665, 669 n.2, 339 P.3d 550, 554 n.2 (2014) (“‘Be-
cause [judicial estoppel] is intended to protect

35

Dep't of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,
816, 256 P.8d 718, 724 (2011)? Here, the
issues of quasi and equitable estoppel were
not raised by Siler and were not raised by
the magistrate court until the court issued its
order denying fees. MRS was not on notice
of the defenses of quasi or equitable estoppel
and was not afforded the opportunity to ad-
dress those issues before the magistrate is-
sued its order. It was error for the magis-
trate court to sua sponte raise the defenses
of quasi and equitable estoppel, See Deon,
157 Idaho at 669, 339 P.3d at 554 (“[T]rial
courts must be cautious about raising a pre-
clusion bar sua sponte, thereby eroding the
principle of party presentation so basic to our
system of adjudication.” (quoting Arizona v.
California, 580 U.S. 392, 412-18, 120 S.Ct.
2304, 2318, 147 L.Ed.2d 874, 394-95 (2000))).

Because Siler did not object to MRS’s
request for postjudgment fees within four-
teen days and because it was error for the
magistrate court to sua sponte raise the is-
sues of quasi and equitable estoppel, we are
constrained to reverse the district court, We
note, however, that while fees are mandatory
under section 12-120(5), the amount of fees to
be awarded is within the trial court’s discre-
tion. Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128
Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 787, 749 (1996)
(“The calculation of reasonable attorney fees
is within the discretion of the trial court.”).
And in making the award, the trial court is
bound to consider the factors listed under
LR.C.P. 54(e)(8), which includes: “(L) Any
other factor which the court deems appropri-
ate in the particular case.” Accordingly, the
magistrate court is free to determine reason-
able attorney fees. This is true even though
Siler did not object to MRS’s request. Low-
ery v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs for Ada Cty., 115
Idaho 64, 68, 764 P.2d 431, 485 (Ct. App.
1988) (noting that a lack of objection does not
mean the Court must automatically award
the full amount sought).

B. Attorney fees on appeal.

HE “MRS requests attorney fees on
appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and

the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equita-
ble doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.”
(quoting Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92
P.3d 492, 502 (2004)))..

36

Idaho Code section 12-120(5), Idaho Appel-
late Rule 41, however, is not “a mechanism
by which this Court can award attorney
fees.... As we have held numerous times,
Rule 41 provides the procedure for request-
ing attorney fees on appeal, but is not au-
thority alone for awarding fees.” Commercial
Ventures, Inc, v. Rea M. & Lynn Lea Fami-
ly Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 219, 177 P.8d 955,
966 (2008). In contrast, we have held that
Idaho Code section 12-120 generally allows
this Court to award reasonable attorney fees
on appeal that are “incurred in connection
with the effort to secure a reasonable amount
of attorney fees.” BECO Constr, Co. v. J-U-B
Eng’rs Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 298, 233 P.38d
1216, 1220 (2010), overruled on other grownds
by Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. PAL I, LLC, 155
Idaho 287, 311 P.8d 299 (2013). However, for
section 12-120(5) to apply, the attorney fees
sought must have been “incurred in attempt-
ing to collect on the judgment.” We have
held, “[w]hen attempting to collect on a judg-
ment, a party may receive attorney fees and
costs pursuant to LC. § 12-120(5) if that
party would have been awarded attorney fees
and costs under subsection (1), (2), (8), or (4)
in the underlying proceeding.” Credit Bu-
reau of E. Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant, 149
Idaho 467, 478, 235 P.8d 1188, 1194 (2010).
Here, the underlying proceeding is MRS’s
request for postjudgment attorney fees, A
request for postjudgment attorney fees un-
der section 12-120(6) is not a proceeding that
would satisfy the requirements of subsections
(1), 2), 8), or (4) of section 12-120, To allow
MRS to collect fees on appeal under section
12-120(5) would be to allow MRS to collect,
attorney fees for attempting to collect attor-
ney fees, not for attempting to collect on the
judgment. We decline to award MRS attor-
ney fees on appeal. See Magleby v. Garn, 154
Idaho 194, 200 n.4, 296 P.8d 400, 406 n4
(2018) (denying fees under section 12-120(5)
because the appeal could not be “reasonably
characterized as an ‘attempt to collect on the
judgment.’ ”).

HM Siler requests fees under Idaho
Code section 12-121, Because Siler is not the
prevailing party, we decline to award Siler
fees as well. Kemmer v. Newman, 161 Idaho
468, 469, 387 P.3d 181, 187 (2016) (noting that

fees under section 12-121 are only available
to the prevailing party).

IV. CONCLUSION

Because postjudgment attorney fees are
mandatory under section 12-120(6), we re-
verse the district court and remand the case
to the district court with instructions to re-
mand to the magistrate court to award rea-
sonable postjudgment fees. No fees on ap-
peal. Costs to MRS.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and BRODY concur,

394 P.3d 79
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve

Jesse Eugene MANN, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket No, 43745

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: April 28, 2017

id
oo

Eric Fredericksen, State Appellate Public
Defender, Boise, for appellant. Jenevieve C.
Swinford argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. Russell J. Spenc-
er argued,

HORTON, Justice.

TH Jesse Eugene Mann appeals from the
judgments of conviction for trafficking mari-
juana, driving without privileges, and posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia which were en-
tered after a jury found him guilty of the
charges. Prior to the trial, Mann sought sup-
pression of the evidence related to the mari-
juana and paraphernalia charges. The district
court found that Mann did not have stand-
ing! to challenge the search as the evidence
was found in a rental car which he was not
authorized to drive. Mann argues that he had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
rental car because he had permission from
the lessee to drive the car. Mann also asserts
that the jury instruction regarding the para-
phernalia charge was erroneous. We affirm,

1, We recognize that the term “standing” is more
commonly used when evaluating the justiciability
of a party's claims. In that broader context, we
have stated that “[a] defendant obviously has
standing to litigate the substantive issue raised
regarding that defendant.” Doe (2013-23) v. Doe,
155 Idaho 660, 662, 315 P.3d 848, 850 (2013).
However, in the context of suppression motions,

39

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Mann was driving east on I-90 near Coeur
d'Alene when he was stopped by Idaho State
Police Trooper Josh Clark. Clark stopped
Mann for signaling less than the required 5
seconds—2.63 seconds—before changing
lanes, Mann was driving a rental car which
had been rented by Ashley Cheney, his “liv-
ing as married” partner of five years. Mann
‘was not authorized by the rental car compa-
ny to drive the car. After stopping Mann,
Clark approached the vehicle and asked
Mann for his driver’s license. Mann provided
Clark with an Oregon identification card and
stated that his driver’s license was currently
suspended. After confirming that Mann’s li-
cense was suspended, Clark arrested him for
driving without privileges.

After arresting Mann, Clark placed him in
the back seat of his police car in order to
transport him to the Kootenai County jail.
Clark then conducted a pre-tow inventory
search of Mann’s vehicle. It is Idaho State
Police policy to conduct an inventory search
prior to a vehicle being towed. During the
search, Clark found a glass pipe with burnt
residue in the top, a toffee-like substance,
and eight plastic bags containing a green
plant-like substance. Clark suspected that
the toffee-like substance was a synthetic
form of marijuana and that the plant-like
substance was marijuana. Clark seized these
items as evidence, and they were tested by
the Idaho State Police laboratory. The lab
technician concluded that the plant-like sub-
stance was marijuana and determined that
the total weight of the marijuana was 5.38
pounds,

Mann was charged with trafficking mari-
juana, driving without privileges, and posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial,
Mann filed a motion to suppress the evidence

the term is used as shorthand for the question
whether the moving party had a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the area that was
searched. This Court and the Court of Appeals
have used this shorthand in the past. See State v.
Ryan, 117 Idaho 504, 788 P.2d 1327 (1990);
State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 716 n, 2, 132
P.3d 468, 473 n. 2 (Ct. App. 2006).

40

seized during the inventory search. The dis-
trict court heard the motion on July 22, 2015,
After receiving testimony and argument, the
district court ruled that Mann did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the rent-
al car, The district court based its ruling on
State v. Cutler, 144 Idaho 272, 159 P.8d 909
(Ct. App. 2007). Of the five factors laid out in
Cutler, the district court found that Mann
was able to meet only one of them and the
totality of the circumstances weighed against,
Mann having a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the rental car,

The case then proceeded to a jury trial on
August 24-25, 2015. During closing argu-
ments, Mann argued that the State was re-
quired to prove that he intended to use the
paraphernalia in Idaho. During its delibera-
tions, the jury sent the judge three ques-
tions, One of those questions asked whether
it mattered if Mann intended to use the
paraphernalia in Idaho or elsewhere. Over
Mann’s objection, the district court respond-
ed as follows: “You are instructed that any
possession of paraphernalia must occur in
Idaho, If you find defendant possessed para-
phernalia in Idaho, you must consider wheth-
er the defendant intended to use the para-
phernalia, It does not matter in which state
the defendant formed the intent to use the
paraphernalia.”

After receiving the new instruction and
further deliberations, the jury found Mann
guilty of all three charges. On October 20,
2015, the district court entered three sepa-
vate judgments, Mann was ordered to serve
seven years, with three years fixed, and fined
$10,000 for trafficking in marijuana. He re-
ceived suspended sentences of 180 days and
865 days, respectively, for driving while sus-
pended and possession of drug parapherna-
lia, Mann timely appealed from these judg-
ments.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

I “We review a district court’s order
granting a motion to suppress evidence using
a bifurcated standard of review.” State v
Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 387 P.8d 575, 677
(2014). “This Court accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erro-
neous, but may freely review the trial court’s

application of constitutional principles in light
of those facts.” Id.

HM “(Whether the jury has been prop-
erly instructed is a matter of law over which
this Court exercises free review.” State v.
Adameile, 152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.8d 417,
444 (2012) (quoting State v, Zichko, 129 Ida-
ho 259, 264, 928 P.2d 966, 971 (1996)), “This
Court reviews jury instructions to ascertain
whether, when considered as a whole, they
fairly and adequately present the issues and
state the applicable law.” Id. “Reversible er-
yor occurs if an instruction misleads the jury
or prejudices a party.” Perry v. Magic Valley
Regt Med. Ctr., 184 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d
816, 821 (2000).

Il. ANALYSIS

A, The district court did not err when it
found Mann did not have standing to
challenge the search of the rental car.

This appeal involves an unauthorized driv-
er of a rental car, ie. a driver who may or
may not have permission of the vehicle’s
lessee, but who has not been authorized to
drive the car by the rental car company
which owns the car. Although the Court of
Appeals has addressed the question whether
an unauthorized driver of a rental car has
standing to challenge a search of that car,
the issue is before this Court for the first
time. As courts across the country have tak-
en different approaches to deciding this ques-
tion, we first consider which test should be
applied.

1, Applicable test.

There are at least three distinct tests
which courts have used to determine if an
unauthorized driver of a rental car has stand-
ing to challenge a search of that car, State v.
Cutler, 144 Idaho 272, 274, 159 P.8d 909, 911
(Ct. App. 2007). The district court applied the
totality of the circumstances test adopted by
the Court of Appeals in Cutler. Mann argues
that this Court should adopt a modified total-
ity of the circumstances test articulated by
Judge Lansing in her concurring opinion in
Cutler,

HM The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides protec-
tion against unreasonable searches. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. Idaho’s Constitution
contains a nearly identical provision. ID.
CONST. art. I § 17. However, even if a
search is unreasonable, a defendant must
have a privacy interest that was invaded by
the search in order to suppress evidence
discovered in the search. Rakas v. Illinois,
489 U.S. 128, 188-84, 99 S.Ct. 421, 424-26, 58
L.Ed.2d 387, 894-95 (1978). When a search is
challenged, the defendant bears the burden
of showing that he or she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place searched.
Cutler, 144 Idaho at 274, 159 P.8d at 911,
There are at least three different tests to
determine if an unauthorized driver of a
rental car has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in that car, Id.

The first test simply considers the rental
agreement. Id. This test has been adopted by
the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Cireuit Courts.
Id, Under this bright line test, if the driver is
not authorized under the terms of the rental
agreement to drive the car, the driver lacks
standing to challenge a search of the car. See
eg. United States v, Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 871
(10th Cir, 1995); United States v. Wellons, 32
F.8d 117, 119 (th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Boruff, 909 F.2d 111, 117 (6th Cir. 1990).

The second test is a modified bright line
test which focuses on permission from an
authorized driver. Cutler, 144 Idaho at 274,
159 P.8d at 911. This test, which has been
adopted by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
considers whether the driver challenging the
search had permission from the lessee to
operate the rental car. See e.g., United States
v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (th Cir,
2006); United States v. Best, 185 F.3d 1228,
1225 (8th Cir. 1998), If the unauthorized driv-
er of a rental car has permission from the
lessee then he or she has standing to chal-
lenge the search. Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1197.
“(This approach equates an unauthorized
driver of a rental car with a non-owner driver
of a privately owned car.” Id.

HM The third test, adopted by the Sixth
Cireuit and the Court of Appeals, examines
the totality of the circumstances. Cutler, 144
Idaho at 275, 159 P.3d at 912; United States

41

v, Smith, 263 F.8d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001),
Under this test, courts begin with a pre-
sumption that unauthorized drivers do not
have standing to challenge a search. Cutler,
144 Idaho at 275, 159 P.8d at 912; Smith, 268
F.3d at 586. Despite this presumption, this
test recognizes that “a rigid [bright line] test
is inappropriate, given that [courts] must de-
termine whether [the driver] had a legitimate
expectation of ‘privacy which was reasonable
in light of all surrounding circumstances.”
Smith, 263 F.3d at 586 (citing Rakas, 439
USS. at 152, 99 S.Ct, at 435, 58 L.Bd.2d at
406-07 (Powell J., concurring)). When it
adopted this test, the Court of Appeals ob-
served: “Given the increasingly common uti-
lization of rental vehicles for a myriad of
purposes and our view that a bright line rule
fails to address the ensuing complexities, we
ave convinced the Sixth Cireuit Court’s totali-
ty of the circumstances approach best ad-
dresses the issue.” Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275,
159 P.8d at 912. The presumption that an
unauthorized driver does not have standing
to challenge a search can be overcome if the
driver shows a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy based on the totality of circumstances.
Smith, 263 F.3d at 586-87. The Smith court
articulated five factors that are helpful in
determining if an unauthorized driver had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. Those
factors are: “(1) whether the defendant had a
driver's license; (2) the relationship between
the unauthorized driver and the lessee; (8)
the driver’s ability to present rental docu-
ments; (4) whether the driver had the les-
see’s permission to use the car; and (5) the
driver’s relationship with the rental compa-
ny.” Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275, 159 P.8d at
912.

Mann argues that this Court should adopt
a fourth test proposed by Judge Lansing in
her concurring opinion in Cutler. Her pro-
posed test is similar to the modified bright
line test adopted by the Ninth and Eighth
Circuits where permission from the lessee or
other authorized driver is dispositive. Howev-
er, Judge Lansing would recognize “extraor-
dinary circumstances” where “a driver who
did not obtain permission from the lessee or
other authorized driver could have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the vehicle.”

42

Id. at 276, 159 P.8d at 918. Judge Lansing
characterized this as occurring when the to-
tality of the circumstances demonstrate “the
possible, rare circumstance where a legiti-
mate privacy interest [arises] even in the
absence of direct permission from the lessee
or other authorized driver.” Id.

Hs is important to observe that
the district court acted properly by applying
the test adopted by the Court of Appeals in
Cutler. “[A]ll tribunals inferior to the Court
of Appeals are obligated to abide by deci-
sions issued by the Court of Appeals.” State
v. Guaman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 P.2d 660,
665 (1992),

HN However, we think that the better
approach is expressed in the bright line test
adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth
Circuits. Under this test, those drivers au-
thorized by the rental car company will have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rent-
al car. Conversely, a driver does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental
car that the driver is not authorized to drive.

HE This Court may affirm decisions
of a district court based on different theories
than applied by the district court. Johnson v.
Blaine Cnty., 146 Idaho 916, 921, 204 P.8d
1127, 1182 (2009). Applying the test that we
adopt today, we hold that Mann lacked
standing to challenge the search of the rental
car. It is undisputed that Mann was not
authorized to drive the rental car. Therefore,
we affirm the district court’s denial of
Mann’s motion to suppress.

B. The jury instructions fairly and ade-
quately presented the issues and stat-
ed the law.

HH Mann was charged with possession
of paraphernalia under Idaho Code section
87-2734A. This statute provides that “[i]t is
unlawful for any person to use, or to possess
with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce,
process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale,
or otherwise introduce into the human body a
controlled substance.” LC, § 37-2784A. In his
closing argument, Mann’s attorney attempt-

ed to argue that the jury must find that he
intended to use the paraphernalia to intro-
duce a controlled substance into his body
while in Idaho, Specifically, he argued that
there was:

No indication that he had used that pipe in

the state of Idaho or that he ever intended

to use that pipe in the state of Idaho. The

Oregon laws are different than the Idaho

laws. Montana laws might be different.

than the—they are different than the Ida-
ho laws, and the question is is [sic] did he
have it intending to use it in the state of

Idaho. There’s no evidence, none, zero,

that he intended to use that pipe in the

state of Idaho. Yeah, it was in the car. It
might have been used in Oregon, might
have been used in Washington. That’s not.
what's before you. You're in the state of

Idaho, What did he intend to do with it in

the state of Idaho?

The prosecutor objected to this argument as
an erroneous statement of what the State
was required to prove. The district court
sustained the objection.

Nevertheless, the jury clearly understood
defense counsel’s argument. During its delib-
erations, the jury asked the trial court
whether it mattered if Mann intended to use
the paraphernalia in Idaho or elsewhere. The
district court answered this question by stat-
ing: “You are instructed that any possession
of paraphernalia must occur in Idaho. If you
find defendant possessed paraphernalia in
Idaho, you must consider whether the defen-
dant intended to use the paraphernalia, It
does not matter in which state the defendant
formed the intent to use the paraphernalia.”
Mann asserts that this instruction misstated
the elements of the offense and “erroneously
signaled to the jury that a determination of
the requisite mental state at the time of the
criminal act did not matter.”

We observe that the district court’s answer
to the jury was not responsive to the jury’s
question. Although the jury clearly wished to
imow whether the State was required to
prove that Mann intended to use the drug
paraphernalia in Idaho, the trial court evi-
dently interpreted the question as whether it
mattered where the necessary intent was
formed. Notwithstanding the district court’s
failure to answer the jury’s question, we find

no error in the instructions that the district
court provided regarding possession of drug
paraphernalia.

HM This Court reviews jury instructions
to determine “whether the instructions as a
whole fairly and adequately presented the
issues and stated the law.” Schmechel v.
Dillé, 148 Idaho 176, 187, 219 P.8d 1192, 1203
(2009). On appeal, Mann asserts that the jury
instructions did not adequately present the
elements of the offense, Specifically, Mann
asserts that the jury instructions did not
require the State to prove that, while in
Idaho, Mann had the intent to use the para-
phernalia, This is significantly different than
the argument advanced before the trial court,
which was that the State was required to
prove that Mann intended to use the para-
phernalia within Idaho,”

First, we note that the answer that the
district court provided, although nonrespon-
sive to the question before it, was an accu-
rate statement of law. Idaho Code section 18-
202 provides: “The following persons are lia-
ble to punishment under the law of this state:
(1) All persons who commit, in whole or in
part, any crime within this state....” Simi-
larly, Idaho Code section 19-802 provides:
“When the commission of a public offense,
commenced without the state is consummat-
ed within its boundaries, the defendant is
liable to punishment therefor in this
state....”

HE More importantly, the instrue-
tions that the trial court gave regarding the
elements of the offense correctly stated the
State’s burden. “Ordinarily the language em-
ployed by the legislature in defining a crime
is deemed to be best suited for that purpose,
and error cannot be predicated on its use in
jury instructions.” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996). “An erro-
neous instruction will not constitute revers-
ible error unless the instructions as a whole
misled the jury or prejudiced a party.” State
vu. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.8d 858,
865 (2011). “The [Idaho Criminal Jury In-

2, The position that Mann argued before the dis-
trict court was clearly wrong. The statute does
not require the State to prove that the defendant
intended to use the drug paraphernalia within
the State of Idaho to introduce a controlled sub-

43

structions] are presumptively correct.”
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225
P.8d 700, 704 n.2 (2010). “Trial courts should
follow the [Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions]
as closely as possible to avoid creating unnec-
essary grounds for appeal.” Jd. Idaho Crimi-
nal Jury Instruction 408 relates to possession
of drug paraphernalia. 1.C.J.I. 408, Jury In-
struction 12h in this case was based on Idaho
Criminal Jury Instruction 408.

HM Jury Instruction 12h required the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

() On or about 8th day of February,
2015;

2) in the state of Idaho;

(8) the defendant JESSE EUGENE
MANN possessed a bong or pipe, intend-
ing;

(4) to use it to introduce into the human
body a controlled substance.

This instruction required the State to prove
not only that Mann possessed paraphernalia
while in the State of Idaho but also that he
intended to use that paraphernalia to intro-
duce a controlled substance into the body.
This instruction is an accurate statement of
the law,

HM Jury instructions are to be consid-
ered as a whole. Draper, 151 Idaho at 588,
261 P.8d at 865. As stated above, an errone-
ous instruction will not be considered revers-
ible error unless the instructions as a whole
misled the jury or prejudiced a party. Id.
Mann argues that the answer the court pro-
vided relieved the State of its burden of
proving intent within the jurisdiction, We
disagree. Jury Instruction 12h properly stat-
ed the State’s burden. The court’s answer to
the jury’s question simply instructed the jury
that it didn’t matter where that intent was
initially formed. This instruction is consistent
with Idaho Code sections 18-202 and 19-301.
Thus, we find Mann’s claim of error to be
without merit.

stance into a human body. Rather, it requires the
State to prove that, while in Idaho, the defendant
possessed paraphernalia with the intent to intro-
duce a controlled substance into a human body,
regardless of where that use might occur.

44 Le |
IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgments of the district
court.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur.

394 P,3d 87
Melinda DEITER and Joseph Deiter, indi-
vidually, and as parents and natural
guardians of Melinda Roberts and Gide-
on Deiter, minors, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Donald COONS, Sharon Coons, and Pen-
ny Coons dba Don’s Meats, and Patty A.
Anderson, Defendants-Respondents,

and

Janak, Inc,, and Donald
Janak, Defendants.

Docket No, 42634-2014

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2016 Term.

Filed: May 1, 2017

Elliot L. Olsen, Pritzker Olsen, P.A., Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, argued for appellants.

Stanley J. Tharp, Eberle, Berlin, Kading,
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd., Boise, argued
for respondents Donald Coons, Sharon
Coons, and Penny Coons.

Steven R. Kraft, Moore & Elia, LLP,
argued for respondent Patty
Anderson,

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Gem County from
a judgment dismissing claims against the
person who sold a steer for slaughter that
was later contaminated with E. coli bacteria
by the slaughterer and against the persons to
whom the slaughterer delivered the carcass
for processing into packages of meat. We
affirm the judgment of the district court.

L

Factual Background.

Patty Anderson agreed to sell a 4-H steer
for her eighteen-year-old granddaughter
Danielle Bryant, who had purchased and
raised the steer. Ms, Anderson placed an ad
on Craigslist, and Joseph Deiter responded

to the ad, but he only wanted to purchase
one-half of the steer. He and Ms. Anderson.
communicated regarding various issues, and
she ultimately prepared a handwritten con-
tract (“Deiter Contract”), which they both
signed. The contract provided:
This is a contract iniated [sic] on Aug.
14, 2010 between Patty A. Anderson and
Joseph and Melinda Deiter ... Meridian,
ID.

A deposit of $100.00 (check # 1178) has
been received by Patty A. Anderson for 1/2
of a beef in (carcass weight). Once the beef
has been killed and delivered to Don's
Meat in Emmett, ID, the carcass weight
will be known and Sharon Coons (owner of
Don’s Meat) will tell us what that weight
is. At that time Joseph and Melinda Deiter
will pay me (Patty Anderson) the amount
of $2.25 Ib for 1/2 the beef. When the meat
has been cut + wrapped by Don’s Meat
Joseph and Melinda Deiter will pay Sharon
Coons 45¢ Ib for that service and will pick
up their half of the beef.

Once Mr. Deiter had paid the $100.00 de-
posit and returned the signed contract, Ms.
Anderson then had to find someone who was
willing to purchase the other half of the steer
before it was slaughtered. She placed anoth-
er ad on Craigslist seeking a purchaser for
the other half of the steer. A Mrs. Kirk
responded to that ad, paid a $100.00 deposit,
and signed a handwritten contract dated Au-
gust 17, 2010, that had been prepared by Ms.
Anderson.

Ms. Anderson contacted Donald Janak,
who along with his wife own Janak, Ine, a
mobile slaughtering business. He was asked
to slaughter the steer on behalf of Mr. Deiter
and Mrs. Kirk and to deliver the carcass to
Don’s Meats, which was a custom meat pro-
cessing business that was owned and operat-
ed by Donald and Sharon Coons and their
daughter Penny Coons. Mr. Janak and an
employee of Janak, Inc, went to Ms.
Anderson’s property, where Ms. Anderson’s
ex-husband delivered possession of the steer
to Mr. Janak. Mr. Janak and the employee
slaughtered and skinned the steer, cut the
carcass in half down the middle, and deliv-
ered the two halves of the carcass to Don’s

Meats, where the meat was processed. Mr.
Deiter’s half of the carcass was processed
first, and then Mrs. Kirk’s half of the carcass
was processed, Ms. Anderson paid Mr. Ja-
nak’s fee, Mr. Deiter and Mrs. Kirk informed
Don’s Meats how they each wanted their
respective halves of the carcass butchered
and wrapped, and they each picked up their
respective quantities of cut-and-wrapped
meat from Don’s Meats. Each package of
meat was marked “Not for Sale.” After eat-
ing the meat, the members of the Deiter
family became ill due to becoming infected
with E. coli bacteria.

On January 9, 2012, the Deiters filed this
action against Ms. Anderson, Mr. Janak and
his corporation, and the Coonses. Ms.
Anderson filed a motion for summary judg-
ment as to the claims against her, and, after
briefing and argument, the district court
granted her motion. The Deiters filed a mo-
tion for reconsideration, but the court denied
their motion. The Coonses moved for sum-
mary judgment as to the claims against them
and, after briefing and argument, the district
court granted their motion. The Deiters set-
tled with Mx. Janak and Janak, Ine. and
they appealed the judgment in favor of Ms.
Anderson and the Coonses. After oral argu-
ment, this Court requested that the parties
submit additional briefing on the issue of
when title to the steer passed under the
Uniform Commercial Code, and the parties
did so.

IL

Did the District Court Err in Granting
Summary Judgment to Ms.
Anderson?

HM In their complaint, the Deiters al-
Jeged various theories of liability against Ms.
Anderson, but the only theory they argue on
appeal is that she was negligent per se for
violating the Federal Meat Inspection Act,
specifically 21 U.S.C. § 610(c). They argued
to the district court that she violated the act
because she sold adulterated meat; the steer
was slaughtered under insanitary conditions;
and she did not sell, slaughter, or prepare
the steer for her own use. On appeal, the
Deiters argue additional alleged violations of
the Act that they contend would be a basis

47

for a finding of negligence per se. Because
those additional theories were not argued in
the district court, we will not consider them
on appeal. “An appellant is bound by the
issues and theories upon which the case was
tried below. Although a judgment may be
sustained upon any legal theory, a new theo-
ry cannot be employed on appeal to attack
the judgment.” Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben
Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 207, 814 P.2d
917, 989 (1991).

HI The Deiters argued to the district
court that Mr, Anderson was negligent per
se for violating section 610(¢) of the Act,
which provides:

No person, firm, or corporation shall,
with respect to any cattle, sheep, swine,
goats, horses, mules, or other equines, or
any carcasses, parts of carcasses, meat or
meat food products of any such animals—

(©) Sales, transportation, and other
transactions
sell, transport, offer for sale or transporta-
tion, or receive for transportation, in com-
merce, (1) any such articles which (A) are
capable of use as human food and (B) are
adulterated or misbranded at the time of
such sale, transportation, offer for sale or
transportation, or receipt for transporta-
tion; or @) any articles required to be
inspected under this subchapter unless
they have been so inspected and passed

in order to violate this provision, Ms.
Anderson would have had to “sell, transport,
offer for sale or transportation, or receive for
transportation, [the described articles] in
commerce.” When initially enacted, the Act
did not apply to intrastate transactions. The
word “commerce” was defined to mean only
interstate transactions. 21 U.S.C. § 601(h).
The Act was later amended to permit the
Secretary of Agriculture to designate a State
as one in which the Act applies to operations
and transactions wholly within the State if it
has failed to develop or is not enforcing
requirements equal to those imposed by the
Act. 21 U.S.C. § 661(4)(0)(1). The Secretary
designated Idaho as subject to the Act in
1981. Designation of the State of Idaho un-

48

der the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 46 Fed.
Reg. 28887-01 (May 29, 1981). Years later,
the Idaho Legislature repealed Idaho’s meat.
inspection laws. Ch. 94, § 1, 2006 Idaho Sess.
Laws, 267, 267. Therefore, the district court
erred in holding that the Act only applied to
interstate transactions. “When the trial court
reaches the correct result by an erroneous
theory, we will affirm the result on the cor-
rect theory,” Stapleton v. Jack Cushman
Drilling & Pump Co. Inc., 158 Idaho 735,
740, 291 P.8d 418, 428 (2012).

Ms. Anderson was acting as an agent for
her granddaughter throughout these transac-
tions. There is a factual dispute as to wheth-
er Mr. Deiter was so informed, but that
dispute is immaterial. Being an agent of an
undisclosed principal would make her liable
on the contract, Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson,
156 Idaho 908, 908, 332 P.3d 815, 820 (2014),
but in this case it does not change the analy-
sis with respect to liability.

Ms. Anderson was not liable because under
the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code, title to
the steer passed to Mr. Deiter and Mrs. Kirk
when possession was transferred to Mr. Ja-
nak. The Deiters contend that they did not
purchase the steer; they only purchased the
meat that was to be derived from the steer.
They argue that the contract uses the word
“beef,” which means the meat from the steer,
not the steer itself, The word “beef” can
mean “the flesh of a cow, steer, or bull raised
and killed for its meat” or “an adult cow,
steer, or bull raised for its meat.” Random
House, Inc. _ http:/Avww.dictionary.com/
browse/beef (accessed: March 28, 2017). The
Deiter Contract unambiguously used the
word “beef” to mean an adult steer raised for
meat.

The contract stated that Mr. Deiter pur-
chased “1/2 of a beef in (carcass weight).” It
was one-half of “a beef” that he contracted to
purchase. (Emphasis added.) The use of the
singular “a” indicates that he purchased one-
half of an object. The contract then states,
“Once the beef has been killed and delivered.
to Don’s Meat in Emmett, ID, the carcass
weight will be known....” Only something
living could be killed. The steer was living,
the meat later derived from the carcass was
not living and could not be killed. The words

“the beef” could only refer to the “beef” in
the preceding sentence, which is the one-half
of a beef that Mr. Deiter contracted to pur-
chase. Selling a live steer that is to be butch-
ered and sold by carcass weight does not
indicate that it is only the resulting pro-
cessed meat that is being sold. Therefore, the
contract unambiguously states that Mr. Deit-
er purchased one-half of the steer that was to
be killed and that the purchase price was to
be determined based upon the carcass weight
of the steer after it was slaughtered and
delivered to Don’s Meats.

Idaho Code section 28-2-401(2) provides,
insofar as is relevant, “Unless otherwise ex-
plicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes
his performance with reference to the physi-
cal delivery of the goods....” There was no
explicit agreement that title to the steer
would pass at any time other than when Ms.
Anderson completed her performance with
reference to the physical delivery of the
steer. Therefore, title passed when she com-
pleted that performance.

Idaho Code section 28-2-308(a) states that
unless otherwise agreed “the place for deliv-
ery of goods is the seller’s place of business
or if he has none his residence.” It is undis-
puted that Mr. Janak went to Ms. Anderson’s
residence where the steer was being held to
take possession of the steer so he could
slaughter it. Upon taking possession of the
steer, Mr. Janak and the employee slaugh-
tered it and then delivered the steer carcass
to Don’s Meats.

Under the Deiter Contract, it is clear that
the carcass was to be delivered to Don's
Meats. The contract states, “Once the beef
has been killed and delivered to Don’s Meat
in Emmett, ID, the carcass weight will be
known and Sharon Coons (owner of Don’s
Meat) will tell us what that weight is.” Ms.
Anderson instructed Mr. Janak that after he
had slaughtered the steer, he was to deliver
the steer carcass to Don’s Meats. Mr. Deiter
and Mrs, Kirk became owners of the steer
when Mr, Janak took possession of it, At that
point Ms, Anderson had “complete[d] hfer]
performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods.” I.C. § 28-2-401@).

“Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
there are two types of sales contracts when a
earrier is used to transport the goods sold:
(1) ‘shipment’ contracts; and (2) ‘destination’
contracts,” 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 479 (2014)
(footnotes omitted), Idaho Code section 28-2-
401 sets forth when title passes under ship-
ment and destination contracts. It states:

(a) if the contract requires or authorizes

the seller to send the goods to the buyer

but does not require him to deliver them at
destination, title passes to the buyer at the
time and place of shipment; but

(b) if the contract requires delivery at

destination, title passes on tender there,
LC. § 28-2-401(2), Subsection (a) states when
title passes for shipment contracts and sub-
section (b) states when title passes under
destination contracts,

HI Under the shipment contract, the sell-
er delivers the goods to a third party to
transport the goods to the place required
under the contract, and title passes when the
goods are delivered to the person who will
transport them. “The effect of the [Uniform
Commercial] Code is that in the ‘shipment’
contract, the most commonly used method,
delivery to the carrier is delivery to the
buyer.” 67 Am, Jur. 2d Sales § 480 (2014).
“‘A® delivery by direction of the buyer to a
third person as intermediary to ship the
goods is a good. delivery to the buyer.”
Adams v. H & H Meat Products, Inc., 41
S.W.3d 762, 773 (Tex. App. 2001), Therefore,
when Ms, Anderson delivered possession of
the steer to Mr, Janak, who was then to
slaughter it and transport the carcass to
Don’s Meats, title to the steer passed to Mr.
Deiter and Mrs, Kirk,

“The ‘shipment’ contract is regarded as the
normal one, and the ‘destination’ contract is
regarded as the variant.” 67 Am. Jur. 2d
Sales § 479 (2014). If terms such as “F.O.B.
the place of shipment” or “F.O.B. the place
of destination” are not used in the contract
“and there has been no specific agreement to
the contrary, a contract for the transporta-
tion of goods by carrier will be presumed to
be a ‘shipment’ contract.” Jd. Thus, the Deit-
er Contract is a shipment contract if the
contract did not have a specific agreement
making it a destination contract.

49

Idaho Code section 28-2-508 deals with the
manner of the seller's tender of delivery.
Subsection (2) of the statute refers to deliv-
ery under a shipment contract, and subsec-
tion (8) deals with delivery under a destina-
tion contract. The Official Comment to the
statute provides some explanation as to the
difference between the two. It states:

5, For the purposes of subsections (2)
and (8) there is omitted from this Article
[Chapter] the rule under prior uniform
legislation that a term requiring the seller
to pay the freight or cost of the transporta-
tion to the buyer is equivalent to an agree-
ment by the seller to deliver to the buyer
or at an agreed destination, This omission
is with the specific intention of negating
the rule, for under this Article [Chapter]
the “shipment” contract is regarded as the
normal one and the “destination” contract
is the variant type. The seller is not obli-
gated to deliver at a named. destination
and bear the concurrent risk of loss until
arrival, wnless he has specifically agreed
so to deliver or the commercial under-
standing of the terms used by the parties
contemplates such delivery.

(Emphases added.)

As’ stated in the comment, the prior uni-
form law provided that a contractual provi-
sion requiring the seller to pay the cost of
transporting the goods to the buyer made
the contract a destination contract, but the
current version of the Uniform Commercial
Code was specifically intended to negate that
rule, Thus, the facts that Ms. Anderson paid
Mr, Janak’s fee and had him deliver the steer
carcass to Don’s Meats did. not make this
contract a destination contract. Likewise, a
provision as to where the goods are to be
shipped does not make the contract a desti-
nation contract. As stated in American Juris-
prudence Second,

If the parties intend that delivery be
made to a carrier, a request in the buyer’s
letter to the seller that the goods be
shipped to the buyer’s residence is a mere
shipping instruction that does not convert
the contract to a destination contract, and
the risk of loss passes to the buyer at the

50

time the goods are delivered to a carrier,

such as the postal service.

67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 480 (2014) (emphasis
added).

HM “Thus a ‘ship to’ term has no signifi-
cance in determining whether a contract is a
shipment or destination contract for risk of
Joss purposes. Other buyers have occasional-
ly argued that the ‘ship to’ term made the
contract into a destination contract. Courts
have properly rejected this argument.” Hber-
hard Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 61 Mich.App. 268,
232 N.W.2d 878, 380 (1975). Likewise:

A “send to” or “ship to” term is a part of

every contract involving the sale of goods

where carriage is contemplated and has no
significance in determining whether the
contract is a shipment or destination con-
tract for risk of loss purposes. As such, the

“send to” term contained in this contract

cannot, without more, convert this into a

destination contract.

Pestana v. Karinol Corp., 367 So.2d 1096,
1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 1979) (citations
omitted),

Hl The Deiter Contract did not expressly
require Ms. Anderson to deliver the steer or
the steer carcass to any place. “The parties
must explicitly agree to a destination con-
tract; otherwise the contract will be consid-
ered a shipment contract.” Id, at 1099. There
was nothing in the contract regarding risk of
loss if the carcass was taken to the wrong
place. The contract stated, “Once the beef
has been killed and delivered to Don’s Meat
in Emmett, ID, the carcass weight will be
known and Sharon Coons (owner of Don’s
Meat) will tell us what that weight is.” The
contract certainly contemplated that the
steer carcass would be delivered to Don's
Meats, but it did not state who was to deliver
it, nor did’ it include any provision regarding
the risk of loss if it was not delivered to
Don’s Meats.

Because the contract in this case was a
shipment contract, title passed to Mr. Deiter
and Mrs. Kirk at the time and place that Ms.
Anderson completed her performance with
reference to the physical delivery of the
goods. 1.C, § 28-2-401(2). Once possession of
the steer was delivered to Mr. Janak, there

was nothing more for Ms. Anderson to do
under the contract with respect to the physi-
eal delivery of the goods, She thereafter nev-
er had possession of the steer or its carcass.
She had completed all that she was to do.

Mr. Janak had agreed to transport the
carcass to Don’s Meats, where the Deiters
were to pick up their portion of the meat
after it was processed. As the contract stat-
ed, “When the meat has been cut + wrapped
by Don’s Meat Joseph and Melinda Deiter
will pay Sharon Coons 45¢ lb for that service
and will pick up their half of the beef.”
(Emphasis added.) Once Ms. Anderson deliv-
ered possession of the steer to Mr. Janak,
Mr. Deiter became the owner of a one-half
interest in the steer, and Mrs. Kirk became
the owner of the other one-half interest.

The Deiters argued in the district court
that Ms. Anderson was not exempt from the
provisions of the Federal Meat Inspection
Act because she did not sell, slaughter, or
prepare the steer for her own use, She did
not sell, slaughter, or prepare the meat. She
sold a steer, and when it was slaughtered and
the carcass prepared, Mr. Deiter and Ms.
Kirk were the owners of the steer and its
carcass.

The Deiters argued to the district court
that Ms. Anderson violated the Federal Meat,
Inspection Act because she sold or offered
for sale, in commerce, articles which were
capable for use as human food and which
were adulterated at the time of the sale or
offer for sale as proscribed by 21 U.S.C.
§ 610(c), The steer was not “capable of use
as human food” as that term is used in 21
US.C, § 610(c). That term does not apply to
a live animal. It would have to be “any
carcass, or part or product of a carcass, of
any livestock.” 9 CFR § 801.2(/). It was also
not adulterated at the time of the sale.

Finally, the Deiters argued in the district
court that Ms. Anderson violated the Federal
Meat Inspection Act because the steer was
slaughtered under insanitary conditions. A
carcass would be adulterated under the Act if
the steer was slaughtered in insanitary con-
ditions. 21 U.S. Code § 6011) & (m)(4).
However, she was not the owner of the steer
when that occurred.

HME When reviewing on appeal the
granting of a motion for summary judgment,
we apply the same standard used by the trial
court in ruling on the motion. Infanger v.
City of Salmon, 187 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d
1100, 1101-02 (2002). We construe all disput-
ed facts, and draw all reasonable inferences
from the record, in favor of the non-moving
party. Id. at 47, 44 P.8d at 1102. Summary
judgment is appropriate only if the evidence
in the record and any admissions show that
there is no genuine issue of any material fact
regarding the issues raised in the pleadings
and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.

We uphold the judgment of the district
court dismissing this action as to Ms.
Anderson. The Deiters have not shown that
there was any genuine issue of material fact
regarding their claim that she was negligent
per se for violating provisions of the Federal
Meat Inspection Act,

I

Did the District Court Err in Granting
Summary Judgment to the
Coonses?

HI In their complaint, the Deiters al-
leged various theories of liability against the
Coonses, but the only theories they argue on
appeal is that the Coonses were negligent
per se based upon their violation of various
provisions of the Federal Meat Inspection
Act. With respect to that Act, the Deiters
argued to the district court that the Coonses
were negligent per se for violating subsec-
tions (a), (c), and (d) of 21 U.S.C. § 610.

Subsection (a), (¢), and (d) of 21 U.S.C.
§ 610 provide:

No person, firm, or corporation shall,
with respect to any cattle, sheep, swine,
goats, horses, mules, or other equines, or
any carcasses, parts of carcasses, meat or
meat food products of any such animals—

(a) Slaughtering animals or prepara-

tion of articles capable of use as hu-

man food

slaughter any such animals or prepare
any such articles which are capable of use
as human food at any establishment pre-
paring any such articles for commerce,

51

except in compliance with the require-
ments of this chapter;

(c) Sales, transportation, and other

transactions

sell, transport, offer for sale or transpor-
tation, or receive for transportation, in
commerce, (1) any such articles which (A)
are capable of use as human food and (B)
are adulterated or misbranded at the time
of such sale, transportation, offer for sale
or transportation, or receipt for transpor-
tation; or (2) any articles required to be
inspected under this subchapter unless
they have been so inspected and passed;

(d) Adulteration or misbranding =~

do, with respect to any such articles
which are capable of use as human food,
any act while they are being transported in
commerce or held for sale after such trans-
portation, which is intended to cause or
has the effect of causing such articles to be
adulterated or misbranded.

In their initial brief opposing the Coonses’
motion for summary judgment, the Deiters
contended that the Coonses violated the Fed-
eral Meat Inspection Act

for three reasons. First, they prepared

human food for commerce not in compli-

ance with the requirements of this chapter.

Second, they received for transportation

food articles which were adulterated at the

time of such receipt for transportation.

Third, they received food articles that were

required to be inspected under this sub-

chapter, given that they were not operat-
ing as a “custom exempt” plant.

With respect to their first reason, the Deit-
ers did not’ point to any provision of the
Federal Meat Inspection Act that the Coons-
es allegedly violated other than “ ‘receiv[ing]
for transportation’ any beef that is ‘adulterat-
ed or misbranded at the time of such ...
receipt for transportation’ or receive for
transportation ‘any articles required to be
inspected under this subchapter’” and “com-
mit[ting] any act while beef is being held for
sale after transportation which is intended to
cause or has the effect of causing such arti-
cles to be misbranded.” The district court
held that the Deiters had not presented any

52

evidence showing that the Coonses received
the carcass for transportation, and the Deit-
ers have not pointed to any evidence showing
that they did. Likewise, there is no evidence
that the Coonses held the meat for sale, In
fact, the Deiter Contract stated, “When the
meat has been cut + wrapped by Don’s Meat
Joseph and Melinda Deiter will pay Sharon
Coons 45¢ Ib for that service and will pick up
their half of the beef.” (Emphasis added.)
The Coonses were to be paid for their ser-
vices in preparing the meat, They did not
own the meat and did not purport to sell it.

HM Finally, the Deiters argued that the
meat was not exempt from the inspection
requirements because the Coonses did not
prepare the meat for Ms, Anderson, whom
they contend was the owner, but they pre-
pared the meat for the Deiters and the
Kirks. The Deiters stated as follows:

As the regulations make clear, “[tJhe re-

quirements of the Act ... do not apply to”

the following:

the custom preparation by any person,
firm, or corporation of carcasses, parts
thereof, meat or meat food products,
derived from the slaughter by any per-
son of cattle, sheep, swine, or goats of
his own raising, or from game animals,
delivered by the owner thereof for such
custom preparation, and transportation
in commerce of such custom prepared
articles, exclusively for use in the house-
hold_of such owner, by him and mem-
bers of his household and his nonpaying
guests and employees.

21 U.S.C. § 628(a) (emphasis added),

Based upon the portion of the statute they
emphasized, they asserted, “Because the
Coons Defendants were not preparing the
steer and its meat exclusively for use in the
household of Patty Anderson, for use in their
own household, or for use in the household of
their employees, they were in violation of the
Federal Meat Inspection Act.” They further
explained that “the Coons Defendants knew
they were doing the butchering work for two
families, the Deiter family and the Kirk fami-
ly—clearly not the owners of the cow.” As
explained above, Ms. Anderson was not the
owner of the steer when it was slaughtered,
nor was she the owner of the carcass when it

was delivered to Don’s Meats, Mr. Deiter
and Mrs. Kirk were the owners. Thus, the
Deiters’ argument that Don’s Meats was not
a custom exempt facility was erroneous,

In their supplemental brief filed in opposi-
tion to the Coonses’ motion for summary
judgment, the Deiters contended that the
Coonses violated the Federal Meat Inspec-
tion Act

because they have (1) “received for trans-

portation” meat that has not been subject

to ante and post-mortem inspection; (2)

“prepared” meat that has not been subject

to ante and post-mortem inspection; (8)

“offered for transportation” meat that has

not been subject to ante and post-mortem

inspection; and (4) performed an act that

“has the effect of causing” meat to be

“misbranded” (ie. labeling meat as “Not

for Sale” when in fact it is for sale).

The inspections required by the Federal
Meat Inspection Act are an antemortem in-
spection “of all amenable species before they
shall be allowed to enter into any slaughter-
ing, packing, meat-canning, rendering, or
similar establishment, in which they are to be
slaughtered and the meat and meat food
products thereof are to be used in com-
merce,” 21 U.S.C. § 608(a), and a postmor-
tem inspection “of the carcasses and parts
thereof of all amenable species to be pre-
pared at any slaughtering, meat-canning,
salting, packing, rendering, or similar estab-
lishment.” 21 U.S.C. § 604.

21 U.S.C. § 628(a) exempts custom exempt
facilities from the “provisions of this sub-
chapter requiring inspection of the slaughter
of animals and the preparation of the car-
casses, parts thereof, meat and meat food
products at establishments conducting such
operations for commerce.” As stated above,
the Deiters contended that this exemption
did not apply because the meat was not
prepared for the owner, Ms, Anderson, but
instead for the Deiters and the Kirks. Thus,
their assertions that the meat had not been
inspected as required by the Federal Meat
Inspection Act fails under the Deiters’ argu-
ment,

HEI also fails because the Deiters
did not present any evidence that either the

antemortem inspection or the postmortem
inspection was designed to or could deter-
mine whether the meat was adulterated with
E, coli bacteria. “The elements of a common
Jaw negligence action are (1) a duty, recog-
nized by law, requiring the defendant to con-
form to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a
breach of that duty; (8) a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the re-
sulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.”
Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Ida-
ho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171,
175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991). “‘The
effect of establishing negligence per se
through violation of a statute is to conclusive-
ly establish the first two elements of a cause
of action in negligence....’ ‘Negligence per
se lessens the plaintiff's burden only on the
issue of the “actor’s departure from the stan-
dard of conduct required of a reasonable
man.”’” O’'Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Ida-
ho 49, 52, 122 P.8d 308, 311 (2005) (citations
omitted), Thus, to establish their claim the
Deiters must prove “a causal connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the re-
sulting injury.”

In their motion for summary judgment,
the Coonses contended that “Plaintiffs are
unable to prove proximate causation.” Absent.
evidence as to the nature of the inspection
and whether it could detect the presence of
E. coli bacteria, the Deiters have not pre-
sented any evidence to show a causal connec-
tion between any alleged failure to have an
antemortem or postmortem inspection and
their injuries. The Deiters have not shown
that there was any genuine issue of material
fact supporting the requirement that they
establish that the failure to have the inspec-
tions caused their injuries.

Finally, the Deiters alleged in the district
court that the Coonses misbranded the meat,
by “labeling meat as ‘Not for Sale’ when in
fact it is for sale.” As explained above, the
Coonses did not sell the meat or hold it for
sale, They were paid only to process it, When
the carcass was delivered to Don’s Meats, it
was owned by the Deiters and the Kirks and
they retained ownership of the meat. The
Coonses were only paid for processing it.

As with Ms. Anderson, the district court
held that “ecommerce” did not apply to intra-

53

state transactions when ruling on the Coons-
es’ motion for summary judgment. “When
the trial court reaches the correct result by
an erroneous theory, we will affirm the result
on the correct theory.” Stapleton v, Jack
Cushman Drilling & Pwmp Co. Inc, 158
Idaho 785, 740, 291 P.3d 418, 428 (2012), We
therefore affirm the judgment dismissing the
complaint as to the Coonses.

On appeal, the Deiters argue additional
theories that they contend would support a
claim against the Coonses for negligence per
se, but we will not consider them because
they were not argued in the district court,
“An appellant is bound by the issues and
theories upon which the case was tried below.
Although a judgment may be sustained upon
any legal theory, a new theory cannot be
employed on appeal to attack the judgment.”
Clements Farms, Inc, 120 Idaho at 207, 814
P.2d at 939,

Ty.

Are Defendants Entitled to an Award
of Attorney Fees on Appeal?

HI Both Ms, Anderson and the Coonses
request an award of attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121, “In
normal circumstances, attorney fees will only
be awarded when this court is left with the
abiding belief that the appeal was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreason-
ably or without foundation.” Minich v. Gem
State Developers, Inc,, 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591
P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). We do not find that
this appeal was brought or pursued frivolous-
ly, unreasonably, or without foundation,
Therefore, we will not award them attorney
fees on appeal.

v.
Conclusion.

We affirm the judgment of the district
court, and we award Respondents costs, but
not attorney fees, on appeal.

Justice HORTON and Justice Pro Tem
WALTERS concur,

54

BURDICK, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

I coneur with the majority insofar as it
affirms summary judgment to Anderson. I
write separately to respectfully dissent from
the majority’s analysis in Part III, where it
affirms summary judgment to the Coonses.

As the majority correctly recites, the Deit-
ers asserted the Coonses violated the Feder-
al Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) in three main
ways:

First, they prepared human food for com-
merce not in compliance with the require-
ments of this chapter. Second, they re-
ceived for transportation food articles
which were adulterated at the time of such
receipt for transportation. Third, they re-
ceived food articles that were required to
be inspected under this subchapter, given
that they were not operating as a “custom
exempt” plant.

The shortcomings of the majority's analy-
sis emerge when the Deiters’ first argument
is addressed. The majority overlooks how the
FMIA defines “prepare” to mean “slaugh-
tered, canned, salted, rendered, boned, cut.
up, or otherwise manufactured or processed.”
21 U.S.C. § 601(0). Indeed, the majority nev-
er acknowledges the FMIA’s broad definition
of “prepare.” As a result, the majority is led
to sidestep the Deiters’ argument, raised be-
fore the district court, triggering the FMIA’s
broad definition of “prepare”—i.e., that “the
Coons Defendants clearly dealt with ‘adulter-
ated’ beef that they further processed into
steaks, roasts, and ground beef.” That asser-
tion, if true, would indicate a violation of 21
U.S.C, § 610(a). But perhaps most critical in
this regard, the district court made no find-
ing as to whether the Coonses “prepared”
the beef in violation of the FMIA, and I
would therefore adhere to precedent and re-
frain from doing so on appeal. Cf Boise
Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho
774, 784, 215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009) (remanding
case for resolution of issues the district court
never reached).

Further, I cannot agree with the majori-
ty’s conclusion that “the Deiters’ argument.
that Don’s Meats was not a custom exempt
facility was erroneous.” 21 U.S.C. § 628 gov-
erns exemptions and specifically exempts

“[plersonal slaughtering and custom slaugh-
tering for personal, household, guest, and
employee uses.” That provision states:

The provisions of this subchapter requir-
ing inspection of the slaughter of animals
and the preparation of the carcasses, parts
thereof, meat and meat food products at
establishments conducting such operations
for commerce shall not apply to [1] the
slaughtering by any person of animals of
his own raising, and the preparation by
him and transportation in commerce of the
carcasses, parts thereof, meat and meat
food products of such animals exclusively
for use by him and members of his house-
hold and his nonpaying guests and employ-
ees; [2] nor to the custom slaughter by any
person, firm, or corporation of cattle,
sheep, swine or goats delivered by the
owner thereof for such slaughter, and the
preparation by such slaughterer and trans-
portation in commerce of the carcasses,
parts thereof, meat and meat food prod-
ucts of such animals, exclusively for use, in
the household of such owner, by him and
members of his household and his nonpay-
ing guests and employees; [8] nor to the
custom preparation by any person, firm, or
corporation of carcasses, parts thereof,
meat or meat food products, derived from
the slaughter by any person of cattle,
sheep, swine, or goats of his own raising,
or from game animals, delivered by the
owner thereof for such custom preparation,
and transportation in commerce of such
eustom prepared articles, exclusively for
use in the household of such owner, by him
and members of his household and his
nonpaying guests and employees: ... Pro-
vided further, That custom operations at
any establishment shall be exempt from
inspection requirements as provided by
this section only if the establishment com-
plies with regulations which the Secretary
is hereby authorized to promulgate to as-
sure that any carcasses, parts thereof,
meat or meat food products wherever han-
dled on a custom basis, or any containers
or packages containing such articles, are
separated at all times from carcasses,
parts thereof, meat or meat food products
prepared for sale, and that all such articles
prepared on a custom basis, or any con-
tainers or packages containing such arti-

cles, are plainly marked “Not for Sale”
immediately after being prepared and kept
so identified until delivered to the owner
and that the establishment conducting the
custom operation is maintained and operat-
ed in a sanitary manner.
21 U.S.C. § 628(a). Thus, the above furnishes
three situations in which the slaughter and
preparation of meat are exempt, The Coons-
es argue they are exempt as a custom opera-
tion under the third situation, which ex-
empts:
[T]he custom preparation by any person,
firm, or corporation of carcasses, parts
thereof, meat or meat food products, de-
rived from the slaughter by any person of
cattle, sheep, swine, or goats of his own
raising, or from game animals, delivered
by the owner thereof for such custom
preparation, and transportation in com-
merce of such custom prepared articles,
exclusively for use in the household of such
owner, by him and members of his house-
hold and his nonpaying guests and employ-
ees|.]
Id. Distilled, the plain language of this ex-
emption covers entities that prepare meat
slaughtered by any person of cattle of his
own raising, which was delivered by the own-
er of the beef for custom preparation that is
exclusively for the owner’s household use. In
other words, two main requirements must be
met for the Coonses to fit this exemption: (1)
the same person who raised the beef must
have slaughtered it; and (2) the owner must
have delivered it to the Coonses for process-
ing for the owner’s exclusive household use.
Both requirements are lacking in this case.
First, the same person who raised the beef
did not slaughter it. Instead, Anderson re-
cruited Janak, Inc. a mobile slaughtering
business, to slaughter the beef after it had
already been raised. Second, the owner of the
beef did not deliver it to the Coonses. Rath-
er, Janak, Inc. delivered the beef to the
Coonses after the slaughter. And, at that

1, I note that the U.S. Senate introduced a bill
that, if enacted, would produce a different result.
If enacted, the Processing Revival and Intrastate
Meat Exemption Act would exempt from the
FMIA custom preparation, like the Coons’ pro-
cessing in this case, if that preparation is (1)
“carried out in accordance of the law of the
State in which the custom slaughter facility is
located”; and (2) “prepared exclusively for distri-

55

time, the Deiters owned the beef, not Janak,
Ine. Thus, the custom exemption does not
apply to the Coonses.! But even if it did, the
Coonses would be exempt “only if the[y] ...
eompl[y] with regulations which the Secre-
tary is hereby authorized to promulgate,” as
stated under 21 U.S.C. § 628(a). Those regu-
lations—numerous and detailed ?—have nei-
ther been addressed by the majority nor
argued by the parties at any proper length
on appeal.

Finally, the majority maintains that sum-
mary judgment is properly affirmed because
the Deiters have presented no evidence of
proximate cause. Given this Court’s clearly
defined role under Article 5, Section 9 of the
Idaho Constitution “to review, upon appeal,
any decision of the district court[ ]’ I would
refrain from reaching the issue of proximate
cause. The district court never reached the
issue of proximate cause; therefore, no deci-
sion on that issue exists for this Court to
review. This Court has so held in the past,
and today should be no different. E.g., Ada
Cty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Invs.,
LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.8d 328, 881
(2008) (“This Court does not review an al-
leged error on appeal unless the record dis-
closes an adverse ruling forming the basis for
the assignment of error.”). In any event,
unlike the majority, I do not believe we are
equipped to resolve proximate cause as a
matter of law in this case. None of the Coons’
proximate cause arguments are properly
suited for a negligence per se causation anal-
ysis—i.e., whether the Coonses violated the
FMIA, and if so, whether that violation
caused the Deiters’ injuries.

For the above reasons, I am unable to join
Part III of the majority’s opinion.

Justice J. Jones, Pro Tem coneurs.

bution to ... (i) household consumers within the
State....”” S. 2651, 114th Cong. (as introduced
by the U.S, Senate on March 8, 2016). However,
because that bill has not been enacted, we must
apply the plain language of the statute in effect.

2. See9 C.F.R. § 303.1.

394 P.3d 99
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v

Chad Lee WILLIAMS, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket No. 48129
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: August 26, 2016

Erie D. Fredericksen, Interim State Ap-
pellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron,
Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for
appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S
PRIOR OPINION DATED JUNE 16,
2016, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN

HUSKEY, Judge

Chad Lee Williams appeals from his judg-
ment of conviction, asserting the district
court erred in denying his motion to sup-
press. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm the trict court’s holding that
Williams’ initial detention was constitutional-

ly permissible because either his detention
was a de minimis intrusion that was out-
weighed by significant law enforcement in-
terests when executing the arrest warrant
for a third party or the officers had a reason-
able suspicion Williams was harboring a fel-
on. We also affirm the district court’s holding
that the initial detention was not unreason-
ably prolonged and there was probable cause
to arrest Williams for frequenting a place
where controlled substances are known to be
located.

L

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Boise City Police officers began surveil-
Jance on an apartment where they believed
the subject of an arrest warrant resided.
Officers positioned themselves at the front of
the apartment and one officer positioned
himself at the back. After conducting surveil-
lance for thirty minutes, the officers watched
one person enter the apartment, but saw four
individuals come out and stand in front of the
door to the apartment. Officers approached
the group to determine whether the subject
of the warrant was one of the four and if so,
to execute the warrant. When an officer
shined his flashlight on the subject of the
warrant, the subject fled into the apartment
and out the back door. One officer pursued
the subject to the back of the apartment to
assist another officer in apprehending and
arresting the subject while two officers de-
tained the three remaining individuals, in-
cluding Williams. After arresting the subject
of the arrest warrant, an officer testified he
returned to the front of the apartment to
assist the other officers with the detained
individuals. As he walked past the apartment,
he detected a strong smell of marijuana ema-
nating from the apartment, The officer testi-
fied that as he approached the front of the
apartment, the other officers were attempt-
ing to identify the three individuals. The
officer asked the apartment owner if there
was marijuana and drug paraphernalia inside
the apartment; she admitted there was.

Based on the odor and the apartment own-
er’s admission to the presence of marijuana,
the officers arrested Williams for frequenting

59

a place where controlled substances are
known to be located. After Williams was
handeuffed, he attempted to run away. An
officer caught him and searched him incident
to arrest. The search yielded a bag of meth-
amphetamine, a bag of marijuana, and drug
paraphernalia. The State charged Williams
with five crimes: felony possession of a con-
trolled substance, methamphetamine; misde-
meanor possession of a controlled substance,
marijuana; possession of paraphernalia; fre-
quenting a place where controlled substances
are known to be located; and resisting and
obstructing officers.

Williams filed a motion to suppress evi-
dence, arguing the evidence was the fruit of
an unlawful detention and arrest. Following a
hearing, the district court denied the motion,
finding the detention and arrest were consti-
tutionally reasonable. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Williams conditionally pleaded
guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, and resisting or obstruct-
ing officers, reserving his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to sup-
press. All other charges were dismissed. The
district court imposed a unified seven-year
sentence, with two years determinate, for the
possession of a controlled substance charge,
and seventy-four days in the county jail, with
eredit for time served, for the resisting and
obstructing charge. Williams timely appeals.

IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMMM The standard of review of a sup-
pression motion is bifureated. When a deci-
sion on a motion to suppress is challenged,
we accept the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence,
but we freely review the application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts as found. State
v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996), At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 998, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999),

60
m1.
ANALYSIS

A. It Was Constitutionally Permissible to
Detain Williams During the Execu-
tion of an Arrest Warrant

Hl Despite Williams’ arguments to the
contrary, the district court rejected Williams’
argument and relied on State v. Reynolds,
148 Idaho 911, 155 P.8d 712 (Ct. App. 2007)
to hold that the constitutionally permissible
detention of third parties during the execu-
tion of a search warrant also applies to the
execution of arrest warrants. Williams con-
ceded in the district court that the officers
lawfully detained him to determine whether
he harbored a fugitive. Given that concession,
he acknowledges on appeal he cannot chal-
lenge the legality of his initial detention;
however, Williams nonetheless argues be-
cause the district court erroneously held the
officers could detain him simply because they
executed an arrest warrant, the basis for
Williams’ detention could not support the
length of his detention,

Although Williams contends both constitu-
tions were violated, he provides no cogent
reason why Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution should be applied differently
than the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in this case. Therefore,
the Court will rely on judicial interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment in its analysis of
Williams’ claims.

Hl The Fourth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution prohibits unreason-
able searches and seizures, Generally, evi-
dence obtained as a result of an unreasonable
search or seizure must be suppressed. Wong
Sun v. United States, 871 U.S. 471, 485, 83
S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 458-454 (1963),
The district court relied on Reynolds in de-
termining the detention of Williams was con-
stitutionally permissible. Reynolds held that.
although detaining an individual during the
execution of a search warrant is constitution-
ally permissible, detaining an individual for
whom there is no evidence linking the indi-
vidual to the premises searched is not consti-

1, See Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed,2d 889 (1968).

tutionally permissible. Reynolds, 148 Idaho
at 916, 155 P.3d at 717.

The underlying rationale in Reynolds was
based on the analysis in Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69
L,Ed.2d 340 (1981), In Summers, police offi-
cers encountered an occupant outside of the
house subject to a search warrant and de-
tained him while they searched the house. Id.
at 698, 101 S.Ct, at 2589, 69 L.Ed.2d at 843-
44, There, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of temporarily seizing
the owner of a home outside the home when
executing a valid search warrant for the
home. In tracing the support for the deten-
tion of individuals in the context of a search
warrant, the Court noted, “some seizures
admittedly covered by the Fourth Amend-
ment constitute such limited intrusions on
the personal security of those detained and
are justified by such substantial law enforce-
ment interests that they may be made on
less than probable cause.” Id, at 699, 101
S.Ct. at 2592, 69 L.Ed.2d at 847-48, The law
enforcement interests are the orderly com-
pletion of the search, preventing flight in the
event incriminating evidence is found, and
the interest of minimizing the risk of harm to
the officers, all of which can be achieved “if
the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation.” Id, at 708, 101
S.Ct. at 2594, 69 L.Ed.2d at 350.

The Court also noted while the cases relied
on to reach the holding were “consistent with
the general rule that every arrest, and every
seizure having the essential attributes of a
formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is
supported by probable cause,” those cases
also demonstrated “the exception for limited
intrusions that may be justified by special
Jaw enforcement interests is not confined to
the momentary, on-the-street detention ac-
companied by a frisk for weapons involved in
Terry! and Adams.” ® Swmmers, 452 U.S, at
700, 101 S.Ct, at 2598, 69 L.Ed.2d at 348, In
deciding whether the case fell within the
general rule or the exception, the Court
looked both to the character of and the justi-
fication for the detention.

2, See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct.
1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).

In analyzing the. character of the deten-
tion, the Court found it important that a
search warrant carried a judicial determina-
tion of probable cause that evidence of crimi-
nal activity may be found on the premises;
thus, a court had already authorized a sub-
stantial invasion of the privacy of the people
who resided on those premises. Jd. at 701,
101 S.Ct. at 2593, 69 L.Ed.2d at 348, The
Court also recognized the detention was un-
likely to be exploited because the information
was likely to be obtained through the search
and not the detention, and the search was
done in a private residence rather than a
public setting, thereby minimizing public
stigma. Jd, The Court also recognized the
intrusion was “substantially less” than an
arrest. Id. at 702, 101 S.Ct. at 2594, 69
L.Ed.2d at 350,

In defining the justification for the deten-
tion, the Court referenced the officers’ need
to control the scene, protect themselves from
attack while they execute a search warrant,
prevent the occupants from concealing or
disposing of the items described in the
search warrant, and ensure the orderly com-
pletion of the search, Jd, at 701-708, 101
S.Ct, at 2598-94, 69 L.Hd.2d at 348-50, Also
of concern was the fact that a search for
narcotics, because of the nature of the under-
lying offense, may give rise to sudden vio-
lence or the frantic efforts to dispose of
evidence. Id. at 702, 101 S.Ct. at 2594, 69
L.Ed,2d at 350.

Ultimately, the Court reasoned, “the con-
nection of an occupant to that home gives the
police officer an easily identifiable and cer-
tain basis for determining that suspicion of
criminal activity justifies a detention of that
occupant.” Id. at 703-04, 101 S.Ct. at 2594~
95, 69 L.Ed.2d at 350-51. Notably, in Swm-
mers, there was no particular suspicion that
the individual posed a specific danger to the
officers, yet the risk of potential harm was
still considered a sufficiently significant law
enforcement interest to justify the detention,
And, although the holding in Summers is
predicated upon the officers being in posses-
sion of a valid search warrant rather than a
valid arrest warrant for a third party, other
courts have applied the rationale of Sum-
‘mers—the need to control the scene and to

61

protect officers and others—to find the de-
tention of a third party based on the arrest
warrant of another party is constitutionally
permissible,

For example, the court in United States v,
Maddox, 388 F.3d 1856 (10th Cir. 2004) held
it was constitutionally reasonable to detain a
third party during the arrest of a subject
because of the officers’ need to take reason-
able steps to ensure their safety after, and
while making, the arrest. Jd. at 1362-63, In
Maddow, a county deputy and two federal
marshals went to execute an arrest warrant
in a high crime area at a house known to be
dangerous. Id. at 1858-59. While the mar-
shals were inside executing the warrant, ulti-
mately eight other individuals were detained
outside, including Maddox. Id. at 1859,

During this time, Maddox’s behavior be-
came erratic and the initial deputy asked
that Maddox be separated from the group
based on the officer’s belief that Maddox was
dangerous. Id. at 1860. After confirming
Maddox’s identity, the deputy asked Maddox
if he had any weapons and Maddox con-
firmed he did. Id. Maddox was then hand-
cuffed and searched, revealing methamphet-
amine and a scale, Jd. Maddox was charged
with various crimes and moved to suppress
the evidence seized from him on the grounds
that his detention and questioning violated
the, Fourth Amendment, Id, The motion was
denied and Maddox entered a conditional
guilty plea, reserving the right to challenge
the denial of the motion to suppress. Jd.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of
the motion, holding Maddox’s detention in
the carport was constitutionally reasonable
based on Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,
110 S.Ct, 1098, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). In
determining there was no reason to distin-
guish between a protective search within a
home and a “protective detention” outside a
home, the court noted:

We hold that Buie applies to both protec-

tive searches and protective detentions

because the Court’s reasoning in Buie
supports treating protective sweeps and
protective detentions similarly. In autho-
rizing officers to protect themselves by
making a limited search for potentially
dangerous individuals, the Court stated

62 De

that officers may take “reasonable steps
to ensure their safety ‘after, and while
making, the arrest.” Because the ability to
search for dangerous individuals provides
little protection for officers unless it is ac-
companied by the ability to temporarily
seize any dangerous individuals that are
located during the search, we conclude
that detaining potentially dangerous per-
sons for the duration of the arrest quali-
fies as a “reasonable step[] to ensure the
[officers’] safety.”
Maddox, 388 F.3d at 1862 (citations omitted).
Thereafter, the court addressed whether
the protective detention was limited to inside
a home or might include an area immediately
outside the home. In defining where a pro-
tective detention would apply, the court re-
lied on the Buie Court’s “arrest scene” lan-
guage. Id. at 1863. Noting the Buie Court
held protective sweeps protect officers from
potentially dangerous individuals that may be
nearby, it was appropriate to consider the
reasonable threats posed to the officers when
drawing the boundaries of the arrest scene in
an individual case. Id.
The court found:
the officer-safety interests at issue in Bute
are nearly identical to those in play here.
As in Buie, the arrest of Ms. Page was
done inside the residence. As the Court
put it, in that instance “[t]he risk of danger
... [to law enforcement officers is] as
great as, if not greater than, it is in an on-
the-street or roadside investigatory en-
counter ... [and puts them] at the disad-
vantage of being on [their] adversary’s
‘turf? An ambush in a confined setting of
unknown configuration is more to be
feared than it is in open, more familiar
surroundings.”
Id. (citing Buie, 494 U.S. at 387, 110 S.Ct. at
1099, 108 L.Ed.2d at 288). The court found
Maddox's detention was justified because he
‘was within the geographical area of the ar-
rest scene, regardless of whether the deputy
believed Maddox was armed and presently
dangerous. However, the court went on to
hold that law enforcement officers may only
detain individuals at the scene of the arrest,
who are not within the “immediately adjoin-
ing” area of the arrest if the officers “possess

a reasonable belief based on specifie and
articulable facts” that the individual poses a
danger to them. Maddow, 388 F.3d at 1362.
‘Thus, where an individual is in an area imme-
diately adjoining the arrestee, the individual
may be placed in temporary protective deten-
tion even in the absence of probable cause or
a reasonable suspicion that the individual
poses a threat to officer safety. On the other
hand, where an individual is on the arrest
seene, but is not in an area immediately
adjoining the arrestee, the individual may
only be detained when officers possess a
reasonable suspicion that the individual poses
a danger.

A similar conclusion was issued in State v.
Valdez, 68 P.8d 1052, 1056 (Utah Ct. App.
2003). There, the officers had a valid arrest
warrant for Young. Upon arriving at and
entering Young’s home, the officers agreed
to accompany Young to her bedroom to allow
her to change her clothes. Jd, at 1054. Upon
entering the bedroom, the officers saw Val-
dez lying on the bed, apparently asleep and
covered with either a blanket or a coat. Id.
Because Valdez did not respond to the offi-
cer’s questions, the officer grabbed Valdez,
shook him, and demanded to see his hands.
Id. During the exchange, the officer asked
Valdez for his name and identification. Id.
Ultimately, the officers identified Valdez and
arrested him on an outstanding warrant. Id.
During the search incident to arrest, the
officers found controlled substances and Val-
dez was charged with various crimes. Id. at
1059.

Recognizing the officer did not have any
reasonable or articulable suspicion that Val-
dez was committing or attempting to commit
a crime, the court nonetheless found the
initial seizure was constitutionally valid, al-
though the subsequent search was not. Id.
The court held, “the limited seizure of a third
party during the execution of an arrest war-
vant may, under certain very limited cireum-
stances, be permissible without the otherwise
necessary showing of facts supporting a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activities.” Id.
at 1056. The court relied both on Summers
and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117
S.Ct. 882, 187 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) in reaching
its decision, concluding, “that under certain

cireumstances officers may detain a person
without reasonable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity for the sole purpose of ‘exercis[ing]
unquestioned command of the situation.”
Valdez, 68 P.38d at 1058 (citing Wilson, 519
US. at 410, 117 S.Ct. at 884, 187 L.Hd.2d at
45).

The court then analyzed the totality of the
circumstances and determined Valdez’s de-
tention was “justified at its inception” as
necessary for the officers to exercise com-
mand of the situation. Valdez, 68 P.8d at
1058. However, the court went on to note
Valdez’s seizure was limited to the reason
justifying it—controlling the scene, Id. at
1059. As controlling the scene did not require
any investigation into Valdez’s identity, the
officer’s request for identification exceeded
the scope of the reason justifying the initial
detention and unnecessarily expanded both
the duration and scope of the initial deten-
tion. Id. As a result, the evidence obtained
following the unreasonable expansion was
correctly suppressed. Jd.

In Way v. State, 101 P.8d 208, 209 (Alaska
Ot. App. 2004), the court adopted similar
reasoning in finding it was constitutionally
permissible to restrain third parties at a
residence when executing an arrest warrant
to prevent interference with the arrest. Id,
However, the court also held that once it was
determined the fugitive was not present,
Way’s continued detention was unreasonable.
Id, at 210,

HN The above cases illustrate which
factors courts use to determine whether the
intrusion on a third party’s Fourth Amend-
ment right is constitutionally permissible.
First, there must be some judicial determina-
tion of probable cause—either for a search
warrant or an arrest warrant. Second, the
courts look to the nexus between the third
party and the subject of the warrant. In
determining the nexus, the courts look both
to the relationship between the third party
and the subject of the warrant and the physi-
cal proximity of the third party to the subject
of the warrant. Fourth, the court determines
what, if any, significant law enforcement in-
terests exist. Fifth, and finally, the court
balances the intrusion on the third party’s

63

Fourth Amendment right and the law en-
forcement interests.

Applying the foregoing to the facts in this
ease, there is no dispute there was a valid
arrest warrant or a nexus between Williams
and the subject of the warrant. Williams was
not someone who just happened to be in the
vicinity of the subject at the time the arrest
warrant was executed. Instead, according to
the testimony, Williams was in the apartment
with the subject of the arrest warrant for at
least thirty minutes before the officers ap-
proached. He was also standing with the
subject at the time the subject fled, establish-
ing both a personal relationship with and
physical proximity to the subject of the war-
rant at the time the officer attempted to
arrest the subject of the warrant. Additional-
ly, Williams’ detention lasted approximately
three to four minutes and Williams was not
hhandeuffed during that detention. Within
that period of time, the officers attempted to
identify Williams and the others,

Also, while only one person entered the
apartment during the thirty minutes the offi-
cers stood watch, four individuals exited and
stood by the door. The officer testified he did
not know if there were more individuals in
the apartment, if anyone was armed or had
access to weapons, or if any of the three
might assist the subject in his escape. These
were all reasonable concerns and highlight
the significant law enforcement interests in
controlling the scene, minimizing the risk to
the officers and others, and ensuring the
orderly execution of the warrant.

In balancing the intrusion on Williams’
Fourth Amendment rights against the signif-
icant law enforcement interests, in these cir-
cumstances, we hold that Williams’ detention
was de minimis and is analogous to the
mere inconvenience of being ordered out of a
vehicle. Because it was de minimis, it was
too small of an intrusion into Williams’ liber-
ty to overcome the weighty law enforeement
interests of exercising command of the situa-
tion, ensuring the safety of the officers and
others, and ensuring the orderly conduct of
the execution of the arrest warrant. We hold,
similarly to other courts, that in these cir-
cumstances, a third party may be detained
during the execution of a valid arrest war-

64

rant. However, Williams’ detention was per-
missible only until the subject of the arrest
warrant was safely in custody and the offi-
cers detaining Williams knew the warrant
was served and the subject was safely in
custody. From the record, it appears the
officers detaining Williams were not aware
the subject was safely in custody until the
officer returned to the front of the apartment.
to assist them. As such, we agree with the
district court that Williams’ initial detention
was constitutionally permissible on this
ground,

B. Alternatively, it Was Constitutionally
Permissible to Detain Williams Until
Officers Confirmed or Dispelled Their
Suspicion Williams May Have Been
Involved in Harboring a Known Felon

HM The district court did not address
whether it was lawful to detain Williams to
investigate whether he harbored a felon.
However, where a ruling in a criminal case is
correct, though not based upon a correct
reason, it still may be sustained upon the
proper legal theory. See State v. Avelar, 129
Idaho 700, 704, 981 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997).

HE Seizures must be based on proba-
ble cause to be reasonable, Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 499-500, 103 S.Ct. 1819, 1825-
26, 75 L.Hd.2d 229, 237-38 (1983). However,
limited investigatory detentions, based on
less than probable cause, are permissible
when justified by an officer's reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicion that a person has commit-
ted, or is about to commit, a crime. Jd. at
498, 108 8.Ct, at 1324, 75 L.Hd.2d at 236. The
determination of whether an investigative de-
tention is reasonable requires a dual inqui-
ry—whether the officer’s action was justified
at its inception and whether it was reason-
ably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first
place. State v, Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90
P.8d 926, 981 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Par-
kinson, 185 Idaho 857, 361, 17 P.8d 801, 305

3. Williams conceded in the district court the
officers could lawfully detain him to investigate
whether he was guilty of harboring a fugitive.
Williams argues the State uses the term “fugi-
tive” in the district court and “felon” on appeal.
This distinction matters, asserts Williams, be-
cause the district court was only presented with

(Ct. App. 2000), Such a detention must be
temporary and last no longer than necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Roe,
140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.8d at 931; State v,
Gutierrez, 187 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461,
465 (Ct, App. 2002), The scope of the permit-
ted intrusion will vary to some extent with
the particular facts and circumstances of
each case. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.8d at
981; Parkinson, 185 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at
805, The brevity of the detention weighs
heavily in favor of a finding the detention
‘was reasonable. See United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 686-688, 105 S.Ct, 1568, 1575-
71, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 615-17 (1985) (holding a
twenty-minute investigative detention was
reasonable under the circumstances),

WN Here, the officers knew Williams
and the other individuals were in the apart-
ment with the subject for at least thirty
minutes prior to them walking out of the
apartment. The officers also knew the sub-
ject fled upon being identified by the officers.
‘These facts are a reasonable articulation con-
necting Williams to the subject and to the
residence—justifying a detention to confirm
or dispel the officers’ suspicion that Williams
committed the crime of harboring a felon.
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 878, 881-882, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580-81, 45
L.Ed.2d 607, 616-17 (1975) (reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity warrants a tempo-
rary seizure for the purpose of questioning to
verify or dispel the suspicion related to the
purpose of the stop); State ». Pachosa, 160
Idaho 35, 368 P.38d 655 (2016). As such,
Williams’ initial detention under this theory
‘was constitutionally permissible,

C. Under Either Theory, the Initial De-
tention Was Not Unreasonably Pro-
longed

HE (Williams asserts that even if his
initial detention was reasonable to investigate
whether he harbored a fugitive,’ the officers

the LC. § 18-2508 citation, there is no evidence
to support a claim that Williams harbored a
fugitive under I.C. § 18-2508, and therefore, it
cannot be an alternate basis for the court's deci-
sion, We disagree the articulation of the statute
in the State’s exhibit in opposition to the motion
to suppress is controlling in this context. While

detained him longer than necessary because
this investigation should have taken seconds,
not minutes, to complete. Investigative de-
tentions must be temporary and last no long-
er than necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the stop. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.8d at
981; Gutierrez, 187 Idaho at 651, 51 P.8d at
465. There is no rigid time limit for deter-
mining when a detention has lasted longer
than necessary; rather, a court must consider
the scope of the detention and the law en-
forcement purposes to be served, as well as
the duration of the stop. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at
685-86, 105 S.Ct, at 1574-74, 84 L.Ed.2d at
614-16; State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 480,
862 P.8d 551, 555 (Ct. App. 2015). The inves-
tigation following a stop generally must be
reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances that justified the interference in the
first place. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.8d at
931; Parkinson, 185 Idaho at 861, 17 P.8d at
305, The purpose of a stop is not permanent-
ly fixed, however, at the moment the stop is
initiated and during the course of the deten-
tion, there may evolve suspicion of criminali-
ty different from that which initially prompt-
ed the stop. Parkinson, 185 Idaho at 362, 17
P.8d at 806, The length and scope of the stop
may be lawfully expanded if the detaining
officer can “point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational in-
ferences from those facts, reasonably war-
rant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905
(1968).

1, The initial detention based on the
execution of an arrest warrant was
not unreasonably prolonged

Williams’ initial detention was constitution-

ally permissible until the subject of the war-
rant was arrested and such knowledge was
communicated to the officers in front of the
apartment. It is not clear how this informa-
tion was communicated from the officer that
assisted in the arrest of the subject to the
other officers in the front of the apartment.
However, it appears from the record the
officer was going to relay that information

the officer used the word “fugitive,” it is clear
from his testimony he was investigating whether
Williams had harbored or protected a known
felon pursuant to § 18-2502(2), giving rise to a

65

when he returned to the front of the apart-
ment to assist the other officers with the
remaining detainees.

HM En route to the front of the apart-
ment building, the officer smelled marijuana
emanating from the building. This provided
reasonable, articulable suspicion of a new
crime, frequenting, which justified an on-
going detention of Williams while the officer
confirmed or dispelled the suspicion of crimi-
nal activity. Because of the new, independent
basis to detain Williams, the initial detention
‘was not unreasonably prolonged by the in-
vestigation into new criminal activity,

2. The initial detention to investigate
the crime of harboring a felon was
not unreasonably prolonged

HM Although Williams argues the ques-
tioning to confirm or dispel the suspicion of
criminal, activity vis-a-vis harboring a felon
should only have taken a few seconds, we
disagree. The officer testified that when he
returned from the back of the apartment
building, the other officers were still attempt-
ing to establish identity of the individuals,
including Williams. In addition to establish-
ing identity, the officers were entitled to
attempt to determine the relationship be-
tween Williams, the subject of the arrest
warrant, and the premises. This questioning
would have taken more than a few seconds to
accomplish. As such, the questioning was re-
lated to the reason for the initial detention,
‘was not unreasonably prolonged, and was
constitutionally permissible.

Moreover, during that initial, permissible
detention, the officers acquired a new reason
to detain Williams—the reasonable suspicion
that Williams was guilty of frequenting a
place where controlled substances are known
to be located, based on the smell of marijua-
na coming from the apartment and the state-
ments of the owner of the apartment. The
officers were then permitted to engage in
questioning to confirm or dispel thei suspi-
cions about new criminal activity. Given the
new basis for an on-going investigatory de-

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based

on the officers’ observations. As such, this consti-

tutes an alternative basis on which the district
court's holding can be affirmed.

66 a

tention, the initial detention was not unrea-
sonably prolonged.

D. The Officers Had Probable Cause for
Arrest,

Hl Finally, Williams argues the officers
did not have probable cause to arrest him for
frequenting a place where controlled sub-
stances are known to be located, and so the
evidence officers seized in the search incident
to that arrest must be suppressed.

Hs A warrantless search is presump-
tively unreasonable unless it falls within cer-
tain special and well-delineated exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 448, 454-55, 91 S.Ct.
2022, 2081-82, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575-76 (1971);
State v. Ferreira, 183 Idaho 474, 479, 988
P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999), A search inci-
dent to a valid arrest is among those excep-
tions; thus, does not violate the Fourth
Amendment proscription against unreason-
able searches. State v. Moore, 129 Idaho 776,
781, 982 P.2d 899, 904 (Ct. App. 1996). A
warrantless arrest is lawful if the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe the ar-
restee has committed a public offense in his
presence or has committed a felony not in his
presence. 1.0. § 19-608. Probable cause is
the possession of information that would lead
a person of ordinary care and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest and strong
presumption that a person they have placed
under arrest is guilty of a crime. See State v.
Julian, 129 Idaho 188, 186, 922 P.2d 1059,
1062 (1996). Probable cause is not measured
by the same level of proof required for con-
viction. Id. Rather, probable cause deals with
the factual and practical considerations on
which reasonable and prudent persons act,
Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 175,
69 S.Ct. 1802, 1810-11, 98 L.Ed, 1879, 1890
(1949); Julian, 129 Idaho at 186, 922 P.2d at
1062. When reviewing an officer’s actions, the
court must judge the facts against an objec-
tive standard. Julian, 129 Idaho at 136, 922
P.2d at 1062. That is, would the facts avail-
able to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or search, warrant a reasonable per-
son in holding the belief that the action taken
‘was appropriate. Jd. A probable cause analy-
sis must allow room for mistakes on the part
of the arresting officer, but only the mistakes
of a reasonable person acting on facts which

sensibly led to his or her conclusions of prob-
ability. State v. Kerley, 184 Idaho 870, 874, 11
P.8d 489, 498 (Ct. App. 2000).

Idaho Code § 37-2732 makes it unlawful
for any person to be present at any place in
which he knows illegal controlled substances
are being held for use. The district court
found there was probable cause to arrest
Williams for frequenting because he was
seen coming out of the apartment from which
police detected a strong odor of marijuana.

There is substantial evidence to support
the district court’s finding that the officer
had probable cause to arrest Williams. The
district court found Williams was present for
at least thirty minutes in the apartment, the
apartment emanated a strong odor of mari-
juana, and the apartment owner admitted
there was marijuana and drug paraphernalia
inside the apartment. Based on these facts, it
was reasonable for the officer to believe that
Williams knew of the marijuana inside the
apartment. As such, there was substantial
evidence to support the district court’s find-
ing that the officer had probable cause to
arrest Williams for frequenting.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we hold it was reasonable for
officers to detain Williams when they execut-
ed an arrest warrant for a third party and
the detention was not longer than necessary.
Further, Williams’ detention was a lawful
investigatory detention based on the officers’
reasonable articulable suspicion _ that.
Williams committed the crime of harboring a
felon. Finally, there was substantial evidence
in the record to support the district court’s
finding that the officers had probable cause
to arrest Williams, and so the methamphet-
amine found in Williams’ pocket in a search
incident to arrest was not the fruit of an
unlawful detention or arrest. We affirm the
district court’s denial of Williams’ motion to
suppress and judgment of conviction,

Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge
GRATTON coneur,

394 P.3d 110
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve

Douglas Raymond COLVIN,
Defendant—Appellant.

Docket No. 43443
Court of Appeals of Idaho,

Filed: November 4, 2016
Review Denied November 21, 2016

Erie D. Fredericksen, Interim State Ap-
pellate Public Defender; Reed P, Anderson,
Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for
appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Chief Judge

Douglas Raymond Colvin appeals from the
district court’s order denying his motions to
correct an illegal sentence, withdraw his
guilty plea, and for appointment of standby

68

counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm,

L

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In 1992, pursuant to a plea agreement,
Colvin pled guilty to second degree murder.
At his sentencing hearing, the district court
invited Colvin to make a statement on his
behalf, which he did. The district court also
asked Colvin’s attorney whether there was
any legal reason the judgment should not be
pronounced, and Colvin’s attorney answered
in the negative, Colvin was sentenced to a
unified life term, with a minimum period of
confinement of twenty-five years, In 2015,
Colvin filed three motions: (1) motion for
correction of an illegal sentence; (2) “motion
for relief,” which requested that he be al-
lowed to withdraw his guilty plea; and (8)
motion for appointment of standby counsel.

In his motion to correct an illegal sentence,
Colvin argued that the district court violated
Colvin’s right to allocution by failing to ex-
plain that his personal statement could in-
clude mitigating information. Colvin also ar-
gued that it was improper for the district
court to ask Colvin’s attorney, rather than
Colvin, whether there was any legal reason
judgment should not be pronounced. In Col-
vin’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he
claimed that his guilty plea was invalid and
therefore resulted in a manifest injustice.
Finally, in his motion for appointment of
standby counsel, Colvin argued that he was
entitled to counsel to confer with regarding
the motion to correct an illegal sentence and
the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The
district court denied all three motions. Colvin.
appeals,

IL

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Colvin contends that the dis-
trict court erred in denying his motion to
correct an illegal sentence and abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
1, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a)(1) requires the trial

court, prior to sentencing, to address the defen-
dant personally, to ask if the defendant wishes to

his guilty plea and motion for appointment of
standby counsel.

A. Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence

HI On appeal, Colvin contends the dis-
trict court erred when it denied his motion to
correct an illegal sentence, The district court
found that Colvin’s motion was barred by the
time limitations contained in Rule 35(b) and
that, even if it were brought under Rule
85(a), that his sentence was not illegal on the
face of the record. Rule 35 is a narrow rule
which allows a trial court to correct an illegal
sentence or to correct a sentence imposed in
an illegal manner. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho
732, 785, 170 P.8d 397, 400 (2007). An illegal
sentence apparent from the face of the rec-
ord can be corrected at any time. 1.C.R.
35(a), However, a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner may only be corrected within
120 days after the judgment of conviction is
filed. L.C.R. 35(b). Whether a sentence is
illegal or whether it was imposed in an illegal
manner is a question of law, over which we
exercise free review. Farwell, 144 Idaho at
785, 170 P.8d at 400.

HI Colvin purported to bring his motion
to correct an illegal sentence under Rule
85(a). However, Colvin’s motion challenges
the manner in which his sentence was im-
posed, not whether the sentence was author-
ized by law. In his motion, Colvin argued that
the district court’s invitation for Colvin to
speak violated his right of allocution because
it did not inform him of his right to introduce
mitigating evidence in accordance with LC.R.
88(a)(1).! Because Colvin’s argument chal-
Jenges the manner in which his sentence was
imposed, Rule 85(b) is the proper vehicle.
Colvin’s challenge is therefore barred by the
time limitations contained in Rule 85(b).

B. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

HH soOn appeal, Colvin contends that the
district court abused its discretion when it
denied Colvin’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Colvin’s judgment of conviction became
final in 1992. In 2015, Colvin filed a “motion

make a statement, and to present any informa-
tion in mitigation of punishment,

for relief,” which requested that he be per-
mitted to withdraw his guilty plea. The dis-
trict court denied the motion on its merits,
However, the district court had no jurisdic-
tion to grant the motion, A trial court’s juris-
diction to grant a motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty pursuant to I.C.R 38(¢) expires once
the judgment becomes final, either by expira-
tion of the time for appeal or affirmance of
the judgment on appeal. State v. Jakoshi, 189
Idaho 852, 355, 79 P.8d 711, 714 (2003). We
note that the district court did not address
the question of subject matter jurisdiction
and the issue was not raised by the State on
appeal.? However, the question of subject
matter jurisdiction is fundamental and can-
not be ignored. Even if jurisdictional issues
are not raised by the parties, the Court must
address them on its own initiative. State v.
Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 328, 246 P.8d 979,
981 (2011).

C. Motion for Appointment of Standby
Counsel

HE On appeal, Colvin asserts that the
district court abused its discretion when it
determined that Colvin’s motions were frivo-
lous and denied his request for the appoint-
ment of standby counsel. Whether to appoint
standby counsel is discretionary. State v. Av-
erett, 142 Idaho 879, 886, 186 P.8d 350, 3857
(Ct. App. 2006). A defendant may be denied
the appointment of counsel to assist in pursu-
ing post-commitment motions if the trial
court finds the motions to be frivolous. State
», Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 528-24, 878 P.2d 167,
169 (Ct. App. 1994), The district court cor-
rectly denied Colvin’s motions because an
attorney would not assist Colvin in preparing
meritless claims. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in denying Colvin’s motion
for appointment of standby counsel.

I.

CONCLUSION
Colvin failed to show that the district court
erred when it denied Colvin’s motion to cor-
rect an illegal sentence. The district court
lacked jurisdiction to consider Colvin’s mo-
tion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district

2. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction was

69

court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Colvin’s motion for appointment of standby
counsel. Accordingly, the district court’s or-
der denying Colvin’s motions to correct an
illegal sentence, to withdraw his guilty plea,
and for appointment of standby counsel is
affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY

concur,

394 P.3d 112
In the MATTER OF the DOE
CHILDREN, Children Under
Eighteen Years of Age,

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare,
Petitioner-Respondent,

ve
Jane Doe (2016-48), Respondent-Appellant.
Docket No. 44536
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: February 28, 2017

mentioned in the appellant's brief,

Knowlton & Miles, PLLC; Mackenzie Jo
Welch, Lewiston, for appellant. Mackenzie Jo
Welch argued,

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Marcy J, Spilker, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. Marcy J. Spilker
argued.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT’S
PRIOR OPINION DATED JANUARY
18, 2017, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN
GUTIERREZ, Judge
Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate’s

judgment terminating Jane’s parental rights
to her three minor children. This Court first
considered Jane’s appeal on the grounds that
the magistrate erred procedurally by failing

72 [|

to issue written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. As we further elaborate in our
decision below, we remanded the case to the
magistrate for issuance of written findings.
The case is before us again after the magis-
trate issued its written findings of fact and
conclusions of law and a corresponding
amended termination order. Thus, having
cured the procedural defect, we now also
consider the merits of the magistrate’s deci-
sion to terminate Jane’s parental rights. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm,

IL

CASE HISTORY

Jane Doe and her husband, John Doe,
have an extensive history of drug abuse and
have been involved in child protection pro-
ceedings in the past. In February 2015, the
Department of Health and Welfare (Depart-
ment) received reports indicating that nei-
ther Jane nor John were in compliance with
the terms of their probations and that the
three children in Jane and John’s care were
unsafe, These three children are the biologi-
eal children of Jane, but only two are the
biological children of John; the biological fa-
ther of Jane’s oldest child is unknown.

On February 20, 2015, the Department
filed a petition asking the magistrate to de-
termine whether the children were within the
jurisdiction of the Child Protection Act, alleg-
ing the children were neglected and lacking a
stable home environment. Additionally, the
petition asked the magistrate to remove the
children from Jane and John’s home and
place the children into the temporary legal
custody of the Department. The magistrate
entered an order granting the Department's
requests, and the children were immediately
removed from Jane and John’s care and
placed in shelter care. The children remained
in shelter care until an adjudicatory hearing
was held, at which point the magistrate found
it was in the children’s best interests to
remain in shelter care, The Department pre-
pared a written case plan for both Jane and.
John, and the magistrate approved the pro-
posed plan on April 29, 2015.

1. The indeterminate portion of this sentence does

In June 2015, Jane was arrested for vari-
ous probation violations. The district court
then sentenced Jane to serve out the re-
mainder of her underlying sentence. In Au-
gust 2015, the magistrate held a permanency
hearing on the child protection case, at
which time the Department requested the
approval of a modified case plan to pursue
relative adoption rather than reunification.
In its subsequent permanency plan order,
the magistrate ordered the Department to
file a petition to terminate parental rights
within thirty days. The Department then
filed a petition to terminate both Jane and
John’s parental rights to the children in Sep-
tember 2015, followed by an amended peti-
tion approximately two weeks later. The
magistrate scheduled the termination trial
for December 2015.

For reasons unclear from the record, the
parties stipulated to postponing the Decem-
ber trial until February 2016. Then, the par-
ties again stipulated to postponing the Feb-
ruary schedule as Jane was pregnant. at the
time and the trial would be too close to her
due date. The magistrate rescheduled the
termination trial for May 2016,

In February 2016, Jane gave birth to a
child fathered by John, The Department filed
an amended petition under the Child Protec-
tion Act to add the new baby to the existing
child protection order. The baby was placed
in shelter care with the other three children.
The magistrate then held the appropriate
shelter care and adjudicatory hearings, Ulti-
mately, in May 2016, after the magistrate
approved the Department’s proposed case
plan regarding the baby, the parties stipu-
lated to sever the baby’s and the children’s
child protection proceedings, Jane and John’s
parental rights to the baby are not at issue in
this appeal.

Meanwhile, in March 2016, the Depart-
ment filed a second amended petition for
termination of the parent-child relationship
between the three older children and both
Jane and John. This amended petition al-
leged that both parents neglected the chil-
dren and divided the grounds for termination.
into four separate counts.

not end until January 2018.

Count I: The children are neglected as
defined in ILC. §§ 16-
1602(81)() ];) 16-2002(8)(a) and
16-2005(1)(b) because they lack
proper support or parental care
necessary for their health, morals,
and well-being, to-wit: [John and
Jane] have shown the inability to
maintain safe and stable [sic] for
their children. Neither parent is
able to demonstrate the’ ability to
safely parent their children when
they are abusing substances, and it
appears that they are still unable to
maintain control of their addictions
despite all the services they have
been offered and that they have
completed throughout the past five
(6) years of Child Protection In-
volvement,

Count II: The children are neglected as
defined in I.C. §§ 16-2002(8)(b) and
16-2005(1)(b). The parents have
failed to comply with the Court’s
orders or the case plan in a Child
Protective act case.

Count III: The parents have neglected the
children. The children are neglected
as they are without the proper pa-
rental care and control, or subsis-
tence, education, medical or other
care and control necessary for their
well-being because of the conduct or
omission of their parents, guardian,
or other custodian or their neglect
or refusal to provide them as fol-
lows: [Jane and John] have a signifi-
cant substance abuse history. [Jane
and John] have not engaged in any
support services recommended by
Department staff that has been
identified to help them successfully
establish a safe life to parent [the
children].

Count IV: The parent, [Jane], is unable to
discharge parental responsibilities
and such ability will continue for a
prolonged indeterminate period and
will be injurious to the health, mor-
als, or well-being of the children, to-

2. Although the petition cited to LC. § 16-

1602(28)(b), this code provision has since been

73

wit: [Jane] has been sentenced to a
prison term to the ... Prison, and
the Idaho Department of Correc-
tions website reflects a parole eligi-
bility date of March-9, 2017.

The trial for terminating the parental
rights of Jane and John as to the children
commenced.on May 10, 2016. On the follow-
ing day, when the trial was not concluded,
the magistrate scheduled its continuation for
July 2016, The trial then continued from July
6 until July 8, During the five days of trial,
the magistrate heard testimony from numer-
ous individuals involved in various aspects of
the case plan, the children’s lives, or the
parents’ lives, These individuals included the
children’s foster parents; the guardian ad
litem; the parents’ probation officer; a police
officer; teachers and administrators from
treatment facilities; as well as Department
employees including visitation supervisors,
social workers, and both current and past
case managers, These individuals testified re-
garding the parents’ history of drug abuse
and relapse; the parents’ participation in
drug treatment programs; observations of
the parents’ home; opinions regarding the
parents’ ability to discipline and supervise
the children; the children’s extensive behav-
ioral and developmental issues; and the ongo-
ing needs of the children, At the conclusion
of trial, the parties were instructed to file
their closing arguments by August 12.

The magistrate then held a hearing on
October 8, 2016. At this hearing, the magis-
trate expressed that he had experienced soft-
ware failure resulting in the permanent loss
of a significant amount of his written work.
The magistrate indicated he would instead
enter his findings of fact and conclusions of
law orally on the record. He stated, “This
will constitute the only record of the same.
The court will not reduce the following to
writing, and I’m doing that in the—for the
sake of expediency for the parties.” The mag-
istrate proceeded to verbally pronounce de-
tailed findings of facts and conclusions of law
from the bench.

renumbered to 1.C. § 16-1602(31)(b).

74

On the same day, the magistrate entered a
written judgment terminating the parent-
child relationships between Jane and John
and the children. In this written judgment,
aside from stating that “it is in [the chil-
dren’s] best interests for the parental rights
... to be terminated,” the judgment did not
include any specific findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. Then, two days after entry of
this written judgment, the magistrate en-
tered an order titled, “Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.” This
order concluded by stating that Jane and
John’s parental rights were being terminated
based upon (1) their failure to follow and
complete the case plan, as alleged in Count
II, and (2) their conduct which resulted in
the children being without proper parental
eare and control, as alleged in Count III, The
magistrate found that the Department did
not demonstrate that the parents were un-
able to discharge their parental responsibili-
ties, as alleged in Count I, and did not termi-
nate on this basis. The order did not address
Count IV of the termination petition, The
magistrate entered a corresponding amended
judgment reiterating its conclusion that ter-
mination was in the children’s best interests
and that the parent-child relationships were
terminated.

Although the magistrate treated the termi-
nation petition of both parents as a consoli-
dated case, Jane and John each separately
appealed the magistrate’s judgment. In
Jane’s appeal, she argued that the magistrate
erred both procedurally and on the merits.
We were persuaded by Jane’s argument that
the magistrate erred in failing to issue writ-
ten findings of fact and conclusions of law, as
required by statute. We reiterate our consid-
eration of that issue in the section below.

I.

PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY AND
CORRESPONDING REMAND

Jane argued the magistrate violated Jane’s
right to due process by terminating her pa-
rental rights without complying with statuto-
ry procedural requirements. Specifically, she
argued that the magistrate violated the stat-
utory mandate in IC. § 16-2010(1) by not

issuing a written order containing the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. The stat-
ute at issue, IC. § 16-2010(1), states, in rele-
vant part, that “every order of the court
terminating the parent and child relationship
. shall be in writing and shall recite the
findings upon which such order is based,
including findings pertaining to the court’s
jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.)

HE The interpretation of a statute is an
issue of law over which we exercise free
review. Aguilar v. Coowrod, 151 Idaho 642,
649-50, 262 P.8d 671, 678-79 (2011). Such
interpretation must begin with the literal
words of the statute; those words must be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary mean-
ing; and the statute must be construed as a
whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.8d 502, 506
(2011). It is well established that where stat-
utory language is unambiguous, legislative
history and other extrinsic evidence should
not be consulted for the purpose of altering
the clearly expressed intent of the legisla-
ture, Id. “Where statutes are not ambiguous,
it is the duty of the court to follow the law as
written.” Anstine v. Hawlhins, 92 Idaho 561,
563, 447 P.2d 677, 679 (1968).

Regarding the plain language of I.C. § 16-
2010(1), we considered the phrase “every or-
der of the court” to be inclusive of any court
order terminating a parent-child relationship.
Further, the phrases stating that the order
“shall be in writing” and “shall recite the
findings” establish the two attributes re-
quired of every order. See State v. Owens,
158 Idaho 1, 4, 848 P.3d 80, 83 (2015). The
word “recite” means that the findings must
be “state[d] formally.” MsrriaM-WEBSTER
Dictionary 1895 (8d ed. 1993). Thus, the
plain language of I.C. § 16-2010(1) contains
an unambiguous directive requiring courts to
issue written findings as part of the termi-
nation order. Such written findings must in-
clude formal statements of the findings upon
which it relied in terminating the parent-
child relationship.

Neither the magistrate’s original judg-
ment nor the amended judgment and corre-
sponding order were in compliance with the
statutory mandate of LC. § 16-2010(1). The
original judgment, which effectuated the ter-

mination and stated that it was in the best
interests of the children to terminate Jane’s
rights, was statutorily deficient because it
did not include a recitation of the facts upon
which the court was relying, The amended
judgment and corresponding findings and
order were also statutorily deficient, In the
order, the magistrate attempted to incorpo-
rate its oral pronouncements by reference.
Idaho Code Section 16-2010(1) requires a
court’s order to recite the findings upon
which the court relied in terminating the
parent’s rights, Because of the statute’s
specificity in requiring written recitation of
findings, we do not consider an order’s “in-
corporation by reference” to be the function-
al equivalent of a written recital.

Further, although the order did specify
that Jane’s rights were being terminated
pursuant to the charges in Counts II and III,
it did not recite any specific findings of fact
supporting termination on those grounds.
Similarly, the amended judgment recited no
facts but instead merely concluded that it
was in the children’s best interests to termi-
nate Jane’s parental rights. The court report-
er’s transcription of the oral proceedings did
not constitute a written order of the court
sufficient to satisfy the statutory require-
ment.

Therefore, because none of the magis-
trate’s orders complied with the statutory
mandates of I.C, § 16-2010(1), we remanded
both cases back to the magistrate with in-
structions to enter written findings of fact
and conclusions of law and a corresponding
amended judgment.

i.

POST-REMAND CONSIDERATION

Following the order on remand, the magis-
trate court entered substantial written find-
ings of facts and conclusions of law in con-
formance with the statutory mandate of I.C,
§ 16-2010(1), The subsequent written find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law reiterated
the magistrate’s previous oral findings that
the children were neglected pursuant to
Counts II and III of the second amended
petition termination. The magistrate entered
a second amended judgment terminating

%

Jane and John’s parental rights to their chil-
dren, All parties were given an opportunity
to submit supplemental briefing for this
Court’s consideration.

HN «We now consider the merits of
Jane’s appellate argument that the magis-
trate erred in terminating Jane’s parental
rights. A parent has a fundamental liberty
interest in maintaining a relationship with his
or her child. Trowel v. Granville, 580 US. 57,
65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2059-60, 147 L.Ed.2d 49,
56 (2000); Doe v. State, 187 Idaho 758, 760, 58
P.8d 841, 343 (2002). This interest is protect-
ed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. State v. Doe, 144
Idaho 889, 842, 172 P.8d 1114, 1117 (2007).
Implicit in the Termination of Parent and
Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that,
wherever possible, family life should be
strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-
2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due pro-
cess must be met when terminating the par-
ent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 148 Idaho
883, 886, 146 P.38d 649, 652 (2006). Due pro-
cess requires that the grounds for terminat-
ing a parent-child relationship be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. Jd. Because a
fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the
United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined that a court may terminate a parent-
child relationship only if that decision is sup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence,
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102
S.Ct. 1888, 1408, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 616-17
(1982). See also LC. § 16-2009; In re Doe,
146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92
(2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at
652.

HN soOn appeal from a decision termi-
nating parental rights, this Court examines
whether the decision is supported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence, which
means such evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 248, 245-46,
220 P.8d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate
court will indulge all reasonable inferences in
support of the trial court’s judgment when
reviewing an order that parental rights be
terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court.
has also said that the substantial evidence
test requires a greater quantum of evidence

76

in cases where the trial court’s finding must
be supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence than in cases where a mere preponder-
ance is required. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 348,
346, 144 P.8d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and
convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be
proved is highly probable or reasonably cer-
tain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.8d
1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate’s
decision must be supported by objectively
supportable grounds, Doe, 148 Idaho at 346,
144 P.8d at 600.

HH Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits
a party to petition the court for termination
of the parent-child relationship when it is in
the child’s best interests and any one of the
following five factors exist: (a) abandonment;
(b) neglect or abuse; (¢) lack of a biological
relationship between the child and a pre-
sumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to
discharge parental responsibilities for a pro-
longed period that will be injurious to the
health, morals, or well-being of the child; or
(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain
ineareerated for a substantial period of time.
Each statutory ground is an independent ba-
sis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842,
172 P.8d at 1117.

A. Finding of Neglect

Here, the magistrate terminated Jane’s pa-
rental rights on the basis of neglect, finding
that termination was in the best interests of
the children. Specifically, the magistrate
found clear and convincing evidence that
Jane neglected her children pursuant to the
allegations in Counts II and III of the second
amended termination petition, Because we
conclude that Jane neglected her children
pursuant to the grounds alleged in Count III,
we need not address Jane’s contentions re-
garding the other grounds considered by the
magistrate? See State, Dep’t of Health &
Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 409, 418, 284 P.3d
788, 737 (2010).

3. Accordingly, we do not address Jane's argu-
ment regarding the amount of time the children
were in the Department's legal custody for pur-
poses of Idaho Code Section 16-2002(b)(3).

4, Idaho Code Section 16-1602(31){a) provides, in
relevant part: “ ‘Neglected’ means a child ...

Count III alleged that Jane neglected her
children by failing to provide the “proper
parental care and control, or subsistence,
medical or other care or control necessary
for his or her well-being because of the con-
duct or omission of his or her parents, guard-
ian, or other custodian or their neglect or
refusal to provide them.” Because this lan-
guage tracks with LC. § 16-1602(81)(a),! the
magistrate considered whether there was
clear and convincing evidence of neglect pur-
suant to this provision. The magistrate found
that Jane neglected her children due to her
extensive history of drug abuse and relapse,
including drug use while pregnant; repeated
law and probation violations; failure to pro-
vide stable housing; failure to engage in and
maintain counseling and treatment; failure to
complete her case plan; and failure to main-
tain consistent employment.

HR It is well-settled that a court may
properly consider the history of the family
both prior to and at the time of State inter-
vention in determining whether clear and
convincing evidence of neglect exists. State v.
Doe, 144 Idaho 889, 848, 172 P.8d 1114, 1118
(2007). A court is not constrained to consider-
ing only the conditions as they exist at the
time of the hearing. Id. A court may also
consider a parent's performance on a case
plan when considering whether that parent
has neglected their children pursuant to I.C.
§ 16-2002(8)(a). In ve Doe, 151 Idaho 356,
365, 256 P.3d 764, 778 (2011).

Jane’s primary argument on appeal is that
the magistrate failed to take into consider-
ation all of the relevant evidence and assign
that evidence the proper weight. Jane first
contends the magistrate improperly consid-
ered whether Jane completed tasks on her
case plan as a basis for finding neglect, She
argues that she was only given a short period
of time to comply before she was incarcerat-
ed. While the magistrate did consider Jane’s
compliance with the case plan before she was

[who is without proper parental care and con-
trol, or subsistence, medical or other care or
control necessary for his well-being because of
the conduct or omission of his parents ... or
their neglect or refusal to provide them.”

incarcerated, the magistrate did not use this
consideration as the sole basis of its finding
of neglect. The magistrate considered the
totality of Jane’s conduct, both before and
after the child protection case was initiated.

WMsJane next contends there is no
showing that the magistrate considered evi-
dence regarding her accomplishments toward
reunification after her incarceration. A trial
court is not free to ignore relevant evidence
that has been admitted. In re Doe, 157 Idaho
765, 770, 339 P.8d 1169, 1174 (2014), Howev-
er, when making findings of fact and conelu-
sions of law, a trial judge is not required to
recite every piece of evidence it considered
or relied upon in reaching its decision. Jd.

Here, Jane’s assertion is disproven both
expressly and implicitly by the magistrate’s
written findings. The magistrate made clear
in his opinion that he considered Jane’s
progress while incarcerated, noting “she is to
be commended for that.” The magistrate
specifically acknowledged that since being in-
earcerated, Jane has “completed cognitive
behavioral intervention, substance abuse
treatment, Thinking For a Change, Moral
Reconation Therapy, completed two (2) par-
enting classes, completed a program entitled
‘Darkness to Light? and ‘Strengthening
Families’” Although the magistrate might
not have specifically written each accom-
plishment that Jane suggests is relevant, it is
nevertheless clear that the magistrate con-
sidered all the relevant evidence in reaching
its decision, What the magistrate makes
clear from the written opinion is that despite
Jane’s recent progress, her longstanding his-
tory of drug abuse is hard to ignore. With
relapses in 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2015,
the magistrate was not persuaded that
Jane’s recent short-term progress out-
weighed her history of neglectful conduct.

Turning to Jane’s other arguments on ap-
peal, Jane effectively challenges whether
there was clear and convincing evidence to
support the magistrate’s finding of neglect.
She itemizes each case plan task and argues
why the magistrate’s finding was erroneous.
First, she contends that certain findings of
the magistrate are blatantly incorrect. For
example, regarding the magistrate’s finding
that Jane failed to provide stable housing for

7

the children, Jane argues that it is significant
that she was never actually evicted from her
housing and that she had never had problems
securing new housing in the past, And, re-
garding the magistrate’s finding that Jane
visited the casino numerous times, Jane ar-
gues that she merely admitted that she had
“been going to the casino,” not that she went
multiple times. Jane also contends that the
magistrate mischaracterized the parents’ trip
to Las Vegas, which occurred in March not
January, and mischaracterized the incident
during the supervised visit where individuals
were locked out of the building. These al-
leged errors take issue with facts that are
immaterial to the magistrate’s finding of ne-
glect. Even if these findings were clearly
erroneous, they are not so material as to
outweigh the other substantial evidence sup-
porting the magistrate’s finding of neglect,
See Doe I v. Doe, 188 Idaho 898, 906, 71 P.8d
1040, 1053 (2008) (“Even if a finding of fact is
in error, this Court should disregard such
error unless it affects the substantial rights
of the parties.”)..

Next, Jane contends that the magistrate
should not have believed certain testimony,
as it was either unproven or contradicted.
For example, Jane points to her probation
officer's testimony regarding multiple proba-
tion violations, missed urinalysis tests and
continued drug use, arguing that none of
those allegations had accompanying definitive
evidentiary proof. Jane’s arguments not only
ignore other relevant information in the rec-
ord, but they also ask this Court to reassess
the credibility of witnesses. Jane also points
to the magistrate’s finding that Jane used
drugs until June 2015, arguing that the pro-
bation officer never testified as such, Howev-
er, this argument specifically ignores Jane’s
own admission that she considers her sober
date to be June 10, 2015,

HS Jane's arguments not only ignore
evidence in the record at times, but they
consistently ask this Court to reweigh the
evidence already considered by the magis-
trate and reach a different conclusion. This
Court does not reweigh evidence, but instead
defers to the magistrate’s “unique ability to
accurately weigh the evidence and judge the
demeanor of the witnesses and take into

78

account the trial court’s superior view of the
entire situation.” In re Doe, 156 Idaho 108,
108, 320 P.3d 1262, 1267 (2014) (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted). The magis-
trate’s findings will be deemed competent,
despite possibly conflicting evidence, so long
as they are supported by substantial evi-
dence. Id.

After careful review of the record, we con-
clude that substantial and competent evi-
dence supports each of the magistrate’s find-
ings regarding Jane’s failure to provide the
proper care and control necessary for her
children’s well-being. During the termination
trial, there was substantial evidence present-
ed as to Jane’s longstanding difficulties with
drug abuse and extensive history of involve-
ment with the Department dating back to
2006. The children at issue in this appeal
began their involvement with the Depart-
ment as early as 2011 after one of the chil-
dren was seriously injured in an automobile
accident due to Jane driving while under the
influence. There was also substantial evi-
dence of Jane’s drug use while pregnant or
while the children were in Jane’s care. Not,
only did one of her children test positive for
methamphetamine at birth, but Jane admit-
ted to using drugs as late as June 2015.
Regardless of whether Jane has ever been
evicted, there was substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate’s finding
that Jane had failed to provide housing for
her children that was both stable and safe,

Next, Jane argues that the magistrate im-
properly weighted the testimony of the foster
parents—who are biased—and the case
workers—who are self-serving—over the tes-
timony of the parents and their witnesses,
Jane’s argument suggests that the nature of
a party’s interest influences the party’s credi-
bility and ability to remain objective, Even if
‘we were to accept Jane’s arguments that the
foster parents are biased and the case work-
ers self-serving, we cannot believe that the
parents and their witnesses are somehow
disinterested parties. Jane’s argument that
the magistrate should be wary of testimony
from involved individuals is not only unsup-
ported by authority, but defies common logic,

TN Finally, we are not persuaded by
Jane’s argument that the magistrate should

have assigned more weight to Jane’s parole
eligibility date of January 2017. Even if Jane
was granted parole in January 2017, her
Jongstanding history of neglectful conduct is
not erased by recent efforts. The Idaho Su-
preme Court has often held that where a
parent's improvements in a child protection
case begin only after the initiation of termi-
nation proceedings, such efforts are often too
late. See, ¢.g., Doe, 151 Idaho at 366, 256 P.38d
at 774; Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v,
Doe, 155 Idaho 145, 153, 806 P.8d 280, 238
(Ct. App. 2018). In this instance, the magis-
trate found, and we agree, that Jane “has
never been a consistent presence in the chil-
dren’s lives. She’s been absent because of
drug usage, absent because the care of the
children was overwhelming to her, and ab-
sent because of incarceration.” Therefore, we
conelude that the cumulative testimony be-
fore the magistrate constituted substantial
and competent evidence demonstrating that
Jane neglected her children as defined by
LC, § 16-1602(81)(a). Thus, the magistrate
did not err in finding neglect pursuant to I.C.
§ 16-2002(8)(a).

B. Best Interests

H«“Where the magistrate finds a
statutory ground for termination, the magis-
trate must also find that it is in the best
interests of the children to terminate the
parent-child relationship. I.C. § 16-2005(1).
When considering the best interests of the
child, a trial court may consider numerous
factors including the improvement of the
child while in foster care, the parent’s con-
tinuing problems with the law, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, the
stability and permanency of the home, unem-
ployment of the parent, and the financial
contribution of the parent to the child’s care
after the child is placed in protective custody.
Doe, 156 Idaho at 111, 820 P.8d at 1270, “The
best interest analysis takes into account the
reality that children need stability and cer-
tainty.” Doe, 157 Idaho at 772, 889 P.8d at
1176 (internal quotation omitted).

HM Here, the magistrate focused its in-
quiry on the improvement of the children
while in foster care. The magistrate consid-
ered evidence that since being in foster care,

the children have improved educationally,
emotionally, and developmentally. The mag-
istrate also considered that the children
would suffer in each of those areas each time
they were removed from the foster home.
The magistrate also focused on the children’s
need for stability. Recognizing that Jane was
not a consistent presence in the children’s
lives due to drug use, incarceration or inabili-
ty to parent, the magistrate found that the
foster family was better suited to provide the
stability needed by the children.

During the termination trial, there was
substantial and competent evidence that the
children have improved while in foster care.
Before entering foster care, the children did
not have their emotional, educational, or
physical needs met. The children were expe-
riencing emotional disturbances and were de-
velopmentally and educationally deficient. Af-
ter entering foster care, the children began
consistently participating in educational pro-
grams and counseling services and have ex-
perienced significant progress in each of
those areas. Evidence demonstrated that
Jane did not routinely maintain these ser-
vices for her children, even though those
services were made available to them.

There is also substantial and competent
evidence that Jane did not take efforts to
improve her situation prior to being incarcer-
ated, She admitted to using drugs up until
the time she was incarcerated in June 2015.
At that time, the termination proceeding was
well underway and the case plan had already
been implemented. Jane’s history of drug
use, beginning in 2006, demonstrates her ina-
bility to refrain from methamphetamine use.
Despite her improvements since incarcera-
tion, her continued stability is unpredictable.

The magistrate opined, and we agree, that,
the children deserve stability, permanency,
and finality. The magistrate did not err in
finding that termination of Jane’s parental
rights was in the best interests of the chil-
dren,

wv.

CONCLUSION

There was clear and convincing evidence
that Jane neglected her children by failing to

79

provide the proper parental care and control
for their well-being and that termination of
Jane’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the
magistrate’s judgment terminating Jane’s pa-
rental rights to her three minor children.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
MELANSON concur.

394 P.3d 122
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve

Bryan A. SANTANA, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 43873
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: March 6, 2017

ro)

lo)
ae

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; John C, McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for appellant.

Tera A. Harden, Canyon County Public
Defender; Barbara Ferre, Deputy Public De-
fender, Caldwell, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge

The State appeals from the district court’s
order on intermediate appeal affirming the
magistrate’s order granting a motion to sup-
press evidence seized during a search of
Bryan A, Santana’s residence, For the rea-
sons set forth below, we reverse the district
court’s order and remand to the magistrate
for further proceedings,

L

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Santana pled guilty to a charge of driving
under the influence and was placed on proba-
tion. At sentencing, the magistrate used a
preprinted form containing optional condi-
tions of probation, checking off the conditions
that applied to Santana. The form contained
an optional condition of a Fourth Amend-
ment waiver, which was not checked. The
magistrate did not orally pronounce that a
Fourth Amendment waiver was a condition
of Santana’s probation. The magistrate did
require that Santana comply with all rules
and reporting requirements of the probation
department. Santana was also ordered to not

82

consume alcohol or any other mood-altering
substance unless prescribed by a physician,

Almost six weeks after sentencing, Santa-
na’s probation officer required Santana to
sign a probation agreement. The probation
agreement contained a Fourth Amendment
waiver, authorizing any law enforcement offi-
cer, peace officer or probation officer to
search Santana and his residence, When San-
tana signed the probation agreement, he ad-
mitted in writing that he used alcohol and
marijuana three days earlier. Two days after
this admission, Santana tested positive for
marijuana. Twelve days later, Santana’s pro-
bation officer and a police officer conducted a
warrantless search of Santana’s home. Santa-
na was not present and did not consent to
the search. The search revealed marijuana
and drug paraphernalia. Santana was subse-
quently charged with possession of marijuana
and drug paraphernalia,

Santana filed a motion to suppress, argu-
ing that the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. Specifically, Santana ar-
gued that the search was conducted without
his consent and that the State lacked the
requisite reasonable grounds, The magistrate
found that the Fourth Amendment waiver
was not a valid condition of Santana’s proba-
tion because it was not announced in the oral
pronouncement of his sentence nor set forth
in the probation order. The magistrate com-
mented that there was disagreement among
other judges as to whether the probation
agreement could set a Fourth Amendment
waiver as a condition of probation when it is
not contained in the probation order. The
magistrate granted Santana’s motion to sup-
press and encouraged the State to appeal so
other judges would have guidance for future
cases,

The State appealed to the district court,
On intermediate appeal, the district court
affirmed the magistrate’s order suppressing
evidence, The district court concluded that
the probation order, not the probation agree-
ment, set the substantive terms of probation.
The district court alternatively affirmed on
the basis that the State did not have the
requisite reasonable grounds to conduct a
search of Santana’s residence. The State
again appeals.

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM For an appeal from the district
court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a
case from the magistrate division, this
Court’s standard of review is the same as
expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reviews the magistrate rec-
ord to determine whether there is substantial
and competent evidence to support the mag-
istvate’s findings of fact and whether the
magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from
those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 418,
415, 224 P.8d 480, 482 (2009). If those find-
ings are so supported and the conclusions
follow therefrom, and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm
the district court’s decision as a matter of
procedure. Jd. Thus, the appellate courts do
not review the decision of the magistrate.
State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318
P.8d 955, 958 (Ct. App, 2014). Rather, we are
procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the
decision of the district court. Id.

HH The standard of review of a sup-
pression motion is bifureated. When a deci-
sion on a motion to suppress is challenged,
we accept the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence,
but we freely review the application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts as found. State
v, Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

i.

ANALYSIS
A. Fourth Amendment Waiver as Condi-
tion of Probation

HI On appeal, the State argues the pro-
bation agreement provided for a Fourth
Amendment waiver as a condition of Santa-

na’s probation. Specifically, the State asserts
that the probation order contemplated a
Fourth Amendment waiver by requiring San-
tana to cooperate with the rules and terms of
the probation department. Idaho Code Sec-
tion 19-2601(2) vests the sentencing court
with the authority to set the substantive
terms and conditions of probation. The stat-
ute does not mention the probation depart-
ment, and the Idaho Supreme Court has
stated that the probation order, not the pro-
bation agreement, sets the conditions of pro-
bation. Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 296,
892 P.2d 552, 554 (1964),

However, the failure to include the condi-
tions of probation in the probation order is
not dispositive in every case, See Ea parte
Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 480-81, 253 P,2d 794,
797-98 (1958). In Medley, the Court deter-
mined that the failure to include the condi-
tions of probation in the probation order was
not fatal because the sentencing court orally
advised the probationer of the condition. Id.
Moreover, the probationer acknowledged
that he was aware of the condition before
accepting probation. The Court reasoned that
the probationer had notice of the condition
and knew what was expected of him. Id. In
another case, the order of probation simply
veferred to the terms and conditions set forth
in the probation agreement, but the order
itself did not contain the conditions of proba-
tion. State v. Mawmmert, 98 Idaho 452, 454,
566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977), In Mummert, the
Idaho Supreme Court allowed the probation
agreement to set forth the substantive condi-
tions of probation because the agreement.
was provided to the defendant in court, at
the time of the order, and in the presence of
the judge. Thus, the validity of a Fourth
Amendment waiver as a condition of Santa-
na’s probation hinges on whether he received
notice of the condition at the time of sentenc-
ing.

HMMM A defendant has the right to de-
cline probation when he or she deems its
conditions too onerous and may, instead,
serve the suspended portion of the sentence.
State v. McCool, 189 Idaho 804, 807, 87 P.8d
1. In Mummert for example, the probation agree-

ment set the conditions of probation where it
‘was presented to the probationer at the same

83

291, 294 (2004); State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho
841, 848, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987). It is
essential that defendants receive notice of
the substantive conditions of thei probations
at sentencing for two reasons. First, notice
apprises defendants of what conduct the
court expects of them, See Medley, 73 Idaho
at 480-81, 253 P.2d at 797-98. Second, notice
affords defendants the opportunity to consid-
er the terms and determine whether to ac-
cept probation. See McCool, 189 Idaho at 807,
87 P.3d at 294,

In the instant case, Santana did not receive
notice at sentencing that a Fourth Amend-
ment waiver would be a condition of his
probation. In fact, the sentencing court spe-
cifically omitted the checkbox for a Fourth
Amendment waiver on the probation order.
The court likewise did not mention a Fourth
Amendment waiver as a condition of proba-
tion during oral pronouncement of Santana’s
sentence, Santana was not apprised that he
would be consenting to searches of his resi-
dence. Likewise, Santana was not afforded
the opportunity to consider the Fourth
Amendment waiver before deciding to accept
probation. Thus, the Fourth Amendment.
waiver was not a condition of Santana’s pro-
bation.

Probation is an agreement between the
court and the probationer. The probation or-
der sets the substantive conditions of the
probation and represents the agreement be-
tween the probationer and the court. The
probation agreement is in the nature of an
administrative document that procedurally
sets forth how the substantive conditions will
be enforced, For example, the probation or-
der may require a probationer to submit to
drug tests as a condition of probation, The
probation agreement could then set forth the
time and place the drug tests would be con-
ducted; however, it could not expand the
condition to include a search of the proba-
tioner’s vehicle at the time of the drug test.
Our determination does not mean that a pro-
bation agreement may never set the condi-
tions of probation! Rather, we hold that only

time as the probation order stating that all condi-
tions of probation would be set forth in the

84

the sentencing court may set the substantive
conditions of probation. Thus, because Santa-
na’s probation agreement was prepared by
his probation officer and signed nearly six
weeks after the sentencing court ordered
Santana’s probation, the Fourth Amendment.
waiver in the probation agreement was not a
valid condition of Santana’s probation,

B. Probation Agreement as Basis for
Consent to Search

HN The State argues that, even if the
probation agreement did not set a substan-
tive condition of probation, Santana consent-
ed to the search of his residence when he
signed the probation agreement containing
the Fourth Amendment waiver, Although a
warrantless entry or search of a residence is
generally illegal and violative of the Fourth
Amendment, such an entry or search may be
rendered reasonable by an individual’s con-
sent. State ». Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522,
716 P,2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta,
181 Idaho 704, 707, 968 P.2d 387, 890 (Ct.
App. 1998), In such instances, the State has
the burden of demonstrating consent by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kil-
by, 180 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct.
App. 1997), The State must show that con-
sent was not the result of duress or coercion,
either direct or implied. Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 98 S.Ct. 2041,
2058-59, 86 L.Hd.2d 854, 875 (1978); State v.
Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 264, 858 P.2d 800,
803 (Ct. App. 1993), The voluntariness of an
individual’s consent is evaluated in light of all
the circumstances. Whiteley, 124 Idaho at
264, 858 P.2d at 808. Consent to search may
be in the form of words, gestures, or conduct.
State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 848, 348, 815 P.2d
1088, 1088 (Ct. App. 1991). Whether consent
was granted voluntarily, or was a product of
coercion, is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by all the surrounding circumstances.
State v. Hansen, 188 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.8d
1052, 1057 (2008).

In the instant case, Santana reported to
the probation department pursuant to a con-
dition of probation as set forth in the proba-
tion order. Santana’s probation officer pro-
vided Santana the probation agreement and

probation agreement, Mummert, 98 Idaho at 454,

required him to sign it, When Santana was
told to sign the probation agreement, he did
not have an attorney present and was not,
advised that he had the right to have an
attorney present. This distinguishes Santa-
na’s circumstances because, generally, the
probation agreement is provided to a proba-
tioner with the probation order at sentencing
where an attorney is present. In light of
these facts, Santana did not choose to waive
his Fourth Amendment rights. Rather, he
signed the probation agreement because he
believed doing so was a condition of his pro-
bation, It is unlikely Santana would waive
his Fourth Amendment rights unless he be-
lieved he was required to under the terms of
his probation. Mere acquiescence to a claim
of authority does not amount to consent.
State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 94, 675 P.2d
851, 854 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, insofar as
Santana consented to the search of his resi-
dence by signing the probation agreement,
his consent was the product of coercion, San-
tana did not consent to the search of his
residence when he signed the probation
agreement containing the Fourth Amend-
ment waiver. Accordingly, the district court
did not err in granting Santana’s motion to
suppress in this regard.

C. Warrantless Search

HM The State argues that, even if Santa-
na did not waive his Fourth Amendment
rights, there was reasonable suspicion that
evidence of a probation violation would be
found in his residence. A condition of Santa-
na’s probation was that he not consume alco-
hol or any other mood-altering substance
unless prescribed by a physician. Almost six
weeks after that condition was set forth in
the probation order, Santana admitted in
writing that he used alcohol and marijuana
three days earlier, Two days later, Santana
tested positive for marijuana use, Twelve
days later, based on this information, the
probation department initiated a search of
Santana’s residence, The magistrate conclud-
ed this information was insufficient to sup-
port reasonable suspicion. Specifically, the
magistrate determined that the length of
time after Santana’s admission and the ab-
sence of facts indicating drugs would be in

566 P.2d at 1112,

his residence rendered the information too
remote to justify a search,

HE The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Warrantless
searches are presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290,
900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995), The State may
overcome this presumption by demonstrating
that a warrantless search either fell within a
well-recognized exception to the warrant re-
quirement or was otherwise reasonable un-
der the circumstances. Id. Even in the ab-
sence of a warrantless search condition, a
parole or probation officer may conduct a
search of a parolee or probationer and his or
her residence if the officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that the parolee or proba-
tioner has violated a parole or probation
condition and the search is reasonably relat-
ed to the disclosure or confirmation of that
violation. See State v. Klingler, 148 Idaho
494, 497-98, 148 P.8d 1240, 1248-44 (2006),

In Klingler, the Idaho Supreme Court up-
held the warrantless search of an unsuper-
vised probationer’s residence based upon an
unsubstantiated tip from police that Klingler
may be dealing drugs, coupled with the pro-
bationer’s drug history which indicated a
heightened need for supervision. Id, at 498,
148 P.8d at 1244, Thus, the mere likelihood of
facts justifying the search can be sufficient to
constitute reasonable grounds, Id.; see also
State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95
P.8d 635, 638-89 (2004) (unconfirmed tips
from a neighbor regarding detected odor of
suspected methamphetamine lab, coupled
with prior drug history and other rumors,
sufficient to establish reasonable grounds or
reasonable suspicion for warrantless search
as a condition of bail pending appeal).

HM There is no magic number of days
before information becomes stale. State v.
Gomez, 101 Idaho 802, 808, 628 P.2d 110, 116
(1980), Rather, the question of whether infor-
mation is fresh or stale must be analyzed in
light of the circumstances. Id. An important
factor in the staleness analysis is the nature
of the criminal conduct. Id, Additionally, if
the crime suspected of is of a protracted or
continuous nature, a time delay in the se-
quence of events is of less significance. State

85

v, Alewander, 188 Idaho 18, 24, 56 P.8d 780,
786 (Ct. App. 2002),

In this case, Santana admitted to violating
a condition of his probation by ongoing use of
alcohol and marijuana. Because the underly-
ing charge involved substance abuse and
Santana admitted to ongoing substance
abuse, these probation violations can be char-
acterized as a crime of protracted nature.
See id. (holding that certain nefarious activi-
ties, such as narcotics trafficking, are contin-
uous in nature and, as a result, are less likely
to become stale even over an extended peri-
od of time.) Additionally, the search occurred
only twelve days after a drug test confirmed
Santana’s marijuana use. Based on these
facts, the information was not too stale to
establish reasonable grounds. Thus, the pro-
bation officer had the requisite reasonable
grounds to search Santana’s residence even
without a valid Fourth Amendment waiver.
Accordingly, the magistrate erred in conclud-
ing that the probation officer lacked the req-
uisite reasonable suspicion to search Santa-
na’s residence. Because there was reasonable
suspicion to search Santana’s residence, the
district court erred in suppressing the evi-
dence,

Iv.

CONCLUSION

A Fourth Amendment, waiver was not a
condition of Santana’s probation, and Santa-
na did not consent to a search of his resi-
dence by signing the probation agreement,
However, Santana’s probation officer had
reasonable grounds to suspect that evidence
of a probation violation would be in Santana’s
residence. Thus, the search of Santana’s resi-
dence did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
and the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate’s order suppressing evidence, Ac-
cordingly, the district court’s order, affirming
the magistrate on intermediate appeal, is re-
versed and the case is remanded to the mag-
istrate for further proceedings.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY

coneur,

394 P.3d 129

Mandy L. VALENTINE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

ve

Dan VALENTINE, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 44350
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: April 4, 2017
Review Denied May 18, 2017

May, Rammell & Thompson, Chid.; Peter
M. Wells, Pocatello, for appellant,

Smith & Banks, PLLC; Jeffery W. Banks,
Idaho Falls, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge

Mandy L. Valentine appeals from an inter-
mediate appellate order of the district court
affirming the magistrate’s judgment and de-
cree of divorce. Specifically, Mandy argues
that the magistrate erred in determining
Dan Valentine’s monthly child support obli-
gation. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.

Mandy and Dan were married in 2005 and
had two children. In 2014, Dan filed a com-
plaint for divorce. At trial, the parties disa-
greed about Dan’s income for the purpose of
determining child support. Mandy argued
that, because Dan’s employer paid Dan’s
health insurance premiums as part of his
compensation, such contributions should be
considered gross income or a fringe benefit
for the purpose of calculating his income.
Mandy also argued that the individual man-
date of the Affordable Care Act required
Dan to have health insurance. She reasoned
that, because Dan’s employer paid for a por-
tion of his health insurance, Dan’s living ex-
penses were reduced. The magistrate caleu-
lated Dan’s child support obligation without
including the value of his employer’s contri-
butions to Dan’s health insurance premiums
and entered a decree of divorce. Mandy ap-
pealed to the district court, alleging that the
magistrate erred in calculating Dan’s child
support obligation by omitting the value of
the employer’s contribution to Dan’s health
insurance premiums. The district court af-
firmed. Mandy again appeals.

1, The guidelines are set forth in Rule 126 of the
Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure

87

For an appeal from the district
court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a
case from the magistrate division, this
Court's standard of review is the same as
expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reviews the magistrate rec-
ord to determine whether there is substantial
and competent evidence to support the mag-
istrate’s findings of fact and whether the
magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from
those findings. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho
855, 858-59, 303 P.8d 214, 217-18 (2018). If
those findings are so supported and the con-
clusions follow therefrom, and if the district
court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we
affirm the district court’s decision as a mat-
ter of procedure, Id. Thus, the appellate
courts do not review the decision of the
magistrate. Bailey v. Bailey, 158 Idaho 526,
529, 284 P.8d 970, 973 (2012). Rather, we are
procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the
decision of the district court. Id. The Court.
exercises free review over issues of law de-
cided by the district court to determine
whether it correctly stated and applied the
applicable law. Garner v. Garner, 158 Idaho
982, 985, 354 P.8d 494, 497 (2015). When a
trial court's discretionary decision is re-
viewed on appeal, the appellate court con-
ducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine
whether the lower court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consis-
tently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it; and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119
Idaho 87, 94, 808 P.2d 998, 1000 (1991).

TH sOn appeal, the sole issue is whether
health insurance premiums provided by
Dan’s employer constitute a fringe benefit
for the purpose of calculating Dan’s income
under the Idaho Child Support Guidelines.t
Courts use 1.C. § 32-706 and the guidelines
to determine a parent’s child support obli-
gation. Any interpretation of the guidelines is
a question of law over which this Court exer-
cises free review. Kornfield v. Kornfield, 134
Idaho 383, 385, 8 P.8d 61, 63 (Ct. App. 2000).

(LE.LRP.).

88

Where the language of the guidelines is clear
and unambiguous, courts must interpret it in
accordance with its plain language and follow
it as promulgated, Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho
885, 889, 894 P.2d 118, 122 (1995).

The guidelines are intended to give specific
guidance for evaluating evidence in child sup-
port proceedings and establishing child sup-
port obligations, LF.L.R.P. 126(A), For the
purpose of calculating a parent’s income in
order to determine his or her child support
obligation, the guidelines provide that “in-
come shall include the gross income of the
parents and if applicable, fringe benefits
and/or potential income; less adjustments.”
LF.L.R.P. 126(F), Gross income under the
guidelines includes income from any source,
and the rule lists numerous specific sources
which are to be included in the definition, as
well as exceptions. LF.L.R.P. 126(F)(1)(a)2
Relating to fringe benefits subject to inclu-
sion in the income calculation formula in Rule
126(F), the guidelines provide:

Fringe Benefits Defined. Fringe benefits
received by a parent in the course of em-
ployment, or operation of a trade or busi-
ness shall be counted as income if they are
significant and reduce personal living ex-
penses. Such fringe benefits might include
a company car, free housing, or room and
board,

LF.L.R.P. 126(F)@).

The magistrate ruled that Dan’s employer-
provided health insurance premiums were
neither gross income nor a fringe benefit for
the purpose of calculating Dan’s child sup-
port obligation. Specifically, the magistrate
found:

[Dan’s] group health insurance benefit is
not gross income either. The Affordable
Care Act did not create a new category of
gross annual income. Since the adoption of
the Idaho Child Support Guidelines, this
court cannot imagine that any employer
that was providing group health insurance
benefits could not have provided informa-
tion that determined its cost to provide its
employees a group health insurance bene~

2, On appeal, Mandy does not challenge the mag-
istrate's finding that Dan’s employer-paid health

insurance premiums did not constitute gross in-
come under the guidelines but only argues that

fit. Under [LF.L.R.P. 126(F)()(@) ] and un-
der the rule that proceeded it, [L.R.C.P.
(6)(e)(6) ], neither employer provided group
health insurance benefits, nor any similar
benefits are considered gross income.

Similarly, the Affordable Care Act did
not create a new class of fringe benefits.
Once again, employers have been provid-
ing group health care insurance for their
employees prior to the enactment and im-
plementation of the Affordable Care Act.
[Mandy] seeks to have the court classify
the employer’s contribution for group
health care insurance as a fringe benefit.
Again, this is a novel argument, but em-
ployers’ group health insurance contribu-
tions have more than likely always been
capable of calculation and the Affordable
Care Act did not make them any more
capable of calculation. The Affordable Care
Act simply requires the employer to pro-
vide the costs on an employee’s W-2 Form
in order to verify compliance of the em-
ployee with the health insurance require-
ments of the act. Additionally, health in-
surance is not substantially similar to the
examples of fringe benefits contained in
the rule. See [LF.L.R.P. 126(F)(2) |.

HI Mandy argues that the magistrate
erred by determining that the employer's
contributions to Dan’s health insurance pre-
miums did not constitute a fringe benefit for
the purpose of calculating his income under
Rule 126(F), Specifically, Mandy contends
that the Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A, creates a mandate for all individu-
als to carry health insurance or pay a penalty
and therefore increases an individual’s per-
sonal living expenses, Thus, Mandy asserts
that Dan’s employer-paid health insurance
premiums constitute a fringe benefit under
the plain language of Subsection (F)(2) and
should be considered income for the purpose
of determining Dan’s child support obli-
gation,

Mandy contends that “to determine wheth-
er a benefit received in the course of employ-
ment or operation of a trade or business is a

those contributions constitute a fringe benefit.
Therefore, we need not analyze the guidelines’
definition of gross income in the context of this
case.

fringe benefit, the court must determine
whether the benefit is first, significant, and
second, reduces the personal living expense
of the individual.” The plain language of Sub-
section (F)(2) does not attempt to set out a
basic definition of what constitutes a fringe
benefit, For instance, Subsection (F)(2) does
not use the generic term “benefit” and apply
a two-part test to determine if that benefit
constitutes a fringe benefit as Mandy asserts.
Rather the first two words of Subsection
(F)Q), “fringe benefits,” specifically identify
the object that is subject to the subsection’s
subsequent analysis. Consequently, under
the plain language of Rule 126(F) and Sub-
section (F)(2), the analysis for what consti-
tutes a fringe benefit subject to inclusion in
the income calculation formula begins with
an identified fringe benefit, Subsection (F)(2)
then narrows the specific type of fringe bene-
fit that is to be included in the income calcu-
lation formula,

The second sentence of Subsection (F)(2)
then suggests that this narrowed definition of
fringe benefits “might include a company car,
free housing, or room and board.” This list of
examples is neither inclusive nor exclusive,
As compared to the inclusive list of the types
of income that are to be included in the
definition of gross income under Rule
126(F)(1)(a) for the purpose of the income
calculation formula in Rule 126(F), Subsec-
tion (F)(2)’s use of the term “might include”
indicates that not in every circumstance is a
particular fringe benefit to be included in the
income calculation formula. Consistent with
the broader context of the guidelines, the
plain language of Subsection (F)(2) suggests
that determinations of what constitutes a
fringe benefit for the purpose of calculating
income is left to the discretion of the magis-
trate to apply to the circumstances of a par-
ticular case.

Hi In sun, we hold that, given the con-
fines of the guidelines, the plain and unam-
biguous language of Rule 126(F) and Subsec-
tion (F)(2) requires that, for a fringe benefit
to be included in the income calculation for-

3. Because we hold that Mandy has failed to meet
the first prong of the test (that Dan’s employer-
paid health insurance premiums are a fringe
benefit), we need not address the remaining four

89

mula, five elements must be met: (1) it must
be a fringe benefit; (2) received by a parent;
(8) in the course of employment, or operation
of trade or business; (4) is significant; and (5)
reduces personal living expenses. Applying
this standard to this case, the first step in
determining whether Dan’s employer-paid
health insurance premiums should be includ-
ed in his income calculation is whether those
contributions constitute a fringe benefit.
Mandy asserts that an interpretation of what
constitutes a fringe benefit under the guide-
lines must be constrained to the plain lan-
guage of the guidelines and reference to
other statutory provisions to interpret the
term is improper. We agree, What consti-
tutes a fringe benefit may be interpreted
from the plain language of Rule 126(F) and
the specific examples articulated in Subsec-
tion (F)(2) irrespective of the various uses of
“fringe benefits” in other contexts.

As previously discussed, the guidelines
provide examples of the type of fringe bene-
fits that might be included in income caleula-
tions—a company car, free housing, or room
and board. It is notable that the guidelines
do not mention items such as health benefits
and dental and vision benefits within the
context of gross income or fringe benefits.
Such benefits have long been examples of
employment benefits provided to an employ-
ee by an employer. Given that such benefits
are common, if it was intended that they be
included in income calculations as a fringe
benefit, the guidelines would have so speci-
fied. The magistrate found that health insur-
ance was not substantially similar to the
examples of fringe benefits contained in Rule
126(F)(2) and held that Dan’s employer-paid
health insurance premiums did not constitute
a class of fringe benefit for the purpose of
Dan’s income calculation under Rule 126(F).
Mandy has not demonstrated otherwise and
has failed to show the magistrate erred?

Mandy seeks an award of attorney fees on
appeal. An award of attorney fees may be
granted on appeal under I.C. § 12 121 and
LA.R, 41 to the prevailing party and such an

prongs—specifically, Mandy's argument pertain-
ing the Affordable Care Act's alleged impact on
the cost of personal living expenses.

90 Es

award is appropriate when the court is left
with the abiding belief that the appeal has
been brought or defended frivolously, unrea-
sonably, or without foundation. Rendon v.
Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776
(Ct, App. 1995). Dan did not request attorney
fees on appeal. Although Mandy requested
attorney fees on appeal, she is not the pre-
vailing party and therefore is not entitled to
attorney fees on appeal.

Mandy has failed to show that the magis-
trate erred in omitting employer-paid health
insurance premiums from Dan’s income cal-
culation for the purpose of determining his
child support obligation. Accordingly, the dis-

trict court’s order affirming the magistrate’s
judgment and decree of divorce is affirmed.
Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to
Dan on appeal.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
GUTIERREZ concur.

394 P.3d 793
Leticia M. SALINAS, Claimant-
Respondent,
ve
BRIDGEVIEW ESTATES, Employer, and

Old Republic Insurance Company,
Surety, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 44186

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: May 9, 2017

Alan Gardner and Margurit R. Cleverdon,
Boise, attorneys for appellant. Margurit R.
Cleverdon argued.

Patrick Brown, Twin Falls, attorney for
respondent,

JONES, Justice
I. Narore or tae Case

Leticia Salinas (“Salinas”) injured her back
while working for Bridgeview Estates (the
“Employer”). After receiving medical treat-
ment for roughly six weeks, her workers’
compensation benefits were temporarily de-
nied by Old Republic Insurance Company
(the “Surety”). Nearly two years later, Sali-

92

nas filed a claim for reimbursement for medi-
cal costs and all future medical care, The
Idaho Industrial Commission (the “Commis-
sion”) concluded that Salinas failed to prove
that she was entitled to payment of compen-
sation, Notwithstanding that conclusion, the
Commission awarded Salinas attorney’s fees
pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-804, The
Employer and Surety appeal that award,

IL FacruaL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about May 5, 2011, Salinas injured
her back (the “Injury”) while in the course
and scope of her employment as a registered
nurse, At the direction of the Employer,
Salinas visited Dr. Stagg seven times be-
tween June 1, 2011, and July 18, 2011. How-
ever, sometime between late July and early
August 2011, Salinas was temporarily cut off
from workers’ compensation medical benefits
while the Surety investigated her medical
background, The temporary denial became,
in effect, permanent when the Surety
stopped communicating with Salinas. Be-
cause Salinas did not have the funds to con-
tinue her treatment at the time, she was not
treated again until April 2013. It was then
that Salinas hired an attorney and pursued
this claim for previously denied benefits. Sa-
linas argued that she was entitled to reim-
bursement of all medical costs that she in-
curred after the Surety refused to provide
further medical treatment, and additionally,
all future palliative care related to the Inju-
ry. The Employer and Surety argued as fol-
lows: (1) Salinas had been paid all benefits to
which she was entitled; (2) her current condi-
tion is not the result of the Injury; (8) she
has no permanent impairment or disability
from the Injury; and (@) she has failed to
prove an entitlement to attorney’s fees.

On August 6, 2015, the Commission as-
signed the matter to Brian Harper (the “Ref-
eree”), The Referee made five conclusions.
First, he concluded that Salinas had failed to
prove that her current low back condition
was caused in whole or in part by the Injury.
This conclusion was supported by the finding
that Salinas had periodic low back issues pre-
dating the Injury. Second, he concluded that
Salinas had failed to prove a right to past
unpaid medical care or future medical care,

palliative or curative, related to the Injury.
Specifically, he noted that Salinas had failed
to show that she obtained any medical care
for her low back during the time immediately
after the Surety discontinued her claim. It
was not until April 2013 that Salinas sought
low back-related treatment, and she did not
prove that this treatment or any subsequent.
treatment was causally related to the Injury.
‘Third, he concluded that Salinas had failed to
prove that she suffered a permanent impair-
ment as a result of the Injury. Fourth, he
concluded, that since Salinas did not suffer a
permanent impairment, she could not have
suffered a permanent disability, Fifth, and
most important to this appeal, the Referee
concluded that Salinas was entitled to attor-
ney’s fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-
804 for the “Surety’s prolonged discontinua-
tion of medical benefits without a reasonable
ground.” Specifically, the Referee concluded
as follows:

In effect, Surety discontinued compensa-

tion justly due and owing to [Salinas] with-

out a reasonable ground, not per se by
temporarily suspending her medical cover-
age, but by unreasonably delaying its deci-
sion on continuing coverage on an accepted
claim and/or refusing to communicate with

[Salinas] on her coverage status despite

her repeated attempts to speak with the

adjuster,
On March 4, 2016, the Commission issued an
order consistent with the Referee’s recom-
mendation,

On March 24, 2016, the Employer and
Surety moved for reconsideration of the
award of attorney’s fees. On April 28, 2016,
the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Therein, the Commission provided the follow-
ing:

Defendants are reminded that [Salinas]

was actively treating for her industrial in-

jury, which was an accepted claim, when

Surety declined payment for additional

treatment without a contemporaneous

medical predicate, and gave [Salinas] the
runaround about her claim status. No phy-

sician had declared [Salinas] to be at MMI

[maximum medical improvement] at the

time. Under the facts of this case, Surety’s

decision to discontinue payment of [Sali-

nas’] treatment before [Salinas] had been
declared MMI, and without appropriately
communicating and/or investigating the
matter denied [Salinas] benefits justly due
during the pendency of her workers’ com-
pensation claim, Even though Defendants
obtained a persuasive medical opinion that,
declared [Salinas] stable, this was procured
years after Defendants’ unsubstantiated
denial. Defendants cannot excuse their ac-
tions by [Salinas’] subsequent recovery. To
hold otherwise would cause an unjust re-
sult.

On May 9, 2016, the Employer and Surety
appealed the Commission’s order.

III. Issue on APPEAL

1, Whether the Commission erred in
awarding attorney’s fees to Salinas.

TV. Sranparp or Review

HM We exercise free review over statu-
tory interpretation because it is a question
of law. Our objective when interpreting a
statute is to derive the intent of the legisla-
tive body that adopted the act. Statutory
interpretation begins with the statute’s
plain language. This Court considers the
statute as a whole, and gives words their
plain, usual, and ordinary meanings, When
the statute’s language is unambiguous, the
legislature’s clearly expressed intent must
be given effect, and we do not need to go
beyond the statute’s plain language to con-
sider other rules of statutory construction.
State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381, 885, 373 P.8d
699, 703 (2016)(citing State v. Owens, 158
Idaho 1, 8, 843 P.8d 30, 32 (2015)) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted),

V. ANALYSIS

A. The Commission erred in awarding at-
torney’s fees to Salinas.

Hl The Employer and Surety argue that
the Commission erred in awarding attorney's
fees to Salinas because the Employer and
Surety owed no payment of compensation to
Salinas; thus, regardless of the Commission’s
finding of unreasonable conduct, no basis ex-
isted for the award of attorney's fees under

93

the plain language of Idaho Code section 72-
804, Salinas did not participate in briefing,

Idaho Code section 72-804 provides as fol-
lows:

If the commission or any court before
whom any proceedings are brought under
this law determines that the employer or
his surety contested a claim for compensa-
tion made by an injured employee or de-
pendent of a deceased employee without
reasonable ground, or that an employer or
his surety neglected or refused within a
reasonable time after receipt of a written
claim for compensation to pay to the in-
jured employee or his dependents the com-
pensation provided by law, or without rea-
sonable grounds discontinued payment of
compensation as provided by law justly
due and owing to the employee or his
dependents, the employer shall pay rea-
sonable attorney fees in addition to the
compensation provided by this law. In all
such cases the fees of attorneys employed
by injured employees or their dependents
shall be fixed by the commission,

LC. § 72-804, In sum, the statute provides
for the award of attorney’s fees against an
employer or surety in three instances, Only
the third instance is relevant to this appeal;
that is, whether an employer or surety “with-
out reasonable grounds discontinued pay-
ment of compensation as provided by law
justly due and owing to the employee or his
dependents.” Id.

The Commission erred in awarding attor-
ney’s fees to Salinas because the plain lan-
guage of Idaho Code section 72-804 does not
support such an award, To award attorney's
fees under the third instance of Idaho Code
section 72-804 the Commission must deter-
mine that an employer or surety, without
reasonable grounds, discontinued payment of
compensation as provided by law justly due
and owing. I.C. § 72-804, The plain language
of the statute is clear: there must be pay-
ment that is justly due and owing to allow an
award of attorney’s fees, no matter how un-
reasonably an employer or surety acted. It
follows then, that because the Commission
found that Salinas was not entitled to pay-
ment of compensation it could not find that
the Employer or Surety “discontinued pay-

94 Le

ment of compensation as provided by law
justly due and owing.” Therefore, the Com-
mission erred in awarding attorney’s fees to
Salinas.

VI. ConcLusion

We vacate the Commission’s award of at-
torney’s fees.

Justices EISMANN and HORTON concur.

BURDICK, Chief Justice, dissenting

The majority reasons that the plain lan-
guage of section 72-804 requires the commis-
sion to find Salinas was entitled to payment
of compensation before the commission can
find that Surety “discontinued payment of
compensation as provided by law justly due
and owing.” Thus, the majority denies fees
because it concludes that the Commission did
not find that Salinas was due the “payment.
of compensation as provided by law,” as re-
quired under Idaho Code section 72-804.
While I concur in the majority’s reading of
section 72-804, I cannot concur in the majori-
ty’s factual finding that the Commission did
not find Salinas was entitled the “payment of
compensation as provided by law.”

In my opinion, the majority overlooks the
fact that the Commission found that Salinas
‘was entitled to the payment of compensation
for medical treatment from the date of her
injury until November 2011. Specifically, the
Commission, by way of adopting the referee’s
findings of fact, found that the weight of the
evidence suggests Salinas did not reach MMI
until November 2011. Furthermore, the
Commission found that during the period
immediately following Surety’s termination of
medical benefits, Salinas, “should have been
receiving medical care, and in fact, had ap-
pointments scheduled... .”

There is no doubt that on or about May 5,
2011, Salinas injured her back in the scope of
her employment. Thus, Employer and Surety
were obligated to provide reasonable medical
care and treatment to Salinas “immediately
after [her] injury ... and for a reasonable
time after.” LC. § 72-432, A reasonable time
after is “as long as the condition and necessi-
ty for treatment exists.” Clevenger v. Pot-
latch Forests, Inc., 85 Idaho 198, 199, 377

P.2d 794, 798 (1963). Here, the commission
found that the weight of evidence suggests
MMI was not reached until November 2011
and that Salinas “should have been receiving
medical care” at the time Surety discontin-
ued paying for her medical treatment. “The
furnishing to the injured employee of medical
+. treatment ... may be treated as pay-
ment of compensation.” Jd. at 199, 877 P.2d
at 798. Thus, Salinas was entitled to and was
receiving “payment of compensation as pro-
vided by law justly due and owing” when
Surety discontinued paying for her treat-
ment, The Commission found this discontinu-
ation was unreasonable. Accordingly, because
there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s decision, I would affirm the
Commission’s award of fees. Page v. McCain
Foods, Inc., 155 Idaho 755, 760, 316 P.8d 671,
676 (2014) (“The decision that grounds exist
for awarding a claimant attorney fees [under
LC, § 72-804] is a factual determination
which rests with the Commission.” (alteration
in original)).

Justice BRODY concurs.

394 P.3d 796
Joel W. HARMON and Kathleen F.
Harmon, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 43802

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: May 11, 2017

,
|
,
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©

6

Bistline Law, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for
appellants, Arthur M. Bistline argued.

Elam & Burke, P.A. Boise, for respondent.
Jeffrey A. Thomson argued.

BRODY, Justice.

Plaintiffs Joel W. Harmon and Kathleen F.
Harmon filed a claim with their insurance
company, State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co,, after their motorhome was bro-
ken into and damaged. The Harmons subse-
quently brought suit against State Farm in
district court, claiming that State Farm
breached the insurance agreement by failing
to pay the amount required to actually repair
the vehicle or pay the cash value. The Har-
mons also brought a claim for bad faith.
State Farm moved for summary judgment on
both claims, which the district court granted,
The Harmons timely appealed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The Harmons owned a 2008 National Paci-
fica motorhome, They lived in the motorhome
in Alaska, The Harmons spent the fall of
2018 in the lower 48 states. In December
2018, they placed the motorhome in storage
at a facility in Spokane, Washington, and
planned to keep it there until spring.

On December 19, 2018, the motorhome was
burglarized. The dashboard was severely
damaged when the intruders removed elec-
trical components, The Harmons immediately
filed a claim with State Farm. State Farm
acknowledged receipt of the claim on Decem-
ber 22, 2018, and assigned a Claim Associate
to handle the claim, The insurance policy at
issue provided comprehensive coverage for
the motorhome subject to a $500 deductible.

Following the loss, the Harmons obtained
a written repair estimate from the facility
where the motorhome had been stored. The
repair estimate which was dated January 21,
2014, contained two separate estimates. The

first estimate totaled over $184,000 and in-
cluded $155,000 for the custom molding of a
new dash because the old dash could not be
repaired and a replacement could not be
found. The second estimate was titled “Esti-
mate with Figures Available.” This estimate
totaled $18,491.86 and included $2,000 for
replacement of the dash, even though a re-
placement unit could not be located.

In January 2014, the Harmons were in
touch with a State Farm claim representative
via telephone. Mr. Harmon stated in his affi-
davit in opposition to summary judgment
that “{the claim representative] informed us
that State Farm would be totaling the coach
because the dash could not be repaired, that.
no existing replacement was available, and
that the dash could only be re-manufactured
for a cost of approximately $155,000.00.”
State Farm did not dispute these statements,

Sometime in April or May 2014, Mr. Har-
mon spoke again with the State Farm claim
representative via telephone. Mr. Harmon
stated in his affidavit that the Claim Repre-
sentative informed him at that time that
State Farm did not consider the motorhome
a total loss and that State Farm would pay
the repair cost based on an estimate of the
eost if a dash were actually available. On
May 29, 2014, the claim representative sent
Mr. Harmon a letter confirming their conver-
sation and offering to pay $18,491.36 for the
damage to the motorhome. The letter stated
in part:

‘The issue has been to get a replacement
dash, to be able to complete the repairs to
your motorhome, After much research by
RV Northwest, it appears there is not a
replacement dash available, new or used.
I have spoke [sic] with several RV repair
facilities myself. If a dash was available I
was told the price would be in the
$2,000.00 range. I have taken the parts
prices, labor prices, ete from the RV
Northwest estimate and added $2,000.00
for a dash. These figures total up to, [sic]
$18,491.36, I can write you a check for this
amount. If there is any additional parts
needed, additional labor, or parts increas-
es, we will review them and handle it as a
supplement.

97

Your motorhome is not a total loss be-
cause of an obsolete part, or because a
company goes out of business and parts
are no longer.available. I am obligated to
pay for what the part would cost if it
was available. In this case the estimate
for a replacement dash was $2,000.00.

If you have any additional information,
or any questions, please give mé a call. I
am willing to look at any prospects with
the idea of getting your motorhome back
to the way it was prior to this incident.
Thanks for your cooperation,

(Emphasis added).

Approximately three weeks after receiving
this letter, the Harmons filed suit against
State Farm alleging breach of contract and
bad faith. On July 21, 2014, State Farm filed
an answer and moved to stay the proceedings
and compel an appraisal process that is re-
quired when there is a disagreement between
the parties as to the cost of the repair or the
actual cash value. It'is undisputed that State
Farm again offered to pay the Harmons
what it estimated to be the actual cash value
of the motorhome while the motion to stay
proceedings was pending. The Harmons re-
jected the offer. On Angust 22, 2014, the
parties stipulated to entry of the stay and to
participate in the appraisal process. Thereaf-
ter, the parties traded letters concerning
what would be determined by the appraisers.
The Harmons demanded that the appraisers
determine the actual cash value of the vehi-
cle. State Farm, on the other hand, demand-
ed the appraisal of both the cost of repair
and the actual cash value.

On October 27, 2014, the claim representa-
tive sent the Harmons a letter advising them
of new repair options. A used replacement
dash from the previous model year had been
located. The used dash would fit the space in
the Harmon’s motorhome, but was not an
exact match, State Farm also advised the
Harmons that another repair specialist had
determined that their existing dash could be
repaired, The claim representative enclosed
two estimates, one for replacing the dash for
$18,994.22 and the other for repairing the
dash for $18,252.89, both of which would be
subject to the $500 deductible. State Farm
requested that the Harmons choose between

98

either replacing the damaged dash or repair-
ing it. The Harmons advised State Farm a
few days later that they wanted to discuss
the feasibility of repairs with their expert.

On November 10, 2014, the Harmons ad-
vised State Farm that they chose to have the
dash repaired. On November 21, 2014, State
Farm paid the Harmons $17,752,89—the
amount of the repair estimate less the $500
deductible. On January 30, 2015, the umpire
involved in the appraisal process, issued a
decision finding that the cost of repair was
$18,252.89—the amount State Farm had ten-
dered previously less the $500 deductible.

After State Farm tendered payment, the
parties again traded letters regarding the
repairs, In February 2015, the Harmons ad-
vised State Farm that they would have the
repairs made subject to their right to reject
if the repairs were not satisfactory. The Har-
mons also asked for a determination of the
actual cash value of the vehicle from the
umpire so that it could be used in the event
the repairs were not successful. In May 2015,
State Farm filed a motion to lift the stay of
proceedings, arguing that the cash value of
the motorhome was moot and, alternatively,
that the Harmons refused to complete the
appraisal process. The Harmons stipulated to
lift the stay. The litigation then proceeded.

State Farm filed a motion for a summary
judgment in June 2015. The Harmons re-
sponded to the motion. In August of 2015,
the district court granted State Farm’s mo-
tion for summary judgment, finding no
breach of contract or bad faith, The district,
court dismissed the Harmons’ claims and
final judgment was entered. In September
2015, the Harmons timely filed a Motion to
Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59, The Order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend
the Judgment was filed in October 2015. The
Harmons timely filed their Notice of Appeal
in November 2015.

IL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred when
it determined that State Farm had not
breached the insurance contract.

2, Whether the district court erred when
it dismissed the Harmons’ bad faith
claim.

8. Whether the Harmons are entitled to
an award of reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs on appeal.

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hs Idaho appellate standards of review
apply even when a contract’s choice of law
provision requires the application of the law
of another state. See Carroll . MBNA Am.
Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 264, 220 P.8d 1080,
1088 (2009) (applying the Idaho standard of
review when a Delaware choice of law was at
issue). In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, this Court’s standard of review is
the same as the district court’s standard in
ruling upon a motion. Thomson v. Lewiston,
187 Idaho 478, 475-76, 50 P.38d 488, 490-91
(2002). “The [district] court must grant sum-
mary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any materi-
al fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.” LR.C.P. 56(a).
Courts will consider “pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any.” Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho
225, 227, 159 P.8d 862, 864 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). In making that determina-
tion, all facts are construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record are to be drawn in favor of
the non-moving party. Parks v. Safeco Ins,
Co. of Illinois, 160 Idaho 556, 561, 876 P.8d
760, 765 (2016). If there is no genuine issue
of material fact, only a question of law re-
mains, over which this Court exercises free
review, Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at
864.

Ivy. ANALYSIS

A. Alaska law governs the parties’ dis-
pute.

State Farm insured the motorhome under
Alaska Policy Form 9802A. There is a choice
of law provision in the policy which states:
“Without regard to choice of law rules, the
law of the state of: Alaska will control ... in
the event of any disagreement as to the

interpretation and application of any provi-
sion in this policy.” This Court has previously
ruled that the law of the state chosen by the
parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied. See Ward v. Puregro
Co., 128 Idaho 366, 369, 918 P.2d 582, 585
(1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 187). The parties do not
contest the application of Alaska law.

It should be noted that, ordinarily, the
reasonable expectations doctrine would not
be applicable to this case, except for the
parties’ choice of law provision. It is not the
Jaw in Idaho. This Court has held:

In declining to adopt the doctrine of
reasonable expectations in Idaho, we follow
the rationale of the dissenting opinion in
Corgatellil v. Globe Life & Ace. Ins. Co, 96
Idaho 616, 533 P.2d 737 (1975) ]. There,
Justice Donaldson rejected an adoption of
the doctrine of reasonable expectations and
relied upon the traditional basic principles
involved in construing contracts. Intent is
to be determined from the language of the
contract itself[ ] and in the absence of am-
biguity, contracts for insurance must be
construed as any other and understood in
their plain, ordinary and proper sense, ac-
cording to the meaning derived from the
plain wording of the contract.

Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,
509, 600 P.2d 1887, 1891 (1979) (footnote
omitted).

B. The district court erred when it deter-
mined that State Farm did not breach
the insurance agreement.

HM The district comt found that State
Farm did not breach the insurance agree-
ment. The district court held that the policy
required State Farm to pay the amount as
determined by a bid or repair estimate that
the company approves, The district court
reasoned that State Farm approved the RVs
Northwest estimate dated January 21, 2014,
in the amount of $18,491.36 and offered to
pay this amount to the Harmons. The district.
court erred in its analysis of the policy.

HH so[n Alaska, the interpretation of an
insurance contract is a question of law that is
reviewed de novo. Devine v. Great Divide
Ins, Co., 350 P.8d 782, 786 (Alaska 2015),

99

“Thus, ‘the -liability of an insurer and the
extent of the loss under a policy of liability or
indemnity insurance must be determined,
measured, and limited by the terms of the
contract”” Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1285
(Alaska 1979) (quoting 15 G. Couch, Cyclope-
dia of Insurance Law § 56:1 (2d ed. 1966)).
“The purpose of contract interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate the reasonable ex-
pectations of the parties.” Stordahl v. Gov't
Eimp. Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 68, 65 (Alaska 1977).
The Alaska Supreme Court has explained:

Interpretation of an insurance contract
is a question of law that we review de
novo, looking “to the language of the dis-
puted policy provision, other provisions of
the policy, and relevant extrinsic evi-
dence.” “[Blecause of inequities in bargain-
ing power, we construe coverage broadly
and exclusions narrowly, in favor of in-
sureds.” Insurance contracts are con-
strued using the reasonable expectations
doctrine, under which the “objectively
reasonable expectations” of an insur-
ance applicant about the terms of the
insurance contract will be honored “even
though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those ex-
pectations.” “To determine the parties’
reasonable expectations, we examine (1)
the language of the disputed policy provi-
sions; (2) the language of other provisions
in the same policy; (8) extrinsic evidence;
and (4) case law interpreting similar provi-
sions,”

Devine, 850 P.3d at 786 (footnotes omitted
and emphasis added).

It is important to begin the analysis of
State Farm’s obligations with the language of
the insuring agreement in the comprehensive
coverage portion of the policy. The policy
stated: “We will pay for loss, except loss
caused by collision, to a covered vehicle.”
‘The policy defined the term “loss” as:

1, direct, sudden, and accidental damage

to; or

2. total or partial theft of a covered vehi-

cle. Loss does not include any reduction in

the value of any covered vehicle after it
has been repaired, as compared to its value
before it was damaged,

100

The policy had a “loss settlement” provision.
which stated:

1, We have the right to choose to settle
with you or the owner of the covered
vehicle in one of the following ways:
a. Pay the cost to repair the covered

vehicle minus any applicable deduct-
ible.

(1) We have the right to choose to
settle with you or the owner of the
covered vehicle in one of the follow-
ing ways:

(a) The cost agreed to by both the
owner of the covered vehicle and us;
(b) A bid or repair estimate ap-
proved by us; or

(c) A repair estimate that is written
based upon or adjusted to:

(i) the prevailing competitive price;
Gi) the paintless dent repair price
that is competitive in the market; or
(ii) a combination of (i) and (ii)
above,

The prevailing competitive price
means prices charged by a majority of
the repair market in the area where
the covered vehicle is to be repaired
as determined by a survey made by
us, If asked, we will identify some
facilities that will perform the repairs
at the prevailing competitive price.
The estimate will include parts suffi-
cient to restore the covered vehicle to
its pre-loss condition,

b, Pay the actual cash value of the
covered vehicle minus any applicable
deduction,

The Harmons sustained a loss to their
motorhome in the form of a partial theft. The
issue to be determined is how to measure
that loss. State Farm takes the position that.
the policy gave the insurer the sole discretion
to determine how to pay the claim. State
Farm argues that it had the choice to either:
(a) pay the cost to repair the motorhome
minus the deductible; or (b) pay the actual
cash value of the motorhome. The company
argues that since it has now paid the cost to
vepair the motorhome there was no breach of

contract. State Farm’s argument is unavail-
ing.

It is undisputed that a State Farm claim
representative initially told the Harmons that
the company would pay the actual cash value
for the motorhome because the dash could
not be repaired or replaced. Later the Har-
mons received a phone call from the same
adjuster reversing course. Instead of paying
the actual cash value of the vehicle, State
Farm would pay the Harmons the cost to
repair the vehicle even though the parties
agreed that it could not be repaired and a
replacement dash did not exist, On May 29,
2014, more than five months after the loss,
State Farm sent the Harmons a written set-
tlement offer confirming their conversation
and stating:

The issue has been to get a replacement
dash, to be able to complete the repairs to
your motorhome. After much research by
RV Northwest, it appears there is not a
replacement dash available, new or used.
I have spoke [sic] with several RV repair
facilities myself. If a dash was available I
was told the price would be in the
$2,000.00 range. I have taken the parts
prices, labor prices, ete from the RV
Northwest estimate and added $2,000.00
for a dash. These figures total up to, [sic]
$18,491.36, I can write you a check for this
amount, If there is any additional parts
needed, additional labor, or parts inereas-
es, we will review them and handle it as a
supplement,

‘The letter continues: “Your motorhome is not,
a total loss because of an obsolete part, or
because a company goes out of business and
parts are no longer available. I am obligated
to pay for what the part would cost if it
was available. In this case the estimate for
a replacement dash was $2,000.00.” (Empha-
sis added).

The insurance agreement gave State Farm
the option to “[play the cost to repair the
covered vehicle minus any applicable de-
ductible” or to “[play the actual cash value of
the covered vehicle minus any applicable
deduction.” “The words ‘repair’ and ‘replace’
mean restoration to a condition substantially
the same as that existing before the damage

was sustained.” Great Tecas Cnty. Mut, Ins,
Co. v. Lewis, 979 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. App.
1998), accord Repair, Dictionary.com, http://
www.dictionary.com/browse/repair (last visit-
ed Feb. 21, 2017) (stating the word “repair”
means “to restore to a good or sound condi-
tion after decay or damage; mend: to repair a
motor”). The cost of making a hypothetical
repair is not the cost of restoring the moto-
rhome to substantially the same condition as
before the damage was sustained. There is
nothing in the policy stating that if a neces-
sary part is no longer available, then State
Farm only needs to pay the amount that a
repair would cost had the necessary replace-
ment part existed. By making that assertion,
State Farm misrepresented the terms of the
policy to ‘its insured in order to lessen the
amount that it would pay for the loss.

HM The district court found that the
only option the Harmons had after receiving
the May 29, 2014 settlement offer was to
initiate an appraisal process set forth in the
policy. The appraisal provision states in rele-
vant part: “If the owner of the covered vehi-
cle or you fail to agree with us on the cost to
repair the covered vehicle or the actual cash
value of the covered vehicle, it shall be
decided by an appraisal upon written demand
by the owner of the covered vehicle, you, or
us.” We disagree with the district court’s
interpretation of the appraisal process re-
quirement. The Harmons filed suit approxi-
mately three weeks after receiving State
Farm’s May 29, 2014 settlement offer. At
that point in time the parties had a dispute
over State Farm’s interpretation of the poli-
cy, not the cost of the repair. This means
that the appraisal process was not actually
required, and the Harmons’ decision to file
suit was not unreasonable,

The case continued and proceeded through
the appraisal process. During the process,
the parties discovered that the dash could be
repaired. State Farm paid $18,252.90 to the
Harmons before the appraisal umpire issued
his decision. The umpire decided that the
cost to repair all damages was in fact
$18,252.90, less the $500 deductible. At this
point, State Farm has satisfied its contractu-
al monetary obligation to the Harmons by
paying for the cost of repair. The dissent

101

argues that this late payment is a mere delay
in the loss settlement negotiations, and it
releases State Farm from the original
breach, We do not agree,

While State Farm has satisfied its obli-
gation to pay for the loss to the motorhome,
a breach of contract still oceurred and may
be the basis of a claim for bad faith. State
Farm’s eventual payment of the contractual
obligation cannot erase the original breach
which prompted the filing of this lawsuit. The
district court erred when it held that State
Farm did not breach the insurance agree-
ment. We hold that State Farm breached the
agreement when it failed to pay the actual
cash value of the motorhome on May 29,
2014,

C. The district court erred when it dis«
missed the Harmons’ bad faith claim
based on its erroneous conclusion that,
State Farm had not breached the in-
surance agreement.

The district court dismissed the Harmon’s
bad faith claim on summary judgment based
upon the erroneous legal conclusion that.
State Farm had not breached the insurance
agreement. However, as stated above, this
Court finds that State Farm did, in fact,
breach the insurance agreement. Therefore,
the bad faith claim must be substantively
reviewed,

Alaska has adopted the indepen-
dent tort of bad faith in first-party cases and
has used the accompanying objective stan-
dard from the well-known Anderson case:

The tort of bad faith ean be alleged only if
the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an
objective standard, show the absence of a
reasonable basis for denying the claim, ive.,
would a reasonable insurer under the cir-
cumstances have denied or delayed pay-
ment of the claim under the facts and
circumstances.
Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
855 P.2d 1821, 1823-24 (Alaska 1998) (quot-
ing Anderson v, Contl Ins. Co., 85 Wis.2d
675, 271 N.W.2d 368, 376-77 (1978)). To
prove bad faith in Alaska, a plaintiff must
establish “the absence of a reasonable basis
for denying benefits of the policy and the

102

defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard
of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying
the claim.” Hillman, 855 P.2d at 1824 (quot-
ing Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 876-77). But
“an insurance company may still challenge
claims which are fairly debatable.” Hillman,
855 P.2d at 1824 (quoting Noble v. Nat'l Am.
Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz, 188, 624 P.2d 866, 868
(1981)). The Alaska Supreme Court has
looked to and quoted Idaho bad faith law,
including the seminal case of White v. Uni-
gard Mutual Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 780 P.2d
1014 (1986). See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Alaska
1989) (citing Unigard, 112 Idaho at 97-98,
780 P.2d at 1017-18).

Hs 1 order for a first-party insured
to recover on a bad faith claim, the insured
must show: “1) the insurer intentionally and
unreasonably denied or withheld payment; 2)
the claim was not fairly debatable; 8) the
denial or failure to pay was not the result of
a good faith mistake; and 4) the resulting
harm is not fully compensable by contract
damages.” Parks v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illi-
nois, 160 Idaho 556, 562, 376 P.8d 760, 766
(2016) (quoting Robinson v, State Farm Mut,
Auto. Ins. Co., 187 Idaho 178, 176, 45 P.3d
829, 882 (2002)). “Although the tort of bad
faith is not a breach of contract claim, to find
that the insurer committed bad faith there
must also have been a duty under the con-
tract that was breached.” Jd,

“In Unigard, this Court held that a party
claiming extra-contractual damages for insur-
ance bad faith must either prove that the
insurer has ‘intentionally and unreasonably’
denied or delayed payment, provided the oth-
er elements are met.” Weinstein v. Pruden-
tial Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,
848, 288 P.8d 1221, 1270 (2010) (citing Uni-
gard, 112 Idaho at 100, 780 P.2d at 1020).
“(T]his Court extended liability for insurance
bad-faith to negligent delays or denials of
insurance.” Id. (citing Reynolds v. Am
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 362, 365,
766 P.2d 1248, 1246 (1988).

HM In the present case, we hold that a
duty under the contract was breached when.
State Farm refused to pay the actual cash
value of the motorhome on May 29, 2014.
Payment does not cure the breach and does

not erase bad faith at the time of the breach,
The question before the district court is
whether State Farm acted in bad faith and
whether the Harmons suffered any extra-
contractual damages. The dissent contends
that the Harmons’ claim is nothing but an
attempt to squeeze money out of State Farm,
The Harmons’ bad faith claim was dismissed
on summary judgment without any analysis
of whether the Harmons sustained any extra-
contractual damages. The district court or a
jury will have to resolve whether the Har-
mons are entitled to any additional compen-
sation,

HM Turning to the final issue, a party
will only be awarded attorney’s fees if it
prevails on the claim. Tobeluk v. Lind, 589
P.2d 878, 877-78 (Alaska 1979); see also
Bighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavat-
ing & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19,
117 P.8d 180, 182-38 (2005). At this time, the
case is remanded for further proceedings on
the bad faith claim. It is not appropriate to
decide attorney’s fees prematurely. See Hs-
tate of Holland v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins.
Co., 158 Idaho 94, 101, 279 P.8d 80, 87 (2012)
(explaining that the district court must make
preliminary determinations on the merits be-
fore determining attorney's fees). Attorney's
fees shall be determined by the district court
upon remand.

V. CONCLUSION

We reverse the decision of the district
court and remand this case for further pro-
ceedings with regard to the bad faith claim,
as well as attorney's fees. Costs to Appellant.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN and HORTON concur.

JONES, J. dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority's
holding that State Farm breached the policy
when it offered to pay the cost to repair the
vehicle on May 29, 2014. The Harmons disa-
greed with the amount State Farm offered to
repair the vehicle, but instead of submitting
the issue to the appraisal process, per the
terms of the policy, they sued State Farm.
Eventually, the appraisal process was initi-

ated and the dispute was settled, albeit after
the unnecessary delay caused by the Har-
mons’ lawsuit.

It is important to contextualize this appeal.
‘The Harmons’ insurance claim has been set-
tled. They accepted $18,252.90, less the $500
deductible, as the cost of repair. Indeed, the
majority admits that “State Farm has satis-
fied its contractual monetary obligation to
the Harmons by paying for the cost of re-
pair.” The Harmons cannot, at this point,
reasonably argue that they are entitled to
the actual cash value of the vehicle because
they have already sold the vehicle! This
frivolous appeal is merely an attempt by the
Harmons to squeeze State Farm for more
money,

Unsurprisingly, the majority's recitation of
the facts is tailored to support its erroneous
conclusion. Consequently, I feel obligated to
recount the facts in an evenhanded manner.
On December 22, 2018, State Farm received
the Harmons’ initial claim. On January 21,
2014, the Harmons submitted two drastically
different repair estimates, one for over
$184,000 and the other for $18,491.36. Within
the month, State Farm responded that it
would consider the vehicle totaled; however,
a few months later, State Farm indicated
that it would pay the $18,491.36 estimate
previously submitted by the Harmons. Three
weeks later, the Harmons ended the cordial
loss settlement negotiation process by initiat-
ing the underlying lawsuit. On July 21, 2014,
State Farm filed an answer and a motion to
stay the proceedings in order to initiate the
appraisal process, as required by the policy.
On August 12, 2014, the Harmons filed an
objection to State Farm’s motion to stay.
That same day, State Farm offered to pay
the Harmons the actual cash value of the
vehicle; essentially offering the Harmons an
opportunity to end the controversy. The Har-
mons rejected State Farm’s offer. On August
22, 2014, the parties stipulated to stay the
proceedings and begin the appraisal process.
The parties exchanged letters and agreed on
the scope of the appraisal. On October 27,
2014, State Farm sent the Harmons a letter
1. The policy provides that if State Farm were to

pay the Harmons the actual cash value of the
vehicle, “The damaged covered vehicle must be

103

with two appraisals, one to repair the exist-
ing dash, and the other to replace the exist-
ing dash with a newly discovered part. On
October 30, 2014, the Harmons acknowledged
the receipt of State Farm’s letter, but did not
indicate that they had decided as to how they
would proceed. Finally, on November 10,
2014, the Harmons decided to have the dash
repaired. State Farm tendered payment elev-
en days later.

Under the plain language of the insurance
policy, State Farm had the choice to either
repair the vehicle or pay the actual cash
value of the vehicle.

1. We have the right to choose to settle
with you or the owner of the covered
vehicle in one of the following ways:

a. Pay the cost to repair the covered
vehicle minus any applicable deduct-
ible.

(1) We have the right to choose one
of the following to determine the cost
to repair the covered vehicle:

(a) The cost agreed to’by both the
owner of the covered vehicle and us;
(b) A bid or repair estimate ap-
proved by us; or

(©) A repair estimate that is written
based upon or adjusted to:

@) The prevailing competitive price;
(i) The paintless dent repair price
that is competitive in the market; or
(ii) A combination of (i) and (ii)
above.

b. Pay the actual cash value of the
covered vehicle minus any applicable
deductible. The damaged covered ve-
hicle must be given to us in exchange
for our payment, unless we agree that
the owner may keep it. If the owner
keeps the covered vehicle, then our
payment will be reduced by the value
of the covered vehicle after the loss;
or

given to [State Farm] in exchange for (State
Farm's] payment...” (Emphasis in original).

104

If the owner of the covered vehicle or
you fail to agree with us on the cost to
repair the covered vehicle or the actual
cash value of the covered vehicle, it
shall be decided by an appraisal upon
written demand by the owner of the
covered vehicle, you, or us.
(Emphasis in original).

State Farm’s May 29, 2014 offer complied
with subsection (1)(b) of the policy. As the
foregoing demonstrates, if State Farm chose
to repair the vehicle, it could do so by, inter
alia, paying a bid or repair estimate ap-
proved by only State Farm. The estimate
submitted by the Harmons provided a cost of
repair of $18,491.86, which is precisely the
amount State Farm offered in its May 29,
2014 letter. Per the terms of the policy, if the
Harmons disagreed with the amount of the
offer, they were required to submit the issue
to the appraisal process. The Harmons ig-
nored the policy and filed the underlying
lawsuit.

As an aside, I disagree with the majority's
conclusion that the appraisal process was not.
required, The majority posits that the ap-
praisal process was not triggered by State
Farm’s May 29, 2014 offer because “At that
point in time the parties had a dispute over
State Farm’s interpretation of the policy, not
the cost of repair.” This is plainly incorrect
because the policy allows State Farm to
make an offer to repair based on an ap-
proved estimate, which is what State Farm
did in its May 29, 2014 letter. The Harmons
did not disagree with State Farm’s interpre-
tation of the policy, i.¢., the fact that State
Farm made an offer to repair the vehicle;
rather, the Harmons disagreed with the
amount State Farm offered to repair the
vehicle. This is precisely the situation that
the appraisal process was designed to ad-
dress: “If the owner of the covered vehicle
or you fail to agree with us on the cost to
repair ... it shall be decided by an apprais-
al.,..” (Emphasis in original), Surely, the
majority's conclusion that the appraisal pro-
cess was not required is an attempt to ration-
alize the Harmons’ unreasonable lawsuit,

The majority concludes that on May 29,

2014, State Farm breached the policy by
unreasonably offering $18,491.36 instead of

the actual cash value of the vehicle. I am
baffled by this conclusion for two reasons,
First, the policy clearly states that State
Farm may repair the vehicle by paying a
repair estimate approved by only State
Farm, State Farm complied with the policy
by offering to pay $18,491.36 to repair the
vehicle. Second, the majority's conclusion
that State Farm breached the policy by fail-
ing to offer the actual cash value of the
vehicle is plainly incompatible with its ac-
kmowledgement that “[ilt is undisputed that
State Farm again offered to pay the Har-
mons what it estimated to be the actual cash
value of the motorhome while the motion to
stay proceedings was pending.” I concede
that State Farm offered the Harmons the
actual cash value of the vehicle late in the
process, but both parties caused delays and
the policy does not impose specific time con-
straints. Moreover, delays should be expect-
ed in loss settlement negotiations; especially
in this case given that the replacement dash
was no longer manufactured. Nonetheless,
the majority takes issue with State Farm’s
delay, but overlooks similar delays by the
Harmons.

A possible explanation for the majority's
erroneous conclusion is that it interpreted
Alaska’s reasonable expectations doctrine as
a license to disregard the plain language of
the policy and rule in favor of the sympathet-
ic insureds. As mentioned by the majority,
Alaska’s reasonable expectations doctrine in-
structs us to honor the Harmons’ “objectively
reasonable expectations even though
painstaking study of the policy would negate
those expectations.” Devine v. Great Divide
Ins, Co., 350 P.8d 782, 786 (Alaska 2015)
reh’g denied, 850 P.8d 782 (Alaska 2015). The
majority emphasized the foregoing, and
seemingly glanced over the subsequent in-
struction, which provides: “To determine the
parties’ reasonable expectations, we examine
(1) the language of the disputed policy
provisions; (2) the language of other provi-
sions in the same policy; (8) extrinsic evi-
dence; and (4) case law interpreting similar
provisions.” Id. (Emphasis added). The lan-
guage of the policy cannot simply be disre-
garded. Indeed, in two cases cited by the
majority, the Alaska Supreme Court ana-

lyzed the language of the respective policies
and ruled in favor of each insurance compa-
ny, despite the alleged expectations of each
insured. See, Devine, 350 P.8d 782 (Alaska
2015); Stordahl v. Government Emp. Ins,
Co, 564 P.2d 68 (Alaska 1977). Here, the
policy’s language is simple and straightfor-
ward: State Farm may repair the vehicle by
paying “[a] bid or repair estimate approved
by [State Farm].” No painstaking study is
necessary to understand State Farm’s re-
sponsibility, nor is a painstaking analysis
necessary to conclude that State Farm ful-
filled its responsibility.

The bottom line is that State Farm’s May
29, 2014 letter did not amount to a breach of
the policy; rather, it was a loss settlement
offer in response to two drastically different
repair estimates submitted by the Harmons.
Based on my experience, which includes over
thirty years of practicing insurance law, in-
sureds and insurers generally exchange a
series of demands and offers in loss settle-
ment negotiations, State Farm’s May 29,
2014 offer complied with the policy, but un-
derstandably, the Harmons expected more.
The appropriate response by the Harmons
would have been to make a counter offer, or
refuse State Farm’s offer and initiate the
appraisal process. Indeed, the appraisal pro-
cess led to the eventual settlement, which
could have been reached sooner, but for the
Harmons’ eagerness to file the underlying

lawsuit.

394 P.3d 807
SECURED INVESTMENT CORP,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve
MYERS EXECUTIVE BUILDING,
LLC, Defendant-Appellant,
Docket No. 48402
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: August 4, 2016
Rehearing Denied August 4, 2016
Review Denied October 18, 2016

2 |
=

_
_
|
Le
a
McConnell

[eConnell, Wagner, Sykes & Stacey,
PLLC; Jeffrey R. Sykes, Boise, for appellant.
Jeffrey R. Sykes, argued.

108

Lukins & Annis, PS; Michael G. Schmidt,
Coeur D’Alene, for respondent, Michael G.
Schmidt, argued.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S
PRIOR SECOND AMENDED OPIN-
ION DATED JUNE 24, 2016, IS
HEREBY WITHDRAWN

HUSKEY, Judge

Myers Executive Building, LLC (Myers)
appeals from the denial of its motion to set
aside default judgment. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On September 7, 2011, Secured Investment
Corp. (Secured), a Wyoming corporation, and
Myers, a Washington limited liability compa-
ny, entered into a written agreement (2011
Agreement) governed by Idaho law, where
Secured would locate borrowers interested in
investing in real estate and connect them
with Myers who would then decide whether
to loan the borrowers money for their pro-
posed investment. The 2011 Agreement pro-
vided that Myers would assume all risks and
would indemnify and hold Secured harmless
for any transaction that occurred under the
agreement. In addition, the 2011 Agreement
provided that any disputes between Myers
and Secured would be submitted to arbitra-
tion,

As a result of the 2011 Agreement, a
Minnesota borrower sued both Secured and
Myers. Myers disputed its obligation under
the 2011 Agreement, but later agreed to
jointly hire a Minnesota attorney and split
litigation costs with Secured, The Minnesota
attorney confirmed the agreement between
Myers and Secured to split litigation costs in
a letter to the parties (Accord Agreement).
Myers did not pay its share of legal expenses
as required by the Accord Agreement.

1. Generally, court documents such as the com-
plaint are not available for download from the
Internet, The only information about a case avail-
able online is the register ‘of actions, Because
counsel testified he looked at the register of ac-

In December 2014, Secured filed a com-
plaint in Idaho against Myers asserting
causes of action for breach of contract and
for a declaratory judgment that all matters
be subject to arbitration. Secured was unsuc-
cessful in personally serving Myers through
its registered agent, Linda Youngberg, at
Myers’ business address in Puyallup, Wash-
ington, and at Youngberg’s home address in
Bonney Lake, Washington, Since 2011,
Youngberg had been involved in and was
aware of litigation outside of Idaho between
the parties.

On January 8, 2015, the court granted
Secured’s motion to serve Myers by publica-
tion, The summons was published in the Pu-
yallup Herald four times between January
14, 2015, and February 4, 2015. Secured
mailed a copy of the summons and complaint.
by regular mail and certified mail return
receipt requested to Myers. Additionally, Se-
cured emailed a copy of the summons and
complaint to Youngberg. Youngberg re-
ceived the summons and complaint by email
and took the documents to Myers’ California
counsel (California counsel). California coun-
sel informed Youngberg that he could not
represent Myers in the matter. California
counsel also told Youngberg that service by
email was insufficient service. In his affida-
vit, California counsel stated he obtained
and reviewed a copy of the complaint on-
line! California counsel also stated he left
one telephone message for Secured’s Idaho
counsel concerning this matter to request an
extension of time to file an answer, or alter-
natively, to dismiss the claim. The parties
dispute the details of that message.

On March 16, 2015, Secured moved for
entry of default, On March 18, 2015, the
district court entered default judgment and
awarded Secured $100,109.64 in damages. On
April 6, 2015, Myers entered a general ap-
pearance. On April 21, 2015, Myers moved to
set aside the default judgment. The district
court denied the motion, finding the default
judgment was not void and that Myers failed

tions on January 27, 2015, it is difficult to under-
stand how he did not also see the order granting
service by publication that was filed January 8,
2015.

to show excusable neglect under Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Myers timely ap-
pealed.

IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE A trial court’s denial of a motion to
set aside a default judgment is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Switts
v, Niw, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.8d 120, 122
(2005), The decision will be upheld if it ap-
pears that the trial court (1) correctly per-
ceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with the applicable legal stan-
dards, and (8) reached its determination
through an exercise of reason. Flood v, Katz,
148 Idaho 454, 456-57, 147 P.3d 86, 88-89
(2006).

HM Where a default or default judgment
is challenged as void under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4),
we conduct de novo review. McClure Eng’g,
Ine. v, Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 958,
155 P.8d 1189, 1192 (Ct. App. 2006).

I.

ANALYSIS

Myers raises two issues on appeal. First,
Myers argues the district court abused its
discretion in not setting aside the default
judgment pursuant to ILR.C.P. 60(b)(4). Sec-
ond, Myers argues the district court abused
its discretion in not setting aside the default
judgment pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b)(1).

A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion in Denying the Motion to
Set Aside the Default Judgment Pur-
suant to LR.C.P. 60(b)(4)

HMMM Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(4) provides that a court may relieve a

2. The potential complexity of the retroactivity
issue is illustrated by Fisher. In Fisher, the issue
was whether a corporation had been validly
served when it was served through a corporate
officer, Fisher, 112 Idaho at 743, 735 P.2d at
1054, Default judgment was obtained against the
corporation. Id. The corporation moved to have
the default judgment set aside, arguing that be-
cause of the defects in service, it had never been
served in its corporate capacity and thus, the
court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over

109

party from a default judgment if the judg-
ment is void. A default judgment is void if
the court lacks personal jurisdiction or sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. State of Idaho, Dep't.
of Health and Welfure v. Housel, 140 Idaho
96, 100, 90 P.8d 821, 325 (2004); Catledge v.
Transport Tire Co. Inc., 107 Idaho 602, 607,
691 P.2d 1217, 1222 (1984). A default judg-
ment is also void where a party has not been
served with process or was improperly
served with process. Thiel v. Stradley, 118
Idaho 86, 87, 794 P.2d 1142, 1148 (1990). A
default judgment entered without compliance
with the three-day notice requirement of
LR.C.P. 55 is voidable. Farber v. Howell, 105
Idaho 57, 59, 665 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1988),

Hl First, Myers argues the default judg-
ment is void under I.R.C.P, 60(b)(4) because
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over
Myers. At oral argument, Myers made two
different arguments, First, that the notice of
appearance did not waive any personal juris-
diction claims because Myers raised the per-
sonal jurisdiction issues in its subsequently
filed motion to set ‘aside default and thus,
preserved its challenge to personal jurisdic-
tion. Second, Myers argued that even if the
general notice of appearance did waive per-
sonal jurisdiction, such waiver was not in
place at the time the district court entered
the default judgment and thus, the general
appearance cannot operate retroactively to
confer personal jurisdiction over Myers.
Myers cites to Fisher v, Crest Corp., 112
Idaho 741, 785 P.2d 1052 (Ct. App. 1987),

Fisher relies on two foreign cases for this
proposition. In each of those cases, there was
no valid service—either personal or by publi-
eation—on the defendants. Thus, any subse-
quent motions by the defendants did not
waive personal jurisdiction because service
had never been effectuated.? Here, Myers

it. Id. Fisher argued Crest had waived any claim
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction be-
cause when Crest filed its answer (after default
had been entered), it did not assert any defenses
based on lack of personal jurisdiction or insuffi-
ciency of process. Id, at 744, 735 P.2d at 1055,

We held the ‘‘service of process was adequate
to confer jurisdiction over the ‘person’ of Crest,
Therefore, the magistrate had authority to enter
a judgment by default.” Id, Because we found

110

‘was validly served, and to the extent valid
service on Myers confers personal jurisdic-
tion, Fisher is inapposite,

Hl More importantly, the issue of wheth-
er there is an invalid retroactive application
of personal jurisdiction may involve other
issues; for example, whether valid service by
publication confers personal jurisdiction on
the district court in the way that personal
service might confer personal jurisdiction
such that there is no retroactivity issue but
instead, only a waiver issue. Myers did not
cite Fisher or raise the issue of retroactive
waiver of personal jurisdiction in either the
district court or in its briefing, instead pre-
senting the argument and authority for the
first time at oral argument. This Court de-
clines to address these issues where they
were not addressed either in the district
court or in the appellant’s opening brief.
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 384, 208 P.8d
734, 738 (Ct. App. 2009).

Hl Because there is no retroactivity issue
to decide, we can only determine whether
Myers personally submitted to the district
court’s jurisdiction when it filed a notice of
general appearance on April 6, 2015, almost
two weeks before filing the motion to set
aside the default judgment, We hold that,
filing the general appearance, without simul-
taneously challenging jurisdiction as required
by LR.C.P. 12(g)(1), constituted a voluntary
appearance pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4, See Rhi-
no Metals, Ine. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319, 322,
198 P.8d 866, 869 (2008) (holding a general
appearance constitutes voluntary submission
to the personal jurisdiction of the court);
Engleman v. Milanez, 187 Idaho 88, 85, 44
P.8d 1188, 1140 (2002) (holding the “notice of
appearance was not a motion under Rule
12(b)(2), (4), or (5), and therefore the filing of
the notice constituted a voluntary appearance
by the defendants in this action, which was
the equivalent of the service of the summons
upon them”). Because Myers’ general ap-
pearance did not contain a simultaneous mo-
tion under I.R.C.P, 12(b) contesting personal
jurisdiction, Myers waived any claim that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over
Myers,

there was no defect in service, and jurisdiction to

enter default is based upon the fact of service, we

Second, Myers argues the default judg-
ment is void because Myers was not properly
served. Specifically, Myers contends Se-
cured’s affidavits filed in support of its appli-
cation for default judgment were defective
because the affidavits did not specifically
state that Myers had no business agent,
manager, cashier, or secretary that could be
found within Idaho or otherwise as required
by Idaho Code § 5-508, Secured argues its
affidavits contained ample evidence meeting
a number of alternative factual situations set
forth in I.C. § 5-508 under which service by
publication is authorized.

Idaho Code § 5-508 provides in relevant
part:

When the person on whom the service is
to be made resides outside of the state, or
has departed from the state, or cannot
after due diligence be found within the
state, or conceals himself therein to avoid
the service of summons, or is a foreign
corporation having no managing or busi-
ness agent, cashier or secretary within this
state ... and such facts appear by affida-
vit to the satisfaction of the court in which
the suit is pending ... the court may make
an order for the publication of the sum-
mons; and an affidavit setting forth in ordi-
nary and concise language any of the
grounds as above set forth, upon which the
publication of the summons is sought, shall
be sufficient without setting forth or show-
ing what efforts have been made or what
diligence has been exerted in attempting to
find the defendant.

Hl Despite Myers’ argument to the con-
trary, there is no statutory requirement for a
specific statement in an affidavit that the
foreign party had no business agent, manag-
er, cashier, or secretary within the state.
Instead, the district court can draw this con-
clusion so long as there is a sufficient factual
basis for such conclusion.

Secured’s affidavits in support of its appli-
cation for default judgment stated Myers was
a Washington LLC, and the only addresses
to effectuate service were Myers’ place of

did not need to address whether the challenge to
the defect in service was waived. Id,

business in Washington and the home ad-
dress of Youngberg, also in Washington. Ser-
vice was attempted at the business address
listed on the Washington Secretary of State
website; no business could be located at that
address. Secured attempted service at anoth-
er address Youngberg apparently resided at
and was similarly unsuccessful. Secured
knew of no other address for Myers. Given
that attempts at personal service had been
unsuccessful and because there was no busi-
ness agent or manager within the state upon
whom service could be made, Secured re-
quested it be permitted to serve Myers by
publication. Secured’s affidavits contained
enough facts to establish that Myers was a
foreign corporation with no managing or
business agent in Idaho and that prior at-
tempts at personal service had been unsuc-
cessful, thus satisfying the district court that
service by publication was appropriate in
compliance with I.C. § 5-508. Myers does
not contest the service by publication was
otherwise deficient. Thus, because Myers was
properly served through publication, the de-
fault judgment is not void,

Third, Myers asserts that the judgment is
voidable because it did not receive proper
notice of the default judgment. Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 55(b)(@2) provides that a party
who has entered an appearance must receive
three days’ written notice of the application
for default judgment. A default judgment
entered without the required three-day no-
tice is voidable. Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho
57, 59, 665 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1988).

HE “Myers argues that Myers had ap-
peared in this case prior to its formal notice
filed on April 6, 2015, because: (1) there was
on-going litigation between the parties in
another state; (2) there had previously been
unsuccessful attempts to initiate arbitration
proceedings in this case (which had conelud-
ed approximately three months before the
filing of the complaint in this case); and (8)
the telephone message to Secured’s counsel.
While an appearance required to trigger the
three-day notice requirement is not limited
to a formal court appearance to constitute an
appearance, the defendant's actions must be
responsive to the plaintiffs formal court ac-
tion. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 288,

111

221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009), Although conduct on
the part of the defendant which indicates an
intent to defend against the action can consti-
tute an appearance, Catledge v. Transport
Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 606, 691 P.2d 1217,
1221 (1984), it is insufficient to merely show
interest in a dispute or to communicate an
unwillingness to comply with the requested
action. Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288, 221 P.8d at
86.

In Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663,
665-66, 672 P.2d 281, 283-84 (1988), the Ida-
ho Supreme Court held the attendance at a
deposition by the defendant and opposing
counsel’s acknowledgment of defendant’s
self-representation at the deposition consti-
tuted an appearance. Id. abrogated on other
grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Intern.
Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 708 P.2d 699 (1985).
However, in Marano v. Dial, 108 Idaho 680,
682-683, 701 P.2d 300, 302-303 (Ct. App.
1985), this Court distinguished Newbold and
held a single letter denying allegations in the
complaint from an out-of-state attorney did
not constitute an appearance, There, we rea-
soned the key event in Newbold was the
acknowledgment of the defendant's self-rep-
resentation at the deposition by plaintiff's
counsel, and because the single letter pre-
sented no similar event, a single letter could
not constitute an appearance even under a
liberal meaning of the word. Marano, 108
Idaho at 683, 701 P.2d at 303.

HM Here, the last contact between the
parties was approximately three months be-
fore the complaint was filed; thus, making
this case more like Marano, The single tele-
phone message left by Myers’ California
counsel is like the single letter in Marano,
because like a letter, defendant’s counsel
would not know whether or not the phone
message was heard or received by opposing
counsel. Because opposing counsel never re-
sponded to the message, there was no inter-
action between the parties to indicate to Se-
eured or the court that Myers intended to
appear and defend in this action or had oth-
erwise formally appeared in the case. Beyond
a single attempt to contact opposing counsel,
the record does not present any intent on the
part of Myers to defend the action until after
the default judgment had been entered. Just

112

as a single letter denying allegations in a
complaint does not constitute an appearance,
neither does a single telephone message of
disputed content constitute an appearance.
Because Myers did not make an appearance
prior to the filing of the motion for default
judgment, it was not entitled to the three-day
notice required by IR.C.P. 55(b)(2). Thus,
the default judgment is not voidable on that
ground,

The district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying Myers’ motion to set aside
the default judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P.
60(b)(4) because the default judgment was
not void, First, the default judgment was not
void because the district court had personal
jurisdiction over Myers when Myers volun-
tary submitted to the court's jurisdiction by
entering its notice of general appearance.
Second, the default judgment was not void
because Myers was properly served by publi-
cation, Finally, the default judgment was not
voidable because Myers did not make an
appearance entitling it to a three-day notice
of Secured’s application of default.

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion When It Found No Excusa-
ble Neglect to Set Aside the Default
Judgment Pursuant to LR.CP.
60(b)(1)

We next address whether the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to set aside
the default judgment pursuant to LR.C.P.
60()(1).

HE Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(1) allows a party to request relief from
a default judgment on the grounds of mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable ne-
glect, Excusable neglect constitutes conduct
which would be expected of a reasonably
prudent person under the same circum-
stances, LeaseFirst v. Burns, 181 Idaho 158,
162, 958 P.2d 598, 602 (1998). “A determina-
tion under Rule 60(b) turns largely on ques-
tions of fact to be determined by the trial
court, whose factual findings will be upheld
unless they are clearly erroneous.” Idaho
State Police ew rel. Russell v. Real Property
Situated in County of Cassia, 144 Idaho 60,
62, 156 P.8d 561, 563 (2007). A court acts
within its discretion if it applies those facts in

a logical manner to the criteria set forth in
LR.C.P, 60), while keeping in mind the
policy favoring relief in doubtful cases. Id.
“When moving to set aside a default judg-
ment, the moving party must not only meet
the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b) but must
also plead facts which, if established, would
constitute a defense to the action,” Idaho
State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.8d at 563.
The district court found Myers’ inaction to
respond to Secured’s complaint was not ex-
cusable neglect because a reasonable person
in the same circumstances, and with the
same knowledge of on-going litigation as
Youngberg, would have done something to
determine the status of the Idaho case.

Myers argues the district court abused its
discretion in denying its motion to set aside
the default judgment on the grounds of ex-
cusable neglect because Myers’ agent,
Youngberg, acted as a reasonable person in
the same circumstances, Specifically, Myers
argues the district court erroneously consid-
ered the actions of Myers’ California counsel
instead of Youngberg’s actions to determine
excusable neglect. Myers further contends it
had a meritorious defense to the action. Se-
cured argues the conduct of Youngberg was
not that of a reasonably prudent person in
the same circumstances because she knew
Myers was unrepresented in Idaho, and she
did not hire Idaho counsel to monitor and
respond to the complaint.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that there
is excusable neglect when an attorney does
not communicate the extent of his represen-
tation to his client. Idaho State Police, 144
Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. In Idaho State
Police, the client took the summons and com-
plaint to an attorney, expecting him to take
appropriate action. Jd. However, the attorney
did not communicate to the client that he was
not representing her; thus, no appearance
was filed to prevent default. Jd. The Court
held there was excusable neglect because the
attorney did not clearly communicate to the
client that he was not representing her on
that matter. Id,

However, this Court has also held a mis-
take of law does not constitute excusable
neglect. Gro-Mor, Inc. v. Butts, 109 Idaho

1020, 1023, 712 P.2d 721, 724 (Ct. App. 1985).
In Gro-Mor, this Court reasoned that lack of
knowledge of the twenty-day answering peri-
od was a mistake of law. See id. at 1022-28,
‘712 P.2d at 723-24. The Court held that a
mistake of law was not excusable neglect.
because no reasonably prudent person in the
same circumstances would have idly stood by
as the defendant did. See id. at 1022-28, 712
P.2d at 723-24,

HM The record indicates Youngberg con-
tacted Myers’ California counsel after receiv-
ing the complaint via email. Myers’ California
counsel told Youngberg he could not repre-
sent Myers in Idaho and that service by
email was not sufficient. After that conversa-
tion, Youngberg took no further action in this
matter, Unlike the misunderstanding of rep-
resentation in Idaho State Police, there is no
excusable neglect because Myers’ California
counsel unequivocally told Youngberg he
could not represent Myers in Idaho. Young-
berg was aware there was on-going litigation
between the parties in California, She was
also aware the complaint and summons had
been filed. As such, it was not reasonable to
rely on the statement of the attorney, who
clearly did not represent Myers in the Idaho
litigation, Although the California attorney
said the service of the complaint and sum-
mons was not valid, Youngberg did nothing
to ensure that statement was correct or that
the rules of service were the same in Idaho
as in California, Given the history of litiga-
tion between the parties, it was not reason-
able for Youngberg to rely on the statement
of an attorney who did not represent her in
the Idaho litigation and fail to take any steps
to determine the validity or status of the
Idaho case.

Further, like the defendant’s lack of
knowledge of the twenty-day answering peri-
od in Gro-Mor, Youngberg’s lack of knowl-
edge of service by publication was a mistake
of law. Because a mistake of law is not
excusable neglect, Youngberg’s lack of
knowledge of service by publication was not
excusable neglect. The district court’s denial
of Myers’ motion to set aside the default
judgment follows logically from applying the
facts to the proper criteria of IR.C.P.
60(b)(1). The district court acted within its

113

discretion in concluding Myers’ actions did
not constitute excusable neglect, Because
Myers did not meet the requirements of
LR.C.P. 60(b), we decline to address its claim
that it had a meritorious defense to the ac-
tion.

C. The Default Judgment Was a Final
Judgment Under LR.C.P. 54(a)

Myers also argues the default judgment
was not a final judgment under IR.O.P.
54(a). Specifically, Myers contends that the
district court did not resolve all of the issues
in Secured’s complaint because Secured also
sought a declaratory judgment referring the
matter to arbitration which the district court
did not rule on.

HH Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a)
states: “[a] judgment is final if ... judgment
has been entered on all claims for relief,
except costs and fees, asserted by or against
all parties in the action.” Under modern
pleading rules, parties may seek alternative
or different types of relief regardless of con-
sistency or whether based on legal or equita-
ble grounds or both. MK. Transport, Inc. v.
Grover, 101 Idaho $45, 350, 612 P.2d 1192,
1197 (1980). Modern pleading practice no
longer prohibits parties from seeking alter-
native forms of relief even if the remedies
Sought are inconsistent. Id. The ultimate
election is made by the court. Id.

HI Secured’s complaint alleged breach
of contract and requested two alternative
forms of relief: a monetary judgment or a
declaratory judgment ordering arbitration.
In this case, the district court awarded Se-
cured a monetary judgment. It would be
illogical for the district court to award Se-
cured a money judgment and then require
the parties to proceed to arbitration. The
district court's award of a monetary judg-
ment implicitly denied the request for a de-
claratory judgment, and as a result, resolved
all issues in the case. Thus, the default judg-
ment was a final judgment pursuant to
LR.C.P. 54(a) because judgment was entered
for all claims of relief.

114

D. The District Court Properly Exercised
Its Discretion in Awarding Secured
Attorney Fees

THM Idaho Code § 12-120(8) allows

recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing
party in any commercial transaction. The
awarding of attorney fees and costs is within
the discretion of the trial court and subject to
review for an abuse of discretion. Ransom v.
Topaz Mtg, L.P., 148 Idaho 641, 643, 152
P.8d 2, 4 (2006). Because Secured was the
prevailing party, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding Secured at-
torney fees and costs, Additionally, we award
attorney fees and costs to Secured because it
is the prevailing party on appeal.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

We conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Myers’ motion

162 IDAHO REPORTS

to set aside the default judgment pursuant to
LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) because the default judg-
ment was not void. Further, the district court
did not abuse its discretion because it prop-
erly applied the criteria of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1)
to the facts in this case, and its decision
follows logically from the application of such
criteria to the facts found in the record. The
district court properly awarded attorney fees
to Secured. We award attorney fees to Se-
cured on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge
GRATTON concur.

394 P.3d 1160

Thomas ARNOLD and Rebecca Arnold,
Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs-

Appellants,
ve
CITY OF STANLEY, a political sub-
division of the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 43868

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: May 12, 2017

rae
ae
oO

Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht,
P.A., Boise, attorneys for appellants. Thomas
J. Lloyd argued.

Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, Chtd.,
Boise, attorneys for respondents. Paul J. Fit-
zer argued.

JONES, Justice
I. Nature or THE Case

This appeal concerns whether the Stanley
City Council (the “Council”) erred in denying
a building permit application submitted by
Thomas and Rebecca Arnold (the “Arnolds”).
The Arnolds proffered several arguments on
appeal asserting that the Council erred in
denying their building permit application;
however, we need not address those argu-
ments because the Council’s denial of the
building permit application is not subject to
judicial review.

II. Facrvan anp Procepurat BAcKGRounD

The Arnolds own property in Stanley, Ida-
ho (the “Property”). They developed the
Property with approval from the Council via
a series of development permits, the first of
which was granted in 2004. The Council ap-
proved a subdivision plat (the “Plat”) for the
Property in 2007. According to the Plat, the

116

Property was divided into six lots and two
parcels. The building permit application at
issue sought approval to build an access road
from Lot 5 of the Property to an adjacent
street.

From 2009 to 2011, the Arnolds and the
City of Stanley (the “City”) were involved in
litigation concerning certain building permits
related to the Property. The litigation result-
ed in a settlement agreement, which provid-
ed that the City would reissue a previously
approved building permit. The reissued
building permit was set to expire on May 12,
2014, In December 2018, the Arnolds applied
for another building permit (“Permit Applica-
tion 831”) to replace the permit that was set
to expire. According to the Arnolds, Permit
Application 881 was only necessary because
the previous permit could not be renewed,

At a meeting on February 18, 2014, the
Council denied Permit Application 831, That
same day, the Arnolds filed a petition for
judicial review. On March 31, 2014, the Ar-
nolds submitted a letter to the Council con-
testing the denial of Permit Application 831.
Therein, Mrs. Arnold claimed that Permit
Application 881 was no different from the
previously approved building permits, Fur-
ther, she argued that there were other exam-
ples where the Council issued permits allow-
ing work on adjacent City streets. Later that
day, the Council held a special meeting to
discuss Permit Application 831. The Council
identified the following four bases for its
denial: (1) the installation of an access road
at this location was inconsistent with the
approved Plat and prior approved building
permits; (2) Permit Application 831 was not
limited to construction of an access road
upon the Arnolds’ own property, but rather
sought to render improvements on adjacent
property, ie, the City’s right-of-way; (8) in
1, Further, the district court found that regardless

of whether the Council treated the Arnolds differ-

ently than other property owners, a rational basis

existed for doing so because of the safety con-
cerns associated with managing the City streets.

2, The district court noted that while a deficient
record is evidence that due process safeguards
were not satisfied, it is not dispositive. The dis-
trict court explained that the andio recording
included a variety of reasons why Permit Appli-
cation 831 must be donied, any one of which
provided a sufficient basis for the denial, The

the absence of an amended plat, the Arnolds
were not permitted to change the point of
access to the Property, nor render modifica-
tion to property not their own as there is no
incidental right to modify the City’s right-of-
way; and (4) even if such approval could be
granted, the Arnolds failed to provide the
technical information necessary for the Coun-
cil to adequately evaluate their request.

On June 12, 2014, the Arnolds filed their
opening brief, wherein they argued as fol-
lows: (1) the Council’s denial of Permit Appli-
cation 831 violated the equal protection
clause of the U.S, and Idaho Constitutions;
(2) the Council’s failure to record and tran-
scribe verbatim the February 18, 2014 meet-
ing violated the Arnolds’ due process rights;
(8) the Council’s denial of Permit Application
881 was not supported by substantial and
competent evidence, and was arbitrary, ca-
pricious, and an abuse of discretion; and (4)
the Council’s denial of Permit Application
881 prejudiced the Arnolds’ substantial
rights,

The district court held a hearing on May
20, 2015, and issued its decision and order on
June 10, 2015. Therein, the district court
made four holdings. First, the district court
held that the Arnolds’ equal protection argu-
ment was meritless because they failed to
provide any evidence that the Council treated
anyone else differently.! Second, the district
court held that appropriate due process safe-
guards were satisfied by the audio recording
of the February 18, 2014 Council meeting
because the recording adequately provided
the bases of the Couneil’s decision? Third,
the district court held that the Council’s deci-
sion was supported by substantial and com-
petent evidence and was not arbitrary or
capricious.’ Fourth, the district court ac-

district court noted that even if the omitted por-
tion of the recording contained some evidence
that the Council acted arbitrarily, that hypotheti-
cal evidence would be contradicted by the re-
mainder of the Council’s recorded discussion,

3. In support of its holding, the district court
noted the following: (1) the Council had the right
to deny Permit Application 831 because it was
not in accordance with the approved Plat; (2) the
Arnolds’ attempt to add the access road in ques-
tion did not follow the required process to allow
the Council and citizenry of the City to raise

knowledged that the denial of Permit Appli-
eation 831 would likely result in a financial
setback for the Arnolds, but concluded that
such a setback did not amount to a substan-
tial prejudice of the Arnolds’ rights.

On July 1, 2015, the Arnolds filed a peti-
tion for rehearing. On November 8, 2015, the
district court denied the petition for rehear-
ing. The Arnolds appealed on December 14,
2015,

TI. Issues on APPEAL

1. Whether the Council's decision is subject
to judicial review.

2, Whether either party is entitled to attor-
ney’s fees on appeal.

TV, ANALysis

A. The Council’s decision to deny the
building permit is not subject to judi-
cial review.

HM The Arnolds argue that they are enti-
tled to judicial review under Idaho Code
section 67-6521(1)(d), codified as part of the
Local Land Use Planning Act (the “LLU-
PA”), and under Stanley Municipal Code sec-
tion 15,04.040.C, which permits an applicant
who is aggrieved by a decision of the Council
to seek judicial review pursuant to the proce-
dures provided by the Idaho Code, The City
argues that if the legislature had intended
the denial of a building permit application to
be subject to judicial review, it would be
clear from the plain text of the LLUPA,

In its current form, Idaho Code section 67-
6521 (1)(d) affords judicial review to an “af-
fected person aggrieved by a final decision.”
IC. § 67-6521(1)(d). An “affected person” is
“one having a bona fide interest in real prop-
erty which may be adversely affected by ...
[t]he approval, denial or failure to act upon
an application for a subdivision, variance,

concerns; (3) the fact that the Council required
more information for the access road in question,
as compared with the permitting of previous
access roads, did not render the Council's deci-
sion arbitrary or capricious because the previous
building permits were for roads that were al-
ready included in the approved plat agreement;
and (4) the Council’s requests for more informa-
tion were reasonable because of the slope be-
tween the Property and the City’s road and the

117

special use permit and such other similar
applications required or authorized pursu-
ant to this chapter.” LC. § 67-6521(1)(a).
(Emphasis added). Notably, the emphasized
language was added in a 2010 amendment
and replaced the phrase “permits authorizing
development.” This amendment raises the
question: are building permit applications in-
eluded in “such other similar applications
required or authorized pursuant to this chap-
ter”? We hold that building permit applica-
tions are not included in “such other similar
applications required or authorized pursuant
to this chapter.” The LLUPA does not au-
thorize or require building permits. Through-
out the entire LLUPA, building permits are
only mentioned once, in Idaho Code section
67-6517. IC. § 67-6517. Idaho Code section
67-6517 does not purport to authorize or
require building permits; rather it addresses
future acquisition maps, which are maps des-
ignating land proposed for acquisition by a
public agency. The section lays out the proce-
dure that a governing board must follow
upon receiving a request for a building per-
mit to develop land designated on a future
acquisition map. Clearly, it does not author-
ize or require building permits. In this case,
the Arnolds’ building permit was required by
Stanley Municipal Code section 15.04.010.4
For the foregoing reasons, the Council’s de-
nial of Permit Application 881 is not subject
to judicial review under Idaho Code section
67-6521(1)(d).

HI Separately, the Council's denial of
Permit Application 831 is not subject to judi-
cial review under Stanley Municipal Code
section 15,04,040.C because a municipal ordi-
nance cannot create a right to judicial review.
See Black Labrador Investing, LLC v. Kuna
City Council, 147 Idaho 92, 97-98, 205 P.8d
1228, 1233-34 (2009),

fact that the access road was constructed on City
property.

4. “No building shall be constructed ... nor shall
any lot be excavated for sidewalks, sewer, water,
septic tanks, roads, or any other purpose ...
unless a building permit therefor has been issued
by the city council or its authorized representa-
tive.” S.M.C. § 15.04.010,

118

B. Neither party is awarded attorney’s
fees on appeal.

Tl The City requests attorney's fees on
appeal according to Idaho Code section 12-
117(1). Idaho Code section 12-117 provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:

Unless otherwise provided by statute, in
any proceeding involving as adverse par-
ties a state agency or a political subdivision
and a person, the state agency, political
subdivision or the court hearing the pro-
ceeding, including on appeal, shall award
the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s
fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.

LC. § 12-117(1). Before this opinion, the
question of whether building permit decisions
were subject to judicial review under the
LLUPA had not been decided. Several deci-
sions had come close, but none addressed
this important question, especially in light of
the amended statute. See Highlands Devel-
opment Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958,
188 P.8d 900 (2008) (declaring that the LLU-
PA does not provide for judicial review of an
initial zoning classification given to annexed.
property); Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome
Cnty., 145 Idaho 680, 181 P.8d 1288 (2008)
(holding that the LLUPA does not provide

for judicial review of a request to change a
comprehensive zoning plan); and Burns
Holdings, LLC v. Madison Cnty. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs, 147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646
(2009) (holding that the LLUPA does not
provide for judicial review of requests to
change zoning or comprehensive zoning
plans). Each of these decisions was issued
prior to the 2010 amendment of the LLUPA
and did not address building permit deci-
sions. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the
Arnolds’ appeal was unreasonable. Therefore,
neither party is awarded attorney’s fees on
appeal.

V. Concrusion

We vacate the decision of the district court
and remand this case to the district court
with instructions to dismiss the petition for
judicial review. Costs on appeal to the City.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur.

395 P.3d 338
AMERICAN SEMICONDUCTOR,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

ve
SAGE SILICON SOLUTIONS, LLC, an
Idaho corporation; Zilog, Inc. a Dela-
ware corporation; David Roberts; Gyle
Yearsley; and William Tiffany, Defen-

dants-Respondents.

Docket No. 48011-2015

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: April 28, 2017
Rehearing Denied June 8, 2017

J
mo

122

Steven B. Andersen, Andersen, Schwartz-
man, Woodard, Brailsford, PLLC, Boise, ar-
gued for appellant,

Gary L. Cooper, Cooper & Larson Char-
tered, Pocatello, argued for respondents
Sage Silicon Solutions, LLC, David Roberts;
Gyle Yearsley, and William Tiffany,

Andrea Jo Rosholt, Moffatt Thomas, Boise,
argued for respondent Zilog, Inc.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Ada County from a
judgment in an action brought by American
Semiconductor, Ine, to recover damages
arising out of Zilog, Inc. contracting with
Sage Silicon Solutions, LLC, to perform en-
gineering services for it, where that entity
was formed by, and the services were provid-
ed by, employees of American Semiconduc-
tor, Inc. American Semiconductor, Inc., ob-
tained a jury verdict awarding damages
against the engineers and the entity they had
formed, but it did not recover against Zilog,
Ine. American Semiconductor, Inc., appeals,
challenging the dismissal of one of its claims
against Zilog, Ine., and seeking a new trial on
damages against the engineers and their en-
tity. We affirm the judgment of the district
court.

L

Factual Background.

David Roberts, Gyle Yearsley, William Tif-
fany, Russell Lloyd, and Evelyn Perryman
were all engineers who worked for Zilog, Inc.
(“Zilog”), at its facility in Meridian, Idaho,
and they constituted the design team at that
facility. They were all laid off in 2009 as part
of a reduction in force and were later hired
by American Semiconductor, Inc. (“American
Semiconductor” or “ASI”). This layoff left
only two design engineers employed by Zi-
log, both of whom were in California.

Mr. Roberts had been the design engineer-
ing manager when they were employed by
Zilog, and he had been hired by David Staab,
one of Zilog’s two remaining design engi-
neers. On October 21, 2009, Mr. Roberts e-
mailed Mr. Staab to inform him that he and
Messrs. Yearsley, Tiffany, and Lloyd had
formed Sage Silicon Solutions to perform
design work and that they would like to
make a quote if Zilog had any design work.
On January 28, 2010, Messrs. Roberts,
Yearsley, Tiffany, and Lloyd and Ms. Perry-
man formed Sage Silicon Solutions, LLC
(“Sage”), to provide those engineering ser-
vices.

In 2009, Zilog began looking into the devel-
opment of a microcontroller. By the end of
2010, the project was defined as developing a
low-power microcontroller by enhancing an
existing processor core that had been devel-
oped by Mr. Yearsley when he had been
employed by Zilog. Mr, Staab was lead for
that project. He contacted Mr. Roberts, and
on February 15, 2011, Zilog entered into a
contract with Sage to provide services in
designing the microcontroller.

On September 28, 2011, American Semi-
conductor learned that the engineers were
working on the project for Zilog, and it made
a demand to Zilog that it cease using the
engineers. Zilog ceased doing so around Sep-
tember 25, 2011, and two days later Ameri-
can Semiconductor terminated its relation-
ship with all of the engineers except Mr.
Lloyd. Zilog completed the project using its
resources and engineering resources from its
sister company.

On December 2, 2011, American Semicon-
ductor filed this action against the five engi-
neers, Sage, and Zilog. It alleged two claims
for damages against only the engineers, six
claims for damages against the engineers and
Sage, and claims for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against all Defendants. Sage and
the engineers filed a four-count counterclaim.
On July 2, 2018, American Semiconductor
filed a second amended complaint dropping
Mr. Lloyd and Ms. Perryman as named de-
fendants and adding claims against Zilog for
intentional interference with economic expec-
tancy, for intentional interference with con-
tract, for violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets
Act, and for unjust enrichment.

By the time of trial, American Semiconduc-
tor had two claims against Zilog: intentional
interference with a contract and intentional
interference with an economic expectancy.
The district court dismissed the second claim
after the close of the evidence, and the jury
found no liability on the first claim.

By the time of trial, American Semicondue-
tor had two claims that were only against
Messrs. Roberts, Yearsley, and Tiffany:
breach of their contractual duty not to com-
pete with American Semiconductor and
breach of their fiduciary duty to American
Semiconductor. The jury found them liable
on both of those claims, but did not award
damages on those claims. American Semicon-
ductor also had a claim of intentional inter-
ference with its economic expectancy of con-
tracting with Zilog that was asserted against.
the three engineers and Sage, and the jury
found all four of them liable on that claim
and awarded damages in the sum of
$195,175. Two of the counterclaims filed by
Sage and the engineers were submitted to
the jury. The jury found that American
Semiconductor intentionally interfered with
Sage’s contract with Zilog, but awarded no
damages, and it found no liability on the
remaining counterclaim,

The district court awarded Zilog court
costs and attorney fees and as between
American Semiconductor and the Sage de-
fendants, it determined that there was no
prevailing party in the litigation, American
Semiconductor then timely appealed.

123
pid

Did the District Court Err in Granting a
Directed Verdict Dismissing the Claim
Against Zilog of Intentional Interfer-
ence with an Economic Expectancy?

HM The elements for a claim of inten-
tional interference with an economic expec-
tancy are:

(1) The existence of a valid economic ex-

pectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy

on the part of the interferer; (8) intentional
interference inducing termination of the
expectancy; (4) the interference was
wrongful by some measure beyond the fact,
of the interference itself (ie, that the de-
fendant interfered for an improper pur-
pose or improper means) and (5) resulting
damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy
has been disrupted.
Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133
Idaho 880, 888, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999).
The knowledge requirement may be satisfied
by proving either actual knowledge or knowl-
edge of facts that would cause a reasonable
person to believe that the economic expectan-
ey exists. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v.
Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 894, 248 P.8d 1069,
1082 (2010). The wrongful requirement may
be established by proving either: “(1) the
defendant had an improper objective or pur-
pose to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defen-
dant used a wrongful means to cause injury
to the prospective business relationship.”
Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, 824 P.2d 841,
861 (1991), However, Zilog could not inter-
fere with American Semiconductor’s expec-
tancy of contracting with Zilog. Cantwell v.
City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 188, 191 P.38d
205, 216 (2008). The interferer would have to
be a third party to the expected economic
relationship, Id.

I In its second amended complaint,
American Semiconductor alleged that “by
soliciting or accepting services from the Indi-
viduals [engineers] and Sage, Zilog tortiously
interfered with American Semiconductor's
prospective economic advantage, including
depriving American Semiconductor of the op-
portunities to earn income from the Individu-
als’ design services.” The word Individuals

124

was defined to mean Messrs, Roberts, Years-
ley, Tiffany, and Lloyd and Ms, Perryman,
Tn its brief opposing Zilog’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, American Semiconductor ex-
plained:

ASI’s tortious interference with prospec-

tive economic advantage claim concerns

the economic expectancy ASI had for Rob-
erts, Yearsley, Tiffany, Lloyd, and Perry-
man’s continued employment and loyalty
and, as such, is not based upon ASI’s
prospective relationship with Zilog. There-
fore, Zilog cannot defeat ASI’s tortious
interference claim by attempting to char-
acterize itself as a party to the subject
economic relationship.

(Emphases added.)

Even though American Semiconductor as-
serted that the alleged interference was “not
based upon ASI’s prospective relationship
with Zilog,” that was the only evidence of
damages offered by American Semiconductor
at trial. Its expert testified that he was asked
to determine “what ASI has suffered if the
jury determines that they would have other-
wise gotten the project that’s at issue in this
case.” He calculated that had Zilog contract-
ed with American Semiconductor, it would
have received $1,182,488 in revenues and that
the loss of that contract resulted in damages
from lost profits totaling $1,025,088, The total
lost profits included $547,670 that would have
been charged for computer-aided-design soft-
ware (“tools”) that American Semiconductor
already had the right to use under the li-
cense with its vendor, The expert’s calcula-
tions were based upon what American Semi-
conductor would have charged to perform all
of the work necessary for the project from
the beginning through completion of the de-
sign of the chip, using the tools that Ameri-
can Semiconductor was licensed to use from
its vendor. Much of that work was in addition.
to the work that Zilog had contracted with
Sage to perform. The expert testified that
the additional work would have produced
$740,182 in revenues for American Semicon-
ductor and that the loss of that work caused
American Semiconductor $582,782 in lost
profits.

American Semiconductor completed its
case in chief during the eighth day of trial,

and Zilog moved for a directed verdict. With
respect to the claim of intentional interfer-
ence with a prospective economic advantage,
Zilog argued that the economic expectancy
had to be with a third party other than Zilog
and that the only evidence of an economic
expectancy presented during the trial was
with Zilog. In response, American Semicon-
ductor stated that “the expectancy, and the
relationships at issue are ASI’s relationships
with its own employees,” and it argued the
evidence showed that Zilog knew that the
engineers were employed by American Semi-
conductor and that Zilog intentionally inter-
fered with that relationship. Zilog then ar-
gued that the evidence showed that it would
not have contracted with American Semicon-
ductor because it would have cost too much
to do so. American Semiconductor responded
to that argument by stating that Zilog hired
the engineers through Sage rather than
through American Semiconductor. The dis-
trict court denied the motion, based upon its
understanding that “ASI is alleging that Zi-
log interfered with ASI’s economic expectan-
ey with—with Zilog.”

All parties rested during the ninth day of
trial, and the following day the court held a
jury instruction conference, During that con-
ference, American Semiconductor explained
that it was not contending that the economic
expectancy was contracting with Zilog. It
stated that the expectancy was the future
economic benefits that American Semicon-
ductor would receive based upon its relation-
ships with the engineers. After that explana-
tion, Zilog responded by pointing out that
American Semiconductor did not present any
evidence of damages other than interference
with the expectancy of contracting with Zi-
log, The district court then stated that it
would reconsider its denial of the motion for
a directed verdict and grant it because there
was no evidence to support the claim as
characterized by American Semiconductor,

By the time of the trial, American Semi-
conductor had two remaining claims against
Zilog: intentional interference with a contract
and intentional interference with an economic
expectancy. The district had proposed a spe-
cial verdict form, with Question No, 6 dealing
with interference with an economic expectan-

ey and Question No. 8 dealing with interfer-
ence with a contract.

The discussion of those two proposed ques-
tions began with Mr. Zarian, counsel for
American Semiconductor, asking to discuss
Question No. 6, and explaining that the eco-
nomic expectancy was not contracting with
Zilog. It was the future benefits that would
come to American Semiconductor from it re-
lationships with the engineers. The dialogue
was as follows:

MR, ZARIAN: And may I speak to,

then, to Question 6?

THE COURT: Question No. 6 in the

Special Verdict?

MR. ZARIAN: Yes, Your Honor.

So, ASI is not—not—not arguing that
Zilog interfered with its—its own relation-
ship that was part of an epectancy. The—
the claim has been, consistently through-
out, that the—the expectancy in the case,
with respect to this claim against Zilog, is
with ASI’s employees and the future bene-
Sits that would come from—from those re-
lationships with its own employees, in par-
ticular the individual defendants, But
that—that’s been the claim throughout,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Your problem is

with Question 6?

MR. ZARIAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the question is: Did
Zilog intentionally interfere with American
Semiconductor's economic expectancy of
contracting with Zilog?

You're saying that’s not the question?

MR. ZARIAN: No, Your Honor — that’s

right, Your Honor,

The—the way we defined that claim is—
is expectancy of future pecuniary gain
from its relationships with its employees,
separate and apart, distinct from the Em-
ployee Confidentiality Agreement, which is
the subject of Question 8,

MR. ZARIAN: Well, our—owr claim,
with respect to the economic expectancy of
contracting with Zilog, is against Sage

1, The reference to the “Sage defendants” meant

125

and the individual defendants, Your Hon-
or,

(Emphases added.)

The district court sought further clarifica-
tion. It apparently thought that if the eco-
nomic expectancy with respect. to contracting
with Zilog was only against Sage and the
engineers, then American Semiconductor’s
claim against Zilog must only be its claim of
intentional interference with contract. Mr.
Zarian again explained that it had two claims
against Zilog, but the interference with eco-
nomic expectancy claim against Zilog was
interfering with “an economic expectancy in
the future benefit of the relationships with
our employees.” The dialogue was as follows:

THE COURT: So, you're saying 6—

MR. ZARIAN: So—

THE COURT: —you—you’re—you only
have one claim against Zilog then?

MR. ZARIAN: We have two at the mo-
ment, Your Honor. But—but I think, per-
haps, the question we're discussing togeth-
er here is 4, Question 4, which is, indeed,
an economic expectancy of contracting
with Zilog, but—but that’s a claim against
the Sage defendants.

And so, the claim against Zilog is—is—
has always been, Your Honor—I mean, the
way we've articulated it, is an economic
expectancy in the futwre benefit of the
relationships with owr employees.

(Emphases added).

The district court expressed surprise as to
this characterization of the economic expec-
tancy claim against Zilog. The proposed jury
instructions submitted by American Semicon-
ductor regarding that claim did not identify
the economic expectancy at issue, The court,
stated that it had received two versions of
the special verdict form, and both of them
had asked whether Zilog had intentionally
interfered with American Semiconductor's
economic expectancy of contracting with Zi-
log. Mr, Zarian explained that it had sent
over a special verdict form that deleted the
reference to Zilog and that the economic
expectancy was, as alleged in its second
amended complaint, “depriving ASI of the

Sage and the three engineers,

126

opportunities to earn income from the indi-
viduals’ design services.” The dialogue was as
follows:

THE COURT: Did—did Zilog intention-
ally interfere with American Semiconduc-
tor’s economic expectancy of contracting
with Zilog?

We—we had—I’ve seen two versions of
this proposed Special Verdict Form, and I
haven’t had—and this has been in both of
them, and I haven’t—I haven’t heard this
until now.

MR. ZARIAN: The comments we sent
that deleted, Your Honor, did make that
change; the—the ones that Mr. Luvai sent.

But, Your Honor, paragraph 90 of our
Second Amended Complaint, which is the
operative complaint, I—I think we do ar-
ticulate the theory we've adhered to
throughout, you know, summary judgment.
briefing and—and other briefing in this
case.

And—and it reads, Your Honor, that—
that Zilog tortiously interfered with ASI’s
prospective economic advantage, including
depriving ASI of the opportunities to earn
income from the individuals’ design ser-
vices.

MS. ROSHOLT: For Zilog.

MR. ZARIAN: No. It doesn’t say that; it
just says individuals’ design services.
Opposing counsel then pointed out that

American Semiconductor had not presented
any evidence of damages regarding the ex-
pectancy of a future economic benefit from
its relationship with the engineers. The dis-
trict court agreed that there was no evidence
of interference with an economic expectancy
regarding anyone other than Zilog. The court.
stated to Mr. Zarian that American Semicon-
ductor could either drop this claim or pro-
ceed with it as stated in the court’s special
verdict form.

Later during the jury instruction confer-
ence, and after discussing it with his client,
2. The proposed jury instructions submitted by

both American Semiconductor and Zilog includ-

ed generic instructions setting forth the elements
of intentional interference with a contract and
intentional interference with an economic expec-

tancy. Their proposed instructions did not identi-
fy the contract or the economic expectancy at

Mr. Zarian stated that it could not try the
claim as worded by the court’s special verdict
form, The modified proposed special verdict.
form, which American Semiconductor had
sent over the night before, simply asked with
respect to this claim, “Did Zilog tortiously
interfere with American Semiconductor's
prospective economic advantage?” The court
stated that this question would not help the
jury know what the claim was, and Mr, Zari-
an responded that he would tell them in his
closing argument.” Ms. Rosholt argued that
there was no evidence of any damage from
an alleged interference with American Semi-
conductor's relationship with its employees.
The court concluded that it would revisit the
motion for a directed verdict and grant it
because there was no evidence supporting
the claim as characterized by American
Semiconductor.

On appeal, American Semiconductor seeks
to change the nature of its claim from inter-
fering with the expectancy of future pecuni-
ary gain from the engineers to interfering
with the expectancy of contracting with Zi-
log. It states in its opening brief that “by
sending work to the Engineers, Zilog did
exactly what ASI reasonably expected that
Zilog would do when ASI hired them”; that
Zilog “necessarily interfered with the reason-
able expectation ASI had in attracting this
design work through the employment of the
Engineers”; and that “ASI presented exten-
sive testimony from its damages expert,
Richard Hoffman, who testified as to the
profits ASI would have realized from con-
tracting with Zilog on the project.”

WM During the jury instruction confer-
ence, American Semiconductor expressly
stated that the economic expectancy at issue
was not contracting with Zilog. It obviously
made that argument to the district court
because, as stated above, Zilog could not
interfere with American Semiconductor’s ex-
pectancy of contracting with Zilog. Cantwell,

issue, In the jury instructions that it gave to the
jury setting forth the elements of those claims,
the district court correctly identified the contract
and economic expectancy at issue, which is how
the jury should be instructed to avoid confusion
or uncertainty as to what the claim actually is.

146 Idaho at 188, 191 P.8d at 216, “An appel-
lant is bound by the issues and theories upon
which the case was tried below. Although a
judgment may be sustained upon any legal
theory, a new theory cannot be employed on
appeal to attack the judgment.” Clements
Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho
185, 207, 814 P.2d 917, 989 (1991). Therefore,
we will not address this alleged error on
appeal, and we affirm the judgment dismiss-
ing American Semiconductor's claims against
Zilog.

i.

Is Zilog Entitled to an Award of
Attorney Fees on Appeal?

HH Zilog seeks an award of attorney
fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-121. An award of attorney fees under
that statute will be awarded to the prevailing
party on appeal only when this Court is left
with the abiding belief that the entire appeal
was brought, pursued, or defended frivolous-
ly, unreasonably, or without foundation,
McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82
P.8d 833, 844 (2003); Benz v. D.L. Evans
Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 231-32, 268 P.3d 1167,
1183-84 (2012). The appeal against Zilog was
brought without foundation, and therefore we
award Zilog reasonable attorney fees on ap-
peal.

Iv.

Is American Semiconductor Entitled to
a New Trial on Damages Against
the Engineers and Sage?

American Semiconductor contends that it
is entitled to a new trial on damages against
the engineers and Sage based upon the dis-
trict court’s ruling on discovery and eviden-
tiary issues. Zilog used tools licensed by Sy-
nopsys, Ine. (“Synopsys”), to design the
computer chip for the microcontroller.
American Semiconductor sought production
of the software license during discovery, and
Zilog objected. The district court ruled that
the license need not be produced because it
‘was not likely to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence. American Semiconductor
later sought to exclude any evidence regard-
ing the Synopsys license because Zilog in-

127

tended to present evidence that it would
never have contracted with’ American Semi-
conductor because it would have been too
expensive, in large part due to the amount
that American Semiconductor would have
charged for it to use the tools it was licensed
to use, The court denied American Semicon-
ductor’s motion to exclude the evidence.
American Semiconductor sought an award of
$1,025,088 in damages against the engineers,
and it contends that the court’s errors re-
sulted in the jury awarding only $195,175. In
order to address this issue, it is necessary to
examine each step of what occurred in de-
tail.

A. Denying motion to compel produc-
tion of the Synopsys license. On April 18,
2014, American Semiconductor filed a motion
to compel discovery seeking, among other
things, copies of contracts with CAST, Inc.
(“CAST”), Cadence Design Systems, Ine.
(“Cadence”), and Synopsys. In the memoran-
dum supporting its motion, American Semi-
conductor simply argued, “Because these re-
quested license records relate to the nature
and manner in which the Sage defendants
[the engineers and Sage] provided certain
design and related services to Zilog, they are
relevant and Zilog has no justifiable basis for
withholding their production.” In its reply
brief in support of its motion, American
Semiconductor argued that the licenses were
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence because they would tend to
show that the engineers collaborated with
Zilog through the unauthorized use of this
third-party software.

In support of the motion, American Semi-
conductor presented several pages of the de-
position of Mr, Staab taken on March 4, 2014,
in which he testified that Mr. Tiffany worked
under the CAST license by remotely connect-
ing to computers in the Zilog facility in Milpi-
tas, California, through a virtual private net-
work. American Semiconductor’s counsel
quoted a document stating that the CAST
software “can only be used on computers
within the listed Zilog sites (Milpitas).” He
apparently construed that to mean that the
computers and the person using them had to
be within that site. When asked whether he
ever discussed that with CAST, Mr. Staab

128

answered that he believed the final license
agreement with CAST included Sage, but he
would have to check. American Semiconduc-
tor did not believe that the CAST license, or
the licenses with Cadence and Synopsys,
would authorize use of the software through
a virtual private network or that the engi-
neers were authorized users of the software.

The motion was heard on May 2, 2014,
During the oral argument on the motion, Mr.
Zarian argued on behalf of American Semi-
conductor that it believed that “these engi-
neers may well have been working under
these software agreements and in dir—direct
violation of them, to do the very work that is
at issue in this case.” He also argued:

The theory—one theory of the case, for
ASI, is that Zilog went to the very engi-
neers, and to the very people, and know-
ingly so, that would allow it, basically, to
save costs, to eut corners, to do this on the
cheap, because they were going after the
people that had key information, had key
trade secrets, had prior experience with
Zilog’s own systems. The only people that
could allow them to develop this new pro-
ject, their first in four years, for a micro-
controller for—for Zilog on the cheap.

In support of its motion to compel, Ameri~
ean Semiconductor had not presented any
evidence regarding what Zilog paid the engi-
neers, whether that pay was standard in the
industry, or what American Semiconductor
would have charged for the same work,? The
assertion was that because of their prior
experience with Zilog, the engineers could
perform the work in less time than it would
take other engineers,

In response, Zilog argued that the three
licenses at issue contained confidentiality
agreements prohibiting the disclosure of the
agreements without the vendor’s consent;
that whether Zilog breached the licensing
agreements by allowing the engineers to use
the vendor's software is not relevant to this
case; and that because American Semicon-

3, During the trial, American Semiconductor's
chief financial officer testified that Zilog had paid
the engineers $65.00 per hour for the work they
had done and that on average American Semi-
conductor paid its design engineers $39.50 per
hour plus 18,5% benefits, That would make their

ductor had never submitted a bid to do any
work for Zilog, there is no way that Zilog
could have sought to undercut American
Semiconductor's price. Zilog also argued that
American Semiconductor had issued a sub-
poena to Synopsys seeking a copy of the
license agreement, and Synopsys had object-
ed on the ground that American Semicondue-
tor was seeking confidential information, Zi-
log concluded its argument by stating that
American Semiconductor, “in its own papers,
has objected to producing agreements be-
tween ASI and third parties, on the grounds
that they’re protected by confidentiality pro-
visions that prohibit ASI from disclosing
those documents.”

In rebuttal, American Semiconductor as-
serted that the Synopsys license was relevant
because it showed Zilog’s intent with respect
to the torts it was alleged to have committed,

MR. ZARIAN: We think the relevance is
clear, Your Honor. It goes to the intent.

Zilog’s taking the position that they were

completely surprised that these individu-

als, as it turned out, were working for ASI
all along. The facts show otherwise. The
facts show that there was a pattern, there

‘was a conduct—pattern of conduct here by

which they affirmatively made a decision to

eut costs, to cut corners, and to, in this
case, violate these agreements in the very
project through which they violated and
breached, collectively, the duties that they
all had to ASI, and that much is set forth
in our pleadings.

(Emphasis added).

The district court denied the motion to
compel production of the licenses. It stated,
“The Court is not convinced, at this point,
that the requests for software—the software
licensing agreements between Zilog and its
vendors is reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.”

Hl On appeal, the only license at issue is
the Synopsys license. Rule 26(b) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[plar-

hourly pay $46.81. She also testified that Ameri-
can Semiconductor would charge a customer for
the engineers’ design services an additional 32%
for overhead and 17% for profit, which could
bring the hourly rate to about $72.00.

ties may obtain discovery regarding any non-
privileged matter that is relevant to any par-
ty’s claim or defense” and that “[rlelevant
information need not be admissible at the
trial if the discovery appears reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.” Assuming that the Synopsys li-
cense would, as alleged, have led to the dis-
covery of evidence that the license did not
authorize the engineers to work remotely
under the license, or to work at all under the
license, such evidence would not have been
admissible to show Zilog’s intent.

Hs The relevant intent for interfer-
ence with an economic expectancy is inten-
tional interference with a known economic
expectancy, Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC,
146 Idaho 118, 125, 191 P.8d 196, 203
(2008), and the relevant intent for interfer-
ence with a contract is intentional interfer-
ence with a known contract, Barlow v. Int'l
Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 898, 522 P.2d
1102, 1114 (1974). Assuming that Zilog
breached the Synopsys license, that may
give Synopsys a claim against Zilog for
breach of contract, but such conduct would
not be relevant to show that Zilog either
intentionally interfered with American Semi-
eonductor’s contracts with the engineers or
intentionally interfered with American Semi-
conductor’s expectancy of receiving future
benefits from its relationship with those en-
gineers,

On appeal, American Semiconductor does
not present any argument that the district
court erred by refusing to grant the motion
to compel based upon the information and
arguments presented to the court in connec-
tion with the motion. Its only argument
with respect to the court’s ruling on the
motion to compel is, “Without reviewing any
documents at issue, the District Court de-
nied the motion, stating it was ‘not con-
vinced,’ at that time, that the requests were
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible
evidence.” Instead, American Semiconductor
points to later events to show the relevance
of the license. The events that it recites are
declarations of Mr. Staab filed on July 14,
2014, and on November 7, 2014; the deposi-
tion testimony of Zilog’s damages expert
taken on November 5, 2015; and events that

129

occurred during the trial, commencing with
Zilog’s opening statement on January 6,
2015.

On July 14, 2014, Mr. Staab filed a declara-
tion in opposition to American Semiconduc-
tor’s motion to add a claim for punitive dam-
ages. In his declaration, he stated that he
would not have contracted with American
Semiconductor because their price to do the
work would have been too high. At some
point during the litigation, American Semi-
conductor had presented a quote setting
forth what it would have charged to provide
the engineer's services for which Zilog paid
Sage $124,000. In his declaration, he stated
that “[t]he ‘TOTAL PRICE’ on the ASI
Quote is $454,801 for 1908 hours of design
engineering, which is the equivalent of over
$288 per hour for design engineering ser-
vices” and that he would not have retained
American Semiconductor to provide any such
services at that rate.

On November 5, 2014, American Semicon-
ductor took the deposition of Zilog’s damages
expert, during which he testified about his
disagreement with the opinions expressed by
American Semiconductor's damages expert
during his deposition taken on October 80,
2014, According to Mr. Zarian, a “major com-
ponent” of the damages calculated by Ameri-
can Semiconductor’s expert was the cost of
tools, and the expert’s opinion about the tools
had not been disclosed until August 2014,
Zilog’s expert testified in his deposition that
he had been told that Zilog did not incur any
additional cost for the engineers to use tools
already licensed by Zilog. Therefore, his
damages calculation did not include any cost
for those tools.

On November 7, 2014, Zilog filed the decla-
ration of Mr, Staab in opposition to American
Semiconductor's motion in limine, In that
declaration, he stated:

The primary CAD [computer-aided-de-
sign] software used by Sage on the Project
were those licensed to Zilog by Synopsys,
Ine. (“Synopsys”). Zilog’s parent company,
IXYS Corporation (“IXYS”), negotiated
and obtained a license specifically permit-
ting Dave Roberts, Russell Lloyd, Evelyn
Perryman, William Tiffany and Gyle
Yearsley, to use the Synopsys CAD soft-

130

ware, and Synopsys did not require any
additional cost for the inclusion of those
individuals in the license.

On January 6, 2015, Zilog’s counsel stated
during his opening statement:

ASI wanted to charge Zilog—frankly,
ASI wanted to charge Zilog over $800,000
for those tools, And Zilog said no; we—we
don’t want to buy those tools—or Zilog
would have said if they had received a bid
or a quote. Zilog had the tools it needed,
and didn’t want to pay ASI for those tools.

Whether or not the district court erred in
denying the motion to compel must be based
upon the information and arguments present-
ed to the court in support of the motion. The
court was not required to be prescient. When
it denied the motion to compel, the district
court stated that it was not convinced, at this
point, that the licenses were reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. American Semiconductor did not
thereafter ask the Court to reconsider the
motion to compel based upon the defenses
thereafter raised by Zilog or the engineers.
American Semiconductor has not presented
any argument showing that the district court
erred in denying the motion to compel based
upon the information and argument present-
ed to the court in support of that motion.

HB. Reviewing the Synopsys con-
tract, in camera, American Semiconductor
alleges that the district court erred by re-
viewing the Synopsys contract in camera. It
asserts: “The District Court's determination
concerning the relevance of the Synopsys
License was the product of an opaque in
camera process that deprived ASI of an op-
portunity to be properly heard on a key issue
at trial with far-reaching implications.” This
assertion misstates what actually occurred.
The court’s review of the Synopsys contract
was not done in connection with determining
whether the license was relevant. An adden-
dum to the license was presented to the court
for in camera review during oral argument
on one of American Semiconductor's motions
in limine.

On October 31, 2014, after discovery had
closed, American Semiconductor filed its Mo-
tion in Limine No. 11 seeking to preclude

“defendants from offering arguments or as-
sertion that rely, in whole or in part, on any
licensing agreement that remain undisclosed
as of the filing of this motion.” The motion in
limine was to preclude evidence regarding
the license, not to determine whether the
license was relevant.

As a ground for the motion, American
Semiconductor argued in its supporting
jmemorandum that “seeking to avoid liability
for ASI’s interference claims, both the Sage
Defendants and Zilog have argued that Zilog
would not have contracted with ASI because
the total project price that ASI would likely
have quoted Gf Zilog had dealt with ASI
directly) would have been too high.” In sup-
port of that argument, American Semicon-
ductor cited the declaration of Mr. Staab
filed on July 14, 2014,

American Semiconductor's motion was
heard on December 9, 2014, along with eight
other motions in limine it had filed. The trial
‘was to commence on January 5, 2015, During
the hearing on its Motion in Limine No. 11,
American Semiconductor’s counsel argued.
that the arguments and defenses now being
advanced were “that Zilog would not or could
not have contracted with ASI because the
project price that ASI would have likely
quoted would have been too high, whereas
the suggestion is that the cost was negligible
or nonexistent for use of these tools by the
Sage individuals.” He asserted that “if, in
fact, the defendants are allowed to make
arguments based on this evidence that was
never produced, that could never be chal-
Jenged, or examined, or tested through depo-
sitions and otherwise, then there will be,
indeed, very significant prejudice.”

Zilog then provided the district court with
a copy of a Synopsys contract for in camera
review. Counsel for Zilog stated that the only
design tools used in connection with the pro-
ject were licensed by Cadence and Synopsys,
that they had written to both entities and
requested permission to provide their con-
tracts to the court for in camera review, and
that Cadence refused and Synopsys gave
permission to do so.

The district court had a further dialogue
with American Semiconductor’s counsel. The
court stated that it did not remember the

cost of the licenses being the focus of the
motion to compel. There was further discus-
sion, during which American Semiconductor's
counsel stated: “There were discovery re-
quests and requests for production that—
that sought not just the agreements, but also
the cost information, communications about
them, and the like. None of that was pro-
duced.” The motion to compel had not includ-
ed discovery requests seeking “the cost infor-
mation, communications about them, and the
like.” The court and American Semiconduc-
tor’s counsel then had the following dialogue:

THE COURT: You wanted a copy of the
license agreement; I said, no. Now you're
focusing on the costs of procuring the
tools, and I don’t remember that coming—
being the focus of your motion to compel.

MR. ZARIAN: But it’s also the agree-
ment, Your Honor, because the agreement
sets forth—and the ones that—a few that
we have do as well—geographic limita-
tions, use limitations. And so, they—

THE COURT: That was more the focus
of the issues last spring, as who can use
this, where can they physically use it, do
they have to go to the employer’s site to
use it, what state is it in, how many users,
those kinds of things, it wasn’t the cost of
the tools that—that was the focus of the
motion, as I recall.

MR. ZARIAN: I think that’s fair, Your
Honor.

THE COURT: But the cost wasn’t—I'll
take a look, in camera, at the copy of the
license agreement, but I don’t remember
this being the focus, Mr. Zarian. I—my
recollection is you wanted a copy of the
license agreement.

MR. ZARIAN: We wanted a copy of—of
that license agreement.

At the conclusion of the arguments on this
motion in limine, the court reserved ruling on
it.

On January 8, 2015, during the fourth day
of the jury trial, American Semiconductor
renewed its motion in limine. The district
court stated with respect to the Synopsys
contract that it did not “find anything in
there which addresses the issue of an incre-

131

mental or increased cost to include or add
contractors or consultants to the total
amount of fees that’s charged.” The court
ultimately denied the motion in limine be-
cause “I see it as an extreme remedy to a—a
failed motion to compel made nine months
ago, never revisited.” American Semiconduc-
tor has not challenged on appeal the court’s
denial of its motion in limine,

After the district court ruled, American
Semiconductor’s counsel requested the date
of the contract. The court stated that it
would consider the request, but they needed
to get back in the courtroom because the
jury had been waiting for a long time. Later
that day during a recess, the court stated,
over Zilog’s objection, that “the Purchase
Agreement says it was effective as of Sep-
tember 29, 2011—and it actually is signed the
day before that, September 28, 2011—as an
addendum to the original Agreement.” The
court also stated that there was a schedule of
payments “starting in October of 2011, and
going into July of 2014.” American Semicon-
ductor did not respond by making any addi-
tional request with respect to the contract.

The court’s in camera review had nothing
to do with the court’s ruling on the relevance
of the license. It had not been asked to do
that. It had been asked to rule on American
Semiconductor’s motion in limine seeking to
preclude any evidence or arguments regard-
ing the license. American Semiconductor did
not object to the district court reviewing the
license in camera, and it therefore cannot
raise that as an issue on appeal. Kirkman v,
Stoker, 184 Idaho 641, 544, 6 P.3d 397, 400
(2000).

C. Excluding testimony regarding the
Synopsys license. American Semiconductor
asserts that the district court erred by “pre-
cluding ASI from eliciting any evidence that
may be pertinent to licensing terms, general-
ly, and the Synopsys License, in particular,
based ewclusively upon an untenable rele-
vance determination amount to reversible er-
rors.” It lists four instances in which the
court allegedly did so.

HE “Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evi-
dence unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of

132

the trial court’s discretion and a substantial
right of the party is affected.” Burgess v.
Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 574,
908 P.2d 780, 789 (1995). “[TJhe burden is on
the person asserting error to show an abuse
of discretion.” Merrill v. Gibson, 189 Idaho
840, 843, 87 P.8d 949, 952 (2004). “A trial
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1)
correctly perceives the issue as discretionary,
(2) acts within the bounds of discretion and
applies the correct legal standards, and (8)
reaches the decision through an exercise of
reason.” O'Connor v. Harger Constr, Inc.,
145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.8d 846, 851 (2008),
1, Precluding American Semiconductor
from allowing its chief financial officer to
explain the difference between the $124,000
charged by Sage and the $454,000 that
American Semiconductor would have
charged for that same work. During the
redirect examination of American Semicon-
duetor’s chief financial officer, she was asked
about the difference between the American
* Semiconductor quote of $454,000 and the
$124,000 that Zilog paid Sage for the services
of the engineers, The exchange was as fol-
lows:

Q. BY MR. ZARIAN: Mr. Cooper
asked you if this, in fact, showed that AST
would have bid or charged $454,000 for
something that was done for much less, in
fact 124,000; do you remember that ques-
tion?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. You said at the time that there was
a good explanation; do you remember say-
ing that?

A. Yes, Ido.

Q. What is the explanation?

MR. HUSCH: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What's the nature of the

explanation? Do we need—

MR. HUSCH: I anticipate that we may
be getting very close to a topic of one of
the Court’s motions in limine.

THE COURT: All right, Is that—is that

AST’s motion?

MR. HUSCH: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We weren’t
going to do this without having the Court
be involved in advance,

So, I'll sustain objection—

MR, ZARIAN: Your Honor, if I may,

Ie

THE COURT: —at this point.

MR. ZARIAN: —I was going to suggest
that perhaps the door’s been opened, and
my—just this one question is the only one
I have to ask, if to have the witness al-
lowed—

THE COURT: And I’ve sustained the

objection,

You may not—

MR. ZARIAN: Okay.

THE COURT: —ask the question with-
out taking it up in—in advance, as we
agreed, before the topic is raised, outside
the presence of the jury,

The district court did not preclude Ameri-
can Semiconductor from presenting the evi-
dence it desired. It merely held that the
admissibility of that area of inquiry must
first be addressed outside the presence of the
jury, as the parties had agreed. American
Semiconductor has not pointed to anything in
the record showing that it then brought the
issue up outside the presence of the jury.

HMM 2. Precluding American Semicon-
ductor’s industry expert from opining as
to tools costs. American Semiconductor con-
tends that the district court precluded its
expert from opining as to the cost of tools.
During the seventh day of trial, American
Semiconductor wanted to project for the jury
slides stating ten opinions of one of its expert
witnesses while the expert was testifying.
Without the district court yet hearing any of
the expert’s testimony, American Semicon-
ductor wanted the court to make a ruling on
the admissibility of the opinions stated in the
slides. The court questioned whether the
slides would be more appropriate for closing
argument, and American Semiconductor's
counsel responded that it was his practice to
use such slides during the examination of an
expert to help the jury understand technical
matters. The court mentioned one slide that
did not concern something that was difficult
to understand, and Zilog’s counsel brought
up slide No. 10, which stated, “Insufficient
supporting data has been provided to show

that Zilog would not have incurred additional
tool costs in contracting with Sage on the
6482 project [the project at issue].” After the
court and the parties discussed the content of
the slide, the court stated: “Saying that
you’re—you’re not having been provided the
cost of the tools, which they paid—now, I—
Tm just—I’m not comfortable with that opin-
ion No. 10 is appropriate. And the Court, at
this point, would be inclined to perhaps sus-
tain an objection to this opinion.” As the
discussion continued about the slides, the
court stated, “I don’t think No, 10 is an
expert opinion.” As the court continued re-
viewing the slides, it commented that some of
them did not appear to be expert opinions,
but simply statements about contested facts
or argument. After further discussions, the
court stated that it did not think the expert
should be asked at all about slide No. 10.

On appeal, American Semiconductor sim-
ply states that the district court’s decision
regarding the opinion stated in slide No. 10
constituted “precluding AST’s industry expert
from opining as to, tools costs.” The slide did
not constitute the expert opinion about tools
costs. It constituted the expert expressing an
opinion regarding the quantum of proof nec-
essary to show that Zilog did not ineur addi-
tional costs for tools in the project. To show
an abuse of discretion, one of the factors that
American Semiconductor must show is that
court did not act within the bounds of discre-
tion and apply the correct legal standards,
American Semiconductor has not provided
any argument or authority showing that the
slide contained an admissible opinion. See
State v, Ellington, 151 Idaho 58, 66-67, 253
P.8d 727, 740-41 (2011); Warren v. Sharp,
189 Idaho 599, 606, 83 P.8d 773, 780 (2008).
Therefore, it has not shown that the court
abused its discretion.

Hl 3. Precluding American Semicon-
ductor from cross-examining Mr. Staab
with regard to how much Zilog paid for
tools given that the Synopsys license was
executed after the engineers were taken
off the project. After discussing the slides,
the parties discussed other issues outside the
presence of the jury. Mr. Zarian stated that
he intended to cross-examine Mr. Staab
about what they had paid for the tools. The

133

following exchange then occurred between
him and the district court,

THE COURT: And that will be a—a big
deal because I’ve—I’ve said that that’s not
relevant because they already had the—
they've already had—had the tools that
they were going to insist be used on this
work by Sage.

And so, I don’t see how you make the
ease that they would've had to buy them
again, I—that’s just—

MR. ZARIAN; And just on that point,
Your Honor, here’s what's—what’s really
puzzling be—because what they—the
Court will recall, they were pulled off the
job on September 27, 2011. The agreement
that was given to the Court was signed the
next day, after they were pulled off the
job.

THE COURT: These—these are period-
ically signed, as Counsel well know, I
mean, this thing all relates back to a 2004
license, and—and they’re periodically re-
viewed within whatever the term is. So,
I—T’m not sure that that is a legitimate
point of view.

Well, in any event, we'll save that for
Mr. Staab’s testimony, We—we need to
get the jury in here and—

MR. ZARIAN: Your Honor?

THE COURT: —proceed with Mr. Hol-

Jand.

MR. ZARIAN: May we have just five

minutes?

THE COURT: We need a humanitarian

break; yes, sir.

MR. ZARIAN: Thank you and—

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. ZARIAN: —thank you, Your Hon-

or.

During this exchange, the district court did
not make any ruling on whether American
Semiconductor could cross-examine Mr.
Staab regarding the cost of the tools that
Zilog used on the project. Because the court
did not make any ruling on the admissibility
of the evidence, there is no issue for appeal.
Krinitt v,. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 159
Idaho 125, 131, 357 P.8d 850, 856 (2015).

134

HM 4. Precluding American Semicon-
ductor from cross-examining Mr. Staab
with regard to how much Zilog paid for
tools. During cross-examination of Mr.
Staab, Mr. Zarian asked how much Zilog
paid for the tools. The following occurred:

Q. BY MR. ZARIAN: Yes. The reason
Sage was cheaper, for example, than what
you think it would have cost to contract
with ASI, is because Sage had no over-
head; true?

A. My recollection of the ASI exhibit
was that a large portion of it was CAD
tools, And, of course, Sage didn’t have a
CAD tool cost. Overhead would, perhaps,
also come into play.

Q. Well, how much did Zilog actually
pay for the tools actually used by Sage
while working on this project?

MS. ROSHOLT: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Zarian, this covers
ground that—that we’ve—we've talked
about before, as I understand it. And this
is the—the stuff of a—a Confidential
Agreement that the Court has ruled on
already.

Counsel approach, please.

(Bench conference.)

THE COURT: Move on to your next

question, please.

MR. ZARIAN: Thank you very much,

Your Honor.

HE “This Court does not review an
alleged error on appeal unless the record
discloses an adverse ruling forming the basis
for the assignment of error.” Ada Cnty.
Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments,
LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 868, 179 P.8d 328, 381
(2008). “ ‘We do not presume error on appeal;
the party alleging error has the burden of
showing it in the record’” VanderWal v.
Albar, Inc., 154 Idaho 816, 822, 308 P.8d 175,
181 (2018) (quoting Miller v. Callear, 140
Idaho 218, 218, 91 P.8d 1117, 1122 (2004)).
Because the record does not reflect what
occurred during the bench conference, Amer-
ican Semiconductor has failed to provide a
record showing any error in this instance.

American Semiconductor has failed to
show any error that would entitle it to a new
trial on damages. Therefore, we affirm the

award of damages against Sage and the engi-
neers.

v.

Did the District Court Abuse Its Discre-
tion in Determining that There Was
No Prevailing Party in the Litigation
Between American Semiconductor
and the Engineers and Sage?

American Semiconductor and the engi-
neers and Sage sought an award of costs and
attorney fees. The court found that there was
no prevailing party in the litigation between
these parties, American Semiconductor con-
tends that it erred in that determination.

HE “In determining the prevailing
party, the court examines the final result
obtained in relation to the relief sought,
whether there were multiple claims or is-
sues, and the extent to which either party
prevailed on each separate issue or claim.”
First State Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 142
Idaho 608, 615, 180 P.38d 1146, 1153 (2006). In
addition, when there are claims and counter-
claims between opposing parties, “the pre-
vailing party question is examined and deter-
mined from an overall view, not a claim-by-
claim analysis.” Highteen Mile Ranch, LLC
v. Nord Bucavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Ida-
ho 716, 719, 117 P.8d 180, 188 (2005),

The district court recited the above state-
ments of law and reviewed the claims initially
asserted between these parties, the claims
ultimately submitted to the jury, the amounts
sought on those claims, and the jury’s resolu-
tion of those claims. Ultimately, the court
concluded that the most significant factor
was that American Semiconductor sought to
recover $1,025,087 in damages against the
engineers and Sage, but only recovered the
sum of $195,175, which amounted to 19% of
its claimed damages,

HM “The district court’s determination
of prevailing party status for the purpose of
awarding attorney fees and costs is within
the court’s sound discretion, and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse
of discretion.” Hobson Fabricating Corp. v.
SE/Z Constr, LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49, 294
P.8d 171, 175 (2012). “[T]he burden is on the

person asserting error to show an abuse of
discretion.” Merrill, 189 Idaho at 843, 87
P.3d at 952. “A trial court does not abuse its
diseretion if it (1) correctly perceives the
issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the
bounds of diseretion and applies the correct
legal standards, and (8) reaches the decision
through an exercise of reason.” O'Connor,
145 Idaho at 909, 188 P.3d at 851.

HM American Semiconductor first con-
tends that the district court incorrectly stat-
ed that it only recovered on one claim against
the engineers and Sage. Question No. 1 on
the special verdict asked with respect to each
of the engineers, “Did some or all of the
following defendants breach paragraph 7
(Duty Not to Compete) of the Employee
Confidentiality Agreement?,” and the jury
answered “YES” as to each engineer, Ques-
tion No. 2 on the special verdict form asked
with respect to each of the engineers, “Did
some or all of the following defendants
breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Ameri-
can Semiconductor, Ine.?,” and the jury an-
swered “YES” as to each engineer. Question
No. 8 then asked: “If you answered ‘NO’ to
all of the above questions, do not answer this
question. Instead, proceed to question 4. If
you answered ‘YES’ to any of the above
questions, what is the total amount of dam-
ages, if any, sustained by American Semicon-
ductor, Ine. that were caused by the breach?”
The jury initially entered $195,175, but
crossed out that figure and wrote “0.”

Question No, 4 asked with respect to each
of the engineers and Sage, “Did some or all
of the following defendants intentionally in-
terfere with American Semiconductor, Inc.’s
economic expectancy of contracting with Zi-
log, Inc.?,” and the jury answered “YES”
with respect to each of those Defendants.
Question No, 5 asked: “If you answered ‘NO’
to question 4, do not answer this question.
Instead, proceed to question 6. If you an-
swered ‘YES’ to question 4, what is the total
amount of damages, if any, sustained by
American Semiconductor, Inc. that resulted
from the intentional conduct of any or all of
the Sage Defendants?” The jury entered
$195,175.

Tn its recitation of the jury’s award, the
district court stated that the jury did not

135

award American Semiconductor any damages
with respect to the claims set forth in Ques-
tions 1 and 2. American Semiconductor con-
tends on appeal that the district court erred
because the jury obviously intended for the
damage award to apply to those claims also.
They base that argument upon the court’s
Instruction No, 28, which stated, “If you
determine that a party is entitled to recover
under two claims for the same injury, you
should not award more than is required to
adequately compensate the party for that one

‘The verdict is ambiguous as to whether the
$195,175 award was for only interference
with American Semiconductor’s economic ex-
pectancy or for all three claims, The jury
instruction stated that if the jury found that
a party was entitled to recover “under two
claims for the same injury,” not “more than
one claim for the same injury.” Questions 1
and 2 set forth two claims and asked the jury
to award damages if it found liability on
either or both of them. The jury instruction
did not, by its terms, apply to the claim in
Question No. 4. The jury did not simply
delete the award of $195,715 in Question No.
8; it deleted the award and inserted “0” in its
place. Question No, 5 asked the jury to
award damages only if it answered “YES” to
Question No. 4, not to Question No. 1, No. 2,
or No. 4. Thus, the verdict could be read as
the jury deciding to award no damages for
the claims set forth in Questions 1 and 2.
Conversely, the jury could have concluded
Instruction No. 28 should apply to an award
under all three claims and intended the
award under Question No. 5 to apply to
findings of liability in answering Questions 1,
2, and 4.

The district court’s interpretation of the
jury verdict was not unreasonable. There-
fore, that interpretation does not show an
abuse of discretion.

HM Finally, American Semiconductor ar-
gues that because the engineers and Sage
did not recover on their counterclaims and
American Semiconductor received “signifi-
cant success” on its claims, it is the prevail-
ing party as a matter of law. It relies upon
this Court’s opinion in Highteen Mile Ranch,

136

LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc, 141
Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 180 (2005). That case
does not so hold.

In Highteen Mile Ranch, the plaintiffs eon-
tracted with a Company to do a construction
project on their ranch, Jd, at 718, 117 P.3d at
182, The parties got into a dispute, and the
plaintiffs terminated the Company’s involve-
ment in the project before it was complete.
Id, They then sued the Company, its two
owners, one owner's wife, and the Company
bookkeeper, and the Company filed a coun-
terclaim seeking $12,000 for services provid-
ed. Id, The plaintiffs’ claims against two of
the individuals were dismissed before trial,
The matter was tried to jury, and it found in
favor of the Company on the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint and awarded the company $1,054.38 in
its counterclaim. Jd. No liability was estab-
lished against the remaining individuals, Id.
‘The owners and the company filed a memo-
vandum of costs seeking an award of court
costs and attorney fees, and the district court
denied that request on the ground that there
‘was no prevailing party. Id.

On appeal, we held that the district court
had abused its discretion for three reasons.
First, the district court misconstrued the ap-
plicable standard for evaluating the prevail-
ing party. It quoted portions of an opinion
from the Court of Appeals and concluded
that dismissal of a claim against a party
before trial does not necessarily make that
party a prevailing party and that successfully
asserting or defending a single claim does
not mandate the award of attorney fees to
the prevailing party on that claim. Id. at 719,
117 P.8d at 188. The court erred by not
determining the prevailing party from an
overall view, but rather based upon a claim-
by-claim analysis. Jd. Second, with respect to
the company, “the district court focused too
much attention on the Company’s less than
tremendous success on its counterclaim and.
seemingly ignored the fact that the Company
avoided all liability as a defendant. The dis-
trict court improperly undervalued the Com-
pany’s successful defense.” Id. Finally, the
district court found that all parties were
partly at fault for the underlying dispute,
that their uncooperative attitudes made it
necessary to resolve the matter by a trial,

and that “[tJhe parties are jointly responsible
for the filing and continuation of this action.”
Id. at 720, 117 P.8d at 184. We held, “It is
improper to allow such considerations to play
a part in determining who prevailed. The
court ‘may not use the award or denial of
attorney fees to vindicate his sense of justice
beyond the judgment rendered on the under-
lying dispute between the parties. ” Id.

In Bighteen Mile Ranch, we did not hold
that if a plaintiff recovers more than a nomi-
nal amount on its claim and defeats a coun-
terclaim, it is as a matter of law the prevail-
ing party in the litigation, That is shown by
our decision in Hobson Fabricating Corp. v.
SE/Z Constr, LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 294 P.38d
171 (2012), The Division of Publie Works had
hired SE/Z Construction as the general con-
tractor on a project, and SE/Z Construction
had awarded a subcontract to Hobson Fabri-
eating. Id. at 47, 294 P.8d at 178, Over one
year later and before the project was com-
pleted, the Division of Public Works termi-
nated its contract with SE/Z Construction,
and it in turn terminated its subcontract with
Hobson Fabricating. Id.

Hobson Fabricating and SE/Z Construc-
tion agreed to jointly pursue their respective
claims against the Division of Publie Works
and to jointly defend against its claims. Jd.
Hobson Fabricating filed an action for over
$1.5 million against the Division of Public
Works and against SE/Z Construction. Id.
Hobson Fabricating added SE/Z Construc-
tion as a defendant in order to assert a pass-
through claim against the Division of Public
Works. Id. SE/Z Construction filed a cross-
claim against the Division of Public Works on
behalf of itself and Hobson Fabricating total-
ing $1,978,107.88. Id. The bulk of the dam-
ages sought by SE/Z Construction on its
behalf and on behalf of Hobson Fabricating
was based upon an attempt to convert the
fixed-price contract into a cost-plus contract.
Id, at 50, 294 P.8d at 176. The Division of
Public Works answered and filed a counter-
claim against Hobson Fabricating and a
cross-claim against SE/Z Construction for
more than $2.6 million. Id, at 47, 51, 294 P.8d
at 178, 177.

On motions for partial summary judgment,
the district court dismissed the claims be-

tween Hobson Fabricating and the Division
of Public Works because there was no con-
tractual relationship between these parties,
id. at 47-48, 294 P.8d at 178-74, and the
court later ordered that the Division of Pub-
lie Works could not pursue its claims because
it had failed to provide notice and an oppor-
tunity to cure, id. at 48, 294 P.8d at 174, The
court also ruled that the damages sought by
SE/Z Construction would be calculated based
upon the contract’s fixed price terms rather
than by the “total cost method” asserted by
SE/Z Construction. Jd. That left only SE/Z
Construction’s claim of $1.9 million against
the Division of Public Works. The parties
then settled their substantive claims by the
Division of Public Works agreeing to pay
SE/Z Construction $225,000 and submitted
briefs to the court on the issue of costs and
attorney fees. Jd. The court found that the
parties had each prevailed in part and that
there was no prevailing party. Id. Hobson
Fabricating and SE/Z Construction then ap-
pealed.

SE/Z Construction argued on appeal that
the district court erred in finding that it was
not a prevailing party because it was only
seeking to recover $302,941.70 for itself
against the Division of Public Works and it
received $225,000. Jd. at 49, 294 P.8d at 175.
This Court held that the prevailing party
analysis with respect to SE/Z Construction
must include the entire $1.9 million as being
its claim, even though it was seeking to re-
cover the bulk of that amount on behalf of
Hobson Fabricating. Jd. at 50, 294 P.8d at
176. Thus, this Court held that the issue was
whether it “must determine whether the dis-
trict court abused its discretion by not find-
ing the Contractors [SE/Z Construction and
Hobson Fabricating] to be the overall pre-
vailing party when they defeated DPWs
cross-claim and received $225,000 in settle-
ment for their $1.9 million dollar claim.” Id.
at 50, 294 P.3d at 176, We noted that “[bloth
a party’s successes in bringing claims and in
defending against them are important to the
prevailing party analysis.” Id. We held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion.
In doing so, we stated:

Because the district court considered this

final result in relation to the relief sought

by the parties, the multiple claims and

137

issues between the parties, and the extent
to which each had prevailed on those is-
sues, it did not abuse its discretion by
finding that both parties prevailed in part.
Therefore, this Court affirms the district
court’s order that each party bear its own
costs and fees,

Id, at 51, 294 P.8d at 177.

In the instant case, the district court recit-
ed the correct standard for determining the
prevailing party and conducted the same
analysis as we recited in the Hobson Fabri-
cating case. It considered the final result in
relation to the relief sought by the parties,
the multiple claims and issues between the
parties, and the extent to which each had
prevailed on those issues. It noted that
American Semiconductor sought to recover
$1,025,087 from the engineers and Sage, but
only recovered $195,175, and that the engi-
neers and Sage sought to recover $76,975.25
on their counterclaims, but recovered noth-
ing. Obviously, American Semiconductor was
not satisfied with its recovery because it filed
this appeal seeking a new trial on damages.
“The district court’s determination of prevail-
ing party status for the purpose of awarding
attorney fees and costs is within the court’s
sound discretion, and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless there is an abuse of discre-
tion.” Id. at 49, 294 P.8d at 175. American
Semiconductor has not shown that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in determin-
ing that there was no prevailing party in this
case,

Vi

Is Either American Semiconductor or the
Engineers and Sage Entitled to an Award
of Attorney Fees on Appeal?

American Semiconductor seeks an award
of attorney fees on appeal against the engi-
neers and Sage pursuant to the terms of the
engineers’ contracts with American Semicon-
ductor and Idaho Code section 12-120(8). Be-
cause American Semiconductor is not the
prevailing party on appeal, it is not entitled
to an award of attorney fees,

HH The engineers seek an award of at-
torney fees on appeal pursuant to their con-

138

tracts with American Semiconductor, Idaho
Code section 12-120(8), and Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-121. The Employee Confidentiality
Agreement executed between each engineer
and American Semiconductor included a pro-
vision stating, “The prevailing party shall be
entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs incurred in connection with such litiga-
tion.” The engineers are entitled to an award.
of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to this
provision in their contracts with American
Semiconductor. Because they are entitled to
an award of attorney fees on appeal under
their contracts with American Semiconduc-
tor, we need not address whether they are
also entitled to an award of attorney fees
under Idaho Code sections 12-120(8) and 12-
121.

HMMM Sage seeks an award of attorney
fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-121. “In normal circumstances, attor-
ney fees will only be awarded [under this
statute] when this court is left with the abid-
ing belief that the appeal was brought, pur-
sued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation.” Minich v. Gem State
Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d
1078, 1085 (1979). We do not find that this
appeal was brought or pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation as to
Sage, and therefore we do not award it attor-
ney fees under this statute.

VIL.
Conclusion,

We affirm the judgment of the district
court. We award Respondents costs on ap-
peal and we award Respondents other than
Sage attorney fees on appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY concur.

395 P.3d 357

ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
body politic corporate of the State
of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant,

ve

BROOKE VIEW, INC. dba The Senator,
Inc., an Idaho corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,

and

Bench Sewer District; Joe J. Hon and
William A. Hon dba Franklin Water
Company; Overland Water Company, an
Idaho company; Tillie Mae Saxton, a
widow; Vincent Lee Humphreys and
Esther C. Humphreys, husband and
wife; Kenneth Richardson and Effie R.
Richardson; and all unknown lessees
and tenants in possession of any or all
of the property which is subject to this
action, and any other person or entity,
who has or may have an interest in and
to the property which is subject of this
action, referenced for convenience by
the fictitious designations of Does 1
Through 10, Defendants.

Docket No, 43452

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: May 23, 2017

Holland & Hart, LLP, Boise, and Jones
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., Boise, attor-
neys for appellant. Mary V. York argued.

Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, Boise,
attorneys for respondent, Heather Cunning-
ham argued.

JONES, Justice
I, Narore or tm Case

In a case arising out of Ada County, the
Ada County Highway District ((ACHD”) ap-
peals a district court judgment awarding
$148,890.21 plus prejudgment interest and
attorney’s fees to Brooke View, Ine. d/b/a
The Senator (“Brooke View”) as just com-
pensation for a parcel of property that
ACHD condemned and took possession of
under the Stute’s eminent domain powers,
ACHD argues on appeal that the district
court misconstrued the law when it allowed
Brooke View to recover the cost to repair
damage to a wall on Brooke View’s property,
which the jury found had been caused by the
construction of improvements on the taken
parcel.

IL Facruat anp ProcepuraL BackgRrounp

Respondent, Brooke View, is an Idaho cor-
poration that owns an undivided interest in
certain property located at 421 South Curtis
Road in Boise, Idaho (the “Property”). The
Property, which is approximately 20 acres, is
the site of a housing development for senior
residents. The development sits behind a ser-
pentine concrete block entrance wall (the
“Wall”), which is covered in stucco on one
side and an intricate pattern of decorative
brick on the other.

In early 2012, ACHD embarked on Project
No. 809028, also known as the Safe Routes to
School project (the “Project”), The goal of

1, At trial, the parties stipulated that ACHD had
actually taken an additional 131.2 square feet of

the Project was to design and build sidewalks
and walkways in order to provide students
with safe walking routes to and from nearby
schools, The improvements undertaken as
part of the Project included not only the
installation of sidewalks, but also the con-
struction of a storm drainage system which
included digging an “infiltration trench.” The
infiltration trench is five to six feet wide and
eleven to twelve feet deep. It is located ap-
proximately six feet from the Wall.

On March 1, 2012, ACHD offered Brooke
View $7,788.47 (which it later increased to
$8,512.82) as just compensation for a 1,425
square foot section of the Property (the
“Taken Property”), which was needed to
complete the Project. Brooke View rejected
the offer.

On April 80, 2012, Dianne Miller (“Miller”),
the president and owner of Brooke View,
contacted ACHD to express concern that the
Project could cause damage to the Wall and
the surrounding landscaping. After meeting
with Miller, ACHD’s project manager, engi-
neer, and right-of-way specialist determined
that the Project would not damage the por-
tion of the Property not required to complete
the Project (the “Remaining Property). It
does not appear that ACHD ever investigat-
ed the possibility of damage to the Wall
beyond this preliminary assessment.

On June 20, 2012, ACHD issued an order
of condemnation with respect to the Taken
Property.! By that issuance, ACHD sought to
exercise its power of eminent domain under
Idaho Code section 7-701 to acquire a fee
simple interest in the Taken Property as well
as a temporary construction easement on an
additional 2,706 square feet of the Remaining
Property. While the Wall itself was not con-
demned, the temporary easement included a
significant portion of the Wall. On July 11,
2012, ACHD filed a complaint with the Ada
County district court seeking to effectuate its
order of condemnation. On August 7, 2012,
the parties stipulated to allow ACHD to take
possession of the Taken Property, On August
28, 2012, the district court entered an Order
for Possession of Real Property effectuating
the stipulation.

the Property. The final size of the Taken Property
was determined to be 1,566.07 square feet,

In October, 2012, ACHD began construc-
tion. On November 1, 2012, a resident on the
Remaining Property discovered a crack in
the Wall and notified Miller. Thereafter, Mil-
Jer located multiple cracks in the Wall. Fol-
lowing the discovery of these damages, the
focus of the litigation shifted from the value
of the Taken Property to the cause of the
damage to the Wall and whether the cost of
repairing that damage could legally be recov-
ered as part of just compensation.

On August 8, 2018, ACHD filed a motion
for summary judgment in which it asserted
that physical damage occurring during con-
struction is not part of just compensation,
and instead must be pursued in tort. The
motion was denied.

On October 8, 2018, ACHD filed another
motion for summary judgment as well as a
motion for reconsideration of its prior motion
for summary judgment. It filed a single
memorandum in support of both motions, in
which it again argued, inter alia, that any
theory that Brooke View had for damage to
the Wall caused during construction was
compensable only in tort. On December 2,
2018, the district court denied both motions.
It stated in its denial of ACHD’s third mo-
tion for summary judgment that:

[T]he Defendant, Brooke View, Inc.’s as-

sertion that ACHD’s “Safe Route to

School” project of Curtis Road ... caused

physical damage to the entrance way walls

on the remaining Brooke View property,
via underground water trespass, vibration,
or taking of lateral support, are encom-
passed within and a part of the ACHD
eminent domain claim and no counterclaim
or affirmative defense must be pled by the
defendant, Brooke View, Inc. to assert the
same,

The district court further held that:
[T]he Defendant, Brooke View, Inc, is not
required to prove the specific mechanism
of how the Brooke View entrance way
walls were allegedly physically damaged,
but rather simply that construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by
the Plaintiff pursuant to the Project was
the cause of the alleged physical damage;
and .,. No evidence of negligent or defec-
tive construction of the Project, or devia-

141

tion from how the Project was proposed to
be constructed, will be permitted at the
trial absent a counterclaim by Brooke
View, Ine. as to the same.

On December 15, 2014, ACHD filed anoth-
er motion for partial summary judgment or,
in the alternative, motion in limine, In its
memorandum in support, ACHD argued, in-
ter alia, that “Brooke View cannot meet its
burden of proof as to proximate cause,”
ACHD further argued that it had immunity
for any damages caused to Brooke View un-
der the Tort Claims Act (Idaho Code section
6-904(7)). On February 26, 2015, the district
court denied ACHD’s motion. In its order,
the district court reasoned that “[t]his is a
constitutional claim, not a tort claim, and tort
principles do not apply. The defendant has to
prove damages were caused, but they do not
have to prove proximate cause of the mecha-
nism of damage.” The district court further
held that because any damages caused dur-
ing construction implicated a constitutional
claim rather than a tort claim, Idaho Code
section 6-904 (the “Tort Claims Act”) was
inapplicable,

On April 6, 2015, the parties went to trial.
Over the course of the trial the district court
repeatedly reemphasized that: (1) damages
caused during construction were part of just
compensation; and (2) there was no tort claim
at issue, and accordingly, tort issues were not.
relevant. Despite multiple admonitions from
the district court, ACHD maintained its posi-
tion that damages caused during construction
were not compensable during a condemna-
tion action, ACHD did not submit any evi-
dence in support of any valuation; instead
conceding that Brooke View was entitled to
just compensation in the amount of $8,512.82.

On April 28, 2015, the jury unanimously
returned a verdict in the amount of
$146,291.68, This number was reached by
adding the fair market value of the Taken
Property ($8,915.18), the fair market value of
the temporary easement ($676.50), the value
of improvements taken ($700.00), and the
value of the cost to cure the damage caused
to the Wall ($141,000.00),

On June 12, 2015, the district court en-
tered a judgment on the verdict in the

142

amount of $148,890.21 and prejudgment in-
terest of $48,792.66. On August 27, 2015, the
district court granted Brooke View’s motion
for attorney's fees and costs, awarding
$744,243.56 in attorney’s fees, $44,051.46 in
non-diseretionary costs, and $865,703.63 in
discretionary costs.

IIL. Issurs on APPEAL

1. Did the district court err when it in-
cluded recovery for physical damages
to the Wall as part of just compensa-
tion for the Taken Property?

2, Did the district court err in its jury
instructions?

8. Did the district court err in admitting
testimony and other evidence of
events, activities, and damages that oc-
eurred during the construction of im-
provements on the Taken Property?

4, Did the district court err in awarding
Brooke View attorney’s fees, costs as a
matter of right, and discretionary
costs?

IV. Sranparp or REvirw

TN We exercise free review over
statutory interpretation because it is a
question of law. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho
845, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2018). Our objec-
tive when interpreting a statute is “to de-
rive the intent of the legislative body that
adopted the act.” Id. (quoting State v
Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970,
978 (2011)). Statutory interpretation begins
with the statute’s plain language. Dunlap,
155 Idaho at 361, 318 P.3d at 17. This
Court considers the statute as a whole, and
gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary

2. As an initial matter, it is proper for this Court
to consider ACHD’s arguments with respect to
the meaning of the word “construction” in Idaho
Code section 7-711 in light of Idaho Code sec-
tions 7-712 and 6-904(7). Brooke View asserts
that these arguments are new on appeal and
therefore should not be considered, citing Crow-
ley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d
435, 438 (2007). Brooke View's position is with-
out merit, Crowley stands for the proposition that
substantive issues cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. The Appellant in Crowley at-
tempted on appeal to challenge a verdict as in-
consistent without having made such a challenge
at the time the verdict was entered. Jd. The issue

meanings. When the statute’s language is
unambiguous, the legislature’s clearly ex-
pressed intent must be given effect, and
we do not need to go beyond the statute’s
plain language to consider other rules of
statutory construction. Id. at 361-62, 318
P.8d at 17-18,

State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 352, 372 P.8d

404, 407 (2016) (quoting State v. Owens, 158

Idaho 1, 8, 848 P.3d 80, 82 (2015)).

I If the words of the statute are subject to
more than one meaning, it is ambiguous and
this Court must construe the statute “to
mean what the legislature intended it to
mean. To determine that intent, [this Court]
examine[s] not only the literal words of the
statute, but also the reasonableness of pro-
posed constructions, the public policy behind
the statute, and its legislative history.”

Doe v, Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho
427, 430, 224 P.8d 494, 497 (2009) (quoting
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.8d
730, 732 (2009)).

V. ANALYSIS

A, The district court erred in its interpre-
tation of just compensation under Ida-
ho Code section 7-711(2)(a).?

HMMM Prior to the trial in this case, the
district court held that Brooke View’s claims
of damage caused to the Wall during con-
struction on the Taken Property were “en-
compassed within and a part of the ACHD
eminent domain claim and no counterclaim or
affirmative defense must be pled by the de-
fendant, Brooke View, Inc. to assert the
same.” We hold that this conclusion was er-
ror. Damages accruing during construction
are not properly part of just compensation

of whether the verdict was inconsistent was an
entirely new issue on appeal.

Here, early in the proceedings before the dis-
trict court ACHD adopted the position that
damages caused during construction were not
recoverable as part of just compensation, ACHD
argued this position repeatedly, despite being
admonished numerous times by the district
court to stop doing so. There is no question that
ACHD clearly raised the relevant issue before
the district court. ACHD’s specific arguments in
support of its position may have evolved since
the trial, but the issues on appeal and ACHD’s
position with respect to them remain the same.

and must be pursued separately in tort, We
further hold that any decisions by the district,
court in reliance on its initial error were
themselves error, including with respect to
the admission of evidence, jury instructions,
and award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitu-
tion imbues the State with the power of
eminent domain. It provides as follows:

RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN. The
necessary use of lands for the construction
of reservoirs or storage basins, for the
purpose of irrigation, or for rights of way
for the construction of canals, ditches,
flumes or pipes, to convey water to the
place of use for any useful, beneficial or
necessary purpose, or for drainage; or for
the drainage of mines, or the working
thereof, by means of roads, railroads,
tramways, cuts, tunnels, shafts, hoisting
works, dumps, or other necessary means to
their complete development, or any other
use necessary to the complete development
of the material resources of the state, or
the preservation of the health of its inhab-
itants, is hereby declared to be a public
use, and subject to the regulation and con-
trol of the state,

Private property may be taken for public
use, but not until a just compensation, to
be ascertained in the manner prescribed
by law, shall be paid therefor.

Idaho Const. art. I, § 14 (emphasis added).

The calculation of the “just compensation”
required for an exercise of eminent domain

3. Section 861 provided as follows:

The Court, jury, or referee must hear such
legal testimony as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess:

1. The value of the property sought to be
condemned, and all improvements thereon
pertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein; if it consists
of different parcels, the value of each parcel
and each estate or interest therein shall be
separately assessed;

2. If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned, by reason of its sever-
ance from the portion sought to be con-
demned, and the construction of the improve-
ment in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;

3. Separately, how much the portion not
sought to be condemned, and each estate or

143

under Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution is
governed by Idaho Code section 7-711 et seg.
Idaho Code section 7-711 provides in relevant
part as follows:

The court, jury or referee must hear
such legal testimony as may be offered by
any of the parties to the proceedings, and
thereupon must ascertain and assess:

1. The value of the property sought to
be condemned, and all improvements
thereon pertaining to the realty, and of
each and every separate estate or interest
therein ...

2, If the property sought to be con-
demned constitutes only a part of a larger
parcel; (a) the damages which will accrue
to the portion not sought to be condemned,
by reason of its severance from the portion
sought to be condemned, and the construc-
tion of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff... .

LC. § 7-711 (emphasis added). This language
is nearly identical to the language used in An
Act to Establish a Code of Civil Procedure
for Idaho Territory, § 861, 1881 Idaho Sess.
Laws, 1, 194, which was the precursor to
Idaho Code section 7-711.

At the time the applicable wording was
originally enacted, the word “manner”
meant:

1. Form; method; way of performing or

executing. Find thou the manner and the

means prepare.

interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by
the construction of the improvement proposed
by the plaintiff; and if the benefit shall be equal
to the damages assessed, under Subdivision 2,
the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no
compensation except the value of the portion
taken; but if the benefit shall be less than the
damages so assessed, the former shall be de-
ducted from the latter, and the remainder shall
be the only damages allowed in addition to the
value;

4, If the property sought to be condemned
be for a railroad, the cost of good and suffi-
cient fences along the line of such railroad,
and the cost of cattle guards where fences may
cross the line of such railroad;

5. As far as practicable, compensation must
be assessed for each source of damage sepa-
rately.

144

8. Sort; kind,

Ye tithe mint and rue, and all manner of
herbs. Luke 11:42, They shall say all man-
ner of evil against you falsely—Matthew
5:11. In this application, manner has the
sense of a plural word; all sorts or kinds.

Noah Webster (1828),  http:/Avebsters
dictionary1828,com/Dictionary/construction,
Thus, the meaning of the phrase could mean
either the method of constructing the im-
provement or the kind of improvement to be
constructed. The phrase in context shows
that the latter meaning is correct.

Section 861 provided a cause of action to
recover damages to the portion of the prop-
erty not to be condemned if that portion of
the property was injuriously affected by the
severance and the proposed construction.
This section stated that the trier of fact must.
ascertain and assess “the damages which will
accrue to the portion [of the larger parcel]
not sought to be condemned, by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be con-
demned, and the construction of the improve-
ment in the manner proposed by the plain-
tiff”

The cause of action for damages for injury
to the remaining portion of the larger parcel
acerued as of the date of the issuance of the
summons, not on the date of some injury that
‘was caused to the remaining property during
the construction project. Section 862 of the
legislation stated, “For the purpose of as-
sessing ... damages, the right thereto shall
be deemed to have accrued at the date of the
summons....”5 If the purpose of Section

4, Brooke View argues that the word “construc-
tion” simultaneously means both the process of
construction and the thing constructed. There
appears to be no context in the English language
in which this is actually true. Rather, the two
definitions are mutually exclusive in use. A per-
son cannot, using a single utterance of the word
“construction,” refer to both a completed edifice
and the process of constructing said edifice, The
word “construction” can be used twice in the
same sentence, each time having a different
meaning, but each individual use will mean one
or the other. It is not surprising then, that de-
spite claiming that the word “construction” is
“not typically used to mean only one of two
mutually different things” Brooke View does not
provide a single example of the word used in
context to convey both definitions simultaneous-
Ly

861 was to provide a cause of action for an
injury to the remaining property caused by
something that occurred during the construc-
tion process, the legislature would not have
provided that the cause of action accrued
upon the issuance of the summons in the
condemnation case. There are many occur-
renees during a construction project that
could possibly injure the remaining property,
depending upon the nature of the remaining
property and other factors. When the sum-
mons was issued, one would not know wheth-
er the remaining property would be injured
by something that may later occur during the
construction process or the extent of such
possible injury. If the legislature had intend-
ed that Section 861 provide a cause of action
for injuries to the remaining property that
were caused during the construction project,
it would have provided that such cause of
action accrued when such injury occurred,
not when the summons was issued in the
condemnation case. It would not have provid-
ed that a cause of action for such injury
accrued before the injury even occurred,

In addition, Section 862, which is substan-
tially similar to the current Idaho Code sec-
tion 7-712, did not provide that the amount of
damages recoverable was based upon an in-
jury to the remaining property that was
caused during the construction project. Rath-
er, it provided that the actual value of the
remaining property as of the date of the
issuance of the summons was the basis for
the damages recoverable, The statute stated,
“For the purpose of assessing .., damages,
..» its actual value, at that date [the issuance

5. Section 862 provided:

Sec, 862, For the purpose of assessing com-
pensation and damages, the right thereto shall
be deemed to have accrued at the date of the
summons, and its actual value, at that date
shall be the measure of compensation for all
property to be actually taken, and the basis of
damages to property not actually taken, but
injuriously affected, in all cases where such
damages are allowed, as provided in the last
section. No improvements put upon the prop-
erty, subsequent to the date of the service of
summons, shall be included in the assessment
of compensation or damages.

An Act to Establish a Code of Civil Procedure for
Idaho Territory, § 861, 1881 Idaho Sess, Laws,
1, 194-95.

of the summons] shall be ... the basis of
damages to property not actually taken, but
injuriously affected, in all cases where such
damages are allowed....” If the legislature
had intended to provide a cause of action in
the statute for injury to the remaining prop-
erty during the construction process, the val-
ue of the remaining property on the date the
summons was issued would not be the meas-
ure of damages. The actual value of the
property would not necessarily have any cor-
relation to any damage caused to it during
the construction process.®

Finally, the damages recoverable under
Section 861 were those allowable under Sec-
tion 862. Section 862 stated, “For the pur-
pose of assessing ... damages, ... its actual
value, at that date shall be ... the basis of
damages to property not actually taken, but
injuriously affected, in all cases where such
damages are allowed, as provided in the last
section.” (Emphases added.) The last section
was Section 861, The value of the remaining
property at the time the summons was issued
is the basis of damages in all cases where
damages are allowed as provided in Section
861. Therefore, the measure of damages set
forth in Section 862 were the damages allow-
able under Section 861. Section 861 did not
provide for the recovery of other damages,

This interpretation of the language in Sec-
tion 861 as only allowing for damages to the
value of remaining property resulting from
the severance, and not accruing during the
process of construction, is in accord with our
prior decisions. In 1911, this Court issued its
opinion in Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Colum-
bia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Au-
gustana Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P, 60
(1911). In Idaho-Western, the State sought to

6. Furthermore, as of the date of the summons,
the property owner will be informed of the
planned improvement and its planned uses. Ac-
cordingly, the owner will be able to calculate
damage to the value of his or her property on
that date in consideration of the future improve-
ment and its planned uses.

By contrast, damage occurring during con-
struction does not affect the value of the remain-
ing property until it actually occurs and thus
cannot be calculated as of the date of the sum-
mons. The case here is a good example. Although
Miller expressed concerns to ACHD, prior to
construction, that the Wall could be damaged
during the construction process, Miller’s own

145

acquire a 100 foot wide strip of land in Coeur
@Alene Idaho to be used for “railroad pur-
poses.” Jd, at 578, 119 P, at 61. Prior to the
eminent domain action, the strip of land was
part of the campus of Coeur d’Alene College.
Id, Offers of just compensation were rejected
and the case proceeded to trial. Jd. At trial,
the president of the college, Dr. Jeperson,
testified that the noise of locomotives and
trains passing back and forth over the
ground so near to the college would have a
detrimental effect to the students’ studies.
Id, at 574, 119 P. at 61-62. Numerous other
professors testified to the same effect. Jd. at
575, 119 P. at 62. The jury returned a verdict
of $5,000 for the value of the property to be
taken and $8,900 as the amount of damage
that would be sustained to the remainder of
the property by reason of the severance. Id.
at 574, 119 P, at 61-62. The State appealed,
arguing that harm to the college due to noise
‘was not a proper part of severance damages
and that testimony as to the effects of such
noise was not relevant. Jd. In addressing this
argument, the Court analyzed Section 5220
of the Revised Codes, which used language
identical to the pertinent language in Idaho
Code section 7-711, Id, at 581, 119 P. at 64.
The Court held that:
The noise usually incident to the operation
of railway trains should not be considered
as an element of damage in the ordinary
ease, for the reason that such a purpose is
lawful and condemnation is allowed there-
for, and the noise of operating a railroad
goes along with the use. Where, however,
the property is already devoted to such a
special and peculiar use that the taking of
a part brings the use and incidental noise
so near as to render the noise a private

experts testified that the planned improvements
could have been constructed without damaging
the Wall. Indeed, Miller presented testimony that
there were numerous steps that could have been
taken to prevent or mitigate the damage. It was
not until well after the damage had actually
occurred, and after substantial expert analysis,
that it became evident that the damage to the
‘Wall was “most likely” caused by vibrations dur-
ing the compaction process. It follows that any
damage to the value of the remaining section of
the Property occurring during construction can-
not be said to have occurred or accrued at the
time of the summons, and could not have been
calculated at that time.

146

nuisance to the owner of the remaining
property, except for the condemnation, and
greatly depreciates its value for such spe-
cial use or renders it valueless, this ele-
ment ought to be considered in ascertain-
ing the damage that will be suffered to the
remaining property after the severance.

Id. at 585-86, 119 P. at 66, Thus, Jdaho-
Western definitively established that damage
to the value of remaining property resulting
from the planned improvement and the
planned uses thereof are properly part of
just compensation. It follows that the word
“construction” in Idaho Code section 7-711
must refer to the completed improvement.

There is no Idaho case law supporting
Brooke View’s assertion that “construction,”
as used in Idaho Code section 7-711, should
be interpreted as the process of construction,
The only Idaho case addressing damages
caused during construction held that the land
owner’s claims for damages caused during
construction had to be pursued in tort. See
Campbell, 34 Idaho 601, 604-05, 202 P. 1065,
1066 (1921). In Campbell, the Oregon-Wash-
ington Railroad & Navigation Company con-
demned a right of way across a property
owner's land in order to construct a railroad.
Id. The property owner argued that he
should be compensated for the fact that con-
struction of the railroad “resulted in turning
the water of [the taken property] through
their land and carrying certain poisonous
matter into a fresh water stream on their
remaining land.” Jd. Citing C.S, 5415, which
is identical to Idaho Code section 7-711, this
Court held that the alleged damages were
not part of just compensation. It reasoned as
follows:

The damages thus complained of were
occasioned by construction of the railroad
on land outside of the tract owned by
appellants and did not in any way result
from the taking of appellant's land. Be-
sides, they accrued long after the date of
the issuance of summons and were not
damages which at that date could have
been anticipated as a result of the con-
struction of respondent’s railroad, and
therefore were not deemed by law to have
accrued at that date ... If respondent was

liable for such damages, they could be
recovered only in a separate action.

Id,

Brooke View argues that this case can be
distinguished from Campbell because in that
case “1) the damages occurred outside the
area of the take; 2) the damages were along
the lines of a tort; obviously a condemnor
would not propose construction that caused
poison to enter a freshwater stream, and 8) it
was not foreseeable from the project pro-
posed.” The problem with Brooke View's ar-
gument is that each of the identified factors
is also present here; thus, Brooke View fails
to distinguish Campbell from the case at
hand. First, in this case, as in Campbell, the
damages occurred outside of the take. While
part of the Wall was inside of the temporary
easement, the damage was not limited to that
part of the Wall. Most, if not all, of the
damage to the Wall occurred to portions that
were on the Remaining Property, which was
not part of the temporary easement. Second,
as in Campbell, the damages at issue in this
case are along the lines of those recovered in
tort, Although we take no position as to
whether Brooke View could successfully pur-
sue a tort claim against ACHD, there is
nothing fundamentally different about the
poisonous matter stemming from the con-
struction in Campbell and the vibrations
stemming from the construction here. Fur-
ther, just as a non-negligent condemnor in
Campbell would not propose construction
causing poison to enter a freshwater stream,
a non-negligent condemnor in this case would
not propose construction that would cause
damage to a wall on the neighboring proper-
ty. Finally, it is far from clear that the
damages here were any more foreseeable
than those in Campbell. Not even Brooke
View's experts, with the benefit of hindsight,
had a settled theory as to what caused the
damage to the Wall.

Between Idaho-Western and Campbell,
this Court’s precedent leads us to conclude
that Idaho Code section 7-711 includes dam-
age to the value of the Remaining Property
as a result of planned improvements to the
Taken Property and their planned uses, but
does not include physical damages to the

Remaining Property occurring during the
construction process,

This conclusion is further supported by
precedent set by this Court providing for
attorney’s fees in eminent domain cases. In
Ada Cownty Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi,
this Court determined that attorney’s fees in
eminent domain cases should be granted in
consideration of the following:

[Gliven the entire theory of eminent do-

main, ie, that a jury will determine the

just compensation to be awarded the con-

demnee, we must, it seems, assume that a

jury verdict at least approximates the fair

market value of the property taken and the
damages which will result to the remain-
der, We are convinced that such is at least

a more reliable indicator than the wide and

wild variations in value which will be testi-

fied to in any given case by the expert
witnesses brought forward by each party.

As a point of beginning, we postulate that

a jury in a condemnation action, attempt-

ing to choose among highly divergent evi-

dence as to value, can only be expected to
arrive at the “real” just compensation to

which a condemnee is entitled within a

margin of error of plus or minus ten per

cent. Hence, we would deem that in consid-

ering the award of attorneys’ fees to a

condemnee, a condemnor should have rea-

sonably made a timely offer of settlement
of at least 90 per cent of the ultimate jury
verdict. We also deem that an offer would
not be ‘timely if made on the courthouse
steps an hour prior to trial. An offer
should be made within a reasonable period
after the institution of the action, to relieve
the condemnee not only of the expense but
of the time, inconvenience and apprehen-
sion involved in such litigation, and also to
eliminate the cloud which may hang over
the condemnee’s title to the property.
105 Idaho 878, 878, 678 P.2d 1067, 1072
(1988). In short, this Court has pinned attor-
ney’s fees to whether or not the condemnor
makes a settlement offer well before the time
of trial which is within 90% of the eventual
just compensation determination arrived at
by the jury. This makes sense, so long as just
compensation is limited to the value of the
taken property, and the damage to the value

147

of the remaining property, which can be cal-
culated as of the time of the taking. Howev-
er, this system of attorney’s fees breaks
down if damages during construction are in-
cluded in just compensation. If that were the
case, the condemnor would need to be able to
foresee construction damages before the trial
and tailor offers of settlement to those dam-
ages. Requiring a condemnor to predict con-
struction damages is simply untenable prior
to construction. This is especially true consid-
ering that there is no rule that the construe-
tion of an improvement must occur immedi-
ately after a taking. A situation could easily
arise in which damages during construction
oceur years after the taking. This Comt
would not require condemnors to wait years
in order to determine whether attorney’s fees
are owed. It would be entirely inequitable to
the condemnor to expect it to be able to
predict such unintended damages at the time
of the taking, and then factor them into a
settlement offer. Accordingly, the system of
attorney’s fees that this Court has set into
precedent also supports our conclusion today
that damages occurring during construction
are not part of just compensation,

Brooke View next asserts that if just com-
pensation does not include the damage to the
Wall, it would be inequitably left without
legal recompense because it would be unable
to prevail under a tort theory. This Court
takes no position as to whether Brooke View
might be able to recover in a tort action. To
make such a determination would be improp-
er, especially considering that the district
court specifically forbade the parties from
presenting evidence that would be relevant in
a negligence case. However, whether Brooke
View could prevail under a tort theory does
not dictate whether limiting Brooke View to
tort theories is equitable or inequitable. To
the contrary, our interpretation of Idaho
Code section 7-711 leaves Brooke View in
exactly the same position as any other party
whose property is damaged during a road
improvement project.

Imagine two neighbors, each with identical
walls on their property. ACHD embarks on
an improvement project. ACHD must take a
small portion of neighbor A’s property, but
none of neighbor B’s. During construction,

148

both neighbors’ walls are damaged in the
exact sume way. This Court’s interpretation
of section 7-711 (in which damages accruing
during construction is not part of just com-
pensation) leaves the two neighbors in exact-
ly the same position, Both can bring tort
actions against the State for the damage to
their walls. In certain cases ACHD may be
protected from those actions under the Tort
Claim Act or under other tort principles, In
such cases, the two neighbors are affected in
the same way. This result is equitable under
the law,

Conversely, under Brooke View’s suggest-
ed interpretation of section 7-711, neighbor B
(who had no property taken) must bring an
action in tort and contend with all available
tort defenses, while neighbor A is able to
recoup any damage as part of just compensa-
tion and avoid any defenses that would be
available in tort, The fact that neighbor A
had a small part of property taken should not
separate her from neighbor B when it comes
to bringing claims for the same damage
caused in the same way. To allow such a
discrepancy would not promote equity, it
would simply be giving neighbor A a worka-
round to Idaho’s tort law.

Finally, if this Court were to adopt the
district court’s interpretation of Idaho Code
section 7-711(2)(a) it would not only result in
the nullification of tort principles in the emi-
nent domain context but it would severely
impede the State’s ability to contract. If the
State is automatically held liable for all dam-
age caused during construction, regardless of
negligence or any tort defenses that might be
available, it stands to reason that the indem-
nification agreements that it enters into with
contractors and tradespeople would become
unenforceable. Any damage caused by con-
tractor negligence, no matter how egregious,
would be attributed to the state without any
finding of negligence. Such a rule would force
ACHD into the unjust position of being legal-
ly responsible for consequences of third par-
ty actions over which it had no control and
for which it would otherwise have been in-
demnified, We find that there is no justifica-
tion to abandon the tort and contract frame-
works simply because the construction of an

improvement occurs as part of a project in
eminent domain.

In sum, we interpret Idaho Code
section 7-711(2)(a) as providing that just com-
pensation includes any decrease in the value
of remaining property based on the future
existence of any planned improvements and
the planned uses of those improvements.
Conversely, just compensation does not in-
clude any physical damages that accrue to
the remaining property during the construc-
tion of any improvements, Claims for such
damages must be brought in tort.

B. The instructions submitted to the jury
were error that prejudiced ACHD,

HE This Court reviews jury instrue-
tions to determine whether the instructions,
as a whole, fairly and adequately present the
issues and state the law. Newberry v. Mar-
tens, 142 Idaho 284, 287, 127 P.8d 187, 190
(2005). A requested jury instruction must be
given when it is supported by any reasonable
view of the evidence. Craig Johnson Constr,
LLC. v Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142
Idaho 797, 800, 184 P.8d 648, 651 (2006)
(citing Bailey v. Sanford, 189 Idaho 744, 750,
86 P.8d 458, 464 (2004), An instruction is not
to be given if it is an erroneous statement of
the law, not supported by the facts, or ade-
quately covered by the other instructions. Jd.
Reversible error occurs when an instruction
misleads the jury or prejudices a party. Per-
ry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 184 Ida-
ho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000) (citing
Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454,
462, 886 P.2d 380, 338 (1994)).

Vanderford Co. Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Ida-
ho 547, 555, 165 P.38d 261, 269 (2007)

TH Jury instruction 20 was error be-
cause it contained the district court’s errone-
ous interpretation of the law:

In this case, Brooke View claims the
taking and the construction of the ACHD
improvement project in the manner pro-
posed by ACHD caused its remaining land
to decrease in market value. Brooke View
has the burden of proving construction of
the ACHD improvement project in the
manner proposed by ACHD caused dam-
age to its property or improvement on that

property. Brooke View does not have to

prove the mechanism for how such dam-

age, if any, oceurred,

If you find Brooke View has met its
burden of proof, Brooke View is entitled to
the lesser of the decrease in the market
value of the remaining property or the cost
to cure any proven damages, but not both,
Cost to cure is the amount required to
restore the property to the condition it was
in before it was damaged.

The language used in this jury instruction
invites the jury to include physical damage
that occurred to the Property during the
construction process in the calculation of just
compensation. This is evident from the
phrase “caused damage to its property or
improvement on that property.” As explained
above, physical damage caused during con-
struction is not properly part of just compen-
sation, but rather must be pursued in tort,
Accordingly, instruction 20 was error.

Jury instruction 27 was also error:

For purposes of your decision you are to
assume ACHD is responsible for all con-
struction work performed as part of the
Curtis Road Project.

The party responsible for the “construction
work” is not relevant to the jury’s calculation
of just compensation damages. Identifying
this as an issue would lead the jury to believe
that damages caused during construction are
part of just compensation,

These instructions, to the extent that they
led the jury to consider physical damages
occurring during the construction process,
prejudiced ACHD, The lion’s share of the
final judgment amount awarded in this case
was for the cost to cure damages occurring
during construction. The inclusion of such
damages constitutes prejudice.

C. The district court erred in admitting
testimony and other evidence of
events, activities, and damages, that
occurred during the construction of
improvements on the Property

To the extent that the district court admit-
ted testimony and other evidence of events,
activities and damages that allegedly oc-
eurred during the construction of improve-

149

ments, the district court committed error, As
explained herein, physical damage caused to
property not taken, during construction does
not factor into just compensation. The admis-
sion of evidence relating to such damages
that is not otherwise relevant to the caleula-
tion of just compensation is error,

D. The district court’s award of attor-
ney’s fees to Brooke View is vacated.
Because Brooke View is no longer the
prevailing party below, the district court’s
award of attorney’s fees and costs must be
vacated.

VIL Conciuston

We hereby vacate the district court judg-
ment and the award of attorney’s fees and
costs. We remand for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. Costs on appeal
to ACHD.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur,

395 P.3d 368
Shammie L, FISHER, Plaintiff-appellant,
ve

GARRISON PROPERTY AND CASU-
ALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 44117-2016

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: May 26, 2017
Rehearing Denied May 25, 2017

James G, Reid, Kaufman Reid, PLLC,
Boise, argued for appellant.

Jeffrey A. Thomson, Elam & Burke, P.A.,
Boise, argued for respondent.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION, THE COURT’S
PRIOR OPINION DATED April 28, 2017
IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Ada County from a
judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's action
seeking to recover under an insurance policy
for the loss of her house caused when a
renter, who had an option to purchase the
house, demolished it. The district court held
that coverage for such loss was excluded
under the policy. We vacate the judgment of
the district court and remand this case for
further proceedings that are consistent with
this opinion.

L

Factual Background.

The Plaintiff, Shammie L. Fisher, was the
owner of a house located at 2510 N. 34th
Street in Boise. It was a single-story building
that had been built in 1965 and contained
1152 square feet with an attached one-car
garage. She purchased a policy of insurance
covering the house from the Defendant, Gar-
rison Property and Casualty Insurance Com-
pany. The policy period was from March 8,
2012, to March 8, 2013, and she renewed the
policy for the period from March 8, 2018, to
March 8, 2014.

The Plaintiff married and decided to sell
her house. She entered into a “Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement” (“Purchase
Agreement”) dated January 23, 2012, with
Ron Reynoso. The Purchase Agreement pro-
vided that Mr. Reynoso would purchase the
property for $153,000; that the purchase was
contingent upon him obtaining financing; that
he intended to occupy the property as his
primary residence; that the closing would
occur no later than March 31, 2013; that Mr.
Reynoso would lease the property from
March 15, 2012, until March 81, 2018; and
that if the he was unable to close before
March 81, 2018, the Plaintiff would extend
the lease on a month-to-month basis for a
period up to September 1, 2018. The Pur-
chase Agreement also included a provision
stating: “Buyer intends to make certain im-
provements to the property upon possession,
with the intent to sell the property for a

161

profit which might be prior to the end of the
lease period. The buyer is required to give a
monthly update for plans/upgrades.”

In conjunction with the Purchase Agree-
ment, the Plaintiff and Mr. Reynoso entered
into a “Rental Agreement” also dated Janu-
ary 23, 2012. It stated that the move-in date
was March 1, 2012, although an addendum to
the Purchase Agreement changed the lease
start date to March 15, 2012, with the rent
prorated accordingly. The Rental Agreement
stated that the Plaintiff was obligated to rent
the property for a minimum term ending on
March 81, 2018 and that “Tenant shall return
said premises to Owner is as good condition
as when received, reasonable wear and tear
excepted.”

‘Within two months of renting the property
to Mr. Reynoso, the Plaintiff learned that he
had demolished the entire house down to the
foundation. She contacted him, and he agreed
to rebuild a house on the foundation. He
commenced doing so, erecting some rough
framing of some interior and exterior walls,
but in August 2013 he ceased working on the
house and left. The Plaintiff then made a
claim under her insurance policy, which the
Defendant denied.

On May 27, 2015, the Plaintiff commenced.
this action seeking to recover for the loss of
her house and her personal property. She
later filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, seeking a ruling that her loss was
covered under the policy. In her affidavit in
support of that motion, she stated that she
had no knowledge that Mr. Reynoso intended
to destroy the house; that the improvements
that he had discussed with her included new
flooring, countertops, light fixtures, paint,
and other cosmetic improvements; that she
did not authorize him to perform any work to
remodel or tear down the house or to per-
form any structural work; and that he said he
would be residing in the house while making
improvements.

The Defendant contended that the Plain-
tiffs loss was excluded by two provisions of
the policy: (1) an exclusion for intentional
loss and (2) an exclusion for faulty, inade-
quate or defective work, The Plaintiff moved.
for partial summary judgment holding that

152

those exclusions did not apply to the facts of
this case, and the Defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment seeking dismissal of the ac-
tion based upon those exclusions,

The district court held that there was a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the
applicability of the intentional loss exclusion,
but that the exclusion for faulty, inadequate
or defective work did apply, It denied the
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judg-
ment, granted the Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, and entered a judgment
dismissing this lawsuit with prejudice. The
Plaintiff then timely appealed.

I

Did the District Court Err in Granting
the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment?

HM «When reviewing on appeal the
granting of a motion for summary judgment,
we apply the same standard used by the trial
eourt in ruling on the motion. Infanger v,
City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 4647, 44 P.8d.
1100, 1101-02 (2002). We construe all disput-
ed facts, and draw all reasonable inferences
from the record, in favor of the non-moving
party. Id. at 47, 44 P.8d at 1102, Summary
judgment is appropriate only if the evidence
in the record and any admissions show that
there is ‘no genuine issue of any material fact
regarding the issues raised in the pleadings
and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.

Under Coverage A, the insurance policy
applied to “the dwelling on the Described
Location shown in the Declarations, used
principally for dwelling purposes, including
structures attached to the dwelling.” The de-
seribed location was 2510 N. 84th Street,
Boise, Idaho, Thus, Coverage A applied to
the dwelling at 2510 N. 84th Street, Boise,
Idaho, which was the Plaintiff’s house,

The perils insured against under Coverage
A were “risk of direct loss to property de-
scribed in Coverage[] A ... if that loss is a
physical loss to property.” Thus, the loss
must be a direct physical loss to the Plain-
tiffs house, The policy then stated

however, we do not insure loss:

1, involving collapse, other than as pro-
vided in Other Coverages 10:

2. caused by: [a list of causes]

8, excluded under General Exclusions.

Under Items 1 and 2, any ensuing loss
to property described in Coverage[] A...
not excluded or excepted in this policy is
covered,

There is no contention that the Plaintiff's
loss would be excluded pursuant to either
Item 1 or Item 2, The contention is that the
loss is excluded under Item 3, which is a list
of exclusions under the title “General Exclu-
sions.” Thus, the policy would cover a direct
physical loss to the Plaintiff's house if it was
a loss that was not excluded pursuant to the
exclusions listed under General Exclusions,

In the district court, the Defendant con-
tended that there were two exclusions that
would apply. The first was the intentional-
Joss exclusion, which provided as follows:

1. We do not insure for loss caused di-

rectly or indirectly by any of the following.

Such loss is excluded regardless of any

other cause or event contributing concur-

rently or in any sequence to the loss.

h. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss
arising out of any act committed:
(1) by or at the direction of you or
any person or organization named as
an additional insured; and
(2) with the intent to cause a loss.

The district court held that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether
this exclusion applied, and it denied Defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment based
upon this exclusion,

‘The second exclusion raised in the district
court was the faulty, inadequate, or defective
work exclusion, which provided as follows:

2. We do not insure for loss to property

described in Coverages A and B caused by

any of the following. However, any ensuing

loss to property described in Coverages A

and B not excluded or excepted in this

policy is covered.

c, Faulty, inadequate or defective:

(1) planning, zoning, development,

surveying, siting;

(2) design, specifications, workman-

ship, repair, construction, renovation,

remodeling, grading, compaction;

(8) materials used in repair, con-

struction, renovation or remodeling; or

(4) maintenance;

of part or all of any property whether

on or off the Deseribed Location.
Thus, to be excluded under this provision,
the direct physical loss to the Plaintiff's
house must have been caused by faulty, inad-
equate, or defective design, specifications,
workmanship, repair, construction, renova-
tion, remodeling, grading, or compaction of
part of any property on or off the described
location.

HE “In construing an insurance policy,
the Court must look to the plain meaning of
the words to determine if there are any
ambiguities. This determination is a question
of law. In resolving this question of law, the
Court must construe the policy ‘as a whole,
not by an isolated phrase.” Cascade Auto
Glass, Inc, v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins, Co.,
141 Idaho 660, 668, 115 P.8d 751, 754 (2005)
(citations omitted). “A provision in an insur-
ance contract must be read within the con-
text in which it occurs.” Dave’s Inc. v. Lin-
ford, 153 Idaho 744, 751, 291 P.8d 427, 434
(2012). “Unless a contrary intent is shown,
common, non-technical words are given the
meaning applied by laymen in daily usage—
as opposed to the meaning derived from legal
usage—in order to effectuate the intent of
the parties.” Howard v. Oregon Mut. Ins,
Co,, 187 Idaho 214, 218, 46 P.8d 510, 514
(2002). An exclusion in the policy must be
strictly construed in favor of the insured.
Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
103 Idaho 298, 800, 647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982).

HM The loss. Defendant first asserts that
the cause of the loss was the failure of Mr.
Reynoso to complete the rebuilding of a
house on the foundation that remained after
he had demolished the Plaintiff's house. That
was clearly not the loss. The loss, as defined
in the insurance policy, had to be a direct
physical loss to “the dwelling on the De-
seribed Location.” The described location

153

was 2510 N. 34th St, Boise, Idaho. The
dwelling on the Described Location was the
Plaintiffs house. Any house that Mr, Reyno-
so intended to build could not be the dwelling
on the described location.

The insurance policy had a page titled
“Your Home Characteristics.” The page stat-
ed:

Our mission at USAA is to help protect
your financial security. One way we do this
is by helping you determine if you're ade-
quately covered in the event of a loss, The
estimated minimum rebuilding cost of your
home is based on your home characteris-
ties, but only you can decide if this is
enough coverage. Our estimates are based
on average construction costs and labor
costs for geographic areas and may not
reflect the unique features of your home or
the area you live in,

On the back of this page, you'll find your
home characteristics... .

The above quoted provision of the policy
referred to “[t]he estimated minimum re-
building cost of your home” based upon
“your home characteristics.” Obviously, “your
home” could not refer to a house that Mr.
Reynoso may have intended to build after he
later demolished the Plaintiff's home.

The home characteristics on the back page
were as follows:

Your Home Characteristics
YEAR BUILT: 1965
STORIES: 1.0
*SQUARE FEET: 1152

*Total Square Footage: Includes garage

square footage if there is living space that

is heated or cooled above the garage. It
does not include a finished basement or
attic,
FOUNDATION (8): CRAWLSPACE
SLAB
EXTERIOR WALL: WOOD SIDING
ROOF COVERING: TAR AND GRAV-
EL
GARAGE TYPE: ATTACHED GA-
RAGE—1 CAR
INTERIOR WALL PARTITIONS:
DRYWALL

154
INTERIOR WALL COVERINGS:
PAINT
FLOOR COVERINGS: HARDWOOD.
VINYL

KITCHEN: 1 STANDARD
BATHROOMS: 1 STANDARD
FIREPLACE: 1
HEAT & AIR: HEATING—GAS
CENTRAL AIR CONDITIONING—
SAME DUCT
WIRED FOR CENTRAL ALARM: NO

Again, these characteristics described the
Plaintiff's home, not some home that Mr.
Reynoso later intended to build on the prop-
erty.

The house that Mr. Reynoso intended to
build could not rationally be described as a
“dwelling on the Described Location.” There
could be no direct physical loss to a house
that did not yet exist. The Plaintiffs loss
occurred when Mr, Reynoso demolished her
house. There is nothing in the insurance poli-
ey that states that it insured against the
failure of Mr. Reynoso or anyone else to
build a new house upon the Plaintiff's lot.
Therefore, the loss was the destruction of the
Plaintiffs house. It was not the failure of Mr.
Reynoso to build a house on the foundation
that remained after he had demolished her
house.

Hl The faulty, inadequate, or defective
work exelusion. The Defendant contends
that the loss in this case was caused by
faulty, inadequate, or defective workmanship,
repair, construction, renovation and/or re-
modeling of the dwelling. The issue is wheth-
er any of those words state the cause of the
direct physical loss to Plaintiff’s house.

The words “faulty,” “inadequate,” and “de-
fective” are all adjectives! Because adjec-
tives modify nouns or pronouns, the words
that follow them are nouns. Therefore, the
words “workmanship,” “repair,” “construc-
1, Collins English Dictionary, httpsy/www.collins

dictionary.com/dictionary/english/faulty, inade-
quate, defective (accessed April 15, 2017).

2, _httpy/www.grammarbook,com/grammar/adj
Adv.asp (accessed April 15, 2017).

tion,” “renovation” and “remodeling” are all
nouns.

Workmanship. The destruction of the
Plaintiffs house was not caused by any
faulty, inadequate, or defective workmanship
on the part of Mr. Reynoso. The word “work-
manship” as a noun means:

1. the art or skill of a workman

2, the art or skill with which something is

made or executed

3, the degree of art or skill exhibited in

the finished product

4, the piece of work so produced
There is no evidence in the record that the
Joss to the house was caused by Mr. Reyno-
so’s lack of skillfulness, artisanship, or exper-
tise in doing his work, It appears that he was
quite adept in demolishing the house. Like-
wise, the only piece of work he produced was
some rough framing, but, as explained above,
that work was not the direct cause of the
Plaintiff's loss to her house. Her house had
been demolished before he constructed the
rough framing.

Repair. The destruction of the Plaintiff's
house was not caused by anything that Mr.
Reynoso did in performing some repair to
her house. “A repair is something that you
do to mend a machine, building, piece of
clothing, or other thing that has been dam-
aged or is not working properly.... Many of
the buildings are in need of repair.”* There is
no evidence in the record that the Plaintiffs
house was in need of repair or that the loss
of her house was caused by repairs that Mr.
Reynoso had made or was making to it, As
mentioned above, his failure to build a house
on the foundation left after he had demol-
ished the Plaintiff's house was not the cause
of the loss to her house.

Construction. The destruction of the
Plaintiff's house was not caused by any con-
struction done by Mr. Reynoso that was
faulty, inadequate, or defective. The word
“construction” when used as a noun means:
3. Collins English Dictionary, https://www.collins

dictionary.com/dictionary/english/Aworkmanship
(accessed April 15, 2017).

4, Collins English Dictionary, https:/Avww.collins
dictionary.com/dictionary/english/repair—(ac-
cessed April 15, 2017).

“1, the process or act of constructing or
manner in which a thing is constructed 2. the
thing constructed; a structure.”® To “con-
struct” something is “to put together sub-
stances or parts, esp systematically, in order
to make or build (a building, bridge, etc);
assemble.” § The insurance policy did not in-
sure the process or act of constructing the
Plaintiff's house. It had been constructed in
1965 and was an existing structure. It in-
sured against the risk of loss to her house if
that construction was faulty, inadequate, or
defective, and there is no evidence that it
was. There is also no evidence in the record
of any subsequent construction on the house
that was the direct physical cause of the loss.
Mr. Reynoso did not perform any construc-
tion on her house. An antonym of “construe-
tion” is “destruction,” ’ and that is what Mr.
Reynoso did to the Plaintiff's house. As stat-
ed above, the only construction he performed
was putting up some rough framing on the
foundation remaining after he had demol-
ished her house.

Renovation. The destruction of the Plain-
tiffs house was not caused by Mr. Reynoso’s
renovation of her house. The word “reno-
vate” means “to restore (something) to good
condition.” * The word “renovation” means,
“The act or process of renovating; the state
of being renovated or renewed.” ® There is no
evidence that the Plaintiffs home needed to
be restored to a good condition or that Mr.
Reynoso did any work on her house in order
to restore it to a good condition. Instead, he
demolished it.

Remodeling. The destruction of the Plain-
tiffs house was not caused by Mr. Reynoso’s
remodeling of it. The word “remodeling” is a

5. Collins English Dictionary, httpsi/www.collins
dictionary.com/dictionary/english/construction
(accessed April 15, 2017).

6. Collins English Dictionary, https:/Avww.collins
dictionary.com/dictionary/english/construct  (ac-
cessed April 15, 2017).

7. Thesaurus.com. Roget’s 21st Century Thesaurus,
Third Edition. Philip Lief Group 2009. http://
-www.thesaurus.com/browse/construction —(ac-
cessed April 17, 2017).

8. Collins English Dictionary, https:/www.collins
dictionary.com/dictionary/english/renovate  (ac-
cessed April 15, 2017).

155

gerund, which is the noun form of a verb. In
this case, it is the noun form of the verb
“remodel.” The word “remodeling” as a noun
means “the act of changing or altering the
structure, style, or form of something” or the
state of being remodeled—‘the remodelling
of Barcelona’s airport.” !° The word “remod-
eling” in this context means: “Making altera-
tions to an existing structure such that it will
be better suited to current needs. This type
of work may involve changing the use of
interior space by repositioning walls, replac-
ing bathroom or kitchen fixtures, or other
such modifications.” As stated above, the
words in an insurance policy are to be given
the meaning applied by lay people in daily
usage. Howard, 187 Idaho at 218, 46 P.8d at.
514. Mr, Reynoso’s actions in demolishing the
Plaintiffs house down to the foundation
would not be considered by lay people as the
remodeling of the house. He did not make
alterations to an existing structure; he de-
molished that structure, There was no house
left to remodel.

The Plaintiff had authorized Mr. Reynoso
to perform some remodeling, such as install-
ing new flooring, countertops, light fixtures,
paint and other cosmetic improvements.
There is no evidence in the record that he
did any remodeling at all, much less that the
direct cause of the loss of the Plaintiffs
house was caused by any remodeling that
had been done.

I,

Conclusion.

For the above reasons, the faulty, inade-
quate, or defective work exclusion does not

9. Merriam-Webster, httpy/www.webster-
dictionary.net/definition/renovation (accessed.
April 15, 2017).

10. Collins English Dictionary, _https:/Avww.
collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/
remodeling (accessed April 15, 2017).

11. _httpy/www.dictionaryofconstruction.com/
definition/remodeling.himl (accessed April 15,
2017).

156

apply to the loss in this case. We vacate the
judgment and remand this case for further
proceedings that are in accordance with this
opinion.

The Plaintiff also asks that we
hold that the district court erred in denying
her motion for partial summary judgment
that the intentional loss exclusion did not
apply to these facts. “An order denying a
motion for summary judgment is an interloc-
utory order from which no direct appeal may
be taken. Additionally, an order denying a
motion for summary judgment is not subject
to review—even after the entry of an appeal-
able final judgment.” Dominguez ea rel,
Hamp »v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7,
18, 121 P.8d 988, 944 (2005) (citations omit-
ted).

We vacate the judgment of the district
court and we remand this case for further
proceedings that are in accordance with this
opinion. We award the Appellant costs on
appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, BRODY, and Justice Pro Tem
KIDWELL concur.

395 P.3d 375
Steven ANDREWS, Claimant-Appellant,
v

STATE of Idaho, INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 44241

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: May 26, 2017

Cooper & Larsen, Chartered, Pocatello,
for appellant. Reed Larsen argued,

Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mol-
lerup, PLLC, Twin Falls, for respondent.
Bren Mollerup argued,

HORTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from the Industrial Com-
mission. Steven Andrews filed for workers’
compensation benefits after he fell from a
ladder in 2009 while working for the Corpo-
ration of the Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter Day Saints (LDS Church). Andrews
sought to establish that the Idaho Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund (SIF) was liable
pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-382, Fol-
lowing a hearing and consideration of post-
hearing depositions, the referee issued his
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation on May 10, 2016. The refer-
ee concluded that, Andrews failed to show
that ISIF was liable because the evidence
showed that any pre-existing physical impai
ments did not constitute a subjective hin-
drance and that Andrews failed to show that,
his pre-existing impairments combined with
the industrial accident to cause his total and

158

permanent disability. In an order of the same
date as the referee’s recommendation, the
Commission adopted the recommendation.
Andrews timely appealed, arguing that the
Commission’s order was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. We af-
firm,

IL. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Andrews was injured when he fell from a
ladder in March 2009. Andrews was 58 years
old and employed by the LDS Church as a
mechanic at the time of the accident. An-
drews had been employed by the LDS
Church since 1988, Andrews was responsible
for maintaining between 82 and 42 buildings
for the LDS Church. Andrews graduated
from Marsh Valley High School in 1977 and
held a variety of jobs before being hired by
the LDS Church.

The accident that led to Andrews filing
this claim occurred on March 17, 2009, An-
drews fell from a 12-foot upper mezzanine
and landed on his shoulders on a stage. This
accident required Andrews to have surgery
on his lower back. Following the surgery, the
LDS Church terminated Andrews’ employ-
ment because they could no longer employ
him due to his restrictions and physical dis-
abilities. After losing his job, Andrews unsuc-
cessfully attempted to find another job. An-
drews had problems with his feet, knees,
lower back, shoulders, and neck before the
2009 accident.

Andrews filed his workers’ compensation
claim in November 2010, In November 2011,
Andrews reached a settlement agreement
with the LDS Church. Andrews then pro-
ceeded with this claim against ISIF. In 2015,
a hearing was held before the referee. On
May 10, 2016, following post-hearing deposi-
tions, the referee filed his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation.
‘The referee found that Andrews had failed to
show that his pre-existing injuries were a
subjective hindrance to his employment and
that he failed to show that but for the pre-
existing injuries he would not have been
totally and permanently disabled. Based on
those findings, the referee recommended that
the Commission hold that ISIF was not liable

for Andrews’ total and permanent disability.
The Commission issued an order the same
day adopting the referee’s Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation.
Andrews timely appealed.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “When this Court reviews a deci-
sion from the Industrial Commission, we ex-
ercise free review over questions of law, but
review questions of fact only to determine
whether the Commission’s findings are sup-
ported by substantial and competent evi-
dence,” Uhl v. Ballard Med. Products, Inc,
188 Idaho 658, 657, 67 P.38d 1265, 1269 (2008).
This Court is “constitutionally compelled to
defer to the Industrial Commission’s findings
of fact where supported by substantial and
competent evidence.” Fife v. Home Depot,
Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 518, 260 P.8d 1180, 1184
(2011). “Substantial and competent evidence
is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion.” Maz-
zone v. Tewas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho
750, 755, 802 P.8d 718, 728 (2018). “This
Court will not disturb the Commission’s de-
termination as to the weight and credibility
of evidence unless clearly erroneous.” Jd. “In
reviewing the Commission’s decision, we
must view the facts and all inferences from
them most favorably to the party who pre-
vailed before the Commission.” Dwmaw v.
JL, Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 155, 795
P.2d 812, 817 (1990).

Ill, ANALYSIS

HH The primary issue in this case is
whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the Commission’s deter-
mination that ISIF is not liable for Andrews’
total and permanent disability. Idaho Code
section 72-332(1) provides:

If an employee who has a permanent
physical impairment from any cause or
origin, incurs a subsequent disability by an
injury or occupational disease arising out
of and in the course of his employment,
and by reason of the combined effects of
both the pre-existing impairment and the
subsequent injury or occupational disease
or by reason of the aggravation and accel-

eration of the pre-existing impairment suf-
fers total and permanent disability, the
employer and surety shall be liable for
payment of compensation benefits only for
the disability caused by the injury or oceu-
pational disease, including scheduled and
unscheduled permanent disabilities, and
the injured employee shall be compensated
for the remainder of his income benefits
out of the industrial special indemnity ac-
count.
LC. § 72-882(1). In Duman, this Court laid
out a four-element test for apportioning lia-
bility under Idaho Code section 72-882. The
four elements are: (1) whether there was a
pre-existing impairment, (2) whether the im-
pairment was manifest, (8) whether the im-
pairment was a subjective hindrance, and (4)
whether the impairment in any way combines
in causing total permanent disability. Du-
maw, 118 Idaho at 155, 795 P.2d at 817. The
claimant has the burden of proving all four
elements. Eckhart v, State, Indus. Special
Indem. Fund, 188 Idaho 260, 268, 985 P.2d
685, 688 (1999). Here, the Commission
adopted the referee's recommendation that
Andrews had failed to show the last two
elements, Andrews argues that this conclu-
sion is not supported by substantial and com-
petent evidence. As it is dispositive of this
appeal, we first address the fourth element.

A. Whether the pre-existing impairment
in any way combines in causing total
permanent disability

I As noted above, the fourth element of

the Dumaw test is whether the pre-existing
impairment in any way combines in causing
total and permanent disability, Duma, 118
Idaho at 155, 795 P.2d at 817. The Commis-
sion adopted the referee’s finding that An-
drews’ total and permanent disability was
due solely to his March 2009 accident and
thus ISIF is not liable. Andrews contends
that this finding is not based on substantial
and competent evidence. We disagree.

Hl “To satisfy the ‘combined effects’ re-
quirement in LC. § 72-882(1), a claimant
must show that but for the pre-existing im-
pairments, he would not have been totally
permanently disabled.” Eckhart, 188 Idaho at
268, 985 P.2d at 688. In Hekhart, the claimant

159

attempted to establish ISIF liability for his
total and permanent disability following a
back injury. Id. at 261, 985 P.2d at 686. This
Court upheld the Commission’s determina-
tion that ISIF was not liable because Eck-
hart had failed to show that, but for pre-
existing impairments, he would not have
been disabled. Id. at 268, 985 P.2d at 688.
The Commission found that Eckhart’s total
and permanent disability could be attributed
solely to his final back injury. Id. at 263-64,
985 P.2d at 688-89.

The Commission’s finding that Andrews’
disability could be attributed solely to the
2009 accident was based on Dr. Collins’ testi-
mony. In her deposition of August 19, 2015,
Dr. Collins testified that Andrews had a
number of physical limitations as a result of
his 2009 accident. Due to these limitations,
Dr. Collins testified that Andrews likely
would not be able to find a job in the Pocatel-
lo market. Additionally, Dr. Selznick testified
that Andrews’ surgery following the March
2009 accident was necessary solely because
of that accident. Dr. Selznick also testified
that the restrictions considered by Dr. Col-
lins were the result of that surgery. The
testimony of Drs. Collins and Selznick consti-
tute substantial and competent evidence sup-
porting the Commission’s determination that
Andrews’ total and permanent disability re-
sulted solely from the 2009 accident.

B. Whether the pre-existing impairment
was a subjective hindrance

Because there is substantial and competent
evidence in the record to support the Com-
mission’s finding that Andrews failed to meet
the fourth element of the Dwmaw test, we do
not decide whether substantial and compe-
tent evidence supported the Commission’s
determination that the pre-existing impair-
ment was not a subjective hindrance.

C. Attorney fees on appeal

ISIF seeks attorney fees on appeal pursu-
ant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2. ISIF con-
tends that Andrews’ appeal simply asks this
Court to reweigh the evidence before the
Commission.

Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 provides in per-
tinent part that:

160 a

The signature of an attorney or party con-
stitutes a certificate that the attorney or
party has read the notice of appeal, peti-
tion, motion, brief or other document; that.
to the best of the signer’s knowledge, in-
formation, and belief after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If the notice of appeal, petition,
motion, brief, or other document is signed
in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses in-
curred because of the filing of the notice of
appeal, petition, motion, brief or other doc-
ument including a reasonable attorney’s
fee.

“We construe [Idaho Appellate
Rule] 11.2 in the same manner as [Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure] 11(a)(1) because
they have identical wording.” Akers v. Mor-
tensen, 160 Idaho 286, 289, 371 P.3d 340, 343
(2016) (quoting Jim & Maryann Plane Fam-
‘ily Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 936, 342
P,3d 639, 648 (2015)). “[Alttorney fees can be
awarded as sanctions when a party or attor-
ney violates either (a) the frivolous filings
clause or (b) the improper purpose clause.”
Id. (quoting Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,
987, 842 P.8d 907, 914 (2015)).

After careful consideration, we have con-
cluded that Andrews’ arguments, although
not ultimately persuasive, were not frivolous-
ly advanced. Therefore, we do not award
attorney fees on appeal.

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the order of the Industrial Com-
mission and award costs, but not attorney
fees, on appeal to Respondent ISIF.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, JONES and Justice Pro Tem
KIDWELL concur.

395 P.3d 379

Jaimi Dean CHARBONEAU,
Petitioner-Respondent,

ve

STATE of Idaho, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 43015

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: May 26, 2017

_

ee

PO
Ke

Senneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, argued for appellant,

162

Erik R. Lehtinen, Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, argued for respon-
dent.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Jerome County
from a judgment in a post-conviction pro-
ceeding granting the petitioner a new trial in
his criminal case. We reverse the judgment
of the district court.

L

Factual Background.

Jaimi Dean Charboneau murdered his ex-
wife, Marilyn Arbaugh, on July 1, 1984. Her
two daughters, Tiffnie and Tira, were pres-
ent when he murdered their mother, and
they both testified during his trial. The facts
surrounding the murder were as follows:

On June 21, 1984, Jaimi went to the cafe
where Marilyn worked. They left in Mari-
lyn’s car. There is some dispute whether
Marilyn went with Jaimi voluntarily. The
next day Marilyn reported to the police
that Jaimi had kidnapped and raped her
and had stolen her car. There is evidence
that Jaimi travelled to Nevada after June
21. The burned remains of Marilyn’s car
were found in southern Idaho in late June
1984, On June 25, 1984, Jaimi was charged
in Jerome County, Idaho with first degree
kidnapping of Marilyn and grand theft of
her car.

On June 28, 1984, Jaimi purchased a .22
caliber rifle from a hardware store in
Gooding, Idaho. About mid-morning on
Sunday, July 1, 1984, Marilyn returned to
her residence on a ranch near Jerome,
after being gone since the evening before.
Some time after 11:00 o’clock that morning
Marilyn went out to check some horses in
a corral near her home. Shortly after that
Marilyn’s daughter Tiffnie heard shots out-
side, grabbed Marilyn’s .22 pistol, and
went to see what had happened. She found
her mother sitting on the ground in the
barn with blood on her. Jaimi was standing
close to Marilyn with a .22 caliber rifle
pointed at Marilyn. Tiffnie asked Jaimi to
leave and told him she was going to call
the police. Jaimi told Tiffnie that he would

take Marilyn to the doctor. Both Marilyn

and Jaimi told Tiffnie to leave.

At 11:38 that morning Tiffnie called the
Jerome County Sheriff's office and said
that Jaimi had shot her mother. Tiffnie
then told her sister Tira about the shoot-
ing, and they both got dressed. They heard
more shots and ran outside where they hid
behind a sheep wagon and called to their
mother, Tiffnie had her mother’s .22 cali-
ber pistol with her, and it accidentally
discharged behind her. She ran into the
house, hid the gun, returned to the sheep
wagon, and then ran to the barn, Tira
followed close behind. Marilyn was lying
on her back with her arms over her head. -
The girls ran back to call for an ambu-
lance, At 11:42 a.m. Tira telephoned for
assistance and reached the Jerome County
Sheriff's office. She told them to get an
ambulance and that her mother was dying.
When the sheriff's deputies arrived at the
scene, they found Marilyn’s body in the
barn and located Jaimi in a field near the
barn with a .22 caliber rifle lying nearby.
Jaimi was arrested and charged with first
degree murder. At the time of his arrest,
Jaimi acknowledged that he had shot Mari-
lyn, although he stated that he did so
because she was going to shoot him.

State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 188, 774
P.2d 299, 303 (1989).

On June 15, 2011, Charboneau filed his
fifth petition for post-conviction relief, con-
tending that on March 18, 2011, he learned of
evidence of a Brady violation and an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim. In his sup-
porting affidavit, he contended that on March
18, 2011, a correctional officer where Charbo-
neau was incarcerated brought him a large
envelope containing various documents upon
which this post-conviction petition is based.
The significant documents are described be-
low.

Tira letter and envelope. The large envel-
ope contained a photocopy of a letter written
by Tira to Judge Becker (“Tira Letter”), who
presided ovér Charboneau’s criminal trial,
and a photocopy of the envelope in which it
was allegedly mailed to Judge Becker. In the
letter, she claimed that she had been pres-
sured by the prosecutor and a detective to

testify falsely at Charboneau’s trial and that
it was Tiffnie, not Charboneau, who fired the
fatal shot killing their mother. Tiffnie appar-
ently could not be located with respect to
these proceedings. The envelope bore a post-
mark from Bruneau, Idaho, dated September
7, 1989, and a return address of 622 Highland
Rd, Jerome, Idaho.

However, the letter and envelope were
photocopies, not the originals. Who made the
photocopies is unknown, and is it not known
when those photocopies were made or who
provided them. Charboneau’s expert testified
that “all photocopies can be manipulated in
some fashion.” The expert was not asked
whether the letter and envelope were the
first-generation photocopies of the originals,
but she testified that the forged Orville Bal-
zer statement discussed below was about a
tenth-generation photocopy.

Tira had married Charboneau’s half-broth-
er on October 18, 1988, when she was eigh-
teen years of age, and she had passed away
on September 24, 1998, The letter stated, “I
am in Bruneau Idaho for a cowboy benefit +
street dance where the Pinto Bennetts band
is providing the music” and “I will be back in
Jerome early next week.” The street dance
did not occur until ten days after the date of
the letter. Tira’s husband testified that in
September of 1989 he and Tira were living on
a ranch in Wells, Nevada; that he was work-
ing on the ranch and she usually worked with
him; that they did not have a car; that he had
never been to a street dance in Bruneau; that
during their marriage he and Tira had never
spent the night apart except for one week
during Christmas of 1989; that she signed
the letter with her maiden name, which she
had not used as long as he had known her;
and that by September 1989 they had a child.
The district court wrote, “For a variety of
reasons, the Court does not accept (and in
fact rejects) his testimony,” but the court did
not state what those reasons were.

‘The statements in the Tira Letter contra-
dict Charboneav’s testimony in key respects,
and the forensic evidence contradicts both of
their versions,

Tira was fourteen years of age when her
mother was killed, and her sister Tiffnie was
sixteen years of age. At Charboneau’s crimi-

163

nal trial, Tira testified that on the day of her
murder, Marilyn had taken a bath and gone
out to make a telephone call to her mother
and father. They did not have a telephone in
their house, The telephone was in the nearby
shop that was used by the man who farmed
the land. Tiffnie was on her bed reading, and
Tira was going to bathe after her mother. As
Tira was running the bath water, her mother
came back into the house and asked Tira if
she had put the horses in a different corral.
Tira stated that she had not, and her mother
went back outside. The water was still run-
ning, Tira heard a yell, and then heard Tiff-
nie jump off her bed onto the floor. Tira
continued bathing, and a short while later
Tiffnie came into the bathroom and said real-
ly fast in a seared, shaky tone of voice: “Tira,
Jaimi’s outside and he shot Mom. Get out of
the bathtub and hurry up.”

Tira ran into her room and hurriedly put a
pair of pants and a shirt, which were too big
for her because they belonged to Tiffnie’s
boyfriend, Bart, who lived with them. She
then put on his boots that were also too big.
She testified that Tiffnie grabbed their moth-
er’s .22 caliber pistol while Tira was dressing,
although she did not actually see Tiffnie grab
the pistol. Tira stated that the pistol was
kept behind the radio on their mother’s bed-
stead and that she had seen it there the
night before.

Tira then testified:

A. Well, we ran out behind the sheep
wagon. Tiffy told me not to go past it, and
‘we were yelling but—

Q. What were you yelling?

A, We were just—well, I just—we
couldn’t really hear anything or nothing.
And Tiffy was kind of in front of me, and I
was off to the side. My dog was sitting
right next to me, and Tiffy was shaking
really bad and she fired a shot, scared me,
and it just went, almost hit my dog, And I
heard the gravel hit the side of the barn
and everything and Tiffy was really ner-
vous, so we went back into the house. We
went back into the house.

Q. Let me interrupt you. Before you
went back into the house, what were you

164

yelling as you were standing out by the

sheep wagon?

A. We were just yelling to Mom. We
were kind of being quiet, but we was yell-
ing to mom. We was, you know, but we
wasn’t getting any reply, you know. We
wasn’t getting nothing.

Q. No reply?

A. Yeah.

On cross-examination, Tira gave more in-
formation regarding the shot fired by Tiffnie:

Q. And did Tiffy have the pistol in her
possession at that time [when they went
outside the first time]?

A. Yes.

Q. What did she do with it?

A. She just carried it out there,

Q. And is that when the shot went off
the first time you when [sic] [went] to the
sheep wagon?

A. Yes, We was behind the sheep wag-
on, Her hands were behind her back and
she shot once.

Q. They you went back into the house?

A. Yes. We was seared. So we went
back into the house.

When they went back into the house, Tira
changed into her own clothing. She testified
that while doing so, she heard more shots.

Q. Okay. Did anything else happen
while you were in the house changing
clothes?

A. Well, yes. Right when I was putting
my leg in my pants we heard several more
shots, about five or so, five.

Q. You would say it’s about five shots?

A. Yes.

Q. It would have been more or less?

A. Yes,

Q. Are you certain, you’re not certain
of the number?

A. No. I was too scared to be counting
them.

Tira testified that she and Tiffnie ran back
out of the house to the alleyway in the horse
barn, where they found their mother lying on
the ground. Tira was behind Tiffnie, so Tiff-
nie was the first one into the barn. Tira
testified what she saw as follows:

Q. Where was Tiffy?

A, Tiffy had my mom in her arms, and
Tiffy pulled up her shirt or something, and
we could see a lot of blood and stuff on her
chest, And I just brushed my hand across
her cheek because I didn’t know what to
do,

Q. Across your mom’s cheek?

A. Yes, And right when I did that
blood started running from her mouth and
her nose, and Tiffy told me to go get an
ambulance and I stood there for a second
and then she said go, so I just got up and I
ran out. And I called the ambulance....

On cross-examination, Tira was asked twice
whether her testimony was true, and both
times she answered that it was. Defense
counsel also asked her what she thought of
Charboneau, The questions and her answers
were as follows:

Q. What do you think about Jaimi’?

A, What am I supposed to think?

Q. Do you dislike him?

A, He—I—I don’t know. He—he killed

mom. What am I supposed to think?

In the Tira Letter, she stated that she was
told by an officer to write some things in her
written witness statement that were not true,
She asserted that the officer told her to write
a specific time for when she woke up on the
morning her mother was killed, and she did
not know what time it really was. She then
wrote that that “after mom woke up that
morning I remember her asking Jamie
[Charboneau] to go out + check on our horse
that had been to the vet a few days earlier.”
Aceording to the letter, before Charboneau
went outside, her mother gave her a .22
caliber rifle that was a graduation gift from
her and Charboneau.

Before Jamie [sic] went outside to check
on the horses mom came back to my bed-
room + gave me a big box wrapped in
decorative paper. When I opened the box
it had a new .22 rifle in it that was my
graduation gift from mom + Jamie [sic],
After I told them thank you Jamie [sic]
went outside + mom went into the bath-
room to take a bath, After mom got
dressed she told Tif + me that she was

going outside to help Jamie with the hors-
es,

The rifle that Charboneau purchased for Tira
was a Remington, and it was the murder
weapon,

Tira then wrote that she told the officer
when she first heard her mother screaming,
she was screaming for Tiffnie, Tira was still
in the bathtub, and Tiffnie came running into
the bathroom and screamed at Tira to get
dressed, Tiffnie grabbed the Remington rifle
and gave Tira their mother’s .22 caliber pis-
tol. Tira described what occurred then as
follows:

I followed Tif over behind the sheep wagon
which was right across the driveway from
the barn. We could see mom in the alley-
way by the feed corrals but I did not see
Jaimi, I could only hear his voice. I re-
member I heard Tif shoot the rifle while
we were behind the sheep wagon. I re-
member this because it startled me so
much that I accidently fired mom’s pistol
which also scared me.

Tira wrote that she then asked Tiffnie
what was going on, and she answered that
their mother had taken her own .22 caliber
rifle with her when she went outside to help
Charboneau. She asserted that she told the
officer that, and he said he would make a
note of it, but it was not necessary for Tira to
write down every little thing in her state-
ment.

At trial, Tira testified that the only .22 rifle
in the house was the Remington. She was
asked about other .22 firearms where they
lived, and she made no mention of the Rem-
ington rifle that Charboneau claimed to have
given her, nor did she state that her mother
owned a .22 rifle. Her testimony was as
follows:

Q. Were there other .22 pistols or rifles
out at El Rancho other than the Ruger
[pistol]?

A. Donna’s boys had a .22 rifle: No, I
think—well, they had a .22 gun, too. I don’t
know exactly what it was,

Q. Did you—did you or your sister or
your mother have any other .22s?

A. Well, Bart had one.

165

Q.: What kind of rifle was it? I know it
was a rifle. What kind of a gun was that?
A. Tt was-just a little, short one, silver,
had a little short, about—it was just little,
Q. Do you know what brand that was?
A. No.
Donna and her boys lived at a second house
on the property, Tiffnie’s boyfriend, Bart,
lived in Marilyn’s house. The defense called
Tiffnie as a witness, and she testified that
her mother did not have a .22 rifle.

In her letter, Tira wrote that a few days
later, another officer came to her and stated
that she had forgotten to write about hearing
more shots after she and Tiffnie had gone
back into the house. She wrote that she had
to sign another statement to that effect even
though it was not true, She also claimed that
a prosecutor told her to get rid of her moth-
er’s .22 rifle and that she, her grandfather,
and her uncle buried the rifle on the proper-
ty, right behind a potato cellar where her
uncle had thrown some of her mom’s things
into the crawl space a few weeks after she
was killed.

Tira’s account in the Tira Letter differs
from Charboneav’s. He testified that he pur-
chased the Remington rifle for Tira as a
graduation present; that he arrived at Mari-
lyn’s house on Thursday evening, but nobody
‘was home; and that’ when he later saw Mari-
lyn walk to the shop to make a telephone call,
he called to her and they talked, According
to him, “[SJhe didn’t want the girls to know I
was there for a few days, and I said, ‘Fine’”
He testified that he then showed her the rifle
he had purchased for Tira, and Marilyn said
they would give it to her in a couple of days,
His testimony was as follows:

Q. Did you show her the gun?

A. Yeah, I showed her, I said, “I got
that .22 for Tira.” And she said, “Fine.”

She said she didn’t like a—it had a small
scope on it, too; it came with it, And she
said, “I don’t think Tira needs a scope,
especially on a .22,” that she didn’t need

that. Fine, Said we'd give it to her in a

couple of days,

Q. Did she take the gun with her at
that time?
A. No, she didn’t.

166

According to Charboneau, he stayed in the
tack room until Sunday morning. He testified
that on Friday morning, Marilyn came to the
tack room and told him she was going to
work; that he next saw her on Friday eve-
ning, when she brought him a snowmobile
jacket; that on Saturday morning she came
to the tack room and said she was going to
work; and that on Saturday evening she
brought him some food, which was the first
time he had eaten since he arrived on Thurs-
day.

Charboneau testified that Marilyn woke
him up on Sunday morning at about 9:30 or
10:00 a.m. According to him, she said that
she would tell her daughters that he was
there and they could give Tira the rifle. His
testimony was as follows:

Q. Did you talk about where she was
last night?

A. Yes, but I talked about that a little
later.

Q. Okay. Talk about right then is what
I am concerned about. Was there any ar-
gument right there?

A. No, there was not, She said that she
was going to tell the girls that I was there
that day. And she said we could give the
rifle to Tira, and we could take her down
to the gun range and let her sight it in.

Q. Did she do anything with that gun
and box?

A. Yes, she got up then; and she picked
up the gun, and it was still where I put it
the first day and she picked it up, and she
said that she was going to take the scope
off because she didn’t want Tira to have it.
And I said, “Fine.”

Charboneau testified that he noticed that
the horses were out, and she asked him if he
had let them out; that he answered that he
had not; and that she responded that maybe
the girls had done so. He then testified that
she took the rifle to the house and returned
with it five to fifteen minutes later. His testi-
mony was as follows:

A. ... She went in and she was gone
five, ten, maybe fifteen minutes; and she
came back, and she had the gun. The scope
was off of it. She didn’t have the box or
anything or nothing. She had a handful of

shells, though, and she sat down. And I
was pulling my boots on then. And she put
shells in the gun. I don’t know how many.
But she put shells in the gun, and then she
leaned it against the feed bunk on the
inside of the tack room.

Charboneau testified that he asked her
where she had been the night before, and she
stood up and stated that she loved him. He
then described what happened as follows:

And she picked up the gun, and she
pointed it at me. She said, “You're dead.
No other woman is going to have you.”
And she said, “You’re dead,” And I stood
looking at her down the barrel of that gun
and scared. And anyway, I heard a click. 1
don’t know what it was. I heard a click.

And right there I grabbed the barrel of
the gun, and I pointed it up towards the
roof of the barn, and I wrestled it from
her, took a while; and she was screaming
all that time. She was screaming to Tiffy to
bring Rufus or something. She had pet
names for all her guns.....

And, anyway, she was screaming for Tif-
fy while we was wrestling for the gun and
she said, “Bring Rufus,” or something, and
I got the gun from her and she turned
around and ran down the alleyway. I was
in right by the door, and she ran that way;
and I heard the door slam, and I seen Tiffy
coming. She was in her nightgown, and she
had the pistol in her hand. And a few
seconds later, when she was about halfway
between me and the house, and I had at
my hip, and I didn’t know if Marilyn was
going to run around and get another gun
or what; and I closed my eyes, and the gun
went off. It went off~I don’t know four or
five times, I—I guess.

I opened my eyes, and Marilyn was on
her knees and she was bleeding from one
Jeg and she was holding her hand on this
shoulder near to her arm. And I ran down
to her and stood right beside her and I
said, “Gees, Marilyn, what are you wanting
to shoot me for?” And just then she looked
down the alleyway of the barn, and she
said, “Tiffy, get out of here.” And I looked
down here and seen Tiffy. I said, “Tiffy, go
call an ambulance for your mother.”

Charbonean testified that he knelt down
next to Marilyn and leaned the rifle against a
feed bunk. He then heard something and saw
Tiffnie running toward them with the pistol
in her hand. She said she hated them both
and fired the pistol two or three times, He
took off running, thinking that Tiffnie was
shooting at him, and he then heard some
talking. He eased back by the door of the
barn and heard Tiffnie yelling at her mother.
He then testified:

And that’s when I peeked around the
corner, and I seen Tiffy standing up above
her mother, and her mother on her knees,
and Marilyn was looking up at Tiffany, and
she said, “Tiffy, I’m your mother.”

And that’s when I heard the gun go off,
and I seen Marilyn’s hair fly up close to
the top of her head. I seen some hair fly
up.

Charboneau testified that he then picked up
the Remington rifle and ran 200 yards into a
wheat field, where he threw the rifle. That is
where it was discovered by the police.

Q. Right after that shot was fired what
happened? What did Tiffy do?

A I just looked around to the
edge of the barn, and I heard Tiffy scream.
And I heard her run out of the way; she
was screaming, her hands over her ears
and—

Q. Was the gun [pistol] still in her
hand?

A. Yes, it was still in her hand, yes;
and then as soon as she was gone, I ran
back in there, and I picked up the gun, the
trifle.

Q. Why did you go back to pick up the
gun?

A. Because I knew that Tiffy had prob-
ably, if she didn’t call an ambulance, she
called Jim Arbaugh; and I have never liked
him anyway, and we have never gotten
along, and I knew that he was possible of
things way before this ever happened. So I
grabbed that gun, I didn’t want to have
anybody give me—shooting at me, and I
didn’t want to shoot at anybody. I grabbed
that gun. And I ran back out of the barn,
and I got the gun, and this time I put my
hand on the top barb and over the fence.

167

And I ran about 200 yards to a wheat field
where I waited for the police to arrive.

In this wheat field I figured I could, if
Jim Arbaugh showed up, I could hide from
him.

Q. What did you do with the gun be-
fore he got there?

A. I threw it to where nobody else
could find it and I could’still tell the police
where it was at or approximately,

Thus, the account in the Tira Letter con-
tradicted Charboneau’s version of what hap-
pened. Tira wrote that Charboneau was in
the house on the morning that Marilyn was
killed. Charboneau’s version was that he was
not in the house, but had been staying in the
tack room. Tira wrote that Marilyn and
Charboneau gave her the Remington rifle
that morning. Charboneau's version was that
Tira was never given the rifle; he had it in
the tack room until Marilyn took it for five to
fifteen minutes to remove the scope and then
returned to the tack room with the rifle. Tira
wrote that Tiffnie took Tira’s .22 rifle, gave
her their mother’s .22 pistol, and they both
went outside and hid behind the sheep wag-
on. Charboneau’s version was that only Tiff-
nie came out of the house; she had a .22
pistol, not the rifle; and she did not hide
behind the sheep wagon. Tira wrote that
while she and Tiffnie were behind the sheep
wagon, she heard Tiffnie shoot the rifle.
Charboneau’s version was that Tiffnie shot
her mother with a .22 pistol while standing
over her. Tira wrote that Tiffnie had Tira’s
.22 rifle. Charboneau’s version was that he
had the rifle and took it with him when he
ran into the wheat field, where he threw it
into the field.

The forensic evidence was inconsistent
with Charboneau’s account. As District
Judge John Butler found with respect to
Charboneau’s third petition for post-convic-
tion relief:

A review of the testimony concerning

physical evidence from the trial indicates

that the victim died from gunshot wounds
to the chest. The recovered bullets came
from a Remington .22 Rifle, and all but one
of the bullets analyzed was determined to
have been fired from the specific rifle re-
trieved at the crime scene and which the

168

petitioner has admitted to using, The re-
maining bullet, identified as “C” was deter-
mined to have probably been fired from
the Remington Rifle, however, the ballis-
ties expert could not state absolutely that
it was fired from the Remington in custo-
dy. The ballistics expert could definitely
determine that “C” was not fired from the
Ruger .22 pistol that had also been recov-
ered from the scene,

The pathologist who performed an autopsy
on Marilyn’s body testified at the trial that,
she had been hit by at least 15 bullets and
that she had not been shot in the head. He
testified that the fatal wound was the sever-
ing of her autonomous artery, “which is one
of the main arteries coming off of the aorta
just as it leaves the heart, and this would
lead to severe hemorrhage shock, and in
combination with a hemothorax, which is a
collapsed lung, would lead to the victim’s
death.” When asked whether the severing of
the artery was caused by one shot or two, the
pathologist answered that he was not sure
because three entrance wounds to her upper
right chest were within about a four-inch
circle and any one of them or any one in
combination with another could have severed.
the artery. He stated that she had three
wounds to the left side of her left thigh, one
of which fractured her femur. Only three of
the bullets hit her from the rear: one hit the
left back part of her shoulder, one hit the
back of her neck, and one hit the back of her
right calf, Finally, he said, “It seems most
likely to me that the body was in multiple

positions during the process of the shoot-
ings.”

In holding that there were corroborating
circumstances that clearly indicated the
trustworthiness of the Tira Letter, the dis-
trict court only considered the contents of
the letter, The court did not consider that it
contradicted Charboneau’s version of what
occurred and the forensic evidence,

Gold statement. The large envelope con-
tained a typed statement signed by Larry
Gold (“Gold Statement”), a former Jerome
County Sheriff, in which he stated that his
then Chief Deputy, Mito Alanzo [sic],! had
told him that the elected clerk was in posses-
sion of a letter that had been mailed to the
Jerome County courthouse; that the letter
was addressed to the presiding judge in
Charboneav’s case; that it had been sent “by
Tira Arbaugh, the daughter of Marilyn Ar-
baugh”; that “the subject matter of this let-
ter had significant relevance concerning the
Charboneau case”; and that “Chief Deputy
Alanzo [sic] stated that his concern was that
the District Court Clerk ... had requested
that he help her to destroy the letter.” In his
statement, Mr. Gold also said that he had
spoken with the Jerome County prosecutor
about the clerk’s possession of the letter and
the “allegations made by Chief Deputy Alan-
zo [sic] that Cheryl Watts was conspiring to
destroy the letter.”

Larry Gold had died at some point before
these post-conviction proceedings. His state-
ment was dated November 18, 2001, and it
was in the form of an affidavit. Its heading
was:

SWORN STATEMENT OF
FORMER JEROME COUNTY SHERIFF

STATE OF IDAHO

COUNTY OF JEROME

However, the Gold Statement was not sworn

1, The correct spelling of the surname is “‘Alon-

LARRY GOLD

wee ew
wa
a

to before a notary public, Rather it began,

20.

“Comes now Larry Gold, I do SWEAR upon
my oath and under penalty of perjury that
the information and facts provided herein are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge
and belief.” Idaho did not authorize a certifi-
cation or declaration under penalty of perju-
ty in lieu of a statement sworn to before a
notary public until July 1, 2018, Mr. Gold had
worked in California at some point before he
was Jerome County Sheriff, and California
has had a provision for a declaration under
penalty of perjury for several decades, Hi-
ther the document was actually prepared af-
ter July 1, 2013, when Idaho law permitted
such a declaration, or, while serving as sher-
iff of Jerome County, Mr. Gold never real-
ized that Idaho law did not provide for a
declaration under penalty of perjury. In con-
nection with Charboneau’s third petition for
post-conviction relief, he had presented a let-
ter from Larry Gold dated June 3, 2001.

Balzer statement. The large envelope con-
tained a handwritten statement purporting to
be signed by Orville Balzer (“Balzer State-
ment”), who was a former Jerome County
deputy sheriff. The Balzer Statement began,
“Letter from Tira Arbaugh/daughter of Mar-
ilyn Arbaugh, Letter addressed to Judge
Philip Becker.” It then stated that the post-
mark on the envelope “indicates the letter
was mailed from Bruneau Idaho on Septem-
ber 7, 1989, A.M.” and that the letter was
given to “Judge Becker’s court clerk Cheryl
Watts” on September 11, 1989. The state-
ment asserts that the “Writer witnessed
Cheryl Watts open the envelope and read the
letter enclosed”; that the “writer” advised
her not to shred the letter because that may
invite a federal investigation; that a better
solution would be “to simply lose the letter in
a ‘ghost? file’; and that the “writer” later
discussed the matter with Chief Deputy Mito
Alanzo, who replied: “‘I’m not suprised [sic].
Just another example of Jerome Counties
[sic] gunsmoke style justice, remember the
Melvin Wright thing.’”

The parties agree that Orville Balzer did
not write the Balzer Statement and that it
was a forgery. The district court found that
the author of the Balzer Statement was De-
Wayne Shedd, who worked for the Idaho
Department of Corrections as a library spe-

169

cialist at the correction facility in Orofino,
Idaho, from 1997 to 2007. Charboneau was
housed at that-facility for about nine and
one-half years and was transferred from that
facility on about April 26, 2011. The large
envelope was discovered by a correctional
officer at the Orofino facility on March 18,
2011, Obviously, by forging the Balzer State-
ment, Mr. Shedd was trying to assist Char-
boneau to support the contention that the
Tira Letter was intercepted by the elected
derk. During his trial testimony, Mr. Shedd
denied knowing who Tira Arbaugh was, who
Orville Balzer was, who Cheryl Watts was,
and who Chief Deputy Mito Alonzo was, even
though he named all of them in the Balzer
Statement that he had forged. The court
found that Mr. Shedd’s testimony that he did
not know these people was true.

There is nothing in the record indicating
how he could have known who those persons
were. Someone directed Mr. Shedd regard-
ing what to write when forging the Balzer
Statement in order to benefit Charboneau
and to lend credence to the assertion that the
elected clerk diverted the Tira Letter. As the
district court found:

Shedd did not and could not have acted
alone. There is no way that Shedd knew of
or could have known of the circumstances
surrounding the Tira Arbaugh letter, or
the names of the personnel described in
Ex.5 [Balzer Statement] allegedly involved
with the discovery of the letter in Jerome
unless or until he was provided that infor-
mation by others. He simply had no in-
volvement in Charboneav’s original trial or
sentencing.

From the record on appeal, the only person
who could have done so was Charboneau.

Shedd note. The large envelope also in-
eluded the original of a note written by De-
‘Wayne Shedd (“Shedd Note”). In the note
dated June 27, 2008, Mr. Shedd wrote that
he had been instructed by a deputy attorney
general to monitor ‘all of Charboneau’s per-
sonal mail and his incoming and outgoing
legal mail; to look for and seize a letter
arriving at the Orofino correctional facility to
Charboneau from Larry Gold, without notify-
ing Charboneau; to look for and confiscate
any documents “depicting the name Tina Ar-

170

baugh”? and immediately notify the deputy
attorney general, or if he is not available
then contact “another attorney Mark Haws
at the Federal Court Building.” During his
trial testimony, Mr. Shedd was asked, “Do
you know who Mare Haws is?” and he an-
swered, “No, sir.” He also had an amazing
lack of memory regarding the note. The note
was not purportedly written to anyone, The
fact that the original of the Shedd Note and
the Balzer Statement that Mr. Shedd forged
were in the large envelope discovered by the
correctional officer on March 18, 2011, shows
that Mr. Shedd was able to put items into
that envelope in order to help Charboneau
before the large envelope was discovered by
the correctional officer. These two items
were obviously not in Charboneau’s mail that
was allegedly intercepted.

There were also two e-mails allegedly from
Mr. Shedd to a superior regarding intercept-
ing Charboneau’s mail. The district court had
those e-mails and the Idaho Department of
Correction’s e-mail system examined by an
expert. In its report, the expert wrote,
“Based on other emails found on the system,
there is no reasonable scenario that results
in these emails being genuine.” The expert
also wrote that “hardware and word process-
ing software at the ICIO [Idaho Correctional
Institution-Orofino] offices were capable of
making the changes seen in the emails” and
that “[t]he emails in question could have been
copied and pasted into any word processor
and modified to produce the results we see.”
‘The district court wrote that “[t]here is no
evidence to suggest that these two emails
were or could have been prepared by anyone
friendly to Charboneau” and that “there is no
explanation as to how Charboneau accom-
plished that feat.” Mr. Shedd had access to
the e-mail system, and he forged the Balzer
Statement to benefit Charboneau.

The State moved for summary judgment to
dismiss this petition for post-conviction relief
on the ground that it was barred by Charbo-
neau’s third petition for post-conviction relief,
and the district court denied that motion. It
ultimately granted Charboneau a new trial.
It held that Tira’s letter was admissible pur-
suant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(8) as

2. Mr. Shedd testified that he thought the name

a statement against interest (she admitted
testifying falsely at Charboneau’s trial) and
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24),
the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule.
‘The court also ruled that the Gold statement,
was admissible. The State timely appealed,
and Charboneau ecross-appealed,

I.

Did the District Court Err in Holding that
This Petition for Post-Conviction Re-
lief Was Not Barred by the Decision
on Charboneau’s Third Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief?

HH “An application for post conviction
relief is a special proceeding, civil in nature,
distinct from the criminal proceeding which
led to the conviction.” State v, Fetterly, 115
Idaho 281, 238, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). A
successive application for post-conviction re-
lief must be filed within a reasonable time
after the petitioner has notice of the issue(s)
raised in the successive petition, not from the
time that the petitioner has sufficient evi-
dence to support the petition. Charboneau v.
State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.8d 870, 875
(2007).

Hl The district court in this case held
that the failure to produce the Tira Letter
constituted a violation of Brady v. Maryland,
878 U.S. 88, 88 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1968). In its Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law filed on April 14, 2014, after the
court trial, the court wrote:

There is no evidence as to who had posses-

sion of the Tira Arbaugh letter from 1989

to December 2002, Wherever the letter

was between 1989 and 2003, it was origi-
nally taken or concealed by someone who
had the state’s purposes in mind, and who
acted on behalf of the state, rather than
the defendant. There is no evidence as to
whether it was or was not delivered to

Judge Becker. Someone sent or delivered

a copy of the letter to Charboneau, who

was in IDOC’s custody, sometime between

December 2002 and September 2003.
(Emphasis in original.)

The court concluded:

was “Tina” instead of “Tira.”

[T]he Tira Arbaugh letter was suppressed.
or withheld by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently, from at least 2003 on, and
prejudice to Charboneau has ensued. The
Court will leave open for further proceed-
ings the question of whether the letter is
“material”—whether there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of any
proceeding would have been different,

Based upon the district court’s findings of
fact, Charboneau filed a motion for summary
judgment on August 4, 2014, seeking to have
the court vacate Charboneau's conviction or
sentence. In its order on the motion, the
district court wrote, “The whereabouts of
this letter from 1989 to 2003 are unknown”
and “The letter did exist and someone knew
about it.” The district court held that wheth-
er the facts were viewed as a Brady violation
or newly discovered evidence, Charboneau
was entitled to a new trial,

This fifth petition for post-conviction relief
asserts the same issues made in Charbo-
neau’s third petition for post-conviction relief.
As the district court acknowledged in its
order on Charboneav’s motion for summary
judgment: “Charboneau did not, of course,
have the Arbaugh letter in 2002 when he
made his claims, His claims made in 2002,
which he could not support with any direct
evidence, turned out to be remarkably simi-
lar to what the Arbaugh letter revealed in
2011.” The issue in this case is not Tira’s
Letter. It is her alleged recantation of her
trial testimony and her allegations that she
had lied during Charboneau's trial at the
direction of the prosecution and law enforce-
ment, These same issues were raised in
Charboneau’s third petition for post-convic-
tion relief, based upon statements that Tira
allegedly made to Charboneau’s mother.

Charboneau's third petition for post-con-
viction relief was filed on May 28, 2002. The
district court in that case stated in its written
decision that

petitioner claims there to be newly discov-

ered evidence as follows:

(8) That Tira Arbaugh during the trial
and sentencing told petitioner’s moth-
er that she and her sister Tiffinie [sic]

171

had been instructed by the prosecutor
to withhold certain evidence and testi-
mony relative to the killing of Marilyn
Arbaugh

(4) That Tira Arbaugh had made state-
ments to the brother of the petitioner
which incriminated Tiffinie [sie] Ar-
baugh in the killing of her mother,
Marilyn Arbaugh

Charboneau supported that petition with
an affidavit of his mother. In her affidavit,
she stated, “Tira told me that the tragedy
which took the life of her mother on July 1st,
1984 did not happen the way it was played
out in court.” According to Charboneav’s
mother, two prosecutors and a Jerome Coun-
ty sheriff's deputy “did instruct her [Tira] on
what they wanted her to say regarding the
events which took place on July 1st, 1984 in
regards to the shooting incident at the EL-
Rancho 98 outside of Jerome, which involved
my son Jaimi Charboneau, his recent ex-wife
and the biological mother to Tira, Marilyn-
Arbaugh [sic].” Charboneau’s mother assert-
ed that Tira had told her that a prosecutor
and an investigator working with law en-
forcement,

had instructed her not to reveal certain
facts about things which were found at the
scene of the shooting on July ist, 1984,
‘Tira told me about two things which she
said she was instructed to remain silent
about they were her mother’s holster and,
her mother’s guns. Tira told me that she
had been instructed to say that the only
gun that she could remember seeing that
day was the rifle,

Charboneav’s mother concluded by stating
that “I asked Tira if she would be willing to
testify in court about that information and,
she stated that she would be willing to do
so,” but she recently passed away.

Thus, in his third petition for post-convic-
tion relief, Charboneau contended that Tira
said she had been instructed by two prose-
cuting attorneys, a deputy sheriff, and an
investigator to lie during the trial and that
her sister, Tiffnie, was criminally involved in
the killing of their mother. He raises the
same issues in his fifth petition for post-
conviction relief. The district court in Char-

172

boneav’s third petition for post-conviction re-
lief held that the mother’s affidavit was inad-
missible hearsay, and Charboneau did not
appeal that holding.

If Tira’s Letter was admissible under Ida~
ho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(8) as a statement
against penal interest or under the catch-all
exception of Idaho Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), then so was Charboneau’s mother’s
statement in her affidavit presented in sup-
port of his third petition for post-conviction
relief. If Tira’s out-of-court statements in her
letter were admissible, then so were her out-
of-court statements allegedly made to Char-
boneau’s mother. Thus, the issue of Tira’s
alleged recantation and her false testimony
given at the direction of two prosecuting
attorneys and law enforcement officials was
raised and denied in Charboneau's third peti-
tion for post-conviction relief, which was filed
on May 28, 2002, He cannot raise the same
issue over thirteen years later based upon
the same statements by Tira in a different
form.

In addition, in denying Charboneav’s third
petition for post-conviction relief, Judge But-
ler also wrote:

The Court would also note that if such

statements were admissible that it is un-

likely that such statements would be un-
known to the defendant at the time of his
trial, or at sentencing or at his prior post
conviction relief hearings. This is because
Betsy Crabtree [Charboneau’s mother] as-
serts that such statements were made to
her by Tira at the trial and sentencing and
this Court is of the belief that it is highly
unlikely that if in fact such statements
were made that she herself would have
withheld such information from her son or
his attorney. The Court notes that Ms.

Crabtree testified at the petitioner’s sen-

tencing hearing and made no such disclo-

sures at that time,

We also note that, as stated above, a suc-
cessive application for post-conviction relief
must be filed within a reasonable time after
the petitioner has notice of the issue(s) raised
in the successive petition, not within a rea-
sonable the time after the petitioner has
sufficient evidence to support the petition.
Charboneart, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.8d at

875. A petition for post-conviction relief must
“specifically set forth the grounds upon
which the application is based” and “[flacts
within the personal knowledge of the appli-
cant shall be set forth separately from other
allegations of facts and shall be verified as
provided in section 19-4902.” I.C. § 19-4903,
The petition must therefore state facts show-
ing that the petitioner brought the successive
petition within a reasonable time after receiv-
ing notice of the issue(s) raised in the peti-
tion, There was no statement in Charbo-
neau’s third petition for post-conviction relief
as to when he learned of Tira’s alleged recan-
tation, nor was there such a statement in this
petition, Charboneau’s criminal trial began
on April 15, 1985, According to his mother,
Tira recanted to her during the trial. Tira
passed away on September 24, 1998. Thus,
there were over fourteen years between
Tira’s alleged recantation and her death, and
the issue of her alleged recantation was not
raised,

HMM Finally, with respect to the alleged
Brady violation, “the individual prosecutor
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the govern-
ment’s behalf in the case, including the po-
lice.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 487,
115 §.Ct, 1555, 181 L.Ed2d 490 (1995),
There is no showing that the prosecutors in
Charboneau’s case or others acting on the
State’s behalf in the case, whether law en-
forcement or the investigator, knew of the
Tira Letter. It is not sufficient to establish a
Brady violation to simply conclude that the
letter was “taken or concealed by someone
who had the state’s purposes in mind, and
who acted on behalf of the state.” Likewise,
the Tira Letter was not material. Charbo-
neau cannot show materiality unless he can
show that there is a reasonable probability
that his conviction or sentence would have
been different had the Tira Letter been dis-
closed. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 268,
296, 119 S.Ct. 1986, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999),
Forensic and other evidence can be consid-
ered in determining whether the Tira Letter
was material. Jd, at 298, 119 S.Ct. 1986. The
statements in the letter so contradicted
Charboneau’s own incriminating testimony
that the alleged suppression of the letter did

not undermine confidence in the outcome of
the trial or in his sentence. Charboneau ad-
mitted shooting at Marilyn with the Reming-
ton rifle while she was unarmed and running
away from him; he admitted that he wound-
ed her after which she was sitting on the
ground; and he admitted that he had sole
control of the Remington rifle from the time
that he shot at her to the time that he threw
it into the wheat field. The forensic evidence
showed that she was shot at least fourteen
times with that rifle; that she was shot one
additional time probably with that rifle; that
she was hit by three bullets coming from her
rear; that the killing shots hit her in the
upper chest; and that she was not shot ei-
ther in her head or with a .22 pistol as Char-
boneau claimed,

Hl With respect to the Larry Gold state-
ment, it is inadmissible hearsay. In that let-
ter, he set forth what he had allegedly been
told by Mito Alonzo about the existence of
the Tira Letter and its receipt by the Jerome
County clerk. In holding that the statement
was admissible, the district court wrote,
“Gold’s affidavit is not being offered to show
or prove the contents of the [Tira] letter. The
letter is in evidence. Instead, the statement
is being offered to prove Milo Alonzo had
very detailed knowledge of the contents of
that letter, and when he knew about it.”
(Emphasis in original.)

“ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E.
801(c). Larry Gold’s statement is hearsay
because it was not made while Mr. Gold was
testifying at a trial or hearing and it was
offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement—that Mr. Alonzo
had made the claimed statements to Mr.
Gold and that Mr. Gold had made certain
statements to the then prosecuting attorney.
The alleged statements by Mr. Alonzo are
also hearsay because his alleged statements
to Mr. Gold were not made while testifying
at a trial or hearing and those statements
were offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted—that the Jerome County clerk had
a letter written by Tira and addressed to the
judge who presided over Charboneav’s crimi-

1738

nal trial, that the subject of the letter had
significant relevance concerning the Charbo-
neau case, and that the clerk asked for Mr,
Alonzo’s help to destroy that letter. Neither
the out-of-court statement by Mr. Gold nor
the out-of-court statement by Mr. Alonzo is
admissible under any exception to the hear-
say rule. Therefore, the Gold statement is
inadmissible because it is hearsay within
hearsay, and each of the combined state-
ments is not admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule. LR.E. 805.

Thus, the district court erred in granting a
new trial. The issues raised in this case were
vaised and rejected in Charboneau’s third
petition for post-conviction relief, and he can-
not raise them in this subsequent petition in
a different form, We reverse the judgment of
the district court and remand this case to the
district court with directions to dismiss the
petition with prejudice.

Charboneau cross-appealed, contending
that the district court erred in denying his
motion to preclude retrying or resentencing
him, Based upon the dismissal of this petition
for post-conviction relief, the cross-appeal is
moot.

Ti.

Should We Grant the State’s Motion
to Revoke Charboneau’s Bail?

The judgment entered by the district court
set bail for Charboneau in the sum of
$20,000, and he bailed out. On February 20,
2016, he was charged in Ada County with
burglary and aggravated assault, both of
which are felonies. That case is set for a jury
trial to commence on October 28, 2017, The
State requests that we revoke Charboneau's
bail that was set in this case. The order
setting bail was in the judgment, which we
are reversing. He is currently in custody
awaiting trial in his new case. Once the re-
mittitur is issued in this case, the order
reversing the judgment, which includes the
order setting bail, will become final. There-
fore, under the circumstances we decline to
enter an order vacating the bail before this
opinion becomes final.

v.

Conclusion.

We reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand this case with directions to
dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief
with prejudice.

Justices HORTON, BRODY and Justices
Pro Tem SCHROEDER and WALTERS

concur.

395 P.3d 393
Nathon A. BAUGHMAN and Melissa K.
Kempton-Baughman, husband and
wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
ve
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc;
Chevy Chase Bank, F.8.B., and Capital
One, N.A., U.S. Bank, N.A,, Trustee for
Master Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust
Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-3,
Defendants-Respondents.

Docket No. 43640-2015

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Lewiston, April 2017 Term.

Filed: May 26, 2017

Henry D. Madsen, Madsen Law Offices,
P.C., Coeur @Alene, argued for appellants.

Kelly G. McConnell, Givens Pursley, LLP,
Boise, argued for respondents.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Kootenai County
from a judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs’
claims, including that the statute of limita-
tions under Idaho Code section 5-2144
barred any foreclosure proceedings by the
Defendants, and granting a counterclaim for
judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. We
affirm the judgment of the district court.

176
IL

Factual Background.

Melissa K. Kempton-Baughman borrowed.
$1,192,000 from Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B.,
to refinance real property located on 5583
East Shoreline Drive in Post Falls, She exe-
euted a promissory note in that amount pay-
able to the bank, and as security for the loan,
the Plaintiffs executed a deed of trust trans-
ferring the real property to First American
Title Insurance Company as trustee, The
promissory note required monthly payments
and stated a maturity date of March 1, 2047.
The deed of trust identified the note, and it
defined the bank as the lender, the Plaintiffs
as the borrowers, and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (““(MERS”), as the
beneficiary, “acting solely as a nominee for
Lender and Lender’s successors and as-
signs.” The deed of trust also stated, “Bor-
rower has promised to pay this debt in regu-
lar Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in
full not later than March 1, 2047.” The deed
of trust was properly recorded on February
26, 2007.

The Plaintiffs did not make the payment
that came due in December 2007, and they
have not made any further payments. On
January 22, 2008, Chevy Chase Bank sent
Ms, Kempton-Baughman a letter stating that
her loan was in default and that the default
had to be cured by February 22, 2008. The
letter also stated:

Your failure to cure said default on or

before said date shall result in the acceler-

ation (immediately becoming due and pay-
able in full) of the entire sum secured by

the loan security instrument and the im-

mediate institution of foreclosure proceed-

ings by either strict foreclosure or by sale
of the property by public auction.

As provided in the loan security instru-
ment, you have the right to reinstate the
Joan after loan acceleration and the right
to bring a court action to assert the nonex-
istence of a default or any other defense
you may have to the acceleration and sale

The promissory note provided that if there
was a default that was not cured by the date
specified in a written notice from the holder
of the note, the holder “may require me to

pay immediately the full amount of principal
which has not been paid and all the interest
that I owe on that amount.”

Plaintiffs apparently tried to work out a
plan to cure the default, The bank sent Ms,
Kempton-Baughman another similar letter
dated April 15, 2008, stating that the loan
was in default, and it sent her a letter dated
May 14, 2008, which set forth a payment
schedule to bring the loan current, She did
not do so, and by letter dated July 16, 2008,
the bank notified her that the default had to
be cured by August 15, 2008, This letter
included the same provision regarding accel-
eration of the entire sum secured by the deed
of trust that is quoted above from the letter
dated January 22, 2008.

On November 15, 2008, MERS executed
an “Assignment of Deed of Trust,” transfer-
ring to UBS Investment Bank the promisso-
ry note and the beneficial interest in the
deed of trust. That assignment was recorded
on May 4, 2009.

On January 29, 2009, Pioneer Lenders
Trustee Services, LLC, as successor trustee,
recorded a “Notice of Default and Election to
Sell Under Deed of Trust.” The notice stated,
“The beneficial interest under said deed of
trust and the obligations secured thereby is
currently held by UBS Investment Bank.”
The notice also stated,

By reason of such Default, the Beneficia-
ry under said Deed of Trust has executed
and delivered to said Trustee a written
declaration of default and demand for sale,
and has deposited with said Trustee such
Deed of Trust and all documents evidenc-
ing obligations secured thereby and has
declared and does hereby declare all sums
secured thereby immediately due and pay-
able and has elected to cause the trust
property to be sold. Said sums being the
following:

The unpaid principal balance of
$1,284,272.29 together with interest
thereon at the current rate of 7.875%
per annum from 12/01/2007 until paid,
plus all accrued late charges, escrow ad-
vances, attorney fees and costs, and any
other sums incurred or advanced by the
beneficiary pursuant to the terms and
conditions of said deed of trust.

In her affidavit filed in opposition to the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Ms. Baughman stated that she was personal-
ly served with this notice,

On June 4, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed a vol-
untary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptey Code. In their petition, they listed
Chevy Chase Bank as a secured creditor, and
they stated that it had a lien on the property
at 5588 Shoreline Drive, that the lien was in
foreclosure, that the secured debt exceeded
the value of the property by $550,000, and
that the property would be surrendered. On
September 9, 2009, they received a dis-
charge. They did not list UBS Investment
Bank as a creditor.

On October 14, 2009, MERS executed an
“Assignment of Deed of Trust,” transferring
to UBS Investment Bank the promissory
note and the beneficial interest in the deed of
trust. That assignment was recorded on No-
vember 20, 2009. On January 8, 2010, the
property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale to UBS Investment Bank, and the trus-

tee’s deed was recorded on January 27, 2010.

On May 28, 2011, MERS executed an “As-
signment of Deed of Trust” transferring to
US. Bank N.A, as Trustee for Master Ad-
justable Rate Mortgage Trust Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2007-8 (“US Bank”), the
promissory note and all beneficial interest in
the deed of trust. That assignment was re-
corded on June 22, 2011.

On May 24, 2011, Pioneer Title Company
of Ada County, as successor trustee, record-
ed a “Notice of Rescission of Trustee's Deed
Upon Sale.” The notice of rescission stated
that the trustee had “been informed by the
Beneficiary that the beneficiary desires to
rescind the Trustee’s Deed recorded upon
the foreclosure sale which was conducted in
error due to a failure to communicate timely,
notice of conditions which would have war-
ranted a cancellation of the foreclosure which
did occur on 1/8/2010.” US Bank contends
that the sale was void because UBS Invest-
ment Bank was a nonentity.

On July 2, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed this
action seeking quiet title to the real property
and an injunction against any further at-
tempts to foreclose on the deed of trust.
They named as Defendants Capital One,

177

N.A. (“Capital One”); MERS; US Bank;
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A; and various other
entities, but these four entities were appar-
ently.the only ones served because they were
the only named Defendants who appeared in
this lawsuit. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., had
merged with Capital One, and so Capital One
appeared for itself and as successor by merg-
er of Chevy Chase Bank, F.8.B, Therefore,
the four Defendants who appeared in the
lawsuit will be herein called the “Defen-
dants,”

The Plaintiffs contended in their complaint
that any foreclosure proceeding was barred
bby Idaho Code section 5-214A, On February
7, 2014, they filed an amended complaint
seeking a declaratory judgment, an injunc-
tion barring any foreclosure, quiet title to the
real property, and damages for mesne profits
and breach of contract, US Bank filed a
counterclaim seeking judicial foreclosure of
the deed of trust.

The Defendants moved for summary judg-
ment on all counts of the Amended Com-
plaint and US Bank moved for summary
judgment on its counterclaim. The Plaintiffs
moved for partial summary judgment deter-
mining that February 22, 2008, was the ma-
turity date of the loan. After briefing and
argument, the district court granted the De-
fendants’ motion for summary judgment and
denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for partial. sum-
mary judgment, It then entered a judgment
in favor of US Bank. The Plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the court
denied, The Plaintiffs appealed, and US Bank
eross-appealed. According to the Plaintiffs,
the property was sold in a foreclosure sale
while their appeal was pending.

IL

Did the District Court Err in Granting the
Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Denying the Plain-
tiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment?

HM The Plaintiffs raise various issues
challenging the district court’s grant of the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
and the denial of the Plaintiffs’ motion for

178

partial summary judgment. When reviewing
on appeal the granting of a motion for sum-
mary judgment, we apply the same standard
used by the trial court in ruling on the
motion. Infanger v. City of Salmon, 187 Ida-
ho 45, 46-47, 44 P.8d 1100, 1101-02 (2002).
We construe all disputed facts, and draw all
reasonable inferences from the record, in
favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 47, 44
P.8d at 1102. Summary judgment is appro-
priate only if the evidence in the record and
any admissions show that there is no genuine
issue of any material fact regarding the is-
sues raised in the pleadings and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id.

A. Granting the Defendants’ motion to
take judicial notice. The Defendants con-
tended that the assignment of the promissory
note and the beneficial interest in the deed of
trust to UBS Investment Bank on October
14, 2009, and the deed to UBS Investment
Bank after the nonjudicial foreclosure sale
were void because UBS Investment Bank
was not a legal entity. The Defendants filed a
motion asking the district court to take judi-
cial notice of: (a) copies of what were pur-
ported to be the Plaintiffs’ voluntary petition
in bankruptcy and discharge; (b) copies of
what were purported to be a complaint and
notice of dismissal of a federal lawsuit filed
by the Plaintiffs; and (¢) copies of what were
purported to be screen shots of a computer
search for the name “UBS Investment Bank”
in the repository of the United States Feder-
al Reserve System National Information
Center. The Plaintiffs objected to the docu-
ments on the grounds of lack of foundation,
none of the documents were certified, they
were hearsay, and the federal lawsuit was
not relevant. The court granted the Defen-
dants’ motion.

Rule 201(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence
provides: “A judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that
it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” On appeal, the
Plaintiffs argue:

The documents were hearsay and lacked
the laying of proper foundation and were,
therefore, inappropriately admitted by the
District Court because these types of docu-
ments cannot be said to be generally
known within the District Court’s jurisdic-
tion and there was no source offered that
the District Court relied upon that offered
testimony as to the authenticity of the
documents.

The Plaintiffs also argued that the docu-

ments relating the federal lawsuit were not

relevant.

The Plaintiffs contend the district court’s
decision to take judicial notice of the docu-
ments offered by the Defendants was error,
yet they do not present any argument or
authority regarding whether the documents
were “capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” “We will
not consider assignments of error not sup-
ported by argument and authority in the
opening brief.” Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho
549, 559, 130 P.38d 1087, 1097 (2006). There-
fore, we need not address this issue.

B. Denying the Plaintiffs’ motion to
strike portions of two affidavits. In support
of their motion for summary judgment, the
Defendants filed an affidavit of Ms. Mensah
who was an employee of Capital One who
was responsible for the Plaintiffs’ loan. In
her affidavit, she stated that the Plaintiffs
were in default in 2008, that they had not
made a payment since approximately 2007,
and that US Bank was the current holder of
the note and deed of trust. She also attached
thirteen documents to her affidavit. The
Plaintiffs also filed the affidavit of Ms. Dina,
one of the Defendants’ attorneys, who stated
that persons at Capital One had informed her
that UBS Investment Bank is not a legal
entity and that UBS takes title to real prop-
erty under the name of UBS Real Estate
Securities, Inc. Ms. Dina also averred that an
employee of UBS confirmed that UBS In-
vestment Bank is not a legal entity that can
take title to property. Ms. Dina deseribed her
internet search of the records of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, which dis-
closed that UBS Trust Company, National
Association (Charter No, 24286), was includ-

ed in the list of the National Banks & Feder-
al Savings Associations that are chartered
and regulated by the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency and that UBS Invest-
ment Bank was not listed as a bank char-
tered by the Comptroller. She also described
her search of the annual filings by UBS
Trust Company, N.A., with the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 2009 and 2010;
that the reports listed over 100 global subsid-
iaries of UBS Trust Company; and that UBS
Investment Bank was not listed. The Plain-
tiffs objected to various portions of the two
affidavits.

The hearing on the Plaintiffs’ motion to
strike portions of the affidavits followed the
hearing on the Defendants’ motion for judi-
cial notice. The district court asked whether
the motion to strike was moot based upon its
granting of the motion for judicial notice. The
Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by stating that
they were not admitting the motion was
moot, but he objected to the affidavits to the
extent that they stated legal conclusions. The
court denied the motion to strike to the
extent that the affidavits brought forth docu-
ments of which the court took judicial notice
because that information was now moot. It
then stated that it would disregard state-
ments in the affidavits to the extent that they
contained legal conclusions and make its own
legal conclusions.

HM sOn appeal, the Plaintiffs assert that
the district court erred in stating that part of
the motion was moot “because the motion did
present a real and substantial controversy
that the District Court could have addressed
but chose not to” and “even if the Motion to
Strike was moot, the motion falls within the
mootness doctrine exceptions, to wit: the
court considering inadmissible evidence in
ruling on the motions for summary judg-
ment.” That is the extent of the Plaintiffs’
argument. They do not state what allegedly
inadmissible evidence was considered by the
court in ruling on the motions for summary
judgment, nor do they argue that they suf-
fered any prejudice from the alleged error.
“A party alleging error on appeal must also
show that the alleged errors were prejudi-
cial.” Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 122, 884

179

P.8d 780, 796 (2014). “[A]lleged errors not
affecting substantial rights will be disregard-
ed.” Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. and Cas.
Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 310, 288 P.8d 1221,
1232 (2010), Because the Plaintiffs have not
presented any argument showing that the
alleged errors affected their substantial
rights, we will not address this alleged error.

HI OC. The district court’s allegedly
erroneous finding of fact. On appeal, the
Plaintiffs assert: “In its Memorandum Deci-
sion and Order the District Court found that.
the parties agreed that UBS Investment
Bank, Inc, (“UBS”) was a non-entity, This
‘was erroneous because the Baughmans had
disputed Defendants’ assertion that UBS was
a non-entity.” To support that assertion, they
cite to page four of their amended complaint,
They do not cite to any portion of the court's
decision where it allegedly stated that the
parties agreed that UBS Investment Bank
‘was a nonentity, “This Court will not search
the record for error.” Miller v. Callear, 140
Idaho 218, 218, 91 P.8d 1117, 1122 (2004),
There is no showing that the court made the
alleged error.

D. The district court allegedly applying
the wrong standard when deciding the
summary judgment motions. The Plaintiffs
assert that “[t]he District Court applied
court (bench) trial standards to its analysis of
the cross motions for summary judgment.”
In support of that assertion, the Plaintiffs
argued that “there was ample disputed evi-
dentiary facts admitted into the record, yet
the District Court resolved the conflicting
evidence in its analysis”; that “the District
Court considered the conflicting affidavit tes-
timony, and exhibits incorporated therein,
made credibility decisions and granted sum-
mary judgment to Defendants”; that “the
District Court should have interpreted the
facts in the light most favorable to the
Baughmans”; and that “[i]f it had done so, it
would have found in the Baughmans’ favor on
several of the key issues, e.g., acceleration
and Defendants’ lack of standing to fore-
close.” These conclusory assertions are the
Plaintiffs’ entire argument. They do not iden-
tify the allegedly disputed evidentiary facts
or cite to the record regarding them, they do
not identify the credibility decisions allegedly

180

made by the court, and they do not identify
the facts that should have been interpreted
in the Plaintiffs’ favor.

“The argument section of the appellant's
brief ‘shall contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues present-
ed on appeal, the reasons therefor, with cita-
tions to the authorities, statutes and parts of
the transcript and record relied upon.’” Bo-
lognese v. Forte, 158 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d.
248, 257 (2012) (quoting LA.R, 35(a)(6)). Be-
cause the Plaintiffs wholly failed to comply
with Rule 85(a)(6) with respect to this issue
on appeal, we will not consider it, VanderWal
», Albay, Ine., 154 Idaho 816, 828, 303 P.8d
175, 182 (2018).

E. The district court’s “findings of
fact” in its Memorandum Decision, The
Plaintiffs allege that the district court’s find-
ings of fact in its Memorandum Decision
were clearly erroneous, They argue, “At the
hearing on the cross motions for summary
judgment and the Motion for Reconsidera-
tion hearing, the Baughmans argued that
UBS was the assignee of the Deed as to the
subject property pursuant to the trustee's
deed recorded on January 27, 2010.” The
evidence in the record shows that UBS In-
vestment Bank was not a legal entity, and
Plaintiffs do not point to any evidence in the
record that would support a finding that
UBS Investment Bank was a legal entity. In
fact, in connection with their motion for sum-
mary judgment, the Defendants submitted a
statement of undisputed facts, one of which
was, “Fact 12: UBS Investment Bank is not a
legal entity that can take title to property.”
In the Plaintiffs’ filed response, they stated,
“Plaintiffs lack sufficient information or be-
lief to agree or disagree with Fact 12.” Be-
cause the Plaintiffs do not support this as-
signment of error with any citations to the
record supporting it, we will not consider it.
Id.

F. The district court’s ruling on the
statute of limitations. The applicable stat-
ute of limitations is Idaho Code section 5-
214A, which states:

An action for the foreclosure of a mort-
gage on real property must be commenced
within five (5) years from the maturity
date of the obligation or indebtedness se-

cured by such mortgage. If the obligation
or indebtedness secured by such mortgage
does not state a maturity date, then the
date of the accrual of the cause of action
giving rise to the right to foreclose shall be
deemed the date of maturity of such obli-
gation or indebtedness,

Hl The Plaintiffs contended that the loan
was accelerated in 2008 based upon the
wording of the notice of default sent to Ms.
Kempton-Baughman on January 22, 2008,
They rely upon the wording that their failure
to cure the default by February 22, 2008,
“shall result in the acceleration (immediately
becoming due and payable in full) of the
entire sum secured by the loan security in-
strument and the immediate institution of
foreclosure proceedings by either strict fore-
closure or by sale of the property by public
auction.” (Emphasis added.) They asserted
that because they did not cure the default by
that date, such notice constituted an acceler-
ation of the entire amount owing on Febru-
ary 22, 2008, Because US Bank did not file
its counterclaim for foreclosure until Febru-
ary 28, 2014, the Plaintiffs contend that the
five-year statute of limitations barred any
action to foreclose the deed of trust. The
district court ruled that the statute of limita-
tions did not begin to run until the recording
on January 29, 2009, of the notice of default,
which expressly declared that “all sums se-
cured thereby [by the deed of trust] immedi-
ately due and payable.”

The district court incorrectly interpreted
section 5-214A, but reached the right result.
The first sentence of the statute states, “An
action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on
real property must be commenced within five
(6) years from the maturity date of the obli-
gation or indebtedness secured by such mort-
gage.” It is clear from the second sentence of
the statute that the reference to “the maturi-
ty date of the obligation or indebtedness” is
the maturity date stated in that obligation or
indebtedness, The second sentence states, “If
the obligation or indebtedness secured by
such mortgage does not state a maturity
date, then the date of the accrual of the
cause of action giving rise to the right to
foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturi-
ty of such obligation or indebtedness.” (Em-

phasis added.) The second sentence only ap-
plies if the obligation or indebtedness does
not state a maturity date. The first sentence
must then logically apply to an obligation or
indebtedness that does state a maturity date.
Otherwise, the two sentences would conflict.

Tn this case, the promissory note expressly
stated that the maturity date was March 1,
2047, There was no provision in the note
providing that the maturity date would
change if the amounts owing under the note
were declared to be immediately due and
payable because of a default, Therefore, the
five-year statute of limitations for foreclosure
would not begin to run until March 1, 2047.
The foreclosure action stated in US Bank’s
counterclaim was not barred, even if the
January 22, 2008, notice of default could be
construed as accelerating the due date of the
sums owing under the note. The district
court did not err when it held that the Defen-
dants’ action to foreclose the mortgage was
not time barred,

The Plaintiffs cite The Union Central Life
Insurance Company v. Keith, 58 Idaho 471,
74 P.2d 699 (1987), for the proposition that
the statute of limitations begins to run when
the note holder accelerates as due all sums
owing under a promissory note. The original
version of Idaho Code section 5-214A was
enacted in 1951, ch. 254, § 1, 1951 Idaho
Sess. Laws 254, 255, almost fourteen years
after that case was decided. They also cite
Thomas v. Goff, 100 Idaho 282, 596 P.2d 794
(1979), but that case dealt with the acerual of
a cause of action under Idaho Code section 5-
216, which sets forth the statute of limita-
tions in “[aJn action upon any contract, obli-
gation or liability founded upon an instru-
ment in writing,” Id. at 285, 596 P.2d at 797.
The case did not involve an action to fore-
close a mortgage, which is governed by sec-
tion 5-214A,

HG. The district court’s decision
that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to
recover mesne profits. In their amended
complaint, the Plaintiffs asserted a cause of
action for mesne profits, They alleged that
they rented the real property as a vacation
rental and that they suffered damages from
lost rentals from the sale of the property to
UBS Investment Bank on January 8, 2010,

181

until they learned of the rescission of that
sale on June 7, 2011. In holding that they
were not entitled to recover mesne profits,
the district court gave three alternative
grounds for denying their claim for mesne
profits, It wrote:

[1] Because the Court has found that the
2010 sale of the property was not an illegal
foreclosure, Defendants did not wrongfully
possess the property. [2] Further, Defen-
dants had a right to secure and protect the
property during the time from the sale or
transfer of the property until the Notice of
Rescission of Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale
was recorded.pursuant to the Deed of
Trust. [8] Lastly, the Court finds that it
would be inequitable to allow the Baugh-
mans to recover lost rent profits when U.S.
Bank has been unable to, and will not be
able to, recover its lost profits due and
owing under the parties’ agreements,
Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to an
award of mesne profits,

HH sin asserting on appeal that the dis-
trict court erred, the Plaintiffs’ entire argu-
ment is, “Because the Defendants had no
lawful right to assert control, due to the
illegal foreclosure action, the Baughmans
were deprived of rental income and the Dis-
trict Court should ‘not have dismissed the
loss of mesne profits claim.” “We will not
consider assignments of error not supported
by argument and authority in the opening
brief.” Hogg, 142 Idaho at 559, 180 P.8d at
1097. In addition, “if an appellant fails to
contest all of the grounds upon which a dis-
trict court based its grant of summary judg-
ment, the judgment must be affirmed.” AED,
Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho
159, 164, 807 P.8d 176, 181 (2018). The Plain-
tiffs did not present argument and authority
showing that the court erred with respect to
any of the three grounds stated by the court,
much legs all three of them, Therefore, they
have not shown that the district court erred.

HM OH. The dismissal of the Plain-
tiffs’ claim for breach of contract, In their
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged as
a claim for breach of contract that “Defen-
dant Chevy Chase’s sale of the subject prop-
erty was a violation of the Deed of Trust,

182

which only allowed sale under specific cir-
eumstances, none of which applied to
BAUGHMAN.” They are referring to the
nonjudicial foreclosure sale on January 8,
2010, when the property was purportedly
sold to UBS Investment Bank.

The Defendants’ statement of undisputed
facts included the following:

5, The Deed of Trust provides that if the

Baughmans breach any covenant or agree-

ment contained in the Deed of Trust, the

trustee (at the lender’s request) may sell
the Property.

6. In 2008, the Baughmans breached

their obligations by, among other things,

failure to make monthly payments when
due and defaulted under the terms of the

Note and Deed of Trust.

In their statement of undisputed facts, the
Plaintiffs stipulated to Fact 5, and with re-
spect to Fact 6 they stated, “Plaintiffs agree
and stipulate that in 2008 they failed to make
monthly payments due under the Note and
Deed of Trust, Plaintiff [sic] do not stipulate
or agree that they breached any other obli-
gations due under the Note and Deed of
Trust.” The Plaintiffs do not argue that fail-
ing to make the payments as they come due
is not one of the “specific circumstances” that
would authorize foreclosure.

The Plaintiffs appear to argue that UBS
Investment Bank did not have authority to
foreclose on the property because the assign-
ment of the promissory note and beneficial
interest in the deed of trust did not occur
until May 4, 2009, which was four months
after the January 29, 2009, notice of default.
The assignment was recorded on May 4,
2009, but the date of the assignment was
November 15, 2008. In their affidavits oppos-
ing the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, Mr. and Ms. Baughman both stat-
ed that they were personally served with the
January 29, 2009, notice of default. That no-
tice stated as a separate paragraph, “The
beneficial interest under said deed of trust
and the obligations secured thereby is cur-
rently held by UBS Investment Bank.”

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Idaho Code
section 45-1510 does not authorize the rescis-
sion of a trustee’s sale merely because the
purported holder of the promissory note and

deed of trust is a nonentity and the trustee’s
deed is issued to that nonentity. They state,
“The statute does not provide for a lender to
rescind a sale due to its own errors.”

Their breach of contract claim alleged in
their amended complaint is not based upon
the rescission of the trustee’s deed. Never-
theless, the applicable portion of Idaho Code
section 45-1510 states:

(2) Where a trustee’s sale held pursuant
to section 45-1506, Idaho Code, is invalid
by reason of automatic stay provisions of
the U.S, bankruptcy code, or a stay order
issued by any court of competent jurisdic-
tion or otherwise, recordation of a notice of
rescission of the trustee’s deed shall re-
store the condition of record title to the
real property described in the trustee’s
deed and the existence and priority of all
lienholders to the status quo prior to the
trustee’s sale.....

The statute permits rescission when the
sale is invalid for one of three reasons: (1) by
reason of automatie stay provisions of the
US. bankruptcy code, (2) by reason of a stay
order issued by any court of competent juris-
diction (8) or is otherwise invalid. The trus-
tee’s sale in this case was invalid for the
third reason. The purported transfer of the
promissory note and beneficial interest in the
deed of trust was made to a purported entity
that did not exist, and the trustee’s deed was
made to a purported entity that did not exist.
“In order that an instrument may be opera-
tive as a deed conveying title to, or interest
or estate in, land, the grantee named in the
deed must be a person, natural or artificial,
in existence at the time of conveyance and
capable of taking title.” 28 Am. Jur. 2d § 21
(2018) (footnotes omitted). “A deed to a ficti-
tious grantee, or which names as grantee a
person who has no existence, is inoperative
and void.” Id.

I, The remaining issues raised by the
Plaintiffs and US Bank’s Counterclaim.
The remaining issues raised by the Plaintiffs
are that the district court erred in: (a) deny-
ing their motion for an injunction barring
any foreclosure, (b) refusing to grant their
claim for quiet title to the real property, (c)
granting US Bank permission to foreclose,

(d) dismissing the Plaintiff's action with prej-
udice, (e) denying their motion to continue
the hearing on their motion for reconsidera-
tion so they could conduct further discovery
as to when the loan was accelerated, (f)
denying their motion for reconsideration as
to when the loan was accelerated, (g) issuing
the decree of foreclosure, and (h) issuing a
writ of execution. All of these alleged errors
are resolved by the above decision. US
Bank’s counterclaim deals with the interpre-
tation of Idaho Code section 5-214A, which
has also been resolved.

I.

Is Either Side Entitled to an Award
of Attorney Fees on Appeal?

HM The Plaintiffs seek an award of at-
torney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section
12-121. “In order to be eligible for an award
of attorney fees under Idaho Code section
12-121, the party must be the prevailing par-
ty on appeal.” Armand v. Opportunity
Mgmt. Co., Inc., 155 Idaho 592, 602, 815 P.8d
245, 255 (2018). The Plaintiffs have not pre-
vailed on this appeal.

WM The Defendants also seek an
award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code section 12-121. Attorney fees can be
awarded under that section only when this
Court finds that the appeal was brought,
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreason-
ably, or without foundation. Ch. 47, § 2, 2017

183

Idaho Sess. Laws 75, 76. “Apportionment of
attorney fees is appropriate for those ele-
ments of the case that were frivolous, unrea-
sonable, and without foundation.” Idaho Mil-
itary Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156
Idaho 624, 632, 329 P.8d 1072, 1080 (2014).
The interpretation of Idaho Code section 5-
214A was a matter of first impression in this
appeal, and therefore we will not award at-
torney fees on that issue pursuant to Idaho
Code section 12-121. The remaining issues on
appeal were pursued frivolously and without.
foundation, so we will award the Defendants
attorney fees in responding to those issues.

Iv.
Conclusion.

We affirm the judgment of the district
court, and we award Respondents costs on
appeal and attorney fees on appeal for re-
sponding to all issues other than the inter-
pretation of Idaho Code section 5-214A,

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY concur.

184

395 P.3d 804

GREEN RIVER RANCHES, LLC, an
Idaho Limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant,

vw

SILVA LAND COMPANY, LLC, et al.,°

Defendants-Counterclaimants.

Jack McCall, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve

Max Silva, an individual; Defendant-
Appellant,

and
Silva Dairy, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company, Defendant.
Jack McCall, Plaintiff,
v.
Silva Land Company, LLC,
et al., Defendants.

Jack McCall, an individual and doing
business as JT Livestock, Plaintiff-
Respondent,

v.
Max Silva, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No, 43548

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Twin Falls, May 2017 Term.

Filed; May 26, 2017

185

Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen, Idaho Falls,
for appellant. Nathan Olsen argued.

Givens Pursley LLP, Boise, for respon-
dent. Bradley J, Dixon argued.

HORTON, Justice.

Max Silva appeals from the judgment of
the district court in Twin Falls County find-
ing him personally liable for the purchase of
116 dairy cows. This appeal is part of a
consolidated action brought by Jack McCall
and Green River Ranches, LLC (Green Riv-
er) against Silva, Silva Dairy, LLC (Silva
Dairy), and Silva Land Company, LLC, After
a bench trial, the district court found Silva
personally liable for the purchase of the cows
and dismissed the other claims against him.
Silva contends that the district court erred
when it found him personally liable for the
purchase. Silva also argues that the district
court abused its discretion when it failed to
award him attorney fees proportionate to the
claims on which he prevailed at trial. We
affirm.

186

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The consolidated action began as four sep-
arate lawsuits arising from transactions in-
volving a dairy operation. This appeal focuses
on the claims asserted by McCall against
Silva personally.

Silva Dairy and Green River began work-
ing together in approximately 2009. Silva is a
part owner of Silva Dairy and McCall is a
part owner of Green River. On August 18,
2010, Silva Dairy filed for Chapter 12 bank-
ruptey. After Silva Dairy filed for bankrupt-
cy, McCall negotiated two transactions with
Silva for the sale of dairy cows. The first
transaction was for 101 cows and the second
was for fifteen cows. There was no written
agreement for either sale. The primary issue
in this appeal is whether McCall sold the
cows to Silva in his individual capacity or in
his capacity as an agent of Silva Dairy.

McCall asserted claims against Silva for (1)
mismanagement of McCall’s dairy herd; (2)
conversion of McCall’s cattle feed; (8) pasture
rent; (4) an unpaid loan for $10,000; (5) dam-
ages for the sale of 15 cows; and (6) damages
for the sale of 101 cows. After a bench trial,
the district court held that Silva was not
personally liable for the first three claims
because Silva Dairy was liable on those
claims. As to the fourth claim, the district
court found that McCall lent $10,000 to Silva
personally but that the loan was offset
against McCall’s lease obligation to Silva
Dairy. As to the final two claims, the district
court found that McCall sold the cows to
Silva personally and not to Silva Dairy. The
cost of the cows was not disputed and the
district court entered judgment in favor of
McCall in the amount of $104,770.55 plus
prejudgment interest.

The district court then found that that
there was no prevailing party in the action
because each side had prevailed on some
claims and failed to prevail on others. There-
fore, the district court did not award attor-
ney fees or costs. Judgment was entered on
July 16, 2015. Silva timely appealed.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW
HE “This Court limits its review of a
trial court’s decision to determining ‘whether

the evidence supports the findings of fact,
and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions of law’” City of Meridian v.
Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 484-35, 299 P.38d
282, 241-42 (2018) (quoting Shore v. Peter-
son, 146 Idaho 908, 907, 204 P.8d 1114, 1118
(2009). “Unless the trial court’s findings of
fact are clearly erroneous, they will not be
set aside.” Id. at 435, 299 P.8d at 242. “A
district court’s findings of fact in a court-
tried case are construed liberally on appeal
in favor of the judgment entered.” Elec.
Wholesale Supply Co. Inc. v. Nielson, 136
Idaho 814, 820, 41 P.8d 242, 248 (2001). “It is
the province of the trier of fact to weigh
conflicting évidence and testimony and to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id.
“However, when the issue is one of law, this
Court exercises free review of the trial
court’s decision.” Reed v. Reed, 187 Idaho 58,
56, 44 P.8d 1108, 1111 (2002),

HM “An award of attorney fees and
costs is within the discretion of the trial court
and subject to an abuse of discretion stan-
dard of review.” Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho
898, 901, 104 P.3d 367, 375 (2004). “In review-
ing an exercise of discretion, this Court must
consider ‘(1) whether the trial court correctly

erceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (8) wheth-
er the trial court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.” Id. at 902, 104 P.3d at
876 (quoting Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc.
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).

I. ANALYSIS
This appeal is focused on the claims be-
tween McCall and Silva. Silva contends that
the district court erred when it held him
personally liable for the purchase of 116
cows. Silva also argues that the district court
erred when it found that neither party pre-
vailed below. These issues will be discussed
in turn,
A. The district court’s finding that
McCall sold the cows to Silva person-
ally is not clearly erroneous.

HM The district court held that McCall
sold the cows to Silva personally and not as

an agent of Silva Dairy. This determination
was based on testimony from McCall and the
fact that the bankruptcy court did not ap-
prove the purchase of the cows. Silva argues
that the district court misapplied the law of
agency. Silva also asserts that Silva Dairy
did not need permission from the bankruptcy
court to purchase the cows as the purchase
was done in the ordinary course of business.

Hl Silva contends that he was acting as
an agent for Silva Dairy when he purchased
the cows and should not be liable unless it
was under the theory of the “undisclosed
agent” as discussed in Agrisowrce, Inc. v.
Johnson, 156 Idaho 908, 382 P.38d 815 (2014).
While agents generally are not liable for the
debts of the principal, the district court made
the factual determination that Silva was not
acting as an agent when he purchased the
cows from McCall. The district court based
its findings on McCall's testimony that he
knew Silva Dairy was in bankruptcy and
wouldn’t transact business with them.

“Review of a district court’s findings of
fact is limited to ascertaining whether the
evidence supports the findings of fact and
whether the findings of fact support the con-
dusions of law.” Electrical Wholesale Sup-
ply, 186 Idaho at 820, 41 P.8d at 248, “A
district court's findings of fact in a court-
tried case are construed liberally on appeal
in favor of the judgment entered.” Jd. “It is
the province of the trier of fact to weigh
conflicting evidence and testimony and to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id.

McCall testified that he told Silva that he
was purchasing cows for Silva personally. “I
said, at the 64 cents a pound, I'll buy the
cows for you, Max, but I’m buying them for
you, Max Silva.” McCall further testified that.
he told Silva that he would not buy the cows
for Silva Dairy unless it was able to give him
a check at the time of purchase. McCall
stated that he was not going to “carry papers
on these cows” for a bankrupt entity but that
he would for Silva. The district court explicit-
ly evaluated the credibility of McCall’s testi-
mony, concluding that “McCall’s testimony
that he knew of [Silva Dairy’s bankruptcy
filing] and that based upon his experience
with bankruptcy proceedings there was ‘no
way’ he would ever enter into transactions

187

with a bankrupt entity is very convincing.”
Because this factual determination is sup-
ported by evidence in the record, the district
court did not err when it found Silva was
personally liable for the purchase of the
cows.

In addition to McCall’s testimony, the dis-
trict court relied on the fact that Silva Dairy
never asked permission from the bankruptcy
court to purchase the cows as support for its
finding that Silva personally bought the
cows. Silva contends that Silva Dairy did not
need permission to purchase the cows as the
purchase was done in the ordinary course of
business. While Silva correctly states the law,
there is evidence in the record to support the
district court’s finding that the purchase of
the cows was not in the ordinary course of
business.

A debtor in chapter 12 bankruptcy pro-
ceedings may operate the farm in the ordi-
nary course of business without notice to the
court, If USC. § 1208; 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(c)(1). Silva Dairy’s bankruptcy attor-
ney testified that while purchasing replace-
ment cows may be within the ordinary course
of business, purchasing a new herd was not.
The bankruptey trustee testified that pur-
chasing cows outside the ordinary course of
business would need to be approved by the
bankruptcy court and trustee.

Silva’s argument is that Silva Dairy could
purchase cows in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. While Silva is correct, Silva does not
point to any evidence in the record that
would suggest the purchase of 116 cows was
done in the ordinary course of business. Be-
cause there is evidence to support the district
court’s finding that Silva Dairy did not re-
ceive permission from the bankruptcy court
to purchase these cows, the district court did
not err in relying on this fact when it found
that McCall sold the cows to Silva personally.

In short, although there was substantial
conflicting evidence presented to the district
court, substantial competent evidence sup-
ports the district court’s factual determina-
tion that McCall sold the cows to Silva per-
sonally.

188

B. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it found that there
was no prevailing party.

HM Silva next argues that the district
court erred when it did not award attorney
fees to him in proportion to the claims on
which he prevailed, The district court found
that because all of the claims had been con-
solidated into one action there was no pre-
vailing party. Silva argues that because the
district court expressly held that he was the
prevailing party on some claims that he
should be awarded attorney fees for those
claims. We find that the district court did not
abuse its discretion.

Idaho Code section 12-120(8) permits the
prevailing party in a case involving a com-
mercial transaction to recover attorney fees
and costs. IC, § 12-120(8). Neither party
disputes that this is a commercial transaction
and the prevailing party is entitled to an
award of attorney fees, The issue is whether
Silva was a prevailing party below.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(1)(B)* describes how courts determine
whether a party has prevailed:

In determining which party to an action
is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion
consider the final judgment or result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by
the respective parties, The trial court in its
sound discretion may determine that a par-
ty to an action prevailed in part and did
not prevail in part, and upon so finding
may apportion the costs between and
among the parties in a fair and equitable
manner after considering all of the issues
and claims involved in the action and the
resultant judgment or judgments obtained.

LR.C.P. 54(4)(1)(B). “When both parties are
partially successful, it is within the court’s
discretion to decline an award of attorney

1. We decide this case based upon the rule in
effect at the time of the district court’s decision.
Effective July 1, 2016, the Rule was amended to
provide as follows:

Prevailing Party. In determining which party
to an action is a prevailing party and entitled
to costs, the trial court must, in its sound
discretion, consider the final judgment or re-
sult of the action in relation to the relief sought

fees to either side.” Smith v. Mitton, 140
Idaho 893, 908, 104 P.8d 367, 377 (2004). “The
determination of who is a prevailing party is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and we will not disturb that determi-
nation absent an abuse of discretion.” Bream
v, Benscoter, 189 Idaho 364, 868, 79 P.8d 728,
7277 (2008). “Only in rare cases has this Court
or the Court of Appeals reversed a trial
court’s determination of which party pre-
vailed.” Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172,
178, 219 P.8d 1188, 1189 (2009) (quoting
Shore v, Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204
P.8d 1114, 1126 (2009)).

HI When determining who is a prevail-
ing party, the district court looks at all the
claims involved in the action and does not
make a claim-by-claim determination of who
is the prevailing party. Jd. at 174, 219 P.8d at
1190. In Israel v. Leachman, 189 Idaho 24,
72 P.8d 864 (2008), the district court held
that there was no prevailing party in an
action after the plaintiffs prevailed on some
of their claims but lost on others. Affirming
the decision of the district court to not award
attorney fees, this Court held that the dis-
trict court has the discretion to examine all
the claims asserted in an action and deter-
mine whether either party prevailed. Jd. at
27, 72 P.8d at 867.

The district court recognized that the de-
termination of who prevailed was a discre-
tionary matter. The district court further
recognized that Silva had successfully de-
fended some claims brought against him by
McCall but was unsuccessful on other claims.
The district court reasoned that “the claims
and defenses in these matters were so inter-
mixed that it would be virtually impossible to
attempt to reasonably apportion fees....”
We conclude that Silva has not demonstrated
that the district court abused its discretion
when it held that neither party prevailed in
the action

by the respective parties. The trial court may
determine that a party to an action prevailed in
part and did not prevail in part, and on so
finding may apportion the costs between and
among the parties in a fair and equitable man-
ner after considering all of the issues and
claims involved in the action and the resulting
judgment or judgments obtained.
LR.CP, 54(d)(1)(B) (2016).

C. McCall is entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.

HMI Both parties request attorney fees
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(8),
Both parties agree that this appeal arose
from a commercial transaction. Because we
affirm the judgment of the district court,
McCall is the prevailing party and is entitled
to attorney fees and costs on appeal.

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the decision of the district court
and award attorney fees and costs on appeal
to McCall.

Justices EISMANN, JONES and Justices
Pro Tem KIDWELL and CRABTREE

concur,

395 P.3d 809
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
Y

Sterling Gene BRAND, Defendant-
Appellant, .

State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
vw

Joshua Michael Nall, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket No, 44221

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed; May 81, 2017

189

im)
Ss

aT

Eric D, Fredericksen, Idaho State Appel-
late Public Defender, Boise, attorney for ap-
pellants. Jenevieve Swinford argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, attorney for respondent.
Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

BURDIOCK, Chief Justice.

In this consolidated appeal out of Ada
County, we address credit for time served
under Idaho Code section 18-309. Sterling G.
Brand and Joshua M. Nall each pled guilty to
their respective charges while they were al-
ready incarcerated due to unrelated charges.
Brand and Nall then moved for credit for
time served under section 18-309, requesting
credit for the time spent incarcerated after
being served with the arrest warrants until
judgments of conviction were entered, even
though they were already incarcerated due to
unrelated charges. The district court denied
both motions, and the Idaho Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. We granted Brand’s and
Nall’s timely petitions for review, and we
now reverse the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

A. State v. Brand

On November 4, 2014, while jailed in Ada
County on a drug possession charge, Brand
was served with an arrest warrant for a
grand theft charge. On November 7, 2014,
Brand was sentenced to seven years with two
years fixed for the drug possession charge.
On March 24, 2015, Brand pled guilty to the
grand theft charge.

On May 12, 2015, the district court entered.
a judgment of conviction and commitment on
the grand theft charge, sentencing Brand to
an aggregate term of fourteen years with two
years fixed and with the remaining twelve
years to run concurrently with the sentence
entered on the drug possession conviction.
The district court gave Brand four days’
credit for time served. Brand moved for the
eredit to be increased to 190 days—caleulat-
ed from when he was served with the grand
theft arrest warrant on November 4, 2014, to
when judgment for that conviction was en-
tered on May 12, 2015. The district court
denied the motion, explaining that “if you are
in custody on separate charges and then
unrelated charges are filed and you're in

custody, you don’t get credit for that time
because you're not being held on the new
charges, you're being held on the original
charges.” Brand timely appeals.

B. State v. Nall

On July 23, 2018, while jailed in Ada Coun-
ty on a U.S. Marshals “no bond” hold related
to charges in a federal case, Nall was served
with an arrest warrant for several state
charges, including conspiracy to commit bur-
glary and providing a firearm to a gang
member. On August 22, 2018, Nall began
serving a thirty-month sentence for the fed-
eral charges.

The U.S. Marshals “no bond” hold was
converted to a detainer so that the State
could pursue its charges against Nall. On
February 26, 2014, Nall pled guilty to con-
spiracy to commit burglary and providing a
firearm to a gang member. On June 3, 2014,
the district court entered a judgment of con-
viction and commitment on the state charges,
sentencing Nall to an aggregate term of ten
years with two years fixed. That sentence
‘was set to run concurrently with Nall’s feder-
al sentence. In its judgment of conviction and
commitment, the district court noted that
“filf [Nall] does not receive credit for time
served in Federal Custody, then [Nall] shall
receive credit for three hundred sixteen (816)
days served in prejudgment incarceration as
provided by § 18-309, Idaho Code.” On July
22, 2014, the State received confirmation
from federal authorities that Nall had re-
ceived credit for time served in federal custo-
dy.

On November 38, 2014, the State filed a
motion to clarify credit for time served. In
that motion, the State pointed out that even
though Nall had received credit for time
served on his federal sentence, the Idaho
Department of Corrections had still awarded
credit for time served on his state sentence.
As such, the State requested that Nall be
awarded “zero (0) days of credit” on his state
sentence. On July 16, 2015, the district court.
granted the State’s motion, concluding Nall
was not entitled to any credit for time served
on his state sentence. Nall timely appeals.

191

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE When addressing a petition for re-
view, this Court will give “ ‘serious consider-
ation to the views of the Court of Appeals,
but directly reviews the decision of the lower
court.’” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491,
337 P.3d 647, 650 (2014) (quoting State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.8d 387, 389
(2007),

Il, ANALYSIS

HH Idaho Code section 18-809 governs
credit for time served. It provides in relevant
part as follows:

In computing the term of imprisonment,
the person against whom the judgment
was entered shall receive credit in the
judgment for any period of incarceration
prior to entry of judgment, if such incar-
ceration was for the offense or an included
offense for which the judgment was en-
tered.

LC. § 18-309(1). This appeal concerns the
meaning of the phrase “if such incarceration
was for the offense or an included offense for
which the judgment was entered.” Id. (em-
phasis added). The issue to be decided is
whether this statutory language authorizes
eredit for time served where the relevant
period of presentence incarceration is both
initiated and maintained due to a prior, unre-
lated offense, This Court exercises free re-
view over statutory interpretation because it
is a question of law. Pocatello v. State, 145
Idaho 497, 500, 180 P.8d 1048, 1051 (2008).
Statutory interpretation begins with the stat-
ute’s plain language. State v. Burnight, 182
Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999), That
language “is to be given its plain, obvious and
rational meaning.” Id. If that language is
clear and unambiguous, “the Court need
merely apply the statute without engaging in
any statutory construction.” Id.

I We recently construed section 18-309
in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 348 P.8d 30
(2015), The defendant in Owens pled guilty to
eight counts of issuing a check with insuffi-
cient funds. Id, at 2, 343 P.3d at 31. The
district court sentenced him to fifteen
months with six months fixed on each of the
eight counts, which were set to run consecu-

192

tively. Id. The district court granted him
eredit for time served under section 18-309,
but on just one of the eight counts. Id. at 2-8,
348 P.3d at 81-82. The defendant moved for
reconsideration of that calculation, arguing
he was entitled to credit for time served on
each of the eight counts, but his motion was
denied. Id. at 8, 843 P.3d at 32. The defen-
dant timely appealed to this Court, raising
the issue whether section 18-309 authorizes
credit for prejudgment time served on each
sentence for each count. Id, at 3-4, 343 P.8d
at 82-33. We concluded it does and explained
as follows:

Idaho Code section 18-809’s language
plainly gives credit for prejudgment time
in custody against each count’s sentence,
The statute does not limit that credit in
any way. First, Idaho Code section 18-309
mandates that a court gives a defendant
eredit for his time served because the stat-
ute states that a person “shall” receive
credit. Second, section 18-809 specifies that
a person “shall receive credit in the judg-
ment for any period of incarceration prior
to entry of judgment....” ILC, § 18-809
(emphasis added). The statute continues to
provide that a defendant gets the credit
only on a requirement that incarceration
was for “the offense or an included offense
for which the judgment was entered.” The
statute has a mandatory directive that spe-
cifically conditions credit for time served
on the fact that the incarceration was for
“the offense” for which the judgment was
entered. While the word “offense” is singu-
lar, the phrase “if such incarceration was
for the offense or an included offense for
which the judgment was entered” simply
describes the type of incarceration that a
defendant gets credit for. This indicates
that as long as the defendant’s prejudg-
ment jail time was for “the offense” the
defendant was convicted of and sentenced
for, the court gives the defendant that
credit. If the legislature had delineated
credit for incarceration for “each case” or
another description other than “the of-
fense,” the outcome would be different.

Id, at 4, 848 P.8d at 83. In sum, “[wle hfelld
Idaho Code section 18-309’s plain language
unambiguously states that a defendant re-
ceives credit for time served on each of his

offenses, whether to be served concurrently
or consecutively.” Id. Accordingly, Owens es-
tablished that credit for time served can
accrue on multiple offenses simultaneously.

In this case, the district court held that
section 18-309 does not authorize credit for
time served where the relevant period of
presentence incarceration is both initiated
and maintained due to a prior, unrelated
offense. In Brand’s case, the district court
stated that “if you are in custody on separate
charges and then unrelated charges are filed
and you're in custody, you don’t get credit
for that time because you're not being held
on the new charges, you’re being held on the
original charges.” And in Nall’s case, the
district court similarly stated “when [Nall]
was served with the Ada County arrest war-
rant in this case, [Nall] was already being
detained as a consequence of charges in the
federal case.... [TJhe Ada County warrant
had no effect upon [Nall’s] liberty when he
was already subject to confinement for the
federal charges.”

HMM Section 18-309’s plain language
steers us to a different result, The statute
mandates credit for “any period of incarcera-
tion” where “such incarceration was for the
offense or an included offense for which the
judgment was entered.” 1.C. § 18-8309 (em-
phasis added). Put another way, section 18-
809 entitles Brand and Nall to credit for time
served “as long as [their] prejudgment jail
time was for ‘the offense’ [they were] convict-
ed of and sentenced for[.]” Owens, 158 Idaho
at 4, 343 P.3d at 88. Aside from that require-
ment, the statute “does not limit that credit
in any way.” Id. Section 18-309 does not limit
credit for time served only if, for example,
the offense for which the defendant is jailed
is that which caused the defendant’s initial
deprivation of liberty. Rather, section 18-309
applies to all offenses that provide a basis for
the defendant’s incarceration. It is irrelevant
if the defendant's incarceration rests on sev-
eral, unrelated offenses, as the fact remains
that each offense provides a basis for the
defendants incarceration. This principle
lends itself to the following two-prong test,
which, if satisfied, mandates credit for time
served under section 18-309: first, the defen-
dant must have been incarcerated during the

intervening period from when the arrest war-
rant was served and the judgment of convic-
tion was entered; and second, putting aside
any alternative reason for the defendant’s
incarceration, the relevant offense must be
one that provides a basis for the defendant’s
incarceration. Cf Owens, 158 Idaho at 4, 348
P.8d at 33 (explaining that credit can accrue
“towards all ... counts at the same time”).

We articulate four scenarios to provide
guidance as to how credit is to be deter-
mined:

Scenario 1: Defendant is already in custo-
dy on unrelated charges. He is served with
an arrest warrant which requires defendant
to post bail. Defendant does not post bail and
remains in custody until sentencing. Defen-
dant is entitled to credit from the date of
service of the warrant through the date of
sentencing.

Scenario 2: Defendant is already in custo-
dy on unrelated charges. He is served with
an arrest warrant. At his initial appearance
later that day, the State persuades the court
to release defendant on his own recogni-
zance. Due to the unrelated charges, defen-
dant remains in custody until sentencing,
Defendant is entitled to credit for 1 day
served.

Scenario 3: Defendant is subject to a war-
rantless arrest. At his initial appearance the
next day, bail is set at $500. Defendant posts
eash bail the same day, but prior to his
release from jail, he is served with a warrant
setting bail on an unrelated charge. He re-
mains in custody until sentencing. Defendant.
is entitled to credit for 2 days served on the
warrantless arrest charge.

Scenario 4: Defendant is subject to a war-
rantless arrest. At his initial appearance the
next day, bond is set at $500. Defendant
obtains a surety bond the same day, but
prior to his release from jail, he is served
with a warrant setting bail on unrelated
charges. After the surety’s bail agent learns
of the new charge, the bail agent provides
the sheriff with a certificate of surrender.
Defendant remains in custody until sentenc-
ing, Defendant is entitled to credit for 2 days
served prior to the posting of the surety
bond as well as credit from the day the

193

certificate of surrender was delivered to the
sheriff through the date of sentencing on the
warrantless arrest charge.

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court’s orders denying Brand
and Nall credit for time served are reversed.
We remand both cases for the district court
to enter the correct credit for time served.

Justices EISMANN and HORTON concur.

BRODY, Justice, dissenting,

T respectfully dissent from the opinion of
the majority. Idaho Code section 18-809 gov-
erns credit for time served:

(1) In computing the term of imprison-
ment, the person against whom the judg-
ment was entered shall receive credit in
the judgment for any period of incarcera-
tion prior to entry of judgment, if such
incarceration was for the offense or an
included offense for which the judgment
was entered,

LC. § 18-809, The question raised in this
case was whether a party may receive credit
for presentence incarceration where that par-
ty was already incarcerated due to a prior,
unrelated offense.

The Court of Appeals addressed the inter-
pretation of section 18-309 before we granted
Brand and Nall’s petitions for review. While
I understand this Court reviews cases inde-
pendently of the Court of Appeals, I agree
with the Court of Appeals’ analysis and could
not say things any better. The Court of
Appeals held:

The directive of IC. § 18-809 is mandato-

ry, specifying that a person shall receive

credit for prejudgment incarceration, State

v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176,

177 (Ct.App.1993). This means that the

defendant is entitled to credit for all time

spent incarcerated before judgment. State

2. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 21, 19 P.8d 501,

505 (Ct.App.2014). The converse is also

true—that the defendant is not entitled to

credit under I.C. § 18-309 for any time not
actually spent incarcerated before judg-
ment. Moore, 156 Idaho at 21, 319 P.8d at

505; see also State v. Hernandez, 120 Ida-

ho 785, 792, 820 P.2d 880, 887 (Ct.App.

194

1991) (stating that I.C. § 18-809 does not
allow the defendant to receive credit for
more time than he or she has actually been
in confinement). Accordingly, a district
court may only give credit for the correct
amount of time actually served by the de-
fendant prior to imposition of judgment in
the case; the district court does not have
discretion to award credit for time served
that is either more or less than that.
Moore, 156 Idaho at 21, 319 P.3d at 505.
Thus, the defendant is entitled to credit for
time actually served prior to entry of judg-
ment in the case, Id.

However, I.C. § 18-809 confers a right to

credit only if the presentence incarceration

‘was a consequence of or attributable to the

offense for which the sentence is imposed.

State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122

P.8d 1167, 1168 (Ct.App.2005); State v.

Rodriguez, 119 Idaho 895, 897, 811 P.2d

505, 507 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Hale, 116

Idaho 768, 765, 779 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct.App.

1989), Credit is to be given only if the

presentence incarceration was caused by

the offense for which a sentence is being
imposed. Horn, 124 Idaho at 850, 865 P.2d
at 177. Moreover, when a defendant is
charged with a second crime while already
incarcerated for a first offense, credit is
not authorized if “the pending proceeding
has no effect whatever upon a defendant’s

liberty.” State v. Dorr, 120 Idaho 441, 448,

816 P.2d 998, 1000 (quoting State v. Moli-

ga, 118 Idaho 672, 675, 747 P.2d 81, 84

(Ct.App. 1987)). The purpose of 1.C. § 18-

309 and similar statutes “is to eliminate

unequal treatment of indigent prisoners

who, because they were unable to post bail,
are confined longer than their wealthier

counterparts.” Dorr, 120 Idaho at 448, 816

P.2d at 1000.

State v. Brand, No. 48441, —- Idaho ——,
—, — P.38d —, —, 2016 WL 886541,
at “2 (Ct.App. Mar. 9, 2016); see also State v.
Nall, No. 48442, 2016 WL 1008051, at *2
(Ct.App. Mar. 14, 2016).

In the first case, Brand was served the
arrest warrant for his grand theft offense
while he was already incarcerated for drug
possession. In the second case, Nall was in
the custody of the U.S. Marshalls on a “no

bond” hold related to charges in a federal
ease. While in federal custody, Nall was
served with a state warrant for conspiracy to
commit burglary, promoting gang activity,
unlawful possession of a firearm, and supply-
ing a firearm to a criminal gang member,
Neither Brand nor Nall was incarcerated for
the crime for which they requested credit.
Neither party was deprived of any freedom
in relation to those charges, rather for other
charges. Where a party is already in custody
on account of another offense, there is no
presentence deprivation of liberty. Accord-
ingly, there is no underlying justification to
grant credit for time served.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent
from the opinion of the Court. The orders of
the district court should be affirmed.

JONES, Justice, concurs.

395 P.3d 814
In the Matter of Jane Doe II, A Minor
Child Under Eighteen (18) Years
of Age.
John DOE and Jane Doe II, Husband and
Wife, Petitioners-Respondents,
v
John DOE I (2016-45), Respondent-
Appellant.

Docket No. 44662

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: May 81, 2017

Pe)
aa

Tera Harden, Chief Public Defender, Cald-
well, for appellant.

Marcus Christian Hardee & Davies, LLP,
Boise, for respondent.

ON THE BRIEFS

BRODY, Justice

This is a parental rights termination and
adoption case. John Doe I (“Father”) is in-
carcerated. The magistrate court held that it
was in the best interest of Jane Doe IIT
(“Child”) that Father’s rights be terminated
so that John Doe IT (“Stepfather”) may
adopt her, We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Jane Doe II (“Mother”) and Father are
the natural parents of Child. Mother and
Father began living together in 2007, and
Child was born in early 2008. Mother and
Child lived with Father until early 2011,
when Mother and Father separated due to
continuous domestic violence perpetrated by
Father. Since her parents separated, Child
has been in the primary physical custody of
Mother and has had minimal contact with
Father.

In June 2011, Father was charged with
second degree murder, In November 2011, a
jury found him guilty of second degree mur-
der and he was sentenced to a minimum of
fifteen years confinement, with a subsequent
indeterminate period not to exceed life.

While Father was in jail awaiting trial,
Mother and Child visited him frequently. Af-
ter sentencing, Father was transferred to the

Idaho State Correctional Institute in Boise,
Mother and Child visited him there once in
September 2012, This was the last physical
contact Child had with Father. Shortly after
this visit, Father was transferred to a prison
in Colorado. In early 2016, he returned to the
Correctional Institute in Boise. Father made
frequent phone calls to Child until 2013 when
Mother, out of concern for Child, began re-
stricting calls to Child. Thereafter, Father
sent a few letters to Child, but has essential-
ly had no contact with Child since then,

In 2018, Mother began dating Stepfather,
In May 2015, Mother and Stepfather were
married, Mother and Stepfather have two
children together, and they, Child and their
two children live as a family in Nampa.
Mother and Stepfather operate two daycare
centers in Nampa. Stepfather has acted as a
father figure to Child since he began dating
Mother, and has had the care, custody and
control of Child since he married Mother in
2015, Stepfather loves Child and has normal
parent-child interactions with her. Although
Child is aware that Father is her biological
father, she calls Stepfather “Dad.” Stepfa-
ther is willing and able to provide financial
and emotional support to Child.

In February 2016, Stepfather, with the
consent of Mother, filed a pro se Petition for
Adoption of Child. Father filed an answer
objecting to the petition and seeking dismiss-
al of the action. After obtaining counsel,
Mother and Stepfather, as co-petitioners,
filed an Amended Petition for Termination of
Parent/Child Relationship and Adoption by
Stepparent, Thereafter, a trial was held and
the magistrate court issued its Memorandum
Deeision and Order. The court concluded that
Mother and Stepfather had proven by clear
and convincing evidence that Father would
be incarcerated during Child’s entire minori-
ty and that it was in the best interest of
Child to terminate Father’s parental rights
under Idaho Code section 16-2005. Accord-
ingly, the court ordered that Father's paren-
tal rights as to Child be terminated. Father
timely appealed.

IL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Whether substantial and competent ev-
idence supports the magistrate court’s

determination that the termination of
Father’s parental rights was in the
best interest of Child.

2, Whether Mother’s consent to the adop-
tion of Child by Stepfather complied
with statutory requirements,

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

The applicable standards of review will be
addressed in the appropriate sections below.

Iv. ANALYSIS

A. Substantial and competent evidence
supports the magistrate court’s de-
termination that termination is in
the best interest of the child.

Hl This is an adoption and termination of
parental rights filed under Idaho Code sec-
tion 16-2005(1)(e). Chapter 20 of Idaho Code
Title 16 governs the termination of parental
rights. IC. § 16-2001. The stated purpose of
the chapter is to “provide for [the] voluntary
and involuntary severance of the parent and
child relationship and for substitution of pa-
rental care and supervision by judicial pro-
cess,” while recognizing the implicit philoso-
phy that “wherever possible[,] family life
should be strengthened and preserved.” I.C.
§ 16-2001(1)(a), (2). Idaho Code section 16-
2005(1) provides that parental rights may be
terminated if it is in the best interests of the
child and at least one of the following condi-
tions exists:

(a) The parent has abandoned the child,

(b) The parent has neglected or abused

the child.

(c) The presumptive parent is not the

biological parent of the child,

(@) The parent is unable to discharge pa-

rental responsibilities and such inability

will continue for a prolonged indeterminate
period and will be injurious to the health,
morals or well-being of the child. [and/or]

(e) The parent has been incarcerated and

is likely to remain incarcerated for a sub-

stantial period of time during the child’s
minority.
(emphasis added). “Each statutory ground is
an independent basis for termination.” In re

197

Doe, 143 Idaho 348, 345, 144 P.8d 597, 599
(2006).

HMM Additionally, it is well established
that “the relationship between a parent and
child is constitutionally protected,” so princi-
ples of due process are implicated. Quilloin
v. Walcott, 484 U.S, 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549,
654, 54 L.Hd.2d 511, 519 (1978). Due process
requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. In re Doe, 148 Ida- *
ho at 345, 144 P.8d at 599. On review, this
Court determines whether the trial court’s
decision was supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Id. at 845-46, 144 P.8d
at 599-600. “Substantial, competent evidence
is such evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Obviously,
the substantial evidence test requires a
greater quantum of evidence in cases where
the trial court finding must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence, than in cases
where a mere preponderance is requited.”
Id. at 346, 144 P.8d at 600 (quoting In re
Bush, 118 Idaho 878, 876, 749 P.2d 492, 495
(1988). .

Wl Father argues that there is an impor-
tant bond. between he and Child and that
there was no evidence presented that termi-
nation of Father’s parental rights was neces-
sary to prevent harm to Child. Father also
argues that the magistrate court decision to
terminate parental rights is improperly
made, as between a parent and a stepparent,
on the basis of who would be a better parent.
On these bases, Father contends that the
magistrate court erred in terminating his
parental rights, .

Hl The appropriate standard to be used
in determining whether a parent’s rights
should be terminated is in Idaho Code sec-
tion 16-2005, The relevant section for our
purposes is Idaho Code section 16-2005(1).
Whether termination of parental rights is
necessary to prevent harm to the child is not
the test required by Idaho Code section 16-
2005(1). Nor is it a determination of which
adult involved would be the “better” parent,
as Father correctly notes, In ve Doe, 157
Idaho 14, 17, 388 P.8d 125, 128 (2014) (declar-
ing that “[t}he issue in a termination pro-

198

ceeding is not whether the natural parent or
the stepparent would better discharge paren-
tal responsibilities”), Instead, the statute re-
quires that the magistrate court conduct a
best interest analysis and find the presence
of one or more of the specific statutory fac-
tors for proper involuntary termination. I.C.
§ 16-2005. Admittedly, the best interest anal-
ysis is wide-ranging and takes into consider-
ation a variety of factors. See Danti v. Danti,
146 Idaho 929, 935, 204 P.8d 1140, 1146
(2009) (declaring that “[i]In determining what
is in the child[ ls best interests, courts are
required to consider all relevant factors. Rel-
evant factors may include, but are not limited
to ... the interrelationship and interaction
between the children and their parents and
siblings; the extent the children have adjust-
ed to their school, home, and community; the
character and circumstances of the persons
involved; the need to promote continuity and
stability in the children’s lives; and domestic
violence” (internal citations omitted)). Ac-
cordingly, this Court has allowed trial courts
to consider a lack of evidence that termi-
nation of a parent’s parental rights is neces-
sary to prevent harm to the child as a factor
in its best interest analysis. In re Doe, 157
Idaho at 17, 333 P.8d at 128. However, this is
only one factor in a wide-ranging analysis
and not an overriding concern or emphasized
principle.

Here, the magistrate court applied the ap-
propriate standard and conducted its best
interest analysis in accordance with recog-
nized principles. In its decision, the magis-
trate court made extensive findings of fact
detailing the nature of the relationship be-
tween Mother and Father prior to their sepa-
ration, Father’s conviction and imprisonment,
Father’s attempts to maintain contact with
Child and the nature of the relationship be-
tween Father and Child, Mother and Stepfa-
ther, and Stepfather and Child. Based on
these findings, the court concluded that it
was in the best interest of Child that Fa-
ther’s parental rights be terminated. There is
substantial and competent evidence in the
record to support this conclusion. The record
indicates that Child was three and a half
years old when Father was sentenced and
thus will be eighteen and a half when Father
finishes serving his minimum sentence, a

condition which fulfills Section 16-2005(e).
The record also indicates that Child lives in a
safe, stable, nurturing environment with
Mother, Stepfather and her two half-siblings;
that Child and Stepfather love each other
and have normal parent-child interactions;
and that Stepfather is willing and able to
provide for the physical, emotional and finan-
cial needs of Child. It is also relevant that
Mother and Stepfather are pursuing termi-
nation and adoption primarily to allow Child
to remain with Stepfather and her half-sib-
lings in the event Mother becomes unavail-
able or indisposed. The court’s best interest
finding was not a judgment that Stepfather
would be a “better” parent. Rather, it was a
thoughtful decision that considered a range
of factors and concluded, on the basis of all
the facts before it, that termination of Fa-
ther’s rights was in the best interest of Child.
There was substantial and competent evi-
dence in the record to support this determi-
nation. We affirm the decision of the magis-
trate court.

B. Mother’s consent to the adoption of
Child did not violate statutory re-
quirements.

I Father asserts that Mother’s consent
to the adoption of Child did not conform with
the requirements of Section 16-2005(4) and
as a result Mother's consent is void and the
trial court is prohibited from undertaking a
best interest analysis in the termination pro-
ceeding in contemplation of Child’s adoption.

This contention is raised for the first time
on appeal. Father did not contest the validity
of Mother’s consent to Child’s adoption in the
proceedings below. Thus, it is not properly
addressed by this Court. Bradford v. Roche
Moving & Storage, Inc., 147 Idaho 783, 736,
215 P.8d 458, 456 (2009) (“We will not ad-
dress issues raised for the first time on ap-
peal”).

HM Additionally, although _ parental
rights termination proceedings and adoption
proceedings can be heard concurrently per
Idaho Code section 16-1506(4), rulings or
procedural defects in one proceeding do not
necessarily affect the other. Father is appeal-
ing the magistrate court’s termination deci-
sion by challenging the validity of Mother’s

consent for adoption. Idaho Code section 16-
1508(c) requires the mother’s consent for the
adoption of a child born outside marriage,
Termination proceedings are conducted prior
to but separate from adoption proceedings
and are governed by Idaho Code section 16-
2005, as set forth above. For termination to
proceed, the court must conclude that termi-
nation is in the best interest of the child and
find that one of the enumerated factors ex-
ists. Consent to adoption is not a relevant
inquiry in termination proceedings. Thus,
even if there were an issue with the form of
Mother’s consent to the adoption of Child, it
would have no bearing on the validity of the
court’s best interest analysis or the termi-
nation proceedings generally. Thus, the mag-
istrate court acted appropriately in conduct-
ing an analysis of the best interest of the
child, as required by Section 16-2005(1), as
part of the termination proceedings.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
order of the magistrate court terminating
Father’s parental rights.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and HORTON concur.

395 P.3d 819
Jimmy L. CHRISTY Jr.,
Claimant-Appellant,
v.

GRASMICK PRODUCE, Employer, Con-
solidated Electrical, Employer, Mr.
Mudd Concrete Corporation, Major Base
Employer, Idaho State Penitentiary,
Cost Reimbursement Employer, Em-
ployers-Respondents,

and
Idaho Department of Labor, Respondent.
Docket No. 43968
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: May 31, 2017

ee
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Ss

Ww
S
—)

Law Office of D, Blair Clark, PC, Boise,
for appellant. D, Blair Clark argued.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho At-
torney General, Boise, for respondent. Doug-
Jas Werth argued.

BRODY, Justice,

Claimant appeals the decision of the Idaho
Industrial Commission that found him ineligi-
ble for unemployment benefits based upon a
willful underreporting of earnings to the Ida-
ho Department of Labor.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Jimmy Christy filed an application for un-
employment benefits in December 2014.
Christy visited the Idaho Department of La-
bor (“IDOL”) for assistance with the website
application. Christy was shown an informa-
tional PowerPoint slideshow to assist appli-
cants during the filing process,

After he applied for benefits, Christy
worked part-time for Grasmick Produce. He
worked for Grasmick from January 2015 un-
til the end of March, Christy also worked for
Consolidated Electrical in March, Christy
testified that he was uncertain about how to
report his earnings so he visited a local
IDOL office where an employee told him to
“report what he gets.” Christy asserts that
this is why he reported his net earnings.

IDOL conducts cross-match audits on a
quarterly basis, A cross-match audit in-
volves comparing earnings reported by em-
ployers with the filings submitted by the
employee. In this case, IDOL received earn-
ings information from Grasmick Produce
and Consolidated Electrical to cross-match

Christy’s reported earnings. IDOL found
that the reports filed by the employers did
not match Christy’s reports. IDOL mailed
Christy a letter to the address the depart-
ment had on record asking him to explain
the discrepancy. IDOL requested a response
by June 5, 2015, at 6:00 p.m. Christy did not.
respond to the letter.

IDOL subsequently found that Christy
willfully misrepresented his weekly earnings.
On June 24, 2015, IDOL mailed Christy its
determination of ineligibility, which set forth
overpayment amounts and imposed civil pen-
alties, Christy: appealed the determination.

A telephonic hearing before an appeals
examiner was held on July 28, 2015. During
the hearing, Christy argued that he had re-
ported the net earnings from his jobs and
that his net earnings were based on a differ-
ent workweek than that used by IDOL. The
appeals examiner suggested, and the parties
stipulated, to vacate IDOL’s determination
and remand this matter so that a decision
could be made with corrected information.

On August 12, 2015, IDOL issued a deter-
mination based upon the corrected income
figures, IDOL found that Christy had willful-
ly misrepresented his earnings, and so it set
forth overpayment amounts and imposed civil
penalties. Christy appealed the determina-
tion to the appeals examiner,

On September 16, 2015, a second telephon-
ie hearing was held. The appeals examiner
heard additional testimony at that hearing,
including Christy’s testimony that despite at-
tending high school, he continues to have
problems with numbers and does not read
well. The appeals examiner then issued his
decision. He found that Christy willfully mis-
represented his weekly earnings, and thus
was ineligible for unemployment benefits,

Christy appealed the hearing examiner’s
decision to the Idaho Industrial Commission.
The Industrial Commission found that
Christy's explanations resolved only part of
the discrepancies revealed by the cross-
match audit. The Industrial Commission also
found that Christy had failed to report $400
in wages from Consolidated Electrical for
March, The Industrial Commission entered
its decision finding that Christy had willfully

201

misstated material facts in his weekly earn-
ings reports to IDOL and found him ineligi-
ble for unemployment benefits for each of
the weeks that earnings were willfully mis-
represented. The Industrial Commission also
imposed civil penalties and interest. Christy
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

IL

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.

1, Whether there was substantial and
competent evidence to support the In-
dustrial Commission’s finding that
Christy willfully failed to report a ma-
terial fact in order to obtain benefits.

2. Whether any party is entitled to attor-
ney’s fees,

tL

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMMM “This Court upholds decisions of
the Industrial Commission unless (1) the
Commission has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of its powers; (2) the Commission’s
findings of fact are not based on substantial
and competent evidence; (8) the findings of
fact, order or award were procured by fraud;
(4) as a matter of law, the findings of fact do
not support the order or award.” Locker v.
How Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 699, 268 P.8d
750, 758 (2011) (citing IC, § 72-782), The
Court exercises free review over questions of
Jaw. Id, at 699, 268 P.8d at 758,

HMMM “Because the Commission is the
fact finder, its conclusions on the credibility
and weight of the evidence will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless they are clearly er-
roneous, This Court does not weigh the evi-
dence or consider whether it would have
reached a different.conclusion from the evi-
dence presented.” Funes v. Aardema Dairy,
150 Idaho 7, 10, 244 P.8d 151, 154 (2010)
(quoting Hacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus.,
186 Idaho 788, 785, 40 P.8d 91, 98 (2002)),
“The Court will not re-weigh the evidence.”
Cow v. Hollow Leg Pub and Brewery, 144
Idaho 154, 157, 158 P.8d 980, 983 (2007).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla
of proof, but less than a preponderance, It is

202

relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion.” Jen-
sen v. City of Pocatello, 185 Idaho 406, 412,
18 P.38d 211, 217 (2000) (quoting Zapata v.
JR. Simplot Co., 182 Idaho 513, 515, 975
P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999)). “[T]his Court views
all the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the party who prevailed before
the Industrial Commission.” Bell v. Idaho
Dep. of Labor, 157 Idaho 744, 746-47, 339
P.8d 1148, 1150-51 (2014) Gnternal citations
omitted).

Iv.

ANALYSIS

A. There is substantial and competent ev-
idence to support the Industrial Com-
mission’s finding that Christy willful-
ly failed to report a material fact.

WM Christy argues that the Industrial
Commission erred in finding that he willfully
failed to report material facts in order to
obtain benefits. He asserts that there were
mistakes in his reporting, but there is no
evidence of a “willful” misreporting. Christy's
argument is unavailing.

WM The Industrial Commission made its
eligibility determination based on Idaho Code
section 72-1366(12), which provides that an
employee is ineligible for unemployment ben-
efits for a period of one year if it is deter-
mined that the employee “willfully” made a
false statement or “willfully” failed to report
a material fact in order to obtain benefits.
Section 72-1366(12) states in relevant part:
“A claimant shall not be entitled to benefits
for a period of fifty-two (52) weeks if it is
determined that he has willfully made a false
statement or willfully failed to report a mate-
vial fact in order to obtain benefits.” IC.
§ 72-1366(12). It only takes one reporting
violation to make an individual ineligible for
unemployment benefits. See McNulty v. Sin-
clair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 588, 272 P.8d
554, 560 (2012).

Under section 72-1866(1), “a fact is materi-
al if it is relevant to the determination of a
claimant’s right to benefits; it need not actu-
ally affect the outcome of that determina-
tion.” Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99
Idaho 754, 760, 589 P.2d 89, 95 (1979). Here,
the amount of Christy’s earnings is a fact
relevant to the determination of Christy's

rights to benefits. The question, therefore,
becomes whether the discrepancies in report-
ing were “willful” or due to a misunderstand-
ing or mistake.

HM This Court has explained that the
term “willful” as used in Section 72-1866 (12)
does not mean that someone has acted mali-
ciously or with what the law calls an “evil
yaind.” McNulty, 152 Idaho at 586-87, 272
P.8d at 558-59, The term “willful” means a
willingness to commit the act:

[Willfully] implies simply a purpose or will-

ingness to commit the act or make the

omission referred to. It does not require
any intent to violate law, in the sense of
having an evil or corrupt motive or intent. -

Tt does imply a conscious wrong, and may

be distinguished from an act maliciously or

corruptly done, in that it does not neces-
sarily imply an evil mind, but is more
nearly synonymous with “intentionally,”

“designedly,” “without lawful excuse,” and

therefore not accidental.

Id. (quoting Meyer, 99 Idaho at 761, 589 P.2d
at 96). “{TJhe legislature intended to disquali-
fy claimants who knowingly or consciously
fail to report material facts, but not to punish
accidental omissions due to negligence or
misunderstanding.” Id.

This Court addressed a situation, which is
similar to this one, in McNulty v. Sinclair
Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 272 P.3d 554 (2012).
McNulty filed for unemployment during the
off-season between April, 2009 and Novem-
ber, 2009. Id. at 583, 272 P.3d at 555. While
collecting benefits, McNulty began working
at another job. Id. He failed to report his
employment status and wages to IDOL. Jd.
IDOL discovered the discrepancy, and after
speaking with McNulty, decided that he was
ineligible for benefits under section 72-
1866(12). Id. at 584, 272 P.8d at 556. On
appeal, this Court considered whether IDOL
had clearly posted the instructions for com-
pleting the wage reports, Id. at 587, 272 P.8d
at 559. At that time, IDOL had a system
prompt, a booklet, and signage instructing
applicants as to how complete the forms. Id.
MeNulty testified that he did not report
earnings under $284.00 because he had been
told that it would not impact his eligibility.
Id. The problem with this explanation was
that he had also failed to report earnings on
weeks where he earned over that amount. Id.

In other words, his explanation did not ex-
plain the discrepancies. This Court found
that there was substantial and competent
evidence to support the Industrial Commis-
sion’s finding that McNulty willfully failed to
disclose material facts in order to obtain
benefits, Jd. at 589, 272 P.3d at 561,

There is no dispute that Christy’s wage
reports do not accurately reflect the gross
amount of his earnings. Christy argues that
English is not his native language and that
he struggled with numbers and reading while
in school. He argues that he did not under-
stand the reporting instructions that were
contained in the instructional video he
watched when he applied for benefits and
that the drop-down menu on the weekly elec-
tronic reporting form did not specify that he
report gross earnings. He argues that he
visited an IDOL office in Meridian where an
employee told him to “report what he got”
and that is why he reported net earnings
rather than gross earnings. He also claims
that IDOL uses a Sunday to Saturday wage
period, while Grasmick uses a Monday to
Sunday tracking period, and that this ac-
counts for discrepancies in some of the week-
ly wages reported.

The Industrial Commission created a de-
tailed table comparing the weekly earnings
reported by Christy with the net amount of
the check actually written by the employer.
The Commission analyzed thirteen weeks of
benefits and found that Christy's testimony
that he reported net earnings from his em-
ployer explained the reported earnings in
four of the thirteen weeks. The Commission
also found, however, that for one of the
weeks where Christy reported net earnings
from Grasmick Produce as he testified, he
also failed to report any earnings from Con-
solidated Electric during that same period
even though he had earned an additional
$400.00. The Industrial Commission also ex-
amined Christy’s claim that Grasmick used a
different work week than IDOL’s reporting
week. The Industrial Commission found that
if Christy were reporting his net earnings
from his paycheck as he claimed (and was
done for three of the weeks at issue), the fact
that he forgot about having worked an extra
day for Grasmick would not have changed
the net earnings on his paycheck. Christy's
claim that he forgot to include one of his

203

work days when reporting how much he
earned actually undermines his claim that he
‘was reporting his net earnings.

While Christy claims that he lost his bene-
fits for making a mistake, he overlooks the
fact that the Industrial Commission actually
allowed benefits for the three weeks where
Christy’s reported earnings were the same as
the net earnings reported by the employer.
This was a partial reversal of the appeal
examiner's decision.

It is well understood that this Court up-
holds decisions of the Industrial Commission
unless the Commission’s findings of fact are
not based on substantial and competent evi-
dence. Locker, 151 Idaho at 699, 263 P.8d at
758 (citing LLC. § 72-782). In this case, the
Industrial Commission’s determination that
Christy willfully failed to report his earnings
is supported by substantial and competent
evidence, As such, we must affirm.

On a final note, Christy argues that civil
penalties should not have been imposed un-
der I.C. § 72-1869(2) because there was no
evidence to support the Industrial Commis-
sion’s finding of “willfulness.” Given our deci-
sion today, civil penalties were properly
awarded.

B. Neither party is entitled to attorney’s
fees.

Christy and IDOL each request attorney’s
fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code
section 12-117. Christy is not the prevailing
party, and thus, is not entitled to attorney’s
fees. IDOL argues that it should receive
attorney’s fees; however, it does not appear
as though Christy acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law. No attorney’s fees are
awarded,

v.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the order of the Industrial Com-
mission. Costs to IDOL.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and HORTON concur,

204

395 P.3d 824
Bryan N. HENRIE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve

The CORPORATION OF the PRESIDENT
OF the CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 44091

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: May 31, 2017

Cooper & Larsen, Chartered, Pocatello,
attorneys for appellant. Javier Gabiola ar-
gued,

Moffatt Thomas, Pocatello, attorneys for
respondent. Bradley J. Williams argued.

JONES, Justice
IL Narore or THe Case

This case arises out of injuries suffered by
Bryan N. Henrie (“Henrie”) while he was
participating in a community service event
organized by the Mormon Helping Hands
(‘Helping Hands”), a priesthood-directed
program run by the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints (the “Church”). Henrie
asserts on appeal that the district court erred
when it dismissed his tort claim on summary
judgment. We affirm the judgment.

IL Facruan AND PRoceDURAL BACKGROUND

In June of 2012, a fire broke out in the
Charlotte Creek area of Pocatello. Once the
fire had been put out, Helping Hands con-
ducted a wide-scale effort to clean up the
burned area. Henrie was a member of the
Paradise Ward of the Church, where he was
the president of the Elder’s Quorum. In late
June of 2012, Henrie was contacted by Bish-
op Fred Zundel and instructed to mobilize
the members of the Quorum to aid in the
cleanup effort. Henrie characterizes the
Bishop’s instruction as “an order,” which he
felt “compelled” to follow due to’ his status in
the Church,

On July 14, 2012, Henrie traveled to Cen-
tury High School, where Helping Hands had
set up a staging area for volunteers to sign in
to participate in the cleanup. When he ar-
rived at the high school a person’, whom
Henrie took to be a representative of the
Church, handed him a smock with the Help-
ing Hands logo on it. Henrie testified as
follows:

1. In his testimony, Henrie admitted that he does the person who gave him the smock was male or
not remember who this person was, or even if female.

Q: Okay. And did she say anything about
it?

A: Whoever it was—I remember getting it.
It was handed to me and I remember
saying this is really big. And they said,
well it’s all we've got left, because appar-
ently, they'd been picked clean—well,
not—I don’t know how clean because, you
know, I can’t vouch for how many were
left. But at that point they said this is all
we've got left.

Q: Okay. And it looked big to you, too big
for you, is that what you're saying?

A: It looked really big. And, I mean, I
don’t know what their standard was, but, I
mean, to me it seemed—it could have been
a lot tighter fit—like a lot tighter fitting.

Q: And was there any discussion about
whether you had to wear it or should wear
it or-

A: Yes, there was.

Q: What was that discussion?

A: I was told that I had to wear it to
participate in the cleanup. It was required.

Henrie was assigned to work with a crew
on a property off Gibson Jack road. He spent
the day felling burned trees and rolling or
throwing the wood down an embankment on
the property to be hauled away later. Later
that day, Henrie was attempting to throw a
tree stump down the embankment when it
caught on his smock. He was pulled down the
embankment by the stump, severely injuring
his right knee in the process.

On July 11, 2014, Henrie filed a complaint
against the Church. Therein, Henrie asserted
that “[a]t the very least, Defendant had a
duty not to supply Plaintiff with gear or
clothing that would put him or his bodily
safety in danger or ultimately harm him ...
Defendant breached this duty of care.” He
further asserted that “Defendant owed a
duty to Plaintiff to use reasonable care in
nominating, training, and supervising any
and all of the clean-up organizers and volun-
teers, including those who spoke with and
directed Plaintiff.”

On December 16, 2015, the Church filed a
motion in limine to exclude evidence. There-
in, the Church requested that the district

207

court exclude any testimony given by Henrie
with respect to statements made by the vol-
unteer who gave him his smock. The Church
argued that such statements were offered “to
prove that the Church ‘mandated’ that every-
one wear a smock in order to participate.”
Accordingly, the Church concluded, such
statements were offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted and therefore were inad-
missible hearsay. The Church preemptively
argued that those statements do not qualify
as an admission of a party opponent because
“{w]hen the declarant is unknown or uniden-
tifiable a plaintiff cannot show that the de-
clarant was an agent of the principal.”

Concurrently with its motion in limine, the
Church filed a motion for summary judgment
on all of Henrie’s claims. Therein, the Church
asserted that: (1) “the Church had no duty to
foresee or predict the accident ... because
[it was] a ‘freak’ accident[] that [was] not
‘veasonably’ foreseeable and [didn’t] impose
unreasonable risks of harm”; and (2) “Henrie
cannot adduce admissible evidence to support
his proximate cause elements of his claims

. Henrie cannot adduce any admissible
evidence that the Church forced him to wear
the smock.”

On March 16, 2016, the district court en-
tered a memorandum decision and order, in
which it found that: (1) “[t]here is no ques-
tion the alleged statements made by the un-
own and unidentifiable volunteer are hear-
say ... [and] the record is utterly devoid of
any evidence of an agency relationship be-
tween the unidentifiable person handing out
the smocks and the Church [so the state-
ments do not qualify as admissions of a party
opponent]; (2) “{ujnder the facts presented
here, there is nothing to indicate the Church
could foresee or reasonably be expected to
anticipate the type of harm that occurred
here ... [s]o this Court cannot find a basis
for imposing a duty on Defendant in this
instance”; (8) “there is no special duty be-
tween the Church and Mr. Henrie”; and (4)
“the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the exis-
tence of a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the cause of his injuries because
he has failed to offer admissible evidence to
support his theory of causation.”

208

Concurrent with the order the district
court entered summary judgment dismissing
the case. Henrie appeals.

TM. Issues on APPEAL

1. Did the district court err in determin-
ing that no issue of material fact exist-
ed as to whether the Church had a
special relationship with Henrie such
that it had an affirmative duty to con-
trol or protect him?

2. Did the district court err in determin-
ing that no issue of material fact exist-
ed as to whether the Church’s duty of
care extended to the causes of Henrie’s
injury?

8. Did the district court err in granting
the Church’s motion in limine with re-
spect to the statements of the unidenti-
fied volunteer?

4, Did the district court err in determin-
ing that no issue of material fact exist-
ed as to Henrie’s theory of proximate
cause?

5. Is either party entitled to attorney's
fees on appeal?

IV. Sranparp or Revirw

HH soOn appeal from the grant of a
motion for summary judgment, this Court
utilizes the same standard of review used
by the district court originally ruling on
the motion, Summary judgment is proper
“$f the pleadings, depositions, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c), When considering
whether the evidence in the record shows
that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the trial court must liberally construe
the facts, and draw all reasonable infer-
ences, in favor of the nonmoving party.

Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 785,
866 P.8d 1088, 1095 (2016) (quoting Golub v.
Kirk-Hughes Dev, LLC, 158 Idaho 78, 75—
76, 343 P.3d 1080, 1082-83 (2015),

When reviewing the trial court’s eviden-
tiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse
of discretion standard. Dulaney v. St. Al-

phonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr, 187 Idaho 160,
168-64, 45 P.8d 816, 819-20 (2002). “To
determine whether a trial court has abused
its discretion, this Court considers whether
it correctly perceived the issue as discre-
tionary, whether it acted within the bound-
aries of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards, and whether it
reached its decision by an exercise of rea-
son.” Perry v. Magic Valley Reg Med.
Ctr., 184 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821
(2000).

State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 450, 875 P.8d

279, 280 (2016).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not err when it
found that the Church did not have a
special relationship with Henrie such
that it had an affirmative duty to con-
trol or protect him.

Hs «Under Idaho law, “one owes the
duty to every person in our society to use
reasonable care to avoid injury to the other
person in any situation in which it could be
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a

failure to use such care might result in such

injury.” Doe v. Garcia, 181 Idaho 578, 581,
961 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1998) (quoting Alegria v.
Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135,
187 (1980)) (emphasis in original). Converse-
ly, “[t]here is ordinarily no affirmative duty
to act to assist or protect another absent
unusual circumstances, which justify impos-
ing such an affirmative responsibility, An
affirmative duty to aid or protect arises only
when a special relationship exists between
the parties.” Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fra-
ternity, 188 Idaho 888, 899, 987 P.2d 300, 311
(1999).
A special relationship can have two sepa-
rate but related aspects. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts states that “(a) a special
relation exists between the actor and a
third person which imposes a duty upon
the actor to control the third person’s con-
duct, or (b) a special relation exists be-
tween the actor and the other which gives
the other a right to protection.” Turpen v.
Granieri, 188 Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669,
673 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS § 315 (1966)). Thus,

having control over someone or a duty to
protect that person is indicative of a spe-
cial relationship.
Beers v. Corporation of President of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155
Idaho 680, 686, 316 P.8d 92, 96 (2013).

This Court has listed examples of indi-
viduals having a duty to control another as
“a parent’s duty to control his child, an
employer’s duty to control an employee
while at work, or a law enforcement offi-
cer’s duty to control a dangerous prison-
er.” Turpen, 183 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at
678. “The common element in each of these
is knowledge of an unreasonable risk of
harm and the right and ability to control
the third party’s conduct.” Id. Thus, a spe-
cial relationship imposing a duty to control
another’s conduct requires a foreseeable
risk and the right and ability to control
that person’s conduct.

Id?

We only engage in a balancing of the

harm in those rare situations when we are
called upon to extend a duty beyond the
scope previously imposed, or when a duty
has not previously been recognized....
Determining whether a duty will arise in a
particular instance involves a consideration
of policy and the weighing of several fac-
tors which include:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plain-
tiff, the degree of certainty that the plain-
tiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s con-
duct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of impos-
ing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability,
eost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved (citations omitted).

Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d
148, 149 (1995) (quoting Isaacs v. Hunting-

2. Other “[elxamples of the types of ‘special rela-
tionships’ which give rise to a duty to aid or
protect include duties owed by: 1) a common
carrier to its passengers; 2) an innkeeper to his
guests; 3) a possessor of land who holds his land

209

ton Mem'l Hosp., 88 Cal.8d 112, 211 Cal.
Rpir, 356, 695 P.2d 658, 658 (1985)).

Accordingly, in Coghlan, when presented
with a tort action filed by a university stu-
dent who was injured when she fell, while
intoxicated, from the third-story fire escape
of her sorority house, this Court held that a
neither a university nor a sorority have “the
kind of special relationship creating a duty to
aid or protect adult students from the risks
associated with the student’s own voluntary
intoxication.” Coghlan, 183 Idaho at 400, 987
P.2d at 812, This Court reasoned that “col-
lege students today are no longer minors;
they are now regarded as adults in almost
every phase of community life.... [TJhe
modern American college is not an insurer of
the safety of its students” Id. at 8399-400, 987
P.2d at 811-12.

In Beers, this Court held that neither the
Corporation of the President of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the
“COP”), nor the Autumn Faire Ward of the

Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day
Saints (the “Ward”), had a special relation-
ship to a minor who was injured jumping off
a bridge into a river while attending a camp-
out organized by the Ward. 155 Idaho at
687-88, 316 P.8d at 99-100. This Court rea-
soned that “there is no evidence that the
Ward had any right or ability to control [the
injured minor’s] actions. The Ward did not
have the ability to compel [the injured mi-
nor’s] attendance at the campout or the
Ward-planned activities.” Id. at 687, 316 P.8d
at 99, The Court also determined that it was
not in the public interest to recognize a spe-
cial relationship using the framework de-
scribed in Rife:

We are unable to ascribe moral blame to
the COP for this incident. We can, howey-
er, ascertain negative consequences to the
community that would result from impos-
ing a duty and resulting liability upon reli-
gious organizations to members of their
open to members of the public who enter upon
the land in response to his invitation; and 4) one

who takes custody of another.” Coghlan, 133
Idaho at 313, 987 P.2d at 401.

210

faith. The result would be a powerful disin-
centive to organized fellowship activities.
Id. at 687-88, 316 P.8d at 99-100.

HM Henrie asserts on appeal that the
district court’s finding that no special rela-
tionship existed was error. He argues that a
special relationship existed between himself
and the Church arising out of the alleged fact
that he “did not have the discretion to ig-
nore” the “assignment” from Bishop Zundel
to participate in the community service pro-
ject. He further asserts that “the Church had
the right to control Mr. Henrie’s conduct” as
evidenced by the fact that “Mr. Henrie []
never said no to his bishop’s requests.” Final-
ly, he argues (albeit without actually identify-
ing any legal issues) that “all of these issues
were for the jury to decide, not the District
Court.” We find that these arguments are
without merit,

The district court did not err in determin-
ing that there was no special relationship
between Henrie and the Church sufficient to
create an affirmative legal duty for the
Church to control Henrie’s actions or to pro-
tect him from harm. Despite Henrie’s asser-
tions to the contrary, the facts alleged in this
case indicate that Henrie’s conduct was at all
times completely voluntary and that he could
have chosen not to participate in the cleanup
project. This Court takes as true, the fact
that Henrie felt obligated to participate in
the cleanup out of a sense of duty to the
Church. However, Henrie’s subjective sense
of obligation is fundamentally different from
the type of control that gives rise to a special
relationship. A parent has a special relation-
ship with a child because that parent has a
legal right and duty to control that child’s
actions. The same is true of a police officer
with respect to a criminal in custody, and, to
a more limited extent, an employer to an
employee, Conversely, the Church had no
right to control Henrie’s actions here. As in
Beers, the Church organized an activity for
which participation was voluntary. A member
of the Church voluntarily participated and
was injured. The fact that he felt duty bound
to participate does not mean that his partic-
ipation was not voluntary or that the Church
had a right to control him, It follows that no
special relationship existed.

Furthermore, public policy factors weigh
against this Court creating an affirmative
duty for the Church to control and protect
Henrie in this case. The injury here, as ex-
plained below, was not foreseeable. There is
no moral blame that can be ascribed to the
Church for organizing an opportunity for its
members to provide a much needed commu-
nity service and encouraging them to partici-
pate, Finally, there could be severe costs to
the community if such a duty were recog-
nized because it would have the effect of
chilling the willingness and ability of Helping
Hands and other charitable organizations to
provide beneficial community services.

B. The district court did not err in find-
ing that no issue of fact existed as to
whether or not the Church had a gen-
eral duty to prevent Henrie’s injury.
Hs A cause of action for common.

Jaw negligence in Idaho has four elements:
“(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring
the defendant to conform to a certain stan-
dard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty;
(8) a causal connection between the defen-
dant’s conduct and the resulting injury;
and (4) actual loss or damage.” Nation v.
State Dep’t of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 189,
158 P.3d 958, 965 (2007) (quoting O’'Guin v.
Bingham County, 142 Tdaho 49, 52, 122
P.8d 808, 811 (2005).

Stoddart v. Pocatello School Dist. #25, 149

Idaho 679, 688-84, 239 P.3d 784, 788 (2010).
In general, it is held that one owes the

duty to every person in our society to use
reasonable care to avoid injury to the other
person in any situation in which it could be
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a
failure to use such care might result in
such injury....
Every person has a general duty to use
due or ordinary care not to injure oth-
ers, to avoid injury to others by any
agency set in operation by him, and to
do his work, render services or use his
property as to avoid such injury.
In determining whether such duty has
been breached by the allegedly negligent
party, his conduct is measured against that
of an ordinarily prudent person acting un-

der all the circumstances and conditions
then existing.
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619
P.2d 135, 187 (1980) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).

Foreseeability is a flexible concept which
varies with the circumstances of each case.
Where the degree of result or harm is
great, but preventing it is not difficult, a
relatively low degree of foreseeability is
required. Conversely, where the threat-
ened injury is minor but the burden of
preventing such injury is high, a higher
degree of foreseeability may be required.
Thus, foreseeability is not to be measured
by just what is more probable than not,
but also includes whatever result is likely
enough in the setting of modern life that a
reasonably prudent person would take
such into account in guiding reasonable
conduct.

Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,
300-01, 796 P.2d 506, 509-10 (1990) (citations
omitted).

HM ‘The question whether a risk of
harm is foreseeable is generally a question
for the trier of fact.” Caldwell v. Idaho Youth
Ranch, Inc., 182 Idaho 120, 125, 968 P.2d
215, 220 (1998) (citing Orthman v. Idaho
Power Co., 180 Idaho 597, 601, 944 P.2d 1860,
1864 (1997)). However, “when the undisputed
facts can lead to only one reasonable conelu-
sion, this court may rule upon the issue of
foreseeability as a matter of law.” Mico Mo-
bile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp.,
97 Idaho 408, 412-13, 546 P.2d 54, 58-59
(1975) (citing Munson v, State, Dep't of
Highways, 96 Idaho 529, 581 P.2d 1174
(1975)).

Accordingly, this Court has described its
task when confronted with a foreseeability
determination on summary judgment as fol-
lows:

In ruling on the correctness of the sum-
mary judgment entered in this case, we
must determine whether (appellants’) inju-
ry and the manner of its occurrence (were)
so highly unusual that we can say, as a
matter of law that a reasonable man, mak-
ing an inventory of the possibilities of
harm which his conduct might produce,

211

would not have reasonably expected the

injury to oceur,
Alegria, 101 Idaho at 620, 619 P.2d at 188
Gnternal quotation and citation omitted).

Henrie asserts that even if he did not have
a special relationship with the Church, the
Church still owed him a general duty not to
act in a way that would create an unreason-
able, foreseeable risk of harm. He argues
that the Church violated this duty. We dis-
agree.

In Alegria, this Court definitively
established that a party owes a duty to every
person to use reasonable care to avoid caus-
ing foreseeable injuries, 101 Idaho at 619,
619 P.2d at 187. This duty does not, by its
own language, extend to injuries that cannot
be reasonably anticipated or foreseen. Id.
Accordingly, whether a party owed a general
duty of care with respect to a particular
injury will depend on whether or not that
injury was a foreseeable result of the party’s
actions, Id. A foreseeability determination
can be made on summary judgment where
the injury caused is “so highly unusual that
We can say, as a matter of law that a reason-
able man, making an inventory of the possi-
bilities of harm which his conduct might pro-
duce, would not have reasonably expected
the injury to oceur.” Id. at 620, 619 P.2d at
138,

HN We agree with the district court’s
conclusion that a severe knee injury is a
highly unusual consequence of the actions
taken by the Church’s alleged agent (ie.
providing an oversize smock to a volunteer in
a post-fire cleanup community service project
and instructing that volunteer to wear the
smock), A reasonable person making an in-
ventory of possible harms would have diffi-
culty imagining the circumstances by which
Henrie’s knee injury came to pass, Further,
while it is not dispositive that Helping
Hands’ long history of providing smocks has
not resulted in any similar injuries, it does
support the conclusion that such an injury is
not likely to oceur,

On appeal, Henrie asserts that the district
court erred in assessing foreseeability be-
cause it assessed the specific mechanism of
injury rather than the general risk. He ar-

212

gues that “it is the inherent risk of injury of
working on a hillside, throwing large logs
down a hill, and the risk of harm associated
with that ... that is relevant.” Henrie is
incorrect on this point, While it is the general
risk of injury, rather than the specific injury,
which must be analyzed, the general risk of
injury in this case is not the risk associated
with throwing logs down a hill. Throwing
logs down a hill was Henrie’s voluntary ac-
tion and was not an action on the part of the
Chureh, The Church’s action, which is the
basis of Henrie’s negligence theory, was pro-
viding Henrie an oversize smock and telling
him that he had to wear it (with the knowl-
edge that he would be participating in the
cleanup). It was making Henrie wear the
smock, not the inherent risk involved in the
cleanup project, which forms the foundation
of the negligence claim here; and, it is that
action from which the injury must have been
foreseeable.

Henrie’s knee injury is not a foreseeable
result of making Henrie wear a smock, even
an oversized one for a cleanup project. Ac-
cordingly, we affirm the district court’s con-
clusion on summary judgment that no duty
existed based on a lack of foreseeability.

C. This Court need not address whether
or not the district court abused its
discretion when it found that Henrie’s
testimony regarding the Church’s al-
leged agent was hearsay.

We need not reach this issue because the
district court did not err when it found on

summary judgment that no duty existed
which could serve as the basis of liability.

D. This Court need not address whether
or not the district court erred when it
found on summary judgment that
Henrie could not prove that the
Church’s actions were the proximate
cause of his injuries.

We need not reach this issue because the
district court did not err when it found on
summary judgment that no duty existed
which could serve as the basis of liability,

E. Neither party is entitled to attorney’s
fees on appeal.

Neither party is entitled to receive attor-
ney’s fees on appeal, This action was not
pursued or defended frivolously or without
foundation.

VI. ConcLusion
We affirm the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment to the Church. No attorney’s
fees are awarded on appeal. Costs to the
Church.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and Justice pro tem
‘WALTERS concur,

395 P.3d 1246
Sarah Marie JOHNSON, Petitioner-
Appellant,
vy.
STATE of Idaho, Respondent,
Docket No. 42857
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: May 12, 2017

st
nN

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP,
Boise, for appellant. Dennis A. Benjamin ar-
gued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General Boise, for respondent. Jessica
Lorello, Deputy Attorney General argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Sarah Johnson appeals from the Blaine
County district court’s order dismissing her
successive petition for post-conviction relief.
On appeal, Johnson argues: (1) the district
court erred in denying her request under
Idaho Code section 19-4902 for additional
DNA testing; (2) that in light of Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 182 S.Ct. 2455, 183
L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Lou-
isiana, — U.S. —, 186 S.Ct. 718, 193
L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the district court erred in
dismissing her Eighth Amendment claim be-

215

eause as a minor, the imposition of two fixed
life sentences is cruel and unusual punish-
ment; and (8) this Court’s decision in Mur-
phy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365
(2014), which holds that ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel does not constitute
a sufficient reason for filing a successive
post-conviction petition, should be over-
turned. We affirm,

i. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Alan and Diane Johnson were shot and
killed in their home on September 2, 2008.
Sarah Johnson (Johnson), the Johnsons’ six-
teen year old daughter, was home at the time
of the shooting. Johnson consistently denied
any involvement, but gave several different
accounts of what she was doing, what she
saw, and what she heard prior to and after
the murders, However, in all accounts she
fled the home either before hearing the sec-
ond shot or immediately thereafter, After
fleeing the house, she ran to a neighbors’
house and the police were called. Johnson
was ultimately charged with both murders.

Police found a leather glove from a pair
usually kept in Diane’s SUV, Johnson’s keys,
including a key to the guesthouse, the maga-
zine of a nine-millimeter handgun wrapped in
a bandana, and two .264 caliber magnum
shells in Johnson’s bedroom. In a garbage
can outside of the residence the police also
found a latex glove, a leather glove (matching
the one found in Johnson’s bedroom), and a
pink robe covered in blood that belonged to
Johnson and had .25 automatic pistol ammu-
nition in the pocket. Testing revealed that
Johnson’s DNA was present inside of the
latex glove and that paint chips found inside
of the robe matched paint on the shirt John-
son was wearing on the morning of the mur-
ders.

The murder weapon, a .264 rifle, belonged
to Mel Speegle, who was renting the John-
sons’ guesthouse, but was out of town at the
time of the murders. There were no prints on
the rifle, scope, or ammunition that matched
Johnson's. Speegle testified at trial that he
kept the rifle in his closet, which was un-
locked. Speegle also testified at trial that
Johnson had access to the guesthouse, knew

216

he would be gone the weekend before the
murders, and knew that the rifle along with
his other guns and ammunition were located
in the closet. Johnson had a key to the
guesthouse and had been in there several
times including the days immediately preced-
ing the murders, A physical examination of
Johnson on the day of the murders revealed
linear bruising on Johnson’s left shoulder
that would be consistent with gun recoil.
Johnson testified that she got the bruising
when she tripped over a coffee table at her
boyfriend’s house over the weekend.

In 2005, after a lengthy trial, a jury found
Johnson guilty of the murder of her parents.
State v, Johnson (Johnson I), 145 Idaho 970,
972, 188 P.8d 912, 914 (2008). She was sen-
tenced to two fixed-life terms of imprison-
ment with a fifteen-year gun enhancement.
Id. Johnson’s first direct appeal was dis-
missed for failure to timely file a notice of
appeal. State v. Johnson (Johnson IT), 156
Idaho 7, 10, 819 P.8d 491, 494 (2014). Johnson.
then filed a petition for post-conviction relief
alleging, among other things, ineffective as-
sistance of counsel for her attorney’s failure
to timely file her notice of appeal. Id. The
district court found ineffective assistance of
counsel for the failure to timely file the no-
tice of appeal and re-entered the conviction
of judgment. Jd. Johnson then filed a timely
notice of appeal, and the district court stayed
proceedings on her remaining post-conviction
claims pending resolution of the direct ap-
peal. Jd. On direct appeal, we affirmed the
district court’s judgment of conviction. John-
son I, 145 Idaho at 980, 188 P.38d at 922.
Following resolution of her direct appeal,
Johnson filed a second amended petition for
post-conviction relief. Johnson II, 156 Idaho
at 10, 819 P.8d at 494.

In her second amended petition for post-
conviction relief, Johnson claimed, among
other things, that:

- () her trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to elicit testimony from Robert Ker-
chusky, the defense’s fingerprint expert;
(2) the unidentified prints on the murder
weapon, its scope, and an insert from the
box of ammunition were fresh; and (8)
newly discovered evidence warranted a
new trial. The newly discovered evidence

claim was based on the discovery that

Christopher Hill's fingerprints matched

the previously unidentified prints on the

murder weapon, its scope, and the ammu-

nition,
Id. The district court held an evidentiary
hearing on Johnson’s claims and denied re-
lief. Johnson appealed, and we affirmed. Jd.
at 18, 819 P.3d at 497. In regard to the newly
discovered evidence, we noted that identify-
ing the previously unidentified prints as
Hills did little to change the likelihood of
Johnson’s guilt and, in fact, due to Hill's
eredible testimony about why his prints were
on the rifle, “[made] the fingerprint testimo-
ny even less valuable than it was at the time
of the trial, when the defense could argue
that a nameless third party handled the gun,
the shells and removed the scope.” Id.

On April 9, 2012, with the help of pro bono
counsel, Johnson filed a DNA and Successive
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Succes-
sive Petition) and, almost two years later, on
January 22, 2014, an Amended DNA and
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(Amended Successive Petition), Following
Johnson’s filing of the Amended Successive
Petition, the district court ordered the Suc-
cessive Petition, the Amended Successive Pe-
tition, and an affidavit by Dr. Greg Hampiki-
an supporting the Successive Petition to be
filed “nune pro tune to April 9, 2012, in a
separate case and assigned a separate case
number.” Johnson’s allegations in her Second
Amended Petition can largely be narrowed
down to three issues: (1) a request for DNA
testing under Idaho Code section 19-4902(b);
(2) a claim under Miller and Montgomery
that her two fixed life sentences violate the
Eighth Amendment; and (8) an ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel claim
alleging numerous deficiencies.

The State filed a motion for summary dis-
missal of Johnson’s Amended Successive Pe-
tition, and the district court held a hearing
on the State’s motion. Following the hearing,
the district court issued a written opinion in
which it noted that Johnson conceded that
the claims relating to ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel were barred by Mur-
phy. The court then discussed the remaining
two issues—the request for DNA testing and

the Eighth Amendment claim—and granted
the State’s motion for summary dismissal.
Johnson timely appeals.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE Summary disposition of a petition
for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the
applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue
of material fact. On review of a dismissal of a
post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will deter-
mine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and ad-
missions together with any affidavits on file
and will liberally construe the facts and rea-
sonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party, A court is required to accept the peti-
tioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but
need not accept the petitioner’s conclusions.
When the alleged facts, even if true, would
not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial
court may dismiss the application without
holding an evidentiary hearing. Allegations
contained in the application are insufficient
for the granting of relief when (1) they are
clearly disproved by the record of the origi-
nal proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as
a matter of law.

Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.8a
1277, 1281 (2010) (quoting Charboneau v.
State, 144 Idaho 900, 908, 174 P.8d 870, 873
(2007).

Ul. ANALYSIS

A. Whether the district court erred in
denying Johnson DNA testing under
LC. § 19-4902,

Under Idaho Code section 19-4902, post-
conviction testing of DNA is generally avail-
able to a petitioner when: (1) the evidence to
be tested was not subject to the requested
testing because the technology for the testing
‘was not available at the time of the trial; (2)
identity was an issue in the trial; (8) the
evidence to be tested has been subject to a
proper chain of custody; (4) the result of the
testing has the scientific potential to produce
new evidence that would show it is more

1. Specifically, Johnson wishes to compare these
profiles to those in the FBI’s current Combined

217

probable than not that the petitioner is inno-
cent; and (5) the testing method would likely
produce admissible results under the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. 1.C. § 19-4902(b)-(e).
Johnson is seeking to have two different
categories of DNA samples tested. The first
involves DNA samples that were tested, ana-
lyzed, and profiled at the time of the trial but
‘were unmatched when run through law en-
forcement databases. Johnson wishes to re-
run these samples through current law en-
forcement databases, which now include
more DNA profiles with which to compare
the samples! The second category involves
testing DNA samples, which due to their
small size, were unable to be tested at the
time of the trial. The district court denied
post-conviction DNA testing on both catego-
ries of samples, ruling that the requested
testing failed to meet the requirements of
section 19-4902. Specifically, the district
court found that: (1) Johnson’s request to re-
run the previously analyzed DNA samples
through the expanded law enforcement data-
base did not involve technology that was not
available at the time of the trial; and (2)
although the DNA samples that were too
small to be tested previously did involve new
technology, the testing did not have the sci-
entific potential to produce new evidence that
would show it is was more probable than not
that Johnson was innocent. Johnson appeals
both findings, and we address each in turn.

1, Whether Johnson’s request to re-run
previously analyzed and tested DNA
samples through current law enforce-
ment databases constitutes a request
for testing that was not conducted at
trial “because the technology for the
testing was not available at the time of
trial,” _as_required under Idaho Code
section 19-4902(b).

THB Idaho Code section 19-4902(b) states:

A petitioner may, at any time, file a
petition before the trial court that entered
the judgment of conviction in his or her
case for the performance of fingerprint or
forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test-

DNA Index System (CODIS) database.

218

ing on evidence that was secured in rela-
tion to the trial which resulted in his or her
conviction but which was not subject to the
testing that is now requested because the
technology for the testing was not avail-
able at the time of trial.

LC, § 19-4902(b) (emphasis added). Thus,
under the statute, post-conviction DNA test-
ing is only available if the requested testing
relies on technology that was not available at
the time of the original trial. Johnson argues
that her request to compare a number of
unidentified but already analyzed and com-
piled DNA profiles with Christopher Hill's
DNA profile and an updated DNA profile
database satisfies this requirement.

In support of her argument, Johnson
points to a definition of technology found in
Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defining
technology as “a manner of accomplishing a
task especially using technical processes,
methods, or knowledge <new technologies
for information storage>.” * Focusing on the
knowledge aspect of the definition of technol-
ogy, Johnson argues that the now available
DNA profile of Christopher Hill and addi-
tional DNA profiles in the CODIS database
are new knowledge, ie., technologies, that
were not available at the time of trial. Thus,
Johnson asserts that her request to compare
unmatched and unidentified DNA samples
that were collected and profiled at the time
of trial to these newly available profiles en-
compasses technology that was not available
at the time of trial. Johnson further asserts
this definition of technology is supported by
the legislative purpose of section 19-4902.

HE When interpreting the meaning of
a word in a statute, this Court exercises free
review. State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286
P.8d 587, 589 (2012). In the absence of a
statutory definition, “[t]he language of a stat-

2. This definition is almost verbatim the one used
by the district court: “[A] manner of accomplish-
ing a task esp. using technical processes, meth-
ods, or knowledge.” (quoting Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 1206 (10th ed. 2001)).

3. The fall definition of technology from the same
online dictionary used by Johnson defines tech-
nology as:

1 a: the practical application of knowledge
especially in a particular area: engineering
<medical technology>

ute should be given its plain, usual and ordi-
nary meaning.” Albee v, Judy, 186 Idaho 226,
281, 81 P.8d 248, 258 (2001). To ascertain the
ordinary meaning of an undefined term in a
statute, this Court often turns to dictionary
definitions of the term. E.g., Marek v. Hecla,
Lid., 161 Idaho 211, 216, 884 P.3d 975, 980
(2016); Arnold v. City of Stanley, 158 Idaho
218, 221, 345 P.3d 1008, 1011 (2015).

Technology, as pointed out by Johnson, is
defined as: “a manner of accomplishing a
task especially using technical processes,
methods, or knowledge.” Thus, broken down,
technology is broadly the “manner of accom-
plishing a task” and particularly “the manner
of accomplishing a task using technical pro-
cesses, methods or knowledge.” In both the
broader and particular senses of the word,
the focus is on the “manner of accomplishing
a task.” But in the particular meaning, the
manner of accomplishing the task is nar-
rowed to the technical aspects of accomplish-
ing the task, ie, the “nuts and bolts” of how
the task is accomplished. Johnson, however,
suggests that technology can be defined by
the simple increase of knowledge, ie., that
increased knowledge or data standing alone
is technology. However, this interpretation
overlooks the primary definition of technolo-
gy, which requires not an increase or change
in knowledge, but rather the technical or
practical application of that knowledge to a
manner of accomplishing a task to produce a
new capability.? More simply, technology en-
compasses technical knowledge, which is the
knowledge relied on to change the “nuts and
bolts” of how a task is accomplished. Rather
than the simple increase or availability of
knowledge, it is the application of knowledge
to a specific process or method of accom-
plishing a task that is included in the defini-
tion of technology.

b: a capability given by the practical applica-
tion of knowledge <a car’s fuel-saving tech-
nology>
2: a manner of accomplishing a task especially
using technical processes, methods, or knowl-
edge <new technologies for information stor-
age>
3: the specialized aspects of a particular field
of endeavor <educational technology>
Technology, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/technology.

Here, the availability of Christopher Hill’s
DNA profile and the increase in DNA pro-
files in the CODIS database do not involve
the application of technical knowledge to cre-
ate a new DNA testing capability or tech-
nique that was not available at the time of
trial. The mere fact that there may now be
more DNA profiles available for comparison
does not constitute technology in the plain
and ordinary sense of the word. The district
court was correct in finding that the simple
availability of Hill’s DNA and the general
increase in DNA profiles with which to com-
pare the unidentified DNA samples does not
constitute “technology” that was not available
at the time of Johnson’s trial. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s decision to deny
“any requests in Johnson’s Successive Peti-
tion seeking the comparison of previously
tested but unidentified DNA samples with
newly acquired profiles[.]”

2. Whether the district court _erred_in
determining that testing on the previ-
ously untested DNA samples did not
have the scientific potential to produce
new, noncumulative evidence that
would show it is more probable than
not that Johnson is innocent,

Under Idaho Code section 19-4902(e) a
trial court “shall allow” DNA testing “upon a
determination” that:

(1) The result of the testing has the sci-

entific potential to produce new, noncumu-

4. Although we do not rely on the legislature's
statement of intent for our decision today, Wright
v, Ada Cty., 160 Idaho 491, 497, 376 P.3d 58, 64
(2016) (“The asserted purpose for enacting the
legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.”
(quoting Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med.
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93, 265 P.3d 502, 505-
06 (2011))), we note that despite Johnson's argu-
ment to the contrary, the plain, usual, and ordi-
nary definition of technology does not conflict
with the legislative intent of the statute. The
legislative statement of intent to Idaho Code sec-
tion 19-4902 reads in part: "The purpose of this
legislation is to allow for post-conviction DNA
testing in appropriate cases.... Idaho inmates
have no statutory right to tests that may exoner-
ate them.” H.B. 242, 56th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess.
(idaho 2001), _https://legislature.idaho.gow/
sessioninfo/200 I/legislation/H0242/#sop. Thus,
ostensibly, the purpose of section 19-4902 is to
give Idaho inmates a statutory right to DNA
testing that may exonerate them. Assigning a
name to DNA samples that have already been

219

lative evidence that would show that it is

more probable than not that the petitioner

is innocent; and

(2) The testing method requested would

likely produce admissible results under the

Idaho rules of evidence,

LC. § 19-4902(e)(1)-(2).

There is no dispute the second require-
ment, that the testing method would produce
admissible results, is met. This leaves only
the first requirement for our review.

After a hearing on Johnson’s request for
DNA testing, the district court concluded
that the “possibility of identifying a third
party DNA source from previously untesta-
ble samples will not make it more probable
than not that Johnson is innocent....” In
reaching this conclusion, the district. court
stated:

The jury was aware that DNA that did
not belong to Johnson was present at the
scene of the murders.... Even with that
knowledge, the jury convicted Johnson, de-
ciding that Johnson either (1) fired the
murder weapon herself while wearing
gloves or (2) aided and abetted that actual
shooter. Hither theory was sufficient for a
conviction. Given the fact that the possibili-
ty of a third party shooter, as evidenced by
the presence of unidentified fingerprints
and DNA, failed to convince the jury that
Johnson was innocent of murdering her
parents, the slim possibility that a name or

tested and presented to a jury will not exonerate
the defendant. At most, it would simply attach a
mame to DNA evidence that was presented at
trial as belonging to an unidentified person. Such
identification does nothing to lessen the evidence
against the defendant because the jury already
knew at the time of trial that the DNA was
unidentified and chose to convict anyway. This is
different than the case where no testing was
performed on a DNA sample and it was un-
known whether the DNA sample matched the
defendant or not. In such cases, DNA testing may
very well exonerate the defendant if the DNA
sample can be shown to have come from the
perpetrator. See Fields v. State, 151 Idaho 18, 22~
24, 253 P.3d 692, 696-98 (2011) (holding that
even though previously untested DNA samples
that were taken from under the victim’s finger-
nails did not match the defendant, the evidence
did not exonerate the defendant because there
was no evidence those DNA samples belonged to
the attacker),

220

face might now be given to that shooter
adds little to the mix.
(footnote omitted).

Johnson argues that the district court
erred in two respects. First, Johnson argues
that the court improperly weighed the evi-
dence at trial against the potential test re-
sults rather than simply considering the po-
tential of the test results to prove Johnson's
innocence irrespective of the trial evidence.
Second, Johnson argues that the test results
could identify who fired the murder weapon.
and that if that person was not Johnson, the
DNA testing results would contradict the
state’s theory of the case and show that it is
more probable than not that Johnson is inno-
cent, Each contention is discussed in turn.

a, Whether under LC. § 19-4902(e)(1), the
district_court properly weighed the po-
tential DNA test results against the evi-
dence at trial,

T,s(Under section 19-4902(e)(1), the
trial court is required to “make a determina-
tion that” the testing results have the “scien-
tific potential” to “show that it is more proba-
ble than not that the petitioner is innocent.”
LC. 19-4902(e)(1). “[TJhe more probable than
not standard, is essentially a 51% standard.”
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 622,
809 P.2d 472, 488 (1991). Thus, before allow-
ing post-conviction DNA testing, the district
court must make a determination that the
testing results, whatever they may be, have
the scientific potential to demonstrate that it
is more than fifty percent likely the petition-
er is innocent.

Johnson contends that she is not required
to demonstrate that the testing results “will
exonerate her,” and that the district court
erred by weighing the potential test results
against the evidence from trial, Rather,
Johnson argues that “weighing the evidence
is not appropriate at this juncture” and that
“it is sufficient that the evidence have the
‘scientific potential’ to produce exonerating

Fields v. State, “test results by themselves
will never show that the petitioner is not the
person who committed the offense.” 151 Ida-
ho 18, 28, 258 P.8d 692, 697 (2011), Conse-
quently, to “make a determination” about
whether DNA testing has the potential to
“show that it is more probable than not the
petitioner is innocent,” it is necessary for the
district court to examine the evidence of guilt
from trial and weigh whether the requested
DNA testing has the potential to overcome
that evidence and demonstrate that “it is
more probable than not that the petitioner is
innocent.” LC, § 19-4902(e)(1),

In addition to showing that the test results
have the potential to “more probably than
not” exonerate the petitioner, the testing re-
sults also have to produce evidence that is
noneumulative. Jd. Here, again, because the
court cannot determine whether the potential
DNA evidence would be cumulative without
comparing it to the evidence already pro-
duced, the district court must examine the
evidence produced at trial and compare it to
the potential DNA testing results to deter-
mine whether the testing results can produce
noncumulative evidence.

Ultimately, section 19-4902(e)(1) acts as a
gateway to obtaining DNA testing. Before a
court may allow post-conviction DNA testing
it must make a determination of whether the
requested testing has the potential to pro-
duce noncumulative DNA evidence that
would make it more probable than not that
the petitioner is innocent. This necessitates a
weighing of the evidence at trial against the
potential testing results, Accordingly, we
hold that section 19-4902(e)(1) requires the
district court to weigh the potential testing
results against the evidence from trial to
determine: (1) whether it is more probable
than not the test results may exonerate the
petitioner, and (2) whether the testing results
would produce new, noncumulative evidence.

b. Whether the district court erred in con-
cluding that the DNA evidence that was

evidence.” Johnson is partly correct—she
does not have to show that the testing results
will exonerate her. However, Johnson does
have to show that the testing has the poten-
tial to produce not just exonerating evidence,
but rather evidence that would make it
“more probable than not that [she] is inno-
cent.” LC. § 19-4902(e)(1). As we stated in

not tested at the time of trial but may
now be tested using advanced DNA
technology did not have the potential to
show that it was more probable than not
that Johnson was innocent,

HM In ruling on Johnson’s motion, the
district court concluded:

Further testing might reveal the source of
DNA samples found on Johnson's robe, on
the gun and elsewhere, but that knowledge
does nothing to establish that the source of
those samples was present in the John-
son’s home on the morning of the crime,
that the source of those samples was the
shooter, or that Johnson didn’t aid and
abet the murderer of her parents. Conse-
quently, because an analysis of previously
untestable DNA samples will not make it
more probable than not that Johnson is
innocent, her request for DNA testing will
not be granted.

Johnson argues the DNA testing does, in
fact, have the potential to identify the shoot-
er, And, if the shooter is not Johnson, her
argument continues, then “the DNA evidence
would show that she is innocent of first de-
gree murder,” Johnson premises this argu-
ment on the theory that because Johnson
was given a deadly weapon enhancement the
jury must have found that Johnson was the
shooter and not an accomplice ‘or aider and
abettor.

At the outset, we note that Johnson is
eorrect, An aider and abettor cannot be given
a sentence enhancement under Idaho Code
section 19-2520, State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho
900, 908, 674 P.2d 396, 404 (1988) (“The
statute cannot be used to convict a person
who was merely an aider or abettor.”). Rath-
er, the sentencing enhancement can only be
applied’ where the defendant had “actual
physical possession of guns during the com-
mission of [the crime].” State v. Thompson,
101 Idaho 430, 438, 614 P.2d 970, 978 (1980).
Moreover, during sentencing, the trial court
explicitly stated: “The jury found you [John-
son] were the shooter.” As a result, any DNA
evidence that shows Johnson was not the
shooter would militate against the jury’s ver-
dict,

However, as explained above, post-convic-
tion DNA testing under section 19-4902 is
not allowed for any potentially exonerating

5. After examining the record, it is apparent that
robe samples 24 and 25 were examined. The
testimony was that bloodstain 24 on the robe was
too small to get a complete profile. However, the
predominate profile from bloodstain 25 on the
robe matched Diane’s profile. Robe samples 26-
30 were explicitly reserved for DNA testing in the

221

DNA evidence. Testing is only allowed in
circumstances where the DNA evidence has
the potential to “show that it is more proba-
ble than not that the petitioner is innocent.”
LC. § 19-4902(e)(1), Such a determination
requires weighing the evidence at trial
against the potential DNA evidence. Supra,
Part 2.a.

According to Dr. Greg Hampikian, the po-
tential DNA evidence that was not tested at
the time of trial but may now be tested using
advanced DNA technology is as follows:

11. In particular, no conclusions could be
reached due to insufficient amounts of
DNA concerning the bloodstain 24 from
the robe, the tissue from the lower left side
of the robe, the tissue from the inside
lower, back of the robe, the tissue from the
inside left sleeve of the robe, the stain
from Bruno Santos’ pants, the fibers im-
bedded in unknown material, bloodstain B
from the rifle, and bloodstain G from the
rifle. This evidence may now be tested
using advanced DNA amplification, purifi-
cation, and analysis techniques.

12. Robe samples #24-80 were never ana-
lyzed and may now be tested using ad-
vanced DNA amplification, purification,
and analysis techniques.5

138. DNA from the unidentified finger-
print on the .264 round (Item # 14) could
not have been tested at the time of trial,
but may now be tested using advanced
DNA amplification, purification, and analy-
sis techniques.

14. DNA from the unidentified finger-
prints on the doorknob set on Diane and
Alan Johnson’s bedroom door (Items # 15-
16) could not have been tested at the time
of trial; but now may be tested using ad-
vanced techniques not available at the time
of trial and compared to reference samples
from the time of trial and after and sub-
mitted to a CODIS databank,

event the defense chose to request testing for
trial. The defense did not request the testing,
Thus, out of stains 24-30, only bloodstain 24, as
a sample that could not be tested at the time of
trial due to the lack of proper technology, would
be available for post-conviction testing under
section 19-4902.

222 a

15. DNA from the palm prints (Items 20-
2 and 20-8) could not have been tested at
the time of trial, but may now be tested
using advanced DNA amplification, purifi-
cation, and analysis techniques.
16. DNA from the print on the empty
shell casing (Item 12-1) could not have
been tested at the time of trial, but now
may be tested using advanced DNA ampli-
fication, purification, and analysis tech-
niques.

17. One of the hairs removed from Bruno

Santo’s [sic] sweater has a small root and

could now be analyzed using advanced

DNA amplification, purification, and analy-

sis techniques,

18. DNA from an unknown contributor

found on the inside of the latex glove can

now be further analyzed using advanced.

DNA amplification, purification, and analy-

sis techniques.

18. [19.] Low levels of DNA from an

unidentified source were found on the

leather glove from the garbage can. That

DNA can now be analyzed using advanced

DNA amplification, purification and analy-

sis techniques.

After examining the record, there is noth-
ing to establish that any of these DNA sam-
ples came from the shooter, There is no
DNA or fingerprint evidence on the trigger,
trigger guard, or bolt lever of the gun. Addi-
tionally, testimony at trial was clear that.

6. For example, Amber Moss, a forensic DNA
analyst, testified about the blood stains:

Q: Let's talk about that for a minute. Do you
have any way to age when a sample was
placed on an item?

A: No. DNA cannot indicate the time that
the stain was placed on an item.

Q: Okay, and so there’s no way to determine
whether or not this stain was put on [the gun]
10 years before, 20 years before, or that day, is
that correct?

A: No. In fact, if it was stored properly, it
could have been 10 years ago. DNA. doesn’t
tell. It can't discriminate between old stains
and new stains.

Testimony from Cynthia Hall, a DNA forensic
scientist, revealed the following about DNA sam-
ples generally:

Q: How about DNA? Are you able to age it?
Do you know when it was placed on a surface?

A: No, I do not.

Q: And why is that?

there is no way to determine when any of the
fingerprint or DNA samples on the gun, the
shell casings, the robe, the latex glove, or the
leather glove were deposited on the items.®
Thus, even if we view the potential outeome
of the requested testing in the light most
favorable to Johnson and assume that some
or even all of these samples came from a
single third-party source, it would—at best—
show that at some unidentified point in time,
and in some unidentified manner, such per-
son was close enough to those items to leave
their DNA on them, But, because there is no
way to tell when the DNA was deposited on
the items, the evidence cannot show that
such person used the gun, gloves, ammuni-
tion, or robe on the day of the murder.
Therefore, the evidence has no potential to
show, and again, even assuming that all these
samples came from the same person, that
such person was the shooter. Likewise, the
evidence cannot show that Johnson was not
the shooter. At best, the evidence would pro-
vide some additional evidence from which the
jury might infer that someone else besides
Johnson was involved. However, the jury was
already informed of the possible involvement,
of a third-party due to the presence of DNA
samples and fingerprints that were tested at
the time of trial and returned unknown. For
example, at trial, the jury was aware of
unidentified fingerprints on the scope, gun,
some of the shells, and the box containing
shells.’ The jury was also aware of unidenti-

A: There is no method of testing to deter-
mine how old a DNA sample is, I can deter-
mine whether or not DNA is present, and
whether or not I'm able to obtain a profile,
but I cannot say how old that sample is,

‘Tina Walthall, a fingerprint forensic scientist,
gave similar testimony about fingerprints:

Q: Is there any wat to determine, just look-
ing at a fingerprint, how old it is?

A: No, there is no way.

Q: Okay, so all of the fingerprints that you
identified as latent prints in this case, you can’t
say whether they're a day old or whether
they're ten years old, is that'correct?

A: That is correct.

7. These were later identified as belonging to
Christopher Hill. Johnson II, 156 Idaho 7, 10,
319 P.3d 491, 494 (2014). Hill helped Speegle
move into the guesthouse in 2002. Id. In explain-
ing why his prints would be on the gun and
ammunition box, Hill testified that in 2001, when
he was a caretaker at Speegle’s ranch, he “took

fied DNA samples from the bathrobe. The
defense used these unidentified samples and
fingerprints to present the theory that a
third-party was involved, but the jury still
chose to convict Johnson. Adding a few more
pieces of evidence that a third-party was
present at the time of the murders is unlikely
to produce an acquittal. Furthermore, the
results do nothing to lessen the evidence
produced at trial that implicated Johnson.
And that evidence was substantial.

Some of that evidence included the follow-
ing: Johnson was angry with her parents
because they were going to report her boy-
friend, a nineteen-year-old illegal immigrant,
to the police on the day they were murdered.
Johnson gave at least five different accounts
about the events of the morning of the mur-
ders. Differences in those accounts included
whether she was asleep or awake then the
first shot was fired, whether she was in her
room or outside her parents’ room when the
second shot was fired, and whether her par-
ents’ bedroom door was open or closed. Ex-
pert testimony was that the parents’ and
Johnson’s bedroom doors were open. John-
son’s bedroom door and her parents’ bed-
room door are parallel to each other in the
hallway. Yet, in at least one account, Johnson
testified that aside from the two gunshots,
she did not hear or see any sign of a struggle
in her parents’ bedroom. Police found a
leather glove from Diane’s SUV in Johnson’s
room and the matching glove wrapped in a
bloody bathrobe in a garbage can that was
placed out for collection. A latex glove was
also found in the garbage can. The bathrobe,
the leather glove, and the latex glove all had
Johnson’s DNA on them. The bathrobe,
which belonged to Johnson, had paint chips
on it that matched the paint on the shirt
Johnson was wearing on the morning of the
murders. Testimony indicated that Johnson’s

{the rifle] out, tried to sight it,” and shot it “six
or seven times,” Id.

8. Johnson argues that because testing was al-
lowed in Fields testing should be allowed in this
case as well, However, this argument overlooks
that fact that the district court in Fields had
already allowed the testing when the case
reached this Court. This Court was not asked to
determine whether testing was appropriate and
did not hold that the testing was properly al-
lowed. It simply held that the test results from

223

path out of the house took her past the
garbage can. There was testimony that the
garbage was supposed to be collected the
morning of the murders and that Johnson
became upset when she learned the garbage
collection had been halted. Police observed
footprints in the dew on the lawn going to
and from the Johnson home and the guest-
house. The murder weapon, a .264 rifle, was
kept in the guest house, Johnson knew the
gun was there and she was known to have
been in the guesthouse on the days immedi-
ately preceding the murders. A guesthouse
key, along with unspent .264 caliber shells,
one of which had Diane’s tissue matter on it,
were found in Johnson’s room on the morn-
ing of the murders. Finally, when Johnson
was examined on the day of the murder she
had linear bruises on her left shoulder that
were approximately between two and four
inches long and were consistent with a recent
impact, such as gun recoil,

Johnson goes to great lengths to point out
how the district court erred in its assessment,
of the evidence from trial; however, nothing
in her attack on the district court’s assess-
ment establishes that the untested DNA
samples came from the shooter. Without evi-
dence establishing that the DNA samples
came from the shooter, we cannot say—espe-
cially when compared to the substantial
amount of evidence from trial that implicates
Johnson—that the district court erred in de-
termining the testing results do not have the
potential to demonstrate that it is more prob-
able than not Johnson is innocent. See Fields
v. State, 151 Idaho 18, 24, 258 P.8d 692, 698
(2011) (holding that without evidence to show
that previously untested DNA samples came
from the perpetrator of the crime, specula-
tion about who the DNA samples came from
or how they got there would not show that
the petitioner was innocent).

the already completed testing, could not support

a finding that Fields was innocent. Fields, 151

Idaho at 24, 253 P.3d at 698, That holding was

premised on the fact that there was no evidence

establishing that the DNA matter that was tested
came from the murderer. Id. Without such evi-
dence, this Court held that the results could not
establish Fields’s innocence. Id. Such reasoning
also would support a finding that the testing did

not need to be allowed in the first place. Without
evidence that the DNA material to be tested came

224

B. Whether the Eighth Amendment, un-
der Miller and Montgomery, provides
Johnson relief from her two fixed life
sentences.

Johnson argues that her fixed life sen-
tences constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
and that under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 182 S.Ct, 2455, 188 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)
(outlawing mandatory life for juveniles and
requiring courts to consider youth and its
attendant circumstances before sentencing a
minor to fixed life without parole), and Mont-
gomery v. Louisiana, — US. —-, —,
186 S.Ct. 718, 784, 198 L.Ed.2d 599, ‘619-20
(2016) (holding that Miller is retroactive and
binding on the States), her sentence is illegal.
The district court dismissed this claim under
Idaho Code sections 19-4901(b) and 19-4908.
‘The district court also found that even if the
claim was not barred by sections 19-4901(b)
and 19-4908, the sentence did not violate the
Eighth Amendment because the trial court,
as required by Miller, properly considered
Johnson's youth in its sentencing.

1, Whether section 19-4901(b) or section
19-4908 bar Johnson’s cl.

HM Post-conviction “is not a substitute
for ... an appeal from the sentence or con-
viction.” LC, § 19-4901(b); accord Rodgers v,
State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353
(1997), “Any issue which could have been
raised on direct appeal, but was not, is for-
feited and may not be considered in post-
conviction proceedings.” I.C. § 19-4901(b).
However, “{plost-conviction relief proceed-
ings are designed to permit a challenge to an
underlying conviction or to an illegal sen-
tence.” Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 850, 352,
796 P.2d 1028, 1025 (1990); accord Hollon v.
State, 182 Idaho 578, 580, 976 P.2d 927, 934
(1999),

The district court found that Johnson could
have brought her Bighth Amendment claim
in her direct appeal and because the claim
did not raise a substantial doubt about the
reliability of the finding of guilt it was barred

from the attacker, the testing results had little to

no potential to prove Fields’s innocence and,

therefore, the district court could have denied
testing in the first instance. Consequently, the

by section 19-4901(b). The district court's
ruling was incorrect.

Although Johnson could have brought a
claim in her direct appeal arguing that her
sentence was cruel, unusual, or excessive,
see, @g., Hollon, 182 Idaho at 681, 976 P.2d
at 985, she could not have argued that her
sentence was illegal under Miller’s interpre-
tation of the Eighth Amendment until after
Miller was decided. Miller was decided in
2012, Johnson’s direct appeal was decided in
2008. Thus, she could not have brought her
claim that her sentence was illegal in her
direct appeal because Miller was decided
after her direct appeal was decided. Conse-
quently, the district court erred in dismissing
the claim under section 19-4901(b).

This is also true of the district court’s
dismissal under section 19-4908, which states
that any grounds for post-conviction relief
not raised in an original petition are perma-
nently waived absent “sufficient reason” for *
failure to do so. I.C. § 19-4908. An analysis
of “sufficient reason” “must necessarily in-
clude an analysis of whether the claims being
made were asserted within a reasonable peri-
od of time,” Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho
900, 905, 174 P.8d 870, 875 (2007). We deter-
mine what constitutes a reasonable period of
time on a case-by-case basis. Jd,

Here again, the district court found that
Johnson could have made an Eighth Amend-
ment claim in her original post-conviction
petition but did not and therefore her claim
was barred. While it’s true Johnson could
have made an Eighth Amendment claim that
her sentence was generally excessive or cruel
or unusual, she could not have made the
claim that her sentence was illegal under
Miller’s holding interpreting the Eighth
Amendment until after Miller was decided.
The State, however, argues that even if that
is true, Johnson did not bring her Miller
claim until approximately a year and a half
after Miller was decided. A year and half,
the State argues, is not a reasonable amount
of time to wait to bring a claim.

fact that the district court allowed testing in

Fields does nothing to support a claim that test-
ing should be allowed here.

‘We make two observations on this point,
First, we note that the district court ruled
that the Amended Successive Petition was
filed nune pro tune to April 9, 2012, Thus,
the Amended Successive Petition has the le-
gal effect of being filed on that date. Miller
was argued in March and decided in June
2012, thereby placing the legal filing of John-
son’s Amended Successive Petition squarely
within the Miller timeframe. Second, we note
that the recent decision in Montgomery
made the holding in Miller retroactive and
binding on the States. Montgomery, — U.S,
at ——, 136 S.Ct. at 732, 193 L.,Hd.2d at 617-
18, Consequently, even if we decline to ad-
dress the issue today, Johnson would be free
to file a new petition and bring the claim
anew. Given these unique circumstances sur-
rounding this claim, we hold that in this
particular case, Johnson’s Eighth Amend-
ment claim was brought within a reasonable
time. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.8d
at 875 (noting that we will decided what a
reasonable time is on a case-by-case basis).
‘We will decide the issue on the merits,

2, Whether Miller and Montgomery pro-

yide Johnson relief.

HE Miller held that the Highth Amend-
ment forbids sentencing schemes that re-
quire mandatory life in prison without possi-
bility of parole for juvenile offenders. 567
US. at 478-79, 182 S.Ct. at 2469, 188
L.Ed.2d at 423-24, The Court then went on
to state that while sentencing courts may still
impose life in prison without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders in homicide
cases, the sentencing court must “take into
account how children are different, and how
those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id.

Montgomery made the holding in Miller
retroactive and binding on the states. —
US. at —, 186 S.Ct. at 784, 193 L.Ed.2d at
619-20 (“Miller announced a substantive rule
of constitutional law. Like other substantive
rules, Miller is retroactive....”). Montgom-
ery was careful, however, to note that “Mil-
ler did not require trial courts to make a
9. Dr. Beaver’s testimony was approximately forty

pages. Dr. Worst’s testimony was approximately

225

finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibil-
ity.” Id. at ——, 186 S.Ct. at 785, 193
L.Ed.2d at 620-21. Indeed the Court specifi-
cally stated: “[Wle leave to the State[s] the
task of developing appropriate ways to en-
force the constitutional restriction upon
[their] execution of sentences.” Jd. (quoting
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17,
106 S.Ct. 2595, 2605, 91 L.Ed.2d 885, 350-51
(1986) (alterations in original)). That being
said, Montgomery also made it clear that
“Miller requires a sentencer to consider a
juvenile offender’s youth and attendant char-
acteristics before determining that life with-
out parole is a proportionate sentence.” Jd, at
——, 186 S.Ct. at 734, 198 L.Ed.2d at 619-20,

Johnson ‘argues because the district court
sentenced her “without adequate consider-
ation of mitigation arguments based on youth
and without a finding that she was irrepara-
bly corrupt,” her sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment. As to the latter part of
her argument, that the court erred because it
did not specifically find that Johnson was
“rreparably corrupt,” that argument is with-
out merit. Id. at ——, 186 S.Ct. at 735, 198
L.Ed.2d at 620-21 (“Miller did not impose a
formal factfinding requirement....”). Miller
and Montgomery, do, however, require that
the sentencing court weighs the juvenile of-
fender's youth and characteristics against the
nature of the crime to determine whether the
erime was one that “reflected the transient
immaturity” of youth. Jd. The requirement to
hold such a hearing “gives effect to Miller’s
substantive holding that life without parole is
an excessive sentence for children whose
crimes reflect transient immaturity.” Id.

Here, the trial court held just such a hear-
ing. Drs, Craig Beaver and Richard Worst
testified at the sentencing hearing about the
developmental state of an adolescent’s brain
compared to an adult.and how youth are
more prone to impulsivity and more likely to
be able to be rehabilitated.® Indeed, Johnson
herself spends approximately two pages in
her Amended Successive Petition highlight-
ing the evidence presented about her youth,
Following the testimony about Johnson’s

sixty-eight pages.

226 Le

youth and the possible effects that it would
have on her decision-making ability and her
propensity for rehabilitation, the trial court
spent considerable time discussing the rea-
sons why it was imposing life without parole
and explicitly noted that it had heard and
considered the evidence presented on John-
son’s youth. The trial court’s sentencing col-
loquy was approximately forty-four pages
and makes specific reference to having con-
sidered the testimony about Johnson’s youth,
including: “I also want to say to everyone
here that I have heard what you have said. I
have listened attentively”; “I would also say
to you that it’s important to me, in this
analysis, to consider the totality of all the
facts and circumstances, and not any one
piece in isolation”; “ I recognize that some of
the psychological evidence presented here at
this sentencing hearing was to the effect that
adolescents can act impulsively ...”; “ on the
mitigating side, there is in fact your age”; “[ ]
I don’t think it’s a product of your age.”
Although Miller and Montgomery had not
been decided at the time of the sentencing
hearing, and therefore the terms of “irrepa-
rably corrupt” and “transient immaturity”
where not in the court’s lexicon at that time,
the court clearly considered Johnson’s youth
and all its attendant characteristics and de-
termined, in light of the heinous nature of
the crime, that Johnson, despite her youth,
deserved life without parole. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s ruling that John-
son’s Eighth Amendment claims under Mil-
ler fail.

C. Whether Murphy should be overruled.

Claims 2-5 of Johnson’s Amended Succes-
sive Petition alleged ineffective assistance of
her original post-conviction counsel because
original post-conviction counsel did not prop-
erly assert ineffective assistance of counsel
claims regarding trial counsel. The district
court dismissed those claims on the grounds
that Johnson had conceded that Murphy v.
State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.38d 365 (2014),
precluded her from bringing those claims.
Murphy held that claims of ineffective assis-
tance of post-conviction counsel are not a

10. Later amended on January 22, 2014, but
ruled as being filed nunc pro tunc to April 9,

“sufficient reason” under Idaho Code section
19-4908 for allowing a successive petition. Id.
at 895, 827 P.3d at 871.

On appeal, Johnson contends that Murphy
should be overruled and claims 2~5 of her
Amended Successive Petition should be re-
manded to the district court. The State re-
sponds that the Court should not consider
Johnson’s argument because: (1) Johnson’s
claims were untimely; (2) the dismissal of her
claims was invited; and (8) Johnson has failed
to demonstrate that Murphy was manifestly
wrong, unwise or unjust. We address each
argument in turn.

1. Whether claims 2-5 in Johnson’s
successive petition were
untimely.

HH A post-conviction proceeding is com-
menced by filing a petition “any time within
one (1) year from the expiration of the time
for appeal or from the determination of an
appeal or from the determination of proceed-
ings following an appeal, whichever is later.”
LC § 19-4902(a).

The appeal from Johnson’s original post-
conviction proceeding was decided on Febru-
ary 18, 2014. Johnson IT, 156 Idaho at 7, 319
P.3d at 491, The original post-conviction pro-
ceeding is a “proceeding following an ap-
peal.” Therefore, the one-year time limit un-
der section 19-4902(a) did not begin to run
yntil February 18, 2014. Johnson filed her
suecessive petition on April 9, 2012.19 Conse-
quently, Johnson’s successive petition, which
‘was filed before the one-year time limit even
began to run, was timely. The State’s argu-
ment to the contrary is simply unavailing.

2, Whether Johnson should be barred from
arguing that Murphy should be over-
ruled_because_she did not argue the
issue in the district court.

The State argues that Johnson should be
barred from arguing that Murphy should be
overruled because Johnson conceded that her
claims were barred by Murphy and indicated.

2012.

that she would bypass the state courts and
proceed with those claims in federal court.

In her Objection to Respondent’s Motion
for Summary Dismissal, Johnson’s counsel
stated:

Murphy now appears to present a bar to
[claims 2-5]. Accordingly, [Johnson] will
file a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
raising the ineffective assistance of counsel
caims.... Now that Palmer has been
overruled by Murphy, Martinez permits
[Johnson] to raise the ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims in this petition
directly in federal court and bypass the
state courts entirely.

This constitutes a clear concession that
claims 2-5 are barred by Murphy. Further,
Johnson’s counsel’s statement that Johnson
“will file a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus raising the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims” and “bypass the state courts
entirely” without presenting any argument
as to why the claims should be allowed in
state court, constitutes a withdrawal of the
issue. This conclusion is further buttressed
by Johnson’s counsel's statement at the hear-
ing: “[Wle concede that, following the Mur-
phy decision of our Supreme Court, there are
certain claims that have been obviated. As
[counsel] has pointed out, that matter can be
taken up in federal habeas proceedings.”

While Johnson’s statements are not suffi-
cient to find that she invited the district
court to dismiss the claims, they do clearly
indicate an intention to abandon those claims
in state court and pursue them in federal
court.t Because Johnson withdrew these
claims from the district court’s consideration
and provided no argument as to why the
claims should be allowed despite our ruling in
Murphy, we need not address the issue, £.g.,
State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 182, 845 P.2d
1211, 1215 (1993) (“[C]ounsel for appellant
withdrew this issue.... Therefore, we de-

11, Johnson has filed such a petition and it is
currently stayed, pending resolution of this ap-
peal. Johnson v. Kirkman, No. 4:14-CV-00395-
CWD, 2014 WL 7186842, at *1 (D, Idaho Dec.
16, 2014).

42. Johnson also argues Murphy should be over-
turned because the Court erroneously interpreted
the phrase “sufficient reason” to require a show-
ing of a constitutional violation. This argument

227

cline to address it.”). However, given that
both parties have fully briefed the issue,
including authority and arguments, and con-
sidering that Johnson has already filed her
habeas petition in federal court, we will ad-
dress the issue to provide future guidance.
See of. Comer v. Cty. of Twin Falls, 130
Idaho 488, 486, 942 P.2d 557, 560 (1997)
(noting that the rule that issues not listed as
issues on appeal can be relaxed when both
parties “fully brief thle] issue, including au-
thority and arguments”); Johnson v, Bonner
Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 498,
887 P.2d 35, 38 (1994) (deciding to address a,
moot issue to provide future guidance and
direction),

3. Whether Murphy should be overruled.

HM “Stare decisis requires that this
Court follows controlling precedent unless
that precedent is manifestly wrong, has prov-
en over time to be unjust or unwise, or
overruling that precedent is necessary to vin-
dicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued justice.” State v. Owens,
158 Idaho 1, 4-5, 343 P.3d 30, 33-34 (2015).

Johnson argues that in light of Martinez v.
Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 182 S.Ct. 1809, 182
L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), this Court’s holding in
Murphy should be overturned.” In Murphy,
we held that claims of ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel “cannot demon-
strate ‘sufficient reason’ for filing a succes-
sive petition,” 156 Idaho at 395, 827 P.8d at
871. In reaching this holding, we relied on
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Coleman
v. Thompson, which held that “{tJhere is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state
post-conviction proceedings” and therefore “a
petitioner cannot claim constitutionally inef-
fective assistance of counsel in such proceed-
ings.” 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct, 2546, 2566,
115 L.Ed.2d 640, 670-71 (1991).

misconstrues Murphy. Murphy did not interpret
the phrase “sufficient reason,” rather it simply
held that because there is no right to post-convic-
tion counsel a claim of ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel necessarily fails and
therefore such a claim can provide no reason, let
alone a sufficient one, to allow a successive peti-
tion. 156 Idaho at 394-95, 327 P.3d at 370-71.

228

In Martinez, the U.S. Supreme Court an-
nounced a “narrow exception” to Coleman:
Where, under state law, claims of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel must be
yaised in an initial-review collateral pro-
ceeding a procedural default will not bar a
federal habeas court from hearing a sub-
stantial claim of ineffective assistance at
trial if, in the initial-review collateral pro-
ceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in
that proceeding was ineffective,
566 U.S. at 17, 182 S.Ct. at 1820, 182 L.Bd.2d
at 287-88. In Trevino v. Thaler, the Court
extended its holding in Martinez to include
states where the “procedural framework, by
reason of its design and operation, makes it
highly unlikely in a typical case that a defen-
dant will have a meaningful opportunity to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal.” 8 569 U.S. 418,
416, 188 S.Ct, 1911, 1921, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044,
1056-57 (2013). Thus, Martinez applies in
Idaho. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,
806, 889 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1992) (recognizing
that the post-conviction setting is the “pre-
ferred forum for bringing claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel,” though in limited
instances such claims may be brought on
direct appeal “on purported errors that arose
during the trial, as shown on the record”);
see also Nielson v, Yordy, No. 1:14-CV-
00236-EJL, 2016 WL 427062, at *11-15 (D,
Idaho Feb. 8, 2016) (ruling that Martinez, as
defined in Trevino, applies in Idaho).
However, while Martinez made it obligato-
ty for federal habeas courts to hear claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel if initial
post-conviction counsel was not provided or
failed to properly raise those issues, Mar-
tinez is explicitly equitable in nature. Mar-
tinez, 566 U.S, at 14-15, 182 S.Ct, at 1819-20,
182 L.Hd.2d at 285-87. Because the holding
in Martinez is not a constitutional holding it
is not binding on state courts. Id. at 16, 182
S.Ct, at 1820, 182 L.Ed.2d at 287 (“In addi-
tion, state collateral cases on direct review
from state courts are unaffected by the rul-
ing in this case”), Accordingly, we are not

13, In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th
Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit extended Martinez
even further, holding that it can also apply to
underlying claims of ineffective assistance of ap-
pellate counsel,

obligated to follow Martinez in our state
courts. And we choose not to. The underlying
policy in Murphy has not changed in the two
year's since it was decided, and we decline to
apply Martinez in our state courts. Murphy
remains good law. Martinez simply means
such claims will not be procedurally default-
ed in federal habeas proceedings and the
federal court will have to address those
claims on the merits.“ The district court’s
dismissal of counts 2-5 in Johnson’s Amend-
ed Successive Petition is affirmed.

IV, CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s rulings re-
garding DNA testing under section 19-4902,
We recognize the holdings in Miller and
Montgomery apply to Idaho, but affirm the
district court's ruling that the substantive
requirement in those cases—that the sen-
tencing court holds a hearing that considers
the youth of the offender—was met, We fur-
ther recognize the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Martinez, but decline to apply
Martinez in Idaho state law and thus affirm
the district court’s dismissal of claims 2-5 of
Johnson’s Amended Successive Petition.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and BRODY coneur,

395 P.3d 1261
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES,
LLC., Plaintiff-Respondent,
y.
Lloyd MACDONALD, Defendant-
Appellant,
Docket No. 48346

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: June 1, 2017

14. Kirkman, 2014 WL 7186842, at *2 n.1, (noting
that due to Murphy and Martinez, such claims
will not be procedural defaulted and the federal
courts will be required to address the claims on
the merits),

230

Ballard Law, PLLC, Rexburg, for appel-
lant,

Johnson Mark, LLC, Meridian, for respon-
dent.

ON THE BRIEFS

BRODY, Justice.

This is a debt collection matter. Plaintiff
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (“PRA”)
sued Defendant Lloyd MacDonald for the
amount owed on a Citibank credit card ac-
count, MacDonald filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that PRA did not
have standing to bring this action because it
could not prove that the debt had been as-
signed by Citibank to PRA, PRA filed a
eross-motion for summary judgment. Mac-
Donald objected to the evidence PRA sub-
mitted to support its position, arguing that
the evidence was inadmissible hearsay and
lacked adequate foundation. The magistrate
court overruled MacDonald’s objections and
granted summary judgment in favor of PRA.
MacDonald appealed to the district court.
The district court affirmed the magistrate
court's decision. We reverse,

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

PRA purchases charged-off credit card ac-
counts and then attempts to collect the debts.
PRA claims to own a Citibank credit card
account for Lloyd MacDonald. PRA sued
MacDonald in magistrate court alleging he
failed to pay $8,776.29 owed on the account.
MacDonald filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, arguing that PRA did not have stand-
ing to bring the suit because PRA could not
prove that the account had been assigned to
it. PRA filed an objection to MacDonald’s
motion and a cross-motion for summary
judgment. PRA attached the following exhib-
its to its objection and cross-motion:

Exhibit 1 Affidavit of Chad Robertson, a
Citibank Document Control Offi-
cer (“Robertson Affidavit”). No ex-
hibits are attached to the affidavit
itself,

Exhibit 2 Affidavit of Sale of Account by
Original Creditor signed by Patri-
cia Hall, a Citibank Financial Ac-
count Manager, dated July 16,
2018 (“Hall Affidavit”),

Exhibit 8 Bill of Sale and Assignment
from Citibank to PRA

Exhibit 4 Missing (it is not part of the
Clerk’s Record and is not part of
the record below).

Exhibit 5 Sears credit card statements in
MacDonald’s name.

MacDonald objected to the consideration
of these exhibits, arguing that they are inad-
missible hearsay and that the statements
contained in the Robertson Affidavit lack
foundation. The magistrate court overruled
MacDonald’s evidentiary objections and
granted summary judgment in favor of PRA,
MacDonald appealed the magistrate court’s
decision to the district court. The district
court, sitting as an intermediate appellate
court, affirmed the magistrate court’s deci-
sion. MacDonald appeals the district court’s
decision, arguing that the Robertson Affida-
vit and credit card statements are inadmissi-
ble and should not have been considered
when deciding the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment.

510

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMM When reviewing the decision of a
district court sitting in its capacity as an
appellate court

[t]he Supreme Court reviews the trial
court (magistrate) record to determine
whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate’s find-
ings of fact and whether the magistrate’s
conclusions of law follow from those find-
ings. If those findings are so supported
and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate’s
decision, we affirm the district court’s deci-
sion as a matter of procedure,

Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284
P.8d 970, 973 (2012) (quoting Losser v. Brad-
street, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 188 P.8d 758, 760
(2008)). “Thus, this Court does not review the
decision of the magistrate court.” Pelayo v.
Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 859, 803 P.8d 214, 218
(2018). “Rather, we are ‘procedurally bound
to affirm or reverse the decisions of the
district court”” Id. (quoting State v. Korn,

231

148 Idaho 418, 415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n.1
(2009)).

tt.

ANALYSIS

A. The Robertson Affidavit does not con-
tain adequate foundation and is not
admissible under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.

Hl MacDonald challenged the admissibil-
ity of the Robertson Affidavit, arguing that
the statements contained in the affidavit are
hearsay and lack adequate foundation. He
argued that the affidavit should not be con-
sidered when deciding the cross-motions for
summary judgment based on the 2014 ver-
sion of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)
which provided that assertions of fact must
be properly supported by admissible evi-
dence, Rule 56(e) stated:

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall
be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof re-
ferred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a.
motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an ad-
verse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the party’s plead-
ings, but the party's response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. If the party

. does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against the
party.

We have held that these requirements “are
not satisfied by an affidavit that is concluso-
ry, based on hearsay, and not supported by
personal knowledge.” State v. Shama Res.
Ltd, P’ship, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 977,
981 (1995).

To determine the admissibility of the Rob-
ertson Affidavit it is necessary to look at the

232

actual text of the document. The Robertson
Affidavit stated in relevant part:

STATE OF MISSOURI )
) ss.
COUNTY OF PLATIE )

Account Holder: LLOYD MACDONALD

SSN/BIN/TIN #: xxX-xx- XXxx

The undersigned, Chad Robertson, being
duly sworn, states and deposes as follows:

1, Iam an employee of Citibank, N.A.
(“Citibank”), a national bank located in
Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and I am au-
thorized to make this Affidavit. My job
title is Document Control Officer, My job
responsibilities include reviewing and ob-
taining account information in Citibank’s
records as it relates to credit card accounts
owned or previously owned by Citibank,
This includes accounts previously owned
by Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., which
merged into Citibank in or about July
2011. The statements set forth in this affi-
davit are true and correct to the best of
my knowledge, information and belief
based on either personal knowledge or re-
view of the business records of Citibank,

2, My duties include having knowledge
of, and access to, business records relat-
ing to the Citibank account referenced
above. These records are kept by Citibank
in the regular course of business and it
was in the regular course of business of
Citibank for an employee or representa-
tive with personal knowledge of the act,
event, condition, or opinion recorded to
make memorandum or records or to
transmit information thereof to be includ-
ed in such memorandum or records; and
that the records were made at or near the
time of the act and/or event recorded or
veasonably soon thereafter.

8, Citibank’s records reflect that a
credit card account ending in account
number 2766 (the “Account”) was sold to
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC on or
about 6/27/2013. At the time the Account
was sold, Citibank prepared and forwarded
to Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC a
spreadsheet reflecting Account informa-

AFFIDAVIT

Account # ending in xxxx

tion as of the sale date based on Citi-

bank’s records, including, among other

things, the Account number, Account
balance, the date of the last payment,
the Account holder’s name, and Social

Security number (the “Account Informa-

tion”), The Account Information reflects

that the Account was opened on 10/4/2005.

The Account Information reflects that the

Account holder’s name at time of the sale

was LLOYD MACDONALD, with a Social

Security number ending: xxx-xx-xxxx,

4, The Account Information indicates
that, as of the date the Account was sold,
there was due and payable on the Account
$8,776.29.

5. The Account Information reflects
that, as of the date the Account was sold,
the last Account payment received by Citi-
bank posted to the Account on 10/2/2012,

(emphasis added).

The district court examined MacDonald’s
objections to the Robertson Affidavit under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6)—the business
records exception to the hearsay rule. Rule
803(6) sets forth the foundational require-
ments for the admission of business records.
Tt states:

The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:

©) A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regu-
larly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown
by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, or by certification that

complies with 902(11), unless the opponent

shows the source of information or the

method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term

“business” as used in this paragraph in-

cludes business, institution, association,

profession, occupation and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
LR.E. 803(6) (emphasis added).

HM This Court has made it clear that
Rule 803(6) does not require the testimony of
the person who created the document in
order to admit it as a business record. “The
general requirement for admission under
LR.E. 803(6) is that the document be ‘pro-
duced in the ordinary course of business, at
or near the time of occurrence and not in
anticipation of trial” ” Large v. Cafferty Real-
ty, Inc., 128 Idaho 676, 683, 851 P.2d 972, 979
(1998) (citing Beco Corp. v. Roberts & Sons
Const, Co., 114 Idaho 704, 711, 760 P.2d 1120,
1127 (1988)). The Court has also noted:

Because records of regularly conducted
activity are not normally self proving, as

public records may be under Rule 803(8),

the testimony of the custodian or other

person who can explain the record keeping
of the organization is ordinarily essential.

The custodian need not have personal

knowledge of the actual creation of the

document nor need [the custodian] have
been an employee of the business when the
record was made. The test is whether

[the custodian] has knowledge of the

system used to make the record and not

whether [the custodian] has knowledge
of the contents of the record.
Id. (quoting Report of the Idaho State Bar
Ewidence Commitiee, C 808, p. 10 (4th Supp.
1985) (emphasis added)).

MacDonald argued that the statements
contained in the Robertson Affidavit are like-
ly based on information contained on a com-
puter screen. We agree. The fact that Rob-
ertson’s statements are based on electronic
information, however, still implicates Rule
808(6). The Rule makes it clear that a busi-
ness record can be in any format. In other
words, a paper printout is not required to fall
under the Rule. Having said that, however,
we recognize that electronic information rais-
es heightened concerns about accuracy and

233

authenticity. This is where the foundation for
Robertson’s statements falls apart.

Robertson stated in his affidavit that Citi-
bank records showed that the account linked
to MacDonald was sold to PRA. He did not
identify the records he examined and did not
explain when or how the information was
entered into the Citibank records. Robertson
also stated that Citibank prepared and deliv-
ered a spreadsheet to PRA reflecting account
information as of the sale date. Robertson
does not explain, however, how that spread-
sheet was made or the procedural safeguards
that were used to make sure that the infor-
mation taken from Citibank records and put
on the spreadsheet was accurate, His affida-
vit also does not contain any statement veri-
fying that the information on the spreadsheet
was still accurate at the time of his affidavit.
The reality is that consumers do not always
know or understand when accounts are sold
and may make payments to their credit card
company that are not reflected on a spread-
sheet created at the time of the sale of the
debt. For these reasons we find that the
foundation for the statements contained in
the Robertson Affidavit was not adequate
under Rule 803(6).

The magistrate court ruled on Mac-
Donald’s objection to the Robertson Affidavit
from the bench, Unfortunately, the court did
not go through a detailed analysis of the
affidavit itself on the record. Instead, the
court ruled that it was persuaded to admit
the affidavit based on another trial court
opinion that MacDonald submitted. We have
reviewed that opinion and do not find that it
addresses the issues raised in this case. The
magistrate court also stated that it would
more fully articulate the basis for its decision
in two cases that were under advisement in
another county. Those decisions are not part
of this record, and we cannot use them to
evaluate the magistrate court’s reasoning.
There is not an adequate record to support
the magistrate court’s decision to admit the
Robertson Affidavit, and as such, we find
that the magistrate court abused its discre-
tion. The district court erred when it af-
firmed the magistrate court’s decision.

234

B. The Sears Credit Card Statements
were inadmissible because they lacked
certification,

HI MacDonald also challenged the ad-
missibility of the Sears credit card state-
ments that were submitted by PRA. He con-
tends that the credit card statements are
hearsay and do not fall under the business
records exception in Rule 803(6). The magis-
trate court ruled that the credit card state-
ments were admissible. The district court
affirmed the decision, finding that the Rob-
ertson Affidavit satisfied the certification re-
quirements of Idaho Rule of Evidence
902(11). Rule 902(11) allows the admission of
certified records of regularly conducted ac-
tivity without extrinsic evidence of authentic-
ity. Under the rule, the custodian of the
record, or another qualified person, must cer-
tify that the record: (1) was made, at or near
the time of the occurrence of the matters in
the record to be admitted, by a person who
has knowledge of those events; (2) is kept in
the course of regularly conducted activity;
and (8) was made as a regular practice. Be-
cause we have ruled that the Robertson Affi-
davit is inadmissible, there is no certification
for the Sears credit card statements. As
such, it was an abuse of discretion for the
magistrate court to consider the credit card
statements, and the district court erred when
it affirmed that decision.

C. The catch-all exception to the hearsay
rule cannot be used to admit the Rob-
ertson Affidavit or Sears Credit Card
Statements.

Hl PRA contends that the “catch-all” ex-
ception to the hearsay rule can be used to
admit the Robertson Affidavit and Sears
credit card statements. Rule 803(24) of the
Idaho Rules of Evidence is the catch-all ex-
ception. The rule states in relevant part:

The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness.

(24) Other exceptions. A statement not

specifically covered by any of the foregoing

exceptions but having equivalent cireum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the state-
ment is offered as evidence of a material

fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent
ean procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into
evidence.
LR.E. 803(24). To allow PRA to use the
catch-all exception in this case would render
the foundational requirements in 808(6) and
the certification requirements in 902(11)
meaningless. We addressed this type of argu-
ment in Fragnella v. Petrovich, 158 Idaho
266, 281 P.8d 108 (2012). In Fragnella, the
Court declined to use the catch-all exception
to admit a police report where the Idaho
Rules of Evidence specifically stated that a
police report is not admissible as a public
record. See id. at 275, 281 P.3d at 112 (dis-
cussing LLR.E. 803(8)). Although Rule 803(6)
and Rule 902(11) do not prohibit the intro-
duction of the Robertson Affidavit or the
Sears credit card statements, these rules lay
out basic foundation requirements that sim-
ply were not satisfied in this case. We recog-
nize that the magistrate court did not consid-
er whether the “catch-all” provision could be
used to admit the evidence at issue. Because
we find that the catch-all exception does not
apply, no findings by the magistrate court on
remand are necessary. .

D. Summary judgment could not be prop-
erly granted in MacDonald’s favor.

HE MacDonald argues that PRA lacks
standing to bring suit because the company
has not proven that it owns the Citibank
account. The district court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the Robertson Affidavit
when accompanied by the Bill of Sale and
credit card statements shows that an assign-
ment took place. While we generally do not
review denials of motions for summary judg-
ment, we find that MacDonald did not ade-
quately marshal PRA’s evidence regarding
the existence of an assignment, and there-
fore, summary judgment could not be grant-
ed in his favor on this issue.

HI Standing is not a mere pleading re-
quirement, “‘but rather an indispensable
part of the plaintiff's case’” Camp Easton

Forever, Inc. v. Inland Nw. Cowneil Boy
Scouts of Am., 156 Idaho 898, 898, 332 P.8d
805, 810 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2180,
119 L.Hd.2d 351 (1992)).

“EJach element must be supported in the
same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, ie, with
the manner and degree of evidence required
at the successive stages of the litigation,”
Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct.
2180). Thus, PRA ultimately bears the bur-
den of proving that MacDonald had a con-
tractual obligation to pay money to Citibank
and that PRA is the assignee of that obli-
gation.

Because PRA bears this burden of proof,
MacDonald’s burden in support of his motion
for summary judgment could “be satisfied by
showing the absence of material fact with
regard to” PRA’s claim to be the assignee of
MacDonald’s obligation. Bromley v. Garey,
182 Idaho 807, 810, 979 P.2d 1165, 1168
(1999), If the materials that MacDonald sub-
mitted in support of his motion for summary
judgment satisfied this threshold burden,
then the burden shifted to PRA to demon-
strate by way of admissible evidence that a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to this
issue. Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25,
148 Idaho 486, 489-90, 148 P.38d 1282, 1235-36
(2006).

MacDonald failed to meet this initial bur-
den. Consequently, PRA was not required to
present admissible evidence to resist Mac-
Donald’s motion for summary judgment.
MacDonald could have shown the absence of
evidence of an assignment “either by an affir-
mative showing with [his] own evidence or by
a review of all [PRA’s] evidence and the
contention that such proof of an element is
lacking.” Holdaway v. Broulim’s Supermar-
ket, 158 Idaho 606, 611, 849 P.8d 1197, 1202
(2015) (citing Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores,
Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 776, 251 P.8d 602, 604
(Ct. App. 2011).

Apparently, because MacDonald had no
personal knowledge as to whether Citibank
assigned its interest in his account to PRA,
he made no effort to make an affirmative
showing that there was no assignment to
PRA. Instead, under Rule of Civil Procedure

235

56 as it then existed, the only basis upon
which summary judgment could have been
granted to MacDonald due to PRA’s lack of
standing was if MacDonald presented the
trial court with a review of all of PRA’s
evidence of an assignment coupled with the
contention that the assembled evidence failed
to demonstrate the existence of an assign-
ment. This did not occur. It is important to
note that after the summary judgment pro-
ceedings were complete before the trial
court, Rule 56 was amended, and the amend-
ments took effect on July 1, 2016. We ad-
dress Rule 56 as it existed at the time of the
trial court’s decision.

The only affidavit that MacDonald offered
in support of his motion for summary judg-
ment was that of his attorney. The affidavit
represented that PRA had responded to the
unspecified discovery requests and produced
the Bill of Sale, the Affidavit of Patricia Hall,
and thirteen account statements that were
appended to counsel’s affidavits as exhibits.
Counsel's affidavit did not assert that the
appended documents were the entirety of the
evidence produced in response to the discov-
ery request,

MacDonald’s brief in support of his motion
does represent that “Plaintiff has provided
all the documents it will be able to produce to
prove the validity of the debt it claims Defen-
dant owes, as well as its evidence it owns the
alleged debt.” There are two difficulties with
this representation. The brief is silent as to
whether counsel’s affidavit contained all doc-
uments PRA provided in response to the
discovery requests. The greater difficulty
with this representation is that the factual
assertions in a party’s brief in support of a
motion for summary judgment were not a
basis for granting a motion for summary
judgment at the time of the trial court’s
ruling. Idaho Rule of Civil Produce 56(¢)
provided that summary judgment decisions
were to be based upon “the pleadings, depo-
sitions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any” offered in support of
the motion. A representation contained in a
brief is not among the items upon which
summary judgment could have been properly
granted.

236 Dn

Because MacDonald did not adequately
marshal PRA’s evidence regarding the exis-
tence of an assignment, PRA did not ever
have a burden of responsive production to
show its standing to pursue its claim, and so
summary judgment could not properly be
granted in MacDonald’s favor,

Iv.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

MacDonald requests an award of attor-
ney’s fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
section 12-120(1), which allows reasonable at-
torney’s fees to the prevailing party. Because
the case is not yet resolved, there is no
prevailing party. Where there is no present
prevailing party, this Court has refused to
award attorney's fees. Howard v. Perry, 141
Idaho 189, 148, 106 P.8d 465, 469 (2005). If
MacDonald is ultimately the prevailing party,
then the trial court may award him attor-
ney’s fees for this appeal.

v.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the decision of the district
court. We remand with instructions to the
district court to remand this case to the
magistrate court with instructions to vacate
the judgment entered in favor of PRA and
conduct further proceedings. Costs to Mac-
Donald.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and HORTON concur.

395 P.3d 1269

In the Matter of the Doe Children,

Children Under Eighteen (18)
Years of Age.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

AND WELFARE, Petitioner-
Respondent,

v

Jane DOE (2016-47), Respondent-

Appellant.
Docket No. 44704

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: June 2, 2017

238

Douglas A. Pierce, Coeur d'Alene, attorney
for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, attorney for respondent.

JONES, Justice
I. Narure or tae Case

Jane Doe (“Doe”) appeals from the magis-
trate court’s judgment granting the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare’s
CIDHW”) petition to terminate her parental
rights. Doe asserts that the magistrate court
erred by: (1) terminating her parental rights
notwithstanding its finding that her mental
health issues made it impossible for her to
comply with the case plan; and (2) consider-
ing evidence outside of the record during the
termination trial,

IL Facruat AND PRocEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe has three children, Z.C. (born 2007);
J.C. (born 2008), and D.C. (born 2012) (col-
lectively, the “Children”), On May 81, 2013,
Doe voluntarily placed Z.C. and D.C. at a
group foster home in Coeur d’Alene called
the Children’s Village. On July 17, 2018, Doe
placed J.C. at the Children’s Village as well.

On January 27, 2014, a petition under the
Child Protective Act was filed alleging that
the Children came within the purview of the
act based on neglect, abandonment, home-
Jessness, and/or an unstable home environ-
ment, In an accompanying affidavit, IDHW
social worker, Heather Johnson (“Ms. John-
son”), testified that the Children had resided
at the Children’s Village since their respec-
tive drop off dates in 2013. Further, Ms.

Johnson related that from November 2013
through January 2014, IDHW had received
several referrals from the Children’s Village,
including the following: (1) on November 25,
2018, it was reported that Doe had disclosed
that Z.C. and J.C. were sexually abused by
their father years ago (Doe later claimed this
was only a misunderstanding) and that Doe
was homeless at that time; (2) on January 8,
2014, it was reported that, on a weekend visit
with Doe, the Children had stayed in a house
with many other people, including six other
children, a heater had fallen on top of D.C.,
Doe had failed to give D.C. his medication for
an infection, D.C. returned to Children’s Vil-
lage with a double ear infection and cigarette
butts in his toys, and concerns were raised
that Doe’s appearance and behavior indicated
that she was under the influence of a sub-
stance; and (8) on January 17, 2014, it was
reported that Doe took D.C, to the doctor for
a face rash, which was a staph infection, and
failed to pick up the prescription when called.
Ms. Johnson’s affidavit also reviewed the var-
ious child protection referrals regarding Doe
and the Children, which included concerns
regarding Doe’s residence not having heat;
Doe not being able to afford a phone, a
vehicle, or food; the presence of cigarettes,
and marijuana at Doe’s residence; Doe left
drug paraphernalia at a shelter home; Doe
and the Children were homeless; Doe wanted.
to give up the Children because she was
depressed; and a burn mark was found on
Z.C.’s neck with no explanation provided by
Doe.

On January 27, 2014, IDHW moved for the
removal of the Children alleging that it was
contrary to the welfare of the Children to
remain in the home and in the Children’s
best interests to vest legal custody with
IDHW pending further proceedings. The
magistrate court granted the motion that
same day ordering that the Children be
placed in the temporary custody of IDHW
pending a shelter care hearing. On February
4, 2014, after a shelter care hearing, the
magistrate court found it appropriate to shel-
ter the Children based on neglect and an
unstable home environment. Further, the
magistrate court found that IDHW had made
reasonable efforts prior to the placement of

the Children in shelter care to prevent the
need for such placement.

On February 28, 2014, the magistrate
court held an adjudicatory hearing and is-
sued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
an order for legal custody. Therein, the mag-
istrate court found that the Children had
been subjected to an unstable home environ-
ment and that continuation of residence in
the home would be contrary to their welfare.
Prior to the adjudicatory hearing, Ms. John-
son submitted an adjudicatory report of in-
vestigation, which found as follows, in perti-
nent part: Doe had refused to engage in
services to ensure the safety of the Children;
IDHW had offered assistance to Doe to ad-
dress the housing, substance abuse, mental
health, and parenting concerns; Doe ap-
peared to be under the influence of a sub-
stance during a recent visit with the Chil-
dren; Doe refused to submit to a drug test;
IDHW requested a mental health assessment
to assess any mental health issues that may
impact Doe’s daily functioning, relationships,
and/or ability to work or engage in meaning-
ful activities; and an ongoing concern existed
that Doe was actively using drugs.

Ultimately, the magistrate court concluded
that the Children’s continuation of residence
in Doe’s home would be contrary to their
welfare; vesting legal custody with IDHW
would be in the best interests of the Chil-
dren; and reasonable efforts were made by
IDHW to eliminate the need for foster care,
but were not successful. Accordingly, the
magistrate court ordered that the Children
be placed in the legal custody of IDHW; a
case plan be submitted within 30 days; and
reasonable efforts continue to be made to
reunify the family in a timely manner in
accordance with the case plan or, alternative-
ly, the initiation of the finalization of the
permanent placement of the Children. Id.
During the hearing, the magistrate court not-
ed Doe’s history of drug use, mental health
issues, homelessness, and her refusal to sub-
mit to drug tests or receive assistance or
services from IDHW.

On March 19, 2014, IDHW submitted a
proposed case plan, which identified the fol-
lowing six areas of concern: (1) Doe’s ability
to protect the Children from further abuse,

239

considering the fact that IDHW had received
referrals regarding Doe’s physical abuse,
sexual abuse, neglect, homelessness, and fail-
ure to seek medical attention for D.C.; (2)
Doe’s homelessness; (8) Doe’s employment;
@ the concern that Doe had been suspected
of arriving to visitations under the influence
of drugs and/or alcohol and had refused to
drug test or engage in substance abuse ser-
vices; (5) Doe’s mental health issues and her
refusal to provide information of her mental
health, or engage in services with IDHW;
and (6) the need for a concurrent case plan in
the event that reunification was unsuccessful.
For each area of concern, the case plan listed
a desired result and required tasks.

On March 25, 2014, the magistrate court
held a case plan hearing. The hearing log
notes indicate that Doe objected to several
requirements of the case plan; namely, the
drug testing and the mental health assess-
ments. The magistrate court approved the
drug testing requirement because Doe had
tested positive for marijuana at the time of
J.C’s birth and previously disclosed her re-
ereational use of marijuana. The magistrate
court modified the case plan’s requirement
for mental health assessments and required
Doe to provide releases of mental health
records from prior assessments instead of
submitting to new assessments, The magis-
trate court noted that IDHW would be per-
mitted to request further mental health as-
sessments if it was not satisfied with Doe’s
release of prior assessments. Lastly, the
magistrate court warned Doe that failure to
comply with the case plan could result in
termination of her parental rights. Following
the hearing, a revised case plan was issued in
accordance with the magistrate court’s modi-
fications. On April 8, 2014, the magistrate
court issued an order corresponding with its
findings and conclusions at the hearing.

Four review hearings were held between
June 17, 2014 and November 25, 2014. Prior
to the first review hearing, the Guardian ad
litem and IDHW submitted progress reports.
The Guardian ad litem concluded that Doe
was making only minimal progress on her
ease plan and was unable to appear for a
drug and alcohol evaluation because she was
in jail on the evaluation date. The Guardian

240

ad litem recommended that the Children re-
main in the legal custody of IDHW. IDHW’s
progress report expressed concern regarding
Doe’s erratic behavior, high anxiety, and
drug use. Further, IDHW noted that Doe
refused to submit to drug tests and blamed
IDHW for her noncompliance. IDHW report-
ed that the Children’s Village employees
claimed that Doe scared them, was disre-
spectful, and lied. Children’s Village asked
that the Children be removed because they
felt that they could not protect other children
from Doe’s poor behavior. IDHW reported
that Doe had yet to prove her employment.
by providing pay stubs, Doe was also convict-
ed for possession of drug paraphernalia with
intent to use.

On June 17, 2014, at the first review hear-
ing, IDHW asserted that the mental evalua-
tion that Doe released was incomplete; ac-
cordingly, IDHW requested that the case
plan be amended to require an entire mental
evaluation. Doe objected to IDHW’s request
and argued that she was apprehensive of
IDHW’s efforts for reunification because
IDHW was not communicating with her, nor
was it completing its required tasks. Doe also
blamed the specific case worker for failing to
communicate with her and for physically and
emotionally abusing her. Doe admitted that
she had recently spent six days in jail, but
argued that her jail time was irrelevant. The
magistrate court reviewed each case plan
item and concluded as follows: (1) Doe had.
failed to provide proof of employment; (2)
Doe had refused to submit to random drug
testing; (8) Doe must submit to a full mental
evaluation; and (4) IDHW had made reason-
able efforts to accomplish reunification,

On September 2, 2014, the magistrate
court held a second review hearing. The
Guardian ad litem and the IDHW case work-
er again submitted progress reports. The
Guardian ad litem’s report provided that
Doe’s behaviors had “progressively gotten
worse since the last hearing.” IDHW’s report
provided that Doe had failed to make prog-
ress on her case plan. IDHW’s report and
the hearing log notes indicate that Doe had
continued to refuse to submit to a drug test;
however, at the hearing, Doe agreed to sub-
mit to a drug test on the spot. She tested

positive for THC. Out of a concern for Doe’s
mental health condition, the magistrate court
scheduled a review hearing for three days
later to facilitate the signing of releases and
to further encourage Doe to make progress
on her case plan.

On October 14, 2014, a third review hear-
ing was held. The Guardian ad litem reported
that the Children were improving dramatical-
ly while living with the foster parent and
attributed the improvement to the consisten-
cy and positive training that the Children
were receiving. Further, the Guardian ad
litem reported that Doe was “not addressing
the most important aspects of her case plan,
drug testing and a mental health assess-
ment.” Ultimately, the Guardian ad litem ree-
ommended that the magistrate court “move
forward with the termination of parental
rights so that permanency may be pursued.”
IDHW’s report provided that Doe had made
progress with housing because she was living
with her husband in Rathrdrum, Idaho, and
that the home was physically appropriate;
however, Doe had failed to make progress
with regard to her employment, her visita-
tion behavior, substance abuse, parenting
classes, or mental health evaluations. The
hearing log notes indicate that Doe had con-
tinued to refuse drug testing and, although
she had made progress by meeting with a
mental health evaluator, she had yet to com-
plete a full mental health evaluation.

On November 25, 2014, a fourth reviewing
hearing was held. The Guardian ad litem and
IDHW case worker noted that the Children
were progressing, but that Doe’s noncompli-
ance had continued. Accordingly, it was again
recommended that the magistrate court
move forward with the termination of Doe’s
parental rights. A letter from a mental health
evaluator was attached to IDHW’s report,
The evaluator concluded that clear sympto-
mology was present, but it was not possible
to render an opinion on a diagnosis of mental
illness because of the inability to rule out
substance abuse as a primary cause of said
symptomology,

Five permanency hearings were held be-
tween January 6, 2015 and December 165,
2015, Prior to the first permanency hearing,
the Guardian ad litem again reported that

while the Children were progressing, Doe
was failing to comply with her case plan,
Accordingly, it again recommended that the
magistrate court move forward with the ter-
mination of Doe’s parental rights. IDHW’s
report was substantially similar to its previ-
ous report; that is, Doe had continued her
noncompliance with the case plan. On Janu-
ary 12, 2015, the magistrate court issued an
order regarding the permanency hearing in
which it found that IDHW had made reason-
able efforts to prevent or eliminate the need
for placement of the Children in foster care.
Further, the magistrate court approved the
permanency plan of termination with the con-
tinuation of reunification efforts. IDHW filed
its petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights
on January 16, 2015.

On March 31, 2015, a second permanency
hearing was held. The Guardian ad litem
again recommended that the magistrate
court move forward with the termination of
Doe’s parental rights due to continued non-
compliance with the case plan. IDHW report-
ed that the Children’s behavior was being
negatively affected by Doe’s visits. Accord-
ingly, IDHW asked the magistrate court to
reconsider its approval of visitation. The
magistrate court concluded that reunification
should not be suspended yet, and emphasized
the need for Doe to submit to the necessary
services and treatment.

On June 28, 2015, a third permanency
hearing was held. Prior to the hearing,
IDHW submitted a review, which concluded
as follows, in pertinent part:

For the duration of this case [Doe] has

been resistant to all services outlined on

her case plan. [Doe] has not adequately
addressed her mental health issues and is
unwilling to attend counseling services to
do so.
The magistrate court found that Doe had still
not addressed her mental health issues, Fur-
ther, the magistrate court found that IDHW
had gone above and beyond in attempting to
reunify the family. Accordingly, the magis-
trate court authorized IDHW’s request to
discontinue reunification efforts. A corre-
sponding order was issued on June 25, 2015.
Therein, the magistrate court ordered an
amendment to the permanency plan to in-
clude termination without reunification.

241

On September 15, 2015, a fourth perma-
nency hearing was held. Prior thereto,
IDHW provided a review, wherein it ex-
plained that it was unable to report on Doe’s
progress because Doe had cut off all contact
with IDHW.

On December 15, 2015, a fifth permanency
hearing was held. IDHW submitted a prog-
ress report, which explained that Doe had
attended two visitations, but one ended in
her breaking down and being very upset.
Further, IDHW provided that it was unable
to assess other areas of Doe’s progress be-
cause of her noncompliance,

The magistrate court held review hearings
on May 10 and 16, 2016. Doe requested a
second chance at working her case plan, but
her request was denied. The magistrate
court discussed possible dates for a termi-
nation trial and explained to Doe that if the
State failed to prove that termination was
appropriate, reunification would be ordered
immediately.

The trial for the termination of Doe’s pa-
rental rights was held August 10-12, and 30,
2016, The magistrate court issued its findings
of fact, conclusioris of law and order termi-
nating Doe’s parental rights, and a corre-
sponding judgment on December 16, 2016, In
its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order, the magistrate court found that
IDHW proved, to a clear and convincing
standard, the following three grounds for the
termination of Doe’s parental rights: (1) ne-
glecting the Children as defined by Idaho
Code section 16-1602(81); (2) neglecting the
Children by failing to comply with the court’s
order in the child protection act case or the
case plan, and reunification has not occurred
within the time standards set forth in Idaho
Code section 16-1629(9); and (8) an inability
to discharge parental responsibilities and
such inability will continue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period and will be injurious to
the health, morals or well-being of the Chil-
dren. The magistrate court also found that
IDHW proved that the termination was in
the best interest of the Children.

The magistrate court found that the follow-
ing factors weighed in favor of its finding
that the termination was in the best interests
of the Children: lack of stability and perma-

242

nency of the home; resistance by those who
live in the home to permit IDHW to inspect
the home; lack of stable employment; Doe’s
lack of effort to improve her situation; Doe’s
failure to complete evaluation and treatment
for mental health issues; Doe’s resistance to
drug testing; Doe’s periodic incarceration;
Doe’s continued failed drug tests; the stabili-
ty of the Children in their current placement
and their improvement while away from Doe;
the testimony regarding the specific needs of
the Children, which Doe does not have the
ability to meet; and the bonding that has
occurred in the Children’s present place-
ment. Further, the magistrate court found
that the Children had been in IDHW’s custo-
dy for over fifteen of the most recent twenty-
two months, and that during the most recent
twenty-two months, reunification had not
been accomplished.

The magistrate court acknowledged that
Doe’s mental health issues impacted her abil-
ity to complete her case plan and provide a
stable home, but ultimately concluded that
Doe’s noncompliance with the case plan was
willful and that her failure to comply with the
case plan was not a result of her mental
health issues. Alternatively, the magistrate
court found that even if Doe’s mental health
issues were considered to prevent compliance
with the case plan, termination was still
proper because Doe’s unresolved mental
health issues rendered her unable to dis-
charge her parental responsibilities and such
inability would continue for a prolonged, in-
determinate period and would be injurious to
the health, morals, or well-being of the Chil-
dren, The magistrate court found Doe’s argu-
ment—that she could comply if given one
more chance—unpersuasive because it was
belied by the overwhelming record of non-
compliance. Ultimately, the magistrate court
found that because “at least one statutory
ground has been pled and proved to a clear
and convincing evidence standard, and be-
cause termination has been shown to be ...
in the best interests of the [Clhildren to a
clear and convincing evidence standard, the
court may grant [[DHW’s] petition.”

Doe appeals.

Ii. Issuzs on APPEAL

1. Whether the magistrate court erred in
terminating the parental rights of Doe,

notwithstanding its finding that Doe’s
mental health issues impacted her abil-
ity to comply with the case plan.

2, Whether Doe’s due process rights
were violated because the same magis-
trate court judge presided over both
the child protection action and the ter-
mination trial.

IV. Sranparp or Review

Hs An appeal of the termination of pa-
rental rights is reviewed as follows:

Grounds for termination of parental
rights must be shown by clear and convine-
ing evidence because each parent has a
fundamental liberty interest in maintaining
a relationship with his or her child. Clear
and convincing evidence is generally un-
derstood to be evidence indicating that the
thing to be proved is highly probable or
reasonably certain. On appeal, this Court
will not disturb the magistrate court’s deci-
sion to terminate parental rights if there is
substantial, competent evidence in the rec-
ord to support the decision. Substantial,
competent evidence is such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. This Court is re-
quired to conduct an independent review of
the magistrate court record, but must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the magistrate court’s judgment because
the magistrate court has the opportunity
to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess
their credibility, to detect prejudice or mo-
tive[,] and to judge the character of the
parties.

Idaho Dep’ of Health & Welfare v. Doe
(2016-11), 160 Idaho 824, 881, 879 P.8d 1094,
1101 (2016) (quoting Idaho Dep’t of Health &
Welfare v. Doe (2015-01), 158 Idaho 764, 767,
351 P.3d 1222, 1225 (2015).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The magistrate court did not err in
terminating Doe’s parental rights, not-
withstanding its finding that Doe’s
mental health issues impacted her
ability to comply with the case plan.

Doe argues that the magistrate court
erred when it terminated her parental rights,

notwithstanding its finding that it was impos-
sible for Doe to comply with her case plan.
Doe’s argument can be distilled to the follow-
ing three points. First, Doe asserts that she
constructively asserted an impossibility de-
fense by demonstrating that her mental
health issues made it impossible for her to
comply with her case plan. Doe notes that
the magistrate court recognized that her
mental health issues impacted her ability to
complete her case plan. Doe cites this Court’s
recent opinion in Idaho Department of
Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016-14) for the
proposition that “impossibility may be assert-
ed as a defense to a claim of neglect founded
upon failure to comply with the requirements
of a case plan.” 161 Idaho 596, 600, 389 P.8d
141, 145 (2016).

Second, Doe asserts that IDHW failed to
demonstrate that she was unable to dis-
charge her parental responsibilities. Doe as-
serts that she “participated greatly” in her
case plan, notwithstanding the fact that her
mental health issues clearly impacted her
ability to do so. She argues that she has
shown the ability to “maintain stable housing,
maintain sobriety for substantial periods of
time, and intermittent employment.” Accord-
ingly, Doe argues that, if given more time,
she could maintain the stability needed to
“not only have a relationship with her chil-
dren, but perhaps take the children back in
her care.”

Third, Doe submits that the termination of
her parental rights was not in the best inter-
est of the Children. Doe claims that evidence
presented at trial established that the termi-
nation of her parental rights would be devas-
tating to the Children.

In response to Doe’s first point, IDHW
claims that Doe has misstated the magistrate
court's findings and conclusions. IDHW
quotes the magistrate court as follows:
“Though her mental health issues clearly im-
pact her ability to complete her case plan ...
they do not prevent her from doing so. It was
possible for [Doe] to comply with her case
plan.” Further, IDHW asserts that Doe’s
argument is directly contradicted by her tes-
timony, which follows, in pertinent part:

Q: [D]id you ever tell [IDHW] about any

personal barriers that you might have, per-

243

sonal things that keep you from being able
to do what this case plan said?

A: Nope.

Q: You didn’t ever tell them? Okay.

A: There’s nothing that keeps me from
doing what this case plan, um, says other
than the case workers and refusing to keep
contact or providing documentations, pro-
viding scheduled appointments, making ar-
rangement.

IDHW submits that there is substantial and
competent evidence supporting the magis-
trate court’s findings that Doe failed to com-
ply with her case plan and that such failure
was due to her own choices, not her mental
health issues.

In response to Doe’s second point, IDHW
emphasizes that Doe’s claim that she has the
ability to maintain stable housing, sobriety
and employment is not the issue; rather, the
issue is whether Doe has in fact maintained
stable housing, sobriety, and employment as
required by the case plan, IDHW claims that
there is substantial and competent evidence
supporting the magistrate court’s finding
that Doe is unable to discharge her parental
responsibilities and that such inability will
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate peri-
od and will be injurious to the health, morals,
or well-being of the Children.

Regarding Doe’s third point, IDHW em-
phasizes the need for permanency and stabil-
ity for the Children and argues that Doe has
failed to so provide. IDHW claims that this
Court should not consider Doe’s argument
because she fails to cite authority in support
thereof.

HH Idaho Code section 16-2005(1) pro-
vides that a court may terminate the parental
rights of a parent if it is found that such
termination is in the best interests of the
child and that one or more of the following
conditions exists:

(b) The parent has neglected or abused

the child.

(d) The parent is unable to discharge pa-
rental responsibilities and such inability
will continue for a prolonged indeterminate

244

period and will be injurious to the health,
morals or well-being of the child.
LC. § 16-2005(1). Idaho Code section 16-
2002(8) defines “neglected” as follows:
(a) Conduct as defined in section 16-
1602(81[0] ), Idaho Code; or
(b) The parent(s) has failed to comply
with the court’s orders or the case plan in
a child protective act case and:

@ The department has had temporary

or legal custody of the child for fifteen

(15) of the most recent twenty-two (22)

months; and

Gi) Reunification has not been accom-

plished by the last day of the fifteenth

month in which the child has been in the
temporary or legal custody of the de-
partment.
LC. § 20028). Further, Idaho Code section
16-1602(81) defines “neglected” as a child:
(a) Who is without proper parental care
and control, or subsistence, medical or oth-
er care or control necessary for his well-
being because of the conduct or omission
of his parents, guardian or other custodian
or their neglect or refusal to provide them
vee OF
(b) Whose parents, guardian or other
custodian are unable to discharge their
responsibilities to and for the child and, as
a result of such inability, the child lacks
the parental care necessary for his health,
safety or well-being. ...
LC. § 16-1602(81).

“Once a statutory ground for termi-
nation has been established, the trial court.
must next determine whether it is in the
best interests of the child to terminate the
parent-child relationship. When consider-
ing the best interests of the child, a trial
court may consider numerous factors.” In
re Doe (2015-08), 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358
P.8d 77, 88 (2015) (quoting In re Doe
(2014-15), 157 Idaho 765, 772, 339 P.8d
1169, 1176 (2014)); LC. § 16-2005(1). While
a comprehensive list of factors a court
must consider does not exist, this Court
has considered the following: “the stability
and permanency of the home, unemploy-
ment of the parent, ... improvement of
child while in foster care, the parent’s ef-

forts to improve his or her situation, and
the parent’s continuing problems with the
law.” In ve Doe (2014-15), 157 Idaho at
‘772, 339 P.38d at 1176 (quoting In ve Doe,
156 Idaho 108, 111, 820 P.8d 1262, 1270
(2014)). Additionally, this Court has consid-
ered the testimony from IDHW social
workers, and guardians ad litem. /State,
Dept. of Health & Welfare v.J Doe, 145
Idaho [662] at 665, 182 P.3d [1196] at 1199
[ 2008) I.

Idaho Dept of Health & Welfare v. Doe
(2016-11), 160 Idaho 824, 888-34, 379 P.8d
1094, 1103-04 (2016).

HE Doe is correct in claiming that impos-
sibility may be asserted as a defense to a
claim of neglect. In Idaho Department of
Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016-14), this
Court considered an appeal from a magis-
trate court’s termination of a mother’s paren-
tal rights. 161 Idaho 596, 597, 889 P.3d 141,
148 (2016). The basis for the termination of
the mother’s parental rights was neglect
founded upon failure to comply with the
court’s orders or the case plan. Jd. On ap-
peal, the mother argued that compliance with
her case plan was impossible due to her
incarceration. Id, at 599, 889 P.8d at 144. In
response, IDHW argued that the mother was
responsible for her noncompliance because
she could have complied had she not been
incarcerated. Id, This Court conceded that
the language of Idaho Code section 16-
2002(8)(b) did not leave room for an impossi-
bility defense because it merely required a
finding that the parent failed to comply with
court orders or the case plan, and that
IDHW had custody of the child for a speci-
fied duration. Id. at 600, 389 P.3d at 145.
Nonetheless, this Court held that “impossi-
bility may be asserted as a defense to a claim
of neglect founded upon failure to comply
with the requirements of a case plan.” Jd,
This Court explained that there was “no
principled basis for [termination of parental
rights] for circumstances beyond [a parent's]
control.” Id. However, this Court cautioned
that its holding did not require a finding of
“willful non-compliance with the terms of a
case plan as a prerequisite to a finding of
neglect under Idaho Code section 16-
2002(8)(b).” Id, Instead, this Court provided

that a “trial court must find that the parent
is responsible, whether directly or indirectly,
for non-compliance with the requirements of
a case plan.” Jd. This Court distinguished the
impossibility of case plan compliance from
instances where a parent bore responsibility
for the noncompliance. Jd. This Court ex-
plained that in Idaho Department of Health
& Welfare v. Doe (2014-17), 157 Idaho 694,
701, 889 P.3d 755, 762 (2014), the mother’s
failure to comply with her case plan consisted
of missed visitations, failure to provide the
required releases, failure to submit to drug
testing, continued use of methamphetamine,
and failure to submit to counseling. Jd. Such
non-compliance, this Court reasoned, was not
a product of impossibility resulting from a
disability; rather it reflected her decision to
continue drug use with the consequence of
ease plan non-compliance. Id.

Doe’s first assertion is meritless not only
because it is based on a misstatement, but
also because she misunderstands the impossi-
bility defense. Doe asserts that the magis-
trate court found that it was impossible for
Doe to comply with her case plan because of
her mental health issues. The magistrate
court made no such finding. While the magis-
trate court found that Doe’s mental health
issues impacted her ability to comply with
the case plan, it concluded that Doe’s non-
compliance was willful. The magistrate court
did not mince words; it emphasized that “Doe
is responsible, both directly and indirectly,
for non-compliance with the requirements of
the case plan. Her failures to comply ...
were not the result of accident or disability.”
Doe’s claim that the magistrate court found
it impossible for her to comply with her case
plan is clearly false,

The magistrate court’s findings undercut,
Doe’s impossibility defense. In Idaho Depart-
ment of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016-14),
this Court provided that impossibility was a
defense to termination based on neglect for
failure to comply with a case plan when the
cireumstances were beyond the parent’s con-
trol. Id, at 600, 889 P.38d at 145. However,
this Court plainly stated that impossibility
was not a defense in instances where the
parent was responsible, whether directly or
indirectly, for case plan non-compliance. Id,

245

Here, the magistrate court found that Doe’s
non-compliance was willful. Accordingly,
Doe’s impossibility defense is unavailing,

HM Doe's second assertion is also merit-
Jess. Doe claims that IDHW failed to demon-
strate that she was unable to discharge her
parental responsibilities because she “partici-
pated greatly” in her case plan. In its find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, the
magistrate court found that the record, testi-
mony, and exhibits supported termination be-
cause Doe’s unresolved mental health issues
rendered her unable to discharge her paren-
tal responsibilities and that such inability
would continue for a prolonged, indetermi-
nate period and would be injurious to the
health, morals or well-being of the Children,
Substantial, competent evidence supports the
magistrate court’s findings. The record, trial
testimony, and trial exhibits demonstrate
that, although Doe made occasional slight
improvements, overall she demonstrated an
inability to discharge parental responsibilities
by failing to make progress with her visita-
tion behavior, employment status, substance
abuse, or mental health evaluations. Accord-
ingly, Doe’s argument fails,

HM «(Doe's third assertion is unpersua-
sive. Doe claims that it is not in the best
interests of the Children to terminate her
parental rights because severing the parent-
child relationship would be devastating to the
Children. A court may consider many factors
when analyzing the best interests of children,
including: the stability and permanency of
the home, unemployment of the parent, im-
provement of the children while in foster
care, the parent’s efforts to improve her situ-
ation, and testimony from IDHW social
workers and guardians ad litem. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016-11), 160
Idaho 824, 883-34, 379 P.8d 1094, 1108-04
(2016). Here, the magistrate court listed the
following factors in support of its conclusion
that termination was in the best interests of
the Children: Doe's lack of stable employ-
ment, lack of efforts to improve her situation,
failures regarding evaluation and treatment
of mental health issues, resistance to drug
testing, periodic incarceration, continued
failed drug tests, and the stability of the
Children in their current placement. Doe’s

246

subjective claim that the Children would be
devastated does not undermine the substan-
tial, competent evidence found by the magis-
trate court that termination would be in the
best interests of the Children. Further, Doe
fails to cite authority supporting her claim
that the Children’s devastation should out-
weigh facts that suggest that termination of
the parent-child relationship is in the Chil-
dren’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm
the magistrate court’s judgment.

B. Doe’s due process rights were not
prejudiced as a result of the same
magistrate judge presiding over the
child protection action and the termi-
nation trial.

HMM Doe argues that the magistrate
court erred by considering matters outside of
the record when it granted IDHW’s petition
to terminate Doe’s parental rights. Doe notes
that the same magistrate judge presided over
both the preceding two years of review hear-
ings and the termination trial and argues
that the magistrate judge’s experience with
Doe through two years of review hearings,
which was not introduced at trial, prejudiced
Doe’s due process rights,

HE IDHW argues that there is no evi-
dence that the magistrate judge’s experience
with Doe ‘during the review hearings preju-
diced a substantial right of Doe, Nonetheless,
IDHW asserts that certified copies of the
magistrate court’s orders in the underlying
child protection action were properly admit-
ted as exhibits to the termination trial. Ac-
cordingly, IDHW asserts that the magistrate
judge’s consideration of the underlying child
protection case was not error.

Even in an appeal from the termination of

parental rights, “we will not consider an

issue which is not supported by cogent
argument and authority.” Idaho Dept of

Health & Welfare v. Doe, 151 Idaho 498,

508 n. 1, 260 P.8d 1169, 1174 n, 1 (2011)

(citing Liponis v, Bach, 149 Idaho 872, 874,

234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010); LA.R. 35(a)(6)).

Idaho Dep of Health & Welfare v. Doe
(2018-15), 156 Idaho 108, 109, 320 P.8d 1262,
1268 (2014),

Doe’s argument is meritless because it fails
to elaborate on the vague claim that the
magistrate judge’s previous experience with
Doe in the child protection case resulted in a
due process violation. However, even if Doe
were to present a relevant legal argument
supporting her contention, such an argument
would fail because IDHW’s reports and the
magistrate court’s orders were properly ad-
mitted as exhibits to the termination trial.
Therefore, the magistrate judge’s reference
to the underlying child protection case was
not, as Doe claims, outside the record, nor
did it prejudice Doe’s substantial rights.

VI. Conctusion
We affirm the termination of Doe’s paren-
tal rights.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur.

395 P.3d 1279

Christina J. GREENFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

ve
Ian D, SMITH, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No, 43831

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Wallace, April 2017 Term.

Filed: June 6, 2017

3
N

2

48,

Christina J. Greenfield, Post Falls, appel-
lant pro se argued,

Randall/Daskin, P.S., Spokane, Washing-
ton, for respondent. Troy Y, Nelson argued.

BRODY, Justice.

This is a legal malpractice case that ad-
dresses the statute of limitations applicable
to professional malpractice claims, how a
statute of limitations is calculated when the
last day for filing a complaint falls on a
Sunday, and whether expert testimony is
necessary to establish the prima facie ele-
ments of legal malpractice. Greenfield ap-
peals the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of the attorney.
We affirm.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Greenfield hired Smith in September 2010
to represent her in a civil suit against her
neighbors, Erie and Rosalynn Wurmlinger,
for the alleged illegal operation of a bed and
breakfast in their home. While the suit was
pending, Greenfield was charged criminally
with malicious injury to the Wurmlingers’
property. Greenfield retained Smith to repre-
sent her in the criminal matter as well.

Smith represented Greenfield for approxi-
mately eighteen months. During that time,
Greenfield was acquitted of the criminal
charges, The civil case was scheduled to go
to trial in May 2012. In February 2012,
Smith filed a motion to withdraw from repre-
senting Greenfield. Smith’s basis for the mo-
tion was that the attorney-client relationship
had broken down to the point where he was
no longer able to represent Greenfield. The
district court granted the motion on March 8,
2012,

Following Smith’s withdrawal, the district
court rescheduled the civil trial for Novem-

ber 26, 2012. Greenfield represented herself
at trial, and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the neighbors on November 30, 2012.
The jury awarded $52,000 in damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and
$17,000 in damages for timber trespass which
were then trebled. The district court also
awarded the neighbors’ attorney’s fees and
costs. The total judgment entered by the
district court was $168,755.37. Greenfield ap-
pealed to this Court, and we affirmed the
judgment and awarded additional attorney's
fees and costs to the neighbors. Greenfield v.
Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591, 849 P.8d 1182
(2015).

On December 1, 2014, Greenfield filed this
malpractice case against Smith, alleging,
among other things, that he failed to com-
plete discovery, failed to file a motion for
summary judgment on the Wurmlingers’
counterclaim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, failed to amend the complaint.
to include additional causes of action for
abuse of process, slander and libel, failed to
file a timely motion for protective order to
safeguard the privacy of her medical records,
missed several important deadlines, and
made no attempt to get the criminal charges
dismissed for lack of evidence. Smith filed a
motion for summary judgment on July 30,
2015, arguing that Greenfield’s claims were
time barred and that she could not prove the
prima facie elements of legal malpractice be-
cause she failed to designate any expert wit-
nesses. Greenfield opposed the motion by
filing a responsive brief and her own affidavit
setting forth the allegations she claimed sup-
ported her malpractice claim. Greenfield did
not file any expert affidavits. Greenfield ar-
gued that her complaint was timely and that
no expert witness was required to prove her
case, The district court granted Smith’s mo-
tion. Greenfield appealed.

I.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1, Whether the district court erred in
determining that Smith’s claims for profes-
sional malpractice were time-barred.

2 Whether the district court erred in
granting Smith’s motion for summary judg-
ment where Greenfield failed to submit any

249

expert affidavits concerning the attorney’s
standard of care and causation.

8. Whether Smith is entitled to attorney’s
fees on appeal.

Il.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE “When this Court reviews a district
court’s decision on summary judgment, it
employs the same standard as that properly
employed by the trial court when originally
ruling on the motion.” Kolin v. Saint Luke’s
Regl, Med. Ctr., 180 Idaho 828, 827, 940 P.2d
1142, 1146 (1997). “The judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material facts and
that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.” ‘LR.C.P. 56(c)
(repealed effective July 1, 2016). This Court
considers “pleadings, depositions, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any.” Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 227, 159
P.8d 862, 864 (2007) (internal citations omit-
ted), When deciding a motion for summary
judgment, all facts are construed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn.
from the record are to be drawn in favor of
the non-moving party. Parks v. Safeco Ins.
Co. of Illinois, 160 Idaho 556, 561, 876 P.8d
760, 765 (2016). “If there is no genuine issue
of material fact, only a question of law re-
mains, over which this Court exercises free
review.” Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.8d
at 864, “In order to survive a motion for
summary judgment, the non-moving party
must make a sufficient showing to establish
the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.”. Jones v. Starnes,
150 Idaho 257, 259-60, 245 P.3d 1009, 1011-
12 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).

Iv.

ANALYSIS

A. The district. court erred in determin-
ing that Smith’s civil matter claims
were time barred.

Greenfield contends that the district court
erred when it determined that her claims

250

were time barred by the two year statute of
limitations for professional malpractice set
forth in Idaho Code section 5-219(4). Green-
field filed her complaint on December 1,
2014. Her complaint contained a host of
claims, including, negligence, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
breach of contract, tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, and fraud.
Some of the claims arose out of Smith’s
representation in the criminal case (“criminal
matter claims”) and some arose out of
Smith’s representation in the civil case (“civil
matter claims”).

The district court dismissed Greenfield’s
fraud claim for failure to plead the cause of
action with particularity. Greenfield does not
challenge that ruling. The district court also
held that all of Greenfield’s remaining causes
of action, regardless of how they were la-
beled (ie., negligence, breach of contract,
breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing) were governed by the two-year stat-
ute of limitations for professional malprac-
tice. The district court found that the latest,
the criminal matter claims could have ac-
crued was October 18, 2011,—the date
Greenfield was acquitted—which meant that
the two-year statute of limitations had long
passed, The district court held that the latest
date the civil matter claims could have ac-
crued was November 30, 2012—the date the
jury returned an adverse verdict. The district
court thus concluded that Greenfield's civil
matter claims were a day late.

Greenfield contends that the district
court’s decisions were erroneous for two rea-
sons. First, she argues that her claims are
governed by a five-year statute of limitations
for breach of written contract. Second, she
argues that the district court miscalculated
the two-year statute of limitations ran,
Greenfield’s argument that the district court
miscalculated the filing deadline for the civil
matter claims is well taken.

1. The district court correctly deter-
mined that Greenfield’s claims are
governed by a two-year professional
malpractice statute of limitations.

Il Greenfield contends that this matter

is a contract dispute, and is therefore subject

to a five-year statute of limitations under
Idaho Code section 5-216. We reject this
argument.

The Idaho legislature has enacted a series
of statutes setting forth the time periods
within which certain causes of action must be
filed. See Idaho Code sections 5-201 et seq.
Section 5-214 provides that “(tlhe periods
prescribed for the commencement of actions
other than for the recovery of real property
are as follows,” Section 5-219(4) is one of the
provisions that follows and provides a two-
year statute of limitations for “professional
malpractice” claims:

Within two (2) years:

An action to recover damages for profes-
sional malpractice, ... including any such
action arising from breach of an implied
warranty or implied covenant... .

LC. § 5-219(4). The statute defines “profes-
sional malpractice” as “wrongful acts or
omissions in the performance of professional
services by any person ... licensed to per-
form such services under the law of the state
of Idaho.” Id.

The Court addressed the broad scope of
Section 5-219(4) in a footnote in Lapham v.
Stewart, 187 Idaho 582, 51 P.8d 396 (2002),
pointing out that a professional malpractice
claim as defined by the legislature includes
some claims that would traditionally sound in
contract, The Court noted:

“Professional malpractice” as used in
Idaho Code § 5-219(4) is not limited to
claims that are alleged as a negligence
action. The statute provides that an action
for professional malpractice also includes
“any such action arising from breach of
an implied warranty or implied cove-
nant,” both of which are actions for breach
of contract,

187 Idaho at 588 n4, 51 P.8d at 402 n4
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

HI The plaintiff in Lapham brought
claims against an attorney for negligence,
breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary
duty. The Court explained that all of these
claims arose out of the professional services
performed by a licensed attorney, and were

therefore subject to the two-year profession-
al malpractice statute of limitations. The la-
bel attached to a cause of action will not
necessarily take it out of the professional
malpractice statute of limitations, Bishop v,
Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 621, 272 P.8d 1247,
1252 (2012). The only time the Court has
recognized a contract basis for a malpractice
action is where the attorney has failed to
perform an elevated standard of care ex-
pressly specified in a written agreement. Id.
at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251.

There is no dispute that Smith is a licensed
attorney, All of Greenfield’s claims arise out
of Smith’s alleged failure to perform services
in connection with his representation of her,
While Greenfield argues that this is really a
breach of contract action, she has not pointed
to any provision in her written agreement
with Smith which he breached. We have re-
viewed the contract, and there are no provi-
sions which guarantee the outcome of the
representation or specify an elevated stan-
dard of care because we are unable to find a
particular contractual provision that has been
breached, we hold that the district court
correctly treated all claims as being subject
to the professional malpractice two-year stat-
ute of limitations.

2. The district court miscalculated the
filing deadline for Greenfield’s civil
matter claims.

HM Greenfield alternatively argues that
her claims are timely. We agree in part. The
jury returned a verdict against Greenfield in
the civil case on November 30, 2012. The
district court found that this was the latest
date that “some damage” could have oc-
curred and that the two-year statute of limi-
tations accrued on that date. The district
court found that Greenfield’s complaint had
to be filed by November 80, 2014. Since the
complaint was filed on December 1, 2014, the
district court considered it untimely. The dis-
trict court’s decision was erroneous because
it failed to take into account that November
80, 2014 fell on a Sunday,

A professional malpractice case with a
statute of limitations question typically in-
volves the vexing issue of when “some dam-
age” has occurred. It is important to recog-

251

nize that Greenfield does not challenge the
district court’s determination that “some
damage” occurred in connection with the civil
claim matters when the jury returned an
adverse verdict on November 80, 2012, We
are not addressing this issue and assume
that the district court’s analysis is correct.

Based on the district court’s “some dam-
age” finding, the statute of limitations would
have run in this case on November 30,
2014—exactly two years from the date of the
adverse verdict—except that it fell on a Sun-
day. The Idaho Code contains several provi-
sions specifying how time is to be computed
when construing statutes, Section 78-109 con-
tains the well-recognized rule that the time
to perform a specific act is computed by
excluding the first day, and including the last
unless the last is a holiday. It states:

The time in which any act provided by
law is to be done is computed by excluding
the first day, and including the last unless
the last is a holiday and then it is also
excluded,

LC. § 78-109. The term “holiday” as used in
this provision includes every Sunday. See I.C.
§ 73-108.

November 80, 2014 was a holiday so it was
excluded from the two-year statute of limita-
tions. This means that the last day for Green-
field to file a malpractice action for the civil
claim matters was December 1, 2014. Thus,
her complaint was timely, and the district
court erred in finding otherwise. It is impor-
tant to note that our conclusion does not
apply to the criminal matter claims. Green-
field did not challenge the district court’s
determination that the statute of limitations
for the criminal matter claims started to run
when she was acquitted on October 18, 2011.
The district court correctly determined that
the criminal matter claims were untimely.

B. Greenfield failed to resist the motion
for summary judgment with expert af-
fidavits addressing the attorney’s
standard of care and causation.

Smith argued in his motion for summary
judgment that Greenfield failed to designate
any expert witnesses and thus had no way to
prove that Smith’s conduct fell below the

252

standard of care for an attorney or that his
performance was the proximate cause of any
damages. Greenfield filed a brief in opposi-
tion to the motion and her own affidavit
setting forth all of the ways that she contend-
ed Smith’s performance was deficient. The
district court granted Smith’s motion, finding
that Greenfield needed to resist the motion
for summary judgment with expert affidavits.
Greenfield contends that she should have
been able to testify regarding Smith’s defi-
cient performance and that no expert testi-
mony was needed.

HsIn order to establish a claim for
legal malpractice the plaintiff must show: “(a)
the existence of an attorney-client relation-
ship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part
of the lawyer; (¢) a breach of duty by the
lawyer (ie, the lawyer’s conduct fell below
the standard of care); and (d) the lawyer’s
deficient performance proximately caused
damages.” See Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272
P.8d at 1251 (citation omitted). In a legal
malpractice case arising out of representa-
tion in a civil matter, the plaintiff must be
able to demonstrate “some chance of suc-
cess” in the underlying case. Murray v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224, 227, 796
P.2d 101, 104 (1990), When a defendant-at-
torney files a motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff ordinarily has an obligation to
provide expert affidavits that explain how the
lawyer’s conduct fell below the standard of
care and how the conduct proximately caused
damages. The reason for this rule is that
laypeople sitting on a jury usually do not
have the knowledge or experience necessary
to determine the standard of care that ap-
plies to an attorney or how the attorney's
performance of that duty may or may not
harm a client. See Samuel v. Hepworth,
Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc,, 184 Idaho 84, 89,
996 P.2d 808, 808 (2000). The only recognized
exception to this rule is where the attorney’s
alleged malpractice is so obvious that it is
within the ordinary knowledge and experi-
ence of laymen, such as when an attorney
allows a statute of limitations to run. Jd.

HH When Smith filed his motion for
summary judgment, he also filed an affidavit
and report from an expert witness stating
that “in [his] opinion, Mr. Smith met and

exceeded the applicable standard of care in
representing Ms. Greenfield in both the
Criminal and Civil Cases.” The report ana-
lyzed the various deficiencies alleged by
Greenfield and concluded that any alleged
deficiency was not the cause of the jury's
adverse verdict, Greenfield did not file any
expert affidavits to refute these opinions and
never disclosed any expert witnesses during
the course of discovery, Instead, she filed her
own affidavit setting forth the ways she be-
lieved that Smith’s performance was defi-
cient, For example, she alleged that Smith
failed file a motion to compel discovery, failed
to finish Rosalyn Wurmlinger’s deposition,
missed a deadline for disclosing Greenfield’s
expert, failed to file for summary judgment
on the Wurmlingers’ counterclaims, submit-
ted a draft protection order to the court later
than Greenfield wanted, failed to complete all
discovery under the pre-trial compliance or-
der, failed to adequately prepare for hear-
ings, and failed to pursue motions she re-
quested.

These alleged deficiencies are not simple
matters like an attorney allowing a statute of
limitations to run, Take for example, the
allegation that Smith’s performance was defi-
cient because he did not file a motion for
summary judgment on the neighbors’ coun-
terclaims. Who controls the decision to file a
motion for summary judgment? The attorney
or the client? Under what circumstances is a
motion for summary judgment appropriate?
Would such a motion have been appropriate
in Greenfield’s civil case? Did Greenfield
have “some chance of success” of prevailing
on such a motion? While Greenfield can cer-
tainly testify about the fact that Smith did
not file a motion for summary judgment in
the underlying civil case, she does not have
the knowledge or expertise to answer the
questions posed and neither does a jury.
Greenfield needed an expert to address these
types of questions in an affidavit when Smith
filed his motion for summary judgment.
Without expert testimony, Greenfield could
not demonstrate that there were genuine
issues of material fact as to whether Smith’s
performance fell below the standard of care
or proximately caused her damages. As such,

the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of Smith.

C. Pro se litigants are held to the same
standard as those represented by an
attorney.

HMM «Greenfield argues that the dis-
trict court had a duty to disclose to her the
effects of a motion for summary judgment
and failed to do so. Greenfield cites federal
authority and case law to support her asser-
tion. However, Idaho courts have long held
that: “Pro se litigants are held to the same
standards and rules as those represented by
an attorney.” Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho
224, 229, 220 P.8d 580, 585 (2009) (quoting
Suitis v. Niw, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.8d
120, 128 (2005). “Pro se litigants are not
accorded any special consideration simply be-
cause they are representing themselves and
are not excused from adhering to procedural
rules.” Id, (quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144
Idaho 710, 718, 170 P.8d 875, 388 (2007).
Therefore, there is no merit to Greenfield’s
assertion that the district court had a duty to
advise her of the impact of summary judg-
ment, Further, as evidenced by the record,
the reality is that Greenfield knew the effects
of summary judgment and she defended
against the motion by filing briefs and affida-
vits. Greenfield did not lose because she did
not understand the effects of summary judg-
ment. She lost because she did not support
the claim with expert testimony. The need
for an expert witness testimony is an issue
that is regularly played out in courts and
among the most seasoned attorneys. Green-
field’s assertions that the district court failed
to advise her is without merit,

D. Greenfield’s other arguments will not
be addressed because there is not an
adequate record.

HM Greenfield argues that the district
court prematurely dismissed her case prior
to the close of discovery. “It is the responsi-
bility of the appellant to provide a sufficient
record to substantiate his or her claims on
appeal. In the absence of an adequate record
on appeal to support the appellant’s claims,
we will not presume error.” Belk v. Martin,
136 Idaho 652, 661, 89 P.3d 592, 601 (2001).

253

The record before this Court does not con-
tain a motion for continuance under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), The Register of
Actions shows that such a motion was filed
two weeks after the hearing on Smith’s mo-
tion for summary judgment, but it was not
included in the record. Greenfield also argues
that the defense expert was disclosed late
and Smith’s supporting affidavits were im-
proper. The record before this Court does
not contain a motion to strike nor was such a
motion made at the time of the summary
judgment hearing. The Register of Actions
shows that a motion to strike was filed two
weeks after the summary judgment hearing,
but it was not included in the record. These
issues will not be considered for the reasons
outlined above.

E. Smith is not entitled to attorney’s
fees.

Smith has requested attorney's fees pursu-
ant to Idaho Code section 12-121 which
states. “In any civil action, the judge may
award reasonable attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing party or parties, when the judge finds
that the case was brought, pursued or de-
fended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.”

Although she ultimately lost her case be-
cause of a failure to provide expert testimo-
ny, Greenfield raised a legitimate issue of law
concerning the statute of limitations. We do
not find that Greentfield’s pursuit of this case
satisfies the criteria of Idaho Code section
12-121 and decline to award fees.

v.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment in favor of Smith.
Costs to Smith,

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and HORTON concur,

254

395 P.3d 1287

Jane DOE (2016-34), Petitioner-
Respondent-Cross
Appellant,

v

Jane DOE I, Respondent-Appellant-
Cross Respondent.

Docket No. 44419

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: June 7, 2017

Cosho Humphrey LLP, Boise, for appel-
lant. Stanley Welsh argued.

The Law Offices of J. Scott Escujuri,
PLLC, Boise; Emily Haan, San Francisco,
CA; Ferguson Durham, PLLC, Boise, for
respondent. Emily Haan argued.

BRODY, Justice.

This case requires us to resolve a custody
dispute between Jane Doe I, Child’s natural
mother, and Jane Doe, the natural mother’s
former partner. During the course of Mother
and Partner’s relationship, Mother conceived
a child via artificial insemination. After the
parties separated, Partner filed a petition to
establish parentage, custody and visitation
with Child. Partner advanced two legal argu-
ments to support her petition. First, she
argued this Court’s decision in Stockwell v.
Stockwell, 116 Idaho 297, 775 P.2d 611 (1989),
provides an independent cause of action by
which the court may grant custody to Part-
ner. Second, she argues that she should be
deemed a parent under Idaho Code section
39-5405, Idaho’s artificial insemination stat-
ute, because she consented to the artificial
insemination. As part of this argument, Part-

255

ner contends that Idaho’s artificial insemina-
tion statute violates Child’s rights and her
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution by discrimi-
nating against children born outside of mar-
riage. The magistrate court denied Partner’s
claim for parentage, but granted her visita-
tion rights under Stockwell. Mother and

Partner cross-appealed the magistrate
court's decision.
L
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Mother and Partner were involved in a
committed relationship from 2006 until 2012.
The two did not marry because Mother did
not want the legal commitment to Partner.
Although not married, Mother and Partner
jointly agreed to start a family using an
anonymous sperm donor. Mother planned to
have a child regardless of whether Partner
participated, and Mother wanted Child to be
biologically related to her.

Partner was involved with the artificial
insemination process. Before Child’s birth,
Mother and Partner consulted with an attor-
ney regarding Partner adopting Child, but
they were discouraged from adoption pro-
ceedings because the attorney believed that
same-sex couples were prohibited from pur-
suing adoptions, although they were instruct-
ed that no law exists prohibiting same-sex
adoptions. This consultation took place before
this Court’s decision in In re Adoption of
Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 326 P.8d 347 (2014),
wherein we ruled that Idaho’s adoption stat-
ute does not prohibit an unmarried woman
from adopting her domestic partner’s chil-
dren. Mother and Partner did not pursue
adoption,

Throughout the pregnancy Partner attend-
ed prenatal appointments and was present
during the birth, From February 2010 until
June 2012, Mother and Partner coordinated
their work schedules to care for Child and
lived as a family. Mother and Partner's rela-
tionship deteriorated in 2012, and Partner
moved out of the home. Partner did not
attempt to have custody of Child, or take her
with her when she moved out. Throughout.

256

the summer of 2012, Partner cared for Child
when Mother was at work. Gradually, the
time Partner spent caring for Child de-
ereased, In January 2015, Mother prohibited
Partner from contacting Child and rejected
Partner’s financial support. Mother told
Partner that Mother was the biological par-
ent, and that Partner had no legal rights to
Child.

Partner filed a Petition for Adoption,
Guardianship, and Visitation in the magis-
trate court. Partner dismissed her adoption
claim because Mother would not consent to
it. Partner filed an Amended Petition to Es-
tablish Parentage, De Facto Parentage, and
Custody and Visitation. Mother filed a mo-
tion to dismiss. The magistrate court dis-
missed the claim involving the parentage
claim under Idaho's artificial insemination.
statute, but allowed the independent Stock-
well claim for custody to proceed to trial.
After the trial, the magistrate court granted.
Mother sole legal custody and primary physi-
eal custody of Child. It also granted Partner
visitation rights. The magistrate court stayed
the judgment, kept a temporary visitation
order in place, and granted permission to
seek an expedited appeal of the judgment to
this Court. This Court granted the parties’
expedited cross-appeals.

IL

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Whether the magistrate court erred in
construing Stockwell to create a cause of
action for a non-parent seeking custodial
rights to a minor child,

2, Whether the magistrate court erred in
dismissing Jane Doe’s claim that she is a
legal parent pursuant to Idaho's artificial
insemination statute,

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
HE “This [Clourt exercises free review
over the lower court’s conclusions of law.”
Barry v, Pac, W. Constr, Inc., 140 Idaho
827, 831, 103 P.8d 440, 444 (2004). “ Surisdic-
tional issues, such as standing, are questions
of law,’ over which this Court exercises free

review.” In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho
845, 848, 826 P.8d 347, 350 (2014) (quoting
Martin v. Camas Cty. ex vel. Bd. Comm’rs,
150 Idaho 508, 512, 248 P.8d 1248, 1247
(2011)). This Court also “exercises free re-
view when interpreting the meaning of a
statute.” Id.

Iv.
ANALYSIS

A. The Stockwell decision does not create
an independent cause of action for a
nonparent seeking custodial rights to
a minor child.

HM Partner filed what has been dubbed
as a “Stockwell petition” based on this
Court’s decision in Stockwell v. Stockwell, 116
Idaho 297, 775 P.2d 611 (1989). Partner ar-
gues that Stockwell created a common law
cause of action enabling non-parents (Part-
ner uses the term “de facto parent”) to seek
custody of children. Mother contends that
Partner’s Stockwell petition is unprecedent-
ed, and, if granted, will open the door to
third party custody claims outside the statu-
tory frameworks passed by the Idaho legisla-
ture. We agree with Mother, and find that
the magistrate court erred when it granted
Partner visitation rights,

Stockwell involved a complicated custody
dispute that arose after a divorce. Prior to
the Stockwell’s wedding, Patricia Stockwell
gave birth to a child named Amber. 116
Idaho at 298, 775 P.2d at 612, Dan Stockwell
was not the biological father of the child,
even though his name was placed on her
birth certificate. Jd, During the course of the
marriage, Dan established a parental rela-
tionship with Amber. Id, He was the only
father she ever knew, Id, at 800, 775 P.2d at
614. The Stockwells divorced when Amber
was about nine years old. By that time, the
Stockwells also had another child. During the
divorce, the Stockwells agreed to place both
girls under the guardianship of Dan’s par-
ents, Id, at 298, 775 P.2d at 612, The divorce
decree did not otherwise address the care,
custody, or support of the children. Jd. About
a year later, Patricia moved to terminate the
grandparents’ guardianship, Id. The magis-

trate court granted the motion to terminate
and awarded Patricia custody of both chil-
dren, Jd. Dan was granted visitation rights,
but when he pressed for those rights, Patri-
cia fled Idaho with the girls and her new
husband. Jd. at 298-99, 775 P.2d at 612-13.
After Patricia fled the state, the magistrate
court entered another order finding that Pa-
tricia’s conduct warranted a change of custo-
dy. Id. at 299, 775 P.2d at 618. The magis-
trate court awarded custody of the biological
child to Dan, but declined to award him
custody of Amber. Jd. The magistrate court
did, however, award Dan visitation rights,
Amber stayed in Dan’s custody while he
appealed the decision. Id.

The Stockwell case made its way to this
Court. This Court held: “[iJn custody dis-
putes between a ‘non-parent’ (i.e,, an individ-
ual who is neither legal nor natural parent)
and a natural parent, Idaho courts apply a
presumption that a natural parent should
have custody as opposed to other lineal or
collateral relatives or interested parties.” Id.
‘The Court held further:

This presumption operates to preclude
consideration of the best interests of the
child unless the nonparent demonstrates
either that the natural parent has aban-
doned the child, that the natural parent is
unfit or that the child has been in the
nonparent’s custody for an appreciable pe-
riod of time.

Id. Tf the child has been in the non-parent’s
eustody for an “appreciable period of time,”
then the court must decide what placement is
in the best interests of the child. For Amber
Stockwell, it meant being placed with her
step-father.

This Court’s decision in Stockwell is not a
key to the courthouse for non-parents seek-
ing custody of minor children. The Stockwell
decision was made in the context of divorce
and guardianship proceedings and cannot be
used as a toe-hold for an independent custo-
dy action brought by a non-parent. This
Court understands that family structures are
changing, but it is not the role of this Court
to create new legal relations. That is the
business of the Idaho legislature.

This Court recently explained this point in
a case involving a surrogate mother and “in-

257

tended parents.” In the Matter of Doe, 160
Idaho 360, 372 P.3d 1106 (2016). In Doe, a
surrogate mother and her husband filed a
declaratory judgment action to have the “in-
tended parents” with whom she contracted
declared as the legal parents of the child she
carried, They brought the action so that the
intended parents’ names could be placed on
the birth certificate and no adoption proceed-
ing would be required. This Court declined to
grant the declaration, holding that Idaho’s
declaratory judgment action statute does not
give the Court the power to create new legal
relationships. This Court explained:

Although the parties are correct that as

a procedural matter Idaho Code section

10-1201, et. seq. does allow courts to de-

clare legal relations, that power is inher-

ently limited to the interpretation of previ-
ously established substantive law. Idaho

Code section 10-1201, et. seq. does not give

this Court, or any other Idaho court, the

power to create law. “The legislature and
the legislature only, under our constitution,
has power to legislate.” Thomas v. Riggs,

67 Idaho 228, 228, 175 P.2d 404, 407 (1946).

Where the legislature has not seen fit to

proyide substantive legal grounds on which

a court can base a requested declaration,

then it is outside of the authority of that

court to make said declaration, even when
it would further the interests of all parties
involved (as here).

160 Idaho at 362, 372 P.3d at 1108.

The Idaho legislature has adopted legisla-
tion enabling non-parents to seek custody of
children, The keys to the courthouse are
varied: Idaho Code section 32-1701 et. seq.
(De Facto Custodian Act enabling relatives
related to a child within the third degree of
consanguinity to seek custody); Idaho Code
section 82-717(8) (enabling grandparents to
intervene in divorce case where the child
actually resides with grandparent); Idaho
Code section 82-719 (enabling grandparents
and great-grandparents to seek visitation);
Idaho Code section 15-5-204 (guardianship
proceeding authorized where child has been
neglected, abused, abandoned, or whose par-
ents are unable to provide a stable home
environment). At this point in time, the legis-
lature has not adopted a statutory framework

258

that would enable Partner to seek custody or
visitation under the circumstances of this
case.

HE Mother made the decision to termi-
nate the relationship between Child and
Partner. She had that right, and while there
may be a temptation to second-guess that
decision, courts cannot do so. Parents have a
constitutional right to care, custody, and con-
trol of their children. Trowel v. Granville, 580
US. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d
49, 56-57 (2000); Leavitt v. Leavitt, 142 Idaho
664, 670, 182 P.8d 421, 427 (2006). The Su-
preme Court of the United States has ob-
served, “The liberty interest at issue in this
ease—the interest of parents in the care,
eustody, and control of their children—is per-
haps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court.” Trowel,
580 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. at 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d
at 56.The magistrate court erred when it
extended Stockwell to award visitation to
Partner. We reverse the magistrate court’s
judgment.

B. The magistrate court properly dis-
missed the parentage claims based on
Idaho’s Artificial Insemination Act.

IM Partner contends that she is Child’s

parent pursuant to Idaho Code section 39-
5405 because she consented to Mother's arti-
ficial insemination. Section 39-5405 estab-
lishes the respective rights of a semen donor,
resulting child, and the mother’s husband.
Under this provision, the semen donor has no
rights or obligations with respect to a child
who is conceived through artificial insemina-
tion. Likewise, the child has no rights or
obligations with respect to the semen donor.
If the mother is married, and the husband
has consented to artificial insemination, then
the husband and resulting child have the
same rights and obligations with respect to
each other as if the child had been conceived
naturally by the mother and husband. The
statute states:

(1) The donor shall have no right, obli-
gation or interest with respect to a
child born as a result of the artificial
insemination.

(2) A child born as a result of artificial
insemination shall have no right, obli-

gation or interest with respect to such
donor.

(8) The relationship, rights and obli-
gation between a child born as a
result of artificial insemination and
the mother’s husband shall be the
same for all legal intents and pur-
poses as if the child had been natu-
rally and legitimately conceived by
the mother and the mother’s hus-
band, if the husband consented to
the performance of artificial insemi-
nation.

LC, § 39-5405 (emphasis added). The plain
language of the statute simply does not ad-
dress a situation like at issue here where a
child is conceived through artificial insemina-
tion by an unmarried couple.

The magistrate court dismissed Partner’s
claim of parentage based on this statute be-
cause Mother and Partner were not married.
Partner contends that section 39-5405(8) as
applied to her and Child violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Con-
stitution by discriminating against non-mari-
tal children. We find Partner does not have
standing to raise Child’s claim,

HM It is well understood that a person
wishing to invoke a court’s jurisdiction must
have standing. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens
for Term Limits, 185 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.38d
1129, 1132 (2000). Standing is a threshold
issue that must be decided before reaching
the merits of the case. Miles v, Idaho Power
Co., 116 Idaho 635, 687, 778 P.2d 757, 759
(1989). The doctrine of standing is a subcate-
gory of justiciability. Jd. at 639, 778 P.2d at
761, To be sure, the doctrine is imprecise and
difficult to apply. Id. at 641, 778 P.2d at 763
(citing Valley Forge College v. Americans
United, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70
L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). It is even more difficult
in a case such as this where the party bring-
ing the claim seeks to assert the rights of
another person.

HM This Court has explained that there
are three interrelated criteria for a party to
assert the constitutional rights of another
person:

(1) [sThe must have suffered injury in fact,

providing a significantly concrete interest

in the outcome of the matter in dispute; (2)

[s]he must have a sufficiently close rela-

tionship to the party whose rights [sJhe is

asserting; and (8) there must be a demon-

strated bar to the third parties’ ability to

protect their interests.
Shepherd v, Shepherd, 161 Idaho 14, 20, 383
P.8d 698, 699 (2016). “Courts hesitate before
resolving the rights of those not parties to
litigation.” Id, at 19, 388 P.3d at 698, “Even
though a potentially illegal action may affect
the litigant as well as a third party, the
litigant may not rest his claims on the rights
or legal interests of the third party.” Id.
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief
and not on the issues the party wishes to
have adjudicated. Van Valkenburgh, 185 Ida-
ho at 124, 15 P.8d at 11382; Boundary Back-
packers v. Boundary Cty., 128 Idaho 371
875, 918 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (quoting
Miles, 116 Idaho at 689, 778 P.2d at 761).

In this case, Partner lacks standing be-
cause she cannot satisfy the second prong of
the criteria articulated in Shepherd. Partner
does not have a legally recognized, protected
relationship with Child. She is not related to
Child by blood or by marriage. She did not
adopt Child at the time of her birth, and
Mother has since refused to consent to the
adoption. She is not the guardian of Child,
and there is no Idaho statute which author-
izes Partner to direct the care, custody or
control of Child in any way, The whole pur-
pose of Partner’s constitutional challenge is
to obtain the legal status that would enable
her to raise Child’s claim in the first place.
Without first having a legally recognized,
protected relationship, she cannot assert
Child’s constitutional claim.

Partner’s position is further complicated
by Mother’s constitutional interests, which
we must also consider. As stated previously,
Mother has a recognized constitutional right
to direct the care, custody, and control of
Child. Trowel, 580 U.S. at 66, 120 S.Ct. at
2060, 147 L.Ed.2d at 56-57; Leavitt v. Leav-
itt, 142 Idaho 664, 670, 182 P.8d 421, 427
(2006). Mother has made the decision not to
assert Child’s constitutional claim. If we were
to allow Partner to assert Child’s claim with-
out a legally protected relationship, we would
be undermining Mother’s constitutional
rights. This we will not do.

259

Partner also argues that she has her own
constitutional claim. She cites Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 652, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1218,
81 L.Ed.2d 551, 559 (1972), to support her
position. Stanley involved a challenge to an
Illinois statute which declared children wards
of the state upon the death of their unmar-
ried mother. Peter Stanley and Joan Stanley
lived together on and off over a period of
eighteen years. They had three children to-
gether. When Joan passed away, the couple’s
three children were declared wards of the
state simply by virtue of their mother’s
death. The state took the position that unwed
fathers were presumptively unfit parents. Pe-
ter challenged the constitutionality of the
statute, arguing that he was denied due pro-
cess of law. The Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States agreed with him, holding that Pe-
ter was entitled to a hearing to determine
whether he was a fit parent, and that by
failing to hold such a hearing and granting
such a hearing to other parents before their
children were removed from their custody,
deprived him of the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.

Partner's reliance on Stanley is misplaced.
Peter’s equal protection claim was based on
the state’s failure to grant him equal protec-
tion of the laws—not the children, In this
case, the equal protection claim has been
framed as discrimination against Child. To
the extent such a claim exists, it belongs to
Child and the only proper party who can
raise that claim at this time is Mother. As
such, we hold that the magistrate court did
not err in dismissing Partner’s claim.

v.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the magistrate court is
yeversed in part and affirmed in part. We
remand this matter to the magistrate court
to vacate the temporary visitation order that
was entered. Costs on appeal to Jane Doe I.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and HORTON concur.

260 De
396 P.3d 689

HAUSER LAKE ROD AND GUN CLUB,
INC., an Idaho non-profit corporation,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v

The CITY OF HAUSER, an Idaho
municipal corporation, Re-
spondent on Appeal,

and

Kootenai County, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho, Respondent.

Docket No. 44095

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Wallace, April 2017 Term,

Filed: June 9, 2017

James, Vernon & Weeks, PA, Coeur @’Al-
ene, for appellant, Susan P. Weeks argued.

William Mark Appleton, Coeur @’Alene, for
respondent,

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

This appeal from Kootenai County con-
cerns attorney fees under Idaho Code section
12-117, The district court held that Hauser
Lake Rod and Gun Club, Inc. was not enti-
tled to attorney fees under section 12-117
because, even though it had prevailed against
the City of Hauser. in a code violation dis-
pute, the administrative tribunal that re-
viewed the dispute was staffed with both
County and City officials. According to the
district court, section 12-1178 definition of
“political, subdivision” does not include ad-
ministrative review tribunals staffed with of-
ficials from multiple governmental entities,
We reverse.

I, FACTUAL AND’ PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

‘The district court summarized the relevant,
facts giving rise to this “procedural night-
mare for all involved” as follows:

In February 2012, Plaintiff, Hauser Lake

Rod and Gun Club (hereinafter “the

Club”), inquired with Kootenai County

(hereinafter “the County”) about obtaining

262

yp

a building permit to construct an accessory
storage building on [its] property. Plaintiff
was referred to the City of Hauser Lake
(hereinafter “the City”) to proceed with
[its] request because the Club’s property
was within the City’s area of impact, and
the type of permit sought was a Class IT
building permit. The Club submitted a
Class II permit request to the City in early
2012, On March 27, 2012 a public hearing
was held on this Class II application. After
the hearing, the City informed the Club
that the City would not issue a decision on
the application. Rather, the City and Coun-
ty agreed that the Club’s application re-
quired different administrative procedures.

On June 8, 2012, the City, [sic] delivered
a notice of violation of Hauser Code to the
Club for “operating outside of the histori-
cal hours of operation.” The Club was told
it had several options. It could change its
hours, thus continuing to operate only dur-
ing the historical hours of operation; alter-
natively, it could apply for a City of Hau-
ser Class II permit for commercial use, or
it could appeal the alleged code violation
issued by the City of Hauser Code Admin-
istrator to the Joint Planning and Zoning
Commission (“the Joint Commission[”]).
The Joint Commission is made up of both
City and County officials and residents.

The Club chose the third option and
appealed the alleged code violation to the
Joint Commission, denying that it had ever
violated the code. In its December 11,
2012, Findings of Facets and Conclusion the
Joint Commission upheld the violation de-
termination by the City Code Administra-
tor. The Club appealed to the [Kootenai
County Joint Board of Commissioners
(“the Joint Board”)] on January 8, 2018.

. Although the Club is located within the City's

area of impact, it is not located within City limits
and therefore is a non-resident of the City.

. The Club appealed to the Joint Board in Janu-

ary 2013, but several “months passed with no
appeal hearing scheduled.” So the Club filed a
declaratory judgment action (CV-13-4626) in
June 2013, concerning ‘“[1] whether the City
could issue code enforcement violations against
non-residents ... [2] the City did not control
Class I permits under the area of city impact
ordinance ... and [3] City’s role with respect to
Class II building permits within the area of city

The Joint Board is comprised of the
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners
and two City of Hauser City Council Mem-
bers, one of which may be the mayor. The
Joint Board was created by Kootenai
County to hear appeals of the Joint Com-
mission’s decisions. The City officials on
the Joint Board do not have authority to
make motions or vote, but serve only in an
advisory capacity. The City officials may
question witnesses testifying and may con-
fer and deliberate with the County Com-
missioners prior to the final decision being
issued. While the Joint Board’s voting
members are also Kootenai County Com-
missioners, the Joint Board has been es-
tablished as a separate and distinct entity
from the County Commissioners.

In August 2013, the Joint Board reversed
the Joint Commission.? The Joint Board held
that the City lacked jurisdiction to issue a
code violation to the Club because it was not,
a resident of the City. The Club requested
attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-
117. The Joint Board made no findings con-
cerning whether section 12-117 was applica-
ble, declaring instead that it “was not in-
clined to award attorney fees as requested by
[the Club].” The Club moved for reconsidera-
tion of the attorney fees ruling. The Joint
Board never ruled on the motion.

In September 2018, the Club appealed the
Joint Board’s attorney fees ruling to the
district court. As is relevant here, the district
court concluded the Joint Board had erred
by making no findings concerning attorney
fees and remanded the case with instructions
to determine whether the Club was entitled
to attorney fees.’ The Club moved for recon-
sideration of that order, questioning “the fi-
nality of the judgment and the premature

impact..,.” The Club requested attorney fees in

CV-13-4626, After the Club filed CV-13-4626, the

Joint Board scheduled a hearing in the Club’s
appeal. The parties then settled CV-13-4626.

3. In addition, the district court concluded assess-
ing an award of attorney fees against the Joint
Commission and the County would be improper.
The Club does not dispute those rulings, conced-
ing those “entities acted as review bodies ... and
were not the entities that issued the adverse
action which was appealed.”

issuance of the remittitur before the time for
appeal had [run], and seeking clarification if
the decision was intended to be final,” but
the district court never ruled on the motion.

On remand, the Joint Board found that the
Club had prevailed but declined to award
attorney fees under section 12-117. Even
though the City lacked jurisdiction to enforce
its code on the Club since it was not a
resident of the City, the Joint Board found
that the City had acted with a reasonable
basis in fact or law. Again, the Club appealed
the Joint Board’s attorney fees ruling to the
district court. The primary issue raised was
whether the Joint Board abused its discre-
tion in denying the Club’s attorney fee re-
quest by concluding the City had acted with
a reasonable basis in fact or law. The district
court consolidated the Club’s two appeals,
noting the Club’s outstanding motion for re-
consideration and that the issues in both
appeals were substantively the same. Al-
though the district court affirmed that attor-
ney fees were improper, the district court did
not reach whether the City had acted with a
reasonable basis in fact or law. Instead, the
district court held that section 12-117 did not
authorize attorney fees against the City be-
cause the Joint Board was not a “political
subdivision” since it was staffed with both
County and City officials! The Club timely
appealed to this Court.

Ii, ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court erroneously inter-
pret Idaho Code section 12-117 by con-
cluding the Joint Board was not a “politi-
cal subdivision?”

Should the district court be affirmed on
the alternative basis that the Joint Board
did not abuse its diseretion in denying
the Club’s request for attorney fees?

Is the prevailing party entitled to attor-
ney fees on appeal?

4, The district court reaffirmed its previous ruling

that section 12-117 did not authorize fees against

the Joint Commission, but that ruling is not
challenged on appeal.

5. Idaho Code section 12-117(5)(b) defines "politi-
cal subdivision” as “a city, a county, any taxing
district or a health district.” (emphasis added).

263
I. ANALYSIS

The district court erroneously inter-
preted Idaho Code section 12-117 by
concluding the Joint Board was not a
“political subdivision.”

HI We exercise free review over the in-
terpretation of a statute because it is a ques-
tion of law. E.g., Hayes v. City of Plummer,
159 Idaho 168, 170, 357 P.8d 1276, 1278
(2015). This appeal concerns Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-117, which provides:

Unless otherwise provided by statute, in
any proceeding involving as adverse par-
ties a state agency or a political subdivision
and a person, the state agency, political
subdivision or the court hearing the pro-
ceeding, including on appeal, shall award
the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s
fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.

LC, § 12-117(1).

HI We start by recognizing that section
12-117(1) expressly indicates that it applies to
“any proceeding” involving a state agency or
political subdivision and a person as adverse
parties. In the proceedings before the Joint
Board, the City and the Club were adverse
parties. The City is—by statutory defini-
tion—a “political subdivision.” IC, § 12-
117(6)(b).5 Likewise, the Club is defined by
the statute as “a person.” IC. § 12-
1176)(a).6 Thus, if the Joint Board consti-
tutes a “state agency, political subdivision or
the court[,]’ it was charged with awarding
attorney fees and other costs if the losing
party acted without a reasonable basis in law
or fact. In this case, the district court cor-
rectly focused on whether the Joint Board is
a “political subdivision.” The district court
held that the Joint Board did not constitute a
“political subdivision” because the Joint

6, Idaho Code section 12-117(5)(a) defines “per-
son” as “any individual, partnership, limited lia-
bility partnership, corporation, limited liability
company, association or any other private organi-
zation.” (emphasis added).

264

Board was staffed with both County and City
officials.

‘We cannot agree with the district court’s
conclusion in this regard. The municipal and
county ordinances creating the Joint Board
unambiguously declare that the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners was the
only entity that possessed the authority to
decide the dispute between the City and the
Club, The City’s ordinance expressly pro-
vides that City officials serving on the Joint
Board “shall not have the authority to make
motions(s) [sic] or vote.” Instead, “[t]he role
of city elected officials is limited to an adviso-
ry capacity to the Board of County Commis-
sioners.” Kootenai County Ordinance No, 289
uses identical language to identify the re-
spective roles of the County Commissioners
and City officials. Thus, the decision of the
Joint Board was, in fact, a decision of the
Board of County Commissioners.

The decision of the Board of County Com-
missioners was the act of a political subdivi-
sion, The statutory definition of a political
subdivision expressly includes counties. I.C.
§ 12-117(5)(b) (“ ‘political subdivision’ means
a city, a county, any taxing district or a
health district[.]”). As with any corporate
body, a county may only act through its
human agents. Under Idaho law, those
agents are the Board because a county's
“powers can only be exercised by the board
of county commissioners, or by agents and
officers acting under their authority, or au-
thority of law.” I.C. § 81-602. For these rea-
sons, the district court erred when it held
that the Joint Board was not a political sub-
division.

B. We decline to affirm the district court
on an alternative basis because the
Joint Board abused its discretion in
denying the Club’s request for attor-
ney fees.

HM The City urges us to affirm on the
alternative basis that the Joint Board did not
abuse its discretion when it denied the Club’s
request for attorney fees because, as the City
maintains, it acted with a reasonable basis in
fact or law when attempting to enforce its
code outside City limits on the Club, a non-
resident. While this issue was raised at

length before the district court, it was not
addressed in light of the district court’s con-
struction of section 12-117, Because the issue
was raised, we will entertain the City’s argu-
ment, Peckham v. Idaho State Bd. of Den-
tistry, 154 Idaho 846, 851, 303 P.3d 205, 210
(2018) (“When reviewing a district court’s
decision in a petition for judicial review un-
der the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act,
we examine the agency record independent-
ly, but ultimately decide whether the district
court correctly ruled on the issues presented
to it”),

HM As the City acknowledges, we “up-
hold the decision of a trial court if any alter-
native legal basis can be found to support it.”
Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of
Admin., 159 Idaho 818, 827, 367 P.8d 208,
222 (2016) (quoting Daleiden v. Jefferson
Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 251, 189 Idaho
466, 470-71, 80 P.8d 1067, 1071-72 (2003)),
But we may set aside an agency’s decision if
it abused its discretion and prejudiced a par-
ty’s substantial rights. LC. § 67-5279(2)-(4).
When reviewing for an abuse of discretion,
we evaluate whether the agency: (1) correctly
perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with relevant legal stan-
dards; and (8) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Clear Springs Foods, Inc,
v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 818, 252 P.3d
71, 94 (2011),

Hl We decline to affirm on this alterna-
tive basis. The Joint Board’s conclusion that
the City acted with a reasonable basis in fact
or law when attempting to enforce its code
outside City limits on the Club, a non-resi-
dent, signifies an abuse of discretion because
it is inconsistent with relevant legal stan-
dards. Article XII, Section 2 of the Idaho
Constitution provides that “[alny county or
incorporated city or town may make and
enforce, within its limits, all such local po-
lice, sanitary and other regulations as are not
in conflict with its charter or with the gener-
al laws.” (emphasis added). Thus, “[tjhis
Court has held that the power of cities and
counties only exists within the sovereign
boundaries of the cities and the counties
respectively.” Blaha v. Bd. of Ada Cnty.
Comm'rs, 184 Idaho 770, 777, 9 P.8d 1236,

1248 (2000); see also Hobbs v. Abrams, 104
Idaho 205, 207-08, 657 P.2d 1073, 1075-76
(1988); Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789,
790-91, 572 P.2d 892, 893-94 (1977), As we
stated in Reardon v. City of Burley,

‘Where an agency has no authority to
take a particular action, it acts without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court
recognized as far back as 1949 that a city’s
exercise of jurisdiction in an impact area
lying beyond a city’s limits is inconsistent,
with the constitutional limitations placed
on a city’s powers by Article XII, § 2 of
the Idaho Constitution.

140 Idaho 115, 120, 90 P.8d 340, 345 (2004),
overruled on other grounds by City of Os-
burn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.8d 858
(2012) (internal citations omitted), As such,
the Joint Board’s conclusion that the City
acted with a reasonable basis in fact or law is
inconsistent with longstanding, axiomatic le-
gal standards. This error, in turn, prejudiced
the Club’s substantial rights by embroiling
the Club in administrative and legal proceed-
ings that culminated in this appeal, all while
requiring the Club to continuously expend
resources to resolve a matter that never
should have arisen in the first place.

The City offers two counter-arguments.
First, the City asserts in passing that it did
not act at all, and therefore, the “non-acting
City could not have acted unreasonably.” The
City explains that it was the Joint Commis-
sion, not the City, that reviewed and affirmed
the issuance of the code violation to the Club.
That argument distorts the events that gave
rise to this matter. It was clearly the City
that initially issued the code violation to the
Club, as the code violation was signed by the
“City of Hauser Code Administrator” and
provided contact information for the “City
Clerk.” Had the City never issued the code
violation, the Joint Commission would have
had nothing to review. Thus, we reject the
City’s first argument,

TM Sccond, the City argues it acted with
a reasonable basis in fact or law, albeit erro-
neously, because its belief that it had authori-
ty to enforce its code outside City limits on
the Club, a non-resident, was merely a good
faith mistake. As the City notes, “a govern-
mental agency does not act without a reason-

265

able basis in fact or law when its interpreta-
tion of a statute that has not been previously
construed by the courts is incorrect, but not
unreasonable.” Randel, 152 Idaho at 909, 277
P.3d at 356. According to the City, it relied
on Ordinance No. 289 to conclude it had
authority to enforce its code against the
Club. Utilizing authority under Idaho Code
section 67-6526, the County and the City
enacted Ordinance No, 289. See Hauser City,
Idaho, Ordinance No, 289 (Oct. 27, 1999).
Ordinance No. 289 governs the relationship
between the County and the City for plan-
ning and zoning matters within the area of
city impact. Id. Ordinance No. 289 sets forth
building permit application procedures and
details the administrative review processes to
which those applications are subject. Jd.
§§ 4-5.

The City elaborates that a court has never
interpreted Ordinance No. 289, and as such,
interpreting Ordinance No. 289 to give the
City authority to enforce its code outside
City limits on non-residents was not unrea-
sonable. We are not persuaded. Ordinance
No. 289 makes no reference to code enforce-
ment by the City on non-residents. Sure,
Ordinance No. 289 instructs that “[tJhe City
of Hauser Development Code and subse-
quent amendments thereto ... shall apply to
all Class II permits ... to all proposals
within the Area of City Impact.” Hauser
City, Idaho, Ordinance No. 289 § 4(B) (Oct.
27, 1999). But Ordinance No, 289 says noth-
ing that could reasonably be construed as
granting the City any authority to enforce its
code outside City limits on non-residents.
Even were that the case, Ordinance No. 289
would, on its face, conflict with fundamental
principles allocating power between govern-
mental entities and could not provide for
reasonable reliance.

In sum, we decline to affirm the district
court on an alternative basis. We find no
yeason to remand the case to the district
court because the above demonstrates that
the City acted with no reasonable basis in
fact or law by attempting to enforce its code
outside City limits on the Club, a non-resi-
dent, Accordingly, we grant the Club’s re-
quest for attorney fees incurred at the ad-

266

ministrative and district court levels under
section 12-117.

C. The Club is entitled to attorney fees
on appeal.

HI Both the Club and the City seek at-
torney fees on appeal under section 12-117,
However, only the Club is the prevailing
party on appeal. As reasoned above, the City
did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or
Jaw by attempting to enforce its code outside
City limits on the Club, a non-resident. Be-
cause that action led to extensive administra-
tive and legal proceedings and ultimately re-
quired the Club to bring this appeal, wherein
the City made arguments that conflict with
longstanding, axiomatic legal standards, we
award the Club attorney fees on appeal un-
der section 12-117.

IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court and grant the
Club’s request for attorney fees incurred at
the administrative and district court levels.
We award the Club attorney fees and costs
on appeal.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and BRODY concur.

396 P.3d 695

In the Interest of Doe Children, Children
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND WELFARE, Petitioner-
Respondent,

ve

John DOE (2017-4), Respondent-
Appellant.

Docket No. 44767

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 9, 2017

268

Ada County Public Defender’s Office,
Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G, Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent.

ON THE BRIEFS

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

John Doe (Doe) appeals the Ada County
magistrate court’s decision terminating his
parental rights, The magistrate court termi-
nated Doe’s rights on the statutory basis of
Idaho Code section 16-2005(1), namely, that
Doe is incarcerated and is likely to remain
incarcerated for a substantial period of time
during his sons’ (A.C, and S.C.) minority. The
court also found termination was in the best
interests of A.C, and S.C, We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

A.C, and S.C, were taken into foster care
on September 28, 2015, after police were
called to the family home due to neglect of
supervision. 8.C., who was two at the time,
was found wandering in the street. S.C, was
not wearing a shirt, shoes, or socks, was
wearing a dirty and full diaper, and had
injuries on his face and head, This was not
the first time S.C. had been found wandering
alone in the road, A.C., who was seven at the
time, came looking for S.C, and told police
that their mom was busy getting ready to go
somewhere. Approximately thirty minutes la-

1, Doe testified that he was pursuing an appeal to
be given credit for time served in county jail,
which if granted would move his parole eligibili-
ty date up to July 2018, However, there was no

ter, mother came looking for S.C. and A.C.
Following an attempt to speak to mother and
a brief struggle, mother was arrested for
Misdemeanor Injury to Child. Because of the
imminent danger caused by mother’s neglect
and because Doe was incarcerated, the De-
partment of Health and Welfare (Depart-
ment) was given temporary legal custody of
the children,

Approximately a year later, after making
reasonable attempts for reunification, the
Department filed a Petition for Termination
of Parent-Child Relationship. A default ter-
mination hearing as to mother was held on
November 17, 2016, and the court terminated
mother’s parental rights thereafter. On Janu-
ary 5, 2017, the court held Doe’s termination
hearing.

Doe’s case manager at the Idaho Depart-
ment of Correction (DOC) testified that
Doe’s earliest possible release date was No-
vember 20181 The case manager also testi-
fied that Doe had committed multiple rule
violations, including testing positive for opi-
ates, tattooing, and engaging in disrespectful
behavior towards staff. Doe testified to hay-
ing a significant bond with his children and
his desire to retain his parental rights. He
also testified to being a drug addict and that
he recognized he would have to demonstrate
he was stable and able to care for the chil-
dren before he could regain custody of them.

Following the hearing, on January 30,
2017, the magistrate court issued its memo-
randum decision. In its decision, the court
terminated Doe’s parental rights, finding
that the State “has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that grounds exist to
terminate the parental rights of [Doe] to the
minor children, [A.C, and S.C,].” The court
found grounds for termination because (1)
Doe “has been incarcerated and is likely to
remain so for a substantial period of time
during the childs minority,” IC. 16-
2005(1)(e); and @) termination is in the best
interests of the children. Doe appeals.

evidence presented to substantiate this claim,

and Doe’s IDOC record shows November 2018
as his earliest parole eligibility date.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HS The grounds for terminating paren-
tal rights must by proven by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Idaho Dept of Health &
Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 474, 478, 285 P.8d
1195, 1199 (2010). Where the trial court has
explicitly applied a clear and convincing stan-
dard, we do not reweigh the trial court’s
determination of whether the evidence was
clear and convincing. In re Doe (2015-03),
159 Idaho 192, 195, 358 P.8d 77, 80 (2015).
Rather, we review whether the trial court’s
decision was supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Doe, 149 Idaho at 478,
235 P.3d at 1199, “Substantial and competent
evidence is relevant evidence that a reason-
able mind might accept to support a conclu-
sion. It is the province of the trial court to
determine the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”
In ve Doe (2015-03), 159 Idaho at 195, 358
P.8d at 80.

Tl. ANALYSIS

A. The magistrate court’s decision to ter-
minate Doe’s parental rights was
based on substantial and competent
evidence.

Hl In its statement of purpose, the Ter-
mination of Parent and Child Relationship
Act states: “Implicit in this chapter is the
philosophy that wherever possible family life
should be strengthened and preserved and
that the issue of severing the parent and
child relationship is of such vital importance
as to require a judicial determination....”
LC. § 16-2001(2). A judicial determination
severing the parent-child relationship must
include a finding upon clear and convincing
evidence that “(1) at least one of the statuto-
ry justifications is present, and (2) termi-
nation is in the best interest of the child.” Jn.
ve Doe (2015-03), 159 Idaho at 196, 858 P.3d
at 81; accord IC. § 16-2005(1).

Here, the magistrate court found by clear
and convincing evidence that termination was
justified on the statutory ground found in
Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(e), and that
termination was in the best interest of the
children, Doe asserts that the magistrate

269

court erred in finding that his incarceration
would likely be for a substantial portion of
A.C. and S.C.’s minorities because he will be
eligible for parole in just over a year. Doe
also argues that termination is not in the
best interests of his children,

1. There is substantial and competent ev-
idence to support the magistrate’s find-
ing that Doe was likely to be incarcer-
ated for a substantial period of A.C.
and 8.C.’s minority,

HMMM Under Idaho Code section 16-
2005(1)(e), termination of parental rights is
justified where “[t]he parent has been incar-
cerated and is likely to remain incarcerated
for a substantial period of time during the
child's minority.” This requires two findings:
(1) that the parent is incarcerated; and @)
that the incarceration will likely last “for a
substantial period of time during the child’s
minority.” 1.0. § 16-2005(1)(e); In Matter of
Doe (2016-14), 161 Idaho 596, 602, 889 P.8d
141, 147 (2016). In determining whether the
parent is “likely to remain incarcerated for a
substantial period of time during the child’s
minority,” the trial court “may consider fac-
tors including, but not limited to: the age of
the child; the relationship, if any, that has
developed between the parent and the child;
and the likely period of time the parent will
remain incarcerated.” In re Doe (2014-26),
158 Idaho 548, 552, 348 P.8d 168, 167 (2015).
In determining the likely period of time the
parent will remain incarcerated the court
must consider the expected duration of fu-
ture incarceration, rather than the duration
of past incarceration, In Matter of Doe (2016-
14), 161 Idaho at 602, 889. P.3d at 147.

Here, the magistrate court considered the
ages of the children, noting that at the time
of termination A.C. was eight and S.C. was
three, Given their young ages, the court not-
ed that even if Doe is released at his earliest
possible parole date in November 2018, he
would still be unavailable to parent his boys
for a substantial period “during a period of
their lives crucial to their development.” Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that it is
“probable [Doe] will be incarcerated well
past November 2018,” Doe is currently serv-
ing a sentence for three felony convictions,

270

Those convictions are for grand theft by
possession of stolen property, grand theft,
and drug trafficking in methamphetamine.
‘The sentence satisfaction dates for his three
felony convictions are in 2025. Doe has a past
criminal record that includes domestic bat-
tery, two violations of no contact order, and
petit theft. During his first year and a half of
incarceration, Doe has received three disci-
plinary reports (DORs). The first DOR was
for communicating to have tobacco brought
to state property and left for pick-up. Doe’s
second DOR was issued after he tested posi-
tive for opiates, specifically morphine, which
Doe testified he obtained while in prison.
This DOR was considered a “Class A” viola-
tion, meaning it posed a significant security
risk to the prison, which resulted in Doe
being remanded to the Closed Custody unit
where he was not allowed to have visits with
his children. His third DOR was issued after
he tattooed his entire arm. In addition to his
DORs, Doe has multiple “C-Notes,” electron-
ie entries in an inmate’s file that reflect
minor rule violations or “behavior that staff
wants to keep an eye on.” One such “C-Note”
involved Doe engaging in disrespectful be-
havior towards prison staff.

Given Doe’s criminal history and poor per-
formance in prison, the magistrate court con-
cluded that it is probable Doe “will remain
incarcerated near to his ‘top-out? date of
2025.” This would put A.C. at seventeen
years old and §.C. at twelve years old, which,
as the magistrate court noted, would make
Doe “unavailable for essentially the majority
of his boys’ childhood.” Considering Doe’s
multiple rule violations and overall poor per-
formance in prison, the magistrate court's
finding that Doe will remain incarcerated
near to his sentence satisfaction date is sup-
ported by substantial and competent evi-
dence. See Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 148 Idaho 832, 840, 230 P.38d 442, 450
(Ct.App.2010) (noting that the magistrate
court did not err in finding Doe would re-
main incarcerated beyond the determinate
term of her sentence based on, among other
things, her prior performance on probation).

Therefore, considering the children’s
young ages and the fact that Doe—based on
his poor performance in prison—is likely to

Tn

remain incarcerated until his sentence satis-
faction date of 2025, we conclude there was
substantial and competent evidence to sup-
port the magistrate court’s finding under
Idaho Code 16-2005(1)(e) that Doe is “likely
to remain incarcerated for a substantial peri-
od of time during the child’s minority.”

2, There is substantial and competent ev-
idence to support _the magistrate
court’s finding that termination was in
the best interest of the children,

Hl The magistrate court found that ter-
mination was in the best interests of Doe's
children because: (1) Doe is incarcerated and
the children need a parent right now; (2)
even before incarceration, Doe did not pro-
vide his children with a stable housing envi-
ronment; (8) Doe has a history of domestic
violence and drug abuse that have not been
addressed through counseling or therapy; (4)
Doe has continued to have problems follow-
ing rules while in prison; (5) the children
need a foundation of emotional support based
in stability and certainty; and (6) Doe is
unlikely to provide such stability and certain-
ty.

Doe argues that termination is not in his
children’s best interests because he has es-
tablished a bond with his children, especially
A.C., and the visits he has had with his
children have gone weil.

HE s(Once the court determines that a
statutory ground for termination exists, the
court must then consider whether it is in the
best interests of the child to terminate the
parent-child relationship. In re Doe (2014-
15), 157 Idaho 765, 772, 389 P.8d 1169, 1176
(2014). “When considering the best interests
of the child, a trial court may consider nu-
merous factors.” Id. (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted), For instance,

[when determining whether termination is

in the child’s best interests the trial court

may consider the stability and permanency
of the home, unemployment of the parent,
the financial contribution of the ‘parent to
the child’s care after the child is placed in
protective custody, improvement of child
while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to
improve his or her situation, and the par-
ent’s continuing problems with the law.

In re Doe (2018-15), 156 Idaho 108, 111, 320
P.8d 1262, 1270 (2014), “The best interest
analysis takes into account the reality that
children need ‘stability and certainty” ” In re
Doe (2014-15), 157 Idaho at 772, 889 P.8d at
1176 (quoting In re Doe (2018-15), 156 Idaho
at 112, 820 P.8d at 1271). “Expert testimony
is not required to establish that termination
would be in the child’s best interests.” In re
Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho at 111, 320 P.3d at
1270,

Here, the magistrate’s finding that termi-
nation was in the best interests of the chil-
dren is supported by substantial and com-
petent evidence. Doe cannot provide his
children with a stable and permanent home
because he is currently incarcerated and, as
discussed above, is likely to remain so until
2025, Even before incarceration, Doe failed
to provide a stable home environment by
engaging in unlawful conduct, including do-
mestic violence and drug use. Additionally,
the children’s guardian ad litem and social
worker both reported that the children
were thriving in foster care and have made
improvements. A.C. is in counseling to ad-
dress trauma caused in part by Doe’s histo-
ry of broken promises. Finally, Doe’s recur-
ving problems while in prison, which have
included drug use, have made it difficult
and at times even impossible for him to
have contact with his children and have
made it likely he will remain incarcerated
until 2025. Both the guardian ad litem and
the social worker testified that termination
was in the best interests of the children
because Doe has failed to provide safety,
stability, and certainty.

While the magistrate court recognized
Doe’s “profound love for A.C. and §.C.,” the
court concluded that the children did not
have the same “depth of bond” and that the
bond was superficial in nature, The court
based its conclusion on the fact that Doe had
been incarcerated for more than half of 8.C.’s
life and that Doe has “subjected his sons to a
home environment marked by housing insta-
bility, domestic violence, drug addiction and
criminal activity.” This conclusion is further
supported by the fact that A.C., while having
expressed excitement about visitation with
Doe, has “stated his preference to continue
to live with his foster parents.” In short,

271

there is nothing in the record that suggests
Doe can currently provide stability and cer-
tainty for his children or that he will be able
to do so in the future.

As the magistrate court pointed out, there
is no question that Doe loves his children.
However, his past and current actions have
made it impossible for him to provide the
day-to-day care that his children need. Ac-
cordingly, we conclude that substantial and
competent evidence supports the magistrate
court’s conclusion that termination of Doe's
parental rights was in the best interests of
his children, We affirm the magistrate court’s
judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the magistrate court’s judgment.
terminating Doe’s parental rights to A.C. and
S.C.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and BRODY concur.

396 P.3d 700
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve

Victor GARCIA-RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 44443

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: June 14, 2017

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for appellant, Kenneth K. Jor-
gensen argued.

Eric Fredericksen, State Appellate Public
Defender, Boise, for respondent. Maya Wal-
dron argued,

SUBSTITUTE OPINION, THE COURT’S
PRIOR OPINION DATED APRIL 14,
2017 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.

HORTON, Justice.

The State of Idaho appeals from the dis-
trict court’s order suppressing evidence
against Victor Garcia-Rodriguez. On April
10, 2014, Garcia-Rodriguez was pulled over
after an Idaho State Police trooper wit-
nessed Garcia-Rodriguez’s car briefly cross
over the fog line while exiting Interstate 84,
This stop ultimately led to Garcia-Rodri-
guez’s arrest. A search incident to arrest
uncovered methamphetamine on his person,
and Garcia-Rodriguez was charged with traf-
ficking in methamphetamine and possession
of paraphernalia. Garcia-Rodriguez filed a

273

motion to suppress the evidence, which the
district court granted. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In the early afternoon of April 10, 2014,
Idaho State Police Trooper Steve Otto en-
countered Garcia-Rodriguez as both were
driving eastbound on Interstate 84 near mile-
post 168, south of Jerome. Garcia-Rodriguez
exited the interstate. As he-did so, Otto
noticed the right tires of Garcia-Rodriguez’s
car briefly cross over the right fog line of the
exit ramp. Garcia-Rodriguez then activated
his turn signals. Initially, he signaled a right
hand turn before turning on his left hand
blinkers. Garcia-Rodriguez turned left off of
the exit ramp and onto Lincoln Avenue. Otto
testified that he was concerned that Garecia-
Rodriguez was impaired or having vehicle
issues. Otto followed Garcia-Rodriguez as he
traveled down Lincoln toward a Shell gas
station. After Garcia-Rodriguez signaled his
indication to turn into the gas station, Otto
turned on his overhead lights and made a
traffie stop.

Garcia-Rodriguez pulled into a parking
spot at the gas station, and Otto parked
directly behind him. Otto observed a Hertz
rental sticker as he approached Garcia-Rod-
riguez’s car and thus knew that it was a
rental car. After Otto made contact with
Garcia-Rodriguez, it became immediately ap-
parent that there was a language barrier.
Otto told Garcia-Rodriquez he stopped him
for driving over the fog line and asked him
for identification, Garcia-Rodriguez present-
ed a Mexican consular identification card
with a Gooding address. Otto began question-
ing Garcia-Rodriguez about the car and in-
surance. He eventually asked Garcia-Rodri-
guez to exit the car because he felt Garcia-
Rodriguez was acting nervous and avoiding
the center console while searching for the
papers Otto had requested.

Otto asked Garcia-Rodriguez to empty his
pockets, and Garcia-Rodriguez took out a cell
phone, wallet and a set of keys. Otto called
for a Spanish-speaking officer and ran checks
on Garcia-Rodriguez, but those checks did
not return any information. Otto did not at-
tempt to determine if Garcia-Rodriguez had

274

ever previously failed to appear for a court
appearance. Otto located someone to trans-
late and asked Garcia-Rodriguez for consent
to search his vehicle, which Garcia-Rodriguez
gave. Otto searched the center console and
found approximately $10,000 in cash inside of
a shaving kit, Otto then placed Garcia-Rodri-
guez in handcuffs and placed him in the
patrol car, but stated that Garcia-Rodriguez
was not under arrest. Soon after, four more
officers arrived on the scene and began to
discuss how to search the vehicle because
Garcia-Rodriguez’s consent was no longer
valid.

Eventually, a Spanish-speaking trooper ar-
rived and, approximately 45 minutes after
the traffic stop, advised Garcia-Rodriguez of
his Miranda rights and began asking him
questions about the money. Otto got his drug
dog out of his patrol car and walked the dog
around Garcia-~Rodriguez’s car. Otto stated
that his dog alerted but it was “really weak,”
and no drugs were subsequently located in
Garcia-Rodriguez’s car. Approximately 75
minutes after the stop, Otto arrested Garcia-
Rodriguez for failure to purchase a driver’s
license, Otto conducted a search incident to
arrest and found methamphetamine in Gar-
cia-Rodriguez’s front pants pocket.

On April 11, 2014, the State charged Gar-
cia-Rodriguez with methamphetamine traf-
ficking and possession of paraphernalia, On
June 10, 2014, Garcia-Rodriguez filed a mo-
tion to suppress all evidence against him. The
district court granted the motion, concluding
that the initial stop, the continued detention
and the eventual arrest were all unlawful.
The State timely appealed. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the district
court. We then granted Garcia-Rodriguez’s
petition for review.

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMMM “In cases that come before this
Court on a petition for review of a Court of
Appeals decision, this Court gives serious
consideration to the views of the Court of
Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of
the lower court.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 724, 170 P.8d 387, 389 (2007). “This
Court thus acts as if the case were on direct
appeal from the district court.” State v.

James, 148 Idaho 574, 576, 225 P.8d 1169,
1171 (2010). “In reviewing a district court
order granting or denying a motion to sup-
press evidence, the standard of review is
bifurcated.” Id. (quoting State v. Purdum,
147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.8d 182, 183 (2009)).
“This Court will accept the trial court’s find-
ings of fact unless they are clearly errone-
ous.” Id, “However, this Court may freely
review the trial court’s application of consti-
tutional principles in light of the facts found.”
Id.

It. ANALYSIS

The State argues that the district court
erred by suppressing the evidence because
the stop was justified by reasonable suspi-
cion, the arrest was justified by probable
cause, and the search of Garcia-Rodriguez’s
person was proper as a search incident to
arrest. Because we decide this case on the
issue of probable cause for the arrest and the
subsequent search incident to arrest, we do
not consider the issue of the initial stop.

A. The State’s argument that the arrest
and search incident to arrest were
constitutional based on probable cause
regardless of state law statutory limi-
tations is not properly before this
Court.

Based on the evidence and testimony pre-
sented, the district court concluded that Otto
did not have reasonable grounds to arrest
Garcia-Rodriguez pursuant to Idaho Code
section 49-1407 for the misdemeanor charge
of driving without a license under Idaho
Code sections 49-301(1) and (8). The district
court concluded: “The burden is on law en-
forcement to provide ‘reasonable and proba-
ble grounds’ to believe a misdemeanor traffic
offender will not appear in court. It is insuffi-
cient for law enforcement to simply ‘disbe-
lieve’ information presented by an offender in
order to justify an arrest under Idaho Code
49-1407.”

For the first time on appeal, the State
argues that: “In this case Trooper Otto de-
veloped probable cause to believe that Garcia
had no driver's license, a violation of I.C,
§ 49-301(1).... This alone constitutionally

justified Garcia’s arrest. Virginia vy. Moore,
558 U.S. 164, 171-72 [128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604,
170 L.Ed.2d 559, 567-68] (2008) (probable
cause constitutionally justifies arrest regard-
less of state laws imposing additional re-
quirements).” Garcia-Rodriguez argues that
issue was not argued before the district court
and; therefore, is not properly before this
Court. The State responds arguing that “the
issue of whether the ‘stop and search’ [was]
constitutionally reasonable was raised by
Garcia in his motion,” and “[tJhe prosecutor
did not have a duty to negate every legal
claim proposed in the motion to suppress,
only establish the facts showing the officer’s
actions were reasonable,” The State is incor-
rect,

HE “This Court will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal.” Mickel-
sen Const., Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396,
405, 299 P.8d 208, 212 (2018) (quoting Clear
Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho
790, 812, 252 P.8d 71, 98 (2011)). “Issues not
raised below will not be considered by this
court on appeal, and the parties will be held
to the theory upon which the case was pre-
sented to the lower court.” Heckman
Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through Dept
of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 798, 799-800, 589
P.2d 540, 546-47 (1979); Marchbanks v, Roll,
142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.8d 993, 995 (2005);
Frasier v, Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 82, 487 P.2d
82, 85 (1968) (“We have held generally that
this court will not review issues not present-
ed in the trial court, and that parties will be
held to the theory on which the cause was
tried.”).

TM The State argues that once Otto had
probable cause to believe that Garcia-Rodri-
guez was driving without a license in viola-
tion of Idaho Code section 49-801(1), Garcia-
Rodriguez’ arrest did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, despite the limitations that Ida-
ho Code section 49-1407 imposes on arrests
for certain misdemeanor violations of Idaho’s
motor vehicle laws. Although we do not reach
the merits of the State’s argument, we note
that the State’s arguments are likely correct
under the holdings of Virginia v. Moore, 558
US. 164, 128 S.Ct, 1598, 170 L.Hd.2d 559
(2008), and State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 354
P.8d 446 (2015). However, the State failed to

275

advance this argument below, and it is not
properly before this Court on appeal.

We have long held that “{alppellate court
review is limited to the evidence, theories
and arguments that were presented below.”
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170
P.3d 875, 879 (2007) (quoting Obenchain v.
McAlvain Const. Inc,, 143 Idaho 56, 57, 187
P.8d 448, 444 (2006); see also, Allied Bail
Bonds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho
405, 418, 258 P.3d 840, 848 2011); Woods v.
Sanders, 150 Idaho 58, 59, 244 P.8d 197, 208
(2010); Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 288,
292, 221 P.8d 81, 90 (2009).

A review of the record of the proceedings
before the trial court shows that the State
consistently argued that Garcia-Rodriguez
‘was arrested pursuant to Idaho Code section
49-301(1) for driving without a license and
that Otto reasonably concluded that Garcia-
Rodriguez “would likely not appear in court,
justifying [Garcia-Rodriguez’s] arrest pursu-
ant to Idaho Code 49-801 and 49-1407(1).”
‘That position is set forth in the State’s Affi-
davit in Support of Complaint or Warrant
for Arrest, the State’s Memorandum Oppos-
ing Defendant’s Motion to Suppress under
the heading “Basis for the Arrest,” and in
the State’s Response to Defendant’s Reply
to State’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
to Suppress, once again under the heading
“Basis for the Arrest.” The State’s current
argument that Idaho Code section 49-1407 is
immaterial to the question of the constitu-
tionality of the arrest is nowhere to be
found.

HM The State contends that this Court
should apply the correct legal analysis in
reaching our decision on appeal, without re-
gard for the arguments advanced before the
trial court. It is true that “where an order of
the district court is correct but based upon
an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm
upon the correct theory. This doctrine is
sometimes called the ‘right result-wrong the-
ory’ rule.” Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Op-
portunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 578, 580, 850
P.2d 724, 781 (1998) (internal citation omit-
ted). While the State properly observes that
this Court has corrected lower court deci-
sions based on legal error, we did so when

276 [|

the lower court reached the correct result
albeit by way of erroneous legal reasoning.
This is not one of those situations, We de-
cline to adopt a “wrong result-wrong theory”
approach to reverse a lower court’s decision
based on issues neither raised nor argued
below, In territorial days, a sesquicentenary
ago, this Court explained why:
It is for the protection of inferior courts.
It is manifestly unfair for a party to go
into court and slumber, as it were, on his
defense, take no exception to the ruling,
present no point for the attention of the
court, and seek to present his defense, that
was never mooted before, to the judgment
of the appellate court, Such a practice
would destroy the purpose of an appeal
and make the supreme court one for decid-
ing questions of law in the first instance.
Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867).
This requirement applies equally to all par-
ties on appeal. Because the constitutionality
of arresting Garcia-Rodriguez without regard
for Idaho Code section 49-1407(1) was not
argued before the district court, it is not
properly before this Court on appeal.

B. The State has waived its argument
that Garcia-Rodriguez’s arrest was
justified pursuant to Idaho Code sec-
tion 49-1407(1).

Tl As explained above, the district court
concluded that Otto did not have reasonable
and probable grounds to arrest Garcia-Rodri-
guez pursuant to Idaho Code section 49-1407
for the misdemeanor charge of driving with-
out a license under Idaho Code sections 49-
801(1) and (8). On appeal, the State simply
contends:

Moreover, Trooper Otto’s subsequent in-

vestigation revealed that Garcia was in this

country illegally, had only Mexican consu-
lar identification, spoke little English, was
not in law enforcement databases, was
driving a car rented by someone else, and
had bricks of cash Trooper Otto associated
with drug trafficking. This gave him
grounds to arrest under state law. LC.

§ 49-1407(1) (arrest for traffic misdemean-

ors allowed where “the person does not

furnish satisfactory evidence of identity or
when the officer has reasonable and proba-
ble grounds to believe the person will dis-

regard a written promise to appear in

court”),
The State makes no attempt to explain how
or why the district court erred in its conclu-
sion that Otto did not have reasonable and
probable grounds to believe that Garcia-Rod-
rviguez would disregard a written promise to
appear in court.

HE “This Court will not search the
record for error. We do not presume error
on appeal; the party alleging error has the
burden of showing it in the record.” Miller v.
Callear, 140 Idaho 218, 218, 91 P.8d 1117,
1122 (2004) (citation omitted),

We will not consider an issue not sup-

ported by argument and authority in the

opening brief. Regardless of whether an
issue is explicitly set forth in the party's
brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the
issue is only mentioned in passing and not
supported by any cogent argument or au-
thority, it cannot be considered by this
Court.

Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.8d
1146, 1152 (2010) (citations and quotations
omitted). “A general attack on the findings
and conclusions of the district court, without
specific reference to evidentiary or legal er-
rors, is insufficient to preserve an issue.” Id.
Because the State has not presented this
Court with argument or authority to support
its argument, the State has waived this argu-
ment on appeal.

Iv, CONCLUSION

We affirm district court’s order granting
Garcia-Rodriguez’s motion to suppress,

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur.

ON DENIAL OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING

HORTON, Justice.

The State has petitioned for rehearing,
explaining: “The [State] requests rehearing
because this Court has never held that citing
superseded authority on an issue before the
trial court forecloses citing the correct au-

fn

thority on appeal.” In support of this conten-
tion, the State argues:

Idaho’s legal standard requiring compli-
ance with state arrest statutes was super-
seded with regard to the Fourth Amend-
ment by precedent of the Supreme Court
of the United States in 2008, [Virginia v.
Moore, 558 U.S. 164, 178, 128 S.Ct. 1598,
1608, 170 L.Ed.2d 559, 571~72 (2008) ],
(The Fourth Amendment “does not require
the exclusion of evidence obtained from a
constitutionally permissible arrest.”), Even
so, the Idaho Court of Appeals was still
applying this standard in 2011, in a case
cited by the parties. See [State v. Jones,
151 Idaho 948, 265 P.8d 1155 (Ct, App.
2011) ], The standard requiring compliance
with state law for an arrest to be “lawful”
for purposes of a search incident to arrest
was not formally abandoned, regarding
both the Fourth Amendment and the Ida-
ho Constitution, until 2015. State v. Green,
158 Idaho 884, 887, 354 P.8d 446, 449
(2015).

As the above shows, when the state and
the defendant briefed the issue in 2018,
and when the district court decided it,
there were three Court of Appeals deci-
sions on point regarding the legal standard
applicable to the search incident to arrest
exception, which decisions were consistent.
with long-standing precedent of this Court.
The parties cited the relevant Idaho prece-
dents and made their arguments based on
those precedents. At the time, a supersed-
‘ing precedent by the Supreme Court of the
United States ewisted, but had never been
applied in the context of the legality of a
search incident to an arrest that did not
comply with state law.

(footnote omitted, emphasis added). The
State’s brief in support of rehearing con-
cludes:

In this case both parties, and the district
court, relied on Idaho Court of Appeals
precedent applying a decades-old Idaho
standard that held that the search incident
to arrest exception required compliance
with state arrest law. It was not clear at
that time that this standard had been su-
perseded by Supreme Court of the United
States precedent, and in fact was not so

277

held by an Idaho Appellate Court wntil

more than a year after the district court's

suppression ruling. The state submits that
it did not waive application of the correct

legal standards governing the legality of a

search incident to arrest by citing super-

seded standards to the district court under
the facts and circumstances of this case.

The state therefore requests rehearing on

this issue,
(emphasis added),

The State’s factual assertion as to when
this case was argued and decided by the
district court is inaceurate, The proceedings
before the district court did not take place in
2013, The Information was filed May 1, 2014,
The motion to suppress was filed on June 10,
2014, The evidentiary hearing on the motion
to suppress was held on June 13, 2014. The
State’s memorandum in opposition to the mo-
tion was filed the same date. The defense
reply to the State’s brief was filed on July 7,
2014, The State filed its response to the reply
brief on July 22, 2014, The parties presented
their arguments to the district court on Au-
gust 8, 2014, and the district court memoran-
dum opinion on the motion was filed October
1, 2014,

The State’s legal premise is also inaccu-
rate. The State’s discussion of the Court of
Appeals’ decision in State v. Jones, 151 Idaho
948, 265 P.8d 1155 (Ct. App. 2011), is not well
taken, The State argues in a footnote that in
Jones, “[t]he Court of Appeals specifically
declined to address the effect of Moore on
Idaho law because it found that the arrest
complied with the statute. Jones, 151 Idaho
at 945 nl, 265 P.8d at 1157 nl.” This is a
misreading of what took place,

There, “Jones filed a motion to suppress
evidence, asserting the search violated her
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution...” Id,
at 944, 265 P.8d at 1156 (emphasis added),
There is a footnote in Jones which the State
cites in its brief (out does not quote) which
demonstrates that the Court of Appeals had
a clear understanding of the effect of Moore
on Idaho’s Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, but the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance required the Court of Appeals to

278

determine whether there had been a violation
of Idaho Code section 49-1407:

Jones argues that this Court’s decision
in State v. Foldest, 131 Idaho 778, 963 P.2d
1215 (Ct.App. 1998) provides a basis to
hold that Idaho’s Constitution affords
greater protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures than federal consti-
tutional standards and has continuing via-
bility despite the holding in Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170
L,Ed.2d 559 (2008) (a warrantless arrest
based on probable cause, even where the
arrest violates state law, does not offend
Fourth Amendment principles). Because
we conclude that the arrest was authorized
under Idaho law, we need not reach
Jones’s constitutional question of whether
Foldesi enlarges the scope of protection
under the Idaho Constitution beyond that
of the Fourth Amendment. See State v.
Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 278, 92 P.38d 521, 523
[2004] (“[W]hen a case can be decided upon
a ground other than a constitutional
ground, the Court will not address the
constitutional issue unless it is necessary
for a determination of the case.”).

State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 948, 945 n.1, 265
P.8d 1155, 1157 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011).

The State’s contention that no appellate
court of this State had addressed this issue
at the time of the hearing is equally flawed.
Although we believe the State’s statement as
to the timing of the proceedings before the
district court is an inadvertent error, the
effect is that the status of appellate jurispru-
dence at that time is misrepresented. One
year before the proceedings in the district
court, the Court of Appeals released its deci-
sion in State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 313
P.3d 782 (Ct. App. 2018), review denied.

In Branigh, the Court of Appeals applied
the rule of law pronounced in Moore, and in
so doing, categorically rejected the premise
that violation of statutes or court rules could
result in suppression of evidence. The Court
of Appeals framed the issue as whether a
violation of Idaho Criminal Rule 41(a) called
for suppression of telephone records obtained
by faxing a search warrant to a cell phone
provider in Kansas, despite the rule’s territo-
vial limitation. Id, at 411, 318 P.3d at 739.

The Court of Appeals concluded that it did
not. Id. at 415, 313 P.3d at 743. The Court of
Appeals began with this declaration:

We find this argument to be without merit

because the exclusionary rule requires sup-

pression of evidence only when constitu-
tional restraints on searches or seizures
have been violated. Decisions of both the

United States Supreme Court and the

Idaho Supreme Court establish that the

violation of state statutes in the conduct

of a search or arrest does not justify

suppression so long as constitutional

standards are met.
Id, at 412, 813 P.3d at 740 (italics in original,
bold added). Discussing Moore, the Court of
Appeals stated: “The Supreme Court held
that although the arrest was unlawful under
state law, suppression was not warranted
because the existence of probable cause for
the arrest satisfied the Fourth Amendment.”
Id.

The Court of Appeals then observed that
“Idaho Supreme Court authority comports
with the foregoing federal court decisions.”
Id, at 413, 318 P.38d at 741, The Court of
Appeals cited five decisions of this Court,
discussing three at length. Jd. at 413-14, 313
P.38d at 741-42. Significantly, the Court of
Appeals discussed an earlier decision by this
Court addressing a statutory violation as
grounds for suppressing evidence:

In State v. Zueger, 143 Idaho 647, 650,

152 P.8d 8, 11 (2006), a warrant was is-

sued in violation of I.C. § 19-4406, which

limits those who may sign a magistrate
judge’s name to a warrant to the magis-
trate himself/herself or an authorized
peace officer, The magistrate had author-
ized a prosecutor to sign the magistrate’s
name to a warrant. The Idaho Supreme
Court held that this error did not consti-
tute a constitutional violation, stating:
In order to rise to the level of a constitu-
tional violation, there must be a defect
which calls into question the Constitu-
tion’s requirement of a finding of proba-
ble cause to justify issuance of the war-
rant, Article I, section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution provides that ‘no warrant
shall issue without a finding of probable
cause....’ [A] mere procedural error,

which does not implicate the defendant’s
constitutionally protected rights, should
not serve to invalidate the otherwise
properly issued warrant... .
Id. at 414, 318 P.8d at 742 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals also cited our decision
in State v. Skurlock, 150 Idaho 404, 405-07,
247 P.8d 681, 632-34 (2011), noting in a par-
enthetical that the case involved “a nighttime
search was conducted, allegedly in violation
of LC. § 19-4411 and LC.R. 41(¢)” and that
this Court held that “suppression was not
warranted because no constitutional violation
was shown.” Branigh, 155 Idaho at 414, 313
P.8d at 742.
In summary, the Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion in Branigh squarely rejected the legal

279

proposition that the parties litigated before
the district court in this case more than a
year before those proceedings took place.
Because the State’s petition for rehearing is
based upon factual and legal premises which
are devoid of merit, it is denied.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur.

396 P.3d 1162

In the MATTER OF the Termination of
the Parental Rights oft Jane DOE (2017-
6) and John Doe (2017-7) Respondents-
Appellants,

Docket No. 44795-2017, 44796-2017

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 20, 2017

eae

Bruce H. Greene, Bruce H. Greene PA,
Sandpoint, submitted a brief on behalf of
Jane Doe (2017-6).

Catherine E. Enright, Deputy Publie De-
fender, Sandpoint, submitted a brief on be-
half of John Doe (2017-7).

Denise L. Rosen, Deputy Attorney Gener-
al, Coeur d’Alene, submitted briefs on behalf
of the Idaho Department of Health and Wel-
fare.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Bonner County
from a judgment terminating the father’s
parental rights in his minor children and a
judgment terminating the mother’s parental
rights in those children. We affirm the judg-
ments of the magistrate court.

L

Factual Background.

Jane Doe (“Mother”) and John Doe (“Fa-
ther”) were married for twenty-five years
and had eleven children between three years
of age and twenty-two years of age. At the
time of this proceeding, seven of the children
were under the age of eighteen. Mother and
Father lived in an Amish community in
Washington until 2004. While they were in
that community, they were shunned by other
members because Father had confessed to
inappropriately touching two of his daugh-
ters,

In March 2015, the family moved to Spirit
Lake, Idaho, to become members of another
religious community. The oldest daughter,
who was then fourteen years of age, dis-
closed to that community that Father had
sexually molested her when she was a child,
starting when she was four or five years of
age and ending when she was fourteen; that
when she was six, seven, or eight years of
age, she told Mother, but Mother did nothing
to protect her; and that when she was twelve
years of age, the molestation became less
frequent as Father began sexually molesting

282

a younger sister who was six years of age.
Members of that community encouraged Fa-
ther to confess to law enforcement, and he
and Mother went to the county sheriff's of-
fice and confessed to sexually molesting two
of his daughters while they lived in Washing-
ton. Because the offenses did not occur in
Idaho, he was not arrested. Members of the
community met with Father and Mother and
developed with them a plan to protect the
other children from Father sexually molest-
ing them. Father and Mother violated the
provisions in the plan, and a member of the
community contacted the Idaho Department
of Health and Welfare (“Department”),

A Department case manager met with Fa-
ther and Mother, who entered into a safety
plan to protect the minor children, Father
called the case manager and stated that they
planned to move back to the state of Wash-
ington, The case manager responded that the
Department could not supervise the safety
plan if they were in another state. Mother
then called the case manager and stated that
they were moving to Washington with the
children. The Department then obtained an
order authorizing it to remove the minor
children from the house.

On August 15, 2015, the county prosecutor
filed a petition under the Idaho Child Protec-
tive Act, At some point, Father was charged
in the state of Washington with three counts
of felony child molestation in the first degree
that were committed sometime between 1999
and 2001 against the oldest daughter. On
June 7, 2016, he pled guilty to all three
charges, and on July 19, 2016, he was sen-
tenced to ten years in prison and lifetime
supervision.

On October 17, 2016, the Department filed
a petition to terminate Father’s and Mother's
parental rights in their minor children. After
a two-day evidentiary hearing, the magis-
trate court found that the Department had
proved by clear and convincing evidence that
there were grounds for terminating the pa-
rental rights of Father and Mother in their

1. Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(b) states as a
condition for termination of a parent's parental
rights that the parent has neglected the child.
Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(a) defines ‘“ne-
glected” as conduct that is defined in Idaho Code

minor children. It entered judgments termi;
nating the parental rights of both parents,
and they timely appealed.

WM “The trial court must find that
grounds for terminating parental rights have
been proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence.” Dept of Health & Welfare v. Doe,
149 Idaho 207, 210, 283 P.8d 188, 141 (2010).
“On appeal, the appellate court does not re-
weigh the evidence to determine if it was
clear and convincing.” Jd. “In an action to
terminate parental rights where a trial court
has noted explicitly and applied a clear and
convincing standard, an appellate court will
not disturb the trial court’s findings unless
they are not supported by substantial and
competent evidence.” State v. Doe, 144 Idaho
534, 585, 164 P.8d 814, 815 (2007). “Substan-
tial and competent evidence is relevant evi-
dence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion.” Anderson v. Harper's,
Inc., 148 Idaho 198, 195, 141 P.8d 1062, 1064
(2006). “It is the province of the trial court to
determine the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”
KMST, LLC v. Cnty. of Ada, 188 Idaho 577,
581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003).

I

Did the Magistrate Court Exr
in Terminating Father’s
Parental Rights?

Idaho Code section 16-2005(1) provides
that a court may grant an order terminating
parental rights if it finds that such termi-
nation is in the child’s best interests and that
one of the statutory conditions for termi-
nation exists. The magistrate court found by
clear and convincing evidence that three of
the statutory conditions existed for terminat-
ing Father’s parental rights in the seven
minor children. They were:

(a) Father had neglected the children

pursuant to Idaho Code sections 16-

2005(1)(b) and 16-20028)(a),1

section 16-1602(31). That definition includes a
child who “is without proper parental care and
control, or subsistence, medical or other care or
control necessary for his well-being because of
the conduct or omission of his parents, guardian

(b) Father had neglected the children

as defined by Idaho Code sections 16-

2005(1)(b) and 16-2002(8)(b),? and

(ec) Father had abused the oldest of the
minor children as defined by Idaho Code
sections 16-2002(4) and 16-1602(1)(b),? and,
with respect to the remaining six minor
children, he was incarcerated and was like-
ly to remain incarcerated for a substantial
period of time during their minority (Idaho

Code section 16-2005(1)(e)).!

With respect to the six youngest children,
the magistrate court found that Father “has
been incarcerated and is likely to remain
incarcerated for a substantial period of time
during the minority of each of these chil-
dren.” Father does not challenge that finding
on appeal.

HEM With respect to the oldest of the
minor children, the magistrate court found
that Father had sexually abused her. Father
argues that he was not criminally charged
with abusing that daughter, she did not testi-
fy, and the evidence supporting that finding
was hearsay. There is no requirement that a
parent be charged or convicted criminally in
order to find in a termination proceeding that.
the parent has sexually abused his or her
child. The hearsay testimony regarding Fa-
ther’s abuse of this daughter was admitted
without objection. “The general rule is that
where hearsay evidence is admitted without
objection, it may properly be considered in
determining the facts; the important question
being the weight to be given such evidence.”
Gem-Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Small, 90 Idaho
354, 871, 411 P.2d 948, 958 (1966). The major-
ity view is that hearsay evidence admitted
without objection “is as strong as any other

or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to
provide them.”

2, Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b) defines ‘“‘ne-
glected” as follows:
(b) The parent(s) has failed to comply with
the court's orders or the case plan in a child
protective act case and:
@ The department has had temporary or
Tegal custody of the child for fifteen (15) of
the most recent twenty-two (22) months; and
i) Reunification has not been accom-
plished by the last day of the fifteenth month
in which the child has been in the temporary
or legal custody of the department.

283

legally competent evidence.” 29A Am.Jur.2d
Evidence § 1867 (2008). It was the province
of the magistrate court to determine the
weight to be given the testimony and the
inferences to be drawn from it. In re Doe
(2014-22), 157 Idaho 955, 958, 342 P.38d 667,
670 (2015). Thus, the court’s finding that
Father sexually abused this daughter is sup-
ported by substantial and competent evi-
dence.

Hl The magistrate court found the exis-
tence of a condition supporting the termi-
nation of Father’s parental rights in the six
youngest children and a ground supporting
the termination of Father's parental rights in
the oldest of the seven children. We there-
fore do not need to address the other two
conditions found by the court to exist. The
statutory conditions supporting termination
of parental rights listed in subsections (a)
through (e) of Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)
are independent. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 910,
914, 277 P.8d 357, 361 (2012). If we uphold
the magistrate court’s finding as to one con-
dition with respect to a child or children, we
need not address any other statutory condi-
tion found by the court to exist. Jd.

I in order to terminate a parent-child
relationship, the magistrate court must also
find that termination is in the best interests
of the child. LC. § 16-2005(1). The court
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
it was in the best interests of the children
that Father’s parental rights in the seven
minor children be terminated. The court
found that he was a serial child molester;
that there was credible evidence that he had
sexually abused most of his children; that the
abuse had been happening for at least six-

3. Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(b) states as a
condition for termination of a parent's parental
rights that the parent has abused the child. Idaho
Code section 16-2002 states that “abused” means
conduct that is defined in Idaho Code section 16-
1602. That definition includes “[sJexual conduct,
including ... molestation.” I.C. § 16-1602(1)(b).

4. Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(e) states as a
condition for termination of a parent's parental
tights that “t]he parent has been incarcerated
and is likely to remain incarcerated for a sub-
stantial period of time during the child’s minori-
ty”

284

teen years; that he had repeatedly confessed,
repented, and then continued molesting his
children; and that no child was safe around
him,

On appeal, Father does not dispute these
findings. Rather, he argues that other factors
should outweigh them. He argues that the
children “have grown up in a happy, loving
home”; that “Mother and Father have suc-
cessfully raised several children into adult-
hood, and by all accounts have raised the
children involved in this case to be well-
mannered, respectful, happy, and healthy
children”; and that Father “still loves his
children as well and will provide for them in
any way he can while incarcerated.” Father
has not shown that the court erred in finding
that it was in the best interests of the chil-
dren to terminate Father’s parental rights.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment terminat-
ing Father’s parental rights in the seven
minor children,

I.

Did the Magistrate Court Err
in Terminating Mother’s
Parental Rights?

HH The magistrate court found by clear
and convincing evidence that two of the stat-
utory conditions existed for terminating
Mother’s parental rights. They were: (a)
Mother had neglected the children pursuant
to Idaho Code sections 16-2005(1)(b) and 16-
2002(8)(a), and (b) Mother had neglected the
children as defined by Idaho Code sections
16-2005(1)(b) and 16-2002(8)(b).

With respect to neglect as defined in Idaho
Code section 16-2002(8)(a), a child is neglect-
ed if the child “is without proper parental
care and control, or subsistence, medical or
other care or control necessary for his well-
being because of the conduct or omission of
his parents, guardian or other custodian or
their neglect or refusal to provide them.” I.C.
§§ 16-2002(8)(u), 16-1602(81). The magistrate
court found by clear and convincing evidence
that Mother had neglected by failing to pro-
vide cave or control necessary for the well-
being of the children, in that “she knew or
had reason to know that the children were
not safe around their father, and took no

steps to protect the children’s safety.” The
court found, based solely upon the testimony
of Father and Mother:

Sometime around 2004 or before, [Fa-
ther] confessed to other bishops and his
wife that he had molested two of his
daughters; sometime around 2005 [Fa-
ther] confessed to [Mother] that he had
molested two of his daughters; sometime
around 2006, [Mother] suspected [Father]
was molesting [the oldest daughter] in the
bedroom and [the daughter] confirmed it;
sometime around 2008 [Mother] knew
[Father] was being investigated by Wash-
ington child protective services for child
molestation; and sometime around 2012
[Father] exposed himself to two of his
daughters and [Mother] knew about it
about a week afterwards. This much was
established based solely on the testimony
of [Father] and [Mother]. Based on this
information alone, [Mother] knew or had
reason to know that the children were not
safe with their father. Although [Mother]
likely did not know the full extent of [Fa-
ther’s] molestation of the children, and al-
though there was no evidence of sexual
molestation of three of the children, she
knew enough that she should have known
that none of the children were safe if left
alone with him,

Mother contends on appeal, “The evidence
was hardly clear as to when the incidences of
molestation took place, much less when she
became aware of it, or to what extent it had
occurred.” That assertion is contrary to
Mother's testimony, She testified that Father
first molested their oldest daughter when the
daughter was six years old and that she
found out about it because Father told her.
The magistrate court found that Father in-
formed Mother of the molestation when the
daughter was six years old, and she was
twenty-two years old at the time of the evi-
dentiary hearing, When asked what she did
when Father told her, Mother answered, “I
don’t really know.” She also testified that she
did not call the police because “I didn’t real-
ize that I would be supposed to.” When
asked when was the last time that Father
sexually abused a child other than the oldest
daughter, Mother answered, “Well, it’s been

so far back I can’t remember, you know, all
the time, just how it all went.” She then
stated that she remembered a time that Fa-
ther had sexually abused the oldest daughter
when she was twelve years of age. Mother
testified that she heard Father go into the
oldest daughter’s bedroom during the night
and she listened to what was happening. The
next morning, she asked the daughter wheth-
er Father was in her bedroom, and the
daughter responded that he was. Mother
asked what he had done, and the daughter
described the sexual abuse. Mother was then
asked whether she confronted Father, and
she had and that he had admitted it. When
asked whether she had called the police, she
again stated that she had not because “I
didn’t realize that’s what you do.” When
asked how many times Father had abused
the daughter between when she was six and
twelve years of age, Mother stated, “I’m not
sure.” The oldest daughter testified that dur-
ing that six-year period, the sexual abuse
“was regular like every day, then maybe
every week. Maybe a few weeks passed by
and then again very regular.” The oldest
daughter also testified that when she was
twelve years of age, Father basically stopped
sexually molesting her and began molesting a
younger sister who was six years of age.

When the oldest daughter was twelve
years of age, Washington authorities wanted
to interview her regarding whether Father
was sexually abusing her. Before they met
with the daughter, Mother admitted telling
her, “Be careful what you say.” The daughter
testified that Mother told her to lie, which
she did, and the investigation ended at that
time.

Mother asserts on appeal: “Perhaps two or
even four girls had had some degree of mo-
lestation; versions differ dramatically. None
of the three boys were allegedly violated; and
there was no sufficient showing that any of
the other five girls underage and at home
had been either.” Mother testified that to her
knowledge, three of the minor daughters had
been sexually molested by Father. In addi-
tion, the evidence showed that all three of
the adult daughters reported that they had
been sexually abused by Father. The oldest
daughter testified that one of her brothers

285

told her he also had been sexually molested
by Father, and the magistrate court found
that that brother had disclosed incidents of
sexual abuse to the case manager.

Mother was asked when was the last time
that she was aware of Father abusing one of
their children, and Mother answered that it
was four or five years earlier. She testified
that to her knowledge, he had sexually
abused four of their daughters. When asked
whether any of her children told her that
Father had sexually abused them, she an-
swered, “Yes,” but could not remember what
she said to them and did not call the police,
The magistrate court’s finding that Mother
had neglected the children by failing to pro-
vide care or control necessary for their well-
being is supported by substantial and compe-
tent evidence,

HI In order to terminate a parent-child
relationship, the magistrate court must also
find that termination is in the best interests
of the child. IC. § 16-2005(1). The court
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
it was in the best interests of the children
that Mother’s parental rights in the seven
minor children be terminated. The court
found that termination of Mother's parental
rights was in the best interests of the chil-
dren because Mother was not able to provide
the care and control necessary for the chil-
dren’s well-being and there was no reason-
able expectation that she would be able to do
so within a reasonable period of time. Mother
does not challenge that factual finding on
appeal. Therefore, it is unnecessary to set
forth the court’s basis for this finding.

Mother simply asserts that there was in-
sufficient evidence to prove that termination
of Mother’s parental rights was in the chil-
dren’s best interests because “none of [the
minor children] were proved to have been
molested by Father and thus ‘neglected’ by
Mother. None of the minor children are even
discussed individually by the Court, Nor is
there any discussion why the boys’ interests
are ‘served’ when they weren’t even endan-
gered to begin with.” There is no require-
ment that all of the children suffer harm in
this circumstance. “[O]nce the State is aware
of circumstances indicating a child faces po-
tential harm, it should not have to wait to

On

286 De

intervene until that child suffers actual harm
or illness, but rather should act to prevent
it.” Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe,
150 Idaho 36, 48, 244 P.3d 180, 187 (2010)
(footnote omitted). Substantial and compe-
tent evidence supports the magistrate court’s
finding that termination of Mother’s parental
rights was in the best interests of the chil-
dren,

Iv.

Conclusion.

We affirm the judgment terminating Fa-
ther’s parental rights in the seven minor
children, and we affirm the judgment termi-
nating Mother’s parental rights in the seven
minor children.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY concur.

396 P.3d 1168
Randy L. MCKINNEY, Plaintiff-
Appellant,

ve
STATE of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No. 42964-2015

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Idaho Falls, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 20, 2017

See also 115 Idaho 1125, 772 P.2d; 183 Idaho
695, 992 P.2d 144; 143 Idaho 590, 150 P.8d
283,

we
N

Erik R. Lehtinen, Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, argued for appellant.

LaMont L, Anderson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, argued for respondent.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Butte County from
a judgment dismissing a petition for post-
conviction relief. We affirm the judgment.

L

Factual Background,

In November 1981, a jury found Randy
Lynn McKinney guilty of first degree mur-
der (both by premeditated killing and by
felony murder), conspiracy to commit mur-
der, robbery, and conspiracy to commit rob-
bery for the April 1981 shooting death of
Robert Bishop, Jr. On March 27, 1982, the
district court sentenced McKinney to death
for first degree murder, an indeterminate
thirty years for conspiracy to commit murder
and conspiracy to commit robbery, and fixed
life for robbery. Id. This Court affirmed his
convictions and the death sentence, State v.
McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 687 P.2d 570
(1984); and this Court affirmed the denial of
his subsequent petitions for post-conviction
relief, McKinney v, State, 115 Idaho 1125,
772 P.2d 1219 (1989); McKinney v, State, 188
Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999); McKinney v.
State, 143 Idaho 590, 150 P.8d 288 (2006).

In April 1997, McKinney filed a petition
for habeas corpus in federal district court,
and on September 25, 2009, the court ruled
that he was not entitled to any relief related
to the guilt phase of his state case but that
he was entitled to resentencing because of
the ineffective assistance of his attorney at
the capital sentencing hearing. Rather than
appealing the court’s decision, the State and
McKinney entered into a binding sentencing
agreement titled “Rule 11 Sentencing Agree-
ment” on November 18, 2009, in which they
agreed that McKinney would “be sentenced
to a term of fixed life without the possibility

1. Rule 11(f) of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides
that the prosecuting attorney and the defense
attorney in a criminal case may enter into an
agreement in which they agree that the defen-
dant will receive a specific sentence, If the court

289

of parole for the crime of first-degree mur-
der, concurrent with his sentences for con-
spiracy to commit murder, robbery and con-
spiracy to commit robbery.”! In 2009,
McKinney was sentenced in accordance with
the plea agreement,

In 2010, McKinney filed a motion pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 85 to correct an
illegal sentence, contending that being sen-
tenced for both robbery and first-degree
murder was barred by the state and federal
double jeopardy clauses and a multiple-pun-
ishment statute that was in effect when he
committed the crimes. The district court de-
nied his motion, and this Court affirmed that
denial on appeal. State v. McKinney, 158
Idaho 887, 291 P.8d 1086 (2018).

On April 8, 2013, McKinney filed a petition
for post-conviction relief, commencing this
ease, In his petition, McKinney requested
that counsel be appointed to represent him,
and the district court appointed counsel for
him.

On July 29, 2014, the State filed a motion
to dismiss the petition. The grounds stated in
the motion were as follows:

This petition should be dismissed, as it is a

successive petition, which has been previ-

ously denied in Butte County Case No.

CV-2001-000105; Butte County Case No.

CV-2002-000118; and Bonneville County

Case No. CV-1990-00040093-PC, LC. § 19-

4908. The State respectfully requests the

Court take judicial notice of the prior peti-

tion and pleadings in each of the three

above entitled cases,

Petitioner’s Petition for Post Conviction
Relief is barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions, LC. § 19-4902(a).

Additionally, Petitioner waived his right
to appeal or seek post conviction relief
from the disposition of the Court in Butte
County Case No. CR-81-0005, at sentenc-
ing, on November 18, 2009, the agreement
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “1.”
The defendant, as well as two of defen-
dant’s separate and independent legal

accepts the agreement, then it must implement
the disposition provided in the agreement, A plea
agreement pursuant to Rule 11(6) is often called a
“Rule 11” plea agreement.

290

counsel entered into the plea agreement in
writing on November 18, 2009.

Petitioner has no evidentiary basis to
support his claims. Small v. State, 182
Idaho 327, 381, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct.
App. 1999).

The State did not file a memorandum or
affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss.
However, it did file a motion asking the
district court to take judicial notice of the
“Transcript of the Defendant’s Re-Sentenc-
ing on November 18, 2009 at which Defen-
dant waives his right to appeal this sentence
pursuant to a plea agreement” and “of the
Record, Transcripts, pleadings, Orders, Rul-
ings or Opinions[,] responsive pleadings,
guilty plea forms, agreements and including
any and all filed or lodged documents in Case
No. CR 81-0005.” The State’s motion to dis-
miss was heard on November 18, 2014, At
the beginning of the hearing, the district
court granted the motion for judicial notice.”
After the hearing, the court issued its find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law in which it
concluded that “the Petitioner has failed to
alleged [sic] facts supporting the claims in
the application for relief and that no genuine
issue of material fact exists. The claims are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.” It then
entered a judgment dismissing the petition
with prejudice, and McKinney timely appeal-
ed,

B18

Did the District Court Err in Dismissing
McKinney’s Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief?

HH “An application for post-conviction
relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding,
entirely distinct from the underlying criminal
action. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
generally apply.” Ferrier v. State, 185 Idaho
7197, 798-99, 25 P.8d 110, 111-12 (2001), “Un-
like the complaint in an ordinary civil action,

2. When granting the motion, the district court
stated, “Well, I believe it is appropriate for the
Court to take judicial notice of its own files, and
so I will do so in that regard.” The court did not
comply with Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(c),
which states, “A court may take judicial notice,
whether requested or not. When a court takes
judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts

however, an application for post-conviction
relief must contain more than ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim’ that would suf-
fice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).”
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174
P.8d 870, 878 (2007). Rather, Idaho Code
section 19-4903 requires that the petition
shall set forth, separately from other factual
allegations, “{flacts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant,” which shall be
verified, and that “[alffidavits, records, or
other evidence supporting its allegations
shall be attached to the application or the
application shall recite why they are not at-
tached.”

Idaho Code section 19-4906(c) permits ei-
ther party in a post-conviction relief proceed-
ing to file a motion for summary disposition
of the application. The trial court can grant
the motion when “it appears from the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions and agreements of fact, to-
gether with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id.

HH Because a post-conviction relief pro-
ceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, Stwart v. State, 127 Idaho
806, 813, 907 P.2d 788, 790 (1995); LC. § 19-
4907(a), a motion for summary disposition
yaust “state with particularity the grounds
therefor.” Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho
819, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995); L.R.C.P.
1b)(1)(B). “If the notice is sufficient that the
other party cannot assert surprise or preju-
dice, the requirement is met.” DeRushé v.
State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150
(2009).

Tl In this case, McKinney was repre-
sented by counsel. If he contended that the
grounds of the State’s motion to dismiss were
not stated with particularity, he was required
to raise that issue in the trial court, and he
cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.

from the court file in the same or a separate
case, the court shall identify the specific docu-
ments or items that were so noticed.” (Emphasis
added.) Although the court did not identify the
specific documents noticed, McKinney did not
object to its failure to do so, and therefore any
objection to the failure to do so is waived.

Id, at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151. In Kelly v. State,
149 Idaho 517, 286 P.38d 1277 (2010), we
explained what a petitioner for post-convic-
tion relief must do in order to preserve any
issue of lack of particularity.

To properly preserve this issue for ap-
peal, an applicant would merely have to
raise the issue below so that the district
court had an opportunity to rule on it. For
example, where the petitioner for post-
conviction relief receives a motion for sum-
mary dismissal and does not feel that the
motion for summary dismissal and accom-
panying memoranda provides him with suf-
ficient notice of the grounds for summary
dismissal—under the standard established
in DeRushé—he may file a motion with the
district court under I.R.C.P. 7, objecting to
the motion for summary dismissal on the
basis that it fails to provide him with suffi-
cient notice. Likewise, the petitioner could
object to the sufficiency of the notice at the
summary dismissal hearing before the dis-
trict court. Finally, if the district court
grants the State’s motion for summary
dismissal, the petitioner may file an
LR.C.P. 11 motion for reconsideration, cit-
ing to DeRushé and arguing that the
State’s motion and accompanying memo-
randa did not provide sufficient notice.

Id. at 522 ni, 286 P.3d at 1282 n.1. McKin-
ney did not contend in the trial court that the
State’s motion to dismiss failed to state the
grounds of the motion with sufficient particu-
larity.

TM Idaho Code section 19-4906(b) pro-
vides that the court “may indicate to the
parties its intention to dismiss the application
and its reasons for so doing,” but if it does so
“t]he applicant shall be given an opportunity
to reply within 20 days to the proposed dis-
missal.” Therefore, “if the State moves to
dismiss a petition under Idaho Code § 19-
4906(c), the court cannot dismiss a claim on a
ground not asserted by the State in its mo-
tion unless the court gives the twenty-day
notice required by Section 19-4906(b).” De-
Rushé, 146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.8d at 1151.

On appeal, McKinney contends that the
district court erred in dismissing five of his
post-conviction claims on grounds that were
not asserted by the State and that the court

291

did not give him a twenty-day opportunity to
reply to its reasons for dismissing them.
Those claims are labeled by McKinney on
appeal as “Claims 2, 3, 4, 6 & 7.”

Hl Claim No. 2. McKinney asserted as
Claim No. 2:

Whether or not upon re-sentencing, and
pursuant to the binding plea agreement,
the Petitioner was sentenced for “premedi-
tated Murder”, or was the Petitioner sen-
tenced for “First Degree Murder” (Felony
Murder), and to continue to refer to the
sentence and conviction as Premeditated
Murder is not correct and violates Due
Process?

HM In denying that claim, the district
court wrote:

The Petitioner’s claim that he was sen-
tenced for “premeditated murder” as op-
posed to “first degree murder” is a frivo-
lous claim for which relief cannot be
granted, nor does the Petitioner allege any
specific violation of law, error by the
Court or cause of action for which relief
can be granted, as noted by the Court, “it
defies belief that the State would gratu-
itously absolve McKinney of serving any
sentence whatsoever for premeditated
murder.” State v. McKinney, 158 Idaho
837[, 841, 291 P.8d 1036, 1040 n.7 (2018)].

Neither the State nor the district court gave
McKinney notice of this reason for dismissal.
However, that does not require that we auto-
matically vacate the dismissal of this claim.
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.8d
925, 930 (2010).

In Ridgley, the petitioner contended that
he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel when deciding to plead guilty, and he
listed five instances of his counsel's allegedly
deficient performance. Jd. at 675, 227 P.8d at.
929. “The district court's notice stated its
intent to dismiss on the grounds that Ridgley
had presented no evidence supporting his
claims of deficient performance nor evidence
establishing an objective basis from which to
conclude that, but for counsel’s alleged defi-
ciencies, Ridgley would not have pled guilty.”
Id. at 676, 227 P.8d at 930. However, the
district court dismissed the claims on the
ground that “the issues previously presented

292

by Ridgley in support of his motion to with-
draw his plea of guilty could not be reliti-
gated in this post-conviction action,” Id, This
Court held that although the district court,
did not give notice of its intent to dismiss the
claim based upon res judicata, the dismissal
could be upheld on the correct ground that it
was not supported by the evidence, Id, at
676-77, 227 P.8d at 930-81.

In the State’s motion to dismiss, it alleged
that “Petitioner has no evidentiary basis to
support his claims.” The resentencing agree-
ment was attached to the State’s motion to
dismiss. It stated in part:

6. In lieu of appeals to the Ninth Cireuit
Court of Appeals, the parties hereby
stipulate and agree to the following dis-
position for the crime of first-degree
murder in the above-entitled criminal
case pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
LILAC):

a, Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
11(f)(1)(C), the parties stipulate and
agree that McKinney shall be sen-
tenced to a term of fixed life without
the possibility of parole for the crime
of first-degree murder, concurrent
with his sentences for conspiracy to
commit murder, robbery and con-
spiracy to commit robbery;

The transcript of the resentencing hearing
was attached to McKinney's petition for post-
conviction relief, It reflects that in pronounc-
ing sentence, the district court stated that it
was resentencing McKinney for the crime of
murder in the first degree.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. McKinney,
then, pursuant to this plea agreement—or
this sentencing agreement and based on
the record before me, we are resentencing
you on the first-degree murder charge to a
fixed life sentence without the possibility of
parole, That will be consistent—or concur-
rent with the other charges on—the other
original charges, So we will do an amended
judgment of conviction wherein the sen-
tence on the first-degree murder charge

3, When McKinney committed the murder, a
murder “perpetrated by any kind of willful, de-
liberate and premediated killing” was one man-
ner of committing the crime of murder in the
first degree. I.C. § 18-4003(a) (1987). The jury

will be fixed life without the possibility of
parole, All other sentences will remain the
same as previously set out in the original
judgment,

The facts in the record show that McKin-
ney was resentenced for first-degree murder.
There are no facts supporting his assertion
that he was resentenced for premeditated
murder,’ nor are there any facts in the rec-
ord showing that it would violate due process
for some unidentified person to refer to his
sentence and conviction as being for “pre-
meditated murder.”

Although, as stated above, the district
court gave a reason for dismissing this claim
that was not raised by the State, the court
also stated in its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law that “the Petitioner has failed to
alleged [sie] facts supporting the claims in
the application for relief and that no genuine
issue of material fact exists.” In its motion,
the State gave as a ground for dismissal that
“Petitioner has no evidentiary basis to sup-
port his claims.” McKinney has not contend-
ed on appeal that there were facts in the
record supporting this claim. Therefore, the
court did not err in dismissing it on the
ground that there were no facts supporting
the claims in his petition.

Hl Claim No. 3. McKinney asserted as
Claim No. 8:

Whether or not the sentence imposed,
(Whether or not agreed upon by all par-
ties), is illegal, as there was no provision in
the laws, at the time of the commission of
the offenses, for the Court to impose a
“Fixed life” sentence. (The Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to impose such
aterm)[.]

‘Whether McKinney could be resentenced
to a fixed life sentence is an issue of law. The
State’s motion to dismiss did not state any
ground for dismissal that was related to this
claim. In denying this claim, the district
court wrote, “The Petitioner’s claim that the
Court did not have authority to enter a sen-

found McKinney guilty “of first degree murder
(both by premeditated killing and by felony mur-
der).” McKiriney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 698,
992 P,2d 144, 147 (1999).

tence of ‘fixed life sentence’ pursuant to the
plea agreement jointly submitted by the par-
ties has no legal merit. State v. Wilson [,] 107
Idaho 506[, 690 P.2d 1388] (Idaho 1984).”
Thus, the court dismissed this claim for a
reason not asserted by the State. Ordinarily,
this would require that we vacate the dis-
missal of this claim. However, this is a mat-
ter of law on which this Court has already
ruled. Therefore, it would serve no purpose
to vacate the dismissal of this claim.

In State v. Wilson, two brothers commit-
ted a grocery store robbery in February 1981
in which one of them shot and killed the
owner of the store. Jd. at 507, 690 P.2d at
1839; State v. Wilson, 105 Idaho 669, 671, 672
P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1988). They each pled
guilty to murder in the first degree, and each
of them was sentenced to a fixed life term for
murder. Id, On appeal, the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that they could have been sen-
tenced to a fixed term of years less than life
for murder in the first degree, and it vacated
their fixed life sentences on the ground that
the district court had not correctly perceived
its sentencing options. Jd. We granted re-
view, and we reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals and reinstated the fixed life
sentences, We stated, “The decision of the
Court of Appeals, vacating the sentence im-
posed by the district judge on the basis that
a fixed term of years less than life is an
alternative sentence for first degree murder,
is reversed and the sentences imposed by the
trial court are reinstated.” Jd. at 509, 690
P.2d at 1341,

We stated: “Prior to 1977, the single possi-
ble sentence upon conviction for first degree
murder was death. In 1977, the legislature
amended I.C. § 18-4004 to provide that ‘ev-
ery person guilty of murder of the first de-
gree shall be punished by death or by impris-
onment for life.’” Id. at 507-08, 690 P.2d at
1339-40, We then stated that we agreed with
the dissent of Judge Swanstrom of the Court
of Appeals, in which he stated:

“By its 1977 amendment to IC. § 18-4004,

the Legislature said that a person guilty of

first degree murder ‘shall be punished by
death or by imprisonment for life” This
mandatory language is plain and direct. It
deserves to be given literal treatment if

293

the result is reasonable and in harmony
with other statutory provisions on the sub-
ject. It means simply that, if imprisonment
is to be the punishment, the sentence must.
be for life, It may be either a fixed or
indeterminate life sentence.”
Td, at 509, 690 P.2d at 1841 (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added). Idaho Code section
18-4004 was not amended between February
1981, when the two brothers in Wilson com-
mitted their murder, and April 1981, when
McKinney committed the murder that is the
subject of this case. Ch, 282, § 1, 1986 Idaho
Sess. Laws 688, 689. Therefore, a fixed life
sentence could be imposed for the crime of
murder in the first degree at the time
McKinney committed the murder.

In Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, National
Ass’n, 160 Idaho 181, 370 P.8d 384 (2016), the
Houpts filed an action seeking to stop pro-
ceedings to foreclose on their real property,
but when they did so they were not the real
party in interest because they had previously
filed a petition in bankruptey. Jd. at 187, 870
P.8d at 890, However, by the time the case
‘was on appeal, the bankruptcy trustee had
abandoned the estate’s interest in the real
property. Id. We allowed them to proceed
with the appeal because “[rJequiring Houpts
to start over would only result in needless
waste.” Id,

TM Likewise, vacating the dismissal of
McKinney's Claim No. 8 and sending it back
so that the district court could dismiss it
after giving McKinney notice of this Court’s
decision in State v. Wilson would result in
needless waste, “The purpose of the twenty
(20) day notice requirement is to give the
petitioner ‘an opportunity to establish a ma-
terial fact issue” ” Fetterly v. State, 121 Ida-
ho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1078, 1074 (1991). Be-
cause the validity of his fixed life sentence
for murder in the first degree is an issue of
law, there is no issue of fact that MeKinney
could establish regarding this claim, There-
fore, we affirm the dismissal of this claim,

HM Claim No. 4, McKinney asserted
as Claim No, 4 that he had been denied the
effective assistance of counsel because:

Counsel, during the plea negotiations,
which led to the binding plea, and the re-

294

sentencing in this case, informed me that I
would be re-sentenced to first degree mur-
der, (Felony Murder), NOT premeditated
murder;
In its motion to dismiss, the State alleged
that “Petitioner has no evidentiary basis to
support his claims.” In denying this claim,
the district court wrote:

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel for not informing Petition-
er of the charge he was sentenced on
November 18, 2009 fails to allege deficient
conduct by his counsel and asserts no facts
contrary to the record. The Court's collo-
quy specifically told Petitioner the charge
in which he was being sentenced. Petition-
er acknowledged he understood the charge
and his wish to proceed. Petitioner’s claim
also fails to allege how Petitioner has been
prejudiced by his allegation.

As stated above, the transcript of the re-
sentencing hearing shows that McKinney
was resentenced for the crime of murder in
the first degree. The resentencing court oral-
ly pronounced the sentence as follows:

COURT: All right. Mr. McKinney, then,
pursuant to this plea agreement—or this
sentencing agreement and based on the
record before me, we are resentencing you
on the first-degree murder charge to a
fixed life sentence without the possibility of
parole, That will be consistent—or coneur-
rent with the other charges on—the other
original charges. So we will do an amended
judgment of conviction wherein the sen-
tence on the first-degree murder charge
will be fixed life without the possibility of
parole. All other sentences will remain the
same as previously set out in the original
judgment. Do you have any questions
about that?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I under-
stand,

Thus, McKinney was advised by the State
that this claim should be dismissed because it,
‘was not supported by facts in the record. As
the district court held, the facts in the record
do not support McKinney’s Claim No. 4, and
the district court did not err in dismissing
this claim on the ground that it was not
supported by facts in the record. McKinney
has not contended on appeal that the district

court erred in holding that there were no
facts in the record supporting this claim.

HE Claim No. 6. McKinney asserted
as Claim No. 6 that he was denied the effec-
tive assistance of counsel because:

Counsel for the Petitioner failed to rec-
ognize that at the time of the commission
of the offenses Idaho Law provided for the
sentence(s) of Death, or life in prisonment
[sic] for the crime of first degree murder.
(There was no sentence possible for a
“fixed Life Term”, and as such counsel was
ineffective for allowing me to be sentenced
at the time I was re-sentenced, to a term
that the Court lacked statutory authority
to impose.) ]

The State alleged in its motion to dismiss
that “Petitioner has no evidentiary basis to
support his claims.” In denying this claim,
the district court wrote:

Petitioner’s claim regarding his counsel’s
alleged deficient performance regarding
the sentence of a fixed term of life is
without merit, since such an argument is
contrary to law. Furthermore, such an ar-
gument being contrary to law, the absence
of such an argument cannot create preju-
dice to the Petitioner. Strickland v. Wash-
‘ington [,] 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 [80
L.Ed.2d 674] (1984); Mitchell v. State, 182
Idaho 274 [971 P.2d 727] (Idaho, 1998)[.]

In Ridgley, the petitioner claimed that he
was entitled to post-conviction relief because
of his defense counsel’s deficient perform-
ance in connection with the petitioner’s guilty
plea. 148 Idaho at 674, 227 P.8d at 928, The
State moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the petitioner “had presented no
evidence supporting his claims of deficient
performance nor evidence establishing an ob-
jective basis from which to conclude that, but.
for counsel’s alleged deficiencies, Ridgley
would not have pled guilty.” Id. at 676, 227
P.3d at 930, Although the district court dis-
missed it on another ground, we upheld the
dismissal on the ground asserted by the
State—that the petitioner did not present
evidence showing prejudice. We stated as
follows:

Because this Court employs the same stan-

dards on appellate review that the trial

P| 25

court applies in considering summary dis-
missal of a petition for post-conviction re-
lief, if Ridgley failed to provide admissible
evidence supporting these claims, they
were properly dismissed.

We address only the prejudice prong of
the Strickland standard.... In order to
demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner is re-
quired to show that as a result of counsel’s
deficient performance “there is a reason-
able probability that, but for counsel’s er-
rors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” .

In his affidavit filed in response to the
district court’s notice of intent to dismiss,
Ridgley asserted that if post-conviction re-
lief were granted, he would not again plead
guilty but would insist on going to trial
because he is innocent. This assertion is
insufficient to withstand summary dismiss-
al. Nowhere in his petition or his affidavit
does Ridgley attempt to draw a causal
connection between the alleged deficiencies
of his attorney’s performance and his deci-
sion to plead guilty.

Id, at 676-77, 227 P.3d at 930-31.

In this case, the State moved to dismiss on
the ground that there were no facts support-
ing the claim. Nowhere in McKinney's peti-
tion does he state under oath that but for the
alleged error (which as mentioned above was
not error because Idaho law did allow for a
fixed-life sentence for first-degree murder),
he would not have pled guilty. McKinney
does not allege on appeal that there were
facts set forth in his petition supporting this
claim. Therefore, the district court did not
err in dismissing this claim.

HH Claim No. 7. McKinney asserted
as Claim No. 7 that “Counsel failed to consult
Petitioner about appeal.” In his binding sen-
tencing agreement, McKinney agreed to
waive his right to appeal. The binding agree-
ment provided as follows:

6. In lieu of appeals to the Ninth Circuit,

Court of Appeals, the parties hereby stipu-

late and agree to the following disposition

for the crime of first-degree murder in the
above entitled criminal case pursuant to

Idaho Criminal Rule 11()(1)(C):

a. Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
11@)()(C), the parties stipulate and
agree that McKinney shall be sentenced
to a term of fixed life without the possi-
bility of parole for the crime of first-
degree murder, concurrent with his sen-
tences for conspiracy to commit murder,
robbery and conspiracy to commit rob-
bery;

b, The parties agree that pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 11((1)(C) this
Court shall be bound by the parties joint
stipulation that McKinney be sentenced
to a term of fixed life without the possi-
bility of parole for the crime of first-
degree murder, concurrent with his sen-
tences for conspiracy to commit murder,
robbery and conspiracy to commit rob-
bery;

¢. The parties agree not to appeal from
Judge Winmill’s Memorandum Decision
and Order and subsequent Judgment,
which were entered on September 25,
2009.

d. The parties agree to waive comple-
tion of a presentence report prior to
resentencing for the crime of first-de-
gree murder, and

e. Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
11@)@) and State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho
456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994), McKinney spe-
cifically waives and gives up his right to
appeal the new judgment and sentence
imposed by this Court.

f McKinney specifically relieves this
Court from its obligation to notify him of
his appellate rights at resentencing un-
der Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a)(8).

The binding agreement also stated:

11. McKinney acknowledges that Idaho
Appellate Rules, Rules 4 and 11(¢)
provides [sic] him the right to file an
appeal from any new sentence this
Court may impose for first-degree
murder, and understands he is know-
ingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waiving his right to appeal.

12. The parties agree that this agreement
constitutes the entire agreement be-
tween McKinney and the State of
Idaho, and that no other promises or
inducements have been made, either

296

directly or indirectly by the State of
Idaho or any of its agents regarding
the disposition of this case. Addition-
ally, McKinney states that no person
has threatened or coerced him, direct-
ly or indirectly, to enter into this
agreement.

18. Counsel for McKinney specifically
states that she has read this agree-
ment, has read and explained said
agreement to McKinney, and states
that, to the best of her knowledge and
belief, McKinney understands this
agreement.

14. McKinney specifically states that he
has read this agreement, that he has
had this agreement read and ex-
plained to him by his attorney, and
that he understands this agreement.

McKinney signed the binding agreement, as
did both of his attorneys, the prosecuting
attorney, and a deputy attorney general.

At the resentencing hearing, McKinney
agreed that he was waiving his right to ap-
peal the sentence of fixed life for the crime of
murder in the first degree. His dialogue with
the resentencing court was as follows:

THE COURT: We talked about appeal-
ing the decision from the Federal District
Court, That also applies to an appeal on.
this case. So once sentencing is entered on
this particular charge, you’re waiving the
right to appeal this sentence pursuant to
this plea agreement. Do you understand
that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is that something that
you're willing to do?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I’m comfort-
able with that.

In denying this claim, the district court
wrote:

Petitioner’s claim regarding his counsel
failing to advise him regarding the right to
appeal has no basis in fact, and is without
merit, The Court specifically addressed
this issue on the record with Petitioner on
November 18, 2009. Thus, Petitioner has
not offered any facts or allegations con-
trary to the transcript of how this issue
could create prejudice. Strickland v. Wash-

ington [,] 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct, 2052 [80
L.Ed.2d 674] (1984); Mitchell v, State [,]
182 Idaho 274 [971 P.2d 727] (daho,
1998)L.]

Rule 11((1) provides that an agreement.
pursuant to that rule “may include a waiver
of the defendant’s right to appeal the judg-
ment and sentence of the court.” The only
action to be taken by the district court in this
case was resentencing McKinney for the
crime of murder in the first degree. He
waived his right to appeal from the new
sentence imposed by the district court.

HE, “Plea agreements are essentially
bilateral contracts between the prosecutor
and the defendant.” State v, Guess, 154 Idaho
521, 524, 300 P.8d 58, 56 (2018), The State is
bound by a plea agreement, State v. Baker,
156 Idaho 209, 218, 822 P.8d 291, 295 (2014),
and a “defendant is also bound by a plea
agreement,” State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74,
106 P.3d 897, 400 (2005).

TH if a defendant files an appeal and
has waived the right to appeal the only is-
sue(s) that the defendant seeks to raise on
appeal, and that fact is brought to our atten-
tion before oral argument, we will issue an
order conditionally dismissing the appeal in
order to give the defendant an opportunity to
show good cause why the appeal should not
be dismissed. If the defendant cannot do so,
we will dismiss the appeal. See State v. Lun-
dahl, No. 40081-2012 (Idaho Aug. 29, 2012)
(order dismissing appeal because defendant-
appellant waived right to appeal in binding
plea agreement); State v. Franco, No. 35493-
2008 (Idaho April 23, 2009) (order granting
motion to dismiss appeal because defendant-
appellant waived right to appeal in binding
plea agreement); State v. Maddock, No.
35009 (Idaho April 24, 2008) (order granting
motion to dismiss appeal because defendant-
appellant waived right to appeal in binding
plea agreement).

HM If the defendant has challenged the
validity of the waiver of the right to appeal,
we will address that issue and, if it is decided
against the defendant, we will dismiss the
appeal without addressing the other issue(s),
For example, in State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho
456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994), the defendant

waived his right to appeal his judgment and
sentence as part of a plea agreement, and
then appealed, seeking to have this Court
review his sentence. Jd, After rejecting the
defendant’s arguments regarding the validity
of his waiver of his right to appeal, we re-
fused to consider the reasonableness of his
sentence. We held as follows:

We hold that there is no basis for Mur-
phy’s challenge to his waiver of the right to
appeal, and the record reflects that the
waiver was knowingly, voluntarily and in-
telligently entered as a part of his plea
agreement. There is, therefore, no reason
to address his further challenge to the
reasonableness of the sentence imposed,
The appeal is hereby dismissed.

Id, at 457, 872 P.2d at 720.

In its motion to dismiss, the State alleged
that “Petitioner has no evidentiary basis to
support his claims.” McKinney’s binding plea
agreement was in the record, as was the
transcript of his resentencing. He had been
found guilty of murder in the first degree by
a jury, so the only action taken by the dis-
trict court was resentencing McKinney to a
fixed life sentence for that crime, in accor-
dance with the plea agreement. He waived
his right to appeal that sentence. Thus, the
record before the district court showed that
McKinney had waived his right to appeal the
only issue that could be appealed—the sen-
tence imposed in his resentencing. In his
petition for post-conviction relief, McKinney
did not allege any facts that would challenge
the validity of his waiver of the right to
appeal.

HH “A defendant claiming ineffective as-
sistance of counsel must show (1) that coun-
sel’s representation ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) that
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced
the defendant.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
US. 470, 476-77, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1084, 145
L.Ed.2d 985, 994-95 (2000) (citations omit-
ted). In Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court
addressed the obligation of an attorney to
consult with the attorney’s client regarding
an appeal, .

‘With respect to the first prong necessary
to show ineffective assistance of counsel, the
Court “reject[ed] a bright-line rule that coun-

297

sel must always consult with the defendant
regarding an appeal.” Jd. at 480, 120 S.Ct. at
1036, 145 L.Ed.2d at 996-97. The Court stat-
ed,

We instead hold that counsel has a con-
stitutionally imposed duty to consult with
the defendant about an appeal when there
is reason to think either (1) that a rational
defendant would want to appeal (for exam-
ple, because there are nonfrivolous
grounds for appeal), or (2) that this partic-
ular defendant reasonably demonstrated to
counsel that he was interested in appeal-
ing. In making this determination, courts
must take into account all the information
counsel knew or should have known.

Id. The Court also stated, “Even in cases
when the defendant pleads guilty, the court
must consider such factors as whether the
defendant received the sentence bargained
for as part of the plea and whether the plea
expressly reserved or waived some or all
appeal rights.” Id.

In this case, McKinney received the exact
sentence he bargained for and expressly
waived his right to appeal that sentence. The
only assertion in his petition for post-convic-
tion relief is that “Counsel failed to consult
Petitioner about appeal.” This bare assertion
is insufficient to show that his counsel’s rep-
resentation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.

With respect to the second prong neces-
sary to show ineffective assistance of counsel,
the Supreme Court also rejected a bright-
line test that there is per se prejudice when
counsel fails to consult with a client regard-
ing an appeal. Jd. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1088-
89, 145 L.Ed.2d at 999-1000, The Court held
that “to show prejudice in these circum-
stances, a defendant must demonstrate that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him
about an appeal, he would have timely ap-
pealed.” Id. In this case, McKinney’s petition
does not contain any allegation that had his
counsel consulted with him regarding an ap-
peal, he would have timely appealed,

Thus, McKinney’s petition for post-convic-
tion relief did not allege any facts that would
support a claim of ineffective assistance of

298 Le

counsel based upon his counsel's alleged fail-
ure to consult with him regarding an appeal.
The district court did not err in dismissing

this claim. |
m. |
Conclusion. |
We affirm the judgment of the district
court.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY concur.

396 P.3d 1180
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Sonnie FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 43946

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Idaho Falls, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 20, 2017

Erie D, Fredericksen, Idaho State Appel-
late Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Sally J. Cooley, Deputy Appellate Public De-
fender argued.

Hon Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K.
Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General argued.

299

BURDICK, Chief Justice,

Sonnie Flores appeals from the Twin Falls
County district court’s orders relinquishing
jurisdiction and declining to reinstate juris-
diction, We affirm.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In September 2012, the State charged
Flores with one felony count of eluding a
peace officer. Flores pled guilty to the
charge. The district court described the sub-
sequent proceedings as follows:

On 01/14/18, a Judgment of Conviction
was entered in the case against the defen-
dant, The sentence imposed consisted of a
5-year unified sentence, comprised of a 8-
year determinate period of confinement,
followed by a 2-year indeterminate period
of confinement. However, the execution of
said sentence was suspended and the de-
fendant was placed on probation for a peri-
od of 4 years. On 01/20/15, this probation
was revoked and the original sentence was
reinstated. However, the execution of that.
sentence was again suspended and the de-
fendant was again placed on probation for
a period of 2 years. On 08/07/15, this pro-
bation was revoked and the original sen-
tence was reinstated. However, pursuant
to L.C. § 19-2601(4), the Court suspended
the execution of the judgment during the
first three hundred sixty-five (865) days of
the sentence to the custody of the Idaho
State Board of Correction, during which
time the Court retained jurisdiction over
the defendant.

Roughly four months after the district
court retained jurisdiction on August 7, 2015,
the North Idaho Correctional Institution
(NICI) filed an addendum to the presentence
investigation report (NICI’s report) as per-
mitted by Idaho Code section 19-2601(4).
NICI’s report informed the district court
that NICI had classified Flores as a security
risk and removed him from the NICI facility.
NICI’s report detailed Flores’s misconduct
and gang-oriented behavior and recom-
mended that the district court relinquish ju-
risdiction. The district court summarized
NICI’s report as follows:

[NICI’s] report describes how FLORES
created and possessed gang related items

300

and drawings and was actively involved in
workouts that were aimed at encouraging
and enforcing gang hierarchy and behav-
ior. He was also closely associated with
inmates who were instrumental in planning
and carrying out a disciplinary assault and
battery on another inmate, Additionally,
FLORES was found to have used the PIN
numbers of nine other offenders to make
personal phone calls. Overall, NICI staff
has concluded that FLORES poses a secu-
rity risk to the program and that there-
fore, the court should relinquish jurisdic-
tion,

The district court followed NICI’s recom-
mendation and relinquished jurisdiction on
December 15, 2015. On December 80, 2015,
Flores moved the district court to reinstate
jurisdiction so that he could complete his
retained jurisdiction program. The district
court denied Flores’s motion. Flores timely
appeals.

IL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err by relin-
quishing jurisdiction over Flores?
2, Did the district court err by denying
Flores’s motion to reconsider?

il. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not err by relin-
quishing jurisdiction over Flores,

HM “IWie review a decision to relin-
quish jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.”
State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166, 296
P.8d 871, 372 (2018), To determine whether
the district court abused its discretion, we
examine whether the district court: (1) cor-
rectly perceived the issue as discretionary;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
diseretion and consistently with relevant le-
gal standards; and (8) reached its decision by
an exercise of reason. Swallow v, Emergency
Med. of Idaho, P.A., 188 Idaho 589, 592, 67
P.8d 68, 71 (2003).

Hl We find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdic-
tion, After recognizing the issue as discre-
tionary, the district court cited several rele-
vant cases for the governing law. It then
found it proper to relinquish jurisdiction, rea-
soning that Flores had

ereated and possessed gang related items
and drawings and was actively involved in
workouts that were aimed at encouraging
and enforcing gang hierarchy and behav-
ior, He was also closely associated with
inmates who were instrumental in planning
and carrying out a disciplinary assault and
battery on another inmate. Additionally,

FLORES was found to have used the PIN

numbers of nine other offenders to make

personal phone calls.

The record supports the district court’s
findings. The district court primarily relied
on NICI’s report. NICI’s report discusses
Flores’s misconduct and gang-oriented be-
havior. His misconduct included (1) unautho-
rized transfer of property; (2) failing to be
inspection ready; (8) showering outside au-
thorized times; (4) foul language; and (6)
horseplay. His gang-oriented behavior in-
cluded (1) participating in workouts struc-
tured to enforce gang hierarchy; (2) associat-
ing with inmates who assaulted and battered
another inmate; and (8) possessing items in-
dicating gang affiliation. Based on Flores’s
misconduct and gang-oriented behavior,
NICI classified Flores as a security risk and
removed him from the facility. Granted,
NICI’s report noted that Flores began his
retained jurisdiction program with a “promis-
ing start” and commended him for his (1)
“willingness to change his criminal thinking
and behavior’; (2) “progress on his assign-
ments and beginning to speak up in classes”;
and (8) “desire to end his active addiction to
Methamphetamine.” NICI’s report also stat-
ed that, while Flores “is a poor candidate for
probation at this time[,].... given another
opportunity at treatment in a secure facility,
he may finish his ‘Rider’ and be a successful
candidate for probation.”

Even so, we find no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s decision to relinquish ju-
risdiction. These successes all center on
Flores’s conduct at NICI. But as we have
explained previously, “{glood performance at
NICI, though commendable, does not alone
create an abuse of discretion in the district
judge’s decision not to place the defendant on
probation or reduce the sentence.” State v.
Station, 186 Idaho 135, 187, 80 P.8d 290, 292
(2001), Thus, the district court did not err by
relinquishing jurisdiction.

B. The district court did not err by deny-
ing Flores’s motion to reconsider.

TM Flores next contends the district
eourt erred by denying his motion to recon-
sider in which he requested the district court
to reinstate jurisdiction. Idaho Code section
19-2601(4) governs retained jurisdiction and
provides:

‘Whenever any person shall have been
convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any
district court of the state of Idaho, of or to
any crime against the laws of the state,
except those of treason or murder, the
court in its discretion may:

Suspend the execution of the judgment
at any time during the first three hundred
sixty-five (865) days of a sentence to the
custody of the state board of correction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction over the
prisoner for a period of up to the first
three hundred sixty-five (865) days. Except
as provided for in section 19-2601A, Idaho
Code, during the period of retained juris-
diction, the state board of correction shall
be responsible for determining the place-
ment of the prisoner and such education,
programming and treatment as it deter-
mines to be appropriate. The prisoner will
yemain committed to the board of correc-
tion if not affirmatively placed on proba-
tion by the court. In extraordinary cireum-
stances, where the court concludes that it
is unable to obtain and evaluate the rele-
vant information within the period of re-
tained jurisdiction, or where the court con-
cludes that a hearing is required and is
unable to obtain the defendant’s presence
for such a hearing within such period, the
court may decide whether to place the
defendant on probation or release jurisdic-
tion within a reasonable time, not to ex-
ceed thirty (80) days, after the period of
retained jurisdiction has expired. Place-
ment on probation shall be under such
terms and conditions as the court deems
necessary and appropriate. The court in its
diseretion may sentence a defendant to
more than one (1) period of retained juris-
diction after a defendant has been placed
on probation in a case or following release
from commitment to the department of

301

juvenile corrections pursuant to section 19-
2601A, Idaho Code. In no case shall the
board of correction or its agent, the de-
partment of correction, be required to hold
a hearing of any kind with respect to a
recommendation to the court for the grant
or denial of probation. Probation is a mat-
ter left to the sound discretion of the court.
Any recommendation made by the state
board of correction to the court regarding
the prisoner shall be in the nature of an
addendum to the presentence report, The
board of correction and its agency, the
department of correction, and their em-
ployees shall not’ be held financially re-
sponsible for damages, injunctive or de-
claratory relief for any recommendation
made to the district court under this sec-
tion,

HE “The interpretation of a statute is a
question of law that the Supreme Court re-
views de novo.” Hayes v. City of Plummer,
159 Idaho 168, 170, 857 P.8d 1276, 1278
(2015). Statutory interpretation begins with
the statute’s plain language. State v, Bur-
wight, 182 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219
(1999). That language “is to be given its
plain, obvious and rational meaning.” Jd. If
that language is clear and unambiguous, “the
Court need merely apply the statute without
engaging in any statutory construction.” Id,

In this case, the district court relinquished
jurisdiction on December 15, 2015. Flores
filed a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 85
on December 30, 2015, asking the district
court to reinstate jurisdiction, He asserted
that the district court could reinstate juris-
diction, notwithstanding that jurisdiction had
already been relinquished, because the dis-
trict court’s order, on August 7, 2015, in-
structed that it would retain jurisdiction for
865 days. The district court disagreed, con-
eluding it could not reinstate jurisdiction.
The district court was correct.

We first observe that Flores’s motion was
filed under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 as a
motion to reconsider, However, Rule 85 does
not create a general basis for requesting
reconsideration of an order or a judgment in
the criminal context. Rule 85 instead narrow-
ly operates to permit the correction, modifi-
cation, or reduction of criminal sentences in
certain instances. Flores’s request for juris-
diction to be reinstated does not constitute a

302

correction, modification, or reduction of a
criminal sentence. Thus, Rule 35 is inapplica-
ble here.

Not only is Rule 35 inapplicable, but so too
is Idaho Code section 19-2601(4). The plain
terms of the statute preclude the district
court from reinstating jurisdiction in this
case. Indeed, section 19-2601(4) provides that
“[tJhe prisoner will remain committed to the
board of correction if not affirmatively
placed on probation by the court.” (emphases
added). Flores’s request further conflicts
with the statute’s sole reference to additional
periods of retained jurisdiction, which is that
a district court may order additional periods
of retained jurisdiction only “after a defen-
dant has been placed on probation[.]” I.C.
§ 19-2601(4). Flores acknowledges this re-
quirement, but emphasizes how the district
court retained jurisdiction for 365 days on
August 7, 2015, and relinquished jurisdiction
on December 15, 2015, He therefore main-
tains that he was not requesting an addition-
al period of retained jurisdiction, but only
“another chance” at his initial period of re-
tained jurisdiction. Flores, however, over-
looks that section 19-2601(4) allows jurisdic-
tion to be retained for “a period of up to the
first three hundred sixty-five (865) days.”
(emphasis added). And during the period of
retained jurisdiction, the district court has
discretion to relinquish jurisdiction at any
time. See, eg., State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho
724, 7129, 816 P.3d 640, 645 (2018); State v.
Coassolo, 186 Idaho 188, 148, 80 P.8d 298,
298 (2001). Since jurisdiction was relin-
quished in this case, Flores’s request
amounts to a request for an additional period
of retained jurisdiction precluded by section
19-2601(4).

HM Accordingly, section 19-2601(4), which
governs retained jurisdiction, does not au-
thorize what Flores has requested, This is
critical because, in the sentencing context,
“felxcept in matters where the court has
inherent power ... the sentencing court has

1. In fact, there is no criminal procedural rule
that provides a basis to reconsider a decision of
this kind, The Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure
have nothing similar to Idaho Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 11.2(6)(1).

2. Because we affirm on this basis, we need not
reach Flores’s argument that the district court

only the authority granted by the legisla-
ture.” State v. Funk, 128 Idaho 967, 969, 855
P.2d 52, 54 (1998); see also Idaho Const. art.
V, § 2 (The jurisdiction of such inferior
courts shall be as prescribed by the legisla-
ture.”). We conclude that the district court
properly denied Flores’s motion to reconsid-
er?

IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the orders of the district court.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and SIMPSON, J., Pro Tem concur.

396 P.3d 1184
The CITY OF BLACKFOOT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

Gary SPACKMAN, in his capacity as Di-
rector of the Idaho Department of Wa-
ter Resources, and the Idaho Depart-
ment of Water Resources, Respondent-
Respondent on Appeal,

and

A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation
District, Milner Irrigation District,
American Falls Irrigation District #2,
Minidoka Irrigation District, North Side
Canal Company, Twin Falls Canal Com-
pany, Intervenors-Respondents.

In the Matter of Application for Permit.
No. 27-12261, In the name of the
City of Blackfoot.

Docket No, 44207

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Twin Falls, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 20, 2017

abused its discretion by denying his motion to
reconsider on the merits, The district court never
reached the merits Flores's motion to reconsider.
Instead, as a threshold matter, the district court
held, and we now affirm, that it could not rein-
state jurisdiction in this case.

304

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC,
Blackfoot, for appellants, Robert L. Harris
argued,

Garrick L, Baxter, Idaho Department of
Water Resources, Boise, argued for respon-
dent Spackman,

Barker, Rosholt & Simpson, LLP, Twin
Falls, for respondents A & B Irrigation Dis-
trict, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irri-
gation District, North Side Canal Company
and Twin Falls Canal Company. Travis L.
Thompson argued,

Fletcher Law Office, Burley, for respon-
dents American Falls Irrigation District #2
and Minidoka Irrigation District.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

The Bingham County District Court af-
firmed a ruling by the Idaho Department of
‘Water Resources (IDWR or Department) de-
nying the City of Blackfoot’s (City) applica-
tion for a water right, Application for Permit
No, 27-12261 (12261), to be offset by mitiga-
tion through another water right, Water
Right No. 01-181C (181C). The district court
ruled that the Department was correct in
ruling that 181C could not be used for
groundwater recharge without an approved
transfer application and could not be used as
mitigation for 12261 until such transfer was
approved, The City appeals and we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The City currently pumps water from the
Blackfoot River and delivers it to irrigators
east of I-15. Due to the cost of operating and
maintaining the pump, the City filed 12261 to
appropriate 9.71 efs of groundwater. This

groundwater, in place of the surface water
from the Blackfoot River, would then be
delivered to the irrigators east of I-15. To
offset the injury resulting from the appropri-
ation, the City wishes to use 1,066 afa of
mitigation credit resulting from seepage that
occurs under 181C.

Under its purpose of use element, 181C
allows for five different uses: Irrigation
Storage, Irrigation from Storage, Diversion
to Storage, Recreation Storage, and Inviga-
tion. This allows the City, during the irriga-
tion season, to divert 2,466.80 afa from the
Snake River to fill a recreation reservoir in
Jensen’s Grove. Of that diversion, 1,100 acre
feet are allocated to remain in the reservoir
for recreation storage, 980.9 acre feet seep
into the aquifer, and 186 acre feet are lost
to evaporation. At the end of the season,
the remaining 1,100 acre feet are left to
seep into the aquifer. The other provisions
element of 181C states that the use and di-
version of water is subject to “additional
conditions and limitations contained in a set-
tlement agreement—IDWR transfer of wa-
ter right, Transfer no, 72385, date June
2006....” (Settlement Agreement). The Set-
tlement Agreement, among others things,
states the City “must file the appropriate
application for permit and/or transfer” if it
wishes to use 181C for groundwater re-
charge or mitigation purposes. In its appli-
cation for 12261, the City proposed using
part of the seepage described in 181C as
mitigation for 122611

The City’s application for 12261 was pro-
tested by the Coalition.? In its protest, the
Coalition asserted that the City failed to
establish that 12261 would not reduce the
quantity of water under existing rights. After
holding an administrative hearing, the hear-
ing officer determined that that the proposed
appropriation in 12261 was a consumptive
use of water and, without mitigation, would
reduce the quantity of water under existing
vights, The hearing officer also concluded
that 181C does not authorize the City to use
the seepage described in 1810 for recharge
1, The City also seeks mitigation credit from the

non-use of Blackfoot River water rights, which
are not subject to this action.

2. “Coalition” refers collectively to the A&B Irri-
gation District, Burley Irrigation District, Ameri-

305

and therefore the City could not use 1810 as
mitigation for 12261. However, the hearing
officer approved 12261 on the condition that
the City successfully apply for a transfer to
add recharge as an authorized purpose of use
for 1810.

The City filed exceptions to the hearing
officer’s rulings, challenging, among other
things, the requirement that it needs to ap-
ply for a transfer to add recharge as a pur-
pose of use before it can use 181C for miti-
gation, The Director of the Department
@irector) reviewed the City’s exceptions
and agreed with the hearing officer that
181C does not authorize the City to use
water for recharge and a transfer would be
required to authorize such use. However,
the Director disagreed with the hearing of-
ficer’s grant of conditional approval and de-
nied the application for 12261 without prej-
udice, suggesting the City could refile its
application for 12261 in conjunction with a
transfer application for 181C.

Following the Director’s order, the City
filed a petition with the district court assert-
ing that the Director's ruling was contrary to
law. After permitting the Coalition to appear
as intervenors, a hearing was held on the
City’s petition. The district court found the
plain unambiguous language of 181C’s pur-
pose of use element does not authorize the
City to use water for recharge and if the City
wanted to use 181C as mitigation for 12261 it
would have to file a transfer. The City ap-
peals the district court’s ruling.

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMM When reviewing the decision of a
district court acting in its appellate capacity
under the Idaho Administrative Procedure
Act, “‘we review the decision of the district
court to determine whether it correctly de-
cided the issues presented to it” However,
we review the agency record independently
of the district court’s decision.” Rangen, Inc.
v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 160 Idaho 251,

can Falls Reservoir District #2, Minidoka Irriga-
tion District, Milner Irrigation District, North
Side Canal Company, and Twin Falls Canal
Company.

306

255, 871 P.3d 805, 309 (2016) (quoting Clear
Springs Foods v. Spackmam, 150 Idaho 790,
797, 252 P.8d 71, 78 2011)). Furthermore,
“the agency’s factual determinations are
binding on the reviewing court, even when
there is conflicting evidence before the agen-
ey, so long as the determinations are sup-
ported by substantial competent evidence in
the record.” Id. (quoting A & B Irrigation
Dist, v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 158 Idaho
500, 505~06, 284 P.8d 225, 280-81 (2012)). We
review questions of Jaw de novo. Vickers vu.
Lowe, 150 Idaho 489, 442, 247 P.8d 666, 669
(2011).

When the agency was required by the
provisions of this chapter or by other pro-
visions of law to issue an order, the court
shall affirm the agency action unless the
court finds that the agency’s findings, in-
ferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statu-
tory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of
the agency;

(© made upon unlawful procedure;

(@) not supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole; or

(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall
be set aside, in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings as nec-
essary.

LC. § 67-5279(8).

Even if one of these conditions is met,
this Court will still affirm the agency ac-
tion “unless substantial rights of the appel-
lant have been prejudiced.” I.C. § 67-
5279(4)

A&B Irrigation Dist., 158 Idaho at 506, 284
P.8d at 281,

IIL ANALYSIS

The City raises multiple issues on appeal.
However, the wellspring of the City’s issues
is whether the district court erred in affirm-

3. Idaho Code sections 42-1411(2)-(3) reads:

(2) The director shall determine the follow-
ing elements, to the extent the director deems
appropriate and proper, to define and adminis-
ter the water rights acquired under state law:

ing the Director’s ruling that the City may
not use 181C for mitigation or recharge un-
less it first files for a transfer. We address
this issue first.

A. Whether the City must file for a trans-
fer before it can use 181C for mitiga-
tion or recharge.

HN When interpreting a water decree
this Court utilizes the same rules of interpre-
tation applicable to contracts, Jd., 158 Idaho
at 528, 284 P.3d at 248. If a decree’s terms
are unambiguous, this Court will determine
the meaning and legal effect of the decree
from the plain and ordinary meaning of its
words. Cf Sky Canyon Props., LLC v. Golf
Club at Black Rock, LLC, 155 Idaho 604, 606,
815 P.8d 792, 794 (2018) (“If a contract's
terms are clear and unambiguous, the con-
tract’s meaning and legal effect are questions
of law to be determined from the plain mean-
ing of its own words.”). A decree is ambigu-
ous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretations. Cf Huber v. Lightforce USA,
Inc, 159 Idaho 838, 850, 367 P.3d 228, 245
(2016) (“Where terms of a contract are ‘rea-
sonably subject to differing interpretations,
the language is ambiguous....’” (quoting
Clark v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co.,
188 Idaho 588, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2008))).
Whether ambiguity exists in a decree “is a
question of law, over which this Court exer-
cises free review.” Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho
Dep't of Water Res,, 159 Idaho 798, 807, 367
P.8d 198, 202 (2016) (quoting Knipe Land Co.
v, Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P.3d
595, 601 (2011)).

I Water rights are defined by elements.
See 1.0. §§ 42-1411(); see also City of Poca-
tello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 889, 275 P.8d
845, 854 (2012) (“The elements listed [in sec-
tion 42-1411(2)] describe the basic elements
of a water right.”); Olson v. Idaho Dep't of
Water Res., 105 Idaho 98, 101, 666 P.2d 188,
191 (1988), Idaho Code sections 42-1411(2)
and 42-1411(8) comprise a list of elements
that define a water right.? Under Idaho Code

(a) the name and address of the claimant;

(b) the source of water;

(c) the quantity of water used describing the
rate of water diversion or, in the case of an
instream flow right, the rate of water flow in

section 42-1412(6), a water decree “shall con-
tain or incorporate a statement of each ele-
ment of a water right as stated in subsections
(2) and (8) of section 42-1411, Idaho Code, as
applicable.” Purpose of use is one of those
defining elements, I.C, § 42-1411@)(). Thus,
a water decree must either contain a state-
ment of purpose of use or incorporate one,
but not both. Markel Int'l Ins. Co. Ltd. v.
EBrekson, 153 Idaho 107, 110, 279 P.8d 98, 96
(2012) (“The word ‘or’ ... is ‘[a] disjunctive
particle used to express an alternative or to
give a choice of one among two or more
things.’”); In ve Snook, 94 Idaho 904, 906,
499 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1972) (“The word ‘or’

. is given its normal disjunctive meaning
that marks an alternative generally corre-
sponding to ‘either’....”).

MM Here, there is no reference to an
incorporated statement in the purpose of use
element; rather, the element contains a clear
statement that plainly provides water may be
used for: (1) Irrigation Storage; (2) Irrigation
from Storage; (8) Diversion to Storage; (4)
Reereation Storage; and (5) Irrigation. No
ambiguity lurks in this element. It clearly
lists five uses and recharge is not one of
them.

The City attempts to argue that recharge,
although not contained in the purpose of use
element, is an authorized use of 181C. How-
ever, recharge is a statutorily recognized
beneficial use. IC. § 42-284(2). As such, it
must be included in the purpose of use ele-
ment before a water right may be used for
recharge. See I.C. §§ 42-14112)(, -1412(6),
And as noted above, recharge is simply not
included in 181C’s purpose of use element.

cubic feet per second or annual volume of
diversion of water for use or storage in acre-
feet per year as necessary for the proper ad-
ministration of the water right;

@ the date of priority;

(©) the legal description of the point(s) of di-
version; if the claim is for an instream flow,
then a legal description of the beginning and
ending points of the claimed instream flow;
@. the purpose of use;

(g) the period of the year when water is used
for such purposes;

(h) a legal description of the place of use; if
one (1) of the purposes of use is irrigation,
then the number of irrigated acres within each
forty (40) acre subdivision, except that the
place of use may be described using a general

307

The City’s attempt to argue otherwise is
nothing more than an impermissible collater-
al attack on the partial decree, As the district
court stated:

If the City believed recharge should be
authorized under water right 01-181C, this
proceeding is not the proper time or place
to raise that argument. Some history is
relevant here. Water right 01-181C was
acquired by the City in 2005 to fill and
maintain the reservoir at Jensen Grove. It
was purchased from the New Sweden Irri-
gation District, which used the right for
irrigation purposes. To change the nature
of use to accommodate Jensen Grove, the
City filed an application for transfer with
the Department, In addition to irrigation,
it sought to add “recreation,” “storage”
and “recharge” as authorized uses under
the right. The Coalition initially protested
the transfer, but ultimately withdrew that
protest pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment. On February 14, 2007, the Director
approved the City’s transfer for the follow-
ing purposes of use: [ (1) Irrigation Stor-
age; (2) Irrigation from Storage; (3) Diver-
sion to Storage; (4) Recreation Storage;
and (6) Irrigation]

Notably, he did not approve the City’s
request to add recharge as an authorized
purpose of use. In fact, recharge was delib-
erately withheld from the approved trans-
fer. If the City believed the Director erred
in this respect, it was required to timely
exhaust its administrative remedies and, if
necessary, seek judicial review. It did nei-
ther.

description in the manner provided under sec-
tion 42-219, Idaho Code, which may consist of
a digital boundary as defined in section 42-
202B, Idaho Code, if the irrigation project
would qualify to be so described under section
42-219, Idaho Code;

(@_ conditions on the exercise of any water
right included in any decree, license, or ap-
proved transfer application; and

@) such remarks and other matters as are
necessary for definition of the right, for clarifi-
cation of any element of a right, or for admin-
istration of the right by the director.

(3) The director may include such general
provisions in the director's report, as the di-
rector deems appropriate and proper, to define
and to administer al] water rights.

308

Then, on May 29, 2009, the SRBA Dis-
trict Court entered a Partial Decree for
the right in the Snake River Basin Adjudi-
cation, When the Director issued his rec-
ommendation for the right, he did not ree-
ommend a recharge purpose of use. If the
City believed it was authorized to divert
water for recharge, it had a duty to timely
object to the Director’s recommendation
and present evidence to rebut the same in
the SRBA. It did not, The SRBA District
Court proceeded to enter a Partial Decree
for the right consistent with the Director's
recommendation. The uses of water au-
thorized under the Decree are ascertain-
able from a simple reading of the purpose
of use element. They did not include re-
charge. If the City believed the Court
erred in failing to identify recharge as an
authorized purpose of use, it was required
to timely appeal. It is inappropriate to now
argue, in the context of this judicial review
proceeding, that the Partial Decree issued
for 01-181C authorizes a use of water not
identified in the purpose of use element of
that Decree,

(citations omitted).

By statute, “decree[s] entered in a general
adjudication shall be conclusive as to the
nature and extent of all water rights in the
adjudicated water system.” I.C, § 42-1420(1);
see also State v, Nelson, 181 Idaho 12, 16,
951 P.2d 948, 947 (1998) (“Finality in water
rights is essential.”), Thus, as the district
court stated, if the City believed recharge
was authorized under 181C, it should have
appealed the Director's original decision not
to include recharge as purpose of use and
appealed the partial decree when it was first
issued by the district court. Rangen, Inc,
159 Idaho at 806, 867 P.3d at 201.

HM There is no question that an applica-
tion for transfer is required to change the
purpose or nature of use of a water right,
LC. § 42-222(1) (“Any person ... who shall
desire to change the ... nature of use of all
or part of the water, under the right shall
first make application to the department of
water resources for approval of such
change.”); see also City of Pocatello, 152
Idaho at 889, 275 P.8d at 854, Furthermore,
it is equally clear from the plain language of

the decree that recharge is not listed as an
authorized use under the purpose of use ele-
ment of 1810. Claiming, at this stage, that
recharge is an authorized use of 181C, is
nothing more than an impermissible collater-
al attack on the partial decree, Allowing the
City “to collaterally attack this determination
would severely undermine the purpose of the
SRBA and create uncertainty in water rights
adjudicated in that process.” Idaho Ground
Water Assoc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res.,
160 Idaho 119, 128, 369 P.38d 897, 906 (2016).
As we recently stated in Rangen, Inc., “[alny
interpretation of [the] partial decree [] that
is inconsistent with the [] plain language
would necessarily impact the certainty and
finality of SRBA judgments and, therefore,
requests for such interpretations needed to
be made in the SRBA itself.” 159 Idaho at
806, 867 P.8d at 201. Here, no such request
was made,

The City attempts to circumvent this fact
by arguing that it is disputing the Director’s
and district court’s interpretation of the par-
tial decree and not the decree itself. The City
argues the partial decree itself is sound and
clearly authorizes recharge as a purpose of
use, but the Director and district court erred
by not correctly interpreting the decree. Spe-
cifically, the City argues: (1) the Settlement
Agreement contemplates recharge as a use
and therefore enlarges the purposes of use
element to include recharge as a purpose of
use; and (2) regardless of the elements of
181C, the actual circumstances of 181C dem-
onstrate that 181C provides mitigation for
12261. These arguments, however, are mis-
placed.

1, Whether the Settlement Agreement
adds yecharge as an authorized use of
water under 181C.

Hs The City argues that the plain
language of paragraph Le of the Settlement
Agreement permits the City “to use 1810 for
groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes
associated with future groundwater
rights....” This argument fails, A private
settlement agreement cannot define, add, or
subtract from the elements of a validly adju-
dicated water right; it can only limit, condi-
tion, or clarify the administration of the right

as between the private parties to the agree-
ment,

One of the purposes of the water right
adjudication statutes is “to establish, through
an adjudication a uniform description for sur-
face water rights, ground water rights and
water rights.” I.C. § 42-1427(1)(a). “It is im-
portant that the elements of a water right be
standardized to allow for a fair and efficient
administration of the limited water supply”
Id. To this end, the district court adjudicat-
ing the water right is required to issue a
decree that “shall contain or incorporate a
statement of each element of a water right as
stated in subsections (2) and (8) of section 42-
1411, Idaho Code, as applicable.” 1.C. § 42-
1412(6). These elements are separate and
distinct elements that, when combined, make
up the water right. City of Pocatello, 152
Idaho at 889, 275 P.3d at 854, The adjudica-
tion statutes require distinct definition state-
ments for each separate element, § 14-
141266) (“The decree shall contain or incorpo-
rate a statement of each element of a water
right....” (emphasis added),

The City asserts, however, that the Settle-
ment Agreement, as a document incorporat-
ed under the other provisions element of
181C, must be “construed along with the rest
of 181C” and may affect all the elements of
181C and, specifically, may add recharge to
the purpose of use element, This argument
falls short in two aspects, First, it flies in the
face of section 42-1412(6), which only allows
an element to either contain a statement
defining the element or incorporate a state-
ment that defines the element. The City’s
argument, by allowing a document incorpo-
rated under the other provisions element to
add a use to those already contained in the
purpose of use element, would allow both.
Not only is this prohibited under the lan-
guage of 42-1412(6), see supra (discussing the
requirement that a decree either contain or
incorporate a statement of each element, but
not both), it would impermissibly muddy the
decree. Rangen, Inc., 159 Idaho at 808, 867
P.8d at 208 (noting that adopting a perspec-
tive that would render a “partial decree less,
rather than more, clear” is disfavored).

HH Sccond, an adjudicated water right
is a judicially decreed property right. Clear

309

Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho
790, 797, 252 P.8d 71, 78 (2011) (“When one
has legally acquired a water right, he has a
property right....” (quoting Bennett v.
Twin Falls North Side Land & Water Co., 27
Idaho 648, 651, 150 P. 886, 889 (1915))). It is
binding on the IDWR, indeed the Director
has a “ ‘clear legal duty’ to distribute water”
according to decreed water rights. In re
SRBA, 157 Idaho 385, 398, 886 P.3d 792, 300
(2014); see also Musser v. Higginson, 125
Idaho 392, 895-96, 871 P.2d 809, 812-13
(1994) (holding that mandamus was appropri-
ate to require the director to deliver the full
decreed water rights of a water right holder),
abrogated on other grounds by Rincover v.
State, Dep’t of Fin, Sec. Bureau, 182 Idaho
547, 976 P.2d 478 (1999). In contrast, the
Settlement Agreement is a private agree-
ment between private parties. IDWR is not a
party to the Settlement Agreement. As such,
the Director is not bound by the Settlement
Agreement and has no duty to enforce the
Settlement Agreement. This is made clear by
the language incorporating the Settlement
Agreement into the other provisions element
of 181C: “The diversion and use of water
under transfer 72885 is subject to additional
conditions and limitations contained in a set-
tlement agreement, .,. the settlement agree-
ment is recorded in Bingham county [] and
Bonneville county [] and is enforceable by
the parties thereto,” Consequently, the Set-
tlement Agreement cannot define, add, or
subtract from the defining elements of 1810.
It is limited to providing “additional condi-
tions and limitations” on the exercise of
181C, To allow the Settlement Agreement to
enlarge or otherwise alter the clearly de-
creed elements of 181C, would allow private
parties to alter. a judicial decree, Such a
result is simply untenable. Cf Borley v
Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 177, 288 P.8d 102, 108
(2010) (“An important principle drives this
holding—private stipulations cannot circum-
vent court orders,”),

2, Whether regardless of the elements of
181C, the actual circumstances of 181C
demonstrate that it provides mitigation
for 12261,

The City argues that regardless of the

elements of 1810, it may be used as mitiga-

310

tion for 12261 because “[tJhere is no factual
dispute that 2,080.8 AF of water seeps from
Jensen’s Grove into the ESPA each year.”
Thus, because it is undisputed that this
“seepage” occurs, the City argues it can use
the seepage as mitigation, even if recharge is
not listed as an authorized use of 181C and
without filing a transfer.

HI Recharge, however, is a statutorily
recognized beneficial use. IC, § 42-234(2).
Uses must be identified under the purpose of
use element of a water right. IC. §§ 42-
14112), -1412(6). Here, 1810's purpose of
use element does not contain recharge as a
beneficial use. Thus, the undisputed seepage
that occurs “from the diversion and use of
[181C] for [its] various beneficial purposes” is
incidental recharge. I.C, § 42-2345) (“{IInci-
dental ground water recharge benefits are
often obtained from the diversion and use of
water for various beneficial purposes.”). Such
recharge cannot be “used as the basis for
claim of a separate or expanded water right.”
Id. Accordingly, without a transfer approving
recharge as a beneficial use, any seepage
that occurs under 181C is incidental recharge
and not eligible to be used for mitigation
purposes. Jd,

in summary, recharge is a beneficial
use. LC. § 42-234(2), As such, it must be
identified in the purpose of use element. I.C.
§ 42-1412(6), An element may either contain
a statement defining the element or incorpo-
rate one, but not both. Jd. 181C’s purpose of
use element clearly contains a statement list-
ing five uses and recharge is not one of them.
The private Settlement Agreement, incorpo-
rated in the other provisions element of
181C, cannot alter, add, or subtract from the
uses clearly contained in the judicially de-
creed purpose of use element. The sole mech-
anism for altering, adding, or subtracting
from a judicially decreed purpose of use ele-
ment is through an application for transfer.

4. The City argues that the appropriate applica~
tion is one for permit, not transfer, However, to
change the nature of use of a water right one
must file an application for transfer. I.C. § 42-
222; City of Pocatello, 152 Idaho at 839, 275 P.3d
at 854, It is true that the non-use of an existing
water may provide mitigation for the approval of
another right without the filing of a transfer.
However, as the district court observed, while

LC. § 42-222(1), Accordingly, if the City
wishes to use 181C for recharge it must file
for a transfer.

B. Attorney fees.

The Coalition requests attorney fees pur-
suant to Idaho Code section 12-117(1) and
Idaho Code section 12-121. Attorney fees are
appropriate under section 12-117(1) “in any
proceeding involving as adverse parties a
state agency ... and a person ... if [the
court] finds that the nonprevailing party act-
ed without a reasonable basis in fact or law.”
LC. § 12-117(1). We have awarded fees un-
der section 12-117(1) where the nonprevailing
party

continued to rely on the same arguments

used in front of the district court, without

providing any additional persuasive law or
bringing into doubt the existing law on
which the district court based its decision.

Although the [nonprevailing parties] may

have had a good faith basis to bring the

original suit based on their interpretation
of Idaho law, [they] were very clearly
aware of the statutory procedures, failed to
appeal separate appraisals when they had
a right to appeal, and were clearly advised
on the applicable law in an articulate and
well reasoned written decision from the
district court. Nevertheless, [they] chose to
further appeal that decision to this Court,
even though they failed to add any new
analysis or authority to the issues raised
below. Accordingly, it was frivolous and
unreasonable to make a continued argu-
ment, and [the prevailing party] is award-
ed its reasonable attorney fees
Rangen, Inc., 159 Idaho at 812, 367 P.8d at
207 (alterations in original) (quoting Castrig-
no v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 98, 98, 106 P.38d
419, 424 (2005).

WH Here, the City has asserted the
same arguments on appeal as it did before

“{a] transfer is not required under Idaho Code
§ 42-222 to effectuate the non-use of an existing
right ... the City does not propose the non-use of
water right 01-181C, Rather it proposes using the
right for the additional purpose of recharge.”
Thus, if the City wishes to use 181C for mitiga-
tion purposes without a transfer it would have to
propose the non-use, rather than the continued
use, of 181C.

the Director and the district court. It has
continually asserted that recharge, although
clearly not listed as a purpose of use, is an
authorized use of 181C. However, the City
failed to appeal either the Director's decision
to leave recharge off the initial transfer or
the district court’s partial decree, which also
did not include recharge as a beneficial use,
While the City’s argument that an incorpo-
rated document under the other provisions
element may add a use to the purposes of use
element is novel, it is not reasonably based in
law. The district court clearly articulated this
in its decision. Thus, because the City failed
to add any significant new analysis or author-
ity to its arguments, and failed to appeal
both the Director’s decision not to include
recharge as a beneficial use and the partial
decree, which also did not include recharge
as a beneficial use, we award the Coalition
fees under section 12-117(1).

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court. Attorney fees
and costs on appeal to the Coalition. Costs on
appeal to IDWR.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and KIDWELL, Pro tem concur.

396 P.3d 1193
Whitney L. BRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Roman MAZNIK and Natalya K. Maznik,
husband and wife, Defendants-
Respondents,

and

James R. Thomas and Katherine
L. Thomas, Defendants.

Docket No. 44129

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 20, 2017

ee
=!
i<)

Evans, Keane, Boise, for appellant. Jed W.
Manwaring argued.

Montgomery Law Offices, Boise, for re-
spondents. Gary L. Montgomery argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Whitney L. Bright appeals from the Can-
yon County district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Roman and Natalya Maznik.
The Mazniks are property owners who leased
an apartment to James and Katherine Thom-
as, owners of a Belgian Shepherd. When
Bright visited the Thomas’ apartment in an
effort to collect on a debt, the Thomas’ dog
attacked her. Bright then lodged a complaint
against the Mazniks, alleging various tort
daims arising from the attack. The district
court granted the Mazniks’ motion for sum-
mary judgment, and we now affirm,

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The Mazniks are owners and landlords of
residential rental properties located in Can-
yon County, In November 2005, the Mazniks
hired Cashflow Management (Cashflow) to
manage their rentals, Cashflow, as property
manager, ensures that the Mazniks’ rentals
are habitable, handles everyday maintenance,
solicits and screens prospective tenants, leas-
es the rentals, and makes monthly, in-person
visits to the rentals to collect rent,

In August 2008, the Thomases applied to
lease an apartment from the Mazniks. On
their rental application, the Thomases dis-
closed that they had a “B. Shepherd”! that
weighed thirty-five pounds. Cashflow re-
viewed the Thomas’ rental application. As
part of that review, Cashflow contacted the
Thomas’ former landlord to ask about “dog
issues”—i.¢., whether the dog was a problem,
had damaged the property, or ever caused
excessive noise. Cashflow could not recall the
details of that conversation, but apparently
no concerns arose because Cashflow ap-
proved the Thomas’ application. When con-
cerns did arise in the application review pro-
cess, Cashflow explained that those issues
were noted on the application and rejection
would follow.

Cashflow routinely rented to dog owners,
and so the Thomas’ dog did not cause con-
1, There is an immaterial dispute as to whether

the Thomas’ dog was a Belgian Shepherd or a
German Shepherd. Because the majority of the

313

cern. Cashflow explained that it rented to
dog owners because:

[Wle have gone [sic] through a phase in

our company where we did try to put

people who didn’t have pets in, And [we]
found that after the fact people move pets
in, anyway. Then it was difficult to collect.
on pet deposits and it was difficult to en-
force the lease. And to avoid having that
headache we became more liberal.
To be sure, as a property management com-
pany, Cashflow “honor[ed] what the owners
want.” But the Mazniks were flexible and
“left that judgment up to [Cashflow].”

Before January 21, 2014, neither the Maz-
niks nor Cashflow ever received any com-
plaints about the Thomas’ dog, That day,
however, the Thomas’ dog attacked Bright
when she visited the Thomas’ apartment con-
cerning a debt Mr. Thomas owed. The Thom-
as’ dog lunged past Mr. Thomas when he
answered the door, biting Bright on her arm
and leg. Bright eventually retreated inside
the Thomas’ apartment until Mr. Thomas
could place the dog under control.

In September 2014, Bright sued the Thom-
ases and the Mazniks, alleging various tort
claims, She obtained a $25,000 default judg-
ment against the Thomases. The Mazniks, by
contrast, moved for and obtained summary
judgment. Bright brings this timely appeal.

IL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1, Did the district court err by granting
summary judgment to the Mazniks on
Bright’s negligence per se claim?

2. Did the district court err by granting
summary judgment to the Mazniks on
Bright’s liability for domestic animals
claim?

3, Did the district court err by granting
summary judgment to the Mazniks on
Bright’s remaining claims?

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a summary
judgment order under the same standard

record identifies the Thomas’ dog as a Belgian
Shepherd, we follow suit,

314

the district court used in ruling on the
motion. Kolln v. Saint Luke’s Reg’l Med.
Cér., 180 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142,
1146 (1997). That is, summary judgment is
appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.” LR.C.P. 56(¢).
We construe disputed facts in favor of the
non-moving party, and all reasonable infer-
ences that can be drawn from the record
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. Major v. Sec. Equip. Corp., 155
Idaho 199, 202, 807 P.8d 1225, 1228 (2013).
Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 84, 369 P.38d
299, 302 (2016)

Iv. ANALYSIS

A. The district court properly granted
summary judgment to the Mazniks on
Bright’s negligence per se claim.

HM The district court granted sum-
mary judgment on Bright’s negligence per se
claim, reasoning that Bright had not shown a
predicate statutory violation. “[I]n Idaho, it is
well established that statutes and administra-
tive regulations may define the applicable
standard of care owed, and that violations of
such statutes and regulations may constitute
negligence per se.” Sanchez v, Galey, 112
Idaho 609, 617, 783 P.2d 1284, 1242 (1986). “A.
court may adopt ‘as the standard of conduct
of a reasonable man the requirements of a
legislative enactment or an administrative
regulation[.!” Brizendine v. Nampa Meridi-
an Irv. Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 586, 548 P.2d 80,
86 (1976) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 286 (1965)). “The effect of establish-

2, The district court granted summary judgment
in 2015. Effective July 1, 2016, Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 was amended. The relevant
portion of the rule now provides: “The court
must grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.” LR.C.P. 56(a).

3. Effective July 1, 2016, the statute was amended
to read:

Any dog that physically attacks, wounds,

bites or otherwise injures any person who is

not trespassing, when such dog is not physical-

ing negligence per se through violation of a
statute is to conclusively establish the first
two elements of a cause of action in negli-
gence.” Slade v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp. 119
Idaho 482, 489, 808 P.2d 401, 408 (1991),

HMMs iBright’s negligence per se claim im-
plicates the interpretation of Idaho Code sec-
tion 25-2805(2). That statute provides:

Any dog which, when not physically pro-
voked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or
otherwise injures any person who is not
trespassing, is vicious. It shall be unlawful
for the owner or for the owner of premises
on which a vicious dog is present to harbor
a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A
secure enclosure is one from which the
animal cannot escape and for which exit
and entry is controlled by the owner of the
premises or owner of the animal. Any vi-
cious dog removed from the secure enclo-
sure must be restrained by a chain suffi-
cient to control the vicious dog. Persons
guilty of a violation of this subsection, and
in addition to any liability as provided in
section 25-2806, Idaho Code, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor. For a second or subse-
quent violation of this subsection, the court
may, in the interest of public safety, order
the owner to have the vicious dog de-
stroyed or may direct the appropriate au-
thorities to destroy the dog.

LC. § 25-2805(2) (2015). “The interpretation
of a statute is a question of law that the
Supreme Court reviews de novo.” Hayes v.
City of Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 170, 357
P.8d 1276, 1278 (2015). Statutory interpreta-
tion begins with the statute’s plain language.
State v. Burnight, 182 Idaho 654, 659, 978
P.2d 214, 219 (1999). That language “is to be
given its plain, obvious and rational mean-

ly provoked or otherwise justified pursuant to
subsection (3) of this section or as set forth in
section 25-2808, Idaho Code, subjects either its
owner or any person who has accepted respon-
sibility as the possessor, harborer or custodian
of the dog, or both, to civil liability for the
injuries caused by the dog. A prior determina-
tion that a dog is dangerous or at-risk, or
subject to any court order imposing restric-
tions or requirements pursuant to the provi-
sions of this section, shall not be a prerequisite
to civil liability for injuries caused by the dog.
LC. § 25-2810(10).

ing.” Id. If that language is clear and unam-
biguous, “the Court need merely apply the
statute without engaging in any statutory
construction,” Id,

The district court concluded Bright
had failed to establish a predicate violation of
section 25-2805(2). Specifically, the district
court reasoned that the Thomas’ dog was not
a “vicious” dog under section 25-2805(2) since
it had never attacked, bitten, or wounded a
person. This represents the “one free bite”
approach. See Borns ex rel. Gannon v. Voss,
410 P.8d 262, 270 (Wyo. 2008) (discussing the
one free bite approach), Under the one free
bite approach, notice of the dog’s viciousness
is a condition precedent to liability; as a
result, liability is not imposed for the first
attack, bite, or wound because that is what
gives rise to notice of the dog’s viciousness.
See id.

HHI The district court is correct that
Bright has not shown a predicate violation of
section 25-2805(2), although we affirm on al-
ternative reasoning. See State v. Mann, 162
Idaho 36, 42, 394 P.8d 79, 85 (2017) (“This
Court may affirm decisions of a district court
based on different theories then applied by
the district court.”), To show the Mazniks
violated section 25-2805(2), Bright had the
burden to prove that they “harborled]” a dog
on the property. Because the term “harbor”
is not defined in the statute, it will be given
its plain, ordinary meaning. Arnold v. City of
Stanley, 158 Idaho 218, 221, 345 P.8d 1008,
1011 (2015). The verb form of harbor is de-
fined as “to receive clandestinely and con-
ceal,” or, as relevant here, “to have (an ani-
mal) in one’s keeping.” Webster's Third New
Int'l Dictionary 1081 (1969). Thus, “harbor”
contemplates “protecting” an animal, or “un-
dertakfing] to control fits] actions[.]”’ Mark-
wood v. McBroom, 110 Wash. 208, 188 P. 521,
522 (1920); see also Hagenau v. Millard, 182
Wis. 544, 195 N.W. 718, 718 (1928) (explain-
ing that “the word ‘harbor’ in its meaning
signifies protection”).

The record does not show that the Mazniks
harbored the Thomas’ dog on the property,
regardless of whether that dog was “vicious.”
The record contains no evidence that the
Mazniks “receive[d] clandestinely and cone-
eale[d]” the Thomas’ dog. Nor does the rec-

315

ord show that the Mazniks “ha[d] (an animal)
[te., the Thomas’ dog] in [their] keeping.” It
is undisputed that the Thomases had their
dog in their keeping at all times. The Maz-
niks did nothing in the way of undertaking to
control the Thomas’ dog. The lease made
clear that the Thomases had responsibility to
control their dog. The lease required the
‘Thomases to, among other things: (1) “[kleep
the pet under control at all times”; (2)
“[k]eep the pet restrained, but not tethered,
when it is outside Resident’s dwelling”; (8)
“{nJot leave the pet unattended for any un-
reasonable periods”; and (4) “[kJeep the pet
from causing any annoyance or discomfort to
others....” Bright apparently seeks to hold
the Mazniks liable on this claim merely be-
cause they owned the property, but property
ownership alone does not constitute harbor-
ing of an animal. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 514, emt. a (1977) (“{TThe possession
of the land on which the animal is kept, even
when coupled with permission given to a
third person to keep it, is not enough to
make the possessor of the land liable as a
harborer of the animal.”). Summary judg-
ment on Bright’s negligence per se claim is
affirmed,

B. The district court properly granted
summary judgment to the Mazniks on
Bright’s liability for domestic animals
claim,

HE The district court granted sum-
mary judgment on Bright’s liability for do-
mestie animals claim, concluding the Mazniks
owed no duty to protect Bright from the
Thomas’ dog. In the context of liability for
domestic animals, duty is governed by

a rule of law lacking the ordinary care

seienter requirement of negligence when

owners of domestic animals know of vicious
tendencies. In cases where a domestic ani-
mal is not trespassing, the owner of the
animal is liable for injuries caused if the
owner knew or should have known of the
animal’s vicious or dangerous tendencies.

Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 560, 348

P.3d 497, 503 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing McClain

v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n,

17 Idaho 68, 79, 104 P. 1015, 1020 (1909); see

also Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho

316

448, 446, 887 P.8d 602, 605 (2014) (“[A]In
owner is liable for injuries caused by a do-
mesticated animal where the owner knew or
should have known of the animal's vicious or
dangerous propensity.” (quotation marks and
citation omitted),

HM A property owner may have a duty
to protect others from an animal if the prop-
erty owner had notice of the animal’s vicious
or dangerous propensity, even if the property
owner is not the animal’s owner. For in-
stance, in Braese, a customer visited a con-
venience store with his dog. 157 Idaho at 444,
887 P.8d at 608. During the customer’s visit,
his dog “jumped up hitting [the plaintiff] in
the chest with her front paws.” Id, at 445,
887 P.3d at 604. The plaintiff sued the store
owner. Id, The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the store owner, and this
Court affirmed on appeal. Id, at 446, 337
P.8d at 605. As this Court emphasized, no
evidence showed “that either the manager or
cashier knew or should have known that [the
dog] would jump up on a customer in the
store.” Id. Indeed, the manager testified that
this particular dog had visited the store sev-
eral times, and the manager had no reason to
be concerned about the dog. Jd, By contrast,
when “uncontrollable” dogs visited, the man-
ager made customers escort their dogs out-
side, Id, Absent any evidence that the store
owner knew or should have known of the
dog’s dangerous or vicious propensity, this
Court affirmed that summary judgment was
properly granted to the store owner. Id.

HM Here, summary judgment on
Bright's liability for domestic animals claim
was proper. As in Braese, it is undisputed
that the Mazniks had neither actual nor con-
structive notice of the dog’s dangerous or
vicious propensity, Bright argues the Maz-
niks had notice of the dog’s dangerous or
vicious propensity because they “failed ... to
investigate to Belgian Shepherd breed to find
that is a regularly used guard dog. A simple
internet search would have revealed the ag-
gressive nature of this breed,” This argu-
ment is overbroad and implicates nothing
specific about this particular dog, This argu-
ment overlooks that, in Idaho, “all dogs, re-
gardless of breed or size, are presumed to be
harmless domestic animals.” Braese, 157 Ida-

ho at 445, 887 P.8d at 604 (quoting 4 Am.
Jur. 2d Animals § 75 (2007)).

Bright further argues the Mazniks had
notice of the dog’s dangerous or vicious pro-
pensity because their agent, Trina Neddo of
Cashflow, “personally visited the home each
month to pick up the rent payment and
therein observed the confining conditions of
the large Dog along with the wild barking
and aggressive nature of the Dog.” This ar-
gument overstates Neddo’s testimony, Neddo
testified that she collected monthly rent from
the Mazniks “many times[.]” While doing so,
she observed the Thomas’ dog. At times, she
observed the dog through a window while it
was inside, but at other times, she observed
the dog while it was outside on a leash, The
dog regularly barked when Neddo knocked
on the door to collect rent, Neddo character-
ized the bark as “protective,” but indicated
that she “d[idjn’t know that [she] would de-
fine it as aggressive.” In Neddo’s thirteen
years of experience as a property manager,
barking was a “typical response” by tenants’
dogs. Neddo further indicated that the
Thomases had a “Beware of Dog” sign post-
ed out front, although she was unable to
recall whether that sign was posted before or
after the bite at issue. Hither way, Neddo
found that sign insignificant. As she ex-
plained:

Q. When you see a sign of one of your
tenant’s rentals with a Beware of Dog sign
in the window what does that say or not
say to you?

A. Typically, I see it in my single wom-
en’s homes. They will put it [up]. Even if
they have the smallest littlest dog. But I
think it is more of a security for people
who want to, you know, protect themselves
against maybe intruders or someone look-
ing to break in.

Q. So in your mind it is not a notice
that there is a dangerous dog on-site?

A. Not my experience. Typically it is
there for a false protection,

This testimony does not raise a triable
issue of fact concerning whether the Mazniks
had notice of the dangerous or vicious pro-
pensity of the Thomas’ dog. As the district
court found, “Neddo’s statements make it
clear that she had no actual knowledge Ten-

ants’ dog was capable of attacking someone,
Further, Bright has failed to establish any
evidence that Neddo was wrong in her belief,
or that she should have known the Tenants’
dog had a dangerous propensity.”

Bright points to an affidavit from the
Thomas’ neighbor, Janette Endecott, Ende-
cott testified that the dog “would bark wildly
at me and lunge hard against its leash to-
ward me.” But Endecott never testified that
she reported these instances to the Mazniks
or Cashflow. As Neddo testified, “[t]here
have been no complaints against the Thom-
ases [sic] dogs from any of the neigh-
bors....” In fact, in her thirteen years of
property management, Neddo “never re-
ceived any complaints of aggressive ani-
mals....” Endecott’s testimony does not
raise a triable issue of fact on the issue of the
Mazniks’ notice.

Accordingly, Bright has not raised a tri-
able issue of fact on her liability for domestic
animals claim because it is undisputed that
the Mazniks had neither actual nor construe-
tive notice of the dog’s dangerous or vicious
propensity,

C. The district court properly granted
summary judgment to the Mazniks on
Bright’s remaining claims.

While the district court's summary judg-
ment order concluded the Mazniks owed no
duty under the theories of common law negli-
gence, voluntary assumption of duty, and
premises liability, it is not clear whether
Bright seeks to appeal the district court’s
ruling on these bases. She never cogently
addresses these issues with argument or au-
thority. These issues are therefore waived.
Cf Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 872, 374, 284
P.3d 696, 698 (2010) (explaining that argu-
ment is waived if “not supported by any
cogent argument or authority” in the opening
brief).

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm summary judgment to the Maz-
niks. We do not award attorney fees on

317

appeal since neither side requests them. We
award costs on appeal to the Mazniks.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON:
and BRODY concur.

396 P.3d 1199

Travis FORBUSH and Gretchen Hymas,
individually and as the Natural Parents
of Private First Class McQuen C. For-
bush, USMC (Deceased), and Breanna
Halowell, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SAGECREST MULTI FAMILY PROPER-
TY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,
and John Kalsbeek, individually and as
President of the Sagecrest Multi Family
Property Owners’ Association, Defen-
dants-Respondents,

and

Jay Arla, individually and as vice president
of the Sagecrest Multi Family Property
Owners’ Association; Chris Schwab, in-
dividually and as secretary of the Sage-
crest Multi Family Property Owners’
Association; David Meisner, individually
and as treasurer of the Sagecrest Multi
Family Property Owners’ Association;
First Rate Property Management, Inc.,
Tony Drost, individually and as presi-
dent of First Rate Property Manage-
ment, Inc.; Sagecrest Development, LLC;
Park City Plumbing, Inc, nka PC
Plumbing, Inc; Widgeon Mechanical,
LLC nka Idaho Geothermal, LLC; 4.0.
Smith, Inc; Matthew E. Switzer Trust,
and Matthew E. Switzer, individually
and as Trustee of the Matthew E. Swit-

18

zer Trust; Goodman Manufacturing
Company, LP; Anfinson Plumbing, LLP;
Daniel Bakken, individually and as em-
ployee of Anfinson Plumbing, LLP;
H&H Properties, LLC; and Intermoun-
tain Gas Company, Defendants.

Docket No. 44053

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: June 20, 2017

eo
wp
i

Peterson Lawyers, Boise and The Spence
Law Firm, Jackson, WY, for appellants. Mi-
chael F, Lutz argued.

Barnham, Howell & Gunn, PLLC, and
Moore & Elia, LLP, Boise, for respondents.
John Howell argued for respondent Kalsbeek
and Michael J. Elia argued for respondent
Sagecrest POA.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Travis Forbush and Gretchen Hymas, indi-
vidually and as natural parents of McQuen C.
Forbush and Breanna Halowell (Appellants),
appeal the Ada County District Court’s grant
of summary judgment to Sagecrest Multi-
family Property Owners’ Association, Inc.,
and its President, Jon Kalsbeek (Respon-
dents). Forbush and Halowell were overnight
guests of a tenant who leased a unit at the
Sagecrest Apartment Complex (Sagecrest).
During the night, hazardous levels of carbon
monoxide filled the unit, killing Forbush and
injuring Halowell. Appellants brought tort
claims against Respondents after the inci-
dent, The district court granted summary
judgment to Respondents. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

This appeal concerns an incident in which
a vent on a water heater clogged and caused.
the emission of hazardous levels of carbon
monoxide in unit 4624 at Sagecrest on No-
vember 10, 2012, The incident killed eigh-
teen-year-old Private First-Class MeQuen C.

Forbush, a U.S. Marine; and injured eigh-
teen-year-old Breanna Halowell. Forbush
and Halowell were overnight guests of unit
4624’s tenant Adra Kipper.

Sagecrest consists of forty-eight separate
buildings, each containing four apartments.
When Sagecrest was built, Sagecrest Devel-
opment, LLC, recorded the Declarations of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions
(CCRs). The CCRs instruct that individuals
or entities hold fee title to the separate build-
ings, each containing the four apartments.
The CCRs grant these individuals or entities
the “exclusive right” to maintain the interiors
of the apartments they own. The unit owners
are shareholders in the Sagecrest Multifami-
ly Property Owners’ Association (POA), a
non-profit corporation. The CCRs task the
POA with maintaining the exterior grounds
at Sagecrest, including the sidewalks, land-
scaping, common areas, and fences. By con-
trast, the CCRs task unit owners with main-
taining the “entire interior” of the units they
own. To meet these maintenance duties, the
CCRs require both the POA and unit owners
to employ the same property management
company. To that end, the POA and unit
owners entered into maintenance contracts
with First Rate Property Management
(FRPM) in March 2010.

In spring 2011, carbon monoxide concerns
emerged at Sagecrest. Evidently, some ten-
ants had reported smelling gas inside of their
units. Intermountain Gas was contacted
about these concerns and explained the prob-
lem was due to certain water heaters’ venting
systems. Two types of water heaters were
used at Sagecrest. Venting on one type had
“a metal screen around the bottom of the
tank.” Venting on the second type “dfid]n’t
have a screen that goes around, but one in
the middle on the bottom.” Venting on the
second type was prone to clogging, which, in
turn, caused carbon monoxide to emit. After
meeting with Intermountain Gas about the
problem, FRPM surmised that “we just need
to clean/vacuum off the screens and it will be
fine.”

Nonetheless, carbon monoxide concerns
grew more serious that summer. In July
2011, Intermountain Gas was again contacted
after another tenant reported smelling gas

321

inside of her unit. Intermountain Gas de-
seribed the carbon monoxide level as “dead-
ly” and attributed it to the unit’s water heat-
er. That same month, a professional plumber,
Ben Davis, inspected the water heaters at
Sagecrest, identified the problematic venting
system, and advised that “these issues be
solved before any tenants suffer health prob-
Jems or death.” Thereafter, FRPM reasoned
that more than just cleaning or vacuuming
the screens was necessary, concluding “the
only way to fix this problem without modify-
ing the water heater is to replace them com-
pletely.” *

Although the POA knew of the carbon
monoxide concerns, it did not move to modify
or replace the water heaters. As the POA’s
President Jon Kalsbeek explained, “the wa-
ter heaters are interior items of each unit”
and, therefore, “an owners [sic] choice on
how to handle this situation.” Even so, the
POA, primarily through Kalsbeek, became
involved with the carbon monoxide issue in
several ways. Although the CCRs give unit
owners the “exclusive right” over unit interi-
ors, Tony Drost, FRPM’s President, testified
that the POA, through Kalsbeek, controlled
“global issues” that were complex-wide,
which included the water heaters. For exam-
ple, the POA instructed FRPM to conduct
carbon monoxide testing inside of the units
every three months. To that end, the POA
issued two sets of procedures governing car-
bon monoxide testing. Those procedures also
governed the installation of hard-wired car-
bon monoxide alarms. And, in September
2011, the POA enlisted an engineering firm
in an effort to explore solutions short of
replacing the water heaters. According to the
engineering firm, the various solutions were
to (1) increase “fresh air intakes”; (2) replace
existing water heaters; and (8) replace “the
smoke detectors with CO/Smoke detector
combination sensor[s.]”

In November 2011, FRPM relayed the en-
gineering firm’s findings to unit owners. Mat-
thew Switzer, who owns the building in which
unit 4624 sits, responded that he was un-
aware of any carbon monoxide issues with his
units. FRPM clarified that Switzer’s units
had “checked in good during the CO detect-
ing.” FRPM further indicated that it would

322

contact Switzer if later testing revealed car-
bon monoxide concerns with his units.

Under the POA’s directive, FRPM con-
ducted carbon monoxide testing on March 9,
2012, That testing revealed a high level of
carbon monoxide in several units, including
unit 4624, However, that testing was later
contradicted. When Intermountain Gas test-
ed unit 4624 on March 12, 2012, it reported
normal, non-hazardous levels of carbon mo-
noxide. In any event, although FRPM had
stated it would contact Switzer if testing
revealed carbon monoxide concerns with his
units, Switzer was never contacted about the
high levels discovered on March 9, 2012.

Warnings were distributed to tenants fol-
lowing the high levels of carbon monoxide
discovered on March 9, 2012. The warning,
placed on unit 4624’s front door, informed
tenant Adra Kipper that her unit's water
heater was emitting “higher levels of carbon
monoxide than we would like to see.” The
warning further informed Kipper that her
water heater would be “replaced next week.”
A battery-powered carbon monoxide alarm
was provided along with the warning be-
cause, although FRPM had begun to install
hard-wired alarms under the POA’s directive,
a hard-wired alarm had not yet been install-
ed in unit 4624.

Kipper’s water heater was never replaced.
And, although Kipper used the battery-pow-
ered carbon monoxide alarm initially, she
eventually removed the alarm’s batteries and
placed it in a closet after it started beeping,
apparently due to low batteries. Consequent-
ly, when Kipper had two overnight guests—
Forbush and Halowell—staying over on No-
vember 10, 2012, no alarm sounded when the
vent on Kipper’s water heater clogged and
caused the emission of hazardous levels of
carbon monoxide. The incident killed For-
bush and injured Halowell.

Appellants filed their initial complaint on
March 7, 2018, and eventually filed four
amended complaints. They named several
parties as defendants, including the POA and
Kalsbeek, Respondents in this appeal. The
district court granted summary judgment to
Respondents. Appellants bring this timely
appeal.

IL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court properly grant
summary judgment to the POA?

2. Did the district court properly grant
summary judgment to Kalsbeek?

8. Should we award attorney fees on ap-
peal? .

I, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HB This Cow reviews a summary
judgment order under the same standard
the district court used in ruling on the
motion. Kolin v. Saint Luke’s Reg’ Med.
Ctr., 180 Idaho 328, 327, 940 P.2d 1142,
1146 (1997). That is, summary judgment is
appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.” LR.C.P. 56(c).
We construe disputed facts in favor of the
non-moving party, and all reasonable infer-
ences that can be drawn from the record
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. Major v. Sec. Equip. Corp. 155
Idaho 199, 202, 307 P.8d 1225, 1228 (2018).

Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 84, 369
P.8d 299, 302 (2016).

HB" The main issues in this appeal trig-
ger negligence, which consists of four ele-
ments: “(1) a duty, recognized by law, re-
quiring a defendant to conform to a certain
standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that
duty; (8) a causal connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the resulting inju-
ries; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Gra-
bicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 691,
302 P.38d 26, 31 (2013) (citation omitted),
More specifically, this appeal centers on
whether a duty existed, which is generally a
question of law over which this Court has
free review. See Gagnon v, W. Bldg. Maint.,
Inec,, 155 Idaho 112, 115, 306 P.8d 197, 200
(2018). However, whether a duty existed be-
comes a question of fact if it requires resolu-
tion of disputed facts. See Coghlan v. Beta
Theta Pi Fraternity, 183 Idaho 388, 402, 987
P.2d 800, 814 (1999).

Iv. ANALYSIS

‘The three main issues raised on appeal are
whether (A) summary judgment was proper-
ly granted to the POA; (B) summary judg-
ment was properly granted to Kalsbeek; and
(C) Respondents are entitled to attorney fees
on appeal. We discuss each below.

A. Did the district court properly grant
summary judgment to the POA?

Appellants contend the district court erred
by granting summary judgment to the POA
because triable issues of fact surround
whether the POA (1) owed a premises liabili-
ty-based duty of care; (2) owed a duty of care
it acquired as a result of voluntary undertak-
ings; and (8) is vicariously liable for FRPM’s
conduct.

1, Premises liability

Appellants first argue the POA owed a
premises liability-based duty of care to For-
bush and Halowell. As a threshold matter,
we note that the POA neither owned nor
occupied unit 4624, Instead, Switzer owns
unit 4624, and tenant Adra Kipper occupied
unit 4624, We must therefore decide whether
a premises liability-based duty of care can be
imposed on a party who neither owns nor
occupies the property at issue.

Hl Appellants correctly inform us that
“the general rule of premises liability is that
one having control of the premises may be
liable for failure to keep the premises in
repair.” Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 261,
245 P.3d 1009, 1013 (2011) (quoting Heath v.
Honker’s Mini-Mart, Inc, 184 Idaho 711,
718, 8 P.8d 1254, 1256 (Ct. App. 2000). Ap-
pellants maintain that the POA had control
over unit interiors under the CCRs and, re-
gardless of the CCRs, actually exerted con-
trol over unit interiors. Consequently, Appel-
Jants assert it is irrelevant that the POA
neither owned nor occupied unit 4624,

HM Appellants’ position overlooks how
our premises liability cases are limited to
actions involving owners or occupiers of land
and their agents. H.g., Rowntree v. Boise
Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 171, 296 P.38d
378, 877 (2018) (“The duty owed by owners
and possessors of land depends on the status

323

of the person injured on the land....” (em-
phasis added)); Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho
590, 591-92, 272 P.3d 562, 563-64 (2012) (ana-
lyzing premises liability claim against owner
of property); Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho
588, 595, 768 P.2d 1321, 1828 (1989) (“Hence-
forward, owners and occupiers of land will be
under a duty of ordinary care under the
circumstances towards invitees who come
upon their premises.”), Thus, we reject Ap-
pellants’ premises liability argument and
reaffirm our case law holding that a premises
liability-based duty of care may be imposed
only on owners or occupiers of land and their
agents.

The dissent, however, maintains that sta-
tus as an owner or occupier is irrelevant. The
dissent’s analysis wholly forgets that premis-
es liability furnishes a fundamental tripartite
framework, under which land entrants are
defined as an invitee, a licensee, or a tres-
passer. H.g., Stiles v. Amundson, 160 Idaho
580, 582 n.8, 876 P.8d 734, 786 n.8 (2016). The
dissent’s analysis renders the well-estab-
lished tripartite framework inapplicable. A
stranger who neither owns nor occupies the
land at issue could not request an invitee to
visit the land so as to confer a benefit on the
land to the stranger, given that the stranger
has no right to the land in the first place.
Similarly, a stranger is without authority to
authorize a licensee to enter land to which
the stranger has no right. Finally, it cannot
be said that a trespass occurs when a person
enters land to which the stranger has no
right simply because the stranger did not
authorize that person’s visit. Nevertheless,
the dissent’s analysis would permit these sce-
narios to be litigated under the rubric of
“premises liability.”

In the dissent’s view, control is the essen-
tial test. While the dissent creates several
hypothetical scenarios that are irrelevant to
this case in an attempt to show that some
degree of control, by itself, should be suffi-
cient to trigger premises liability, this Court
has never resolved a premises liability case
in such a manner. Three of our cases firmly
reinforce that premises liability does not ex-
tend beyond owners or occupiers of the
premises and their agents, and that control
determines which party, as between the own-

324

er or occupier and their agents, had control
of the premises during the relevant time.
First, in Offs v, Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 181,
409 P.2d 95, 98 (1965), superseded on other
grounds by 1.C. § 6-801, we explained:
Owners or persons in charge of property
owe to an invitee or business visitor the
duty to keep the premises in a reasonably
safe condition, or to warn the invitee of
hidden or concealed dangers of which the
owner or one in charge knows or should
mow by exercise of reasonable care, in
order that the invitee be not unnecessarily
or unreasonably exposed to danger.

Otts concerned the duty owed by a general
contractor to a subcontractor. Id. at 131-32,
409 P.2d at 98-99. The general contractor
occupied the worksite at issue, as he “stated
that he was continually on the job site; that
every day he supervised the entire work of
the construction of the building[.]” Id. at 182,
409 P.2d at 99, We reversed summary judg-
ment that had been granted to the general
contractor, concluding triable issues of fact
surrounded the general contractor's liability.
Id, at 185-86, 409 P.2d at 101-02. Oits, there-
fore, forecloses the dissent’s assertion that
our ruling today would allow “a general con-
tractor or construction manager, who exer-
cises the requisite control over the premises,
[to] eseap[e] liability ... because he does not
neatly fit within the categories elucidated
today.” As demonstrated in Otts, a general
contractor or construction manager is regu-
larly in occupation of the premises at issue,
Additionally, the general contractor or con-
struction manager is frequently an agent of
the owner or occupier, But even supposing
premises liability were for some reason inap-
plicable, the dissent embellishes the notion of
a tortious general contractor or construction
manager “escaping liability.” Premises liabili-
ty is not the exclusive path to liability.
Similarly, in Jones, as the dissent acknowl-
edges, this Court stated that “the general
rule of premises liability is that one having
control of the premises may be liable for
failure to keep the premises in repair.” 150
Idaho at 261, 245 P.8d at 1018 (quoting
Heath v. Honker’s Mini-Mart, Inc., 184 Ida-
ho 711, 718, 8 P.8d 1254, 1256 (Ct. App.
2000)), Our clear holding in Jones, however,

was that the district court properly found
premises liability did not apply because the
injury occurred “on a public sidewalk or
street, and not on [the defendant’s] proper-
ty.” Id.; see also Heath, 184 Idaho at 714, 8
P.8d at 1257 (affirming summary judgment
for defendant because plaintiff's vague asser-
tion that she “may well have been” on prop-
erty the defendant owned did not raise a
triable issue of fact). Jones illustrates that, if
premises liability indeed applies, the issue
becomes which party, as between an owner
or occupier of the land and their agents, had
control over the premises. We did not hold,
nor even suggest, in Jones that a stranger
who neither owns nor occupies the property
can be sued in premises liability merely by
exercising some degree of wrongful or right-
ful control over the property.

We reaffirmed these principles in our re-
cent case of Stiles v. Amundson, 160 Idaho
580, 581, 876 P.3d 734, 735 (2016), which
concerned a “premises liability action
brought against ... the owner of a piece of
property[.]” In Stiles, the issue raised was
“who, between a landlord and a tenant, owes
the relevant duty of care to a tenant’s social
guests.” Id, at 588, 376 P.38d at 787, In resolv-
ing that issue, we explained that “[e]xisting
case law demonstrates it is the entity having
control over the property that bears the bur-
den of warning social guests and licensees of
dangerous conditions on the property.” Id, In
affirming summary judgment for the proper-
ty owner, we reasoned that:

[Tenants are liable to injured third par-

ties, including the tenant’s social guests, as

if they were the owner of the property.

This stands to reason, because the tenant,

as the possessor of the property, is in the

best position to eliminate dangers or to
make those dangers known to third par-
ties. Landlords, on the other hand, are not
in a comparable position because they do
not have possessory control over the land.
Likewise, they do not have control over the
guests hosted by the tenants, and they
likely will not even be aware when a ten-
ant’s social guest is on the premises,
Further, landlords, who do not generally
have unfettered access to the premises,
cannot reasonably be expected to be aware

of all potential hazards on the property
while the tenancy is in effect, especially in
the event that the tenant creates the haz-
ard. It would create an unfair burden on
landlords to give them a responsibility to
warn social guests to whom they have no
connection of dangers of which they have
no way of learning.
Id, at 588-34, 376 P.8d at 787-88. Very simi-
lar to Jones, Stiles reinforces that, if premis-
es liability applies, the issue becomes which
party, as between an owner or occupier of
the premises and their agents, had control
over the premises during the relevant time.
Nevertheless, the dissent “cannot square
the ... decision today with the Court’s re-
cent decision in McDevitt v. Sportsman’s
Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280, 255 P.8d
1166 (2011).” McDevitt involved a plaintiff
who sued a tenant for injuries sustained on a
sidewalk outside the tenant’s retail store. Id.
at 281, 255 P.8d at 1167. Specifically, the
plaintiff tripped over a recessed sprinkler
box on the sidewalk. Jd. The landlord had
hired Idaho Scapes, Ine. to install the sprin-
Kler box. Id. at 282, 255 P.3d at 1168. At
some point after Idaho Scapes installed the
sprinkler box, it sunk about an inch below
the sidewalk, and the plaintiff tripped on it.
Id, When the case came before us on appeal,
we affirmed that summary judgment was
properly granted to the tenant because it
owed no duty of care to keep the sidewalk,
which was not part of the leased premises,
reasonably safe or to warn of hazards. Id. at
281, 255 P.3d at 1167. As the dissent correct-
ly observes, we first analyzed whether the
tenant occupied the sidewalk, ultimately con-
eluding the sidewalk “was not part of the
leased premises.” Id. at 285, 255 P.8d at
1171. We then addressed arguments con-
cerning whether the tenant controlled the
sidewalk outside its retail store. Jd. Regard-
ing that inquiry, we emphasized that “{nJo
Idaho case has confronted a fact pattern
such as the one at issue here, where the
area over which the tenant allegedly has
control is not a part of the leased premises.”
Id, In looking to other jurisdictions, we ex-
plained that, “absent a contractual obli-
gation, a tenant in a multi-tenant shopping
mall does not have control over common
areas, and therefore has no duty to keep

325

them safe for invitees.” Id. (listing cases).
We then concluded the tenant owed no duty
of care to keep the sidewalk outside its retail
store reasonably safe or to warn of hazards
because the commercial lease and CCRs
“imposed the duty to maintain the common
areas on the landlord....” Jd. at 286, 265
P.8d at 1172, Accordingly, McDevitt did not
expand the confines of premises liability.
Rather, we declined to hold that a tenant
who neither owns nor occupies the area at
issue can somehow exert the requisite con-
trol to trigger premises liability, Thus,
McDevitt aligns with our analysis today. In
fact, it is the dissent’s analysis that McDev-
itt does not support. The dissent’s analysis
would suggest that Idaho Scapes, the entity
that merely installed the sprinkler box, could
be held liable in ‘premises liability. That is-
sue was never presented to us in McDevitt,
and we never suggested that an entity like
Idaho Scapes could be sued in premises lia-
bility. But once again, the dissent overlooks
that, even if premises liability is for some
reason inapplicable, it does not represent the
exclusive path to liability in tort law.

HM The above holdings illustrate that
premises liability concerns the duties owed
by owners and oceupiers of land and their
agents. Secondary sourees are in accord. See,
eg., 2 Premises Liability 8d § 36:1 (2016)
(“Premises liability stems from the law of
negligence and constitutes the body of law
that sets the guidelines involving duties
owed by an owner or occupier of real es-
tate....” (emphasis added); Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 51
(2012) (summarizing the duties that posses-
sors of land owe). Thus, contrary to the
dissent’s assertion, our ruling in this regard
is aptly supported by current law. Premises
liability does not contemplate imposing a
duty of care on a stranger who neither owns
nor occupies the premises at issue merely
because the stranger may have exercised
some degree of wrongful or rightful control
over the premises, Indeed, like we explained
in Stiles, ascribing a premises liability-based
duty to a party who is without “unfettered
access” to the premises would create an un-
fair burden, as that party “cannot reasonably
be expected to be aware of all potential haz-

326

ards[.J’160 Idaho at 583-34, 376 P.3d at 737-
38.

TM Declining to deviate from the above
principles, we hold that a premises liability-
based duty of care cannot be imposed on the
POA since it neither owned nor occupied unit
4624,

2, Voluntary undertakings

The parties dispute (a) whether this argu-
ment is preserved; and (b) if so, whether it
creates triable issues of fact,

(a) Is the voluntary undertakings
argument preserved?

HM The POA argues Appellants did not
preserve their voluntary undertakings argu-
ment for appeal because, although Appellants
made voluntary undertakings arguments be-
low, those arguments differ from what Appel-
lants now assert on appeal. According to the
POA, below Appellants argued tenant Adra
Kipper relied on the POA’s alleged voluntary
undertakings, but on appeal, Appellants ar-
gue FRPM—not Kipper—relied,

The POA’s preservation argument is una-
vailing. Appellants made broad reliance argu-
ments before the district court, stating that
“{blecause the POA exerted absolute control
over the property manager's operation and
management at the property, First Rate did
not even seek owner input on issues ... the
POA made the call.” As a result, the district
court reasoned that Appellants’ arguments
triggered the inquiry of whether the POA
“undertook a duty and that Kipper, or even
some other party, relied on [the] POA....”
That inquiry led the district court to conclude
“no party presented any evidence that [the]
POA represented to anyone, including First
Rate, Switzer, or Kipper, that it, and not the
owners, would provide and install carbon mo-
noxide detectors or new water heaters.” The
district court further explained that FRPM
did not rely on the POA’s voluntary under-
takings, if any, because FRPM understood
that unit owners had exclusive control over

1. Although safety-related undertakings are fre-
quently at issue, we note that any type of volun-
tary undertaking is sufficient. Beers, 155 Idaho at
688 n.5, 316 P.3d at 100 n.5 (“We do not intend
to suggest that assumed duties exist only in the

unit interiors. Given that adverse ruling, Ap-
pellants’ voluntary undertakings argument is
preserved for this appeal.

(b) Did the POA owe a duty of care as
a result of voluntary undertakings?

HE This Court has recognized that if
“one voluntarily undertakes to perform an
act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty
arises to perform the act in a non-negligent
manner.” Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraterni-
ty, 183 Idaho 888, 400, 987 P.2d 300, 312
(1999). That duty, however, “is limited to the
duty actually assumed.” Beers v. Corp. of
Pres, of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688, 316 P.3d 92,
100 (2018) (citation omitted). “{Mlerely be-
cause a party acts once does not mean that
party is forever duty-bound to act in a simi-
lar fashion.” Id. This duty arises “when [i]
one previously has undertaken to perform a
primarily safety-related service; [ii] others
are relying on the continued performance of
the service; and [iii] it is reasonably foresee-
able that legally-recognized harm could re-
sult from failure to perform the undertak-
ing.” ! Id. (citation omitted), We discuss each
element below.

i Specific undertakings

Appellants contend the POA specifically
undertook to control (1) the installation of
hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms; (2) pre-
ventative maintenance; and (8) carbon mo-
noxide warnings.

1, Hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms

HH Appellants argue triable issues of
fact surround whether the POA voluntarily
undertook to control the installation of hard-
wired carbon monoxide alarms. That argu-
ment centers on how the POA, through
Kalsbeek, issued two sets of procedures gov-
erning the installation of hard-wired carbon
monoxide alarms.

context of safety-related undertakings. To the
contrary, the rule is that ‘if one voluntarily un-
dertakes to perform an act having no prior duty
to do so’ then a duty ‘arises to perform the act in
a non-negligent manner.’” (citation omitted).

The POA issued its first set of procedures
in March 2012 after learning of carbon mo-
noxide concerns. Under the POA’s proce-
dures, hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms
were to be installed during “turnovers, pre-
ventative maintenance, lease renewals, or
faulty smoke detectors... .” Thus, the proce-
dures contemplated piecemeal installation,
The procedures were amended after a ten-
ant’s carbon monoxide alarm sounded in Oc-
tober 2012. The tenant called the fire depart-
ment, which tested the unit and found the
water heater was emitting high levels of car-
bon monoxide. After that incident, FRPM
contacted the POA to request immediate in-
stallation of hard-wired carbon monoxide
alarms, seeking authorization for a mainte-
nance man to visit “every unit and check and
make sure the CO detectors that we installed
are in working condition. The units that do
not have CO detectors I would like him to
install one.” Kalsbeek responded on behalf of
the POA, stating that he would talk “to the
board and see how the board wants to pro-
ceed.” FRPM’s request for immediate instal-
lation was further discussed at the POA’s
annual meeting in October 2012, where it
became clear that many units lacked hard-
wired carbon monoxide alarms. After that
meeting, the POA, through Kalsbeek, amend-
ed the procedures, stating that hard-wired
carbon monoxide alarms were to be installed
“continuously.”

The POA argues it acted as nothing more
than a “sounding board” for issues affecting
multiple owners and, thus, did not exercise
control over the installation of hard-wired
carbon monoxide alarms. As an issue con-
cerning unit interiors, the POA maintains
that unit owners had exclusive control over
the installation of hard-wired carbon monox-
ide alarms. On the one hand, in November
2011, FRPM sent an email to unit owners
concerning hard-wired carbon monoxide
alarms, seeking unit owners’ approval for
installation. Yet, eleven months later, Kals-
beek indicated that the POA’s procedures
governed, stating that “{t]here is absolutely
nothing about owners’ ... approval” with
respect to the installation of hard-wired car-
bon monoxide alarms. The POA asserts that
Kalsbeek merely meant that FRPM did not
need unit owners’ approval because FRPM

327

already had authority to make repairs cost-
ing less than $250 under FRPM’s mainte-
nance contracts with unit owners, and hard-
wired carbon monoxide alarms cost less than
$250. While the record provides only indirect
support for that assertion, its veracity is
irrelevant. Even if that assertion is true, a
jury could still reasonably find that the POA,
through Kalsbeek, undertook to control the
installation of hard-wired carbon monoxide
alarms by issuing the two sets of procedures.

The district court concluded issuing the
two sets of procedures was not an undertak-
ing that would “create a duty to repair or
replace the water heaters or to install carbon
monoxide detectors inside the units.” While
the district court is correct that this under-
taking would not create a “duty to repair or
replace the water heaters or to install carbon
monoxide detectors inside the units,” that
conclusion overlooks whether this undertak-
ing would create a duty to nevertheless con-
trol the installation of hard-wired carbon mo-
noxide alarms, We find triable issues of fact
surround that issue.

2, Preventative maintenance

The second voluntary undertaking Appel-
lants cite concerns preventative maintenance
and arises from a string of emails sent on
April 15, 2011. That day, FRPM reported to
the POA that certain maintenance needed to
be performed, explaining that:

Intermountain [G]as came out today and
inspected an empty unit to try to find out
what is causing the gas smell from the
water heaters. He said the problem is with
the venting. There are two different kinds
of water heaters here, some have a metal
sereen around the bottom of the tank, the
others don’t have the screen that goes
around, but one in the middle on the bot-
tom. Those get clogged with lint, hair,
debris very easily and if there is not ade-
quate air flow from the bottom then the
water heater cannot release exhaust. He
said we just need to clean/vacuum off the
screens and it will be fine. I think we
should add this to the turn over spread-
sheet under Typical Items for [the mainte-
nance man] to vacuum out the bottom area
and screens, Let me know if this is ok....

328

Before the POA responded, another email
from FRPM clarified that a professional
plumber should be hired, explaining:

No. Please do not have [the maintenance
man] vacuum these. This is something the
plumber needs to do. I already asked them
when I went and had my “plumbing train-
ing” at their shop. In order to clean it
properly some things have to be taken
apart so it can get cleaned from both sides
or it would be pointless and/or could cause
more problems, I will be in Meridian short-
ly and will explain. This will be a common.
problem since the units are located next to
the dryers.

Later that day, the POA, through Kals-
beek, communicated disagreement with
FRPM’s idea that a plumber should be hired,
citing cost concerns:

This seems to be a very expensive solu-
tion to have a plumber come out and vacu-
um vents for water heaters. Why not have
[the maintenance man] learn what needs to
be done to do it correctly at a lower cost?
Ave these only going to be done at turn-
overs? The vents need to be cleaned at
least annually for preventative mainte-
nance to be effective, is this something
that if regularly vacuumed will not require
a labor intensive process? These could be
done at the same time as the filter changes
maybe?

Three days later, FRPM sent the POA
information on the cost to hire a plumber and
requested guidance as to what next steps
should be taken. The POA, through Kals-
beek, responded that “[l]et us review this and
get back to you next week.” The POA never
responded, and the maintenance was never
performed, As a result, Appellants contend
the POA undertook to control the above pre-
ventative maintenance and is to blame for the
fact that it was not performed.

We note that the district court never ad-
dressed this undertaking, although it was
raised below. On appeal, the POA argues
Kalsbeek’s “alleged non-response is not an
affirmative act creating an assumption of
2. We note that the warning tenant Adra Kipper

received in March 2012, which stated that her

unit's water heater was emitting “higher levels of
carbon monoxide than we would like to see” and

duty to install detectors. Indeed, it was
FRPM who was contractually obligated to
have preventative maintenance performed on
#4624 bi-annually at the expense of the own-
ex...,” Although that argument boasts logi-
cal appeal, the undisputed facts do not sup-
port it. Instead, the above demonstrates that
a jury could reasonably find that the POA
voluntarily undertook to control preventative
maintenance, regardless of any contractual
obligations between FRPM and unit owners.

3. Carbon monoxide warnings

The third voluntary undertaking Appel-
Jants cite concerns carbon monoxide warn-
ings. Appellants point to two warnings.”
First, in July 2011, FRPM wanted to distrib-
ute a warning it had received from a profes-
sional plumber, Ben Davis, who inspected the
water heaters after carbon monoxide con-
cerns emerged. Davis’s letter detailed the
scope of the carbon monoxide threat and
advised that “these issues be solved before
any tenants suffer health problems or death.”
The POA, through Kalsbeek, intervened and
instructed FRPM to not distribute Davis's
letter. Sheila Thomason, FRPM’s mainte-
nance supervisor, testified that Kalsbeek’s
instruction was the sole reason why Davis’s
letter was not distributed. As Thomason tes-
tified, Kalsbeek wanted to be “in charge of
distributing this type of information to the
individual—individual owners at Sagecrest.”

Second, in March 2012, FRPM contacted
Kalsbeek concerning warnings to distribute
to unit owners and tenants and provided a
draft warning. The warning “stated different
levels of CO levels and what the ... symp-
toms were experienced at those levels,” Kals-
beek reviewed the warning and instructed
FRPM to not distribute the warning, insist-
ing it was irrelevant. FRPM, however, clari-
fied that the warning had already been dis-
tributed.

The district court found that “no one pre-
sented any evidence that [the] POA under-
took the duty to warn tenants about carbon
monoxide issues....” The POA similarly ar-

that her water heater would be “replaced next
week,” is not one of these warnings. No argu-
ment is made on appeal that the POA undertook
any involvement with regard to that warning.

gues the above facts do not concern “acts to
warn the tenants of the dangerous condition
on the property previously. ...” Neither the
district court’s finding nor the POA’s argu-
ment persuades us. To be clear, the district
court and the POA are correct insofar that
the above facts do not show that the POA
undertook to warn unit owners and tenants;
rather, the above facts illustrate that FRPM
undertook to warn unit owners and tenants,
But that conclusion overlooks whether the
POA undertook to exercise control over
warnings by intervening, or attempting to
intervene, with regard to the two warnings
above. Exercising control over warnings is a
different issue than actually distributing
warnings, and we find triable issues of fact
surround its resolution,

ii, Reliance
HM According to Appellants, FRPM re-
lied on the POA with regard to the three
voluntary undertakings explored above. The
district court, by contrast, concluded no par-
ty relied on the POA and explained that:
Other than argument, no party presented
any evidence that Sagecrest POA repre-
sented to anyone, including First Rate,
Switzer or Kipper, that i, and not the
owners, would provide and install carbon
monoxide detectors or new water heaters,
In fact, the only evidence is that Kipper
did not even know who or what Sagecrest.
POA was. The only evidence in the record
is that both Sagecrest POA and First Rate
always recognized that First Rate needed
Switzer’s consent, as the owner of the unit,
to repair or replace the water heaters if
the cost was over $250,

The record before us on appeal causes us
to disagree. First, as to the installation of
hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms, the
POA issued two sets of procedures governing
that undertaking, The POA’s procedures ap-
pear mandatory, as they instruct that the
“procedures shall be followed....” FRPM
referred to the POA’s procedures as “Jon’s
procedures or Jon’s way.” Specifically, “[hle
came into town ... and said, ‘[t]his is what
the procedures are going to be,’ He laid them
out for [FRPM].” And, the POA refused to
deviate from those procedures. For instance,

329

although FRPM requested to make immedi-
ate installation of hard-wired carbon monox-
ide alarms in October 2012, the request was
never granted, Indeed, Lizz Loop, FRPM’s
general manager, explained that immediate
installation was not performed because
FRPM was “following the procedures.” Thus,
triable issues of fact surround whether
FRPM relied on the POA with respect to this
voluntary undertaking.

‘Triable issues of fact also surround wheth-
er FRPM relied on the POA with respect to
preventative maintenance. As discussed,
FRPM proposed hiring a plumber to perform
preventative maintenance, provided informa-
tion on the cost to do so, and requested
guidance, The POA, through Kalsbeek, ob-
jected to FRPM’s proposal, citing cost con-
cerns, but indicated the POA would never-
theless review that information and “get back

.-next week.” But the POA never did so,
and the preventative maintenance was never
performed. Given that the POA represented
it would provide guidance, a jury could rea-
sonably find that FRPM relied on the POA
regarding this voluntary undertaking.

Finally, triable issues of fact surround
whether FRPM relied on the POA with re-
spect to the distribution of Ben Davis’s let-
ter. As noted, FRPM sought to distribute
Davis’s letter in July 2011, Because Kals-
beek’s instruction prohibited FRPM from do-
ing so, as Thomason testified, a jury could
reasonably find that FRPM relied on the
POA with respect to the distribution of
Davis’s letter. Conversely, reliance cannot be
shown as a matter of law regarding the
warning issued in March 2012, The key un-
disputed fact undermining reliance is that
the March 2012 warning was issued before
the POA, through Kalsbeek, could intervene.
While Kalsbeek instructed that the warning
should not be issued, his instruction came too
late. In sum, although reliance fails as a
matter of law regarding the March 2012
warning, triable issues of fact surround
whether FRPM relied on the POA with re-
spect to Davis’s letter.

The POA tries to rebut the above by argu-
ing FRPM could not rely on the POA with
respect to undertakings FRPM had contract-
ed to perform on behalf of unit owners. The

330

undisputed facts do not support that argu-
ment, Based on the above, the record is
replete with factual disputes showing that a
jury could reasonably find that FRPM relied
on the POA. In fact, this case is similar to
Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Ida-
ho 346, 179 P.38d 309 (2008). In Baccus, an
employer hired a contractor to place safety
mats at workplace entryways. Id. at 351-52,
179 P.8d at 314-15. On at least one occasion,
the contractor failed to do so, and as a result,
an employee slipped and became injured. Id.
The employee sued the contractor in negli-
gence. Id. When the case came before us on
appeal, we explained with regard to reliance:
“[s]o, [the contractor] induced [the employ-
er’s] reliance on [the contractor’s] promise to
replace the safety mats, which increased the
risk that ... [an] employee such as plaintiff
could slip, fall, and sustain injury were the
promise not kept.” Id. at 352, 179 P.8d at
815, Here, like Baccus, a jury could reason-
ably find that the POA induced FRPM’s
reliance with regard to hard-wired carbon
monoxide alarms, preventative maintenance,
and carbon monoxide warnings, all of which
were matters with the potential to increase
the risk of harm to Sagecrest tenants and
guests. Therefore, we conclude triable issues
of fact surround reliance.

iii, Foreseeability

HM “(Nlormally, the foreseeability of a
risk of harm, and thus whether a duty conse-
quently attaches, is a question of fact re-
served for the jury.” Stoddart v. Pocatello
Sch, Dist. #25, 149 Idaho 679, 686, 239 P.8d
784, 791 (2010). We find that to be true in
this case. We cannot say as a matter of law
that Forbush’s death and Halowell’s injuries
were or were not foreseeable. Instead, we
find it proper for a jury to decide.

In sum, triable issues of fact surround
whether the POA acquired a duty of care as
a result of the voluntary undertakings ex-
plored above, We therefore reverse the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment in
this regard and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. We empha-
size that if the POA is found to have acquired
a duty of care as a result of these voluntary
undertakings, any duty imposed must be lim-

ited to the scope of the actual undertaking.
Cf. Beers v. Corp. of Pres. of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680,
688, 816 P.8d 92, 100 (2018) (“[Allthough a
party may assume a duty by undertaking to
act, that duty is limited to the scope of the
undertaking.”),

8. Vicarious liability
Hs Finally, Appellants argue triable
issues of fact surround whether the POA is
vicariously liable for the torts of its agent,
FRPM. “A principal is liable for the torts of
an agent committed within the scope of the
agency relationship.” Sharp v. W.H. Moore,
Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 303, 796 P.2d 506, 512
(1990). An agency relationship arises when
the principal:
(1) (Elxpressly grants the agent authority
to conduct certain actions on his or her
behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent au-
thority to conduct certain actions which
are necessary to complete those actions
that were expressly authorized; or (8) ap-
parently grants the agent authority to act
through conduet towards a third party in-
dicating that express or implied authority
has been granted.
Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 785,
866 P.8d 1088, 1095 (2016). “This Court has
previously viewed the question of whether an
agency relationship exists as a question of
fact for the jury to determine.” Id. at 785 n.2,
366 P.3d at 1095 n.2, But, to be clear,
“fw]hether facts sufficient to constitute an
agency relationship exist is indeed a question
of fact for the jury, however, whether a given
set of facts are sufficient to constitute an
agency relationship is a question of law ap-
propriate for this Court’s consideration.” Id.
HM The district court rejected Appel-
lants’ agency argument, concluding Appel-
lants lacked authority over unit interiors.
That conclusion rests on the authority grant-
ed to the POA under the CCRs, which the
district court found was limited to unit exte-
riors. We agree insofar that the CCRs do not
grant the POA any authority over unit interi-
ors, and hence, the CCRs cannot give rise to
an agency relationship over unit interiors.
Indeed, the CCRs clearly and unambiguously
delineate authority between the POA and

unit owners. CCR § 8.8 gives the POA au-
thority over unit exteriors and unit owners
authority over unit interiors. CCR § 8.5 rein-
forces that delineation of authority, as it
provides that “[elJach Owner shall have the
exclusive right to paint, repair, tile, wash,
paper or otherwise maintain ... the interior
portions of their Four Plex...” Because the
CCRs do not give the POA any authority
over unit interiors, they cannot give rise to
an agency relationship over unit interiors?

HI However, the district court over-
looked how authority bestowed by a contract,
like the CCRs, is not dispositive when deter-
mining whether an agency relationship ex-
ists. E.g., Thornton v, Ford Motor Co., 297
P.8d 418, 419 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (“If the
facts show actual control by the principal, an
agency is established regardless of the con-
tract language.”); Hylton v. Koontz, 138
N.C.App. 629, 582 S.H.2d 252, 257 (2000) (It
is not dispositive that a contract denies the
existence of an agency relationship, if in fact
the relationship was that of agent-princi-
pal.”); Tomlinson v. G.E. Capital Dealer Dis-
trib. Fin, Inc., 624 So.2d 565, 567 (Ala. 1998)
(“[Tyhe language of this provision is not con-
dusive and will not preclude the finding of
agency if there is independent evidence of a
retained right of control.”). We have long
instructed that the “important factor is the
control or right of control reserved by the
[principal] over the functions and duties of
the agent.” Koch v. Elleins, 71 Idaho 50, 57,
225 P.2d 457, 462 (1950),

HH In this case, we find triable issues of
fact surround whether an agency relationship
existed as a result of control the POA actual-

3. The parties dispute the extent of authority
granted to the POA under CCR § 3.8, which
provides:

In the event the Owner of any Residential Lot
improved with a Four Plex shall fail to main-
tain any portion of such Owner's Residential
Lot that Owner is responsible to maintain, in a
manner reasonable satisfactory to the Board,
after approval by vote of at least sixty percent
(60%) of the members of the Board present
and voting and subject to such Owner's right
to notice and a hearing before the Board, the
Association may, through its agents and em-
ployees, enter upon the Residential Lot or Four
Plex and repair, maintain and restore the Resi-
dential Lot, or the Four Plex. The cost of such
repair, maintenance and restoration shall be

331

ly exerted over FRPM with regard to unit
interiors, As a general matter, the record
shows that the POA exercised financial lever-
age over FRPM. As Appellants assert, Sage-
erest was FRPM’s largest account, and
FRPM was therefore required to stay in the
POA’s “good graces” to keep Sagecrest, CCR
§ 6.6A supports that assertion, as it required
unit owners to employ the same property
management company the POA selected to
employ for its duties. Further, the POA con-
trolled FRPM’s rate of compensation.
FRPM’s compensation at Sagecrest was two-
fold: (1) a $150 monthly management fee,
paid by the POA; and @) five percent of
monthly gross rental receipts, which, al-
though paid by unit owners, was contingent
on the rental rates that the POA and FRPM
set. Finally, the POA paid the wages of
FRPM’s employees who were “fully as-
signed” to Sagecrest. The POA therefore ov-
ersaw those employees’ overtime requests.
For example, in October 2012, the POA re-
quested FRPM to clarify in which units hard-
wired carbon monoxide alarms were install-
ed. In response, FRPM’s employee request-
ed to stay late, working overtime, to gather
the information. The POA denied the over-
time request.

The POA maintains that the above argu-
ments are “completely irrelevant to the is-
sues of control of the interiors of the units.”
The POA elaborates that “Switzer had a
contract with FRPM to manage his unit
#4624. Switzer granted authority to FRPM
over his residential lot and, as a non-party to
the contract, the SMPOA Board could not
alter this agreement in any way.” We decline

chargeable to the Owner of such Residential
Lot or Four Plex and shall constitute a lien on
the Residential Lot of such Owner, collectible
in the same manner as Limited Assessments
under this Declaration.
The parties specifically dispute whether CCR
§ 3.8 extends to unit interiors and thus whether
it gives the POA authority to maintain unit interi-
ors if unit owners fail to do so, We do not
address that dispute, What is undisputed is that
CCR § 3.8 requires a 60% vote, notice, and hear-
ing before the POA can take any action, And
what is further undisputed is that the procedure
did not occur in this case. As a result, the author-
ity CCR § 3.8 provides to the POA, whatever its
extent, was never triggered.

332

to find Switzer’s contract with FRPM dispos-
itive. Despite that contract, we find triable
issues of fact surround whether the above
leverage allowed the POA to exert control
over FRPM and unit interiors. Tony Drost,
FRPM’s President, testified that the POA,
through Kalsbeek, controlled “global issues”
that were complex-wide. Drost testified that
global issues extended to unit interiors and
consisted of “the CO testing”; “the water
heaters”; “leaks with the windows, stairwells,
light bulbs.” According to Drost, FRPM was
required to “run any global issue through
[Kalsbeek]....” Sheila Thomason, FRPM’s
Maintenance Supervisor, further testified
that Kalsbeek “was in charge.” She explained
that Kalsbeek led FRPM to believe that “he
spoke on behalf of the owners.” Thus, Swit-
zer’s contract with FRPM does not resolve
whether the POA exerted actual control over
FRPM and unit interiors.

Moreover, as explained above, triable is-
sues of fact surround whether FRPM relied
on the POA regarding (1) the installation of
hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms; (2) pre-
ventative maintenance; and (8) carbon mo-
noxide warnings. See supra Part IV(A)(2)(b).
Based on the record before us on appeal,
triable issues of fact surround whether the
PO4A’s control over FRPM caused FRPM to
rely on the POA with respect to those volun-
tary undertakings, Consequently, we cannot
say as a matter of law that no agency rela-
tionship existed as a result of actual control,
We therefore reverse summary judgment on
this issue and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

B. Did the district court properly grant
summary judgment to Kalsbeel?

Appellants contend triable issues of fact
surround whether Kalsbeek owed a duty of
care he acquired as a result of voluntary
undertakings? To make this argument, Ap-
pellants rely on the same contentions ex-
plored above concerning the POA. See supra
Part IV(A)(2)(b). Here, however, Appellants’
arguments implicate Kalsbeek as an individu-

4, In their opening brief, Appellants argued Kals-
beek also owed a premises liability-based duty of
care, Appellants have withdrawn that argument.
Additionally, although Kalsbeek discussed vicari-

al, not as the POA’s President. Thus, Appel-
lants seek to hold Kalsbeek personally liable.

HM “A director who personally partici-
pates in a tort is personally liable to the
victim, even though the corporation might
also be vicariously liable.” Hliopulos v, Know,
128 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.
App. 1992), The same is true for corporate
officers, See, ag., 18B Am, Jur. 2d Corpora-
tions § 1609 (2016) (“A director or officer of
a corporation does not incur personal liability
for its torts ... unless he or she has partici-
pated in the wrong, had direct personal in-
volvement ... or authorized or directed that
the wrong be done.”). “A contrary rule would
enable a director or officer of a corporation
to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape
liability behind the shield of his or her repre-
sentative character even though the corpora-
tion might be insolvent or irresponsible.” Id.

HE In granting summary judgment to
Kalsbeek, the district court applied the same
logic to Kalsbeek as it applied to the POA
and concluded Kalsbeek did not acquire a
duty of care as a result of voluntary under-
takings. That conclusion represents error,
Based on the above, triable issues of fact
surround whether the POA acquired a duty
of care as a result of voluntary undertakings.
And, as noted, Kalsbeek directed those un-
dertakings. Kalsbeek promulgated the POA’s
two sets of procedures governing the installa-
tion of hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms.
FRPM even referred to those procedures as
“Jon’s procedures.” Kalsbeek objected to
FRPM’s preventative maintenance proposal
and instructed FRPM that the POA would
provide guidance, but he failed to do so.
Kalsbeek intervened in an effort to control
the warnings issued to unit owners and ten-
ants, and as FRPM explained, Kalsbeek was
the sole reason why Ben Davis's letter was
not distributed.

Kalsbeek concedes his involvement in
these matters, but he contends it does not
give rise to a duty of care. He emphasizes
how CCR § 7.2 designates him as the “the
authorized representative of the [POA] to

ous liability in his brief, Appellants make clear
that they seek to hold only the POA vicariously
liable. Thus, we are left with only the voluntary
undertakings argument.

give and receive notices, approvals, and in-
structions hereunder.” Simply that the CCRs
may authorize Kalsbeek’s involyement is ir-
relevant, Even if his involvement were au-
thorized, that authorization would not resolve
whether he acquired a duty of care as a
result of voluntary undertakings and could
therefore be subject to personal liability if he
personally participated in tortious conduct.

Thus, we conclude triable issues of fact
surround whether Kalsbeek acquired a duty
of care for the same reasons identified above,
See supra Part IV(A)@)(b). We therefore
reverse summary judgment granted to Kals-
beek.5

C. Should we award attorney fees on ap-
peal?

HH Appellants do not request fees. Kals-
beek and the POA request fees under Idaho
Code section 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 54(e)(1), and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.
Fees are properly awarded to the prevailing
party “if the action was pursued, defended,
or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or with-
out foundation.” Idaho Military Historical
Soc’y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 638, 829
P.8d 1072, 1081 (2014) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

As to Kalsbeek, he is not the prevailing
party on appeal and is therefore not entitled
to fees, As to the POA, it prevails on appeal
on the premises liability issue, but Appellants
prevail on the issues of whether the POA
may have acquired a duty of care as a result
of voluntary undertakings, and whether the
POA may be vicariously liable for FRPM’s
eonduet, Although the POA is the prevailing
party on the premises liability issue, Appel-
lants did not bring or pursue that argument
frivolously, unreasonably, or without founda-
tion. Accordingly, we do not award fees on
appeal.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm in part and reverse in part the
district court’s summary judgment order. We

5, Even if he acquired a duty of care, Kalsbeek
argues he is immune from liability under Idaho
Code section 30-30-623, Yet, since Kalsbeek con-
cedes the district court did not address the issue
of immunity, we decline to reach it on appeal. Cf.

333

affirm that summary judgment was properly
granted as to whether the POA owed a
premises liability-based duty of care. Howev-
er, summary judgment was improperly
granted as to whether the POA and Kalsbeek
acquired @ duty of care as a result of volun-
tary undertakings, and whether the POA is
vicariously liable for FRPM’s conduct. We
therefore remand this case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. We de-
cline to award attorney fees on appeal. We
award Appellants costs against Kalsbeek on
appeal because they prevail against him, but
not against the POA.

Justices, EISMANN, JONES and
HORTON concur.

BRODY, Justice, concurring in part,
dissenting in part. .

I respectfully dissent from Part IV.A.1. of
the Court's: opinion, because I disagree with
the majority’s conclusion that premises Habil-
ity can only be imposed on an “owner” or
“occupier” of land or their agents, This
bright-line rule is-inconsistent with our prior
case law and may allow some responsible
parties to escape liability,

The majority begins its analysis with the
statement “[alppellants correctly inform us
that ‘the general rule of premises liability is
that one having control of the premises may
be liable for failure to keep the premises in
repair,” Jones %, Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 261,
245 P.3d 1009, 1018 (2011) (quoting Heath v,
Honker’s Mini-Mart, Inc, 184 Idaho 711,
718, 8 P.8d 1254, 1256 (Ct.App. 2000)),” The
majority then limits this principle by stating
that our case law demonstrates that premises
liability is limitéd to owners or occupiers or
their agents. The majority contends that the
issue of control only comes irito play when
there is a dispute between owners and oceu-
piers as to whom actually owes a duty to the
injured party. I disagree with the majority’s
analysis.

Boise Tower Assocs., LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho

714, 784, 215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009) (remanding

case for resolution of issues the district court
never reached).

334

To begin with, none of the cases cited by
the majority actually address whether some-
one other than an owner or occupier or their
agents can be held responsible under a prem-
ises liability theory. The first case the major-
ity cites is Rowntree v. Boise Baseball, LLC,
154 Idaho 167, 296 P.3d 878 (2018). In Roun-
tree, the plaintiff was a patron at a Boise
Hawks baseball game. Id. at 169, 296 P.3d at
375. He was seated in the executive section
of the stadium when he was hit in the face
with a baseball during the game. Id. He lost.
an eye. Id. He sued a number of parties,
including the baseball team and the owner of
the stadium. Id. Rountree contains this state-
ment: “(t]he duty owed by owners and pos-
sessors of land depends on the status of the
person injured on the land....” Id. at 171,
296 P.8d at 377. The majority quotes this
language, but it is important to recognize
that Rountree does not actually address
whether someone other an owner or posses-
sor of land can be held responsible under a
premises liability theory. The issues actually
decided in Rowntree were whether Idaho
should adopt the so-called “baseball rule” (a
rule which limits owner liability to protect
against foul balls) and whether the patron
assumed the risk of being hit. Id. at 170-75,
296 P.3d at 376-81.

The majority also cites Stem v. Prouty, 152
Idaho 590, 272 P.8d 562 (2012). Stem involved
a forklift accident. Id. at 591, 272 P.3d at 563.
The plaintiff lost his leg after being pinned
underneath a forklift that toppled over when
it broke through a water meter cover in the
floor. Id. The plaintiff sued the landowner,
alleging that the premises were unsafe be-
cause the water meter cover was too thin to
support the weight of the forklift. Jd. The
only issue decided by the Court was whether
the landowner was not responsible because
there was no evidence that he knew that the
water meter cover created a dangerous con-
dition. Id. at 598-94, 272 P.8d at 565-66, The
Stem decision does not address whether a
premises liability can be brought against a
tortfeasor who is not a landowner or occupi-
er.

The final case cited by the majority is
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d
1821 (1989). The plaintiff in Harrison

brought suit against a building owner and
tenant when she fell in a hole in a sidewalk in
front of the business. Id. at 589-90, 768 P.2d
at 1822-23. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants based on
the “open and obvious” doctrine. Jd. at 590,
768 P.2d at 1828. This Court reversed, find-
ing that the doctrine was inconsistent with
Idaho’s comparative negligence laws. Id. at
595-96, 768 P.2d at 1328-29. Like Stem and
Prouty, the Harrison decision did not ad-
dress in any fashion whether a premises
liability action could be brought against
someone other than an owner or occupier or
their agents.

The earliest case where the Court ad-
dressed premises liability in the context of a
non-owner appears to be Oits v. Brough, 90
Idaho 124, 409 P.2d 95 (1965), superseded on
other grownds by I.C. § 6-801. In Ofts, the
plaintiff was injured when he fell into a
framed opening in a conerete floor. Id. at
128-29, 409 P.2d at 96-97. The plaintiff was a
subcontractor who had been hired to do the
ceiling insulation in a new school building
that was being constructed in Rexburg. Id.
The plaintiff sued the general contractor for
failing to guard and warn against the danger
created by the opening in the floor. Id. at
129, 409 P.2d at 97. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the general
contractor, holding that the claim was barred
by the defense of assumption of risk. Jd. This
Court reversed, holding that there were gen-
uine issues of material fact which precluded
summary judgment. Id. at 134-86, 409 P.2d
at 100-02. In addressing the duty owed by
the general contractor, the Court held:
“Owners or persons in charge of property
owe to an invitee or business visitor the duty
to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, or to warn the invitee of hidden or
concealed dangers of which the owner or one
in charge knows or should know by exercise
of reasonable care, in order that the invitee
be not unnecessarily or unreasonably ex-
posed to danger.” Id. at 131, 409 P.2d at 98
(emphasis added).

The majority contends that Otis can be
squared with their holding today because
there is evidence that the general contractor
“occupied” the worksite. While I agree that

there is evidence in Otts from which a rea-
sonable jury could reach that conclusion, the
“persons in charge of property” language in
Otts is a better test for determining whether
premises liability should attach than the “oc-
cupier” label used by the majority. A simple
example illustrates my point.

Suppose I hire a contractor to remodel my
kitchen. The contractor works at my house a
few days a week while my family and I are
still living in the home. One day, my mother
comes to visit, She is helping me cook dinner,
She steps inside the pantry to get an ingredi-
ent and is injured when she falls into a hole
in the floor. I had no idea the hole was there
and there was no warning or barricade. Can
the contractor be held responsible for her
injuries under a premises liability theory for
creating a dangerous condition on the prem-
ises? Under the majority’s decision today the
answer would likely be no since the contrac-
tor does not “oceupy” the house. My family
and I do. If the analysis were “does the
contractor control the premises”—as I advo-
cate the legal test is in Idaho—the answer
would much more likely be yes. Imposing
premises liability on a contractor in a situa-
tion like this makes sense because he created
the hazard and was in a position to remedy it
or guard against it.

The majority’s decision to include “agents”
within the categories of persons who can be
held liable under a premises liability theory,
while a step in the right direction, does not
go far enough to address my concerns. An-
other example illustrates my point,

Suppose a local school district hires a gen-
eral contractor to build a new science wing at,
its high school. The general contractor enters
into a contract with a construction manager
to oversee the project. A student is injured
when he falls into a hole that has been
covered with a flimsy piece of plywood. Can
the general contractor and/or the profession-
al construction manager be held responsible
under a premises liability theory as “agents”
of the school district? The majority says yes,
asserting that general contractors and pro-
fessional construction managers are “fre-
quently” the agents of the landowner. My
experience tells me differently.

335

This Court explained nearly 100 years ago
that “{algency is the relationship which re-
sults from the manifestation of consent by
one person to another that the other shall act
on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act.” Gorton v.
Doty, 57 Idaho 792, 798, 69 P.2d 186, 189
(1937) (emphasis added). When a school dis-
trict hires a general contractor to build a new
science wing, it usually does so because the
district does not have the knowledge, skills,
tools, or time to do the work. The general
contractor is an independent contractor who
exercises its own judgment about how to do
the work and provides the tools and skills to
get it done. There is a contractual relation-
ship between the district and the general
contractor, but that contractual relationship
does not necessarily mean there is an agency
relationship.

Similarly, the construction manager in my
example cannot be the school district’s agent.
‘The school district did not even contract with
the construction manager so there is no con-
sent by either party and the school district
would have no control over anything the
construction manager does. The general con-
tractor might control the construction man-
ager depending on the contractual relation-
ship, but a professional construction manager
may also be an independent contractor.
While I would agree that it is the landowner
who typically contracts with a construction
manager and that an agency relationship is
more likely to exist in that scenario, con-
struction projects are carried out in many
different ways and one cannot assume that a
construction manager will always be the
landowner’s agent. Given the complex nature
of modern business entities and real estate
transactions, it is possible to imagine the
prospect of a general contractor or construc-
tion manager, who exercises the requisite
control over the premises, escaping liability
under the majority’s rule because he does not
neatly fit within the categories elucidated
today.

Other jurisdictions have dealt with this
‘issue and have concluded that construction
contractors share in premises liability, even
though they are neither owner nor occupier.
See Worth v. Eugene Gentile Builders, 697

336

S0.2d 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 1997) (holding
that contractors may share premises liability
for job site injuries when the premises are
under the contractor’s control); see also 62
AM, JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 6 (2005);
18 AM. JUR. 2D Building and Construction
Contracts § 186 (2009); 4r § 884. In Maine,
premises liability for other parties has arisen
in the context of whether a national fraterni-
ty is liable for sexual assault perpetrated by
one of its members. In Brown v. Delta Taw
Delia, 2015 ME 75, 118 A.38d 789 (2015), the
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the
national fraternity organization had a prem-
ises-liability-based duty to its collegiate chap-
ters’ social invitees, even though the national
fraternity did not own or oceupy the premis-
es in question, because the assault was for-
seeable, the national fraternity had authority
to control its members and actually exercised
that control, and because it had a sufficiently
close relationship with its local chapters and
individual members.

I cannot square the majority's decision
today with the Court’s recent decision in
McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc.,
151 Idaho 280, 255 P.8d 1166 @011). In
McDevitt, the plaintiff was injured when she
slipped or tripped over a recessed irrigation
box in a sidewalk outside of Sportsman’s
‘Warehouse in Twin Falls. Jd. at 281, 255 P.3d
at 1167. The primary issue presented in the
case was whether Sportsman’s could be held
liable under a premises liability theory for
the alleged dangerous condition. Jd. at 283,
255 P.3d at 1169, In answering this question,
this Court engaged in a two-step analysis. Id,
at 284-86, 255 P.8d at 1170-73, First, it
explained that a tenant “occupies” land. Id.
This Court then analyzed whether the side-
walk was part of Sportsman’s leased premis-
es and determined that it was not. Jd. This
Court’s analysis did not, however, stop there.
Even though the Court concluded that
Sportsman's was not an “occupier” of the
sidewalk (i.e., it did not fit within one of the
categories of persons defined by the majority
today), this Court then went on to analyze
whether Sportsman’s controlled the sidewalk.
Id, at 285-86, 255 P.8d at 1171-72, While the
plaintiff in McDevitt was ultimately unsuc-
cessful in demonstrating Sportsman’s control,
all I am saying is that the majority should

have applied the same legal analysis to this
case,

In this case, the record contains evidence
that the POA exercised some control over
the interior of the apartment units, regard-
less of the content of the CC&R’s. FRPM’s
President testified that POA handled “global
issues” that affected apartment units com-
plex wide, such as furnace filters and water
heaters. These global issues were not re-
stricted to the exterior of the units, as the
COGR’s seemed to contemplate, For in-
stance, the POA ordered the FRPM to con-
duct carbon monoxide testing inside each
unit every three months. They also issued
two sets of procedures for handling carbon
monoxide issues related to the faulty water
heaters, including directing the installation of
hard-wired carbon monoxide alarms inside
the units, From my perspective, this evidence
is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact about whether the POA exer-
cised sufficient control to incur premises lia-
bility. For that reason I believe that sum-
mary judgment on this issue was not proper.
The issue should have been submitted to a

jury.

396 P.3d 1218

Carlos MARTINEZ (Portillo),
Petitioner-Respondent,

v

Evelia CARRASCO (Mendoza),
Respondent-Appellant,

and

State of Idaho, Department of Health
and Welfare, Child Support Services
Intervenor-Respondent,

Docket No. 44622-2016

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: June 20, 2017

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. Mr. Blower was not counsel for appellant in

Earl Blower, Swafford Law PC, Idaho
Falls, argued for appellant.

Javed M. Harris, Baker & Harris, Black-
foot, argued for respondent.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Bingham County
from the modification of a judgment by de-
fault to require that the parents of a child
rotate custody of their three-year-old child
every three weeks, where the father is living
in Blackfoot and the mother is living in
Oceanside, California, a distance of 918 miles
away. We hold that the magistrate court
abused its discretion in ordering that custody
rotation. In addition, the mother had moved
to modify the judgment by default, but did
not move to set aside the entry of default.
We hold that the father waived the default
by litigating the motion to modify.

L

Factual Background.

In June 2011, Carlos Martinez (“Father”)
and Evelia Carrasco (“Mother”) met in Idaho
Falls, and they lived together in Idaho until
February 2018. When they separated, Moth-
er was seven months pregnant. She moved to
Salt Lake City to live with her sister and
gave birth while there to a male child
(“Child”). She then returned to Idaho, and in
September 2018, she moved to California

the trial court.

with Child and her older nine-year-old son
from a prior relationship.

On July 25, 2018, the State of Idaho, De-
partment of Health and Welfare (“Depart-
ment”), filed an action in Bingham County
against Father and Mother to establish filia-
tion and child support. After Department.
established through DNA testing that Father
was the father of Child, Father filed a cross-
claim against Mother seeking, among other
things, that the court enter a judgment pro-
viding: “That the parties share joint legal
and joint physical custody of the minor child.
The parties will have custody every other
week alternating on Friday nights at 6:00
pan”

On April 16, 2014, Father filed a separate
action against Mother seeking, among other
things, a judgment providing: “That the par-
ties share joint legal and joint physical custo-
dy of the minor child. The parties will have
eustody every other week alternating on Fri-
day nights at 6:00 p.m.” On April 17, 2014,
the magistrate court entered an order consol-
idating the case filed by Department into the
case filed by Father.

The State was able to serve Mother in
Pocatello on July 31, 2014. She contends that.
she had returned temporarily to assist her
nieces in obtaining public assistance, She ap-
parently applied for public assistance in Ida-
ho while she was in Pocatello, which was
probably how the State was able to locate
and serve her, Father was unable to person-
ally serve her, so he served her by publica-
tion in a Pocatello newspaper, which service
was completed on September 20, 2014.2 He
obtained a default judgment on October 16,
2014, and an amended judgment on Decem-

2. Mother did not challenge the service by publi-
cation in a Pocatello, Idaho, newspaper on the
ground that she was living in California at the
time.

3. A copy of the original judgment is not in the
record, so the record does not reflect how the
amended judgment differs from the original judg-
ment. Likewise, the record does not reflect how
an amended judgment could be entered without
Mother being served with a motion to amend the
original judgment.

4. The magistrate court erred in holding that the
motion should be resolved pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but that error was
harmless. Father’s judgment by default and the

339

ber 29, 2014.3 The amended judgment provid-
ed, “That the parties share legal custody and
FATHER have sole physical custody of the
minor child with MOTHER to have visitation
as the parties can agree.” It also provided
that “MOTHER be ordered by the court to
pay FATHER’s attorney’s fees and costs of
$2,500.00,” although there is no indication of
the statutory basis for such award.

Mother had actual physical custody of
Child until March 31, 2016. Father went to
Oceanside, California, where Mother was liv-
ing with Child and her older son. He found
her at a Wal-Mart store and told her that his
mother was there from Mexico and wanted to
see Child. She agreed to that request. Moth-
er’s older son was in school, and she drove to
his school to pick him up, with Child, Father,
and Father’s mother in the car. Mother
agreed to permit Child to spend the night
with Father, but asked that he also take her
older son because he and Child were close.
They agreed to meet at the Wal-Mart store
the next day, which was March 81, 2016.
When Mother arrived at the store, Father
was not there. She called him, and he stated
that he was taking Child and that he left
Mother's older son outside her apartment.
Father then brought Child to Idaho.

HM On April 14, 2016, Mother filed a
motion pursuant to Idaho Rules of Family
Law Procedure 306 and 809(4) to set aside
the initial October 16, 2014, default judge-
ment on the ground that it was void. At the
conclusion of oral argument on the motion,
the magistrate court stated that it would
decide the motion based upon Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) * and that it could “find

later amended judgment were entered pursuant
to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However,
Mother’s motion to modify the judgment was
filed after the Idaho Rules of Family Law Proce-
dure took effect statewide on July 1, 2015. Rule
101 of those rules provides:

‘These rules govern the procedure in the
magistrate’s division of the district court in the
State of Idaho in all actions for divorce, legal
separation, child support, child custody, and
paternity; ... and all proceedings, judgments
or decrees related to the establishment, modifi-
cation, or enforcement of orders in such ac-
tions, except contempt.

Therefore, the Idaho Rules of Family Law Proce-
dure applied to Mother's motion to modify the

340

no mistake, inadvertence, or other grounds
under Rule 60(b) to set the judgment aside
under these circumstances.” However, the
court stated that it would permit Mother to
make an oral motion to modify the existing
judgment, to be followed by a written one,

After the magistrate court stated it would
deny the motion to set aside the default
judgment, it set an evidentiary hearing on
the anticipated motion to modify and then
told the parties that they needed to discuss a
temporary custody arrangement for Child,
The court made it clear that it was contem-
plating equal time for both parents, It stated
as follows:

Let me just throw out a suggestion to
you. What I anticipate doing is saying that
Dad will keep the child until the month of
April is over, and then Mom can take the
child for the month of May. And then Dad
will get the child back for the month of
June. So we're just going to rotate it on
that basis between on that.

Now, that is not the best custody ar-
rangement for this child. I understand
that, But under the circumstances and the
limited amount of time, it’s somewhat fair
to the parents—probably not fair to your
child, but it’s fair to the parents,

Now, if you men want to discuss that
with your clients, you can do that. If not,
we'll launch into a hearing at 4:00 o’clock.
And what I'll do is I'll take a little bit of
testimony from each of these parties for a
few minutes, and then I’ll issue a decision.

Mother is not fluent in English and had to
communicate through an interpreter. After a
recess, the parties stipulated to change phys-
ical custody of Child every two weeks. Moth-
er filed her petition to modify on April 26,
2016,

The evidentiary hearing was held on Au-
gust 11, 2016. At that time, Child was three
years of age and Mother's older son was nine
years of age. After the trial, the court en-
tered its findings of fact and conclusions of

judgment and to all further proceedings. Howev-

er, Rules 306 and 809(4) of the Idaho Rules of

Family Law Procedure are essentially the same

as Rules 55(c) and 60(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of

Civil Procedure, Therefore, the court's error as to

which rules applied was harmless.

Jaw and a judgment. The judgment required
the parties to change physical custody of
Child every three weeks, with the exchange
of custody to occur at the McDonald’s restau-
rant in Barstow, California off I-15 at exit
184, and it ordered that neither party would
pay child support and that each party would
provide health insurance for Child if it was
available at a reasonable cost and would pay
one-half of any uncovered medical expenses
for Child.

Mother petitioned for a permissive appeal
to this Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 12.1, which this Court granted. Mother
then filed her notice of appeal.

IL

Does this Court Have Jurisdiction
to Hear the Appeal?

HH On October 16, 2014, Father obtained
the entry of default against Mother and a
default judgment. On April 14, 2016, Mother
filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Rules of
Family Law Procedure 806 and 809(4) to set
aside the default judgment on the ground
that it was void because the magistrate court
lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment.
Father's cross-claim had been served by pub-
lication in a Pocatello newspaper in Septem-
ber 2014, Mother contended that she had
been a resident of California from September
2018 to the present; that while she was tem-
porarily in Idaho visiting her niece, she had
asked for public assistance; that she did not
know of this lawsuit or the judgment until
March 81, 2016, after Father had taken
Child;® and that California was her son’s
home state for purposes of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act, The magistrate court denied her motion
to set aside the default judgment, but stated
that she could file a motion to modify the
judgment. In so stating, the court erred.

I “Courts distinguish a judgment by
default from the mere entry of default....

3. The clerk of the court mailed a copy of the
judgment to Mother at an address in Pocatello
provided by Father, and Mother did not receive
it.

An entry of default and an entry of default
judgment are two separate events or steps.”
46 Am, Jur. 2d Judgments § 233 (2006) (foot-
notes omitted). An entry of default does not
constitute a judgment. Pierce v. McMullen,
156 Idaho 465, 469, 828 P.8d 445, 449 (2014).
Rule 301 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law
Procedure provides for the entry of default,$
and Rules 304 and 805 provide for entry of a
default judgment.” The corresponding Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure are essentially iden-
tical.6

HI Rule 306 of the Idaho Rules of Fami-
ly Law procedure sets forth the procedure
for setting aside a default and a default
judgment. It states, “For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default
and, if a judgment by default has been en-
tered, may likewise set it aside in accordance

6. Rule 301 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law
Procedure provides:

When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead
or otherwise defend as provided by these rules
and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or
otherwise, the court, shall order entry of de-
fault against the party. Default shall not be
entered against a party who has appeared in
the action unless that party (or, if appearing by
representative, the party's representative) has
been served with three (3) days written notice
of the application for entry of such default,

7. Rule ‘304 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law
Procedure provides:

When the petitioner's claim against a re-
spondent is for a sum certain or for a sum
which can by computation be made certain,
the court or the clerk thereof, upon request of
the petitioner, and upon the filing of an affida-
vit of the amount due showing the method of
computation, together with any original instru-
ment evidencing the claim unless otherwise
permitted by the court, shail enter judgment
for that amount and costs against the respon-
dent, if the respondent has been defaulted for
failure to appear and if the respondent is not
an infant or incompetent person, and has been
personally served, other than by publication or
personal service outside of this state. Any ap-
plication for a default judgment must contain
written certification of the name of the party
against whom judgment is requested and the
address most likely to give the respondent no-
tice of such default judgment, and the clerk
shall use such address in giving such party
notice of judgment. An application for default
judgment in a divorce or annulment action
must be accompanied by a certificate furnished
by the department of vital statistics fully filled

341

with Rule 809.” Under that rule, a party’s
default may be set aside for good cause
shown “and, if a judgment by default has
been entered,” the default judgment may
likewise be set aside in accordance with Rule
809, Thus, the default must be set aside and
then the judgment by default, although mo-
tions to set aside the default and to obtain
relief from the default judgment can be made
simultaneously, Setting aside the judgment
by default does not set aside the default,
because they are two separate actions.

Tn this case, Mother never moved to set,
aside the entry of default. Her motion stated:

COMES NOW the Cross Respondent,
Evelia Carrasco Carrasco, by and through
her attorney of record, NATHAN D. RIV-
ERA, and moves the Court, pursuant to

out by the party seeking the default divorce or
annulment.
Rule 305 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law
Procedure provides:

In all other cases the party entitled to a
judgment by default shall apply to the court
therefor; but no judgment by default shall be
entered against an infant or incompetent per-
son unless represented in the action by a gen-
eral guardian, or other such ‘representative
who has appeared therein. If the party against
whom judgment by default is sought has ap-
peared in the action, the party (or, if appearing
by representative, the party's representative)
shall be served with written notice of the appli-
cation for judgment at least three (3) days
prior to the hearing on such application, If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment or
to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an
account or to determine the amount of dam-
ages or to establish the truth of any statement
by evidence or to make an investigation of any
other matter, the court may conduct such
hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper. In actions for divorce,
the statutes of the state of Idaho shall apply.
Any application for a default judgment must
contain written certification of the name of the
party against whom the judgment is requested
and the address most likely to give the party
‘notice of such default judgment, and the clerk
shall use such address in giving such party
notice of judgment.

8. See Rule 55(a)(1) & (b) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.

9. Rule 55(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is virtually identical. It provides, “The court
may set aside an entry of default for good cause,
and it may set aside a default judgment under
Rule 60(b).”

342

the Rule 306 and Rule 809(4) of the Idaho

Rules of Family Law Procedure, to set

aside the default judgment which was en-

tered in this matter on October 16, 2014,

and that the case be reopened.
(Emphasis added.)

In Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92
P.2d 1053 (1939), we wrote:

“Upon the failure of the defendant to
answer the complaint within the time al-
lowed by law, and upon the entry of de-
fault, in the absence of fraud, the right of
the defendant to participate in the litiga-
tion is terminated, and the subsequent fil-
ing of an answer or demurrer on his part is
unauthorized and void, unless upon pro-
ceedings duly had, the default is first set
aside.”

60 Idaho at 469, 92 P.2d at 1055 (quoting
Jones v. Moers, 91 Cal.App. 65, 266 P, 821,
822-28 (1928)), We then added, “Upon the
filing of the default and default judgment,
May 24, 1938 respondent was out of court,
and the filing of his answer, June 2, 1938,
was unauthorized and void, adding nothing to
his legal rights. Jones v. Moers, supra, and
eases therein cited.” Id. at 470, 92 P.2d at
1055.

One of the cases cited in Jones v. Moers
was Title Inswrance & Trust Co. v. King
Land & Improvement Co., 162 Cal. 44, 120 P,
1066 (1912). In that case, the California Su-
preme Court explained that it would be inef-
fectual to set aside a default judgment with-
out also setting aside the entry of default.

A default cuts off the defendant from
making any further opposition or objection
to the relief which plaintiffs complaint
shows he is entitled to demand. A defen-
dant against whom a default is entered ‘is
out of court and is not entitled to take any
further steps in the cause affecting plain-
tiffs right of action.’ He cannot thereafter,
nor until such default is set aside in a
proper proceeding, file pleadings, or move
for a new trial, or demand notice of subse-
quent proceedings. ‘A default confesses all
the material facts in the complaint.’ Conse-
quently, if the judgment were vacated, it
would be the duty of the court immediately
to render another of like effect, and the
defaulting defendants would not be heard.

for the purpose of interposing any denial

or affirmative defense.
Id. at 1067 (internal citations omitted),

Likewise, in Commonwealth Trust Co. of
Pittsburgh v. Lorain, 43 Idaho 784, 255 P.
909 (1927), this Court held that the entry of
default must be set aside in order to set
aside a default judgment. In that case, de-
fault was entered against the defendants on
June 18, 1928, in an action to foreclose two
water contracts, and the judgment ordering
the sale of the contracts was entered during
the next term of court on February 5, 1924.
Id. at 786, 255 P. at 909. On March 10, 1924,
a successor in interest of the defendants
served a motion to vacate the default and
later filed the motion on March 14, 1924. Id.
The applicable statute provided that a court
could “relieve a party ... from a judgment,
order or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect ... upon application
made within a reasonable time, not exceeding
six months after the adjournment of the
term.” Idaho Comp. Stats. § 6726 (1919), The
motion to set aside the default was made
more than six months after the entry of
default but less than six months after the
entry of the default judgment.

The issue was: “Does the period prescribed
by the statute within which the motion to
vacate should be made date from the entry of
default or from the entry of judgment?” 43
Idaho at 787, 255 P. at 909. Relying upon the
decision of the California Supreme Court in
Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. King Land &
Improvement Co., construing identical lan-
guage in a California statute, this Court held
that the words “other proceeding taken
against him” included the entry of default
and that the time for relief from the entry of
default therefore began to run from the en-
try of the default, not from the later entry of
the judgment. Id. at 788, 255 P. at 910. Thus,
we held that where the motion to set aside
the entry of default was not timely, the judg-
ment could not be set aside. “The setting
aside of the judgment if the default must
nevertheless stand would be a vain thing; it
was error to set aside the judgment. (Cases
cited supra.)” Id. The trial court had set
aside the default and default judgment, and

this Court held that “the order setting aside
and vacating the judgment and default is
hereby set aside and held for naught.” Id,

I In the instant case, Mother never
moved to set aside the entry of default
against her, and the magistrate court did not
purport to set it aside. In fact, it denied her
motion for relief from the judgment by de-
fault. Therefore, that would normally bar her
appeal. B. Idaho Econ. Dev. Council v. Lock-
wood Packaging Corp. Idaho, 189 Idaho 492,
496, 80 P.8d 1098, 1097 (2008) (“The failure of
Cross-Appellants to have the default set
aside bars their appeal to this Court.”), How-
ever, a party obtaining the entry of a default
against an opposing party can waive the en-
try of default so that it is no longer of any
effect, even if the trial court does not set the
default aside. Pierce v. McMullen, 156 Idaho
465, 470, 828 P.8d 445, 450 (2014) (plaintiff
waived entry of default by filing an amended
complaint), In Kingsbury we acknowledged,
“Tt appears to be well settled that the entry
of a default against a defendant is merely a
privilege which may or may not be exercised
by the plaintiff and that not only may the
right to a default be waived, but so may the
default itself after entry.” 60 Idaho at 468-69,
92 P.2d at 1054-55. Waiver requires “some
act disclosing an implied or expressed intent
to waive the default.” Id. at 469, 92 P.2d at
1055. In Kingsbury, we stated that one such
act is “where the defaulted party is permit-
ted without objection to raise and try issues
admitted by the default.” Id.; see also 46 Am.
Jur. 2d Judgments § 241 (2006) (“Acts which
have been allowed to constitute waiver in-
clude ... going to trial on the merits.”)
(footnotes omitted), In this case, Father did
not object to the failure of Mother to move to
set aside the default, and he litigated the
issues regarding her motion to modify the
judgment. Therefore, the entry of default
against Mother was waived, and we will ad-
dvess the merits of Mother’s appeal.

HMMM For further guidance, under both
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure, a
default may be set aside for good cause
shown. LR.C.P. 55(¢), LR.F.L.P 306, Under
the current rules, a party seeking relief from
or to modify a judgment by default must also

343

move to set aside the entry of default. Where
a judgment by default has been entered,
good cause to set aside the entry of a default
exists if the defaulted party, or that party's
legal representative, desires to file a motion
seeking relief from a judgment pursuant to
Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
or Rule 808 or 809 of the Idaho Rules of
Family Law Procedure, whichever is applica-
ble, or to commence a proceeding to modify a
provision in a judgment regarding child cus-
tody, child support, or spousal maintenance
pursuant to Rule 201.C of the Idaho Rules of
Family Law Procedure. In those circum-
stances, there is good cause to set aside the
entry of default regardless of whether the
party had good cause to set aside the entry
of default before the judgment by default
was entered. This should not be read as
stating that these are the only circumstances
where there could be good cause to set aside
a default,

i.

Did the Magistrate Court Abuse Its Dis-
cretion in Ordering a Change in Physi-
cal Custody Every Three Weeks?

Tl In this case, the parties live 918 miles
apart. The magistrate court ordered that the
parties change physical custody of Child ev-
ery three weeks. It is apparent from the
court’s comments that it believed that the
parties should have equal time with Child
regardless of the travel time involved or the
impact that may have on Child.

As stated above, when the magistrate
court raised the issue of temporary child
eustody after orally denying Mother’s motion
for relief from the default judgment, the
court stated:

Let me just throw out a suggestion to
you. What I anticipate doing is saying that
Dad will keep the child until the month of
April is over, and then Mom can take the
child for the month of May. And then Dad
will get the child back for the month of
June. So we're just going to rotate it on
that basis between on that,

Now, that is not the best custody ar-
rangement for this child. I understand
that. But under the circumstances and the

344

limited amount of time, it’s somewhat fair

to the parents—probably not fair to your

child, but it’s fair to the parents.
Based upon that statement by the court, the
parties agreed to exchange custody every
two weeks,

At the commencement of the evidentiary
hearing, the court stated that it had to “fig-
ure out what we're going to do about
[Child’s] custody for essentially the next two
years, until he starts kindergarten” and that.
it was the court’s understanding “that Dad is
going to continue to reside here in Blackfoot
and Mom is going to continue to reside in
Southern California.” With respect to the
custody arrangement until Child started kin-
dergarten, the court stated that it would
order that Child spend an equal amount of
time with both parents unless one party
could prove some ground related to parental
unfitness to have the court order some other
custody arrangement. The court stated:

Between now and then, there’s no rea-
son the child shouldn’t spend about half of
his time with Mom and half of his time
with Dad for the next two years.

So as we start this hearing, what I’m
trying to figure out is is that going to be
one-week/one-week? Is it going to be two-
weeks/two-weeks? Is it going to be three
weeks with Mom and then three weeks
with Dad? Or is it going to be four weeks
with Mom and four weeks with Dad?

So as we start this hearing, if you attor-
neys think you’ve got some evidence that
would move me off of that track, you’re
certainly entitled to it. For example, if
Mom can prove to me that Dad is a serious
drug abuser, he’s in and out of jail because
he violates the law often, he’s a serious
alcoholic and can’t parent because of that,
then I would move off of that split custody
arrangement.

And likewise, if Dad can prove to me
that Mom has serious problems—for exam-
ple, if she were an active prostitute, that
would not be a good environment for the
child, or if Mom had the alcohol or drug
problem as I indicated like Dad might
have.

Mother testified first. After the parties’
counsel had questioned her, the magistrate

court likewise questioned her. During its
questioning, the court asked:

Q, And if I divide the custody on a 50/50
basis, do you want to have one-week/one-
week? © Two-weeks/two-weeks?  Three-
weeks/three-weeks? Four-weeks/four-
weeks? Do you have a preference?

Mother responded with her concerns of driv-
ing very far with two children in the car,
particularly if she had a flat tire, and of
driving on Sundays because of how congested
the traffic was. The court asked if Saturday
would be better, and Mother stated: “He
doesn’t have to pay child support. I'll pay for
the gas, please.” The court then said: “One-
week/one-week? Two-weeks/two-weeks?
Three-weeks/three-weeks? Four-weeks/four-
weeks?” Mother answered by saying she
would leave it up to Father. Father then
testified, and stated that he would like a
custody arrangement where each parent had
Child half the time, with physical custody
changing every three weeks.

After the evidence was presented, the
magistrate court stated that it was “not real-
ly hung up on a 50 percent shared custody,”
but in context that was if the parties could
agree on a custody arrangement other than
them each having equal time with Child, The
court then stated that if custody changed
every week, they would have to travel 52
times a year; if it changed every two weeks,
they would have to travel 26 times a year;
and if it changed every three weeks, they
would have to travel 17 times a year. Another
option stated by the court was that each
parent could have physical custody for six
months, with the other having a two-week
visit in each quarter.

During counsel’s closing arguments, Moth-
er’s counsel argued for Mother to have pri-
mary physical custody of Child, with Father
having extended visits during holidays and
spring break and for the majority of the
summer. Mother’s counsel stated that if the
court rejected such a custody arrangement,
then Mother would prefer physical custody
changing every three weeks. Father’s coun-
sel argued for exchanging physical custody
every third Sunday in St. George, Utah, with
Child seeing both parents on Christmas. The

magistrate court ordered that the parties
change physical custody every three weeks.

HEME The welfare and best interest of
the child is of paramount importance when
awarding custody. Brownson v, Allen, 184
Idaho 60, 62, 995 P.2d 830, 882 (2000); I.C.
§ 82-717. Decisions as to the custody, care,
and education of the child are committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court, Oste-
rvaas v. Osteraas, 124 Idaho 850, 352, 859
P.2d 948, 950 (1998), and they will be upheld
on appeal unless there is a clear showing of
abuse of that discretion, Ratliff v. Railiff, 129
Idaho 422, 424, 925 P.2d 1121, 1128 (1996),
When reviewing the trial court’s exercise of
discretion, this Court inquires: (1) whether
the trial court rightly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court
acted within the boundaries of such discre-
tion and consistently with any legal stan-
dards applicable to specifie choices; and (8)
whether the trial court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason, Brownson v. Allen,
184 Idaho 60, 68, 995 P.2d 880, 888 (2000).

Idaho Code section 82-717 sets forth a non-
exhaustive list of factors for the court to
consider when deciding what custody ar-
rangement would be in the best interests of a
child. King v. King, 187 Idaho 488, 444, 50
P.8d 458, 459 (2002). The statute also pro-
vides that the court “shall consider all rele-
vant factors.” In this case, the magistrate
court addressed the factors listed in section
82-717, but it did not address the distance
that the child must travel to exchange custo-
dy, which is clearly a relevant factor in this
case,

Idaho Code section 32-717B(2) states:

Joint physical custody shall be shared by
the parents in such a way to assure the
child a frequent and continuing contact
with both parents but does not necessarily
mean the child’s time with each parent
should be exactly the same in length nor
does it necessarily mean the child should
be alternating back and forth over certain
periods of time between each parent.

The actual amount of time with each
parent shall be determined by the court.

The statute does not mandate equal time
with each parent or alternating physical cus-

345

tody back and forth. However, it is obvious
from the court’s statements quoted above
that it based its custody decision solely on its
belief that the parties must share physical
custody equally, regardless of the distance
that they must travel in order to exchange
custody,

In State v, Hart, 142 Idaho 721, 182 P.8d
1249 (2006), we upheld a two-week custody
rotation where the father lived in Pocatello,
Idaho, and the mother lived in Laramie, Wy-
oming, id. at 728, 182 P.8d at 1251, which
required driving about 453 miles one way.
We stated:

Doubiless the splitting of custody in the
fashion done by the trial court creates
issues. Uprooting a child every two weeks
to travel and live in alternating locations
‘with alternating people raises serious con-
cerns as to the welfare of the child. How-
ever, there is evidence in the record from
Dr. Corgiat [an expert witness] supporting
the decision, The trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it ordered equal joint
physical custody between Heather and Ja-
cob.

Id. at 725, 182 P.8d at 1258,

The distance traveled in State v. Hart for
the two-week custody rotation was certainly
at the outer limit that would ordinarily be
reasonable for such type of child custody
rotation. In the instant case, the distance to
be traveled in order to exchange physical
custody every three weeks is over twice that
in State v. Hart, and there was no expert
testimony in this case regarding the impact
that would have on Child. The magistrate
cout abused its diseretion in ordering that
physical custody be exchanged every three
weeks. We therefore vacate the provisions in
the judgment regarding physical custody.

Iv.

Did the Magistrate Court Err in Order-
ing the Amount of Child Support
to Be Paid by Mother?

HMM At the time of the evidentiary hear-
ing, Mother was unemployed and was receiv-
ing public assistance. She testified that she
had been working at a restaurant where she
was paid in cash, but she lost that job be-

346

eause of missing work to come to Idaho in
connection with this case and had not found
another job. She also testified that she does
not have a social security number, and her
immigration lawyer told her not to work,
apparently until she can obtain a social secu-
rity number,

In caleulating child support, the magistrate
court listed Mother’s income as $15,080.00.
The court did not explain the derivation of
that figure, but both parties agree that such
income was based upon working at the mini-
mum wage for forty hours per week. The
Idaho Child Support Guidelines provide, “If a
parent is voluntarily unemployed or under-
employed, child support shall be based on
gross potential income....” LR.F.L.P Rule
126,F.3.a. There was no finding by the magis-
trate court that Mother was voluntarily un-
employed or underemployed. Therefore, the
court erred in holding that Mother's potential
income was $15,080.00,

In its judgment, the magistrate court ruled
that “(neither party shall pay child support
to the other.” The court determined that
Mother's obligation was $145.59 per month
and Father’s obligation was $328.18, based
upon his actual income and her potential
income. The court then offset those two
amounts and held that Father should not be
required to pay Mother the difference be-
cause of his expense and time in facilitating
custody exchanges, although no evidence was
offered as to such expense and time, Because
of the magistrate court’s error in attributing
potential income to Mother, we must vacate
that part of the judgment holding that nei-
ther party shall pay child support to the
other.

The judgment also provided, “Each parent.
shall pay half of any uncovered medical ex-
penses of [Child] and each parent will pro-
vide health insurance for [Child] if available
at a reasonable cost.” With respect to health
insurance for a minor child, the Child Sup-
port Guidelines provide, “Such health insur-
ance should normally be provided by the
parent that can obtain suitable coverage
through an employer at the lower cost.”
LR.F.L.P Rule 126H4.a. The magistrate
court’s judgment requires each parent to
provide health insurance for Child if it is

available at a reasonable cost, which could
result in there being two health insurance
policies covering Child. The court did not
explain why it chose to deviate from the
guidelines. The Guidelines also provide that
“The actual cost paid by either parent for
health insurance premiums or for health care
expenses for the children not covered or paid
in full by insurance ... shall be prorated
between the parents in proportion to their
Guidelines Income.” Jd. The magistrate court
erred in ordering that the uncovered medical
expenses be shared equally, rather than in
proportion to their Guidelines Income,
Therefore, we also vacate the provisions in
the judgment regarding child support, health
insurance for Child, and the proration of
Child’s health care expenses that are not
covered or paid in full by insurance,

v.

Should this Court Order a New
Trial on Remand?

Mother requests that we order a new trial
on remand. We decline to do so. Instead, we
order that this case be assigned to a different
judge on remand, and the new judge can
make a determination as to whether to have
a new trial or take additional evidence.

VI.

Is Father Entitled to an Award of
Attorney Fees on Appeal?

HMM Father requests an award of attor-
ney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
section 12-121. In order to be eligible for an
award of attorney fees under that statute,
the party must be the prevailing party on
appeal. Armand v. Opportunity Mgmt. Co.,
Ine., 155 Idaho 592, 602, 815 P.8d 245, 255
(2013). Because Father is not the prevailing
party on appeal, he cannot be awarded attor-
pey fees under that statute.

Vil.

Conclusion.
We vacate the provisions of the magistrate
court’s judgment regarding child custody,
child support, health insurance for Child, and

the proration of Child’s health care expenses
that are not covered or paid in full by insur-
ance. We remand this case for appointment
of another judge and for further proceedings
that are in accordance with this opinion. We
award costs on appeal to Mother,

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY coneur.

396 P.3d 1229

Rocky W. FLETCHER and Delores
L. Fletcher, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

ve

LONE MOUNTAIN ROAD ASSOCIA-
TION, an Idaho Unincorporated Non-
Profit Association; Alan K. Sims, indi-
vidually; Edward J, Sitar, an individual;
Lou Ann Stamp, an individual; Eugene
DePaulis, an individual; Rick M. Picci-
nini, an individual; Kathleen Stone, an
individual; Thomas D. Valenzuela, an
individual; Daniel D. Gregg, an individu-
al; Roy Stults and Jane Doe Stults, hus-
band and wife; Andrew J. Ponder and
Jane Doe Ponder, husband and wife;
Robert L. Imperatrice and Jane DOE
Imperatrice, husband and wife, Defen-
dants-Respondents,

and

Douglas B. Grant and Jane Doe Grant,
husband and wife; CCM, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company; Brian Reed,
an individual; Linda D. Sutliff, an indi-
vidual; Rawland L. Ahlman, Trustee of
the Rawland L. Ahiman Living Trust
and Cheryl A. Wilson, Trustee of the

347

Norma A. Ahlman Marital Trust; Janet
L. Richmond, an individual; Gary A.
Wilson and Jane Doe Wilson, husband
and wife; and John K. Moats and Jane
Doe Moats, husband and wife; and The
Estate of Ryan C. Wells, Defendants.

Docket No. 43741

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Wallace, April 2017 Term.

Filed: June 21, 2017

James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d’Al-
ene, for appellants, Susan P, Weeks argued.

Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, LLP,
Coeur d’Alene, for respondents Sims and
Ponders. Michael E. Ramsden argued,

Owens, McCrea & Linscott, PLLC, Hay-
den, for respondents Lone Mountain Road
Association, Valenzuela, Stults and Impera-
trice.

Witherspoon Kelley, Coeur d'Alene, for re-
spondents Stamp and ‘DePaulis,

Edward Sitar, Athol, pro se respondent.

Rick M. Piccinini, Athol, pro se respon-
dent,

Kathleen Stone, Athol, pro se respondent.
Daniel Gregg, Athol, pro se respondent,

HORTON, Justice,

Rocky and Delores Fletcher (“the Fletch-
ers”) appeal from the judgment of the dis-
trict court in Kootenai County, The Fletch-
ers’ action sought a declaratory judgment
outlining the rights and responsibilities of
property owners in the Twin Lakes Meadows
Subdivision (“Subdivision”) with respect to a
private road known as Lone Mountain Road
(“Subdivision Road” or “the Road”), The dis-
trict court determined that the Subdivision’s
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions
(“CC&Rs”) were ambiguous and contrary to
Idaho easement law. After finding that the
CC&Rs were ambiguous, the district court
declared that all lot owners who used the
Road had the right to make reasonable re-
pairs to the Road. The Fletchers appeal,
arguing that the district court erred when it
found the CC&Rs to be ambiguous and that
they should be strictly applied. The Fletchers
also argue that the district court erred when
it failed to declare that dust from the Road
created an additional burden on their ser-
vient estate and by failing to declare that the
Lone Mountain Road Association had no

350

right to maintain the Road or to collect as-
sessments, We affirm in part, reverse in part
and remand for further action by the district
court.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In 1981, S&S Drilling and Development
Company (“S&S”) owned and developed a
parcel of property in Kootenai County that
would become the Subdivision. S&S recorded
the Subdivision CC&Rs on June 22, 1981. All
lots located within the Subdivision are sub-
ject to the CC&Rs, which “shall run with the
land and shall be perpetually binding upon
[S&S] and its successors-in-interest and as-
signs, and all parties having or acquiring any
right, title, or interest in or to any part of the
Property.”

The Subdivision was platted in two phases
and the district court referred to the sepa-
rate platted parcels as “the Surveyed Prop-
erty” and “the Eastern Property.” When the
CC&Rs were recorded, only the Surveyed
Property had been platted. The Eastern
Property was subsequently platted in 1983,
The Surveyed Property comprises eighteen
lots, eleven of which adjoin the Subdivision
Road. The Eastern Property consists of eight
lots which are all connected to the Road.

The Subdivision Road was initially cleared,
graded, and graveled by S&S but the
CC&Rs provide that it is to be maintained by
the lot owners. The Road runs to the east
through the Subdivision from the intersection
with Ramsey Road, a county road which runs
north and south on the western boundary of
the Subdivision. The right-of-way for the
Subdivision Road is sixty feet wide. The par-
cels on the north and south sides of the
Subdivision Road are each subject to express
easements providing thirty foot strips of land
for the Subdivision Road. The Road gives
several Subdivision lot owners access to their
parcels.

The Subdivision Road originally extended
through the Surveyed Property. In 1987, the
Road was extended into the Eastern Proper-
ty, where it comes to a dead end.

The Fletchers purchased Lot 4 in the Sur-
veyed Property in 1981. The Fletchers’ lot is

located on the north side of the intersection
of the Subdivision Road and Ramsey Road.
Although various associations for road main-
tenance have been formed over the years,
none of the associations have been created in
conformity with the provisions of the
CC&Rs. A defendant in this action, Lone
Mountain Road Association (“the Associa-
tion”), was formed as an informal association
in 2006. In September 2009, owners of 9 lots
entered into a “Mutual Repair and Mainte-
nance Agreement” formalizing their commit-
ment to the Association. The agreement stat-
ed that all participants would “mutually
share the cost of repair and maintenance of
Lone Mountain Road.” The agreement also
provided that the Association “shall exclu-
sively govern the future actions and responsi-
bilities of the [signatories] related to the
repair and maintenance of Lone Mountain
Road.” Alan Sims, the owner of a lot in the
Eastern Property, became president of the
Association, The Fletchers, as well as a ma-
jority of the other parcel owners in the Sub-
division, do not belong to or participate in the
Association.

Historically, maintenance of the Subdivi-
sion Road (including snow removal) has been
performed by lot owners and the Association.
Delores Fletcher suffers from asthma which
is aggravated by dust from the Road, In the
past, the Fletchers, have oiled the first 200
feet of the Subdivision Road at their own
expense for dust control. In 2008, the Fletch-
ers applied asphalt grindings to the Subdivi-
sion Road for dust control. Following the
record-setting winter of 2008, the asphalt
grindings began to break up making it diffi-
cult for some vehicles to travel the Subdivi-
sion Road. In the spring of 2009, Sims, acting
as president of the Association, hired a con-
tractor to cover the asphalt grindings with
gravel and to grade the Subdivision Road. In
May 2009, the Association sent the Fletchers
a letter which demanded that the Fletchers
not oil the Subdivision Road. The letter stat-
ed that if the Fletchers did apply road oil,
the Association would remove and/or cover it.

In response to the letter, the Fletchers
filed this action seeking a declaration of the
rights and obligations of lot owners with
regard to the Subdivision Road, On Novem-

ber 16, 2011, the Fletchers filed their amend-
ed complaint against the Association and the
owners of lots that fronted the Subdivision
Road. This complaint named the Association
and the owners of nineteen parcels fronting
the Subdivision Road as defendants.

A bench trial was held from March 30-
April 8, 2015. The district court found that
five of the nineteen defendants who owned
property fronting the Subdivision Road had
never used the Road. The district court fur-
ther found that the remaining lot owners had
waived any right to seek contribution from
these lot owners for maintenance unless they
used the Subdivision Road in the future. The
district court found that the CC&Rs were
ambiguous as to maintenance and contribu-
tion requirements. The district court found
that the each of the fourteen lot owners who
used the Subdivision Road had the right to
make repairs and perform maintenance on
the Road but that there was no right to
contribution from any other lot owner unless
the maintenance was approved by a two-
thirds vote of the fourteen lot owners who
used the Subdivision Road. The Fletchers
timely appealed from the judgment of the
district court.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “When a court interprets a restric-
tive covenant, it is to apply generally the
same rules of construction as are applied to
any contract or covenant.” Brown v. Perkins,
129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 484, 437 (1996).
“Where contract terms are clear and unam-
biguous, the interpretation of the contract's
meaning is a question of law.” Id. “On the
other hand, where the terms of a contract
are ambiguous, the interpretation of the con-
tract’s meaning is a question of fact.” Id.
“The preliminary question of whether a con-
tract is ambiguous, is a question of law over
which this Court exercises free review.” Id.
“To determine whether there is an ambiguity

1, The Amended Complaint named twenty-two lot
owners as defendants, but three were dismissed
from the action because their property was not
within the Subdivision and they had no claim to
the easement.

2. Exhibit B, relating only to lots in the Surveyed
Property, provided that lot owners would be re-

351

in the Restrictive Covenants ... this Court
must determine whether the provisions are
reasonably susceptible to conflicting inter-
pretations.” Id. at 198, 928 P.2d at 438. “[Ble-
cause restrictive covenants are in derogation
of the common law right to use land for all
lawful purposes, the Court will not extend by
implication any restriction not clearly ex-
pressed.” Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates,
L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 363, 93 P.38d 685, 694
(2004), “[AJl doubts are to be resolved in
favor of the free use of land,” Id.

I. ANALYSIS

A. The district court erred when it found
that the CC&Rs are ambiguous.

Tl The main issue on appeal is whether
the district court erred when it found the
CC&Rs were ambiguous. The following arti-
cles of the CC&Rs are pertinent to this issue:

1.6 “Subdivision Road” shall mean and

refer to the road which is initially cleared,

graded, and graveled by Declarant in con-
nection with the subdivision of the Sur-
veyed Property, and which may, in Declar-
ant’s discretion be extended in connection
with the subdivision of the Eastern Prop-
erty. The Subdivision Road shall be used
to provide access to certain of the Parcels
from Ramsey Road, and shall be privately
maintained according to this Declaration.

23 Maintenance of Subdivision Street.

Except for the initial grading and gravel-
ing of the Subdivision Road, Declarant
shall have no responsibility for the mainte-
nance or repair of the Subdivision Road.
Each Owner of a Parcel which is bound by
the Subdivision Road (including Parcels
which are also bounded by a public road)
shall contribute a pro-rata share of the
cost of maintaining and repairing the
Subdivision Road, based wpon the [per-
centages] set forth on Exhibit B® attached
sponsible for the cost of maintenance in propor-

tion to the length of Road frontage adjoining
their lots. It provides:

352

hereto and incorporated herein by this ref-
erence. All decisions with respect to the
maintenance, repair or improvement of
the Subdivision Road shall be made by the
Owners of Parcels responsible therefor,
and such decisions shall require the vote of
the Owners having two-thirds (2/3) of the
maintenance responsibility according to
Exhibit B. Decisions made by such a two-
thirds (2/3) majority shall be binding upon
all such Owners, and each Owner’s share
of any such costs shall be a lien against his
Parcel, enforceable as a mortgage by any
other Owner or Owners.

44 Road Maintenance,
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
set forth above or voted upon by the Own-
ers, the pro-rata allocation of maintenance
expenses for the Subdivision Road shall be
as provided elsewhere in this Declaration;
further, no Parcel which is not bounded by
the Subdivision Road shall have any main-
tenance responsibility for the Subdivision
Road,
(emphasis added). Appendix B to the CC&Rs
explained the financial obligations of lot own-
ers in the Eastern Property after the Road
was extended:
Upon extension of the Subdivision Road
into the Eastern Property, the Lot Owners
having Parcels fronting on the Subdivision

Parcel No.
Per Survey

WOIAUGH

10

12
13
14

Road within the Eastern Property shall
have full responsibility for the mainte-
nance, repair and improvement of that por-
tion of the Subdivision Road which lies
within the Eastern Property. Unless [S&S]
records a specific Declaration setting forth
the allocation of such expense, each such
Owner (within the Eastern Property) shall
contribute a pro-rata share of the expenses
based upon the lineal frontage of his Par-
cel on the Subdivision Road, as compared
to the total lineal frontage of all such Par-
cels,

The district court found the maintenance
provisions of the CC&Rs to be ambiguous
because they were subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation. The district court
identified one reasonable interpretation as
providing that lot owners adjoining the Road
in both the Surveyed Property and the East-
ern Property would share the total cost of
road maintenance in direct proportion to
their property’s frontage. The second inter-
pretation was that lot owners in the Sur-
veyed Property would share the cost of main-
tenance of the portion of the Subdivision
Road located within the Surveyed Property
and the lot owners in the Eastern Property
would be responsible for a proportion share
of the cost of maintenance of the Subdivision
Road located in the Surveyed Property and
exclusively responsible for the maintenance

EXHIBIT B
ic i ce Expens.

Percentage of
Maintenance Obligation

12.50%
6.25%
6.25%
6.25%
6.28%
6.25%
6.25%

12.50%

12.50%

12.50%

12.50%

100%

of the portion of the Subdivision Road situat-
ed within the Eastern Property. We disagree
because the first interpretation identified by
the district court was not a reasonable inter-
pretation of the provisions of the CC&Rs,

HM “[A] covenant is ambiguous when it
is capable of more than one reasonable inter-
pretation on a given issue.” Pinehaven Plan-
ning Bd. v. Brooks, 188 Idaho 826, 829, 70
P.3d 664, 667 (2003). “[IIn determining
whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is
to ascertain whether the contract is reason-
ably subject to conflicting interpretation.”
Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d
1342, 1346 (1992). “If the covenants are un-
ambiguous, then the court must apply them
as a matter of law.” Pinehaven Planning
Bad., 188 Idaho at 829, 70 P.8d at 667.

Article 2.3 of the CC&Rs expressly pro-
vides that “[elach Owner of a Parcel which is
bound by the Subdivision Road shall contrib-
ute a pro-rata share of the cost of maintain-
ing and repairing the Subdivision Road,
based upon the percentages set forth on Bx-
hibit B....” Exhibit B identifies only lots
within the Surveyed Property. However, Ex-
hibit B describes the lot owners’ responsibili-
ties following extension of the Road into the
Eastern Property. Upon that occurrence,
“the Lot Owners having Parcels fronting on
the Subdivision Road within the Eastern
Property shall have full responsibility for the
maintenance, repair and improvement of that
portion of the Subdivision Road which lies
within the Eastern Property.” (emphasis
added). The exhibit sets forth the method of
allocating the cost of maintaining the Road
within the Eastern Property: “[EJach Owner
(within the Eastern Property) shall contrib-
ute a pro-rata share of the expenses based
upon the lineal frontage of his Parcel on the
Subdivision Road, as compared to the total
lineal frontage of all such Parcels.

In our view, the express terms of Article
2.8, Article 4.4 and Appendix B are simply
not consistent with an interpretation that the
owners of lots adjoining the Road bear a
proportional cost of maintenance of the en-
tire Subdivision Road. To the contrary, the
CC&Rs unambiguously bifurcate mainte-
nance responsibility for the portions of the
Road located on the Surveyed Property and

353

the Eastern Property between the adjoining
lot owners in the two phases of the Subdivi-
sion. The district court rejected the literal
language of the CC&Rs, explaining:

Exhibit B states that the Lots in the Sur-
veyed Property have one hundred percent
(100%) of the Maintenance Obligation for
that portion of Subdivision Road that is
within in the Surveyed Property and that
the Lots in the Eastern Property have
100% of the Maintenance Obligation for
the portion of Subdivision Road in the
Eastern Property, While the division of
that obligation is pro rata based upon lin-
eal frontage, a literal reading of Exhibit B
bifureates the maintenance obligation of all
the dominant easement holders between
the Surveyed Property and the Bastern
Property,

The bifureation of maintenance rights
and duties is not only contrary to Idaho
easement law, but, when the road is a dead
end, the result is that the Lots in the
Eastern Property have no obligation to
maintain that part of Subdivision Road in
the Surveyed Property, even though the
Lots in the Eastern Property are the dom-
inant holder of an easement for the road
across the Surveyed Property.

HE The district court was correct in
its statement of the common law. “The owner
of the dominant estate has the duty to main-
tain the easement even when the servient
estate landowner uses the easement.” Beck-
stead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 66, 190 P.38d 876,
885 (2008). The district court’s error, howev-
er, was the failure to recognize that parties’
freedom to contract allows them to reallocate
duties that would otherwise be imposed by
law, provided that such a reallocation of
duties is not illegal or violate public policy.
See, eg. Two Jinn, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of
Ins., 154 Idaho 1, 5, 298 P.8d 150, 154 (2018).
The apportionment of duties and costs of
maintenance under the literal terms of the
CC&Rs is neither illegal nor does it violate
public policy. As courts lack “the roving pow-
er to rewrite contracts,” Shawver v. Huckle-
berry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 862, 98
P.3d 685, 698 (2004), we must give effect to
the express provisions of the CC&Rs,

354 |

The district court also applied the common
law when it held that the owners of dominant
estates in both the Surveyed Property and
the Eastern Property had the right to per-
form maintenance on the Subdivision Road,
albeit without the right to obtain contribution
from other lot owners. In so holding, the
district court erred, Article 2.3 expressly pro-
vides: “All decisions with respect to the main-
tenance, repair or improvement of the Subdi-
vision Road shall be made by the Owners of
Parcels responsible therefor, and such deci-
sions shall require the vote of the Owners
having two-thirds (2/8) of the maintenance
responsibility according to Exhibit B.” We
are obligated to give effect to the unambigu-
ous language in this provision. No mainte-
nance, repair, or improvement can be made
to the Subdivision Road within the Surveyed
Property without eight? owners of parcels
adjoining parcels agreeing to do so.

B. The district court erred when it held
that Subdivision property owners had
waived any right to seek contribution
from lot owners who own property
fronting the Subdivision Road but do
not use the road.

HM There are twenty-six lots in the two
phases of the Subdivision, nineteen of which
front the Subdivision Road. Eleven of these
lots are in the Surveyed Property. The dis-
trict court found that a total of five lot own-
ers in the Subdivision have never used the
Subdivision Road, four of which own lots in
the Eastern Property. The district court
found that the other lot owners had waived
any right of contribution from those lot own-
ers who do not use the Subdivision Road:

Five (5) of these nineteen (19) lots that
front on Subdivision Road have not been
involved in the case, other than having
been named as indispensable parties. None
of these five lots has ever used Subdivision

Road over more than 80 years.... The

fourteen (14) lot owners in this case, who

have and do use Subdivision Road have
never attempted to assess any fees against
the five (5) lots that do not use the road,
and, none of the fourteen (14) lot owners
3. There are eleven parcels adjoining the Subdivi-

sion Road in the Surveyed Property. In order to
achieve the two-thirds agreement required by the

have ever asserted that the five (6) lots
have any duty to contribute to the mainte-
nance of Subdivision Road. As a result, the
Court finds that the fourteen (14) lot own-
ers using Subdivision Road have waived
any claim against these five (6) lots, by
having conceded over the years that there
was no duty to maintain the road when
there was no use or claim of use. ... What
easement rights these five (5) lots may
retain based upon the recorded plat and
the CC&R’s, and what responsibilities
would apply, should a right to use Subdivi-
sion Road be asserted at some point in the
future, has not been raised in this case.
Nothing herein should be construed ...
that this Court is finding that these five (5)
lots have any duty to maintain Subdivision
Road, in the continuing absence of any use
or claim of use.

In so holding, the district court erred in
two respects. First, it treated lot owners in
the Surveyed Property and the Eastern
Property as one group, instead of the two
distinct groups contemplated by the CC&Rs.
More significantly, the district court erred in
finding that there was any waiver of the
right to seek contribution from lot owners
who do not use the Road.

Hs “The existence of waiver ordi-
narily is a question of fact, and if there is any
substantial evidence in the record to support
a waiver it is for the trier of fact to deter-
mine whether the evidence establishes such a
waiver.” Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 108
Idaho 515, 518, 650 P.2d 657, 660 (1982).
“(Waiver is primarily a question of intent.”
Id, at 521, 650 P.2d at 663. Article 2.3 pro-
vides in pertinent part:

All decisions shall be made by the Owners

of Parcels responsible therefor, and such

decisions shall require the vote of the Own-
ers having two-thirds (2/3) of the mainte-
nance responsibility according to Exhibit

B. Decisions [with respect to the mainte-

nance, repair or improvement of the Subdi-

vision Road] made by such a two-thirds

(2/8) majority shall be binding upon all

CC&Rs, eight property owners must be in agree-

ment as to any proposed maintenance, repair or
improvement of the Road.

such Owners, and each Owner's share of
any such costs shall be a lien against his
Parcel, enforceable as a mortgage by any
other Owner or Owners.

Article 4.4 provides: “Notwithstanding any-
thing to the contrary set forth above or voted
upon by the Owners, the pro-rata allocation
of maintenance expenses for the Subdivision
Road shall be as provided elsewhere in this
Declaration...”

The district court found that “the CC&R’s
have never been used to invoke a two-thirds
vote about maintenance.” The district court
correctly concluded that there was no right
to seek contribution for costs incurred in the
absence of a two-thirds vote to undertake
maintenance, repair or improvement of the
Subdivision Road. Thus, as there was never a
circumstance in which a lot owner had an
enforceable duty to contribute for the costs
of maintenance, there is no factual basis for
the district court's conclusion that waiver
prohibited other lot owners from enforcing
their right of contribution from lot owners
who do not use the Road after two-thirds of
the relevant lot owners (ie. the eleven lot
owners in the Surveyed Property and the
eight lot owners in the Eastern Property)
have agreed to such maintenance, repair or
improvement,

C. The district court did not err when it
found that road dust does not create
an additional burden on the Fletchers’
servient estate.

HM The Fletchers argue that the district
court erred when it concluded that dust from
the Road did not burden their servient es-
tate. The district court stated: “While dust
does not constitute a damage or interference
with the servient estate, the servient estate
ean mitigate dust issues.” The Fletchers ar-
gue that a dominant estate owner has the
duty to maintain the easement so as to not
create an additional burden on the servient
estate and that dust from the Subdivision
Road constitutes an additional burden. Re-
spondents Sims and Ponders reply that the
Subdivision Road has been a gravel road as
Jong as the Fletchers have owned the proper-
ty and thus, dust from the Road cannot

355

constitute an additional burden on the prop-
erty. We agree with Sims and Ponders.

Hs Idaho law requires the owner of
the dominant estate to maintain the ease-
ment so as to not create an additional burden
on the servient estate. Gibbens v. Weis-
shaupt, 98 Idaho 688, 640, 570 P.2d 870, 877
(1977). “The duty of maintaining the ease-
ment rests with the easement owner (i.e.,
dominant estate), even when the servient
landowner uses the easement.” Walker v.
Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 456, 95 P.8d 69, 74
(2004). “That duty requires the easement
owner maintain, repair, and protect the ease-
ment so as not to create an additional burden
on the servient estate or an interference that
would damage the land, such as flooding of
the servient estate.” Id, “This duty to main-
tain does not mean that the easement owner
is required to maintain and repair the ease-
ment for the benefit of the servient estate.”
Id. “Tt follows then, that absent a showing
that the easement owners’ maintenance of
the easement created an additional burden or
interference with the servient estate, the ser-
vient estate cannot dictate the standard by
which the easement should be maintained.”
Id.

The Fletchers direct us to City of Bellevue
v. Daly, 14 Idaho 545, 94 P. 1086 (1908), for
the proposition that a dominant estate owner
must maintain an easement so it does not
interfere with the servient estate owner’s use
of their land. In City of Bellevue, the city
received its drinking water through a ditch
which ran through pasture land where Daly
kept cattle. Id. at 547, 94 P. at 1087. Daly’s
cattle grazed along the ditch and contaminat-
ed the city’s drinking water with their excre-
tion. Id. The city sought an injunction pre-
venting Daly from running cattle on the land
unless he built a fence around the ditch. Id.
at 548, 94 P, at 1037. The lower court grant-
ed the injunction and Daly appealed. Id. This
Court held that while the City could fence
the ditch, it could not require Daly, the own-
er of the servient estate, to do so. Id. at 549-
50, 94 P. at 1038. The additional burden
discussed in City of Bellevue was not inter-
ference resulting from the fence, but rather
who bore the responsibility for fencing the
ditch. As such, City of Bellevue is not partic-

356

ularly instructive as to the issue before this
Court.

The Subdivision Road has always been a
gravel road, The Subdivision Road is de-
scribed by the CC&Rs as, “[a] road which is
initially cleared, graded, and graveled by
[S&S] in connection with the subdivision of
the Surveyed Property.... The Subdivision
Road shall be used to provide access to cer-
tain of the Parcels from Ramsey Road, and
shall be privately maintained according to
this Declaration.” Because the Subdivision
Road was a gravel road when the Fletchers
purchased their property subject to the ease-
ment, the nature of the Road has not
changed and the district court did not err
when it found that dust from the Road did
not constitute an additional burden on the
Fletchers’ servient estate.

D, The district court’s failure to declare
that the Association had no right to
maintain the Subdivision Road or col-
lect assessments.

HMI The Fletchers contend that the dis-
trict court erred by failing to address their
claim that the Association has no right to
maintain the Subdivision Road or collect as-
sessments, The Association has not appeared
in this appeal,

The CC&Rs provide the mechanism by
which a road maintenance association might
be created:

4.1 Purpose of Community Association,
At any time after recordation of this Dec-
laration, and if Declarant (while still an
Owner) shall agree in writing, the owners
may form a Community Association,
which may have among other things, for
its purposes, the maintenance and devel-
opment of roads, utility systems and other
common facilities, the establishment of re-
creational common areas and facilities, the
enforcement of liens, covenants, restriction
and easements existing upon or created for
the benefit of the Property, and the foster-
ing of acquaintences [sic] and friendships
among the Owners.

42 Method of Formation.

A Community Association formation may

be initiated by one or more record owners,

Said Owner(s) must give thirty (80) days
written notice to all other record owners
by registered or certified mail. To those
Owners whose addresses are unknown, the
last address registered with the Kootenai
County Treasurer (or such other person
who is responsible for real estate tax no-
tices) shall be used. The notice shall state
that said Owner(s) propose to form a Com-
munity Association and shall fix a time and
place for a meeting of Owners, to be held
in Kootenai County, Idaho, not less than
ten (10) nor more than forty (40) days
after the date of said notice, to vote upon
said proposal, Hach Owner shall have the
right to vote at such meeting in person or
by proxy. If three-fourths (8/4) of all rec-
ord Owners other than Declarant, voting in
person or by proxy at a meeting called for
such purpose, vote in favor of a Communi-
ty Association, and if Declarant agrees in
writing to the formation of the Association,
the Community Association shall be estab-
lished,

It is evident that the Association was not
formed in compliance with these provisions.
Our holdings regarding the district court’s
decision interpreting the CC&Rs and finding
a waiver of the right to seek contribution
from lot owners that do not use the Road
require that we vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand for entry of a
judgment consistent with this opinion, On
remand, the district court shall incorporate
into its amended judgment the declaration
that the Association has no right to maintain
the Subdivision Road or obtain involuntary
contributions from lot owners for past expen-
ditures,

E, Attorney fees on appeal.

The only attorney fees request comes from
the Fletchers, They sought an award of fees
against the Association if it chose to partici-
pate in this appeal, As the Association has
not done so, we do not award any party
attorney fees on appeal. Because we reverse
the district court’s decision that the CC&Rs
are ambiguous and that lot owners have
waived the right to seek contribution from
those lot owners who do not use the Road,

we hold that the Fletchers are the prevailing
party.

Iv. CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the district
court based upon its findings that the
CC&Rs are ambiguous and there was a waiy-
er of the right to obtain contributions from
lot owners that do not use the Road. We
affirm the district court’s judgment that road
dust does not create an additional burden on
the Fletchers’ estate. We remand for entry of
an amended judgment consistent with this
opinion. The district court shall incorporate
into its amended judgment the declaration
that the Association has no right to maintain
the Subdivision Road or seek involuntary
contributions from lot owners for past expen-
ditures. Costs to Fletchers.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur.

396 P.3d 1239
Jeremy Ray WHEELER, Petitioner-
Appellant,

v.
STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
Docket No. 44797

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: June 21, 2017

oo
coi
a

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. Russell J, Spenc-
er argued,

HORTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from the district court’s
summary dismissal of Jeremy Ray Wheeler's
petition for post-conviction relief. We vacate
the district court’s order of dismissal and
remand for further proceedings.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On June 26, 2014, Wheeler was arrested
and charged with possession of methamphet-
amine in violation of Idaho Code section 87-
2732(c)(Z). Due to prior convictions of a simi-
lar nature, he was also charged with being a
persistent: violator as defined in Idaho Code
section 19-2514, Wheeler filed a motion to
suppress evidence that was denied by the
district court. Consistent with Idaho Crimi-
nal Rule 11(e), Wheeler completed a written

plea advisory form on March 28, 2015. There,
he indicated that he was entering a condition-
al guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal
the issue of his “motion to surpress [sic].” He
appeared before the district court the next
day and entered his guilty plea to the charge
of possessing methamphetamine in exchange
for dismissal of another criminal matter and
the persistent violator allegation. On May 11,
2015, Wheeler was sentenced to serve seven
years, with three years fixed, and the district
court retained jurisdiction for one year. On
August 18, 2015, the district court relin-
quished jurisdiction at Wheeler’s request.

Wheeler’s trial counsel filed a notice of
appeal on September 14, 2015. The notice of
appeal purported to challenge both the denial
of Wheeler’s motion to suppress and his sen-
tence, The State Appellate Public Defender
(‘SAPD”) was appointed to represent Wheel-
er on appeal. Wheeler’s SAPD attorney in-
formed him that his appeal from the denial of
the motion to suppress was untimely and
recommended that Wheeler file a petition for
post-conviction relief alleging ineffective as-
sistance of trial counsel for failing to timely
appeal from the denial of his motion to sup-
press.

On February 2, 2016, Wheeler filed a pro
se petition for post-conviction relief. The
State moved for summary dismissal of the
petition. The district court granted the mo-
tion, finding that Wheeler’s claim that trial
counsel had failed to timely appeal from the
denial of the motion to suppress was ground-
less: “[T]he Court again notes that an appeal
was timely filed, the Court has verified this
with the Supreme Court of Idaho, and the
appeal is ongoing at the time of this decision.
Wheeler’s [claim based upon a failure to
timely appeal] must be dismissed as it is
patently false.”

Wheeler timely appealed from the dismiss-
al of his petition. In an unpublished opinion,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Wheeler’s petition for
post-conviction relief. We granted Wheeler's
pro se petition for review. We thereafter
appointed the SAPD to represent Wheeler in
proceedings before this Court. We granted
the SAPD leave to file a supplemental brief

on review which we have considered in decid-
ing this appeal.

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE “While this Court gives serious con-
sideration to the views of the Idaho Court of
Appeals when considering a case on review
from that court, it reviews the district court’s
decision directly.” State v. Watkins, 148 Ida-
hho 418, 420, 224 P.8d 485, 487 (2009) (citing
Mattoon v, Blades, 145 Idaho 684, 636, 181
P.8d 1242, 1244 (2008)),

Because one judge presided over the plea
hearing, and a different judge presided over
the suppression hearing and sentencing, “this
Court has determined that its role on appeal
is to freely review the evidence and weigh
the evidence in the same manner as the trial
court would do when ruling on a motion for
new trial.” Shabinaw v. Brown, 181 Idaho
‘747, 751, 963 P.2d 1184, 1188 (1998) (citing
Nafus v, Campbell, 96 Idaho 366, 368, 529
P.2d 266, 268 (1974)),

HH “On review of a dismissal of a post-
conviction relief application without an evi-
dentiary hearing, this Court will determine
whether a genuine issue of fact exists based
on the pleadings, depositions and admissions
together with any affidavits on file.” Work-
mam v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 528, 164 P.8d
798, 808 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State,
188 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.8d 787, 791 (2002)). A
claim for post-conviction relief may only be
summarily dismissed if it does not present a
genuine issue of material fact. 1.0. § 19-
4906(b); Baldwin v, State, 145 Idaho 148, 158,
177 P.8d 362, 367 (2008). A genuine issue of
material fact exists when “the appellant has
alleged facts in his petition that if true, would
entitle him to relief” Charboneau v. State,
140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.8d 1108, 1111
(2004) (internal citations omitted),

HH Because the analysis of that ques-
tion requires the courts to evaluate the peti-
tioner’s claim “if true,” the courts must lib-
erally construe the facts and draw reasonable
inferences in favor of the petitioner. Jd. Addi-
tionally, it means that “[a] court is required

1. The State does not suggest that Wheeler did not
request his trial counsel to appeal from the deni-

359

to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allega-
tions as true... .” Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153,
177 P.8d at 367; Saykhamchone v. State, 127
Idaho 319, 821, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995).

Il. ANALYSIS

HH The district court rejected Wheel-
er’s claim for post-conviction relief based
upon his claim that his trial counsel failed to
timely appeal from the denial of his motion to
suppress. It did so because Wheeler’s direct
appeal was pending at the time of its deci-
sion. The State concedes that the district
court erred in this regard and that Wheeler’s
appeal was timely only as to the district
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. The
State urges, however, that the district court’s
order of summary dismissal may be affirmed
on the alternative basis that Wheeler did not
preserve the right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress. We disagree.

A petitioner’s claim that counsel’s assis-
tance was so defective as to require rever-
sal of a conviction has two components.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,
698 (1984), In addition to showing that his
counsel’s performance was deficient, “the
defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Id.

Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.8d
925, 929 (2010).

HM “1A] defendant who proves that he or
she was denied an appeal because counsel did
not file an appeal as requested! states a
meritorious claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel because the loss of the right to ap-
peal is sufficient prejudice, in and of itself, to
support such claim.” Gosch v. State, 154 Ida-
ho 71, 74, 294 P.8d 197, 200 (Ct.App.2012)
(citing Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 861-
62, 888 P.2d 714, 719-20 (Ct.App.1994)).

The State’s position does not challenge
these basic principles of law. Rather, the
State relies on the guilty plea colloquy in
support of its assertion that Wheeler’s guilty
plea did not preserve the right to appeal
from the denial of the motion to suppress

al of his motion to suppress.

360

despite the contents of the guilty plea adviso-
ry form, The State relies on State v. Watts
for the proposition that the statements
Wheeler made when pleading guilty are suffi-
cient evidence that he did not reserve the
right to appeal this issue. See State v. Watts,
181 Idaho 782, 963 P.2d 1219 (Ct.App.1998)
(“Where there is a disparity between the oral
pronouncement and written order, the oral
pronouncement controls”),

We take no issue with the holding in
Watts; rather, we simply do not find the
decision to be instructive as to the issue
before this Court. The question presented in
Watts related to a disparity between the
sentence pronounced in open court and the
written judgment of conviction. Watts, and
the authorities cited therein, simply hold that
clerical errors in a judgment will not take
precedence over the sentence which was ac-
tually pronounced by the sentencing judge,
See id. at 786, 963 P.2d at 1228; State v
Luma, 118 Idaho 124, 126, 795 P.2d 18, 20
(Ct.App.1990); State v. Wallace, 116 Idaho
980, 982, 782 P.2d 58, 55 (Ct.App.1989); Unit-
ed States v. Berymann, 886 F.2d 1220, 1221
(Sth Cir. 1988). Here, we must determine
whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Wheeler’s guilty plea was
conditioned upon his right to appeal from the
denial of his motion to suppress. This re-
quires a consideration of both Wheeler's
written guilty plea advisory and the colloquy
at the time of his guilty plea.

Question 9 of Wheeler's plea agreement
form asked, “Is this a conditional guilty plea,
meaning you are reserving your right to
appeal any pre-trial issues or decisions?”
Wheeler placed his initials next to a serib-
bled-out “NO” and circled “YES” to the
question, Question 9(a) then asked, “If YES,
what issue are you reserving the right to
appeal?” Wheeler wrote, “Motion to surpress
[sic]” Standing alone, these answers appear
to be a clear and unambiguous declaration of
Wheeler’s intent to condition his guilty plea
upon the right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress,

The State relies on the exchange between
Wheeler and the trial court at the time of his
plea of guilty, The entirety of the portion of

that colloquy upon which the State relies is

as follows:
THE COURT: Ok. All right. And, in fact,
[trial counsel] explained to me that in this
case there was a suppression issue and a
motion was filed, and it was argued before
Judge Nye, and he denied that motion to
suppress; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct.
THE COURT: All right. And, certainly,
that is something that you could reserve
and/or could preserve for appeal if you
decided to appeal this sentence. Let's say,
it didn't go the way you wanted it to and
you ended wp having to go serve time. I
suppose you could appeal your sentence,
and you could appeal the suppression is-
sue that Judge Nye decided on, Do you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. But you’re not plead-
ing guilty and reserving your right to this
isn’t a conditional plea of guilty based on
the fact that there is this suppression issue
out there that has been ruled on by the
Court, are you?
Let me ask—that is a complicated question
but it’s an important question, Mr. Wheel-
er. It really is. So oftentimes what happens
in cases is that the defendant will say,
yeah, I’m going to plead guilty because I
lost my suppression issue with the District
Court, but the only reason I’m going to
plead guilty, I’m preserving this right be-
cause I’m going to immediately appeal
this case to the Supreme Court for them to
look at this suppression issue that was
denied by the District Court, Is that what
you're doing, or are you just simply—
THE DEFENDANT: No,
THE COURT: Okay. So you're simply
entering the plea with regard to the recom-
mendations from the State and under-
standing that there is an issue out there
that you could appeal, but you're not nec-
essarily doing it because you want it in
front of the Supreme Cowrt immediately?
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, I’m not.
THE COURT: Okay. I just want to make
sure I understand that, Did I cover that
right, [trial counsel]?

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Yes, I think you did,
(emphasis added).

The State argues that Wheeler’s responses
of “No,” and “No, I’m not” reflect his waiver
of the right to appeal from the denial of his
motion to suppress. We first note that the
questions directed to Wheeler are far from
unambiguous. Viewing the exchange in a
light most favorable to Wheeler, we are only
able to conclude that he had no desire to
“immediately” appeal the suppression issue.
In light of the written guilty plea advisory,
we find that there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Wheeler’s guilty
plea was conditioned upon his right to appeal
from the denial of the motion to suppress.

As the State has conceded that the district
court erroneously dismissed Wheeler’s peti-
tion for post-conviction relief based upon his
then-pending ? direct appeal, and because we
find that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to the alternative ground for affir-
mance posited by the State, we must vacate
the district court’s order dismissing Wheel-
er’s petition for post-conviction relief?

Iv. CONCLUSION
We vacate the order dismissing Wheeler's

petition for post-conviction relief and remand
for further proceedings.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur,

2. After the district court summarily dismissed
Wheeler's petition for post-conviction relief, the
Court of Appeals affirmed Wheeler's judgment of
conviction and sentence in an unpublished opin-
jon. State v. Wheeler, No. 43567, 2016 WL
3193469, at *1 (Idaho Ct, App. June 1, 2016).

3, In the event that the district court finds that
Wheeler requested his attorney to file an appeal
from the denial of the motion to suppress and
that trial counsel failed to do so, the appropriate

396 P.3d 1243
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve

Shawn William WASS, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket Nos. 43844 & 43845

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: June 22, 2017

remedy is for the district court to vacate and
reenter the previous judgment in order to permit
Wheeler to seek review through a delayed ap-
peal.” State v. Crumble, No. 39235, 2013 WL
5486749, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013)
(citing Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 363, 883
P2d 714, 721 (CtApp.1994)). Our decision
should not be interpreted as an expression re-
garding the merits of the district court's ruling
on the motion to suppress.

wo
S
nN

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, attorney for appel-
lant. Andrea Reynolds argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, attorney for respondent.
John C, McKinney argued.

JONES, Justice
I, Narore or rae Case

Shawn William Wass (“Wass”) appeals
from the judgment entered upon his condi-
tional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine). He asserts on
appeal that the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress his admission

to the arresting officer that he was in posses-
sion of syringes.

I. Facruan anp ProcepuraL BACKGROUND

At approximately 12:37 A.M. on August 9,
2015, Officer Dan Drake (“Officer Drake”) of
the Canyon County Sheriff's Office was pa-
trolling the Sportsman’s access on 21319
Midland Boulevard. He observed a purple
Hyundai Elantra in the parking area, which
is closed during the night. Officer Drake
approached the vehicle. Grace Stanbery
(“Stanbery”) was sitting in the passenger
seat. Wass was standing behind the vehicle.
Officer Drake spoke briefly to Wass, who
admitted that he and Stanbery had been
drinking two hours prior. Officer Drake
asked both parties for identification. Stan-
bery provided an Idaho driver's license.
Wass gave Officer Drake his name, but
claimed that he did not have any identifica-
tion on him. Officer Drake asked Wass if
there was anything illegal in the vehicle.
Wass answered that there was not. Officer
Drake asked Wass and Stanbery for permis-
sion to search the vehicle. Both refused. Offi-
cer Drake then returned to his vehicle to
enter the identifying information he had been
given into his mobile computer. The mobile
computer alerted Officer Drake that Wass
had two active outstanding warrants. Officer
Drake reapproached the vehicle and adminis-
tered a field sobriety test on Wass. During
the field sobriety test, Wass placed his wallet,
on the hood of the vehicle. Wass then admit-
ted that he had identification in his wallet
and that he had lied to Officer Drake because
he was concerned that there might be an
outstanding warrant. Officer Drake informed
Wass that there were actually two outstand-
ing warrants and placed him in wrist re-
straints. Officer Drake again asked Wass if
there was anything illegal in Wass’ vehicle.
This time Wass admitted that there were
syringes in the vehicle. At the time of this
admission, Wass had not been informed of
his Miranda rights. Officer Drake later testi-
fied that he immediately realized at that time
that he had made “a mistake.”

After Wass told him that there were syr-
jnges in the vehicle, Officer Drake placed
Wass in his police vehicle. Officer Drake

approached Wass’ vehicle but did not enter
it. He visually inspected the vehicle but was
unable to see anything illegal. After approxi-
mately two minutes, Officer Drake returned
to his police vehicle. Officer Drake informed
Wass of his Miranda rights, Wass affirmed
that he understood his rights. Officer Drake
then asked Wass if, with those rights in
mind, Wass still wanted to tell him about
anything illegal in Wass’ vehicle. Wass again
stated that there were syringes in the vehi-
cle. Officer Drake searched Wass’ vehicle
where he recovered a black spoon with white
residue, three syringes, a cotton arm sleeve,
two small pieces of cotton, and an aluminum
foil bindle containing marijuana. One of the
syringes was loaded with a white clear liquid.
‘The syringe containing the clear liquid tested
positive for methamphetamine.

On August 20, 2015, the State filed an
Information alleging felony Possession of
Methamphetamine. On October 5, 2015, Wass
filed a motion to suppress the statements he
made to Officer Drake with respect to the
presence of syringes in his vehicle and any
physical evidence recovered as a result of
those statements. Wass argued that he was
not informed of his Miranda rights prior to
being questioned.

At a hearing on October 22, 2015, the
district court denied the motion to suppress.
It held as follows:

[T]he question is whether the drug evi-

dence must be suppressed because the

first—because of the first unwarned state-
ments about the syringes or does the sec-

ond statements after the—does the Mi-

randa warnings given a few minutes later

cure that problem,

... I find that the officer did not tacti-
cally induce a confession prior to Miranda
warnings—or coerce a confession or use
improper tactics to obtain the confession
prior to Miranda warnings. And the second
Miranda warnings does cure the failure to
administer it the first time.

Its not a coercion where the actual cir-
cumstances are calculated to undermine
the suspect's ability to exercise free will,
So I find that the second Miranda warn-
ings does [sic] cure it. Once that happens,
then the officer has reasonable articulable

363

suspicion to search the automobile under
the automobile search warrantless excep-
tion and he does search it and finds the
items found in the case. So I’m denying the
motion to suppress.

On December 22, 2015, Wass and the State
entered into a plea agreement by which Wass
agreed to plead guilty to felony Possession of
Methamphetamine while reserving his right
to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. The district court sen-
tenced Wass to a suspended sentence of sev-
en years with three years fixed. Wass ap-
peals.

TI. Issuz on APPEAL

1. Did the district court err when it de-
nied Wass’ motion to suppress his oral
admission that there were syringes in
his vehicle?

IV. Sranparp or Revirw

Hs In reviewing a district court order
granting or denying a motion to suppress
evidence, the standard of review is bifur-
eated. State v. Watis, 142 Idaho 280, 282,
127 P.8d 188, 185 (2005), This Court will
accept the trial court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v.
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.38d 7389, 741
(2007). However, this Court may freely
review the trial court’s application of con-
stitutional principles in light of the facts
found. Id.

State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207

P.8d 182, 188 (2009).

V. ANALYSIS

The United States Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of whether admissions
made in response to police questioning be-
fore Miranda warnings have the effect of
rendering the same admissions made again
after Miranda warnings inadmissible in the
case of Oregon v. Hlstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105
S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). Hlstad
arose out of the theft of roughly $150,000 of
art and furniture from a home while the
owners were on vacation. Id. A witness to the
burglary contacted police and implicated El-
stad, a friend of the owners’ son. Jd. Police

364

arrived at Elstad’s residence where he lived
with his parents. Jd. A police officer spoke
with Elstad, at his residence, informing him
that the police believed Elstad was involved
in the burglary. Jd. at 301, 105 S.Ct. at 1288,
84 L.Ed.2d at 227. Elstad responded that he
was present when the burglary took place,
Id, Blstad was arrested and taken to the
police station where he was advised of his
Miranda vights, Id. Elstad indicated that he
understood his rights and gave a full state-
ment confessing to being involved in the
burglary. Id, At trial, Elstad moved to have
his post-Miranda admissions suppressed, Jd.
at 802, 105 S.Ct. at 1289, 84 L.Hd.2d at 227-
28, His motion to suppress was denied, and
he was convicted on the evidence of his con-
fession. Jd, Hlstad appealed to the Oregon
Court of Appeals, which reversed his convic-
tion, reasoning that Elstad’s original state-
ment was made in response to a Miranda
violation and that not enongh time had
passed between Elstad’s pre-Miranda state-
ment at his house and his post-Miranda
statement at’ the police station to cure the
taint of the original violation, Jd, at 808, 105
S.Ct, at 1290, 84 L.Ed.2d at 228,

The United States Supreme Court re-
versed. Id, at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298, 84
L.Ed.2d at 288. It held that the Oregon
Court of Appeals had erred in treating a
Miranda violation as equivalent to a consti-
tutional violation, Jd. at 804, 105 S.Ct. at
1290, 84 L.Hd.2d at 228-29. It explained that
a breach of Miranda does not necessarily
mean a Fifth Amendment violation has oc-
curred, Id at 807, 105 S.Ct. at 1292, 84
L.Ed.2d at 280-81. Accordingly, “errors []
made by law enforcement officers in adminis-
tering the prophylactic Miranda procedures

.. Should not breed the same irremediable
consequences as police infringement of the
Fifth Amendment itself.” Jd. at 809, 105 8.Ct.
at 1298, 84 L.Bd.2d at 282, The United
States Supreme Court reasoned that:

It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda

to hold that a simple failure to administer

the warnings, unaccompanied by any actu-
al coercion or other circumstances caleulat-
ed to undermine the suspect’s ability to
exercise his free will, so taints the investi-
gatory process that a subsequent voluntary
and informed waiver is ineffective for some

indeterminate period. Though Miranda re-
quires that the unwarned admission must
be suppressed, the admissibility of any
subsequent statement should turn in these
cireumstances solely on whether it is
knowingly and voluntarily made,

... [Albsent deliberately coercive or im-
proper tactics in obtaining the initial state-
ment, the mere fact that a suspect has
made an unwarned admission does not
warrant a presumption of compulsion. A
subsequent administration of Miranda
warnings to a suspect who has given a
voluntary but unwarned statement ordi-
narily should suffice to remove the condi-
tions that precluded admission of the earli-
er statement. In such circumstances, the
finder of fact may reasonably conclude that
the suspect made a rational and intelligent
choice whether to waive or invoke his
rights.

... [TJhere is no warrant for presuming
coercive effect [with respect to the post-
Miranda statement] where the suspect’s
initial inculpatory statement, though tech-
nically in violation of Miranda, was volun-
tary.
Id, at 809, 814, 818, 105 S.Ct. at 1298, 1296,
1298, 84 L.Bid.2d at 282, 235-86, 288, Elstad’s
initial pre-Miranda statement, the United
States Supreme Court concluded, “was vol-
untary, within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment,” Id. at 315, 105 S.Ct. at 1296, 84
L.Ed.2d at 286. Accordingly, it focused on
the facts surrounding Elstad’s post-Miranda
warning statements and found that Hlstad
“knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to remain silent before he described his par-
ticipation in the burglary.” Jd. The United
States Supreme Court concluded that “[wle
hold today that a suspect who has once re-
sponded to unwarned yet uncoercive ques-
tioning is not thereby disabled from waiving
his rights and confessing after he has been
given the requisite Miranda warnings.” Id.
at 818, 105 S.Ct. at 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d at 288,

Twenty years later, the United States Su-
preme Court revisited Histad in Missouri v.
Seibert, 642 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159

L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), Seibert arose out of the
death of Jonathan Seibert, a twelve year old
boy with cerebral palsy, Id. at 604, 124 S.Ct.
at 2605, 159 L.Hd.2d at 651. Following Jona-
than’s death, his mother, Patrice Seibert
(“Patrice”), feared charges of neglect because
her son’s body was covered in bedsores. Jd.
In order to conceal the facts surrounding
Jonathan’s death, Patrice’s two other sons
and two of their friends devised a plan, with
her knowledge, to set the family’s mobile
home on fire. Jd. In order to avoid the ap-
pearance that Jonathan had been left alone,
they set the mobile home on fire while Don-
ald Rector, a mentally ill teenager living with
the family was still inside. Jd. Donald died in
the fire. Id.

Five days later, at approximately 3:00
A.M,, the police arrested Patrice and brought
her to the police station. Id. Prior to the
arrest, the arresting officer was specifically
instructed by the officer scheduled to conduct
the interrogation not to give Patrice Mi-
randa warnings. Id. At the police station, the
interrogating officer questioned Patrice for
80 to 40 minutes, squeezing her arm and
repeating that “Donald was supposed to die
in his sleep.” Id. at 605, 124 S.Ct. at 2606, 159
L.Ed.2d at 651. Patrice broke down and ad-
mitted that Donald was supposed to die in
the fire. Jd. Following Patrice’s admission,
the interrogating officer brought a tape re-
corder into the interrogation room, and it
was only then that he informed Patrice of her
Miranda rights. Id. During the taped inter-
rogation that followed, the interrogating offi-
cer confronted Patrice with her pre-Miranda
statements in order to obtain a confession,
Id.

At trial, the interrogating officer testified
that he had made a “conscious decision” to
initially withhold Miranda warnings from
Patrice as an interrogation tactic. Id. at 606~
07, 124 S.Ct. at 2606, 159 L.Ed.2d at 651-52.
The trial court suppressed the pre-Miranda
statements but allowed evidence of the post-
Miranda confession. Id. at 607, 124 S.Ct, at
2606, 159 L.Ed.2d at 651-52, The Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed, holding that the
confession was clearly a product of the pre-
Miranda statements and that the interro-
gating officer intended to deprive Patrice of

365

the opportunity to exercise her Miranda
rights. Id. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri. Id, at 617, 124 S.Ct. at 2618, 159
L.Ed.2d at 658. In a plurality opinion, Jus-
tice Souter reasoned that Miranda stands
for the proposition that “a suspect must be
adequately and effectively advised of the
choice the Constitution guarantees.” Id. at
611, 124 S.Ct. at 2610, 159 L.Ed.2d at 654-
55 (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted). “By any objective measure, applied to
circumstances exemplified here, it is likely
that if the interrogators employ the tech-
nique of withholding warnings until after in-
terrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession,
the warnings will be ineffective in preparing
the suspect for successive interrogation,
close in time and similar in content.” Id. at
618, 124 S.Ct, at 2610, 159 L.Hd.2d at 655,
“Upon hearing warnings only in the after-
math of interrogation and just after making
a confession, a suspect would hardly think
he had a genuine right to remain silent, let
alone persist in so believing once the police
began to lead him over the same ground
again.” Id.

Writing for the plurality, Justice Souter
distinguished Seibert from the holding in H-
stad, by noting that

in Elstad, it was not unreasonable to see

the occasion for questioning at the station

house as presenting a markedly different
experience from the short conversation at
home; since a reasonable person in the
suspect’s shoes could have seen the station
house questioning as a new and distinct
experience, the Méranda warnings could
have made sense as presenting a genuine
choice whether to follow up on the earlier
admission,

Id, at 615-16, 124 S.Ct, at 2612, 159 L.Ed.2d

at 657-58,

In conclusion, Justice Souter identified
several factors that a court should consider
in determining whether post-Miranda state-
ments are admissible:

The contrast between Elstad and [Sei-
bert] reveals a series of relevant facts that
bear on whether Miranda warnings deliv-
ered midstream could be effective enough
to accomplish their object: the complete-

366

ness and detail of the questions and an-

swers in the first round of interrogation,

the overlapping content of the two state-
ments, the timing and setting of the first
and the second, the continuity of police
personnel, and the degree to which the
interrogator’s questions treated the second
round as continuous with the first.

Id, at 615, 124 S.Ct. at 2612, 159 L.Ed.2d at

656-58.

Justice Kennedy concurred in the judg-
ment, but provided a different holding. Id. at
618, 124 S.Ct. at 2614, 159 L.Ed.2d at 659.
He agreed with the plurality opinion that
“{tIhe interrogation technique used in this
case is designed to circumvent Miranda v.
Arizona.... Tt undermines the Miranda
warning and obscures its meaning.” Id. Jus-
tice Kennedy differed with the plurality,
however, writing that

[t]he plurality concludes that whenever a

two-stage interview occurs, admissibility of

the postwarning statement should depend
on “whether the Miranda warnings deliv-
ered midstream could have been effective
enough to accomplish their object” given
the specific facts of the case.... I would
apply a narrower test applicable only in
the infrequent case, such as we have here,
in which the two-step interrogation tech-
nique was used in a calculated way to
undermine the Miranda warning.

Id. at 621-22, 124 S.Ct. at 2616, 159 L.Ed.2d

at 661-62,

Hl Interpretation of the Seibert opinion
is currently subject to a circuit split. The
majority of circuits, including the Ninth Cir-
euit Court of Appeals, have determined that
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, and not Jus-
tice Souter’s plurality opinion, contains the
precedential holding of the case.

Ordinarily, “[w]hen a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale ex-
plaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v, Unit-
ed States, 430 U.S. 188, 198, 97 S.Ct, 990,
998, 51 L.Ed.2d 260, 265-66 (1977)....

... [B]oth the plurality and Justice Ken-
nedy agree that where law enforcement

officers deliberately employ a two-step in-
terrogation to obtain a confession and
where separations of time and circum-
stance and additional curative warnings
are absent or fail to apprise a reasonable
person in the suspect’s shoes of his rights,
the trial court should suppress the confes-
sion, This narrower test—that excludes
confessions made after a deliberate, objec-
tively ineffective mid-stream warning—
represents Seibert’s holding. In situations
where the two-step strategy was not delib-
erately employed, Histad continues to gov-
ern the admissibility of postwarning state-
ments,

US. v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (9th
Cir, 2006). Other circuit courts have come to
the same conclusion. See U.S. v. Courtney,
463 F.3d 838, 888 (th Cir. 2006) (“we find
Seibert’s holding in Justice Kennedy’s opin-
ion concurring in the judgment.”); U.S. v
Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 582 (8d Cir. 2006) (“This
court applies the Seibert plurality opinion as
narrowed by Justice Kennedy. ... Once we
determine that the Miranda violation was
not deliberate, we must fall back on Histad
as instructed by Justice Kennedy.”); U.S. v.
Mashburn, 406 F.3d 308, 309 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“Justice Kennedy’s opinion therefore repre-
sents the holding of thé Seibert Court: The
admissibility of postwarning statements is
governed by Zistad unless the deliberate
‘question-first’ strategy is employed.”); U.S.
v. Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 2004)
(‘Because Justice Kennedy relied on grounds
narrower than those of the plurality, his
opinion is of special significance.”); U.S. v
Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“Justice Kennedy thus provided a fifth vote
to depart from Elstad, but only where the
police set out deliberately to withhold Mi-
ronda warnings until after a confession has
been secured. Where the initial violation of
Miranda was not part of a deliberate strate-
gy to undermine the warnings, Eistad ap-
pears to have survived Seibert.”).

We hereby adopt the analysis of Seibert
promulgated by the majority of cireuit
courts. “When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that

position taken by those Members who con-
curred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.” Marks, 430 U.S. at 198, 97 S.Ct. at
998, 51 L.Ed.2d at 265-66 (internal quota-
tions and citation omitted). In Seibert, the
Plurality set forth a multi-factor analysis to
be applied in every instance of two-stage
interrogation. Justice Kennedy agreed to the
Plurality’s framework, but only in cases in
which the two stage-interrogation was the
result of an intentional tactic to induce a
confession and not in the case of mistake or
accident, Accordingly, the more narrow hold-
ing of Seibert is Justice Kennedy’s; the Plu-
rality’s multi-factor analysis is applicable
only in cases of intentional two-stage interro-
gations,

Hl It follows that Seibert does not apply
to this case. There is no evidence that the
district court erred when it determined that
Officer Drake did not intentionally use a two-
stage interrogation technique as a tactic to

induce a confession. Rather, all of the evi-
dence presented to the district court indi-
cates that Officer Drake made a mistake
questioning Wass before giving him his Mi-
randa rights, realized his mistake, and imme-
diately attempted to correct his mistake by

367

giving Wass his Miranda warnings and ques-
tioning him again.

HM Because Seibert does not apply here,
Elstad governs our analysis. Under Zlstad, a
suspect's prior, voluntary statements made in
violation of Miranda do not preclude the
trier of fact from concluding that the sus-
peet’s later voluntary statements made after
being administered Miranda rights were the
result of a rational and intelligent choice to
waive those rights. Wass did not contend in
the district court that either his pre- or post-
Miranda statements were coerced. There-
fore, we uphold the court’s decision that his
post-Miranda statements were admissible.

VI. ConcLusion

This Court affirms the -district court’s
judgment of conviction.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur.

368

397 P.3d 398
H20 ENVIRONMENTAL INC., an Idaho
Company, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross
Respondent,
ve
PROIMTU MMI, LLC, a Nevada Com-
pany, Defendant-Respondent-Cross
Appellant.

Docket No. 44148

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: June 23, 2017

Fisher Rainey Hudson, Boise, for appel-
lant. Vaughn Fisher argued.

Fennemore Craig, P.C., Las Vegas, Neva-
da, for respondent. Brenoch R. Wirthlin ar-
gued.

BRODY, Justice

This is a contract dispute involving wheth-
er personal jurisdiction is proper over an out-
of-state defendant. It concerns two out-of-
state companies, one of which, H20 Environ-
mental, Ine. (“H20”), is registered to do
business in Idaho and maintains an office in
Boise. H20 filed suit in Idaho against the
other company, Proimtu MMI, LLC (“Proim-
tu”), alleging breach of contract and seeking
reimbursement for the payment of employ-
ment taxes for Proimtu employees. Proimtu
moved to dismiss for lack of personal. juris-
diction and the district court granted the
motion. We vacate and remand for further
proceedings.

iL FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Proimtu is a Nevada limited liability com-
pany that provides construction management
services, H20 is a Nevada environmental
services company that is registered to do
business in Idaho and has bases of operation
in Boise, Idaho; Las Vegas, Nevada; Reno,
Nevada; Phoenix, Arizona; and Salt Lake
City, Utah,

Proimtu and H20 started doing business
together in approximately October .2012,
when they entered into a written agreement.
for the provision of services related to a
construction project in Arizona. Proimtu
hired H20 to manage the employment of
construction laborers and do the wage re-

369

porting. That contract stated that Proimtu
was an Arizona limited. liability company,
with its place of business in Phoenix, Arizona
and that H20 is a Nevada company with its
place of business in Chandler, Arizona. Two
days before the contract was signed, H20, at
the request of Proimtu, provided a completed
‘W-9 form, indicating that its business ad-
dress was 6679 South Supply Way in Boise,
Idaho. H20 also indicated that reimburse-
ment checks should be sent to that address
and that it would be using a Wells Fargo in
Boise, Idaho, for processing workers’ pay.

Around November 2012, the parties had a
series of phone calls and emails that led to
the formation of an oral contract for employ-
ment services related to the construction of a
solar panel plant in Tonapah, Nevada. These
phone calls and emails were between Proim-
tu and the Chief Financial Officer and Chief
Executive Officer of H20 who work in Boise.
H20 agreed to handle the hiring, compensa-
tion and Davis-Bacon wage reporting of the
construction workers hired by Proimtu for
the Tonapah project. Proimtu agreed to re-
imburse H20 for all costs arising from the
employment of these workers.

In fulfillment of the oral contract, H20
provided pre-employment screening of poten-
tial employees selected by Proimtu, complet-
ed weekly Davis-Bacon wage reporting for
the employees and provided weekly pay-
checks to the employees via direct deposit
from a Boise bank. Proimtu emailed weekly
wage information and instructions to H20’s
CFO in Boise and mailed weekly reimburse-
ment checks to Boise for reimbursement of
these costs. .

In May 2018, a United States Department
of Labor investigation revealed that some of
the Tonapah workers employed by Proimtu
were misclassified, and thus were not receiv-
ing wages appropriate for participation on a
government project. Reclassification required
the payment of additional wages and employ-
ment taxes, In 2014, Proimtu’s general con-
tractor at the Tonapah site paid the addition-
al wages and H20 paid the $28,882.21 due in
employment taxes. Throughout the summer
of 2014, H20 sought reimbursement for
these additional taxes, but Proimtu did not

370

respond to H20’s invoices. In April 2015,
H20 filed suit in Idaho against Proimtu to
recover the employment taxes it had paid.
Proimtu moved to dismiss for lack of person-
al jurisdiction. The district court granted the
motion.

Thereafter, Proimtu filed a statement of
costs, including a request for attorney’s fees.
H20 filed a motion to disallow costs and a
motion to vacate the judgment, arguing that
Proimtv’s filing of the statement of costs was
a general appearance and constituted volun-
tary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court. The district court issued a written
decision concluding that (1) Proimtu’s filing
of a statement of costs was not a general
appearance and did not invoke the personal
jurisdiction of the court, and 2) that Proim-
tu’s statement of costs did not comply with
the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 54(e). Accordingly, the court denied
H20’s motion to vacate the judgment, but
granted its motion to disallow costs. H20
appeals, alleging that the district court erred
in granting Proimtu’s motion to dismiss for
personal jurisdiction and in refusing to va-
cate the judgment thereafter entered. Proim-
tu cross-appeals, alleging that the district
court erred in granting H20’s motion to dis-
allow costs.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM Similar to a motion for summary
judgment, in reviewing a district court’s deci-
sion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdie-
tion, this Court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-movant and
draws all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party. Houghland Farms,
Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 75, 803 P.2d
978, 981 (1990).

Ill. ANALYSIS

A. The exercise of personal jurisdiction
by Idaho courts over Proimtu does not
violate the Due Process clause.

H20 contends that Proimtu purposefully
availed itself of Idaho jurisdiction because it
knew it was conducting business with people
who were based in Idaho. Proimtu knew this,
H20 argues, because Proimtu sent weekly

emails to H20’s CFO, who was based in
Boise, and whose email signature block in-
cluded an Idaho address. Proimtu also mailed
weekly reimbursement checks to H20 at an
Idaho address and received a completed W-9
form indicating that H20’s address was in
Idaho, H20 argues that these facts, together
with the phone calls made to Boise at the
time of contract formation and the payments
issued from H20’s Boise bank, are sufficient
minimum contacts with the State of Idaho to
allow Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction
over Proimtu without offending principles of
due process.

The district court held, as indicated above,
that these contacts were sufficient to consti-
tute transacting business within the purview
of Idaho’s long-arm statute, but that they
were not sufficient minimum contacts to al-
low the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction
over Proimtu. We disagree.

HM “tn order for an Idaho court to exert
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant,
two criteria must be met; the act giving rise
to the cause of action must fall within the
scope of our long-arm statute and the consti-
tutional standards of due process must be
met.” St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Wash-
ington, 123 Idaho 789, 742, 852 P.2d 491, 494
(1998).

Idaho’s long-arm statute, Idaho Code sec-
tion 5-514, provides, in pertinent part, for the
jurisdiction of Idaho courts over

[a]lny person, firm, company, association or
corporation, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the acts
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits
said person, firm, company, association or
corporation, and if an individual, his per-
sonal representative, to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any cause of
action arising from the doing if any of said
acts:
(a) The transaction of any business with-
in this state which is hereby defined as the
doing of any act for the purpose of realiz-
ing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or
attempting to accomplish, transact or en-
hance the business purpose or objective or
any part thereof ...

Hl Idaho courts have traditionally afford-
ed section 5-514 broad application. Southern
Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe &
Supply, Inc, 98 Idaho 495, 497, 567 P.2d
1246, 1248 (1977) (“The language of I.C. § 5-
514(a) is broad.... [It] is remedial in nature
and should be broadly construed”). However,
“(t]he exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
courts of this state over those who do any of
the acts enumerated in I.C. § 5-514 extends
only ‘as to any cause of action arising from
the doing of any of said acts.’” Houghland
Farms, Inc., 119 Idaho at 75, 803 P.2d at 981.
Thus, it is specific, as opposed to general
jurisdiction. Id.

HM For jurisdiction to be properly ex-
ercised, defendants must also be afforded
due process protections pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Schneider v. Sverdsten Logging
Co., Inc., 104 Idaho 210, 211, 657 P.2d 1078,
1079 (1983). Due process requires that, for
personal jurisdiction to be properly exercised
over an out-of-state defendant, the defendant
must “have certain minimum contacts [with
the forum state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.” Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 826 U.S. 810,
816, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 101-02
(1945) internal quotations omitted), “The re-
lationship between the defendant and the
forum must be such that it is ‘reasonable ...
to require the [defendant] corporation to de-
fend the particular suit which is being
brought there’” World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100
S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490, 498 (1980)
(quoting International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at
317, 66 S.Ct. at 158, 90 L.Ed. at 102). “{IIt is
essential ... that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully ayail[ed] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.” Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 285, 258, 78 S.Ct. 1228,
1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1288, 1298 (1958).

Hl Here, H20 challenges the court’s con-
clusion that Proimtu’s contacts with Idaho
were insufficient under the Due Process
clause of the United States Constitution. The
district court’s analysis focused on the ac-

371

tions of Proimtu (the defendant) and whether
they gave “fair warning” to Proimtu that it
‘was subjecting itself to jurisdiction in Idaho.
It concluded that they did not,

H20 argues that Proimtu knew well in
advance of performance of the contact that
the essential services under the contract
were going to be performed in Idaho, includ-
ing pre-employment screening of potential
employees, Davis-Bacon wage reporting and
processing of employee wages. This argu-
ment is well taken.

The record indicates that Proimtu received
documentation at least fowr weeks prior to
entering into the oral contract with H20 that
indicated that it would be conducting busi-
ness with Proimtu from its Boise office. This
documentation included a W-9 form with a
Boise address for H20, a form indicating
that wages for Proimtu employees would be
paid by H20 through the Boise branch of a
national bank, and a request that Proimtu
send reimbursement checks to H20’s Boise
office for these wages. This was plenty of
time in which Proimtu could decide whether
it would rather conduct business elsewhere.
But it did not. Instead, it engaged in a series
of calls and emails with H20 executives in
Boise to form the oral contract at issue here.
Throughout the duration of the contract,
weekly emails were sent to H20 executives
in Boise with wage and employee information
that H20 needed to fulfill its duties under
the contract, All of the work H20 performed
under the contract was performed in Idaho.
Although Proimtu was contracting with a
Nevada company for services related to em-
ployees at a Nevada site, Proimtu was ap-
prised very early on that H20 would be
completing its work under the contract from
its Idaho office. By contracting with H20
after being notified of its presence in Idaho
and its desire to perform contractual duties
there, Proimtu purposefully availed itself of
the benefits and protection of Idaho laws.
The exercise of personal jurisdiction by Ida-
ho courts over Proimtu is thus constitutional-
ly proper.

Because we have determined that the dis-
trict court erred when it granted Proimtu’s

372 |

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, we
need not reach the issue of whether the filing
of the statement of costs constituted a gener-
al appearance.

B. No attorney fees on appeal.

Proimtu seeks attorney fees on appeal pur-
suant to Idaho Code section 12-120, Howey-
er, in light of our decision above, Proimtu is
not the prevailing party. No attorney fees
are awarded on appeal.

Iv. CONCLUSION

We vacate the judgment of the district
court and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Costs to H20,

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and HORTON concur.

397 P.3d 1132
John E. FUQUAY; Clinton Ward Fuquay;
and Hailey Rose Fuquay, Plaintiffs-
Counterdefendants-Appellants,
v.

Susie LOW and Cal Low, Defendants-
Respondents,

and

Gilbert King, as Trustee of the Heart K _

Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012;
the Estate of Gordon G. King; and Rose
M. King, as Beneficiary of the Heart K
Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012,
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respon-
dents,

and

Aveo Financial Services of Idaho Falls;
and First American Title Insurance
Company, Defendants.

Docket No. 44155

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 29, 2017

>
oD

Fidelity National Law Group, Seattle,
Washington, for appellants. Matthew R.
Cleverley argued.

Sawtooth Law Offices, Boise, for respon-
dents Low. S. Bryce Farris argued.

Ronald P. Rainey, Caldwell, for respon-
dents King.

HORTON, Justice.

John Fuquay, Clinton Fuquay, and Hailey
Fuquay (the Fuquays), appeal the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Gil-
bert King, as Trustee of the Heart K Ranch
Trust, the Estate of Gordon King, Rose King
(the Kings), Susie Low, and Cal Low (the
Lows), and the denial of the Fuquays’ motion
for reconsideration in a property dispute con-
cerning an alleged prescriptive easement in
favor of the Fuquays across the Kings’ and
Lows’ property. We affirm.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

King Lane is a private, all-weather road in
Owyhee County about one-half mile in
length. It is lined by two barbed wire fences
and it runs in an east-west direction connect-
ing with Oreana Loop Road on the east end

375

and Castle Lane on the west end. Castle
Lane then continues southward until it con-
nects with Oreana Loop Road. The Kings
own the parcel of land to the north of King
Lane, and the Lows own the parcel of land to
the south of King Lane. The Lows purchased
their property in 2006 from Samuel Steiner.
The Fuquays own the parcels of land to the
west of King Lane where it ends and con-
nects with Castle Lane. The degree to which
King Lane crosses over either the King prop-
erty or the Low property is not known;
however, it is undisputed that King Lane
crosses portions of each property.

The Kings purchased their property on
September 17, 1973. According to Rose King,
at the time the Kings purchased the proper-
ty, “King Lane was only a path through
grass and weeds and was wet and muddy
most of the year.” According to Samuel
Steiner, the Lows’ predecessor, “during wet
weather” King Lane was “pretty difficult to
get through.” Starting in 1978, the Kings
hauled rocks to build a base for King Lane
and over the years improved it to the point
where it could be used consistently for the
Kings’ farming needs. In 1982, the Kings sold
their property to Zane Block, but repos-
sessed the property in 1986, According to
Rose King, it was impossible to cross King
Lane in a large truck until 1988-89 when a
welded barrel culvert under King Lane was
replaced by a concrete culvert.

At various times throughout the year, the
Kings graze cattle over King Lane. Until
2014, the Kings had barbed wire gates on
both the east and west ends of King Lane to
enclose their livestock. Anyone attempting to
use King Lane had to stop, open, and then
close the gates. In 2014, the Kings placed
large iron gates across each end of King
Lane.

The Fuquays purchased their property in
1977. Contrary to Rose King’s testimony, the
Fuquays claim that they have continuously
used large semi-trucks, cattle trucks, farm
vehicles, and personal vehicles to cross King
Lane since 1977. In 2014, John Fuquay divid-
ed the Fuquay property into parcels for sale.
At that time, the Fuquays discovered that
there was no recorded easement for the ben-

376

efit of the Fuquay property for access by
way of King Lane. In the summer of 2014, a
dispute also arose between the Kings and the
Fuquays regarding the iron gates that the
Kings placed at each end of King Lane.

On August 11, 2014, the Fuquays filed a
complaint against the Kings and the Lows
seeking a declaratory judgment for a pres-
eriptive easement across King Lane, On Sep-
tember 4, 2014, the Fuquays filed a motion
for a temporary restraining order to enjoin
the Kings from blocking their access to King
Lane, The district court granted the Fu-
quays’ request for a temporary restraining
order and set a hearing for preliminary in-
junction. Following that hearing, the district
court denied the Fuquays’ request for tempo-
rary injunction.

The Fuquays filed a motion for summary
judgment against the Lows; however, the
Fuquays subsequently withdrew the motion.
The Kings then moved for summary judg-
ment. On March 25, 2015, the district court
denied the Kings’ motion for summary judg-
ment, finding that that there was a material
issue of fact as to when the Fuquays’ claimed
adverse use of King Lane began. On March
80, 2015, the Fuquays filed an amended com-
plaint.

On April 7, 2015, the Kings filed a motion
for reconsideration under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(a)(2)(B)! arguing that under
Idaho’s joint-use-in-common rule, the Fu-
quays’ use of King Lane was presumptively
permissive and that the Fuquays failed to
present any evidence of “adverse” use to
rebut that presumption. On June 19, 2015,
the district court granted the Kings’ motion
for reconsideration, concluding that the Fu-
quays failed to make any showing that their
use of King Lane was adverse use under a
claim of right; an essential element required
to create a prescriptive easement, The dis-
trict court then entered judgment in favor of
the Kings on July 8, 2015. On July 15, 2015,
the Lows moved for partial summary judg-
ment raising the same arguments as the
Kings. On September 21, 2015, the district
court granted the Lows’ motion for partial
1, Our citations to the Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-

dure in this opinion relate to the rules in effect at
the time of the district court's decision. Idaho

summary judgment after concluding that
their position was legally identical to the
Kings.

On July 6, 2015, the Fuquays moved for
reconsideration of the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to the Kings. The
Fuquays argued that the district court ap-
plied the wrong presumption in its analysis
and that there was conflicting evidence in the
record as to whether the Fuquays’ use of
King Lane was “in-common” with the Kings
or “adverse.” On September 11, 2015, the
district court issued its memorandum deci-
sion denying the Fuquays’ motion for recon-
sideration. The district court concluded that
because the Kings had annually improved
King Lane since 1978 to create an all-weath-
er roadway, the correct presumption was
that of permissive use. The district court
further concluded the Fuquays failed to pres-
ent evidence that their use of King Lane
interfered in any way with the Kings’ use of
the roadway. On December 21, 2015, the
district court entered it judgment as to the
claims between the Fuquays and the Lows.
The Fuquays timely appealed.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HN “On appeal from the grant of a
motion for summary judgment, this Court
utilizes the same standard of review used by
the district court originally ruling on the
motion.” Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 158 Ida-
hho 801, 804, 291 P.8d 1000, 1008 (2012). Sum-
mary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.” ILR.C.P. 56(c).
“When considering whether the evidence in
the record shows that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the trial court must
liberally construe the facts, and draw all
reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-
moving party.” Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 187 Idaho 160, 168, 45 P.8d
816, 819 (2002),

Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b), effective July 1,
2016, now governs motions for reconsideration.

HE “[Whhen reviewing a trial court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion for recon-
sideration, this Court utilizes the same stan-
dard of review used by the lower court in
deciding the motion for reconsideration.”
Fragnelia v. Petrovich, 158 Idaho 266, 276,
281 P.8d 108, 118 (2012). Thus, “when review-
ing the grant or denial of a motion for recon-
sideration following the grant of summary
judgment, this Court must determine wheth-
er the evidence presented a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment.”
Id.

When an action will be tried before the
court without a jury, the trial court as the
trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most
probable inferences based upon the undis-
puted evidence properly before it and
grant the summary judgment despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences. The
test for reviewing the inferences drawn by
the trial court is whether the record rea-
sonably supports the inferences.

Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisi-
ana-Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 238, 285, 31 P.8d
921, 923 (2001) (internal citations omitted).

Il, ANALYSIS

‘The Fuquays argue the district court erred
by not applying the legal presumption that
their use of King Lane was adverse, that the
Kings failed to present any evidence that the
use was permissive, and that the Fuquays
had presented evidence of at least three sep-
arate and distinct acts of adverse use that
would rebut any presumption of permissive
use,

A. The district court applied the correct
presumption of permissive use and the
Fuquays failed to present evidence of
any hostile or adverse act that would
rebut that presumption.

Hs To prove the existence of an ease-
ment by prescription, a party must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that use of the
subject property was: “(1) open and notori-
ous, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, (8)
adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with
2, Under Idaho Code section 5-203, the statutory

period is five years for prescriptive easement
claims established prior to the amendment of the

377

the actual or imputed knowledge of the own-
er of the servient tenement (6) for the statu-
tory period....”? Hughes v. Fisher, 142
Idaho 474, 480, 129 P.8d 1228, 1229 (2006).
“Under claim of right means that the claim-
ant has used the way without recognition of
the rights of the owner of the servient tene-
ment.” Marshall v. Blair, 180 Idaho 675, 680,
946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997) “[A] prescriptive
right cannot be obtained ifthe use of the
servient tenement is by permission of its
owner, because the use, by definition, was
not adverse to the rights of the owner.” Jd.
“Easements by prescription are not favored
by the law.” Hunter v. Shields, 181 Idaho
148, 152, 953 P.2d 588, 592 (1998).

1, The timeframe for application of the
presumption is 1977 when the Fu-
quays purchased their property and
began to use King Lane.

HE The Fuquays argue that the district
court incorrectly applied the presumption
that their use of King Lane was permissive.
The Fuquays contend that there is no evi-
dence as to how the original use of King
Lane began and, therefore, the district court
should have applied the general rule presum-
ing that the use was adverse based on the
Fuquays’ predecessors’ use of King Lane,
The Fuquays are incorrect.

Hl “Generally, proof of open, notorious,
continuous, and uninterrupted use of the way
for the prescriptive period, without evidence
as to how the use began, raises a presump-
tion that the use was adverse and under
claim of right.” Marshall, 180 Idaho at 680,
946 P.2d at 980. “Proof of all of these ele-
ments shifts the burden to the owner of the
servient estate, who must demonstrate that
the claimant’s use was permissive.” Id.

The Fuquays contend that “[t]he roadway
had been used by the predecessors to the
current parties by use of the roadway for
nearly 100 years; [and] [t]he origin of the
roadway is unknown and therefore is pre-
sumed to be adverse to the Kings and Lows.”
However, the record does not support the

statute in 2006, or twenty years if established

after the amendment. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Ida-
ho 212, 222, 280 P.3d 715, 725 (2012).

378

Fuquays’ claim. As we explained in Marshall,
it is the “proof of all these elements” that
shifts the burden. Id. The evidence that the
Fuquays presented regarding use of King
Lane by their predecessors falls well short of
the requirement of continuous use. The Fu-
quays presented Samuel Steiner’s statements
that he did “not know who, if anyone, con-
structed King Lane,” and that “(rjenters on
the old Munger property, now owned by
[the] Fuquays and previously owned by Bob
Collett used it occasionally as a short-cut to
Grand View.” The Fuquays simply have not
presented “proof of open, notorious, continu-
ous, and uninterrupted use of the way for the
prescriptive period,” Marshall, 130 Idaho at
680, 946 P.2d at 980, on the part of their
predecessors that would trigger a shift to a
presumption of adverse use at any time prior
to the Fuquays’ purchase of the property and
subsequent use of King Lane starting in
1977.

2. The Fuquays’ use of King Lane
starting in 1977 was presumptively
permissive based on the Kings’ annu-
al improvement of King Lane, start-
ing in 1973, into an all-weather road-
way.

As explained above: “Without evidence of
how the use of the property began, proof of
open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupt-
ed use for the prescriptive period raises a
presumption that the use was adverse and
under a claim of right.” Hodgins v. Sales, 189
Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969, 976 (2008) (inter-
nal citations omitted). However, we have ar-
ticulated two exceptions to the presumption
of adverse use: (1) “The use of a driveway in
common with the owner and the general
public, in the absence of some decisive act on
the user’s part indicating a separate and
exclusive use on his part negatives any pre-
sumption of individual right therein in his
favor.” Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136,
144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941); and, (2)
“[W]here the owner of real property con-
structs a way over it for his own use and
convenience, the mere use thereof by others
which in no way interferes with his use will
be presumed to be by way of license or
permission.” Id.

It its memorandum decision on the Kings’
motion for reconsideration, the district court
concluded that under the first exception to
the general rule of adverse use, the Fuquays’
use of King Lane was presumptively permis-
sive based on their in-common use with the
Kings and the general public. However, in its
memorandum decision on the Fuquays’ mo-
tion for reconsideration, the district court
changed positions, concluding that there was
a question of fact as to whether there had
been use of King Lane by the general public.
The district court nevertheless denied the
Fuquays’ motion for reconsideration after
concluding that the second exception to the
presumption of adverse use applied because
the Kings improved King Lane starting in
1978 for the benefit of their farming opera-
tion and the Fuquays had failed to produce
any evidence that their own use of King Lane
interfered with the Kings’ rights,

It appears that the Fuquays have not fully
appreciated the district court’s changed anal-
ysis. The majority of the Fuquays’ argu-
ments on appeal focus on their claim that
King Lane’s existence and use by the parties’
predecessors prior to 1978 establishes the
presumption of adverse use, that the Kings
did not present any evidence of a change
from adverse to permissive use, that the
public use exception does not apply, and that
the Fuquays have presented evidence of dis-
tinct adverse use on King Lane. Indeed, the
Fuquays’ opening brief is virtually a word-
for-word copy of the motion for reconsidera-
tion they submitted to the district court.

The Fuquays do not discuss the district
court’s conclusion concerning the creation or
improvement of King Lane into an all-weath-
er road under the second exception to the
presumption of adverse use until their reply
brief, wherein the Fuquays simply argue that.
the “ewistence of King Lane as an access
road, and the improvements to the road swr-
face that the Kings began in 1978” are two
separate issues and because King Lane exist-
ed prior to the Kings purchase of the proper-
ty in 1978, “[a] reasonable person could con-
clude that the roadway was in existence for
nearly 100 years, and that prescriptive use
rights had vested before the Kings pur-
chased their property and began to improve

the roadway surface in 1978,” The Fuquays
have not presented this Court with any argu-
ment or authority to contradict the district
court’s conclusion that their use of King
Lane was presumptively permissive under
the second exception to the general presump-
tion of adverse use. Thus, the question then
turns to whether the Fuquays have present-
ed sufficient evidence of an adverse and hos-
tile act.

HM ‘{IJf 2 use has commenced as per-
missive, a user must make some new and
independent act that would put the owner of
the servient property on notice that the use
was no longer permissive.” Backman v. Law-
rence, 147 Idaho 890, 398, 210 P.3d 75, 83
(2009). “[T]he presumption continues until a
hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested
and ‘brought home’ to the servient property
owner.” H.F.L.P., LLC v. City of Twin Falls,
157 Idaho 672, 681, 339 P.3d 557, 566 (2014).

3. The Fuquays have failed to present
any evidence of hostile or adverse
acts that infringed on the Kings’
rights.

HM The district court concluded that the
Fuquays did nothing to interfere with the
Kings’ use of King Lane, and that interfer-
ence is required to show adverse use. The
Fuquays claim they have shown three dis-
tinct acts of adverse use, The Fuquays argue
that the record shows distinctly adverse acts:
(1) when the Fuquays purchased the proper-
ty in 1977 and began using the roadway for
access to their property; (2) when the Fu-
quays put a new mobile home on the proper-
ty and used King Lane to access that new
home; and, (8) when the Fuquays allowed
numerous renters on their property to use
the roadway for access to the rental proper-
ty. The Fuquays do not present any citation
to authority to support their arguments.

“Indeed, the rule is well established that
no use can be considered adverse or ripen
into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes
an actual invasion of or infringement on the
rights of the owner.” Hughes, 142 Idaho at

3. This version of Idaho Code section 12-121 took
effect March 1, 2017, as House Bill 97 contained
an emergency clause which provided that it be-
came effective upon “its passage and approval.”

379

480, 129 P.8d at 1229. The record shows that.
the Fuquays did not interfere with the rights
of the Kings at any time. In fact, the Fu-
quays admitted during the preliminary in-
junction hearing that they never interfered
with the Kings’ use of King Lane. Thus, the
Fuquays have failed to provide any evidence
that their use of King Lane infringed on the
rights of the Kings or Lows.

B. The Kings and the Lows are entitled
to attorney fees and costs on appeal.

HM The Kings and the Lows request
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section
12-121. Idaho Code section 12-121 states,
“fin any civil action, the judge may award
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party or parties when the judge finds that
the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without founda-
tion.”* LC. § 12-121. “Such circumstances
exist when an appellant has only asked the
appellate court to second-guess the trial
court by reweighing the evidence or has
failed to show that the trial court incorrectly
applied well-established law.” City of Boise v.
Ada Cnity., 147 Idaho 794, 812, 215 P.8d 514,
582 (2009). “Ordinarily, attorney fees will not
be awarded where the losing party brought
the appeal in good faith and where a genuine
issue of law was presented.” Nelson v. Nel-
son, 144 Idaho 710, 718, 170 P.38d 375, 383
(2007).

Both the Kings and the Lows argue that
they are entitled to attorney fees under Ida-
ho Code section 12-121 because the Fuquays
have done nothing more than assert the same
arguments that failed before the district
court, without adding significant analysis or
authority. They are correct. “[A]ttorney fees
on appeal have been awarded under Section
12-121 when appellants failed to add any new
analysis or authority to the issues raised
below that were resolved by a district court’s
well-reasoned authority.” Frantz v. Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, 161 Idaho 60,
66, 883 P.8d 1280, 1236 (2016) (internal quo-
tation omitted). This Court has awarded fees

2017 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 47, § 4, p. 76. The
Governor signed the bill on March 1, 2017. We
will apply the law in effect at the time of this
decision,

380

under Section 12-121 when an appellant pres-
ents “substantially the same arguments on
appeal as it did before the district court on
judicial review and failed to add significant
new analysis or authority to support its argu-
ments.” Rangen, Ine, v. Idaho Dep't of Water
Res., 159 Idaho 798, 812, 867 P.38d 198, 207
(2016) (applying Castrigno v. McQuade, 141
Idaho 98, 98, 106 P.3d 419, 424 (2005)),

As noted above, the Fuquays’ opening
brief on appeal is almost a word-for-word
copy of their motion for reconsideration be-
fore the district court. The Fuquays did not
supplement their briefing with new analysis
or authority to support their arguments and
did not address the basis for the district
court’s decision on their motion for reconsid-
eration until their reply brief. Thus, the
Kings and the Lows are entitled to attorney
fees and costs on appeal,

Iv, CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment in
favor of the Kings and the Lows and award
attorney fees and costs on appeal to the
Kings and the Lows.

Justices EISMANN and JONES concur.

BRODY, Justice, concurring in part,
dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent from the award of
attorney's fees to the Kings and Lows. There
is no dispute that the Fuquays have been
using King Road for about forty years. While
the Fuquays were not successful in establish-
ing that they have a preseriptive easement,
they litigated an important, long-time inter-
est, and I do not find that their efforts were
frivolous, unreasonable or without founda-
tion, This case was decided by the district
court on summary judgment. The path to
that judgment, however, was anything but
straight and narrow. The Kings filed their
motion for summary judgment in March
2015. The district court denied the motion,
finding that there were genuine issues of
material fact. The Kings then filed a motion
for reconsideration which the district court
granted and judgment was entered in their
favor, The Fuquays then filed a motion for
reconsideration, and although the motion was

denied, the district court recognized that
there were, in fact, genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the general public used
King Road. Given these circumstances and
the important interest at issue, asking this
Court to review the district court’s decisions,
particularly where the standard of review is
de novo, is not unreasonable, frivolous or
without foundation,

Chief Justice BURDICK concurs,

397 P.3d 1139
In the Matter of John Doe, A Child
Under Eighteen Years of Age.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND WELFARE, Petitioner-
Respondent,

ve
Jane DOE (2017-3), Respondent-Appellant.
Docket No. 44764

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 29, 2017

381

Canyon County Public Defender’s Office,
Caldwell, for appellant.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent.

ON THE BRIEFS
HORTON, Justice.

This case was previously before this Court
in In Matter of Doe (2016-14), 161 Idaho 596,
389 P.8d 141 (2016). There, we vacated the
judgment terminating Jane Doe’s parental
rights to her son M.R. and remanded the
case for further findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. On remand, the magistrate
court again terminated Doe’s parental rights,
The magistrate court found that M.R, was
neglected as defined by Idaho Code sections
16-2002(8)(a) and 16-2002(8)(b) and that
Doe’s compliance with her case plan was not
impossible, Doe timely appealed. We affirm.

382

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Doe has a long history of involvement with
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
(the Department), beginning in 2000. Doe
was removed from her biological parents in
2000 and 2004 for physical abuse. The abuse
resulted in head wounds and scarring and
necessitated surgeries. Doe later disclosed
sexual abuse by her parents. Her parents
consented to termination of their parental
rights to Doe in 2004. Doe turned eighteen
while in foster care, aging out of the system.
Doe gave birth to MLR. in 2011 and—despite
the earlier termination of her legal relation-
ship with her parents—began living with
M.R. in a separate residence on her parents’
property.

In August of 2012, Doe was arrested for
aggravated assault. M.R. was sixteen months
old at the time of her arrest. Upon her
incarceration, Doe “signed over temporary
guardianship” of M.R. to her parents, Doe
was eventually sentenced to serve five years,
with two years fixed, and the court retained
jurisdiction, Doe was unsuccessful on her
rider. In June of 2014, the district court
relinquished jurisdiction because of Doe’s
“ageressive behavior” while in prison. Doe
testified that the earliest that she may be
released is in May of 2017.1 At that time,
MLR. will be six years old. He has not been in
Doe’s care since her arrest.

In October of 2014, M.R. came into the
care of the Department because of physical
abuse of another child in Doe’s parents’
home. A case plan was approved in Decem-
ber of 2014, which included tasks that Doe
was to complete while incarcerated. Doe
failed to complete certain case plan require-
ments, specifically, counseling and a parent-
ing class after being transferred to a differ-
ent prison facility.

On November 12, 2015, the Department
filed a Petition for Termination of the Par-
ent-Child Relationship. Following a hearing
on March 21, 2016, the magistrate court
found that the Department had met its bur-
den of proving, by clear and convincing evi-

1, Although not part of the record before this
Court, we note that Idaho Department of Correc-

dence, two grounds upon which termination
could be granted: (1) neglect, due to Doe’s
failure to comply with her case plan; and (2)
Doe’s incarceration for a substantial portion
of M.R.’s minority, The magistrate court fur-
ther found, again by clear and convincing
evidence, that terminating Doe’s parental
rights was in M.R.’s best interests.

Doe appealed. We vacated the judgment
terminating Doe’s parental rights to her son
MLR. and remanded the case for further find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law on the
issue of the impossibility of Doe completing
her case plan, On December 16, 2016, the
magistrate court issued its findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The magistrate court
again found by clear and convincing evidence
that termination of Doe’s parental rights was
proper based on Doe’s failure to comply with
her case plan under Idaho Code section 16-
2002(8)(b) and Doe’s failure or inability to
provide care under Idaho Code section 16-
2002(8)(a). Doe timely appealed.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE “Pursuant to Idaho Code section
16-2005(1), a court may terminate parental
rights if it finds that doing so is in the best
interests of the child and that at least one of
five grounds for termination is satisfied.” In
re Doe (2014-23), 157 Idaho 920, 928, 342
P.8d 632, 635 (2015). “The trial court must
find that grounds for terminating parental
rights have been proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence.” Dep't of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 149 Idaho 207, 210, 233 P.8d 188, 141
(2010); see also LC. § 16-2009. “Clear and
convincing evidence is evidence that indicates
the thing to be proved is highly probable or
reasonably certain.” In re Doe (2014-17), 157
Idaho 694, 699, 339 P.3d 755, 760 (2014).
“This Court must ‘conduct an independent
review of the magistrate court record, but
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the magistrate court’s judgment, as the
magistrate court has the opportunity to ob-
serve witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their
credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and
to judge the character of the parties.” In re
Doe (2014-28), 157 Idaho at 928, 342 P.3d at

tion records show that Doe was discharged from
custody on May 23, 2017.

635 (quoting Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 46, 49,
244 P.3d 190, 198 (2010)).

Hl This Court “will not disturb the mag-
istrate court’s decision to terminate parental
rights if there is substantial, competent evi-
dence in the record to support the decision.”
In ve Doe (2014-17), 157 Idaho at 699, 889
P.8d at 760 (quoting Idaho Dept Health &
Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, 41, 244 P.8d
180, 185 (2010)). “Substantial, competent evi-
dence is evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion.” Id.

Il, ANALYSIS

A. There is substantial and competent ev-
idence in the record to support the
magistrate court’s judgment terminat-
ing Doe’s parental rights to M.R. due
to neglect as defined under Idaho
Code section 16-2002(8)(b).

HI The magistrate court found that Doe
failed to comply with her case plan and thus
MLR. was neglected as defined by Idaho
Code section 16-2002(8)(b). The magistrate
court explained:

[Doe] has failed to comply with the court’s

orders or the case plan in the child protec-

tive act case, in that she has accomplished
literally nothing in the case plan. She has
not been released from prison, so she has
not: obtained stable housing; obtained em-
ployment or other income to support her-
self and her child; provided proof comple-
tion of a parenting class approved by

IDHW; or obtained a substance abuse

evaluation and completed the recom-

mended treatment.
On the defense of impossibility, the magis-
trate court concluded:

The court finds and concludes that the

state has shown by clear and convincing

evidence that compliance with the case
plan was not impossible, because [Doe’s]
inability to comply with the case plan was
the result of her own conduct. At the time
the case plan was prepared, [Doe] was
serving the fixed portion of her sentence,
which would have been completed in late

2014, Had [Doe] complied with prison re-

quirements, she could reasonably have an-

383

ticipated that she would be release in early
2015, and be able to progress on the case
plan. Instead, she is “topping out” and
serving the balance of the indeterminate
time, time, which occurred as a result as
[sic] of her own substantial misconduct
while incarcerated.

In reaching its conclusion, the magistrate
court considered, among other things, Doe’s
own testimony admitting that Doe’s behav-
ioral problems played a part in her not being
paroled. The magistrate court analyzed cop-
ies of the Idaho Department of Correction
records regarding Doe. The records show
that Doe committed thirteen disciplinary of-
fenses after M.R. was removed from the
home, twelve of which were after Doe’s case
plan was adopted. The magistrate court also
examined the minutes from a hearing held
before the Commission of Pardons and Pa-
role (Commission) six weeks following the
approval of the case plan. The minutes show
that Doe failed to complete the therapeutic
community program in December of 2018
and November of 2014, both dates prior to
the creation of her case plan in December of
2014, and that Doe committed three disciplin-
ary offenses which resulted in restrictions,
two occurring after the creation of the case
plan. Finally, the magistrate court examined
the minutes from a hearing held by the Com-
mission on Doe’s petition for reconsideration
of parole. The Commission noted five disci-
plinary offenses in the record and denied
Doe’s petition for reconsideration of parole.
Based in part on that evidence, the magis-
trate court terminated Doe’s parental rights
to MR.

On appeal, Doe argues that the Commis-
sion documents do not constitute substantial
and competent evidence that Doe willfully
avoided parole. Doe concludes:

Without evidence to determine Why Moth-
er failed to parole, only the speculation and
supposition that such failure to pass or
complete the therapeutic community (TC)
program along with the [disciplinary of-
fenses] was sufficient. We are left with
mere speculation on why the parole com-
mission voided the parole date, and not

384

firm evidence that Mother’s behavior

caused this failure,

Doe’s arguments are unpersuasive,

Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(b) provides:
“The court may grant an order terminating
the relationship where it finds that termi-
nation of parental rights is in the best inter-
ests of the child and ... [t]he parent has
neglected or abused the child.” IC. § 16-
2005(1)(b), “Neglect” is defined under Idaho
Code section 16-2002(3)(b) as:

The parent(s) has failed to comply with the

court’s orders or the case plan in a child

protective act case and ... [t]he depart-
ment has had temporary or legal custody
of the child for fifteen (15) of the most
recent twenty-two (22) months; and ...

{rleunification has not been accomplished

by the last day of the fifteenth month in

which the child has been in the temporary

or legal custody of the department.
LC. § 16-2002(8)(b). In Doe’s earlier appeal,
we held that “impossibility may be asserted
as a defense to a claim of neglect founded
upon failure to comply with the requirements
of a case plan.” In Matter of Doe (2016-14),
161 Idaho 596, 598, 889 P.3d 141, 148 (2016).
We explained:

This is not to say, however, that a trial
court must find willful non-compliance with
the terms of a case plan as a prerequisite
to a finding of neglect under Idaho Code
section 16-2002(8)(b). Instead, the trial
court must find that the parent is responsi-
ble, whether directly or indirectly, for non-
compliance with the requirements of a case
plan. This requirement reflects the reality
presented by parents who engage in be-
havior that results in con-compliance with
no apparent thought or consideration of
the effect of that behavior upon the case
plan.

Id. The magistrate court provided thorough
and reasoned findings of fact and conclusions
of law which detail Doe’s actions while incar-
cerated that directly or indirectly resulted in
Doe’s non-compliance with the requirements
of her case plan, We find that there is sub-
stantial and competent evidence in the record
supporting the magistrate court’s determina-
tion that Doe’s compliance with the case plan
was not impossible and terminating Doe’s

parental rights to MLR. for neglect as defined.
by Idaho Code section 16-2002(8)(b).

B. We do not reach the magistrate
court’s second ground for terminating
Doe’s parental rights to MLR.

Hl The magistrate court found and con-
eluded upon clear and convincing evidence
that M.R. was neglected as defined by Idaho
Code section 16-2002(8)(a). Because this
Court may affirm the magistrate court’s deci-
sion based on neglect as defined under Idaho
Code section 16-2002(3)(b), we do not reach
the second issue on appeal. “When a decision
is ‘based upon alternative grounds, the fact
that one of the grounds may be in error is of
no consequence and may be disregarded if
the judgment can be sustained upon one of
the other grounds.’” In Matter of Doe (2015-
07), 159 Idaho 461, 464, 362 P.8d 536, 589
(2015) (quoting Andersen v. Profl Escrow
Servs, Ine., 141 Idaho 748, 746, 118 P.8d 75,
78 (2005).

C. The magistrate court’s determination
that terminating Doe’s parental rights
to MLR. was in M.R.’s best interest is
not an issue on appeal.

Hl In Doe's previous appeal, we held
that substantial and competent evidence sup-
ported the magistrate court’s finding that
terminating Doe’s parental rights to M.R.
was in M.R.’s best interest. In Matter of Doe
(2016-14), 161 Idaho at 604, 889 P.8d at 149,
However, we vacated the magistrate court’s
judgment and remanded the case for further
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
application of the impossibility defense. Id. at
605, 389 P.3d at 150. In its subsequent find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, the magis-
trate court did not reach the issue of the best
interest analysis, concluding:

The court previously found and conclud-
ed that termination of parental rights and
adoption is in [M.R.’s] best interest, and
this was affirmed on appeal. The court
makes no further findings and conclusions
with respect to this issue.

On appeal, Doe attempts to relitigate the
issue. That issue is not before this Court on
appeal,

The doctrine of “law of the case” is well
established in Idaho and provides that
upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in
deciding a case presented states in its
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary
to the decision, such pronouncement be-
comes the law of the case, and must be
adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon
subsequent appeal.

Swanson v. Swanson, 184 Idaho 612, 515, 5
P.8d 978, 976 (2000) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the magistrate court’s judgment
and decree terminating Doe’s parental rights
to MR.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur.

397 P.3d 1144

GREEN RIVER RANCHES,
LLC, Plaintiff,

ve
SILVA LAND COMPANY,
LLC, Defendant.
Jack McCall, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v

Silva Dairy, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company, Defendant-
Appellant,

and
Max Silva, an individual, Defendant.
Docket No. 43547

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Twin Falls, May 2017 Term.

Filed: June 29, 2017

385

io)
to}

Mayness, Taggart, PLLC, Idaho Falls, at-
torneys for appellant Silva Dairy, LLC. Ste-
ven Taggart argued.

Givens Pursley LLP, Boise, attorneys for
respondent Jack McCall. Bradiey J. Dixon
argued.

JONES, Justice
I, Narore or THe Case

This is a companion case to Green River
Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Company, LLC,
162 Idaho 184, 895 P.8d 804 (2017). In an
appeal arising out of Twin Falls County,
Appellant Silva Dairy, LLC (“Silva Dairy”),
challenges a district court’s holding that Silva
Dairy’s claim against Respondent Jack
McCall (“McCall”) for herd management ser-
vices is offset by amounts that Silva Dairy
owes McCall for feed expenses and pasture
rent. McCall owns a livestock business and
used Silva Dairy’s herd management ser-
vices. The district court found that McCall’s
total claims against Silva Dairy were at least
$492,464.77 and exceeded Silva Dairy’s claim
by $287,487.12. Accordingly, the district court
dismissed Silva Dairy’s claim with prejudice.
We affirm the district court’s judgment.

IL, Facruan anpD PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Between 2009 and 2012, McCall, Silva
Dairy, members of the Silva family, and re-
lated business entities owned by McCall or
members of the Silva family engaged in vari-
ous cattle-related business transactions. The
transactions relevant to this appeal are: (1)

387

Silva Dairy’s management of McCall’s herd;
(2) MeCall’s provision of feed to Silva Dairy;
and (8) Silva Dairy’s pasture rental from
McCall. In 2010, Silva Dairy filed for Chap-
ter 12 bankruptcy. Thereafter, McCall began
removing himself from the parties’ business
relationship. Litigation ensued between the
individuals and their business entities.

Three actions were consolidated below.
First, on March 27, 2018, Green River
Ranches, LLC, an entity owned in large part
by McCall, sued Silva Land Company, LLC
seeking payment on a loan made in 2009.
Second, McCall sued Max Silva for damages
related to the sale of 101 cattle, and Silva
Dairy filed a third party complaint against
McCall alleging that it was owed over
$245,000 for the management of McCall's
herd. Third, McCall sued Silva Dairy for,
inter alia, conversion of feed, pasture rent,
and feed payment.

It is important to note that because Silva
Dairy filed a Chapter 12 bankruptcy pro-
ceeding in August 2010, and later entered a
confirmed Chapter 12 plan, the district
court’s analysis of McCall’s claims against
Silva Dairy was limited to whether they off-
set Silva Dairy’s claim against McCall. In-
deed, the parties agreed that affirmative re-
lief could not be awarded against Silva Dairy
and that the district court was to determine
whether Silva Dairy’s claim exceeded
McCall’s claims,

This case illustrates the problems that
arise when businessmen fail to formalize oral
agreements with written contracts, The par-
ties formed a series of vague oral agreements
and planned on settling up at a later date.
Their business relationship soured and, un-
surprisingly, they were unable to settle their
respective debts. Needless to say, the fact
that Silva Dairy filed bankruptcy did not
simplify matters. The undisputed facts are
sparse and left the district court, as the fact-
finder, in the difficult position of untangling
the oral agreements. Between April 2010 and
August 2012, McCall placed his herd under
the management of Silva Dairy. There was
not a written agreement between the parties
concerning the management fee McCall was
to pay Silva Dairy; however, the parties
agreed that McCall was required to provide

388 Le

feed for his cattle. Silva Dairy managed its
own cattle at the same time it managed
McCall’s cattle, stored its own feed in the
same location where McCall's feed was
stored, and fed McCall’s feed to Silva Dairy
cattle, While both parties understood that
neither was obligated to provide feed for
each other’s cattle, both parties acknowl-
edged that the feed was commingled and fed
to both herds. Indeed, the herd nutritionist.
admitted that McCall’s feed and Silva Dairy’s
feed were intentionally mixed to achieve a
desired balance of nutrients, In the spring of
2012, McCall observed that his feed costs
were exorbitant; however, he continued to
supply feed until August 2012, when he re-
moved his cattle from Silva Dairy’s manage-
ment. Separately, between June 2011 and
August 2012, cattle owned by Silva Dairy
were placed on property owned or leased by
McCall. The parties did not have an agree-
ment as to the pasture rental fee.

The district court held two bench trials.
The first bench trial, held on June 26 and 27,
2014, determined whether either party was
liable for damages on the various claims. In a
memorandum opinion, the district court con-
cluded as follows, in pertinent part: (1) Max
Silva owed McCall for unpaid pasture rent;
(2) McCall owed Silva Dairy for approximate-
ly two years of herd management fees; and
(8) McCall was permitted to offset his man-
agement fee liability with his feed conversion
cdaim,

The second bench trial, held on June 24~
26, 2015, determined the amount of damages.
The district court issued a memorandum
opinion and corresponding judgment on July
16, 2015. First, the district court held that
Silva Dairy was entitled to $204,977.65 for
managing McCall’s herd. Second, the district
court revised its previous holding that Max
Silva was personally liable for McCall’s pas-
tore rent claim. The district court held that
Silva Dairy was actually liable for the pas-
ture rent after learning that the “MS” brand
that was on the pastured cattle stood for
“Manuel Silva and Sons,” which was Silva
Dairy’s brand. Previously, the district court
was under the impression that “MS” stood
for Max Silva. The district court concluded
that credible testimony from McCall and his

pasture manager proved the dates the cattle
were pastured and the associated costs, Ac-
cordingly, the district court held that Silva
Dairy’s management fee would be offset by
$52,386.90 for the pasture rent. Third, the
district court concluded that McCall was
owed $40,067.87 for feed purchases he made
for Silva Dairy’s cattle, Fourth, the district
court addressed McCall’s claim that Silva
Dairy had converted his feed. The district
noted as follows:
The parties spent an [sic] substantial
amount of time ... attempting to prove
their claims [with] theoretical calculations
of what cattle should have eaten, what
they should have been fed, and what the
feed was worth over the 28 months....
Unfortunately, there is little, if any, hard
evidence of the amount of McCall’s feed
consumed by Silva Dairy cattle, and vice
versa, That fact, however, does not pre-
clude the [cJourt from determining wheth-
er there is merit to McCall’s claim.
The district court found “several problems
with McCall’s methodology” in calculating
that he was owed $881,864 for feed that was
converted. However, the district court found
the testimony of McCall’s expert, Mr, Onain-
dia, to be “extremely credible.” (Emphasis
in original). Mr, Onaindia, an experienced
banker and dairyman, estimated that an
$800,000 to $900,000 gap existed between the
value of feed McCall purchased and the value
of McCall's feed that remained in Silva
Dairy’s possession, less the value of the
amount of feed that should have been fed to
McCall’s cattle. The district court accepted
Mr, Onaindia’s calculation and deducted the
remaining feed inventory, $386,047, from
$800,000 to conclude that Silva Dairy con-
verted “at least” $418,958 of McCall’s feed.
(Emphasis in original), In sum, the district
court dismissed Silva Dairy’s herd manage-
ment claim with prejudice because it was
more than offset by McCall's claims. Silva
Dairy appealed.

II. Issuzs on APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in concluding
that Silva Dairy converted $413,953
worth of MeCall’s feed and that such
amount offset McCall’s herd manage-
ment liability to Silva Dairy?

On

2. Did the district court err in holding
Silva Dairy liable for McCall's
$52,886.90 pasture rent claim?

3. Did the district court abuse its discre~
tion in declining to award Silva Dairy
costs and attorney’s fees?

4, Is either party entitled to costs and
attorney’s fees on appeal?

IV. Sranparp or Revinw

HM «On review by this Court, a trial
court's conclusions following a bench trial will
be limited to a determination of whether the
evidence supports the trial court’s findings of
fact, and whether those findings support the
conclusions of law. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co, of Idaho, 148
Idaho 47, 50, 218 P.8d 891, 394 (2009). This
Court will “liberally construe the trial court’s
findings of fact in favor of the judgment
entered, as it is within the province of the
trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and
testimony and judge the credibility of wit-
nesses.” Id.; see also Beckstead v. Price, 146
Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008) (re-
garding findings of fact in view of the trial
court’s role as trier of fact), This Court will
not disturb findings of fact on appeal that are
supported by substantial and competent evi-
dence, even if there is conflicting evidence at
trial. Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith,
147 Idaho 562, 565-66, 212 P.3d 992, 995-96
(2009), Only erroneous findings will be set
aside. Id. at 565, 212 P.8d at 995. Also, this
Court has always held that its view of the
facts will not be substituted for that of the
trial court. See Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho
851, 857, 280 P.8d 748, 749 (2010), Finally,
conclusions of law are freely reviewed by this
Court, drawing its own conclusions from the
facts presented in the record. Griffith v.
Clear Lakes Trout Co., 146 Idaho 618, 619,
200 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2009).

Hl Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 152 Ida-
ho 581, 535, 272 P.8d 508, 507 (2012). “ ‘Sub-
stantial and competent evidence’ is ‘relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might ac-
cept to support a conclusion,’” Lamar Corp.
v, City of Twin Falls, 183 Idaho 36, 42-48,
981 P.2d 1146, 1152-58 (1999) (quoting Man-
cilla v. Greg, 181 Idaho 685, 687, 968 P.2d
368, 370 (1998)).

389

V. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not err in con-
cluding that Silva Dairy converted
$413,953 worth of McCall’s feed and
that such amount offset McCall’s herd
management liability to Silva Dairy.

Hl Silva Dairy argues that the district
court erred in concluding that McCall's liabil-
ity for the herd management fee was offset
by Silva Dairy’s feed conversion liability. Sil-
va Dairy’s argument can be distilled to the
following two assertions: (1) Silva Dairy did
not exercise wrongful dominion over the feed
necessary to find conversion; and (2) McCall
never proved that the alleged converted feed
was missing, In support of its first assertion,
Silva Dairy claims that its use of McCall's
feed did not amount to wrongful dominion
because McCall knew that his feed was
mixed with Silva Dairy feed, per the sugges-
tion of the herd nutritionist. Silva Dairy
claims that this case is similar to Toriw v.
Allred, 100 Idaho 905, 606 P.2d 1884 (1980),
wherein this Court held that the wrongful
dominion element of conversion was not sat-
isfied because the plaintiff had placed cattle
in the defendant’s possession and specifically
authorized the defendant to sell those cattle,

In support of its second assertion—that
McCall never proved the alleged converted
feed was missing—Silva Dairy attacks the
district court’s reliance on Exhibit 182, which
‘was prepared by McCall and purports to
calculate his feed purchases, the amount of
feed consumed by his cattle, and the amount
of feed that was left at the time the parties
ended their business relationship. It is note-
worthy that Silva Dairy did not challenge the
admission of Exhibit 182; however, perhaps it
should have considering that all of the at-
tacks on appeal would have been appropriate
objections below. Raising them now, howev-
er, is useless because Exhibit 182 has been
properly admitted into evidence.

HN McCall makes two assertions in
support of his position that the district court
did not err in concluding that Silva Dairy
converted $413,958 worth of his feed. First,
McCall argues that, although he provided the
feed to Silva Dairy and knew that the feed

390

was being mixed with Silva Dairy’s feed,
Silva Dairy’s unauthorized depletion of his
feed inventory below the total amount of feed
that he had deposited, less the amount con-
sumed by his cattle, amounted to conversion.
Second, McCall asserts that the district
court’s conclusion that Silva Dairy converted
$418,958 worth of feed is supported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence. McCall con-
cedes that conflicting evidence existed, but
argues that the district court was in the best
position to determine the weight of that evi-
dence and the credibility of the witnesses.
Conversion is any distinct act of domin-
ion wrongfully exerted over another’s per-
sonal property in denial or inconsistent
with his rights therein, such as a tortious
taking of another’s chattels, or any wrong-
ful exercise or assumption of authority,
personally or by procurement, over anoth-
er’s goods, depriving him of the possession,
permanently or for an indefinite time. The
act must be essentially tortious, but it is
not essential to conversion sufficient to
support the action of trover that the defen-
dant should have complete manucaption of
the property, or that he apply the property
to his own use, if he has exercised domin-
ion over it, in exclusion of, in defiance of,
or inconsistent with the owner’s right.
Carver v. Ketchum, 58 Idaho 595, 601, 26
P.2d 189, 141 (1983) (citation omitted). In
short, conversion is “a dealing by a person
with chattels not belonging to him, in a man-
ner inconsistent with the rights of the own-
er.” Id.

In Toria v. Allred, Allred, the defendant-
respondent, operated a feedlot to which cat-
tle owners would send their cattle to be
fattened up before being sold. 100 Idaho 905,
906, 606 P.2d 1384, 1835 (1980). Allred was
specifically authorized by Torix to sell certain
cattle to a meatpacker, who, unbeknownst to
both Allred and Torix, was insolvent. Jd. at
907, 606 P.2d at 1886. After not receiving
payment for the sale of his cattle, Torix
sought recovery from Allred arguing, inter
alia, that Allred was liable for the conversion
of the cattle. Id. at 910, 606 P.2d at 1339. The
district court held that Allred had not exert-
ed wrongful dominion over the cattle because
Torix had specifically authorized Allred to

sell the cattle to the buyer. Accordingly, the
district court found that Allred had not con-
verted Torix’s cattle. Id. at 909, 606 P.2d at.
1838. This Court affirmed the district court’s
judgment, finding that Torix had failed to
establish that Allred had wrongfully exerted
dominion over the cattle because Allred was
“specifically authorized ... to sell the cattle.”
Id. at 910, 606 P.2d at 1839.

The Restatement Second of Torts discuss-
es conversion in the context of grain storage
as follows:

In many grain-producing states a long
standing custom authorizes proprietors of
grain elevators to mingle grain of various
owners, Under such circumstances, unless
a depositor forbids the commingling, the
warehouseman is not liable for a conver-
sion of grain by reason of the mere fact
that it is mixed with grain of similar kind
and quality. The warehouseman, however,
must at all times retain sufficient grain to
meet the demands of all depositors, and if
he disposes of so much grain as to reduce
the amount in his possession below the
total quantity deposited, he becomes liable
to each depositor ... for the conversion of
such depositor’s proportional share of the
deficiency.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 226 emt. e
(1965).

The district court found that McCall had
deposited feed with Silva Dairy with authori-
zation to commingle the feed with Silva
Dairy’s feed and feed it to McCall cattle.
Further, the district court found that McCall
was aware that the commingled feed was
being fed to both McCall and Silva Dairy
cattle. However, when McCall terminated the
business relationship, there was a significant
deficiency in his feed. Although McCall knew
Silva Dairy was mixing his feed with its feed
at the suggestion of the nutritionist, he did
not authorize Silva Dairy to deplete his in-
ventory below the amount that he had depos-
ited, less the feed consumed by his cattle.
Accordingly, the district court found that Sil-
va Dairy was liable for the conversion of
McCall’s feed. It is important to note that
Silva Dairy did not convert McCall’s feed in
the traditional sense of the word, i¢., taking
or keeping a plaintiffs property without the

right to do so. Rather, the district court
found that Silva Dairy committed a different
form of conversion by failing to return bor-
rowed property. Although Silva Dairy is nei-
ther a proprietor of a grain elevator, nor a
warehouseman, the reasoning from the Re-
statement applies here; that is, Silva Dairy
committed conversion when it failed to retain
sufficient feed to meet the demand of the
depositor, McCall, less the amount fed to
McCall's cattle.

The district court’s finding that Silva Dairy
converted McCall’s feed is supported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence. McCall pro-
vided the district court with feed invoices and
profit and loss statements for 2010-2012, as
well as a feed conversion analysis. The dis-
trict court expressed concern regarding the
aceuracy of MeCall’s calculations, but found
McCall’s expert, Mr. Onaindia, to be “ex-
tremely credible.” Mr. Onaindia testified that
aceording to his review of the McCall's finan-
cial documents and his own understanding of
budgeting and costs of feed, approximately
$800,000 to $900,000 worth of feed, less the
remaining amount in Silva Dairy’s posses-
sion, was missing. Mr. Onaindia acknowl-
edged that he did not have every single one
of McCall’s feed invoices, but stated that his
“30-plus years in the industry,” together with
his review of McCall's financial documents,
enabled him to determine the amount of feed
McCall purchased during the time in ques-
tion. Next, Mr. Onaindia relied on his experi-
ence and review of the nutritionist’s recom-
mendations to determine the amount of feed
McCall’s cattle consumed during the time in
question. Lastly, Mr. Onaindia testified that
Silva Dairy’s financial documents revealed
that it was paying significantly less than it
should have to feed its own cattle, After
reviewing the testimony, the district court
accepted Mr. Onaindia’s opinion as factual
and accurate. The district court concluded
that Silva Dairy converted “at least $418,953
of McCall’s feed” after deducting the ending
inventory, $886,047, from Mr. Onaindia’s low-
er number, $800,000, (Emphasis in original).

Silva Dairy’s assertion that here, as in
Torix, the element of wrongful dominion was
absent because McCall placed the feed in
Silva Dairy’s possession with authorization to

391

use the feed is unpersuasive, In Torix, Allred
‘was specifically authorized to sell Torix’s cat-
tle to the buyer. 100 Idaho 905, 909, 606 P.2d
1834, 1388 (1980). Here, while McCall under-
stood that his feed was being commingled
with Silva Dairy’s feed, and as a result some
of his feed would be fed to Silva Dairy’s
cattle, he never authorized Silva Dairy to
deplete his deposit more than that which was
used for McCall’s cattle. Silva Dairy was
required to retain enough inventory to meet
McCall’s demand, less the feed used for
McCall's cattle.

Silva Dairy asserts that the district court’s
conclusion is undermined by the inaccuracies
in McCall's calculations. Specifically, Silva
Dairy argues that the feed invoices and the
calculations of feed consumed by the cattle
do not support the district court’s conclusion
that McCall’s feed was converted, As previ-
ously noted, Silva Dairy stipulated to the
admission of the evidence that it now attacks,
namely, Exhibit 132, Exhibit 182 was proper-
ly admitted to the record; accordingly, the
district court was entitled to consider it. Silva
Dairy’s assertion would be persuasive had
the district court blindly relied upon McCall’s
calculations, but that is not the case. Mr.
Onaindia testified based on his review of
McCall’s financial documents, and crucially,
his own knowledge of budgeting and cost of
feed. The district court was in the best posi-
tion to weigh conflicting evidence and judge
the credibility of Mr. Onaindia, In sum, we
affirm the district court’s conclusion that Sil-
va Dairy converted at least $418,958 worth of
McCall's feed. However, due to Silva Dairy’s
bankruptey, McCall is not entitled to a
$413,958 judgment; rather, Silva Dairy’s
claim against McCall is offset by $418,958.

B. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in transferring the pasture
rent claim from Max Silva to Silva
Dairy.

HM Silva Dairy argues that the district
court erred in transferring the pasture rent
obligation from Max Silva to Silva Dairy.
Silva Dairy explains that McCall’s attempt to
amend his complaint against Silva Dairy to
include a claim for pasture rent was denied
by the district court; accordingly, Silva Dairy

392

asserts that the district court erred in reas-
signing the pasture rent obligation to Silva
Dairy without complying with the require-
ments of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(p).

McCall argues that the district court did
not err in holding Silva Dairy liable for the
pasture rent claim. McCall explains that the
issue of whether Max Silva or Silva Dairy
was liable for the pasture rent was tried
before the district court in June 2015, and
Silva Dairy did not object to testimony relat-
ed to this issue as an unpleaded issue under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). McCall
argues that because Silva Dairy did not ob-
ject to the evidence, the issue was tried by
implied consent under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(b)(2), and the district court’s
holding should not be reversed,

Hs sIdaho Rule of Civil Procedure
15(b), as it existed at the time of trial, pro-
vides as follows in pertinent part:

When issues not raised by the pleading
are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings, Such amendment of the plead-
ings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues.

LR.O.P. 15(b) (2015) (amended 2016).

“The requirement that the unpleaded is-
sues be tried by at least the implied con-
sent of the parties assures that the parties
have notice of the issues before the court
and an opportunity to address those issues
with evidence and argument.” M.K.
Transp, Ine. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 845, 349,
612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). “The determi-
nation whether an issue has been tried
with the consent of the parties is within
the trial court’s discretion, and such deter-
mination will only be reversed when that
diseretion has been abused.” Lindberg v.
Roseth, 187 Idaho 222, 226, 46 P.8d 518,
522 (2002).

Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V., 148
Idaho 89, 106, 218 P.8d 1150, 1167 (2009).

“To determine whether a trial court has
abused its discretion, this Court considers
whether it correctly perceived the issue as
diseretionary, whether it acted within the
boundaries of its diseretion and consistent-
ly with applicable legal standards, and
whether it reached its decision by an exer-
cise of reason.” Perry v. Magic Valley
Reg'l Med, Ctr., 184 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d
816, 821 (2000).

State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 450, 375 P.8d
279, 280 (2016).

Silva Dairy’s argument is puzzling because
it claims that the denial of McCall’s motion to
amend his complaint to add Silva Dairy as a
defendant to the pasture rent claim should
preclude the district court from reassigning
the claim. However, after the motion to
amend was denied, the district court issued a
pre-trial order stating, inter alia, “the issues
to be tried to the [clourt starting on June 26,
2014 shall be limited to the following: ... (8)
Which party, if any, entered into a pasture
agreement with McCall ... and thereby al-
legedly incurred an outstanding debt owed to
McCall ...?” Thus, the district court did not,
as Silva Dairy claims, limit its analysis to
whether only Max Silva was liable for the
pasture rent; rather, it considered all parties.

Turning to the crux of this issue, Silva
Dairy has failed to demonstrate, or even
attempt to demonstrate, that an abuse of
diseretion occurred under any part of the
test applied by this Court. Silva Dairy makes
the conclusory claim that the transfer of the
pasture rent obligation from Max Silva to
Silva Dairy “is inconsistent with LR.C.P.
15(b).” It is Silva Dairy’s burden to demon-
strate that an abuse of discretion occurred,
and its failure to do so is fatal to its argu-
ment.

C. The district court did not err in de-
clining to grant attorney’s fees to Sil-
va Dairy below.

Silva Dairy did not prevail below, and we
affirm the district court’s judgment. Accord-
ingly, the district court did not err in declin-
ing to grant attorney’s fees to Silva Dairy.

D. McCall is entitled to costs and attor-
ney’s fees on appeal.

HM Silva Dairy argues that it is entitled
to attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to Ida-
ho Appellate Rule 41(a). McCall argues that
he is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40 and 41
and under Idaho Code section 12-120(8) be-
cause he is the prevailing party in a commer-
cial transaction.

Idaho Code section 12-120(8) mandates
that when “the gravamen of a lawsuit” is a
commercial transaction, the prevailing par-
ty is entitled to attorney's fees. Kugler v.
Nelson, 160 Idaho 408, 418, 374 P.3d 571,
576 (2016). Under the statute, a “commer-
cial transaction” is any “transaction[] ex-
cept transactions for personal or household
purposes.” I.C, § 12-120(8).

Prehn v. Hodge, 161 Idaho 821, 381, 385 P.8d
876, 886 (2016),

Silva Dairy did not prevail on appeal; ac-
cordingly, Silva Dairy’s request for attor-
ney’s fees on appeal is denied. McCall pre-
vailed on appeal and requested attorney’s
fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
120(8). The cattle-related agreements were
clearly commercial transactions and were not
for personal or household purposes. Accord-
ingly, as the prevailing party, McCall is enti-
tled to costs and attorney’s fees on appeal.

VI. Conciusion

We affirm the judgment of the district
eourt, Costs and attorney's fees on appeal
are awarded to McCall.

Justices EISMANN, HORTON and.
Justices pro tem KIDWELL and
CRABTREE concur.

393

397 P.3d° 1152
Lisa A. ELLEFSON, Plaintiff-
Respondent-Cross
Appellant,
v.

Ashley PALMER, a minor; and Stephen
Palmer, Defendant-Appellant-Cross
Respondents,

Docket No. 43712

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: June 80, 2017

S
i)

Carey Perkins, LLP, Boise, for appellant.
David 8. Perkins argued.

Comstock & Bush, Boise, for respondent.
David E, Comstock argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Ashley Palmer (Palmer) and Stephen
Palmer appeal the Ada County district
court’s order granting Lisa A. Ellefson’s mo-
tion for a new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(a)(6).1 Ellefson was involved in
an automobile accident caused by Palmer. A
jury found that Ellefson was not injured in
the accident. However, the district court de-
termined that the jury verdict of “no injury”
was against the clear weight of evidence and
granted a new trial subject to an additur in
the amount of $50,000, On appeal, Palmer
argues that the district court abused its dis-

1. All citations to LR.C.P. are to the 2015 rules,
which were in effect at the time of the district

cretion in granting the new trial and in set-
ting additur at $50,000. We affirm.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2012, while stopped in a
turning lane on southbound Broadway Ave-
nue at the intersection with Beacon Street,
Ellefson’s vehicle was rear-ended by a vehi-
cle driven by Palmer. Ellefson’s vehicle was
pushed into the vehicle in front of it, and that
vehicle was pushed into the next. However,
Ellefson’s airbag did not deploy, and no one
complained of any injuries. There was little
damage to either Ellefson’s or Palmer's vehi-
cles, and the police officer who responded to
the accident did not conduct an accident in-
vestigation or issue a citation.

On June 4, 2014, Ellefson filed a personal
injury action against Palmer. At trial the
evidence showed that Ellefson left work early
on October 8, 2012, complaining of a head-
ache and nausea. That same day, Ellefson
went to see her health care provider at St.
Luke’s internal medicine group where she
was treated by nurse practitioner Tyley Nel-
son, and later by Dr. Leslie Nona. Based on
the symptoms Ellefson reported, Nelson de-
termined that she “most likely” suffered a
concussion and ordered a CT scan. The CT
scan showed “no acute intracranial process.”
Ellefson also complained of memory prob-
lems, word searching problems, fatigue and
sensitivity to light and sound. On October 8,
2012, Nelson discussed Ellefson’s status with
Dr. Nona, and Dr. Nona referred Ellefson to
Elks Rehab Hospital for physical and oecupa-
tional therapy.

In November 2012, Elks Rehab Hospital
referred Ellefson to Dr. Nancy Greenwald
and the outpatient brain injury program at
Idaho Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation.
Dr. Greenwald found that Ellefson had suf-
fered a concussion but that her poor neurop-
sychological testing “does not fit the injury.”
In December 2012, Dr. Greenwald referred.
Ellefson to Leigh Beglinger, PhD, for a neu-
ropsychological evaluation. Dr. Beglinger

court's ruling.

396

found that Ellefson was suffering from “cog-
nitive impairments in all domains tested.”
However, she concluded that Ellefson’s cog-
nitive impairments were “not consistent with
a concussion and would be more consistent,
with dementia of moderate severity.”

Craig Beaver, PhD, a neuropsychologist,
performed a neuropsychological evaluation of
Ellefson in October 2018 and testified at trial
that Ellefson sustained a mild traumatic
brain injury in the car accident. Robert Cal-
houn, PhD, also a neuropsychologist, per-
formed a neuropsychometric evaluation of
Ellefson in February of 2014. Dr. Calhoun
testified at trial that Ellefson did not sustain
a mild traumatic brain injury in the accident.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was
given a special verdict form. Question No, 1
on the form read: “Was Plaintiff Lisa Ellef-
son injured in the collision?” The jury an-
swered “No,”

Following the’ trial, Ellefson moved for
j.n.o.v. or, in the alternative, a new trial. The
district court denied the motion for j.n.o.v,
but granted the motion for new trial. In
ruling on the motion for j.n.o.v., the court
found that because there was contradicting
evidence about whether or not Ellefson had
suffered an injury, the jury was “entitled to
determine whether Ellefson was credible”
and “that there was substantial evidence sup-
porting the jury’s verdict.” In ruling on the
motion for new trial, the court found that the
verdict of no injury was against “the clear
weight of the evidence” and granted the mo-
tion for a new trial under I.R.C.P, 59(a)(6).
However, the court excluded the issue of
cognitive impairment from the new trial and
limited the scope of damages from the date
of the accident on October 1, 2012, to Janu-
ary 2013, Palmer timely appealed, and Ellef-
son timely cross-appealed,

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH A trial court’s decision to grant or
deny a motion for a new trial under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Blizzard v. Lunde-
by, 156 Idaho 204, 206, 822 P.8d 286, 288
(2014), When reviewing the trial court’s dis-
cretionary decision to grant a new trial, we
consider:

(1) whether the trial court correctly per-
ceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and con-
sistently with the legal standard applicable
to the specific choices available to it; and
(8) whether the trial court reached its deci-
sion by an exercise of reason.

E.g., Sheridan v. St. Luke’s Reg’ Med. Ctr.,
185 Idaho 775, 780, 25 P.8d 88, 93 (2001),
“Although this Court necessarily must review
the evidence, it primarily focuses on the pro-
cess by which the district court reached its
decision, not on the result of the district
court’s decision.” Karlson v. Harris, 140 Ida-
ho 561, 568, 97 P.8d 428, 435 (2004).

Il, ANALYSIS

A. Whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting a new trial sub-
ject to a $50,000.00 additur.

1, Whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting a new trial un-
der_Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a)(6).

HMMM Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a)(6) provides that a trial court may grant
a new trial “to all or any of the parties and
on all or part of the issues in an action for
any of the following reasons: .... (6) Insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision, or that it is against the
law.” In determining whether a new trial
should be granted under Rule 59(a)(6), “the
trial judge must weigh the evidence and
determine (1) whether the verdict is against
his or her view of the clear weight of the
evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would
produce a different result.” Hoffer v. Shap-
pard, 160 Idaho 868, 877, 880 P.8d 681, 690
(2016) (quoting Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co.,
152 Idaho 741, 749, 274 P.8d 1256, 1264
(2012); accord, eg., Blizzard, 156 Idaho at
207-08, $22 P.8d at 289-90, The trial court is
given broad diseretion in determining wheth-
er to grant a motion for a new trial, and the
“trial judge may set aside the verdict even
though there is substantial evidence to sup-
port it.” Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 779-80, 25
P.8d at 92-93,

a sr

TH Here, the district court, after noting
that the grant of a new trial was within its
discretion, determined that the jury's verdict
of “no injury” was against the clear weight of
the evidence. In doing so, the district court.
specifically looked to the fact that Nelson,
Dr. Nona, Dr. Greenwald, Dr. Beglinger, and
Dr, Beaver all concluded that Ellefson sus-
tained a concussion in the accident, The dis-
trict court also noted “even Dr. Calhoun con-
ceded that Ellefson’s referral to the brain
injury program was appropriate, given Hllef-
son’s symptoms.” Finally, the court noted
that there was “no indication that any medi-
eal provider has any issue of malingering.”
Based on these facts, the district court con-
cluded that “the verdict that Ellefson was not
injured in the collision is against the clear
weight of the evidence” and that “it is more
probable than not that a different jury, at a
new trial, would answer the same question
differently.” In doing so, the district court
relied on facts in the record and, after weigh-
ing that evidence, determined whether, in its
view, the verdict was against the clear weight
of the evidence and whether a new trial
would produce a different result,

Palmer argues that the district court
abused its discretion in granting a new trial
because the court, in denying Ellefson’s mo-
tion for j.n.o.v., had previously concluded that
there was “substantial evidence” to support
the jury’s verdict. Specifically, Palmer states:

Appellant’s struggle to understand how
the district court could recognize that it
was not free to substitute it’s [sic] own
judgment for that of the jury, finding sub-
stantial evidence supporting the jury’s ver-
dict in regard [to] the request for JNOV,
and then concluded that the jury’s decision
that Ellefson was not injured was against
the clear weight of the evidence, ordering

a new trial or additur. Palmer argues that

the court abused its discretion in determin-

ing that Ellefson was entitled to a new
trial or additur.
(citations omitted). However, the standards
that are applied when evaluating a motion for
joy. and a motion for a new trial are
expressly different.

HH Under a motion for j.n.o.v., the trial

court is forbidden to “weigh the evidence or

pass on the credibility of witnesses and make
his own separate findings of fact and com-
pare them to the jury’s findings as he would
in deciding a motion for a new trial.” Quick v.
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187,
1191 (1986). Rather, the only issue to be
determined under a motion for jnov. is
whether “there.is substantial and competent
evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”
O'Shea v. High Mark Dev, LLC, 158 Idaho
119, 129, 280 P.8d 146, 156 (2012), The trial
court “must simply determine whether rea-
sonable minds could have reached the same
conelusion as the jury when the evidence and
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom are considered in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Mosell
Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 154
Idaho 269, 275, 297 P.8d 232, 238 (2018).
Thus, when evaluating a jn.o.v. motion, the
trial court is forbidden from weighing the
evidence and must confine its analysis to
whether, as a matter of law, there is suffi-
cient evidence to support the jury’s verdict,

HM This is different from the standard
when evaluating a motion for a new trial
under Rule 59(a)(6). Under the standard for
a motion for a new trial, the trial court “is
not required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict-winner ..,
[and] the judge is free to weigh the conflict-
ing evidence for himself.” Quick, 111 Idaho
at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195, Indeed, we have
stated that the trial court “must weigh the
evidence” when evaluating a motion for a
new trial. Carrillo, 152 Idaho at 749, 274 P.8d
at 1264, Furthermore, unlike when ruling on
a motion for j.n.o.v., when ruling on a motion
for a new trial, the trial court is expressly
allowed to “set aside the verdict even though
there is substantial evidence to support it.”
Sheridan, 185 Idaho at 779-80, 25 P.8d at
92-98,

After reviewing the district court’s deci-
sion, it is apparent that the district court
simply found the fact that Nelson, Dr. Nona,
Dr. Greenwald, Dr. Beglinger, and Dr. Bea-
ver all concluded that Ellefson had suffered
an injury was more persuasive than Dr. Cal-
houn’s testimony that she did not, Such a
weighing of the evidence is squarely within
the bounds of discretion granted the trial

398

judge when evaluating a motion for a new
trial. Sheridan, 185 Idaho at 781, 25 P.3d at
94 (holding that a court’s “determination to
discount the testimony of the defendant's
expert witnesses was a proper exercise of his
discretion in weighing the demeanor, credi-
bility and persuasiveness of the evidence”
when ruling on a motion for a new trial);
Collins v. Jones, 181 Idaho 556, 558, 961 P.2d
647, 649 (1998) (“It is the trial court’s duty to
weigh the evidence and make an assessment.
of the credibility and weight of that evi-
dence.”)2

Ultimately, because the district court prop-
erly identified the grant of a new trial as
within its discretion, properly acted within
the bounds of its diseretion by weighing the
evidence and making the requisite findings to
grant a new trial, and did so through the
exercise of reason, we affirm the district
court’s grant of a new trial under Rule
59(a)@).

2, Whether the district court_erred_in
conditioning the grant of a new trial on
2. $50,000.00 additur,

TH Palmer contends that in light of
“this minor automobile collision” the district,
court’s grant of an additur in the amount of
$50,000.00 was an abuse of discretion. In
support of this argument, Palmer points to
the district court’s single statement regard-
ing the additur: “Pursuant to IR.C.P. 59.1,
the grant of a new trial is conditional and
subject to an additur in the amount of
$50,000.00.” Without an explanation of how
the court arrived at the $50,000 figure, Palm-
er argues the court’s grant of additwr is
“both arbitrary and excessive.”

HE “Orders granting new trials con-
ditioned upon the acceptance or rejection of
an additur are appealable as a matter of

2. Palmer also contends the court implicitly found
that Ellefson’s testimony about her symptoms
was credible, This finding, Palmer contends, was
in error because the court previously noted that
in its view, the jury must have found Ellefson’s
testimony was not credible and it was improper
for the court to substitute its finding on Ellef-
son’s credibility for that of the jury's. This argu-
ment misstates what the district court did. The
district court’s opinion of how a jury could have
arrived at a determination is not a finding of fact

right....” Collins, 131 Idaho at 558, 961
P.2d at 649; accord LA.R. 11(a)(5). “A trial
court’s grant of additur is reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” Crowley v. Critchfield, 145
Idaho 509, 518, 181 P.8d 435, 439 (2007).

Palmer offers no authority to support her
argument that the additur is arbitrary, ex-
cessive, or otherwise an abuse of the district
court’s discretion. The only authority Palmer
cites in support of her argument is Bumgar-
ner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 640, 862
P.2d 821, 382 (Ct. App. 1993). However,
Bumgarner, as Palmer even notes, only
stands for the proposition that damages need
not be proved with mathematical exactitude.
Bumgarner says nothing about additur. We
therefore decline to address the issue. AgS-
tar Fin. Servs, ACA v. Nw. Sand & Gravel,
Ine., 161 Idaho 801, 816, 391 P.3d 1271, 1286
(2017) (‘A party waives an issue cited on
appeal if either authority or argument is
lacking, not just if both are lacking.” (quoting
Gem State Ins, Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho
10, 16, 175 P.8d 172, 178 (2007))).

Furthermore, Palmer has not demonstrat-
ed that a substantial right has been affected
by the district court’s grant of additur, The
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
“{t]he court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties.” I.R.C.P. 61. Conse-
quently, we have held that when an appellant
fails to present argument that a substantial
right was implicated she waives the issue.
Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc, 153 Idaho 18,
18, 278 P.8d 415, 420 (2012) (“[Blecause [ap-
pellant] presents no argument that the error
affected a substantial right, [appellant] has
waived the issue.”). Here, although Palmer
argues that the grant of additur in the
amount of $50,000 was an abuse of discretion,
she offers no argument that the error affect-

and does not constitute a “finding of the jury.”
Here, the jury did not make a finding on Ellef-
son’s credibility. It only found that there was “no
injury.” The district court did not substitute its
finding of credibility for that of the jury's because
the jury never made such a finding. Accordingly,
Ellefson’s argument that the district court substi-
tuted its finding of credibility for that of the jury
is not supported by the record and will not be
further addressed.

ed a substantial right. We therefore decline
to address the issue for this reason as well.
Hurtado, 158 Idaho at 18, 278 P.38d at 420;
see also Taylor v, AIA Servs. Corp., 151
Idaho 552, 578, 261 P.8d 829, 850 (2011)
(holding that even if witnesses were not time-
ly disclosed, appellant had “not demonstrated
that he suffered any prejudice,” and there-
fore any error was harmless); Kuhn v. Cold-
well Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240,
250, 245 P.8d 992, 1002 (2010) (holding that.
even if district court’s failure to give statute
of frauds instruction was error, it was harm-
less because appellants failed “to demon-
strate how the failure to instruct on the
statute of frauds affected their substantial
rights”),

B. Whether the district court abused its
discretion in limiting the scope of the
new trial.

HH Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a) a trial court has the discretion to grant
a new trial “on all or part of the issues in an
action.” LR.C.P. 59(a); accord Smith v. Great
Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 276, 561 P.2d
1299, 1809 (1977) (“A determination of the
issues to be retried after the granting of a
new trial is committed to the discretion of
the trial court.”).

On cross-appeal, Ellefson argues that the
district court erred in limiting the issues in
the new trial. Specifically, Hllefson argues
that the district court’s exclusion of cognitive
impairments from the new trial and the asso-
ciated limitation of economic and non-eco-
nomic damages was an abuse of discretion
because the issue of cognitive impairments
and the damages associated with them are so
interwoven with her concussion injuries that
they cannot be separated without causing
unfair prejudice. In support of this argument,
Ellefson relies primarily on Gasoline Prod-
ucts Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 2838 US.
494, 51 S.Ct, 518, 75 L.Ed. 1188 (1981).

In Gasoline Products, the First Cireuit
reversed a decision of a trial court due to
errors with respect to the measure of dam-
ages and granted a new trial. Jd. at 496, 51
S.Ct. at 518-14, 75 L.Ed, at 1189. However,
the Circuit Court split the issues of liability
and damages and limited the new trial to the

399

determination of damages. Id. The underly-
ing cause of action was breach of contract,
and the U.S. Supreme Court held that be-
cause proving the alleged damages required
showing elements of liability, including when
the contract was entered into, what was re-
quired by the contract, whether the non-
breaching party failed to mitigate, and when
the contract was finalized, the issue of liabili-
ty was so interwoven with the issue of dam-
ages that the issues could not be split “with-
out confusion and uncertainty, which would
amount to a denial of a fair trial.” Id. at 500,
51 S.Ct, at 515, 75 L.Ed. at 1191,

Here, Ellefson’s alleged cognitive impair-
ments are not so interwoven with the issue of
Ellefson’s concussion that the two cannot be
separated. Indeed, Dr. Beglinger concluded
that Ellefson’s cognitive impairments were
not consistent with a concussion. And Dr.
Greenwald concluded that “[flrom the con-
cussion aspect, we have found the patient to
be recovered without any permanent impair-
ment.” Furthermore, unlike in Gasoline
Products, there does not appear to be any
reason why a jury could not determine the
appropriate damages for a concussion with-
out consideration of Ellefson’s alleged cogni-
tive impairments. While cognitive impair-
ments can be symptoms of a concussion, in
this case the jury and the district court found
that the evidence shows Ellefson’s cognitive
impairments were not “consistent with a con-
cussion.” There is no reason why Ellefson’s
claims concerning her concussion and whip-
lash, including her symptoms of headaches,
sensitivity to light and sound, fatigue and
soreness cannot be severed from her alleged
cognitive impairments, ie. memory loss,
word search problems, and forgetfulness. El-
lefson remains free to bring in evidence that
would support a finding that she suffered a
concussion and argue damages based on her
injury. She is simply excluded from arguing
that her injury from the accident included
cognitive impairments,

Because Ellefson’s cognitive impairments
are not so interwoven with her concussion
that they cannot be split, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s decision to exclude the issue of
cognitive impartments from the grant of a
new trial. Accordingly we also affirm the

400

district court’s decision to limit “medical
treatment through January 2018”; damages
“for loss of work through the phased return
to work beginning January 28, 2013”; and
“non-economic damages to January 25, 2018.”

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s grant of a
new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) and the court’s
decision to exclude the issue of cognitive
impairments. We also affirm the district
court’s grant of additur. Each side to bear its
own costs on appeal.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and BRODY concur.

397 P.3d 1159
In the Interest of: Jane Doe,
A Child Under Eighteen
(18) Years of Age.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND WELFARE, Petitioner-
Respondent,

v

Jane DOE I (2017-5), Respondent-
Appellant,

Docket No. 44775
Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed: June 6, 2017
Review Denied July 10, 2017

402

Janet, K, Whitney, Bonner County Public
Defender; Catherine E, Enright, Deputy
Public Defender, Sandpoint, for appellant.
Catherine E. Enright argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Denise L. Rosen, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Coeur d’Alene, for respondent. Denise
L, Rosen argued.

MELANSON, Judge

Jane Doe I (2017-5) appeals from a judg-
ment terminating her parental rights. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

L

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Doe has a significant history of drug use,
including methamphetamine and prescription
pain medications, accompanied by multiple
periods of sobriety and relapse. In 2018, Doe
was arrested and charged for being in pos-
session of a large quantity of methamphet-
amine and drug paraphernalia. Doe, who had
been released pending trial, became preg-
nant but did not learn of the pregnancy until
January 2014. Doe continued using drugs

1, Doe had three other children who were the
subject of a child protection case pending in a
different state prior to Doe’s incarceration. Doe
voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to
her three other children upon learning that she
would be incarcerated.

until she was arrested on a federal warrant
in March 2014. Doe pled guilty to one count
of possession with intent to distribute meth-
amphetamine in federal court and, in ex-
change for her guilty plea, Doe’s state and
other federal charges were dismissed.

In August 2014, Doe gave birth to a child
while in custody and awaiting sentencing. A
petition under the Child Protective Act was
filed, a shelter care hearing was held, and the
child was placed in the legal custody of the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. In
September 2014, Doe was sentenced to a
term of sixty months and to an additional five
years of supervised release. In October 2014,
a case plan was developed for the potential
reunification of Doe and the child. In early
2015, the child was transitioned to the same
foster family that had previously adopted the
child’s older siblings.t

A petition to terminate Doe’s parental
rights was filed June 80, 2016, and an amend-
ed petition was filed in August 2016. Doe
remained incarcerated until her release from
residential drug treatment to a residential
re-entry facility in August 2016.2 At the ter-
mination trial, evidence and testimony was
submitted relating to Doe’s history, case plan
progress, relationship with the child, and the
child’s special needs. Following the trial, the
magistrate made extensive findings of fact
and conclusions of law, ultimately ruling that
there was clear and convincing evidence that
Doe had neglected the child as defined under
both LC, § 16-2002(8)(a) and (b) and that
termination was in the child’s best interests.
Final judgment terminating Doe’s parental
rights was entered on January 20, 2017. Doe
appeals, challenging the magistrate’s findings
that Doe had neglected the child and that
termination was in the child’s best interests.

58

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HSA parent has a fundamental liberty
interest in maintaining a relationship with his

2. During her incarceration, Doe earned reduc-
tions in her sentence after completing drug pro-
gramming and for having no behavioral viola-
tions. Doe was expected to transition from the re-
entry facility to home confinement in January
2017 and to supervised release on July 28, 2017.

or her child. Trowel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2059-60, 147 L.Ed.2d 49,
56 (2000); Doe uv, State, 187 Idaho 758, 760, 53
P.8d 341, 348 (2002). This interest is protect-
ed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. State v. Doe, 144
Idaho 889, 842, 172 P.8d 1114, 1117 (2007).
Implicit in the Termination of Parent and
Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that,
wherever possible, family life should be
strengthened and preserved. IC. § 16-
20012). Therefore, the requisites of due pro-
cess must be met when terminating the par-
ent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho
383, 386, 146 P.8d 649, 652 (2006). Due pro-
cess requires that the grounds for terminat-
ing a parent-child relationship be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a
fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the
United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined that a court may terminate a parent-
child relationship only if that decision is sup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S, 745, 769, 102
S.Ct. 1888, 1408, 71 L,Hd.2d 599, 616-17
(1982). See also I.C. § 16-2009; In re Doe,
146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 208 P.8d 689, 691-92
(2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.8d at
652,

HH sOn appeal from a decision termi-
nating parental rights, this Court examines
whether the decision is supported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence, which
means such evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 248, 245-46,
220 P.8d 1062, 1064-65 (2009), The appellate
court will indulge all reasonable inferences in
support of the trial court’s judgment when
reviewing an order that parental rights be
terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court
has also said that the substantial evidence
test requires a greater quantum of evidence
in cases where the trial court’s finding must
be supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence than in cases where a mere preponder-
ance is required. Doe v, Doe, 1483 Idaho 348,
346, 144 P.8d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and
convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be
proved is highly probable or reasonably cer-
tain, In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.8d
1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate’s

403

decision must be supported by objectively
supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346,
144 P.3d at 600,

Hl Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a
party to petition the court for termination of
the parent-child relationship when it is in the
child’s best interests and any one of the
following five factors exist: (a) abandonment;
(b) neglect or abuse; (¢) lack of a biological
relationship between the child and a pre-
sumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to
discharge parental responsibilities for a pro-
longed period that will be injurious to the
health, morals, or well-being of the child; or
(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain
incarcerated for a substantial period of time.
Each statutory ground is an independent ba-
sis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842,
172 P.8d at 1117.

mM.

ANALYSIS

A. Neglect

Idaho Code Section 16-2002(8) defines “ne-
glect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-
1602(81), as well as situations where the par-
ent has failed to comply with the court’s
orders or the case plan in a child protection
case and the Department has had temporary
or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the
most recent twenty-two months and reunifi-
eation has not been accomplished by the last
day of the fifteenth month in which the child
has been in the temporary or legal custody of
the Department. Section 16-1602(81)(a) pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that a child is ne-
glected when the child is without proper
parental care and control, or subsistence,
medical or other care or control necessary
for his or her well-being because of the con-
duct or omission of his or her parents, guard-
ian, or other custodian or their neglect or
refusal to provide them.

In this case, the magistrate found that Doe
neglected the child under I.C, § 16-2002(8)(a)
because, since the child’s birth two years
prior, Doe had provided none of the care,
support, or control necessary for the child’s
well-being. The magistrate considered Doe’s

404

contention that she had done what she had
been able to do, including communicating via
email and letters, completing any available
programming while incarcerated, and achiev-
ing the earliest possible release. However,
the magistrate ruled:
The statute does not define neglect by
what a parent is able to do, but instead by
what is necessary for a child’s well-being.
[Doe] has provided for none of the child’s
basic needs, for food, clothing, shelter, or
attachment, all of which ave necessary for
a child’s well-being. This lack of care has
been the result of the conduct or omission
of [Doel], specifically the criminal conduct
which resulted in her incarceration and her
inability to provide them. As noted ..., the
Idaho Supreme Court has specifically
ruled that inability to provide care for a
child due to incarceration constitutes ne-
glect.

HI On appeal, Doe argues that the mag-
istrate’s finding that Doe had not provided
for any of the child’s basic needs was an
unsupported assumption and was not sup-
ported by substantial and competent evi-
dence. Doe asserts that, throughout the pen-
dency of the case, she had made efforts to do
what she could for the child given Doe’s
limitation of being incarcerated and that she
had provided for some of the child’s needs.

Hs Even assuming Doe made efforts
to provide for the child within the confines of
her incarceration, that is not a defense to a
finding of neglect. Willfulness is not neces-
sary to support a finding of neglect and its
absence is not a defense to neglect. Idako
Dep't of Health & Welfare v, Doe, 158 Idaho
764, 768, 351 P.8d 1222, 1226 (2015), Rather,
evidence of incarceration is competent evi-
dence of neglect, Id.; see also Idaho Dep't of
Health & Welfare v. Doe, 151 Idaho 846, 852,
264 P.8d 953, 959 (2011) (holding that a fa-
ther’s imprisonment alone constitutes neglect
under I.C, § 16-1602(25) 8), A parent who is
incarcerated for a substantial portion of his
or her child’s life cannot provide any amount
of parental care and control, subsistence,
medical or other care, or control necessary
for the child’s well-being. Doe, 151 Idaho at

3, This statute has been renumbered as L.C. § 16-

852, 264 P.3d at 959. Further, an incarcerat-:
ed parent is unable to discharge his or her
responsibilities to and for his or her children
and he or she is leaving his or her children
without the parental care necessary for the
children’s health, safety, or well-being. Jd, A
parent's inability to comply with the law is
contrary to providing for the health, morals,
and well-being of a child. Doe, 158 Idaho at
768, 851 P.8d at 1226. Therefore, the magis-
trate properly considered Doe’s incarceration
in finding she neglected the child.

Additionally, the magistrate made exten-
sive specific findings that support the magis-
trate’s ruling that Doe failed to provide prop-
er parental care and support. As noted, Doe
has an extensive history of criminal offenses,
drug use, and addiction. Doe continued to use
drugs even after she became aware of the
pregnancy. From the time of the child’s
birth, two years before, the child had been in
the custody of the Department and at no
time had Doe provided parental control or
care for the child and had not been involved
in the child’s medical treatments beyond re-
ceiving update reports. As the magistrate
acknowledged, Doe’s progress during her in-
carceration was promising—having complet-
ed drug programing, maintaining sobriety,
and finding employment. However, Doe, at
the time of trial, was still in custody and did
not have the ability to house the child given
Doe’s restrictions at the re-entry facility and
had only spent three to five visitation ses-
sions with the child. Although Doe now as-
serts that she provided a winter hat to the
child at the termination trial and other finan-
cial support directly to the foster parent on
occasion, Doe has not cited any testimony or
exhibit within the record that supports Doe’s
statements. Rather, the only evidence of Doe
providing for the child was testimony show-
ing that Doe provided a few puzzles and
snacks at visitations with the child. Upon
review, the magistrate properly considered
all of these factors in its determination that
Doe did not provide for the child, See Doe,
158 Idaho at 768, 351 P.8d at 1226 (holding
that there was substantial and competent
evidence to support a finding of neglect

1602(31).

based on various factors, in addition to a
father’s incarceration).

Doe has failed to show that the magistrate
erred in finding that Doe had not provided
for the child for purposes of LC. § 16-
1602(81). Accordingly, there is substantial
and competent evidence to support the mag-
istrate’s finding that Doe had neglected the
child

B. Best Interests of the Child

HH sOnce a statutory ground for ter-
mination has been established, the trial court
must next determine whether it is in the best
interests of the child to terminate the parent-
child relationship, In re Aragon, 120 Idaho
606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991), When
determining whether termination is in the
child’s best interests, the trial court may
consider the parent’s history with substance
abuse, the stability and permanency of the
home, the unemployment of the parent, the
financial contribution of the parent to the
child’s care after the child is placed in protec-
tive custody, the improvement of the child
while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to
improve his or her situation, and the parent’s
continuing problems with the law. In re Doe,
159 Idaho 192, 198, 858 P.3d 77, 88 (2015); In
ve Doe, 156 Idaho 108, 111, 820 P.3d 1262,
1270 (2014); see also Doe v. Roe, 188 Idaho
805, 809-10, 992 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (1999);
Doe v, State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 122
Idaho 644, 648, 837 P.2d 319, 328 (Ct. App.
1992), A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must
still be made upon objective grounds, In re
Doe, 152 Idaho 958, 956-57, 277 P.8d 400,
408-04 (Ct. App. 2012).

In this case, the magistrate determined
that termination of Doe’s parental rights was
in the best interests of the child. Specifically,
the magistrate found that the child had no
parental bond with Doe but was strongly
bonded with her siblings and foster parents
to the point that transitioning the child would
be disruptive. The magistrate also found that
the child had special needs requiring a highly
4. Doe also argues that the magistrate erred in

finding that Doe neglected the child under 1.C.

§ 16-2002(3)(b). Because we have concluded that
Doe has failed to show that the magistrate erred

405

structured environment and diligent constant
parenting, The magistrate considered Doe’s
progress toward maintaining sobriety and
completing her case plan in the two years
since the child had been born. However, the
magistrate found that considerable time was
still necessary for Doe to establish a parental
relationship with the child and achieve suc-
cessful reunification. The magistrate further
found that, although there was a basis to
believe that Doe may be able to maintain
sobriety, legal income, stable housing and
provide for the basic needs of the child, there
was no basis to believe Doe could provide the
highly structured environment necessary to
address the child’s special needs. The magis-
trate concluded that “no matter how much
we hope and believe in [Doe’s] potential to
succeed, it is not in [the child’s] best interest,
to delay permanency, to disrupt what we
know she has, and to wager her future suc-
cess based on hopes and beliefs about [Doe’s]
future success.”

HHI On appeal, Doe argues the magis-
trate’s findings failed to consider all the testi-
mony and factors before determining what
‘was in the best interests of the child, Specifi-
cally, Doe alleges the magistrate’s findings
were based entirely on the testimony of bi-
ased witnesses who lacked complete knowl-
edge of Doe’s progress. In support, Doe em-
phasizes contrary expert witness testimony
showing that it would be in the child’s best
interests to be with her biological mother
where she' could have one-on-one attention,
know her family history, and have a relation-
ship with her extended biological family.

As noted, Doe has an extensive history of
drug use going back to age eleven, criminal
activity, and multiple periods of relapse. It
is uncontested that Doe made efforts to
communicate with the child, including
through letters, photos, and also by attempt-
ing to organize video meetings. In addition,
Doe has shown personal progress by finding
employment, maintaining her sobriety, and
participating in approximately three to five
visits with the child since Doe’s release to a

in finding that Doe neglected the child pursuant

to LC. § 16-2002(3)(a), we need not address
Doe's arguments regarding LC, § 16-2002(3)(b).

406

re-entry facility. However, Doe has at no
time parented the child. Rather, the child
has remained in the legal custody of the De-
partment and under the care of the foster
parents, growing up with her siblings. Doe
acknowledged at trial that the child had de-
veloped a strong bond with her siblings and
the foster mother, Additionally, it is undis-
puted that the child was doing well, her
needs were being met by the foster family,
and the child had come to rely on and learn
from her siblings. Doe testified that she did
not have a mother/daughter relationship
with the child and that additional time and
visitations would be necessary to form such
a bond.

Perhaps most notably, the child’s mental
health specialist testified that the child is
drug-affected and has special needs. The spe-
cialist testified that some of the child’s men-
tal health issues will not change and will
require predictability and a highly structured
environment in order for the child to function
well. Additionally, the testimony shows the
child necessitates constant contact to form
healthy attachments. The child also requires
ongoing specialized instruction to develop
communication skills, self-regulation, and
sensory processing. The specialist testified
that the foster mother and the siblings have
provided the structure, stability, and support.
to help the child develop and learn how to
function. The specialist went on to opine that,
if the child were to be placed in a different
environment, it would be traumatic for her
and may result in her having increased
struggles and possibly regressing in her de-
velopment. It was the specialist’s conclusion
that, based on the child’s ability to adjust,
the specialist would recommend that the
child not be transitioned out of the strong
relationships the child now had.

Doe has not been involved in the child’s
treatment beyond receiving reports and has
not had to deal with the child when she is
upset and acting out. The magistrate ac-
knowledged Doe’s positive progress and
strides to be in a position that she could
provide for the child’s care in the future,
including the child’s special needs. However,
Doe’s employment and treatment require-
ments, while allegedly flexible, had not been

fully determined and could vary. Doe testi-
fied that she would likely need to use day-
care in order to work but had not yet deter-
mined what options were available to her to
meet her potential work-hour requirements.

We recognize that an absence of an incar-
cerated parent may be more significant to a
very young child than to an older one. Doe
remains incarcerated until her expected re-
lease date of July 2017, at which time the
child will be nearly three years old. Even if
Doe moved to home supervision prior to her
anticipated release day, she will not be eligi-
ble to care for the child until she can demon-
strate that she is able to provide a safe,
structured, and stable home environment suf-
ficient to address the child's needs. Given
Doe’s drug abuse history, criminal record,
previous child protection cases, probation
compliance, lack of bonding with the child
and the child’s special needs, it is likely that
considerable additional time will pass before
Doe is able to regain custody of the child and
sufficiently care for her. Consequently, Doe
has failed to show that the magistrate erred
in finding that it was not in the child’s best
interests to delay permanency and to disrupt
the child’s current environment and develop-
ment based on a hope for Doe’s potential
future success.

Doe counters that whatever lack of bond-
ing that may exist between Doe and the child
is, in large part, due to the lack of reasonable
efforts by the Department in providing visi-
tation, Specifically, Doe contends that the
Department blocked Doe’s attempts to ar-
range video meetings with the child, which
would have allowed Doe and the child to
better bond. However, while a finding of
reasonable reunification efforts was required
throughout Doe's child protection action, it is
not required to terminate Doe’s parental
rights. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v, Doe, 160 Idaho 824, 834, 879 P.8d 1094,
1104 (2016). Moreover, the magistrate found
that the Department had made reasonable
efforts at each stage of the proceedings ex-
cept for one status hearing held during Doe’s
imprisonment. In that instance, the Depart-
ment had discontinued use of email to com-
municate with Doe. However, subsequent
status review findings show that the Depart-

ment was making reasonable efforts to reuni-
fy. Additionally, the Department arranged
for Doe and the child to have in-person visi-
tation every other week when Doe was re-
leased to the re-entry facility. The Depart-
ment provided plane tickets for the foster
mother and the child to come to Doe for
visitation. The record demonstrates that po-
tential video meetings were being reviewed
but, for a number of logistical reasons, had
not yet occurred at the time of trial. Howev-
er, even if the Department did not facilitate
the video meetings as requested, Doe has not
provided the Court with any legal authority
supporting her argument that the Depart-
ment’s failure to arrange video meetings
demonstrates the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts and we do not consider it
further. See Powell v. Sellers, 180 Idaho 122,
128, 937 P.2d 484, 440 (Ct. App. 1997) (hold-
ing that a party waives an issue on appeal if
either argument or authority is lacking),

HH In sun, Doe’s arguments on appeal
seek to have this Court reweigh the evidence
and testimony and reach a different conclu-
sion. However, this Court will not second-
guess the magistrate by reweighing allegedly
conflicting witness testimony on appeal. In re
Doe, 157 Idaho 955, 958, 342 P.38d 667, 670
(2015) (holding that it is the province of the
trial court to determine the credibility of

fn

407

witnesses, the weight to be given their testi-
mony, and the inferences to be drawn from
the evidence). Therefore, for the foregoing
reasons, we hold there was substantial and
competent evidence to support the magis-
trate’s finding that termination of Doe’s pa-
rental rights was in the best interests of the
child. Consequently, Doe has failed to show
that the magistrate erred in terminating
Doe's parental rights.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

There was substantial and competent evi-
dence that Doe neglected the child and that
termination of Doe’s parental rights was in
the best interests of the child. Accordingly,
the magistrate’s judgment terminating Doe’s
parental rights is affirmed.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
GUTIERREZ concur.

408

398 P.3d 141
Jaymie QUIGLEY, an individual, and
Paxton Quigley, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

ve

Travis KEMP, an individual,
Defendant-Appellant,

and

Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
Inc., an Idaho corporation, and Christo-
pher Tobe, an individual, Defendants,

Docket No, 48725

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, February 2017 Term.

Filed: May 11, 2017
Rehearing Denied August 3, 2017

Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC, Boise, for
appellants. Keely E, Duke argued.

Fisher Rainey Hudson, Boise, for respon-
dents, Rebecca A. Rainey argued.

i
LE

BRODY, Justice.

This case involves a thorny discovery dis-
pute in a medical malpractice case. The issue
to be decided is whether a plaintiff must
disclose the identity of a non-testifying medi-
eal expert who has been consulted by a testi-
fying expert to familiarize the testifying ex-
pert with the applicable local standard of
care. This issue has been addressed by dis-
trict courts, but this Court has never ruled
on it, The district court held that Rule
26(b)(4)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-
dure shielded the Quigleys from disclosing
the identity of the non-testifying medical ex-
pert. Defendant Dr. Travis Kemp was grant-
ed a permissive, interlocutory appeal to re-
solve this issue.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jaymie and Paxton Quigley
brought this medical malpractice action
against Dr. Travis Kemp, a board-certified
orthopedic surgeon, Dr, Christopher Tobe, a
board-certified emergency medicine physi-
cian, and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center (“SARMC”). Dr. Kemp performed
surgery on Mrs. Quigley’s right ankle and
placed a temporary splint over her right foot.
Following surgery, Mrs. Quigley suffered
several acute pain episodes. Allegedly,
SARMC’s nursing staff expressed reserva-
tions about Mrs. Quigley being discharged
with uncontrolled pain, but told Mrs, Quigley
that Dr. Kemp would not keep her any long-
er in the hospital. Mrs. Quigley was dis-
charged.

Several hours after being discharged, Mrs.
Quigley went back to the SARMC emergency
room because of severe pain. Dr. Tobe exam-
ined her and admitted her to the hospital.
Once admitted, a nurse cut the splint away
from Mrs. Quigley’s foot, providing Mrs.
Quigley with immediate relief. Dr. Kemp ex-
amined Mrs. Quigley and noted that the
pressure from the post-operative splint
caused permanent damage to her foot that
would require future treatment. The Quig-
leys later brought this malpractice action.

Shortly after receiving the complaint, Dr.
Kemp sent the Quigleys the following inter-

409

rogatory requesting the identity of any medi-

cal providers who were called to familiarize

an expert witness with the local standard of

care: :

INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Do you in-
tend to call any person as an expert wit-
ness at trial? If so, with regard to each
such person, state:

(a) the name, address, telephone number,
employer and job title or classification of
such person;

(b) the subject matter on which the ex-
pert is expected to testify;

(¢) any and all opinions the expert wit-
negs is anticipated to testify to;

(a) the substance of the facts and opin-
ions to which the expert’is expected to
testify and a summary of grounds for

_ , each opinion; :

(e) the information or materials provided
to, or received from, the expert; and

(f) the name of any medical provider
that any of plaintiff's expert(s) called
to familiarize himself/herself with the
applicable standard of care in this

- ease.

(Emphasis added).

As the case progressed, the Quigleys dis-
closed Dr. Aprajita Nakra, an out-of-state
board-certified doctor of podiatrie medicine,
as their liability expert to testify concerning
the negligence of all defendants. As part of
their disclosure, the Quigleys included Dr.
Nakra’s resume and a summary of what
steps she.took to familiarize herself with the
local standard of care as required by the
Medical Malpractice Act (specifically, Idaho
Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1018), The disclo-
sure explained that Dr. Nakra has experi-
ence working with board-certified orthopedic
surgeons like Dr. Kemp and is familiar with
the national standard of care applicable to
them. The disclosure also provided that Dr.
Nakra consulted with a physician assistant.
who worked with orthopedic surgeons in
Boise at the time Mrs. Quigley was treated
and that the physician assistant confirmed
that the national standard of care with which
Dr. Nakra was familiar was the same stan-
dard of care that was applicable in Boise at
the time of Mrs, Quigley’s surgery. The dis-

410

closure did not name the physician assistant,
but stated that the person practiced in a
post-operative setting alongside and in con-
junction with board-certified orthopedic sur-
geons in Boise at the time of Mrs, Quigley’s
surgery.

Shortly after receiving the disclosure, Dr.
Kemp sent the Quigleys a letter requesting
the identity of the physician assistant and
asking for available deposition dates. The
Quigleys denied the request on the grounds
that the identity of the physician assistant
was protected under Idaho Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(4)(B) because the provider was
a non-testifying expert. Dr. Kemp filed a
Motion to Compel the identity of the physi-
cian assistant in response to his initial inter-
rogatory, arguing that the identity is rele-
vant to whether Dr. Nakra has adequately
familiarized herself with the local standard of
care as well as other issues of credibility. The
Quigleys filed a competing Motion for a Pro-
tective Order. The district court denied Dr.
Kemp’s Motion to Compel and granted Plain-
tiffs’ Motion for a Protective Order prohibit-
ing the discovery. The district court recog-
nized that this discovery issue has yet to be
resolved by this Court and welcomed defini-
tive guidance on the issue. We granted an
interlocutory appeal.

Il, ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure protects the identity
of a medical provider who was consulted by a
liability expert in order to familiarize herself
with the applicable local standard of care,

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HEME “[Clontrol of discovery is an area
within the diseretion of the trial court. There-
fore, the proper standard for reviewing a
trial court’s grant of a protective order is
abuse of discretion.” Vaught v. Dairyland
Ins. Co., 181 Idaho 357, 860, 956 P.2d 674,
677 (1998) Gnternal citations omitted). Ac-
cordingly, a trial court’s decision to grant or
deny a motion to compel will only be re-
versed when there has been a clear abuse of
discretion. Doe v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,
159 Idaho 741, 745, 867 P.8d 186, 140 (2016).

To determine whether a trial court abused its

discretion, this Court examines:
(1) [W]hether the trial court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and con-
sistently with the legal standards applica-
ble to the specifie choices available to it;
and (8) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.

Id. (quoting Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141

Idaho 697, 701, 116 P.8d 27, 31 (2005).

Iv. ANALYSIS

The district court denied Dr. Kemp’s Mo-
tion to Compel the identity of the physician
assistant based on Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the
2015 version of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule states:

A party may not discover facts known
or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial and who is not
expected to be called as a witness at
trial, except as provided in Rule 35(b) or
except upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracti-
cable for the party seeking discovery to
obtain facts or opinions on the same sub-
ject by other means,

LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). It is
important to note that the rule has been
subsequently amended and the new language
may now be found at 26(b)(4)(D). However,
this amendment and its minor changes do not
substantively change the Rule. This opinion
is binding as to the current version of the
Rule as well.

The district court held that the physician
assistant was retained by the Quigleys in
preparation for trial and is not expected to
be called as a witness. The district court
reasoned that the facts or opinions at issue
are the local standard of care and whether
Dr. Kemp met that standard, Ultimately, the
district court concluded that Dr. Kemp had
“lots of folks” ready to testify about the local
standard of care, and therefore, he had not
made a showing of “exceptional circum-
stances” requiring the disclosure of the phy-
sician assistant’s identity. We find that the

district court’s reliance on Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
‘was misplaced and warrants reversal.

Forty years ago, the Idaho legislature
passed the Medical Malpractice Act, which
requires plaintiffs in a medical malpractice
action to prove the local standard of care that
applied to their medical provider at the time
of the alleged malpractice. See 1.0. § 6-1012.
The act provides in detail what foundation
must be laid before the testimony of a testi-
fying expert is admissible:

The applicable standard of practice and
such a defendant’s failure to meet said
standard must be established in such cases
by such a plaintiff by testimony of one (1)
or more knowledgeable, competent expert
witnesses, and such expert testimony may
only be admitted in evidence if the founda-
tion therefor is first laid, establishing (a)
that such an opinion is actually held by the
expert witness, (b) that the said opinion
can be testified to with reasonable medical
certainty, and (c) that such expert wit-
ness possesses professional knowledge
and expertise coupled with actual
knowledge of the applicable said commu-
nity standard to which his or her expert
opinion testimony is addressed; provid-
ed, this section shall not be construed to
prohibit or otherwise preclude a compe-
tent expert witness who resides else-
where from adequately familiarizing
himself with the standards and practices
of (a particular) such area and thereaf-
ter giving opinion testimony in such a
trial.

LC. § 6-1013.

Under this statute, a plaintiffs testifying
medical expert must be able to demonstrate
“actual knowledge” of the local standard of
eare. “Actual knowledge” does not mean that
the testifying expert has to practice medicine
in the same community or even the same
specialty as the provider at issue. Section 6-
1018 expressly allows an out-of-state/out-of-
area expert to testify so long as the expert
“adequately” familiarizes himself with the
standards and practices applicable in a given
case.

The Quigleys contend that there is nothing
in the Medical Malpractice Act which re-
quires the disclosure of the identity of the

411

physician assistant as part of the foundation
for Dr. Nakra’s testimony. We agree and
have addressed this argument. In Bybee v.
Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 885 P.8d 14 (2014),
we reversed the district court’s decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of a medi-
cal provider based on the plaintiff's failure to
identify a non-testifying medical expert, The
district court concluded that the testifying
medical expert’s “failure to name the cardiol-
ogist with whom he conferred proves fatal to
the admissibility of his affidavit.” Id. at 177,
335 P.3d at 22, We reversed that decision,
stating: “Today we hold that an affidavit that
fails to identify an anonymous consultant
does not categorically fail to comply with the
foundation requirements for admissibility of
an out-of-area expert’s testimony under Ida-
ho Code section 6-1013.” Id. at 178, 885 P.8d
at 23, Certainly, if Dr. Nakra were on the
witness stand testifying as to how she be-
came familiar with the local standard of care
applicable to Dr, Kemp, there is nothing in
Section 6-1013 which would require her to
identify the physician assistant by name,
While it may leave an unanswered question
in the minds of the jurors, we understand
that such a decision is within the discretion
of the Quigleys’ attorney and does not render
her testimony inadmissible.

Having said that, the Quigleys also argue
that if this Court were to rule that disclosure
of the physician’s identity is required, it
would impermissibly heighten the foundation
requirements of Section 6-1013. In particular,
they contend that the holding in Bybee can-
not be reconciled with footnote 8 of that
decision which states:

The corollary of this holding is that de-
fendants should be permitted to conduct
discovery as to the identity of consulting
physicians. As in [Dunlap v. Garner, 127
Idaho 599, 903 P.2d 1296 (1994)], an ex-
pert’s claim to have consulted with a local
practitioner in order to gain familiarity
‘with the applicable standard of health care
practice may present questions of credibili-
ty for consideration by the ultimate trier of
fact.

Id, at 179 n.8, 385 P.8d at 24 n.8, The Quig-
Jeys’ argument confuses the issue of admissi-

412

bility with discoverability and is not well
taken.

The identity of the physician assistant is
discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1)(A) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure—not the
Medical Malpractice Act. The Rule specifical-
ly provides for the discovery of any nonprivi-
leged matter that is relevant to a party’s
claim or defense, including the identity of
persons who know of any discoverable mat-
ter:

Unless otherwise limited by order of the
court in accordance with these rules, the
scope of discovery is as follows: (1) Parties
may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery
or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of
any books, documents, or tangible things
and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. It is not ground for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible
at the trial if the information sought ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.

LR.C.P, 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).

Hl Dr. Kemp argues persuasively that
the identity of the physician assistant should
be discoverable because it enables him to
explore and raise issues pertaining to Dr,
Nakra’s actual knowledge of the local stan-
dard of care. If Dr. Nakra were to testify at
trial that she consulted with a local physician
assistant about the standard of care without
revealing the person’s identity (which we
agree may be permissible), a natural ques-
tion to ask on cross-examination would be
“who did you talk to.” The answer to this
question could be important because it might
reveal, for example, that the conversation did
not actually take place. See, eg., Dunlap v.
Garner, 127 Idaho 599, 604-05, 908 P.2d
1296, 1801-02 (1994) (involving the situation
where a defendant submitted affidavits from
local physicians stating that they did not
consult with the plaintiffs testifying expert).
It might reveal that the physician assistant

did not actually work in Boise at the time in
question or had a suspended license. Or, it
might reveal that the physician assistant had
a run-in with Dr. Kemp in the past and
might have an ax to grind now, Of course all
of this is purely hypothetical, but the point is
that Dr. Kemp has a legitimate interest in
knowing who the physician assistant is so he
ean prepare his defense, There is nothing
inconsistent or irreconcilable with the Court
holding that a testifying medical expert’s tes-
timony can be admitted without identifying
the medical expert who provided the local
standard of care, but that the identity of that
non-testifying expert is subject to a properly
formulated discovery request.

TI The Quigleys argue that this Court
should use Rule 26(o)(4)(B) to protect the
identity of the physician assistant. We de-
cline to do so. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not apply
to non-testifying expert witnesses who have
been called to provide the foundation for a
testifying witness’ testimony. Our discovery
rules require a testifying witness to disclose
the basis and reasons for all opinions and all
of the data and information considered by
the witness in forming the opinions. See
LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)@) (2015), This require-
ment fairly encompasses the names of any
non-testifying medical experts who provide
information concerning the local standard of
care, If we were to interpret Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
as the Quigleys advocate, we would effective-
ly undermine the full disclosure require-
ments in Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(4)(A)@). As
such, we find that the district court's decision
to preclude discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
was not consistent with applicable legal stan-
dards, and constitutes reversible error.

We do not make this decision lightly. We
understand that finding a medical expert who
has actual knowledge of the local standard of
care and who is willing to get involved in a
medical malpractice action against a col-
league is difficult at best. In some cases, it
may be impossible depending on the location
and specialization of the medical provider at
issue. Some may argue that our holding to-
day will further impede plaintiffs’ ability to
get help from the local medical community.
We understand that the Medical Malpractice
Act poses real, substantial hurdles for plain-

tiffs bringing medical malpractice cases. We
have an obligation, however, to see that the
laws passed by the legislature are followed.
We also believe that secreting the identity of
a medical expert who provides the foundation
for a testifying expert’s testimony is incom-
patible with our system of justice.

V. CONCLUSION

We vacate the district court’s order and
vemand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion, Costs to Appellant,

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and HORTON coneur.

398 P.3d 146
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve

Tyrell Garrett MCNEELY, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 43943

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Idaho Falls, May 2017 Term.

Filed: July 10, 2017

414 Dt

" Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for appellant. Russell J. Spencer
argued.

Michael J. Wood, Twin Falls, for respon-
dent.

HORTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order granting a
motion to suppress. The district court in
Franklin County granted a motion to sup-
press statements made by Tyrell McNeely to
Detective Zane Jensen after finding that the
Miranda warnings given to McNeely did not
adequately advise him of his rights. On ap-
peal, the State argues that the district court
erred when it followed case law from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals requiring po-
lice to advise suspects of their right to have
an attorney present during interrogation. We
affirm,

IL. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

McNeely was arrested on May 15, 2015,
for a misdemeanor probation violation. While
MeNeely was at the Franklin County Sher-
iff's Office, Detective Jensen was asked to
transport him to jail. Detective Jensen was
investigating a report that McNeely had en-
gaged in lewd and lascivious conduct with a
minor child and decided to interview McNee-

ly. At the beginning of the interview the
following exchange took place:

Detective Jensen: You kind of got yourself

in a spot.

McNeely: Uh huh.

Detective Jensen: And I need to visit with

you about it. But I need—I need to have

you understand—I need to talk to you

about first about your rights.

MeNeely: Kay.

Detective Jensen: Do you understand your

rights?

MeNeely: Uh, read them all to me again.

Detective Jensen: Okay. You have the

right to remain silent. You understand

that?

McNeely: Yes.

Detective Jensen: You have the right—

uhm—because anything you say can and

will be used against you in court.

McNeely: (Nodding his head up and down).

Detective Jensen: You have the right to

have an attorney, do you understand that?

McNeely: (Simultaneously nodding his

head up and down).

Detective Jensen: To help you with—stuff.

Detective Jensen: And if you can’t afford

an attorney we'll provide one for you.

Detective Jensen: Do you understand all

that?

MeNeely: (Nodding his head up and down)

Uh-huh.
During the conversation that followed,
McNeely made incriminating statements that
the State wished to use against him at trial.
McNeely filed a motion to suppress the state-
ments made during the interview. Following
a hearing, the district court granted the mo-
tion to suppress finding that Detective Jen-
sen failed to adequately advise McNeely of
his right to have an attorney present during
the interview. The State timely appealed.

Tl, STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hl “The standard of review of a suppres-
sion motion is bifurcated.” State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.8d 454, 456 (2004).
“When a decision on a motion to suppress is
challenged, the Court accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by sub-

stantial evidence, but freely reviews the ap-
plication of constitutional principles to the
facts as found.” Id.

I. ANALYSIS

The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that no person,
“shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself....” U.S. Const,
amend. V. This right has been applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
US, Const. amend. XIV. In a landmark case,
the United States Supreme Court held that
in order to use statements made by a suspect
during a custodial interrogation, the suspect
must be advised of his Fifth Amendment
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 486,
479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1680-81, 16 L.Ed.2d 694,
"726-27 (1966). In Miranda, the Court stated:

To summarize, we hold that when an
individual is taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom by the au-
thorities in any significant way and is sub-
jected to questioning, the privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized, Procedur-
al safeguards must be employed to protect
the privilege and unless other fully effec-
tive means are adopted to notify the per-
son of his right of silence and to assure
that the exercise of the right will be seru-
pulously honored, the following measures
are required, He must be warned prior to
any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attor-
ney, and that if he cannot afford an attor-
ney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires. Opportu-
nity to exercise these rights must be af-
forded to him throughout the interroga-
tion. After such warnings have been given,
and such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement. But unless
and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interro-
gation can be used against him.

Id, at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1629-80, 16 L.Hd.2d
at 725-26, This case presents a single issue:

415

whether Detective Jensen adequately in-
formed McNeely of his right to have counsel
present during questioning. The parties
agree that this was a custodial interrogation
and that Detective Jensen adequately in-
formed McNeely of his other rights.

The district court held that the warning
regarding the right to counsel was inade-
quate as Detective Jensen did not inform
McNeely that he had the right to have coun-
sel present before and during interrogation,
The State argues that the district court
based its opinion on the improper belief that
it was bound by Ninth Circuit case law re-
quiring police to inform suspects that they
have the right to have counsel present before
and during interrogation, The State further
argues that Miranda does not require such
an elaborate warning and that the warnings
given by Detective Jensen adequately in-
formed McNeely of his rights. The issue of
whether a suspect must be informed of their
right to have counsel present before and
during interrogation is a matter of first im-
pression before this Court.

A. The district court was not bound by
Ninth Circuit case law.

The State argues that the district court
erred because it felt bound to follow Ninth
Circuit case law. McNeely argues that the
district court did not feel bound by the Ninth
Cireuit but merely adopted its reasoning.
While the State is correct, this issue is not
dispositive in this case on appeal.

HE This Court has said, “the decisions of
lower federal courts are not binding on state
courts, even on issues of federal law.” Dan
Wiebold Ford, Ine. v. Universal Computer
Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 285, 240, 127 P.8d
188, 148 (2005). “Such decisions are authori-
tative only if the reasoning is persuasive.” Id.

Tl In this case, the district court stated
that it felt “compelled” to follow the pro-
nouncements of the Ninth Cireuit.

While the Court recognizes that there is
room for debate concerning this issue and
one might speculate that the United States
Supreme Court will ultimately reach a dif-
ferent result, if and when they consider
this precise issue, especially if one reads

416

closely the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in California v. Prysock, 543
[458] U.S, 355, 359 [101 S.Ct. 2806, 2809,
69 L.Ed.2d 696, 701] ... (1981) (per cu-
viam) and Duckworth [v. Hagan, 492 U.S.
195, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166
(1989)], However, the Court believes that it
is compelled to follow the directive and
pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals on this issue and their pro-
nouncement is quite clear in this respect.
See [United States v.] Noti, [781 F.2d 610
(9th Cir. 1984].
Thus, it appears that the district court felt
bound by Ninth Circuit case law. As noted
above, state courts are not bound by cireuit
court precedent even on matters of federal
law. While Noti may be considered as per-
suasive authority, the district court erred to
the extent that it believed itself to be com-
pelled to follow the Ninth Cireuit’s directive
and pronouncement. However, this error is
not dispositive of this appeal.

B. The Miranda warnings given to
MeNeely were inadequate as they did
not reasonably convey his rights.

Hl The district court found that the Mi-
vanda warnings given to McNeely by Detec-
tive Jensen were inadequate because they
failed to inform MeNeely that he had the
right to have counsel present before and
during interrogation, The State argues that
the warnings were adequate as they reason-
ably conveyed the Miranda warnings to
McNeely. The district court was correct.

Hin Mirando, the United States Su-
preme Court announced a set of warnings
which must be given to a suspect to protect
his Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination a right which “has consistently
been accorded a liberal construction.” Mi-
randa, 884 US, at 460, 86 S.Ct. at 1620, 16
L.Ed.2d at 715-16, “Unless adequate protec-
tive devices are employed to dispel the com-
pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,
no statement obtained from the defendant.
can truly be the product of free choice.” Id.
at 458, 86 S.Ct. at 1619, 16 L.Ed.2d at 714,
When discussing the right at issue in this
case, the Miranda Court said, “the right to
have counsel present at the interrogation is

indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege under the system we
delineate today.” Id. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625,
16 L.Hd.2d at 720-21.

TM In a recent case discussing Miranda
and its progeny, the United States Supreme
Court articulated the standard used to deter-
mine the adequacy of Miranda warnings, See
Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 180 8,Ct.
1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010).

In determining whether police officers ade-

quately conveyed the four warnings, we

have said, reviewing courts are not re-
quired to examine the words employed “as
if construing a will or defining the terms of
an easement, The inquiry is simply wheth-

ex the warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a

suspect] his rights as required by Mi-

ronda,’” Duckworth, 492 U.S, at 208 [109

S.Ct. at 2880, 106 L.Hd.2d at 177] (quoting

Prysock, 458 U.S. at 861 [101 S.Ct. at 2810,

69 L.Ed.2d at 702)).

Id, at 60, 180 S.Ct. at 1204, 175 L.Ed.2d at
1018-19 (alterations in original).

Detective Jensen told McNeely that, “[y]ou
have the right to an attorney, do you under-
stand that? To help you with—stuff.” This
warning did not reasonably convey to
MeNeely that he had the right to have the
presence of counsel before and during ques-
tioning. Although the Supreme Court has not
required that law enforeement officer use
specific phraseology, it has consistently held
that the right to the presence of counsel is an
essential part of the Miranda warnings. See
eg. Miranda, 384 U.S, at 469, 86 S.Ct. at
1625, 16 L.Ed.2d at 720-21 (“He must be
warned prior to questioning ... that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney
..); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,
204, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2881, 106 L.Ed.2d 166,
177-78 (1989) (upholding warnings which
stated suspect had the, “right to the advice
and presence of a lawyer ...”); Powell, 559
US, at 59, 180 S.Ct. at 1208, 175 L.Ed.2d at
1017-18 (“Miranda prescribed the following
four now-familiar warnings: ... ‘[8] that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney
...”), The warning that Detective Jensen
gave McNeely failed to advise him that he
had the right to have an attorney present.
Instead, Detective Jensen simply told

McNeely that an attorney would be provided
to help with “stuff.” Because the warning did
not adequately convey to McNeely his right
to the presence of counsel before and during
questioning, the district court properly
granted McNeely’s motion to suppress.

The State argues that the warnings were
adequate based on a decision from this Court
soon after Miranda was announced. In State
v Ross, 92 Idaho 709, 449 P.2d 369 (1968),
this Court found warnings similar to those
provided to McNeely were adequate. In
Ross, the defendant was informed, “I will
have to tell you that you're entitled to an
attorney.” 92 Idaho at 715, 449 P.2d at 376.
While the warnings in Ross and this case are
similar, subsequent decisions from the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court leads us to the
conclusion that such a warning is insufficient,
Therefore, we overrule the decision in Ross
and affirm the district court’s order granting
McNeely’s motion to suppress.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the decision of the district court
suppressing statements made by McNeely to
Detective Jensen.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur.

398 P.3d 150

Ethan Allen WINDOM, Petitioner-
Appellant,

v
STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
Docket No. 44037-2016

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: July 10, 2017

>
=
oo

Andrew H. Parnes, Ketchum, argued for
appellant.

Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, argued for respondent,

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Ada County from a
judgment dismissing a petition for post-con-
viction relief after the district court denied a
motion to amend the petition to raise a claim
that petitioner, who had been sentenced to
life without parole for murdering his mother
when he was a juvenile, was entitled to be
resentenced pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, — US. , 186 8.Ct, 718, 198
L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), The district court denied

the motion to amend on the ground that.
Montgomery did not apply to the petitioner
because he had not been sentenced to a
mandatory fixed-life sentence and because, if
Montgomery did apply, the sentence would
be upheld. We vacate the judgment of dis-
missal, hold that the sentencing was not in
conformity with the requirements of Mont-
gomery, reverse the order denying the peti-
tioner’s motion to amend, and remand this
case for further proceedings.

L

Factual Background.

On January 24, 2007, sixteen-year-old Eth-
an Windom brutally murdered his mother by
repeatedly striking her head with a club that
he had fashioned by attaching weights to one
end of a dumbbell. After his arms tired from
the weight, he then stabbed her dead body
repeatedly in the throat, chest, and abdomen
and finally thrust a knife into her exposed
brain. He pled guilty to murder in the second

degree, and the district court sentenced him
to a determinate life sentence. This Court
affirmed that sentence on appeal. State v.
Windom, 150 Idaho 878, 258 P.8d 310 (2011).

On June 25, 2012, the United States Su-
preme Court issued its opinion in Miller
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 182 S.Ct. 2455, 183
L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which addressed whether
state laws that required a mandatory fixed
life sentence for juveniles convicted of mur-
der violated the Eighth Amendment. The
Court held that they did, but it also stated
that

a sentencer misses too much if he

treats every child as an adult. To recap:

Mandatory life without parole for a ju-

venile precludes consideration of his

chronological age and its hallmark fea-
tures—among them, immaturity, impe-
tuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences. It prevents taking
into account the family and home envi-
ronment that surrounds him—and from
which he cannot usually extricate him-
self—no matter how brutal or dysfunc-
tional. It neglects the circumstances of
the homicide offense, including the ex-
tent of his participation in the conduct.

419

and the way familial and peer pressures

may have affected him.... And finally,

this mandatory punishment disregards

the possibility of rehabilitation even

when the circumstances most suggest it.
Id. at 477-78, 182 S.Ct. at 2468, 188 L.Ed.2d
at 423-24,

The Court concluded by stating:

But given all we have said in Roper [v.

Simmons, 548 U.S, 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161

L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)], Graham [v, Florida,

560 U.S. 48, 180 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d

825 (2010) ] and this decision about chil-

dren’s diminished culpability and height-

ened capacity for change, we think appro-
priate occasions for sentencing juveniles to
this harshest possible penalty will be un-
common. That is especially so because of
the great difficulty we noted in Roper and

Graham of distinguishing at this early age

between “the juvenile offender whose

crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corrup-
tion.” Although we do not foreclose a sen-
tencer’s ability to make that judgment in
homicide cases, we require it to take into
account how children are different, and
how those differences counsel against irre-
vocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison,

Id. at 479-80, 182 S.Ct. at 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d

at 428-24,

On July 8, 2012, an attorney who did not
represent Windom sent him a letter at the
correctional institution in which he was
housed. The attorney wrote:

You may have heard that the United
States Supreme Court recently decided
that mandatory fixed-life sentences for ju-
veniles are unconstitutional, You do not
have a mandatory fixed life sentence. But,
it is possible that Judge Copsey did not.
consider all the factors that the Supreme
Court says courts should consider before
she imposed your discretionary fixed life
sentence.

Therefore, you may want to challenge
your sentence in court. I have enclosed a
form to fill out if you want to file a federal
habeas corpus petition. You need to file
that petition in the federal court in Boise
no later than September 19, 2012. You also

420

might be able to file a state post-conviction
petition, but the deadline for that might
have been June 21, 2012. So you might be
too late if you haven't filed a state post-
conviction petition already. Finally, you
might be able to file a Rule 85 motion to
correct an illegal sentence, I suggest you
write to your trial attorney, Ed Odessey,
to see if he thinks that is advisable.

I spoke to Justin Curtis today and he
said that he would be writing you too,

I do not Imow if any of these court
challenges will end up helping you, I write
only out of a concern that you may have let
one opportunity slip by and would hate to
see you lose any chance to challenge your
sentence, should you want to do so.

Please feel free to write or call if you
have any questions or concerns. My office
accepts collect calls,

On September 12, 2012, Windom filed a
petition for habeas corpus in federal district
court, alleging that his sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment. The court dismissed the
petition on August 18, 2014, and Windom
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals,

On August 18, 2015, Windom filed in the
State district court a petition for post-convic-
tion relief in which he alleged ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The
petition was filed by Lori A. Nakaoka, who is
to be commended because she has represent-
ed him throughout this case pro bono, On
August 26, 2015, the district court gave no-
tice of its intent to dismiss the petition on the
ground that it was untimely under Idaho
Code section 19-4902(a) because it was not
filed within one year of the determination of
the direct appeal. In response, Windom filed
a brief in which he presented argument as to
why his petition should not be dismissed
based upon the doctrine of equitable tolling.

On November 8, 2015, the State filed an
answer, a motion for summary disposition,
and a supporting brief. The State argued
that the petition was barred by the statute of
limitations and that equitable tolling did not
apply. On January 11, 2016, the district court
heard oral argument on the State’s motion
for summary disposition, and it took the mat-
ter under advisement to issue a written deci-
sion.

On January 25, 2016, the United States
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Mont-
gomery v. Louisiana, — US. ——, 136
S.Ct, 718, 198 L,Hd.2d 599 (2016), and it
revised that opinion on January 27, 2016. In
Montgomery, the Court held that Miller was
retroactive to juvenile offenders whose con-
victions and sentences were final when Mil-
ler was decided. On January 26, 2016, Win-
dom filed a motion to amend his petition to
include a claim that his fixed-life sentence
violated Miller, The State responded by fil-
ing a brief in which it argued that Monigom-
ery could not cure the problem that the
petition was untimely. On February 22, 2016,
the district court heard oral argument on
Windom’s motion to file an amended com-
plaint, It took that motion under advisement
and stated it would issue a written decision,

On February 28, 2016, the district court
filed its decision on Windom’s motion to
amend his petition and on the State’s motion
for summary disposition, The court denied
Windom’s motion to amend on the ground
that “Montgomery did not change the hold-
ing announced in Miller and, thus, does not
apply to Windom’s case or change the fact
this Petition is untimely.” The court granted
the State’s motion on the grounds that Win-
dom’s petition was untimely and that, even if
Montgomery applied to Windom, the sen-
tencing transcript shows that the court “in
fact applied the heightened standards and
factors identified in Montgomery and previ-
ously in Miller.” The court entered a judg-
ment dismissing Windom’s petition with prej-
udice, and Windom timely appealed.

On June 22, 2016, the Ninth Cireuit Court
of Appeals vacated the federal district court
order dismissing Windom’s petition for habe-
as corpus. The court remanded the petition
to the federal district court with instructions
to stay the federal habeas petition until this
Court’s decision on his petition for post-con-
viction relief.

I.
Did the District Court Err in Denying

Windom’s Motion to Amend His
Complaint?

Windom pled guilty to the charge of mur-
der in the second degree, All of Windom’s

claims in his petition for post-conviction relief
were based upon the alleged ineffective assis-
tance of counsel during his sentencing and
the appeal of his sentence. The basis of the
district court’s order conditionally dismissing
Windom’s petition was that the petition was
barred by the statute of limitations, as was
the State’s motion for summary disposition,

HM On January 26, 2016, Windom filed a
motion to amend his petition to add a claim
pursuant to Montgomery and Miller. The
district court denied the motion on the
grounds that Miller and Montgomery do not
apply to Windom because he did not receive
a mandatory fixed-life sentence, so the pro-
posed amendment would be futile. The court
also held that if Montgomery announced new
standards for sentencing a juvenile to life
without parole, the transcript of the sentenc-
ing hearing shows that the court “in fact
applied the heightened standards and factors
identified in Montgomery and previously in
Miller.” The court therefore held that
“amendment would be futile. Windom’s Peti-
tion is untimely.”

HE “An application for post-conviction
relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding,
entirely distinct from the underlying criminal
action, The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
generally apply.” Ferrier v. State, 185 Idaho
‘797, 798-99, 25 P.8d 110, 111-12 (2001) (cita-
tion omitted). “The denial of a plaintiff's mo-
tion to amend a complaint to add another
eause of action is governed by an abuse of
discretion standard of review.” Thomas v
Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 188 Idaho 200,
210, 61 P.8d 557, 567 (2002). “To determine
whether a trial court has abused its discre-
tion, this Court considers whether it correct-
ly perceived the issue as discretionary,
whether it acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with applicable
legal standards, and whether it reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.” Reed v.
Reed, 137 Idaho 58, 57, 44 P.8d 1108, 1112
(2002), “A court may consider whether the
allegations sought to be added to the com-
plaint state a valid claim in determining
whether to grant leave to amend the com-
plaint.” Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140
Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.8d 628, 628 (2004).

421

HM Idaho Code section 19-4902(a) pro-
vides that a petition for post-conviction relief
“may be filed at any time within one (1) year
from the expiration of the time for appeal or
from the determination of an appeal or from
the determination of a proceeding following
an appeal, whichever is later.” The one-year
period begins to run when the appellate court
issues a remittitur. Hauschule v. State, 144
Idaho 884, 887, 172 P.8d 1109, 1112 (2007).
This Court upheld Windom’s sentence on
direct appeal, and that determination became
final on June ‘21, 2011, when this Court is-
sued the remittitur. The one-year period
within which Windom could file a petition for
post-conviction relief expired on June 21,
2012. Four days later, the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller.

The district court held that the “actual
holding” in Miller and Montgomery was that
mandatory fixed-life sentences for juveniles
‘were unconstitutional and that those deci-
sions did not apply to Windom because he
was not subject to a mandatory fixed-life
sentence, Although the issue in Miller was
the constitutionality of a mandatory fixed-life
sentence for juveniles who commit murder,
the basis of the decision was that a fixed-life
sentence precluded the sentencing court
from considering age-related characteristics
and other factors before imposing the sen-
tence. The Court concluded by stating, “Al-
though we do not foreclose a sentencer’s
ability to make that judgment in homicide
cases, we require it to take into account how
children are different, and how those differ-
ences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison.” 567 U.S. at 480,
182 S.Ct. at 2469, 188 L.Ed.2d at 423-24
(emphasis added). (footnote omitted), Thus,
Miller mandated that a sentencing court take
certain factors regarding a juvenile murderer
into account before sentencing the juvenile to
a fixed-life senténce. However, as mentioned
above, Miller was issued four days after the
deadline for Windom to file a petition for
post-conviction relief, even assuming that the
decision would apply to a juvenile whose
sentence had become final over a year earli-
er, There was nothing in the Miller decision
that indicated it would be applied retroactive-
ly.

422

HM Idaho law does not preclude the
granting of relief pursuant to a petition for
post-conviction relief that was filed beyond
the one-year deadline. Because there may be
claims that are not known to the defendant.
within that time limit, we have held that
there must be a reasonable time beyond that
deadline within which claims can be asserted
once they are known. Charboneau v. State,
144 Idaho 900, 904-05, 174 P.8d 870, 874-75
(2007). A petition raising any such claims
“must be filed within a reasonable time after
the petitioner has notice of the issue(s)
raised.” Charboneau v. State, 162 Idaho 160,
170, 395 P.3d 379, 389 (2017).

On January 25, 2016, the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in Mont-
gomery. It stated that the issue was “wheth-
er its [Miller’s] holding is retroactive to
juvenile offenders whose convictions and sen-
tences were final when Miller was decided.”
Montgomery, — U.S. at ——, 186 S.Ct. at
725, 198 L.Ed.2d at 608-09. With respect to
the Miller decision, the Court in Montgom-
ery stated that “Miller held that mandatory
life without parole for juvenile homicide of-
fenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punish-
ments.’” Id. at ——, 136 S.Ct. at 726, 193
L.Ed.2d at 608-09 (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, the Court also stated:

Miller required that sentencing courts con-

sider a child’s “diminished culpability and

heightened capacity for change” before
condemning him or her to die in prison.

Although Miller did not foreclose a sen-

tencer’s ability to impose life without pa-

role on a juvenile, the Court explained that

a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate

sentence for all but the rarest of children,

those whose crimes reflect “ ‘irreparable
corruption.’”

Id. (internal citation omitted).

HE The Montgomery Court held that
Miller announced a new substantive rule of
constitutional law. In addressing that issue,
the Court did not limit the new rule to a
prohibition on mandatory fixed-life sentences
for juveniles, Rather, the Court reiterated
the factors that must be considered by the
sentencing court before imposing a discre-

tionary fixed-life sentence on a juvenile of-
fender. The Court stated at length:

Miller took as its starting premise the
principle established in Roper and Graham
that “children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing.”
These differences result from children’s
“diminished culpability and greater pros-
pects for reform,” and are apparent in
three primary ways:

“First, children have a ‘lack of matu-
rity and an underdeveloped sense of re-
sponsibility, leading to recklessness,
impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.
Second, children ‘are more vulnerable
to negative influences and outside pres-
sures,’ including from their family and
peers; they have limited ‘control over
their own environment’ and lack the
ability to extricate themselves from hor-
vific, crime-producing settings. And
third, a child’s character is not as ‘well
formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less
fixed’ and his actions less likely to be
‘evidence of irretrievable depravity. ”
As a corollary to a child’s lesser culpabil-

ity, Miller recognized that “the distinctive
attributes of youth diminish the penologi-
eal justifications” for imposing life without
parole on juvenile offenders. Because retri-
bution “relates to an offender’s blamewor-
thiness, the case for retribution is not as
strong with a minor as with an adult.” The
deterrence rationale likewise does not suf-
fice, since “the same characteristies that
render juveniles less culpable than
adults—their immaturity, recklessness,
and impetuosity—make them less likely to
consider potential punishment.” The need
for incapacitation is lessened, too, because
ordinary adolescent development diminish-
es the likelihood that a juvenile offender
“forever will be a danger to society.”
Rehabilitation is not a satisfactory ratio-
nale, either. Rehabilitation cannot justify
the sentence, as life without parole “for-
swears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”

These considerations underlay the
Court’s holding in Miller that mandatory
life-without-parole sentences for children
“posfe] too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment.” Miller vequires that before

sentencing a juvenile to life without parole,
the sentencing judge take into account
“how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”
The Court recognized that a sentencer
might encounter the rare juvenile offender
who exhibits such irretrievable depravity
that rehabilitation is impossible and life
without parole is justified. But in light of
“children’s diminished culpability and
heightened capacity for change,” Miller
made clear that “appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possi-
ble penalty will be uncommon.”

Miller, then, did more than require a
sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s
youth before imposing life without parole;
it established that the penological justifica-
tions for life without parole collapse in
light of “the distinctive attributes of
youth.” Even if a court considers a child’s
age before sentencing him or her to a
lifetime in prison, that sentence still vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment for a child
whose crime reflects “‘unfortunate yet
transient immaturity. ” Because Miller de-
termined that sentencing a child to life
without parole is excessive for all but “ ‘the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption,” it rendered life

without parole an unconstitutional penalty

for “a class of defendants because of their
status”—that is, juvenile offenders whose
crimes reflect the transient immaturity of

youth. As a result, Miller announced a

substantive rule of constitutional law. Like

other substantive rules, Miller is retroac-

tive because it “‘necessarily carr[ies] a

significant risk that a defendant’ ”—here,

the vast majority of juvenile offenders—

“faces a punishment that the law cannot

impose upon him”

Id. at —, 186 8.Ct. at 738-84, 198 L.Bd.2d
at 18-19 (citations omitted). The Court held
that “Miller announced a substantive rule
that is retroactive in cases on collateral re-
view.” Id. at ——, 186 S.Ct. at 782, 198
L.Ed.2d at 617-18.

Although it is possible that the Court in-
tended Miller to be applied retroactively only
to those juveniles who were given mandatory

423

sentences of life without parole, that reading
would be inconsistent with the last paragraph
quoted above. The Court stated that Miller
“rendered life without parole an unconstitu-
tional penalty for ‘a class of defendants be-
cause of their status’—that is, juvenile of-
fenders whose crimes reflect the transient
immaturity of youth, As a result, Miller an-
nounced a substantive rule of constitutional
law.” Id. at ——, 186 S.Ct. at 784, 193
L.Ed.2d at 619-20. Thus, it appears that
Montgomery declared that Miller was retro-
active not only for those juveniles sentenced
to a mandatory of life without parole, but
also for those for whom the sentencing court.
imposed a fixed-life sentence without consid-
ering the distinctive attributes of youth. As
we held in Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 218,
395 P.8d 1246 (2017), regarding a post-con-
viction petition filed by a petitioner who had
been sentenced to life without parole for the
murder of her parents while she was a juve-
nile, id. at 215-16, 895 P.8d at 1248-49,
“Montgomery also made it clear that ‘Miller
requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile
offender’s youth and attendant characteris-
tics before determining that life without pa-
role is a proportionate sentence,’” id, at 225,
395 P.8d at 1258,

Windom did not have a claim under Miller
until Montgomery was issued, and the day
after it was issued he filed his motion to
amend his petition to include a claim under
Miller and Montgomery. In Johnson v.
State, 162 Idaho 218, 895 P.8d 1246 (2017),
the petitioner had been sentenced to life
without parole for the murder of her parents
while she was a juvenile. Id. at 215-16, 395
P.8d at 1248-49, She filed a petition for post-
conviction relief based upon Miller and
Montgomery, and the trial court ruled that
she could have brought an Eighth Amend-
ment claim in her direct appeal or in her first
petition for post-conviction relief and there-
fore her claim under Miller was barred by
Idaho Code section 19-4901(b) as being un-
timely. Id. at 224, 395 P.8d at 1257. We held
that the trial court erred, stating, “While it’s
true Johnson could have made an Highth
Amendment claim that her sentence was
generally excessive or cruel or unusual, she
could not have made the claim that her sen-
tence was illegal under Miller’s holding in-

424

terpreting the Eighth Amendment until after
Miller was decided.” Id.

Windom would not have had a claim under
Miller until Montgomery was decided, which
made Miller “retroactive to juvenile offend-
ers whose convictions and sentences were
final when Miller was decided.” Monigom-
ery, — U.S. at —, 186 S.Ct. at 725, 198
L.Ed.2d at 609. Therefore, his motion to
amend his petition to include a claim under
Miller and Montgomery, made one day after
the Montgomery decision was issued, was
timely.

The district court also held that the tran-
script of the sentencing hearing showed that
the court complied with the requirements of
Miller and Montgomery. The transcript does
not show that any evidence was presented
regarding the distinctive attributes of youth
mentioned by the Supreme Court in Miller
and Montgomery. When commencing its ex-
planation of the sentence it was going to
hand down, the court stated: “I have consid-
ered the nature of the offense. I have consid-
ered the mental health issues. I have consid-
ered mitigating and aggravating factors. I
have considered in mitigation, for example,
the relative youth, I have considered the fact
that he does not have a long criminal rec-
ord.”

Although the district court stated that it
considered Windom’s “relative youth” as a
mitigating factor, “Miller ... did more than
require a sentencer to consider a juvenile
offender's youth before imposing life without
parole; it established that the penological
justifications for life without parole collapse
in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of
youth.” Id, at ——, 186 S,Ot. at 734, 193
L.Ed.2d at 619-20 (emphasis added). Before
imposing sentence, the district court dis-
cussed at length Windom’s statements to
classmates that he hated his mother; the
brutal nature of the murder; his apparent
lack of remorse when questioned by police;
his fascination with serial killers; his diagno-
sis as a paranoid schizophrenic; and the need,
if he is released into society, that he be
treated by a competent mental health profes-
sional, that he take his medications, and that
they actually work. However, the sentencing
hearing did not show that evidence was pre-

sented regarding the factors required by
Miller, Those factors must be individualized
for the juvenile being sentenced. Miller, 567
US. at 465, 477, 182 S.Ct. at 2460, 2467-68,
183 L.Ed.2d at 414-15, 422-23,

In holding that it complied with the re-
quirements of Miller and Montgomery, the
district court wrote, “Based on the horrific
facts of the murder itself, the past behaviors,
and Windom’s own statements and actions in
the interviews, the Court concluded, after
eareful deliberation, that Windom’s actions
did not reflect ‘the transient immaturity of
youth’ but in the words of the United States
Supreme Court, reflected those actions of
‘the rarest of children’ whose crime reflected
‘reparable corruption’ deserving life with-
out parole.” The quotes in this sentence did
not appear in the court’s comments at the
sentencing hearing, obviously because the
hearing predated the Supreme Court’s opin-
ions in Miller and Montgomery, nor did the
court point to any statements it made that
have the equivalent meaning, In making this
statement, the court was apparently holding
retrospectively that it did not believe that.
Windom’s actions reflected “the transient im-
maturity of youth” and instead were the ac-
tions of “the rarest of children” whose crime
reflected “irreparable corruption.”

HM A vetrospective analysis does not
comply with Miller and Montgomery where
the evidence of the required characteristics
and factors was not presented during the
sentencing hearing, “Miller’s holding has a
procedural component. Miller requires a sen-
tencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth
and attendant characteristics before deter-
mining that life without parole is a propor-

tionate sentence.” Montgomery, — U.S.
——, 186 S.Ct. at 784, 198 L.Ed,2d at 619-20
(emphasis added).

A hearing where ‘youth and its attendant
characteristics’ are considered as sentenc-
ing factors is necessary to separate those
juveniles who may be sentenced to life
without parole from those who may not.
The hearing does not replace but rather
gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding
that life without parole is an excessive
sentence for children whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity,

Id. at ——, 136 S.Ct. at 785, 198 L.Ed.2d at
620-21 (emphasis added). It is the lack of
such evidence at Windom’s sentencing hear-
ing that distinguishes this case from Johnson
v. State. In Johnson, we upheld a juvenile’s
pre-Miller sentence of life without parole for
the murder of her parents because evidence
later required by Miller had been admitted
during the sentencing hearing and consid-
ered by the trial court before it imposed a
sentence of fixed life. In Johnson, “Drs.
Craig Beaver and Richard Worst testified at
the sentencing hearing about the develop-
mental state of an adolescent’s brain com-
pared to an adult and how youth are more
prone to impulsivity and more likely to be
able to be rehabilitated.” Johnson v. State,
162 Idaho at 225, 395 P.3d at 1258. “Dr.
Beaver’s testimony was approximately forty
pages. Dr. Worst’s testimony was approxi-
mately sixty-eight pages.” Id, at n.9, There-
fore, we held:

Although Miller and Montgomery had not

been decided at the time of the sentencing

hearing, and therefore the terms of “irrep-
arably corrupt” and “transient immaturity”
where not in the court’s lexicon at that
time, the court clearly considered John-
son’s youth and all its attendant character-
istics and determined, in light of the hei-
nous nature of the crime, that Johnson,
despite her youth, deserved life without
parole,

Id. at 226, 395 P.3d at 1258,

Thus, the district court erred in denying
Windom’s motion to amend his petition. The
denial of the motion was not consistent with
applicable legal standards because Windom’s
motion to amend was filed within a reason-
able time after the issuance of the Montgom-
ery decision, which made Miller applicable to
Windom’s sentence of life without parole.
The sentencing hearing in Windom’s case did
not include evidence of the factors required
by Miller and Montgomery, and therefore
his sentencing did not comport with the re-
quirements of those decisions.

I.
Conclusion.

We vacate the judgment dismissing Win-
dom’s petition for post-conviction relief, re-

425

verse the order denying his motion to amend,
and remand this case for further proceedings
that are consistent with this opinion,

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY concur.

398 P.3d 158
Perry KRINITT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME and State of Idaho,
Defendants-Respondents.

Perry Krinitt, Plaintiff-Respondent,

Vv

Idaho Department. of Fish and Game
and State of Idaho, Defendants-
Appellants,

Docket No, 44326, Docket No. 44442

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: July 11, 2017

+

Carpenter Law Firm, Missoula, MT, for
appellant. Charles H. Carpenter argued.

Johnson Law Group, Spokane, WA, for
respondents. Peter J. Johnson argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Perry Krinitt, Sr. (Krinitt) appeals the
Lewis County district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the State of Idaho
and the Department of Fish and Game
(DFG). The district court ruled that IDFG
was a statutory employer under the Idaho
Worker’s Compensation Act and, consequent-
ly, IDFG was entitled to immunity from ac-

428

tions based on the work-related death of
Perry Krinitt, Jr. (Perry). We affirm,

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Perry, a pilot for Leading Edge Aviation,
died when the helicopter he was piloting
erashed on August 31, 2010, in Kamiah, Ida-
ho. Krinitt v. Idaho Dep’t of Fish and Game,
159 Idaho 125, 126, 357 P.38d 850, 851 (2015).
Perry was flying IDFG employees Larry
Bennett and Danielle Schiff to conduct a fish
survey on the Selway River. Id. Bennett and
Schiff died in the crash as well. Jd. at 127,
857 P.8d at 852. An investigation revealed
that the accident was caused when a clip-
board struck the tail rotor. Id, Evidence was
that one of the passengers became sick and
opened the helicopter door, dropping the
clipboard in the process. Id.

On August 30, 2012, Krinitt filed a wrong-
ful death suit based in negligence seeking
damages against IDFG for Perry’s death, On
October 22, 2012, IDFG filed its answer. In
its answer, IDFG did not assert statutory
immunity under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensa-
tion Act as a defense. Thereafter, the district
court entered a scheduling order dated Feb-
ruary 14, 2018, which stated: “Dispositive
motions shall be filed by January 31, 2014.”
IDFG filed a motion for summary judgment
on January 81, 2014, In support of its motion,
IDFG did not raise the issue of statutory
immunity; rather, IDFG moved for summary
judgment on the basis that Krinitt could not
prove negligence, The district court granted
the motion and Krinitt appealed.

On appeal, this Court determined that a
reasonable jury could conclude that the acci-
dent was the result of IDFG’s negligence and
reversed and remanded the case to district
court, Krinitt, 159 Idaho at 127-81, 857 P.8d
at 852-56, Following remand, the district
court ordered the parties to mediation. On
March 21, 2016, after a failed mediation at-
tempt, and after the date set for the filing of

1. All citations to the Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are to the 2015 rules, as those were the
rules in effect at the time of the proceedings in
district court,

2. The district court granted summary judgment
prior to the recent amendment of Idaho Rule of

dispositive motions, IDFG filed another mo-
tion for summary judgment on the basis of
statutory immunity.

Krinitt opposed the motion, arguing: (1)
IDFG was not Perry’s statutory employer
and therefore did not qualify for statutory
immunity; and (2) even if IDFG was Perry’s
statutory employer, IDFG had waived its
statutory immunity defense by failing to
timely plead it. After a hearing, the district
court granted IDFG’s motion for summary
judgment, ruling that IDFG did not waive its
right to assert statutory immunity as a de-
fense, and, as a statutory employer, IDFG
was immune from suit under Idaho’s Work-
er’s Compensation Act. However, under Ida-
ho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(i),! the district
court also imposed sanctions on IDFG for
filing its March 21, 2016, summary judgment
motion after the January 31, 2014, deadline
for filing dispositive motions set in the sched-
uling order. Krinitt timely appeals the grant
of summary judgment in favor of IDFG.
IDFG appeals the district court’s imposition
of sanctions,

Tl. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “This Court's review of a trial
court’s ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment is the same standard used by the trial
court in originally ruling on the motion.”
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 189 Idaho
207, 209, 76 P.8d 951, 953 (2003) (citations
omitted). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
state that summary judgment shall be ren-
dered when “the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affida-
vits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” LR.C.P. 56(c)? “If the evi-
dence reveals no disputed issues of material
fact, what remains is a question of law, over
which this Court exercises free review.” Ro-

Civil Procedure 56(a), which, as of July 1, 2016,
provides; “The court must grant summary judg-
ment if the movant shows that there is no genu-
ine dispute as to any material fact and the mov-
ant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
LRC.P, 56(a),

bison, 189 Idaho at 209, 76 P.8d at 953
(citations omitted).

Hs We review a trial court’s decision to
impose sanctions under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(i) under an abuse of discretion
standard. Lepper v. FE. Idaho Health Servs,
Inc., 160 Idaho 104, 109, 369 P.8d 882, 887
(2016). To determine whether the district
court abused its discretion, we examine
whether the district court: (1) correctly per-
ceived the issue as discretionary; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with relevant legal stan-
dards; and (8) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Swallow v, Emergency
Med. of Idaho, P.A., 188 Idaho 589, 592, 67
P.8d 68, 71 (2008).

Ill. ANALYSIS

The parties raise three issues: (1) whether
the district court erred in allowing IDFG to
assert its statutory employer immunity de-
fense; (2) whether IDFG is a statutory em-
ployer of Perry; and (8) whether the district
court abused its discretion in imposing sane-
tions against IDFG.

A. Whether the district court erred in
allowing IDFG to assert its statutory
employer immunity defense.

Hl Krinitt contends IDFG waived the af-
firmative defense of statutory employer im-
munity by failing to timely assert it as a
defense. IDFG responds by asserting that
the question of whether an employer is enti-
tled to statutory immunity is one of subject
matter jurisdiction and may therefore be
raised at any time, and at the very least, at
any time before trial when the opposing par-
ty has had an opportunity to respond in
briefing and oral argument,

HE Statutory employer immunity is
an affirmative defense. Fukriman v. State,
Dep't of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 803, 158
P.8d 480, 483 (2007). Like other affirmative
defenses, if not properly raised it may be
waived. Cf: id. at 803-04, 153 P.8d at 4838-84
(noting that the defense was not waived be-
cause it was properly raised). Furthermore,
we have expressly stated, “[slince status as a
statutory employer is a defense to a common

429

law negligence action, deciding whether a
defendant is a third party or a statutory
employer, when that defense is raised, neces-
sarily attends the district court’s task in rul-
ing on matters in such suits.” Kolar v. Cassia
Cnty. Idaho, 142 Idaho 846, 851, 127 P.3d
962, 967 (2005). Simply put, deciding whether
an employer has properly raised the statuto-
ry employer immunity defense or whether an
employer qualifies as a statutory employer
does not implicate subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Hither a court or the Industrial Com-
mission may determine whether an employer
qualifies as a statutory employer and wheth-
er the employer has properly raised the de-
fense. Dominguez ew rel. Hamp v, Evergreen
Res, Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 12, 121 P.8d 988, 948
(2005) (“The Industrial Commission and the
district courts of Idaho have’ concurrent ju-
risdiction to determine whether they have
jurisdiction to consider a claim or hear a
case.”), It is only after such a determination
has been made that subject matter jurisdic
tion comes into play. If it is found that the
employer is a statutory employer, then work-
er’s compensation is the only remedy and
jurisdiction rests with the Industrial Com-
mission. If it is found that the employer does
not qualify as a statutory employer or has
waived the defense, then jurisdiction rests
with the courts.

HI In determining whether an affirma-
tive defense has been waived, we have held
that “a party does not waive an affirmative
defense for failing to raise it in the initial
answer, so long as it is raised before trial and
the opposing party has time to respond in
briefing and oral argument.” Patterson v.
State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho
810, 816, 256 P.8d 718, 724 (2011); accord
Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 985, 818
P.8d 918, 925 (2014); Fubriman, 143 Idaho at
803, 153 P.3d at 483; Bluestone v. Mathew-
son, 108 Idaho 453, 455, 649 P.2d 1209, 1211
(1982). However, the ability to raise an affir-
mative defense by motion is not unfettered.
Parties must still comply with the court’s
scheduling orders, and failure to comply with
such orders may result in the denial of the
defendant’s motion. LR.C.P. 16(); LR.C.P.
87(b)(2)(B) (allowing the court to refuse to
allow “the disobedient party to support or

430

oppose designated claims or defenses” when
a party fails to comply with a scheduling
order).

HH Here, the district comt entered a
scheduling order that required all dispositive
motions to be filed by January 31, 2014.
IDFG filed its motion for summary judgment
asserting the statutory employer affirmative
defense on March 21, 2016. A motion assert-
ing an affirmative defense is a dispositive
motion by its very nature. See Fuhriman,
148 Idaho at 808, 158 P.8d at 483 (“An affir-
mative defense is ‘[a] defendant’s assertion
raising new facts and arguments that, if true,
will defeat the plaintiff's or prosecution's
claim, even if all allegations in the complaint
are true.” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
186 (2d Pocket ed. 2001))). Thus, although
IDFG’s motion was before trial, it was after
the date set by the district court’s scheduling
order for the filing of dispositive motions.
Had the district court been so inclined, it
could have denied the motion for failure to
comply with its scheduling order, I. P.
16(); LR.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B); of Cummings v.
Stephens, 157 Idaho 848, 861, 336 P.8d 281,
294 (2014) (denying a motion to reconsider
the exclusion of a witness because the party
did not comply with the court’s scheduling
order); Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. &
Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 771, 264 P.8d
400, 410 (2011) (denying the admission of an
exhibit because the party failed to comply
with the court’s scheduling order). It did not.
Instead the district court heard the motion
on its merits and imposed a lesser sanction.
It was within the district court’s discretion to
do so.

HM The decision of whether to impose
sanctions for violating a scheduling order “is
within the district court’s discretion ... and
we will not overturn such a decision absent a
manifest abuse of that discretion.” Lepper,
160 Idaho at 109, 369 P.8d at 887. Here, the
district court noted that the decision to im-
pose sanctions for violating its scheduling
order was within its discretion. The court
also noted that under the applicable legal
principles an affirmative defense may be
vaised for the first time in a motion for
summary judgment as long as it is raised
before trial and with time for the opposing

party to present argument in opposition.
Fuhriman, 143 Idaho at 808, 153 P.3d at 483.
The district court also observed that under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(i) it could
have denied IDFG’s motion “on the basis
that it was untimely filed.” The district court,
however, noted that Krinitt did not argue for
this remedy under Rule 16(i). Additionally,
the court noted: (1) IDFG’s failure to bring
the motion earlier was “not part of a pattern
of delay or gamesmanship”; (2) the oversight
was “immediately brought before the court
with IDFG acknowledging its error”; and (8)
“there is no argument that Krinitt was preju-
diced by such action.” Given the these fac-
tors, the district court reasoned that under
the applicable legal principles, dismissal of
IDFG’s motion, although violating the court’s
scheduling order, was unwarranted. Such a
decision was squarely within the district
court’s discretion, and we will not overturn it.
Lepper, 160 Idaho at 109, 369 P.3d at 887;
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 872-73,
186 P.8d 838, 343-44 (2006),

B. Whether IDFG was a statutory em-
ployer of Perry.

HM Krinitt argues that IDFG was not
the statutory employer of Perry. This argu-
ment has two main points. First, Krinitt ar-
gues that Leading Edge was not a contractor
of IDFG and therefore there was no privity
of contract between Perry and IDFG, and,
thus, IDFG could not be Perry’s statutory
employer. Second, Krinitt argues that be-
cause the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI)
was involved in contracting Leading Edge,
and because the DOI—as a federal agency—
is outside the reach of Idaho's Worker’s
Compensation Act, the DOI cannot be a con-
tractor “under” IDFG.

To the extent Krinitt argues that the DOL
is not subject to Idaho’s Worker’s Compensa-
tion Act, this argument fails. See Struhs v.
Protection Tech. Inc., 183 Idaho 715, 720, 992
P.2d 164, 169 (1999) (holding the U.S, De-
partment of Energy was the plaintiffs statu-
tory employer); Liberty N.W. Ins. Corp. v.
United States, No, 1:10-CV-102-REB, 2011
WL 6002468, at *8 (D. Idaho Nov. 30, 2011)
(Statutory employer immunity under Ida-
ho’s Worker’s Compensation Act can apply to

the United States,”), Krinitt’s argument that
statutory employer immunity in this case
would violate the United States and Idaho
Constitutions is also premised on the argu-
ment that the DOI is outside the reach of
Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Act and sim-
ilarly fails.

HB This leaves us with only the second
issue: whether statutory employer immunity
applies to IDFG. There are two categories of
statutory employers. Venters v, Sorrento
Del., Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 249, 108 P.8d 392,
396 (2005). At issue here is the first category.
Statutory employers under the first category
are employers “described in section 72-216,
Idaho Code, having under them contractors
or subcontractors who have in fact complied
with the provisions of section 72-801, Idaho
Code.” LC. § 72-228(1). To identify a statuto-
ry employer under the first category, we first
consider the statutory definition of “employ-
er” found in LC. § 72-102(18)(a). Fuhriman,
143 Idaho at 804, 153 P.8d at 484, There,
“employer” is defined as “any person who
has expressly or impliedly hired or contract-
ed the services of another.” IC. § 72-
102(18)(a). This definition “includes contrac-
tors and subcontractors.” Kolar v. Cassia
Cnty., 142 Idaho 346, 352, 127 P.8d 962, 968
(2005). Essentially, “an employer who makes
use of a contractor’s or subcontractor’s em-
ployees qualifies as a category one statutory
employer and is immune from suits in tort.”
Ewing v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 147 Idaho
305, 807, 208 P.8d 287, 289 (2009).

Here, IDFG qualifies as a category one
statutory employer of Perry. The “Service
Level Agreement” between IDFG and the
DOI clearly shows IDFG contracted with the
DOI to seeure aviation services, That agree-
ment states the DOI “agrees to provide ser-
vices and/or product support as outlined be-
low to the State of Idaho—Idaho Fish and
Game.... The State of Idaho—Idaho Fish
and Game and the Department of Interior
..» have entered into this agreement for the
purpose of establishing aviation ser-
vices....” It is undisputed that Leading
Edge had a contract with the DOI to provide
such services. Based on these facts, Perry’s
employer, Leading Edge, was a subcontrac-
tor of the DOI, and the DOI contracted with

431

IDFG to provide aviation services. Accord-
ingly, Perry was a statutory employee of
IDFG. Jd. (finding that an employee of a
company that was a subcontractor of a com-
pany who had contracted with the Idaho
Transportation Department was a statutory
employee of the Idaho Transportation De-
partment),

C. Whether the district court abused its
discretion in sanctioning IDFG for
failing to comply with its scheduling
order.

HMM The district court entered a schedul-
ing order on February 14, 2018. In that
order, the court imposed a deadline of Janu-
ary 81, 2014, for the filing of any dispositive
motions. IDFG did not bring its summary
judgment motion asserting statutory employ-
er immunity until March 21, 2016, Because
IDFG did not comply with its scheduling
order, the district court entered sanctions
against IDFG under Idaho Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 16().

HH “Upon motion or on its own initia~
tive, the district court may impose sanctions
for failure to obey a scheduling or pre-trial
order.” McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568,
571, 149 P.8d 843, 846 (2006) (citing I.R.C.P.
16(@). Such sanctions “shall require the party
or the attorney representing him or both to
pay the reasonable expenses incurred be-
cause of any noncompliance with this rule,
including attorney’s fees....” L.R.C.P. 16().
“Tt is within the district court’s discretion
whether to impose such sanctions, and we
will not overturn such a decision absent a
manifest abuse of that discretion.” Lepper,
160 Idaho at 109, 369 P.3d at 887.

Here, the facts are pretty straightforward.
IDFG was required by the scheduling order
to bring any dispositive motions by January
81, 2014. As noted above, a motion asserting
an affirmative defense is a dispositive motion
by its very nature. See Fuhriman, 143 Idaho
at 803, 153 P.3d at 483. IDFG did not bring
its motion asserting its affirmative statutory
employer defense until March 21, 2016. This
clearly violated the court’s scheduling order.
As mentioned above, because the filing of the
motion violated the court’s scheduling order,
the district court could have denied the mo-

432

tion entirely, However, noting its discretion
in the matter, the district court cited the
applicable legal principles and imposed a
lesser sanction requiring IDFG to pay Krin-
itt’s “reasonable expenses and attorney fees”
incurred after the January 31, 2014, deadline
for filing dispositive motions. The decision to
set January 31, 2014, as the start date for
sanctions was reasonable as it was the last
day available for IDFG to assert its affirma-
tive defense and still comply with the sched-
uling order. As the district court observed,
IDFG should have known and discovered
their affirmative defense earlier and IDFG
“took a risk in retaining an out-of-state attor-
ney.” There was no excuse for failing to
bring the affirmative defense by the January
81, 2014, deadline, and the district court was
within the bounds of its discretion in impos-
ing sanctions for failure to comply with its
scheduling order. We affirm its decision to do
80.

Iv. CONCLUSION

The district court is affirmed. Because nei-
ther party prevailed on their appeals—Krin-
itt did not prevail on the appeal of summary
judgment and IDFG did not prevail on the
appeal of the imposition of sanctions—each
side will bear its own costs on appeal.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and KIDWELL, J., Pro Tem concur,

398 P.3d 165
Bret D, KUNZ and Marti Kunz, Husband
and Wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v

NIELD, INC., dba Insurance Designers,
an Idaho corporation, Defendants-
Respondents.

Docket No. 48724

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: July 11, 2017

_
wo
_

Steven A. Wuthrich, Montpelier, attorney
for appellant.

Echohawk Law, Pocatello, attorneys for
respondent. Joseph T. Preston argued.

JONES, Justice.
I, Narure or Tar Case

This appeal arises from an agent contract
(the “2009 Contract”) entered into between
Bret Kunz (“Bret”) and Nield, Inc. (“N.I.”)
authorizing Bret to sell insurance on behalf
of N.I. N.I. is owned by two brothers, Bryan
Nield (“Bryan”) and Benjamin Nield. A dis-
pute arose concerning the method and type
of compensation available to Bret under the
2009 Contract, Bret filed a complaint seek-
ing, inter alia, a declaratory judgment inter-
preting the 2009 Contract. The district court
held, inter alia, that the 2009 Contract did
pot provide for profit sharing as Bret
claimed. Bret and his wife, Marti, (collective-
ly, the “Kunzes”) appeal.

IL Facruat anp PRocepuraL BAckGROUND

The crux of this appeal is whether Bret is
entitled to profit sharing payments under the
2009 Contract, and if so, what percentage of
the profit sharing should be distributed to
him. Profit sharing is a unique type of com-
mission that insurance agents earn by meet-

ing certain goals.! If an insurance agent qual-
ifies for profit sharing, the payment is made
the year after it is earned. Ordinary insur-
ance commissions, which are a percentage of
the premiums for new and renewed policies,
are paid monthly.

The business relationship between Bret
and N.I. began in 1996 when the parties
entered into a written contract (the “1996
Contract”) for Bret to sell insurance as a
subcontractor for N.I. As a subcontractor for
N.L, Bret worked under his brother Michael,
who was also a subcontractor for N.I. and
had been since 1982. Pursuant to a contract,
Michael signed with N.I. in 1982, he and N.I.
split his book of business 50/50. While Bret’s
1996 Contract was substantially similar to
Michael’s 1982 Contract, it did not contain a
provision addressing the ownership of the
book of business,

Bret and Michael agreed that Michael
would cover all of the overhead expenses and
Bret would receive the entire 80% monthly
commission to which he was entitled under
the 1996 Contract. Michael did not make any
money from Bret, but received profit sharing
from sales attributable to Bret due to the
fact that Michael owned 50% of the book of
business. According to Bret’s testimony, he
did not expect to receive profit sharing under
his 1996 Contract because that contract did
not address the ownership of the book of
business.

On July 4, 2008, Michael died. Thereafter,
the Kunzes purchased Michael’s insurance
agency and Michael’s share of the business
placed with N.I. from Michael’s surviving
spouse. Around October 2008, Bret and N.I.
began to discuss the need for a new contract
that would include an ownership provision
similar to the ownership provision in Mi-
chael’s 1982 contract. Bret testified that
Bryan brought a draft of the 2009 Contract
to his office that mirrored Michael’s 1982
contract.

1, Within the insurance industry, “profit sharing”
and “contingent commissions” are used inter-
changeably.

2, The bracketed language is the district court’s
paraphrasing of the 2009 Contract language.
N.I’s letterhead is printed over three lines of

435

Sometime around the end of October, or
the beginning of November 2008, Bret signed
a final version of the 2009 Contract. Bret
testified that he did not review the 2009
Contract closely and was not aware that the
language therein was different from the lan-
guage in the draft contract, Bret testified
that at the time he signed the 2009 Contract,
Bryan mentioned that “they had some pretty
good profit sharing checks with [Michael].”
Bret also recalled that between November
2008 and February 2009, Bryan mentioned
the profit sharing checks again, likely in an
attempt to motivate Bret to sell more insur-
ance,

The pertinent provisions of the 2009 Con-
tract are as follows:

(5) Responsibilities of Agent: The agent
is a sub-contractor and as such has respon-
sibility for all expenses related to his or
her business.... Agent is to place all in-
surance business through company. Com-
pany has final underwriting authority for
all business placed.... Agent is responsi-
ble for all premium and return commis-
sions on business placed. When collections
are not on time, deduction may be made
from payment of commissions due. When
the collection is completed the deducted
commission will be paid.

©) Responsibilities of Company: Compa-
ny will maintain contracts with companies
for placing of insurances, Company will do
all billing and accounting functions (except
collections). Agent is personally responsi-
ble for the collection of premiums and
returned commissions on business
placed.... [provide Bret with a commis-
sion check based on agreed percentages on
the 15th of each month, and other func-
tions based upon commission split and indi-
vidual agreement]?

(7) Terms of Compensation: Agent will
receive 80 percent of commissions received
on insurance placed by agent with compa-

paragraph six rendering those lines illegible. The
district court explained that its paraphrasing was
based on an attempt to decipher the blocked
content, the testimony of the parties, and review-
ing other N.I. agent contracts,

436

ny. Company will receive 20 percent of
commission placed by agent with company.
(8) Ownership: This is subject to change,
but only as agreed between Company and
Agent. The agent will own 50% of the book
of business and the company will own 50%
of the book of business.

As previously mentioned, the crux of this
appeal is whether Bret is entitled to profit
sharing under the 2009 Contract. More spe-
cifically, the issue is whether Bret is entitled
to profit sharing for business he wrote with
Gem State Insurance Company (“Gem
State”), Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance
Company (“Farmers Alliance”), Acuity Mutu-
al Insurance Company (“Acuity”), and Allied
Insurance Company (“Allied”). The following
is a summary of payments that N.I. made to
Bret, which the Kunzes allege were profit
sharing payments, In 2009, Bret received his
first alleged profit sharing check from N.I.
for 2008 business done with Gem State.
Bret’s work in 2009 did not qualify for profit
sharing; accordingly, he did not receive an
alleged profit sharing check in 2010. In 2011,
Bret received an alleged profit sharing check
for 2010 business done with Gem State and
Acuity. Bret testified that, at the time he
yeceived the check, he believed the amount
he received was the appropriate percentage
of the profit share. However, he did not have
access to data to enable him to verify that he
received the appropriate amount of the profit
share, He did, however, have access to Gem
State data because he had exclusive control
over the Gem State book of business, In
2012, Bret received an alleged profit sharing
check for 2011 work done with Gem State
and Farmers Alliance. Bret testified that the
profit sharing amount he received for Gem
State business reflected a 50/50 split, but
that the profit sharing for Farmers Alliance
was less than 10% of the 80% he believed he
was owed.

Bryan testified that N.I. does not pay prof-
it sharing or contingent commissions and
characterized the payments made to Bret as
bonuses, Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Bryan conceded that N.I. paid Bret 50% of
the profit sharing that N.I. received from
Gem State, The district court concluded that
the Gem State profit sharing agreement was

an “individual agreement,” which Bryan de-
scribed as follows:

Gem State is a separate issue by itself....
the whole book of business is totally sepa-
rate from ours, Therefore anything that he
would receive as profit sharing is paid
directly to Bret from Gem State.... So
based on the Gem State paying him, since
we own 50 percent of his book of business,
therefore we receive 50 percent of the
profit sharing,

On January 16, 2018, Bret sent Bryan a
letter wherein he argued that the profit shar-
ing split should be the same as the ordinary
commission split, 80% to him, and 20% to
NI. In the letter, Bret conceded that the
profit sharing split “was never addressed in
the contract with [Michael] or me.” On Janu-
ary 22, 2013, Bryan responded to Bret’s let-
ter and agreed that there was nothing in the
2009 Contract addressing the issue. Bryan
explained that “[plrofit sharing is a bonus
based on loss ratios and book of business as
you know. It is not based on commissions.
The reason we have split profit sharing 50/50
is based on ownership, not commissions, and
there are no guarantees on profit sharing.”
Nonetheless, Bryan included a check for 80%
of the profit sharing for Gem State, which
the district court concluded was a “one-time
acquiescence and showing of good faith.”
Bryan testified that he gave Bret the 80%
because it was “not worth the fight for a
couple hundred dollars.”

In April 2018, Bret received a check from
NL for $424 with the notation “Profit Shar-
ing 2012.” On April 17, 2018, Bret emailed
Bryan asking for the “company [the profit
sharing check] came from” and the split
percentage. Additionally, Bret asked for in-
formation regarding the “profit sharing
agreements with all of the companies,” Bret
testified that Bryan never responded to the
email, but that he later learned the check
was for business written with Acuity.

After the initiation of this action, Bret
learned the amount of profit sharing that
N.L received from Acuity between 2009 and
2013 and from Farmers Alliance between
2010 and 2014. Bret argued that he did not
receive the profit sharing to which he was
entitled, considering the amounts received by

N.I. Bret testified that he believes profit
sharing should be calculated as follows:
I would take the total written premium.

So, for example, let’s say the total written

premium with Acuity was [$1200,000. If I

had wrote [$]100,000 of that, then I

would—and let’s say the total contingent

payment was [$]10,000, and my book of
business would have been responsible for

[$15,000 of that, then I would take 80 per-

cent of that [$]5,000.

Conversely, Bryan offered the following tes-
timony to explain N.1’s bonus structure:

[What we do is get together and take any

profits that we’ve earned. And if we decide

to give out bonuses then we decide what—
we take and pay money to the company,
see what is left, and determine what
amount to pay for a bonus to whoever we
feel it is necessary.
Bryan continued, explaining that N.I would
not pay bonuses unless it received profit
sharing from an insurance company.

Bret filed a complaint on November 18,
2018, with two causes of action.’ First, Bret
sought an accounting of all profit sharing,
bonuses, incentives, or unpaid commissions
that he generated, in whole or in part, be-
tween 2008 and 2012. In the event that the
accounting revealed monies due, Bret re-
quested a corresponding judgment, Second,
Bret sought declaratory relief that: (1) the
2009 Contract included bonus commissions
and profit sharing received by N.I. that were
generated by Bret; (2) Bret’s share of the
bonuses or profit sharing was 80% of what he
generated; and (8) N.I. had no interest in life
and health insurance sold by Bret or Marti
and no interest in the health insurance book
of business bought from Michael’s widow.
Bret also requested prejudgment interest on
all sums found properly due and costs and
attorney’s fees.

On December 2, 2018, N.I. filed its answer
and counterclaim alleging that Bret breached
the 2009 Contract by not placing all insur-
ance through N.I.4 Bret sought to subpoena

3, During the course of pre-trial motion practice,
the district court concluded that while not ex-
pressly pleaded, Bret had asserted a claim for
breach of contract in his complaint.

437

the records of Farmers Alliance, Acuity, and
Allied for 2009 through 2012, which N.I. op-
posed via a motion for a protective order.
N.I. also filed a motion for change of venue
and a motion to bifurcate the proceedings.
The district court denied N.I’s motions for a,
protective order and change of venue, but
granted the motion to bifureate, In granting
the motion to bifurcate, the district court
held that the first bifurcated proceeding
would address the merits of the declaratory
relief action, i¢, the interpretation of the
2009 Contract, while the second proceeding
would address the merits of the breach of
contract claims and Bret’s accounting claim.
On November 20, 2014, N.I. voluntarily dis-
missed, without prejudice, its counterclaim
against Bret and stipulated that it had no
interest in life and health insurance sold by
Bret.

On December 8 and 9, 2014, the district
court held a two day bench trial, and on
August 31, 2015, the district court issued its
findings of fact, conclusions of law and mem-
orandum decision. Therein, the district court
concluded as follows: (1) the 2009 Contract
was not integrated and was not intended to
be a final expression of their agreement; (2)
the parties had a separate individual agree-
ment, which was established by their testi-
mony and course of dealing whereby N.1.
paid Bret 50% of the profit sharing received
from Gem State; (8) paragraph six of the
2009 Contract was ambiguous and it could
not be determined whether the parties had a
profit sharing agreement for any insurance
company other than Gem State; (4) the term
“commission” as used in the 2009 Contract
was not defined, and it could not be deter-
mined, based upon a review of extrinsic evi-
dence, that it included profit sharing; (5)
there was no legally enforceable agreement.
whereby Bret was entitled to receive profit
sharing from NI. with respect to Acuity,
Farmers Alliance, or Allied; and (6) the pay-
ments made by N.I. to Bret, which the
4, “N.I. also filed a third party complaint against

Marti Kunz alleging breach of contract. This

claim was later dismissed and the parties stipu-

lated that Marti would be added to Bret’s com-
plaint as a plaintiff.

438

Kunzes allege were profit sharing payments,
were actually gratuitous bonuses.

The Kunzes appeal.

Il. Issurs on APPEAL

1, Whether the district court erred in
interpreting the term “commission.”

2. Whether the district court erred in
interpreting the phrase “other func-
tions.”

8, Whether the district court erred in
characterizing certain payments as
“gratuitous bonuses.”

4, Whether the district court erred in
concluding that the profit sharing pay-
ments related to the Gem State im-
plied in fact contract should be split
50/50.

5. Whether the district court erred in
failing to construe the 2009 Contract
against the drafter, N.I.

6. Whether the district court’s judgment.
‘was erroneous because it failed to ac-
knowledge that the Kunzes prevailed
in part.

7. Whether either party is entitled to at-
torney’s fees on appeal.

IV. Sranparp or Review
HN When considering an appeal of a
trial court’s decision from a bench trial, this
Court’s review is limited as follows:

[Whether the evidence supports the
findings of fact, and whether the findings
of fact support the conclusions of law. A
district court’s findings of fact in a bench
trial will be liberally construed on appeal
in favor of the judgment entered, in view
of the district court’s role as trier of fact.
It is the province of the district judge
acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting
evidence and testimony and to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. We will not
substitute our view of the facts for the
view of the district court. Instead, where
findings of fact are based on substantial
evidence, even if the evidence is conflict-
ing, those findings will not be overturned
on appeal. We exercise free review over
the lower court’s conclusions of law, how-
ever, to determine whether the court cor-

rectly stated the applicable law, and
whether the legal conclusions are sustained
by the facts found.

Pocatello Hosp, LLC v. Quail Ridge Med.
Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 714, 380 P.38d
1067, 1072 (2014) (quoting Clayson v. Zebe,
158 Idaho 228, 232, 280 P.38d 731, 735 (2012)).

WE “Whether a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law over which we exercise free
review.” Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co. Inc,
145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.8d 748, 751 (2007)
(citing Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 189, 142,
106 P.3d 465, 468 (2005)).

V. ANALYSIS

1. The district court did not err in inter-
preting the term “commission.”

The Kunzes argue that the district court
erred in interpreting the term “commission”
by relying on Bryan’s subjective, undisclosed
intent—that the payments were bonuses, not
profit sharing payments—and failed to at-
tribute more significance to the parties’
course of conduct. Specifically, the Kunzes
argue that in interpreting the term “commis-
sion” narrowly, the district court ignored the
following: (1) that N.I. made profit sharing
payments to Bret; and (2) that at the time
the 2009 Contract was signed, Bryan men-
tioned that N.I. had a good profit sharing
arrangement with Michael. Citing Johnson
Cattle Co. v. Idaho First Natl Bank, 110
Idaho 604, 607, 716 P.2d 1876, 1879 (Ct. App.
1986), the Kunzes submit that Bryan’s state-
ment, which was made contemporaneous with
the signing of the 2009 Contract, is material
to the interpretation of the 2009 Contract.

On a somewhat unrelated note, the Kunzes
argue that the district court erred in conclud-
ing that a profit sharing agreement did not
exist for business written with Acuity or
Farmers Alliance. The Kunzes argue that the
only difference between Gem State and the
aforementioned companies is that N.I. had
exclusive control over the accounting infor-
mation for Acuity and Farmers Alliance.

In response, N.I. makes two arguments.
First, N.L. argues that the Kunzes’ argument
fails to consider the fact that the parties’
course of conduct is merely one of several

factors the district court considered in inter-
preting the term “commission.” Second, N.I.
argues that the district court erred in consid-
ering extrinsic evidence, i¢, the parties’
course of conduet, to conclude that an implied
in fact contract existed for Gem State profit
sharing. Specifically, N.I. argues that the
district court erred in making findings con-
cerning the separate agreement because the
legal theory upon which it was based—an
implied in fact contract—was not pleaded by
the Kunzes. Nonetheless, N.I. recognizes
that because the district court ultimately en-
tered judgment in its favor, the error was
“probably harmless.”

HM “A contract term is ambiguous when
there are two different, reasonable interpre-
tations of the language.” Brown v. Greenh-
eart, 157 Idaho 156, 167, 335 P.3d 1, 12 (2014)
(citing Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145
Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.8d 748, 751 (2007). In
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, this Court ex-
plained how a court should interpret an am-
biguous contract.

If the provisions of a contract are ambig-
uous, the interpretation of those provisions
is a question of fact which focuses upon the
intent of the parties. Bream v. Benscoter,
139 Idaho 364, 79 P.38d 723 (2003). The
determination of the parties’ intent is to be
determined by looking at the contract as a
whole, the language used in the document,
the circumstances under which it was
made, the objective and purpose of the
particular provision, and any construction
placed upon it by the contracting parties as
shown by their conduct or dealings. Ramco
v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108,
794 P.2d 1381 (1990); International Eng’g
Co, Ine. v. Dawm Indus. Inc., 102 Idaho
363, 630 P.2d 155 (1981). A party’s subjec-
tive, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the
interpretation of a contract.

144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006).

Hl The term “commission” is ambiguous
because it is not defined by the 2009 Con-
tract and has multiple reasonable definitions
in the insurance industry including monthly
commissions and annual contingent commis-
sions, The parties both proffered a reason-
able definition that, unsurprisingly, best suit-
ed their respective positions. To resolve the

439

ambiguity, the district correctly applied the
factors from Bosen. The district court exam-
ined the 2009 Contract as a whole and the
language used therein and noted that the
term “commission” was used multiple times,
including in the context of monthly payments
with no attempt to import different meanings
between each use of the term. Further, the
district court highlighted the fact that Bret’s
2009 Contract and his 1996 Contract were
nearly identical, and Bret admitted that he
did not expect to receive profit sharing un-
der his 1996 Contract. As for the circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the
2009 Contract, the district court noted that
Bret testified that he entered the 2009 Con-
tract with the expectation that an ownership
provision would be included; therefore, the
district court reasoned that it would be ex-
pected that had profit sharing been contem-
plated by the parties, it would be expressly
provided in the 2009 Contract. Regarding
the parties’ course of conduct, the district
court found that both sides agreed that com-
missions were paid monthly and profit shar-
ing was paid annually. Accordingly, because
there was no attempt to distinguish “com-
mission” in paragraph six (in the context of
monthly payments) from “commission” in
paragraph seven (addressing the compensa-
tion. percentage split), the district court
found that both uses of the term must be
limited to the monthly commission payments,
not annual profit sharing payments. In sum,
substantial and competent evidence supports
the district court’s finding that the term
“commission,” as used in the 2009 Contract,
is limited to monthly commissions and does
not include profit sharing.

The Kunzes’ arguments are unpersuasive.
Bryan’s comments about profit sharing
checks, and the fact that N.I.’s payments to
Bret were labeled “profit sharing” are not
dispositive. The Kunzes are correct in as-
serting that Johnson Cattle Co. Inc. stands
for the proposition that, in interpreting an
ambiguous contract, evidence of an oral
agreement reached prior to the signing of a
contract may be admissible to resolve the
ambiguity. 110 Idaho 604, 607, 716 P.2d
1876, 1879 (Ct. App. 1986). In Johnson Cat-
ule Co., however, the oral agreement was just

440

that: an agreement, Jd. A bank manager
purportedly agreed to finance a loan if the
opposing party was willing to relinquish its
secured position, Jd. Here, however, the
Kunzes rely merely upon a statement made
by Bryan and fail to present evidence that
the parties had reached an oral agreement
regarding profit sharing. Bryan’s statements
are of limited value to the Kunzes’ position
because the Kunzes failed to present evi-
dence that an oral agreement had been
reached,

The Kunzes’ somewhat unrelated argu-
ment—that the district court erred in con-
cluding that an individual profit sharing
agreement did not exist for business written
for Acuity or Farmers Alliance—is meritless.
The Kunzes argue that the only difference
between Gem State and the aforementioned
companies is that N.I. had exclusive control
over the accounting information for Acuity
and Farmers Alliance. The Kunzes’ argu-
ment ignores the basis upon which the dis-
trict court concluded a side agreement exist-
ed, ie, N.I. and Bret, through an exchange
of emails and corresponding payments,
reached an implied in fact contract to split
Gem State profit sharing 50/50. Whether or
not N.I, had exclusive control over certain
accounting information is irrelevant.

Under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(g), a re-
spondent must file a cross-appeal if it seeks
affirmative relief by way of reversal, vaca-
tion, or modification of the judgment. LA.R.
11(g), This Court has clarified, in Walker v,
Shoshone Cnty,, that a cross-appeal is not
required when a respondent “merely seeks to
sustain a judgment for reasons presented at
trial which were not relied upon by the trial
judge but should have been.” 112 Idaho 991,
998, 739 P.2d 290, 292 (1987). Here, N.I. is
seeking the vacation or reversal of the dis-
trict court’s conclusion that an implied in fact,
contract existed for Gem State’s profit shar-
ing. We will not consider N.I.’s claim because
NLL. failed to file a cross-appeal.

2. The district court did not err in inter-
preting the phrase “other functions.”
HM The Kunzes argue that the phrase
“other functions” provides an alternative ba-
5. For the same reason, we will not consider

N.L’s argument that the district court erred in
concluding that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

sis for their entitlement to profit sharing
payments and that the district court erred by
failing to interpret it as such. The Kunzes
note that while the district court concluded
that the phrase “other functions” was ambig-
uous, it failed to resolve the ambiguity. Thus,
the Kunzes reason, the phrase was rendered
“meaningless surplusage.” The Kunzes argue
that, in construing a contract, an interpreta-
tion should be avoided that would render
meaningless any particular provision of the
contract.

N.I. argues that the Kunzes’ assertion is
meritless. N.I. notes that the district court
specifically addressed the phrase and con-
cluded that it had “no place within this docu-
ment other than to notify the reader and the
parties that there are other unexpressed
functions and individual agreements not dis-
cussed and/or outlined in the body of this
document.”

HN The Kunzes premise their argument
on a theory of contract interpretation ad-
vanced by Justice Schroeder in his dissent in
Star Phoenia Min. Co. v, Hecla Min. Co.,
130 Idaho 228, 233, 939 P.2d 542, 552 (1996)
(Schroeder, J., dissenting). Justice Schroeder
quoted a Maine court, stating: “In construing
a contract, an interpretation should be avoid-
ed that would render meaningless any partic-
ular provision in the contract.” Id. While
Justice Schroeder’s approach does not ap-
pear to be adopted as precedent by this
Court, it does mirror a well-recognized ap-
proach to statutory interpretation: “The Su-
preme Court will not construe a statute in a
way which makes mere surplusage of provi-
sions included therein.” Sweitzer v. Dean,
118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990)
(citing Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho
688, 692 P.2d 382 (1984).

The Kunzes’ argument is unpersuasive.
Considering the Bosen factors, there is no
indication that the phrase “other functions”
includes profit sharing, For example, Bret’s
1996 Contract includes the phrase “other

41(b) does not apply to declaratory judgment
actions,

functions”; yet, Bret did not expect profit
sharing under that contract. As for the pur-
pose of the phrase, it notifies a reader that
unexpressed functions, which are the respon-
sibility of N.I, exist. Further, considering
the 2009 Contract as a whole, there is no
mention of profit sharing. It is unreasonable
to assume that “other functions” would some-
how include profit sharing,

8. The district court did not err when it
characterized certain payments as
“gratuitous bonuses.”

HE The Kunzes argue that the district
court erred in concluding that certain pay-
ments from N.L, which related to business
with Acuity, Farmers Alliance, and Allied,
were “gratuitous bonuses.” The Kunzes as-
sert that the only explanation for the district
court's conclusion is that it impermissibly
considered Bryan’s subjective, undisclosed
intent that the payments were bonuses.

N.I, does not dispute the Kunzes’ argu-
ment that a party’s subjective, undisclosed
intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a
contract. Indeed, N.I. argues that the objec-
tive law of contract should be applied when a
contract is unambiguous, However, N.I. as-
serts that the Kunzes’ argument fails be-
cause they attempt to apply the objective law
of contract interpretation to extrinsic evi-
dence, i.e, the checks labeled “profit shar-
ing.” N.I. argues that there is no authority
supporting such an application, Separately,
N.I. asserts that the Kunzes overlook the
reasonable approach by which the district
court reached its conclusion.

The Kunzes’ argument is unpersuasive. In-
explicably, they assert that the district court
must have relied on Bryan’s subjective, un-
disclosed intent in characterizing certain pay-
ments as gratuitous bonuses, Such an asser-
tion ignores the rational process by which the
district court reached its conclusion. The dis-
trict court determined that the term “com-
mission” in the 2009 Contract was ambigu-
ous, applied the Bosen factors, and concluded
that the meaning of “commission” was limit-
ed to monthly commissions. Thus, the district
court held that the 2009 Contract did -not
provide for profit sharing. As discussed
above, this conclusion was correct.

HH Digressing for a moment from the
substantive issues, we feel compelled to ac-
knowledge that this result is not especially
equitable to the Kunzes. N.I. was less than
transparent with Bret regarding its position
on profit sharing. Indeed, N.I. allowed Bret
to operate under the 2009 Contract with the
understanding that he would receive profit
sharing, but did not correct. Bret until litiga-
tion commenced. Despite our discomfort with
the scenario, there is no legal basis upon
which to find that the parties had a legally
enforceable contract regarding profit shar-
ing. “[C]ourts do not possess the roving pow-
er to rewrite contracts in order to make
them more equitable.” Kantor v. Kantor, 160
Idaho 810, 820, 879 P.38d 1080, 1090 (2016)
(quoting Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,
228, 220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009)). Furthermore,
while “[e]quity may intervene to change the
terms of a contract if the court finds uncon-
scionable conduct serious enough to justify
its interference,” the harsh enforcement of
unwise provisions is not proper justification,
Id. Despite our misgivings with the result,
we affirm the district court’s decision.

4, The district court did not err in con-
cluding that profit sharing payments
for Gem State should be split 50/50.

HN The Kunzes assert that the district
court erred by importing the 50/50 ownership
split from the 2009 Contract to the Gem
State implied in fact contract instead of the
80/20 commission split, which was also in the
2009 Contract. They argue that this Court
should “set aside the conclusion that profit
sharing payments are limited to 50/50 where
nothing in the [2009 Contract] supports
that.”

NL. asserts that the district court’s conclu-
sion that the Gem State profit sharing should
be split 50/50 was based on the parties’
course of conduct. Further, N.I. argues that
the Kunzes’ argument that the profit sharing
split should be 80/20 contradicts the district
court’s conclusion that the term “commis-
sion” does not include profit sharing,

The Kunzes’ argument is unpersuasive.
The crux of the Kunzes’ argument is that the
district court erred by importing the incor-

442

reet percentage split from the 2009 Contract
to the implied in fact contract. This position
is undermined by two of the district court’s
findings. First, the district court found that
the profit sharing split for the implied in fact
contract stemmed from the parties’ course of
conduct. Accordingly, the Kunzes’ assump-
tion that the 2009 Contract was the source of
the profit sharing split for the implied in fact
contract is incorrect. Second, the district
court found that the 2009 Contract did not
provide for profit sharing. Thus, it would be
nonsensical for the 2009 Contract to provide
the profit sharing percentage split for the
implied in fact contract.

5. The district court did not err by failing
to construe the 2009 Contract against
the drafter, N.I.

HN The Kunzes argue that the district
court erred by failing to apply the general
rule that written documents, if ambiguous,
should be construed against the drafter.
They assert that the district court found that
there was little evidence demonstrating that
a discussion occurred regarding profit shar-
ing, yet failed to interpret the 2009 Contract
against N.L, the drafter.

In Sinclair Mktg, Inc. v. Siepert, this
Court provided as follows: “If the factfinder
is unable to determine the intentions of the
parties from the factual evidence, then the
ambiguity should be resolved against the
drafter of the contract as a last resort.” 107
Idaho 1000, 1005, n.5, 695 P.2d 385, 390, n.5
(1985). This approach is confirmed by Idaho
Jury Instruction 6.08.8, which states:

Where there is ambiguous language in a
contract, and where the true intent of the
parties cannot be ascertained by any other
evidence, the ambiguity can be resolved by
interpreting the contract against the party
who drafted the contract or provided the
ambiguous language.

LD.J.I. 6.08.8.

The Kunzes’ argument is unavailing be-
cause the ambiguities in the 2009 Contract
were resolved by applying the Bosen factors,
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to interpret
the 2009 Contract against the drafter, N.1.,
because such an approach is only employed
when the intent of the parties cannot be

ascertained by any other evidence. Sinclair
Mktg. Inc., 107 Idaho at 1005, n.5, 695 P.2d
at 890, n.5.

6. The district court did not err by failing
to note in its judgment that the
Kunzes prevailed in part.

HE The Kunzes emphasize that, before
trial, N.I. stipulated that it had no interest in
life or health insurance sold by Bret or his
wife, and no interest in the health insurance
book of business that they purchased from
Michael’s widow. The Kunzes argue that the
district court erred by failing to include this
stipulation into its judgment. They assert
that the district court’s omission is notewor-
thy because it may have an impact on attor-
ney’s fees awarded below. Accordingly, they
ask this Court to order that any final judg-
ment from the district court must incorpo-
rate N.1’s stipulation,

NL. argues that the Kunzes waived this
issue because they did not raise it below and
because they failed to provide legal authority
supporting the assertion, Further, N.I. ar-
gues that the Kunzes’ position on this issue is
inconsistent with their position at a January
21, 2016 hearing, in which Bret objected to
“any amendment.” Lastly, N.I. argues that
the Kunzes’ argument is inconsistent with
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) because
after this appeal, the district court will re-
sume jurisdiction and enter judgment on all
remaining claims.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) ad-
dresses partial judgment upon multiple
claims or involving multiple parties. 1.R.C.P.
54(b). Subsection one of the rule provides as
follows:

When an action presents more than one
claim for relief, whether as a claim, coun-
terclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim
..» the court may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more, but fewer
than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay. Otherwise, any judgment,
however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabili-
ties of fewer than all the parties does not
end the action as to any of the claims or

parties and may be revised at any time

before the entry of a judgment adjudicat-

ing all the claims and all the parties’ rights
and liabilities. In the event the trial court
determines that a partial judgment should

be certified as final under this Rule 54(b),

the court must execute a certificate which

must immediately follow the court’s signa-
ture on the partial judgment and be in
substantially the form found in Appendix

B.

Id.

The district court still has the opportunity
to address the remaining claims and issue a
final judgment. Further, the district court
will have the opportunity to consider the fact
that N.I. stipulated to part of the Kunzes’
complaint before ruling on costs and attor-
ney’s fees. Therefore, the district court did
not err by failing to note that the Kunzes
prevailed in part.

7. Neither party is entitled to attorney’s
fees on appeal.

In their opening brief, the Kunzes’ argu-
ment for attorney’s fees on appeal consists,
in its entirety, as follows: “Appellants should
be awarded their attorney’s fees on appeal.”

N.I. argues that it is entitled to attorney’s
fees and costs on appeal on multiple grounds.
First, N.I. asserts that it is entitled to costs
under Idaho Code section 10-1210. Next, N.I.
argues that it should be awarded attorney’s
fees as the prevailing party under Idaho
Code section 12-120(1) and (8). Lastly, N.I.
asserts that it should be awarded attorney's
fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 be-
cause the Kunzes’ appeal was unreasonable
and lacked foundation,

In Asbury Park, LLC v,. Greenbriar Estate
Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc, this Court re-
viewed a partial judgment that was certified
as final pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 54(b). 152 Idaho 388, 345, 271 P.38d
1194, 1201 (2012). The Court reasoned that it
could not determine the prevailing party, nor
could it award attorney's fees because the
certified judgment did not dispose of all of
the parties’ claims. Jd. The Court instructed
the district court to “take the issue of attor-
ney fees and costs ... into consideration
when it addresses all fees and costs at the

443

conclusion of the case.” Id. at 346, 271 P.8d
at 1202. Similarly, at this time, we cannot
determine a prevailing party, nor can we
award attorney’s fees on appeal, because the
judgment before this Court did not dispose of
all the parties’ claims; namely, Bret’s ac-
counting claim. Nonetheless, we instruct the
district court to consider the issue of attor-
ney’s fees and costs when it addresses all
fees and costs at the conclusion of the case.

VI. Conciusion

We affirm the judgment of the district
court, Attorney’s fees and costs on appeal are
not awarded to either party at this time.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur.

398 P.3d 176
Penny Ann WEYMILLER,
Claimant-Appellant,
v
LOCKHEED IDAHO TECHNOLOGIES,
Employer, and Employers Insurance
of Wausau, Surety, Respondents.

Docket No. 44109

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: July 11, 2017

i
>
>

Penny Weymill
pellant,

Law Office of Kent Day, Meridian, attor-
neys for respondents.

Matthew J. Vook argued,

, Idaho Falls, pro se ap-

JONES, Justice.
I. Narure oF THE CasE

Penny Weymiller (“Weymiller”), a former
employee of Lockheed Idaho Technologies
(“Lockheed”), appeals the Idaho Industrial
Commission’s (the “Commission”) order that
she was not entitled to additional medical
care in relation to her bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome (“CTS”).

II. Facruat anp ProcepuraL BAckGRrounp

In March of 1991, Weymiller began to
develop pain in her wrists. On July 28, 1994,
Weymiller filed a claim with Employers In-
surance of Wausau (“Surety”) asserting that.
she had developed CTS due to data entry
involved in her employment. Surety denied
the claim. On March 1, 2000, Weymiller, then
an employee for Lockheed, filed another
claim. On May 30, 2000, Surety reevaluated
and reversed its previous denial thereby ac-
cepting that Weymiller’s CTS was related to
her work and originally started in 1991.
Weymiller was referred to Dr, R. Timothy
Thurman, M.D. (“Dr, Thurman”), a hand sur-
geon in Idaho Falls. Thereafter, Weymiller
received medical treatment for CTS includ-
ing wrist braces, pain medication, and steroid
injections, On June 6, 2007, Dr. Thurman
performed surgery on Weymiller’s left wrist,
On September 20, 2007, Weymiller was re-
leased to return to work without restrictions.
Weymiller did not seek another appointment
with Dr. Thurman until May of 2012. She
explained why she stopped seeking appoint-
ments with Dr. Thurman as follows:

Well, when I go see Dr. Thurman, there is
nothing he can do except—it’s not like he
can treat me, except for prescription medi-
cine and wrist braces, So the idea that I’m
going to take sick leave or vacation time or
whatever I need to do and spend time and
expense—your [Surety’s] expense going
back to see Dr. Thurman to say that you
have bilateral carpal tunnel. I don’t need
anybody to tell me that, I know that.

Surety investigated Weymiller’s claim be-
cause it had been nearly five years since
Weymiller had been evaluated by Dr. Thur-
man. Surety characterized the five year time
period as a “gap in treatment.” Surety au-
thorized an appointment with Dr. Thurman,
but does not appear to have authorized any
other treatment at that time, including medi-
cation or wrist braces. On October 26, 2012,
Dr. Thurman examined Weymiller. On Janu-
ary 18, 2018, Dr. Thurman conducted a fol-
low-up appointment, He diagnosed Weymil-
ler with intermittent carpal tunnel-type
symptoms and wrote her a prescription for
wrist braces. On August 22, 2018, Weymiller
filed a worker’s compensation complaint

against Surety. Weymiller’s complaint was
assigned to Referee LaDawn Marsters, who
conducted a hearing in Idaho Falls on June
29, 2015. Weymiller represented herself pro
se. The parties presented oral and documen-
tary evidence at the hearing. Following the
hearing, the matter was reassigned to Refer-
ee John C, Hummel.

On February 28, 2016, Referee Hummel
issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusion of
Law, and Recommendation. He concluded
that Weymiller had not proven that she was
entitled to further medical care because she
had not proven, to a reasonable degree of
medical probability, a causal connection be-
tween her ongoing condition and her oceupa-
tional exposure. Referee Hummel reasoned
as follows:

Claimant’s treating physician, Dr. Thur-
man, has not given an opinion, to a degree
of reasonable medical probability, that
Claimant’s recurrent CTS symptoms are
causally related to her workplace exposure
that began in 1991. The Referee has seruti-
nized the medical records of Dr, Thur-
man’s treatment of Claimant. The records
reflect that he consistently diagnosed
Claimant with CTS from 2000 to 2014,
Nowhere in any of those records did Dr,
Thurman state a medical opinion that caus-
ally velated her CTS symptoms to her
accepted occupational exposure. Merely
because Dr. Thurman’s medical records re-
flect an ongoing diagnosis of CTS does not
provide sufficient evidence for Claimant to
meet her burden on medical causation,

This case might have had a different
result if Claimant had deposed Dr. Thur-
man as she initially intended, or, at the
very least, sought a clear causation opinion
from him in writing. As her treating physi-
cian, Dr. Thurman might have been able to
provide a qualified expert medical opinion
as to causation. Such evidence, however, is
not before the Commission, Accordingly,
Claimant has failed to sustain her burden
of proof on causation.

On February 28, 2016, the Commission
issued an order approving, confirming, and
adopting Referee Hummel’s Findings of
Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Recommenda-

446

tion. The Commission concluded that “Claim-
ant has not proven her entitlement to addi-
tional medical care.”

Weymiller appeals,

TL Issuz on APPEAL

1, Did the Commission err in holding that
Weymiller failed to prove her entitle-
ment to additional medical care?

IV. Sranparp or REviEw

HE When this Court reviews a deci-
sion from the Industrial Commission, it
exercises free review over questions of law
but reviews questions of fact only to deter-
mine whether substantial and competent.
evidence supports the Commission’s find-
ings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87,
88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). Substantial
and competent evidence is “relevant evi-
dence which a reasonable mind might ac-
cept to support a conclusion.” Boise Ortho-
pedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins, Fund (In
ve Wilson), 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d
154, 757 (1996).

The Commission’s conclusions on the
credibility and weight of evidence will not
be disturbed unless the conclusions are
clearly erroneous. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot
Co., 182 Idaho 518, 515, 975 P.2d 1178,
1180 (1999). On appeal, this Court is not to
re-weigh the evidence or consider whether
it would have reached a different conclu-
sion from the evidence presented. See
Warden v. Idaho Timber Corp., 182 Idaho
454, 457, 974 P.2d 506, 509 (1999),

Rodriguez v. Consolidated Farms, LLC, 161
Idaho 735, 740, 390 P.38d 856, 861 (2017).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The Commission erred in holding that
Weymiller failed to prove her entitle-
ment to additional medical care,

HN The Commission’s decision is not
supported by substantial and competent evi-
dence. Idaho Code section 72-482(1), codified
as part of Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation
Act, provides as follows:

[T]he employer shall provide for an injured

employee such reasonable medical, surgical

or other attendance or treatment, nurse
and hospital services, medicines, crutches
and apparatus, as may be reasonably re-
quired by the employee’s physician or
needed immediately after an injury or
manifestation of an occupational disease,
and for a reasonable time thereafter.

LC. § 72-482(1). In Rish v, Home Depot,
Inc., we reversed the Commission’s holding
that medical care was unreasonable because
it “was merely palliative and failed to restore
function to any useful degree.” 161 Idaho
702, 705, 390 P.8d 428, 431 (2017). When read
in conjunction with Rish, it becomes clear
that the reasonable treatment required by
Idaho Code section 72-432(1) includes pallia-
tive care, Separately, “an occupational dis-
ease claimant has the burden of proving, to a
reasonable degree of medical probability, a
causal connection between the condition for
which compensation is claimed and occupa-
tional exposure to the substance or condi-
tions which caused the alleged condition.”
Langley v. State, Indus. Special Indem.
Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 786, 890 P.2d 732, 737
(1995) (citing Hagler v. Micron Tech, Inc,
118 Idaho 596, 598, 798 P.2d 55, 57 (1990)).
However, a claimant need not prove causa-
tion if an employer concedes that the occupa-
tional disease was caused by the claimant’s
employment.

Hl Here, Surety denied Weymiller’s 2013
claim for replacement wrist braces because
she did not satisfy her burden of proving a
causal connection between her CTS and oceu-
pational exposure after the “gap in treat-
ment” between 2007 and 2012. This denial
was error for two reasons. First, there was
no “gap in treatment.” The findings adopted
by the Commission note that from 2007 to
2012, Weymiller “continued to wear wrist
braces at night and during the day.” Al-
though Weymiller did not see Dr. Thurman
between 2007 and 2012, her use of wrist
braces, as palliative care, during that time
constituted treatment for her CTS. The wrist
braces did not cure her CTS, but they did
ease her pain.

Second, Dr, Thurman noted at a 2013 ap-
pointment that Weymiller “simply wanted
authorization for new wrist braces.” Weymil-

ler’s claim for replacement wrist braces was
merely a continuation of her CTS claim that
was accepted by Surety on May 30, 2000.
Indeed, she was not contending that she had
some new manifestation of symptoms that
required some different type of treatment,
nor was there evidence of an intervening
injury. Surety conceded that it accepted
Weymiller’s claim on May 30, 2000 based on
an interview with Weymiller in which she
stated that she “first developed symptoms of
[CTS] at work in 1991 and that those symp-
toms have always been present since 1991.”
It is undisputed that she has continuously
had symptoms of CTS since 1991. According-
ly, because Surety conceded that Weymiller’s
CTS was caused by her employment and she
has continuously had symptoms of CTS since
then without an intervening injury, she need
not prove causation. The Commission erred
in requiring Weymiller to do so in order to
obtain replacement braces.

In sum, the Commission’s failure to consid-
er palliative care in the form of wrist braces
as treatment is contrary to our holding in
Rish, The Commission misapplied the law
and there was sufficient uncontradicted evi-
dence to support Weymiller’s claim for re-
placement braces.

VI. Conciusion

This Court reverses the Commission’s de-
cision. Costs to Weymiller.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justice
EISMANN concur.

HORTON, J., concurring.

I join in the Court’s opinion. I write sepa-
rately to caution practitioners that this deci-
sion has limited precedential value because
this Court is not retreating from the well-
established line of authority holding that
“(t]he claimant’s burden is to prove to a
reasonable degree of medical probability that
the injury she claims benefits for is causally
related to an accident occurring in the course
of employment” and “[t]he claimant must
prove causation by expert medical testimo-
ny.” Shubert v. Macy’s W., Inc., 158 Idaho
92, 100, 348 P.8d 1099, 1107 (2015), overruled

447

on other grounds by Chavez v. Stokes, 158
Idaho 798, 353 P.3d 414 (2015).

In my view, our decision is grounded in no
small part by the unreasonable position ad-
vocated by Respondent. The discussion be-
tween Respondents’ counsel and Justice
Brody, regarding the Surety’s previous ac-
ceptance of Weymiller’s CTS claim in 2000
without supporting medical evidence regard-
ing causation, illustrates my point. Counsel
indicated that Surety frequently accepts
claims without supporting medical evidence
of causation in order to quickly provide
claimants benefits “without always having to
jump through the hoops.” Given Weymiller’s
long-standing CTS symptomology, Justice
Brody asked the reasonable follow-up ques-
tion,

JUSTICE BRODY: Why are we making

her jump through the hoops today?

RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL: I think it

was always our right to be able to make

her jump through the hoops.

To the extent that lessons may be drawn
from today’s decision, they are: (1) this Court
takes to heart the proposition that the Idaho
Worker’s Compensation Act is intended to
provide sure and certain relief to an injured
worker; and (2) therefore, this Court will not
assist a Surety in its insistence on the right
to unreasonably deny medical service, includ-
ing palliative care, to which a claimant is
manifestly entitled.

Justice BRODY concurs

398 P.3d 180

CHANDLER’S-BOISE LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No, 44211

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: July U1, 2017

Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, attorneys for
appellant, Peter Barton argued.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, attorneys for respondent.
Erick Shaner argued.

JONES, Justice.
I. Nature or tHe Case

Chandler’s-Boise, LLC (“Chandlers”),
challenges a district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment upholding the Idaho State
Tax Commission’s (the “Commission”) defi-
ciency determination, The Commission deter-
mined that Chandlers did not pay sales tax
on gratuities that were automatically added
to customer checks between 2007 and 2010.
Chandlers appeals.

IL, Facruan anD ProcepurAL BACKGROUND

This is a sales tax appeal, and the facts are
uncontested, The crux of the appeal concerns
an administrative rule and its interaction
with certain sections of the Idaho Sales Tax
Act (the “Tax Act”), Idaho Code title 63,
chapter 36. The Legislature amended the
Tax Act in the midst of the underlying litiga-
tion (the “2011 Amendment”). The following
is a review of relevant portions of the Tax
Act, the administrative rule, and the 2011
Amendment.

Idaho Code section 68-3619 imposes a tax
upon “each sale at retail at the rate of six
percent (6%) of the sales price.” IC. § 63-
3619. A “sale” is defined by Idaho Code
section 63-8612(1) as follows:

449

pe term “sale” means any transfer of
title, exchange or barter, conditional or
otherwise, of tangible personal property
for a consideration and shall include any
similar transfer of possession found by the
state tax commission to be in lieu of, or
equivalent to, a transfer of title, exchange
or barter.

LC. § 63-8612(1). Idaho Code section 63-
3612(2)(b) provides that a “sale” also includes
“[flurnishing, preparing, or serving food,
meals, or drinks and nondepreciable goods
and services directly consumed by customers
included in the charge: thereof.” I.C. § 63-
3612(2)(b).

Idaho Code section 63-3613(a) defines
“sales price” as the “total amount for which
tangible personal property, including services
agreed to be rendered as a part of the sale, is
sold.” IC. § 68-8618(a). However, Idaho
Code section 63-3618(b) excludes certain
charges from the “sales price” thereby ren-
dering said charges tax-exempt. There are
two exclusions that Chandlers contends are
relevant to this appeal.

First, subsection (b)(4), as it. existed in
2010, exempts the following charges from the
“sales price”:

The amount charged for labor or ser-
vices rendered in installing or applying the
property sold, provided that said amount is
stated separately and such separate state-
ment is not used as a means of avoiding
imposition of this tax upon the actual sales
price of the tangible personal property;
except that charges by a manufactured
homes dealer for set up of a manufactured
home shall be included in the “sales price”
of such‘manufactured home,

LC. § 63-8618(b)(4) (2010). Second, subsec-
tion (b)(6) excludes; “The amount charged for
finance charges, carrying charges, service
charges, time-price differential, or interest on
deferred payment sales, provided such
charges are not used as a means of avoiding
imposition of this tax upon the actual sales
price of the tangible personal property.” 1.C.
§ 63-8613(b)(6).

There is also a tax commission rule that is
at issue in this case. The 2010 version of

450

IDAPA Rule 35.01.02.043.04.c (the “Pre-2011
Rule”) provided as follows:

When an amount is added to a custom-
ex’s bill by the retailer, and the customer is
not advised in writing on the face of the
bill that he may decline to pay all or part
of the amount, it is not a gratuity and the
fee so added is subject to the sales tax.

IDAPA 35.01.02.043.04.c (2010). As previous-
ly mentioned, the Tax Act was amended by
the Legislature in 2011. The 2011 Amend-
ment added the following exemption to Ida-
ho Code section 63-3618: “Sales price shall
not include a gratuity or tip received when
paid to the service provider of a meal. The
gratuity or tip can be either voluntary or
mandatory, but must be given for the service
provided and as a supplement to the service
provider’s income.” LC. § 63-3613(f). By
adding this exemption, the Legislature did
away with the voluntariness distinction in
the Pre-2011 Rule. Accordingly, the Tax
Commission revised the Pre-2011 Rule to
provide: “When a gratuity is paid in addition
to the price of a meal, no sales tax applies to
the gratuity. A gratuity can be paid volun-
tarily by the customer or be required by the
seller.” IDAPA 35.01.02.043.04.

Chandlers owns and operates a steak and
seafood restaurant in downtown Boise, Ida-
ho. The Commission, through its Sales, Use,
and Miscellaneous Tax Audit Bureau (the
“Bureau”), conducted a comprehensive sales
audit of Chandlers for the period of May 1,
2007, through May 31, 2010 (the “Audit Peri-
od”), to determine sales tax law compliance.
After its audit, the Bureau asserted errors in
sales, fixed asset additions, ordinary pur-
chases, and meals given to employees and
guests. The only error relevant to this appeal
is Chandlers’ failure to pay sales tax on
automatically added gratuities! that were
added to banquet meals, room service meals,
and restaurant dining services for groups
having six or more persons (the “Charges”).
The bills that Chandlers gave its customers
during the Audit Period did not contain a
written statement indicating that the
Charges could be declined as required by the
1, The term “gratuities” is a misnomer in this

context because, according to the Pre-2011 Rule,
an amount automatically added to a customer's

Pre-2011 Rule. Chandlers did not retain the
Charges in question; rather, the employees
involved in preparing or providing the meals,
including the server, busser, and bartender,
kept the Charges.

On June 18, 2010, the Bureau issued a
Notice of Deficiency Determination to Chan-
ders wherein it determined that Chandlers
owed $91,248 for sales and use tax plus pen-
alty and interest. On August 20, 2010, Chan-
dlers timely protested the deficiency and
filed a Petition for Redetermination of Notice
of Deficiency Determination to the Commis-
sion. At that time, Chandlers provided addi-
tional documentation for the Bureau’s review.
After reviewing the documentation, the Bu-
reau modified the audit findings and reduced
Chandlers’ liability.

On July 14, 2015, the Commission upheld
the Bureau’s determination that the Charges
were subject to sales tax and concluded that
Chandlers owed $52,167, less $9,748 that had
already been paid. On October 18, 2015,
Chandlers filed a Complaint for Judicial Re-
view and Redetermination of Tax with the
district court challenging the Commission’s
updated Notice of Deficiency Determination.
On March 1, 2016, both parties filed motions
for summary judgment.

On April 7, 2016, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Commis-
sion thereby affirming the deficiency deter-
mination. In its summary judgment order,
the district court explained that the Pre-2011
Rule was in effect during the entire Audit
Period. The district court noted that the
parties agreed that Chandlers added the
Charges to customers’ bills without writing
on the face of the bills that the Charges may
be declined. The district court held that,
according to relevant law in effect at the time
of the Audit Period, sales tax must be paid
on the Charges. The district court acknowl-
edged that Idaho Code section 63-3613 was
amended in 2011 to exempt gratuities, wheth-
er voluntary or mandatory, from being taxed.
as part of the “sales price.” However, the
district court held that the 2011 Amendment
did not affect the Commission’s deficiency

bill without notice that it may be declined “is not
a gratuity.” IDAPA 35.01.02.043.c (2010).

determination because it was not retroactive
to the Audit Period. The district court did
not address attorney's fees or costs. A corre-
sponding judgment was entered on April 8,
2016.

Chandlers appeals.

Il. Issues on APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred by
determining that Idaho Code sections
63-8618(b)(4) and (b)(6) did not apply
to this case,

2. Whether the district court erred by
determining that the 2011 Amendment
did not clarify or reflect the state of
the statute as it existed all along.

8. Whether the Commission is entitled to
costs and attorney’s fees below and/or
on appeal.

IV. Sranparp or Review

HI A taxpayer may appeal a decision
by the Tax Commission to the district
court by filing a complaint against the Tax
Commission in the district court pursuant
to Idaho Code section 63-3049. The case
proceeds as a de novo bench trial in the
district court. This Court reviews the dis-
trict court’s decision directly, and utilizes
the Tax Commission’s administrative de-
termination as merely an articulation of
the position of the Tax Commission as a
party to the action.

HMM This Court reviews the district
court’s grant of summary judgment under
the same standard employed by the dis-
trict court. The fact that the parties have
filed cross-motions for summary judgment
does not change the applicable standard of
review, and this Court must evaluate each
party’s motion on its own merits. Summary
judgment is proper if the pleadings, depo-
sitions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Because the
ease proceeds as a de novo bench trial in
front of the district court, the district
court, as the trier of fact, is entitled to
arrive at the most probable inferences
based upon the undisputed evidence prop-

451

erly before it and grant the summary judg-
ment despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences. This Court freely reviews the
entire record that was before the district
court to determine whether either side was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and whether the inferences drawn by the
district court are reasonably supported by
the record.

Gracie, LLC v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 149

Idaho 570, 572, 287 P.8d 1196, 1198 (2010)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

V. ANALysIS

A. The district court did not err by deter-
mining that the exemptions set forth
in Idaho Code sections 63-3613(b)(4)
and (b)(6) did not apply to this case.

HM Chandlers argues that the Charges
are tax-exempt because they are excluded
from the “sales price” by Idaho Code sec-
tions 63-3618(b)(4) and (b)(6). Chandlers as-
serts that the district court erred by narrow-
ly construing the exclusions in a way that
categorically excluded the Charges from tax-
exemption,

In a related argument, Chandlers asserts
that the district court erred in relying upon
the Pre-2011 Rule in finding that the
Charges were subject to sales tax. Chandlers
asserts that the Pre-2011 Rule conflicts with
IDAPA Rule 35.01.02.11.02(c) (Rule 11”),
Rule 11 provides that when the transfer of
tangible personal property and the perform-
ance of a service are both consequential ele-
ments of a transaction—a “mixed transac-
tion”—the former is subject to sales tax, and
the latter is not.

The Commission argues that the district
court properly held that the exclusions in
Idaho Code section 63-3618(b) do not apply
to this case. The Commission makes three
arguments to support its position. First, the
Commission argues that Chandlers’ interpre-
tation of Idaho Code section 68-8613(b)(4) is
nonsensical and stifles the true meaning of
the section because a plain reading of the
statute makes clear that it does not apply to
restaurant tips, fees, or service charges, Sec-
ond, the Commission asserts that when sub-
section (b)(6) is read as a whole, it becomes

452

clear that the term “service charges” is not
intended to include restaurant related
charges. Third, the Commission asserts that
Chandlers’ argument relating to Rule 11 is
misplaced. The Commission explains that
Rule 11 states that sales tax is applied to
services “stated above.” Included in the ser-
vices “stated above” is the “[flurnishing, pre-
paring or serving food, meals or drinks.”
Thus, the Commission argues that the plain
language of Rule 11 subjects services related
to providing a restaurant meal to sales tax,

In Jayo Dev, Inc. v. Ada Cnty, Bd. of
Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 845 P.8d 207
(2015), this Court reiterated the standard
applied to statutory interpretation:

The objective of statutory interpretation
is to give effect to legislative intent. Such
intent should be derived from a reading of
the whole act at issue. Statutory interpre-
tation begins with the literal words of the
statute, and this language should be given
its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If
the statutory language is unambiguous, the
clearly expressed intent of the legislative
body must be given effect, and there is no
oceasion for a court to consider rules of
statutory construction, This is because
[t]he asserted purpose for enacting the
legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.

Id, at 152, 345 P.8d at 211 (alteration in
original) (quoting Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v.
Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 187 Idaho
180, 184-85, 885 P.3d 25, 29-80 (2014).

As previously mentioned, Idaho Code sec-
tion 68-8618(b) renders certain charges tax-
exempt by excluding them from the “sales
price.” Subsection (b)(4) excludes the follow-
ing charges from the “sales price”:

The amount charged for labor or ser-
vices rendered in installing or applying the
property sold, provided that said amount is
stated separately and such separate state-
ment is not used as a means of avoiding
imposition of this tax upon the actual sales
price of the tangible personal property;
except that charges by a manufactured
homes dealer for set up of a manufactured.
home shall be included in the “sales price”
of such manufactured home.

2, Onc of the “sale of services ... stated above’
is: “Furnishing, preparing or serving food, meals

LC. § 68-3618(b)(4) (2010). Subsection (b)(6)
exempts the following charges from the
“sales price’: “The amount charged for fi-
nance charges, carrying charges, service
charges, time-price differential, or interest on
deferred payment sales, provided such
charges are not used as a means of avoiding
imposition of this tax upon the actual sales
price of the tangible personal property.” IC,
§ 63-3618(b)(6).
The 2010 version of Rule 11 provided as
follows, in pertinent part:
Retail Sales of Tangible Personal Property
Together with Services.
The sales tax applies to retail sales of
tangible personal property. It does not ap-
ply to the sale of services except as stated
above, However, when a sale of tangible
personal property includes incidental ser-
vices, the tax applies to the total amount
charged, including fees for any incidental
services except separately stated transpor-
tation and installation fees, The fact that
the charge for the tangible personal prop-
erty results mainly from the labor or erea-
tivity of its maker does not turn a sale of
tangible personal property into a sale of
services. The cost of any product includes
labor and manufacturing skill... .

IDAPA 35.01.02.11.02 (2010) (emphasis add-
ed).

Chandlers’ arguments are meritless. The
plain language of subsections (b)(4) and (b)(6)
indicate a narrow application and do not ren-
der the Charges tax-exempt. Subsection
(b)(4) narrowly targets service charges relat-
ed to contractors. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the fact that the subsection men-
tions charges related to the setting up of a
manufactured home, This interpretation is
bolstered by IDAPA Rule 35.01.02.014, titled
“Contractors/Retailers.” It provides that an
over-the-counter sale of an appliance such as
a stove or refrigerator is taxed, but an instal-
lation charge related to the sale, if properly
separated, is not taxed. IDAPA
85.01.02.014.06, Subsection (b)(6) specifically
exempts charges related to the financial in-
dustry and does not apply to restaurant re-

or drinks for compensation.” IDAPA

35.01,02.011.01.c (2010).

lated charges. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the legal maxim noscitur a soctis,
“which means ‘a word is known by the com-
pany it keeps.” State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho
868, 867, 264 P.38d 970, 974 (2011) (quoting
State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 821, 10
P.8d 1285, 1290 (2000). In light of subsection
(b)(6)’s_ exemption of technical financial
charges, it would be unreasonable to broaden
the term “service charges” to include restau-
rant related charges. For the foregoing rea-
sons, neither subsection (b)(4), nor subsection
(b)(6) renders the Charges tax-exempt.

Chandlers’ argument that the Pre-2011
Rule should not be relied upon due to its
conflict with Rule 11 is meritless. Rule 11
exempts certain consequential service
charges from sales tax. Crucially, though,
Rule 11 provides that sales tax is applied to
sales including the “(flurnishing, preparing
or serving [of] food, meals or drinks for
compensation.” IDAPA  35,01.02.011.01.c
(2010). Thus, the Pre-2011 Rule and Rule 11
do not conflict because both result in the
taxation of services related to providing a
restaurant meal.

B. The district court did not err by deter-
mining that the 2011 Amendment
changed the statute rather than clari-
fying or reflecting the state of the
statute as it existed all along.

WM Chandlers’ argument that the 2011
Amendment clarified the meaning of the stat-
ute as it existed all along can be distilled to
three main points. First, Chandlers asserts
that the legislative history of the 2011
Amendment indicates that the Pre-2011
Rule’s unnecessary distinction between vol-
untary and mandatory gratuities was the im-
petus for the 2011 Amendment. Chandlers
notes that the House Revenue and Taxation
Committee minutes include the following:
“(This legislation adds language to the stat-
ute to clarify that the sales price does not
include a gratuity or a tip when serving
meals, and therefore, is not taxed.” Similarly,
the Senate Local Government and Taxation
Committee minutes include the following:
“This bill adds language to clarify and make
consistent that the sales price should not
include gratuity for serving meals and there-

453

fore is not subject[ ] to sales tax.” Chandlers
argues that the foregoing legislative history
demonstrates that the Pre-2011 Rule’s mis-
placed distinction between voluntary and
mandatory gratuities was the impetus for the
2011 Amendment.

Second, Chandlers requests that this Court
apply the substance of the 2011 Amendment
to the Audit Period even though the amend-
ment contains a retroactive effective date of
January 1, 2011. Chandlers asserts that Ida-
ho courts have applied the substance of a
“clarificatory” statutory amendment to cir-
cumstances predating an amendment’s effec-
tive date. In support of its assertion, Chan-
dlers relies predominantly upon Stonecipher
v. Stonecipher, 181 Idaho 781, 968 P.2d 1168
(1998), for the proposition that legislative
clarifications merely further describe stat-
utes as they already existed at the time of
enactment notwithstanding a stated effective
date that is later than the events in question.

Third, Chandlers asserts that the 2011
Amendment’s January 1, 2011 retroactive ef-
fective date “does not mean that the pre-
Amendment Idaho Code [section] 63-
8613(b)(4) and/or (6) did not already incorpo-
rate or otherwise encompass this concept.”
In support of its position, Chandlers quotes
the following from Sutherland on Statutory
Construction:

An amendment’ which in effect construes

and clarifies a prior statute must be ac-

cepted as the legislative declaration of the
meaning of the original act, where the
amendment was adopted soon after the
controversy arose concerning the proper
interpretation of the statute. This has led
courts to logically conclude that an amend-
ment was adopted to make plain what the
legislation had been all along from the time
of the statute’s original enactment.
Chandlers argues that the 2011 Amendment
clarifies what the Legislature meant in enact-
ing Idaho Code section 68-8613(b)(4) and
(b)(6) in the first-place, i.¢., gratuities such as
the Charges are not subject to sales tax,

The Commission raises three points. First,
the Commission argues that the 2011
Amendment is retroactive only to January 1,
2011. For support, the Commission cites
Jayo Dev. Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Bqualiza-

454

tion, 158 Idaho 148, 845 P.8d 207 (2014),
wherein this Court denied a plaintiff's argu-
ment that a statutory amendment served to
clarify the Legislature’s earlier intent as it
existed all along. This Court stated: “Had the
legislature wished for the amendment to ap-
ply retroactively to the 2012 tax year, the
legislature could have done so. It did not.”
Id, at 154, 345 P.8d at 218, The Commission
likens the case at hand to Jayo Development
Inc, and argues that had the Legislature
wished for the 2011 Amendment to relate
back any further than January 1, 2011, it
would have done so.

Second, the Commission asserts that
Chandlers’ argument that the 2011 Amend-
ment strengthened or clarified the law as it
existed all along is meritless. To begin, the
Commission asserts that the 2011 Amend-
ment did not clarify the existing law, but
changed the law by creating a narrow ex-
emption that did not previously exist, i.¢., the
restaurant owner’s income is distinguished
from the server’s income. The Commission.
argues that this new exemption illustrates
that the law was changed by the 2011
Amendment, not clarified. Similarly, the
Commission argues that the Legislature’s ap-
proval of the Commission’s revisions to IDA-
PA Rule 35.01.02.043.04 (the “Post-2011
Rule”) illustrates that the 2011 Amendment
changed the law instead of clarifying it. The
Commission notes that the Post-2011 Rule
added new requirements for service charges
to be tax-exempt, namely: tips must be addi-
tional income to the base wages of the ser-
ver; tips cannot be used to artificially lower
the cost of the meal to avoid sales tax; and
the tips cannot go to managers or owners
unless they are directly involved with provid-
ing the meal. Next, the Commission address-
es Chandlers’ argument that the 2011
Amendment was aimed at correcting an in-
consistency created by the Pre-2011 Rule.
The Commission concedes that, generally
speaking, services are not subject to sales tax
under the Tax Act, but claims that some
services are still taxable, eg., prior to 2011,
services related to “[flurnishing, preparing,
or serving food, meals, or drinks” were
taxed. Thus, the Commission argues that the
2011 Amendment could not be solely aimed
at correcting the Pre-2011 Rule because the

Pre-2011 Rule was consistent with the plain
language of Idaho Code sections 63-3619, -
8612, and -8613 as they existed prior to the
2011 Amendment. Turning to Chandlers’ reli-
ance on Sutherland on Statutory Construc-
tion, the Commission notes that although the
treatise provides that an amendment that
clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as a
declaration of the meaning of the original act,
the treatise also provides that “[aln amend-
ment of an unambiguous statute indicates an
intent to change the law.”

Third, and finally, the Commission argues
that the 2011 Amendment must be narrowly
construed against Chandlers. The Commis-
sion cites Jayo Development, Inc. for the
proposition that “{s]tatutes granting tax ex-
emptions are strictly construed against the
taxpayer and in favor of the State’ ... Fur-
ther, tax exemptions are to be ‘narrowly
construed’ and the ‘taxpayer must show a
clear entitlement to an exemption, as an ex-
emption will never be presumed,’ ” 158 Idaho
at 151, 345 P.8d at 210 (quoting Ada Cnty.
Ba. of Equalization v. Highlands, Inc., 141
Idaho 202, 206, 108 P.3d 349, 353 (2004). The
Commission argues that to interpret the 2011
Amendment to apply before its clearly ex-
pressed retroactive effective date, January 1,
2011, is contrary to the plain words of the
amendment and is not a narrow interpreta-
tion strictly construed against the taxpayer.

The objective of statutory interpretation
is to give effect to legislative intent. Such
intent should be derived from a reading of
the whole act at issue. Statutory interpre-
tation begins with the literal words of the
statute, and this language should be given
its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If
the statutory language is unambiguous, the
clearly expressed intent of the legislative
body must be given effect, and there is no
oceasion for a court to consider rules of
statutory construction. This is because
[tIhe asserted purpose for enacting the
legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.

Jayo Development, Inc., 158 Idaho at 152,
845 P.8d at 211 (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty.
Ba. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85,
885 P.8d 25, 29-80 (2014).

This Court has set forth a number of
rules in determining whether or not a tax-
payer is entitled to an exemption. Namely,
[t]ax exemptions are disfavored generally,
perhaps because they seem to conflict with
principles of fairness—equality and unifor-
mity—in bearing the burdens of govern-
ment. Thus, [s]tatutes granting tax exemp-
tions are strictly construed against the
taxpayer and in favor of the State. Fur-
ther, tax exemptions are to be narrowly
construed and the taxpayer must show a
clear entitlement to an exemption, as an
exemption will never be presumed.

Id. at 151, 345 P.8d at 210 (alterations in
original) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).

Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 181 Idaho 781,
968 P.2d 1168 (1998), involved a mother’s
attempt to collect unpaid child support pay-
ments from her children’s father in 1995 via a
motion for an order to show cause. The stat-
ute at issue was enacted in 1988 and provid-
ed: “An action or proceeding to collect child
support arrearages accrued under a support
order must be commenced within five (5)
years after the child reaches the age of ma-
jority or within five (6) years after the child’s
death, if death occurs before the child reach-
es majority.” LC, § 5-245 (1988). A 1995
amendment to the statute added the follow-
ing sentence: “An action or proceeding under
this section shall include, but is not limited
to, execution on the judgment, order to show
cause, garnishment, income withholding, in-
come tax offset or lottery prize offset.” I.C.
§ 5-245 (1995). This Court reasoned that the
original purpose of the 1988 version of the
statute was to benefit the mother and held
that the 1995 amendment “simply clarified
the language of the original statute by pro-
viding a list, though non-exhaustive, of terms
to be encompassed by ‘an action or proceed-
ing to collect child support arrearages.’” Sto-
necipher, 181 Idaho at 785, 963 P.2d at 1172.
Accordingly, the 1995 amendment was inter-
preted as clarifying the law as it was all
along. Notably, the 1995 amendment did not
include a retroactive effective date. I.C. § 5-
245 (1995).

The 2011 Amendment did not merely clari-
fy Idaho Code section 68-8618 as it existed

455

all along; rather, it changed the law. This
Court has held that when the Legislature
amends a statute, it must be presumed that
the Legislature intended the statute to have
a different meaning from the pre-amendment
version. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v.
Bad. of Cnty. Commrs of Madison Cty., 109
Idaho 685, 687, 710 P.2d 595, 597 (1985).
Moreover, the inclusion of a retroactive effec-
tive date indicates that the Legislature in-
tended the 2011 Amendment to take effect
from that date forward, This Court has held
that statutory amendments are not retroac-
tive unless expressly so declared. A & B Irv.
Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 153 Idaho
500, 508, 284 P.3d 225, 288 (2012). It stands
to reason that a statute with a retroactive
effective date cannot be applied to events
prior thereto. Further, interpreting the 2011
Amendment to have effect to dates predating
the retroactive effective date, i¢, the Audit
Period, would conflict with this Court’s in-
struction to construe tax exemptions narrow-
ly. Jayo Dev, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of
Equalization, 158 Idaho at 151, 345 P.8d at
210.

Chandlers’ assertion that the 2011 Amend-
ment was aimed at correcting the inconsis-
tency created by the Pre-2011 Rule is unper-
suasive. Chandlers cites to House and Senate
committee minutes for support; however,
these minutes actually undercut Chandlers’
argument. The minutes indicate that the pur-
pose of the 2011 Amendment was to clarify
and make consistent that the sales price
should not include the gratuity for serving
meals. As previously discussed, sales price is
defined by Idaho Code section 63-3613, to-
gether with the incorporation of Idaho Code
section 63-3612(2)(b). Thus, Idaho Code sec-
tions 63-3613, and -3612(2)(b), not the Pre-
2011 Rule, were the target of the 2011
Amendment.

Chandlers’ assertion that the 2011 Amend-
ment clarified what the Legislature meant in
enacting Idaho Code section 63-3618 all along
is similarly unpersuasive. Chandlers’ refer-
ence to Sutherland on Statutory Construction
is not helpful to its position. Sutherland on
Statutory Construction provides that a statu-
tory amendment that clarifies a prior statute
must be accepted as a declaration of the

456

meaning of the original statute only “where
the amendment was adopted soon after the
controversy arose concerning the proper in-
terpretation of the statute.” 1A Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 22:31 (7th ed.). Be-
cause the alleged “clarificatory” 2011 Amend-
ment was adopted nearly twenty years after
the issuance of the Pre-2011 Rule and not
“goon after the controversy arose concerning
the proper interpretation of the statute,” the
2011 Amendment did not clarify the Tax Act
as it existed all along, but rather changed the
Tax Act,

Lastly, Chandlers’ reliance on Stonecipher
is misplaced, Chandlers cites Stonecipher for
the proposition that a legislative clarification
merely further describes a statute as such
already existed at the time of its enactment
notwithstanding a stated effective date that
is later than the events in question, Stoneci-
pher can be distinguished from this case
because the amendment at issue in Stoneci-
pher was truly a clarification, The Stoneci-
pher amendment did not change the original
purpose of the statute because, both before
and after the amendment, the purpose was to
allow the mother to collect child support
payments. 131 Idaho at 735, 963 P.2d at 1172.
Conversely, the 2011 Amendment changed
the purpose of the Tax Act in part, Prior to
the 2011 Amendment, the purpose of the Tax
Act, in part, was to tax “services agreed to
be rendered as part of the sale” and charges
associated with “[flurnishing, preparing, or
serving food, meals or drinks.” 1.C. §§ 63-
3618(a); -8612(2)(b). To that end, the Pre-
2011 Rule taxed mandatory gratuities as ser-
vice charges. The 2011 Amendment changed
the purpose of the Tax Act by rendering a
large swath of service charges, including
mandatory gratuities, tax-exempt, Further,
the 2011 Amendment included a clear retro-
active effective date, which signaled that the
Jaw had been changed and that such change
would take effect from the retroactive effec-
tive date, January 1, 2011, forward. See Jayo
Dev. Inc, v. Ada Cnty, Bd. of Equalization,
158 Idaho 148, 154, 845 P.8d 207, 218 (2015).
For the foregoing reasons, the district court
did not err in rejecting Chandlers’ argument
that the 2011 Amendment clarified the Tax
Act as it existed all along.

C. The Commission is entitled to costs
and attorney’s fees on appeal.

As a preliminary matter, the Commission
requests costs and attorney’s fees at the
district court level pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(e). Separately, the Com-
mission requests costs and attorney’s fees on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35,
40, and 41, as well as Idaho Code section 12-
117(1) and (2), Idaho Code section 12-121,
and Idaho Code section 63-3049(d). The Com-
mission asserts that Chandlers’ arguments
are inconsistent with the interpretation and
application of the law in place during the
Audit Period.

Chandlers argues that the Commission
waived its right to costs and attorney’s fees
at the district court level by failing to timely
and properly request fees and costs below.
Further, Chandlers asserts that the Commis-
sion did not file a memorandum of costs
within fourteen days of the district court’s
judgment as required by Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(4), which provides that
“(failure to timely file a memorandum of
costs is a waiver of the right to costs,”

Chandlers argues that the Commission’s
request for costs and attorney’s fees on ap-
peal under Idaho Code sections 12-117 and
12-121 must be denied because this Court
has held that where the Legislature includes
a specific standard for attorney's fees in a
particular statute, that statute provides the
exclusive basis for fees.

Regarding the Commission’s request pur-
suant to Idaho Code section 63-3049(d),
Chandlers argues that its position was not
frivolous or groundless because: (1) the statu-
tory language at issue here is different from
the statutory language in Jayo Development
Ine.; (2) the case law relating to the Legisla-
ture’s power to clarify a statute “does not
appear to have been applied in this precise
context”; and (8) its arguments result from
differing interpretations of the statutory lan-
guage and the interpretative weight of the
2011 Amendment. In sum, Chandlers argues
that costs and attorney’s fees on appeal are
not warranted under these circumstances.

Hl “(Whhere two statutes appear to ap-
ply to the same case or subject matter, the
specific statute will control over the more
general statute.” State v. Barnes, 188 Idaho
878, 382, 987 P.2d 290, 294 (1999) (citing V-1
Oil Co. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 181 Idaho
482, 488, 959 P.2d 468, 464 (1998)).

Idaho Code section 68-3049(d) provides as

follows:

Whenever it appears to the court that:

(1) Proceedings before it have been insti-

tuted or maintained by a party primarily

for delay; or

(2) A party’s position in such proceeding

is frivolous or groundless; or

(8) A party unreasonably failed to pursue

available administrative remedies;

the court, in its discretion, may require the

party which did not prevail to pay to the

prevailing party costs, expenses and attor-
ney’s fees.
LC. § 63-3049(a).

The Commission’s request for attorney’s
fees below need not be addressed by this
Court because the argument is merely men-
tioned in passing and not supported by co-
gent argument. See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Ida-
ho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing
Inama v. Boise Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 138
Idaho 324, 380, 68 P.8d 450, 456 (2008)),

HE The Commission is entitled to attor-
ney’s fees on appeal because Chandlers’ ar-
guments are groundless. Chandlers’ argu-
ments rest on an untenable reading of Idaho
Code sections 63-3613(b)(4) and (b)(6), attack
the district court’s dicta, and ignore the 2011
Amendment’s unambiguous retroactive effec-
tive date. Further, Chandlers asserts that
this case is similar to Stonecipher v. Stoneci-
pher, 131 Idaho 781, 963 P.2d 1168 (1998),
but ignores the clear distinguishing factors.

VI. ConcLusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. Costs and attor-
ney’s fees on appeal are awarded to the
Commission.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justice
BRODY concur.

457
HORTON, J., specially concurring.

I join in the result reached by the Court.
Although I do not disagree with the Court’s
analysis, I get to the same destination by a
shorter route, The central issue presented by
this appeal is the validity of the pre-2012
version of the Tax Commission’s rule regard-
ing gratuities, specifically © IDAPA
35.01.02.043.04(c), The rule was effective
from 1989 until the Tax Commission amend-
ed it in response to the 2011 amendment of
Idaho Code section 63-3613—a time frame
that covers the entirety of the Audit Period.

In 1996, the Idaho Legislature enacted
Idaho Code section 63-105, which provides in
pertinent part:

63-105. Powers and duties—General. In

addition to all other powers and duties

vested in it, the state tax commission shall
have the power and duty:

@) To make, adopt and publish such
rules as it may deem necessary and desir-
able to carry out the powers and duties
imposed upon it by law, provided however,
that all rules adopted by the state tax
commission prior to the effective date of
this 1996 amendatory act shall remain in
full force and effect wntil such time as they
may be rescinded or revised by the com-
‘mission,
1996 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 98, § 2, pp. 811-12
(emphasis added). Idaho Code section 68-105
took effect on January 1, 1997, prior to the
Audit Period in question. Id., § 21, p. 401.
The Commission argues that the statute
constituted legislative “approval” of the Com-
mission’s rules. This careful phraseology is
no doubt intended to recognize the distine-
tion between the Executive's rulemaking
powers and the Legislature’s authority to
approve or reject an administrative rule. This
Court first explicitly recognized this legisla-
tive authority in Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho
660, 791 P.2d 410 (1990), and the people of
this State enshrined this power in our Con-
stitution in 2016 with their approval of Arti-
ele II, § 29. I think that the Commission’s
distinction is too fine. Although the rule went
through the legislative review process now
addressed by Idaho Code section 67-5291,

458

Idaho Code section 63-105(2) was not enacted
by way of a concurrent resolution; rather,
Idaho Code section 63-105(2) was the product
of the Legislature passing HB 783 and the
Governor approving that bill by his signa-
ture. In short, the declaration that the then-
existing Commission rules, including IDAPA
35.01.02.043.04(c), were “in full force and ef-
fect” was a matter of duly-enacted legisla-
tion.

Significantly, at least to me, Chandlers’
briefing simply ignores the Commission’s ar-
guments based upon Idaho Code section 68-
105(2). In light of Chandlers’ otherwise-thor-
ough briefing, I do not think that Chandlers’
silence is the product of oversight; rather, I
believe it represents an implicit recognition
that IDAPA 35,01.02,043.04(c), as it existed
during the relevant time, was valid and effec-
tive by operation of statute.

Justice EISMANN concurs.

398 P.3d 191
Shawn W. BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Y

PERITUS I ASSETS MANAGEMENT,
LLC, Defendant-Respondent,

and

American Medical File, Inc., a California
Corporation; Ronald J. Heller, an indi-
vidual; David J. Desmond, an individual;
and William R. Espinosa, Defendants.

Docket No. 44357

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: July 12, 2017

Jeffrey J. Hepworth & Associates, Boise,
for appellant. Jeffrey J. Hepworth argued.

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP,
Boise, for respondent. John Ashby argued.

BURDIOCK, Chief Justice,

Shawn W. Bailey brings this appeal from
the Ada County district court. In October
2014, Bailey sued several parties, including
Peritus 1 Assets Management, LLC (Peri-
tus), for claims allegedly arising out of his
employment at American Medical File, Inc.
(AMF), doing business as OnFile. Bailey al-
leged claims for breach of his employment
contract and intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress. Peritus moved to dismiss Bailey's
claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and the district court granted the
motion on the basis that Bailey had not
alleged conduct that was extreme and outra-
geous. Peritus thereafter moved for sum-
mary judgment on Bailey’s breach of con-
tract claim, contending the statute of frauds
rendered it unenforceable. In response, Bai-
ley moved to amend his complaint in an
effort to bypass the statute of frauds. The
district court denied Bailey leave to amend
and granted Peritus summary judgment,
finding the statute of frauds dispositive. Bai-
ley timely appeals the denial of leave to
amend and grant of summary judgment in
favor of Peritus. We vacate the district
court’s judgment dismissing Bailey’s breach
of contract claim against Peritus and remand.

i, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

AMF was incorporated in California in
2001. AMF was a startup company that pro-
vided medical records management software
to entities in the healthcare industry. Bailey
was hired as AMF’s Vice President of Prod-
uct Development in April 2006 under an oral
contract of employment entitling Bailey to an

460

annual salary of $110,000 plus several fringe
benefits. Bailey maintains that Peritus, an
investment advisory company involved with
AMF, recruited him to work at AMF and
agreed it would be responsible for paying his
compensation.

Peritus became involved with AMF in
2004, when some Peritus clients took an in-
terest in investing in AMF. To that end,
Peritus formed the Peritus Global Opportuni-
ty Fund, LLP (PGO Fund), a hedge fund, as
a vehicle for interested clients to invest in
AMF, Between September 2004 and Novem-
ber 2006, the PGO Fund invested approxi-
mately $6,450,000 in AMF. Moreover, the
PGO Fund extended a bridge loan to AMF,
which was secured by AMF’s founders’
shares of AMF stock. After AMF defaulted
on the bridge loan in 2005, the PGO Fund
foreclosed on the AMI shares securing its
loan and became the owner of ninety percent
of AMF’s outstanding stock, The PGO Fund
dissolved in 2008, at which time the AMF
shares were distributed to the Peritus clients
who formerly comprised the PGO Fund, Per-
itus then began loaning funds to AMF, As a
condition of the loans, Peritus required AMF
to allow Peritus’s Chief Operating Officer,
David J, Desmond, and its Founder and
Managing Member, Ronald J. Heller, to be
on AMF’s Board of Directors so as to “moni-
tor the operation of AMF.”

In his pre-employment discussions, Bailey
became aware of Peritus’s ties to AMF, He
became aware also that AMF was underfund-
ed and generating only $2,500 per month in
revenue. When Bailey recalled those discus-
sions, he indicated that Peritus representa-
tives made several promises that Peritus
would pay Bailey's compensation because
AMF could not. Nevertheless, Bailey did not
receive all compensation to which he was
entitled under his oral contract of employ-
ment, By August 2011, Bailey was allegedly
owed $95,000 in back pay. When he threat-
ened to resign, he was provided with a writ-
ten contract of employment. The written con-
tract recites that Bailey was entitled to an
annual salary of $150,000 plus several fringe
benefits. The written contract says nothing of

1, These three individuals are: (1) Ronald J. Hel-
ler, “owner and founder of Peritus as well as its
managing member,” ‘President of Peritus,” and
“Board Member of AMF”; (2) David J. Desmond,

back pay, but Bailey maintains that Peritus
made several promises to pay his back pay in
full.

Even with the written contract, Bailey still
did not receive all compensation to which he
was entitled. He resigned from AMF in
March 2018 and sued in October 2014, alleg-
ing claims for breach of employment contract
and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. As defendants, Bailey named AMF,
Peritus, and three individuals associated with
AMF and Peritus! All defendants moved to
dismiss, In March 2015, the district court
dismissed both claims against the defendants
who Bailey had named individually and also
dismissed the emotional distress claim
against all defendants, leaving only the
breach of contract claim against AMF and
Peritus. In May 2015, AMF filed for bank-
ruptecy, and Bailey's contract claim against
AMF was stayed. Peritus moved for sum-
mary judgment, contending the statute of
frauds barred Bailey’s breach of contract
claim. Bailey responded by requesting leave
to amend his complaint in an effort to bypass
the statute of frauds. The district court de-
nied Bailey’s motion to amend and granted
Peritus’s motion for summary judgment. Bai-
ley timely appeals the denial of leave to
amend and grant of summary judgment in
favor of Peritus,

Il, ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court err by granting
summary judgment to Peritus on Bai-
ley’s claim for breach of employment
contract?

2. Did the district court err by denying
Bailey leave to amend his complaint?

8. Is the prevailing party entitled to at-
torney fees on appeal?

Ill. ANALYSIS

A. The district court erred by granting
summary judgment to Peritus on Bai-
ley’s claim for breach of employment
contract.

This Court reviews a summary
judgment order under the same standard

“Chief Operating Officer of Peritus and ... mem-
ber of the Board of Directors of AMF”; (3) Wil-
liam R. Espinosa, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of AMF.

the district court used in ruling on the
motion, Kolln v. Saint Luke’s Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 180 Idaho 828, 827, 940 P.2d 1142,
1146 (1997). That is, summary judgment is
appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.” LR.C.P. 56(c).2)
We construe disputed facts in favor of the
non-moving party, and all reasonable infer-
ences that can be drawn from the record
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. Major v. Sec. Equip. Corp., 155
Idaho 199, 202, 807 P.8d 1225, 1228 (2018).
Mitchell v, State, 160 Idaho 81, 84, 369 P.3d
299, 302 (2016),

Hl The district court found that the stat-
ute of frauds, Idaho Code section 9-505(2),
barred Bailey’s breach of contract claim
against Peritus and granted summary judg-
ment to Peritus, As the district court rea-
soned, Bailey's argument was merely that
Peritus had allegedly made an oral promise
that was collateral to AMF’s original promise
to pay Bailey's compensation if AMF failed
to do so. And because Peritus’s alleged collat-
eral promise was never memorialized in a
sufficient writing, the district court held that
section 9-505(2) rendered Bailey's breach of
contract claim against Peritus unenforceable,
The district court erred in so concluding.

HM The statute of frauds is an affirma-
tive defense that carves out an exception to
the general rule that oral contracts are en-
forceable, enumerating five primary catego-
ries of contracts that are deemed unenforcea-
ble if not reduced to a sufficient writing. See
LC. § 9-505. Employment contracts for an
indefinite term, like Bailey’s, generally do not
trigger the statute of frauds. Cf Mackay v.
Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 412,
179 P.8d 1064, 1068 (2008). However, in this
case, the specific statute of frauds provision
the district court found to be dispositive pro-
vides that “[a] special promise to answer for

2. The district court granted summary judgment
in June 2016. Effective July 1, 2016, Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 was amended, The relevant
portion of the rule now provides: “The court
must grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

461

the debt, default or miscarriage of another”
must be reduced to a sufficient writing to be
enforceable, LC. § 9-505(2). That provision
renders a collateral -promise to assume the
original obligation of another unenforceable if
not memorialized in a sufficient writing. See
id.; see also 9 Williston on Contracts § 22:6
(4th ed. 2017).

Section 9-505(2) does not apply here. The
allegations in this case are not that a collat-
eral promise was made to assume the debt of
another, but instead that multiple debtors
are jointly liable for an original obligation as
principals. Bailey's complaint is replete with
allegations that Peritus and AMF assumed
joint liability for his compensation as original
obligors, allegations which do not trigger the
statute of frauds. For example, as Bailey
alleged in his complaint, when he threatened
to resign in August 2011, the “Defendants 8)
again promised and agreed to provide a writ-
ten employment contract and promised to
pay back wages in full.” He further alleged
that, after threatening to resign, “Bailey and
the Defendants entered into a written em-
ployment agreement wherein the Defendants
agreed to pay Bailey a base salary of
$150,000.00 per year, an immediate vesting of
1,500,000 shares of [AMF] stock, and a sever-
ance package of two years annual salary
upon termination.” And even though the
written contract does not address the back
pay allegedly due Bailey, Bailey alleged that
“the Defendants promised Bailey they would
pay the amounts owed under the April 1,
2006 contract at a future date when AMF
became profitable or Bailey was terminated,”

The record lends support to Bailey's alle-
gations. Bailey testified to pre-employment
discussions with Peritus representatives in
his deposition. In those pre-employment dis-
cussions, Peritus representatives “said they
would pay [Bailey]” because AMF was un-
derfunded. Bailey testified additionally that
Peritus representatives enticed him to work
for AMF, assuring him that Peritus “could

material fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.” LR.C.P. 56(a),

3. Because Bailey named Peritus as a defendant
in his initial complaint, Peritus is included in
Bailey's reference to the “Defendants.”

462

raise another $50 million in assets to recapi-
talize and to put American Medical File back
together” when seeking to recruit Bailey.
However, because he knew AMF was under-
funded, Bailey testified that one “stipulation”
of coming aboard AMF was “{t]hat Peritus
be responsible for paying [him].” From those
discussions emerged a written offer of em-
ployment provided to Bailey in 2006, The
2006 offer states that it “serve[s] as a letter
of intent toward [Bailey’s] potential employ-
ment with American Medical File, Inc. (On-
File).” Yet, the offer’s only signature blocks
are for Heller and Desmond and refers to
them as Peritus representatives. At that
time, neither Heller nor Desmond were AMF
representatives. The 2006 offer contains no
signature block for any AMF representative.
While the 2006 offer is unsigned, Bailey testi-
fied that he did receive a signed copy of it.
Similarly, Desmond and Heller both signed
Bailey’s 2011 written contract in their Peri-
tus and AMF capacities,

Peritus counters with Viacom Outdoor,
Ine. v. Taowil, 254 8.W.3d 234 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008), arguing the 2006 offer’s signature
blocks and the 2011 offer’s signatures are
irrelevant. In Taowil, two businesses, Viacom
Outdoor, Inc. (Viacom) and Fourth and
Washington, LLC, doing business as W.S. on
Washington (Washington), entered into a
contract for billboard advertising on Wash-
ington’s commercial building. Id. at 236, Un-
der the contract, Viacom “agreed to provide
three months of outdoor billboard advertis-
ing services for ... Washington, and ...
Washington agreed to pay Viacom $12,000
for said advertising services.” Id. Represen-
tatives of both Viacom and Washington
signed the contract. Jd. Additionally, Max
Taouil, who managed a restaurant inside
Washington’s commercial building, signed
the contract “believ[ing] he was simply giv-
ing permission for his artwork and logo to be
placed on the billboard.” Id. When payment
for the advertising services was never made,
Viacom sued Taouil for payment of those
services. Id. Taouil, however, never partici-
pated in the negotiations between Viacom
and Washington for advertising services. Id.
at 288. Nor did Taouil have any part in
drafting the contract. Jd. Indeed, the record
“reveal[ed] not even a modicum of evidence

showing a meeting of minds between Viacom
and Taouil,” and as such, Taouil’s signature
was “not dispositive of his intent to be
bound” for payment of the advertising ser-
vices. Id. at 238.

Taowil is inapposite because here the rec-
ord does contain evidence raising a triable
issue of fact as to whether Peritus intended
to bind itself for payment of Bailey’s compen-
sation. Unlike in Taouil, Bailey alleged and
testified that Peritus held a key role in nego-
tiating the terms of his employment. Not
only did Bailey testify to the pre-employment
discussions with Peritus representatives ex-
plored above, but he testified also that Peri-
tus representatives kept him working at
AMF when he threatened to resign over
missed compensation, as he would not have
continued working at AMF absent the 2011
“contract signed by the Peritus officers and
the numerous verbal assurances” that Peri-
tus would pay his compensation. Additionally,
unlike in Taouil, where the third-party had
no part in drafting the contract, here Bailey
testified that Peritus representatives drafted
both the 2006 offer and the 2011 contract.
And comparing those documents to the con-
tract of employment executed between AMF
and its Operating Officer, R.J. Dundas, we
note that no signature block or signature of
any Peritus representative is found on Dun-
das’s contract. The only two signatures on
Dundas’s contract are Dundas’s and Joel
Rayden’s, AMF’s Chief Executive Officer.
Resolving doubts and inferences in Bailey’s
favor at this juncture, we task the finder of
fact with deciding whether Bailey had an
enforceable contract with Peritus. Cf Mac-
kay, 145 Idaho at 418, 179 P.8d at 1069
(“When the existence of a contract is in issue,
and the evidence is conflicting or admits of
more than one inference, it is for the jury to
decide whether a contract in fact exists.”).

Accordingly, the district court erred by
finding the statute of frauds barred Bailey’s
breach of contract claim against Peritus.
Because section 9-505(2) is triggered by an
assumption of another’s debt, default, or
miscarriage, section 9-505(2) does not apply
to this case. As explained, Bailey’s allega-
tions are that Peritus is jointly liable for his
compensation as a principal debtor, not that

it made a collateral promise to “answer for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another”
under section 9-505(2). Granted, Bailey’s
complaint did contain an allegation that, in
2007, Peritus promised it “would guarantee
payment of Bailey's salary and other com-
pensation.” In placing undue weight on that
lone allegation, Peritus forgets that Bailey
is not “slavishly bound” to any particular
theory alleged in his complaint. See e9.,
Cook v. Skyline Corp, 185 Idaho 26, 38-34,
13 P.3d 857, 864-65 (2000). Moreover, that
lone allegation does not vitiate the thrust of
Bailey's complaint to somehow change this
case from one alleging principal liability to
one alleging collateral liability. When viewed
in the context of Bailey’s complaint and the
record, that lone allegation reasonably sug-
gests Bailey used “guarantee” to mean that
Peritus and AMF made original promises to
pay his compensation, Bailey, the nonmov-
ant, was entitled to have this inference de-
cided in his favor at summary judgment.
Kugler v. Nelson, 160 Idaho 408, 412, 374
P.8d 571, 575 (2016) (explaining that, at
summary judgment, the court “draws all
reasonable inferences and conclusions sup-
ported by the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion” (quoting Chandler v.
Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 768, 215 P.8d 485,
488 (2009))).

We vacate the district court’s judgment.
granting summary judgment to Peritus on
Bailey’s breach of contract claim and remand
this case for further proceedings consistent.
with this opinion. Because the statute of
frauds is inapplicable, we do not reach the
parties’ arguments concerning whether a
statute of frauds exception applies.

B. We decline to address whether the dis-
trict court erred by denying Bailey
leave to amend his complaint.

Bailey's arguments concerning whether
the district court erred by denying him leave
to amend his complaint all center on his
position that leave should have been granted
to allow him to allege that a statute of frauds
exception applied. However, our conclusion
that the statute of frauds does not apply to

463

Bailey’s claim for breach of contract against
Peritus as alleged in his initial complaint
moots any need for Bailey to allege statute of
frauds exceptions. Hence, we need not reach
this issue. See, eg., Mitchell, 160 Idaho at 89,
869 P.8d at 307 (explaining that this Court
“will not hear and resolve” moot issues); see
also LR.C.P. 61 (“At every stage of the
proceeding, the court must disregard all er-
rors and defects that do not affect any par-
ty’s substantial rights.”),

C. We decline to award attorney fees on
appeal.

HMMM Bailey and Peritus both seek attor-
ney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section
12-120(8), which entitles the prevailing party
to attorney fees “[iJn any civil action to re-
cover on ... [a] contract ... and in any
commercial transaction....” Section 12-
120(8) applies if a “commercial transaction is
integral to the claim, and constitutes the
basis upon which the party is attempting to
recover.” Union Bank, N.A. v. JV LLC, No.
42479, Idaho > , P3d :
——, 2017 WL 383434, at *10 (idaho Jan. 27,
2017) (quoting Blimka v. My Web Wholesal-
er, LLC, 143 Idaho 728, 728, 152 P.8d 594,
599 (2007), “Actions brought for breach of
an employment contract are considered com-
mercial transactions and are subject to the
attorney fee provision of I.C. § 12-120(8).”
Mackay, 151 Idaho at 399, 257 P.3d at 766
(quoting Willie . Bd. of Trs., 188 Idaho 181,
186, 59 P.8d 802, 307 (2002)).

Hl However, an award of attorney fees is
improper at this juncture. It is presently
unclear who the prevailing party will be.
Bailey’s breach of contract claim must be
resolved before the identity of the prevailing
party can be determined. When a final judg-
ment is entered, we direct the district court
to determine which party has prevailed and
whether the prevailing party is entitled to
attorney fees related to this appeal. E.g.,
Wolford v. Montee, 161 Idaho 432, —, 387
P.8d 100, 111-12 (2016); Steel Farms, Ine. v.
Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 269, 297
P.8d 222, 282 (2012),

464 Le

Iv. CONCLUSION

We vacate the district court's judgment
granting summary judgment to Peritus on
Bailey’s breach of contract claim and remand
this case for proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not award attorney fees or
costs at this time on appeal.

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and KIDWELL, J., PRO TEM conenr.

398 P.3d 839
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v
Shawn Nathan FISHER, Defendant-
Appellant.
Docket No. 43621-2015
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: July 17, 2017

466

Jason C, Pintler, Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, argued for appellant.

Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, argued for respondent.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Ada County chal-
lenging the statutory elimination of the in-
sanity defense and the imposition of a deter-
minate life sentence for the crime of murder
in the second degree that was committed
when the defendant was experiencing para-
noia resulting from schizophrenia and was
under the influence of bath salts. ‘We affirm
the judgment of the district court.

L

Factual Background.

On February 18, 2013, while under the
influence of a controlled substance, suffering
from schizophrenia, and experiencing para-
noia and a delusion that he and his family
were in danger, Shawn Nathan Fisher (“De-
fendant”) killed one person and attempted to
kill another.

At 8:25 p.m., a 911 operator received a call
about a possible murder. The caller reported
that he was driving home from work on a
four lane road, when he came up behind a car
stopped in his lane of travel at an intersec-
tion, He stopped, and, after waiting for the
traffic to clear, he pulled around the car.
When he did so, he noticed that the driver
was slumped over in the driver’s seat, Think-
ing that the driver may have had a heart
attack, he turned around and drove back to
the car to check on its driver. When he
walked up to the car, the driver’s window had
been rolled down, and he saw that there was
blood pouring from the driver's head. The
car was still running, so he turned it off. He
also checked the driver’s neck for a pulse,
and could not feel one. The manual transmis-
sion was in neutral. It was later determined
that the driver had been shot in the face. The
bullet hit the left side of his nose and trav-
eled to the rear of his head, slightly to the
right, passing through the brain. The victim
was 28 years of age, and was driving home
from work. The outside temperature was
thirty degrees. Because the driver’s window

was rolled down and there was a small pool
of blood on the roadway beneath the driver's
door and blood running down the side of the
vehicle, Defendant may have stopped beside
the victim’s car at the traffie light and mo-
tioned to him to roll down his window before
shooting him.

At 8:26 p.m., a 911 operator received a call
that the operator interpreted as being about
leaving the scene of an accident. The caller
had left his apartment complex shortly after
8:00 p.m., to go to the store where he worked
to visit his friends and make a purchase.
Then he intended to drive to the university
he attended to drop off a heat gun for use
the next morning on an art project. After
getting into his car and starting to drive
away, he realized that he had forgotten the
heat gun. He stopped his car, backed up, and

arked parallel to the parking stalls. It took

im about five minutes to go back into his
apartment, grab the heat gun, and return to
his car. Upon returning, he saw another car
stopped about fifty feet away facing his car.
The other car’s headlights were on, and it
was running. The victim thought at first that
he may be blocking a parking stall, but, after
waiting a few minutes, he drove past the
other car, out of the apartment complex, and
onto a two-lane street. The other car left the
apartment complex using another driveway.
While driving down the street, the victim
noticed the other car coming up behind him
very quickly. As the victim approached the
intersection with a five-lane street (two lanes
in each direction and a center turn lane), the
other car slammed into the rear of the call-
er’s car. He turned south into the outer lane
of a five-lane street, and the other car pulled
alongside in the inner lane. He looked to-
wards the other car, saw the front passenger
window explode outward, and heard a bullet
hit his car near his ear. The other car then
sped away southbound. The caller wanted to
find a safe place before calling the police, so
he drove to the store where his friends were.

There is no indication that Defendant pre-
viously had any contact with either victim.
He apparently selected them at random. Af-
ter his arrest, it was determined that Defen-
dant was also under the influence of bath
salts.

Defendant was ultimately charged with
murder in the first degree and several other
crimes, but on October 8, 2018, the district
court found him unable to assist in his own
defense due to his mental illness. The court
committed Defendant to the custody of the
Department of Correction for care and treat-
ment. On February 17, 2015, the court termi-
nated the commitment because Defendant
was determined to be competent to proceed.

On May 15, 2015, Defendant filed a motion.
seeking to have the statutory abolition of the
insanity defense declared to be unconstitu-
tional. On June 17, 2015, the district. court
denied the motion,

On June 25, 2015, the prosecutor, defense
counsel, and Defendant entered into a bind-
ing plea agreement, which provided that De-
fendant would plead guilty to murder in the
second degree, the remaining charges would
be dismissed, and Defendant would reserve
the right to appeal the district court’s denial
of his motion to declare unconstitutional the
statutory abolition of the insanity defense.
There was no agreement as to the sentence.

On July 1, 2015, the State filed an amend-
ed information reducing the charge of mur-
der in the first degree to murder in the
second degree. On the same day, Defendant
pled guilty to murder in the second degree.
The district court held a sentencing hearing
on September 30, 2015, and at the conclusion
of the hearing the court sentenced Defendant
to a determinate life sentence with no possi-
bility for parole. Defendant then timely ap-
pealed,

IL.

Denial of the Motion to Declare Uncon-
stitutional the Statutory Abolition
of the Insanity Defense.

In 1982, the Idaho legislature repealed for-
mer Idaho Code section 18-209, which made
mental disease or defect an affirmative de-
fense in a criminal proceeding, In its place
the legislature enacted Idaho Code section
18-207. That statute provides, “Mental condi-
tion shall not be a defense to any criminal
charge.” LC, § 18-207(1), However, it does
not preclude evidence regarding a defen-
dant’s state of mind if it is an element of the
charged offense. The statute also provides,
“Nothing herein is intended to prevent the

admission of expert evidence on the issue of
any state of mind which is an element of the
offense, subject to the rules of evidence.” The
State is still required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt any state of mind that is an
element of the offense charged. In addition, if
the defendant is convicted, the trial court is
required to consider, if offered, evidence of
the defendant’s mental condition. I.C. § 19-
2528(1),

On appeal, Defendant contends that the
abolition of the insanity defense violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Eighth Amendment.
Defendant admits that we have on numerous
oceasions rejected claims that the abolition of
the insanity defense violated the Federal
Constitution. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122,
267 P.8d 709 (2011); State v. Moore, 126
Idaho 208, 880 P.2d 238 (1994); State v, Odia-
ga, 125 Idaho 384, 871 P.2d 801 (1994); State
v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 88, 878 P.2d 782 (1994);
State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 828 P.2d 879
(1992); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d
1081 (1991); State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632,
798 P.2d 914 (1990). The most recent decision
on the issue from the United States Supreme
Court is Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S, 785, 126
S.Ct, 2709, 165 L.Hd.2d 842 (2006), which this
Court considered in Delling. “Having previ-
ously decided this question, and being pre-
sented with no new basis upon which to
consider the issue, we are guided by the
principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law
as expressed in our earlier opinions.” Odiaga,
125 Idaho at 388, 871 P.2d at 805.

I.

Did the District Court Abuse Its
Discretion in Sentencing?

HMMM “When reviewing whether a sen-
tence is excessive, we review all the facts and
cireumstances in the case and focus on
whether the trial court abused its discretion
in fixing the sentence.” State v. Baker, 186
Idaho 576, 577, 88 P.3d 614, 615 (2001).
“When reviewing a fixed life sentence, the
primary factors considered are the gravity of
the offense and/or the need to protect society
from the defendant.” State v. Cannady, 187
Idaho 67, 78, 44 P.8d 1122, 1128 (2002). If the
sentence is within the statutory limits, “the

468

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
that the trial court committed a clear abuse
of its discretion,” and “[w]e will not substi-
tute our view of a reasonable sentence for
that of the trial court where reasonable
minds might differ.” State v. Carver, 155
Idaho 489, 496, 814 P.8d 171, 178 (2018).
‘When considering whether the sentence was
an abuse of discretion, “this Court considers:
(1) whether the trial court correctly per-
ceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable; and (8)
whether the trial court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason.” State v. Miller, 151
Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.8d 985, 941 (2011).

HM “The objectives of criminal punish-
ment are protection of society, deterrence of
the individual and the public, possibility of
rehabilitation, and punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing, with the primary objective
being the protection of society.” State v. Jim-
enez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 876 P.8d 744, 748
(2016). “The district court has the discretion
to weigh those objectives and give them dif-
fering weights when deciding upon the sen-
tence.” State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895,
392 P.3d 1228, 1286 (2017). The district court
considered all four objectives, but decided in
its discretion that the two most important
were the protection of society and punish-
ment.

With respect to protecting society, the
court stated, “It is clear that Mr. Fisher,
particularly in an unmedicated state, pres-
ents a profound risk to the public because of
his mental health condition and his history of
drug use.” The forensic psychiatrist who tes-
tified at the sentencing hearing diagnosed
Defendant as having schizophrenia, a major
depressive disorder, and several substance
abuse issues. She testified that in general
schizophrenia “occurs in someone’s late ado-
lescence at the earliest and usually in the
individual’s twenties,” that “[i]t’s something
that most people suffer from for the rest of
their lives.” Defendant was thirty-five years
old when he committed this murder. She
added: “Once it is identified and diagnosed,
which it had not been in his case, the progno-
sis is better in the sense that with treatment,
the symptoms can be reduced significantly.
For a majority of people, they don’t go away

completely.” With respect to Defendant, she
stated: “If he doesn’t have that treatment, he
would be like he was when he was arrested
and just in jail for that first eight months, So
it’s essential that he gets treatment to keep
those symptoms at bay.” When asked about
the typical duration of the treatment for
schizophrenia and whether the diagnosis
changes, the psychiatrist answered that “typ-
ically most individuals have persistent symp-
toms, and they usually don’t come off of the
medication” and that the diagnosis “[iJs usu-
ally consistent for the duration of their life.”

With respect to punishment for the crime,
the district court stated that “[w]e also have
the other factor that appears to me to be the
most significant here is the need to impose a
punishment that fits the crime” and that
“anything less than a very lengthy prison
sentence would depreciate the seriousness of
this offense.” When Defendant pled guilty, he
admitted that he willfully shot at the victim;
that he aimed his revolver at the victim and
meant to pull the trigger; that he did not
intend to kill the victim, but intended to
shoot him; and that he knew of the danger
and had a conscious disregard for the vic-
tim’s life.

With respect to Defendant's future risk of
violence, the psychiatrist stated that “{ilf
someone has committed a prior act of vio-
lence, that will increase someone's risk of
violence”; “[iJf someone has a mental illness
that has got active symptoms, that increases
their risk”; and that “[slomeone with an ac-
tive substance abuse issue who is abusing
drugs and alcohol would have—that’s proba-
bly the highest risk for violence.” Conversely,
his risk to commit violence in the future
would be reduced by understanding his men-
tal health diagnosis and his need for medi-
cation and by abstaining from abusing drugs
and alcohol. In the psychiatrist’s opinion, De-
fendant’s behavior in killing the victim was
based upon both his mental illness and being
under the influence of the illegal drug.

The district court considered mitigating
factors, including that Defendant had a mini-
mal prior criminal record, that he held a
steady job for many years before quitting
just before these criminal events, and that he
had done nothing to cause his schizophrenia.

The court also considered that Defendant
had declined medication in the past (when he
was initially in jail before he was treated)
and that the victims were selected at ran-
dom.

After considering all of the information
available to it, the district court stated that it
did not believe that there “was a realistic
prospect that Mr, Fisher could safely be
returned to the future—to the public at some
future point without a meaningful risk, that
he would engage in some kind of violent
conduet like this again in the future.” The
court concluded that the appropriate sen-
tence was life without parole.

On appeal, Defendant contends that the
district court abused its discretion because
“[t]here is no reason to believe that a medi-
eated Shawn Fisher would pose a threat to
public safety in the future”; “[the fixed life
sentence imposed in this case is nothing
more than a hedge against the district court’s
uncertainty that Mr. Fisher would be medi-
cation compliant in the future”; and “[t]here
is nothing in the record to suggest that after
at least seven and one-half additional years
of understanding that he is schizophrenic and
taking medications to help him control his
delusions, Mr. Fisher would not be medi-
eation compliant.” 1

HM “To impose a fixed life sentence
‘requires a high degree of certainty that the
perpetrator could never be safely released
back into society or that the nature of the
offense requires that the individual spend the
rest of his life behind bars,’” State v. Carver,
155 Idaho 489, 496, 814 P.8d 171, 178 (2018).
This statement refers to these two factors
standing alone. In this case, the district court
found both of these factors to be the predom-
inant ones. The court concluded that there
was not a “reasonable prospect” that Defen-
dant could be safely returned to society and
that the punishment must fit the crime. “The
considerations of societal retribution and
general deterrence are not decided on the
basis of the unique characteristics of the
offender; rather these considerations are de-
cided upon the characteristics of the offense.”

1, Idaho Code section 18-4004 states, “Every per-
son guilty of murder of the second degree is
punishable by imprisonment not less than ten
(10) years and the imprisonment may extend to
life.” In making this argument, Defendant is as-

469

State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 878, 880, 258
P.3d 810, 317 (2011) (footnote omitted),

Defendant has not shown that the court
committed a clear abuse of discretion in im-
posing the fixed life sentence.

Iv.
Conclusion.

We affirm the judgment of the district
court.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
HORTON and BRODY coneur,

JONES, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

I concur with Part II of the majority's
opinion, but I respectfully dissent from Part
III for two reasons. First, the majority’s
quotation of State v. Windom at the end of
the opinion is susceptible to misinterpreta-
tion because it is taken out of context, overly
broad, and incomplete. The majority opinion
quotes Windom as follows: “The consider-
ations of societal retribution and general de-
terrence are not decided on the basis of the
unique characteristics of the offender; rather
these considerations are decided upon the
characteristics of the offense.” 150 Idaho 878,
880, 258 P.8d 310, 317 (2011). This quotation,
standing alone, may be interpreted to mean
that the characteristics of the offense, not the
offender, are the focus of criminal punish-
ment, That is incorrect, It must be empha-
sized that there are “four objectives of crimi-
nal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public;
(8) the possible rehabilitation of the individu-
al; and (4) retribution for the crime. State v.
Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 876 P.8d 744,
748 (2016), These four considerations take
into account the characteristics and cireum-
stances of the offender in addition to the
consideration of the heinous nature of the
offense,

Second, the district court abused its disere-
tion because its sentencing decision was not
reached through an exercise of reason. The

suming a’ mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Cor-
rection, during which time Defendant would re-
ceive treatment and counseling,

470

district court gave only nominal consideration
to Fisher’s well documented schizophrenia
and based its sentencing decision on the pro-
tection of society and the nature of the of-
fense. In my view, the district court should
have considered the factors discussed in the
following four cases: Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana, — US, ——, 186 S.Ct. 718, 193
L.Hd.2d 599 (2016); Miller v, Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 182 S.Ct. 2455, 188 L.Ed.2d 407
(2012); Windom »v. State, 162 Idaho 417, 398
P.8d 150, 2017 WL 2928788 (2017); and John-
son v, State, 162 Idaho 218, 395 P.8d 1246
(2017). In Miller v. Alabama the United
States Supreme Court declared that the
Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing
schemes that require mandatory life in pris-
on without the possibility of parole for juve-
nile offenders. 567 U.S. 460, 478-79, 132 S.Ct.
2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, 423-24 (2012).
The Court continued, stating that although a
court may still sentence a juvenile offender
to life in prison without the possibility of
parole in homicide cases, it must “take into
account how children are different, and how
those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id.
The Court reasoned as follows:
a sentencer misses too much if he
treats every child as an adult. To recap:
Mandatory life without parole for a ju-
venile precludes consideration of his
chronological age and its hallmark fea-
tures—among them, immaturity, impe-
tuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences. It prevents taking
into account the family and home envi-
ronment that surrounds him—and from
which he cannot usually extricate him-
self—no matter how brutal or dysfune-
tional. It neglects the circumstances of
the homicide offense, including the ex-
tent of his participation in the conduct
and the way familial and peer pressures
may have affected him.... And finally,
this mandatory punishment disregards
the possibility of rehabilitation even
when the circumstances most suggest it,
Td. at 460, 477-78, 182 S.Ct. at 2455, 2468-69,
188 L.Ed.2d at 407, 422-283 (2012). Montgom-
ery v. Louisiana declared that the holding
from Miller was retroactive for juveniles sen-
tenced to mandatory life without the possibil-
ity of parole and for juveniles sentenced by a

court that did not consider the distinct attrib-
utes of youth. — U.S. —-, ——, —, 136
S.Ct. 718, 784, 786, 193 L.Hd.2d 599, 619-20,
622-23 (2016). In State v. Windom, this Court
reviewed the requirements of Miller and
Montgomery and held that “[tJhe sentencing
hearing in Windom’s case did not include
evidence of the factors required by Miller
and Montgomery, and therefore his sentenc-
ing did not comport with the requirements of
those decisions.” 162 Idaho 417, 398 P.8d 150,
2017 WL 2928788 (2017). In Johnson v. State,
this Court affirmed a district court’s ruling
that Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claims
under Miller failed. 162 Idaho 218, 228, 395
P.8d 1246, 1259 (2017). This Court noted that
the trial court’s “sentencing colloquy was ap-
proximately forty-four pages” and made
“specific reference to having considered the
testimony about Johnson’s youth.” Jd, Ulti-
mately, this Court held that the trial court
“clearly considered Johnson’s youth and all
its attendant characteristics and determined,
in light of the heinous nature of the crime,
that Johnson, despite her youth, deserved life
without parole.” Id.

I recognize that Miller, Montgomery,
Windom, and Johnson are not binding prece-
dent because Fisher is an adult and his life
sentence was not mandatory, but I am con-
vinced that the reasoning from the aforemen-
tioned cases applies also to those suffering
from mental disorders such as Fisher. Specif-
ically, sentencing courts must take into ac-
count the possibility of rehabilitating offend-
ers suffering from severe mental disorders
before sentencing them to a lifetime in prison
without the possibility of parole. We do not
know whether severe mental disorders will
one day be curable by medicine thereby ren-
dering past offenders as good candidates for
parole, That is a question best left to a fully
informed parole board. In sum, using lan-
guage from Miller, it was unreasonable to
sentence Fisher to life without the possibility
of parole before taking into account how
those with mental disorders are different,
and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in

prison.

474

399 P.3d 145
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
Vv.

Jessica L. WENZEL, Defendant-
Appellant,

Docket No. 44649
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: June 28, 2017
Review Denied August 14, 2017

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Depu-
ty Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for ap-
pellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge

Jessica L. Wenzel appeals from her judg-
ment of conviction entered upon her condi-
tional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance. Specifically, Wenzel argues the
district court erred in denying Wenzel’s mo-
tion to suppress evidence found in her purse,
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Wenzel was charged with possession of a
controlled substance, I.C. § 87-2782(0)(1), af-
ter officers found hydrocodone pills in Wen-
zel’s purse while executing a search warrant.
Wenzel filed a motion to suppress, arguing
that the search of the purse was unlawful. At
the suppression hearing, Wenzel testified
that she had been sleeping in an acquain-
tance’s home when she was awakened by
officers executing a search warrant for that
residence. Wenzel testified that, prior to be-
ing escorted outside so officers could conduct
the search, she had requested to take her
purse and the officers denied her request.
However, two officers testified that they did
not remember. Wenzel making any such re-
quest. During the course of the residence
search, an officer searched a purse located in
the area where Wenzel had been sleeping.
Inside a wallet, an officer found Wenzel’s
identification and hydrocodone pills. After
being brought back inside, Wenzel indicated
that she knew that the officer had found the
pills for which Wenzel had no prescription. In
its order denying Wenzel’s motion to sup-
press, the district court found the officers to
be credible that they did not remember Wen-
zel making a request to take the purse with
her before going outside. The district court
then found that Wenzel had standing to con-
test the search of the residence and the
purse because she was an overnight guest in
the home and had a legitimate expectation of

475

privacy in the premises searched. However,
the district court ruled that the search of the
purse did not exceed the scope of the search
authorized by the warrant and denied Wen-
zel’s motion. Wenzel appeals.

HMMM The standard of review of a sup-
pression motion is bifurcated. When a deci-
sion on a motion to suppress is challenged,
we accept the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence,
but we freely review the application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts as found, State
v, Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996), At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual. inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v, Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d.998, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct, App. 1999),

HE «Generally, any container situated
within residential premises, which are the
subject of a validly-issued warrant, may be
searched if it is reasonable to believe that the
container could conceal items of the kind
portrayed in the warrant. United States vu
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S.Ct. 2157,
2170-71, 72 L.Hd.2d 572, 590-91 (1982). How-
ever, special considerations may arise when
visitors are present on the premises when
the search is executed. See United States v.
Young, 909 F.2d 442, 444-46 (11th Cir. 1990);
State v. Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878,.880, 820 P.2d
1285, 1287 (Ct. App. 1991). When analyzing
whether a search of a visitor's personal ef-
fects violates the scope of a premises search
warrant, Idaho courts analyze the relation-
ship between the object, the person, and the
place being searched. Bulgin, 120 Idaho at
880, 820 P.2d at 1237; see also Young, 909
F.2d at 444-45 (adopting the relationship test
in analyzing whether a search of personal
effects violates the scope of a premises war-
rant). Under this standard, there is a differ-
entiation between the personal effects of a
person who is a usual occupant of the premis-
es which are to be searched and the personal
effects of a transient visitor to the premises.
Bulgin, 120 Idaho at 880, 820 P.2d at 1237.
Consequently, an overnight visitor’s personal
effects would be subject to a premise search,

476 Le

whereas a mere visitor’s personal effects
would not be subject to the search because
an overnight guest is more likely to have a
special relationship to the premises than a
transient visitor. Id.

HE On appeal, Wenzel argues that, al-
though she was an overnight guest and the
purse was not in her physical possession
when the officers executed the search war-
rant, under Bulgin, her purse was not within
scope of the search warrant. Wenzel seems to
contend that this Court’s standard in Bul-
gin—that an overnight guest is more likely
to have a relationship to the premises—over-
simplifies the relationship test analysis. How-
ever, Wenzel has not argued that Bulgin was
wrongly decided by this Court and should be
overturned. Rather, Wenzel asserts that the
district court misapplied the standard this
Court adopted in Bulgin. Specifically, Wenzel
argues that, under Bulgin, her purse did not
fall within the scope of the search warrant
because she was not described in the search
warrant, the officers did not articulate a sus-
picion that Wenzel was using controlled sub-
stances, and the officers knew or should have
known the purse belonged to Wenzel. We
disagree.

In Bulgin, officers executed a probation
search of a home in which Bulgin was an
overnight guest. After being detained, Bulgin
made statements indicating she possessed an
illegal substance in her purse. Subsequently,
officers obtained a search warrant covering
the premises and persons in that residence.
Bulgin challenged the validity of the search
warrant by asserting that it did not authorize
a search of Bulgin’s purse. In holding that
Bulgin’s purse was subject to the search
warrant, we began our analysis on the as-
sumption that “the warrant authorized a
premises search only, and not a search of
Bulgin’s person and therefore her purse.” Jd.
at 880, 820 P.2d at 1237. Proceeding on this
assumption, this Court adopted the afore-
mentioned relationship test and held that
“the personal effects of an overnight visitor
would be subject to a search, whereas the

1, Wenzel also asks this Court to adopt a separate
notice test in order to conclude that the search of
the purse was outside the scope of the search
warrant. We decline Wenzel’s invitation, having

personal effects of a mere visitor or passerby
would not be subject to a search.” Id. In
applying this standard to Bulgin’s purse, we
concluded:
In the present case, Bulgin was not a
transient visitor or a mere passerby. Not
only was she an overnight guest at the
premises described in the search warrant,
the officers had described her in their affi-
davit and articulated a suspicion that she
was using methamphetamine. Therefore,
the search of Bulgin’s purse was within the
scope of the premises search warrant.
Id. at 880-81, 820 P.2d at 1237-38. Although
Bulgin was both an overnight visitor and
described in the search warrant application,
the legal standard, when read in its proper
context, did not require both. See id.t
In this case, the search warrant was issued
based on probable cause that evidence of the
eriminal offense of delivery of a controlled
substance would be located at the residence.
The warrant authorized a search of the resi-
dence, outbuildings, and certain vehicles lo-
cated at the residence. Certainly, a purse is a
plausible repository of such evidence and
Wenzel has not suggested otherwise. The
district court found that Wenzel neither re-
quested nor attempted to take the purse
from the residence when officers escorted
Wenzel outside prior to conducting the
search, Although Wenzel was not a person
described in the search warrant, it is uncon-
tested that Wenzel was an overnight guest.
Thus, Wenzel’s purse, found within the prem-
ises, was subject to the search warrant. Con-
sequently, Wenzel has failed to show that
district court erred in denying Wenzel’s mo-
tion to suppress the hydrocodone pills found
inside her purse. Accordingly, Wenzel’s judg-
ment of conviction for possession of a con-
trolled substance is affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY

concur,

previously chosen to adopt the relationship test
in Bulgin, and Wenzel’s failure to demonstrate
why this standard should be abandoned for an-
other, See id. at 880, 820 P.2d at 1237. '

399 P.3d 804

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

Mark H. LANKFORD, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket No, 35617

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: July 8, 2017

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Be
tH

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st

or
wa

Erie Fredericksen, State Appellate Public
Defender, Boise, for appellant. Shannon N.
Romero argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. LaMont
Anderson argued, .

HORTON, Justice.

Mark Henry Lankford (Lankford) appeals
from his judgment of conyiction after a jury
in Idaho County district court found him
guilty of two counts of felony murder. Lank-
ford argues that the district court erred in
multiple ways and that he is entitled to a new
trial. The State argues that Lankford has
failed to prove that reversible error was com-
mitted by the district court and that Lank-
ford’s convictions should be affirmed.

L FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Lankford and his brother, Bryan Lankford
(Bryan), were both convicted and sentenced
to death for the 1983 murders of Robert and
Cheryl Bravence, who were brutally mur-
dered while camping in the Sheep Creek
area of Idaho County. State v. Lankford, 116
Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989); State v.
Lankford, 118 Idaho 688, 747 P.2d 710 (1987).
Bryan’s death sentence was overturned by
the Supreme Court of the United States
because the State failed to provide him with

484.

notice that the death penalty could be im-
posed. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 127,
111 S.Ct. 1728, 1788, 114 L.Ed.2d 178, 188-89
(1991), The Ninth Circuit vacated Lankford’s
conviction and sentence and ordered the
State to re-try Lankford or release him.
Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 592 (9th
Cir. 2006) (finding ineffective assistance of
counsel based upon Lankford’s attorney re-
questing a jury instruction that failed to ade-
quately instruct jurors regarding accomplice
testimony).

A new trial was held in 2008, and on
February 18, 2008, a jury again found Lank-
ford guilty of both murders. Lankford then
filed a motion for new trial. In July 2008,
Lankford was sentenced to two consecutive
fixed life sentences, which he timely appeal-
ed. The appeal was suspended until proceed-
ings on Lankford’s motions for new trial
were decided. On October 7, 2009, the district
court denied Lankford’s motion for new tri-
al. Lankford filed his Second Motion for a
New Trial on October 29, 2009, and on De-
eember 6, 2018, that motion was denied as
well. Lankford timely appealed from the de-
nial of his motions for new trial. Lankford
also filed a pro se Rule 35 motion for corree-
tion of an illegal sentence which the district
court found to be untimely.” On July 25, 2016,
this Court released its original decision in
this appeal. We thereafter granted the
State’s petition for rehearing.

Il. ANALYSIS

Lankford advances four primary argu-
ments in support of his claim that the district
court erred. These are that the district court:
(1) made biased and prejudicial comments
during voir dire; (2) provided erroneous and
misleading jury instructions; (8) violated Ida-
ho Code section 19-2405; and (4) improperly
denied Lankford’s pro se Rule 35 motion. In
addition to these claimed errors by the dis-
trict court, Lankford alleges prosecutorial
misconduct and that the cumulative effect of
the district court’s errors and the prosecu-

1. The Hon. John H. Bradbury presided over the
jury trial and decided Lankford’s first motion for
new trial,

tor’s misconduct warrant a new trial. Lank-
ford’s contentions will be discussed in turn,

A. The district court did not err during
voir dire,

Lankford contends that he was denied his
right to due process and a fair trial because,
during the course of voir dire, the district
court advised potential jurors that there had
been a previous trial. Lankford argues that
this irreparably prejudiced the jury and that
a new trial is warranted. The State responds
that Lankford’s claim is barred by the invit-
ed error doctrine and that Lankford has
failed to establish fundamental error.

1, Standard of Review

HE We review constitutional claims de
novo. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 218, 322
P.8d 296, 3800 (2014), However, because
Lankford did not object to the district court’s
statements to the jury, he must demonstrate
that the district court’s actions constituted
fundamental error. State v. Draper, 151 Ida-
ho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 858, 865 (2011). Funda-
mental error is error that: “(1) violates one
or more of the defendant’s unwaived consti-
tutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the
need for any additional information not con-
tained in the appellate record, including in-
formation as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision); and (8) was not
harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228,
245 P.8d 961, 980 (2010).

2, Lankford’s claim is not barred by the
invited error doctrine.

HM “The purpose of the invited error
doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or
played an important role in prompting a trial
court to give or not give an instruction from
later challenging that decision on appeal.”
State v. Blake, 188 Idaho 287, 240, 985 P.2d
117, 120 (1999). “It has long been the law in
Idaho that one may not successfully complain
of errors one has acquiesced in or invited.
Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited

2, The Hon, James F. Judd presided over the
proceedings relating to Lankford’s second mo-
tion for new trial, Judge Judd decided that mo-
tion, as well as Lankford’s pro se Rule 35 mo-
tion.

are not reversible.” State v. Dunlap, 155
Idaho 345, 379, 818 P.8d 1, 85 (2018) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting State v. Owsley,
105 Idaho 886, 888, 678 P.2d 436, 488 (1988).
However, an appellant who did not encour-
age the district court to offer the specific
instructions given, but merely failed to ob-
ject, is not precluded by the invited error
doctrine from raising an issue on appeal.
State v. Adameik, 152 Idaho 445, 477, 272
P.8d 417, 449 (2012); Blake, 188 Idaho at 240,
985 P.2d at 120,

Hl While the State has presented various
transcript excerpts and other evidence which
suggest that Lankford explicitly agreed to
the district court’s voir dire advisement re-
garding the prior trial, the State ultimately
concedes that, although discussed between
the parties, “there is nothing in the record
explicitly stating what [defense] counsel sug-
gested” the court do to handle the issue of
the earlier trial. Because there is no record
of explicit suggestion, encouragement, or ac-
quiescence by Lankford regarding the ad-
visement and because a failure to object is
not enough to invoke the invited error doc-
trine, we hold that Lankford’s claim is not
barred and will consider the underlying claim
of fundamental error.

8, The district _court’s advisement_about
Lankford’s prior trial _did_ not _consti-
tute fundamental error.

HM Lankford argues that the district
court’s statement about a prior trial and
appeal is indistinguishable from telling the
jury that Lankford had been found guilty
and convicted by a previous jury. Indeed,
Lankford states “The district court told ju-
rors during voir dire that Mark had previous-
ly been tried and convicted of the charged
crimes in 1984....” Lankford then contends
that the district court’s statement was “in-
herently prejudicial,” “cannot be cured or
minimized by a contemporaneous limiting in-
struction,” affected the “base structure” of a
constitutional right, and requires that Lank-
ford’s “convictions must be vacated.” More
succinctly stated, Lankford is arguing that
the district court’s advisement created an
implied bias in the jury.

485

HMMM As this Court has noted many
times, the right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury is fundamental to both the
US. Constitution and the Idaho Constitution.
U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Idaho const.
art. 1, sections 7, 18; see also, eg., State v.
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 421, 348 P.3d 1, 36
(2014). The Supreme Court of the United
States has noted: “It is elementary that a fair
trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process,” Weiss v. United States, 510
US. 168, 178, 114 S.Ct. 752, 761, 127 L.Bd.2d
1, 15-16 (1994); and this Court has stated
that the due process requirements of the
Idaho Constitution require “a trial by a fair
and impartial jury.” State v. Nadiman, 68
Idaho 158, 163, 118 P.2d 58, 62 (1941). The
impartiality. of a juror may be challenged for
“actual or implied” bias. United States v.
Wood, 299 U.S. 128, 188, 57 S.Ct. 177, 179, 81
L.Ed. 78, 81-82 (1936); Abdullah, 158 Idaho
at 421, 348 P.3d at 36. Actual bias deals with
the specific state of mind of an individual
juror and is proved by questioning the juror
as to whether he or she can serve with entire
impartiality. LC. § 19-2018(2); Abdullah, 158
Idaho at 421-22, 348 P.3d at 36-37. Implied
bias, however, conclusively presumes bias as
a matter of law based on the existence of a
specific fact. IC. § 19-2018(1); Wood, 299
US. at 183, 57 S.Ct. at 179, 81 L.Ed. at 81-
82.

Many courts, including the Supreme Court
of the United States, have held that the fact
that a juror knew that the defendant has
been found guilty or convicted by a previous
jury for the same crime creates an implied
bias and constitutes fundamental error be-
cause it is inherently prejudicial. Leonard v.
United States, 878 US, 544, 544, 84 S.Ct.
1696, 1696, 12 L.Ed.2d 1028, 1028 (1964) (per
curiam) (recognizing that a jury containing
jurors that had previously heard a defendant
pronounced guilty in open court on similar
charges was “plainly erroneous”); see also,
29., Arthur v. Bordenkircher, 715 F.2d 118,
120 (4th Cir, 1988); United States v
Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 470-71 (6th Cir.
1978); Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1076
Wel. 1987); Salas v. People, 177 Colo. 264,
4983 P.2d 1856, 1357 (1972); State v. Lee, 346
So.2d 682, 688-85 (La. 1977); Weber v. State,
5OL So.2d 1879, 1381-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

486

1987). But see State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d
615, 621-23 (Minn. 2015) (holding that the
knowledge of two jurors that defendant was
previously convicted for the same charges
did not create an implied bias); People v,
Dashnow, 116 A.D.8d 1222, 1229-80, 983
N.Y.S.2d 681 (2014) (holding that a trial
court’s statement to potential jurors that the
defendant’s prior conviction had been re-
versed did not deprive the defendant of a fair
trial where jurors had been repeatedly in-
structed that they could not consider that
fact in their deliberations).

Here, this Court need not decide whether
the disclosure of a prior conviction for the
same offense would be cause for a finding of
implied bias because, despite Lankford’s con-
tention otherwise, the district court did not
mention a prior conviction or that Lankford
was previously found guilty. Rather, the dis-
trict court stated: “There was a prior trial in
Idaho County in 1984 for the offenses for
which he is now charged. And an Appeals
Court held that Mr. Lankford was not effec-
tively represented and that his trial was
therefore unfair.” .

Idaho law has clearly distinguished be-
tween the mention of a previous trial and the
mention of a previous conviction, State v.
Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 766, 274 P.8d 1279,
1281 (Ct. App. 2012) (“We are not persuaded
that [the mention of a prior trial and an
appeal] is equivalent to the disclosure that a
previous jury had found him guilty.”), As our
Court of Appeals stated in Watiins this dis-
tinction has been noted by several other ju-
risdictions as well. Id. at 766-67, 274 P.8d at
1281-82 (citing inter alia, People v. Boose, 85
TlLApp.8d 457, 40 Ill.Dec, 760, 406 N.E.2d
968, 964-66 (1980) (holding that a witness’
references to defendant’s incarceration and
appeal were harmless)); Brooks v, State, 918
$0.2d 181, 208 (Fla. 2005) (State’s reference
to prior trial without disclosing the result
was not reversible error); Brown v. Ken-
tucky, 318 8.W.3d 577, 607 (Ky. 2010) (hold-
ing that a jury’s knowledge that defendant
was being retried but not that he had been
found guilty, did not violate the defendant’s
rights).

The issue, therefore, is not whether the
mention of a prior conviction for the same

offense creates an inherent, or implied bias,
but whether the mention of a prior trial and
appeal is so extremely and inherently preju-
dicial that the jury “is not susceptible to
rehabilitation through further questioning.”
People v. Lefebre, 5 P.8d 295, 800 (Colo, 2000)
(overruled on other grounds by People v.
Novotny, 320 P.8d 1194 (Colo. 2014)); State v.
Brown, 732 N.W.2d 625, 629 n.2 (Minn, 2007);
see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S, 209, 222,
102 S.Ct. 940, 948, 71 L.Ed2d 78, 89-90
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
implied bias is reserved only for extreme
cases), We hold that it is not.

HH Idaho Code section 19-2020 allows
for a challenge for implied bias for any one of
nine causes and “for no other.” LC, § 19-
2020 (“Grounds of challenge for implied
bias.—A challenge for implied bias may be
taken for all or any of the following causes
and for no other: [listing nine causes].”), This
Court has been invited on numerous occa-
sions to expand the scope of section 19-2020
to include other grounds for finding implied
bias; however, this Court has consistently
declined to do so, See, e.g., State v. Lule, 184
Idaho 294, 299, 1 P.8d 795, 800 (2000) (declin-
ing to extend implied bias to jailor/prisoner
relationship); State v. Cypher, 92 Idaho 159,
167-68, 488 P.2d 904, 912-13 (1968) (declining
to extend implied bias to attorney/client rela-
tionship between juror and attorney); State v.
Major, 105 Idaho 4, 7-8, 665 P.2d 708, 706-07
(1983) (same). Such an approach is not only
in line with our own jurisprudence, seg, e9.,
State v. Gordon, 5 Idaho 297, 299, 48 P, 1061,
1062 (1897) (“Our statutes [] specify nine
separate grounds upon which a challenge for
implied bias may be predicated.... We can-
not understand why a rule so long estab-
lished, and which should be familiar to every-
one ... is so uniformly ignored.”); Luke, 184
Idaho at 299, 1 P.8d at 800 (“Because the
legislature saw fit to include the language
‘and for no other’ we will not extend the
statute to situations that are analogous, but
not specifically mentioned.” (quoting State vu.
Bowman, 124 Idaho 986, 942, 866 P.2d 198,
199 (Ct. App. 1998)), but is also in line with
decisions from the Supreme Court of the
United States), See, eg., Dennis v. United
States, 389 U.S. 162, 167, 70 S.Ct. 519, 521,

94 L.Ed. 784, 737 (1950) (declining to find
implied bias where the plaintiff was the State
and jurors were government employees);
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 581, 101
S.Ct, 802, 818, 66 L.Ed.2d 740, 755-56 (1981)
(declining to find bias without a showing of
actual bias). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
noted that the “long held ... remedy for
allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in
which the defendant has the opportunity to
prove actual bias.” Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215,
102 S.Ct, at 945, 71 L.Hd.2d at 85 (emphasis
added). Implied bias is reserved only for
extreme cases. Jd. at 222, 102 S.Ct, at 948, 71
L,Ed.2d at 89-90 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(While each case must turn on its own facts,
there are some extreme situations that would
justify a finding of implied bias.”); Hunley v.
Godinez, 975 F.2d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“Use of the ‘implied bias’ doctrine is certain-
ly the rare exception.”); Tinsley v. Borg, 895
F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990) (asking whether
“this is one of those extreme situations” that
allow a finding of implied bias (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); Fraga, 864 N.W.2d at
622 (Minn. 2015) (“Other courts have found
implied bias in extreme situations... .”).

Hs In determining whether an “extreme
situation” exists each case must turn on its
own facts. Here, there are three specific
reasons why the advisement of the district
court about Lankford’s previous trial and
conviction is not such a situation:

a, The district court did not reveal the out-
come of Lankford’s previous trial but
only stated that there had been a previ-
ous trial and appeal.

As noted earlier, there is a clear distinction
between a reference to a previous trial and a
previous conviction. While the mention of a
previous conviction is certainly very damag-
ing, see, ag., Arthur, 715 F.2d at 119 “[Wle
are hard pressed to think of anything more
damning to an accused than information that
a jury had previously convicted him for the
crime charged.” (quoting United States v.
Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 1978))),
the fact that the jury is aware that a defen-
dant is facing trial for a second time simply
does not carry the same weight. Watkins,

487

152 Idaho at 766, 274 P.8d at 1281 (“We are
not persuaded that this is equivalent to the
disclosure that a previous jury had found him
guilty.”). The fact that a defendant is being
retried, without reference to a defendant’s
conviction or guilt, is no more prejudicial
than the fact that the defendant has been
held to answer to a criminal charge, Such
prejudice is not a basis for relief because it is
neither extreme nor unfair, but rather is an
inevitable part of the criminal process,
Brown, 313 S.W.8d at 607 (“[TJhe fact that
the jury may have been aware that [the
defendant] was being retried no more in-
fringed upon his right to be presumed inno-
cent than does the jury’s awareness that the
defendant was arrested, indicted, and put on
trial.”),

This is particularly true in this case where
the fact of Lankford’s retrial was inevitably
going to come to the jury’s attention. In the
twenty-five year period between Lankford’s
original trial and the retrial, various wit-
nesses had died and as a result their testimo-
ny from the previous trial was read into the
record, Additionally, all the evidence used in
the retrial was still marked with the exhibit
stickers: from the “previous trial. Further,
Lankford’s own witnesses referred to the
prior trial and Lankford’s counsel stated dur-
ing cross-examination of Robert Lankford
that: “And it’s—maybe at Mark’s prior trial,
right, you might have seen him there.” Thus,
even absent the trial judge’s advisement, the
jury was sure to have realized that Lankford
had been previously tried. Such a conse-
quence is inherently part of the criminal
process and cannot be deemed extreme or
unreasonable.

b. There was discussion between counsel and
the Court about how to handle the issue
of the previous trial and defense counsel
did_not_object_at the time the Court
made the statement.

Tf Lankford’s counsel had wished to ensure
that the jury did not hear from the court or
the parties: that there had been a previous
trial, they could have requested that the
court not mention the trial and objected to
any such mention. They did not.

488

Indeed, in a pretrial hearing the district
court specifically discussed mentioning the
previous trial during voir dire with counsel
and explicitly invited defense counsel to pro-
vide advice on how to handle the fact of the
previous trial. Defense counsel recognized
the importance of the issue and stated that
they had discussed mentioning the previous
trial during voir dire as “a potential strate-
gy.” Ultimately the court told defense coun-
sel: “I’m not going to cover it until you signal
to me what your approach is going to be on
it.” Thus, defense counsel had ample oppor-
tunity to address the issue in advance of trial
and request that the previous trial not be
mentioned. Furthermore, defense counsel
questioned potential jurors “about the fact
that they'll be referring at times to prior
hearings and prior trial.”

HE There is “a strong presumption
‘that counsel made all significant decisions in
the exercise of reasonable professional judg-
ment.’” State v, Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,
418, 348 P.8d 1, 83 (quoting Cullen v, Pinhol-
ster, 568 U.S. 170, 195, 181 S.Ct. 1388, 1406-
07, 179 L.Ed.2d 557, 578 (2011). Thus, given
the multiple opportunities for defense coun-
sel to inform the district court as to how they
wanted the fact of a previous trial handled, it
is almost certain that the decision to not
object to the advisement was strategic. Such
“decisions are ‘virtually unchallengea-
ble....’” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Wash-
‘ington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 695 (1984)), Under
these circumstances, the advisement does not
constitute the extreme situation that requires
a finding of implied bias.

¢. The court properly questioned the jurors
whether their knowledge of the previous
trial would cause them to_have actual
bias against_Lankford and properly in-
structed the jurors that they must pre-
sume Lankford innocent regardless of
his prior trial.

As noted previously, the Supreme Court of
the United States has stated that the “long
held ... remedy for allegations of juror par-
tiality is a hearing in which the defendant
has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”
Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 945, 71

L.Ed.2d at 85. Here, the district court, imme-
diately after advising the potential jurors of
the previous trial, specifically questioned
their ability to be impartial: “[I]s there any-
one here who thinks he or she would not be
able to judge the charges against Mr. Lank-
ford because of the earlier trial that Mr.
Lankford went through?” Moreover, at that
same time, the district court also specifically
instructed the jurors that:

As jurors you are not to consider the earli-
er trial and deliberate whether or not Mr.
Lankford is guilty. In other words, you
must presume him to be innocent and
judge the charges against him solely on
the evidence that is presented during this
trial without considering in any manner his
earlier trial.

We presume that “the jury followed the
jury instructions given by the trial court in
reaching its verdict,” Abdullah, 158 Idaho at
445, 348 P.3d at 60, and that, “[allthough not
always dispositive, the court is entitled to
rely on assurances from venire persons con-
cerning partiality or bias.” State v. Hairston,
188 Idaho 496, 506, 988 P.2d 1170, 1180
(1999). Consequently, any effect of the jury’s
awareness of the previous trial was properly
addressed by the district court’s questioning
and instruction,

Therefore, given the specific facts of this
case, specifically that the court did not men-
tion Lankford’s previous finding of guilt or
conviction; that the fact of a previous trial
inevitably was going to come to the jury's
attention; that defense counsel clearly had
multiple opportunities to object to the advise-
ment and did not do so; and that the district
court properly guarded against actual bias by
questioning and instructing the jurors, we
hold that this is not the “extreme situation”
that would require this Court to depart from
our previous decisions denying the expansion
of implied bias. Accordingly, we hold that the
district court’s advisement of Lankford’s pre-
vious trial and appeal did not create an im-
plied bias,

B. The district court did not err in its

jury instructions.

Lankford contends that the district court
committed reversible error by providing the

jury with improper and ambiguous jury in-
structions regarding the legal requirements
necessary to find Lankford guilty of felony
murder. Lankford argues that the court did
not explicitly instruct the jurors that they
had to find that Lankford formed an inde-
pendent intent to rob the Bravences before
they were killed as a prerequisite to convict-
ing him of felony murder. Lankford acknowl-
edges that counsel failed to object to the
instructions at trial but argues that the er-
rors in the jury instructions constitute funda-
mental error because they relieved the State
of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Lankford formed the intent to
commit robbery before the Bravences were
killed.

1. Standard of Review

HE “Whether jury instructions fairly
and adequately present the issues and state
the applicable law is a question of law over
which this Court exercises free review.” State
v. Humpherys, 184 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.38d
652, 654 (2000). Additionally, “[T]he correct-
ness of a jury instruction depends on wheth-
er there is evidence to support the instruc-
tion.” State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588,
261 P.8d 858, 865 (2011). When considering
whether the jury was properly instructed,
“fw]e look at the jury instructions as a whole,
not individually... .” Jd. Finally, “[aln erro-
neous instruction will not constitute revers-
ible error unless the instructions as a whole
misled the jury or prejudiced a party.” Id.

HD “When a party fails to object to
jury instructions this Court reviews the in-
structions for fundamental error. Jd, Funda-
mental error is an error that “so profoundly
distorts the trial that it produces manifest
injustice and deprives the accused of his
fundamental right to due process.” State v.
Lowy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873
(1992), In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228,
245 P.8d 961, 980 (2010), this Court stated
that in order to constitute fundamental error
the defendant must show that the error: “(1)
violates one or more of the defendant’s un-
waived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists
(without the need for any additional informa-
tion not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the fail-

489

ure to object was a tactical decision); and (8)
was not harmless.” In addition, this Court
has held that errors in jury instructions are
fundamental if the error functions to “re-
lieve[] the State of its duty to prove all
elements of the charges beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.8d at
865; see also State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho
743, 749, 170 P.8d 886, 892 (2007) (“The
United States Supreme Court has held that
in criminal trials ‘the State must prove every
element of the offense, and a jury instruction
violates due process if it fails to give effect to
that requirement.’” (quoting Middleton v.
MeNeil, 541 U.S, 488, 487, 124 S.Ct. 1830,
1832-88, 158 L.Hd.2d 701, 706-07 (2004))).

2 The district_court’s jury instructions
did not constitute error,

HM Lankford is correct in asserting that
to be guilty of felony murder Lankford must
have individually formed the intent to rob the
Bravences before they were killed. State v.
Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 2338 P.8d 71, 78
(2010) (“Idaho’s felony murder rule requires
a finding that each participant had the specif-
ie intent to commit the underlying felony.”).
It is equally true that Lankford could not be
guilty of felony murder if he was an accesso-
ry after the fact. State v. Cheatham, 184
Idaho 565, 571, 6 P.8d 815, 821 (2000) (“The
general rationale behind the felony murder
rule is that the intent to commit the felony
substitutes for the malice requirement.
Where the intent to commit the felony does
not arise until after the homicide has oc-
curred, the rationale behind the rule no long-
er applies.”), Thus, if the district court re-
lieved the State of having to prove that
Lankford had the intent to commit robbery
before the Bravences were killed, or instruct-
ed the jury that they could find Lankford
guilty even if he was only an accessory after
the fact, then the instructions constituted
fundamental error. Draper, 151 Idaho at 588,
261 P.3d at 865.

Here, the district court correctly instruct-
ed the jury. Jury Instruction No. 11 clearly
states that to find Lankford guilty of first
degree murder the state must prove that
Lankford “was a principal to or aided and
abetted in the commission of a robbery dur-

490

ing which an unlawful killing of Robert [and
Cheryl] Bravence occurred.” Jury Instrue-
tion 12 explicitly states:

In order to find Mark Lankford guilty of
Murder in the First Degree, you must first
find the following beyond a reasonable
doubt:

1, Mark Lankford intended to commit
the act of robbery against the per-
sons of Robert and/or Cheryl Bra-
vence;

2. Mark Lankford formed the intent to
commit the act of robbery prior to
the commission of the homicide(s).

If you cannot find both of the above
elements are true beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find Mark Lankford not
guilty of Murder in the First Degree.

Jury Instructions 13-19 then explain the el-
ements necessary for the commission of
robbery and instruct on the meaning of
perpetration and aiding and abetting. Jury
Instruction 19A gives the definition of ac-
cessory after the fact:

Idaho law defines “Accessories” as per-
sons who, having knowledge that a felony
has been committed, unlawfully conceal it
from a peace officer, or harbor and protect
the person charged with or convicted
thereof.

Should you conclude that the defendant,
Mark Henry Lankford, was merely an ac-
cessory after the fact, rather than a princi-
pal to the murders of Robert Bravence
and/or Cheryl Bravence, you must acquit
him of the respective count(s) for which he
is now charged.

Taken as a whole, these instructions clear-
ly state that Lankford could not be found
guilty of felony murder without: (1) commit-
ting robbery against the Bravences; and (2)
forming the intent “to commit the act of
robbery against the persons of Robert and/or
Cheryl Bravence ... prior to the commission
of the homicide(s).” Further, Jury Instruc-
tion 19A makes it categorically clear that if
the jury believed Lankford’s version of
events and found that he was only an acces-

3, Lankford testified that Bryan, not Lankford,
formed the intent to steal the Bravences’ van;
that Lankford left the campsite; that Bryan pro-
ceeded to rob and murder the Bravences on his

sory after the fact they “must acquit him of
the respective count(s) for which he is now
charged.”

Lankford attempts to make much of a
colloquy that took place during the defense’s
closing argument to support his claim that
that district court erred and that the jury
instructions were ambiguous and misleading.
The exchange is as follows:

Defense Counsel: [Jury Instruction No. 13]

says, on or about June 21st, in the State of

Idaho, Robert and Cheryl Bravence had

possession of personal property which

Mark Henry Lankford took from their per-

son or immediate possession against their

will. And this is the reason you can’t rob a

dead person—

Prosecutor: Your honor, I object. I don’t

think that is a correct statement of the

law.

‘The Court: I don’t either. Well, ladies and

gentlemen, I’ve instructed you on the law,

so go to my instructions and refer to that.
Lankford argues that, by agreeing with the
prosecutor, the district court erroneously im-
plied that “as a matter of law, you can rob a
dead person,” and as a result, even if the
jurors believed that Lankford did not do
anything but help conceal the bodies and
take property from the Bravences after
Bryan killed them, Lankford’s own testimony
about what happened would have required
the jury to find Lankford guilty of robbery
and thus felony murder.*

Idaho follows the “stream of
events” theory. See, eg., State v. McLeskey,
188 Idaho 691, 697-98, 69 P.8d 111, 117-18
(2003), Under this theory, a defendant is
guilty of felony murder as long as the defen-
dant formed the intent to commit the rob-
bery before the victim died, whether the
victim’s personal property is taken before or
after the death occurs is immaterial. See
State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 771-72, 710
P.2d 1202, 1207-08 (1986) (holding that a
burglary continued after the victim was
killed and until the victim’s possessions were

own; and Lankford helped Bryan conceal the

bodies only after Bryan had committed the rob-
bery and murders.

removed from the home). Thus, while defen-
dants cannot commit robbery by taking the
personal property of people who were al-
ready dead when the defendant found them,
defendants can commit robbery by forming
the intent to commit robbery before the vie-
tim is killed and then taking the victim’s
personal property after the death. Thus, be-
cause the element of robbery that requires
that the defendant “take personal property in
the possession of another” can occur after
the victim has died, it is not incorrect to state
that “you can rob a dead person.” Further,
any ambiguity that may have arisen from the
colloquy was ameliorated by the district
court’s direction to “go to my instructions
and refer to that,” because the jury instruc-
tions clearly stated that to find Lankford
guilty the jury had to find that Lankford
formed the intent to rob the Bravences be-
fore their deaths and that, if the jury found
that Lankford was only an accessory after
the fact, they “must acquit him.”

Therefore, because the district court did
not misstate the law and because the jury
instructions clearly state that Lankford had
to form the intent to commit robbery before
the Bravences’ deaths and that Lankford
could not be convicted if he was merely an
accessory after the fact, the jury instructions
did not “relieve[] the State of its duty to
prove all elements of the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Draper, 151 Idaho at 588,
261 P.8d at 865. Thus, the first Perry
prong—that one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights be violated—
has not been met. Because we find no error
in the district court’s instructions we do not
reach the issue of invited error.

C. The district court did not err by deny-
ing Lankford’s request for a new trial
based on the provisions of Idaho Code
section 19-2405,

Lankford argues that the district court
erred when it denied his motion for a new
trial based on violations of Idaho Code sec-
tion 19-2405, Lankford makes two arguments
in this regard: (1) the plain language of sec-
tion 19-2405 stating that “all testimony must
be produced anew” explicitly disallows the
use of prior sworn testimony from a previous

491

trial; and (2) language in section 19-2405
stating that “the former verdict cannot be
used or referred to either in evidence or in
argument” specifically prevented the district
court from mentioning that there had been a
previous trial.

1. Standard of Review

HEME Generally, “{tJhe denial of a mo-
tion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 189,
144, 191 P.8d 217, 222 (2008). This Court
applies a three-part test when evaluating dis-
eretionary decisions of the trial court. We
consider “(1) whether the trial court correct-
ly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of this discretion and consistent
with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (8) wheth-
er the trial court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.” Fox v. Mountain West
Glee, Inc., 187 Idaho 708, 711, 62 P.8d 848,
856 (2002).

HM This case presents somewhat of an
exception to the standard of review which we
traditionally apply to decisions on a motion
for new trial. Here, Judge Judd, who presid-
ed over the proceedings for new trial, was
not the judge who heard the evidence pre-
sented at trial. Judge Judd did preside over a
three-day evidentiary hearing on the second
motion for new trial. Thus, we defer to his
factual findings based upon the evidence pre-
sented to him, This reflects the deference
that we traditionally accord factual findings
in light of “the trial judge’s special opportuni-
ty to assess and weigh the credibility of the
‘witnesses who appear.” State v. Tierney, 109
Idaho 474, 476, 708 P.2d 879, 881 (1985).

HHI Such deference does not, however,
extend to the district court’s evaluation of the
evidence presented in earlier proceedings, as
Judge Judd relied on the same record as is
before this Court. “[W]here a motion for a
new trial is heard and passed upon by a
judge who did not preside at the trial of the
case, and an appeal is taken .,. the appellate
court must ‘examine and weigh the evidence
the same as the nisi prius court should do.”
Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 Idaho 747, 750-51,
968 P.2d 1184, 1187-88 (1998) (quoting Van

492

Camp v. Emery, 13 Idaho 202, 207, 89 P, 752,
754 (1907). “Under these limited circum-
stances, this Court has determined that its
role on appeal is to freely review the evi-
dence and weigh the evidence in the same
manner as the trial court would do when
ruling on a motion for new trial.” Id, at 751,
968 P.2d at 1188 (citing Nafus v. Campbell,
96 Idaho 366, 368, 529 P.2d 266, 268 (1974)).

HE “This Court reviews questions of
law de novo.” State, Dep’t of Health & Wel-
fare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.38d
821, 825 (2004). “The interpretation of a stat-
ute is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review.” State v. Herren, 157
Idaho 722, 725, 339 P.8d 1126, 1129 (2014).

2. Whether Idaho Code section 19-2405
allows the use of sworn testimony from
aprevious trial

Idaho Code section 19-2405 provides:
The granting of a new trial places the
parties in the same position as if no trial
had been had, All the testimony must be
produced anew, and the former verdict can
not be used or referred to either in evi-
dence or in argument.

HM Lankford argues that the phrase “all
testimony must be produced anew” requires
that testimony in the new trial must be sub-
mitted by live witnesses and not by tran-
scripts from the first trial. This is true,
Lankford contends, even if the witnesses are
unavailable, In support of this argument
Lankford relies on a Montana case, State ex
rel. Mazurek v. District Court of Twentieth
Judicial Dist., 302 Mont. 39, 22 P.3d 166, 169
(2000), and an Oklahoma statute, 22 Oxia.
Star. Ann. § 951(A). Lankford’s reliance is
misplaced,

This Court has consistently and clearly
held that only the Idaho Rules of Evidence,
as promulgated by this Court, determine the
admissibility of evidence. See IR.E. 1102
(Statutory provisions and rules governing
the admissibility of evidence, to the extent
they are evidentiary and to the extent that
they are in conflict with applicable rules of
Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or
effect.”); State v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho
375, 382, 360 P.3d 1056, 1063 (2015) (“[Alny

statute pertaining to the admission of evi-
dence is of no force or effect where an Idaho
Rule of Evidence covers the same subject
matter.”); State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho
971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992) (“{To the
extent that this statute attempts to prescribe
the admissibility of hearsay evidence ... it is
of no force or effect.”). Thus, in determining
whether the phrase “all testimony must be
produced anew” precludes the use of prior
sworn testimony from unavailable witnesses,
Lankford should have first looked to the
Idaho Rules of Evidence rather than the
jurisprudence of sister states.

Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, prior
testimony of an unavailable declarant is ad-
missible if (1) it is relevant, and (2) it com-
ports with the requirements of Idaho Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if it
tends “to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” LR.E. 401.
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804, prior
testimony is admissible when: (1) the declar-
ant is unavailable as a witness and (2) the
party against whom the testimony is offered
had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony. A declarant is unavail-
able when, among other things, he or she is
“anable to be present or to testify at the
hearing because of death....” I.R.H. 804(a).

Here, the challenged testimony is from
witnesses who testified in the first trial but
died before the second trial. Because they
are deceased, these witnesses were clearly
unavailable under Rule 804(a) “to be present
or to testify” at the second trial. Further,
because the testimony was given in the first
trial for the same charges, the defense “had
an opportunity and similar motive to develo
the testimony” as required by Rule 804(b)(1).
The relevance of the challenged testimony is
not disputed. Thus, because the witnesses
were unavailable and because the testimony
was “given as a witness at another hearing of
the same or a different proceeding ... [and]
the party against whom the testimony is now
offered ... had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination” the testimony
was admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence

804, Accordingly, because the testimony was
admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evi-
dence, Lankford’s reliance on Idaho Code
section 19-2405 is misplaced, State v, How-
ard, 150 Idaho 471, 477, 248 P.8d 722, 728
(2011) (“To the extent that this statute at-
tempts to prescribe the admissibility of hear-
say evidence and is in conflict with the Idaho
Rules of Evidence, it is of no force or effect.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). This Court has unequivocally held that.
“(t]he testimony of a deceased witness, given
at a former trial, may be read as evidence at
a subsequent trial between the same parties
and involving the same issues.” State v.
Johnston, 62 Idaho 601, 612, 118 P.2d 809,
814 (1941). Idaho Code section 19-2405 does
not provide a basis for departing from this
rule and the district court did not abuse its
discretion by permitting testimony from the
first trial to be read into the record in the
second trial.

8. Whether Idaho Code section 19-2405
prevented the district court from refer-

ring to the previous trial

HI Lankford also argues that the dis-
trict court’s mention of a prior trial during
voir dive violated Idaho Code section 19-2405
and requires a new trial. The statute pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that “the former
verdict cannot be used or referred to either
in evidence or in argument.” As discussed
above, the district court did not refer to a
prior verdict, See Part II.A.8, supra. Rather,
the district court only referred to a previous
trial and appeal. A reference to a “previous
trial” during voir dire does not violate section
19-2405. See State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764,
766, 274 P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 2012) (“We
are not persuaded that [the mention of a
prior trial] is equivalent to the disclosure that
a previous jury had found him guilty.”).

4, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,

10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

5. Napue v. Ilinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173,
3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).

6. Idaho Criminal Rule 34 presently provides
that, upon motion of the defendant, the trial

493

D. Lankford is entitled to a new trial due
to prosecutorial misconduct.

Lankford alleges multiple instances of
prosecutorial misconduct which he contends
warrants a new trial. Lankford alleges that
the prosecutor: (1) elicited improper testimo-
ny from witnesses about Lankford’s prior
bad acts and conviction; (2) improperly called
Lankford a liar and vouched for his own
witnesses during closing statements; and (8)
suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation
of Brady + and Napue.' In addition, Lankford
argues that even if no single instance of
misconduct warrants a new trial, the cumula-
tive effect of the misconduct does.

In its initial appellate briefing, the State
addressed the substantive issues presented
by Lankford’s claim of prosecutorial miscon-
duct. In its briefing in support of the petition
for rehearing, the State observes that Lank-
ford raised his Brady and Napue claims by
way of a motion for new trial and vigorously
argues that such claims may not be raised
under Idaho Code section 19-2406. Indeed,
this Court has “consistently recognized” that
the grounds enumerated in the statute are
the exclusive grounds upon which a defen-
dant’s motion for new trial may be granted.
State v. Page, 185 Idaho 214, 228, 16 P.8d
890, 899 (2000). Likewise, we have held that
Idaho Criminal Rule 34° “does not provide
and independent ground for a new trial.”
State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 678, 675, 981 P.2d
1191, 1198 (1997). Accordingly, we have re-
peatedly stated that prosecutorial misconduct
is not a basis for granting a motion for new
trial under Idaho Code section 19-2406. See
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 468, 469, 163
P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007); Page, 185 Idaho at
228, 16 P.3d at 899; State v. Jones, 127 Idaho
478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995),

HM Although a defendant’s motion for
new trial may not rest upon claims of prose-
cutorial misconduct, we regularly review such
claims on direct appeal to determine whether

court “may grant a new trial to the defendant if
required in the interest of justice.” The rule has
been amended, effective July 1, 2017. The new
rule eliminates the reference to “the interest of
justice” and simply provides that “[oln the defen-
dant’s motion, the court may vacate any judg-
ment and grant a new trial on any ground per-
mitted by statute.” I.C.R. 34(a) (2017).

494

the judgment should be vacated and a new
trial granted. See, eg., State v. Parker, 157
Idaho 182, 834 P.8d 806 (2014). As this is the
direct appeal from Lankford’s judgment, we
will consider his claims of prosecutorial mis-
conduct,

1. Standard of Review

HE “Where prosecutorial misconduct
was not objected to during trial, this Court
may only reverse when that misconduct con-
stitutes a fundamental error.” State v. Adam~-
cil, 152 Idaho 445, 480, 272 P.8d 417, 452
(2012) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
227, 245 P.8d 961, 979 (2010)). “Where a
defendant demonstrates that prosecutorial
misconduct has occurred, and such miscon-
duct was followed by a contemporaneous ob-
jection by defense counsel, such error shall
be reviewed for harmless error,...” Perry,
150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.8d at 979. Funda-
mental error is error that; “(1) violates one
or more of the defendant’s unwaived consti-
tutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the
need for any additional information not con-
tained in the appellate record, including in-
formation as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision); and (8) was not
harmless.” Id. at 228, 245 P.8d at 980. An
error is harmless when it is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not con-
tribute to the jury’s verdict. Id, at 227, 245
P.8d at 979.

2 Analysis

The first step in considering
Lankford’s claim that the State engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct is to determine
whether the alleged conduct actually rises to
the level of prosecutorial misconduct. “Where
a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on
any factor other than the law as set forth in
the jury instructions and the evidence admit-
ted during trial, including reasonable infer-
ences that may be drawn from that evidence,
this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.” Id, It is the
prosecutor’s duty to “see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and that nothing but compe-
tent evidence is submitted to the jury. [Pros-
ecutors] should not exert their skill and inge-
nuity to see how far they can trespass upon

the verge of error, because generally in so
doing they transgress upon the rights of the
accused.” Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 469, 168
P.8d at 1181 (citations omitted). “However, in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial miscon-
duct the Court must keep in mind the reali-
ties of trial. A fair trial is not necessarily a
perfect trial.” State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho
58, 62, 258 P.8d 727, 786 (2011) (citation
omitted).

a. Whether testimony from witnesses about
Lankford’s prior trial, prior crimes and
bad acts, prior incarceration, and prior
death sentence was improperly elicited
by the prosecutor

The district court made a pretrial ruling in

which the court ruled that evidence of Lank-
ford’s “prior conviction, prior charges, [and]
prior incarceration, are not admissible.”
Lankford argues that the prosecutor violated
this ruling when questioning Lane Thomas
(Thomas) and Bryan by eliciting testimony
about Lankford’s prior trial, conviction,
crimes and bad acts, incarceration, and death
sentence. In response, the State argues that
the testimony was not intentionally elicited
by the prosecutor but was volunteered by the
witnesses and therefore was not prosecutori-
al misconduct,

HM We have held that a violation of a
district court’s ruling regarding the admissi-
bility of evidence constitutes prosecutorial
misconduct, State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
572, 165 P.8d 278, 286 (2007). This is true
even when the prosecutor does not directly
violate the ruling but attempts to “skirt
around the district court’s ruling.” Parker,
157 Idaho at 144, 834 P.8d at 818,

We initially observe that the district court
did not prohibit reference to Lankford’s prior
trial. Indeed, as discussed previously in Part
ILA, the district court itself referred to the
previous trial, as did defense counsel. Thus,
the references to the prior trial complained
of by Lankford, for the reasons stated earli-
er, were neither misconduct nor error. Part
ILA, supra,

i Thomas’ Testimony
HS Lankford’s first complaint relates to
the prosecutor’s questioning of Thomas.

Thomas shared a unit with Lankford in the
Latah County Jail. Thomas testified that
Lankford confessed to the murders over a
period of three or four days while they
played dominoes. Thomas further testified
that he did not approach the State about
testifying, but that the State approached him
after one of the correctional officers over-
heard Thomas telling his girlfriend about
Lankford’s confession during a monitored
telephone call. While laying foundation for
Thomas’ testimony, the prosecutor asked
Thomas:

Q: Did [Lankford] ever tell you what he

was in for?

A: Yes.

Q; And did he ever talk about the charges?

A: Yes.

Q: What did he say about them?

A: He said that he was in—he’s been on

death row for 23 years for two murders,

and that was committed in Grangeville.

Although the prosecutor’s question about
the charges (“What did he say about them?”)
can be viewed as calculated to elicit a re-
sponse about the nature of the prior charges
against Lankford, we are unable to conclude
that the question sought an answer reflecting
the outcome of the earlier charges. Stated
differently, asking Thomas what Lankford
had said about the charges against him can-
not be interpreted as asking Thomas what
Lankford had said about the earlier outcome
of the charges against him. We are unable to
conclude that Thomas’ statement was the
product of prosecutorial misconduct.

ii, Bryan’s Testimony

HMM Lankford next contends that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct when
questioning Bryan about a camera Lankford
sold to his brother Robert, what Bryan and
Lankford did when they got to Sheep Creek
Campground, why Bryan left Texas, and why
Bryan changed his story while in prison,

‘When questioning Bryan about the camera
that Lankford sold to his brother, the prose-
cutor asked:

Q: Did you get any money from that pur-

chase?

495

A: I didn’t know for sure that it was
actually ever—money transpired, I
thought maybe he might have just ulti-
mately gave it to him for some drugs or
something, because I remember drugs in-
volved in it,
{Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going
to object, and move to strike.
The Court: I will—that is not responsive. I
will instruct you to disregard that, ladies
and gentlemen, about the drugs.
The prosecutor’s questioning of Bryan re-
garding what he and Lankford did once they
got to Sheep Creek proceeded as follows:
Q: What did you and Mark do when you
got to that camp?
A: We had—before we got to the camp we
had stopped and sat on a big rock on the
river, And we had talked about this, be-
cause he wanted to steal the car. I was
opposed to stealing the car. I should[]
have been more adamant about it but obvi-
ously I wasn’t. We were a little inebriated,
too, by the way. We were drinking from
the canteen which was—I think it was
Jack Daniels in the canteen. But anyway
that notwithstanding we still talked there
and then ultimately I agreed to help be a
watchout because he had stolen cars before
and I had never stolen a car so—.
The prosecutor's examination of Bryan about
why he left Texas:
Q: Bryan, did there come a time in 1983
when you left Texas?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I left myself because I was on proba-
tion, and I had got a ticket because I was
drinking, Friend of mine, and because I
‘was on probation I talked to my probation
officer who was brand new, and he said I
‘was going to go to prison. So I was scared
of prison because what [Lankford] told me
about prison, where he had been,
When Bryan was discussing why he changed
his story while in prison:
A: ... ve said several different stories to
try to survive in prison ... I changed my
story because I thought I was going to be
killed or what have you.
Q: By who?

496

A: No. I’m saying that’s not the only rea-
son I changed it.

Q: I know, but you said you thought that
you would be killed. And I asked by who?
A: Oh, by the gang members or friends of
[Lankford]. That’s a serious business in
prison.

Q: Did you ever talk to [Lankford] about

any of your other statements?

A; Oh sure.

Q; And prior to making them?

A: Oh, yes. We were on death row together

for a long time.

Bryan’s testimony about the drugs, the
prior car thefts, and prior incarcerations do
not appear to have been intentionally elicited
by the prosecutor. Nonetheless, we have held
that “a prosecutor must ‘guard against any-
thing that would prejudice the minds of the
jurors, and tend to hinder them from consid-
ering only the evidence introduced.’ A prose-
cutor must also ensure that the jury receives
only competent evidence.” State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.8d 414, 485 (2009)
(citations omitted) (quoting State v. Irwin, 9
Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). In State
v. Ellington, we stated that a police officer’s
“gratuitous and prejudicial response is im-
puted to the State, whether or not the State
intended to elicit that response.” 151 Idaho
58, 67, 258 P.8d 727, 741 (2011). In so doing
we noted that the officer's response to the
question was “completely unsolicited and
wholly unnecessary.” The same can be said
here of Bryan’s responses. While it is true
that Bryan is not a police officer or an officer
of the State, the prosecutor had the duty to
ensure that Bryan provided only competent
evidence. Bryan’s statements about drugs,
stolen cars, and Lankford’s prison gang affili-
ation were improper and inadmissible and
were clearly prejudicial. While a prosecutor
certainly cannot be held responsible for ev-
ery remark a witness might make, under the
facts of this case—where the outcome of the
trial turned solely on the credibility of the
witnesses—presenting such prejudicial evi-
dence could have potentially affected the out-
come of the trial. It was incumbent upon the
prosecutor to conform to the pretrial ruling
precluding much of this inadmissible evi-

dence and to instruct the State’s witnesses to
avoid mention of the prohibited evidence.

b. Whether the prosecutor’s misconduct
yvegarding Bryan’s testimony requires
the judgment to be vacated

HE Having determined that some of
the prosecutor’s questioning of Bryan consti-
tuted misconduct, we now consider whether
such conduct requires the judgment to be
vacated. The statement by Bryan about
drugs was objected to by the defense but the
remaining statements by Bryan were not
objected to. Thus, the testimony about drugs
is reviewed for harmless error and the re-
maining statements are reviewed for funda-
mental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
2277, 245 P.8d 961, 979 (2010).

Immediately following Bryan’s statement
about drugs being exchanged for the camera,
defense counsel objected and the district
court sustained the objection stating: “[T]hat
is not responsive, I will instruct you to disre-
gard that, ladies and gentlemen, about the
drugs.” There is no evidence to suggest that
the jury did not follow this instruction.
Therefore, although the statement was im-
proper, because the district court sustained
the objection and instructed the jury to dis-
regard the statement we are satisfied that
the statement did not affect the outcome of
the trial. State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71, 74, 437
P.2d 24, 27 (1968) (“[IIn Idaho an error in
admission of evidence may be cured by a
proper instruction, and it must be presumed
that the jury obeyed the trial court’s instrue-
tion to disregard entirely the objectionable
testimony.”),

HM The prosecutor's remaining ques-
tions and the witnesses’ responses were not
objected to and are reviewed for fundamental
error. “We have stated that ‘where ... the
asserted error relates not to infringement
upon a constitutional right, but to violation of
a rule or statute ... the fundamental error
doctrine is not invoked.’ ” Perry, 150 Idaho at
226, 245 P.8d at 978 (quoting State v. Kirk-
wood, 111 Idaho 628, 626, 726 P.2d 735, 738
(1986) (internal quotation marks around “fun-
damental error” omitted). “Nowhere in Per-
ry did this Court suggest that erroneous

introduction of evidence ‘violates a defen-
dant’s constitutional right to a jury trial’”
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 845, 370, 318 P.8d
1, 26 (2018), Rather, evidentiary errors “do
not implicate constitutional considerations
unless ‘the error results in the defendant
being deprived [of] his or her Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to a fair trial
in a fair tribunal.’” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 417,
299 P.3d 219, 224 (2018). Here, although the
prosecutor’s conduct violated the district
court’s evidentiary ruling, it did not affect
Lankford’s Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess right to a fair trial. Thus, the first Perry
element is not met and Lankford has failed
to establish fundamental error.

¢. Whether the prosecutor’s statements
in closing argument_constituted
misconduct

Lankford contends that the prosecuting
attorney committed misconduct during his
closing argument by vouching for the credi-
bility of the State’s witnesses and by calling
Lankford a liar. Lankford also insists that
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in his
rebuttal argument. The State asserts that
Lankford has not established prosecutorial
misconduct, and that even if there was mis-
conduct, Lankford has failed to show that
such misconduct rose to the level of funda-
mental error.

HE Lankford did not object to any of
the statements he now seeks to challenge.
We review unobjected to errors for funda-
mental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245
P.8d at 978, “Whether comments during clos-
ing arguments rise to the level of fundamen-
tal error is a question that must be analyzed
in the context of the trial as a whole.” State
v. Carson, 151 Idaho 718, 718-19, 264 P.38d
54, 59-60 (2011). “Prosecutorial misconduct
during closing arguments will constitute fun-
damental error only if the comments were so
egregious or inflammatory that any conse-
quent prejudice could not have been remed-
ied by a ruling from the trial court informing
the jury that the comments should be disre-
garded.” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 182, 146,
834 P.3d 806, 820 (2014). “The relevant ques-
tion is whether the prosecutors’ comments

497

‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 US.
168, 181, 106 S.Ct, 2464, 2471-72, 91 L.Hd.2d
144, 157 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChris-
toforo, 416 U.S, 687, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871-
72, 40 L.Ed.2d 481, 486-87 (1974).

i, Vouching Statements

HE “Vouching consists of placing the
prestige of the government behind a witness
through personal assurances of the witness’
veracity, or suggesting that information not
presented to the jury supports the witness’s
testimony.” United States v, Necoechea, 986
F.2d 1278, 1276 (9th Cir, 1998), However,
prosecutors may “argue reasonable infer-
ences based on the evidence, including that
one of the two sides is lying. Furthermore,
prosecutors are permitted to respond to de-
fense counsel’s attempts to impeach the cred-
ibility of government witnesses.” United
States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 540 (9th Cir,
2011). (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). As we stated in State v, Dunlap:

There is [ ] considerable latitude in closing

argument, and both sides are entitled to

discuss fully, from their respective stand-
points, the evidence and the inferences
that should be drawn from it. Unlike an
opening statement, in a closing argument,
the parties are entitled to explain how,
from their own perspectives, the evidence
confirms or calls into doubt the credibility
of particular witnesses. However, the pros-
ecutor may not express a personal belief as
to the credibility of witnesses, unless the
comment is based solely on inferences
from evidence presented at trial, nor make
personal attacks on defense counsel....
155 Idaho 345, 369, 313 P.38d 1, 25 (2013)
(citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted).

The comments which Lankford contends
constituted improper vouching are empha-
sized and shown below in the context in
which they occurred:

e If you remember when he got the ride

from Darrel Cox he said that—Darrel
Cox said that Mark Lankford told him
that his family had come camping to
Idaho with him and that he needed a

498

ride to McAlister Campground and that
he was going to meet his family at
MeAlister Campground. Why would
Mark Lankford lie about that? It
doesn’t make any sense. It shows that,
he’s a liar, And as we go through these
different things you will see a pattern
here. You will see that Mark Lankford
is a lar. Now, Darrel Cow had no rea-
son to male that up. He had no reason
to lie today. He was inconvenienced,
I’m sure, to come in and be a witness
in this case, but he told the truth,
Again, the defense when they first
talked to you said we were going to
show you all these lies and deceptions.
We've shown you good people that have
come up and been honest. We've shown
you good evidence, overwhelming evi-
dence. And now the tables are turned.
Lane Thomas, basically with his life
on the line, came in and testified in
front of you. He had no reason to lie.
He did not get a plea bargain from the
State, The only thing that we agreed to
do was write a letter of cooperation
that if he testified I would write a
letter saying he came in and told the
truth. And that I would submit that to
the Judge on his case and to the prison
facility in Cottonwood, which is a six-
month prison facility where he’s serv-
ing what they call a rider program,
That overwhelming evidence is, one,
the testimony of Lane Thomas that
puts Mark Lankford there. A credible
person that puts him there. Mark
Lankford’s confession to him,

Td ask you to think about Lane Thom-
as’ testimony. I think we had a person
there that didn’t want to be here. He
said—he said he didn’t want to be here.
He said that his life had been threat-
ened by Mr. Lankford and that his life
had been Hell since he got involved in
this case. Yet, even facing that he came
in and testified for nothing, nothing
except a letter. And I submit that he
told the truth about Mark Lankford’s
confession to him, about him being
there with Bryan Lankford and partici-
pating in these murders.

HH Here, the statement about Cox be-
ing inconvenienced and telling the truth is
vouching, There is no evidence to support the
assertion by the prosecutor that Cox “was
inconvenienced, I’m sure, to come in and be a
witness in this case, but he told the truth.”
However, this vouching was harmless be-
cause defense counsel told the jury that
“{tThere’s no reason to disbelieve what Mr.
Cox says.” Further, vouching statements, al-
though constituting prosecutorial misconduct,
do not constitute a clear constitutional viola-
tion, Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 370, 318 P.8d at
26 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 229, 245 P.3d
at 981), The statement regarding Cox does
not rise to the level of fundamental error.

HH The remaining statements about the
truthfulness of the State’s witnesses includ-
ing the general statement “We've shown you
good people that have come up and been
honest” and the specific statements about
Thomas’ truthfulness are not vouching be-
cause defense counsel opened the door to
discussion of the State’s witnesses’ veracity.
Defense counsel asserted the following in his
opening statement: “You're going to find that
a lot of the testimony that they're going to
have from witnesses in this case is going to
be based on deception, and some of the wit-
nesses in this case are going to speculate. So,
the State’s case is based on lies, deception,
and speculation,” Having opened the door to
the subject of the veracity of the State’s
witnesses, the defense “should not be sur-
prised to see the prosecutor enter.” United
States v. Dorsey, 677 F.8d 944, 954 (2012).
Under these circumstances, the statement
that the State has provided “good people that
have come up and been honest” was not
impermissible vouching,

HN This is likewise the case for the
prosecutor’s statements about Thomas’ ve-
racity. During cross-examination, defense
counsel asked Thomas whether he was get-
ting anything from the State in exchange for
his testimony. Defense counsel implied that
Thomas was a liar and attempted to impeach
him by showing that Thomas had previously
lied about what he heard Lankford say about
the murders:

Q; “And do you remember making—telling
advising Mr. Schoonover that what you
had told Mr. Renshaw—or, excuse me, Ms.
Renshaw and Mr. Mealer was a lie?

A: I told him that out of fear,

Q: So when you told Mr. Schoonover that
you made it up, ‘that it was all a fabrica-
tion in my own fucking mind that Mark
had something to do with it, that was a
lie?

A: Everything I said to Mr, Schoonover

was a lie.”

In closing argument, defense counsel stated
“(The prosecutor] didn’t mention anything
about what they were going to testify to, not
anything about Robert, Lane [Thomas], Lee
John, and Bryan. And you know why he
didn’t tell you in his opening statement what
they were going to testify to? He didn’t trust
them. He didn’t know what they were going
to testify to. He knew they were liars.” (em-
phasis added). Defense counsel argued that
“Lane Thomas is an admitted liar” and
“{Thomas] has a reputation for dishonesty, a
reputation as a liar.” Thus, because the de-
fense opened the door regarding Thomas’
veracity, the prosecutor’s comments did not
constitute improper vouching. Wilkes, 662
F.8d at 540 (“[S]tatements made by the pros-
ecution do not constitute improper vouching
where the argument that witnesses had no
motive to lie is a permissible response to the
defense counsel’s earlier attacks on the wit-
nesses’ credibility”).

Furthermore, the prosecutor’s argument
that Thomas told the truth, testified for noth-
ing more than a letter, did not get a plea
bargain, and faced possible physical danger
was not vouching because the statements
were “based [] on inferences from evidence
presented at trial” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 369,
818 P.8d at 25. Both the prosecution and the
defense asked Thomas what he would receive
in exchange for his testimony. In response to
both, he responded that he was not getting a
plea bargain but only a letter. Thomas also
testified that he faced possible physical retri-
bution from Lankford for testifying. The
prosecutor’s statements did not reflect the
prosecutor’s personal belief about Thomas’
truthfulness, but were inferences from the

499

record. These statements were not impermis-
sible vouching. Jd.; United States v. Necoe-
chea, 986 F.2d 1278, 1279 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding that “I submit” statements of truth-
fulness were not vouching but inferences
from the record),

ii, Liar/L, Statements

HH The statements in which Lankford
contends the prosecutor committed miscon-
duet by calling Lankford a liar are as follows:

1, Mark Lankford testified in this case,
and there was [sic] many lies that he
told you. ©

2, [Mark] Lied [sic] to Darrell Cox about
where he was going and who he was
going to meet.

3, It shows that he’s a liar.

4, You will see Mark Lankford is a liar.

5, Well, Mark lied. He said, I don’t know
anything about any murders, and I
don’t know anything about any stolen
van. That was a lie,

6. So he lied to you on the stand when he
talked about the kind of money he had
when he left Texas and when he came
back from Texas.

7. He lied to Robert Lankford about the
money he had when he left Texas,

.8. He lied to Robert Lankford when he
got back to Texas about why he left his
car in Idaho.

9. He lied about that. He lied about hav-
ing money when he left and when he
returned,

10, He lied about going to the Frank
Church River of No Return Wilder-
ness, - .

11. He lied about having access to the
hatchback door on the Camaro,

12. Again, another lie.

18. He lied about his use of the night-

, stick,

14, He basically lied about the cireum-
stances of that nightstick.

15. He lied about having to use the rest-
room at McAlister [sic].

16, I find it strange that these people he
allegedly says gave him an alibi de-

500

fense have never been found.... I
submit that there is nobody that gave
him a ride, and that that’s a made-up
story. That’s another of his lies,

We note that defense counsel initiated the
theme in his opening statement by calling the
State’s witnesses liars and specifically calling
Bryan a liar, stating:

You're going to find that a lot of the

testimony that they're going to have from

witnesses in this case is going to be based
on deception, and some of the witnesses in
this case are going to speculate. So, the

State’s case is based on lies, deception, and

speculation. You're not going to know what

Bryan Lankford ‘is going to testify to until

he actually gets upon on the stand, Bryan

Lankford, by my count, has said at least 15

to 20 different times about what happened.

that night. Many times under oath in prior
court proceedings, many times in sworn
affidavits, many times in letters, many
times in interviews with the police and the

FBI agents. He’s a liar, and when he testi-

fies you're going to see that.

Further, Lankford himself admitted to ly-
ing at various points in the trial. Thus, al-
though the repeated use of the term “liar”
and its various grammatical forms is trov-
bling and ill-advised, it did not rise to the
level of prosecutorial misconduct. State v.
Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19, 189 P.8d 477, 481
(Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he prosecutor's excessive
use of the term ‘liar’ is troubling but did not
amount to misconduct given that [the defen-
dant] placed his credibility in issue and ad-
mitted to lying in connection with the case.”);
Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S, 61, 69, 120
S.Ct. 1119, 1125, 146 L.Ed.2d 47, 55-56
(2000) (“The prosecutor’s comments in this
case [] concerned respondent's credibility as
a witness, and were therefore in accord with
our longstanding rule that when a defendant
takes the stand, his credibility may be im-
peached and his testimony assailed like that.
of any other witness.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, the prosecutor's statements are
supported by the evidence presented at trial.
Lankford himself admitted to lying at various
points during the trial. For example, when
questioned about what he had told Darrell

Cox, Lankford stated: “None of that was
true.” When asked about his statement to
FBI Agent Dennis Ploeger about whether he
lied about knowing anything about the Bra-
vences’ car, Lankford stated: “I didn’t con-
sider the van a car, but you could say it was
a lie.” Statements two through four, when
taken in context, directly referenced Lank-
ford’s conversation with Cox and Lankford
himself admitted in his testimony that he lied
in his conversation with Cox. Statement 5
relates to Lankford’s conversation with Spe-
cial Agent Dennis Ploeger and Lankford ad-
mitted in his testimony that he lied to Agent
Ploeger.

Statements six through nine refer to state-
ments Lankford made to his brother Robert
about his financial condition and why he
didn’t have his car anymore. In context, the
prosecutor stated:

He [Lankford] lied to Robert Lankford
about the money he had when he left
Texas. He testified he had a lot of money
when he left Texas. That’s not true, I think
we've shown that. He claimed he had a lot
of money when he returned to Texas.
That’s not true. How do we know that’s not
true? Well, he moved in with Roy Ralmuto.
He didn’t help with any groceries. He
didn’t help with any expenses. That was
testified to. He moved in with Robert
Lankford for six days. He didn’t help with
any expenses there. He didn’t help with
any groceries. So he lied to you on the
stand when he talked about the kind of
money he had when he left Texas and
when he came back to Texas.

He lied to Robert Lankford when he got
back to Texas about why he left his car In
Idaho. He told Robert Lankford his oil pan
had been damaged, and it was inoperable
and that he couldn’t drive it out of Texas
[sic]. He didn’t say he robbed somebody.
And he didn’t say that this was somebody
else’s van that he had driven from Idaho to
Texas. He didn’t say anything about that.
to his brother—to his brother Robert. He
lied about that. He lied about having mon-
ey when he left and when he returned. I
think we’ve already covered that.

The prosecutor’s statements, when taken
in context, are reasonable inferences based
on evidence from the trial.

Statement ten addressed Lankford’s claim
about trying to go to the Frank Church
River of No Return Wilderness. However,
the prosecutor directed the jury’s attention
to evidence presented at trial in support of
his assertion:

He lied about going to the Frank
Church River of No Return Wilderness. As
I remember his testimony he said that’s
where he was going to. That’s where he
was going to camp. Well, he wasn’t any-
where near the Frank Church River of No
Return Wilderness. You'll get a map that.
you can look at as to where he was camped
on Summit Flats, and it’s not—Frank
Church River of No Return Wilderness is
not even on that map. So, he lied about
that.

Statements eleven and twelve related to
Lankford’s access to the hatchback door.
Once again, the prosecutor contrasted what
Lankford said with the testimony of other
witnesses in support of his claim that Lank-
ford was lying:

He lied about having access to the
hatchback door on the Camaro car. Rodger
Laughlin, the ex-sheriff of Idaho County,
and Jon Stoop, the ex-deputy sheriff who
was the main investigator on the case, they
testified that when they looked at that car
it was completely covered. [Defense coun-
sel] said in opening argument that it was
partially covered. Well, you’ll—you've seen
the photographs. You'll [get] to look at
them again. Extremely well covered with
all kinds of branches and limbs on that car.
And again, the testimony from Laughlin
and Stroop was, you could not open that.
back hatchback door. Again another lie.
Statements thirteen and fourteen were

about the use of a nightstick. Again, the
prosecutor compared what Lankford had said
about the nightstick with the testimony from
other witnesses and inferred from the evi-
dence that Lankford was a liar. Statement,
fifteen referred to Cox’s testimony and, once
7. We are perplexed why the talented prosecutors

of this State continue to choose to use the word
“liar” and tisk appeal or reversal. There are so

501

again, the prosecution pointed to discrepan-
cies between Cox’s testimony and Lankford’s
testimony to support the conclusion that
Lankford had lied. Finally, statement six-
teen—that Lankford was lying about people
having given him a ride—was based upon the
lack of evidence supporting Lankford’s alibi.

Because the prosecutor supported his as-
sertions with evidence presented during the
trial, the statements, although troubling, did
not constitute misconduet.’ State v. Dunlap,
155 Idaho 845, 369, 818 P.8d 1, 25 (2018)
(Unlike an opening statement, in a closing
argument, the parties are entitled to explain
how, from their own perspectives, the evi-
dence confirms or calls into doubt the credi-
bility of particular witnesses. However, the
prosecutor may not express a personal belief
as to the credibility of witnesses, unless the
comment is based solely on inferences from
evidence presented at trial.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).

HM Finally, even if these statements
were prosecutorial misconduct, they did not
rise to the level of fundamental error, “Pros-
ecutorial misconduct during closing argu-
ments will constitute fundamental error only
if the comments were so egregious or inflam-
matory that any consequent prejudice could
not have been remedied by a ruling from the
trial court informing the jury that the com-
ments should be disregarded.” State v. Par-
ker, 157 Idaho 182, 146, 884 P.8d 806, 820
(2014). Here, the court explicitly informed
the jury that comments during closing state-
ments were not to be considered as evidence.
Instruction twenty-seven stated: “The argu-
ments and statements of the attorneys are
not evidence. If you remember the facts dif-
ferently from the way the attorneys have
stated them, you should base your decision
on what you remember.” “We presume that
the jury followed this instruction in reaching
its verdict.” State v. Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498,
506, 363 P.8d 339, 347 (2015). Given the
context of the prosecutor’s comments, we do
not think they were so egregious or inflam-

many other powerful verbal techniques that can
be used to convey the same concept to jurors.

502

matory that they would not have been cured.
by the court’s instruction,

iii, Whether statements in rebuttal
constituted misconduct

Hl In his rebuttal, the prosecutor laid
out a detailed timeline in which he placed the
time of the murders at approximately 8:30
p.m, Defense counsel objected to the 8:30
p.m, time because the prosecutor had previ-
ously stated in a pretrial hearing that the
murders occurred at 9:00 or 9:15 p.m. The
district court overruled the objection. Lank-
ford now contends that the prosecutor com-
mitted misconduct by misrepresenting the
time the murders occurred and that the dis-
trict court erred in overruling the objection.
The State responds that they were not bound
by their earlier representation that the mur-
ders occurred at 9:00 or 9:15 p.m, and that
even if it was misconduct it was harmless,

HM “Where a defendant demonstrates
that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred,
and such misconduct was followed by a con-
temporaneous objection by defense counsel,
such error shall be reviewed for harmless
error...” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.8d
at 979. An error is harmless when it is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
not contribute to the jury’s verdict, Id, “It is
improper to misrepresent or mischaracterize
the evidence in closing argument.” State v.
Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 188, 294 P.8d 1137,
1145 (Ct. App. 2018), “Indeed, the prosecutor
has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the
facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tac-
ties.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871, 382
P.8d 767, 788 (2014),

In Moses, the prosecutor misled the jury
as to the terms of a witness’ immunity agree-
ment, There, the prosecutor, although aware
that an immunity agreement explicitly pro-
vided multiple penalties should the witness
falsely testify, stated that the witness could
not get in trouble no matter what he said. Id.
at 870-71, 882 P.38d at 782-83, We held that,
because the prosecutor had a duty to avoid
misrepresentation of the facts, the unquali-
fied misstatement of the terms of the immu-
nity agreement constituted misconduct. Jd.
However, we found that the misconduct was
harmless, Id, at 871, 882 P.3d at 783.

This case does not present the same situa-
tion as Moses, Here, before the trial began,
the prosecutor informed the court that the
murders likely occurred around 9:00 or 9:15
p.m, on June 21, 1988, but his representation
was far from a stipulation or an agreement.
to be bound to that time, The prosecutor
stated that the murders took place on June
21, 1988, “basically ... around dark, around
9:15, 9:00 in the evening ... About 9:15 ...
at approximately 9:15 just at dark ...” The
prosecutor’s representation that the murders
occurred “basically around” “about” and “ap-
proximately” between 9:00 and 9:15 pm did
not constitute a binding admission intended
to conclusively establish that the murders
occurred at those times. It was an approxi-
mation. The prosecutor was free to argue the
time of the murders based upon the evidence
presented at trial. Accordingly, the prosecu-
tor’s statement in rebuttal was not miscon-
duct and the district court did not err by
overruling the defense objection.

d, Brady/Napue Violations

Lankford contends that the prosecutors
violated the requirements of Brady v. Mary-
land, 873 U.S, 88, 88 S.Ct, 1194, 10 L.Bd.2d
215 (1963), by withholding material impeach-
ment evidence regarding the deals the prose-
cutors made with Bryan and Thomas for
their testimony and violated the rule of Na-
pue v. Illinois, 860 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1178, 3
L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), by failing to correct
false testimony from Bryan and Thomas.
Both of these claims were addressed by the
district court in its Order on Motion for New
‘Trial. The district court found that some of
the Brady and Napue evidence brought for-
ward by Lankford was “newly discovered.”
The district court found that “there was no
reasonable probability of a different verdict if
the prosecutor had timely disclosed his un-
derstanding with Thomas.” The district court
found that Bryan’s failure “to testify about
his access to a cell phone does not constitute
perjury, as Bryan was never asked about
such access.

HE At the outset, it is important to
distinguish the difference between the stan-
dards governing a motion for new trial based

upon newly discovered evidence established
in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d
972 (1976), and those applicable to Brady and
Napue claims. A Brady claim is quite distinct
from a request for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. Grube v. State, 184 Ida-
ho 24, 80-81, 995 P.2d 794, 800-01 (2000)
(noting that the Drapeau standard is a dif-
ferent and “higher standard” than what is
required under Brady); see also State v.
Bramigh, 155 Idaho 404, 421-22, 313 P.3d
782, 749-50 (Ct. App. 2018). Under Drapeau,
the defendant must show, among other
things, that the newly discovered evidence
“will probably produce an acquittal.” Dra-
peau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. Under
Brady, the defendant must demonstrate that
the government’s suppression of evidence
“gndermines confidence in the outcome of
the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
488, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 181 L.Ed.2d 490,
505 (1995). And under Napue, the defendant
must show that the false testimony “could
have affected the judgment of the jury.”
United States v. Bagley, 478 U.S. 667, 678,
105 S.Ct. 8875, 3381-82, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 491~
92 (1985) (quoting United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct, 2392, 2397, 49
L.Ed.2d 842, 349-50 (1976). Thus, the defen-
dant’s burden of proof under Brady and Na-
pue is lower than that under Drapeau.
Grube, 134 Idaho at 30-31, 995 P.2d at 800-
O1. This is because such claims derive from
prosecutorial misconduct, whereas Drapeau
claims deal with evidence that was unknown
to the defendant not due to prosecutorial
misconduct. Compare Bagley, 473 U.S. at
678-81, 105 S.Ct. at 8881-88, 87 L.Ed.2d at
491-94 with State v, Ellington, 157 Idaho
480, 485, 337 P.8d 639, 644 (2014),

Ts The State has a duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence to a defendant. Brady,
878 U.S. at 87, 838 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10
L.Ed.2d at 218-19, This duty exists even in
the absence of a request by the defendant,
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96
S.0t. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 351-52
(1976), and extends to impeachment evidence
as well as exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 473
US, at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3880, 87 L.Ed.2d at
490. In order to establish a Brady violation,
there must be evidence that (1) is favorable
to the accused because it is either exculpato-

503

ry or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inad-
vertently suppressed by the State; and (8)
‘was prejudicial or material in that there is a
reasonable probability that its disclosure to
the accused would have led to a different
result. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,
880, 247 P.8d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strickler
v. Greene, 527 U.S, 268, 281-82, 119 S.Ct,
1986, 1948-49, 144 L.Ed.2d 286, 301-08
(1999); Kyles, 514 U.S,.at 488, 115 S.Ct. at
1565, 131 L.Ed.2d at 505). “Reasonable prob-
ability” of a different result is shown when
the suppression “undermines confidence in
the outcome of the trial.” Jd, (quoting Kyles,
514 U.S, at 488, 115 S.Ct. at 1565, 181
L.Ed.2d at 505),

HE “‘[A] conviction obtained through
use of false evidence, known to be such by
representatives of the State, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, as do convictions
obtained in proceedings where ‘the State,
although not soliciting false evidence, allows
it to go uncorrected when it appears.’” State
v. Dunlop, 155 Idaho 845, 389, 318 P.8d 1, 45
(2018) (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79
S.Ct. at 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d at 1220-21), Thus, to
establish a Napue violation a defendant must
show “(1) the testimony was false; (2) the
prosecutor should have known it was false;
and (8) the testimony was material.” State v.
Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368, 288 P.8d 1286,
1290 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Hovey v, Ayers,
458 F.3d 892, 916 (9th Cir. 2006)), Testimony
is material when “there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury.” Bagley,
473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 8381-82, 87
L.Ed.2d at 491-92; Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d
972, 985 (9th Cir. 2005).

i, Alleged Bs and Napue violations
regarding Bryan’s testimony

Hs Lankford claims that the State
violated Brady because it did not disclose the
fact that the prosecutor: (1) arranged for
Bryan to have a cell phone while in prison to
call his wife; and (2) helped facilitate commu-
nication between Bryan and his brother, Lee
John, Lankford contends that Napue was
violated because when the prosecutor elicited
Bryan’s testimony explaining what Bryan

504

was receiving in exchange for his testimony
the prosecutor failed to mention the cell
phone and facilitated communications. At a
post-trial evidentiary hearing, one of the
prosecutors testified that he agreed to Bryan
having a cell phone while in prison so Bryan
could contact his wife and that he facilitated
communication between Bryan and his broth-
er Lee John,

There is no doubt that the first two Brady
and Napue requirements are met. The undis-
closed cell phone privileges and the facilitat-
ed communications were relevant to impeach
Bryan’s credibility and therefore were favor-
able to Lankford. Additionally, the prosecu-
tor knew about the cell phone access and the
facilitated communications and he should
have corrected Bryan’s testimony to include
mention of those items. All that remains,
therefore, is to determine whether Lankford
suffered prejudice under Brady or whether,
under Napue, the failure to correct Bryan’s
testimony created a reasonable likelihood
that the jury’s judgment could have been
affected.

Bryan was extensively examined about his
different and conflicting statements. Indeed,
Bryan himself stated that he “changed [his]
story ... [mJany times,” to the extent that
he could not “remember all the made up
stories.” When asked “How many versions of
this story do you think you have made up?”
Bryan responded, “probably about ten. It
could be a couple of more, few less, but I
would say about ten or more.” Bryan admit-
ted that in exchange for his testimony the
prosecutor had promised to: (1) obtain a pro-
tection order so he would not have to go back
to Boise; (2) attempt to get him transferred
out of Idaho to a confidential location; (8)
assist him in obtaining a name change; (4)
assist in getting his parole hearing moved up
by seven years; (5) write a letter to the
Board of Pardons and Parole informing them

8. An evidentiary hearing was held regarding the
promises Thomas received in exchange for his
testimony and when he received them. Testimony
from the hearing showed that Idaho County paid
Thomas $1,500 on March 3, 2008, when he was
released from prison and placed on probation,
The money came from a check written to a
detective involved in the case, who cashed the
check and provided the proceeds to Thomas be-
hhind a carwash. One of the prosecutors testified

of Bryan’s cooperation; (6) give Bryan immu-
nity from perjury charges for his prior con-
tradictory testimony; and (7) appear, along
with Detective Mealer, to testify at the pa-
role hearing about Bryan’s cooperation in
Lankford’s case. In short, Bryan was thor-
oughly impeached at trial and we are con-
vinced that the information regarding the cell
phone access and the facilitated communica-
tions would not have affected the judgment
of the jury nor does it undermine our confi-
dence in the outcome of the trial. See Heish-
man v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that a witness was so “thor-
oughly impeached” that there was no reason-
able likelihood that the Brady and Napue
violations had any effect on the jury or the
outcome of the trial).

ii, Alleged Brady and Napue violations
regarding Thomas’ testimony

Hs Lankford argues that the State
committed two Brady violations in relation-
ship to the testimony of Lane Thomas. They
are characterized by Lankford as (1) the
failure to disclose that the prosecutor had
told Thomas about a month before the trial
that he would try to get him out of prison
and placed on probation; and (2) the failure
to disclose that $1,500 was given to Thomas
after the trial. Lankford also alleges that
Napue was violated because the prosecutor
failed to correct Thomas’ testimony when
Thomas stated that he was only testifying for
a letter of cooperation and for “just being
honest.”

HH initially we note that after carefully
examining the record we find no evidence to
support Lankford’s assertion that the post-
trial $1,500 payment made to Thomas by
Idaho County was part of any pretrial agree-
ment made between the prosecutors and
Thomas in exchange for his testimony.’

that the payment to Thomas did not come up
until Thomas’ rider review hearing following
Lankford’s trial, that the payment was not part of
any deal with Thomas, and was made only for
Thomas’ travel expenses to leave Idaho. The oth-
er prosecutor testified that he was unaware of
the payment until late 2010 or early 2011. The
district court found that all discussion about the
decision to pay Thomas $1,500 occurred post-
trial. Lankford does not point to any evidence to

Therefore, our analysis focuses solely on
Lankford’s assertion that the prosecutors
failed to disclose their promise to help Thom-
as get out of prison and placed on probation.

During the prosecutor's direct examination
of Thomas, the following exchange took
place:

Q: The Prosecutor’s Office was going to

write a letter of cooperation for your testi-

mony today?

A: Yes.

Q: And that they would send that to the

North Idaho Correctional Institution at

Cottonwood?

A: Yes.

Q: And that [they] would say that you

cooperated with the investigation of the

Mark Lankford case and testified truthful-

ly?

A: Yes.

The prosecutor then asked: “Any other rea-
son other than the letter that the Prosecu-
tor’s office will write that you're testifying
today?” To which Thomas responded:
“There’s no reason but just being honest.”
This was the entirety of the evidence that the
prosecutor offered at trial regarding the con-
sideration extended to Thomas in exchange
for his testimony. Defense counsel’s cross-
examination elicited only slightly more infor-
mation, including the fact that Thomas was
also given immunity from perjury charges
and that Thomas hoped to be placed on
probation.

At a post-trial evidentiary hearing, one of
the prosecutors testified that he told Thomas
before the trial that he would try to help
Thomas “get out of the prison system” and
“try to get him put on probation.” In addi-
tion, the prosecutor testified that he told
Thomas he “would talk to ... the Latah
County Prosecutor, to try to get him on
probation.” The prosecutors admitted that

suggest that the agreement occurred beforehand
but asserts that “it requires a healthy degree of
faith and willful ignorance to believe the prose-
cutor’s claim that [] the $1,500 [was] not part of
[the] deal with [Thomas] in exchange for his
testimony....” A review of the record did not
‘uncover any evidence that pointed to the discus-
sions about the $1,500 occurring at any time
pretrial. Indeed, Thomas’ own attorney indicated
that he thought it came up at Thomas’ review

505

this information was not disclosed to the
defense. Affirmative personal intervention
with the Latah County Prosecutor to assist
Thomas in getting out of prison and placed
on probation is materially different than of-
fering to write a letter to correctional author-
ities. Thomas’ testimony to the jury that he
was only getting a letter of cooperation was
false and misleading,

This evidence satisfies the first Brady
prong because it is significant impeachment
evidence that suggests that Thomas had sig-
nificant incentive to testify in a fashion fa-
vorable to the prosecution. It satisfies the
second Brady prong because it was not dis-
closed to the defense. Because the testimony
was false and, as evidenced by the prosecu-
tors’ testimony at the evidentiary hearing,
the prosecutors should have recognized that
it was false, the first two Napue elements
are satisfied as well. Thus, the only remain-
ing question is that of materiality.

HH As the Supreme Court of the United
States has stated, “the [fundamental] ques-
tion [of materiality] is not whether the defen-
dant would more likely than not have re-
ceived a different verdict with the evidence,
but whether in its absence he received a fair
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whit-
ley, 514 U.S. 419, 484, 115 S.Ct, 1555, 1565-
66, 181 L.Ed.2d 490, 505-06 (1995). The anal-
ysis of materiality is different for Brady and
Napue claims. Under a Brady claim, evi-
dence is material “if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been dis-
closed to the defense, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different” United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct.
8875, 3383-84, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494 (1985)
(emphasis added); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at
433, 115 S.Ct. at 1555, 181 L.Ed.2d at 505. “A.
‘reasonable probability’ of a different result

hearing: “I believe—I know—well, I believe that
I discussed funds for Lane [Thomas] to be able to
move out of state with, I believe it was [one of
Lankford’s prosecutors], the day—the day of the
hearing in [Thomas]’s case, or the day before.”
Although, as Lankford suggests, the payment of
the $1,500 is certainly suspicious, we are unable
to conclude that the district court's factual find-
ing was clearly erroneous.

506

is accordingly shown when the government’s
evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confi-
dence in the outcome of the trial.’” Kyles,
514 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 1565-66, 131
L.Ed.2d at 505-06 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S.
at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381-82, 87 L.Ed.2d at
491-92). For a Napue claim, evidence is ma-
terial when “there is any reasonable likeli-
hood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury.” Bagley,
4738 US. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 8881-82, 87
L.Ed.2d at 491-92 (emphasis added); Hayes
v, Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 985 (9th Cir. 2005).

The State argues that the Napue and Bra-
dy violations were immaterial because Thom-
as had been impeached, the jury was aware
that the prosecutors had agreed to write a
letter of cooperation, and that Thomas had
admitted on cross-examination that he want-
ed to be released on probation, The State
argues that “there was no other reason to
write a letter than to try and help Thomas
secure probation and the details about con-
tacting the prosecutor [] would not have
helped Lankford and or changed the jury's
understanding regarding the letter of cooper-
ation.”

The State also argues that because Thom-
as did not contact law enforcement regarding
Lankford’s admissions, but only came to
their attention due to the monitored tele-
phone call, strongly indicates that his testi-
mony was truthful. Indeed, the district court
found this argument to be compelling, stat-
ing:

In large measure Thomas’ credibility
was and is supported by the circumstances
under which his testimony was discovered,
ie, Thomas was overhead telling a girl
friend of Lankford’s disclosures. Thomas
did not seek out the State to use this
information to benefit himself. Thomas tes-
tified that he didn’t want to be involved.

The district court's evaluation of Thomas’
credibility is not entitled to the usual defer-
ence that we afford such determinations be-

9, The jury returned its verdict on February 13,
2008, Shortly thereafter, Lankford’s prosecutors
contacted the Latah County Prosecutor about
getting Thomas out on probation, The Latah
County Prosecutor testified that he met with
Thomas’ lawyer and the judge on Thomas’ case
in chambers and it was decided that Thomas

cause the judge did not observe Thomas
when he testified, Shabinaw v. Brown, 131
Idaho 747, 750-51, 968 P.2d 1184, 1187-88
(1998); Nafus v. Campbell, 96 Idaho 366, 368,
529 P.2d 266, 268 (1974); Van Camp v. Em-
ery, 18 Idaho 202, 207, 89 P. 752, 754 (1907).
Instead, we freely review the same evidence
that the district court considered evidence.
Having done so, we reach a different conclu-
sion.

The State underestimates the value of a
prosecutor’s correction of Thomas’ testimony
and the disclosure of the true extent of the
prosecutors’ efforts in securing Thomas’ re-
lease from prison could have had. There is a
dramatic difference between writing a letter
stating that Thomas had cooperated and per-
sonally contacting the Latah County Prose-
eutor to lobby for Thomas’ early release. In
fact, the prosecutors did much more than
simply write a letter to correctional authori-
ties. One of the prosecutors testified that
they met with the Latah County Prosecutor
before Lankford’s trial to request that the
prosecutor be “liberal with regard to the
time [Thomas] had to serve.” The other pros-
ecutor testified at the post-trial evidentiary
hearing: “At some point after the trial, I
contacted [the Latah County Prosecutor]. ...
And I recommended to [him] that ... if
there was anything that [he] could do to keep
Lane [Thomas] out of prison right now and
have him on probation—a felony probation,
you know, I would appreciate that.”® Al-
though Thomas was cross-examined about
how he hoped to benefit from his coopera-
tion, evidence of an explicit prosecutorial
promise to help Thomas get out of prison and
placed on probation likely would have carried
far greater weight than any benefit the jury
might have perceived that he would receive
from a simple letter. Such evidence would
have demonstrated motive to provide testi-
mony aiding the prosecution well beyond that
of Thomas’ claimed motive of “just being
honest,”

would be released from his rider program early.
Thomas’ rider review hearing was held on Febru-
ary 28, 2008, a full three months before it would
have otherwise occurred, Thomas was released
from prison on probation on March 3, 2008, less
than one month after the jury returned its guilty
verdict in Lankford’s case.

Although some of the facts presented in
Thomas’ testimony were corroborated by
other witnesses and by physical evidence,
those facts pale in significance when com-
pared to Thomas’ testimony that Lankford
intended to rob the Bravences before they
were killed, The district court properly in-
structed the jury that to find Lankford guilty
of felony murder the jury had to find that
Lankford “intended to commit the act of
robbery against the persons of Robert and/or
Cheryl Bravence ... prior to the commission
of the homicide(s).” Bryan and Thomas were
the only witnesses who testified that Lank-
ford had the required intent to rob the Bra-
vences before they were killed.

Thomas’ credibility as a witness was es-
sential to Lankford’s conviction. Without
Thomas’ testimony corroborating Bryan’s
testimony, the State had little to no hope of
securing Lankford’s conviction. .C. § 19-
2117; State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 891, 216
P.8d 648, 649 (Ct. App. 2009) (“[the] eorrobo-
ration requirement is intended to protect
against the danger that an accomplice may
wholly fabricate testimony, incriminating an
innocent defendant in order to win more
favorable treatment for the accomplice.”).
The critical importance of Thomas’ testimony
was underscored by the district court when
it ruled on Lankford’s motion for acquittal:
“If it were just Bryan Lankford this would
be a lot tougher decision. But with the testi-
mony of Lane Thomas I find it much easier
to deny the motion.” Thomas’ account of
events, which he claimed to have learned
from Lankford, corroborated Bryan’s version
of events.

As this case hinged on Thomas’ credibility,
we conelude that there is a “reasonable likeli-
hood” that Thomas’ false testimony about his
motive for testifying “could have affected the
judgment of the jury.” The prosecutor’s fail-
ure to disclose the full details of the agree-
ment “undermines our confidence in the out-
come of the trial,” such that we cannot be
sure the defendant “received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict
worthy of confidence,” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434,
115 S.Ct. at 1565-66, 131 L.Ed.2d at 505-06,
Therefore, we hold that Lankford’s right to a

507

fair trial was violated and that he is entitled
to a new trial.

Because we find that Lankford is entitled
to a new trial we do not address the issues of
cumulative error or Lankford’s Rule 35 mo-
tion.

Il. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, we vacate the
Judgment of conviction and remand for a new
trial,

Justices EISMANN and JONES concur.

BURDICK, Chief Justice, dissenting.

I dissent because I am unable to agree
with the Majority’s conclusion that the prose-
eutors violated Brady and Napue by not
disclosing every minute detail about their
promises to’ help Thomas get out of prison
and placed on probation. The Majority con-
cludes that the prosecutors failed to disclose
the full details about their agreement with
Thomas in exchange for his testimony and
this failure “undermines' our confidence in
the outcome of the trial.” However, I believe
the details of the agreement were adequately
disclosed, and that any additional details
about what was agreed to by the prosecutors
and Thomas was merely cumulative impeach-
ment evidence that would not have affected
the judgment of the jury.

At a post-trial evidentiary hearing one of
the prosecutors was questioned about his
pre-trial conversations regarding what
Thomas would receive in exchange for testi-
fying in Lankford’s case:

Q: [What was your understanding of what

Lane Thomas would get in exchange—

A: Well, first of all, Lane never asked me

for anything.

Q: Did—let me follow up on that. Did you

ever negotiate directly with Lane?

A: I—believe—you know, again, let me

say, he never asked for anything. I think

at one point when I was talking to him—
and I don’t know—I don’t know for sure
when that was. It would have been before
trial.

And I—I told him—and, again, he didn’t
ask for this. But I said, if you’re going to

508

put your life on the line and testify against

Mark, I would be willing to talk to the

Latah County Prosecutor. Because at that

time, I believe—when I talked to him at

that point, he was doing a rider at Cotton-
wood, and I was fearful for his safety.
And what I told him in that conversation

‘was, you know, I will try and—try and get

you out of the prison system. He was on

a—not—you know, he wasn’t in Boise do-
ing hard time; he was doing a rider. And,

basically, I told him I would help him, if I

could. And I—I couldn’t promise him any

results, but I said I would try to get him

put on probation,
It is clear from the prosecutor’s testimony
that although Thomas did not ask for any-
thing, in essence, the prosecutor offered to
help Thomas get out prison and placed on
probation, This underlying assertion, that the
prosecutor would attempt to help Thomas
get out on probation, is essentially what was
disclosed at trial.

On direct examination of Thomas the fol-
lowing exchange took place between the
prosecutor and Thomas:

Q: The Prosecutor’s Office was going to

write a letter of cooperation for your testi-

mony today?

A: Yes.

Q: And that they would send that to the

North Idaho Correctional Institution in

Cottonwood?

A: Yes.

Q: And that that would say that you coop-

erated with the investigation of the Mark

Lankford case and testified truthfully?

A: Yes.

Then on cross-examination defense counsel
asked about Thomas’ current sentence and
what Thomas hoped would happen after tes-
tifying in the Lankford case:

Q: And you want to better yourself on this

rider or retained jurisdiction program, cor-

rect, so you can be placed on probation
when you come back for a rider review
hearing, correct?

A: Yes, sir,

Q: And it’s your hope to be placed on

probation at the end of this right?

A: Yes, sir.

From these two exchanges it is clear that
the prosecution agreed to support Thomas by

writing a letter and that Thomas believed his
cooperation in Lankford’s case would help
him secure a release from prison and place-
ment on probation. Accordingly, the jury was
perfectly aware that the prosecutors were
going to be involved in securing probation for
Thomas. The Majority makes much of the
fact that during the trial Thomas only testi-
fied to a letter being written on Thomas’
behalf and not to the prosecutor’s pre-trial
statements that the prosecutor would try to
help Thomas get out on probation by person-
ally talking to the Latah County prosecutor.
Evidence of the latter, the Majority con-
cludes, would so further impeach Thomas to
the jury that the Majority’s confidence in the
verdict is undermined. However, Thomas was
already impeached by evidence of the letter
of cooperation, which the jury had been in-
formed was intended to help Thomas get
placed on probation, and thus, the principal
component of the agreement between Thom-
as and the prosecutors was readily evident to
the jury: By testifying in Lankford’s case,
Thomas hoped to get out of prison and
placed on probation, and the prosecutors had
agreed to assist Thomas in his desire to do
so. Any additional evidence of the prosecu-
tors’ agreement to help Thomas get out on
probation was merely cumulative to the
jury’s awareness that the prosecutors had
agreed to support Thomas in his desire to be
placed on probation. In my view, such cumu-
lative impeachment evidence, without more,
is insufficient to undermine confidence in the
verdict to the extent that a new trial is
warranted. See, eg., State v. Martinez, 125
Idaho 445, 452, 872 P.2d 708, 715 (1994)
(“Evidence which is merely cumulative or
impeaching is not a sufficient basis for the
grant of a new trial.”); U.S. v. Marashi, 918
F.2d 724, 782 (1990) (“[CJumulative impeach-
ment evidence [is] not Brady material.”).
Therefore, because the Majority’s sole reason
for granting a new trial was based on what I
view to be merely cumulative impeachment
evidence I would affirm the district court.

Justice BRODY concurs.

399 P.3d 836

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an
Idaho Corporation, Plaintiff-
Respondent,

v

Marty D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
Cindy M. Frantz, an individual,
Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No, 44252-2016

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: July 10, 2017
Rehearing Denied August 15, 2017

510 a

Cindy M. Frantz and Marty D. Frantz
argued in their own behalf.

Sheila R. Schwager, Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LLP, Boise, argued for respon-
dent.

EISMANN, Justice,

This is an appeal out of Kootenai County
from a judgment in favor of the lender
against the guarantors of construction loans
made to the guarantors’ closely held corpora-
tion, We affirm the judgment of the district
court.

I

Factual Background,

Marty and Cindy Frantz executed a series
of commercial guaranties so that Idaho Inde-
pendent Bank (“Bank”) would lend money to
Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc. (“Eagle
Ridge”), a closely held corporation in which
the Frantzes held a majority interest and
Mr. Frantz was the president. Hagle Ridge
executed in favor of Bank a promissory note
dated December 14, 2006, in the principal
sum of $3,750,000, with a maturity date of
April 14, 2008; a renewal promissory note
dated July 11, 2007, in the principal sum of
$4,500,000, with a maturity date of April 14,
2008; an agreement dated April 17, 2008,
changing the maturity date of the renewal
note to June 15, 2008; a second renewal
promissory note dated June 18, 2008, in the
principal sum of $4,500,000, with a maturity

1, Appellants were represented by counsel

date of December 17, 2008; a third renewal
promissory note dated January 21, 2009, in
the principal sum of $4,500,000, with a matu-
rity date of January 15, 2010; and an agree-
ment dated March 11, 2010, extending the
maturity date to April 15, 2010, In order to
induce Bank to extend credit to Hagle Ridge,
the Frantzes executed five commercial guar-
anties in which they unconditionally guaran-
teed the full and punctual payment and satis-
faction of all indebtedness of Eagle Ridge to
Bank. They executed their last guaranties on
March 11, 2010,

On July 19, 2010, Bank filed this action
against the Frantzes to recover on their com-
mercial guaranties, The Frantzes filed an
answer in which they admitted the material
allegations in the complaint, but asserted af-
firmative defenses and counterclaims against
Bank. They later amended their answer to
include a third-party claim against Eagle
Ridge.

In October 2011, the Frantzes filed a peti-
tion under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code
the day before Mr. Frantz’s deposition was
to oceur. The petition stayed this action,
Bank was the Frantzes’ largest creditor. On
April 23, 2018, the Frantzes’ bankruptcy was
converted to a liquidation case under chapter
7, and a trustee was duly appointed for the
estate. On August 28, 2018, Bank filed an
adversary complaint alleging causes of action
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 528(a)(2) and (a)(6) seek-
ing both a judgment for damages for all sums
owed the Bank by the Frantzes and a ruling
that such damages, plus interest, attorney
fees and costs, were nondischargeable. Less
than two weeks before the trial on Bank’s
adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case,
the Frantzes filed a voluntary waiver of dis-
charge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10), and on
May 20, 2015, the bankruptcy court filed an
order approving the waiver. As a result, the
bankruptcy court was deprived of jurisdiction
to hear the adversary proceeding, and it
dismissed it without prejudice. However, the
court did award sanctions in the sum of
$49,477.46 against the Frantzes and their
attorney, jointly and severally, for their con-
duet during the course of the adversary pro-
ceeding. The court found that their conduct

throughout the proceedings in the trial court.

511

constituted misuse of litigation tactics to
cause economic injury to an opponent and its
counsel in the form of increased litigation
costs.

On May 27, 2015, Bank filed in this case a
notice that because of the waiver of dis-
charge, the automatic stay was terminated.
On September 21, 2015, Bank filed a motion
for summary judgment. In its supporting
memorandum it argued that it was entitled
to a judgment against the Frantzes based on
the guaranties that they had signed, that
there was no merit to the Frantzes’ affirma-
tive defenses, and that their counterclaims
should be dismissed because they were
owned by the trustee in bankruptcy.

On October 6, 2015, the Frantzes filed a
motion for partial summary judgment, seek-
ing a ruling that Bank was estopped from
enforcing the guaranties and that there was
an accord and satisfaction. The claimed ac-
cord and satisfaction was based on Bank
giving the bankruptcy trustee a $20,000
check that Bank had received from the
Frantzes, where the check was marked pay-
ment in full. After receiving briefing and
hearing the oral arguments of the parties,
the district court granted Bank’s motion for
summary judgment and denied the Frantzes’
motion,

The district court entered a judgment
against the Frantzes “in the amount of
$9,198,546.50, plus pre-judgment interest at
the rate of $2,475.02 per diem from Septem-
ber 16, 2015, until the date this Judgment is
entered.” Because the Frantzes had filed a
third-party claim against Eagle Ridge that
was yet unresolved, the court certified the
judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Frantzes filed a motion for reconsideration,
and the court denied that motion. They then
timely appealed.

I

Did the District Court Err in Denying the
Frantzes’ Affirmative Defenses Based
upon the Breach of an Alleged Oral
Contract?

HN «When reviewing on appeal the
granting of a motion for summary judgment,

‘we apply the same standard used by the trial
court in ruling on the motion. Infanger v.
City of Salmon, 187 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.8d.
1100, 1101-02 (2002). We construe all disput-
ed facts, and draw all reasonable inferences
from the record, in favor of the non-moving
party. Id. at 47, 44 P.8d at 1102, Summary
judgment is appropriate only if the evidence
in the record and any admissions show that
there is no genuine issue of any material fact
regarding the issues raised in the pleadings
and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the
evidence reveals no disputed issues of mate-
rial fact, then only a question of law remains,
over which this Court exercises free review.
Id.

TI The Frantzes state as the issue on
appeal, “Did the district court err by dismiss-
ing the Frantzes’ affirmative defenses for
lack of privity?” In order to put that argu-
ment in its factual context as to why the
district court ruled that the Frantzes lacked
privity, it is necessary to address other litiga-
tion between the parties.

On June 27, 2014, Eagle Ridge filed a
lawsuit against Bank (“Eagle Ridge lawsuit”)
in which Eagle Ridge alleged that in 2008
Bank made a “2008 Loan Commitment.” The
Frantzes held a majority interest in Eagle
Ridge, and Mr. Frantz was its president. As
stated in the complaint, the agreement to
lend additional money was between Eagle
Ridge and Bank. The complaint stated:

Under the 2008 Loan Commitment IIB
agreed to lend the construction funds to

Eagle Ridge under the same loan terms as

the then existing loan between IIB and

Eagle Ridge, so long as Frantz (the guar-

antor) remained credit worthy and an ap-

praisal of IIB’s collateral would justify the
loan amount (IIB stated that the loan
amount could not exceed 65% loan to as
completed value). ITB further required
that Eagle Ridge would raise additional
capital, approximately $1m, and invest it
into the project over the next year increas-
ing Hagle Ridge’s “skin in the game.”

Then, in 2009 a new appraisal would be

obtained and a loan issued pursuant to the

aforementioned constraints (appraisal jus-
. tification and creditworthiness).

512

In the Eagle Ridge lawsuit, Eagle Ridge
sought: (a) to recover damages for breach of
the oral contract to lend additional money to
Eagle Ridge, (b) to obtain a declaratory
judgment that Eagle Ridge was not liable for
late charges and penalty fees, (c) to obtain
damages for tortious interference with an
economic relationship caused by Bank
wrongfully suing Marty Frantz, (d) to obtain
damages for unjust enrichment for the addi-
tional time and capital that Eagle Ridge in-
vested in the development project, and (e) to
recover damages for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Bank filed a
counterclaim against Hagle Ridge and a third
party claim against the Frantzes in which it
sought foreclosure of its mortgage on certain
real property. On September 21, 2015, Bank
filed a motion for summary judgment, which
was granted, and Bank obtained a decree of
foreclosure and later a deficiency judgment,

In the Hagle Ridge lawsuit, Eagle Ridge
and the Frantzes, through their counsel, al-
leged in a document filed with the court that
“Marty Frantz was Eagle Ridge on Twin
Lakes, Inc.’s primary agent. All of the inter-
actions between Marty Frantz and IIB were
in behalf of Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes,
Ine.”

The same judge presided over the Eagle
Ridge lawsuit and this action. In addressing
whether Bank was entitled to summary judg-
ment, the court wrote that Bank “also argues
that these affirmative defenses rely on an
alleged oral agreement between Plaintiff and
Eagle Ridge, which Defendants were not a
party to, and, thus do not have standing to
bring any defenses that are based on that
alleged oral agreement.” In a footnote to this
statement, the court wrote:

This Court is familiar with the issue of

whether IIB and Eagle Ridge entered into

an oral agreement under which IIB agreed.
to loan additional money to Eagle Ridge,
and then breached that agreement. Those
allegations are the basis for a cause of
action pending before this court in Hagle

Ridge v. Idaho Independent Bank, CV 14-

5339,

Thus, the district court viewed the Frantzes
as alleging that there was an oral contract
between Eagle Ridge and Bank under which

Bank agreed to loan additional sums to Eagle
Ridge, as claimed in the Eagle Ridge lawsuit.
That was the basis of the court’s ruling that
the Frantzes lacked standing to assert Hagle
Ridge’s rights as affirmative defenses.

One of the arguments that Bank made in
its brief supporting its motion for summary
judgment was that the alleged oral agree-
ment asserted by the Frantzes was barred
by the terms of the guaranties signed by the
Frantzes. Bank argued:

In the Guaranties the Defendants specifi-
cally waive the right to require IIB “to
continue lending money or to extend other
credit to [Eagle Ridge].” Further, the De-
fendants expressly acknowledged and
agreed that “no representations or agree-
ments of any kind have been made to
Guarantor which would limit or qualify in
any way the terms of this Guaranty.” Fur-
ther, the Defendants, as Guarantors, ex-
pressly waived the right to assert any set-
off, counterclaims, and defenses against
unconditionally paying IIB the outstanding
obligations.

(Citations to the record omitted.) In re-
sponse, the Frantzes simply asserted that
they had not waived their defenses. Their
entire argument was as follows:

The Bank’s argument in its Motion for
Summary Judgment is essentially that the
Defendants signed the guaranty and hav-
ing signed the guaranty the Bank can do
anything it wants. The Bank equates the
signing of the guaranty as a waiver of any
defenses and at the same time an exculpa-
tion of any wrong doing by the Bank.
Obviously this is not a correct interpreta-
tion of the law, nor would it be equitable.

Defendants admit they signed personal
guaranties. But Defendants have not
waived their defenses where the Plaintiff
has acted improperly, acted in a manner in
which alters or effects the the [sic] person-
al guaranties, acted pursuant to a long
history of course of dealing or made state-
ments upon which Plaintiff knew or should.
have known Defendants would detrimen-
tally rely and where the Defendants have
completely performed based upon Plain-
tiffs promises.

In making this argument, the Frantzes did
not acknowledge that they signed personal
guaranties after that alleged oral agreement.
and the breach of the alleged oral agreement.

After the district court ruled that the
Frantzes’ affirmative defenses were barred
by lack of privity because they were based
upon the alleged oral agreement between
Bank and Hagle Ridge, the Frantzes moved
for reconsideration. In their motion, they
stated that the factual background included
the following statement:

When IIB refused to extend the loan [to
Eagle Ridge] and instead required payoff,
Eagle Ridge was unable to pay. Frantz
was also unable to pay off the loan at that
point as he had expended $3.1 million of
personal funds on infrastructure on the
property instead of paying down the loan,
which course of action was made at JIB’s
suggestion in exchange for a loan increase
and extension.

In this statement of the facts, the loan was to
Eagle Ridge and the alleged oral agreement
was for “a loan increase and extension,” The
only loan mentioned was the one to Hagle
Ridge. Thus, here, the Frantzes contended
that the alleged oral agreement was to ex-
tend additional credit to Eagle Ridge.

In arguing that the Frantzes were in privi-
ty with Bank, they stated that “the Frantzes
personally had privity with IIB in regards to
the oral agreement because they were a par-
ty to that oral agreement in their capacity as
guarantors in the overall loan transaction
and because they had a substantial interest,
as guarantors, in the terms of the loan.”
Thus, their argument as to privity with re-
spect to the alleged oral agreement was
based upon the contention that they would be
affected by the failure to extend additional
eredit to Eagle Ridge. As they also wrote:

More importantly, it simply makes sense
that the Frantzes, as unconditional guaran-
tors of this debt, would be intensely inter-
ested in ensuring that the loan does not go
bad and that the terms are appropriate.

That is exactly what happened; Mr. Frantz

worked with ITB personally, as the guaran-

tor, to ensure that the Eagle Ridge loan
would not go into default because he al-

513

ways felt that he was the principal obligor

anyway.

They then asserted that “there’s nothing
that indicates that when Mr. Frantz was
working with the bank that he was not repre-
senting himself and Eagle Ridge.” Of course,
that conflicts with the Frantzes’ statement in
the Hagle Ridge lawsuit that “[aJll of the
interactions between Marty Frantz and IIB
were in behalf of Hagle Ridge on Twin
Lakes, Inc.”

Finally, they contended that they were in
privity with Bank regarding the alleged oral
agreement because that agreement was sim-
ply part of one overall transaction, which
included the guaranties that they signed.
They asserted that “the Frantzes personally
had privity with ITB in regards to the oral
agreement because they were a party to that
oral agreement in their capacity as guaran-
tors in the overall loan transaction and be-
cause they had a substantial interest, as
guarantors, in the terms’ ofthe loan,” Thus,
they did not contend that the oral agreement
was between them and Bank. They alleged
that they were a party to the alleged oral
agreement “because they had a substantial
interest, as guarantors, in the terms of the
loan.” They characterized the single, large
transaction as follows:

The Commercial Guarantees and other

documents themselves indicate that the

Note, the Mortgage, and the Guarantees

are not separate, individual transactions

but parts to one single, large transaction.

The Frantzes would not have executed the

personal guarantees if ITB had not prom-

ised to lend Eagle Ridge money. IIB would
not have lent money to Eagle ridge if the

Frantzes had not personally guaranteed

the debt. Eagle Ridge would not have ex-

isted if it were not for the Frantzes form-
ing it for that purpose. It is all a single
transaction and the Frantzes are party to
that transaction.
Thus, in the district court, the Frantzes con-
tended that the oral agreement was an
agreement betweén Bank and Eagle Ridge to
extend additional credit to Eagle Ridge as
necessary to complete its development pro-
ject. The Frantzes chose to create a corpo-
rate entity, Eagle Ridge, to develop the prop-

514

erty and obtain loans from Bank, and they
cannot disavow the separate entity when it is
to their advantage.

On appeal, the Frantzes alleged in their
opening brief that there was evidence show-
ing that they were a party to the oral con-
tract and therefore were in privity with Bank
with respect to that oral promise, although it
is not clear whether they contended that they
and Eagle Ridge were parties to the alleged
oral contract with Bank or that only they
were. The Frantzes argue:

The Frantzes conferred with the Bank

about whether the Frantzes should invest

their millions of dollars into Hagle Ridge
or pay down the loan. That is when the
bank represented to the Frantzes, not Ha-
gle Ridge, that if the Frantzes invested
their money into Eagle Ridge, IIB would
continue to fund the development of Hagle

Ridge. The promise by the bank was to the

Frantzes, personally. Tt was not made ea-

clusively to Hagle Ridge.

It would not make sense for IIB to make
Eagle Ridge such a promise. Hagle Ridge
had nothing to offer to the Bank to secure
such a promise from it; Eagle Ridge did
not have the millions of dollars from the
sale-lease-back. It was the Frantzes who
had the millions in cash. IIB issued the
oral agreement to the Frantzes to induce
them to invest their funds into Hagle
Ridge.

(Emphasis added.)

The Bank pointed out in its respondent’s
brief that even if the alleged oral promise
was made to the Frantzes’ to extend credit to
Eagle Ridge, the Frantzes would still be
liable under the terms of the guaranties. In
their reply brief, the Frantzes then changed
the terms of the alleged oral agreement,
contending that it was not to extend credit to
Eagle Ridge. It was to make loans to any
entity that the Frantzes may create.

In their reply brief, they state: “However,
the Frantzes have not alleged that IIB would
issue a loan to Eagle Ridge. Instead, the
Frantzes have asserted that ITB would con-
tinue to fund the development of the Project,
not the corporation, Hagle Ridge.” They ar-
gue:

The following sworn assertions by the

Frantzes illustrate this:

From the inception of the Eagle Ridge

on Twin Lakes project, IIB represented

to the Frantz’s, [sie] that so long as
they were creditworthy, IIB would fund
development loans for Eagle Ridge at

Twin Lakes [which is the name of the

Project, there is no “Inc.” designation]

. through completion of the pro-
ject.”

The Frantzes further argue:

TIB’s own guarantees (which it unilaterally

wrote) only restricted the Frantzes from

requiring IIB to lend to the Eagle Ridge
corporation, However, the Frantzes are
not, in their affirmative defenses, claiming
that IIB should have loaned money to the

Eagle Ridge corporation. Since the begin-

ning, the Frantzes have maintained that

IIB was required to loan money so that,

the (Eagle Ridge) Project could be com-

pleted. The Borrower for future loan
transactions would have almost certainly
been a different entity since the Eagle

Ridge corporation did not own the addi-

tional 50 acre collateral that was going to

be hypothecated to the Bank.

The language that the Frantzes quoted
above was from their counterclaim, in which
they alleged:

From the inception of the Hagle Ridge on

Twin Lakes project, IIB represented to

the Frantz’s, [sic] that so long as they

were creditworthy, IIB would fund devel-
opment loans for Hagle Ridge at Twin

Lakes at seventy five percent (75%) of loan

to value through completion of the project.

IIB and Hagle Ridge proceeded on this

course until 2008 when the real estate mar-

kets experienced unprecedented economic
value deflation.

This unprecedented market decline cre-
ated a funding issue at the proposed IIB
Joan to value ratio of seventy five percent
(75%).... In order to induce the Frantz’s
[sic] to provide additional collateral, which
would directly benefit IIB’s position in the
property, IIB agreed with Frantz’s [sic]
plan to support the loan with additional
collateral to improve the loan to value ra-
tio, ITB required that the outstanding loan

to Eagle Ridge be amortized through 2009

until a new appraisal could be obtained in

[sic] to determine the level of funding

which could be given for the final round of

funding. IIB represented to the Frantz’s

[sic] that IIB would continue to fund devel-

opment loans but would only be able to do

so at a ratio of sixty (60%) loan to value
because of the economic downturn, Within

a few months after the new appraisal was

completed in September 2009, IIB repre-

sented to Frantz’s [sic] that ITB had un-
derwritten Frantz’s [sic] and proved them
for further funding and that IIB had found

Frantz’s [sic] to be creditworthy and that

IIB would approve a three year loan ex-

tension,

In reliance upon IIB’s promise to pro-
vide financing as described above to com-
plete the Eagle Ridge project, Frantz’s
[sic] personally invested substantial
amounts of capital into the project during
the end of 2008, 2009 and 2010 and recon-
figured the Eagle Ridge project. As a re-
sult of Frantz’s [sic] effort in reconfiguring
the project and Frantz’s [sic] infusion of
substantial amounts of new capital, the
overall reconfigured project reappraised at
$15,800,000 “as completed” in September
of 2009. With this new appraisal the pro-
ject qualified for funding of $9,300,000 at
the (60%) loan to value ratio agreed to by
IIB. However, IIB refused to honor its
commitment to fund the completion of the
project and instead changed its position
and refused to fund completion of the pro-
ject.

The Frantzes contend that the references
to the “Eagle Ridge project” had nothing to
do with the corporation. It only referred to
the project the corporation was working on.
However, in their answer they defined “Ea-
gle Ridge” to mean the corporation. In their
factual allegations, they wrote, “(Eagle Ridge
on Twin Lakes, Inc, eventually became the
construction borrower and will be referred to
herein as ‘Hagle Ridge’).” Thus, the refer-
ence to the Eagle Ridge project would mean,
according to the definition in their pleading,
the Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc., pro-
ject. It was the corporation’s project, and the
references to further extension of credit obvi-
ously referred to the corporation. For exam-

515

ple, the Frantzes alleged that after the 2009
appraisal, Bank represented that it “would
approve a three year loan extension. In reli-
ance upon IIB’s promise to provide financing
as described above to complete the Hagle
Ridge project, Frantz’s [sic] personally in-
vested substantial amounts of capital into the
project during the end of 2008, 2009 and
2010.” The reference to a “three year loan
extension” could only mean the loan that had
already been made to Eagle Ridge. One can-
not extend a loan that had not yet been
made. The Frantzes then stated, “In reliance
upon ITB’s promise to provide financing as
described above....” The only promise to
provide financing “as described above” was
the three year loan extension.

This pivot by the Frantzes is insufficient to
change the outcome. There is no evidence in
the record that Bank allegedly agreed to
extend credit to some other unknown entity,
and such argument is contrary to the position
taken by the Frantzes in the district court
and in the Eagle Ridge lawsuit.’

As mentioned above, in its motion for sum-
mary judgment, one of the arguments that
Bank made in its brief supporting its motion
for summary judgment was that the alleged
oral agreement asserted by the Frantzes was
barred by the terms of the guaranties signed
by the Frantzes. Bank quoted provisions in
the guaranties where the Frantzes specifical-
ly waived the right to require Bank “to con-
tinue lending money or to extend other credit
to [Eagle Ridge],” where they expressly ac-
knowledged and agreed that “no representa-
tions or agreements of any kind have been
made to Guarantor which would limit or qual-
ify in any way the terms of this Guaranty,”
and where they expressly waived the right to
assert any setoff, counterclaims, and defens-
es against unconditionally paying Bank the
outstanding obligations. Although the district
court did not address this argument, Bank
argued in it respondent’s brief that the judg-
ment could be affirmed based upon the provi-
sions in the guaranties, and the Frantzes
responded to such argument in their reply
brief. Under these circumstances, this Court
can address this argument by Bank on ap-
peal. Nicholson v. Coewr d'Alene Placer

516 Le

Mining Corp., 161 Idaho 877, 892 P.3d 1218,
1222 (2017).

The Frantzes signed five guaranties, the
last one on March 11, 2010, which was after
the alleged oral agreement had been entered
into and after the alleged breach of the oral
agreement, The relevant provisions of the
guaranty are as follows:

CONTINUING GUARANTEE OF PAY-

MENT AND PERFORMANCE. For good.

and valuable consideration, Guarantor ab-

solutely and unconditionally guarantees
full and punctual payment and satisfaction
of the Indebtedness of Borrower [Eagle

Ridge] to Lender, and the performance

and discharge of all Borrower's obligations

under the Note and the Related Docu-

GUARANTOR’S REPRESENTATIONS
AND WARRANTIES. Guarantor repre-
sents and warrants to Lender that (A) no
representations or agreements of any kind
have been made to Guarantor which would
limit or qualify in any way the terms of
this Guaranty; (B) this Guaranty is execut-
ed at Borrower's request and not at the
request of Lender; ....

GUARANTOR’S WAIVERS. Except as
prohibited by applicable law, Guarantor
waives any right to require Lender (A) to
continue lending money or to extend other
credit to Borrower; ...

Guarantor also waives any and all rights or
defenses based on suretyship or impair-
ment of collateral, including, but not limit-
ed to, any rights or defenses arising by
reason of ... (F) any defenses given to
guarantors at law or in equity other than
actual payment and performance of the
Indebtedness... .

Guarantor further waives and agrees not
to assert or claim at any time any deduc-
tions to the amount guaranteed under this
Guaranty for any claim of setoff, counter-
claim, counter demand, recoupment or sim-
ilar right, whether such claim, demand or
right may be asserted by the Borrower;
the Guarantor, or both.

GUARANTOR’S UNDERSTANDING
WITH RESPECT TO WAIVERS. Guar-
antor warrants and agrees that each of the
waivers set forth above is made with Guar-
antor’s full knowledge of its significance
and consequences and that, under the cir-
cumstances, the waivers are reasonable
and not contrary to public policy or law. If
any such waiver is determined to b con-
* trary to any applicable law or publie policy,
such waiver shall be effective only to the
extent permitted by law or public policy.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. The
following miscellaneous provisions are a
part of this Guaranty:

Amendments. This Guaranty, together
with any Related Documents, constitutes
the entire understanding and agreement
of the parties as to the matters set forth
in this Guaranty.....

In the guaranties signed by the Frantzes,
with knowledge of the alleged breach of the
oral agreement to extend additional credit to
Eagle Ridge, they “absolutely and uncondi-
tionally guarantee[d] full and punctual pay-
ment and satisfaction of the Indebtedness of
Borrower [Eagle Ridge] to Lender, and the
performance and discharge of all Borrower’s
obligations under the Note and the Related
Documents”; they warranted that “no repre-
sentations or agreements of any kind have
been made to Guarantor which would limit
or qualify in any way the terms of this Guar-
anty”; they waived any right to require Bank
“to continue lending money or to extend oth-
er credit to Borrower [Eagle Ridge]” and
“any defenses given to guarantors at law or
in equity other than actual payment and
performance of the Indebtedness”; and they
agreed that “{t]his Guaranty, together with
any Related Documents, constitutes the en-
tire understanding and agreement of the
parties as to the matters set forth in this
Guaranty.” They have not presented any ar-
gument or authority that would relieve them
of the provisions of the guaranties they
signed. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of
the district court on this alternative ground.

I.

Is Either Party Entitled to an Award
of Attorney Fees on Appeal?

HI The Frantzes request an award of
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code section 12-120(8) on the ground that
this is an action to recover in a commercial
transaction. They are not entitled to an
award of attorney fees on appeal for two
reasons: (a) persons representing themselves
are not entitled to an award of attorney fees,
Chavez v. Canyon Cnty., State, ew rel. its
Duly Elected Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 152 Ida-
ho 297, 305, 271 P.8d 695, 703 (2012), and
they are not the prevailing parties on appeal,
Cummings v. Stephens, 157 Idaho 348, 386
P.3d 281, 300 (2014),

HM Bank also seeks an award of attorney
fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-120(8) on the ground that this is an
action to recover on a guaranty and in a
commercial transaction, and it seeks an
award of attorney fees pursuant to the provi-
sion in the guaranties stating, “Guarantor
agrees to pay upon demand all of Lender’s
costs and expenses, including Lender’s rea-
sonable attorneys’ fees and Lender’s legal
expenses, incurred in connection with the
enforcement of this Guaranty.” Because
Bank is the prevailing party on appeal, it is
entitled to an award of attorney fees under
section 12-120(8) and the guaranties.

Iv.

Conclusion.

We affirm the judgment of the district
court, and we award Respondent costs and
attorney fees on appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY concur.

517

399 P.3d 844
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve

Gabbrielle Ramona ABERASTURI, aka
Powell, Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 44247
Court of Appeals of Idaho,
Filed: June 9, 2017

on

18

Hon. Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kale D, Gans, Deputy Attorney Gener-
al, Boise, for appellant, Kale D, Gans argued.

Erie D, Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respon-
dent. Jenny C. Swinford argued.

MELANSON, Judge

The State appeals from the district court’s
order granting a motion to suppress evi-
dence. Specifically, the State argues that the
district court erred in finding that the inves-
tigative detention of Gabbrielle Ramona
Aberasturi aka Powell was unlawfully ex-
tended. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm,

An officer observed Aberasturi’s vehicle
parked near a dumpster in a private alley
behind a commercial building. The respond-
ing officer also observed Aberasturi in the
dumpster and her acquaintance in the vehi-
cle. It is disorderly conduct and therefore
unlawful to loiter, prowl, or wander upon.
the private property of another without per-
mission of the owner. 1.C. § 6-01-05(B). The
responding officer instructed Aberasturi to
get out of the dumpster and her acquain-
tance to exit the vehicle. Less than two
minutes later, a second officer arrived. The
responding officer told Aberasturi and her
acquaintance to wait while their information
was run through police dispatch. The re-
sponding officer returned to his vehicle
while the second officer stayed with Aberas-
turi and her acquaintance.

Approximately four minutes after the ini-
tial contact was made, a third officer with a
canine arrived and made contact with Aber-
asturi. Neither the responding officer nor the
second officer requested the canine officer's
assistance. The canine officer later testified
that he requested Aberasturi’s permission to
search her vehicle and that she had consent-
ed. The responding officer testified that he

heard Aberasturi give permission to search

her vehicle. Throughout the investigation, -

only the second officer used an audio record-
ing device. The responding officer gave Aber-
asturi a warning about disorderly conduct,
which can be heard on the second officer's
recording, The district court inferred that
the responding officer concluded his warning
when Aberasturi thanked the responding of-
ficer, At some point while the responding
officer gave Aberasturi a warning, the canine
officer conducted a canine drug sniff of Aber-
asturi’s vehicle. The responding officer and
canine officer testified that the canine officer
gestured to the responding officer while he
was still warning Aberasturi, which would
indicate that the canine alerted before the
responding officer concluded his warning,
The audio recording reveals that over ten
minutes passed between the time Aberasturi
thanked the responding officer and the time
that Aberasturi was called away from the
second officer to discuss the drugs found in
the vehicle, The district court found that the
officers’ testimonies conflicted with the audio
recording and were not sufficiently reliable
to find that the canine alert occurred before
the responding officer concluded his warning,
The district court further found that the
purpose of the investigatory detention for
disorderly conduct was effectuated when
Aberasturi thanked the responding officer
for his warning. The district court concluded
that the State failed to meet its burden of
establishing that probable cause to search
arose before the purpose of the initial stop
was effectuated. The district court granted
Aberasturi’s motion to suppress evidence ob-
tained as a result of the search. The State
appeals.

HM The standard of review of a sup-
pression motion is bifurcated. When a deci-
sion on a motion to suppress is challenged,
we accept the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence,
but we freely review the application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts as found, State
v, Atkinson, 128 Idaho 659, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996), At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v. Valdee-Molina, 127

519

Idaho 102; 106, 897 P.2d 998, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).

HMM The determination of whether an
investigative detention is reasonable requires
a dual, inquiry—whether the officer’s action
‘was justified at its inception and whether it
‘was reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justified the interference
in the first place, State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176,
181, 90 P.Bd 926, 981 (Ct.App.2004); State v.
Parkinson, 185 Idaho 357, 861, 17 P.38d 301,
305 (Ct.App.2000). An investigative detention
is permissible if it is based upon specific
articulable facts which justify suspicion that
the detained person is, has been, or is about
to be engaged in criminal activity, State v.
Sheldon, 189 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.8d 1220,
1228 (Ct.App.2008). Such a detention must be
temporary and last no longer than necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Roe,
140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.8d at 981; State v
Gutierrez, 187 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.8d 461,
465 (Ct.App.2002). Where a person is de-
tained, the scope of the detention must be
carefully tailored to its underlying justifica-
tion. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 981;
Parkinson, 185 Idaho at 861, 17 P.8d at 305,
In this regard, we must focus on the intensi-
ty of the detention, as well as its duration,
Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.8d at 981.

Hs The scope of the intrusion permit-
ted will vary to some extent with the particu-
Jar facts and circumstances of each case, Roe,
140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.8d at 931; Parkinson,
185 Idaho at 861, 17 P.8d at 808. Brief inqui-
ries not otherwise related to the initial pur-
pose of the stop do not necessarily violate a
detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights.. Roe,
140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.8d at 981. It is the
State’s burden to demonstrate that the sei-
2ure it seeks to justify on the basis of reason-
able suspicion was sufficiently limited in
scope and duration to satisfy the condition of
an investigative detention, Parkinson, 185
Idaho at 361-62, 17 P.8d at 805-06, This
Court will not substitute its view for that of
the trier of fact as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to
be drawn from the evidence. State v. Flow-

520

ers, 181 Idaho 205, 207, 953 P.2d 645, 647
(Ct.App.1998).

HH On appeal, the State’s assertion that
the stop was not unlawfully extended rests
on the proposition that the canine alert oc-
curred before the responding officer conclud-
ed his warning to Aberasturi. The State ar-
gues that the district court erred when it
concluded that the State failed to prove
whether the canine alert happened before the
end of the initial investigation. The State
contends the record demonstrates that the
responding officer learned of the canine alert
before the initial investigation was concluded.
Specifically, the State points to the officers’
testimonies that the canine officer indicated
to the responding officer that the canine
alerted while the responding officer was
warning Aberasturi. The State further insists
the district court affirmed that the respond-
ing officer became aware of the canine alert
during the responding officer’s warning.

While the district court acknowledged the
responding officer's testimony that the ca-
nine alert happened during the warning, the
district court appears to have questioned that
testimony. Indeed, the district court found
that there were enough discrepancies in the
officers’ testimonies that the district court
was not confident that all the details were
remembered exactly as they happened or in
the order they occurred. The district court
observed that nothing in the second officer’s
recording suggested that the responding offi-
cer was aware of the canine alert before the
responding officer concluded his warning to
Aberasturi. Because neither the responding
officer nor the canine officer used a record-
ing device, the officers’ testimony was the
only evidence indicating when the canine offi-
eer notified the responding officer of the
canine alert. A review of the record, includ-
ing the second officer’s audio recording, sup-
ports the district court’s finding that the
State failed to prove that the canine alert
oceurred before the initial stop was conclud-
ed. The district court determined that the
purpose of the initially valid stop was effectu-
ated when the responding officer concluded
his warning about disorderly conduct to
Aberasturi. Thus, the officers needed reason-

able suspicion of future criminal activity to
conduct a search of Aberasturi’s vehicle.

The district court found that the officers
did not have probable cause to search Aber-
asturi’s vehicle. The State asserts that the
district court applied the incorrect legal stan-
dard by requiring the State to prove proba-
ble cause, rather than reasonable suspicion,
to search Aberasturi’s vehicle. While the
State is correct that reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity would have been sufficient
to extend the scope of the investigatory de-
tention, it is inconsequential because the dis-
trict court found that the canine alert gave
the officer probable cause to search Aberas-
turi’s vehicle. However, because the State
could not show that the canine alerted prior
to the conclusion of the initial stop, reason-
able suspicion was not developed during the
course of the valid stop. An investigative
detention must be temporary and last no
longer than necessary to effectuate the pur-
pose of the stop. State v. Howell, 159 Idaho
245, 248, 358 P.38d 806, 809 (Ct.App.2015).
Thus, the canine officer unlawfully extended
the stop to conduct a canine search, and any
evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful
search was fruit of the poisonous tree. Ac-
cordingly, the district court’s order granting
Aberasturi’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY

concur.

399 P.3d 847
Evin DEVAN, Petitioner-Appellant,
v

STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

Docket No. 43508
Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed: June 9, 2017

Review Denied August 23, 2017

el
a
be)

522

Erie D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Reed P, Anderson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Ted 8. Tollefson, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent,

GRATTON, Chief Judge

Evin Devan appeals from the district
court's order denying his motion for relief
from post-conviction judgment pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We af-
firm.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

A judgment of conviction was entered
against Devan after a jury found him guilty
of conspiracy to commit burglary, Idaho
Code § 18-1701; burglary, LC. § 18-1401;
and misdemeanor trespassing, IC. § 18-
7011, Devan appealed and in an unpublished
decision this Court affirmed the conviction.
State v, Devan, Docket No. 39858, 2018 WL
5970605 (Ct, App. Nov. 7, 2018). Devan filed
a petition for post-conviction relief alleging
that counsel in the underlying case was inef-
fective for failing to secure witnesses, failing
to object, and failing to investigate a defense.
Devan also asserted there was new evidence
in the case. The State filed a motion for
summary dismissal, which the district court
subsequently granted. Devan filed a notice of
appeal.!

Devan filed a pro se motion and memoran-
dum for relief from judgment or order under
LR.C.P. 60(b)(6). In his motion, Devan
claimed that he was entitled to relief from
the order dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief as there had been an ab-
sence of meaningful representation by his
appointed counsel, and Devan had a meritori-
ous claim. Devan argued that his post-convic-
tion counsel failed to submit evidence that
would have withstood summary dismissal;
specifically, an affidavit by Mr. Jones which
1, The Idaho Supreme Court suspended Devan's

appeal of the district court's summary dismissal
of his petition for post-conviction relief pending

Devan believed established an alibi for his
underlying convictions. Further, Devan as-
serted that his appointed counsel failed to file
an amended petition or a response to the
State’s motion for summary dismissal, and
that counsel did not inform Devan that the
State had filed a motion for summary dis-
missal. Counsel was appointed to replace the
post-conviction counsel against whom Devan
directed the allegations. After a hearing, the
district court denied Devan’s motion for re-
lief. Devan timely appeals,

IL

ANALYSIS

Devan argues that the district court erred
in denying his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Devan
asserts the district court abused its discre-
tion in finding that there was not a com-
plete absence of meaningful representation
by his post-conviction counsel. Further, De-
van asserts the district court impermissibly
addressed the credibility of the proffered
evidence in determining that it did not con-
stitute a meritorious claim,

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) gives
the district court authority to grant relief
from a judgment in limited circumstances,
The Rule states, in relevant part: “On motion
and just terms, the court may relieve a party
or its legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons ... (6) any other reason that justi-
fies relief.”

HH SA trial court enjoys broad discre-
tion when deciding whether to grant relief
pursuant to ILR.C.P, 60(b).

A trial court’s decision whether to grant
relief pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b) is re-
viewed for abuse of discretion. The deci-
sion will be upheld if it appears that the
trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue
as discretionary, (2) acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistent
with the applicable legal standards, and (8)
reached its determination through an exer-
cise of reason, A determination under Rule

the ruling on his motion for relicf from post-
conviction judgment.

60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to
be determined by the trial court. Those
factual findings will be upheld unless they
are clearly erroneous. If the trial court
applies the facts in a logical manner to the
criteria set forth in Rule 60(b), while keep-
ing in mind the policy favoring relief in
doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to
have acted within its discretion,
Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 784, 228 P.8d
998, 1001 (2010) (quoting Waller v. State,
Dep't of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,
237-38, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061-62 (2008)).

On appeal, Devan argues that the district
court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) be-
cause he was prejudiced by an absence of
meaningful representation by his appointed
counsel and demonstrated a potentially meri-
torious defense. Devan argues that his case
rises to the level of “unique and compelling
circumstances” found in Hby. In Hby, the
petitioner’s case received “shocking and dis-
graceful neglect” by a series of attorneys
appointed to represent him. Eby, 148 Idaho
at 732, 228 P.3d at 999. The petitioner’s third
appointed attorney filed a motion pursuant to
LR.C.P. 60(b) to set aside a previous dismiss-
al for inactivity pursuant to LR.C.P. 41(e)?
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court noted
that a petitioner could not claim ineffective
assistance of counsel in a post-conviction pro-
ceeding, as there is no constitutional right to
counsel in such proceedings, Hby, 148 Idaho
at 787, 228 P.8d at 1004. However, the Court
recognized that the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act is the exclusive means for
challenging the validity of a conviction or
sentence other than by direct appeal. Id. As
a result, the Court concluded that given the
unique status of a post-conviction proceeding
and the complete absence of meaningful vep-
resentation, the case possibly presented the
“anique and compelling circumstances” in
which Rule 60(b)(6) relief was potentially
warranted. Eby, 148 Idaho at 787, 228 P.8d
at 1004. The Court then vacated and remand-
ed the case to the trial court to use its
discretion to determine if Eby should be
granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Zby, 148
Idaho at 787, 228 P.8d at 1004.

2, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(e) was

523

Devan’s reliance on Hby is misplaced. In
denying Devan’s motion, the district court
distinguished Hby because Devan acknowl-
edged “multiple contacts between [Devan]
and his counsel’s office reflecting ongoing
communications” and also “a meeting be-
tween [Devan] and counsel wherein the affi-
davit of Mr. Jones ... was discussed.” Fur-
ther, the district court noted at the hearing
on the motion for summary dismissal, De-
van’s post-conviction counsel indicated that
he had met with Devan but “was unable to
find any meritorious claims.” Thus, the dis-
trict court found that “there was communica-
tion between counsel and [Devan], specifical-
ly there was communication regarding the
potential alibi, and that counsel considered
this information and determined that there
‘was no meritorious claim.” The district court
concluded that “there was sufficient commu-
nication between the parties and consider-
ation of the issue by counsel that there was
not a complete lack of meaningful represen-
tation.” We agree.

Hl The circumstances of Devan’s case do
not rise to the level of unique and compelling
cireumstances found in Hby. This is true even
if we consider that Devan’s post-conviction
counsel failed to file a response to the State’s
motion to dismiss or to present evidence at
the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss,
Devan’s motion does not allege a complete
absence of post-conviction representation,
nor does the record support such a finding.
Devan’s post-conviction counsel met with De-
van, reviewed the case to determine whether
to file an amended petition with knowledge of
the Jones affidavit, and appeared at the sum-
mary dismissal hearing on Devan’s behalf.

HM A post-conviction petitioner is not
entitled to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel, and thus, “petitioner can-
not claim constitutionally ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in such proceedings.” Mur-
phy », State, 156 Idaho 889, 804, 827 P.3d
365, 370 (2014) (quoting Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2566,
115 L.Hd.2d 640, 670-71 (1991)). We do not
read Eby to open the door to challenge the
effectiveness of post-conviction counsel by

adopted and renumbered in 2016,

524 Le

virtue of a Rule 60(b) motion. In Hby, the
case was dismissed for inactivity, pursuant to
LR.C.P. 41(e), after over four years and sev-
eral attorneys who did nothing but attempt
to forestall such dismissal. Eby, 148 Idaho at
733, 228 P.3d at 1000. Only after the petition
was dismissed did yet another lawyer make
any attempt to advance a claim. Id. at 783-34,
228 P.8d at 1000-01. Our Supreme Court’s
reference to “the complete absence of mean-

ingful representation” reflected these
“anique and compelling. circumstances.” Id.
at 787, 228 P.3d at 1004.3

Unlike the petitioner in Zby, Devan did
not experience a “complete absence of mean-
ingful representation.” Eby, 148 Idaho at 787,
228 P.8d at 1004. Devan’s dissatisfaction with
his post-conviction counsel’s performance
does not constitute the unique and compel-
ling circumstances required before a court
may grant relief under LR.C.P. 60(b).4 The
district court did not err in denying Devan’s
Rule 60(b) motion.

il.

CONCLUSION

Devan failed to demonstrate that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in denying
his Rule 60(6) motion. The district court’s
denial of the motion for relief from post-
conviction judgment is affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge
MELANSON concur.

3. We hasten to add, however, that even though a
post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel,
such does not relieve post-conviction counsel of
his or her obligations in representing his or her
client.

4. Devan further cites to Martinez v. Ryan, 566
U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Bd.2d 272 (2012);
see also Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 133 S.Ct.

399 P.3d 851
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
vy.
James Dean HOGAN, Defendant-
Appellant.
Docket No. 44711

Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: June 28, 2017

1911, 185 L.Bd.2d 1044 (2013) as cases which
“emphasize the importance of a defendant's
rights to a full and fair opportunity to bring
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on
post-conviction.” However, Martinez and Trevino
create narrow exceptions for overcoming proce-
dural bars in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
and simply do not apply to a state post-convic-
tion case.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant.

Hon. Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent.

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge;
GUTIERREZ, Judge; and HUSKEY, Judge

PER CURIAM

On December 12, 2005, while on probation
for an unrelated Cassia County conviction,
James Dean Hogan was convicted in this
Twin Falls County case for felony injury to a
child. The district court in Twin Falls County
imposed a unified sentence of ten years with
five years determinate, suspended the sen-
tence, and placed Hogan on supervised pro-
bation for five years. On December 15, 2005,
Hogan’s probation in the Cassia County case
was revoked and his underlying sentence ex-
ecuted. Hogan remained on supervised pro-
bation in the Twin Falls case throughout the
period of time that he was incarcerated for
the Cassia County case (being paroled in the
Cassia County case on February 19, 2009).

In 2010, Hogan violated his probation in
the Twin Falls case and the district court
extended Hogan’s period of probation for two
years beginning on July 6, 2010. Hogan sub-
sequently violated his probation a second
time and the district court revoked Hogan’s
probation, executed the underlying sentence,
and retained jurisdiction on December 18,
2011. Following the period of retained juris-
diction, the district court relinquished juris-
diction, Hogan filed a motion for credit for
time served (over four year's later), request-
ing credit for the time he was incarcerated
for the Cassia County case while he was on
probation in the Twin Falls County case. The
district court denied the motion. Hogan ap-
peals, asserting that the district court erred
by denying his motion for credit for time
served,

In computing a term of imprisonment, the
defendant shall receive credit for any period

525

of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if
such incarceration was for the offense or an
included offense for which the judgment was
entered, Idaho Code § 18-309(1). Because
the incarceration for which Hogan seeks
eredit was not attributable to the charges or
conduct in the instant offense, the district
court did not err in refusing to give Hogan
credit in the Twin Falls case for time served
in the unrelated Cassia County case.

We note that this case is distinguishable
from the recent consolidated Supreme Court
decision in State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 395
P.8d 809 (2017). In that case, each defendant
had been incarcerated on an unrelated mat-
ter. While incarcerated, each defendant was
served with an arrest warrant in the instant
matter. The Supreme Court determined that
even though the defendants had initially been
incarcerated on the unrelated matter, after
service of the arrest warrant, they were enti-
tled to credit for time served in the instant
ease. In our present case, Hogan acknowl-
edges that, while he was incarcerated in the
unrelated case, he was never incarcerated or
served with an arrest warrant in this case.
During the time for which Hogan sought
credit he was solely incarcerated in the unre-
lated case and throughout that time on pro-
bation in this case. Thus, he served no time
(nor was under an arrest warrant) for which
any credit was due.

Therefore, the district court’s order deny-
ing Hogan’s motion for credit for time served
is affirmed.

399 P.3d 852
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve
Wilbert LONGHOFER, Defendant-
Appellant.
Docket No. 44041
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: June 29, 2017
Review Denied August 22, 2017

Erie D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant.

Hon, Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Ted §, Tollefson, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent,

HUSKEY, Judge

Wilbert Longhofer appeals from the judg-
ment of conviction entered upon his condi-
tional guilty plea to operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. Lon-
ghofer argues the district court abused its
discretion when it denied Longhofer’s motion
in limine to exclude the aleohol breathalyzer
test results, Because the State’s expert laid
the necessary foundation to show the reliabil-
ity of the breath-test results, we affirm the

district court’s denial of the motion in limine
and judgment of conviction.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Longhofer was stopped by a police officer
for speeding. The officer conducted field so-
briety tests and used a LifeLoe FC20 breath-
alyzer to conduct three breath tests. The
breath tests yielded results of 114, INF
(nsufficient), and .116. The officer arrested
Longhofer,

The State charged Longhofer with felony
operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, Idaho Code §§ 18-8004,
18-8005. Longhofer pleaded not guilty. Lon-
ghofer filed a motion in limine to exclude the
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) results,
memorandum in support, and request for
hearing, as well as two amended motions,
The motion (and the two subsequent mo-
tions) requested an order excluding the re-
sults of the BAC tests, since the performance
check on the breathalyzer did not meet the
standards required by the Idaho Breath Al-
cohol Standard Operation Procedure manual
(SOP).

The SOP requires breathalyzers to under-
go a performance verification within twenty-
four hours before or after the breathalyzers
are used for a breath test. The performance
verification requires an operator to take two
samples which cannot deviate more than 10%
from the target value, In this case, the target
value was .08, while the samples measured.
073 and .070, A 10% deviation from .08
meant the sample must fall between .072 and
.088. The .070 sample, therefore, fell outside
the acceptable range and did not conform to
the SOP. Longhofer argued that because the
SOP was not properly followed, the breath-
test results should be excluded from evi-
dence.

In response, the State argued that Lon-
ghofer’s motion in limine should be denied
because the State intended to call an expert
witness at the hearing, The State explained

1. The State charged Longhofer with a felony DUI
because Longhofer had a prior felony DUI con-

527

its expert witness would testify that the
breathalyzer had been trending low and the
results would have been to the benefit of
Longhofer. Longhofer replied that the State
cannot prove the process produced an accu-
rate result.

At the hearing, counsel stipulated: (1) the
“blows” in the field were conducted properly;
and (2) the twenty-four-hour performance
verification on the breathalyzer was not done
pursuant to the SOP. The State’s expert was
an employee of the Idaho State Police and
helped to calibrate and certify all of Idaho's
new LifeLoc FOC20 breath-testing instru-
ments. The expert created the SOP for
breath-testing. The expert explained the per-
formance verification procedure, which is re-
quired twenty-four hours before or after a
breath test and is meant to show that the
calibration is still valid and the instrument is
providing reliable results. This calibration is
required for the LifeLoe FC20 breathalyzer
because the breathalyzer uses fuel cell tech-
nology, which dries out over time. The expert
explained that the fuel cell becomes less re-
sponsive to alcohol as it dries out, which
produces results that are steadily lower than
the actual BAO, but are internally consistent
‘with each other. When the fuel cell begins to
trend low in this way, the software on the
device requires recalibration in order to accu-
rately report the blood alcohol level. After
reviewing the performance verification log,
the State’s expert concluded the breath-test
readings had been trending low in this case.
The expert also concluded there was no evi-
dence to lead him to believe the breath-test
results were elevated. As a result, the State’s
expert concluded he was confident to a rea-
sonable degree of scientific certainty that
Longhofer’s breath test measured an alcohol
content above .08,

After the hearing, the district court issued
a written order denying Longhofer’s motion
in limine. The court found the State’s expert
persuasive because “any issue with the de-
vice would cause it to produce lower, not
higher readings, and would thus not preju-

viction in 2007,

|

528 Dn

dice Defendant.” As a result, the court deter-
mined the expert testimony provided a suffi-
cient basis to allow the evidence of the
breath tests to be admitted at trial.

The State filed an amended information
that alleged Longhofer was a persistent vio-
lator, I.C, § 19-2514. Pursuant to a condition-
al plea agreement, Longhofer pleaded guilty
to felony operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, and the State
dismissed the persistent violator charge.
Longhofer reserved his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion in limine.
The district court sentenced Longhofer to a
unified sentence of ten years, with three and
one-half years determinate. Longhofer timely
appeals.

i.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision whether to admit evidence at
trial is generally within the province of the
trial court. A trial court’s determination that
evidence is supported by a proper foundation
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Gilpin, 182 Idaho 648, 646, 977 P.2d 905,
908 (Ct. App. 1999). Therefore, a trial court’s
determination as to the admission of evidence
at trial will only be reversed where there has
been an abuse of that discretion. State v,
Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 978-74, 829 P.2d
861, 868-64 (1992). When a trial court’s dis-
cretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inqui-
ry to determine whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discre-
tion, acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices
before it, and reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Ida-
ho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1833 (1989).

I.

ANALYSIS
Longhofer argues the district court abused
its discretion when it denied his motion in
limine that sought to exclude the breathaly-
zer test results. Longhofer asserts the State
did not lay the necessary foundation to show

how the breath-test results were reliable. We
disagree,

Hs In order to admit the results of a
breath test into evidence, the State must
proceed in one of two ways. See State v.
Healy, 151 Idaho 784, 786-37, 264 P.8d 75,
‘77-78 (Ct. App. 2011). First, the State may
establish that the administrative procedures,
which ensure the reliability of that test, have
been met. State v. Mazzuca, 182 Idaho 868,
869, 979 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Ct. App. 1999);
State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127, 129, 867 P.2d
1001, 1008 (Ct. App. 1993). As part of this
first option, the State can show that a state
agency approved the equipment and an offi-
cer operated the equipment and adminis-
tered the test in conformity with applicable
standards, Idaho Code § 18-8004(4); State v.
Nickerson, 182 Idaho 406, 411, 978 P.2d 758,
763 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, even without
fulfilling the administrative procedures, the
State may still make the test results admissi-
ble if it calls an expert witness to establish
the reliability of the test. State v. Charan,
182 Idaho 841, 348, 971 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Ct.
App. 1998).

Here, both parties agree the State did not
comply with the administrative procedures
when it executed the breath test, Because it
is uncontroverted that the State did not com-
ply with the administrative procedures, the
admissibility of evidence in this case depends
upon whether the State’s expert witness
properly established the reliability of the
breath test. Longhofer argues the State did
not lay the necessary foundation to show how
the breath-test results were accurate, and
thus failed to meet the requisite standard for
admissibility. We disagree.

In accordance with several legislative de-
velopments, the Idaho Supreme Court has
established that, when analyzing an alcohol
test, we focus on whether a defendant is
above the legal limit of .08, rather than the
exact alcohol concentration within the blood.
See Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 158
Idaho 200, 203, 280 P.8d 708, 706 (2012). In
1970, the Idaho Code created a presumption
of intoxication if a driver’s BAC exceeded the
legal limit, See 1.C. § 49-1102 (1970), In 1984,
the statute was repealed and codified as I.C.

§ 18-8004, so that test results no longer cre-
ated a presumption of intoxication, but could
be used to establish a per se violation. Zlias-
Cruz, 158 Idaho at 203, 280 P.8d at 706. A
1987 amendment removed the requirement of
showing the amount, by weight, of alcohol in
the blood. See 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.
122, § 2, pp. 247-50. A violation can instead
be established through the results from an
approved blood, breath, or urine test. Jd. The
Supreme Court provided the following expla-
nation to summarize the recent legislative
history:

After the 1987 amendment, a violation
can be shown simply by the results of a
test for aleohol concentration that complies
with the statutory requirements. With that
change, the margin of error in the testing
equipment is irrelevant. The equipment
need not precisely measure the alcohol
concentration in the person’s blood. The
test need only be based upon the correct
formula, and the equipment must be prop-
erly approved and certified.

Hlias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204, 280 P.8d at
707. The Court acknowledged it does not
require the State to establish the precise
amount of aleohol in the driver’s blood at the
time of driving, even if the alcohol concentra-
tion at the time of driving could be lower
than at the time of testing. Id. at 205, 280
P.8d at 708, The Court in Zlias-Cruz further
explained the current standard as follows:
The issue is not the alcohol concentration
in the blood, It is the alechol concentration
as shown by the test results, There is
nothing to which to compare the test re-
sults, All that is required is that the test
results show that the alcohol concentration
‘was above the legal limit.

Id. at 206, 280 P.8d at 709,

Hl More recently, the Supreme Court
affirmed the holding in Elias-Cruz that the
proper standard is no longer the concentra-
tion of alcohol in the driver’s blood. State v.
Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 451, 875 P.8d 279, 281
(2016). This Court also recognized Hlias-
Cruz as controlling precedent. State v. Tom-
Tinson, 159 Idaho 112, 121, 857 P.8d 288, 247
(Ct. App. 2015). However, in Tomlinson we
issued an additional explanation that the Zi-
as-Cruz holding does not prevent a defen-

529

dant from challenging the accuracy or relia-
bility of the specific machine or test results.
Id. As such, Longhofer properly challenges
the reliability of the breathalyzer in this case,
but the State is not required to show exactly
the alechol concentration in Longhofer’s
blood in order to admit the evidence of the
test results. Instead, the State must show
that the test results reliably demonstrate
that Longhofer’s BAC was .08 or more.

We find the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Elias-Cruz is controlling in this case. Howev-
er, we acknowledge the issue in Hlias-Cruz
was distinct from the issue here. The ques-
tion in Hlias-Cruz was whether a testing
machine’s margin of error was relevant to
determine if the defendant's BAC exceeded
the legal limit. Hlias-Cruz, 158 Idaho at 206-
07, 280 P.3d at 709-10, In contrast, Longhof-
er does not challenge the breathalyzer’s mar-
gin of error. Nonetheless, the Court in Zlias-
Cruz does not specify that its holding should
be limited to the question of margin of error,
The holding instead described the legislative
history and judicial trends in analyzing alco-
hol concentration testing, after which the
Court decided breath-test results are ana-
lyzed according to the legal limit rather than
the actual BAC of the driver. We therefore
find the holding in Zlias-Cruz is controlling
in this case.

On appeal, Longhofer argues the breatha-
lyzer was underreporting, and thus the
breath test was inaccurate. Furthermore,
Longhofer argues the State’s expert failed to
testify why the procedural defects did not
affect the reliability of the test results. Using
Jones and Elias-Cruz, Longhofer contends
the actual alcohol concentration is irrelevant.
Longhofer concluded: “[The State’s expert]’s
testimony on Mr. Longhofer’s actual alcohol
concentration was not relevant to why the
procedural defects did not affect the reliabili-
ty of the test results.”

We disagree with Longhofer’s argument.
Longhofer correctly cites Elias-Cruz for the
rule that the actual alcohol concentration
within the driver's blood is irrelevant, How-
ever, missing from Longhofer’s analysis is
how the State’s expert must still testify that
the breath-test results can be relied upon to

530

show that Longhofer’s BAC was above the
legal limit,

Here, it is first helpful to define and apply
the following terms: consistent, reliable, and
accurate, “Consistent” is defined as “marked
by harmony, regularity, or steady continuity
throughout: showing no significant change,
unevenness, or contradiction.” Werpster’s
Tarp New Inri Dict, 484 (8d ed. 1998).
“Reliable” is defined as “giving the same
result on successive trials.” Wenstir’s THIRD
New Inr't Dior. 1917 (8d ed. 1993), Finally,
“accurate” is defined as “in exact conformity
to truth or to some standard.” Wussrsr’s
TurD New Inv Dicr. 14 (8d ed. 1993),
Although similar in meaning and usage, the
three terms are not synonyms. A perfect
breathalyzer test would give results that are
consistent, reliable, and accurate, so as to
indicate the instrument provides regular and
predictable results that would be the same on
multiple tests, and precisely reflect the exact
amount of alcohol within a driver’s blood.
However, Idaho courts have historically rec-
ognized that, at trial, parties have difficulty
proving the extent to which a driver's “actu-
al” BAC while driving was above or below
the reading on a breathalyzer. See Jones, 160
Idaho at 451, 875 P.38d at 281; Tomlinson,
159 Idaho at 121-22, 857 P.8d at 247-48; State
v Roach, 157 Idaho 551, 555-56, 387 P.8d
1280, 1284-85 (Ct, App. 2014). As a result,
Idaho does not require the State to prove the
exact amount of alcohol within a driver's
blood or that test results reflect the precise
concentration of alcohol in the blood. See
Hlias-Cruz, 168 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at,
708, Hlias-Crue made clear that the actual
concentration in the blood is not the issue
when analyzing breath-test results, Hlias-
Cruz, 158 Idaho at 206, 280 P.3d at 709.
Similarly, Healy analyzed the expert testimo-
ny only as to the reliability of the breath test,
and not the accuracy. Healy, 151 Idaho at
736, 264 P.8d at 77,

HI Here, the State’s expert established
that the breath-test results were consistent.
The State’s expert explained that as the fuel
cell ages, it underreports the BAC. However,
the expert explained that the underreporting
is consistent, so that the aging fuel cell still
shows consistent results, The instrument,

therefore, provided results that were inter-
nally consistent. Upon review of the logs, the
State’s expert concluded the breath-test in-
strument in this case was underreporting as
expected from an aging fuel cell, but that this
reporting was consistent.

HI Additionally, the State’s expert estab-
lished the reliability of the breath test admin-
istered to Longhofer. The question of relia-
bility does not focus on whether the test
measures the exact concentration of alcohol
in the driver’s blood. Instead, based on the
reliability standard articulated in Hlias-Cruz,
the test results only need to show the test
results accurately measured Longhofer’s
BAC as above the legal limit. Blias-Cruz, 158
Idaho at 206, 280 P.3d at 709, In this case,
the expert testified to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty that Longhofer’s BAC
was above .08; as such, the State established
the admissibility of the test results.

In sum, the State’s expert in this case
explained the test results in Longhofer’s case
were internally consistent and reliably meas-
ured Longhofer’s BAC as greater than .08.
The expert did not opine about the precise
concentration level of alcohol in Longhofer’s
blood besides that the level was greater than
.08. The expert also did not testify the degree
to which the breathalyzer was underreport-
ing or calculate the precise amount of alcohol
in Longhofer’s blood when he was driving.
Instead, the State’s expert issued the follow-
ing conclusion; “All of the evidence shows
that the instrument appears to be underre-
porting and definitely not overreporting. So
those results given in the field, that they're
definitely not overreported.” The expert
agreed that, in his expert opinion, he was
confident to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty that the breath measured was
above the legal limit of .08, Because the
State’s expert explained how the test reliably
measured Longhofer’s BAC as above the le-
gal limit, the State provided sufficient foun-
dation to admit the evidence of the breath-
test results. Furthermore, because the
State’s expert issued his conclusions relative
to the legal limit and not an actual concentra-
tion of alcohol, we determine the testimony

531
satisfied Hlias-Cruz and sufficiently account- firm the district court’s denial of the motion

ed for the procedural defects, in limine and judgment of conviction.
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge
WV. MELANSON concur.
CONCLUSION

Because the State’s expert demonstrated
the breath-test results were reliable, we af-

532 [|

400 P.3d 620
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve

Scott Cameron FREELAND,
Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 44593
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: May 4, 2017
Review Denied September 8, 2017

Eric D, Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge

Scott Cameron Freeland appeals from his
judgment of conviction for grand theft by
possession of stolen property. Specifically,
Freeland argues that the district court erred
in denying Freeland’s motion to suppress
evidence found during a search for weapons,
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Freeland rented a home on his landlords’
property. The landlords asked Freeland to
leave for failure to pay rent and because the
landlords suspected Freeland was engaged in
drug activity. After the landlords believed

Freeland had moved out, the landlords en-
tered the home and found evidence that
Freeland had stolen a pistol from the land-
lords, The landlords called the police who
took pictures of the evidence, filed a theft
report, and instructed the landlords to con-
tact the police if Freeland returned. The
following day, Freeland returned. The land-
lords’ daughter contacted the police and ad-
vised that Freeland was outside arguing with
the landlords, The two responding officers
were advised of the theft report,

When the police arrived, Freeland moved
his hands toward his waist. One of the offi-
cers drew his weapon and ordered Freeland
to put his hands up. When Freeland com-
plied, the other officer went inside the land-
lords’ house to speak with them while the
first officer stayed with Freeland. The first
officer saw a bulge in Freeland’s sweater and
asked him to raise his sweater, Freeland
complied and the officer did not see a weapon
at that time. The other officer returned and
asked the first officer whether he frisked
Freeland for weapons, When the first officer
said he did not frisk Freeland, the other
officer asked Freeland for consent to check
his pockets and he offered to empty his own
pockets. As Freeland emptied his pockets,
the other officer observed what he believed
was a holster on Freeland’s hip. The other
officer ordered Freeland to turn around with
his hands behand his back and frisked him
for weapons. The frisk revealed the pistol the
landlords suspected Freeland had stolen.

The State charged Freeland with unlawful
possession of a firearm (I.C. § 18-8316) and
grand theft by possession of stolen property
(LC. §§ 18-2408(4), 18-2407(1), and 18-2409).
Freeland filed a motion to suppress, arguing
that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion
to search Freeland.! The district court found
that the search of Freeland’s person was
justified by the officers’ reasonable fear for
their safety and denied the motion to sup-
press. Freeland entered a conditional guilty
plea to grand theft, reserving his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress,
In exchange, the State dismissed the unlaw-
1, Freeland also argued that the search of the

home he rented violated the Fourth Amendment.
However, the district court determined the

533

ful possession of a firearm charge. Freeland
appeals.

The standard of review of a suppression
motion is bifureated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept
the trial court’s findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but we
freely review the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found, State uv
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284,
1286 (Ct. App. 1996), At a suppression hear-
ing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v, Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 998, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

A warrantless search is presump-
tively unreasonable unless it falls within cer-
tain special and well-delineated exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 408 U.S. 448, 454-55, 91 S.Ct.
2022, 2081-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575~76 (1971);
State v. Ferreira, 183 Idaho 474, 479, 988
P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999). In Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct, 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court.
ereated a stop-and-frisk exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
The stop and the frisk constitute two inde-
pendent actions, each requiring a distinct and
separate justification, State v. Babb, 188 Ida-
hho 890, 892, 994 P.2d 6838, 635 (Ct. App.
2000); State v. Fleenor, 188 Idaho 552, 556,
989 P.2d 784, 788 (Ct App. 1999).

HM The stop is justified if there is a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
individual has committed or is about to com-
mit a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
108 S.Ct, 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Termy,
392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 20
L.Ed.2d at 911; State v. DuValé, 181 Idaho
550, 558, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998); Ferreira,
188 Idaho at 479, 988 P.2d at 705. However,
merely because there are reasonable grounds
to justify a lawful investigatory stop, such
grounds do not automatically justify a frisk

search was reasonable, and Freeland does not
challenge that determination on appeal.

534

for weapons. Babb, 188 Idaho at 892, 994
P.2d at 635, An officer may frisk an individu-
al if the officer can point to specific and
articulable facts that would lead a reasonably
prudent person to believe that the individual
with whom the officer is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous and nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves
to dispel this belief. Terry, 892 U.S. at 27, 88
S.Ct, at 1888, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909; Babb, 133
Idaho at 892, 994 P.2d ‘at 685; Fleenor, 188
Idaho at 555, 989 P.2d at 787, In our analysis
of a frisk, we look to the facts known to the
officer on the seene and the inferences of risk
of danger reasonably drawn from the totality
of those specific circumstances, Babb, 188
Idaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 686; Fleenor, 138
Idaho at 555, 989 P.2d at 787,

On appeal, Freeland argues that the dis-
trict court erred in denying Freeland’s mo-
tion to suppress. Specifically, Freeland
contends that the district court erred in
analyzing the search of Freeland’s person
as of the time the officer ordered Free-
land to put his hands behind his back and
conducted a frisk for weapons, rather than
when the officers asked to check Free-
land’s pockets, ‘Freeland admits that
whether requesting a person empty his or
her pockets constitutes a Terry search is
an issue of first impression in Idaho, Free-
land cites to cases in other jurisdictions to
support his contention that the officers’ re-
quest to search Freeland’s pockets consti-
tuted a Terry search, Specifically, Freeland
cites to United States v, Reyes, 849 F.3d
219, 225 (6th Cir. 2008) where an officer
requested a defendant lift his shirt and
empty his pockets. However, Reyes does
not establish a bright-line rule that re-
questing a defendant empty his or her
pockets constitutes a Terry search. Reyes,
849 F.8d at 225, In fact, Reyes stands for
the proposition that an officer may request
a defendant lift his or her shirt and empty
his or her pockets without violating Terry
because such a request is less intrusive
than a frisk for weapons, Reyes, 349 F.8d
at 225. Freeland also cites United States
v, DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211, 1215 (0th
Cir. 1978). However DiGiacomo involved a
consensual search in which the government
failed to meet its burden of establishing

the consent was voluntary and is inapplica-
ble. Other cases cited by Freeland involve
an order, not a request, by officers that a
defendant empty his or her pockets. See,
eg., State v. Hlavacek, 185 W.Va. 3871, 407
S.E.2d 875, 880 (1991); State v. Ingram,
126 N.M. 426, 970 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Ct.
App. 1998).

Hl Im contrast, the officer in this case
asked Freeland for consent to search his
pockets, and Freeland offered to empty his
own pockets. Thus, even if these cases did
announce a bright-line rule that requesting a
defendant empty his or her pockets consti-
tutes a Terry search, that rule would not
render the search of Freeland’s person un-
constitutional. Freeland offered to empty his
own pockets and does not argue on appeal
that his offer was involuntary. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in analyzing the
search of Freeland’s person as of the time
the officer ordered Freeland to put his hands
behind his back and conducted a frisk for
weapons, The district court found that, at
that time, the officers were aware that Free-
land may have stolen a pistol, observed Free-
Jand move his hands toward his waist when
the officers arrived, and observed what ap-
peared to be a holster on Freeland’s hip,
These circumstances support a reasonable
inference that Freeland posed a risk of dan-
ger. Moreover, even if reasonable suspicion
that Freeland may be armed was required to
request Freeland empty his pockets, the offi-
cers’ knowledge that Freeland may have pos-
sessed the stolen pistol, coupled with the
initial encounter between Freeland and the
officers, was sufficient to justify a frisk for
weapons, Thus, the district court did not err
in denying Freeland’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, Freeland’s judgment of convic-
tion for grand theft by possession of stolen
property is affirmed,

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY
concur.

400 P.3d 623
Terry Lee ASH, Petitioner-Appellant,
vy.
STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
Docket No. 44295
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: June 7, 2017
Review Denied September 8, 2017

id

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP;
Deborah A. Whipple, Boise, for appellant.
Dennis A. Benjamin argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M.
Lorello argued.

GRATTON, Chief Judge

Terry Lee Ash appeals from the district
court’s judgment summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief, We affirm,

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In the underlying case, the State charged
Ash with driving under the influence, Idaho
Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(9), and a persistent
violator enhancement, 1.C. § 19-2514, In the
State’s case-in-chief at trial, the prosecutor
asked the arresting officer, “Now, after he
performed those FSTs and you arrested him,
did he say anything about drinking any more
alcohol besides the one beer?” The officer
responded, “He decided not to say anything
more after that.” Trial counsel moved for a
mistrial, asserting the question and answer
violated Ash’s privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. The prosecutor opposed the motion,
filing an affidavit in which she stated she
understood how the Fifth Amendment ap-
plied to Ash’s rights, would not intentionally
attempt to violate those rights, and was try-
ing to impeach anticipated testimony from
Ash that contradicted prior statements he
made to the officer. Relying on State v. Ell-
ington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.8d 727 (2011), the
district court stated: “a prosecutor cannot
use post-custody silence to infer guilt in its
ease in chief.” The court held the prosecu-
tor’s question and officer’s answer constitut-
ed fundamental error, granted the motion for
mistrial, and scheduled the case for a second
trial. The jury in the second trial convicted
Ash of driving under the influence. Ash ap-
pealed, and this Court affirmed his convic-
tion.

537

Ash filed a pro se petition for post-convic-
tion relief and requested appointed counsel.
The district court appointed counsel, and
counsel amended Ash’s petition. In his
amended petition, Ash asserted his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
his second prosecution on double jeopardy
grounds and his “rights to be free from
double jeopardy ... were violated by the
second prosecution and conviction.” Ash at-
tached a transcript of the proceedings in the
underlying case and the prosecutor’s affidavit
to his amended petition, The State moved for
summary dismissal, and Ash moved for sum-
mary judgment in response. The district
court dismissed the petition. Ash timely ap-
peals.

IL

ANALYSIS

HMM Ash asserts the district court erred
in summarily dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief. A petition for post-convic-
tion relief initiates a proceeding that is civil
in nature. LC. § 19-4907; Rhoades v. State,
148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.38d 1066, 1068
(2009); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,
678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v.
State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1828, 1826
(Ct. App. 1992), Like a plaintiff in a civil
action, the petitioner must prove by a pre-
ponderance of evidence the allegations upon
which the request for post-conviction relief is
based. Goodwin v. State, 188 Idaho 269, 271,
61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition
for post-conviction relief differs from a com-
plaint in an ordinary civil action. Dunlap v.
State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.8d 376, 382
(2004). A petition must contain much more
than a short and plain statement of the claim
that would suffice for a complaint under Ida-
ho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1). Rather, a
petition for post-conviction relief must be
verified with respect to facts within the per-
sonal knowledge of the petitioner, and affida-
vits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations must be attached or the petition
must state why such supporting evidence is
not included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903.
In other words, the petition must present or
be accompanied by admissible evidence sup-

538

porting its allegations, or the petition will be
subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho
64, 67, 266 P.38d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).

HMM [idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes
summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion
by a party or upon the court’s own initiative,
if it appears from the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions
and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When considering summary dismissal, the
district court must construe disputed facts in
the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not
required to accept either the petitioner's
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s con-
clusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho
644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994);
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715
P.2d 369, 872 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the
district court, as the trier of fact, is not
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the
party opposing the motion for summary dis-
position; rather, the district court is free to
arrive at the most probable inferences to be
drawn from uncontroverted evidence, Hayes
v. State, 146 Idaho 358, 355, 195 P.8d 712, 714
(Ct, App. 2008). Such inferences will not be
disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted
evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.

HM Claims may be summarily dis-
missed if the petitioner’s allegations are
clearly disproven by the record of the crimi-
nal proceedings, if the petitioner has not
presented evidence making a prima facie
case as to each essential element of the
claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do
not justify relief as a matter of law, Kelly v.
State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281
(2010); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603,
200 P.8d 1148, 1152 (2009), Thus, summary
dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief
is appropriate when the court can conclude,
as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief even with all disputed facts
construed in the petitioner’s favor. For this
reason, summary dismissal of a post-convic-
tion petition may be appropriate even when
the state does not controvert the petitioner’s

evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873
P.2d at 901.

HEE Conversely, if the petition, affida-
vits, and other evidence supporting the peti-
tion allege facts that, if true, would entitle
the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction
claim may not be summarily dismissed. Char-
boneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.8d
1108, 1111 (2004); Sheahan v. State, 146 Ida-
ho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 928 (Ct. App.
2008). If a genuine issue of material fact is
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted to resolve the factual issues, Good-
win, 188 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629,

HO» appeal from an order of sum-
mary dismissal, we apply the same standards
utilized by the trial courts and examine
whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence
asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the
petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Ida-
ho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010); Sheah-
am, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.8d at 928, Over
questions of law, we exercise free review.
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.8d at 1069;
Downing v. State, 186 Idaho 367, 870, 33
P.8d 841, 844 (Ct, App. 2001),

Ash asserts the district court erred in sum-
marily dismissing his ineffective assistance of
counsel and double jeopardy claims.

A, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claim

Hs Ash asserts the district court
erred in summarily dismissing his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. A claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel may properly be
brought under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho
469, 477, 224 P.3d 586, 544 (Ct. App. 2009),
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, the petitioner must show that
the attorney’s performance was deficient and
that the petitioner was prejudiced by the
deficiency, Strickland v. Washington, 466
US. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct, 2052, 2064-65, 80
L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984); Self v. State, 145
Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.38d 504, 506 (Ct. App.
2007). To establish a deficiency, the petition-
er has the burden of showing that the attor-
ney’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, Aragon v. State,

114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176
(1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442,
163 P.8d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To estab-
lish prejudice, the petitioner must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attor-
ney’s deficient performance, the outcome of
the trial would have been different. Aragon,
114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Knutsen,
144 Idaho at 442, 163 P.3d at 231, This Court
has long adhered to the proposition that tac-
tical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will
not be second-guessed on appeal unless those
decisions are based on inadequate prepara-
tion, ignorance of relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.
Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254
P.8d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).

Hs In 2 post-conviction proceeding
challenging an attorney’s failure to pursue a
motion in the underlying criminal action, the
district court may consider the probability of
success of the motion in question in deter-
mining whether the attorney’s inactivity con-
stituted ineffective assistance. Lint v. State,
145 Idaho 472, 477, 180 P.8d 511, 516 (Ct.
App. 2008). Where the alleged deficiency is
counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion
that the motion, if pursued, would not have
been granted by the trial court, is generally
determinative of both prongs of the Sérick-
land test. Lint, 145 Idaho at 477-78, 180 P.3d
at 516-17.

HE Ash asserts his amended petition
raised a genuine issue of material fact about.
whether trial counsel was ineffective for fail-
ing to object to his second prosecution on
double jeopardy grounds. Generally, a defen-
dant’s motion for mistrial removes any dou-
ble jeopardy bar to retrial. Oregon v. Kenne-
dy, 456 U.S. 667, 678, 102 S.Ct. 2088, 2088, 72
L.Ed.2d 416, 422-28(1982). A narrow excep-
tion! to this general rule arises when the
prosecutor “intended to provoke the defen-
dant into moving for a mistrial.” State v.
Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 968, 829 P.2d 550,
558 (Ct, App. 1992). “Negligence, even if
gross, is insufficient to constitute intent to
provoke a mistrial.” State v. Pugsley, 128

1, Referring to Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,
102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 LEd.2d 416 (1982), Ash re-

539

Idaho 168, 174, 911 P.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App.
1995).

Ash asserts a genuine issue of material
fact exists about whether the prosecutor in-
tended to provoke him into moving for a
mistrial. Therefore, he contends that sum-
mary dismissal was inappropriate as to
whether trial counsel was ineffective for fail-
ing to object to the second prosecution on
double jeopardy grounds. According to Ash,
inconsistencies in the prosecutor’s affidavit
created a genuine issue of material fact about.
whether the prosecutor intended to provoke
him into moving for a mistrial. Ash contends
the prosecutor’s “averment that she under-
stands the Fifth Amendment and that she
did not intend to violate it cannot be true—
because she either did not understand the
Amendment or she did intend to violate it,
because she did violate it.”

The district court held there was no genu-
ine issue of material fact about whether the
prosecutor intended to provoke Ash into
moving for a mistrial and concluded, in fact,
that the prosecutor did not intend to provoke
him into moving for a mistrial. The court
stated:

[T]he State’s inquiry about post-arrest si-

lence was to influence [Ash’s] decision

about testifying to different facts than stat-
ed by the officer. In this sense, [the prose-
cutor] certainly acted intentionally. Howev-
er, there is nothing in the record that the

State intended thereby to “provoke the

defendant into calling for a mistrial ...”

Rather, it appears the deputy prosecutor

acted upon an inadequate understanding of

the law. Therefore, double jeopardy did

not attach to [Ash’s] case and was not a

bar to subsequent prosecution... ..

Even if Ash’s trial counsel had objected
or moved to dismiss the second trial, the
end result would have been the same, Dou-
ble jeopardy did not attach.

(quoting Pugsley, 128 Idaho at 178, 911 P.2d
at 766).

We agree. While the prosecutor's affidavit,

shows she intended to inquire about Ash’s

fers to this exception as the Kennedy exception.

540

post-arrest silence and calls into question the
prosecutor’s understanding of the law, it does
not raise a genuine issue of material fact
about whether the prosecutor intended to
provoke Ash into moving for a mistrial. Im-
portantly, the State did not dispute the facts
in the prosecutor's affidavit. Therefore, the
district court was free to arrive at the most.
probable inferences to be drawn from the
affidavit. The district court concluded that
the prosecutor “acted upon an inadequate
understanding of the law” and, therefore, did
not intend to provoke Ash into moving for a
mistrial. Because the uncontroverted evi-
dence justifies these conclusions, we refuse to
disturb them on appeal. Accordingly, a mo-
tion by Ash’s trial counsel objecting to the
second prosecution on double jeopardy
grounds would have failed. Because the dis-
trict court would not have granted a motion
by Ash’s trial counsel objecting to the second
prosecution on double jeopardy grounds,
Ash’s claim that trial counsel should have
sought such a motion fails both prongs of the
Strickland test.

B. Double Jeopardy Claim

HM Ash asserts he raised a genuine is-
sue of material fact about whether his “rights
to be free from double jeopardy ... were
violated by the second prosecution and con-
viction.” Ash did not raise this claim in his
direct appeal from the underlying case. Ash
asserts this claim is a direct constitutional
claim that can be raised for the first time on
appeal from his post-conviction case.

Idaho Code § 19-4901(a) sets forth the
types of claims that are cognizable in post-
conviction, which include claims “[t]hat the
conviction or the sentence was in violation of
the constitution of the United States or the

2. At oral argument, Ash asserted that Johnson v.
State, 162 Idaho 213, 395 P.3d 1246, 2017 WL
1967808 (2017) (pet. for rehr’g pending) supports
this argument. However, Johnson did not hold
that Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) was inapplicable
to direct constitutional violation claims. Instead,
Johnson held only that LC. § 19-4901(b) did not
bar the Eighth Amendment claim of an illegal
sentence in that case because the basis for the
claim and relief requested—Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Bd.2d 407
(2012)—did not exist at the time of Johnson's

constitution or laws of this state.” IC. § 19-
4901(a)(1). However,
[alny issue which could have been raised
on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited
and may not be considered in post-convic-
tion proceedings, unless it appears to the
court, on the basis of a substantial factual
showing by affidavit, deposition or other-
wise, that the asserted basis for relief rais-
es a substantial doubt about the reliability
of the finding of guilt and could not, in the
exercise of due diligence, have been pre-
sented earlier.
LC. § 19-4901(o). Ash asserts LLC. § 19-
4901(b) must be construed not to preclude
claims authorized by I.C. § 19-4901(a), such
as direct constitutional claims. According to
Ash, I.C. § 19-4901(b) must be limited to
trial errors, and claims authorized by I.C.
§ 19-4901(a) can be raised for the first time
in post-conviction? Thus, Ash asserts he did
pot waive his double jeopardy claim by fail-
ing to raise it on direct appeal because it is a
direct constitutional claim authorized by 1.C.
§ 19-4901(a).

The State responds that I.C. § 19-4901(b)
must be construed to place a limitation on
the remedy available under I.C. § 19-4901(a),
‘Thus, a petitioner waives a claim authorized
by LC. § 19-4901(a) that was not raised on
direct appeal unless the claim “raises a sub-
stantial doubt about the reliability of the
finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise
of due diligence, have been presented earli-
er.” LC, § 19-4901(b). The State asserts Ash
did not show his double jeopardy claim could
not have been presented in his direct appeal.
Thus, the State argues Ash waived his double
jeopardy claim. In reply, Ash asserts his
double jeopardy claim could not have been
raised on direct appeal because it requires
proof of the prosecutor's intent, and such

direct appeal. Johnson, 162 Idaho at 224, 395
P.3d at 1257. On the other hand, in Grove v.
State, 161 Idaho 840, 851, 392 P.3d 18, 29 (Ct.
App. 2017), we held that the potential remedy for
post-conviction claims grounded upon the al-
Teged failings of counsel falls within ineffective
assistance of counsel, not direct constitutional
violation. We further held that an alleged direct
constitutional violation claim that has not been
shown could not have been presented on direct
appeal is subject to LC. § 19-4901(b)’s bar.
Grove, 161 Idaho 840, 851-53, 392 P.3d 18, 29-
31.

proof was not in the trial record. In ruling on
the double jeopardy claim, the district court
reiterated that double jeopardy did not at-
tach. The court also held Ash had waived the
issue by failing to assert it in his direct
appeal,

We need not decide if Ash’s double jeopar-
dy claim is cognizable in post-conviction be-
cause we have upheld the district court’s
conclusion that the prosecutor did not intend
to provoke Ash into moving for a mistrial.
Thus, Ash’s double jeopardy claim fails even
if it is cognizable in post-conviction because
double jeopardy did not attach.

I.

CONCLUSION

Ash has not demonstrated a genuine issue
of fact that the prosecutor intended to pro-
voke Ash into moving for a mistrial, Thus,
double jeopardy did not attach and trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to ob-
ject to Ash’s second prosecution on double
jeopardy grounds. The district court’s judg-
ment summarily dismissing Ash’s petition for
post-conviction relief is affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY
concur.

3. Ash asks this Court to adopt “the expansion of
the Kennedy exception set out in United States v.
Wallach, 979 F.2d 912 (2nd Cir. 1992)” or “an
even broader exception consistent with the Idaho
Constitution’s greater protection against double
jeopardy.” Ash urges an exception that, instead
of focusing on the prosecutor's intent, bars “re-
trial on the basis of double jeopardy when prose-
cutorial misconduct has so prejudiced the rights
of the defendant that the only recourse is a
mistrial or reversal.” We decline to adopt a
broader exception than that set out in Kennedy

541

400 P.3d 629
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

ve

Benjamin J. DAHL, aka Benjamin John
Dahl, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 44003 & 44004
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: June 22, 2017

because neither the United States Supreme Court
nor our Supreme Court has expressed a need for
such an exception. Moreover, Idaho courts have
consistently held the Idaho Constitution’s Double
Jeopardy Clause is co-extensive with the United
States Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause,
See, 2.g., Berglund v. Potlatch Corp., 129 Idaho
752, 757, 932 P.2d 875, 880 (1996); State v.
Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 457-58, 915 P.2d 14,
19-20 (1996); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619,
624, 38 P.3d 1275, 1280 (Ct. App. 2001).

a
Y=)

Erie D, Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Depu-

543

ty Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for ap-
pellant. Andrea W. Reynolds argued,

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Lori A, Fleming, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming
argued,

WALTERS, Judge Pro Tem

Benjamin J. Dahl appeals from his judg-
ments of conviction entered upon his condi-
tional guilty pleas. to one count of possession
of methamphetamine with intent to deliver,
Idaho Code § 37-2782(a)(1)(A), and one count
of possession of a controlled substance, her-
oin, LC, § 87-2782(c)(1). Dahl argues the dis-
trict court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. Because the police officers had
consent to search Dahl’s bedroom, we uphold
the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress and affirm the judgments of convic-
tion,

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Two officers arrived at a home to serve a
felony arrest warrant upon an individual. The
subject of the arrest warrant did not live at
the home, but the officers’ last contact with
the subject was at this residence. An eight-
year-old girl answered the door, and the
officers asked the child if the subject of the
arrest warrant was present. The child re-
sponded: “Who?” One officer then asked if
Dahl was home and the child responded: “I
don’t know.” The officer asked: “Can you go
look for me?” The child closed the door and
came back approximately two minutes later
and said: “I think he is still sleeping.” The
following conversation took place:

Officer: Okay, is your parents up? [inaudi-

ble]

Officer: Okay, can you open the door for
officer safety reasons?

Child: Yeah.

Officer: We just need to talk to one adult,
Can you go get one of your par-
ents for me, please?

Child: Yeah.

Officer: May I come in?

544

Child: Yeah.
Officer: Ok.

One officer entered the home with the
permission of the child while the second offi-
cer remained outside. The officer stood in the
entryway of the home while the child went to
get one of her parents or Dahl. Approximate-
ly two minutes after the officer entered the
residence, Dahl’s mother came to speak with
the officer, The officer asked if the subject of
the arrest warrant was in the home. The
mother responded: “No, he doesn’t come by
very often.” The officer informed the mother
that they had a felony arrest warrant for the
subject and the officer stated:

If he is found here in this home, then

people could be arrested for felony harbor-

ing. And I know that you don’t want that,
but, I just want to make sure that he is not
here. So if [inaudible] is not here, he was
here with your son, [Dahl]. Do you mind if
we go up there and at least clear to make
sure that he is not here?

The district court found the mother consent-

ed to the officer’s request.

The mother and the officer walked up the
stairs to Dahl's bedroom. The mother
mocked on the door and said: “{Dahl], the
police would like to see your room, please.”
Dahl opened his bedroom door and the fol-
lowing conversation took place:

Officer: Hey [Dahl], how are you?

Dahl: Good, how about you?

Officer: I’m not too bad. Hey man, I’m
here for [the subject of the arrest
warrant]. Where is he at?

Dahl: [He] is not here.

Officer: Okay, do you mind if I look?
[inaudible]

Officer: Appreciate it. Who else is in here
with you?

Dahl: Just my boy.

Officer: Where did you see [the subject of
the arrest warrant] last?

Dahl: Um, yesterday in a [band or van].

Officer: In a [band or van]?

Dahl: Yes, sir.

1, See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.

Officer: Can I move past you real quick. I
just want to check that real fast.
[inaudible]

Officer: What have you got in there?
{Dahl] can you do me a favor and
come out here real quick? I’ve
got some questions for you, man.

The officer testified that Dahl motioned for

the officer to walk into the bedroom. The
district court found that while searching for
the subject of the arrest warrant, the officer
observed in plain view a glass pipe and a
white crystal substance that was neatly divid-
ed into rows laying on a large glass mirror
along with multiple bundles of U.S. currency.
The officer then asked Dahl to speak to him
in the hallway and the officer informed Dahl
of his Miranda! rights. The officer told
Dahl: “the issue is that you allowed me into
your room, I went into your closet back there
and I found paraphernalia, which I recog-
nized to be used for methamphetamines.”
The officer arrested Dahl.

The State charged Dahl with possession of
a controlled substance, methamphetamine,
with intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2782(a)(1)(A),
and one count of possession for each of the
following controlled substances: heroin, hy-
drocodone, and oxycodone, IC. § 87-
2782(¢)(1), Dahl filed a motion to suppress,
arguing the officer violated his rights under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution when the officer seized evidence
without a search warrant. Dahl argued the
evidence must be suppressed because the
State cannot meet its burden to show that
consent by a minor to enter the home was
valid and there were no exigent circum-
stances to justify a warrantless entry into the
home. The district court held a hearing on
the motion to suppress. Dahl argued:

You'll hear in the audio that it’s not clear
whether or not Mr. Dahl gave the officers
consent when they entered his bedroom. I
only point this out if it becomes relevant. I
don’t think it’s relevant because I think the
entry into the home was unlawful, and so
all of this should be suppressed. But I
think it’s important to know that because
the search of his room could be suppressed

1602, 16 L.Bd.2d 694 (1966).

on the grounds that there was no consent

for him to get into the bedroom.

The State responded:

Judge, it’s difficult for me to respond to
a lot of what the defense says I think for
two reasons. Number one, when I’m read-
ing their brief, I understand it to be a very
simple issue. And that’s why when I re-
phrased my issue in this case I essentially
don’t respond to whether this young girl
had the authority to consent because the
way I analyze it is even if we assume she
didn’t, we still have the issue of is there a
nexus. My argument being there’s no nex-
us here.

I didn’t really deal with whether the
homeowner had given consent or the de-
fendant had given consent because that
wasn’t something that was argued in the
defense brief. It was simply that this
young girl couldn’t have consented. So I
sort of just stepped over that issue without
necessarily conceding it because I really
didn’t think it was relevant in looking at
the facts in relation to the cases that I
cited.

Following the hearing, Dahl filed a notice
of supplemental authority, arguing that Dahl
and the mother did not give consent. The
State requested the district court not consid-
er the supplemental authority. The State ar-
gued it was prevented from calling witnesses
to prove that consent was given because
Dahl’s motion to suppress focused only on
the lawfulness of the initial entry while the
notice of supplemental authority addressed
the separate issue of whether Dahl and the
mother gave consent to search,

The district court denied Dahl’s motion to
suppress. The district court held the officer’s
initial entry into the home based on the
consent of the child was an unlawful entry
because the officer should have reasonably
known that an eight-year-old child did not
have authority to consent to the entry. The
State does not challenge that determination,
The district court, however, noted that Dahl
offered no testimony contradicting the offi-
cer’s position that there was consent to
search and concluded that both the mother
and Dahl subsequently consented to the
search, Because the consent by the mother

545

and Dahl independently justified the initial
warrantless search, the district court held:

Dahl has failed to establish that but for the
initial invalid entry the seizure would not
have occurred. Rather, the State has
shown that both [the mother] and Mr.
Dahl consented to a search for [the subject
of the arrest warrant]. While so searching,
[the officer] discovered the contraband in
plain view.
Thus, Dahl failed to meet his burden of
establishing a factual nexus between the offi-
cer’s initial unlawful entry and the discovery
of the evidence.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dahl condi-
tionally pleaded guilty to possession of meth-
amphetamine with intent to deliver and to
one count of possession of heroin, reserving
his right to appeal the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress. All other charges
were dismissed. The district court imposed a
unified eight-year sentence, with two years
determinate, for possession of methamphet-
amine with intent to deliver, and a unified
five-year sentence, with two years determi-
nate, for possession of heroin, to be served
concurrently. The district court suspended
the execution of the sentences and placed
Dahl on probation for four years. Dahl timely
appealed.

i.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM) The standard of review of a sup-
pression motion is bifurcated. When a deci-
sion on a motion to suppress is challenged,
we accept the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence,
but we freely review the application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts as found. State
v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App.1996). At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.24 659, 662 (Ct. App.1999).

546

Although Dahl contends that both constitu-
tions were violated, he provides no cogent
reason why Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Con-
stitution should be applied differently than
the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in this case. Therefore, the
Court will rely on judicial interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment in its analysis of
Dahl's claims. See State v. Schaffer, 183 Ida-
ho 126, 180, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct, App.1999).

i.

ANALYSIS

Dahl argues the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress for two rea-
sons: First, Dahl asserts his bedroom would
not have been searched but for the officer's
unlawful entry into his home, and the consent
to search was not sufficiently attenuated
from this unlawful entry. Second, Dahl as-
serts the consent to search from both Dahl
and his mother was invalid,

A. Dahl’s Consent to Enter and Search
the Bedroom, and the Resulting Evi-
dence, Was Not the Direct or Indirect
Result of the Unlawful Entry

HM s«(Dahl argues the methamphetamine
would not have been discovered but for the
unlawful entry; thus, it must be suppressed,
The exclusionary rule calls for suppression of
evidence that is gained through unconstitu-
tional governmental activity. Segura v. Unit-
ed States, 468 U.S. 796, 815, 104 S.Ct, 3380,
8390-91, 82 L.Bd.2d 599, 614-16 (1984), This
prohibition against the use of derivative evi-
dence extends to the indirect as well as the
direct fruit of the government’s misconduct.
Segura, 468 U.S, at 815, 104 S.Ct. at 8390-91,
82 L.Ed.2d at 614-16; Wong Sun v. United
States, 871 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-
16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 452-54 (1963), Neverthe-
less, “[s]uppression is not justified unless ‘the
challenged evidence is in some sense the
product of illegal governmental activity.”
Segura, 468 U.S. at 815, 104 S.Ct, at 3391, 82
L.Bd.2d at 615-16 (quoting United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S, 468, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244,
1250, 68 L.Ed.2d 587, 54546 (1980). That is,
“evidence will not be excluded as ‘fruit? un-
less the illegality is at least the ‘but for’

cause of the discovery of the evidence.” Jd.
Where a defendant has moved to suppress
evidence allegedly gained through unconsti-
tutional police conduct, the State bears the
ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that
the challenged evidence is untainted, but the
defendant bears an initial burden of showing
a factual nexus between the illegality and the
State’s acquisition of the evidence. State v.
Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125 P.8d 536,
540 (Ct. App.2005). This requires a prima
facie showing that the evidence sought to be
suppressed would not have come to light but
for the government's unconstitutional con-
duct, Id. at 184, 125 P.3d at 540. By express-
ing the query as a “but for” test, we do not
imply that a defendant bears the burden to
prove a negative—that the State would not
or could not have discovered the evidence on
any set of hypothetical circumstances that
could have arisen absent the illegal search.
State v. McBaine, 144 Idaho 180, 184, 157
P.8d 1101, 1105 (Ct. App.2007), Rather, the
defendant need only show that, on the events
that did take place, the discovery of the
evidence was a product or result of the un-
lawful police conduct. Id,

Citing to State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho 835,
209 P.8d 196 (Ct. App.2009), Dahl argues
that because the officer’s unlawful entry was
ongoing at the time Dahl consented to the
search of his bedroom, the officer’s subse-
quent discovery of the incriminating evidence
was contemporaneous and irrevocably inter-
twined with the misconduct. In Hudson, the
officer knocked on a motel room door, and
when Hudson answered the door, the officer
questioned him about the marijuana odor
coming from the room, Id, at 836, 209 P.8d at
197, Hudson attempted to close the door, but
the officer prevented the door from closing
with his foot. Jd. The officer then pushed the
door open and continued to observe Hudson.
Id. A second officer arrived and Hudson
granted the second officer permission to en-
ter the motel room and later consented to a
search of the room. Jd. This Court found the
first officer’s unlawful search never ended
because the officer prevented Hudson from
restoring his privacy by closing the door; by
preventing the door from closing, the officer
remained in a position to observe Hudson. Id.
at 888, 209 P.8d at 199. As such, the Court

held: “because the unlawful intrusion was
ongoing, the search and subsequent aequisi-
tion of the incriminating evidence was con-
temporaneous and irrevocably intertwined
with the misconduct.” Id.

Conversely, in McBaine, officers were in-
vestigating the report of a methamphetamine
Jab located inside McBaine’s house. McBaine,
144 Idaho at 182, 157 P.8d at 1103. Officers
knocked on the front door and McBaine an-
swered. Id. One of the officers observed
McBaine’s girlfriend inside and told her that
he desired to come inside and speak with her.
Id. McBaine responded that he would rather
the officers speak with his girlfriend outside.
Id, The officer stated he preferred to speak
to the girlfriend separately and then entered
the house without permission from McBaine
or the girlfriend. Jd. Shortly thereafter, the
officer went back outside. McBaine subse-
quently gave the officers consent to search
his house. Id. The search resulted in the
discovery of a methamphetamine lab. Id.
McBaine moved to suppress the evidence and
the district court denied the motion. Jd.

On appeal, McBaine argued the discovery
of the lab should have been suppressed be-
cause his consent was the product of the
officer’s unjustified entry into his house. Id.
at 132-38, 157 P.38d at 1103-04. This Court
examined the consequences of the unlawful
entry and emphasized that the unlawful en-
try did not yield any incriminating informa-
tion. Id, at 185, 157 P.8d at 1106. The officer
did not search for contraband and did not act
in a threatening or overbearing manner. Id.
Further, the officer’s intrusion had ended
before consent to search was requested of
McBaine. Id, Thus, the Court held McBaine
failed to demonstrate a causal link between
the unlawful entry by the officer and
McBaine’s subsequent consent to search. Id.

The circumstances in this case are more
analogous to those in McBaine than Hudson.
Unlike Hudson, where the officer prevented
Hudson from closing the door to the motel
room, the mother in this case did not attempt
to end the officer’s unlawful entry. Rather,
the mother consented to the officer’s pres-
2. We recognize Dahl’s argument that because the

officer did not leave the house before being al-
lowed re-entry, the unlawful entry never ended,

5AT

ence in the home and escorted the officer to
Dahl's bedroom. Like McBaine, the officer’s
unlawful entry did not yield any incrimina-
ting evidence, nor any evidence which would
have affected Dahl’s decision to grant con-
sent to enter or search his bedroom. The
officer’s unlawful entry ended when Dahl’s
mother consented to the officer’s search for
the subject of the arrest warrant and escort-
ed the officer to Dahl’s bedroom.? At the time
Dahi consented to the entry and search of his
bedroom, the officer was lawfully entitled to
be in the home. Moreover, the officer did not
have his gun drawn and the conversation
appeared non-accusatory and cordial in na-
ture, The officer testified that he asked Dahl
if he could look for the subject of the arrest
warrant in Dahl’s bedroom and that Dahl
shook his head and motioned for the officer
to walk inside the bedroom. The officer did
not threaten or create an overbearing envi-
ronment. Therefore, we hold Dahl has failed
to demonstrate that his consent to enter and
search his bedroom, and the resulting evi-
dence, was the direct or indirect result of the
initial unlawful entry.

HH Dahl's argument on appeal focuses on
the attenuation doctrine. That doctrine re-
quires a determination of “whether the chain
of causation proceeding from the unlawful
conduct has become so attenuated or has
been interrupted -by some intervening cir-
cumstance so as to remove the ‘taint? im-
posed upon that evidence by the original
illegality.” Crews, 445 U.S. at 471, 100 S.Ct.
at 1250, 68 L.Ed.2d at 545-46. As the United
States Supreme Court has stated: “attenua-
tion analysis is only appropriate where, as a
threshold matter, courts determine that ‘the
challenged evidence is in some sense the
product of illegal governmental activity.’ ” Id.
‘There being no tainted evidence here, there
is no occasion for application of the attenua-
tion doctrine.

B. The Mother and Dahl Consented to a
Search of Dahl’s Bedroom

Dahl argues the State did not meet its

burden of establishing, by a preponderance

However, absent invalidity of his mother’s con-
sent to proceed to the bedroom, her consent
ended the unlawful entry.

548

of the evidence, the validity of Dahl’s consent
because Dahl did not voluntarily consent to
the search. Dahl also asserts the State did
not meet its burden of establishing that the
mother had actual or apparent authority to
consent to a search of Dahl’s bedroom. The
State argues Dahl did not preserve for ap-
peal his challenge to the voluntariness of his
and his mother’s consent because he failed to
raise the issue below. Alternatively, the State
contends even if the issue is preserved, the
record supports the district court’s conclu-
sion that Dahl and his mother consented to
the entry and search and that such consent
was voluntary.

1. The State established by a prepon-
derance of evidence that the mother
and Dahl consented to a search

HH Dahl argues the State did not meet
its burden of establishing, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that Dahl and his moth-
er consented to a search.

Hs Although a warrantless entry or
search of a residence is generally illegal and
violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an
entry or search may be rendered reasonable
by an individual’s consent. State v. Johnson,
110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294
(1986); State v. Abeyta, 181 Idaho 704, 707,
963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App.1998), In such
instances, the State has the burden of dem-
onstrating consent by a preponderance of the
evidence. State v. Kilby, 180 Idaho 747, 749,
947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App.1997). The State
must show that consent was not the result of
duress or coercion, either direct or implied.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S, 218,
248, 98 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 86 L.Ed.2d 854,
874-75 (1978); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho
261, 264, 858 P.2d 800, 808 (Ct. App.1993).

In this case, the officer was granted entry
into the home by a child. When the mother
came to speak with the officer, the officer
asked: “Do you mind if we go up there and at
least clear to make sure he is not here?” The
mother responded: “Yeah,” which gave the
officer permission to search for the suspected
felon. The mother escorted the officer to
Dahl’s bedroom and facilitated the officer’s
interaction with Dahl by knocking on Dahl’s
bedroom door, stating: “[Dahl], the police

would like to see your room, please.... They
just want to make sure [the subject of the
arrest warrant] isn’t here.” When Dahl
opened the bedroom door, the officer asked if
he could look in the bedroom for the subject
of the arrest warrant. The officer testified
that Dahl shook his head and motioned for
the officer to walk inside the bedroom,

The district court determined: “The evi-
dence before the Court shows that [the moth-
er and Dahl] consented to the Officer’s
search,” In a footnote, the district court indi-
cated “[t]he defense did not offer testimony
from either the defendant or his mother that
contradicts the State’s position that both
Dahl’s [sic] gave the Officer’s [sic] consent to
search for [the subject of the arrest war-
rant].” Thus, the district court’s finding that
the mother and Dahl consented to the search
is supported by the evidence.

2, The issue of whether consent was
voluntary is not preserved for appeal

WM The threshold issue is whether
Dahl preserved for appeal the argument that
even if Dahl and his mother consented to the
search of his bedroom, that consent was not
voluntary. Appellate court review is limited
to the evidence, theories, and arguments that
were presented below. State v. Johnson, 148
Idaho 664, 670, 227 P.38d 918, 924 (2010).
Issues not raised below generally may not be
considered for the first time on appeal. State
v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 128,
126 (1992). For an objection to be preserved
for appellate review, either the specific
ground for the objection must be clearly
stated or the basis of the objection must be
apparent from the context. State v, Sheahan,
189 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.8d 956, 966 (2003).

HE Although Dahl preserved for ap-
peal the general issue that Dahl and his
mother did not consent to the search of the
bedroom, he cannot argue more grounds for
that challenge than were asserted before the
district court. See State v. Armstrong, 158
Idaho 364, 368, 347 P.8d 1025, 1029 (Ct
App.2015) (constitutional arguments not
raised before lower courts are not preserved
for appellate review). Even when a defendant
mentions the general basis for a motion to

suppress, his or her arguments on appeal are
limited by what was argued to the trial court.
See State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 705-06,
302 P.3d 828, 330-881 (2012) (declining to
address the issue of a drug dog’s reliability
raised for the first time on appeal when only
the issue of whether probable cause to search
one area of the vehicle after the drug dog
had previously alerted to another area was
challenged below). Moreover, although more
frequently cited for evidentiary questions, an
objection on one ground will not preserve for
appeal a separate and different basis for
objection not raised before the trial court.
State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 597, 836
P.2d 586, 548 (1992).

Dah!’s argument on appeal—that any con-
sent was not voluntary—was not raised be-
fore the district court, thereby depriving the
district court of an opportunity to address
the argument in the first instance and to rule
accordingly. In Dahl's motion to suppress, he
only raised the issue of whether the child’s
consent to the officer entering the home was
valid, Dahl argued: “In this case, the Officers
were given consent to enter the home by 8-
year old [child]. The question before this
Court is whether such consent is valid.” At
the suppression hearing, Dahl raised the is-
sue of whether the child’s consent was valid
and whether Dahl and his mother consented
to the search. Regarding whether the child’s
consent was valid, Dahl argued: “And so I
think the consent by the young girl I think
that’s invalid, which makes it unlawful, and
that’s inextricably intertwined with the offi-
cer’s search of Mr. Dahl’s room.” Regarding
the mother’s consent, Dahl argued that:
“There’s no clear consent from [the mother]
for [the officer] to be in the home.” Finally,
regarding Dahl’s consent, Dahl argued:

You'll hear in the audio that it’s not clear
whether or not Mr, Dahl gave the officers

consent when they entered his bedroom. I

only point this out if it becomes relevant. I

don’t think it’s relevant because I think the

entry into the home was unlawful, and so

all of this should be suppressed. But I

think it’s important to know that because

the search of his room could be suppressed.
on the grounds that there was no consent
for him to get into the bedroom.

549

In his notice of supplemental authorities,
Dahl asserted: “Based upon evidence ad-
duced at the hearing, [the mother] did not
give explicit consent for the officers to come
in or remain in her home.” She acquiesced in
allowing the officers to go upstairs to [Dahl’s]
bedroom. Additionally, Dahl argued: “It is
also not clear whether Mr. Dahl granted
consent to search his home based upon the
evidence adduced at the hearing.” Thus,
Dahl's arguments in his motion to suppress,
at the suppression hearing, and in his notice
of supplemental authorities focused on the
issue of whether Dahl and his mother gave
consent; not whether such consent was volun-
tary.

On appeal, however, Dahl’s issue heading
reads: “Even If The Consent Given By Mr.
Dahl And/Or His Mother Was Sufficiently
Attenuated From The Illegal Entry, The
State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Establish-
ing By A Preponderance Of The Evidence
The Validity Of That Consent.” Dahl asserts:
“With respect to Mr. Dahl, it appears from
the record that, at most, Mr. Dahl acquiesced
to the search of his bedroom, but did not
voluntarily consent to it.” Dahl’s arguments
to the district court and on appeal are differ-
ent. To argue in district court that there was
no consent does not fairly include an argu-
ment on appeal that even if there was con-
sent, that consent was not voluntary. The
district court’s factual findings and holding
are limited to whether there was an unlawful
entry and whether there was a factual nexus
between the unlawful entry and the discovery
of the evidence. The district court deter-
mined: “Dahl has failed to establish that but
for the initial invalid entry the seizure would
not have occurred. Rather, the State has
shown that both [the mother] and Mr. Dahl
consented to a search for [the subject of the
arrest warrant].” The district court’s holding
is limited to whether the mother and Dahl
consented to the search; as the district court
was never asked to and consequently did not.
rule on whether such consent was voluntary.
Dahl may not claim the district court’s deci-
sion was in error based on an argument that
‘was never presented to the district court for
consideration. See Armstrong, 158 Idaho at
368, 347 P.8d at 1029. Appellate courts are
forums of review, not for a factual determina-

550

tion in the first instance, Because Dahl did
not raise the voluntariness of his consent as
an issue before the district court, it is not
preserved for appeal.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Dahl has failed to demonstrate that his
consent to enter and search his bedroom, and
the resulting evidence, was the direct or indi-
rect result of the initial unlawful entry, The
State established, by a preponderance of evi-
dence, that Dahl and his mother consented to
a search, The issue of whether such consent,
was voluntary is not preserved for appeal.
We affirm the district court’s denial of Dahl’s
motion to suppress and the judgments of
conviction,

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
MELANSON concur,

400 P.3d 638
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v

Dustin Jade MORGAN, Defendant-
Appellant. .

Docket No. 44273
Court of Appeals of Idaho,

Filed: June 27, 2017
Review Denied August 30, 2017

3, As noted above, the district court's finding that
consent was given by Dahl and his mother is
supported by the evidence in the record, Dahl’s
argument regarding the validity of his consent is
not a claim of whether such consent was invalid,
but rather whether his conduct amounted to con-
sent or was merely acquiescence, In that regard,
Dahl's conduct amounted 10 consent and was
therefore valid, As to his mother's consent, Dah]
argues it was invalid due to the coercive atmo-

sphere in which his mother consented, given the
time of day, the officer already present in the
entryway, the fact that his mother was woken up,
and that she was in her bathrobe. Dahl did not
present an argument below that his mother's
consent was involuntary due to those circum-
stances. Even so, to the extent the district court's
finding of valid consent encompasses or consid-
ers these factors, it remains supported by the law
and evidence,

L

Eric D, Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant. Jason O. Pintler argued.

Hon, Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kenneth K, Jorgensen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent, Kenneth
K, Jorgensen argued.

552

HUSKEY, Judge

Dustin Jade Morgan appeals from his
judgment of conviction and argues the dis-
trict court erred when it denied Morgan’s
motion to dismiss.' Because the district court
used the wrong legal authority and the incor-
rect standard when ruling on Morgan’s mo-
tion to dismiss and motion to reconsider, we
reverse the orders denying the motion to
dismiss and the motion to reconsider, vacate
the judgment of conviction, and remand this
case to the district court for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. Further-
more, since the district court did not make
sufficient factual findings regarding the 2010
Montana proceedings, we cannot determine
whether Morgan was arrested in 2010 or, if
so, whether there was good cause for the
delay.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On December 1, 2009,? an Idaho police
officer pursued a vehicle driven by Morgan
but the vehicle successfully eluded the offi-
cer’s pursuit. On January 11, 2010, the State
filed a criminal complaint against Morgan,
alleging felony eluding and misdemeanor
driving without privileges That day, the
State filed an affidavit of probable cause for
warrant of arrest. The district court issued
the arrest warrant. On January 21, 2010,
Morgan was taken into custody in Lake
County, Montana, and the State of Montana
also filed a complaint and affidavit under the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The Mon-

1. Morgan and the State routinely direct their
arguments on appeal to the defendant's motion
to dismiss. Because both parties provide argu-
ment and authority regarding the court's denial
of Morgan's motion for the court to correct the
record and reconsider or, in the alternative, a
second motion to dismiss, that issue will also be
addressed. Although appellant's analysis refers to
the motion to reconsider as the “second motion
to dismiss,” the district court issued its response
solely on the “defendant's motion to reconsider.”

2. The district court’s order denying defendant's
motion to dismiss indicated the events in this
case occurred on December 1, 2009. This date
also appears in Morgan’s memorandum in sup-
port of motion to dismiss, In contrast, the State's

tana complaint indicated Morgan was
charged in Idaho with felony eluding and
misdemeanor driving without privileges, and
Morgan was in Lake County jail pursuant to
an Idaho warrant, A Montana Justice of the
Peace ordered Morgan to remain in custody
for thirty days, from January 21 to February
20, 2010.

On February 23, 2010, a Montana Justice
of the Peace filed an order for Morgan’s
release, and the State of Idaho dismissed the
Idaho charges. On February 24, 2010, the
State of Idaho filed a new criminal complaint
against Morgan with the same allegations.
Idaho also filed a new affidavit of probable
cause which was identical to the first affida-
vit. The new Idaho warrant was issued. Mon-
tana received the warrant on February 26,
2010, and a Montana Justice of the Peace
committed Morgan for another thirty days,
from February 26 to March 28, 2010. On
March 4, 2010, the Governor of Idaho issued
an application for requisition to Montana
which requested that Morgan be arrested,
secured, and delivered to Idaho. Morgan and
the Montana Department of Correction re-
ceived the Idaho Governor’s application for
requisition on April 9, 2010. The Montana
court dismissed the extradition proceedings
on May 20, 2010, since Morgan indicated a
willingness to waive the extradition. On the
same day, the Montana court sentenced Mor-
gan to fifteen years, with ten years suspend-
ed, for two Montana felony charges that were
unrelated to the Idaho charges. The fugitive
case in Montana was dismissed.

Morgan was released from the Montana
Department of Correction on April 7, 2015.5

affidavit of probable cause for warrant of arrest,
notes the date at issue is December 21, 2009. The
State's information also uses December 21, 2009,
Although we recognize the conflict, we use the
district court's findings.

3. The first case number was CR-2010-81.
4, The second case number was CR-2010-550.

5. Although the district court says Morgan's re-
lease occurred on May 12, 2015, the parties later
stipulated that Morgan was released from Mon-
tana custody on April 7, 2015. The record also
indicates that Morgan received a travel permit
on April 3, 2015, which allowed him to return to
Idaho.

On May 18, 2015, Morgan was arrested in
Idaho on the CR-2010-550 warrant involving
the 2010 charges. The State filed an informa-
tion on July 24, 2015, that charged Morgan
with felony eluding, Idaho Code § 49-
1404(2)(a), and misdemeanor driving without
privileges, I.C. § 18-8001(5). Morgan filed a
motion to dismiss the information, arguing
the State failed to obtain an indictment or
information within six months of his arrest,
in violation of I.C. § 19-8501. Morgan assert-
ed the information should have been filed
within six months of January 21, 2010,° when
arguably a warrantless arrest was effectuat-
ed, or May 20, 2010, when Morgan waived
extradition to Idaho. In response, the State
argued the right to a speedy trial did not
apply until Morgan was arrested in Idaho,
which oceurred in May 2015. The State ar-
gued that because the arrest occurred in
2015 rather than 2010, the State properly
filed the information within the six-month
timeframe. The district court entered an or-
der denying in part and granting in part the
defendant’s motion to dismiss—denying the
motion as related to the eluding charge, but
granting the motion for the driving without
privileges charge.

Morgan filed a motion for the district court
to correct the record and reconsider or, in
the alternative, a second motion to dismiss.
Morgan asserted the court mistakenly relied
upon the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Act as the basis for its analysis and failed to
find that Morgan was arrested in 2010. The
State objected to Morgan’s motion on the
grounds that the arrest occurred in May
2015, which meant the July 2015 information
was well within the six-month deadline, The
district court denied the defendant’s motion
to reconsider. The court determined the In-
terstate Agreement on Detainers Act ap-
plied, and in the alternative, the pre-indict-
ment delay did not amount to a denial of due
process under 1.C. § 19-8501. The court ex-
plained that Morgan failed to show that the
delay “substantially prejudiced the defendant
or that the delay was a tactical decision made
by the prosecution.”

6. On appeal, Morgan no longer argues the arrest

date was January 21, 2010. Instead, Morgan
states he was arrested on February 26, 2010,

553

Morgan pleaded guilty to felony eluding,
conditioned upon his ability to challenge the
district court’s denial of his motion to dis-
miss. Morgan was sentenced to a suspended
unified term of five years, with three years
determinate, and placed on probation. Mor-
gan timely appeals.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM Whether there was an infringement
of a defendant’s right to speedy trial pres-
ents a mixed question of law and fact. State
v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.8d 981, 983
(2000). We will defer to the trial court’s
findings of fact if supported by substantial
and competent evidence; however, we will
exercise free review of the trial court’s con-
clusions of law. Id.

Idaho Code § 19-3501(1) sets specific time
limits within which a criminal defendant must
be brought to trial and provides:

The court, unless good cause to the con-
trary is shown, must order the prosecution
or indictment to be dismissed, in the fol-
lowing cases:

(1) When a person has been held to
answer for a public offense, if an indict-
ment or information is not found against
him and filed with the court within six (6)
months from the date of his arrest.

HMM Under 1.C. § 19-3501, criminal de-
fendants are given additional protection be-
yond what is required by the United States
and Idaho Constitutions, Clark, 185 Idaho at
258, 16 P.38d at 984, Idaho Code § 19-8501
mandates that unless the State can demon-
strate good cause for a delay greater than six
months, the court must dismiss the case.
Good cause means that there is a substantial
reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse
for the delay. Clark, 185 Idaho at 260, 16
P.3d at 936. In determining whether good
cause exists, the district court may consider
the following additional factors insofar as
they bear on the sufficiency or strength of
the reason for the delay: (1) the length of the

when he was brought by Montana law enforce-
ment officers in front of a Montana judge.

554

delay; (2) whether the defendant asserted the
right to a speedy trial; and (8) the prejudice
to the defendant, See Barker v. Wingo, 407
US. 514, 580, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-92, 33
L.Ed.2d 101, 115-17 (1972); Clark, 185 Idaho
at 258-60, 16 P.8d at 984-86, If the reason for
the delay is sufficient, these factors are not
needed; if the reason for the delay is insuffi-
cient, the other factors will not avail to avoid
dismissal. See Clark, 185 Idaho at 260, 16
P.8d at 936.

i.

ANALYSIS

Morgan argues the district court erred
when it denied his motion to dismiss. On
appeal, Morgan asserts the district court
erred for four reasons: (1) the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers Act does not apply;
(2) Idaho Code § 19-8501(1) does not require
that Morgan show he was prejudiced by a
delay or that a delay was a tactical decision;
(8) Morgan was arrested when he was taken
to appear in front of a Montana judge; and
@ the State failed to obtain an information
or an indictment within six months of the
arrest, We will address the arguments in
turn.

A. The Interstate Agreement on Detain-
ers Act Does Not Apply

The district court denied Morgan’s motion
to dismiss on the grounds that Morgan was a
fugitive under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act, codified in 1.C. §§ 19-5001 to -
5008, The court found that Morgan could not
invoke the speedy trial provision because he
failed to properly request a final disposition,
pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on De-
tainers Act, On appeal, Morgan asserts—and
the State agrees—that the Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers Act does not provide a
basis to deny Morgan’s motion. Similarly, at
trial, the State did not dispute Morgan’s
argument on the issue. Notwithstanding the
district court’s holding in denying Morgan’s
motion to dismiss and motion to reconsider,
we determine the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act is inapplicable in this case, The
district court erred in reliance on the Inter-

state Agreement on Detainers Act to deny
Morgan’s motion.

B. The District Court Used the Incorrect.
Standard When Considering Idaho
Code § 19-3501(1)

HE Morgan argues the district court
utilized an incorrect standard in denying his
motion, and therefore, issued an irrelevant
finding. In its order denying Morgan’s mo-
tion to reconsider, the district court ex-
plained, in the event the Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers Act did not apply, “under
Idaho Code § 19-3501 the pre-indictment de-
lay would not amount to a denial of the due
process of law requiring a speedy trial.” To
support its conclusion, the district court used.
the standard for pre-accusatory delay:

Before a court can find a due process

violation, the Defendant must show that

the delay “caused substantial prejudice to

[the defendant’s] rights to a fair trial and

that the delay was an intentional device to

gain tactical advantage over the accused.”

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S, 307, 324

[92 S.Ct. 455, 465, 30 L.Hd.2d 468, 480-81]

(1971). See State v. Murphy, 99 Idaho 511,

514 [584 P.2d 1286, 1239] (1978). The de-

termination of whether the right to speedy

trial has been denied is an issue within the

trial court’s discretion. State v. Lund, 124

Idaho 290, 292 [858 P.2d 829, 881] (Ct.

App. 1998).

The district court then concluded that Mor-

gan failed to show substantial prejudice or

that the delay was a tactical decision in this
case,

Pre-accusatory delay describes the period
of time after a crime is committed, but prior
to any accusation. As the Idaho Supreme
Court explained in Murphy, the pre-accusa-
tory delay standard used in Marion only
applies to cases that involve delay prior to a
defendant being accused of a crime. Murphy,
99 Idaho at 514, 584 P.2d at 1239, The Su-
preme Court in Marion suggested a defen-
dant is “accused” not only when he is indict-
ed, but also when he is arrested, charged, or
otherwise subjected to formal restraint. Mar-
ion, 404 U.S. at 825, 92 S.Ct. at 465-66, 30
L.Ed.2d at 481-82, Idaho courts adopted a
similar position by interpreting Marion as

follows: “The recent United States Supreme
Court case of United States v. Marion held
that the speedy trial right is activated at the
point when a defendant formally becomes an
‘accused, whether that be by arrest, the
filing of a complaint, or by indictment or
information.” State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho
846, 850, 509 P.2d 881, 385 (1978),

If a delay occurs after the defendant is
accused, but before the information or indict-
ment is filed, then the case involves the
denial of a speedy trial under the Sixth
Amendment, which invokes a different stan-
dard, The Supreme Court has adopted a
four-part test to determine whether a Sixth
Amendment violation of the right to a speedy
trial has occurred: (1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reason for the delay; (8) whether the
defendant asserted the right to a speedy
trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant,
Clark, 185 Idaho at 258, 16 P.8d at 984,
Morgan argues the delay in this case oc-
curred after Morgan was accused of commit-
ting a crime, and thus, the district court
should have used the four-part test enunciat-
ed in Clark. We agree that the four-part test
from Clark is appropriate here because the
delay was not between the alleged acts and
the filing of the complaint. Instead, any delay
in this case occurred after Morgan was
charged but before an information or indict-
ment was issued.

Because there was no pre-accusatory delay
in Morgan’s case, the district court used the
incorrect legal standard when it analyzed
Morgan’s motion to dismiss. First, methods
other than filing an indictment or information
can signify that a defendant is “accused.” In
the district court’s order, it appears the court
mistakenly focused on the date the informa-
tion was filed. The court analyzed the case
according to Morgan’s “pre-indictment de-
lay.” However, the United States Supreme
Court provided language in its Marion opin-
ion—and Idaho courts have adopted this lan-
guage—that a defendant is “accused” at the
point of arrest, the filing of a complaint, or
by indictment or information. See Marion,
404 US. at 825, 92 S.Ct. at 465-66, 30

7, The record indicates that the first criminal
complaint and affidavit of probable cause for
warrant of arrest were subscribed and sworn on
January 11, 2010, and originally file-stamped on

555

L,Ed.2d at 481-82; Wilbanks, 95 Idaho at
350, 509 P.2d at 885. It is inaccurate to
analyze the delay in this case pursuant only
to the State’s information filed in July 2015.
While Morgan may have been “accused” in
February 2010 because the State filed a
criminal complaint and issued a warrant for
Morgan’s arrest in February 2010, the dis-
trict court made no factual findings on this
issue.

Second, because Morgan was charged in
early 2010, there was not a consequential
delay between the alleged act and the date
Morgan was charged with the offense. Mor-
gan eluded a police officer on December 1,
2009, The State filed a criminal complaint
and an affidavit of probable cause for an
arrest warrant on February 24, 2010.7 Al-
though Morgan and the State disagree about.
the exact date of Morgan’s “arrest” in Idaho,
the arrest date is not necessarily dispositive
in a pre-accusatory delay analysis. Instead,
the relevant date is the date Morgan was
accused (by whatever method) of committing
acrime.

In fact, no Idaho court has used the Mar-
ion standard for pre-accusatory delay in a
case where only three months pass between
the crime and the accusation. See State v.
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 446, 872 P.2d 708,
709 (1994) (where the State filed an indict-
ment in December 1989 for a June 1979
murder); State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 878,
606 P.2d 981, 982 (1980) (where the State
filed a complaint in December 1977 for draw-
ing a check without sufficient funds in Janu-
ary 1977); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879,
882-84, 186 P.8d 350, 353-55 (Ct. App. 2006)
(where the defendant was suspected of man-
ufacturing a controlled substance in Decem-
ber 2000, arrested in January 2001, but the
charges were dropped until the State refiled
charges in October 2001); State v. Davis, 141
Idaho 828, 884-85, 118 P.8d 160, 166-67 (Ct.
App. 2005) (where although an arrest oc-
curred the same day in October 2002 as a
DUI offense, the State dismissed the charge,
only to refile a complaint in September 2008);

January 11, 2010, However, the initial case was

dismissed in Idaho, and then a second complaint
and affidavit were filed on February 24, 2010.

556

State v. Burchard, 128 Idaho 882, 388, 848
P.2d 440, 441 (Ct. App. 1998) (where the
State filed an indictment in July 1990 for
securities fraud acts from November 1985
through February 1986). Here, a complaint
was filed three months after the crime oc-
curred, and thus, the three months between
the eluding crime and the criminal complaint
did not constitute a “delay” sufficient to trig-
ger the pre-accusatory delay standard.

C. The District Court Did Not Make Suf-
ficient Factual Findings to Allow This
Court to Determine Whether Morgan
Was Arrested in 2010

Hl Morgan and the State disagree as to
the exact date when Morgan was arrested.
Morgan argues he was arrested in 2010 when
he was held in custody by Montana officers
and taken in front of the Montana judge. The
State asserts the arrest did not occur until
2015. Without additional factual findings
from the district court, we cannot make a
legal determination as to whether Morgan
was arrested in Montana in 2010.

Regarding the events in Montana, the dis-
trict court made the following factual find-
ings:

Before the Idaho warrant was served, De-

fendant was taken into custody in Lake

County, Montana on January 21, 2010. The

State sent the Montana Department of

Corrections a copy of the arrest warrant.

The State dismissed the Idaho case on

February 23, 2010.

On February 24, 2010, the Court opened
case number CR-2010-550 when the State
filed a second criminal complaint against
the Defendant charging Felony Eluding
and Driving without Privileges, the same
charges in the previously dismissed case.
Another warrant was issued and bond set
at $10,000. A new Idaho warrant was is-
sued in case number CR-2010-550 and was
received by Montana on February 26,
2010. On March 4, 2010, the Governor of
the State of Idaho issued an application for
requisition (““Governor’s Warrant”) to Mon-
tana, to detain the Defendant on the Idaho
charges, On April 9, 2010, the Montana
Department of Corrections and the Defen-
dant received the Governor’s warrant.

On May 20, 2010, Defendant was sen-
tenced to fifteen years with ten years sus-
pended in Montana on charges unrelated
to the Idaho charges. At the hearing, the
Defendant indicated a willingness to waive
extradition. The fugitive case in Montana
was dismissed in light of Defendant's will-
ingness to waive extradition.

These findings fail to indicate precisely why
Morgan was taken into custody and the role
of the Idaho warrant. They also fail to indi-
cate if the second Idaho warrant was a rea-
son to continue holding Morgan in custody in
Montana. Additionally, there is no determina-
tion regarding whether Morgan was subject
to a warrantless arrest or the effect of Mon-
tana receiving the Governor’s warrant. We
therefore cannot determine if an arrest, war-
rantless or otherwise, occurred in 2010 be-
cause of the lack of factual findings by the
district court,

For the 2015 events in Idaho, the district
court issued the following factual finding:
“On May 18, 2015, Defendant was arrested
on a warrant in this criminal case (CR-2010-
550) in Bannock County, Idaho and was sub-
sequently transferred to the Mini-Cassia
Criminal Justice Center.” Unlike the 2010
events, the district court clearly found that
Morgan was arrested in Idaho in 2015. Nev-
ertheless, this factual finding is not disposi-
tive on the issue on appeal-whether Morgan
was arrested in Montana in 2010, As such, we
Jack a sufficient factual record to determine
the concomitant legal issues.

D. The District Court Failed to Analyze
the Length and Reason for Delay, and
the State Failed to Explain Good
Cause for Any Delay

HM The final question in this case is
whether the State filed an information or an
indictment within six months of Morgan’s
arrest, If the State did not file an information
within six months of the arrest, then the
district court must dismiss the prosecution
unless the State shows good cause for the
delay. I.C. § 19-8501(1). We cannot analyze
this question because we do not have enough
information to decide whether Morgan was
arrested in 2010. The district court not only
failed to issue factual findings regarding the

length of the delay, but the court also failed
to consider the reason for the delay, which is
essential to analyze whether there was a
Sixth Amendment violation of the right to a
speedy trial under Clark, Similarly, the State
failed to argue there was good cause for the
delay. At the district court, the State did not
provide arguments that would justify any
delay. On appeal, the State asserts for the
first time that IC. § 19-8501 does not re-
quire the State to argue good cause, and in
the alternative, that any delay was justified
by Morgan being in custody in Montana. We
find these arguments to be insufficient, and
yet the impact of their inadequacy depends
again on whether Morgan was under arrest
in 2010.

We cannot issue a decision regarding the
date of Morgan’s arrest, since we do not have
sufficient facts on appeal. Because we cannot
determine whether Morgan was arrested in
Montana in 2010, we cannot consider whether
there was good cause for any such delay
beyond six months. Therefore, we reverse
the orders denying the motion to dismiss and
the motion to reconsider, vacate the judg-
ment of conviction, and remand this case to
the district court.

557
Iv.

CONCLUSION

The district court used the incorrect legal
authority and standard when ruling on Mor-
gan’s motion to dismiss and motion to recon-
sider. As a result, we reverse the orders
denying the motion to dismiss and the motion
to reconsider, vacate the judgment of convic-
tion, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. Additionally, because the dis-
trict court did not make sufficient factual
findings regarding the 2010 Montana pro-
ceedings, we cannot determine whether Mor-
gan was arrested in 2010 or, if so, whether
there was good cause for the delay.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge
MELANSON concur.

558

401 P.3d 136

ESTATE OF Zippora STAHL, Deceased,
Kathleen Krucker, Personal Repre-
sentative, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant—Respondent.

Docket No, 43832

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: August 24, 2017

1, This appeal arises from the district court's de-
cisions on the parties’ cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment. Because the underlying facts are
undisputed, the parties submitted a joint stipula-
tion of facts to the district court, Paragraph 4 of
the stipulation states that the Estate sold the
Chino property for $16,318,909. Paragraph 5 of

Ahrens DeAngeli Law Group LLP, Boise,
for appellant. Nicholas 8. Marshall argued.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. Phil N, Skinner
argued,

HORTON, Justice.

This appeal presents a narrow question of
law relating to state income tax liability.
Kathleen Krucker, personal representative of
the Estate of Zippora Stahl, deceased (“the
Estate”), appeals from the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Idaho State Tax Commission (“Commission”)
and the district court’s denial of the Estate’s
motion for reconsideration. The district court
held that the Estate could not use a different
figure as the starting point for calculating its
Idaho taxable income for 2012 than it report-
ed to the Internal Revenue Service for that
year. We affirm,

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Zippora Stahl was an Idaho resident who
died in 2010, At the time of her death, Stahl
owned real property located in Chino, Cali-
fornia that had substantially appreciated in
value. An ancillary probate proceeding val-
ued the Chino property at $16,000,000. In
December of 2012, the Estate sold the Chino
property for $16,389,000.1

A limited—and necessarily oversimpli-
fied—overview of income and estate tax law
may be helpful in describing the context of
the parties’ dispute. For purposes of deter-
mining income tax liability arising from the

the stipulation indicates that the “total sales

price” was $16,339,000, We have used the latter
figure because it is the figure that the Estate used
when computing its federal income tax liability.

The slight difference in these figures is irrelevant

to the legal question presented by this appeal.

560

sale of property, a taxpayer’s “basis” in the
property is used to determine whether there
has been a taxable gain and the amount of
that gain. Broadly speaking, the taxpayer’s
basis is the original price paid for the proper-
ty, subject to adjustment for items such as
depreciation (downward) and capital im-
provements (upward).

For many years, the federal government
has imposed taxes on the estates of U.S.
citizens and residents. The estate tax is
based upon the value of the property owned
by the decedent at the time of death. Those
who inherit property from the decedent take
the property with a “stepped-up basis” for
federal income tax purposes. Under Internal
Revenue Code section 1014 (Section 1014),
the recipient’s basis is defined as “the fair
market value of the property at the date of
the decedent’s death.” The underlying ratio-
nale for Section 1014 is to avoid double taxa-
tion; heirs’ use of a stepped-up basis avoids
imposition of both estate taxes and income
taxes on the increased value of the property
when it was sold by the heirs.

In 2001, Congress passed legislation which
provided for a gradual phase-out of the fed-
eral estate tax, Among a number of other
provisions, the Economie Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No,
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (“EGTRRA”),
phased out federal estate taxes, with their
complete elimination at the end of 2009. EG-
TRRA § 511.

In an evident effort to avoid the windfall to
heirs that the stepped-up basis provision of
Section 1014 would otherwise provide, follow-
ing repeal of the federal estate tax EGTRRA
also provided that Section 1014 would not
apply to the estates of people who died after
2009. EGTRRA § 541, Instead, Congress en-
acted a new Section 1022 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which provided that that
transferees of property of decedents dying
after 2009 would have a basis in the property
equal to “the lesser of—(A) the adjusted
basis of the decedent, or (B) the fair market
value of the property at the date of the
decedent's death.” EGTRRA § 542(a)(2). The
basis defined in Section 1022 is referred to as
the “modified carryover basis.”

In 2010, Congress passed the Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization,
and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-812, 124 Stat, 3296 (2010) (“TRUIRJ-
CA”). Two sections of this omnibus legisla-
tion are germane to this appeal.

Section 801(a) of TRUIRJCA provided
that “[elach provision of law amended by
subtitle A or E of title V of [EGTRRA] is
amended to read as such provision would
read if such subtitle had never been enact-
ed.” The statutes repealing the federal estate
tax and the new Section 1022 were both
located in Subtitle A of Title V of EGTRRA.
EGTRRA § 1(¢).

Section 301(c) of TRUIRJCA created a
unique option for estates of decedents dying
in 2010, as was the case with Ms. Stahl,
providing:

Notwithstanding subsection (a), in the
case of an estate of a decedent dying after
December 31, 2009, and before January 1,
2011, the executor (within the meaning of
section 2208 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986) may elect to apply such Code as
though the amendments made by subsec-
tion (a) do not apply with respect to chap-
ter 11 of such Code and with respect to
property acquired or passing from such
decedent (within the meaning of section
1014(b) of such Code). Such election shall
be made at such time and in such manner
as the Secretary of the Treasury or the
Seeretary’s delegate shall provide. Such an
election once made shall be revocable only
with the consent of the Secretary of the
Treasury or the Secretary's delegate. For
purposes of section 2652(a)(1) of such
Code, the determination of whether any
property is subject to the tax imposed by
such chapter 11 shall be made without
regard to any election made under this
subsection,

TRUIRJCA § 301(). Although drafted in
the nearly impenetrable prose that seems to
be the hallmark of federal legislation, the
effect of Section 301(c) can be stated in com-
paratively simple terms. Despite TRUIRJ-
CA’s reinstatement of the federal estate tax,
Section 801(c) permitted executors of estates
of people dying in 2010 to elect not to pay the
federal estate tax. In the event that an exec-

utor made this election, for income tax pur-
poses, gains from the sale of the decedent's
property are measured by the modified car-
ryover basis provided by Section 1022 rather
than the stepped-up basis provided by See-
tion 1014. The effect was to permit the es-
tates of 2010 decedents to elect to pay feder-
al income taxes in lieu of estate taxes (“the
1022 Election”).

The Estate made the 1022 Election. Thus,
following the sale of the Chino property, in
its 2012 federal income tax return, the Estate
calculated its income tax liability based upon
a modified carryover basis of $1,457,841 and
a sales price of $16,339,000. This resulted in a
taxable gain of $14,881,659 from the sale.

The Estate also filed an Idaho income tax
return for 2012. When it did so, the Estate
initially used the same modified carryover
basis for the Chino property as it had for its
federal income tax return. The Estate com-
puted its state tax liability as $1,029,107,
which the Estate paid. The Commission pro-
cessed the Estate’s 2012 Idaho income tax
return and determined that the Estate had
incorrectly computed a credit for taxes paid
to other states. The Commission adjusted
that credit and issued a Notice of Deficiency
Determination (“NODD”) in July of 2013.
The NODD identified a deficiency of $20,629
for tax year 2012,

The Estate protested the NODD and filed
an amended 2012 Idaho income tax return.
In the amended Idaho return, the Estate
computed the gain from the sale of the Chino
property using a stepped-up basis of
$16,000,000 rather than the earlier modified
carryover basis of $1,457,341. The amended
Idaho return was accompanied by a “sample
recomputed” federal income tax return?
Schedule D to the recomputed federal tax
return showed a sales price of $16,318,909
and a stepped-up basis of $16,000,000. The
Estate’s amended state income tax return
identified a taxable gain of $318,909 from the
sale of the Chino property, $14,562,750 less
than originally reported. Based upon the use

2. The “sample recomputed” federal return was
evidently created in order to comply with the
requirement that the state return be accompa-
nied by “a complete copy of the federal income

561

of the stepped-up basis, the Estate sought a
refund of $1,026,485 of its earlier payment.

In November of 2018, the Commission is-
sued a second NODD denying the Estate’s
claim for a refund. In October of 2014, the
Commission issued a decision upholding the
earlier $20,629 tax assessment and denying
the Estate’s refund claim.

On December 30, 2014, the Estate deposit-
ed $21,782 with the Commission to satisfy
the $20,629 deficiency, penalty and interest.
On January 6, 2015, the Estate filed its com-
plaint with the district court seeking a judg-
ment directing the Commission to refund the
deposit and its claimed overpayment of
$1,026,435 in state income taxes for 2012,
plus accrued interest. The Estate’s theory
underlying its claim for refund is relatively
straightforward: Idaho taxable income for
2012 is to be determined pursuant to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended,
and in effect on January 1, 2012; Section
801(a) of TRUIRJCA repealed the modified
carryover basis provisions of Section 1022;
and thus, despite its exercise of the 1022
Election, the Estate was entitled to use the
stepped-up basis provided by Section 1014.

The parties filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment. The district court granted
summary judgment to the Commission. The
Estate moved for reconsideration, The dis-
trict court then issued a memorandum deci-
sion denying the Estate’s motion for recon-
sideration, albeit using different reasoning.
The Estate timely appealed.

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE soOur standard of review is well-es-
tablished:

“When this Court reviews a district
court’s decision on summary judgment, it
employs the same standard as that proper-
ly employed by the trial court when origi-
nally ruling on the motion.” Kolln v. Saint
Luke’s Regl. Med, Cir., 180 Idaho 323, 327,
940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997). “The judgment,
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the

tax return including all forms, schedules and
attachments.” IDAPA 35.01.01.800.02. There is
no indication that the Estate amended its federal
income tax return for 2012.

562

pleadings, depositions, and admissions on.
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material facts and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” LR.C.P. 56(c) (repealed effective
July 1, 2016).... “If there is no genuine
issue of material fact, only a question of
law remains, over which this Court exercis-
es free review.” [Kiebert v, Goss, 144 Idaho
225, 2217, 159 P.38d 862, 864 (2007) J.
Greenfield v, Snvith, 162 Idaho 246, 249, 395
P.8d 1279, 1282 (2017). “Statutory interpreta-
tion is a question of law over which this
Court exercises free review.” Carrillo v.
Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 748, 274 P.8d
1256, 1268 (2012). When a question before
this Court requires statutory interpretation,
we apply the following principles:
The objective of statutory interpretation is
to derive the intent of the legislative body
that adopted the act. Statutory interpreta-
tion begins with the literal language of the
statute, Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the
context of the entire document. The stat-
ute should be considered as a whole, and
words should be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meanings. It should be noted
that the Court must give effect to all the
words and provisions of the statute so that
none will be void, superfluous, or redun-
dant. When the statutory language is un-
ambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of
the legislative body must be given effect,
and the Court need not consider rules of
statutory construction.
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 868, 866, 264 P.3d.
970, 973 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho
State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 807, 310, 208 P.8d.
289, 292 (2009) (internal citations omitted)),

Il, ANALYSIS

As noted earlier, the parties agree as to
the underlying facts. Thus, this appeal pres-
ents a pure question of statutory interpreta-
tion. That question is whether Section 1022
was part of “the Internal Revenue Code of

3. Idaho Code section 63-3004 is amended each
year to define “Internal Revenue Code” as the
“the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of the Unit-
ed States, as amended, and in effect on the first

1986 of the United States, as amended, and
in effect on the first day of January 2012,”
despite its apparent repeal by Section 301(a)
of TRUIRJCA, The Estate contends that the
district court erred in its initial determina-
tion that Section 1022 was part of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code on January 1, 2012, and
subsequently erred when deciding the Es-
tate’s motion for reconsideration by holding
that Section 301(c) of TRUIRJCA applied to
the Estate under the Idaho Income Tax Act.
Because we find that the district court’s orig-
inal determination was correct, we do not
reach the arguments that the Estate ad-
vances in support of its claim that the district
court erred when deciding its motion for
reconsideration.

A. Section 1022 was part of “the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 of the United
States, as amended, and in effect on
the first day of January 2012.”

The Idaho Income Tax Act provides for
the taxation of “taxable income.” “The term
‘taxable income’ means federal taxable in-
come as determined under the Internal Rev-
enue Code.” I.C, § 63-3011B. For tax year
2012, the Idaho Income Tax Act defined the
Internal Revenue Code as follows:

(a) The term “Internal Revenue Code”
means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
of the United States, as amended, and in
effect on the first day of January 2012.
(b) Provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code amended, deleted, or added prior to
the effective date of the latest amendment
to this section shall be applicable for Idaho
income tax purposes on the effective date
provided for such amendments, deletions,
or additions, including retroactive provi-
sions.

LC. § 63-8004 2012).

The Hstate’s position in this appeal rests
upon its contention that Section 801(a) of
TRUIRJCA repealed Section 1022 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code. Building from this
premise, the Estate argues that because Sec-
tion 1022 was not part of the statutory text of

day of January” of that year, See e,g., 2017 Idaho

Sess. L. ch. 5, § 1, p. 17, effective retroactive to

January 1, 2017 (amending § 63-3004(a) to read
2017"),

the Internal Revenue Code “as amended, and
in effect on the first day of January 2012,” it
was not incorporated into the Idaho Income
Tax Act by Idaho Code section 63-3004.

Section 301(a) of TRUIRJCA provides:

(a) IN GENERAL.—Each provision of law

amended by subtitle A or E of title V of

the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Rec-

onciliation Act of 2001 is amended to read

as such provision would read if such

subtitle had never been enacted.
TRUIRJCA § 301(a) (emphasis added). The
Estate contends that this provision operates
such that “(Section 1014] was reinstated and
[Section 1022], having been added to the
Internal Revenue code by EGTRRA, was
expressly and retroactively repealed from the
IRC [Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended and in effect on the first day of
January 2012].” In support of this argument,
the Estate continues:

A review of the IRC as published at
Title 26 in the United States Code Anno-
tated (“U.S.C.A.”) (West) conclusively con-
firms that TRUIRJCA § 801(a) repealed
§ 1022 from the IRC in its entirety effec-
tive December 17, 2010. The notation in
the U.S.C.A. volume states, “§ 1022. Re-
pealed. Pub, L. 111-312, Title ITI, § 301(a),
Dec. 17, 2010, 124 Stat. 3300 Effective:
December 17, 2010.” (Zmphasis added),
Furthermore, the text of Title 26 as set
forth in the U.S.C.A. does not suggest that
Repealed § 1022 was repealed for some
taxpayers but not others. Therefore, as of
January 1, 2012, Repealed § 1022 did not
exist as a section of the IRC with respect
to any taxpayer.

The sections of Title 26 are identical to
the sections of the IRC. See 1 U.S.C. § 204
(note) (entitled “Title 26, Internal Revenue
Code.”).

(emphasis in original).

We first note that the United States Code
Annotated, while generally reliable, is pub-
lished by a private company. We are not
persuaded that this private publication “con-
clusively confirms” the effect of Section
801(a) of TRUIRJCA. Rather, we consider it
our duty to ascertain the meaning and effect
of the statute.

563

HM The plain language of Section
801(a) does not explicitly repeal Section 1022,
Certainly, Congress knows how to unambigu-
ously repeal statutes. See eg. Chem. Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Envtl Prot. Agency, 673 F.2d 507,
513 n.18 (D.C, Cir, 1982), There is a signifi-
cant distinction between an “express repeal”
and “implied repeal” of federal statutes. “An
express repeal requires that Congress overt-
ly state with specificity that the subsequent
statute repeals a portion of the former stat-
ute.” Gallenstein v. United States, 975 F.2d
286, 290 (6th Cir. 1992). “The intention of the
legislature to repeal must be ‘clear and mani-
fest.” ” United States v. Borden Co., 808 U.S.
188, 198, 60 S.Ct, 182, 188, 84 L.Ed. 181, 190-
91 (1939) (quoting Town of Red Rock v.
Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602, 1 S.Ct. 434, 439, 27
L.Ed. 251, 258 (1883)), As the Estate recog-
nizes, “Congress utilizes a clearly defined
‘stated means’ for denoting enactments that
amend the [Internal Revenue Code]” and
“when Congress intends to modify the [Inter-
nal Revenue Code’s] statutory text it does so
explicitly and unambiguously.” Indeed, Sec-
tion 1(b) of TRUIRJCA addresses which’ of
its provisions amend the Internal Revenue
Code: .

AMENDMENT OF 1986 CODE.—Ex-
cept as otherwise expressly provided,
whenever in this Act an amendment or
repeal is expressed in terms of an amend-
ment to, or repeal of, a section or other
provision, the reference shall be consid-
ered to be made to a section or other
provision of the Internal Revenue Code of

1986,

(emphasis added). Thus, we consider whether
the language of Section 801(a), providing that
Section 1022 was “amended to read as such
provision would read if such subtitle had
never been enacted,” constitutes an implied
repeal of Section 1022. We conclude that it
does not,

Section 801(a)-essentially directs a reader
of Section 1022 to see nothing; that is, one is
directed to read Section 1022 as if no words
appear therein. However, Congress made it
clear that one is not always required to blind
oneself to that which was written in Section
1022. Section 301(c) of TRUIRJCA provides
an exception to the mandate of Section 301(a)

564

in cases where an estate has made the 1022
Election. TRUIRJCA section 301(c) provides:
(© SPECIAL ELECTION WITH RE-
SPECT TO ESTATES OF DECEDENTS
DYING IN 2010.—Notwithstanding sub-
section (a), in the case of an estate of a
decedent dying after December 81, 2009,
and before January 1, 2011, the executor
(within the meaning of section 2208 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986) may elect
to apply such Code as though the amend-
ments made by subsection (a) do not
apply with respect to chapter 11 of such
Code [providing for the estate tax] and
with respect to property acquired or pass-
ing from such decedent (within the mean-
ing of section 1014(b) of such Code).
(emphasis added). Thus, executors who make
the 1022 Election permitted by Section 301(c)
utilize Section 1022 when computing their
federal income tax liability. As the Internal
Revenue Service explains:

Subtitle A of title V of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001, P.L. 107-16 (EGTRRA) enacted
section 2210, which made chapter 11 (the
estate tax) inapplicable to the estate of any
decedent who died in 2010 and chapter 13
(the GST tax) inapplicable to generation-
skipping transfers made in 2010. On De-
cember 17, 2010, TRUIRJCA became law,
and section 801(a) of TRUIRJCA retroac-
tively reinstated the estate and GST taxes.
However, section 301(c) of TRUIRJCA al-
lows the executor of the estate of a dece-
dent who died in 2010 to elect to apply the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) as though
section 801(a) of TRUIRJCA did not apply
with respect to chapter 11 and with respect
to property acquired or passing from the
decedent (within the meaning of section
1014(b)). Thus, section 301(¢) of TRUIRJ-
CA allows the executor of the estate of a
decedent who died in 2010 to elect not to
have the provisions of chapter 11 apply to
the decedent’s estate, but rather, to have
the provisions of section 1022 apply (Sec-
tion 1022 Election).

Method for Making Election to Apply Carry-
over Basis Treatment under Section 1022 to
the Estates of Decedents who Died im 2010
and Rules Applicable to Inter Vivos and

Testamentary Generation-Skipping Trans-
Jers in 2010, Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2011-
35, Notice 2011-66, August 29, 2011 (empha-
sis added).

In effect, Section 801(c) is the legislative
equivalent of a magician’s illusion: it seems to
cause Section 1022 to disappear, even though
Section 1022 reappears if an executor makes
the 1022 Election authorized by Section
801(c). Indeed, the Estate concedes that “the
basis calculation method provided by re-
pealed § 1022 was ‘in effect’ with respect to
the Estate for federal income tax purposes;”
however, the Estate contends that “§ 1022
itself was not in effect as part of the Internal
Revenue Code on January 1, 2012 because
... TRUIRJCA totally and completely re-
pealed it.”

In support of this argument, the Estate
attempts to analogize this case to 1995 Idaho
Attorney General Opinion 95-2. A review of
Opinion 95-2 shows that the situations are
not analogous. In Opinion 95-2, the Attorney
General concluded that a tax bill signed into
Jaw on April 11, 1995, with retroactive appli-
cation to taxpayers for the 1994 tax year was
not incorporated into the Idaho Income Tax
Act because it was not part of the Internal
Revenue Code “as amended, and in effect on
the first day of January 1995” pursuant to
Idaho Code section 63-3004. This is a reason-
able conclusion because, while the tax bill
ynay have had retroactive application, it was
not signed into law until after the amend-
ment to Idaho Code section 63-3004 had tak-
en effect on the first day of January 1995.

‘The situation here is not similar. TRUIRJ-
CA was signed into law in 2010. Prior to
TRUIRJCA’s enactment, executors of dece-
dents’ estates were required to apply Section
1022 and, after TRUIRJCA’s enactment, ex-
ecutors of decedents’ estates who passed
away in 2010 could utilize Section 1014 or
elect to utilize Section 1022 as permitted by
Section 801(¢). There was no point in time
where Section 1022 was not part of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.

The Estate further contends that Section
801(c) is simply an “off-eode” (ie., not part of
the Internal Revenue Code) provision which
Congress used to “apply the basis calculation
formula of Repealed § 1022 to the assets of
estates making the Public Law Election”

rather than Section 1022 itself. The Estate’s
arguments are not supported by the text of
the statutes. TRUIRJCA makes no reference
to a “basis calculation formula”; rather, it
provides that executors of estates making the
1022 Election may “apply” Section 1022 of
the Internal Revenue Code. As the district
court wrote:

That the Estate made the Section 1022
Election under an “off-code” provision does
not mean, however, that the “off-code” pro-
vision itself is the mechanism for determin-
ing the Estate’s federal taxable income, To
the contrary, the “off-code” provision at
issue here directs electing taxpayers, like
the Estate, to the Internal Revenue Code
provision—Section 1022—that must be ap-
plied in determining basis and, by exten-
sion, federal taxable income. Thus, the Es-
tate has no way around the conclusion that
Section 1022 was “in effect on the first day
of January 2012,” as that phrase is used in
LC. § 68-3004, with respect to the Estate.
That Section 1022 was “in effect” with
respect to the Estate at that time is clear
as a matter of federal law ....

HH Although not a basis for our deci-
sion, we observe that our conclusion is con-
sistent with the clearly expressed intent of
the Idaho Legislature. Idaho Code section
63-3002 of the Idaho Income Tax Act pro-
vides:

Jt is the intent of the legislature by
the adoption of this act, insofar as possi-
ble to make the provisions of the Idaho act
identical to the provisions of the Federal
Internal Revenue Code relating to the
measurement of taxable income, to the end
that the taxable income reported each
taxable year by a taxpayer to the inter-
nal revenue service shall be the identi-
cal sum reported to this state, subject
only to modifications contained in the Ida-
hho law; to achieve this result by the appli-
cation of the various provisions of the Fed-
eral Internal Revenue Code relating to the
definition of income, exceptions therefrom,
deductions (personal and otherwise), ac-
counting methods, taxation of trusts, es-
tates, partnerships and corporations, basis
and other pertinent provisions to gross
income as defined therein, resulting in an
amount called “taxable income” in the In-
ternal Revenue Code, and then to impose

565

the provisions of this act thereon to derive
a sum called “Idaho taxable income”; to
impose a tax on residents of this state
measured by Idaho taxable income wher-
ever derived and on the Idaho taxable
income of nonresidents which is the result
of activity within or derived from sources
within this state. All of the foregoing is
subject to modifications in Idaho law in-
cluding, without limitation, modifications
applicable to unitary groups of corpora-
tions, which include corporations incorpo-
rated outside the United States.
LC. § 68-3002 (emphasis added). “Idaho tax-
able income is the same as federal taxable
income, except that it is ‘adjusted’ according
to the subsections of LC. § 68-3022.” Pot-
latch Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 128
Idaho 387, 389, 918 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1996).

HH In summary, we hold that Section
1022 was part of “the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 of the United States, as amended,
and in effect on the first day of January
2012” and was thereby incorporated into the
Idaho Income Tax Act for tax year 2012
pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-3004.
Based upon this determination, we do not
consider the Estate’s claim that the district,
court erred in evaluating its motion for re-
consideration. We affirm the judgment of the
district court,

B. The Estate is not entitled to attorney
fees and costs on appeal.

TE The Estate requests an award of
attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code section 63-3049(d) and Idaho Ap-
pellate Rules 40 and 41. The Commission
does not request attorney fees on appeal.
The Estate is not the prevailing party on
appeal and is thus not entitled to an award of
attorney fees.

Iv. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district
court. Costs to the Commission.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur.

566 Lt
401 P.3d 144
Josue BARRIOS, Claimant-Respondent,
ve

ZING LLC, Employer, and Idaho
State Insurance Fund, Surety,
Defendants—Appellants.

Docket No, 44554+2016

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, August 2017 Term,

Filed: August 24, 2017

Matthew ©. Parks, Elam & Burke PA,
Boise, argued for appellants,

Richard §. Owen, Owen and Farney
PLLO, Nampa, argued for respondent.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal from the order of the
Industrial Commission requiring an employ-
er and its surety to pay the cost of a guard-
ian and a conservator for a claimant who
suffered a severe, traumatic brain injury as a
result of an industrial accident, which left
him unable to care for himself. We affirm the
order of the Commission,

L

Factual Background.

While employed by Zing LLC, Josue Bar-
rios (“Claimant”) was totally and permanent-
ly disabled as a result of an industrial acci-
dent when he fell about twelve feet from a
ladder and hit his head face first on a con-
erete floor. He suffered multiple facial frac-
tures, a frontal bone fracture, the loss of
sight in his left eye, and a severe traumatic
brain injury that caused a major neurocogni-
tive disorder and speech language deficits,

It is undisputed that Claimant is unable to
eare for himself as a result of his injuries. At
the time of the hearing, he was living in a
home certified by the Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare. The person operating
that home speaks Spanish, which is the only
language that Claimant speaks. Claimant’s
treating physician recommended that a
guardian and a conservator be appointed for
him, In making this recommendation, the
physician wrote:

He requires a professional guardian of the

person, and a professional conservator of

the estate per the Idaho Probate code: He
is unable to plan, advocate, or care for
himself in the medical, personal and finan-
cial areas of his life due to his cognitive
issues and closed head injury sequelae,
+++ The appointment of a guardian and of

a conservator for Mr. Barrios is medically

necessary due to the traumatic brain inju-

ry, which robs him of his ability to make
cogent decisions about his medical treat-
ment and about his financial affairs, and

which requires the appointment of a

guardian and of a conservator to make

those decisions and to manage his financial
affairs,

Proceedings were instituted to accomplish
that recommendation, and the magistrate
court in Ada County appointed a guardian
and a conservator for Claimant. His employ-
er and the Idaho State Insurance Fund (both
herein called “Surety”) refused to pay the
fees charged by the guardian and conserva-
tor, contending that such expenses were not
compensable under Idaho Code section 72-
432, The Industrial Commission considered
that legal issue and held that Surety were
responsible for the payment of the fees and
expenses of the guardian and the conserva-
tor. Surety then timely appealed.

IL

Did the Commission Err in Holding that
the Fees and Expenses of a Guardian
and Conservator Are Compensable un-
der Idaho Code section 72-432(1)?

HM “The interpretation of a statute is an
issue of law over which we exercise free
review.” State v, Maidwell, 187 Idaho 424,

567

426, 50 P.8d 439, 441 (2002), Idaho Code
section 72-482(1) states insofar as is relevant,
“{TJhe employer shall provide for an injured
employee such reasonable medical, surgical
or other attendance or treatment, nurse and
hospital services, medicines, crutches and ap-
paratus, as may be reasonably required by
the employee’s physician or needed immedi-
ately after an injury ..., and for a reason-
able time thereafter.” The issue is the mean-
ing of the words “other attendance.”

I Surety contends that those words in
context only refer to the expenses that can
be characterized as “medical” in nature, The
Commission disagreed, reasoning as follows:

We agree with Defendants that the ex-
penses at issue cannot fairly be character-
ized as medical, surgical or other treat-
ment, and that if they are compensable as
Idaho Code § 72-482(1) expenses, they
must qualify as “other attendance”, The
term attendance refers to the act or state
of attending. To attend is to take care of,
administer to, devote one’s services to, to
take charge of, watch over, look after, tend
or guard. Against Defendants’ assertion
that the type of attendance referenced in
Idaho Code § 72-432 must be medical in
nature, one need only refer to the language
of the statute to reject this argument, The
attendance that employer is required to
provide is medical; surgical and “other”,
ie, other than medical.

Claimant has suffered a severe traumat-
ie brain injury, leaving him without higher
executive function, It is conceded that this
disability is of such severity to render him
totally and permanently disabled. The ser-
vices provided by his guardian and conser-
vator are intended to assist and protect
Claimant where he no longer is possessed
of the faculties to take care of himself,
These services are clearly of a type that
fall within the aforementioned definition of
attendance,

(Citations omitted.)

The language at issue was included in the
Workmen’s Compensation Act adopted in
1917. The relevant provision stated:

Medical Attendance

568

Sec. 16. The employer shall provide for
an injured employee such reasonable medi-
eal, surgical or other attendance or treat-
ment, nurse and hospital service, medi-
cines, crutches and apparatus, as may be
required or be requested by the employee
immediately after an injury, and for a rea-
sonable time thereafter.

Ch, 81, § 16, 1917 Idaho Sess, Laws 252,
261-62.

The first case that sheds some light on the
meaning of this statutory provision is Irvine
v. Perry, 78 Idaho 182, 299 P.2d 97 (1956). In
that case, the claimant’s wife sought compen-
sation for the time she was required to take
eare of him at home due to injuries from an
industrial accident that caused him to be-
come a paraplegic. Id. at 137, 299 P.2d at 99-
100, At that time, the statute was codified as
Idaho Code section 72-807. Idaho Code sec-
tion 73-808 permitted workers and their em-
ployers to enter into contracts waiving the
provisions of Idaho Code section 72-807 and
entering into hospital contracts that provided
for medical, hospital, and surgical attend-
ance,t

The issues to be decided on appeal in
Irvine were:
First, the construction of the hospital con-
tract entered into in this case and the
liability thereunder; second, what is a rea-
sonable time under the statute, I.C. Sec-
tion 72-807, and the hospital contract, with-
in which claimant is entitled to receive
medical care, medicine and supplies?
Third, is claimant’s wife entitled to receive
pay for home nursing?
Id, at 138, 299 P.2d at 100. This Court held
that the hospital contract only waived the
rights of the employee under Idaho Code
section 72-307 to the extent that the contract
gives the employee the rights afforded by the
statute and in all other respects the statutory
liability remains unimpaired and unreduced.
1, The relevant provision in Idaho Code section
72-308 provided:

Nothing in this act shall be construed as
preventing employers and workmen from
waiving the provisions of section 72-307 and
entering into mutual contracts or agreements
providing for hospital benefits and accommo-
dations to be furnished to the employee.

The approved contract definitely fixes
and limits the liability of the contracting
hospital. To the extent, but only to the
extent, that such contract gives to the em-
ployee the benefits granted to him by the
statute, it is a substitute for the employer’s
statutory liability. The employee, by his
waiver of statutory rights, accepts the con-
tract of the contracting hospital only to the
extent that it gives to him the rights af-
forded by the statute. In other respects,
the statutory liability of the employer re-
mains unimpaired and unreduced.

Id, at 140, 299 P.2d at 102.

We held that because the hospital contract
did not provide for home nursing services,
they remained the statutory responsibility of
the employer.

In the case now before us, the hospital
contract specifically provides for medical,
hospital, and surgical attendance (as re-
quired by I.C. § 72-308) immediately after
an injury, and continuously for a reason-
able time thereafter. The contract limits
the hospital attendance and nursing to hos-
pital care and nursing in the hospitals des-
ignated in the contract, and for such condi-
tions and for such length of time as may be
reasonably necessary for the proper treat-
ment of the conditions presented,

We construe the hospital contract in this
ease to provide for medicine and medical
supplies for a reasonable length of time,
but not to provide for home nursing ser-
vices. These, not having been contracted
for, would remain the statutory responsi-
bility of the employer.

Id. (emphasis added).

In Irvine, there was no contention that the
claimant’s wife was a licensed or even a
trained nurse. Rather, the claimant sought
compensation because “his wife had been
compelled to act as his nurse and spent at
least three hours a day in taking care of him,
for which he is entitled to reasonable com-

Such hospital contracts or agreements must
provide for medical, hospital and surgical at-
tendance for such employee for sickness, con-
tracted during employment (except venereal
diseases and sickness as a result of intoxi-
cation), as well as for injuries received arising
out of and in the course of the employment.

pensation.” Jd, at 187, 299 P.2d at 99-100.
The Court did not engage in construing the
wording of the statute, but merely stated
that the nursing services provided by the
claimant’s wife “would remain the statutory
responsibility of the employer.”

The second case to address the wording at
issue was Burch v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 82
Idaho 828, 858 P.2d 1076 (1960). In Burch,
the issue was whether a claimant was enti-
tled to receive a dental bridge due to having
lost two teeth in an industrial accident, Id. at,
325, 353 P.2d at 1077. The Industrial Acci-
dent Board held that the employer and sure-
ty were not required to pay the cost of the
dental bridge, apparently upon expert testi-
mony that “the presence of such bridge
would not affect [claimant’s] ability to obtain
employment or to remain gainfully em-
ployed.” Id. at 327, 353 P.2d at 1078,

In addressing that issue, this Court stated,
“It is too well settled under the decisions of
this Court to require the citation of authori-
ties that the provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Law of this state are to be
liberally construed in favor of employees.”
Id. With respect to the meaning of then
Idaho Code section 72-307, we stated: “It
must be borne in mind that said section (72-
807) does not attempt to specify every kind
of treatment which shall be provided—it does
provide for ‘other attendance or treatment.
In common parlance and often in the law the
word ‘treatment’ is a broad term and is
employed to indicate all steps taken in order
to effect a cure of an injury or disease.” Id,
at 328, 358 P.2d at 1078. In reversing the
decision of the Industrial Accident Board, we
stated that “the uncontradicted expert testi-
mony establish[ed] that a replacement for
the extracted teeth would be advisable and
proper in the rehabilitation process.” Id.

In Burch, the dental bridge would not be
considered medical or surgical treatment. In
holding that the words “other ... treatment”
included providing a dental bridge, we reject-
ed the argument that such other treatment
must be other medical treatment. Thus, we
held that the scope of the word “treatment”
was not limited either by the words “medi-
cal” and “surgical” that preceded it or by the
words “nurse and hospital services, medi-

569

cines, crutches and apparatus, as may be
reasonably required by the employee’s physi-
cian” that followed it. If the scope of the
word “treatment” was not limited by the
preceding or ensuing words, neither would
the scope of the word “attendance” be so
limited.

The third case to address the meaning of
the words at issue is Hamilton v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 84 Idaho 209, 370 P.2d 191
(1962), One of the issues was whether the
employer and surety were required to pay
for nursing home care for the claimant. They
contended that “the award for domiciliary
care was error because it was not reasonable
medical service for a compensable injury.”
Id. at 218, 370 P.2d at 192. They asserted
that “nursing care must be in conjunction
with a physician’s attendance, which is am-
plified by referral to a physician’s care or
treatment in a hospital as against occasional
observation and treatment other than in a
hospital.” Id. at 214, 870 P.2d at 198. The
claimant needed the nursing home care be-
cause the injury to his right hip caused by
falling from a ladder badly fractured the
head of the femur, resulting in the head and
neck of the femur being removed. Jd. at 211,
370 P.2d 191. A metal prothesis was inserted
to replace the head and neck of the femur,
but it was later removed due to complica-
tions that later developed, resulting in a
“pistonlike action” by the femur when he
walked that caused physical distress. Id. at
212, 870 P.2d at 192. He was ultimately able
“to dress, feed himself, get into and out of a
wheel chair, take a shower, and take care of
his toilet needs.” Jd. We held that “domicili-
ary nursing care is an integral portion of
services contemplated by 1.C. sec. 72-807 in
relation to the facts herein.” Id. at 215, 370
P.2d at 194. Nursing home care was not.
mentioned in the statute, and it would not be
considered “medical” or “surgical” treat-
ment, nor would it be considered as being
“nurse and hospital services.” Thus, we held
that the word “treatment” was not restricted
to medical or surgical treatment.

In 1971, the legislature repealed eleven of
the twelve chapters of Title 72 that set forth
the statutes governing workmen’s compensa-
tion and occupational disease compensation,

570

including Chapter Three that included for-
mer section 72-807. Ch. 124, § 2, 1971 Idaho
Sess. Laws 422, 424, In the same bill, it
enacted new legislation, which it stated was
“a, comprehensive recodification of the work-
men’s compensation and occupational disease
compensation laws of the state of Idaho.” Id.,
§ 1, at 424. When doing so, it enacted Idaho
Code section 72-482(1), which included the
requirement that an employer provide an
injured employee “reasonable medical, surgi-
cal or other attendance or treatment, nurse
and hospital service, medicines, crutches and
apparatus.” Jd., § 8, at 460-61. Thus, the
legislature used the identical language stat-
ing the type of “other attendance or treat-
ment” required to be provided by an employ-
er to an injured employee as has existed
since 1917.

Over a century ago, this Court held:

When a statutory or constitutional provi-

sion is adopted from another state, where

the courts of that state have placed a

construction upon the language of such

statute or constitution, it is to be presumed
that it was taken in view of such judicial
interpretation, and with the purpose of
adopting the language as the same had
been interpreted and construed by the
courts of the state from which it was tak-
en,

Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 457, 75 P.

246, 257 (1904).

I The same presumption applies when
the Idaho legislature repeals a statute and
then enacts in its place a new statute that
includes the same language that was in the
repealed statute. We presume that the legis-
lature intended that such language in the
new statute have the same meaning as the
construction we placed on that language in
the repealed statute. Although that presump-
tion can be overcome, the Surety has not
shown that the legislature did not intend that
the language at issue in Idaho Code section
72-432(1) was not intended by the legislature
to be given the same construction as we
previously gave that language in former Ida-
ho Code section 72-307.

We agree with the construction placed on
the statute by the Industrial Commission and
that the services of a guardian and a conser-

vator were other attendance that was neces-
sary because “Claimant has suffered a physi-
cal injury to his brain, which leaves him
unable to perform certain functions neces-
sary to day-to-day living.”

TIL.

Conclusion,

We affirm the order of the Industrial Com-
mission, and we award Respondent costs on
appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY coneur,

401 P.3d 148
Sharon R, HAMMER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Nils RIBI, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No. 44447

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term,

Filed: August 25, 2017

Saal
qe
wo

As

72

James R. Donoval, Eagle, for appellant.

Naylor & Hales, P.C., Boise, for respon-
dent. Kirtlan Naylor argued.

HORTON, Justice,

Sharon Hammer appeals from the district
court’s order dismissing her complaint. Ham-
mer’s action against Nils Ribi alleges that he
assaulted her during a city council meeting
on September 15, 2011, The district court
granted Ribi’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The district court denied Hammer's
motion to require Ribi to undergo a mental
examination and ruled that Hammer failed to
plead facts which would show that Ribi was
not immune from suit under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act (ITCA). We vacate the judgment
dismissing Hammer's lawsuit and remand for
further proceedings.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

This litigation arises from events occurring
during a city council meeting on September
15, 2011. Hammer was employed as City
Administrator for Sun Valley, and Ribi was a
member of the city council. Hammer’s com-
plaint alleges that, during a break in the
meeting, Hammer left the council chambers
to copy some documents. Ribi followed Ham-
mer and demanded that she make certain
changes to budget documents. Hammer re-
fused to make the changes and told Ribi that
she had to speak with the Mayor before she
could make any changes. Ribi then raised his
arms and told Hammer, “No! You will not
talk to the Mayor!” Hammer was afraid that
Ribi was going to hit her, and she stepped
back and said, “Whoa!”

Hammer's complaint alleged that Ribi had
committed a civil assault. Hammer's action
was originally brought in federal court. In
July of 2015, the federal court declined to
continue to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over the civil assault claim. Hammer

then filed this case in state court. In the
state court proceedings, Hammer filed a mo-
tion pursuant to LR,C.P. 35, seeking an or-
der requiring Ribi to undergo a mental ex-
amination,

Ribi moved to dismiss the complaint. Ham-
mer responded with a motion to amend her
complaint. Following a hearing, the district
court granted Ribi’s motion to dismiss the
complaint for failing to properly plead facts
that would support a claim of civil assault but
granted Hammer leave to amend her com-
plaint. The court then denied Hammer’s mo-
tion for a mental examination. Hammer filed
a motion to reconsider which the district
court denied without hearing.

On May 20, 2016, Hammer filed her
amended complaint. Ribi filed a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), again argu-
ing that Hammer had failed to plead facts
necessary to support a finding of civil assault.
Ribi also claimed that he was immune from
the lawsuit under the ITCA. The district
court granted the motion to dismiss. The
district court assumed, without deciding, that
Hammer had properly pleaded the elements
of civil assault but held that Hammer had
failed to plead sufficient facts to show that
Ribi was not immune under the ITCA, Ham-
mer timely appealed.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE “When this Court reviews an order
dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6), we apply the same standard of re-
view we apply to a motion for summary
judgment.” Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho
670, 672~78, 183 P.8d 758, 760-61 (2008). “A.
12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to
determine whether a claim for relief has been
stated.” Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho
102, 104, 44 P.8d 1157, 1159 (2001). “[O}n
review of a dismissal this Court determines
whether the non-movant has alleged suffi-
cient facts in support of his claim, which if
true, would entitle him to relief.” Idaho Wool
Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 154 Idaho 716,
720, 302 P.8d 341, 345 (2012) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted). “In doing so, the
Court draws all reasonable inferences in fa-
vor of the non-moving party.” Id.

573

HEME “The decision to order psychologi-
cal testing is within the discretion of the trial
court.” Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882,
887, 173 P.38d 1141, 1146 (2007). “A trial court
acts within its discretion when it (1) recog-
nizes the decision as one of discretion, (2)
acts within the outer limits of that discretion
and (8) reaches its conclusion through an
exercise of reason.” Id.

Il. ANALYSIS

Hammer contends that the district court
used the wrong legal standard for civil as-
sault when it dismissed her original com-
plaint, the district court erred when it dis-
missed her amended complaint based upon
ITCA immunity, and the district court erred
when it denied her motion for a mental ex-
amination. These will be discussed in turn.

A. Whether the district court applied the
wrong legal standard for civil assault
when it considered Hammer’s original
complaint.

HM Hammer argues that the district
court erred when it dismissed her original
complaint because it applied the wrong defi-
nition for a civil assault claim. As a threshold
issue, we first consider whether this claim is
an appropriate subject of appellate review.

HMM Ordinarily, “{tJhe amendment of
the complaint supersedes the original com-
plaint and all subsequent proceedings are
based upon the amended complaint.” Wein-
stein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins.
Co., 149 Idaho 299, 380, 238 P.8d 1221, 1252
(2010) (quoting W.L. Scott, Inc. v. Madras
Aerotech, Inc., 108 Idaho 786, 789, 658 P.2d
791, 794 (1982)). Thus, the general rule is
that “the ‘amended complaint supersedes the
original, the latter being treated thereafter
as non-existent.’” Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,
114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting
Lowe v. Rhay, 875 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir.
1967)). Therefore, we would not ordinarily
review the district court’s actions with regard
to Hammer’s original complaint.

However, in the limited context of an in-
voluntary amendment of a plaintiff's com-
plaint in response to a proposed order of

574

dismissal, the federal courts have recognized
an exception to the general rule. See Hay-
ward v, Cleveland Clinic Found, 759 F.8d
601, 616-17 (6th Cir. 2014); Lacey v. Marico-
pa Cnty., 693 F.8d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012);
In ve Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064,
1067 (8th Cir. 2000).

The Lacey decision is particularly instruc-
tive. There, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that application of the general
rule in the case of an involuntary amendment
not to be “prudent or sufficiently just.” La-
cey, 698 F.8d at 927, Rather, the Court char-
acterized application of the rule in such cir-
cumstances as “formalistie and harsh.” Id.
The Court reasoned that the “rule is unfair
to litigants” as it creates a “‘patently coer-
cive predicament’ ” for plaintiffs. Jd. (quoting
In ve Atlas Van Lines, 209 F.8d at 1067).
The “coercive predicament” plaintiffs’ coun-
sel face is that “counsel is between failing to
preserve issues for appeal and risking sanc-
tions by realleging dismissed claims.” Jd.
“The Court further found that ‘the rule is
unfair to district courts.’ We see no benefit in
requiring plaintiffs to reallege claims that the
district courts have already dealt with on the
merits and dismissed with prejudice.” Id, at
928, Finally, the Court concluded that there
is no “countervailing reason for keeping the
current rule..,. in practical terms we think
there is little benefit to the orderly adminis-
tration of justice.” Jd, As we find the Lacey
analysis to be persuasive, we will consider
the merits of the district court’s decision
dismissing Hammer’s original complaint,

WE «When it dismissed her initial
complaint, the district court expressed skep-
ticism that Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30
properly states the elements of civil assault.
Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 provides as
follows:

The plaintiff has the burden of proving
each of the following propositions:

(1) The defendant acted intending to

cause a harmful or offensive contact with

the person of the plaintiff or a third per-
son, or an immediate fear of such contact;
and

@) As a result, the plaintiff feared that

such contact was imminent.

ICJI 4.80, The district court appears to have
accepted Ribi’s contention that this instruc-
tion is inadequate because it does not require
the plaintiff to show that the defendant dis-
played a violent overt action. In his treatise
Law of Torts, Prosser notes that a require-
ment of an overt physical act is generally not
necessary to prove a tort. William L. Pros-
ser, Law of Torts 40 (4th ed. 1971), “Any act
of such a nature as to excite apprehension of
a battery may constitute an assault.” Id, at
88. “It would appear, however, that too much
emphasis has been placed by the courts upon
the idea of motion or gesture, usually de-
seribed as ‘some overt act.’” Id. “The only
valid reason that mere words do not amount
to an assault is that ordinarily they create no
reasonable apprehension of immediate con-
tact.” Id. at 40, We hold that ICJI 4.30
accurately prescribes the elements of civil
assault in this state,

B. The district court erred when it dis-
missed Hammer’s amended complaint.

HM The district court dismissed Ham-
mer’s amended complaint pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that
Ribi was immune under the ITCA, Although
the parties devote much briefing to the ques-
tion whether Hammer pled facts sufficient to
show that Ribi was not entitled to immunity
under the ITCA, they have missed the dis-
positive issue.

We have long held that immunity is an
affirmative defense, including immunity un-
der the ITCA, See, ag., Teurlings v. Larson,
156 Idaho 65, 68, 820 P.8d 1224, 1227 (2014)
(considering immunity under Idaho Code
section 6-904(4)). In ruling on a 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, the district court is to consider only the
facts set forth in the pleadings. Young, 187
Idaho at 104, 44 P.8d at 1159. These facts
must be taken as true for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss, Idaho Wool Growers
Ass'n, Inc., 154 Idaho at 720, 302 P.8d at 345,
Thus, the sole question is whether “a ‘well-
pleaded ... claim is asserted’” Dujf v
Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 305, 527 P.2d 1257,
1268 (1974) (quoting Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d
104, 109 (8th Cir, 1960)).

HMM The corollary to the standard gov-
erning a district court’s decision on a 12(b)(6)

motion is this: a complaint is not subject to
dismissal simply because it does not negate
an affirmative defense. Duff, 96 Idaho at 299,
527 P.2d at 1268; see also Dumas v. Ropp, 98
Idaho 61, 64, 558 P.2d 682, 685 (1977) (“One
wonders how the pleading philosophy behind
those simple statements of a claim for relief
.++ could ever be interpreted to require the
plaintiff to negate the defense of statute of
limitations in his complaint.”) (Bakes, J., con-
curring).

HH Because a plaintiff is not required to
“plead around” affirmative defenses, the dis-
trict court erred by dismissing Hammer's
complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) based upon Ribi’s affirma-
tive defense under the ITCA.! Therefore, we
vacate the judgment dismissing Hammer’s
lawsuit.

C. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Hammer's
motion to compel a mental health ex-
amination.

Hsin support of her claim that the
district court erred by denying her motion to
compel Ribi to undergo a mental examina-
tion, Hammer argues that the mental state of
a defendant in a civil assault claim is always
in controversy. Hammer further argues that
the question of Ribi’s ability to tell the truth
makes his mental state an issue in this case.
The district court denied Hammer’s motion,
holding that Ribi’s mental health was not in
controversy in the case. We recognize that a
discovery order is interlocutory in nature,
but will address Hammer’s claim for guid-
ance on remand,

Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a),
the district court may order a party to un-
dergo a mental examination upon a showing

1. Even if a plaintiff were required to anticipate
and negate affirmative defenses in her complaint,
Hammer's complaint would have satisfied the
more rigorous standard. Hammer's amended
complaint expressly alleged that Ribi’s conduct
was outside the scope of his employment and
done with malice, Paragraph 8 of her Amended
Complaint alleges:

The alleged acts engaged in by Defendant Ribi
associated with his assault of Ms. Hammer on
September 15, 2011, were done outside of the
course and scope of his role as a member of
the Sun Valley City Council and with malice or

575

by the moving party that the proposed exam-
inee’s mental health is in controversy and
that there is good cause to order the exami-
nation. I.R.C,P. 85(a). The Idaho rule is near-
ly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 35(a). “We prefer to interpret the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with
interpretations of the same language in the
federal rules.” Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho
616, 622, 888 P.8d 1220, 1226 (2014).

The United States Supreme Court consid-
ered Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 85(a) in
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S, 104, 85
S.Ct, 284, 18 L,Ed.2d 152 (1964). There, pas-
sengers of a Greyhound bus sued for dam-
ages resulting from injuries they sustained
when their bus crashed into the back of a
tractor-trailer, 879 U.S. at 106, 85 S.Ct. at
236, 18 L.Ed.2d at ——. The passengers
sued Greyhound, Schlagenhauf (the bus driv-
er), and the owners of the tractor and trailer,
Id. at 107, 85 S.Ct. at 236-37, 18 L.Ed.2d at
——. Greyhound filed a cross-claim against
the tractor-trailer owners, claiming that the
truck was driving too slowly. Jd. The truck
owner’s answer alleged that Schlagenhauf
was not “mentally or physically capable” of
driving the bus and that his medical deficien-
cies had caused the collision, Jd, The truck
owner sought an order compelling Schlagen-
hauf to undergo a number of mental and
physical examinations, Jd, The district court
ordered that he submit to nine separate ex-
aminations, After the Ninth Cireuit Court of
Appeals denied Schlagenhauf’s request for
extraordinary relief from the district court’s
order, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court remanded the case,
with instructions that the district court re-
consider its order. The Supreme Court noted
that Schlagenhauf did not rely upon his men-

reckless disregard for Ms. Hammer's protected
rights.
Paragraph 72 reiterated this claim:
The alleged acts engaged in by Defendant Ribi
of assaulting Ms. Hammer were done outside
of the course and scope of his limited role as a
member of the Sun Valley City Council and
with malice or reckless disregard for Ms, Ham-
mer’s protected rights.
For purposes of the 12(b)(6) motion, the district
court was required to accept these allegations as
true.

576 —

tal or physical condition in support or de-
fense of a claim, id. at 119, 85 S.Ct. at 248, 18
LEd.2d at ——, and held that the truck
owner’s bald allegation regarding Schlagen-
hautf’s capability to drive was not sufficient to
warrant the battery of examinations ordered
by the district court. Jd. at 120-21, 85 S.Ct.
at 248-44, 18 L,Ed.2d at ——. Discussing the
“good cause” and “in controversy” require-
ments of the rule, the Court explained:

They are not merely met by conclusory

allegations of the pleadings—nor by mere

relevance to the case—but require an affir-
mative showing by the movant that each
condition as to which the examination is
sought is really and genuinely in contro-
versy and that good cause exists for order-
ing each particular examination.
Id. The Court cautioned that the rule “re-
quires discriminating application by the trial
judge, who must decide, as an initial matter
in every case, whether the party requesting a
mental or physical examination or examina-
tions has adequately demonstrated the exis-
tence of the Rule’s requirements of ‘in con-
troversy’ and ‘good cause.’” Id, at 118-19, 85
S.Ct. at 242-48, 18 L.Ed.2d at —,

Hammer advances three theories in sup-
port of her contention that Ribi’s mental
health is in controversy. First, she argues
that the mental health of the defendant in an
assault case is always relevant. Second, she
contends that evidence of Ribi’s mental con-
dition may be used to attack his credibility.
Finally, Hammer asserts that Ribi put his
mental health at issue in a related defama-
tion action. These arguments do not per-
suade us that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied Hammer’s motion
to compel Ribi to submit to a mental exami-
nation.

HM First, as discussed earlier, the ele-
ments of civil assault are set forth in ICJI
430. Only the first element relates to the
defendant. That element requires the plain-
tiff to show that the defendant acted with
intent to cause a harmful contact or put the
plaintiff in fear of such contact, This element
does not place the mental health of the de-
fendant in controversy. Indeed, if we were to
accept Hammer’s premise, a party’s mental
health would be at controversy in every case

in which intent is an element of the cause of
action,

Hammer's next argument is that Ribi’s
eredibility is relevant and his mental capacity
to tell the truth is in controversy. As with
Hammer's first argument, if we were to ac-
cept this reasoning, every party in every case
would be required to submit to a mental
examination upon demand of another party.

Hammer's final argument is equally devoid
of merit. She was required to demonstrate
that Ribi’s mental condition is in controversy
in this action, not that it was an issue in a
different lawsuit between the parties, Ham-
mer has failed to show that the district court
abused its discretion by denying her motion
to compel Ribi to submit to a mental exami-
nation.

D. Attorney fees on appeal.

HH Each party has requested an award
of attorney fees. Hammer has obtained a
decision vacating the district court’s judg-
ment dismissing Hammer's amended com-
plaint, She was also correct in her assertion
that the district court erred by dismissing
her original complaint based upon its view of
the elements of a claim for civil assault.
However, she was unsuccessful in her effort
to persuade us that the district court erred
by denying her motion to compel the mental
examination. Considering the mixed result,
we hold that there is no prevailing party in
this appeal. Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 808,
809, 879 P.8d 1073, 1079 (2016). Therefore,
neither party is entitled to an award of costs
or fees on appeal. Id.

IV. CONCLUSION
We vacate the district court’s judgment
dismissing Hammer’s amended complaint
and remand for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, JONES, and Justice Pro Tem
TROUT coneur,

401 P.3d 577
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

Thomas Cruz COLVIN, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket No. 44484
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: July 26, 2017
Review Denied September 20, 2017

577

Eric D, Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
Jant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney Gener-
al, Boise, for respondent.

GRATTON, Chief Judge

Thomas Cruz Colvin appeals from the dis-
trict court’s order denying his motion to dis-
miss.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Colvin was issued a citation for misde-
meanor domestic battery, Idaho Code § 18-
918(8)(b). The police report noted the victim,
his girlfriend at the time, had blood on her
clothes, face, and arms, and her eye was
swollen shut. The State filed a motion to
dismiss the misdemeanor charge, which was
granted. The State subsequently filed a new
complaint charging Colvin with felony do-
mestic battery, IC. § 18-918(2)(a), alleging
he inflicted traumatic injury upon the victim.

Colvin moved to dismiss the felony charge,
asserting it was barred by I.C. § 19-3506
because it was for the same offense as the
previously dismissed charge. The State ar-
gued that felony and misdemeanor domestic
violence charges are not the same offense
and that IC. § 19-3506 only bars the State
from filing repeat misdemeanors, as opposed
to felonies, arising from the same events, The
district court concluded the charges for mis-
demeanor and felony domestic battery are
the same offense when applying the test as
set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284

578

USS. 299, 52 S.Ct, 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1982),
but denied Colvin’s motion to dismiss based.
on its holding that IC. § 19-3506 only bars
prosecution for the same offense if the subse-
quent charge is a misdemeanor.

Colvin entered a conditional guilty plea, in
which he reserved his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to dismiss, The district,
court imposed a withheld judgment for a
probation term of four years, Colvin timely
appeals.

IL

ANALYSIS

The statute at issue in this case is LC.
§ 19-8506, which states: “An order for the
dismissal of the action, as provided in this
chapter, is a bar to any other prosecution for
the same offense, if it is a misdemeanor; but
it is not a bar if the offense is a felony.” I.C,
§ 19-8506 (emphasis added). The first issue
is whether the misdemeanor domestic bat-
tery charge is for the same offense as the
subsequent felony domestic battery charge
for the purpose of applying I.C. § 19-8506.
Colvin argues both charges are the same
offense while the State asserts they are not.
The second issue is whether “it” (italicized
above) refers to the action that was dis-
missed or the newly filed action, In order for
Colvin’s subsequent charge for felony domes-
tie battery to be barred pursuant to the
statute, he must show that the charges were
for the same offense and that this Court
oust conclude on the second issue that the
statute bars subsequent felony charges when
the original charge is a misdemeanor.

This Court exercises free review over the
application and construction of statutes, State
v, Reyes, 189 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.8d 1108,
1106 (Ct, App. 2003), Where the language of
a statute is plain and unambiguous, this
Court must give effect to the statute as
written, without engaging in statutory con-
struction, State v. Burnight, 182 Idaho 654,
659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. H’sco-
bar, 184 Idaho 387, 889, 3 P.8d 65, 67 (Ct.
App. 2000), The language of the statute is to
be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning. Burnight, 182 Idaho at 659, 978
P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and.

unambiguous, there is no occasion for the
court to resort to legislative history or rules
of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 184 Ida-
ho at 389, 8 P.8d at 67. When this Court must
engage in statutory construction because an
ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain
the legislative intent and give effect to that
intent, State v. Beard, 185 Idaho 641, 646, 22
P.8d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001), To ascertain
such intent, not only must the literal words
of the statute be examined, but also the
context of those words, the public policy be-
hind the statute, and its legislative history. It
is incumbent upon a court to give an ambigu-
ous statute an interpretation which will not
vender it a nullity. Jd. Constructions of an
ambiguous statute that would lead to an ab-
surd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140
Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.8d 521, 525 (2004),

The first issue is whether the misdemean-
or domestic battery charge is for the “same
offense” as the subsequent felony domestic
battery charge. Colvin asserts the applicable
analysis to determine whether the offenses
are the same is the double jeopardy test set
forth in Blockburger, 284 U.S, 299, 52 S.Ct.
180. The relevant difference between the two
charges is the additional element of traumat-
ie injury, which elevates the crime to a felo-
ny. Because misdemeanor domestic battery
does not require any element that felony
domestic battery does not, it is considered a
lesser included offense under the Blockbur-
ger test and therefore, Colvin would have
been tried for the same offense. The State
asserts the outcome under this test is irrele-
vant because I.C. § 19-3506 is not a double
jeopardy question since no plea had been
entered or jury empaneled. The State also
argues that Colvin’s citations to State v. Bar-
ter, 80 Idaho 552, 885 P.2d 887 (1959), and
State v, Barlow’s, Inc., 111 Idaho 958, 729
P.2d 433 (Ct, App, 1986), supporting the defi-
nition of the same offense are misplaced
since neither definitively states what test
should be applied, Barlow's discusses both
the “same evidence” test, which focuses on
whether the same evidence is required to
support a conviction for each offense, and the
“same transaction” test, which focuses upon
the behavior of the defendant that led to the
prosecution. Barlow’s, 111 Idaho at 960-61,

729 P.2d at 435-36. The State does not explic-
itly set forth which test should be applied,
only that it could not bar charging a higher
offense based on the same acts, which is in
line with the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding
in State v. McKeehan, 49 Idaho 581, 289 P.
998 (1930), which is discussed in more detail
below. Regardless of which test is applied, it
appears that the conclusion is the charges
are for the same offense given that the same
evidence would be required for each, the
same behavior led to Colvin’s prosecution for
each, and the original charge is a lesser
included offense of the second under the
double jeopardy test. However, even if we
determine that Colvin was charged for the
same offense, I.C. § 19-8506 will only act as a
bar based on the outcome of the second
issue,

Hl The parties differ on the second issue
of whether “it” as mentioned in the clause “if
it is a misdemeanor” in LC. § 19-8506, refer-
ences the dismissed charge or the newly filed
charge. The State argues “it” references the
newly filed charge, thus the new charge
would not be barred pursuant to the statute
in this case since the newly filed charge is a
felony. Conversely, Colvin asserts “it” refer-
ences the dismissed charge, thus providing a
bar since the dismissed charge was for a
misdemeanor. Because an ambiguity exists,
this Court must engage in statutory con-
struction; however, the statute was enacted
in 1864 and legislative history is scarce,
thereby making it difficult to ascertain its
intent. Therefore, we must provide a reason-
able interpretation to determine the outcome
in this case by examining the statute’s words
and their context, public policy, and the limit-
ed case law that addresses its application.

To support its position that the outcome is
based on the classification of the newly filed
charge, the State examines the Idaho Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of this statute
(then codified as C.S. § 9181) in McKeehan,
49 Idaho at 584, 289 P. at 994, In that case,
the petitioner was initially charged with the
unlawful sale of two pints of moonshine, an
indictable misdemeanor. Id. at 588, 289 P. at
994, Thereafter, a complaint was filed charg-
ing him with unlawful possession of intoxicat-
ing liquor, based on the same two pints, a

579

simple misdemeanor. Prior to trial, the pros-
ecutor moved to dismiss the new charge
which was granted; thereafter, McKeehan
made a plea for acquittal based on the fact
that the same two pints of moonshine were
the basis for both charges. The lower court
instructed the jury that the dismissed charge
‘was a lesser offense than the charge for
which McKeehan was on trial, and if the
dismissed offense was a lesser offense than
that for which McKeehan was on trial, the
charge would not be barred pursuant to the
statute, The jury found MeKeehan guilty and
he appealed, asserting his plea for acquittal
should have been upheld, Jd, The Idaho Su-
preme Court held that McKeehan’s rights
were not violated and provided the following
reasoning:

The statute provides dismissal is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense,
Nothing more. As we view the law, such a
dismissal does not amount to an acquittal
of defendant of the acts complained of. Jt
is therefore not a bar to the prosecution of
a higher offense, which may necessarily
include the acts complained of as a basis
of the action dismissed, because it does not
amount to an acquittal, or even former
jeopardy.

Id, (Emphasis added.)

This holding is consistent with Stockwell v.
State, 98 Idaho 797, 573 P.2d 116 (1977). In
that case, in order to circumvent a ruling
reducing the charge from second degree
murder to voluntary manslaughter, the pros-
ecutor moved to dismiss the original charge
and subsequently filed a new complaint
charging Stockwell with second degree mur-
der. Id, at 800, 578 P.2d at 119. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that Stockwell’s rights
were not violated by the second filing be-
cause IC, § 19-3506 “specifically provides
that the first dismissal is not a bar to second
prosecution if the offense involved is a felo-
ny.” Stockwell, 98 Idaho at 808, 578 P.2d at
122. Therefore, these two cases support the
conclusion that “it” refers to the newly filed
charge. Also supportive of this conclusion is
this ‘Court's holding that “following an order
of dismissal, 1.C, § 19-8506 bars any subse-
quent misdemeanor prosecution for the same

580

offense.” Barlow’s, 111 Idaho at 960, 729 P.2d
at 485 (emphasis added).

HI On the other hand, Colvin argues the
application of I.C. § 19-3506 is based on the
classification of the original dismissed
charge. He cites several cases for support. In
Barter, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a
second charge for reckless driving was
barred after a previous charge for reckless
driving had been dismissed. Barter, 80 Idaho
at 556, 885 P.2d at 890. Specifically, Colvin
relies on the following statement: “The of-
fense of reckless driving is a misdemeanor
and the dismissal of the action ... would be
a bar to any other prosecution for the same
offense.” Id. The Court reasoned that the
two complaints were for the identical offense
of misdemeanor reckless driving; the only
difference being the location for the offense
charged. The first charge was for reckless
driving in both north and south of Carey and
the second charge was for reckless driving
solely south of Carey. Barter, 80 Idaho at
556, 885 P.2d at 890. In its opinion, the Court
cited to McKeehan, 49 Idaho at 531, 289 P. at
998, and its reasoning supports the conclu-
sion that the Court took into consideration
the fact that both the dismissed and new
charges were misdemeanors. Thus, a misde-
meanor cannot subsequently be charged af-
ter a misdemeanor has been dismissed.

Colvin also cites State v. Hinostroza, 114
Idaho 621, 759 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1988), for
its holding that, “Idaho Code § 19-3506, by
its express terms, bars subsequent prosecu-
tion only if the charge dismissed is a misde-
meanor, It does not prevent the state from
further prosecuting a defendant where, as in
this case, the charge dismissed is a felony.”
Hinostroza, 114 Idaho at 623, 759 P.2d at
914, While it appears the Court is making a
bright line rule that the application of LC.
§ 19-8506 is determined solely by the classifi-
cation of the dismissed charge, thereby “it”
would reference the dismissed charge, one
must consider the fact that in that case both
the dismissed charge ‘and the newly filed
charges were felonies. Hinostroza, 114 Idaho
at 628, 759 P.8d at 914. Taking that fact into
consideration when reading the rule, Hinos-
troza holds that a felony can subsequently be
charged after a felony has been dismissed,

while Barter holds that a misdemeanor can-
not follow a misdemeanor. This is echoed in
State v. Hogan, 182 Idaho 412, 973 P.2d 764
(Ct. App. 1999), which held: “a dismissal of
the misdemeanor would bar a subsequent
prosecution (refiling) of the underlying of-
fense, whereas a felony complaint, dismissed
at the preliminary hearing stage, can be re-
filed.” Id. at 415 n.2, 973 P.2d at 767 n2
(citations omitted). However, neither Barter
nor Hinostroza deal with the situation here
where the dismissed charge and the new
charge are not both misdemeanors, nor are
they both felonies.

TM Although there are no cases directly
on point, based upon the plain language of
the statute, we read the application of LC.
§ 19-3506 to be dependent on the classifica-
tion of the newly filed charge as opposed to
the original dismissed charge. Therefore,
pursuant to the rule, the newly filed charge
is barred if the newly filed charge is a misde-
meanor. Accordingly, a misdemeanor cannot
follow a dismissed misdemeanor, a subse-
quent felony may follow a dismissed felony,
and a subsequent felony may follow a dis-
missed misdemeanor. This is in line with the
outcome of the above cases. Applying this
rule to the facts of the case, the subsequent.
felony domestic battery charge against Col-
vin is not barred and the district court did
not err in denying his motion to dismiss.

i.

CONCLUSION

Idaho Code § 19-8506 does not bar the
subsequent charge against Colvin for felony
domestic battery. Therefore, the district
court’s order denying his motion to dismiss is
affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY

coneur,

an
io)
Pad

401 P.3d 581
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v
Rosa L. GREUB, Defendant-Appellant,
Docket No, 44747
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: August 29, 2017

ris
oO
nN

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent,

HUSKEY, Judge

Rosa L, Greub appeals from the district
court’s judgment of conviction and claims the
district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress, Greub argues the district court
erred in holding that she did not delimit the
scope of her consent to exclude her purse or,
alternatively, that she revoked any previous-
ly given consent to search her purse. We
agree and reverse the district court’s order
denying the motion to suppress, vacate the
judgment of conviction, and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion,

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The district court made the following fac-
tual findings:

Defendant Rosa L. Greub (“Defendant”)
was parked in a parking lot in Pocatello
between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on June
10, 2016, when Officer Christ of the Poca-
tello Police Department drove into the
parking lot to complete an accident report,
Upon entering, Officer Christ saw Defen-
dant’s car in the back corner of the park-
ing lot and saw her stare at him in what he
perceived to be a startled manner. Officer
Christ parked his patrol car perpendicular
to Defendant’s car, either 28 feet or 15
yards away, and did not have his interior
lights flashing. Officer Christ, in uniform,
approached Defendant to ask her what her
business was there. Defendant replied that
she was on her way to work, but stopped
to smoke a cigarette because her employer
did not allow its employees to smoke on
the premises. Officer Christ did not see a
cigarette and saw that Defendant was
wearing a uniform.

Officer Christ asked her [to] provide her
driver’s license, which she could not pro-
vide. Instead Defendant provided an iden-
tification card and confirmed that the ad-
dress on it was current. Officer Christ next
asked if she had “anything illegal,” such as
alcohol, drugs, or prescription medications,
to which Defendant responded that she did
not. Defendant testified at the hearing that
Officer Christ persisted in asking her if
she had anything illegal, and asked “If I
look in your vehicle, will I find anything?”
Officer Christ testified that he asked De-
fendant if he could search her vehicle and
that Defendant said “Sure.” Defendant
also testified that she agreed to Officer
Christ searching her car,

During this questioning, Officer Christ
observed that Defendant appeared nervous
because she averted her eyes from him,
Officer Christ does not recall when he
returned Defendant's identification to her.

After Defendant agreed to the search,
Officer Christ asked Defendant to step out
of the car, and he called a second unit to
assist him because he was the only officer
there and was not sure whether Defendant
had any weapons. Defendant held her
purse as she stepped out of the car, but
Officer Christ told her to leave her purse
in the car for safety purposes, which De-

583

fendant did. Before the second officer, Of-
ficer Buetts, arrived, Officer Christ direct-
ed Defendant to stand in front of his patrol
ear while he began searching the car. By
the center console between the driver’s
seat and the passenger seat, Officer Christ
saw a brown paper bag with the red cap of
what he perceived to be a whiskey bottle
protruding from the top. He noted that the
seal had been broken.

At this time, Officer Christ stopped his
search and talked with Defendant about
the bottle he found in her car because he
wanted backup before proceeding any fur-
ther, He testified that it [was] standard
procedure for a second officer to stay with
the person while the other officer conducts
the search for safety purposes. Because it
was taking Officer Buetts an extended
amount of time to arrive, Officer Christ
decided to continue his search without Offi-
cer Buetts because he did not want to
make Defendant late for work. Officer
Christ searched behind the passenger
area, then searched Defendant's purse in
which he found methamphetamine. After
arresting Defendant, Officer Buetts ar-
rived and Officer Christ searched Defen-
dant’s purse a second time and found a
pipe.

Thereafter, Greub was arrested for posses-
sion of a controlled substance, in violation of
Idaho Code § 87-2782(c)(1), Greub filed a
motion to suppress alleging her detention
was unlawful, and the search of her purse
violated her state and federal constitutional
rights to be free from an unreasonable
search and seizure. In her motion, Greub
argued that when the officer retained her
identification card, she was seized and that
the seizure was unlawful because there was
no basis for the officer to suspect Greub was
engaged in misconduct. Although Greub gave
consent to search her car, her consent was
involuntary because it was given during an
illegal detention. Greub further argued that
even if she had given consent, the officer had
no basis to look in Greub’s purse because the
officer did not demonstrate he was concerned.
for his safety. Finally, Greub argued that
even if she had voluntarily consented to a
search of the car, when she got out of the car

584

holding her purse, she revoked any consent
related to the purse. And, the officer's order
to leave the purse in the car so that it could
subsequently be searched, violated the Idaho
Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Newsom,
182 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100 (1998). As a
result, Greub requested any evidence derived
from the search be suppressed.

The State responded to the motion to sup-
press. Therein, the State argued the deten-
tion was a consensual contact between Greub
and the officer, Greub’s consent to search the
car constituted a valid exception to the war-
rant requirement, and that Greub needed to
do something more than attempt to take her
purse with her as she got out of the car in
order to revoke her previously given consent.
The State noted:

[Greub] did not verbally state she was

revoking consent or impliedly revoke her

consent by both verbal and physical resis-
tance by staying in her car; instead she
told Officer Christ he could search her
vehicle and after making that statement
then exited the vehicle to allow him to
conduct his search.
The State also argued that based on officer
safety, the officer was justified in requiring
Greub to leave the purse in the car, thereby
subjecting it to a search.

The district court denied the motion to
suppress, finding the initial encounter was
consensual and that the original contact did
not constitute a seizure. The district court
further found that Greub voluntarily consent-
ed to the search of her purse because when
the officer asked to search Greub’s car for
illegal drugs, it was reasonable for the officer
to conclude that Greub consented to the
search of her purse because a purse may
contain drugs.

In analyzing whether Greub revoked her
consent to search her purse, the district
court noted no Idaho case law interprets
whether a person’s conduct (as opposed to
statements) constitutes a revocation of con-
sent, After reviewing cases from other juris-
dictions, the district court held that Greub:

did not tell Officer Christ of any limitations

to his search of her car. Furthermore,

holding onto her purse and then replacing
fit] in her car was not clearly inconsistent

with her consent to the search of her car,
nor was it a clear [and] unequivocal act to
prevent Officer Christ from searching her
purse.
The district court concluded: “Therefore, un-
der the circumstances in this case, a reason-
able person would have understood that De-
fendant gave general consent to Officer
Christ to search her car and any containers
inside of it which might contain alcohol or
drugs, and that Defendant did not revoke her
consent.”

Greub thereafter entered a conditional
plea of guilty, reserving her right to appeal
the district court's denial of her motion to
suppress. The district court withheld judg-
ment and placed Greub on probation for four
years. Greub timely appealed following her
conviction,

IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM The standard of review of a sup-
pression motion is bifurcated. When a deci-
sion on a motion to suppress is challenged,
we accept the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence,
but we freely review the application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts as found. State
v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v, Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 998, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct, App. 1999).

i.

ANALYSIS

Hl On appeal, Greub argues the district
court erred in finding she did not delimit or
revoke her consent to search her car and the
containers within the car when she got out of
the car with her purse. The State asserts
that Greub’s conduct of grabbing her purse
after granting consent to search and after
being instructed to step out of the car was

not a clear and unequivocal revocation of her
previously given consent but instead was, at
best, ambiguous.

HM The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Warrantless
searches are presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore, violative of the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288,
290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). The State may
overcome this presumption by demonstrating
that a warrantless search either fell within a
well-recognized exception to the warrant re-
quirement or was otherwise reasonable un-
der the circumstances, Id.

Hs A warrantless search may be ren-
dered reasonable by an individual’s consent,
State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716
P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 181
Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 887, 390 (Ct. App.
1998). In such instances, the State has the
burden of demonstrating consent by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. State v, Kilby,
180 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct.
App. 1997). The State must show that con-
sent was not the result of duress or coercion,
either direct or implied. Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S, 218, 248, 98 S.Ct. 2041, 36
L.Ed.2d 854 (1978); State ». Whiteley, 124
Idaho 261, 264, 858 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct. App.
1998), The voluntariness of an individual’s
consent is evaluated in light of all the cireum-
stances. Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 264, 858 P.2d
at 803. Consent to search may be in the form
of words, gestures, or conduct. State v.
Knapp, 120 Idaho 348, 348, 815 P.2d 1088,
1088 (Ct. App. 1991), Whether consent was
granted voluntarily, or was a product of coer-
cion, is a question of fact to be determined by
all the surrounding circumstances. State v.
Hansen, 188 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.8d 1052,
1057 (2003).

Although Greub contends that both consti-
tutions were violated, she provides no cogent.
reason why Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution should be applied differently
than the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in this case. Therefore,
the Court will rely on judicial interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment in its analysis of
Grueb’s claims. See State v. Schaffer, 188

585

Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App.
1999),

Hs is well settled that when the
basis for a search is consent, the state must
conform its search to the limitations placed
upon the right granted by the consent. State
v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 849, 186 P.8d 696,
705 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Thorpe, 141
Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App.
2004), The standard for measuring the scope
of consent under the Fourth Amendment is
that of objective reasonableness, i.e., “what
would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the offi-
eer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500
US, 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d
297 (1991); Ballow, 145 Idaho at 849, 186 P.38d
at 705, Generally, the scope of a search is
defined by its expressed object. Jimeno, 500
US. at 251, 111 S.Ct, 1801. In Jimeno, the
defendant granted the officer permission to
search the defendant’s vehicle without any
express limitation on the scope of the search,
Id. at 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801. Before the search
took place, the officer informed the defen-
dant that the officer believed the defendant
was carrying narcotics and that the officer
would be looking for narcotics in the vehicle.
Id. During the search, the officer noticed a
folded brown paper bag on the floorboard,
picked up the bag, opened it, and found
cocaine inside. Before trial, the defendant
moved to suppress the cocaine found in the
bag arguing that his consent to search the
vehicle did not extend to the closed paper
bag inside of the vehicle. The trial court
granted the motion to suppress, and the state
appellate courts affirmed. Id. However, the
United States Supreme Court reversed, con-
cluding that it was objectively reasonable for
the officer to conclude that the defendant's
general consent to search his vehicle for nar-
eotics included consent to search any contain-
ers within the vehicle that might contain
narcotics, which was the express object of
the search. Id, at 251-52, 111 S.Ct, 1801.

Idaho has recognized that a person may
have a constitutionally protected privacy in-
terest in a purse. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698,
979 P.2d 100. Newsom testified she had her
purse in her lap when she was asked by
police to exit the vehicle. Id. Newsom began

586

to get out of the vehicle while holding her
purse, but an officer ordered her to leave her
purse in the car, Jd. at 699, 979 P.2d at 101.
When the driver was arrested and officers
searched the vehicle incident to that arrest,
they also searched Newsom’s purse and
found methamphetamine. Newsom filed a
motion to suppress, which the district court
denied, Id. The Idaho Supreme Court re-
versed the district court’s denial of the mo-
tion to suppress, holding that because New-
som was holding her purse at the time she
was ordered out of the vehicle, her purse was
entitled to as much privacy and freedom
from search and seizure as the passenger
herself, Id. at 700, 979 P.2d at 102. Since the
purse was only in the vehicle because the
officer ordered her to leave it there, the
district court erred in finding the purse was
subject to the search incident to arrest. Id.

HE Here, Greub had a privacy inter-
est in both her car and her purse, When she
consented to a search of her vehicle for “any-
thing illegal,” it was objectively reasonable
for the officer to believe he could search any
containers within the vehicle, including
Greub’s purse, which might contain aleohol
or drugs. Nonetheless, consent once given
may also be revoked for “inherent in the
requirement that consent be voluntary is the
vight of the person to withdraw that con-
sent.” State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 648, 646,
839 P.3d 868, 871 (2014). Thus, after a defen-
dant has revoked consent, officers no longer
may act pursuant to that initial voluntary
consent. Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 154, 106 P.8d
at 480. Of course, an individual may renew
his consent after revoking it, Id,

The scope of consent is governed by “ob-
jective” reasonableness, i.¢., “what would the
typical reasonable person have understood
by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?” Jimeno, 600 U.S, at 251, 111 S.Ct.
1801, Idaho appellate courts have typically
analyzed revocation of consent using the
same test that governs whether consent was
voluntary when initially granted. For exam-
ple, in State v, Staatz, 182 Idaho 693, 978
P.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1999), a wife consented to
officers entering her home. Jd. at 694, 978
P.2d 881, Thereafter, she asked the officer to
go outside so she could think about the situa-

tion. Jd. This Court concluded that a “typical
reasonable person would have understood
that [the wife] was specifically requesting
[the officer] to leave her home.” Id. at 696,
978 P.2d at 884, This Court then held that
the wife effectively revoked whatever initial
consent she may have given to the officers to
enter her home. Jd. at 697, 978 P.2d at 885.

Similarly, Thorpe gave consent for officers
to search her residence. Thorpe, 141 Idaho at
168, 106 P.8d at 479. While the officers were
searching the house, Thorpe received a call
from her attorney and advised the officers
that her attorney said the officers needed to
stop searching if they did not have a search
warrant. Id, This Court held that Thorpe’s
statements constituted a revocation of the
previously given consent to search the home
because a “typical reasonable person []
would have understood that Thorpe was ask-
ing the officers to end their search of her
residence even though she was relaying in-
structions from her attorney and did not
state that she was personally making the
request.” Id, at 154, 106 P.8d at 480.

Other jurisdictions have articulated the
same standard a bit differently. Those juris-
dictions also use the objectively reasonable
standard but hold that in order to meet that
standard, there must be unequivocal conduct,
in the form of either an act, statement, or
some combination of the two, that is inconsis-
tent with the consent to the search previous-
ly given, Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d
741, 748 (D.C. 1994), This is because equivo-
eal conduct is not sufficient to reasonably
convey the withdrawal of the previously giv-
en consent and can be construed in many
different ways and therefore, does not pass
muster under an objective reasonableness
test. Id.

HH Although the district court focused
on whether consent could be revoked by an
action as opposed to a statement, this is not
an important distinction. Consent to search
may be in the form of words, gestures, or
conduct, Ballou, 145 Idaho at 846, 186 P.3d
at 702. If consent can be granted by words,
gestures, or conduct, then it can also be
withdrawn by words, gestures, or conduct.
This standard is consistent with the holdings
of other jurisdictions. See Burton, 657 A.2d

741, 748, Thus, we hold that consent can be
revoked by word, gesture, or conduct.

In this case, Greub demonstrated by clear,
unequivocal conduct that she was either lim-
iting or revoking the previously given con-
sent to search her purse, The district court
concluded that Greub’s behavior of holding
onto her purse and then replacing it in the
car was not clearly inconsistent with her
consent to the search of her car, nor was it a
clear and unequivocal act to prevent Officer
Christ from searching her purse. But the
district court did not distinguish between the
two events.

Greub’s action of attempting to remove her
purse as she got out of the car was a limit to
or a revocation of her previously given con-
sent. This act clearly conveyed to the officer
that while Greub consented to the search of
items in the vehicle, the consent did not
extend to the purse she removed from the
vehicle, Removing the purse from the car
necessarily excluded the purse from the
scope of consent Greub had previously given
because it was no longer in the car. Put
differently, taking the purse out of the car
was clearly inconsistent with her consent to
search items in the car. A typical reasonable
person would have understood that by re-
moving her purse, Greub was either limiting
or revoking her consent to search her purse.

HE Although Greub put her purse
back in the car after the officer told her to
leave it in there, acquiescence to a claim of
lawful authority is not voluntary consent,
State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488-89, 163
P.8d 1194, 1200-01 (2007). Here, the officer’s

587

order to leave the purse in the car prevented
Greub from effectuating her constitutional
right to limit or revoke her previously given
consent, Although Greub tried to limit or
yevoke her consent by removing the purse
from the car, the officer told her she could
not do so, After her failed attempt, Greub
had no choice but to follow the officer’s or-
der. As such, Greub’s acquiescence to the
order does not render her earlier attempt to
limit or revoke her consent equivocal. Be-
cause the officer did not honor Greub’s revo-
cation of her consent to search her purse, the
evidence must be suppressed. Wong Sun v.
United States, 871 U.S, 471, 488, 88 S.Ct.
407, 9 L,Ed.2d 441 (1968).

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Greub clearly and unequivocally revoked
her previously given consent as it related to
the search of her purse. We reverse the
district court’s order denying the motion to
suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction,
and remand the case for proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
GUTIERREZ concur.

588

402 P.3d 1041
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on be-
half of itself and all others similarly sit-
uated; and Ed Quinn, on behalf of him-
self and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho
municipality, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 44074-2016

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: September 6, 2017

590

Nathan M. Olsen, Petersen Moss Hall &
Olsen, Idaho Falls, argued for appellants,

Blake G. Hall, Hall Angell & Associates,
LLP, Idaho Falls, argued for respondent.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Bannock County
from a judgment dismissing an action seek-
ing to recover money unlawfully collected by
the City of Pocatello from users of the City’s
water and sewer systems. We vacate the
judgment and remand this case for further
proceedings that are consistent with this
opinion.

L

Factual Background.

The City of Pocatello (“City”) owns and
operates water and sewer systems for City
residents. In 2005, the city government de-
cided that the City should be able to operate
its water and sewer systems at a profit like
private utilities. By law, the City is required
to charge and collect sufficient fees so that
its water and sewer systems “shall be and

always remain self-supporting.” I.C. § 50-
1082. Those fees had to be sufficient to pay
when due all bonds and interest as required
by Idaho Code section 50-1082(a) and “to
provide for all expenses of operation and
maintenance of such works ..., including
reserves therefor,” as required by Idaho
Code section 50-1032(b). The reserves can
also provide for improvements to such sys-
tems, IC. § 50-1033.

The City wanted to obtain a profit in ex-
cess of the amounts necessary for the water
and sewer systems to remain self-supporting.
This profit was paid into the general fund,
City officials believed that the City should be
able to make a profit just as private utilities
are able to do, and so the City added an
additional charge to water and sewer bills.
The City called this additional charge a “rate
of return” or “return on equity,” which was
an increased charge (profit) included in the
bills sent to users of the City’s water and
sewer systems. As explained by the City’s
Chief Financial Officer: “The ‘rate of return’
policy refers to city-owned public utilities (.e,
water, sewer, etc.) making a transfer to the
general fund. These are businesses operated
by the public that could and do operate as
for-profit private enterprises in other com-
munities.” This charge was in addition to the
statutorily permitted charges to cover the
costs of operation, maintenance, replacement
and depreciation, including creating and
maintaining reserves for such expenses. The
City also adopted a policy called “PILOT,”
which stood for payment in lieu of taxes.
Under this scheme, the city-owned water and
sewer departments were required to pay
“property taxes” to the City as if they were
private entities, and the departments then
passed this cost on to their customers. The
“property taxes” were then paid into the
City’s general fund. As explained by the
City’s Chief Financial Officer in 2012: “For
the past two years, the rates have been re-
described as a franchise fee (% of gross
revenues) and a payment-in-lieu-of-taxes (PI-
LOT) to make it directly comparable to pri-
vate utilities operating in the community
such as Intermountain Gas. The PILOT is
calculated on the prior year city property tax
levy rate multiplied by the estimated market

591

value per the most recent financial plan pre-
pared by an outside consulting engineer.”

By letter dated December 26, 2006, Poca-
tello Mayor Chase asked the Attorney Gen-
eral about the City’s policy of imposing the
additional charge for a rate of return, In the
letter, the Mayor stated:

Charging a rate of return is commonly
used by public utilities and private sector
companies, and we feel it is a fairer way to
generate revenue for the City. As I am
sure you are well aware, relying on proper-
ty taxes for revenue will not work in Poca-
tello due to the number of property tax
exemptions given by the State, Therefore,
it has been my practice as Mayor to move
our city away from property taxes and to a
fee based system. The rate of return is an
important part of this plan.

By letter dated February 6, 2007, a Depu-
ty Attorney General responded to Mayor
Chase’s letter. In that letter, the Deputy
wrote with respect to the City’s rate-of-re-
turn charge: “The overall rate of return for
the same utilities [Idaho’s three largest elec-
tric utilities] range [sic] between 8.1% and
9.25%. According to the Robinson letter, the
city’s ‘rate of return’ is equal to 7% and
generates approximately $3.54 million in rev-
enues.” The letter included an analysis of
applicable law, and it concluded that analysis
by stating: “In this instance, the revenue
from the rate of return component is dedicat-
ed to the city’s general fund and is utilized as
a property tax substitute. Thus, it appears
this practice is contrary to Loomis [v. City of
Hailey, 119 Idaho 484, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991)]
and therefore not appropriate.”

The profit earned by the City from the
return-on-equity charge and PILOT totaled
about $4 million during fiscal years 2006
through 2011. The City apparently stopped
receiving the return-on-equity charge in fis-
cal year 2012, and it stopped receiving the
PILOT funds during fiseal year 2014,

On December 9, 2011, the Building Con-
tractors Association of Southeast Idaho filed
an action against the City challenging the
PILOT, and the district court ultimately held
that it was an unlawful charge. On November
15, 2018, the district court entered a judg-
ment enjoining the City “from using the PI-

592

LOT fee as part of the calculation of user
and/or connection fees charged to the pub-
lic.” When the City discontinued the PILOT
component in the bills sent to users of the
City water and sewer systems, their monthly
bills decreased by about ten percent.

This shows that the City was operating its
water and sewer “primarily as a source of
revenue to the city,” in violation of Idaho
Code section 50-1028, The City made the
decision that its water and sewer depart-
ments should be operated as for-profit corpo-
rations in order to raise revenues for the
City’s general fund. The ten percent increase
in monthly bills means that the City was
earning a profit of ten percent above the
amount that was necessary to ensure that its
water and sewer systems would always re-
main self-supporting. That profit went into
the general fund, not into any reserves for
the maintenance and improvement of the wa-
ter and sewer systems. Indeed, the rationale
for the “rate of return” and the PILOT was
the profit that the City would earn if its
water and sewer systems were for-profit en-
tities.

On April 15, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed this
action seeking a refund of the PILOT sums
that they had paid. They also sought class
certification for those who had been charged
and paid the illegal sum. On cross-motions
for summary judgment, the district court
held that the Plaintiffs’ state law claims were
barred under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, that
there was no unconstitutional taking under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, that the decision in
the Building Contractors case would not be
applied retroactively, and that the Plaintiffs’
motion for class certification was denied. The
court entered a judgment dismissing the
Plaintiffs’ complaint, and they timely appeal-
ed.

1, Ironically, over 100 years ago, the City sued the
owner of the water system that supplied water to
the City, contending that the rates being charged
were “not fair, equitable, or reasonable” and that
the earnings of the water system should not
exceed “five per cent above reasonable expenses
upon the value of said water system.” City of
Pocatello v. Murray, 21 Idaho 180, 188, 191, 120
P. 812, 815 (1912). The City sought a writ of
mandate requiring the owner of the water system

HN When reviewing on appeal the
granting of a motion for summary judgment,
we apply the same standard used by the trial
court in ruling on the motion. Infanger v.
City of Salmon, 187 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.38d
1100, 1101-02 (2002). We construe all disput-
ed facts, and draw all reasonable inferences
from the record, in favor of the non-moving
party. Id. at 47, 44 P.8d at 1102. Summary
judgment is appropriate only if the evidence
in the record and any admissions show that
there is no genuine issue of any material fact
regarding the issues raised in the pleadings
and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Jd. If the
evidence reveals no disputed issues of mate-
rial fact, then only a question of law remains,
over which this Court exercises free review.
Id. In this case, there is no dispute regarding
the material facts.

IL

Did the District Court Err in Holding that
Recovery of the PILOT Was Barred by
Idaho Code Section 6-904A?

Idaho Code section 6-904A states, insofar
as is relevant:

A governmental entity and its employees
while acting within the course and scope of
their employment and without malice or
criminal intent and without reckless, willful
and wanton conduct as defined in section
6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for
any claim which:

1, Arises out of the assessment or col-
lection of any tax or fee.

The district court held that all of the Plain-
tiffs’ state-law claims were barred because
their “state law claims—unconstitutional tak-
ing, unjust enrichment, and equitable estop-
pel/equitable tolling—arise out of the collec-
tion of the PILOT component, which was

to appoint two commissioners in conformity with
Idaho Revised Codes section 2839 (1908). Id. at
188, 120 P. at 814. Under the statute, the town
and the owner of the water system each selected
two commissioners, who then selected a fifth
commissioner, and the majority of the commis-
sioners then determined the water rates to apply
for the next three years. This Court ordered that
the writ issue. Id. at 211, 120 P. at 822-23.

found to be a tax.” In so holding, the district
court erred.

HE “A municipality may collect fees
considered incidental to regulation and enact-
ed pursuant to the municipality’s police pow-
ers.” Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City
of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 800, 804-05, 264 P.3d
907, 911-12 (2011). Pursuant to its proprie-
tary function, municipalities may also con-
struct and maintain public works, Viking
Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irv. Dist., 149
Idaho 187, 198, 283 P.38d 118, 124 (2010), and
charge a fee “for a direct public service
rendered to the particular consumer,” Brew-
ster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 505,
768 P.2d 765, 768 (1988). Finally, a municipal-
ity may assess and collect taxes if authorized
by the legislature, Id. at 504, 768 P.2d at 767;
Idaho Const. art, VII, § 2.

HM For a fee to be considered inciden-
tal to regulation, “funds generated thereby
must bear some reasonable relationship to
the cost of enforcing the regulation.” Brew-
ster, 115 at 504, 768 P.2d at 767. “Such
municipal fees must be rationally related to
the cost of enforcing the regulation and can-
not be assessed purely as a revenue-generat-
ing scheme.” Potts Constr. Co. v. N. Koote-
nai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 681, 116 P.38d
8, 11 (2005). The power to impose a regulato-
ry fee “may not be resorted to as a shield or
subterfuge, under which to enact and enforce
a revenue-raising ordinance or statute.” Fos-
ter’s, Inc. v. Boise City, 68 Idaho 201, 218-
19, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941). If the regulatory
fee does not bear a reasonable relationship to
the cost of enforcing a regulation, it is con-
sidered as being a tax. Brewster, 115 at 504—
05, 768 P.2d at 767-68.

HM. For a fee to be for water and
sewer services provided by the municipality
that is subject to the Revenue Bond Act, as
in this case, “the services of such works shall
be furnished at the lowest possible cost.” IC.
§ 50-1028. “[I]f fees are collected under the
disguise of the [Revenue Bond] Act and allo-
cated and spent otherwise, then the fees are
primarily revenue raising and will be con-
strued as taxes.” Loomis v. City of Hailey,
119 Idaho 434, 439, 807 P.2d 1272, 1277
(1991). “In a general sense a fee is a charge

593

for a direct public service rendered to the
particular consumer, while a tax is a foreed
contribution by the publie at large to meet
public needs.” Brewster, 115 at 505, 768 P.2d
at 768.

HH In both of the above instances, the
fee is considered to be a tax because its
purpose is primarily to raise revenue. “[I]f
the fee or charge is imposed primarily for
revenue raising purposes, it is in essence a
tax and can only be upheld under the power
of taxation.” Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v.
City of Coeur d’Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 748,
890 P.2d 326, 329 (1995). A fee or charge
primarily for raising revenue is “in essence a
tax,” id. (emphasis added); “a disguised tax,”
Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist., 151 Idaho at 801,
264 P.3d at 912 (emphasis added); or it “oper-
ates as general tax on the public,” Potts
Constr. Co,, 141 Idaho at 681, 116 P.8d at 11
(emphasis added). That classification is part
of the analysis in determining whether the
fee or charge is lawful. If its purpose is
primarily to raise revenue, it is not a regula-
tory fee or fee for services, but is character-
ized as a tax. It would then only be valid if
the city was authorized to impose such a tax,
See State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 718, 722, 218 P.
358, 361 (1923) overruled on other grounds
by, Greater Boise Auditoriwm Dist. v. Royal
Inn of Boise, 106 Idaho 884, 888, 684 P.2d
286, 290 (1984) (“A license that is imposed for
revenue is not a police regulation, but a tax,
and can only be upheld under the power of
taxation.”); Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115
Idaho 502, 508, 768 P.2d 765, 766 (1988)
(There is no argument here that our legisla-
ture has authorized the imposition of such a
tax if indeed it is denominated a tax.”).

Hs However, although fees or
charges that are imposed primarily to raise
revenues may be considered as being a tax or
in essence a tax, such fees or charges are not
actually taxes, because the legislature must
invest in any county, city, town, or other
municipal corporation “the power to assess
and collect taxes for all purposes of such
corporation.” Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6.
“{TJhe grant of taxing power to cities is not
self-executing or unlimited. It is limited by
what taxing power the legislature authorizes
in its implementing legislation.” Brewster,

594

115 Idaho at 508, 768 P.2d at 766. “A city or
village cannot, in the exercise of its police
power, levy taxes.” Nelson, 36 Idaho at 722,
218 P. at 361, If the legislature has not
granted a city the power to impose a fee or
charge as a tax, then such fee or charge is
not actually a tax, There is no contention that
the legislature authorized the City to impose
a tax like the charges that it added to the
bills of users of the City’s water and sewer
systems. Because those charges were not an
authorized tax, they were not a tax as that
term is used in Idaho Code section 6-904A,

HH In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of
Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.8d 815 (2004), we
held that the fee versus tax analysis does not
apply when a city does not have the authority
to impose either the fee or a tax. In BHA
Investments, an entity referred to as “Split-
ting Kings” leased a liquor license and
agreed in the lease agreement to pay the
liquor license transfer fee charged by the
City of Boise. Jd, at 171, 108 P.8d at 318.
Later, Splitting Kings and its lessor’s succes-
sor, “Bravo,” sued Boise to recover damages
for wrongful taking and unjust enrichment
based upon the exaction of the transfer fee.
Id. The district court granted summary judg-
ment to Boise on three grounds, one of which
was that “the fee charged by the City was a
disguised tax and a party cannot obtain reim-
bursement of a tax unless it is paid ‘under
protest” ” Id. We held that the analysis of
whether the money collected was an unrea-
sonable fee or a disguised tax had no bearing
where the city did not have the authority to
impose either the fee or a tax. We stated:

We have also held that a city’s imposition

of a purported fee that does not bear a

reasonable relationship to services to be

provided by the city is in reality the impo-
sition of a tax.....

The purpose of the analysis regarding
excessive fees is to prevent a city from
imposing an illegal tax by masquerading
it as a fee. That analysis does not apply,
however, where the city does not have the
authority to impose either the tax or the
fee. If it has no authority to impose any fee
at all, it does not matter whether the fee
imposed bears a reasonable relationship to
the services provided. It is illegal regard-

Jess of the amount of the fee. In this case,
the City did not have the authority to
impose either a fee for the transfer of a
liquor license or a tax on the transfer of a
liquor license. Therefore, the analysis of
whether liquor license transfer fee was in
reality a disguised tax does not apply.
Id, at 176, 108 P.8d at 323 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). We also held that where
Boise “denominated the sum owing as a ‘fee,’
the payment-of-tax-under-protest require-
ment does not apply.” Id. In this case, the
City did not have the authority to add either
the fee (PILOT) or a tax to the bills of those
who used City the water or sewer systems.
The City also did not denominate the addi-
tional charges as taxes. In fact, it raised the
rates for water and sewer service so that it
would not have to take the politically unpopu-
lar route of raising property taxes.

TN“ ‘Whenever an act of the Legisla-
ture can be so construed and applied as to
avoid conflict with the Constitution and give
it the force of law, such construction will be
adopted by the courts.’” Grice v. Clearwater
Timber Co., 20 Idaho 70, 77, 117 P. 112, 114
(1911). As quoted above, Idaho Code section
6-904A provides that a governmental entity is
not liable for a claim that arises out of the
assessment or collection of a tax unless the
governmental entity was acting with “malice
or criminal intent and with[ ] reckless, willful
and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-
904C.” The Idaho Constitution provides,
“Private property may be taken for public
use, but not until a just compensation, to be
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law,
shall be paid therefor.” Idaho Const. art. I,
§ 14, To hold that an unlawful fee or charge
is a “tax” as that term is used in section 6-
904C would create a conflict between the
statute and the Constitution. A statute can-
not limit the right to recover for the taking
of property in violation of the Constitution,

1.

Did the District Court Err in Holding that
Money Is Not Property under the Tak-
ings Clause of the Constitution?

The Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint
that the unlawful additional charge for water

and sewer service was a taking under the
Idaho and United States Constitutions. In
granting summary. judgment, the district
court held that the imposition of the PILOT
was not a compensable taking. It appeared to
rely upon three grounds for that decision: (1)
“Some courts have made that determination
on the grounds that money is not ‘property’
within the meaning of the Takings Clause,”
and (2) “Other courts ‘have concluded that a
governmental-imposed obligations to pay
money are not the sort of governmental ac-
tions subject to a takings analysis.’” (Cita-
tions omitted.) Both of these rationales are
incorrect,

HM First, it is clear that money is prop-
erty within the meaning of the takings
clause. The Supreme Court of the United
States so held in Webb’s Fabulous Pharma-
cies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S, 155, 101 8.Ct.
446, 66 L.Hd.2d 358 (1980). In that case, the
purchaser of the assets of a corporation,
whose debts appeared greater than the pur-
chase price, filed an interpleader action inter-
pleading as defendants the corporation and
its creditors and paid into court the amount.
of the purchase price. Id, at 156-57, 101 8.Ct,
446. Pursuant to a statute, the court clerk
deducted a fee for services rendered for re-
ceiving the money into the registry of the
court and deposited the balance of the money
into an interest bearing account. Id. at 157,
101 S.Ct. 446, About a year later, a receiver
‘was appointed for the corporation, and the
principal balance in the account was paid to
the receiver, but the interest earned was
retained by the clerk pursuant to another
statute which declared that the interest
earned was public money. Jd. at 158, 101
S.Ct. 446, The receiver obtained a court or-
der holding that the clerk was not entitled to
the interest earned, and on appeal the Su-
preme Court of Florida held “that a fund so
deposited is ‘considered “public money”’
from the date of deposit until it leaves the
account; that ‘the statute takes only what it
creates’; and that ‘[t]here is no unconstitu-
tional taking because interest earned on the
clerk of the cireuit court’s registry account is
not private property.” Jd. at 158-59, 101
S.Ct. 446, The United States Supreme Court
reversed, because “[i]t is obvious that the
interest was not a fee for services” because

595

the sum deducted by the clerk was for ser-
vices rendered and “the exaction is a forced
contribution to general governmental reve-
nues, and it is not reasonably related to the
eosts of using the courts.” Id, at 162-168, 101
S.Ct. 446. Therefore; “the interest earned on
the interpleader fund while it was in the
registry of the court was a taking violative of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,” Jd,
at 164-65, 101 S.Ct. 446. Likewise, in BHA
Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho
168, 172, 108 P.38d 315, 819 (2004), we held,
“Money is clearly property that may not be
taken for public use without the payment of
just compensation.” Thus, the district court
erred in holding-that money is not property
under the Takings Clause.

Second, the cases cited by the district
court regarding a governmental-imposed ob-
ligation to pay money are inapposite. The
issue in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United
States, 46 Fed.Cl. 29 (2000) affd, 271 F.3d
1827 (Fed. Cir. 2001), was the constitutionali-
ty of legislation “which imposes special mon-
etary assessments on domestic utilities for
the remediation of environmentally contami-
nated uranium processing facilities owned by
the United States,” Id. at 1829, The issue in
Branch v. United States, 69 F.8d 1571, 1576-
‘TT (Fed.Cir, 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S, 810,
117 S.Ct. 55, 186 L.Ed2d 18 (1996), was
whether a statute changing corporate liabili-
ty for acts of sister corporations constituted a
taking. The statute at issue provided “that
when a bank failure causes a loss to the
federal Bank Insurance Fund, sister banks
that are owned by the same bank holding
company may be held liable for the loss.” Id.
at 1578. In Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit
Co. v, F.D.LC., 62 F.8d 449 (2d Cir. 1995),
there was no taking where a bank voluntarily
subjected itself to a known obligation created
by a failure of a commonly owned bank, Id.
at 455. In Commercial Builders of Northern
California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d
872 (Oth Cir, 1991), the court held that an
ordinance that “conditions certain types of
nonresidential building permits upon the pay-
ment of a fee intended to offset the burdens
on the city caused by low-income workers
who move there to fill jobs created by the
project in question” does not constitute an

596 Le

unconstitutional taking where “the city had
adequately supported its contribution re-
quirement by showing a sufficient nexus be-
tween nonresidential development and the
demand for low-income housing.” Id. at 878.
In United States Shoe Corp. v. United States,
296 F.8d 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2002), a harbor tax
had been held unconstitutional as a violation
of the Export Clause of the Constitution,
which states, “No Tax or Duty shall be laid
on Articles exported from any State.” On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the government attempted to uphold the tax
as a user fee, but the Court held that “the
tax, which is imposed on an ad valorem basis,
is not a fair approximation of services, facili-
ties, or benefits furnished to the exporters,
and therefore does not qualify as a permissi-
ble user fee.” United States v. U.S. Shoe
Corp., 523 U.S. 860, 363, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 140
L.Ed.2d 458 (1998). The Shoe Corporation
received a refund of the tax, and the Court of
International Trade awarded it interest on
the refund. 296 F.3d at 1381. The govern-
ment appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
addressed the Shoe Corporation’s arguments
in support of the award of interest, one of
which was that the harbor tax was a taking
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The
eourt held it was not a taking because the
amount of the tax was not excessive when
compared to the exporter’s use of port ser-
vices. “Because ‘the Takings Clause is less
restrictive than the Export Clause, and the
tax [of 0,125 percent] would be sustained if it
‘fairly mateh[ed] the exporters’ use of port
services and facilities,’ we conclude that the
tax did not rise to the level of a taking.” Id.
at 1883-84, None of these cases involved a
government entity inflating its user fees to
the point that they are clearly excessive
when compared to the services provided in
order to raise revenue for the entity’s gener-
al fund,

More instructive is the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 110 S.Ct.
387, 107 L.Hd.2d 290 (1989), After the sei-
gure of the United States Embassy in Teh-
ran on November 4, 1979, the governments
of the United States and Iran reached ac-
cords to provide a means for resolving
claims by American companies against Iran.

Id. at 55, 110 S.Ct. 387. Pursuant to the
agreement, a tribunal was created to hear
the claims, and litigation by Americans
against Iran was precluded in American
courts. Id, at 55-56, 110 S.Ct, 887. Sperry
Corporation and Sperry World Trade, Inc,
(hereinafter “Sperry”), had filed suit against
Iran prior to the creation of the tribunal, but
it was prohibited from pursuing that claim.
Id, at 56, 110 S.Ct. 387. Sperry therefore
filed its claim with the tribunal, and Sperry
and Iran reached an agreement requiring
Ivan to pay Sperry $2.8 million. Jd. They
submitted the claim to the tribunal, and,
upon the tribunal granting the claim, it be-
came final and binding and enforceable in
the courts of any nation in accordance with
that nation’s laws. Id. at 56-57, 110 S.Ct.
887. That enabled Sperry to have its daim
paid from $1 billion in Iranian assets that
had been placed in a Security Account in the
Bank of England for the payment of those
awards, Id. at 57, 110 S.Ct. 887. Sperry’s
award was paid through the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, and Congress en-
acted legislation (“Section 502”) requiring
the bank to deduct 14% from Sperry’s
award “as reimbursement to the United
States Government for expenses incurred in
connection with the arbitration of claims of
United States claimants against Iran before
[the] Tribunal and the maintenance of the
Security Account established pursuant to the
[Accords].” Id. at 58, 110 S.Ct. 887, Sperry
sued, contending that the deduction consti-
tuted, among other things, the taking of
property by the government without just
compensation. Id. The court of claims reject-
ed Sperry’s claim, but the Federal Circuit
reversed, holding that the deduction was an
unconstitutional taking of Sperry’s private
property without just compensation, and the
Government appealed. Id.

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
‘was required to show that the amount of the
deduction was not a user fee to reimburse
the United States Government for expenses
it incurred in connection with the arbitration
of the claims against Iran in order to prove it
was a taking. The Court stated:

Section 502(a) specifically states that the
deductions are made as “reimbursement to

the United States Government for ex-
penses incurred in connection with the ar-
bitration of claims of United States claim-
ants against Iran before [the] Tribunal and
the maintenance of the Security Ac-
count....” Given especially this specific
declaration by Congress that the deduc-
tions are intended to reimburse costs in-
curred by the United States, the burden
must lie with Sperry to demonstrate that.
the reality of § 502 belies its express lan-
guage before we conclude that the deduc-
tions are actually takings.

Id. at 60, 110 8.Ct. 887.

The Court then held that the amount de-
ducted was not so clearly excessive as to
show that it was not a user fee. “This Court
has never held that the amount of a user fee
must be precisely calibrated to the use that a
party makes of Government services.... All
that we have required is that the user fee be
a fair approximation of the cost of benefits
supplied.’” Jd. The Court stated that “[tJhe
deductions authorized by § 502 are not so
clearly excessive as to belie their purported
character as user fees..... [Flor we are
convinced that on the facts of this case, 1
% % does not qualify as a ‘taking’ by any
standard of excessiveness.” Id. at 62, 110
S.Ct. 387. The Court concluded that the ben-
efits available to Sperry through the tribunal
were “sufficient benefits to justify the impo-
sition of a reasonable user fee.” Id. at 64, 110
S.Ct. 387.

In rejecting the claim that the deduction
constituted a taking, the Court stated that “a
reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is
imposed for the reimbursement of the cost of
government services.” Jd. at 68, 110 S.Ct.
387. The Court did not hold that there was
no taking because money is not subject to the
Takings Clause, nor did it hold that a user
fee cannot be subject to the Takings Clause.
Rather, the Court held that a reasonable
user fee is not a taking if it was to reimburse
the cost of government services, That proviso
would be meaningless, as would the Court’s
discussion about the reasonableness of the
fee in relation to the services provided, un-
less the converse was also true—a “user fee”
is a taking if it is not a reasonable fee

597

imposed for the reimbursement of the costs
of government services,

The PILOT was not a reasonable user fee
to reimburse the City for the cost of govern-
ment services. It was an exaction that was
designed to be in addition to what would be a
reasonable charge for the water and sewer
systems to remain self-supporting. In the
Building Contractors case, the City conceded.
that fact.

In denying the Plaintiffs’ motion for recon-
sideration in this case, the district court also
held that the PILOT was not a taking be-
cause: “In this case the City clearly had the
authority to charge the fees, but to the ex-
tent it used those fees for improper pur-
poses, that portion of the fee was a disguised
tax and could not be collected. This is not a
constitutional ‘taking’ but an improper meth-
od of raising revenue.” The district court did
not cite any authority for this proposition. If .
an “improper method of raising revenue”
cannot constitute a taking, then money can-
not be subject to the Takings Clause because
all money received by the government is
revenue. Revenue is simply “the income of a
government from taxation, excise duties, cus-
toms, or other sources, appropriated to the
payment of the publie expenses.” http://www.
dictionary.com/browse/revenue?s=t. (ac-
cessed July 17, 2017).

Iv.

Did the District Court Err in Holding that
Its Conclusion that the PILOT Was
Unlawful Would Not Be Applied to
this Case?

HM The district court held that it would
not apply its decision in the Building Con-
tractors case to this case, and so it dismissed
the Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. In so
holding, the court applied this Court’s analy-
sis in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of
Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.8d 315 (2004)
(BHA II). In a prior appeal (BHA J), we had.
held that a liquor license transfer fee im-
posed by the City of Boise was not author-
ized by the legislature. Jd. at 170, 108 P.8d at
317. After our opinion in BHA J, the case of
Bravo Entertainment, L.L.C. v. City of Boise
was brought seeking to recover the liquor
license transfer fee paid by a party in that

598

case, and the trial court held that our opinion
in BHA I should not apply retroactively to
the Bravo Entertainment case.

On appeal, we did not address whether the
district court abused its discretion in refusing
to apply our BHA I opinion to the Bravo
Entertainment case. Rather, we stated:

The usual rule is that decisions of this

Court apply retroactively to all past and

pending cases. For policy reasons, howev-

er, this Court has discretion to limit the
retroactive application of a particular deci-
sion. We may hold that it does not apply
even to the case in which the decision was
announced; or that it applies only to that,
ease and not to other past or pending
cases; or that it applies to both that case
and pending cases, but not to past cases,
When deciding whether to limit the retro-
active application of a decision, we weigh
three factors: (1) the purpose of the deci-
sion; (2) the reliance upon the prior law;
and (8) the effect upon the administration
of justice if the decision is applied retroac-
tively. We balance the first factor against
the other two to determine whether to
limit the retroactive application of the deci-
sion.
Id, at 178, 108 P.8d at 320 (emphases add-
ed)(Citations omitted). In the above-quoted
statement from BHA I, we made it clear that
it is this Court sitting in its appellate capaci-
ty that has discretion to limit the retroactive
application of a particular decision, That is
exactly what happened in BHA II, We did
not even address the trial court’s determina-
tion or rationale for holding that BHA I
would not be applied retroactively. We ad-
dressed the three factors, weighed them, and
concluded that the retroactive application of
our decision in BHA I should not be limited,
Id, We have not held that a trial court has
discretion to refuse to apply a decision it
made on an issue in one case to another case
involving the same issue. Therefore, the dis-
trict court erred in holding that it would not
apply its decision in the Building Contrac-
tors case to this case,

v.

Did the District Court Err in Failing
to Consider Equitable Remedies?
The Plaintiffs contend that the
district court erred in failing to consider

equitable remedies. Since the district court
granted the City’s motion for summary judg-
ment on all claims, the court did not consider
any remedies, “This Court does not review
an alleged error on appeal unless the record
discloses an adverse ruling forming the basis
for the assignment of error.” Ada Cnty.
Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments,
LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d 828, 831
(2008). Therefore, we will not consider this
issue,

Hs The Plaintiffs also assert that
they attempted to amend their complaint,
which motion the district court denied. The
district court denied the motion on various
grounds—‘undue delay, timeliness, court-
imposed deadlines, substantial work being
done, prejudice, and validity of the claim.”
The Plaintiffs do not address any of those
grounds on appeal, much less all of them.
Therefore, to the extent that the Plaintiffs
are contending that the court erred in de-
nying their motion to amend, we will not
address that issue. “We will not consider
assignments of error not supported by ar-
gument and authority in the opening brief.”
Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 180
P.8d 1087, 1097 (2006).

VI

Is the City Entitled to an Award
of Attorney Fees on Appeal?

The City seeks an award of attorney fees
on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sections 6-
918A and 12-117. Idaho Code section 6-918A
provides:

At the time and in the manner provided
for fixing costs in civil actions, and at the
discretion of the trial court, appropriate
and reasonable attorney fees may be
awarded to the claimant, the governmental
entity or the employee of such governmen-
tal entity, as costs, in actions under this
act, upon petition therefor and a showing,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the
party against whom or which such award is
sought was guilty of bad faith in the com-
mencement, conduct, maintenance or de-

fense of the action..... The right to re-
cover attorney fees in legal actions for
money damages that come within the pur-
view of this act shall be governed exclu-
sively by the provisions of this act and not
by any other statute or rule of court, ex-
cept as may be hereafter expressly and
specifically provided or authorized by duly
enacted statute of the state of Idaho.

The statute provides that if, “upon a show-
ing, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the party against whom or which such award
is sought was guilty of bad faith in the
commencement, conduct, maintenance or de-
fense of the action,” reasonable attorney fees
may be awarded as costs “at the discretion of
the trial court.” In Minich v. Gem State
Developers, Inc, 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078
(1979), this Court held that the word “judge”
in Idaho Code section 12-121 “is simply an
officer or member of a tribunal assembled
under authority of law for the administration
of justice, we conclude that the singular
§udge’ should also be construed to mean the
plural judges’ or ‘justices,’” thereby autho-
rizing the award of attorney fees on appeal
under that statute. Jd, at 918, 591 P.2d at
1085. We also stated that “had the legislature
intended to limit the statutory authority to
any particular level of courts within the judi-
cial system, it could easily and clearly have
done so.” Id.

HH Idaho Code section 6-918A clearly
states that upon the proper showing, attor-
ney fees may be awarded under that statute
“at the discretion of the trial court.” The
words “trial court” could not reasonably be
construed to include an appellate court.
Therefore, Idaho Code section 6-918A does
not provide for the awarding of attorney fees
on appeal.

This Court has never previously addressed
the meaning of the words “trial court” in
section 6-918A, We have previously denied
requests for an award of attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to the statute because there
was no showing that the party against whom
attorney fees was sought was “guilty of bad
faith in the commencement, conduct, mainte-
nance or defense of the action.” We have not,
however, previously addressed the meaning
of the words “trial court” in the statute, nor

599

have we even quoted that part of the statute
that includes those words.” CNW, LLC v
New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 161 Idaho 89,
98 n.1, 383 P.3d 1259, 1268 n.1 (2016); Henne-
Ser v. Blaine Cnty. Sch, Dist., 158 Idaho 242,
261-62, 346 P.8d-259, 278-79 (2015); Block v.
City of Lewiston, 156 Idaho 484, 490, 328
P.8d 464, 470 (2014); Hoffer v. City of Boise,
151 Idaho 400, 403, 257 P.8d 1226, 1229
(2011); Renzo v. Idaho State Dep't of Agr,
149 Idaho 777, 781, 241 P.8d 950, 954 (2010);
Cordova v, Bonneville Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist,
No. 98, 144 Idaho 687, 642-48, 167 P.8d 774,
779-80 (2007); Dorea Enterprises, Inc. v
City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 426, 163
P.8d 211, 215 (2007); Nation v. State, Dep't of
Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.8d 958,
970 (2007); O'Guin v. Bingham Cnty. 142
Idaho 49, 55-56, 122° P.3d 308, 314-15 (2005);
Jensen v, State, 189 Idaho 57, 64-65, 72 P.8d
897, 904-05 (2008); Tomich v. City of Pocatel-
lo, 127 Idaho 894, 400, 901 P.2d 501, 507
(19965).

In Block, we did cite Beehler v. Fremont
Cownty, 145 Idaho 656, 182 P.8d 718 (Ct,
App. 2008), but. it was for the proposition,
“(holding I.C, § 12-117 did not provide an
exception after noting it has held that ‘1.C.
§ 6-918A governed to the exclusion of all
other standards when the case was brought
under the ITCA’).” 156 Idaho at 490, 328
P.83d at 470. In Beehler, the issue was wheth-
er the requirement in Idaho Code section 6-
610 of posting a bond before filing an action
against any law enforcement officer that
arises in the course of performance of the
officer’s duty was superseded by the later
enactment of Idaho Code section 6-918A. 145
Idaho at 658, 182 P.3d at 715. The appellant
contended that’ section 6-918A superseded
section 6-610 because both statutes address
attorney fees, Id. at 659, 182 P.8d at 716. The
Court of Appeals held that “[tJhere is no
indication that the legislature intended 1.C.
§ 6-918A to terminate the applicability of
LC. § 6-610 in tort claims.” Id.

With respect to the respondents’ request
for an award of attorney fees on appeal in
Beehler, the Court of Appeals held that they
had not shown by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the appellants had proceeded in
bad faith. Id. at 661, 182 P.8d at 718, The

600

Court of Appeals did state, “Section 6-918A.
is the exclusive provision for awarding attor-
ney fees under the ITCA, including claims on
appeal.” Id. at 661, 182 P.3d at 718. However,
the Court of Appeals did not quote or consid-
er that portion of the statute stating that
attorney fees may be awarded “at the discre-
tion of the trial court,” Rather, it cited as
authority for that statement Nation v. State,
144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.8d 953, 970 (2007);
Jensen v. State, 189 Idaho 57, 64-65, 72 P.38d
897, 904-05 (2003); and Packard v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 171, 104 Idaho 604, 614, 661 P.2d
770, 780 (Ct.App.1983). In Nation and Jen-
sen, we had simply denied requests to award
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code section 6-918A on the ground that
there was no showing that the appeal had
been brought in bad faith. Nation, 144 Idaho
at 194, 158 P.8d at 970; Jensen, 139 Idaho at
64-65, 72 P.8d at 904-05. In those cases we
did not quote or discuss that part of section
6-918A that referred to the “trial court.” In
Packard, the Court of Appeals held: “Asswm-
ing, without deciding, that neither party
would be entitled to recover attorney fees on
appeal unless the opposing party had exhibit-
ed ‘bad faith’ within the meaning of I.C. § 6-
918A, we believe no award could be made.
This appeal has been free of bad faith.” 104
Idaho at 614, 661 P.2d at 780, (Emphasis
added). We have never previously addressed
the issue of the scope of section 6-918A in
light of the words “trial court,” not only
regarding whether the statute permitted the
award of attorney fees on appeal, but also
with respect to what impact, if any, those
words would have on the exclusivity provi-
sion in the statute.

HE The City also seeks an award of
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section
12-121. “In order to be eligible for an award
of attorney fees under Idaho Code section
12-121, the party must be the prevailing par-
ty on appeal.” Armand v. Opportunity
Mgmt. Co., Inc., 155 Idaho 592, 602, 315 P.8d
245, 255 (2018). Thus, the City is not entitled
to an award of attorney fees on appeal, as-
suming that it would apply. Because the issue
ig not raised in this appeal, we do not decide
whether the exclusivity provision in section
6-918A only applies to the awarding of attor-
ney fees in the trial court or also prevents

the awarding of attorney fees on appeal pur-
suant to another statute.

VIL.
Conclusion.

‘We vacate the judgment and amended
judgments in this action and remand this
case for further proceedings that are consis-
tent with this opinion. We award the Appel-
Jants costs on appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES, HORTON and BRODY concur.

402 P.3d 1053

Stella WATKINS, as Personal Representa-
tive of the Estate of Arthur Donald Wat-
kins, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Re-
spondent,

and

Steven G. Neighbors, as Trustee of the A.
Don Watkins Revocable Trust Dated
May 1, 2009, Restatement Dated July 8,
2011, Counterdefendant,

v.
Arnold Douglas WATKINS, Defendant-
Counterclaimant-Appellant,
and

Brian D. Watkins and Robynlee Watkins,
husband and wife, and the Marital Com-
munity composed thereof, Defendants-
Counterclaimants,

and
Donald Eugene Watkins and Katie Wat-
kins, husband and wife, and the Marital

Community composed thereof; and Vir-
ginia Watkins, Defendants.

Docket No. 44036

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: September 7, 2017

Dinius & Associates, PLLC, Boise, for ap-
pellant. Kevin E, Dinius argued.

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP,
Boise, for respondent. Beth L. Coonts ar-
gued,

BRODY, Justice.

This case involves Arthur Donald Watkins’
(Father) attempt to recover damages based
on a default by his son, Arnold Douglas
Watkins (Son or Doug), under a real estate
installment contract. The question presented
is whether the complaint gave adequate no-
tice of the election to accelerate the debt as
required by Washington law. Son also
brought a counterclaim for breach of a com-
pensation agreement executed by a sibling
acting on behalf of Father using a power of
attorney. The compensation agreement pur-
ported to obligate Father to pay Son $3,000
per month for life. Father argued that the
compensation agreement lacked consider-
ation. The district court held a bench trial.
The district court found in favor of Father on
his breach of contract claim and on the coun-
terclaim brought against him. Son timely ap-
pealed,

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Father was a successful businessman and
accumulated a number of businesses and as-
sets over his lifetime, including, nursing
homes, airplanes, apartment complexes, stor-
age units, and a cattle ranch. Father and his
first wife Florence had six children, three
daughters and three sons. The three sons—
Doug, Brian, and Donald—and their three
spouses were named as defendants in this
case, On the eve of trial, Brian and Donald
filed bankruptcy and the claims against them
were automatically stayed, The case proceed-
ed to trial on Father's claims against Doug

603

and Doug’s counterclaim. While the case was
pending, Father passed away and Stella Wat-
kins, Father’s wife at the time of his death
and the personal representative of his estate,
‘was substituted as the plaintiff.

There are two agreements at issue. The
first is a real estate installment contract.
Father and Florence owned a nursing home
in Seattle, Washington. In August of 1984,
Father and Florence sold 78% of their inter-
est in the facility to their six children. Son
acquired a 18% interest for the agreed price
of $676,000, Son paid $65,000 as a down
payment, He was obligated to pay the bal-
ance of $611,000 in equal monthly install-
ments of $5,590 plus interest. The contract
was amended twice, eventually reducing the
monthly payments to $1,645. Florence passed
away in 1988, Her interest in the contract
was initially transferred to a testamentary
trust and later to Father.

On August 2, 2010, Son breached the real
estate installment contract by failing to make
the full monthly payment when it came due,
Son has not made full monthly payments
since that time, but he has made partial
payments that were accepted on behalf of
Father, At trial, Son did not deny that he
entered into the real estate installment con-
tract, that the contract is valid, or that he
stopped making payments. Rather, Son con-
tended that he does not know or have a
record of the balance due under the terms of
the agreement, and therefore, denies liability
as claimed by Father.

The second agreement at issue is the com-
pensation agreement. Beginning in 1984, Son
worked for Father in various capacities, in-
cluding as a backhoe operator, mechanic, and
general farm laborer. In September 1989,
Son injured his back while working for one of
Father’s business ventures, but he continued
working for his father after his injury. Son
received an hourly wage until September
1998, when he began receiving a salary of
$8,000 per month. In December 1995, Son’s
compensation was reduced to $1,000 per
month,

Another son, Brian, assisted Father with
the operation of Father’s business interests
for many years. On October 24, 2000, at
seventy-five years old, Father executed a

604

general power of attorney, appointing Brian
as his attorney-in-fact to assist Father with
the management and operation of Father's
business interests. Approximately one week
before Father revoked the power of attorney,
Brian used it to execute four compensation
agreements, purportedly on Father’s behalf,
requiring Father to make substantial month-
ly payments to Brian, Brian’s wife, and his
brothers—Doug and Donald. Son did not
sign the compensation agreement. That same
day, Brian used the power of attorney to
execute a settlement and release agreement,
purportedly on Father’s behalf. Each of the
compensation agreements obligated Father
to pay $3,000 per month to each party for
life, and at death, to his or her spouse for the
spouse’s life, and each included a cost-of-
living escalator. Brian did not discuss the
compensation agreements with Father before
signing them, nor obtain Father’s approval
for the compensation agreements after they
were signed. The power of attorney author-
ized Brian to enter into contracts, but it did
not authorize Brian to make gifts of Father’s
estate,

Father revoked the power of attorney in
March 2009. Father filed a complaint against
his three sons and their spouses on Novem-
ber 6, 2009. The complaint made claims for
rescission, fraud or deceit, constructive trust,
unjust enrichment, conversion, civil RICO,
and breach of contract. In September 2010, a
conservator was appointed for Father. The
conservator and an expert retained to trace
Father’s assets discovered serious issues
with the financial records that Brian had
maintained. On January 12, 2012, Defendants
filed an answer and counterclaim alleging
breach of contract relating to the compensa-
tion agreements executed by Brian.

Father and Son both filed motions for
summary judgment, The district court en-
tered partial summary judgment in favor of
Son on Father’s fraud claim. Otherwise, the
motions for summary judgment were denied
and the case proceeded to trial. Father pre-
sented his breach of contract claim arising
out of Son’s default under the real estate
installment contract, but did not pursue the
other claims. The district court dismissed the
other claims on a motion for a directed ver-

dict prior to Son presenting evidence on his
claim for breach of the compensation agree-
ment,

On January 11, 2016, the district court
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, It also entered a corre-
sponding judgment as follows:

1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plain-
tiff Arthur Donald Watkins and against
Defendant Arnold Douglas Watkins on the
breach of contract claim pertaining to the
nursing home real estate contract in the
amount of five hundred twenty eight thou-
sand six hundred forty dollars and forty
three cents ($528,640.43).

2, Judgment is entered in favor of Plain-

tiff Arthur Donald Watkins and against

Defendant Arnold Douglas Watkins on the

counterclaim for breach of contract on the

compensation agreement. Plaintiff owes

Defendant nothing.

8. On Count V (fraud and deceit), with

respect to Defendant Arnold Douglas Wat-

kins only, the claim is dismissed with prej-
udice.

4, All remaining claims against Defen-

dant Arnold Douglas Watkins are dis-

missed without prejudice.

Son filed a motion for reconsideration asking
the district court to dismiss the remaining
claims against him with prejudice. The dis-
trict court granted Son’s motion and an
amended judgment was entered on March 4,
2016. The district court awarded Father at-
torney’s fees over Son’s objection. Son timely
appealed,

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “Review of a trial court’s conclu-
sions following a bench trial is limited to
ascertaining whether the evidence sup-
ports the findings of fact, and whether the
findings of fact support the conclusions of
law,... [I]t is the province of the trial
court to weigh conflicting evidence and
testimony and to judge the credibility of
witnesses... [TJhis Court will liberally
construe the trial court’s findings of fact in
favor of the judgment entered. This Court
will not set aside a trial court’s findings of

fact unless the findings are clearly errone-
ous. If the trial court based its findings on
substantial evidence, even if the evidence
is conflicting, this Court will not overturn
those findings on appeal. Additionally, this
Court will not substitute its view of the
facts for that of the trial court. This Court
exercises free review over matters of law.”
Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 78, 77, 205
P.8d 1209, 1218 (2008) (internal citations
omitted).

I.

ANALYSIS

A. The district court erred in concluding
that Father was not required to give
notice of acceleration.

The district court concluded as a matter of
Jaw that Father was not required to give Son
notice of default or acceleration of the
amounts owed under the real estate install-
ment contract. The district court reasoned
that the terms of the real estate installment,
contract did not require notice and neither
did Washington law. Son contends that the
district court’s legal conclusions were errone-
ous. We agree in part.

1. Washington law governs the inter-
pretation of the real estate install-
ment contract.

The real estate installment contract has an
express choice of law provision that provides
that the agreement is to be interpreted and
construed according to the laws of the State
of Washington. The parties do not dispute
that Washington law governs this dispute.

2. Notice of Default.

The terms of the real estate installment
contract make it clear that Father was not,
required to give Son notice of default. The
default provision of the agreement states in
relevant part:

Default by Purchaser: It is agreed that in

the event the Purchaser shall fail to com-

ply with or perform any condition or
agreement hereof or to make any payment.
required hereunder promptly at the time
and in the manner required or in the event

605

the Purchaser shall in any way be in de-
fault hereunder, seller may without fur-
ther demand or notice declare all amounts
due hereunder or otherwise and pursuant
to this Contract immediately due and pay-
able so as to effect a true acceleration of
the entire balance of the unpaid balance
secured hereby. Thereafter the entire bal-
ance of the indebtedness to the Seller shall
be immediately due and owing and shall
draw default interest... .

(Emphasis added). If there is a default, the
emphasized language gives Father the right
to declare all amounts owed immediately due
and payable without making a demand on
Son and without giving him notice. Son has
not pointed to any provision of Washington
law that alters this interpretation of the par-
ties’ agreement. As such, the district court
did not err by concluding that notice of de-
fault was not required.

8. Acceleration of the amounts owed.

HM Son contends that the district court
erred by holding that notice of acceleration
‘was not required. The district court based its
decision on Jacobson v. McClanahan, 48
Wash.2d 751, 264 P.2d 258 (1958), a case in
which the Washington Supreme Court held
that notice of intent to accelerate a debt is
not required. While we agree that notice of
intent to accelerate a debt is not required,
the creditor still has to take some affirmative
“action” to accelerate the debt and communi-
cate the acceleration to the debtor, In this
ease, the First Amended Complaint filed by
Father did not make it known that he was
electing to accelerate all of the amounts owed
under the parties’ agreement, and the parties
did not otherwise litigate this issue at the
time of trial.

Hl In Washington, “[t]he law is settled
... that even if the provision in an install-
ment note provides for the automatic acceler-
ation of the due date upon default, mere
default alone will not accelerate the note.” A.
A. C. Corp. v. Reed, 73 Wash.2d 612, 440 P.2d
465, 467 (1968). The creditor has to take
some affirmative action to accelerate the debt
and communicate the acceleration to the
debtor:

606 Es

The debt does not become due on the
mere default in the interest payment.
Some affirmative action is required, some
action by which the holder of the note
makes known to the payors that he intends
to declare the whole debt due, This exer:
cise of the option may, of course, take
different forms, It may be exercised by
giving the payors formal notice to the ef-
fect that the whole debt is declared to be
due, or by the commencement of an _ac-
tion to recover _the debt, ov perhaps by
any means by which it is clearly brought
home to the payors of the note that the
option has been exercised before the inter-
est is paid or tendered,

Weinberg v. Nuher, 51 Wash. 591, 99 P. 736,
‘787 (1909) (emphasis added).

Hl The purpose of this rule is to give
debtors some warning that the debt has been
accelerated. See id. It is important to note
that only “some affirmative action” is re-
quired. Jd, at 787. The election to accelerate
the debt can be exercised in different ways.
Id, Washington law only requires that the
election to accelerate be made in such a way
that the election is “clearly brought home” to
the debtor. Jd. The filing of a complaint may
serve as the affirmative action necessary to
accelerate the debt. Id.

In this case, Father’s First Amended Com-
plaint is too vague to accelerate the debt.
Father asserted a breach of contract claim
against Son. As part of that claim, Father
requested a judgment compelling Son to
comply with the real estate installment con-
tract, and awarding Father damages. The
complaint stated: “Based on the information
currently available to Father, Son is in de-
fault of Son’s Note and, as of December 1,
2009, the total sum owed thereunder was
$205,260.26, plus interest, attorney's fees,
and costs.” In terms of the relief requested,
the First Amended Complaint stated:

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff re-
spectfully requests that this Court enter
an order compelling Doug to produce any
and all records relating to Doug’s Note,
including a detailed accounting, compelling
Doug to comply with the terms of Doug’s
Note, brining [sic] the same current, and
awarding Plaintiff damages against Doug

under Doug’s Note, as well as Plaintiff's
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Idaho
Code § 12-120, -121, and all other reme-
dies available at law or in equity.

Nowhere in this provision does it state that
the entire amount due has been accelerated.
In fact, the language requiring Doug to
“comply with the terms of Doug’s Note” and
“brining [sic] the same current” can be fairly
read as a demand to cure the default rather
than as an acceleration of the entire amount
owed.

HM The parties also did not litigate the
issue of acceleration at the time of trial. The
2012 version of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
15(b), which was controlling when the First
Amended Complaint was filed, states:

When issues not raised by the pleading
are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the plead-
ings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues, If evi-
dence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may al-
low the pleadings to be amended and shall
do so freely when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such
evidence would prejudice the party in
maintaining the party’s action or defense
upon the merits. The court may grant 4
continuance to enable the objecting party
to meet such evidence.

“Although IR.C.P, 15(b) permits a court to
base its decision on a theory fully tried by
the parties, an issue not tried either [by]
express or implied consent cannot be the
basis for the decision.” Bolognese v. Forte,
158 Idaho 857, 868, 292 P.8d 248, 254 (2012)
(quoting M.K. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101
Idaho 845, 849, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980),
Since the language of the complaint is inade-
quate to give notice of acceleration and the

issue was not tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, we hold that there was
no acceleration of the debt in this case,

As the entire balance of the debt was not
accelerated, the district court’s damages
award was not supported by substantial evi-
dence and must be recalculated accordingly.
‘We vacate the judgment entered by the dis-
trict court and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

B. The compensation agreement is not
valid or enforceable.

HMM The district court found that the
compensation agreement was not valid or
enforceable against Father. While the district
court found that the compensation agreement
‘was within the scope of Brian’s general pow-
er of attorney, the court ultimately found
that the compensation agreement did not
comply with the requirements of Idaho Code
section 15-12-114(1) because Brian did not
act in good faith or in the principal’s best
interest. The court also found that the com-

pensation agreement lacked the consider-
ation necessary to make it enforceable. The
court held that a subsequent promise to pay
for services already rendered lacks consider-
ation,

On appeal, Son argues that Brian had the
power to enter into the compensation agree-
ment. He contends that any bad faith con-
duct on Brian’s part is not relevant to the
breach of contract claim involving Son. Son
argues that a prior conversation where Fa-
ther promised to pay Son $3,000 per month
‘was a promise made contemporaneously at
the time of the services, He argues that the
compensation agreement was merely a writ-
ten memorialization of previous promises and
representations that Father made. We find
that the district court’s findings of fact sup-
port its conclusion that the compensation
agreement lacked consideration, and do not
reach the issue of whether Brian’s bad faith
conduct is a defense to Son’s breach of con-
tract claim,

The district court made a number of factu-
al findings related to the compensation
agreement, The court found that Son worked
for Father in various capacities from 1984 to
2000. Son received an hourly wage from 1984

607

until September 1998, when he began to re-
ceive a salary of $3,000 per month. Son re-
ceived this salary until December 1995, when
the compensation was reduced to $1,000 per
month, At some point in the late 1990s, Son’s
monthly pay again increased. On September
30, 2000, Father and Son had a conversation
where Father stated his intention to give all
three of his sons, including Son, a lifetime
payment of $8,000 per month for the work
they had performed for Father and injuries
they had sustained while working for Father.
Son received $8,000 per month from Decem-
ber 2000 until March 2009, when the pay-
ments stopped.

HH After considering all of the evidence,
the district court concluded as a matter of
Jaw, that at the time Son rendered services
to Father, there was no agreement that Son
would be compensated for those services in
the ‘years to come. Idaho adheres to the
majority view that “absent an understanding
at the time services are rendered that com-
pensation will later be paid for such services,
a subsequent promise to pay for them is
unenforceable for lack of consideration.” Col-
lord v, Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 792, 451 P.2d
585, 588 (1969), As there was no understand-
ing at the time services were rendered that
payment would be made later, the district
court properly concluded that the compensa-
tion agreement was unenforceable for lack of
consideration. Therefore, we affirm the deci-
sion of the district court.

C. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel.

HH Son contends that Father took in-
compatible positions in two different courts
and that he should be estopped from doing
so, He argued that Father cannot claim in a
divorce proceeding that he was paying Son
$1,000 per month for Son’s injuries, and then
deny in this case that he owes Son $8,000 per
month for those injuries. The district court,
in its discretion, declined to apply the doc-
trine of judicial estoppel because it did not
find Father’s positions inconsistent, The dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion.

608

In 1998, Father signed an affidavit in a
divorce proceeding that stated, in relevant
part that he was paying Son $1,000 per
month for injuries he sustained:

The Respondent has obligations to three

(8) of his sons in a combined amount of

$5,300.00 per month. $3,000.00 per month

is being paid to Brian, a son who was
injured while working on the Respondent's
ranch, $1,000.00 is being paid to his son,

Doug, who was also injured by working on

the ranch. $1,300.00 is being paid to Eu-

gene, who was injured when he was work-
ing for a business the Respondent used to
own in Boise, Idaho. These three (8) sons
are unable to hold full time jobs because of
the injuries they received while working
for the Respondent. The Respondent has
been paying these sums to his sons since
approximately 1989, which pre-dates the

Respondent’s marriage to the Petitioner.

Without these funds, these individuals

would not be able to sustain themselves

and their families. This is not being done

as a charity, but because of an obligation

owed by the Respondent.
Father paid that money—and more—to Son
for over a decade. The district court found
that “Plaintiff was never obligated—in the
legal sense—to give Son a monthly sum for
injuries Son sustained while working for
Plaintiff.” The court held that “Plaintiff's ob-
ligation, even back in 1998, was at most a
personal or moral obligation. It was never a
legal one and Plaintiff's sworn affidavit did
not make it a legal obligation.”

HE “The doctrine of judicial estoppel
... is invoked at the discretion of the court.”
McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303
P.8d 578, 581 (2012), To determine whether a
trial court abused its discretion, this Court
examines:

(1) [Whether the trial court correctly per-

ceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)

whether the trial court acted within the

outer boundaries of its discretion and con-
sistently with the legal standards applica-
ble to the specific choices available to it;
and (8) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.
Doe v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 159 Idaho
‘741, 745, 367 P.3d 136, 140 (2015) (quoting

Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 701,
116 P.8d 27, 81 (2005)). “Idaho adopted the
doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v
Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954),
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from ad-
vantageously taking one position, then subse-
quently seeking a second position that is
incompatible with the first.” McCallister, 154
Idaho at 894, 303 P.8d at 581 (quoting A & J
Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116
P.8d 12, 14 (2005). “The policy behind judi-
cial estoppel is to protect ‘the integrity of the
judicial system, by protecting the orderly
administration of justice and having regard
for the dignity of the judicial proceeding.”
Id. (quoting Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nic-
holls, 181 Idaho 99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916
(Ct. App. 1998)). “Broadly accepted, it is
intended to prevent parties from playing fast
and loose with the legal system.” Id.

In this case, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it determined that.
Father did not take inconsistent positions, It
is not inconsistent for Father to argue in
divorce court that he was paying Son $1,000
per month for injuries, and then argue here
that he is not legally obligated to pay Son
$8,000 per month. In his affidavit in divorce
court, Father did not state that he had an
obligation to pay $1,000 per month in perpe-
tuity, and he certainly never agreed or prom-
ised to pay $3,000 per month as Son now
claims. There is no evidence that Father has
taken inconsistent positions with the intent to
take advantage of the legal system.

The district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in declining to apply the doctrine of
judicial estoppel in this case. Therefore, we
affirm the decision of the district court in
refusing to apply the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel.

D. The district court’s award of attor-
ney’s fees and costs to Father is vacat-
ed.

Son challenges the district court’s award of
attorney’s fees and costs to Father. Given
our decision to vacate the judgment entered
in favor of Father for breach of the real
estate installment contract, there is currently
no prevailing party. See Howard v, Perry,
141 Idaho 189, 148, 106 P.38d 465, 469 (2005)

(holding that there must be a prevailing par-
ty to award fees). As such, the judgment
awarding costs and attorney's fees to Father
is vacated.

E. Attormey’s fees on appeal are not
awarded at this time.

Son requests an award of attorney’s fees
on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
120(1), which allows reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party. Because the case
is not yet resolved, there is no prevailing
party. Where there is no present prevailing
party because a case has been remanded
after an appeal, this Court has refused to
award attorney’s fees. Portfolio Recovery As-
sociates, LLC v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228,
236, 395 P.3d 1261, 1269 (2017) (citing How-
ard, 141 Idaho at 148, 106 P.8d at 469). If
Son is ultimately the prevailing party, then
the trial court may award him attorney’s fees
for this appeal.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

We affirm in part and vacate in part the
amended judgment of the district court en-
tered on March 4, 2016. We vacate the judg-
ment of the district court entered on March
16, 2016 in which costs and attorney's fees
were awarded to Father. We remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with
the Court’s opinion. Costs to Son.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justice
EISMANN concur.

HORTON, J., concurring.

I coneur with the Court’s decision, al-
though to a certain extent this feels as if we
are elevating form over substance. However,
this is an instance where the forms are sig-
nificant. As the Court’s opinion makes clear,
absent express or implied agreement to try
the question of acceleration, the district court
was required to’ decide the case based upon
Father’s Amended Complaint. Further, if ac-
celeration had been pled, the question wheth-
er Father took “some affirmative action to
accelerate the debt” is a factual matter to be
decided by the trial court, not this Court.
Thus, we must vacate the judgment.

609

That being said, by October 9, 2018, Fa-
ther’s actions in this litigation “clearly
brought home” to Son that Father was exer-
cising the option to accelerate the debt. See
Weinberg v. Naher, 51 Wash. 591, 99 P. 736,
737 (1909). The declaration of Father’s ex-
pert, Denise McClure, in support of Father’s
motion for partial summary judgment made
it clear that the entire obligation was deemed
due and owing. However, even if the declara-
tion wasn’t sufficiently clear, Father’s brief-
ing was:

In short, Don can accelerate the relevant

Nursing Home Contracts if Brian, Doug,

or Gene fail to promptly make a payment,

and he can do so without notice. Upon
accelerating a Nursing Home Contract,

Don is entitled to collect 1.5% interest on

the unpaid amount, compounded monthly.

On August 1, 2010, a full payment came
due under Doug’s Nursing Home Contract,
but he failed to pay that amount in full.
Doug himself conceded that he stopped
making full payments in July 2010. Since
Doug failed to pay the full required
amount, he was in default and Don was
empowered to accelerate the entire
amount owing under the agreement
without notice. Therefore, as of August 2,
2010, the entire obligation of $768,159.70
came due immediately and has been ac-
eruing interest at 1.5% per month, or
18% per year, compounded monthly. As
of September 80, 2018, the amount due and
owing under Doug’s Nursing Home Con-
tract was $1,598,268.48. Don is entitled to
summary judgment for this amount plus
the default rate of interest.
(emphasis added; citations, footnote omitted).
It seems evident to me that Father's first
course of action on remand will be to amend
his complaint to specifically.allege the accel-
eration which he had previously claimed. If
that motion is granted, given Son’s unques-
tioned default, the outcome is preordained.

Justice W. JONES concurs.

610 Dn
402 P.3d 1063
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve

Darol Keith ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 48673

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: September 12, 2017
Rehearing Denied September 18, 2017

611

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, attorney for respondent.
Theodore §S, Tollefson argued.

Erie D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, attorney for appel-
lant, Jenevieve C. Swinford argued.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION, THE COURT’S
PRIOR OPINION DATED JULY 11,
2017 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.

JONES, Justice
1, Nature or THE Case

In a ease arising out of Kootenai County,
Darol Keith Anderson (“Anderson”) appeals
his convictions for felony domestic battery
and misdemeanor domestic battery.
Anderson asserts that the district court
erred when it admitted the preliminary hear-
ing testimony of his alleged victim, Erica
Messerly (“Messerly”), after finding that she
‘was unavailable to testify at his trial due to
mental illness. Anderson also asserts that the
district court abused its discretion when it
allowed Officer Spencer Mortensen (“Officer
Mortensen”) to testify that the injuries that
he had observed on Messerly’s person were
consistent with her allegations against
Anderson. He argues that Officer Morten-
sen’s testimony constituted impermissible
vouching for Messerly’s truthfulness.

HL. FacrvaL anp ProcepuraL BACKGROUND

On the evening of September 7, 2014, Offi-
cer Mortensen was dispatched to investigate
reports of a physical domestic dispute. On
arriving at the scene, Officer Mortensen en-
countered Messerly, whom he described as
appearing to be nervous, Officer Mortensen
noted that Messerly had bruises and cuts on
her neck and face. Messerly proceeded to
describe the following events.

Shortly after midnight on the morning on
September 6, 2014, Messerly and Anderson,
her husband of three months, were lying in
bed. Messerly was angry because she had
found explicit photographs of another woman
on Anderson’s cell phone, Messerly kicked
Anderson in the back, causing him to partial-
ly fall out of bed. Anderson jumped back onto
the bed, straddled Messerly, and squeezed
her trachea until she was unable to breathe.

612

Anderson choked Messerly for approximately
five minutes, but she did not lose conscious-
ness. While Anderson was choking her, Mes-
serly attempted to scratch his face with her
fingernails. After Anderson stopped choking
Messerly, he walked downstairs. Messerly
followed him downstairs and grabbed his cell
phone out of his hands. She proceeded to
drop his cell phone into a toilet. Anderson
punched her in the face with his right fist.
Messerly fled her home, and Anderson
locked the doors behind her. On discovering
that the doors were locked, Messerly sought
help from a neighbor to gain reentry. When
she returned with the neighbor, the door was
unlocked. She entered her home with the
neighbor and found Anderson hiding in the
laundry room holding a metal pipe, Anderson
proceeded to threaten the neighbor with the
pipe and accuse him of sleeping with Messer-
ly. When Messerly and the neighbor attempt-
ed to leave, Anderson grabbed her by the
hair and pulled her back inside. Inside the
home, Anderson punched Messerly one time
in the face, briefly knocking her unconscious.
She fell to the floor. While Messerly was on
the floor, Anderson punched her in the back
of the head and neck. After regaining con-
sciousness, Messerly stood up, walked to a
couch, and sat down. She begged Anderson
to return to bed, but he refused. Anderson
grabbed a steak knife and held it to her
throat, Messerly grabbed Anderson by the
abdomen and he dropped the knife. Anderson
then bit Messerly on the neck and shoulder.
Anderson left the room and returned with
the metal pipe. He swung the pipe at Mes-
serly’s head, but stopped the swing before it
hit her. He then jabbed the pipe into Messer-
ly’s left side. Messerly attempted to flee to
the garage, and Anderson punched her in the
back of the head twice, Messerly finally es-
caped from the residence and walked back to
the neighbor’s residence. The neighbor drove
Messerly to the home of Melissa Watts
(“Watts”).

In corroboration of her statements to Offi-
cer Mortensen, Messerly showed him a mark
on the right side of her nose where she was
allegedly punched, a small cut on her throat
allegedly caused by the knife, bite marks on
her neck and shoulder, and a deep purple
bruise on her right side where she was alleg-

edly jabbed with the pipe. Messerly took
Officer Mortensen into her residence, but
was unable to locate the knife or the pipe.

Officer Mortensen next spoke with Watts.
‘Watts told Officer Mortensen that on Sep-
tember 6, 2014, at 2:30 P.M., she and Messer-
ly had returned to Messerly’s residence in
order to take some of Messerly’s clothing.
While they were there, Anderson kicked
Messerly in the stomach twice. Messerly and
Watts told him to leave the residence, which
he did. Officer Mortensen spoke to Messerly
about this second incident. Messerly con-
firmed that she had been kicked.

Officer Mortensen next spoke with Law-
rence Preston (“Preston”), the neighbor who
had called the police on September 7, 2014.
Preston stated that immediately prior to call-
ing the police, he had observed Messerly
taking Anderson’s cell phone in their drive-
way and attempting to keep it away from
him, Anderson then grabbed Messerly by the
hair and pulled her into the house, At trial,
Preston would testify that he had seen
Anderson punch Messerly in the face during
this altercation.

While Officer Mortensen was speaking
ve witnesses, Officer A. Winstead (“Officer

instead”), who had been called in to assist
Officer Mortensen, made contact with
Anderson over the phone. Anderson stated
that Messerly and Watts were lying and that
he had never touched Messerly. Anderson
refused to meet with Officer Winstead to give
a statement in person.

On October 1, 2014, Officer N. Lowry (“Of-
ficer Lowry”), a third officer assigned to the
case, was able to contact Anderson by phone.
Anderson again denied harming Messerly,
daiming that Messerly had kicked him dur-
ing the altercation on the morning of Sep-
tember 6, 2016, and had hit him when she
had returned later that day.

On January 29, 2015, the State filed an
Amended Criminal Complaint, charging
Anderson with Felony Domestic Battery (ve-
garding the allegations of battery on Septem-
ber 6, 2014), Aggravated Assault (regarding
the allegations involving the knife), Attempt-
ed Strangulation, and Misdemeanor Domes-

tic Battery (regarding the allegations of bat-
tery on September 7, 2014).

On February 3, 2015, the magistrate court
conducted a preliminary hearing in the case,
Messerly testified at the hearing to the
events that she had described to Officer Mor-
tensen. Messerly testified that on September
6, 2014, Anderson had punched and choked
her, that he had briefly knocked her uncon-
scious, that he had swung a long metal pipe
at her head and then jabbed it into her side,
that he had held a knife to her throat, and
that he had bitten her neck. At times during
her testimony, Messerly stated that
Anderson’s presence in the courtroom was
distressing to her, She needed to take multi-
ple breaks in order to complete her testimo-
ny. Following her direct testimony, Anderson
cross examined Messerly.

At the close of the preliminary hearing, the
State amended its complaint to add an addi-
tional count of aggravated assault (with the
metal pipe). The magistrate court found that
probable cause existed with respect to each
of the five counts. The district court set trial
for July 20, 2015.

On June 19, 2015, Messerly checked into
the Kootenai Behavioral Health Center (the
“KBH”), She was diagnosed with a Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Substance
Use Disorder.

On July 16, 2015, the State filed a motion
in limine seeking to declare Messerly un-
available to testify at trial and seeking to
admit a transcript of her testimony at the
preliminary hearing, In support of that mo-
tion, the State submitted the affidavit of Dr.
Eric J. Heidenreich, M.D. (“Dr. Heiden-
reich”), dated July 16, 2015, which provided,
in part, as follows:

Comes Now, Erie J, Heidenreich, M.D.,

and hereby deposes and swears:

2, That Erica Messerly is currently, and
has been, a patient at KBH since
6/19/2015;

3. That I have examined Ms. Messerly
and have had multiple opportunities to ob-
serve her and interact with her over the
past few days;

613

6, Ms. Messerly presents as tearful and
emotionally labile;

7. It has been my observation, and that
of my staff, that any significant emotional
distress typically is followed by Erica de-
compensating, which in turn, increases her
risk for relapse in the context of her addic-
tion to controlled substances;

9, Ms. Messerly’s prognosis is poor to
begin with and I would anticipate having to
testify would result in further deterioration
of her current, already fragile condition;
10. Testifying would put Ms. Messerly at
substantial risk for relapse on controlled
substances and pose a significant risk to
her mental health;

11. I emphatically recommend that Ms.
Messerly not testify at this time or any in
the near future.

On July 20, 2015, the district court held a
hearing at which it addressed the motion in
limine. Lisa Bunker (“Bunker”), the clinical
manager of the chemical dependency unit at
KBH, testified. Bunker corroborated Dr.
Heidenreich’s diagnoses of Substance Use
Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der. She stated that in her professional judg-
ment it would not be appropriate for Messer-
ly to testify at trial:

She has a very fragile, if you will, mental
health state, and it is our belief that it
would re-traumatize her at this point in
time. Our—we would prefer for her to
stabilize from a mental health standpoint.
Our—our goal for her is to increase her
ability to stay mentally well and psychiat-
rically stabilized, and it’s too soon in her
very early recovery from [sic] her mental
health.

So we talk about in—in recovery, mental
health and substance abuse, the first 90
days being a really important time in a
person’s early recovery. So I wouldn’t go
near any kind of revisiting this in the next
90 days. That would be my professional—
and then—and then to evaluate, but have
the psychiatrist evaluate her mental health
professionals evaluate her to see what in
90 days it looks like for her.

614

Following Bunker's testimony, the district
court held as follows:
I am going to find, I do find, that Miss
Messerly is unavailable... .

I do find that a continuance of this trial
is not a practical option. Mr, Anderson has
been steadfast, adamant in his not wanting
to waive his right to a speedy trial....

. and there is no indication that Miss
Messerly would be available between now
and October.

As far as opportunity to have sufficient
cross-examination at the preliminary hear-
ing, I read the preliminary hearing tran-
seript, and while certainly Mr. Anderson
‘was disruptive at the beginning, Miss Mes-
serly had difficulty throughout the pro-
ceedings, which I think just lends credence
to Dr. Heidenreich’s observations and Miss
Bunker’s testimony and observations from
the witness stand today.

In accordance with the district court’s deci-
sion on the motion in limine, at the time of
trial, the State read Messerly’s testimony
from the preliminary hearing regarding the
events that occurred on September 6, 2014.
Officer Mortensen also testified at trial.
Part of his testimony regarded the injuries
he observed on Messserly’s person on Sep-
tember 7, 2014, Specifically, Officer Morten-
sen testified as follows:
Q: After having that conversation with
Miss Messerly, did you observe any inju-
vies on her?
A:T did.
Q: Would you please describe as best you
can the injuries you observed on Miss
Messerly?
A: There was [sic] several that I ob-
served.... I observed a cut on her nose,
and her eyes were starting to blacken on
the interior of the eyes, which was consis-
tent with what she told me had happened.

I observed a little straight line kind of
ent mark right on her neck, lower part of
her neck, was also consistent with her
story.

I observed a large area of immediate
bruising on the right side of her neck,
which is also consistent.

I observed a bite mark ... what ap-
peared to be a bite mark on her right
shoulder, also consistent. ...

I also observed on her left side, her
oblique area, a large bruise in the form of
a circle, was also consistent.

I observed several other bruises, fresh
bruises on her right forearm and on her
other arm, which I—they were new, looked.
like fresh bruises.

Each time Officer Mortensen used the term
consistent, Anderson objected, claiming that
Officer Mortensen was “vouching for [Mes-
serly’s] credibility.”

The jury found Anderson guilty of Felony
Domestic Battery (for his actions on Septem-
ber 6, 2014) and Misdemeanor Domestic Bat-
tery (for his actions of September 7, 2014).
The jury found Anderson not guilty of the
two aggravated assault charges and attempt-
ed strangulation. The district court sentenced
Anderson to ten years with four years fixed.

Anderson appealed,

Ill. Issues on APPEAL

1. Did the district court err when it ad-
mitted Messerly’s testimony from the prelim-
inary hearing?

2, Did the district court abuse its discre-
tion by admitting Officer Mortensen’s testi-
mony?

IV. Sranparp or Revirw

HN When reviewing the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an
abuse of discretion standard. Dulaney v,
St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Cir., 187 Idaho
160, 163-64, 45 P.8d 816, 819-20 (2002).
“To determine whether a trial court has
abused its discretion, this Court considers
whether it correctly perceived the issue as
diseretionary, whether it acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistent-

ly with applicable legal standards, and
whether it reached its decision by an exer-
cise of reason.” Perry v Magic Valley
Reg’l Med, Ctr., 184 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d
816, 821 (2000).

Constitutional questions are reviewed de
novo, State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 845, 377,
818 P.8d 1, 38 (2018).

State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 450, 875 P.3d
279, 280 (2016).

V. ANALysIS

A. The district court erred when it admit-
ted Messerly’s testimony from the pre-
liminary hearing because the State
failed to establish that Messerly was
unavailable to testify.

Anderson asserts on appeal that the ad-
mission of Messerly’s preliminary hearing
testimony was error. He reasons that under
both the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and Idaho Rule of Evidence 804, prelim-
inary hearing testimony is not admissible un-
less the declarant is unavailable at trial.
Messerly was not unavailable, Anderson ar-
gues, because “Ms. Messerly’s mental illness
was not so severe as to render her unavail-
able to testify.” Anderson argues that:

Ms. Messerly was diagnosed with PTSD
and substance use disorder. These mental
health issues do not satisfy “extreme cir-
cumstances” to excuse her from testify-
ing.... Ms. Messerly was not committed
to a psychiatric hospital or diagnosed with
any psychotic disorders. In fact, she was
discharged from KBH. There was no evi-
dence that Ms. Messerly’s memory was
impaired or distorted by her mental health
issues. There was no evidence that she
refused to testify or would not appear at
trial, There was no evidence that she was
suicidal or a danger to others. There was
no evidence of permanent psychological
damage if she testified. There was no evi-
dence that any temporary psychological
effect could not be reversed through her
treatment with KBH. In all, the possible
harm to Ms. Messerly fell in the category
of the normal and expected “adverse emo-
tional or psychological effects” or “an-

615

guish” due to the nature of the proceed-
ings.

The State did not meet its burden to estab-
lish that Ms. Messerly would experience
substantial trauma or “grave risks” to her
mental health, And the district court did
not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards by declaring Ms. Messerly
unavailable.

Anderson next argues that the district
court’s error was not harmless. He reasons
that:

The State must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained...

‘The State cannot meet its burden in this
case, Ms. Messerly’s testimony was vital to
proving the September 6 charge of felony
domestic battery..., No one besides Ms,
Messerly, and later Mr. Anderson in his
defense, testified as to the events of Sep-
tember 6.

The State argues that “[t]he district court
had substantial competent evidence that fore-
ing Ms. Messerly to testify on either July 20
or 21 would result in severe harm to her
mental health.” Further, the State argues
that Anderson has failed to show the district
court’s finding was clearly erroneous. As evi-
dence supporting the district court’s conclu-
sion, it cites the testimony of Dr. Heiden-
reich and Bunker that testifying could result
in the deterioration of Messerly’s mental con-
dition. .

The State also claims that any error was
harmless, because “(t]he result would have
been the same even if the jury had not heard
Ms. Messerly’s , preliminary hearing tran-
script.” The State points out that, with re-
spect to the September 6, 2014, altercation,
Anderson himself admitted that he grabbed
Messerly by her throat and that he punched
her hard enough to knock her out. It also
notes that both Officer Mortensen and Pres-
ton testified with respect to Messerly’s inju-
ries, and the State introduced pictures of
those injuries.

With respect to the September 7, 2014,
altercation, the State argues that Messerly

616

did not testify. Her testimony was limited to
the events on September 6, 2014. According-
ly, it is not possible that the misdemeanor
conviction was affected by the admission of
Messerly’s preliminary hearing testimony.

HH The Sixth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution provides that “{iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him.” U.S, Const. amend. VI,
§ 1. “[Tyhis provision [also known as the
Confrontation Clause] bars admission of tes-
timonial statements of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.” Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 818, 821, 126 S.Ct.
2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (internal cita-
tions omitted). The term “testimonial ...
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or
at a former trial.” Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d
177 (2004), It is the proponent of the testimo-
ny that has the burden to establish unavaila-
bility. State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 266, 269, 159
P.8d 908, 906 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v.
Button, 134 Idaho 864, 868, 11 P.38d 483, 487
(Ct. App. 2000)). There have been numerous
cases decided by this Court in which prelimi-
nary hearing testimony was found admissible
because it was proven that the declarant
became unavailable before trial. See, a9.
State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 528-80,
828 P.8d 504, 508-10 (2014); State v. Sepulve-
da, 161 Idaho 79, 84, 388 P.3d 1249, 1254
(2016).

However, unavailability due to mental ill-
ness is an issue of first impression for this
Court. Likewise, despite the importance of
the Confrontation Clause, relatively little fed-
eral clarification has been provided with re-
spect to what makes a witness unavailable.
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4), which is
substantially similar to Idaho Rule of Evi-
dence 804(a)(4), identifies mental illness as
one criteria for unavailability, however, the
United States Supreme Court has not issued
any opinions establishing a standard for una-
vailability due to mental illness. Accordingly,
state and federal courts have taken it upon

themselves to establish standards for una-
vailability due to mental illness.

For example, in Warren v. U.S. the Court.
of Appeals for the District of Columbia was
presented with a case in which a lower court
held that a rape victim was “psychologically
unavailable” to testify. 436 A.2d 821, 824
(.C.App. 1981). The D.C. Court of Appeals
reviewed the United States Supreme Court
precedent on the matter and determined that
“the constitutional question appears to be at
what point, if any, is it no longer reasonable
to require the government to produce wit-
nesses at the risk of their psychological
health.” Id. at 827,

The D.C, Court of Appeals concluded that
the witness was unavailable on the basis that,
“experts agreed that she would undergo far
greater mental anguish than normally accom-
panies court appearances of the victims of
rapes (and presumably other such crimes as
kidnapping, terrorism, and hijacking) and
that her appearance in court ... would be
likely to lead to severe psychosis, even possi-
ble suicide.” Id, at 828. In Warren, the wit-
ness had been diagnosed with narcissistic
personality disorder and as vulnerable to
transient psychosis as a result of stress. Id.
at 829, She informed the doctor that she
would rather be jailed for contempt than
testify. The D.C, Court of Appeals concluded:

We do not intend to sanction a new catego-

ry of medical unavailability in all cases

where witnesses are likely to suffer ad-
verse emotional or psychological effects as

a result of testifying against their assail-

ants. But in the extreme circumstances

presented here, we agree that the grave
risks to the witness’ psychological health
justify excusing her live in-court testimony.

The expert testimony relating to Reed’s

mental health established that there was

both a high likelihood of temporary psy-
chological injury, perhaps even psychosis,
and a possibility of permanent psychologi-
cal injury.

Id, at 829-80.

In Burns v. Clusen, the Seventh Cireuit
Court of Appeals reviewed a state district
court determination that a witness (“L.L.”)
diagnosed with acute schizophreniform disor-

der was unavailable to testify. 798 F.2d 981,
937 (1986). The cireuit court reasoned that:

The burden of proving the unavailability
of the witness rests upon the party offer-
ing the prior testimony. If there is a possi-
bility, albeit remote, that affirmative
measures might produce the declarant, the
obligation of good faith may demand their
effectuation. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. [56]
at 74, 100 S.Ct, [2581] at 2548 [65 L.Ed.2d
597 (1980)]. The lengths to which the
prosecution must go to produce a witness
is a question of reasonableness. California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n, 22, 90 S.Ct.
1980, 1951 n. 22, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).

As to severity, mental illness itself may
not automatically render a witness unavail-
able. The judge must consider the symp-
toms, what tasks a witness is then capable
of, While all victims of violent crimes may
suffer emotional trauma, some victims may
suffer far greater anguish than normally
accompanies court appearances.

Given those considerations, there is no
question that L.L. was unavailable in early
September 1980.... The prosecutor rea-
sonably abandoned the effort to produce
L.L, when she learned of L.L.’s hospital-
ization. L.L.’s mental condition at the time
of admission to the psychiatric ward was
undoubtedly severe—‘“catatonic stupor
with hallucinations and delusions,” and re-
covery in the near future was speculative,

Id. at 937-88, Despite finding that the evi-
dence showed that L.L. had been initially
unavailable, the cireuit court concluded, that
by the time the judge made her unavailability
decision, too much time had passed from the
initial diagnosis and it was unclear whether
or not the witness was still suffering from
the same level of mental illness. Id. at 942.
[Wle hold that the State has not fulfilled
its burden of proving L.L.’s unavailability
as a precedent to offering her prior testi-
mony. The prosecution has neither made
stringent efforts to show that L.L. was
unavailable, nor produced affirmative proof
of L.L’s actual unavailability at the time of
trial in March 1981. Instead we are left
with an out-dated prediction, one which

617

may or may not have been accurate on the
eve of trial.

Id.

Hl The determination of whether a wit-
ness is unavailable, such that preliminary
hearing testimony is admissible, is evidentia-
ry in nature, Evidentiary decisions are re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 187 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.8d 816, 819-
20 (2002). Accordingly, we will review the
district court’s decision to approve the mo-
tion in limine under an abuse of discretion
standard.

TM The crux of this case is whether the
district court acted consistent with applicable
Jegal standards. We hold that the district
court did not. Specifically, we hold that the
district court abused its discretion in admit-
ting the motion in limine because the State
failed to produce sufficient evidence to dem-
onstrate that Messerly was unavailable to
testify at the time of trial. The affidavit from
Dr. Eric J. Heidenreich and the testimony of
Lisa Bunker are insufficient to establish that,
Messerly was physically, emotionally, or
mentally precluded from testifying at trial.
Dr. Heidenreich opined that “testifying
would put Ms. Messerly at substantial risk
for relapse on controlled substances and pose
a significant risk to her mental health.”
Bunker testified that “[Messerly] has a very
fragile, if you will, mental health state, and it
is our belief that it would re-traumatize her
at this point in time.” While this Court is
sensitive to the adverse emotional effects
associated with providing testimony of a
traumatic event, the aforementioned testimo-
ny does not demonstrate that Messerly was
unavailable. In this case, the concern was
regarding a possible relapse due to her frag-
ile mental state. As noted by the court in
Burns, the severity of the mental illness
itself may not automatically render a witness
unavailable. The judge must consider the
symptoms, what tasks a witness is then capa-
ble of. See Burns, 798 F.2d 981, 987 (1986).
Indeed, Messerly was able to provide testi-
mony, albeit with breaks, at the preliminary
hearing.

618

HMM s-Because Dr. Heidenreich’s affida-
vit and Bunker’s testimony are not sufficient
evidence to establish that Messerly’s mental
illness made her unavailable to testify, the
district court erred when it granted the mo-
tion in limine to allow her prehearing testi-
mony to be read at trial. Further, the district
court’s error was not harmless. In cases
where an alleged constitutional violation was
followed by a contemporaneous objection,
this Court applies the harmless error test.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.38d
961, 978 (2010) (citing Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 886 U.S. 18, 21-24, 87 S.Ct, 824, 17
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), Under this test, “(a]
defendant appealing from an objected-to,
non-constitutionally-based error shall have
the duty to establish that such an error
oceurred, at which point the State shall have
the burden of demonstrating that the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
222, 245 P.8d at 974. “In other words, the
error is harmless if the Court finds that the
result would be the same without the error.”
State v, Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301
P,8d 242, 256 (2018).

The State argues that the result would
have been the same despite the admission of
Messerly’s preliminary hearing testimony
because of other evidence that was properly
admitted, such as: Anderson’s testimony re~
garding the events of September 6, 2014;
testimony from Officer Mortensen and Pres-
ton regarding Messerly’s injuries; and pho-
tographs that the State introduced of Mes-
serly’s injuries. However, we hold that this
evidence is not sufficient to establish, “be-
yond a reasonable doubt,” that the decision
to allow Messerly’s preliminary hearing tes-
timony, in lieu of allowing Anderson to con-
front her, was harmless.

B. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting Officer Mor-
tensen’s testimony.

HH soOn appeal, Anderson argues that Of
ficer Mortensen erroneously testified with
respect to Messerly’s credibility. A ruling on
this argument is not necessary since we have
already vacated the district court’s sentence.
However, because the issue regarding the
admissibility of Officer Mortensen’s testimo-

ny has the potential to arise again in any
retrial, we will address it.

Anderson asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting Officer
Mortensen’s testimony, He argues that a lay
witness cannot give an opinion as to another
witness’ credibility, and “Officer Mortensen’s
testimony on Ms. Messerly’s ‘consistent’ sto-
ry did ‘nothing but vouch’ for the credibility.”
He concludes that:

Whether Mr. Anderson committed an un-

justified battery against Ms. Messerly or

acted in self-defense came down to a credi-
bility determination between Mr. Anderson
and Ms. Messerly. Because Ms. Messerly

did not testify at trial, the jury had no way

to assess her demeanor and minimal infor-

mation to determine her credibility—ex-
cept, of course, the opinion of Officer Mor-
tensen, The State cannot prove Officer

Mortensen’s vouching for Ms. Messerly’s

credibility did not contribute to the guilty

verdict on the September 6 charge.

The State responds that:

Officer Mortensen did not vouch for the
inherent trustworthiness of Ms, Messerly.
Officer Mortensen testified that her visible
injuries were consistent with the attacks
she reported. Testimony that physical evi-
dence is consistent with a witness’ version
of events is not improper vouching,

“The Supreme Court of the Territory of
Idaho stated over one-hundred years ago,
that a question calling ‘for the opinion of one
witness as to the truthfulness of another ...
is clearly an invasion of the province of the
jury, who are the judges of the credibility of
witnesses.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
229, 245 P.3d 961, 981 (2010) (quoting People
v. Barnes, 2 Idaho 148, 150, 9 P. 582, 588
(1886)). “This Court has repeatedly recog-
nized that a lay or expert witness cannot give
an opinion of another witness’s credibility or
encroach on the fact-finding functions of the
jury.” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 182, 148,
334 P.8d 806, 822 (2014),

In Perry, this Court found that the prose-
cutor committed misconduct when he elicited
testimony from a foster father, foster moth-
er, and an investigating officer as to the
truthfulness of the victims’ allegations of

lewd and lascivious conduct. 150 Idaho at
229, 245 P.8d at 981. Specifically, in that case,
the prosecutor asked the foster mother if the
victims had ever been dishonest with her.
The foster mother replied that the victims
had, but only about immaterial things. Id. at
228-29, 245 P.8d at 980-81. The prosecutor
then asked the foster father during redirect
examination whether he noticed any signs of
dishonesty on the girls’ faces when they re-
ported the allegations. Id. The foster father
replied that he had not. Jd. Finally, the pros-
ecutor asked the investigating officer on di-
rect examination whether he believed that
the victims were being truthful in their alle-
gations. Id. The investigating officer replied
that he believed the victims were being
truthful. Jd. This Court reasoned that these
statements were impermissible “vouching
testimony.” Id.

In State v. Ehrlick, this Court held that a
district court erred in allowing an expert to
opine as to whether or not eyewitness re-
ports that the defendant had been seen at
eertain times were credible. 158 Idaho 900,
910, 354 P.3d 462, 472 (2015). This Court held
that the opinion directly related to the credi-
bility of the eyewitness and was therefore
error, albeit harmless error. Id.

‘The district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing Officer Mortensen to opine
that the injuries that he observed on Messer-
ly’s person were consistent with her descrip-
tion of the altercation. While it is true that
this Court has definitively established that a
witness may not opine as to the truthfulness
of another witness, in this case Officer Mor-
tensen was not opining as to the truth of
Messerly's testimony. Rather, Officer Mor-
tensen testified as to injuries, which he ob-
served, and then testified as to whether those
injuries could have been caused by certain
acts alleged to have been committed. Officer
Mortensen made no comment as to whether
or not Messerly was credible. He did not
diseuss her demeanor or whether she ap-
peared trustworthy while testifying. He
made no comment as to whether or not he
believed Messerly’s testimony was true, Any
of these things would have infringed upon
the province of the jury. However, testifying
as to whether or not an alleged action could

619

factually cause an observed injury is not the
same as testifying to credibility. Officer Mor-
tensen testified that certain alleged facts
could be true, not that he believed said facts
were or were not true, This can sometimes
be a difficult distinction, because giving one’s
opinion on an alleged fact often has the effect,
of supporting or casting doubt on another
witnesses’ testimony. However, testifying to
a factual consistency or inconsistency is not
the equivalent of testifying to truthfulness or
credibility.

This distinction is consistent with this
Court’s precedent. In Perry, for example, the
prosecutor asked certain witnesses point
blank if they thought that other witnesses
were telling the truth. In Zhrtick, the prose-
eutor asked an expert witness whether an
eyewitness’ testimony was “credible.” The
opinion testimony here is fundamentally dif-
ferent. Instead of asking Officer Mortensen
about Messerly’s credibility, the prosecutor
asked Officer Mortensen whether his own
observations were consistent with certain al-
leged facts. Officer Mortensen’s opinions
likely affected the jury’s assessment of
whether Messerly was credible, but they did
not expose his own opinion as to her credibil-
ity.

VI. Conciusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district
eourt’s judgment is hereby vacated in part
and affirmed in part. Anderson’s felony
conviction is hereby vacated. However,
Anderson’s misdemeanor conviction related
to the events on September 7, 2014, was
untainted by the district court’s error be-
cause Messerly’s preliminary hearing testi-
mony was limited to the events on Sep-
tember 6, 2014. Therefore, Anderson’s
misdemeanor conviction is affirmed. We
also affirm the district court’s admission
of Officer Mortensen’s testimony. The
matter is hereby remanded to the district
court for future proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur.

620
402 P.3d 1073
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v

Jonathan Earl FOLK, Defendant-
Appellant

Docket No. 48790

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: September 20, 2017

o
nN
| |

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Maya
P, Waldron argued.

Hon. Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jor-
gensen argued,

HORTON, Justice.

Jonathan Earl Folk appeals from his judg-
ment of conviction for one felony count of
sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years
old entered after a jury trial in Bonneville
County. On appeal, Folk contends that the
district court made numerous evidentiary er-
rors. Folk also argues that the district court
erred by denying his motion for a judgment
of acquittal and the prosecutor committed
misconduct amounting to fundamental error
in his closing argument. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
We described the circumstances giving rise
to this prosecution in State v. Folk, 151 Idaho
827, 256 P.8d 735 (2011) (Folk I):

On December 25, 2007, at about 5:30
p.m., the mother of three minor children
(Mother) arrived home after running an
errand and went into the kitchen to help
her grandmother finish preparing Christ-
mas dinner. As she was walking to the
kitchen, Jonathan Folk (Defendant) was in
the living room. He had come over to pick
up a house guest. After about ten to fifteen
minutes, Mother walked into the living
room and asked her husband where their
five-year-old son (Child) was. He said that
he thought Child was in his bedroom.
Mother walked to Child’s room, and as she
was nearing the open door to the room she
heard Child say, “That’s gross.” As she
walked into the room, she saw Child lying
on his back on the bed and Defendant
kneeling down in front of Child with
Child’s legs around Defendant and his
hands on Child’s hips. The bed was a small
child’s bed, about ten inches off the floor.
Mother asked what they were doing, and
both Child and Defendant said they were
just playing. Both Defendant and Child
were fully clothed, and it did not appear
that either of them had just pulled or
zipped their pants up. Mother did not see
any signs of any type of sexual act by
Defendant. Defendant stood up and walked
out of Child’s room, and then returned and
sat on the floor while Child picked up his
toys pursuant to Mother’s instructions. De-
fendant and the guest left about one and
one-half hours later. At about 4:00 am.
that night, Child awakened Mother and
stated that he had just had a nightmare,
Mother asked what it was about, and Child
responded that it was about what that guy
did to Child last night. Mother asked what
guy, but Child would not answer. Later
that morning, Mother telephoned the po-
lice and then asked Child what had hap-
pened last night. Child answered that De-
fendant had placed his mouth on Child’s
penis.

Id. at 831, 256 P.3d at 739.

The State charged Folk with lewd conduct
by oral-genital contact with Child. A jury
found Folk guilty of lewd conduct and the
district court sentenced him to life in prison
without parole, Folk appealed. In Folk I, we
vacated Folk’s judgment, holding: (1) Folk’s

right to confrontation was violated; (2) Folk’s
right to self-representation was infringed;
and (8) there were errors in the jury instruc-
tions which would have permitted the jury to
convict Folk for uncharged conduct or con-
duct that did not constitute lewd conduct. Id.
at 342, 256 P.8d at 750. Following a second
jury trial, Folk once again appealed from a
fixed life sentence. State v. Folk, 157 Idaho
869, 878, 341 P.3d 586, 590 (Ct. App. 2014) (
Folk IT). The Court of Appeals vacated
Folk’s judgment because evidence of Folk’s
prior convictions was improperly admitted,
Id, at 880, 341 P.3d at 597,

Following remand, the State made a curi-
ous charging decision. It amended the charge
from lewd conduct to sexual abuse of a child
under the age of sixteen, alleging that Folk
committed the crime “by tickling the stomach
and/or feet of [Child] and/or touching the
hips of [Child] with his hands.” The State
also added a persistent violator allegation.
Folk filed a number of pretrial motions, in-
cluding a motion to exclude the testimony of
Blaine Blair that Folk had told him that Folk
desired to sexually abuse children. The dis-
trict court issued two memorandum decisions
on Folk’s motions and ultimately permitted
Blair to testify regarding Folk’s statement
by way of a narrow set of leading questions:

Q [by the prosecutor]: All right. I'm going

to ask you some questions, and I just want

you to answer yes or no to these questions.

Okay? Can you do that?

A: Yes, I can.

Q: Did you and [Folk] ever discuss things?

Yes or no?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Did you and [Folk] ever share

secrets with one another? Yes or no?

A: Yes.

Q: Now again this is yes or no. Did the

defendant, [Folk], ever say anything to you

indicating that he desired to sexually abuse
children? Yes or no?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. How many times did he express

that to you?

A: Just once.

After the State amended the charge to sexual
abuse of a child, Folk moved to exclude

625

evidence of the alleged oral-genital contact.
The district court denied Folk’s request.

On several occasions during the trial, Folk
unsuccessfully attempted to admit evidence
of Child’s testimony from the earlier trials.
On some occasions, he did so to refresh
Child’s memory, and on other occasions, he
sought to introduce the prior testimony to
impeach Child with prior inconsistent state-
ments, The district court’s evidentiary rul-
ings on these efforts are one of the subjects
of this appeal.

Folk was found guilty of sexual abuse of a
child under sixteen, a violation of Idaho Code
section 18-1506(1)(b). The district court dis-
missed the persistent violator enhancement
and imposed a fixed sentence of 25 years.
Folk timely appealed.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMB “The trial court has broad discre-
tion in the admission and exclusion of evi-
dence and its decision to admit evidence will
be reversed only when there has been a clear
abuse of that discretion.” State v. Lopez-
Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 877, 360 P.8d 1056,
1058 (2015) (quoting State v. Robinett, 141
Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.8d 486, 488 (2008)).

A three point inquiry is used to deter-
mine whether a trial court has abused its
discretion: (1) whether the court correctly

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)

whether the court acted within the outer

boundaries of its discretion and consistent-
ly with the legal standards applicable to

the specific choices available to it; and (8)

whether the trial court reached its decision

by an exercise of reason,
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6, 304 P.38d 276, 281
(2013) (quoting State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho
678, 686, 273 P.8d 1271, 1279 (2012)).
“[Wyhether evidence is relevant is a question
of law this Court reviews de novo.” Id.

Il. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting Blair’s testi-
mony.

Folk argues that Blair’s testimony was not
relevant to any issue of material fact in the

626

ease and, even if it were relevant, the proba-
tive value of the evidence was substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

1. Blair’s testimony was relevant
to the issue of intent.

Tl In its second memorandum decision,
the district court concluded that Blair’s testi-
mony “appears to be highly relevant to the
issues of motive, intent, or absence of mis-
take or accident” and “is probative of Folk’s
state of mind and gives an explanation as to
why he would place himself alone with a child
or touch a child.” Folk argues that a “desire
to sexually abuse children generally doesn’t
show that otherwise-innocent tickling was
done to gratify Mr, Folk’s sexual desires.”

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tenden-
cy to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the ac-
tion more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” LR.E. 401,
The question before the jury was whether
Folk’s conduct in tickling Child and/or touch-
ing Child on the hips was done with the
intent to gratify Folk’s sexual desires. We
agree with the district court’s conclusion that
Blair’s testimony that Folk indicated that he
desired to sexually abuse children had a ten-
dency to make it more likely Folk’s admitted
contact with Child was not innocent but was
rather done for the purpose of gratifying
Folk’s sexual desires. Therefore, we find no
error in the district court’s conclusion that
Blair’s testimony was relevant.

2, The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined that
the probative value of Blair’s testi-
mony was not outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.

HMM Folk argues that Blair’s testimony
has extremely low probative value due to
Blaix’s “disastrous” memory and the district
court increased the level of unfair prejudice
by allowing the State to use leading ques-
tions to elicit Blair’s testimony. “[W]e review
the district court’s determination of whether
the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discre-
tion.” State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 574,
388 P.3d 588, 588 (2017) (quoting State v.

Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907, 854 P.8d 462,
469 (2015)).

Tn its first memorandum decision, the dis-
trict court concluded that “{ilf offered for
rebuttal purposes, the probative value of
[Blair’s testimony] is not substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
The district court reasoned that Blair's testi-
mony was “highly probative in a case where
the intent of the contact is a significant part
of the charged crime, especially given Folk’s
anticipated defense that he was merely en-
gaged in harmless horseplay with the vic-
tim.” However, the district court recognized
that there was a “substantial risk that the
jury would treat such testimony as propensi-
ty evidence.” The district court held that
evidence of Folk’s statements to Blair would
be conditionally admissible if offered to rebut
assertions that the touching was the result of
an accident, mistake, or done of some other
purpose.” In its second memorandum deci-
sion, the district court again concluded that
Blair's testimony was “highly relevant to the
issues of motive, intent, or absence of mis-
take or accident.” At trial, Folk objected to
the State’s proposed question based on Idaho
Rule of Evidence 404(b).

HMMM Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b)
provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show that the
person acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, or absence of mistake or accident. ...

LR.E, 404(b). The district court’s analysis of
Blair’s testimony shows that the district
court recognized the issue as one of discre-
tion, that the district court acted within the
bounds of its discretion, and that the district
court reached its decision through an exer-
cise of reason, Specifically, the district court
recognized and applied this Court’s two-ti-
ered analysis in State v. Grist:

Admissibility of evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a
permitted purpose is subject to a two-
tiered analysis, First, the trial court must

determine whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to establish the other crime or
wrong as fact, The trial court must also
determine whether the fact of another
crime or wrong, if established, would be
relevant, Evidence of uncharged miscon-
duct must be relevant to a material and
disputed issue concerning the crime
charged, other than propensity. Such evi-
dence is only relevant if the jury can rea-
sonably conclude that the act occurred and
that the defendant was the actor.

Second, the trial court must engage in a
balancing under LR.E. 403 and determine
whether the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value
of the evidence. This balancing is commit-
ted to the discretion of the trial judge. The
trial court must determine each of these
considerations of admissibility on a case-
by-case basis.

State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.38d
1185, 1188 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
Once the district court reached the Rule 403
analysis, it determined that the danger of
unfair prejudice in Blair’s testimony would
arise from reference to Folk’s past abuse of
children. By requiring the State to question
Blair only about Folk’s statement of intent to
sexually abuse children in the future, the
district court eliminated the danger that the
jury might consider past conduct as evidence
of Folk’s propensity to abuse children. We
find that Blair’s testimony was prejudicial to
Folk, but not unfairly so.

HI “Rule 403 does not require the ex-
clusion of prejudicial evidence. Most evidence
offered to prove a defendant’s guilt is inher-
ently prejudicial. The rule only applies to
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial because
it tends to suggest that the jury should base
its decision on an improper basis.” State v,
Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498, 506, 863 P.8d 339,
347 (2015) (internal citations omitted). The
district court properly acted to prevent the
introduction of testimony from Blair that
might have led the jury to base its decision
on an improper basis. We hold that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion when
it admitted Blair’s testimony.

627

B. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted testimony
concerning the alleged oral-genital
contact as evidence of Folk’s intent.

HI in its second memorandum decision,
the district court held that testimony con-
cerning the alleged oral-genital contact with
Child was admissible as evidence of Folk’s
intent to gratify his sexual desires under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that it
was not unfairly prejudicial under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 403. The district court rea-
soned that a finding of criminal intent may
be based upon circumstantial evidence and
that testimony concerning the alleged oral-
genital contact was relevant to the determi-
nation whether Folk touched and tickled
Child with the intent to gratify his sexual
desires. In its Rule 403 analysis, the district
court stated:

Here, the evidence is certainly prejudicial,

but the Court does not believe it is unfairly

prejudicfial]. Because of the contemporary
nature of the acts involved, it is directly
related to the charged conduct, This would
be different if the alleged oral to genital
contact occurred at some earlier or later
date. The State has elected to charge Folk
with sexual abuse, not lewd conduct. The

Court does not conclude that this strategy

lessens the relevancy of the alleged vic-

tim’s testimony about the entirety of the
incident.

The district court concluded that allowing the

jury to know exactly what happened at the

time of the alleged incident would not result
in unfair prejudice to Folk.

Folk argues that the evidence of the al-
leged oral-genital contact was not relevant to
any issue in the case including Folk’s intent.
Folk contends that evidence of the alleged
oral-genital contact was not necessary to pro-
vide the jury with the complete story and
cites to this Court’s opinion in State v. Kralo-
vec where this Court “decline[d] to perpetu-
ate the use of the res gestae doctrine in
Idaho,” concluding that “evidence previously
considered admissible as res gestae is only
admissible if it meets the criteria established
by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.” Kralovec,
161 Idaho at 578-74, 888 P.8d at 587-88.
Finally, Folk argues that the evidence was so

628

confusing, misleading, and unfairly prejudi-
cial that it suggested a decision on an im-
proper basis.

We hold that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
evidence of the alleged oral-genital contact.
First, as discussed above, evidence is rele-
vant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. “Specific intent,
may, and ordinarily must, be proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence.... One’s intent may
be proved by his acts and conduct, and such
is the usual and customary mode of proving
intent.” State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 182,
438 P.2d 275, 283 (1968) (internal citations
and quotations omitted); State v. Cheatham,
184 Idaho 565, 572, 6 P.8d 815, 822 (2000).

Folk’s assertion that the district court im-
properly used the doctrine of res gestae to
admit the evidence is incorrect. We first ob-
serve that the district court did not have the
benefit of our decision in Kralovec at the
time it made its decision, as we released
Kralovec nearly a year and a half after the
district court's decision. The district court’s
discussion of res gestae came in the context
of its discussion of the Court of Appeals’
decision in State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14,
878 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994). Nevertheless,
the district court’s analysis concluded: “Re-
gardless of what we call such evidence, the
Court concludes that it is admissible under
Rules 403 and 404(b).” Thus, the district
court’s decision was consistent with our hold-
ing in Kralovec, as the district court made its
decision based upon the “criteria established
by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.” Kralovec,
161 Idaho at 574, 388 P.3d at 588,

TH Finally, we are unable to accept
Folk’s argument that the evidence was so
confusing, misleading, and unfairly prejudi-
cial that it suggested that the jury should
reach its decision on an improper basis. Folk
does not attempt to show that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting the
evidence under an erroneous Rule 403 analy-
sis, The district court instructed the jury that
Folks could only be convicted for the act of
tickling Child or touching his hips. “We must

presume that the jury followed the jury in-
structions in arriving at their verdict.” Wein-
stein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149
Idaho 299, 835, 288 P.8d 1221, 1257 (2010).
We hold that Folk has not shown that the
district court abused its discretion by admit-
ting the evidence of the alleged oral-genital
contact.

C. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it excluded evidence
of Child’s prior testimony.

Folk argues that the district court errone-
ously excluded Child’s prior sworn testimony.
Folk contends that the prior testimony was
admissible for substantive purposes under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) and for
impeachment purposes under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 618(). We address these argu-
ments in turn.

1. Folk’s argument based on Rule
801(d)(1)(A) was not preserved
for appeal.

HN Folk argues that Child’s prior
testimony was admissible non-hearsay pursu-
ant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A). However, Folk fails
to point to any place in the record where the
evidence was presented to the district court
as admissible non-hearsay evidence under
Rule 801. “This Court does not review an
alleged error on appeal unless the record
discloses an adverse ruling forming the basis
for the assignment of error.” Morrison v. St.
Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr, Ltd., 160 Idaho 599,
608, 877 P.8d 1062, 1071 (2016) (quoting Ada
Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Invs.,
LLC, 145 Idaho 860, 368, 179 P.3d 328, 331
(2008)). At best, Folk points to this exchange
at trial:

[FOLK’S STANDBY COUNSEL]: Your

Honor, maybe we should just publish the

testimony of his previous—the transcript

of his previous testimony, since the witness
doesn’t remember anything.

THE COURT: Well, again, there’s no need

to publish it if he doesn’t deny it. I think

the mode of impeachment is you just ask
him about it. Right? Certainly, though, if
it’s under oath, it could be extrinsic evi-
dence, if he’s denying it. But I don’t think

he’s denying it. If he denies that he made
the statement, then extrinsic evidence is
admissible. If he doesn’t deny it, then im-
peachment is complete.

And I’m just basically quoting Rule 618.
Based on the district court’s statements and
surrounding context of the transcript, it is
clear that the evidentiary basis upon which
Folk sought to introduce the prior testimony
was Idaho Rule of Evidence 613. As neither
Folk nor his standby counsel advanced Rule
801 as a basis for introducing the testimony
as admissible non-hearsay, we hold that the
issue was not preserved for appeal.

2. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding Child’s prior
testimony pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Evidence 613(b).

WM Folk argues the district court
abused its discretion when it did not allow
Folk to introduce extrinsic evidence of
Child’s prior testimony when Child stated
that he did not remember having previously
testified as to a number of subjects. In sup-
port of his argument, Folk cites to broad
swaths of the trial transcript:

The district court erred by not allowing

Mr, Folk to introduce extrinsic evidence of

[Child’s] prior sworn testimony when

[Child] stated, over and over again, that he

did not remember issues to which he had

previously testified. (See generally Tr. Vol.

IT, p. 489, L.2~p.445, L.21, p.463, L.22-

p.488, L.18, p.498, L.1-p.516, 1.20.) The

district court repeatedly told Mr. Folk it

would only let him introduce [Child’s] prior

sworn testimony if [Child] denied making a

statement he had previously made, but

that he could not introduce prior sworn
testimony if [Child] merely said he did not.
remember whether he made the statement.

(Tr, Vol. I, p.483, L.19~p.434, L.4 (“You're

asking him if he remembers.... Essential-

ly we need to know whether [reading the
transcript] would cause him to change his
answer ... And if not, then you need to go
on and ask a different question in a differ-
ent way.”), p.451, L.25-p.452, L.5 (“{Hle’s
being asked if this would refresh his recol-
lection. Generally he’s been saying some-
times that it does, sometimes that it

629

doesn’t. And that’s different than impeach-
ing with prior inconsistent testimony. And
not remembering isn’t necessarily inconsis-
tent.”), p.467, Ls.21-25 (“If he says he
doesn’t remember, that’s not the same as
denying it. If he looked at it and said,
yeah, I may have said that in the first trial
but I don’t remember now, then you've
made your point and you get to move on.”),
p.505, Ls.5-7 (“If he denies that he made
the statement, then extrinsic evidence is
admissible. If he doesn’t deny it, then im-
peachment is complete.”), p.507, Ls.3-5
(“{I]f he denies it, confront him with it. If
he still denies it, I'll let extrinsic evidence
in. If he doesn’t deny it, then you've made
your point.”),
Folk cites to the Court of Appeals decision in
Preuss v. Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 780 P.2d
1089 (Ct, App. 1986). There, the Court of
Appeals interpreted Idaho Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 43(b)(8), since replaced by Idaho Rule
of Evidence 618, and held that “[t]estimony
by a witness that he or she cannot remember
is sufficient to complete the foundation for
impeachment with a prior inconsistent state-
ment.” Preuss, 112 Idaho at 171, 780 P.2d at
1091.

TI Folk’s briefing cites to large por-
tions of the record generally, but not to any
specific instance of an alleged erroneous rul-
ing by the district court. Compounding the
problem, Folk’s citations broadly cover in-
stances where both Folk and the district
court discussed issues relating to refreshing
a witness’ memory under Idaho Rule of Evi-
dence 612 as well as impeaching a witness
with prior inconsistent statements under Ida-
ho Rule of Evidence 613. Folk makes no
attempt to differentiate the district court’s
evidentiary rulings; rather, Folk lumps them
all together under the broad assertion that
the prior statements were admissible under
Rule 618(b), and the district court erred.
“This Court will not search the record on
appeal for error.” Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho
872, 875, 234 P.3d 696, 699 (2010).

To the extent that Folk has identified spe-
cific statements by the district court, we can
find no error. The district court recognized
that Child’s prior testimony could be used as
extrinsic evidence to impeach Child’s incon-

630

sistent statements under Rule 613 and that
an admission that the prior statements were
made following Child's testimony that he
could not remember making the statements
completed the impeachment. “The trial court
has broad diseretion in the admission and
exclusion of evidence and its decision to ad-
mit evidence will be reversed only when
there has been a clear abuse of that discre-
tion,” State v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375,
877, 860 P.8d 1056, 1058 (2015) (quoting State
v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.8d 436,
488 (2005). Folk frankly concedes that many
of the evidentiary rulings and exchanges
were muddled during the trial. We conclude
that Folk has not shown a clear instance
where the district court abused its discretion,

D. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted Detective
Galbreaith’s testimony.

HH Folk argues the district court erred
by admitting Detective Galbreaith’s testimo-
ny that Child told Galbreaith that Folk put
his mouth on Child’s genitals during an inter-
view. Folk contends that he did not “open the
door” to Galbreaith’s testimony by eliciting
Child’s testimony about the interview or
reading portions of the transcript of the in-
terview into the record. Folk concludes that
Galbreaith’s testimony was inadmissible
hearsay because the out-of-court statement
made by Child was used to prove the truth of
the matter asserted and it was not offered to
rebut an express or implied charge of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or to rehabilitate Child.

The State responds that Folk did indeed
open the door for Galbreaith’s testimony and
that Folk fails to address the actual ruling of
the district court. The State contends that
the district court specifically admitted the
testimony for the purpose of evaluating
Child’s credibility rather than substantive ev-
idence and properly instructed the jury not
to consider Galbreaith’s testimony for the
truth of Child’s statement.

During his cross-examination of Child,
Folk initiated the following exchange:

[DEFENDANT FOLK]: When did you tell

your mom that Jon put his mouth on your

penis?

A: I don’t remember.

Q: Do you remember having an interview
with this man, Detective Galbreaith?

A: Um, no,

DEFENDANT FOLK: Your Honor, I
would ask the State to stipulate that
[Child] did have an interview with Detec-
tive Galbreaith,

(STATE'S COUNSEL]: That’s fine. I'll
stipulate to that,

THE COURT: Okay. Fine. The record will
reflect that there was an interview.

DEFENDANT FOLK: Do you remember

saying—do you remember telling the de-

tective that Jon—that he didn’t actually

touch me?

A: No.

Q: Would it help to refresh your memory if

you looked at the transcript?

A: Maybe. I don’t know.

DEFENDANT FOLK: Your Honor, Pd

like to publish the interview with Detective

Galbreaith.

THE COURT: Which transcript are you

referring to?

DEFENDANT FOLK: The interview of

[Child] and Detective Galbreaith,

THE COURT: [State’s Counsel]?

(STATE’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, this

one doesn’t get published. It’s not the rec-

ord,

THE COURT: Right. You're asking to

publish it. Do you mean you want to have

the witness shown it to look at but not

show it to the jury?

DEFENDANT FOLE: Oh, that’s correct.

THE COURT: Is that what you're asking

for?

DEFENDANT FOLK: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. If you want him to

see that, then you may show it to him,

DEFENDANT FOLK: Great. Would the

court like to use the official copy or—
At that point in the examination, Folk was
unable to produce the correct transcript of
the interview. Instead, he questioned Child
on other subjects until the correct transcript
was located. Later in the cross-examination,

Folk returned to the issue of Child’s inter-

view:
DEFENDANT FOLK: Your Honor, I
would ask the court to ask the State to
stipulate that they've received a copy of
Detective Galbreaith’s interview, an en-
hanced copy.
[STATE’S COUNSEL]: We have it. So we
I think that’s it there.
THE COURT: I understand it’s been sup-
plied to the State. If it didn’t, ’m sure—
[STATE'S COUNSEL]: It’s right there,
Your Honor,
THE COURT: I’m sorry. I thought it had
been,
ISTATE’S COUNSEL]: We made a copy
of that,
THE COURT: Okay. The State now has a
copy of it, Go ahead, Mr. Folk.
DEFENDANT FOLK: Does the court
have a copy of it also?
THE COURT: I think they got the court’s
copy.
THE CLERK: No,
THE COURT: We have one for ourselves?
Yes, so we have one.
DEFENDANT FOLK: Excellent.
DEFENDANT FOLK: [Child], do you re-
member the interview with Detective Gal-
breaith?
A: Nope.
Q: You don’t remember it at all?
A: No. I kind of remember it, but—
Q: Earlier you said that when Jon was—
put his mouth on your penis, that there
was a popping sound, Did you ever say
that there was any other descriptions of it?
A: Yeah.
Q: Could you tell me what those were?
A: Be like when you have a sucker and you
kind of pull it out of your mouth, that
sound it makes, that’s what sound.
Q: Did you ever describe it as biting?
A: Not that I remember.
DEFENDANT FOLK: Your Honor, I'd
like to refresh his memory with Detective
Galbreaith’s interview transcript.
THE COURT: Okay. A copy of the tran-
seript is being handed to the witness. And

631

this is for refreshment; is that correct, Mr.
Folk?

This exchange demonstrates that Folk’s
cross-examination of Child raised the subject
of whether Child told Galbreaith that Folk
had not touched him, Although Folk contends
that he did not actually introduce Child’s
statement from the interview, the clear impli-
cation presented to the jury was that Child
told Galbreaith that Folk had not touched
him.

Further, the district court gave the jury a
specific limiting instruction following Gal-
breaith’s testimony:

THE COURT; Okay, Before you ask that

question, I’m going to admonish the jury at

this time similar to what I did yesterday.

‘There’s been some reference to an inter-
view that took place, That interview was
not under oath, The interview was refer-
enced yesterday during the trial in an ef-
fort to impeach the victim, And I advised
you at the end of the victim’s—alleged
victim’s testimony that that evidence of an
unsworn statement that may have been
made to someone is not actual evidence
that you can consider in determining the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. You
can consider that evidence only for the
purpose of determining the credibility of
the witness.

Now today you’ve heard some similar
testimony from the other part of that con-
versation, from the witness that’s now tes-
tifying. The evidence that he’s just given
you about what was said during the inter-
view is not evidence that you can consider
in determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. That’s very important, That
cannot be considered for that purpose, The
only reason that you can consider the testi-
mony you've just heard is in determining
the credibility of the witness and whether
the things he said were credible or not,
And that’s the only purpose for which such
evidence may be considered by you in your
deliberation. Okay?

Folk does not contend that the district
court’s decision to admit the testimony for
purposes of evaluating Child’s credibility was
erroneous or that the district court’s limiting

632

instruction was erroneous. Thus, we hold that.
Folk has not shown that the district court
abused its discretion when it admitted Gal-
breaith’s testimony.

E. The district court did not err when it
denied Folk’s motion for a judgment
of acquittal pursuit to Idaho Criminal
Rule 29(a).

HH At the close of the State’s case, Folk
motioned for a judgment of acquittal under
Idaho Criminal Rule 29, Folk argued that the
State had failed to present substantial and
competent evidence as to Folk’s intent. The
district court denied the motion concluding:

And that on the issue of intent, which
was the only issue specifically addressed.
by the defense, certainly from the totality
of the circumstances I believe the jury can
infer the intent. Certainly there was some
evidence. The court just heard that the
defendant may have had such intent from
witness Blair, But again there was lots of
surrounding circumstances from which it
can be inferred, including some specific
and graphic testimony.

Folk contends that because the State did not
present any evidence that Folk tickled Child
or touched Child’s hips with the intent to
satisfy his sexual desires, no rational trier of
faet could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Folk touched Child with the req-
uisite intent.

Hs As we discussed earlier, “[slpecif-
ic intent may, and ordinarily must, be proved
by cireumstantial evidence.... One’s intent
may be proved by his acts and conduct, and
such is the usual and customary mode of
proving intent.” State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho
124, 182, 488 P.2d 275, 288 (1968) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); State v.
Cheatham, 184 Idaho 565, 572, 6 P,3d 815,
822 (2000).

Under I.C.R. 29, the district court may
set aside a jury verdict and enter judg-
ment of acquittal if the evidence is insuffi-
cient to sustain a conviction, That is be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution guarantees the
right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that as a part of that due
process, no person shall be made to suffer

the onus of a criminal conviction except
upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence
necessary to convince a trier of fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt of the existence of
every element of the offense. However,
appellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence is limited in scope.
State v. Hliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 545, 348 P.8d
157, 160 (2015) (internal citations, quotations,
and alterations omitted). “The relevant inqui-
ry is not whether this Court would find the
defendant to be guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, but whether ‘after viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id, at
546, 848 P.8d at 161 (quoting State v. Adam-
cik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.8d 417, 482
(2012).

We hold that the State presented substan-
tial and competent evidence of Folk’s actions
and conduct such that, when taken in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential element of intent was met be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the dis-
trict court did not err when it denied Folk’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal.

F. The prosecutor did not commit mis-
conduct amounting to fundamental
error,

Hs “On appeal, the standard of re-
view governing claims of prosecutorial mis-
conduct depends on whether the defendant
objected to the misconduct at trial. As a
general rule, we will not consider arguments
made for the first time on appeal.” State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.8d 414,
435 (2009). “When the alleged error consti-
tutes a fundamental error, however, review
on appeal is permissible.” Jd. at 715-16, 215
P.8d at 435-36. “Accordingly, when an objec-
tion to prosecutorial misconduct is not raised
at trial, the misconduct will serve as a basis
for setting aside a conviction only when the
conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in
fundamental error.” Id at 716, 215 P.3d at
436. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
In such an instance, we apply the following
standard of review:

Such review includes a three-prong inquiry
wherein the defendant bears the burden of
persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of
the defendant’s unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need
for any additional information not con-
tained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision); and (8) was
not harmless. If the defendant persuades
the appellate court that the complained of
error satisfies this three-prong inquiry,
then the appellate court shall vacate and
remand,

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.8d
961, 980 (2010).

Folk argues this Court should vacate his
judgment of conviction because the prosecu-
tor committed misconduct amounting to fun-
damental error for various statements made
during closing arguments. Specifically, Folk
argues the prosecutor: (1) asked the jury to
infer facts which the prosecutor knew to be
false; (2) impermissibly commented on Folk’s
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and
Sixth Amendment right to confront Child;
and, (8) impermissibly appealed to the emo-
tions, passions, or prejudices of the jury.
These arguments are addressed in turn.

1, The prosecutor did not ask the jury
to infer facts which the prosecutor
knew to be false.

HM During his closing argument, the
prosecutor referenced Blair’s testimony that
Folk had stated a desire to sexually abuse
children:

You heard testimony from Blaine Blair,
who’s an interesting character. This is
somebody that the defendant lived with,
somebody who he shared secrets with, who
he talked with. You heard him testify that
he saw the defendant go in the bedroom
with [Child]. You heard him testify that
the defendant had stated to him a desire to
sexually abuse children.

Mr. Folk had him on the stand, and he
steered him pretty good on some other
stuff, Didn’t even ask him about that ques-
tion, Didn’t ask him a single thing. When

633

was it supposed to happen? Just, you

know, any sort of argument about that.
Folk argues that the prosecutor implied that
Blair’s testimony was incontrovertible de-
spite knowing that Blair had made a prior
inconsistent statement during his conversa-
tion with Galbreaith.

HE “Generally, both parties are giv-
en wide latitude in making their arguments
to the jury and discussing the evidence and
inferences to be made therefrom.” Severson,
147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.8d at 440. “The Court
has recognized, however, that the line sepa-
rating acceptable from improper advocacy is
not easily drawn; there is often a gray zone.”
State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 182, 146, 384 P.8d
806, 820 (2014) (internal quotation and cita-
tion omitted).

Tt is certainly within the bounds of fair
advocacy for a prosecutor, like any lawyer,
to ask the jury to draw inferences from the
evidence that the prosecutor believes in
good faith might be true. But it is decided-
ly improper for the government to pro-
pound inferences that it knows to be false,
or has very strong reason to doubt, partic-
ularly when it refuses to acknowledge the
error afterwards to either the trial court or
this court and instead offers far-fetched
explanations of its actions. [T]he difference
between a lawyer asking the jury to infer
only things that he believed in good faith
might be true and making factual asser-
tions he well knew were untrue is the
difference between fair advocacy and mis-
conduct.

United States v. Blueford, 312 F.3d 962, 968-
69 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quo-
tations omitted). At issue here is Blair's
statement to Galbreaith during an interview
conducted on January 8, 2008, after the al-
leged incident with Child:

MR. BLAIR: Well, [Folk] left around after

the holidays was done and at New Year's

he came back for his bicycle and just says

you guys are going to miss me and he gave

me a hug and said good-bye and that’s

about it.

OFFICER GALBREAITH: When did he

come back for his bike?

MR. BLAIR: After the holidays.

634

OFFICER GALBREAITH; Okay.

MR. BLAIR: New Year's.

OFFICER GALBREAITH: Do you re-

member what day?

MR. BLAIR: I think it was about Wednes-

day.

OFFICER GALBREAITH; Like a couple

of days ago Wednesday?

MR. BLAIR: No, not a couple days, but -—

OFFICER GALBREAITH: A week and a

couple days?

MR, BLAIR: Right,

OFFICER GALBREAITH: Okay. He told

you he’d miss you and then left, huh?

MR. BLAIR: Right, We were pretty close

and he said to me that he was quit anyway.

OFFICER GALBREAITH: He was quit

what?

MR. BLAIR: Was going to quit having

contact with children.

OFFICER GALBREAITH: Oh, When did

he tell you that?

MR. BLAIR: He told me that several

times,

OFFICER GALBREAITH: Oh.

MR, BLAIR: He also said he was going to

go to Africa.
Folk contends that this interview constitutes
clear impeachment evidence that the prose-
cutor knew was available but could not be
submitted by Folk without opening the door
to evidence of Folk’s prior instances of sexual
abuse with children. Folk’s argument is un-
persuasive. A reasonable reading of the in-
terview is that Folk’s statements that he was
“going to quit having contact with children”
could have been made during a conversation
after the alleged incident, thus, the interview
would not impeach Blair’s testimony that
Folk had previously expressed a desire to
sexually abuse children, Even if this Court
agreed with Folk’s argument that the prose-
eutor implied that Blair’s testimony was “in-
eontrovertible” and not simply “uncontro-
verted,” the record does not support the
contention that the prosecutor knew that im-
plication was false or that the prosecutor did
not have a good faith basis for advancing this
argument.

2. The prosecutor did not impermissibly
comment on Folk’s Fifth Amendment
rights, Sixth Amendment rights, or
impermissibly appeal to the emotions,
passions, and prejudices of the jury.

Hs During his rebuttal closing argu-
ment, the prosecutor stated:

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr, Folk doesn’t
want to be found guilty, And he didn’t
want to be cross-examined. He didn’t want
an attorney asking him questions, The vic-
tim of this crime didn’t get that luxury.
And he stood—he sat here and he was
cross-examined for hours about what had
happened. He’s not the one who’s alleged
to have done something wrong,

Folk contends that these statements were
impermissible commentary on Folk’s Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights, and that the
prosecutor impermissibly appealed to the
emotions, passions, and prejudices of the
jury.

The Fifth Amendment prohibits prose-
cutors from making direct or indirect com-
ments on a defendant's failure to testify in
order to infer guilt. However, the United
States Supreme Court has noted that in
determining whether a prosecutor’s com-
ment violated the Fifth Amendment, a
court should not lightly infer that a prose-
cutor intends an ambiguous remark to
have its most damaging meaning or that a
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation,
will draw that meaning from the plethora
of less damaging interpretations. Addition-
ally, such comments must be evaluated in
light of defense conduct and in the context
of the entire trial.

Severson, 147 Idaho at 718-19, 215 P.8d at

438-89 (internal citations and quotations

omitted) (emphasis added). The record shows

the prosecutor’s comments do not rise to the
level of fundamental error based on Folk’s
conduct, closing argument, and the context of
the entire trial. The relevant portion of

Folk’s closing argument is as follows:

[FOLK]: You may have noticed that I did
not testify this time. I have testified be-
fore.

[STATE'S COUNSEL]; Objection. Your
Honor. I don’t think this is proper argu-
ment in any sort of way.

THE COURT: Well, so far, I don’t find it
improper, inasmuch as the state’s already
produced evidence that he testified before.
So I don’t think he has said anything so far
the jury doesn’t know. But I’m listening
very intently to make sure he stays within
the bounds of the law.

DEFENDANT FOLK: Thank you.

It is a horror to be charged with a crime
and to be innocent. If I protest too much, I
will be seen as guilty. If I get angry, I will
be seen as guilty. If I forget a fact under
the heat of interrogation, I may be seen as
guilty.

People often do not believe the accused
who testifies because they think that he
may not only be guilty of a crime, but he
may take the oath and lie under oath to
escape conviction, Nothing I say on the
‘witness stand can ever acquit me.

I stand before you now as pleading not
guilty. Taking the stand allows the prose-
eutor to make the most innocent person
look guilty. And anyway, the state has
failed to prove its case. They cannot prove
what was not in my mind any more than
the state can prove what was in my mind.

What is there for me to rebut that
standing here before you that pleading not
guilty does not rebut? I know two things: I
know I’m not guilty of this crime, and I
now the state did not prove me guilty of
this crime.

I know you must be afraid; what if you
convict an innocent man? “What if you fail
to do justice? I have to tell you for the last
two days—excuse me, three days, I have
been scared to death, Representing myself
is the hardest thing that I’ve ever had to
do. It’s the bravest thing that I’ve ever did.
Please put an end to this madness and find
me innocent; not just not guilty, but find
me innocent,

Please hold to your oath to hold the
state to its burden to prove that I had—
that I had sexual contact with [Child], and
your verdict will be innocent.

It appears that the prosecutor’s comments
were made in response to Folk’s assertion
that taking the stand allows a prosecutor to
make innocent people look guilty. “Prosecu-
torial misconduct rises to the level of funda-

635

mental error if it is ‘calculated to inflame the
minds of jurors and arouse passion or preju-
dice against the defendant, or is so inflamma-
tory that the jurors may be influenced to
determine guilt on factors outside the evi-
dence.’” State v. Sheahan, 189 Idaho 267,
280, 77 P.8d 956, 969 (2008) (quoting State v
Babb, 125 Idaho 984, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913
(1994), Although arguments of the type ad-
vanced by the prosecutor are not to be en-
couraged, we are unable to conclude that
they were not made in response to Folk’s
explanation for not taking the stand or were
“calculated to inflame the minds” of the ju-
rors and influence them to determine guilt on
factors outside of the evidence.

HM “A conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only when the con-
duct is sufficiently egregious as to result in
fundamental error.” Sheahan, 189 Idaho at
280, 77 P.8d at 969. “More specifically, prose-
cutorial misconduct during closing arguments
will constitute fundamental error only if the
comments were so egregious or inflammatory
that any consequent prejudice could not have
been remedied by a ruling from the trial
court informing the jury that the comments
should be disregarded.” Jd. (internal quota-
tion omitted). Following the prosecutor's
closing argument, the district court instruct-
ed the jury as follows:

One thing that I feel legally bound to
address at this time, just to remind the
jury—I wouldn’t normally do this, but at
the beginning of [the prosecutor’s] rebut-
tal he did mention that the defendant
didn’t want to be cross-examined by the
prosecutor. I understand why he made
that comment. Certainly it’s a response to
something that was said by the defendant
himself in his closing argument.

But I do need to remind the jury that
its important that you consider and re-
member instruction 14-A, And 14-A says
that you must not draw any inference of
guilt from the fact that the defendant has
not testified, nor should this fact be dis-
cussed by you or enter into your delibera-
tions in any way.

Those are things that we don’t talk
about and probably shouldn’t have been

636

brought up. So please disregard any com-

ment to the defendant's failure to testify.
We hold that any error on the part of the
prosecutor did not rise to the level of funda-
mental error because it was promptly remed-
ied by an instruction from the district court
to disregard such statements,

G. The cumulative error doctrine is not
applicable in this case.

HM Folk argues that this Court should
vacate his judgment of conviction because,
even if all of the alleged errors are individu-
ally harmless, the accumulation of errors de-
prived Folk of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process of law and a fair trial. As
we have found no error, the cumulative error
doctrine is not applicable.

IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm Folk’s judgment of conviction.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices JONES,
BRODY, and Justice Pro Tem EISMANN

concur,

402 P.3d 1089

In the Matter of the Doe Children,
Children Under Eighteen (18)
Years of Age.

Jane DOE I (2017-13), Petitioner-
Appellant,
ve
Jane DOE II, Respondent.
Docket No. 44874

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, July 2017 Term.

Filed: September 21, 2017

Tit

James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d’Al-
ene, for appellant. Monica Flood Brennan
argued,

Jane Doe II, respondent pro se argued.

637
BRODY, Justice.

This case involves a petition for co-adop-
tion of two children. The Court addresses the
following issues: (1) whether there is a basis
for claiming legal error where a magistrate
judge expresses a likely outcome of a motion,
but does not actually hear the matter or
enter an order; (2) whether an order vacating
a final judgment is appealable under Idaho
Appellate Rule 11(a); and (8) whether a
guardian gave sufficient legal consent to an
adoption.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Jane Doe II (“Grandmother”) has been
raising her two young granddaughters, VG
and CG, since they were born. Grandmother
met Jane Doe I (“Former Girlfriend”) soon
after CG’s birth. Grandmother and Former
Girlfriend were involved in a romantic rela-
tionship and moved to Idaho with the girls in
July 2010, where they all lived together for
several months. Soon after arriving, Grand-
mother ended the relationship with Former
Girlfriend. Former Girlfriend moved out of
the home, but continued to care for the girls.

In June 2011, Grandmother became legal
guardian of both girls, In March 2018,
Grandmother filed a petition to make Former
Girlfriend a co-guardian because she thought
it would ensure that the girls would remain
together if something happened to her.
About a year later, Grandmother and For-
mer Girlfriend filed a joint petition to termi-
nate the biological parents’ rights and co-
adopt the girls.

About a year after the parties’ joint peti-
tion was filed, their attorney noticed the
matter for hearing. A few minutes before the
hearing was scheduled to take place, the
parties’ attorney spoke with Judge Peterson
who was assigned to hear the matter. During
the conversation, Judge Peterson expressed
that he likely would not grant the petition for
co-adoption because “the parties aren’t mar-
ried and that they apparently don’t have an
intention to be together as a couple.” Judge
Peterson made it clear he was not refusing to
hold a hearing. The parties’ attorney con-

638

firmed that the parties were making the
decision to call down the hearing,

After their attorney spoke with Judge Pe-
terson, the lawyer met with Grandmother
and Former Girlfriend in the hall to discuss
their options. The option agreed upon was
for each party to adopt one child while main-
taining a guardianship over the other child,
The parties then went into the courtroom
and, under oath, agreed to the conditions
before Judge Wayman, another magistrate
judge in the courthouse. The written agree-
ments to adopt that were prepared prior to
the hearing were changed to reflect that
Former Girlfriend would adopt CG and
Grandmother would adopt VG. The parties
each signed their own adoption agreement in
front of Judge Wayman. During the hearing
on the matter, Judge Wayman granted the
petition to terminate the biological parents’
rights and granted the separate adoptions,
No written orders or judgments were en-
tered at that time. .

Less than two months after the termi-
nation/adoption hearing with Judge Wayman,
Grandmother told Former Girlfriend that she
would not drop off the girls at Former Girl-
friend’s home as she had traditionally done
under their childcare arrangement unless
they were able to agree upon a custody plan,
This was apparently due to a new romantic
relationship between Former Girlfriend and
another woman that had created some ten-
sion between the parties. The next day,
Judge Wayman entered a written judgment
terminating the biological parents’ rights and
granting Former Girlfriend’s adoption of CG.
Once that judgment was entered, Former
Girlfriend sent the police to Grandmother's
house to remove CG from Grandmother’s
home. The child was not at home. The police
made two other efforts to remove the child
from Grandmother which were not success-
ful, Ultimately, Former Girlfriend went to
Grandmother's home and physically removed
oG.

On August 18, 2015, Former Girlfriend
filed a motion in the pre-adoption guardian-
ship case to obtain temporary physical custo-~
dy of CG and to terminate the guardianship
of Grandmother. The record for the pre-
adoption guardianship case was not made

part of this appeal, but Grandmother testi-
fied that the court handling the guardianship
proceeding granted Former Girlfriend physi-
eal custody of CG around August 20, 2015,
Grandmother also testified that the magis-
trate handling the guardianship proceeding
told her that once an adoption is entered a
guardianship is automatically terminated.
Grandmother testified that she agreed to the
termination of the guardianship for each
child based on that understanding and be-
cause she did not have the resources to chal-
lenge the decision,

On September 11, 2015, Grandmother filed
a motion to set aside the adoption judgment
entered in favor of Former Girlfriend, alleg-
ing that Former Girlfriend committed fraud
because she had no intention of allowing
Grandmother to have continued guardianship
over CG. Judge Combo presided over the
motion to set aside the judgment. He held an
evidentiary hearing on Grandmother’s mo-
tion in late November 2015. In December
2015, Judge Combo issued a decision from
the bench. He vacated both adoptions be-
cause the court found clear and convincing
evidence of fraud, In January 2016, Former
Girlfriend appealed the decision to set aside
the adoption to the district court. The district
court dismissed the appeal, ruling that there
was no final judgment entered by Judge
Combo, Former Girlfriend did not appeal the
district court’s dismissal of the appeal.

In August 2016, Former Girlfriend filed a
separate proceeding to have herself appoint-
ed as co-guardian of CG. Grandmother also
filed a separate proceeding, and the two
cases were consolidated. In December 2016,
Grandmother was granted sole guardianship
of both children, It does not appear that
Former Girlfriend appealed that determina-
tion nor is that case part of the record on
appeal,

In late December 2016, Former Girlfriend
filed a motion for summary judgment in this
case seeking co-adoption of both girls and
orders of guardianship or visitation based on
the parties’ original petition for co-adoption,
In response, Grandmother filed a motion to
dismiss the petition, stating that she no
longer wished to have the co-adoption go
forward. Judge Combo denied Former Girl-

friend’s motion for summary judgment be-
cause Grandmother (the sole guardian) must
give consent to the adoption and Grand-
mother did not consent. Judge Combo
granted Grandmother’s motion to dismiss
and entered a judgment of dismissal. For-
mer Girlfriend now appeals what she alleges
was Judge Peterson’s decision to deny the
petition for co-adoption, Judge Combo’s de-
cision on the motion to set aside the adop-
tion judgments based on fraud, and the
judgment of dismissal in favor of Grand-
mother based on lack of consent to the co-
adoption,

Tl. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate review of a district court’s rul-
ing on a motion for summary judgment is
the same as that required of the district
judge when ruling on the motion. Under
LR.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment is ap-
propriate when the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law, This Court must
Hberally construe ... the record in favor
of the party opposing the motion and draw
«+. all reasonable inferences and conclu-
sions in that party's favor. Summary judg-
ment is not appropriate if the evidence is
conflicting on material issues, or if reason-
able minds could reach different conclu-
sions.

Massey v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 156 Idaho
476, 479, 828 P.8d 456, 459 (2014) (internal
quotations and citations omitted),

Il, ANALYSIS

1. There is no basis for a claim of error
where Judge Peterson did not rule
upon the co-adoption petition.

Hs Former Girlfriend argues that Judge
Peterson erred by rejecting the June 2015
petition for co-adoption. She argues she
should have been able to enter into a co-
adoption because under Idaho Code section
16-1501 marriage is not a requirement to
adopt and therefore, her constitutional rights
were violated. The problem with Former

639

Girlfriend’s position is that Judge Peterson
did not enter an order or make any ruling
denying the petition for co-adoption.

Judge Peterson had a verbal exchange
with the parties’ attorney wherein he ex-
pressed his concerns about the proposed co-
adoption—not because the ladies were in-
volved in a same-sex relationship—but be-
cause they were not involved in any commit-
ted relationship, Judge Peterson stated:

The Court’s concern is that that the
parties aren’t married and that they appar-
ently really don’t have an intention to be
together as a couple. Were they married, I
would give full faith and credit to that and
I would consider permitting both of them
to adopt if the statutory elements were
otherwise met. Here though, they are not
married and they're not even in a dating
relationship at this time, and frankly, the
same-sex issue is to me a red herring, This
court in its discretion would not permit
boyfriend/girlfriend even in the dating re-
lationship to adopt. One of them could
adopt, but there is just no permanence or
structure without that committed union
there, and it would leave the child in limbo
if the guardianship ended, and it’s just a
very troubling situation from a rights and
custody standpoint, so having had that dis-
cussion with [counsel] he indicated that he
was going to call down today’s hearing.
He goes on to further clarify:

And [counsel], also just for the record, I
think we discussed the Court [is] not pro-
hibiting you from having a hearing. We
had a discussion. J indicated how the Court
would likely exercise its discretion, and it’s
your request to call down this hearing. I
don’t want the record to suggest that the
Court is prohibiting you from having a
hearing,

To which counsel responded:

I understood that, Judge, and my clients
have consented under the circumstances to
call down the hearing pending further re-
flection on their part whether or not they
want to go forward with their relationship
from a marital standpoint or if they wish to
just pursue so that one of them adopts. It
does not prohibit one of them to still main-
tain the status as guardian.

640

Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a) sets out what,
decisions are reviewable in civil actions. It
listed the following in June 2015 when Judge
Peterson had his conversation with the par-
ties’ attorney:

(1) Final judgments, as defined in Rule
54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, including judgments of the district
court granting or denying peremptory
writs of mandate and prohibition.

» (2) Decisions by the district court dis-

missing, affirming, reversing or remanding

an appeal,

(8) Judgments made pursuant to a par-
tial judgment certified by the trial court to
be final as provided by Rule 54(b), LR.C.P.

(@) Any order or judgment of con-
tempt.

(6) An order granting or refusing a
new trial, including such orders which con-
tain a conditional grant or denial of a new
trial subject to additur and remittitur.

() An order granting or denying a mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict.

(%) Any order made after final judg-
ment including an order denying a motion
to set aside a default judgment, but exclud-
ing an order granting a motion to set aside
a default judgment.

(8) Any order appealable under the
Uniform Arbitration Act, Title Seven,
Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code,

(9) A district court order designating a
person a vexatious litigant pursuant to Ida-
ho Court Administrative Rule 59, in which
case the notice of appeal may be filed with
either the district court clerk or the Clerk
of the Supreme Court.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) in

June 2015 defined “judgment” as:

“... “Judgment” as used in these rules
means a separate document entitled
“Judgment” or “Decree”. A judgment shall
state the relief to which a party is entitled
on one or more claims for relief in the
action. Such relief can include dismissal
with or without prejudice.... A judgment
or partial judgment must begin with the
words “JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS
FOLLOWS ...,” and it shall not contain

any other wording between those words
and the caption.

In order for this Court to exercise its
power of judicial review, there must be an
actual decision by the trial court. Judge Pe-
terson expressed his concerns to the parties’
attorney about the petition for co-adoption,
but he did not actually hear the matter or
enter any type of order or judgment which is
reviewable under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a).
Instead of moving forward with a hearing,
the parties, with the advice of their attorney,
elected to cancel the hearing and proceed
with two separate adoptions. That was their
choice, Because Judge Peterson did not enter
an order or judgment for this Court to re-
view, there is no basis for a claim of error on
appeal.

2. Former Girlfriend failed to timely ap-
peal Judge Combo’s decision to vacate
the adoption judgment.

Wl Former Girlfriend claims that Judge
Combo erred when he vacated the adoption
judgment for CG because there was not clear
and convincing evidence of fraud. This Court
does not have jurisdiction to hear this issue
because it was not timely appealed to this
Court,

Judge Combo entered an order vacating
the adoption judgments for both girls on
December 10, 2015. Former Girlfriend timely
appealed Judge Combo’s decision to the dis-
trict court on January 14, 2016. The district
court dismissed the appeal on January 22,
2016, ruling that there was no final judgment
from which to appeal. Former Girlfriend did
not appeal the district court’s decision to
dismiss the appeal.

To determine whether Former Girlfriend’s
appeal is timely, it is important to recognize
that Judge Combo made two separate deci-
sions—the decision to vacate the adoption
judgment and the subsequent decision to dis-
miss the petition for co-adoption based on
Grandmother's refusal to consent. These two
decisions give rise to two different appeal
rights.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 88(a) sets
forth the scope of appeals from decisions of
magistrates. The rule at the time of Judge

Combo’s decision to set aside the adoption
judgment stated in relevant part:

An appeal from any final judgment, as
defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, granting or denying a pe-
tition for termination of parental rights or
granting or denying a petition for adoption
must be taken to the Idaho Supreme Court
in accord with Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1.
Otherwise, absent an order allowing a per-
missive appeal pursuant to Idaho Appel-
late Rule 12.1, an appeal must first be
taken to the district judges division of the
district cowrt from any of the following
judgments or orders rendered by a magis-
trate:

(@) A final judgment in a civil action or

a special proceeding commenced, or
assigned to, the magistrate’s divi-
sion of the district court,

(2) Any of the judgments or orders in

an action in the magistrate’s divi-
sion which would be appealable
from the district cowrt to the Su-
preme Cowt under Rule 11 of the
Idaho Appellate Rules,
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 83(a) (empha-
sis added), Idaho Appellate Rule 11 expressly
stated that “any order made after final judg-
ment” gave rise to an appeal as a matter of
right. Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(7).

Former Girlfriend recognized that she did
not have the right to appeal Judge Combo’s
decision to vacate the adoption judgment di-
rectly to this Court because it was not a final
judgment denying a petition for adoption as
required by the first sentence of Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 83(a). Instead, she recog-
nized that her appeal of Judge Combo’s deci-
sion had to be filed with the district court.
The appeal was proper under Idaho Appel-
Jate Rule 11(a)(7) because Judge Combo's
decision to vacate the adoption judgment was
an order made after final judgment. The
district court’s decision to dismiss the appeal
because of a lack of finality was erroneous
and appealable to this Court under Idaho
Appellate Rule 11(a)(2), which provided for
an appeal as a matter of right of “decisions
by the district court dismissing, affirming,
reversing or remanding an appeal.” The dis-
trict court’s decision to dismiss Former Girl-

641

friend’s: appeal was entered on January 22,
2016, Under Idaho Appellate Rule 14, For-
mer Girlfriend had 42 days from that date to
appeal the district court’s decision. No appeal
was taken, and we do not have jurisdiction to
review Judge Combo’s order vacating the
adoption judgment.

There are harsh consequences for the fail-
ure to timely appeal. We have long held that
the “failure to comply with time restrictions
is jurisdictional ‘and shall cause automatic
dismissal of such appeal.’” Goodman Oil Co.
v. Scotty’s Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc, 147
Idaho 56, 58-59, 205 P.8d 1192, 1194-95
(2009); see also L.A.R. 21. The Court recog-
nizes that there has been much focus on the
issue of finality of judgments in recent years,
but it is important for litigants to recognize
that the scope of appellate review set forth in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 is broader than just
final judgments.

8. Judge Combo did not err when he dis-
missed the petition for co-adoption
based on the failure of written con-
sent,

TM After the district court dismissed
Former Girlfriend’s appeal of Judge Combo’s
decision to vacate the adoption judgment,
Former Girlfriend filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment seeking to enforce the par-
ties’ original petition for co-adoption. Grand-
mother objected to the motion for summary
judgment and filed a motion to dismiss the
joint petition. Judge Combo granted Grand-
mother’s motion to dismiss because Grand-
mother did not consent to the co-adoption.
Former Girlfriend contends that Grandmoth-
er consented to the co-adoption when she
filed the joint petition and when she signed
an adoption agreement in front of Judge
Wayman. Former Girlfriend contends that
Grandmother cannot revoke consent based
on this Court’s decision in Petition of Steve
B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 728 P.2d 829 (1986). We
affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
petition for co-adoption.

Idaho Code section 16-1504(f) requires that
a legally appointed custodian or guardian
consent to an adoption if there is no other
parent. That consent must be in writing un-
der Idaho Code section 16-1506(2) and in a

642

form substantially consistent with the provi-
sions of Idaho Code section 16-2005(4).
Among other requirements, Idaho Code sec-
tion 16-2005(4) requires the signing of the
consent document to be witnessed by a dis-
trict judge, magistrate of a district court or
equivalent judicial officer,

Given our decision in Steve B.D., where we
held that once a parent or guardian gives
consent for a specified individual to adopt a
child, that consent cannot be revoked and
becomes permanent, we require strict com-
pliance with the requirements of Idaho Code
sections 16-1506(2) and 16-2005(4). The peti-
tion for co-adoption filed by the parties in
2014 was not sufficient written consent for
the adoption. It was merely a petition and
did not contain the type of language set forth
in Section 16-2005(4), and it was not signed in
the presence of a judge.

Wl Former Girlfriend also argues that
Grandmother consented to the adoption
when she signed an adoption agreement wit-
nessed by Judge Wayman on June 11, 2015.
The adoption agreement signed by Grand-
mother stated:

COME NOW, the Petitioner, [Grand-
mother], at the time set for hearing of
their petition for Adoption of the above-
named minor child, [VG], and do hereby
execute this written agreement that the
said minor child shall be adopted by her
and treated in all respects as their own
lawful child should be treated.

This adoption agreement did not comply with
the requirements of section 16-2005(4). This
adoption agreement does not contain any ex-
pression of Grandmother’s consent to For-
mer Girlfriend’s adoption of CG. In fact, it
does not pertain to CG or Former Girlfriend
at all. Because Grandmother did not consent
in writing to Former Girlfriend’s adoption of
either girl, Judge Combo properly dismissed
the petition for co-adoption.

IV. CONCLUSION

The statements made by Judge Peterson
are not reviewable because they do not con-
stitute a final decision or judgment, therefore
that issue is not properly before this Court.
Additionally, this Court does not have juris-

diction to decide whether Judge Combo’s
order vacating the adoption judgment based
on fraud was in error because Former Girl-
friend’s appeal was not timely. Lastly, Judge
Combo did not err when he dismissed the
petition for co-adoption because Grandmoth-
er did not give legally sufficient written con-
sent. We award costs on appeal to Grand-
mother.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, W. JONES, and HORTON

concur,

402 P.3d 1095
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
vy.
Trevor Glenn LEE, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No, 44932

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, August 2017 Term,

Filed: September 22, 2017

on)
| :

3 ii

Eric D, Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Andrea
'W. Reynolds, Depute State Appellate Public
Defender argued.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica
M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice,

Trevor Glenn Lee appeals the Payette
County district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. As part of his plea agreement, Lee
reserved the right to challenge the denial of
his suppression motion on appeal. The dis-
trict court concluded the pat-down frisk was
reasonable under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), but the
officer exceeded the scope of the frisk by
opening the containers found in Lee’s pocket.
However, the district court concluded the
search of the containers was permissible as a
search incident to Lee’s arrest because, prior
to the search, the officer had probable cause
to arrest Lee for driving without privileges
and the search was substantially contempora-
neous with the arrest. The court of appeals
agreed and affirmed the district court’s deni-
al of Lee’s motion to suppress. We reverse.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2015, Officer Laurenson of the
Fruitland Police Department observed Tre-
vor Lee driving a pickup. Officer Laurenson
suspected that Lee might be driving without
a valid license due to a prior encounter and
confirmed through dispatch that Lee’s li-
cense was indeed suspended. Officer Lauren-
son then observed Lee park in a Maverik
parking lot and enter the store. He later
observed Lee exit the store and start to walk
on the highway instead of getting back into
his pickup. Officer Laurenson pulled in be-
hind Lee, activated his patrol lights, and
made contact with Lee.

During the initial contact, Officer Lauren-
son asked Lee why he left his truck back at
the Maverik store. Lee responded that he

646

wanted to walk. Officer Laurenson then
asked Lee for his driver's license. Lee said
that he did not have his license on him while
patting his pockets. Officer Laurenson told
Lee not to touch his pockets and asked if he
had any weapons. Once again, Lee began
patting his pockets, mumbling some words.
Officer Laurenson immediately told Lee not
to touch his pockets and to go to the front of
his patrol car, Lee did not move, asking
“What did I do?” Officer Laurenson, once
again, told Lee that he saw him driving with
a suspended license. Officer Laurenson told
Lee another three times to go to the patrol
car, but Lee did not comply, arguing that he
“was not driving.” Finally, on the fifth re-
quest, Lee began to walk towards the patrol
ear, Once Lee made it to the patrol car,
Officer Laurenson began a pat-down frisk for
weapons. During the frisk, Officer Laurenson
felt a large bulge in Lee’s front pocket, Offi-
cer Laurenson felt that the bulge consisted of
several cylindrical items, but one item felt
longer, like a pocketknife, Officer Laurenson
asked Lee for his consent to search his pock-
et; Lee denied his request, but Officer Lau-
renson, not knowing whether the item he felt
was indeed a knife, told Lee that he was
going to anyway, Officer Laurenson pulled
each item out one at a time until he reached
and pulled out the last object, a pocketknife.
Officer Laurenson handeuffed Lee and told
him that he was being “detained right now.”
Officer Laurenson advised Lee that he was
“going to get a citation for driving without
privileges” and in the meantime, that he was
“going to sit in the back of [the] car.”

Once Lee was detained, Officer Laurenson
examined the containers because, based on
his experience and training, he believed the
containers contained evidence of drug activi-
ty. Officer Laurenson opened the container
that he found to be the “most worn” and.
discovered a green leafy substance. He then
opened the other container and discovered a
powdery residue. Officer Laurenson arrested
Lee and charged him with Possession of a
Controlled Substance, Possession of Para-
phernalia, and Driving without Privileges.

Lee moved to suppress the evidence found
during the search, The district court denied
Lee’s motion to suppress. The court conelud-

ed Officer Laurenson was justified in con-
ducting a frisk under Terry. However, the
court concluded that Officer Laurenson ex-
ceeded the scope of a Terry frisk when he
opened the containers because he did not
believe the containers contained weapons,
Nonetheless, the court held that the search
of the containers was permissible as a search
incident to Lee’s arrest because Officer Lau-
renson had probable cause to arrest Lee
based on the driving offense, and the search
was substantially contemporaneous with the
arrest,

The parties entered into a plea agreement,
pursuant to which Lee pled guilty to felony
possession of a controlled substance and the
State dismissed the misdemeanor charges.
The court imposed a unified sentence of four
years, with eighteen months determinate.
The court then suspended the sentence and
placed Lee on probation for three years, The
court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
denial of the motion to suppress and judg-
ment of conviction. Lee timely petitioned for
review to this Court.

IL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Regarding the Terry frisk, was the
district court correct in holding that
the frisk was reasonable, but that the
officer exceeded the permissible scope
under Terry?

2, Under the search incident to arrest
exception, was the district court cor-
rect in holding that the search of the
containers was permissible because the
officer had probable cause to arrest
Lee for driving without privileges prior
to the search regardless of whether
the officer intended to arrest Lee be-
fore finding the drug paraphernalia?

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HN «When addressing a petition for re-
view, this Court will give “serious consider-
ation to the views of the Court of Appeals,
but directly reviews the decision of the lower
court.” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491,
837 P.8d 647, 650 (2014). In reviewing an
order denying a motion to suppress evidence,
this Court applies a bifurcated standard of

review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207,
207 P.8d 182, 183 (2009). This Court will
accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous but will freely
review the trial court’s application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts found. Id.
Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if
they are supported by substantial and com-
petent evidence. State v, Bishop, 146 Idaho
804, 810, 208 P.8d 1208, 1209 (2009).

‘Tv. ANALYSIS

Lee’s constitutional challenges arise exclu-
sively under the United States Constitution,
as Lee makes no argument under the Idaho
Constitution! Lee contends the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress for
two main reasons. First, Officer Laurenson’s
frisk of Lee was not a permissible frisk un-
der Terry. Second, Officer Laurenson’s
search of Lee’s containers was not permitted
under the search incident to arrest exception,
For the reasons discussed below, we reverse
the district court's denial of Lee’s motion to
suppress.

A. The district court correctly concluded
that the frisk was justified under Ter-
ry but that Officer Laurenson exceed-
ed the scope of a permissible frisk
when he opened the containers found
on Lee.

HMM The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects “{t]he
right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend IV. Evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment is subject to the
exclusionary rule, which requires unlawfully

1, “The Idaho Constitution offers protection for
unlawful search and seizure as well. Idaho
Const. art. I, § 17. However, [Lee] does not ar-
gue that Idaho's Constitution provides greater
protection than the U.S. Constitution; thus, our
analysis is limited to the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.” State v. Cohagan, No.
44800, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 659, 662,
2017 WL 3623658 *2 (Idaho July 18, 2017) (cit-
ing In re Doe, 155 Idaho 36, 39 n.2, 304 P.3d
1202, 1205 n.2 (2013).

2, Deterrence of police misconduct is not the only
purpose of the exclusionary rule under Idaho's

647

seized evidence to be excluded.” E.g., Wong
Sun v. United States, 871 U.S. 471, 484-85,
88 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968); State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 108 P.8d 454, 459
(2004). The exclusionary rule requires the
suppression of both “primary evidence ob-
tained as a direct result of an illegal search
or seizure, ... but also evidence later discov-
ered and found to be derivative of an illegali-
ty or fruit of the poisonous tree,’” Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S.Ct.
8380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (quoting Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 388, 341, 60
S.Ct, 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); accord, e9.,
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811-12, 203 P.8d at
1210-11. “Searches conducted without a war-
rant are considered per se unreasonable un-
less they fall into one of the ‘specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions’ to
this general rule.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 815,
208 P.8d at 1214; (quoting State wv
Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295, 756 P.2d
1057, 1059 (1988),

HN One such exception is the Terry
frisk, which permits a pat-down search for
weapons acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under Terry, an
officer may conduct a limited pat-down
search, or frisk, “of the outer surfaces of a
person’s clothing all over his or her body in
an attempt to find weapons.” Bishop, 146
Idaho at 818, 203 P.8d at 1217 (quoting Ter-
ry, 892 U.S. at 16, 80, 88 S.Ct. 1868). “Such a
frisk is only justified when, at the moment of
the frisk, ‘the officer has reason to believe
that the individual he or she is investigating
is ‘armed and presently dangerous to the
officer or to others’ and nothing in the initial

Constitution, rather the exclusionary rule serves
to: “1) provide an effective remedy to persons
who have been subjected to an unreasonable
government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the
police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evi-
dence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the warrant
issuing process; 4) avoid having the judiciary
commit an additional constitutional violation by
considering evidence which has been obtained
gal means; and 5) preserve judicial
Cohagan, No. 44800, 162 Idaho at
221-23, 404 P.3d at 663-65, 2017 WL, 3623658 at
*4-5 n.3 (citing State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,
993, 842 P.2d 660, 672 (1992). However, Lee

648

stages of the encounter dispels the officer’s
belief.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30,
88 S.Ct. 1868). “The test is an objective one
that asks whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonably prudent person
would be justified in concluding that the indi-
vidual posed a risk of danger.” Id. (citing
State v. Henage, 148 Idaho 655, 660-61, 152
P.8d 16, 21-22 (2007); see also Terry, 392
US. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The officer must
indicate “specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from
those facts,” and in light of the officer's
experiences, justify the officer’s suspicion
that the individual is armed and presently
dangerous. Henage, 148 Idaho at 660, 152
P.8d at 21 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88
S.Ct. 1868).

This Court has identified several factors
that influence whether a reasonable person
in the officer’s position would conclude that a
particular individual was armed and danger-
ous, including:

[Whether there were any bulges in the

suspect’s clothing that resembled a weap-

on; whether the encounter took place late
at night or in a high crime area; and
whether the individual made threatening
or furtive movements, indicated that he or
she possessed a weapon, appeared nervous
or agitated, appeared to be under the influ-
ence of alcohol or illegal drugs, was unwill-
ing to cooperate, or had a reputation for
being dangerous.

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218.

HE The district court concluded that
the frisk was reasonable based on Lee’s re-
luctant attitude and noncompliance with Offi-
cer Laurenson’s requests, as well as Lee’s
previous encounter with Officer Laurenson,
where Lee ran when told he would be
searched for drugs.? Here, although Lee was
not violent with Officer Laurenson, he was
uncooperative. Lee did not initially comply

makes no argument concerning the Idaho Con-
stitution.

3. Lee supports his argument, that Officer Lau-
renson’s frisk was unreasonable, by arguing that
the district court clearly erred in two of its factu-
al findings that are relevant to this analysis:
First, the district court found that Lee did not
verbally respond when Officer Laurenson asked
if he was carrying any weapons; and second, the

with Officer Laurenson’s several requests to
go to the front of the patrol car. Further,
although Officer Laurenson may not have
noticed the bulge until after he conducted the
frisk, when he asked Lee whether he had any
weapons, Lee moved his hand towards his
pocket before stating whether he did or did
not. Therefore, although an officer’s “incho-
ate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch, ” for safety is not enough to justify a
frisk, id., (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88
§.Ct. 1868), the specific and articulable facts
in this case, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, and in light of
Officer Laurenson’s experiences, justified Of-
ficer Laurenson’s suspicion that Lee was
armed and dangerous.

HE However, Officer Laurenson ex-
ceeded the permissible scope of the Terry
frisk when he opened the containers, believ-
ing they contained drugs, not weapons.

[T]he permissible scope of a pat-down

search for weapons is limited to the mini-

mum intrusion necessary to reasonably as-
sure the officer that the suspect does not
have a weapon. If the officer is unable to
make an objectively reasonable determina-

tion that an object causing a bulge under a

person’s clothing is not a weapon by feel-

ing its size and density, the officer is enti-
tled to further invade the person’s privacy

only to the extent necessary that such a

determination can be made.

State v. Watson, 143 Idaho 840, 845, 158 P.8d
1186, 1191 (Ct. App. 2007).

HM Once an officer is satisfied that an
object found on the individual’s person does
not contain a weapon, the officer no longer
has a valid reason to further invade the
object. In State v. Faith, the officers per-
formed a Terry frisk on the defendant, found
an Altoids tin on his person, and then opened
the tin to find drug residue and parapherna-
Tia, 141 Idaho 728, 729, 117 P.3d 142, 148 (Ct.

district court found that Officer Laurenson ob-
served a bulge in Lee's front pocket before he
began the frisk. However, according to Lee, Lee
did respond to Officer Laurenson’s question, and
Officer Laurenson did not observe the bulge in
Lee's pocket until after he began the frisk. Our
conclusion that the frisk exceeded the scope of
Terry obviates the need to address Lee’s asser-
tions that the district court erred in its factual
inding,

App. 2005). The Court of Appeals concluded
that the removal of the tin violated the defen-
dant’s Fourth Amendment rights because
“(alfter satisfying themselves that the item
was a container and not a weapon ... the
officers had no valid reason to further invade
{the defendant’s] right to be free of police
intrusion absent reasonable cause to arrest
him,” Jd, at 730, 117 P.8d at 144. The court
further explained that “even if the officers
were justified in removing the tin for their
own protection ... once the container was in
the officers’ possession, the officers no longer
had reason to believe that it posed a threat to
them in either respect.” Id.

Similarly, in this case, Officer Laurenson
exceeded the permissible scope of the Terry
frisk when he opened the containers, because
he did not believe the containers posed a
threat. Officer Laurenson testified that based
on his drug training, he immediately recog-
nized that the items might contain contra-
band. Although Officer Laurenson was per-
mitted to conduct a pat-down frisk of Lee’s
outer clothing for weapons, once Officer Lau-
renson opened the containers, he exceeded
the scope of the permissible Terry frisk.
Thus, the warrantless opening of the contain-
ers violated Lee’s right against unreasonable
searches, unless an exception to the warrant
requirement applies. The district court found
that the search incident to arrest exception
justified the search.

B. The district court erred in concluding
that the search of Lee’s person was a
permissible search incident to arrest.

HM The second well-recognized excep-
tion to the warrant requirement applicable in
this case is the search incident to arrest.
Pursuant to the search incident to arrest
exception, law enforcement officers may
search an arrestee incident to a lawful custo-
dial arrest. Virginia v. Moore, 558 U.S. 164,
176-77, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559
(2008); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 285-36, 94 S.Ct. 467, 88 L.Ed.2d 427
(1978); see also State v. Bawter, 144 Idaho
672, 680, 168 P.3d 1019, 1027 (Ct. App. 2007).
Further, “so long as the search and arrest
are substantially contemporaneous, and the
fruits of the search are not required to estab-

649

lish probable cause for the arrest, the search
need not precisely follow the arrest in order
to be incident to that arrest.” State v. John-
son, 137 Idaho 656, 662, 51 P.8d 1112, 1118
(Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Crabb, 107
Idaho 298, 304, 688 P.2d 1208, 1209 (Ct. App.
1984),

HI Lee contends that the search of the
containers found in Lee’s pocket was not
permitted as a search incident to arrest for
two reasons. First, the probable cause for the
arrest was provided by the fruits of the
search because Officer Laurenson did not
arrest Lee for driving without privileges ei-
ther prior to or after the search and Lee was
not, and could not, have been arrested for
possession of a controlled substance prior to
the search of the containers found in his
pockets. Second, the search of the containers
did not implicate either of the historical ra-
tionales underlying the search incident to
arrest exception—officer safety and evidence
preservation—because (1) Officer Laurenson
stated that he would issue Lee a citation for
the driving offense; and (2) due to the de
minimis nature of the offense, Officer Lau-
renson knew no further evidence of driving
without privileges would be found on Lee’s
person or in the containers.

The State, on the other hand, contends
that for a search to fall within the search
incident to arrest exception all that is re-
quired is that probable cause for any arrest-
able offense exists prior to the search and
that the search be substantially contempora-
neous to the arrest—regardless of the of-
fense for which one is arrested, and even if
the officer is neither making nor contemplat-
ing an actual arrest.

The threshold question involves
probable cause. An officer may perform a
warrantless search only incident to an arrest
that is lawful. “In conformity with the rule at
common law, a warrantless arrest by a law
officer is reasonable [and lawful] under the
Fourth Amendment where there is probable
cause to believe that a criminal offense has
been or is being committed,” Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160
L.Ed.2d 587 (2004).

650

In this case, Officer Laurenson initially
had probable cause to arrest Lee for driving
without privileges before he searched the
containers, because he saw Lee drive and
confirmed Lee was without driving privi-
leges. Thus, the marijuana and methamphet-
amine discovered during the search were not
used to establish probable cause to arrest
Lee.

However, the question still remains: When
Officer Laurenson established that he was
not going to arrest Lee, and rather was only
going to issue a citation, could the officer still
search Lee’s person “incident to arrest” be-
cause he could have arrested him for driving
without privileges, but chose not to?

The United States Supreme Court has re-
peatedly reaffirmed that warrantless
searches incident to a lawful arrest are justi-
fied by two historical rationales: “(1) the need
to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, and (2) the need to preserve
evidence for later use at trial.” Knowles v.
Towa, 525 U.S. 118, 116, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142
L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (citing Robinson, 414
US, at 284, 94 S.Ct. 467).

The United States Supreme Court laid
down the “proper extent” of a search incident
to a lawful, custodial arrest in Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S, 752, 762, 89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). The Court stated that,
due to officer safety interests, “[wJhen an
arrest is made, it is reasonable for the ar-
resting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape.” Id. at 762-68, 89
S.Ct. 2084, The Court similarly recognized
that “it is entirely reasonable for the arrest-
ing officer to search for and seize any evi-
dence on the arrestee’s person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.” Id.
at 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034, The Court clarified that
the area of such search includes the area
“ ‘within [the arrestee’s] immediate control—
construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession
of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Id,

Though Chimel failed to address the issue
of whether the bare fact of probable cause

4. Towa Code Ann. § 805.1(4).

and an arrest justified the search, the Court
later answered this question by announcing
that all officers are entitled to search inci-
dent to a “full custodial arrest” regardless of
the likelihood that the search will reveal a
dangerous weapon or evidence material to
the prosecution of the offense, Robinson, 414
US, at 286, 94 S.Ct. 467; Gustafson v. Flori-
da, 414 U.S. 260, 265, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38
L,Ed.2d 456 (1978).

HH More recently, in Knowles, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court clarified that a
warrantless search of a vehicle pursuant to a
citation, rather than an arrest, violated the
Fourth Amendment. 525 U.S, at 119, 119
S.Ct, 484, In Knowles, defendant Knowles
was stopped for speeding. Jd. at 114, 119
S.Ct. 484. Under Iowa law, if an officer ob-
serves an individual committing a traffic vio-
lation, the officer is authorized to either ar-
rest the individual or issue a citation. Id. at
115, 119 S.Ct. 484. The officer chose to issue
Knowles a citation—and did in fact issue him
a citation—in lieu of an arrest. Id. at 114, 119
S.Ct. 484, The officer then conducted a full
search of Knowles’ car with neither consent
nor probable cause for a different offense, Id.
at 114-15, 119 S.Ct. 484. The officer found
drugs and then arrested Knowles. Id, In
upholding the search, the Iowa Supreme
Court relied upon an Iowa statute specifying
that “the issuance of a citation in lieu of an
arrest ‘does not affect the officer’s authority
to conduct an otherwise lawful search,’”*
interpreting this statute to allow a search
incident to citation. Id. at 115, 119 S.Ct. 484.

The Court reversed, reasoning that the
two primary historical justifications for inci-
dent searches set out in Chimel—disarming
an arrestee and preserving evidence—did not
justify the search of Knowles once the cita-
tion was issued. Id. at 118, 119 S.Ct. 484,

We have recognized that the first ratio-
nale—officer safety—is “‘both legitimate

and weighty,” Maryland v. Wilson, 519

US, 408, 412, 117 S.Ct, 882, 187 L.Ed.2d

41 (1997) (quoting Pennsylwania wv

Mims, 484 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S.Ct. 880, 54

L.Hd.2d 881 (1977) (per curiam)), The

threat to officer safety from issuing a traf-

fie citation, however, is a good deal less

than in the case of a custodial arrest. In

Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest.

involves “danger to an officer” because of

“the extended exposure which follows the

taking of a suspect into custody and trans-

porting him to the police station.” 414 U.S,

at 234-235, 94 S.Ct. 467, We recognized

that “[t]he danger to the police officer
flows from the fact of the arrest, and its
attendant proximity, stress, and uncertain-
ty, and not from the grounds for arrest.”

Id,, at 284 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38

L.Ed.2d 427. A routine traffic stop, on the

other hand, is a relatively brief encounter

and “is more analogous to a so-called ‘Ter-
vy stop’ ... than to a formal arrest.” Ber-

kemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104

S8.Ct. 3188, 82 L.Ed.2d 817 (1984),

Id. at 117, 98 S.Ct. 830. Similarly, with re-
spect to evidence preservation, Knowles rea-
soned that “[o]nce Knowles was stopped for
speeding and issued a citation, all the evi-
dence necessary to prosecute that offense
had been obtained. Id. at 118, 98 S.Ct. 330.
No further evidence of excessive speed was
going to be found on the person of the of-
fender or in the passenger compartment of
the car.” Id,

Here, the State seeks to distinguish
Knowles from this case because the search in
Knowles took place after the officer had is-
sued a citation. However, Knowles makes it
clear that the search incident to arrest is not
so absolute that it extends to every traffic
stop for which there is probable cause. While
it is true that no citation was issued in this
case, the facts of the Knowles case and of
this case are almost indistinguishable. Here,
like Knowles, Lee was temporarily stopped
for a traffic offense—driving without privi-
leges in this case and speeding in Knowles.
Like Knowles, the officer determined that
Lee would not be arrested, but would instead
be issued a citation. Like Knowles, the stop
of Lee offered no additional probable cause
to give the detaining officer reason to search
Lee. The only difference between Knowles
and this case is that Knowles was issued a
citation before the search. However, the dis-
tinction that Knowles was issued a citation
before the search, but Lee was not, is mean-
ingless when considering the historical ratio-

651

nales underlying the search incident to arrest
exception because Officer Laurenson already
said that he would issue Lee a citation for
the traffic offense.

Therefore, Lee correctly contends that the
distinction between actually issuing a citation
and stating that a citation will be issued is a
distinction without a difference because the
historical rationales explained in Chimel are
not present in both situations—when a cita-
tion is actually issued and when an officer
states that he is going to issue a citation.
Regarding evidence preservation, all the evi-
dence that was needed to issue Lee a citation
for driving without privileges had already
been obtained before the search. Thus, no
further evidence of driving without privileges
would be found in Lee’s containers. Regard-
ing officer safety, Officer Laurenson had al-
ready frisked Lee for weapons, and Officer
Laurenson knew no other weapons would be
found in the containers because, based on his
experience and training, he immediately rec-
ognized that the containers might contain
contraband.

In sum, Officer Laurenson had probable
cause to arrest Lee for driving without privi-
leges prior to the search. However, Officer
Laurenson told Lee that he would issue him
a citation for that offense instead. Yet, in-
stead of actually writing the citation, Officer
Laurenson searched the containers found on
Lee’s person, finding drug paraphernalia. Of-
ficer Laurenson then decided to arrest Lee
instead of issuing him the citation. Lee was
arrested and charged with driving without
privileges as well as several drug possession
charges. Although the arrest was substantial-
ly contemporaneous to the search, once it
was clear that an arrest was not going to
take place, the historical rationales justifying
the search were no longer present.

HH Decisions from other jurisdictions
support the rationale that the search incident
to arrest exception should not apply when no
arrest is to take place. “A search incident to
arrest need not necessarily occur after for-
mal arrest to be valid, but the argument that.
the search was incident to arrest becomes
more strained when the facts show that a
defendant would not have been arrested but

652

for the fact that the search produced evi-
dence of a erime....” United States v.
Davis, 111 F.Supp.3d 323, 3384 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).

In People v. Reid, an officer pulled over a
vehicle for driving erratically, and subse-
quently developed probable cause to arrest
the driver for driving while intoxicated. 24
N.Y.8d 615, 2 N.Y.S.8d 409, 26 N.E.3d 287,
238 (2014). The officer subsequently per-
formed a pat-down of the driver, found a
switch-blade knife, and then arrested the
driver. Id. At the driver’s suppression hear-
ing, the officer testified that he was not going
to arrest the driver for driving while intoxi-
eated; rather he only made the decision to
arrest after finding the knife in the pat-down
search. Id. The court found that the search
could not be justified as incident to arrest
stating, “[ilt is irrelevant that, because prob-
able cause existed, there could have been an
arrest without a search. A search must be
incident to an actual arrest, not just to prob-
able cause that might have led to an arrest,
but did not.” Id., 2 N-Y.S.3d 409, 26 N.E.3d
287 at 239. The court went on to say that “If
a search could be justified by an arrest that,
but for the search, would never have taken
place, the Supreme Court would not have
decided Knowles in the way it did.” Id, 2
N.Y.S.3d 409, 26 N.E.3d 237 at 240.

Similarly, in State v. Taylor, officers ap-
proached a man drinking in a park, intending
to issue a citation for that offense. 167 Ariz.
439, 808 P.2d 824, 324 (Ariz. Ct, App. 1990).
One officer searched the defendant and found
hashish, and subsequently arrested the de-
fendant. Jd, Both officers agreed that if the
hashish had not been found during the
search, the defendant would have been free
to leave. Id. On appeal, the court addressed
“whether officers are free to search anyone
they might arrest but have no intention of
arresting under a search incident to arrest
theory.” Id. The court held “they may not.”
Id. The court went on to say,

[ijt would be obviously destructive of the

privacy of many if police could justify

searches on the basis of charges they nev-
er intended to pursue in the hope that the
search would turn up something they could
pursue. That would invite pretextual ar-

rests and incident searches, with a custodi-

al arrest to follow if something was found

and release to follow otherwise.
Id, at 825,

Recently, the California Supreme Court
held in People v. Macabeo, that “... Rawl-
‘ings [v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct.
2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 688 (1980) ] does not stand
for the broad proposition that probable cause
to arrest will always justify a search incident
as long as an arrest follows. Otherwise,
fru would have been decided different-
ly.” 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 384 P.8d 1189, 1197
(2016). The court explained that the “[p]eo-
ple’s expansive understanding of Rawlings
... is inconsistent with Chimel” and “in ten-
sion with the reasoning in Knowles[—officer
safety and evidence preservation].” Id., 211
Cal.Rptr.8d 34, 884 P.8d at 1195-96. The
court concluded, “Once it [is] clear that an
arrest [is] not going to take place, the justifi-
eation for a search incident to arrest is no
longer operative.” Id. 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 34,
384 P.3d at 1197.

HN. «We é=agree with the rationale
adopted by the courts in Reid, Taylor, and
Macabeo. The reasonableness of a search is
determined by the totality of the circum-
stances, and a search incident to arrest is not
reasonable when an arrest is not going to
occur. We determine if an arrest is going to
occur based on the totality of the circum-
stances, including the officer’s statements.
While the subjective intent of an officer is
usually not relevant in Fourth Amendment.
analysis, statements made by the officer of
his intentions along with other objective facts
are relevant in the totality of circumstances
as to whether an arrest is to occur, If an
arrest does not occur, and objectively the
totality of the circumstances show an arrest
is not going to occur, an officer cannot justify
a warrantless search based on the search
incident to arrest exception.

Here, Officer Laurenson told Lee he would
get a citation for driving without privileges.
It was only after Officer Laurenson searched
Lee and subsequently the containers that
Officer Laurenson decided to arrest Lee. Be-
cause the totality of the circumstances, in-
eluding Officer Laurenson’s statement that
Lee was to get a citation, show that no arrest

P| wa

was to occur prior to finding marijuana and
methamphetamine during the search, the
search that oecurred was a search incident
only to an intended citation. Therefore, the
search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement cannot justify the
search. Thus, the search was unlawful, and
therefore the fruits of the search must be
suppressed. Accordingly, the district court’s
denial of Lee’s motion to suppress must be
reversed.

V. CONCLUSION

We vacate the conviction, reverse the dis-
trict court’s denial of Lee’s motion to sup-
press, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion,

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON
and BRODY concur.

402 P.3d 1106

In the Matter of: Jane Doe I,
A Child Under Eighteen
(18) Years of Age.

Jane DOE and John Doe II, husband and
wife, Petitioners-Respondents,
v.

John DOE I (2017-15), Respondent-
Appellant.

Docket No, 44997

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, August 2017 Term.

Filed: September 22, 2017

6

4

Canyon County Public Defender, Caldwell,
attorneys for appellant, Scott J. Davis ar-
gued,

James F. Jacobson, Boise, attorney for
respondents.

JONES, Justice
I, Narore or Tar Case

In a case arising out of Canyon County,
John Doe I (“Father”) appeals a magistrate
court’s order terminating his parental rights
to Jane Doe I (“Child”), Father argues that it
was error to conclude that he neglected Child
because Jane Doe (“Mother”) prevented Fa-
ther from supporting or contacting Child,
Father also argues that the magistrate court,
in analyzing the best interest of Child, imper-
missibly compared Father's relationship to
John Doe II (“Stepfather”) without consider-
ing Mother's actions.

IL, Facrua. anD ProcepuraL BackGRounp

Mother and Father were married in De-
cember 2008 and are the biological parents of
Child, who was born in July 2009. In April
2010, Mother moved from California to Idaho

with Child. In July 2010, Father visited Child
for her birthday. In October 2010, Mother
established residency in Idaho, filed for di-
yorce, and sought sole custody of Child.
Mother testified that there were several in-
stances of domestic violence in the marriage
and that Father would drink heavily and
could become aggressive and abusive. Father
testified that there was no domestic violence
and that he did not have an alcohol or anger
problem during the marriage.

In Jate October 2010, Mother began dating
Stepfather. In November 2010, the divorce
decree was entered, which awarded Mother
sole custody of Child and required Father to
pay child support. In early 2011, Father
moved to Idaho. In February 2011, Father
visited Mother unexpectedly, acted profane,
smelled of alcohol, and wanted to take Child,
Mother called the police, and Father was
removed from the property.

In April 2011, Mother permitted Father to
visit Child for four consecutive weekends, the
last of which was an overnight visit. After-
wards, Father testified that Mother stopped
letting him visit Child because he had not
paid child support. Mother testified that, in
addition to Father not paying child support,
Father was not prepared for his visits with
Child (specifically, Mother complained that
Father did not have a car seat for Child at
his first visit and another time asked Mother
for diapers). Stepfather testified that after
the April 2011 visits, Father’s text messages
to Mother became aggressive, and as a re-
sult, Mother stopped communicating with
Father directly. However, Mother kept in
touch with Father's family.

In June 2011, Stepfather moved in with
Mother and Child. Around the same time,
Father moved in with Mother's friend (“Girl-
friend”) and her two children. In late 2011,
Mother and Stepfather moved into a differ-
ent home, and Mother got a new cell phone
number. Mother did not give Father the new
address or phone number,

In early 2012, Father filed a petition to
modify custody. On September 14, 2012, a
magistrate court modified the divorce decree
to reflect that: (1) Mother shall continue to
have sole legal and primary physical custody
of Child; (2) Father is entitled to supervised

655

visitation at K.LD.S, Services or a similar
facility for up to one hour every two weeks;
(8) if Father wants unsupervised visitation he
would be required to submit to-an aleohol
and psychiatric evaluation to the court; (4)
Father is not to consume aleohol within 48
hours of visitation with Child; and (6) Father
is required to pay $296 in child support each
month.

There was: conflicting testimony at trial
regarding Father’s attempted visitations af-
ter the 2012 custody modifications, Father
testified that he called K.LD.S. Services,
filled out the paperwork, and paid the fees,
He testified that he called and emailed to
schedule a visit with Child, but K.I.D.S. Ser-
vices informed him that Mother was not re-
sponding and refunded his money, Father
testified that he tried to schedule a visit
approximately six times over a two-month
period before he stopped trying. Mother tes-
tified that she called K.L.D,S, Services, filled
out the paperwork, but never received a call
to schedule a visit. Father made no further
attempts to visit Child or to modify custody
through the court.

Mother maintained relationships with oth-
er individuals in Father’s family, but they did
not provide Father with her contact informa-
tion, Father learned of events in Child’s life
through his family. Father provided birthday
gifts for Child in 2011 and 2012.

In 2018, Father was convicted of domestic
violence involving Girlfriend. The court en-
tered a no contact order, which Father violat-
ed twice, In March 2016, Father and Girl-
friend separated. In June 2016, there was
another incident of domestic violence in
which Father assaulted Girlfriend, Father
was sentenced to four years fixed plus six
indeterminate, which was suspended with re-
tained jurisdiction, At the time of trial, Fa-
ther was doing a rider at the state facility in
Cottonwood.

Stepfather testified that he served in the
army for six years and had been working as
an accountant since 2013, Stepfather testified
that Child started calling him “Dad,” and
while at first he corrected her, he relaxed
and allowed it after Father's family also re-
ferred to Stepfather as “Dad.” Mother and

656

Stepfather testified that Child has a “father-
daughter relationship” with Stepfather that,
is similar to his relationship with their other
sons. Stepfather is involved in Child’s daily
life. Until the summer of 2015, Child was not.
aware she had a dad other than Stepfather.

Girlfriend testified that Father lived with
her and her two children, who were from a
previous relationship, for nearly five years.
Father and Girlfriend also had their own
child sometime in 2012, She testified that.
Father “was a wonderful father and step-
father.” Girlfriend testified that the incidents
between her and Father did not make him a
bad dad, and that she would not stop him
from seeing her kids. Girlfriend testified that
Father talks about Child “all the time, but he
felt helpless to do anything, and was saving
money to get a lawyer, because he got ann-
ihilated when he went to court without one.”

Father paid child support sporadically,
amounting to around $5,000 during Child’s
life. The arrearages at the time of trial were
approximately $15,000. Father testified that
he paid child support to Mother while he was
in California and when he first moved to
Idaho, but admitted that he has not paid
child support since October 2015. Mother
further testified that Father did not pay for
any of Child’s daycare, nor did he provide
clothes or any other items necessary for
Child’s support.

In April 2016, Mother and Stepfather mar-
ried. On September 1, 2016, Mother and
Stepfather filed a petition to terminate Fa-
ther’s parental rights on the grounds of
abandonment so that Stepfather could adopt
Child, On January 18, 2017, Mother and
Stepfather amended the petition to also al-
lege that Father neglected Child. On March
29, 2017, the magistrate court issued its find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, which
follow in pertinent part:

84. The court finds and concludes, upon
clear and convincing evidence ... that [Fa-
ther] has neglected [Child] as defined by
Idaho Code § 16-2002(8)(a), in that he has
not provided proper parental care and con-
trol, or subsistence, medical or other care
necessary for the child’s well-being.

a, The last time [Father] was with
[Child] was in April, 2011. The only other

contact he had with [Child] since that time
was a birthday present he sent through his
mother in 2012. For the last six years,
[Father] has provided none of the parental
care necessary for [Child’s] well-being. All
of the parental care necessary for [Child’s]
well-being has been provided by [Mother]
and [Stepfather].

85. [Father] asserts he has not been
able to provide the care and support neces-
sary for [Child’s] well-being because
[Mother] obstructed his efforts to maintain
a parental relationship with [Child]. The
statute does not define neglect on the basis
of what a parent is able to do, but rather
based on what is necessary for a child’s
well-being.... willfulness is not necessary
to a finding of neglect, and its absence is
not a defense to neglect.

86. [Mother’s] conduct has no bearing
on [Father's] failure to provide financial
support, which is necessary for a child’s
well-being,

88. The court finds and concludes,
based on clear and convincing evidence .. .
that termination of parental rights is in the
best interest of [Child]. [Child’s] biological
father is a stranger to her, and she has a
father-daughter bond with  [Stepfa-

Additionally, the magistrate court considered
that Stepfather had undertaken the neces-
sary responsibilities of parenthood, acknowl-
edging that Stepfather had demonstrated
that he was able to make decisions based on
Child’s best interests. The magistrate court
recognized that:
In this case, there is a step-parent who has
undertaken the responsibility of father-
hood, without having the right to those
decisions recognized by officials at a
school, in a hospital, or in a court. In this
case there is a father who has no familiarly
with [Child], and who has not for many
years attempted to develop any familiarly
with [Child]. In this case, it is in [Child’s]
best interest to have a legal father who has
the commitment to, the familiarity with,
and the affection for [Child] that is neces-

sary for a parent to make decisions in

[Child’s] best interest, and who has the

legal right to make those decisions. The

father who has that commitment to, famil-
iarity with, and affection for [Child] is

[Stepfather].

Ultimately, the magistrate court found that
Father's neglect of Child was not the result
of Mother having obstructed the relationship.
Instead, the magistrate court found that Fa-
ther neglected Child because it was easier
for him to leave the responsibility of parent-
hood to Mother, “while he otherwise went
about his life.” The magistrate court declined
to address the issue of termination based on
abandonment because it already found
grounds for termination based on neglect, On
April 7, 2017, the magistrate court entered
an order terminating Father’s parental
rights.

Father timely appealed.

TI. Issues on APPEAL

1. Whether the magistrate court erred in
terminating Father’s parental rights,
despite the allegation that Mother pre-
vented Father from providing care and
support for Child.

2. Whether the magistrate court erred by
comparing Father’s and Stepfather’s
relationship with Child in the context
of analyzing whether it was in the best
interest of Child to terminate Father's
parental rights.

IV. Sranparp or Review

HMM “It is well settled that, in a pro-
ceeding to terminate a parent-child relation-
ship, the due process clause mandates that
the grounds for termination must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence.” Doe v
Doe, 148 Idaho 248, 246, 220 P.8d 1062, 1065
(2009) (internal citations omitted). “When the
trial court finds that the grounds as defined
by statute, which are alleged for termination,
are established by clear and convincing evi-
dence, those findings will not be overturned
on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.”
Doe I v. Doe, 188 Idaho 898, 900, 71 P.8d
1040, 1047 (2003). Clear error “will not be
deemed to exist where the findings are sup-
ported by substantial and competent, albeit

657

conflicting, evidence.” Jd. “Substantial and
competent evidence is such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Idaho Dep't of Health
& Welfare v. Doe (2011-02), 151 Idaho 356,
363, 256 P.8d 764, 771 (2011) (internal cita-
tion omitted). “In reviewing [a lower court’s]
findings, this Court will indulge all reason-
able inferences in support of the trial court’s
judgment.” Matter of Aragon, 120 Idaho 606,
608, 818 P.2d 310, 312 (1991). “The magis-
trate has a better opportunity to observe
witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibili-
ty, to detect prejudice or motive, and to
judge the character of the parties.” Idaho
Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho
662, 664, 182 P.8d 1196, 1198 (2008) (internal
citation omitted).

VY. ANALYSIS

A. The magistrate court did not err when
it determined that clear and convinc-
ing evidence supported the termi-
nation of Father’s parental rights on
the grounds of neglect.

Hl Father argues that he made efforts to
provide for Child, but those efforts were
futile due to Mother's “deliberate frustration
of every attempt.” Father asserts that the
following facts indicate that Mother refused
to allow Father to provide care and support
for Child:

Mother moved to Idaho without him,

Mother intended the move to end the rela-

tionship with Father. Mother obtained sole

legal and physical custody of Child. Father

‘was recovering from injuries sustained in a

car accident when served with the original

divorce petition. Father moved to Idaho
only to be nearer to his daughter. Mother
stopped visitation after a verbal altercation
over child support with Father. Father

moved to Idaho in order to maintain a

relationship with Child. When Father at-

tempted to modify the decree, his visitation

was reduced to supervised visits through a

monitoring agency.

Father attempted to provide gifts for
the Child. Father is only able to obtain
information about Child from Father's rel-
atives. Mother testified that she provided

658

neither her phone number nor her address
to Father, In fact, she testified that Father
should have NO access to that information.
Child had no idea that Father was her
father, instead of [Stepfather] until 2016.

In short, Father argues that it was Mother's
“deliberate choices negating and minimizing
Father’s role in Mother and Child’s lives”
that prevented him from providing care and
support for Child. Accordingly, Father as-
serts that the magistrate court erred when it
found that he failed to provide necessary
eare and support for Child. In support of his
argument, Father cites to a series of cases in
which drug and alcohol use constituted ne-
glect, See In Interest of Cheatwood, 108 Ida-
ho 218, 697 P.2d 1232 (Ct. App. 1985); Doe »,
Roe, 138 Idaho 805, 992 P.2d 1205 (1999); In
re Doe, 148 Idaho 348, 144 P.8d 597 (2006).
Father argues that in these cases neglect
was found “not solely for reasons of non-
eontact or non-support, but the parent’s ina-
bility to provide a home fit for children.”
Father asserts that these cases are distin-
guishable from the current situation based on
Father's ability to care and provide a home
for his other children with Girlfriend,

Mother and Stepfather contend that the
magistrate court did not err in finding that
clear and convincing evidence supported the
termination of Father's parental rights based
on neglect, Mother and Stepfather argue that
a parent is not relieved of the responsibility
to provide care to a child simply because
another has shouldered that responsibility
and that “the burden of proof can be estab-
lished by long-term lack of contact and sup-
port, which are both necessary for the child’s
well-being.” Specifically, Mother and Stepfa-
ther argue that willfulness is not a defense to
neglect. Further, they contend that the evi-
dence demonstrates that Father’s behavior
was not Mother’s fault:

[Father’s] failure to consistently pay child

support over the life of [Child] is his own

decision. [Mother's] address is unnecessary
for him to fulfil this obligation as he is to
pay his child support through the Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare, The

evidence at trial established that, at the

time of trial, [Father] was over $15,000 in
arrears with his child support payments,

and hadn’t made any payments since Octo-

ber 2015. Furthermore, since the divorce,

[Father] has failed to pay any portion of

[Child’s] daycare costs, of which the origi-

nal divorce decree required him to pay

50%,

Mother and Stepfather also allege that Fa-
ther chose not to comply with the terms of
the 2012 custody agreement by failing to
obtain alcohol and psychiatric evaluations.
Mother and Stepfather allege that Father
only attempted to pursue visitation through
K.LD.S. Services on one oceasion in 2012.
Ultimately, Mother and Stepfather assert
that Father's lack of effort to establish con-
tact with Child is undisputed and, even if
willfulness were an element of neglect, Fa-
ther’s actions would still constitute neglect
based on his long-term failure to provide
contact or support for Child. Additionally,
Mother and Stepfather dispute Father's
claim that neglect requires some “moral fail-
ing” and argue that even if it were a prereq-
uisite to a finding of neglect, Father's history
of domestic violence would satisfy the burden
of proof.

TH Idaho Jaw allows the termination of a
parent-child relationship in cases where the
parent has neglected the child and termi-
nation is in the best interest of the child. 1.C.
§ 16-2005(1)(b). A finding of neglect is a
question of fact that must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. In re Doe
(2018-15), 156 Idaho 108, 110, 320 P.8d 1262,
1269 (2018) (internal citation omitted). The
Child Protective Act, in pertinent part, de-
fines “neglect” as a child:

(a) Who is without proper parental care
and control, or subsistence, medical or oth-
er care or control necessary for his well-
being because of the conduct or omission
of his parents, guardian or other custodi-
aN...

(b) Whose parents, guardian or other
custodian are unable to discharge their
responsibilities to and for the child and, as
a result of such inability, the child lacks
the parental care necessary for his health,
safety or well-being. ...

LC. § 16-1602(81),

HH In determining whether neglect has
occurred, a court may consider past charac-

ter evidence in order to determine future
behavior. Roe v. Doe, 142 Idaho 174, 178, 125
P.8d 580, 684 (2005). Additionally, the Idaho
Court of Appeals has recognized that “noth-
ing in the statutory definition of ‘neglect’
suggests that a child must suffer demonstra-
ble harm before the parent-child relationship
can be terminated.” Cheatwood, at 220, 697
P.2d at 1284. “It is sufficient that the child
‘lacks parental care necessary for his health,
morals, and well-being’” Jd. The Idaho
Court of Appeals has also acknowledged that
“a parent is not relieved of his or her respon-
sibility to provide appropriate parental care
by informally relinquishing custody of a child
to a relative or a friend.” Thompson v.
Thompson, 110 Idaho 98, 97, 714 P.2d 62, 66
(Ct. App. 1986).

WH Further, this Court has held that
“{wiillfulness ... is not necessary to a find-
ing of neglect, and therefore its absence is
not a defense to neglect.” Idaho Dep’ of
Health & Welfare v. Doe (2015-01), 158 Idaho
764, 768, 351 P.8d 1222, 1226 (2015). A court
is permitted to consider a parent’s failure to
pay child support as a factor when determin-
ing whether termination is appropriate based
on neglect, Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare
v, Doe (2011-03), 151 Idaho 498, 503, 260 P.3d
1169, 1174 (2011); In ve Doe, 149 Idaho 564,
568, 287 P.8d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 2010); In
Interest of Brown, 112 Idaho 901, 908, 786
P.2d 1855, 1957 (Ct, App. 1987).

Father argues that in order to “willfully”
fail to maintain a normal parental relation-
ship, the parent must have the ability to
maintain it and choose not to. See Doe v, Doe
(2011-01), 152 Idaho 77, 79, 266 P.8d 1182,
1184 (Ct. App. 2011), However, the analysis
in Doe v. Doe pertained to a termination
based on abandonment. In the context of
neglect, this Court has held, “{wlillfulness

. is not necessary to a finding of neglect,
and therefore its absence is not a defense to
neglect.” Doe (2015-01), 158 Idaho at 768, 351
P.3d at 1226, Indeed, the magistrate court
acknowledged that neglect is not found “on
the basis of what a parent is able to do, but
rather based on what is necessary for a
child’s well-being.” Further, even if this
Court were persuaded by Father’s argument
that he did not “willfully” neglect Child, Fa-

659

ther provided no excuse for his failure to
provide financial support, which is necessary
for Child’s well-being. While it cannot be the
only factor, a court is permitted to consider a
parent’s failure to pay child support when
determining whether termination is appropri-
ate based on neglect. See Doe (2011-08), 151
Idaho at 508, 260 P.8d at 1174,

Despite Mother's unwillingness to provide
her or Child’s contact information, the evi-
dence demonstrates that Father had several
opportunities to play a role in Child’s life, but
his attempts to do so inevitably lost traction.
For example: Father paid child support spo-
radically, amounting to approximately $5,000
during Child’s life, but he still owes approxi-
mately $15,000 in arrears; Father failed to
pay half of Child’s daycare costs; Father sent
Child birthday gifts in 2011 and 2012, but did
not send any gifts after those years; and
Father successfully modified the custody
agreement in 2012 to allow for supervised
visitation, but stopped trying to schedule vis-
its with Child after approximately two
months. Father provided no explanation for
his failure to try to make further efforts to
visit with Child through K.1.D.S. Services or
return to the court to enforce the order
allowing him visitation, As a result, the last
time Father saw Child was in April 2011, and
for the last six years Father has failed to
provide any parental care necessary for
Child’s well-being. The foregoing demon-
strates that Father neglected Child as de-
fined by Idaho Code section 16-1602(81). Ac-
cordingly, the magistrate court’s decision to
terminate Father’s parental rights based on
neglect is supported by substantial and com-
petent evidence.

B. The magistrate court did not err when
it found that the termination of Fa-
ther’s parental rights was in the best
interest of Child.

II Father argues. that a court, in con-
ducting a best interest analysis, should not
consider whether the natural parent or the
step-parent would better discharge parental
responsibilities. Father argues that the mag-
istrate court disregarded Mother's interfer-
ence in the relationship between Father and
Child and instead erred by “reducing the

660

decision to a contest between Father, who
had no relationship due to Mother’s actions,
and [Stepfather], who had gained the eviden-
tiary benefit from an enhanced relationship
with [Child].”

Mother and Stepfather argue that the
magistrate court correctly acknowledged the
permanency and stability of Child’s home
with them, and that it did not err when it
considered that Stepfather has an intimate
familiarity with Child’s needs, has undertak-
en responsibilities of fatherhood, and has had
stable employment since he came into their
lives, which has contributed to Child’s care.
Separately, Mother and Stepfather argue
that Father was unable to provide perma-
nence and stability for Child, has a history of
unemployment, has not significantly contrib-
uted to the needs of Child, has not made any
significant effort to become familiar with
Child’s needs, and has a history of domestic
violence. Ultimately, Mother and Stepfather
argue that Father’s inability to establish a
relationship with Child was due to his own
inaction and failures. Mother and Stepfather
argue that this amounts to substantial and
competent evidence in support of the magis-
trate court’s termination of Father’s parental
rights to Child.

HE “Once a statutory ground for ter-
mination has been established, the trial court
must next determine whether it is in the best.
interest of the child to terminate the parent-
child relationship.” In ve Doe (2018-15), 156
Idaho 108, 111, 820 P.8d 1262, 1270 (2014)
(citing Matter of Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611,
818 P.2d 810, 315 (1991). “Findings are com-
petent, so long as they are supported by
substantial, albeit possibly, conflicting, evi-
dence.” Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 248, 246, 220
P.8d 1062, 1065 (2009) (citing Roe v. Doe, 142
Idaho 174, 177, 125 P.8d 580, 533 (2005)). In
determining whether termination is in the
best interest of the child, some factors that a
court may consider are: the “parent's history
with substance abuse, whether the parent
has provided financial support, the child’s
relationship with those currently caring for
him or her and whether the child has im-
proved under that care, the child’s need for
stability and certainty, and the parent’s in-

carceration.” In re Doe (2015-03), 159 Idaho
192, 198, 358 P.8d 77, 83 (2015).

HM Father's contention that the magis-
trate court improperly considered Stepfa-
ther’s relationship with Child is without
merit. A court is permitted to consider the
stability and permanency of a child’s home.
See Doe (2015-03), 159 Idaho at 198, 358
P.8d at 88. Part of this analysis would natu-
rally include Stepfather’s ability to care for
Child, The magistrate court found:

Tn this case there is a father who has no

familiarly with [Child], and who has not for

many years attempted to develop any fa-
miliarly with [Child]. In this case, it is in

{Child’s] best interest to have a legal fa-

ther who has the commitment to, the famil-

jarity with, and the affection for [Child]
that is necessary for a parent to make
decisions in [Child’s] best interest, and who
has the legal right to make those decisions,

The father who has that commitment to,

familiarity with, and affection for [Child] is

[Stepfather].

Additionally, Child’s relationship with
Stepfather was only one factor that was con-
sidered by the magistrate court in determin-
ing that termination was in the best interest
of Child. The magistrate court also consid-
ered that Father had not paid child support,
or made a substantial effort to contact Child
since 2012. It was appropriate for the magis-
trate court to consider these factors when it
analyzed whether termination was in the best
interest of Child. Accordingly, the magistrate
court did not err when it found clear and
convincing evidence supported the finding
that the termination of Father's parental
rights was in the best interest of Child.

VI. Conctusion
We hereby affirm the magistrate court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights to
Child and award costs to Mother and Stepfa-
ther.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur.

402 P.3d 1114
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v
Edward L. COMER, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket Nos. 48718 & 43719
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: June 30, 2017
Review Denied September 25, 2017

Erie D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant,

Hon, Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Jessica M, Lorello, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

HUSKEY, Judge

Edward L, Comer appeals from his judg-
ments of conviction entered upon jury ver-
dicts finding him guilty of three counts of
sexual abuse of a child under the age of
sixteen involving two different victims, Com-
er argues the district court erred by consoli-
dating the charged offenses into a single trial
because the offenses against two different
victims did not constitute a common scheme
or plan. The State argues consolidation of the
sexual abuse charges was appropriate given
the common elements, circumstances, and
ages of the victims. Even if there was error,
the State contends any such error was harm-
less because the district court previously
ruled that evidence of the victims’ abuse was
admissible in separate trials under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 404(b), We reverse the
district court’s order granting the State’s
motion to consolidate and vacate Comer’s
judgments of conviction.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In October 2018, the State charged Comer
with two counts of sexual abuse of a child
under the age of sixteen years, Idaho Code
§ 18-1506(1)(b). Count I alleged that Comer
committed sexual abuse by touching and/or
poking the breasts of an eleven-year-old fe-

male, K.F. Count II alleged that Comer com-
mitted sexual abuse by touching and/or pok-
ing the vagina of KF. KF, alleged that
during a sleepover at S,S.’s house, S.S.’s
uncle, Comer, approached K.F. from behind
while she was working on a puzzle, K.F,
stated Comer put his hands under her shirt
and touched her breasts. Comer then ran his
hands over K.F.’s sides and slid one hand
under the front of her shorts, poking her
vagina over the top of her underwear. Comer
acknowledged that he may have accidentally
touched K.F.’s breasts while teaching K.F.
self-defense techniques, but Comer denied
ever intentionally touching K.F.’s breasts or
vagina.

The State filed a notice of intent pursuant
to LR.E. 404(b) to introduce testimony of
8.S., Comer’s ten-year-old niece, who claimed
that during the same time period Comer
abused K.F., Comer also touched 8.S’s
breasts, buttocks, and vagina, The State as-
serted 8.S.’s testimony was necessary to cor-
roborate K.F.’s testimony, prove the absence
of mistake, and demonstrate a common
scheme or plan, Comer argued S.S.’s testimo-
ny was improper bad acts testimony because
the probative value of the evidence was sub-
stantially outweighed by its prejudicial na-
ture. The district court granted the State’s
motion, finding §.S.’s testimony was relevant.
because the similarities between S.8.’s and
K.F’s allegations indicated Comer had a
common scheme or plan. The district court
alternatively reasoned that S.S.’s testimony
was relevant to demonstrate absence of mis-
take. The district court held the probative
value of the evidence outweighed its prejudi-
cial effects because the testimony was rele-
vant to whether the touching was incidental
or intentional and also evidenced a common
scheme or plan,

In September 2014, the State charged
Comer in a second case with two counts of
sexual abuse of a child under the age of
sixteen years, IC. § 18-1506(1)(b). Count I
alleged that Comer committed sexual abuse
by touching the breasts of ten-year-old S.S.
Count II alleged that Comer committed sex-
ual abuse by touching the vagina of S.S, The
State filed a notice of intent pursuant to
LR.E, 404(b) to introduce evidence of K.F’s

sexual abuse allegations in §.S.’s trial. The
district court granted the motion for the
same reason it granted the ILR.E. 404(b)
motion in K.F.’s case. 8.S,’s case proceeded
to trial. The jury was unable to reach a
verdict on the first count of sexual abuse and
acquitted Comer of the second count.

After the result in S.S.’s trial, the State
moved to consolidate the remaining count in
S.S’s case and the two charges in K.F’s
case. At the hearing on the motion to consoli-
date, the State argued that for judicial effi-
ciency the charges should be consolidated
because all charges had the same defendant,
the same witnesses, and a similar type of
crime. Comer objected to consolidation, argu-
ing:

But to actually try the cases themselves
together, I don’t agree with counsel that.
they’re similar witness, similar facts. You
know, there’s some general similarities,
but I think specifically they are different.
The witnesses are different. And I think
that given the outcome of the first trial, I
think it’s an effort to now try and simply
complicate the matter in terms of defend-
ing as to both these alleged victims in the
same trial, And I think it causes an insur-
mountable task for the defendant to over-
come what can come of that or could come
of it in terms of how the jury would per-
ceive the evidence in trying together.

Comer recognized that evidence relative to
another alleged victim could be admitted in
each case under I.R.E, 404(b) and argued:
“So if you have 404(b) already, there’s no
need to consolidate.” The court granted the
motion to consolidate, holding:

I do think that the best thing to do here is

to consolidate these two cases. I do think

it’s the same witnesses, It’s the same fact

pattern, Its the same time, event. I’m

going to let the one victim, alleged victim,

testify in the other case anyway because

Tve already made that ruling. So I am

going to consolidate the two cases.

At the consolidated trial, jury instruction 3

provided:

Each count charges a separate and distinct

offense. You must decide each count sepa-

rately on the evidence and the law that
applies to it, uninfluenced by your decision

663

as to any other count. The defendant may
be found guilty or not guilty on any or all
of the offenses charged.

The jury found Comer guilty of both sexual
abuse charges involving K.F. and the sexual
abuse charge involving S.S. The district court
sentenced Comer to concurrent, unified ten-
year sentences, with four years determinate,
for each count and retained jurisdiction. Fol-
lowing the. period of retained jurisdiction, the
district court relinquished jurisdiction. Com-
er filed a timely notice of appeal in each case.

o,

ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Erred in Granting
the State’s Motion to Consolidate

HM Comer argues the district court
erred in granting the State’s motion to con-
solidate the charged offenses against two
different victims into a single trial, Whether
a lower court properly joined offenses pursu-
ant to Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) is a question
of law over which we exercise free review.
State v, Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.8d
278, 278 (2007), A court may order two or
more complaints, indictments, or informa-
tions to be tried together if the offenses
“could have been joined in a single complaint,
indictment or information.” 1.C.R. 13. Two or
more offenses may be joined in a single
complaint, indictment, or information if they
“are based on the same act or transaction or
on two (2) or more acts or transactions con-
nected together or constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan.” I,C.R. 8(a). Be-
cause a charging document may not contain
all of the facts necessary for making a deci-
sion whether joinder complies with 1.C.R. 8,
it may be necessary for the trial court to
consider information outside the charging
documents. State v. Orellana-Castro, 158
Idaho 757, 760, 851 P.8d 1215, 1218 (2015).
However, in reviewing whether initial joinder
‘was proper, the appellate court considers
what was alleged by the State, not what the
proof at trial ultimately showed, Field, 144
Idaho at 565, 165 P.8d at 279.

Comer argues joinder was improper be-
cause the offenses did not constitute a com-

664

mon scheme or plan. Comer asserts Orella-
na-Castro sets forth the requisite analysis to
determine whether joinder is proper. The
State alleged that joinder was proper under
the considerations articulated in Field be-
cause the offenses had sufficient common
elements including the type of sexual abuse,
the circumstances under which the abuse
occurred, and the age of the victims.

HE Oreliana-Castro instructs this
Court that the proper analysis in determin-
ing whether joinder is permissible requires
consideration of the standards set forth in
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.8d 1185
(2009) and State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,
227 P.8d 918 (2010), Orellana-Castro, 158
Idaho at 762, 351 P.3d at 1220. Although both
Grist and Johnson addressed the admissibili-
ty of evidence under I.R.E. 404(o) and not
the permissibility of joinder, these cases hold
that trial courts must closely scrutinize
whether evidence of other bad acts truly
demonstrates the existence of a common
scheme or plan. See Johnson, 148 Idaho at
668-69, 227 P.8d at 922-23; Grist, 147 Idaho
at 54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91. “[Alt a mini-
mum, there must be evidence of a common
scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that
sexual misconduct has occurred with children
in the past.” Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668, 227
P.8d at 922, The events of a common scheme
or plan “must be linked by common charac-
teristics that go beyond merely showing a
criminal propensity and instead must objec-
tively tend to establish that the same person
committed all the acts.” Jd. Essentially, “a
common scheme or plan must embrace the
commission of two or more crimes so related
to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the other.” Orellana-Castro, 158
Idaho at 762, 851 P.3d at 1220,

The Orellana-Castro Court went on to dis-
cuss three Idaho Supreme Court cases rele-
vant to the inquiry into whether various sex-
ual abuse charges are sufficiently similar to
constitute evidence of a common scheme or
plan, First, in State v. Schwartzmiller, 107
Idaho 89, 93, 685 P.2d 830, 834 (1984), the
Court held that the district court properly
joined the charges of sexual abuse against
two different fourteen-year-old male victims
into a single trial. The Court reasoned that

although the acts took place at different
times and with different people, the facts
demonstrated that the defendant had a com-
mon plan, Id. The Court explained that the
defendant “frequents areas where young
boys may be found, befriends boys with no
father figure in the home, entices them from
their homes, lowers their natural inhibitions
through the use of drugs and alcohol, and
commits sex acts upon them.” Jd. Given these
similarities, the Court affirmed the joinder
on the basis of common scheme or plan, Id.

In Field, the Court held that facts alleged
by the State were insufficient to demonstrate
a common plan or scheme. Field, 144 Idaho
at 566-67, 165 P.8d at 280-81. There, the
district court granted the State’s motion to
join a 2003 charge of lewd conduct against a
seven-year-old victim with a 2001 charge of
sexual battery against a seventeen-year-old
victim. Id, at 563-64, 165 P.3d at 277-78. The
Supreme Court rejected the State’s argu-
ment that the two offenses were connected as
parts of the defendant’s common scheme or
plan to take advantage of underage females
who came into his home to babysit or be
babysat. Id. at 566, 165 P.8d at 280. The
Court found it significant that the victims’
ages were different, the type of sexual con-
tact was different, and the incidents occurred
two years apart. Jd. The Court acknowledged
the similarities in the cases—that both girls
were only temporarily in the household, the
acts occurred in the defendant’s home, and
the abuse began with “innocent” touching—
but the Court found those similarities insuffi-
cient to prove a common scheme or plan. Id,
at 566-67, 165 P.3d at 280-81.

Finally, in Johnson, the Court again held
that the facts alleged by the State were
insufficient to demonstrate a common plan or
scheme. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669, 227 P.38d
at 923. There, the defendant was charged
with abusing his six or seven-year-old daugh-
ter. Id. at 666, 227 P.3d at 920. During trial,
the district court admitted evidence of the
defendant’s previous, uncharged sexual con-
duct with his younger sister as evidence of a
common scheme or plan under I.R.E. 404(b).
Id. The State maintained that the conduct
with the sister was similar to the charged
offense in that: “(1) both victims were about

seven to eight years old; (2) both victims
viewed Johnson as an ‘authority figure’ be-
cause he was an older brother or father;
[and] (8) both courses of conduct involved
Johnson requesting the victim to touch his
penis.” Id. at 669, 227 P.8d at 923, Acknowl-
edging these similarities, the Supreme Court
nevertheless held that the facts were insuffi-
cient to demonstrate a common scheme or
plan. Id. The Court explained: “These simi-
larities, however, are sadly far too unremark-
able to demonstrate a ‘common scheme or
plan’ in [the defendant’s] behavior. The [fact]
that the two victims in this case are juvenile
females and that [the defendant] is a family
member are precisely what make these inci-
dents unfortunately quite ordinary.” Id.

TM Because we exercise free review in
determining whether joinder was proper, we
consider the facts as alleged by the State in
support of its joinder motion to determine if
the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a
common scheme or plan. Thus, we consider
the allegations contained in the charging doc-
uments as well as the arguments made by
the State during the hearing on the motion to
consolidate. The State maintains that the of-
fenses committed by Comer against the two
victims had sufficient common elements
which constituted part of a common scheme
or plan, The State alleged the following com-
mon elements: (1) the acts took place in the
same time period; (2) the victims were the
same gender and of similar age; (8) the acts
of abuse were very similar; and (4) the acts
took place in Comer’s home while the victims
were in his care,

In these cases, we conclude joinder was
improper because, as in Johnson and Field,
the similarities in the charged conduct and
the victims were too unremarkable to imply a
common scheme or plan, As in Johnson, the
victims were similarly aged and the acts of
abuse were similar. And, as in Field, the acts
occurred in Comer’s home as a result of the
victims being left in Comer’s care. Just as
the Court held that these facts were insuffi-
cient to demonstrate a common scheme or
plan, we also hold these similarities are insuf-
ficient to rise to the level of showing a com-
mon scheme or plan. Unlike Schwartemiller,
where the defendant took affirmative steps to

665

select and entice his victims, Comer’s con-
duct more accurately evidences an opportun-
istic tendency that is unfortunately entirely
unremarkable in sexual abuse cases. Because
the evidence alleged by the State did not
extend beyond merely showing a criminal
propensity to opportunistically abuse young
females entrusted to Comer’s care, we con-
clude that joinder of the offenses against the
two victims was improper.

B. Any Exror Was Not Harmless

MMMM Having found error in the joinder
of the charges, the potential exists that the
jury heard inadmissible evidence. The State
argues that even if the district court erred
by joining the two cases, the error was
harmless. Error is not reversible unless it is
prejudicial. State v, Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169,
171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App. 1983), With
limited exceptions, even constitutional error
is not necessarily prejudicial error. Id. Thus,
we examine whether the alleged error com-
plained of in the present cases was harmless,
See State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578, 114
P.3d 133, 186 (Ct. App. 2005). Where a de-
fendant meets his or her initial burden of
showing that a constitutional violation has
occurred, the State has the burden of dem-
onstrating to the appellate court beyond a
reasonable doubt that the violation did not
contribute to the jury’s verdict. State v. Per-
‘ry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.8d 961, 979-
80 (2010).

Hl In support of its argument, the State
contends that even if joinder was improper,
the error was harmless because the evidence
was admissible in separate trials under
LR.E. 404(o) for the purpose of refuting
Comer’s claim that the touching occurred
accidentally. Moreover, the State contended
that there was a proper limiting instruction
for the evidence in jury instruction 3, which
instructed the jury that it must “decide each
count separately on the evidence and the law
that applies to it, uninfluenced by your deci-
sion as to any other count.” Comer asserts
the error was not harmless because even if
the evidence was admissible in separate tri-
als, the evidence would have been subject to
LR.E. 404() limitations and the jury would
have been specifically instructed that the evi-

666

dence was admissible only to show an ab-
sence of mistake; whereas at the joined trial
the only limitation was that each count be
decided separately.

The instruction to decide each count sepa-
rately is insufficient to alleviate the prejudice
from improper joinder. In these cases, there
‘was no physical evidence corroborating the
victims’ testimony. The risk from improper
joinder was that evidence regarding one vic~
tim would convince the jury that Comer had
a propensity to engage in sexual abuse when
evaluating the evidence regarding the other
victim or her credibility. The existence of two
accusers would enhance their credibility. The
instruction did not address that issue nor
would an instruction stating that the jury
‘was not to consider such evidence as proba-
tive of Comer’s criminal propensity have
been sufficient. In Johnson, such a limiting
instruction was given but the Idaho Supreme
Court held that the instruction alone could
not always prevent an error from prejudicing
the defendant. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 670,
2277 P.8d at 924. The Court reasoned:

Evidence of prior sexual misconduct with

young children is so prejudicial that there

is a reasonable possibility this error con-
tributed to [Defendant’s] conviction. As
this Court has observed, admitting such
propensity evidence may reflect “the un-
stated belief that sexual deviancy is a char-
acter trait of especially powerful probative
value for predicting a defendant’s behav-
ior.”
Id. Thus, we are not persuaded that the
instruction given to the jury rendered the
prejudice caused by the improper joinder
harmless. The State has failed to meet its
burden of showing that the error of improper
joinder was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

mL

CONCLUSION

The district court erred in granting the
State’s motion to consolidate the charges of
the two separate victims. This error was not
harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the order
of consolidation, vacate the judgments of con-
viction, and remand the cases to the district

court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion,

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
GUTIERREZ concur.

402 P.3d 1119
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve
‘Travis WHARTON, Defendant,
and

Aladdin Bail Bonds as claimed agent for
American Contractors Indemnity Com-
pany, Surety/Real Party in Interest-Ap-
pellant.

Docket No, 44279
Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed: September 14, 2017
Rehearing Denied October 8, 2017

Tr

>

168

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP;
Christopher D. Sherman, Boise, for appel-
lant. Christopher D, Sherman argued.

Hon. Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M.
Lorello argued.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S
PRIOR OPINION DATED JUNE 28,
2017, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN

HUSKEY, Judge

Aladdin Bail Bonds (Aladdin)! appeals
from the district court’s order denying Alad-
din’s motion to set aside forfeiture and exon-
erate bond posted on behalf of Travis Whar-
ton, Aladdin argues the district court made
clearly erroneous factual findings and abused
its discretion when it failed to consider Alad-
din’s efforts to locate and apprehend Whar-
ton under Idaho Criminal Rule 46(h)(1)(B).
Aladdin also contends the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to consid-
er Aladdin’s recovery efforts as a relevant,
non-enumerated factor under I.C,R. 46(h)(1).
The State asserts Aladdin failed to show

1, The district court recognized that Aladdin Bail
Bonds is an assumed name under which Two
Jinn, Inc. conducts business. As the district court
referred to Two Jinn by its assumed name, we
will do the same.

error because there is an incomplete record
on appeal and Aladdin’s argument on appeal
is not preserved. We affirm.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The State charged Wharton with traffick-
ing in marijuana and obstructing and delay-
ing an officer. The magistrate set bail in the
amount of $100,000. Benjamin Barrera (Bar-
rera), as a licensed bail agent of the Ameri-
can Contractors Indemnity Company (Ameri-
can Contractors), signed the bail bond posted
for Wharton. If Wharton failed to appear,
American Contractors agreed to pay Whar-
ton’s $100,000 bond. According to the district
court, attached to the bail bond was a power
of attorney form issued by American Con-
tractors, which gave Aladdin the power to act
as the attorney-in-fact for American Contrac-
tors in executing a bail bond?

Wharton failed to appear for a motion
hearing and his trial counsel was unable to
explain Wharton’s absence, The district court
revoked Wharton's bail, issued an arrest war-
rant, and ordered the bond posted by Ameri-
can Contractors be forfeited. Pursuant to
Idaho Code § 19-2915, the clerk of the court
sent notice to American Contractors and
Aladdin, an agent authorized to receive such
notices, of the district court’s intention to
discharge the order of forfeiture if Wharton
‘was not brought before the court within 180
days of the order of forfeiture.

Three days before the expiration of the
180-day time period, Aladdin filed a motion
to set aside the order of forfeiture and to
exonerate American Contractors from fur-
ther liability under the bond. Aladdin sup-
ported its motion with affidavits from Alad-
din’s bond recovery agents. Aladdin argued
the district court should consider Aladdin’s
efforts to locate and return Wharton as a
factor under I.C.R. 46(h). The State filed an
objection, arguing the district court should

2. Although referenced by the district court, nei-
ther the bond document nor the power of attor-
ney document is included in the record on ap-
peal.

not exonerate the bond because Wharton had
a previously dismissed Iowa parole violation,
had a previous felony drug conviction, and
Wharton was committing new crimes at the
time he was located by Aladdin. Aladdin re-
sponded that the district court should not
consider Wharton’s previous parole violation
because it is “irrelevant and not an enumer-
ated factor under 1.C.R. 46(h).” Aladdin ex-
plained that the district court should consider
all relevant factors, which were the enumer-
ated factors in 1.C.R. 46(h), Because Whar-
ton’s previous parole violation was not an
enumerated factor, Aladdin argued it was not
a relevant factor to consider,

After a hearing on the motion, the district
court denied Aladdin’s motion. In considering
“the participation of the person posting bail
in locating and apprehending the defendant”
under LC.R. 46(h)(1)(B), the district court
held it could not attribute Aladdin’s efforts to
locate and apprehend Wharton to American
Contractors or to American Contractors’ li-
censed bail agent, Barrera, because there
was no evidence of any agreement or rela-
tionship between American Contractors and
Aladdin, nor was there any evidence of an
agreement or relationship between Barrera
and Aladdin. The district court held: “What,
if any, agreement or relationship exists be-
tween American Contractors and Aladdin has
not been shown or even argued to the
Court.” Further, the district court explained
that while it suspected Aladdin and American
Contractors had some agreement, there was
nothing in the record to support that suspi-
cion. Even if there was evidence of the rela-
tionship, the district court stated:

[T]he court is not sure the analysis would
change. American Contractors would still
be the “person posting bail” even if they
had subsequently passed the risk of that
undertaking onto someone else. If the or-
der of forfeiture “becomes” a judgment
under LC, § 19-2918 the judgment would
be against American Contractors,

The district court then addressed other
relevant factors not enumerated in I.C.R.
46(h), such as a surety’s knowledge of the
risk it is accepting. The district court ex-
plained that although Aladdin understood
Wharton was a risk, the district court had no
information about Aladdin’s relationship with
American Contractors or Barrera, Because of

669

the lack of information of the relationship,
the district court determined it could not
determine whether American Contractors or
Barrera knew of the risk, The district court
stated that both Aladdin and the State as-
sumed the existence of relationships between
American Contractors, its licensed agent
Barrera, and Aladdin, that were not apparent.
from the record. The district court held:
“Where the Court has no information at all
regarding Mr, Barrera’s or American Con-
tractors’ knowledge of the defendant’s crimi-
nal history, the Court will simply not consid-
er this argument, like it has not considered
Aladdin’s efforts at recovery.”

Aladdin timely appeals. The district court
granted Aladdin’s request to stay remittance
of the forfeiture while the appeal is pending.

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMM Whether to set aside the forfeiture
of a bail bond under LC.R. 46 is committed
to the discretion of the trial court and will
not be overturned absent a finding that the
trial court abused its discretion. State v. Big
Dawg Bail Bonds, 157 Idaho 878, 376, 336
P.8d 306, 309 (Ct. App. 2014), When a trial
court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-
tiered inquiry to determine whether the low-
er court correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion, acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any le-
gal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it, and reached its decision by
an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1383 (1989).

Ii.

ANALYSIS

A. The District Court’s Factual Findings
Are Not Clearly Erroneous and the
District Court Did Not Abuse Its Dis-
cretion in Holding There Was Insuffi-
cient Evidence of a Relationship and
Aladdin’s Recovery Efforts Could Not
Be Attributed to American Contrac-
tors Under Idaho Criminal Rule
46(h)(1)(B)

HM Aladdin argues the district court’s de-
nial of its motion to set aside forfeiture and

670

exonerate bond was an abuse of discretion
because the district court relied upon clearly
erroneous factual findings. Aladdin contends
the district court incorrectly found that there
was no evidence indicating that Aladdin was
the person posting bond under IC.R.
46(h)(1)(B), that no evidence in the record
demonstrated Aladdin acted as an agent of
American Contractors, and that there was no
evidence of American Contractors’ attempts
to locate and apprehend Wharton. Aladdin
argues that because it had power of attorney
and was the designated agent to receive no-
tice pursuant to IC. § 19-2915(8), there was
sufficient evidence that Aladdin acted on be-
half of American Contractors. The State ar-
gues the district court properly held there
‘was no evidence indicating a relationship be-
tween Aladdin and American Contractors.

HE This Court will not set aside factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Henage, 1483 Idaho 655, 659, 152 P.8d
16, 20 (2007). To be found clearly erroneous,
factual findings must be unsupported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence. Id, Idaho
Criminal Rule 46(h) provides that the district
court may direct forfeiture be set aside, in
whole or in part, if it appears justice does not
require the enforcement of the forfeiture.
The decision whether or not to set aside
forfeiture is left to the discretion of the dis-
trict court. Big Dawg Bail Bonds, 157 Idaho
at 876, 886 P.8d at 309. In deciding how to
exercise that discretion, the district court is
required under I.C.R. 46(h) to consider a
number of factors. One of those factors pro-
vides that the district court shall consider the
participation of the person posting bail in
locating and apprehending the defendant,
LCR. 46(a)(1)(B).

As noted above, the district court found
that under L.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B) American Con-
tractors was the person posting bail. The
district court held it could not attribute
Aladdin’s efforts to locate and apprehend
Wharton to American Contractors or to
American Contractors’ licensed bail agent,
Barrera, because there was no evidence of
any agreement or relationship between.
American Contractors and Aladdin, nor was
there any evidence of an agreement or rela-
tionship between Barrera and Aladdin. The

district court recognized that “certainly
Aladdin is not expending the resources to
hire a private investigator to fly around the
country in an attempt to track [the defen-
dant] down unless Aladdin has some expo-
sure for the bail liability or someone is com-
pensating it foi those services.” Although the
district court suspected Aladdin and Ameri-
can Contractors had some agreement, it
found nothing in the record before the dis-
trict court evidenced that relationship, The
district court reasoned that even if there was
evidence of a relationship between Aladdin
and American Contractors, its analysis
would not change because “American Con-
tractors would still be the ‘person posting
bail’ even if they had subsequently passed
the risk of that undertaking onto someone
else.”

TM Aladdin argues that the district
court’s decision was in conflict with the pur-
pose of the Idaho Bail Act, Aladdin repre-
sented that Aladdin’s relationship with Amer-
ican Contractors is the typical practice of the
bail bond industry, in which surety compa-
nies, such as American Contractors, rely
upon agent companies like Aladdin to super-
vise defendants and ensure their appearance
in court. Aladdin’s attorney argued that be-
cause this practice ensures the appearance of
the defendant in court, which is the primary
purpose of bail, Aladdin’s efforts to locate
and apprehend the defendant should be at-
tributed to American Contractors, In our
view, under I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B), courts should
look not only to the efforts of the person
posting bail, but also at the relationships the
person posting bail has with other entities
such that the efforts of another entity might
be attributed to the person posting bail. A
sufficient relationship between the person
posting bail and a separate entity could have
been established in this case based on the
bail bond agreement and/or the power of
attorney document, but neither of those doc-
uments are in the record.

Aladdin also argues that because the dis-
trict court articulated what the power of
attorney form stated, the district court made
a factual finding that “American Contractors
authorized Aladdin to execute undertakings
of bail” and that this Court should defer to

that factual finding. However, read in its
entirety, the district court noted in a foot-
note:

The power of attorney form attached to
the bail bond indicates American Contrac-
tors authorized Aladdin to execute under-
takings of bail on its behalf. Therefore,
Aladdin meets the second prong of the
definition of “Bail Agent” under I.C. § 19-
2905(2) but not the first. The Court notes
that if Aladdin is a licensed producer of
surety insurance then in order to act as an
agent for a surety it must not only be
authorized by the surety to do so but also
must be “appointed” as agent under the
procedure outlined in LC. § 41-1018,
There is no evidence Aladdin has been so
appointed.

HE The district court’s factual finding
was that Aladdin was not an agent pursuant
to the statute. The district court’s recitation
of one phrase on a document not included in
the record is insufficient to establish the
nexus between Aladdin and American Con-
tractors, This Court cannot conclude Aladdin
was acting as an agent of American Contrac-
tors, particularly where the district court
explicitly found that despite the language of
the power of attorney, Aladdin did not meet
the statutory definition of a bail agent or the
procedural requirements to be an appointed
agent. The record before this Court does not
include the bail bond or the power of attor-
ney form attached to the bond. It is the
responsibility of the appellant to provide a
sufficient record to substantiate his or her
claims on appeal. State v. Murinko, 108 Ida-
ho 872, 878, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App,
1985). In the absence of an adequate record
on appeal to support the appellant’s claims,
we will not presume error. State v. Beason,
119 Idaho 108, 105, 808 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct.
App. 1991). Any missing portions of the rec-
ord are presumed to support the trial court’s
ruling. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 588, 541,
835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992). Without
a complete record, we cannot review the
documents to determine whether the district
court made erroneous factual findings and as
a result, we must defer to the district court’s
factual findings. Because the district court’s
factual findings that Aladdin did not act as a
bail agent or meet the procedural require-

671

ments to be an appointed agent were not
clearly erroneous, Aladdin did not show that
the district court abused its discretion,

Hs Additionally; Aladdin did not pro-
vide any authority from the Idaho Bail Act or
the Idaho Criminal Rules to support its as-
sertion that Aladdin is the person posting
bail. Aladdin contends it acted on behalf of
American Contractors as evidenced by the
power of attorney form and being the desig-
nated agent to receive notice pursuant to I.C.
§ 19-2915(8). However, Aladdin provided no
argument or authority to explain how or why
having power of attorney and/or being the
designated agent to receive notice pursuant
to LC. § 19-2915(8) is sufficient evidence that
Aladdin acted on behalf of American Con-
tractors for purposes of I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B), A
party waives an issue on appeal if either
authority or argument is lacking, State v,
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 268, 928 P.2d 966, 970
(1996). Because Aladdin did not present this
Court with argument or authority to support
this issue, Aladdin waived consideration of
the issue on appeal.

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its
Diseretion When It Declined to Con-
sider Aladdin’s Efforts to Locate and
Apprehend Wharton as an Additional
Relevant Factor Under I.C.R, 46(h)(1)

HMM Aladdin argues the district court
abused its discretion by failing to consider
Aladdin’s attempts to locate and apprehend
Wharton as an un-enumerated relevant fac-
tor pursuant to LC.R. 46(h)(1). The State
argues Aladdin has not preserved this argu-
ment on appeal because Aladdin argued in
the district court that factors not enumerated
in LC.R. 46(h)(1) could not be considered. We
affirm the district court.

Hs Appellate court review is limited
to the evidence, theories, and arguments that
were presented below. State v. Garcia-Rodri-
guez, 162 Idaho 271, 275-76, 396 P.8d 700,
104-05 (2017); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 670, 227 P.8d 918, 924 (2010). Issues not
raised below generally may not be consid-
ered for the first time on appeal. State v,
Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 128, 126
(1992). Aladdin’s argument on appeal—that

672

the district court should consider Aladdin’s
efforts as a relevant, non-enumerated fac-
tor—was not raised before the district court.
In its written motion to set aside forfeiture,
Aladdin asked the court to set aside the
forfeiture pursuant to LC. § 19-2917 and
1.C.R. 46. However, in the memorandum in
support of its motion to exonerate, the re-
sponse to the State’s objection, and during
the hearing, Aladdin argued a more narrow
issue—that in determining whether to set
aside forfeiture, the district court should con-
sider all relevant factors and that the enu-
merated factors of I.C.R. 46(h)(1) are the
relevant factors. While Aladdin asserted the
district court should consider Aladdin’s ef-
forts to locate and return Wharton, Aladdin
did not articulate that these efforts should be
considered as a relevant, non-enumerated
factor not listed in the rule. Instead, consis-
tent with its written argument, Aladdin ar-
gued the district court should consider only
relevant factors enumerated in and pursuant
to LC.R. 46(h)(1). During the hearing on
Aladdin’s motion, Aladdin’s trial counsel stat-
ed:

As I think is evidenced in our memoran-
dum and in our response to the State’s
objection, the factors that are to be consid-
ered by the Court when determining
whether or not justice requires that the
forfeiture be set aside, those factors are
fairly and clearly articulated by Idaho
Criminal Rule 46.

In its decision, the district court specifical-
ly noted the more narrow argument present-
ed by Aladdin, stating: “Aladdin argues in its
reply memorandum that in deciding its mo-
tion the Court must consider only factors
that are relevant to whether justice requires
enforcement of the forfeiture. Aladdin fur-

ee

ther argues that the only factors that are
relevant factors are those enumerated in
Rule 46(h).”

Aladdin’s arguments in the district court
and on appeal are different. To argue in
district court that the court should consider
Aladdin’s recovery efforts only under one of
the enumerated factors in LC.R, 46(h)(1)
does not fairly include the argument that
Aladdin’s recovery efforts should have alter-
natively been considered as a relevant, non-
enumerated factor. Aladdin may not claim on
appeal that the district court’s decision was
in error based on an argument that was
never presented to the district court for con-
sideration. Appellate courts are forums of
review, not decisions in the first instance.
Because Aladdin did not raise this argument
before the district court, it waived consider-
ation of the argument on appeal.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Aladdin has failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion by denying its
motion to set aside forfeiture and exonerate
bond. Accordingly, the district court's order
denying the motion to set aside forfeiture
and exonerate bond is affirmed.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
GUTIERREZ concur.

403 P.3d 309
Linda DUNN, individually, and as
surviving spouse of Barry Dunn,
deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No, 44378

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, August 2017 Term.

Filed: September 25, 2017

g
~

Richard Kochansky, Coeur d’Alene, attor-
ney for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, attorney for respondent. David
B. Young argued.

JONES, Justice
I. Narure or rae Case

Linda Dunn (“Linda”) appeals from a dis-
trict court’s judgment affirming the Idaho
State Tax Commission’s (the “Commission”)
deficiency determination. The Commission is-
sued a deficiency against Linda after deter-
mining that her one-half community interest
in her husband’s, Barry Dunn (“Husband”),
out-of-state earnings should have been in-
cluded as Idaho taxable income for 2000-01,
2008-05, and 2007-10 (the “Taxable Years”),

Ti, Facrvau AnD PRocepurAL BAcKGROUND

The crux of this appeal concerns the prop-
er tax treatment of Linda’s one-half commu-
nity interest in Husband’s out-of-state earn-
ings. The facts are uncontested. Linda was
married to Husband during the Taxable
Years. During the Taxable Years, Husband
lived primarily in Texas and was employed
by a Texas offshore drilling company. All of
the earnings at issue were earned by Hus-
band personally as a wage earner in Texas,
Alaska, or Washington and were directly de-
posited into his bank account in Tomball,
Texas. Husband never worked or was domi-
ciled in Idaho during the Taxable Years.
Throughout the Taxable Years, Linda tempo-
rarily lived with Husband at his work loca-
tion, but always returned to Idaho to operate
a horse farm, She was a resident of Idaho for
all of the Taxable Years. Linda and Hus-
band’s tax filing status was “married filing
jointly.”

On April 13, 2012, the Commission issued a
Notice of Deficiency Determination, The
Commission’s deficiency was only addressed
to income attributed to Linda, Linda appeal-
ed the decision to the Idaho Board of Tax
Appeals, and the Board affirmed the Com-
mission’s decision. On May 11, 2015, Linda
petitioned a district court for review of the
Commission’s decision.

On June 8, 2016, the district court issued a
memorandum decision and order affirming
the Commission’s decision wherein it held
that: (1) Linda owned a one-half undivided
interest in the Texas earnings of Husband,
and, because she was domiciled in Idaho at
the time she acquired the interest in Hus-
band’s wages, her interest was subject to the
tax laws of Idaho; (2) Linda owned a vested
interest in the community property wages
earned by Husband in Washington, which
were subject to taxation under the laws of
Idaho as the domicile of Linda; and (8) Ida-
ho’s personal income tax scheme did not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause or the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
United States Constitution because Linda
failed to show a substantial effect on an
identifiable interstate economic activity or
market. The district court denied the Com-
mission’s request for costs and attorney fees

675

because, although Linda’s argument was ulti-
mately failing, it was not devoid of merit. A
corresponding judgment was issued on Au-
gust 3, 2016,

Linda appeals.

TIL. Issues on APPEAL

1. Did the district court err by holding
that there were no constitutional viola-
tions?

2. Did the district court err by holding
that Linda’s one-half community inter-
est in Husband’s wages was subject to
the tax laws of Idaho?

IV. Sranparp or Review
Hl A taxpayer may appeal a determi-
nation by the Commission by filing a com-
plaint against the Commission in district
court, LC, § 68-8049, The case is to pro-
ceed as a de novo bench trial. 1.C, § 63-
3049; of LC. § 63-8812(¢). A deficiency
determination issued by the Commission is
presumed to be correct, and the burden is
on the taxpayer to show that the Commis-
sion’s decision is erroneous. Albertson’s
Ine, v. State Dep't of Revenue, 106 Idaho

810, 814, 688 P.2d 846, 850 (1984).
Parker v, Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 148 Ida-
ho 842, 845, 280 P.8d 784, 787 (2010) (foot-

note omitted),

HI “Because constitutional questions are
purely questions of law, they are ... re-
viewed de novo.” V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho State
Tax Com’n, 184 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.8d 519,
521 (2000) (citing Idaho State Ins. Fund v.
Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 905-906, 980 P.2d
566, 569-570 (1999)).

V. ANALYSIS

Hl Throughout her briefing, Linda focus-
es solely on Husband’s Texas earnings and
Texas law. She does not proffer an argument.
related to Husband’s Washington earnings or
Washington law. “We will not consider an
issue not ‘supported by argument and au-
thority in the opening brief’” Bach v, Bag-
ley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.38d 1146, 1152
(2010) (quoting Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145
Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.8d 450, 454 (2008).
Accordingly, we only consider Linda’s appeal

676

as it relates to her one-half community inter-
est in Husband’s Texas earnings.

A. The district court correctly held that
there were no constitutional viola-
tions.

First, Linda argues that the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Comptroller of
Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, — US.
—,, 185 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Bd.2d 818 (2015)
“abrogated Parker [v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 148 Idaho 842, 847, 230 P.8d 734,
739 (2010) ] and applied the [dlormant Com-
merce Clause to state cross-border income
tax cases.” Linda claims that the tax at issue
here “flunks the internal consistency test”
from Wynne because “Idaho is taxing [Hus-
band’s] wages earned in Texas where there is
no state income tax.” Further, Linda claims
that Idaho’s income tax “is inherently dis-
criminatory and acts as a tariff” because her
one-half interest in Husband’s Texas earn-
ings would be tax-exempt if she lived in
Texas.

Second, Linda argues that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution applies. She cites Lunding v.
New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S.
287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 189 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998),
and claims that it stands for the proposition
that unequal income tax treatment of a non-
resident violates the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.

The Commission’s position—that the dis-
trict court was correct in holding that there
‘were no constitutional violations—can be dis-
tilled to two main points. First, the Commis-
sion asserts that the Commerce Clause is not
implicated by the facts of this case. The
Commission contends that, to implicate the
Commerce Clause, Linda must show that the
application of Idaho’s tax scheme substantial-
ly affected interstate commerce, The Com-
mission asserts that Linda failed to do so.
Further, the Commission claims that Wynne
does not render Idaho’s personal income tax
scheme unconstitutional as Linda claims. The
Commission claims that the internal consis-
tency test from Wynne does not require each
state to adopt identical tax provisions; rather,
it asks, if every state used the same tax
scheme, would interstate commerce be at a

disadvantage as compared to intrastate com-
merce? Wynne, 185 S.Ct. at 1802. If the
answer is no, then the tax scheme under
scrutiny passes the test. The Commission
concludes that Linda has failed to demon-
strate that she was entitled to a credit for
taxes paid to another state.

HMM Second, the Commission argues
that there is no violation of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. The Commission
states that, in tax cases, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause stands for the proposition
that a state must offer “substantial equality
of treatment” as between its citizens and a
nonresident taxpayer, Austin v. New Hamp-
shire, 420 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. 1191, 48 L.Ed.2d
5380 (1975). Here, the Commission argues,
there can be no violation of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause because Linda has
not shown disparate treatment between a
nonresident and a resident. The Commission
distinguishes Lunding, arguing that in that
case, the United States Supreme Court inval-
idated a state tax that expressly discrimi-
nated against nonresidents. Conversely, here,
the Commission argues, there was no show-
ing of discriminatory tax treatment of resi-
dents relative to nonresidents. Lastly, the
Commission explains that Husband is not the
target of the tax; therefore, there is no occa-
sion of Husband having to pay tax in Idaho
greater than what he paid in another state.

“To show that the Commerce Clause is
implicated by a tax statute, [a taxpayer]
must demonstrate that the state’s taxation
of [her] entire income has a substantial
effect on an identifiable interstate econom-
ic activity or market.” 71 Am.Jur.2d State
and Local Taxation § 891 (2009) (citing
Stelener v. Comm’r of Revenue, 621
N.W.2d 786, 740 (Minn.2001)).

“The dormant Commerce Clause pro-
tects markets and participants in markets,
not taxpayers as such.” Gen. Motors Corp.
v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 [117 S.Ct. 811,
825, 186 L.Ed.2d 761, 781] (1997). There-
fore, the dormant Commerce Clause will
not apply unless there is actual or prospec-
tive competition between entities in an
identifiable market and state action that
either expressly discriminates against or
places an undue burden on interstate com-

merce. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 800 [117 S.Ct. at

825, 136 L.Ed.2d at 780-81]. Furthermore,

this impact must be more than merely

incidental. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.

549, 559 [115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 181 L.Ed.2d

626, 687-38] (1995).

Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 148 Ida-
ho 842, 847, 280 P.8d 734, 739 (2010) (quoting
Stelzner v. Comm’r of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d
736, 740-41 (2001)).

The facts in Parker are remarkably similar
to the facts in this case. 148 Idaho 842, 280
P.3d 734, Mrs. Parker was domiciled in Ida-
ho, and her husband was domiciled in Neva-
da. Id, at 844, 230 P.8d at 786. The Commis-
sion conducted an audit and determined that
one-half of the income earned by Mr. Parker
in Nevada was subject to Idaho income tax
because Mrs. Parker owned a one-half com-
munity interest in the Nevada income, Id.
The Parkers appealed the Commission’s deci-
sion arguing, inter alia, that taxing one half
of Mr. Parker’s Nevada earnings violated the
Commerce Clause. Id. This Court held that
the Commerce Clause was not implicated
because the Parkers did not identify an inter-
state economic market or activity that was
burdened by the taxation of Mrs, Parker’s
one-half community interest in Mr. Parker’s
Nevada income. Jd. at 847, 230 P.8d at 739.

In Wynne, the United States Supreme
Court analyzed the constitutionality of Mary-
land’s income tax scheme. —- U.S. ——, 185
S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 818 (2015). The spe-
cific tax scheme at issue discriminated in
favor of intrastate over interstate economic
activity. Id. at 1796. Residents were subject
to a two-part income tax: (1) a “state” income
tax; and (2) a “county” income tax. Id. at
1790. Despite the misleading name, the
“county” tax was collected by the state. Resi-
dents who paid income tax to another juris-
diction for income earned in that jurisdiction
were allowed a credit against the “state” tax,
but not the “county” tax. Jd. Thus, part of
the income that a resident earned outside of
Maryland could be taxed twice.

The Wynnes were Maryland residents and
earned pass-through income from a Subchap-
ter S corporation that earned income in 39
States. Jd. The Wynnes claimed an income
tax credit for taxes paid to the other 39

677

States. Jd. The Maryland State Comptroller
of the Treasury allowed the Wynnes a credit
against their “state” income tax, but not
against their “county” income tax. Id. A defi-
ciency was assessed. Id.

The United States Supreme Court noted
that three of its previous decisions were par-
ticularly instructive: J.D. Adams Manufac-
turing Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 807, 58 S.Ct.
918, 82 L.Ed. 1865 (1988); Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v, Henneford, 805 U.S. 484, 59
S.Ct. 825, 83 L.Ed. 272 (1939); and Central
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S.
653, 68 S.Ct. 1260, 92 L.Ed. 1633 (1948), Id.
at 1795. In all three of these cases, the
United States Supreme Court “struck down a
state tax scheme that might have resulted in
the double taxation of income earned out of
the State and that discriminated in favor of
intrastate over interstate economic activity.”
Id, Although, the Court reasoned that the tax
schemes in the aforementioned three cases
“could be cured by taxes that satisfy what we
have subsequently labeled the ‘internal con-
sistency’ test,” which “helps courts identify
tax schemes that discriminate against inter-
state commerce [by] ‘look[ing] to the struc-
ture of the tax at issue to see whether its
identical application by every State in the
Union would place interstate commerce at a
disadvantage as compared with commerce
intrastate’ ” Id. The United States Supreme
Court explained the benefit of the test as
follows:

By hypothetically assuming that every
State has the same tax structure, the inter-
nal consistency test allows courts to isolate
the effect of a defendant State’s tax
scheme. This is a virtue of the test because
it allows courts to distinguish between (1)
tax schemes that inherently discriminate
against interstate commerce without re-
gard to the tax policies of other States, and
(2) tax schemes that create disparate in-
centives to engage in interstate commerce
(and sometimes result in double taxation)
only as a result of the interaction of two
different but nondiscriminatory and inter-
nally consistent schemes.... The first cat-
egory of taxes is typically unconstitutional;
the second is not.

Id.

The United States Supreme Court held

that Maryland’s income tax scheme failed the

678

internal consistency test and provided the
following example to illustrate its reasoning:
Assume that every State imposed the fol-
lowing taxes, which are similar to Mary-
land’s “county” and “special nonresident”
taxes: (1) a 1.25% tax on income that resi-
dents earn in State, (2) a 1.25% tax on
income that residents earn in other juris-
dictions, and (8) a 1.25% tax on income
that nonresidents earn in State, Assume
further that two taxpayers, April and Bob,
both live in State A, but that April earns
her income in State A whereas Bob earns
his income in State B. In this circum-
stance, Bob will pay more income tax than
April solely because he earns income inter-
state. Specifically, April will have to pay a
1,25% tax only once, to State A. But Bob
will have to pay a 1.25% tax twice: once to
State A, where he resides, and once to
State B, where he earns the income.
Id. at 1808-04. The United States Supreme
Court emphasized that this illustration dem-
onstrated that “Maryland scheme’s discrimi-
natory treatment of interstate commerce is
not simply the result of its interaction with
the taxing schemes of other States. Instead
... Maryland’s tax scheme is inherently dis-
criminatory and operates as a tariff.” Id, at
1804. The United States Supreme Court rea-
soned, however, that
Maryland could remedy the infirmity in its
tax scheme by offering, as most States do,
a credit against income taxes paid to other
States.... If it did, Maryland’s tax
scheme would survive the internal consis-
tency test and would not be inherently
discriminatory. Tweak our first hypotheti-
cal ... and assume that all States impose a.
1.25% tax on all three categories of income
but also allow a credit against income taxes
that residents pay to other jurisdictions. In
that circumstance, April (who lives and
works in State A) and Bob (who lives in
State A but works in State B) would pay
the same tax. Specifically, April would pay
a 1,25% tax only once (to State A), and
Bob would pay a 1.25% tax only once (to
State B, because State A would give him a
credit against the tax he paid to State B),
Id, at 1805-06.
HI Turning to the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause,

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Art, IV, § 2, el. 1, provides: ‘The Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States.’ The Clause thus estab-
lishes a norm of comity without specifying
the particular subjects as to which citizens
of one State coming within the jurisdiction
of another are guaranteed equality of
treatment.

Austin v, New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660,
95 S.Ct. 1191, 48 L.Ed.2d 580 (1975). In
Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal,
522 U.S, 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 189 L.Ed.2d 717
(1998), the United States Supreme Court an-
alyzed the constitutionality of a New York
tax law that denied only nonresident taxpay-
ers a deduction to their state ineome tax for
alimony paid. The United States Supreme
Court held that, “in the absence of a substan-
tial reason for the difference in treatment of
nonresidents, [the tax law at issue] violates
the Privileges and Immunities Clause by de-
nying only nonresidents an income tax de-
duction for alimony payments.” Id. at 296,
118 S.Ct. 766,

TM Linda’s argument regarding the dor-
mant Commerce Clause is meritless for two
reasons. First, much like the appellants in
Parker, Linda fails to identify any interstate
economic activity or market that is burdened
by the taxation of her one-half community
interest in Husband’s Texas earnings.

Second, Idaho’s income tax scheme does
not, as Linda claims “flunk[] the internal
consistency test.” Linda asserts that there is
no internal consistency because “Idaho seeks
an income tax on Linda’s presumed commu-
nity half that would not be taxed in Texas.”
Linda clearly misunderstands the internal
consistency test. The United States Supreme
Court explained that the internal consistency
test “isolate[s] the effect of a defendant
State’s tax scheme.” Wynne, — U.S. —,
185 S.Ct. 1787, 1802, 191 L.Ed.2d 818 (2015).
Therefore, for purposes of the internal con-
sistency test, whether or not Texas would
tax Linda’s one-half community interest in
Husband’s earnings is irrelevant, Indeed,
comparing Texas and Idaho tax law merely
demonstrates that the differences “create

disparate incentives to engage in interstate
commerce (and sometimes result in double
taxation) only as a result of the interaction of
two different but nondiscriminatory and in-
ternally consistent schemes.” Id. at 1802.
The United States Supreme Court held that
such a result is, not unconstitutional. Jd.

To apply the internal consistency test, we
must first examine Idaho's tax statutes. Ida-
ho taxes its residents on income, “wherever
derived,” and taxes nonresidents on income
“which is the result of activity within or
derived from sources within the. state.” LC.
§ 63-8002, However, Idaho grants residents
“a credit against the tax otherwise due under
this chapter for the amount of any income
tax imposed on the individual ... by another
state on income derived from sources therein
while domiciled in Idaho and that is also
subject to tax under this chapter.” I.C. § 63-
3029(1). Idaho’s tax scheme is not inherently
discriminatory because, if adopted by every
state, interstate commerce would not be at a
disadvantage as compared to intrastate com-
merce. As acknowledged by the United
States Supreme Court in Wynne, a tax credit
may cure an otherwise discriminatory tax
scheme, 185 S.Ct. at 1805-06. Accordingly,
Linda’s argument—that Idaho’s tax scheme
fails the internal consistency test—is merit-
less.

Separately, Linda’s claim that “Parker ...
is obsolete since the 2015 case of Wynne” is
incorrect. Parker's analysis of the dormant
Commerce Clause is straight forward. Par-
ker, 148 Idaho 842, 847-48, 230 P.8d 734,
739-40 (2010). This Court began by stating
that, for a tax statute to implicate the Com-
merce Clause, a taxpayer “must demonstrate
that the state’s taxation of [her] entire in-
come has a substantial effect on an identifi-
able interstate economic activity or market.”
Td, at 847, 230 P.8d at 739 (quoting 71 Am.
Jur2d State and Local Taxation § 391
(2009)), This Court continued, stating that
“the dormant Commerce Clause will not ap-
ply unless there is actual ... competition
between entities in an identifiable market
and state action that either ewpressly dis-
criminates against or places an undue bur-
den on interstate commerce.” Id. (quoting
Stelener v. Comm’r of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d

679

736, 740-41 (2001)) (emphasis added), Be-
cause the Parkers did not identify any inter-
state economic activity or market that was
burdened by Idaho’s tax scheme, the Com-
merce Clause was not implicated, Id. at 847-
48, 230 P.3d at 739-40. Wynne does not cut
against Parker; rather, Wynne endorsed the
internal consistency test as a method of iden-
tifying discriminatory tax schemes, The
Wynne Court’s endorsement of the internal
consistency test does not do away with the
other showings necessary to implicate the
Commerce, Clause, 7.2, “a substantial effect
on an identifiable interstate economic activity
or market.” Parker, 148 Idaho 842, 847, 280
P.8d 784, 739 (2010), Therefore, Wynne did
not abrogate Parker,

Hl Lastly, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is not violated by the Commission’s
taxing of Linda’s one-half community interest
in Husband’s earnings. Linda’s suggestion
that the holding from Lunding v. New York
Tas Appeals Tribunal is applicable here is
meritless, In Lunding, the United States Su-
preme Court analyzed a tax law that treated
nonresidents differently from residents. 522
US. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 189 L.Ed.2d 717
(1998). That is not the case here. The Com-
mission is taxing Linda, a resident of Idaho.
The Commission is not seeking to tax Hus-
band. Therefore, the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause is not implicated because Linda
has failed to demonstrate that Idaho, without,
substantial reason, is taxing nonresidents dif-
ferently than residents.

B. .The district court did not err by hold-
ing that Linda’s one-half community
interest in Husband’s Texas earnings
was subject to the tax laws of Idaho.

Linda submits that if Wynne is not bind-
ing, Texas tax law applies and the community
property at issue is not subject to Idaho’s

income tax. Linda cites Lane-Burslem v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 659 F.2d

209 (D.C. Cir. 1981), for the proposition that

“the ownership interests in marital personal

property should be determined by the inter-

nal law of the state with the most significant
relationship to the spouses and to the earn-
ings.” Lastly, Linda argues that Texas Fami-
ly Code section 3.202(b) renders her commu-

680

nity interest in Husband’s Texas earnings
immune from Idaho income tax.

The Commission claims that Linda, as an
Idaho resident, is taxed on all of the income
she received during the Taxable Years while
living in Idaho, including her one-half com-
munity interest in Husband’s Texas earnings.
As a preliminary matter, the Commission
recognizes, in a footnote, that “fiJt is argua-
ble that Idaho community property law (and
not Texas or Washington law) should have
controlled whether [Husband’s] income was
community property.” However, the Commis-
sion did not assert that position in this case
because “[glenerally, the Commission takes
the position that the laws applicable to mari-
tal assets will largely be determined by the
spouses’ domiciles.” (citing Idaho State Tax
Commission Publication 175 COMMUNITY
PROPERTY, hittps://tax.idaho.gov, Rev. Oct.
15, 2012, at 2-8). The Commission’s position
“mirrors the federal taxation scheme.” (citing
Treas, Reg. § 1.66-1 (providing that the law
of the state where one is domiciled governs
whether there is community income or sepa-
rate income for federal tax purposes)). After
conceding that Texas law applies to charac-
terize Husband’s Texas earnings, the Com-
mission asserts that Texas law makes clear
that Husband’s Texas earnings are communi-
ty property in which Linda owns a one-half
interest.

Next, the Commission addresses Linda’s
reliance on Texas Family Code section
3,202(b). The Commission contends that Tex-
as Family Code section 3.202(b) does not
operate as a bar against Linda paying Idaho
income tax on her one-half community inter-
est in Husband’s Texas earnings because the
plain language of the statute merely prohib-
its a creditor from attaching sole-manage-
ment community property to satisfy the oth-
er spouse’s debt. The Commission asserts
that the district court was correct in conclud-
ing that the Commission “is not seeking the
wages of [Husband] to satisfy a debt, rather,
it is assessing a tax on [Linda] for her one-
half interest to income earned during mar-
riage.”

Lastly, the Commission addresses Idaho’s
ability to tax its own residents’ income. The
Commission asserts that Linda conflated the

following two concepts: (1) analyzing Texas
law to characterize the earnings as communi-
ty or separate property; and (2) Idaho’s abili-
ty to tax its own residents. The Commission
explains that, by taxing its own residents’
income—even income earned in Texas—Ida-
ho is not invading Texas and seizing Hus-
band’s wages, nor is it taxing Husband, The
Commission argues that the bottom line is
that Idaho is taxing whatever community
property interest Linda, a resident of Idaho,
owns due to the wages earned by Husband.
After clarifying Linda’s alleged error, the
Commission turns to Idaho Code section 63-
3002, which provides that Idaho imposes “a
tax on residents of this state measured by
Idaho taxable income wherever derived.” I.C.
§ 68-3002 (emphasis added). Therefore, the
Commission claims that Linda, as an Idaho
resident, is taxed on all the income she re-
eeived during the Taxable Years while domi-
ciled in Idaho, even if said income was de-
rived from Texas.

It appears that the conflict of law analysis
regarding the characterization of Husband’s
Texas earnings is an issue of first impression
for this Court. Indeed, in Parker, this Court
declined to address “whether the district
court erred in applying Idaho rather than
Nevada community property law” because
the Parkers stipulated that Idaho community
property laws applied. 148 Idaho 842, 846,
280 P.8d 784, 788 (2010). Similarly, here, we
decline to address the issue because the
Commission concedes that Texas community
property law applies.

WM Turning to Texas community
property law:

With limited exceptions, community
property under Texas law consists of all
property either spouse acquired during the
marriage “other than separate property.”
... Texas recognizes both sole and joint-
management community property....
Sole-management community property is
that property which, though acquired dur-
ing the marriage, would have belonged to
that spouse if single.

Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex.
1999).

The characterization of property as ei-
ther community or separate is determined
by the inception of title to the proper-
ty.... Inception of title occurs when a
party first has a right of claim to the
property by virtue of which title is finally
vested,
Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2004). However, there is a unique fea-
ture of Texas community property law:

(a) During marriage, each spouse has the

sole management, control, and disposition

of the community property that the spouse

would have owned if single, including:

(1) personal earnings...
Tex. Family Code § 8,102. Property that is
under the sole management of one spouse is
known as “special community property.”
While personal earnings may be controlled or
managed by one spouse, this characterization
does not render them immune from the non-
earning spouse’s community property inter-
est. See Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391,
401 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991),

WM Texas Family Code section 3.202(b)
protects special community property from
nontortious liabilities incurred by the other
spouse, Tex. Fam. Code § 3.202(b). However,
in Kimsey, the Texas Court of Appeals held
that “both spouses are jointly and severally
liable for the tax due on a joint return....
Thus, a spouse may be liable for the entire
tax liability although the income was totally
earned by the other spouse.” Kimsey v. Kim-
sey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
It stands to reason, then, that Texas Family
Code section 3.202(b) does not immunize spe-
cial community property from the tax liabili-
ty of the non-controlling spouse.

Idaho Code section 63-3002 provides that
Idaho imposes “a tax on residents of this
state measured by Idaho taxable income
wherever derived....” 1.C. § 63-3002 (em-
phasis added). Further, this Court, in Par-
ker, upheld the constitutionality of Idaho’s
tax on residents’ out-of-state income, stating:

The Supreme Court of the United States
has made it clear that a state has the
power to tax in relation to a resident’s
income derived from sources outside the

State and that there is nothing in the

681

Federal Constitution to prevent the exer-
cise of such power. The rationale for allow-
ing a state to compute a tax on income
earned elsewhere is based on the premise
that inhabitants are supplied many ser-
vices by their state of residence and should
contribute toward the support of the state,
no matter where their income is earned.
Parker, 148 Idaho 842, 846-47, 230 P.8d 784,
788-89 (2010) (citations omitted original).

HM The Commission correctly asserts
that Linda conflates two concepts: (1) Texas
law's characterization of property as either
separate or community property; and (2) Ida-
ho’s ability to tax its own residents. It is true
that this is a two-step analysis, but the steps
must not be confused. First, we will apply
Texas community property law to character-
ize Husband’s Texas earnings as either com-
munity or separate property. This step de-
termines whether Linda owns a one-half
community interest in Husband’s Texas
earnings. Second, we will apply Idaho tax
Jaw to Linda, an Idaho resident. Crucially,
Idaho tax law is not applied to Husband. In
sum, this analysis determines: (1) whether
Linda owns a one-half community interest in
Husband’s Texas income; and (2) how Idaho
tax law treats Linda’s one-half community
interest in Husband's Texas income.

Linda’s claim that Texas law should apply
is correct, but only to a certain extent. Texas
community property law is applied to charac-
terize Husband’s Texas earnings as either
separate or community property and to de-
termine Linda’s interest in those earnings.
But, Texas tax law is not applied because
Idaho is taxing Linda, a resident of Idaho,
not Husband. Applying Texas community
property law makes clear that Linda owns a
one-half community interest in Husband’s
Texas earnings. Linda is correct in pointing
out that community property may be classi-
fied as special community property, but the
Texas court in Massey demonstrated that the
sole-management aspect of special communi-
ty property does not render it immune from
the non-earning spouse’s community proper-
ty interest. Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 401
(“Each spouse owns an undivided one-half
interest in all community assets and funds
regardless of which spouse has management

682 Dn

and control.”), Therefore, according to Texas
community property law, Linda owns a one-
half community interest in Husband’s Texas
earnings because they are community prop-
erty.

Linda’s claim that Texas Family Code sec-
tion 8.202(b) exempts her interest in Hus-
band’s sole-management special community
property from Idaho’s income tax is unper-
suasive. The Texas court in Kimsey provided
that both spouses are jointly and severally
liable for tax due on a joint return. 965
S.W.2d at 696. The parties’ stipulated facts
indicate that Linda and Husband’s filing sta-
tus was “married filing jointly’ during the
Taxable Years. Therefore, Texas Family
Code section 8,202(b) does not exempt Lin-
da’s one-half community interest in Hus-
band’s special community property from Ida-
ho’s income tax,

Lastly, Idaho Code section 63-3002, in con-
junction with this Court’s holding in Par-
ker—that a state’s power to tax a resident’s
out-of-state income is not unconstitutional—
makes clear that Idaho may tax Linda’s one-
half community interest in Husband’s Texas
earnings. Parker, 148 Idaho at 846-47, 280
P.8d at 788-89 (quoting Herndon v. West, 87
Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 35 (1964)). In sum: Texas
community property law characterizes Hus-
band’s earnings as community property; Lin-
da owns a one-half community interest in
said property; and, because Linda was domi-
ciled in Idaho during the Taxable Years, her
one-half community interest is subject to Ida-
ho income tax,

Neither party requested attorney fees on
appeal.

VI, CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Costs on appeal are awarded to the Commis-
sion.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
EISMANN, HORTON and BRODY concur,

403 P.3d 318

In the Matter of the Driver’s License
Suspension of: Jesse Leroy
Herrmann

Jesse Leroy HERRMANN, Petitioner-
Respondent,

Y

STATE of Idaho, Idaho Transportation
Department, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 44379
Court of Appeals of Idaho,

Filed: September 19, 2017

wo

Susan K. Servick, Coeur d’Alene, for ap-
pellant.

James E. Siebe, Moscow, for respondent.

GRATTON, Chief Judge

The Idaho Transportation Department.
(ITD) appeals from the district court’s de-
cision setting aside ITD’s denial of Jesse
Leroy Herrmann’s request for an adminis-
trative license suspension hearing. ITD
determined that Herrmann’s request was
untimely. We affirm the district court’s
determination that the request was timely.

684.
L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Herrmann failed an evidentiary breath test
on Sunday, December 6, 2015, and was ar-
rested and charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol. Herrmann was served
with a notice of suspension for failure of
evidentiary testing, advising him that ITD
would suspend his driving privileges unless
he filed a written request for an administra-
tive hearing within seven calendar days from
the date of the notice, Herrmann filed a
request for administrative hearing with ITD
by facsimile on Monday, December 14, 2015,
eight calendar days from service. ITD con-
cluded the request was not timely filed and
denied Herrmann’s request. Thereafter,
Herrmann filed a petition for judicial review
with the district court. Following a hearing,
the district court set aside ITD’s decision and.
remanded the administrative license suspen-
sion to ITD for the purpose of conducting an.
administrative license suspension hearing.
ITD timely appeals.

518

ANALYSIS

HM The Idaho Administrative Proce-
dures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of
ITD decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, dis-
qualify, revoke, or restrict a person’s driver’s
license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-830, 67-
52012), 67-5270. In an appeal from the deci-
sion of the district court acting in its appel-
late capacity under the IDAPA, this Court
reviews the agency record independently of
the district court’s decision. Marshall v. Ida-
ho Dep't of Transp., 137 Idaho 387, 340, 48
P.8d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court
does not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence
presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 187
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court
instead defers to the agency’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda
v. Brighton Corp., 180 Idaho 928, 926, 950
P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 187 Idaho
at 840, 48 P.8d at 669. In other words, the
agency’s factual determinations are binding
upon the reviewing court, even where there

is conflicting evidence before the agency, so
long as the determinations are supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the
record, Urrutia v. Blaine Cnty., ew rel. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 184 Idaho 358, 357, 2 P.8d 788, 742
(2000); Marshall, 187 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at
669.

HE The Court may overturn an agency’s
decision where its findings, inferences, con-
clusions, or decisions violate statutory or con-
stitutional provisions; exceed the agency's
statutory authority; are made upon unlawful
procedure; are not supported by substantial
evidence in the record; or are arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-
5279(8). The party challenging the agency
decision must demonstrate that the agency
erred in a manner specified in IC, § 67-
5279(8) and that a substantial right of that
party has been prejudiced, Price v. Payette
Cnty. Ba. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 181 Idaho 426,
429, 958 P.2d 588, 586 (1998); Marshall, 187
Idaho at 340, 48 P.8d at 669. If the agency’s
decision is not affirmed on appeal, it shall be
set aside and remanded for further proceed-
ings as necessary. 1.C, § 67-5279().

I In the present case, there are no
factual issues on appeal. The single issue is
whether Herrmann timely filed his request
for an administrative hearing. The statute
pertaining to the deadline provides:

Administrative hearing on suspension. A

person who has been served with a notice
of suspension after submitting to an evi-
dentiary test may request an administra-
tive hearing on the suspension before a
hearing officer designated by the depart-
ment. The request for hearing shall be in
writing and must be received by the de-
partment within seven (7) calendar days
of the date of service upon the person of
the notice of suspension, and shall include
what issue or issues shall be raised at the
hearing. The date on which the hearing
request was received shall be noted on the
face of the request.

Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) (emphasis added).
Hl The general rule is that the interpre-

tation of a statute is an issue of law over
which we exercise free review. Aguilar v.

Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 649-50, 262 P.8d 671,
678-79 (2011). Such interpretation must begin
with the literal words of the statute; those
words must be given their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole, Verska v. Saint Al-
phonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 898,
265 P.8d 502, 506 (2011), It is well estab-
lished that where statutory language is un-
ambiguous, legislative history and other ex-
trinsic evidence should not be consulted for
the purpose of altering the clearly expressed
intent of the legislature. Jd. Only where a
statute is capable of more than one conflict-
ing construction is it said to be ambiguous
and invoke the rules of statutory construc-
tion, L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand
Family Trust, 186 Idaho 788, 743, 40 P.8d
96, 101 (2002). If it is necessary for this
Court to interpret a statute because an ambi-
guity exists, then this Court will attempt to
ascertain legislative intent and, in construing
the statute, may examine the language used,
the reasonableness of the proposed interpre-
tations, and the policy behind the statute.
Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 184
Idaho 180, 184, 997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000).
Where the language of a statute is ambigu-
ous, constructions that lead to absurd or
unreasonably harsh results are disfavored.
See Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151 Idaho 790,
798, 264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011).

ITD maintains that the statutory language
is clear and unambiguous, and therefore no
statutory interpretation is necessary to de-
termine what is meant by seven calendar
days, resulting in the deadline falling on Sun-
day, December 18, 2015, Conversely, Herr-
mann asserts two other statutes, IC. §§ 73-
109 and 78-108, dictate that the deadline
would fall on December 14, 2015, which is the
day he filed his request. Idaho Code § 78-109
provides, “The time in which any act provid-
ed by Jaw is to be done is computed by
excluding the first day, and including the last.
unless the last is a holiday and then it is also
excluded.” Idaho Code § 78-108 provides,

1, ITD contends that filings can be delivered to
ITD through “a variety of mechanisms” on holi-
days and weekends. How a driver would know
this is uncertain. Moreover, ITD's interpretation
would create an anomaly in the system of calcu-
Jating time. The Idaho Supreme Court has en-

685

“Holidays, within the meaning of these com-
piled laws, are: Every Sunday....”

Hl The Idaho Supreme Court has clari-
fied that while conclusions of law are freely
reviewable, in an appeal of agency actions, a
four-prong test must be applied to determine
the appropriate level of deference to be given
to an agency construction of a statute, Ham-
ilton ex rel. Hamilton v, Reeder Flying
Serv., 185 Idaho 568, 571, 21 P.8d 890, 898
(2001). If the four-prong test is met, then
courts must give considerable weight to the
agency’s interpretation of the statute, Pres-
ton v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 181 Idaho
502, 504, 960 P.2d 185, 187 (1998). The Court.
must first determine if the agency has been
entrusted with the responsibility of adminis-
tering the statute at issue. Hamilton, 185
Idaho at 571, 21 P.8d at 898. Second, the
agency’s statutory construction must be rea-
sonable. Third, the Court must determine
that the statutory language at issue does not
expressly treat the precise question at issue.
Finally, the fourth prong requires the Court
to make a determination of whether any of
the rationales underlying the rule of defer-
ence are present. Id.

Hl In this case, ITD is clearly entrusted
with the responsibility of administering I.C.
§ 18-8002A, therefore satisfying the first
prong. Regarding the second prong, ITD ar-
gues its interpretation of I.C. § 18-8002A(7)
is reasonable “[gliven the immediate and ex-
peditious time considerations for the Depart-
ment to determine whether a driver’s privi-
leges should be suspended based upon a
failed evidentiary test.”! It also claims it
satisfies the third prong, requiring the Court
to determine that the statutory language at
issue does not expressly treat the precise
question at issue. An agency’s interpretation
will not be followed if it contradicts the clear
expression of the legislature. Hamilton, 135
Idaho at 572, 21 P.8d at 894, ITD asserts
there is nothing about its interpretation of
the statute in question that contradicts the

dorsed a system that establishes “a uniform sys-
tem of computing time for the convenience of
both the court and the litigants.” Cather v. Kelso,
103 Idaho 684, 686, 652 P.2d 188, 190 (1982)
(discussing LR.C.P. 6(a)).

686

clear statutory language. However, the legis-
lature expressly stated how time should be
calculated for any act provided by law, which
would include 1.C. § 18-8002A(7). “The time
in which any act provided by law is to be
done is computed by excluding the first day,
and including the last unless the last is a
holiday and then it is also excluded.” I.C.
§ 73-109 (emphasis added). Given that the
last day of the seventh calendar day fell on a
Sunday, which is considered a holiday pursu-
ant to I.C. § 78-108, the legislature clearly
expressed its intent that the time should be
calculated to determine the deadline in Herr-
mann’s case to be Monday, December 14,
2015. This holding is also consistent with
Title 34, governing elections, Idaho Code
§ 84-116, entitled “CALENDAR DAYS
USED IN COMPUTATION OF TIME,”
provides:

Calendar days shall be used in all com-
putations of time made under the provi-
sions of this act, In computing time for any
act to be done before any election, the first
day shall be included and the last, or elec-
tion day, shall be excluded. Sundays, Sat-
urdays and legal holidays shall be includ-
ed, but if the time for any act to be done
shall fall on Sunday, Satwrday or a legal
holiday, such act shall be done upon the
day following such Swnday, Saturday or
legal holiday.

LC. § 84-116 (emphasis added), A review of
the fourth prong regarding a determination
of whether any of the rationales underlying
the rule of deference are present is unneces-
sary given the failure to meet the second and
third prong of the deference test formulated
by J.B. Simplot Co., Inc. v, Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206,
1219 (1991).

Finally, ITD cites Wanner v, State, Dep’t
of Transp., 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.8d 1250
(2011), to support its argument that the Ida-
ho Supreme Court did not find any ambiguity
in determining the appropriateness of its in-
terpretation of the seven-calendar-day period
provided in I,C. § 18-8002A(7). The Idaho
Supreme Court noted that I.C. § 18-8002A(7)
“allows the person whose license has been
suspended to request a hearing within seven
days to contest the ninety-day suspension.”

Wanner, 150 Idaho at 169, 244 P.8d at 1255.
It held that the petitioner in that case had
waived his right to an administrative hearing
by failing to request a hearing within the
seven-day period following his notice of sus-
pension, Jd. However, that case does not deal
with the specific issue here, where the last
day falls on a holiday.

More analogous to the specific issue here
is Page v. McCain Foods, Inc, 145 Idaho
802, 179 P.8d 265 (2008). In that case, the
claimant filed a motion for reconsideration
with the Industrial Commission regarding a
worker's compensation claim. Id, at 811, 179
P,8d at 274, Pursuant to 1.0. § 72-718, which
governs workers compensation and related
laws, motions to reconsider must be made
within twenty days from the date of filing the
decision, Page, 145 Idaho at $11, 179 P.8d at
274, In that case, Page conceded that she did
not mail her motion until the twenty-first day
following the Industrial Commission’s order;
however, Page argued the computation of
time would have resulted in the twentieth
day falling on July 4 (a holiday), Jd. The
Industrial Commission denied the claim as
being untimely filed; however, the Idaho Su-
preme Court held the computation of time in
LC, § 72-718 is controlled by LC. §§ 73-108
and 73-109 and concluded that because July 4
is a holiday, the deadline for filing a motion
for reconsideration was July 5. Therefore, it
held the claimant complied with the timing
requirement and reversed the Industrial
Commission’s denial of her motion for recon-
sideration. Page, 145 Idaho at 311, 179 P.8d
at 274,

ITD’s interpretation of IC. § 18-8002A(7)
contradicts the clear expression of the legis-
lature regarding how to calculate time for an
act provided by law. The computation of time
is governed by I.C. §§ 78-108 and 78-109. To
be consistent with these statutes and others,
including IC. § 84-116 which defines “calen-
dar days,” we hold that because the seventh
day following Herrmann’s notice of suspen-
sion fell on a Sunday, which is a holiday, it is
excluded. Thus, the completion of the seven-
day period would fall on the following day,
Monday, December 14, 2015. Because Herr-
mann filed his request for an administrative

hearing on Monday, December 14, his re-
quest was timely.

mW.

CONCLUSION

Herrmann’s request for an administrative
license suspension hearing pursuant to 1,C,
§ 18-8002A(7) was timely filed, ITD’s deci-
sion is reversed, and this case is remanded to

687

ITD for the purpose of conducting an admin-
istrative license suspension hearing.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY
concur,

688

403 P.3d 632

BEDARD AND MUSSER, an Idaho part-
nership, and Boise Hollow Land Hold-
ings, RLLP, an Idaho limited liability
partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a body politic
corporate of the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 44171

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2017 Term.

Filed: September 22, 2017

ATLL

Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP,
Boise, for appellant. Terry C. Copple argued.
Robert B. Luce, Boise City Attorney,

Boise, for respondent. Abigail Germaine ar-
gued.

BRODY, Justice.

This case involves a claim to quiet title.
Plaintiffs Bedard and Musser, and Boise Hol-
low Land Holdings, RLLP (collectively re-
ferred to as Boise Hollow) filed suit against
Boise City seeking a declaration that they:
(1) hold an access easement over part of
Quail Hollow Golf Course pursuant to a re-
corded Permanent Easement Agreement;
and (2) are entitled to expand the easement.
area to comply with certain requirements of
the Ada County Highway District so that it
can be dedicated as a public road. The dis-
trict court rejected Boise Hollow’s position
on summary judgment, finding that the
agreement did not create an easement be-
cause the entity which purported to grant the
easement across the golf course property had
only a leasehold interest at the time the
agreement was signed. Moreover, the same
party owned both the land where the ease-
ment was located (the servient estate) and
the land to which the easement was appurte-
nant (the dominant estate). The district court
further found that any access that was grant-
ed by the lessor under the agreement termi-
nated when the leasehold was terminated by
an express agreement. The district court en-
tered judgment in favor of Boise City. We
affirm the district court’s judgment.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

This is an easement dispute between two
adjoining landowners. Boise Hollow owns ap-
proximately 68 acres designated as Lot 4 in
the Nibler Subdivision in Ada County. Boise
City owns the adjacent Quail Hollow Golf
Course.

The properties at issue have a lengthy
ownership and transfer history. In 1948, Vic-
tor Nibler purchased a large tract of land. In
the 1970s, Victor and his wife, Ruth, con-
structed a golf course on part of their land.
In 1980, the Niblers leased the golf course to
a group of individuals for 99 years. Those
individuals subsequently assigned the lease-
hold to a corporation, whose leasehold was
later judicially foreclosed and purchased at
the foreclosure sale by an entity called A-J

689

Corporation, The Niblers and A-J Corpora-
tion subsequently amended the lease agree-
ment, but did not change the duration of the
leasehold. In 1986, A-J Corporation assigned
its interest in the leasehold to Tee, Ltd.
whose principals included Tommy Sanderson.

In 1990, the Niblers sold a large portion of
their land to Vaneroft Corporation, including
the golf course and the 68 acre parcel now
owned by Boise Hollow. Since the golf course
was leased to Tee, Ltd. at the time of the
sale, the Niblers also assigned their interests
as landlords to Vaneroft.

In approximately 1991, Vancroft, Tee, Ltd.,
and Sanderson executed the Permanent
Easement Agreement at issue. The agree-
ment purports to create a permanent access
easement across the golf course for the bene-
fit of the 68 acre parcel. There is no dispute
that Vancroft owned both parcels at the time
the agreement was executed. Both parcels
have changed hands multiple times since the
Permanent Easement Agreement at issue
was executed. There is no dispute that Boise
Hollow and Boise City are the successors-in-
interest to that agreement.

The parties filed cross motions for sum-
mary judgment. The district court granted
Boise City’s motion and entered judgment in
the City’s favor. Boise Hollow timely appeal-
ed to this Court.

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMM sn reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, this Court’s standard of review is
the same as the district court’s standard in
ruling upon a motion. Thomson v. Lewiston,
187 Idaho 478, 475-76, 50 P.8d 488 (2002).
“The [district] court must grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). The court will
consider “pleadings, depositions, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any.” Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 227, 159
P.3d 862, 864 (2007) (citations omitted).
“When an action will be tried before the
court without a jury, the trial court as the

690

trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most
probable inferences based upon the undisput-
ed evidence properly before it and grant the
summary judgment despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences.” Shawver v. Huckle-
berry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 360-61,
98 P.8d 685, 691-92 (2008), “[The Court] will
not disturb findings of fact that are sup-
ported by substantial and competent evi-
dence, even if there is conflicting evidence.”
Akers v. D.L. White Constr. Inc., 142 Idaho
298, 298, 127 P.8d 196, 201 (2005).

im.
ANALYSIS

A, The district court correctly held that
the agreement did not create a perma-
nent easement across the golf course
property.

HE Boise Hollow contends that the dis-
trict court erred when it held that the agree-
ment at issue did not create a permanent
easement, The district court based its deci-
sion on two well-understood legal principles.
First, a tenant cannot grant a greater inter-
est in property than its own possessory inter-
est (Le, Tee, Ltd. could only grant access
across the property so long as its lease was
in place), Second, a landowner cannot create
an easement across his own property. Boise
Hollow contends that these principles should
not apply, Boise Hollow’s arguments are not
well taken,

There is no dispute that Vancroft owned
both the golf course property and the 63 acre
parcel at the time the Permanent Easement.
Agreement was executed. There is also no
dispute that Tee, Ltd. held only a leasehold
interest in the golf course property. Sander-
son was principal of Tee, Ltd., and did not
hold any interest in either parcel so it is
unclear why he was made a party to the
agreement,

HMMM The agreement stated that Tee,
Ltd. and the Sandersons:

Hereby grant, convey and remise to Van-

croft Corporation a forty (40’) foot perpet-

ual easement under, over and across the

southwest quarter of Lot 1, Block 2, Nibler

Subdivision the legal description of which

is attached hereto as Exhibit B and incor-

porated herein by this reference, for the

purposes of providing utilities and access

(ie., ingress and egress) to Lot 4, Block 2,

Nibler Subdivision. A drawing of the loca-

tion of the easement is shown on Exhibit C

which is attached hereto and incorporated

herein by this reference and is also shown
on the Nibler Subdivision Plat as a forty

40’) foot access and utility easement to

Lot 4, Block 2.

While this language purports to grant a per-
manent easement, an easement can be grant-
ed only by a person who has title to, or an
estate in, the servient tenement, and an ease-
ment may not create a right that the grantor
did not possess, 25 Am. Jur, 2d Hasements
and Licenses § 12 (2017), A “lessee has ... a
limited ownership interest in the real proper-
ty” still owned in fee title by the landlord.
Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124, 125, 578
P.2d 240, 241 (1978). A tenant has a possesso-
ry interest and the landlord has a reversion-
ary interest. Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267,
272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984).

Here, Tee, Ltd. held only a possessory
interest in the golf course property until the
expiration of its leasehold estate and could
not convey any interest in the property
greater than its own possessory interest, Any
right that Tee, Ltd., could have conveyed to
Vaneroft under the agreement terminated
with the leasehold.

Boise Hollow recognizes that this is the
law in Idaho, but contends that the policy
behind it—to protect the owner of the ser-
vient estate from being bound by a condition
granted unilaterally by his tenant without the
owner’s approval—is not implicated here.
Boise Hollow cites Leichtfuss v. Dabney, 829
Mont, 129, 122 P.8d 1220 (2005), to support
its position. Its reliance on Leichifuss is mis-
placed.

The Leichtfuss court addressed a situation
which is much different than the one at hand
as evidenced by its description of the issue
presented:

The precise issue, therefore, is whether
an easement established by prescription
for the benefit of a dominant tenement
held as a life estate terminates as a matter

of law upon the extinguishment of that life
estate. As a general rule, an easement
appurtenant attaches to, passes with, and
is an incident of ownership of the particu-
lar land to which it is appurtenant. See 7
Thompson, supra, § 60.07(b)(1), at 470. In
other words, such an easement “runs with
land,” which means that the benefit or
burden passes automatically to successors,
See Rest.3d § 1.5 emt. a, at 31. Yet, a
number of courts have held that an ease-
ment burdening or benefitting an estate
less than a fee simple ends when that
estate expires. See Jon W. Bruce & James
W. Ely, Jr, The Law of Easements and
Licenses in Land, § 10:15, at 10-28 (2001),
and cases cited therein. As such, it may be
more precise to say that an easement runs
with the estate in land to which it is appur-
tenant, or that it follows ownership of the
estate for as long as that estate ewists.

The foundation for this principle is easily
understood where the servient tenement is
held in less than fee simple: a person can
convey no more or greater title than he
holds. See Rest.3d § 43 emt. e, at 526
(“The duration of a servitude is normally
limited to the duration of the estate of the
creator of the servitude because the cre-
ator cannot burden a greater estate than
he or she has.”) (emphasis added). In other
words, a life tenant or a lessee generally
cannot impose upon his land a burden that
passes to the remainderman or the rever-
sioner.

Where the dominant tenement is held in
Jess than fee simple, however, the basis for
the foregoing rule—which prevents the
benefit of an easement from running to the
yemainderman or reversioner—is less obvi-
ous. A number of courts have ruled that an
easement granted to a life tenant or lessee
terminates as a matter of course with the
life estate or lease. Yet, there is nothing
inherent in a future estate that would pre-
clude its benefitting from a servitude. To
the contrary, a servitude may be created to
burden or benefit any estate in land, in-
eluding present possessory estates and fu-
ture estates. See Rest.3d § 2.5 & emt. a, at
99,

122 P.8d at 1229-30 (emphasis in original).
The Leichtfuss court did not make an excep-

691

tion to the well settled principle that a tenant
cannot grant an interest in land that extends
beyond his leasehold estate. To the contrary,
the court acknowledged the law and the
sound reasoning behind it. We decline to
make any exception to this well settled prin-
ciple and affirm the judgment of the district
court.

Given our ruling it is not necessary to
address whether the district court erred
when it held that Vancroft could not grant an
easement across its own property.

B. We will not address issues raised for
the first time on appeal.

During oral argument Boise Hollow urged
this Court to consider Saddlehorn Ranch
Landowner’s, Inc. v, Dyer, 146 Idaho 747,
752, 203 P.38d 677, 682 (2009), since the plat
that was recorded in 1992 included a dedica-
tion of the easement. This is an entirely new
issue that is being raised for the first time on
appeal. “This Court has repeatedly held: ‘To
properly raise an issue on appeal there must
either be an adverse ruling by the court
below or the issue must have been raised in
the court below, an issue cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.” Skinner v. U.S.
Bank Home Mortg., 159 Idaho 642, 650, 365
P.3d 898, 406 (2015) (quoting Bank of Com-
merce v. Jefferson Enters, LLC, 154 Idaho
824, 828, 303 P.8d 183, 187 (2018), As such,
‘we will not consider it.

Similarly, Boise Hollow argues in its open-
ing memorandum that Boise City should be
estopped from denying the existence of an
easement. This issue is also being raised for
the first time on appeal and will not be
considered.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district
court, Costs to Respondent,

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justice
HORTON, and Justices Pro Tems
WALTERS and KIDWELL concur.

692 Le

403 P.3d 636
Reed J. TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Richard A, RILEY and Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership, Defendants-Re-
spondents,

and

Sharon Cummings, Personal Representa-

tive of the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow,

and Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chtd., an Idaho Corporation.

Docket No, 43686-2015

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, August 2017 Term.

Filed: September 25, 2017

oO
oS

Roderick C. Bond, Roderick Bond Law
Office PLLC, Bellevue, Washington, argued
for appellant.

Jeffrey A. Thomson, Elam & Burke PA,
Boise, argued for respondents,

AMENDED OPINION

THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION
DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 2017
IS HEREBY AMENDED.

EISMANN, Justice,
This is an appeal from a judgment dismiss-
ing claims against an attorney and a law firm

that he later joined based upon an opinion
letter issued by the attorney in his capacity
as corporate counsel regarding the legality of
a stock redemption agreement. The Appel-
lant challenges the grant of summary judg-
ment to the Respondents and the amount of
attorney fees awarded to them. We affirm
the judgment dismissing the claims and the
awards of attorney fees, and we award attor-
ney fees on appeal,

L

Factual Background.

This case arises out of an opinion letter
issued in August 1995 to Reed J. Taylor by
Messrs, Richard A. Riley and Robert M.
Turnbow, as counsel for AIA Services Corpo-
vation (‘AIA Services”), Mr. Taylor held six-
ty-three percent of the corporation’s common
stock and served as the Chairman of the
Board of Directors and the corporation’s
Chief Executive Officer. In July 1995, Mr.
Taylor and AIA Services entered into a stock
redemption agreement, in which the corpora-
tion agreed to redeem Mr, Taylor’s stock for
$7.5 million and other consideration. Messrs.
Riley and Turnbow represented the corpora-
tion in negotiating that agreement, and Mr.
Taylor was represented by his own counsel,
The stock redemption agreement required an
opinion letter from the corporation’s legal
counsel, and Messrs, Riley and Turnbow par-
ticipated in drafting and issuing that letter,

The letter was dated August 15, 1995, and
signed “Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chtd.” (“Eberle Berlin”), which
was the law firm of which Mr, Turnbow was
a partner and Mr. Riley was an employee. In
the letter, they stated that ALA Services and
its subsidiaries “have full corporate power
and authority to enter into, execute and de-
liver” the stock redemption agreement and
related documents; that the stock redemption
agreement and related documents “constitute
the valid and binding obligation of Company
and its Subsidiaries enforceable against them
in accordance with their respective terms”;
and that neither the stock redemption agree-
ment nor the consummation of the transac-
tion, “to the best of our knowledge, violate

any law.” The opinion letter was addressed to
Mr. Taylor, and it concluded with the state-
ment, “This opinion is furnished by us solely
for your benefit for use in connection with
the Transaction Documents and the transac-
tions contemplated thereby; and it may not
be furnished or quoted to, or relied upon, by
any other person.”

The stock redemption transaction closed in
August 1995. Pursuant to agreement, AIA
Services gave Mr. Taylor a promissory note
in the sum of $1.5 million payable within
ninety days and a promissory note in the
sum of $6 million payable in ten years, with
monthly interest-only payments until the
note was paid in full. The corporation failed
to make the required payments, and Mr.
Taylor and the corporation executed a re-
structured stock redemption agreement dat-
ed July 1, 1996, When the corporation failed
to make the payments due under that agree-
ment, Mr. Taylor filed a lawsuit on January
29, 2007, against the corporation, its subsid-
iaries, Mr. Taylor’s brother, other officers
and directors of AIA Services, and their
spouses (Taylor v. AIA Services Corp.). Be-
fore the lawsuit was resolved, Mr, Taylor
filed two more lawsuits against the attorneys
who were representing or had represented
defendants in the Taylor v. AIA Services
Corp. lawsuit.

In April 2008, defendants in Taylor v. AIA
Services Corp. filed motions for a partial
summary judgment alleging that the stock
redemption agreement was unenforceable be-
cause it was an illegal contract. The hearing
on those motions was held on April 23, 2008,
In August 2008, Mr. Taylor filed a lawsuit
against Michael E. MeNichols and his firm,
Clements, Brown and MeNichols, P.A. (Tay-
lor v. MeNichols), who initially represented
Mr. Taylor’s brother, AIA Services, and its
subsidiary. In April 2007, Mr. McNichols had
withdrawn from representing AIA Services
and its subsidiary, and Gary Babbitt and
John Ashby, of the law firm Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley, LLP (“Hawley Troxell”),
appeared as counsel for those defendants. In
August 2008, Mr, Taylor also filed a lawsuit
against Messrs. Babbitt and Ashby, Hawley
Troxell, and two other attorneys from that
firm, Patrick Collins and Richard Riley,

695

(Taylor v. Babbitt). On March 1, 1999, Mr.
Riley had left Eberle Berlin and had joined
Hawley Troxell.

Mr, Taylor asserted claims against the at-
torneys for (1) aiding and abetting or assist-
ing others in the commission of tortious acts
in Taylor v. AIA Services Corp.; (2) conver-
sion and misappropriation of the corporate
assets of AIA Services and its subsidiary; (8)
violations of Idaho’s Consumer Protection
Act, and (4) professional negligence and/or
breach of fiduciary duties for their conduct in
representing AIA Services, including their
failure to defend the accuracy of the opinion
letter. The defendants in these two cases
filed motions to dismiss, and the court en-
tered orders granting those motions. The
district judge presiding over these two cases
was also the district judge presiding over
Taylor v. AIA Services Corp, and he took
judicial notice of that case in toto when de-
ciding the motions, Mr. Taylor filed notices
of appeal, but no judgments had yet been
entered in the cases. They were remanded
for the entry of judgments, which were then
provided to this Court on March 24, 2010.
The two cases were consolidated for the ap-
peal, and this Court upheld the judgments in
favor of the defendants. Taylor v. McNi-
chols, 149 Idaho 826, 248 P.8d 642 (2010).

On June 17, 2009, the court in Taylor v
AIA Services Corp. held that the stock re-
demption agreement was void because a stat-
ute in effect in 1995 prohibited a corporation
from redeeming its own shares unless either
(a) the corporation had sufficient unreserved
and unrestricted earned surplus to do so or
(6) it had sufficient unreserved and unre-
stricted capital surplus to do so and the use
of capital surplus for the redemption was
authorized either by the articles of incorpo-
ration or by the vote of the holders of a
majority of all its shares. The court found,
based upon the evidence presented in con-
nection with the motions for summary judg-
ment, that AIA Services had negative earned
surplus in 1995 and that the use of capital
surplus had not been authorized by a vote of
the shareholders. Mr. Taylor did not contend
that the use of capital surplus was authorized
by the articles of incorporation.

696

On September 4, 2009, the court in Taylor
», AIA Services Corp. entered a partial judg-
ment dismissing as to all defendants Mr.
Taylor’s claims alleging breach of contract,
misrepresentation, fraud, conversion, con-
structive trust, specific performance, and
breach of the implied covenants of good faith
and fair dealing. That partial judgment was
certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This
Court affirmed the partial judgment on ap-
peal. Taylor v. AIA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho
552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011).

On October 1, 2009, Mr. Taylor filed this
lawsuit against Mr. Riley, Hawley Troxell,
Mr. Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin, In Mr,
Taylor’s complaint, he sought to recover
damages caused by his reliance on the opin-
ion letter issued by Messrs. Riley and Turn-
bow based upon the theories of negligent
misrepresentation, malpractice, consumer
protection act violations, breach of fiduciary
duties, and fraud or constructive fraud. Mr.
Turnbow passed away while the lawsuit was
pending, and the personal representative of
his estate was substituted as a party in his
place. Mr. Taylor and the personal represen-
tative ultimately reached a settlement, and
Mr. Taylor’s claims against the estate were
dismissed with prejudice,

Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell filed mo-
tions for summary judgment seeking dismiss-
al with prejudice of all claims alleged against
them in the complaint, and Mr. Taylor filed a
motion for partial summary judgment seek-
ing an order that they were liable on all of
his claims. After briefing and argument, the
district court entered orders denying Mr.
Taylor’s motion, granting Mr. Riley’s motion
with respect to the claims of negligent mis-
representation and violation of the Consumer
Protection Act, and granting Hawley Trox-
ell’s motion dismissing all claims against it.

On September 7, 2011, this Court issued
its opinion in Taylor v. AIA Services Corp.
upholding the judgment that the stock re-
demption agreement was illegal and there-
fore void. In that case, Mr, Taylor argued
that if the stock redemption agreement was
illegal, it should still be enforced because he
was fraudulently induced to enter into the
agreement by the opinion letter. He also

argued that the opinion letter included false
assertions of fact. In rejecting those argu-
ments, this Court in Taylor v. AIA Services
Corp. stated as follows:

Third, Reed Taylor argues that even if
the Stock Redemption, Agreement is ille-
gal, it should be enforced because he was
fraudulently induced to enter into the
agreement by an opinion letter (the Opin-
ion Letter), which offered the opinion that
the Stock Redemption Agreement was le-
gal. The Opinion Letter was written by a
law firm, acting as general counsel for ATA
Services in connection with the agreement,
and was addressed to Reed Taylor. Reed
Taylor argues that the district court erred
in; (1) refusing to enforce the Stock Re-
demption Agreement based upon fraud; (2)
finding that the Opinion Letter did not
provide factual representations or mixed
representations of fact and opinion; and (8)
making these decisions on fraud without
ever permitting Reed Taylor to depose or
conduct discovery with the attorneys who
rendered the opinions and factual repre-
sentations to him. Reed Taylor makes no
argument and provides no explanation on
these claims; he merely states that the
district cowrt made these errors, Further-
more, Reed Taylor cites nothing in the
record except for the district court’s Opin-
ion and Order granting partial summary
judgment and its Opinion and Order on
the motion for reconsideration,

Taylor v. AIA Servs, Corp., 151 Idaho at 566,
261 P.8d at 848 (emphasis added).

After quoting the district court’s conclu-
sion that the opinion letter was not a state-
ment of fact, but merely a statement of opin-
ion that cannot form the basis of a fraud
claim, we held:

We affirm the district court in dismiss-
ing Reed Taylor’s fraud argument. On ap-
peal, Reed Taylor merely states the gener-
al proposition that an opinion can form
the basis for fraud when there is intent to
mislead, but he does not actually argue
that anyone intended to mislead him in
this case and points to nothing in the
record suggesting that anyone had such
intent. As to Reed Taylor’s claim that the
district court erred in finding an absence

of fraud without giving him the opportuni-

ty to depose or conduct discovery with the

lawyers who authored the Opinion Letter,

Reed Taylor again makes no argument in

this section of his brief concerning this

issue.
Id. (emphasis added).

Based upon our opinion in Taylor v, AIA
Services Corp. on December 15, 2011, Mr.
Riley moved for a partial summary judgment
dismissing the claims against him for fraud
and constructive fraud. The motion was
briefed by Mr. Riley and Mr. Taylor, and it
was argued on January 30, 2012. Based upon
the briefing and oral argument, the district
court entered a decision holding that the
fraud and constructive fraud claims were
barred by res judicata because Messrs, Riley
and Turnbow were in privity with AIA Ser-
vices, based upon the fact that they issued
the opinion letter in the course of represent-
ing the corporation and, alternatively, that
the fraud and constructive fraud claims were
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
On April 30, 2012, the court entered an order
dismissing the fraud and constructive fraud
claims.

Mr, Riley again moved for summary judg-
ment on several grounds, including that the
claim for malpractice was barred by res judi-
cata based upon the judgment entered in
Taylor v. Babbitt. The district court denied
the motion, and Mr. Riley sought a permis-
sive appeal to this Court on that issue, which
this Court granted. On appeal, this Court
held that Mr. Taylor’s malpractice claim
against Mr. Riley was barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho
328, 335, 836 P.8d 256, 268 (2014) (Taylor v.
Riley D.

On remand, the district court entered
judgments on July 8, 2015, dismissing with
prejudice all claims against Hawley Troxell
and all claims against Mr. Riley. The court
also awarded Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell
court costs and attorney fees. Mr. Taylor and
Sharon Cummings, the personal representa-
tive of Mr, Turnbow’s estate, reached an
agreement to settle the claims against the
estate, and on September 18, 2015, the court
entered a judgment dismissing all claims
against the estate.

697

On October 28, 2015, Mr. Taylor filed a
motion asking the district court to reconsider
various orders and decisions it had entered
during the litigation and the judgments en-
tered in favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell.
Mr. Taylor filed a notice of appeal on Octo-
ber 29, 2015, and on January 5, 2016, the
eourt entered an order denying his motion
for reconsideration.

IL

Did the District Court Err in Dismissing
Mr. Taylor’s Claim for Negligent
Misrepresentation?

Hl As the first claim for relief in his
complaint, Mr. Taylor alleged that Mr. Riley
was liable for alleged false representations
made in the opinion letter based upon the
tort of negligent misrepresentation. Mr. Ri-
ley moved for summary judgment dismissing
that claim, which the district court granted
based upon this Court’s opinions in Duffin v.
Idaho Crop Improvement ‘Ass’n, 126 Idaho
1002, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995), and Mannos v.
Moss, 148 Idaho 927, 155 P.8d 1166 (2007). In
Duffin, we held that, “except in the narrow
confines of a professional relationship involv-
ing an accountant, the tort of negligent mis-
representation is not recognized in Idaho.”
126 Idaho at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203, In
Mannos, we reaffirmed that holding. 148
Idaho at 935, 155 P.8d at 1174. On appeal,
Mr. Taylor asks us to expand the tort of
negligent misrepresentation to include attor-
neys. We need not address the arguments he
makes in asking us to do so, because any
claim for negligent misrepresentation would
be barred by res judicata, based upon our
opinion in Taylor v. Riley I. In that appeal,
we held that Mr. Taylor’s claim, which he
alleged in his complaint as being for “profes-
sional negligence, malpractice, negligence
and/or negligent issuance of an opinion let-
ter” was barred by the doctrine of res judica-
ta. 157 Idaho at 335, 336 P.8d at 268. A claim
for negligent misrepresentation based upon
the content of the opinion letter is the same
cause of action under a different theory, and
so it too would be barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. Therefore, we will not address
this issue.

698
mm.

Did the District Court Err in Dismissing
Mr. Taylor’s Claim for Malpractice?

Il As the second claim for relief in his
complaint, Mr. Taylor alleged that Mr, Riley
committed malpractice in drafting and issu-
ing the opinion letter. Mr. Taylor contends
on appeal that the district court erred in
holding that his malpractice claim was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata.

Hl Mr. Riley moved for summary judg-
ment seeking dismissal of the malpractice
claim on the ground that it was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata based upon the judg-
ment in Taylor v. Babbitt, and the district
court denied that motion. This Court granted
Mr. Riley's request for a permissive appeal
to decide that issue, On appeal, we held that.
Mr, Taylor’s malpractice claim against Mr.
Riley was barred by res judicata, and we
remanded the case to the district court. Tay-
lor v, Riley I, 157 Idaho at 335, 340, 336 P.3d
at 268, 278. Based upon the doctrine of “law
of the case,” the district court did not err in
holding that Mr. Taylor’s malpractice claim
‘was barred by res judicata.

The doctrine of “law of the case” is well
established in Idaho and provides that
“agpon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in
deciding a case presented states in its
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary
to the decision, such pronouncement be-
comes the law of the case, and must be
adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon
subsequent appeal... .”

Swanson v. Swanson, 184 Idaho 512, 515, 5
P.8d 978, 976 (2000). Therefore, we will not
revisit our prior holding that Mr. Taylor’s
malpractice claim is barred by res judicata.

Iv.

Did the District Court Evr in Dismissing
Mr. Taylor’s Claims for Breach of
Fiduciary Duties?

Hl As the fourth claim for relief in his
complaint, Mr. Taylor alleged that Mr. Ri-
Jey’s actions in representing AIA Services in
Taylor v. AIA Services Corp. violated fiducia-
ry duties owed to Mr. Taylor, including the

duty of loyalty. In Taylor v. Riley I, we held
that an attorney could voluntarily assume a
duty to a nonelient and that the statement in
the opinion letter stating that Mr. Taylor
could rely upon it created a duty of care to
Mr. Taylor with respect to the issuance of
the opinion letter, 157 Idaho at 339, 386 P.38d
at 272, Mr, Taylor contends that Mr, Riley's
representation of AIA Services in connection
with the stock redemption agreement and in
drafting the opinion letter created a fiduciary
duty owing to Mr. Taylor and that Mr, Riley
breached that duty when he “asserted argu-
ments contrary to the Opinion Letter and
engaged in representation adverse to the
Opinion Letter and the legal representation
provided for the redemption agreement and
related agreements.” Because Mr, Riley be-
came a partner in Hawley Troxell on March
1, 1999, Mr. Taylor alleges that Hawley
Troxell is also liable for the alleged breach of
fiduciary duties,

The material allegations in Mr. Taylor’s
complaint are as follows:

55. Defendants Riley, Turnbow and
Eberle Berlin owed Reed Taylor fiduciary
duties as the majority shareholder of AIA
Services, the Chairman of the Board of
ATA Services, the Chief Executive Officer
of AIA Services, and the direct intended
third-party beneficiary of the legal repre-
sentation pertaining to the redemption of
his shares and the recipient of the Opinion
Letter expressly drafted for his reliance.
They also owed additional fiduciary duties
by the fact that Defendants Eberle Berlin,
Turnbow and Riley provided the Opinion
Letter at the request of AIA Services.

56. .... Defendant Riley, and, conse-
quently, Defendant Hawley Troxell owed
Reed Taylor fiduciaries duties (including,
without limitation, the duty of loyalty) to
not make arguments which are contrary to
the Opinion Letter and to not undertake
any representations which were adverse to
the Opinion Letter or Reed Taylor, which
pertain in any way to the redemption of his
shares or the redemption agreement and
related agreements. Defendants have en-
gaged in a course of self-dealing, deception
and/or misrepresentations which go be-
yond the mere allegations of negligence,

59. Defendant Riley, and, consequent-
ly, Defendant Hawley Troxell, breached
their fiduciary duties and duties of good
faith and fair dealing owed to Reed Taylor
when they asserted arguments contrary to
the Opinion Letter and engaged in repre-
sentation adverse to the Opinion Letter
and the legal representation provided for
the redemption agreement and related
agreements, which such arguments and ad-
verse representations are a direct violation
of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor,
including the duty of loyalty.

Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment seeking dismissal
of Mr. Taylor’s complaint on the ground that
it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Mr. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin moved for
summary judgment and argued with respect
to this claim that there was no attorney-
client relationship between Mr. Turnbow and
Mr. Taylor. In response to Mr, Taylor’s mo-
tion for a partial summary judgment, Mr.
Riley and Hawley Troxell also argued that
Mr. Riley did not have a fiduciary or attor-
ney-client relationship with Mr. Taylor. The
district court granted summary judgment on
this claim on the ground the acts of Messrs.
Turnbow and Riley in issuing the opinion
letter did not create a fiduciary or attorney-
client relationship with Mr. Taylor.

On appeal, Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell
argue that the claim for breach of fiduciary
duty was barred by res judicata. We affirm
the dismissal of this claim on that ground,
but our doing so should not be taken as an
indication that we believe that the opinion
letter created an attorney-client or fiduciary
relationship with Mr. Taylor.

On August 18, 2008, Mr. Taylor filed Tay-
lor v. Babbitt against Mr. Riley, Hawley
Troxell, and others. In that lawsuit, Mr. Tay-
lor alleged various claims against Mr. Riley
and Hawley Troxell based upon their conduct
in representing AIA Services in the Taylor v.
AIA Services Corp. lawsuit, including that
they breached fiduciary duties and the duty
of loyalty allegedly owing to Mr. Taylor. Mr.
Taylor’s complaint in Taylor v. Babbitt al-
leged:

699

62. The Defendants owed AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Ine, and/or
Reed J, Taylor a duty of care to provide,
including, but not limited to, reasonable,
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and
professional legal advice and legal repre-
sentation in keeping with the standard of
care in the legal profession and as owed to
the corporations (referred to herein and
above as “duty of care”). The Defendants
breached their duty of care as a result of
their acts and/or omissions thereby damag-
ing the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, to
the detriment of Reed J. Taylor.

63. The Defendants breached their fi-
duciary duties owed to AIA Services Cor-
poration, AIA Insurance, Inc, and/or
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, including, without.
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty.

64. The Defendants’ acts constitute
professional negligence and/or breach of
the Defendants’ fiduciary duties, and such
conduct has damaged the corporations and
Reed J. Taylor, in an amount to be proven
at trial or on summary judgment.

Mr, Taylor’s complaint in Taylor v. Babbitt
also alleged that Mr. Riley’s conduct, for
which Hawley Troxell was also liable, includ-
ed asserting arguments in Taylor v, AIA
Services Corp. that were counter to repre-
sentations made in the opinion letter. He
alleged:

58, The Defendants were fully aware of
Reed J, Taylor’s rights to property in
which he held a security interest and was
pledged to him as collateral. In fact, De-
fendant Richard A. Riley represented AIA
Services Corporation in the redemption of
Reed J. Taylor’s shares and the drafting of
the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge
Agreement and other applicable agree-
ments. Defendants were responsible for
issuing opinion letters relating to the
transaction, which include various applica-
ble representations and warranties. Defen-
dants are now asserting arguments coun-
ter to the representations made in the
opinion letter drafted by Defendants by
and through Defendant Richard A. Ri-

700

56. The Defendants’ conduct consti-
tutes the willful interference with property
and money belonging to AIA Services Cor-
poration, AIA Insurance, Ine. and/or Reed
J. Taylor and/or which such property and
money should be under the possession
and/or control of Reed J. Taylor, as the
person entitled to such money and proper-
ty as a creditor and pledgee. The Defen-
dants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession
of such property and money. Despite Reed
J. Taylor’s demands, the Defendants have
refused to return such property and mon-
ey.

(Emphasis added.)

“Mr. Taylor’s cause of action against Mr.
Riley based upon the issuance of the opinion
letter accrued in April 2008 when he was
required to incur attorney fees to counter the
claim that the stock redemption agreement
was an illegal contract.” Taylor v. Riley I,
157 Idaho at 383, 336 P.3d at 266, By August
18, 2008, Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell had
asserted arguments counter to the represen-
tations made in the opinion letter, because
Mr. Taylor so alleged in the complaint he
filed in Taylor v. Babbitt, and he also alleged
that he had been damaged by such breach of
fiduciary duties. A plaintiff who files a law-
suit alleging that he had been damaged by
the defendant's conduct cannot later claim
that he had not suffered any damage when
the judgment in that lawsuit is subsequently
asserted as the basis for a defense of res
judicata in another lawsuit. Any cause of
action he had with respect to the alleged
breach of fiduciary duties had arisen by that
time.

On appeal in Taylor v. Babbitt, we upheld
the dismissal of Mr. Taylor’s claims against
Hawley Troxell and the attorneys in that
firm, including Mr. Riley, for malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duties in their represen-
tation of AIA Services in the Taylor v, AIA
Services Corp. lawsuit. With respect to the
claim for legal malpractice, we stated, “It is
clear that Reed [Taylor], in his complaints,
has failed to allege that he is in an attorney-
client relationship with Respondents, and
therefore lacks the privity necessary to sue
Respondents for legal malpractice.” 149 Ida-
ho at 845, 248 P.8d at 661. With respect to

the claim for breach of fiduciary duties, we
held, “Reed [Taylor] has failed to allege facts
which can support a finding that Respon-
dents owed any fiduciary duty to Reed per-
sonally.” Id. Thus, Mr. Taylor’s claim of
breach of fiduciary duties alleged in this law-
suit is the same claim that he alleged in
Taylor v. Babbitt, and the claim here is
barred under the doctrine of res judicata by
the judgment entered in that case.

HM “In Taylor v, Babbitt, the district
court had jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject of the litigation, and it entered a
final judgment dismissing Mr. Taylor’s com-
plaint with prejudice.” Taylor v. Riley, 157
Idaho at 334, 836 P.8d at 267. “[T]he former
adjudication concludes parties and privies not
only as to every matter offered and received
to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to
every matter which might and should have
been litigated in the first suit.” Joyce v.
Murphy Land & Irrigation Co. 85 Idaho
549, 558, 208 P, 241, 242-48 (1922), There-
fore, any cause of action that Mr, Taylor
allegedly had for breach of fiduciary duties is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

v.

Did the District Court Err in Dismissing
Mr. Taylor’s Claim for Fraud or
Constructive Fraud?

HM As the fifth claim for relief in his
complaint, Mr. Taylor alleged that Mr. Riley
committed fraud and constructive fraud and
that Hawley Troxell was liable for his ac-
tions. In support of those claims, Mr. Taylor
alleged, at least in part, that the statements
in the opinion letter constituted fraud or
constructive fraud. In Taylor v, AIA Ser-
vices, Corp. the district court held that the
opinion letter “is, simply, an opinion based on
one’s interpretation of law and cannot form
the basis for a fraud claim,” and we affirmed
the district court’s rejection of Mr. Taylor's
fraud argument based upon the opinion let-
ter. 151 Idaho at 566, 261 P.8d at 848, Based
upon that opinion, Mr, Riley moved on De-
cember 15, 2011, for a partial summary judg-
ment dismissing the claims for fraud and
constructive fraud. After the motion was
briefed, it was argued on January 80, 2012.

The district court later granted Mr. Riley's
motion, holding that the claims of fraud and
constructive fraud were barred by res judica-
ta and, in the alternative, collateral estoppel.
In Taylor v. Babbitt, Mr. Taylor alleged a
claim against Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell
for fraud and constructive fraud. We upheld
the dismissal of those claims, stating as fol-
lows:

Reed [Taylor], also claims that his com-
plaints and amended complaints pled
causes of action for frand and constructive
fraud. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), fraud must be pled with
particularity. As this Court wrote in Glaze
v. Deffenbaugh:

A party must establish nine elements to

prove fraud: “1) a statement or a repre-

sentation of fact; 2) its falsity; 8) its
materiality; 4) the speaker’s knowledge
of its falsity; 5) the speaker’s intent that
there be reliance; 6) the hearer’s igno-

rance of the falsity of the statement; 7)

reliance by the hearer; 8) justifiable reli-
ance; and 9) resultant injury.” .
Reed fails to plead these elements in a
general sense, let alone with particularity
and, as such, has failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted as to
fraud.
“An action in constructive fraud exists
when there has been a breach of a duty
arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence, as in a fiduciary duty.” “Exam-
ples of relationships from which the law
will impose fiduciary obligations on the
parties include when the parties are: mem-
bers of the same family, partners, attorney
and client, executor and beneficiary of an
estate, principal and agent, insurer and
insured, or close friends.” It is clear that
Reed has not alleged facts sufficient to
support an inference that he is in an analo-
gous relationship with Respondents, and
has therefore not pled a claim upon which
relief may be granted as to constructive
fraud.
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845-46,
248 P.8d at 661-62 (citations omitted).

On appeal, Mr. Taylor argues that “[t]he
district court erred in holding that collateral
estoppel barred Taylor’s fraud claims be-

701

cause Riley did not establish all of the req-
uisite elements of collateral estoppel.” He
asserts that there are two reasons why col-
lateral estoppel does not apply—“Taylor’s
fraud and constructive fraud claims are not
barred by collateral estoppel because the
current fraud claims are different than those
litigated in AIA, and because Taylor did not
have an opportunity to fully and fairly liti-
gate the current fraud claims in AJA.”

Mr, Taylor contends that his current fraud
claims are different from those he asserted in
Taylor v, AIA Services Corp. because “Tay-
lor’s current fraud claims against Riley are
not based upon the opinions set forth in the
Opinion Letter, but rather on the material
facts that Riley intentionally omitted from
the Opinion Letter.” He asserts, “If these
facts had been made known to Taylor before
the Opinion Letter was delivered, then the
Opinion letter would not have been intention-
ally misleading” and “Reed Taylor or any
other reasonable opinion recipient would
have elected to not sell his shares.” In es-
sence, he is contending that he was fraudu-
lently induced to enter into the stock re-
demption agreement not based upon what
was stated in the opinion letter, but what was
not stated in the opinion letter. In both in-
stances, his claim is that he was deceived by
the contents of the opinion letter,

Mr. Taylor contends that he did not have a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
of fraud in Taylor v, AIA Services Corp. He
argues that “[t]he AZA district court stayed
general discovery and prohibited Taylor from
deposing Riley,” that the district court in this
case stayed discovery until after this Court’s
decision in Taylor v. AIA Services Corp., and
that he “did not have a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate his current claims in AIA
because it was not until February/March of
2012 that Taylor learned that Riley had been
concealing these material facts.” In Taylor v.
AIA Services Corp., Mr. Taylor raised the
issue that the district court in that case erred
in “making these decisions on fraud without
ever permitting Reed Taylor to depose or
conduct discovery with the attorneys who
rendered the opinions and factual represen-
tations to him.” Taylor v. AIA Services,
Corp., 151 Idaho at 566, 261 P.8d at 843.

702

However, he was deemed to have waived that
issue on appeal because he did not present
any argument in support of it, “As to Reed
Taylor’s claim that the district court erred in
finding an absence of fraud without giving
him the opportunity to depose or conduct
discovery with the lawyers who authored the
Opinion Letter, Reed Taylor again makes no
argument in this section of his brief concern-
ing this issue.” Jd. We have long held,
“Where a party raises an issue on appeal but
fails to support the alleged error with argu-
ment and authority, the party is deemed to
have waived the issue.” U.S. Banls Nat. Ass'n
v, Kueneli, 184 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877,
881 (2000); accord Hamp v. Stonebraker, 57
Idaho 434, 65 P.2d 766, 767 (1937). Thus, in
Taylor v. AIA Services Corp, Mr. Taylor
failed to properly raise on appeal the asser-
tion that he should have been able to conduct,
discovery from Mr. Riley regarding the opin-
ion letter before his fraud claims were decid-
ed,

In Taylor v, AIA Services Corp., Mr. Tay-
lor alleged that “he was fraudulently induced.
to enter into the agreement by [the] opinion
letter.” 151 Idaho at 566, 261 P.38d 829, We
upheld the rejection of Mr, Taylor’s claims of
fraud because he “merely states the general
proposition that an opinion can form the
basis for fraud when there is intent to mis-
lead, but he does not actually argue that
anyone intended to mislead him in this case
and points to nothing in the record suggest-
ing that anyone had such intent.” Id, In
Taylor v. Babbitt, Mr. Taylor alleged that
Mr. Riley and others committed fraud and
constructive fraud, but he failed “to plead
[the] elements in a general sense, let alone
with particularity and, as such, has failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be grant-
ed as to fraud.” Taylor v. McNichols, 149
Idaho at 846, 248 P.3d at 662, Res judicata
applies even if the prior lawsuit failed to
state a claim, 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 545 (2006), or was unsupported by evi-
dence. Id. § 564,

Hl In its decision entered on April 5,
2012, the district court in this case granted
Mr, Riley’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment regarding the fraud claims on two inde-
pendent grounds: “Because Taylor v. AIA

services constituted a final judgment, res ju-
dicata is appropriate to bar Taylor’s claim
for fraud. Alternatively, collateral estoppel
applies to Taylor's claim for fraud.” With
respect to his alleged fraud claims, Mr. Tay-
lor only argues on appeal that the court
erred in granting summary judgment based
upon collateral estoppel. He does not present.
argument and authority in his opening brief
that the court erred in granting summary
judgment based upon res judicata. He only
argued that it was error to dismiss his claims
for professional malpractice, negligent mis-
representation, and breach of fiduciary duty
based upon the doctrine of res judicata.
“Where a lower court makes a ruling based
on two alternative grounds and only one of
those grounds is challenged on appeal, the
appellate court must affirm on the uncontest-
ed basis.” State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510,
517-18, 164 P.8d 790, 797-98 (2007), There-
fore, we will not address whether the district
court erred in dismissing the fraud claims
based upon collateral estoppel because Mr,
Taylor has not argued on appeal that the
district court erred in dismissing the fraud
claims based upon res judicata.

Mx. Taylor contends that because he was
prevented from taking Mr. Riley's deposition
before the entry of judgment in Taylor v.
Babbitt, he has new evidence that supports
his claim of fraud, He argues:

After the district court held that issue
preclusion barred Taylor’s fraud claims in
this case, Riley supplemented written dis-
covery answers and disclosed, for the first
time, the reasoning, explanation, and ratio-
nale that supported the opinions contained
in the Opinion Letter. Thereafter, on
March 29-80, 2012, Taylor finally had the
opportunity to depose Riley. At Riley's
deposition, he testified to the reasons that
he believed his Opinion Letter was correct.
Riley also testified that he believed that
Taylor did not engage in a preferential
transaction.

Based on the substance of Riley’s Feb-
ruary 2012 disclosures and March 2012
deposition, Taylor finally had conerete in-
formation that the Opinion Letter improp-
erly omitted material facts, thereby estab-
lishing facts needed to support causes of

action against Riley for fraud and con-
‘structive fraud, as well as reviving claims
for professional malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty, to the extent such claims
were related to these material omissions.

(Citations to record omitted.)

HI Res judicata precludes the relitiga-
tion of the same claim even if there is new
evidence to support it. Wolfe v. Farm Bu-
reau Ins. Co,, 128 Idaho 898, 408, 918 P.2d
1168, 1178 (1996). However, with respect to a
fraud claim, res judicata would not bar the
claim if Mr. Taylor could not have discovered
the fraud by the exercise of due diligence,
Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho
610, 614-15, 826 P.2d 1322, 1826-27 (1992),
As stated above, Mr. Taylor failed to proper-
ly appeal his assertion that the district court
in Taylor v. AIA Services Corp. erred in
granting summary on his fraud claim without.
permitting him to depose Mr. Riley. We need
not decide whether this failure constitutes a
lack of due diligence or whether the alleged
new evidence supports a claim for fraud be-
cause Mr, Taylor did not timely present the
alleged new evidence to the district court.

Mr, Taylor supported his motion for recon-
sideration by filing on October 28, 2015, his
declaration, the declarations of his counsel,
and the declaration of his expert, who opined
that Mr, Riley had “intentionally prepared
and delivered the misleading Opinion Letter
to Reed Taylor” and that it was impossible
“to ascertain that the Opinion Letter was
intentionally misleading when such disclo-
sures and reasoning were omitted from the
Opinion Letter until Mr. Riley first disclosed
that information on February 22, 2012.”

1. The judgment was titled “Amended Judgment”
because on June 3, 2010, the district court had
entered a document titled “Judgment” purport-
ing to dismiss Mr. Taylor's claims against Haw-
ley Troxell, but the document did not constitute a
judgment because it did not comply with Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(@) (2009). That rule
stated that “[a] judgment shall not contain ...
the record of prior proceedings,” and the docu-
ment included a record of prior proceedings.

2. On February 20, 2015, the court had entered a
document titled “Judgment” purporting to dis-
miss Mr, Taylor's claims against Mr. Riley, but
the document did not constitute a judgment be-
cause it did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil

703

The partial judgments entered in this case
became final judgments on September 18,
2015. On July 8, 2015, the district court en-
tered an “Amended Judgment” stating that
“{t]he Plaintiff's Complaint against Defen-
dant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP,
is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice”
and awarding Hawley Troxell court costs and
attorney fees.! On the same date, the district
court entered an “Amended Judgment” stat-
ing that “[t]he Plaintiff's Complaint against
Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in
its entirety with prejudice” and awarding Mr,
Riley court costs and attorney fees.2 On Sep-
tember 18, 2015, the court entered a “Judg-
ment” stating, “Judgment is entered as to all
claims against Defendants Sharon Cum-
mings, Personal Representative of the Estate
of Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin,
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered,
which are dismissed with prejudice.” Upon
the entry of this judgment on September 18,
2015, the claims against all defendants in the
action had been. dismissed with prejudice. “A
judgment is final if .-, judgment has been
entered on all claims for relief, except costs
and fees, asserted by or against all parties in
the action.” L.R.C.P. 54(a) (2015). Upon the
entry of the judgment on. September 18,
2015, all of the three judgments became final
judgments.

Rule 11(a)(2)(B) provides, “A motion for
reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of
the trial court may be made at any time
before the entry of final judgment but not
later than fourteen (14) days after the entry
of the final judgment.” LR.C.P, 11(a)(2)(B)
(2015), The motion for reconsideration had to
be filed by October 2, 2015, but it was not

Procedure 54(a) (2014). That rule stated that “[a]
judgment shall state thé relief to which a party is
entitled on one or more claims for relief in the
action,” and the document included a statement
regarding the manner in which the court would
later assess and order costs and attorney fees.
That statement did not constitute the granting of
relief to which any party was entitled on a claim
for relief in the action, See Spokane Structures,
Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 619,
226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010) (“The ‘judgment
sought’ is not an order granting a motion for
summary judgment. The judgment sought is a
final determination of a claim or claims for relief
in the lawsuit.”),

704

filed until October 28, 2015, which was twen-
ty-one days too late. Although the district
court considered the motion for reconsidera-
tion and denied it on January 5, 2016, it did
not have jurisdiction to consider the motion
because it was not timely filed. See O’Neil v.
Schuckardt, 116 Idaho 507, 509-10, 777 P.2d
729, 731-82 (1989) (trial court was without
jurisdiction to decide an untimely motion for
a new trial); Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855,
860, 786 P.2d 1809, 1314 (1987) (trial court,
had no jurisdiction to amend judgment where
there was no timely motion to alter or amend
the judgment). Therefore, the denial of the
motion for reconsideration is not an issue for
consideration on appeal, nor can the docu-
ments submitted with that motion be consid-
ered on appeal.?

On October 9, 2015, the district court en-
tered a “Final Amended Judgment” dismiss-
ing Mr. Taylor’s claims against Mr. Riley and
a “Final Amended Judgment” dismissing Mr.
‘Taylor’s claims against Hawley Troxell. Both
of these judgments were identical to the
respective prior amended judgments dismiss-
ing with prejudice the claims against those
parties, except that each “Final Amended
Judgment” included a Rule 54(b) certificate
declaring the judgment to be final. That cer-
tifieate was meaningless because the judg-
ments were already final.

On March 3, 2016, the district court en-
tered an order awarding Mr. Riley and Haw-
ley Troxell each an additional $3,750.00 in
attorney fees. Those fees were awarded for
defending against Mr. Taylor’s motion for
reconsideration, On the same date the court
entered a “Second Amended Judgment” with
respect to Hawley Troxell increasing its
award of court costs and attorney fees from
$25,029.00 to $28,779.00 and a “Second
Amended Judgment” with respect to Mr.
Riley increasing his award of court costs and
attorney fees from $289,265.25 to $243,015.25.
Neither of these judgments amended the pri-
or judgment with respect to the dismissal of
Mr. Taylor’s claims with prejudice. There-
fore, those judgments did not alter the time

3. Mr. Taylor filed a notice of appeal on October
29, 2015, which was timely. Idaho Appellate
Rule 13(b)(7) states that the district court has the
power and authority during the pendency of an
appeal to “[rlule upon any motion for reconsid-

for filing his motion for reconsideration as to
the interlocutory decisions upon which the
judgments were based.

TE We have held that an amended judg-
ment that does not alter the material terms
from which a party might have appealed does
not enlarge the time for filing an appeal.
Vierstra v. Vierstra, 158 Idaho 878, 880, 292
P.3d 264, 271 (2012). Similarly, the entry of
the final amended judgments and second
amended judgments in this case did not ex-
tend the time for filing a motion for reconsid-
eration. The final amended judgments did
not alter the material terms of the respective
amended judgments, and the addition of the
Rule 54(b) certificates in the final amended
judgments were meaningless because the
amended judgments were already final, The
second amended judgments only increased
the amounts of the costs and attorney fees
awarded, they did not alter the prior judg-
ments dismissing Mr. Taylor’s claims. “An
attorney fee award made subsequent to entry
of judgment in a case does not affect the
finality of the original judgment.” Tanner v.
Cobb’s Estate, 101 Idaho 444, 446, 614 P.2d
984, 986 (1980).

The issue regarding the timeliness of the
motion for reconsideration was raised by this
Court during oral argument, and the parties
submitted supplemental briefs on that issue.
Mr. Taylor contends that the motion for re-
consideration should be timely for various
reasons. He asserts that absent a Rule
54(b)(1) certificate, Rule 54(a)(1) requires one
judgment adjudicating all claims. That is not
what the rule says. It states, “A judgment is
final if either it is a partial judgment that has
been certified as final pursuant to subsection
(b)(1) of this rule or judgment has been
entered on all claims for relief, except costs
and fees, asserted by or against all parties in
the action.” Upon the entry of the partial
judgment dismissing all claims against the
Turnbow estate and Eberle Berlin, “judg-
ment ha[d] been entered on all claims for
relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or

eration filed pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)(),
LR.C.P.” Mr. Taylor's motion for reconsideration
was not filed pursuant to that rule because it was
untimely.

against all parties in the action.” LR.C.P
54(a)(1). The rule does not state that the
judgment is final when “one” judgment has
been entered dismissing all claims.

Relying upon Rule 54(b)(1) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Taylor con-
tends that the partial judgment entered on
September 18, 2015, dismissing all claims
against the Turnbow estate and Eberle Ber-
lin was not a final judgment because it did
not adjudicate all claims in the lawsuit. He is
correct that this partial judgment by itself
did not adjudicate all claims in the lawsuit.
However, as a result of the entry of this
partial judgment and the two prior partial
judgments, judgment was entered on all
claims in the lawsuit and so all three of the
partial judgments became final judgments.

Mr. Taylor also argues, “In addition,
technically speaking, while the Estate of
Turnbow was eventually substituted in as a
defendant, there still is no judgment that
specifically addresses the claims assert [sic]
against Turnbow individually in the com-
plaint.” (Citation to record omitted.) Mr.
Turnbow died and the personal representa-
tive of his estate was substituted in his
place as a party to this lawsuit. Mr. Turn-
bow is no longer a party, and therefore a
judgment could not address him individual-
ly. The claims against him were asserted
against his estate, which settled those
claims with Mr. Taylor.

HMM Mr. Taylor next argues that the dis-
trict court and the parties did not intend that
the judgments be final once partial judg-
ments were entered on all claims. Decades
ago, this Court did consider intent in deter-
mining whether a document was a final judg-
ment. McPheters v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 88
Idaho 472, 474, 365 P.2d 47, 48 (1961) (“Al-
though in terms a final judgment, the record
shows that neither counsel for plaintiffs nor
the district judge intended or regarded the
minute entry of February 2, 1961, as a final
judgment, but rather regarded it as an order
for judgment. Thus, the minute entry was
not a final judgment.”); Hqual Water Rights
Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 110 Idaho
247, 249, 715 P.2d 917, 919 (1985) (Appeal
from document titled “Final Judgment” en-
tered on December 7, 1982, was untimely

705

because “we perceive that the judgment and
order signed by the district court on June 17,
1982 was intended to be the final judgment
and order in the case.”), However, since then,
Rule 54(a) has been amended to clearly de-
fine what constitutes a final judgment, and it
does not depend upon the intent of the trial
court or the parties. For example, in Wickel
v. Chamberlain, 159 Idaho 582, 368 P.8d 854
(2015), the trial court granted Dr. Chamber-
lain’s motion for summary judgment on the
ground that Wickel had failed to show the
applicable standard of health care, and it
“entered a document styled as a ‘Final Judg-
ment’ on July 30, 2013 (July 2018 Judgment),
dismissing Wickel’s complaint with preju-
dice.” Id, at 584, 363 P.8d at 856. “Wickel
timely appealed to this Court, and Dr. Cham-
berlain cross-appealed.” Jd. at 585, 868 P.38d
at 857, Thus, the trial court obviously intend-
ed and the parties believed that the “Final
Judgment” was a final, appealable judgment.
“On October 28, 2018, this Court remanded.
the matter to the district court because the
July 2013 Judgment was not a final judgment
as defined by LR.C.P. 54(a).” Id. While the
case was on remand to the trial court, Wickel
filed a motion for reconsideration and sub-
mitted an additional affidavit to establish the
standard of care, Id, The trial court entered
a judgment that complied with Rule 54(a)
and later held a hearing on whether it had
jurisdiction to hear the motion for reconsid-
eration, Id. at 586, 363 P.8d at 856. The trial
court held that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear the motion for reconsideration because
“tthe imperfections in the July 30, 2013
final judgment were not a result of actions of
the parties ... it would be unjust for this
Court to allow the party to benefit from the
error’” Id. at 586, 368 P.3d at 858. We
disagreed, holding that the motion for recon-
sideration filed while the case was on remand
for the entry of a final judgment was timely,
based upon the plain language of the appli-
cable rule. We stated:

The July 2018 Judgment contained proce-
dural history and, thus, was not a final
judgment, Based upon the plain language
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the
July 2018 Judgment was an interlocutory
order and subject to reconsideration. Wick-

706

el filed his Second Motion for Reconsidera-

tion prior to entry of a final judgment on

October, 81, 2018. Because I.R.C.P.

11(a)@)(B) allows motions to reconsider to

be filed at any time before entry of a final

judgment, and because there was no final
judgment at the time Wickel filed his Sec-
ond Motion to Reconsider, the motion was
timely,
Id, at 587, 363 P.8d at 859. Thus, the intent
of the trial court and the belief of the parties
as to whether the July 2018 Judgment was a
final judgment did not make it a final judg-
ment where it was not final under the Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Likewise, in Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 315
P.8d 848 (2018), the petitioner, the grand-
mother of a child born out of wedlock, had
submitted a proposed judgment to the trial
court and it had signed the purported judg-
ment terminating the parental rights of the
child’s father and granting the grandmoth-
er’s petition for adoption. Jd, at 661, 815 P.8d
at 849. When the father learned of the court
proceedings, he filed a motion for relief from
proposed judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at
662, 815 P.3d at 850. Although the trial court
and the petitioner intended that the purport-
ed judgment was a final judgment and the
father believed it was a final judgment, it was
not because it did not comply with Rule 54(a)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Id. at
668, 815 P.8d at 851, Thus, we have rejected
the contention that a judgment is or is not
final if the trial court and/or parties intended
it to be. The issue is not intent, but rather
whether it is final under Rule 54(a)(1) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, After Rule
54(a) was amended in 2010, whether a docu-
ment constitutes a judgment and whether
that judgment is final are based upon an
objective standard, not on a subjective stan-
dard,

Wl Finally, Mr. Taylor argues that any
error in failing to make a timely motion for
reconsideration either was harmless and
should be disregarded pursuant to Rule 61 of

4, Mr. Taylor filed a notice of appeal on October
29, 2015. Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(7) states
that the district court has the power and authori-
ty during the pendency of an appeal to “[rlule

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or was
waived by Riley and Hawley Troxell, because
they did not object in the district court to its
consideration of the motion for reconsidera-
tion. As stated above, the failure to make a
timely motion for reconsideration was juris-
dictional. The district court had no jurisdie-
tion to address an untimely motion for recon-
sideration. Neither Rule 61 nor the failure to
object can remedy the court’s lack of juris-
diction.

Rule 11(a)(2)(B) provided, “A motion for
reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of
the trial court may be made at any time
before the entry of final judgment but not
later than fourteen (14) days after the entry
of the final judgment.” LR.C.P, 11(a)(2)(B)
(2015). The motion for reconsideration had to
be filed by October 2, 2015, but it was not
filed until October 28, 2015, which was twen-
ty-one days too late. Although the district
court considered the motion for reconsidera-
tion and denied it on January 5, 2016, it did
not have jurisdiction to consider the motion
because it was not timely filed. Therefore,
the denial of the motion is not an issue for
consideration on appeal and the documents
submitted with the motion cannot be consid-
ered on appeal.

Because the motion for reconsideration
filed on October 28, 2015, was untimely, the
only issue regarding the dismissal of Mr.
Taylor’s claims for fraud and constructive
fraud was whether the district court erred in
granting Mr, Riley’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment in its decision and order
entered on April 5, 2012. That motion was
made on December 15, 2011; it was briefed
by Mr. Riley and Mr. Taylor; and it was
argued on January 80, 2012, Based upon the
briefing, argument, and record at that time,
the district court granted the motion, The
district court obviously did not have for con-
sideration the briefing, the expert’s opinion,
and the other documents that were filed
thereafter. “We have long held that ‘[alppel-
late court review is limited to the evidence,
theories and arguments that were presented

upon any motion for reconsideration filed pursu-
ant to Rule 11(@)(2)(B), LR.C.P,” Mr. Taylor’s
motion for reconsideration was not filed pursu-
ant to that rule because it was untimely.

BO

below.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Ida-
ho 271, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017). On appeal,
Mr. Taylor has not argued that the district.
court erred in granting Mr. Riley’s motion
for partial summary judgment on April 5,
2012, based upon the arguments and evi-
dence presented to the court in connection
with that motion. Instead, Mr. Taylor argues
that the dismissal of his claims for fraud and
constructive fraud was in error based upon
the documents he filed in support of his
untimely motion for reconsideration. Because
that motion was untimely, the supporting
documents cannot be considered on appeal to
show error. We therefore affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Mr, Taylor’s claims for
fraud and constructive fraud.

VI.

Did the District Court Abuse Its
Discretion in Awarding
Attorney Fees?

HM A. Attorney fees awarded to
Hawley Troxell. Counsel for Hawley Troxell
represented both Mr. Riley and Hawley
Troxell from the commencement until dis-
missal of the claims against Hawley Troxell.
The attorney fees charged by Hawley Trox-
ell’s counsel for that joint defense totaled
$80,487.50. Hawley Troxell filed a memoran-
dum of costs seeking an award of attorney
fees in the sum of $40,248.75. The district
court determined that a reasonable attorney
fee for that joint defense was $50,000, and it
awarded Hawley Troxell $25,000 as one-half
of that amount, The court awarded the fees
under Idaho Code section 12-121 on the
ground that the claims against Hawley Trox-
ell were pursued unreasonably and without
foundation and under Idaho Code section 12-
120(8) on the ground that the claims were
brought to recover in a commercial transac-
tion.

Mr. Riley's counsel represented Hawley
Troxell and Mr, Riley in defending against
Mr. Taylor’s motion for reconsideration that
was filed on October 23, 2015. Mr. Riley's
counsel charged $11,025 for that joint de-
fense. The district court found that $7,500
was a reasonable attorney fee for that joint
defense, and it awarded Hawley Troxell
$8,750 as one-half of that amount.

707

Thus, Hawley Troxell was awarded a total
of $28,750 in attorney fees for its defense in
this lawsuit. Mr. Taylor contends that such
award is unreasonable.

First, he contends that the district court
erred in awarding Hawley Troxell one-half of
the fees awarded for the joint defense with-
out segregating the amount incurred for de-
fending Mr, Riley and the amount incurred
for defending Hawley Troxell. Mr. Taylor
asserts that Hawley Troxell’s “failure to seg-
regate fees is particularly significant because
only two of Taylor’s six claims were even
asserted against HTEH.” That statement is
incorrect. Hawley Troxell was named in
three of the five titled causes of action in Mr.
Taylor’s complaint.

Mr. Taylor listed five titled “causes of
action,” with the first two being titled “Negli-
gent Misrepresentations” and “Negli-
gence/Malpractice.” Hawley Troxell was not.
expressly named in those two, but it was
expressly named in the other three, In his
“Third Cause of Action—Consumer Protec-
tion Act Violations,” Mr. Taylor alleged that
“Defendant Riley and Hawley Troxell’s acts
constitute violations of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act (IC, § 48-601, et seq.).” In his
“Fourth Cause of Action—Breach of Fiducia-
ry Duties,” Mr. Taylor alleged that “[aJs a
direct and/or proximate result of Defendants
Eberle Berlin, Riley, Turnbow and Hawley
Troxell’s breached fiduciary duties, Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be
proven at the time of trial or on summary
judgment.” In his “Fifth Cause of Action—
Fraud/Constructive Fraud,” Mr. Taylor al-
leged a fraudulent scheme to deprive him of
his majority interest in AIA Services by as-
sisting the minority shareholders in drafting
documents that have been held unenforceable
by the court, and that the corporation “re-
fused to give him his shares back, including,
without limitation, by and through the acts of
Defendant Riley’s firm, Defendant Hawley
Troxell.” Thus, Hawley Troxell was expressly
alleged to have committed wrongful conduct.
in three of the five alleged causes of action.

The district court did not award attorney
fees regarding the alleged violation of. the
Consumer Protection Act because. Hawley

708

Troxell did not identify in the twenty pages
of single-spaced time entries the fees in-
eurred in defending that claim. Therefore,
Hawley Troxell was expressly alleged to have
committed wrongful conduct in two of Mr.
Taylor’s four causes of action for which attor-
ney fees were awarded, Mr. Taylor also as-
serted that Mr. Riley’s conduct was imputed
to Hawley Troxell. He alleged in his com-
plaint: “The knowledge held and duties owed
by Defendant Richard A. Riley as asserted
throughout this Complaint are imputed upon
Hawley Troxell and, consequently, Hawley
Troxell owes the same duties. Hawley Troxell
is vicariously liable for certain acts and/or
omissions of Defendant Riley.”

In support of this assertion that the attor-
ney fees incurred in the joint defense of Mr.
Riley and Hawley Troxell must be segregat-
ed, Mr. Taylor relies upon Hackett v. Street-
er, 109 Idaho 261, 706 P.2d 1872 (Ct. App.
1985). The reasoning in Hackett is not appli-
cable to the facts in this case. In Hackett, the
plaintiffs sued a subdivision developer and a
contractor for negligent construction of a
subdivision water system, and the same at-
torney represented both defendants. Id. 262~
68, 706 P.2d at 1873-74. The contractor was
found liable for the negligent construction of
the water system, id. at 268, 706 P.2d at
1874, and the developer was found not liable
because he “did not have any actual authority
or control over the installation and construc-
tion of the water system and did not purport
to have such authority,” id. at 264, 706 P.2d
at 1875. The attorney sought to recover the
entire amount of attorney fees incurred in
the lawsuit on the ground that his prevailing
and nonprevailing clients had agreed to be
jointly and severally liable for his attorney
fees and there was no way to separate his
time and costs for each client. Jd. The only
information he provided in support of the
requested award was his hourly rate and the
total number of hours he expended in the
case. Id. at 264, 706 P.2d at 1875. The trial
court was faced with awarding fees to both
the prevailing and nonprevailing defendants,
or not awarding any fees, and it declined to
award fees. Jd. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed stating, “We believe it is in-
cumbent upon a party seeking attorney fees
to present sufficient information for the court

|

to consider factors as they specifically relate
to the prevailing party or parties seeking
fees.” Id. The court held that the prevailing
party’s argument that he was entitled to an
award of the entire fees incurred because the
parties had agreed to be jointly and severally
liable for the total attorney fees and costs
was simply “a ‘boot strap’ argument which, if
followed, would permit a non-prevailing party
to have all of its fees and costs paid by a
prevailing party.” Id. at 265, 706 P.2d at
1876.

In this case, we do not have a prevailing
defendant and a nonprevailing defendant.
Both Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley were
prevailing parties, and Hawley Troxell was
alleged to be liable for the conduct of Mr.
Riley. Each of them was entitled to conduct a
defense with separate counsel, which would
have increased the attorney fees incurred in
defending against Mr. Taylor’s claims. Their
agreement to conduct. a joint defense reduced
the total amount of attorney fees incurred.
Each of Mr. Taylor’s four causes of action
stated that he had been damaged in an
amount to be proved at trial, with no asser-
tion that the damages claimed against Haw-
ley Troxell differed from the damages
claimed against Mr. Riley. Mr. Taylor has
failed to show that the district court abused
its discretion in apportioning the attorney
fees awarded for the joint defenses one-half
to each party.

Mr. Taylor alleges that it was error to
award any attorney fees for the Consumer
Protection Act claim, but he has not shown
that any fees were awarded for that claim,
The court stated that it would not award fees
for that claim, and there is no indication that
it did. Mr. Taylor alleges that “Riley was the
overwhelming target of Taylor’s claims and
discovery,” but that assertion is meaningless
where Mr. Taylor alleged that Hawley Trox-
ell was liable for the conduct of Mr. Riley.
We affirm the award of attorney fees to
Hawley Troxell.

HI OB. Attorney fees awarded to Mr.
Riley. Mr. Riley requested an award of at-
torney fees totaling $302,328.75, which con-
sisted of $40,248.75 as one-half of the attor-
ney fees in the joint defense provided by

Hawley Troxell and $262,085 for his defense
after the district court ordered that the claim
against Hawley Troxell be dismissed. The
district court awarded Mr. Riley $25,000 as
his share of the attorney fees incurred in the
joint defense and $175,000 for the attorney
fees thereafter incurred. The court also
awarded him $3,750 for his share of the fees
incurred in the joint defense of Mr. Taylor's
motion for reconsideration filed on October
28, 2015. Thus, Mr. Riley requested an award
of attorney fees totaling $807,841.25, and the
trial court awarded him attorney fees total-
ing $203,750.

Mr, Taylor contends that the district court
abused its discretion in awarding Mr. Riley
attorney fees of $1'75,000 because “it included
a substantial amount of fees that were not
‘reasonably incurred’ by Riley and because
such fees were not reduced by the time Riley
spent defending the Consumer Protection
Act claim, for which he was not entitled to
fees.” Mr. Riley requested $262,085 in attor-
ney fees; the court awarded $175,000; and it
stated that it was not awarding any attorney
fees for defending the claim based upon the
Consumer Protection Act. There is no show-
ing that it did so.

Mr, Taylor next asserts, “Most significant
to the case at bar is that many of the costs
and fees unreasonably incurred by Riley as

5, Although Mr. Taylor's argument that Mr, Riley
should have sought a permissive appeal from the
district court's decision of May 10, 2010, is with-
out merit, the district court did not even rule on
Mr. Riley’s earlier motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata. Mr, Riley and Hawley
Troxell moved for summary judgment contend-
ing that all claims alleged against them were
barred by the doctrine of res judicata based upon
the judgment in Taylor v. Babbitt. In its decision
entered on May 10, 2010, the district court held,
“To the extent Plaintiff seeks to make a claim
against Hawley Troxell for malpractice based on
the allegations in the complaint, the same is
barred by res judicata.” It also held: “As to the
remainder of the allegations [of breach of fidu-
ciary duty] to the extent they apply to Hawley
Troxell, they are barred by res judicata. They are
barred for the same reasons set forth above re-
garding the malpractice.” The court did not ad-
dress the argument that any claims against Mr.
Riley were barred by res judicata, although it did
deny his argument that the claim of fraud was
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel
based upon the trial court's decision in Taylor v.
AIA Services Corp. Mr. Riley was not a party to

709

he [sic] attempting to postpone certain ac-
tions in the present litigation until the appeal
in [Taylor v,] AIA [Services Corp.] was final.
Notably, Riley did not seek a permissive
appeal after Judge Greenwood’s May 10,
2010 decision, but instead waiting two years
to address the same issues.” Mr. Taylor ar-
gued below that the district court should
reduce Mr. Riley’s requested attorney fees
by $280,000 because he failed to seek a per-
missive appeal of that decision. The court
declined to do so stating, “Ongoing litigation
would be constantly interrupted by requests
for interlocutory appeal by parties fearful of
forfeiting some later claim to attorney fees
for having failed to seek interlocutory ap-
peal.” Mr. Taylor contends that such holding
did not constitute the exercise of reason.

Hs lt was Mr. Taylor who chose to file
Taylor v, Babbitt, which this Court upheld as
being brought frivolously, unreasonably and
without foundation, Taylor v. McNichols, 149
Idaho at 848, 243 P.3d at 664, and it was he
who then filed this action seeking to pursue
claims that were barred by res judicata
based upon the judgment in Taylor v. Bab-
bitt. It was Mr. Taylor who was responsible
for the amount of attorney fees awarded by
the district court to Mr. Riley, not Mr. Ri-
ley’s alleged failure to pursue an interlocu-
tory appeal earlier.’ Mr, Taylor criticizes

that litigation. The district court declined to dis-
miss the fraud claim on that ground because the
ruling in that case was not directed to the claims
made against Mr, Riley and the ruling was not a
finding of specific fact. In its conclusion, the
court did not mention Mr. Riley's assertion that
the claims against him were barred by res judica-
ta, The court stated:

In conclusion:

1) The Court grants summary judgment on
Taylor's claims against Hawley Troxell;

2) The Court will deny summary judgment,
in part, on the claim for malpractice against
Riley, Tumnbow, and Eberle Berlin so far as the
claims arise from the issuance of the opinion
letter. The so-called derivative claims are dis-
missed;

3) The Court concludes that the Statute of
Limitations on the malpractice cause of action
began to run when Taylor incurred attorney
fees to defend against allegation that the Stock
Repurchase agreement was illegal;

4) The Court denies summary judgment on
the claim of fraud against Riley, Turnbow, and
Eberle Berlin, both on the merits and on the

710

certain actions taken by Mr. Riley in the liti-
gation, contending that it was unreasonable
to award attorney fees for those actions.
Since the district court awarded Mr. Riley
$87,085 less than he requested for attorney
fees incurred in representing himself, there
is no showing that the district court awarded
attorney fees for the actions that Mr. Riley
claims were unreasonable. In addition, the
court awarded him attorney fees pursuant to
Idaho Code section 12-120(8) upon the deter-
mination that he was the prevailing party in
an action to recover in a commercial transac-
tion, “Where one party has been determined
to be the overall prevailing party in the
litigation and by statute or contract the pre-
vailing party is entitled to an award of attor-
ney fees on all claims asserted in the litiga-
tion, the award of reasonable attorney fees is
not required to be limited to the claims upon
which the prevailing party prevailed.” Ad-
vanced Med. Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging
Ctr. of Idaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812, 815-16,
303 P.8d 171, 174-75 (2018). We affirm the
award of attorney fees to Mr, Riley. .

VIL.

Is Either Party Entitled to an Award
of Attorney Fees on Appeal?

Both parties seek an award of attorney
fees on appeal, and they agree that the pre-

statute of limitations on the basis of factual
disputes;

5) The Court grants summary judgment to
all defendants as dismissing claims of breach
of fiduciary duty,

Mr, Riley would not have been granted an inter-
locutory appeal from the district court's failure

vailing party is entitled to attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
120(8) on the ground that this is an action to
recover in a commercial transaction. Because
Mr. Taylor is not the prevailing party on
appeal, he is not entitled to an award of
attorney fees. Cummings v. Stephens, 157
Idaho 348, 886 P.8d 281, 300 (2014), Because
Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell are the pre-
vailing parties, they are entitled to an award
of attorney fees on appeal.

vil.

Conclusion.

We affirm the judgment of the district
court, and we award the Respondents costs
and attorney fees on appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justice BRODY,
and Justices Pro Tem TROUT and
KIDWELL concur.

to address his argument that all claims against
him were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

403 P.3d 1200
Kenneth M. WORKMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vy.

Christopher RICH, Clerk of the Fourth
Judicial District; Idaho Department of
Correction, Defendants-Respondents,

and

Unknown and Unnamed Individual of
the State of Idaho, Defendant.

Docket No, 44701

Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: August 81, 2017
Review Denied October 24, 2017

a
=
iS)

Kenneth M. Workman, Boise, pro se appel-
lant.

Jan M. Bennetts, Ada County Prosecuting
Attorney; Ray J. Chacko, Deputy Prosecut-
ing Attorney, Boise, for respondent, Christo-
pher Rich.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kristina M. Schindele, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent, Idaho De-
partment of Correction.

GRATTON, Chief Judge

Kenneth M. Workman appeals from the
district court’s order affirming the magis-
trate’s decision to grant Christopher Rich’s
(Rich) motion to dismiss and the Idaho De-
partment of Correction’s (IDOC) motion for
summary judgment.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Tn 2001, Workman drove his vehicle off
Interstate 84 and into two pickups parked on
the side of the road. At the time of the crash,
Workman was under the influence of heroin,
methamphetamine, and THC. The owners of
the pickups were standing between the vehi-
cles at the time of the crash, and both owners
suffered serious injuries. One person was
thrown into the road and suffered major
broken bones and a ruptured spleen. The
other person was pinned between the vehi-
cles, breaking one leg while the other leg was
severed from his body. Workman was con-
victed of two counts of aggravated driving
under the influence, Idaho Code § 18-8006,
and being a persistent violator, 1.C. § 19-
2514, and was sentenced to two determinate
life sentences, On April 28, 2008, the district.
court ordered Workman to pay $32,391.44 in
restitution, with interest accruing annually.
The district court’s order also provided that
“this Order shall constitute a Civil Judgment
against the defendant, KENNETH M.
WORKMAN.”

HMMM The IDOC began deducting funds
from Workman’s inmate account on Septem-
ber 30, 2003, These funds were sent to Rich,
the clerk of the district court in which Work-

man was convicted, for distribution to the
victims. On December 30, 2015, Workman
filed a pro se complaint,! in which he assert-
ed that Rich and the IDOC improperly gar-
nished money from his inmate account in
order to pay the court-ordered restitution,
Rich filed a motion to dismiss and the IDOC
filed a motion for summary judgment? The
magistrate granted Rich’s and the IDOC’s
motions. Workman appealed to the district
court, and the district court affirmed the
magistrate’s decision. Workman timely ap-
peals,

IL

ANALYSIS

HN Workman argues that the restitu-
tion order entered against him has “expired,
fis] unenforceable, uncollectable, and no long-
er still owing” because it is a civil judgment
that was not renewed within five years of its
entry. Workman further argues that I.C.
§§ 19-4708 and 19-5805(2) do not apply to his
restitution order because the statutes were
amended subsequent to his judgment being
entered. For an appeal from the district
court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a
ease from the magistrate division, this
Court’s standard of review is the same as
expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reviews the magistrate rec-
ord to determine whether there is substantial
and competent evidence to support the mag-
istrate’s findings of fact and whether the
magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from
those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 418,
415, 224 P.8d 480, 482 (2009). If those find-
ings are so supported and the conclusions
follow therefrom, and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm
the district court's decision as a matter of
procedure. Jd, Thus, the appellate courts do
not review the decision of the magistrate.
State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318
P.8d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Rather, we are

1. Pro se litigants are held to the same standards
as those litigants represented by counsel. Mi-
chalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d
580, 585 (2009). Pro se litigants are not excused
from abiding by procedural rules simply because
they are appearing pro se and may not be aware
of the applicable rules. Id.

Fn

713

procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the
decision of the district court. Id.

HM As an appellate court, we will af-
firm a trial court’s grant of an Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion where the
record demonstrates that there are no genu-
ine issues of material fact and the case can
be decided as a matter of law. Coghlan v
Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 183 Idaho 388,
398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). When review-
ing an order of the district court dismissing a
case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the nonmov-
ing party is entitled to have all inferences
from the record and pleadings viewed in its
favor, and only then may the question be
asked whether a claim for relief has been
stated. Coghlan, 188 Idaho at 898, 987 P.2d
at 810. The issue is not whether the plaintiff
will ultimately prevail, but whether the party
is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126
Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995).

Hl On appeal, we exercise free review in
determining whether a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact exists and whether the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho
851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986),
Summary judgment is proper if the plead-
ings, depositions, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. ILR.C.P. 56(c).
The movant has the burden of showing that
no genuine issues of material fact exist. Stod-
dart v. Pocatello Sch, Dist, No. 25, 149 Idaho
679, 683, 289 P.38d 784, 788 (2010). The bur-
den may be met by establishing the absence
of evidence on an element that the nontnov-
ing party will be required to prove at trial.
Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882
P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an ab-
sence of evidence may be established either
by an affirmative showing with the moving

2. The IDOC’s motion was captioned as a motion
to dismiss but was supported by materials out-
side the pleadings. “[BJecause matters outside
the pleadings were presented, the motion to dis-
miss was converted into a motion for summary
judgment under LR.C.P. 56(c).” See Hauschulz v.
‘Idaho Department of Correction, 143 Idaho 462,
466, 147 P.3d 94, 98 (Ct, App. 2006).

714

party’s own evidence or by a review of all the
nonmoving party’s evidence and the conten-
tion that such proof of an element is lacking.
Heath v. Honker’s Mini-Mart, Inc., 184 Ida-
ho 711, 712, 8 P.8d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App.
2000), Once such an absence of evidence has
been established, the burden then shifts to
the party opposing the motion to show, via
further depositions, discovery responses or
affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine
issue for trial or to offer a valid justification
for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(d).
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125
Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App.
1994), Disputed facts and reasonable infer-
ences are construed in favor of the nonmoy-
ing party. Castorena v. Gen. Hlec., 149 Idaho
609, 618, 288 P.8d 209, 218 (2010). This Court
freely reviews issues of law. Cole v. Kumaler,
115 Idaho 552, 555, 768 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct.
App. 1989),

A. Restitution Order

Workman asserts that criminal restitution
orders are civil judgments subject to a collec-
tion process whereby Rich, as clerk of the
district court, was required to record the
restitution order as a civil judgment and
continually renew it in order to collect on
behalf of the victims. Because Rich did not
do so, Workman argues, the judgment order-
ing Workman to pay restitution expired five
years after the judgment was entered, on
‘April 28, 2008,

Idaho’s restitution statute directs a court
to order a defendant, found guilty of any
crime which results in an economic loss to
the victim, to make restitution to the victim
unless the court finds restitution would be
inappropriate or undesirable. IC. § 19-
5804(2). The policy to fully compensate crime
victims for their economic loss has long been
recognized by the courts. State v. Weaver,

3. Idaho Code § 19-4708 states, in part:

(1) The supreme court, or the clerks of the
district court with the approval of the adminis-
trative district judge, may enter into contracts
in accordance with this section for collection
services for debts owed to courts. The cost of
collection shall be paid by the defendant as an.
administrative surcharge when the defendant
fails to pay any amount ordered by the court
and the court utilizes the services of a con-
tracting agent pursuant to this section.

2) As used in this section:

158 Idaho 167, 170, 345 P.8d 226, 229 (Ct.
App. 2014). Through LC. § 19-5805, the de-
termination of when or how a restitution
order may be enforced after it is entered has
been specifically entrusted to the clerk of the
district court or to the victim. Weaver, 158
Idaho at 172, 345 P.8d at 281. Idaho Code
§ 19-5805 provides:

(1) After forty-two (42) days from the
entry of the order of restitution or at the
conclusion of a hearing to reconsider an
order of restitution, whichever occurs la-
ter, an order of restitution may be record-
ed as a judgment and the victim may
execute as provided by law for civil judg-
ments.

(2) The clerk of the district court may
take action to collect on the order of resti-
tution on behalf of the victim and, with the
approval of the administrative district
judge, may use the procedures set forth in
section 19-4708,8! Idaho Code, for the col-
lection of the restitution,

(emphasis added),

Idaho Code § 20-209H was enacted to pro-
vide for the IDOC to mandate the withdraw-
al of inmate-owed restitution. The law went
into effect on March 1, 2015. Workman con-
tends this statute is not applicable to him
because the order for restitution became un-
enforceable in April 2008, Workman relies on
LC, §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 which state that
to keep a judgment an active, collectable
order, the parties must file a timely motion
to renew judgment within five years from the
date of the entry and thereafter every five
years. Workman reasons that because the
judgment against him has never been re-
newed, all funds deducted from his inmate
account after April 2008 must be returned
and all future attempts to deduct funds must
cease and desist.

(©) “Debts owed to courts” means any as-
sessment of fines, court costs, surcharges,
penalties, fees, restitution, moneys expended
in providing counsel and other defense ser-
vices to indigent defendants or other charges
which a court judgment has ordered to be
paid to the court in criminal cases, and
which remain unpaid in whole or in part,
and includes any interest or penalties on
such unpaid amounts as provided for in the
judgment or by law.

The magistrate court determined, and the
district court agreed, that “the legislature
provided two different avenues for crime vic-
tims to receive restitution from the perpetra-
tors of the crime.” First, 1.C. § 19-5804(4)
provides for a court order of restitution:

If a separate written order of restitution
is issued, an order of restitution shall be
for an amount certain and shall be due and
owing at the time of sentencing or at the
date the amount of restitution is deter-
mined, whichever is later. An order of
restitution may provide for interest from
the date of the economic loss or injury.

Payment of restitution can be pursued by a
civil judgment that can be executed on or
result in a lien being placed on the perpetra-
tor’s real property pursuant to LC. § 19-
5805(1). Rich argues that Workman’s inter-
pretation fails to provide for these separate
avenues for obtaining restitution: allowing
victims to personally collect through the use
of a civil judgment and allowing the clerk of
the court to collect on the victim’s behalf.
Therefore, Rich asserts, Workman’s claim
fails to give effect to all parts of LC, § 19-
5805, Similarly, the IDOC argues that Work-
man fails to recognize the victims and the
clerk of the court have different mechanisms
governed by separate and distinct processes
set forth in statutes through which collection
efforts may be undertaken. We agree with
the respondents and the district court.

As the district court noted, the
language of 1.C, § 19-5805 highlighted above
would not be necessary if all restitution or-
ders were civil judgments. Unlike the re-
quirements imposed on creditors seeking to
enforce civil judgments, neither LC. §§ 19-
4708 nor 19-5305(2) require the clerk of the
court to take any steps to execute the resti-
tution order entered as a result of a criminal
conviction, Instead, any collection efforts by
the clerk of the court are to be undertaken in
the same manner or fashion as other “debts
owed to courts” as provided in IC. § 19-
4708, See 1.C. § 19-5805(2). This Court notes,
as did the district court, that the restitution
statute is silent concerning the expiration of

4, The same is true of the holdings in the other
cases cited by Workman, including: State v.
Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 292 P.3d 273 (2013);
State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90
(2012); State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 271 P.3d

715

an order of restitution, rather, stating it
“shall be due and owing at the time of sen-
tencing or at the date the amount of restitu-
tion is determined, whichever is later.” I.C.
§ 19-5804(4). Therefore, Workman's conten-
tion that restitution orders must be collected
under one civil judgment methodology is
‘without merit,

Workman points to State v. McCool, 189
Idaho 804, 87 P.8d 291 (2004) in support of
his contention that criminal restitution orders
are civil judgments against a defendant. In
McCool, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted
LC. § 19-5805(1) and noted that “the order
of restitution provided in Idaho Code § 19-
5804(2) becomes, in essence, a civil judgment
for the amount of such restitution.” McCool,
189 Idaho at 806, 87 P.8d at 298. The Court
did not hold that a court order of restitution
is extinguished and loses enforceability when
the order is also recorded as a judgment for
purposes of constituting a civil judgment, or
that an order of restitution is always and
solely a civil judgment‘ Workman’s argu-
ment fails to make a distinction between
criminal restitution orders, that do not ex-
pire, and civil judgments, which do expire.

HE Workman points to Grazer v. Jones,
164 Idaho 58, 294 P.8d 184 (2018); Bach v.
Dawson, 152 Idaho 287, 268 P.8d 1189 (Ct.
App. 2012); and Smith v, Smith, 181 Idaho
800, 964 P.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998) in support
of his contention that I.C. §§ 10-1110 and 10-
1111 speak to the expiration of civil orders
and money judgments. However, none of
these cases involve restitution or restitution
orders. Workman also asserts IC. §§ 10-
1110 and 10-1111 are applicable because gar-
nishments from inmate accounts made under
1.C. § 20-209H can only be made for restitu-
tion that “is still owing.” As explained above,
Workman’s argument that all restitution or-
ders are solely civil judgments is without
merit, We agree with the magistrate and the
district court that neither I.C. §§ 10-1110 nor
10-1111 are applicable to Workman’s restitu-
tion order.

1243 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Mosqueda, 150
Idaho 830, 252 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2010); State v.
Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 97 P.3d 489 (Ct. App.
2004); State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 67 P.3d
1271 (Ct. App. 2002).

716

B. Applicability of Idaho Code §§ 19-4708
and 19-5305(2)

HH Workman further argues that LC.
§§ 19-4708 and 19-5305(2) do not apply to his
restitution order because the statutes were
amended subsequent to his judgment being
entered. Generally, issues not raised below
may not be considered for the first time on
appeal. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 821, 322,
815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991). Workman states
that this issue was not raised before because
LC. §§ 19-4708 and 19-5805(2) were first
mentioned in the motions to dismiss, not in
his initial complaint. However, that does not
explain why Workman did not make an argu-
ment of the statutes’ inapplicability either to
the magistrate in response to the motions to
dismiss or to the district court on appeal.

Accordingly, this Court will not further con-
sider this issue.

ti.

CONCLUSION
The magistrate’s decision is supported by
the applicable law. The district court’s order
affirming the magistrate’s decision to grant
Rich’s motion to dismiss and the IDOC’s
motion for summary judgment is affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge Pro Tem
WALTERS concur.

404 P.3d 659
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v

Matthew Elliot COHAGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No, 44800

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: August 24, 2017
Rehearing Denied November 17, 2017

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Maya
P, Waldron argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorel-
Jo, argued.

HORTON, Justice.

Matthew Elliot Cohagan appeals the Can-
yon County district court’s denial of his mo-
tion to suppress. Following the denial of his
motion, Cohagan entered a conditional guilty
plea to possession of methamphetamine. The
appeal was originally assigned to the Idaho
Court of Appeals, which reversed the district
court. This Court granted the State’s timely
petition for review, We reverse the district
court’s order denying Cohagan’s motion to
suppress.

I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2014, Officers Curtis and
Otto observed Matthew Elliot Cohagan on
the southwest corner of 12th Avenue South
and 7th Street South in Nampa, Idaho. As
they drove by, Officer Curtis thought Coha-
gan resembled an individual who had an out-
standing arrest warrant. Officers Curtis and
Otto turned their vehicle around to get a
better look at Cohagan. However, by the
time they drove back through the intersec-
tion, Cohagan had entered a grocery store
located on the same corner,

The officers entered the grocery store and
Officer Otto, without Officer Curtis present,
made contact with Cohagan. Officer Otto re-
quested Cohagan’s driver’s license, and Co-
hhagan complied, After inspecting Cohagan’s
license, Officer Otto determined that Coha-
gan was not the individual Officer Curtis
suspected had an outstanding arrest warrant.
Both officers then left the store.

Before leaving the parking lot, however,
the officers received a radio request to go
back into the grocery store and retrieve sur-

719

veillance video for an unrelated incident.
While Officer Otto went to obtain the re-
quested video, Officer Curtis decided he
wanted to confirm Officer Otto’s identifica-
tion of Cohagan. Officer Curtis stated that he
felt Cohagan might have given Officer Otto
false identification and, because Officer Otto
was new to the force, Officer Curtis wanted
to confirm that Cohagan was not the person
he suspected had an outstanding arrest war-
rant, Officer Curtis found Cohagan shopping
in one of the aisles. Officer Curtis testified
that as he approached Cohagan he recog-
nized that Cohagan was not the individual he
suspected. However, Officer Curtis decided
he still wanted to ask Cohagan his name and
look at his identification.

Officer Curtis activated his lapel camera
and made contact with Cohagan. The video
shows that Officer Curtis asked if he could
see Cohagan’s identification. Cohagan replied
“absolutely man” and handed his identifica-
tion to Officer Curtis. Officer Curtis then
took Cohagan’s identification, told Cohagan
that he resembled another man they were
looking for, and asked Cohagan if he had any
outstanding warrants. Cohagan stated that
he did not. Officer Curtis replied that he was
going to check to see if Cohagan had any
warrants and radioed dispatch to run a war-
rant check,

While Officer Curtis waited for dispatch to
respond to the warrant check, Cohagan
asked if he could continue shopping. Officer
Curtis told Cohagan that he could, and Coha-
gan began walking away. Seconds later, how-
ever, Officer Curtis appeared to receive no-
tice from dispatch that Cohagan might have
a warrant and stated, “Hey, come here,
they're telling me you might have a warrant.
I don’t want you running around the store
here.” Officer Curtis then quickly caught up
to Cohagan, put his hand on Cohagan’s
shoulder, and told Cohagan to walk to the
front of the store, On the way to the front of
the store, Officer Curtis and Cohagan were
joined by Officer Otto, and the three of them
then stood at the front of the store and
waited until the warrants were confirmed.
Once the warrants were confirmed, Cohagan
was escorted out of the store and arrested,
During the search incident to arrest, officers

720

discovered a yellow box containing a glass-
smoking device with white crystal residue
that tested positive for methamphetamine,

Cohagan was charged with possession of
methamphetamine. He promptly filed a mo-
tion to suppress all evidence seized as a
result of his arrest. The State conceded that
Cohagan was illegally seized when Officer
Curtis retained his license to run a warrant
check, but argued that suppression was un-
warranted because the discovery of metham-
phetamine was sufficiently attenuated from
the illegal seizure. The district court denied
Cohagan’s motion to suppress because it
found that the discovery of the outstanding
warrant was an intervening circumstance
that sufficiently purged the discovery of the
methamphetamine from the taint of the ille-
gal seizure,

Following the denial of his motion, Coha-
gan entered a conditional guilty plea to pos-
session of methamphetamine, reserving his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress, The Court of Appeals reversed. We
granted the State’s timely petition for re-
view.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH “In cases that come before this
Court on a petition for review of a Court of
Appeals decision, this Court gives serious
consideration to the views of the Court of
Appeals, but directly reviews the decision
of the lower court.” State v. Oliver, 144
Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.8d 887, 889 (2007).
“This Court thus acts as if the case were
on direct appeal from the district court.”
State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576, 225
P.8d 1169, 1171 (2010). “In reviewing a
district court order granting or denying a
motion to suppress evidence, the standard
of review is bifureated.” Id. (quoting State
v. Pwrdwm, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.8d
182, 183 (2009)). “This Court will accept
the trial court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous.” Id. “However, this
Court may freely review the trial court’s

. The Idaho Constitution offers protection for
unlawful search and seizure as well. Idaho
Const. art. I, § 17, However, Cohagan does not
argue that Idaho's Constitution provides greater

application of constitutional principles in
light of the facts found.” Id.
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271,
274, 396 P.38d 700, 703 (2017).

I. ANALYSIS

Cohagan asserts the district court erred in
denying his suppression motion. Specifically,
Cohagan argues that the evidence seized
when he was arrested should have been sup-
pressed because it was “the direct result of
the illegal detention because Officer Curtis
detained [him] so that he could run a warrant
check.”

A. Whether the district court erred in
denying Cohagan’s suppression mo-
tion under the Fourth Amendment.

HM The Fourth Amendment to the

US. Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses,

and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. It has
been incorporated through the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

US. Constitution to apply to the states.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 648, 654-55, 81 S.Ct.

1684, 1691-92, 6 L.Ed2d 1081, 1089-

90(1961).! Evidence obtained in violation of

the Fourth Amendment is subject to the

exclusionary rule, which requires unlawfully
seized evidence to be excluded from trial.

Eig., Wong Sun v. United States, 871 U.S.

471, 485, 88 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441,

458-54 (1963); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,

846, 108 P.8d 454, 459 (2004). The exclusion-

ary rule requires the suppression of both

“primary evidence obtained as a direct result

of an illegal search or seizure” and, pertinent

here, “evidence later discovered and found to
be derivative of an illegality,” the proverbial

“fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Segura v.

United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S.Ct.

8380, 8885, 82 L.Ed.2d 599, 608 (1984); ac-

cord, eg., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,

810-11, 203 P.38d 1208, 1209-10 (2009).

HM However, there are various excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule. See, eg., Mur-

protection than the U.S. Constitution; thus, our
analysis is limited to the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, In re Doe, 155 Idaho 36, 39
n.2, 304 P.3d 1202, 1205 n.2 (2013).

vay v. United States, 487 U.S, 588, 587, 108
S.Ct, 2529, 2538, 101 L.Ed.2d 472, 480 (1988)
(describing the independent source doctrine);
Nix v, Williams, 467 U.S. 481, 448-44, 104
S.Ct, 2501, 2508-09, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 387-88
(1984) (describing the inevitable discovery
doctrine). At issue here is the attenuation
doctrine. The attenuation doctrine allows evi-
dence to be admitted “when the connection
between unconstitutional police conduct and
the evidence is remote or has been interrupt-
ed by some intervening circumstance, so that
‘the interest protected by the constitutional
guarantee that has been violated would not
be served by suppression of the evidence
obtained.’”” Utah v. Strieff, — US. —,
——,, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400,
407-08 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan,
547 US. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2163-64,
165 L.Ed.2d 56, 64 (2006)).

HMM As 2 threshold matter, the State
maintains on appeal, even though it conceded
the point below, that the Court must decide
whether the interaction between Cohagan
and Officer Curtis was lawful. This is ineor-
rect. It is true that the question of whether a
seizure occurred is a question of law over
which we exercise free review. State v. Bain-
bridge, 117 Idaho 245, 247, 787 P.2d 281, 288
(1990). It is also true that this Court is not
“timited by the prosecutor’s argument or the
absence thereof.” State v. Veneroso, 188 Ida-
ho 925, 980, 71 P.8d 1072, 1077 (Ct. App.
2008), However, it is equally true that “{iJs-
sues not raised below will not be considered
by this court on appeal, and the parties will
be held to the theory upon which the case
was presented to the lower court.” Garcia-
Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275, 396 P.38d at 704
(quoting Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By
& Through Dep't of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho
798, 799-800, 589 P.2d 540, 546-47 (1979);
see also Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 175 S.E.
836, 888 (1934) (“An examination of the ree-
ord discloses that the cause was not tried
upon that theory, and the law does not per-
mit parties to swap horses between courts in
order to get a better mount in the Supreme
Court.”).

2. The State also stated at the hearing on the

motion to suppress: “[W]e admit holding the ID
was probably a seizure; we do admit that.” And,

HI In its briefing before the district
court, the State stated that it “concedes that
[Cohagan] was unjustifiably seized at the
point Officer Curtis chose to retain his li-
cense and hold it while running [Cohagan’s]
information for active warrants.” To allow
the State to change positions on appeal and
argue that the stop was not illegal would
sharply cut against our longstanding and re-
cently re-affirmed policy of requiring parties
to present their arguments to the court be-
low:

It is manifestly unfair for a party to go

into court and slumber, as it were, on his

defense, take no exception to the ruling,
present no point for the attention of the
court, and seek to present his defense, that

‘was never mooted before, to the judgment

of the appellate court. Such a practice

would destroy the purpose of an appeal
and make the supreme court one for decid-
ing questions of law in the first instance.

Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 276, 896
P.8d at 705 (quoting Smith v. Sterling, 1
Idaho 128, 131 (1867)).

As we will discuss further when consider-
ing the State’s claim of attenuation, Officer
Curtis’s retention of Cohagan’s license re-
sulted in an unlawful detention. We therefore
proceed to the question of attenuation: ie.,
whether the discovery of the warrant suffi-
ciently breaks the causal chain between the
unlawful stop and the discovery of the evi-
dence. See Strieff, — U.S. at ——, 186 S.Ct.
at 2062, 195 L.Eid.2d at 408-09 (proceeding to
the analysis of the attenuation factors with-
out deciding whether the stop was illegal
because the State conceded the point),

1. Whether the discovery of the arrest
warrant was a sufficient intervening
event to break the causal chain be-
tween the unlawful stop and the dis-
covery of the evidence.

HM “There are three factors for a
court to consider when determining whether
unlawful conduct has been adequately attenu-
ated.” Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 108 P.8d at

“Now as I indicated, the state admits that once
the officer has that ID, under the law that is a
seizure.”

722

459; see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
608-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d
416, 426-28 (1975). Those factors are: “(1) the
elapsed time between the misconduct and the
acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence
of intervening circumstances, and (8) the fla-
grancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action.” Page, 140 Idaho at 846,
108 P.3d at 459; accord, ¢9., Brown, 422 U.S.
at 608-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d at
426-28; Strieff — U.S. at —, 186 S.Ct. at
2062, 195 L.Ed.2d at 408-09,

a. Elapsed time

HI In addressing the first factor, the
district court found “there was a minimal
lapse of time between the seizure of the
license and the discovery [of] a valid arrest,
warrant.” The district court, however, looked
to the wrong period of time. It is not the
period of time between the misconduct and
the intervening circumstance that matters.
Rather, as this Court and the U.S. Supreme
Court have both stated, the period of time to
consider is “the elapsed time between the
misconduct and the acquisition of the evi-
dence.” Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 108 P.3d at
459; Strieff — U.S. at ——, 136 S.Ct. at
2062, 195 L,Hd.2d at 408-09 (“First, we look
to the ‘temporal proximity’ between the un-
constitutional conduct and the discovery of
evidence ....”). “[TJhis factor favors attenu-
ation unless ‘substantial time’ elapses be-
tween an unlawful act and when the evidence
is obtained.” Strieff, — U.S. at ——, 136
S.Ct. at 2062, 195 L.Ed.2d at 408-09 (citing
Kaupp v. Tewas, 588 U.S, 626, 688, 128 S.Ct,
1848, 1847-48, 155 L.Ed.2d 814, 822 (2008)
(per curiam)).

HM Here, drug contraband was discover-
ed on Cohagan’s person within minutes of the
illegal stop. Such a short period of time
between the illegal stop and the discovery of
evidence weighs in favor of suppression. Jd.
(noting that the space of minutes between
the misconduct and the discovery of evidence
“counsels in favor of suppression”),

b. Intervening circumstances
HI The intervening circumstance, in
this case, is the discovery of an arrest war-
rant for Cohagan. The discovery of an arrest,

warrant as an intervening circumstance
“strongly favors the State.” Id. “Where the
discovery of an arrest warrant constitutes an
intervening circumstance, ‘it is an even more
compelling case for the conclusion that the
taint of the original illegality is dissipated.’”
United States v, Simpson, 489 F.3d 490, 495
(8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States uv
Green, 111 F.8d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 1997).

HM Here, it is undisputed that the arrest
warrant was valid, Indeed, counsel for Coha-
gan admitted at the suppression hearing that.
there were actually three warrants. “[A] war-
rant valid on its face is prima facie sufficient
authority for the officer to arrest and deliver
the accused.” In re Martz, 83 Idaho 72, 75,
857 P.2d 940, 942 (1960), Furthermore, in
Monson v. Boyd, this Court held that the
existence of a valid arrest warrant imposes a
duty on peace officers to make an arrest. 81
Idaho 575, 579, 348 P.2d 98, 95 (1959) (“Plain-
tiff contends that the word ‘may’ in the fore-
going statute is permissive only, and does not.
charge the peace officer with a duty to make
an arrest. On the contrary, we think the
statute imposes a duty on peace officers.”);
accord Strieff, — U.S. at —, 186 S.Ct, at
2062, 195 L.Ed.2d at 408-09 (“A warrant is a
judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a
search or make an arrest, and the officer has
a sworn duty to carry out its provisions.”
(quoting United States v, Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
920 n21, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3419 n.21, 82
L.Ed.2d 677, 697 n.21 (1984))), Thus, the
discovery of the outstanding warrant, inde-
pendent of the stop, compelled Cohagan’s
arrest. And there is no question that the
search that revealed the drug contraband
was lawful as a search incident to arrest. See
State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 885, 888, 108 P.8d
448, 451 (2004); Arizona v, Gant, 556 U.S.
882, 889, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1716-17, 178
L.Ed.2d 485, 498-94 (2009). Accordingly, this
factor weighs strongly in favor of attenua-
tion. Strieff, — U.S. at ——, 136 S.Ct. at
2062, 195 L,Ed.2d at 408-09; Simpson, 439
F.8d at 495.

ce, Flagrancy and purpose

HM The purpose of the exclusionary
rule, under federal law, is to deter police

misconduct.3 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S.
229, 236-87, 181 S.Ct. 2419, 2426-27, 180
L.Ed.2d 285, 298-94 (2011). Accordingly, the
third factor only favors exclusion “when the
police misconduct is most in need of deter-
rence—that is, when it is purposeful or fla-
grant.” Strieff, — US. at —, 186 S.Ct. at
2062, 195 L.Ed.2d at 408-09 (emphases add-
ed).

The State argues that the recent U.S. Su-
preme Court decision in Sérieff controls the
outcome of this case and dictates that we find
attenuation rather than suppression. Because
Cohagan has not argued that the Idaho Con-
stitution affords greater protection than the
US. Constitution, we agree that Strieff con-
trols. However, Strieff differs factually from
the present case, and we hold that those
differences are sufficient to warrant suppres-
sion.

In Strieff, an officer received an anony-
mous tip about drug activity occurring in a
residence. Id, — U.S. at ——, 186 S.Ct. at
2059, 195 L.Hid.2d at 408-09. Over the course
of a week, and after observing multiple peo-
ple make brief visits to the residence, the
officer became suspicious that the occupants
of the residence were dealing drugs. Id.
While watching the home, the officer ob-
served the defendant exit the house and walk
toward a nearby convenience store. Jd. —
US. at ——, 186 S.Ct. at 2060, 195 L.Ed.2d
at 406-07. The officer detained the defendant
in the store parking lot and asked the defen-
dant what he was doing at the residence. Id.
The officer also requested the defendant’s
identification and relayed the defendant’s in-
formation to dispatch, which reported that
the defendant had an outstanding arrest war-
rant. Id. The officer then arrested the defen-
dant and searched him incident to arrest. Id.

3. In State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98,
842 P.2d 660, 667-77 (1992), this Court declined
to accept deterrence of police misconduct as the
sole purpose of the exclusionary rule under Ida-
ho’s Constitution; rather, we instructed that the
exclusionary rule serves to:

1) provide an effective remedy to persons
who have been subjected to an unreasonable
government search and/or seizure; 2) deter
the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining
evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the
warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the

723

The search revealed a baggie of metham-
phetamine and drug paraphernalia, Id.

In determining whether the officer’s con-
duct was flagrant, the Supreme Court noted
that the officer’s decision to run a warrant
check was a “ ‘negligibly burdensome precav-
tion’ for officer safety” and the officer’s con-
duct “was at most negligent” and the result
of “two good-faith mistakes.” Id. — U.S. at
——, 186 S.Ct. at 2063, 195 L.Ed.2d at 409-
10 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, —
US. —-, —, 185 S.Ct. 1609, 1616, 191
L,Ed.2d 492, 500-01 (2015). It also noted
that the officer’s purpose in approaching the
defendant was to determine what was going
on in the house and that “the stop was an
isolated instance of negligence that occurred
in connection with a bona fide investigation
of a suspected drug house.” Jd. Based on
those observations, the Supreme Court held
that the officer’s conduct did not reflect “fla-
grantly unlawful police misconduct.” Id.

Here, there was no “bona fide investiga-
tion.” Officer Otto had asked Cohagan for his
identification just a few minutes before Offi-
cer Curtis interacted with Cohagan and con-
firmed that Cohagan was not the person they
suspected. The only proffered purpose for
Officer Curtis’s stop of Cohagan was that
Officer Curtis suspected that Cohagan might
have given Officer Otto a false identification
card, but there are no objective grounds to
support this belief or the subsequent seizure.
Cf. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-62,
152 P.8d 16, 21-28 (2007). Indeed, Officer
Curtis admitted that before stopping Coha-
gan, he knew Cohagan was not the person he
suspected.! Thus, there was no cause for
Officer Curtis to stop Cohagan because both
Officer Otto and Officer Curtis himself had
already confirmed that Cohagan was not the
suspected individual. Further, there was no

judiciary commit an additional constitutional
violation by considering evidence which has
been obtained through illegal means; and 5)
preserve judicial integrity.

Id, at 993, 842 P.2d at 672,

However, as noted, Cohagan makes no argument

concerning the Idaho Constitution.

4. Officer Curtis testified: “So as [Cohagan] got
close, maybe 10 or 15 feet away, I realized it was
not him, but at that point I still wanted to ask his
name and ID him.”

724

need for Officer Curtis to stop Cohagan and
run a warrant check as a precaution for
officer safety. Officer Otto had just checked
Cohagan’s identification and there was no
reason Officer Curtis could not have run a
warrant check before he made contact with
Cohagan. Indeed, the more prudent and safe
approach for Officer Curtis would have been
to check for warrants before making contact.

Ultimately, there was simply no reason for
Officer Curtis to stop Cohagan and run a
warrant check. Unlike in Strieff, where the
defendant had just exited a residence the
officer suspected was a source of drugs, here,
there was no indication that Cohagan was
involved in illegal activity. Also unlike in
Strieff, where the officer did not already
know the defendant’s name, Officer Otto had
already identified Cohagan and there was no
reason Officer Curtis could not have run a
warrant check before stopping Cohagan. As
Officer Curtis stated: “So as [Cohagan] got
close, maybe 10 or 15 feet away, I realized it
was not him, but at that point I still wanted
to ask his name and ID him.” Having already
stated his realization that Cohagan was not
the suspected person, Officer Curtis’s deci-
sion to request Cohagan’s identification and
run a warrant check was nothing more than
“a suspicionless fishing expedition ‘in the
hope that something would turn up.’” Id. —
US. at ——, 186 S.Ct. at 2064, 195 L.Hd.2d
at 410-11 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457
U.S. 687, 691, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667-68, 73
L.Hd.2d 814, 319-20 (1982). Such purposeful
conduct is simply untenable and is exactly
the type of flagrantly unlawful conduct the
Fourth Amendment is designed to protect
against. See, eg., Kawpp v. Tewas, 588 U.S.
626, 638, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1848, 155 L.Ed.2d
814, 822 (2003) (finding flagrant violation
where officers knew they lacked probable
cause to detain the defendant but did so
anyway); Brown v. Illinois, 422 US. 590,
605, 95 S.Ct, 2254, 2262-63, 45 L.Ed.2d 416,
428 (1975) (holding that a stop that was
solely investigatory and conducted on the
hope that something might turn up violates
the protections of the Fourth Amendment),

Our decision in State v. Page, 140 Idaho
841, 108 P.8d 454 (2004), warrants further

discussion when evaluating Officer Curtis’s
conduct.

In Page, a police officer noticed Page walk-
ing down the middle of a street in the middle
of the night. Id. at 842, 103 P.8d at 455. The
officer approached Page and, “{alfter inquir-
ing about his well-being,” asked for Page’s
identification. Id, at 842-48, 103 P.3d at 455-
56, The officer took Page’s driver's license
back to his patrol car and contacted dispatch.
Id, at 848, 108 P.8d at 456, After dispatch
informed the officer that Page had an out-
standing warrant for his arrest, the officer
arrested Page. Id. The ensuing search inci-
dent to arrest led to the discovery of meth-
amphetamine, marijuana, and drug parapher-
nalia on Page’s person. Jd, Page moved to
suppress the evidence. Id. The district court
found that Page was unlawfully seized and
granted his motion to suppress. Id.

We reversed. Id. at 847, 103 P.8d at 460.
We agreed with the district court’s determi-
nation that Page was unlawfully seized, id. at
845, 108 P.8d at 458, but held that the discov-
ery of the outstanding warrant attenuated
the taint of the unlawful seizure. Id. at 846-
47, 108 P.3d at 459-60.

Page is important for its discussion of the
illegal seizure, There, the State relied on our
decision in State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491,
826 P.2d 452 (1992), in support of its argu-
ment that:

the brief retention of a driver’s license or

other identifying paperwork during an oth-

erwise lawful police contact is reasonable,
because the intrusion upon the person’s
privacy interest is minimal when compared.
to the valid public/governmental interests,
including the officer’s need to properly
identify the person with whom he is deal-
ing, prepare accurate reports and ensure
officer safety.
Page, 140 Idaho at 845, 108 P.3d at 458, We
rejected this argument. We first distin-
guished Godwin from the facts presented in
Page, noting:
the Court in Godwin was heavily influ-
enced by the fact that LC. § 49-816 re-
quires a driver to surrender a driver's
license to a police officer upon demand and
that the statutory authority for police to
demand a driver’s license would mean little

if the police could not check the validity of

the license.

Id. (internal quotation, citation, and altera-
tion omitted). We held that there was “[nlo
equally compelling policy or statutory au-
thority” that would support seizure of a driv-
er’s license from a pedestrian, Jd. We then
took note of our statement in Godwin “that
‘police officers do not have unfettered discre-
tion to stop drivers and request a display of a
driver's license’ to conduct a random status
and/or warrants check.” Id. (quoting Godwin,
121 Idaho at 496, 826 P.2d at 457). Most
significantly, we expressed concern “about
the implications of a rule allowing law en-
forcement officers the ability to initiate con-
sensual encounters with pedestrians in order
to seize identification and run a warrants
check.” Id.

It appears that our holding regarding the
illegality of Page’s seizure and the concern
we identified has been obscured by the result
of the decision—reversal of the district
court's order suppressing the evidence. This
leads us to discuss an implicit component of
the exclusionary rule that receives little at-
tention: the fact that application of the rule
leads law enforcement officers to receive
training in the law of search and seizure. The
United States Supreme Court has explained:

The deterrent purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule necessarily assumes that the po-
lice have engaged in willful, or at the very
least. negligent, conduct which has de-
prived the defendant of some right. By

refusing to admit evidence gained as a

result of such conduct, the cowrts hope to

instill in those particular investigating of-

ficers, or in their future counterparts, a

greater degree of care toward the rights of

an accused.
Michigam v. Tucker, 417 US. 488, 447, 94
S.Ct. 2857, 2865, 41 L.Ed2d 182, 194-95
(1974) (emphasis added). In the landmark
decision announcing the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule, the United States
Supreme Court explained:

The objective standard we adopt, more-

over, requires officers to have a reasonable

knowledge of what the law prohibits. Unit-

ed States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 581, 542, 95

S.Ct, 2818, 2320, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 [883]

725

(1975). As Professor Jerold Israel has ob-

served:

“The key to the [eclusionary] rule’s effec-

tiveness as a deterrent lies, I believe, in

the impetus it has provided to police train-
ing programs that make officers aware of
the limits imposed by the fourth amend-

‘ment and emphasize the need to operate

within those limits. [An objective good-

faith exception] is not likely to result in the
elimination of such programs, which are
now viewed as an important aspect of po-
lice professionalism. Neither is it likely to
alter the tenor of those programs; the pos-
sibility that illegally obtained evidence may
be admitted in borderline cases is unlikely
to encourage police instructors to pay less
attention to fourth amendment limitations.
Finally, [it] should not encourage officers
to pay less attention to what they are
taught, as the requirement that the officer
act in ‘good faith’ is inconsistent with clos-
ing one’s mind to the possibility of illegali-
ty.” Israel, [Criminal Procedure, the Burg-
er Court, and the Legacy of the Warren

Court, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1819, 1412-1413

(1977) ] (footnotes omitted).

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20,
104 S.Ct. 3405, 3418-19 n.20, 82 L,Ed.2d 677,
696-97 n.20 (1984) (emphasis added, bracket-
ed material (except for Israel citation) in
original).

Although the record is silent as to Officer
Curtis’s training, it appears that law enforee-
ment’s “takeaway” from our decision in Page
may differ from that which this Court intend-
ed. Rather than recognizing the illegality of
seizing identification belonging to a pedestri-
an not suspected of criminal conduct, Page
may have been interpreted as granting law
enforcement officers license to engage in
fishing expeditions. Stated differently, it ap-
pears that some members of law enforcement
have interpreted Page as meaning that this
Court will apply the attenuation doctrine to
excuse a constitutional violation in the event
that a fishing expedition proves successful.

In our view, the training that law enforce-
ment officers receive regarding the law of
search and seizure should play a role in
evaluating the flagrancy of their behavior. As
the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated:

726 Le

It is the duty of those who enforce the
law to follow it, and ignorance thereof can
no more excuse the conduct of officers and
judges than it would excuse the conduct of
a defendant, If anything, a higher duty of
compliance rests on those whose responsi-
bility it is to enforce the law than on the
general [populace].

State v, Kelley, 362 Ark. 636, 210 S.W.3d 98,
99 (2005). Today’s decision should remove
any lingering doubt as to whether this Court
will sanction the unjustified, suspicionless
seizure of citizens. It is difficult to imagine
how similar conduct, following the release of
this opinion, can be characterized as anything
but purposeful or flagrant,

In summary, although the discovery of the
arrest warrant strongly favors attenuation,
the other two factors support a finding of
suppression. Accordingly, we hold that the
discovery of the evidence was not sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal stop as to break
the causal chain between the unconstitutional
stop and the discovery of the evidence. The
district court’s denial of Cohagan’s motion to
suppress is reversed,

IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s denial of
Cohagan’s motion to suppress and remand to
the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion,

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES, and BRODY conenur.

404 P.3d 668
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v

Michael Anthony HIATT,
Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No, 44059
Court of Appeals of Idaho,
Filed: April 25, 2017
Review Denied November 17, 2017

Eric D, Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy Ap-
pellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Michael Anthony Hiatt appeals from the
district court’s order denying Hiatt’s motion
for credit for time served. He argues that the
district court erred when it denied Hiatt’s
request for credit for time served as a condi-
tion of probation. For the reasons below, we
affirm.

1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In March 2010, Hiatt was found guilty of
felony domestic assault, Idaho Code §§ 18-
918(8)(b), 18-903(b). The district court im-
posed a unified five-year sentence, with a
two-year determinate term, but after a peri-
od of retained jurisdiction, suspended the
sentence and placed Hiatt on probation. One
of the terms of Hiatt’s probation was a sus-
pended sixty-day jail term, which could be
imposed at the discretion of his probation
officer with the court’s approval.

On January 10, 2011, the district court
approved fourteen days of discretionary jail
time at the request of Hiatt’s probation offi-
cer, On January 19, 2011, while still in custo-
dy serving the discretionary jail time, Hiatt
was served with an arrest warrant for a
reported probation violation. After this pro-
bation violation, and a subsequent violation in
2012, the district court continued Hiatt on

727

probation. Hiatt later admitted to a third
probation violation in 2018, at which point the
district court entered an order revoking pro-
bation and ordering execution of the original
sentence, At this time, the court calculated
Hiatt’s credit for time served as sixty-nine
days in an order dated April 80, 2018. Hiatt
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of his sentence, which the district
court denied, Hiatt then appealed that denial,
which this Court affirmed. See State v, Hiatt,
Docket No. 40990, 2014 WL 1017273 (Ct,
App. Mar. 14, 2014) (unpublished),

While Hiatt’s Rule 85 appeal was pending,
he filed a motion for credit for time served.
The district court granted Hiatt’s motion,
awarding him credit for 548 days served in
an order dated August 9, 2013. The district
court specifically declined to grant credit for
the eight days served January 10-19, 2011,
reasoning, “It is within the Court’s discretion
to grant or deny credit for time served as a
term of probation. With respect to those
eight (8) days, the Court declines to grant
credit.”

In January 2016, Hiatt moved for credit.
for the time he served as a condition of
probation. In asking, for credit for the eight
days he served in January 2011 at the disere-
tion of his probation officer, Hiatt cited to
amendments made in 2015 to the code provi-
sions governing the calculation of credit for
time served. The district court denied the
motion, reasoning that the laws in effect in
2018, when Hiatt’s sentence was ordered into
execution, did not award defendants credit
for time served as a condition of probation.
Moreover, the 2015 statutory amendments
did not apply retroactively to the court’s 2018
order. Hiatt timely appeals.

1.
ANALYSIS

Hl Hiatt argues the district court erred
when it denied Hiatt’s motion seeking recal-
culation of credit for time served as a condi-
tion of probation, He maintains that he is
entitled to credit for the eight days he served
at the discretion of his probation officer in
January 2011.

728

HMM We exercise free review when the
issue is whether the district court properly
applied the law governing credit for time
served. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170,
189 P.38d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006). We defer
to the trial court’s findings of fact “unless
those findings are unsupported by substan-
tial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id.
Whether the district court properly applied
this statutory provision to the facts in this
case is a question of law, which we freely
review. State v. Dorr, 120 Idaho 441, 443-44,
816 P.2d 998, 1000-01 (Ct. App. 1991).

Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c), a
defendant may move to correct a court’s
computation of credit for time served, grant-
ed pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-309 or 19-2603, at
any time. Both LC. §§ 18-809 and 19-2603
were amended effective July 1, 2015, and now
provide that a court must award a defendant
with credit for time served as a condition of
probation. See State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349,
358, 872 P.8d 404, 408 (2016). Prior to the
amendment, it was not required that a court
award credit for time served as a condition of
probation. See id.

It is well established that these amended
credit statutes do not have retroactive effect.
State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381, 385, 373 P.8d
699, 703 (2016); Leary, 160 Idaho at 353-54,
872 P.3d at 408-09. The Supreme Court has
expressly stated:

The amendment to Idaho Code 18-309

clearly applies to a “person against whom

the judgment is entered or imposed,” not a

person whose judgment was previously en-

tered or imposed. Similarly, the amend-
ment to Idaho Code section 19-2603 is
devoid of any indication that it should ap-
ply to persons who were sentenced or
whose probation was revoked before the
amendment was effective.

Leary, 160 Idaho at 858, 872 P.3d at 408,

Hiatt acknowledges that amended credit
statutes do not apply retroactively. However,
he contends that because he moved for recal-
culation of the credit computation after the
amended statutes had gone into effect, he is
not seeking retroactive application of the
amended laws. Instead, he suggests that be-
cause he filed his Rule 35(¢) motion in 2016,

the district court should apply the law in
effect at the time Hiatt filed his motion. If we
were to accept Hiatt’s argument that the law
in effect at the time of a motion controls the
computation, we would effectively be apply-
ing the eredit statutes retroactively. To hold
as Hiatt suggests would allow a defendant to
move the court for recalculation any time the
law is amended in the defendant’s favor. The
practical effect would be the retroactive ap-
plication of newly enacted legislation—the
practice of which the Idaho Supreme Court
has already held improper.

Here, the district court provided its initial
calculations of credit in an order dated April
80, 2018, crediting Hiatt for sixty-nine days.
Then, on August 9, 2018, the district court
recalculated its initial computation of credit
for time served, awarding Hiatt 548 days but.
expressly declining to award credit for the
eight days at issue. The pre-amended ver-
sions of IC. §§ 18-809 and I.C, 19-2603 were
in effect when the district court made both
its initial calculation and its corrected caleu-
lation regarding Hiatt’s credit for time
served. Moreover, the court specifically con-
sidered that Hiatt was not entitled to the
eight days at issue based upon the law in
effect at the time. Because Hiatt is not enti-
tled to retroactive application of the amended
credit statutes, we hold that the district court
did not err in denying Hiatt’s motion for
eredit for time served as a condition of pro-
bation.

i.

CONCLUSION

The amended eredit statutes do not apply
retroactively to Hiatt’s motion for credit for
time served as a condition of probation. Ac-
cordingly, we affirm the district court’s deni-
al of Hiatt’s motion for credit for time
served,

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
MELANSON concur.

404 P.3d 1280
In the Matter of the Agency’s Finding of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Or-
der Regarding Sex Offender Registra-
tion.
Travis David KNOX, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
Docket No, 44807
Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed: September 29, 2017

a
oo
—

Rape in the third degree is defined by Oregon
Statute as:

(1) A person commits the crime of rape in the

third degree if the person has sexual inter-

ahi

Clark and Feeney; Kate A, Hawkins, Lew-
iston, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Cheryl Rambo, Deputy Attorney Gener-
al, Meridian, for respondent,

GRATTON, Chief Judge

Travis David Knox appeals from the dis-
trict court’s order affirming the Idaho Cen-
tral Sex Offender Registry’s final order. The
final order determined that Knox must regis-
ter as a sex offender for as long as he lives in
Idaho because his sex offense convictions in
Oregon are equivalent to an aggravated of-
fense in Idaho. We affirm.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In 2002, Knox was convicted in Oregon of
rape in the third degree, Oregon Revised
Statutes § 163.3551,1 and sexual abuse in the

course with another person under 16 years of
age.

(2) Rape in the third degree is a Class C
felony.

second degree, Or. Rev. Star. § 163.425.2 In
2008, Knox moved to Lewiston, Idaho. He
registered as a sex offender in Idaho. On
June 2, 2015, Knox filed a petition for release
from registration requirements and expunge-
ment of his record.? However, on August 5,
2015, in a separate action, the Idaho Central
Sex Offender Registry (Registry), an Idaho
State Police agency, issued a final order pur-
suant to Idaho Code §§ 18-8304(1)(b), 18-
8304(4) and Idaho Administrative Procedures
Act (IDAPA) 11.10.08,000-012 determining
that Knox’s sex offense convictions in Oregon
were substantially equivalent to I.C. § 18-
1508, lewd conduct with a minor under six-
teen The final order further determined the
convictions are equivalent to an aggravated
offense pursuant to IC, § 18-8303(1). As a
result, Knox is required to continue registra-
tion as a sex offender for as long as he
resides in Idaho. On September 4, 2015,
Knox sought judicial review of the Registry’s
final order by the district court. The district
court affirmed the Registry’s final order.
Knox timely appeals.

I.

ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction

HH As an initial matter, the Registry
argues that the district court lacked jurisdic
tion to rule on Knox’s petition for judicial
review of the agency’s final order because he
failed to timely file it. Thus, the Registry

On. Rev. Stat, § 163.355.

2. Sexual abuse in the second degree was defined

by Oregon statute in 2002 as:
(1) A person commits the crime of sexual
abuse in the second degree when that person
subjects another person to sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse or, except as provid-
ed in ORS 163.142, penetration of the vagina,
anus or penis with any object other than the
penis or mouth of the actor and the victim
does not consent thereto.
(2) Sexual abuse in the second degree is a
Class C felony.

Or. Rev. Stat, § 163.425.

3. Knox's June 2, 2015, petition has been stayed
pending the outcome in this matter.

4, Lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen
is defined by Idaho Code § 18-1508 as:

731

avers, the district court erred in denying the
Registry’s motion to dismiss. Idaho Code
§ 67-5278(2) states that a petition for review
of a final order “must be filed within twenty-
eight (28) days of the service date of the final
order.” The filing of a petition for judicial
review within the time permitted by statute
is jurisdictional. Grand Canyon Dories, Inc.
v. Idaho State Tas Comm'n, 121 Idaho 515,
516, 826 P.2d 476, 477 (1992). Idaho Adminis-
trative Procedures Act Rule 04.11.01.055 sets
forth the rules the agency must follow for
service, The rule allows the agency to serve
documents by regular mail to the party’s last
known mailing address. However, the rule
also requires service must be made on the
representatives of each party.
The officer designated by the agency to
serve documents in a proceeding must
serve all orders and notices in a proceed-
ing on the representatives of each party
designated pursuant to these rules for that
proceeding and upon other persons desig-
nated by these rules or by the agency.

IDAPA 04.11.01.055.04,

As stated above, on August 5, 2015, the
Registry issued its final order and Knox filed
a petition for judicial review thirty days later,
on September 4, 2015. The Registry’s final
order was sent to Knox’s home address. The
Registry had notice that Knox was repre-
sented by counsel because approximately two
months earlier, the Registry had received the
petition for release from registration require-
ments and expungement of record from

Any person who shall commit any lewd or
lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or
any part or member thereof of a minor child
under the age of sixteen (16) years, including
but not limited to, genital-genital contact, oral-
genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal
contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-geni-
tal contact, whether between persons of the
same or opposite sex, or who shall involve
such minor child in any act of bestiality or
sado-masochism as defined in section 18-1507,
Idaho Code, when any of such acts are done
with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires
of such person, such minor child, or third
party, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not
more than life.

732

Knox’s counsel, There is nothing in the rec-
ord to indicate that, in addition to sending
the final order to Knox’s home address, the
Registry served the final order on Knox’s
counsel. Where service was not made on
Knox’s representative, the twenty-eight-day
period to appeal did not run and this Court
has jurisdiction to hear the matter,

B. Constitutional Issues

1, Ex post facto doctrine

Hl Knox argues that the Registry’s final
order was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion. Knox bases this argument on
his claim that the Registry made an equiva-
lency determination in 2003 when Knox first
moved to Idaho and then made a redetermi-
nation in 2015.5

The Idaho Sexual Offender Registration
Notification and Community Right-to-Know
Act (SORA) requires a person sentenced for
an offense identified in the Act to register
with the Registry. I.C. § 18-8306(1). The reg-
istry is maintained on a publicly accessible
website. SORA applies, in relevant part, to
anyone “who has a foreign conviction that is
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed
in paragraph (a) of this subsection.” I.C.
§ 18-8804(1)(b). The legislature delegated to
the Idaho State Police the authority to imple-
ment SORA and establish the Registry. L.C.
§ 18-8304(4); Doe v. State, 158 Idaho 778,
782, 852 P.8d 500, 504 (2015), The Idaho
State Police then promulgated “Rules Gov-
erning the Sex Offender Registry” (“Regis-
try Rules”) for administration of the Regis-
try. IDAPA 11.10.03.000-012, The Registry
Rules apply to “[a] person convicted of a sex
offense in another jurisdiction and who
moves to : Idaho.” IDAPA
11.10.08.012(08). The Registry Rules state
the process for appeals of agency decisions,
IDAPA 11.10.08.008, and the process for ob-
taining and appealing “substantially equiva-
lent” determinations, IDAPA
11.10.03.012(08),

Until July 1, 2009, only certain specifically
enumerated sexual offenses qualified as ag-
5. Knox refers to an Equivalency Board as the

agency who made the equivalency determination
of Knox’s Oregon convictions in 2015. However,

gravated offenses, including I.C. § 18-1508,
lewd conduct with a minor, when the victim
was less than twelve years old. See 2009
Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 250 § 1, p. 761. In
2009, the legislature amended the definition
to provide that lewd conduct with a minor
was an aggravated offense, regardless of the
age of the victim. 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.
250, § 1, p. 761. Knox’s victim in the Oregon
convictions was fifteen years old. Knox avers
that in 2008, the Registry determined that
Knox’s Oregon convictions were equivalent to
LC. § 18-1508 (ewd conduct with a minor)
and LC. § 18-6101 (rape). Therefore, Knox
claims his offense should not be considered
an aggravated offense because when he
moved to Idaho in 2008, I.C. § 18-1508 was
not an aggravated offense if the victim was
fifteen years old.

HMM As the State notes, Knox does not
point to anything in the record before this
Court to demonstrate that such an equivalen-
ey determination was made in 2003. The
exhibits which purport to do so are screen-
shots of the online sex offender registry at-
tached to petitioner’s written response to
respondent’s post-hearing case law notes.
However, the screenshots indicate that
Knox’s offender profile was updated on Feb-
ruary 10, 2015. There is no indication of a
2008 determination. Regardless, this Court
has unambiguously rejected Knox’s argu-
ment. The constitutions of Idaho and the
United States prohibit ex post facto laws.
US. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Idaho Const.
art. I, § 16, “[T]he ex post facto doctrine
prohibits a state from retroactively increas-
ing the punishment for criminal acts.” State
v, Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, 75, 187 P.8d 461, 462
(Ct. App. 2005). But “civil proceedings” do
not amount to a violation of the ex post facto
clauses. Jd. at 76, 187 P.3d at 463, Whether a
statutory scheme is civil or criminal is a
question of statutory construction. Id.; see
Smith v. Doe, 588 US. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140,
155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003).

The process of statutory construction be-

gins by determining “whether the legis-

lature, in establishing the penalizing

the equivalency determination was made by the
Registry.

mechanism, indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label or
the other.” Thereafter, a seven-factor,
nonexhaustive test is used to determine
whether the effects of the regime are so
punitive so as to overcome the State’s
intention to create a civil proceeding.

Groves v. State, 156 Idaho 552, 554, $28 P.8d
582, 584 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Gragg, 143
Idaho at 76, 187 P.3d at 463).

A defendant convicted of a sex offense is
generally required to register for life. But
there is a statutory provision that allows a
registrant to petition the district court to be
excused from registering if the crime was not
an aggravated offense.’ Aggravated offenses
require lifetime registration without excep-
tion. As noted above, I,C. § 18-1508 was not
listed as an aggravated offense when Knox
moved to Idaho (except in cases where the
victim was under twelve years old), but “[a]
long line of Idaho cases have upheld SORA
over ex post facto challenges.” Groves, 156
Idaho at 555, 828 P.8d at 585. This Court has
“concluded that the effects of sex offender
registration are not so punitive as to override
the legislative intent to create a civil, regula-
tory scheme.” Jd. And the statutory scheme
expressly applies retroactively to any person
who

[pleads guilty to or has been found
guilty of a crime covered in this chapter
prior to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a
result of the offense, is incarcerated in a
county jail facility or a penal facility or is
under probation or parole supervision, on
or after July 1, 1993.

LC. § 18-8304(d); see also Bottum v. Idaho
State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identifica-
tion Cent. Sea Offender Registry, 154 Idaho
182, 188, 296 P.8d 388, 389 (2018). Therefore,
the retroactive application of SORA to Knox
will be upheld unless that application results
in a constitutional violation.

6. Registration under this act is for life; however,
any offender, other than a recidivist, an offend-
er who has been convicted of an aggravated
offense, or an offender designated as a violent
sexual predator, may, after a period of ten (10)
years from the date the offender was released
from incarceration or placed on parole, super-

733

2. Due process rights

HH Knox also argues that the district
court erred in determining that the Registry
was not required to provide Knox any addi-
tional due process prior to issuing its final
order. The Registry is a state agency under
the IDAPA. LC. § 67-5201). A final order
issued by an agency arising out of a contest-
ed case proceeding constitutes agency action.
IC. § 67-5201(8). Judicial review of agency
action is governed by IDAPA. LC. § 67-
5201(1). In an appeal from the decision of the
district court acting in its appellate capacity
under the IDAPA, this Court reviews the
agency record independently of the district
court’s decision. Marshall v. Idaho Dep't of
Transp., 187 Idaho 387, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 669
(Ct. App. 2002). This Court does not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence presented. I.C.
§ 67-5279(1); Marshall, 187 Idaho at 340, 48
P.8d at 669. This Court instead defers to the
agency’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton
Corp., 180 Idaho 928, 926, 950 P.2d 1262,
1265 (1998); Marshall, 187 Idaho at 840, 48
P.8d at 669. In other words, the agency's
factual determinations are binding on the
reviewing court, even where there is conflict-
ing evidence before the agency, so long as
the determinations are supported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence in the rec-
ord. Urrutia v, Blaine Cnty. ew rel. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 358, 357, 2 P.8d 788, 742
(2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.8d at
669,

HN The Court may overtumn an
agency’s decision where its findings, infer-
ences, conclusions, or decisions violate statu-
tory or constitutional provisions; exceed the
agency’s statutory authority; are made upon
unlawful procedure; are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record; or are
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discre-
tion. IC. § 67-5279(8). The party challenging
the agency decision must demonstrate that

vised release or probation, whichever is great-
er, petition the district court for a show cause
hearing to determine whether the offender
shall be exempted from the duty to register as
a sexual offender.

LC. § 18-8310(1).

734,

the agency erred in a manner specified in
LG. § 67-5279(8) and that a substantial right
of that party has been prejudiced. Price v,
Payette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 181
Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 588, 586 (1998);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. If
the agency’s decision is not affirmed on ap-
peal, it shall be set aside and remanded for
further proceedings as necessary. LC, § 67-
5279(8).

HM Knox first asserts that he was not
afforded the due process protections owed to
him in an administrative law proceeding,
Knox avers that a determination as to his sex
offender status was first made when he
moved to Idaho in 2008 and then again in
2015, and neither time was he given the
opportunity to present evidence on his own
behalf. Where a defendant claims that his or
her right to due process was violated, we
defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Smith, 185 Idaho 712, 720, 28 P.8d 786, 794
(Ct. App. 2001), However, we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to
those facts found. Id.

Knox also argues that the 2009 amendment
to SORA violates his right to due process. As
noted above, in 2009, I,C. § 18-1508 was clas-
sified as an aggravated offense regardless of
the victim’s age. Prior to that, I.C, § 18-1508
was deemed an aggravated offense only if the
victim was less than twelve years old. Knox’s
victim in the Oregon convictions was fifteen
years old. Thus, when Knox moved to Idaho
and registered as a sex offender in 2003,
there was no “aggravated offense” under
SORA. At that time, any sexual offender
other than a “violent sexual predator” could
petition for exemption from registration.
Thus, Knox submits that the Registry’s de-
termination that his Oregon convictions are
equated to an aggravated offense in Idaho is
tantamount to being classified as a “violent
sexual predator.”

HE Knox has failed to provide a cogniza-
ble liberty or property interest in obtaining
release from registration to support his due
process claim, This Court has previously held
that a sex offender seeking to determine
whether his offense was an aggravated of-
fense was afforded procedural due process

prior to his conviction. Groves, 156 Idaho at
558, 828 P.3d at 588. In Groves, the defen-
dant had been granted a hearing to deter-
mine if he had committed an aggravated
offense, but was not allowed to call witnesses
because he had failed to provide notice of his
intent to do so. Id, at 557, 328 P.3d at 587,
The defendant claimed that he was entitled
to additional due process because labeling his
convicted offenses as “aggravated” created a
“badge of infamy” that created a liberty in-
terest in a hearing where he could call his
witnesses, Jd. This Court held that “the duty
to register is triggered ‘solely on the fact of
conviction of a predicate offense’ and because
an offender was provided due process to
dispute that charge prior to his conviction, he
is not entitled to additional due process,” Jd.
(quoting Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 828,
208 P.8d 1221, 1227 (2009)). Similarly, Knox
was provided due process to dispute his un-
derlying charges in Oregon, and he was sub-
sequently convicted.

Knox attempts to distinguish the case at
bar from Groves by highlighting the fact that
his conviction occurred in another state, and
thus, he was not “subjected to and provided
the required due process under the criminal
procedures of the State of Idaho.” In support
of this contention, Knox cites an Idaho Su-
preme Court decision in which the Court
held that Idaho’s administrative process for
designating a person a “violent sexual preda-
tor” failed to comport with the constitutional
requirement of procedural due process.
Smith, 146 Idaho at 827, 203 P.8d at 1226.
The Court reasoned that “where a person’s
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is
at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be
heard are essential.” Id. (quoting Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S, 488, 487, 91 S.Ct.
507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971), The Court fur-
ther noted that the “violent sexual predator”
designation functions as a “badge of infamy”
because it affirmatively labels an offender.
Smith, 146 Idaho at 827, 208 P.8d at 1226.
Furthermore, the designation “is based upon
a factual determination of probable future
conduct; ie., that the offender poses a high
risk of committing an offense or engaging in

predatory sexual conduct.” Id. at 828, 208
P.8d at 1227.

As this Court concluded in Groves, “the
holding in Smith regarding ‘violent sexual
predators’ is inapposite.” Groves, 156 Idaho
at 558, 828 P.8d at 588, This Court further
noted that the reasoning in Smith shows that
Knox’s due process claim is meritless.

The determination that an offense is an
“ageravated offense” is analogous to the
determination of which offenders must
register and is not analogous to designat-
ing a person a “violent sexual predator.”
As is relevant here, I.C. § 18-8308 defines
an “aggravated offense” and does so by
reference to the crime charged. This is
analogous to the provision in I.C. § 18-
8304 that sets forth the crimes that trigger
a duty to register. Both the duty to regis-
ter and eligibility to seek an exemption
from the duty to register are triggered
“simply by reason of conviction for a speci-
fied crime.”

Groves, 156 Idaho at 558, 328 P.3d at 588.

HE This Court also observed that desig-
nating an offense an “aggravated offense”
does not affix any “badge of infamy” because
it is a classification of the offense, not the
offender. Moreover, unlike the “violent sexu-
al predator” label, the determination that an
offense is aggravated does not label a person
as having been specifically found to be likely
to engage in any specific conduct in the
future. Ultimately, this Court held that
Groves was afforded procedural due process
prior to his conviction, Jd. Similarly, Knox
was also afforded procedural due process
prior to his conviction in Oregon. The Idaho
appellate courts have made clear that sex
offenders do not have an additional due pro-
cess right based merelysupon a sex offense
conviction unless a “badge of infamy” is at-
tached. That is not case here and Knox does
not have an additional due process right.

Finally, Knox argues that the provisions of
SORA which make up the statutory frame-
work for equivalency determinations present
“significant constitutional shortcomings.” It
is unclear to this Court whether Knox is
arguing that the statutory framework is un-
constitutional on its face or just as they have
been applied to him. Regardless, the previ-

735

ously cited case law demonstrates that either
claim is without merit. The Registry issued a
declaratory ruling in Knox’s case as envi-
sioned by I.C, § 67-5278(8). The ruling was
made after the Registry engaged in a com-
parison of the Oregon statutes upon which
Knox was convicted and the sex offenses
listed in LC, 18-8804(1), The Registry then
determined that Knox’s Oregon sex offense
convictions were substantially equivalent to
LO. § 18-1508, lewd conduct with a minor
under the age of sixteen. Knox was provided
a process to contest that ruling through judi-
cial review of the Registry’s final order.
Therefore, the Registry was not required to
provide Knox with any additional due process
prior to the issuance of its determinations
that Knox’s sex offense convictions were sub-
stantially equivalent to at least one of Idaho’s
sex offenses enumerated in LC, § 18-
8804(1)(a). The district court did not err in
determining that Knox's due process rights
were not violated.

C. Attorney Fees

The Registry asks this Court to award
attorney fees pursuant to IC, § 12-117 on
the basis of the jurisdictional issue. An award
of attorney fees may be granted to the pre-
vailing party and such an award is appropri-
ate when the “nonprevailing party acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.”
LC. § 12-117(1). Although the Registry is the
prevailing party in this matter, it did not
prevail on the jurisdictional issue, Further,
‘we cannot say that this appeal was without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. Therefore, we
‘will not award attorney fees.

TIL

CONCLUSION

The district court’s order affirming the
Registry’s final order determining that Knox
must register as a sex offender for as long as
he lives in Idaho because his sex offense
convictions in Oregon are equivalent to an
aggravated offense in Idaho is affirmed. Ad-
ditionally, we decline to award attorney fees

736 Dn
to the Registry. Costs are awarded to the
Registry.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY

coneur,

404 P.3d 1287
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

Vv.
Brandon BRIGGS, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket Nos. 44140 & 44141
Court of Appeals of Idaho,
Filed: September 29, 2017
Review Denied November 15, 2017

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent,

HUSKEY, Judge

Brandon Briggs appeals from his judg-
ment of conviction entered upon the jury

737

verdict finding him guilty of five counts of
lewd conduct, four counts of sexual abuse,
and one count of enticing, Before trial, the
district court denied Briggs’s request to
cross-examine witnesses regarding sexual ac-
tivity under Idaho Rule of Evidence
412(b)(2)(D). On appeal, Briggs argues unob-
jected-to error occurred because the district
court violated his right to confront witnesses
under I.R.E, 412(b)(1) and the Sixth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, Be-
cause this case did not involve an unobjected-
to error, the standard for unobjected-to error
does not apply. Even if this standard does
apply, there was no constitutional violation in
this case, and thus, Briggs cannot establish
fundamental error. Furthermore, Briggs did
not present a Sixth Amendment or LR.E.
412(b)(1) argument to the district court, and
thus, we cannot address the arguments for
the first time on appeal. We therefore affirm
the district court’s order denying Briggs’s
motion in limine and judgment of conviction.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In Docket No. 44140 (2014 case), the State
charged Briggs with six crimes: (1) lewd
conduct with a child under the age of sixteen
years, felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-1508 and 18-
112A; (2) sexual abuse of a child under the
age of sixteen years, felony, I.C. §§ 18-1506
and 18-112A; (8) lewd conduct with a child
under the age of sixteen years, felony, I.C.
§§ 18-1508 and 18-112A; (4) lewd conduct,
with a child under the age of sixteen years,
felony, 1.C. §§ 18-1508, 18-112A, and 19-304;
(6) lewd conduct with a child under the age of
sixteen years, felony, 1.C. §§ 18-1508, 18-
112A, and 19-304; and (6) lewd conduct with a
child under the age of sixteen years, felony,
LLC. §§ 18-1508, 18-112A, and 19-804.

In Docket No, 44141 (2015 case), the State
charged Briggs with four crimes: (1) sexual
abuse of a child under the age of sixteen
years, felony, IC. §§ 18-1506(1)(a) and 18-
112A; (2) sexual abuse of a child under the
age of sixteen years, felony, 1.C. §§ 18-
1506(1)(a) and 18-1124; (8) sexual abuse of a
child under the age of sixteen years, felony,

738

LC. §§ 18-1506(1)(o)? and 18-112A; and (4)
enticing a child through the use of the Inter-
net or other communication device, felony,
LC. § 18-1509A. The district court consoli-
dated the cases,

Before trial, Briggs filed a motion in li-
mine, pursuant to LR.E. 412. In the motion,
Briggs moved the district court to admit the
sexual history of the victims in the case to
show the victims were sexually involved with
individuals other than Briggs. Briggs alleged
the victims accused Briggs in order to pro-
tect the actual perpetrators of the crimes.
Briggs argued the testimony was relevant to
provide a motive for the victims to lie about,
any sexual contact with Briggs, At the hear-
ing on the motion, Briggs was asked which
section of LR.E, 412 applied, and Briggs
responded: “I think it goes under Rule
412(b)(2)(D), ‘sexual behavior with parties
other than the accused which occurred at the
time of the event giving rise to the sex crime
charged.” The district court issued the fol-
Jowing ruling on the matter:

I think evidence that these [victims]
Imew each other and would, therefore,
have an opportunity to maybe conspire or
get their stories together would be rele-
vant evidence. But I don’t think the allega~
tions about sexual contact between these
[victims] and others—I don’t see how that
would fit under 412 in this particular case,
because consent is not an issue in this case
because these are minors.

The district court issued a written order on
the motion in limine, ruling that Briggs could
not present evidence of the victims’ sexual
conduct with other individuals. At no point
did Briggs articulate that he had a constitu-
tional right to present the evidence in ques-
tion, cross-examine the victims on the mat-
ter, or specify any different or additional
bases under LR,E, 412 to admit the evidence,

At trial, the jury found Briggs guilty on all
counts charged. In the 2014 case, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of forty-
eight years, with eighteen years determi-
nate, on each of the five lewd conduct
counts, The district court also imposed a
1. The information lists the count as Idaho Code,

Section 18-1506(a)(b), but this appears to be a
typographical error, Idaho Code § 18-1506(a)(b)

unified sentence of twenty-five years, with
twelve years determinate, on the sexual
abuse count. In the 2015 case, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of twenty-
five years, with twelve years determinate, on
each of the three sexual abuse counts. For
the charge of enticing a child through the
use of the Internet, the district court im-
posed a unified sentence of fifteen years,
with seven years determinate, The district
court ordered all sentences to run concur-
rently. Briggs timely appeals.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM The decision whether to admit evi-
dence at trial is generally within the province
of the trial court. A trial court’s determina-
tion that evidence is supported by a proper
foundation is reviewed for an abuse of discre-
tion. State v. Gilpin, 182 Idaho 648, 646, 977
P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1999). Therefore, a
trial court’s determination as to the admis-
sion of evidence at trial will only be reversed
where there has been an abuse of that dis-
eretion, State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,
978-74, 829 P.2d 861, 863-64 (1992),

I.

ANALYSIS

HM Generally, issues not raised below
may not be considered for the first time on
appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195,
824 P.2d 128, 126 (1992), Idaho decisional
law, however, has long allowed appellate
courts to consider a claim of error to which
no objection was made helow if the issue
presented rises to the level of fundamental
error, See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 671,
165 P.8d 278, 285 (2007); State v. Haggard,
94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971).
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.8d
961 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court aban-
doned the definitions it had previously uti-
lized to describe what may constitute funda-
mental error, The Perry Court held that an
appellate court should reverse an unobjected-

does not exist and the language of the charge
correlates instead to LC. § 18-1506(1)().

to error when the defendant persuades the
court that the alleged error: (1) violates one
or more of the defendant’s unwaived consti-
tutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without
the need for reference to any additional in-
formation not contained in the appellate rec-
ord; and (8) affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 226, 245 P.8d at 978.

A. Because There Was No Unobjected-to
Error, the Unobjected-to Error Stan-
dard Does Not Apply to This Case

HH The threshold question here is wheth-
er the failure to articulate a specific basis on
which to admit evidence qualifies as unob-
jected-to error for purposes of a fundamental
error analysis. This Court does not apply
Perry factors unless it first determines a
trial contained an unobjected-to error. See
Id. at 226, 245 P.8d at 978.

Hl It is not unobjected-to error when a
party articulates a specific basis to admit
evidence, receives a ruling, and then fails to
offer a different basis on which to admit the
evidence, For example, in Perry, trial counsel
made only one objection to the State’s wit-
nesses during trial. Jd, at 214-15, 245 P.8d at.
966-67. The Court analyzed the unobjected-to
error after Perry argued on appeal that the
prosecutor committed five acts of miscon-
duet, four of which Perry did not object to at
trial. Id. at 219, 245 P.8d at 971, The Su-
preme Court also analyzed unobjected-to er-
ror when both parties in State v, Sutton, 151
Idaho 161, 254 P.8d 62 (2011) agreed the
court gave the wrong jury instructions, yet
Sutton failed to object at trial. Jd. at 163, 254
P.8d at 64. Similarly, the appellant in State v,
Rollins, 152 Idaho 106, 266 P.8d 1211 (Ct.
App. 2011) argued on appeal that the district
court should have ordered a psychological
examination, even though Rollins did not ob-
ject to the lack of an evaluation. Id. at 109,
266 P.8d at 1214. In State ». Carter, 155
Idaho 170, 307 P.8d 187 (2018), Carter ap-
pealed his sentence on the grounds that,
although Carter did not object, the district
court failed to order a psychological evalua-
tion and used a pretrial competency evalua-
tion, Id, at 171, 307 P.3d at 188,

2, It must be remembered that fundamental error
is simply a standard created and utilized by our

739

HM Here, the actions of Briggs’s trial
attorney did not qualify as unobjected-to er-
ror, Trial counsel filed a motion in limine,
arguing a very specific ground on which the
district court should admit evidence of the
victims’ sexual history, which the district
court denied. When the evidence was exclud-
ed, trial counsel did not offer a different
basis for its admission. Thus, this is not a
case where trial counsel failed to object; in-
stead, this is a case where trial counsel failed
to offer a basis upon which the evidence
could be admitted. Briggs’s claim on appeal
is not that the State or the district court
made an error to which no objection was
made. Rather, Briggs is claiming his attorney
failed to argue a particular basis on which to
admit the evidence, thus constituting “unob-
jected-to error.” Here, however, there was no
error to which trial counsel could object be-
cause he could not object to his own inaction.
This is not the type of circumstance of “unob-
jected-to error” contemplated by the Perry
opinion. The failure to offer a specific evi-
dence rule as a basis to admit or exclude
evidence is not unobjected-to error for pur-
poses of a fundamental error analysis.”

B. Even If We Consider Unobjected-to
Error, Briggs Cannot Show Funda-
mental Exror Because He Cannot Sat-
isfy the First Prong of Perry

Hoven if we could apply the Perry
factors to this case, Briggs cannot show fun-
damental error. Where the asserted error
involves. a violation of a rule or statute, and
not a constitutional right, the fundamental
error doctrine is not invoked. Perry, 150
Idaho at 226, 245 P.8d at 978, Throughout
trial, Briggs attempted to admit evidence of
the victims’ sexual behavior under I.R.E.
412(b)(2)(D), sexual behavior with parties
other than the accused which occurred at the
time of the event giving rise to the sex crime
charged. Only on appeal has Briggs asserted
a constitutional violation for what was an
evidentiary issue at trial, making this case
similar to the facts in State v. Jackson, 151
Idaho 876, 256 P.8d 784 (Ct, App. 2011).

appellate courts for appellate review. It is not a
right of review. :

740 Es

In Jackson, the defendant filed a motion in
limine before trial, seeking to exclude evi-
dence pursuant to ILR.E. 404(b). Jackson, 151
Idaho at 878-79, 256 P.3d at 786-87. On ap-
peal, Jackson argued fundamental error pur-
suant to his Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess right to a fair trial. Jackson, 151 Idaho
at 879, 256 P.38d at 787. This Court was not
persuaded, holding that Jackson’s argument.
did not satisfy the first prong of Perry. Jack-
son, 151 Idaho at 379, 256 P.8d at 787. Spe-
cifically, we explained:

To hold that the presentation of evidence
and associated argument in violation of an
evidentiary rule satisfies the constitutional
violation element of Perry because all evi-
dentiary error implicates due process
would, in our view, virtually eviscerate the
first prong of the Perry standard and con-
travene the limits that Perry places on
fundamental error review.

Jackson, 151 Idaho at 379-80, 256 P.3d at
787-88. We decline to extend the Perry
“anobjected-to error” analysis to situations in
which trial counsel fails to offer a particular
basis upon which to admit evidence. Conse-
quently, Briggs cannot satisfy the first prong
of Perry.

C. Briggs Did Not Present a Sixth
Amendment or LR.E. 412(b)(1) Argu-
ment to the District Court, and Thus,
We Cannot Address These Arguments
on Appeal

Hs Even if we were to hold such a
claim was cognizable under the Perry analy-
sis, Briggs raises the issue for the first time
on appeal. The Supreme Court has recently
emphasized that appellate court review is
limited to the evidence, theories, and argu-
ments that were presented below. State v.
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396
P.8d 700, 704 (2017).? For an objection to be
preserved for appellate review, either the
specifie ground for the objection must be
clearly stated, State v. Norton, 184 Idaho

3. We acknowledge Briggs filed the appellant’s
brief prior to the Supreme Court's issuance of
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 396
P.3d 700 (2017), and thus, Briggs did not have
the benefit of the ruling. Nonetheless, Garcia-
Rodriguez cites to the long history of appellate
restraint. See Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710,

875, 880, 11 P.8d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000), or
the basis of the objection must be apparent
from the context, State v. Cannady, 187 Ida-
ho 67, 72, 44 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2002), An
objection to the admission of evidence on one
basis does not preserve a separate and differ-
ent basis for exclusion of the evidence. Nor-
ton, 184 Idaho at 880, 11 P.3d at 499.

Although both parties address whether the
district court’s failure to admit the evidence
pursuant to I.R.H. 412(6)(1) constitutes fun-
damental error, Briggs concedes he is mak-
ing a different argument on appeal than he
made at trial regarding the admissibility of
evidence, On appeal, Briggs argues that his
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
was violated because the evidence was ex-
cluded. Specifically, Briggs asserts that he
had a constitutional right to cross-examine
the victims regarding their sexual activity.
Briggs explains in his appellant’s brief: “Pri-
or to trial, Mr. Briggs’s counsel asserted the
evidence at issue was admissible under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 412 to show the alleged
victims’ motive to lie. However, defense coun-
sel did not articulate that the evidence was
constitutionally required to be admitted pur-
suant to Rule 412(b)(1).” After this admis-
sion, Briggs asserts that this Court may re-
view the constitutional violation because the
error plainly exists and is not harmless. We
disagree.

HM Briggs did not argue to the district
court that the evidence of the victims’ sexual
activity was constitutionally required to be
admitted. The issue of constitutionality is
raised for the first time on appeal. Through-
out the pretrial and trial proceedings, Briggs
presented no evidence of a Sixth Amendment
violation and offered no claim regarding his
constitutional right to confront witnesses.
Rather, Briggs attempted to admit evidence
of the victims’ sexual behavior under LR.E.
412(b)(2)(D), sexual behavior with parties
other than the accused which occurred at the
time of the event giving rise to the sex crime

714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007); see also, Allied
Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho
405, 413, 258 P.3d 340, 348 (2011); Woods v.
Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 59, 244 P.3d 197, 203
(2010); Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 292,
221 P.3d 81, 90 (2009).

charged. Because we are limited to the evi-
dence, theories, and arguments that were
presented to the district court, and because
Briggs did not assert a constitutional right to
confront witnesses at trial, we decline to
address Briggs’s constitutional claim on ap-
peal. Additionally, on appeal Briggs does not
address the exclusion of the evidence pursu-
ant to ILR.E. 412(b)(2)(D), Because Briggs
makes no argument that the district court
erred in excluding the evidence on that basis,
we decline to address the issue on appeal,

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Briggs’s actions at trial did not qualify as
unobjected-to error pursuant to Perry, and

TAL

even if they did, Briggs has not established a
constitutional violation occurred in this case.
Briggs also presents arguments on appeal
that he did not present at trial. For the
reasons set forth above, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s order denying Briggs’s motion in
limine and judgment of conviction.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
GUTIERREZ concur.

742

405 P.3d 1

WASHINGTON FEDERAL, successor by
merger to South Valley Bank & Trust,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

vw

Michael R, HULSEY, indviduly,

Commercial Properties, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company; John and Jane
Does I-X, White Corporations I-X, De-

fendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants. __

Docket No. 43936
44190

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, June 2017 Term.

Filed: October 81, 2017

Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP,
Boise, for appellant. Terry C, Copple argued,

John F, Magnuson, Coeur d’Alene, argued
for respondents,

BRODY, Justice.

This case arises from the foreclosure of
nine commercial condominium units owned
by Michael R. Hulsey and SM Commercial
Properties, LLC. Just prior to a sheriff's
sale, SM Commercial Properties filed bank-

744

ruptcy. Eventually the bankruptcy stay was
lifted and the sale took place. Washington
Federal bought the property with a credit
bid and then asserted a deficiency against
Hulsey. The district court found that Wash-
ington Federal failed to prove both the exis-
tence of a deficiency as well as the fair
market value of the property. Washington
Federal raises the following issues on appeal:
(1) whether Hulsey is precluded (collaterally
estopped) from litigating the fair market val-
ue of the property based on the bankruptcy
court proceedings; and (2) whether the dis-
tvict court erred when it determined that
Washington Federal failed to prove the exis-
tence of the deficiency and the fair market
value of the property. Both parties appealed
the district court’s denial of attorney's fees,
but Hulsey dismissed his cross-appeal at the
time of oral argument. We affirm the district
court’s judgment dismissing Washington
Federal’s claim for a deficiency, but vacate
the district court’s judgment denying Wash-
ington Federal’s costs and attorney's fees
incurred to enforce the judgment and decree
of foreclosure.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Michael Hulsey purchased nine commer-
cial condominium units, which were located
on the base floor of the Morning Star Lodge
located in the Silver Mountain Resort Com-
plex in Kellogg, Idaho, Several of the units
are used by the resort for its operations.
Hulsey purchased the units from Jeld-Wen,
the developer, for the total purchase price of
$2,378,000. He financed $1,350,000 of the pur-
chase price through Washington Federal’s
predecessor-in-interest bank. The commer-
cial loan was made to Hulsey individually and
was secured by a deed of trust on the units
and an assignment of rents. After the units
were completed, Hulsey attempted to sell the
nine units as a single package, but he was
unsuccessful. In 2008, the real estate mar-
ket’s downturn made it difficult for Hulsey to
maintain tenants in some of the units. Hulsey
transferred title to the nine units to his
wholly owned limited liability company, SM
Commercial Properties. Although he trans-
ferred title to the units, Hulsey remained
liable on the loan because he was the original

borrower. During this time, the original lend-
er merged with Washington Federal.

Under the terms of the promissory note,
the entire amount due and owing matured on
September 5, 2012. After the loan matured,
Washington Federal granted Hulsey time to
continue to attempt to sell the units to satisfy
the loan. Hulsey continued to make voluntary
interest payments, and at the end of 2018,
the balance owed under the loan was
$1,218,751. In August of 2013, Hulsey re-
ceived an offer (“2013 Offer”) to purchase the
nine units, together with an additional com-
mercial condominium not at issue, for a total
of $2 million. The offer was subject to the
buyer’s ability to simultaneously close on his
purchase of the Silver Mountain Resort.

On October 29, 2013, Washington Federal
told Hulsey to direct all future communica-
tions regarding the loan to Washington Fed-
eral’s counsel. Hulsey proposed to continue
making interest payments, as he had done
with Washington Federal’s predecessor-in-in-
terest and with Washington Federal, but the
bank declined Hulsey’s proposal.

In January 2014, Hulsey’s attorney sent
Washington Federal a written, prelitigation
settlement offer. The settlement offer includ-
ed a short valuation letter from Jim Koon, an
experienced commercial broker and property
manager in North Idaho. In the offer, Hulsey
suggested to Washington Federal that the
property might be worth $578,000 depending
on certain assumptions. Washington Federal
did not accept the settlement offer.

Washington Federal subsequently filed
suit against Hulsey and SM Commercial
Properties. The parties stipulated to the en-
try of an order appointing a receiver and to
the entry of a Judgment and Decree of Fore-
closure in the amount of $1,487,517.62. The
parties requested that the district court re-
tain jurisdiction to handle any deficiency that
might result from the sale of the property.

On October 29, 2014, SM Properties filed
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. The Sheriff's sale
that had been scheduled to take place the
next day was cancelled. Shortly thereafter,
Hulsey received another unsolicited offer for
the property (“2014 Offer”) for $1.5 million,
Like the 2018 Offer, the 2014 Offer was
subject to the buyer simultaneously purchas-
ing the Silver Mountain Resort.

Washington Federal moved the bankrupt-
ey court for relief from the automatic stay to
allow the foreclosure to proceed under the
district court's order. Hulsey objected to
Washington Federal’s motion, and the matter
was heard by the bankruptcy court. The
bankruptey court granted the motion from
the bench. Subsequently, the property was
sold by the Shoshone County Sheriff pursu-
ant to the district court’s Judgment and De-
eree of Foreclosure. Washington Federal
purchased the property based upon a credit
bid of $765,000. Washington Federal sought a
deficiency against Hulsey for over $700,000
($1,487,517.62-$780,000 (the appraised value
advanced by Washington Federal’s expert).)

The sole remaining issue—whether a defi-
ciency judgment should enter—was tried by
the district court. One week before trial,
Washington Federal filed a motion in limine
challenging some of the exhibits proposed by
Hulsey, including a 2005 appraisal of the
property. Washington Federal argued the
2005 appraisal was irrelevant and requested
that the district court apply the bankruptcy
court’s ruling on the motion for relief from
stay (specifically, a finding that there was no
equity in the property) to preclude Hulsey
from contesting the fair market value of the
property as of the sale date. In its memoran-
dum decision following the trial, the district
court rejected Washington Federal’s issue
preclusion argument, finding that the bank-
ruptcy court did not determine the fair mar-
ket value of the property. The district court
subsequently found that Washington Federal
had failed to meet its burden of proof as to
the existence of a deficiency and the fair
market value of the property as of the sale
date. Both parties then moved for attorney's
fees incurred after the entry of the stipulated
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, which
the district court denied, Washington Feder-
al timely appealed to this Court. Hulsey filed
a cross-appeal on the denial of the attorney's
fees, but dismissed the appeal at the time of
oral argument,

I.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in
ruling that the bankruptcy proceedings did

745

not preclude Hulsey from contesting the ex-
istence of a deficiency.

2. Whether the district court erred by
finding that Washington Federal failed to
satisfy its burden of proving the existence of
a deficiency and the amount of the deficiency.

8. Whether the district court erred in
denying attorney’s fees and costs incurred by
Washington Federal after entry of the stipu-
lated Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
and before the deficiency trial.

4, Whether the district court erred in
striking portions of the affidavit of Roy Cuz-
ner submitted by Washington Federal in
support of its request for attorney’s fees.

5. Whether either party is entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

Il.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH The Court’s review is limited “to a
determination of whether the evidence sup-
ports the trial court's findings of fact, and
whether those findings support the conclu-
sions of law.” Sims v. Daker, 154 Idaho 975,
977, 808 P.8d 1281, 1288 (2018). “[T]his Court
is not bound by the legal conclusions of the
trial court, but may draw its own conclusions
from the facts presented.” Steuerer v, Rich-
ards, 155 Idaho 280, 288, 311 P.8d 292, 295
(2018). “Findings of fact will not be set aside
on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.”
Kennedy v, Schneider, 151 Idaho 440, 442,
259 P.8d 586, 588 (2011). But “[w]here find-
ings of fact are supported by substantial and
competent, though conflicting, evidence, they
are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be
disturbed by this Court.” Id.

Iv.
ANALYSIS

A. The district court correctly held that
Hulsey was not precluded from con-
testing the existence or amount of the
alleged deficiency because those issues
were not previously litigated by the
bankruptcy court.

I Washington Federal contends that
the district court erred when it refused to

746

apply the doctrine of issue preclusion (collat-
eral estoppel) to prevent Hulsey from con-
testing the deficiency. The bank argues that
Section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code required the bankruptcy court to deter-
mine the fair market value of the property in
order to adjudicate Washington Federal’s
motion to lift the automatic stay. Washington
Federal argues that the only plausible mar-
ket value must have been $780,000, because
the only evidence the bankruptcy court con-
sidered was Washington Federal’s appraisal
as it declined to consider the 2013 and 2014
failed offers. Washington Federal’s argu-
ments are not well taken.

HM Issue preclusion protects litigants
from having to re-litigate an identical issue
with the same party or a party in privy with
the original party. Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144
Idaho 119, 128, 157 P.8d 618, 617 (2007). This
Court explained in Ticor Title that there are
five factors that are required to preclude a
party from re-litigating an issue:

(1) the party against whom the earlier

decision was asserted had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue decided in
the present action; (2) the issue decided in
the prior litigation was identical to the

issue presented in the present action; (8)

the issue sought to be precluded was actu-

ally decided in the prior litigation;
there was a final judgment on the merits
in the prior litigation; and (5) the party

against whom the issue is asserted was a

party or in privity with a party to the

litigation.
Kootenai Elec. Coop. Inc. v. Lamar Corp.,
148 Idaho 116, 120, 219 P.8d 440, 444 (2009)
(emphasis added). Washington Federal can-
not satisfy the second and third factors.

A Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed un-
der Sections 301, 302, or 308 results in the
imposition of an automatic stay precluding a
number of actions, including any act to en-
force a lien against property of the debtor. 11
US.C. § 862, Section 862 provides a mecha-
nism for lifting the automatic stay so that a
debtor can proceed with collection efforts
under certain circumstances:

(@ On request of a party in interest and

after notice and a hearing, the court shall

grant relief from the stay provided under

subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or con-
ditioning such stay
(1) for cause, including the lack of ade-
quate protection of an interest in proper-
ty of such party in interest;
(2) with respect to a stay of an act
against property under subsection (a) of
this section,
(A) if the debtor does not have an
equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to
an effective reorganization,

11 U.S.C, § 362(d)), @) (emphasis added),

Washington Federal filed a motion for re-
lief from stay with the bankruptcy court so
that it could proceed with the sale of the
property, The bank argued that, based upon
the fair market value of the property as
presented in its expert appraiser’s report,
there was no equity and it should be allowed
to proceed with the sale, Hulsey objected to
the motion for relief from stay, arguing that
it had equity in the property based upon the
2018 Offer of $2 million and the 2014 Offer of
$1.5 million,

At the hearing, the bankruptey court con-
sidered Washington Federal’s appraisal:
“The creditor ... specifically presents that it
has a current MAI appraisal establishing a
value of the real property at $780,000.” The
bankruptcy court refused to consider Hul-
sey’s evidence of the two failed offers:

The debtor did not indicate under the
local rule that Mr. Cox or others working
with the offeror would be testifying wit-
nesses at a final hearing, and specifically
advised that it planned only on calling
Hulsey as a witness.

The debtors’ counsel also conceded that
unless the Court accepted the suggestion
that the $1.5 million dollar contingent offer
established value that it could not other-
wise contest the valuation figure offered by
Washington Federal’s appraiser.

On the representations required under
the local rule, and given the requirements
of Section 362(d), (e), and (g), Washington
Federal is found to have met its burden of
showing that there is no equity.

‘The bankruptcy court stated that, “[E]ven if
the Cox group proposal would be considered,
the offer now and the Washington Federal
debt are both approximately $1.5 million. ...
So in that regard, I find that the value is
likely to be less than the amount of the debt
and ergo there is no equity.” The bankruptcy
court subsequently granted Washington Fed-
eral’s motion for relief from stay.

It is important to recognize that the bank-
ruptey court made one finding—the value of
the property is likely to be less than the
amount of the debt. The bankruptcy court
did not make a finding as to the actual fair
market value, and it is too far of a stretch to
claim that it must have implicitly adopted
Washington Federal’s appraised value of
$780,000. The bankruptcy court did not have
to determine the actual fair market value of
the property to determine whether relief
from the stay should be granted. It only had
to consider whether the actual value was
likely to be less than the amount of the debt.
In other words, there is no way to determine
based on the bankruptey court’s decision that
there would be a deficiency when the proper-
ty was sold or how much that deficiency
would be. The bankruptey court did not adju-
dicate or actually decide the same issues that
were presented to the district court. As such,
the district court correctly declined to apply
the doctrine of issue preclusion to estop Hul-
sey from contesting the deficiency.

HMM soon 2 final note, this Court would
like to address the procedural manner in
which the issue preclusion defense was
raised, Issue preclusion is a form of res
judicata and is an affirmative defense which
must be pled. See Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 8(c)(1)(0). Washington Federal raised
this defense in a motion in limine filed eight
days before trial. A motion in limine is not a
proper substitute for a motion for summary
judgment. There are serious time constraints
on filing motions for summary judgment un-
der Rule 56(b), and litigants cannot circum-
vent those time requirements through crea-
tive captioning, This issue was not raised on
appeal, but we want to make attorneys aware
of our view of the disguised motion for sum-
mary judgment so they can manage their
cases accordingly,

TAT

B. The district court correctly held that
Washington Federal failed to satisfy
its burden of proving the existence of
a deficiency and the amount of the
deficiency.

HM The district court held that Wash-
ington Federal failed to carry its burden of
proving the existence of a deficiency and the
amount of that deficiency. Washington Fed-
eral challenges that holding, arguing the tes-
timony of the bank’s appraiser Vicki Mundlin
was the only testimony of an Idaho licensed
appraiser and should have been accepted by
the district court. Washington Federal ar-
gues that Hulsey’s “sole evidence” about the
two failed, contingent offers is inadequate to
establish the market value of the property,
and that Hulsey failed to produce an actual
appraisal. Washington Federal also objects to
the use of several demonstrative exhibits,
which were used to illustrate hypothetical
scenarios, The exhibits were not admitted
into evidence or disclosed prior to trial, but
were part of Hulsey’s cross examination of
Mundlin.

HR “In foreclosure actions, a mort-
gagee may obtain a deficiency judgment if a
foreclosure sale does not satisfy a mortga-
gor’s debt.” Nw. Farm Credit Servs, FLCA
v, Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC, 156 Idaho
758, 760, 331 P.3d 500, 508 (2014) (citing I.C.
§ 6-108). The deficiency is limited by Idaho
Code section 6-108 to the difference between
the fair market value of the property and the
amount of the unpaid debt. Jd. As stated
earlier, “[t]he Court will not disturb the dis-
trict court’s finding of fact unless the finding
is clearly erroneous.” Jd. (citing PacifiCorp v.
Idaho State Taw Comm'n, 153 Idaho 759,
767, 291 P.8d 442, 450 (2012)), A finding is
clearly erroneous if it is not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Id,
“Substantial and competent evidence is rele-
vant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion.” Jarvis v.
Rexburg Nursing Ctr., 186 Idaho 579, 588, 38
P.8d 617, 621 (2001),

The district court analyzed all of the evi-
dence presented at trial, including the testi-
mony of Washington Federal’s appraiser, the
valuation discussion from Jim Koon that was

748

included in the Hulsey settlement offer, and
the testimony of Hulsey. The district court
carefully analyzed Mundlin’s opinions, includ-
ing the assumptions she made and the infor-
mation she considered and did not consider
in forming her opinion. The district court
considered Mundlin’s imputed vacancy rates,
actual and market lease rates, expense reim-
bursements for management fees and tax
burdens, and capitalization rate. To say that
Hulsey undermined Mundlin’s opinions
through cross examination is putting it mild-
ly, The district court went through Mundlin’s
testimony in detail and the cross examination
that was done and hypothetical scenarios
that were used to discredit her opinions. At
the end of the day, the district court conclud-
ed:

The court is very well aware Ms. Mund-
lin disagrees with Mr. Magnuson’s changes
to her assumptions in the appraisal and in
his hypothetical analyses. The court is very
well aware of the reasons Ms. Mundlin
testified to as support for her opinions,
The court has thoroughly reviewed and
considered the entire trial record. Because
of the credible distinctions and inconsisten-
cies raised by Mr. Magnuson in his cross-
examination of Ms. Mundlin; because of
the conflicting but credible opinion of Mr,
Hulsey, a licensed real estate broker and
experienced commercial real estate inves-
tor and manager, supported by the assem-
plage value theory; because of the omission
of the contingent offers by Washington
Federal; and because of the profound
change in appraised value illustrated by
Mr. Magnuson’s hypothetical changes to
Ms. Mundlin’s subjective assumptions the
court does not find Ms. Mundlin’s determi-
nation of fair market value of $780,000 to
be credible.

ek oe

The court finds the Plaintiff has failed to
meet its burden of proof as to the fair
market value of the subject real property
on March 5, 2015. Further, the court finds
Plaintiff has failed to prove the existence
of a deficiency between the fair market
value of the property on March 5, 2015 and.
its credit bid of $765,000.

The district court’s decision was supported
by substantial and competent evidence. The
district court considered evidence that “a
reasonable mind might aecept to support a
conclusion.” Jarvis, 136 Idaho at 588, 38 P.3d
at 621. The district court carefully considered
in-depth all of the evidence presented before
it and made reasonable conclusions. Wash-
ington Federal makes much of the fact that
Hulsey did not put on any evidence from a
certified appraiser. Washington Federal
misses the point that it had the burden of
proof—not Hulsey, After cross examining
Mundlin, Hulsey made the decision not to
call his own expert. He obviously felt that he
had discredited Mundlin’s opinions enough
through cross examination that he did not
need to put on his own expert testimony.
‘That was a calculated decision that worked in
his favor. The district court’s decision that
Washington Federal failed to prove the exis-
tence of a deficiency and the amount of a
deficiency is supported by substantial and
¢ompetent evidence, As such, we affirm the
decision of the district court.

C. The district court erred when it denied
Washington Federal’s motion for post-
judgment attorney’s fees and costs.

HM Washington Federal claims the dis-
trict court erred when it denied the bank’s
motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Hulsey
filed a competing motion under Idaho Code
section 12-1203), claiming that he was the
prevailing party. The district court denied
both parties’ requests, finding that neither
one of them prevailed based on an overall
view of the case. Both parties appealed the
district court’s decision, but Hulsey dis-
missed his cross appeal at the time of oral
argument. Washington Federal continues
with its assertion of error, arguing that its
motion should have been granted because: (1)
section 12-120(5) mandates the award of at-
torney’s fees and costs incurred to enforce a
judgment; (2) the promissory note and deed
of trust authorize the award of attorney's
fees and costs regardless of whether the
bank was the prevailing party; and (8) the
district court should have determined that
the bank was the prevailing party.

HE) Generally speaking, the district
court’s decision to award attorney's fees is a
discretionary call, subject to the abuse of
discretion standard of review. Bailey v. San-
ford, 189 Idaho 744, 758, 86 P.8d 458, 467
(2004). To determine whether the district
court abused its discretion, this Court consid-
ers: (1) whether the trial court correctly per-
eeived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (8) wheth-
er the trial court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Nampa Charter School,
Ine. v, DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23, 29, 89 P.3d
863, 869 (2004). We hold that the district
court abused its discretion because it did not
act consistently with applicable legal stan-
dards.

HH We first address Washington Feder-
al’s assertion that it is entitled to attorney’s
fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code see-
tion 12-1205). The problem with this argu-
ment is that Washington Federal did not
assert this statute as a basis for its motion
for attorney’s fees and costs at the time it
made its motion. The only bases cited by the
bank in its motion were “Rule 54 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties’
Promissory Note, Deed of Trust and related
loan documentation.” We have repeatedly
held that “[a] party claiming attorneys fees
must assert the specific statute, rule, or case
authority for its claim.” MDS Invs., L.L.C. v.
State, 188 Idaho 456, 465, 65 P.8d 197, 206
(2003), See also Bream v. Benscoter, 139
Idaho 364, 79 P.38d 723 (2003). Because Wash-
ington Federal did not make the 12-120(5)
argument when it presented its motion to the
district court, it cannot now claim that the
district erred by failing to consider it.

Next we address the more difficult issue of
whether the bank was entitled to attorney’s
fees and costs even though the district court
determined it was not the prevailing party.
Washington Federal contends the district
court erred because its decision was inconsis-
tent with our decisions in Post v. Murphy,
125 Idaho 478, 476-77, 878 P.2d 118, 121-22
(1994), and Farm Credit Bank v. Wissel, 122
Idaho 565, 569, 886 P.2d 511, 517 (1992). In

749

those cases, we held that the terms of a valid
contract between the parties provided for the
award of attorney's fees and costs even
though the trial court determined that the
requesting party had not prevailed. We agree
that the district court did not consider these
decisions when denying Washington Feder-
al’s motion and that it constituted an abuse of
discretion because the decision to deny fees
was not made in accordance with applicable
Jaw.

While the dissent contends we should over-
rule Post and Farm Credit Bank, particular-
ly based on the role that Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54 plays as a conduit to the award
of attorney’s fees in contract cases, Hulsey
did not address Washington Federal’s argu-
ment in its briefing on appeal and certainly
did not advocate for the reversal of these
long-standing precedents. Given the impor-
tance of the freedom to contract and poten-
tial reliance issues, we are not persuaded to
ve-consider Post and Farm Credit Bank in a
case where the parties have not fully briefed
the issue. See, ag., Payne v. Tennessee, 501
USS, 808, 827-28, 111 8,Ct, 2597, 115 L.Bd.2d
720 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving
property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved”), Similarly, we will not
consider the waiver argument the dissent
raises because Hulsey did not make this ar-
gument on appeal.

Because we hold the district court erred in

denying Washington Federal’s request for
attorney’s fees and costs based on Post and
Farm Credit Bank, we need not address
Washington Federal’s argument that it was
the prevailing party. We vacate the judgment.
dated April 21, 2016, to the extent it denied
Washington Federal’s request for attorney's
fees and costs and remand this matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.
D. The issue of whether the district court
properly struck portions of the affida-
vit of Roy Cuzner submitted in sup-
port of Washington Federal’s request
for attorney’s fees is moot.

Washington Federal submitted the affida-
vit of Roy Cuzner, a vice president of special

750

assets, in opposition to Hulsey’s motion for
attorney's fees and to support its alternative
argument that it was the prevailing party in
the litigation. The affidavit outlined a settle-
ment offer made by Washington Federal and
included as an exhibit a copy of the appraisal
done by Hulsey’s own expert that essentially
established a sizeable deficiency (the expert
was not called at trial and his appraisal was
not admitted as an exhibit). Hulsey filed a
motion to strike portions of the affidavit and
the exhibit. Given our decision today that
Washington Federal is entitled to costs and
fees without regard to whether it was the
prevailing party, this issue is moot and will
not be addressed,

E. Washington Federal is entitled to at-
torney’s fees for responding to Hul-
sey’s cross-appeal.

Hulsey requests an award of attorney’s
fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-120) on the ground that this is an
action to recover in a commercial transaction,
Because Hulsey only prevailed in part on
appeal and did not prevail in his cross-appeal,
he is not entitled to an award of attorney’s
fees on appeal. Telford v. Smith County,
Tewas, 155 Idaho 497, 504, 314 P.38d 179, 186
(2018). Washington Federal did not request
attorney’s fees on its appeal, but did request
an award of attorney's fees in responding to
Hulsey’s cross-appeal. Consistent with our
analysis of Washington Federal’s request for
attorney’s fees set forth above, Hulsey is
obligated to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in
responding to the cross-appeal.

v.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment entered on De-
cember 28, 2015, in which Washington Feder-
al’s claim for deficiency was dismissed and
vacate the judgment entered on April 21,
2016, to the extent it denies Washington
Federal’s claim for attorney's fees and costs.
We award Washington Federal attorney’s
fees and costs in defending against Hulsey’s
cross-appeal, The case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this deci-
sion,

Justices EISMANN and HORTON concur.
Justice JONES concurs.

BURDICK, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part,

I respectfully dissent from Part IV(C) of
the majority’s opinion. I cannot agree with
the majority that Washington Federal is en-
titled to attorney fees for the relevant pro-
ceedings below even though Washington
Federal was the non-prevailing party.

Washington Federal seeks attorney fees
incurred from the date of the entry of the
stipulated judgment and decree of foreclo-
sure “on August 18, 2014, through the suc-
cessful completion of Washington Federal’s
Motion To Lift Automatic Stay ... but ex-
eluding any costs and attorneys’ fees in-
eurred with regard to the ... fair market
value of the real estate ....” The plain
terms of the stipulated judgment foreclose
Washington Federal’s claim for attorney
fees. In pertinent part, the stipulated judg-
ment states as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED:

1, That [Washington Federal] have and
recover judgment against [Hulsey] for the
principal sum of $1,218,751.44, plus ac-
erued interest to August 18, 2014, in the
amount of $201,820.50, plus the expenses of
foreclosure of $5,761.78, attorneys’ fees
and costs of $66,188.95, for a total judg-
ment of $1,487,517.62 as of August 18,
2014, together with interest hereafter at
the statutory rate of interest as provided
by law until this judgment is paid in full;
and

9. That the Court specifically retains
jurisdiction to determine the sole remain-
ing issue after sheriff sale of the fair mar-
ket value of the foregoing property as of
the date of the foreclosure sale for the
purpose of determining whether [Washing-
ton Federal] is entitled to entry of a defi-
ciency judgment against [Hulsey]. The cur-
rent trial date for this action commencing
on December 10, 2014, shall be the date for
the trial of such fair market value issue,

unless rescheduled by the Court or stipula-

tion of the parties.
(emphasis added).

Thus, the stipulated judgment parceled out
the exact damages to which Washington Fed-
eral was entitled, including $66,188.95 in at-
torney fees and costs for matters predating
August 18, 2014.1 More importantly, and dis-
positive here, the stipulated judgment fur-
ther reserved to Washington Federal the
right to litigate the fair market value in a
deficiency judgment proceeding—the “sole
remaining issue.” This key language refutes
Washington Federals claim for attorney
fees. Washington Federal did not, for exam-
ple, reserve the right to seek both a deficien-
cy judgment and attorney fees in excess of
the $66,188.95 it already recovered as the
“sole two remaining issues.” To the contrary,
the stipulated judgment clearly shows that
Washington Federal’s claim for attorney fees
was not preserved as the “sole remaining
issue.” As Hulsey argued below to the dis-
trict court, “The attorney fees were not a
preserved claim under the stipulated Judg-
ment and Decree of Foreclosure.” Washing-
ton Federal, therefore, waived the right to
seek attorney fees beyond the $66,188.95 it
already recovered under the stipulated judg-
ment. See, eg., Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho
364, 368, 304 P.2d 646, 649 (1956) (“A waiver
is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. It is a voluntary act and implies elec-
tion by a party to dispense with something of
value or to forego some right or advantage
which he might at his option have demanded
and insisted upon.”). Similarly, Washington
Federal is estopped from asserting its claim
for attorney fees because that claim is incon-
sistent with the stipulated judgment. See,
eg., Smith v. U.S.R.V. Props. LC, 141 Idaho
795, 800, 118 P.8d 127, 182 (2005) (“Judicial
estoppel, sometimes also known as the doc-
trine of preclusion of inconsistent positions,
precludes a party from gaining an advantage
by taking one position, and then seeking a
second advantage by taking an incompatible
position.” (quoting McKay v. Owens, 180 Ida-
ho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997))); 830A.
CJS. Hstoppel and Waiver § 186 (August
1. The district court observed that “[iJt is not

clear from the stipulation what the legal basis for
the award of expenses of foreclosure or attor-

71

2017) (“Under the rule, principle, or doctrine
of judicial estoppel, during the course of liti-
gation a party.is not permitted to occupy or
assume inconsistent or contradictory posi-
tions, and the parties to the litigation are
necessarily bound to the positions that they
assume therein.”), The majority is remiss to
overlook how these governing principles ap-
ply to the clear language of the stipulated
judgment, as this Court has long expressed a
preference for holding parties to their amica-
ble resolutions of litigation, 2g, Quick v
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 780, 727 P.2d 1187,
1208 (1986) (“This Court has always held to
the strong public policy favoring amicable
settlement of litigation”); accord Hammer v.
City of Sun Valley, No. 48079, —~ Idaho
— +, — P3d —, —, 2016 WL
7884188, 'at *4 (Idaho Dee, 21, 2016) (quoting
Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enters. Inc.,
99 Idaho 589, 542, 585 P.2d 949, 952 (1978)).

Notwithstanding that the plain terms of
the stipulated judgment are dispositive, the
key contract provisions the majority asserts
entitles Washington Federal to attorney fees
provide as follows:

_ ¢ Deed: of Trust, “If Lender institutes any
suit or action to enforce any of the terms
of this Deed of Trust, Lender shall be
entitled to recover such sum as the court
may adjudge reasonable as attorneys’
fees at trial and upon any appeal.”

Promissory Note. “Lender may hire or
pay someone else to help collect this
Note if Borrower does not pay. Borrower
will pay Lender that amount. This in-
cludes, subject to any limits under appli-
cable law, Lender’s attorneys’ fees and
Lender’s legal expenses, whether or not
there is a lawsuit, including attorneys’
fees, expenses for bankruptcy proceed-
ings ..., and appeals. If not prohibited
by applicable law, Borrower will also pay
any’ court costs, in addition to all other
sums provided by law.”

Like the majority, I observe that these
contract provisions purport to entitle Wash-
ington Federal, the lender, to attorney fees

neys’ fees and costs included in the judgment

was.” However; since “the amount was agreed
to[,]” the district court declined to disturb it.

752

absent any requirement that Washington
Federal be the prevailing party. Indeed,
these provisions appear to sweep broadly by
permitting Washington Federal to recover
attorney fees even if, for example, it were to
file a frivolous claim in bad faith. According-
ly, I question whether interpreting these pro-
visions as broadly as Washington Federal
argues would render them void as against
public policy. I recognize freedom of contract
is vitally important, but it must yield at times
to the greater good. Cj: Strong v. W. Union
Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 889, 401, 109 P. 910, 914
(1910) (“Public policy is that principle of law
under which freedom of contract or private
dealing is restricted by law for the good of
the community-the public good.”). Undoubt-
edly, contract provisions making a prevailing
party liable for the non-prevailing party’s
attorney fees epitomizes inequitable bargain-
ing while chilling both contract negotiation
and litigation, As such, these provisions are
notoriously suspect. See eg. Hackett v.
Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 265, 706 P.2d 1872,
1876 (Ct. App. 1985) (noting that “argument
which, if followed, would permit a non-pre-
vailing party to have all of its fees and costs
paid by a prevailing party” would not serve
the “interest of justice”); Jadwin v. Kasal,
818 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn, 1982) (“Requir-
ing the mortgagor to underwrite all of the
bank’s legal actions taken with respect to the
mortgagor’s property would encourage ill-
considered litigation and farfetched claims by
the bank and discourage the mortgagor from
challenging the liens claimed by subcontrac-
tors and materialmen.”),

Construing the contract provisions in light
of these potentially fatal concerns, I question
whether their plain terms actually entitle
Washington Federal to attorney fees in this
case, It is axiomatic that a contract purport-
ing to authorize what the law precludes is
void as an illegal contract. #.g., AED, Inc. v.
KDC Invs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 167, 307
P.8d 176, 184 (2018). And I do not find
Washington Federal’s construction of the
above contract provisions to be authorized by
the applicable law, to wit: the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 54(e)(1) grants discre-
tion to award attorney fees to the “prevailing
party or parties ... when provided for by
any statute or contract.” (emphasis added).

Similarly, under Rule 54(e)(5), attorney fees,
“when allowable by statute or contract, are
costs in an action and processed in the same
manner as other costs ....” (emphasis add-
ed). Costs, in turn, are exclusively for the
prevailing party. ILR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A). Merely
that Washington Federal claims attorney
fees under the contract provisions does not
eviscerate the clear requirements of the Ida-
ho Rules of Civil Procedure, namely that it
must be the prevailing party. See Zenner v.
Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 449, 210 P.8d 552,
557 (2009) (Furthermore, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1)
governs the trial court’s award of attorney
fees in a civil action when fees are provided
by statute or contract. Rule 54(e)(1) states
that the trial court may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party or par-
ties as defined by Rule 54(d)(1)(B).”); Farm
Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, 122 Idaho
565, 670-72, 886 P.2d 511, 515-18 (1992)
(Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).

At any rate, the majority cites to two
decisions of this Court to conclude Washing-
ton Federal is entitled to attorney fees. In
Farm Credit, this Court reversed and re-
manded a denial of attorney fees to Farm
Credit Bank (FCB). 122 Idaho at 568-69, 836
P.2d at 514-15, The district court concluded
FCB was not entitled to attorney fees be-
cause it was not the prevailing party in an
action seeking possession of a leasehold. Id.
at 567, 886 P.2d at 518. The district court
explained that “[i]t is therefore my conclu-
sion that each of the parties hereto prevailed
in part and did not prevail in part.” Id. FOB
thereafter appealed, contending it was enti-
tled to attorney fees under a contract be-
tween the parties, which provided that “in
the event that the Lessor does find it neces-
sary to bring suit or action under the terms
of this lease, then the Lessee hereby agrees
to pay the Lessor’s reasonable attorney fees
and costs of suit incurred in said suit or
action.” Id. at 568, 886 P.2d at 514, In light of
that contract provision, this Court remanded
and emphasized the following:

Under the lease provision, the only re-

quirement for the award of attorney fees

and costs is that the “lessor does find it
necessary to bring suit or action under the

terms of this lease,” in which event, “the

lessee hereby agrees to pay the lessor’s

reasonable attorney fees and costs of suit

incurred in such suit or action.” Whether

the lessor found it necessary to bring suit

or action is a subjective decision and stan-

dard on the part of the lessor, which must

not be “prompted by caprice or bad faith.”
Id.

Two years after Farm Credit, this Court
decided Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 478, 476,
878 P.2d 118, 121 (1994). In Post, this Court
affirmed an award of attorney fees to a set of
defendants even though they did not prevail
in the underlying litigation. Jd. The contract
entitling the defendants to fees stated “[i]n
the event that the Grantors shall employ
Jegal counsel in connection with or to enforce
these covenants and restrictions, then the
persons with respect to which such employ-
ment occurs shall pay all costs incurred, in-
cluding reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Id. As
this Court explained, “Farm Credit controls
the costs and fees recovery of appellants in
this case. The only requirement in [the con-
tract] is that a [defendant] employ legal
counsel in connection with the [contract].” Id.
at 476-77, 873 P.2d at 121-22. This Court
then affirmed the attorney fee award entered
under the contract below, stating it was “be-
yond question” that defendants employed le-
gal counsel “in connection with” the contract
by hiring legal counsel to defend, albeit un-
successfully, from plaintiffs’ suit arising un-
der the contract. Id.

Farm Credit and Post do not control. To
the extent the majority reads these two cases
to authorize an award of attorney fees to
non-prevailing parties absent considerations
of policy, equity, and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, I believe these cases should be
overruled as manifestly wrong. While the
majority notes that no argument was made
for these cases to be overruled, it is the
responsibility of this Court to evaluate prece-
dent. As we have explained previously:

This Court in the proper performance of
its judicial function is required to examine
its prior precedents. When precedent is
examined in the light of modern reality
and it is evident that the reason for the
precedent no longer exists, the abandon-

153

ment of the precedent is not a destruction
of stare decisis but rather a fulfillment of
its proper function,

Stare decisis is not a confining phenome-
non but rather a principle of law. And
when the application of this principle will
not result in justice, it is evident that the
doctrine is not properly applicable.

State v. Humpherys, 184 Idaho 657, 660-61,
8 P.3d 652, 655-56 (2000) (quoting Smith v.
State, 93 Idaho 795, 801, 478 P.2d 987, 948
(1970), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Gavica v. Hanson, 101
Idaho 58, 65, 608 P.2d 861, 868 (1980)).

Further, the majority overlooks that we
“may affirm decisions of a district court
based on different theories then applied by
the district court.” State v. Mann, 162 Idaho
36, 42, 894 P.8d 79, 85 (2017). Put another
way, “Where the lower court reaches the
correct result, albeit by reliance on an erro-
neous theory, this Court will affirm the order
on the correct theory.” Ridgley v. State, 148
Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.8d 925, 980 (2010)
(emphasis added). But even if these cases are
not overruled, I find them distinguishable
and therefore unpersuasive, Unlike Farm
Credit, the contract provisions have no quali-
fier ensuring Washington Federal instituted
only necessary litigation. The contract provi-
sions’ attorney fee provisions thus raise con-
cerns not presented in Farm Credit, And in
Post, this Court gave deference to the dis-
trict court’s factual findings and concluded
the literal requirements of the contract provi-
sion were met. But here, the district court
made no findings to which this Court gives
deference. As such, Farm Credit and Post do
not support Washington Federal’s argument.

For the reasons above, I cannot join Part
IV(C) of the majority’s opinion.

754

405 P.3d 13

COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe, Plaintiff-
Respondent,

ve

Kenneth JOHNSON and Donna Johnson,
Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 44478

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, August 2017 Term.

Filed: November 3, 2017

a

56 Dt .

Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields,
Chartered, Boise, for appellants. Norman M.
Semanko argued.

Smith & Malek PLLC, Coeur d'Alene, for
respondent. Peter John Smith, IV argued.

HORTON, J.

Kenneth and Donna Johnson appeal the
judgment of the district court in Benewah
County recognizing a tribal judgment from
the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court (Tribal
Court), The Johnsons own land within the
Coeur d’Alene Reservation (Reservation) on
the banks of the St. Joe River and have a
dock and pilings on the river. The Coeur
d’Alene Tribe (Tribe) initiated an action in
Tribal Court to enforce a tribal statute which
requires a permit for docks on the St. Joe
River within the Reservation, The Johnsons
did not appear and a default judgment was
entered against them. The judgment imposed
a civil penalty of $17,400 and declared that
the Tribe was entitled to remove the dock
and pilings. On January 22, 2016, the Tribe
filed a petition to have the Tribal Court
judgment recognized in Idaho pursuant to
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.
LO. §§ 10-1801, et seq. Following a hearing,
the district court held that the Tribal Judg-
ment was valid and enforceable. We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings,

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The Johnsons own property on the bank of
the St. Joe River and have a dock and pilings
that extend into the river from their proper-
ty. The Johnsons’ property is located within
the Reservation, but the Tribe does not own
the Johnsons’ land, and the Johnsons are not,
members of the Tribe.

On June 5, 2014, the Tribe sent the John-
sons a letter asking them to remove their

dock and pilings or obtain a permit from the
Tribe. The Johnsons neither removed their
dock nor obtained a permit, The Tribe filed
suit in the Tribal Court and served notice of
the suit on the Johnsons. The Johnsons did
not appear, and the Tribal Court entered an
order of default against them. The Johnsons
were then served with notice of a hearing to
determine damages. Once again, the John-
sons did not appear, and judgment was en-
tered against them, The April 1, 2015, Tribal
Court judgment imposed a civil penalty of
$17,400 and declared that the Johnsons were
trespassing upon tribally controlled lands
and that the Tribe was entitled to remove the
encroachment,

On Mareh 2, 2016, the Tribe filed a motion
for an order recognizing the foreign judg-
ment in the district court in Benewah Coun-
ty. The Johnsons objected, arguing that their
dock and pilings are located above the high
water mark as it existed when the Reserva-
tion was set aside in 1878 and that the Tribal
Court lacked jurisdiction. After hearing the

motion, the district court applied this Court’s
decision in Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho
1, 655 P.2d 895 (1982), and held that the
Tribal Court judgment was entitled to recog-
nition and enforeement, The Johnsons timely
appealed.

If, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM Enforcement of a foreign judgment is
“a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review.” Burns v, Baldwin,
188 Idaho 480, 488, 65 P.8d 502, 505 (2008).

Ill. ANALYSIS

Hl The district court held that the Tribal
Court judgment was entitled to full faith and
credit. In so holding, the district court prop-
erly applied! the rule announced by this
Court in Sheppard, There, we held that a
tribal judgment is entitled to full faith and
eredit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1788. 104
Idaho at 8, 655 P.2d at 902.That statute
provides:

The Acts of the legislature of any State,

Territory, or Possession of the United

1, “[TJhe lower courts are obligated to abide by
the decisions of this Court and the Court of

VEY

States, or copies thereof, shall be authenti-
cated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.

The records and judicial proceedings of
any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be
proved or admitted in other courts within
the United States and its Territories and
Possessions by the attestation of the clerk
and seal of the court annexed, if a seal
exists, together with a certificate of a
judge of the court that the said attestation
is in proper form,

Such Acts, records and judicial proceed-
ings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken,

28 U.S.C. § 1788.

This Court “found the phrase ‘Territories
and Possessions’ broad enough to include
Indian tribes.” Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8, 655
P.2d at 902, The Johnsons argue that this
Court should overrule Sheppard and apply
the Ninth Cireuit’s analysis found in Wilson
v Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
We will first consider the Johnsons’ request
that we overrule Sheppard before deciding
whether the district court erred by recogniz-
ing the Tribal Court judgment,

A. Tribal court judgments are not enti-
tled to full faith and credit, and Shep-
pard’s holding to the contrary is over-
ruled,

HM Article IV, section 1, of the United
States Constitution provides:

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. “Nothing in debates
of the Constitutional Convention concerning

Appeals.” Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879,
883, 231 P.3d 524, 528 (2009).

758

the clause indicates the framers thought the
clause would apply to Indian tribes.” Wilson,
127 F.8d at 808, In Wilson, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that 28 U.S.C. section
1788 did not extend full faith and credit to
the tribes. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 809, Instead,
that court held that the recognition and en-
forcement of tribal judgments rested on prin-
ciples of comity, Id.

As noted above, Sheppard held that the
language “Territory or Possession” in 28
U.S.C, section 1788 was broad enough to
include Indian tribes and tribal courts, Shep-
pard, 104 Idaho at 8, 655 P.2d at 902. In so
holding, we stated that “[w]e believe that this
holding will facilitate better relations be-
tween the courts of this state and the various
tribal courts within Idaho.” Id.

HI In reaching its decision in Wilson, the
Ninth Circuit considered legislation enacted
subsequent to 28 U.S.C, section 1738 wherein
Congress expressly stated that tribal judg-
ments are entitled to full faith and credit
with respect to certain judgments, Wilson,
127 F.8d at 809, “A later legislative act can
be regarded as a legislative interpretation of
an earlier act and ‘is therefore entitled to
greater weight in resolving any ambiguities
and doubts’” Jd. (quoting Brienbaugh v.
United States, 409 U.S, 289, 248-44, 93 S.Ct.
477, 84 L.Ed.2d 446 (1972)), “If full faith and.
credit had already been extended to Indian
tribes, enactment of the Indian Land Consol-
idation Act, the Maine Indian Claims Settle-
ment Act, and the Indian Child Welfare Act
would not have been necessary.” Id, “Fur-
ther, the separate listing of territories, pos-
sessions and Indian tribes in the Indian
Child Welfare Act provides an indication that
Congress did not view these terms synony-
mous.” Jd,

As noted in Wilson, since the passage of 28
U.S.C, section 1788, Congress has passed at
least three laws expressly extending full faith
and credit to tribal decisions. Id. at 808-09;
Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2211 (1988); Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g)(1980);
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901 et seg. That these statutes expressly
extend full faith and credit to tribal decisions
strongly suggests that Congress did not con-

sider Indian tribes to be territories or pos-
sessions for purposes of 28 U.S.C. section
1738. Further, in addition to expressly ex-
tending full faith and credit to Indian tribes,
the text of the Indian Child Welfare Act
suggests that Indian tribes are not included
in the definition of “territory or possession.”
The United States, every State, every
territory or possession of the United
States, and every tribe shall give full faith
and credit to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe
applicable to Indian child custody proceed-
ings to the same extent that such entities
give full faith and credit to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of any
other entity.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(d).

HMM “The decisions of lower federal
courts are not binding on state courts, even
on issues of federal law.” Dam Wiebold Ford,
Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc.,
142 Idaho 235, 240, 127 P.8d 188, 148 (2005),
“Such decisions are authoritative only if the
reasoning is persuasive.” Id. Although we
value good relations with the tribal courts
within Idaho, we are unable to continue to
apply the strained construction of 28 U.S.C.
section 1738 that we adopted in Sheppard in
order to advance that important objective.
Therefore, we overrule the holding in Shep-
pord that tribal judgments are entitled to full
faith and credit and adopt the reasoning of
the Ninth Cireuit in Wilson and hold that
tribal court judgments are entitled to recog-
nition and enforcement under principles of
comity. We do not overrule Sheppard in its
entirety. We will continue to apply its re-
quirement that a party attacking the validity
of a tribal court’s judgment bears the burden
of proving its invalidity. Sheppard, 104 Idaho
at 7, 655 P.2d at 901.

B. The tribal judgment imposing a civil
penalty is not entitled to recognition
in Idaho courts.

Hl The Wilson court analyzed the doc-
trine of comity as it applied to tribal judg-
ments, Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810. The Ninth
Cirenit noted the unique position of tribal
courts and noted that as a general principle,

“courts should recognize and enforce tribal
judgments.” Id. However, the Ninth Cireuit
also pointed out a tribal judgment is not
entitled to enforcement if the tribal court did
not have both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction or the defendant was not afford-
ed due process of law. Id. The Wilson court
also identified four equitable grounds upon
which a court may decide not to recognize a
tribal judgment. Id. Those grounds are:

(d) the judgment was obtained by fraud;

(2) the judgment conflicts with another

final judgment that is entitled to recogni-

tion;

(8) the judgment is inconsistent with the

parties’ contractual choice of forum; or

(4) recognition of the judgment, or the

cause of action upon which it is based, is

against the public policy of the United

States or the forum state in which recogni-

tion of the judgment is sought.
Id, We hold that Wilson accurately describes
the circumstances when Idaho courts will
recognize a foreign judgment pursuant to the
doctrine of comity.

1, The Tribal Court had jurisdiction
over the Johnsons and the subject,
matter in this case.

Hl In order for a foreign judgment to be
recognized as a matter of comity, the foreign
court must have both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, Id. The district court,
held that the Johnsons had failed to exhaust
their remedies by failing to challenge the
Tribal Court’s jurisdiction during those pro-
ceedings and therefore the Johnsons could
not collaterally attack the Tribal Court’s ju-
risdiction. We first examine the application of
the exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine
and then address the question of jurisdiction.

a. The exhaustion doctrine is not
applicable in this case as there is
no pending tribal litigation.

HM The Johnsons did not challenge the
Tribal Court’s jurisdiction in that forum. The
district court held that this failure meant
that they were precluded from challenging
the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction by the exhaus-
tion of tribal remedies doctrine, We find that

759

the district court erred by applying the doc-
trine in this case. .

The doctrine was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in National Farmers
Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S, 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85
L.Ed.2d 818 (1985), In National Farmers, a
member of the Crow Tribe brought suit in
tribal court after he was injured on school
property. Id, at 847, 105 S.Ct, 2447. The
school district and its insurer brought suit in
federal court seeking an injunction to pre-
vent the tribal court from enforcing a default
judgment on the basis that the tribal court
lacked jurisdiction, Id. The Supreme Court
held that the federal courts should not hear
the case until the school district had exhaust-
ed its remedies in the pending tribal action,
id. at 857, 105 S.Ct, 2447, stating “[w]e be-
lieve that examination should be conducted in
the first instance in the Tribal Court itself.”
Id. at 856, 105 S.Ct. 2447, In so holding, the
Court noted that “[olur cases have often
recognized that Congress is committed to a
policy of supporting tribal self-government
and self-determination.” Id.

The Supreme Court has never specifically
held that this doctrine applies to the states,
and it is unclear whether it does. Drumm v,
Brown, 245 Conn. 657, 716 A.2d 50, 61 (1998).
In Drumm, the Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut analyzed the application of the exhaustion
doctrine in state courts, Jd, The reasoning in
Drumm. is persuasive as it analyzes the ap-
plication of the exhaustion doctrine in a situa-
tion similar to the present case,

HE In Drumm, the lower court dis-
missed plaintiffs’ case after finding that they
had failed to exhaust tribal remedies. Id. at
52. The Connecticut Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the exhaustion of tribal
remedies doctrine applied to state courts in
Connecticut, but the doctrine is only applica-
ble when there is pending litigation in tribal
court and “that exhaustion is not required in
the absence of a pending action in the tribal
court.” Id. at 64, In support of this conelu-
sion, the Connecticut court noted that in both
Supreme Court cases discussing the docirine
a proceeding was pending in the tribal court.
Id.; see Natl Farmers Union Ins, Compa-
mies, 471 US, 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447; see also

760

Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,
107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987). In a
more recent decision discussing the exhaus-
tion doctrine, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the exhaustion requirement is “pruden-
tial not jurisdictional.” Strate v. A-1 Contrac-
tors, 520 US. 488, 451, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 187
L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins.
Co., 480 U.S. at 20 n14, 107 S.Ct. 971.)
“(The issue of whether a court has exceeded
its jurisdiction is always open to collateral
attack in Idaho.” Andre v. Morrow, 106 Ida-
ho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1859 (1984).

Here, the state court action was initiated
by the Tribe to enforce a final judgment from
the Tribal Court. There is no pending action
before the Tribal Court. Because there is no
pending action before the Tribal Court, the
doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies is
not applicable.

b. The Johnsons have failed to meet their
burden of establishing that the Tribal
Court did not have jurisdiction.

HMM The Johnsons do not contend that
the Tribal Court did not have personal juris-
diction. Instead, they contend that the Tribal
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for
two reasons. First, the Johnsons argue that
the dock is located on land that was not
flooded when the Reservation was set aside
in 1878 and is therefore not within the juris-
diction of the Tribe. Second, the Johnsons
argue that the district court misapplied the
decision in Montana v. United States, 450
US. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 498
(1981), when it found that the Tribal Court
had subject matter jurisdiction. The district
court held that the Tribal Court had jurisdic-
tion because the conduct had “some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health and welfare of the
tribe.” (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566,
101 S.Ct, 1245),

HE “Tribal courts cannot be
courts of general jurisdiction ... for a tribe’s
inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over non-
members is at most only as broad as its
legislative jurisdiction.” Nevada v. Hicks, 583
US. 358, 867, 121 S.Ct, 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d.
898 (2001). The general rule from Montana
is that tribes have no jurisdiction over non-

Indians. Id. at 359-60, 121 S.Ct, 2304. How-
ever, “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign
power to exercise some forms of civil juris-
diction over non-Indians on their reserva-
tions, even on non-Indian fee lands.” Mon-
tana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245. The
Montana court identified two situations
when a tribe may exercise jurisdiction over a
non-member:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual rela-
tionships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may
also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians
on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the eco-
nomic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe.

Id, at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245.

Both parties agree that the first exception
does not apply. The district court held that
the second Montana exception applied in this
case.

We first consider ownership of the riv-
erbed, as the ownership of the land may
sometimes be a dispositive factor. Hicks, 583
US. at 360, 121 S.Ct. 2804. The Johnsons
argue that the submerged land in question is
located above the high water mark that exist-
ed in 1873.when the Reservation was estab-
lished. The district court did not explicitly
decide this issue in its analysis. Nevertheless,
we affirm its decision because the Johnsons
have failed to present any evidence that
would support a finding that the Tribe does
not own the riverbed.

Both parties focus on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. United
States, 588 U.S. 262, 121 S.Ct. 2185, 150
L.Ed.2d 826 (2001). There, the Supreme
Court held that when the Reservation was
set aside in 1873 the submerged lands of
Lake Coeur d’Alene and the St. Joe River
were included in the land set aside. Id. at
279-81, 121 S.Ct. 2185. The order of the
federal district court which led to the Su-
preme Court's decision appears to support

the Tribe’s contention that the Johnsons’
dock and pilings are located on tribal land:
Title is quieted in favor of the United
States, as trustee, and the Coeur d’Alene
Tribe of Idaho, as the beneficially interest-
ed party of the trusteeship, to the bed and
banks of the Coeur d’Alene Lake and the
St. Joe River lying within the current
boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Indian
Reservation.

United States v. Idaho, 95 F.Supp.2d 1094,
1117 (. Idaho 1998), Despite this broad
language, the Johnsons argue that the deci-
sion by the Supreme Court was limited to
submerged lands as they existed in 1878. The
Johnsons base this argument on a footnote
from United States v. Idaho, 210 F.8d 1067
(9th Cir. 2000). There, the Ninth Circuit not-
ed:

In construing the parties’ pleadings, we
bear in mind that the current physical
situation in and around [Heyburn State]
Park differs from the situation that existed
in 1878, at the time of the executive reser-
vation, and in 1908 and 1911, the years,
respectively, that the Park was authorized
and conveyed to the State. Due to the
construction of a dam, three small lakes
have combined with the Lake into one
large body of water. We read the United
States’ complaint in light of the physical
situation as it existed prior to the construc-
tion of the dam.

Id, at 1079 n.18.

We need not consider whether the scope of
the Supreme Court’s ruling was limited by
the footnote quoted by the Johnsons. That is
because the Johnsons have failed to meet
their burden of establishing that they have
title to the lands lying between the high
water mark following construction of the dam
and that existing in 1878.

HM Following the creation of the Reser-
vation, the lands on both sides of the St. Joe
River within the boundaries of the Reserva-
tion were held in trust by the United States
for the use and benefit of the Tribe. A trans-
fer of such lands conveys title only to the
high water mark. Montana Power Co. v
Rochester, 127 F.2d 189, 192 (9th Cir. 1942),
Thus, in order for the Johnsons to advance a

761

eolorable claim to ownership of the sub-
merged lands above the 1873 high water
mark, they bore the burden of demonstrating
that the tribal lands were alienated prior to
the construction of the dam. They did not do
so. Accordingly, we presume that the lands
continue to be held by the United States in
trust for the benefit of the Tribe.

HH In Hicks, the Supreme Court noted:
“[t]he ownership status of land... is only
one factor to consider in determining wheth-
er regulation of the activities of nonmembers
is necessary to protect tribal self-government.
or to control internal relations.” Hicks, 583
US. at 360, 121 S.Ct. 2804 (internal quotes
omitted). However, “(i]t may sometimes be a
dispositive factor.” Id. In Hicks, the Su-
preme Court held that a tribe did not have
jurisdiction over state officers who were exe-
euting a search warrant on tribal land. Id.
Although the Supreme Court deemed the
fact that the search took place on tribal land
to be significant, it was not sufficient to
outweigh the State’s interest in enforcing its
criminal laws, Id. at 370, 121 S.Ct. 2304.
“[Wle acknowledge that tribal ownership is a
factor in the Montana analysis, and a factor
significant enough that it ‘may sometimes
be... dispositive’” Jd. (internal citations
omitted). “We simply do not find it disposi-
tive in the present case, when weighed
against the State’s interest in pursuing off-
reservation violations of its laws.” Id. In a
more recent case, the Ninth Cireuit held that
tribal ownership was a dispositive factor con-
ferring jurisdiction in the absence of compet-
ing State interests. Water Wheel Camp Re-
creational Area, Ine. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d
802, 814 (2011). “[W]here the non-Indian ac-
tivity in question occurred on tribal land, the
activity interfered directly with the tribe’s
inherent powers to exclude and manage its
land, and there are no competing state inter-
ests at play, the tribe’s status as landowning
is enough to support regulatory jurisdiction
without considering Montana.” Id. “Finding
otherwise would contradict Supreme Court
precedent establishing that land ownership
may sometimes be dispositive and would im-
properly limit tribal sovereignty without
clear direction from Congress.” Id.

762

Tn this case, the ownership of the land is
dispositive. Unlike the situation in Hicks, the
State here does not have any interests that
would weigh against the Tribal Court exer-
cising jurisdiction, This case is similar to
Water Wheel in that there are no competing
State interests. We hold that the Johnsons
have failed to meet their burden of demon-
strating that the Tribal Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.

2. The Johnsons were afforded due
process in the Tribal Court.

HH In order to recognize the tribal
judgment through comity, the Johnsons must
have been afforded due process in the Tribal
Court, Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.8d 805,
810 (9th Cir. 1997), The Johnsons contend
that they were not afforded due process be-
cause the Tribal Court is dominated by the
Tribe and was thus biased against them.

HH Due process requires that parties be
given notice of proceedings and an opportuni-
ty to be heard. Anderson v. Spalding, 1387
Idaho 509, 516, 50 P.8d 1004, 1011 (2002).
The Johnsons argue that because the Tribal
Court is biased they did not have a meaning-
ful opportunity to be heard. In support of
this argument, the Johnsons quote from Wil-
son:

Due process, as that term is employed in
comity, encompasses most of the Hilton
factors, namely that there has been oppor-
tunity for a full and fair trial before an
impartial tribunal that conducts the trial
upon regular proceedings after proper ser-
vice or voluntary appearance of the defen-
dant, and that there is no showing of prej-
udice in the tribal court or in the system of
governing laws. Further, as the Restate-
ment (Third) noted, evidence “that the ju-
diciary was dominated by the political
branches of government or by an opposing
litigant, or that a party was unable to
obtain counsel, to secure documents or at-
tendance of witnesses, or to have access to
appeal or review, would support a conclu-
sion that the legal system was one whose
judgments are not entitled to recognition.”
Restatement (Third) § 482 emt. b.

Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811. The Johnsons argue
that the Tribal Court is dominated by the
Tribe which is the plaintiff in this case.

HM A similar argument was advanced by
the appellant in Jowa Mutual Insurance
Company v. LaPlante, 480 U.S, 9, 107 S.Ct.
971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987). There, the appel-
lant sought to avoid application of the doc-
trine of exhaustion of tribal remedies on the
basis that the tribal court was biased and
incompetent, Id. at 18-19, 107 S.Ct, 971. Re-
jecting this argument, the Supreme Court
noted that it “had rejected similar attacks on
tribal court jurisdiction in the past.” Jd. at
19, 107 S.Ct, 971. The Supreme Court ex-
plained that allegations of incompetence and
bias are not persuasive and that acceptance
of such claims “would be contrary to the
congressional policy promoting the develop-
ment of tribal courts.” Id. “Moreover, the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1802,
provides non-Indians with various protec-
tions against unfair treatment in the tribal
courts.” Id,

Here, the Johnsons assert that the Tribal
Court is dominated by the Tribe. They point
to the tribal law stating that the Tribe has
jurisdiction over the river and to the amount
of the fine imposed against them, As dis-
cussed above, the Johnsons have failed to
show that the Tribe does not have jurisdic-
tion over the bed of the St. Joe River adjoin-
ing their property. Further, while the fine
was large, it was only one-fifth of that au-
thorized by the tribal code. CTC 44-24.01
(authorizing a fine of $500 per day for unli-
censed encroachments). We hold that the
Johnsons have failed to show that the Tribal
Court was biased.

Further, the Johnsons had more than suf-
ficient notice and opportunity to be heard in
the Tribal Court. The record shows the John-
sons were informed of the proceedings on
four occasions before default judgment was
entered. Despite this, they elected to simply
ignore the proceedings in Tribal Court. The
Johnsons were not denied due process,

3. The penal law rule precludes
the recognition of part of the
Tribal Court judgment.

HMM The Johnsons argue that even if this
Court finds that the Tribal Court had juris-

diction and the Johnsons were given due
process it should still not recognize the judg-
ment based on the penal law rule, Because
the district court was applying the rule we
pronounced in Sheppard, it did not err in
finding the penal law rule inapplicable. How-
ever, because Sheppard was wrongly decided
we hold that the penal law rule is applicable
to the tribal court judgment in this case.

HE “The courts of no country exe-
cute the penal laws of another.” The Ante-
lope, 28 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123, 6 L.Ed. 268
(1825). “The test whether a law is penal... is
whether the wrong sought to be redressed is
a wrong to the public or a wrong to the
individual. ...” Huntington v. Attrill, 146
US. 657, 668, 18 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123
(1892).

“The rule that the courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another applies
not only to prosecutions and sentences for
erimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits
in favor of the state for the recovery of
pecuniary penalties for any violation of
statutes for the protection of its revenue,
or other municipal laws, and to all judg-
ments for such penalties.”

Id. at 671, 18 S.Ct, 224 (quoting Wisconsin v,
Pelican Ins, Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290, 8 S.Ct.
1870, 82 L.Ed, 289 (1888).) “In short, the
label ‘civil? does not strip a remedy of its
penal nature.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Con-
tre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 488 F.3d
1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006),

HH In this case the judgment comprises
two parts. The first part is a civil penalty of
$17,400. The second part is a declaration that
the Tribe has the right to remove the offend-
ing encroachment, The civil penalty is not
enforceable under principles of comity. How-
ever, the penal law rule does not prevent
courts from recognizing declaratory judg-
ments of foreign courts, Therefore, we vacate
the district court's judgment to the extent
that it recognized the Tribal Court's judg-
ment imposing the civil penalty of $17,400.
We affirm the judgment recognizing the
Tribal Court judgment regarding the Tribe’s
right to remove the dock and pilings.

163
C. Costs on appeal

As each party has prevailed in part, we do
not award costs on appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for entry of an amended judgment
consistent with this decision. No costs on
appeal,

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
EISMANN, JONES and BRODY concur.

405 P.3d 22
MANWARING INVESTMENTS, L.C., an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve
CITY OF BLACKFOOT, a municipal
corporation, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 44393

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Pocatello, September 2017 Term.

Filed: November 8, 2017

z call i a

a

66

Manwaring Law Office, Idaho Falls, for
appellant, Kipp L, Manwaring argued,

Sandow Law Offices, Blackfoot, for respon-
dent, Garrett H. Sandow argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Manwaring Investments, L.C., (Manwar-
ing) appeals from Bingham County, where
the district court affirmed a grant of sum-
mary judgment to the City of Blackfoot
(City). Manwaring sued the City in October
2014, alleging the City was overcharging it
for wastewater utilities. The magistrate
granted the City’s motion for summary judg-
ment. Manwaring moved for reconsideration,
which the magistrate denied. Manwaring
then appealed the magistrate’s rulings to the
district court, which affirmed the magistrate.
Manwaring timely appeals the decision of the
district court. We affirm.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Manwaring owns a commercial building
(the Building) located in the City. The Build-
ing, constructed in 2001, is approximately
5,000 square feet. Approximately 2,100
square feet of the Building is devoted to
office space, The remaining space consists of
“one central entryway, two waiting areas,
two hallways, and two separate restroom ar-
eas,” Manwaring leases out space in the
Building to several different commercial ten-
ants.

City Ordinance No. 9-8-20 governs waste-
water utility rates in the City. Ordinance No,
9-83-20 embodies the City’s effort to “equate
the wastewater use to an Equivalent Dwell-
ing Unit [(EDU)].” One EDU signifies 350
gallons of wastewater discharge per day,
which, as the City explains, is the “average
volume of domestic waste discharged from an
average residential dwelling unit.” Averages
are critical, Ordinance No. 9-3-20 indicates,
because the City does not have “the technolo-
gy or ability to measure ,.. exact use of the
sewer system.” Thus, Ordinance No, 9-3-20
assigns properties “a multiplier point (based
upon type of use) and then a point value is
determined which is equal to how many
EDU’s that particular property is assessed.”

The City amended Ordinance No, 9-3-20 in
June 2014, but before that amendment, Ordi-
nance No. 9-8-20 provided that an “[olffice,
up to 20 employees” would be assessed one
EDU. As such, one building containing, for
example, ten offices, each having up to twen-
ty employees, would be assessed ten EDUs,
Even though the Building housed multiple
commercial tenants (and thus multiple of-
fices) from 2001 to 2007, it was assessed only
one EDU. The assessment of one EDU yield-
ed a monthly rate of $25.90 for wastewater
utilities.

The City conducted a regular reassess-
ment of EDU assessments in 2007. During
this reassessment, the Building was assessed
two EDUs. The new assessment took effect
sometime in 2008, thereby increasing the
Building’s monthly rate for wastewater utili-
ties to $51.80, The reason for this assessment
was that multiple commercial tenants oceu-
pied the Building,

In June 2014, the City amended Ordinance
No, 9-8-20. Ordinance No. 9-38-20, as amend-
ed, sets forth “19 different classifications and
74 different sub-classifications,” which the
City uses to make EDU assessments. The
City explains that whether these different
classifications and sub-classifications apply
depends on the “type of building, size of
building, type of business, number of busi-
nesses, type of waste water released, and
other similar factors.” Under Ordinance No.
9-83-20, as amended, the Building was as-
sessed two EDUs because it is a commercial
building with no food prep whose space ex-
eeeds 4,000 square feet. Also in June 2014,
the City increased the base rate per EDU
from $25.90 to $80.04. Thus, in June 2014, the
Building’s monthly wastewater utility rate
increased from $51.80 to $60.08,

Disputing the assessment of two EDUs,
but not the base rate per EDU, Manwaring
filed a claim against the City for alleged
wastewater utility overcharges on September
9, 2014. Manwaring argued the Building
should have been assessed one EDU, not
two, because the assessment of two EDUs
did not reasonably approximate the Build-
ing’s actual wastewater discharge. Manwar-
ing presented its claim to the city council on
October 7, 2014, The city council concluded

167

the assessment of two EDUs was permissible
and denied the claim.

On October 14, 2014, Manwaring filed this
lawsuit: against the City and stopped paying
the disputed portion of fees, Manwaring’s
complaint alleged that the assessment of two
EDUs on the Building: (1) violates the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act; (2) constitutes an uncon-
stitutional tax; and (8) violates due process,
In addition to requesting a declaratory judg-
ment and an injunction, Manwaring request-
ed damages in the amount of $1,808.66, which
reflects the amount Manwaring allegedly
overpaid for wastewater utilities.

On March 11, 2015, Manwaring moved for
a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin
the City from applying the assessment of two
EDUs on the Building. On March 25, 2015,
the magistrate held a hearing on Manwar-
ing’s requested preliminary injunction and
denied it. The parties then filed cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment. On May 20,
2015, the magistrate denied Manwaring’s mo-
tion for summary judgment and granted the
City’s motion for summary judgment. Man-
waring timely moved for reconsideration, but
the magistrate denied the motion, Manwar-
ing then appealed the magistrate’s rulings to
the district court, which upheld the judgment
in the City’s favor, Manwaring timely appeals
to this Court.

IL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Was summary judgment properly
granted to, the City?

2. Was Manwaring’s motion for reconsid-
eration properly.denied?

8. Is the prevailing party entitled to at-
torney fees on appeal?

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hl “On appeal of a decision rendered by
a district court acting in its appellate capaci-
ty, we directly review the district court’s
decision to determine whether it correctly
decided the issues presented to it on appeal.”
Borley v. Snvith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 288 P.8d
102, 107 (2010) (citing Idaho Dep’ of Health
and Welfure v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126, 219
P.8d 448, 450 (2009)),

768

Iv. ANALYSIS

Addressed below is whether (A) summary
judgment was properly granted to the City;
(B) Manwaring’s motion for reconsideration
was properly denied; and (C) the prevailing
party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

A. Summary judgment was properly
granted to the City.

This Court has explained that, when it
reviews a summary judgment on appeal,

it does so under the same standards em-

ployed by the district court. “The fact that

the parties have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment does not change the
applicable standard of review, and this

Court must evaluate each party’s motion

on its own merits.” Summary judgment is

proper “if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affida-
vits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(¢).!)

Where the case will be tried without a

jury, “the trial court as the trier of fact is

entitled to arrive at the most probable
inferences based upon the undisputed evi-
dence properly before it and grant the
summary judgment despite the possibility
of conflicting inferences.” This Court freely
reviews the entire record that was before
the district court to determine whether
either side was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and whether inferences
drawn by the district court are reasonably
supported by the record,
Id, at 176-77, 233 P.38d at 107-08 (citations
omitted).

The district court's order affirming sum-
mary judgment to the City rests on four
main bases: (1) the Idaho Revenue Bond Act;
(2) whether the City’s charge for wastewater
utility services is an unconstitutional tax; (8)
whether Manwaring’s due process rights
were violated; and (4) the Idaho Tort Claims
Act,

1, The magistrate rendered its judgment in May
2015, and the district court affirmed in June
2016, Effective July 1, 2016, Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 was amended, The relevant portion
of the rule now provides: “‘The court must grant

1, The Idaho Revenue Bond Act

Under article 8, section 3 of the Idaho
Constitution, the City is authorized to con-
struct and maintain certain public works pro-
jects. “[PJursuant to this section of the Con-
stitution, the Idaho legislature enacted the
Idaho Revenue Bond Act [ (RBA) ], codified
at IC. § 50-1027 through § 50-1042.” Loom-
is v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 488, 807
P.2d 1272, 1276 (1991). Manwaring places at
issue the following provision of IRBA, which
provides:

Any city acquiring, constructing, recon-
structing, improving, bettering or extend-
ing any works pursuant to this act, shall
manage such works in the most efficient
manner consistent with sound economy
and public advantage, to the end that the
services of such works shall be furnished
at the lowest possible cost. No city shall
operate any works primarily as a source of
vevenue to the city, but shall operate all
such works for the use and benefit of those
served by such works and for the pro-
motion of the welfare and for the improve-
ment of the health, safety, comfort and
convenience of the inhabitants of the city.

LC. § 50-1028,

HE Public works projects under IRBA
“shall be and always remain self-supporting.”
LC. § 50-1082. This Court has explained that
“{thhe fees, rates and charges imposed by the
municipality must be reasonable and produce
sufficient revenue to support the system at
the lowest possible cost as required by the
Idaho Revenue Bond Act.” Loomis, 119 Ida-
ho at 442, 807 P.2d at 1280. To be sure, “the
legislature has not imposed exacting rate re-
quirements upon localities and the law re-
quires only that the fee be reasonably related
to the benefit conveyed.” Id. Creating a fee
structure “whereby every member of the
general public would be charged only for his
exact contribution of waste presumably could
be established, but the system would be cum-
bersome and perhaps prohibitively expensive

summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” LR.C.P, 56(a).

to maintain. The law only requires that the
fee be reasonably related to the benefit con-
veyed.” Kootenai Cnty. Prop. Ass’n v. Koote-
nai Cnity., 115 Idaho 676, 680, 769 P.2d 553,
587 (1989).

Utilizing the above grants of authority, the
City enacted Ordinance No. 9-83-20, which
governs wastewater utility rates. It reads:

The mayor and city council shall deter-
mine and set all applicable fees and
charges for use of the sewer system. This
chapter supplants and replaces resolution

240 and amendments thereto, The city cur-

rently does not have the technology or

ability to measure each class’s exact use of
the sewer system. Therefore, the rates are
based on an estimate of each class’s contri-
bution or potential contribution to the load-
ing of the sewer system. A multiplier is
assigned to each class pursuant the table
set forth below. The multiplier is not based
solely on the amount of water used and
discharged into the system, but rather,
takes into consideration other factors such
as the estimated amount of BODs, CODs,
suspended solids, and other contaminates
that may be discharged into the system by
the various classes of users, and the esti-
mated number and types of users under
each classification, To determine the
monthly sewer charge, the multiplier (or
equivalent residential unit, as it is some-
times called) is multiplied by the rate set
from time to time by the city council by
resolution or ordinance,

Ordinance No. 9-8-20?

No contention is made that Ordinance No.
9-8-20 was not in effect when the Building
was constructed in 2001. Thus, at all relevant.
times from the Building’s construction until
June 2014, Ordinance No. 9-8-20’s EDU as-
sessment structure provided that an “[olffice,
up to 20 employees” would be assessed one
EDU. The City amended Ordinance No, 9-3-
20's EDU assessment structure in June 2014.
As a result of that amendment, now, a
“[blusiness for each 4,000 square feet (no
food prep)” is assessed one EDU.

2. The pre- and post-amended forms of Ordinance
No, 9-3-20 are identical in this regard,

769

From 2001 to 2008, the Building, even
though it housed multiple commercial tenants
(and thus multiple offices), was assessed one
EDU? The City conducted a regular reas-
sessment of EDU assessments in 2007.
Thereafter, from 2008 until June 2014, the
Building was assessed two EDUs because
multiple commercial tenants occupied the
Building, each having their own offices, And
from June 2014 to present, the Building has
been assessed two EDUs because it is a
commercial building with “no food prep”
whose space exceeds 4,000 square feet.

Hl Manwaring challenges Ordinance No.
9-3-20 as it applies to the Building, contend-
ing the assessment of two EDUs does not
reasonably approximate the Building’s actual
wastewater discharge. It is Manwaring’s bur-
den, then, to overcome Ordinance No, 9-3-
20's presumption of validity. Boise City
Better Homes, 72 Idaho 441, 447, 248 P.2d
803, 806 (1952) (“Ordinances and resolutions
of a municipal corporation are presumed val-
id until the contrary is shown.”); accord City
of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 96,
117 P.2d 461, 463 (1941). In support of its
argument, Manwaring submitted the affidavit
of Lance Bates, a civil engineer with the City
of Ammon, Bates testified to the City of
Ammon’s commercial wastewater utility rate
structures. He opined that “factors used in
establishing a reliable quantifiable basis ...
include the nature and type of commercial
use, number of employees, number and types
of plumbing fixtures in the business, metered
water consumption rates, and known dis-
charge flowrates if any.” Evaluating the
City’s EDU assessment structure, Bates
opined that “{a] multiplier based solely on
square footage is random and arbitrary.”
Manwaring contends Bates’s affidavit was
uncontradicted and controls, and as such,
summary judgment for the City was improp-
er.

We reject Manwaring’s argument. For one,
Bates is incorrect that the City’s EDU as-
sessment structure is based “solely on square
footage.” In addition to square footage, Ordi-
3. The City asserts the Building should have been

assessed two EDUs since its construction in
2001.

770

nance No, 9-3-20 has always “take[n] into
consideration other factors such as the esti-
mated amount of BODs, CODs, suspended
solids, and other contaminates that may be
discharged into the system by the various
classes of users, and the estimated number
and types of users under each classification.”

Moreover, we do not find the City’s EDU
assessment structure to be random and arbi-
trary; rather, it meets IRBA’s requirement
that fees for public works projects must be
“peasonably related to the benefit conveyed.”
Loomis, 119 Idaho at 442, 807 P.2d at 1280.
The City is unable to measure actual waste-
water flowvates, as it “does not have the
technology or ability to measure each class’s
exact use of the sewer system.” Nor does the
City “have the ability to test every business
..+-” The City therefore analyzes the poten-
tial wastewater flowrates based on the type
of building and the character of its use,

and based on the potential, since we do not.

have a direct way to measure flow, biologi-

cal oxygen demand, chemical oxygen de-
mand, total suspended solids or any other,
the primary constituents in the wastewa-
ter, ... we say, okay, this business, based
on their type of business, falls in this chart
here.
As Ordinance No, 9-8-20 clearly states, “the
rates are based on an estimate of each class’s
contribution or potential contribution to the
loading of the sewer system.” Cf Loomis,
119 Idaho at 448 n4, 807 P.2d at 1281 n4
(holding that utility connection fee, which
sought to charge the new user for “the value
of that portion of the system capacity that
the new user will utilize,” was reasonable).

In drafting Ordinance No. 9-8-20, the City
relied on an engineering study and ordi-
nances from other municipalities in Idaho.
Under Ordinance No. 9-83-20 before it was
amended, over thirty EDU classifications
were provided, Buildings with different uses
received different EDU classifications. For
example, an assessment of two EDUs was
given to “[clar washes (per stall)” and a
“[e]afe, up to 50 seats.” Under Ordinance No.
9-8-20, as amended, “19 different classifica-
tions and 74 different sub-classifications” are
ereated. The City explains that whether
these different classifications and sub-classifi-

cations apply depends on the “type of build-
ing, size of building, type of business, number
of businesses, type of waste water released,
and other similar factors.” Thus, Ordinance
No, 9-8-20's EDU assessment structure,
while not based on actual wastewater flow-
rates, is not arbitrary.

Manwaring disputes the assessment of two
EDUs, which yields a flat-rate based on dis-
charge averages and discharge potentials.
Manwaring overlooks, however, that we have
stated that “[cJharging a flat residential sew-
age fee is reasonable even though the actual
use (outflow volume) varies somewhat from
house to house.” Kootenai Cnty., 115 Idaho
at 678, 769 P.2d at 555 (citing Schmidt v.
Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P.2d
515 (1958)). Kootenai County addressed an
annual $54 solid waste disposal charge im-
posed on all habitable residences. Id. In up-
holding the fee as reasonable, we reasoned:

No one suggests that each and every resi-
dence generates the same amount of solid
waste. Presumably, the precise annual cu-
bie yardage of solid waste from each resi-
dence could be painstakingly monitored
and determined for each residence by
county employees, However, all users
would have to pay substantially more to
cover the additional salaries of trash moni-
tors.

Id, This Court further observed that differ-
ent rate structures governed residences
housing the elderly and indigent, and com-
mercial establishments. Jd. at 679, 769 P.2d
at 556. Accordingly, because the $54 was not
arbitrary, we upheld it as reasonable,

Here, similar to Kootenai County, Ordi-
nance No, 9-8-20 has always set forth several
different classifications and sub-classifica-
tions, depending on the type of building and
the character of its use. Although it is possi-
ble that the City could acquire technology to
make EDU assessments correspond with ex-
actness to actual wastewater flowrates, ex-
actness is not required. Jd, at 678-80, 769
P.2d at 555-57; Loomis, 119 Idaho at 442,
807 P.2d at 1280, We agree with the magis-
trate that requiring the City to be more
exact in making EDU assessments “could be
overly consuming of time and treasure.” Cf.

Kootenai Cnty., 115 Idaho at 678, 769 P.2d at
555.

Hsin overemphasizing Bates’s testi-
mony, Manwaring overlooks that the City is
not required to mold its EDU assessment
structure to mirror any other municipality.
Rather, the City has diseretion in adopting a
particular EDU assessment method, See Vi-
king Constr. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation
Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 194, 283 P.8d 118, 125
(2010), Likewise, Manwaring overlooks that
“{tJhe opinion of an expert is not binding on
the trial court, and, as long as it does not act
arbitrarily, the trial court may reject expert
testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”
Pinnacle Eng’rs, Ine. v. Heron Brook, LLC,
189 Idaho 756, 758, 86 P.38d 470, 472 (2004).
Bates’s testimony was not arbitrarily reject-
ed. Rather, his testimony was addressed be-
low and found unpersuasive:

Could [the City] use a more precise
methodology for setting its wastewater
user rates? Yes. Lance Bates does give a
more precise method of setting wastewater
user rates, but at what cost: (meters on
every business for inflow and outflow,
number and type of plumbing fixtures in
each business, number of employees and
customers each reporting cycle, and so on),
It appears in Idaho, by statue [sic] and
case law the standard is “reasonable ap-
proximation” without charging more that
[sic] is required to make the system self-
sufficient (enterprise fund concept). [The
City] appears to have met this standard in
this instance in setting its wastewater user
rate and applying it to [the City].

The magistrate was “entitled to arrive at the
most probable inferences based upon the un-
disputed evidence properly before it and
grant the summary judgment despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences.” Borley,
149 Idaho at 176-77, 288 P.8d at 107-08
(quoting P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Fami-
ly Irrev, Trust, 144 Idaho 288, 287, 159 P.8d
870, 874 (2007).

TM Finally, Manwaring overlooks that
fees for public works projects can be collect-
ed for “operation, maintenance, replacement
and depreciation, including creating and
maintaining reserves for such expenses.”
City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127

771

Idaho 198, 202, 899 P.2d 411, 415 (1995)
(citing 1.C, §§ 50-1038(b), -1038(e)). Manwar-
ing has presented no argument or evidence
that the City uses the fees at issue for any-
thing aside from these expressly permitted
purposes, But of Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park
v. City of Pocatello, 162 Idaho 588, 591, 402
P.3d 1041, 1044 (2017) (“The City wanted to
obtain a profit in excess of the amounts
necessary for the water and sewer systems
to remain self-supporting. This profit was
paid into the general fund.”),

In sum, Manwaring has not overcome Or-
dinance No, 9-8-20’s presumption of validity.
As we have explained previously:

It is not the province of this Court to
determine how a municipality should allo-
cate its fee and rate system. So long as the
fees and rates charged conform to the
statutory requirements and are reason-
able, the fees, rates and charges will be
upheld, The fees, rates and charges im-
posed by the municipality must be reason-
able and produce sufficient revenue to sup-
port the system at the lowest possible cost
as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond
Act.

Loomis, 119 Idaho at 442, 807 P.2d at 1280,
Recognizing that our “limited role in this
situation is to determine whether the fees,
rates and charges conform to the statutory
requirements, are reasonable and are not
arbitrary,” Id. at 448, 807 P.2d at 1281, we
conclude the City has not violated IRBA for
the reasons articulated above.

2, Unconstitutional tax

HM Manwaring argues the charge for
the City’s wastewater utilities is an unconsti-
tutional tax. The legislature has authority to
give municipalities “the power to assess and
collect taxes for all purposes of such corpora-
tion.” Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6. But the
“grant of taxing power to cities is not self-
executing or unlimited. It is limited by what
taxing power the legislature authorizes in its
implementing legislation.” Brewster v. City of
Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 508, 768 P.2d 765,
766 (1988). Accordingly, taxes require legisla-
tive approval and authorization. Id.

772

HE Manwaring’s argument inquires
whether the charge for the City’s wastewater
utilities is a fee or an unconstitutional tax.
“In a general sense a fee is a charge for a
direct public service rendered to the particu-
lar consumer, while a tax is a forced contri-
bution by the public at large to meet public
needs.” Id, at 505, 768 P.2d at 768. “[W]hen
the rates, fees and charges conform to the
statutory scheme set forth in the [[RBA] or
are imposed pursuant to a valid police power,
the charges are not construed as taxes.”
Loomis, 119 Idaho at 438, 807 P.2d at 1276,
On the other hand, “if the rates, fees and
charges are imposed primarily for revenue
raising purposes they are in essence dis-
guised taxes and subject to legislative ap-
proval and authority.” Id.

Here, the charge for the City’s wastewater
utilities is not an unconstitutional tax, As
reasoned above, the rate conforms to the
statutory scheme set forth under IRBA. Ad-
ditionally, nothing suggests that the City im-
permissibly uses money collected from
wastewater utilities for revenue raising pur-
poses. Indeed, the magistrate concluded
“there was no evidence presented that [the
City] is raising funds exceeding the expenses
of operating the wastewater system (for ex-
ample, no evidence that money was taken
from the wastewater fund and transferred
into the general fund).” And the district court
concluded the magistrate was correct, ex-
plaining that:

[The City’s wastewater system for sewage

operates financially independently from

the City in that it “stands alone” from the
general tax revenues generated by the

City and is self-supporting. The wastewa-

ter treatment plant creates an annual bud-

get for its probable revenue, expenses,
debt payments, and reasonable reserves.

The City contracts with engineering firms

as needed to review the wastewater treat-

ment plant’s operations, its probable ex-

penses, et cetera.
Manwaring points out no error in these find-
ings. Manwaring instead cites to North Idaho
Building Contractors Association v. City of
Hayden, 158 Idaho 79, 81, 343 P.38d 1086,
1088 (2015), to contend “[wJhere evidence
proves that an assessment of 2 EDUs is not

the actual cost of the sewer service being
provided, the fees assessed are an unlawful
tax.”

But City of Hayden does not assist Man-
waring. In City of Hayden, the City of Hay-
den nearly tripled the capitalization fee for
new users on the local sewer system. Id. at
81, 343 P.3d at 1088. As this Court summa-
rized the relevant facts, “A house connected
to the City sewer system on June 6, 2007,
would have paid $774 as the City’s part of
the capitalization fee, while a house connect-
ed to the system the following day would
have paid $2,280 for the same service.” Id.
‘The purpose behind the fee increase was to
gather funds to upgrade the sewer system
and “extend the sewer system to the entire
area of city impact and provide sewer service
to anticipated new residents ....” Id, This
Court concluded the capitalization fee was an
unconstitutional tax because it did not repre-
sent any attempt to approximate actual use.
See id. at 81-85, 348 P.3d at 1088-92, The
capitalization fee was collected instead to im-
prove and extend the sewage system. Id. at
81, 348 P.8d at 1088. While this Court recog-
nized that any excess money lawfully collect-
ed could be used to extend the sewage sys-
tem, this Court clarified that “[t]he power to
spend money lawfully collected in order to
extend the system is not the power to base a
fee on the cost to extend the system to
whatever size is desired.” Id. at 83, 848 P.3d
at 1090. Accordingly, the $2,280 capitalization
fee was a disguised tax subject to legislative
approval and authority. Id.

Here, Manwaring points to nothing that
shows the City is collecting the wastewater
utility fees in an attempt to unduly improve
or expand the system. Instead, “the rates are
based on an estimate of each class’s contribu-
tion or potential contribution to the loading
of the sewer system.” Manwaring’s argument
is that its wastewater utility fees should be
closer to exactly what its actual use is. But,
as noted, exacting requirements are not re-
quired. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 442, 807 P.2d at
1280. Therefore, we conclude the charge for
the City’s wastewater utilities is not an un-
constitutional tax.

3, Due process

Manwaring contends its due pro-
cess rights were violated when the City in-
creased the Building’s EDU assessment from
one to two without first providing notice. The
United States and Idaho Constitutions pre-
vent state deprivations of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Idaho Const. art. 1,
§ 18, Due process has a procedural and sub-
stantive component. See Albright v, Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 272, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d
114 (1994); Bradbury v, Idaho Judicial
Council, 136 Idaho 63, 70, 28 P.8d 1006, 1018
(2001).

HR Manwaring’s argument sounds in
procedural due process, an inquiry “focused
on determining whether the procedure em-
ployed is fair.” Bradbury, 186 Idaho at 72, 28
P.8d at 1015. The threshold step in a due
process analysis is to determine whether a
protected interest giving rise to due process
protections even exisis, See Leon v. Boise
State Univ., 125 Idaho 865, 870, 870 P.2d
1824, 1329 (1994). “To receive due process,
the property interest must be an identifiable
and legitimate claim or entitlement to a spe-
cific benefit provided by state or federal
Jaw.” Guzman v, Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 989,
318 P.3d 918, 929 (2014).

Here, the district court properly concluded
Manwaring’s due process claim fails at the
threshold step, That is to say, Manwaring
does not have a protected interest in a specif-
ie EDU assessment. The source of Manwar-
ing’s interest is Ordinance No. 9-8-20, which
is recited above. Ordinance No. 9-83-20 is of
general applicability and does not apply sole-
ly to the Building. Of particular importance
is how Ordinance No, 9-83-20 states that
“[tJhe mayor and city council shall determine
and set all applicable fees for use of the
sewer system.” Within legal limits, the mayor
and the city council are authorized to set
whatever EDU assessment structure they
deem proper. Even once the EDU assess-
ment structure is set, it is not intransigent.
The city council remains free to amend Ordi-
nance No, 9-38-20 “from time to time by reso-
lution ....” Ordinance No, 9-83-20 specifically
instructs that “{a] reassessment of each com-

173

mercial user will be completed at a minimum
of once every five (5) years.”

Tn sum, Ordinance No. 9-83-20 does not
create any “legitimate claim or entitlement”
to a particular EDU assessment. Cf Leon,
125 Idaho at 370, 870 P.2d at 1329 (holding
that employee had no protected interest in
indefinite employment because employer had
discretion whether to renew employee’s one-
year employment contract). We affirm sum-
mary judgment for the City on Manwaring’s
due process claim.

B. Manwaring’s motion for reconsidera-
tion was properly denied.

HE When a motion to reconsider is
raised for our review, we employ “the same
standard of review used by the lower court in
deciding the motion for reconsideration.”
Fragnella v, Petrovich, 158 Idaho 266, 276,
281 P.8d 108, 118 (2012). Thus, when a mo-
tion to reconsider follows the grant of sum-
mary judgment, “this Court must determine
whether the evidence presented a genuine
issue of material fact to defeat summary
judgment.” Id.

HM Manwaring has not shown it pre-
sented any new argument or evidence on
reconsideration. Accordingly, Manwaring’s
motion for reconsideration was properly de-
nied. See, eg., Spwr Prods. Corp. v. Stoel
Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 817, 153 P.8d
1158, 1168 (2007); Jordan v. Beeks, 185 Idaho
586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001) (“[Wle con-
clude that the district court was provided
with no new facts to create an issue for trial,
and thus there was no basis upon which to
reconsider its summary judgment order.”).

C. We decline to award attorney fees on
appeal.

HH Both parties request attorney fees
on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-117,
which provides:

Unless otherwise provided by statute, in
any proceeding involving as adverse par-
ties a state agency or a political subdivision
and a person, the state agency, political
subdivision or the court hearing the pro-
ceeding, including on appeal, shall award
the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s

TTA

fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
LC. § 12-1171), Based on the above, the
City is the prevailing party on appeal. How-
ever, Manwaring did not act without a rea-
sonable basis in fact or law. Instead, Man-
waring argued complex issues in good faith,
Thus, we do not award attorney fees on
appeal,

Vv. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we affirm the judg-
ment in favor of the City. Although Manwar-
ing raises issues concerning whether the pre-
liminary injunction and the damages request
were properly denied, and whether the dis-
trict court erred by sua sponte raising the
Idaho Tort Claims Act as an alternative
ground in affirming the judgment, those is-
sues need not be addressed in light of the
above since none of those issues have the
potential to affect Manwaring’s substantial
rights, LR.G.P. 61 (“At every stage of the
proceeding, the court must disregard all er-
rors and defects that do not affect any par-
ty’s substantial rights.”). We award costs on
appeal, but not attorney fees, to the City as
the prevailing party,

Justices JONES, HORTON, BRODY and
DUNN, Pro Tem concur.

405 P,3d 33
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT COMPANY, an Idaho Cor-
poration, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vw

Megan RONK, in her capacity as Director
of the Idaho Department of Commerce,
Defendant-Respondent.

Docket No. 44511

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, August 2017 Term,

Filed: November 3, 2017

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McKlveen, Chartered, Boise, for appellant.
Neil D. MeFeeley argued.

Hon, Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent. Carl J, Withroe
argued.

HORTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from the district court’s
dismissal of Employers Resource Manage-
ment Company’s (“Employers”) complaint
for declaratory relief for lack of standing. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings,

776

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In 2014, the Idaho Legislature passed the
Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act
(IRIA”). IRIA is intended to create incen-
tives for businesses to move to Idaho or to
significantly increase their workforces by
way of a subsidy in the form of a refundable
tax credit. IRIA authorizes the Department.
of Commerce to provide a business with a
refundable tax credit for up to 15 years and
up to 80% of the new revenue Idaho receives
from the company’s corporate income tax,
payroll taxes, and sales and use tax attribut-
able to a new project. LC. § 67-4740. The
benefits of IRIA are available to both new
and existing businesses in any industry with
a competitive project that adds a minimum of
20 new full-time, non-seasonal jobs in rural
areas (50 new jobs in urban areas) that pay
an average wage that equals or exceeds the
wage for the county where the business is
located. I.C. § 67-4788(11), (12).

A business seeking the credit must apply
to the Director of the Idaho Department of
Commerce (“the Director”). I.C. § 67-4739.
Among the requirements that the applicant
must satisfy is “proof of a community
match.” I.C. § 67-4739(1)(¢). The applicable
local government unit must demonstrate “ac-
tive support of the applicant,” which may
include “a contribution of money, fee waivers,
in-kind services, the provision of infrastiuc-
ture, or a combination thereof.” I.C. § 67-
473865).

The Director conducts a technical review
and economic impact analysis of each applica-
tion, IDAPA 28.04,01.151.07. After the Di-
rector determines that the application meets
the requirements of IRIA, the application is
forwarded to the Economie Advisory Council
(“the EAC”), a body created under authority
of Idaho Code section 67-4704. The EAC
reviews the application and may require that
additional information be provided before ap-
proving or rejecting the application. I.C.
§ 67-4739. If the application is approved, the
Director enters into an agreement with the
applicant consistent with the terms of the
BAC’s approval. I.C. § 67-4789(8). The EAC
is given broad discretion to approve or deny
applications for the IRTA tax credit.

In 2016, the BAC granted a tax credit of
$6.5 million to Paylocity, an Illinois corpora-
tion. Employers’ complaint alleged that this
tax credit was a governmental subsidy to
Paylocity that would give it a competitive
advantage over Employers. Employers chal-
lenged the IRIA program as unconstitution-
al, alleging that the Legislature unconstitu-
tionally delegated its authority over tax
matters to the Executive Branch,

Ronk moved to dismiss Employers’ com-
plaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(6)(6), asserting that Employers
lacked standing because nothing done by the
EAC was directed at Employers. Ronk fur-
ther contended that Employers’ allegation of
competitor standing was insufficient because
there was only conjectural proof of injury.
The district court granted the motion to dis-
miss, holding that Employers did not have a
protectable interest in its competitive posi-
tion in the marketplace. The court also found
that the harm Employers alleged that it
would suffer was “abstract and speculative.”
Thus, the district court concluded that Em-
ployers did not have standing. Employers
timely appealed from the district court’s
judgment dismissing the action.

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HEM The district court dismissed Em-
ployers’ complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 12()(6). In a decision issued
subsequent to the district court’s decision, we
clarified that justiciability challenges, includ-
ing those related to standing, “are subject to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) since
they implicate jurisdiction.” Tucker v. State,
162 Idaho 11, 18, 394 P.8d 54, 61 (2017).
Despite the different applicable rule, our
standard of review is the same. This is be-
cause:

There is a distinction between 12(b)(1)
facial challenges and 12(b)(1) factual chal-
lenges. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d
724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir.1990); 5B [Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure], § 1850 [8d ed.
(2004) ]. Facial challenges provide the non-
movant the same protections as under a
12(b)(6) motion. Jd. Factual challenges, on

the other hand, allow the court to go out-
side the pleadings without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment. Id.
Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm’n, 141 Idaho
129, 183 n.1, 106 P.8d 455, 459 n.1 (2005).
Ronk has presented a facial challenge to
Employers’ standing. Thus, we apply the
same standard as if the motion to dismiss
were governed by Idaho Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(6).
When this Court reviews an order dismiss-
ing an action pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 12(b)(6),
we apply the same standard of review we
apply to a motion for summary judgment.
After viewing all facts and inferences from
the record in favor of the non-moving par-
ty, the Court will ask whether a claim for
relief has been stated.
Joki v. State, 162 Idaho 5, 8, 394 P.8d 48, 51
(2017). “[AJs a practical matter, a dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted
only in the unusual case in which the plaintiff
includes allegations showing on the face of
the complaint that there is some insurmount-
able bar to relief.” Harper v. Harper, 122
Idaho 585, 586, 885 P.2d 1846, 1847 (Ct. App.
1992) (citations omitted),

TL ANALYSIS
HE Idaho’s standing requirement “is a
self-imposed constraint adopted from federal
practice, as there is no ‘case or controversy’
clause or an analogous provision in the Idaho
Constitution as there is in the United States
Constitution.” Coewr d’Alene Tribe v. Den-
ney, 161 Idaho 508, 518, 887 P.8d 761, 766
(2015). We have described the traditional ele-
ments of standing 1 as follows:
In order to satisfy the requirement of
standing, a petitioner must allege or dem-
onstrate an injury in fact and a substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested
will prevent or redress the claimed injury.
Standing requires a showing of a distinct
palpable injury and fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and
the challenged conduct.

1. In addition to this “traditional” standing analy-
sis, this Court has also applied a “relaxed” stan-
dard in certain cases. In Coeur d’Alene Tribe, we
noted that we will “relax ordinary standing re-
quirements in other cases where: (1) the matter
concerns a significant and distinct constitutional

717

Coal. for Agric’s Futwre v. Canyon Cnty.,
160 Idaho 142, 146, 369 P.38d 920, 924 (2016)
(citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Injury in fact requires the injury to “be
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ”
Tucker, 162 Idaho at 19, 394 P.8d at 62
(quoting State v. Philip Morris, Inc, 158
Idaho 874, 881, 354 P.38d 187, 194 (2015)),
Causation requires the injury to be “fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the de-
fendant, and not the result of the indepen-
dent action of some third party not before
the court.” Id. at 21, 394 P.3d at 64 (quoting
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S.Ct.
1154, 187 L.Hd.2d 281 (1997)). Finally,

Standing’s redressability element ensures
that a court has the ability to order the
relief sought, which must create a substan-
tial likelihood of remedying the harms al-
leged. See Ciszek v. Kootenai Cniy. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 151 Idaho 128, 129, 254 P.8d 24,
80 (2011); Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d
1268, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982). Redressability
requires a showing that “a favorable deci-
sion is likely to redress [the] injury, not
that a favorable decision will inevitably
redress [the] injury.” Beno v. Shalala, 80
F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir, 1994), However,
it cannot be only speculative that a favor-
able decision will redress the injury.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Enutl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 US. 167,
181, 120 S.Ct. 698, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).

Tucker, 162 Idaho at 24, 394 P.8d at 67.

The district court explained its determina-
tion that Employers failed to adequately al-
lege standing as follows:

Where there is a direct impediment to a
company, then a company may be poten-
tially harmed in a way that is sufficient to
show a protectable legal interest. In con-
trast, when the conduct is directed at a
third party, with no direct impact to the
plaintiff that is traceable to the govern-
ment conduct, then there is no protectable

violation, and (2) no party could otherwise have
standing to bring a claim.” 161 Idaho at 514, 387
P.3d at 767. As we decide this appeal based upon
the traditional standing analysis, we will not ad-
dress the alternative analysis that we employed
in Coeur d'Alene Tribe.

718

interest at stake. This is the situation in
this case. The government conduct is di-
rected at a third party, Palocity [sic] and
other businesses who qualify for the tax
credit, and not [Employers]. The conduct
has no direct impact on [Employers] that
is traceable to the government conduct.
Accordingly, [Employers] has no protecta-
ble interest at stake in this matter.
Additionally, [Employers] alleges that the
tax refund would injure its competitive po-
sition in the market. [Employers] alleged
that a tax credit has incentivized a compet-
itor to set up its business in Idaho and
[Employers] will have to do certain things
to compete against this competitor. It must
be noted that [Employers] is not the object,
of the government action. Instead, Payloci-
ty, a third party, is the object of the gov-
ernment action. This fails to satisfy the
requirement that there is a “substantial
likelihood that the relief requested will
prevent the claimed injury.” [Employers]
has only alleged a mere possibility that
competition will increase and that there is
a possibility that the increased competition
will injure [Employers]. [Employers’] pur-
ported injuries are abstract and specula-
tive and cannot be said to be specific or
distinct and palpable.

The rule which [Employers] relies on to
assert standing is competitor standing to
establish that it has a personal stake, or
distinet palpable injury. The general rule is
that a competitor has standing to challenge
future loss of profits, National Tank
Truck Carriers v. Lewis, 650 F.Supp. 113,
117 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1982), However, Idaho
has not recognized competitor standing.
Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508,
514, 248 P.8d 1243, 1249 (2011), Further,
even when competitor standing has been
recognized, “it is only when a successful
challenge will set up an absolute bar to
competition, not merely an additional hur-
dle, that competitor standing exists.” Id.

[Employers] challenges the legislature’s
exercise of its constitutional authority, But
[Employers] has no standing to challenge
the Reimbursement Act because the pro-

gram makes tax credits available to busi-
nesses that meet certain criteria. The pro-
gram does not actually do anything to
[Employers], therefore, [Employers] has
suffered no particularized injury by which
to establish standing in a challenge to the
act. Instead, [Employers] attempts to man-
ufacture standing by alleging it may have
to do certain things or that it expects
certain things will occur as a response to
another company receiving a tax credit
under the program. In short, [Employers]
has no protectable, legal interest that has
been directly damaged by the Act; the
claim of injury is ill-defined, fuzzy, and
speculative, essentially self-inflicted in
mere anticipation and expectation of what
may happen.

Hl We start by noting a point of agree-
ment with the district court; the challenged
action is not directed at Employers. We dis-
agree, however, with the corollary identified
by the district court (“therefore [Employers]
has suffered no particularized injury....”).
Instead, as the United States Supreme Court
has noted, “[wJhen the plaintiff is not himself
the object of the government action or inac-
tion he challenges, standing is not precluded,
but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more diffi-
cult’ to establish,” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2180, 119
L.Ed.2d 851 (1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 787, 758, 104 S.Ct. 3815, 82 LEd2d
556 (1984).

This case affords us the opportunity to
more fully explain our holding in Martin v.
Camas County. There, we observed that this
Court has “never held that increased compe-
tition alone is sufficient to confer standing.”
Martin, 150 Idaho at 514, 248 P.8d at 1249,
In this respect, we have adopted a somewhat
more restrictive standard than the federal
courts, which have adopted the doctrine of
competitor standing.

The doctrine of competitor standing ad-

dresses the first requirement [for stand-

ing] by recognizing that economic actors

“suffer [an] injury in fact when agencies

lift regulatory restrictions on their compet-

itors or otherwise allow increased competi-
tion” against them. La. Energy & Power

Auth, v. FERC, 141 F.8d 864, 367 (D.C.

Cir. 1998); accord New World Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 294 F.8d 164, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(“basic law of economics” that increased
competition leads to actual injury); see also
Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. Unit-
ed States, 517 F.8d 1819, 1882 (Fed. Cir,
2008) (doctrine of competitor standing “re-
lies on economic logie to conclude that a
plaintiff will likely suffer an injury-in-fact
when the government acts in a way that.
inereases competition or aids the plaintifi’s
competitors”). The form of that injury may
vary; for example, a seller facing increased
competition may lose sales to rivals, or be
forced to lower its price or to expend more
resources to achieve the same sales, all to
the detriment of its bottom line, Because
increased competition almost surely in-
jures a seller in one form or another, he
need not wait until “allegedly illegal trans-
actions ... hurt [him] competitively” be-
fore challenging the regulatory (or, for
that matter, the deregulatory) governmen-
tal decision that increases competition. La,
Energy, 141 F.3d at 367.
Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.8d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir.
2010) vacated on other grownds, Sherley v.
Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Standing is a somewhat elusive concept. As
we explained in Butters v. Hauser, 181 Idaho
498, 960 P.2d 181 (1998):
Although the doctrine is imprecise and dif-
ficult in its application, in [Miles v. Idaho
Power Co, 116 Idaho 685, 778 P.2d 757
(1989)] this Court adopted a criterion
which explained:
{t]he essence of the standing inquiry is
whether the party seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction has “alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete
adversariness which sharpens the pres-
entation upon which the court so de-
pends for illumination of difficult consti-
tutional questions.”
Butters, 181 Idaho at 500-01, 960 P.2d at
183-84 (quoting Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778
P.2d at 768, and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envil. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98
S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Bd.2d 595 (1978).
We are unwilling to go as far as the federal
courts in recognizing standing based upon

779

governmental action that simply has the ef-
fect of increasing competition. Cf Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 152, 154, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25
L,Ed.2d 184 (1970) (sellers of data processing
services “no doubt” had standing to test rul-
ing allowing national banks to sell data pro-
cessing services; injury-in-fact element met
by allegations that competition from national
banks “might entail some future loss of prof-
its” and that respondent bank was preparing
to perform data processing services for two
of plaintiffs’ customers); Arnold Tours, Inc.
v, Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 45-46, 91 S.Ct. 158, 27
LEd2d 179 (1970) (holding that travel
agents had “competitor standing” to test rul-
ing allowing national banks to provide travel
services); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401
US. 617, 620-21, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Bd2d
367 (1971) (finding “competitor standing,” on
the part of investment companies, to test a
regulatory ruling authorizing national banks
to operate collective investment funds).

Hi In our view, increased competition—
so long as it is on a level playing field—does
not provide a basis for judicial intervention.
That is not the case, however, when there is
governmental action that alters the competi-
tive landscape by providing an advantage to
an economic competitor. To that extent, “[w]e
see no reason any one [sic] ... should not be
able to assert competitor standing when the
Government takes a step that benefits his
rival and therefore injures him economical-
ly.” Sherley, 610 F.3d at 72, The United
States Supreme Court has noted that:

The Court routinely recognizes probable
economic injury resulting from [govern-
mental actions] that alter competitive con-
ditions as sufficient to satisfy the [Article
III “injury-in-fact” requirement] .... It
follows logically that any ... petitioner
who is likely to suffer economic injury as a
result of [governmental action] that
changes market conditions satisfies this
part of the standing test.

Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 US, 417, 488, 118
S.Ct. 2091, 141 L,Hd.2d 893 (1998) (quoting 8
K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law
Treatise 13-14 (8d ed. 1994)) (bracketed ma-
terial in original).

780

EE: Although the district court found that
Employers’ claimed injury was “abstract and
speculative,” we agree with the First Cireuit
Court of Appeals that “[iIn some ‘direct com-
petitor’ cases, future injury-in-fact is viewed
as ‘obvious’ since government action that re-
moves or eases only the competitive burdens
on the plaintiff's rivals plainly disadvantages
the plaintiff's competitive position in the rele-
vant marketplace.” Adams v, Watson, 10
F.8d 915, 922 (1st Cir. 1998), In a market-
place where companies are courting potential
customers, it is evident that a governmental
subsidy to one company will have a negative
effect on competitors not receiving the subsi-
dy, satisfying the palpable injury and causa-
tion components of standing.

The district court’s rejection of Employers’
claim of competitor standing was, in part,
based upon its view that “even when compet-
itor standing has been recognized, ‘it is only
when a successful challenge will set up an
absolute bar to competition, not merely an
additional hurdle, that competitor standing
exists.’” This quoted language is from the
decision in National Tank Truck Carriers v.
Lewis, 550 F.Supp. 118, 117 (D.C. Dist. Ct.
1982).2 We do not view the decision in Na-
tional Tank as instructive as to the issue
presented by this appeal. There, the plaintiff
sought to invalidate a rule adopted by the
Department of Transportation (DOT) regard-
ing the amount of insurance that gasoline
motor carriers were required to maintain, Id.
at 114, At the time, Section 30(b) of the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 required DOT to
establish minimum insurance levels for motor
carriers carrying certain hazardous sub-
stances. Section 30(b) set forth two levels: a
minimum level of $5,000,000 for carriers
transporting extraordinarily hazardous sub-
stances and a minimum level of $1,000,000 for
those transporting other hazardous materi-
als, Jd. at 114-15, DOT adopted a federal
regulation that did not require the higher
level of insurance for those transporting gas-
oline. Jd. at 115. Plaintiff alleged that its
members would be injured in five ways: (1)
the lower level of insurance would result in a
poor safety record in the carrier industry,

2, The district court's opinion erroneously identi-
fies our decision in Martin as the source of this

ultimately leading to higher insurance rates
for all carriers; (2) carriers who chose to
insure at the lower level would be unable to
adequately compensate potential victims re-
sulting in reputational injury to all carriers;
(8) as a consequence of the reputational inju-
ry to the industry, there would be a backlash
of inereased regulation of all carriers; (4)
because plaintiff's membership shared facili-
ties with those electing to maintain the lower
level of insurance, they were likely to be
inadequately compensated victims; and (5)
those selecting the lower level of coverage
would see a decreased cost in doing business,
which would force plaintiff's membership to
either insure at the lower, allegedly inade-
quate level or experience reduced profits. Id.
The court determined that the alleged inju-
ries were “conjectural” and “not ‘real and
immediate’” Id, at 116 (quoting Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 108, 109, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22
L,Ed.2d 118 (1969).)

The court’s statement that “it is only when
a successful challenge will set up an absolute
bar to competition, not merely an additional
hurdle, that competitor standing exists,”
upon which the district court in this action
relied, was drawn from the decision in Amer-
ican Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blu-
menthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir, 1977), Hav-
ing carefully considered the decision in
American Society, we are convinced that the
federal district court in National Tani: read
American Society far too broadly, 550
F.Supp. at 117, or, if it correctly divined the
American Society court’s intended holding,
that holding represented a fundamental mis-
yeading of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Association of Data Pro-
cessing Service Organizations, In either
event, we are not persuaded that the state-
ment in National Tank upon which the dis-
trict court relied is an accurate statement of
the law of competitor standing.

HH Finally, as to the redressability com-
ponent of standing, if Employers receives the
relief it seeks, the competitive advantage cur-
rently enjoyed by Paylocity will be eliminat-

quotation.

ed and the parties will compete on a level
playing field. This satisfies the third compo-
nent of standing.’ For these reasons, the
district court’s judgment dismissing Employ-
ers’ complaint must be vacated.

Iv. CONCLUSION
We vacate the judgment dismissing Em-
ployers’ amended complaint and remand for
further proceedings. We award costs on ap-
peal to Employers.

3. We do not intend to express an opinion as to
the merits of Employers’ claim that IRIA is un-

781

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN, BRODY and Justice Pro Tem
KIDWELL concur.

constitutional or that the district court should
declare that the actions of the EAC are void.

782
405 P.3d 567
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve
Kody Ray GIBBS, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No, 44299

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, August 2017 Term.

Filed: November 6, 2017

783

Lae

Erie D, Fredericksen, Idaho State Appel-
late Public Defender, Boise, for appellant,
Reed P. Anderson argued,

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent. Theodore
S, Tollefson argued.

HORTON, Justice.

Kody Ray Gibbs (“Gibbs”) appeals the
Kootenai County district court’s order ex-
tending his probation. Gibbs argues that: (1)
he was denied his constitutional right to due
process because his case was not heard by an
impartial judge; and (2) the district court
abused its discretion by increasing, sua
sponte, his probation from a term of six
years to life. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In March of 2018, Gibbs was charged with
delivery of a controlled substance after he
sold methamphetamine to a minor. Pursuant
to plea negotiations, Gibbs pled guilty to

784

delivery of a controlled substance, and the
district court dismissed allegations that the
delivery was to a minor and that Gibbs was a
persistent violator. On August 9, 2018, the
district court imposed a suspended sentence
of fifteen years, with ten years fixed, and
placed Gibbs on probation for five years. One
condition of Gibbs’ probation required him to
successfully complete mental health court.

On July 2, 2014, Gibbs tested positive for
using spice and was ordered to serve seven
days of discretionary jail time. On August 6,
2014, Gibbs was again ordered to serve seven
days of discretionary jail time after he admit-
ted to using spice, frequenting a bar, and
associating with people involved in criminal
activity. After these violations, Gibbs re-
mained on probation, but his mental health
court progress reports began reflecting con-
cerns, with one report noting that Gibbs
“needs to take this program seriously.”

On November 19, 2014, Gibbs’ probation
officer filed a report of probation violation
alleging that Gibbs had engaged in sexual
activity with a fourteen year-old girl. The
State filed a motion to show cause why pro-
bation should not be revoked. Gibbs was
subsequently terminated from mental health
court.

On March 26, 2015, Gibbs and the State
entered into a Rule 11 Plea Agreement, in
which Gibbs agreed to plead guilty to a felo-
ny charge of injury to a child (“the 2014
Case”), and to be sentenced to a unified term
of five years, with two and one-half years
fixed, with the court retaining jurisdiction.

Gibbs admitted that he violated the terms
of his probation in the current case, and the
district court extended the term of probation
by one year, ordered Gibbs to continue pro-
bation on the same terms originally imposed,
and added the requirement that Gibbs suc-
cessfully complete the retained jurisdiction in
the 2014 Case, Gibbs satisfactorily completed
the rider.

On February 28, 2016, Gibbs’ probation
officer filed another report alleging that
Gibbs had violated his probation by: (1) com-
mitting the felony crime of sexual exploita-
tion of a child; (2) using methamphetamine;
(8) possessing three unauthorized smart

phones; (4) knowingly associating with his
methamphetamine supplier; and (5) making
prohibited contact with a victim. The State
filed a motion to show cause why probation
should not be revoked.

On April 27, 2016, the parties informed the
district court that Gibbs had been indicted by
a federal grand jury for possessing child
pornography. The State requested a continu-
ance of the probation violation hearing, and
the parties informed the district court that
they intended to enter into a plea agreement
whereby Gibbs would plead guilty to the
federal charge and the State would move to
dismiss the probation violation proceedings
in the current case and the 2014 Case as well
as the new sexual exploitation charge. The
district court expressed concern about the
proposed agreement, stating:

Well, if the State does withdraw the allega-
tions, I intend to proceed on an order to
show cause. I have the ability to enforce
my orders, and if these allegations are
proven to be true, my intention is to im-
pose your Idaho prison sentence, so we can
proceed at a later date but it would be on
an evidentiary hearing even if the State
wants to withdraw these allegations. ...
I think both sides need to research my
ability to go forward. I mean I don’t want
to do something illegal, but my under-
standing is that the Court has the power to
enforce its own orders, and if you’re going
to strip the Court of that power, I’m not—
you'd better be sure you can do it.

On May 17, 2016, the parties filed a writ-
ten plea agreement in which the State com-
mitted to dismissing the pending felony
charge and the probation violation allegations
in the 2014 Case and the current case if
Gibbs pled guilty to the federal charge. On
May 28, 2016, Gibbs’ lawyer sent the district
court a letter regarding the pending proba-
tion violation proceeding. The letter ex-
plained the federal charges against Gibbs,
the sentence he would likely receive, and the
possibility of supervised release following his
incarceration.

In a May 25, 2016, hearing, the district
court acknowledged that it had reviewed the
letter from Gibbs’ counsel as well as the

proposed plea agreement. The district court
clarified its position stating:

All right. And Pve read the plea agree-
ment. On April 27 I indicated that if the
plaintiff were to withdraw the allegation or
not prosecute on the probation violation or
the order to show cause, that I was plan-
ning on proceeding ahead with an order to
show cause of my own, and I think the
appropriate way to proceed beyond that
would be to appoint a special prosecutor,
so why ... I would not want to enforce my
order and impose Mr. Gibbs’ prison sen-
tence in the state of Idaho if he didn’t do—
if he did what he was accused of doing,
The prosecuting attorney responded that

“it was my decision [after consultation with
his superiors] to use my discretion, my pros-
ecutorial discretion, to dismiss the case es-
sentially without prejudice to see what the
feds were going to do.” The prosecuting at-
torney went on to say that “this doesn’t
happen a lot to [sic] where I'll dismiss a case
if it goes federal, but it’s happened a handful
of times in my practice where I’ve done just
that.” The State indicated it had filed mo-
tions to dismiss in Gibbs’ other state court
cases and noted that Gibbs would be serving
significant time on the federal charge and,
upon release, would be required to register
as a sex offender.

The district court granted the State’s mo-
tion to dismiss the motion to show cause, but
it also made its own order to show cause,
informing the parties, “I’m going to appoint a
special prosecutor and we'll have an eviden-
tiary hearing, and I’m just—I’m not going to
let the judiciary’s ability to enforce its own
orders be tramped ....”

On June 6, 2016, the district court in-
formed the parties that while it previously
intended to appoint a special prosecutor, it
found the “simpler solution” to be increasing
the length of Gibbs’ probation. The district
court stated:

Tm not increasing the sentence, I don’t
have the ability to do that. I would be
increasing the length of probation .... I’m
happy to reconsider this if there is legal
argument to the—that should cause me to
reconsider, but I will get an order out
today increasing the length of probation,

785

same terms and conditions, to life, and
then when Mr. Gibbs gets out, if I’m still a
judge, then I can decide whether or not to
proceed with a probation violation, and if I
don’t, then you're still on probation which I
think would be a benefit to the public that
you be on probation in addition to any
parole that you might be on with the feder-
al system ....

The district court entered an order placing
Gibbs on supervised probation for life on the
same terms and conditions that were im-
posed on August 9, 2018, and as modified on
November 20, 2014, The district court explic-
itly reserved the right to bring an order to
show cause and hearing on the February 23,
2016, Report of Violation, following Gibbs’
completion of his federal prison sentence,
Gibbs timely appealed. His appeal asserts
that he was denied his due process right to
an impartial judge and that the district court
abused its discretion when it extended his
probation.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM Gibbs did not advance his constitu-
tional claim before the district court. There-
fore, we apply the fundamental error test
articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
245 P.8d 961 (2010). This three-part test
requires:

(1) the defendant must demonstrate that

one or more of the defendant's unwaived

constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the
need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (8) the
defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights,
meaning (in most instances) that it must
have affected the outcome of the trial pro-
ceedings.

Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

HHH A district court’s decision to extend
probation is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 815, 982
P.2d 986, 988 (1997). To determine whether a
trial court abused its discretion, this Court
considers “(1) whether the lower court right-

786

ly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer
boundaries of such discretion and consistent-
ly with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (8) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of rea-
son.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768
P.2d 1881, 1883 (1989) (internal citation omit-
ted).

I. ANALYSIS

As noted earlier, Gibbs’ appeal presents
two claims: that he was denied his constitu-
tional right to due process because his case
was not heard by an impartial judge, and
that the district court abused its discretion
when it extended Gibbs’ probation from six
years to life after the State dismissed the
probation violation allegations. We will ad-
dress these claims in turn,

A. Gibbs has failed to establish that the
district court judge who presided over
his case was not impartial.

HH Gibbs contends that he was denied his
constitutional right to due process because
his case was not heard by an impartial judge.
Gibbs argues that the district court judge
was upset that the parties entered into a plea
agreement which, in his view, “tramped” his
ability to enforce his orders. Specifically,
Gibbs argues that his right to due process
was violated when the district court judge
rejected the plea deal offered by the parties
and increased Gibbs’ probation on his own
accord, thereby stepping into the role of the
prosecutor. Gibbs reasons that if this case
had been heard by an impartial judge, his
probation would not have been extended be-
cause the State had moved to dismiss the
charges and had not suggested that any addi-
tional punishment would be proper. Further,
Gibbs contends that “[t]he judge’s continued
involvement in this case—culminating in his
order extending Mr, Gibbs’ probation to a
term of life and indicating his intent to poten-
tially pursue the probation violation allega-
tions against Mr. Gibbs after Mr. Gibbs com-
pletes his federal prison sentence—violated
Mr, Gibbs’ right to procedural due process.”

Hl We start with the observation that we
are not presented with a situation where the

district court actually appointed a special
prosecutor to advance probation violation al-
legations where the county prosecutor has
refused to do so and then presided over a
probation violation hearing. We do not reach
this question because the issue is not ripe
and we do not address constitutional ques-
tions such as separation of powers that we
are not required to address, See State v. Doe,
140 Idaho 271, 278, 92 P.8d 521, 528 (2004)
(‘fWihen a case can be decided upon a
ground other than a constitutional ground,
the Court will not address the constitutional
issue unless it is necessary for a determina-
tion of the case.”),

HM The Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits the
State from depriving any person of life, liber-
ty, or property, without due process of law.
US. Const, amend XIV, section 1, Due pro-
cess demands the parties be heard by an
impartial trial judge. State v. Lankford, 116
Idaho 860, 875, 781 P.2d 197, 212 (1989)
(internal citation omitted). Accordingly, a
judge who engages in “prosecutorial acts”
may violate a defendant’s constitutional
rights. Jd.

HN However, the narrow question
presented by this appeal is whether the dis-
trict court’s action in extending Gibbs’ proba-
tion must be reversed due to a lack of impar-
tiality. In order to disqualify a judge for
prejudice, it must be shown that the preju-
dice is directed against the party and is “of
such nature and character as would render it
improbable that the party could have a fair
and impartial trial in the particular case
pending.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Even if a trial judge has been exposed to
prejudicial information, judges are presumed
“capable of disregarding that which should
be disregarded.” Pizzuto v. State, 184 Idaho
798, 799, 10 P.8d 742, 748 (2000) (citing Sivak
v, State, 112 Idaho 197, 205, 781 P.2d 192, 200
(1986). “{T]he standard for recusal of a
judge, based simply on information he has
learned in the course of judicial proceedings,
is extremely high.” Bach v. Bagley, 148 Ida-
ho 784, 792, 229 P,8d 1146, 1154 (2010).

In determining whether judicial bias is
present such that a recusal may be warrant-
ed, this Court has held:

First, judicial rulings alone almost never

constitute valid basis for a bias or partiali-

ty motion ... and can only in the rarest
circumstances evidence the degree of fa-
voritism or antagonism required .... Al-
most invariably, they are proper grounds
for appeal, not for recusal. Second, opin-
ions formed by the judge on the basis of
facts introduced or events occurring in the
course of the current proceedings, or of
prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis
for a bias or partiality motion unless they
display a deep seated favoritism or antago-

nism that would make fair judgment im-

possible. Thus, judicial remarks during the

course of a trial that are critical or disap-

proving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the

parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not

support a bias or partiality challenge ....
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 845, 391, 318 P.8d
1, 47 (2018) (citing Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127
L,Ed.2d 474 (1994),

Once a person is convicted of a crime or
has entered a guilty plea, “the court in its
discretion may ... suspend the execution of
judgment ... and may place the defendant
on probation under such terms and condi-
tions as it deems necessary and appropriate.”
LC. § 19-2601@). After a defendant is placed
on probation, Idaho Code section 20-222 “em-
powers the court to extend the probation
period, so long as the total term does not
exceed the maximum period for which the
defendant might have been imprisoned.”
State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 818, 815, 932
P.2d 986, 988 (1997) (internal citations omit-
ted).

In State v. Lankford, this Court reviewed
numerous actions taken by a district court to
determine whether there was evidence of
bias or a prejudicial attitude by the judge.
116 Idaho at 875, 781 P.2d at 212. Specifical-
ly, this Court reviewed the district court’s
sua sponte consideration of two additional
aggravating factors during sentencing and
found that the district court’s action was “not
evidence of a prejudicial attitude but rather
constitutes the trial court’s proper perform-

ee
|

787

ance of its statutory duties.” Jd. (finding that
the judge is required to determine sentenc-
ing and the prosecuting attorney merely pro-
vides sentencing recommendations), In the
present case, it appears that the district
court believed it was acting within the statu-
tory framework to monitor and extend Gibbs’
probation period pursuant to Idaho Code sec-
tion 20-222. We do not find that the district
court’s action in response to information pre-
sented to it in the course of its handling of
Gibbs’ case constitutes a “prosecutorial act”
because action to extend probation may only
be done by the court. Although this is a close
ease, we conclude that Gibbs has failed to
meet the “extremely high” burden imposed
on those asserting judicial bias based upon
information acquired in the course of judicial
duties. This case does, however, raise a sig-
nificant question as to whether the district
court’s decision constituted an abuse of dis-
cretion,

B. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it modified Gibbs’
probation from a term of six years to
a term of life, ‘

HM Gibbs argues that the district court
abused its diseretion when it lengthened, sua
sponte, his probation after the probation vio-
lation allegations were dismissed. In this
case, it is evident that the district court
recognized that it had the discretion to ex-
tend the term of Gibbs’ probation. As Gibbs’
underlying conviction was for delivery of a
controlled substance, a crime which carries a
maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the
district court’s decision was within the outer
boundaries of its discretion. The district
court’s decision was based upon reason, as it
reflected the district court’s view that it was
appropriate for the protection of society. The
remaining question is whether the decision
‘was consistent with the applicable legal stan-
dards governing decisions to modify the du-
ration of probation. This last question is one
which we have not previously explored.

There are two statutes addressing the trial
courts’ authority to modify probation. Idaho
Code section 20-221(1) provides that “the
court may impose and may at any time modi-
fy any terms or conditions of probation or

788

suspension of sentence.” Idaho Code section
20-222(1) states that “[t]he period of proba-
tion or suspension of sentence shall be fixed
by the court and may at any time be extend-
ed or terminated by the court. Such period
with any extension thereof shall not exceed
the maximum period for which the defendant
might have been imprisoned.”

Both statutes authorize the courts to act
“at any time” and neither statute provides
explicit conditions under which the courts
may exercise this authority. In view of the
similar language employed by these two stat-
utes (not to mention that they are codified
adjacent to one another), we believe that the
same legal standards ought to govern deci-
sions made under both statutes.

Idaho Code section 20-2212) authorizes
“lalny party or the board of correction” to
request a modification of the terms and con-
ditions of probation. The request need only
“[gset] forth the facts upon which the request
is based.” Indeed, Idaho Code section 20-
221) authorizes courts to rule upon such
requests “without a hearing.” Likewise, Ida-
ho Code section 20-221(8) authorizes courts
to exercise the power granted by Idaho Code
section 20-222(1) to terminate probation
“without a hearing.”

In the absence of any prior decision from
this Court addressing this important ques-
tion, we start with a few observations. First,
the statutes permit the trial court to alter
conditions and the duration of probation.
There are times when the trial court may
wish to reduce the burdens of probation for a
defendant. For example, a court may wish to
reward a defendant for good performance
while on probation, either by reducing the
length of probation or removing burdensome
conditions, e.g., travel restrictions. We can
discern no principled basis for imposing dif-
1, In the proceedings before the trial court, Gibbs’

attorney acknowledged the court’s statutory au-

thority to extend probation, but objected on the
grounds that Gibbs “was sentenced to a particu-
lar term, and this would be an increase of that,”

This Court has rejected this argument. In Mu-

chow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 128 P.3d 938

(2006), the district court extended the defen-

dant’s probation by an additional year pursuant

to Idaho Code section 20-222. Id. at 402, 128

P.3d at 939. The defendant violated his probation

during the extended period of probation, and the

ferent legal standards for increasing the bur-
den on a probationer from those instances
where the burden is reduced. Second, there
are occasions when the trial court may be-
come aware that the defendant has rehabili-
tative needs that may be addressed through
probation which were not apparent at the
time of sentencing. Frequently, a defendant's
substance abuse or mental health issues only
become apparent after supervision has be-
gun, There is no discernable purpose for
requiring adversarial proceedings (ie., pro-
bation violation proceedings) as a prerequi-
site to addressing a defendant’s immediate
needs through probation. Finally, given the
limited supervision resources available to the
Department of Correction, it makes no sense
whatsoever to restrict the ability of trial
courts to terminate probation for low-risk
offenders to those instances where a proba-
tion violation has been proved.

HH Thus, we hold that the applicable
legal standard governing probation modifica-
tion proceedings is this: If, in the regular
course of his or her duties, a judge becomes
aware of circumstances constituting good
cause for modification of the conditions or
duration of probation (whether that be add-
ing or eliminating conditions of probation or
extending, reducing, or terminating the dura-
tion of probation), after notice to the parties
and affording the parties an opportunity to
be heard, the trial court may modify the
terms or duration of probation pursuant to
Idaho Code section 20-221(1) or 20-222(2).

TE We note that Gibbs’ briefing on ap-
peal! does not address the trial court’s au-
thority to extend the length of his probation
under Idaho Code section 20-222(1), Al-
though the failure to acknowledge the legal
basis for the trial court’s action would ordi-

district court revoked probation and imposed the
previously suspended sentence. Id. On appeal,
the defendant contended that the district court
could not revoke probation after the original
probationary period would have expired. We
made short work of this argument: “Idaho Code
§ 20-222 is clear on its face. The term ‘maximum
period for which the defendant might have been
imprisoned’ simply means the total number of
days a defendant may be placed in physical cus-
tody for a particular crime.” /d. at 403, 128 P.3d
at 940,

narily have been fatal to his claim that the
trial court erred, we will consider his claim of
error under the standard that we have just
articulated.

Here, the district court was provided sub-
stantial information in the course of its duties
that was germane to its evaluation of the risk
that Gibbs presented to society. The district
court knew that Gibbs was on probation for
delivery of methamphetamine to a minor.
The district court knew that Gibbs violated
that probation by having sexual contact with
a minor, resulting in the 2014 Case. Based
upon representations to the district court
from both parties, the district court knew
that Gibbs had been charged in federal court
with a felony offense of child pornography,
that he intended to plead guilty to the
charge, and that Gibbs would receive a sub-
stantial federal prison sentence. In short, the
district court was aware of significant facts
which persuaded it that Gibbs’ continuing
eriminal conduct necessitated extending pro-
bation for the protection of society.

HM As is frequently the case in sentenc-
ing review cases, if we were acting in the role
of the trial court, we might well have reached
a different conclusion as to whether proba-
tion for life was necessary in Gibbs’ case.
However, as “our task is not to determine
whether we agree with” the district court’s
decision, State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 878,
881, 253 P.3d 310, 318 (2011), we may not
reverse the district court’s decision in the
absence of an abuse of discretion. As the
district court recognized its discretion, acted
within the boundaries of that discretion and
consistent with applicable legal standards,
and reached its decision through the exercise
of reason, we are duty-bound to affirm.

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s order ex-
tending the term of Gibbs’ probation.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
EISMANN and BRODY concur.

JONES, J. coneurring in part and
dissenting in part:

I reluctantly concur with Section A of the
majority opinion, but only because the stan-

789

dard of review is whether the district court
abused its discretion. Extending my defer-
ence of the district court’s discretion to its
absolute maximum, I agree that the district
court did not exhibit bias against Gibbs.
Turning, however, to Section B of the majori-
ty opinion, I simply cannot agree that the
district court did not abuse its discretion
when it modified Gibbs’ probation term. I
firmly believe that the district court judge
fell far short of the permissible discretion
when he extended Gibbs’ probation from a
term of six years to a term of life, Specifical-
ly, I believe that the district court’s conclu-
sion was not reached through an exercise of
reason,

The majority thinks that this is a close
case with respect to the issue of bias, but also
recognizes that this case raises a significant
question as to whether the district court’s
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The majority admits that it “might well have
reached a different conclusion as to whether
probation for life was necessary in Gibbs’
case.” However, the majority then acknowl-
edges that it is not our task to determine
whether we agree with the district court’s
decision, but instead it is our task to decide
whether the district court abused its discre-
tion. Although I agree with the majority’s
statements, I simply cannot agree that there
‘was no abuse of discretion here,

Looking at the facts of this case, it is
apparent that the district court was dissatis-
fied with the parties’ plea agreement in
which the prosecutor proposed dismissing
the state court proceedings in exchange for
Gibbs’ guilty plea to federal charges regard-
ing possession of child pornography, which
would likely result in a substantial federal
sentence. Upon receiving notice of the par-
ties’ intent to dismiss the allegations that
Gibbs violated his probation, the judge ac-
knowledged various steps that could be taken
before he would proceed with modifying pro-
bation, eg., appointing a special prosecutor
and holding an evidentiary hearing. Howev-
er, upon realizing that these alternative op-
tions “seemed to be a lot of work,” the judge
placed Gibbs on probation indefinitely and
justified his decision by stating that it was in
the best interest of society. For a decision to

790

be reached through an exercise of reason,
especially a decision extending probation, I
believe that a probationer must be given the
opportunity to dispute allegations upon which
a probation extension is based.

Despite the prosecution’s decision to dis-
miss the motion to show cause, the judge
assumed that the probation violation allega-
tions originally levied against Gibbs were
true, and he based his decision to extend
Gibbs’ probation on these unproven allega-
tions, The judge began by stating that he had
“the ability to enforce [his] own orders, and
if these allegations are proven true, my in-
tention is to impose [Gibbs’] Idaho prison
sentence.” (Emphasis added). At the next
hearing, the judge changed course and deter-
mined that it would be appropriate to appoint.
a special prosecutor and hold an evidentiary
hearing. Had an evidentiary hearing been
held, I would have no problem with the result
because Gibbs would have had an opportuni-
ty to be heard and defend himself before the
modification of his probation. However,
thereafter, the judge changed course again,
stating that he had reached a “simpler solu-
tion” and would:

[Glet an order out today increasing the
length of probation, same terms and condi-
tions, to life, and then when Mr, Gibbs gets
out [from his federal prison sentence], if
Tm still a judge, then I can decide whether
or not to proceed with a probation viola-
tion, and if I don’t, then [Gibbs is] still on
probation which I think would be a benefit
to the public that [Gibbs] be on probation
in addition to any parole [Gibbs] might be
on with the federal system ....

In response to defense counsel's inquiry as
to whether the district, court would still be
appointing a special prosecutor, the judge
replied no, “that seemed to be a lot of work
and—and I think this is a better result for
the public, I think I can protect the public
better this way than what I was proposing
doing earlier.” While the result may be a
“simpler solution,” it offends principles of
due process.

As noted by the majority, there is no doubt,
that a court has the power to modify the
terms or duration of probation for good cause
after notifying the parties and affording the

parties an opportunity to be heard, 1.C, § 20-
221; 1.C. § 20-2222). However, a review of
the transcript in the present case shows no
discussion, analysis, or argument on the mod-
ification of the terms of probation. Moreover,
the judge did not offer the parties a reason-
able opportunity to be heard, ie, to offer
information in mitigation. The parties arrived
at the hearing believing that they would be
discussing the appointment of a special pros-
ecutor, Instead, the judge essentially am-
bushed the parties with a sua sponte decision
to extend Gibbs’ probation. I firmly believe
that the judge was not happy with the pro-
posed plea agreement and decided that—
instead of appointing a special prosecutor—
the “simpler solution” was to punish the de-
fendant by increasing the probation from a
term of six years to life, and to leave him
with the threat that the judge might revive
the probation violation at a later time.

It is firmly established that, in reviewing
whether a lower court has abused its discre-
tion, this Court must determine “(1) whether
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted
within the outer boundaries of such discre-
tion and consistently with any legal stan-
dards applicable to specific choices; and (8)
whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1881, 1888 (1989)
(internal citation omitted).

In the present case, there is no question
that the district court rightly perceived the
issue as one of discretion, and acted within
the outer bounds of such discretion—al-
though, the district court certainly toed the
line of the outer bounds of its discretion by
imposing a lifetime of probation. However, as
I indicated earlier, there was no “reason”
involved in any of this proceeding. There was
absolutely no reason exercised in any of the
interplay between the defendant, the prose-
eutor, and the district court. In short, the
plea agreement proposed by the parties up-
set the judge, and the proceeding degenerat-
ed into an argument in which the judge
sought to determine what he could do within
his discretion to upset the prosecutor's plan
to dismiss the probation violation allegations.
Ultimately, the judge succumbed to a knee-

jerk reaction, extending Gibbs’ probation to a
term of life and putting the probation viola-
tion issue on hold until the federal process is
complete.

As an example of judicial diseretion, the
context of this proceeding would leave a dam-
aging image in an observer's mind, of a judge
who handed out an arbitrary sentence based
on no reasoning whatsoever. The transcript
of these proceedings will certainly not paint a
favorable impression of judicial conduct to
the average citizen. Instead, the picture it
portrays is that of a defendant caught up in a
dispute between a prosecutor and a judge
that ends with a lifetime of probation. This
order was entered by a judge that, although
probably not biased, was at least angry
enough to impose a life term of probation,

Instead of acting reasonably, the district
judge repeatedly showed his disdain for the
parties’ plea agreement, and when the par-
ties disagreed with him, he independently
elected to proceed with an order that will
affect Gibbs for the rest of his life. The
bottom line is that the judge’s decision to
extend Gibbs’ probation to a term of life was
rooted in his anger rather than through an
exercise of reason.

405 P.3d 576
Gilberto GARZA Jr., Petitioner-Appellant,
ve.
STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
Docket No. 44991

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, September 2017 Term.

Filed: November 6, 2017

a
7

Eric D, Fredericksen, Idaho State Appel-
late Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Maya P. Waldron, Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent. Kale D.
Gans, Deputy Attorney General argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Gilberto Garza, Jr., appeals the Ada Coun-
ty district court’s order dismissing his peti-
tions for post-conviction relief. Garza signed
two plea agreements relating to charges of
aggravated assault and possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute. As
part of his plea agreements Garza waived his
right to appeal. Despite the waivers, Garza
instructed his attorney to appeal. Garza’s
attorney declined to file the appeals, citing
the waivers of appeal in the plea agreements.
Garza then filed two petitions for post-convic-
tion relief, alleging his counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to appeal. The district court
dismissed Garza’s petitions concluding
Garza’s counsel was not ineffective in failing
to appeal. The Court of Appeals agreed and
affirmed. We granted Garza’s timely petition
for review and affirm.

1, The convictions were based on two Idaho
Criminal Rule 11 plea agreements that were part

793

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

This appeal involves two underlying con-
victions and two corresponding petitions for
post-conviction relief! On January 28, 2015,
Garza entered an Alford plea to aggravated
assault (assault case), and on February 24,
2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver
(possession case). The plea agreements
bound the district court to sentence Garza to
five years in prison for the assault case (two
years fixed, three indeterminate), and anoth-
er five years in prison for the possession case
(one year fixed, four indeterminate), The sen-
tences were to run consecutively, along with
another prison sentence previously imposed
on Garza. The district court accepted the
plea agreements and imposed sentence in
accordance with them on the same day Garza
entered the possession plea. In both binding
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(@(1)(c) plea agree-
ments, Garza waived his right to appeal, and
waived his right to request relief pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The court acknowl-
edged that Garza had waived his right to
appeal, but advised Garza of his appeal rights
anyway. Garza did not appeal the convictions
or sentences in the underlying cases.

Approximately four months later, Garza
filed a petition for post-conviction relief in
each case, asserting among other things that
his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing
notices of appeal. Garza stated in his affidavit
submitted in the possession case that he
asked his attorney to appeal, and in his affi-
davit submitted in his assault case that his
attorney failed to appeal despite numerous
phone calls and letters from Garza. Garza’s
former attorney stated in an affidavit that he
did not file an appeal because Garza “re-
ceived the sentence(s) he bargained for in his
[plea] agreement” and “an appeal was pro-
plematic because [Garza] waived his right to
appeal in his Rule 11 agreements.”

The court appointed an attorney for Garza
and issued a notice of intent to dismiss all of
Garza’s claims except for his claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. After both parties
responded to the notice, the court dismissed

of a global agreement that included a third case
and other unfiled charges.

794

all post-conviction claims except for the inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim regarding
the failure to file an appeal. The parties then
filed cross-motions for summary adjudication
on Garza’s remaining claim for post-convic-
tion relief, where Garza sought a reopening
of the appeals period in the underlying crimi-
nal cases on the basis of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, The district court dismissed
Garza’s petitions, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. We granted Garza’s timely petition
for review.

IL ISSUE ON APPEAL

1, Was Garza’s attorney ineffective when
he did not file an appeal after Garza request-
ed it even though Garza had waived his right
to appeal as part of a Rule 11 plea agree-
ment?

UI. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM When addressing a petition for re-
view, this Court will give “serious consider-
ation to the views of the Court of Appeals,
but directly reviews the decision of the lower
court.” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491,
887 P.8d 647, 650 (2014) (quoting State 0,
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 887, 389
(2007). “Proceedings for post-conviction re-
lief are civil in nature, rather than criminal,
and therefore the applicant must prove the
allegations in the request for relief by a
preponderance of the evidence.” State v.
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 845, 861, 318 P.8d 1, 17
(2018). The district court may grant a motion
by either party for summary disposition for
post-conviction relief when there is no genu-
ine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. LC. § 19-4906(¢). This Court exercises
free review over the district court’s “determi-
nation as to whether constitutional require-
ments have been satisfied in light of the facts
found.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 861, 318 P.8d
at 17 (quoting State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,
248, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072 (2008).

Iv. ANALYSIS

HM A criminal defendant is permitted
to waive his right to appeal as part of a plea
agreement, State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456,

I

457, 872 P,2d 719, 720 (1994), The waiver is
valid and will be upheld as long as it was
entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and in-
telligently as part of a plea agreement. Id, In
this case, the district court found that Garza
did not show that his plea was not knowing,
voluntary, or intelligent, nor did Garza raise
this issue on appeal, The sole issue remaining
is whether, despite the appeal waiver, Garza
still had the right to appeal and therefore his
counsel was ineffective for failing to file an
appeal at his request.

This Court has not yet decided whether
counsel is ineffective if counsel denies his
client’s request to file an appeal when the
client waived the right to appeal in a binding
Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea agreement.
Garza argues that the district court erred in
requiring him to show, rather than presum-
ing, his counsel was deficient and that Garza
‘was prejudiced when his attorney declined to
file an appeal in light of the waiver. For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of Garza’s petitions for
post-conviction relief.

Hs Criminal defendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to “reasonably effective”
legal assistance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470, 476, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d
985 (2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct, 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984)); see also Booth v. State, 151 Idaho
612, 617, 262 P.8d 255, 260 (2011). A defen-
dant claiming ineffective assistance of coun-
sel must show that (1) counsel’s representa-
tion was deficient; and (2) counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant.
Strickland, 466 U.S, at 688-92, 104 S.Ct.
2052; Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181
P.8d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To show coun-
sel was deficient, the defendant has the bur-
den of showing that his attorney’s represen-
tation fell below an objective standard of
veasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
‘758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). General-
ly, when trial counsel fails to file an appeal at
a criminal defendant's request, such perform-
ance is professionally unreasonable and
therefore deficient. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
at 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029; Beasley v, State, 126
Idaho 856, 862, 888 P,2d 714, 720 (Ct. App.
1994). To show that counsel’s deficient. per-

formance was prejudicial, the defendant must
show there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s deficiencies, the result of
the proceeding would have been different,
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052;
Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.
This test applies to claims that counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a notice of ap-
peal, Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477, 120
S.Ct. 1029. However, whether counsel was
ineffective becomes unclear when the reason
the attorney did not file the appeal is because
the client waived the right to appeal as part
of a plea agreement.

Neither the United States Supreme Court
nor this Court have decided whether an at-
torney has provided ineffective assistance of
counsel if the attorney declines to file an
appeal after a defendant has requested it,
when the defendant has waived the right to
appeal as part of a plea agreement, There is
a federal circuit split regarding the issue,
which involves differing interpretations of the
United State Supreme Court’s decision in
Flores-Ortega, The Flores-Ortega case did
not involve an appeal waiver, but rather dealt
with whether an attorney provided ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel when she failed to
appeal because it was unclear if her client
wanted to appeal. See Flores-Ortega, 528
US. at 475, 120 S.Ct, 1029, The Court held
“when counsel’s constitutionally deficient
performance deprives a defendant of an ap-
peal that he otherwise would have taken, the
defendant has made out a successful ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim entitling him
to an appeal.” Id, at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029,

A majority of federal circuit courts have
interpreted Flores-Oriega to apply even in
situations where the defendant has validly
waived his right to appeal. Those circuits
hold that attorneys are ineffective when they
do not file an appeal after the clients re-
quested it, regardless of whether the defen-
dants had waived their rights. See Campbell
v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 360 (6th Cir.
2012); United States v. Poindeater, 492 F.8d
263, 265 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v.

2. While the Ninth Circuit follows the majority
approach, its language in Sandoval-Lopez seems
to indicate it has doubts about the policy consid-
erations implicated under the majority approach,
The court expressed that the defendant's appeal

795

Tapp, 491 F.8d 268, 266 (5th Cir. 2007);
Watson v. United States, 498 F.8d 960, 964
(8th Cir, 2007); Campusano v. United States,
442 F.8d 770, 775 (2d Cir, 2006); United
States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.8d 1198,
1198 (Sth Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett,
402 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005); Gomez-
Diaz v. United States, 433 F.8d 788, 794
(11th Cir. 2005). Under the majority ap-
proach, an attorney is required to file an
appeal at his client’s request, even if the
attorney thinks the appeal would be frivo-
lous. Campusano, 442 F.3d at 771-72, When
counsel fails to follow his client’s express
direction to appeal, prejudice is presumed.
Id, at 772. “The prejudice in failure to file a
notice of appeal cases is that the defendant
Jost his chance to file the appeal, not that he
Jost a favorable result that he would have
obtained by appeal.” Sandoval-Lopez, 409
F.8d at 1197?

Two federal circuit courts and a federal
district court in an undecided circuit follow
the minority approach and hold that Flores-
Ortega does not require an attorney be pre-
sumed ineffective for failing to appeal upon
request when there has been a waiver of the
right to appeal. See Nunez v. United States,
546 F.3d 450, 456 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated on
other grounds by Nunez v. United States,
554 US. 911, 128 S.Ct, 2990, 171 L.Ed.2d 879
(2008); United States v. Mabry, 586 F.3d 231,
242 (8d Cir. 2008); Maes v. United States,
No. 15-CV-240-SM, 2015 WL 9216588, at *3
(D.N.H. Dec, 16, 2015). The minority ap-
proach does not presume deficiency or preju-
dice when an attorney denies his client’s
instruction to file an appeal when there has
been an appeal waiver, and instead requires
the defendant meet the test in Strickland,
which requires showing deficient perform-
ance and prejudice. Nunez, 546 F.8d at 456,
The minority approach holds that when a
defendant waives his appellate rights, he no
longer has a right to appeal, and'therefore an
attorney is not bound to file an appeal at his
client's request. Id, at 455,

would likely have been dismissed or he would
have lost, and it was likely wise for his attorney
to not file the appeal as it was in breach of the
plea agreement, Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at
41197,

796 be

Though few other states have addressed
the issue, the ones who have continue to
apply the Strickland test. See Buettner v.
State, 2015 MT 848N, 11 14-15, 382 Mont.
410, 863 P.8d 1147 (2015) (applying the two-
prong test of Strickland to determine that
counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a
notice of appeal); People v. Miller, 12 A.D.3d
852, 784 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681-82 (2004)
(Where, as here, a defendant makes an in-
formed and intelligent waiver of the right to
appeal, ordinarily he or she will be precluded
from arguing ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, except to the extent that the claimed
ineffective assistance impacts upon the volun-
tariness of the plea.”); Stewart v. United
States, 87 A.8d 870, 877 (D.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(holding Flores-Ortega did not control when
there had been an appeal waiver, and stating
that “[defendant’s] claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in relation to the failure to
file a notice of appeal is palpably incredible
....”); Kargus v. State, 284 Kan. 908, 169
P.8d 807, 820 (2007) (citing Kan. Admin.
Regs. § 105-3-9) (applying a modified adapta-
tion of Flores-Ortega, however, it is limited
by statutory language stating an attorney
must “file notice of appeal in a timely man-
ner, unless a waiver of the right to appeal
has been signed by the defendant”).

In a recent case, this Court discussed
Flores-Ortega in the context of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim when counsel did
not consult with a defendant about filing an
appeal after the defendant waived his right
to appeal. McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho 286,
289-90, 396 P.8d 1168, 1171-72 (2017). In
McKinney, a defendant waived his right to
appeal as part of a Rule 11 sentencing agree-
ment, and then sought post-conviction relief
on the ground that his attorney was ineffec-
tive for not consulting with him about appeal-
ing his sentence, despite having waived his
appeal rights in the plea. Id, at 297, 396 P.8d
at 1179, This Court interpreted Flores-Orte-
ga to not compel a bright-line presumption of
deficiency or prejudice in the failure to con-
sult context. Id. Rather, this Court consid-
ered whether counsel's failure to consult with
the defendant about filing an appeal was
deficient conduct that prejudiced the defen-
dant, and concluded it was not. Id.

HH In this case, we decline to presume
counsel ineffective for failing to appeal at
Garza’s request when Garza has waived the
right to appeal as part of a plea agreement.
Rather, to show ineffective assistance of
counsel, Garza must show deficient conduct
and resulting prejudice. In so holding, we
conclude that Flores-Ortega does not require
counsel be presumed ineffective for failing to
appeal at the client's direction in situations
where there has been a waiver of the right to
appeal, as there was here.

The Flores-Ortega Court made clear that a

presumption of prejudice applies in the

context of an ineffectiveness claim because
an attorney's deficient performance de-
prives the defendant of his or her opportu-
nity for an appellate proceeding. Notably,

Flores-Ortega did not address whether this

principle has any force, let alone controls,

where the defendant has waived his right

to appellate and collateral review.
Mabry, 586 F.3d at 240 (citations omitted).
In fact, the Court in Flores-Ortega stated,
“The even more serious denial of the entire
judicial proceeding itself, which a defendant.
wanted at the time and to which he had a
right, similarly demands a presumption of
prejudice,” 528 U.S, at 488, 120 S.Ct. 1029
(emphasis added). Once a defendant has
waived his right to appeal in a valid plea
agreement, he no longer has a right to such
an appeal. Thus, the presumption of preju-
dice articulated in Flores-Ortega would not
apply after a defendant has waived his appel-
late rights. Therefore, an attorney who de-
clines to file the appeal when there has been
a waiver will not be presumed ineffective, nor
will the attorney be found to have violated
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.

HE This approach is consistent with
other areas of Idaho law. Idaho courts do not.
presume a defendant is prejudiced when an
attorney fails to follow his client’s instruction
to file a Rule 35 motion, despite the client
having the right to do so. Hassett v. State,
127 Idaho 318, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.
App. 1995).

[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assis-

tance of counsel an applicant ... must

show both that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced

the applicant, Where the alleged deficiency
is counsel’s failure to file a ... motion, a
conclusion that the motion, if pursued,
would not have been granted, is generally
determinative of both prongs of the test. If
the motion lacked merit and would have
been denied, counsel ordinarily would not
be deficient for failing to pursue it, and,
concomitantly, the petitioner could not
have been prejudiced by the want of its
pursuit,
Id. (quoting Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155,
158-59, 857 P.2d 634, 637-88 (Ct. App. 1998)).
As the district court correctly stated, “[ilt
would seem anomalous to presume prejudice
in the failure-to-appeal context when the de-
fendant waived the right to appeal, yet not
presume prejudice in the Rule 35 context
even when the defendant has not waived the
right to file a Rule 85 motion.” Other Idaho
cases have adopted similar policies regarding
when counsel is ineffective:

When considering whether an attorney’s
failure to file or pursue a motion to sup-
press or strike evidence constitutes incom-
petent performance, the court is required
to examine the probability of success of
such a motion in order to determine
whether counsel’s decision against pressing
the motion was within the wide range of
permissible discretion and sound trial
strategy. In Carter v, State, 108 Idaho 788,
794-795, 702 P.2d 826, 832-33 (1985), the
Idaho Supreme Court held that counsel’s
failure to move to suppress the defendant’s
confession constituted ineffective assis-
tance because it was obvious that the con-
fession would have been suppressed. In
Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 501, 700
P.2d 115, 128 (Ct. App. 1985), we held that.
newly appointed counsel’s failure to renew
a motion to suppress was not deficient,
since previous counsel had been unsuccess-
ful on the same motion and no new
grounds existed. Because it was clear that.
the new motion would have been denied as
well, counsel’s failure to make the motion
was not deficient. See also, Davis v. State,
116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248
(Ct. App. 1989), (counsel’s failure to timely
file a motion to suppress evidence seized
from defendant's home was not deficient
because defendant had failed to show that,

797

the items would have been suppressed);
State v. Youngblood, 117 Idaho 160, 165,
786 P.2d 551, 556 (1990) (failure to move to
suppress items seized was not error where
items were obviously subject to plain view
exception to exclusionary rule); State v,
Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 56, 818 P.2d 857,
867 (1991) (failure of counsel to object to
inadmissible opinion testimony was ineffec-
tive assistance.)
Huck, 124 Idaho at 158, 857 P.2d at 687.
While the above cases do not deal with ap-
peal waivers specifically, they show the policy
of this Court to not presume counsel ineffec-
tive automatically when counsel exercises
judgment in declining to file a motion where
it would obviously be denied, or where the
motion had previously been unsuccessful. See
Dawis, 116 Idaho at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248,

HE Moreover, a criminal defense attor-
ney has a duty to the judicial system to
exercise professional judgment and not file
frivolous litigation, “and an appeal in the
teeth of a valid waiver is frivolous.” Nunez,
546 F.3d at 455; See also Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.1. The defendant,
even if allowed his appeal, will very likely
still have his appeal dismissed as a result of
the waiver, and “{t]here is no point in a
constitutional rule that would yield an exer-
cise in futility.” Nunez, 546 F.8d at 456.
Garza’s attorney chose to exercise profes-
sional judgment and uphold the plea agree-
ments that contained his client’s original de-
sire to waive his right to appeal. Such an
exercise of judgment that keeps frivolous and
futile litigation out of the courts will not be
presumed ineffective assistance of counsel,

HE Additionally, a plea agreement is
a bilateral contract, to which both the State
and defendant are bound. McKinney, 162
Idaho at 296, 396 P.3d at 1178. Once a defen-
dant has accepted the plea, he should be
bound by the waiver therein. Numez, 546
F.8d at 455. “Empty promises are worthless
promises; if defendants could retract their
waivers ... then they could not obtain con-
cessions by promising not to appeal.” United
States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir.
1995). “[Garza] exchanged the right to appeal
for prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have

798

his cake and eat it too.” Id, Moreover, a
lawyer has a duty to avoid taking actions that
will cost their client the benefit of the plea
bargain. Naez, 646 F.8d at 455, If an attor-
ney files an appeal despite a waiver in the
plea agreement, the agreement may be
breached, and the State may now be entitled
to disregard the plea in its entirety, Here,
filing an appeal would have been a direct,
violation of the plea agreement, and the State
would have been free to revoke the benefits
of the plea given to Garza, When Garza’s
attorney declined to file an appeal because
the right to appeal had been waived, counsel
ensured Garza would not be in breach of the
plea, We are cognizant that there are con-
ceivable situations where a defendant who
has waived his right to appeal as part of a
plea agreement may still seek to challenge
his conviction or sentence, for example if he
is sentenced illegally or the State breaches
the plea agreement. This is properly done in
a petition for post-conviction relief or writ of
habeas corpus, rather than on direct appeal.

In this case, we decline to presume Garza’s
counsel ineffective when counsel failed to file
an appeal at Garza’s request because of the
appeal waiver. Rather, to show ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to appeal in
light of the waiver, Garza needed to show
both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice. The district court concluded that
Garza was unable to show any non-frivolous
grounds for appeal, and therefore could not
show prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Garza’s petitions
for post-conviction relief.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court's dismissal of
Garza’s petitions for post-conviction relief.
This Court does not presume counsel to be
automatically ineffective when counsel de-
clines to file an appeal in light of an appeal
waiver. Rather, a defendant needs to show
deficient performance and resulting preju-
dice to prove ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. Because Garza cannot show such
grounds, his petitions for post-conviction re-

lief were properly dismissed by the district
court, and the district court is affirmed,

Justices JONES, HORTON, BRODY and
TROUT, Pro Tem concur.

405 P.3d 583
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

Teresa Lee TOLLMAN, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket No. 44648

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, September 2017 Term.

Filed: November 8, 2017

Erie D, Fredericksen, Idaho State Appel-
late Public Defender, Boise, attorney for ap-
pellant, Brian R, Dickson argued,

Hon, Lawrence G, Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, attorney for respondent,
Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued,

JONES, Justice
1. Naturn or tae Case

In a case arising out of Ada County, Tere-
sa Lee Tollman (“Tollman”) appeals a district
court's order denying her motion for a re-
stricted driver's license. Specifically, Tollman
argues that the district court erred when it
failed to apply a 2015 amendment to Idaho
Code section 18-8005(6)(d) (the “Amend-
ment”), which permitted her to apply for a
restricted driver’s license, Tollman argues
that the Amendment should have been ap-
plied because she filed her request for a
restricted driver's license after the Amend-
ment was enacted.

I, Facruan anp Procepural BAackerounp

In December 2012, Tollman pled guilty to
the felony crime of driving under the influ-
ence, In March 2018, the district court sen-
tenced Tollman to a unified term of ten
years, with two and a half years fixed fol-
lowed by seven and a half years indetermi-
nate. The judgment required that Tollman’s
driver’s license be absolutely suspended for
five years beginning on the date of Tollman’s
release from custody.

800

On March 14, 2016, Tollman applied! for a
restricted driver’s license to drive to and
from work. On March 21, 2016, the district
court denied the motion for restricted driving
privileges based on Idaho Code section 18-
8005(6)(d), acknowledging that at the time
Tollman was convicted, the statute read that
a defendant convicted of felony driving under
the influence:

Shall have his driving privileges suspended

by the court for a mandatory minimum

period of one (1) year after release from
imprisonment, and may have his driving
privileges suspended by the court for not
to exceed five (5) years after release from
imprisonment, during which time he shall
have absolutely no driving privileges of
any kind.

The district court noted that in 2015 the

legislature amended the section to read that

a defendant:

Shall have his driving privileges suspended

by the court for a mandatory minimum

period of one (1) year after release from
imprisonment, during which time he shall
have absolutely no driving privileges of
any kind, and may have his driving privi-
leges suspended by the court for an addi-
tional period not to exceed four (4) years,
during which the defendant may request
restricted driving privileges that the court

may allow if the defendant shows by a

preponderance of the evidence that driving

privileges are necessary for his employ-
ment or for family health needs ...
(Emphasis added).

Ultimately, the district court denied Toll-
man’s application, stating as follows, in perti-
nent part:

The statute makes clear that a defendant

convicted of felony driving under the influ-

ence shall have absolutely no driving privi-

Jeges of any kind for no less than a year

following release from imprisonment. It is

the burden of the movant (here, the Defen-
dant) to show that that year has elapsed
and the Defendant is eligible for restricted
privileges. The defendant has provided no
proof that she is eligible for restricted
privileges. Therefore, the {clourt DENIES

1, Although the process to obtain a restricted
driver's license is technically an application, the

Defendant's motion for a restricted driv-
er’s license.

On September 5, 2016, Tollman filed an-
other application for a restricted driver’s li-
cense accompanied by proof that her release
was over 18 months prior. In support of her
request, Tollman sent the district court a
letter, which stated that she had been sober
since November 29, 2012, was very active in
the Alcoholics Anonymous community, and
planned to continue with the program. Addi-
tionally, she explained that she had been
working two jobs since April of 2016 and had
been using Uber for transportation, which
cost over $600 each month. Tollman also
stated that her youngest daughter just start-
ed school at University of Idaho and she
would like to be able to drive up to visit her
because she was homesick.

The district court held a hearing on No-
vember 4, 2016, and affirmed what it held in
its March 21, 2016, order:

Tm going to say what that order says. It
says I don’t have the power, even if I
wanted to, to give you back your driver’s
license. That’s the point of that order.

So it’s not discretionary. It’s not, oh, you
know, I don’t think you're doing well
enough. Even if I wanted to give you your
driver's license, I can’t.

The district court went on to discuss that a
court can take a driver’s license away either
as part of a criminal sentence, or as a condi-
tion of probation. The district court noted
that Tollman’s license was suspended as part
of her sentence. The district court discussed
the effect of the Amendment before ultimate-
ly denying Tollman’s motion:

The other thing that’s super frustrating
in your case ... is that from the time that
you were sentenced until now, the law
itself has changed. So the legislature said
after one year courts can get back in ...
even when it’s part of the sentence, the
judge can come back after a year and
revisit that and say now you can have
restricted privileges, But the change in the
law doesn’t do you any good because I am

district court treated Tollman’s application as a
motion, .

stuck with the law that was in effect in the
first instance.

Tollman timely appealed.

TL Issue on AppraL

Whether the district court had discretion
to grant Tollman’s application for a restricted
driver's license,

TV. Sranparp or Review

HMM This Court exercises free review
over the interpretation of a statute. State v.
Schulz, 151 Idaho 868, 865, 264 P.8d 970, 972
(2011) Gnternal citation omitted). “Statutory
interpretation begins with the statute’s plain
language.” State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349,
352, 372 P.3d 404, 407 (2016) (citing State v,
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.8d 1, 17
(2018).

Hl When this Court reviews a discretion-
ary decision, it considers: “(1) whether the
lower court rightly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the court acted
within the outer boundaries of such discre-
tion and consistently with any legal stan-
dards applicable to specific choices; and (8)
whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1831, 1333 (1989)
Gnternal citation omitted).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not have discre-
tion to grant Tollman’s request for a
restricted driver’s license.

HM Tollman contends that the district
court erred when it denied her application
for a restricted driver's license, arguing that
a statute is not considered retroactive simply
because it draws on facts that occurred prior
to its enactment. Instead, Tollman argues
that this case is not in the “realm of retroac-
tivity” because she waited to file her applica-
tion for a restricted driver’s license until
after the Amendment was in effect, Tollman
asserts that the district court had the discre-
tion to grant her application for a restricted
license and failed to appreciate the outer
bounds of its discretion. Tollman further ar-
gues that when an amendment is remedial or
procedural in nature, that amendment should

801

control the analysis of an action even if it was
enacted after the event because the effect of
such an amendment is prospective based on
its influence over procedure to be followed in
the future.

The State argues that the district court
properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
to amend Tollman’s driver’s license suspen-
sion. The State reasons that, in applying the
plain language of the 2018 version of Idaho
Code section 18-8005(6)(d), a sentence allow-
ing restricted driving privileges would have
been illegal at the time judgment was en-
tered. The State argues that a statute is not
applied retroactively absent clear legislative
intent to that effect, and that there was no
language in the Amendment indicating that it
should be applied retroactively. Additionally,
the State asserts that Tollman’s position—
that the Amendment was “procedural or re-
medial” in nature—is misguided because the
Amendment is an alteration to a judge’s
scope in sentencing, and as a result the legis-
lature had to expressly provide that it should
apply retroactively, Because the legislature
did not do so, the State argues that the
district court properly denied Tollman’s re-
quest.

Hs Idaho law provides that “[a] statute
is not made retroactive merely because it
draws upon facts antecedent to its enact-
ment.” Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 187 Idaho
307, 313, 48 P.3d 636, 642 (2002) (internal
citation omitted). Further, “statutory amend-
ments are not deemed to be retroactive un-
Jess there is an express legislative statement
to the contrary.” State v. Leary, 160 Idaho
349, 358, 872 P.8d 404, 408 (2016) Gnternal
citations omitted). “A statute that is proce-
dural or remedial and does not create, en-
large, diminish or destroy contractual or
vested rights is generally held not to be a
retroactive statute, even though it was enact-
ed subsequent to the events to which it oper-
ates.” Bryant, 187 Idaho at 318, 48 P.3d at
642 (citing Floyd v. Board of Comm’rs of
Bonneville County, 181 Idaho 234, 958 P.2d
984 (1998)). “Changes in procedural laws are
held applicable to existing causes of action
because the effect of such statutes is actually
prospective in nature since they relate to the

802

procedure to be followed in the future.” Id,
(internal citation omitted).

The Idaho Court of Appeals has recog-
nized that when the legislature amends a
statute to reduce a punishment, “it has obvi-
ously expressly determined that its former
penalty was too severe and that a lighter
punishment is proper as punishment for the
commission of the prohibited act.” State v.
Morris, 181 Idaho 268, 265, 954 P.2d 681, 683
(Ct. App. 1998) (citing In ve Estrada, 68
Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 175, 408 P.2d
948, 951 (1965). However, the Idaho Court of
Appeals went on to hold that it was only
proper to apply the newly amended law when
the defendant “had not been convicted and
sentenced until after the new sentencing leg-
islation became effective.” Id, at 267, 954
P.2d at 685, This reasoning is consistent with
other jurisdictions, See State v. Tapp, 26
Utah 2d 892, 395, 490 P.2d 884, 336 (1971)
(The Utah Supreme Court held that if a
statute is amended to reduce a penalty, and
the amendment is effective before the sen-
tence, the defendant is entitled to the lesser
penalty as provided by law at the time of the
judgment and sentence; however, if the
amendment does not become effective until
after the conviction and sentence, the sen-
tence will be imposed in accordance with the
Jaw that was in effect at the time of convic-
tion); Estrada, 48 Cal.Rptr. at 175, 408 P.2d
at 951 (The California Supreme Court held
that “[i]f the amendatory statute lessening
punishment becomes effective prior to the
date the judgment of conviction becomes fi-
nal then, in our opinion, it, and not the old
statute in effect when the prohibited act was
committed, applies.”); People v. Oliver, 1
N.Y.2d 152, 160, 151 N.Y.S.2d 867, 184
N.E.2d 197 (1956) (The New York Court of
Appeals held that when an ameliorative stat-
ute reduces the punishment for a erime, “the
law is settled that the lesser penalty may be
meted out in all cases decided after the effec-
tive date of the enactment, even though the
underlying act may have been committed
before that date.”),

Idaho Code section 18-8005(6)(d) addresses
the driving privileges for a person convicted
of driving under the influence of alcohol. At

the time of Tollman’s conviction, the statute
required that a defendant;

Shall have his driving privileges suspended

by the court for a mandatory minimum

period of one (1) year after release from
imprisonment, and may have his driving
privileges suspended by the court for not
to exceed five (5) years after release from
imprisonment, during which time he shall
have absolutely no driving privileges of
any kind.
2015 Idaho Sess, Laws Ch, 60 (S.B. 1026). In
2015, the legislature amended this section to
allow a defendant to apply for restricted
driving privileges after one year with abso-
lutely no driving privileges after his or her
release from imprisonment, The Amendment.
provides that a defendant:

[Mlay have his driving privileges suspend-

ed by the court for an additional period not

to exceed four (4) years, during which the
defendant may request restricted driving
privileges that the court may allow if the
defendant shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that driving privileges are
necessary for his employment or for family
health needs.

LC. § 18-8005(6)(d).

We hold that the district court properly
determined that it did not have discretion to
grant Tollman a restricted driver's license.
Tollman argues that because she was not
eligible to apply for restricted driving privi-
leges until the Amendment was in effect, the
Amendment is the applicable law. However,
at the time Tollman received her sentence,
Idaho Code section 18-8005(6)(d) provided
that a court may suspend driving privileges
for a period not to exceed five years after
release from imprisonment, “during which
time he shall have absolutely no driving
privileges of any kind.” 2015 Idaho Sess.
Laws Ch. 60 (S.B. 1026) (emphasis added).
Complying with the law at the time, the
district court judgment required Tollman’s
driver’s license be absolutely suspended for
five years beginning on the date of Tollman’s
release from custody.

HH The Amendment provides defendants
convicted of driving under the influence a
new avenue of relief by allowing them to

apply for restricted driving privileges. I.C.
§ 18-8005(6)(d). When the legislature has
acted to reduce a penalty by amending or
repealing a statute, the new law is only appli-
cable in cases where the sentence was not
yet final. See State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 268,
265, 954 P.2d 681, 683 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing
In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr.
172, 175, 408 P.2d 948 (1965)). Tollman’s sen-
tence suspending her driving privileges was
final in 2018, two years before the Amend-
ment was enacted. As a result, the law that
was in place at the time Tollman received her
sentence is the applicable law. Further, the
Amendment cannot be considered a proce-
dural law because it creates a new right for
defendants and changes the district court’s
sentencing guidelines. Absent an “express
legislative statement,” statutory amendments
do not apply retroactively, See State v.
Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 353, 872 P.8d 404, 408
(2016). There is no language in the Amend-
ment that indicates the legislature intended
it to apply retroactively.

Because Tollman’s sentence was final at
the time the Amendment was enacted, and
there is no legislative intent that the Amend-
ment apply retroactively, the district court
properly denied Tollman’s request for re-
stricted driving privileges.

VI. Conciusion

This Court hereby affirms the district
court’s denial of Tollman’s motion for re-
stricted driving privileges.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices
HORTON, BRODY and Justice pro tem
KIDWELL concur.

803

405 P.3d 588
Todd J. PHILLIPS, in his capacity as
Trustee of Trust “A” of the Elliott Fam-
ily Testamentary Trust, Plaintiff-Appel-
lant,
ve
Richard D. GOMEZ, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No, 44594

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, September 2017 Term.

Filed: November 8, 2017

Nicholas Law Offices, Boise, for appellant.
Charles J. Nicholas argued.

Fisher Law Office, PLLC, Meridian, for
respondent. Steven Fisher argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

This case arises from Richard Gomez’s
breach of a real estate agreement for the sale
and papenase of residential real estate from

ips in his capacity as Trustee of
‘Trust “A” of the Elliott Family Trust. Phil-
lips appeals the Ada County district court’s
denial of Phillips’s request to recover actual

damages. After a bench trial, the district
court held that Phillips’s claim for breach of
contract had been fully satisfied by Phillips’s
retention of the non-refundable earnest mon-
ey as liquidated damages as provided by the
agreement. We affirm,

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Todd J. Phillips, Appellant, is the trustee
of Trust “A” of the Elliott Family Trust
(“Trust”). In the spring of 2008, Phillips list-
ed the Trust’s real property (located at 1372
W. Wickshire Ct., Eagle, Idaho) for sale with
a real estate agency. In the fall of 2008,
Richard Gomez, Respondent, submitted sev-
eral offers to purchase the property. The
second offer, with amendments, was accepted
on October 80, 2008.

The agreement was set forth in several
documents,! the first being the RH-21 Real
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (“RE-
21”), which provided for the deal to be as
follows: The sale of the described real prop-
erty was to be for $660,000. With $66,000
earnest money to be deposited into the list-
ing broker’s trust account to be applied to
the purchase price at closing, or, in the event
Gomez could not close, Phillips would have
the option of accepting the earnest money as
liquidated damages, which would be Phillips’s
sole and exclusive remedy, or pursuing any
other legal right or remedy.

The remaining documents in the agree-
ment were amendments to RE-21. The
amendments provided that the earnest mon-
ey deposit of $66,000 was to be non-refunda-
ble following the inspection of the property
and Gomez’s attorney’s review and accep-
tance of the contract documents, Gomez was
to take possession of the house promptly
after the deal was accepted under the terms
of a Residential Lease, but the sale was not
required to close until December 15, 2009,
about a year after Gomez took possession,

‘When the agreement was accepted by both
parties, Gomez paid the $66,000 non-refunda-
ble earnest money into the broker’s trust.

1, The agreement at issue consists of five docu-
ments: (1) an RE-21 Real Estate Purchase and
Sale Agreement form; (2) an RE-11 Addendum
form, marked #1; (3) an RE-11 Addendum form,

805

account, and Gomez moved into the property
under the Residential Lease provisions. The
entire $66,000 was released from the broker’s
trust account and paid to Phillips, with a
portion ($8,960) going to the real estate
agent’s commission, and the balance ($62,040)
going to Phillips. The release of the earnest
money was without restriction.

Around December 1, 2009, Gomez advised
Phillips that he would not be able to close on
time, and the parties began negotiating.
Those negotiations resulted in Addendum #2
under which Phillips agreed to carry a
$100,000 note from Gomez, with closing still
set for December 15, 2009. On the day of
closing, Gomez emailed Phillips explaining
that due to the “drop in the value of the
home, the real estate market and the lending
erunch” he was unable to close on the loan
for the property in time.

In January 2010, an agreement was
reached for Gomez to remain in possession of
the property under a month-to-month rental
agreement, Gomez remained in possession.
until approximately May 31, 2010, thirty days
after Gomez gave written notice to Phillips
that he would be vacating the property. Go-
mez vacated the premises in a timely manner
without incident.

On February 4, 2010, Phillips sent Gomez
a letter demanding that Gomez perform un-
der RE-21 or Phillips would pursue a claim
against Gomez for any deficiency after the
house re-sold. Gomez did not respond. Phil-
lips relisted the property for sale in the
spring of 2010. An appraisal was obtained
indicating the value of the property in the
spring of 2010 to be $540,000. In June 2010,
Phillips received and accepted an offer to sell
the property to an unrelated third party for
$580,000. The sale closed on June 21, 2010,
with a purchase price of $527,500,

On August 13, 2012, Phillips sent Gomez
another letter demanding payment for the
lost “benefit of the bargain” damages sus-
tained as a result of Gomez’s failure to pur-
chase the property as agreed, Phillips sought

marked #2; (4) a manuscript document titled

“Counter-Offer #3”; and (5) Exhibit A to Coun-
ter-Offer #3, marked “Residential Lease.” *

806

the difference between the proceeds of the
sale ($527,500) and the price agreed upon by
Gomez ($660,000), less the earnest money
received ($62,040—$66,000 minus the $3,960
commission), for a total damage claim of
$70,460 plus interest. Gomez did not respond
and did not pay any of the amounts claimed
in the demand.

On November 6, 2018, Phillips filed his
complaint against Gomez for breach of con-
tract. Phillips claimed damages in the
amount of $60,148.66 after giving Gomez
eredit for the $66,000 earnest money.? The
ease was tried as a bench trial on September
1, 2015, On September 23, 2015, the district
court entered its judgment in favor of Gomez
and against Phillips.

On September 6, 2016, this Court entered
its order dismissing the appeal without prej-
udice because this Court did not timely re-
ceive a copy of a final judgment that con-
formed with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(a). On October 6, 2016, this Court dis-
missed Docket #43678 without prejudice be-
cause the conforming judgment was not time-
ly entered. On October 7, 2016, Phillips filed
his second notice of appeal, which initiated
the instant appeal, and, pursuant to this
Court’s November 9, 2016, order augmenting
the prior appeal, this matter came before the
Court.

Il, ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did Phillips pre-elect the earnest mon-
ey as liquidated damages when the
parties contracted to make the earnest
money non-refundable and immediate-
ly transferrable to Phillips’s aceount
without restrictions?

2, Did the language in the agreement.
give Phillips the option of accepting
the non-refundable earnest money and
pursuing actual damages?

8, Is either party entitled to attorney fees
on appeal?

2, This damage claim consists oft (1) the
$51,620.50 difference between what the sale pro-
ceeds would have been if Gomez had closed and
what the sale proceeds were upon closing with
the third-party buyer; (2) $3,960 commission
paid to Coldwell Banker; (3) $1,776 trustees fees

I, STANDARD OF REVIEW

I ‘{Tihis Court exercises free review
over the district court’s conclusions of law.”
Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho
602, 605, 88 P.8d 1258, 1261 (2002) (citing
JR, Simplot Co. v. W. Heritage Ins. Co., 182
Tdaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999)),
“The standard of review of a non-jury trial
court’s findings of fact is set forth in Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).” Id, (citing
LR.C.P. 52(a)), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a) provides in pertinent part:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury ... the court shall find the facts
specifically and state separately its conclu-
sions of law thereon and direct the entry of
the appropriate judgment. Findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous. In application of this principle regard
shall be given to the special opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of
those witnesses that appear before it,

HE “In determining whether a finding
is clearly erroneous this Court does not
weigh the evidence as the district court did.
The Court inquires whether the findings of
fact are supported by substantial and compe-
tent evidence.” In re Williamson, 185 Idaho
452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001) (citing
LR.C.P, 52(a)), “This Court will not substi-
tute its view of the facts for the view of the
district judge.” Id, (citing Carney v. Heinson,
183 Idaho 275, 281, 985 P.2d 1187, 1148
(1999)). “Evidence is regarded as substantial
if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it
and rely upon it in determining whether a
disputed point of fact had been proven.” Id.
(citing Carney, 183 Idaho at 281, 985 P.2d at
1148),

Ty, ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not err in
concluding that Phillips made an
advance election of remedies to ac-
cept the earnest money as liquidated
damages.

Hl Phillips contends he never accepted,

elected, or agreed to accept the earnest mon-

associated with the closing of the sale to Gomez;
(4) $2,187.90 attorney fees associated with the
closing of the sale to Gomez; and (5) $1,000 as
the cost of the appraisal obtained after Gomez's
breach,

ey as liquidated damages in lieu of his actual
damages when he contracted to make the
earnest money non-refundable. Rather, Phil-
lips maintains that he “elected to proceed
with an action to recover the Trust’s actual
damages of approximately $60,000.00 over
and above the amount of the earnest money
Gomez released to Phillips.” Thus, Phillips
contends, although he accepted the earnest,
money, he never accepted the earnest money
as liquidated damages.

The district court, on the other hand,
found that the amendments to RE-21, mak-
ing the “earnest money deposit non-refunda-
ble and immediately available to [Phillips]
without restriction was, to work, an advance
election of remedies ... to accept the earnest
money deposit as liquidated damages.” As
such, “the damages for this breach are, by
contract, the liquidated damages, which dam-
ages have been fully paid and satisfied by
[Gomez] by the provisions pertaining to the
earnest money deposit.” The district court’s
conclusion is supported by competent and
substantial evidence,

Phillips maintains that there is no “lan-
guage anywhere in the agreement between
the parties suggesting” Phillips accepted,
elected, or agreed to accept the non-refunda-
ble earnest money as liquidated damages, or
that Phillips “had conceded or given up [his]
right to make an election to accept earnest.
money as liquidated damages, seek specific
performance or seek to recover its actual
damages.” Phillips’s argument is unavailing.

HM As provided by this Court in Pot-
latch Education Association v. Potlatch
School District Number 285:

When interpreting a contract, this Court
begins with the document’s language. In
the absence of ambiguity, the document
must be construed in its plain, ordinary
and proper sense, according to the mean-
ing derived from the plain wording of the
instrument. Interpreting an unambiguous
contract and determining whether there
has been a violation of that contract is an
issue of law subject to free review. A con-
tract term is ambiguous when there are
two different reasonable interpretations or
the language is nonsensical. Whether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law,

807

but interpreting an ambiguous term is an
issue of fact.

148 Idaho 630, 688, 226 P.8d 1277, 1280
(2010) (internal citations and quotations omit-
ted).

Of the documents forming the agreement,
the following provisions are particularly rele-
vant to the issues on appeal: (1) RE-21,
paragraphs 3(A) and 28; (2) Addendum #1,
item #2; and (8) Counter-Offer #8, para-
graph 2.

Paragraph 3(A) of RE-21 provides,

$66,000.00 EARNEST MONEY: BUYER
hereby deposits Sixty-Six Thousand and
Zero/100 DOLLARS as Earnest Money
evidenced by: personal check and a receipt
is hereby acknowledged, Earnest Money to
be deposited in trust account upon accep-
tance by all parties and shall be held by:
Listing Broker ... for the benefit of the
parties hereto.

Paragraph 28 of RE-21 provides,

DEFAULT: If BUYER defaults in the
performance of this Agreement, SELLER
has the option of: (1) accepting the Ear-
nest Money as liquidated damages or (2)
pursuing any other lawful right and/or
remedy to which SELLER may be enti-
tled.... SELLER and BUYER specifical-
ly acknowledge and agree that if SELLER
elects to accept the Earnest Money as
liquidated damages, such shall be SELL-
ER’s sole and exclusive remedy.

(emphasis added). Addendum #1, item #2
provides,
The $66,000.00 down payment is non-~re-
fundable and will be released to seller
upon buyer’s written acceptance of the in-
spection and credited to buyer at closing.

(emphasis added). Finally, paragraph 2 of
Counter-Offer #3 provides,

The Buyer shall pay earnest money in the
$66,000.00 which earnest money shall be-
come non-refundable and shall be paid di-
rectly to Seller immediately on the satis-
faction of Buyer’s inspection contingency
and the contingency of the Buyer’s attor-
ney’s review of this document and the at-
tached lease..,. The earnest money shall

808

be credited to buyer toward the purchase
price at closing.
(emphasis added).

HM “The amended agreements should be
construed together with the original agree-
ments where possible.” Opportunity, LLC,
186 Idaho at 607, 88 P.3d at 1268 (citing
Silver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine Min. Co.,
101 Idaho 226, 285, 611 P.2d 1011, 1020
(1979)). However, “addenda are controlling
over any inconsistent provisions in a pre-
printed, fill-in-the-blank agreement.” John-
son v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 474, 147 P.38d
100, 106 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing IC. § 29-
109).

Further, a party's subjective intent
is immaterial to the interpretation of the
contract. JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Ida-
ho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). Instead,
courts will give full “force and effect to the
words of the contract without regard to what
the parties of the contract thought it meant
or what they actually intended it to mean.”
Id. (quoting 17 Am. Jur, 2d Contracts § 347
(2004)).

Although “courts in some states have held
that the presence of an option to choose
between liquidated damages and actual dam-
ages renders a liquidated damages provision
unenforceable,” Ravenstar LLC v. One Ski
Hill Place LLC, 405 P.3d 298, 800-08, 2016
WL 835142, *1-9 (Colo. App. 2016), Idaho is
one of several states that have upheld provi-
sions allowing sellers to choose between liq-
uidated and actual damages. See, eg., Mar-
garet H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho
258, 258, 846 P.2d 904, 909 (1993).

Here, the rights of the parties were de-
fined by the agreement. Under the terms of
RE-21, the amount of liquidated damages for
this agreement was to consist of the $66,000
earnest money paid by Gomez and held in
the broker’s trust account. In the event Go-
mez defaulted, paragraph 28 of RE-21 gave
Phillips the option of either accepting the
earnest money as liquidated damages or pur-
suing any other lawful right or remedy to
which Phillips was entitled. Thus, before the
addendum amending the form agreement,
the earnest money would not be turned over
to Phillips until or unless one of the following

events occurred: (1) it was credited against
the purchase price at closing, (2) the broker
turned it over to Phillips as liquidated dam-
ages in the event of a default if Phillips so
elected, or (8) in the event Phillips elected
“any other lawful right and/or remedy” to
which Phillips may be entitled, it was to be
separately held pending resolution of the
matter,

However, the parties amended and added
terms to RE-21, making the earnest money
non-refundable and immediately available to
Phillips without any restrictions. The amend-
ments did not make any mention of what
would happen if Gomez defaulted and Phillips
decided to pursue actual damages instead of
liquidated damages, being that Phillips had
already transferred and retained the earnest
money thirteen months prior to the sched-
uled closing date. The parties could have
stipulated that such retention of the earnest
money is not an acceptance or election of
liquidated damages; however, the parties did
not do so. Therefore, a plain reading of the
agreement indicates that Phillips pre-elected
his remedy for Gomez’s breach of the con-
tract.

Moreover, there is language in three other
provisions in Counter-Offer #3 supporting
the district court’s conclusion that Phillips
pre-elected the earnest money as liquidated
damages. Each provision similarly addresses
a material breach and similarly makes no
mention of actual damages.

For example, paragraph 5 of Counter-Of-
fer #8 provides,

[BJuyer/Lessee’s failure to make any lease

payment when the same is due and pay-

able shall constitute a material breach of

Buyer’s obligations the terms of this Real

Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement and

... Seller may, at its sole election, termi-

nate this Agreement and the said lease and

retain Buyer’s earnest money payment,
together with any lease payments Buyer
may have made, as liquidated damages
and Buyer shall have no further right or
claim of interest in the subject premis-
es.... Buyer will remain responsible to

Seller for any damages Seller may cause to

the premises while occupying the same and

Seller may recover any such damages in

addition to the liquidated damages herein-

above provided for.
(emphasis added).

Paragraph 18 of Counter-Offer #3 pro-
vides in relevant part, “[iln the event this
sale does not close, Coldwell Banker Tomlin-
son Group may retain the $3960.00 being
paid to it as its sole compensation for its
services as an agent in this matter.” Al-
though this provision does not address a
remedy specifically available to Phillips, this
provision shows that the parties contemplat-
ed the realtor’s remedy being a portion of
the earnest money.

Finally, paragraph 14 of Counter-offer #3
provides,

If Buyer should file for bankruptcy at any
time prior to the closing of this transac-
tion, Buyer agrees that such filing shall
constitute a material breach of the terms
of both this Purchase and Sale Agreement
and its lease with Seller and Seller may
.+. retain any and all monies paid to it by
Buyer, whether in the form of earnest
money or lease payments, as liquidated
damages which sum Buyer and Seller
agree would be fair and reasonable liqui-
dated damages to Seller for such breach of
this Agreement... .

Thus, although the amendments to RE-21
did not specifically state that making the
earnest money non-refundable was an ad-
vanee election of remedies, when Phillips
availed himself of the earnest money, he
foreclosed his ability to pursue actual dam-
ages. See, eg., McMullin v. Shimmin, 10
Utah 2d 142, 349 P.2d 720, 720-21 (1960)
(holding that the seller’s retention of the
deposit evidenced an election of liquidated
damages by the seller). Further, the parties’
intent is supported by other similar provi-
sions in the amendments. In effect, Phillips
‘was entitled to the full measure of the liqui-
dated damage remedy from the outset. To
conclude otherwise would permit recovery of
both liquidated and actual damages, a result
contrary to the language of the agreement.
and the decisions of this Court. See, eg.,

3, A Memorandum of Understanding Re: Terms of
Month to Month Lease, and two demand letters

809

Lipsky, 128 Idaho at 257-58, 846 P.2d at
908-09,

Phillips offers outside evidence? for this
Court to consider in ascertaining the parties’
intent. However, because the parties’ intent.
can be determined from the agreement itself,
this Court will not consider this evidence.

“In the absence of ambiguity, a document
must be construed by the meaning derived
from the plain wording of the instrument.”
Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 166,
335 P.8d 1, 11 (2014) (iting C & G Inc v
Rule, 185 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.8d 76, 78
(2001)). The language of the agreement is
free from conflicting interpretations by rea-
sonable persons. It is clear that Phillips ini-
tially, under the terms of RE-21, had the
option of accepting the earnest money as
liquidated damages or bringing an action for
recovery of actual damages. However, when
the parties amended RE-21, thereby making
the earnest money non-refundable and im-
mediately transferable to Phillips, Phillips
pre-elected the earnest money as liquidated
damages, regardless of what Phillips subjec-
tively intended,

B. The damages award Phillips seeks
is not permitted either by the terms
of the agreement or by law.

HI Phillips contends that the agreement
gave Phillips the “option of either accepting
the non-refundable earnest money [he] had
received as liquidated damages or, giving
[Gomez] full credit for the non-refundable
earnest money, instituting an action to recov-
er its actual damages.” Phillips’s argument is
unavailing.

As the district court correctly found, the
agreement gave Phillips an option between
liquidated damages or actual damages, but it
did not permit Phillips to choose both. Specif-
ically, paragraph 28 of RH-21 states in rele-
vant part, “SELLER has the option of: (1)
accepting the Earnest Money as liquidated
damages or (2) pursuing any other lawful
right and/or remedy to which SELLER may
be entitled.... If SELLER elects to accept
the Earnest Money as liquidated damages,

from Phillips's attorney.

810

such shall be SELLER’s sole and exclusive
remedy....” (emphasis added). The word
“or” is “a disjunctive particle used to express
an alternative or to give a choice of one
among two or more things.” City of Blackfoot
v Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 807, 396 P.8d
1184, 1189 (2017) (quoting Markel Int'l Ins.
Co, Lid v. Brekson, 158 Idaho 107, 110, 279
P.8d 98, 96 (2012)), Thus, the RE-21 agree-
ment gave Phillips the choice to elect either
liquidated damages or actual damages, but
did not provide Phillips both remedies with-
out an actual election.

Phillips cites this Court to Lipsky to sup-
port his argument that the agreement itself
permitted Phillips to retain the non-refunda-
ble earnest money as partial satisfaction and
pursue actual damages for the remaining bal-
ance. However, as Gomez correctly contends,
Lipsky does not stand for that proposition.
And more importantly, Lipsky did not in-
volve a non-refundable earnest money depos-
it.

In Lipsky, this Court held that the pres-
ence of a liquidated damages clause in an
earnest money agreement did not preclude
the non-defaulting seller from recovery of
actual damages suffered when the buyer
breached the agreement. 123 Idaho at 257,
846 P.2d at 908. The standard printed real-
estate purchase and sale agreement form
provided for the purchaser to pay $1,000 in
earnest money and contained a liquidated
damages clause. Id, at 255, 846 P.2d at 906.
Specifically, the form provided in relevant
part, that in the event of the buyer’s breach,

[t]he earnest money shall be forfeited and
considered as liquidated damages to Seller,
and Buyer's interest in the premises shall
be immediately terminated.... Such for-
feiture and acceptance by Seller or Broker
of the earnest money as liquidated dam-
ages does not constitute a waiver of other
remedies available to Seller or Broker.

Td. at 257, 846 P.2d at 908. The buyer in-
formed the seller that he did not intend to
close and would forfeit the earnest money he
had paid. Id. at 255, 846 P.2d at 906. The
seller refused to accept the earnest money as
liquidated damages and brought suit for ac-
tual damages. Id. at 256, 846 P.2d at 907.

This Court reasoned that the contractual
provision that allowed the non-defaulting
seller to retain the earnest money as liqui-
dated damages without “a waiver of other
remedies indicated that the seller’s accep-
tance of earnest money as liquidated dam-
ages would be optional, with the seller pre-
serving her right to seek any other remedies
available to her.” Id. at 257, 846 P.2d at 908,
This Court further explained that, “In spite
of the fact that the clause is poorly written, it
is clear from a reading of the agreement as a
whole that the seller has the option of accept-
ing the forfeited earnest money as liquidated
damages, bringing an action for recovery of
actual damages, or seeking specific perform-
ance,” Id, at 257-58, 846 P.2d at 908-09
(emphasis added); see also Noble v. Ogborn,
43 Wash.App. 387, 717 P.2d 285, 287 (1986)
(explaining that a “liquidated damages clause
does not preclude a party from suing for
actual damages if that right is preserved in
the contract between the parties.”).

In this case, it is undisputed per RE-21,
that Phillips had the option of either accept-
ing the earnest money as liquidated damages
or pursuing any other lawful right or remedy
(actual damages). The plain language of RE-
21 supports these two different legal choices.
However, Phillips essentially contends that
the language of the agreement does not con-
fine Phillips to liquidated damages; rather,
he may retain the earnest money as partial
satisfaction for his actual damages, whatever
they may be. Lipsky did not address this
issue,

Idaho has no case construing whether the
“or” language contained in the default provi-
sion—paragraph 28 of RE-21—permits a
non-defaulting seller the option of retaining
an earnest money deposit and pursuing actu-
al damages for any remainder not covered by
the earnest money. However, in 1962, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held, on facts al-
most identical to these, that the seller, who
retained the down payment under a provision
of the contract, exercised the option to treat
the down payment as liquidated damages and
therefore, no cause of action for actual dam-
ages remained to him. Zimmerman v.
Thompson, 16 Wis.2d 74, 114 N.W.2d 116,
117-18 (1962),

In Zimmerman, the seller and the buyer
entered into a real estate contract whereby
the buyer agreed to pay $500 down and
thereafter the remaining balance of $48,000.
Id, at 116. The buyer defaulted, causing the
seller to re-sell the property to a third party,
Id. The seller retained the $500 down pay-
ment and brought a lawsuit “against the
buyer for $2,000 which the seller alleges was
the actual damage caused by the buyer's
default after crediting the $500 kept by the
seller.” Id, at 117, The provision in the con-
tract recited:

Should the undersigned Buyer fail to carry

out this agreement, all money paid hereun-

der shall, at the option of the Seller, be
forfeited as liquidated damages and shall
be paid to or retained by the Seller, sub-
ject to deduction of broker’s commission
and disbursements, if any.
Id, at 116-17. The court held that this specif-
ie provision in the contract
[glives the seller an option to take liqui-
dated damages or to take whatever actual
damages he can prove, but it does not give
him the right to both. If he chooses liqui-
dated damages he may retain the down
payment without further fuss or bother. If
he chooses actual damages the contract
gives him no additional present, simulta-
neous, right to retain the down payment.

He has retained it and is now trying to

expand the limited right of retention into a

right to keep the money and apply it on

whatever larger damages he can establish.

The contract does not so provide.

Id, at 117; see also Osborn v. Dennison, 318
Wis.2d 716, 768 N.W.2d 20, 80 (2009) (ex-
plaining that “[t]he overriding principle in
this commonplace consumer transaction is
that, when the buyer defaults and the seller
wants damages (not specific performance),
the seller has the option to seek either liqui-
dated damages or actual damages, but not
both”) (citing Galatowitsch v. Wanat, 289
Wis.2d 558, 620 N.W.2d 618, 622-25 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2000)).

Here, Phillips retained the $66,000 earnest
money deposit as he rightfully could do, but
then brought action against Gomez for the
remaining actual damages after “crediting”
Gomez the $66,000 kept by Phillips. Phillips

811

is trying to expand the limited right of reten-
tion into a right to keep the deposit and
apply it to whatever larger damages he can
establish, The contract does not so provide,
Though Phillips contends the earnest money
‘was a down payment toward actual damages,
there is no plain language in any of the five
documents showing that this was the parties’
intent. Such a clause that allowed Phillips to
keep the earnest money and pursue actual
damages would have been easy to include,
and should have been included if that was
what the parties so intended. The default
clause in this agreement gave Phillips the
option of accepting the earnest money as
liquidated damages or pursuing any other
legal right or remedy, but it did not give him
the right to both. Because the parties did not
expressly reserve such a right, the earnest
money as liquidated damages is Phillips’s
exclusive remedy. Accordingly, no cause of
action for actual damages remains to him.

C. Neither party is entitled to attorney
fees on appeal.

Phillips and Gomez both request attorney
fees and costs on appeal in their statements
of issues in their briefs. However, neither
party has presented any argument on this
issue in their briefs as required under Idaho
Appellate Rules 35(a)(6) and 35(b)(6).

HM “Where a party requesting attorney
fees on appeal cites the applicable statutes
but does not present argument ‘with respect
to the issues presented on appeal, the rea-
sons therefor, with citations to the authori-
ties, statutes and parts of the transcript and
record relied upon,’” this Court will not ad-
dress the issue, Carl H. Christensen Family
Trust v. Christensen, 188 Idaho 866, 874, 993
P.2d 1197, 1205 (1999) (quoting Weaver v.
Searle Bros., 181 Idaho 610, 616, 962 P.2d
881, 387 (1998)). Because neither party pre-
sented the necessary argument, this Court
declines to award attorney fees on appeal.

Vv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment in favor of Gomez.
We do not award attorney fees on appeal
because neither party presented argument.

812

on this issue in briefing. We award costs on
appeal to Gomez.

Justices JONES, HORTON, BRODY and
KIDWELL, J., Pro Tem concur,

405 P.3d 597

Ronald EDDINGTON, Petitioner-
Appellant,

ve
STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
Docket No, 44353
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: May 8, 2017

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fore)

16

Smith Horras, PA; Ellen N. Smith, Boise,
for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; John C, McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Ronald Eddington appeals from the dis-
trict court’s summary dismissal of Edding-
ton’s petition for post-conviction relief. Ed-
dington specifically argues the district court
erred in summarily dismissing Eddington’s
claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffec-
tive assistance. Additionally, Eddington
maintains the trial court erred in failing to
inquire into trial counsel’s conflict of interest.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On August 9, 2018, Eddington broke into
his ex-wife’s home, held her at gunpoint, and
threatened to kill both himself and his ex-

wife. Once Eddington left the house, the ex-
wife called her father, who then called the
police. The State charged Eddington with
second degree kidnapping pursuant to Idaho
Code § 18-4503, burglary pursuant to LC.
§ 18-1401, aggravated assault pursuant to
LC. § 18-905(a), and using a deadly weapon
in the commission of a felony pursuant to
LC. § 19-2520, Eddington retained private
counsel, Soon after Eddington was charged,
his mother was charged with witness intimi-
dation, 1.C. § 18-2604. The charge stemmed
from a letter Eddington’s mother wrote to
her ex-daughter-in-law about Eddington’s
charges. Eddington’s trial counsel then
agreed to represent Eddington’s mother.
Eddington pled guilty to second degree
kidnapping and aggravated assault, and the
remaining charges were dismissed as the
result of a plea agreement. Eddington was
sentenced on March 17, 2014. During the
sentencing hearing, the State put several wit-
nesses on the stand. The witnesses most
relevant to the post-conviction proceedings
were Eddington’s ex-wife, the ex-wife’s fa-
ther, the detective who responded to the
scene of the crime, and a forensic psycholo-
gist. The district court then imposed a uni-
fied sentence of twenty-two years, with ten
years determinate, for second degree kidnap-
ping and a concurrent unified sentence of five
years, with five years determinate, for aggra-
vated assault. On March 18, 2014, Edding-
ton’s mother’s charge was dismissed,
Eddington filed a petition for post-convic-
tion relief, alleging several instances of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel and one
instance of trial court error. Along with sev-
eral other documents, Eddington attached an
affidavit from his mother to the petition. The
district court granted the State’s motion for
summary dismissal. Eddington appeals.

i

ANALYSIS
HH A petition for post-conviction relief
initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature,
LC. § 19-4907; Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho
247, 249, 220 P.8d 1066, 1068 (2009); State v.
Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548,
550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,

817

921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1826 (Ct. App. 1992), Like
a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must
prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. Goodwin v. State,
188 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App.
2002). A petition for post-conviction relief
differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil
action. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106
P.8d 876, 382 (2004). A petition must contain
much more than a short and plain statement
of the claim that would suffice for a com-
plaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, a peti-
tion for post-conviction relief must be veri-
fied with respect to facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits,
records, or other evidence supporting its alle-
gations must be attached or the petition must
state why such supporting evidence is not
included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4908. In
other words, the petition must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence support-
ing its allegations or the petition will be
subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho
64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).

HEM Idaho Code Section 19-4906 author-
izes summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion
by a party or upon the court’s own initiative,
if it appears from the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions
and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When considering summary dismissal, the
district court must construe disputed facts in
the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not
required to accept either the petitioner’s
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s con-
clusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho
644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994);
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715
P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the
district court, as the trier of fact, is not
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the
party opposing the motion for summary dis-
position; rather, the district éourt is free to
arrive at the most probable inferences to be
drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes
v, State, 146 Idaho 358, 355, 195 P.8d 712, 714

818

(Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be
disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted
evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.

Claims may be summarily dismissed
if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly dis-
proven by the record of the criminal proceed-
ings, if the petitioner has not presented evi-
dence making a prima facie case as to each
essential element of the claims, or if the
petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as
a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,
521, 286 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé v.
State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.8d 1148, 1152
(2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim
for post-conviction relief is appropriate when
the court can conclude, as a matter of law,
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief
even with all disputed facts construed in the
petitioner's favor. For this reason, summary
dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be
appropriate even when the State does not
eontrovert the petitioner’s evidence. See Ro-
man, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.

HMM Conversely, if the petition, affida-
vits, and other evidence supporting the peti-
tion allege facts that, if true, would entitle
the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction
claim may not be summarily dismissed. Char-
boneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d
1108, 1111 (2004); Sheahan v. State, 146 Ida-~
hho 101, 104, 190 P.8d 920, 928 (Ct. App.
2008). If a genuine issue of material fact is
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted to resolve the factual issues. Good-
win, 188 Idaho at 272, 61 P.8d at 629.

HH On appeal from an order of sum-
mary dismissal, we apply the same standards
utilized by the trial courts and examine
whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence
asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the
petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Ida-
ho 671, 675, 227 P.8d 925, 929 (2010); Sheah-
am, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.8d at 928. Over
questions of law, we exercise free review.
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069;
Downing v, State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 338
P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).

HH A claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel may properly be brought under the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
Barcella v, State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224

P.8d 586, 544 (Ct. App. 2009), To prevail on
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
petitioner must show that the attorney’s per-
formance was deficient and that the petition-
er was prejudiced by the deficiency, Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S, 668, 687-88,
104 S.Ct, 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693
(1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181
P.8d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a
deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of
showing that the attorney's representation
fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Knutsen v.
State, 144 Idaho 488, 442, 168 P.8d 222, 231
(Ct. App. 2007). To establish prejudice, the
petitioner must show a reasonable probabili-
ty that, but for the attorney’s deficient per-
formance, the outcome of the trial would
have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at
761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at
442, 168 P.8d at 281. This Court has long
adhered to the proposition that tactical or
strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be
second-guessed on appeal unless those deci-
sions are based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcom-
ings capable of objective evaluation. Gonzales
v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254 P.8d 69, 73
(Ct. App. 2011),

A. Conflict of Interest

Eddington first claims his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance because he
entered into an actual conflict of interest by
representing both Eddington and Edding-
ton’s mother in related criminal actions
without obtaining informed consent from ei-
ther party. Eddington argues this conflict
prejudiced him because trial counsel priori-
tized Eddington’s mother’s interests over
Eddington’s interests, and trial counsel’s
representation of Eddington’s mother mate-
vially limited trial counsel’s duties to Ed-
dington. Specifically, Eddington maintains
the conflict prejudiced his plea agreement
and sentence because the State agreed to
dismiss Eddington’s mother’s charge only af-
ter Eddington pled guilty and was sen-
tenced, trial counsel did not permit Edding-
ton’s mother to testify on Eddington’s behalf
at sentencing, and trial counsel did not sub-

mit Eddington’s mother’s letter of support
for Eddington to the district court. The dis-
trict court summarily dismissed this claim,
reasoning Eddington’s arguments were spec-
ulative and insufficient to support an ineffec-
tive assistance claim based on an actual con-
flict of interest. Moreover, the district court
determined Eddington failed to provide evi-
dence to support his claim that his mother’s
charge was dismissed because Eddington
pled guilty.

An accused has the right under
both the federal and state constitutions to
representation free from conflicts of interest,
State v. Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 871, 883
P.2d 726, 729 (Ct. App. 1994), This right has
been accorded not for its own sake but be-
cause of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused to receive a fair trial. Mickens v,
Taylor, 585 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1287,
1240-41, 152 L.Hid.2d 291, 300-01 (2002), “Ac-
tual conflict of interest may be shown, for
example, if the defendant identifies with par-
ticularity alternative defenses or additional
important evidence that should have been
presented by counsel.” Giles v. State, 125
Idaho 921, 928, 877 P.2d 365, 367 (1994).
Eddington must demonstrate an actual con-
flict.

HE Focusing on the prejudice prong
of Strickland, Eddington contends that prej-
udice should be presumed. Prejudice is pre-
sumed in certain conflict of interest cases.
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 296, 92 P.8d
542, 546 (Ct. App. 2004). This presumption of
prejudice is a narrow exception. “A presump-
tion of prejudice is triggered only by an
actual conflict of interest.” Guzman, 126 Ida-
ho at 871, 888 P.2d at 729. The conflict must.
be shown and will not be presumed. Id.
Prejudice is presumed “only if the defendant
demonstrates that counsel ‘actively repre-
sented competing interests’ and that ‘an actu-
al conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.” Burger v. Kemp, 483
1, Eddington maintains he was entitled to sum-

mary disposition in his favor because the State

failed to provide evidence controverting Edding-
ton’s claims. Eddington cites to Idaho Code

§ 19-4906(c) for support: ‘The court may grant a

motion by either party for summary disposi-

tion....” However, Eddington did not file a mo-
tion for summary disposition with the district

819

US. 776, 783, 107 S.Ct. 8114, 3120, 97
L.Ed.2d 638, 650 (1987) (quoting Strickland,
466 USS, at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d
at 696). This presumption of prejudice arises
because “it is difficult to measure the precise
effect on the defense” when representation is
“corrupted by conflicting interests.” Strick-
land, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct, at 2067, 80
L.Ed.2d at 696.

HR “While Eddington bears the bur-
den to demonstrate an actual conflict existed,
his petition set forth a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact regarding an actual conflict. He pre-
sented evidence of the representation of his
mother, the relationship of his plea to dis-
missal of her case, and the limitation of infor-
mation from her in defense of his case, Addi-
tionally, Eddington provided an e-mail from
the prosecutor to trial counsel, indicating the
prosecutor planned to hold a hearing on Ed-
dington’s mother’s case the very day after
Eddington was expected to plead guilty. It
can be reasonably inferred that Eddington’s
mother’s case was dismissed as a result of
Eddington pleading guilty. This reasonable
inference and the evidence Eddington provid-
ed were sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact that trial counsel entered
into an actual conflict of interest by concur-
rently representing Eddington and his moth-
er, Accordingly, the district court erred in
summarily dismissing this claim without an
evidentiary hearing. We remand with in-
structions to hold an evidentiary hearing on
whether an actual conflict existed and, if so,
whether prejudice has been shown or is pre-
sumed.

B. Pressure to Plead Guilty and Failure
to Properly Advise of Plea Agreement
Consequences

Next, Eddington argues trial counsel was
ineffective in pressuring Eddington to plead
guilty and in failing to properly advise Ed-
dington of the potential consequences of the

court. Moreover, Eddington bears the burden to
establish a prima facie case supporting each of
his claims—the burden is not on the State to
present evidence. Accordingly, Eddington’s argu-
ment that he was entitled to summary disposition
in his favor, on any of his claims, is without
merit.

820 Es

plea agreement. The district court summarily
dismissed the latter claim after determining
Eddington was advised of all possible conse-
quences of the plea agreement.

The district court did not address Edding-
ton’s claim that trial counsel pressured Ed-
dington to plead guilty. Since the district
court did not address this claim and since it
may relate to the conflict claim addressed
above, we remand this claim for an evidentia-
ry hearing.

HH Eddington’s claim that trial counsel
failed to properly advise Eddington of the
plea agreement consequences, however, is
unsupported by the record. Eddington ar-
gues his trial counsel minimized the severity
of the possible plea agreement consequences
by informing Eddington that the prosecutor
would recommend a unified sentence of up to
ten years in prison. Eddington received a
determinate ten-year sentence, followed by
an indeterminate twelve-year sentence, for
kidnapping in the second degree. On the
aggravated assault conviction, the district
court imposed a determinate five-year sen-
tence to run concurrently with the kidnap-
ping sentence, As the district court noted in
its decision granting summary dismissal, Ed-
dington acknowledged in his guilty plea advi-
sory form that the kidnapping charge alone
had a maximum potential determinate sen-
tence of twenty-five years. The advisory form
also indicated the court was not bound by the
plea agreement or any sentencing recommen-
dation. Moreover, when the district court
asked Eddington at his change of plea hear-
ing whether he “understood [it is] not bound
by any plea agreement [Eddington] has with
the state,’ Eddington responded, “yes.”
Therefore, Eddington’s argument that trial
counsel was ineffective by minimizing the
possible consequences of accepting the plea
agreement is without merit. Eddington did
not make out a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance of counsel and, accordingly, the
district court did not err in summarily dis-
missing this claim.

C. Deficient Performance at Sentencing

Eddington contends the district court

erred in summarily dismissing Eddington’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that

trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing by
refusing to call favorable witnesses to testify
on Eddington’s behalf, failing to cross-exam-
ine the State’s witnesses to correct or object
to irrelevant or inaccurate testimony, failing
to present mitigating evidence of Eddington’s
mental health challenges, and depicting Ed-
dington in a negative light during closing
argument. The district court summarily dis-
missed these claims after determining there
was no reasonable probability that the sen-
tencing outcome would have been different
even if trial counsel was deficient in these
specific regards. The district court addition-
ally noted trial counsel’s actions were within
the permissible range of tactical decisions.
Eddington further argues trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to investigate in prepa-
ration for sentencing. The district court sum-
marily dismissed this claim, reasoning Ed-
dington stated in open court that he was
satisfied with the services of his attorney,
and Eddington failed to support his asser-
tions with any evidence trial counsel would
have produced if trial counsel had more ade-
quately investigated the case.

Hs The standards for evaluating in-
effective assistance claims at sentencing par-
allel those at trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-
98, As discussed, tactical decisions of trial
counsel will not be second-guessed unless
those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective eval-
uation. Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 172, 254 P.3d
at 78, In the absence of evidence that a
strategic decision was “the product of inade-
quate preparation or ignorance of the rele-
vant law,” this Court will not find deficient
performance. Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7,
11, 819 P.8d 491, 495 (2014); State v. Dunlap,
155 Idaho 345, 384, 318 P.3d 1, 40 (2018).
Decisions by trial counsel as presumed to be
made “in the exercise of reasonable profes-
sional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.

1. Failure to call favorable witnesses

HE s(We first address Eddington’s ar-
gument that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to call favorable witnesses to testify

on Eddington’s behalf at sentencing. The de-
cision whether to call character witnesses is a
strategic decision which ordinarily should not
be second-guessed on appeal. Aragon, 114
Idaho at 768, 760 P.2d at 1179, Eddington
alleged that he provided trial counsel with a
list of witnesses who were willing to testify
on Eddington’s behalf, and trial counsel re-
fused to call any of those witnesses to the
stand. However, Eddington concedes trial
counsel submitted character letters to the
court from several of these witnesses. Ed-
dington does not explain how the character
letters alone were insufficient. In fact, Ed-
dington does not provide the letters on ap-
peal with this Court, so we are unable to
properly review the record. It is well estab-
lished that an appellant bears the burden to
provide an adequate record upon which the
appellate court can review the merits of the
claims of error, State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,
422, 918 P.2d 1186, 1192 (Ct. App. 1996);
State v, Beason, 119 Idaho 108, 105, 803 P.2d
1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko,
108 Idaho 872, 878, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct.
App. 1985), and where pertinent portions of
the record are missing on appeal, they are
presumed to support the actions of the trial
court, State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 588, 541, 835
P.2d 1849, 1852 (Ct. App, 1992), In sum,
without evidence of inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law, or shortcom-
ings capable of objective evaluation, we are
unable to conclude the district court erred in
summarily dismissing Eddington’s claim that
trial counsel’s decision to not call witnesses
to the stand amounted to ineffective assis-
tance,

2. Failure to cross-examine or object

HMM Next, Eddington maintains trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-
examine the State’s witnesses to correct or
object to testimony. Eddington maintains he
would have received a more lenient sentence
if counsel objected to or cross-examined the
witnesses. The manner of cross-examination
and the lack of objections to testimony are
considered tactical or strategie decisions.
Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368.

HH Eddington first takes issue with his
ex-wife’s testimony, The ex-wife testified that

821

Eddington broke into his ex-wife’s house,
entered her bedroom, pointed a handgun at
her repeatedly, and threatened to kill her.
She testified about a clicking sound she
heard coming from the handgun. The ex-wife
further described Eddington’s behavior as
violent, abusive, controlling, and manipu-
lative. Eddington argues trial counsel should
have objected to his ex-wife’s “provably inac-
curate” testimony or should have at least
cross-examined her. Eddington maintains
that if trial counsel was adequately prepared
for the sentencing hearing, he would have
refuted the ex-wife’s testimony with evidence
of cell phone records, e-mail records, and
audio police report interviews that contradict
her testimony. A review of the audio police
recordings reveals the ex-wife previously told
the police Eddington was never physically
abusive toward the ex-wife. Accordingly, Ed-
dington set forth a genuine issue of material
fact that trial counsel was deficient by being
inadequately prepared or demonstrating a
shortcoming capable of objective review.
When the district court imposed Eddington’s
sentence, it went through the factors it con-
sidered and indicated one of those factors
was the ex-wife’s “description of the incident
that night, and, specifically, related to the
clicking of the gun.” Thus, there is a genuine
issue of material fact that, but for trial coun-
sel’s failure to cross-examine or object to the
ex-wife’s testimony, the result of sentencing
would have been different. The district court
erred in summarily dismissing this claim.

HEE Additionally, Eddington contends
trial counsel should have objected to or
cross-examined the ex-wife’s father, who tes-
tified that the ex-wife refused to allow her
father to call the police out of fear Eddington
would come back and kill the ex-wife. The
father also described the events that took
place on August 9, 2018, and testified to what
his daughter told her father over the phone
when the daughter called her father after
Eddington left the house. However, Edding-
ton does not point to a specific instance in
which trial counsel should have objected or
one that necessitated cross-examination. Ed-
dington notes the ex-wife told the police she
only allowed her father to call the police
because the ex-wife hoped Eddington would

822

get the help he needed. While the father did
not testify to this, the ex-wife’s past state-
ment does not controvert her father’s testi-
mony. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the
father’s testimony and trial counsel’s decision
to not cross-examine the father does not
demonstrate inadequate preparation, igno-
rance of relevant law, or other shortcomings.
The district court properly summarily dis-
missed this claim,

HHI Eddington also argues trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to object to or cross-
examine the detective’s testimony. Specifical-
ly, Eddington argues the detective gave false
testimony that contradicted his own official
police report, Eddington does not specify in
his brief what testimony was false, but in
Eddington’s petition he takes issue with the
detective’s testimony about Eddington’s al-
leged infidelity. Even assuming trial coun-
sel’s performance was deficient, a review of
the sentencing transcript does not demon-
strate a reasonable probability the district
court considered Eddington’s infidelity in im-
posing sentence, Again, Eddington has failed
to establish a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance of counsel here, The district court
properly summarily dismissed this claim,

HN Sddington also maintains trial
counsel was deficient in failing to object to
Dr, MJ’s testimony and in failing to ask
certain questions during Dr. MJ.’s cross-
examination, However, trial counsel’s cross-
examination of Dr. MJ. does not suggest
trial counsel was inadequately prepared, ig-
norant of relevant Jaw, or had other short-
comings capable of objective review. Rather,
trial counsel asked several questions on
eross-examination, and some of those ques-
tions specifically inquired into the doctor’s
notes, report, and tests. Trial counsel’s deci-
sion to not object to Dr. M.J.’s testimony or
ask certain questions may have been a tacti-
cal decision; for example, to avoid drawing
attention to damaging testimony. Thus, Ed-
dington has not made out a prima facie case
of ineffective assistance of counsel pertaining
to the doctor’s testimony. The district court
did not err in summarily dismissing this
claim,

3. Failure to present evidence of men-
tal health challenges

HM Next, Eddington contends trial
counsel failed to present mitigating evidence
of Eddington’s mental health challenges,
Again, trial counsel's decision to not present
evidence of Eddington’s mental health chal-
lenges may have been a tactical decision to
not draw attention to what trial counsel per-
ceived as damaging evidence. Without a sug-
gestion trial counsel was inadequately pre-
pared, ignorant of relevant law, or exhibited
a shortcoming capable of objective evalua-
tion, we will not second-guess trial counsel’s
decisions on what evidence to present. Be-
cause Eddington is unable to demonstrate
deficient performance, the district court did
not err in summarily dismissing this claim.

4. Depicting Eddington in a negative
light

HH Eddington argues trial counsel pre-
sented closing argument that depicted Ed-
dington in a negative light. He specifically
maintains trial counsel was deficient in fail-
ing to present and emphasize Eddington’s
lack of a criminal record; his depression,
suicidal thoughts, and extreme stress; his
remorse for his actions (more specifically the
fact that he cooperated with police, confessed
to his criminal behavior, and accepted re-
sponsibility for his actions); and his addiction
issues. The record refutes this claim. During
trial counsel’s closing argument at sentenc-
ing, he discussed Eddington’s alcoholism and
the possibility that his addiction carried over
to prescription drugs. Trial counsel noted
Eddington confessed to the police the morn-
ing after the incident and discussed how Ed-
dington admitted he “can’t blame this on
anybody, I have to be responsible for it.”
Moreover, trial counsel indicated Eddington
“never ever wants to do anything like this
again, remotely close to it.” Trial counsel
described Eddington’s difficult history with
his ex-wife, the loss of his child, and Edding-
ton’s history of dealing poorly with stress,
Trial counsel stated Eddington was “very,
very stressed out, and he had been thinking
about suicide.” Finally, trial counsel noted
Eddington “reached the age of 48 years old
without a criminal history that would suggest

anything” and he “was law-abiding.” Trial
counsel presented numerous mitigating cir-
cumstances, Because the record contradicts
Eddington’s argument, the district court
properly summarily dismissed this claim,

5. Failure to investigate

Eddington further maintains trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
adequately investigate. Eddington specifical-
ly contends that if trial counsel listened to
the audio police interviews, he would have
learned that the ex-wife told police Edding-
ton never abused or threatened the ex-wife.

WM «(Defense counsel has a duty to
conduct a prompt and thorough investigation.
Mitchell v. State, 182 Idaho 274, 280, 971
P.2d 727, 738 (1998). The duty to investigate
requires only that counsel conduct a reason-
able investigation, Estes v, State, 111 Idaho
430, 434, 725 P.2d 185, 189 (1986), Here,
Eddington alleged in his petition that he
asked trial counsel whether trial counsel lis-
tened to the audio police interviews, and trial
counsel responded that Eddington could not.
financially afford the time it would take to
review the tapes. Eddington argues the in-
formation obtained from the audio record-
ings, specifically the ex-wife’s statement that
Eddington never abused or threatened the
ex-wife, would have been worth the addition-
al expense. Eddington maintains he never
told trial counsel to do less than a thorough
job on reviewing the evidence and is unsure
why trial counsel assumed Eddington could
not afford to have trial counsel review the
tapes. Eddington indicates he would have
been happy to pay for the additional time
spent on reviewing the tapes. Based on these
allegations, Eddington set forth a genuine
issue of material fact that his trial counsel
was ineffective in not listening to the audio
police tapes, which contradict the ex-wife’s
testimony at the sentencing hearing. Consis-
tent with our holding above regarding the
failure to cross-examine or object to the ex-
wife’s testimony at sentencing, the district
court erred in summarily dismissing this
daim.

823

D. Failure to Request a Referral into
Mental Health Court

HHI Eddington further argues trial coun-
sel was ineffective in failing to request a
referral to place Eddington in mental health
court, The district court summarily dismissed.
this claim after determining there was no
reasonable probability that Eddington would
have been admitted into mental health court
if trial counsel so requested because of the
nature of Eddington’s crimes. We agree. Hd-
dington has not established a genuine issue
of material fact that trial counsel was ineffec-
tive in this respect because Eddington has
not demonstrated a reasonable probability
that the outcome of his trial or sentence
would have been different had trial counsel
requested a referral into mental health court.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5609(1), there
is no right to admission into mental health
court. Even if trial counsel requested a refer-
ral, there is no showing of a reasonable prob-
ability the district court may have ordered
that referral. Because Eddington failed to
establish a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the district court did
not err in summarily dismissing this claim.

E. Trial Court’s Failure to Inquire

Hs Lastly, Eddington argues he was
deprived of effective assistance of counsel
because the district court failed to inquire
into trial counsel’s conflict of interest. How-
ever, this argument assigns error to the dis-
trict court—not trial counsel. The scope of
post-conviction relief is limited. Knutsen, 144
Idaho at 488, 168 P.8d at 227, A petition for
post-conviction relief is not a substitute for
an appeal. I.C, § 19-4901(b). A claim or issue
that was or could have been raised on appeal
may not be considered in post-conviction pro-
ceedings. Id; Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho
845, 348-49, 247 P.3d 210, 218-14 (Ct, App.
2010). The argument that the district court
failed to inquire into trial counsel’s alleged
conflict of interest could have been raised on
direct appeal. The district court properly
summarily dismissed this claim because it
was waived.

BK Attorney Fees and Costs

HM Eddington requests attorney fees
and costs on appeal pursuant to IC. § 12-

824

121. However, the defense of this appeal was
not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation and we decline to award attorney fees.

i.

CONCLUSION

The district court erred in summarily dis-
missing Eddington’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claims pertaining to conflict of inter-
est, pressure to plead guilty, failure to cross-
examine or object to the testimony of the ex-
wife, and failure to investigate and we there-
fore reverse as to those claims. The district
court properly summarily dismissed the re-
maining claims and we therefore affirm as to
those claims. We remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
MELANSON concur.

405 P.3d 609
CROSSROADS NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff-
Respondent,
ve
Rick A. ERICKSON, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket No. 44075

Court of Appeals of Idaho,

Filed: June 27, 2017
Review Denied August 14, 2017

Rick A. Erickson, Meridian, pro se appel-
lant,

Vial Fotheringham LLP; Brindee Collins,
Boise for respondent,

SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S
PRIOR OPINION DATED APRIL 13,
2017, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Rick A. Erickson appeals from the district,
court’s order of dismissal of Erickson’s inter-
mediate appeal from the magistrate. Erick-
son argues the district court erred in several
respects, including denying Erickson thirty-
five days to file his appellant’s brief and not
settling the transcripts. Erickson requests
attorney fees and costs on appeal to this
Court, Crossroads requests attorney fees and
costs on appeal to this Court and on appeal
from the magistrate. For the reasons ex-
plained below, we vacate the district court’s
dismissal and remand.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In August 2018, Crossroads Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (hereinafter “Crossroads”)
filed a complaint against Erickson to enforce
compliance with Crossroads’ protective cove-
nants and to address a number of alleged
violations on Erickson’s property. Erickson
failed to respond with an answer to the com-
plaint and instead filed several motions, in-
cluding some presented as “Special Appear-
ance.” Ultimately, the magistrate entered
default judgment against Erickson in July

825

2014. Erickson soon after filed several addi-
tional motions with the magistrate, including
a motion to set aside the default judgment.
Erickson also filed an appeal with the dis-
trict court in September 2014,

That same month, the district court issued
an order setting forth the procedure and
timelines for the appeal and requiring Erick-
son to order and pay for the cost of the
transcripts within fourteen days of the filing
of the notice of appeal. After Erickson failed
to pay the transcript fee, the district court
entered a conditional order dismissing ap-
peal, giving Erickson an additional fourteen
days to pay the fee. Erickson paid the fee on
October 9, as evidenced by a notice of pay-
ment filed October 9, but the district court,
apparently unaware the fee had been paid,
dismissed the appeal on October 15. After
Erickson filed a motion on October 24 to
vacate the dismissal, the district court cor-
rected its error and reinstated the appeal on
October 30, 2014. The district court then
updated the briefing schedule in an amended
order on October 80, 2014, which provided
that Erickson had thirty-five days to file his
appellant’s brief after the filing of the tran-
scripts.

The district court determined that Erick-
son’s motion to set aside the default judg-
ment had not yet been resolved by the mag-
istrate. Accordingly, the district court stayed
the appeal, pending a decision on Erickson’s
motion, and remanded the case, The magis-
trate denied the motion to set aside the
default judgment. The district court thereaf-
ter dismissed the appeal based on the magis-
trate’s ruling.

Erickson filed a petition for rehearing,
which the district court granted, During the
hearing on November 19, 2015, the district
court stated, “I’m dissolving the stay ... we
need to resolve this quickly, and we can best
do that by reinstating the appeal, having a
briefing schedule.... Any stays are dis-
solved, the appeal is reinstated, and we'll
issue an order setting forth a briefing time.”
The district court clarified the issue on ap-
peal was whether the magistrate appropri-
ately granted the default judgment. The dis-
trict court asked Crossroads to prepare an
order reinstating the appeal.

826

On November 20, 2015, the district court
entered another amended order governing
procedure on appeal, requiring Erickson to
file his appellant’s brief by December 24,
2015. The district court noted in that order,
“it appear[s] that a transeript of all the testi-
mony of the original trial or hearing has been.
provided by appellant.” However, a review of
the record indicates the transcripts were
never produced. Erickson filed a request for
the transcripts on November 24, 2015, but
the record does not indicate the district court
resolved this request,

On December 21, 2015, the district court
issued a written order lifting the stay and
reinstating the appeal, Erickson failed to file
his brief by December 24, 2015, so Cross-
roads filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
Notably, Crossroads did not provide authori-
ty to support its motion to dismiss, The
district court subsequently dismissed the ap-
peal with prejudice on January 8, 2016, Er-
ickson filed a petition for rehearing, which
the district court denied, Erickson appeals
from the district court’s order dismissing the
intermediate appeal.

I.

ANALYSIS

Hl As a threshold issue, Erickson argues
Crossroads lacks standing. However, Erick-
son does not support his argument with au-
thority and instead offers the mere conclu-
sion that “the plaintiff lacks standing to bring
this case in the first place.” When issues on
appeal are not supported by propositions of
law, authority, or argument, they will not be
considered. State v, Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,
268, 928 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). We accordingly
decline to further. address this argument.

HM Turning to the merits, Erickson ar-
gues the district court erred in denying him
thirty-five days to file his appellant’s brief.
We agree and conclude the district court
acted improperly by dismissing the appeal on
the basis of Erickson’s failure to timely file
an appellant’s brief, The briefing schedule
entered on November 20, 2015, was invalid
1, See, e.g. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 58:

“{ryhe placing of the clerk's filing stamp on the
judgment constitutes the entry of the judgment,

PN

and unenforceable because the district court
had not yet signed and filed an order rein-
stating the appeal. “Once the proceedings are
stayed by appeal, the district court ordinarily
is divested of jurisdiction to act in any man-
ner (with relation to the rights and liabilities
of an appellant) except to act in aid of and
not inconsistent with the appeal.” Coewr d’Al-
ene Turf Club, Inc. v. Cogswell, 98 Idaho 324,
829, 461 P.2d 107, 112 (1969). While the
district court attempted to verbally reinstate
the appeal during the November 19 hearing,
it also directed counsel to prepare a written
order reinstating the appeal: “Will you [pre-
pare] an order to this effect?” Counsel for
Crossroads responded, “Yes, I will.” The dis-
trict court’s order reinstating the appeal was
signed and filed on December 21, 2015, which
would require a new briefing schedule to be
set Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 88(0) and Idaho Appellate Rule 34(c),
Erickson was entitled to thirty-five days to
file his brief, We therefore remand to the
district court to reset the briefing schedule
so that Erickson may have the opportunity to
file an appellant’s brief within the thirty-five-
day time period.

Erickson further contends the district
court erred in failing to address the proce-
dures and time periods for lodging and set-
tling the transcripts. The record confirms
Erickson paid a transcript fee, but there is
no indication the transcripts were produced,
Thus, we remand to the district court with
instructions to order the production of and
settle the transcripts of testimony before the
magistrate.

HM Because Crossroads did not prevail
on appeal, we deny attorney fees and costs to
Crossroads, Moreover, we deny attorney fees
to Erickson because pro se litigants are not
entitled to attorney fees. See Michalk v. Mi-
chalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.8d 580, 591
(2009) (denying attorney fees to a pro se
litigant because “this Court has long held
that pro se litigants are not entitled to attor-
ney fees”). Erickson cites to Bowles v. Pro
Indiviso, Inc,, 182 Idaho 871, 877, 973 P.2d

and the judgment is not effective before such
entry.”

142, 148 (1999) in support of his argument.
that he is entitled to attorney fees. However,
the Court in Bowles held that because one of
the respondents “is the attorney of record on
appeal for all respondents, including himself
+». an award of attorney fees is inappropri-
ate” to the extent that the respondent “has
represented himself on appeal.” Jd. at 377,
978 P.2d at 148. Here, also, Erickson repre-
sented himself. While Erickson may have
paid an attorney for legal advice, an attorney
never filed a notice of appearance on Erick-
son’s behalf or represented Erickson. Ac-
cordingly, Erickson is a pro se litigant.

Erickson also requests costs on appeal.
Because Erickson is the prevailing party on
appeal, we award costs pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 40.

I.

CONCLUSION

The district court erred in dismissing Er-
ickson’s appeal because the briefing schedule
was invalid and unenforceable. We vacate the
district court’s order dismissing the interme-
diate appeal and remand for further proceed-
ings. Costs to Erickson on appeal.

Judge MELANSON and Judge HUSKEY
coneur,

405 P.3d 612
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
vw

James Patrick STELL Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No, 48967
Court of Appeals of Idaho,
Filed: October 5, 2017

fers]
ey
ios}

At

Erie D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant. Jenny C. Swinford argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth
K, Jorgensen argued.

GUTIERREZ, Judge

James Patrick Stell Jr. appeals from his
judgment of conviction after a jury returned
a guilty verdict for aggravated assault, with a
deadly weapon enhancement; malicious inju-
ry to property; possession of drug parapher-
nalia; and carrying a concealed weapon while
under the influence. Stell first argues the
trial court erred in admitting an audio re-
cording of his arrest into evidence because it
was irrelevant and prejudicial. Stell further
argues that even if the recording is relevant,
the trial court's failure to perform an Idaho
Rule of Evidence 408 balancing test consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion, Second, Stell
maintains admitting an audio recording
wherein Stell invokes his right to counsel
during his arrest constituted fundamental er-
ror. Last, Stell contends the trial court erred
by denying his motion for judgment of ac-
quittal on the charge of carrying a concealed

weapon while under the influence because
the State failed to present sufficient evidence
of Stell’s intoxication. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm.

L

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

During trial, the State presented testimo-
nial evidence that on March 6, 2015, Stell and
the victim began arguing at the victim’s
house. The argument resulted in Stell leaving
the house on foot, The victim followed by car,
requesting Stell return, Eventually, the vic-
tim drove to a park, while Stell walked to the
residence of two friends: a male and a fe-
male. Based on Stell’s behavior and level of
agitation, the male friend believed Stell had
been drinking,

Upon arriving at the residence, Stell asked
the male friend to take Stell to the gas
station to purchase beer. Stell and the two
friends drove to the gas station, where Stell
bought a 40-ounce bottle of malt liquor. As
the three drove back, Stell threw the victim’s
cellular phone out the window of the van.
Officers later found the phone in the street,
broken into three pieces. Stell then saw the
victim in a parking lot and asked the male
friend to pull over. Stell and the victim began
arguing, and Stell eventually slammed the
victim’s passenger door, pointed a gun at the
car, and finally got back into the van with the
two friends. Both friends testified that Stell
‘was very upset; saying he was going to kill
the victim. Additionally, both friends believed
Stell had a gun and saw what appeared to be
a gun. Moreover, the three aimlessly drove
around town because, based on Stell’s behav-
ior, the male friend did not want to take Stell
to the house where the male friend’s two
children were,

After observing the interaction at the park
between Stell and the victim, a resident
across the street called 911. In both her
testimony and in the 911 recording, the resi-
dent described a man yelling at someone
inside a car and pointing a gun at the car as
it drove away. Police responded to the 911
dispatch call, searching for a white minivan,
Officers eventually found the minivan in front.

1, See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.

829

of the two friends’ residence. When officers
arrived, Stell was inside the house, in the
bathroom. As police went to the rear of the
residence, Stell emerged from the bathroom
window. Stell was handcuffed, read his Mi-
randa' rights, and placed in a police car.

As the arresting officer gave Stell Mi-
randa warnings, Stell interrupted the officer,
making various statements, and three times
requested a lawyer. The entire exchange was
audio recorded and the State sought intro-
duction of a redacted version. Stell objected
based on relevance and prejudicial effect.
The district court overruled the objection,
and the jury listened to the redacted audio
recording, including Stell’s repeated request
for an attorney.

Immediately following Stell’s arrest, offi-
cers found a pink and black backpack under
a pile of dirty clothes inside the bathroom
Stell had just crawled from. Both friends
testified that no one in their household
owned the bag and that they believed it
belonged to Stell. The backpack contained
rubber gloves, duct tape, zip ties, three
smoking pipes, a lighter, a cell phone, ammu-
nition, and a loaded gun,

In addition to witness testimony, the State
presented the 911 call reporting Stell’s inter-
action with the victim at the park, The State
also presented physical evidence for the jury
to consider. The physical evidence included a
picture of the vantage point of the 911 call-
er’s house in relation to the park. Additional-
ly, the State presented evidence of the con-
tents of the backpack found in the bathroom,
which included three pipes, one testing posi-
tive for THC, and a gun in its holster and
ammunition. Also presented were pictures of
a partially drank malt liquor bottle and pie-
tures of the victim’s fractured phone.

Stell did not take the witness stand, and
the defense presented no testimonial or
physical evidence. Stell filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal, under Idaho Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29, for carrying a con-
cealed weapon while under the influence,
which was denied.

1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

830

Ultimately the jury returned a verdict of
not guilty on the charges of assault with
intent to commit murder and grand theft, A
verdict of guilty was returned on the lesser
included offense of aggravated assault, with
an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon,
and on the misdemeanors of malicious injury
to property, possession of paraphernalia, and
carrying a concealed weapon while under the
influence. Stell timely appeals from his judg-
ment of conviction,

L
ANALYSIS

A, Admission of the Audio Recording

TM At trial, after hearing the officers’
testimony regarding Stell’s apprehension and
arrest, the district court admitted a redacted
version of the audio recording of that same
interaction. Stell argues the audio recording
is irrelevant and prejudicial” Specifically
Stell argues the evidence amounts to improp-
er character evidence and that the district
court failed to conduct an Idaho Rule of
Evidence 408 balancing analysis, Additional-
ly, Stell argues that admitting the audio re-
cording wherein he requests counsel consti-
tutes fundamental error,

The State argues to the contrary on all
issues raised by Stell and further submits
that any error in the admission of the audio
recording was harmless, In support of its
harmless error argument, the State points to
the overwhelming evidence presented during
trial indicating Stell was guilty of all four
offenses, Assuming any errors raised exist,
we determine that the harmless error analy-
sis is dispositive of the audio recording evi-
dentiary issue raised,

HE Error is not reversible unless it is
prejudicial, State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169,
171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App. 1983), With
limited exceptions, even constitutional error
is not necessarily prejudicial error. Id. Two
standards are employed when reviewing al-
leged errors on appellate review: harmless
error and fundamental error. State v. Perry,
2. In the audio recording of Stell’s arrest, when

informed he was being charged with aggravated
domestic assault, Stell denied having a girlfriend,

150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
If the alleged error was nonconstitutionally
based and was followed by a contemporane-
ous objection, it shall be reviewed under the
harmless error standard. Jd. In such a case
the defendant has the initial duty to establish
that such an error occurred, at which point
the burden is on the State to prove that the
alleged error did not contribute to the ver-
dict obtained. Id, at 221, 245 P.8d at 978, If
the alleged error was not followed by a con-
temporaneous objection, it shall be reviewed
under Idaho’s fundamental error doctrine.
Id, at 227-28, 245 P.8d at 979-80. An appel-
late court should reverse an unobjected-to
error when the defendant persuades the
court that the alleged error: (1) violates one
or more of the defendant’s unwaived consti-
tutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without
the need for reference to any additional in-
formation not contained in the appellate rec-
ord (neluding information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision); and
(8) was not harmless. Id, at 226, 245 P.3d at
978. Thus, under both standards, the court
must ultimately determine if the alleged er-
ror was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Stell was convicted of aggravated assault,
with an enhancement for firearm use; mali-
cious destruction of property; possession of
drug paraphernalia; and carrying a con-
cealed weapon while under the influence.
Based on the evidence presented, we are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
playing the audio recording for the jury,
including the portion in which Stell request-
ed a lawyer, did not contribute to the ver-
dict. The jury was provided with overwhelm-
ing evidence that Stell threw the victim’s
phone from the vehicle’s window based on
the testimony of the two friends, the victim’s
own testimony, the testimony of the officer
who recovered the broken phone, and the
photographs of the victim’s phone. Likewise,
the jury was presented with substantial evi-
dence that Stell possessed drug parapherna-
lia based on the three pipes found in the
backpack and the two friends’ testimony that
the backpack most likely belonged to Stell.
Similarly, based upon the testimony of the

potentially threatened to sue the police officers,

challenged the officers to shoot him, and request-
ed a lawyer three times while being Mirandized.

male friend stating Stell had been drinking
and the male friend did not want Stell
around the male friend’s children, the testi-
mony of the two officers that Stell smelled of
alcohol, and the erratie behavior of Stell
throughout the entire episode, the jury was
presented with substantial evidence that
Stell was under the influence while carrying
a concealed weapon. Finally, based upon the
911 caller’s testimony, the two friends’ testi-
mony, and the recording of the 911 call, the
jury was presented with convincing evidence
that Stell assaulted the victim by use of a
firearm. Thus, it follows that the audio re-
cording in which Stell asks for an attorney
and makes various potentially prejudicial
statements to the officers would have little
to no effect. Significantly, the prosecution
had already elicited foundational testimony
from the officer relating generally to the
contents of the audio recording. Therefore,
any errors in the admission of the audio
recording of Stell’s apprehension, arrest, and
invocation of his right to counsel were harm-
Jess.

B. Denial of Idaho Criminal Rule 29 Mo-
tion

Hl Stell also argues the trial court erred
by denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 29 mo-
tion for judgment of acquittal for carrying a
concealed weapon while intoxicated or under
the influence because the State lacked suffi-
cient evidence that Stell was intoxicated or
under the influence. The State responds that
Stell’s behavior combined with police and the
male friend’s testimony is sufficient for a
reasonable juror to find that Stell was intoxi-
cated,

Hl Idaho Criminal Rule 29 provides that
when a verdict of guilty is returned, the
court, on motion of the defendant, shall order
the entry of a judgment of acquittal if the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction
of the offense. The test applied when review-
ing the district court’s raling on a motion for
judgment of acquittal is to determine wheth-
er the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged. State v,
Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 912-18, 908 P.2d 1211,
1219-20 (1995). When reviewing the sufficien-
ey of the evidence where a judgment of

831

conviction has been entered upon a jury ver-
dict, the evidence is sufficient to support the
jury’s guilty verdict if there is substantial
evidence upon which a reasonable trier of
fact could have found that the prosecution
sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 181 Idaho 383,
385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998);
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822
P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991), We do not
substitute our view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to
be given to the testimony, and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001;
State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 688, 684, 701 P.2d
3038, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we con-
sider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, Herrera-Brito, 181 Idaho
at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho
at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001.

HM Stell concedes there is sufficient evi-
dence that he carried a concealed weapon;
however, he contends that there was insuffi-
cient evidence that he was intoxicated: or
under the influence, Stell was charged under
Idaho Code § 18-8802B, which provides: “It
shall be unlawful for any person to carry a
concealed weapon on or about his person
when intoxicated or under the influence of an
intoxicating drink or drug.” Thus, under the
terms of the statute, the State must prove
not only that the defendant carried a con-
cealed weapon, but also that he was intoxicat-
ed or under the influence of drugs or alcohol
at the time of the concealed carry, The stat-
ute provides no definition for “intoxicated” or
“onder the influence,”

This Court exercises free review over the
application and construction of statutes, State
v. Reyes, 189 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.8d 1108,
1106 (Ct. App, 2008), Where the language of
a statute is plain and unambiguous, this
Court must give effect to the statute as
written, without engaging in statutory con-
struction. State v. Burnight, 182 Idaho 654,
659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v, Hsco-
bar, 184 Idaho 387, 889, 8 P.8d 65, 67 (Ct.
App. 2000). The language of the statute is to
be given its plain, obvious, and rational

832

meaning. Burnight, 182 Idaho at 659, 978
P.2d at 219,

Hl Both parties agree the definitions of
“intoxication” and “under the influence” pro-
vided in Black’s Law Dictionary are appro-
priate definitions. Black’s Law Dictionary de-
fines “intoxication” as “a diminished ability to
act with full mental and physical capabilities
because of alcohol or drug consumption.”
Bracx’s Law Dictionary 950 (10th ed. 2014).
“Under the influence” is defined as “deprived
of clearness of mind and self-control because
of drugs or alcohol.” Biack’s Law Dicrio-
NARY 1759 (10th ed. 2014), Accordingly, Stell
must have been mentally and/or physically
impacted by the consumption of drugs or
alcohol,

The State presented sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to conclude that Stell was
intoxicated and/or under the influence. Based
on Stell’s behavior and level of agitation, the
male friend believed Stell had been drinking
before Stell first arrived at the house. The
male friend drove Stell to the gas station to
purchase alcohol. Stell purchased and drank
malt liquor prior to being arrested.

Additionally, two officers present at Stell’s
arrest smelled alcohol on Stell’s breath as
they handcuffed Stell, after he exited the
bathroom attempting to evade the police.
Though the arresting officer was unsure of
the exact level of intoxication the statute
prohibits, the officer could tell Stell had been
drinking.’ To support the belief that Stell
was intoxicated, the arresting officer identi-
fied the witness statements, the bottle of
malt liquor, the odor of aleohol on Stell, and
the firearm.

There was also testimony regarding Stell’s
erratic behavior. Stell was upset and yelling.
The nearby resident called 911 and reported
that Stell had pointed a gun at a car as it
drove away. Based on Stell’s condition, the
male friend did not want to bring Stell back
to the house because the male friend did not
want Stell around the male friend’s children.
Stell crawled out a bathroom window to
evade the officers, Stell told the officers to
shoot him. Stell made statements regarding

3. While no field sobriety tests were administered,
the arresting officer testified that sobriety tests

suing the officers. Finally, while being hand-
cuffed, Stell told officers he was not wearing
any underwear.

Based on the evidence presented, although
conflicting, the jury could reasonably find
that Stell’s mental and physical capabilities
were diminished such that he was deprived of
clearness of mind and self-control because of
his alcohol consumption. Accordingly, the
State presented substantial evidence meeting
its burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that Stell was intoxicated while carry-
ing a concealed weapon. The Court cannot
substitute its opinion for that of the jury to
determine the credibility of the witnesses,
the weight to be given to the testimony, and
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence. Therefore, the trial court did
not err in denying Stell’s Rule 29 motion for
judgment of acquittal on the charge of carry-
ing a concealed weapon while under the influ-
ence,

mi.

CONCLUSION

There was overwhelming evidence in the
record for the jury to find that Stell was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggra-
vated assault, with a deadly weapon enhance-
ment; malicious injury to property; posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia; and carrying a
concealed weapon while under the influence.
Therefore, any error the district court may
have committed on admission of the audio
recording was harmless as it did not affect
the outcome of the trial. Further, there was
substantial evidence for the jury to find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that Stell was intox-
icated at the time he carried a concealed
weapon. Thus, the district court did not err
in denying Stell’s Rule 29 motion for judg-
ment of acquittal. Accordingly, Stell’s judg-
ment of conviction is affirmed.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge Pro
Tem WALTERS concur,

are only administered when someone is under
the age or is driving a vehicle.

fore)
eo
w

405 P.3d 618
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
ve

Eugenio CALIZ-BAUTIST:
Defendant-Appellant,

Docket No, 44440
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: November 2, 2017

Calbo & Depew, PLLC; C, Ira Dillman, for
appellant. C. Ira Dillman argued.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Ted S. Tollefson, Deputy Attorney Gen-

834

eral, Boise, for respondent. Ted S. Tollefson
argued.

HUSKEY, Judge

Eugenio Caliz-Bautista appeals from his
judgment of conviction after a jury found him
guilty of sexual abuse of a child under the
age of sixteen. On appeal, Caliz-Bautista ar-
gues the district court erred in granting the
State’s motions in limine that excluded the
testimony of Caliz-Bautista’s expert witness.
Because the expert’s testimony was specula-
tive about whether the State violated its test-
ing protocol or contaminated the evidence,
we affirm the district court’s order granting
the State’s motions in limine and judgment of
conviction.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Caliz-Bautista was arrested and charged
with felony lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen years of age, Idaho Code § 18-1508,
and felony sexual abuse of a child under the
age of sixteen years, I.C. § 18-1506. As part
of the investigation, the State collected DNA
evidence consisting of saliva from one of the
victim’s breasts and the State tested that
sample to compare it with a saliva sample
from Caliz-Bautista. The results of the DNA
analysis indicated the saliva recovered from
the victim matched the DNA sample from
Caliz-Bautista,

Caliz-Bautista requested, and the district
court approved, funding for a DNA expert to
examine the State’s testing methods. In his
witness disclosure, Caliz-Bautista explained:

[The expert witness] will testify general-
ly as to proper DNA testing protocol. He
will testify as to the accepted science stan-
dards to avoid contamination. He will testi-
fy as to how contamination can occur in

DNA testify [sic]. He will more specifically

testify as to the procedures used to test

the DNA in this case and how those proce-

1. The district court explained: “It is the burden
of the defense, to make a sufficient showing that
the expert would testify that there was likely
contamination within a reasonable degree of sci-
entific certainty before the testimony of [the ex-

dures go against standard appropriate lab
protocol to avoid contamination. He will
testify that the samples in this matter
were packages [sic] and sent to the biologi-
cal lab together. He will testify that the
sample obtained from Mr. Caliz was “out
in the laboratory” for DNA extraction at
the exact same time as the samples ob-
tained from the complaining witness in this
case were also having DNA extracted.

The witness disclosure provided only this
general information and contained no addi-
tional foundation. Defense counsel later ad-
mitted that no written report existed.

The State filed a motion in limine to ex-
clude Caliz-Bautista’s expert testimony on
the grounds that the testimony was specula-
tive. At the motion hearing, defense counsel
explained the expert’s testimony, which
would conclude that multiple samples were in
the lab at the same time during the extrac-
tion process and the samples were loaded
into a testing machine simultaneously. The
procedure, according to the expert, violated
the State’s own lab protocol. The expert did
not explain the degree to which the proce-
dure violated standard protocol, nor could he
quantify the effect. Defense counsel did not
explain or provide the basis from which Cal-
iz-Bautista’s expert concluded the samples
were out and extracted at the same time,
except that he had reviewed the State lab
testing procedure manual. In its memoran-
dum decision granting the State’s motions in
limine, the district court explained: “Counsel
has provided no explanation from the expert
as to how [the State lab] documentation dem-
onstrates that the samples were open at the
same time in the laboratory and the Court’s
review of that documentation does not show
an explanation on the face of the documenta-
tion itself.” The district court acknowledged
the testimony might be relevant to impeach
the State’s DNA expert, but the district
court granted the motions in limine subject
to a further offer of proof from Caliz-Bautis-
tat

pert witness] would be relevant and admissible.”

Assuming without deciding that this standard is

incorrect, any error does not require reversal

because the district court issued its decision sub-
ject to a further offer of proof. The district court

During trial, Caliz-Bautista attempted to
call the expert as a witness. Caliz-Bautista
made an offer of proof, during which the
expert witness testified and was questioned
by both parties and the district court. The
expert explained he reviewed documents
from the crime lab and was familiar with the
analytical methods that were typically em-
ployed by the lab, including the requirement
that the lab separate all samples by time
and/or place in order to avoid contamination.
The expert explained that, according to the
records he reviewed, the lab violated this
protocol because several samples were out in
the lab at the same time and the same instru-
ments were likely used to process them.

The district court reserved ruling on the
admissibility of the expert testimony. After
the State and Caliz-Bautista finished pre-
senting their respective cases-in-chief, the
district court granted the State’s motion to
exclude the testimony of the expert witness,
holding the testimony was speculative, would
only invite conjecture, and therefore would
not be of assistance to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict of not guilty
for lewd conduct with a minor child under
sixteen years of age. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty for sexual abuse of a child
under the age of sixteen. The district court
imposed a sentence of fifteen years, with five
years determinate. Caliz-Bautista timely ap-
peals,

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

‘The decision whether to admit evidence at,
trial is generally within the province of the
trial court. A trial court’s determination that
evidence is supported by a proper foundation
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Gilpin, 182 Idaho 648, 646, 977 P.2d 905,
908 (Ct. App. 1999). Therefore, a trial court’s
determination as to the admission of evidence
at trial will only be reversed where there has
been an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 978-74, 829 P.2d
861, 863-64 (1992).

therefore allowed for additional evidence of con-
tamination before it issued its decision on the

835

When a trial court’s discretionary decision
is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine
whether the lower court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion, acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consis-
tently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it, and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1831,
1833 (1989).

i.

ANALYSIS

Caliz-Bautista argues the district court
erred when it granted the State’s motions in
limine which excluded Caliz-Bautista’s expert
testimony. We disagree because the expert
testimony was speculative and would not as-
sist the jury. The district court, therefore,
did not err in excluding the testimony.

A. The District Court Correctly Ruled
That the Expert Testimony on Violat-
ing State Lab Protocols Was Specula-
tive

HM If scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise. I.R.E. 702. To deter-
mine whether expert testimony is admissible,
the district court must consider two factors.
First, to give expert opinion testimony, a
witness must be qualified as an expert on the
matter at hand. Id, Whether a witness is
sufficiently qualified as an expert is a matter
largely within the discretion of the trial
court. Sidwell v. Wiliam Prym, Inc, 112
Idaho 76, 81, 780 P.2d 996, 1001 (1986). Here,
neither party disputes that the expert wit-
ness is qualified.

HM Second, once the witness is quali-
fied as an expert, the trial court must deter-
mine whether the expert’s opinion testimony

matter.

836

will assist the trier of fact in understanding
the evidence. LR.E. 702; Sidwell, 112 Idaho
at 81, 780 P.2d at 1001. This condition goes
primarily to relevance. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US. 579, 591, 113
S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Hd.2d 469 (1993). One as-
pect of relevancy is whether the expert testi-
mony proffered in a case is sufficiently tied
to the facts of the case such that the testimo-
ny will aid the jury in resolving a factual
dispute. Id. An expert’s opinion that is specu-
lative or unsubstantiated by facts in the rec-
ord is inadmissible because it would not as-
sist the trier of fact. J-U-B Engineers, Ine. v.
Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 316,
198 P.3d 858, 863 (2008). If the expert’s
testimony is competent and relevant, it may
be admissible; the weight given to the testi-
mony is left to the trier of fact. State v.
Hopkins, 118 Idaho 679, 681, 747 P.2d 88, 90
(Ct. App. 1987). The admissibility of expert
opinion testimony is within the district
court’s discretion. Sidwell, 112 Idaho at 81,
730 P.2d at 1001.

HM The critical question in this case is
whether the expert opinion was speculative,
which would render the opinion inadmissible.
When an opinion is not based upon a proper
factual foundation, that opinion is speculative.
See Bromley v. Garey, 182 Idaho 807, 811,
979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999), The Supreme
Court explained: “Testimony is speculative
when it theorizes about a matter as to which
evidence is not sufficient for certain knowl-
edge.” Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 588,
848 P.8d 145, 153 (2015). An opinion that is
speculative suggests only possibilities and
may be properly excluded since the opinion
would not assist the trier of fact. See Nield v.
Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 802,
815, 882 P.8d 714, 727 (2014); Slack v. Kelle-
her, 140 Idaho 916, 923, 104 P.8d 958, 965
(2004); Bromley, 182 Idaho at 811, 979 P.2d
at 1169,

Although there are multiple steps in ana-
lyzing DNA samples, Caliz-Bautista’s expert
only took issue with the first step of the
process. To understand the expert's testimo-
ny, it is helpful to understand what occurs
during this first step of the testing process,
as shown by the evidence presented in this
ease. The lab receives samples of different

swabs, which are maintained in a secure loca-
tion. Typically, the lab will receive two types
of samples in each case: first, “known” or
reference samples, which contain DNA taken
from either the victim or the defendant
against which a comparison is made; second,
“anknown” samples, which includes evidence
collected as part of the investigation. A lab
technician transports all the samples from a
secure location to the lab, Beginning with the
ynknown sample, the lab technician opens a
sealed envelope, cuts off a piece of the un-
lmown sample, and places the cutting into a
test tube that has a screw cap as a seal. The
sample envelope is then resealed. The lab
technician repeats this process for any other
unknown samples that will be tested. The
sealed test tubes of the unknown samples are
placed in a test tube rack and set aside. After
completing the unknown samples, the lab
technician repeats the process with the refer-
ence samples, except the reference samples
are placed in a separate test tube rack and
processed in a different machine than the
unknown samples. Here, the State lab techni-
cian testified that the analysis of known and
unknown samples must be separated by time
and/or place. She testified that both require-
ments were satisfied in this case because all
the unknown samples were processed first
and then placed in a separate machine from
the known samples.

Caliz-Bautista sought to introduce expert
testimony to show the State violated its own
lab protocols and, as a result, the evidence
might have been contaminated because all
the sealed evidence envelopes were out in the
lab at the same time. However, the expert
could not and did not testify the State violat-
ed its own lab protocols because the expert
could not define what type of time and/or
place separation was required by the State’s
Jab protocol. Prior to trial, the expert failed
to prepare a report or summary of his find-
ings. At the pretrial hearing, the district
court only heard defense counsel’s interpre-
tation of the expert’s opinion, which included
general claims about contamination and the
assertion that the State violated protocol
when samples were “out in the laboratory” at
the same time as other samples. After hear-
ing argument on the issue, the district court
found that the expert testimony was inadmis-

sible in Caliz-Bautista’s case-in-chief because
the evidence was speculative.

During Caliz-Bautista’s offer of proof, the
expert’s testimony was presented as im-
peachment evidence, Caliz-Bautista’s expert
testified outside the presence of the jury and
explained that the State’s manual on DNA
testing procedures require reference samples
and evidence samples to be separated by
time and/or place? He asserted that this
recommendation aligns with labs all around
the country, which separate the analysis com-
pletely. The expert concluded the State “put
the suspect’s DNA in the same place and
time with evidence DNA,” although he did
not explain how this happened. The expert
did not argue that more than one sample was
open in the lab; instead, the expert was
concerned that all the sealed samples were in
the lab at the same time, When asked more
about the requisite degree of separation, Cal-
iz-Bautista’s expert explained that complete
separation—where a lab analyzes the un-
known evidence entirely before opening up
the reference samples—is best practice. The
district court asked:

Now, in terms of the practices and pro-
cedures as set forth in the [Idaho State
Police] Forensic Lab manuals, they refer-
ence a separation in time and space. They
recommend that the evidence sample or
the suspect sample be tested first. In
terms of time or space, does the ISP man-
ual specifically describe what that space
should be, what that time should be?

The expert did not answer the question. In-
stead, the expert referred to the language of
the State’s manual, which states only that the
question and known casework samples must.
be separated by time and/or space.

The district court did not err in excluding
the testimony of Caliz-Bautista’s expert in
this case, either as substantive evidence in
Caliz-Bautista’s case-in-chief or as impeach-
ment evidence. Caliz-Bautista’s expert did
not provide any testimony to refute the
State’s evidence that the samples were pro-
cessed with the required separation of time
and/or space. The expert also did not provide
any evidence that the State violated its own

2, The Forensic Biology Training Manual uses the
term “time and/or space” whereas Caliz-Bautis-

837

protocols. The district court explained:
“(While I understand that he may have his
own opinions as to how labs should conduct
DNA testing, [the expert’s] opinion alone
does not necessarily manifest or create the
standard by which labs perform their re-
quired testing services.” The district court
properly concluded that while other labs may
test evidence differently, it does not follow
that the State failed to test the evidence in
accordance with the standards for which they
are accredited and approved. Furthermore,
we cannot assume there was a violation of
protocol to have multiple sealed evidence
samples in the lab at the same time. The
expert witness failed to explain any violation,
and thus, the district court did not err when
it determined that Caliz-Bautista’s expert’s
testimony was too speculative to be admitted
and there was no other evidence the State
violated its own testing standards.

B. The District Court Correctly Ruled
That the Expert Testimony on Con-
tamination Was Speculative

HI The district court correctly excluded
Caliz-Bautista’s expert’s testimony that there
was a possibility of contamination because
the samples, even in sealed envelopes, were
all in the lab at the same time. This conclu-
sion was premised on the expert’s opinion
that the State failed to comply with its own

Jab protocol. During the offer of proof, the

Court asked the Caliz-Bautista’s expert to

quantify the probability of contamination.

The expert explained that he could not do so,

he did not believe anyone could make such a

calculation, and there was no way to tell for

sure that contamination occurred in this case.

Rather than provide a conclusion that con-
tamination occurred or it was more probable
than not to have occurred, the expert ex-
plained that the State could have reduced the
risk of contamination if it changed its testing
procedure. The expert stated he was con-
cerned with the risk of contamination, specif-
ically during the first step of the analysis. As
explained previously, the expert was con-
cerned that the State increased its risk of
contamination when it took all the sealed

ta’s expert refers to the phrase as “time and/or
place” and “time and place.”

838

samples from the secure location into the lab,
instead of taking out only the suspect's
known sample and completing the test before
removing the unknown evidence sample.

At trial, the DNA testing lab manager
explained there was no indication that con-
tamination occurred in this case. When Caliz-
Bautista’s expert took the stand for his offer
of proof, he admitted there was no evidence
the lab technician failed to take recom-
mended precautions such as putting down
clean paper, changing gloves, and cleaning
the instruments between each sample, The
expert admitted there was no evidence that
the test tubes containing samples were ever
open or unsealed when the unknown sample
was opened. The expert explained contamina-
tion can occur when a molecule of DNA is
transferred to the lip of a test tube, but the
expert failed to explicate how this was possi-
ble or more likely when the test tubes that
contained the evidence samples were sealed
and the lab technician properly cleaned the
instruments, The overall issue here was
whether the DNA samples were contaminat-
ed, and yet Caliz-Bautista’s expert witness
testified only about a possibility of increased.
risk of contamination that could have been
reduced. The expert admitted he could not
say there was contamination or quantify the
risk of contamination. Because the district

court may exclude expert testimony that
merely suggests possibilities and speculates
on a matter to which evidence is not suffi-
cient, the district court did not err in grant-
ing the State’s motions in limine to preclude
expert testimony in this case, The district
court therefore did not err when it held the
expert’s proffered testimony regarding the
possibility of contamination would not assist
the jury.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Because the expert’s testimony was specu-
lative about whether the State violated its
testing protocol or contaminated the evi-
dence, we affirm the district court’s order
granting the State’s motions in limine and
judgment of conviction.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
GUTIERREZ coneur.

405 P.3d 1180

Lisa M. SEARLE nka Loosle,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

ve

Dustin L, SEARLE, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 45029

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Pocatello, September 2017 Term.

Filed: November 8, 2017
Rehearing Dismissed December 5, 2017

g

Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen &
Hoopes, PLLC., Idaho Falls, for appellant.
Tracy W. Gorman argued.

Swafford Law, PC, Idaho Falls, for re-
spondent, Larren Covert argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

This expedited, permissive appeal presents
a child custody dispute. Lisa M. Searle, nka
Lisa Loosle (“Mother”) appeals the Bingham
County magistrate judge’s order which modi-
fied the current child custody plan outlined in
the 2013 order between Mother and Dustin
L, Searle (“Father”). Mother argues that the
magistrate judge abused its discretion in de-
termining there had been a substantial, ma-
terial, and permanent change in circum-
stances warranting a change in custody.
Mother also argues the magistrate judge
abused its discretion when it determined it
was in the best interests of Child to modify
the existing custody agreement and give Fa-

ther physical custody during the school year.
We reverse the magistrate judge’s change in
custody.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Mother and Father were married in 2005
and had one child (“Child”) during the mar-
riage. Mother and Father divorced in Bonne-
ville County in 2007. Following the divorce,
the parties entered into a child custody
agreement that gave Mother custody of Child
during the school year, with Father having
visitation on weekends and holidays. On An-
gust 28, 2012, the parties entered into a
modified custody agreement that contemplat-
ed and allowed for Mother's potential reloca-
tion for her employment, and if Mother found
employment outside of Idaho, she would be
allowed to relocate to another state. The
agreement indicated the parties would con-
tinue to adhere to the existing visitation
schedule and transportation schedule even if
Mother moved. Six days after the magistrate
judge entered this agreement as a court or-
der, Mother moved with Child to Virginia.

On October 5, 2012, Father filed a petition
for modification based on Mother’s move to
Virginia. The magistrate judge created the
“2018 Custody Order” which continued to
give custody to Mother during school, and
gave Father visitation during summers,
spring break, fall break, and every other
Christmas break. The 2018 Custody Order
required Father to pay for his flight to Virgi-
nia to get Child, and Mother to pay for the
return flight to bring Child back, At the time,
the visitation schedule worked because Fa-
ther was employed in the oil fields of North
Dakota, while earning a substantial salary, so
he could afford to fly for his visitation. From
2009 until May 2015, Father worked in North
Dakota for three weeks out of the month.
Starting in 2011, Father took summers off
from work and spent summers in Shelley,
Idaho, and worked the rest of the year in
North Dakota.

In November of 2014, Mother became ill
and moved back to the Boise area with Child.
Mother consulted with Father before moving
back to Boise, and Father consented to
Mother’s move. Mother and Father contin-

841

ued to follow the visitation plan in the 2013
Custody Order even after Child had returned
to Idaho. Father testified that after Mother
moved back to Idaho in 2014, they discussed
changing his visitation to more than what
was in the 2018 Custody Order. Mother was
open to changing the agreement, but Father
told Mother he wanted it to stay the same, as
he did not want to give up any of his already-
established visitation time. Mother testified
that she asked Father if Mother could spend
time with Child when Child was in Shelley,
but that Father said no.

In May of 2015, Father stopped working in
the oil fields. On May 21, 2015, Father filed a
petition for modification, to reduce his child
support, as he was earning significantly less
than he had in the oil fields, Approximately
one year later, on July 15, 2016, Father
amended his petition for modification asking
for a revision to visitation and custody time
due to Child being back in Idaho.

On December 16, 2016, a trial was held on
the issues raised in Father’s amended peti-
tion for modification—the child support
amount and custody agreement. At trial, Fa-
ther argued that his income had decreased
significantly and his support amount should
be reduced. Father also indicated his new
employment was seasonal and may lay him
off, or give him full-time work, but he does
not need the income from the job because he
“ean make a living working at McDonald’s”
and still be able to pay his bills, Mother
testified that she is currently earning $45,000
per year working for the Caldwell School
District as a school psychologist, but that she
is almost finished completing her degree as
an Education Specialist, and had been of-
fered an internship needed to complete that
training in Virginia.

Father argued that Child should come live
with Father during the school year, instead
of Mother, because Child would be able to
attend one consistent school in Shelley and
have consistent relationships with Father's
family that lived in Shelley. Child had attend-
ed five different schools while in the care of
Mother; however, Mother testified that Child
switched schools five times due to Child’s
enrollment in a gifted and talented program.

842

The only voluntary switch, where Mother
changed Child’s school, occurred when Moth-
er moved back to Boise from Virginia. The
other school changes were a result of the
gifted and talented program changing loca-
tions, as the school district rotates where the
gifted and talented program is located each
year. Father had agreed to enroll Child in
the gifted and talented program.

When asked what sort of custody arrange-
ment Father wanted, Father stated that the
2018 Custody Order already in place was
“not a bad one” and that custody should just,
be switched so that Father would have custo-
dy during the school year, and Mother would
have the visitation that Father had previous-
ly had, Father stated that if he were given
eustody of Child during the school year he
would get more involved in Child’s schooling,
as even after Child moved back to Idaho,
Father had only been to Child’s former and
current schools in Boise one time each and
did not know who Child’s teacher was. Addi-
tionally, Father had never attended a parent
teacher conference. Mother testified that she
takes Child to medical appointments, helps
Child with homework, and takes Child to
extracurricular activities. Mother had main-
tained custody of Child during the school
year for all of Child’s life. Mother also testi-
fied that Child has documented separation
anxiety when away from Mother.

At trial the magistrate judge asked Moth-
er, “If the order is that [Child]’s going to go
and go to school in Shelley, would you stay in
Boise or would you go to Virginia or would
you move to Shelley and—what would you
do? What’s your spontaneous response to
that?” Then the magistrate judge stated,
“And nobody is going to hold you to it,
ecause I know you're just shooting from the
hip here right now.” Mother replied, “I would
move to Virginia.” Mother’s statement that
she would return to Virginia regardless of
the trial outeome was a main basis for the
denial of her motion to reconsider, with the
magistrate judge stating Mother had taken
one position at trial, and then changed her
position to try and change the trial results.
Mother later stated she was attempting to
ask the magistrate judge for permission to
move, rather than stating her firm intention

to move. Mother has since declined her op-
portunity in Virginia and is staying in Boise.

The magistrate judge found there had
been a substantial change in circumstances
because of Mother’s move to Idaho and her
plan to move back to Virginia, as well as
Father’s job loss and reduced income. The
magistrate judge determined that the best
interests of Child would be served by revers-
ing the existing custody plan and giving Fa-
ther school year custody of Child. In reach-
ing his decision, the magistrate judge focused
on Child’s five changes in schools as well as
Mother's residential moves, as Mother had
moved four to five times during Child’s life.
The magistrate judge also credited Father
for Father’s homeownership of his house in
Shelley since 2011, Father’s family network
in Shelley, and Father's ability to pay his
pills by working at McDonald’s if needed.
Mother filed a motion to reconsider and said
she was staying in Boise rather than moving
to Virginia, The magistrate judge denied the
motion to reconsider, reiterating many of the
reasons given in its initial order, and noting
that Mother was changing her position by
deciding not to move to Virginia. Mother
timely appealed.

I. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the magistrate abused its dis-
eretion when it modified the parties’
existing custody arrangement.

2. Whether either party is entitled to at-
torney fees on appeal,

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This is a permissive appeal under
[LA.R.] 12.1, and as such, the Court re-
views the magistrate judge’s decision with-
out the benefit of a district court appellate
decision. A trial court’s child custody deci-
sion will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion. A trial court does not
abuse its discretion as long as the court
“recognizes the issue as one of discretion,
acts within the outer limits of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the available choices, and
reaches its decision through an exercise of
reason.” When the trial court’s decisions

affect children, the best interests. of the
child is the primary consideration,

Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 858, 356, 347
P.8d 645, 648 (2015) (citations omitted). “An
abuse of discretion oceurs when the evidence
is insufficient to support a magistrate’s con-
clusion that the interests and welfare of the
children would be best served by a particular
custody award or modification.” Nelson v.
Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 718, 170 P.8d 875, 378
(2007). When an appellate court reviews the
magistrate judge’s findings of fact, the appel-
late court “will not set aside the findings on
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous such
that they are not based upon substantial and
competent evidence.” Jd,

Iv. ANALYSIS

Mother argues the magistrate judge erred
in changing primary custody during the
school year from Mother to Father. Specifi-
cally, Mother argues that there was not a
substantial, material change in circumstances
because the parties had continued to adhere
to the visitation schedule outlined in the 2013
Custody Order for two years after Mother
returned to Idaho. Additionally, Mother ar-
gues that it is not in Child’s best interests to
live with Father during the school year.
Mother argues that Mother has always been
Child’s primary caretaker, Child is enrolled
in a gifted and talented program in Boise,
Child has separation anxiety when away from
Mother, and Mother helps Child with school-
ing and extracurricular activities whereas
Father has not been involved in Child’s
school or activities. Father argues that there
has been a substantial, material change in
circumstances because he lost his job in the
oil fields and because Mother moved back to
Idaho, Father asserts that the magistrate
judge properly modified custody to give
Child to Father during the school year be-
cause Child has changed schools five times,
and because Mother moved to Virginia, then
back to Boise, and wanted to move back to
Virginia again. Father also asserts that
Mother’s moving makes her unstable, and
that Child should live with Father in Shelley
where she will be near his family,

843

A. The magistrate erred in modifying the
parties’ custody arrangement.

HN For the reasons discussed below,
we reverse the magistrate judge’s order
modifying the existing custody plan. This
Court has long held that in order to modify
an existing custody agreement there must be
a material, permanent, and substantial
change in cireumstances that warrants modi-
fication of custody for the best interests of
the child. Doe v. Doe (2016-7), 161 Idaho 67,
‘71, 883 P.8d 1237, 1241 (2016); Rogich v.
Rogich, 78 Idaho 156, 161, 299 P.2d 91, 94
(1956); Simpson v. Simpson, 51 Idaho 99,
102, 4 P.2d 345, 346 (1981). The party who
wants to “‘modify a previously existing cus-
tody order must first demonstrate that a
material, substantial change in circumstances
occurred since the earlier custody order. A
court then will determine custody and where
the children will reside using the best inter-
ests of the child standard’ provided in Idaho
Code section 82-717.” Lamont, 158 Idaho at
359, 847 P.8d at 651 (quoting Suter v. Big-
gers, 157 Idaho 542, 546, 387 P.8d 1271, 1275
(2014)), Whether a change is “material” or
“substantial” depends on the impact the
change has on the child. Doe (2016-7), 161
Idaho at 78, 883 P.8d at 1248 (citing Bvans v.
Sayler, 151 Idaho 228, 226, 254 P.8d 1219,
1222 (2011).

“The movant in custody modifica-
tion proceedings has the burden not only of
showing the change in circumstances has oc-
curred but that, in light thereof, the best
interests of the children require the shifting
of custody.” Chislett v. Cow, 102 Idaho 295,
298, 629 P.2d 691, 694 (1981). The changed-
circumstances requirement reflects the policy
favoring finality and discouraging relitigation
of custody agreements. Doe (2016-7), 161
Idaho at 78, 883 P.8d at 1248, “That policy
goal, however, is of secondary importance
when compared to the best interest of the
child, which is the controlling consideration
in all custody proceedings.” Poesy v. Bumney,
98 Idaho 258, 261, 561 P.2d 400, 408 (1977).

HH In this case, the magistrate found
there had been a material, permanent, and
substantial change in circumstances, stating:

844

This Court concludes that there has
been a material, permanent, and substan-
tial change of circumstances since this
Court’s last order in this case in April of
2018 because M has moved from Virginia
to Idaho, M plans to move back to Virginia
in August of 2017, F has lost his job in the
oil fields and earns about a third or twen-
ty-five percent of what he earned there,
and M has a history and pattern of moving
[Child] often and calls into question the
stability of [Child] while in M’s care and
custody.

The magistrate judge correctly found that
there had been a material, permanent, and
substantial change in circumstances because
Father was no longer employed in North
Dakota and as such was earning substantially
less income and because Mother had moved
back to Idaho from Virginia.

HH However, the magistrate judge
erred when it determined that the changed
circumstances warranted a change in custody
for the best interests of Child. “Idaho Code
section 82-717 provides a framework for the
trial court in determining the best interests
of the children in making a custody decision,”
Doe (2016-7), 161 Idaho at 78, 383 P.3d at
1243. Section 32-717(1) sets forth a non-ex-
haustive list of factors to consider when eval-
uating the best interests of the Child. Those
factors are:

(a) The wishes of the child’s parent or

parents as to his or her custody;

(b) The wishes of the child as to his or
her custodian;

(© The interaction and interrelationship
of the child with his or her parent or
parents, and his or her siblings;

(@) The child’s adjustment to his or her
home, school, and community;

(e) The character and circumstances of
all individuals involved;

(f) The need to promote continuity and
stability in the life of the child; and

(g) Domestic violence as defined in sec-
tion 89-6303, Idaho Code, whether or
not in the presence of the child.

LC. § 82-7170). But importantly, “[t}he
court shall consider all relevant factors,”
even if they are not enumerated in the above

list. Id. “[AJn abuse of discretion may also
occur where the court overemphasizes one
factor ... thereby similarly failing to support
its conclusion that the welfare and interests
of a child will be best served by a particular
custody award.” Moye v, Moye, 102 Idaho .
170, 172, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (1981). In this
case, the magistrate judge did not find suffi-
cient facts nor did it thoroughly analyze or
apply the facts of this case to any statutory
factor. The magistrate judge’s findings of
fact read as follows:

M testified that since the last Petition to
Modify and trial in this ease in 2018, that
M has married and divorced, M has relo-
cated from Virginia back to Boise, Idaho
area, in November 2014, M has continued
her education and is now working on a
degree through Idaho State University
through the Meridian, Idaho campus on an
Education Specialist Degree (a degree that
falls between a Master’s Degree and a
PhD) which follows M’s two Master De-
grees in the Educational Psychology Field,
M is currently working full time in the
Caldwell School District earning $45,000
per year; M is planning to accept an in-
ternship back in Virginia with the Fauqier
County Schools starting in August of 2017
and will earn $65,000 per year as an intern
for one year and M anticipates that the
Faugier County Schools will then hire her
on a rolling contract basis for over
$100,000 per year and after meeting the
rule of 30, M will then retire from the
Fauqier County schools and permanently
reside in Virginia. M testified that the
parties daughter [Child] does well in school
and is in a gifted and talented program,
that [Child] has changed schools about
once each year while in M’s care, [Child] is
now in 5th grade in Boise area having
attended two schools in Boise area since
moving there in 2014 in November during
the school year. M wants to keep the cus-
tody schedule set by the Court in 2013. M
has her parents and five siblings living in
Boise area and one sister who lives in
Virginia Beach, Virginia. M moved back to
Boise in November of 2014 because she
had health issues arising out of Lyme’s
disease, but M’s health is fine now. M feels
that F may have had mental health issue

when they were together and that [Child]
suffers from separation anxiety when she
is away from M because M feels that M is
the primary attachment person in [Child?s
life.

F testified that his home base has been
Shelley, Idaho most of his adult life, but F
has worked in the oil fields in North Dako-
ta earning over $100,000 per year until F
lost his job in the oil fields in the spring of
2015, F bought a home in Shelley, Idaho in
2011 and has resided in that same home
since. F lives alone but has a large extend-
ed family in Shelley where his mother,
siblings, cousins, aunts and uncles live.
Since losing his job in the oil fields, F has
worked as a low voltage electrical appli-
ance installer with his cousin, but in Sep-
tember of 2016 started working seasonally
for LP Propane earning $17.50 hour and
hopes when the season ends in May that F
might be offered full time employment, F
filed his petition to modify to get his child
support adjust to reflect his current in-
come and to seek greater stability for
[Child] who has been moved often by M
since the divorce. F testified that he be-
lieves that F, M, and [Child] are each in
good health physically and emotionally. F
testified that when [Child] is with him
through the summer and at other times
that she is happy, joyous, a pleasure to be
around and that [Child] interacts well with
F’s extended family.

The magistrate judge went on to discuss the
best interests of the child factors as follows:

The wishes of the individual parents: In
this case, M would like the current custody
arrangement to stay in place while F
would like the current custody arrange-
ment reversed with [Child] to live with F
during the school year and M to have the
visitation that F has had over the past
three plus years.

The wishes of the children: In this case,
neither party had a child custody evalua-
tion done nor did either party request that
the Court interview the child to determine
the child’s wishes. This Court believes that
the child loves each parent and wants to
spend considerable time with each parent.

845

The interaction and interrelationship of
the children with his or her parents and
siblings: In this case, M reports that
[Child] does well while in her custody and
F reports that [Child] does well while in
his custody.

The children’s adjustment to his/her
home, school, community: M testified that
[Child] does well with M no matter where
M lives nor which school M puts [Child]
into. F testified that F feels that [Child]
would do better living in his home in Shel-
Jey, Idaho and [Child] attending the same
school district with the same set of friends
for the next seven years,

The character and circwmstances of all
individuals tmvolved: F and M both aec-
knowledge the other is a good, loving, car-
ing parent.

The need to promote continuity and sta-
bility in the life of the child: M contends
that she is providing stability in the life of
[Child] even though M moves often and
[Child] changes schools often. F contends
that F does not move and that [Child]
would be more stable attending school in
Shelley, Idaho from [Child]’s home.

Domestic violence if any: No testimony
of domestie abuse was received by the
Court.

The disability of any party to the action
and related adaptive equipment and sup-
portive services: No evidence of either par-
ent or of the child being disabled was
presented to the Court.

Best Interest of [Child]: In an exercise
of discretion, the Court concludes that
[Child?s best interest will be served by
reversing the current custody order so
that [Child] lives primarily with F during
the school year and with M during the
summer and additional visits with M dur-
ing the school year because M has moved
frequently over the past years and plans
another major move in 2017 and after her
internship of one year there is the possibil-
ity of yet another move, [Child] has
changed schools almost every year over
the past five years while being in M’s
custody and changed in the middle of the
year in 2014, in contrast F has had and
maintains the same home in Shelley since

846

2011, F testified that his finances are such
that he could survive and meet his monthly
expenses working at McDonald’s, if neces-
sary, and F has a close extended family
living in Shelly or [sie] to help him with
parenting [Child].
The purported findings of fact are not suffi-
cient findings of fact. “A finding of fact is a
determination of a fact supported by the
evidence in the record.” Crown Point Dev,
Ine. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 77,
156 P.3d 578, 578 (2007) (citing Biack’s Law
Diorronary 284 (2d Pocket ed. 2001)). A
statement that “merely recite[s] portions of
the record which could be used in support of
a finding” is not a finding of fact. Crown
Point Dev. Ine., 144 Idaho at 77, 156 P.3d at
578, Here, the magistrate judge merely recit-
ed portions of the record, restating what
Mother and Father had testified to, Then,
despite the lack of application of the statuto-
ry factors to the present case, the magistrate
judge determined Child’s best interests
would be served by modifying the existing
custody plan, and giving Father custody dur-
ing the school year. The magistrate judge’s
decision to modify custody was in error,

This Court’s prior decisions make clear
that the parent seeking the modification has
the burden of showing not only that there
has been a substantial, material, and perma-
nent change in circumstances, but also that
because of the change in circumstances, the
child’s best interests now require a change in
custody. Chislett, 102 Idaho at 298, 629 P.2d
at 694, In Strain v. Strain, the only evidence
presented supporting modification of the cus-
tody agreement was the father and the
child’s desire that custody be transferred to
the father. 95 Idaho 904, 906, 523 P.2d 36, 37
(1974). This Court concluded that this desire
by father and child was not a change in
circumstances that warranted modifying the
existing custody plan, and thus the magis-
trate judge had abused its discretion in modi-
fying the custody agreement. Id. at 906, 523
P.2d at 38. In contrast, in Brownson v. Allen,
there was a substantial and material change
in circumstances warranting a change in cus-
tody back to the father when a child changed
his mind about which parent he wanted to
live with, the child’s academic performance
suffered while living with the mother, and

EET

the child was anxious while staying with the
mother, 184 Idaho 60, 64, 995 P.2d 830, 884
(2000). In Lamont, this Court upheld the
magistrate judge’s decision that it was in the
best interests of the children to stay with
their mother, even though the mother was
relocating for employment, 158 Idaho at 356-~
57, 847 P.8d at 648-49. In upholding that it
was in the best interests of the children to
move with their mother, this Court noted the
mother’s history of being the primary care-
giver and the better educational opportuni-
ties in the new school district. Id.

Additionally, the court must consider all
relevant factors when deciding what custody
award is in the best interests of the child.
LC. § 82-717(1). In Moye, in finding the tri-
al court abused its discretion when it modi-
fied custody, this Court stated, “[Tyhe
court’s apparent overemphasis of but one
consideration, that being the mother’s physi-
cal condition, convinces this Court that all
other relevant factors impacting upon the
best interests of the children were not duly
considered or, if they were, it was not so
reflected upon the record.” 102 Idaho at 172,
627 P.2d at 801.

The present case is similar to Strain, La-
mont, and Moye. In Strain, the only evi-
dence presented by the moving party was the
father and child’s desire that custody be
changed, Here, the only evidence presented
by the moving party, Father, aside from his
desire that Child live with him, is an unsub-
stantiated claim that Child’s interests would
be better served by living near cousins in
Shelley. This case is unlike Brownson where
the child’s academic performance suffered
and the child was anxious while staying with
his mother, because here, Child has thrived
in school while in Mother’s care and has
separation anxiety when away from Mother.
No evidence or testimony was offered show-
ing any sort of detriment to Child while in
Mother’s care, Like in Lamont, where the
mother had historically been the primary
caretaker, here, Mother has historically been
the primary caretaker of Child. Also like in
Lamont, where there were better school op-
portunities in Mother's location, in this case,
Child, who is academically gifted, has better
educational opportunities in Boise as opposed

to Shelley, as Child is enrolled in a gifted and
talented program in Boise. Additionally, the
concerns present in Moye, where the court
focused on a single factor, are also present
here, In this case, the magistrate judge fo-
cused on Mother's “instability” without mak-
ing any finding that Mother’s four residential
moves in the last ten years had any impact
on Child, and unrebutted testimony showed
that Child’s school changes were due to her
enrollment in the gifted and talented pro-
gram, and were in Child’s educational best
interests.

The dissent states that this Court is “sim-
ply considerling] the same facts as did the
magistrate and reach[ing] a different conclu-
sion.” While we are constrained by the rec-
ord before us, we are not simply considering
the same facts as the magistrate judge and
reaching a different conclusion. Such is not
possible when the magistrate judge did not
state which facts it considered when it decid-
ed to modify custody. As discussed above, the
magistrate judge’s “findings of fact” consist
of an objective recitation of Mother and Fa-
ther’s testimony. Then, without engaging in a
thorough analysis of any of the best interest
of the child factors, the magistrate judge
determined it was in Child’s best interest to
modify custody, apparently relying on noth-
ing more than an intuition that custody
should be modified. The dissent cites to Pres-
cott v. Prescott to support its contention that
this Court gives “special deference [to] the
findings of fact of the court below [because of
the] recognition of the special opportunity of
the lower court to assess the credibility of
the witnesses in the proceeding there.” 97
Idaho 257, 261, 542 P.2d 1176, 1180 (1975).
However, such deference is given only when
the magistrate judge’s findings are based on
sufficient, competent evidence. Jd. In this
ease, the findings are insufficient as they are
mere recitations of each party's testimony.
Moreover, there does not appear to be any
evidence in the record to support the magis-
trate judge’s decision to modify custody.
Thus, even though the magistrate judge has
“proad discretion” in child custody determi-
nations, see, eg., Brashear v. Brashear, 71
Idaho 158, 168, 228 P.2d 248, 246 (1951), we
do not give up our oversight and automatical-
ly defer to the magistrate judge’s determina-

847

tion, Rather, we review the magistrate
judge’s decision for an abuse of discretion,
which requires the magistrate judge to act
within the outer limits of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applica-
ble to the available choices, and reach its
decision through an exercise of reason, La-
mont, 158 Idaho at 356, 347 P.8d at 648,
Here, because we are unable to find any facts
in the record supporting the magistrate
judge’s decision to modify custody in the best
interests of Child, we conclude that the mag-
istrate judge erred.

In sum, Father failed to show that a modi-
fication of custody was in Child’s best inter-
ests, The record shows that Mother moved to
Virginia initially in compliance with a valid
court order, and then moved back to Boise in
2014 after consulting with Father, Once
Mother was back in Boise, Father did not
spend more time with Child, as he wanted
the 2013 Custody Order to continue to gov-
ern the visitation plan. Unrebutted testimony
shows that the Childs changes in schools
were in Child’s best educational interests as
part of Child’s gifted and talented program,
and that Father consented to Child’s enroll-
ment in the program. Father did not show
that Shelley schools would offer the appropri-
ate schooling needed for Child. Additionally,
there was no evidence in the record that
Mother’s moves had any impact on Child, or
that Mother was doing anything contrary to
Child’s best interests. Father testified that
eustody should be modified to give him custo-
dy of Child during the school year because
Father wants Child to be close to his family
in Shelley, However, Father wanting Child to
be close to his family is not the test for
custody modification. Rather, Father, as the
moving party, had the burden of showing it
was in Child’s best interests to modify the
existing custody plan. Chislett, 102 Idaho at
298, 629 P.2d at 694. Father offered no evi-
dence or testimony supporting why Child
would be better served by living with Father
in Shelley, rather than staying with Mother
in Boise, aside from an unsubstantiated claim
that living in Shelley close to Child’s cousins
was in Child’s best interests. There is no
evidence that Mother’s four moves had any
impact or caused any problems with Child, or

848

that Mother was acting in any way contrary
to Child’s best interests.

Because Father, as the moving party,
failed to carry his burden of showing a mate-
vial, permanent, and substantial change in
circumstances that warranted a change in
custody in the best interests of Child, the
magistrate judge’s modification of custody
was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we
reverse the magistrate judge’s modification
of custody. Because we reverse the magis-
trate judge’s modification of custody, we do
not reach the issue of whether Mother’s mo-
tion to reconsider was properly denied.

B. Neither party is entitled to attorney
fees on appeal.

HM Both Mother and Father request at-
torney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code section 12-121. This Court, in any civil
action, may award reasonable attorney fees
to the prevailing party. I.C. § 12-121; Doe
(2016-7), 161 Idaho at 79, 383 P.8d at 1249.
“This Court has held that attorney fees can
be awarded on appeal under Idaho Code
section 12-121 ‘only if the appeal was brought
or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, we cannot conclude that either party’s
conduct in this appeal was frivolous, unrea-
sonable, or without foundation. Therefore,
neither party is entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.

Vv. CONCLUSION

We reverse the magistrate judge’s decision
that changed school year custody from Moth-
er to Father. We remand to the magistrate
court to reinstate the custody agreement
from the 2018 Custody Order, which gave
Mother custody during the school year, and
Father custody during school breaks and hol-

idays. We decline to award attorney fees to
either party on appeal. Costs to Mother.

Justices JONES, BRODY and J.
PICKETT, Pro tem concur.

HORTON, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

I join in the Court’s conclusion that Father
demonstrated a substantial, material and
permanent change in circumstances, Howev-
er, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s
determination that the magistrate abused its
discretion when it determined that modifica-
tion of the custody arrangement was in
Child’s best interests. This Court has tradi-
tionally recognized that trial courts have
“broad discretion” in child custody determi-
nations. See, eg. Brashear v. Brashear, 71
Idaho 158, 168, 228 P.2d 248, 246 (1951). We
have afforded “special deference” to best in-
terests findings in “recognition of the special
opportunity of the lower court to assess the
credibility of the witnesses in the proceeding
there.” Prescott v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257,
261, 542 P.2d 1176, 1180 (1975). In my view,
this Court has simply considered the same
facts as did the magistrate and reached a
different conclusion. If the standard of re-
view was de novo review of the magistrate’s
decision, I would not hesitate to join with the
Court. I do not, however, believe that Mother
has demonstrated that the magistrate court
abused its discretion when it modified the
custody arrangement.

406 P.3d 370

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve
Ivan Drake PETTIT, Defendant-
Respondent.
Docket Nos. 44198, 44199

Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: September 29, 2017

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for appellant. Mark W. Olson
argued,

McCormick Law Office; Deborah L.
McCormick, Moscow, for respondent. Debo-
rah L, McCormick argued.

HUSKEY, Judge

The State appeals from the district court’s
appellate decision affirming the magistrate’s
order granting Ivan Drake Pettit’s motion to
suppress evidence obtained during a driving
under the influence investigation. The State

argues: (1) there was not substantial and
competent evidence to support the magis-
trate’s finding that Pettit was not required
by statute to use a turn signal at the inter-
section at issue; (2) alternatively, the statute
is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
Pettit’s maneuver and even if it were, sup-
pression is not the appropriate remedy; and
(8) alternatively, the officer’s mistake of law
is objectively reasonable and constitutes a
good faith exception to the warrant requite-
ment, The district court’s decision on appeal
affirming the magistrate’s order granting
Pettit’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2015, an officer stopped a car
driven by Pettit for failure to use a right turn
signal at an intersection, When approaching
the intersection while southbound, motorists
choose from three adjacent lanes of travel:
the leftmost lane which allows motorists to
continue straight through the intersection to
State Highway 8 East or to turn left to
either Highway 95 North or Highway 8
North and the center and rightmost lanes
which guide motorists to curve right and
continue on Highway 95 South. The intersec-
tion’s signage designates these options, with
one straight- or left-turn sign and two right-
turn-only signs. The signs are accompanied
by traffic lights, which for the right-turn-only
signs, display either red, yellow, or green
arrows, indicating when it is appropriate to
proceed through the intersection. Before
reaching the intersection, motorists are con-
fronted with at least two signs on the right
side of the road that designate Highway 95
South to be on the right and Highway 8 East.
to be straight ahead. At some point north of
the intersection, Highway 95 South is desig-
nated as South Jackson Street,

Pettit was traveling on Highway 95 South
and approached the intersection in the center
lane. He was faced with a green arrow, which
indicated to curve right through the intersec-
tion. Pettit remained in the center lane and,
without using a right turn signal, curved
right through the intersection. Because Pettit

851

did not use a right turn signal, the officer
stopped Pettit’s vehicle. As a result of the
stop, the officer obtained evidence which re-
sulted in Pettit being charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol (second of-
fense) and driving without privileges.

Pettit pleaded not guilty to both charges
and moved to suppress the evidence the offi-
cer obtained, arguing that a turn signal was
not required at the intersection and, thus, the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to
stop Pettit’s vehicle. The magistrate granted
Pettit’s motion to suppress, finding: (1) Idaho
Code § 49-808(1) unambiguously did not re-
quire Pettit to use a right turn signal and,
thus, the officer did not have reasonable sus-
picion to stop Pettit’s vehicle; (2) the officer’s
mistake of law was not reasonable because
the statute is unambiguous; and (8) alterna-
tively, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
The State appealed the magistrate’s decision
to the district court which affirmed the mag-
istrate’s decision on the same grounds, but
declined to address whether the statute was
unconstitutionally vague. The State timely
appeals to this Court.

518

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH For an appeal from the district
court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a
ease from the magistrate division, this
Court’s standard of review is the same as
expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reviews the magistrate rec-
ord to determine whether there is substantial
and competent evidence to support the mag-
istrate’s findings of fact and whether the
magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from
those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 418,
415, 224 P.8d 480, 482 (2009). If those find-
ings are so supported and. the conclusions
follow therefrom, and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm
the district court's decision as a matter of
procedure. Id. Thus, the appellate courts do
not review the decision of the magistrate.
State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318
P.8d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014), Rather, we are
procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the
decision of the district court. Jd.

|

852

HN The standard of review of a sup-
pression motion is bifureated. When a deci-
sion on a motion to suppress is challenged,
we accept the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence,
but we freely review the application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts as found. State
v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 998, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999),

THM This Court exercises free review
over the application and construction of stat-
utes. State v. Reyes, 189 Idaho 502, 505, 80
P.8d 1108, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003), Where the
language of a statute is plain and unambigu-
ous, this Court must give effect to the statute
as written, without engaging in statutory
construction. State v. Burnight, 182 Idaho
654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v.
Escobar, 184 Idaho 387, 889, 3 P.38d 65, 67
(Ct, App. 2000). The language of the statute
is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning. Burnight, 182 Idaho at 659, 978
P.2d at 219, If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the
court to resort to legislative history or rules
of statutory interpretation. Hscobar, 184 Ida-
ho at 889, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must
engage in statutory construction because an
ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain
the legislative intent and give effect to that
intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22
P.8d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001), To ascertain
such intent, not only must the literal words
of the statute be examined, but also the
context of those words, the public policy be-
hind the statute and its legislative history.
Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give an
ambiguous statute an interpretation which
will not render it a nullity. Id.

in.

ANALYSIS

The State asserts the district court erred
when it affirmed the magistrate’s order

granting Pettit’s motion to suppress. The
State makes several arguments on appeal.
First, the State asserts that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop Pettit because
LC. § 49-808(1) unambiguously required a
right turn signal. Second, the State argues
that the statute is not unconstitutionally
vague as applied to Pettit’s maneuver and
even if it were, that suppression is not the
appropriate remedy. Third, the State con-
tends that if the officer did not have reason-
able suspicion to stop Pettit, it was the result
of an objectively reasonable mistake of law
and, therefore, suppression is not warranted.

A. The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable
Suspicion to Stop Pettit’s Vehicle Be-
cause Pettit Did Not Turn Onto a New
Highway

Hs A traffic stop by an officer consti-
tutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and sei-

zures. Delaware v. Prowse, 440 U.S. 648, 653,

99 S.Ct, 1891, 59 L.Hd.2d 660 (1979); Athin-

son, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286.

Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer

may stop a vehicle to investigate possible

criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws. United States

v. Cortez, 449 US. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66

L,Ed.2d 621 (1981); State v Flowers, 131

Idaho 205, 208, 958 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App.

1998), The reasonableness of the suspicion

must be evaluated upon the totality of the

circumstances at the time of the stop. State

v, Ferreira, 188 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700,

709 (Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion

standard requires less than probable cause,

but more than mere speculation or instinct
on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may
draw reasonable inferences from the facts in
his or her possession, and those inferences
may be drawn from the officer’s experience
and law enforcement training. State v. Mon-
tague, 114 Idaho 819, 321, 756 P.2d 1088,
1085 (Ct. App. 1988).

“Whether the officer had reason-
able suspicion that Pettit violated IC. § 49-
808(1) by failing to use a right turn signal at
the intersection can be determined by the

plain language of the statute. The State ar-
gues the statute requires a turn signal in the
circumstance of this case and Pettit argues it
does not. The text of the statute provides:
“No person shall turn a vehicle onto a high-
way or move a vehicle right or left upon a
highway or merge onto or exit from a high-
way unless and until the movement can be
made with reasonable safety nor without giv-
ing an appropriate signal.” I.C. § 49-808(1).
The statute thus requires a signal for three
specific maneuvers: (1) when turning a vehi-
cle onto a highway; (2) when moving a vehicle
right or left upon a highway, as when chang-
ing lanes; and (8) when merging onto or
exiting from a highway, At issue in this case
is whether Pettit failed to signal before turn-
ing his vehicle onto a highway.

In the State’s reply brief, the State nar-
rows the parties’ interpretive dispute to the
term “onto” as contained in I.C. § 49-808(1).
The State concedes the plain language of the
term contemplates a driver turning onto a
new highway, or in other words, onto a high-
way a driver was not on prior to the turn.
The State argues Pettit did just that, leaving
Highway 95 South as he entered the Moscow
intersection and turning onto a new Highway
95 South as he exited the intersection. The
evidence does not support this argument.
Highway 95 South is a continuous highway
that traverses the intersection at issue, Thus,
Pettit did not leave Highway 95 South by
turning onto a new highway, but rather con-
tinued on Highway 95 South, the same high-
way he was on prior to his turn, For that
reason, the plain language of 1.C. § 49-808(1)
did not require Pettit to use a turn signal. In
contrast, if Pettit had instead turned left at
the intersection, onto Highway 8 North, he
would have turned onto a new highway, ne-
cessitating a turn signal. The magistrate’s
factual finding that Pettit was not required to
signal was thus supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Because the district
court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we
affirm the district court's decision and con-
clude the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop Pettit’s vehicle. Because we
conclude the plain language of I.C. § 49-
1, Although this is a narrow distinction, it is one

drawn by the plain language of LC. § 49-808(1),
which we are compelled to apply by the Idaho

853

808(1) did not require Pettit to use a turn
signal at the Moscow intersection, we need
not address whether the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague as applied to Pettit’s ma-
neuver.

B. The Officer Made an Objectively Rea-
sonable Mistake of Law

HH The State is correct that this Court
has not squarely addressed whether an offi-
eer’s mistake of law will necessarily invali-
date a traffic stop. See State v. Horton, 150
Idaho 300, 303, 246 P.8d 678, 676 (Ct. App.
2010). Consideration of that question has
been prevented by the preliminary question
of objective reasonableness of an officer’s
stop. In State v. McCarthy, 183 Idaho 119,
982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999), an officer
stopped a driver traveling at an estimated
forty-five miles per hour for speeding
through what the officer believed to be a
twenty-five-mile-per-hour zone. Id. at 121,
982 P.2d at 956. However, the officer was
mistaken about the speed limit, a mistake the
Court characterized as a mistake of fact and
Jaw. Id. at 124, 982 P.2d at 959, Before
reaching the question of whether a mistake
of law invalidates a traffie stop, the Court
noted it could dispose of the case by consid-
ering the preliminary question of whether
the mistake of law was objectively reason-
able. Id. at 125, 982 P.2d at 960. The Court
emphasized the objective nature of the rea-
sonableness determination and concluded
that the officer’s mistake of law was not
objectively reasonable because no evidence
was presented to support the reasonableness
of the mistake and the operative law was not
“ambiguous or susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” Id. Because the
officer’s mistake was not objectively reason-
able, the Court held the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop the driver, inval-
idating the stop. Id.

In this case, however, we must go further
than the Court in McCarthy. Although we
conclude that, on its face, IC. $ 49-808(1)
plainly did not require Pettit to signal at the
Moscow intersection, we also conclude the

Supreme Court's holding in Verska v. Saint Al-

phonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265
P.3d 502, 509 (2011).

854 Le

officer’s mistake was objectively reasonable
in this circumstance. Idaho Code § 49-808(1)
leaves the question of when a “highway”
begins and ends subject to reasonable de-
bate. For this reason, both parties argue that
different characteristics of the Moscow inter-
section and surrounding area determine the
location where Highway 95 South begins and
ends, The State argues the nature of an
intersection can signal the beginning and end
of a highway. Here, the State points to High-
way 95 South’s designation as South Jackson.
Street at some point north of the intersection
(although the State asserts naming conven-
tions should not enter into the determina-
tion), Pettit’s location in a right-turn-only
lane, traffic signs indicating Pettit was re-
quired to turn right, the approximate ninety
degree turn Pettit completed, and the choice
of direction the intersection forced Pettit to
make. Pettit, however, argues that a highway
does not end simply because it passes
through an intersection, even one with the
characteristics he drove through. Here, Pet-
tit points to Highway 95 South, which is
specifically designated as Highway 95 South
north of, through, and south of the intersec-
tion at issue. In support of this proposition,
Pettit points to the two traffic signs before
the intersection that indicate a right turn
allows a driver to continue on Highway 95
South. Idaho Code § 49-808(1), without ex-
plicit language defining where a highway be-
gins or ends or what impact the characteris-
ties of an intersection have on the definition,
prefers neither of these interpretations. As
such, the officer’s consideration of all these
factors and his decision that Pettit was re-
quired to signal at the Moscow intersection,
was objectively reasonable,

C. The Mistake of Law Does Not Prevent
Suppression .

HHI Next, we determine whether an ob-
jectively reasonable mistake of law amounts
to a good faith exception to Idaho’s indepen-
dent exclusionary rule, so that here, suppres-
sion would be inappropriate. The State ar-
gues that Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S.
——,, 185 S.Ct. 580, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014)
requires the Court to treat the officer’s un-
constitutional stop as valid for suppression
purposes. Indeed, the State points to the

United States Supreme Court’s observation
in Heien that for suppression purposes, there
should be no distinction between an officer's
reasonable mistake of fact and a reasonable
mistake of law. Id. at 586 (“There is no
reason, under the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment or our precedents, why this same result
should be acceptable when reached by way of
a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when
reached by way of a similarly reasonable
mistake of law.”), But the State’s use of
Heien looks only to the Fourth Amendment,
to the United States Constitution and ignores
Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

The Idaho Supreme Court’s interpretation
of Article 1, § 17 departed from the United
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment in State v. Gueman, 122
Idaho 981, 998, 842 P.2d 660, 677 (1992).
(‘[Wle finally and unequivocally no longer
adhere to a policy of sheepishly following in
the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in
the area of state constitutional analysis.”) In
Guzman, the Idaho Supreme Court deter-
mined Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitu-
tion would no longer be limited by a good
faith exception. Gueman, 122 Idaho at 998,
842 P.2d at 672, The Idaho Supreme Court
gave several reasons why under Article 1,
§ 17 a good faith, mistake of law exception
should not be allowed:

1) provide an effective remedy to persons
who have been subjected to an unreason-
able government search and/or seizure; 2)
deter the police from acting unlawfully in
obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thorough-
ness in the warrant issuing process; 4)
avoid having the judiciary commit an addi-
tional constitutional violation by consider-
ing evidence which has been obtained
through illegal means; and 5) preserve ju-
dicial integrity.

Guaman, 122 Idaho at 998, 842 P.2d at 672.

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Guz-
man’s validity in State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho
511, 272 P.8d 483 (2012), where the Court
reiterated the Guzman Court’s reasoning,
refused to reject Idaho’s independent exclu-
sionary rule, and reinforced the rule that
Idaho courts will continue to construe Article
1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution “to provide

greater protection than is provided by the
United States Supreme Court’s construction
of the Fourth Amendment.” Koivu, 152 Ida-
ho at 519, 272 P.3d at 491.

The State nonetheless advocates for a good
faith, mistake of law exception on the basis
that traffic stops are only minimal intrusions
on privacy as compared to warrantless
searches of a person, home, car, or other
property and that not creating a good faith
exception is inconsistent with the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 448 U.S, 81, 99 S.Ct, 2627, 61
L.Ed.2d 848 (1979) (imposing a good faith
exception for an officer’s acts performed pur-
suant to a statute later declared unconstitu-
tionally vague). Neither of these arguments
address the Idaho Supreme Court’s reason-
ing in Guzman or Koivu for not maintaining
a good faith exception. First, even a minimal
intrusion upon an individual’s privacy may
amount to an unreasonable government
search or seizure. Second, DeFillippo’s in-
consistency is irrelevant; both Heien and De-
Fillippo have no bearing on whether Idaho's
independent exclusionary rule is operable,
allowing courts to suppress evidence even as
to a reasonable mistake of law. Therefore,
the Court declines to follow Heien or DeFil-

855

lippo and adopt a good faith exception for an
officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of
law. As such, we affirm the district court’s
ruling suppressing the resulting evidence ob-
tained by the officer’s stop of Pettit’s vehicle.

Iv.
CONCLUSION

The officer did not have reasonable suspi-
cion to stop Pettit’s vehicle because Pettit did
not turn onto a new highway. However, the
officer’s mistake of law in interpreting I.C.
§ 49-808(1) was objectively reasonable, al-
though the mistake still merits suppression,
We affirm the district court’s decision affirm-
ing the magistrate’s order granting Pettit’s
motion to suppress,

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
GUTIERREZ concur.

856 Le

406 P.3d 868
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Corey Dale YOUNG, Defendant-
Appellant.
State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Marco Antonio Rios-Lopez,
Defendant-Appellant,
Docket No. 45125

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, November 2017 Term.

Filed: November 29, 2017

Eric D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Appel-
late Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Sally Cooley, Deputy Appellate Public De-
fender argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent. Russell
J. Spencer, Deputy Attorney General argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

This consolidated appeal from the Ada and
Blaine County district courts concerns credit
for time served under Idaho Code section 18-
309. Marco Antonio Rios-Lopez and Corey
Dale Young (collectively, Appellants) seek
credit for time served under the construction
of section 18-309 pronounced in State v. Ow-
ens, 158 Idaho 1, 843 P.8d 30 (2015). The
district courts denied Appellants’ motions,

and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This
Court granted Appellants’ timely petitions
for review, and we now affirm the orders of
the district courts.

I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

A. State v. Rios-Lopez

In October 2001, Rios-Lopez was convicted
of three counts of trafficking cocaine and
three counts of failure to affix illegal drug tax
stamps. On the three trafficking counts, the
district court imposed a sentence of fourteen
years, with seven years fixed. On the three
drug tax stamps counts, the district court
imposed a sentence of two years, with one
year fixed. The district court ordered the
sentences to run consecutively. The district
court awarded 258 days of credit for time
served under section 18-309 on the first traf-
ficking count. Rios-Lopez timely appealed,
“eontending that there was error in the ad-
mission of evidence and prosecutorial miscon-
duet during closing argument, and that the
sentences are excessive,” but the Court of
Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion
in 2008, A remittitur was issued on October
29, 2003,

Some fifteen years later, Rios-Lopez
moved for additional credit for time served.
He filed a pro se motion under Idaho Crimi-
nal Rule 35, seeking 253 days of credit on
each of the remaining seven! counts, for an
additional credit of 1,771 days. Rios-Lopez
argued he was entitled to that credit under
the construction of section 18-309 pronounced.
in Owens, even though his judgment of con-
viction had become final before Owens was
decided. The district court concluded Owens
did not apply retroactively and denied the
motion, The Court of Appeals affirmed, and
this Court granted Rios-Lopez’ timely peti-
tion for review.

B. State v. Young

In March 2018, Young was convicted of
two counts of burglary and two counts of
grand theft. On the first burglary count, the
district court imposed a sentence of one year

1. Rios-Lopez’ briefing does not clarify why he
requested a credit reflecting eight counts, rather
than six counts. As his opening brief states, “Mr.
Rios-Lopez was sentenced to consecutive sen-

857

fixed. On the second burglary count, the
district court imposed a sentence of nine
years, with one year fixed. On the first grand
theft count, the district court imposed a sen-
tence of eight years, with one year fixed. On
the second grand theft count, the district
court imposed a sentence of two years, with
one year fixed. The district court ordered the
sentences to run consecutively. The district
court awarded 94 days of credit for time
served on the first burglary count. Young did
not directly appeal his conviction or sentence
within 42 days of the district court’s judg-
ment,

In December 2015, Young moved for addi-
tional credit for time served. He filed a pro
se motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35,
seeking 94 days of credit on each of the
remaining three counts, for an additional
credit of 282 days, Young argued he was
entitled to that credit under Owens, even
though his judgment of conviction had be-
come final before Owens was decided. The
district court concluded Owens did not apply
retroactively and denied the motion. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, and this Court
granted Young’s timely petition for review.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM When addressing a petition for re-
view, we give “serious consideration to the
views of the Court of Appeals, but directly
review[] the decision of the lower court.”
State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491, 387 P.8d
647, 650 (2014). “This Court thus acts as if
the case were on direct appeal from the
district court.” State v. James, 148 Idaho 574,
576, 225 P.8d 1169, 1171 (2010). “The ques-
tion of whether a sentencing court has prop-
erly awarded credit for time served to the
facts of a particular case is a question of law,
which is subject to free review by the appel-
late courts.” State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381,
884-85, 373 P.8d 699, 702-08 (2016) (quoting
State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d
1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005)).

tences on six counts ... it is not clear why he is

under the impression that he was convicted of
eight counts....”

858

TI ANALYSIS

TB At issue are the district courts’ orders
denying Appellants’ Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motions seeking credit for time served under
Idaho Code section 18-809 and the holding
pronounced in Owens. The district courts in
both cases held that Appellants were not
entitled to relief under Owens because their
judgments of conviction had become final
before Appellants filed their Rule 35 motions.

Appellants’ arguments implicate section
18-809, which provides:

In computing the term of imprisonment,
the person against whom the judgment
was entered shall receive credit in the
judgment for any period of incarceration
prior to entry of judgment, if such incar-
ceration was for the offense or an included
offense for which the judgment was en-
tered. The remainder of the term com-
mences upon the pronouncement of sen-
tence and if thereafter, during such term,
the defendant by any legal means is tem-
porarily released from such imprisonment
and subsequently returned thereto, the
time during which he was at large must
not be computed as part of such term.

LC. § 18-809(1).

Appellants were sentenced under the con-
struction of section 18-309 pronounced in
State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352, 630 P.2d
148, 144 (1981), and thus were awarded cred-
it for time served on just one of their counts.
The Hoch defendant pled guilty to two
charges of second degree burglary. Id, The
district court sentenced him to two five-year
terms, which were to run consecutively. Id.
The defendant requested 888 days of credit
for time served under section 18-809, seeking
for that credit to apply to each sentence for
each count, but the district court rejected
that construction of section 18-309. Id, This
Court affirmed on appeal. Id. This Court,
without citing the plain language of the stat-
ute, explained, “We find no intent of the
legislature that a person so convicted should
have that credit pyramided simply because
he was sentenced to consecutive terms for
separate crimes.” Id.

Appellants do not contend they were sen-
tenced incorrectly under Hoch. Rather, they
seek relief under Owens, where, nearly 34
years after Hoch, this Court pronounced a

different construction of section 18-309 and
overruled Hoch. The Owens defendant pled
guilty to eight counts of issuing a check with
insufficient funds, 158 Idaho at 2, 348 P.3d at
81. The district court sentenced him to fif-
teen months with six months fixed on each of
the eight counts, which were set to run con-
secutively. Jd. The district court awarded
credit for time served under section 18-809,
but on just one of the eight counts, Id, at 2-3,
343 P.8d at 31-82. The defendant requested
additional credit for time served, arguing he
was entitled to credit for time served on each
of the eight counts, but his motion was de-
nied. Jd. at 8, 343 P.8d at 82, The defendant
timely appealed to this Court, raising the
issue whether section 18-809 authorizes cred-
it for prejudgment time served on each sen-
tence for each count, Id, at 8-4, 348 P.3d at
82-88, This Court concluded it does and ex-
plained as follows:

Idaho Code section 18-309’s language
plainly gives credit for prejudgment time
in custody against each count’s sentence,
The statute does not limit that credit in
any way. First, Idaho Code section 18-309
mandates that a court gives a defendant,
credit for his time served because the stat-
ute states that a person “shall” receive
eredit, Second, section 18-309 specifies that
a person “shall receive credit in the judg-
ment for any period of incarceration prior
to entry of judgment ....” LC, § 18-809
(emphasis added). The statute continues to
provide that a defendant gets the credit
only on a requirement that incarceration
was for “the offense or an included offense
for which the judgment was entered.” The
statute has a mandatory directive that spe-
cifically conditions credit for time served
on the fact that the incarceration was for
“the offense” for which the judgment was
entered, While the word “offense” is singu-
lar, the phrase “if such incarceration was
for the offense or an included offense for
which the judgment was entered” simply
describes the type of incarceration that a
defendant gets credit for, This indicates
that as long as the defendant’s prejudg-
ment jail time was for “the offense” the
defendant was convicted of and sentenced
for, the court gives the defendant that
credit, If the legislature had delineated

credit for incarceration for “each case” or

another description other than “the of-

fense,” the outcome would be. different.
Id. at 4, 843 P.8d at 38; accord State v.
Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 192, 395 P.3d 809, 812
(2017) (“It is irrelevant if the defendant’s
incarceration rests on several, unrelated of-
fenses, as the fact remains that each offense
provides a basis for the defendant’s incarcer-
ation.”), Owens thus overruled Hoch, recog-
nizing that Hoch had “erroneously relied on
the statute’s legislative purpose without find-
ing the statute was ambiguous,” 158 Idaho at
5, 848 P.3d at 34,

HI Owens then addressed whether its
holding would apply retroactively. Owens
reasoned that it had “interpret{ed] section
18-309 in a way that was not dictated by
precedent” and, thus, “announce[d] a new
rule.” Id. at 6, 843 P.8d at 35, A “new rule
applies retroactively when it meets one of
two exceptions: (1) the rule substantively al-
ters punishable conduct or (2) the rule is a
‘watershed’ rule implicating the fundamental
fairness of the trial.” Id. (citing Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 811, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103
L.Hd.2d 384 (1989)). As Owens then rea-
soned,

This Court’s interpretation of Idaho
Code section 18-309’s plain language meets
neither exception. First, the statute’s plain
language does not alter the class of per-
sons or the conduct the law punishes. The
statute only alters the amount of time a
person spends incarcerated after the court
determines he committed punishable con-
duct. Second, the statute is not a water-
shed rule implicating a trial’s fundamental
fairness because defendants sentenced un-
der the statute still received a fair plea,
trial, and sentencing. The statute only af-
fects the punishment after trial. Also, the
trial court already had discretion to sen-
tence the defendant to concurrent counts
or consecutive counts. In sum, our new
rule does not meet either exception. There-
fore, we apply this Court’s new interpreta-
tion of Idaho Code section 18-309’s plain
language only prospectively and to cases
now on direct review.

Id, at 6-7, 848 P.8d at 35-36.

Here, Appellants are not entitled to credit
for time served under Owens. Owens was
decided on February 9, 2015. Rios-Lopez’

859

judgment of conviction has a file-stamped
date of October 17, 2001. He timely filed a
direct appeal, “contending that there was
error in the admission of evidence ‘and prose-
eutorial misconduct during closing argument,
and that the sentences are excessive,” but
the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpub-
lished opinion in 2003, A remittitur was is-
sued on October 29, 2008, at which time Rios-
Lopez’ judgment of conviction became final
by operation of Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c).
Similarly, Young’s judgment of conviction has
a file-stamped date of March 6, 2013. Young
filed no direct appeal within 42 days of the
judgment’s file-stamped date. His convictions
therefore became final on April 18, 2018, by
operation of Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a). Ac-
cordingly, Appellants’ convictions were final
well before Owens was decided, Because Ow-
ens applies only prospectively and to cases
on direct review as of February 9, 2015, 158
Idaho at 7, 348 P.8d at 36, Appellants are not
entitled to relief under Owens.

Appellants counter that a “motion to cor-
rect a court’s computation of credit for time
served” may be made “at any time” under
Rule 35(c). Appellants are correct that Rule
85(e) states: “A motion to correct a court’s
computation of credit for time served, grant-
ed pursuant to Idaho Code’§ 18-309 or 19-
2608, may be made at any time.” According
to Appellants, because the issue of credited
time may be “directly raised” at any time
under Rule 35(¢), the arguments here do not
contravene Owens’s non-retroactivity analy-
sis.

We are not persuaded. Appellants forget
that they were not sentenced after Owens
was decided, Nor were their cases pending
on direct review when Owens was decided.
Instead, their judgments of conviction were
already final when Owens was decided. We
resolved the retroactivity question in Owens
and were unequivocally clear that its con-
struction of section 18-809, a “new rule,”
would apply “only prospectively and to cases
now on [ie, as of February 9, 2015] direct
review.” 158 Idaho at 7, 348 P.8d at 36.
Merely that a Rule 35(c) motion to correct a
computation of credit for time served may be
filed “at any time” is beside the point, A
newly-filed Rule 85(c) motion seeking credit

860

under Owens in a criminal defendant's case
whose conviction was already final before
Owens was decided is not a motion asking for
a prospective application of Owens; the mo-
tion instead asks for a retroactive application
of Owens by seeking relief under a post-
judgment construction of section 18-309,
thereby contravening Owens’s clear non-ret-
roactivity analysis.

Appellants are correct to further note that.
section 18-309 mandates an award of appro-
priate credit, But that argument does not
assist Appellants here because the credit due
Appellants was appropriately awarded under
Hoch, The absence of error in Appellants’
sentences thus belies their reliance on Rule
85(c). Rule 85(c) encompasses motions “to
correct a court’s computation of credit for
time served....” (emphasis added). As a re-
sult, “Idaho case law has consistently treated
Rule 35(¢) as a mechanism to correct a
court’s computation of the credit due to a
defendant based upon objective evidence of
the time he or she actually spent in confine-
ment prior to imposition of the judgment in
the case.” State v. Martin, 159 Idaho 860,
864, 367 P.3d 255, 259 (Ct. App. 2016), How-
ever, Appellants have not proffered argu-
ment or evidence that their sentences were
erroneously calculated under the law as it
existed when they were sentenced. Since Ap-
pellants have not shown the existence of
error that warrants correction in the compu-
tations of their sentences, Rule 35(¢) does not,
entitle them to relief under Owens.

Our reasoning finds support under federal
law. In United States v. Booker, 548 U.S.
220, 226, 125 S.Ct. 788, 160 L.Ed.2d 621
(2005), the United States Supreme Court
evaluated whether the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution prohibits a
judge—rather than a jury—from determin-
ing a fact used to enhance a sentence under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Booker was a consolidated appeal that arose
after two district judges had found facts by a
preponderance of the evidence during sen-
tencing, facts which juries had not found
when determining guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 227-29, 125 S.Ct. 738. The facts
the district judges found warranted sentence

2, Similar to Rule 35(c), habeas relief can be
sought after the judgment of conviction becomes

enhancements under the Sentencing Guide-
lines, which, in turn, were binding on the
district judges. Id. at 226-27, 125 S.Ct. 738.
One of the district judges, bound by the
Sentencing Guidelines, sentenced the defen-
dant in light of the additional facts found
during sentencing. Id. at 227, 125 S.Ct. 738.
But the other district judge, citing Sixth
Amendment concerns, sentenced the defen-
dant according to the facts the jury found.
Id. at 228-29, 125 S.Ct. 738. On review, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment pre-
cludes a sentence enhancement based on the
sentencing judge’s determination of a fact
the jury never found (aside from a prior
conviction) and, therefore, excised the provi-
sions of the Sentencing Guidelines that were
mandatory and made them discretionary. Id.
at 244-59, 125 S.Ct. 788. Having pronounced
a “new rule for the conduct of criminal prose-
cutions,” the Court instructed that Booker’s
holding would apply to all cases “pending on
direct review or not yet final.” Id. at 268, 125
S.Ct. 738 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
US. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct, 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649
(1987)).

Since Booker, convicted criminal defen-
dants across the country have sought writs of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,? mak-
ing arguments that arise under Booker, not-
withstanding that their convictions were final
before Booker was decided. These habeas
petitions have been denied as foreclosed by
Booker. F.g., In re Zambrano, 483 F.3d 886,
889 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Cruz,
423 F.8d 1119, 1121 (th Cir. 2005); In re
Elwood, 408 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir. 2005); In
re Olopade, 403 F.3d 159, 164 (8d Cir. 2005);
Guzman v. United States, 404 F.8d 189, 144
(2d Cir. 2005); Bey v. United States, 399 F.3d
1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005); Green v. United
States, 397 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir, 2005); In re
Anderson, 396 F.3d 1836, 1339-40 (11th Cir.
2005).

Similar to Booker, we clearly expressed
the construction of section 18-309 pronounced
in Owens would apply “only prospectively
and to cases now on [i¢, as of February 9,
2015] direct review.” 158 Idaho at 7, 343 P.38d

final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255().

861

at 36. Since Appellants’ judgments of convic
tion were final before Owens was decided,
Appellants are not entitled to relief under
Owens.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we affirm
the orders of the district courts.

Justices JONES, HORTON, BRODY and
BEVAN concur.

406 P.3d 873
CMJ PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a

national banking association,
Defendant-Respondent,

and
Does 1-10, Defendants.
Docket No, 44526

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, September 2017 Term.

Filed: November 29, 2017

8

62

Angstman, Johnson & Associates, Boise,
for appellant. Matthew T. Christensen ar-
gued,

Parsons Behle & Latimer, Idaho Falls, for
respondent. Jon A, Stenquist argued.

BRODY, Justice

This is a quiet title action, A landowner
brought suit against a lender to extinguish a
deed of trust that was recorded against the
landowner’s property. The landowner
claimed that the lender’s time to foreclose
the deed of trust had expired. The district
court denied a motion to enter default judg-
ment in fayor of the landowner, finding,
among other things, that the statute of limi-
tations to foreclose the deed of trust had not
run. The district court entered a judgment
dismissing the landowner’s suit. We affirm
the district court’s judgment,

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Cory Jakobson and others (“Jakobson”)
owned the property at issue when a deed of
trust was granted to Washington Mutual
Bank (“WMB”). The deed of trust secured a
line of credit, A day after the deed of trust
was granted to WMB, Jakobson transferred
the property to CMJ Properties, LLC
(“CMJ”), via quitclaim deed. The deed of
trust was later assigned to JP Morgan Chase
Bank (“Chase”) as successor in interest.

Jakobson stopped making payments on the
credit line in May 2010 and filed bankruptey
about five months later. On April 6, 2011,
Chase terminated the credit line and subse-
quently filed a motion for relief from stay to
foreclose the deed of trust, The bankruptcy
court granted the motion for relief from stay,
but Chase has not initiated foreclosure pro-
ceedings,

On June 17, 2016, CMJ filed a complaint
against Chase to quiet title to the property.
CM3 alleged the deed of trust was no longer
enforceable because the time for foreclosure
had run. On July 27, 2016, CMJ filed a
motion for entry of default and default judg-

ment because Chase failed to appear. The
district court entered default, but denied the
motion for entry of default judgment, finding
that Chase’s time to initiate foreclosure pro-
ceedings had not run. The district court en-
tered a judgment dismissing CMJ’s claim.
CMJ appeals the district court’s judgment,

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “This Court exercises free review
over the district court’s conclusions of law to
determine whether the court correctly stated
the applicable law and whether the legal
conclusions are sustained by the facts found.”
PacifiCorp v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 153
Idaho 759, 767, 291 P.8d 442, 450 (2012).

The meaning and effect of a statute is a
question of law over which this Court ex-
ereises free review, Where the language
of the statute is clear and unambiguous,
legislative history and other extrinsic evi-
dence should not be consulted for the pur-
pose of altering the clearly expressed in-
tent of the legislature. The words must be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning, and the statute must be con-
strued as a whole.

State v. Hart, 185 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.38d
850, 852 (2001) (internal quotations and cita-
tions omitted).

Il. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not err when it
declined to deem as admitted an alle-
gation that more than five years had
passed since the maturity date of the
credit line.

CMJ alleged in its complaint that “[mJore
than 5 years has passed since the credit line
maturity date (ie. April 6, 2011 at the lat-
est).”. CMJ argues that this is a factual alle-
gation, and that the district court should
have deemed this as admitted pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6) because
Chase defaulted. We disagree.

Hs it is well understood that factual
allegations contained in a complaint are
deemed admitted when a defendant defaults.
Holladay v. Lindsay, 148 Idaho 767, 772, 152
P.8d 638, 643 (Ct. App. 2006); see Dawis v.
Parrish, 181 Idaho 595, 598, 961 P.2d 1198,
1201 (1998); LR.C.P, 8(b)(6). Courts are not
required, however, to deem legal conclusions

863

as admitted merely because they were plead
as factual allegations. See Bell Atl. Corp, v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct, 1955,
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S, 265, 286, 106 S.Ct, 2982, 92
L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (“{Flor the purposes of
this motion to dismiss we must take all the
factual allegations in the complaint as true,
we are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”);
In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Prac-
tices Litig., 490 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1100 (D.
Nev. 2007) (“T]he Court does not necessarily
assume the truth of legal conclusions merely
because they are cast in the form of factual
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint,”).

Hl The district court had no obligation to
accept as true CMJ’s allegation that more
than five years had passed since the credit
line maturity date of April 6, 2011. The dis-
trict court correctly understood that deter-
mining the maturity date of a debt requires a
legal conclusion based upon the terms of the
debt instrument. Regardless of Chase’s de-
fault, the district court was required to ana-
lyze the debt instrument and determine as a
matter of law what the maturity date was
and whether the time for filing a foreclosure
action had run based upon the factual allega-
tions, The district court did not err in the
process that it used when it denied CMJ’s
motion for default judgment,

CMJ also claims that the district court
erred when it determined that there were
foundational issues with CMJ’s complaint,
namely that it was unsworn and contained
insufficient information establishing how the
lawyer who signed it had personal knowledge
of some of the events. The district court’s
opinion clearly stated, “Even assuming coun-
sel could cure the foundation problems with
his testimony, there are more fundamental
issues with the relief sought.” It is apparent
from this statement that the district court
did not rely on the deficits in the complaint
when making its final decision. Consequently,
this issue is not dispositive, and we will not
address CMJ’s argument further. See J.R,
Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 615, 167
P.8d 748, 752 (2006) (holding that testimony
on which the trial court did not rely is imma-

864

terial to the outcome and need not be ad-
dressed by this Court),

B. The district court did not err in inter-
preting the statute of limitations set
forth in Idaho Code section 5-214A,

HH CMJ argues alternatively that if the
maturity date of the credit line is a question
of law, the district court erred in interpreting
the statute of limitations set forth in Idaho
Code section 5-214A. Specifically, CMJ ar-
gues the occurrence of an acceleration event
(ie, Jakobson’s default) caused the credit
line’s defined maturity date to change and
triggered the start of the statute of limita-
tions period. We recently rejected a virtually
identical argument in Baughman v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 162 Idaho 174, 395 P.8d
398 (2017).

Idaho Code section 5-214A states:

An action for the foreclosure of a mort-
gage on real property must be commenced
within five (5) years from the maturity
date of the obligation or indebtedness se-
cured by such mortgage. If the obligation
or indebtedness secured by such mortgage
does not state a maturity date, then the
date of the accrual of the cause of action
giving rise to the right to foreclose shall be
deemed the date of maturity of such obli-
gation or indebtedness.

In Baughman we explained that the first
sentence of Section 5-214A applies when
there is a stated maturity date in the instru-
ment at issue:

The first sentence of the statute states,

“An action for the foreclosure of a mort-

gage on real property must be commenced

within five (5) years from the maturity
date of the obligation or indebtedness se-
cured by such mortgage.” It is clear from
the second sentence of the statute that the
reference to “the maturity date of the obli-
gation or indebtedness” is the maturity
date stated in that obligation or indebted-
ness. The second sentence states, “If the
obligation or indebtedness secured by such
mortgage does not state a maturity date,
then the date of the accrual of the cause of
action giving rise to the right to foreclose
shall be deemed the date of maturity of
such obligation or indebtedness.” (Empha-
sis added.) The second sentence only ap-
plies if the obligation or indebtedness does

not state a maturity date. The first sen-

tence must then logically apply to an obli-

gation or indebtedness that does state a

maturity date. Otherwise, the two sen-

tences would conflict,
Id, at 180-81, 395 P.3d at 899-400.

The debtor in Baughman, like in this case,
argued that acceleration of the debt changed
the maturity date and triggered the start of
the statute of limitations period. We rejected
that argument because there was no provi-
sion in the promissory note which altered the
stated maturity date in the event of accelera-
tion:

In this case, the promissory note ex-
pressly stated that the maturity date was
March 1, 2047. There was no provision in
the note providing that the maturity
date would change if the amounts owing
under the note were declared to be im-
mediately due and payable because of a
default. Therefore, the five-year statute of
limitations for foreclosure would not begin
to run until March 1, 2047.

Id. at 181, 895 P.8d at 400 (emphasis added).

Jakobson’s obligation to pay is set forth in
an agreement called the “WaMu Mortgage
Plus Agreement and Disclosure” (the “Credit
Agreement”). The Credit Agreement has a
box near the top of the document which
states: “Maturity Date: 08/09/2037.” The ma-
turity date is re-stated in the deed of trust,
“(t]he Credit Agreement provides that unless
sooner repaid, the Debt is due and payable in
full thirty years from the date of this Deed of
Trust which is 08/09/2037 (the “Maturity
Date”).” Like in Baughman, there is no lan-
guage in the deed of trust or the Credit
Agreement that changes the stated maturity
date in the event of default or acceleration,
The maturity date is simply defined as
08/09/2037, and there is no language in the
instruments which alters that date. Under
Idaho Code section 5-214A, the stated matu-
rity date is when the statute of limitations for
foreclosure begins to run. As such, we affirm
the judgment dismissing CMJ’s complaint.

On a final note, CMJ argues that the dis-
trict court erred by ruling that a successor in
interest with lmowledge of an unsatisfied
mortgage cannot quiet title against a mort-
gagee even though the statute of limitations

has run. See Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 282,
237, 249 P.2d 814, 817 (1952). Given our
ruling that the statute of limitations has not
run, this issue is moot, and we decline to
reach the merits of the argument. See, e9.,
Zylstra v. State, 157 Idaho 457, 468, 387 P.38d
616, 627 (2014) (declining to reach statute of
limitations defense where tort claim defeated
on issue of causation),

C. Neither party is entitled to attorney
fees,

Hl Both parties seek attorney fees on
appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121. “In
order to be eligible for an award of attorney
fees under Idaho Code section 12-121, the
party must be the prevailing party on ap-
peal.” Baughman, 162 Idaho at 188, 395 P.8d
at 402, CMJ is not the prevailing party, and
therefore, not entitled to fees or costs.

TI Chase is also not entitled to fees.
Before addressing the requirements of Idaho
Code section 12-121, it is important to recog-
nize that Chase is in default, Although Chase
argues in its response brief that the district
court's entry of default was improper, it nev-
er made a motion to set aside the default and
only argues on appeal that the default should
be set aside in the event the Court were to
find CMJ’s appeal arguments meritorious.
We recently addressed the effect of a default
in Martinez (Portillo) v. Carrasco (Mendo-
za), 162 Idaho 886, 341, 396 P.8d 1218, 1223
(2017), and explained that a default is sepa-
rate from a default judgment. A party must.
not only seek relief from a default judgment,
but also from the default. Id.

Hn Martinez, we quoted the fol-
lowing language:
Upon the failure of the defendant to an-
swer the complaint within the time allowed
by law, and upon the entry of default, in
the absence of fraud, the right of the de-
fendant to participate in the litigation is
terminated, and the subsequent filing of an
answer or demurrer on his part is unau-
thorized and void, unless upon proceedings
duly had, the default is first set aside.
See id. (quoting Kingsbury v. Brown, 60
Idaho 464, 469, 92 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1939).
The statement that the defendant’s right to
participate in the litigation is “terminated”
upon default requires clarification. Default

865

does not necessarily cut off a defendant’s
ability to participate in the litigation alto-
gether. In a tort case, for example, a default-
ing defendant is generally allowed to contest
the amount of unliquidated damages. See 46
Am, Jur. 2d Judgments § 285 (1994). A de-
faulting defendant can also contest the legal
sufficiency of the complaint and its allega-
tions to support a judgment. See, eg., Olson
v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 87, 720 P.2d 217,
220 (Ct. App. 1986). A party in default can-
not, however, bring an appeal seeking affir-
mative relief from this Court, Z. Idaho Econ.
Dev, Council v. Lockwood Packaging Corp.
Idaho, 189 Idaho 492, 496, 80 P.3d 1098, 1097
(2008).

Even though Chase is in default, it still
had the ability to contest the legal sufficiency
of the complaint and effectively did so by
participating as a respondent on appeal.
Chase’s request for attorney fees is part of
its defense on appeal and is therefore proper.
Having said that, the requirements of Idaho
Code section 12-121 as recently amended by
the Legislature have not been satisfied. Sec-
tion 12-121 authorizes an award of attorney
fees to the prevailing party where the case is
brought, pursued or defended “frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.” CMJ’s
pursuit of this quiet title action was not
frivolous or unreasonable. Although our deci-
sion in Baughman essentially decided this
matter, the Baughman decision was not is-
sued until after the briefing in this case was
complete,

IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment dismissing the quiet title
action is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
Chase as the prevailing party.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
JONES and HORTON, and Justice Pro Tem
TROUT coneur.

66

406 P.3d 878
Daniel PASLAY, an individual; Gary Ott-
man, an individual; and Tateoka Broth-
ers, LLC, an Idaho limited liability com-
pany, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, an Idaho
irrigation district, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No. 44446

Supreme Court of Idaho.
Filed; November 29, 2017

rT

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC,
Idaho Falls, for appellants. Robert L. Harris
argued.

Barker, Rosholt & Simpson, LLP, Twin
Falls, for respondent. Travis L. Thompson
argued,

867

BRODY, Justice

This case is about landowners’ recourse
against an irrigation district for diverting a
portion of their water source to other land-
owners within the district. The landowners
brought an action for a declaratory judgment
regarding their constitutional water and
property rights. They also sought injunctive
relief against the irrigation district for a
breach of fiduciary duty. The district court
granted the irrigation district's motion to
dismiss on all three of the landowners’
claims. The landowners appeal.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Appellants own farms in Jerome County,
Idaho, A&B Irrigation District (the “Dis-
trict”) distributes water to these farms and
others throughout its service area in Jerome
and Minidoka Counties. The District serves
two distinct sub-areas in its district: Unit A
and Unit B. The water the District distrib-
utes comes from two sources: (1) surface
water from the Snake River and associated
reservoirs, and (2) groundwater from the
Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer. These two wa-
ter sources were historically what separated
Units A and B, and many owners based their
land choices in the 1950s on the water source.
Unit A farms have received surface water
exclusively since the District’s inception. For
decades Unit B farms received only ground-
water, but the District converted approxi-
mately 1400 Unit B acres to surface water in
the’ 1990s in response to decreasing ground-
water supply. This conversion did not abate
the declining groundwater supply, and the
District subsequently proposed the “Unit A
Pumping Plan #2 Project” (“Project”).

The District’s manager claims the Pro-
ject’s benefits are twofold: (1) it will allow
the District to deliver surface water to Unit
A farms at an increased rate during the peak
irrigation season, and (2) it will convert ap-
proximately 1500 Unit B acres facing declin-
ing groundwater over to surface water—sim-
ilar to the District’s prior conversion in the
1990s. In November 2018, the District held a
special election in which its residents ap-
proved bonds of up to $7 million to pay for
the Project. In 2014, the District's Board of

868

Directors held a hearing at which they as-
sessed Project costs proportionally based on
acreage to both Unit A and Unit B landown-
ers, Appellants did not appear at this hear-
ing. The District then sought judicial confir-
mation (the “Confirmation Proceeding”) of
the Board’s cost assessment in the Minidoka
County District Court, which Appellants
Paslay and Ottman contested. In the Confir-
mation Proceeding, the court approved the
assessment but withheld consideration of Ap-
pellants’ constitutional arguments as beyond
that forum’s scope.

Appellants claim the Project primarily
benefits Unit B landowners at the expense of
Unit A by diverting a portion of Unit A’s sole
water source (surface water) onto Unit B
land and “diluting” their annual water sup-
ply. Additionally, the District divided Project
costs equally among all landowners despite
what Appellants claim is the Project’s pri-
mary purpose: to help sustain Unit B farms
as their groundwater supply continues to de-
cline. Appellants claim the Project is part of
a decades-long trend whereby the District
subjugates Unit A’s interests due to Unit B’s
size—roughly 80% of the District’s service
area—and comparably large representation
and voting strength. Appellants sought relief
on three claims in the Jerome County Dis-
trict Court after the Confirmation Proceed-
ing approved the Project’s cost apportion-
ment, In Count I of their amended complaint,
Appellants sought a declaratory judgment.
enforcing their water rights under Article
XV, sections 1, 8, 4, and 5 of the Idaho
Constitution. Count IT requested identical re-
lief, challenging the assessment as a violation
of their property rights under Article I, sec-
tions 18 and 14. In Count I1J—absent in the
original complaint and added in the amended
complaint—Appellants sought injunctive re-
lief for breach of fiduciary duty.

Respondents filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss the claims, and submitted addi-
tional materials—including affidavits and the
Confirmation Proceeding order. Appellants
responded and requested the court deny the
motion and strike matters outside the plead-
ings as immaterial and improper under the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Alternatively, Appel-
lants requested the court continue the pro-
ceedings—and allow discovery—if the court
was to consider matters outside the plead-

ings. They argued that considering the addi-
tional information would effectively convert
the decision from a Rule 12 to a Rule 56
analysis, and thus required discoverable facts
to defend against a summary judgment
grant. In its first of two decisions below, the
district court denied Appellants’ motion to
strike and motion to continue, and dismissed
Counts I and II. The court dismissed Count I
as non-justiciable, finding the claim unripe
and that the Appellants lacked standing, The
court dismissed Count II as barred by res
judicata based on the Confirmation Proceed-
ing decision. Pending the court's decision on
Count III, Appellants filed a motion for re-
consideration of the district court’s first deci-
sion. In its second decision, the district court
dismissed Count III as non-justiciable on
standing and ripeness grounds, just as with
Count I, The court also denied Appellants’
motion to reconsider its previous dismissal of
Counts I and II. Appellants timely appealed.

Il, ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1, Whether the district court erred in
dismissing Counts I and III of Appellants’
amended complaint as non-justiciable.

2, Whether the district court erred in
dismissing Count II of Appellants’ amended
complaint as barred by res judicata.

8, Whether the district court erred in
denying Appellants’ motions to strike, contin-
ue, and reconsider,

4, Whether the District is entitled to at-
torney fees.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HI This Court exercises free review over
jurisdictional issues, including “whether dis-
missal for lack of jurisdiction was properly
granted.” Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 17,
894 P.8d 54, 60 (2017) (citing Meisner v,
Potlatch Corp., 181 Idaho 258, 260, 954 P.2d.
676, 678 (1998)).

HM This Court reviews de novo both
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal orders and Rule 56
summary judgment grants. Syringa Net-
works, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin. 159
Idaho 818, 828, 867 P.38d 208, 218 (2016).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), “[alfter viewing all facts

a so

and inferences from the record in favor of
the non-moving party, the Court will ask
whether a claim for relief has been stated.”
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 678, 188
P.8d 758, 761 (2008) (quoting Gallagher v.
State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 P.8d 756, 758
(2005)). Dismissal “for failure to state a claim
should not be granted ‘unless it appears be-
yond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief’” Taylor v. Maile, 142
Idaho 258, 257, 127 P,3d 156, 160 (2005)
(quoting Gardner v, Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609,
611, 588 P.2d 780, 782 (1975)). A Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in which “matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court ... must be treat-
ed as one for summary judgment under Rule
56, All parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.” LR.C.P. 12(d).
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that.
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,
142 Idaho 790, 793, 184 P.8d 641, 644 (2006).

Iv. ANALYSIS

The landowners’ appeal centers on two
issues with respect to their three claims
against the District: the legal standard under
which the district court dismissed Appellants’
claims, and the court’s substantive determi-
nations under that standard. Appellants con-
tend the district court erred both procedural-
ly and substantively in dismissing all three
counts in its amended complaint. Procedural-
ly, they claim the district court improperly
considered matters outside the pleadings in
dismissing all three claims under Rule
12(b)(6)—rather than converting to the Rule
56 summary judgment standard. Substan-
tively, Appellants contend that Counts I and
III are justiciable as presented on the face of
their amended complaint, and that res judica-
ta does not bar relief under Count II.

For the reasons that follow, this Court
determines that Counts I and [II—the al-
leged violation of Appellants’ water rights
and breach of fiduciary duty—do not present
justiciable controversies. The district court

procedurally erred, however, in dismissing
Count II as barred by res judicata.

A. Appellants have failed to demonstrate
that Counts I and III present justicia-
ble claims.

Appellants contend that Counts I and III
are currently justiciable controversies since
the Project will result in an annual diminu-
tion of their available, dedicated water
source. The District noted that the surface
water supplies are variable from one sea-
son to the next, and have the potential to
completely refill annually. This, they claim,
necessarily reduces Appellants’ claims to
speculation since they allege no current de-
privation, nor can they point to a future
deprivation.

HI Appellants seek both injunctive relief
and a declaratory judgment regarding their
water rights. Under Idaho law, courts “shall
have power to declare rights, status, and
other legal relations, whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed.” LC. § 10-1201.
This Court has long held that “the ques-
tion[ed] ‘right’ or ‘status’ may invoke either
remedial or preventive relief; it may relate to
a right that has either been breached or is
only yet in dispute or a status undisturbed
but threatened or endangered ....” State ex
vel. Miller v. State Bd. of Educ., 56 Idaho
210, 217, 52 P.2d 141, 144 (1935). A declarato-
ry judgment action must involve a justiciable
controversy, however. Davidson v. Wright,
148 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.8d 812, 816 (2006).

HM “Idaho has adopted the constitu-
tionally based federal justiciability standard.”
Id. Standing is an essential element of a
justiciable claim. Van Valkenburgh v. Citi-
zens for Term Limits, 185 Idaho 121, 125, 15
P.8d 1129, 1182 (2000). Standing requires (1)
a distinct injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to
the conduct from which a plaintiff seeks re-
lief, and (8) a substantial likelihood that the
requested relief will remedy or prevent the
injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 US.
555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2180, 119 L.Ed.2d 351
(1992); Coal. for Agric.’s Fuiwre v. Canyon
Cnty., 160 Idaho 142, 146, 869 P.8d 920, 924
(2016); Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767,
772, 133 P.8d 1232, 1287 (2006). “Standing
may be predicated upon a threatened harm

870

as well as a past injury.” Id. (citing Harris v.
Cassia Gnty., 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d
988, 991 (1984). However, the injury must be
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical.” Tucker, 162 Idaho at 19, 894 P.3d at
62 (quoting State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158
Idaho 874, 881, 854 P.3d 187, 194 (2015)).
Since standing is jurisdictional, it can be
raised at any time, and the Court has a duty
to raise it sua sponte. Arambarri v. Arm-
strong, 152 Idaho 784, 788, 274 P.8d 1249,
1258 (2012) (citations omitted),

HHI Appellants have failed to allege a
distinct injury in their amended complaint
for Counts I and III, either current or
threatened. They claim that the Project will
cause a “dilution” of their available water
supply, which could result in a deprivation of
their allotted water—particularly in years
where there is a shortage of water. This
allegation requires a court to hypothesize
three successive events in order to reach a
distinct, palpable injury: first, that the Pro-
ject’s additional water delivery to Unit B
farms will cause a decrease in the annual
surface water available to Unit A farms; sec-
ond, in the case where there is less surface
water available, the amount will be substan-
tial enough to threaten Appellants’ allotment;
third, in such a case, the District will still
allocate some surface water to newly-con-
verted Unit B farms during a season in
which it provides less than the full allotment
to Unit A farms.

While the first seems intuitive—that more
farms using the same surface water will re-
sult in less surface water—Appellants’
claimed injuries necessarily implicate the sec-
ond and third hypotheticals above as well,
This Court cannot decide based on such con-
jecture. The Appellants are essentially ask-
ing for a court order directing the District to
follow the law in the event there is a short-
age of water. Such a pronouncement would
be hollow without a particularized set of cir-
cumstances to which we can apply the law
and tailor an order that either requires the
District to do particular acts or prohibits the
District from engaging in particular conduct.
Appellants simply have not alleged a current
or future harm, merely the fear of one if the
District abuses its discretion and mismanag-
es water resources outside the boundaries of
the law.

While the district court erred in dismissing
Counts I and III on justiciability grounds
under Rule 12(b)(6) instead of 12(b)(1), we
find that error harmless, As we stated in
Tucker, “our earlier cases left the issue un-
settled.” 162 Idaho at 18, 894 P.8d at 61.
Additionally, this Court or any Idaho court
must raise a lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion at any time, whether the parties raise it
or not. Arambarri, 152 Idaho at 788, 274
P.8d at 1268; In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 887, 840,
179 P.8d 800, 308 (2008),

This court thus affirms the district court's
dismissal of Counts I and III for want of a
justiciable controversy,

B. The district court erred in dismissing
Appellants’ property rights claim in
Count II by considering matters out-
side the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6).

HH In Count II of the amended com-
plaint, Appellants sought a declaratory judg-
ment enforcing their property rights under
Article I, sections 18 and 14 of the Idaho
Constitution, They claim the District had no
authority to exact its assessment for the
Project without either consent or due process
of law. Appellants contend that the district
court erred procedurally by considering mat-
ters outside the amended complaint in its
dismissal of Count II, and further claim that
the court also erred in its substantive res
judicata analysis. The District claims the dis-
trict court properly took judicial notice of the
Confirmation Proceeding because the court
“recognized” that the Rule 56 summary judg-
ment standard applied. Additionally, the Dis-
trict agrees with the district court’s substan-
tive res judicata analysis.

Hs The Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-
dure require courts treat a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss as a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment when it considers mat-
ters outside the pleadings. LR.C.P. 12(d);
McCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809, 814, 275
P.8d 824, 829 (2012). The extrinsic informa-
tion need not raise disputed facts to mandate
this shift. Syringa, 159 Idaho at 828, 867
P.8d at 218, However, a court can dismiss an
action under Rule 12(b)(6) if it considers only
the complaint, despite whether a party has
submitted additional materials to the record.

Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho
526, 581, 446 P.2d 895, 900 (1968).

The district court in this case was free to
either consider information outside of the
amended complaint and treat the Rule
12(b)(6) motions as Rule 56 proceedings, or
decide the Rule 12(b)(6) motion “on the alle-
gations contained in the complaint alone.”
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 888, 243
P.8d 642, 649 (2010) (citing Hellickson v.
Jenkins, 118 Idaho 278, 276, 796 P.2d 150,
158 (Ct. App. 1990)).

The district court in this case acknowl-
edged the above requirements in its orders,
stating in its first order (and incorporating
by reference in its second):

Tt is clear that the court may not consider
evidence or facts outside the scope of the
pleadings when determining if the petition
states a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The court, however, may consider
facts that supplement those stated in the
complaint, of which the court may properly
take judicial notice,

However, when. the motion is presented

under Rule 12(b)(6) and it is supported by

evidence, such as affidavits, outside of the
pleadings, the motion may properly be
treated as one for summary judgment to
which the summary judgment standard
would apply.
The district court later stated, “[t]reating the
motion as one for summary judgment is not
error so long as the hearing and notice re-
quirements of I.R.C.P. 56(c) are complied
with.” The District claims that these recita-
tions demonstrate that the court acknowl-
edged under Idaho law the required shift
from Rule 12 to Rule 56 when considering
information outside the pleadings. However,
the issue Appellants raise is not whether the
court recognized the appropriate standard; it
is whether the district court applied the ap-
propriate standard.

The district court dismissed Count IT un-
der the Rule 12(b)(6) standard: “[Tyhe defen-
dant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 2 for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)6) is
GRANTED ....” The issue for Count II
then is whether the court considered only the
amended complaint or relied on matters out-
side the pleadings. Here, the court consid-

871

ered the Confirmation Proceeding in finding
that res judicata barred Appellants’ Count IT
claim, The judge in the Confirmation Pro-
ceeding noted Appellants “failed to take ad-
vantage of their opportunity to contest the
assessment of benefits and apportionment of
costs related to the Projects and A&B’s issu-
ance of bonds,” He found no reasonable ex-
cuse for their failure to appear at that hear-
ing, and additionally that the proceedings
were not “in any substantial matter errone-
ous or unjust.”

The district court in this case granted the
District’s motion to dismiss based on the
Confirmation Proceeding, stating, “Our
courts have long held that with respect to
confirmation proceedings conducted pursuant
to Title 48, Chapter 4, that a final judgment
entered in such proceedings is not subject to
collateral attack and are otherwise barred by
the doctrine of res judicata.” The district
court thus considered information outside the
pleadings in deciding its Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion.

Two cases are instructive where a court
takes judicial notice of an underlying case in
a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. In Hellickson v,
Jenkins, 118 Idaho 278, 276, 796 P.2d 150,
158 (Ct. App. 1990), the trial court took
judicial notice of probate files from other
eases and considered them in ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held this was error, stating:

The only facts which a court may properly

consider on a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim are those appearing in the
complaint, supplemented by such facts as
the court may properly judicially notice,

However, a trial court, in considering a

Rule 12(6)(6) motion to dismiss, has no

right ‘to take judicial notice of anything,

with the possible exception of facts of com-

mon lenowledge which controvert aver-

ments of the complaint,
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted),
This Court has since approved of Hellick-
son’s bar on taking judicial notice of other
proceedings when considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. In Taylor v. McNichols,
149 Idaho 826, 849, 248 P.8d 642, 665 (2010),
this Court explicitly adopted Hellickson and
held that the “district court could not proper-

872

ly take judicial notice of the Underlying Case
when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.”

The District contends that Hellickson and
MeNichols do not apply since the district
court properly recognized the summary judg-
ment standard. Indeed, the district court dis-
cussed summary judgment with counsel dur-
ing the May 2016 motion hearing:

THE COURT: But isn’t the standard
more as to what facts you need that you
cannot obtain at this time to oppose a
summary judgment motion? If the issues
presented based upon the pleadings—and.
whether it’s characterized as a summary
judgment motion or a 12(b)(6) motion, if
the issues presented are a question of law,
doesn’t there have to be some presentation
of what facts are out there that we haven’t
had the opportunity to obtain?

Moreover, the district court—in its first deci-
sion—addressed the required Rule 56 stan-
dard in its analysis of Appellants’ motion to
strike as well as in its standards of review.
But as noted above, it applied the Rule
12(b)(6) standard in deciding the motion. The
fact that the filing dates fell within Rule 56
requirements does not automatically convert
the District’s motion or the court’s ruling.
‘The District filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the court held a hearing on the Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and—most impor-
tantly—the court decided Count II under the
Rule 12()(6) standard. The district court
thus committed procedural error in granting
under Rule 12(o)(6) the District's motion to
dismiss Count II and considering the Contir-
mation Proceeding in its decision.

HM This Court must thus determine
whether that error was harmless, and in so
doing “must disregard all errors and defects
that do not affect any party’s substantial
rights.” LR.C.P. 61. If—by considering only
the pleadings—this Court finds under Rule
12(b)(6) that Appellants failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, then
the procedural error below is harmless.
MeNichols, 149 Idaho at 849, 243 P.3d at 665,

Because we “shall look only to the plead-
ings without consideration to the record from
the [u]nderlying [clase” when reviewing un-
der the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, this Court
cannot analyze the substantive res judicata
argument as it relies entirely on the Confir-
mation Proceeding. Id. at 886, 243 P.8d at

652. Thus, we determine that the district
cout’s procedural error was not harmless,
since the Confirmation Proceeding was the
sole basis for its determination that res judi-
cata precluded Appellants’ claim.

This Court thus vacates the district court’s
order granting dismissal of Count II and
remands with instructions to consider Count,
II under the Rule 56 summary judgment
standard.

C. Attorney’s Fees,

The District requests attorney’s fees pur-
suant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, and Idaho
Code sections 12-117 and 12-121. Neither the
District nor Appellants are the prevailing
party, so neither are entitled to costs or fees
on appeal.

Vv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court af-
firms the dismissal of Counts I and III for
lack of justiciability. We vacate the district
court’s order dismissing Count II, and re-
mand with instructions to consider this claim.
consistent with this Court’s opinion, In light
of these decisions, we further hold that the
appeals on the motions to strike, to reconsid-
er, and to continue are moot. We award no
fees or costs on appeal.

Justices JONES, HORTON, and Justice
Pro Tem DUNN concur.

BURDICK, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
conclusion that the dismissal of Count II
must be reversed. I agree with the majority
that the district court erred by taking judi-
cial notice of the preclusive effect of the
Confirmation Proceeding. But I do not agree
that this error requires reversal. Because the
district court considered material explicitly
referenced in the amended complaint and
later attached to the motion to dismiss, I
would affirm,

As is well established, “This Court may
affirm decisions of a district court based on
different theories than applied by the district
court.” State v. Mann, 162 Idaho 36, 42, 394

P.8d 79, 85 (2017) (citing Johnson v. Blaine
Cnty., 146 Idaho 916, 921, 204 P.8d 1127,
1182 (2009)), In this case specifically, I would
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Count,
II by differentiating impermissible takings of
judicial notice from permissible consider-
ations of outside evidence.

The majority is correct that in Taylor v.
MeNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 838, 248 P.8d 642,
649 (2010), this Court adopted the judicial
notice standard for Rule 12(b)(6) articulated
by the Court of Appeals in Hellickson v.
Jenkins, 118 Idaho 278, 276, 796 P.2d 150,
158 (Ct. App. 1990). This standard is as
follows:

[A] trial court, in considering a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, has no right to

hear evidence; and since judicial notice is

merely a substitute for the conventional

method of taking evidence to establish

facts, the court has no right to take judicial

notice of anything, with the possible excep-

tion of facts of common knowledge which

controvert averments of the complaint.
MeNichols, 149 Idaho at 888, 243 P.8d at 649
(quoting Hellickson, 118 Idaho at 276, 796
P.2d at 153). Thus, under this standard, it is
clear that the district court erred by taking
judicial notice of the preclusive effect of the
Confirmation Proceeding. However, this
standard is limited to judicial notice and its
intersection with Rule 12(b)(6). This standard
does not address the propriety of considering
outside evidence by methods aside from tak-
ing judicial notice of it.

In MeNichols, this Court acknowledged
that federal courts evaluate Rule 12()(6)
motions by

consider[ing] the complaint in its entirety,

as well as other sources courts ordinarily

examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tions to dismiss, in particular, documents
incorporated into the complaint by refer-
ence, and matters of which a court may

take judicial notice. See 5B Wright & Mil-

ler § 1857 (8d ed. 2004 and Supp. 2007).
Id. (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 822, 127 S.Ct.
2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). This Court in
MeNichols then clarified that “{nJothing in
[the above federal standard] is inconsistent
with what is written in Hellickson.” Id. That
is because the standard articulated in Hel-
lickson and McNichols is limited to judicial

873

notice and its intersection with Rule 12(b)(6),
not the propriety of considering outside evi-
dence by methods aside from taking judicial
notice of it.

The federal standard, which this Court
clarified is not inconsistent with McNichols
and Hellickson, permits consideration of out-
side evidence in certain circumstances, the
most relevant circumstance being where a
key document is referenced in the pleadings
and later attached to a dismissal motion. E.g.,
Vanover v. Hantman, 7 F.Supp.2d 91, 98
(D.D.C. 1999) (“TW]here a document is re-
ferred to in the complaint and is central to
plaintiff's claim, such a document attached to
the motion papers may be considered without
converting the motion to one for summary
judgment.” (citing Greenberg v. The Life Ins.
Co. of Va., 177 F.8d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999)));
Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949
F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991).

Here, Appellants’ amended complaint spe-
cifically pled as follows:

Plaintiffs appeared in the District's judi-
cial confirmation case, Minidoka County
Case No, CV-2014-189, to protest the bond.
There, the court declined to address Plain-
tiffs’ constitutional concerns to be ad-
dressed in this matter, finding that they
were outside the purview of that proceed-
ing. See Order Regarding Responses in
Opposition to the Verified Complaint and
Petition CV-2014-189 at 5-6 (filed May 18,
2014).

And when moving to dismiss Appellants’
complaint, Respondents attached the rele-
vant order and the certified final judgment to
their motion to dismiss. Therefore, the dis-
trict court did not err by considering the
preclusive effect of the Confirmation Pro-
ceeding. Cf. Cortec, 949 F.2d at 47-48 (ex-
plaining that F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) permits con-
sideration of documents outside the pleadings
if the complaint necessarily relies on the
document and the defendant presents the
document in a motion to dismiss). As stated,
MeNichols expressly clarified that “[nlothing
in [the federal standard] is inconsistent with
what is written in Hellickson[,]” 149 Idaho at
838, 248 P.38d at 649, and the federal stan-
dard would permit consideration of the pre-

874

clusive effect of the Confirmation Proceeding
in this case, as reasoned above.

Further, Hellickson and McNichols are
factually inapposite to this case, In Hellick-
son, the magistrate court considered probate
files in estate cases, but nowhere does Hel-
lickson suggest the specific files or estate
eases had been referenced in the pleadings.
118 Idaho at 275-76, 796 P.2d at 152-53.
Likewise, in McNichols, the prior case con-
sidered had not been referenced in the plead-
ings; rather, “the district court judge, who
was also the judge in the [prior case], found
that the arguments made by [the parties]
incorporated events and actions that oc-
curred in the [prior case] and, therefore, took
judicial notice of the [prior case] in toto.” 149
Idaho at 881, 248 P.8d at 647. Here, by
contrast, the district court’s consideration
was limited to material explicitly referenced
in Appellants’ amended complaint and at-
tached to Respondents’ motion to dismiss. It
is not as if the district court sua sponte
considered nuanced arguments made in the
Confirmation Proceeding or some obscure
detail buried in the record thereof.

As such, I would affirm the dismissal of
Count II

406 P.3d 886
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
Vv.
Samuel J. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 44476

Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: October 10, 2017
Review Denied December 21, 2017

1, Inaddition, this Court could affirm by applying
the Rule 56 summary judgment standard. As this
Court explained in Peterson v. Private Wilderness,
LLC, 152 Idaho 691, 697, 273 P.3d 1284, 1290
(2012):

[TJhe district court took into consideration the
Easement Case when it denied the Petersons’
motion to dismiss. Judicial notice of another
case file is inappropriate procedure where a

12(b)(6) standard is used within a trial court's
analysis. However, ... where a 12(b)(6) stan-
dard is inappropriate, as it was here, this
Court can review the record presented on a
summary judgment basis de novo. Accordingly,
upon review of the record, this Court finds that
the Petersons are entitled to summary judg-
ment based upon judicial notice of the Ease-
ment Case.

875
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appel-
lant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-

eral; Ted S. Tollefson, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Boise, for respondent,

GRATTON, Chief Judge

Samuel J. Davis appeals from his judg-
ment of conviction entered upon his condi-
tional guilty plea to robbery, asserting the
district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress and that his confession was not
voluntary, We affirm.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
_ BACKGROUND

Davis traveled to Spokane, Washington, to
attend a hearing regarding the custody of his
child. Driving back to his home in Vienna,
Missouri, he realized he did not have enough
money to complete the trip and robbed a
check-cashing business at gunpoint in Post
Falls, Idaho, He was identified as a suspect
in the robbery pursuant to a review of video
footage and a description provided by the
dlerk on duty. An arrest watrant was issued
and Davis was arrested after he reached
Vienna. Detectives from the Post Falls Police
Department traveled to Vienna where Davis
‘was in custody and conducted an interroga-
tion in which Davis made incriminating state-
ments regarding the robbery.

The State charged Davis with robbery,
Idaho Code § 18-6501, burglary, 1.C. § 18-
1401, in addition to a deadly weapon en-
hancement, I.C, § 19-2520. Davis filed a mo-
tion to suppress statements made during the
interrogation, which was denied. Davis en-
tered into a conditional guilty plea agreement
in which he reserved his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress. He pled

876

guilty to robbery and the State dismissed the
burglary charge and the deadly weapon en-
hancement. Davis timely appeals.

I.

ANALYSIS

HMM Davis asserts the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress be-
cause he invoked his right to counsel and
because his confession was not voluntary.
The standard of review of a suppression mo-
tion is bifureated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept
the trial court’s findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but we
freely review the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found. State v.
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284,
1286 (Ct. App. 1996), At a suppression hear-
ing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

HH After an individual is advised of his
right to the assistance of counsel, interrogat-
ing officers are only required to cease ques-
tioning if the individual makes a clear and
unequivocal request for counsel. Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62, 114 S.Ct.
2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), If a reference
regarding a desire for an attorney’s assis-
tance is ambiguous or equivocal so that a
reasonable officer, in light of the cireum-
stances, would have understood only that the
suspect might be invoking the right to coun-
sel, the officer is not required to stop ques-
tioning the suspect. Id. at 454-61, 114 S.Ct.
2850; State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 559, 199
P.8d 128, 134 (2008).

Hl In this case, the interrogation includ-
ed in part:

Detective 1: Because I’ve got you stuck in
this little room here, I’m going to tell
you what your rights are, okay?

You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law. You have
the right to talk to a lawyer and have

1, See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 86 S.Ct.

him present with you while you’re being
questioned. If you can’t afford to hire a
lawyer, one will be appointed to repre-
sent you before questioning, if you wish
one. Do you understand what I just told
you?

Davis: Yes.

Then later in the interrogation, the follow-
ing took place:

Detective 1; Was it a one-time thing or
more than one?

Davis: I think I need to talk to a lawyer
before I say anything else. I mean, I
want to help you guys out, but I’m not—
I got so much on the line. I’m in the Air
Force reserves, I got my job at FedEx,
I got my kid.

(emphasis added).

In Payne, the Idaho Supreme Court has
held that phrases such as “I think,” and
“maybe I should” are equivocal. Payne, 146
Idaho at 559, 199 P.8d at 184. In Payne, the
petitioner made the statement, “I don’t think
I should answer that.” Jd. The Court held it
was not sufficiently clear such that a reason-
able officer would understand it as an invoca-
tion of the right to remain silent, and found
the petitioner did not clearly invoke his right
to remain silent and the officer did not have
a duty to discontinue his questioning of the
petitioner. Id. Likewise, in this case, Davis’s
statement that, “I think I need to talk to a
lawyer before I say anything else,” is equivo-
cal. Because Davis did not unequivocally in-
voke his right to counsel, the officer was not
required to stop questioning. Therefore, the
district court did not err in denying his mo-
tion to suppress based on invocation of the
right to counsel.

HMM (Davis also asserts his confession
was involuntary. Use of an involuntary state-
ment against a criminal defendant violates
the Due Process Clause. State v. Hays, 159
Idaho 476, 485-86, 362 P.38d 551, 560-61 (Ct.
App. 2015). Whether a statement was invol-
untary turns on whether the defendant's will
was overborne by police coercion. Jd. In de-
termining the voluntariness of a confession, a
court must look to the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation,
including: (1) whether Miranda’ warnings

1602, 16 L.Bd.2d 694 (1966).

fo

were given; (2) the youth of the accused; (8)
the level of education or low intelligence of
the accused; (4) the length of the detention;
(6) the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; and (6) deprivation of food or
sleep. State v. Stone, 154 Idaho 949, 958, 308
P.8d 636, 640 (Ct. App. 2013). Further, if the
defendant’s free will is undermined by
threats or through direct or implied prom-
ises, then the statement is involuntary and
not admissible. Id.

In this case, the officers and Davis con-

versed as follows:

Detective 2: I mean, you’re caught. Bottom
line is you’re caught, and it just depends
on whether you want to be responsible
and fess up to what you did, and I’m
guessing what [Detective 1] said is that
you just didn’t have enough money to
get home. And that’s understandable. It
really is.

Davis: What kind of a deal can you give
me?

Detective 2: I can’t make any deals. That’s
up to the prosecutor.

Davis: Because I can’t afford to be expedit-
ed (sic) back. I mean—

Detective 1: Well, here’s what I can tell
you. As this case stands right now, if I
don’t have your side to include in it, it’s
just going to look like some guy going in
at gunpoint and searing the bejesus out
of this lady, stealing the money, and
taking off across the country.

So my goal today is to find out what the
real story is here and find out—I believe
it’s a one-time thing, but I have to hear
that from you.

So, certainly, you know, if you want an
attorney, you could go that route, but I
would really like to be able to document.
this, because all I’ve got is what I know,
and it’s enough to charge you and it’s
enough to prove it, but if this was just a
one-time thing where you were screwed
and you were stuck in Post Falls or you
were stuck in Spokane and you didn’t
have a way to get home, I get it. But I
need to hear that from you.

Detective 2: The problem here is we also
have a couple more that happened just
previous to that in Spokane, so they're
asking us to determine whether or not

877

you are also involved with that or wheth-
er you just were involved with ours.

Detective 1: So, Sam, what’s it going to be?

Detective 2: You need to do the right
thing, Sam. You do.

Davis: I know, but if I give you my side of
the story, can you get with the prosecu-
tor to work out a deal where I don’t get
expedited (sic) back?

Detective 1: What I can promise you is
that I will tell the prosecutor your side
of the story. I’m not authorized to make
any sort of deal. I can’t—

Davis: But is there any way you can call
from here and talk to them?

Detective 1: I can certainly share the infor-
mation, but I can’t make any deals.

Detective 2: The warrant’s there. The war-
rant’s been put in the system. That’s—

Davis: I seen that. That’s what they told
me. It’s a $100,000 bond. I mean, as long
as you can guarantee to call the prosecu-
tor tonight.

Detective 1: Yeah, we'll call the prosecutor.

Detective 2: We'll call the prosecutor,

Detective 1: For sure,

Davis: When I left the courthouse—

Detective 2: Wait. Before you do this, you
want to talk to us; right?

Davis: Yeah.

Detective 2: Okay.

Davis: I mean, that’s the only way I got. I
mean, I can’t afford a lawyer. If I get
expedited (sic), I’m losing everything
and then some. I'll never be able to
recover, but—

Detective 2: So start ... from the begin-
ning,

Davis acknowledges he was read his Mi-
randa rights, that there is no evidence he
was subject to an inordinately long interroga-
tion, or that he was deprived of food, water,
or sleep. At the time of the interrogation,
Davis was twenty-eight years old, had served
in the United States Air Force, and he does
not dispute the district court’s finding that he
had “at least average intelligence.” Davis fo-
cuses on the nature of the questioning, as-
serting the detectives took advantage of the
fact he did not want to be extradited back to

878

Idaho and that the detectives “clearly sug-
gested that the only way he could avoid
extradition to Idaho was by doing the right
thing and confessing to the robbery.” Fur-
ther, Davis argues that his statement that he
could not afford a lawyer suggests he did not
fully understand the Miranda warnings since
he did not realize an attorney could be ap-
pointed free of charge. Davis submits that he
only spoke to the officers after they promised.
to talk with the prosecutor, with whom Davis
wanted them to discuss avoiding extradition.
He asserts the totality of circumstances
shows that he only confessed to avoid extra-
dition,

Davis was concerned about extradition, but
his concern does not suggest police coercion.
Nothing said by the officers took improper
advantage of his concern or amount to a
threat to coerce a confession. The officers
repeatedly stated they were not in a position
where they could offer him a deal guarantee-
ing he would not be extradited. They did not
directly or indirectly promise Davis that he
would be able to stay in Missouri. While the
officers did promise to talk with the prosecu-
tor, it was only an assurance of telling
Davis’s side of the story. The agreement to
call the prosecutor did not rise to the level of
his free will being undermined by direct or
implied promises. Additionally, Davis’s lone
comment that he could not afford a lawyer
does not negate that he verbally acknowl-
edged he understood his Miranda rights.
Thus, the district court correctly determined
Davis’s statements were voluntary and de-
nied his motion to suppress.

pain

CONCLUSION

Davis did not unequivocally invoke his
right to counsel and his confession was volun-
tary and admissible. Therefore, the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress
is affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY

concur,

406 P.3d 890
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
Kasey A. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 44499
Court of Appeals of Idaho,
Filed; November 18, 2017
Review Denied December 21, 2017

o
i
ao

QO

80

|. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Smith notes that
the Miranda waiver he signed failed to advise
him that an attorney would be provided if he

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate
Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Depu-
ty Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for ap-
pellant. Andrea W. Reynolds argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney Gen-
eral; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth
K, Jorgensen argued.

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Kasey A. Smith pled guilty to one count of
injury to children. On appeal, Smith argues
that the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress should be reversed and his judg-
ment of conviction vacated because his con-
fession was not voluntary. Smith also asks to
be resentenced, asserting that the district
court erred in finding that he breached his
plea agreement. For the following reasons,
we affirm.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
After receiving a report involving the sexu-
al assault of a minor, an officer from the
Pocatello Police Department questioned
Smith, the alleged perpetrator. The officer
asked Smith to sign a waiver stating that he
understood that he did not have to proceed,
that he could remain silent, and that he was
consenting to a truth verification examina-
tion. The waiver included the pertinent por-
tions of the standard Miranda+ warnings.
could not afford one. However, Smith concedes

that he did not challenge the adequacy of the
Miranda warnings in the district court, and he

Smith signed the waiver. During the exami-
nation, the officer performed a computer
voice stress analysis (CVSA) test on Smith.
The test detects stress patterns in a person’s
responses to questions and then formulates
appropriate follow-up questions. Once the
test concluded, the officer continued to ques-
tion a nervous Smith, who confessed to
touching the victim.

The State charged Smith with one count of
lewd conduct with a child under sixteen by
manual-genital contact. Smith then filed a
motion to suppress his confession. After
hearing oral arguments and reviewing
Smith’s brief, the district court denied the
motion, concluding that Smith’s confession
was made knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily.

The State and Smith subsequently reached
a plea agreement. The plea agreement, in its
entirety, reads:

1, The State will amend the charge to

Felony Injury to Child.

2, The State will recommend an underly-
ing sentence of 3 and 7.

8, The Defendant will complete a Psycho-
sexual evaluation with a full disclosure
polygraph (PSE).

4, If the PSE returns with no other
hands on victims and low to moderate
risk to re-offend, the Stat[e] will con-
cur in the PSI with no more than a
rider. If not, the State can argue for
imposition of sentence.

5. Defendant can argue for any sentence,
Smith pled guilty to injury to children, but
reserved his right to appeal the order deny-
ing his motion to suppress. The district court
aecepted the plea,

At sentencing, the State questioned
whether it was still bound by the plea agree-
ment due to the fact deception was found
during the polygraph examination Smith was
required to complete, The district court de-
termined that Smith never completed the
polygraph, meaning that the State was not
required to perform under the agreement.
At the continued sentencing hearing, the
State recommended a unified sentence of ten
years with a minimum period of confinement
of four years, without a period of retained

does not raise the adequacy of the warnings as a

881

jurisdiction. This was contrary to the terms
of the plea agreement. The district court im-
posed a sentence of ten years, with a mini-
mum period of confinement of three years.
Smith filed an appeal timely from the entry
of judgment.

I

ANALYSIS

A. Voluntariness of Confession

HM The standard of review of a sup-
pression motion is bifurcated. When a deci-
sion on a motion to suppress is challenged,
we accept the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence,
but we freely review the application of consti-
tutional principles to the facts as found. State
v, Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evi-
dence, and draw factual inferences is vested
in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 998, 997 (1995);
State v. Schevers, 182 Idaho 786, 789, 979
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct, App, 1999).

Hs To determine whether a confession
is voluntary, a court must examine the totali-
ty of the circumstances and ask whether the
defendant’s will was overborne by police con-
duct. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
287-88, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 118 L.Bd2d 302
(1991); State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858
P.2d 750, 758 (1998); State v Valero, 153
Idaho 910, 912, 285 P.8d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App.
2012). In determining the voluntariness of a
confession, a court should consider the char-
acteristics of the accused and the details of
the interrogation, including whether Mi-
randa warnings were given, the youth of the
accused, the accused’s level of education or
low intelligence, the length of the detention,
the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning, and the deprivation of food or
sleep. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 226, 98 S.Ct. 2041, 836 L.Ed2d 854
(1978); Troy, 124 Idaho at 214, 858 P.2d at
758; Valero, 153 Idaho at 912, 285 P.8d at
1016. The presence or absence of Miranda

separate issue on appeal.

882

warnings is a particularly significant factor,
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124
S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 648 (2004) (“[Mlain-
taining that a statement is involuntary even
though given after warnings and voluntary
waiver of rights requires unusual stamina,
and litigation over voluntariness tends to end
with the finding of a valid waiver.”); Berkem-
er v. McCarty, 468 U.S, 420, 433 n.20, 104
§.Ct, 3188, 82 L.Ed.2d 817 (1984) (“[Clases in
which a defendant can make a colorable ar-
gument that a self-incriminating statement
was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dic-
tates of Miranda ave rare.”). While one’s
“mental condition is surely relevant to an
individual’s susceptibility to police coercion,”
it cannot alone make a statement involun-
tary. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165,
107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986); see also
State v. Doe, 181 Idaho 709, 718, 963 P.2d
892, 396 (Ct. App. 1998). If, under the totality
of circumstances, the defendant’s free will
was overborne by threats, through direct or
implied promises or other forms of coercion,
then the statement is not voluntary and is
inadmissible. Pulminante, 499 U.S. at 285-87,
111 S.Ct. 1246; Troy, 124 Idaho at 214, 858
P.2d at 758; Valero, 153 Idaho at 912, 285
P.8d at 1016, When a defendant alleges an
interrogation is coercive, the State bears the
burden of proving voluntariness of the defen-
dant’s confession by a preponderance of the
evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489,
92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Hd.2d 618 (1972); State v.
Yager, 189 Idaho 680, 685, 85 P.8d 656, 661
(2004); State 1. Johns, 112 Idaho 878, 878,
786 P.2d 1827, 1882 (1987).

In determining whether to grant Smith’s
motion to suppress, the district court consid-
ered the totality of the circumstances, includ-
ing Smith’s signing of a Miranda waiver and
the fact that he never invoked his right to
silence or right to counsel. The district court
also found that nervousness is to be expected
during an interrogation, Notably, the district
court failed to find any improper actions on

2. The district court found that before starting the
interview and asking Smith to sign the Miranda
waiver, “[the officer] informed Smith of his
rights and what was going to happen that day.”
At the suppression hearing, the officer who con-
ducted the CVSA answered, “yes,” when the
prosecutor asked whether he “gave [Smith] his
Miranda warnings.” This was done before the

the part of the officer, explaining that there
was “no evidence to support the claim of
coercion.”

1. Validity of Miranda waiver

HE Smith first asserts that he was not
properly informed of his Miranda rights,
meaning he could not have knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waived them. Any
waiver of Miranda rights or the underlying
constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion must be made knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently. State v. Dunn, 184 Idaho
165, 169, 997 P.2d 626, 630 (Ct. App. 2000).
The State bears the burden of demonstrating
that an individual has knowingly, voluntavily,
and intelligently waived his or her rights by
a preponderance of the evidence, Doe, 131
Idaho at 712, 963 P.2d at 895. A trial court’s
conelusion that a defendant made a knowing
and voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda
rights will not be disturbed on appeal where
it is supported by substantial and competent
evidence, State v. Luke, 184 Idaho 294, 297, 1
P.8d 795, 798 (2000), An appellate review of
this waiver issue encompasses the totality of
the circumstances. State v. Johnson, 126 Ida-
hho 859, 868, 898 P.2d 806, 810 (Ct. App.
1995).

HHI Smith argues that because he was
not verbally informed of his rights before
signing the Miranda waiver, the process was
improper. We know of no case requiring
verbal explanations of the waiver, though it is
good practice as it provides further proof
that the waiver was done knowingly and
intelligently. The record is unclear as to
whether the officer provided the warnings in
verbal form and written form, or merely
written form, but evidence explored in more
detail below supports the district court’s find-
ing that Smith signed the waiver knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily regardless of
whether the warnings were read out loud or
merely provided in written form?

officer began recording the interview, which is
why the audio recording is not helpful in deter-
mining whether the warnings were given verbal-
ly or merely in written form. However, the offi-
cer also answered, “yes,” when the prosecutor
asked, “So did you go over that—did you go over
any form with the defendant?”

Smith’s appellate counsel contends that it
is not clear that Smith understood the Mi-
vanda waiver. Smith’s trial counsel furthered
a similar argument, pointing out in the brief
in support of the motion to suppress that the
police never inquired into Smith’s educational
background. At the suppression hearing, the
district court asked Smith’s trial counsel if
his argument was that Smith “couldn’t un-
derstand that [Miranda waiver] form?”
‘When Smith’s trial counsel responded, “It’s
not on the recording, so we have no way of
knowing,” the district court reminded him,
“Your client knows if he understood it or
not.” Trial counsel did not introduce evidence
of any intellectual disabilities or lack of edu-
cation to bolster the contention that Smith
may have not understood the Miranda waiv-
er. The State, however, elicited testimony
from the officer showing that he asked Smith
if he had any questions regarding the waiver
and that Smith responded that he did not
have any questions. During a previous video-
taped interview, a different officer working
on this case had Smith read the waiver out
loud and Smith did not appear to struggle
with his reading fluency. Another factor
weighing in favor of finding that Smith un-
derstood the Miranda waiver is the fact that
this is not his first encounter with law en-
forcement; he has an extensive criminal rec-
ord. See, eg., United States v, Rojas-Tapia,
446 F.3d 1, 8 (st Cir, 2006) (relying on the
defendant's extensive prior record to coun-
terbalance any intellectual deficiencies he
may have had for purposes of making a
voluntary confession after being read his Mi-
rvanda rights, as he had “repeated earlier
exposure to Miranda warnings”); see also
People v. Davis, 46 Cal.4th 589, 94 Cal.
Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.8d 78, 117 (Cal. 2009)
(“That defendant was no stranger to the
criminal justice system and had fully waived

3, Smith also contends that he “arguably sought
to exercise his Miranda rights by [asking to con-
tact] his wife during the interview.” Asking for
relatives and other nonattorneys does not consti-
tute an invocation of the right to be silent or
right to counsel. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S,
707, 723-24, 99 S.Ct, 2560, 61 L.Bd.2d 197
(1979) ("The State cannot transmute the rela-
tionship between probation officer and juvenile
offender into the type of relationship between at-
torney and client that was essential to the hold-
ing of Miranda....”); State v. Crowhurst, 470
A.2d 1138, 1142 (RL. 1984) (‘“Bven if Crowhurst

883

his Miranda rights on previous occasions ...
reinforces our conclusion that his Miranda
waiver ... was voluntary, knowing, and intel-
ligent.”), Evidence that Smith did not under-
stand his Miranda rights before knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waiving them is
sparse at best? The district court’s finding
that Smith knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently waived his Miranda rights is sup-
ported by substantial and competent evi-
dence in the record.

2. Analysis of the officer’s conduct

HE Smith further contends that his
confession was involuntary because, inter
alia, the officer made misrepresentations con-
cerning the accuracy of the CVSA test. De-
ceptive police practices do not necessarily
create coercion which would render a sus-
pect’s subsequent confession involuntary and
excludable. State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888,
892, 908 P.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1995), Con-
fessions derived during the course of interro-
gations have been upheld as voluntary, not-
withstanding misrepresentations of facts by
the police, such as telling a defendant that
his fingerprints were found on physical evi-
dence or at the scene. Jd. Courts have uni-
formly accepted the police tactic of “telling a
suspect they have found some incriminating
evidence to elicit statements from a suspect
on the view that an innocent person would
not be induced to confess by such police
deception.” Id. However, that acceptance
wanes when the police misrepresent the law.
Id.

Smith argues that Valero, 158 Idaho at
914-15, 285 P.8d at 1018-19 requires us to
hold the confession was involuntary because
the officer here misrepresented the accuracy
of the CVSA test. Specifically, the officer

had specifically requested to speak with his wife,
such a request does not in and of itself invoke his
right to be silent or his right to counsel.”).

4. Smith correctly notes that while deception or
trickery does not automatically make a confes-
sion involuntary, ‘a court must weigh the decep-
tion or trickery against such circumstances as
the defendant’s knowledge of his right to remain
silent and his apparent ability to make a rational
decision.” State v. Welker, 129 Idaho 805, 808,
932 P.2d 928, 931 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations
omitted).

884.

stated, “I have this test saying it absolutely
shows me that this happened.” But the de-
fendant’s statements in Valero were deemed
involuntary because the officer misrepresen-
ted the law regarding the admissibility of
polygraph results, not because he misrepre-
sented the accuracy of the test when he
stated that “he could testify one hundred
percent to Valero’s guilt.” Id. at 914, 285 P.8d
at 1018. The phrase “could testify” is what is
important in that sentence, not the phrase
“one hundred percent.” Here, the officer nev-
er told Smith that the CVSA results would
be used against him in court. Rather, when
talking about sentencing, the officer said he
would have to inform the court that, “I have
this test saying it absolutely shows me that
this happened but he refuses to do anything
to help it out.” This is not a misstatement of
the law. The results of truth verification
tests, though inadmissible at trial, are admis-
sible at sentencing hearings. See State v.
Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 947-48, 308 P.8d
627, 634-85 (Ct. App. 2018); see also Gonzales
v, State, 151 Idaho 168, 170, 254 P.3d 69, 71
(Ct. App. 2011). Accordingly, Valero does not
mandate a reversal of the district court’s
denial of Smith’s motion to suppress based
on the officer’s misrepresentations as to the
accuracy of the CVSA test,

HM Smith further argues the officer mis-
represented the law by stating that if Smith
did not accept responsibility for his actions,
the court would not have “any other recourse
than to maybe impose the maximum.” First,
the officer qualified his statement with the
word “maybe.” Second, courts give great con-
sideration to lack of remorse and refusal to
recognize culpability during sentencing be-
cause these factors play an important role in
the court’s determination of the rehabilitative
potential of a defendant, See, eg., State v.
Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 95-96, 896 P.2d 1002,
1008-04 (Ct. App. 1995). Third, lack of re-
morse has led to the imposition of maximum
sentences. See, e.g., State v, Dallas, 109 Ida-
hho 670, 675, 710 P.2d 580, 585 (1985). There-
fore, the officer was not incorrect in stating
that the court may have no other recourse
than to impose the maximum if Smith re-
fused to accept responsibility.

5. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S, 25, 91

This Court, in Valero, also gave weight to
the fact that the officer “represented an al-
leged offense that carries a maximum sen-
tence of fifteen years of imprisonment, I.C.
§ 18-1506, as a ‘minor issue.” Valero, 153
Idaho at 914, 285 P.3d at 1018. In this case,
the officer refers to the alleged conduct as a
“mistake” and appears to trivialize the al-
leged conduct, but the fact that an officer
downplayed the seriousness of a situation
does not make a confession involuntary if the
suspect was aware of the seriousness of the
situation. See State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926,
929, 894 P.2d 159, 162 (Ct. App. 1995).
Though the officer in this case appears to
downplay the seriousness at times, he also
explains that if Smith admits to the “mis-
take” the issue “will go to the prosecutor and
then go to the court.” Any perceived triviali-
zation also is counterbalanced by the officer
talking about the court possibly imposing the
maximum sentence if Smith did not accept
responsibility for his actions. Viewing the
questioning as a whole, Smith was sufficient-
ly apprised of the seriousness of the accusa-
tion.

Smith also protests that the officer over-
stated the importance of accepting responsi-
bility. We must therefore examine the offi-
cer’s exact words to determine if they were
sufficiently coercive to cause Smith’s will to
be overborne. The officer told Smith that
accepting responsibility “always helps.”
Though this Court has explained that an
Alford plea does not necessarily result in a
longer sentence than would be imposed if a
defendant accepted responsibility, it is diffi-
cult to deny that refusing to accept responsi-
bility generally affects sentences in a delete-
rious manner and also adversely affects an
individual’s chance of obtaining parole. See
Steele v. State, 153 Idaho 788, 788-90, 291
P.8d 466, 471-72 (Ct. App. 2012) (noting that
at Steele’s sentencing hearing, the district
court stated, “The most problematic of all of
this is the fact that you simply are not ac-
cepting responsibility for your conduct.”); of
State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 679-80, 603
P.2d 1009, 1018-14 (1979) (“Indications of co-
operation are routinely brought to the atten-
tion of a sentencing judge.”), Though the
officer’s phrasing may have technically been

S.Ct, 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

inaccurate—it would have been more accu-
rate to say accepting responsibility “usually
helps” or “can’t hurt’—it was a harmless
misstatement of the law. See Kettman v.
State, 257 Ga. 603, 362 S.H.2d 342, 346 (1987)
(holding that an officer's statement that the
“only thing that can help anybody out at a
time like this is the truth” did not render a
confession involuntary); see also Humphries
v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. 601, 295 8,W.2d 218,
220 (App. 1956) (holding that an officer’s
statement that it was “always best to tell the
truth” did not render a confession involun-
tary). The context for the officer’s statement.
makes it clear that it was not just an appeal
to conscience, but rather an implication that,
Smith’s punishment would be less severe if
he accepted responsibility. Speaking in abso-
lutes when discussing legal repercussions
may not be best practice, but in this instance
it is not enough to render Smith’s confession
involuntary.

HM A confession can also be rendered
involuntary by an officer’s false promises,
either express or implied. For instance, if an
officer represents that he has the authority
to affect the charges brought against the
defendant or promises leniency in return for
the truth, a confession may be deemed invol-
untary. Troy, 124 Idaho at 215-16, 858 P.2d
at 754-55, The officer, in trying to convince
Smith to admit guilt, said, “Pl guarantee you
that [the judge is] not coming down harder
‘on you [if you accept responsibility, as op-
posed to denying the accusation].” Read in
isolation, this appears to be a promise of
leniency that the officer had no way of ensur-

6. Though the presentence report indicates that
Smith quit school before finishing the eleventh
grade, was enrolled in some special education
classes, and possessed a below average IQ score
of 81, it would be improper to consider these
facts on appeal as they were not presented to the
district court at the time the motion to suppress
was being considered. The only indication of
Smith's low intelligence that was provided to the
district court was contained in the video record-
ing of the CVSA interview, which contains this
statement from Smith: “I don’t get what you
mean by ‘context,’ I didn't graduate; I’m not that
smart, alright.” The fact that one did not gradu-
ate high school does not, absent additional facts
of low intelligence, suggest that one could not
knowingly and intelligently sign a Miranda waiv-
er. Compare United States v. Bautista-Avila, 6
F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
district court's determination that the defen-

885

ing. However, the officer also stated that he
had “limited ability to make recommenda-
tions” and could not predict a specific sen-
tence length. He also explained that his views
were based on his personal observations,
“T've been doing this for twenty years [and
accepting responsibility has never made a
person worse off.” The officer’s other state-
ments made it clear that he did not have the
authority to affect the charges or sentencing.
Therefore, the officer's “guarantee” was not.
so much a promise of leniency as it was a
figure of speech. Even if we label it a prom-
ise of leniency, this is one instance where a
promise of leniency does not render a confes-
sion involuntary. See Alger, 100 Idaho at 679-
80, 603 P.2d at 1018-14 (“Nevertheless, even
[if] such actions were deemed to be promises
of leniency, they do not necessarily render a
confession involuntary.”); Wilson, 126 Idaho
at 929, 894 P.2d at 162 (“Vague assurances of
leniency, in and of themselves, do not neces-
sarily render a confession inadmissible.”), In
our view, the interrogation tactics employed
by the officer are not coercive enough to
render the confession involuntary.

Hl In sum, the factor weighing heaviest
in favor of the State is the fact that Smith
signed a Miranda waiver. See Seibert, 542
US. at 608-09, 124 S.Ct, 2601. The district
court found the waiver to be valid as it was in
writing, and Smith never indicated that he
did not understand it. We accept this finding,
as Smith did not provide the district court
with evidence of low intelligence either at the
hearing or in his brief supporting his motion
to suppress.’ Moreover, Smith is not a minor,

dant's Miranda waiver was knowing and intelli-
gent, despite the defendant only finishing the
sixth grade); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894,
898-99, 821 P.2d 949, 954-55 (1991) (holding
waiver to be knowing and voluntary despite the
defendant receiving a limited grade school edu-
cation in Mexico), with Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S.
404, 407, 88 S.Ct. 523, 19 L.Bd.2d 634 (1967)
(taking into consideration the fact the defendant
was illiterate and possessed only a third-grade
education), Moreover, Miranda waivers are usu-
ally written at a fifth to eighth-grade reading
level, and the psychosexual report indicates that
Smith reads at approximately a seventh-grade
reading level. See People v. Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d
1165, 1171 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (providing
testimony of a linguistics professor that the Mi-
randa warnings “required a seventh-grade read-
ing level”); Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 497
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (providing expert testimo-

886

so the youth factor does not weigh in his
favor, The length of the interrogation, at fifty
minutes, also fails to suggest the confession
was involuntary. We need not address the
issue of food or sleep deprivation, as Smith
makes no argument and presents no evidence
regarding those factors. As to the officer's
deceptive statements regarding the CVSA
test, we hold that any deception on the part
of the officer was well within the bounds of
acceptable police tactics in regard to this
particular defendant due to the aforemen-
tioned factors. Moreover, any potential mis-
representations or promises the officer made
were corrected by later statements and con-
text, dampening their impact enough that we
cannot hold the officer’s conduct was over-
bearing. Accordingly, we hold that the dis-
trict court did not err in denying Smith’s
motion to suppress, as his confession was not
coerced by the officer and thus voluntary.

B. Breach of Plea Agreement.

HE Smith contends that the State
breached the plea agreement when it recom-
mended a sentence that deviated from the
sentence contained in the plea agreement,
The State argues that Smith breached the
plea agreement first, thereby relieving the
State of its duties, by refusing to complete a
polygraph. Smith and the State disagree over
whether participation in the post-test inter-
view portion of the polygraph examination
process is required to “complete Psycho-sex-
ual evaluation with a full disclosure poly-
graph”

HM Whether a plea agreement has
been breached is a question of law to be
reviewed by this Court de novo, in accor-
dance with contract law standards. State v.
Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 78, 106 P.3d 397, 399
(2005). Smith has the burden of proving the
State breached the plea agreement. See State
v. Acuna, 154 Idaho 189, 141, 294 P.8d 1151,
1158 (Ct. App. 2018). In determining whether
the State has breached a plea agreement, a
court must examine the language of the plea
agreement and, where the language of that
plea agreement is ambiguous, those ambigui-
ties shall be resolved in favor of the defen-
dant. Id, If the language of the document is

ny that “Miranda warnings are at an 8th grade

reading level”); State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422,
428 (Utah 1998) (providing expert testimony that

unambiguous, given its ordinary and well-
understood meaning, we will not look beyond
the four corners of the agreement to deter-
mine the intent of the parties. Id.

Hs It is well established that when a
plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so
that it can be said to be part of the induce-
ment or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 80 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971).
Like a contract, a valid plea agreement binds
the State to perform the promised obli-
gations. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S,
129, 187, 129 S.Ct, 1428, 178 L.Ed.2d 266
(2009), The State’s failure to comply with its
obligations constitutes a breach of the agree-
ment and entitles the defendant to appropri-
ate relief, Jd, As a remedy, the court may
order specific performance of the agreement
or may permit the defendant to withdraw the
guilty plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 268, 92
S.Ct. 495; State v. Jones, 189 Idaho 299, 802,
‘77 P.8d 988, 991 (Ct, App. 2008),

One of the terms of Smith’s plea agree-
ment was that he would “complete a Psycho-
sexual evaluation with a full disclosure poly-
graph (PSE).” The district court determined
that because Smith refused to discuss the
indicated deception in the relevant questions
during the post-test interview, he “never
completed the polygraph.” Smith contends
that he was not obligated to complete a post-
polygraph interrogation, as it is not within
the scope of the term “full disclosure poly-
graph.” The question, therefore, is whether
cooperative participation in the post-test in-
terview is required in order to complete a full
disclosure polygraph.

The polygraph examiner’s own statements
are inconsistent, lending support to both par-
ties’ arguments, For instance, the polygraph
examiner noted that when he confronted
Smith about his deceptive responses, Smith
refused to speak with him and “the poly-
graph exam ended.” This suggests the post-
test interview was part of the polygraph
exam. However, in the same report, the poly-
graph examiner included subsections titled
“pre-test interview,” “test administration,”

the Miranda warnings are “equivalent to a fifth
or sixth grade reading level”).

and “post-test interview,” writing: “During
the post-test interview, I elicited the follow-
ing information: (1) Smith’s responses to the
polygraph examination indicated significant
response and deception was indicated to the
relevant questions.” This suggests that the
polygraph examination was distinct from the
pre-test and post-test interviews. Reading
the entirety of the report, we conclude that
the polygraph examiner uses the term poly-
graph examination to mean both the actual
polygraph test and the entire examination
process, depending on the context of the
sentence.

It is apparent from the structure and
wording of the report that Smith did com-
plete the polygraph test. However, “complete
a Psycho-sexual evaluation with a full disclo-
sure polygraph” is different than “take a
polygraph test.” Though Smith did take the
polygraph test in its entirety, he did not
complete the entire examination process. The
purpose of the State’s condition, as evident
from the “full disclosure” requirement, was
to formulate an informed decision as to
Smith’s recidivism risk. See generally State
v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 392 P,8d 1228
(2017) (discussing polygraphs and risk as-
sessment). Thus, this condition in the plea
agreement—if read in context—requires par-
ticipation and cooperation in the pre-test and
post-test interviews held in conjunction with
the administration of the actual polygraph
test. Because Smith did not complete the
entire polygraph examination process, the

887

State was released from the terms of the
plea agreement, allowing it to recommend
any sentence it deemed appropriate.

I.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in denying
Smith’s motion to suppress. The existence of
a Miranda waiver, which the evidence in the
record indicates was signed knowingly, intel-
ligently, and voluntarily, is a significant fac-
tor in our determination that the confession
‘was voluntary. Smith does present some evi-
dence of misstatements of the law and assur-
ances of leniency made by the officer, but
context and qualifying statements cure any
coercive effect these statements may have
had in isolation, We also hold that Smith’s
refusal to participate in the post-test inter-
view violated his plea agreement, as he did
not complete the polygraph examination pro-
cess; he merely completed the test portion of
the examination process, Therefore, the State
was free to recommend any sentence it
thought appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of conviction and the sentence
for one count of injury to children.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
HUSKEY concur,

88

407 P.3d 202
STATE of Idaho, Idaho State Board of
Land Commissioners, and Idaho Depart-
ment of Lands, Plaintiffs-Counterdefen-
dants-Respondents,
Y.
Philip HUDSON, Defendant-
Counterclaimant-
Appellant.

Docket No. 44418

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, September 2017 Term.

December 4, 2017

John F. Magnuson, Coeur d'Alene, attor-
ney for appellant.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, attorney for respondent.
Angela S, Kaufmann argued,

JONES, Justice.
I, Nature oF THE Case

In a case arising out of Bonner County,
Philip Hudson (“Hudson”) appeals a district
court’s grant of partial summary judgment in
favor of the State of Idaho, the Idaho State
Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho
Department of Lands (collectively, the
“State”), The district court found that Hud-
son violated the Idaho Lake Protection Act
(the “LPA”) when he placed fill in the bed of
Priest Lake without a permit. Specifically,
the district court held that the State had
jurisdiction of Priest Lake up to an elevation
of approximately 2487.64 feet, and Hudson’s
fill was placed within that elevation, Hudson
disputes the location of the Ordinary High
Water Mark (the “OHWM”) and argues that.
the fill was placed on his own property to
protect it from erosion. Hudson argues that
there was an issue of material fact regarding
the location of the OHWM, which made sum-
mary judgment improper.

IL Facrua anp Procepura BACKGROUND

Priest Lake has been a navigable lake
since Idaho became a state in 1890, In ap-
proximately 1950, the State of Idaho con-
structed a dam on Priest Lake, which has
stabilized the lake elevation at approximately
2437.64 feet from July to September since
1951. In 2014, the State investigated a com-
plaint which alleged that Hudson encroached
on Priest Lake by placing fill in an area
adjacent to his property. The fill extends
approximately nineteen feet waterward of
1. The State disputed the presence of an AHWM

on Priest Lake. However, the State maintained
that the distinction between the OHWM and the

889

the 2437.64 foot elevation. Hudson did not
apply for a permit prior to placing the fill,
and refused the State’s request that he re-
move it.

On July 18, 2015, the State filed a verified
complaint alleging two causes of action
against Hudson: (1) that he violated that
LPA by placing unauthorized fill in Priest
Lake, and (2) a trespass action. Hudson an-
swered the complaint and asserted counter-
claims for declaratory relief and quiet title to
the land in dispute. Hudson argued that the
area in question was his property because it
was located upland of the OHWM of Priest
Lake at the time Idaho became a state.

In April 2016, the State moved for partial
summary judgment, arguing that the LPA
grants the State regulatory authority over
the fill that is the subject of this litigation,
regardless of the location of the natural or
ordinary high water mark of Priest Lake,
because such fill is located on the bed of a
navigable lake as defined by Idaho Code
section 58-1802(b). In support of its motion,
the State filed a memorandum which assert-
ed that the State’s regulatory authority un-
der the LPA extends to any lands lying
below the Artificial High Water Mark (the
“AHWM”) and above the OHWM, which
would give it jurisdiction over the land be-
neath Hudson’s fill! The State argued that
Priest Lake has been maintained at an ap-
proximate elevation of 2487.64 feet during
the summer months since 1951, and consid-
ers that to be the high water mark, whether
artificial or natural. The State asserted that
the 2487.64 foot line represents the point at
which the bed of the lake is regulated by the
State. The State supported this argument
with affidavits of Mick Schanilec and Mat-
thew Anders. Mr. Schanilec, the area manag-
er for the Priest Lake Supervisory Area,
testified that the State administers the LPA
at Priest Lake to the elevation of 2487.64
feet, which is where the State considers the
natural or ordinary high water mark to be.

Ultimately, the State argued that the ma-
terial Hudson placed encroached upon State
controlled land, and that the district court

AHWM was not germane to its argument because

the State controlled the area in dispute under
either.

890

should issue an injunction requiring Hudson
to:

(a) remove all unauthorized fill below ele-
vation 2487.64 feet msl during the low
water period of Priest Lake, between
about November 1 and March 1; (b) stabi-
lize any unstable bank or lake bed remain-
ing landward of elevation 2437.64 feet msl
of Priest Lake; and (c) perform any other
measures recommended by [the State] de-
signed to contain sediment and erosion and
to restore Priest Lake to as near its condi-
tion immediately prior to the unauthorized
encroachment as possible,

The State additionally requested a perma-
nent injunction preventing Hudson from en-
eroaching upon, in, or above the waters of
Priest Lake unless approved by the State,
and that he be required to pay a $10,000 fine
for his violation of the LPA.

Hudson filed a memorandum opposing the
State’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment, disputing the location of the OHWM
and arguing that a material issue of fact
existed as to whether or not the encroach-
ments at issue were located on his property
or the property of the State. Hudson argued
that he placed the natural improvements on
his own property, which was located between
2485 and 2487.64 feet. In support of his oppo-
sition to the State’s motion, Hudson provided
declarations of Ernest Warner, himself, and
Drew C. Dittman. Mr. Warner, a licensed
surveyor, testified that he believed and con-
eluded that the OHWM of Priest Lake, as of
July 8, 1890, was at least two vertical feet
lower than the 2487.64 foot elevation, the
artificial level now maintained during the
summer months. Further, Mr, Dittman, a
professional engineer, testified that if the
boundary line between the Hudson parcel
and the State-owned bed of Priest Lake was
extended nineteen feet waterward of the
summer pool level maintained on Priest
Lake, then most, if not all, of Hudson’s im-
provements would be located on his property
as opposed to the State of Idaho. Hudson
argued that the State bears the burden of
proving that his encroachments are located
waterward of the OHWM of Priest Lake.
Ultimately, Hudson concluded that the:

State has failed to show that Hudson’s

encroachments were located below the

OHWM of Priest Lake. Defendant Hudson

further submits that the State is estopped

to seek relief on the basis that his en-
croachments are located below an AHWM
of Priest Lake, having specifically and em-
phatically denied, under oath, that there is
an AHWM on Priest Lake, Hudson re-
quests that all relief sought by the State
on summary judgment be denied and that
the matter be set for trial wherein the

State will be required to prove that Hud-

son’s encroachments are in fact below the

OHWM of Priest Lake as it existed on

July 3, 1890.

On June 15, 2016, the State responded
with a Second Affidavit of Mr. Schanilee
(‘Second Schanilee Affidavit”). On June 17,
2016, Hudson moved to strike the Second
Schanilec Affidavit because it did not comply
with the timeframe set forth in LR.C.P.
56(c). The State responded, arguing that a
party is permitted to file a reply brief seven
days before a summary judgment hearing,
and that the brief may be accompanied by an
affidavit in support.

On June 22, 2016, the district court heard
arguments from the parties regarding the
State’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment, At the outset, the district court recog-
nized the arguments made regarding the
OHWM and the AHWM of Priest Lake, and
advised the parties as follows:

I looked at the statute that requires the

lake to be kept up the additional three feet

during the summer months. But I guess

what I’m most struck by is Idaho Code 58-

1802 and the issue of navigability and en-

croachments, And I’m not sure whether it

matters whether we're talking about the

[OHWM] or the [AHWM] when you look

at 58-1802(b) and (h) and @).

During oral argument the State reiterated
what it set forth in its briefing, and reasoned
that for the purposes of its motion, it was
irrelevant whether they were talking about
the OHWM or the AHWM, because under
the LPA, parties are required to obtain a
permit before encroaching on a navigable
lake. The State argued that because Hudson
failed to obtain a permit prior to placing fill

in the lake bed, he violated the LPA. Hudson
argued that the OHWM at statehood was two
and one half feet lower than the summer
level, which would result in his property ex-
tending approximately nineteen feet further
into Priest Lake, and nearly all of his en-
croachments fall within those nineteen feet.
Hudson argued that the State was in a
unique procedural posture because it had
specifically denied the existence of an
AHWM, and had testified that the OHWM is
2487.64 feet. Hudson contended that he had
offered evidence to contradict the State’s lo-
cation of the OHWM and that if the State
was going to allege that Hudson’s encroach-
ments were waterward of the OHWM, the
dispute regarding the location creates an is-
sue of material fact.

On June 80, 2016, the district court issued
its memorandum decision and order granting
the State’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment. The district court first determined that
the fill placed by Hudson was an encroach-
ment not in aid of navigation. The district
court next found that the State has the pow-
er to regulate and control navigational and
non-navigational encroachments, and that a
permit is required before a person may place
an encroachment into the bed of Priest Lake.
In response to Hudson’s argument that the
AHWM is higher than the OHWM in the
summer months, and his property extends to
the OHWM as it existed in 1890, the district
court found:

[That pursuant to the definition of a lake-

bed in Idaho Code § 58-1802, it does not

matter whether the fill is located below the

OHWM, or between the OHWM and the

AHWM, if there is one; because the stat-

ute makes clear that the State of Idaho has

the power to regulate and control en-
croachments on land lying between the

OHWM and the AHWM.

Accordingly, the State of Idaho has the
power, as a matter of law, to regulate and
control encroachments in or above the bed
of Priest Lake by requiring that a lake
encroachment permit be obtained before

2. The district court did not impose the $10,000
fine requested by the State,

3. The district court granted summary judgment
in June 2016, Effective July 1, 2016, Idaho Rule

891

~ construction of a nonnavigational encroach-

ment such as the fill at issue here. :
Additionally, the district court acknowledged
that it did not utilize the Second Schanilec
Affidavit in rendering its decision, and as a
result, considered Hudson’s motion to strike
moot. a

The district court issued a mandatory in-
junction requiring Hudson to: (1) remove all
unauthorized fill below the high water mark,
regardless of whether it is natural or artifi-
cial; (2) stabilize any unstable bank or lake
bed; and (8) perform any other measures
recommended by the State to restore the
lake to as close to its original condition as
possible, The district court also issued a per-
manent injunction requiring Hudson to re-
frain from encroaching upon, in, or above the
beds or waters of Priest Lake, absent prior
approval from the State.?

The parties stipulated to a stay of further
action on the remaining claims pending an
appeal, and the district court entered an
amended partial judgment certified as final
pursuant to LR.C.P, 54(b). Hudson timely
appealed.

IIL. Issues on APPEAL

1, Whether the district court erred when it
granted the State’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment despite the dispute regarding
the location of the OHWM.

2, Whether the State is entitled to attorney
fees and costs on appeal.

IV. SrAnparp or Revinw

HMM This Court reviews a district
court’s decision to grant summary judgment
under the same standard employed by the
district court. In re Sanders Beach, 148 Ida-
ho 448, 446, 147 P.38d 75, 78 (2006) (internal
citation omitted), Summary judgment is
proper “if the pleadings, depositions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there.is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” LR.C.P. 56(¢)%,

of Civil Procedure 56 was amended. The relevant
portion of the rule now provides: “The court
must grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

892

“A material issue of fact, for summary judg-
ment purposes, is one that is relevant to an
element of the claim or defense and whose
existence might affect the outcome of the
case.” Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 849-50,
908 P.2d 148, 151-52 (1995) (citing United
States v. Grayson, 879 F.2d 620 (th Cir,
1989)). “[TJhis Court construes disputed
facts, and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from the record, in favor of the
non-moving party.” Grabicki v. City of Lewi-
ston, 154 Idaho 686, 690, 302 P.8d 26, 30
(2018) (internal citation omitted).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not ery in grant-
ing partial summary judgment be-
cause the dispute regarding the true
location of the OHWM is not a mate-
rial fact in determining whether Hud-
son violated the LPA.

Hl Hudson argues that the district court
erred in concluding that it did not matter
whether 2437.64 feet was the OHWM or the
AHWM of Priest Lake. Hudson argues that
his evidence proves that the OHWM was at
2485.64 feet at the time Idaho became a
state, and that most, if not all, of the fill was
placed within the nineteen feet between ele-
vations 2435.64 and 2487.64. Hudson argues
that summary judgment is only appropriate
when there is no genuine issue of a material
fact, and that because there was a dispute
regarding the actual location of the OHWM,
and whether or not his encroachment was
located upland of the OHWM, the district
court erred when it granted the State’s mo-
tion for partial summary judgment. Further,
Hudson reasons that because the State de-
nied the existence of the AHWM on Priest:
Lake, it needed to prove that the OHWM of
Priest Lake at the time Idaho became a state
was located at 2437.64 feet. Hudson claims
that the district court impermissibly resolved
an issue of fact based on the State’s denial
that Priest Lake has an AHWM. Additional-
ly, Hudson alleges that the Second Schanilec
Affidavit should not be considered on appeal

material fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.” LLR.C.P. 56(a).

4. The difference between the 2435.64 and
2437.64 water marks results in approximately

because it was not timely filed with the dis-
trict court.

In response, the State reasons that wheth-
er 2487.64 feet is the OHWM or the AHWM
is immaterial because the State has the au-
thority under the LPA to regulate encroach-
ments below either the OHWM or the
AHWM. Accordingly, the State asserts the
district court did not err in granting the
motion for partial summary judgment be-
cause, regardless of whether 2437.64 feet is
an ordinary or an artificial high water mark,
the State has authority to regulate Hudson’s
encroachment, and he was required to obtain
an encroachment permit prior to placing fill
in the bed of Priest Lake. The State contin-
ues, arguing that while Hudson’s fill might
benefit his own property, it does not provide
major environmental, economic, or social
benefits to the general public, and that under
the LPA, any person who is found to be
wrongfully encroaching on, in or above the
beds of a navigable lake shall be directed to
restore the lake to the condition it was in
prior to the unauthorized encroachment. Fur-
ther, the State alleges that Hudson’s concern
regarding the Second Schanilee Affidavit is
not properly before this Court because the
district court specifically noted that it did not
consider it when rendering its decision.

Hs daho law provides that “a riparian
owner (on a navigable river or stream) or a
littoral owner (on a navigable lake) takes title
down to the natural high water mark.” In re
Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 448, 458, 147 P.3d
75, 85 (2006) (citing West v. Smith, 95 Idaho
550, 554, 511 P.2d 1826, 1380 (1973)).The
State of Idaho then owns, “in trust for the
public title to the bed of the navigable water
below the OHWM as it existed at the time
the State was admitted into the Union.” Id.
(iting Frickson v. State, 182 Idaho 208, 210,
970 P.2d 1, 3 (1998)).The Idaho legislature
enacted the LPA, which is codified as Idaho
Code 58, chapter 18, to regulate encroach-
ments and activities that occur in, on, or

nineteen feet of sloping land extending water-
ward from the 2437.64 water mark.

above navigable lakes in the State of Idaho.

See generally 1.C. §§ 58-1301 et. seq.
The LPA provides that:
[T]he public health, interest, safety and
welfare requires that all encroachments
upon, in or above the beds or waters of
navigable lakes of the state be regulated in
order that the protection of property, navi-
gation, fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic
life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water
quality be given due consideration and
weighed against the navigational or eco-
nomic necessity or justification for, or ben-
efit to be derived from the proposed en-
croachment, No encroachment on, in or
above the beds or waters of any navigable
lake in the state shall hereafter be made
unless approval therefor has been given as
provided in this act.

LC. § 58-1801.

The LPA defines a navigable lake as: “any
permanent body of relatively still or slack
water, including man-made reservoirs, not
privately owned and not a mere marsh or
stream eddy, and capable of accommodating
boats or canoes.” I.C. § 58-1802(a).

Beds of navigable lakes are defined as:
“the lands lying under or below the ‘natural
or ordinary high water mark’ of a navigable
lake and, for purposes of this act only, the
lands lying between the natural or ordinary
high water mark and the artificial high water
mark, if there be one.” Id. at (b). Encroach-
ments not in aid of navigation include “en-
croachments on, in or above the beds or
waters of a navigable lake, including landfills
or other structures not constructed primarily
for use in aid of the navigability of the lake.”
LC. § 58-1802).

An OHWM is defined as; “the high water
elevation in a lake over a period of years,
uninfluenced by man-made dams or works, at
which elevation the water impresses a line on
the soil by covering it for sufficient periods to
deprive the soil of its vegetation and destroy
its value for agricultural purposes.” Id. at (c).

An AHWM is defined as: “the high water
elevation above the natural or ordinary high
water mark resulting from construction of
man-made dams or control works and im-

893

pressing a new and higher vegetation line.”
Id, at (d).

The erux of this appeal is whether the true
location of the OHWM on Priest Lake is a
material fact. If it is a material fact, the
district court’s award of partial summary
judgment was improper. We hold that the
location of the OHWM is not a material fact
in determining whether Hudson violated the
LPA. The State alleges that Hudson violated
the LPA by placing fill in an area waterward
of the OHWM of Priest Lake, while Hudson
maintains that the OHWM is two feet lower
and the fill was placed on his own property.
Under either argument, it is undisputed that
Hudson placed fill that extends into the navi-
gable bed of Priest Lake. It is undisputed
that Hudson’s fill constitutes an encroach-
ment.

The LPA requires that, in order to protect
public health, interest, safety and welfare:

all encroachments upon, in or above the
beds or waters of navigable lakes of the
state be regulated in order that the protec-
tion of property, navigation, fish and wild-
life habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesth-
etic beauty and water quality be given due
consideration and weighed against the nav-
igational or economic necessity or justifica-
tion for, or benefit to be derived from the
proposed encroachment.

1.C. § 58-1801. As a result, the State must
provide approval before any encroachment
can be placed on, in, or above the beds or
waters of any navigable lakes. Jd. The LPA
defines the beds of navigable lakes as “the
lands lying between the natural or ordinary
high water mark and the artificial high water
mark, if there be one.” IC. § 58-1802(b).In
sum, whether 2487.64 feet was the OHWM or
the AHWM is not an issue of material fact
because the State has the authority to regu-
late encroachments under both marks. Ac-
cordingly, the district court did not err in
granting partial summary judgment in favor
of the State. Separately, because the district
court did not consider the Second Schanilec
Affidavit in reaching its decision, Hudson’s
request that it not be considered for pur-
poses of resolving this appeal is moot.

894

B. The State is entitled to costs and at-
torney fees on appeal.

TH The State requests costs and attorney
fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-117. The State argues that whether
2487.64 feet is the OHWM or the AHWM is
irrelevant under the LPA, and that Hudson’s
appeal was brought without a reasonable ba-
sis in fact or law. Hudson argues that it
would be improper to award the State attor-
ney fees regardless of which party prevailed,
because his position is supported by facts and
law.

Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides that
“fw]ith the exception of post-conviction ap-
peals and appeals from proceedings involving
the termination of parental rights or an
adoption, costs shall be allowed as a matter
of course to the prevailing party unless oth-
erwise provided by law or order of the
Court.” LA.R. 40, Idaho Code section 12-117
provides that:

Unless otherwise provided by statute, in

any proceeding involving as adverse par-

ties a state agency or a political subdivision
and a person, the state agency, political
subdivision or the court hearing the pro-
ceeding, including on appeal, shall award
the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s
fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
LC. § 12-117(1). This Court has awarded at-
torney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section
12-117 when a nonprevailing party “contin-
ued to rely on the same arguments used in
front of the district court, without providing
any additional persuasive law or bringing
into doubt the existing law on which the
district court based its decision.” City of
Blackfoot v. Spackman, 162 Idaho 802, 810,
896 P.8d 1184, 1192 (2017) (citing Rangen,
Ine. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 159 Idaho
‘798, 812, 867 P.3d 198, 207 (2016),

The State is the prevailing party on appeal
and is awarded costs and attorney fees pur-
suant to Idaho Code section 12-117(1). On
appeal, Hudson proffered substantially the
same argument that previously failed before
the district court. Hudson did not present
any new persuasive law, nor did he signifi-

cantly challenge the existing law upon which
the district court relied in granting partial
summary judgment in favor of the State, See
Blackfoot, 162 Idaho 302, 396 P.8d at 1192.
As a result, we award the State attorney fees
on appeal,

VI. ConcLusion

We hereby affirm the district court’s grant
of partial summary judgment in favor of the
State and award costs and attorney fees on
appeal to the State. This case is remanded to
the district court for further action on any
remaining issues.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices
HORTON, BRODY and Justice pro tem
TROUT concur.

407 P.3d 208

Dennis B. CURRENT, Claimant-
Appellant,

v

WADA FARMS PARTNERSHIP,
Employer,

and
Idaho Department of Labor, Respondent.
Docket No, 44683

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Twin Falls, November 2017 Term.

December 4, 2017

Dennis B. Current, Blackfoot, pro se.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attor-
ney General, Boise, attorney for respondent.
Douglas A. Werth argued,

JONES, Justice,
I, Narure or THe Case

Dennis B. Current (“Current”) appeals an
Idaho Industrial Commission (the “Commis-
sion”) decision that determined he was ineli-
gible for unemployment benefits based on
willful underreporting of his earnings to the
Idaho Department of Labor (“IDOL”). IDOL,
discovered wage discrepancies between the
amount reported by Current and the amount
reported by his employer, Wada Farms Part-
nership (“Wada Farms”), for the weeks end-
ing March 5, 2016, and March 12, 2016. On
appeal, Current disputes that he “willfully”
misrepresented his wages.

I. Facruan anp Procepural BAcKGRounD

Since September 2009, Current has
worked for Wada Farms on a seasonal basis.
Due to the nature of his employment, his
hours varied weekly. When Current was not
working regularly, he sought unemployment
benefits.

Sometime around April 2016, IDOL re-
quested wage information from Wada Farms
for the weeks ending November 7, 2015
through March 19, 2016. On April 26, 2016,
IDOL sent Current a letter, notifying him
that the wages that he had reported for the
weeks ending March 5, 2016 and March 12,
2016, differed from the wages reported by
Wada Farms; specifically, for the week end-
ing March 5, 2016, Current reported $8380.00
in wages, while Wada Farms reported
$897.51 in wages, and for the week ending
March 12, 2016, Current reported $231.00 in
wages and Wada Farms reported $318.59 in
wages, The letter afforded Current an oppor-
tunity to explain the discrepancies, However,

Current maintains that he never received the
letter.

On May 10, 2016, IDOL issued an eligibili-
ty determination ruling, finding that Current
willfully misstated a material fact to obtain
unemployment benefits. As part of the rul-
ing, IDOL: (1) determined that Current
would not be eligible for benefits from May
8, 2016 through May 6, 2017; (2) sought
repayment of the benefits that Current re-
ceived to which he was not entitled; and (8)
issued a civil penalty. Current appealed the
eligibility determination, arguing that he did
not willfully submit false facts or statements.

In June 2016, the parties appeared for a
telephonic hearing with the Appeals Examin-
er to determine whether Current willfully
made a false statement or willfully failed to
report a material fact in order to obtain
unemployment insurance benefits. In re-
sponse to questions regarding the discrepan-
ey between Current's reported wages, and
Wada Farms’ reported wages, Current ex-
plained that Wada Farms’ new payroll sys-
tem, Kronos, was electronic, and he was also
enrolled in direct deposit. As a result, Cur-
rent noted that he did not receive a paystub,
and, at the time, he maintained that he had
no way to log onto the system to review his
hours. Current admitted that he estimated
his hours, and deducted hours for lunch. In a
discussion regarding Kronos, Current testi-
fied as follows:

Current: I was able to log onto Kronos
after ... May 26th ... But prior to that I
was not able to access my time, my hours,
or anything like that and I just had to
guesstimate and I did mention that to
some of your people over the phone and
they said that that was fine, that I could
guesstimate my time....

Appeals Examiner: Okay. So when they
told you [that] you could estimate your
time, did they tell you that you should go
back and correct your earnings once you
find out—once you found out what you
were actually paid?

Current: Well, I think they mentioned
something like that, but ... like I said, I

haven’t been able to even access a pay stub
until May 18, 2016....

Current also disclosed that he had been able
to obtain printed copies of his paystubs in the
past, but that usually Wada Farms charged
for that.

Despite Current’s explanation, IDOL
sought to make it clear that:

[Current] was notified that ... itis ... his
responsibility to make sure that he in-
cludes [his hours] correctly. The statement:
that he made based on not being able to
enter into the system of the employer that
keeps his hours does not excuse him from
his responsibility to make sure that he
provides the department accurate informa-
tion. There is [sic] other options, He could
have gone to the employer. He could
have—when he received his payment clari-
fied that it was correct. He knew that he
was estimating the hours when he provid-
ed the information to us. There was no
indication that he ever called and verified
and corrected... .

After the hearing, the Appeals Examiner
issued a decision affirming the May 10, 2016
Eligibility Determination. Ultimately, the
Appeals Examiner determined that Current
misreported his earnings to IDOL for two
weeks without providing a reasonable expla-
nation for the error, Current appealed
IDOL’s decision to the Commission.

Subsequently, Current requested that the
hearing be reopened so that he could present
additional information. The Appeals Examin-
er denied Current’s request, finding that
Current had been afforded a full and fair
opportunity to provide evidence and there
was not a sufficient basis upon which to
reopen the hearing,

Ultimately, the Commission affirmed the
Appeals Examiner’s finding and held that
Current was ineligible for unemployment
benefits, First, the Commission determined
that the Appeals Examiner correctly denied
Current’s request to reopen the hearing be-
cause Current had been afforded due process
and the information he sought to introduee—
that he did not intend to defraud IDOL—was
uncontested.

897

Second, the Commission determined that
Current underreported his earnings despite
knowing the importance of providing accu-
rate information. Specifically, the Commis-
sion stated that “the issue in this case comes
down to assessing the probability that, given
the information available to [Current], he did
not know what IDOL was asking, and, then,
deliberately elected not to seek clarification.”
The Commission further noted that, even if
Current did not have immediate access to his
paystubs for the weeks at issue, he admitted
that he had obtained paper copies of his
paystubs before Wada Farms changed to a
new accounting system in March 2016, The
Commission conceded that Current may not
have intended to commit any fraud by un-
derreporting his wages, but that “he made
assumptions about his hours and did nothing
to verify that the wages he reported were
correct.” As a result, the Commission con-
cluded:

[Current] willfully misstated material facts

for the purpose of obtaining unemployment

benefits when he misreported his wages.

[Current] is ineligible for all the benefits

he received and any waiting week credit

for the weeks ending in March 5, 2016 and

March 12, 2016. [Current’s] conduct has

also rendered him ineligible for unemploy-

ment benefits for the fifty-two (52) week

period May 8, 2016 through May 6, 2017.

[Current] is ineligible for a waiver and

must repay the benefits he received, but to

which he was not entitled, along with appli-

cable interest and penalties... .

Current timely appealed the Commission’s

decision.

TH. Issues on APPEAL

1. Whether Current’s argument fails to
meet the requirements of Idaho Appellate
Rule 35(a).

2, Whether substantial and competent evi-
dence supports the Commission’s finding that
Current willfully misrepresented material
facts when he underreported his earnings to
IDOL.

8. Whether IDOL is entitled to attorney
fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code section 12-117(1).

898

IV.
=

“When this Court reviews a decision
from the Industrial Commission, we exer-
cise free review over questions of law, but
review questions of fact only to determine
whether the Commission’s findings are
supported by substantial and competent,
evidence.” Uhl v. Ballard Med. Products,
Inc., 188 Idaho 658, 657, 67 P.38d 1265, 1269
(2008). “Substantial and competent evi-
dence is relevant evidence that a reason-
able mind might accept to support a con~
clusion.” Id. “[Tyhis Court does not re-
weigh the evidence or consider whether it
would have reached a different conclusion
from the evidence presented.” Hughen v.
Highland Estates, 187 Idaho 349, 351, 48
P.8d 1288, 1240 (2002), “The Industrial
Commission’s conclusions regarding the
credibility and weight of evidence will not
be disturbed unless the conclusions are
clearly erroneous.” Id, [T]his Court views
all the facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the party who prevailed
before the Industrial Commission. Neihart
v. Universal Joint Auto Parts, Inc, 141
Idaho 801, 802-03, 118 P.8d 188, 134-35
(2005).

Bell v. Idaho Dep't of Labor, 157 Idaho 744,
746-47, 889 P.8d 1148, 1150-51 (2014).

Sranparp or Revinw

V. ANALYSIS

A. Current’s argument meets the require-
ments of Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a).
HM IDOL argues that Current's argu-
ment should be waived pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 85(a) because he failed to
provide any argument or authority for the
issues stated in his brief. Specifically, IDOL
argues that Current merely advances conclu-
sory statements and fails to cite case law.

Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires that an
appellant’s brief contain: “the contentions of
the appellant with respect to the issues pre-
sented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with
citations to the authorities, statutes and parts
of the transcript and record relied upon.”
LAR. 35(2)(6).

This Court finds that Current’s appellate
brief is supported by sufficient argument and

authority to meet the requirements set forth
in Idaho Appellate Rule 35,

B. Substantial and competent evidence
supports the Commission’s finding
that Current willfully failed to report
a material fact.

Hl Cwrent sets forth the following facts
in his briefing. He has been a seasonal em-
ployee of Wada Farms for seven years, moni-
tors his time by clocking in and out on a time
clock, and receives payment via direct depos-
it. From approximately mid December 2015
to late May 2016, he did not have electronic
access to his pay stubs or hours; however, he
did receive copies of his pay stubs from
Wada Farms’ accounting department in De-
eember of 2015 after a winter layoff. Wada
Farms updated their payroll system and pro-
vided him with a password in April 2016,
However, because of technical issues, he did
not have access to the system until May 26,
2016,

Current argues that he reported his wages
“to the best of his ability and memory” and
that he presented sufficient evidence to es-
tablish that he did not willfully misreport his
wages. Ultimately, Current concludes that he
did not have knowledge that an overpayment
had been made, and that a willful act re-
quires knowledge that the act was wrong.

Despite Current’s assertions, IDOL main-
tains that substantial and competent evi-
dence supports the Commission’s finding that
Current willfully misrepresented material
facts when he underreported his earnings.
IDOL argues that it is clear from Current's
testimony that he knew of his obligation to
correct estimated earnings, but failed to do
80.

TN «Idaho law provides that “[t}he
claimant bears the burden of proving statuto-
ry eligibility for unemployment benefits.”
McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho
582, 585, 272 P.8d 554, 557 (2012) (citing
Steffen v. Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple,
120 Idaho 129, 182, 814 P.2d 29, 32 (1991),
Further, “[a] claimant shall not be entitled to
benefits for a period of fifty-two (52) weeks if
it is determined that he has willfully made a
false statement or willfully failed to report a

material fact in order to obtain benefits.” I.C.
§ 72-1366(12).

[Willfully] implies simply a purpose or will-

ingness to commit the act or make the

omission referred to. It does not require
any intent to violate law, in the sense of
having an evil or corrupt motive or intent.

It does imply a conscious wrong, and may

be distinguished from an act maliciously or

corruptly done, in that it does not neces-
sarily imply an evil mind, but is more
synonymous with “intentionally,” “de-
signedly,” “without lawful excuse,” and
therefore not accidental.
Bell v. Idaho Dep’t of Labor, 157 Idaho 744,
‘TAT, 889 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2014) (quoting Mey-
er v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754,
761, 589 P.2d 89, 96 (1979)).

HH “Enactment of ‘provisions penalizing
claimants who willfully fail to report material
facts in order to obtain benefits ... suggests
that [the Legislature] intended to disqualify
those claimants who purposely, intentionally,
consciously, or knowingly fail to report a
material fact, not those whose omission is
accidental because of negligence, misunder-
standing or other cause.’” Id. However, will-
fulness is found where a claimant “was prop-
erly informed of his reporting obligation and
his alleged misunderstanding lacked credibil-
ity.” Bringman v. New Albertsons, Inc., 157
Idaho 71, 77, 884 P.3d 262, 268 (2014) (citing
McNulty, 152 Idaho at 587, 272 P.3d at 559).

In Bell, Bell worked at Sears, but regular-
ly filed for unemployment benefits through
IDOL, Bell, 157 Idaho at 745, 339 P.3d at
1149. IDOL discovered some discrepancies
between the wages reported by Bell in his
unemployment filings, and the wages report-
ed by Sears. Jd. IDOL found that “Bell will-
fully misstated his gross wages for nineteen
weeks in which he received benefits and that
he was ineligible for benefits for nine weeks
in which he claimed to have worked part-time
hours despite working at least forty hours.”
Id. Accordingly, Bell was; (1) disqualified
from receiving benefits for fifty-two weeks;
(2) ordered to repay benefits that he had
received during the relevant periods; and (8)
ordered to pay penalties for willfully misrep-
resenting his wages and the hours worked.
Id, The Commission found that Bell willfully

899

made false statements or failed to disclose
material facts based on the fact that Bell
estimated his gross wages and knew of the
requirement to update IDOL with accurate
information, but made no attempt to do so.
Id. at 746, 839 P.3d at 1150. In making its
decision, the Commission considered that
IDOL provided Bell a pamphlet titled “Un-
employment Insurance Claim Benefit Rights,
Responsibilities, and Filing Instructions,”
which contained the following instruction:
“filf you cannot determine the exact amount
you earned, you must estimate weekly earn-
ings as close as possible. If you do estimate
earnings, you must contact your local office
when you receive the correct earnings infor-
mation,” Jd, at 748, 889 P.8d at 1152. On
appeal, this Court was not persuaded by
Bell’s argument that he did not intend to
defraud IDOL, noting that “willful conduct
‘does not require any intent to violate
law....’” Id. at 749, 389 P.8d at 1158 (citing
Meyer, 99 Idaho at 761, 589 P.2d at 96).
Ultimately, this Court found that Bell knew
that he was obligated to correctly report his
hours and update IDOL if he had initially
reported inaccurate information, but that
Bell had failed to do so. Id.

The crux of this appeal is whether the
Commission’s finding—that Current willfully
failed to report a material fact to obtain
unemployment insurance benefits—is sup-
ported by substantial and competent evi-
dence. Current argues that it was an honest
mistake and that he did not intentionally
misrepresent his wages. However, Current’s
argument fails to consider that this Court
has defined “willfulness” as simply a willing-
ness to commit the act, “[i]t does not require
any intent to violate the law.” Bell, 157 Idaho
at 747, 389 P.3d at 1151,

As was the case in Bell, Current received a
pamphlet that informed him that he was
required to keep track of hours and earnings,
and that “ilf you cannot determine the exact
amount you earned, you must estimate week-
ly earnings as closely as possible. If you do
estimate earnings, you must call ... when
you. veceive the correct earnings informa-
tion.” (Emphasis added), As a result, Cur-
rent was on notice that if he estimated his
wages, he needed to follow up with IDOL to

900

provide accurate information. Current ac-
knowledged this requirement in his testimo-
ny, and he admitted knowing that if he did
estimate his time he was required to correct
the estimation with the accurate information.

Willfulness is found where a claimant “was
properly informed of his reporting obligation
and his alleged misunderstanding lacked
credibility.” Bringman, 157 Idaho at 77, 384
P.8d at 268. It is possible that Current’s
misunderstanding was credible, i.e, that he
never received the letter notifying him that
the wages he had reported differed from the
wages reported by Wada Farms, or that he
did not have access to his paystubs due to a
recent change in the payroll system; howev-
er, these arguments fail to justify Current’s
failure to follow up to ensure that his report-
ing was accurate.

Nonetheless, on appeal, questions of fact
are only reviewed to determine whether the
Commission’s findings are supported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence. Uhl, 138
Idaho at 657, 67 P.8d at 1269. Ultimately, the
Commission conceded that Current may not
have intended to commit any fraud by un-
derreporting his wages, but that “he made
assumptions about his hours and did nothing
to verify that the wages he reported were
correct.” We find that substantial and compe-
tent evidence supports the Commission’s de-
cision.

C. IDOL is not entitled attorney fees on
appeal.

HH IDOL requests attorney fees on ap-
peal on the basis that Current’s appeal is
without reasonable basis in fact or law.

Idaho Code section 12-117(1) provides that:

Unless otherwise provided by statute, in
any proceeding involving as adverse par-
ties a state agency or a political subdivision
and a person, the state agency, political
subdivision or the court hearing the pro-
ceeding, including on appeal, shall award
the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s
fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing

party acted without a reasonable basis in

fact or law.
LC. § 12-1171).

We find that Current had a good faith
basis for his argument that he did not willful-
ly lie to IDOL, Accordingly, we deny IDOL’s
request for attorney fees on appeal.

VI. Conctusion

We affirm the Commission’s decision and
award costs on appeal to IDOL. We decline
IDOL’s request for attorney fees on appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices
HORTON, BRODY and BEVAN concur.

407 P.3d 214

Sharon WECHSLER, Plaintiff-
Respondent,

v

Norman J. WECHSLER, Defendant-
Appellant.

Docket No. 44297

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Pocatello, September 2017 Term.

Filed: December 6, 2017

904 |

May, Rammell & Thompson, Chtd., Poca-
tello, attorneys for appellant. Bron M. Ram-
mell argued.

Racine, Olsen, Nye, Budge & Bailey,
Chtd., Pocatello, attorneys for respondent.
Stephen J. Muhonen argued.

JONES, Justice.
I. Narore or Tae Cast

Appellant, Norman Wechsler (“Norman”),
and Respondent, Sharon Wechsler (“Shar-
on”), divorced in New York in 2005, A Di-
vorce Judgment, dated November 9, 2005,
was entered in the office of the New York
County Clerk on February 3, 2006, which set
forth a distribution of the parties’ property
and maintenance obligations. In 2014, Sharon
moved a New York court for an order to
direct the entry of a money judgment in her
favor because Norman had defaulted on his
obligation to transfer funds according to the
Divorce Judgment. On May 27, 2014, a New
York court granted Sharon’s motion and is-
sued a $9,468,008.98 Judgment in her favor.
On March 10, 2015, the New York Judgment
was filed in Idaho as a Foreign Judgment.
(the “Foreign Judgment”). The issues on ap-
peal relate to Sharon’s attempt to collect on
the Foreign Judgment.

II. FacruaL anD ProcepuRAL BACKGROUND

On March 16, 2012, Sharon partially col-
lected on a $17,669,678.57 divorce-related
Judgment by executing on Norman’s house
in Colorado, Between the acquisition of Nor-
man’s Colorado house, and the filing of the
Foreign Judgment in Idaho, Norman did not
disclose his updated address; accordingly, in
an affidavit filed with the Idaho Foreign
Judgment, Sharon indicated that Norman’s
last known address was the Colorado house
that she had acquired. Unbeknownst to Shar-
on, Norman had moved to a rental apartment
in Angel Fire, New Mexico. After living in
New Mexico for one year, Norman moved to
Pocatello, Idaho.

On May 2, 2018, a New York court issued
an order appointing Joseph B. Nelson as
receiver for the assets held by Norman, in-
cluding Norman’s interest in CYB Master,
LLC, a holding company. The New York
court reasoned that the appointment of a
receiver was appropriate because Norman
had not satisfied several divorce related
judgments, nor had he paid maintenance and
distributive award obligations. The New
York court noted that Norman’s interest in

intangible assets, including interests in sev-
eral LLCs, warranted the appointment of a
receiver. The order granted Mr. Nelson
wide-ranging authority to liquidate Norman’s
assets and disburse the resulting money to
Sharon to satisfy the New York Judgment.

On August 26, 2015, Sharon moved for an
order in Idaho to conduct a debtor’s exami-
nation of Norman. Therein, she noted that
the Foreign Judgment remained unsatisfied
and claimed that an examination of Norman,
under oath, could reveal property owned by
Norman, or property in which Norman has
an ownership interest, upon which she could
execute. The district court issued an order
for a debtor’s examination, and on Septem-
ber 16, 2015, Sharon conducted a debtor’s
examination of Norman. Norman was evasive
during the examination. For example, when
asked whether he had caused CYB Master,
LLC to transfer money or property to any
individual or entity during the last three
year's, Norman replied “Well, you know, what
do you mean did I cause some? Did the
butterfly beating its wings in China cause the
thunderstorm that we had two weeks ago in
Pocatello?” However, Norman did state that:
(1) he kept his personal business records in
his house in Pocatello, Idaho; (2) his records
for CYB Master, LLC are kept “{hlither and
yon” and may be on his computer in Pocatel-
lo; and (8) his records for life insurance
policies are stored on a home computer
owned by IntelliCorp (a company for which
he is a director), Throughout the debtor’s
examination, Norman refused to answer
many questions relating to his business inter-
ests claiming that it was not his right to
provide information of “third parties” to
Sharon.

On the same day as the debtor’s examina-
tion, Sharon served Norman a subpoena
duces tecwm, which demanded the production
of records relating to his assets as well as his
business and investment interests. On Octo-
ber 14, 2015, Norman sent a letter to Sharon
in which he explained that he refused to
produce documents pertaining to his business
or investment interests because that informa-
tion belonged to “third parties,” and he did
not have the right to produce those docu-
ments. On October 16, 2015, Norman filed an

905

objection and request for a protective order
for the subpoena duces tecum. On December
8, 2015, Sharon sent a letter to Norman,
which requested the production of certain
documents that were not produced as re-
quested in the subpoena duces tecwm. In
support of her request, Sharon cited Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure 84(a) and 45(b), and
stated that her request was a “good faith
attempt to avoid bringing contempt proceed-
ings.” On January 7, 2016, Norman respond-
ed by letter and explained that he would not
produce the requested documents.

On March 28, 2016, Sharon filed a motion
to compel responses to certain debtor’s ex-
amination questions. In support of her mo-
tion, Sharon attached an affidavit of her Ida-
ho attorney, David Alexander; an affidavit of
her New York attorney, Louis Black; and a
memorandum. Sharon also filed a motion to
appoint an ancillary receiver “to assist the
primary receiver appointed over [Norman] in
marshalling assets and property of [Norman]
located within the State of Idaho.”

In response, Norman filed a motion to
strike the affidavit of Louis Black. Therein,
he argued that certain exhibits attached to
Mr. Black’s affidavit should not be admitted
because they were hearsay and lacked con-
text or foundation. Norman also filed a mo-
tion to strike portions of Sharon’s memoran-
dum of law arguing that certain portions
must be struck because they “contain redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.”

On May 11, 2016, the district court issued
a decision addressing the motion to compel,
the motion to appoint an ancillary receiver,
and the motions to strike. The district court
granted Sharon’s motion to compel, writing:

The [c]ourt hereby orders Norman to com-
ply with Sharon’s request and present an-
swers to questions asked during the debt-
or’s exam in relation to the two corporate
entities owned by him. Furthermore, Nor-
man is ordered to produce all documents
necessary for Sharon and the receiver to
assess any and all assets that may be used
to satisfy the debt.

The district court also granted Sharon’s
motion to appoint an ancillary receiver,
David M. Smith, CPA (the “Ancillary Receiv-

906

er”), to help the primary receiver, who was
appointed by a New York court, in his fidu-
ciary duties over CYB Masters, LLC. The
district court denied Norman’s motion to
strike Louis Black's affidavit. The district
court explained that Norman objected to
emails attached to Mr. Black’s affidavit,
which purport to detail Norman’s interests in
various entities, on the grounds that they
were inadmissible hearsay. The district court
noted that the affidavit would not be struck
because it was used during the course of
discovery and the rules of discovery are
broader than the rules of evidence. Similarly,
the district court denied Norman’s motion to
strike portions of Sharon’s memorandum.

On May 24, 2016, the district court issued
an order appointing the Ancillary Receiver
pursuant to Idaho Code section 8-601. There-
in, the district court appointed David M.

ith as the Ancillary Receiver and granted
him:

all of the powers authorized pursuant to
Idaho Code § 8-605, namely, ... as receiv-
er; to take and keep possession of the
property, to receive rents, collect debts, to
compound for and compromise the same,
to make transfers, and generally to do
such acts respecting the property as the
court may authorize.

All parties to this action are ordered to
cooperate with and assist the Ancillary
Receiver in taking possession of the prop-
erty described above. The past and/or
present officers, directors, agents, mem-
bers, managers, general partners, manag-
ing partners, trustees, attorneys, account-
ants, and employees of CYB Master LLC,
any of the “Receivership Defendants” iden-
tified in the Order Appointing Receiver
Pursuant to CPLR 5228, or any employee,
officer, director, or agent of any second-
tier or subsequent-tier entity, are ordered
to turn over to the Ancillary Receiver
forthwith all paper and electronic informa-
tion belonging to and/or relating to CYB
Master LLC, any of the “Receivership De-
fendants,” and/or any second-tier or subse-
quent-tier entities or assets, in such man-
ner as the Ancillary Receiver may specify,

Hours later, Norman filed an objection and
response to Sharon’s proposed order appoint-
ing the Ancillary Receiver.

On June 8, 2016, Sharon filed an Applica-
tion for Writ of Assistance wherein she re-
quested that the Bannock County Sheriff's
Office assist the Ancillary Receiver in taking
possession of Norman’s business records,
The Writ of Assistance (the “Writ”) was is-
sued that same day.

On June 16, 2016, the Ancillary Receiver,
Deputy Nickel, and Sergeant Dalquist, of the
Bannock County Sheriffs Department,
served the Writ on Norman in an effort to
collect the items as outlined therein. Norman
refused to let the Ancillary Receiver or Sher-
iff's deputies in, and he did not produce any
documents. Not wanting to escalate the situ-
ation, the Sheriff's deputies and the Ancillary
Receiver left.

On June 17, 2016, Norman filed a notice of
appeal of the district court’s decision on the
motion to compel, motion to appoint the An-
cillary Receiver, and the motions to strike.
This Court issued a Notice of Defect on July
12, 2016 advising that the decision was not
appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
11(a)(7), Also on June 17, 2016, Norman filed
a motion to stay the enforcement of the
district court’s orders, which the district
court denied. The district court reasoned that
Norman’s motion was “nothing more than
another attempt ... to avoid his duties and
waste the time and resources of the judicial
system.”

On June 20, 2016, Sharon filed a motion for
contempt seeking court assistance due to
Norman’s refusal to cooperate with the Ancil-
lary Receiver’s attempt to take possession of
certain documents. Also on June 20, 2016,
Norman filed an objection to the Writ argu-
ing that it “grants unconstitutionally wide
ranging seizure authority to the Bannock
County Sheriff and the Receiver.” Thereaf-
ter, Norman appealed the district court's
grant of the Writ.

On July 18, 2016, the district court held a
hearing on Sharon’s motion for contempt.
During the hearing, Norman made an oral
motion regarding a perceived conflict of in-
terest between the Ancillary Receiver and
Sharon, On October 28, 2016, the district

court issued a decision in which it denied
Norman’s motion regarding the conflict of
interest. The district court explained that
Norman’s argument was twofold: (1) Sharon
was paying the Ancillary Receiver and there-
fore his allegiance would be swayed to Shar-
on; and (2) Sharon’s counsel represented the
Ancillary Receiver. The district court reject-
ed Norman’s first argument and held that it
‘was not a conflict of interest because Sharon
was required by the district court’s order to
pay the Ancillary Receiver and then seek
reimbursement, if available. The district
court rejected Norman’s second argument,
noting that Sharon’s counsel did not repre-
sent the Ancillary Receiver in the instant
action; rather, Sharon filed contempt charges
on behalf of the Ancillary Receiver after
Norman refused to let him in his home to
accomplish his court ordered duty. The dis-
trict court continued, writing: “the so called
‘representation’ only occurred as a result of
{Norman’s] alleged contempt. The [Ancillary
Receiver] would not have needed any repre-
sentation but for [Norman’s] conduct.”

On November 7, 2016, Norman filed a
second amended notice of appeal from the
district court’s decision on the motion to com-
pel; the motion to appoint the receiver; the
motions to strike; the order appointing an
ancillary receiver; and the decision regarding
the conflict of interest.

On January 12, 2017, the district court
held a hearing on the contempt motion. Nor-
man, the Ancillary Receiver, and Sheriff's
Deputy Phil Nickel were all called as wit-
nesses, On February 7, 2017, the district
court issued a decision on Sharon’s motion
for contempt in which it concluded that Nor-
man was in contempt of its prior orders. The
district court rejected two of Norman’s pre-
liminary arguments: (1) the Writ violated
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure because he
did not receive it; and (2) to comply with his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation,
Sharon’s presence was required at the hear-
ing in order to effectuate a charge of con-
tempt. In dismissing Norman’s first argu-
ment, the district court analyzed whether the
Writ qualified as an order such that it must
be immediately served upon all parties pur-
suant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2.3(b).

907

The district court compared the ew parte
issuance of the Writ to an issuance of a
search warrant—in certain circumstances,
both may be issued without notice to the
person in possession for fear of destruction
or concealment of the items to be seized, The
district court noted that in this case, Sharon
and the receiver in New York had been
attempting to collect on the Judgment and
gather assets for many years without suc-
cess; therefore, serving the Writ without no-
tice was appropriate and “more akin to a
subpoena or warrant th[aln to an order.”
Further, the district court cited Thomas v.
Stevens, wherein this Court affirmed the is-
suance of an ex parte writ of assistance. 78
Idaho 266, 300 P.2d 811 (1956). Norman’s
second preliminary argument—that Sharon’s
presence was required to effectuate the
charge of contempt—was also rejected by the
district court because the Ancillary Receiver
and the Sheriff's deputies were the individu-
als who laid out the facts necessary to allege
contempt. The district court held that be-
cause Norman was able to confront them via

cross-examination, Norman’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront was not violated,

After addressing Norman’s preliminary ar-
guments, the district court turned to Nor-
man’s main argument: whether a search war-
rant was necessary to enter Norman’s home
to effectuate the Writ. The district court
compared a search warrant to a writ of assis-
tance and noted the significant differences,
namely: a writ of assistance does not require
a showing of probable cause that a criminal
offense has been committed; a writ of assis-
tance does not need to satisfy Fourth
Amendment requirements; a writ of assis-
tance does not simply allow, but rather com-
mands a person to take possession of whatev-
er is included in the writ; and a writ is used
to enforce a court order or judgment. The
district court concluded that a search war-
rant was not necessary in order for the Writ
to be valid because, if that were the case, a
judge would be required to make a determi-
nation of probable cause for criminal conduct,
which has not been alleged here. Ultimately,
the district court granted Sharon’s motion
for contempt and imposed the following sane-
tions: (1) the Sheriff's deputies and the Ancil-
lary Receiver would return to Norman’s

908

house and perform their duties under the
Writ; and 2) Norman would bear the costs
associated with the first attempt to exercise
on the Writ including Sharon’s cost of bring-
ing the motion for contempt,

TIL. Issuzs on APPEAL
1. Whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting Sharon’s motion
to compel.
2, Whether the district court abused its
discretion in appointing the Ancillary

Receiver.
8, Whether Norman’s constitutional
rights were violated.

4, Whether the district court erred by
holding that: (1) attachments to Louis
Black’s affidavit were not hearsay; and
(2) Sharon’s memorandum in support
of her motion to appoint the Ancillary
Receiver did not contain unsubstantiat-
ed or scandalous information without
foundation.

5. Whether the district court erred by
finding that there was not a conflict of
interest between Sharon and the Ancil-
lary Receiver,

6. Whether the district court erred by
holding Norman in contempt of court.

7. Whether either party is entitled to
costs and attorney fees on appeal.

IV. Sranparp or Revirw
HH “Control of discovery is within the
trial court’s discretion.” Westby v. Schaefer,
157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.8d 1220, 1225
(2014) (internal citations omitted).

The test to determine whether a trial
court has abused its discretion ... consists
of three parts asking whether the trial
court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistent-
ly with the legal standards applicable to
the specifie choices available to it; and (8)
reached its decision by an exercise of rea-
son.”

Parks v. Safeco Ins. Co., 160 Idaho 556, 562,
876 P.3d 760, 766 (2016) (quoting Marek v.
Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50, 58, 278 P.8d 920,
923 (2012).

Similarly, “[t]he power to appoint a receiv-
er is very largely in the discretion of the trial
court, and an appellate court will not inter-
fere with the exercise of such discretion ex-
cept in cases of palpable abuse.” Northwest-
ern & Pacific Hypotheekbank v. Dalton, 44
Idaho 120, 124, 256 P. 98, 95 (1927) (quoting
18 Cal. Jur. 301).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by granting Sharon’s mo-
tion to compel answers to the debtor’s
examination,

Norman argues that the district court
abused its discretion by granting Sharon’s
motion to compel. Norman’s overarching
claim is that the district court conflated the
discovery process with the process of con-
ducting a debtor’s examination, which is
found in Idaho Code sections 11-504 and 11-
508,

Sharon argues that while a motion for
contempt is one available remedy for a debt-
or’s refusal to answer examination questions,
it is not exclusive, Sharon notes that Rule 69
clearly defines a debtor’s examination as dis-
covery to be governed under Idaho Civil
Procedure Rules 26 and 80, which allow a
court to grant a motion to compel when a
judgment debtor does not comply. Further,
Sharon contends that a motion to compel was
appropriate because Norman failed to an-
swer questions that were within the scope of
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 30 and 31,
and because Norman was evasive and provid-
ed incomplete disclosure.

HE It is the appellant’s burden to dem-
onstrate that the district court abused its
diseretion. Westby, 157 Idaho at 621, 838
P.8d at 1225. “The trial court has broad
discretion in determining whether or not to
grant a motion to compel. The decision of the
trial court will only be reversed when there
has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Night-
engale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 351, 256
P.8d 755, 759 (2011) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

Rule 34(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, as it was drafted at the time the

motion to compel was filed, provided that
“any party may serve on any other party a
request ... to produce ... any designated
documents ... which constitute or contain
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b).”
LR.C.P. 84(a) (2015). In specifying the scope
of discovery, Rule 26(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that “[plarties
may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the sub-
ject matter ... including the existence, de-
scription ... and location of ... persons
having knowledge of any discoverable mat-
ter.” LR.C.P. 26(b)(1) (2015),

Tl Parties seeking to execute on a judg-
ment may utilize discovery. Indeed, Rule 69
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides:

In aid of judgment or execution, the judg-

ment creditor ... may obtain discovery

from any person, including the judgment
debtor, as provided in these rules and may
examine any person, including the judg-
ment debtor, in the manner provided by
the practice of this state,

LR.C.P. 69(c) (2015) (emphasis added).

Normal discovery rules still apply. For
instance, Rule 80, which addresses oral depo-
sitions, provides that a party who wants to
depose a person by oral questions must give
reasonable written notice to every other par-
ty stating the time and place of the deposi-
tion. L.R.C.P. 30(b)(1) (2015), Similarly, a par-
ty seeking the production of documents must
file with the court a notice of when and upon
whom it was served, LR.C.P, 34(d) (2015),
Rule 87 provides that a party may move for
an order compelling an answer if, inter alia,
a deponent fails to answer a question asked
under Rules 30 or 81. I.R.C.P. 87(a)(2) (2015).
An evasive or incomplete answer must be
treated as a failure to answer. LR.C.P. 37
(a)(8) (2015). Rule 87 also requires a motion
to compel to include “a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or at-
tempted to confer with the party not making
the disclosure in an effort to secure the
disclosure without court action.” LR.C.P.
87(a)(2) (2015).

Idaho Code title 11 provides another ave-
nue by which a judgment creditor may obtain
discovery after a judgment has been entered.

909

Idaho Code section 11-501 provides that if an
execution is returned unsatisfied, a judgment
creditor is entitled to an order from a judge
requiring a judgment debtor to appear and
answer under oath concerning his property.
LC. § 11-501. Idaho Code section 11-504 pro-
vides a judgment creditor may examine a
judgment debtor’s debtors:

After the issuing or return of an execu-
tion against property of the judgment
debtor or of any one of several debtors in
the same judgment, or upon proof by affi-
davit or otherwise, to the satisfaction of
the judge, that any person or corporation
has money or property of such judgment
debtor, or is indebted to him in an amount.
exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00), the judge
may, by an order, require such person or
corporation, or any officer or member
thereof, to appear at a specified time and
place before him, or a referee appointed by
him, and answer concerning the same.

LC. § 11-504. Further, Idaho Code section
11-508 provides that disobedience of orders
under this section may result in being held in
contempt of court. 1.0. § 11-508,

As previously stated, “{clontrol of discov-
ery is within the trial court’s discretion.”
Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 621, 338
P.8d 1220, 1225 (2014) (internal citation omit-
ted). To determine whether a trial court has
abused its discretion, this Court applies the
following three-part test, which asks whether
the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consis-
tently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (8)
reached its decision by an exercise of rea-
son.” Parks, 160 Idaho at 562, 876 P.8d at
766 (quoting Marek, 158 Idaho at 53, 278
P.8d at 928), In attempting to demonstrate
that the district court abused its discretion,
Norman cites several discovery rules and
concludes that the district court violated the
applicable legal standards, Norman’s argu-
ment fails because he did not demonstrate
that any part of the three-part abuse of
discretion test was violated.

TM The first prong of the abuse of discre-
tion test is satisfied because the district court

910

noted in its decision that “[t]he control of the
discovery process is within the discretion of
the trial court.” The second prong of the
abuse of discretion test—whether the district
court violated any legal standard or law in
granting the motion to compel—is also satis-
fied. The legal standards at issue are three-
fold: (1) whether the motion to compel was a
proper action; (2) whether notice require-
ments were satisfied; and (8) whether the
parties conferred or attempted to confer pri-
or to the filing of the motion to compel. First,
the motion to compel was proper under to
Rule 69(¢), which allows a judgment creditor
to utilize the traditional discovery process
including a motion to compel. Idaho Code
title 11 provides an alternate, but not exclu-
sive, avenue by which Sharon could have
examined Norman. Second, the required no-
tice was effectuated on September 3, 2016,
when a copy of the district court’s order for a
debtor’s examination was served to Norman’s
counsel. Third, Sharon’s letter to Norman
after the examination and subsequent letter
requesting and narrowing her discovery re-
quest constituted a good faith effort to confer
before seeking court intervention especially
considering Norman’s pattern of evasiveness.
In other words, it is unlikely that further
attempts by Sharon to confer with Norman’s
attorney would have been successful in avoid-
ing court intervention.

The third prong of the abuse of discretion
test—whether the district court’s granting of
Sharon’s motion to compel was outside the
bounds of reason—is satisfied. The district
court cited the applicable Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, cited Norman’s noncompli-
ance with the debtor's examination, analyzed
the propriety of Sharon’s discovery requests,
and explained why a motion to compel was
appropriate. The district court’s action was
reasonable, In sum, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in granting Sharon’s mo-
tion to compel.

B. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in appointing the Ancillary
Receiver.

HE Norman argues that the district
court's appointment of the Ancillary Receiver
was an abuse of discretion because: (1) such

an appointment is not supported by Idaho
statutory or case law; and (2) the authority
granted to the Ancillary Receiver had al-
ready been granted to the primary receiver
in New York. Specifically, Norman argues
that the district court erred in concluding
that Idaho Code section 8-601 authorized the
appointment of the Ancillary Receiver. In a
related argument, Norman contends that it
was inappropriate for the district court to
appoint the Ancillary Receiver without bond.

Sharon contends that Idaho Code section
8-601 supported the appointment of the An-
cillary Receiver. Specifically, Sharon cites
Idaho Code section 8-601, which provides as
follows, in pertinent part;

A receiver may be appointed by the court.

in which an action is pending or has passed

to judgment, or by the judge thereof:

1. In an action .., by a creditor to sub-

feet any property, or fund to his claim.

3. ” after judgment to carry the judgment
into effect,

4. ... [T]n proceedings in aid of execu-
tion, when an execution has been returned
unsatisfied, or when the judgment debtor
refuses to apply his property in satisfac-
tion of the judgment.

6, In all other cases where receivers have

heretofore been appointed by the usages of

courts of equity.
LC. § 8-601. Further, Sharon cites a decision
of a district court in New York and a decision
of the Fifth Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals for the proposition that the
appointment of a local or ancillary receiver to
assist a primary receiver is well established
in the courts of equity. See Meyers v. Moody,
693 F.2d 1196, 1205 (6th Cir, 1982) (noting
that after a New York court had rendered
judgment, an ancillary receiver was appoint-
ed in Texas to preserve a company’s Texas
assets); See also In Re Hayes, 192 F, 1018
(ist, Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1912) (“In granting an
ancillary receivership the court ordinarily
looks at nothing except the pendency of a
proceeding in the parent district, the ap-
pointment there of a receiver, and the pres-
ence of assets in the district where the appli-

cation is made.”). Sharon acknowledges that
a New York court had already appointed a
primary receiver for Norman’s interest in
CYB Master, LLC, but claims that the Idaho
district court's appointment of the Ancillary
Receiver was proper because Norman pos-
sesses the business records of CYB Master,
LLC in his Pocatello home. Regarding Nor-
man’s bond-related argument, Sharon posits
that the decision of whether to require a
receiver to post bond is discretionary. Sharon
contends that the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it appointed the Ancillary
Receiver to serve without bond,

“The power to appoint a receiver is very
largely in the discretion of the trial court,
and an appellate court will not interfere with
the exercise of such discretion except in
eases of palpable abuse.” Northwestern &
Pacific Hypotheekbank v. Dalton, 44 Idaho
120, 124, 256 P, 98, 95 (1927) (quoting 18 Cal.
Jur. 301).

Norman’s argument fails because he did
not demonstrate that the district court’s ap-
pointment of the Ancillary Receiver was an
abuse of discretion. The district court did not
abuse its discretion because it recognized
that the decision was a matter of discretion,
noted the circumstances that warranted the
appointment of the Ancillary Receiver, and
acted within the bounds of reason by autho-
rizing the Ancillary Receiver to control only
Norman’s Idaho assets. Specifically, the dis-
trict court did not violate the second prong of
the abuse of discretion test because Idaho
Code section 8-601(6) permits courts to ap-
point a receiver in cases where receivers had
previously been appointed by courts of equi-
ty. LC. § 8-601(6). In Re Hayes demon-
strates that courts of equity have previously
appointed ancillary receivers. 192 F. 1018
Therefore, the district court acted within the
legal standards when it appointed the Ancil-
lary Receiver. The district court satisfied the
third prong of the abuse of discretion test
because it reasoned that a local ancillary
receiver would be necessary to gather Nor-
man’s Idaho assets. The district court exer-
eised discretion by limiting the Ancillary Re-
eeiver’s authority to only Idaho assets that
were within the primary receiver's authoriza-
tion,

911

HEsNorman’s bond-related argument
was not preserved for appeal. “This Court
does not review an alleged error on appeal
unless the record discloses an adverse ruling
forming the basis for the assignment of er-
ror.” Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
v. MRI Assocs, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 491, 224
P.8d 1068, 1080 (2009) (quoting Ada Cnty.
Highway Dist. v, Total Success Invs,, LLC,
145 Idaho 860, 368-69, 179 P.8d 328, 331-82
(2008)). Even if an issue was argued to a
lower court, “to preserve an issue for appeal
there must be a ruling by the [lower] court.”
Id, (citing De Los Santos v, J.R. Simplot Co,
Inc., 126 Idaho 968, 969, 895 P.2d 564, 570
(1995)), According to the record on appeal,
the district court judge issued the order ap-
pointing the Ancillary Receiver (without
bond) on May 24, 2016, and Norman filed a
written objection that same day. However, it
does not appear that, Norman’s objection was
ever noticed for a hearing, nor does it appear
that the district court ruled upon Norman’s
objection. Accordingly, the issue was not pre-
served for appeal.

C. Norman’s constitutional rights were
not violated. .

HM Norman argues that the district
court’s orders related to Sharon’s motion to
compel, motion to appoint the Ancillary Re-
ceiver, and the district court's Writ violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically,
Norman argues that the Writ violated his
Fourth Amendment rights because it permit-
ted the government to enter his home, con-
duct a search, and to seize any property or
things of value without a proper warrant.
Norman argues that constitutional issues are
present because the two-part test construct-
ed by the Ninth Cireuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Miller is satisfied: (1) the
Ancillary Receiver, who attempted to effeetu-
ate the Writ, was acting as an agent of the
government; and (2) Sharon acted with the
intent to assist the government, and not for
an independent purpose.

HN Separately, Norman claims that the
fact that this is a civil case “in no way
negates [his] constitutional rights.” Norman
likens his situation to the facts in Camara v.
Mumicipal Court of San Francisco, in which

912

the United States Supreme Court held that
building inspectors’ search of an apartment
building was a “significant intrusion[ ] upon
the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, [and] that such search[ ] when
authorized and conducted without a warrant
procedure lack[ed] the traditional safeguards
which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to
the individual.” 887 U.S. 528, 534, 87 S.Ct.
1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). Norman contin-
ues, arguing that the target of the Writ—his
money, or documents that may lead to his
money—does not justify the violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. Further, Norman
argues that the breadth of the Writ lacked
the specificity required in a warrant. Norman
also argues that his Fifth Amendment right
to due process was violated by the district
court’s attempt to deprive him of his proper-
ty without sufficient notice or purpose. Spe-
cifically, Norman argues that the Writ violat-
ed his due process rights because he did not
have notice or an opportunity to be heard.

Lastly, Norman argues that Sharon’s at-
tempt to obtain his passwords to email ac-
counts violated his First Amendment right to
free speech. Norman argues that if the Ancil-
lary Receiver or Sharon were allowed to
“surveil [his] communications, his speech
would not only be chilled but immediately cut
off.”

Sharon argues that the Fourth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against unlawful search
and seizure does not apply. Sharon notes that
the Fourth Amendment only applies to a
debtor if; (1) the actor (here, the Ancillary
Receiver) is acting as an instrument or agent
of the government; and (2) the debtor has a
legitimate privacy interest with respect to
the property. In Re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 263
(Bankr. C.D, Cal. 2004). With respect to the
first prong, Sharon argues that the Fourth
Amendment does not generally protect
against an unreasonable intrusion by a pri-
vate party, but does apply to conduct of
private parties acting as agents of the gov-
ernment. Sharon explains that to determine
whether an individual is acting as a govern-
ment agent, another two-part test is applied:
(1) whether the government knew of and
acquiesced to the intrusive conduct; and (2)
whether the private party intended to assist

Jaw enforcement efforts or further his own
needs. Finally, Sharon notes that the involve-
ment of a government official does not neces-
sarily transform private conduct into a gov-
ernment search or seizure, “especially ...
where the purpose of the government pres-
ence is to ensure the safety of the private
party and not to ‘reap the benefits’ of the
search or seizure.” In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. at
264. Sharon argues that Norman did not
have a legitimate privacy interest in his docu-
ments or things because he was previously
required to answer truthfully during the
debtor's examination.

Throughout her briefing, Sharon likens
this case to In re Kerlo, wherein a bankrupt-
ey court determined that the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibition against unlawful searches
and seizures did not apply to a bankruptcy
trustee who was charged with assembling
and liquidating the assets of an estate for the
benefit of creditors. In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. at
256.

Regarding Norman’s Fifth Amendment
claims, Sharon argues that Norman’s due
process rights were not violated because the
Writ was a post-judgment matter, which
means that Norman had an opportunity to be
heard before the Judgment was rendered. In
support of this argument, Sharon notes that
in Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia
Press, 266 U.S, 285, 45 S.Ct. 61, 69 L.Ed, 288
(1924), the United States Supreme Court
held that a post-judgment garnishment pro-
cedure did not require notice and opportunity
for hearing.

The Fourth Amendment provides as fol-
lows:

The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

US. Const. Amend. IV.

In In re Kerlo, a bankruptcy court ana-
lyzed Fourth Amendment issues related to a
trustee’s ability to administer property for

the benefit of creditors in accordance with a
court order, The court explained that a two-
part test applied to determine whether the
trustee’s actions implicated the Fourth
Amendment rights of the debtor: (1) whether
the trustee was acting as an instrument or
agent of the government; and (2) whether the
debtor had a legitimate expectation of priva-
ey with respect to his property. Regarding
the first prong, the court explained as fol-
lows:

The general principles for determining
whether a private individual is acting as a
governmental instrument or agent for
Fourth Amendment purposes have been
synthesized into a two part test. According
to this test, we must inquire:

(1) whether the government knew of and

acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; and

(2) whether the private party intended to

assist law enforcement efforts or further

his own ends.
In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. at 268.

The court noted that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not apply where a private party
has a legitimate independent motivation for
engaging in the challenged conduct. Jd. Fur-
ther, the court noted that the “involvement of
government officials does not necessarily
transform private conduct into a government.
search or seizure.... This is especially true
where the purpose of the government pres-
ence is to ensure the safety of the private
party and not to ‘reap the benefits’ of the
search or seizure.” Jd, at 264, Ultimately, the
court held that, despite the fact that the
trustee sought assistance from a governmen-
tal official in carrying out his statutory and
fiduciary duties, she was not a law enforce-
ment official because she was acting indepen-
dently under her statutory mandate as a
trustee. Id. at 265. Thus, the court turned to
the remaining analysis: (1) whether the gov-
ernment knew of and acquiesced in the con-
duct, and (2) whether the trustee acted with
the intent to assist the government in its
investigatory or administrative purposes. Jd.
The court held that the Fourth Amendment.
was not implicated because the trustee had a
legitimate, statutory, independent reason for
enforcing the court’s order—maximizing the
value of the assets of the estate for distribu-

913

tion to the creditors—and only enlisted the
assistance of the government to assist her in
carrying out the orders. Jd.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the
defendant had a legitimate expectation of
privacy, Jd. The court provided the following
framework for its analysis:

A legitimate expectation of privacy re-

quires both (1) a subjective expectation of

privacy, and (2) an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy.... In determining
whether someone has a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy for Fourth Amendment
purposes, courts consider the following fac-
tors: (1) whether the person has a proprie-
tary or possessory interest in the place

searched or property to be seized, (2)

whether the person has the right to ex-

clude others from the premises, (8) wheth-
er the person has taken normal precau-

tions to maintain his or her privacy, and (4)

whether the person is legitimately on the

premises,
Id. at 265, The court explained that because
the debtor was required to surrender the
property, she no longer had a possessory
interest therein and could not exclude the
trustee from the property. Id. at 266.

Regarding Norman’s Fifth Amendment
claim, the United States Supreme Court has
held that:

The words “due process of law,” when

applied to judicial proceedings, “mean a

course of legal proceedings according to

those rules and principles which have been
established in our systems of jurispru-
dence for the protection and enforcement.
of private rights.” ... They require a pro-
ceeding which, observing the general rules
thus established, follows forms of law ap-
propriate to the case and just to the par-
ties to be affected; and which, whenever it
is necessary for the protection of the par-
ties, gives them an opportunity to be heard
respecting the justice of the judgment
sought.... However, the established rules
of our system of jurisprudence do not re-
quire that a defendant who has been
granted an opportunity to be heard and

has had his day in court, should, after a

judgment has been rendered against him,

have a further notice and hearing before

914 a

supplemental proceedings are taken to
reach his property in satisfaction of the
judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statu-
tory requirement, it is not essential that he
be given notice before the issuance of an
execution against his tangible property; af-
ter the rendition of the judgment he must
take “notice of what will follow,” no further
notice being “necessary to advance jus-
tice,”

Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia

Press, 266 U.S. at 288, 45 8.Ct. 61.

As an aside, this Court has held that it will
not consider issues that are “only mentioned
in passing and not supported by any cogent
argument or authority.” Bach v. Bagley, 148
Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.8d 1146, 1152 (2010),

Norman’s Fourth Amendment claim is
meritless, Similar to the trustee in In re
Kerlo, who was acting on behalf of the credi-
tors, the Ancillary Receiver was acting on
behalf of Sharon. Although the district court
appointed the Ancillary Receiver, such ap-
pointment does not result in the Ancillary
Receiver being an instrument of the govern-
ment, Indeed, in In re Kerlo the trustee was
independent, despite acting according to a
court order, The Sheriffs deputies who were
present at the time the Writ was served were
only there to assist the Ancillary Receiver;
thus, there was no government investigatory
purpose, Further, Norman did not have a
privacy interest in the property listed in the
Writ because he was already required to
surrender the information and documents
pursuant to the debtor’s examination.

Norman’s Fifth Amendment claim is mer-
itless because the United States Supreme
Court has clearly held that the Fifth Amend-
ment does not require “a defendant who has
been granted an opportunity to be heard and
has had his day in court” to be given “further
notice and hearing before supplemental pro-
ceedings are taken to reach his property in
satisfaction of the judgment.” Endicott-John-
son Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S, at
288, 45 §.Ct. 61. Norman has already had
notice and opportunity to be heard through-
out the proceedings, including the New York
divorce proceedings and the several hearings
in Idaho; accordingly, his due process claims

related to the district court’s attempt to seize
his property are unpersuasive.

Lastly, Norman’s First Amendment claim
will not be addressed by this Court because
it is merely mentioned in passing and not
supported by cogent argument.

D. The district court did not err by hold-
ing that: (1) attachments to Louis
Black’s affidavit were not hearsay;
and (2) Sharon’s memorandum in
support of her motion to appoint the
Ancillary Receiver did not contain
unsubstantiated or scandalous infor-
mation.

HE “Norman argues that the district
court erred by not striking portions of Mr.
Black’s affidavit or Sharon’s memorandum
in support of her motion to appoint the An-
cillary Receiver. Norman argues that at-
tachments to Mr. Black’s affidavit were in-
admissible hearsay. Norman also alleges
that portions of Sharon’s memorandum in-
cluded “false, immaterial, impertinent,
and/or scandalous” information that should
have been struck,

Sharon argues that the district court did
not improperly consider hearsay or unsub-
stantiated and scandalous information. Spe-
cifically, Sharon notes that in the discovery
process, not all requested material must be
admissible; rather, the information must only
appear “reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence,” I.R.C.P.
26(b)(1). Sharon contends that the district
court’s orders with which Norman takes is-
sue were in pursuit of discovery because they
related to the debtor’s examination, which is
discovery governed by the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. Lastly, Sharon argues that
merely because Norman disagrees with the
facts or law in her memorandum does not
mean that her memorandum and supporting
affidavits were immaterial or scandalous.

As previously held, the debtor’s examina-
tion was part of discovery, pursuant to Rule
69 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the discovery rules apply to this
issue, namely, Rule 26,

Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides that “It is not ground for

objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
LR.C.P, 26(b)(1) (2015).

Norman’s allegation that the district court
abused its discretion is meritless because the
district court’s decisions complied with the
three-part abuse of discretion test. First, the
district court recognized its decision as one of
discretion. Second, the district court did not
violate a standard or law in rendering its
decision. The district court cited the applica-
ble Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules
26(b)(1) and 84(p)) and made a reasonable
holding based thereon. Lastly, the district
court’s decision was reasonable evidenced by
its statement that “[blecause this is not trial,
and because Black’s affidavit was given to aid
in the discovery process, the [clourt will not
strike the affidavit, but will give it the weight
to which it is entitled.” Further, the district
court reasoned that Norman’s allegations re-
garding Sharon’s memorandum was “solely
his opinion and nothing in the rules prohibits
a party from writing what they deem to be
necessary for their case, even if the other
side disagrees,”

E. The district court did not err by find-
ing that a conflict of interest did not
exist between Sharon and the Ancil-
lary Receiver.

Norman raises two claims in arguing that.
the district court erred by finding that a
conflict of interest did not exist between
Sharon and the Ancillary Receiver. First,
Norman argues that there was a conflict of
interest because Sharon paid the Ancillary
Receiver directly. Second, Norman argues
that there was a conflict of interest in Shar-
on’s counsel representing the Ancillary Re-
ceiver. Specifically, Norman claims that a
conflict of interest arose when Sharon’s coun-
sel filed a motion for contempt on behalf of
the Ancillary Receiver,

In response to Norman’s first argument,
Sharon claims that her payment to the Ancil-
lary Receiver did not create a conflict of
interest. Sharon notes that she sought the
appointment of the Ancillary Receiver; the
Ancillary Receiver had a right to be compen-

915

sated; and the district court’s order requiring
payment from Sharon, which may be recov-
ered from property obtained from Norman,
was a proper exercise of discretion. For sup-
port, Sharon cites the 11th Circuit Court of
Appeals as follows:

The district court appointing the receiv-
er has discretion over who will pay the
costs of the receiver. It is appropriate and
obvious that a-receiver will make expendi-
tures to maintain trust property. The court,
in equity may award the receiver fees from
property securing a claim if the receiver’s
acts have benefitted that property. Other
courts have also held that it is appropriate
for a receiver to be paid from the proceeds
of secured property if the receiver has
benefitted that property.

Some courts have held that the receiv-
er’s right to payment is created by the
creditors’ implied consent or acquiescence
in the receivership proceedings. Perhaps it
is more accurate to say there is an

implied understanding that the court

which appointed him and whose officer

he is will protect his right to be paid for
his services, to be reimbursed for his
proper costs and expenses.

Or simply, those who benefit from a receiv-

ership should pay for that benefit.

SEC v. Elliott, 958 F.2d 1560, 1576 (11th Cir.
1992) Gnternal citations omitted).

Regarding Norman’s second claim, Sharon
argues that her motion to compel incorrectly
identified the Ancillary Receiver’s counsel as
Sharon's counsel. Sharon contends that her
counsel did not represent the Ancillary Re-
ceiver in the matter; rather, the motion to
compel was filed only after the Ancillary
Receiver alleged that Norman failed to coop-
erate with the district court’s order. Sharon
claims that her counsel filed the motion to
compel as a means of providing notice to the
district court of Norman’s alleged failure to
eomply with the district court’s order.

“The power to appoint a receiver is very
largely in the discretion of the trial court,
and an appellate court will not interfere with
the exercise of such discretion except in
eases of palpable abuse.” Northwestern &
Pacific Hypotheekbank v. Dalton, 44 Idaho

916 Le

120, 124, 256 P. 98, 95 (1927) (quoting 18 Cal.
Jur. 301). As discussed above, it is not unusu-
al for a court to require the party requesting
a receiver to cover the costs associated there-
with. SHC v, Hiliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1576
(11th Cir, 1992).

HE The district court did not abuse
its discretion. The district court authored a
well-reasoned decision wherein it cited case
law standing for the proposition that a party
seeking a receiver should pay the fees associ-
ated therewith, The district court reasoned
that because Sharon requested the appoint-
ment of the Ancillary Receiver, she “has a
slightly more significant role moving for-
ward. Part of that role is payment.” Further,
the district court noted that there was no
case law in Idaho that forbid such a proce-
dural practice for payment. Regarding Nor-
man’s second claim, the district court found
that the so called “representation” only oc-
curred as a result of Norman’s alleged con-
tempt. The district court reasoned that be-
cause Norman was unlikely to file contempt
charges against himself, it was appropriate
for Sharon’s counsel to file contempt charges
“based on knowledge from the [Ancillary Re-
ceiver] on behalf of [Sharon].” The district
court’s decision satisfied the three-part abuse
of discretion test.

F. The district court did not err by hold-
ing Norman in contempt of court.

Norman contends that the district court
erred by holding him in contempt. First, he
challenges the district court’s holding that he
did not comply with the Writ, arguing that:
(1) he was not provided notice of the Writ; (2)
the Writ ordered the Sheriff's Department to
act, not him, therefore, he did not disobey
the Writ; and (8) he did not have the ability
to comply with the Writ because the Ancil-
lary Receiver did not make his presence
known at the time the Writ was served upon
him, Second, Norman argues that the district
court did not find that he willfully disobeyed
the Writ, which is required to hold him in
contempt. Third, Norman argues that his
Sixth Amendment right to confront is impli-
cated because Sharon was not present at the
motion for contempt hearing.

Sharon argues that Norman’s Writ-related
arguments are meritless. Specifically, she ar-
gues that Norman knew that he was to com-
ply with the Writ by producing certain docu-
ments because the district court’s previous
Motion to Compel Decision and Order Ap-
pointing Ancillary Receiver required similar
production. Further, Sharon argues that
Norman did not need notice of the Writ
because this is a post-judgment proceeding;
accordingly, he had already been ordered to
cooperate with the Ancillary Receiver and to
produce certain documents in the previous
two orders. Second, Sharon argues that Nor-
man’s willful disobedience is evidenced by
his failure to comply with the district court’s
previous two orders, and his refusal to per-
mit entry to the Sheriff's deputies who ac-
companied the Ancillary Receiver. Third,
Sharon argues that Norman’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront was not violated be-
cause she was not a witness of the contempt;
accordingly, her presence at the contempt
proceeding would have in no way assisted
either of the parties. Sharon notes that Nor-
man had the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the Ancillary Receiver and the
Sheriff's deputies, who witnessed the con-
tempt.

In Thomas v. Stevens, 78 Idaho 266, 270-
74, 800 P.2d 811, 812-815 (1956), this Court
affirmed the issuance of an ew parte writ of
assistance that directed a sheriff to put the
plaintiffs in possession of certain property.

Idaho Code section 7-601 defines contempt
as “disobedience of any lawful judgment, or-
der or process of the court.” I.C. § 7-601(5).
In In ve Weick, this Court held that, to find
contempt, it must be shown that the accused
willfully disobeyed a court order. 142 Idaho
275, 281, 127 P.8d 178, 184 (2005). This Court
defined “willful” as “ ‘an indifferent disregard
of duty’ or ‘a remissness and failure in per-
formance of a duty’ but not a ‘deliberately
and maliciously planned dereliction of duty.’”
Id, This Court also stated that: “Under our
law, inability to comply is not a defense
unless the contemnor complied to the extent,
of his ability. In re Bean, 58 Idaho 797, 802,
79 P.2d 540, 542 (1938).”

Hs Whether Norman’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront Sharon applies to the

contempt proceeding depends on whether the
district court held Norman in civil or criminal
contempt of court. Camp v. East Fork Ditch
Co., Lid., 187 Idaho 850, 863, 55 P.38d 804, 317
(2002). (“The distinction between civil and
criminal contempt is important because of
the federal constitutional rights that the
United States Supreme Court has held appli-
eable in nonsummary criminal contempt pro-
ceedings. Those rights include ... the right
to cross-examine witnesses.”).
Whether contempt is criminal or civil
does not depend upon the nature of the
lawsuit in which the contempt proceedings
are brought. A civil contempt sanction can
be imposed in a criminal case (¢.g., impri-
soning a recalcitrant witness until he testi-
fies), and a criminal contempt sanction can
be imposed in a civil case (¢.g., imprisoning
a child support payor for thirty days for
failing to pay the support previously or-
dered). In addition to the confusion caused
by the crime of contempt, the distinction
between criminal and civil contempt is fur-
ther confused by the fact that there are
several definitions of those terms.
Id. at 862, 55 P.38d at 316. In Camp, this
Court followed the United States Supreme
Court definitions of civil and criminal con-
tempt, which differentiated between the two
types of contempt based on the character of
the sanctions imposed, Jd, at 868, 55 P.8d at
317. The United States Supreme Court held
that an unconditional sanction is criminal in
nature and therefore implicates the Sixth
Amendment. Id. (citing Hicks v, Feiock, 485
US, 624, 638, 108 S.Ct, 1428, 99 L.Ed.2d 721
(1988)). A sanction is unconditional if “the
contemnor cannot avoid any sanction by com-
plying with the court order violated.” Id.
However, there are two relevant exceptions
to this rule: (1) a sanction “is conditional if
the contemnor can avoid any sanction, includ-
ing probation, by doing the act he had been
previously ordered to do;” and (2) “[a]n un-
conditional fine is a civil contempt penalty
under federal law if it is paid to the com-
plainant and is compensatory (based upon
the damages actually sustained by the com-
plainant).” Id.

HM On May 24, 2016, the district court
issued an order appointing the Ancillary Re-

917
ceiver. Therein, the district court ordered

“All parties to this action ... to cooperate
with and assist the Ancillary Receiver in
taking possession of the property described
above.” Norman had notice of this order and
he failed to obey it when he refused the
Ancillary Receiver admission to his home to
take possession of his business records. As
the district court’s contempt decision con-
eluded, “Here, the [clourt had commanded
Norman to cooperate with the ancillary re-
ceiver and turn over certain documents and
items. Norman did not do this.” There was
substantial—indeed overwhelming—evidence
that Norman willfully violated the district
court’s May 24, 2016, order. Thus, the district
court’s contempt order is affirmed.

Hs The Sixth Amendment is not im-
plicated by the district court’s contempt deci-
sion. As previously noted, whether the Sixth
Amendment is implicated depends on the
character of the sanction imposed. Camp, 187
Idaho at 863, 55 P.3d at 317 (citing Hicks v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 638, 108 S.Ct. 1428, 99
L.Ed.2d 721 (1988)). An unconditional sanc-
tion is generally considered to be criminal in
nature unless the contemnor can avoid the
sanction by doing the act that he had been
previously ordered to do, or, in the case of a
fine, if the fine is paid to the complainant and
is compensatory. Id. at 863, 55 P.8d at 317.
Here, the district court imposed two sanc-
tions: (1) Norman was ordered to comply
with the original Writ (allow the Ancillary
Receiver to perform his duties with the help
of the Sheriffs deputies); and (2) Norman
was ordered to bear the cost associated with
the first attempt to execute on the Writ,
including the cost of bringing the motion for
contempt. Both of these sanctions fall within
the previously stated exceptions because: (1)
Norman can comply by doing the act he had
been previously ordered to do; and (2) Nor-
man’s fine is compensatory. Therefore, Nor-
man’s Sixth Amendment rights are not impli-
cated.

G. Sharon is entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.
HN Norman’s argument regarding attor-
ney fees on appeal, in its entirety, is as
follows: “Appellant moves the Court to award

918

all attorney fees and costs incurred as a
result of this appeal pursuant to Idaho Ap-
pellate Rule 41 and LR.C.P, 37(c).”

Sharon requests attorney fees on appeal
because Norman’s appeal was brought frivo-
Jously, unreasonably, and without foundation.
Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v.
Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 842 P.8d 639 (2015).
Sharon contends that Norman's arguments
were not well grounded in fact or warranted
by existing law and that his sole purpose was
to “cause [her] to incur additional legal fees
and to prolong this litigation process as to
enable him to continue to evade collection of
the judgments against him.”

Idaho Code section 12-121 provides that
“fiJn any civil action, the judge may award
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party or parties when the judge finds that
the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without founda-~
tion.” LC. § 12-121,

We award Sharon attorney fees on appeal
because she is the prevailing party and be-
cause Norman’s appeal was brought frivo-
lously, unreasonably, and without foundation.
Norman’s arguments were not well grounded
in fact or warranted by existing law. The
facts and procedural nature of this case sup-
port Sharon’s contention that Norman’s sole
purpose was to cause her to incur additional
legal fees and to prolong this litigation to
evade collection of the judgments against
him, Norman’s appeal amounts ‘to nothing
more than continued delay and evasive ac-
tion,

VI. ConcLusion
We affirm the district court’s decision and
award Sharon costs and attorney fees on
appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices

HORTON, BRODY and Justice pro tem
SIMPSON coneur.

407 P.3d 232

Patricia J. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vw

Ronald L, THOMPSON, Defendant-
Respondent.

Docket No, 44522
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: September 22, 2017
Rehearing Denied November 2, 2017
Review Denied December 28, 2017

IEEE

920

if

Strother Law Office; Jeffrey A. Strother,
Boise, for appellant. Jeffrey A. Strother ar-
gued.

Ludwig, Shoufler, Miller, Johnson, PLLC;
Daniel A. Miller, Boise, for respondent. Dan-
iel A, Miller argued.

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Patricia J. Thompson appeals from the dis-
trict court’s order affirming the magistrate’s
denial of Patricia’s motion for relief from
judgment and granting Ronald L. Thomp-
son’s motion to dismiss and award of attor-
ney fees. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Patricia and Ronald stipulated to a judg-
ment and decree of divorce on July 28, 2018.
The magistrate entered its judgment and
decree of divorce on August 21, 2013, The
judgment states, “[Patricia] shall own, con-
trol and as beneficiary be entitled to continue
in effect, at her sole expense, the current
Term Life Policy on [Ronald].” The judgment
also states, “Each party shall execute any
and all documents necessary to effectuate the
terms and conditions set forth herein.”

HI On October 30, 2014, Patricia filed a
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a),
60(b)(5), and 60(b)(6).1 In her motion, Patricia
asserted that between July 28, 2018, and
August 21, 2018, she contacted the insurance
company regarding the status of the life in-
surance policy. The company informed her
that the annual premium on the policy had
been paid through August 2014. She again
contacted the insurance company in June
2014 and learned that the policy had expired.
She then contacted Ronald’s attorney, who
informed Patricia that the policy had expired
on September 26, 2018, and the premiums
were never paid through August 2014. In her
motion, Patricia argued it was not equitable
to enforce the judgment as written because
the policy had lapsed, and Ronald had
breached his fiduciary duty and/or the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
associated with the parties’ stipulation.

Ronald moved to dismiss pursuant to
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), arguing Patricia’s motion
for relief from judgment failed to state
claims upon which relief could be granted.
Both sides filed affidavits in support of their
arguments. Patricia moved for time to con-
duct discovery pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(f)?
arguing the magistrate should treat Ronald’s
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to L.R.C.P 56, and discoy-
ery would allow Patricia to establish the in-
surance company sent notices regarding the
life insurance policy to Ronald. The magis-
trate held a hearing on all the motions and
entered an order granting Ronald’s motion to
dismiss, denying Patricia’s motion to contin-
ue and, in effect, denying Patricia’s motion
for relief from judgment.

Patricia appealed to the district court. The
district court affirmed the magistrate’s deci-

1. On appeal, Patricia does not argue for relief
from the judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(a) or
60(6)(6). A party waives an issue on appeal if
either argument or authority is lacking. Powell v,
Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440
(Ct. App. 1997), Accordingly, Patricia has waived
consideration on the issue pursuant to LR.C.P.
60(a) and 60(b)(6).

2. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) has since
been amended and is now Rule 56(d). At the
time, LR.C.P. 56(P) read:

921

sion, holding Ronald did not owe Patricia any
duty with regard to the life insurance policy
and awarding attorney fees to Ronald. Patri-
cia timely appeals from the district court’s
order.

i

ANALYSIS

HMM Patricia asserts the district court
erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of
both Patricia’s motion for relief from judg-
ment and her motion for continuance, as well
as granting Ronald’s motion to dismiss and
award of attorney fees. For an appeal from
the district court, sitting in its appellate ca-
pacity over a case from the magistrate divi-
sion, this Court’s standard of review is the
same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court reviews the mag-
istrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to sup-
port the magistrate’s findings of fact and
whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law
follow from those findings, Pelayo v. Pelayo,
154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-18
(2018), If those findings are so supported and
the conclusions follow therefrom, and if the
district court affirmed the magistrate’s deci-
sion, we affirm the district court’s decision as
a matter of procedure, Jd. Thus, the appel-
late courts do not review the decision of the
magistrate. Bailey v. Bailey, 158 Idaho 526,
529, 284 P.3d 970, 978 (2012), Rather, we are
procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the
decision of the district court. Id.

A. Motion for Relief From Judgment
HMMM Patricia first argues the district
court erred in affirming the magistrate’s de-
nial of her motion for relief from judgment.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essen-
tial to justify the party’s opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or dis-
covery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.
LR.CP. 56(f) (2015) (amended 2016).

922

relief from judgment pursuant to IR.C.P, 60
is committed to the discretion of the trial
court. Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside
Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 448, 283
P.8d 757, 765 (2012). When a trial court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal,
the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry to determine whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of disere-
tion; acted within the boundaries of such
diseretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr.,
Ine. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94,
808 P.2d 998, 1000 (1991).

HH On appeal, Patricia argues she has
a valid claim for equitable relief pursuant to
LR.C.P, 60(b)(5). Idaho Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b)(5) states: “On motion and just
terms, the court may relieve a party ...
from a final judgment ... [if] applying [the
judgment] prospectively is no longer equita-
ble.” Thus, Rule 60(b)(5) requires a movant
to show: “(1) that the judgment is prospec-
tive in nature; and (2) that it is no longer
equitable to enforce the judgment as writ-
ten.” Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 289,
221 P.8d 81, 87 (2009); Rudd v, Rudd, 105
Idaho 112, 118, 666 P.2d 639, 645 (1988).
Though “the definition of a prospective judg-
ment can be elusive and circular,” Meyers,
148 Idaho at 290, 221 P.3d at 88, with no
definitive test, a judgment is prospective and
modifiable under Rule 60(b)(5) “if it is sus~
ceptible to the legal or equitable rights of the
parties as they evolve due to changes in law
or circumstances.” Meyers, 148 Idaho at 290,
221 P.8d at 88; see Fin v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372,
878, 870 P.2d 1881, 1387 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding divorce decree requiring a husband
to assign one-half of his oil well royalties was
prospective in nature because it required the
husband to actually assign the royalty rights
and such assignment had not yet been made).
The typical prospective judgment is an in-
junction or restraining order; however, when
seeking to change a divorce decree, the crux
of the matter is that the judgment has pro-
spective application, Rudd, 105 Idaho at 118,
666 P.2d at 645.

Patricia asserts this case is similar to
Rudd. In that case, the parties stipulated to
a judgment and decree of divorce, which
ordered that property be sold and the pro-
ceeds divided between the parties. Jd. at 114,
666 P.2d at 641. The sale never occurred, and
the property became “so scattered and dete-
viorated that a sale of such property [was]
impractical.” Id, at 118 n.11, 666 P.2d at 645
nll, The wife sought relief from the judg-
ment, Jd. at 118, 666 P.2d at 645, The Idaho
Supreme Court held the judgment was pro-
spective in nature because “it contemplated a
sale of the parties’ property at some time in
the future,” and enforeing the judgment as
written was no longer equitable because “by
the time the motion for a final division of
property was made much of the personal
property had either disappeared or become
worthless,” Id. at 119, 666 P.2d at 646. Patri-
cia asserts the judgment in this case is pro-
spective in nature because it could not be
fully applied until Ronald assigned the life
insurance policy to Patricia, Moreover, she
asserts enforcing the judgment as written is
no longer equitable because Ronald allowed
the policy to lapse without assigning it to
Patricia.

The district court held the judgment is not
prospective in application, The court stated:

The decree was fully applied as to the

life insurance property upon its issuance.
There was nothing left to accomplish or
adjudicate as between the parties; all of
the rights and entitlements were fixed and
absolute upon entry of the decree. Any
further documentation was not a require-
ment to fix the rights between the parties,
but only to document that right on the
books of the insurance company. The right,
duty and obligation belonged to [Patricia],
if she intended to take over the benefits of
the property, to complete the documenta-
tion with the company.

... There was no element of perform-
ance required of [Ronald] into the future
upon which any continuing jurisdiction of
the court could attach. The loss of the
asset was not through some unforeseen
event, it was a failure on the part of [Patri-
cia] to take the steps necessary to take

control of the asset awarded to her. There
exists no basis in law for relief from judg-
ment under LR.C.P. 60(b)(5),

... [T]he judgment as entered was a
final and complete adjudication of the
rights of the parties with respect to the
insurance policy. There was no prospective
application of judgment necessary as be-
tween the parties to carry out the property
division adjudicated. The only thing re-
maining under the judgment was execution
upon the judgment, which was entirely un-
der the control and direction of [Patricia].

‘We agree. The judgment states,

“[Patricia] shall own, control and as benefi-

ciary be entitled to continue in effect, at her

sole expense, the current Term Life Policy
on [Ronald].” Upon entry of the judgment,

Patricia took legal control of the life insur-

ance policy, thus satisfying that provision of

the judgment. Any prospective action by the
parties (such as the execution of documents)
only served to document Patricia’s ownership
of the policy with the insurance company.
While, the judgment did require that Patricia
and Ronald cooperate with each other in
providing any documentation necessary to
implement parts of the decree, it did not
require Ronald to assign the policy at some
future date for Patricia to have legal control
of the life insurance policy, This requirement
to cooperate did not make the clause award-
ing the policy to Patricia one of prospective
application. Thus, the judgment is not pro-
spective, but instead a declarative judgment.>

Because the judgment is not prospective in

application, Patricia is not entitled to equita-

ble relief from the judgment pursuant to

LR.C.P. 60(b)(5).*

Patricia also asserts Ronald breached his
fiduciary duty and/or the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing associated with
the parties’ stipulation by failing to forward

3. This would be a different situation if the decree
created a prospective obligation of future per-
formance for Ronald regarding the life insurance
policy; however, the decree merely stated that
Patricia now owned the policy.

4, For the first time in her reply brief, Patricia
argues the community paid for the policy
through August 2014, the community interest in
the policy did not lapse until August 2014, and

923

Patricia notices regarding the life insurance
policy prior to and after the entry of the
judgment.

HE Ronald owed Patricia a marital
fiduciary duty until the marviage’s termi-
nation, See Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 481,
440, 860 P.2d 634, 648 (1998). Moreover, the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
associated with the stipulation applied until
the entry of the judgment. See Phillips v.
Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 386, 462 P.2d 49, 51
(1969). However, Ronald’s failure to forward
notices, if there were any, prior to the entry
of the judgment did not breach either Ron-
ald’s marital fiduciary duty or the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing asso-
ciated with the stipulation because it is undis-
puted that the life insurance policy was in
effect on August 21, 2018, the day the court
entered the judgment, Also, it is undisputed
that between the dates of the stipulation and
entry of judgment, Patricia had contacted the
insurance company and received confirmation
that the policy was in effect through August
2014. In such case, any notice regarding the
status of the life insurance policy prior to
that date would have merely informed Patri-
cia the policy was in effect.

Patricia’s argument also fails to the extent
it asserts Ronald breached the terms of the
judgment or the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing associated with the
judgment by failing to forward Patricia no-
tices regarding the life insurance policy, if
there were any, after the entry of the judg-
ment, The judgment states, “[Patricia] shall
own, control and as beneficiary be entitled to
continue in effect, at her sole expense, the
current Term Life Poliey on [Ronald].” The
judgment also states, “Each party shall exe-
cute any and all documents necessary to
effectuate the terms and conditions set forth
herein.” Neither of these provisions can be

Ronald misappropriated or destroyed the com-
munity asset by cancelling the policy before Au-
gust 2014, “{TJhis Court will not consider argu-
ments raised for the first time in the appellant's
reply brief.” Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co.,
140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004).
Accordingly, we will not address this issue fur-
ther.

924

reasonably interpreted to require or imply a
duty to forward notices regarding the life
insurance policy after the entry of the judg-
ment. Upon entry of the judgment, Patricia
took legal control of the life insurance policy.
Thus, notices were not necessary to effectu-
ate Patricia’s ownership of the policy.

Patricia is not entitled to equitable relief
from the judgment pursuant to IR.C.P.
60(b)(5), and she has failed to show Ronald
breached any duty owed to Patricia before or
after the entry of the judgment. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in affirming the
magistrate’s denial of Patricia’s motion for
relief from judgment.

B. Motion to Continue

HE Patricia argues the district court
erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of
Patricia’s motion to continue. Patricia origi-
nally argued discovery would allow her to
establish that at some point the insurance
company sent notices regarding the life in-
surance policy to Ronald. The decision to
grant or deny a motion to continue is com-
mitted to the discretion of the trial court,
Fagen, Inc. v. Lava Beds Wind Park, LLC,
159 Idaho 628, 638, 364 P.8d 1193, 1198
(2016), The district court determined allow-
ing Patricia more time to conduct discovery
would serve no purpose because she had
failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. We agree. As we have
already concluded, the judgment is not pro-
spective in application. Thus, Patricia was
not entitled to equitable relief from the judg-
ment pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b)(5) regard-
Jess of any facts she could have proved in
discovery. Moreover, as we have already
concluded, even if notices were sent to Ron-
ald, the record does not show that Ronald
breached any duty, marital or contractual,
owed to Patricia before or after entry of
judgment. Thus, allowing discovery to estab-
lish the insurance company sent notices re-
garding the life insurance policy to Ronald
would have been pointless. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in affirming the
5. On appeal, Patricia argues discovery would

also allow her to establish Ronald “executed no

document necessary to transfer the policy to

{her].” Generally, issues not raised below may
not be considered for the first time on appeal.

magistrate’s denial of Patricia’s motion to
continue.

C. Motion to Dismiss

Patricia asserts the district court erred in
affirming the magistrate’s grant of Ronald’s
motion to dismiss. According to Patricia, the
magistrate and the district court should have
considered Ronald’s motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment because both
courts looked to affidavits outside Patricia’s
motion for relief from judgment.

In addressing this argument, the district
court stated:

[Iit is immaterial whether the court below
considered the result of the denial of the
Rule 60(b) motion under rules applicable to
summary judgment or to judgment on the
pleadings. What is clear is that, however
construed, the motion for relief from judg-
ment is not sustainable. The magistrate
made no findings of fact, but simply denied
the motion. The ruling stands as a ruling
of law that under any construction of facts
within the reach of the allegations as
framed in the motion, relief under the mo-
tion is not available.

Similarly, the facts contained in the affida-
vits submitted with and in response to the
motion to dismiss do not change this conclu-
sion. It does not matter what standard the
magistrate used to analyze Ronald’s motion
to dismiss because the outeome would be the
same under applicable standards for either a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, the district court did
not err in affirming the magistrate’s grant of
Ronald’s motion to dismiss,

D, Attorney Fees

HE Patricia asserts the district court
erred in awarding attorney fees to Ronald
and opposes Ronald’s request for attorney
fees on appeal. An award of attorney fees
may be granted under Idaho Code § 12-121
and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 to the prevail-
ing party, and such an award is appropriate
when the court finds that the appeal has
been brought or defended frivolously, unrea-

Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d
1061, 1062 (1991). Patricia did not assert this
argument below, and it will not be considered on
appeal.

sonably, or without foundation. The decision
whether to award attorney fees under ‘IC.
§ 12-121 rests in the sound discretion of the
district court and will only be reversed where
there is an abuse of discretion, Bingham v.
Montane Res. Assocs., 183 Idaho 420, 427,
987 P.2d 1035, 1042 (1999). Patricia failed to
advance any legitimate claims upon which
relief could be granted in either the district
court or this Court. Patricia was not entitled
to equitable relief from the judgment pursu-
ant to LR.C.P. 60(b)(6) and failed to show
Ronald's failure to forward notices breached
any duty owed to Patricia before or after the
entry of the judgment. Accordingly, we af-
firm the district court’s award of attorney
fees and award attorney fees on appeal to
Ronald.

TL

CONCLUSION

Patricia was not entitled to equitable relief
from the judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P.

925

60(b)(5), and Ronald did not breach any duty
owed to Patricia before or after the entry of
the judgment. Thus, allowing discovery
would have been futile. We affirm the district
court’s order affirming the magistrate’s deni-
al of Patricia’s motion for relief from judg-
ment and granting of Ronald’s motion to
dismiss and award of attorney fees. Pursuant
to IC. § 12-121 and LA.R. 41, Ronald is
awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge
HUSKEY concur.