State: Maryland
Volume: 456
Term: 2017-2017
Jurisdiction(s): Maryland
Source: https://static.case.law/md/456.pdf

ra

169 A.3d 431
Sadie M. CASTRUCCIO
ve
The ESTATE OF Peter A. CASTRUCCIO et al.
No. 79, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
August 25, 2017
Reconsideration Denied October 19, 2017

Argued by Kenneth B. Frank (Kenneth B. Frank, PA,
Baltimore, MD and Cynthia E. Young, Annapolis, MD), on
brief, for Petitioner.

SC tC“(‘ié‘a
Argued by Shale D. Stiller (Brett Ingerman, Melissa L.
Mackiewicz and Michael N. Bakhama, DLA Piper LLP (US),
Baltimore, MD; Robert H. B. Cawood, Cawood & Cawood,
LLC, Annapolis, MD and Frederick R. Franke, Jr., (David E.
Sessions and Jack K. Beckett, Law Offices of Frederick R.
Franke, LLC, Annapolis, MD)), on brief, for Respondents.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Adkins, McDonald, Watts,
Hotten, Getty, Lawrence F. Rodowsky (Senior Judge,
Specially Assigned), JJ.

Getty, J.

If from the whole evidence, the jury shall find that Tilgh-

man Waters executed the will in controversy, in the pres-

ence of three subscribing witnesses thereto, and that they,
at his request, in his presence, and in the presence of each
other, signed their names as witnesses thereto; that at the
time of the execution thereof, he, the said Tilghman, was
capable of understanding the business in which he was
engaged—the property he desired to dispose of, and the
object of his bounty named in said will, and that the same
was his free and voluntary act, they will find for the
defendants.

Waters v. Waters, 35 Md. 581, 586 (1872).

Remarkably similar to the formulation quoted by this Court
in Waters in 1872, the current testamentary statute provides
that “every will shall be (1) in writing, (2) signed by the
testator, or by some other person for him, in his presence and
by his express direction, and (8) attested and signed by two or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator.” Md.
Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Estates & Trusts (“ET”) § 4-
102.

In fact, the statutory requirements for the valid execution of
a will have remained virtually unchanged in Maryland for over
two hundred years. In 1798, the General Assembly enacted the
first testamentary statute in Maryland, which included strik-
ingly similar language for devises:

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All devises and bequests of any lands or tenements, devisa-
ble by law, shall be in writing, and signed by the party so
devising the same, or by some other person in his presence,
and by his express directions, and shall be attested and
subscribed in the presence of the said devisor, by three or
four credible witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void
and of none effect[.]

1798 Md. Laws, ch. 101, sub-ch. 1, § 4. This Court has
previously traced the foundational roots of these longstanding
testamentary formalities to the English Statute of Frauds. See
Casson v. Swogell, 304 Md. 641, 648-50, 500 A.2d 1081 (1985).

Relatively few changes have been made to the language of
the 1798 statute. In 1884, the statute was amended such that
only “two or more credible witnesses” were required for
attestation. 1884 Md. Laws, ch. 298. In 1948, the statute was
amended to add a paragraph (b), which provided exceptions to
the statutory formalities for persons serving in the armed
forces located outside of the United States’ 1948 Md. Laws,
ch. 799. The current language of the statute first appeared in
1969 as Article 98, § 4-102 of the Maryland Code. See 1969
Md. Laws, ch. 3, § 1. In 1974, the former Article 93 was
recodified as the Hstates and Trusts Article during Code
Revision. See 1974 Md. Laws, ch. 11, § 2. The statute has not
been substantively amended since its enactment in its current
form in 1969, But see 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 72, § 5 (nonsubstan-
tive amendment).

In this appeal, we must determine whether a will admitted
to probate satisfied the statutory requirements for valid exe-
cution, particularly the requirement of attestation. For the
following reasons, we hold that the will at issue satisfied the
statutory requirements for valid execution, and therefore the
cireuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
the testator’s estate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the Court of Special Appeals.

1, The language of the former paragraph (b) is now codified as ET § 4~
103.

a =’

BACKGROUND

Dr. Peter Castruccio died on February 19, 2018, at the age
of eighty-nine. He was survived by his wife of sixty-two years,
Sadie Castruccio, who was ninety-two years old at the time of
his death,

A. Drafting and Execution of the 2010 Will

Peter signed a last will and testament on September 28,
2008, which he filed with the Register of Wills for Anne
Arundel County for safekeeping. In September 2010, Peter
asked his attorney, John Greiber, to retrieve the 2008 Will so
that he could revise it. When Peter received the 2008 Will, he
marked up the document in the presence of Mr. Greiber, and
asked his longtime employee, Darlene Barclay, to transcribe
his changes. Darlene made the requested changes and re-
turned the draft 2010 Will to Peter, who reviewed it with Mr.
Greiber on September 28, 2010.

On September 29, 2010, Peter signed the 2010 Will in the
presence of three witnesses: Mr. Greiber, his daughter Sa-
mantha Greiber, and Darlene’s daughter Kim Barclay, who
had also been employed by Peter for approximately six years.
Peter called the three witnesses into his office and requested
that they sign the papers on his desk, which he identified as
his will. Peter then signed the Will in the presence of Mr.
Greiber, Samantha, and Kim. Next, each of the three wit-
nesses signed the Will in the presence of Peter and each
other. Six weeks later, on November 17, 2010, Mr. Greiber
deposited the Will with the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel
County, where it remained until one week after Peter’s death.

B. Format and Substance of the 2010 Will

The 2010 Will, which is reproduced in the appendix to this
opinion, consists of six pages, which are consecutively num-
bered as pages 1 of 6, 2 of 6, ete. The page numbers are
centered on the bottom of each page. The words “Peter
Adalbert Castruccio” are centered in large font on the top of

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page 1 of 6; otherwise, the font and type-size are consistent
throughout the document.

In the first paragraph on page 1 of 6 of the Will, Peter
“declare[s] this instrument as his WILL IN TESTAMENT
[sic].” The second paragraph on page 1 of 6 states that, upon
his death, Peter “hereby declare[s] the following:[.]” Following
these introductory paragraphs, the 2010 Will contains eleven
consecutively numbered paragraphs labeled Item 1, Item 2,
etc. Some paragraphs are further subdivided into consecutive-
ly numbered subparagraphs.

Item 1 names Mr. Greiber as Peter’s personal representa-
tive for the administration of his estate. Item 7 leaves cash
bequests of varying amounts to three specified individuals,
including Darlene. Item 8 leaves “the rest and remainder” of
Peter’s estate to Sadie, “should she one, survive [Peter] and
two provided she has made and executed a Will prior to
[Peter’s] death.” Item 10, entitled “Residuary Clause,” appear-
ing on page 5 of 6, provides as follows:

Should, at the time of my death, my beloved wife not have
a valid Will filed with the Register of Wills in Anne Arundel
County dated prior thereto these, I hereby give, devise and
bequeath all the rest and residue of my Estate and proper-
ty, whether imposition, expectancy will remainder, including
all property over which I may have Power of Appointment
to the following individuals share and share alike per stirpes
and not per capita to DARLENE BARCLAY, [address
redacted], Glen Burnie, Maryland, 210617)

Also on page 5 of 6 of the Will, below the “Residuary
Clause” and Item 11, appears a concluding paragraph:

2. According to Mr. Greiber, Peter was concerned that Sadie would
leave her estate to certain family members of whom he did not approve.
He sought assurances that Sadie would not leave her assets, or at least
the assets that she would receive from him, to those family members.
Thus, he conditioned Sadie’s bequests under the 2010 Will upon her
having made and filed a will that disclosed whether she intended to
make testamentary gifts to those family members.

a «

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, the above mentioned
testator have hereunto set my hands and seals to this six
page instrument, and have initial [sic] each page hereof,
which instrument is intendant [sic] to be my Last Will and
Testament, this 29" day of September, 2010.

(The date “29” is handwritten above a blank line.) Contrary
to this statement, none of the pages of the 2010 Will are
initialed. Below this concluding paragraph, Peter signed his
full name above the typewritten words “PETER ADALBERT
CASTRUCCIO[.]” Below his signature are the words
“SIGNED, SEALED, PUBLISHED AND DECLARE [sic],
BY PETER ADALBERT CASTRUCCIO.” Another line
down, the last two lines of page 5 of 6 read as follows: “The
above named individual, does declare for his Last Will and
Testament this instrument, have hereunto subscribed to have
witness on the date last mentioned above, and at the location,
and[....]”

The first two lines of the next page of the Will, page 6 of 6,
appear to be a continuation of the sentence that began on the
previous page: “I do hereby attest that the testator to be of
sound mind, fully able to understand this instrument, and the
testator voluntarily and freely did sign same.” Below these
words are the signatures of Mr. Greiber, Kim, and Samantha,
each appearing under the word “WITNESS:” and above a line
that reads, “Signature, residing at:[.!” Below each signature
appears the witness’ address. (Mr. Greiber’s address is typed
consistent with the text of the document; Kim’s and Saman-
tha’s addresses are handwritten in what appears to be the
same handwriting as their signatures.) No other text appears
on page 6 of 6, other than the pagination at the bottom of the
page.

C. Petition to Caveat the 2010 Will

On February 26, 2018, one week after Peter’s death, Mr.
Greiber filed a Petition for Administrative Probate with the
Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County, requesting ap-
pointment as personal representative of Peter’s estate and
admission to probate of the 2010 Will. The next day, the

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Register of Wills issued an Administrative Probate Order,
appointing Mr. Greiber as personal representative of Peter’s
estate and admitting the 2010 Will to administrative probate.

At the time of Peter’s death, Sadie had not filed a valid will
with the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County. Thus,
under Mr. Greiber’s interpretation of Peter’s 2010 Will (and
specifically the Residuary Clause), the residue of Peter’s es-
tate would pass to Darlene, not to Sadie. Seeking to avoid this
result, on March 27, 2018, Sadie filed a Petition to Caveat Will
in the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County. On July 2,
2018, Sadie petitioned the Orphans’ Court to transmit issues
related to the caveat to the circuit court.

On August 1, 2018, the Orphans’ Court entered an order
transmitting seven issues to the Circuit Court for Anne Arun-
del County for trial, designating Sadie as the plaintiff and the
Estate of Peter Castruccio (“Estate”) as the defendant. The
seven issues were designated as follows:

A. Was the six (6) page paper writing dated September 29,
2010, captioned “Peter Adalbert Castruccio” (the “Will”)
executed by Peter Adalbert Castruccio (the “Testa-
tor”)[?]

B. Did the Testator execute the Will intending it to consti-
tute his last will and testament?

C. Are all of the pages of the Will the genuine pages the
Testator believed comprised the Will he intended to
execute?

D. Was the execution of the Will procured by undue influ-
ence?

E. Was the execution of the Will procured by fraud?

F. Was the Will actually attested and signed by credible
witnesses in the presence of the Testator?

G. Were the contents of the Will read by or to the Testator
or known to him at or before the time of its purported
execution?

On September 17, 2018, the circuit court granted a motion to
intervene filed by Darlene, and designated her as a defendant.

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D. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

On October 10, 2018, the Estate filed a motion for summary
judgment on all seven issues. Sadie filed an opposition to the
motion on October 30, 2018. The circuit court held hearings on
the motion on February 21, 2014 and May 2, 2014, Meanwhile,
on April 8, 2014, Sadie filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment as to Issue F, arguing that the 2010 Will did not
satisfy the statutory requirement of attestation because the
witnesses did not sign on the same page as the testator or on
“physically connected pages.” Sadie submitted the affidavit of
her attorney, who declared that he inspected the 2010 Will at
the Register of Wills on March 27, 2018, and found that it
“consisted of six separate, unattached pages, without any
staple holes or other evidence of having ever been physically
connected together.”

Sadie also submitted the deposition testimony of Mr. Greib-
er and his daughter Samantha, both of whom were witnesses
to the 2010 Will. In his deposition, Mr. Greiber recalled that
the Will had been stapled when it was signed:

Q. So he took his signature page and the—

A. The whole will, I think everything was stapled together

Tm pretty sure.

Q. It was stapled at that time?

A. I think, I’m pretty sure. Again, Peter had a habit of

stapling everything. I don’t staple everything.

Q. So—and this is not a will but—so if it was stapled, was it

stapled like here—

_ A. Yes.
Samantha also testified in her deposition that the 2010 Will
was stapled at the time of signing:

Q. Do you remember when he gave you the will—

A, Uh-huh.

Q. And again, if you don’t remember please let me know.

A. Okay.

Q. But whether it was actually stapled as one unit—

A. Yes.

a

Q.—or whether it was just loose papers?

A. Stapled.

In addition, Samantha testified that she remembered seeing
Peter initial each page of the Will:

Q. But you do remember seeing him sign it?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember seeing him initial each page?

[Counsel for the Estate]: Object to the question. Go ahead

and answer.

A. Yes. Yeah. I remember him signing and then him getting

up and giving the will to me.

Based on this testimony and the affidavit of her attorney,
Sadie argued that summary judgment as to the remaining
issues (other than Issue F) was inappropriate because there
were disputed issues of material facts. Specifically, Sadie
noted that the 2010 Will admitted to probate did not match the
physical description of the will provided by Mr. Greiber and
Samantha: The 2010 Will was not stapled nor was each page
initialed, even though Mr. Greiber and Samantha stated that it
was at the time of signing.

E. The Lower Courts’ Rulings

On September 28, 2014, the circuit court issued a memoran-
dum decision granting the Estate’s motion for summary judg-
ment on all issues and denying Sadie’s cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment as to Issue F. In reaching its decision, the
circuit court “proceeded ... on the assumption ... that the
separate sheets of the Will were not mechanically affixed by a
staple or other device and were not so affixed when deposited
with the Register of Wills for safekeeping on November 17,
2010.” The court then concluded, as to Issue F, “that the focus
should be on a more holistic inquiry about whether the docu-
ment purporting to be the will holds together as the unitary
document completed by the testator and signed by the wit-
nesses rather than an inquiry that at a certain point some or
all of the pages were mechanically affixed to each other.”

a

As to the remaining issues, the circuit court found that the
2010 Will contained a proper attestation clause, and therefore
the presumption of due execution attached. The court also
found that Sadie had not presented clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption. Finally, regarding
Peter’s testamentary capacity, the court found “that while
Peter was at age 84, elderly, he appears to have been fully in
control of what his desires and intentions were and was not
one to be lead [sic] by others or even to take advice—including
good advice—that he did not appreciate.”

On October 2, 2014, the circuit court entered an order
consistent with its memorandum decision. In its order, the
court found that

A. the six page paper writing dated September 29, 2010,
captioned “Peter Adalbert Castruccio” (the “Will”) was
executed by Peter Adalbert Castruccio (the “Testator”);

B. the Testator executed his Will with the intention that it
constituted his last will and testament;

C. all of the pages of the Will are the genuine pages the
Testator believed comprised the Will he intended to
execute;

D. the Will was not procured by undue influence;

E. the Will was not procured by fraud;

F. the Will was actually attested and signed by credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator; and

G. the contents of the Will were read by the Testator and
known to him at and before the time of the execution of
the Will on September 29, 2010.

On October 9, 2014, Sadie filed a notice of appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court in a reported opinion issued on July 28, 2016.
Sadie filed a motion for reconsideration, which the intermedi-
ate appellate court granted in part and denied in part. The
Court of Special Appeals issued a revised opinion on Septem-
ber 29, 2016. Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio, 230 Md.App.

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118, 146 A.8d 1182 (2016), Sadie then petitioned this Court for
a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on January 9,
2017. Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio, 451 Md. 248, 152 A.3d
758 (2017). Sadie presents three questions for our review:

I. Can a Will satisfy the requirements of valid execution in
Maryland if (a) the testator and the witnesses do not sign on
the same page, or on physically connected pages, (b) the
Will contains no proper attestation clause, and (c) the Will
was not otherwise regular on its face because it expressly
states the pages were initialed, but they were not?

IL. Can a presumption of due execution attach to a Will (a)
executed by the testator and the witnesses on separate,
loose pages, (b) containing no valid attestation clause, (¢)
expressly stating the pages were initialed, when they were
not, and (d) lacking any other evidence that the witnesses
signed in the presence of the testator, based on a common
font, consecutive page numbering, and continuation of lan-
guage?

III. Can summary judgment as to a Wills validity be
granted where the physical description of the Will by two of
the witnesses directly contradict[s] the actual physical con-
dition of the Will submitted for probate?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM The question of whether a trial court’s grant of
summary judgment was proper is a question of law subject
to de novo review on appeal. In reviewing a grant of
summary judgment under Md. Rule 2-501, we independent-
ly review the record to determine whether the parties
properly generated a dispute of material fact, and, if not,
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. We review the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reason-
able inferences that may be drawn from the facts against
the moving party.

LU

Boland v. Boland, 423 Md. 296, 366, 81 A.38d 529 (2011)
(quoting Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 896 Md. 469, 479,
914 A.2d 735 (2007).

DISCUSSION

Hl In Maryland, in order to be validly executed, a will
must be “(1) in writing, (2) signed by the testator, or by some
other person for him, in his presence and by his express
direction, and (8) attested and signed by two or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator.” ET § 4-102, The
proponent of the will bears “(t]he burden of proving the
existence of these elements, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence[.]” Groat v. Sundberg, 218 Md.App. 144, 152, 73 A.38d
374 (2018).

HEM (One way to establish the validity of a will is through
an attestation clause in the will itself. “An attestation clause is
a ‘provision at the end of an instrument (esp. a will) that is
signed by the instrument’s witnesses and that recites the
formalities required by the jurisdiction in which the instru-
ment might take effect (such as where the will might be
probated)” Slack v. Truitt, 368 Md. 2, 8 n.5, 791 A.2d 129
(2002) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 124 (7th ed. 1999)).
“{AJn attestation clause reciting facts necessary for the valid
execution of a will is prima facie evidence of the due execution
of the will, if it bears the genuine signatures of the testator
and subscribing witnesses.” Van Meter v. Van Meter, 188 Md.
614, 617-18, 39 A.2d 752 (1944). Furthermore, “a presumption
of due execution attaches to a will that contains the testator’s
signature and an attestation clause signed by the witnesses.”
Slack, 368 Md. at 7-8, 791 A.2d 129 (footnote omitted). “[O]nce
the presumption attaches, the burden of proof is on the
caveator to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
facts stated in the attestation clause are untrue.” Id. at 8, 791
A.2d 129 (footnote omitted).

HMMM soOn the other hand, an attestation clause is not a
requirement for a valid will. See id. at 8 n.5, 791 A.2d 129 (“A
formal attestation clause is not an essential part of a will.”);

ST

Van Meter, 188 Md. at 617, 89 A.2d 752 (“The validity of the
execution of a will depends, not upon an attestation clause, but
upon conformity of the execution with the requirements of the
statute, and also the testimony of the subscribing witnesses if
they are produced and examined.”). Nor is an attestation
clause required in order to establish the presumption of due
execution. See Slack, 368 Md. at 12, 791 A2d 129 (“(Aln
attestation clause is not the sine qua non of the presumption
of due execution.”). “[I]n the absence of an attestation clause,
if a proponent of a testamentary document can adduce suffi-
cient evidence from the document and/or surrounding cireum-
stances to make a prima facie case for the satisfaction of the
statutory requirements for execution of a will, the presump-
tion of due execution attaches.” Groat, 218 Md.App. at 156-57,
73 A.38d 874. Thus, a proper attestation clause in a will is itself
sufficient to establish a prima facie case for the validity of the
will, but is not necessary to do so.

HM “‘The attestation of the will is the act of the
witnesses in seeing that those things exist and are done which
the attestation clause declares were done and which the
statute requires.” McIntyre v. Saltysiak, 205 Md, 415, 421, 109
A2d 70 (1954). In other words, the witnesses’ attestation
confirms that the will was executed in accordance with the
requirements of ET § 4-102. Attestation requires that “the
testator directly or indirectly request{ ] those persons who do
attest [the will] to subscribe their names to it as witnesses.”
Casson, 304 Md. at 654-55, 500 A.2d 1081 (quoting Gross v.
Burneston, 91 Md. 383, 387, 46 A. 998 (1900)). “[Tyhe testator
need not formally ask the witness to sign the paper, his
implied assent being sufficient.” Id. at 654, 500 A2d 1031.
Furthermore, “where the testator signs a will in front of the
witnesses, proper attestation does not require that the testator
inform the witnesses that they are signing a will.” Slack, 368
Mad. at 18, 791 A.2d 129 (citing Casson, 304 Md. at 656, 500
A2d 1081). Nor does attestation require that the witnesses
“see the testator sign the will.” Van Meter, 183 Md. at 617, 39
A.2d 752. But, if the witnesses do not observe the testator
signing the will, then “the testator must acknowledge his

a °

signature before the witnesses or declare the document to be
his will.” Slack, 368 Md. at 18, 791 A.2d 129 (citing Casson, 304
Ma. at 655, 500 A.2d 1031).

Hs In contrast, the witnesses must always sign the
will in the presence of the testator. See Groat, 218 Md.App. at
161-62, 73 A.3d 374; ET § 4-102(8). “In the presence of the
testator” means “within the unobstructed range of vision of
the testator, although if he is able to see it, without any
material change of position, the fact that he does or does not
avail himself of the privilege is immaterial.” Groat, 218 Md.
App. at 161-62, 73 A.3d 374 (quoting Brittingham v. Britting-
ham, 147 Md. 158, 160, 127 A. 737 (1925)). In other words, “(i]t
is not necessary for the testator to have watched the witnesses
sign, as long as the testator could have watched them sign.”
Id, at 162, 73 A8d 874 (alteration in original) (quoting Re-
statement (Third) of Property, Wills and Other Donative
Transfers § 3.1 emt. p (1999)).

In this appeal, Sadie does not dispute that the 2010 Will
satisfies the requirements of ET § 4-102(1) and (2)—~it is a
writing, signed by Peter, the testator. Sadie also does not
dispute that the Will was “signed by two or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator’—it was in fact
signed by three credible witnesses in the presence of Peter
and each other. Furthermore, there is no dispute over the
requirement that the witnesses either see the testator sign the
will or that he acknowledge his signature or declare the
document to be his will. In fact, Peter signed the 2010 Will in
the presence of the three witnesses, and he identified the
document as his will.

Instead, Sadie contends that the 2010 Will does not satisfy
the requirement of ET § 4~102(8) that the will be “attested
... by two or more credible witnesses.” Quoting Shane v.
Wooley, 138 Md. 75, 78, 118 A, 652 (1921), Sadie argues that
attestation requires “that the witnesses must sign, either upon
the same sheet as the signature of the testator, or on some
sheet physically connected with it.” Because Peter signed on
page 5 of 6 of the 2010 Will, and the three witnesses signed on

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page 6 of 6, and those pages were not physically connected at
the time of signing (or, at a minimum, there is a factual
dispute as to whether the pages were physically connected
when signed), Sadie argues that the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate on the
issue of attestation. In addition, Sadie contends that the 2010
Will is otherwise invalid because it does not contain a “proper
attestation clause,” and because the Will “expressly states
[that] the pages were initialed, but they were not.” In the
alternative, Sadie argues that even if these deficiencies do not
necessarily invalidate the 2010 Will, the circuit court nonethe-
Jess erred in finding that the presumption of due execution
attached to the Will, thereby requiring Sadie to rebut the
presumption by clear and convincing evidence.

A, Attestation on a Different Page than the Testator’s
Signature

Ws The primary issue in this case is whether attestation
requires that the testator and the witnesses sign on the same
page of the will, or else on physically connected pages. Sadie
cites Shane v. Wooley for the proposition that attestation
requires “that the witnesses must sign, either upon the same
sheet as the signature of the testator, or on some sheet
physically connected with it.” Shane, 188 Md. at 78, 113 A.
652. The Estate and Darlene respond that the “physically
connected” rule of Shane applies only when the attestation is
“on a document separate from the will itself”; this rule does
not apply, they contend, to separate pages of a multi-page will.

Shane involved a one-page will that had been signed by the
testatrix, placed in an envelope, and sealed. 138 Md. at 76, 118
A. 652. The following language “appeared across the sealed
portion of the envelope,” followed by the signatures of three
witnesses: “We have seen the said Mrs. Catherine Shane sign
and seal this paper in our presence and at her request we
hereby sign our names as witnesses.” Id. The plaintiffs argued
that the will was invalid because the witnesses signing on the
envelope rather than the will itself did not satisfy the statuto-
ry requirement of attestation. Id. at 77, 113 A. 652.

a °

In Shane, this Court examined a variety of cases (both in
state and out of state) and treatises, and arrived at the
following observation:

While there is no provision of the statute of this State which
requires in terms that the attestation clause and the signa-
tures of the witnesses shall be at the end of the will or at
any particular place of the will, as in some of the States of
the Union, the weight of authority, however, appears to be
that the witnesses must sign, either upon the same sheet as
the signature of the testator, or on some sheet physically
connected with it, to constitute a valid will.

Id, at 78, 118 A. 652. After summarizing those authorities, the
Court concluded that “it is obvious, under the authorities
cited, the formalities prescribed by law, in the execution of
wills, have not been complied with, to constitute a valid will.”
Id. at 80, 118 A, 652.

As the Estate and Darlene note, however, the facts of Shane
and the cases cited therein are materially distinguishable from
the facts of this case. For example, the Shane Court quoted
Brengle v. Tucker for the proposition that “[t]o subscribe
means that the witnesses shall sign their name to the same
paper for the purpose of identification, and implies that attes-
tation has been performed.” Id. at 78, 118 A. 652 (quoting
Brengle v. Tucker, 114 Md. 597, 602, 80 A. 224 (1911)). In
Brengle, the testator wrote and signed a will from a hospital
bed immediately before going into surgery. Brengle, 114 Md.
at 599-600, 80 A. 224. After writing the purported will on a
piece of paper he had received from his doctor, the testator
handed the paper back to the doctor and asked him to sign it.
Id. at 600, 80 A, 224, The doctor complied. Id. Although there
were three other people in the hospital room who had also
witnessed these events, none of them signed the purported
will. Id. at 601, 80 A. 224. The Court held that the purported
will did not satisfy the statutory requirements because there
was “only one subscribing witness to [the] paper writing.” Id.
at 602, 80 A. 224.

a

Thus, the issue in Brengle was not where the witnesses must
sign in order to satisfy the statutory requirement of attesta-
tion, but whether the “witnesses” must sign the will at all in
order to satisfy the requirement, when it is undisputed that
they actually witnessed the testator write and sign the will. In
this case, there is no dispute that three witnesses actually
signed the 2010 Will in the presence of Peter and each other.

The Shane Court also cited In ve Baldwin’s Will for the
proposition that “[t]he authorities hold that the attestation or
subscription by witnesses must be on the same sheet of paper
as that which contains the testator’s signature, or else upon
some paper physically connected with that sheet.” Shane, 138
Mad. at 78, 118 A. 652 (quoting In re Baldwin’s Will, 146 N.C.
25, 59 8... 163, 165 (1907). In Baldwin, Mr. Covington wrote
a will that was dictated to him by the testator, Mr. Baldwin.
Baldwin, 59 S.E. at 164. Mr. Baldwin signed the will in Mr.
Covington’s presence, and Mr. Covington signed the will as a
witness in the presence of Mr. Baldwin. Jd. Later, Mr. Coving-
ton took the paper writing with his and Mr. Baldwin's signa-
tures to his home and “transcribed it on better paper.” Id.
There, outside the presence of Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Covington
signed this new copy of the will as a witness. Jd. At some point
after Mr. Covington returned the new copy to Mr. Baldwin,
Mr. Baldwin signed it outside the presence of Mr. Covington.
Id. Thereafter, another witness named Mr. Bowles signed the
new copy of the will at the request and in the presence of Mr.
Baldwin. Id. at 164-65. After Mr. Baldwin’s death, his wife
burned the original copy of the will, and only the second copy
(on better paper) was admitted to probate. Id. at 165.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the second
copy of the will did not satisfy the statutory “requirement that
the will shall be subscribed in the presence of the testator by
two witnesses at least.” Jd. This was because Mr. Covington
signed the second copy of the will before Mr. Baldwin had
signed it and outside his presence. Jd. It was immaterial that
Mr. Covington had signed the original copy in Mr. Baldwin’s
presence, because this copy “was not attached in any way to
the paper offered for probate and had no physical connection

a ©

with it.” Id. Therefore, the Court held that, “[iJn the absence
of any sort of physical connection between the two papers,
resort cannot be had to parol proof to show a similarity of
contents, and that they constituted one and the same will.” Id.

Thus, the issue in Baldwin was whether a witness’ proper
attestation of one copy of a will could essentially transfer to a
second copy of the will, when the witness’ signature on the
second copy occurred outside the presence of the testator and
consequently was invalid. In this case, all three witnesses
signed the 2010 Will after Peter had signed it, in the presence
of Peter and each other. All four signatories signed the same
document (albeit on separate pages) as part of the same
transaction.

The Shane Court also relied on James Schouler, Law of
Wills, Executors, and Administrators § 886 (5th ed. 1915).
Shane, 188 Md. at 79, 118 A. 652. That section is entitled
“Attestation on a Different Paper” and provides,

But the attestation or subscription by witnesses must be
on the same sheet of paper as that which contains the
testator’s own signature, or else upon some paper physically
connected with that sheet. No particular mode of connection
is prescribed by law; and hence the fastening by tape, by
eyelets, by mucilage, or even by a pin, seems unobjectiona-
ble. Where papers are thus connected, the testator may sign
on one paper and the witnesses on another, provided their
intent corresponded,

But attestation or a subscription by witnesses on a piece
of paper, detached and separated from the will and the
testator’s signature, nor affixed in his presence to the paper
at the time of execution, fails of compliance with the policy
of our law; we may assume it to be void, as otherwise a
door would be open to much fraud and perjury.

Schouler, swpra at § 336 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Notably, the Shane Court did not cite to the next section of
Schouler, § 337, which is entitled “Attestation where a Will is
written on Several Sheets.” That section provides,

TT

[Tif the will be written on several sheets, whether fastened
together or not, and the last sheet alone is attested in form,
the whole will is well executed, provided all the sheets were
in the room.... and unquestionably, if the several pieces of
paper are connected in their provisions and form a connect-
ed series, and are brought in this shape before the attesting
witnesses at the time of their subscription, a single attesta-
tion will suffice for the whole,

HE The fact that the Shane Court cited § 336, which
discusses attestation “on a piece of paper detached and sepa-
rated from the will,” but did not cite § 887, which describes a
will “written on several sheets, whether fastened together or
not,” supports the Estate’s and Darlene’s position that the
Shane Court was only concerned with the validity of the
attestation when the witnesses sign a document other than the
will itself, not when the witnesses sign the will on a different
piece of paper than the testator. Indeed, these were the facts
in Shane: the testator signed a one-page will, while the
witnesses signed on a sealed envelope containing the will.
Unlike here, where the three witnesses signed the will on a
different page than the testator, the witnesses in Shane did
not sign the will at all. Therefore, we conclude that the
“physically connected” rule of Shane does not apply to loose
pages of a multi-page will. Instead, Shane stands for the
proposition that, when the witnesses sign on a piece of paper
that is not part of the will itself, the paper must be physically
connected to the will in order to satisfy the statutory require-
ment of attestation,

As we have just determined, Shane did not address the
issue presented in this case: when the witnesses sign the will
on a different page than the testator, must the pages be
physically connected in order to satisfy the statutory require-
ment of attestation? In fact, the majority of the cases cited by
the parties to this Court are generally concerned with the
validity of a multi-page will whose pages are not physically
connected at the time of execution, rather than the validity of
the attestation when it is not on the same page as the
testator’s signature, See, eg., In re Estate of Beale, 15 Wis.2d

a

546, 118 N.W.2d 880 (1962); In re Covington’s Estate, 348 Pa.
1, 88 A.2d 235 (1948); In re Swaim’s Will, 162 N.C. 218, 78
S.E, 72 (1918). Those cases generally hold that a multi-page
will is not invalid merely because its pages are not physically
connected, as long as “they are connected by their internal
sense by coherence or adaptation of parts.” Swaim, 78 S.E. at
73; see also id. (“[T]he papers themselves bear intrinsic
evidence that, while separate, they were tacked together in
the mind of the testator.”).

Sadie acknowledges that “[t]he overwhelming majority of
the cited material confirms that a properly executed will may
be valid even if written on disconnected sheets,” and she does
not challenge this principle. Thus, Sadie does not dispute the
validity of the 2010 Will merely because its pages were not
physically connected. Nor does she dispute whether the page
containing Peter’s signature (page 5 of 6) and the page
containing the witnesses’ signatures (page 6 of 6) are part of
the same document constituting the 2010 Will. Instead, Sadie
argues that the 2010 Will was not properly attested, because
the witnesses did not sign on the same page as the testator’s
signature or on a page physically connected to it.

The parties have cited, and this Court has been able to find,
only one case in American jurisprudence that addresses this
precise issue: In re Kaiser’s Estate, 150 Neb. 295, 84 N.W.2d
366 (1948). The will in Kaiser “consisted of two sheets num-

3. The appellant in Gorowm v. Rynarzewski, 89 Md.App. 676, 599 A.2d
843 (1991) raised a similar issue, but the Court of Special Appeals did
not address the argument on the merits. In Goroum, the attestation
clause and the signatures of the witnesses appeared on a page that
contained no other provisions of the will. 89 Md.App. at 684, 599 A.2d
843. “[TJhe testator [had] initialed and signed each and every page of
his will, except the attestation page, in the presence of the witnesses.”
Id, at 683, 599 A.2d 843. The appellant argued that the will was invalid
based on one of the witnesses’ testimony that it was the normal practice
of the law office “that the sheets were not stapled together when wills
were signed.” Id, at 680 n.2, 599 A.2d 843,

The court noted that “[nJo one testified that the attestation page of this
will was at any time unaffixed.” Jd, at 681, 599 A.2d 843, Furthermore,

“{a] law office’s general practice to do things a certain way is not clear

and convincing evidence that it was done that way in a specific

TT

bered (1) and (2) respectively. The dispositive portion of the
will thus written, and signed by the testator, all appeared on
page (1). The perfected attestation clause thereof, subscribed
by the witnesses, alone appeared on page (2).” Kaiser, 34
N.W.2d at 370. The evidence did not affirmatively show
“{w]hether or not the two sheets were physically attached to
each other at the time of execution.” Id. “[Alfter the execution
of the will[,] both pages were placed in a sealed envelope and
on the same day delivered into the custody of the county
judge, who thereafter opened it only after [the] testator’s
death.” Id.

The Kaiser Court noted that “[t]here is no statutory provi-
sion in this state designating just where a will shall be
attested and subscribed by the witnesses, or forbidding the
use of separate sheets in making a will, or directing how or
that they shall be physically attached to each other in order to
make a valid will.” Jd. at 373. The Court also observed, “[iJn
the case at bar, the sheets were not only connected by their
internal sense, but identified by the subscribing witnesses as
connected parts of [the] testator’s will.” Jd. Therefore, the
Court upheld the validity of the will. Id. at 374.

Sadie attempts to distinguish Kaiser by noting that the will
in that case “contained a valid attestation clause,” and “was
placed in a sealed envelope after it was signed, from which it
did not emerge until the testator’s death.” Indeed, these
additional facts provide further indications of the validity of
the will in Kaiser. However, these additional facts have no
bearing on whether attestation requires the witnesses to sign
on the same page as the testator, or else on physically
connected pages. If attestation required the witnesses to sign
on the same page as the testator, or else on physically
connected pages, then it would not matter that the will bore
certain other indicia of its validity, such as having a valid

instance. Simply put, there is no evidence that at the time the testator
and witnesses executed this will, its pages were unaffixed.” Id. There-
fore, the court declined to address whether the will would have satisfied
the statutory requirements if the attestation page had not been affixed
to the remainder of the will. Jd. at 684, 599 A.2d 843.

©

attestation clause and remaining in a sealed envelope. In other
words, if the will was not properly attested as required by
statute, then it would have been invalid, regardless of any
other indicia of validity.

This Court considered a similar issue in Casson. In that
case, the Court rejected an argument “that the will is invalid
because the signatures of both witnesses do not appear at the
end of the will, and do not appear in close proximity to one
another at any particular place on the document.” 304 Md. at
657, 500 A.2d 1031. The Court noted that ET § 4-102 “does
not require the witnesses to sign together, or at any particu-
lar place on the will.” Zd. (emphasis added). Therefore, the
Court concluded that “[w]hile the fact that the two witnesses
did not sign in the same place may bear on the jury question
of whether the will is a fraud, it does not constitute a fatal
variance from the required procedure for lawful execution.”
Id.

Furthermore, we believe that the holding of Kaiser com-
ports with previous decisions of this Court emphasizing the
effectuation of the testator’s intent over strict compliance with
the statutory formalities. For example, in Slack, this Court
held that the presumption of due execution attaches to a will
notwithstanding the absence of an attestation clause, as long
as the will bears sufficient other indicia of due execution. 368
Ma. at 12, 791 A.2d 129. Moreover, the Slack Court declined to
invalidate the will at issue in that case even though one of the
witnesses “testified that she did not know that the paper she
was signing was a will, and could not remember whether she
saw [the testator]’s signature on the document.” Id. at 14, 791
A.2d 129. The Court noted that the purpose of ET § 4-102
“was to remove uncertainty in the making of wills and to
prevent the practice of imposition and fraud upon testators.”
Id. at 17, 791 A2d 129. The Court then observed that the
circumstances of that case did “not suggest that there was any
fraud worked upon the testator. The will was found in [the]
testator’s home after his death, duly signed and witnessed;
this shows that the testator thought it was a valid will.” Id.
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Slack Court concluded that

5

“the will was entitled to probate as a validly executed will.” Id.
at 18, 791 A.2d 129. Additionally, in Casson, this Court held
that “{t]o fulfill the requirement that a testator request a
witness sign a document it is not necessary that the witness
know it is a will.” 304 Md. at 654, 500 A.2d 1081.

Thus, this Court’s decisions in Casson and Slack indicate
that the Court is generally reluctant to impose formalities
beyond those specifically required by statute, and that the
testator’s intention that the document act as his will is para-
mount. Cf Carney v. Kosko, 229 Md. 112, 117, 182 A.2d 28
(1962) (“[A] will or a codicil need not be in any particular form,
so long as it (a) makes a disposition of the testator’s property,
and (b) such disposition is to take effect only upon death.”);
see also Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don.
Trans.) § 8.1, emt. f (“A court should never impose formal
requirements beyond those in the statute.”).

Moreover, we believe that Sadie’s proposed rule—that the
witnesses must sign on the same page as the testator, or on
physically connected pages—would not serve the purpose of
ET § 4-102, “to prevent the practice of imposition and fraud
upon testators.” Slack, 8368 Md. at 17, 791 A.2d 129. To the
contrary, we believe that Sadie’s rule would result in the
invalidation of numerous wills that otherwise comply with the
statutory requirements and present no evidence of fraud. As
the Court of Special Appeals noted,

One need not strain to consider the unfortunate results that

could occur when a will is drafted on word-processing

software, as most undoubtedly are these days. Even if the
places for the witnesses’ signatures are initially adjacent to
the testator’s, the slightest revisions or additions to the
body of the will may send them to a new page, presumably
in violation of the strict rule that [Sadie] advances. The
results may attend changes to the font, font size, or mar-
gins. Facing such potentially ruinous results, the testator
might have to compose the document on a scroll.

Castruccio, 280 Md.App. at 142 n.18, 146 A.8d 1132. In addi-

tion, “the physical-connection rule is fraught with vagueness

a

and uncertainty. Would a paperclip or binder clip suffice?
What if someone pinched the pages between her thumb and
index finger while the witnesses signed? What if the pages
were pressed together under a paperweight?” Id. at 148, 146
A.8d 1182.

HE For all of these reasons, we conclude that attestation
does not require the witnesses to sign on the same page as the
testator, or on physically connected pages. Instead, attestation
requires (1) that two or more credible witnesses sign the will
in the presence of the testator, and (2) that the witnesses
either observe the testator sign the will, or that the testator
acknowledges his signature on the document or acknowledges
that the document is his will.

In this case, three credible witnesses observed Peter sign on
page 5 of 6 of the 2010 Will, and Peter informed the witnesses
that the document was his will. After having witnessed this,
the three witnesses each signed on page 6 of 6 of the 2010
Will. Whether they were physically connected or not, all six
pages of the document were in the room, together, at the time
of signing. The six pages are consecutively numbered, the font
and typeface are consistent throughout, and the text flows
continuously from one page to the next. “[T]hey are connected
by their internal sense by coherence or adaptation of parts”
and “the papers themselves bear intrinsic evidence that, while
separate, they were tacked together in the mind of the testa-
tor.” Swaim, 78 S.E. at 73.

The evidence does not reveal whether the pages were
physically connected to each other at the time of signing, but
this fact is immaterial to the Will’s validity. Regardless of
whether the last two pages (or any of the pages, for that
matter) were physically connected, it is clear from “the papers
themselves” that they were intended to form a single docu-
ment constituting the 2010 Will. Attestation does not require
that the witnesses sign on the same page as the testator, or on
physically connected pages. Therefore, the fact that the last
two pages of the 2010 Will may not have been physically
connected at the time of signing does not render the Will

TT

invalid, nor prevent the presumption of due execution from
attaching to it. Accordingly, we hold that the cireuit court did
not err in denying Sadie’s cross-motion for summary judgment
as to Issue F (attestation).

B. Imperfect Attestation Clause and the Presumption of
Due Execution

HI Next, Sadie argues that the 2010 Will is invalid
because it does not contain a “proper attestation clause,” and
“it expressly states [that] the pages were initialed [by Peter’,
but they were not.” Alternatively, Sadie argues that even if
these deficiencies do not necessarily invalidate the 2010 Will,
they nonetheless should prevent the presumption of due exe-
cution from attaching to it. Therefore, Sadie asserts that she
should not have been required to rebut the presumption by
clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, Sadie contends
that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of the Estate on all transmitted issues.

The Estate and Darlene respond that these purported defi-
ciencies do not invalidate the 2010 Will because neither a
“proper attestation clause” nor having the testator initial each
page are requirements for a valid will. Furthermore, the
Estate and Darlene maintain that even if the attestation
clause in the 2010 Will was itself insufficient to give rise to the
presumption of due execution, the Will contained other suffi-
cient indicia of due execution such that the presumption
should attach. Additionally, the Estate and Darlene assert that
Sadie produced no evidence to rebut the presumption of due
execution, let alone clear and convincing evidence. Therefore,
the Estate and Darlene contend that the circuit court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate on all
transmitted issues.

Sadie is correct that page 5 of 6 of the 2010 Will states that
Peter has “initial [sic] each page hereof,” when in fact he did
not, as his initials do not appear on any pages of the Will.
However, Sadie cites to no authority, and we have found none,
supporting her position that this error either invalidates the

CUE

Will or prevents the presumption of due execution from at-
taching to it. We see no reason why an error such as this—
stating that the pages were initialed when in fact they were
not—should either invalidate an otherwise valid will or pre-
vent the presumption of due execution from attaching to it, so
long as the will contains sufficient other indicia of due execu-
tion. Having the testator initial each page of a multi-page will
is not required by statute, and therefore we decline to impose
such a requirement here. See Restatement (Third) of Property
(Wills & Don. Trans.) § 3.1, emt. f (“A court should never
impose formal requirements beyond those in the statute.”).

Turning to the allegedly “improper” attestation clause, we
note that the attestation clause appearing in the 2010 Will is
admittedly imperfect. It states,

The above named individual, does declare for his Last
Will and Testament this instrument, have hereunto sub-
scribed to have witness on the date last mentioned above,
and at the location, and [//*] I do hereby attest that the
testator to be of sound mind, fully able to understand this
instrument, and the testator voluntarily and freely did sign
same.

The attestation clause does not recite the statutory require-
ment that the witnesses signed the Will “in the presence of
the testator.” See ET § 4-102(8). Thus, it does not “recite[ ]
the formalities required by the jurisdiction in which the instru-
ment might take effect (such as where the will might be
probated).” Slack, 368 Md. at 8 n.5, 791 A.2d 129 (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 124 (7th ed. 1999)). As such, the
attestation clause in the 2010 Will, standing alone, does not
provide prima facie evidence for the validity of the Will. See
Van Meter, 183 Md. at 617-18, 89 A.2d 752 (“[A]n attestation
clause reciting facts necessary for the valid execution of a
will is prima facie evidence of the due execution of the will, if
it bears the genuine signatures of the testator and subscribing
witnesses.” (emphasis added)).

4. These symbols have been inserted to indicate the page break between
the bottom of page 5 of 6 and the top of page 6 of 6 in the 2010 Will.

a

ME However, as discussed earlier in this opinion, we
agree with the Hstate and Darlene that an attestation clause is
not a requirement of a valid will, and therefore an “improper”
or incomplete attestation clause does not serve to invalidate an
otherwise valid will. “The validity of the execution of a will
depends, not upon an attestation clause, but upon conformity
of the execution with the requirements of the statute, and also
the testimony of the subscribing witnesses if they are pro-
duced and examined.” Jd. at 617, 89 A.2d 752; see also Slack,
868 Md. at 8 n.5, 791 A.2d 129 (“A formal attestation clause is
not an essential part of a will.”), Nor is a “proper” attestation
clause required for the presumption of due execution to attach
to a will. See Slack, 368 Md. at 12, 791 A.2d 129 (“{Aln
attestation clause is not the sine qua non of the presumption
of due execution.”), “[I]n the absence of an attestation clause,
if a proponent of a testamentary document can adduce suffi-
cient evidence from the document and/or surrounding cireum-
stances to make a prima facie case for the satisfaction of the
statutory requirements for execution of a will, the presump-
tion of due execution attaches.” Groat, 218 Md.App. at 156-57,
73 A8d 874 (citing Slack, 368 Md. at 12, 791 A2d 129).

In this case, the circuit court did not err in finding “suffi-
cient evidence from the document and/or surrounding cireum-
stances to make a prima facie case for the satisfaction of the
statutory requirements for execution of a will,” id. at 157, 78
A.3d 874, and thus properly found that the presumption of due
execution attached to the 2010 Will. Although the attestation
clause itself is imperfect, each of the three witnesses signed
their names under the word “WITNESS:.” Cf Slack, 368 Md.
at 12, 791 A.2d 129 (that “[t]he two witnesses, in the presence
of the testator, signed beneath the words ‘Witnessed By’”
provides an indication of due execution). The witnesses’ signa-
tures all appear on the same page, which is the next consecu-
tively numbered page following the one that contains the
testator’s signature. Cf id. (that the testator’s signature “was
nearly adjacent to the signatures of the witnesses” provides an
indication of due execution). Additionally, the imperfect attes-
tation clause includes a recitation of some (though not all) of

a ©

the statutory requirements for execution of a will, including
witnessing Peter sign the will and a statement of Peter's
testamentary capacity.

Furthermore, the “surrounding circumstances” in this case
provide additional evidence of satisfaction of the statutory
requirements. All three witnesses testified that they observed
Peter sign the 2010 Will, that he declared the document to be
his will, and that they all signed the Will in his presence and in
the presence of each other. See Van Meter, 188 Md. at 617, 39
A.2d 752 (“The validity of the execution of a will depends, not
upon an attestation clause, but upon conformity with the
requirements of the statute, and also the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses if they are produced and examined.”
(emphasis added)).

Therefore, based on the document itself and the cireum-
stances surrounding its execution, we conclude that the circuit
court did not err in finding sufficient evidence “to make a
prima facie case for the satisfaction of the statutory require-
ments for execution of a will,” Groat, 218 Md.App. at 157, 73
Ad 874, and thus finding that the presumption of due
execution attached to the 2010 Will.® Accordingly, the circuit
court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
the Estate on all transmitted issues.

C. Disputed Facts

Finally, Sadie argues that the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the Estate because she pro-
duced evidence that generated disputed issues of material
facts. Specifically, Sadie contends that the 2010 Will admitted
to probate did not match the physical description of the will
provided by Mr. Greiber and Samantha in their depositions.

5. Sadie only argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the
presumption of due execution attached to the 2010 Will. She does not
argue, in the alternative, that if the presumption did attach, she none-
theless produced clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presump-
tion, Therefore, we need not consider whether Sadie produced suffi-
cient evidence to overcome the presumption of due execution regarding
the 2010 Will.

TT

Both Mr. Greiber and Samantha testified that they remem-
bered that the 2010 Will was stapled when it was signed, and
Samantha recalled that Peter had initialed each page. The Will
admitted to probate, however, bore no indication of ever
having been stapled, and did not contain Peter’s initials on any
of the pages, Sadie contends that whether the Will was stapled
and initialed are material facts bearing on its validity, and
therefore the circuit court erred in granting summary judg-
ment in favor of the Estate. The Estate and Darlene do not
respond to Sadie’s argument regarding disputed issues of
material facts,

Hs “A material fact is a fact the resolution of which
will somehow affect the outcome of the case. Consequently, a
dispute over a non-material fact will not preclude summary
judgment.” King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111, 492 A.2d 608
(1985) (citation omitted). In other words,

[mlerely proving the existence of a factual dispute is not

necessarily fatal to a summary judgment motion. A dispute

as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is
not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact
and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary
judgment.
Boland, 423 Ma. at 366, 31 A.3d 529 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).

As discussed in Part A above, whether the 2010 Will was
stapled at the time of signing has no bearing on its validity. As
such, resolution of this disputed fact would not affect the
outcome of the case. Indeed, in granting the Estate’s motion
for summary judgment, the circuit court “proceeded ... on
the assumption ... that the separate sheets of the Will were
not mechanically affixed by a staple or other device and were
not so affixed when deposited with the Register of Wills for
safekeeping on November 17, 2010.” Therefore, the dispute
about whether the 2010 Will was stapled at the time of signing
“relate[d] to grounds upon which the [circuit court’s] decision
[was] not rested.” Boland, 423 Md. at 366, 31 A.3d 529.
Similarly, as discussed in Part B above, whether the 2010 Will

a «

was initialed by Peter also has no bearing on its validity.
Accordingly, resolution of this disputed fact would not affect
the outcome of the case.

HE Sadie contends that these disputed facts are mate-
rial because the contrary descriptions of the 2010 Will by the
witnesses indicate that the will that was signed by Peter and
the three witnesses on September 29, 2010 might not be the
same will that was admitted to probate. However, in order to
defeat summary judgment, “[a] plaintiff's claim must be sup-
ported by more than a ‘scintilla of evidence[,? as ‘there must
be evidence upon which [a] jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff’ ” Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 488 Md. 100, 108, 90
A.8d 464 (2014) (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods. Inc., 330 Md. 726, 788-
39, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993)). Furthermore, when a witness to a
testamentary document provides testimony that is contrary to
the description provided in the document itself, “[t]he court
views such contradictory testimony with great caution and
scans it with grave suspicion[.]” Van Meter, 188 Md. at 618, 39
A.2d 752; see also Slack, 368 Md. at 15, 791 A.2d 129 (“This
Court and most other state courts consistently have found that
a witness’ inability to remember certain events should not
overcome the presumption of due execution.”).

Therefore, we conclude that Mr. Grieber’s and Samantha’s
inaccurate recollections about whether the 2010 Will was
stapled and initialed on each page at the time of signing were
insufficient to generate disputed issues of material fact. Ac-
cordingly, the circuit court did not err in granting summary
judgment in favor of the Estate on all transmitted issues.

CONCLUSION

The statutory requirements for a validly executed will are
that it must be “(1) in writing, (2) signed by the testator, or by
some other person for him, in his presence and by his express
direction, and (8) attested and signed by two or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator.” ET § 4-102. When
the testator and the witnesses sign on separate pages of a

oT

multi-page will, attestation does not require that the pages be
“physically connected” at the time of signing, Furthermore,
neither a complete attestation clause nor having the testator
initial each page of the will are requirements for valid execu-
tion. Therefore, the absence of these elements in a testamen-
tary document does not serve to invalidate the will, nor
prevent the presumption of due execution from attaching to it.

In this case, the Estate and Darlene produced “sufficient
evidence from the document and/or surrounding circumstances
to make a prima, facie case for the satisfaction of the statutory
requirements for execution of a will.” Groat, 218 Md.App. at
157, 73 A.8d 874. Thus, the cireuit court properly found that
the presumption of due execution attached to the 2010 Will,
and Sadie does not argue that she produced clear and convine-
ing evidence to overcome the presumption. Therefore, the
cireuit court correctly denied Sadie’s cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment as to Issue F (attestation), and properly
granted the Estate’s motion for summary judgment on all
transmitted issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED, COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.

APPENDIX

a ©

a
FILED
PETER ADALBERT CASTRUCCIO FEB 24 2013

L, PETER ADALBERT CASTRUCCIO, residingat 8229 Anglers Bdge Trail, Glen Burnie,
Maryland 21060, being of sound and disposing mind, memory and understaiding, do hereby
voluntarily make, publish and declare this instrument as his WILL IN TESTAMENT, thereby
swvoking any and all previous Wills and Codiotls lerein before male by me,

WHEREAS, itis my intonton that on my death, oll provisions ofthis instrument will
‘onstitute my Last Will In Testament; therefore, I do ereby declare the Collowi

‘TEM 1 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE,

Ido hereby nominate, constitute and appoint my friend and comsel of many years, JOHN
RALPH GRRIBRR, JR, to act as my Personal Representative for the administration of my Estate,
To tut affect, 1 do confor upon my Personal Representative the following rights and obligations:

1, Ido hereby express the desire that my Personal Representative pay my just debts,

final expenses and taxes, as soon as practical after my death, Fistly out of cash or
liquid assets within my Bstate, seeondly by ofthe sale of any personal property in my
Estate, and thirdly out of any real estate which is subject to my control and
disposition,

2, Ido hereby direot that my Personal Representative pay from my Estate, primarily

‘rom theresiduary clause, all government, Estate or Inheritance taxes, which may be
duo and payable by reason of my debt, without requiring contribution from anyoue,
‘who, in the absence of this exoneration, would be Hable for payment of any portion
of snch taxes by virtue of the inheritance of the status of beneficiary,

3. I do horeby requost that my Personal Representative be excused from the necessity

of giving bond, unless absolutely required by lav, ancl in that event, mny Personal
Representative shall give such bond in such minimum amount as would be required
by law.

tof 6

38

6

8

10.

u,

For any and all activities of my Personal Representative, I do hereby ditest und
request that fe be relieved ftom the necessity of securing any previously obtained
authority ot subsequent ratifiction ftom any court, to perform the activities of
Potconal Representative,

My Petsonal Representative shall not be lisble for any act or omission oa his pat
wihioh rosults ftom mere negligence, unless such activity by the Personal
Roprosentatve constitutes fraud or willful misconduct,

My Pervonal Representative is hereby authorized 10 sell fase, give option, oF
otherwise dispose of any and all property constituting a pat of my Estat, whether
teal, poraonal ot mix, at ether public or private sale, all within the performance of
tho aotultes of the Personal Representative in the furtherance of administering my
Batate,

do hereby deat that my Personal Representative pay the cost of any andall feral
coxpenses and that these cost be pad out ofthe funds availabl in my Estate,

1 do hereby authorize my Personal Representative fo carry on my business for such
reasonable period of time as is necessary to bring tho business to a orderly
conclusion, or, iin thediseretion ofthe Personal Representative, to continue to cerry
on suoh blsness for euoh a reasonable period of time as maybe epproprinle fr the
eventual termination of my Estat, whereby I heteby authorize my Personal
‘Representative fo act with the same authority which I may have had in the conduot
‘of such business,

T hereby anthotize my Personel Representalive to be empowered, by stle or
‘otherwise, to dea with any personal property in my Estate including stocks, bonds,
securities or other similar matters, ineluding tho right fo cast votoon such seouitiog,
cither in person or by limited genoral proxy.

My Personal Ropresonatve is hereby authorized to enforas, compromisa and/or
Iitigate say claim against or i favor of my Esato,

My Personal Ropresenatve is hereby authorized to exeoute euch guarantees and
indenanily agreoments binding upon my Estate, which, in his sole discretion, ere
Appropriate (o the handling ofthe administration of my Estate,

2o0f 6

12, My Personal Representative is hereby authorized to prepare, file and execute In my
‘name, ar on behalf of my Estate any and all income or other Tax Retumns,

13, MyPersonal Representative is hereby authorized to exerofse any und all other powors
which are reasonable and nevessary forthe proper handling of tho administration of
sy Estate,

14, The enumeration ofthe foregoing powers are given forthe purpose of enumerating
some of the power of my Personal Representative, and not by way of limitations;
therefore, any an all other powers petmilled to Personal Representatives, under the
Javes of the State of my residence atthe time of my death are expressly granted unto
amy Personal Representative,

ITEM 2: SURVIVAL OF BENEFICIARY

If any beneficiary or beneficiaries under this instrument, and I should dle In a common
disaster or accident, or under such circumstances that it is doubtful as to which of us died firs, then.
all provisions of this Will shall be effective as though any suck beneficiary or beneficiaries shall
bave prodeceased me. Further, in the event that any beneficiary under thix Will shell die

within (30) days after my death, then such beneficiary shall be deemed to have predeocased mo, and

‘lire that the provisions of this Will shall be construed upon that assumption,

YTEM3: MEMORANDUM OF INTENT

All the bequests conteined in my Will sro absolut, it s my desire that any memorandum
vihich I may leave, addressed to my Personal Representative, o: to auy beneficiary, indleaing my
<esire with regard to the disposal of any item of my Estate, or manner of handling my Estate, shalt
bo given due regard in so far it is deomed practical in the sole disrtion of may Personal
‘Representative, and provided these ditections aro otherwise legal,

ITEM 4: PRIOR DISTRIBUTION OF BEQUEST

‘As to uny speclfic item of property, whethor rel, personal or mix, indicated to be left to a
bonsfilary, under the provisions of tis Will, if such beneficiary shal! have recelved all at part of
any such asset prior to the final administration of my Estate, then I do direct that my Personal

dof 6

39

40

Reprosentative deduct from the Estate to be reveived by sucht bonotioiury ull such advances made to
‘such buneficlary,

TTRM S; ADVANCKS TO BENEFICIARIES

By his sole diserotion, my Peraona! Roprosoatative skull be empowered to mako sucl,
advances of asets to any auch benoffolary mentloned hereln, provided such advances tnade por to
inal administration of this Fstto, shall be takon to reduce tho eventual distfbutton to any such
benoficlury,

ITEM 6; EFFECT OF UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO VOID

Ta tho ovost that any party, whother thoy ara a benoflalary ov not, hal Elo any procoeding
{nan o(femptto void any and all provislons ofthis inirumont, in thot oven, sual
party shall reovive no benifits whatsoever from my Estat, in the evout that such proceedings are
‘unsticoessful,

ITEM 71 CASH BEQUESTS:
‘The following individuals shall receive cosh boquosts, prior to nny bequost to my beloved

wifes
1, DARLENE BARCLAY, 107 Foxhound Drive, Glen Bumle, Maryland, 21061,
Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($800,000) whieh includes the Four Hundred
“Vhowsnnd Dollars ($400,000) already act aside with Wachovin,
2, ADRIANA LANATA, Via ‘Tuloste 45, Chinvari 16043, laly, One Hundred
‘Thousand Dollars ($100,000) ©
3, BRNESTSTINCHCOMB, JR,, 1141-B Digus Mill Rou, Millersville, Maryland,
21108, Ono Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000)
Trem 8;

‘To my loving wift, Sadie, excluding the individual hoquest made in tem 7, I leave the sost
and remainder of my Kate fo Her should she one, survive me and two provided she has mado and
‘exeouted a Will prior to my death,

4of 6

ITEM 9: PERSONALITY

T have instructed my fiend and Attornoy of many years to draft a Jotter, which we have
discussed, to advise my family members of my demise and reasons for the beneficiary distribution
‘of my ostato, *

NEM 10: RESIDUARY CLAUSE

Should, at the timo ofmy death, my beloved wife nothaye. valid Will filed with tho Register
‘of Wills in Anne Arundel County dated prior thereto these, [ hereby give, devise ond bequeath all
‘the rest and residue of my Estate and property, whother imposition, expectancy will remainder,
including all property over which I may have Power of Appointment to the following Individuals
share and share altke per stitpes and not per capita to DARLENE BARCLAY, 107 Foxhound Drive,
‘Glen Bumie, Maryland, 21061,

ITEM 11, As above noted, should sny beneficlary be deceased at the time af his or her
dlstribution under tho proceeds of my last Will, It is my express intention thot his or her abare shall
‘bo distributed to his or her heirs equally.

IN TESTIMONY WIHEREOF, I the above mentioned jestatorhiaveherounto sot my hands
‘and scals to ths ix page instrument, and have Initial each page hereof, whioh Instymont is intendant
to be my Lust Will and Testament, this 62.9” day of Soptember, 2010,

41

dl bf G6frtti

TER ADALBERT CASTRUCCIO

SIGNED, SEALED, PUBLISHED AND DECLARE, BY PETER ADALBERT CASTRUCCIO,

‘The above named individual, does declare for his Last Will and Testament this instrument,
have hereunto subseribed to have witness on the dufe last mentioued above, and atthe location, and

Soré

a
Le

Ido hereby attest thatthe testator to be of sound mind, fully able to understand this instrument, and
the testator voluntarily and freely did sign same,

Annapolis, MD 214

WITNESS; WIINESS:
‘Signature, residing at: + Signature, residing at:
NAM v2R Gee

WAR Sr Ave.

iataaamliibe Sra Bg wee03

Gof 6

a

169 A.3d 457
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
vy.
Lance BUTLER II
Mise. Docket AG No. 14, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 7, 2017

Argued by Lydia E. Lawless, Bar Counsel (Attorney Griev-
ance Commission of Maryland), for Petitioner.

No argument on behalf of Respondent.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

PER CURIAM ORDER

For reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed, it is
this 7th day of September 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
Respondent, Lance Butler III be, and he is hereby, disbarred,
effective immediately, from the further practice of law in the
State of Maryland; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
name of Lance Butler III from the register of attorneys, and
pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-761, shall certify that fact to
the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the clerks of
all judicial tribunals in the State; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by
the Clerk of this Court, including the costs of all transcripts,
pursuant to Maryland Rule 19~709, for which sum judgment is
entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland against Lance Butler ITI.

ee

169 A.8d 458
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner
v .
Marianne Elizabeth MORRIS, Respondent.
Mise. Docket AG No. 89, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 7, 2017

ORDER

This matter came before the Court on the Joint Petition of
the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland and Respon-
dent, Marianne Elizabeth Morris, to indefinitely suspend the
Respondent from the practice of law for violations of Rules
8.4(a)-(d) of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct. The Court having considered the Petition, and the
record herein, it is this 7th day of September, 2017;

ORDERED, that the Respondent, Marianne Elizabeth Mor-
ris, be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the
State of Maryland, effective thirty (80) days from the date of
this Order; and it is further

ORDERED, that, thirty (80) days from the date of this
Order, the Clerk of this Court shall strike the name of
Marianne Elizabeth Morris from the register of attorneys in
the Court and certify that fact to the trustees of the Client
Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland and all Clerks of all
judicial tribunals in this State in accordance with Maryland

Rule 19-762(b).

169 A.3d 952

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner,

v.
Jibril Abdussaboor BROWN, Respondent.
Mise. Docket AG No, 84, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 11, 2017

ORDER

This matter came before the Court on the Joint Petition for
Reprimand by Consent Filed by the Attorney Grievance Com-
mission of Maryland and Respondent, Jibril A. Brown. The
Court, having considered the Petition and the record herein, it
is this 11th day of September, 2017,

ORDERED, that Respondent, Jibril A. Brown, be and he is
hereby REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(d)
of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.

169 A.8d 952
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
Y.
Louisa Content MCLAUGHLIN
Mise. Docket AG No. 47, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 11, 2017

aT

Argued by Amy 8. Paulick, Esquire, Assistant Bar Counsel,
Lydia E. Lawless, Bar Counsel (Attorney Grievance Commis-
sion of Maryland), for Petitioner.

Argued by Louisa Content McLaughlin (Bel Air, MD), for
Respondent.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

PER CURIAM ORDER

For reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed, it is
this 11th day of September 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
Respondent, Louisa Content McLaughlin be, and she is here-
by, disbarred, effective immediately, from the further practice
of law in the State of Maryland; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
name of Louisa Content McLaughlin from the register of
attorneys, and pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-761, shall certify
that fact to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the
clerks of all judicial tribunals in the State; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by
the Clerk of this Court, including the costs of all transcripts,
pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-709, for which sum judgment is
entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland against Louisa Content McLaughlin.

es

169 A.3d 953
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
Maurice Marnea MOODY
Misc. Docket AG No. 38, Sept. Term, 2016

Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 12, 2017

Argued by Amy S, Paulick, Esquire, Assistant Bar Counsel,
Lydia E. Lawless, Bar Counsel (Attorney Grievance Commis-
sion of Maryland), for Petitioner.

Argued by Maurice Marnea Moody (Baltimore, MD), for
Respondent.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

PER CURIAM ORDER

For reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed, it is
this 12th day of September 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
Respondent, Maurice Marnea Moody be, and he is hereby,
disbarred, effective immediately, from the further practice of
law in the State of Maryland; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
name of Maurice Marnea Moody from the register of attor-
neys, and pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-761, shall certify that
fact to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the
clerks of all judicial tribunals in the State; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by
the Clerk of this Court, including the costs of all transcripts,
pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-709, for which sum judgment is

SS

entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland against Maurice Marnea Moody.

—z °
=

170 A.8d 288

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner

v.
Raouf Muhammad ABDULLAH, Respondent.
Misc, Docket AG No. 24, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

ORDER

This matter came before the Court on the Joint Petition for
Reprimand by Consent filed by the Attorney Grievance Com-
mission of Maryland and Respondent, Raouf M, Abdullah. The
Court, having considered the Petition and the record herein, it
is this 22nd day of September, 2017,

ORDERED, that Respondent, Raouf M. Abdullah, be and
he is hereby REPRIMANDED for violating Rule 5.1 of the
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.

170 A.8d 288
Carrie M. WARD, et al.
ve
Catherine MARTINSON
No, 46, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 22, 2017

a

Submitted by Ava E. Lias-Booker (Emily Patterson,
McGuire Woods, LLP of Baltimore, MD; Brian E. Pumphrey
of Richmond, VA) for Petitioners.

Submitted by Phillip R. Robinson (Consumer Law Center,
LLC of Silver Spring, MD), for Respondent.

Submitted before Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts,
Hotten, Getty, JJ.
PER CURIAM ORDER

The petition for writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case
having been granted, it is this 22nd day of September, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
writ of certiorari be, and it is hereby, dismissed as moot.

170 A.3d 289
BEAUCHAMP, Kenneth
ve
STATE of Maryland
Case No. 33, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 20, 2017

Case dismissed prior to oral argument.

170 A.3d 289
JACKSON, Lawrence E., Jr.
v.

STATE of Maryland
Case No. 30, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 25, 2017

Case dismissed prior to oral argument.

51

TT
a

170 A.3d 289
JONES, Clinton
ve
STATE of Maryland
Case No. 34, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 25, 2017

Case dismissed prior to oral argument.

170 A.8d 289
BELL AND BON SECOURS HOSPITAL
ve
CHANCE
Pet. Docket No. 145, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 12, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No,

2259, Sept.Term, 2014). Transferred to the regular docket as
No. 36, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

es

|_|

170 A.3d 290

BLACKSTONE

ve

SHARMA;

Shanahan
ve

Marvastian

Pet, Docket No. 198, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 12, 2017

Reported below: 233 Md.App. 58, 161 A.38d 718. Transferred
to the regular docket as No. 40, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

170 A.3d 290
DUFFY
ve
CBS CORPORATION
Pet. Docket No. 202, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 12, 2017

Reported below: 232 Md.App. 603, 161 A.38d 1, Transferred
to the regular docket as No. 41, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

a

|

170 A.3d 290

GOLDBERG
vy.

NEVIASER

Pet. Docket No. 235, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 12, 2017

Pending in the Court of Special Appeals (No. 288, Sept.
Term, 2017).

Transferred to the regular docket as No. 47, Sept.Term,
2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

170 A.3d 290
GRIMM, Brian
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 164, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.

September 12, 2017
Reported below: 282 Md.App. 382, 158 A.3d 1037. Trans-
ferred to the regular docket as No. 87, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari and conditional cross-peti-
tion—both granted.

a
a

170 A.8d 291

In the MATTER OF WEINTRAUB FOR the APPOINTMENT
OF A GUARDIAN OF the PROPERTY

Pet. Docket No. 217, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 12, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
813, Sept.Term, 2016). Transferred to the regular docket as
No. 44, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

170 A.3d 291
LAMALFA
ve
HEARN
Pet. Docket No. 190, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 12, 2017

Reported below: 233 Md.App. 141, 163 A.8d 205. Trans-
ferred to the regular docket as No. 39, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

a
|

170 A.8d 291
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
vy.
SMITH
Pet, Docket No. 205, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 12, 2017

(No, 18-C-16-001627, Cirenit Court for St, Mary's County.)
Transferred to the regular docket as No. 42, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

170 A8d 291
O’SULLIVAN
ve
ALTENBURG
Pet. Docket No. 230, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 12, 2017

Pending in the Court of Special Appeals (No. 1618, Sept.
Term, 2016). Transferred to the regular docket as No. 45,
Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted.

a
|

170 A.8d 292
PRECISION SMALL ENGINES
ve
COLLEGE PARK
Pet. Docket No. 206, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 12, 2017

Reported below: 288 Md.App. 74, 161 A.8d 728, Transferred
to the regular docket as No. 48, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

170 A.3d 292
SHEALER
ve
STRAKA
Pet, Docket No. 183, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 12, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.

1028, Sept.Term, 2016). Transferred to the regular docket as
No. 38, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

SS
|
170 A.3d 292
WARD
ve
MARTINSON
Pet. Docket No. 234, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 12, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 734, Sept.
Term, 2017). Transferred to the regular docket as No. 46,
Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

170 A.3d 292
ANDERSON, Keith
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 243, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1428, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a «
=

170 A.38d 293
CARTER, Calvin Caron
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 245, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Application for leave to appeal denied by the Court of
Special Appeals (No. 2805, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.3d 293
CORDELL, Clinton
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 218, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
554, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

TT
m=

170 A.3d 293
COVERDALE, Lawrence A.
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 186, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.

797, Sept.Term, 2016).
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.8d 293
CROPPER, Clarence William
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 204, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.

995, Sept.Term, 2016).
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

LU

170 A.3d 294
DESHAZOR, Lester Edward, Jr.
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No, 213, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
355, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

a
170 A.8d 294
EL-BEY
Vv.
DYSON
Pet. Docket No. 214, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 2180,
Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

TT
|

170 A.8d 294
ESTATE OF ADAMS
ve
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO.
Pet. Docket No. 201, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.3d 294
FLEMING, Christopher B.
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 225, Sept.Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
760, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

Ue
|

170 A.38d 295
GILMORE, Larry
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 177, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (Nos.
2514 & 2869, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

170 A.8d 295
HARRIS, Arthur
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 208, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1481, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

TT
|

170 A.Bd 295
HENRY, Clarence S.
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 228, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
247, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

170 A.3d 295
HILL
ve
HILL
Pet, Docket No. 188, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
584, Sept.Term, 2016),

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a
a

170 A.8d 296
HSN, LLC and Ravanbakhsh
v.
KALANTAR
Pet. Docket No. 209, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
881, Sept.Term, 2016),

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.3d 296
IN RE: MS., AS., and M.S.
Pet. Docket No. 260, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (Nos.
1853 & 2298, Sept.Term, 2016 & No. 615, Sept.Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.8d 296
In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF KIRSCH
Pet. Docket No. 210, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2004, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.3d 296
JONES, Troy
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 231, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017
Pending in the Court of Special Appeals (No. 2036, Sept.
Term, 2016).
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a
|

170 A.3d 297
LAW OFFICE OF MCGILL & WOOLERY
ve
ORPHANS’ COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S CO.
Pet. Docket No. 223, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

(No. CAL16-28972, Circuit Court for Prince George’s Coun-
ty.)

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

=
170 A.3d 297
LAWRENCE, Pompey
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 187, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
119, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

ST
|

170 A.3d 297
LUTAVA
v.
EARLE MANOR LTD. P’SHIP
Pet. Docket No. 98, Sept.Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017
(No. 9518D, Circuit Court for Montgomery County.)
Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

170 A.8d 297
MATTINGLY
vy.
VERGHESE
Pet. Docket No. 184, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

(No. 18-C-16-001488, Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County.)
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

es
=

170 A.3d 298
MCCOY, Frankie L., Sr.
ve
WARDEN, M.C.L-J
Pet. Docket No. 168, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2920, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.3d 298
MT, PLEASANT A.M.E, CHURCH
ve
T & T SERVICES
Pet. Docket No. 573, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,

September 22, 2017
(No, 03-C-16-006397, Cireuit Court for Baltimore County.)
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

TT
|

170 A.8d 298
MUA

vy.
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY EXCHANGE
Pet. Docket No. 212, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 1534,
Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.3d 298
SARTOR
ve
FREED PHOTOGRAPHY
Pet. Docket No. 195, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017
(No. 9488D, Circuit Court for Montgomery County.)
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

es
=
170 A.3d 299
SMITH, Chalmers
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 222, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 22, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 2080,
Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.8d 299
SMOOT, Larry Mitchell
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 221, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.

September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
787, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

2
=
170 A.3d 299
STAMPS, Rupert
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet, Docket No. 208, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1164, Sept.Term, 2016),

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.8d 299
STEVENSON, Korey
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 226, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

Application for leave to appeal dismissed by the Court of
Special Appeals (No, 866, Sept.Term, 2016),

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

a «
= |
170 A.3d 300
WHITE, Adrian R.
v

STATE of Maryland

Pet. Docket No. 242, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 22, 2017

Application for leave to appeal denied by the Court of
Special Appeals (No, 2498, Sept.Term, 2016),

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

170 A.3d 300
WOMEN FIRST OB/GYN
ve
HARRIS
Pet. Docket No. 194, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September 22, 2017

Reported below: 232 Md.App. 647, 161 A.8d 28.
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

TT

170 A.3d 800
WORSHAM
ve
MOSBY
Pet. Docket No. 220, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 22, 2017

(No. 12-C-15-002452, Circuit Court for Harford County.)
Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

a

170 A.3d 818

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner,

v.
Alex Jonathan BROWN, Respondent.
Misc, Docket AG No. 91, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
September 27, 2017

ORDER

This matter came before the Court on the Joint Petition for
Reprimand by Consent filed by the Attorney Grievance Com-
mission of Maryland and Respondent, Alex Jonathan Brown.
The Court, having considered the Petition and the record
herein, it is this 27th day of September, 2017,

ORDERED, that Respondent, Alex Jonathan Brown, be
and he is hereby REPRIMANDED for violating Rule 8.4(d) of
the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.

a

171 A8d 194

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner

v
Gary Stewart PEKLO, Respondent
Misc. Docket AG No. 27, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 2, 2017

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Joint Petition for Disbarment by
Consent filed herein pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-736 and
Respondent’s acknowledgement therein that sufficient evi-
dence exists to sustain allegations that he committed profes-
sional misconduct in violation of Rules 8.4(c) & (d) of the
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct in effect at
the time of the misconduct, it is this 2nd day of October, 2017,

ORDERED, that Gary Stewart Peklo, Respondent, is here-
by disbarred by consent from the practice of law in this State,
effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
name of Gary Stewart Peklo from the register of attorneys in
this Court, notify Respondent of the filing of this order in
accordance with Maryland Rule 19-742(a)(1), and comply with
the notice provisions set forth in Maryland Rule 19-761(b).

a

171 A.8d 609

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner

ve
John Thomas BURCH, Jr., Respondent
Misc. Docket AG No. 31, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
October 12, 2017

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Joint Petition for Disbarment by
Consent filed herein pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-786 and
Respondents acknowledgement therein that sufficient evi-
dence exists to sustain allegations that he committed profes-
sional misconduct in violation of Rules 8.4(b)(c) & (d) of the
Maryland Lawyers? Rules of Professional Conduct in effect at
the time of the misconduct, it is this 12th day of October, 2017,

ORDERED, that John Thomas Burch, Jr., Respondent, is
hereby disbarred by consent from the practice of law Jn this
State, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
name of John Thomas Burch, Jr. from the register of attor-
neys in this Court, notify Respondent of the filing of this order
in accordance with Maryland Rule 19-742(a)(1), and comply
with the notice provisions set forth in Maryland Rule 19-

‘761(b).

TT

171 A3d 610
CALVO
ve
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
Pet. Docket No. 229, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 10, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1086, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 48, Sept. Term, 2017.

171 A.8d 610
CHRISTIAN
ve
MATERNAL-FETAL MEDICINE ASSOC. OF MD.
Pet. Docket No. 247, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 10, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No. 13,
Sept. Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 51, Sept. Term, 2017.

a «
|

171 A.3d 610
HACKNEY, Thoyt
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 264, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 10, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2518, Sept. Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted and conditional cross-
petition denied. Transferred to the regular docket as No. 58,

Sept. Term, 2017.

171 A.3d 610
STATE of Maryland
ve
PHILLIPS, Bashunn Christopher
Pet. Docket No. 236, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 10, 2017
Reported below: 288 Md.App. 184, 168 A.3d 280,

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 49, Sept. Term, 2017.

171 Ad 611
STATE of Maryland
v
WEDDINGTON, Robert Clifford
Pet. Docket No. 250, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 10, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
122, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 52, Sept. Term, 2017.

171 A.8d 611
WHEELER, Robert
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet, Docket No. 246, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 10, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 50, Sept. Term, 2017.

a *
|
171 A8d 611

BOWIE, James E.
v

STATE of Maryland

Pet. Docket No. 286, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 19, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1906, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 55, Sept. Term, 2017.

171 A8d 611
CARTER, Daniel
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 261, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
October 19, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1150, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 54, Sept. Term, 2017.

Ss
Lt
171 A8d 612

MCCULLOUGH, Matthew Timothy

v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 304, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 19, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari and conditional cross-petition
both granted. Transferred to the regular docket as No. 56,

Sept. Term, 2017.

171 A8d 612
STATE of Maryland
ve
CLEMENTS, Phillip James
Pet. Docket No. 306, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 19, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2607, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 57, Sept. Term, 2017.

a =
|
171 Ad 612
ACKERMANN
ve
CVS PHARMACY
Pet. Docket No. 240, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017
(No, 9577D, Circuit Court for Montgomery County.)
Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A.3d 612
ALSTON, Algee
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 287, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2082, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A.3d 618
AVEDISIAN
v
RAPID FINANCIAL SERVICES
Pet. Docket No, 241, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1035, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A8d 613
BANKS
v.
FAR
Pet. Docket No. 237, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.

October 20, 2017

(Nos. CADV17-14008 & CAL17-11876, Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County.)

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

a «
a

171 A3d 618
BATES, William
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 238, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 2724, Sept.
Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed.

171 Ad 613
BROWN, Alfred Lee
Vv.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 219, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1441, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed.

171 A3d 614
DAVIS, Roy Sharonnie, III
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 216, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1184, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 Aad 614
DINGLE, Antonio
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 252, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1414, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

a
| |

171 A3d 614
EDOKOBI
v.
PRINCE GEORGE'S CO.
Pet. Docket No. 196, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

(No. CAL17-05947, Cireuit Court for Prince George’s Coun-
ty.)
Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A8d 614
GITTINGS
ve
MAUERHAN
Pet. Docket No. 244, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Pending in the Court of Special Appeals (No. 794, Sept.
Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

ST
|

171 A3d 615
HOLLOWAY, Christopher A.
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No, 265, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
884, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied,

171 A8d 615
HUNTER, David
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 224, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (Nos.
1684 & 2516, Sept. Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari and conditional cross-petition

both denied.

a «
a

171 A.8d 615
JONES, Letory
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 207, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Application for leave to appeal dismissed by the Court of
Special Appeals (No. 541, Sept. Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A.3d 615
MAIETTA, Patrick Allen
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 281, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 98, Sept.
Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed,

es
|
171 A3d 616
MOFOR
Vv.
N.E.C. TOWING
Pet. Docket No. 248, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.

October 20, 2017

(No. 03-C-16-012365, Circuit Court for Baltimore County.)

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed.

171 A8d 616
MORRISON, Abras S.Q.
v
STATE of Maryland, et al.
Pet. Docket No. 215, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
546, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

a «
|

171 A.3d 616
OLIPHANT, Samuel
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 256, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2918, Sept. Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A3d 616
RICHTER, Charles
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet, Docket No. 263, Sept. Term, 2017
Court. of Appeals of Maryland,
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1264, Sept. Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

.
a

171 A8d 617
ROBINSON, James W., Jr.
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 259, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1346, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A.3d 617
SERRANO, David
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 284, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (Nos.
1574 & 1575, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

re

a °
a

171 A.3d 617
STATEN, Bernard
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 200, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1509, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed.

171 Ad 617
SUMO
ve
GARDA WORLD
Pet. Docket No. 254, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1010, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

TT
|

171 A3d 618
TINSLEY
v.
STARR
Pet. Docket No. 239, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
549, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A.3d 618
TRUSTY
v.
WARD
Pet. Docket No. 227, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2571, Sept. Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

a
a

171 A.3d 618
TURNER-BEY, Shahid
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 285, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1144, Sept. Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A.8d 618
WILLIAMS, Duane Lamar
vy.
STATE of Maryland
Pet, Docket No. 211, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2428, Sept. Term, 2014).

Petition for writ of certiorari and conditional cross-petition

both denied.

TT
a

171 A3d 619
WOOLRIDGE
ve
ABRISHAMI
Pet, Docket No. 251, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

Reported below: 233 Md.App. 278, 163 A.3d 850.
Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

171 A8d 619
YAN
Vv.
HILL
Pet. Docket No. 249, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017
(No. 08-C-17-001086, Circuit Court for Baltimore County.)
Petition for writ of certiorari denied.

a "
171 A.8d 1162
John W. GREEN, III
ve
STATE of Maryland
No. 4, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,

October 20, 2017

Argued by Jeffrey M, Ross, Assistant Public Defender (Paul
B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on
brief, for Petitioner.

Argued by Edward J. Kelley, Assistant Attorney General
(Gary E. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General and Brian E.
Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on
brief, for Respondent,

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Watts, J.

“Whether a witness can positively identify the [defendant]
at the scene of the crime is often the cardinal facet of a
determination of guilt.” Williams v. State, 864 Md. 160, 179,
771 A.2d 1082, 1093 (2001). In other words, “[i]dentification
testimony may be outcome determinative[.]’ Id. at 174, 771
A.2d at 1090. “[H]ence, any solid preparation of a defense
demands this information.” Id. at 174, 771 A.2d at 1090,

During discovery in a criminal case in a circuit court,
Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) requires the State to disclose to
the defense, without the necessity of a request, “[aJll relevant
material or information regarding ... pretrial identification of
the defendant by a State’s witness[.]”

Here, we are asked to decide whether Maryland Rule 4~
263(d)(7)(B) requires the State to disclose to a defendant’s
counsel information regarding a State’s witness’s pretrial iden-
tification of a co-defendant. If not, we must decide whether
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) required the State to make such
a disclosure under the circumstances of this case, in which the
State’s undisputed theory was that only the defendant and co-
defendant were with the person who was killed when he was
fatally shot, and a State’s witness identified the co-defendant
as not being the shooter.

At trial, the State, Respondent, offered evidence of the

following theory of the case. John W. Green, III (“Green”),
Petitioner, was friends with Jonathan Copeland (“Copeland”),

a drug dealer. One of Copeland’s customers was Jeffrey
Myers (“Myers”), the person who was killed. One day, Myers
burglarized Copeland’s residence and stole cash and drugs.
Later that day, Copeland and Green went to Myers’s resi-
dence and confronted him about the burglary. The next day,
Copeland obtained a handgun. The following day, Copeland
and Green returned to Myers’s residence and confronted him
about the burglary again. During the confrontation, Myers
was fatally shot. Copeland, Myers, and Green were the only
people who were present at the time of the shooting. Accord-
ing to the State, Green was the shooter.

Green was the only defendant when the case proceeded to
trial, Copeland had been charged with the same offenses with
respect to Myers. Copeland, however, pled guilty to first-
degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

The State’s sole eyewitness to the shooting was Doris
Carter (“Carter”), Carter saw two men with Myers at the
scene of the shooting. Carter was unable to see the shooter’s
face because he was wearing a hoodie, Carter, however, saw
the face of the person who was not the shooter.

At trial in the Cireuit Court for Cecil County (“the circuit
court”), during Carter’s direct-examination, the prosecutor
proffered that Carter would identify Copeland as the person
who was not the shooter. Green’s counsel objected on the
ground that the State had not disclosed Carter’s identification
of Copeland during discovery. The circuit court permitted
Carter to identify Copeland. Copeland was briefly brought
into the courtroom, and Carter identified him as the person
who did not do the shooting.

Before us, Green contends that the circuit court erred in
permitting Carter to identify Copeland for two alternative
reasons. First, Green argues that Maryland Rule 4-
268(d)(7)(B) requires the State, as a matter of course, to
disclose a pretrial identification of a co-defendant during dis-
covery. Second, Green asserts that Maryland Rule 4-
268(d)(7)(B) required such a disclosure in this case because a
pretrial identification of Copeland as the person who was not

the shooter essentially constituted a pretrial identification of
Green as the shooter.

In Part I, we hold that, as a general matter, Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B), by its plain language and history, does not
require disclosure of pretrial identifications of co-defendants.
In Part II, we conclude that a pretrial identification of a co-
defendant is “relevant ... information regarding ... pretrial
identification of the defendant” under Maryland Rule 4-
268(d)(7)(B) where the pretrial identification of the co-defen-
dant is the equivalent of a pretrial identification of the defen-
dant as the person responsible for the crime. Here, Carter’s
pretrial identification of Copeland as the person who was not
the shooter was the equivalent of a pretrial identification of
Green as the shooter because the State’s theory of the case
was, and the State’s evidence showed, that Green, Copeland,
and Myers, the person who was killed, were the only people at
the scene of the shooting, and Myers was shot by one of the
other two men. Thus, the State was obligated to disclose
during discovery Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland as
the person who was not the shooter.

BACKGROUND

Charges, Writ of Habeas Corpus, and
State’s Opening Statement.

On November 18, 2018, Green was indicted for first-degree
murder, second-degree murder, conspiracy with Copeland to
commit first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commis-
sion of a felony or crime of violence, possession of a firearm
after conviction of a disqualifying crime, and wearing, carry-
ing, or transporting a handgun.

On November 18, 2014, prior to trial, the State filed a
Request for Writ in the circuit court, asking that “a writ be
issued to” Copeland. (Emphasis omitted). The Request for
Writ did not state its purpose. On November 28, 2014, the
circuit court issued to Copeland a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Testificandum/Prosequendum for each day from December 9

through December 12, 2014, and each day from December 15
through December 19, 2014. On December 8, 2014, trial began.

After a jury was selected, but before opening statements,
the prosecutor informed the circuit court that the State in-
tended to call Carter as a witness. The prosecutor advised that
he wanted Copeland to appear in the courtroom during Car-
ter’s testimony so that she could identify him. Green’s counsel
stated: “I very well might object to that. This is the first time
[that] I’ve heard that this is going to happen.”

During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor ad-
dressed Carter’s identification of Copeland as follows:
You're going to hear a witness who drove by the shooting
and saw a very distinct hat and then saw the shooting
actually take place in her side-view mirror.
em

[¥]ou have one eyewitness putting two people, one which
will be very clearly identified as [] Copeland and one that
loosely identifies as [] Green, at the scene of the shooting,
and that the trigger man is the one loosely identified by
size, shape[,] and stature as [] Green, and you connect all
the other things that you hear—I’m not going to lay out
every piece you’re going to hear.

Carter’s Testimony

At trial, as a witness for the State, Carter testified that, on
October 28, 2018, she was driving north on Principio Road in
Cecil County. Carter saw two parked vehicles facing each
other. One vehicle was a truck, and the other was a dark Ford
Mustang. Two men were nearby. One man was standing off to
the side of the road. That man was shorter and stouter than
the other one, and was wearing a hoodie. The other man was
standing near the Mustang’s driver’s seat, with one foot in the
Mustang and the other foot on the ground. That man was tall
and thin, and was wearing a black hat with what appeared to
be white snowflakes. During Carter’s testimony, the State
showed her a hat. Carter identified the hat as the one that she

had seen on the tall, thin man. The circuit court admitted the
hat into evidence,

Carter testified that she heard a gunshot. She looked into
her driver’s side-view mirror and saw the shorter, stouter man
shoot into the truck three times. Carter could not see the face
of the shorter, stouter man—ie., the shooter—because his
hood was up. Carter, however, got a look at the face of the
tall, thin man—i.e., the person who was not the shooter—and
drove away. Afterward, Carter decided to return to the scene
of the shooting so that she could find out the address. Within
two or three minutes, Carter drove back to the scene. On her
way, she did not see the Mustang. By the time that Carter
returned to the scene, the Mustang was gone.

One or two days after the shooting, Carter provided a
statement to detectives in her home. Within a week, detectives
interviewed Carter at a police station.

On direct-examination, the following exchange occurred with
regard to Carter’s ability to identify the two men:
PROSECUTOR: When you first met with detectives, do
you remember what you told them in terms of whether you
got @ good look at faces or not?

CARTER:] You know, at first I didn’t want to get anything
wrong. I just wanted to say exactly what I knew that I saw.
And as those memories started coming back, it was after I
talked to them,

[PROSECUTOR:] So when you first met the detectives
what did you say in terms of—

CARTER:] I think I told them that I couldn’t—I could tell
you how—like one was tall and thin and the other one was
short and stout, and that the one was wearing a hat. Then I
think I might have said that one was a white male, but I’m
not even sure.

[PROSECUTOR:] All right. As time has gone by though, as
you sit—again, as you sit here right now, do you have an
image of what the taller skinnier one, as you described him,
next to the driver’s door looked like?

[CARTER;] Yes.

[PROSECUTOR:] And if he was presented to you do you
believe that you could identify him?
[CARTER;] I think so.
While Carter was still on the stand, at a bench conference, the
prosecutor stated:
[T}his was the reason for the writ for [] Copeland—
noting, of course, that [Green] is not charged merely with
first[-]degree murderf ], he is also charged with conspiracy
to commit first[-]degree murder. He’s charged specifically
conspiracy with [ ] Copeland. It is the [S]tate’s proffer to the
court that we believe that [] Carter, upon seeing [] Cope-
land, will be able to positively identify him.
ak ok
We intend to have [] Carter specifically ... identify []
Copeland either by face, and say, yes, that’s him, or that
looks like him or whatever she says, then ask her about the
physique, whether that’s consistent with the first or the
second person or anything to that effect.
(Emphasis added) (paragraph break omitted).

Green’s counsel objected, stating: “[Nlowhere in any discov-
ery has anyone told me that a witness is going to identify a co-
defendant[.]” Green’s counsel stated: “[W]ithout giving notice,
[Carter]’s going to identify [Copeland.] ... [Slurprise, sur-
prise, she’s identifying the co-defendant.” Green’s counsel
contended that the State had been obligated to disclose during
discovery that a witness had been expected to identify Cope-
land,

In response, the prosecutor stated, among other things:
“[Clivilian witnesses[,] every day[,] get on the stand and say
things ... for the first time. They say things different and
supplemental, additional to what they said during the inter-
view process[.]” The prosecutor did not, however, contend that
he had just learned that Carter could identify Copeland, or
that he was surprised to discover that Carter could identify
Copeland. The prosecutor stated that Green’s counsel’s

claim of surprise that the body [of Copeland] would be

produced here for purposes of the identification ... just

can’t be accurate .... There is no surprise. This is not a

surprise witness. [Green’s counsel] knew that there were

plenty of people that could identify [Copeland]; andl[,] real-
lyL,] the only claim of surprise is, is that [Carter] is going to
be able to identify [Copeland].

(Paragraph break omitted).

The prosecutor neither disputed that there had been a
pretrial identification of Copeland by Carter, nor denied that
Copeland had informed law enforcement officers pretrial of
her ability to identify Copeland as the person who was not the
shooter. Instead, the prosecutor contended that Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) obligated the State to disclose during
discovery pretrial identifications of a defendant, not a co-
defendant. The prosecutor stated that Green’s counsel would
be able to elicit on cross-examination that, at one point, Carter
“went so far as to say that she couldn’t identify anybody.”

Without expressly determining whether there had been a
discovery violation, the circuit court stated that it would allow
Carter to identify Copeland. Copeland was brought in the
courtroom, briefly stood there, and was excused. Carter identi-
fied Copeland as the tall, thin man who had been wearing a
hat and standing near the Mustang’s driver's side. In other
words, Carter identified Copeland as the person who did not
perform the shooting.

On cross-examination, the following exchanges occurred
with regard to the statement that Carter had provided to
detectives in her home one or two days after the shooting:

[GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Do you remember what you told

[the detectives] the first time?

[CARTER:] Pretty much what I said here except for I’m

sure—tike I said, it’s been a year, and after that[,] I just

didn’t contact them to tell them anything else.
kK

[GREEN’S COUNSEL] Is it fair to say [that] the detec-

tives asked you if you could identify [the shooter]?

CARTER:] I’m sure [that] they did. That was—believe me,
I was so nervous after all this. I was traumatized. I have to
say [that] I was traumatized because I didn’t sleep. I just
kept thinking about it over and over again. I couldn’t believe
that I saw what I saw.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] But two days later[,] they asked if
you could identify either of these people.
CARTER:] Yeah. I’m sure they asked me if I knew what
they were wearing, and I said the hat and the height and as
much of a description—
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Did you give them an idea—two
days after the interview you said short and stocky; or did
you give an idea of height or just a general description?
CARTER:] Just that, short and stocky.
On cross-examination, the following exchanges occurred re-
garding the detectives’ interview of Carter at the police station
within a week after she provided the statement to detectives
in her home:
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Is it fair to say [that,] in that
interview[,] you told the detectives that you didn’t really get
a very good look at these people as you drove by because
you were worried about their vehicle in the road?
CARTER:] Right.

aR
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] And they asked you once again for
descriptions of these people beyond what you’ve testified to,
and you were unable, even a week after this happened, to
give any further description, is that fair?
CARTER] That’s fair.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Have you seen a tape of your
interview?
CARTER:] Yes.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] So me asking you that, you've
seen it?
CARTER:] I’ve seen it.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] You know what’s on there.

[CARTER:] Right. I do know what’s on there. It’s just that
memories start coming back after I talked to them, and I
didn’t talk to them until now. I’m just telling you what I saw
that day and what I remember [that] I saw that day.

The following exchange occurred pertaining to Carter’s
ability to identify Copeland:
GREEN’S COUNSEL: Yjou just identified the person
who came in. Have you ever been shown a photo of him
before?
CARTER:] Just[,] I identified him through just like his
eyes and the hat, and not because of, you know, what he was
wearing today or anything like that. I remember [that] he
looked at me and I looked at him as I was going by because
he was right there.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Have you seen his picture in the
newspaper or anywhere since this happened?
CARTER:] Yes, yes, in the Cecil Daily.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Oh.
CARTER:] But I knew [that] when saw [sic] that, that was
the person driving the car—or standing outside that driver's
door. The other person I’d saw in the paper also, and I
didn’t know them at all.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] When you—since—when was the
first time that you realized, seeing a picture, that you knew
who that person was?
CARTER:] When I saw it probably in the paper. I said, oh,
wow, that’s the guy [who] was wearing the hat, that’s the
guy [who] was standing outside the door.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] So like a year ago?
CARTER:] Yes, probably a little—no, I don’t know if it was
a year ago because it wasn’t in the paper—I’m not sure, I’m
not sure when they put it in the paper.
GREEN’S COUNSEL:] But sometime after this case and
people were charged—
CARTER:] Yes.

GREEN’S COUNSEL:] (Continuing)—you saw a picture of
{] Copeland, and you—

[CARTER;] And I knew that—

GREEN’S COUNSEL:] And you knew [that] it was him?
CARTER:] But I didn’t plan on like being here today. I
didn’t want to be here today.

GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Did you ever call anyone, inform
anyone that —

CARTER:] No.

GREEN’S COUNSEL:] Okay. When did you eventually
tell any of the detectives that you knew who [] Copeland
was?
CARTER:] When I went over—over everything again with
them, what I saw—everything that I saw that day.

Testimony of Other State’s Witnesses

Including Carter, the State called thirty witnesses, For
brevity’s sake, we will refrain from discussing the testimony of
all of the State’s witnesses and summarize the testimony of
those witnesses who provided relevant information concerning
Myers, Copeland, and Green, and evidence of the crime.

Randy Smith (“Smith”) testified that, in October 2013,
Copeland was renting a house from him. On October 21, 2018,
Copeland told Smith that Myers had broken into his house
and stolen cash, According to Smith, Copeland seemed “very
upset.”

David Gordon (“Gordon”) testified that, on October 21, 2018,
he was spending time with Copeland. Copeland got a tele-
phone call about an alarm in his residence going off. Gordon
and Copeland went to Copeland’s residence, and Copeland
went inside. Afterward, Copeland came back outside looking
mad, and said that “stuff” had been stolen. Gordon and
Copeland went to Myers’s residence, and went inside. Cope-
land told Myers that cash and drugs were missing. Gordon
and Copeland left Myers’s residence, then picked up Green.
Gordon, Copeland, and Green went to Myers’s residence.

PT

Hither Copeland or Green told Myers: “[J]ust give it back.”
Copeland also talked to Myers’s father, Howard Steve Myers.
Eventually, Gordon, Copeland, and Green left Myers’s resi-
dence,

Dawn Watson (“Watson”), Myers’s girlfriend, testified that,
in October 2018, she lived with Myers in his parents’ base-
ment. At the time, Myers was using heroin. According to
Watson, Copeland was Myers’s heroin dealer. Watson testified
that, on October 21, 2013, she and Myers were at home.
Suddenly, the back door opened, and Copeland and another
man appeared. Copeland told Myers that someone had broken
into his residence. Copeland and the other man left Myers’s
residence. According to Watson, Copeland texted Myers, stat-
ing: “If my stuff is not in the back of your truck when I get
there[,] somebody is going to get shot.” Approximately half-
an-hour after Copeland and the other man left Myers’s resi-
dence, Copeland, Green, and the other man came to Myers’s
residence in Copeland’s black Mustang. Watson knew Green
because Myers had previously introduced him to her. At the
time, Green had a full beard. Myers and his father went
outside. Copeland spoke in a loud voice, but Watson could not
make out what he was saying. The next day, on October 22,
2018, Green telephoned or texted Myers, warning him that
people were looking for him.

Myers’s mother, Rebecca Myers, testified that, on October
21, 2018, when she came home from work, she saw Copeland’s
black Mustang parked near her residence. Myers, his father,
Copeland, Green, and another man were standing outside.
Copeland accused Myers of burglarizing his residence. Myers
threw his hands in the air and said: “I wasn’t there. I didn’t
do anything.” Myers’s father told Copeland to get off their
property. Copeland, Green, and the other man left in Cope-
land’s Mustang.

Myers’s father testified that, in October 2018, he, Myers’s
mother, Myers, and Watson lived on Principio Road in Port
Deposit. On October 21, 2018, at approximately 3:15 p.m. or
3:30 p.m., Myers’s father arrived home from work, and en-

tered his residence, Afterward, Myers’s father heard a vehicle
approaching. Myers’s father looked outside and saw Copeland,
Green, and another man in Copeland’s black Mustang. At the
time, Green had a bushy beard. Myers’s father went outside
and asked if he could help the men. The three men asked to
talk to Myers. Myers’s father went inside and told Myers that
he had company, and Myers went outside. Myers’s father
heard yelling, went outside, and asked the three men what
was going on. Copeland said something along the lines of:
“None of [your] business[.]” Myers’s father heard Copeland
tell Myers that someone had broken into his residence, At
approximately 4:30 p.m. or 4:35 p.m., Myers’s mother arrived
home. Two or three times, Myers’s father told the three men
to leave, or he would call the police. Eventually, the three men
left.

Myers’s father testified that, two days later, on October 28,
2013, at approximately 3:15 p.m. or 3:30 p.m., he came home
from work. Myers was in the basement. At approximately 4:30
p.m., Myers’s mother came home from work. Afterward,
Myers’s father heard a door slam. Later, Thomas Miller
(“Miller”), a neighbor, telephoned Myers’s father and said that
something had happened to Myers. Myers’s parents went
outside. Myers’s truck was at the end of the driveway, and
Myers’s body was in the driver’s seat.

Michael Owens (“Owens”) testified that, in October 2013,
Copeland was his heroin dealer. At the time, Owens used one
or two “bundles” of heroin each day. In September and
October 2018, Owens owned approximately eight guns. One of
Owens’s guns was a 40 caliber Kahr handgun. Sometime
before October 21, 20138, Copeland said that he wanted the
handgun, and offered to either buy it or trade drugs for it. On
October 21, 2013, Copeland told Owens that someone had
broken into his residence. Copeland said that he wanted to
obtain the handgun for self-defense in case another break-in
occurred.

Owens testified that, the next day, on October 22, 2018,
Owens went to Copeland’s residence and saw Copeland,

Green, and Kenny Howell (“Howell”), Copeland’s cousin.
Copeland and Green “seemed to be very good friends.” Owens
gave Copeland the handgun, which was loaded with six bullets.
In exchange, Copeland gave Owens thirteen bags of heroin.

Owens testified that, in March 2014, Detective Chris Lewis
contacted him. Owens gave Detective Lewis two spent shell
casings that had been ejected from the handgun when he had
fired it twice sometime in 2013. During Owens’s testimony, the
circuit court admitted the shell casings into evidence.

Jessie Campbell (“Campbell”), a forensic scientist of the
Firearms and Tool Marks Unit of the Forensic Sciences
Division of the Maryland State Police, was accepted as an
expert in firearm and tool mark examination. Campbell com-
pared the shell casings that Owens had given Detective Lewis
to four shell casings that had been found at the scene of the
shooting. Campbell concluded that all six shell casings had
been fired from the same gun.

Richard Bell, Jr. (“Bell”) testified that, on October 28, 2018,
he telephoned Copeland to ask to buy marijuana. At approxi-
mately 4 p.m., Copeland and Howell, his cousin, came to Bell’s
residence in Copeland’s black Mustang. Copeland and Howell
stayed at Bell’s residence for approximately ten minutes.
Copeland told Bell that Myers had broken into his residence
two days earlier. Copeland “looked pretty mad,” and had
something that “looked like a gun.”

Jessica Peacock (“Peacock”) testified that, in October 2018,
she was dating Green. On October 28, 2013, at approximately
4:30 p.m., Green met Peacock outside the residence of one of
her friends, Green told Peacock: “Something bad might hap-
pen.” Afterward, Green left. At approximately 6:00 p.m., Pea-
cock returned to her residence. At approximately 6:30 p.m.,
Green was dropped off at Peacock’s residence. Green told
Peacock that someone had been shot. Green told Peacock that
he had been present at the scene of the shooting, but that he
did not do it.

Gwen Wisniewski (“Wisniewski”) testified that, on October
28, 2018, she was driving on Principio Road, in the area of its

intersection with Biggs Highway. Wisniewski saw a truck
parked in a driveway, A black Mustang with two occupants
was blocking the driveway. The person in the Mustang’s
passenger seat was moving around.

Miller—the neighbor whom Myers’s father had mentioned—
testified that he lived on Principio Road, approximately one or
two acres away from the Myerses’ residence, On October 23,
2018, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Miller saw a black Mustang
blocking Myers’s truck in the driveway. A man with a long,
reddish beard was standing near Myers’s truck. A tall man
with black hair was walking around the Mustang. Miller heard
loud voices, but could not make out what was being said.
Miller went into his garage. One or two minutes later, Miller
heard two gunshots, Miller left his garage and saw the Mus-
tang speeding away. Miller went to Myers’s truck and saw
that Myers had been shot.

Deputy First Class Ross Griffin of the Cecil County Sher-
iff's Office testified that he lived approximately a quarter of a
mile away from Myers’s residence. On October 28, 2018, while
Deputy First Class Griffin was at home, he heard two gun-
shots. After a pause, he heard two more gunshots. Approxi-
mately one or two minutes later, a black Mustang with two
occupants went down Principio Road. The passenger had a
larger build than the driver, and was wearing a dark coat or
jacket.

James Finn (“Finn”), a paramedic with the Cecil County
Department of Emergency Services, testified that, on October
28, 2018, at 4:56 p.m., he was dispatched to Principio Road. At
5:02 p.m. he arrived. There was a truck parked in the
driveway. Inside the truck was an unresponsive man with a
bullet wound. The man was pronounced dead on the scene.

James Locke, M.D. (“Dr. Locke”), a medical examiner of the
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, was accepted as an
expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Locke testified that, on
October 24, 2018, he autopsied Myers’s body. The cause of
death was multiple gunshot wounds. Myers had four gunshot

wounds: one to his head, one to the left side of his chest, one
to the right side of his chest, and one to his right hand.

Stephanie Peterson (“Peterson”), a crime scene technician
of the Cecil County Sheriff’s Office, testified that, on October
28, 2018, at approximately 9:20 p.m., she arrived at Principio
Road. Peterson recovered one cartridge and four cartridge
casings from the scene. Peterson recovered from Myers’s body
182 baggies that contained suspected heroin. In the basement
of Myers’s residence, Peterson saw pills, suspected marijuana
seeds, suspected drug paraphernalia, and a “Suboxone strip,”
which is used to treat drug addiction.

Deputy First Class Jonathan Pruett of the Cecil County
Sheriff's Office testified that, on October 28, 2018, he assisted
in Copeland’s arrest at an M & T Bank in Colora, Maryland. A
person named Eddie Haskins (“Haskins”) was the only person
who was with Copeland at the time of his arrest. Deputy First
Class Pruett performed a search incident to arrest, and found
two bundles, or approximately twenty-six bags, of heroin, as
well as a cell phone on Copeland’s person.

Detective William Sewell of the Criminal Investigation Divi-
sion of the Cecil County Sheriff's Office testified that he
obtained records for Copeland’s and Green’s cell phones.
Detective Sewell had those records sent to Detective Jordan
Swonger of the Prince George’s County Police Department.

Detective Swonger was accepted as an expert in the fields of
cell phones and cell phone technology. Detective Swonger
testified that he had performed an analysis of the records for
Copeland’s and Green’s cell phones. Detective Swonger pre-
pared a Cellular Analysis Report for Copeland’s cell phone,
and another Cellular Analysis Report for Green’s cell phone.
Detective Swonger also created a map showing the cell towers
to which Copeland’s and Green's cell phones connected be-
tween 4:46 p.m. and 5:46 p.m. on October 23, 2018. The cireuit
court admitted the Cellular Analysis Reports and the maps
into evidence.

On October 28, 2018, at 4:46 p.m., Copeland’s cell phone
connected to a cell tower in the general vicinity of Myers’s

residence. At 4:57 p.m., Green’s cell phone connected to a
different cell tower in the general vicinity of Myers’s resi-
dence. Copeland’s and Green’s cell phones appeared to move
east across Interstate 95, which runs through Cecil County
and Delaware. At 5:34 p.m., Green’s cell phone connected to a
cell tower in the general vicinity of a Pathmark store in
Delaware. At 5:39 p.m., Copeland’s cell phone connected to a
different cell tower in the general vicinity of the Pathmark
store in Delaware.

Detective Matt Blailock of the Criminal Investigation Divi-
sion of the Cecil County Sheriff's Office testified that he
reviewed surveillance videos as part of the homicide investiga-
tion. At the time, Copeland’s Mustang was in the Sheriff's
Office’s possession. Detective Blailock was able to identify
Copeland’s Mustang in surveillance videos because it had
after-market rims or wheels, blinkers on the side-view mir-
rors, and a stripe on the side. Additionally, stickers and an H—
ZPass transmitter tag’ were attached to Copeland’s Mus-
tang’s windows. According to Detective Blailock, surveillance
videos showed that, on October 28, 2018, sometime after 4
p.m., Copeland’s Mustang traveled on Theodore Road, then
turned onto Camp Meeting Ground Road. At 4:55 p.m., Cope-
land’s Mustang traveled through the parking lot of a Lan-
dhope Farms gas station, and left onto Maryland Route 276.
At 5:14 p.m., Copeland’s Mustang went east through the toll
booth on Interstate 95 that is near the Maryland—Delaware
border. Detective Blailock viewed a surveillance video from a
camera outside a Pathmark store in Delaware. On October 28,
2013, at 5:46 p.m., Copeland and Green were walking together
outside of the store,

Detective Blailock testified that he helped execute a search
warrant for Green’s residence. Detective Blailock found a hat

1, E-ZPass “is a commercial service that allows motorists to pay into an
account from which certain roadway and bridge tolls are deducted
when the motorist passes through the prescribed toll lanes equipped to
receive the transmission sent from the motorist’s B-Z[ ]Pass transmitter
‘tag’.”” Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 409 n.2, 921 A.2d 171, 174 n.2
(2007).

on the kitchen countertop. Detective Blailock was shown the
hat that had been admitted into evidence—ie., the hat that
Carter testified that she had seen the tall, thin man wearing.
Detective Blailock identified the hat as the one that he had
seized from Green’s residence.

Julie Kempton (“Kempton”), a forensic scientist of the Biol-
ogy Unit of the Forensic Sciences Division of the Maryland
State Police? testified that she had received a hat and oral
swabs from Green and Copeland. Kempton found skin cells on
the hat. There were two contributors to the DNA in the skin
eells—one major, and one minor. The major contributor’s
profile matched Green’s profile. Kempton excluded Copeland
as the minor contributor.

Detective Lewis of the Criminal Investigation Division of
the Cecil County Sheriff's Office testified that, on October 24
or 25, 2018, he and Detective Sewell interviewed Carter at her
residence. On October 25, 2018, Detective Lewis prepared a
statement of charges against Green. According to the state-
ment of charges, Carter said that the shooter was a short,
stocky person who was wearing a hat with snowflakes.

Detective Lewis testified that, when they were arrested and
booked, Green was approximately 5’7” and 190 pounds, and
Copeland was approximately 5’11” and 160 pounds. On Octo-
ber 25, 2018, Detective Lewis interviewed Green. Detective
Lewis advised Green of his Miranda rights,’ which he waived.
Green told Detective Lewis that he had never been with
Copeland on October 28, 2018. Green acknowledged, however,

2. Kempton testified about her education, experience, and training in
forensics. The State, however, did not offer Kempton as an expert in
any field. Green’s counsel did not raise any objection during Kempton’s
testimony.

3. In Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 246, 249 ni, 55 A.3d 680, 682 ni
(2012), this Court explained that, under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 467-69, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966),

[law enforcement officers] are required, prior to any custodial inter-
rogation, to inform a suspect that he or she has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he or she does make can be used as
evidence against him or her, and that he or she has the right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.

that he and Copeland were close. Green also said that he used
to have a bushy beard, and that he had shaved on the day of
the interview.

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Green’s Testimony

At the conclusion of the State’s case, Green’s counsel made
a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the circuit court
granted only as to the charge for possession of a firearm after
conviction of a disqualifying crime.

As the only witness on his own behalf, Green testified that
he had known Myers for fifteen years. According to Green, he
and Myers “were all right” and “got high together.” On
October 22, 2018, Green telephoned Myers and told him “to
watch out, that people were looking for him[.]” Green told
Myers that, if he had stolen cash or drugs, he should give
them back.

Green testified that on October 28, 2018, Copeland tele-
phoned him and said that he was going to pick him up and
drive to Myers’s residence. Copeland said that he wanted to
talk to Myers about “taking [his] s[***].” Copeland picked up
Green in his Mustang. Green acknowledged that, at the time,
he was wearing the hat that had been admitted into evidence.

According to Green, Copeland drove to Myers’s driveway
and parked in front of his truck. Myers told Copeland and
Green to leave, and threatened to call the police. Myers and
Copeland started arguing about the “dope” that had gone
missing. Myers told Copeland to move his Mustang because
Myers’s truck was blocked in, Green testified that while Myers
was in his truck, Copeland pulled out a gun and shot Myers.
Green acknowledged that no one else was present at the time.

According to Green, Copeland drove his Mustang to Dela-
ware, with Green as a passenger. Eventually, Copeland drove
to an open-air drug market, and left his Mustang to buy
drugs. When Copeland left his Mustang, he had his gun, but
when he returned, the gun was gone. Copeland drove down
Interstate 95. Eventually, due to car trouble, Copeland parked
and telephoned Haskins to ask for help. Haskins picked up
Copeland and Green.

On cross-examination, Green acknowledged that, when de-
tectives interviewed him, he falsely stated that, on October 28,
2018, he was not at the scene of the shooting. Green admitted
that he told detectives that he does not drive. Green also
acknowledged that he had a beard at the time of the shooting.

State’s Closing Argument.

During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor ad-
dressed Carter's identification of Copeland as follows:
Passers[ Jby and neighbors saw the two people outside the
Mustang. One taller. One skinnier. I’m sorry. One taller and
skinnier and the other was shorter and stockier. And []
Miller, the neighbor, and [] Carter, the passer[ ]by, both
said without reservation, no ambiguity, no cross[ Jexamina-
tion that got them tongue[-]tied or twisted or slightly con-
fused, no question in their minds that the shorter[,] stocky
guy was the one at the side of [Myers]’s truck. [] Miller
distinctly remembered a bushy beard on the shorter[,]
stockier man. And [ ] Copeland [was] positively identified by
[] Carter, you saw him, he stood right here, she sat right
there, he left the room, she said [that] that was the guy. Not
just the guy. That was the guy standing at the side of the
Mustang. That is one key piece of evidence. So [] Copeland
was positively identified by [] Carter as being the man next.
to his Mustang at the time of the shooting. He is distinct-
ly—you have seen them both. He is distinctly the taller[,]
skinnier guy as compared to [] Green. [] Green himself
says [that] he doesn’t drive, yet he wants you to believe that
he, not Copeland, was the person at the driver’s side of the
door when [] Carter drove by. You know [that] that makes
no sense. He was the passenger. He said, “I don’t drive.”
You heard that in a statement to the detectives during their
interview and you heard that in his testimony here. He
doesn’t drive. But for convenience sake [sic] of this story he
concocted, he wants you to believe that roles were reversed,
he got out of the car and just meandered over to the
driver’s side while [] Copeland was the one who went and
executed [ ] Myers.

Still talking about that puzzle piece about short and
stocky, [] Carter was quite clear in her memory. First of
all, the tall[,] skinny guy was at the side of the Mustang.
She said that without reservation. Secondly, she positively
identified him as the guy next to the Mustang when he was
in the courtroom[,] and she said that the shorter[,] stocky
guy was the one by the side of the truck. This is so
important. Think about the time that went by. She drove by,
she’s feet away, she sees Copeland standing at the side of
the Mustang, and within seconds, not enough time for them
to just do a quick role reversal, she hears the bang, she
looks in the mirror and she sees the shorter[,] stocky guy.
This tall[/Jskinny versus short[/]stocky is critical. The timing
did not allow the two to change positions as [ ] Carter heard
shots fired almost instantly she passed by. So not only did
she say without reservation that the shorter[,] stockier guy
was the shooter, but given that she is certain that []
Copeland was the person standing at the driver’s side of the
Mustangl[,] and given the lack of time between passing by
and hearing that first shot, those two could not have
swapped positions. She said she saw the shorter[,] stockier
guy firing the gun.

eee

[] Wisniewski and [ ] Carter happened to drive by as this
thing was all just going down. Think about the timeframe
here, ladies and gentlemen. Think about this. They have got
two guys there. Carter definitively, definitively, she is as
neutral as you can get, she’s a passer[ Joy who you could
tell, maybe not as much as [] Peacock, but you could tell
she didn’t want to be here either. I mean, who would want
to be here and testifying in circumstances like this? But she
gets on the stand[,] and she says without reservation, that
man, [ ] Copeland, was the man standing at the side. This is
all important because of the amount of time, the speed by
which this happened.

ke

Green, by his own admission[,] and as supported by other

evidence, was, in fact, at the crime scene. The shooter was

the short[,] stocky guy and had a bushy beard. [ ] Green was
and is the shorter[,] stockier guyl,] and had, by his own
admission[,] and again as supported by the evidence we
presented, a bushy beard when [] Myers was shot. []
Copeland was positively identified as the man standing on
the roadway immediately next to the driver’s door of his
own Mustang a mere second or two before the first shots
were fired. [] Carter was quite clear about this fact, and []
Copeland, therefore, was not the shooter.

Verdicts and Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals

The jury found Green guilty of first-degree murder, conspir-
acy with Copeland to commit first-degree murder, use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, and
wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Green noted an
appeal,

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. See
Green v. State, 231 Md.App. 58, 56, 149 A.8d 1159, 1161 (2016).
The Court of Special Appeals held “that the State’s discovery
obligations pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 4-268(d)(7)[ (B) ] are
limited to that set forth by the plain language of the rule, ie.,
information regarding ‘pretrial identification of the defendant
by a State’s witness.’” Id, at 74, 149 A.8d at 1171. In other
words, the Court concluded that Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B)
is unambiguous, and applies only to “disclosure of pretrial
identifications of ‘the defendant.’” Id, at 72, 149 A.8d at 1170,
The Court observed that, in contrast to Maryland Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B), other provisions of Maryland Rule 4-268(d) ex-
pressly use the term “co-defendant.” See id. at 72, 149 A.8d at
1170.

The Court concluded that Green had supplied “no persua-
sive authority” indicating that Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B)
applies to a pretrial “identification of someone other than the
defendant” where such a pretrial identification “suggests, in
conjunction with other evidence, that the defendant was in-
volved with the crime.” Id, at 78, 149 A.8d at 1171. The Court
reasoned that concluding otherwise would make the State’s

discovery obligations depend on the defendant’s trial strategy,
“which often will be unknown prior to trial.” Id. at 74, 149
A.8d at 1171. Applying its holding to the facts of this case, the
Court concluded that the State did not violate Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B) by not disclosing during discovery Carter's
pretrial identification of Copeland. See id. at 74, 149 A.8d at
1171.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
Green petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the follow-
ing two issues:

1. Does Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), which requires
the State to disclose “{a]ll relevant material or information
regarding ... pretrial identification of the defendant by a
State’s witness,” require the State to disclose all relevant
material or information regarding pretrial identification of a
co-defendant by a State’s witness?

2. Where [Green] and another individual, [ ] Copeland,
who pled guilty to first[-]degree murder and conspiracy to
commit first[-]degree murder in the shooting death of the
victim in [Green]’s case, were both present at the scene of
the shooting, and the eyewitness identification of Copeland
as the [person who was not the shooter] implicated [Green]
as the person who shot and killed the victim, did the Court
of Special Appeals err in holding that information regarding
the identification of Copeland did not fall within the scope of
“relevant material or information regarding ... pretrial
identification of the defendant by a State’s witness,” under
[Maryland] Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)?

(Ellipses and first alteration in original), This Court granted
the petition. See Green v. State, 452 Md. 4, 155 A3d 891
(2017).

DISCUSSION
I. Pretrial Identification of Co-Defendants

The Parties’ Contentions

Green contends that, as a general matter, Maryland Rule 4—
263(d)(7)(B) requires the State to disclose a State’s witness’s

pretrial identification of a co-defendant. Green argues that
disclosure of a pretrial identification of a co-defendant fulfills
the objectives of Maryland Rule 4-263—namely, assisting the
defendant in the preparation of a defense and protecting the
defendant from unfair surprise. Green asserts that the Court
of Special Appeals’s holding resulted in too narrow an inter-
pretation of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), and that the use of
the phrase “all relevant material or information” in the sub-
section warrants a broader interpretation, requiring disclosure
of a pretrial identification of a co-defendant.

Green maintains that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is analo-
gous to Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G), which requires the
State to disclose a pretrial failure to identify a defendant or a
co-defendant. Green acknowledges that, unlike Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(6)(G), Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) does not explicit-
ly refer to co-defendants. Green contends, however, that
“there is no reasonable explanation as to why the [Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (“the Rules
Committee”) ] would recommend[—Jand this Court, in its rule-
making capacity, would require[—ldisclosure of information
regarding the failure of a witness to identify a co-defendant[,]
but not disclosure of information regarding the witness’s
identification of a co-defendant.” According to Green, both of
these pieces of information are important to preparing a
defense, and neither is more burdensome to produce than the
other. Green argues that the inclusion of the term “co-defen-
dant” in Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(6)(G) mandates the inclusion
of the term “co-defendant” in Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B).

Green asserts that, even if Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G)’s
use of the word “co-defendant” does not establish that Mary-
land Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) applies to co-defendants, Maryland
Rule 4~268(d)(6)(G)’s use of the word “co-defendant” shows
that Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) is ambiguous in its applica-
bility to co-defendants. Green maintains that, if Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B) is ambiguous, the Rule’s history is vital to
resolving any question as to its construction. Green points out
that Maryland Rule 4-263 was amended in 2008, and contends
that the Rules Committee sought to harmonize Maryland Rule

4-268 with the American Bar Association Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury, 8d Hd. (1996) (“the
ABA Standards”) as much as possible, and, as such, intended
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) to “cover identifications of the
defendant or co-defendant.” (Footnote and ellipsis omitted),
Green argues that the lack of inclusion of the term “co-
defendant” in Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is not evidence of
a deliberate omission.

The State responds that Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B)’s
plain language limits the State’s discovery obligations to pre-
trial identifications of the defendant, not a co-defendant. The
State points out that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) explicitly
refers to “the defendant,” not “a defendant,” meaning that
Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) may not be construed to include
any defendant—i.e., a co-defendant or a defendant. In other
words, the State contends that the Rules Committee specifi-
cally chose language limiting Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) to
disclosure of the pretrial identification of the defendant. The
State argues that, because the Rules Committee chose to
include the phrase “or a co-defendant” in other provisions of
Maryland Rule 4-263, but deliberately omitted the phrase
from Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), it must be presumed that
the omission is intentional.

The State acknowledges that the purposes of Maryland
Rule 4-263 include assisting the defendant in the preparation
of a defense and protecting the defendant from unfair sur-
prise, but the State asserts that not all alleged surprises are
covered by Maryland Rule 4-268. The State points out that
another purpose of the discovery rules is the provision of clear
notice as to what is required to be disclosed. The State
maintains that interpreting Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)—
which refers to the disclosure of a pretrial identification of
“the defendant”—to include a requirement to disclose the
pretrial identification of a co-defendant would not provide
adequate notice of the State’s disclosure obligations.

The State contends that Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B)’s
history does not show that the Rules Committee intended for

the phrase “the defendant” to include co-defendants and/or co-
conspirators. The State points out that ABA Standard 11-2.1
requires disclosure of “[alny material, documents, or informa-
tion relating to lineups, showups, and picture or voice identifi-
cations in relation to the case.” The State notes that, in
proposing amendments to Maryland Rule 4-263, the Rules
Committee considered the ABA Standards, but failed to in-
clude the broad language requiring disclosure of any pretrial
identifications in relation to the case, The State argues that,
instead, the Rules Committee decided to narrow the State’s
disclosure requirement to “[alll relevant material or informa-
tion regarding ... pretrial identification of the defendant by a
State’s witness[.]” The State asserts that the Rules Committee
was free to require the disclosure of a pretrial failure to
identify a co-defendant in Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(6)(G) and
not require the disclosure of a pretrial identification of a co-
defendant in Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B).

The State contends that Maryland case law does not sup-
port the position that the pretrial identification of a co-
defendant is required to be disclosed under Maryland Rule 4~
263(d)(7)(B). The State points out that the cases relied on by
Green involve pretrial identifications and non-identifications of
“the defendant,” not a co-defendant. The State asserts that,
even if Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) can be construed to
apply to a co-defendant, it is unclear in this case that Copeland
was a co-defendant because he and Green were not charged in
the same charging document, did not appear at the same
hearings, and were not tried together.

Standard of Review

Hl Where, as here, a trial court does not expressly deter-
mine that a discovery violation occurred, an appellate court
reviews the issue without deference. See Williams, 364 Md. at
169, 771 A.2d at 1087 (“Where the trial [court] made no
specific finding as a matter of law that the State violated the
discovery rule, we exercise independent de novo review to
determine whether a discovery violation occurred.” (Citations
omitted)).

In Fuster v. State, 487 Md. 658, 664-65, 89 A.8d 1114, 1120
(2014), this Court discussed the standard for interpreting a
Maryland Rule:

A court interprets a Maryland Rule by using the same
canons of construction that the court uses to interpret a
statute. First, the court considers the Rule’s plain language
in light oft (1) the scheme to which the Rule belongs; (2)
the purpose, aim, or policy of this Court in adopting the
Rule; and (8) the presumption that this Court intends the
Rules and this Court’s precedent to operate together as a
consistent and harmonious body of law. If the Rule’s plain
language is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the
Rule’s apparent purpose, the court applies the Rule’s plain
language. Generally, if the Rule’s plain language is ambigu-
ous or not clearly consistent with the Rule’s apparent
purpose, the court searches for rulemaking intent in other
indicia, including the history of the Rule or other relevant
sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the rulemaking process, in
light of: (1) the structure of the Rule; (2) how the Rule
relates to other laws; (8) the Rule’s general purpose; and
(4) the relative rationality and legal effect of various com-
peting constructions.

(Brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

HM Where a Rule’s language is clear, a court “neither
add[s] nor delete[s] language so as to reflect an intent not
evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the
Rule.” Williams y. State, 485 Md. 474, 490, 79 A.3d 981, 940
(2018) (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omit-
ted), “Unambiguous language will be given its usual, ordinary
meaning unless doing so creates an absurd result.” Hurst y.
State, 400 Md. 397, 417, 929 A.2d 157, 168 (2007) (citation
omitted).

Maryland Rule 4-263

Maryland Rule 4-263 states in relevant part:
(a) Applicability. This Rule governs discovery and inspec-
tion in a circuit court.

Committee note—This Rule also governs discovery in
actions transferred from District Court to circuit court upon
a jury trial demand made in accordance with Rule 4—
801(b)(1)(A). See Rule 4-301(¢).

(b) Definitions. In this Rule, the following definitions
apply:

(1) Defense. “Defense” means an attorney for the defen-
dant or a defendant who is acting without an attorney.

(2) Defense Witness. “Defense witness” means a witness
whom the defense intends to call at a hearing or at trial.

(8) Oral Statement. “Oral statement” of a person means
the substance of a statement of any kind by that person,
whether or not reflected in an existing writing or recording.

(4) Provide. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties or
required by Rule or order of court, “provide” information or
material means (A) to send or deliver it by mail, e-mail,
facsimile transmission, or hand-delivery, or (B) to make the
information or material available at a specified location for
purposes of inspection if sending or delivering it would be
impracticable because of the nature of the information or
material.

(5) State’s Witness. “State’s witness” means a witness
whom the State’s Attorney intends to call at a hearing or at
trial.

Cross references.—For the definition of “State’s Attorney,”
see Rule 4-102( ).

(6) Written Statement. “Written statement” of a person:

(A) includes a statement in writing that is made,
signed, or adopted by that person;

(B) includes the substance of a statement of any kind
made by that person that is embodied or summarized in a
writing or recording, whether or not signed or adopted by
the person;

(C) includes a statement contained in a police or in-
vestigative report; but

(D) does not include attorney work product.

(ec) Obligations of the Parties. (1) Due Diligence. The
State’s Attorney and defense shall exercise due diligence to
identify all of the material and information that must be
disclosed under this Rule.

(2) Scope of Obligations. The obligations of the State’s
Attorney and the defense extend to material and informa-
tion that must be disclosed under this Rule and that are in
the possession or control of the attorney, members of the
attorney’s staff, or any other person who either reports
regularly to the attorney’s office or has reported to the
attorney’s office in regard to the particular case.

Cross references.—For the obligations of the State’s Attor-
ney, see State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194, 896 A.2d 978 (2006).

(d) Disclosure by the State’s Attorney. Without the
necessity of a request, the State’s Attorney shall provide
to the defense:

(1) Statements. All written and all oral statements of the
defendant and of any co-defendant that relate to the
offense charged and all material and information, including
documents and recordings, that relate to the acquisition of
such statements;

(2) Criminal Record. Prior criminal convictions, pending
charges, and probationary status of the defendant and of
any co-defendant;

(8) State’s Witnesses, As to each State’s witness the
State’s Attorney intends to call to prove the State’s case in
chief or to rebut alibi testimony: (A) the name of the
witness; (B) except as provided under Code, Criminal Pro-
cedure Article, § 11-205 or Rule 16-910(b), the address and,
if known to the State’s Attorney, the telephone number of
the witness; and (C) all written statements of the witness
that relate to the offense charged;

(4) Prior Conduct. All evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts committed by the defendant that the State’s Attor-
ney intends to offer at a hearing or at trial pursuant to Rule
5-404());

(5) Exculpatory Information. All material or information
in any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to
exculpate the defendant or negate or mitigate the defen-
dant’s guilt or punishment as to the offense charged;

(6) Impeachment Information. All material or informa-
tion in any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to
impeach a State’s witness, including:

(A) evidence of prior conduct to show the character of
the witness for untruthfulness pursuant to Rule 5-608(b);

(B) a relationship between the State’s Attorney and
the witness, including the nature and circumstances of
any agreement, understanding, or representation that
may constitute an inducement for the cooperation or
testimony of the witness;

(C) prior criminal convictions, pending charges, or
probationary status that may be used to impeach the
witness, but the State’s Attorney is not required to inves-
tigate the criminal record of the witness unless the State’s
Attorney knows or has reason to believe that the witness
has a criminal record;

(D) an oral statement of the witness, not otherwise
memorialized, that is materially inconsistent with another
statement made by the witness or with a statement made
by another witness;

(EZ) a medical or psychiatric condition or addiction of
the witness that may impair the witness's ability to testify
truthfully or accurately, but the State’s Attorney is not
required to inquire into a witness’s medical, psychiatric,
or addiction history or status unless the State’s Attorney
has information that reasonably would lead to a belief
that an inquiry would result in discovering a condition
that may impair the witness’s ability to testify truthfully
or accurately;

(F) the fact that the witness has taken but did not
pass a polygraph examination; and

(G) the failure of the witness to identify the defen-
dant or a co-defendant;

Cross references.—See Brady v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 88, 88
S.Ct, 1194, 10 L.Hd.2d 215 (1968); Kyles v. Whitley, 514
US. 419, 115 S.Ct, 1555, 181 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Giglio vw
U.S., 405 US. 150, 92 8.Ct. 768, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); U.S.
v, Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct, 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976);
Thomas v. State, 872 Md, 842, 812 A.2d 1050 (2002); Gold-
smith v. State, 387 Md, 112, 651 A.2d 866 (1995); and Lyba
v, State, 321 Md, 564, 583 A.2d 1088 (1991).

(7) Searches, Seizures, Surveillance, and Pretrial Identi-
fication. All relevant material or information regarding:

(A) specific searches and seizures, eavesdropping, and
electronic surveillance including wiretaps; and

(B) pretrial identification of the defendant by a
State’s witness;

(8) Reports or Statements of Experts. As to each expert
consulted by the State’s Attorney in connection with the
action:

(A) the expert’s name and address, the subject matter
of the consultation, the substance of the expert’s findings
and opinions, and a summary of the grounds for each
opinion;

(B) the opportunity to inspect and copy all written
reports or statements made in connection with the action
by the expert, including the results of any physical or
mental examination, scientific test, experiment, or com-
parison; and

(C) the substance of any oral report and conclusion by
the expert;

(9) Evidence for Use at Trial. The opportunity to in-
spect, copy, and photograph all documents, computer-gener-
ated evidence as defined in Rule 2-504.8(a), recordings,
photographs, or other tangible things that the State’s Attor-
ney intends to use at a hearing or at trial; and

(10) Property of the Defendant. The opportunity to in-
spect, copy, and photograph all items obtained from or
belonging to the defendant, whether or not the State’s
Attorney intends to use the item at a hearing or at trial.

(g) Matters Not Discoverable. (1) By Any Party. Not-
withstanding any other provision of this Rule, neither the
State’s Attorney nor the defense is required to disclose (A)
the mental impressions, trial strategy, personal beliefs, or
other privileged attorney work product or (B) any other
material or information if the court finds that its disclosure
is not constitutionally required and would entail a substan-
tial risk of harm to any person that outweighs the interest
in disclosure,

(2) By the Defense. The State’s Attorney is not required
to disclose the identity of a confidential informant unless the
State’s Attorney intends to call the informant as a State’s
witness or unless the failure to disclose the informant’s
identity would infringe a constitutional right of the defen-
dant.

G) Continuing Duty to Disclose. Each party is under a
continuing obligation to produce discoverable material and
information to the other side. A party who has responded to
a request or order for discovery and who obtains further
material information shall supplement the response prompt-

ly.

(n) Sanctions. If at any time during the proceedings the
court finds that a party has failed to comply with this Rule
or an order issued pursuant to this Rule, the court may
order that party to permit the discovery of the matters not
previously disclosed, strike the testimony to which the un-
disclosed matter relates, grant a reasonable continuance,
prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the matter
not disclosed, grant a mistrial, or enter any other order
appropriate under the circumstances, The failure of a party
to comply with a discovery obligation in this Rule does not
automatically disqualify a witness from testifying. If a mo-

tion is filed to disqualify the witness’s testimony, disqualifi-
cation is within the discretion of the court.

(Emphasis added).

Collins v. State

Tn Collins v. State, 373 Md. 180, 146, 183-84, 816 A.2d 919,
928, 921 (2003), this Court held that the State violated what is
now Maryland Rule 4~263(d)(7)(B)‘ by failing to disclose
during discovery that a State’s witness had failed to identify
the defendant pretrial. When this Court decided Collins, Ma-
ryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) had not yet been adopted, and no
provision of Maryland Rule 4-268 expressly required disclo-
sure of a pretrial failure to identify a defendant or a co-
defendant.

In Collins, 373 Md. at 182, 816 A.2d at 920, the defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder and related handgun
offenses. On the night of the shooting, a witness told a
Baltimore City detective that he had not seen anything be-
cause he had been too far away. See id, at 188, 816 A.2d at
921. The detective included this information in a report. See
id. at 188, 816 A.2d at 921. Subsequently, however, before
trial, the witness identified the defendant as the shooter in a
photographic array and gave a contemporaneous audiotaped
statement. See id. at 1838-34, 816 A.2d at 921. Initially, during
discovery, the State disclosed the witness’s pretrial photo-
graphic array identification of the defendant, but did not
disclose the pretrial failure to identify the defendant the night
of the shooting, or the audiotaped statement identifying the
defendant. See id. at 184, 816 A.2d at 921. Later, the State
provided to the defense the audiotaped statement, but still did

4. When this Court decided Collins in 2003, the provision that is now
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) was Maryland Rule 4-263(a)(2)(C). For
clarity, we refer to the provision’s current version when we discuss
Collins and other cases that were decided before the amendment

occurred in 2008. See Court of Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order at 17
(Apr. 8, 2008), available at http:/;Avwww.mdcourts.gov/rules/rodocs/ro158
supp.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU4N-N6NG].

not disclose the pretrial failure to identify the defendant. See
id, at 184, 816 A.2d at 921,

At trial, the State initially encountered difficulties in secur-
ing the witness’s appearance. See id, at 134, 816 A.2d at 921.
By the time that law enforcement officers located the witness,
the trial’s evidentiary phase had concluded. See id, at 134-35,
816 A.2d at 921. The State moved to reopen its case so that
the witness could testify. See id. at 185, 816 A.2d at 921. The
defendant's counsel opposed the motion to reopen on the
ground that there was no necessity for reopening, as the State
had simply failed to summons the witness before trial. See id.
at 185, 816 A2d at 921-22. The defendant’s counsel also
advised that he had just learned about the witness’s pretrial
failure to identify the defendant. See id. at 185, 816 A.2d at
922. The prosecutor responded that the omission of the wit-
ness’s pretrial failure to identify the defendant was inadver-
tent. See id. at 185, 816 A.2d at 922. The trial court granted
the motion to reopen. See id, at 135, 816 A.2d at 922.

The defendant’s counsel moved for a continuance over the
weekend to prepare for the witness’s testimony, and the trial
court denied the motion to continue. See id, at 148, 816 A.2d at
926-27. While testifying, the witness identified the defendant
as the shooter. See id. at 189, 816 A.2d at 924. The defendant
was convicted. See id. at 182, 816 A.2d at 920. The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed, and this Court reversed and re-
manded for a new trial. See id. at 182, 149, 816 A.2d at 920,
930.

In discussing the underlying policies of Maryland Rule 4~
263, this Court stated:

Inherent benefits of discovery include providing adequate

information to both parties to facilitate informed pleas,

ensuring thorough and effective cross-examination, and ex-
pediting the trial process by diminishing the need for con-
tinuances to deal with unfamiliar information presented at
trial. Specific to the mandatory disclosure provisions of

[Maryland] Rule 4-263([d]), the major objectives are to

assist defendants in preparing their defense and to protect

them from unfair surprise. The duty to disclose pref ]trial
identifications, then, is properly determined by interpreting
the plain meaning of [Maryland] Rule [4-263] with proper
deference to these policies,
Id, at 14647, 816 A.2d at 928 (quoting Williams, 864 Md. at
172, 771 A.2d at 1089).

This Court concluded that the State violated Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B) “{iJn light of the plain meaning and policies of
the Rule[.]” Collins, 8373 Md. at 147, 816 A.2d at 928. More
specifically, this Court held that the witness's pretrial failure
to identify the defendant fell “within the scope of ‘relevant
material or information regarding pretrial identification of the
defendant by a witness for the State.’ ” See id. at 146, 816 A.2d
at 928 (quoting Md. R. 4-268(d)(7)(B)) (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted). This Court concluded that the witness’s
pretrial photographic array identification of the defendant
made “the initial statement given on the night of the crime
relevant to the veracity of the subsequent identification[,]” and
that “the prior statement, [then] a prior inconsistent state-
ment, became subject to the requirements of’ Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B). Id. at 146 n.9, 816 A.2d at 928 n.9.

This Court held that the State’s violation of Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B) was prejudicial, and thus was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 148, 816 A.2d at 929.
This Court observed that a witness’s ability to identify a
defendant “at the scene of the crime is often the cardinal facet
of a determination of guilt.” Id, at 148, 816 A2d at 929
(citation omitted). This Court explained: “It is not for us to
determine what, if any, response the defense could have
prepared had it known of the prior inconsistent statement. It
is enough to find that the defense was denied an adequate
opportunity to do so, to its prejudice.” Id. at 148, 816 A.2d at
929,

This Court determined that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance,
which would have given the defendant’s counsel “an opportuni-
ty to review the circumstances surrounding the undisclosed

prior inconsistent statement[.]” Id. at 149, 816 A.2d at 930. In
other words, a continuance “would have been appropriate to
allow defense counsel adequate time to ‘regroup,’ investigate,
and prepare as full a defense as possible.” Id, at 148, 816 A.2d
at 927.

Analysis
Here, we conclude that, as a general matter, Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7(B) does not, by its plain language and history,
require the State to disclose during discovery a State’s wit-
ness’s pretrial identification of a co-defendant.

Hl As an initial matter, we address the State’s contention
that, even if Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) can be construed to
apply to co-defendants, Maryland Rule 4~263(d)(7)(B) does not
apply in this case because it is not clear that Copeland and
Green were co-defendants. Despite the State’s contention in
its brief, the record is replete with references by the prosecu-
tor identifying Copeland as a co-defendant in the circuit court.
At a bench conference, the prosecutor stated: “[TJhe [S]tate
intends to produce the body of [] Copeland to at least one
witness[.] ... ([I]dentification of a co-defendant{,] when
charged as co[-]conspirators[,] is almost as important as iden-
tification of the defendant[.]” Later at the bench conference,
the prosecutor stated: “[T]his is [a] co-defendant, not the
defendant himself.” Still later at the bench conference, the
prosecutor stated: “The co-defendant, [ ] Copeland, was inter-
viewed by other people.” Shortly afterward, the prosecutor
stated that Green and his counsel “knew that ... the co-
defendant existed.” Later, the prosecutor stated: “[Wle had a
collateral thought about the co-defendant being brought in, as
you said, in prison garb[.]” Shortly before Copeland was
brought into the courtroom, the prosecutor stated: “We're
going to ask [Carter] another question before we bring in the
body of the co-defendant[.]’ And, during the State’s closing
argument, the prosecutor stated:

To call each other, [] Green and [] Copeland had to use

outside sources to connect them together. You heard testi-

mony about the system at the detention center. They are on

separate tiers. Co-defendants, people who are charged as
co-defendants in a crime, are put in separate places, and one
of the reasons is so that they can’t talk, can’t contrive, can’t
discuss the cases.
The record demonstrates that, in the circuit court, the State
took a different position with respect to Copeland’s status as a
co-defendant.

No Maryland Rule or statute defines the term “co-defen-
dant.” Black’s Law Dictionary provides the following definition
of the term “co-defendant”: “One of two or more defendants
sued in the same litigation or charged with the same crime.”
Codefendant, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

Neither this Court nor the Court of Special Appeals has had
the occasion to expressly define the term “co-defendant.” Both
this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, however, have
treated the term “co-defendant” in a manner that indicates
that Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of the term “co-
defendant” is accurate—i.¢., that a co-defendant is an individu-
al who is charged with the same crime as the defendant. In
Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 164, 246 A.2d 608, 612 (1968), this
Court stated: “The motion for discovery and inspection filed
by the appellant asked for copies of all written statements of
three co-defendants who were charged with the same
crimes with which appellant was charged.” (Emphasis add-
ed). In Boone v. State, 3 Md.App. 11, 31, 237 A.2d 787, 800,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872, 89 S.Ct. 161, 21 L.Ed.2d 141 (1968),
the Court of Special Appeals stated: “The fact of the convic-
tion or acquittal of one person charged with a crime is neither
relevant nor material to the issue of the guilt or innocence of
another person charged with the same crime as a co-
perpetrator. Contrary to the position taken by the appellant,
we feel that the admission of evidence of the conviction of a
co-defendant at a prior trial would be prejudicial error.”
(Emphasis added). And, in Boyd v. State, 821 Md. 69, 72, 581

5. To be sure, in Boone, 3 Md.App, at 13, 237 A.2d at 790, the Court of
Special Appeals stated that the appellant and three others “were jointly
indicted for [] murder and robbery with a deadly weapon[.]” The Court

A2d 1, 2 (1990), this Court repeatedly referred to defendants
who were charged with the same crime as co-defendants, even
though they were charged separately and tried separately.
Similarly, in Hickman v. State, 242 Md. 91, 91, 218 A.2d 21, 22
(1966), this Court stated that the defendant “was tried ...
with two separately indicted co-defendants[.]” And, in State v.
Johnson, 367 Md. 418, 421 & n.2, 788 A.2d 628, 630 & n2
(2002), without expressly referring to co-defendants, this
Court stated that four co-conspirators were tried jointly, even
though one of them “was indicted separately.”

This Court has never determined, or, indeed, even indicated,
that a co-defendant must be charged in the same charging
document as the defendant. To the contrary, Maryland Rule
4-258(a) expressly permits two defendants who have been
charged separately to be tried together. See Md. R. 4~253(a)
(On motion of a party, the court may order a joint trial for
two or more defendants charged in separate charging docu-
ments if they are alleged to have participated in the same act
or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions
constituting an offense or offenses.”). In other words, Mary-
land Rule 4~258(a) explicitly allows two separately-charged
individuals to be tried together as co-defendants.

The State mistakenly relies on State _v. Stojetz, 84 Ohio
St.8d 452, 705 N.E.2d 829, 388 (1999) for the proposition that,
to be a co-defendant, an individual must have been charged in
the same charging document as the defendant. In Stojetz, id.,
the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned that co-conspirators were
not co-defendants because the defendant “was the only person
charged in the indictment[.]” In Stojetz, id., the Court quoted
State _v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St8d 114, 552 N.E.2d 913, 918
(1990), in which, in turn, the Court quoted the following
definition of “co-defendant” in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.
1979); “More than one defendant being sued in the same
litigation; or, more than one person charged in same com-
plaint or indictment with same crime.” (Emphasis added),

of Special Appeals did not expressly indicate that the appellant and
three other individuals were charged in the same document,

This definition of the term “co-defendant” in the Fifth
Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary from 1979 is now approxi-
mately thirty-eight years old. In the meantime, there have
been five newer editions of Black’s Law Dictionary. The most
recent edition—namely, the Tenth Edition, published in
2014—has a different definition of the term “co-defendant”
than the one that the Supreme Court of Ohio employed in
Wickline and Stojetz. In contrast to the Fifth Edition, the
Tenth Edition does not include in its definition of the term
“co-defendant” the requirement that the individual was
charged “in the same complaint or indictment.” Instead, the
Tenth Edition simply defines the term “co-defendant” as
“fone of two or more defendants ... charged with the same
crime.” Codefendant, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

The Tenth Edition’s definition of the term “co-defendant” is
consistent with Maryland case law, which indicates that a co-
defendant is an individual who is charged with the same crime
as the defendant. To the extent that an older edition of Black’s
Law Dictionary, or Ohio case law, endorses a definition of the
term “co-defendant” that requires the co-defendant to be
charged in the same charging document as the defendant,
such a definition is inconsistent with the way in which this
Court and the Court of Special Appeals have employed the
term “co-defendant.” In this case, it is undisputed that Cope-
land pled guilty to first-degree murder of Myers and conspira-
cy to commit first-degree murder of Myers—ie., that he was
charged with, and convicted of, the same crimes with which
Green was charged. We have no difficulty in concluding that
Green and Copeland were co-defendants.

IM As to the plain language of Maryland Rule 4~
263(d)(7)(B) and whether, as a general matter, it requires
disclosure of the pretrial identification of a co-defendant,
Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) provides: “Without the necessi-
ty of a request, the State’s Attorney shall provide to the
defense ... [alll relevant material or information regarding
... pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s wit-

ness[.]” The word “co-defendant” is conspicuously absent from
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B).

One of the cardinal tenets of rule interpretation is that,
where the language of the Rule is plain, we “neither add nor
delete language” to reach a result not set forth in the clear
language of the Rule. Williams, 485 Md. at 490, 79 A.3d at 940
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The language
of Maryland Rule 4-268(a)(7)(B) is plain and unambiguous—
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) applies only to pretrial identifi-
cations of “the defendant,” and not to pretrial identifications of
a co-defendant. Significantly, where Maryland Rule 4-263(d)
applies to co-defendants, the language of the Rule says as
much; the word “co-defendant” is found in three of Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)’s other provisions. First, Maryland Rule 4-
268(d)(1) requires the State to disclose “[alll written and all
oral statements of the defendant and of any co-defendant that
relate to the offense charged and all material and information
... that relate to the acquisition of such statements[.]” Sec-
ond, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(2) requires the State to disclose
“(plrior criminal convictions, pending charges, and probation-
ary status of the defendant and of any co-defendant[.]” And
third, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) requires the State to
disclose “{aJll material or information in any form, whether or
not admissible, that tends to impeach a State’s witness, includ-
ing ... the failure of the witness to identify the defendant or a
co-defendant[.]”

Each party contends that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G)
supports its position. Green asserts that, by requiring the
State to disclose a pretrial failure to identify a co-defendant,
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) implies that the State must also
routinely disclose a pretrial identification of a co-defendant.
By contrast, the State argues that, by referring to co-defen-
dants, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G)—as well as Maryland
Rule 4—263(d)(1) and (d)(2)—establish that the lack of a refer-
ence to co-defendants in Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) was
intentional. In our view, the State has the better part of the
argument. Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G), (d)(1), and (d)(2)
demonstrate that, where a provision of Maryland Rule 4-263

applies to co-defendants, the provision explicitly states that it
applies to co-defendants. The plain language of Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B) supports the conclusion that Maryland Rule 4—
268(d)(7)(B) applies only to the defendant, and not to co-
defendants.*

Our interpretation of Maryland Rule 4~263(d)(7)(B) is also
supported by the circumstance that Maryland Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B) is not the only provision of Maryland Rule 4-
263(d) that expressly refers to the defendant, but does not
apply to a co-defendant. This leads to the conclusion that
Maryland Rule 4-263(d) expressly delineates when provisions
apply to the defendant, but not a co-defendant. In addition to
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), three other provisions of Mary-
land Rule 4-263(d) apply only to the defendant. Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)(4) requires the State to disclose “[aJll evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant
that the State’s Attorney intends to offer at a hearing or at
trial pursuant to Rule 5-404(b)[.]” (Emphasis added). Mary-

6. Contrary to Green’s position, there is a reasonable explanation as to
why Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) requires disclosure of a pretrial
failure to identify a co-defendant, whereas Maryland Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B) does not require disclosure of a pretrial identification of a
co-defendant. Specifically, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) does not
share Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G)’s purpose of disclosing impeach-
ment material to the defense. Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6) requires the
State to disclose “[aJll material or information in any form, whether or
not admissible, that tends to impeach a State’s witness[.]” A failure to
identify a co-defendant pretrial clearly falls under this category, as it
would cast doubt on any subsequent identification of the defendant by
the witness. If a witness fails to identify a co-defendant, but identifies
the defendant, this circumstance would call into question the witness's
credibility, the witness’s ability to observe, and the witness's ability to
recall,

However, where, as here, a witness identifies a co-defendant before
trial, this circumstance does not provide any grounds for impeachment
under Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6), as the witness’s pretrial identifica-
tion of the co-defendant would not constitute impeachment material. In
short, a failure to identify a co-defendant pretrial is impeachable; a
pretrial identification of a co-defendant is not. The rationale underlying
the requirement of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) to disclose the failure
to identify a co-defendant pretrial does not extend to the requirement of
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) to disclose pretrial identifications of the
defendant,

land Rule 4-268(d)(10) requires the State to provide “(t]he
opportunity to inspect, copy, and photograph all items ob-
tained from or belonging to the defendant, whether or not the
State’s Attorney intends to use the item at a hearing or at
trial.” (Emphasis added). And, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(5)
requires the State to disclose “[a]ll material or information in
any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to exculpate
the defendant or negate or mitigate the defendant’s guilt or
punishment as to the offense charged[.]” (Emphasis added).
Like Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), Maryland Rule 4-
268(d)(4), (d)(10), and (d)(5) are provisions that, by their plain
language, extend the State’s discovery obligations to matters
involving only the defendant, not a co-defendant. As such,
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is not an anomaly. Just as we
would not read into Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(4), (d)(10), or
(d)(5) a requirement that the State’s discovery obligations
include a co-defendant as well as the defendant, we would not
alter the plain language of Maryland Rule 4~-263(d)(7)(B). In
short, certain provisions of Maryland Rule 4-263(d) do not
require the State to disclose information that relates to a co-
defendant. To accept Green’s position that, as a general mat-
ter, Maryland Rule 4~263(d)(7)(B) applies to pretrial identifi-
cations of both the defendant and a co-defendant would read
into the Rule language that is not there, potentially affecting
interpretation of other provisions of the Rule, which also only
apply to the defendant.

We acknowledge that there may be cases, such as this one,
where a defendant alleges that a pretrial identification of a co-
defendant is relevant and, thus, should be disclosed under
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). In such instances, however, the
correct resolution is not to read into Maryland Rule 4-
268(d)(7)(B) the requirement that the State disclose pretrial
identifications of a co-defendant. Instead, the proper inquiry is
whether the pretrial identification of the co-defendant consti-
tutes “relevant material or information regarding ... pretrial
identification of the defendant” under Maryland Rule 4—
268(d)(7)(B). Stated otherwise, a defendant’s allegation of prej-
udice based on the nondisclosure of a pretrial identification of

a co-defendant does not require departing from the plain
meaning of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)’s language.

We conclude that the language of Maryland Rule 4~
263(d)(7)(B) is unambiguous because it plainly does not re-
quire disclosure of the pretrial identification of a co-defendant.
Maryland Rule 4~-263(d)(7)(B) does not become ambiguous
when considered together with Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(6)(G),
which requires the disclosure of the failure to identify a co-
defendant pretrial. These are separate provisions of Maryland
Rule 4-263(d), and, like other provisions, reflect instances in
which the Rule applies to the defendant, or to the defendant
and a co-defendant. Our holding in this case fully comports
with Maryland Rule 4-263(d)’s purposes of preventing unfair
surprise and assisting in the preparation of a defense, Because
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is unambiguous, we decline to
add the phrase “or a co-defendant” “so as to reflect an intent
not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the
Rule.” Williams, 435 Md. at 490, 79 A8d at 940 (brackets,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Given that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is unambiguous,
we are not required to examine its history, but we elect to do
so “as a confirmatory process.” State v. Rice, 447 Md. 594, 623,
136 A.8d 720, 787 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). In 1977, this Court adopted a predecessor of Mary-
land Rule 4-268, former Maryland Rule 741. Former Mary-
land Rule 741(a) was entitled “Disclosure Without Request,”
and stated:

Without the necessity of a request by the defendant, the

State’s Attorney shall furnish to the defendant:

1. Any material or information within his possession or
control which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as
to the offense charged or would tend to reduce his punish-
ment therefor; [and]

2. Any relevant material or information regarding: (a)
specific searches and seizures, wire taps and eavesdropping,
(b) the acquisition of statements made by the defendant, and

Be

(c) pretrial identification of the defendant by a witness

for the State.

(Emphasis added). Thus, like current Maryland Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B), former Maryland Rule 741(a)(2)(c) applied only to
disclosure of pretrial identifications of the defendant, not a co-
defendant.

In 1984, without substantive amendment, former Maryland
Rule 741(a)(2)(c) was replaced by Maryland Rule 4-
263(a)(2)(C). In 2007, Maryland Rule 4-263(a)(2)(C) remained
identical to former Maryland Rule 741(a)(2)(c), except that the
words “by the defendant” had been deleted from the phrase
“[wlithout the necessity of a request by the defendant,” so that
the Rule read, in pertinent part, “[wlithout the necessity of a
request, the State’s Attorney shall furnish to the defendant:
... [] Any relevant material or information regarding: ...
pretrial identification of the defendant by a witness for the
State.”

On September 26, 2007, the Rules Committee submitted its
One Hundred Fifty-Eighth Report to this Court. Rules Com-
mittee, One Hundred Fifty-Highth Report at 3 (Sept. 26,
2007), available at http://www.mdcourts.gov/rules/reports/158
thReport.pdf[https://perma.cc/7U62-CPYN]. The Rules Com-
mittee proposed making several amendments to Maryland
Rule 4-268, including adding in Maryland Rule 4-263(b)(8) a
requirement that the State provide “[alny material or informa-
tion in any form, whether or not admissible, in the possession
or control of the State, ... that tends to impeach a witness[.]”
Id, at 109-10. The Rules Committee proposed replacing Mary-
land Rule 4~263(a)(2)(C)—which required the State to disclose
a pretrial identification of the defendant—with Maryland Rule
4-263(b)(4)(C) without substantive amendment. See id. at 110.
In proposed Maryland Rule 4-263(b)(4)(C), the Rules Commit-
tee recommended replacing the word “furnish” with the word
“provide,” and recommended adding the phrase “Except for
the privileged work product of the State’s Attorney as defined
in subsection (d)(1) of this Rule” to the beginning of the
sentence. Id, at 109. The Rules Committee did not propose
any changes to the phrase “pretrial identification of the defen-

dant by a witness for the State.” Id. at 110. In other words,
the Rules Committee did not propose adding a requirement
that the State disclose a pretrial identification of a co-defen-
dant. See id,

The Rules Committee proposed a Committee Note stating
in pertinent part: “Examples of material and information that
must be disclosed pursuant to subsections (b)(2) and (8) of this
Rule if within the possession or control of the State ...
include: ... the [pretrial] failure of a witness to make an
identification[.]” Id. The Rules Committee, however, did not
include in the text of proposed Maryland Rule 4-268 a re-
quirement to disclose a pretrial failure to make an identifica-
tion.

In a Rules Order dated December 4, 2007, this Court
deferred consideration of the proposed amendments to Mary-
land Rule 4-263 “pending further study by this Court[.]”
Court of Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order at 8 (Dee. 4, 2007),
available at http:/Avww.mdcourts.gov/rules/rodocs/r0158.pdf
[https://perma.ce/2CRL-8QLL].

On March 25, 2008, the Rules Committee submitted a
Supplement to the One Hundred Fifty-Eighth Report. Rules
Committee, Supplement to One Hundred Fifty-Highth Report
at 1 (March 25, 2008), available at http:/Awww.mdcourts.gov/
rules/reports/158supplementappx.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM3F-
A7QZ]. In the Supplement, the Rules Committee explained
why this Court had deferred consideration of the proposed
amendments to Maryland Rule 4-268:

At the hearing held on [the One Hundred Fifty-Eighth]
Report[ ] on December 8, 2007, concerns were expressed by
a number of prosecutors and others with respect to certain
aspects of the recommended changes to [Maryland] Rules
4-262 and 4-263, principally the latter. Members of the
Court inquired whether, in formulating its recommenda-
tions, the Rules Committee had considered the [ABA Stan-
dards], and the answer was that those Standards had not
been considered. In light of the controversy with respect to

some of the [Rules] Committee’s proposals, the Court de-
ferred action on them.

Id. The Rules Committee stated: “Although the Rules Com-
mittee has now given consideration to the ABA Standards and
has crafted [Maryland] Rule[] 4-263 in closer harmony to
them, its recommendations continue to depart from them in
some respects.” Id, at 3.

With regard to pretrial identifications, the Rules Committee
proposed adding Maryland Rule 4~268(d)(6)(G), which would
require the State to disclose a witness’s failure “to identify the
defendant or a co-defendant” pretrial. Id, at 84. Significantly,
however, the Rules Committee did not propose adding a
reference to co-defendants to the provision that required
disclosure of a pretrial identification of the defendant. See id.
In other words, the Rules Committee proposed changing
Maryland Rule 4-268(a)(2)(C) to Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)
without substantive amendment. See id. Specifically, proposed
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) stated; “Without the necessity
of a request, the State’s Attorney shall provide to the defense
... [alll relevant material or information regarding ... pre-
trial identification of the defendant by a State’s witness[.]” Id.
at 82, 84, This language is identical to that of current Mary-
land Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B).”

Proposed Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) was not as broad as
its counterpart, ABA Standard 11-2.1(a)(vii), which states:
The prosecution should, within a specified and reasonable
time prior to trial, disclose to the defense the following
information and material and permit inspection, copying,
testing, and photographing of disclosed documents or tangi-
ble objects ... [alny material, documents, or information

7. Ina Rules Order dated April 8, 2008, this Court rescinded the existing
Maryland Rule 4-263 and added a new Maryland Rule 4-263. See
Court of Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order at 2 (Apr. 8, 2008), available
at http:/www.mdcourts.gov/rules/rodocs/ro158supp.pdf [https://perma.
cc/WU4N-N6NG]. Since then, this Court has amended other provisions
of Maryland Rule 4-263 multiple times, but this Court has never
amended Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B).

relating to lineups, showups, and picture or voice [pre-

trial] identifications in relation to the case.

ABA Standards, available at https:/Avww.americanbar.org/
publications/criminal justice. _ section_archive/crimjust_stan-
dards_discovery_blk.html# 2.1 [https://perma.ce/BUWQ-4SQQ]
(emphasis added).

In Appendix C to the Supplement,’ the Rules Committee
addressed the differences between proposed Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B) and ABA Standard 11-2.1(a)(vii):

[Maryland] Rule 4-268(d)(7), when coupled with [Maryland

Rule 4-263](d)(6)(G)[,] is generally consistent with [ABA

Standard 11-2.1], but there are some differences. As to

[pretrial] identification evidence, [] ABA Standard [11-

2.1(a)(vii) ] would seem to apply to the [pretrial] identifica-

tion (or not) of anyone; [Maryland Rule 4-263](d)(6)(G)
and (d)(7) cover only [pretrial] identifications of the
defendant or co-defendant by a State’s witness (or [pre-
trial] failure to make such an identification), [Maryland

Rule 4-263](d)(7) follows the current Rule, and the

Rules Committee saw no need to expand the Rule. The

ABA Standard requires only that the State inform the

defense of electronic surveillance and does not require

disclosure of relevant material concerning it. To that extent,
subsection (d)(7) is broader than the ABA Standard. With
respect to the disclosure of information regarding specific
searches and seizures, subsection (d)(7) is comparable to

ABA Standard 11-2.1(d).

Rules Committee, Supplement to One Hundred Fifty-Highth
Report at 41-42 (emphasis added).

From our perspective, there is nothing in the history of
Maryland Rule 4-263 to indicate that the omission of the word
“co-defendant” in Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) was uninten-
tional or an oversight. We are aware that Green contends that
the history of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) demonstrates an

8. Unlike a Committee Note, an appendix to a Report of the Rules
Committee does not become incorporated into the Maryland Rules.

intent to include co-defendants and to harmonize the Rule
with the ABA Standards concerning discovery. What Green
draws our attention to about the history of Maryland Rule 4—
263(d)(7)(B) is not persuasive. The passage in Appendix C is a
far ery from evidencing an intent to have Maryland Rule 4~
268(d)(7)(B) apply to pretrial identifications of a co-defendant.
The passage references the respective requirements of Mary-
land Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) and Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B),
and explicitly states an intent not to expand Maryland Rule 4—
268(d)(7)(B). ABA Standard 11-2.1(a)(vii) is a broad standard
that applies to numerous discovery requirements, and the
desire to harmonize Maryland Rule 4-263 with the ABA
Standards in no way reflects the purpose to expand Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) to require disclosure of pretrial identifica-
tions of co-defendants.

It is significant that the Rules Committee stated that it
“saw no need to expand” Maryland Rule 4-263 with respect to
pretrial identifications or otherwise. It is reasonable to infer
from this statement that the Rules Committee considered, but
intentionally refrained from, adding a reference to co-defen-
dants to proposed Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Indeed, the
Rules Committee included a reference to co-defendants in
proposed Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G), which would require
the State to disclose a failure “to identify the defendant or a
co-defendant” pretrial. Rules Committee, Supplement to One
Hundred Fifty-Eighth Report at 84, And, tellingly, in Appen-
dix C, the Rules Committee stated that proposed Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)(6)(G) lacked a counterpart in ABA Standard 11~
2.1, See id. at 40. In other words, the Rules Committee
included a reference to co-defendants in proposed Maryland
Rule 4~263(d)(6)(G) on its own initiative, not in the course of
following ABA Standard 11-2.1. This circumstance demon-
strates that the Rules Committee was well aware that it could
include a reference to co-defendants in proposed Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). And, by its own assessment, the Rules
Committee knew that ABA Standard 11-2.1(a)(vii) “would
seem to apply to the identification (or not) of anyone[.]’ Rules
Committee, Supplement to One Hundred Fifty-Highth Report

at 41. Nonetheless, the Rules Committee “saw no need to
expand” Maryland Rule 4-263’s requirements regarding dis-
closure of pretrial identifications. Id. This history reinforces
our conclusion that the absence of a reference to a co-
defendant in proposed Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B) was in-
tentional.

In sum, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)’s plain language and
history compel our holding that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)
does not require as a general matter the State to disclose
during discovery a State’s witness’s pretrial identification of a
co-defendant. We hold that the State’s obligation under Mary-
land Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) is governed by its plain language—
i¢, the State is obligated to disclose “relevant material or
information regarding ... pretrial identification of the defen-
dant[.]” There may be cases, such as this one, in which a
defendant contends that a pretrial identification of a co-
defendant constitutes relevant information regarding the pre-
trial identification of the defendant. Below in Part II, we
address whether the pretrial identification of the co-defendant
in this case was subject to disclosure under Maryland Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B) as relevant material or information regarding the
pretrial identification of the defendant.

Il. Pretrial Identification of the
Co-Defendant in this Case

The Parties’ Contentions

Green contends that, under this case’s circumstances, Mary-
land Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) required the State to disclose Car-
ter’s identification of Copeland as the person who was not the
shooter because that identification necessarily implicated
Green as the shooter. Stated otherwise, Green argues that
Carter's identification constituted “relevant material or infor-
mation regarding .,. pretrial identification of the defen-
dant[.]” Md. R. 4-263(d)(7)(B). Green asserts that the Court of
Special Appeals erred in concluding that adopting his position
would cause the State’s discovery obligations to depend on the
defense’s trial strategy. Green maintains that the record dem-

onstrates that the State intended to introduce Carter’s identi-
fication of Copeland, regardless of his trial strategy. Green
contends that, had his trial counsel known of Carter’s pretrial
identification of Copeland, the defense’s trial strategy might
have differed,

Green argues that his position is supported by Collins, 373
Md. at 146 n9, 816 A.2d at 928 n.9, in which this Court
commented that “the State was required by [Maryland Rule]
4-268[ (d)(7)(B) ] to produce not only statements containing
the identification, but also any and all other statements made
by [the State’s witness] regarding who[m] he saw or did not
see commit the act.” Green asserts that Carter’s pretrial
identification of Copeland was a statement regarding whom
she did not see perform the shooting. Green contends that the
importance of Carter’s identification of Copeland establishes
that the error was not harmless. Green argues that the
prosecutor’s reliance on Carter’s identification during the
State’s closing argument demonstrated the importance of Car-
ter’s identification to the State’s case.

The State responds that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)’s use
of the words “relevant” and “regarding” refer to circum-
stances surrounding a pretrial identification of a defendant—
not a pretrial identification of a co-defendant. The State
contends that requiring the disclosure of a pretrial identifica-
tion of a co-defendant expands the meaning of “relevant” and
“regarding,” such that Maryland Rule 4~263(d)(7)(B) would
fail to provide clear notice to the State regarding its discovery
obligations. The State argues that, although Carter testified
that she told detectives that she could identify Copeland, it is
unclear whether this occurred “pretrial.” The State asserts
that, in the event of a discovery violation, the circuit court
should impose the least severe sanction, that is consistent with
Maryland Rule 4-263’s purposes, and that, in this case, the
proper remedy was permitting cross-examination of Carter
about her pretrial identification of Copeland.

Relevant Case Law

In Williams, 364 Md. at 164, 771 A.2d at 1084, this Court.
held that a law enforcement officer’s surveillance observations

of the defendant, if used by the State for purposes of identifi-
cation, is a pretrial identification subject to disclosure under
Maryland Rule 4~-263(d)(7)(B). In Williams, id, at 178, 167-68,

771 A.2d at 1092, 1086, this Court determined that the State
violated Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) where, before trial, a
prosecutor proffered that a law enforcement officer could not
identify the defendant, but, at trial, the officer testified that he
had made surveillance observations of the defendant and then
identified the defendant in court. Of particular significance to
this case, this Court concluded that the information that may
be subject to mandatory disclosure under Maryland Rule 4—
263(d)(7)(B) is not limited to State-orchestrated identification
procedures, such as showups, lineups, and photographic ar-
rays. See id. at 172-78, 771 A.2d at 1089,

In Williams, id. at 164-65, 771 A.2d at 1084, the defendant
was charged with distribution of cocaine; the charges
stemmed from the execution of a search warrant at an apart-
ment. The State contended that, shortly before execution of
the warrant, the defendant entered the apartment, which was
under law enforcement surveillance, to deliver cocaine. See id.
at 165, 771 A.2d at 1085. In Williams, id. at 166, 771 A.2d at
1085, in response to a request for disclosure from the defen-
dant’s counsel, the State filed discovery stating that the defen-
dant had not been identified through a pretrial identification
procedure. Subsequently, the defendant moved to suppress
any unlawful pretrial identifications of him. See id. at 166, 771
A.2d at 1085. Immediately prior to a hearing on the motion to
suppress, the prosecutor proffered that the law enforcement
officer’s testimony would not be an identification because the
officer would testify only as to the general description of a
man who entered the apartment. See id. at 166, 771 A.2d at
1085. At the hearing, the prosecutor again proffered that,
while surveilling an apartment for suspected drug activity, a
law enforcement officer had seen a man enter the apartment.
See id, at 167, 771 A.2d at 1086. The prosecutor also proffered
that the officer had observed “the stature, the size, the
height,” and race of the man who entered the apartment. See
id, at 167, 771 A.2d at 1086. The prosecutor proffered, howev-

er, that the officer would not be able to identify the man who
entered the apartment as the defendant. See id. at 166-67, 71
A.2d at 1085-86, The trial court found that no pretrial identifi-
eation of the defendant had occurred, and determined that the
State had complied with its discovery obligations. See id. at
167, 771 A.2d at 1086. At an unrelated pretrial motion hearing,
the prosecutor again indicated that the law enforcement offi-
cer could identify the man who entered the apartment only by
“size, height, and weight[.]” See id. at 167, 771 A.2d at 1086.

Contrary to the prosecutor’s multiple proffers, at trial, the
officer identified the defendant as the man who entered the
apartment. See id. 167-68, 771 A.2d at 1086. The defendant's
eounsel objected and moved to strike the officer's identifica-
tion of the defendant. See id. at 168, 771 A.2d at 1086. The
trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion to
strike, See id. at 168, 771 A.2d at 1086.

Only one State’s witness other than the officer placed the
defendant in the apartment on the night in question. See id. at
165, 771 A.2d at 1085. Testifying pursuant to a plea agree-
ment, the witness stated that the defendant entered the
apartment, put a foil-wrapped package on the kitchen counter,
and said to “take whatever off the top.” Id, at 165, 771 A.2d at
1085. After the defendant left the apartment, law enforcement
officers executed a search warrant and found cocaine in the
apartment. See id. at 165, 771 A.2d at 1084-85.

After being convicted, the defendant moved for a new trial,
contending that the State had violated Maryland Rule 4-263
by failing to disclose during discovery the officer’s pretrial
identification of the defendant. See Williams, 364 Md. at 168,
771 A.2d at 1086. The trial court denied the motion for a new
trial, determining that the State had not withheld a pretrial
identification of the defendant by the officer, as the prosecutor
did not know that the officer had made an out-of-court identifi-
cation of the defendant and would identify the defendant at
trial. See id. at 168, 771 A.2d at 1086-87. In other words, the
trial court found that the inaccuracy in the prosecutor’s prof-
fer had been inadvertent because the prosecutor had been

surprised by the officer’s identification of the defendant. See
id. at 169 n.9, 168, 771 A.2d at 1087 n.9, 1086, The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed, and this Court reversed and re-
manded for a new trial. See id. at 168, 181, 771 A.2d at 1087,
1094,

As a threshold matter, in Williams, id, at 172, 71 A.2d at
1088-89, this Court observed that the case involved an issue of
first impression—namely, whether a law enforcement officer’s
surveillance observations can be subject to mandatory disclo-
sure under Maryland Rule 4~-268(d)(7)(B). The State contend-
ed that Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)

is limited to [S]tate-orchestrated identification procedures,

such as a photographic array, a show[ Jup, or a line[ Jup,

because a purpose of the discovery disclosures is to ‘force

the defendant to file certain motions before trial, including a

motion to suppress ...’ and a [law enforcement] officer’s

surveillance observations would not be the subject of such a

pretrial motion.

Id, at 172, 771 A.2d at 1089 (ellipsis in original) (citation
omitted).

This Court “flouJnd the State’s position faulty[,]” and stated
in relevant part:

Simply because we recognize the relationship between the
discovery and pretrial motions rules, in that discovery is
necessary so that mandatory pretrial motions can be filed,
does not mean that we limit discovery to strictly that which
may be utilized in support of a pretrial motion. ... Relevan-
cy is not limited to material or information which would
tend to support a motion to suppress. Material or informa-
tion is also producible under [Maryland] Rule 4-263[ (d)(7) ]
if it supports the State’s proposed use of validly obtained
material or information and the denial of a defendant's
suppression motion.

Generally speaking, discovery disclosures may, indeed,
assist a defendant in determining whether certain motions
can be filed prior to trial{,] and thus expedite the trial
process; however, the fact that discovery may advance that

goal is not dispositive of other laudable goals. We have

repeatedly insisted that discovery rules should assist the

defendant in preparing a defense and protect him [or her]
from surprise. One can hardly imagine a greater obstacle to
al defendant’s] defense than the State’s declaration prior to
trial that the only corroborating witness could not specifical-
ly identify the defendant, while the testimony of the witness
at trial was nothing shy of a clear and positive identifica-
tion—“it was [the defendant] who is seated at the defense
table ...” Identification testimony may be outcome deter-
minative and hence, any solid preparation of a defense
demands this information. Furthermore, unlike statements
made by the defendant, identification testimony naturally
comes from third parties. As such, it is information with
which, absent the State’s disclosure, a defendant may never
be familiar until trial. To prevent unfair surprise, disclosure
of identification testimony is required.

Id, at 178-74, 771 A.2d at 1089-90 (second ellipsis in original)

(brackets, citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks

omitted).

This Court held that the State violated Maryland Rule 4—
268(d)(7)(B) by failing to provide “complete and accurate
information regarding the extent to which [the officer], a
witness closely identified with the State, could identify” the
defendant. Id. at 178, 771 A.2d at 1092, More specifically, this
Court “conclude[d] that [the officer]’s surveillance observation,
if used by the State for purposes of identification, [wa]s
‘yelevant material regarding a pretrial identification’ under
[Maryland] Rule 4-268[ (d)(7)(B)] and disclosure [wa]s re-
quired.” Id, at 178, 771 A.2d at 1092, This Court determined
that “the objectives of discovery were not realized” because
discovery “not only failed to assist [the defendant] with his
defense, but [also] failed to protect [the defendant] from unfair
surprise.” Id. at 178, 771 A.2d at 1092,

This Court rejected the State’s argument that it had not
violated Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) because the prosecutor
had disclosed that the officer had seen a man of the defen-
dant’s size and race enter the apartment, See id. at 175, 771

A.2d at 1090-91. This Court noted that the prosecutor had
unequivocally proffered that the officer could not identify the
defendant; thus, the prosecutor’s proffer was inconsistent
with the officer’s in-court identification of the defendant. See
id, at 175, 771 A.2d at 1091.

This Court concluded that the circumstance “that the [pros-
ecutor] was ‘surprised’ [by the officer’s in-court identification
of the defendant] ha[d] no bearing on whether the defendant
was prejudiced by the” prosecutor's inaccurate proffer, Id, at
176 n.21, 771 A.2d at 1091 n.21. In other words, this Court
held that “ ‘surprise’ [on the part of the prosecutor] does not
excuse or mitigate the prejudice to the defendant.” Id, at 176,
771 A2d at 1091, This Court observed that “the State is
charged with the knowledge of all seemingly pertinent facts
related to the charge [that] are known to” law enforcement
officers. Id. at 177, 771 A.2d at 1092 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), This Court further explained why it
does not matter whether a prosecutor is aware of facts that
law enforcement officers know:

Tf [a prosecutor]’s lack of knowledge could excuse, or even

mitigate[,] the prejudicial effect of the undisclosed informa-

tion, [prosecutor]s would most effectively operate in a vacu-
um because, by removing themselves from the privity of

{law enforcement officers’] testimony and evidence, [prose-

eutor]s could slip beyond the grasp of discovery rules by

claiming ignorance, and thereby force the defendant to
enter trial unaware of the evidence to be offered against
him [or her]. This is intolerable and totally adverse to one of
the avowed purposes for discovery rules: to assist the
defendant in preparing his [or her] defense and prevent
unfair surprise at trial.

Id, at 177-78, 771 A.2d at 1092 (emphasis in original),

This Court held that the State’s violation of Maryland Rule
4-263(d)(7)(B) was prejudicial, and thus was not harmless
error, because the officer’s testimony was “the only corrobo-
rating witness identification of the defendant[.]” Id, at 179, 771
A.2d at 1098 (emphasis omitted). This Court noted that “a

Bn

conviction may not rest on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.” Id, at 179, 771 A.2d at 1098 (citation omitted).
This Court determined that, if the officer had not identified
the defendant, there would have been “a strong basis for
moving for judgment of acquittal[.]” Id. at 179-80, 771 A.2d at
1098. This Court also observed that, at the conclusion of the
bench trial, the trial court gave “great weight” to the officer's
testimony. Id. at 180, 771 A.2d at 1098. Ultimately, this Court
concluded that it was likely that the State’s violation of
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) contributed to the conviction.
See id. at 181, 771 A.2d at 1094,

In Simons v. State, 159 Md.App. 562, 575, 574, 860 A.2d 416,
424, 423 (2004), the Court of Special Appeals held that the
State violated Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) by failing to
disclose that, before trial, a State’s witness told law enforce-
ment officers that she had seen the defendant near the scene
of the crime around the time the crime was committed.
Specifically, the Court stated:

While we shall not attempt to delineate the “limiting princi-

ple that prevents all statements about interactions with a

defendant from constituting pre-trial identifications,” we are

persuaded that the holding in Williams constrains us to
conclude that, when the pretrial statement of an eyewitness
directly implicates the defendant in the commission of the
crime, such a statement is the equivalent of the State’s test
for what constitutes an identification, ie, the witness’s
ability to say, “this is the man.”

Simons, 159 Md.App. at 575, 860 A.2d at 424.

In Simons, id. at 566, 574, 860 A.2d at 418, 423, at trial, the
defendant’s counsel learned that a State’s witness had told
officers that, on the night of a burglary, she saw the defendant
near the victim’s residence. The defendant’s counsel character-
ized the witness’s statement to officers as a pretrial identifica-
tion of the defendant. See id. at 566, 860 A.2d at 418. The
defendant moved to preclude the witness from identifying the
defendant at trial on the ground that the State had not
disclosed the witness’s pretrial identification of the defendant.

See id. at 566, 860 A.2d at 418. The trial court denied the
motion to preclude. See id. at 566, 860 A.2d at 418. At trial,
consistent with her statement to officers, the witness testified
that she had observed the defendant “ ‘walking back and forth’
in front of” the victim’s residence on the night of the burglary.
Id. at 566, 860 A.2d at 418. The defendant was convicted, and
the Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded for a
new trial. See id. at 564-65, 860 A.2d at 417.

As a threshold matter, the Court of Special Appeals ob-
served that it needed to determine whether the witness’s
statement to law enforcement officers constituted a pretrial
identification for the purpose of Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B).
See id. at 570, 860 A.2d at 420. The Court observed that, in
Williams, 364 Md. at 178, 771 A.2d 1082, this “Court dismissed
the State’s contention that [Maryland] Rule [4-263(d)(7)(B) ] is
limited to traditional pref ]trial identifications[,] such as
show[ Jups or line[ Jups.” Simons, 159 Md.App. at 571, 860
A.2d at 421, The Court of Special Appeals stated that this
Court’s holding in Williams led to the conclusion that, where a
pretrial statement of an eyewitness “directly implicates the
defendant in the commission of the crime,” that statement is
the equivalent of an identification, “i.¢., the witness's ability to
say, ‘this is the man.’” Simons, 159 Md.App. at 575, 860 A.2d
at 424,

In Simons, id, at 575, 860 A.2d at 428, the Court of Special
Appeals determined that the witness’s statement to law en-
forcement officers constituted a pretrial identification of the
defendant, and was subject to mandatory disclosure under
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). The Court explained that the
witness's in-court identification of the defendant was an “un-
fair surprise [that] was prejudicial to” him. Id. at 574, 860 A.2d
at 423. The Court observed that, if the defendant had known
of the witness’s statement to officers, that knowledge “could
have influenced his decision to accept a plea bargain; he could
have questioned [the witness] about the identification before
trial; conducted a thorough investigation of the scene to
assess [the witness]’s vantage point when she witnessed [the

defendant] at the [victim’s residence]; and tested [the witness]
on cross-examination.” Id, at 574, 860 A.2d at 423.

The Court concluded that the State’s violation of Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) was not harmless because the witness was
the only one who had observed the defendant near the victim’s
residence on the night of the burglary. See id. at 577-78, 860

A.2d at 425. The Court observed that, therefore, the witness’s
identification testimony was “crucial to” the State’s case, Id,
578, 860 A.2d at 425.

Analysis

HM Here, we hold that, under this case’s circumstances,
Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland as the person who
was not the shooter was relevant information regarding the
pretrial identification of Green as the person who was the
shooter, and was required to be disclosed under Maryland
Rule 4~-263(d)(7)(B). The pretrial identification of Copeland as
the person who was not the shooter was the equivalent of the
pretrial identification of Green as the shooter, where the
State’s theory of the case was, and its evidence showed, that
Green, Copeland, and Myers were the only people at the scene
of the shooting, and that Copeland was not the shooter.

As a threshold matter, we are unpersuaded by the State’s
contentions that the record does not establish that Carter
informed law enforcement officers of her ability to identify
Copeland before trial, and that Carter did not make a pretrial
identification of Copeland. In affirming the convictions, the
Court of Special Appeals determined that the State’s discov-
ery obligations pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) are
limited to the plain language of the Rule, and that, because
Carter’s identification of Copeland was an identification of
someone other than the defendant, the State did not violate
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). See Green, 231 Md.App. at 74,
149 A8d at 1171, As such, the Court of Special Appeals did
not expressly address the question of when Carter advised the
detectives that she could identify Copeland and whether this
constituted a pretrial identification.

The record demonstrates that Carter advised law enforce-
ment officers before trial of her ability to identify Copeland as
the person who was not the shooter. It is undisputed that, at
trial, Carter testified that she saw two men at the scene of the
shooting with Myers, and she identified Copeland as the
person who was not the shooter. It is also undisputed that, one
or two days after the shooting, Carter informed detectives
that she was unable to describe the face of either person—ie.
the shooter and the person who was not the shooter. The
record reflects that, at trial, Carter testified that, after the
shooting, she recognized a photograph of Copeland in the
newspaper. Carter was uncertain of the date on which she
recognized Copeland. Carter acknowledged that, upon recog-
nizing the photograph of Copeland, she did not call anyone or
inform anyone. Green’s counsel asked Carter, however:
“(W]hen did you eventually tell any of the detectives that you
knew who [ ] Copeland was?” Significantly, Carter responded:
“When I went over—over everything again with them, what I
saw—everything that I saw that day.”

To be sure, Carter did not specify when she “went over
everything again” with the detectives. But, twenty days before
the first day of trial, the State requested a writ to compel
Copeland to appear at trial. Notably, Copeland’s plea agree-
ment provided that, if either party called Copeland as a
witness in this case, he would invoke his privilege against self-
inerimination in response to any question of substance. As
such, the State’s purpose in securing Copeland’s appearance
could not have been to call him as a witness. Instead, as the
prosecutor acknowledged at a bench conference, the State’s
purpose was to have Carter identify Copeland. Specifically,
the prosecutor stated: “(The [S]tate’s intention at this time—
and this was the reason for the writ for [] Copeland[.] ... It
is the [S]tate’s proffer to the court that we believe that []
Carter, upon seeing [] Copeland, will be able to positively
identify him.” The State’s request for a writ to compel Cope-
land’s appearance three weeks before trial leads to the ines-
capable conclusion that, sometime before the request for the
writ—ie., pretrial—Carter told detectives that she recognized

Copeland. Otherwise, there would have been no reason for the
State to request the writ for Copeland’s appearance, as Cope-
land’s plea agreement with the State provided that he would
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and not answer any substantive questions,

More tellingly, though, at trial, at a bench conference during
Carter’s testimony, before her identification of Copeland, the
prosecutor informed the circuit court: “We intend to have []
Carter specifically ... identify [ ] Copeland either by face, and
say, yes, that’s him, or that looks like him or whatever she
says, then ask her about the physique, whether that’s consis-
tent with the first or the second person or anything to that
effect.” In other words, before Carter’s identification of Cope-
land, the prosecutor advised that the sole purpose of Cope-
Jand’s presence was for Carter to identify him.

Equally telling, the record reveals other circumstances giv-
ing rise to the conclusion that the prosecutor intended for
Carter to identify Copeland at trial—ie, that Carter had
advised detectives pretrial of her ability to identify Copeland.
Before opening statements, the prosecutor stated that he
wanted Copeland to appear in the courtroom during Carter’s
testimony so that she could identify him. During opening
statement, the prosecutor said: “[Y]ou have one eyewitness
putting two people, one which will be very clearly identified as
[] Copeland and one that loosely identifies as [ ] Green, at the
scene of the shooting[.]” During direct-examination of Carter,
the prosecutor asked Carter whether she would be able to
identify the tall, skinny man who had stood next to the
Mustang’s driver’s door—i.e., the person who was not the
shooter—if he were shown to her. Carter responded in the
affirmative. At a bench conference, Green’s counsel expressed
surprise that Carter would be able to identify Copeland. In
response, the prosecutor did not claim that he too was sur-
prised to learn that Carter could identify Copeland. Instead,
the prosecutor stated that “[t]here [wa]s no surprise” because
Green’s counsel knew that multiple witnesses could identify
Copeland. Significantly, at no time did the prosecutor advise
the circuit court that he, like Green’s counsel, had been

unaware of Carter’s ability to identify Copeland. The State’s
request for a writ nearly three weeks before trial, as well as
the prosecutor’s announcement at a bench conference and
during the State’s opening statement that Carter was expect-
ed to identify Copeland, demonstrate that Carter’s in-court
identification of Copeland was not unexpected—to the con-
trary, it was planned in advance based on Carter having
informed detectives pretrial of her ability to identify Copeland.

Hl Our precedent mandates the conclusion that Carter’s
informing detectives before trial of her ability to identify
Copeland as the person who was not the shooter constituted a
pretrial identification of Copeland. For purposes of Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), the phrase “pretrial identification” is not
“limited to [S]tate-orchestrated identification procedures, such
as a photographic array, a show[ ]up, or a line[ Jup[.J”
Williams, 364 Md. at 172-78, 771 A.2d at 1089. For example, in
Williams, id, at 178, 771 A.2d at 1092, this Court “conclude[d]
that [a law enforcement officer]’s surveillance observation, if
used by the State for purposes of identification, [wal]s ‘relevant
material regarding a pretrial identification’ ” under Maryland
Rule 4~263(d)(7)(B). And, notably, in Simons, 159 Md.App. at
574-75, 860 A.2d at 423, guided by this Court’s holding in
Williams, the Court of Special Appeals held that a pretrial
identification occurred where a witness stated to law enforce-
ment officers that she saw the defendant near the scene of the
crime around the time the crime was committed. Here, a
pretrial identification of Copeland occurred when Carter in-
formed detectives before trial that she could identify Copeland
as being present with the victim but not being the shooter.

It is of no moment that Carter may or may not have
informed law enforcement officers that she recognized Cope-
land in a photograph in a newspaper, or that the officers were
not present when Carter viewed the newspaper. Just as it is
unnecessary for an identification to occur during a lineup,
showup, or other formal identification procedure, see Williams,
864 Md. at 172-78, 771 A.2d at 1089, it is also unnecessary for
an eyewitness’s recognition of a person who was at the scene

of a crime to occur in front of law enforcement officers. What
matters is that the eyewitness advises officers of his or her
ability to identify the person, At that point, the State is
charged with knowledge of the eyewitness’s ability to identify
the person, As we explained in Williams, id, at 177, 771 A.2d at

1092, “the State is charged with the knowledge of all seeming-
ly pertinent facts related to the charge [that] are known to”
law enforcement officers. (Citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).

Having determined that Carter made a pretrial identifica-
tion of Copeland and that law enforcement officers were aware
of the identification, we must next determine whether that
identification was subject to mandatory disclosure under Ma-
ryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B). We start by reviewing Maryland
Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B)’s language. Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B)
does not simply require disclosure of pretrial identifications of
defendants. Rather, Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) requires
disclosure of “(alll relevant material or information regard-
ing ... pretrial identification of the defendant by a State’s
witness[.]’ (Emphasis added).

In Collins, 873 Md. at 146, 816 A.2d at 928, this Court
underscored the importance of the phrase “relevant material
or information regarding” in Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B).
Specifically, this Court stated its holding as follows: “[The
witness]’s prior inconsistent statement [about not seeing any-
one at the scene of the crime], under the circumstances of this
case, falls within the scope of ‘relevant material or information
regarding pretrial identification of the defendant by a witness
for the State”” Id, at 146, 816 A.2d at 928 (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted), The phrase “relevant material or
information regarding” is plainly not limited to the mere
occurrence of a pretrial identification of a defendant.

I Instead, the phrase “relevant material or information
regarding” renders Maryland Rule 4~-263(d)(7)(B) applicable
to more than just a pretrial identification procedure identify-
ing the defendant. For example, in Collins, id. at 146, 816 A.2d
at 928, this Court held that Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B)

requires disclosure of a failure to identify the defendant
pretrial. And, in Williams, 364 Md. at 178, 167-68, 180, 771
A.2d at 1092, 1086, 1098, this Court concluded that the State
violated Maryland Rule 4~263(d)(7)(B) where, contrary to a
prosecutor’s proffer, a law enforcement officer testified that he
had observed the defendant during surveillance, where the
officer had not participated in a pretrial photographic array or
lineup identifying the defendant. Thus, in both Collins and
Williams, this Court found violations of Maryland Rule 4—
263(d)(7)(B), even though there had not been a pretrial identi-
fication procedure, such as a photographic array or lineup, in
which the defendant was identified?

In addition to considering Maryland Rule 4-268’s language,
we also take into account its purposes—“to assist defendants
in preparing their defense and to protect them from unfair
surprise.” Collins, 873 Md. at 146, 816 A.2d at 928 (quoting
Williams, 364 Md. at 172, 771 A.2d at 1089), “The duty to
disclose pref Itrial identifications ... is properly determined
by interpreting the plain meaning of [Maryland] Rule [4-268]
with proper deference to these policies.” Collins, 8738 Md. at
146-47, 816 A.2d at 928 (quoting Williams, 364 Md, at 172, 771
A.2d at 1089). Guided by Maryland Rule 4-268(d)(7)(B)’s
language and purposes, as well as our holdings in Collins and
Williams, we conclude that a pretrial identification of a co-

9. To be subject to mandatory disclosure under Maryland Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B), material or information regarding pretrial identification of
the defendant must be “relevant” to the identification of the defendant,
but it is not necessary that the material or information be found to be
“material,” Although one of Maryland Rule 4-263's predecessors limit-
ed discoverable information to that which was “material,” Maryland
Rule 4-263 includes no such limitation, See Williams, 364 Md, at 171 &
n.12, 771 A.2d at 1088 & n12. For Maryland Rule 4-263’s purposes,
generally, information or material is “relevant if it reasonably is calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and their probative
value is not outweighed by any privacy interests, confidentiality, privi-
lege, or other conflicting interest, including the burden of production.”
Cole v. State, 378 Md. 42, 63, 835 A.2d 600, 611-12 (2003). By contrast,
under one of Maryland Rule 4-263’s predecessors, to obtain informa-
tion during discovery, the defendant was required to show that the
information “may be material to the preparation of his [or her] defense
and that the request is reasonable.”

defendant is relevant information regarding pretrial identifica-
tion of the defendant where the pretrial identification of the
co-defendant is effectively the equivalent of a pretrial identifi-
eation of the defendant. Stated otherwise, under the circum-
stances of this case, information regarding the pretrial identi-
fication of Copeland was relevant information regarding the
pretrial identification of Green.

The facts of this case serve as a prime example of a pretrial
identification of a co-defendant being effectively the equivalent
of a pretrial identification of the defendant. It is undisputed
that, at the time of the shooting, Myers, the victim, was in his
truck, which was facing Copeland’s Mustang. Carter testified
that, as she was driving by the scene of the shooting, she saw
two men. One man was shorter and stouter, wearing a hoodie,
and standing off to the side of the road. The other man was
taller and skinnier, wearing a hat with snowflakes, and stand-
ing near the Mustang’s driver’s seat. Carter heard a gunshot,
looked into her driver’s side-view mirror, and saw the shorter,
stouter man shoot into the truck three times. Carter had not
gotten a look at the face of the shorter, stouter man—i.e., the
shooter—because his hood was up. Carter had, however, got-
ten a look at the face of the tall, thin man—ie., the person
who was not the shooter. The record establishes that prior to
trial Carter informed law enforcement officers of her ability to
identify Copeland as the person who was not the shooter. And,
at trial, Carter unequivocally identified Copeland as the per-
son who was not the shooter. The State’s theory of the case
was that Green was the person with Copeland and was the
shooter.

Given the State’s theory of the case, Carter’s identification
of Copeland as the person who was not responsible for the
shooting established that Green was the shooter. Carter's
pretrial identification of Copeland was in essence the equiva-
lent of a pretrial identification of Green as the shooter. As
such, Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland was relevant
information regarding the pretrial identification of Green, and
was subject to mandatory disclosure under Maryland Rule 4~
263(d)(7)(B).

We disagree with the State’s assertion at oral argument
that our holding requires prosecutors to be “soothsayers” by
predicting what defense strategy will be. Indeed, we conclude
that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that
the State’s discovery obligations would depend on the defen-
dant’s trial strategy, “which often will be unknown prior to
trial.” Green, 281 Md.App. at 74, 149 A.8d at 1171. The Court
of Special Appeals reasoned that Carter’s identification of
Copeland as the person who was not the shooter implicated
Green as the shooter only because Green testified that he,
Copeland, and Myers were the only ones at the scene of the
shooting. See id. at 78-74, 149 A.8d at 1171. The record,
however, establishes that Carter told detectives before trial
that she could identify Copeland as the person who was not
the shooter, and that the State intended to use Carter’s
identification of Copeland at trial in its case-in-chief. We have
no reason to imagine that there will not be other cases in
which the State may be aware that a witness's pretrial identifi-
cation of a co-defendant will effectively identify the defendant.
Our holding simply requires the State to disclose information
that would reasonably be expected to be known to prosecu-
tors, and that is relevant to the pretrial identification of the
defendant.

Independent of Green’s testimony, Carter’s pretrial identifi-
cation of Copeland was known to the prosecutor and relevant
to the pretrial identification of Green. The State’s theory of
the case was that only Green, Copeland, and Myers were at
the scene of the shooting. At trial, the State introduced
evidence aimed at establishing that Green was the third
person at the scene of the shooting—i.e., that Green was the
shooter, Watson, Myer’s girlfriend, and both of Myers’s par-
ents testified that, two days before the shooting, Green and
Copeland confronted Myers about the burglary of Copeland’s
residence. Carter, Wisniewski, Miller, and Deputy First Class
Griffin testified that, around the time of the shooting, two
people were in or near a dark Mustang that was at or near the
scene of the shooting. Detective Swonger prepared Cellular
Analysis Reports that showed that, around the time of the

shooting, Copeland’s and Green’s cell phones connected to cell
towers in the general vicinity of Myers’s residence. Peacock,
Green’s girlfriend, testified that, on the day of the shooting,
Green told her: “Something bad might happen.” Significantly,
according to Peacock, later that day, Green told her that he
had been present at the scene of the shooting, but that he did
not do it. During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor
asserted that the short, stocky person who shot Myers loosely
identified as Green. During the State’s closing argument, the
prosecutor contended: “The shooter was the short[,] stocky
guyl,] and had a bushy beard. [] Green was and is the
shorter[,] stockier guyl,] and had, by his own admission[,]
and[,] again[,] as supported by the evidence we presented, a
bushy beard when [ ] Myers was shot.”

In sum, the State presented evidence that Green, Copeland,
and Myers were the only people at the scene of the shooting.
Before Green testified, Carter’s identification of Copeland as
the person who was not the shooter, in the context of the
State’s theory of the case and the evidence presented at trial
in support of that theory, identified Green as the shooter. The
State obviously knew in advance of trial that Carter’s identifi-
cation of Copeland as the person who was not the shooter was
not only relevant, but also highly probative as to the issue of
the shooter’s identity.

Our holding does not require prosecutors to predict the
future. As a prosecutor prepares for trial, he or she becomes
aware of evidence that identifies the defendant. A prosecutor
is in a position to determine whether a witness's pretrial
identification of a co-defendant is the equivalent of a pretrial
identification of the defendant as the person responsible for
the crime. For example, here, the prosecutor was certainly
aware in advance of trial of the State’s theory that Green,
Copeland, and Myers were the only people at the scene of the
shooting and that Copeland was not the shooter. The prosecu-
tor knew in advance that, if Carter identified Copeland as the
person who was not the shooter, her identification of Copeland
would essentially identify Green as the shooter. It was incum-
bent upon the prosecutor under Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)

to disclose Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland, as
Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland was relevant infor-
mation as to the pretrial identification of Green as the shooter.

HMMM Having established that the State violated Maryland
Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) by failing to disclose Carter’s pretrial
identification of Copeland, we must next inquire as to whether
the error was harmless. Under the doctrine of harmless error,
“{aJn appellate court does not reverse a conviction based on a
trial court’s error or abuse of discretion where the appellate
court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial
court’s error or abuse of discretion did not ‘influence the
verdict’ to the defendant’s detriment.” Hall v. State, 487 Md.
534, 540-41, 87 A.3d 1287, 1291 (2014) (quoting Perez v. State,
420 Mad. 57, 66, 21 A.3d 1048, 1054 (2011)) (brackets omitted);
see also Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 850 A.2d 665, 678
(1976).

Here, Carter’s identification of Copeland as the person who
was not the shooter was critical to the State’s case. Carter was
the State’s only eyewitness to the shooting. Carter’s testimony
that Copeland was not the shooter was the only evidence that
directly identified Green as the shooter. The other State’s
witnesses, at best, gave testimony demonstrating that Green
and Copeland confronted Myers and testimony that placed
Green at the scene of the shooting. For example, Watson and
both of Myers’s parents testified that, two days before the
shooting, Green and Copeland visited Myers’s residence and
confronted him about the burglary of Copeland’s residence.
Detective Swonger’s Cellular Analysis Reports established
that, around the time of the shooting, Copeland’s and Green’s
cell phones connected to cell towers in the general vicinity of
Myers’s residence. Peacock testified that, on the day of the
shooting, Green said that he had been at the scene of the
shooting, but denied that he had done it. Although the State
produced evidence placing Green at the scene of the shooting
and demonstrating that Green and Copeland had confronted
Myers, Carter was the only eyewitness to the shooting. Signif-
icantly, the prosecutor referred to Carter’s identification of

Copeland as the person who was not the shooter at least once
during the State’s opening statement, and multiple times
during the State’s closing argument. During the State’s clos-
ing argument, the prosecutor referred to Carter’s identifica-
tion of Copeland as a “key piece of evidence.”

Undeniably, the State’s failure to disclose Carter’s pretrial
identification of Copeland prejudiced Green. Green’s counsel
stated that it was a “surprise” to learn at trial that Carter was
expected to identify Copeland. The State’s failure to disclose
Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland prevented Green’s
counsel from attempting to interview Carter about her identi-
fication of Copeland, and potentially performing research to
determine if, or when, Carter had seen Copeland’s photograph
in a newspaper. Green’s counsel lacked the ability to prepare
to cross-examine Carter regarding the timing or remoteness
of her pretrial identification of Copeland. Green’s counsel was
unable to prepare to question Carter as to whether anything
in the newspaper article or other circumstances may have
influenced Carter’s testimony. Although Green’s counsel theo-
retically could have formulated such questions without being
told of Carter's pretrial identification of Copeland before trial,
being aware of the pretrial identification would undoubtedly
have aided Green’s counsel’s trial preparation.

In addition to providing Green’s counsel the opportunity to
interview Carter about her identification of Copeland and
perform pretrial research, disclosure of Carter’s pretrial iden-
tification of Copeland may have “influenced [Green’s] decision
to accept a plea bargain[.]” Simons, 159 Md.App. at 574, 860
A.2d at 428, In any event, “[i]t is not for us to determine what,
if any, response the defense could have prepared had it known
of the prior inconsistent statement. It is enough to find that
the defense was denied an adequate opportunity to do so, to
its prejudice.” Collins, 8373 Md. at 148, 816 A.2d at 929.

In sum, we are far from convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the State’s violation of Maryland Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B) did not influence the verdict to Green’s detriment.
A failure to disclose a witness’s pretrial identification is preju-

dicial, and thus not harmless error, where the witness’s identi-
fication is critical to the State’s case. For example, in Williams,
364 Md. at 179, 771 A.2d at 1098, this Court held that a failure
to disclose a witness’s pretrial identification was not harmless
error where an accomplice was the only other witness to place
the defendant at the scene of the crime. Similarly, in Simons,
159 Md.App. at 578, 860 A.2d at 425, the Court of Special
Appeals held that a violation of Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)
was not harmless error where the witness in question was the
only person who saw the defendant at the scene of the crime
around the time the crime occurred.

We reject the State’s contention that cross-examination was
the proper remedy for the violation of Maryland Rule 4—
268(d)(7)(B) in this case. As discussed above, the inability to
engage in pretrial preparation hindered Green’s counsel’s
ability to adequately prepare a defense and cross-examine
Carter about her pretrial identification of Copeland. And,
again, it need not be certain that Green’s counsel would have
actually prepared differently had he known in advance of
Carter’s pretrial identification of Copeland. All that is re-
quired to find that the violation was not harmless error is the
circumstance that Green’s counsel was denied the opportunity
to prepare differently. See Collins, 373 Md. at 148, 816 A.2d at
929.

Contrary to the State’s position, the prejudice to Green was
not ameliorated by the circumstance that he testified that he,
Copeland, and Myers were the only people at the scene of the
shooting. Regardless of whether Green testified as such, Car-
ter’s identification of Copeland as the person who was not the
shooter remained the only direct evidence that Green was the
shooter. Independent of Green’s testimony, Carter’s identifica-
tion of Copeland was crucial to the State’s case.

Nor do we agree with the State’s contention that any
prejudice to Green from Carter's identification of Copeland
was nullified by the circumstance that, according to the state-
ment of charges, Carter indicated that the shooter was a
short, stocky person and the non-shooter was the tall, thin

person. Green apparently was, at the time, short and stocky,
These circumstances may have given rise to the inference that
Green was the shooter. By contrast, Carter’s identification of
Copeland as the person who was not the shooter directly
implicated Green as the shooter. None of the State’s other
evidence did so. Thus, we conclude that the error in this case
was not harmless.

Having held that the State violated Maryland Rule 4~
268(d)(7)(B), and that the error was not harmless, our final
task is to determine the appropriate remedy. In his briefs,
Green did not specify the remedy sought, beyond requesting
that we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
At oral argument, however, Green clarified that he simply
desires a new trial, and that he does not request that we
exclude Carter’s identification of Copeland from the new trial.
Consistently, in Williams, 364 Md. at 181, 771 A.2d at 1094,
and Collins, 878 Md. at 149, 816 A.2d at 930, after finding
violations of Maryland Rule 4~263(d)(7)(B), this Court ordered
new trials without instructing that the identification testimony
in question be excluded from the new trials. We shall do
likewise here, and order a new trial and refrain from ordering
that Carter’s identification of Copeland be excluded on re-
mand.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDG-
MENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CECIL COUN-
TY AND REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL. RESPONDENT
TO PAY COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS.

Barbera, C.J., McDonald and Hotten, JJ., dissent.

Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J., which Barbera, C.J.,
and Hotten, J., join.

There is much in the meticulously rendered Majority opin-
ion with which I agree. However, the Majority opinion inter-
prets the discovery rule relating to a “pretrial identification of

the defendant” in a way that is at odds with the language of
the rule and that broadens its application well beyond an
actual identification of the defendant. Accordingly, I cannot
join the opinion and would affirm the well-reasoned opinion of
the Court of Special Appeals on this issue. 231 Md.App. 58,
58-74, 149 A.3d 1159 (2016).

As the Majority opinion indicates, Doris Carter was origi-
nally able to say that the confrontation on Principio Road
involved a short, stocky (or stout) man and a tall, thin man and
that the short, stocky man was the shooter. Despite her initial
inability to make any identifications of either man, she later
realized, and advised the prosecution at some point in advance
of taking the stand, that she could identify Mr. Copeland as
the tall, thin man. The Majority opinion characterizes this as a
“pretrial identification” of Mr. Copeland, which seems fair.
Majority op. at 155-60, 171 A.3d at 1195-98.

T also agree that it is appropriate to refer to Mr. Copeland,
as the Majority opinion does, as a “co-defendant” of Mr.
Green, regardless of whether they were both charged in the
same indictment or in separate indictments. Majority op. at
183-87, 171 A.3d at 1182-85.

I also agree with the Majority opinion that the criminal
discovery rule, Maryland Rule 4-263, does not require that the
State make advance disclosure of a pretrial identification of a
co-defendant, such as Mr. Copeland. Majority op. at 187-47,
171 A.8d at 1184-91.

The Majority opinion then reasons, however, that Ms. Car-
ter’s pretrial identification of Mr. Copeland was also “relevant
... information regarding ... pretrial identification of [Mr.
Green]” for purposes of Rule 4-263. Majority op. at 102, 160~
61, 171 A.38d at 1164-65, 1198-99. This is where, in my view,
the Majority opinion’s reasoning departs from the rule.

In order for there to be “relevant ... information regarding
... pretrial identification of [Mr. Green],” there must be a
pretrial identification of Mr. Green. What “pretrial identifica-
tion of [Mr. Green]” is at issue here?

There is no dispute that Ms. Carter did not place Mr. Green
at the scene of the crime. So the Majority opinion cannot be
referring to a pretrial identification of Mr. Green by Ms.
Carter. Nor was there a pretrial identification of Mr. Green by
another prosecution witness. As the Majority opinion recounts,
two other witnesses observed parts of the confrontation on
Principio Road, but neither of those witnesses identified either
Mr. Green or Mr. Copeland.

Thus, there was no “pretrial of identification of [Mr. Green]”
in this case. At trial, it was all the items of evidence, recounted
in detail by the Majority opinion, that effectively proved that
Mr. Green was the short, stocky man involved in the confron-
tation with Mr. Myers on Principio Road—a fact that Mr.
Green confirmed in his own testimony. Ms. Carter's identifica-
tion of Mr. Copeland as the tall, thin man in that confrontation
is one piece of the mosaic of relevant evidence that pointed to
Mr, Green as the shooter.” But this piece of the mosaic was
not a “pretrial identification of [Mr. Green].” And, without a
pretrial of identification of Mr. Green, there cannot be, in the
language of the rule, “relevant information” concerning a non-
existent pretrial identification of Mr. Green.

The Majority opinion seeks to base its analysis on Williams
v. State, 364 Md. 160, 771 A.2d 1082 (2001) and Collins v.
State, 373 Md. 180, 816 A.2d 919 (2008), Both of those cases
involved deficiencies in pretrial discovery concerning witnesses
who were able to identify the defendant prior to trial and who

1. Indeed, only Mr. Green himself in his own testimony definitively
placed himself at the scene of the shooting. As the Court of Special
Appeals noted, the pretrial discovery obligations of the prosecution
under Rule 4-263 cannot be contingent on what testimony the defen-
dant later gives at trial—which is likely to be unknown to the prosecu-
tion in advance of the trial. See 231 Md.App. at 73-74, 149 A.3d 1159,

2. It may well be that it would be fairer for the prosecution to disclose
that piece of evidence sooner rather than later, as the prosecution was
required to do with many other pieces of that mosaic (although not all
inculpatory testimony is necessarily going to be revealed in pretrial
discovery). Perhaps the discovery rule should be amended to encom-
pass pretrial identifications of co-defendants. But that is not the ques-
tion before us.

made an identification of the defendant at trial. In Williams,
the prosecution, in response to specific requests by the de-
fense, inaccurately stated in pretrial discovery that the wit-
ness—a police officer who had conducted a surveillance—
would not be able to identify the defendant. In Collins, the
prosecution failed to timely disclose that a witness who made
pretrial and in-court identifications of the defendant had ini-
tially been unable to make that identification. Neither case
concerned discovery of an identification of a co-defendant, or
other evidence that might inculpate the defendant but was not
itself an identification of the defendant.

Ultimately, the Majority opinion rests its holding on the
proposition that, in this case, “a pretrial identification of a co-
defendant [is] effectively the equivalent of a pretrial identifica-
tion of the defendant.” Majority op. at 162, 171 A.8d at 1199.
The Majority opinion reasons that, because Ms, Carter had
described the shooter as short and stocky and the non-shooter
as tall and thin, her identification of Mr. Copeland as the tall,
thin man was effectively an identification of Mr. Green as the
shooter. But the same could be said for Detective Lewis’
testimony that, at the time of the offense, Mr. Green was 57”
and 190 pounds while Mr. Copeland was 5’11” and 160 pounds.
That testimony also established that, in relation to each other,
Mr. Copeland was the tall, thin man and Mr. Green the short,
stocky man, and thus “effectively” identified Mr, Green as the
shooter.

In any event, it is easy for us to say, with the record of the
entire trial before us (including Mr. Green’s own testimony),
that Ms. Carter’s identification of Mr. Copeland or Detective
Lewis’ testimony concerning the height and weight of the two
men—or some other item of evidence pointing to Mr. Green as
the shooter that was known to the prosecution in advance of
trial—was “effectively” an identification of Mr. Green. It is
quite another thing to create a rule of pretrial discovery based
on that hindsight observation. What other sort of inculpatory
evidence, viewed from that perspective, will be deemed to be
“effectively the equivalent” of a pretrial identification of a
defendant?

In my view, the Majority opinion’s interpretation of the rule
undermines the notion, frequently expressed by this Court,
that the rule is a “precise rubric,”*® and renders the rule’s
application uncertain for those who must apply it without the
benefit of hindsight.

Chief Judge Barbera and Judge Hotten have advised that
they join this opinion.

171 A.38d 1205
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
Vv
Louisa Content MCLAUGHLIN
Mise. Docket AG No. 47, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
October 20, 2017

3. E.g,, Williams, 364 Md. at 171, 771 A.2d 1082.

4, Itis also notable that issue before us—Ms. Carter's pretrial identifica-
tion of Mr. Copeland—is a matter of pretrial discovery, not the admissi-
bility of that evidence. Ms. Carter's in-court identification of Mr. Cope-
land was clearly admissible. Mr. Green’s counsel was free to cross-
examine her about that identification in light of her failure to make any
identifications in her initial interview with detectives—and did so. See
Majority op. at 106-10, 171 A.3d at 1167-69. (As the trial judge was
careful to confirm during the trial, Mr. Green’s counsel had received
the report of that interview in discovery), Ms. Carter's identification of
Mr. Copeland no doubt bolstered the prosecution case, but it was
perfectly admissible evidence and, even if the timing of its disclosure
somehow violated the discovery rule—which, for the reasons explained

in the text, it did not—Mr. Green is hard pressed to show how he was
harmed by it.

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180

Argued by Amy S. Paulick, Esquire, Asst. Bar Counsel,
Lydia E. Lawless, Bar Counsel (Atty. Grievance Commission
of Maryland), for Petitioner.

Argued by Louisa Content McLaughlin (Bel Air, MD), for
Respondent.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Adkins, J.

The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC”),
acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent Louisa Con-
tent McLaughlin. Bar Counsel charged McLaughlin with vio-

lating the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct
(“MLRPO”)! during her representation of Doris Leedom.

The AGC investigated after Paula McCabe, Ms. Leedom’s
daughter and power of attorney, filed a complaint. Bar Coun-
sel alleged that McLanghlin violated the following: (1) Rule
1.8 (Diligence); ® (2) Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication); * (8)
Rule 1.5(a) (Fees); (4) Rule 1.15(a) and (e) (Safekeeping

1. Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland
Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and renumbered.
Rules Order (June 6, 2016). The revised rules are now numbered as
follows: MARPC 19-301.3 (Diligence), MARPC 19-301.4 (Communica-
tion), MARPC 19-301.5 (Fees), MARPC 19-301.15 (Safekeeping Proper-
ty), MARPC 19-308.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and
MARPC 19-308.4 (Misconduct). We will refer to the MLRPC because
the misconduct at issue occurred before this change.

2. Rule 1.3, Diligence

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.

3. Rule 1.4. Communication

(a) A lawyer shall :

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in
Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules;

(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;

(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the
lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects
assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-

sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the

representation.

4. Rule 1.5. Fees

(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses, The
factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a
fee include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment of
the lawyer;

182

Property); * (5) Rule 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disci-
plinary Matters); * (6) Rule 8.4 (a), (¢) and (d) (Misconduct); 7

@)

@
()

©
1)
(3)

the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;

the amount involved and the results obtained;

the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circum-
stances;

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;

the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and

whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

5. Rule 1.15, Safekeeping Property

(a)

od

©

A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in
a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation sepa-
rate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a
separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600
of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and main-
tained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other
property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriate-
ly safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall
be created and maintained. Complete records of the account
funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall
be preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the
record was created.

When a lawyer in the course of representing a client is in
possession of property in which two or more persons (one of
whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The
lawyers shall distribute promptly all portions of the property as
to which the interests are not in dispute.

6. Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:

(a)
b)

knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or

fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
mown by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does
not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.

7. Rule 8.4, Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

and Maryland Code (1957, 2010 Repl. Vol.), § 10-806 of the
Business Occupations and Professions Article (“BP”) (Misuse
of Trust Money)?

We transmitted the matter to the Honorable Kevin J.
Mahoney (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Har-
ford County to hear the case. After trying and failing to serve
McLaughlin, Bar Counsel served the Client Protection Fund
of the Bar of Maryland pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-728(b).
The Fund mailed the Petition to McLaughlin at three different
addresses. When McLaughlin did not answer the Petition, Bar
Counsel moved for an Order of Default under Maryland Rule
2-618(b), which the Circuit Court granted. McLaughlin was
sent notice of the Default Order and served with Bar Coun-
sel’s discovery requests. McLaughlin never responded to Bar
Counsel, nor sought to overturn the default.

McLaughlin did not appear at the Circuit Court hearing on
March 20, 2017. The hearing judge concluded that because
McLaughlin had defaulted, all requests for admissions in Bar
Counsel’s discovery requests were deemed admitted pursuant
to Maryland Rule 2-424(b), The hearing judge issued Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based on the admitted facts,
in which he found by clear and convincing evidence that
McLaughlin violated MLRPC 1.8, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a)
and (e), 8.1(a) and (b), 8.4(a), (¢), and (d), and BP § 10-806, He
found multiple aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do
so, or do so through the acts of another;

eae

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation;

(@ engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice ....

8. Maryland Code (1957 2010 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations &
Professions, § 10-306. Misuse of Trust Money

A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the
purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.

THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT

The hearing judge made the following findings of fact.
McLaughlin was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 15,
2004 and has substantial experience in the practice of law.

In 2011, Ms. Leedom, then age 86, and a resident of New
York, retained McLaughlin to prepare estate planning docu-
ments. Ms. Leedom gave her son George Leedom (“Mr.
Leedom”) her power of attorney, and her daughter, Mrs.
McCabe, was identified as his successor. When Ms. Leedom
moved to Maryland in 2018, McLaughlin drafted a Maryland
power of attorney for her, which named Mr. Leedom as her
agent. In 2018, Ms. Leedom sold her New York home and
gifted the proceeds, over $500,000, to Mr, Leedom. McLaugh-
lin provided some advice regarding this gift. The hearing
judge found that Mr. Leedom managed his mother’s finances
from 2011 to June 2014. At that time,

Mr, Leedom entered a rehabilitation for substance abuse

issues, and Mrs. McCabe notified [McLaughlin] .... How-

ever, [McLaughlin] did not advise Ms. Leedom of the risks
of allowing Mr. Leedom to continue to serve as her power of
attorney at any time after June 2014. In fact, [McLaughlin]

did not communicate with Ms. Leedom at all in June 2014,

and never discussed Mr. Leedom’s substance abuse issues

with Ms, Leedom.

On August 12, 2014, Ms, Leedom, with [McLaughlin’s]

assistance, sold two pieces of property located in Aberdeen,

Maryland. The sale of the two properties resulted in net

proceeds to Ms. Leedom of approximately $95,000.00,

[McLaughlin] agreed to serve as an escrow agent, holding

the proceeds of the sale in her Attorney Trust Account.

Respondent was not to disburse the proceeds of the sale

until [Mr.] Leedom and Mrs. McCabe agreed on the disposi-

tion of the funds.

The hearing judge found that despite this agreement,
McLaughlin disbursed $10,000 to Mr, Leedom in October
2014. McLaughlin did not notify Mrs, McCabe or obtain her
consent to the disbursement,

In December 2014, Ms. Leedom executed a power of attor-
ney, naming McLaughlin as her agent. The next month,
McLaughlin “paid herself $5,175.00 from Ms. Leedom’s funds
held in her trust account without Mrs. McCabe’s authorization
or consent.” McLaughlin did not provide invoices or billing
statements to Ms. Leedom, or to Mr. Leedom when he had his
mother’s power of attorney.

Ms. Leedom executed another power of attorney in April
2015, naming Mrs. McCabe as her agent. Mrs, McCabe imme-
diately sent McLaughlin a letter asking “for an accounting of
and the return of her mother’s funds.” The hearing judge
found that McLaughlin provided an accounting in May, “but
vefused to return the balance of Ms, Leedom’s funds unless
and until Mrs. McCabe signed a waiver releasing [McLaugh-
lin] from any and all liability.” He also found that Mrs.
McCabe signed this release under duress.

In July 2015, Mrs, McCabe filed a complaint with the AGC.
Bar Counsel sent McLaughlin a copy of the complaint and
requested a written response. McLaughlin submitted a written
response on September 18. The hearing judge found that
McLaughlin made “knowing and intentional misrepresenta-
tions to Bar Counsel” in her response, specifically:

[McLaughlin] stated that ‘Doris Leedom ... was adamant

that she did not want her daughter [Paula McCabe] in-

volved. I had been told by [Mr.] Leedom on several occa-
sions that his mother became very agitated and combative
when Paula wanted to take her to a hair appointment or
when her name came up. I witnessed this on several occa-
sions in meetings just between Doris Leedom and myself.’
[McLaughlin] also misrepresented to Bar Counsel that she
was in frequent contact with [Mr.] Leedom, including in
person meetings, in the fall of 2014. Additionally, [McLaugh-
lin] misrepresented that she wrote a letter to Mrs. McCabe
on May 15, 2015, when in fact she had not. [McLaughlin]
also misrepresented that Mike McCabe, Paula McCabe’s
husband, {o]Jn more than one occasion ... said he did not
want to deal with Paula or have her get involved and finally

on May 8, 2015 said he was not getting involved with this
and that he had told Paula he wanted nothing to do with her
actions.’ Finally, [McLaughlin] misrepresented that she ‘ex-
plained on several occasions to Mrs. McCabe [that] there
was never an [escrow] account in Doris Leedom’s name.’

Bar Counsel sent a letter to McLaughlin dated November
18, 2015, which explained that the matter had been docketed
for further investigation, enclosed additional correspondence
from Mrs. McCabe, and requested a response. Bar Counsel
sent a similar letter on January 11, 2016. McLaughlin received
both of these letters, but never responded.

An AGC investigator interviewed McLaughlin in February
2016. McLaughlin told the investigator that she did not think
she had to respond to Bar Counsel’s November 18 letter, and
that she “did not recall” receiving the January 11 letter. Bar
Counsel sent McLaughlin additional copies of the previous
correspondence through U.S. mail and e-mail. McLaughlin
received, but did not respond to these communications.

THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The hearing judge found that an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary because the Circuit Court had entered an Order
of Default and McLaughlin had not moved to vacate the order.
He found that the admitted facts were “sufficient by a clear
and convincing standard” to justify the court’s conclusions of
Jaw that McLaughlin violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b),
1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (e), 8.1(a) and (b), 8.4(a), (¢), and (d), and BP
§ 10-306.

MLRPC 1.3: Diligence

The hearing judge concluded that McLaughlin violated Rule
1.8 when she “fail[ed] to promptly advise her client, Doris
Leedom, of the risks of continuing to have [Mr.] Leedom act
as her power of attorney when [Mr.] Leedom was experienc-
ing problems with substance abuse.” This “increased the likeli-
hood that her client would suffer adverse financial conse-
quences.”

MLRPC 1.4: Communication

The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated 1.4(a) by
failing “to provide information, advice and counsel to her client
regarding the propriety of having [Mr.] Leedom, who had
known substance abuse issues, continue as her power of
attorney.” This omission left Ms, Leedom without “sufficient
information to participate in making decisions regarding the
representation.” The hearing judge found that McLaughlin’s
failure “to explain to [Ms.] Leedom in any manner, the risks of
having [Mr.] Leedom continue as her power of attorney”
violated Rule 1.4(b) because she never explained the matter to
permit her client to make an informed decision.

MLRPC 1.5(a): Fees

The hearing judge found that McLaughlin never provided
an invoice or billing statement for the $5,175 fee to either her
client or her power of attorney. She simply deducted the
money from her IOLTA account, and the only justification for
this fee was a notation: “through 08/2014.” The hearing judge
found that “[w]ithout any basis to substantiate her charges in
this case, [McLaughlin’s] fee is unreasonable,” and violated
Rule 1.5(a).

MLRPC 1.15(a) and (e): Safekeeping Property

The hearing judge found that McLaughlin “violated ...
Rule [1.15(a) ] when she failed to keep her own property, i.e.,
the $5,175 in fees she earned in August 2014, separate from
[Ms.] Leedom’s own property,” because “she failed to with-
draw the funds from the IOLTA account until January 24,
2015.” The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated Rule
1.15(e) “by disbursing $10,000 to George Leedom in October
2014 without Mrs. McCabe’s consent.... [and] when she
disbursed $5,175.00 to herself for attorney’s fees without Mrs.
McCabe’s consent.”

MLRPC 8.1: Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

The hearing judge concluded that McLaughlin violated Rule
8.1(a) when she repeatedly made false statements to Bar

Counsel in her September 18, 2015 letter. The hearing judge
found that McLaughlin violated Rule 8.1(o) because she re-
ceived three requests for information from Bar Counsel and
never responded.

MLRPC 8.4: Misconduct

The hearing judge determined that McLaughlin violated
Rule 8.4(a) because she violated other Rules of Professional
Conduct. The hearing judge concluded that McLaughlin’s five
misrepresentations to Bar Counsel in the September 18 letter
violated Rule 8.4(¢), which prohibits conduct involving dishon-
esty or misrepresentation.

The hearing judge found that McLaughlin’s “failures to
communicate with her client, failures to safeguard her client’s
funds, misrepresentations to [Bar Counsel], and failures to
respond to [Bar Counsel’s] lawful requests for information”
were “likely to impair public confidence in the profession and
impact the image of lawyers in the public eye.” Such conduct
was prejudicial to the administration of justice, and violated
8.4(d).

Business Occupations & Professions § 10-
306: Misuse of Trust Money

The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated § 10-806
when she disbursed $10,000 to Mr. Leedom and $5,175 to
herself contrary to the agreement that she would not disburse
any proceeds from the sale of the Aberdeen properties until
Mr. Leedom and Mrs. McCabe could agree on the disposition
of the funds.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Relying on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md.
494, 506-07, 117 A.3d 88 (2015), the hearing judge considered:
(1) the rules McLaughlin violated; (2) her mental state; (8)
the injury her misconduct caused, or could have caused; and
(4) aggravating and mitigating factors. He found that
McLaughlin had violated numerous Rules of Conduct and BP
§ 10-806. The hearing judge concluded that McLaughlin's
mental state “seem[ed] to be intentional and deliberate” based

on her September 18 letter. He found that Ms. Leedom lost.
$10,000 when McLaughlin released funds to Mr. Leedom
without Mrs. McCabe’s consent, and $5,175 when McLaughlin
transferred the fee to herself without “proper documentation
that [she] had earned those fees.” Ms. Leedom may have lost
additional funds when McLaughlin failed to advise her client
of the dangers of retaining Mr. Leedom as her power of
attorney.

The hearing judge found multiple aggravating factors. He
found that McLaughlin had violated multiple rules and BP
§ 10-806. She engaged in “bad faith obstruction of the attor-
ney discipline proceedings” because she “failed to respond to
[Bar Counsel’s} last three letters.... failed to file an answer
to the PDRA, which resulted in a default judgement being
entered against her.... [and] she failed to respond to any of
[Bar Counsel’s] discovery requests.” McLaughlin “submitted
false statements, false evidence, and engaged in other decep-
tive practices” by making multiple misrepresentations in her
response to Bar Counsel. McLaughlin did not acknowledge the
wrongful nature of her misconduct because she “never admit-
ted that she violated any Rules of Professional Conduct....
[and] never apologized for her misconduct.”

The hearing judge found that Ms. Leedom was a vulnerable
victim because she was 89 years of age at the time the
misconduct occurred. McLaughlin had substantial experience
in the practice of law. McLaughlin was indifferent to making
restitution or correcting her misconduct because she never
refunded her fees, nor apologized. He also found that
McLaughlin was likely to repeat her misconduct, because
“absent recognition of and remorse for her wrongdoing, there
is a substantial likelihood that she will repeat it.” The hearing
judge found that McLaughlin had no available mitigating
factors because she had not provided any evidence, nor had
she “participated in any way during these proceedings ....”

DISCUSSION

In proceedings before this Court, McLaughlin was limited
to addressing sanctions because of the default entered against

her. We issued a per curiam order disbarring McLaughlin on
September 11, 2017. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
McLaughlin, 456 Md. 45, 169 A.3d 952, 2017 WL 3976468
(2017). We now explain the basis for that order.

Standard of Review

“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original
and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review
of the record.” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McClain, 406
Md. 1, 17, 956 A.2d 185 (2008). The Court will accept the
hearing judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly errone-
ous. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Page, 430 Md. 602, 626, 62
A8d 168 (2018). Both parties may file “exceptions to the
findings and conclusions of the hearing judge[.]” Maryland
Rule 19~728(b)(1). Because neither party filed an exception in
this case, we choose to “treat the findings of fact as estab-
lished.” Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(A); see also Attorney Griev-
ance Comm'n v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 584, 552, 16 Add 181
(2011), We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law
without deference, “even where default orders and judgments
have been entered at the hearing level.” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md, 36, 49, 785 A.2d 1260 (2001).

The Order of Default

The hearing judge entered an Order of Default under Md.
Rules 2-613(b) and 19-724(c) because McLaughlin never filed
a response to the Petition. He relied on Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 528, 550-51, 108 A.3d 629 (2014),
to conclude that “a full-blown evidentiary hearing [wa]s not
necessary.”

Hl In Thomas, we explained:

In the context of a default attorney grievance proceeding,
... after an order of default has been entered, the taking of
additional evidence may be warranted only when, as noted
above, new and material evidence has come to light since
the filing of the PDRA, or perhaps when the hearing judge
expresses doubt as to certain averments (or absence there-

of) and invites live testimony or additional demonstrative
evidence.
Id. at 547 n.26, 108 A.8d 629. Absent those circumstances, in
the event of a default, the hearing judge is not required to
hold a full evidentiary hearing. Id. at 550, 103 A.3d 629.

Hl The hearing judge properly entered an Order of De-
fault when McLaughlin failed to answer the Petition, see Md.
Rules 2-613(b), 19-724(c), and never sought to vacate the
default under Md. Rule 2-613(d).? We turn our attention to
whether the admitted facts were sufficient by a clear and
convincing standard to warrant the hearing judge’s conelu-
sions of law.

MLRPC 13: Diligence

HM Rule 1.3 requires an attorney to “act with reasonable
promptness and diligence in representing a client.” Our review
of the record reveals that McLaughlin was aware that Mr.
Leedom had a history of substance abuse before she began
representing Ms. Leedom. McLaughlin was aware that Mr.
Leedom entered a facility to treat his substance abuse in June
of 2014, and interacted with him while he was intoxicated after
he had been released from treatment. Mrs, MeCabe had
contacted McLaughlin in July 2014 regarding her brother’s
past and current substance abuse problems, and alleged that
he had poor financial management skills. McLaughlin’s Sep-
tember 18 letter lists a series of events between June and
December 2014 that should have raised concerns for any
reasonable attorney regarding Mr. Leedom’s fitness to serve
as his mother’s power of attorney.”

9. The summons requested a “written response by pleading or motion,
within 30 days after service of this summons ....” Although the Circuit
Court of Harford County entered the Order of Default within those 30
days, McLaughlin never sought to overturn the default, nor did she
appear at the hearing. The issue is ultimately irrelevant to the outcome
of this case, and this Court will not speculate as to what might have
happened had McLaughlin complied with her obligations.

10. Mr. Leedom was accused of assaulting his elderly father and a
protective order was issued against him, Mr, Leedom's wife and Mrs,

Hl These events undoubtedly impacted Ms, Leedom’s in-
terests. See MLRPC 1.8, emt. [8] (“A client’s interests often
can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change
of conditions ....”). Despite learning new information and
observing changes in Mr, Leedom’s behavior, McLaughlin did
not promptly discuss these issues with her client, or act to
protect her client’s financial interests, We have “consistently
regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a client’s interests to
be a violation of the Canon of Ethics warranting the imposi-
tion of some disciplinary sanction.” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 118, 120, 460 A.2d 597
(1988).

Hl There is no evidence that McLaughlin investigated the
situation, or verified that Mr, Leedom was complying with his
obligations as his behavior deteriorated." An attorney who
fails to investigate a client’s matter violates Rule 1.3, See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. London, 427 Md. 328, 347, 47
A.8d 986 (2012) (“The failure to consistently monitor and
manage a client’s business is a classic example of a Rule 1.3
violation.”); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Monfried, 368
Mad. 878, 885, 894, 794 A.2d 92 (2002) (attorney violated Rule
1.8 when he failed to investigate a client’s matter).

McLaughlin violated Rule 1.3 when she did not act to
protect her client against Mr. Leedom’s behavior, including
advising her client about the risk of keeping Mr. Leedom as

McCabe complained to McLaughlin about his substance abuse.
McLaughlin learned that Mr. Leedom had spent over half a million
dollars that his mother had given him in a very short period of time.
McLaughlin also reported that Adult Protective Services contacted her
to discuss concerns that Ms. Leedom was being financially abused.

11, McLaughlin says that she “did not dismiss the [information from
Mrs. McCabe], but ... did not find it alarming.” Mrs. McCabe made
serious allegations of financial mismanagement and drug abuse. This
communication should have alarmed McLaughlin and at a minimum,
spurred her to investigate the financial mismanagement claims, particu-
larly if they could adversely affect her client's interests. See MLRPC 1.3,
cmt, [1] (“An attorney must also act with commitment and dedication
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf.”),

her power of attorney when he was experiencing substance
abuse problems or investigating whether he was complying
with his duties as her power of attorney.

MLRPC 1.4; Communication

Hl “Attorneys violate Rule 1.4 when they fail to communi-
cate with clients and keep them informed of the status of their
legal matters.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powers, 454
Md. 79, 93, 164 A.8d 188 (2017). The duty to communicate
includes providing information about “significant develop-
ments affecting ... the substance of the representation.”
MLRPC 1.4, emt. [8]; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Narasimhan, 438 Md. 638, 656-57, 92 A.3d 512 (2014) (failing
to inform a client about the status of a matter or update the
client after significant case developments violates Rule 1,4(a)).

HI The record shows that Ms. Leedom engaged
McLaughlin for estate planning, including establishing a pow-
er of attorney to manage her financial affairs. McLaughlin was

required “when appropriate, to consult with the client about
the means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives.”
MLRPC 1.4, emt. [8]. McLaughlin knew that her 89-year-old
client suffered from the early stages of dementia and did not
wish to manage her own affairs. Moreover, she learned from
a third party—after the instrument was signed—that Mr.
Leedom entered a rehabilitation facility for his alcoholism.
McLaughlin did not know whether her vulnerable client was
aware of this change in circumstances,

Hl When the representation began, both McLaughlin and
Ms. Leedom knew of Mr. Leedom’s history of substance abuse
problems. Surely, the reoccurrence of Mr. Leedom’s substance
abuse problems could affect his ability to manage his mother’s
financial affairs under the power of attorney, and could well
inerease the risk of mismanagement and loss. Under these
circumstances, McLaughlin had a duty to communicate with

12. McLaughlin's September 18 letter stated that Ms. Leedom was
“suffering from early stages of dementia,” but was competent to sign a
legal document.

Ms. Leedom about this information."® Her failure to discuss
this information with Ms. Leedom violated Rule 1.4(a) because
she did not keep her client reasonably informed about the
matter.

HN Rule 1.4() requires an attorney to “explain on-
going matters to the extent reasonably necessary to allow a
client to make informed decisions ....” Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 363, 910 A.2d 429 (2006).
Whether a lawyer has fulfilled this duty “depends in part on
the kind of advice or assistance that is involved.” MLRPC 1.4,
emt. [5]. In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Rand, 429 Md.
674, 717, 57 A.3d 976 (2012), we explained that the analysis of
whether an attorney has violated Rule 1.4(b) requires consid-
ering “the entire interaction between [the attorney] and [the
client] and the information that was communicated.”

McLaughlin violated Rule 1.4(b) when she did not explain to
Ms. Leedom the risks of having Mr. Leedom continue as her
power of attorney. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler,
454 Md. 200, 214, 164 A.38d 209 (2017) (failure to explain
important aspects of the matter to a client violates Rule 1.4(b)
when the client is denied the opportunity to make an informed
decision). McLaughlin should have consulted with her client to
permit Ms. Leedom to make an informed decision about her
financial management because the circumstances of the on-
going representation had changed. See Steinberg, 395 Md. at
368, 910 A.2d 429,

MLRPC 1.5: Fees

HE (Rule 1.5(2) prohibits attorneys from agreeing to,
charging, or collecting “unreasonable fee[s],” and sets out a
list of non-exclusive factors to determine whether a fee is
reasonable. It is unclear how McLaughlin earned the $5,175
she deducted from the escrow account, other than for work

13. This is not to say that an attorney drafting a power of attorney is
always obligated to discuss or investigate the reliability or health of the
person given authority under the instrument. Certainly an attorney
generally is entitled to rely on the good judgment of her healthy client,

“through 08/2014.” McLaughlin’s letter stated that this fee
related to the sale of Ms. Leedom’s Aberdeen properties. But
her letter does not contain sufficient information to conclude
that the fee was reasonable under Rule 1.5(a). “[A]n other-
wise-reasonable fee can become unreasonable if the lawyer
fails to earn it.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 427
Mad. 209, 224, 46 A.8d 1169 (2012).

HM In her initial engagement letter to Ms. Leedom,
McLaughlin explained that she sent statements for fees and
disbursements on a monthly basis, but she never provided an
invoice or billing statement for this fee to anyone. Failure to
send invoices when an attorney is required to do so is unrea-
sonable. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Green, 441 Md.
80, 99, 105 A.8d 500 (2014); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Rand, 445 Md. 581, 608, 128 A.38d 107 (2015). The hearing
judge’s findings of fact, and our own review of the record
establish that McLaughlin never submitted an invoice for this
charge, nor supplied a basis for her fee. Therefore, she
violated Rule 1.5(a).

MLRPC 1.15: Safekeeping Property

HM Rule 1.15(a) requires a lawyer “to keep the property
of clients separate from the lawyer’s own property.” Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 168, 188, 118 A.3d
958 (2015). This Court has consistently held that “an attor-
ney’s failure to withdraw earned fees from his or her trust
account in a timely manner results in an impermissible com-
mingling of funds violative of MLRPC 1.15(a) ....” Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Weiers, 440 Md. 292, 305, 102 A.3d 332
(2014).

The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated Rule
1.15(a) when she failed to remove her earned fees from trust
monies. Because we do not know what legal services she
provided, or when, it is impossible to know whether or when
she should have removed these funds. Therefore, we decline to
reach this issue, which did not, in any event, affect our
decision to disbar McLaughlin.

Rule 1.15(e) applies to property that comes into an attor-
ney’s possession “in the course of representing a client.” If two
or more persons claim an interest in the property, the lawyer
is required to keep that property separate pending the resolu-
tion of the dispute. Id. The hearing judge found that all of Bar
Counsel’s averments were admitted because McLaughlin nev-
er answered the Petition, nor appeared at the hearing. For
that reason, he concluded that McLaughlin had violated
1.15(e).

It is not clear to us whether 1.15(e) would apply to the
dispute between Mrs. McCabe and Mr. Leedom. McLaughlin
received the property in the course of the representation. But
our review of the record does not show that anyone disputed
that Ms. Leedom owned the funds, or that Mrs. McCabe or
Mr. Leedom claimed an interest in the funds. Our cases
applying 1.15(e) typically address a lawyer’s failure to pay bills
out of settlement funds on a client’s behalf, or turn settlement
funds over to a client.“ This rule also applies to attorney fee
disputes. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Gracey, 448 Md.
1, 28, 186 A.8d 798 (2016). There is no evidence in the record
that anyone disputed McLaughlin’s fee because she never
notified anyone that she was taking the fee. We similarly
decline to reach this issue because it does not affect our
decision to disbar McLaughlin.

MLRPC 8.1: Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

HM Rule 8.1(a) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making
false statements of material fact in connection with disciplin-
ary matters. An attorney violates this rule “whenever an
attorney makes intentional misrepresentations to Bar Coun-
sel.” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mitchell, 445 Md, 241,
259, 126 A.3d 72 (2015). Bar Counsel identified five “knowing
and intentional” misrepresentations McLaughlin made in her
September 18 letter to Bar Counsel. The hearing judge found,

14, See, ¢.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Olszewski, 441 Md. 248, 269,
107 A.3d 1159 (2015); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thaxton, 415 Md.
341, 362, 1 A.3d 470 (2010).

apparently by allegation and default, that McLaughlin made
five “knowing and intentional’ misrepresentations to Bar
Counsel, and that this conduct violated Rule 8.1(a). We review
these misrepresentations in greater detail.

1. Misrepresentation regarding Ms. Leedom’s preference
that Mrs. McCabe should not be involved in her
finances or her day-to-day care.

HM McLaughlin misrepresented that Ms. Leedom did not
want Mrs. McCabe involved in managing her finances or her
day-to-day care, and became “agitated and combative” when
Mrs. McCabe took her to appointments, or when her name
came up. Mrs. McCabe provided letters to Bar Counsel from
Ms. Leedom’s physician and daily caregivers. All of these
letters refuted McLaughlin’s assertion and stated that Mrs.
McCabe was involved in her mother’s day-to-day care and that
they had a loving and positive relationship. McLaughlin did
not provide any information supporting her claim, and we find
that the record sufficiently demonstrates the falsity of her
statement.

2. Misrepresentation regarding the frequency
of contact with Mr. Leedom.

McLaughlin claimed frequent contact with Mr. Leedom in
the fall of 2014, including in-person meetings. McLaughlin’s
letter states that she met with Mr. Leedom in September and
October 2014, but he began cancelling meetings and never
rescheduled at the end of October 2014, Mrs. McCabe ex-
plained that both she and Mr. Leedom’s wife regularly con-
tacted McLaughlin after July 2014 because Mr, Leedom was
not accounting for his mother’s finances. McLaughlin told
them that Mr. Leedom had set up meetings, but failed to
attend or reschedule. It is unclear when McLaughlin had
meetings with Mr. Leedom, but an e-mail from May 2015 she
enclosed in her September 18 letter suggests that Mr. Leedom
was meeting with McLaughlin to discuss his mother’s care in
August of 2014—but not after that point. McLaughlin did not

provide any other information substantiating her claims of
regular meetings with Mr. Leedom.

8. Misrepresentation regarding correspondence
with Mrs. McCabe.

Mrs. McCabe’s initial complaint to Bar Counsel stated she
sent a certified letter to McLaughlin in April 2015, which
requested a full accounting of the escrow account, and includ-
ed a copy of Ms. Leedom’s new power of attorney naming
Mrs. McCabe as her agent. McLaughlin told Mrs. McCabe
that she had not received the letter, although Mrs. McCabe
had a received signed confirmation card. The individual who
signed the card told Mrs. McCabe that McLaughlin had been
given the letter. McLaughlin subsequently claimed that she
found the letter, and that she mailed a response on May 15.
McLaughlin’s September 18 letter encloses a copy of a letter
dated May 15, 2015. There is no evidence that she mailed the
letter. Mrs. McCabe stated that she never received it.

4, Misrepresentation regarding Mr. McCabe’s
willingness to deal with Ms. Leedom’s affairs
and statements he made about Mrs. McCabe.

McLaughlin misrepresented that Mr. McCabe said on multi-
ple occasions that he did not want to deal with his wife, or
have her involved in Ms. Leedom’s affairs, and that he wanted
nothing to do with his wife’s actions. Mr. McCabe provided
information regarding this claim to Bar Counsel. He explained
that once he and his wife learned that Mr. Leedom had been
mishandling his parents’ financial affairs, Mr. McCabe ad-
dressed his father-in-law’s financial situation, and attempted to
remain neutral regarding Ms. Leedom’s finances. He asserts
that McLaughlin used this information out of context. Mr.
McCabe denied that he ever said that he wanted nothing to do
with his wife’s actions.

5. Misrepresentation regarding the escrow account.

McLaughlin misrepresented that she had explained on sev-
eral occasions to Mrs, McCabe that there was never a sepa-

rate escrow account in Ms. Leedom’s name. McCabe’s initial
complaint stated that everyone had agreed that McLaughlin
would invest the proceeds of the sale of the Aberdeen proper-
ties in Fidelity Investments. One of McLaughlin’s emails
confirms that this was the original understanding. Mrs.
McCabe independently sought account information from a
bank after McLaughlin failed to provide an accounting and
told Mrs. McCabe that no separate account existed. When
McLaughlin sent an accounting in May 2015, she stated that
the funds were in her IOLTA escrow account, and not a
separate account in Ms. Leedom’s name. Mrs. McCabe was
apparently unaware of this until McLaughlin told her in May
2015. McLaughlin’s letter misrepresents the course of events
and suggests an agreement that did not exist.

The September 18 letter demonstrates at least five inten-
tional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel about McLaughlin’s
representation of Ms. Leedom. For that reason, McLaughlin
has violated Rule 8.1(a). See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Brigerman, 441 Md. 28, 89, 105 A.38d 467 (2014) (knowingly
making false statements to Bar Counsel violates 8.1(a)).

Rule 8.1(b)

HE “This Court has a long history of holding that an
attorney violates Rule 8.1(b) by failing to respond to letters
from disciplinary authorities requesting information.” Attor-
ney Grievance Comm'n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 284, 249, 760 A.2d
1108 (2000). Bar Counsel sent McLaughlin three requests for
information. McLaughlin told the AGC investigator that she
had received one of those requests, but did not think she had
to respond. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 482
Md. 325, 68 A.3d 862 (2018), we found that an attorney
violated Rule 8.1(b) when he did not respond to a Petition for
Discipline, told an investigator that he would respond, but
failed to do so. Jd. at 336, 68 A.3d 862. McLaughlin’s conduct
is substantially similar. Bar Counsel’s letters included a warn-
ing that a knowing failure to respond to the communication
constituted a violation of Rule 8.1. McLaughlin received Bar

Counsel’s correspondence, knew she was required to reply,
and did not comply. Therefore, she violated Rule 8.1(b).

Rule 8.4; Misconduct

Rule 8.4 defines professional misconduct for an attorney. An
attorney violates Rule 8.4(a) “when other Rules of Professional
Conduct are breached.” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Nel-
son, 425 Md. 844, 363, 40 A.8d 1039 (2012). For the reasons
discussed swpra, we have concluded that McLaughlin has
violated Rules 1.8, 1.4, 1.5(a), and 8.1(a) and (b). McLaughlin,
therefore, has violated Rule 8.4(a). See Garrett, 427 Md. at
2217, 46 A.3d 1169.

HE Subsection (c) prohibits an attorney from engaging
in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation.” This Court has explained that “[d]ishonest acts, in
and of themselves are violative of Rule 8.4(c).” Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Gisriel, 409 Md. 381, 388, 974 A.2d 331
(2009). We have consistently found that attorneys violate Rule
8.4(c) by making false statements to Bar Counsel. See Attor-
ney Grievance Comm’n v. Barnett, 440 Md. 254, 266-67, 102
A8d 310 (2014). McLaughlin violated Rule 8.4(c) when she
knowingly and intentionally made multiple misrepresentations
to Bar Counsel.

HE An attorney commits professional misconduct
when she “engage[s] in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.” MLRPC 8,4(d). This is conduct that
‘“veflects negatively on the legal profession and sets a bad
example for the public at large.” Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 22, 922 A.2d 554 (2007). Here, McLaughlin
did not communicate with her client about information that
significantly affected the representation, and failed to act
diligently in protecting her client’s interests. She charged a
fee without submitting invoices or explaining the basis for her
fee. When her misconduct came under investigation, she made
multiple misrepresentations to Bar Counsel and ignored Bar
Counsel’s requests for information.

HM We have found that this kind of conduct reflects
negatively on the legal profession and is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Shapiro, 441 Md. 367, 394, 108 A.38d 394 (2015), we explained
that “[a]ttorneys violate MLRPC 8.4(d) when they fail to keep
their clients advised of the status of the representation and
represent diligently their client’s interests.” See also Thomas,
440 Mad. at 555, 108 A.8d 629. In Rand, we found that failing to
provide invoices, and misrepresentations to Bar Counsel, vio-
lated Rule 8.1(d). 445 Md. at 618, 128 A.38d 107, Dishonesty to
Bar Counsel regarding a disciplinary matter violates Rule
8.4(d). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 445 Md.
379, 396, 127 A.8d 562 (2015). McLaughlin, therefore, violated
Rule 8.4(d).

BP § 10-306: Misuse of Trust Money

HE BP § 10-806 prohibits an attorney from “us[ing]
trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which
the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.” BP § 10-307"
requires that an attorney’s violation be willful to subject the
attorney to disciplinary proceedings under BP § 10-306. See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86, 98, 706
A2d 1080 (1998). This Court has explained that although
willfulness “does not require proof of a specific criminal intent,
it does require at least proof of a general intent.” Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Glenn, 841 Md. 448, 482, 671 A.2d 463
(1996).

HE “McLaughlin agreed to serve as an escrow agent
and hold Ms. Leedom’s funds until Mr. Leedom and Mrs.
McCabe could agree how to use them for Ms. Leedom’s
benefit. The funds were not deposited as advance fees or a

15. Md, Code Business Occupations & Professions (1957, 2010 Repl.
Vol.), § 10-307. Disciplinary Action
A lawyer who willfully violates any provision of this Part I of this
subtitle, except for the requirement that a lawyer deposit trust
moneys in an attorney trust account for the charitable purposes
under § 10-303 of this subtitle, is subject to disciplinary proceed-
ings as the Maryland Rules provide.

retainer. McLaughlin’s disbursement to Mr. Leedom was in-
consistent with the purpose for which the money was entrust-
ed to her, She misappropriated funds when she paid herself
$5,175 from those funds without billing her client, or obtaining
consent to use the funds for that purpose, See id. at 484, 671
A.2d 468 (misappropriation occurs through “unauthorized use
... of a client’s funds entrusted to him or her, whether or not
temporary or for personal gain or benefit”). The September 18
letter demonstrates that she intentionally took funds from the
account to pay herself when the funds were to be used for Ms.
Leedom’s benefit. McLaughlin, therefore, violated BP § 10-
306.

We agree with the hearing judge that Bar Counsel pro-
duced clear and convincing evidence that McLaughlin violated
MLRPC 1.8, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 8.1(a) and (pb), 8.4(a), (¢), and
(d), and BP § 10-806. We hold that disbarment is the appro-
priate sanction for McLaughlin’s violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.

Sanction For Violations of MLRPC Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)
and (b), 1.5(a), 8.1(a) and (b), 8.4(a), (c), and
(d), and BP § 10-306
WM Bar Counsel recommended disbarment based on
McLaughlin’s “dishonest conduct and multiple aggravating
factors.” McLaughlin argued that disbarment is not appropri-
ate because she was prejudiced by lack of notice."

HEME This Court imposes sanctions on attorneys “ ‘not
to punish’ the lawyer, but instead ‘to protect the public and
the publie’s confidence in the legal profession .... ’” Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. McDowell, 489 Md. 26, 45, 98 A.3d 711
(2014). This Court also “aim[s] to deter other lawyers from
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Attorney Griev-

16, The record is replete with evidence that McLaughlin received ade-
quate notice. If the facts are incomplete, as McLaughlin asserted, it is
because she chose not to participate in the proceedings and provide
information that might have supported other factual findings or mitiga-
tion,

ance Comm’n v. Taylor, 405 Md. 697, 720, 955 A.2d 755 (2008).
Sanctions should be “commensurate with the nature of the
gravity of the misconduct and the intent with which it was
committed,” Id. The severity of a sanction “depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the case, taking account of any
particular aggravating or mitigating factors.” Id. “[T]his Court
considers ‘(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors.’” McDowell, 489 Md. at 45, 98 A8d 711 (quoting
American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions at TI1.C.8.0 (1992)).

McLanghlin’s lack of participation until the proceedings
before this Court make it difficult to determine her mental
state. In her September 18 letter, McLaughlin appears intent
on blaming Mrs. McCabe for any problems that arose during
the representation to absolve herself of any misconduct. Dur-
ing argument before this Court, she claimed that she had been
caught in the middle of a family dispute, but that she had done
nothing wrong.

The actual injury McLaughlin caused is a serious one, An
elderly, vulnerable adult lost $10,000 for her care. She also lost
$5,175 without knowing that her attorney charged that fee or
why. It is unknown whether Ms. Leedom lost additional funds
when McLaughlin did not advise her client of the dangers
inherent in retaining an individual with active substance abuse
issues as her power of attorney. McLaughlin’s inaction put her
client at risk for future financial losses,

HH Mitigation is not available “without the attorney pro-
viding supporting evidence of the existence of such factors.”
Kremer, 432 Md. at 339, 68 A.3d 862. This Court has previous-
ly reasoned that “the availability for consideration of mitigat-
ing factors cannot be undertaken where an attorney neither
attends his or her evidentiary hearing nor responds to Bar
Counsel’s requests for written responses to the client’s com-
plaint.” Id. at 340, 68 A.8d 862. McLaughlin never participated

in the proceedings until she appeared before this Court. We
conclude that McLaughlin has no mitigation available to her.

HMM Aggravating factors include:

(@) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish

motive; (8) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations

of the MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney
discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with
the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court [or the hearing
judge]; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or
other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline
proceeding; (7) [a] refusal to acknowledge the [miscon-
duct’s] wrongful nature; (8) [the victim’s] vulnerability; (9)
substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) indiffer-
ence to making restitution [or rectifying the misconduct’s
consequences]; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving
the use of controlled substances[; and (12) likelihood of
repetition of the misconduct].
Shuler, 443 Md. at 506-07, 117 A.8d 38 (quoting Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Marcalus, 442 Md. 197, 207, 112 A.3d
875 (2015) (brackets omitted)). The hearing judge found that
aggravating factors 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 applied. Upon our
review of the record, we agree.

HMM McLaughlin violated multiple Rules of Professional
Conduct and BP § 10-306, thus factor 4 is present. This Court
has found bad faith obstruction when attorneys knowingly
failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for documents,
attend evidentiary hearings, submit written responses, or oth-
erwise fail “to comply with the rules or lawful directives of the
AGO.” Kremer, 432 Md. at 840-41, 68 A.3d 862; see also
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dominguez, 427 Md. 308, 327,
AT A.8d 975 (2012). McLaughlin received multiple communica-
tions from Bar Counsel at various stages of the disciplinary
investigation and proceedings. After her initial response, she
did not comply with further requests for information.
McLaughlin was aware that AGC was investigating a com-
plaint, but claims that she assumed matters never proceeded
further, despite meeting with an AGC investigator who in-

formed her that she was required to respond to Bar Counsel.
A prudent attorney who did not receive such important antici-
pated communications would have contacted Bar Counsel,
particularly if, as McLaughlin claimed, she was beset with
mail delivery problems.”

Because McLaughlin intentionally did not respond to Bar
Counsel’s communications, factor 5, “bad faith obstruction of
the attorney discipline proceeding” is present. We have found
that McLaughlin made multiple misrepresentations in her sole
communication to Bar Counsel. For that reason, factor 6,
“submission of false evidence, false statements, or other de-
ceptive practices,” is present. See Mitchell, 445 Md. at 264-65,
126 A.3d 72.

Ms. Leedom was 89 years of age at the time the misconduct
occurred and had been diagnosed with dementia, Because Ms.
Leedom was a vulnerable adult, factor 8, the victim’s vulnera-
bility is present. McLaughlin emphasized that she was an
experienced Estates and Trusts attorney. Despite her experi-
ence, which presumably included working with elderly, vulner-
able individuals, she failed to act in her client’s best interests
and mishandled client funds. Her “substantial experience in
the practice of law” is an aggravating factor.

Factor 7, “refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful
nature,” and factor 10, “indifference to making restitution or
rectifying the misconduct’s consequences” are also present.

17, McLaughlin claimed that she had trouble receiving mail, and that
she only received “sporadic” mail at three different addresses. Attor-
neys are, however, required to maintain an address on file with the
Client Protection Fund:

Each attorney shall give written notice to the trustees of every
change in the attorney’s resident address, business address, e-mail
address, telephone number, or facsimile number within 30 days of
the change, The trustees shall have the right to rely on the latest
information received by them for all billing or other correspon-
dence.
Maryland Rule 19-605(b). Prior to the July 1, 2016 Amendments, this
Rule was numbered 16-811.5. If McLaughlin had difficulties receiving
mail, it was incumbent on her to take action to ensure that the address
on file was one where she could receive mail.

Shuler, 443 Md. at 506-07, 117 A8d 38. At argument,
McLaughlin never conceded that her conduct might have been
improper. She has never admitted to violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct, nor did she participate in the proceed-
ings until argument before this Court. See Thomas, 440 Mad. at
557, 103 A.8d 629 (“Absence from the proceedings also indi-
cates a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of ...
conduct and indifference to making restitution ....”).
McLaughlin told this Court that she was not sure what else
she could have done to serve her client appropriately. She
could have done more. At a minimum, she could have commu-
nicated with her client, or investigated the information she
received suggesting that Mr. Leedom might be mismanaging
his mother’s finances. She certainly could have provided item-
ized billing invoices on a regular basis. And if McLaughlin
became concerned that her client’s age and vulnerability made
her insistence that Mr. Leedom serve as power of attorney
unreasonable, she could have taken action under MLRPC 1.14
(Client with Diminished Capacity). An experienced Estates
and Trusts attorney should know that.

Factor 12, the “likelihood of the repetition of the miscon-
duct” is present here. The hearing judge found that “absent
recognition of and remorse for her wrongdoing, there is a
substantial likelihood that she will repeat it.” Based on our
review of the record, and McLaughlin’s insistence that her
conduct did not violate any of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, we agree.

HM McLaughlin violated multiple Rules of Professional
Conduct and BP § 10-306. Her violations of MLRPC 8.1(a)
and 8.4(c) and (d), however, persuade us that disbarment is
the proper sanction. We have explained that “[dlisbarment
ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest
conduct,” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Vanderlinde, 364
Mad. 376, 418, 778 A.2d 468 (2001), absent “compelling extenu-
ating circumstances ....” Id. at 418, 773 A.2d 463. McLaugh-
lin has not shown any circumstances that could excuse her
conduct. She made at least five intentional misrepresentations

to Bar Counsel to evade the consequences of her actions. “The
appropriate sanction for that kind of behavior ordinarily is
disbarment.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Payer, 425 Md.
78, 95, 38 A.8d 378 (2012) (deceitful conduct towards Bar
Counsel).

McLaughlin’s failure to participate in the attorney disciplin-
ary proceeding, lack of remorse or awareness, and the nature
of the underlying misconduct only underline the propriety of
this sanction. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz, 368
Md. 419, 431, 795 A.2d 706 (2002) (“Respondent’s continuing
disregard for the Attorney Grievance Process, his apparent
indifference to the tenets of his chosen profession, the derelic-
tion of his duties to his client and his ostensible lack of
remorse for his misconduct, warrant [disbarment].”).
McLaughlin’s eleventh-hour appearance before this Court
does not excuse her apathy towards attorney discipline pro-
ceedings or her dishonest conduct. We are convinced that
disbarment is the appropriate sanction to protect the public
and deter future violations of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct.

a m9
172 Ad 476
IN RE: C.E.
No. 2, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 20, 2017

n
=
—

Hl

Argued by Thomas A. Appel, Assigned Public Defender
(Owings Mills, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Argued by Janet Hartge, Assistant Attorney General (Brian
E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD) and
Argued by Joan F. Little (Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., Baltimore,
MD), on brief, for Respondents.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Adkins, J.
In this CINA? case, we settle conflicting decisions from the
Court of Special Appeals on the appealability of a juvenile

1. A “CINA” case refers to cases under Maryland Code (1973, 2013
Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), subtitle 8 of the Courts and Judicial Proceeding

court’s order waiving the government's obligation to provide
reasonable reunification efforts to families. In doing so, we
also clarify which actions by a juvenile court “deprive” a
parent of care or custody of a child as outlined by Maryland
Code (1978, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 12-303(8)(x) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”).

We issued a writ of certiorari to consider two questions.
First, did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the
court’s order waiving reasonable reunification efforts was not
a final order and not appealable? Second, did the juvenile
court err in holding that a waiver of reasonable efforts pursu-
ant to Md. Code. (1978, 2018 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), CJP § 3~
812 was constitutionally permitted?

We shall answer the first question no, holding that Petition-
er had no right to an interlocutory appeal. We do not reach
the second question.

I. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

C.D., the mother of C.E., has an extensive history with
Baltimore City Department of Social Services (“Department”).
Under a series of saddening circumstances, all six of C.D.’s
children have been adjudged CINA. The first finding occurred
in 1998 and the latest in 2015. Juvenile courts have involun-
tarily terminated C.D.’s parental rights for four of her six
children,

A. Involuntary Terminations of C.D.’s Parental Rights

C.D. suffers from several mental illnesses that prevent her
from properly caring for her children. C.D.’s previous mental
health diagnoses include paranoia, adjustment disorder, major
depression, somatization disorder, borderline personality dis-
order, mania, and bipolar affective disorder. C.D. also demon-
strated “fits of rage” and underwent psychiatric hospitaliza-
tions, yet she refused regular and continuing mental health

Article (“CIP”) for the protection of children “coming within the
provisions of [the] subtitle.” CJP § 3~802(a)(1). “‘CINA’ means ‘child
in need of assistance.’ CJP § 3-801(g).

treatment. Despite numerous services and referrals, juvenile
courts repeatedly have found that C.D. displayed a complete
inability to care for her children, control her emotions, or
effectively communicate with her children and the Depart-
ment.

As a result of her inability to care for her children, primari-
ly attributed to her mental illnesses, C.D. lost parental rights
to four of her six children. C.D.’s second child, I.8., was found
to be a CINA in 1998. Her third child, L.B., was also found to
be a CINA in 1999. In 2008, a juvenile court terminated C.D.’s
parental rights over both LS., and L.B. after a contested
hearing. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the juvenile
court’s termination of C.D.’s parental rights. C.D.’s fourth and
fifth children, J.D. and M.D., were both found to be CINA in
2012. After a contested hearing in 2014, C.D.’s parental rights
with respect to J.D. and M.D. were also terminated. Again, the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed. When C.D. had her sixth
child in 2014, the Department intervened once again.

B. CINA Finding Regarding C.E.

C.E. was born prematurely in May of 2014. In June, C.E.
was transferred from the neonatal intensive care unit at Johns
Hopkins to Mount Washington Pediatrie Hospital after com-
plications arising from C.E.’s low birth weight. In July, before
C.E. could leave the hospital in the care and custody of C.D.,
the Department filed a CINA Petition for shelter care of C.E,
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Department
alleged that C.D. had untreated mental health conditions that
prevented her from caring for C.E. Two weeks later, the
juvenile master approved the CINA petition and ordered C.E.
into the Department’s custody. The Department then trans-
ferred custody of C.E, to relatives. An adjudicatory hearing
was set for October of 2014, This hearing was postponed five
times. The juvenile court agreed to four of these postpone-
ments to allow C.D. to hire an attorney—she hired and fired
several in this timeframe.

On June 16, 2015, nearly a year after the Department filed
its Petition, the court conducted an adjudicatory hearing and

found C.E. was a CINA. Shortly thereafter, the Department
requested a waiver of the Department’s obligation to continue
reasonable reunification efforts.

C. Department’s Waiver Request

The Department expended extensive resources and took
substantial steps to provide C.D. with reasonable reunification
services. The Department, through an assigned caseworker,
made repeated referrals to assist C.D. in obtaining mental
health treatment. C.D. refused to leave her home for mental
health treatment. To appease C.D. the Department contacted
twelve mental healthcare providers but each refused to pro-
vide in-home care to C.D. A social worker attempted to give
C.D. psychiatric resources, but C.D. promptly ripped up the
resources and handed them back to the social worker. C.D.
rejected the transportation offered by the Department for
visits with C.E. Although C.D. had a period of supervised bi-
weekly visits with C.H., these visits were marred by C.D.’s
emotional outbursts.

On July 9, 2015, the Department filed a Motion to Waive
Reasonable Efforts to Reunify pursuant to CJP § 8-812. This
statute permits the juvenile court to waive the Department’s
obligation to continue reunification efforts under certain condi-
tions. Specifically, CJP § 3-812(c) allows the Department to
“Gmmediately request the court to find that reasonable efforts
to reunify the child with the child’s parent or guardian are not
required,” if “any of the circumstances specified in subsection
(b) of this section exists .... ” Subsection (b)(8) permits the
Department to request a waiver if “a parent or guardian: ...

2. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower court's CINA find-
ings:
The juvenile court's findings were supported by the evidence present-
ed and the court's CINA determination was supported by the law.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err nor abuse its
discretion when it found C.E. to be CINA and committed him to the
custody of the Department.
In re C.E., No, 0925, 2015 WL 9183397, at *10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Dec. 15, 2015), cert. denied, 446 Md. 705, 133 A3d 1110 (2016).

[hJas involuntarily lost parental rights of a sibling of the
child.”

The Department argued that it should not continue to
provide reasonable reunification services because C.D. invol-
untarily lost her parental rights to four siblings of C.E. C.D.,
opposing the motion, argued that CJP § 3-812 violated her
fundamental right to parent by unconstitutionally penalizing
her for contesting the previous termination of her parental
rights because the statute would not apply had she consented
to the previous terminations. Further, she argued that applica-
tion of the statute would end her ability to reunify with C.E.

After the court heard argument on the Department’s Mo-
tion and C.E.’s response, it granted the Department’s Motion.
The hearing judge noted C.D.’s four previous contested termi-
nations of parental rights and explained that “in my view of
the entire record of this case ... it is mandatory for me to
grant the Department’s motion under [CJP] 3-812.” In his
written order, the hearing judge again noted “[C.D.’s] four
prior appellate-sustained [terminations of parental rights] over
{C.D.’s] objection for [C.E.’s] siblings.” C.D. immediately ap-
pealed the order waiving reasonable efforts to the Court of
Special Appeals.

D. C.D.’s Appeal of the Waiver Order
The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported decision,
affirmed the waiver. In re C.E., No. 0464, 2016 WL 7235560
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dee. 14, 2016). The Court did not address
the question C.D. submitted,’ but instead held that an order

3. C.D. raised the following question for review before the Court of

Special Appeals:
After conducting a hearing under Md. Code Amn., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 3-812, did the juvenile court properly waive the Department's
obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify Ms. D with C.E.,
when Ms, D’s parental rights to four of her other children has been
terminated involuntarily and the Department had already provided
extensive, but unsuccessful reunification services to Ms. D for many
years?

In re C.B., No, 0464, 2016 WL 7235560, at “1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec.

14, 2016).

waiving reasonable reunification efforts is not immediately
appealable because it was merely an interlocutory order and
not a final judgment. Id. at *7.

The intermediate court also considered whether CJP § 12-
308 permitted the Court to hear the appeal. Id, at *5-7. CJP
§ 12-803(8)(x) provides that a party may appeal any interlocu-
tory order “[dJepriving a parent, grandparent, or natural
guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the
terms of such an order[.]” The Court considered whether the
waiver order deprives a parent of the care and custody of her
child, or changes the terms of such an order. 7d. at *5. It
turned to In re Karl H., 394 Md. 402, 906 A.2d 898 (2006),
which explained that the question depends on “ ‘whether the
order and the extent to which that order changes the anteced-
ent custody order.” Id. at *7 (quoting In re Karl H., 394 Md.
at 430, 906 A.2d 898). Reasoning that the order regarding
reunification services did not change any other order in the
case, alter a permanency plan, or deprive C.D. of the care or
custody of her child, the panel majority dismissed C.D,’s
appeal. Id.

A dissenting judge disagreed with the Court’s rejection of
C.D.’s appeal and reasoned that that the panel majority
improperly characterized the waiver order as one that would
not affect C.D.’s care or custody. Id. at *9,

The 2016 decision conflicts with an earlier decision from the
Court of Special Appeals. In that case, In re Joy D., 216 Md.
App. 58, 84 A.8d 223 (2014), a different panel considered the
same question: whether a party may immediately appeal an
order waiving a department’s obligation to provide reasonable
reunification services. Id. at 61, 84 A.8d 228. The intermediate
appellate court, in a unanimous opinion, reasoned that a
waiver order was appealable as a change to the terms of
another order regarding a parent's care or custody of her
child. Id. at 78, 84 A8d 223 n.10. (“An order waiving the
requirement to make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent
with his or her child is appealable pursuant to CJP § 12-
303(8)(x) ....”).

Il, DISCUSSION

C.D, makes two arguments before this Court. First, she
contends that the juvenile court’s order waiving reasonable
reunification efforts deprived her of care and custody of C.E,
thereby creating an immediate right to an appeal. Second,
C.D. argues that CJP § 3-812—facially and as applied to
her—violates the constitutional guarantees of substantive due
process, procedural due process, and equal protection.

A. Standard of Review

HEME Appellate courts do not disturb the juvenile court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Yve S.,
373 Md, 551, 586, 819 A.2d 1080 (2008) (citing Davis v. Davis,
280 Md. 119, 125-26, 872 A.2d 231 (1977)), We review the
juvenile court’s decisions on matters of law without deference.
Id. Here, the parties do not dispute the juvenile court’s finding
with respect to the only relevant fact—that C.D.’s parental
rights to four of C.E.’s siblings were involuntarily terminated.

The juvenile court determined, as a matter of law, that CJP
§ 8-812 permitted the waiver of the Department’s obligation
to provide reasonable reunification efforts. The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals concluded that C.E. has no right to appeal the
juvenile court’s non-final interlocutory order. We review both
of these legal determinations without deference. Id.

B. Appealability of the Juvenile Court’s Waiver

Hl Our decision regarding the appealability of the juvenile
court’s waiver of the Department’s obligation to provide rea-
sonable reunification services first requires an exploration of
the CINA statutory scheme and the progression of such cases.

1. CINA Statutory Framework and Proceedings

A local social services department can file a petition to
remove a child from a home to protect a child “from serious
immediate danger.” Md. Code (1978, 2018 Repl. Vol.), CJP
§ 8-815(b). The department must then seek an immediate
court authorization to continue emergency shelter care place-

ment of the child. Id. § 3-815(c). The parties have a right to
an attorney “at every stage” of any CINA proceeding. Id, § 3-
818(a), To justify continuing emergency shelter care of a child,
the court must determine that returning the child to the
child’s home “is contrary to the safety and welfare of the
child”; and removal “is necessary due to an alleged emergen-
cy situation and in order to provide for the safety of the child”;
or “[rJeasonable efforts were made but were unsuccessful in
preventing or eliminating the need for removal of the child
from the home.” Id. § 8-815(d). The court must also decide
whether the Department has made reasonable efforts to assist
in returning the child to the home, or the reasonableness of
the absence of such efforts. Id. § 3-815(e)(3).

After the emergency shelter care hearing, the juvenile court
must hold an adjudication hearing. The rules of evidence apply
and the juvenile court must decide “whether the allegations in
the petition ... are true.” Id. §§ 3-801(c); 38-817. The court
must find: (1) that the child is abused, neglected, has a
developmental disability, or a mental disorder, and (2) the
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling to
provided appropriate care and attention to the child and the
child’s needs. Id. § 38-801(f), If the court makes this finding, it
then holds a disposition hearing. Id. § 8-819(a); see also
Maryland Rule 11-115(a). At this hearing, the court will
determine whether a child requires assistance, and if the court
makes such a determination, it will then decide the interven-
tion necessary “to protect the child’s health, safety, and well-
being.” CJP § 3-801(m). If the child is not a CINA, the court
must dismiss the case, Id. § 8-819(b)(1)()(4).

If the child is committed to the care of the Department, the
court must also conduct a permanency planning hearing
wherein the court shall decide the long-term plan for the
child’s placement. Jd. § 3-828(b). The court must decide which
placement—of several possibilities enumerated in the stat-
ute—would be best for the child. Jd. §§ 3-828(e)(1)@)(1)-(5).*
The court must also give “primary consideration” to the best

4, Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), CIP § 3-823 provides:

interests of the child factors listed in Md. Code (1984, 2012
Repl. Vol. 2016 Supp.), § 5-525(f)(1) of the Family Law
Article (“FL”)* FL § 5-525(e)(1) requires the Department to
make “reasonable ... efforts to preserve and reunify fami-
lies.” The Department need not continue reasonable reunifica-

@u At a permanency planning hearing, the court shall:
Determine the child’s permanency plan, which, to the extent
consistent with the best interests of the child, may be, in descend-
ing order of priority:
1, Reunification with the parent or guardian;
2. Placement with a relative for:
A. Adoption; or
B. Custody and guardianship under § 3-819.2 of this subtitle;
3. Adoption by a nonrelative;
4. Custody and guardianship by a nonrelative under § 3-819.2 of
this subtitle; or
5. For a child at least 16 years old, another planned permanent
living arrangement that:

A. Addresses the individualized needs of the child, including the
child's educational plan, emotional stability, physical place-
ment, and socialization needs; and

B, Includes goals that promote the continuity of relations with
individuals who will fill a lasting and significant role in the
child’s life; and

Gi) For a child at least 14 years old, determine the services needed
to assist the child to make the transition from placement to
successful adulthood.

5. Md. Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 5-525(f)(1) of the
Family Law Article provides:
(Q(1) In developing a permanency plan for a child in an out-of-home
placement, the local department shall give primary consideration to
the best interests of the child, including consideration of both in-State
and out-of-state placements. The local department shall consider the
following factors in determining the permanency plan that is in the
best interests of the child:
(i) the child’s ability to be safe and healthy in the home of the
child's parent;
(ii) the child’s attachment and emotional ties to the child’s natural
parents and siblings;
(ii) the child’s emotional attachment to the child’s current care-
giver and the caregiver's family;
(iv) the length of time the child has resided with the current
caregiver;
(v) the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm
to the child if moved from the child’s current placement; and
(vi) the potential harm to the child by remaining in State custody
for an excessive period of time,

tion efforts if “a court orders that reasonable efforts are not
required under [CJP] § 8-812 ....” Id.

CJP § 3-812 plays an important role in CINA litigation.
This section permits a department to request waiver of rea-
sonable reunification efforts to reunify a child with the parents
if, among other possible conditions listed in the statute, a
parent has involuntarily lost parental rights to one of the
child’s siblings.’ The juvenile court, pursuant to CJP § 3-
812(d) may waive the Department’s reasonable reunification

6, CJP § 3-812(b) states:
In a petition under this subtitle, a local department may ask the court
to find that reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the child’s
parent or guardian are not required if the local department concludes
that a parent or guardian:
(1) Has subjected the child to any of the following aggravated
circumstances:

@® The parent or guardian has engaged in or facilitated:

1. Chronic or severe physical abuse of the child, a sibling of the
child, or another child in the household;

2. Chronic and life-threatening neglect of the child, a sibling of
the child, or another child in the household;

3. Sexual abuse of the child, a sibling of the child, or another
child in the household; or

4. Torture of the child, a sibling of the child, or another child in
the household;

(i) The parent or guardian knowingly failed to take appropriate
steps to protect the child after a person in the household
inflicted sexual abuse, severe physical abuse, life-threatening
neglect, or torture on the child or another child in the house-
hold;

(iii) The child, a sibling of the child, or another child in the
household has suffered severe physical abuse or death result-
ing from abuse by the parent or guardian or another adult in
the household and all persons who could have inflicted the
abuse or caused the death remain in the household; or

(iv)_ The parent or guardian has abandoned the child;

(2) Has been convicted, in any state or any court of the United
States, of:

@) Acrime of violence against:

1. Aminor offspring of the parent or guardian;
2. The child; or
3. Another parent or guardian of the child; or

(ii) Aiding or abetting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit a crime
described in item (i) of this item; or

(3) Has involuntarily lost parental rights of a sibling of the child.

(Emphasis added).

effort obligation if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
one of the conditions listed in CJP § 3-812(b).

2, Appealable Orders in CINA Proceedings

HMM The right to an appeal is not a constitutional right,
but rather, as Judge Moylan has noted, “a grant of legislative
grace.” Kurstin v. Bromberg Rosenthal, LLP, 191 Md.App.
124, 181, 990 A.2d 594 (2010), aff'd, 420 Md. 466, 24 Abd 88
(2011) (citing Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 358, 355, 384 A.2d 91
(1978)). Maryland's statutes determine this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. Accordingly, an appeal must be legislatively per-
mitted. Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546, 801 A.2d 1013
(2002) (citing Kant v. Montgomery Cty., 365 Md. 269, 273, 778
A.2d 384 (2001).

The General Assembly has outlined permitted appeals in
CJP Title 12. Section 12-801 permits appeals of final judg-
ments, unless an appeal is specifically prohibited by § 12-802."
CIP § 12-101(f) defines a “final judgment” as a “judgment,
decree, sentence, order, determination, decision or other ac-
tion by a court, including an orphans’ court from which an
appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari
may be taken.” Finding little guidance in § 12-101(f)’s defini-
tion of “final judgment,” we concluded that the statute leaves
the determination of the characteristics of an appealable final
judgment to case law. Peat v. Los Angeles Rams, 284 Md. 86,
90-91, 394 A.2d 801 (1978).

Hl As we said in Peat: “[T]o be appealable a ‘judgment
must be so final as to determine and conclude rights involved,
or deny the appellant means of further prosecuting or defend-
ing his rights and interests in the subject matter of the
proceeding.’” Id. at 91, 894 A.2d 801 (quoting U.S. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Schwartz, 280 Md. 518, 521, 374 A.2d 896 (1977),
overruled on other grounds by Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Servs. v. LeVan, 288 Md. 588, 419 A.2d 1052 (1980)).

Hl In Robrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767
(1989), we set out further requirements of a final judgment:

7. The exceptions outlined in CJP § 12-302 do not apply here,

If a ruling of the court is to constitute a final judgment, it
must have at least three attributes: (1) it must be intended
by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter
in controversy, (2) unless the court properly acts pursuant
to Md. Rule 2-602(b),° it must adjudicate or complete the
adjudication of all claims against all parties, and (8) the
clerk must make a proper record of it in accordance with
Ma. Rule 2-601.
(Emphasis added). The final judgment rule aims to “promote
judicial economy and efficiency” by preventing piecemeal ap-
peals after every order or decision by a trial court. Sigma
Reprod. Health Ctr, v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665, 467 A.2d 483
(1983).
Judge Wilner, writing for this Court, identified three excep-
tions to CJP § 12-801’s finality requirement:
[Wle have made clear that the right to seek appellate review
of a trial court’s ruling ordinarily must await the entry of a
final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties,
and that there are only three exceptions to that final
judgment requirement: [(1)] appeals from interlocutory
orders specifically allowed by statute; [ (2) ] immediate ap-
peals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602; [(8)] and
appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the com-
mon law collateral order doctrine.
Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615, 881 A.2d 660 (2005).
Petitioner does not contend that the second exception to the
finality rule (Maryland Rule 2-602) or the third exception (the
common law collateral order doctrine)® permit appeal of the

8. Md. Rule 2-602: Judgments not disposing of entire action:
(b) When allowed: If the court expressly determines in a written
order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order
the entry of a final judgment:
(1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties;
or
(2) pursuant to Rule 2-501(f)(3), for some but less than all of the
amount requested in a claim seeking money relief only,

9. To be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, the order must
satisfy four requirements:

juvenile court’s waiver. Rather, C.D. argues that CJP § 12-
303(8)(x) allows the immediate appeal of the juvenile court’s
interlocutory order.

This Court has explored, on numerous occasions, the appeal-
ability of the juvenile court’s interlocutory orders as permitted
by CJP § 12-308(8)(x). See, e.g., In re Joseph N., 407 Md. 278,
965 A.2d 59 (2009) (order changing a permanency plan for
foster care placement to a permanency plan for temporary
supervised custody for the child’s father); In re Karl H., 394
Md. 402, 906 A.2d 898 (2006) (order establishing a permanency
plan); In re Billy W., 386 Md. 675, 874 A.2d 423 (2005) (order
continuing a previously established permanency plan); In re
Samone H., 385 Md. 282, 869 A.2d 870 (2005) (order denying
parent’s motion for an independent clinical assessment to
determine whether a bond existed between her and her chil-
dren); In ve Damon M., 862 Md. 429, 765 A.2d 624 (2001)
(order amending a permanency plan for reunification to a
permanency plan for adoption, long-term care, or permanent
foster care). In these cases, the Court has measured which
orders in CINA cases “deprive[] a parent ... of the care,
custody, of his child ... or changfe] the terms of such an
order.” CJP § 12-308(8)(x).

In In ve Karl H., we considered whether a parent could
appeal the juvenile court’s modification of a permanency plan
from one of unification alone to a concurrent permanency plan
for both reunification and adoption.” 394 Md. at 426-27, 906

(1) it must conclusively determine the disputed question;
(2) it must resolve an important issue;
(3) it must be completely separate from the merits of the action;
and
(4) it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.
See, e.g., Dawkins v. Balt. City Police Dep’t., 376 Md. 53, 58, 827 A.2d
115 (2003) (citing In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 633, 820 A.2d 587 (2003))
(emphasis added).

10. A concurrent permanency plan calls for implementing primary and
secondary solutions for the child. COMAR 07.02.11.03(B)(16). For
example, a concurrent permanency plan might provide for primary

A.2d 898. Judge Greene, writing for a unanimous Court,
explained that “in the context of custody cases, the focus
should be on whether the order and the extent to which that
order changes the antecedent custody order.” Id. at 480, 906
A.2d 898 (emphasis added). Using this rationale, we concluded
that a mother could appeal a permanency plan change from
one for reunification to a concurrent permanency plan for
reunification or adoption. Id. at 480-81, 906 A.2d 898. Moving
from a plan for reunification to one that substantially in-
creased the chances of adoption raised a sufficient possibility
that the mother’s fundamental right to parent her child would
be impacted in a negative way. Id.

Most recently, we considered the appealability of a non-final
order altering a permanency plan. We assessed whether a
mother could appeal a juvenile court order transferring imme-
diate custody of the child from the Department to the child’s
father. In re Joseph N., 407 Md. at 282-83, 965 A.2d 59, The
ultimate goal of the permanency plan—reunification with only
the mother—remained the same. Id. at 288-84, 965 A.2d 59.
Relying on authority discussed above, we concluded that the
mother could appeal the juvenile court’s transfer of immediate
custody from the Department to the child’s father, because it
substantially increased the probability that the child would be
reunified with the mother and the father rather than solely
the mother. Jd. at 292, 965 A.2d 59. Although the juvenile
court did not amend the permanency plan’s ultimate goal,
granting the father immediate custody significantly reduced
the likelihood that the mother would receive sole custody. Id.
at 292-98, 965 A.2d 59. We also noted that the order repre-
sented a “meaningful shift in direction” for the mother and her
ability to regain custody of her child. Id. at 292, 965 A.2d 59.

In a case closer to the present appeal, a mother appealed
the juvenile court’s denial of her request to compel an inde-
pendent evaluation of the “bonding” between her and her
children. In re Samone H., 385 Md. at 285, 869 A.2d 370.

pursuit of family reunification while also exploring adoption by a non-
relative.

Although the juvenile court denied the bonding study, the
permanency plan remained unchanged, Id. at 315-16, 869 A.2d
870. We acknowledged the potential benefit of the independent
evaluation requested by the mother. But the denial of that
beneficial service was not sufficient to justify an interlocutory
appeal because the juvenile court’s order did not change the
permanency plan or the terms of any child custody order. Jd.
at 316, 869 A.2d 370. Cf In re Joseph N., 407 Md. at 290, 965
A.2d 59 (quoting In re Karl H., 894 Md. at 480, 906 A.2d 898).
Here too, C.D.’s request for a beneficial service—the continua-
tion of reunification services—was denied, But as in Samone
H, denial of this service did not deprive C.D. of the care or
custody of C.E.

Unlike Joseph N. or Karl H., in which the juvenile court
altered immediate custody of the child or materially changed
the terms of a permanency plan, C.H. has remained in the
custody of relatives and the permanency plan has not changed.
The Department’s initial permanency plan and the continued
permanency plan both called for C.E. to be ultimately placed
with relatives. Accordingly, the order has not denied C.D. of
the custody of C.E. Additionally, we cannot conclude that the
order impacts C.D,’s “care” of C.E, Prior to the order, C.D.
failed to utilize reunification services. After the order, this has
not changed. The order merely relieved the Department of its
obligation to foist services upon an uncooperative parent.
Contrary to C.D.’s assertions, the waiver of reasonable reunifi-
cation efforts has not worked a “death-knell” on her ability to
regain custody and care of her child and represents no “mean-
ingful shift in direction.” In re Joseph N., 407 Md. at 292, 965
A.2d 59. Since the order does not deprive C.D. of the “care or
custody” of C.E., it is not immediately appealable via CJP
§ 12-8038(8)(x).

We consider another of the Department’s arguments to be
particularly persuasive. We have recognized that the General
Assembly permitted waiver of the reasonable efforts to pre-
vent a CINA from languishing in foster care. The statutes
regarding CINA and reasonable reunification efforts have
their origin in federal law. We explained the origin of the

fT

State’s mandate that departments provide reasonable reunifi-
cation efforts in another CINA case: In re Adoption/Guard-
ianship No. 10941 in Cirewit Court for Montgomery Cty., 885
Mad. 99, 104-06, 642 A.2d 201 (1994).
During the 1970’s, nationwide concern grew regarding the
large number of children who remained out of the homes of
their biological parents throughout their childhood, fre-
quently moved from one foster care situation to another,
thereby reaching majority without belonging to a perma-
nent family. This phenomenon became known as “foster
care drift” and resulted in the enactment by Congress of
Public Law 96-272, the “Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980,” [(“AACWA”) ] codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 670-679 (1988), One of the important purposes of this
law was to eliminate foster care drift by requiring states to
adopt statutes to facilitate permanent placement for chil-
dren as a condition to receiving federal funding for their
foster care and adoption assistance programs.
Id. at 104, 642 A.2d 201 (emphasis added). Congress condi-
tioned federal funding for Maryland’s foster care programs on
the General Assembly’s adoption of provisions such as FL.
§ 5-525. Id. at 105, 642 A2d 201. Specifically, Congress
required states to develop care plans providing “a description
of the services provided to the parents, child, and foster
parents to facilitate return of the child to his or her own home
or to establish another permanent placement for the child.” Id.
Congress then revised the AACWA when it passed the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”). Pub. L. No.
105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. Chapter 7,
subchapter IV). The Court of Special Appeals explained that
Congress passed the AFSA in response to criticisms that the
previous statutory framework permitted children to languish
in foster care while the departments sought to reunite hope-
lessly broken homes. See In re James G., 178 Md.App. 548,
572-77, 948 A.2d 58 (2008) (citing Kathleen S. Bean, Reason-
able Efforts: What State Courts Think, 86 U. Tol. L. Rev. 321,
826 (2005)). Professor Bean notes that that children lingered
in foster care, not because of agency inaction, but because the

departments fruitlessly tried to repair dysfunctional families.
Kathleen §. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts
Think, 36 U. Tol. L. Rev. 821, 325-26 (2005). Critics of the
statute’s requirement for reasonable reunification efforts de-
cried these consequences. Id. In response, Congress passed
the ASFA, which contained the provisions now adopted by
Maryland in CJP § 8-812 permitting the waiver of reasonable
reunification efforts. See In re Karl H., 394 Md. at 419-21, 906
A.2d 898.

We agree with the Department that permitting C.D.’s ap-
peal of the juvenile court’s order waiving reasonable reunifica-
tion services will not serve the purposes of the CINA statuto-
ry framework. “A key purpose of the CINA law is to ‘achieve
a timely, permanent placement for the child consistent with
the child’s best interests[.!’” In re Ashley S., 481 Md. 678, 712,
66 A.8d 1022 (2018) (quoting CJP § 3-802(a)(7)). CIP § 3-812
provides a necessary safety valve to prevent the Department
from forcing reunification efforts upon families that cannot be
reunified. Upon consideration of the history of CJP § 3-812
and the purpose of CINA statutory framework—to provide a
just and expeditious decision regarding the placement of a
displaced child—we cannot allow C.D. to force yet another
delay in the final resolution of C.E.’s case.

The Court of Special Appeals has issued conflicting opin-
jons—one reported and one unreported—on the issue of
whether a parent may immediately appeal a juvenile court’s
order waiving reasonable reunification efforts. Today we settle
this issue. The intermediate appellate court’s 2016 decision in
this case—upholding the juvenile court’s waiver order—cor-
rectly denied C.D.’s appeal.

We hold that a juvenile court’s order waiving a department’s
obligation to provide reasonable reunification efforts, while
leaving a custody order and permanency plan unchanged, does
not deprive a parent of care or custody of a child. Accordingly,
C.D. has no statutory right to an immediate appeal within CJP

Il. Inre Joy D., 216 Md.App. 58, 84 A.3d 223 (2014).

§ 12-803(8)(x). C.D.’s constitutional arguments regarding the
application of CJP § 3-812 must await another day.

Il. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and
hold that C.D, could not immediately appeal the juvenile
court’s order waiving the Department’s obligation to provide
reasonable reunification efforts.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.

172 A3d 486
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
Lance BUTLER, III
Mise. Docket AG No. 14, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 23, 2017

N
nN

2
N
nN

i

Argued by Lydia E. Lawless, Bar Counsel (Attorney Griev-
ance Commission of Maryland), for Petitioner.

No argument on behalf of Respondent.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Barbera, C.J.

On June 22, 2016, Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Com-
mission of Maryland (“AGC”), acting through Bar Counsel,
filed in this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action (“Petition”) against Respondent, Lance Butler, III. The
Petition alleged violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 3.3 (Candor Toward the
Tribunal) and 8.4 (Misconduct).’ Those violations stemmed

1. Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct (“MLRPC”) were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
Professional Conduct and recodified, without substantive change, in
Title 19 of the Maryland Rules. Because we judge Respondent's conduct

from Respondent materially misrepresenting the existence of
his private law practice and the status of his personal finances;
falsifying his time sheets at his job with a federal agency;
submitting false testimony during his deposition and hearing
in a prior disciplinary proceeding; making material misrepre-
sentations to the Inspector General of the federal agency at
which Respondent was employed; and, for multiple years,
failing to file certain tax returns and making misrepresenta-
tions on others.

Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16~-752(a) and 16~757, this
Court designated the Honorable Beverly J. Woodard (“the
hearing judge”) to hold an evidentiary hearing and make
findings of fact and conclusions of law. On September 6, 2016,
Respondent was served, pursuant to Rule 19~728(b), with the
Petition and “Petitioner’s Request for Admission of Facts and
Genuineness of Documents.” Respondent failed to respond to
either. On October 6, 2016, Bar Counsel filed a Motion for
Order of Default and Military Service Affidavit. On November
28, 2016, the hearing judge entered an Order of Default and
mailed a copy to Respondent. The order included notice to the
parties of the scheduled hearing. Respondent did not move to
vacate the Order of Default.

The hearing judge held a hearing on January 18, 2017.
Respondent did not appear at that hearing. The hearing judge
deemed Respondent to have admitted both the averments in
the Petition and the facts set forth in Exhibits 1-37 attached
to Bar Counsel’s Request for Admission of Facts and Genuine-
ness of Documents, and treated all matters admitted as con-
clusively established. See Md, Rules 2-828(e), 2-424(b), (d);
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bellamy, 453 Md. 877, 885, 162
A.38d 848 (2017); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harmon, 488
Md. 612, 619, 72 A.3d 555 (2013). The hearing judge issued
written findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law,
concluding that Respondent had violated MLRPC 3.3 and
8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).

against the extant law at the time of his actions, we refer to the MLRPC
throughout.

No exceptions were filed. Respondent made no written
recommendation regarding sanction; Bar Counsel recom-
mended disbarment. On September 7, 2017, we heard oral
argument, at which only Bar Counsel appeared. On that same
date, we issued a per curiam order disbarring Respondent.
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Butler, 456 Md. 48, 169 A.3d
457, 458, 2017 WL 8910147, at *1 (2017), We explain in this
opinion the reasons for that action.

I
A. The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact

1. Background

In 1984, when he was seventeen years old, Respondent
began working for the United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”) as a typist. From 1984 to 2015, he
held various non-legal positions at USAID, He continued to
work in a non-legal capacity at USAID while attending law
school and after being admitted to the Bar of Maryland in
2007 and the District of Columbia Bar in 2010.

Tn addition to his employment at USAID, Respondent main-
tained a law office in Prince George’s County, Maryland.
Respondent was temporarily suspended from the practice of
law in Maryland on March 20, 2014, for failure to pay the
required annual Client Protection Fund and AGC assess-
ments. He remained in that status at the time of the hearing.

2. The First AGC Complaint

In April 2012, the USAID Office of the Inspector General
received a complaint about Respondent. The complaint, which
‘was submitted anonymously, alleged, among other things, that
Respondent falsified his time sheets and purported to attend
fabricated USAID meetings in order to spend time furthering
his private law practice; improperly rendered, and received
payment for, legal advice to his co-workers during work hours;
provided false information about unemployment to his federal

loan servicer to obtain a deferral; and failed to pay back
income taxes,

The Inspector General referred the matter to the AGC,
which sought to contact Respondent to elicit a reply to the
allegations. After multiple attempts over many months, Bar
Counsel’s investigator finally made contact. Bar Counsel sub-
sequently charged Respondent with violating MLRPC 8.1(b)*
for knowingly failing to respond to a disciplinary authority.
Following an evidentiary hearing in January 2014, the hearing
judge found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respon-
dent violated MLRPC 8.1. In an opinion filed on January 27,
2015, this Court reprimanded Respondent. Attorney Griev-
ance Comm’n v. Butler, 441 Md. 352, 107 A.38d 1220 (2015). As
we shall see, the substance of the allegations in the anonymous
complaint, rather than Respondent’s failure to reply to Bar
Counsel’s inquiries regarding that complaint, are the subject
of the current proceeding.

8. The USAID Inspector General’s Investigation

In April 2014, while the prior AGC proceedings were ongo-
ing, the Inspector General began its own investigation of
Respondent’s conduct. The Reporting Agent assigned to the
case reviewed documents and records and conducted inter-
views related to the allegations. Among those documents and
records analyzed were Respondent’s OGE Form 450 (“Confi-
dential Financial Disclosure Report”); search results from
Maryland Judiciary Case Search and Public Access Court
Electronic Records (PACER); the websites of the District of
Columbia and Maryland State Bar Associations; documents
provided by Access Group, Inc., the federal loan processing
company referenced in the anonymous complaint; documents,
emails, and personal tax return forms found on Respondent's
government computer; data from Respondent's parking logs;

2, MLRPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer ... in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not ... knowingly fail to
respond to a lawful demand for information from .,, [a] disciplinary
authority[,.]”

FY

and records from Respondent’s personnel security file at
USAID. The Reporting Agent interviewed numerous wit-
nesses, including Respondent’s former clients and employees
of USAID.

On March 10, 2015, the Reporting Agent interviewed Re-
spondent. During the first hour, Respondent made multiple
material misrepresentations to the Reporting Agent. The Re-
porting Agent then revealed that she had been investigating
Respondent since early 2014 and asked if he would like to
revise his prior statements. Respondent admitted that he had
provided untruthful answers.

After its investigation was complete, the Inspector General
transmitted a final report to the AGC.

4, Additional Findings

a. Financial disclosure form

From 2007 to 2014, in addition to being employed full time
by USAID, Respondent maintained a private law practice in
Maryland and represented clients in roughly fifty separate
matters in court. Respondent also worked part time as a
personal fitness trainer from 2010 to 2014.

As a federal government employee, Respondent was re-
quired to file an annual ethics disclosure form with the U.S.
Office of Government Ethics to report certain financial infor-
mation and outside activities that might present a conflict of
interest. On February 16, 2012, he signed and filed a Contfi-
dential Financial Disclosure Report in which he falsely stated
that he had no reportable assets or sources of income, liabili-
ties, outside positions, agreements, or arrangements for him-
self outside of USAID, and he certified that those statements
were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowl-
edge.” Moreover, he failed to file the required financial disclo-
sure reports for the years 2010, 2011, 2018, and 2014.

b. Unemployment deferment request

In June 2014, the Inspector General reviewed documents
provided by Access Group, Inc., Respondent’s student loan

servicer. In September 2010, Respondent became delinquent
on his student loan payments. He filled out and signed an
Unemployment Deferment Request, which indicated that as of
September 25, 2010, he qualified to have his payments de-
ferred because he “became unemployed or began working less
than full time” and was “diligently seeking but unable to find
full-time employment in the United States ... in any field or
at any salary or responsibility level.” Respondent also certified
that he had “made at least 6 diligent attempts to find full-time
employment in the most recent 6 months.”

In January 2011, Respondent faxed a copy of the Request to
Access Group, Inc. He certified that the information he pro-
vided was “true and correct,” despite a clear warning on the
form that “[alny person who knowingly makes a false state-
ment or misrepresentation on this form” would be “subject to
penalties that may include fines, imprisonment, or both{.]”
Respondent later admitted to the Reporting Agent that he
was employed full-time when he filled out the form and that he
knew it was illegal to falsify information on a federal loan
document.

ce. Taw returns

Respondent “intentionally failed to file federal income tax
returns for tax years 2008, 2009 and 2010,” He also “failed to
disclose to USAID that he had not filed state income tax
returns for tax years 2008, 2009 and 2010,” and he “intention-
ally failed to pay his income taxes for tax years including 2009,
2010 and 2018.” On November 20, 2012, Respondent falsely
stated to the USAID Office of Security that he had rectified
his delinquent tax filings and payments. The hearing judge
further found:

In July 2018, the Respondent hand-delivered federal tax

returns for 2009 and 2010 to the Office of Security. There

was no evidence that the returns had actually been filed.

The Respondent failed to claim his law practice on his 2009

return and misrepresented his associated earnings on his

2010 return. In August 2018, the Adjudications Chief of the

Office of Security issued the Respondent a letter notifying

him that his security clearance had been downgraded to
“conditional” due to, the Respondent having over $100,000.00
in delinquent debt and $1,127.93 in tax debt. The Chief
advised the Respondent that he was to provide proof of
filing his federal returns for tax years 2009 and 2010 and
state returns for tax years 2008, 2009 and 2010 by August
81, 2018. The Respondent failed to provide the requested
documentation.
In his interview with the Reporting Agent on March 10, 2015,
Respondent admitted to knowingly falsifying his tax returns.
d. National security questionnaire
Respondent also intentionally misrepresented his financial
status on a Questionnaire for National Security Positions,
Standard Form 86, on September 12, 2012. In particular, he
did not disclose that of forty-one active accounts, ten were in
collection status, totaling over $100,000 in past due accounts.
Further, Respondent did not disclose his failure to file federal

or state income tax returns for tax years 2008, 2009, and 2010.

e. Theft of services
Respondent falsified numerous time sheets and submitted
them to USAID. Specifically, the hearing judge found:
A review of the Respondent’s time and attendance sheets,
as compared to his court appearances and estimated transit,
time, revealed that approximately 200 hours in which the
Respondent claimed to be working at USAID, on sick leave,
or on jury duty[,] he was, in fact, working as an attorney for
his private law practice. The number of hours amounted to a
loss of approximately $9,500 to the government. Additional-
ly, the Respondent used his government computer for his
private law practice and worked for his private clients while
present at USAID.
(Citations omitted). The documents recovered from Respon-
dent’s government computer and email account revealed nu-
merous files concerning Respondent’s private law practice and
Maryland court cases in which Respondent was identified as
the representing attorney.

£, False testimony

On January 10, 2014, Respondent was deposed by Bar
Counsel in his prior disciplinary matter, Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Butler, 441 Md. 852, 107 A.3d 1220 (2015). Respon-
dent testified in the deposition that he had reported Bar
Counsel’s investigation to the Inspector General. Respondent
then testified at the hearing on the charged violations of the
MLRPC on January 15, 2014, that he “self-reported [the
AGC’s investigation] to the [Inspector General]” and that
there were “[nJo issues.” In his interview with the Reporting
Agent on March 10, 2015, Respondent admitted that he never
reported the AGC’s investigation to the Inspector General and
that his testimony stating otherwise was false.

g. Bar Counsel’s investigation

USAID suspended Respondent’s security clearance on
March 16, 2015. Shortly thereafter, Respondent resigned from
USAID. On August 18, 2015, Bar Counsel received a com-
plaint from the Office of the Inspector General. On August 28,
2015, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Respondent at the address
listed in the Client Protection Fund and requested a reply.
The letter was returned as undeliverable, Bar Counsel then
attempted to serve Respondent at all known addresses but
‘was unsuccessful.

B. The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law
Based on the record and the above-summarized findings of
fact, the hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.8 and 8.4(a), (b),
(o), and (a).

I

Standard of Review
HEM “In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has
original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an indepen-
dent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Good, 445 Md. 490, 512, 128 A.3d 54 (2015) (citation omitted),

We accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we
determine that those findings are clearly erroneous. Id. “A
hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there
is any competent material evidence to support it.” Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 186, 169, 105 A.8d 583
(2014) (citation omitted). Neither party filed exceptions to the
hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. We
may “treat the findings of fact as established[.]” Md. Rule 16-
759(b)(2)(A).? We review de novo the hearing judge’s conclu-
sions of law, and we ultimately decide the appropriate sanction
for an attorney’s alleged misconduct. Md. Rule 16-759(b)(1),
(©); Good, 445 Md. at 512, 128 A.3d 54.

TIL
Based on our independent review of the record, we agree
with the hearing judge that Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3
and 8.4(a), (b), (¢), and (d).

Rule 8.8: Candor Toward the Tribunal

HH Rule 3.3, in pertinent part, provides the following:

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail
to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.]

In other words, an attorney “must be candid at all times with
a tribunal or inquiry board.” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Joseph, 422 Md. 670, 699, 31 A.8d 187 (2011). Accordingly, a
lawyer violates Rule 8.8 when he or she gives “false and
misleading testimony.” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. White,
854 Md. 346, 365, 731 A.2d 447 (1999).

The record is clear that Respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1).
In March 2015, Respondent admitted to the Reporting Agent
that he falsely testified, at his January 2014 disciplinary
hearing, about having self-reported Bar Counsel’s investiga-
tion to the Inspector General at USAID. Such testimony

3. Maryland Rule 16-759 has been recodified without substantive
change as Maryland Rule 19-741.

constituted a knowing and intentional misrepresentation of
fact to the tribunal. Therefore, we agree with the hearing
judge and conclude that Respondent violated Rule 3.3.

Rule 8.4: Misconduct

HM Rule 844, in relevant part, provides the following:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or in-
duce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects;

(©) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;

(a) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice[.]

As the hearing judge correctly found, Respondent violated
Rule 8.4(b) by committing multiple criminal acts reflecting
unfavorably on his honesty. On February 16, 2012, Respon-
dent violated 18 U.S.C. § 10014 when he submitted a Confi-
dential Financial Disclosure Report that he knew contained
false information. Respondent also violated § 1001 by making
material misrepresentations to the Reporting Agent on March
10, 2015.

4. In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, ‘Statements or entries general-
ly,” provides the following:

(a) [W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United
States, knowingly and willfully—

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact;

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or

(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same
to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
entry;

shall be fined under this title [or] imprisoned not more than 5
years[.]

Respondent committed multiple violations of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7208. First, he intentionally failed to file income tax returns
for tax years 2009, 2010, and 2018. Respondent also made
material misrepresentations and omissions in his tax returns
in other years: he failed to disclose income from personal
training for tax years 1989 to 2000 or 2002; he failed to
disclose the existence of, or income from, his private law
practice for tax year 2009, and he incorrectly reported his
income from that practice in tax years 2010 and 2011; he
intentionally failed to timely file his federal and state income
tax returns for tax years 2009, 2010, and 2013 and intentional-
ly failed to fully pay taxes in those years; and he knowingly
misstated to the USAID Office of Security the status of his
federal and state income tax returns.

In addition, Respondent violated 20 U.S.C. § 1097° when he
knowingly misrepresented his employment status in the Un-
employment Deferment Request, dated October 25, 2010, and
submitted to Access Group, Inc., in January 2011. That sub-

5. 26 U.S.C. § 7203, “Willful failure to file return, supply information,
or pay tax,” provides the following:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax,
or required by this title or by regulations made under authority
thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any informa-
tion, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such
return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or
times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in
the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution, In the case of any person
with respect to whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this
section shall not apply to such person with respect to such failure if
there is no addition to tax under section 6654 or 6655 with respect to
such failure, In the case of a willful violation of any provision of
section 6050I, the first sentence of this section shall be applied by
substituting “felony” for “misdemeanor” and “5 years” for “1 year”.

6, In relevant part, 20 U.S.C. § 1097, ‘Criminal penalties,” provides the
following:
(a) In general
Any person who knowingly and willfully embezzles, misapplies,
steals, obtains by fraud, false statement, or forgery, or fails to refund
any funds, assets, or property provided or insured under this sub-

mission was also a violation of the perjury provision of Mary-
land Code Annotated, Criminal Law § 9-101.’ Respondent
further violated § 9-101 by filing his falsified Confidential
Financial Disclosure Report; by testifying falsely on January
10, 2014, during his deposition; and by testifying falsely on
January 15, 2014, at his hearing.

These transgressions, taken either separately or together,
constitute clear and convincing evidence that Respondent vio-
lated Rule 8.4(b) by engaging in criminal activity that reflected
adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, and general fitness
to act as a representative of the legal profession,

Bar Counsel also charged Respondent with violat-
ing 8.4(c). “As used in this Rule, a misrepresentation is made
when the attorney knows the statement is false, and cannot be
the product of mistake, misunderstanding, or inadvertency.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 488 Md, 685, 698, 73
A.3d 161 (2018) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v, Zeiger,
428 Md. 546, 556, 58 A.8d 882 (2012)). Respondent admitted
that on multiple occasions he knew that he was submitting
false information. We therefore agree with the hearing judge
that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c); each contravention of

chapter ... or attempts to so embezzle, misapply, steal, obtain by
fraud, false statement or forgery, or fail to refund any funds, assets,
or property, shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned for
not more than 5 years, or both, except if the amount so embezzled,
misapplied, stolen, obtained by fraud, false statement, or forgery, or
failed to be refunded does not exceed $200, then the fine shall not be
more than $5,000 and imprisonment shall not exceed one year, or
both.

7. In pertinent part, Maryland Code Annotated, Criminal Law § 9-101,
“Perjury,” provides the following:
(a) Prohibited —A person may not willfully and falsely make an oath
or affirmation as to a material fact:
(1) if the false swearing is perjury at common law;
(2) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local law;
(3) in an affidavit made to induce a court or officer to pass an
account or claim;
(4) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local govern-
ment or governmental official with legal authority to require the
issuance of an affidavit; or
(5) in an affidavit or affirmation made under the Maryland Rules,

Rule 8.4(b) described above also constitutes a violation of
8.4(c) because each act involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pak, 400
Md. 567, 606, 929 A.2d 546 (2007) (“Willfully providing false
information in a deposition or in courtroom proceedings is a
clear violation of [Rule 8.4(c)].”); Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Worsham, 441 Md. 105, 129, 105 A.8d 515 (2014)
(“(Tyhe repeated failure to file income tax returns is ‘a dishon-
est act, and reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustwor-
thiness, and fitness to practice law.’” (quoting Attorney Griev-
ance Comm'n v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 655, 745 A.2d 1086
(2000)). Moreover, Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) by submit-
ting falsified timesheets to USAID.

In light of the above, we have no difficulty concluding that
Respondent’s conduct was also prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice and brought the legal profession into disrepute,
in violation of Rule 8.4(d). See, eg., Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Rand, 411 Md. 88, 96, 981 A.2d 1234 (2009) (“In
general, an attorney violates [Rule] 8.4(d) when his or her
conduct impacts negatively the public’s perception or efficacy
of the courts or legal profession... Dishonest conduct by an
attorney also may be prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garcia, 410 Md.
507, 520, 979 A.2d 146 (2009) (attorney violated Rule 8.4(d) by
filing a false document with federal immigration authorities);
Worsham, 441 Md. at 180, 105 A.3d 515 (“Even though it does
not directly injure a client, the willful failure to file returns or
pay taxes is also prejudicial to the administration of justice
because it cheats and defrauds the government.” (citation
omitted).

Finally, because we determine that Respondent violated
multiple provisions of the MLRPO, Respondent necessarily
committed several violations of Rule 8.4(a).

Iv

The Sanction

HE The fundamental aim of attorney discipline is well
established—“to protect the public, not to punish the erring

es

attorney.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rees, 396 Md. 248,
254-55, 913 A.2d 68 (2006). In these cases, “[w]e are guided by
our ‘interest in protecting the public and the public’s confi-
dence in the legal profession.’” Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v, Lewis, 487 Md, 308, 329, 85 A.3d 865 (2014) (quoting
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 595,
876 A.2d 642 (2005)). The proper discipline for an attorney
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and as
such, sanctions should be “commensurate with the nature and
gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were
committed.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stein, 8738 Md.
531, 587, 819 A.2d 372 (2003).

Here, disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Respon-
dent’s multiple violations of the MLRPC. Among other viola-
tions, Respondent submitted false testimony on two occasions;
falsified state and federal forms and disclosures; and lied to
the USAID Office of the Inspector General to cover up his
acts of deceit. This Court has emphasized that “candor by a
lawyer, in any capacity, is one of the most important character
traits of a member of the Bar.” Joseph, 422 Md. at 699, 81
A.8d 187 (citation omitted),

Respondent’s prolonged course of dishonest and criminal
behavior falls squarely on the spectrum of conduct for which
disbarment is, and has been previously considered to be,
appropriate. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barnett,
440 Md. 254, 270, 102 A.3d 810 (2014) (“This Court has held
that intentional dishonest conduct by an attorney is almost
beyond excuse[.]” (citation omitted)). In Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Zodrow, we disbarred an attorney who, among
other things, failed to make relevant disclosures and provided
false testimony to the court during his personal bankruptcy
proceeding. 419 Md. 286, 299-800, 19 A.8d 381 (2011). We also
disbarred an attorney who repeatedly and intentionally failed
to timely file federal tax returns over the course of roughly
fourteen years. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Katz, 448 Md.
889, 116 A.3d 999 (2015). Respondent’s conduct, of which
repeatedly failing to file state and federal tax returns is but a

TT

part, goes far beyond the behavior held to warrant disbarment
in Katz.

Even considering that Respondent eventually admitted that
he engaged in a prolonged course of fraudulent and criminal
behavior, disbarment is generally the sanction for engaging in
intentionally dishonest conduct. Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 876, 418, 773 A.2d 463 (2001), And,
given that the dishonest behavior also involved falsely testify-
ing before a tribunal in violation of Rule 3.3, as was the case in
Zodrow, disbarment is required.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we issued a per
curiam order disbarring Respondent on September 7, 2017.

172 A.8d 926

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner

ve
William Gordon MCLAIN, IV, Respondent.
Misc, Docket AG No. 0008, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 25, 2017

ORDER

The Court of Appeals of Maryland, having considered the
Joint Petition for Disbarment by Consent filed by Petitioner,
the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, and Respon-
dent, William Gordon McLain, IV, it is this 25th day of
October, 2017;

ORDERED, that William Gordon McLain, IV, be, and he is
hereby, disbarred, effective immediately, from the further
practice of law in the State of Maryland for violating Maryland
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 8.1(a), 8.4(b) and (ce);
and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
name of William Gordon McLain, IV, from the register of
attorneys, and pursuant to Maryland Rule 19~761, shall certify
the fact to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the
clerks of all judicial tribunals in the State.

172 A.8d 926
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner
ve
Jeff A. GODFREY, Respondent
Mise. Docket AG No. 37, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.

October 31, 2017

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court upon the filing of
a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, with attached
certified copy of an Order entered May 16, 2017, whereby the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia annulled the
license to practice law in West Virginia of Jeff A. Godfrey;
and it appearing that said Jeff A. Godfrey is admitted to the
Bar of this Court;

NOW, THEREFORE, it is this 81st day of October, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in accor-
dance with Maryland Rule 19-787(d), that Jeff A. Godfrey,
Respondent, is hereby suspended, effective immediately, from
the practice of law in the State of Maryland, pending further
order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the

name of Jeff A. Godfrey from the register of attorneys in this
Court and comply with the notice provisions of Maryland Rule

19~761(b).

172 A.8d 927

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner,

ve
Matthew Peter GORMAN, Respondent.
Mise. Docket AG No. 35, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 31, 2017

ORDER

247

Upon consideration of the Petition for Disciplinary or Re-
medial Action filed by Petitioner pursuant to Maryland Rules
19-721(a)(2) and 19-788 and the Respondent’s response to the

Court’s Order to Show Cause, if any, it is 31st day of October

2017, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland;

ORDERED, that the Respondent, Matthew Peter Gorman,
be and hereby is temporarily suspended from the practice of
law in the State of Maryland pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-
738(d) until further order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall remove the
name of Matthew Peter Gorman from the register of attor-
neys in this Court and certify that fact to the Trustees of the
Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland and all Clerks
of all judicial tribunals in this State in accordance with Mary-

land Rule 19-761(b).

178 A8d 151
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
ve
Mariatu KARGBO
Mise. Docket AG No. 75, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 7, 2017

Argued by Jennifer L. Thompson, Esquire Assistant Bar
Counsel, Lydia E. Lawless, Bar Counsel (Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland), for Petitioner.

Argued by Mariatu Kargbo (Kargbo Law Firm, Bladens-
burg, MD), for Respondent.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

PER CURIAM ORDER

The Court having considered the Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action filed in the above entitled matter in accor-
dance with Md. Rule 19-721, the Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law of the Evidentiary hearing in the Cireuit Court
for Prince George’s County before Judge Dorothy M. Engel,
the Recommendation for Placement on Inactive Status filed by
Bar Counsel and the oral arguments of Bar Counsel and
Respondent, it is this 7th day of November, 2017

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
Respondent be, and is hereby, placed on inactive status,
effective immediately, pending further Order of this Court;
and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall remove the
name of Mariatu Kargbo from the register of attorneys in this

Court and shall certify that fact to the Trustees of the Client
Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland and all Clerks of all
judicial tribunals in the State in accordance with Md. Rule 19-

‘761(b).

178 A8d 151

In the MATTER OF the Application of Maso Toussaint
HAMILTON for Admission to the Bar of Maryland

Mise. Docket No. 2, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 8, 2017

Argued by Norman L. Smith, Esquire (Nusinov Smith,
LLP, Baltimore, MD), for Applicant.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

ORDER

The Court having considered the recommendations of the
Character Committee for the Fourth Appellate Circuit of
Maryland and the State Board of Law Examiners, and the
oral argument of the applicant’s counsel presented at a show
cause hearing held before this Court on November 6, 2017, it
is this 8th day of November, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, a majori-
ty of the Court concurring, that the favorable recommenda-
tions of the Character Committee for the Fourth Appellate
Circuit, and of the State Board of Law Examiners be, and are
hereby accepted, and it is further

ORDERED, that the applicant, upon taking the oath pre-
scribed by the statute, be admitted to the practice of law in
this State,

=
178 A.Bd 153
POOLE, Leroy
vy.
STATE of Maryland
Case No, 32, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
October 10, 2017

Case dismissed prior to oral argument.

178 A8d 153
ESTATE OF ZIMMERMAN
ve
Erich E, BLATTER
Pet. Docket No. 290, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 38, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2146, Sept.Term, 2015). Transferred to the regular docket as
No. 62, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

|

178 A3d 153
Elizabeth HANSON-METAYER,
v
Leslie RACH
Pet. Docket No. 262, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 8, 2017

(No. CAL17-07812, Circuit Court for Prince George’s Coun-
ty.) Transferred to the regular docket as No. 59, Sept.Term,
2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

178 A8d 153
Shontel HUNTER
ve
BROADWAY OVERLOOK
Pet. Docket No. 283, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 8, 2017

(No, 24-C-17-003110, Cireuit Court for Baltimore City.)
Transferred to the regular docket as No. 61, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

| |

178 A3d 154
MCIVER, Cornelius John
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 233, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 3, 2017

(No, 1299710, Cireuit Court for Montgomery County.)
Transferred to the regular docket as No. 58, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

178 A.3d 154
OTTO, Albert
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 280, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 8, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2758, Sept.Term, 2015). Transferred to the regular docket as
No. 60, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

a

173 Ad 154
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
v.
Ty CLEVENGER
Pet. Docket No. 338, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

(No. C-02-CV-16-003620, Cireuit Court for Anne Arundel
County.) Transferred to the regular docket as No. 64, Sept.
Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

178 A.3d 154
KRANZ, William Louis
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 317, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Reported below: 233 Md.App. 600, 168 A.3d 986. Trans-
ferred to the regular docket as No. 63, Sept.Term, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari granted

=

173 Ad 155
ARD MALHI, LLC
ve

BD. OF LICENSE COMMISSIONERS
FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S CO.

Pet. Docket No. 295, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
847, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

178 A.3d 155
BARTON, Willie L.
vy.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 288, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
806, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

256

178 A8d 155
BELL
ve
DYCK O'NEAL, INC.
Pet. Docket No. 307, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2269, Sept.Term, 2014 & No. 388, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

178 A.Bd 155
BURTON, Chris
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No, 297, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1688, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

|

178 A.8d 156
CLUB HOUSE
ve
CUSHMAN
Pet. Docket No. 276, Sept.Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (Nos.
889 & 890, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

178 A.8d 156
COX, Samuel J.
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 302, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
126, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

7

178 A.8d 156
FREEDMAN, Calvin
Y.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 291, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1429, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

178 Ad 156
GRANT
ve
NEWMAN
Pet. Docket No. 362, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1208, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

173 A3d 157
HALL
v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK
Pet. Docket No. 282, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
434, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

178 A3d 157
HORTON
ve
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES
Pet. Docket No. 270, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017
(No. 01-C-17-045608, Circuit Court for Allegany County.)
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

173 A3d 157

IN RE: C.W.
Pet. Docket No. 253, Sept.Term, 2017
: Court of Appeals of Maryland.
: November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2537, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

178 A.3d 157
KLEPPER
Y.
SIGETHY
Pet. Docket No. 268, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No. 16,
Sept.Term, 2016),

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

=

178 A.8d 158
KROPFELDER
ve
KROPFELDER and Nolan, Plumhoff & Williams, Chtd.
Pet. Docket No. 267, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland, |
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2560, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

178 A.3d 158
LAUREL RACING ASSOCIATION
v
ANNE ARUNDEL CO.
Pet. Docket No. 274, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 17, 2017

Reported below: 288 Md.App. 311, 165 A.3d 525,
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

173 A8d 158
MANSARAY
v

MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE CO.
and Southern Maryland Insurance

Pet. Docket No. 271, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 340, Sept.
Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

178 A.8d 158
MCC MILLWORK & CABINET CORP.
ve
SLOCUM ADHESIVES
Pet. Docket No. 273, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
290, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

178 A.8d 159
PELLUM
v.
FISHER
Pet. Docket No. 275, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2702, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

178 A.8d 159
PRINCE GEORGE’S CO.
ve
FLETCHER
Pet. Docket No. 294, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No. 37,
Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

7

173 A8d 159
REMBOLD, Donald G.
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 301, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1122, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

178 A3d 159
TRIM
ve
YMCA
Pet. Docket No. 266, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Reported below: 288 Md.App. 326, 165 A.3d 534,
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

||

178 A.8d 160
UBOM
ve
WARD
Pet. Docket No. 279, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1306, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

178 A8d 160
VELEZ, Carlos Enrique
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 292, Sept.Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2695, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

178 A.3d 160
WARD, Edward Brad, Jr.
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 269, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1114, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

178 A8d 160
WARD, Karim
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 293, Sept.Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
539, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

178 A.3d 161
WOOTEN, Tavon
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 300, Sept.Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.

|
November 17, 2017 |
576, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

173 A.3d 547

In the MATTER OF the Petition for Reinstatement
of Raymond Jerome VANZEGO, Jr. to the Bar
of Maryland

Mise. Docket AG No. 25, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.

November 16, 2017

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Petition for Reinstatement of
Raymond Jerome Vanzego, Jr. and the response filed thereto
by Bar Counsel, in the above captioned case, it is this 16th day
of November, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
petition be, and it is hereby, GRANTED, and the petitioner,
Raymond Jerome Vanzego, Jr., be, and is hereby, reinstated
to the practice of law in this State; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall replace the
name of Raymond Jerome Vanzego, Jr. upon the register of
attorneys entitled to practice law in this State and certify that
fact to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the
Clerks of all judicial tribunals in this state.

178 A.3d 547

In the MATTER OF the Petition for REINSTATEMENT
OF L. Michael SCHAECH to the Bar of Maryland

Mise. Docket AG No. 33, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 16, 2017

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Petition for Reinstatement of L.
Michael Schaech and the response filed thereto by Bar Coun-
sel, in the above captioned case, it is this 16th day of Novem-
ber, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, a majori-
ty of the Court concurring, that the petition be, and it is
hereby, GRANTED, and the petitioner, L. Michael Schaech,
be, and is hereby, reinstated to the practice of law in this
State; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall replace the
name of L. Michael Schaech upon the register of attorneys
entitled to practice law in this State and certify that fact to the
Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all
judicial tribunals in this state.

178 A3d 547
Cornelius John MCIVER

vy.
STATE of Maryland
No. 58, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 16, 2017

Submitted by Cornelius John Mclver (of Westminster, MD),
for Petitioner.

Submitted by Carrie J. Williams, Assistant Attorney Gener-
al (Attorney General of Maryland of Baltimore, MD), for
Respondent.

Submitted before Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts,
Hotten, Getty, JJ.*

ORDER

WHEREAS, a supplemental petition for writ of certiorari
having been filed by Petitioner and granted by this Court with
a writ of certiorari being issued on November 3, 2017; and

WHEREAS, Respondent was issued a citation for a speed
camera infraction, which carries a civil penalty not exceeding
$40, pursuant to Sec. 21-809(c) of the Transportation Article;
and as a result of proceedings held in the District Court of
Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, the charges against
Respondent ended in a default judgment. Thereafter, Respon-
dent noted an appeal to the Cireuit Court for Montgomery
County; and

WHEREAS, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County did
not assign the case to its civil docket but instead assigned the
case to its criminal docket and designated it criminal case no.
129917-C and set the matter for a pre-trial hearing; a hearing
at which the Respondent failed to appear. Thereafter, Respon-
dent noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals; and

WHEREAS, the Court of Special Appeals transferred to
this Court on August 7, 2017 the above captioned appeal
pursuant to Sec. 12-302(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceed-
ings Article, and Md. Rule 8-132; and

WHEREAS, Sec. 4~401(18) of the Courts & Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article provides that the District Court has exclusive
civil jurisdiction in a proceeding for a civil infraction under
Sec. 21-809(c) of the Transportation Article; and

WHEREAS, Sec. 21-809(c)(2) of the Transportation Article

provides, in part, that a driver of a motor vehicle is subject to
a civil penalty if a motor vehicle is recorded by a speed-

* Chief Judge Barbera did not participate in the consideration of this
matter,

monitoring system while being operated in violation of the law, i
it is this 16th day of November, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that this !
case be, and it is hereby, remanded to the Cireuit Court for
Montgomery County for further civil proceedings with the
appropriate parties pursuant to Sec. 4~401(18) of the Courts &
Judicial Proceedings Article and Sec, 21-809 of the Transpor-
tation Article; and it is further,

ORDERED, that this case be unsealed and the record in
this case be corrected by designating it as a civil, rather than
a criminal, proceeding nune pro tune,

178 A3d 549

LILLIAN C. BLENTLINGER, LLC,
William L. Blentlinger, LLC

v.
CLEANWATER LINGANORE, INC., et al.
No. 13, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 17, 2017

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Argued by Thomas E. Lynch, III (Paul D. Rose, Jr., Miles
& Stockbridge P.C. of Frederick, MD) on brief, for Petition-
ers.

Argued by Kurt J. Fischer (Christine E. White, Venable
LLP of Towson, MD; John S. Mathias, County Attorney and
Kathy L. Mitchell, Assistant County Attorney of Frederick,
MD) and Argued by Michele McDaniel Rosenfeld (The Law
Office of Michele Rosenfeld, LLC of Rockville, MD) on briefs,
for Respondents.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Watts, J.
This case involves a Development Rights and Responsibili-
ties Agreement (“DRRA”), which is governed by Md. Code

Ann., Land Use (2012) (“LU”) §§ 7-801 to 7-806 (“the DRRA
statute”), and is defined as “an agreement between a local
governing body and a person having a legal or equitable
interest in real property to establish conditions under which
development may proceed for a specified time.” LU § 7-
301(b). A “local governing body,” in turn, “means the legisla-
tive body, the local executive, or other elected governmental
body that has zoning powers under this division.” LU § 7-
301(c). The purpose of a DRRA is to allow developers and
local governing bodies, such as a county, to negotiate terms
and conditions under which development may occur, A DRRA
serves to streamline the various approval processes that must
occur for a complex development project. To that end, one of
the key aspects of a DRRA is controlled by the “freeze
provision” of the DRRA statute, LU § 7-804(a), which permits
parties to agree to freeze certain laws, rules, regulations, and
policies as of the time of the execution of the DRRA. LU § 7-
804(a) provides: “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the local laws, rules, regulations, and policies govern-
ing the use, density, or intensity of the real property subject
to an agreement shall be the local laws, rules, regulations, and
policies in force at the time the parties execute the agree-
ment.” * The effect of the freeze provision is that developers
are able to move forward, with certainty regarding the appli-
cable laws, with development projects that may extend over a
long period of time.

Hl Importantly, pursuant to LU § 7-808(a), to be valid a
DRRA must contain certain requirements. And, like any other
contract, a DRRA must be supported by consideration. In this
case, we decide whether a DRRA must be supported by

1. LU § 7-304(b) provides:
If the local jurisdiction determines that compliance with local laws,
rules, regulations, and policies enacted or adopted after the effective
date of an agreement is essential to ensure the public health, safety,
or welfare, an agreement may not prevent a local government from
requiring a person to comply with those local laws, rules, regulations,
and policies,

“enhanced public benefits” to be valid—i.e., whether a DRRA
must confer an enhanced public benefit to the county, and
whether the DRRA at issue is supported by adequate consid-
eration.2 We hold that, based on the plain language and
legislative history of the DRRA statute, as well as relevant
ease law, to be valid a DRRA is not required to confer an
enhanced public benefit ® on a county. In other words, there is
no evidence in the DRRA statute, its legislative history, or
case law demonstrating an intent to require an enhanced
public benefit as part of a DRRA. And, we hold that the
DRRA at issue in this case is not required to confer any
enhanced public benefit to the county, and is supported by
sufficient consideration, Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals.

BACKGROUND

This case arose under the following circumstances. Lillian
C. Blentlinger, LLC and William L. Blentlinger, LLC, Peti-
tioners, own two parcels of land (“the Property”) in Frederick
County, Maryland (“the County”), Respondent, totaling ap-
proximately 279 acres. The Blentlinger family farmed the
Property for generations before deciding to explore the possi-
bility of developing the Property for other uses. Since 1959,
the Property had been zoned for agricultural use. In 2006, for
the first time, the Property was designated for Low Density
Residential (“LDR”) land use as part of the 2006 New Market
Region Plan. Being designated for LDR land use permits a

2. Although “[iJt is basic contract law that courts generally will not
inquire as to the adequacy of considerationl,]"" Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308
Md. 183, 190-91, 517 A.2d 1092, 1096 (1986)—i.e., that a court general-
ly does not analyze whether there is adequate consideration supporting
a contract—the specific argument raised by the parties in this Court is
whether there is adequate consideration supporting the DRRA at issue
given the alleged lack of enhanced public benefits. As such, we address
the sufficiency of the consideration.

3. The term “enhanced public benefit’ does not appear in the DRRA
statute. It is a term mentioned for the first time in case law of this
Court. See Queen Anne’s Conservation, Inc. v. Cty. Comm'rs of Queen
Anne’s Cty., 382 Md. 306, 322, 855 A.2d 325, 334 (2004).

property owner to apply for a Planned Unit Development.
(“PUD”). Frederick County Code (2014) (“FCC”) § 1-19-
10.500.2(A) provides, in pertinent part, that a “PUD District
may only be established where the tract of land receiving the
PUD District has a County Comprehensive Plan Land Use
designation of [LDR], Medium Density Residential, or High
Density Residential[.]!” A PUD is a “floating zone[] estab-
lished to provide for new development and redevelopment
within identified growth areas that result in an integrated
mixture of commercial, employment, residential, recreational,
civie and/or cultural land uses as provided within the appropri-
ate Frederick County Comprehensive, Community, or Corri-
dor Plan.” FCC § 1~-19-10.500.1.

Sometime in 2007, however, the Frederick County Board of
County Commissioners (“the BOCC”)* removed the Proper-
ty’s designation for LDR land use. During the 2008 update of
the New Market Region Plan, the Property’s designation was
changed to agricultural/rural. During the 2010 Comprehensive
Plan update, the Property’s designation remained agricultur-
al/rural. With the 2012 Comprehensive Plan, the Property’s
designation was changed back to LDR, and the Property was
included in the Linganore Community Growth Area. Since
2012, the Property has been designated for LDR land use.

On February 25, 2014, after the Property had been re-
designated for LDR land use, Petitioners filed an application
to rezone the Property from agricultural to PUD zoning as
well as a Phase I Concept Plan. Petitioners proposed develop-
ing the Property to have 720 residential dwelling units, includ-
ing a mix of single-family homes and townhomes, and included
an approximately twenty-five-acre site for a future middle
school. On March 11, 2014, Petitioners filed an application or
petition for a DRRA, and included a draft DRRA to be
entered into between Petitioners and the BOCC. The DRRA
petition incorporated by reference the PUD application and

4, On December 1, 2014, Frederick County became a charter county,
and the BOCC was replaced with a County Executive and a County
Council. See Frederick County Charter §§ 802, 805,

the Phase I Concept Plan. In a letter dated May 5, 2014, Jim
Gugel (“Gugel”), the Planning Director for the Frederick
County Planning and Development Review Department, ad-
vised Petitioners that, on April 15, 2014, the BOCC “accepted”
the DRRA petition.

On July 30, 2014, at a public hearing, the Frederick County
Planning Commission (“the Planning Commission”) unani-
mously voted (five to zero, with two members absent) to
recommend the approval of the application to rezone the
Property from agricultural to PUD. On October 8, 2014,
Planning Commission staff recommended that the “Planning
Commission find that the location, character, and extent of the
proposed [DRRA] for the [] Property are consistent with the
County Comprehensive Plan.” Also on October 8, 2014, at a
public hearing, the Planning Commission reviewed the draft
DRRA, and, in accordance with its staff's recommendation,
voted to find the draft DRRA consistent with the Frederick
County Comprehensive Plan. On October 22, 2014, Gugel and
an Assistant County Attorney issued a staff report recom-
mending that the BOCC review the proposed DRRA “and any
conditions related thereto in deciding whether to approve or
deny the [] DRRA.”

On November 6, 2014, the BOCC conducted a public hearing
on the PUD application and the DRRA, and witnesses testi-
fied and were subject to cross-examination. At the hearing,
members of the public and counsel for Cleanwater Linganore,
Ine, RALE Inc. Nikki Chauvin, Jimmy D. Duffy, Joyce A.
Duffy, Paul D. Garcia, Tracy E. Garcia, Dang Mindte, Carrie
Payne, Pamela Pennington, Carol Swandby, Reggie Wade, and
Patricia Wells (collectively, “Cleanwater”), Respondents,
cross-examined witnesses and provided public comment. Dur-
ing the hearing, the BOCC voted four-to-one to approve the
PUD rezoning application, but limited the total unit count to
675 residential dwelling units, including 500 single-family
homes and 175 townhomes,’ on the condition that no building

3, Pursuant to FCC § 1-19-10.500,6(H)(1)(a), a property that is desig-
nated as LDR in the Frederick County Comprehensive Plan may con-

permit for the construction of a residence could be obtained
before January 1, 2020.

As to the DRRA, during the hearing, Cleanwater’s counsel
questioned Petitioners’ counsel about any “greater public ben-
efits” that the DRRA offered, and the following exchange
occurred:

[CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: [Would the applicant

please explain what greater public benefits the DRRA pro-

vides above and beyond those that would be otherwise
obtainable absent the DRRA?

{[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: A certainty that the project

would not lose zoning, wouldn’t lose density, wouldn’t lose

its comprehensive plan, a certainty as to what—how the
development will proceed in terms of the laws that are in
effect when it goes to Phase I and in subsequent years,

You know, all of that is certainly public benefit, and that’s
the whole reason why, or one of the main reasons why these
DRRAs are available to localities within the state,
[CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: And what you described
certainly would reflect the certainty that the property own-
er would achieve as a result of the DRRA, but what are the
greater public benefits in terms of infrastructure or other—
[PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: I mean, it’s one and the
same. That’s the argument. I mean, how is it to the greater
good or how is it to public benefit, and by public meaning
not just a property owner if the—if the zoning can change
willy-nilly, if property rights can be given and taken away
based on, you know, whatever, you know, however the winds
change.

I mean, it’s Maryland law. I mean, obviously it’s—the way
common law in Maryland has developed it’s that zoning is
up for grabs unless there’s valid—unless there’s recogniz-
able vertical construction based on a validly issued building
permit, and all the parties have tried to address this

tain three to six dwelling units per acre, Thus, a maximum of 1,674
dwelling units could be permitted for the Property with PUD zoning.

through legislation at the state in terms of vesting and this
was the compromise.

And so obviously by virtue of there being a DRRA
available to folks in the state it’s—to the public in the state
it’s to the greater public good. Otherwise, the state wouldn’t
have passed the law. As my co[-]counsel ... is referencing,
I mean, the school site, the roads, the representations as to
making all of the improvements that are required under the
[Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance], I mean, it’s all right
here. It’s all spelled out in the DRRA.

Cleanwater’s counsel also cross-examined Gugel about the
DRRA and the following exchange occurred:
[CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: Under the DRRA is
there anything in the—what are [Petitioners’] responsibili-
ties under the DRRA with respect to transportation im-
provements?
[] GUGEL: Nothing specific. It defers to what would be
identified as part of a subsequent [Adequate Public Facili-
ties Ordinance Letter of Understanding].
At different points during the hearing, Cleanwater’s counsel
questioned Gugel about the middle school site, and the follow-
ing exchanges occurred:
[CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: Would this property own-
er be required to proffer the [ ] middle school site whether
or not there is a DRRA in this case?
[] GUGEL: Well, the PUD, I mean it—the new PUD
regulations do give that discretion on requiring public site
dedication. The old regulations were kind of on a per acre
basis. But given the symbol on the site and the rezoning
request, it would have been conditioned even without a
DRRA.
eee
[CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: And under the school
dedication requirement I just would like to confirm that
there is no guarantee that the school site will be dedicated,
it’s contingent on acceptance by the Board of Education; is
that correct?

[] GUGEL: Yeah, the site itself. I mean, the Phase I PUD
does establish thresholds, timing thresholds of when that
dedication and conveyance must occur,

[CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: But acceptance depends

on the Board of Education?

{] GUGEL: Correct.

Gugel also testified that, “in the event that the Board of
Ed{ucation] does not approve the public school site or deter-
mines not to accept conveyance then [Petitioners] shall retain
fee simple ownership of the public school site and may use the
public school site in a manner consistent with other uses in the
project.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the BOCC voted
four-to-one to approve the DRRA.

On November 24, 2014, the BOCC enacted Ordinance No.
14-27-682, approving Petitioners’ PUD application and the
Phase I Concept Plan for the development, subject to certain
conditions (“the PUD Ordinance”). As discussed at the hearing
before the BOCC, one of the conditions of the PUD Ordinance
limited the number of dwelling units to be constructed in the
development. Specifically, the PUD Ordinance provided that
“Ta] maximum of 675 dwelling units may be constructed,
comprised of no more than 175 townhomes, and the remaining
units being single-family detached.” Another condition stated
that the development needed to “[p]rovide a diversity of
single[-]family lot sizes.” Yet another condition concerned the
middle school site, stating:

[Petitioners] shall dedicate and convey to the County a 24.5

+/- acre middle school site to the [Board of Education (“the

BOE”) J, in fee simple, upon

i) the recordation of the subdivision plat for the 100th lot

in the Project or within two (2) years of the recordation of

the subdivision plat for the 1st lot in the Project, whichever
occurs first; and

ii) [the] BOE’s acceptance of the conveyance of land for

the Public School Site. [Petitioners] and [the] BOE shall

enter into a Memorandum of Understanding [ ], which shall
set forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties in

connection with development of the school site, prior to

final, unconditional approval of the Phase II (Execution)

Plan for the portion of the Project that contains the school

site.

In the PUD Ordinance, another condition stated that Petition-
ers were to “[p]rovide two (2) neighborhood parks of at least
20,000 square feet each to be centrally located, with one in the
northern land bay, and the other in the central land bay.” And,
consistent with the BOCC’s vote at the hearing, the last
condition of the ordinance provided that, “[w]ith the exception
of structures on the Public School Site and models for the
Project, neither Frederick County, nor any agency, depart-
ment, division and/or branch thereof shall issue any structural
building permits, prior to January 1, 2020.”

On the same day, November 24, 2014, the final DRRA
executed by Petitioners and the BOCC was recorded among
the Land Records of Frederick County (“the Blentlinger
DRRA”). We briefly summarize some of the Blentlinger
DRRA’s relevant provisions. Section 2.2A of the Blentlinger
DRRA, concerning permissible uses and density, provides that
the development shall be developed as a PUD in accordance
with the provisions of the Frederick County Code, so long as
the overall density and intensity of the development is not
increased, and a maximum of 675 residential dwelling units are
permitted pursuant to the PUD Ordinance. In Section 2.2C,
Petitioners agree to comply with applicable laws should they
revise the mix of residential unit types, subject to the cap of
675 residential dwelling units, and to pay any adjusted school
construction fees resulting from a change in the unit types. In
Section 2.2E, concerning limitation on building permit issu-
ance, Petitioners “acknowledge[] and agree[] that[,]” “with
the exception of structures on the Public School Site and
models for the Project,” “neither Frederick County, nor any
agency, department, division and/or branch thereof shall issue
any structural building permits, prior to January 1, 2020.” In
Section 2.4, Petitioners agree to make a payment to the
County in lieu of building moderately priced dwelling units, as
permitted by the Frederick County Code.

Article III of the Blentlinger DRRA sets forth the parties’
agreement with respect to community facilities and infrastruc-
ture improvements. Section 3.1, concerning road improve-
ments, provides that, to fulfill the Adequate Public Facilities
Ordinance (“the APFO”) requirements,’ Petitioners will either
construct or fund construction of road improvements or con-
tribute to escrow funds for road improvements. In Sections 8.2
and 8.8, Petitioners agree to comply with the sewer and water
improvements as required by the APFO Letter of Under-
standing, and to pay tap fees in accordance with the fee
schedule in effect at the time of building permit application.

Section 3.4 concerns schools. And, in Section 8.4A, Petition-
ers agree to pay the school construction fee as a condition of
the APFO, notwithstanding the sunset of a school construction
fee ordinance. Pursuant to Section 3.4B, all “{alpplicable
[s]chool [impact [flees shall be paid at the time of the issuance
of building permits in accordance with the fee schedule in
effect at the time of the issuance of building permits.” Section
8.4C concerns “[s]chool [s]ite [d]edication,” and provides, in
relevant part, as follows:

[Petitioners] shall convey in fee simple to the Frederick

County Board of Education (“BOE”), with no monetary

consideration paid, the Public School Site shown on EX-

HIBIT 6, totaling a minimum of 24.5 + buildable acres, to

serve the Project and the surrounding region. The Public

School Site will be conveyed to the BOE upon: i) the

recordation of the first subdivision plat for lots in the

Project; and ii) BOE’s acceptance of the conveyance of land

6. Chapter 1-20 of the Frederick County Code is the APFO. See FCC
§ 1-20-1 (‘This chapter shall be known and cited as the ‘Adequate
Public Facilities Ordinance of Frederick County, Maryland.’”). Pursu-
ant to FCC § 1-20-4, the APFO “is adopted with the intent that new
residential, commercial, industrial and other development take place in
accordance with the Frederick County Comprehensive Plan and the
Capital Improvements Program and to ensure that adequate public
facilities and services are reasonably available concurrent with new
development so that orderly development and growth can occur.” And,
for purposes of the APFO, “public facilities shall include road, water,
sewerage, and school facilities.” Id.

for the Public School Site .... A separate Memorandum of
Understanding (“BOE MOU”) between the BOE and [Peti-
tioners] shall be executed prior to unconditional Phase II
approval for residential dwelling units in the Project (as-
suming commercially reasonable efforts by both parties),
which MOU shall establish and control other aspects of the
Public School Site and the rights and responsibilities of the
parties relative to the Public School Site, and the construc-
tion of a public school .... In the event that the BOE does
not approve the Public School Site or determines not to
accept conveyance of the Public School Site, then [Petition-
ers] shall retain fee simple ownership of the Public School
Site, and may use the Public School Site in a manner
consistent with other uses with the Project. [Petitioners]
acknowledge[] that use of the Public School Site may
require regulatory approvals, including but not limited to,
revision of the [PUD] Ordinance.
(Emphasis in original).
As to property acquisition for public infrastructure, Section
3.5A provides:
In the event that some of the public infrastructure improve-
ments, at the collector road or higher facility level, required
by this DRRA or the APFO to be made by [Petitioners] will
require the acquisition of public right-of-way from third-
party property owners, [Petitioners] shall exercise commer-
cially reasonable efforts to secure such right-of-way without
the assistance of the County.
Section 3.5B provides that, if Petitioners demonstrate to the
County that they are unable to secure a public right-of-way
through commercially reasonable efforts, then Petitioners may
request that the County or the State Highway Administration
assist in such acquisition at Petitioners’ “sole cost and ex-
pense.” Section 3.5B further provides that, should the County
approve Petitioners’ request for assistance, then the County or
the State Highway Administration “shall have two years to
acquire the needed right-of-way.” And, Section 3.5C provides
that, if the County decides not to acquire the right-of-way, or

the two-year time period of assistance has passed, then Peti-
tioners “may be permitted to make a contribution to the
County equal to the entire anticipated project development
costs, which shall include but not be limited to costs for:
design, engineering, right-of-way acquisition, management, in-
spection, ete. in lieu of constructing the public infrastructure
improvements[,]’ unless the applicable APFO letter of under-
standing provides otherwise.

Article IV of the Blentlinger DRRA, concerning the terms
of the agreement, provides:

This Agreement shall constitute covenants running with
the land and shall run with and bind the Property so long as
the Project is under development, provided that this Agree-
ment shall terminate and be void twenty-five (25) years
after the Effective Date of this Agreement unless extended
by an amendment complying with all procedures required in
this Agreement, the County Ordinance and the State law.
The parties acknowledge and agree that the Term of this
Agreement is justified by the: (1) substantial economic
investment made and/or to be made by [Petitioners] for the
development of the Project; (2) substantial investment in,
and construction of, extensive public and private infrastruc-
ture by the parties; (8) public purposes to be advanced by
development of the Project in accordance with the Develop-
ment Laws; (4) uncertainty of future market demands and
political pressures; and (5) expectations of the parties.

Article V of the Blentlinger DRRA concerns development
review and Article VI concerns survival and transfer of obli-
gations.

Article VII deals with breach of the Blentlinger DRRA and
the parties’ respective remedies. Section 7.1 concerns breach
by Petitioners, and Section 7.1A provides that, if Petitioners
fail or refuse to perform obligations under the Blentlinger
DRRA, and fail to cure that default within a certain period of
time, then the BOCC “may seek and obtain equitable relief to
enforce the terms and conditions of th[e] Agreement[,] either
through a decree for specific performance or an injunction.”

Section 7.1A further states that, if specific performance or an
injunction is not available due to actions taken by Petitioners,
“then the BOCC shall be entitled to bring a legal action for
damages.” In Section 7.1B, Petitioners waive the right to a
“rial by jury in connection with any proceedings brought to
enforce the terms of” the Blentlinger DRRA. Section 7.2A
provides that the same remedies are available to Petitioners in
the event of a breach by the BOCC. And, in Section 7.2B, the
BOCC also waives the right to a jury trial.

Section 8.1A provides that Petitioners “shall comply with all
Development Laws” as defined in the Blentlinger DRRA,
stating:

Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, the local

laws, rules, regulations and policies governing the use,

density or intensity of the Property, including but not
limited to, those governing development, subdivision, growth
management, impact fee laws, water, sewer, stormwater
management, environmental protection, land planning and
design, and adequate public facilities (hereafter collectively
the “Development Laws”), shall be the local laws, rules,
regulations and policies, if any, in force on the Effective

Date of the Agreement, and [Petitioners] shall comply with

all Development Laws.
And, Section 8.1B provides:

If the BOCC determines that compliance with Development

Laws enacted or adopted after the Effective Date of this

Agreement is essential to ensure the health, safety or

welfare of residents of all or part of Frederick County, the

BOCC may impose the change in laws, rule, regulations and

policies and the effect thereof upon the Property.

Section 8.8, concerning fees, states that, except as otherwise
provided in the Blentlinger DRRA, Petitioners “shall pay all
fees (specifically including but not limited to impact fees,
school mitigation fees[,] and water and sewer connection fees)
required by Frederick County at the rate in effect at the time
the fee is due.” Section 8.3 further states that, in the event
that any of the fees are eliminated due to a change in the law

and “replaced with a procedure or requirement that would
impose some other burden on” Petitioners, then Petitioners
“may elect to pay the impact fee in effect prior to the change
in the law.”
Section 9.7 of the Blentlinger DRRA, titled “Authority to
Execute,” states:
The BOCC hereby acknowledges and agrees that all re-
quired notices, meetings, and hearings have been properly
given and held by the County with respect to the approval
of this Agreement, and [Petitioners] agree[] not to chal-
lenge this Agreement or any of the obligations created by
this Agreement on the grounds of any procedural infirmity
or any denial of any procedural right. The BOCC hereby
warrants and represents to [Petitioners] that the person(s)
executing this Agreement on its behalf have been properly
authorized to do so, [Petitioners] hereby warrant[] and
represent[ ] to the BOCC (1) that [they are] the fee simple,
record owner[s] of the Property, (2) that [they have] the
right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement and
to agree to the terms, provisions, and conditions set forth
herein and to bind the Property as set forth herein, and (8)
that all legal actions needed to authorize the execution,
delivery and performance of this Agreement have been
taken,

Finally, Section 9.12 of the Blentlinger DRRA, addressing
appeals, states:
The County DRRA Ordinance allows any person aggrieved
by this Agreement to file an appeal to the Circuit Court for
Frederick County within 30 days of the date on which the
parties execute the Agreement. If the effect of the decision
of the Circuit Court revises this Agreement in any material
way, then either party to this Agreement may terminate the
Agreement by providing notice to all parties to this Agree-
ment within 30 days of the date the Circuit Court decision
becomes final and all appeals thereof have been finally
determined, and, in this event, the other party so notified
hereby agrees to mutually consent to the termination and to

comply with all applicable laws concerning termination of a
DRRA. Any such termination of this Agreement pursuant to
this Section 9.12, shall not in any way affect the validity of
any Development Approvals which have been obtained for
the Project at the time of termination, including, but not
limited to, APFO approvals.

Exactly thirty days after the Blentlinger DRRA was record-
ed, on December 24, 2014, Cleanwater filed in the Circuit
Court for Frederick County (“the circuit court”) a petition for
judicial review, challenging, among other things, the validity of
the PUD Ordinance and the Blentlinger DRRA. On June 8,
2015, Cleanwater filed a memorandum in support of the
petition for judicial review. In relevant part, Cleanwater con-
tended that the Blentlinger DRRA was void for lack of
consideration because Petitioners had failed to provide “any
‘enhanced public benefits’ as consideration[.]” Cleanwater fur-
ther argued that the middle school site was subject to BOE
approval, which was uncertain, and that, as such, “[t]here is no
guarantee that the school site will be dedicated.” (Emphasis
omitted).

On August 21, 2015, Petitioners filed a memorandum in
opposition to the petition for judicial review. Petitioners con-
tended, in pertinent part, that the Blentlinger DRRA was
supported by “adequate consideration.” Also on August 21,
2015, the County filed a memorandum in response to Cleanwa-
ter’s memorandum, arguing that substantial evidence sup-
ported the BOCC’s approval of the PUD Ordinance, and that
such approval fulfilled the requirements of State and County
law, Although the County did not specifically address whether
the Blentlinger DRRA was supported by adequate consider-
ation, the County asserted that “[tJhe decisions challenged by
[Cleanwater, i.¢., the PUD Ordinance and the Blentlinger
DRRA,] were approved by the BOCC based upon substantial
evidence in the record and in accordance with applicable
requirements of State and County law.”

On September 14, 2015, Cleanwater filed a reply memoran-
dum, again contending that the Blentlinger DRRA was not

supported by adequate consideration because there was no
evidence in the agreement showing that the County provided
vested rights in exchange for enhanced public benefits. /

On September 28, 2015, the circuit court conducted a hear-
ing on the petition for judicial review. On November 4, 2015,
the circuit court entered an opinion and order affirming the
BOCC’s adoption of the PUD Ordinance and approval of the
Blentlinger DRRA. The circuit court rejected the argument
that the Blentlinger DRRA was not supported by adequate
consideration, and concluded that the Blentlinger “DRRA
imposes both binding obligations and legal detriment to”
Petitioners.

On December 1, 2015, Cleanwater filed a notice of appeal.
On February 38, 2017, in a reported opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and
remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to
vacate the Blentlinger DRRA. See Cleanwater Linganore, Inc.
vy. Frederick Cty., 2831 Md.App. 620, 625, 648, 153 A.3d 874,
877, 888 (2017). In pertinent part, the Court of Special Appeals
held that the Blentlinger DRRA was void for lack of consider-
ation because it lacked any enhanced public benefits to the
County. See id, at 625, 637, 153 A.3d at 877, 884. According to
the Court of Special Appeals, many of the provisions of the
Blentlinger DRRA

do not reflect enhanced obligations of the developer. Rather,

they reflect the obligations the developer would otherwise

be required to satisfy during the course of the development
of the property if no DRRA were in place. Indeed, the
benefits relied upon by the developer (specifically those
relating to road, sewer, water improvements, and tap fees)
are required of the developer under the County’s [APFO].
Id. at 639-40, 158 A.3d at 886. As to the middle school site, the
Court of Special Appeals stated that it did not need to “decide
whether the conveyance of a middle school site constitutes an
enhanced public benefit to” the County, and explained:
Because [Petitioners] retain[ ] fee simple ownership of the
middle school site if the BOE “does not approve the Public

School site or determines not to accept conveyance of the

site,” this “benefit,” at the time of execution and recordation

of the DRRA, was a conditional promise and potentially an
illusory one to boot. Indeed, the offer by [Petitioners] to
proffer the property in fee simple is not a definitive compul-

sory obligation to do anything other than offer the site for a

middle school contingent on acceptance by the Board of

Education.

Id, at 641, 642, 153 A.3d at 886, 887 (brackets omitted), The
Court of Special Appeals ultimately determined that the
Blentlinger DRRA conferred no enhanced public benefit to the
County, and concluded:

As the developer’s testimony and its counsel’s argument
reflects, the public benefit conferred by the [Blentlinger]
DRRA consists of the developer’s vested rights in the
project and the applicant’s obligations to satisfy
APFO[] infrastructure requirements. Clearly, every devel-
opment must satisfy APFO requirements regardless of
whether a DRRA is executed. A DRRA, in contrast, re-
quires the applicant to provide some public benefit beyond
complying with statutory land use standards and otherwise
satisfy [APFO] infrastructure requirements. The [Blentling-
er] DRRA [] does not require the applicant to uncondition-
ally convey property for a middle school or otherwise pro-
vide any extra or enhanced benefit to Frederick County or
its citizens. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this
case, the [Blentlinger] DRRA is void for lack of consider-
ation.

Id, at 643, 153 A.3d at 888.

Thereafter, Petitioners filed in this Court a petition for a

writ of certiorari, raising the following two issues:

1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err by holding that a
DRRA, in order to be valid, must include “enhanced
public benefits” to the local governing body?

2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err by holding that
Petitioners’ proffer of a 24.5 +/- acre school site did not
constitute adequate consideration for the DRRA, con-

cluding instead that the proffer of the school site was a
“conditional promise and potentially an illusory one to
boot?”
On May 9, 2017, this Court granted the petition. See Blent-
linger, LLC y. Cleanwater Linganore, 453 Md. 7, 160 A.8d 546
(2017).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Grasslands Plantation, Inc, v, Frizz-King Enters. LLC,
410 Md. 191, 203-04, 978 A.2d 622, 629 (2009), this Court set
forth the standard of review that applies to an administrative
agency’s decision, stating:

When reviewing the decision of a local zoning body, ...
we evaluate directly the agency decision, and, in so doing,
we apply the same standards of review as the cireuit court
and intermediate appellate court. Our role is limited to
determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as
a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions,
and to determine if the administrative decision is premised
upon an erroneous conclusion of law. In applying the sub-
stantial evidence test, we have emphasized that a court
should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of those
persons who constitute the administrative agency from
which the appeal is taken. Our obligation is to review the
agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency,
since their decisions are prima facie correct and carry with
them the presumption of validity.

Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of
deference should often be accorded the position of the
administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency’s in-
terpretation and application of the statute which the agency
administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight
by reviewing courts. We are under no constraint, however,
to affirm an agency decision premised solely upon an erro-
neous conclusion of law.

(Citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
See_also Cty. Council of Prince George’s Cty. v. Chaney

Enters, Ltd. P’ship, 454 Md. 514, 528, 165 A.3d 379, 387 (2017)
(“Judicial review of an administrative agency action is typical-
ly limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the
record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclu-
sions, and to determine if the administrative decision is prem-
ised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” (Citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). And, in Attar v. DMS
Tollgate, LLC, 451 Md. 272, 279, 152 A.3d 765, 769 (2017), we
explained that “we may not substitute our judgment for that
of [the administrative agency] unless the agency’s conclusions
were not supported by substantial evidence or were premised
on an error of law.” (Citation omitted).

Because this case also involves statutory interpretation, we
set forth the relevant rules of statutory construction:

HM The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly.
As this Court has explained, to determine that purpose or
policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it
its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit
theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have
meant what it said and said what it meant. When the
statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the
statutory language to determine the General Assembly's
intent. If the words of the statute, construed according to
their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unam-
biguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to
the statute as it is written. In addition, we neither add nor
delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a
meaning not reflected by the words that the General Assem-
bly used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an
attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning. If there is
no ambiguity in the language, either inherently or by refer-
ence to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as
to legislative intent ends.
If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then
courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the
words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting,

the objectives, and the purpose of the enactment under
consideration. We have said that there is an ambiguity
within a statute when there exist two or more reasonable
alternative interpretations of the statute. When a statute
can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this
Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative
intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory con-
struction at our disposal.
If the true legislative intent cannot be readily determined
from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and
often must, resort to other recognized indicia—among other
things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how
the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history,
including the derivation of the statute, comments and expla-
nations regarding it by authoritative sources during the
legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to
it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative
rationality and legal effect of various competing construc-
tions.
In construing a statute, we avoid a construction of the
statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with
common sense,
In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is con-
trolled by the context in which it appears. As this Court has
stated, because it is part of the context, related statutes or a
statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue
of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus,
not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole,
but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory
scheme of which it is a part.

Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 481-82, 157 A.8d 272, 280-81

(2017) (citation and brackets omitted).

MOTION TO STRIKE

In this Court, the County filed a brief contending, for the
first time, that to be valid a DRRA must be supported by
enhanced public benefits, and arguing that the Blentlinger

DRRA does not require any enhanced public benefit, and,
thus, is invalid.” On brief, the County also asserts that “the
absence of an enhanced public benefit has a particularly acute
impact on the reserved legislative powers of the County in the
present case because the scope of the Blentlinger[] DRRA
exceeds that authorized by” the DRRA statute. The County
maintains that Section 8.1A of the Blentlinger DRRA—i¢.,
the “freeze provision”’—exceeds the County’s authority under
the DRRA statute.

Petitioners filed in this Court a motion to strike the Coun-
ty’s brief and a memorandum in support, contending, in
pertinent part, that the County is judicially estopped from
arguing that the Blentlinger DRRA is invalid and that the
County’s contention concerning the freeze provision of the
Blentlinger DRRA is not properly before the Court. Specifi-
cally, Petitioners assert that, in the circuit court and the Court
of Special Appeals, the County contended that the Blentlinger
DRRaA is valid; as such, Petitioners maintain that the County
is judicially estopped from now changing its position and
arguing that the Blentlinger DRRA is invalid. Petitioners also
contend that any issue as to the freeze provision is not before
this Court because the issue was not raised in a petition for a
writ of certiorari or a cross-petition.

The County filed an opposition to the motion to strike,
contending that judicial estoppel applies only where three
circumstances are present, including where a party takes a
factual position that is inconsistent with a position that it took
in previous litigation. The County argues that it has not taken
a factual position that is inconsistent with one that it took in
previous litigation, and asserts that its change in position in
the same litigation relates to the legal requirements governing
the validity of a DRRA. The County maintains that it “raised
the discussion of the freeze provision of the [Blentlinger]

7. Previously, only Cleanwater advanced this argument, challenging the
Blentlinger DRRA’s validity in the circuit court and the Court of Special
Appeals, By contrast, the County argued in support of the Blentlinger
DRRA's validity until proceedings in this Court.

DRRA, not to create a separate issue for this Court to decide,
but for the purpose of showing that the prejudice to the
County of not requiring a DRRA to contain enhanced public
benefits is particularly acute[.]” Cleanwater also filed an oppo-
sition to the motion to strike “join[ing] in” the County’s
opposition.

HH On August 30, 2017, this Court issued an order pro-
viding “that action on the motion [to strike] be, and it is
hereby, deferred pending oral argument.” We now address the
motion to strike, and we deny the motion. It is undispute
that, up until proceedings in this Court, in the circuit court
and the Court of Special Appeals, the County took the position
that the Blentlinger DRAA is valid. Indeed, on brief, the
County readily acknowledges that in arguing that the Blent-
linger DRRA is invalid it “has changed its position in this case
from that which it argued before the [clircuit [clourt and [the
Court of Special Appeals.”

HE Judicial estoppel has been defined as “a principle
that precludes a party from taking a position in a subsequent
action inconsistent with a position taken by him or her in a
previous action.” Dashiell v. Meeks, 896 Md. 149, 170, 918 A.2
10, 22 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“{Jjudicial estoppel applies when it becomes necessary to
protect the integrity of the judicial system from one party who
is attempting to gain an unfair advantage over another party
by manipulating the court system.” Id, at 171, 918 A.2d at 23.
To that end,

[blefore judicial estoppel may be applied, three cireum-

stances must exist: (1) one of the parties takes a [ ] position

that is inconsistent with a position it took in previous
litigation, (2) the previous inconsistent position was accepted
by a court, and (8) the party who is maintaining the
inconsistent positions must have intentionally misled the
court in order to gain an unfair advantage.
Id. at 171, 918 A2d at 22 (citation omitted). In Underwood~
Gary v. Mathews, 366 Md. 660, 667 n.6, 785 A.2d 708, 712 n.6
(2001), this Court noted that “[jludicial estoppel has been

defined as a principle that precludes a party from taking a
position in a subsequent action inconsistent with a position
taken by him or her in a previous action.” (Emphasis added)
(citation omitted). And, in Mona v. Mona Elec. Grp., Inc., 176
Md.App. 672, 726, 934 A.2d 450, 481 (2007), reconsideration
denied (Nov. 26, 2007), the Court of Special Appeals concluded
that judicial estoppel did not apply, explaining, in relevant
part:

Mark’s claim in this case ... is not inconsistent with any

position taken in previous litigation. Indeed, there was no

“previous litigation.” Instead of pointing to previous litiga-

tion in which Mark took an inconsistent position, MEG

complains that Mark took inconsistent positions within this
litigation. Specifically, MEG argues that, at the outset of
this case, Mark alleged that MEG was legally obligated to
pay a dividend in order to cover any debts he owed to MEG,
but that assertion is inconsistent with Mark’s later assertion
that MEG acted illegally in making deductions from those
dividends to cover his alleged debts. As MEG acknowledges,
however, any inconsistency in Mark’s position occurred
within this litigation. Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial
estoppel does not apply.
(Emphasis in original). In other words, judicial estoppel ap-
plies where a party takes a position in subsequent litigation
that is inconsistent with one taken in previous litigation, not
where a party takes an inconsistent position within the same
litigation.

Here, we conclude that the prerequisites that must exist
before judicial estoppel may be applied are not satisfied. In
our view, the County’s change in position occurs in the same
litigation; in other words, the County did not take a position
in a previous action or litigation and then change that position
in new litigation. And, there is no evidence whatsoever in the
record that the County intentionally misled the court to gain
an unfair advantage. Given that the first and third prerequi-
sites for the application of judicial estoppel are not estab-
lished, we need not address the remaining circumstance, ‘e.,

whether the previous inconsistent position was accepted by the
court.

Hl As to the contention that the County is raising a new
issue concerning the validity of the freeze provision and that
the issue is not properly before the Court, to the extent that
the County is raising such an issue, we shall decline to
consider any question as to the validity of the freeze provision
in the Blentlinger DRRA. Notably, the County contends that
it is not challenging the validity of the freeze provision, but
rather it is arguing that the existence of the freeze provision is
prejudicial in light of the alleged lack of adequate consider-
ation, i.¢., enhanced public benefits. Nonetheless, we observe
that none of the parties raised any issue as to the validity of
the freeze provision in a petition for a writ of certiorari or a
cross-petition. Accordingly, the issue is not properly before
this Court. See Md. R. 8-131(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise provid-
ed by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a
decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals ..., the
Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that
has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-
petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court
of Appeals.”); Vito v. Grueff, 458 Md. 88, 126 n.9, 160 A.3d
592, 614 n.9 (2017) (This Court noted that an “issue was not
squarely addressed by the cireuit court, nor raised by [the
party] in a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. Thus, the
issue is not properly preserved for our review.”). To the extent
that any issue as to the freeze provision is, as the County
posits, simply a point made in support of the contention that,
in order to be valid, a DRRA must be supported by enhanced
public benefits, there is no reason to grant the motion to strike
the County’s brief on that ground.

As a final point, Petitioners argue that the County’s brief
should be stricken because the County relies on facts and
exhibits outside of the record—specifically, facts about the
2014 County election. Although information about the 2014
County elections is included in the County’s brief ostensibly to
explain its change in position with respect to the validity of the

Blentlinger DRRA, because that information is not relevant to
the issues before the Court in this case, we need not consider
it. As such, we conclude that the inclusion of information
regarding the 2014 election does not warrant granting the
motion to strike.

DISCUSSION *
The Parties’ Contentions

Petitioners contend that to be valid a DRRA need not
include a provision requiring that enhanced public benefits be
bestowed upon a local governing body, and, thus, the BOCC
did not err in approving the Blentlinger DRRA, as there was
sufficient consideration. Petitioners argue that neither the
plain language of the DRRA statute, nor the County’s statutes
governing DRRAs, nor the legislative history of the DRRA
statute, includes the term “enhanced public benefits” or re-
quires that a DRRA include enhanced public benefits. Peti-
tioners assert that, because the DRRA statute and the Coun-
ty’s statutes governing DRRAs are unambiguous and clearly
do not require a DRRA to include enhanced public benefits to
a local governing body, our analysis should end there. Peti-
tioners maintain that Court of Special Appeals’s reliance on
Queen Anne’s Conservation, Inc, v. Cty. Comm'rs of Queen
Anne’s Cty., 382 Md. 306, 822, 855 A.2d 325, 334 (2004), is
misplaced because that case did not address the consideration
that is needed for a DRRA to be valid and mentioned the term
“enhanced public benefits” only in dicta.

Petitioners assert that they have undertaken “significant
commitments” in the Blentlinger DRRA, including the proffer
of the middle school site, as well as detriments, which consti-
tute sufficient consideration for the Blentlinger DRRA. Peti-
tioners maintain that the Blentlinger DRRA creates binding

8, Although Petitioners raised two issues in the petition for a writ of
certiorari and on brief in this Court—namely, whether a DRRA is
required to confer enhanced public benefits to the County, and whether
the Blentlinger DRRA is supported by adequate consideration—we
consolidate the two issues for purposes of this opinion.

fp

obligations on them that provide many benefits to the County,
including, for example, Petitioners’ agreement to pay school
impact fees, as well as pay water and sewer capacity fees, and
Petitioners’ agreement to secure public rights-of-way from
third-party property owners without assistance from the
County. Petitioners contend that the County also received
other benefits, such as “certainty as to the timing and scope of
the development of the project over the span of twenty-five [ ]
years.” Petitioners argue that, in addition to being subjected
to binding obligations, they incurred detriments under the
Blentlinger DRRA, including, for example, a limit on the
number of residential dwelling units to be built, and a waiver
of the right to challenge the Blentlinger DRRA or any of its
obligations on the ground of any procedural infirmity or any
denial of a procedural right. Petitioners assert that the middle
school site proffer is an additional benefit to the County and
the BOE, and serves as additional consideration supporting
the Blentlinger DRRA. Petitioners maintain that even a condi-
tional promise constitutes consideration for a contract, and
that their promise to proffer the middle school site constitutes
consideration for the Blentlinger DRRA,

Cleanwater responds that the plain language and legislative
history of the DRRA statute, as well as case law, lead to the
conclusion that enhanced public benefits as consideration are
required for a DRRA to be valid. Specifically, Cleanwater
contends that LU § 7-303(a)(9) requires the local governing
body to obtain enhanced public benefits from the developer in
exchange for conferring vested rights. Cleanwater argues that
enhanced public benefits are benefits, “secured in the public
interest, in excess of those that a developer would be required
to provide in the ordinary course of development.” Cleanwater
asserts that, in Queen Anne’s Conservation, 882 Md, at 322,
855 A.2d at 334, this Court expressly stated that a DRRA
must be made “in consideration of enhanced public benefits[,]”
which is consistent with the DRRA statute’s legislative histo-
ry.

Cleanwater contends that the Court of Special Appeals
correctly held that the Blentlinger DRRA was not supported

by sufficient consideration due to the lack of an enhanced
public benefit to the County. Cleanwater argues that the
middle school site proffer does not constitute consideration
because it was a condition of rezoning, and would have been
required even absent a DRRA. Cleanwater asserts that, be-
cause the middle school site was required for Petitioners to
secure rezoning of the Property, the middle school site did not
serve as an enhanced public benefit given in exchange for the
Blentlinger DRRA. Cleanwater also maintains that the other
benefits identified by Petitioners are required under the
APFO and other statutes, and thus do not constitute enhanced
public benefits. In sum, Cleanwater contends that the County
received nothing from Petitioners in exchange for the Blent-
linger DRRA, and that, as such, the Blentlinger DRRA is
“void for lack of consideration (i.¢., enhanced public benefits).”

Like Cleanwater, the County responds that a DRRA must
bestow enhanced public benefits upon a local governing body.
Also like Cleanwater, the County relies on Queen Anne’s
Conservation to support its position, and argues that the
Blentlinger DRRA imposes no obligation on Petitioners that
the PUD Ordinance did not already impose, and does not
impose any obligation on Petitioners that is not otherwise
required by law.

Consideration for Contracts

In Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atl., Inc, 878 Md.
189, 147-49, 885 A.2d 656, 661-62 (2008), we discussed consid-
eration for a contract in some detail, stating:

To be binding and enforceable, contracts ordinarily re-
quire consideration. In Maryland, consideration may be
established by showing a benefit to the promisor or a
detriment to the promisee. In particular, we have recog-
nized that for[ Jbearance to exercise a right or pursue a
claim, can constitute sufficient consideration to support an
agreement.

A promise becomes consideration for another promise
only when it constitutes a binding obligation. Without a

binding obligation, sufficient consideration does not exist to

support a legally enforceable agreement.

An illusory promise appears to be a promise, but it does
not actually bind or obligate the promisor to anything. An
illusory promise is composed of words in a promissory form
that promise nothing. They do not purport to put any
limitation on the freedom of the alleged promisor. If A
makes an illusory promise, A’s words leave A’s future action
subject to A’s own future whim, just as it would have been
had A said nothing at all. Similarly, the Restatement of
Contracts explains that words of promise which by their
terms make performance entirely optional with the promi-
sor whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in
other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise.
Likewise, the promise is too indefinite for legal enforcement
is the promise where the promisor retains an unlimited
right to decide later the nature or extent of his perform-
ance. The unlimited choice in effect destroys the promise
and makes it merely illusory.

(Citations, brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Cty. Comm’rs for Carroll Cty. v. Forty W.
Builders, Inc., 178 Md.App. 328, 884-85, 941 A.2d 1181, 1218,
cert. denied, 405 Md, 63, 949 A.2d 652 (2008) (“In Maryland,
consideration may be established by showing a benefit to the
promisor or a detriment to the promisee.” (Citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).

And, in Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 190-91, 517 A.2d
1092, 1096 (1986), we stated that “[i]t is basic contract law that
courts generally will not inquire as to the adequacy of consid-
eration[,]” explaining:

The policy behind this rule was best expressed [in a previ-

ous case]:

It is not the province of the Courts to interfere with the

natural right of parties to contract, and to exercise their

own will and judgment upon the subject; and they will
have the power to estimate the value of the consideration
and the benefits to be derived from their contracts, where

there is no incompetency to contract, no fraud or surprise,

and no rule of law is violated.
It follows, therefore, that anything which fulfills the require-
ment of consideration, that is, one recognized as legal, will
support a promise, whatever may be the comparative value
of the consideration and of the thing promised. A benefit to
the promisor or a detriment to the promisee is sufficient
valuable consideration to support a contract, Legal detri-
ment means giving up something which immediately prior
thereto the promisee was privileged to retain, or doing or
refraining from doing something which he was then privi-
leged not to do, or not to refrain from doing,

(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Requirements of DRRAs
LU § 7-803 sets forth both the required and permissible
contents of a DRRA, providing in full as follows:

(a) Required contents.—A. development rights and respon-
sibilities agreement shall include:
(1) a legal description of the real property subject to the
agreement;
(2) the names of the persons having a legal or equitable
interest in the real property subject to the agreement;
(8) the duration of the agreement;
(4) the permissible uses of the real property;
(5) the density or intensity of use of the real property;
(6) the maximum height and size of structures to be
located on the real property;
(2) a description of the permits required or already
approved for the development of the real property;
(8) astatement that the proposed development is consis-
tent with the comprehensive plan and development regu-
lations of the local jurisdiction;
(9) a description of the conditions, terms, restrictions, or
other requirements determined by the local governing

body of the local jurisdiction to be necessary to ensure
the public health, safety, or welfare; and

(10) to the extent applicable, provisions for the:

(i) dedication of a portion of the real property for
public use;

i) protection of sensitive areas;

Gii) preservation and restoration of historic struc-
tures; and
(iv) construction or financing of public facilities,
(b) Permissible contents—An agreement may:
(1) set the time frame and terms for development and
construction on the real property; and

(2) provide for other matters consistent with this divi-
sion.

LU § 7-805 sets forth the procedures and process governing a
DRRA, including that a public hearing must be held, that the
local planning commission must review the proposed DRRA to
determine whether it is consistent with the local jurisdiction’s
comprehensive plan, and that a DRRA must be recorded in
the land records of the local jurisdiction within twenty days
after the DRRA is executed.

LU § 7-802(a) authorizes the local governing body of a local
jurisdiction to, “by local law, establish procedures and require-
ments for the consideration and execution of agreements; and
[] delegate all or part of the authority established under the
local law to a public principal within the jurisdiction of the
local governing body.” (Paragraph break omitted)’ To that
end, the County has established procedures and requirements
for the consideration and execution of DRRAs. The County’s
DRRA ordinance’s requirements for a DRRA mirror, in large
part, LU § 7-803. Specifically, FCC § 1-254 provides:

9. Notably, however, LU § 7-306 provides; “This subtitle does not
require the adoption of a local law by a local governing body or
authorize a local governing body to require a party to enter into an
agreement.”

(A) Ata minimum, a development rights and responsibili-
ties agreement shall contain the following:
(1) A lawyer's certification that applicant has either a
legal or equitable interest in the property;
(2) The names of all persons having an equitable or legal
interest in the property, including lien holders;
(8) A legal description of the property subject to the
agreement;
(4) The duration of the agreement;
(5) The permissible uses of the property;
(6) The density or intensity of use of the property;
(7) The maximum height and size of structures to be
located on the property;
(8) A description of permits required or already ap-
proved for the development of the property;
(9) A statement that the proposed development plan is
consistent with the Comprehensive Plan and all applicable
county regulations;
(10) A description of the conditions, terms, restrictions
or other requirements determined by the county to be
necessary to ensure the public health, safety or welfare;
and
(11) To the extent applicable, provisions for the:
(a) Dedication of a portion of the property for public
use;
(b) Protection of sensitive areas;
(c) Preservation and restoration of historic structures;
(a) Construction or financing of public facilities; and
(e) Responsibility for attorney’s fees, costs, and ex-
penses incurred by the county in the event an agree-
ment is abandoned or breached by the applicant.
(B) An agreement may contain other terms, provisions,
requirements and agreements concerning the property
which may be agreed upon by the county and the applicant.

(C) An agreement may fix the time frame and terms for
development and construction on the property.

(D) An agreement may provide for other matters consis-
tent with this chapter.

(E) All persons with a lien interest in the property must
execute the agreement.

(F) Any superior interest with a power of sale must be
subordinated to the position of the county or acceptable
financial guarantees must be provided.

Analysis

HM Here, we hold that, based on the plain language and
legislative history of the DRRA statute, as well as relevant
case law, to be valid a DRRA is not required to confer an
enhanced public benefit upon a local governing body, ie, a
county, Stated otherwise, there is no evidence in the DRRA
statute, its legislative history, or case law demonstrating an
intent to require an enhanced public benefit as part of a
DRRA. Nothing in FCC § 1-25-4 requires that a DRRA in
Frederick County be supported by enhanced public benefits.
Thus, we hold that the Blentlinger DRRA is not required to
confer any enhanced public benefit to the County, and is
supported by sufficient consideration.

We begin by examining the plain language of the DRRA
statute. LU § 7-808(a), the relevant statute, sets forth the
required contents of a DRRA. By its plain language, LU § 7-
308(a) requires certain detailed items to be included in a
DRRA, but an enhanced public benefit, or even a public
benefit, is not identified among those required contents. Rath-
er, LU § 7-803(a) requires a DRRA to include, among other
things, a legal description of the real property subject to the
DRRA, the duration of the DRRA, the density or intensity of
use of the real property, and a statement that the proposed
development is consistent with the local jurisdiction’s compre-
hensive plan and development regulations. Significantly, LU
§ 7-808(a) does not mention, as one of the items that must be
included in a DRRA, a requirement that a DRRA be sup-

ported by enhanced public benefits. Indeed, the term “en-
hanced public benefit” appears nowhere in LU § 7-303(a) or
elsewhere in the DRRA statute, nor does the term “public
benefit.” In short, the plain language of LU § 7-803(a) is
unambiguous—an enhanced public benefit is not a require-
ment of a DRRA.

Notwithstanding Cleanwater’s and the County’s contentions,
we are unconvinced that LU § 7-808(a)(9) requires a DRRA
to include an enhanced public benefit. LU § 7~803(a)(9) pro-
vides: “A [DRRA] shall include: [] a description of the
conditions, terms, restrictions, or other requirements deter-
mined by the local governing body of the local jurisdiction to
be necessary to ensure the public health, safety, or welfare[.]”
(Paragraph break omitted). LU § 7-808(a)(9)’s plain language
is unambiguous, and merely requires the local governing body
to determine, and include in the DRRA, a description of what
it has determined to be necessary to ensure the public health,
safety, or welfare, Tellingly, LU § 7-308(a)(9) does not re-
quire that a local governing body determine that any specifi-
cally identified condition, term, restriction, or other require-
ment is necessary to ensure the public health, safety, or
welfare, or indicate in any way that a condition, term, restric-
tion, or other requirement to ensure the public health, safety,
or welfare constitutes an enhanced public benefit, or even a
public benefit. We decline to read into the DRRA statute, and,
specifically, LU § 7-808(a)(9), a requirement that is not evi-
denced by the clear language and plain meaning of the stat-
ute—i.e., we will not add words to the unambiguous DRRA
statute to reach the strained result that Cleanwater and the
County advocate. See Bellard, 452 Md. at 481, 157 A.3d at 280
(“(Wle neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambigu-
ous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words
that the General Assembly used or engage in forced or subtle
interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s
meaning.” (Citation omitted)).

Similarly, nothing in FCC § 1-25-4(A) requires a DRRA to
provide for an enhanced public benefit. Like LU § 7-308(a),
FCO § 1-25-4(A) sets forth the various requirements of a

DRRA in the County, including, for example, the require-
ments that the DRRA contain a legal description of the
property subject to the DRRA, the duration of the DRRA, and
the density or intensity of use of the property. Unlike LU
§ 7-808(a), FCC § 1-25-4(A)(1) also requires that a DRRA
contain “[a] lawyer's certification that applicant has either a
legal or equitable interest in the property[.]” That additional
requirement is very different from setting forth a requirement
that a DRRA in the County include enhanced public benefits.
In short, nothing in LU § 7-808(a)’s or FCC § 1-25-4(A)’s
plain language purports to include enhanced public benefits, or
public benefits, as required content of a DRRA.

Although the plain language of LU § 7-308(a) and FCC
§ 1-25-4(A) is unambiguous—and clearly does not require
enhanced public benefits as part of a DRRA generally or in
the County specifically—and our analysis could end at this
point, we nonetheless point out that our holding is fully
supported by the legislative history and purpose of the DRRA
statute. See Lamone v, Schlakman, 451 Md. 468, 496, 158 A.3d
144, 161 (2017) (“Although the language of the statute is clear,
a brief review of legislative history of relevant [statutory]
provisions ... provides a context for our holding and confirms
our interpretation of the statute.”). A review of the DRRA
statute’s legislative history reinforces our conclusion that a
DRRA is not required to confer enhanced public benefits to
the county. Stated otherwise, a review of the DRRA’s statute
legislative history does not change the result or alter the plain
meaning of LU § 7-308(a). The legislative history of the
DRRA statute demonstrates that, in 1995, through House Bill
700, the General Assembly codified the use of development
agreements when it enacted the DRRA statute. See 1995 Md.
Laws 3242 (Vol. V, Ch. 562, H.B, 700). House Bill 700’s bill file
reveals that one of the main purposes of House Bill 700 was to
permit vesting of rights through the use of DRRAs.

To that end, in a bill analysis of House Bill 700, the House
Commerce and Government Committee explained House Bill
700’s background in detail as follows:

In a briefing paper provided by the Institute for Govern-
mental Service, it was found that vested rights are defined
legally in three ways: through common law, often under the
principle of equitable estoppel; through just compensation
and takings requirements in the federal and state constitu-
tions; and through legislation. In focusing on the legislative
remedies, the Institute found that states have used two
approaches to solve the vesting problem: (1) prohibiting
local governments from applying new regulations to on-
going projects by defining when vesting occurs, and (2)
authorizing the use of development agreements.

To date, at least ten states have authorized development,
agreements in one form or another .... In Maryland,
Montgomery County uses development agreements some-
what similar to those envisioned by this legislation.
Development agreements can provide benefits for both de-
velopers and local governments. For the developer, a devel-
opment agreement establishes the rules and regulations
which will govern the project throughout its construction,
and perhaps beyond. For the local government, the develop-
ment agreement provides for greater certainty in the com-
prehensive planning process, as well as an opportunity to
ensure the provision of necessary public facilities.

In Maryland, the Court of Appeals ruled in 1993 (Prince
George’s County vs. Sunrise Development[, 330 Md. 297,
623 A.2d 1296 (1998) ]) that development rights do not vest
in a property until construction begins on a structure that is
visible to the general public. The effect of the ruling is to
give a local government the ability to change a permissible
land use until very late in the land use approval process. In
fact, a change could occur after the issuance of a building
permit, typically the last stage in the approval process.
A similar bill was introduced in the 1994 session as House
Bill 990. House Bill 990 received an unfavorable report from
this committee. A workgroup was established in the interim
which led to the development of House Bill 700. The work-
group consisted [of] the following representatives: Linowes
and Blocher; Fossett and Brugger; Maryland Builder’s

Association; Suburban Maryland Building Industry Associ-

ation; Maryland Association of Counties; Maryland Munici-

pal League; Calvert County Commissioner; Charles Coun-
ty Attorney; Chair of the State Economic Growth, Resource

Protection, and Planning Commission; and the Critical Ar-

eas Commission.

H. Commerce and Gov't Comm., Bill Analysis, H.B. 700
(1995 Md. Leg. Sess.), at 3.

Similarly, in another bill analysis of House Bill 700, the
Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee ex-
plained House Bill 700’s background, in pertinent part, as
follows:

The Maryland Court of Appeals has ruled that development
rights do not vest in a property until construction begins on
a structure that is visible to the general public. Prince
George’s County v. Sunrise Development, 330 Md. 297, 623
A2d 1296 (1993). This ruling gives a local government the
ability to change a permissible land use until very late in the
land use approval process. Because development rights have
not yet vested, a change could occur even after the issuance
of a building permit which is typically the last stage in the
approval process.
... In focusing on the legislative remedies to the problem of
vesting presented by the Sunrise Development case, the
Institute [for Governmental Service] found that states have
used two approaches to solve the problem: 1) prohibiting
local governments from applying new regulations to on-
going projects by defining when vesting occurs; and 2)
authorizing the use of development agreements.
Development agreements can provide benefits for both de-
velopers and local governments. For the developer, a devel-
opment agreement establishes the rules and regulations
which will govern the project throughout its construction,
and perhaps beyond. For the local government, the develop-
ment agreement provides for greater certainty in the com-
prehensive planning process, as well as an opportunity to
ensure the provision of necessary public facilities.

House Bill 700 received a favorable report by the House

Commerce and Government Matters Committee which was

adopted with floor amendments and passed the House of

Delegates (123-9) on March 20, 1995,

8. Econ. and Env’t Affairs Comm., Bill Analysis, H.B. 700
(1995 Md. Leg. Sess.), at 2-8.

In a floor report of House Bill 700, the Senate Economic
and Environmental Affairs Committee summarized House Bill
700 as follows:

House Bill 700 authorizes all municipalities exercising zon-
ing and planning powers and all counties, except Prince
George’s County, to enact ordinances providing for
[DRRAs]. The purpose of an agreement is to establish the
conditions under which development of real property may
proceed for a specified time period. The bill requires an
agreement to include specific elements, for example, the
permissible uses of the real property, the density or inten-
sity of use, the maximum height and size of structures, a
description of the permits required or already approved
for the development of the property, and a statement that
the proposed development is consistent with the plan and
development regulations of the jurisdiction. To the extent
applicable, an agreement may contain provisions for the
dedication of a portion of the property for a public use,
preservation of sensitive areas, preservation and restora-
tion of historic structures, and construction or financing of
public facilities.
The bill requires a public hearing prior to the execution of
an agreement. Unless otherwise provided by the parties to
an agreement, the agreement becomes void five years after
the date on which it is executed. In addition, the parties to
an agreement may terminate it by mutual consent. The
agreement may be modified with the mutual consent of the
parties to the agreement or if the jurisdiction finds that
modification is essential for the public health, safety, or
welfare,

8. Econ. and Env’t Affairs Comm., Floor Report, H.B. 700
(1995 Md. Leg. Sess.), at 1.

Ultimately, in 1995, the General Assembly enacted the
DRRA statute for the following purposes:

FOR the purpose of authorizing certain local governments

. to enter and amend [DRRAs] with certain persons;
authorizing the local governments to establish, by ordi-
nance, certain procedures and requirements for the consid-
eration, execution, and amendment of [DRRAs]; requiring
certain procedures before entering and amending [DRRAs];
requiring [DRRAs] to contain certain provisions; establish-
ing that under certain conditions a [DRRA] is void after a
certain number of years; authorizing the parties to a
[DRRA] to suspend or terminate the agreement under
certain circumstances; authorizing the local government to
unilaterally suspend or terminate a [DRRA] under certain
circumstances; establishing that certain laws, rules, regula-
tions, and policies shall govern [DRRAs] under certain
circumstances; providing that the recording of an agree-
ment within a certain number of days has a certain effect;
establishing the rights of parties to enforce a [DRRA];
defining certain terms; providing for the application of
certain provisions of this Act; providing that this Act is not
intended to abrogate certain laws, except under certain
circumstances; providing that this Act is not intended to
abrogate certain powers of certain local governments; and
generally relating to [DRRAs].

1995 Md, Laws 3242 (Vol. V, Ch. 562, H.B. 700) (italics and
underlining omitted). The statute governing the required con-
tent of DRRAs, originally enacted as Md. Code (1957, 1995
Repl. Vol.), Art. 66B, § 18.01(f), provided in its entirety as
follows:

() Contents of agreement——(1) An agreement shall in-
elude:

@ A legal description of the real property subject to the
agreement;

(ii) The names of the persons having a legal or equitable
interest in the real property subject to the agreement;
(ii) The duration of the agreement;
(iv) The permissible uses of the real property;
(v) The density or intensity of use;
(vi) The maximum height and size of structures;
(vii) A description of the permits required or already
approved for the development of the real property;
(viii) A statement that the proposed development is
consistent with the plan and development regulations of
the jurisdiction;
(ix) A description of the conditions, terms, restrictions,
or other requirements determined by the governing body
of the jurisdiction as necessary to ensure the public
health, safety, or welfare; and
(x) To the extent applicable, provisions for the:
1, Dedication of a portion of the real property for
public use;
2. Protection of sensitive areas;
8. Preservation and restoration of historic structures;
and
4, Construction or financing of public facilities.
(2) An agreement may:
(i) Fix the period in and terms by which development
and construction may commence or be completed; and
Gi) Provide for other matters consistent with this article.
Significantly, Md. Code (1957, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Art. 66B,
§ 18.01(f) did not include an enhanced public benefit as a
requirement of a DRRA, and did not even mention the term
“enhanced public benefit.” Thereafter, in 2012, Md. Code
(1957, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Art. 66B, § 13.01(f) was recodified in
Title 7 of the new Land Use Article; at that time, Md. Code
(1957, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Art. 66B, § 13.01(f) became LU § 7-
308 without substantive change, See 2012 Md. Laws 2157,
2291-92 (Vol. IV, Ch. 426, H.B. 1290). Indeed, the Revisor’s

Note to LU § 7-808 states that the “section formerly was Art.
66B, § 13.01(Hf,]” and that “[tJhe only changes are in style.”
LU § 7-808 has remained unchanged since 2012.

What we discern from this legislative history is that the
DRRA statute has never required, and was not intended to
require, a DRRA to confer enhanced public benefits to the
county to be valid. In other words, the DRRA statute’s
legislative history fails to demonstrate that the provision of
enhanced public benefits by the developer to the county is a
requirement of a DRRA. There is simply nothing in House Bill
700’s bill file to suggest that a purpose of House Bill 700, and
ultimately the DRRA statute, was to ensure that local govern-
ing bodies received enhanced public benefits from developers.
Importantly, the term “enhanced public benefits” does not
appear anywhere in House Bill 700’s bill file or in the DRRA
statute as enacted. And, as demonstrated by the various bill
analyses, the main purposes of House Bill 700 were to fix the
problem of vesting caused by this Court’s holding in Sunrise
Development, 330 Md. 297, 623 A.2d 1296, and to allow
developers and local governments to enter into DRRAs, which
not only solved the vesting problem, but also resulted in
mutually beneficial agreements through which both the devel-
opers and local governments achieved important goals.

As recognized by both the House Commerce and Govern-
ment Committee and the Senate Economic and Environmental
Affairs Committee, a benefit of a DRRA to the local govern-
ment is that a DRRA “provides for greater certainty in the
comprehensive planning process, as well as an opportunity to
ensure the provision of necessary public facilities.” However,
these statements concerning the benefit to the local govern-
ment speak only to the local government’s ability to ensure the
provision of “necessary public facilities,” not the local govern-
ment’s ability to ensure “enhanced public benefits.” And,
nothing in these statements leads to a conclusion that “neces-
sary public facilities’ was intended to be the equivalent of
“enhanced public benefits.” Moreover, tellingly, in the Senate
Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee's floor report
of House Bill 700, in summarizing House Bill 700 and outlining

House Bill 700’s requirements for DRRAs, the provision of
enhanced public benefits is not identified as an example of a
specific item that must be included in a DRRA,

To be sure, House Bill 700’s bill file includes a letter dated
March 38, 1995, submitted by Maryland Association of Coun-
ties, Incorporated (“the Association”) to the House Commerce
and Governmental Matters Committee, in which the Associa-
tion stated that it supported House Bill 700, and explained
that House Bill 700 “solves two problems”:

First, it clarifies that local governments already have the

authority to establish developers agreements that define the

terms and conditions of project approvals ....

Second, a recent Supreme Court decision, see Dolan v.

Tigard[,] 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Hd.2d 304

(1994), may unnecessarily limit the ability of a local govern-

ment acquiring additional public benefits from a developer

during development project approval negotiations. The new

“rough proportionality” test described by Dolan may re-

strict a community from securing a greater amount of

desirable open space, density concessions, public infrastruc-

ture, or facility construction as part of project approval.
Significantly, although the Association mentioned “additional
public benefits,” and seemingly provided examples of what it
considered to be additional public benefits, such as “a greater
amount of desirable open space, density concessions, public
infrastructure, or facility construction as part of project ap-
proval[,]” the General Assembly did not amend House Bill 700
to provide, as a requirement for a DRRA, the inclusion of
additional or enhanced public benefits to the county. Indeed,
neither the examples that the Association provided, nor the
term “additional public benefits,” appeared in the original
DRRA statute’s requirements for the contents of a DRRA.

We reiterate the obvious point that, had it desired to do so,
the General Assembly could have required a DRRA to be
supported by enhanced public benefits. Cf, Bottini y. Dep’t of
Fin, 450 Md. 177, 206, 147 A.3d 871, 389 (2016) (“[T]he
General Assembly could have identified a bank account and

the funds contained in a bank account as a separate classifica-
tion of property subject to forfeiture, or as a specific form of
tangible or intangible personal property distinct from money,
had it desired to do so.” (Citation omitted); Montgomery Cty.
y. Phillips, 445 Md. 55, 76, 124 A.3d 188, 200 (2015) (“Tellingly,
the General Assembly could have, but did not, modify or
otherwise raise the tax ceiling on the combined State agricul-
tural land transfer tax and county agricultural land transfer
tax that may be imposed.”). Presumably, had the General
Assembly intended to include the requirement that a DRRA
be supported by enhanced public benefits, the General Assem-
bly would have taken care to define the term “enhanced public
benefit,” or otherwise delineate what would constitute an
enhanced public benefit. Absent any indication in the relevant
statutory language or the legislative history that the General
Assembly intended that a DRRA be supported by enhanced
public benefits, we decline to construe the DRRA statute to
reach such a strained result.

Importantly, nothing in case law that has been issued after
the enactment of the DRRA statute leads to the conclusion
that a DRRA must be supported by enhanced public benefits,
Significantly, the term “enhanced public benefits” appears in
only one opinion by this Court, Queen Anne’s Conservation,
382 Md. at 322, 855 A.2d at 334, and was repeated later by the
Court of Special Appeals in Cleanwater Linganore, Inc. v.
Frederick Cty, (“Casey”), 281 Md.App. 878, 392, 151 A.3d 44,
56 (2016), and in its opinion in this case, In Queen Anne’s
Conservation, 382 Md. at 310, 311, 855 A.2d at 327, 328, this
Court considered “the correct path to be followed by a person
or entity, not a party to a DRRA, but who feels aggrieved by
the execution of the agreement, in obtaining scrutiny of the
legal bona fides of the DRRA[,]” and held that the “[a]ppel-
lants, in pursuing a challenge to the execution of the DRRA in
th[e] case, were first required to file an appeal to the Board of
Appeals and obtain a final administrative decision prior to
seeking judicial review in the [trial clourt.” In other words,
this Court determined that the trial court correctly dismissed
the appellants’—non-DRRA parties’—action based on the ap-

pellants’ “failure to exhaust an available and exclusive admin-
istrative remedy.” Id. at 311, 855 A.2d at 328. In Queen Anne’s
Conservation, id, at 308-09, 322, 855 A.2d at 326, 334, this
Court referenced “public benefits” on two occasions. In the
introduction to the opinion, we stated:

[IDRRAsf ] are a relatively recent addition to the Mary-
land toolbox of land use and development implements ap-
proved by the [General Assembly] for possible use by many
local political subdivisions and the legal or equitable owners
of real properties desiring to develop their properties. Al-
though many states, such as California in 1979, preceded
Maryland in recognizing the use of DRRAs or their equiva-
lents, [the General Assembly] lingered until 1995 before
enacting [the DRRA statute]. The legislation seems to be
the result of the balancing of developers’ and property
owners’ desires for a larger measure of certainty than that
offered by proceeding to market through the traditional
development processes, while risking the monetary invest-
ment to develop their property, against local governments’
desire to receive greater public benefits on a more predict-
able schedule than might otherwise be attainable through
the traditional processes.

Id. at 308-09, 855 A.2d at 326 (emphasis added) (footnote and
citations omitted). And, later in the opinion, in explaining one
of the reasons why we disagreed with the contention “that a
determination by the governing body of the local jurisdiction
as to what terms, conditions, restrictions or other require-
ments are necessary to ensure the public health is the ‘very
essence’ of the legislative function performed by local elected
officials[,]” we stated:

First, the negotiation of terms protective of public health,
safety, or welfare, in a contract entered into by a local
government body is a discretionary executive act, not a
legislative one. See Montgomery County v. Revere Nat'l
Corp., Inc., 341 Md. 366, 390, 671 A.2d 1, 12 (1996) (“When
the executive branch of the county government, in carrying
out the laws and functions of government, enters into a
contract, such action constitutes the exercise of executive

discretion.”), A DRRA is not an ordinance or legislation as

those terms are commonly understood; rather, it is a con-

tract whose purpose is to vest rights under zoning laws and

regulations, in consideration of enhanced public benefits.
Queen Anne’s Conservation, 382 Md. at 321-22, 855 A.2d at
834 (emphasis added).

As an initial matter, reading the opinion leads to the conelu-
sion that the references to “greater public benefits’ and
“enhanced public benefits” in Queen Anne’s Conservation are
nothing more than references to the fact that a local governing
body may desire “greater public benefits” and that a local
governing body may bargain for “enhanced public benefits” as
consideration in a DRRA. In Queen Anne’s Conservation, the
term “enhanced public benefits” is not defined or described in
any manner. There is no reference to the DRRA statute or
legislative history requiring enhanced public benefits as con-
sideration in a DRRA. Simply put, the references to enhanced
public benefits and greater public benefits in Queen Anne’s
Conservation fall far short of a holding that a DRRA must be
supported by enhanced or greater public benefits—ie., that a
DRRA must consist of an enhanced public benefit to the
county conferred by the developer. Indeed, the statements
about “greater public benefits” and “enhanced public benefits”
are dicta, In Queen Anne’s Conservation, id. at 310-11, 855
A.2d at 327-28, this Court’s holding concerned a procedural
matter as to whether the appellants challenging a DRRA, who
were not parties to the agreement, had exhausted administra-
tive remedies prior to seeking judicial review in the trial court.
Nothing in Queen Anne’s Conservation purported to address,
let alone analyze, what contents are required for a DRRA to
be valid, or whether LU § 7-808(a) requires enhanced public
benefits. In other words, the references to “greater public
benefits” and “enhanced public benefits” “were neither part of
nor essential to the holding{ ] in the [] case[] and therefore
constitute mere obiter dicta[.]” Silbersack v. ACandS, Inc., 402
Mad. 678, 688, 988 A.2d 855, 860 (2008).

Additionally, in Queen Anne’s Conservation, 382 Md. at 322,
855 A.2d at 334, the reference to “enhanced public benefits”

must be read in the context of the paragraph in which the
term appears. In the sentence preceding the sentence that
includes the term “enhanced public benefits,” the Court stat-
ed: “First, the negotiation of terms protective of public health,
safety, or welfare, in a contract entered into by a local
government body is a discretionary executive act, not a legisla-
tive one.” Id, at 321, 855 A.2d at 334 (citation omitted), This
sentence states that the ability to enter into, and negotiate the
terms of, a DRRA is a discretionary executive act, insofar as
the terms concerning the public health, safety, or welfare. Our
remarks in Queen Anne’s Conservation would be inconsistent
if we were to announce, on the one hand, that the ability to
enter into a DRRA and to negotiate terms related to the
public health, safety, or welfare are discretionary executive
acts, but mandate, on the other hand, that a local governing
body must obtain enhanced public benefits as a requirement
for a DRRA—4e., that enhanced public benefits are necessary
to the public health, safety, or welfare, and that, as such, the
local governing body must negotiate and obtain enhanced
public benefits.

In Casey, 231 Md.App. at 378, 151 A.8d at 46-47, the Court
of Special Appeals held that a DRRA did not include unlawful-
ly broad language purporting to freeze local laws beyond that
authorized by LU § 7-304, and that the BOCC made all
required factual findings justifying the grant of PUD zoning.
In Casey, id. at 380, 392, 151 A.3d at 48, 55, the Court of
Special Appeals referenced “public benefits” on three occa-
sions. In discussing the freeze provision of the DRRA statute,
the Court of Special Appeals explained:

Obtaining forbearance of the application of subsequent

changes in relevant local laws provides certainty and stabili-

ty to developers, whose projects may take many years to
complete and/or sell-off or lease. Local governments derive,
in return, negotiated greater public benefits than may be
attained through typical governmental exactions or condi-
tions of development approvals.
Id, at 880, 151 A.3d at 48 (emphasis added), And, later in the
opinion, immediately after quoting the House Commerce and

Government Committee’s bill analysis of House Bill 700—
specifically, the language that “[flor the local government, the
development agreement provides for greater certainty in the
comprehensive planning process, as well as an opportunity to
ensure the provision of necessary public facilities”’—the Court
of Special Appeals stated:

What would achieve best the legislative purpose of balanc-
ing a developer's interest in legal stability against a local
government’s interest in certainty and obtaining enhanced
public benefits; limiting, for example, the Casey DRRA’s
freeze provision to subsequent changes in the zoning code
only, as urged by [the petitioner], or allowing it to apply to
the expansive list of local provisions in the negotiated
DRRA as written? If the DRRA [statute] only allowed
DRRaAs to freeze the application of local zoning ordinance
provisions, a local government could undermine still the
legal and financial stability of an on-going development
project by changing the laws related to, for example, devel-
opment or site plans, subdivision, or planning compliance.
Where a developer assumed that its project could be
thwarted by a last-minute or mid-stream change to any of
these non-zoning laws, it would be less likely to undertake a
substantial development at all in a jurisdiction. This, in turn,
would frustrate the local government’s interest in obtaining
greater public benefits through negotiation of a DRRA’s
terms,

Id. at 392, 151 A.3d at 55 (emphasis added).

First, to the extent that, in Casey, 231 Md.App. at 392, 151
A8d at 55, the Court of Special Appeals read the DRRA
statute’s legislative history as providing that a local governing
body must obtain enhanced public benefits, such a reading is
mistaken. To be sure, both the House Commerce and Govern-
ment Committee and the Senate Economic and Environmental
Affairs Committee recognized, in their respective bill analyses,
that a benefit of a DRRA to the local government is that a
DRRA “provides for greater certainty in the comprehensive
planning process, as well as an opportunity to ensure the
provision of necessary public facilities.” As we explained

above, however, the Committees’ statements about the benefit
to the local government concern only a local government’s
ability to ensure the provision of “necessary public facilities,”
and not the local government’s ability to ensure “enhanced
public benefits.” And, nothing in the Committees’ statements
even suggests that “necessary public facilities” was intended
to be the equivalent of “enhanced public benefits” or that
there was a requirement that a developer confer enhanced
public benefits to a local governing body. Put simply, neither
Queen Anne’s Conservation nor Casey changes our holding
that a DRRA is not required to be supported by enhanced
public benefits.”

Second, the Court of Special Appeals’s statements in Casey
referencing “greater public benefits” and “enhanced public
benefits” are dicta. In Casey, 231 Md.App. at 378, 381, 151
A8d at 46-47, 48, the Court of Special Appeals’s holdings
concerned the freeze provision of a DRRA and of LU § 7-304,
and whether the BOCC made the requisite findings for ap-
proving PUD zoning. As in Queen Anne’s Conservation, noth-
ing in Casey purported to address and decide the issues of
what requirements a DRRA must include, and whether LU
§ 7-803(a) requires enhanced or greater public benefits. In
other words, as in Queen Anne’s Conservation, the references
to “greater public benefits” and “enhanced public benefits” in
Casey “were neither part of nor essential to the holdings in
the [] case{] and therefore constitute mere obiter dicta[.]”
Silbersack, 402 Md. at 683, 938 A.2d at 860. We do not
consider the references in Casey to “greater public benefits”
and “enhanced public benefits” either precedential or persua-
sive as to whether the General Assembly intended to require
that a DRRA be supported by enhanced public benefits.

10. Interestingly, the opinion in Queen Anne’s Conservation was au-
thored by the Honorable Glenn T. Harrell, Jr., while an incumbent
member of this Court, and the opinion in Casey also was authored by
Judge Harrell, in his capacity as a specially assigned senior judge. This
could, perhaps, account for the repetition and use of the terms “greater
public benefit” and “enhanced public benefit” in Queen Anne’s Conser-
vation and in Casey.

HM Having determined that a DRRA is not required to
confer enhanced public benefits on a county to be valid, we
turn to the issue of whether the Blentlinger DRRA is sup-
ported by sufficient consideration. We hold that it is. As an
initial matter, contrary to Cleanwater’s and the County’s
contentions, we know of no statute or case law requiring a
DRRA’s requirements to exceed requirements of a related
PUD ordinance, In our view, a PUD ordinance and a DRRA
are often a “package deal,” so it would seem commonsensical
that the requirements of the two would largely mirror one
another. And, we know of nothing that dictates that a DRRA’s
requirements must somehow exceed that of a PUD ordinance,
or of any other regulation or local law. Simply put, we are
unpersuaded by the argument that the Blentlinger DRRA is
somehow void for lack of consideration on the basis that the
Blentlinger DRRA’s requirements are also required by the
PUD Ordinance and other regulations and local Jaws, such as
the APFO.

The consideration bestowed upon the BOCC, i¢., the Coun-
ty, in the Blentlinger DRRA is sufficient. As we have ex-
plained, “consideration may be established by showing a bene-
fit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.” Cheek,
878 Md. at 148, 885 A.2d at 661 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Forty W. Builders, Inc. 178 Md.
App. at 384-85, 941 A.2d at 1213 (“In Maryland, consideration
may be established by showing a benefit to the promisor or a
detriment to the promisee.” (Citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). And, in Vogelhut, 308 Md, at 191, 517 A.2d at
1096, we explained:

A benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee is
sufficient valuable consideration to support a contract. Legal
detriment means giving up something which immediately
prior thereto the promisee was privileged to retain, or doing
or refraining from doing something which he was then
privileged not to do, or not to refrain from doing.

(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
“{a] promise [may be] consideration for another promise

[where] it constitutes a binding obligation.” Cheek, 378 Md. at
148, 835 A.2d at 661.

Here, there were both benefits to the County and detri-
ments to Petitioners, as well as binding promises on Petition-
ers’ part, that constitute sufficient consideration for the Coun-
ty’s entering into the DRRA, which guarantees vesting of
rights. As to benefits to the County and detriments to Peti-
tioners, in Section 2.2A of the Blentlinger DRRA, concerning
development limitations, Petitioners agree to develop no more
than 675 residential dwelling units—i.e., Petitioners agree that
the maximum number of residential dwelling units permitted
on the Property is 675. Pursuant to FCC § 1-19-
10.500.6(H)(1)(a), however, a property that is designated as
LDR in the Frederick County Comprehensive Plan may con-
tain three to six dwelling units per acre. Thus, a maximum of
1,674 dwelling units could be permitted for the Property with
the PUD zoning; and, by agreeing to limit the project to 675
residential dwelling units, Petitioners are relinquishing the
right to pursue development of 999 additional residential
dwelling units, or, at a minimum, the right to pursue develop-
ment of 45 additional residential dwelling units, as Petitioners
originally sought to develop 720 residential dwelling units.
Clearly, this is a detriment to Petitioners, and the County
benefits by limiting the number of residential dwelling units
on the Property.

In Section 2.2E of the Blentlinger DRRA, Petitioners agree
that, “with the exception of structures on the Public School
Site and models for the Project, ... neither Frederick County,
nor any agency, department, division and/or branch thereof
shall issue any structural building permits, prior to January 1,
2020.” Thus, as of the time of execution of the Blentlinger
DRRA, Petitioners agreed to wait a period of just over five
years before seeking building permits. In other words, Peti-
tioners agreed to forego the right to seek structural building
permits that they might otherwise have been entitled to seek
but for the terms of the Blentlinger DRRA. Like the agree-
ment to limit the number of residential dwelling units, the
agreement to a limitation on the issuance of structural build-

ing permits obviously constitutes a detriment to Petitioners
and effectively prevents them from proceeding with building
up the development until January 1, 2020.

Moreover, the Blentlinger DRRA includes a plethora of
binding promises by Petitioners that evidence consideration
for the DRRA. For example, in Section 8.1 of the Blentlinger
DRRA, to satisfy APFO requirements for the project, Peti-
tioners agree “to either construct or fund the construction of
certain road improvements or contribute to escrow funds for
road improvements, all as will be comprehensively set forth in
an [APFO] Letter of Understanding[.]” In Sections 8.2 and
3.3, Petitioners agree to comply with the sewer and water
improvements required by the APFO Letter of Understand-
ing, and to pay tap fees in accordance with the fee schedule in
effect at the time of building permit application. In Section
3.4A, Petitioners agree to pay the school construction fee as a
condition of APFO approval for the project at Phase II,
notwithstanding the sunset of a school construction fee ordi-
nance. And, pursuant to Section 3.4B, Petitioners agree that
all “[alpplicable [s]chool [i]mpact [flees shall be paid at the
time of the issuance of building permits in accordance with the
fee schedule in effect at the time of the issuance of building
permits.”

As to property acquisition for public infrastructure, in Sec-
tion 8.5A, Petitioners agree to “exercise commercially reason-
able efforts to secure [a third party’s] right-of-way without the
assistance of [Frederick] County” in the event that such
acquisition is necessary. In Section 3.5B, Petitioners agree
that, if they demonstrate that they are unable to secure a
public right-of-way through commercially reasonable efforts,
then they may request that the County or the State Highway
Administration assist in such acquisition at their “sole cost and
expense.” And, in Section 8.5C, Petitioners agree that, if the
County decides not to acquire the right-of-way, or the two-
year time period of assistance has passed, then Petitioners
“may be permitted to make a contribution to the County equal
to the entire anticipated project development costs, which
shall inelude but not be limited to costs for: design, engineer-

ing, right-of-way acquisition, management, inspection, ete. in
lieu of constructing the public infrastructure improvements|[,]”
unless the applicable APFO letter of understanding provides
otherwise.
Additionally, in Section 7.1B, Petitioners waive the right to
a “trial by jury in connection with any proceedings brought to
enforce the terms of’ the Blentlinger DRRA should they
breach the terms of the DRRA and the BOCC is forced to
bring a legal action for damages. In Section 8.3, concerning
fees, Petitioners agree that, except as otherwise provided in
the Blentlinger DRRA, they “shall pay all fees (specifically
including but not limited to impact fees, school mitigation fees
and water and sewer connection fees) required by Frederick
County at the rate in effect at the time the fee is due.”
Finally, significantly, we conclude that the proffer of the
middle school site is a conditional promise that constitutes
sufficient consideration. In Section 3.4C, entitled “[s]chool
[slite [d]edication,” Petitioners agree to convey, at no cost,
approximately 24.5 acres of the Property to the BOE for a
middle school site; specifically, Section 3.4C provides, in rele-
vant part:
[Petitioners] shall convey in fee simple to the [ JBOE[ ], with
no monetary consideration paid, the Public School Site
shown on EXHIBIT 6, totaling a minimum of 24.5 +
buildable acres, to serve the Project and the surrounding
region. The Public School Site will be conveyed to the BOB
upon: i) the recordation of the first subdivision plat for lots
in the Project; and ii) BOE’s acceptance of the conveyance
of land for the Public School Site .... A separate Memo-
randum of Understanding (“BOE MOU”) between the BOE
and [Petitioners] shall be executed prior to unconditional
Phase II approval for residential dwelling units in the
Project (assuming commercially reasonable efforts by both
parties), which MOU shall establish and control other as-
pects of the Public School Site and the rights and responsi-
bilities of the parties relative to the Public School Site, and
the construction of a public school .... In the event that
the BOE does not approve the Public School Site or deter-

mines not to accept conveyance of the Public School Site,
then [Petitioners] shall retain fee simple ownership of the
Public School Site, and may use the Public School Site in a
manner consistent with other uses with the Project. [Peti-
tioners] acknowledge[ ] that use of the Public School Site
may require regulatory approvals, including but not limited
to, revision of the [PUD] Ordinance.

(Emphasis in original).

As an initial matter, we note that LU § 7-808(a) does not
require that a DRRA include dedication of a portion of the
real property for public use. Rather, as provided in LU § 7—
303(a)(10)@), a DRRA shall include “to the extent applicable,
provisions for the[ ] dedication of a portion of the real proper-
ty for public use[.]’ (Paragraph break omitted). Similarly,
FOC § 1-25-4(A)(11)(@) provides that a DRRA shall include,
“{t]o the extent applicable, provisions for the[ dledication of a
portion of the property for public use[.]” (Paragraph break
omitted). In other words, under the DRRA statute and County
ordinance, dedication of a portion of the property for public
use is a requirement of a DRRA only “[tJo the extent applica-
ble”—1.¢., such dedication is not required as a matter of course
with every DRRA. In other words, a DRRA could be valid
under both State and County law without the dedication of
land for public use.

Relevant here, FCC § 1-19-10.500.8(B), concerning public
facilities, other than parks and recreation facilities, within
PUD districts, provides: “The County Council [formerly, the
BOCC] may require additional sites for other public facilities
including schools, library services, or a fire and emergency
medical service site to serve the proposed development where
the County Council determines that a need exists based on
established county standards of service.” An applicant for
PUD zoning is not required to proffer a school site or other
public facility site to obtain PUD zoning; rather, as FCC § 1-
19-10.500.8(B) demonstrates, the County Council, formerly,
the BOCC, has the discretion to require such additional sites
for public facilities such as schools where it determines that a
need exists. Reading these statutory provisions together leads

to the conclusion that LU § 7-808(a)(10)@) and FCC § 1-25-
4(A)(11)(a) are not automatically applicable to all DRRAs, as
those provisions expressly state that only “to the extent
applicable” shall a DRRA include provisions for the dedication
of a portion of the property for public use; and under FCC
§ 1-19-10.500.8(B), the BOCC had the discretion to require
the designation of a portion of the Property for public use, but
was not required to do so. Simply put, under the relevant
statutes, the Blentlinger DRRA was not required as a matter
of course to include dedication of a portion of the Property for
the middle school site. Nevertheless, despite not being re-
quired for the PUD Ordinance or the DRRA, Petitioners
proffered the middle school site, and the proffer was incorpo-
rated into the Blentlinger DRRA.

Specifically, in Section 3.4C of the Blentlinger DRRA, Peti-
tioners agree to convey in fee simple to the BOE, at no cost,
the middle school site consisting of approximately 24.5 acres
upon two conditions subsequent—the recordation of the first
subdivision plats for lots in the project, and the BOE’s accep-
tance of the conveyance of the land for the middle school site.
Thus, the conveyance of the middle school site rests on the
BOB’s acceptance or rejection of the site. This, however, does
not make Petitioners’ conditional promise of the middle school
site “illusory,” as alleged by Cleanwater and the County. As
we explained in Cheek, 878 Md. at 149, 835 A.2d at 662, “[ilf A
makes an illusory promise, A’s words leave A’s future action
subject to A’s own future whim, just as it would have been had
A said nothing at all.” (Citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, Petitioners have no control over whether the
BOE will accept or reject the middle school site, and their
future action—either conveying the middle school site in fee
simple to the BOE or retaining fee simple ownership of the
site for use in a manner consistent with other uses with the
project—is not subject to their own determination. If the BOE
accepts the middle school site, Petitioners’ performance is
mandatory; in Section 3.4C, Petitioners have expressly prom-
ised the middle school site if the BOE accepts it, and Petition-
ers will be required to deliver fee simple ownership of the

middle school site under those circumstances, The proffer of
the middle school site is valuable consideration for the Blent-
linger DRRA.

In sum, we conclude that the Blentlinger DRRA—indeed,
any DRRA—is not required to confer enhanced public benefits
to the local governing body, i.e, the County, to be valid; that
the Blentlinger DRRA is supported by sufficient consider-
ation; and that the Court of Special Appeals erred in conclud-
ing that the Blentlinger DRRA was void for lack of consider-
ation.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED, CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY.
RESPONDENTS TO PAY COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.

330

178 A.8d 1069
WATERMAN FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al.
vy.
Kathleen B. BOOMER, et al.
No. 18, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
November 20, 2017

re
Argued by Brynja M. Booth (Lyndsey J. Ryan, Booth,
Booth, Cropper & Marriner, PC of Eaton, MD) and Joseph A.

Stevens (Justin M. Hoyt, Stevens Palmer, LLC of Centreville,
MD) on brief, for Petitioners.

Argued by Jesse B. Hammock (Peter R. Cotter, Parker
Goodman Gordon & Hammock of Easton, MD) on brief, for
Respondents.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Lawrence F. Rodowsky (Senior Judge,
Specially Assigned), JJ.

McDonald, J.

Among the powers conferred on a Maryland municipality by
the General Assembly pursuant to the State Constitution are
the power to zone land within the municipality’s boundaries
and the power to enlarge those boundaries by annexing con-
tiguous land. However, when a municipality exercises those

powers together, there is a constraint. A State statute delays
for five years the rezoning of annexed land for a use “substan-
tially different” from that allowed by the land’s prior county
zoning classification—unless the county approves the munici-
pality’s reclassification of the annexed property before the
expiration of the five-year period.

Petitioner Waterman Family Limited Partnership (“Water-
man”) asked the Town Commissioners of Queenstown (“the
Town”), also a Petitioner, to annex farm land owned by
Waterman adjacent to Queenstown in Queen Anne’s County.
At the same time, Waterman asked the Town to rezone the
annexed land for purposes of a long planned development. The
Town acceded to those requests. In order to make the new
zoning effective sooner rather than later, the Town sought the
County’s approval of the new zoning classification. Certain
nearby property owners, including Respondents Kathleen B.
Boomer, Marie J. McNurlan, Paul A. McNurlan, Stacy L.
Swartwood, and the Queen Anne’s Conservation Association
(collectively “QACA”), opposed the effort to obtain the Coun-
ty’s approval of the new zoning.

At the same time, the County government happened to be
in a period of transition as a result of the November 2014
election. The outgoing Board of County Commissioners—the
County’s governing body—narrowly approved the Town’s re-
zoning in late November 2014. Two weeks later, the newly
installed Board of County Commissioners rescinded that ap-
proval.

Disappointed, Waterman and the Town instituted legal ac-
tion against the County. QACA joined the fray in defense of
the County’s rescission of its initial approval. Waterman’s
challenge raised a question of first impression: May a county
rescind its approval of a municipality’s rezoning of annexed
land?

The Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County said “no.” The
Court of Special Appeals said “yes.” For the reasons set forth
in this opinion, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals.

I
Background

A. Rezoning Land After Municipal Annexation

1. Municipal Zoning

The General Assembly has authorized municipalities in Ma-
ryland to exercise zoning authority over land within their
respective jurisdictions. Maryland Code, Local Government
Article (“LG”) § 5-218; see also Maryland Code, Land Use
Article (“LU”), § 1-101(g) (definition of “legislative body”
includes governing body of municipality), § 4-101 et seq. (au-
thorizing legislative body to exercise zoning powers).

2. Municipal Annexation

State law allows a municipality to annex unincorporated
land contiguous to the municipality's boundaries if certain
procedures are followed. LG § 4-401 et seg. A proposal to
annex land may be initiated by the legislative body of the
municipality or by residents or owners of the land in question.
LG §§ 4-408, 4404.

8. Rezoning of Annexed Land

It is generally the case that unincorporated land annexed by
a municipality will already have been subject to county zoning.
State law temporarily limits the rezoning and development of
such land after annexation by a municipality. In particular, for
a period of time the county retains some say over whether and
when the land may be rezoned or developed in a way that
allows for a substantially higher density or different use than
that allowed by the county zoning classification that applied to
the land prior to annexation. That constraint is set forth in LG
§ 4-416, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) Existing municipal authority—(1) Notwithstanding [a
provision of the Local Government Article that limits
the extent of municipal authority over planning, subdi-
vision, and zoning] ... if an area is annexed to a
municipality that has planning and zoning authority at

Ss

the time of annexation, the municipality shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over planning, subdivision control,

and zoning in the area annexed.
ek Re

(b) Different land use or density—Without the express
approval of the county commissioners or county council
of the county in which the municipality is located, for 5
years after an annexation by a municipality, the munic-
ipality may not allow development of the annexed land
for land uses substantially different than the author-
ized use, or at a substantially higher density, not
exceeding 50%, than could be granted for the proposed
development, in accordance with the zoning classifica-
tion of the county applicable at the time of the annex-
ation.

(c) County approval of zoning classification.—Notwith-
standing [a provision of the Land Use Article concern-
ing amendment or repeal of a zoning classification] and
if the county expressly approves, the municipality may
place the annexed land in a zoning classification that
allows a land use or density different from the land use
or density specified in the zoning classification of the
county or agency with planning and zoning jurisdiction
over the land prior to its annexation applicable at the
time of the annexation.

4. Summary

The principles incorporated in the statute can be summa-
rized as follows:

© Municipality’s exclusive jurisdiction—As a general rule,
a municipality that has planning and zoning authority has
exclusive jurisdiction over planning, zoning and subdivision
control in any area that the municipality annexes.

e Five-year delay of rezoning—The exclusive authority of
the municipality is subject to the proviso that, for a period of
five years after annexation, the municipality may not allow
development of the annexed land for uses “substantially differ-

ent” from that authorized under the county zoning applicable
to the property prior to annexation. In sum, municipal rezon-
ing of annexed land may be subject to a five-year delay.

@ County waiver of delay—That proviso, however, is sub-
ject to a further proviso, The county—ie., the county commis-
sioners or the county council, as the case may be—may give
“express approval” for the new municipal zoning before the
five-year period expires. This approval is sometimes referred
to as a county “waiver” of the five-year delay.

This case raises the question whether a county that waives
the five-year delay by giving express approval may rescind
that waiver before any development has been undertaken in
the annexed area.

B, Facts and Legal Proceedings

1. The Property

Waterman owns approximately 148 acres of land, known as
Wheatlands Farm, located immediately south of Route 50 in
Queen Anne’s County. The property is across Route 50 from a
commercial development known as the Queenstown Ouitlets.
Before the events that gave rise to this case, the property was
zoned CS (“Countryside”) by the County—a designation that
permits agricultural and low density residential uses.

2. Annexation and Town Rezoning of the Property

On June 25, 2014, Waterman submitted a petition to the
Town to annex the Wheatlands Farm property to the Town.
At the same time, Waterman asked the Town to zone the
property PRC (“Planned Regional Commercial”) under the
Town zoning ordinance. A month later, on July 28, 2014, a
proposed annexation resolution and a proposed zoning ordi-
nance were introduced before the Town Commissioners. The
Commissioners referred both proposals to the Town’s Plan-
ning Commission for its recommendations.

The Town Planning Commission held two public hearings,
concluded that the annexation and proposed zoning were

consistent with the Town plan, and recommended approval to
the Town Commissioners.’

Following a public hearing on the proposals on September
24, 2014, the Town Commissioners voted unanimously to an-
nex the property. A month later, on October 22, 2014, they
held a second hearing on the rezoning proposal. On November
12, 2014, the Town Commissioners approved the rezoning.

It is undisputed that the Town’s PRC zoning classification is
“substantially different” from the County CS classification and
allows for a “substantially higher density” than the CS classifi-
cation. Accordingly, under LG § 4416(b), the property could
not be developed with that higher density within five years
after annexation, unless the County gave its express approval
to the new zoning classification. In light of this requirement,
the Town Commissioners made the effectiveness of the rezon-
ing ordinance contingent in part on the County’s approval of
the rezoning?

8. County Resolutions Related to the Rezoning

During the summer of 2014, while the annexation and
rezoning proposals were pending in the Town, the Town
Commissioners asked the County Commissioners to grant
express approval of the Town’s rezoning of the property upon
annexation, The County Commissioners referred the request
to the County Planning Commission, which recommended
approval.

In the meantime, as a result of the election held on Novem-
ber 4, 2014, there was a significant turnover in the composition
of the County governing body, with four of the five seats to be
oceupied by new Commissioners.

1, The annexation of this property to the Town and the PRC zoning
classification were contemplated in the comprehensive plans of both
the Town and the County.

2. The ordinance provided that the PRC zoning designation of the
Waterman property would become effective as of the earlier of (1) the
County’s approval of the rezoning or (2) five years from the date of the
Town’s annexation of the property.

On November 25, 2014, the outgoing County Commissioners
conducted a brief hearing and passed, by a 3-2 vote, County
Resolution 14-81, which gave express approval for the Town’s
rezoning of the annexed Waterman property.

On December 2, 2014, the newly elected County Commis-
sioners took office. One week later, on December 9, the newly
elected County Commissioners conducted a hearing and
passed County Resolution 14-33, rescinding the resolution
that their predecessors had passed two weeks earlier to
approve the rezoning. The rescinding resolution noted that no
site plan or other indication of the intended development had
been provided to the County and stated that the County
Commissioners wished to review the planned development of
the property and its impact “in terms of traffic, population
growth, infrastructure, schools, and the environment....”

4, Litigation over County Resolution 14-83

One month later, on January 7, 2015, in response to County
Resolution 14-83 rescinding the County’s approval of the
rezoning, Waterman filed an action styled as a “Petition for
Judicial Review and Writ of Administrative Mandamus” in the
Cireuit Court for Queen Anne’s County. Waterman thus in-
voked alternative routes of judicial review of administrative
action pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-201 et seg. and Maryland
Rule 7-401 e¢ seg. The Town subsequently joined that petition.
QACA filed a notice of its intention to participate in the
judicial review proceeding? Waterman later also filed a declar-
atory judgment action against the County in which it asked
the Circuit Court to declare County Resolution 14~33—the
resolution rescinding approval—to be void. Waterman’s two
actions were consolidated in the Cireuit Court.

3. In the Circuit Court, QACA indicated that it had planned to file an
action challenging the County Resolution 14-31—the first resolution
approving the rezoning—but decided not to pursue such an action after
the newly elected County Commissioners rescinded that resolution
before the deadline for QACA to file such an action had expired.

Waterman, the Town, and the County pursued an effort to
settle the case without success (QACA was apparently exclud-
ed from those discussions). The parties then filed cross mo-
tions for summary judgment.

After hearing legal argument, the Cireuit Court held that
the County Commissioners had “no statutory right of recon-
sideration” once the County had granted express approval
waiving the five-year delay under LG § 4-416. On July 28,
2015, the Circuit Court issued a declaratory judgment that
County Resolution 14-83—the resolution rescinding approv-
al—had “no legal force and effect.”* The Cireuit Court denied
the County’s motion for reconsideration, which QACA had
joined.

QACA and the County appealed.’ The Court of Special
Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment. Boomer v.
Waterman Family LP, 232 Md.App. 1, 155 A.3d 901 (2017).
The intermediate appellate court held that, while LG § 4-416
itself does not explicitly provide that a county may rescind
approval of a new zoning classification of land recently an-
nexed by a municipality, the Maryland Constitution generally
authorizes the county commissioners of a code home rule
county to repeal a public local law by resolution, as occurred
here, and that a county ordinarily has inherent authority to
rescind a measure, absent the vesting of rights based on that
measure.

4. The Circuit Court ultimately also issued an order granting the relief
sought in Waterman’s petition for judicial review and administrative
mandamus and denying the contrary requests for relief made by QACA.
In its opinion, the Circuit Court noted that the parties disputed whether
the court had authority to resolve the case as a matter of judicial review
of administrative action, but opined that it clearly had authority to
assess the validity of the second County resolution under the Declarato-
ry Judgments Act, Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings
Article, § 3-401 et seq. Before us, the parties have treated the matter as
a declaratory judgment action rather than as judicial review of adminis-
trative action. We shall do the same.

5. The County later dismissed its own appeal.

Waterman and the Town filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari, which we granted to consider whether the County
had authority to rescind the initial resolution approving the
rezoning.

I
Discussion

A, Standard of Review

Hl The Circuit Court issued its decision on the basis of
cross motions for summary judgment. A case may be resolved
on summary judgment when there is no dispute of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Maryland Rule 2-501(f), There is general agreement in
this case that no material facts are in dispute and that the
issue before us is purely legal. Accordingly, we review that
legal issue without according any special deference to the
conclusions of the Circuit Court or the Court of Special
Appeals. See Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Maryland, Inc., 485
Md. 584, 598, 80 A.3d 269 (2018).

B. Whether a County May Rescind a Resolution Approv-
ing Municipal Rezoning of Annexed Land

Waterman and the Town contend that the County, having
given its express approval to the rezoning of the tract in
County Resolution 14-81 on November 25, 2014, lacked au-
thority to rescind that approval two weeks later. There is no
contention that Waterman or the Town took any action in
reliance on County Resolution 14-31 during the two week
interval before the new Board of County Commissioners re-
scinded it. Thus, the question is whether the County generally
has the power to rescind such an action.®

6. If Waterman had taken action to develop the property in accordance
with the new zoning classification during the interval between the
approving resolution (County Resolution 14-31) and the rescinding
resolution (County Resolution 14-33) there might be an issue as to
whether Waterman had acquired vested rights in the new zoning

SS

LG § 4-416

Hl As Waterman and the Town point out, nothing in LG
§ 4-416 authorizes a county to rescind its approval once it is
given. It is true that the statute does not explicitly address
whether a county may withdraw its approval of a municipal
rezoning of recently-annexed land. It is equally true, however,
that the statute does not address whether a county that
initially denies approval may later reverse that determination
and grant approval. Waterman and the Town take the position
that a county may do the latter—that is, approve a rezoning
after initially declining to do so. In their view, the statute is a
one-way ratchet: Approval, once given, may not be withdrawn.
Once denied, however, it may later be given, But the text of
the statute provides no support for this view.’ It is simply
silent.

A review of the extant legislative history of the statute is
unenlightening on this question. The key provisions of the
statute were enacted before the General Assembly began to
retain bill files in 1976 and thus we do not have the benefit of

classification and whether the County would be constitutionally barred
from rescinding its approval. See Prince George’s County v. Sunrise
Development Limited Partnership, 330 Md. 297, 623 A.2d 1296 (1993).
That question is not before us.

7. Waterman and the Town argue that allowing a County to rescind
approval of a rezoning would offend the “exclusive jurisdiction” over
planning, subdivision control, and zoning that subsection (a) of the
statute confers on the municipality. They suggest that such exclusive
jurisdiction is triggered by county approval of the rezoning and, once
triggered, cannot be retracted. This is a misreading of the statute.
Under the statute, the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the municipality is not
activated by county action. Rather, it is a consequence of the municipal-
ity’s action in annexing the land, But it is also qualified by subsections
(b) and (c) of the statute for a five-year period following annexation.

Waterman and the Town suggest that allowing a County to rescind
approval is an “illogical” reading of the statute because rescission
could effectively change the zoning of the property after a developer
had obtained certain approvals for the development (but presumably
before acquiring vested rights in the zoning classification). But it is no
more illogical than the authority that the Town itself has to change the
zoning classification before the developer has acquired a vested right in
the zoning,

the types of legislative materials that are available for more
recent legislation. In Mayor and Council of Rockville v.
Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 548-61, 814 A.2d 469
(2002), Judge Harrell provided a comprehensive history of the
enactment of the key provisions that now make up LG § 4—
416, prior to their 2018 recodification in the Local Government
Article. We need not repeat all of that analysis, but note only
the critical junctures in the development of the statute that
relate to the question before us.

In 1954, the State Constitution was amended to provide for
municipal home rule. Chapter 53, Laws of Maryland 1954,
ratified November 2, 1954 (adding Article XI-E to the Mary-
land Constitution). To implement municipal home rule, the
General Assembly enacted various provisions the following
year that were codified in Article 283A of the Maryland Code.
Chapter 423, Laws of Maryland 1955. Included among those
enactments were certain provisions concerning annexation and
municipal zoning that appeared in §§ 9 and 19 of Article 283A.
Two years later, the General Assembly provided that if a
municipality had zoning power—not all municipalities had such
power at that time—the municipality would have exclusive
zoning authority over land that it annexed. Chapter 197, Laws
of Maryland 1957. In Rylyns, Judge Harrell referred to this
as the “highwater mark” of municipal power “with respect to
the initial zoning of annexed lands.” Rylyns, 372 Md. at 557,
814 A.2d 469; see also Prince George’s County v. Mayor and
City Council of Lawrel, 262 Md. 171, 182-83, 277 A.2d 262
(1971); Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 410-11, 206
A.2d 678 (1965).

The tide receded from that highwater mark 14 years later
when the Legislature decided that a municipality should tem-
porarily share with the county its otherwise exclusive zoning
authority over annexed land. In 1971, the General Assembly
amended Article 283A, § 9(c) to delay the effectiveness of
municipal rezoning of annexed land for a period of five years
when the new zoning classification would permit a land use
“substantially different” from that specified in the county plan
prior to annexation. Chapter 116, Laws of Maryland 1971. As

Ss °°

a result, municipal “autonomy [with respect to the initial
zoning of annexed land] ceased.” Rylyns, 372 Md. at 557, 814
Ad 469; see also Northeast Plaza Associates v. Town of
North East, 310 Md. 20, 28-29, 526 A.2d 963 (1987). A major
objective of this provision was to “preserve the integrity” of
the county master plan by delaying a substantial change in
zoning for the annexed area that “might well be disruptive to
the planning for the surrounding areas.” Maryland—National
Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Mayor and Coun-
cil of Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 561, 325 A.2d 748 (1974) (uphold-
ing constitutionality of law enacting the five-year delay).

Four years later, the Legislature decided to add some
flexibility to the statute. In 1975, the General Assembly again
amended Article 283A, § 9(c), this time to allow the five-year
delay to be truncated with the county’s assent. The amend-
ment provided that a county could waive the five-year delay by
expressly approving the new municipal zoning before the
expiration of the five-year period. Chapter 618, Laws of Mary-
land 1975.

The Legislature subsequently modified these provisions in
various respects, but the key components of the statute for
our purposes—placing exclusive zoning power in the munici-
pality, making new zoning that allows a substantially different
use subject to a five-year delay, and allowing for a county
waiver of that delay—have remained essentially unchanged
since the mid-1970s. As is evident, this history does not reveal
a legislative intent as to whether or not county approval, once
given, may be rescinded® In 2018, these provisions were
recodified without substantive change as § 4-416 of the new

8. Waterman and the Town argue that a 2006 amendment of the
predecessor statute somehow supports their view of LG § 4-416. Chap-
ter 381, Laws of Maryland 2006. Among other things, the 2006 amend-
ment amended Article 23A, § 9(c) to provide a more specific descrip-
tion of the kind of “substantially different use” permitted by a new
municipal zoning classification that would trigger the five-year delay
under the statute. Nothing in that amendment, or its legislative history,
supports the idea that the statute operates as a one-way ratchet under
which a county may grant approval previously withheld, but not rescind
approval previously given.

Local Government Article. Chapter 119, Laws of Maryland
2013.

Thus, neither the text of LG § 4-416, nor its legislative
history, indicates that the General Assembly intended to pre-
clude a county from exercising whatever authority the county
may have under existing law to rescind an action taken by its
governing body. To decide whether a county may withdraw
approval of municipal rezoning of annexed land, we thus
consider the general authority of a county governing body to
reconsider its actions.

Common Law Authority

HM As a general rule, the governing body of a local
government “has the right to reconsider its actions and ordi-
nances, and adopt a measure or ordinance that has previously
been defeated or rescind one that has been previously adopted
before the rights of third parties have vested.” Dal Maso v.
Board of County Commissioners, 182 Md. 200, 206~7, 34 A.2d
464 (1948);? see also 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
§§ 18.70, 18,72. This general principle is related to the idea
that a legislative body ordinarily lacks authority to restrict the
legislative activities of its successors. State v. Fisher, 204 Md.
807, 315, 104 A.2d 408 (1954) (“One legislature cannot prohibit
repeal or modification by its successors, even where it pur-
ports to do so”); see also Nordheimer v. Montgomery County,
307 Md. 85, 101, 512 A.2d 379 (1986). Were it otherwise,
legislative action would be frozen in time with local officials
unable to react to changed circumstances or to pursue policies
presently preferred over those previously adopted. The gener-
al power of a governing body to rescind a prior law or policy
on a matter subject to its jurisdiction may be constrained in
particular circumstances, as when a party has acquired a

9. Waterman and the Town attempt to distinguish Dal Maso, arguing
that it concerned a “zoning action” by a local government while, in
their view, the County resolutions in this case do not, However, as
noted in the text, the principle stated in Dal Maso is longstanding and
widely applicable in the law regardless of whether or not the particular
legislative action is called a “zoning action.”

vested right in the governing body’s prior policy decision.”
Absent such circumstances, the governing body retains the
option of changing its mind.

‘Thus, a county would ordinarily have authority to rescind its
action giving assent—or one denying assent—for a municipali-
ty’s rezoning of recently annexed land. That is true regardless
of whether that authority is explicitly reiterated in LG § 4~
416. As indicated above, there is no indication in the statute
that the General Assembly intended to trump the general
principle that a county governing body may rescind a prior
action,

Article XI-F of the Maryland Constitution

Hl The parties have focused much of their attention in
this case on certain provisions of Article XI-F of the Maryland
Constitution, which authorizes counties to adopt code home
rule, Those provisions authorize a code home rule county, such
as Queen Anne’s County, to “enact, amend, or repeal a public
local law of that county by a resolution of the board of county
commissioners.” Maryland Constitution, Article XI-F, § 6;
see also Article XI-F, § 8 (“a code county may enact, amend,
or repeal a public local law of that county...”); § 10 (ater
enacted public local law prevails over previously enacted pub-
lie local law). To the extent that they concern amendment or
repeal of a public local law, these provisions simply reiterate
the common law principle described in the previous section in
the particular context of a county that has transitioned to code
home rule, In doing so, these provisions of the State Constitu-
tion make clear that the governing body of a county that has
adopted code home rule has authority not only to repeal or
amend its own enactments, but also to modify or repeal public

10. See footnote 6 above.

11, That section further authorizes the General Assembly to “amplify
[its] provisions by general law in any mamner not inconsistent with ...
Article [XI-F].” Maryland Constitution, Article XI-F, § 6, None of the
parties has suggested that the General Assembly has “‘amplified” the
procedures for rescission by a code county in a way pertinent to this
case,

local laws enacted for that county prior to adoption of home
rule by a different legislative body—the General Assembly.
See 62 Opinions of the Attorney General 275 (1977).

HN Much of the debate in this case has focused on
whether County Resolution 14-31 granting express approval
to the rezoning was a “public local law” of Queen Anne’s
County that falls within the purview of Article XI-F, § 6. In
distinguishing public local laws of a county from public general
laws, this Court has focused on the substance of the law more
than its form. Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 488, 240
A.2d 272 (1968). Necessarily, a public local law of a county
applies only in that county, although the fact that a measure
applies only in a single county is not by itself determinative; a
law that applies in a single county may nonetheless be a public
general law when it “affects the interests of the whole state.”
Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 507, 801 A.2d 148
(2002); see also Kent Island Defense League, LLC v. Queen
Anne’s County Board of Elections, 145 Md.App. 684, 698-94,
806 A.2d 841 (2002) (county ordinance classifying areas for
purposes of State Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Law was not
a public local law as its actions “were affected by, and had an
effect on, the entire State Critical Area Program.”), The
distinction between a public local law and a public general law
is based on whether the provision “pertains only to a subject
of local import” or rather deals with a subject “of significant
interest not just to any one county, but rather to more than
one geographical subdivision, or even to the entire state.”
Tyma, 369 Md. at 507-08, 801 A.2d 148 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

Ws Waterman and the Town suggest that the two resolu-
tions do not qualify as public local laws because they affect
more than one political subdivision—i.e., the County and the
Town.” However, in distinguishing public local laws of a

12, In their brief, Waterman and the Town also argue that the two
resolutions do not qualify as public local laws because the County failed
to follow certain procedures set forth in LG § 9-301 et seg. As best we
can tell, this argument was not raised before either of the courts below

county from public general laws, the State Constitution gener-
ally regards counties (and Baltimore City) as the relevant local
jurisdictions. Cf. Maryland Constitution, Article KI-A, § 4
(distinguishing “public local law” of charter home rule county
from a public general law and defining “geographical sub-
division” to mean a county or Baltimore City). Moreover, in
this particular context, the General Assembly has, by means of
LG § 4-416, made the timing and effectiveness of a municipal
zoning classification explicitly contingent on the assent of the
county within which the annexed land lies.

Finally, Waterman and the Town argue that we should
interpret “public local law’ for purposes of Article XI-F
differently from other contexts because Article XI-F contains
its own definition of that phrase. “Public local law” is defined
as “a law applicable to the incorporation, organization, or
government of a code county and contained in the county’s
code of public local laws.” Article XI-F, § 1.8 While this has
been characterized as a “unique” definition of “public local
law,” detailed examinations of the history of the code home
rule provisions of the Constitution have concluded that those
provisions were designed to provide a broad grant of legisla-
tive power to code home rule counties concerning all matters
of local concern. See 62 Opinions of the Attorney General, 275,
277, 290-94 (1977); M. Peter Moser, County Home Rule-
Sharing the State’s Legislative Power with Maryland Cown-
ties, 28 Md. L. Rev. 827, 336-38 & n. 34 (1968).

Resolution 14-31 applied to Wheatlands Farm, land wholly
within Queen Anne’s County; the resolution did not concern

and the record does not otherwise address this issue. We decline to
attempt to resolve this question at this juncture.

13. Specifically excluded from this definition are “(i) the charters of
municipal corporations under Article 11E of this Constitution, (ii) the
laws or charters of counties under Article 11A of this Constitution, (ii)
laws, whether or not Statewide in application, in the code of public
general laws, (iv) laws which apply to more than one county, and (v)
ordinances and resolutions of the county government enacted under
public local laws.” Article XI-F, § 1. No contention is made that any of
these specific exclusions apply here.

any other county. As a law concerning the timetable for a
change of zoning of that land, Resolution 14~31 concerned a
matter of local import to Queen Anne’s County. Thus, were it
necessary to decide this question to resolve this case, we
would be inclined to agree with the Court of Special Appeals
that County Resolution 14-31 was a public local law of Queen
Anne’s County.

In any event, whether or not the resolutions fit the defini-
tion of “public local law” under Article XI-F, the County
Commissioners had common law authority to rescind County
Resolution 14-31. Moreover, nothing in the State Constitution
precludes the County Commissioners from rescinding a reso-
Iution previously adopted by that body or abrogates the
common law principle.

Summary

Under the common law, the County Commissioners had
authority to rescind their resolution assenting to the Town’s
rezoning of the recently annexed land before rights vested in
that zoning classification. Nothing in LG § 4-416 abrogated
that authority. Moreover, consistent with this common law
authority, the Maryland Constitution explicitly confers author-
ity on a code home rule county like Queen Anne’s County to
repeal a public local law.

Tl

Conelusion

For the reasons set forth above, the County had authority
to rescind its assent to the Town’s rezoning of Wheatlands
Farm in conjunction with the Town’s annexation of that prop-
erty. Accordingly, under LG § 4-416(b), as well as the Town
rezoning ordinance itself, the new zoning classification will not
become effective until five years after annexation, unless the
County should approve the rezoning in the interim.

JupGMENT oF THE Court or SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. CASE
RemanveD To THAT Court Wira Directions To REMAND THE
Case To THE Crecurr Court or QuEEN ANNE’s COUNTY FOR

SS

Entry or a Deciaratory JupGmenr ConsisTENT WITH THIS
Opmion. Costs To BE Pap By PETITIONERS.

ee

a

174 A.3d 326
Jamal SIZER

ve
STATE of Maryland
No. 1, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 28, 2017

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Argued by Helki Philiusen, Assistant Public Defender (Paul
B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD) on
brief, for Petitioner.

Argued by Carrie J. Williams, Assistant Attorney General
(Brian H. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore,
MD) on brief, for Respondent.

Argued by Anthony J. May, Murnaghan Appellate Advocacy
Fellow, Baltimore, MD, amici curiae for Public Justice Center,
American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, and Washington
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Greene, J.

In the case before us, we are asked to consider the constitu-
tionality of the stop and the subsequent search incident to the
arrest of Petitioner, Jamal Sizer. On the evening of November
20, 2015, five or six officers of the Howard County Police
Department Pathways Patrol Unit, a bicycle patrol unit, ob-
served Mr. Sizer and others congregating in a public parking
lot, drinking from what appeared to be an open alcohol
container. The officers described the group as “loud and
disorderly.” The officers observed a bottle being thrown and
heard it hit the ground, but could not see who threw the
bottle. The officers approached the group to investigate who in
the group threw the bottle. Mr. Sizer fled upon the officers’
approach. A chase ensued and ended with the seizure of Mr.
Sizer, which led to the discovery that he possessed a .88
caliber revolver in his backpack. Contemporaneously with the
seizure of Mr. Sizer, an officer recognized Mr. Sizer as having
an outstanding arrest warrant. Subsequently, pursuant to the
discovery of the outstanding warrant, Mr. Sizer was arrested
and taken to the local police precinct, where an officer
searched Mr. Sizer incident to his arrest and recovered a

baggie containing twenty-seven pills of oxycodone, a controlled
dangerous substance, hidden in his sock.

Mr. Sizer filed a motion to suppress the firearm and the
pills recovered from his person, and after a hearing, the
Cireuit Court for Howard County granted his motion. The
State appealed, pursuant to Maryland Code, Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article, § 12-302(c)(4) (1978, 2018 Repl. Vol.,
2016 Supp.). In a reported opinion, the Court of Special
Appeals reversed the judgment of the Cireuit Court, holding
that the stop was constitutional. State v. Sizer, 230 Md.App.
640, 658, 149 A.3d 706, 717 (2016). The intermediate appellate
court held in the alternative that, assuming arguendo that the
stop was unlawful, the evidence recovered would have been
admissible under the independent source doctrine because Mr.
Sizer was arrested on a valid pre-existing warrant that was
independent of the illegal stop. Id. at 669, 149 A.3d at 723, A
concurring member of the three-judge panel, Judge Kathryn
Graeff, concluded that, assuming arguendo that the stop was
illegal, the evidence that was recovered from Mr. Sizer would
have been admissible under the attenuation doctrine, rather
than the independent source doctrine, in light of this Court’s
decisions in Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 909 A.2d 1048 (2006),
Cow v. State, 397 Md. 200, 916 A.2d 311 (2007), and the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Utah v. Strieff/ — US.
——, 186 S.Ct. 2056, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016). Id. at 680-81, 149
A.8d at 730.

We review the issue of whether the officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer. We hold that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop when they witnessed
what appeared to be criminal activity occurring immediately
before the investigatory stop. In the alternative, we hold that,
even assuming the stop was unlawful, the evidence recovered
from Mr. Sizer would be admissible in evidence because the
attenuation doctrine would apply, pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Strieff.

For reasons stated in this opinion, we shall affirm the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals to the extent that it

held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr.
Sizer. We also, alternatively, affirm the judgment of the
intermediate appellate court and adopt the reasoning of the
concurring opinion, penned by Judge Graeff, with respect to
the application of the attenuation doctrine.

L
Initial Stop

The relevant undisputed facts are taken from testimony
presented at the suppression hearing. On the evening of
November 20, 2015, five or six officers, from the Howard
County Police Department Pathway Patrol Unit (“Patrol
Unit”), on routine patrol, biked the footpaths that “lead all
throughout Columbia, [Maryland].” While on the footpath,
officers in the Patrol Unit observed a group of individuals
“play fighting and passing around an alcoholic beverage back
and forth.” The Patrol Unit suspected that the beverage was
alcohol because it was in a brown paper bag and the group’s
body language was “consistent with individuals drinking.” The
officers, from 25-35 yards away from the group, observed a
bottle being thrown and heard it hit the ground, but could not
see who threw the bottle. At that point, the officers ap-
proached the group to investigate. When the officers were
approximately five feet away, Mr. Sizer fled on foot, away
from the officers.

Officer Andrew Schlossnagle, one of the officers in the
Patrol Unit, gave immediate chase and “physically took [Mr.
Sizer] to the ground.” As Mr, Sizer was being tackled to the
ground, he revealed that he was carrying a handgun on his
person. Within seconds of the takedown, another officer from
the Patrol Unit recognized Mr. Sizer as the subject of an
outstanding arrest warrant. At that point Mr. Sizer was
arrested and taken to the police satellite station in the Village
Center pursuant to the officers’ belief that he was the subject
of a pre-existing warrant. At the satellite station, the officers
confirmed the existence of the warrant and performed a
search of Mr. Sizer incident to his arrest. The officers recov-

ered a .88 caliber handgun from Mr. Sizer’s backpack and
twenty-seven pills of oxycodone, a controlled dangerous sub-
stance, from Mr. Sizer’s sock. Additional facts will be dis-
cussed as needed.

Suppression Hearing

Mr. Sizer moved to suppress the weapon and the pills,
arguing that the evidence was obtained pursuant to an unlaw-
ful stop. At the suppression hearing, members of the Patrol
Unit testified that the Owen Brown Village Center was a
“high” or “higher crime area,” compared to other parts of
Columbia, Maryland. The State argued that Mr. Sizer’s flight
in a high crime area was enough to give the officers reason-
able suspicion to conduct a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Hd.2d 889 (1968) (“Terry stop”); see also
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 8.Ct. 678, 145 L.Ed.2d
570 (2000) (“Terry stop in a high crime area”).

The three testifying officers similarly characterized the
Owen Brown Village Center as a high crime area. Officer
Schlossnagle testified that the Owen Brown, Long Reach, and
Oakland Mills Village Centers “tend to [have] an increase in
calls for service and just general issues. There tends to be
more calls for service in that—in those congested areas.”
When asked about what types of crimes he had investigated in
the Owen Brown Village Center, the officer responded, “[Wle
were tasked to Owen Brown because of the increased calls for
service and on-going trends in the area.” The Cireuit Court
judge interjected:

[COURT]: Is “increased calls for service” a nice way of

saying “high crime ]?”

[OFFICER SCHLOSSNAGLE]: Yes, Your Honor.

[COURT]: Thank you. I mean, just so I know what we’re

talking about.

Officer Schlossnagle explained that at the time of the inci-
dent, there was “an ongoing robbery series” and that “busi-
ness owners ... were complaining of quality of life issues,
[such as controlled dangerous substance] violations, loitering,

drinking, where the business centers requested an increased
presence.” Officer Schlossnagle also explained that “there was
a report of a subject displaying a handgun the day before in
the footpaths and fields that abut up to the village center.” *
He testified that “there is a network of footpaths that leads up
to the back side of [the village center].” A second officer,
Corporal James Zammillo, testified that the Owen Brown
Village Center was a “high crime area” as compared to other
parts of Columbia. Corporal Zammillo explained that his as-
signment as a member of the bike team patrol included
“passively patrolling the ninety-plus miles of pathway that
traverses through Columbia.” Corporal Zammillo confirmed
Officer Schlossnagle’s testimony that there was “an ongoing
robbery series” in the area.

A third officer, Officer Ronald Baker, the only witness
called by the defendant, testified that the patrol officers had
been “traveling the pathways, and we came across the Owen
Brown Village Center, but we stopped at the entrance to the
Owen Brown Village Center via [the] pathway.” He explained
that, at the time of observing the group of individuals, he
recognized one individual whom he knew had been banned
from the Owen Brown Village Center:

[STATE]: Is Mr. Davis banned from the—I believe it’s the

Owen Brown Village Center?

[OFFICER BAKER]: Yes, he is.

[STATE]: And you indicated—did you indicate you were

waiting for him, to see if he would enter where he was

banned from?

[OFFICER BAKER]: Yes.

1. Collectively, the testimony from two officers about the location of the
handgun incident can, at best, be described as ambiguous. On cross
examination, one officer described the incident as having been reported
“that there was a handgun seen in the area the day before[.]” On
redirect, that officer testified that the handgun was displayed “near a
school and also near a community center and a library[.]” Another
officer testified that “there was an individual reportedly armed with a
handgun and pointing it in the area [] passing the parking lot of the
Howard County Library off Cradlerock.”

[STATE]: And where specifically was that?

[OFFICER BAKER]: That particular area we were at, to

the best of my knowledge, that parking lot isn’t part of the

village center. So, we was [sic] watching him and the group

to see if they were going to enter the banned part of the

village center.
Officer Baker also testified that when the officers were about
five feet away, the group noticed the officers. Officer Baker
testified that his uniform consisted of a badge and the word
“Police” on the front of the jacket in neon lettering. Two other
officers testified with a similar description of their uniform.
Later, in Officer Baker’s testimony, he stated that it appeared
that Mr. Sizer ran as soon as Mr. Sizer observed the officers:
STATE]: How far away were you from this group of
suspects—subjects when you believed they noticed you?
OFFICER BAKER]: Well, as we approached, probably
about five feet when they turned around to see us.
STATE]: And as soon as they noticed you, did Mr.—did
one of the suspects run?
OFFICER BAKER]: Yes.
STATE]: And did you write in your report that as soon as
the suspect observed officers ... Is that correct?
OFFICER BAKER]; Yes.

ee

(STATE]: You indicated in your report that the subject ran
as soon as he recognized you were there.
OFFICER BAKER]: It appeared that way; yes.

The officers testified that they were concerned with the
group’s general disorderliness and possible open container
violations. None of the officers testified that they believed the
group was connected to the “ongoing robbery series,” or that
they suspected any member of the group was the individual
who had displayed a gun on the previous night.

After the three officers testified, the hearing judge first
analyzed whether Mr, Sizer’s flight was legally sufficient to
conduct a Terry stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,

20 L.Hd.2d 889 (1968). The hearing judge found all three
testifying officers “to be truthful and credible” and that they
had “testified today without embellishment.” She found that
“somebody [in] the group they cannot be sure whether it was
Mr. Sizer or not—threw a bottle. The police were concerned,
understandably, and approached the group.” The hearing
judge found that “there had been a complaint made of some-
one brandishing or displaying a handgun in the parking lot of
the Owen Brown Cradlerock Library, and there was, under-
standably, concern, In general, the area is considered a high
or higher-crime area in Columbia.” Nevertheless, the hearing
judge suppressed the evidence, and, in doing so, indicated that
she questioned whether “all the rules [were] followed[.]” The
hearing judge explained, “[Tyhe fact that Mr. Sizer ran, in and
of itself, based on the particular scenario that’s being given
here today, is not sufficient.” Further, the hearing judge
concluded that the pre-existing arrest warrant did not attenu-
ate the taint of the unconstitutional stop.

Procedural History

The State appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to suppress
the evidence. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the
suppression of the weapon and the pills, and held that given
the totality of the circumstances, the stop was reasonably
justified. Sizer, 2830 Md.App. at 658, 149 A3d at 717. The
Court of Special Appeals alternatively held that had the stop
not been constitutional, the evidence would not have been
suppressed due to Mr. Sizer’s pre-existing arrest warrant,
although the three-judge panel disagreed as to the reason for
non-suppression of the evidence. Id. at 669, 149 A3d at 728.

Mr. Sizer petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we
granted. Sizer v. State, 452 Md. 8, 155 A.38d 890 (2017). In the
interest of clarity, we have condensed Mr. Sizer’s questions for
certiorari into two questions: Did the arresting officers have
reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer, and if the arresting
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain
Mr. Sizer, was the suppression of the evidence justified? ?

2. Mr. Sizer’s petition for certiorari raised the following questions:

I.

Standard of Review

WE When reviewing a hearing judge’s ruling on a motion
to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, we con-
sider only the facts generated by the record of the suppression
hearing. Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129,
1185 (2007). We view the evidence and all reasonable infer-
ences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
prevailing on the motion, in this case, Mr. Sizer. Id. We review
the hearing judge’s findings for clear error. Id.

Finally, we review the hearing judge’s legal conclusions de
novo, making our own independent constitutional evaluation as
to whether the officer’s encounter with the defendant was
lawful. Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 785 A.2d 491, 497

(1) Where the police illegally stop a person, discover a valid, pre-
existing arrest warrant, and seize evidence from the person during a
search incident to arrest, must the admissibility of that evidence be
determined based on an application of the “attenuation factors,” as
held in Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 195 L,Ed.2d 400
(2016), Cox v. State, 397 Md. 200, 916 A.2d 311 (2007), and Myers v.
State, 395 Md. 261, 909 A.2d 1048 (2006), or may a court, as the
Court of Special Appeals did in this case, reject the attenuation
doctrine and find that such evidence will always be admissible
because the arrest warrant constitutes an “independent source”?

(2) Did the hearing judge correctly rule that the discovery of a valid,
pre-existing arrest warrant did not attenuate the connection between
the illegal “‘takedown’”’ of Petitioner and the evidence seized from him
shortly thereafter?

(3) Where a person is under no obligation to interact with the police,
does flight to avoid that interaction, by itself, justify a Terry stop; and
if so, does it still justify the stop where there is evidence that flight
was provoked by the threatening or startling actions of police offi-
cers?

(4) Did the hearing judge correctly rule that the police violated Petition-
er’s Fourth Amendment rights where, inter alia, six officers patrolling
the footpaths of Columbia on unmarked bicycles after dark, who
testified that, especially at night, people do not immediately recognize
them as police, rode towards a loud group of people to investigate the
improper disposal of a glass bottle, the group first noticed the officers
when they were five feet away and was visibly ‘‘startled,” and the
only observation officers made regarding Petitioner before tackling
him was that he immediately ran upon noticing the six bicyclists
riding towards him?

(1999), In other words, our plenary review of the record for
error requires application of the facts under a totality of the
circumstances analysis.

In.

Parties’ Contentions

Mr. Sizer’s arguments generally focus on the officers’ con-
sideration of Mr. Sizer’s flight in what the officers character-
ized as a high crime area. He asserts that the officers did not
have a “particularized and objective basis” to support reason-
able suspicion for the stop. Mr. Sizer correctly acknowledges
that the United States Supreme Court has not imposed a
bright-line rule that flight in a high crime area is always
sufficient to generate reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Mr. Sizer postulates, however, that if this Court affirms the
suppression court’s decision, it will effectuate a bright-line rule
that neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has endorsed.
Mr, Sizer relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wardlow
for his contention that flight is merely a display of a citizen’s
constitutional “right to ignore the police and go about his
business.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S.Ct.
678, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570, 577 (2000). Finally, Mr. Sizer urges
us to hold that flight should be given minimal weight in a
totality of the circumstances analysis.

The State contends that Mr. Sizer’s flight was merely one of
many factors that the officers considered before attempting to
conduct an investigatory stop. The State describes these fac-
tors as Mr. Sizer’s flight, his presence in a high crime area,
the group’s general disorderliness, the suspected open contain-
er violation, and the improper disposal of a glass bottle. The
State implicitly concedes that the officers did not have a
particularized suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer at the moment they
approached the group. Instead, the State argues that at the
moment the officers approached the group, they had observed
enough suspicious activity to warrant further investigation
based on the suspected littering and the passing around of an
apparent open alcoholic container.

Fourth Amendment Terry Stop

HMM The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” Generally, when the government has
violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, courts are
required to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an
unconstitutional search or seizure. Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 340-41, 60 S.Ct, 266, 267, 84 L.Ed. 807, 311
(1989); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
885, 391-92, 40 S.Ct. 182, 182-83, 64 L.Ed. 319, 321 (1920);
Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 383, 398, 34 S.Ct. 841, 346, 58
L.Ed. 652, 657 (1914). The exclusionary rule is “ordinarily ...
the appropriate remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.” Myers v. State, 895 Md. 261, 278, 909 A.2d 1048 (2006).
Where there is a valid, pre-existing and untainted arrest
warrant, however, an exception to the exclusionary rule ap-
plies and the evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is admissible under the attenuation doctrine.
Strieff, — U.S. —, 186 S.Ct. at 2063, 195 L.Ed.2d at 410.

HE Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as it pertains to
stops and seizures, operates along an escalating plane that
begins with “unparticularized suspicion[s] or hunch[es]” and
erescendos at probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct.
at 1888, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reasonable suspicion exists somewhere between unparticular-
ized suspicions and probable cause. See Alabama v. White, 496
US. 825, 830, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309
(1990). “And in determining whether the officer acted reason-
ably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to
his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to
the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at
27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909.

HE Reasonable suspicion “has been defined as nothing
more than ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Stokes v.
State, 362 Md. 407, 415, 765 A.2d 612, 616 (2001) (citing United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66

L,Ed.2d 621, 628-29 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 356, 958 A.2d 356,
365 (2008). Moreover, reasonable suspicion is a “common
sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and prac-
tical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent
people act.” Bost, 406 Md. at 356, 958 A.2d at 865, (quoting
Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 415, 765 A.2d 612, 616 (2001)),
The reasonable suspicion standard “ ‘does not allow [a] law
enforcement official to simply assert that innocent conduct was
suspicious to him or her.’” Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 508,
970 A.2d 894, 904 (2009) (citing Bost v. State, 406 Md. 841, 857,
958 A.2d 356, 365 (2008)). “Rather, the officer must explain
how the observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of
the other circumstances known to the officer, was indicative of
eriminal activity.” Id.; see Derricott v. State, 827 Md, 582, 591,
611 A.2d 592, 597 (1992).

When explaining the degrees of suspicion necessary for
reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court has explained that it
is a lesser degree of suspicion than probable cause. Alabama
v, White, 496 U.S. 825, 880, 110 S.Ct, 2412, 2416, 110 L.Bd.2d
801, 309 (1990). Specifically:

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than

probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspi-

cion can be established with information that is different in
quantity or content than that required to establish probable
cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can
arise from information that is less reliable than that re-
quired to show probable cause.

Id. (internal citations omitted),

HE There is no universal starting point when it comes to
our analysis of a Fourth Amendment violation, We decide
where along the plane to begin our analysis depending on the
circumstances before us. Here, our analysis begins at reason-
able suspicion. We recognize that it is “importan[t] ... not [to]
focus[] on any set list of facts that must be present for
reasonable suspicion to exist, but rather to examine the totali-
ty of the circumstances to determine whether an officer could

reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot.” State v.
Holt, 206 Md.App. 589, 558, 51 A.8d 1, 12 (2012), aff'd, 485 Md.
448, 78 A.3d 415 (2018).
Cartnail explains the two analytical techniques used in
assessing the totality of the circumstances:
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield
a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of
which must be present before a stop is permissible. First,
the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances.
The analysis proceeds with various objective observations,
information from police reports, if such are available, and
consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of
certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained
officer draws inferences and makes deductions—inferences
and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities.
ee
The second element contained in the idea that an assess-
ment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspi-
cion is the concept that the process just described must
raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped
is engaged in wrongdoing. Chief Justice Warren, speaking
for the Court in Terry v. Ohio ... said that, “[t]his demand
for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.”
Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 288, 753 A2d 519, 527-28
(2000) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101
S.Ct. 690, 698, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981)) (some internal
quotations omitted).

The Totality of the Circwmstances Analysis
Both parties agree that our totality of the circumstances
analysis must focus on reasonable suspicion, but they dispute
whether the factors rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.
Petitioner contends that the totality of the circumstances do

not rise to reasonable suspicion, even if flight is considered in
the Court’s analysis. To the contrary, Respondent argues that
even if flight is not considered the officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer. Petitioner draws our focus to the
unprovoked flight factor to refute the officers’ reasonable
suspicion, whereas Respondent focuses our attention on the
high crime area factor as a means of justifying the officers’
reasonable suspicion surrounding the stop. Because the totali-
ty of the circumstances analysis “does not deal with hard
certainties,” we determine that an individual’s unprovoked
flight or presence in a high crime area, or both, are individual
factors that may contribute to the reasonable suspicion calcu-
lus. Id.

In Wardlow, which both parties rely on to advance their
opposing views, the United States Supreme Court discussed
the weight to be given unprovoked flight in a high crime area
as one factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis.
Mlinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct, 678, 145 L.Hd.2d
570 (2000). In Wardlow, a team of eight officers, in a four car
caravan, travelled through a Chicago neighborhood known for
“heavy narcotics trafficking.” Id. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676, 145
L.Ed.2d at 576. The defendant, Wardlow, held an opaque bag
in his hand, and upon noticing the last car in the police
caravan, fled on foot from the outside area where he stood. Jd.
at 122, 120 S.Ct. at 675, 145 L.Ed.2d at 575. Two officers
chased him on foot, and when they finally caught him, they
conducted a pat-down and search for weapons. Jd. The opaque
bag he held contained a .38 caliber handgun. Id. The suppres-
sion hearing judge denied Wardlow’s motion to suppress the
handgun, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, and the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate appellate court’s
conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed. Id.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of
Illinois’ highest court as to suppression of the evidence. Ward-
low, 528 U.S, at 126, 120 S.Ct. at 677, 145 L.Ed.2d at 577. The
Supreme Court held that flight in a high crime area was
relevant in a totality of the circumstances analysis. It opined
that:

An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reason-
able, particularized suspicion that the person is committing
a crime. But officers are not required to ignore the relevant
characteristics of a location in determining whether the
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact
that the stop occurred in a “high crime area” among the
relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.
Id. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676, 145 L.Ed.2d at 576 (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added). Specifically, the Supreme
Court explained:
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s
presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that
aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight
upon noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized
that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in deter-
mining reasonable suspicion, Headlong flight—wherever it
occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not neces-
sarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive
of such.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
HH In Bost v. State, we had occasion to consider whether
a defendant’s flight in a high crime area supplied officers with
the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop him, 406 Md. 3841,
848, 958 A.2d 856, 359 (2008). Officers observed Mr. Bost and
a group of people drinking alcohol and loitering on a sidewalk
in a drug-trafficking area, located in Washington, D.C., three
blocks from the Maryland border, Id. at 846, 958 A.2d at 360.
As the officers approached Mr. Bost, he began briskly walking
away and took flight “while clutching his right waistband
....” Id. An officer pursued him on foot, under the suspicion
that he was concealing a weapon and based on the officer’s
experience that Mr. Bost’s clutching of his waistband was
consistent with someone trying to conceal a weapon. Id.
Officers tackled him to the ground and then found a gun tied
around his neck. Id, Officers arrested him, and upon a search

incident to the arrest, discovered $140 in cash and two, white,
rock-like substances, later determined to be crack cocaine, on
his person, Jd. Mr. Bost moved to suppress the seized cocaine
and weapon on the basis that the evidence was seized in
violation of the Maryland Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit.’ Jd,
at 847, 958 A.2d at 858,

Upon review, we held that officers had reasonable suspicion
to stop Mr. Bost because he was seen in a high crime, drug-
trafficking area, he took off in unprovoked flight, and he was
clutching his side, in what appeared to be an attempt to
conceal a weapon, Jd. at 359-60, 958 A.2d at 860. In the case,
we relied on Wardlow for the generalized proposition that that
case “had made clear that unprovoked flight is enough to
support reasonable suspicion that a crime has been commit-
ted.” Id, at 348, 958 A.2d at 360 (emphasis added). Notwith-
standing our focus on unprovoked flight, in Bost we applied a
totality of the circumstances analysis, as the Wardlaw Court
had done, and held that Mr. Bost’s unprovoked flight was
properly considered in the totality of the circumstances analy-
sis. Id, at 859, 958 A.2d at 360.

In Crosby, we emphasized the need for hearing courts to
consider the totality of the circumstances when wholly inno-
cent actions take place in a high crime area, Crosby v. State,
408 Md. 490, 508, 970 A.2d 894, 904 (2009), In that case, an
arresting officer, at the suppression hearing, testified that he
made the decision to approach a driver in a parked car
because: the driver was in a high crime area, he pulled in and
out of “parking pads,” he was in an area where a recent
homicide had occurred, he switched his left turn signal to a
right turn signal, and he drove in a “big loop.” Id. at 500, 970

3. The Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit [Maryland Code, Criminal Proce-
dure § 2-305 (2001, 2006 Cum, Supp.)] permits “[a] member of a
state, county, or municipal law enforcement unit of another state who
enters [Maryland] in fresh pursuit and continues within [Maryland] in
fresh pursuit of a person to arrest the person on the ground that the
person is believed to have committed a felony in the other state has the
same authority to arrest ... the person.” Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341,
345, 958 A.2d 356, 358 n.1 (2008).

A.2d at 899. We reversed the Circuit Court’s denial of Mr.
Crosby’s motion to suppress the evidence and held that the
factors the arresting officer relied on “(did] not constitute
ingredients that [were] sufficiently potent enough in [that]
ease to enrich the porridge to the constitutionally required
consistency of reasonable suspicion,” because “the combination
of [innocent] factors, viewed in their totality, [were] no more
indicative of criminal activity than any one factor assessed
individually.” Id. at 511-518, 970 A.2d at 906-07.

The Hearing Judge’s Analysis of the
Totality of the Circumstances

HH In the instant case, although we determine that the
police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Sizer, we
conclude that the suppression hearing judge erred in her
application of the totality of the circumstances analysis be-
cause she based her decision on ambiguous testimony and
identified Mr. Sizer’s flight as the dispositive factor in the
analysis. The suppression hearing judge did not properly
consider other pertinent factors in her application of the
totality of the circumstances analysis.

There was no evidence at the suppression hearing that
established that the parking lot was located in the Owen
Brown Village Center or established how near it was to the
Owen Brown Village Center or the area where the handgun
violation had occurred. In fact, Officer Baker testified that “to
the best of [his] knowledge, that parking lot isn’t part of the
[V]illage [Clenter.” He also testified that the Patrol Unit was
“waiting to see if [one of the members of Mr. Sizer’s group]
would enter where he was banned from.” Given that the
officer was waiting to see whether a certain individual would
enter the banned Village Center area, this individual, along
with the remaining group members, including Mr. Sizer, was
not in the Owen Brown Village Center.

The suppression hearing judge did not receive any testimo-
ny regarding whether the group was connected in any way to
the Owen Brown Village Center. None of the officers testified
that the group, or any member of the group, was seen leaving

or approaching the Village Center at any time during the
officers’ patrol of the pathways. The officers did not observe
anyone joining or leaving the group during their time of
observation. Nor did they testify that they observed the group
demonstrating behavior consistent with the nature of the
crimes that led them to conclude that the Village Center was a
high crime area. Furthermore, none of the officers testified
that they suspected any member of Mr. Sizer’s group to be
connected to the weapon violation that had been reported the
previous day. As was true for the location of the Village
Center, the two officers who testified about the handgun
violation did not provide any proximal description of the area
where the violation had occurred and its relation to the
parking lot where Mr. Sizer was observed.

HI Because we determine that the Circuit Court erred in
its application of the totality of the circumstances analysis, we
need not decide whether the Cireuit Court’s erred in finding
that the parking lot was a “high or higher crime area.” In her
analysis, the suppression hearing judge did not consider other
pertinent factors in their totality, such as the officers’ suspi-
cion of an open container violation or their attempt to investi-
gate the littering. Instead she found that, “the fact that Mr.
Sizer ran, in and of itself, based on the particular scenario ...
[was] not sufficient” to justify the stop. The hearing judge had
sufficient facts before her to apply the reasonable suspicion
test from Terry, but she overlooked the import of two possible
crimes that had occurred in the officers’ presence along with
Mr. Sizer’s unprovoked flight as officers approached to investi-
gate, In other words, her analysis abandoned consideration of
the totality of the circumstances. “Under the totality of cir-
cumstances, no one factor is dispositive.” In re David S., 367
Mad. 528, 585, 789 A.2d 607, 614 (2002). Therefore, the hearing
judge erred when she failed to consider the totality of the
cireumstances.*

4, According to the Concurring/Dissenting Opinion, the Majority Opin-
ion mischaracterizes the hearing judge's conclusions of Jaw. Concur-
rence/Dissent Op, at 383-84, 174 A.3d at 345-46, The Concurrence/Dis-

Our Analysis of the Totality of the Circwmstances

HI Upon our independent review of the factors that were
before the hearing judge, we hold that under the totality of
the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to
stop Mr. Sizer to investigate a possible open container viola-
tion as well as the improper disposal of a glass container,
whether he was in a high crime area or not. Even Mr. Sizer
concedes that when the officers approached him they were
“Gnvestigating the improper disposal of a bottle.” Pursuant to
Maryland Code, Criminal Law § 10-110 (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.,
2015 Supp. Vol.), the improper disposal of waste is a criminal
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or fines.’ Pursuant
to the Howard County Code, Title 8, Subtitle 7, § 8.700 (2016),
consuming or possessing alcoholic beverages on posted com-
mercial property or posted public parking lots is a criminal
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or fines. Therefore,
when officers observed that a bottle was passed among the
group and then was discarded or thrown to the ground, they
had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was
afoot. Mr. Sizer’s flight from the group as the officers ap-
proached to investigate probable crimes committed in their
presence shifted their focus to Mr. Sizer, which could have
reasonably heightened their suspicion that he was the individ-
ual responsible for throwing the bottle. When Mr. Sizer ran,
his flight obviously drew the officers’ attention and intensified
the officers’ investigation by shifting their focus from the
group to him as an individual. In fact, according to Officer
Baker, who testified at the suppression hearing, it appeared
that Mr. Sizer ran as soon as he realized that the people
approaching were police. Thus, in conducting their investiga-

sent concludes that the hearing judge considered the totality of the
circumstances in her “scenario” but fails to explain what law the
hearing judge applied to the facts in order to conclude that Mr. Sizer's
flight and the “scenario” was not sufficient. Without more, neither we,
nor the Concurrence/Dissent can say precisely what the hearing judge
meant when she concluded that the “‘scenario” was insufficient.

5. Mr. Sizer was not charged with improper disposal of waste or with an
open container violation,

tion the officers were not required to “simply shrug [their]
shoulders and allow ... [an apparent] criminal [misdemean-
ant] to escape.” Holt v. State, 485 Md. 448, 459, 78 A.8d 415,
424 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 148, 145, 92 S.Ct.
1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 616 (1972)).

HM Mr. Sizer asserts that “officers can ‘investigate’ what-
ever they want, for any reason they want, but they cannot
stop a person without reasonable suspicion that criminal activi-
ty is afoot,” and that here the officers’ testimony was insuffi-
cient to establish reasonable suspicion that a crime was being
committed. We disagree that the investigating officers’ testi-
mony in this case was insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion of suspected criminal activity because Mr. Sizer
overlooks the significance of the officers’ decision to investi-
gate based on the improper disposal of the bottle, The investi-
gatory nature of a stop does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment if the stop is based on a reasonable suspicion. See Terry,
392 US. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Hd.2d at 909 (“And in
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such
circumstances, due weight must be given ... to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the
facts in light of his experience.”),

This Court has previously examined how the Supreme
Court has reconciled the tension between an individual’s right
to freedom from unlawful detainment and the extent to which
an officer may conduct an investigatory stop and we recog-
nized that the Supreme Court held that officers may “stop and
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the offi-
cers have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable
facts, that ‘criminal activity’ may be afoot.” In re Dawid S., 867
M4. at 582, 789 A.2d at 612 (citing Terry v, Ohio, 892 U.S. 1,
30, 88 S.Ct, 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1969); see United
States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 2001) (recognizing that
“[a]n individual’s flight from police combined with other obser-
vations by a police officer may support reasonable suspicion
sufficient for detention under Terry” and also acknowledging
that “[iIn Wardlow itself, the only relevant fact other than

flight known to the detaining officer was the suspect’s pres-
ence in an area known for crime,” and noting that “prior
behavior ... suggest[s] guilt more strongly than would simple
presence in such an area”) (internal citations omitted).

Hsin summation, the officers had reasonable suspicion
to investigate the group prior to Mr, Sizer’s flight. The officers
suspected that members of the group were consuming alcohol;
then the officers observed the improper disposal of a bottle.
Because a bottle was thrown to the ground, it logically follows
that at least one member of Mr. Sizer’s group was responsible
for the improper disposal of the bottle. Mr. Sizer’s flight,
however, drew the officers’ attention away from the group and
towards him individually. Based on these circumstances, we
conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr.
Sizer. After being informed that he was armed with a weapon,
the officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk him.' Therefore,
we affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court on
the basis that upon witnessing the likelihood that criminal
activity was afoot, the officers had reasonable suspicion to
approach the group and investigate an apparent open-contain-
er violation and littering and to stop Mr. Sizer.

Application of the Attenuation Doctrine

HM oOur primary holding is that the apprehension of Mr.
Sizer after he ran from the group that was assembled in the

6. The Concurring/Dissenting Opinion describes the stop of Mr. Sizer as
a “hard take-down” and criticizes the officer's conduct as unreason-
able. Con/Diss. Op. at 385-86, 174 A.3d at 347-48. To support its
contention that the take-down was unreasonable, the Concurring/Dis-
senting Opinion cites to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct.
1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In that case, however, the Supreme
Court points out that “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight” is among the factors considered
under the objective reasonableness standard. Id, at 396, 109 S.Ct. at
1872, 104 L,Ed.2d at 445 (emphasis added). Moreover, “[t]he calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circum-
stances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-
97, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 455-56.

parking lot constituted a valid Terry stop. We hold, in the
alternative, that assuming the stop of Mr. Sizer was unlawful,
the police officer’s discovery of a valid pre-existing arrest
warrant attenuated the connection between any unlawful in-
vestigatory stop and evidence seized from Mr. Sizer during
the search incident to his arrest. Accordingly, there would be
no justification for applying the exclusionary rule to the facts
of this case,

The State and Mr. Sizer concur that Utah v. Strieff would
contro] the outcome of this case if the stop were deemed
unlawful. In its brief, the State pressed the argument that the
independent source doctrine or the attenuation doctrine would
apply; however, at oral argument, counsel for the State
conceded that the attenuation doctrine was on point based on
the facts. Mr. Sizer agrees that the outstanding arrest warrant
is an intervening circumstance pursuant to Strieff; however,
he bifurcates the evidence recovered from his person to sug-
gest that the pre-existing arrest warrant operates as an
intervening circumstance only with respect to the pills, not the
revolver. Mr. Sizer argues that the evidence of the revolver
“came to light before the officers discovered a valid warrant
for Petitioner's arrest.”

HM Recently, in Strieff, the United States Supreme Court
applied the attenuation doctrine when it evaluated whether a
pre-existing arrest warrant sufficiently attenuated “the causal
link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery
of evidence[.]” — U.S. ——, 186 S.Ct. at 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d at
408. We follow the precedent of that Court, which directs us to
evaluate the three factors articulated in Brown:

First, we look to the “temporal proximity” between the
unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to
determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed
the unconstitutional search. Second, we consider “the pres-
ence of intervening circumstances.” Third, and “particular-
ly” significant, we examine “the purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct.”

Strieff, — U.S. ——, 186 S.Ct. at 2062, 195 L.Ed.2d at 408
(citing to Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-04, 95 S.Ct.
2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427 (1975) (internal citations
omitted). In Strieff, the Supreme Court reasoned that that an
outstanding arrest warrant was “a critical intervening circum-
stance that is wholly independent of the illegal stop” and
therefore the illegal stop was “sufficiently attenuated by the
pre-existing arrest warrant.” —- U.S. ——, 136 S.Ct. at 2063,
195 L.Ed.2d at 410 (internal citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see also Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261,
290, 909 A.2d 1048, 1065 (2006); Cow v. State, 897 Md. 200,
209-10, 916 A.2d 311, 316-17 (2007).

HEM The application of the attenuation doctrine is a
fact-specific analysis that focuses on when and the manner in
which the evidence seized was obtained in relation to the
unlawful conduct. Where there is an outstanding arrest war-
rant, the attenuation doctrine applies because the discovery of
the warrant breaks the causal chain from any possible taint to
the evidence collected. Here, even assuming that the stop of
My. Sizer was unlawful, the discovery of a valid pre-existing
arrest warrant as well as absence of flagrant police miscon-
duct, notwithstanding the close temporal proximity between
the illegal seizure and the discovery of the pistol, would result
in the non-suppression of the evidence. Mr. Sizer focuses on
the closeness of the timing of the discovery of the revolver in
relation to the discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant. He
argues that because his admission about the revolver came
before the discovery of the outstanding warrant, the warrant
could not attenuate the taint of the alleged unlawful stop. We
disagree. We have previously held that “the question of timing
is not dispositive on the issue of taint, especially because there
was an outstanding arrest warrant between the initial stop
and the subsequent search incident to arrest, even though
some of the evidence was discovered shortly after the illegal
stop.” Myers, 895 Md. 261, 292, 909 A.2d at 1066 (emphasis
added). The “temporal proximity” between Mr. Sizer’s alleged
unlawful stop and the discovery of the revolver favors sup-
pression of the evidence; however, this factor is outweighed

by the intervening circumstance and the absence of flagrant
police misconduct. See eg. Cow v. State, 397 Md. 200, 218, 916
A.2d 811, 822 (2007) (holding that a two minute time lapse
weighed in the defendant’s favor but recognizing that, “[t]he
temporal proximity factor must depend ... on other factors to
which it relates, because a ‘lengthy detention can be used to
exploit an illegal arrest at least as easily as a brief deten-
tion.” (quoting Ferguson v. State, 301 Md, 542, 550, 488 A.2d
1255, 1259 (1984)). The discovery of the pre-existing warrant
sufficiently broke the causal chain between any Fourth
Amendment violation alleged by Mr. Sizer and the recovery of
the evidence against Mr. Sizer. Therefore, had the stop of Mr.
Sizer been unlawful, the evidence recovered would still be
admissible under the attenuation doctrine.

Conclusion

The officers of the Patrol Unit had reasonable suspicion to
investigate what appeared to be criminal acts occurring in
their presence and, thus, had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr.
Sizer to investigate whether he had improperly disposed of a
bottle. The stop was not unconstitutional. During the course of
the stop, Mr. Sizer alerted the officers to the presence of a
gun, which justified the officers’ frisk of his person. The gun
and the pills should not have been suppressed because they
were recovered after a lawful detention. Alternatively, the gun
and the pills would be admissible into evidence as a result of
the search incident to the lawful arrest of Mr. Sizer, pursuant
to the discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant, We affirm
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, albeit for
different reasons. Accordingly, the motion to suppress should
have been denied.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.

Adkins and Hotten, JJ., concur and dissent.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J., which
Hotten, J., joins.

At a suppression hearing, the State has the burden to
“articulat[e] a sufficient factual basis for the stop, and appel-
late courts cannot fill in blanks in the evidentiary record.” In
ve Jeremy P., 197 Md.App. 1, 22, 11 A.8d 880 (2011). Most
respectfully, I write separately because the State did not meet
its burden of showing that the totality of the circumstances
created reasonable suspicion justifying the officers’ decision to
chase Mr. Sizer and use a hard take-down. We should not
resolve this case by repairing the deficiencies in the State’s
arguments and evidence to provide a sufficient factual basis
for reasonable suspicion.

Despite my conclusion that this was an unreasonable sei-
zure, the discovery of a valid arrest warrant was a sufficiently
attenuating circumstance that the evidence located is admissi-
ble. For that reason, I dissent from the Majority’s holding that
the stop was reasonable, but concur in the alternative holding
that the evidence should have been admitted through attenua-
tion.

REASONABLENESS OF THE CHASE
AND HARD TAKE-DOWN

When evidence is obtained pursuant to a warrantless search
or seizure, the State carries the burden in a suppression
hearing to justify the lawfulness of the officers’ conduct and
demonstrate that the evidence is admissible. See Grant v.
State, 449 Md. 1, 80, 141 A.8d 188 (2015) (“[Wlithout satisfying
its burden of proof, the State did not establish that the
evidence was admissible ....”); see also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 448, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Hd.2d
564 (1971). “[T]he officer must explain how the observed
conduct, when viewed in the context of all the other circum-
stances known to the officer, was indicative of criminal activi-
ty.” Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 508, 970 A.2d 894 (2009), A
reviewing court accepts the suppression court’s factual find-
ings unless they are clearly erroneous. Raynor v. State, 440
Md. 71, 81, 99 A.8d 758 (2014). Because Mr. Sizer’s Motion to

Suppress was granted, inferences in this case should be drawn
in the light most favorable to him. Id.

Here, the Majority concludes that the hearing “judge erred
in her application of the totality of the circumstances analysis
because she based her decision on ambiguous testimony and
identified Mr. Sizer’s flight as the dispositive factor in the
analysis.” Maj. Op. at 870, 174 A.3d at 887. In the Majority’s
view, the hearing judge “did not consider other pertinent
factors in their totality, such as the officers’ suspicion of an
open container violation or their attempt to investigate the
littering.” Id. at 871, 174 A3d at 338. Instead, the Majority
rules that she “abandoned consideration of the totality of the
circumstances” by concluding that “ ‘the fact that Mr. Sizer
ran, in and of itself, based on the particular scenario ... [was]
not sufficient,” to find that the officers had reasonable suspi-
cion that Mr. Sizer was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 371,
174 A.3d at 838 (Emphasis in original).

The Majority uses this conclusion to evade the deficiencies
in the State’s claims that the officers had reasonable suspicion
to detain Mr. Sizer. The State relied heavily on Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S, 119, 120 S.Ct. 678, 145 L.Hd.2d 570 (2000),
as well as our own similar precedent, for the proposition that
unprovoked flight in a “high crime area” provides sufficient
reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory detention in
this case. The Majority rightfully appears skeptical of the
evidence the State supplied that suggests that this incident
took place in a “high crime” area, but avoids addressing the
issue by deciding that the Circuit Court for Howard County
erred in applying the totality of the circumstances analysis.
The Majority concludes that upon a review of the factors
before the hearing judge, the officers had reasonable suspicion
to detain Mr. Sizer for a possible open container violation and
improper disposal of a bottle regardless of whether or not he
was in a high crime area.

1, The term “high crime area” has never been defined in legal jurispru-
dence. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High
Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence
for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L.
Rev, 1587, 1590-91 (2008).

Reasonable suspicion requires a determination that, under
the totality of the circumstances, officers had a “particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (emphasis
added); see also Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 507, 924
A.2d 1129 (2007). In evaluating the constitutionality of an
investigatory detention, we consider “whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justi-
fied the interference in the first place.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Hd.2d 889 (1968). The issue is,
whether under the totality of the circumstances, officers had a
reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Sizer was engaged in
criminal activity that justified their decision to seize him, and
whether that seizure was “reasonably related in scope” to the
circumstances justifying that suspicion. Jd.

The tenor of the State’s arguments suggest that reviewing
courts should simply accept the “high crime” designation when
officers provide general information about some criminal activ-
ity in an area (whatever area that may be), and opine that the
area is “high” or “higher” crime. Whether an activity occurs in
a high crime area can inform a police officer’s analysis about
the activity that is taking place. Batley v. State, 412 Md. 349,
888-84, 987 A.2d 72 (2010). A suspect need not be connected to
previous crimes in the area, Holt v. State, 485 Md. 448, 466, 78
A.3d 415 (2018), but the nature of the area is relevant to
reasonable suspicion when the suspect's activities appear to be
the kind of criminal activity that is likely to be occurring
there. A generalized description of an area as “high crime,”
without a greater connection to the observed activities, does
not support reasonable suspicion. See Bailey, 412 Md. at 384,
987 A.2d 72. Other Maryland cases addressing Terry stops in
high crime areas demonstrate that the nexus between the
nature of the area and the observed activities is significant in
determining whether officers had reasonable suspicion. See
Chase v. State, 449 Md. 288, 289, 144 A.3d 630 (2016) (detain-

ing individuals for suspicion of drug trafficking based on
behavior in area known for drug trafficking); Cow v. State, 161
Md.App. 654, 671-74, 871 A.2d 647 (2005) (individual suspected
of drug dealing had been warned away from intersection
known for heroin trafficking earlier, when officers saw him
again, he fled, committing a traffic infraction); Wise v. State,
182 Md.App. 127, 184, 751 A.2d 24 (2000) (suspeet’s actions in
neighborhood known for drug trafficking coupled with flight
after seeing officers justified investigatory detention).

Federal precedent provides further support. In Wardlow,
the suspect was in an area of Chicago “known for heavy
narcotics trafficking” and the officers expected to encounter
individuals who were involved in those activities. 528 U.S. at
124, 120 S.Ct. 673. Wardlow’s behavior and subsequent flight
triggered the officer’s suspicion that he was engaged in drug
trafficking. In United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 58-54 (1st
Cir. 2007), relying on Wardlow and other circuits’ precedent,
the First Circuit identified three specific factors relevant to
the “high crime” designation, and the designation’s relation-
ship to reasonable suspicion. First, “the nexus between the
type of crime most prevalent or common in the area and the
type of crime suspected in the instant case”; second, the
“limited geographic boundaries of the area”; and third, “tem-
poral proximity between evidence of heightened criminal activ-
ity and the date of the stop or search at issue ....” Id. See
also United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir.
2006); United States v. Bailey, 417 F.8d 878, 877 (8th Cir.
2005); United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir.
2001); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.8d 1122,
1188-39 (9th Cir. 2000) (en bane).

Applying these factors, I conclude that the State failed to
show that the Owen Brown Village Center is a high crime
area—a conclusion the Majority seems poised to reach, but
then abandons.” Increased calls for service* and concerned
business owners do not permit a conclusion that an area is

2. The Majority points out that the group was not in the Owen Brown
Village Center, which the officers testified was a “high crime area.” The

“high crime.” An ongoing series of robberies at unknown
locations and times, as well as a single sighting of an individu-
al with a handgun do not suffice absent greater specificity.
Even assuming that these incidents could be sufficient for a
finding that the area is “high crime,” there is no nexus
between these crimes and the activity in this case, or between
these crimes and Mr. Sizer.‘ For these reasons, I do not find
sufficient evidence to support the State’s contention that
Wardlow is dispositive precedent.

The Majority’s determination that the hearing judge aban-
doned the totality of the circumstances appears to be a
mischaracterization of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.
The hearing judge concluded “the fact that Mr. Sizer ran, in
and of itself, based on the particular scenario that’s being
given here today, is not sufficient.” The Majority explains that
this is erroneous because no single factor is dispositive in the
analysis. Maj. Op. at 371, 174 A.3d at 338. It is evident, upon
review of the record that the hearing judge did apply the
totality of the circumstances analysis.

The officers observed a loud group in a parking lot from 25
to 85 yards away, and the officers thought that some individu-
als in the group might be consuming alcohol.’ The officers also

Majority also notes that the officers did not testify that the group’s
behavior was “consistent with the nature of the crimes that led them to
conclude that the Village Center was a high crime area.” The officers’
testimony did not connect the string of robberies or the suspected gun
violation to the group. Maj. Op. at 371, 174 A.3d at 338.

3. Officer Schlossnagle admitted that increased calls for service are not
necessarily indicative of criminal activity, but only demonstrate that
someone called the police.

4. Corporal Zammillo’s testimony about the satellite office is not particu-
larly persuasive in the “high crime” analysis. During cross-examina-
tion, he explained that there are five satellite offices at five villages in
Columbia. Mr. Sizer points out that because there are ten villages in
Columbia, half the villages have a satellite office. The presence of this
office, absent further evidence, does not support a conclusion that
Owen Brown Village is “high crime.”

5. The officers’ testimony is vague regarding which, if any, individuals
might have been committing alcohol violations, or indeed whether an

testified that someone threw a bottle, but they did not know
who threw it, or even where the bottle originated in the group.
They approached to determine who threw the bottle. The
State highlights these facts, as well as two others—that the
group was in a “high crime area” and that only Mr. Sizer fled
when the officers approached—to argue that the officers had
sufficient reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Sizer.®

The hearing judge considered all of these factors in reach-
ing her decision that the seizure was unreasonable.’ She did

alcohol violation was occurring. The officers testified that some of the
individuals in the parking lot “appeared to be” drinking alcohol.
Schlossnagle testified that “[t]here were bottles that appeared to be
alcohol bottles and cans ... [AInd a brown bag, a—bottle in a bag
....”’ Zammillo testified that he saw “body language [that] was consis-
tent with individuals that were consuming alcohol; hanging around,
passing a bottle back and forth.”

6. Mr. Sizer was seized when the officers tackled him. See California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)
(seizure requires either physical force, or if no force, submission to
authority). Terry stops are undisputedly seizures. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“It must be recog-
nized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”).

7. In formulating the “scenario,” the hearing judge explained:

The police testified today without embellishment. The Court found
them to be truthful and credible. The issue for the Court, as I
outlined it at the beginning, is the time-line, So as I understand it,
and from the testimony of the officers, it’s that they're there,
They're in a darker less lit area. They see this group of individuals
which includes the Defendant, Mr. Sizer. That the group appears to
be loitering; that the group appears to be drinking alcohol, open
containers, and that somebody of the group—they cannot be sure
whether it was Mr. Sizer or not—threw a bottle. The police were
concerned, understandably, and approached the group. They were
in uniform. On their bright-blue jackets are their respective names
and the word “Police”, and they verbally identified themselves as
police. While they themselves had been in a darker area, the
testimony was that there was sufficient lighting in the parking lot
area to see the group.

The issue before the Court is, when Mr. Sizer ran, was it reason-
able for the police to run after him?

Ss

And although I can understand the heat of the moment, I can
understand the high crime area, the fact that Mr. Sizer ran, in and

not doubt what the officers had observed, but the officers
never saw Mr. Sizer engaging in any of these activities. Thus,
at the moment the officers reached the group, they had no
reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Sizer was engaged in
eriminal activity. He was with a group of individuals, some of
whom might have been engaging in misdemeanor activities.’
The hearing judge decided that this “scenario,” combined with
Mr. Sizer’s flight, could not provide a sufficiently particular-
ized reasonable suspicion to detain him,

The Majority notes that the State “implicitly concedes that
the officers did not have a particularized suspicion to stop Mr.
Sizer at the moment they approached the group.” Maj. Op. at
368, 174 A.8d at 334. It is unclear whether the Majority thinks
that the officers were stopping the entire group under Terry,
or whether the officers were merely accosting the group. The
Majority reasons that “Sizer’s flight from the group as the
officers approached to investigate probable crimes committed
in their presence shifted their focus to Mr. Sizer, which could
have reasonably heightened their suspicion that he was the
individual responsible for throwing the bottle.” Id. at 872, 174
A8d at 389. The Majority places too much weight on Mr.
Sizer's flight.

Unprovoked flight is a factor in the totality of the cireum-
stances analysis. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. 673;
Bost v. State, 406 Md. 841, 358, 958 A.2d 856 (2008); Collins v.
State, 876 Md. 359, 372, 829 A.2d 992 (2003). Based on the
evidence presented, it appears that the officers had a hunch

of itself, based on the particular scenario that’s being given here
today, is not sufficient,

8, Littering is a misdemeanor. See Maryland Code (1957, 2012 Repl.
Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 10-110 of the Criminal Law Article. On brief, and
at argument, the State also suggested that officers could have reason-
ably suspected that Mr, Sizer was violating a Howard County Ordi-
nance that prohibits possessing an open container, or consuming alco-
holic beverages in posted areas. See Howard County, Maryland, Code of
Ordinances § 8.700: Consumption and possession of alcoholic bever-
ages in opened containers (2016). References to laws and ordinances do
not provide a particularized basis for suspecting Mr, Sizer of wrongdo-
ing, they only particularize the offense the officers thought might be
occurring.

that Mr. Sizer was engaged in criminal activity because he ran
at their approach. We do not accord weight to an “inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch[.]’” Terry, 892 U.S.
at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, Officers may certainly investigate ambigu-
ities, but they must still be able to articulate a particularized
basis for suspicion that comports with constitutional stan-
dards,

The Majority’s analysis is unpersuasive and accords the
State too much eredit, The Majority claims that Mr. Sizer
“overlooks the significance of the officers’ decision to investi-
gate based on the improper disposal of the bottle.” Maj. Op. at
878, 174 A.3d at 339, But under the Majority’s reasoning, and
the State’s implied concession, there is no reason to suspect
Mr, Sizer was littering without placing unwarranted weight on
his flight. The officers never testified that they believed there
was a connection between Mr. Sizer’s flight and the littering
or the alcohol violations, Put simply, he ran, so they chased
him.

Although much of the evidence the hearing judge relied on
was ambiguous, as the Majority points out, this is not to either
the hearing judge’s or Mr. Sizer’s detriment. The State must
demonstrate a sufficient factual basis for the stop. See Jeremy
P., 197 Md.App. at 22, 11 A.8d 880. If the hearing judge
resolved this issue based on ambiguous evidence, it is because
the State failed to satisfy its burden. Any inferences from
these ambiguities should be drawn in Mr, Sizer’s favor be-
cause the motion to suppress was granted. See Longshore, 899
Ma. at 498, 924 A.2d 1129.

Turning to the question of the use of a hard take-down, the
Supreme Court in Terry explained that “[t]he manner in which
[a] seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a

9. Mr, Sizer’s brief suggests that he may have run because he was
startled, The officers approached out of darkness, and Officer Baker
testified that the group first noticed the officers when they were five feet
away from the group. The officers testified that they identified them-
selves as police during their approach, but they also described the
group as “loud.” Based on this evidence, it is not unreasonable to draw
an inference that Mr. Sizer’s flight may have not been entirely unpro-
voked.

part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all.”
892 U.S. at 28, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The Supreme Court has held
that claims that “law enforcement officials used excessive force
in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
‘seizure’ ” of an individual must be analyzed under the “objec-
tive reasonableness” standard of the Fourth Amendment,
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104
L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), The Fourth Amendment permits “some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof’ in making an
investigatory stop. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct, 1865. The “reasonable-
ness” of a seizure depends both on when it occurred and how
it is carried out. See id. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citing Tennes-
see v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1
(1985).

Whether a seizure is reasonable “requires careful attention
to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, includ-
ing the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempt-
ing to evade arrest by flight.” Id.; see also Cty. of Los Angeles
v, Mendez, — U.S. —,, 187 S.Ct. 1589, 1546, 198 L.Ed.2d 52
(2017). A court must consider “whether the officers’ actions
are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circum-
stances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ conduct
was not reasonable. The officers lacked a particularized basis
to suspect Mr. Sizer of criminal activity. There was no reason
to believe that he was a threat to officer safety at the time of
the chase and tackle because he stated that he had a gun
during the tackle. The officers seized Mr. Sizer before they

10, There was some dispute during the hearing regarding precisely
when Mr. Sizer said “I have a pistol,” and whether that statement
occurred before or after Schlossnagle tackled him. The hearing judge
also found that Mr. Sizer made the statement “in the process of Officer
Schlossnagle taking him down ...." This factual finding was not
clearly erroneous given the speed of events and the ambiguities in
timing. See Raynor v. State, 440 Md. 71, 81, 99 A.3d 753 (2014).

were aware that he armed. See California v. Hodari D., 499
US. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 118 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991).

Maryland permits warrantless arrests for individuals who
have committed or attempted to commit a misdemeanor “in
the presence of or within the view of the police officer.”
Maryland Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 2-202(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Article. If the officer has probable cause
to believe that the misdemeanor is being committed in his
presence or in his view, he may arrest any person whom the
officer reasonably believes has committed the crime. Id. § 2~
202(b). Assuming that throwing the bottle was littering, or
that someone in the group was consuming alcohol, the officers
did not know who committed these offenses, The officers could
not reasonably believe it was Mr. Sizer when they testified
that they had not observed anyone in particular doing those
activities. See Parks v. State, 4 Md.App. 482, 484, 248 A.2d 645
(1968) (warrantless arrest for littering was unlawful when
officers did not see arrestee littering and there was no evi-
dence of a common criminal design to litter).

Finally, the nature of the suspected offenses does not
suggest that a hard take-down was reasonable. Our prior
cases on the use of force in investigatory detentions have dealt
with crimes that presented a threat to public safety, with
identified suspects. See In re David S., 367 Md. 528, 589, 789
A.2d 607 (2002) (officers saw a suspect with what appeared to
be a handgun); Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 661-67, 587 A.2d
235 (1988) (officers detained suspects in an armed robbery
who had injured an individual and were believed to be armed);
Cf. Longshore, 399 Md. at 517, 924 A.2d 1129. I am reluctant
to extend our reasoning in those cases to minor misdemeanor
offenses when the officer lacks particularized suspicion that
the detained individual is engaged in criminal activity. Under
the totality of the circumstances in this case, I conclude that it
was unreasonable for the officers to chase and tackle Mr.
Sizer.

ATTENUATION

Although I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that this
stop was constitutional, I concur in their alternative holding,
that the officer’s unlawful conduct was attenuated by the
discovery of the arrest warrant." To determine whether atten-
uation applies, a reviewing court considers three factors first
set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45
L.Hd.2d 416 (1975); see also Miles v. State, 365 Md, 488, 522,
781 A.2d 787 (2001). First, we examine the “ ‘temporal proxim-
ity’ between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of
the evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evi-
dence followed the unconstitutional search.” Utah v. Strieff,
— US. —, 186 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016)
(quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254). Second, we
examine the intervening circumstances. Third, we “examine
‘the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id.
(quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254).

Temporal Proximity

The temporal proximity factor weighs against attenuation if
there is no “substantial time” between the “unlawful act and
when the evidence is obtained.” Id.; see also Cow v. State, 397
Md. 200, 218, 916 A.2d 311 (2007). The officers testified that
the sequence of events happened very quickly. Mr. Sizer
stated that he had a gun as he was being tackled, and the
search took place almost immediately after the officers cuffed
Mr. Sizer and discovered the warrant. Generally, an unlawful
stop and near-contemporaneous discovery of evidence will not
be a sufficient lapse in time to “attenuate the taint of a
presumptively illegal stop ....” Cow, 397 Md. at 218, 916 A.2d
811. Thus, the temporal proximity factor here favors rejecting
attenuation because no substantial time elapsed. See Strieff,
136 8.Ct. at 2062; Cow, 397 Md. at 218, 916 A.2d 311.

11. Tagree with the Majority that the independent source doctrine is not
applicable. Because attenuation applies, there is no reason to reach this
issue,

Intervening Circumstances

“{A]n intervening circumstance is an event that breaks the
causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the deriv-
ative evidence.” Ferguson v. State, 301 Md. 542, 551, 488 A.2d
1255 (1984). Even before Strieff,” we have found that discov-
ery of a valid arrest warrant after an unconstitutional deten-
tion is an intervening circumstance that weighs in favor of
attenuation. See Cow, 397 Md. at 219, 916 A.2d 811; Myers v
State, 395 Md. 261, 227-28, 909 A.2d 1048 (2006). The discov-
ery of an arrest warrant that is “wholly independent of the
illegal stop”* breaks the causal chain because the warrant
compels the officer to arrest the suspect. Strieff, 186 S.Ct. at
2063.

Corporal Zammillo was compelled to arrest Mr, Sizer when
he recognized him from prior interactions and knew that he
had an open warrant. See id. at 2062. Officer Schlossnagle
became aware of the gun through Mr. Sizer’s statement
during an unlawful seizure before Zammillo recognized Mr.
Sizer and discovered the arrest warrant, however, officers
searched the backpack and found the gun after the warrant
discovery. The question is whether this fact affects the inter-
vening circumstance factor such that it weighs against attenu-
ation.

In Cow, after detaining two individuals without reasonable
suspicion, the officers learned that Cox had an outstanding
warrant for failure to appear in court on drug charges and
arrested him. 397 Md. at 205, 916 A.2d 311. After the arrest,

12. The Supreme Court applied Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) in its reasoning in Utah v. Strieff,
— US. —-, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), The Court
acknowledged that Segura applied the independent source doctrine, not
attenuation, but concluded that the principle relating to a valid arrest
warrant was applicable in attenuation, Strieff, 136 S.Ct, at 2062.

13. In Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 692, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d
314 (1982), the Supreme Court determined that an arrest warrant filed
after an unconstitutional arrest did not serve as an intervening circum-
stance because the officers secured the warrant using information
obtained from the illegality.

the officers found marijuana on the ground where Cox had
been sitting. Id. We concluded that the presence of the
warrant favored attenuation because the valid arrest warrant
gave officers probable cause to arrest Cox before they found
the marijuana. Jd. at 219, 916 A.2d 311.

In Myers, an officer initiated a traffic stop and observed a
screwdriver in plain view that could make pry marks consis-
tent with those found at some recent burglaries. The officer
learned that Myers had outstanding warrants from another
jurisdiction and took him into custody, A search incident to
arrest revealed further evidence of burglary. 395 Md. at 268-
69, 909 A.2d 1048. We assumed the stop was invalid, but
concluded that the arrest warrant “sufficiently attenuated” the
tainted stop such that the exclusionary rule did not apply. Id.
at 277-78, 909 A.2d 1048. As the Majority opinion notes, we
determined in Myers that the timing was not “dispositive”
because “there was an outstanding arrest warrant discovered
between the initial stop and the subsequent search incident to
arrest, even though some of the evidence was discovered
shortly after the illegal stop.” Id. at 292, 909 A2d 1048
(emphasis added).

Mr. Sizer cites People v. Maggit, 319 Mich.App. 675, 903
N.W.2d 868, 2017 WL 2351500 (2017), suggesting that case
supports rejecting attenuation here. In Maggit, the Michigan
Court of Appeals paid careful attention to the timing of the
seizure and the discovery of a warrant to determine whether
intervening circumstances favored suppression. Jd. at 881-82,
908 N.W.2d 868, at *10. The court pointed out that Strieff
involved a “fact pattern[ ] of (1) invalid seizure; (2) discovery
of a valid arrest warrant; and (8) search and discovery of
contraband ....” Id. The court distinguished Maggit based on
the difference in the fact pattern: “(1) invalid seizure; (2)
search and discovery of contraband; and (8) discovery of a
valid arrest warrant.” Id. The court determined that the
warrant in that case was not an intervening act because it
“had no effect on the actions taken by the police in this case,
nor did it have any effect on the evidence that was recovered
from the defendant.” Id.

Here, the fact pattern diverges from both Strieff, Cow, and
Maggit, but is consistent with Myers: (1) An invalid seizure
and some evidence; (2) discovery of an arrest warrant; and
(8) search and discovery of contraband. Like Myers, although
some evidence was obtained before the discovery of the war-
rant, the gun was found after the discovery of the warrant and
the arrest. Unlike in Maggit, the search was incident to a
lawful arrest. In Maggit, the arrest itself was unlawful, despite
the later discovery of a valid warrant. See 319 Mich.App. at
881-82, 903 N.W.2d 868, 2017 WL 2351500, at *10. I agree
with the Majority that Myers sufficiently resolves the issue.
The presence of a valid unrelated arrest warrant supports
attenuation, even if some evidence is found before the arrest
warrant. See 395 Md. at 292, 909 A.2d 1048. I reach this
conclusion because there was no substantial lapse in time
between the illegality and the intervening circumstance, and
the officers had not taken any significant action based on Mr.
Sizer’s statement, such as searching his bag. Thus, this factor
weighs in favor of the State.

The Purpose and Flagrancy of Police Misconduct

This factor reflects the exclusionary rule’s goal of deterring
police misconduct by “favoring exclusion only when the police
conduct is most in need of deterrence—that is, when it is
purposeful or flagrant.” Strieff, 186 S.Ct. at 2068. Flagrancy
requires more severe police misconduct than the mere absence
of proper cause for a seizure. Id. at 2064; see also Myers, 395
Mad. at 298, 909 A.2d 1048 (officer’s conduct was not flagrant
only because the stop was invalid).

Here, the officers accosted the group after an unknown
member of the group made an ill-advised decision to throw a
bottle in the parking lot, and the officers suspected that some
members of the group might be drinking. Although they
lacked suspicion that Mr. Sizer had done anything, it was not
unreasonable for the officers to approach the group. There is
no evidence in the record of a pattern of systemic police
misconduct by the Howard County Police Department. See
Strieff, 186 S.Ct. at 20638; Maggit, 319 Mich.App. at 881-82,

908 N.W.2d 868 N.W.2d 868, 2017 WL 2351500, at *10. While
the officers’ decision to chase and tackle Mr. Sizer may have
been an error in judgment, given the lack of reasonable
suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, absent
further evidence of misconduct, I do not conclude their con-
duct was purposeful or flagrant. Thus, this factor weighs in
favor of the State. The arrest warrant, therefore, sufficiently
attenuated the illegality, and the evidence of the gun should
have been admitted."*

CONCLUSION

I agree with the Majority that the evidence is admissible
because the valid, unrelated arrest warrant sufficiently attenu-
ated the unreasonable seizure. I do not agree, however, with
the Majority’s conclusion that the seizure of Mr. Sizer was
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. I do not
suggest officers should permit individuals suspected of com-
mitting crimes to escape. But at a suppression hearing, the
State must demonstrate that the officers had a sufficient
factual basis to stop a citizen—especially when that stop is a
hard take-down. Grant, 449 Md. at 30, 141 A.3d 138; Jeremy
P., 197 Md.App. at 22, 11 A.3d 880. They failed to do so. This
Court should not shoulder that burden.

Judge Hotten has authorized me to state that she joins this
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

14, When Mr. Sizer was being processed for detention at Booking, a
corrections officer located a bag of pills in Mr. Sizer’s sock. Schlossna-
gle referred to this as a “search incident to detention” as a matter of
“protocol.” This appears to be an inventory search, which is a well-
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645-47, 103 S.Ct, 2605, 77
L.Ed.2d 65 (1983),

393

174 A3d 351

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL
SYSTEM CORPORATION et al.

ve
Brandon KERRIGAN, a minor et al.
No. 3, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 28, 2017

S
oo

3
cc)

Argued by Raymond L. Marshall (Francis X. Leary, Cha-
son, Rosner, Leary & Marshall, LLC, Towson, MD) and
Curtis H. Booth (Booth, Booth, Cropper & Marriner, P.C.,
Easton, MD) on brief, for Petitioners.

Argued by Adam P. Janet (Howard A. Janet and Giles H.
Manley, Janet, Jenner & Suggs, LLC, Baltimore, MD; An-
drew H. Baida, Rosenberg Martin Greenberg LLP, Baltimore,
MD) on brief, for Respondents.

Argued by Mitchell Y. Mirviss, Esquire, Venable LLP,
Rockville, MD, amicus curiae for Medical Mutual Insurance
Liability Society of Maryland and MedChi, the Maryland State
Medical Society.

Argued by George S. Tolley III, Esquire, Dugan, Babij,
Tolley & Kohler, LLC, Timonium, MD, amicus curiae for
Maryland Association for Justice, Inc.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Opinion by Greene, J.

The fundamental inquiry before us in this case is the proper
application of the standard of appellate review to a trial court’s
order to transfer a case pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-327(c).
Although the underlying facts of this case involve alleged
medical malpractice, it is before us because of the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City’s grant of the Defendants’ motion to
transfer the case to Talbot County. The Court of Special
Appeals reversed the hearing judge’s grant of the motion to
transfer, holding that the moving party failed to meet its
burden of demonstrating that the convenience of the parties
and the interests of justice supported transfer of the case from
Baltimore City to Talbot County. Because we determine that
the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it conclud-

ed that the case should be transferred to Talbot County, we
shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

L

As a result of the procedural posture of this case, the facts
are queued up by the parties’ pleadings. With the exception of
limited factual findings by the Circuit Court related to the
residency of the parties, the parties have not litigated the
remaining allegations. We provide a summary of the allega-
tions here for context only. Brandon Kerrigan and his parents,
Kimberly and Michael Kerrigan, (“Respondents”), live in Boz-
man, @ community located in Talbot County. Brandon, through
his parents and with them in their individual capacities, filed a
medical malpractice action in May 2015 against seven defen-
dants: three medical systems, the University of Maryland
Medical System Corporation, the University of Maryland
Shore Regional Health, Inc. (“Shore Medical”), and Delmarva
Radiology, PA, and four doctors in their individual capacities,
Drs. David White, Dayanand Bagdure, Nicole Mallory, and
Steven Sauter (“Petitioners”), in the Cireuit Court for Balti-
more City.

In August of 2018, Brandon, age fifteen, visited his Talbot
County physician, Dr. Mark Langfitt, after experiencing
shortness of breath and a prolonged period of dry coughing.
Dr. Langfitt referred Brandon to Delmarva Radiology to
receive a chest X-ray for further examination. Dr. Steven
Sauter reviewed the X-ray results at Delmarva Radiology and
diagnosed Brandon with atypical pneumonia. Thereafter, Dr.
Langfitt prescribed Brandon five days of antibiotics.

Brandon’s symptoms persisted. He was admitted to the
emergency room at Shore Medical, where an examination
revealed indicators of potential heart failure. Dr. David White
directed that Brandon receive intravenous fluids while Bran-
don waited to receive further testing to confirm the condition
of his heart. Dr. White consulted with Dr. Dayanard Bagdure,
of the University of Maryland Medical System Corporation,
who agreed to treat Brandon after an emergency transfer, by
helicopter, to the University of Maryland in Baltimore City.

Brandon received fluids until he completed them during the
helicopter ride, where he coded on his way from Talbot
County to Baltimore City.

Upon admission to the University of Maryland, Brandon’s
treating physicians changed his diagnosis from heart failure to
septic shock, After arrival, Brandon received a second blood
test, the results of which confirmed heart failure. At the
University of Maryland, Brandon had received over four liters
of IV fluids during a fourteen hour period before he received
any diuretics. Four months after his admission, Brandon
received a heart transplant.

After the Kerrigans filed suit in May 2015, the seven
Petitioners jointly filed a motion to transfer venue from
Baltimore City to Talbot County, pursuant to Rule 2-327(c),
and requested a hearing. After a lengthy hearing, the Cireuit
Court granted the motion to transfer and delivered an eight-
minute oral decision from the bench. The hearing judge clari-
fied that he had considered the motion on forwm non conve-
niens grounds:

And, obviously, this is not a claim that the forum is improp-

er. It’s not a motion to dismiss for an improper forum.

It’s a motion under the forum non conveniens analysis as to

whether the case as it is and whether the factors balance

heavily in favor of transfer to the suggested jurisdiction of

Talbot County.

I have weighed those factors, and I do find that those

factors do weigh strongly in favor of transfer. There are a

number of things that I considered.

The hearing judge explained that his first consideration in the
balancing test was convenience to the parties and witnesses:

First, with respect to the balance of convenience of the

parties and the witnesses, as counsel for the defendant has

pointed out, seven of the ten named parties in the case,
plaintiff and defendants, are in Talbot County.

I was struck by the fact and it was pointed out by defense

counsel that plaintiffs actually must pass the Circuit Court

for Talbot County on the way to the Circuit Court for

Baltimore City.

es °

I was unpersuaded by the exhibit and statistics presented
by plaintiffs’ counsel as to the witnesses. I don’t find the fact
that the transplant team is in Baltimore City is of signifi-
cance.
The primary and key witnesses that would be testifying in
this case—obviously, everyone has noted that it’s hard to
say who will actually testify. But you're not going to have
500 and some care providers who may have touched the
treatment at some point testify at trial. But it’s clear that
the significant balance is in favor of those who would be
inconvenienced significantly coming from Talbot County to
Baltimore City.

Next, the hearing judge explained that consideration of public

interest, including the burden on the public, weighed in favor

of transfer to Talbot County:
As to the statistical analysis with respect to the other prong,
the public interest, I was not persuaded by the statistics as
argued by plaintiffs’ counsel. The numbers don’t bear out in
what I reviewed in the annual statistical abstract as to the
courts’ dockets.
Of course, I certainly am not saying that we're here in
Baltimore City ... looking to avoid having additional cases.
We certainly can handle everything that comes at us, and
we do. But the numbers do not support plaintiffs’ position.
The numbers, in fact, would weigh in favor—strongly in
favor of the transfer,
With respect to the burden on the public, again, both with
respect to the jury duty issue, clearly there’s a heavier
burden here in the city than in Talbot County, based on just
the numbers submitted and the number of trials that are
recorded as having taken place... .
[T]he other component of the public interest that I was
considering was the question with respect to the parties’
interest or the public’s interest in the health care that’s
provided in the jurisdiction. I was persuaded by the defense
argument noting that the sole institution in Talbot County
providing medical care is a party defendant in the case, So
compare that to Baltimore City where there are several

large medical institutions. The Court does find that there is
a significantly stronger interest in Talbot County in the
handling of this matter, the outcome of this matter than in
Baltimore City.

The hearing judge noted that he considered other factors as

well, Ultimately, upon weighing the various considerations and

allocating appropriate deference to the plaintiffs for their

choice of venue, the hearing judge found that transfer to

Talbot County was appropriate. He said:
Other factors that were mentioned in terms of location of
documents, evidence, service of process, I don’t find that
those factors weigh in favor of either the plaintiff or—
plaintiffs or defendants.
But at bottom, the Court sees many motions to transfer,
noting that plaintiff is afforded deference with respect to
choice of venue.
And in many cases, it comes down to, well, it would certainly
be more convenient for it to be in, for example, Cecil County
than in Baltimore City, but not sérong—in terms of the
factors, the factors would not weigh strongly in many cases.
But in this case, I see this as, far and away, one of the
strongest in terms of weighing in favor of transfer to Talbot
County. That the inconvenience of the parties and the
witnesses would be tremendous if the matter were handled
in Baltimore City. And that it serves the interest of justice
to transfer the matter to Talbot County. So the motion to
transfer is granted....
It doesn’t change my decision [that there will be, at a
minimum, six physicians that will be called to trial from the
University of Maryland and that there are two doctors down
there and there are two doctors up here], I find that the
balance weighs strongly im favor .., even given those
arguments, in favor of transfer.

(Emphasis added).

IL

The Kerrigans noted an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals from the Cireuit Court’s order to transfer the case to

Talbot County. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the
Circuit Court in an unreported opinion, holding that, like in
Scott v. Hawit, 211 Md.App. 620, 66 A.3d 60, cert. denied, 434
Md. 314, 75 A.3d 319 (2018), the balance of the factors did not
weigh strongly in favor of transfer but rather weighed in
“near equipoise.”

The University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, et
al., filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. Univ. of
Md. Med. Sys. Corp. v. Kerrigan, 452 Md. 5, 155 A.8d 891
(2017), The certiorari petition contained three questions.! We
find the Court of Special Appeals’ action in reframing the
questions and condensing them into a single question for
clarity more apropos. Accordingly, we adopt the following
question to be resolved:

Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion by granting the

motion to transfer venue?
We answer no,

ii.

Hl When faced with the task of reviewing transfers grant-
ed pursuant to Rule 2-327(c), this Court has resolutely applied
an abuse of discretion standard, Odenton Dev. Co. v. Lamy,
320 Ma. 38, 40, 575 A.2d 1285, 1238 (1990), Although appellate
courts do not rubberstamp the rulings of trial court judges,
appellate courts “should ... be reticent” to substitute their
own judgment for that of the trial court unless they can
identify “clear abuse” of the wide latitude given to trial courts

1, The Petitioner presented the following questions to this Court;

1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals substituted its judgment
and failed to defer to the wide discretion owed to the lower
court’s reasons in support of transfer?

2, Whether the Court of Special Appeals failed to review this case
on its individual merits by placing too much reliance upon Scott
v, Hawit, 211 Md.App. 620, 66 A.3d 60, cert. denied, 434 Md. 314,
75 A3d 319 (2013), a decision with much different facts and
erroneous trial rulings that did not occur in this case?

3, Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by holding that the
residence of foreign plaintiffs should not factor into the conven-
ience of the parties’ analysis under Rule 2-327(c)?

when ruling on Rule 2-827(c) motions. Urquhart v. Simmons,
839 Md. 1, 17-19, 660 A.2d 412, 420-21 (citing Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 8.Ct. 252, 266, 70 L.Ed.2d
419, 486 (1981)); see Lapides v. Lapides, 50 Md.App. 248, 252,
487 A.2d 251, 254 (1981) (“The exercise of a judge’s discretion
is presumed to be correct, he [or she] is presumed to know the
law, and is presumed to have performed his [or her] duties

properly.”) (internal citations omitted); Alewis v. State, 437
Ma. 457, 478, 87 A.3d 1248, 1254 (2014) (citing North v. North,
102 Md.App. 1, 18-14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031-32 (1994); Aventis
Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 436, 914 A.2d 113,
182 (2007) (“So long as the Circuit Court applies the proper
legal standards and reaches a reasonable conclusion based on
the facts before it, an appellate court should not reverse a
decision vested in the trial court’s discretion merely because
the appellate court reaches a different conclusion.”); see also
Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 971 (8th Cir.
1984) (“The very concept of a discretion presupposes a zone of
choice within which the trial court may go either way.”)?

Iv.
Parties’ Contentions

Respondents argue that the Circuit Court abused its discre-
tion when transferring the case from Baltimore City to Talbot
County. The Kerrigans note that the burden of persuasion
resided with the Petitioners in the trial court and that, based
on the record of this case, the Circuit Court could not reason-
ably find that the balance strongly weighed in favor of trans-
ferring the case from Baltimore City to Talbot County. The
Kerrigans point to several alleged tortious acts that occurred

2. The amicus brief submitted by the Maryland Association for Justice
suggests that the standard of review differs from how we have stated it
here. The brief beckons this Court to ignore the words in its previous
decisions and to read into the various decisions a raised level of review
where the trial court receives less deference than what is afforded to it
under an abuse of discretion standard. Never has this Court held that
any other standard of review applies 1o Rule 2-327(c) motions to
transfer, We see no good reason now to change the rule.

in Baltimore City as well as the three defendants and multiple
treating physician-witnesses who would be inconvenienced by
traveling from Baltimore City, where they work, to Talbot
County. The Kerrigans further argue that the Circuit Court
erred when it assessed the interests of justice by finding that
Baltimore City’s caseload was larger than Talbot County’s,
that Talbot County had a greater interest in the health care
provided by Shore Medical than Baltimore City had in the
care provided by the University of Maryland, and that the
jury burden would be greater in Baltimore City than in Talbot
County. According to the Kerrigans, the failure to properly
weigh the arguments made by both sides warranted reversal
by the Court of Special Appeals.

Petitioners, on the other hand, urge this Court to reverse
the Court of Special Appeals, and point us to Odenton and
Urquhart as holding that a trial court has discretion to make
the determination to transfer the case. Petitioners suggest
that in the present case, the hearing judge properly weighed
the facts before him and that he, therefore, did not abuse his
discretion in granting the motion to transfer. Petitioners invite
us to clarify what they suggest was an incorrect reliance upon
Scott v. Haawit, 211 Md.App. 620, 66 A.8d 60 (2018), a case
which they argue is factually different from the present case,

History of Rule 2~827(c)

Rule 2-327(c), provides:

On motion of any party, the court may transfer any action

to any other circuit court where the action might have been

brought if the transfer is for the convenience of the parties

and witnesses and serves the interests of justice.
The Maryland Rules Committee drafted Rule 2-827(c) in 1984
for our adoption, and, in doing so, relied on the language found
in 28 U.S.C, § 1404(a). Odenton, 320 Md. at 40, 575 A.2d at
1288. Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code
states that “[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought or to any district or division to which all parties

have consented.” * In light of the near-replication of the feder-
al language, we held in Odenton that “federal law construing
§ 1404(a) is highly persuasive in our analysis.” 320 Md. at 40,
575 A.2d at 1238; Paul V. Niemeyer, Linda M. Schuett, and
Joyce H. Smithey, Maryland Rules Commentary 303 (4th ed.
2014) (“This section is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and is
intended to incorporate the body of law construing that stat-
ute.”); see Stidham v. Morris, 161 Md.App. 562, 568, 870 A.2d
1285, 1289 (2005) (“In fact, federal and Maryland law, on this
point, can almost be viewed as one body of law.”).

The federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), has its origins in
the federal common law doctrine of forwm non conveniens.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 285, 258, 102 S.Ct. 252,
264, 70 L.Hid.2d 419, 434 (1981). In Piper Aircraft, the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged the intent of Congress to
ereate a legislative analogue to the common law doctrine.
Congress did not simply enshrine pre-existing common law
into statutory form but rather revised the doctrine to “giv[e]
more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) than [courts] had
to dismiss on grounds of forwm non conveniens.” Id, at 258,
102 S.Ct. at 265, 70 L.Hd.2d at 434; M. Moore, Federal
Practice § 111.58 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 2017)
(“Recognizing that the ‘broad venue provisions in federal
[alets often resulted in inconvenient forums,’ Congress intend-
ed Section 1404(a) to remedy this situation by authorizing easy
transfer of actions to a more convenient federal forum.”)
(internal citations omitted). Congress sought to avoid the
unnecessary and unjust consequences that could arise as a
result of the application of the forwm non conveniens doctrine

3. Rule 2-327(c) differs from the federal rule in the plain language
insofar as the Md. Rule includes “On motion of any party ..,.” The
language of the two rules are otherwise ‘‘virtually identical.” Urquhart,
339 Md. at 11, 660 A.2d at 417. The meaning of this variation in
language was litigated in Urquhart, in which we determined that “on
motion of any party” precludes the trial court from, sua sponte, trans-
ferring the case pursuant to Rule 2-327(c) and requires the parties to
raise the issue in a motion to transfer (unlike federal trial courts which
may decide, sua sponte, to transfer a case based on convenience), Id. at
11-12, 660 A.2d at 417.

by making transfers easier than dismissal on the same
grounds. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 82, 75 S.Ct.
544, 546, 99 L.Ed. 789, 793 (1955) (“Congress, in writing
§ 1404(a), which was an entirely new section, was revising as
well as codifying. The harshest result of the application of the
old doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action,
was eliminated by the provision in § 1404 (a) for transfer....
[I]t can hardly be called mere codification.”), Greater discre-
tion given to trial courts by Congress went hand-in-hand with
“Gntend[ing] to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser
showing of inconvenience.” Id. (“That is not to say that the
relevant factors have changed or that the plaintiff's choice of
forum is not to be considered, but only that the discretion to
be exercised is broader.”). Congress’s construction of 28
US.C. § 1404(a) relegated the common law doctrine to a
limited set of circumstances involving a foreign forum. Ameri-
can Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 448, 449, 114 S.Ct. 981,
986, 127 L.Hd.2d 285, 294 n.2 (1994). In Johnson v. GD.
Searle & Co., we first recognized the distinction between the
federal common law and the federal statutory provision. 314
Mad, 521, 526-27, 552 A.2d 29, 31-82 (1989),

Application of Maryland Rule 2-827 to this Case

HEM It is undisputed in this case that the Kerrigans could
have brought suit in either Talbot County or Baltimore City.’
“Rule 2-827(c) does not deal with a transfer for want of venue;
it confers on a circuit court the discretionary power to transfer
even if the transferring court is a proper venue.” Lewng, 854
Md. at 222, 729 A.2d at 959. The plaintiff chooses where to
bring suit within the parameters set out by the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article,® and the trial court must regard

4, That venue is appropriate in more than one Maryland trial court is a
prerequisite to pleading for transfer under Rule 2-327(c), See, eg., Paul
V. Niemeyer, Linda M. Schuett, and Joyce E, Smithey, Maryland Rules
Commentary 303 (4th ed, 2014) (‘‘The transferee court must be a court
where the action could have been properly filed in the first instance,”’),

5. See, e.g., Mp. Copz Ann, Crs. & Jup. Proc, §§ 6-201-203 (1973, 2013
Repl. Vol.).

that choice with deference. Id. at 224, 729 A.2d at 959 (citing
Urquhart v. Simmons, 339 Md. 1, 18, 660 A2d 412, 420 n.7
(1995), That deference shrinks, however, when the plaintiff
does not reside in the forum where the plaintiff has chosen to
file suit. Leung, 354 Md. at 228-29, 729 A.2d at 962. That
deference diminishes further “if a plaintiff's choice of forum
has no meaningful ties to the controversy and no particular
interest in the parties or subject matter.” ° Stidham, 161 Md.
App. at 569, 870 A.2d at 1289-90 (citing Liban v. Churchey
Group II, L.L.C., 305 F.Supp.2d 186, 142 (D.D.C. 2004). A
trial court, however, has wide discretion to weigh the “conven-
jence of the parties and witnesses” and “interests of justice”
on the facts of the case before it when assessing whether to
transfer the case. Odenton, 820 Md. at 40, 575 A.2d at 1238
(citing Stewart Organization Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
29, 108 S.Ct. 2289, 2244, 101 L.Hd.2d 22, 31 (1988)); Leung,
854 Md. at 224, 729 A.2d at 959. Only if the trial court fails to
exercise, or abuses, its discretion will a reviewing court re-
verse the trial court’s order to transfer venue. Urquhart, 339
Mad. at 19, 660 A.2d at 421.

A. THE TRIAL COURT MUST GIVE DUE DEFERENCE T0 THE PLAIN-
‘TIFF’S CHOICE OF VENUE.

In relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as a model for Rule 2-

827(c), we adopted the general rule that plaintiffs receive the

6. Stidham was not the first case in which Maryland appellate courts
have used the “meaningful ties” analysis. In Urquhart, for example, we
suggested that when “‘the only contact that Prince George’s County had
to the instant case was that Mr. Simmons died at ... [a] [hospital ...
located in Prince George’s County and [a defendant] had an office
located in Prince George's County,” the plaintiff's choice of venue had
no meaningful ties to the controversy and no particular interest to the
parties or subject matter. 339 Md. at 18-19, 660 A.2d at 420-21 (1995).
In context, the hearing judge in the case at bar considered that the
controversy contained meaningful ties to health institutions in both
Talbot County and Baltimore City, and therefore did not alter the
deference owed to the Kerrigans’ choice of forum on that basis. See
Pacific Car, 403 F.2d at 954 (“If the operative facts have not occurred
within the forum of original selection and that forum has no particular
interest in the parties or the subject matter, the plaintiff's choice is
entitled only to minimal consideration.”).

privilege of deference to their choice of forum. Leung, 854 Md.
at 224, 729 A2d at 960. The Rules Committee explicitly
commented on the right of plaintiffs to choose the venue for
their suit as well as the deference owed to that choice by trial
courts. Paul V. Niemeyer, Linda M. Schuett, and Joyce E.
Smithey, Maryland Rules Commentary 308 (4th ed. 2014)
(“{D]ue consideration must be given to the plaintiff's selection
of forum, and this selection will not be altered solely because it
is more convenient for the moving party to be in another
forum.”). Piper Aircraft, a landmark decision in federal law on
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), stated the proposition that “ordinarily a
strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum”
exists. 454 U.S. at 255, 102 S.Ct. at 265-66, 70 L.Eid.2d at 435;
Lewng, 354 Md. at 224, 729 A.2d at 959-60. Piper Aircraft
explained that “{[w]hen the home forum has been chosen, it is
reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the
plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less
reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forwm non
conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a
foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less deference.” 7 454 U.S. at
255-56, 102 S.Ct. at 266, 70 L.Ed.2d at 436; Sinochem Int
Co. v. Malay. Intl Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 480, 127 S.Ct.
1184, 1191, 167 L.Hid.2d 15, 25 (2007).

B. THE PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE OF VENUE IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE PRIVI-
LEGE,

HM Although the plaintiff's chosen venue is the presumed
convenient forum for the plaintiff, and, as such, is granted
deference, that deference is by no means guaranteed as an
absolute. Leung, 354 Md. at 225, 729 A2d at 960 (“The
plaintiffs choice, however, is not an absolute and uncontrolled
privilege that is determinative under present forum non con-
veniens law.”); Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 408 F.2d

7. The Dissenting Opinion mischaracterizes our reference to Piper Air-
craft as a reliance on that case. This Court has repeatedly and consis-
tently referred to Piper Aircraft for its general exposition of the law, not
its facts. Here, we only cite to Piper Aircraft to show the history and
development of the principles of our law over time.

949, 954 (9th Cir. 1968) (“Plaintiffs choice of forum, then, is
not the final word.”). Not only is the privilege not absolute,
but the deference owed to the plaintiff may face significant
diminishment to the point of non-existence, depending on the
circumstance, Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.8d 65, 71
(2nd Cir. 2001) (“[T]he degree of deference to be given to a
plaintiff's choice of forum moves on a sliding scale ....”).

Our case law interpreting Rule 2-827(¢) has acknowledged
the significance of the plaintiff's residence when that residence
is not the same place as the chosen forum. Leung first
explicitly incorporated the federal rule that a “ ‘plaintiff's
choice of venue ... has minimal value ... where the plaintiff
is not a resident of the judicial district in which he [or she] has
instituted suit.’” Id. at 228, 729 A.2d at 962 (citing Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256, 102 S.Ct, 252, 266, 70
L,Ed.2d 419, 486 (1981)). In Lewng, we noted that the fact that
the plaintiff failed to reside in the forum in which suit was
brought “los[t] its force [because] not only were the plaintiffs
not residents of the venue of their choice, but the defendants’
choice of venue was not the venue in which they resided. Nor
is the plaintiff a resident of the venue sought by the defen-
dants ....”§ Id. at 229, 729 A.2d at 962. As we explained
there, the deference owed to the plaintiff was not meant to be
fixed but varied depending on the facts before the trial court.
Id.

Prior to Leung, we had implicitly acknowledged this princi-
ple of diminished deference when interpreting Rule 2-327(c).
For example, in Odenton, we affirmed the trial court’s trans-
fer of the case to Anne Arundel County, where the plaintiff
resided. 820 Md. at 41, 575 A.2d 1285-89, Similarly, in Urgu-
hart, without expressly recognizing the principle of diminished
deference, we affirmed the trial court’s exercise of its discre-

8. The Dissenting Opinion relegates the section of Leung where we
assessed the residence of the plaintiffs and defendants to “dicta,” In
doing so, the Dissenting Opinion abbreviates the Court’s analysis to
exclude how the convenience of the parties did not militate in favor of
transfer, a necessary determination for the Court to make based on the
legal standard set forth in Rule 2-327(c).

CULE

tion in considering that the plaintiffs did not live in the venue
where they filed suit. 389 Md. at 18-19, 660 A.2d at 420-21.
Furthermore, in that case, we commented that the only con-
tact the plaintiffs had with the chosen forum was that the
subject of the suit, Mr. Simmons, had died at a hospital in that
venue, 339 Md. at 18-19, 660 A.2d at 420-21.

In Stidham, the Court of Special Appeals cited to Lewng as
standing for the proposition that the trial court accords the
plaintiff's choice of forum less deference when the plaintiff
does not reside in that forum. 161 Md.App. at 569, 870 A.2d at
1289. According to the intermediate appellate court in Stid-
ham, not only did the trial court properly transfer the case,
the trial court properly weighed the plaintiff's choice of venue
in light of the fact that the plaintiff did not reside in that
forum and additionally, that the plaintiff resided in the forum
in which the defendants sought transfer. Jd. at 569, 870 A.2d
at 1290. In Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co, the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s transfer of
forum, and held that the trial court properly “discounted” the
deference owed to the plaintiff's choice “by the fact that she
does not live there.” 196 Md.App. 285, 254, 9 A3d 112, 122
(2010).

In addition to the plaintiff's residence as a factor to lessen
the deference given to the plaintiff's choice of venue, the
Stidham court applied the “meaningful ties” factor to further
lessen the deference afforded to the plaintiff's choice of forum,
In Stidham, the defendants struck the plaintiff's car in Balti-
more County, the residence of the plaintiff. 161 Md.App. at
565-66, 870 A.2d at 1287-88. The plaintiff brought his action in
Prince George’s County, an undisputed appropriate venue in
light of the fact that the defendants lived in Pennsylvania. Id.
at 569, 870 A.2d at 1290. The Stidham court held that because
meaningful ties to the controversy connected the action to
Baltimore County as the situs of the accident, the meaningful
ties consideration militated in favor of transferring the action
to Baltimore County instead of retaining the action in Prince
George’s County. Id. The Stidham court gave no sequential
importance to evaluating whether the plaintiff lived in the

forum in which the plaintiff sued or whether meaningful ties
existed between the controversy and the chosen forum. Id.
(“We therefore conclude that, because appellant is a resident
of the transferee jurisdiction, Baltimore County, his choice of
Prince George’s County, which ‘has no meaningful ties to the
controversy and no particular interest in the parties or subject
matter,’ is entitled to little deference and thus little weight
when the factors for and against transfer are weighed.”). We
note that, when correctly applied, “meaningful ties” is a factor,
like the plaintiff's residence in the chosen forum, which can
minimize the deference afforded to the plaintiffs choice of
forum.

Appellate courts in this state have reversed the trial court’s
decision to transfer the case to another forum in three rele-
vant but factually different cases from the case at bar, Lewng,
Nodeen, and Scott. First, Lewng involved a motor vehicle tort
action in which neither the three plaintiffs nor the five defen-
dants lived in Maryland. 354 Md, at 220, 729 A.2d at 957. The
Leungs filed suit in Baltimore City, and one defendant filed a
motion to transfer venue to Howard County. Id. The defen-
dant supported her motion by attaching a copy of the motor
vehicle accident report issued by a Maryland State Trooper,
which indicated that the accident had occurred in Howard
County. Id, at 220-21, 729 A.2d at 958. The trial court granted
the motion to transfer without affording the parties a hearing.
Id, at 221, 729 A.2d at 958. Upon review, we surmised that the
only factor weighing in favor of transfer was the situs of the
accident, Howard County, and therefore, the location where
the accident occurred alone was not a strong basis for trans-
ferring the case. Id. at 224, 729 A.2d at 959. We reversed,
concluding that the Circuit Court abused its discretion by
granting the transfer, because “at best, the balancing factors
produce[d] an equipoise, so that the plaintiffs’ choice of forum
controls.” Id. at 229, 729 A.2d at 962. Notably, the present
case before us is different from Lewng because the defendants
in Lewng sought to transfer to a venue where neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant resided. Here, unlike the case of

Leung, the defendants sought to transfer the case to a venue
where the plaintiffs reside.

In Nodeen, we reviewed a Circuit Court’s order, which also
granted the transfer without a hearing. 408 Md. at 174, 968
A.2d at 1079. Nodeen involved a motion to modify a custody
order pending in the plaintiff's choice of forum, a different
forum than where the custody order originated. Id. at 174, 968
A.2d at 1082-83. The defendants did not live in Maryland, and
we determined that the Court of Special Appeals failed to
properly analyze that either of two venues was appropriate,
which is the critical step before analyzing the application of
Rule 2-327(c). Id. at 179-80, 968 A.2d at 1082-83, There, we
held that no reasonable trial judge could have set aside the
deference owed to the plaintiff's choice of forum in light of the
particular facts of the case, including that the plaintiff resided
in the forum selected for suit. Id, at 181, 968 A.2d at 1088-84.
Without the benefit of the trial court’s rationale for transfer,
we reasoned that the evidence presented did not support the
conclusion to transfer the case from Calvert County to Anne
Arundel County. Unlike in Nodeen, the hearing judge here
provided a basis for the conclusion that the balancing of
convenience and justice weighed strongly in favor of transfer.

Respondents rely upon the decision of the Court of Special
Appeals in Scott v. Hawit, 211 Md.App. 620, 66 A.8d 60, to
argue that the intermediate appellate court properly reversed
the trial court in the present case. Scott involved a medical
malpractice claim in which the plaintiffs alleged that a doctor
in Calvert County, Dr. Raja I. Hawit, and a medical institution
in Baltimore City, Johns Hopkins Hospital, were separately
negligent in acts or omissions with regard to the post-delivery
care rendered to the plaintiff's son. Id. at 628, 66 A.3d 60. Ms.
Scott filed suit in Baltimore City, and, upon defendants’
motion, the Circuit Court transferred the case to Calvert
County. Id. at 628-26, 66 A.8d at 62-64. When assessing the
convenience of the parties in Scott, the Court of Special
Appeals noted the atypical nature of the case insofar as the
plaintiff alleged negligence “on the part of two defendants,
who are independent of each other, based on their separate,

allegedly negligent conduct, taking place at different times but
causing a single harm.” Jd. at 630, 66 A.3d at 66. The Court of
Special Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of the motion
to transfer to Calvert County, holding that the trial court
improperly focused on irrelevant factors, such as the situs
where the child’s injuries originated as opposed to the location
of the tortious conduct, the perceived apportionment of liabili-
ty between the defendants, and for treating Johns Hopkins as
a resident of Calvert County and not Baltimore City. Id. at
684, 66 A.8d at 69-71. Unlike in Scott, the hearing judge in the
case at bar did not abuse his discretion by considering irrele-
vant factors.

©. THE DEFERENCE OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE OF FORUM
IS CALIBRATED IN THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION.

HM (When the trial court assesses whether to transfer a
case pursuant to Rule 2-827(c), the court may only transfer
the case if the moving party demonstrates that the balance of
the convenience along with the interests of justice weighs
strongly in favor of transfer. Odenton, 320 Md. at 40, 575 A.2d
at 1288 (citing Akers v. Norfolk and Western Railway Compa-
ny, 378 F.2d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1967)); Paul V. Niemeyer, Linda
M. Schuett, and Joyce E. Smithey, Maryland Rules Commen-
tary 303 (4th ed. 2014) (“The burden is on the moving party to
show that justice is best served by the transfer, and a transfer
should occur only when the balance weighs strongly in favor of
the moving party.”). In both Urquhart and Leung, we ex-
plained that we adopted that particular language—that the
balance weighs strongly in favor of transfer—in order to
afford the appropriate deference to the plaintiffs desired
forum. Leung, 854 Md. at 224, 729 A.2d at 959 (“Proper regard
for the plaintiff's choice of forum is the reason why ‘a motion
to transfer from the forum chosen by the plaintiff should be
granted only when the balance weighs strongly in favor of the
moving party.’”) (citing Urquhart v. Simmons, 339 Md. 1, 18,
660 A.2d 412, 420 n.7 (1995)). The burden falls on the moving
party to demonstrate that the balance strongly points toward

transfer.’ Id. When balancing the factors amounts to equi-
poise, or a tie, then the plaintiff's choice of forum should
remain undisturbed. Lewng, 354 Md, at 229, 729 A.2d at 962;
Nodeen v. Sigurdsson, 408 Md. 167, 181, 968 A.2d 1075, 1083
(2009); see also Smith v. Johns Hopkins Cmty. Physicians,
Inc., 209 Md.App. 406, 418, 59 A.38d 1070, 1074 (2018) “(The
proponent of the transfer of venue, bearing the burden of
proof, thereby loses the evidentiary tie.”).

Given the fact-laden nature of this balancing test, trial court
decisions are necessarily “individualized” and made on a “case-
by-case” basis. Stewart Organization Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
US. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2289, 2244, 101 L.Ed.2d 22, 81 (1988)
(citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 876 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805,
812, 11 L.Hid.2d 945, 953 (1964)). As we stated in Leung, “The
discretionary decision by a trial court on whether to transfer
an action, and appellate review of that exercise of discretion,
are predominantly fact driven. Very few generalizations can be
made in this area of the law.” 354 Md. at 226, 729 A.2d at 961.
We recognize that because trial courts have discretion to
weigh the facts of each case, “uniformity and predictability of
outcome” are “almost impossible.” American Dredging Co.,
510 U.S. at 455, 114 S.Ct. at 989, 127 L.Hd.2d at 298, We
cannot, therefore, generalize Rule 2-327(c) transfer cases be-
cause one case’s facts do not fit neatly into the next.

Given the fact-intensive nature of Rule 2-327(c) transfer
inquiries, appellate courts are limited in their review to the
facts before them. Thus, appellate courts understandably con-
front a puzzle when reviewing transfer cases. On the one hand,
an appellate court must give wide latitude to a trial court’s
evaluation and, thus, to the balance of the various factors it
considered prior to making a final determination about wheth-

9, That the moving party is most typically the defendant(s) does not
preclude a plaintiff from seeking transfer under Rule 2-327(c). See Paul
V. Niemeyer, Linda M, Schuett, and Joyce E. Smithey, Maryland Rules
Commentary 303 (4th ed, 2014) (‘Under section (c) of this rule, any
party to an action may file a motion to transfer the action to another
court having venue for the convenience of the parties and the wit-
nesses.”).

er to transfer the case. On the other hand, appellate review
calls for a reviewing court to determine if the trial court
abused its discretion when balancing convenience and the
interests of justice. The appellate court must do so without
imposing on the province of the trial court. As a result,
appellate courts must resolve the tension between their own
standard of review and the moving party’s burden of persua-
sion at the trial level.

Wl Judge Charles B. Moylan, Jr., in Payton-Henderson v.
Evans, observed this tension, and emphasized that the burden
of persuasion “being a heavy one is a guideline for the trial
judge and not a standard of appellate review.” 180 Md.App.
267, 287, 949 A.2d 654, 665. Appellate courts would do well to
remember that just because they “may not have chosen to
transfer” the case does not mean that the trial court abused
its diseretion in doing so, assuming the trial court had suffi-
cient facts to support its order to transfer. Urquhart, 339 Md.
at 19, 660 A.2d at 421 (holding that, although the Court may
not have chosen to transfer the case from Prince George’s
County to Montgomery County, the trial court was within its
discretion to do so). The trial court must have acted unreason-
ably based on the facts before it for an appellate court to
reverse under an abuse of discretion standard. North v. North,
102 Md.App. 1, 14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1032 (1994) (“The decision
under consideration has to be well removed from any center
mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe
of what that court deems minimally acceptable.”). Appellate
courts must, therefore, judiciously approach reviews of Rule
2-827(c) transfers so as not to foist onto themselves the task
designed for, and better left to, the trial courts.

D. Tue Crrcurr Court pip NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FIND-
ING THAT THE BALANCE OF THE CONVENIENCE OF THE PARTIES
AND WITNESSES AND INTERESTS OF JUSTICE WEIGHED IN FA-

VOR OF TRANSFER.
Hl Even though the few decisions in Maryland interpret-
ing Rule 2-827(c) seemingly turn on the residence of the
plaintiff, this Court has relied upon a number of factors that

hearing judges should consider when determining the conven-
ience of the parties. Plaintiffs received due deference from
their choice of venue when they reside in the forum. Odenton,
320 Md. at 41, 575 A.2d at 1238-39; Urquhart, 839 Md, 1, 19,
660 A.2d 412, 421; Lewng, 354 Md. at 228, 729 A.2d at 959-60;
Nodeen, 408 Md. at 180-81, 968 A.2d 1075, 1083-84. Defen-
dants received due deference from their proposed choice of
venue when defendants resided in that forum. Urquhart, 889
Ma. at 18-19, 660 A.2d at 420; Lewng, 354 Md. at 228-29, 729
A.2d at 962; Nodeen, 408 Md. 167, 181, 968 A.2d 1075, 1088. A
trial court properly considered the location where the cause of
action arose as a factor. Odenton, 320 Md. at 41, 575 A.2d at
1238-39; Urquhart, 339 Md. at 18-19, 660 A.2d at 420-21, We
have assessed the relative convenience of haling defendants or
plaintiffs into the others’ choice of venue based on residence or
where they carry on business. Odenton, 320 Md. at 41, 575
A.2d at 1238-39; Urquhart, 339 Md. at 19, 660 A.2d at 420-21;
Leung, 354 Md. at 228-29, 729 A.2d at 962; Nodeen, 408 Md.
at 181, 968 A.2d at 1083. We commented on the convenience of
the witnesses as a factor for the trial court to consider.
Odenton, 320 Md. at 41, 575 A.2d at 1238-89; Lewng, 854 Md.
at 228, 729 A.2d at 962; Nodeen, 408 Md. at 181, 968 A.2d at
1083. Lastly, we have considered the ease of access to sources
of proof. Nodeen, 408 Md. at 181, 968 A.2d at 1083. We have
previously commented about these factors and, although not
intended as an exhaustive or exclusive list of concerns for trial
judges, these factors operate as a guide for judges when they
engage in a convenience analysis. Trial judges have the discre-
tion to weigh the factors as they deem appropriate in light of
the circumstances of the cases before them.

Thus, we review the facts of the case before us. We deter-
mine that the hearing judge gave some weight to the plaintiffs’
venue choice by properly recognizing the moving party’s bur-
den of persuasion. The hearing judge stated that this was a
“motion under the forum non conveniens analysis” and that it
had to determine “whether the factors balance heavily in favor
of transfer to the suggested jurisdiction of Talbot County.”
Next, when considering the convenience factor, the hearing

judge looked at the convenience of all parties “—in this case
ten parties, the three plaintiffs and seven defendants—and
correctly found that the majority of the parties would be
convenienced by the transfer. The hearing court accurately
determined that “seven of the ten named parties in the case,
plaintiff and defendants, are in Talbot County.” The hearing
judge noted that he “was struck by the fact ... that [the]
plaintiffs actually must pass the Cireuit Court for Talbot
County on the way to the Cireuit Court for Baltimore City.”
At the end of the hearing judge’s order to transfer, he
reasoned that “[I] see many motions to transfer, noting that
[the] plaintiff is afforded deference with respect to choice of
venue. And in many cases ... the factors would not weigh
strongly .... But in this case, I see this as, far and away, one
of the strongest in terms of weighing in favor of transfer to
Talbot County.” Accordingly, it is not our place as the review-
ing court to second-guess the weighing of the evidence by the
Cireuit Court." See Smith, 209 Md.App. at 415, 59 A.3d at
1074; Payton-Henderson, 180 Md.App. at 287, 949 A.2d at
665.

We disagree with the Court of Special Appeals’ reasoning
when the Court of Special Appeals conflated the deference
owed to the Kerrigans with the balancing of the convenience
of the parties. The intermediate appellate court concluded that
the residency of the Kerrigans should not have factored into

10. The Dissenting Opinion weighs the convenience of the parties with-
out consideration of the plaintiffs in the convenience analysis. We have
not previously weighed the convenience of the parties using the method
the Dissenting Opinion suggests, nor have we previously considered the
factors the dissent prioritizes as legally significant. The Dissenting
Opinion’s reference to a footnote in Urquhart is simply a discussion of
the burden of persuasion, not an explanation of how to conduct a
convenience analysis.

11, The Dissenting Opinion argues that the Kerrigans have a “significant
connection” to Baltimore City and that the Kerrigans “made dozens of
trips into Baltimore City,” findings not made by the hearing judge.
Additionally, the Dissenting Opinion characterizes these connections as
“far more tangible” than connections in Odenton or Urquhart, a distinc-
tion without a difference given that how tangible a connection is has
never before been recognized by this Court as legally relevant.

the overall convenience analysis if the hearing judge gave the
Kerrigans due deference to their choice of venue. The Court of
Special Appeals erred when it set aside consideration of the
plaintiffs’ convenience (or inconvenience). Without providing
any legal support, the intermediate appellate court calculated
only the convenience to the seven defendants by weighing four
defendants from Talbot County and three defendants from
Baltimore City rather than all ten parties, which would have
included the plaintiffs, Rule 2-327(c) analysis calls for trial
judges to weigh the convenience of the parties. Moreover, we
have previously adopted deference to the plaintiff's choice of
venue as an additional factor to weigh, separate from the
convenience of the parties, in the overall balancing. See Urqu-
hart, 389 Md. at 18, 660 A.2d at 420 n.7 (“We note that the
Court of Special Appeals adopted from federal case law the
additional factor of ‘proper regard for the plaintiff's choice of
forum ....’”); see also Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 571, 870
A.2d at 1291 (weighing the geographical convenience of both
the plaintiff and the defendants); ef Scott, 211 Md.App., at
636-87, 66 A.3d at 70-71 (explaining that despite the plaintiff
receiving deference, the plaintiff's residence is still considered
in the convenience analysis); ¢f Sousa v. TD Banknorth Ins.
Agency, Inc., 429 F.Supp.2d 454, 457 (D.N.H, 2006) (acknowl-
edging that although the plaintiff receives deference for filing
suit in his or her home forum, the geographical convenience of
the plaintiff is still balanced against the geographical conven-
ience of the defendant),

When weighing the convenience of the witnesses, the hear-
ing judge admitted that “it’s hard to say who will actually
testify,” but he acknowledged that he had considered a list of
over five hundred potential witnesses offered by the Kerri-
gans. The hearing judge then determined that the “primary
and key witnesses” who would be inconvenienced were located
in Talbot County. Additionally, the hearing judge weighed the
relative convenience of the doctors on the transplant team that
had treated Brandon, all of whom worked in Baltimore City,
against the convenience of Brandon’s coaches and teammates
who lived in Talbot County. We cannot say that the hearing

judge’s finding that “the significant balance is in favor of those
who would be inconvenienced significantly coming from Talbot
County to Baltimore City” was unreasonable.

The Kerrigans split hairs over the words used by the
hearing judge in his convenience weighing. The Kerrigans
argue that the judge placed no weight on the transplant team
in considering the convenience of the witnesses. Even a curso-
ry review of the record suggests otherwise. The hearing judge,
in fact, stated: “I was unpersuaded by the exhibit and statis-
ties presented by plaintiffs’ counsel as to the witnesses. I don’t
find the fact that the transplant team is in Baltimore City is of
significance.” That the judge found the argument advanced by
the Kerrigans regarding the transplant team less compelling
than the argument advanced by the University of Maryland
regarding the teammates and coaches of Brandon was not
unreasonable.”

HE «When a trial court considers the interests of jus-
tice, the court accounts for overall “systemic integrity and
fairness” in transferring or retaining the case by assessing the
public and private interests. Odenton, 320 Md. at 40, 575 A.2d
at 1238; Johnson, 314 Md. at 526, 552 A.2d at 31. The private
interests are not at issue in the case sub judice as the hearing
judge held those factors did not tip toward one side or the
other. The factors to which hearing judges look to determine
the public interest include court congestion, the jury duty
burden, and keeping localized concerns decided in their place
of origin. Johnson, 314 Md. at 526, 552 A.2d at 31. Yet, these
factors are not intended to be an exhaustive list. Id.

The hearing judge reasonably found that the public interest
of justice weighed in favor of transfer. Based on the record of

12, An additional argument raised by the Kerrigans is that the hearing
judge allowed the defendants who work in Baltimore City to waive their
inconvenience. This assertion is baseless, given the judge’s findings that
seven out of ten of the named parties lived in Talbot County. Had the
judge allowed the members of the transplant team to waive their
inconvenience, as the Kerrigans suggest, then the judge would have
concluded that the seven remaining named parties resided in Talbot
County.

the motion hearing, we have insufficient facts to determine
which side correctly determined the caseload and relative
congestion. The Kerrigans claim that no data was submitted to
the hearing judge to make the determination that the jury
burden weighed in favor of transfer. We disagree based on the
hearing judge’s reference to and use of the “Maryland Judicia-
ry Annual Statistical Abstract for Fiscal Year 2014,” which
was included as an exhibit in both parties’ filings and refer-
enced on the record by both sides during the hearing. The
hearing judge determined that the burden was heavier in
Baltimore City as compared to Talbot County based on the
number of trials recorded as having taken place and the
numbers submitted in the Statistical Abstract. Lastly, as the
public interest is an overarching concept regarding systemic
integrity and fairness, we determine that the hearing judge
acted reasonably in considering the public’s interest in the
health care provided to its communities. When considering the
facts before him, the hearing judge found the arguments
advanced by the University of Maryland and the other defen-
dants more persuasive. We cannot say that the hearing judge
abused his discretion in finding that both the convenience of
the parties and witnesses as well as the interests of justice
weighed strongly in favor of transfer."

Vv.

Upon our review of the Circuit Court’s order to transfer the
Kerrigan’s case from Baltimore City to Talbot County, we

13. The Dissenting Opinion repeatedly emphasizes that the balance does
not weigh strongly in favor of transfer, yet concedes that both the public
interest and convenience of the parties and witnesses weigh in favor of
transfer, The Dissenting Opinion muddles the burden of persuasion,
that the evidence weighs strongly in favor of transfer, with the standard
of review, abuse of discretion, and in so doing, chooses to substitute its
judgment for that of the hearing judge and engages in precisely the
process we have cautioned against. By applying a de novo standard of
review to the hearing judge’s decision, the Dissenting Opinion sidesteps
the abuse of discretion standard in order to reach its preferred outcome
for the case. The endpoint of the Dissenting Opinion’s rationale makes
the Rule 2-327(c) burden of persuasion an insurmountable hurdle for
the moving party, and if adopted, would reverse decades of jurispru-
dence by this Court and the Court of Special Appeals,

TT

determine that the hearing judge did not abuse his discretion
in balancing the convenience of the parties and interests of
justice and finding that the weight of the evidence strongly
favored transfer. We recognize that less weight is given to the
plaintiffs choice of venue when the plaintiff does not reside in
that forum, and that choice, likewise, is given minimal weight
when the forum has no meaningful ties to the controversy and
no particular interest in the parties or subject matter. The
facts of each case will dictate whether the plaintiff's choice of
venue will control the choice of forum, The intermediate
appellate court erred in reversing the hearing judge’s order to
transfer the case to Talbot County.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. COSTS
IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.

Barbera, C.J., Adkins and McDonald, JJ., dissent.

Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J., which Barbera, C.J. and
McDonald, J., join.

The Majority’s holding today has undermined the long-held
recognition of a plaintiff's right to choose a venue. Maryland
Rule 2-827(c) permits transfer of an action from one circuit
court to another if the transfer “is for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and serves the interests of justice.”
Cases from this Court considering the propriety of a change in
venue have required that convenience and justice must
strongly favor transfer. Lewng v. Nunes, 854 Md. 217, 224,
729 A.2d 956 (1999). Most respectfully, I dissent because I
cannot conclude that the convenience of the parties and wit-
nesses, or the interests of justice strongly favor transfer of
Kerrigan’s suit. I would affirm the Court of Special Appeals’
holding that the trial court abused its discretion by transfer-
ring the case from Baltimore City to Talbot County.

Deference to a Plaintiffs Choice of Venue

I do not agree that a plaintiff's choice of venue deserves any
less deference when plaintiffs choose to sue in a county where
they do not live. The Majority cites Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 285, 255-56, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Bd.2d 419
(1981), for the proposition that, in a forwm non conveniens
analysis, a foreign plaintiff's choice of venue deserves less
deference than a plaintiff suing in his or her home court. The
facts of Piper, not included in the Majority’s opinion, differ
greatly from the facts in the present appeal. Piper involved a
plane crash in Scotland. Id. at 288-89, 102 S.Ct. 252, Five
passengers and the pilot perished in the crash. All of dece-
dents were Scottish subjects as were their heirs and next of
kin. The personal representative of the decedents’ collective
estates, a California resident, sued Piper Aircraft and a pro-
peller manufacturer in the United States. Id, at 289-40, 102
S.Ct. 252. On these facts, the Supreme Court determined that
the district court properly dismissed on forwm non conveniens
grounds and concluded that the case should be tried in Scot-
land, Id. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 252,

Surely, Piper differs from this appeal, First, the Supreme
Court held the action was properly dismissed. The Court
concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring their case any-
where in the United States. Id, at 261, 102 S.Ct, 252. Here, the
parties do not dispute whether Kerrigan can bring suit in
Baltimore City. Furthermore, whereas all the Piper plaintiffs
lived in Scotland and the suit had only minor ties to the
United States, all the Baltimore defendants’ allegedly negli-
gent conduct occurred in Baltimore and most, if not all, of
Kerrigan’s damages witnesses are in Baltimore. For these
reasons, I cannot agree that Piper applies to Kerrigan’s
appeal.

1. The Supreme Court used the term “foreign” to describe plaintiffs
entirely outside the United States. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 255-56, 102 S.Ct, 252, 70 L.Ed,2d 419 (1981). Commentators
discussing federal law have analyzed Piper as if it applies only to actions
from plaintiffs outside the United States. See Charles Wright & Arthur
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3828.2 (4th ed. 2009), We

2

This Court in Lewng, in dicta, noted Piper merely for the
principle of attributing less deference to a foreign plaintiff's
choice of venue. 854 Md. at 228-29, 729 A.2d 956. The Majority
relies on Leung’s citation to Piper to diminish Kerrigan’s
choice of venue. But in Leung, this Court reversed a trial
court’s transfer on forwm non conveniens grounds and al-
lowed the plaintiffs to choose a venue. Jd. at 229, 729 A.2d 956.
The plaintiffs in Leung were New Jersey residents passing
through Maryland on Interstate 95. Id. at 220, 729 A.2d 956.
While on a portion of I-95 in Howard County, the plaintiffs
were injured in a crash. Several vehicles were involved in the
wreck. The plaintiffs sued five defendants. Both of the individ-
ual defendants lived out of state. Of the three corporate
defendants, only two had registered agents in Maryland—one
in Prince George’s County and another in Baltimore. Jd. The
plaintiffs filed their suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City but the defendants moved to transfer venue to Howard
County. Id. at 221, 729 A.2d 956. The trial court granted the
motion and transferred the case to Howard County. Jd. Even
though the accident occurred in Howard County and only one
defendant had a registered agent in Baltimore City, we re-
versed the transfer. Id. at 229, 729 A.2d 956. The Court
specifically rejected the defendants’ argument that Piper's
less deferential standard should have permitted the transfer.
Id. at 228, 729 A.2d 956,

Because we have not adopted a less deferential standard for
“foreign” plaintiffs, we should apply our normal Rule 2-327(c)
standard: that the plaintiffs may choose their venue unless
the convenience of the parties and witnesses or the interests
of justice strongly favor transfer. Under this test, I would hold
the trial judge abused his discretion by concluding that both
convenience and the interests of justice weighed strongly in
favor of transfer.

should not apply Piper to a dispute between parties merely from
different subdivisions in the same state,

2. The Majority also notes that the Court of Special Appeals, in Stidham
v. Morris, 161 Md.App. 562, 870 A.2d 1285 (2005), properly invoked the

Convenience

A trial court’s convenience analysis should focus on the
convenience of both the witnesses and the parties. But mere
added convenience cannot compel a transfer. Commentators
have noted, and we have recognized, that trial courts must
give due deference to a plaintiff’s selection of venue and that
selection should not be disturbed merely because it is more
convenient for a moving party to be in another court. See
Leung, 354 Md, at 225, 729 A.2d 956 (citing Paul V. Niemeyer,
Linda M. Schuett & Joyce E. Smithey, Maryland Rules
Commentary 808 (4th ed. 2014)).

I do not agree that the convenience of the parties and
witnesses strongly favors transfer to Talbot County.

In Odenton Dev. Co. v. Lamy, 820 Md. 38, 41-42, 575 A.2d
1235 (1990), this Court approved a transfer against the plain-
tiffs wishes due to limited connection with the chosen venue.
The plaintiff, an Anne Arundel County resident, slipped and
fell while traversing a snow covered-sidewalk outside of a
grocery store in Anne Arundel County. Jd. at 36, 575 A.2d
1235. She brought suit in Baltimore City against the property
owner, Odenton Development Co., which had a registered
agent in Baltimore. Id. at 87, 575 A2d 1285. The Court
concluded that the trial court properly transferred the case
from Baltimore City to Anne Arundel County. Convenience
strongly weighed in favor of transfer to Anne Arundel County
because the accident occurred there and it was reasonable to

less deferential standard mentioned in Leung. But in Stidham too, the
facts differed greatly from Kerrigan’s appeal.

Stidham involved a car accident in Baltimore County. Id. at 565-66,
870 A.2d 1285. The plaintiff also lived in Baltimore County. The
plaintiff sued out-of-state defendants in Prince George’s County and the
defendants moved to transfer the case to Baltimore County. Id. After
noting that the plaintiff and the suit had “virtually no connection” to
Prince George’s County, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s transfer, Id, at 565, 569-70, 870 A.2d 1285, Again, Kerri-
gan’s suit has a much greater connection to his chosen venue given the
extensive, and allegedly negligent, medical care he received in Balti-
more City.

assume that all of the witnesses either lived or worked in
Anne Arundel County. Id. at 41, 575 A,2d 1285,

In Urquhart v. Simmons, 389 Md. 1, 18-19, 660 A.2d 412
(1995), we rejected a plaintiff's choice of venue and approved a
transfer on convenience grounds. The plaintiff sued in Prince
George’s County despite the suit’s scant connections to that
county. Id. at 8-5, 660 A.2d 412. Though the plaintiff's dece-
dent died in Prince George’s County and the defendants
maintained offices there, all of the allegedly negligent conduct
occurred in Montgomery County. Id. at 1-4, 660 A.2d 412. We
approved the transfer to Montgomery County on convenience
grounds because “each of the individual defendants was a
resident of Montgomery County.... [and] the relevant medi-
cal care and treatment received by [the decedent] took place
in Montgomery County.” Jd. at 18, 660 A.2d 412. In Urquhart,
the Court never relied on or even mentioned Piper’s principle
that a plaintiff's choice receives less deference when suing in a
“foreign” venue. Perhaps the Court recognized that the unique
factual background of Piper rendered it inapplicable when
parties dispute merely which Maryland circuit court should
hear a case.

Kerrigan has a significant connection with his chosen forum.
Two of the allegedly negligent doctors work in Baltimore,
Kerrigan’s entire heart transplant team works in Baltimore,
and several medical professionals treated him in Baltimore
during his many months in recovery. During his treatment
and recovery, Kerrigan and his family made dozens of trips
into Baltimore City. These connections are far more tangible
than either the Odenton plaintiff—who only sued in Baltimore
City because a defendant’s resident agent was present there—
or the Urquhart plaintiff—who sued in Prince George’s Coun-
ty despite the fact that the decedent never received any
allegedly negligent medical treatment in that county.

Furthermore, the trial court did not properly weigh the
convenience of the parties because it used Kerrigan’s resi-
dence as a factor against his choice of venue, Relying on
Odenton, we stated in Urquhart that the plaintiff's choice of

forum is not a “factor” for consideration in a forum non
conveniens analysis. Rather, the plaintiffs right to choose a
forum is the reason why a trial court should transfer only
when “the balance weighs strongly in favor of the moving
party.” Urquhart, 889 Md. at 18 n.7, 660 A.2d 412 (quoting
Odenton, 320 Md. at 40, 575 A.2d 1285). When plaintiffs select
a venue, they presumably make determinations of convenience
for themselves. A trial court should not ignore the plaintiff's
choice when weighing convenience. Three defendants in this
case hail from Baltimore City. Yet the trial court took no issue
with these same Baltimore defendants moving to transfer the
case out of their home locale. We ought to look skeptically
upon a trial court's decision to use a plaintiff's residence
against him while not weighing the movant’s desire to transfer
in the same manner.

Interests of Justice

Maryland Rule 2-827(c) requires that both the convenience
of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice favor
transfer. Because I would find that a weighing of the conven-
ience of the parties and witnesses does not strongly favor
transfer, I could end my dissent. I continue to write separately
because the trial court further erred by concluding that the
“interests of justice” strongly favored transfer.

This Court has outlined relevant factors to consider in an
“interest of justice” analysis. See Johnson v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 814 Md. 521, 525-26, 552 A.2d 29 (1989). The interests of
justice can be divided into private interests and public inter-
ests. Jd, Private interest factors include:

The relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability

of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the

cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility
of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the

action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a

case easy, expeditious and inexpensive,

Stidham v. Morris, 161 Md.App. 562, 568, 870 A.2d 1285
(2005) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 880 U.S. 501, 508, 67
8.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), superseded by statute on other

grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) as recognized in Johnson v.
GD. Searle & Co., 314 Md. 521, 526-27, 552 A.2d 29 (1989)).

Here, the trial court concluded that the private interest
factors did not weigh in favor of trial in either Baltimore City
or Talbot County. I agree. Much of the evidence relevant to
the alleged negligence exists both in Baltimore City and
Talbot County. Many of the proffered witnesses also live or
work in both places. Given that evidence and witnesses are in
both locations, it seems very likely that trial in either venue
would demand the same time and costs from the parties.

Our interest of justice inquiry also requires consideration of
public interests. These interests include “among other things,
considerations of court congestion, the burdens of jury duty,
and local interest in the matter.” Id. at 569, 870 A.2d 1285
(citing Johnson, 314 Md. at 526, 552 A.2d 29). Regarding court
congestion and the burdens of jury duty in each venue, I agree
with the Majority and cannot conclude that the trial court
erred in determining that these factors favored transfer.

The Majority also approves of the trial court’s conclusion
that Talbot County has a greater local interest in Kerrigan’s
suit. The Majority explains only that the trial court found the
defendants’ argument more persuasive on this point. Further
inspection of the trial court’s reasoning leads me to disagree.
The trial court explained that:

I was persuaded by the defense argument noting that the
sole institution in Talbot County providing medical care is a
party defendant in the case. So compare that to Baltimore
City where there are several large medical institutions. The
Court does find that there is a significantly stronger inter-
est in Talbot County in the handling of this matter, the
outcome of this matter than in Baltimore City.

The trial court concluded that, merely because Talbot County
has only one hospital, the citizens of Talbot County have a
greater interest in deciding Kerrigan’s case. The Majority
determined that “the hearing judge acted reasonably in con-
sidering the public’s interest in the health care provided to its

communities.” Maj. Op. at 419, 174 A.3d at 867. I struggle to
find a line of reasoning to support this conclusion.

Maryland courts have only briefly discussed the “locality”
factor of the public interests. Specifically, we have said “there
is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home.” Johnson, 314 Md. at 526, 552 A.2d 29 (quoting Gilbert,
330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839); see also Stidham, 161 Md.App.
at 571-72, 870 A.2d 1285. Although this Court in Johnson did
not weigh the local interest factor, the Court of Special
Appeals in Stidham did. There, the intermediate appellate
court considered whether a plaintiff could bring suit in Prince
George’s County after a car accident in Baltimore County.
Reasoning that the trial court properly transferred the action
to Baltimore County, the Court explained “the people of
Baltimore County have a direct interest in what occurs on
Baltimore County roads; the people of Prince George’s Coun-
ty do not.” Stidham, 161 Md.App. at 571-72, 870 A.2d 1285;
see also Bland v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 116 Ill.2d 217,
107 IlL.Dec. 286, 506 N.E.2d 1291, 1297 (1987) (analyzing the
locality factor of forwm non conveniens and holding that
Macon County in Illinois had a local interest in an action since
it was the situs of plaintiff's alleged injury).

We cannot yet say whether doctors in Talbot County or
Baltimore City had a greater role, if any, in negligently
treating the plaintiff. In Stidham, all of the torts allegedly
occurred in the same county. Here, Kerrigan alleges multiple
torts in both Baltimore and Talbot County. Without more fact
finding, the trial court’s conclusion that citizens of Talbot
County have a greater interest in this case than their fellow
Marylanders in Baltimore was not supported.

Additionally, the trial court noted the existence of several
large hospitals in Baltimore while only one such hospital
operates in Talbot County. Presumably though, healthcare is
equally important no matter where one lives or how many
hospitals exist in a given municipality. For this reason, to the
extent that the trial court implied that the citizens of Talbot

County have a greater interest than Baltimoreans in assuring
access to safe healthcare, I do not agree.

The Majority today deals a heavy blow to our long-held
recognition of a plaintiff's right to choose a venue, See e9.,
Lewng, 354 Md. at 224, 729 A.2d 956; Akers v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 378 F.2d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1967). This Court has never
held, until today, that a plaintiff's choice of venue receives less
deference when suing where he or she does not live.

Chief Judge Barbera and Judge McDonald have authorized
me to state that they join this dissenting opinion.

174 Abd 872
IN RE: J.J. and T.S,
No. 5, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
November 28, 2017

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Argued by Nenutzka C. Villamar, Assistant Public Defender
(Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore,
MD) and Deborah A. Ullmann, Appointed Public Defender
(Pocomoke City, MD) on brief, for Petitioners.

Argued by Ann M. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General
(Leslie K. Ridgway, Assistant Attorney General and Brian E.
Frosh. Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD) on
brief, for Respondent.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getiy, JJ.

Barbera, C.J.

Hl Out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the
matter asserted are generally inadmissible as hearsay unless
otherwise permitted by statute or rule. One such statutory
exception, known as the “tender years exception,” is found at
§ 11-804 of the Criminal Procedure (“CP”) Article of the
Maryland Code. Section 11-304 applies to criminal cases and
juvenile court proceedings, including child in need of assis-
tance (“CINA”) proceedings.’ That section further provides
that a child’s out-of-court statement is admissible to prove the
matter asserted “only if” the statement has “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.” CP § 11-804(e)(1). In making

1. A “child in need of assistance” (“CINA”) is a child who requires court
intervention because the child has been neglected or abused and whose
parents or guardians are “unable or unwilling to give proper care and
attention to the child and the child’s needs,” Md. Code Ann., Courts &
Judicial Proceedings, § 3-801(f).

—i «

that determination, the court “shall consider, but is not limited
to” thirteen factors listed in the statute. CP § 11-304(e)(2).

We address in the present case the admissibility at a CINA
proceeding of the out-of-court statement of J.J., the then-nine-
year-old daughter of Petitioner James J. (“Mr. J,”), alleging
that Mr. J. had sexually abused her, The Wicomico County
Department of Social Services sought to introduce J.J.’s state-
ment to prove the truth of the matter asserted at the CINA
adjudication and disposition hearings involving J.J. and her
brother, T.S. The Circuit Court for Wicomico County, sitting
as a juvenile court, determined that J.J.’s statement would be
admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted because
the statement possessed the requisite particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness,

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
juvenile court. In re: J.J. and T.S., 231 Md.App. 304, 311, 150
A.3d 898 (2016). In an apparent exercise of its discretion, the
intermediate appellate court first addressed Mr. J’s argu-
ment, raised for the first time on appeal, that the juvenile
court should have ruled on J.J.’s competence to distinguish
between truth and falsehood before determining whether her
out-of-court statement was admissible under CP § 11-804, Id.
at 327-31, 150 A.3d 898. The intermediate appellate court
concluded that CP § 11-804 does not require a juvenile court
to determine a child’s truth competency when ruling on the
admissibility of the child’s out-of-court statement. Id, at 831,
150 A.38d 898, The court then held that the juvenile court
complied with the requirements of CP § 11-804 in concluding
that J.J.’s statement possessed particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. Jd. at 385, 150 A.3d 898.

We similarly exercise our discretion to address the unpre-
served competency issue, and, like the Court of Special Ap-
peals, hold that competency is not a prerequisite to admission
of a child’s out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter
asserted under CP § 11-304. We also agree with the Court of
Special Appeals that the juvenile court did not err in finding
that J.J.’s out-of-court statement possessed the requisite par-

o

ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admissi-
bility under that section. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals.

L

The Statute

We begin with a more detailed overview of CP § 11-304.
That section prescribes the conditions under which a child’s
out-of-court statement is admissible to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in a juvenile court proceeding. As a threshold
matter, the statement must be made by a child victim who is
under thirteen years old and “is the alleged victim or the child
alleged to need assistance in the case before the court con-
cerning ... a juvenile court proceeding[.]’ CP § 11-304(b).
Next, the statement must be “made to” and “offered by a
person [who is] acting lawfully in the course of” certain
professions, including, as relevant here, a social worker, when
the statement was made. CP § 11-804(c).

The statement may be admitted in a CINA proceeding
pursuant to the statute “if the statement is not admissible
under any other hearsay exception” and “regardless of wheth-
er the child victim testifies.” CP § 11-304(d)(2)(i). If the child
victim does not testify, the statement “will be admissible only
if there is corroborative evidence that the alleged offender had
the opportunity to commit the alleged abuse or neglect.” CP
§ 11-804(d)(2)Gi).

As noted above, to be admissible, the statement must also
have “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” CP § 11-
804(e)(1). When determining whether the statement has such
guarantees, the juvenile court “shall consider, but is not
limited to,” the following thirteen factors:

(@ the child victim’s personal knowledge of the event;

(ii) the certainty that the statement was made;

(ii) any apparent motive to fabricate or exhibit partiality by

the child victim, including interest, bias, corruption, or

coercion;

a 8

(iv) whether the statement was spontaneous or directly

responsive to questions;

(v) the timing of the statement;

(vi) whether the child victim’s young age makes it unlikely

that the child victim fabricated the statement that repre-

sents a graphic, detailed account beyond the child victim’s
expected knowledge and experience;

(vii) the appropriateness of the terminology of the statement

to the child victim’s age;

(viii) the nature and duration of the abuse or neglect;

(ix) the inner consistency and coherence of the statement;

(x) whether the child victim was suffering pain or distress

when making the statement;

(xi) whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the defendant

or child respondent had an opportunity to commit the act

complained of in the child victim’s statement;

(xii) whether the statement was suggested by the use of

leading questions; and

(xiii) the credibility of the person testifying about the state-

ment,

CP § 11-804(e)(2).

Prior to the hearing at which the out-of-court statement is
to be introduced, the court conducts a hearing at which the
court must “make a finding on the record as to the specific
guarantees of trustworthiness that are in the statement” and
“determine the admissibility of the statement.” CP § 11-
304(f). Section 11-304(g)(1) directs the court to examine the
child as part of its determination unless “the court determines
that an audio or visual recording of the child victim’s state-
ment makes an examination of the child victim unnecessary.”

We have said that a judge who is called upon to determine
“the admissibility of a tape recorded interview offered into
evidence pursuant to [CP] § 11-304 ... must comply with the
foundational requirements of that statute, including the re-
quirement that the court ‘make a finding on the record as to
the specific guarantees of trustworthiness that are in the

o

statement[.]’” Jones v. State, 410 Md. 681, 699-700, 980 A.2d
469 (2009) (quoting CP § 11-304(f)(1)). The hearing at which
that determination is made is generally referred to as the
“§ 11-804 hearing.” We shall employ that description here.

Il.
The Present Case

A. Factual Background

The underlying facts relevant to this appeal are not exten-
sive, J.J. was born in April 2006 and, as mentioned, was nine
years old when she made the allegation of sexual abuse
against her father, Mr. J. Her brother, T.S., born in December
2011, was three years old at the time of the allegation. J.J. and
T.S. are the children of Petitioners, Mr. J. and Ms. B. The
children were living alone with Mr. J. in August 2015 because
Ms. B. was incarcerated. On August 30, 2015, during a visit
with her maternal grandmother, J.J. told her grandmother
that Mr. J. had sexually abused her twice in the prior week.
Someone—the record does not disclose who—contacted the
Fruitland Police Department on August 30, 2015, to report
J.J.’s allegation that Mr. J. had sexually assaulted her. That
same day, the Fruitland Police Department contacted Trooper
Donna Hale of the Wicomico County Sheriff's Office about
J.J.’s allegations. Sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
that afternoon, Tiffany Gattis, a licensed clinical social worker
with the Child Advocacy Center, received a report of the
allegation.

At 7:09 p.m. on August 30, Ms. Gattis conducted an audio-
recorded forensic interview of J.J. in a treatment room at the
Peninsula Regional Medical Center. The interview was audio-
recorded because visual recording was unavailable due to the
location of the interview. Trooper Hale was present when the
interview was conducted. Ms. Gattis interviewed J.J. using a
forensic interview method known as RATAC, an acronym for
Rapport, Anatomy, Touch, Abuse, and Closure. RATAC is a
guided, non-leading, standardized approach for interviewing
children about alleged abuse. The interview lasted approxi-

mately twenty-one minutes and ended when J.J. asked to stop
the interview.

Later on the evening of August 30, Ms. Gattis spoke with
Mr. J. and T.S8. at the police department. Mr. J. told Ms.
Gattis that J.J. and T.S. had gone to visit their maternal
family on Wednesday, August 25, and returned to his care on
the evening of Saturday, August 29. Mr. J. denied abusing
JJ., stating that “he would not consider fighting for his
children because it was becoming an old and tiring process to
be accused of sexual abuse.” Mr. J. also told Ms, Gattis that
JJ. was “starting [a] mess, again” and that “he should have
never allowed her to visit ... her family because they were
filling her head with nonsense.” Ms. Gattis also spoke with
T.S., who was three years old at the time. No useful informa-
tion was gathered because the information sought was beyond
the scope of his age.

That same evening, a doctor at the Peninsula Regional
Medical Center performed a Sexual Assault Forensic Exam
(“SAFE”) on J.J., but J.J. had brushed her teeth, showered,
urinated, and defecated prior to the exam. The SAFE report
documented that J.J. was observed to have a “notch” on her
hymen and that she was “tender.” The report also noted that
“{J.J.] pointed to [a] penis sketch to say ‘it went in me.”

On August 31, 2015, the Department of Social Services
(“Department”) removed J.J. and T.S. from their home and
placed them in shelter care. That day, after the children had
been removed from their home, the Department filed a Peti-
tion for CINA. At the shelter care hearing on September 2,
2015, both parents agreed to shelter care, and an adjudication
was scheduled. On September 8, 2015, a medical doctor con-
ducted a Child Abuse Medical Providers (“CHAMP”) exam
and produced a report. The CHAMP report documented that
J.J. stated, “[D]ad put his finger in me and made me suck his
private part.” Though the physical CHAMP exam “show[ed]
no lacerations, scars, bruises, [and] no evidence of acute
trauma,” the examiner found that this “exam CAN be consis-
tent with disclosure.” (emphasis in original).

The Department filed an Amended CINA Petition on Sep-
tember 22, 2015, supplementing the Petition with allegations
of neglect dating back to 2012.

B. The Proceedings

1. The § 11-304 Hearing

Pursuant to CP § 11-804(d)(8), the Department filed a
notice of intent to introduce J.J.’s audio-recorded out-of-court
statement to Ms. Gattis and, on November 80, 2015, the
juvenile court conducted a hearing on its admissibility. Both
parents were present and represented by counsel. J.J. and
T.S., though not present at the hearing, were also represented
by counsel. The court heard testimony from Ms. Gattis and
Christine Whitworth, a Department in-home case worker as-
signed to Petitioners’ family from December 2014 through and
including August 2015. Mr. J. also testified.

Ms. Whitworth testified that Mr. J. lived alone with J.J. and
T.S. on the days immediately preceding the alleged sexual
abuse. Although she could not confirm that Mr. J. remained
alone with the children on the exact days of the alleged abuse,
she saw no reason that Mr. J. would have discontinued his role
as the sole caregiver.

Ms. Gattis’s testimony focused on her interview of J.J. At
the time of trial, Ms. Gattis had eight years of experience with
the Department and had interviewed approximately 3500 chil-
dren in her work with the Child Advocacy Center, though not
exclusively for sexual abuse. She described J.J.’s demeanor
during the interview. She stated that J.J. was initially “very
pleasant,” showing no signs of physical distress in the inter-
view. When, however, the conversation turned to anatomy and
abuse, J.J. became more “quiet and reserved,” her “shoulders
would cave in and her head dropped down,” and “she with-
drew from conversation.” Ms. Gattis interpreted such changes
as a “sign of distress.” Ms. Gattis described J.J.’s allegations
of sexual abuse by her father:

[J.J.] was very specific during the forensic interview. She

identified that her father forced her, and she identified as

—i °°

‘wee wee, adult or others would say penis. She identified that

her father forced her to suck his wee wee. She also identi-

fied that her father rubbed his wee wee on her vagina at
some point in time.... She was very specific to say that it
occurred in the living room of their current homef{.] ...

When asking about dates, [J.J.] referred to the incidents as

occurring, she stated last night [August 29] and Tuesday

[August 24].... [J.J.] identified that it was herself, her

father and her brother in the household.”

Ms. Gattis added that “[J.J.] made a very spontaneous com-
ment regarding her brother. During the abuse scenario, [she]
referred to her brother as upstairs in the bathtub making a
whole bunch of noise.... Her brother was not around when
the abuse occurred.”

During Ms. Gattis’s testimony, the audio recording of J.J.’s
statement was played for the court. In the audio recording,
J.J. described Mr. J. as getting “fully naked,” after which he
“pulled [her] pants off and pulled [her] shirt off,” “got on top,”
“eabbed his wee wee” on her unclothed “private part,” and
made her “suck his wee wee.” J.J. said that when the oral sex
was over, she “threw up.”

Ms. Gattis testified that, during the interview, J.J. used her
hands to demonstrate to Ms. Gattis the size of Mr. J.’s penis,
of which J.J. drew a picture that was consistent with what she
demonstrated to Ms. Gattis. When Ms. Gattis asked J.J. if this
had ever happened before, J.J. said, “Yeah, the last time I
talked to you.” *

2. Addressing the days of the week on which J.J. alleged the abuse to
have occurred, Ms. Gattis stated:

[J.J.] was able to say the night before and Tuesday, She has a concept
of what days of the week. However, because of her age, and because
it’s a traumatic event, I would not hold her steadfast to saying
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, whatever day it may have been,
However, she was able to be cognizant last night. She was able to say
last night which doesn’t require a day of the week.

3. J.J. had alleged in January 2013 and again in October 2014 that Mr.
J. had sexually abused her. Ms. Gattis met J.J. after the alleged October
2014 incident. The Department of Social Services investigated both of

Ms. Gattis testified that J.J. demonstrated with a pen the
act of “sucking a wee wee.” Ms. Gattis added that this was
“sexual knowledge” a nine-year-old should not have and that it
was “grotesque ... to see a child who is 9 years old perform
what she is telling you.” Ms. Gattis also described her August
80 interview with Mr. J., who told her that J.J. and T.S. “(left
his house and care on Wednesday” and “were with maternal
family from Wednesday until Saturday morning.”

On cross-examination by counsel for Mr. J., Ms. Gattis
admitted to using leading questions inadvertently—for exam-
ple, Ms. Gattis used the word “penis” in a sentence, instead of
referring to it as a “little wee wee,” as JJ. had done. Ms.
Gattis acknowledged that she did not discuss “truthfulness”
with J.J. during the interview because it is “not part of the
RATAC protocol.” Ms. B.’s counsel questioned Ms. Gattis on
inconsistencies in J.J.’s audio-recorded statement: J.J. made
conflicting statements to Ms. Gattis whether Mr. J’s penis
“rubbed” or was “in” J.J; and whether J.J, was partially or
fully nude. Ms, B.’s counsel noted the inconsistencies between
JJs statement to Ms. Gattis and those she gave to the SAFE
and CHAMP examiners. Ms. B.’s counsel also highlighted, as a
possible motive for alleging that Mr. J. sexually abused her,
JJ’s statement to Ms. Gattis that she was “trying to stay the
night with my grandmom.” Ms. Gattis conceded that “[t]here
is no document that says from another individual that he had
the opportunity” to commit the abuse.

those allegations. Neither allegation was “ruled out”; however, both
were determined to have been “unsubstantiated.” See Md. Code Ann.,
Fam, Law § 5-701(m), (w), (aa) (providing three findings concerning
alleged abuse and neglect: “indicated,” “ruled out,” and “unsubstanti-
ated”). A finding of “unsubstantiated” means “a finding that there is an
insufficient amount of evidence to support a finding of indicated or
ruled out.” § 5~701(aa).

J.J. made a separate allegation of sexual abuse by her maternal
cousin in January 2013. Following that investigation, the local Depart-
ment of Social Services found the cousin’s sexual assault to have been
““ndicated,” which is defined as “a finding that there is credible
evidence, which has not been satisfactorily refuted, that abuse, neglect,
or sexual abuse did occur.” § 5-701(m), Her cousin was ultimately
criminally charged and convicted.

After hearing the above testimony, the court concluded that
it would not examine J.J. as part of its determination of the
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and admissibility
of her statement. Section 11-304(g)(1) directs the court to
examine the child victim when making these findings unless
“the court determines that an audio or visual recording of the
child victim’s statement makes an examination of the child
victim unnecessary.” The court concluded that “the audio
recording of the child makes an examination of the child victim
unnecessary in this case.” The court further stated, “I don’t
think it would add to my ability to determine whether that
statement made back [in August] in light of the questioning
had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. So I’m not
going to interview the child.”

The juvenile court next addressed whether J.J.’s statement
would be admissible for the truth of the matter asserted if she
did not testify at the adjudication hearing. Pursuant to CP
§ 11-804(d)@2)Gi), a child victim’s out-of-court statement is
admissible when the child does not testify “only if there is
corroborative evidence that the alleged offender had the op-
portunity to commit the alleged abuse or neglect.” The De-
partment argued that such corroborative evidence could be
found in Mr. J.’s statement to Ms. Gattis that he was the sole
caregiver of the children on the nights of the alleged abuse,
which was consistent with J.J.’s statement and Ms. Whit-
worth’s testimony. Ms. B.’s counsel argued that the Depart-
ment had not met its burden to show that such corroborative
evidence existed. The juvenile court disagreed, finding corro-
borative evidence that Mr. J. had the opportunity to sexually
abuse J.J., given his pre-hearing statement against interest to
Ms. Gattis that he was alone with the children on the dates of
the alleged abuse and “the existence that they were all living
there.”

The juvenile court then heard from Petitioners and the
Department regarding the thirteen factors set forth in CP
§ 11-304 for determining the admissibility of J.J.’s out-of-
court statement at the subsequent adjudicatory hearing, The

juvenile court then made on-the-record findings concerning
each statutory factor:'
{@ the child victim’s personal knowledge of the event]

The child has great personal knowledge of the event. She
talks about it in detail about—there is no confusion about
what happened in the statement.

[ Gi) the certainty that the statement was made]

It was clearly made. It was tape-recorded. We all heard
it.

[ Gii) any apparent motive to fabricate or exhibit partial-
ity by the child victim, including interest, bias, corrup-
tion, or coercion]

[Slhe, in 2018, I think a little more than a year and a half
before this incident made the statements about her father
and wanted to get the gun and shoot him.

And in addition, there was testimony that the recurrence
of this occurs that she may [have been] coerce[d] somewhat
by her maternal relatives. So there does exist an apparent
motive to exhibit partiality by the child, and there was some
testimony about [the] possibility [of] coercion, although
nothing specific under that factor.

[ Gv) whether the statement was spontaneous or directly
responsive to questions]

There was some spontaneity in the answers. Most of them
were directly responsive to questions.

[ (y) the timing of the statement]

The timing of the statement is very proximate to the most
recent abuse which was the night before. So at least with
regard to that, it’s very proximate. And then if you go back
to Tuesday and Thursday, it was close in time to those, also.
[ (vi) whether the child victim’s young age makes it
unlikely that the child victim fabricated the statement

4, For convenience, we have separated by statutory factors the juvenile
court’s findings,

—_i  «

that represents a graphic, detailed account beyond the
child victim’s expected knowledge and experience]

Well, she is 9 years old now, right? Am I right?

And what she described would be beyond the child vie-
tim’s expected knowledge and experience except for, unfor-
tunately, for this child victim, she is a prior victim of sex
abuse. So she may have and in all likelihood does have much
more knowledge and experience. So it was an age appropri-
ate statement for a 9-year-old in the sense of, I mean, it
was a believable statement in the sense that she wouldn’t
have that knowledge. We don’t know how much knowledge
she has if any as a result of having been sexually abused
before.

Now, I will talk more about how I’m evaluating that
factor when I make my final ruling.

[ @ii) the appropriateness of the terminology of the
statement to the child victim’s age]

It was completely appropriate using the terms of wee wee
and private parts[.]

[ (viii) the nature and duration of the abuse or neglect]

She talked about the three specific days that she said.
And then she said Tuesday and last night, but also that it
started, I think, it was three weeks after she went to see
Miss Christine I think we figured out.

[ Gix) the inner consistency and coherence of the state-
ment]

There are things that are inconsistent in this statement.
First, there’s no clothes on. Then there’s clothes on. Where
she is during this? But when I look at, and then what
happened? ...

5. The court made no further mention of this factor. Yet, we can
presume that the judge took it into consideration when ruling on the
admissibility of J.J.’s statement. See Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax,
396 Md. 405, 426, 914 A.2d 113 (2007) (stating that judges are pre-
sumed to know the law and apply it, even absent express consider-
ation),

She is not being led in that part, and she is giving it
graphically. Then she draws a picture—I mean, she writes a
note about the suck. And uses her finger to go in and out of
her mouth, I believe, later on when we get through here.

So there is nothing about that that is inconsistent or
incoherent. And those are the two—the discussion of the
actual events or whatever—the meat of the statement.

{(x) whether the child victim was suffering pain or
distress when making the statement]

She was, obviously—according to the testimony of Ms.

Gattis in some distress, the stress not inconsistent with a 9-
year-old making those statements.
{ (xi) whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the de-
fendant or child respondent had an opportunity to com-
mit the act complained of in the child victim’s state-
ment]

In the child victim’s statement, there is extrinsic evidence.
How convinced the trier of fact will be in light of other
evidence does [not] [sic] negate the fact that there is
extrinsic evidence, and that is his statement against interest
to [the Department] and/or the law enforcement officer. I
don’t know who he made that to exactly, the fact that they
all live together in that house. And I don’t know what other
evidence will come in at trial. But there is extrinsic evi-
dence.

[ (xii) whether the statement was suggested by the use of
leading questions]

There were a lot of leading questions in here. I’m not sure
with the social work background that Ms. Gattis has the
same understanding of what a leading question is as people
with a legal background. But as I was just reading through
that part, which I call the meat of the statement, those
weren’t leading.

And then what happened? And then what? Tell me what
you remember. This is what she says about the oral sex.
Tell me what you remember....

—i

These are not leading questions, at least as to the meat of
anything or the central issues. ...

[Yles, there are leading questions. I do not find that the
salient parts of this statement were suggestive by the use of
leading questions.

[ (xiii) the credibility of the person testifying about the

statement]

Ms. Gattis was a credible witness. I didn’t—I mean, it
looked to me—I mean, from my evaluation, she was trying
just to evaluate this statement. She did know in the back of
her mind that there had been earlier allegations. But I don’t
find that that influenced the way she conducted the inter-
view.

Now, whether that had any influence with their finding of
indicated or—I don’t know. But that’s not for me to decide
here and now.

Based on its findings concerning each of the above factors,
the court, pursuant to the statute, found that J.J.’s out-of-
court statement was admissible pursuant to CP § 11-304:

So I find that there are particularized guarantees of trust-

worthiness, and so I will determine that the statement is

admissible as far as the Statute goes. But, again, I think it’s
unclear to me whether at trial, additional evidence on the
issue of opportunity might become relevant, but at this point

I find it to be admissible.

Of note, neither Mr. J. nor Ms. B. argued at any point
during the § 11-804 hearing that J.J. was incompetent to be a
witness or asked the court to examine J.J. to determine her
competency.

2. Adjudication, Disposition, and Appeal

J.Jv’s statement was introduced and played at the adjudica-
tory hearing on December 16, 2015. At the conclusion of the
evidence, the juvenile court found J.J’s interview and her
statements “to be entirely credible.” The court sustained the
allegations of Mr. J.’s sexual abuse of J.J., stating that “[nJoth-
ing has refuted those statements.” Mr. J. and Ms. B. noted

their exceptions on the record. At the disposition hearing on
January 26, 2016, the juvenile court declared both children
CINA and committed them to the care and custody of the
Department for appropriate placement.

Petitioners each noted an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals. Among other contentions, Mr. J. contended that the
juvenile court erred in failing to consider J.J.’s competency as
a witness, even though he had not raised that concern before
the juvenile court. The Court of Special Appeals, evidently
exercising its discretion to address the issue, concluded that
J.J’s competency to testify as a witness “was not relevant to
the admissibility of her statement to Ms. Gattis.” In re: J.J.,
231 Md.App. at 329, 150 A.8d 898. The intermediate appellate
court looked to the plain language of the statute, as well as
decisions from sister states, and held that CP § 11-304 does
not impose a threshold finding of competency prior to admit-
ting a child victim’s out-of-court statement. Id. at 329-31, 150
A.3d 898.

The Court of Special Appeals further held that the juvenile
court properly deemed J.J.’s out-of-court-statement to Ms.
Gattis admissible at the adjudicatory hearing. The Court of
Special Appeals detected no error attendant to the juvenile
court’s handling of the requirements of CP § 11-804. The
intermediate appellate court likewise concluded that the juve-
nile court did not err, much less clearly err, when, upon
addressing each of the statutory factors, the court determined
that J.Jv’s statement had “particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness.” Jd, at 831-35, 150 A.3d 898.

We granted both Petitioners’ petitions for writ of certiorari
to answer three questions:

I. Under Maryland Code Annotated, Criminal Procedure
§ 11-804, where a child victim does not testify and the
juvenile court declines to examine the child in chambers,
must the court first find that the child is competent before
admitting her statement into evidence at a CINA adjudica-
tion hearing for the truth of the matter asserted?

—  «

II. Did the facts in this case establish that J.J. was compe-
tent where she did not testify in court and the court did not
examine her because it found that her audio-recorded state-
ment made an examination of her unnecessary?

III. Did J.J’s hearsay statement have particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness to be allowed into evidence?

mm.
Discussion

A. Competency
1, Preservation

Hr. J. argues that a juvenile court, before admitting a
child victim’s out-of-court statement for the truth of the
matter asserted, must first find that the child is “truth compe-
tent,” meaning that the child understands the distinction
between truth and falsehood. As noted above, Mr. J. did not
raise that contention before the juvenile court at any time
before or during the § 11-304 hearing; neither, for that
matter, did he or Ms. B. attempt to raise the contention at any
other juncture during the proceedings before the juvenile
court.

Maryland Rule 8-181 (a) states that “olrdinarily, the appel-
late court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly
appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the
trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if neces-
sary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the
expense and delay of another appeal.” This Court has not been
deterred from addressing and deciding, in the appropriate
case, a matter that was not timely raised before the trial
court. To the contrary, “[w]e have explained time and again
that Rule 8-131(a) grants an appellate court discretion to
consider issues deemed to have been waived for failure to
make a contemporaneous objection.” Abdul-Maleek v. State,
426 Md. 59, 69, 48 A.8d 883 (2012) (citing Bible v. State, 411
Md. 138, 148, 982 A.2d 348 (2009)). We have exercised such
discretion when, for example, doing so “will promote the

o

orderly administration of justice.” See id. at 70, 43 A.3d 383
(quoting Bible, 411 Md. at 152, 982 A.2d 348). Notwithstanding
Mr. J.’s failure to raise the issue before the juvenile court, we
shall exercise our discretion under Maryland Rule 8-131 to
address the contention, as it is likely to be raised in future
cases,’

2, The Parties’ Contentions

Mr. J. argues that a juvenile court must find that a non-
testifying child is truth competent before admitting his or her
out-of-court statement into evidence for the truth of the
matter asserted. He argues that the juvenile court erred by
admitting J.J.’s statement because, “absent any indication that
J.J. was capable of distinguishing between the truth and a lie
and fantasy and reality, her statement was unreliable” and
therefore inadmissible. He admits that the plain language of
the statute is “silent with regard to whether the court must
make a preliminary determination of the competency of a non-
testifying child declarant.” Nevertheless, he argues that the
legislative history suggests that the General Assembly did not
intend to admit statements made by a “truth-incompetent
declarant.”

The Department disagrees, arguing that the plain language
and legislative history of CP § 11-304 confirm that the juve-
nile court was not required to make a threshold competency
determination of J.J. prior to admitting her out-of-court state-
ment. The Department looks to the plain language of CP
§ 11-804, which has no such requirement, and argues that this
Court should decline to read a competency requirement into
CP § 11-304.

6. Mr. J. raises an additional contention that was not presented to the
juvenile court or raised or decided by the Court of Special Appeals. He
argues in this Court, for the first time, that due process requires a
juvenile court to determine the competency of a non-testifying child
before admitting the child’s out-of-court statement under CP § 11-304.
We decline to address that unpreserved argument,

—i  «
8. Analysis

HMM soOur analysis begins with the statute itself, In Phil-
lips v. State, we summarized the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion, noting that we “focus[ ] primarily on the language of the
statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General
Assembly.” 451 Md. 180, 196, 152 A.8d 712 (2017). To effectu-
ate that intent, “[w]e begin our analysis by first looking to the
normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute[.]” Id.
(quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 178, 31 A.8d 250
(2011), To ascertain the plain meaning of the language, “[w]e
view the plain language of a statute in the context of the
statutory scheme to which it belongs.” See Brown v. State, 454
Mad, 546, 551, 165 A.8d 898 (2017). “We neither add nor delete
language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain
and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not
construe a statute with ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that
limit or extend its application.” State v. Bey, 452 Md. 255, 265,
156 A.3d 873 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 418,
421, 2 A.8d 368 (2010)); see also State v. Adams—Bey, 449 Md.
690, 702, 144 A.38d 1200 (2016) (declaring that this Court will
not read words into a statute “to extend or limit the statute’s
meaning”). Where statutory language is “clear and unambigu-
ous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our
analysis ends.” Phillips, 451 Md. at 197, 152 A.8d 712.

HEM The Department observes, correctly, that CP § 11-
304 is silent on whether a juvenile court must make a truth-
competency determination prior to ruling on the admissibility
of a child’s out-of-court statement. Silence, though, is not
necessarily dispositive of legislative intent. Rather, “when a
statute is silent as to a particular issue, it is appropriate for
the Court to consider legislative history.” Nesbit v. Gov't
Emps. Ins. Co., 882 Md. 65, 77, 854 A.2d 879 (2004), We
therefore look for guidance to the legislative history of CP
§ 11-804,

The legislative history confirms that the General Assembly
did not intend to impose a requirement upon a juvenile court
to determine a child victim’s truth competency. In 1988, the

General Assembly enacted the tender years statute without
any competency requirement. 1988 Md. Laws 3646 (Vol. VI,
Ch, 548, S.B. 66); 1988 Md. Laws 3650 (Vol. VI, Ch. 549, H.B,
1018).’ In 1998, Senate Bill 688 was introduced and proposed,
inter alia, adding as a statutory factor “{tJhe child’s ability to
distinguish truth from falsehood.” S.B. 688, 1998 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 1998). This language would have replaced the
existing factor that examined “[wJhether extrinsic evidence
exists to show the defendant’s opportunity to commit the act
complained of in the child’s statement.” Id. By the third
reading of the bill, this proposed change had been stricken,
and the bill was later signed by the governor without this
change. 1998 Md. Laws 3100, 3104 (Vol. V, Ch. 638, S.B. 688).
Our research discloses that there was no other legislative
attempt to add a competency requirement to the tender years
statute since its enactment in 1988.8

Accordingly, we reach the same conclusion as did the Court
of Special Appeals. Section 11-804 contains no ambiguity. The
plain language of that section does not require a juvenile court
to find that a child is truth competent before admitting that
child’s statement under the statute, nor does its legislative
history suggest a contrary interpretation.

HN We also agree with the Court of Special Appeals
that a preliminary competency determination is irrelevant to a

7. The tender years exception was first codified at § 9-103.1 in the 1988
Supplement to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

8. Although bills were introduced, but never enacted, to admit a child’s
statement where the child is unavailable to testify at the proceeding due
to “incompetence,” see, ¢.g., S.B. 498, 1993 Leg,, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1993);
S.B. 482, 1992 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1992); H.B. 548, 1988 Leg., Reg.
Sess, (Md. 1988); S.B. 24, 1988 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1988); see also,
e2g., S.B. 340, 1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1994) (introducing an amend-
ment to admit a child’s statement when the child is unavailable due to
the child’s “[Ilevel of cognitive development, including ability to under-
stand abstract concepts”), such proposals cannot be read to have
imposed a competency determination. To the contrary, under these
proposed amendments, any competency determination would have
been unnecessary because the juvenile court could admit the child’s
out-of-court statement notwithstanding a finding of incompetence.

juvenile court’s admissibility determination. There has been no
showing, nor do we conclude, that the statute’s existing thir-
teen-factor trustworthiness test would be enhanced by requir-
ing examination of a non-testifying child’s competency. Rather,
CP § 11-804 imposes multiple conditions that must be satis-
fied prior to a juvenile court’s determination that the state-
ment is admissible: the court must make a finding as to
whether (1) it is unnecessary to examine the child; (2) there is
corroborative evidence that the alleged abuser had an oppor-
tunity to commit the abuse; and (8) the child’s statement
contains “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” No
additional findings are (or should be) necessary for a state-
ment to be admissible under the statute when the trial judge
“compl[ies] with the foundational requirements of that stat-
ute.” Jones, 410 Md. at 700, 980 A.2d 469. Accordingly, we
agree with the Court of Special Appeals that, “[g]iven the
plain language of CP § 11-804, as well as the different con-
cerns regarding the competency of a child witness to testify
and the admissibility of a prior out-of-court statement by an
abused child, ... a court need not make a competency deter-
mination prior to admitting a prior statement pursuant to CP
§ 11-804.” 231 Md.App. at 331, 150 A.8d 898,

Our conclusion is consistent with that of our sister states.
See Commonwealth v. Walter, 625 Pa. 522, 98 A8d 442, 458
(2014) (“[BJased on the plain language of the [state’s tender
years statute], ... we hold that a child need not be deemed
competent to testify as a witness in order for the trial court to
admit the child’s out-of-court statements into evidence pursu-
ant to the [statute].”); State v. Silverman, 121 Ohio St.3d 581,
906 N.E.2d 427, 434 (2009) (holding “that a hearsay statement
of a child declarant can be admitted under [the state’s tender
years rule of evidence] without a determination of the child’s
competence to testify”); State v. CJ., 148 Wash.2d 672, 63
P.3d 765, 770 (2003) (en banc) (“The statute’s prerequisites to
the admissibility of a child victim’s hearsay statements do not
include any requirement that a declarant must be shown to
have ... the ability to distinguish the difference between
truthful and false statements and an understanding of an

obligation to tell the truth.”); People v. Dist. Cowrt of Hl Paso
Cty., T76 P.2d 1088, 1088 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (“[W]e reject
the logically flawed assumption that a determination of incom-
petency at the time of the hearing invariably establishes that
the child’s statement was not reliable.”).

HM In summary, nowhere in CP § 11-304 or the legisla-
tive history is there support for Mr. J.’s argument that truth
competency is a prerequisite or relevant to the admission of a
child victim’s out-of-court statement for the truth of the
matter asserted. We therefore hold that CP § 11-304 imposes
no duty on the part of the juvenile court, beyond those duties
set forth in the statute, to determine a child’s truth competen-
cy. Accordingly, we have no need to address the second
question presented by Mr. J, concerning whether J.J. herself
was competent.

B. Trustworthiness

1. The Standard of Review

We turn now to the admissibility under CP § 11-
304 of J.J.’s out-of-court statement to Ms. Gattis. This Court
applies the clearly erroneous standard of review to the juve-
nile court’s factual findings made under CP § 11-304, See
Jones, 410 Md. at 700, 980 A.2d 469 (“The ‘clearly erroneous’
standard of review is applicable to the factual findings re-
quired by this statute.”); Md. Rule 8-131(¢). A decision is not
clearly erroneous “ ‘if the record shows that there is legally
sufficient evidence to support it.’” Kusi v. State, 438 Md. 362,
380, 91 A8d 1192 (2014) (quoting Biglari v. State, 156 Md.
App. 657, 668, 847 A.2d 1239 (2004)).

2. The Parties’ Contentions

Ms. B. argues that the juvenile court clearly erred by
admitting J.J.’s statement because her statement did not
possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. First,
though not a statutory factor under CP § 11-304, Ms. B.
argues that J.J.’s statement did not possess particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness because it was not “consistently

repeated.” She points to J.J.’s inconsistent statements to Ms.
Gattis and the SAFE and CHAMP examiners about the extent
and dates of the abuse. In support of this argument, Ms. B.
relies on Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3189, 111
L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), which provides that, in Confrontation
Clause cases, “consistent repetition” is a factor to determine
reliability in child hearsay statements, id. at 821-22, 110 S.Ct.
3139. Next, Ms. B. argues that there was insufficient corrobo-
rative evidence of Mr. J,’s opportunity to commit the abuse. In
Ms. B.’s view, it was not enough that the court found corrobo-
rating evidence in Mr. J’s statement against interest that
“they were all living there”; Ms. Whitworth had no informa-
tion concerning whether J.J. or T.S. were in fact residing with
Mr. J. on the alleged dates of the abuse.

Ms. B. further argues that J.J. was motivated to fabricate
her statement based on J.J.’s previous “false” allegations of
sexual abuse by her father, her “homicidal ideations towards
her father,” and her past “influenc[e] by others.” Though the
juvenile court acknowledged that “there does exist an appar-
ent motive to exhibit partiality by the child,” Ms. B. highlights
that the court failed to discuss how motive weighed in its
trustworthiness finding. Ms. B. also claims that the juvenile
court erred when it considered the degree to which J.J.’s
answers were either directly responsive to questions or spon-
taneous. In particular, while the court noted “some spontane-
ity” in J.J’s answers, Ms. B. contends that the court should
have considered not only J.J.’s spontaneity, but also what Ms.
B. characterizes as J.J.’s past manipulation by maternal rela-
tives to fabricate sexual abuse and J.J,’s motive to fabricate.
Ms. B. also contends that the juvenile court erred by admit-
ting J.J.’s statement due to the number of leading questions in
the interview. She suggests that, because a significant number
of the questions were leading, the entire interview was tainted.

Finally, Ms. B. argues that the court erred when it gave
insufficient weight to J.J.’s prior victimization by her cousin
when it considered whether J.J.’s described events were be-
yond her expected knowledge and experience. To illustrate
this point, Ms. B. highlights the court’s remarks on the

. a

subject: “I don’t know how the fact that there were prior
investigations or prior incidents of abuse might contribute to
the child’s knowledge and go to what she would be able or not
able to say.”

The Department responds that the juvenile court fully
complied “with the foundational requirements of that statute,
including the requirement that the court ‘make a finding on
the record as to the specific guarantees of trustworthiness
that are in the statement[.]” Jones, 410 Md. at 700-01, 980
A.2d 469 (quoting CP § 11-804(f)(1)). The Department argues
that the evidence at the § 11-304 hearing was sufficient for
the juvenile court to make its findings. The Department
reiterates the juvenile court’s analysis that J.J. showed she
had “great personal knowledge of the event” and contends
that she could provide sensory details of the abuse and
describe in detail where and how the abuse occurred, including
through illustrations and demonstrations. The Department
argues that any inconsistencies between J.J.’s forensic inter-
view and statements that she gave to others go to weight and
not admissibility under the statute, which requires the court to
consider only a statement’s internal consistencies. CP § 11-
304(e)(2)(ix). The Department adds that the court correctly
found that corroborative evidence showed Mr. J. had the
opportunity to commit the abuse.

8. Analysis

HH We are persuaded, for the reasons that follow, that
the juvenile court did not err, much less clearly so, in conclud-
ing that J.J.’s out-of-court statement possessed “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness” as required by CP § 11-804.
At the § 11-804 hearing, the juvenile court fully “complfied]
with the foundational requirements of that statute, including
the requirement that the court ‘make a finding on the record
as to the specific guarantees of trustworthiness that are in the
statement.’ ” Jones, 410 Md. at 700, 980 A.2d 469 (quoting CP
§ 11-804((1)). The court played the audiotape of J.J.’s out-of-
court statement, heard testimony and argument, and consid-
ered the evidence. Pursuant to CP § 11-304(f(1), the court

— «

made on-the-record findings as to the requisite guarantees of
trustworthiness of J.J.’s statement. The court addressed each
of the thirteen statutory factors and deemed J.J.’s statement
to be admissible under CP § 11-804.

We reject Ms. B.’s argument that the juvenile court was
required to consider as a factor whether J.J.’s statement was
“consistently repeated” pursuant to Idaho v. Wright. Wright
was replaced by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124
8.Ct. 1854, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), as the seminal case on
confrontation, and Wright only spoke of the need for this
finding in a criminal context, where the right to confrontation
attaches. In contrast, Maryland courts have found that the
right to confrontation does not apply in civil, let alone CINA,
proceedings. Tyler v. State, 8342 Md. 766, 774 n4, 679 A2d
1127 (1996) (“In a civil case, there is no need to protect the
defendant’s right of confrontation.”); In re Colin R., 63 Md.
App. 684, 693-94, 498 A.2d 1088 (1985) (“[Tyhe right of con-
frontation ... is not available to the parents of an alleged
C.LN.A.”).

We further note that consistent repetition is not an enumer-
ated factor of CP § 11-304 that the juvenile court “shall
consider” when determining admissibility. Instead, the juve-
nile court need only consider “the inner consistency and
coherence of the statement.” CP § 11-804(e)(2)(ix). Although
the court “is not limited to” the enumerated factors, CP § 11—
304(e)(2), we agree with the Department that any inconsisten-
cies between J.J.’s statement to Ms, Gattis and statements she
gave to others go to weight and not admissibility.

Our review of the record reflects that the juvenile court’s
treatment of the requisite statutory factors was exacting and
fully considered, and that it “compllied] with the foundational
requirements” of CP § 11-804. Jones, 410 Md. at 700, 980
A.2d 469. We likewise reject Ms. B.’s arguments that the
juvenile court improperly weighed the factors in its analysis.
It is for the juvenile court, and not us, to weigh the evidence
and make factual findings in accordance with that evidence.
See Md. Rule 8-181(c).

We hold that, because there was legally sufficient evidence
to support the juvenile court’s findings, we find no error in the
court’s conclusion that J.J.’s statement had particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness to be admissible for the truth of
the matter asserted under CP § 11-304,

Iv.
Conclusion

HM We hold that the CP § 11-304 does not require a
juvenile court to make a competency determination prior to
ruling on the admissibility of a child declarant’s out-of-court
statement for the truth of the matter asserted. Such a prelimi-
nary competency determination is likewise irrelevant when
determining whether a child victim’s statement contains “par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness” to be admissible
under CP § 11-304. We further hold that the juvenile court
did not err in concluding that J.J.’s out-of-court statement was
admissible in her juvenile court proceeding because her state-
ment contains the requisite “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness” for admission pursuant to CP § 11-304. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals,
which came to the same conclusions.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID 50% BY PETITIONER
FATHER AND 50% BY PETITIONER MOTHER.

457

174 A.Bd 894

In the MATTER OF the PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT
OF Vaughn Miles MUNGIN to the Bar of Maryland

Misc. Docket AG No. 118, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 5, 2017

Argued by William C. Brennan, Jr., Esquire (Brennan,
McKenna, Manzi, Shay, Chtd. of Greenbelt, MD) for respon-
dent.

Argued by Raymond A. Hein, Esquire, Deputy Bar Counsel,
Lydia E, Lawless, Bar Counsel (Attorney Grievance Commis-
sion of Maryland) for petitioner.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Petition for Reinstatement of
Vaughn Miles Mungin to the Bar of Maryland filed on May 24,
2017; Bar Counsel’s response filed on August 24, 2017; Bar
Counsel’s supplemental response filed on August 29, 2017; the
Court of Appeals of Maryland’s opinion issued on July 18,
2014, concluding that Petitioner had violated Maryland Law-
yers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competence), 1.15(a)
and 1.15(d) (Safekeeping Property), 8.4(d) (Conduct That is
Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Vio-
lating the MLRPC), Maryland Rule 16-609 (Prohibited Trans-
actions), and Md. Code Ann., Bus. Oce. & Prof. § 10-806
(Trust Money Restrictions) and indefinitely suspending Peti-
tioner from the practice of law in Maryland with the right to
apply for reinstatement after six months; and oral argument
on December 1, 2017,

WHEREAS, Petitioner has existing financial obligations,
ie, debt in form of amounts owed to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), the State of Maryland, and the United States
Department of Education totaling in excess of $1 million;

WHEREAS, Petitioner has entered into payment plans with
the IRS and the Comptroller of Maryland requiring monthly
installment payments;

WHEREAS, Petitioner has an account with the United
States Department of Education which is in default and has
been placed with Coast Professional, Ine. a debt collection
agency;

WHEREAS, as evidenced at oral argument, Petitioner has
made only two payments of $2,500 to the IRS on February 10,
2017 and May 16, 2017, respectively, and one payment of $250
on May 18, 2017 to the United States Department of Edu-
cation;

WHEREAS, Petitioner has advised the Court of Appeals of
Maryland without further explanation that, with respect to
employment, during the period of suspension, he considered
various entrepreneurial activities;

WHEREAS, since the suspension on August 17, 2014, thirty
(30) days after issuance of the Court of Appeals of Maryland’s
opinion, to the present, Petitioner has not sought and main-
tained consistent employment;

WHEREAS, the Court determines that Petitioner has not
demonstrated the requisite character and competence to prac-
tice law for reinstatement;

it is this 5th day of December, 2017, ORDERED, by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the Petition for Reinstate-
ment be, and it is hereby, DENIED.

174 A.3d 895

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner,

v.
Phillip G. DANTES, Respondent.
Mise. Docket AG No. 45, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 6, 2017

ORDER

The Court of Appeals of Maryland, having consider the
Joint Petition of the Attorney Grievance Commission and
Respondent, Phillip G. Dantes, to place Respondent on Inac-

tive Status by Consent pursuant to Maryland Rule 19~736(¢),
it is this 6th day of December, 2017;

ORDERED, that the Joint Petition be, and it is hereby
GRANTED, and the Respondent, Phillip G. Dantes, is hereby
placed on Inactive Status by consent; and it is further,

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall remove the
name of Phillip G. Dantes from the register of attorneys in the
Court and certify that fact to the Client Protection Fund of
the Bar of Maryland and all Clerks of all judicial tribunals in
this State in accordance with Maryland Rule 19-761.

175 A.3d 117
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner,
ve
Diana Beth DENRICH, Respondent.
Misc. Docket AG No. 70, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.

December 11, 2017

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Joint Petition for Disbarment by
Consent filed herein pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-786, and
the Respondent’s acknowledgement herein that she committed
professional misconduct in violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the
former Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, in
effect at the time of the misconduct, it is this 11th day of
December, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
Respondent, Diana Beth Denrich, be and she is hereby dis-
barred from the practice of law in the State of Maryland, and
it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
name of Diana Beth Denrich from the register of attorneys in
this Court, notify Respondent of the filing of this Order in
accordance with Maryland Rule 19~742(a)(1), and comply with
the notice provisions set forth in Maryland Rule 19-761(b).

oa
a

175 A8d 117
In the MATTER OF the APPLICATION TO RESIGN FROM
the PRACTICE OF LAW OF JERRY SUSSMAN
Misc. AG Docket No. 40, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 13, 2017

ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of the Application to Resign
from the Practice of Law of Jerry Sussman and the response
of Bar Counsel thereto, it is this 18th day of December, 2017,
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland:

ORDERED, that the resignation of Jerry Sussman from the
Bar of the State of Maryland is hereby accepted; it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall remove the
name of Jerry Sussman from the register of attorneys entitled
to practice law in this State and certify that fact to the
Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all
judicial tribunals in this State.

175 A8d 118

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND, Petitioner

ve
Francis A. POMMETT, III, Respondent,
Misc. Docket AG No. 47, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 14, 2017

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Joint Petition for Indefinite Sus-
pension With Right to Seek Reinstatement After One Year

filed herein pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-736, and Respon-
dent’s acknowledgement therein that sufficient evidence exists
to sustain allegations that he committed professional miscon-
duet in violation of Rules 1.2(a), 1.4 (a)(2)-(8) & (b), 1.5(a) &
(b), 1.15(a) and 8.4(d) of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct in effect prior to July 1, 2016 and that he
also violated Maryland Rules 16-606.1, 16-607 and 16-609c in
effect prior to July 1, 2016, it is this 14th day December, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that
Francis A. Pommett, III, Respondent, is hereby indefinitely
suspended by consent from the practice of law in this State,
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of this order; and it is
further

ORDERED, that Respondent shall be eligible to seek rein-
statement pursuant to Rule 19-752 no sooner than one year
from the effective date of the suspension; and it is further

ORDERED, that fifteen (15) days from the date of this
Order, the Clerk of this Court shall strike the name of Francis
A, Pommett, [II from the register of attorneys in this Court,
notify Respondent of such action, and comply with the notice
provisions set forth in Maryland Rule 19-761(b).

175 A3d 118

In the MATTER OF the Honorable Alfred NANCE, Judge
of the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City,
Eighth Judicial Circuit

Judicial Disabilities Docket No. 1, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 14, 2017

Submitted by Kendra Randall Jolivet, Esquire and Carol
Anne Crawford, Esquire (of Commission on Judicial Disabili-
ties), for Petitioner.

Submitted by William C. Brennan (of Brennan, McKenna,
Manzi, Shay Chartered, Greenbelt, MD), for Respondent.

Submitted to: Barbera, C.J., Adkins, McDonald, Watts,
Hotten, Getty, JJ.

ORDER

WHEREAS, the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabili-
ties, pursuant to Maryland Rule 18-407 (j) & (k), referred to
this Court the case of In the Matter of the Honorable Judge
Alfred Nance, Judge of the Circuit Court for Maryland for
Baltimore City, Eighth Judicial Circuit, Case Nos. CJD
2015-121, CJD 2015-163 and CJD 2016-012 for expedited
consideration pursuant to Maryland Rule 18-408(a), and

WHEREAS, Judge Nance having filed a Motion to Dismiss
in light of his resignation from the bench, effective December
1, 2017, with his declaration that he will not seek recall as a
Senior Judge, and there being no opposition filed, it is this
14th day of December, 2017,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
case be, and it is hereby, dismissed without a determination as
to mootness.

Judge Greene did not participate in the consideration of this

case.

175 A3d 119
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
John Alexander GIANNETTI, Jr.
Misc. Docket AG No. 54, Sept. Term, 2016

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

=

>
&

Argued by Dolores O. Ridgell, Esquire, Senior Assistant

Bar Counsel (Lydia E. Lawless, Bar Counsel, Attorney Griev-
ance Commission of Maryland) for Petitioner.

Argued by John Alexander Giannetti, Jr. (Annapolis, MD),
for Respondent.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Alan M. Wilner (Senior Judge, Specially
Assigned), JJ.

Greene, J.

This attorney discipline case arises out of an attorney’s
failure to file federal and state tax returns as well as his
failure to satisfy federal and state tax obligations for a seven-
year period.

The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (‘“Peti-
tioner” or “Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel,
charged Respondent, John Alexander Giannetti, Jr., with sev-
eral violations relating to his failure to file and pay federal and
state incomes taxes for the years 2008 through 2015. Specifi-
cally, the Commission charged Respondent with violating the
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”
or “Rule”) 8.4 (Misconduct)! and the Commission filed a

1. Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct (“MLRPC”) were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
Professional Conduct (““MARPC”) and re-codified, without substantive
change, in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules, Because we assess Respon-

Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, pursuant to
Maryland Rule 16-751(a).

This Court referred the matter to Judge Glenn L. Klavans
(the “hearing judge”), of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County, on November 4, 2016, to conduct an evidentiary
hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
hearing judge scheduled the case for a hearing on April 28,
2017.

Petitioner served Respondent with discovery requests in the
form of Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents
and/or Electronically Stored Information, and Requests for
Admissions of Fact and Genuineness of Documents. Respon-
dent failed to file any response. Upon Petitioner’s Motion for
Sanctions Upon Failure to Provide Discovery, the hearing
judge found that Respondent’s failure to respond was “without
excuse or objection, was purposeful and willful, and that
Respondent made no good faith effort to resolve the discovery
dispute.” As a result, the hearing judge deemed admitted
Petitioner’s Requests for Admissions of Fact and Genuineness
of Documents, and prohibited Respondent from testifying or
introducing evidence in opposition to Petitioner’s claims. Re-
spondent was also prohibited from offering mitigation wit-
nesses, other than his own personal testimony. On the eve of
trial, Respondent filed a Request for Postponement to Prepare
Defense based on New Information and Other Facts, along
with a Motion to Shorten Time for Petitioner’s Response. The
hearing judge heard the motion orally as a preliminary matter
on the day of trial, April 28, 2017, and upon Respondent’s
argument as well as Petitioner’s response, the hearing judge
denied the motion. The Circuit Court heard evidence from
Petitioner, and although Respondent was permitted to testify
on his behalf as to any mitigation evidence, he did not offer
any mitigation evidence. After the hearing, Judge Klavans
issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which

dent's conduct against the extant law at the time of his actions, we refer
to the MLRPC throughout.

he concluded that Respondent had violated Rule 8.4(a), (b), (¢)
and (d).

L
The Hearing Judge’s Findings

The hearing judge made the following findings of fact by
clear and convincing evidence. See Md. Rule 19-727(c) (noting
that “Bar Counsel has the burden of proving the averments of
the petition by clear and convincing evidence.”). Respondent
was admitted to practice law in Maryland on April 6, 1995.
Beginning in January 2008 and continuing through December
2015, Respondent maintained an office for the practice of law
in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, where he was self-em-
ployed and, therefore, was not working for an employer who
withheld payroll taxes. The hearing judge found that Respon-
dent knew he had an obligation to file tax returns and pay
taxes to both the federal and state governments. With respect
to the filing and payment of those federal and state tax
obligations, the hearing judge found:

4, Beginning on or about April 15, 2008 and continuing

through April 15, 2015, Respondent knowingly failed to

timely file both federal and Maryland income tax returns.

Admission 5,

5. In some years, Respondent requested and received ex-

tensions for filing his tax returns. In the years Respondent

requested and received extensions, Respondent did not file

a return prior to the extended date. Admission 6-7.

6. Respondent paid no Maryland State Income taxes for

tax years 2008 through 2014. Admission 8.

7. On occasions when Respondent filed untimely federal

and Maryland tax returns, he did not include payments for

taxes owed. Admission 9.

8. During the period 2008 through 2015, Respondent made

one payment on his federal income tax liability. Payment

was made in 2011 and was applied to Respondent’s 2007 tax

liability. Admission 10-11.

aoe

11. Respondent did not keep accurate and complete finan-
cial records of his income during the years 2008 through
2015. Admission 14.

OR

16. The total amount owed by Respondent for federal

income taxes, according to the records provided by Respon-

dent, was $38,107.97, which included penalties and interest

for failure to file and failure to pay as of February 26, 2016.

17. The exact amount of Respondent’s income tax obli-

gation to the State of Maryland cannot be determined by

this [Circuit] Court, since Respondent provided no informa-
tion regarding his state tax liability to Bar Counsel. The

State, however, has a tax lien in excess of $112,000.00

against Respondent.

Judge Klavans noted that Respondent “chose not to testify
as to the presence of any physical and/or mental health
problem and/or other mitigating factors related to his failure
to file timely tax returns and pay his tax obligations.” The
hearing judge found that Petitioner’s investigator, and sole
witness at trial, did not suspect Respondent of having a
substance abuse problem. Finally, the hearing judge found
that although the Petitioner’s witness did not understand all of
the information on the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
reports, “it was clear from the records that for each tax year
2008 through 2014, the IRS had imposed penalties for not
paying income taxes in a timely manner and for every tax year
2008 through 2014, the IRS imposed penalties for not filing a
return in a timely manner.”

IL.
The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law

Judge Klavans concluded by clear and convincing evidence
that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), (¢) and (d). As he
explained:

The following conclusions of law were supported by
clear and convincing evidence:

The Petition alleged that Respondent violated Maryland
Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)-(d) (as enu-
merated at the time of the misconduct), which provides, in
relevant part:

Rule 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’

Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce

another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the

lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in

other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit

or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the adminis-

tration of justice;

The Court of Appeals has long recognized that willful failure
to file tax returns and/or pay taxes is professional miscon-
duct, even in the absence of fraud and/or dishonest intent.
See Attorney Grievance Commission [of] Maryland v. Wal-
man, 280 Md. 458, 459, 468, 374 A.2d 354, 358-59, 360
(1977). An intentional and voluntary violation of a known
legal duty, such as willful failure to file income tax returns,
is sufficient to constitute a violation of the Maryland Law-
yers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Katz, 429 Md. 808, 817-18, 55 A.3d 909
(2012). For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds
clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated
MLRPC 8.4(a) through (d). See Attorney Grievance Com-
mission v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 655-56, 745 A.2d 1086,
1091 (2000) (An attorney’s failure to file returns and pay
taxes for a period of ten years violated MLRPC (b), (c) and
(d).).

With regard to finding a violation of MLRPC 8.4(b), a
two-part test must be applied. The Court must first find
that the lawyer’s conduct violated a criminal statute. Prose-
eution and conviction are not necessary. The Court only

needs to find clear and convincing evidence that the conduct
was in violation of the law. See, eg. Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Proctor, 809 Md. 412, 418, 524 A.2d 778, 776
(1987). That part of the test has been met. Willful failure to
file returns and/or to pay personal income taxes is a crime
under both federal and Maryland Law. See Attorney Griev-
ance Commission v. Tayback, 878 Md. 578, 587, 887 A.2d
158, 164 (2003). In this case, there were conclusive findings
that Respondent knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily
failed to file both state and federal tax returns in a timely
manner for a period of at least seven years, 2008 through
2015, Owing [taxes for] those seven years, he knowingly
failed to pay Maryland State taxes and made only one late
payment on his federal income tax obligation. The fact that
Respondent’s failures were knowing was established by the
admissions. The facts that Respondent’s failure began after
he became self-employed and no longer subject to withhold-
ing taxes, that he filed requests for extensions of the time in
which to file his federal Income Tax Returns in some years
but then failed to file and/or pay within the extended period,
and his statements to [Bar Counsel’s investigator] provided
additional clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
was well aware of the requirements of the law and that his
failure to meet this known obligation was, therefore, willful
and intentional. Respondent offered no mitigation evidence
to the contrary.

With regard to the second part of the test, the Court of
Appeals has previously determined that criminal conduct
involving failure to file returns and pay taxes adversely
reflects on the lawyers’ honesty, trustworthiness and/or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects. “Many kinds of illegal
conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as
offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to
file an income tax return.... A pattern of repeated of-
fenses, even ones of minor significance when considered
separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.”
MLRPC 8.4 Comment [2].

In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Atkinson, 857 Md.
646, 656, 745 A.2d 1086, 1091 (2000), the Court of Appeals
found that an attorney’s failure to file returns and/or pay
taxes for a ten year period violated MLRPC 8.4(b). In
Atkinson, the Court of Appeals found that the lawyer had
purposefully avoided almost all contact with both the state
and federal income taxing authorities and at no point exhib-
ited, over a period of eleven years, any real intention to
fulfill her duties of filing the required returns and paying
the taxes due, until the authorities discovered her delin-
quency and contacted her. In this case, Respondent demon-
strated a similar purposeful avoidance. Except for the filing
of a 2007 return in March 2011 and a single credit of
payment in August 2014, (Petitioner’s exhibit 2, pages 1-2),
Respondent failed to exhibit any efforts to correct the on-
going delinquency until after he admitted his conduct while
testifying in the family law matter in August 2014, that he
had not filed returns for a number of years, and even then
he did not promptly act to correct the problems. As of
March 2016, Respondent had not yet entered into a pay-
ment plan with the IRS and/or the State of Maryland. As of
the hearing date, April 28, 2017, there was no evidence of
any efforts by Respondent to correct the situation. Atkin-
son, 857 Md. at 658-55, 745 A.2d at 1090. See also Tayback,
378 Md. at 587-90, 887 A.2d at 164-65.

Based on the foregoing, there was clear and convincing
evidence that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(b).

Respondent’s continued failure to file timely returns and
pay taxes due and/or overdue also constituted conduct in-
volving dishonesty, in violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). In Atkin-
son, the Court of Appeals overruled an exception to the
hearing judge’s finding that the lawyer’s failure to contact
an IRS agent to remedy the situation after failing to file
returns for a number of years was, “at best, dishonest.” The
Court explained that the hearing court correctly character-
ized Atkinson’s particular misconduct as dishonest, “... if
only because of the substantial duration in time over which
she failed to pay both state and federal income taxes. The

repeated failure to file tax returns—particularly when it
spans an uninterrupted period of over ten years—is not a
minor criminal offense, [it] is a dishonest act ...” (emphasis
in original) 857 Md. at 655, 745 A.2d at 1091. Although in
this case the evidence of Respondent's failure to file timely
returns and pay taxes extends a few years less than that in
Atkinson, the misconduct went on for a substantial duration
of time and may be ongoing.

For the foregoing reasons, there was clear and convincing
evidence that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c).

The Court of Appeals has also previously determined that
an attorney’s willful failure to file tax returns and pay taxes
constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice. The conduct described above provided clear and con-
vineing evidence that Respondent engaged in conduct likely
to erode the public’s confidence in the legal profession and
that this conduct was prejudicial to the administration of
justice, in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d). See Tayback, 878 Md.
at 592, 837 A.2d at 166; Walman, 280 Md. at 468, 374 A.2d
at 360.

With regard to MLRPC 8.4(a), the violations of the other
subsections of this Rule provided clear and convincing evi-
dence that Respondent violated the MLRPC, thereby violat-
ing MLRPC 8.4(a).

Til.

HMMM Neither party has taken exception to the hearing
judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Where no
exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact are filed, this
Court “may treat the findings of fact as established for the
purpose of determining appropriate sanctions.” Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Gray, 444 Md. 227, 250, 118 A.8d 995,
1008 (2015). We, therefore, deem Judge Klavans’ findings of
fact as established by clear and convincing evidence. See Rule
19-727(¢); see also Gray, 444 Md. at 250, 118 A.3d at 1008. We
review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo. Attor-
ney Grievance Comm'n v. Storch, 445 Md. 82, 89, 124 A8d

204, 208 (2015). Judge Klavans determined that Respondent
violated MLRPC 8.4(a), (b), (ec) and (d). Based upon our
independent review of the record, we are satisfied that the
facts support the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.

Discussion
Hl Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part, that:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice[.]

This Court has recognized that not only is the “willful failure
to file returns and/or to pay personal income taxes [] a crime
under both federal and Maryland law” but that the “repeated
failure to timely file tax returns is a serious violation of the
[MLRPC].” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tayback, 378 Md.
578, 587, 588, 837 A.2d 158 (2003) (observing that the Com-
ment to MLRPC 8.4 begins “Many kinds of illegal conduct
reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses
involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an
ineome tax return.” Jd. at 588, 837 A.2d at 164.), The Court
has plainly declared that the repeated failure to file tax
returns “is a dishonest act” in violation of Rule 8.4. Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 655, 745 A.2d
1086, 1091 (2000). Moreover, a “conviction for tax evasion is
not a necessary predicate to support a finding of dishonesty.”
Id. at 655-56, 745 A.2d at 1091.

HMM In Toyback, this Court noted that “{t]he willful
failure to file returns and/or to pay personal income taxes is a
erime under both federal and Maryland law.” 878 Md. at 587,
837 A.2d at 164. Respondent violated Rule 8,.4(b) when he
willfully failed to timely file, or pay, his federal and state
income taxes for a seven-year period starting in 2008 and
lasting through 2015. See, eg. 26 U.S.C. § 7208;? Maryland
Code, Tax-General Article, § 18-1001(d) (1988, 2016 Repl.
Vol.) Aside from filing his 2007 federal tax return in March
2011 as well as making one payment in August 2014 towards
his federal tax liability, which was applied to his 2007 tax
liability, Respondent has avoided rectifying the delinquencies
related to his tax obligations.

In fact, Respondent first testified in open court during a
family law-related proceeding in August 2014 about his failure
to comply with his tax-related responsibilities. Nearly three
years later, at the disciplinary hearing in April 2017, Respon-

2. “26 U.S.C. § 7203 entitled ‘Willful failure to file return, supply
information, or pay tax’ provides:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax,
or required by this title or by regulations made under authority
thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any informa-
tion, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such
return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or
times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in
the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 years, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution. In the case of any person
with respect to whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this
section shall not apply to such person with respect to such failure if
there is no addition to tax under section 6654 or 6655 with respect to
such failure. In the case of a willful violation of any provision of
section 60501, the first sentence of this section shall be applied by
substituting “felony” for “misdemeanor” and “5 years” for “1

year.
3. Md. Code, § 13-1001(d) of the Tax-General Article provides:
A person who is required to file an income tax return and who
willfully fails to file the return as required under Title 10 of this
article is guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction, is subject to a

fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or
both,

dent still had not resolved—either by paying or by entering
into a payment plan—his outstanding tax liabilities. Further,
in some of the years that Respondent failed to file and pay his
taxes, he requested and received extensions for filing his
returns. Despite receiving extensions to file, Respondent con-
tinued to not file his returns.

Respondent’s persistent failure to file and pay his federal
and state taxes over a continuous span of seven years consti-
tutes a dishonest act in violation of Rule 8.4(c). See Atkinson,
357 Mad. at 655, 745 A.2d at 1091 (“The repeated failure to file
tax returns—particularly when it spans an uninterrupted peri-
od of over ten years—is not a minor criminal offense, [it] is a
dishonest act.”).

Hl Finally, Respondent’s willful failure to file returns or
pay his taxes from 2008 through 2015 is a violation of Rule
8.4(d) as conduct that is “prejudicial to the administration of
justice because ‘it cheats and defrauds the government.’”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Worsham, 441 Md. 105, 180,
105 A.8d 515, 580 (2014) (recognizing that although an attor-
ney’s willful failure to file or pay tax returns does not cause
direct harm to a client, the act itself is “prejudicial to the
administration of justice because it ‘cheats and defrauds the
government,’ ”) (quoting Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Agnew,
271 Md. 548, 551, 318 A.2d 811, 816 (1974)). “By willfully
failing to file his tax returns, a lawyer appears to the public to
be placing himself above the law.” Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Baldwin, 308 Md. 397, 407-08, 519 A.2d 1291, 1297
(1987). At a minimum, the conduct with which Respondent is
charged—the repeated failure to file his tax returns—“reflects
adversely on a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to
practice law.” Atkinson, 857 Md. at 655, 745 A.2d at 1091.

We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated
Rules 8.4(b), (@) and (d). Because Respondent violated

4. Respondent acknowledged at Oral Argument that, as of November 6,
2017, his outstanding tax balance with the federal government was
$41,628 and was $23,032.73 with the state government.

MLRPC 8.4(b), (c) and (d), he also violated Rule 8.4(a). See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Katz, 448 Md. 889, 407, 116
A8d 999, 1010 (2015) (“It goes without saying that because
[the attorney] violated MLRPC 8.4(b), (c), and (d), he also
violated MLRPC 8.4(a), which states, in part, that it is profes-
sional misconduct for an attorney to violate the MLRPC.”);
see also Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Phillips, 451 Md. 658,
677, 155 A.3d 476, 490 (2017).

Iv.
Sanction

HMM Having determined that Respondent violated Rule
8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d), we must now decide the appropriate
sanction for Respondent’s misconduct. In doing so, we remain
mindful that the goal of attorney discipline is to not to punish
the errant attorney but to “protect the public and the public’s
confidence in the legal profession[.]” Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Brigerman, 441 Md. 28, 41, 105 A3d 467, 477
(2014). An appropriate sanction measures the attorney’s mis-
conduct against any aggravating or mitigating factors as well
as the attorney’s prior grievance history. Atkinson, 357 Mad. at
656, 745 A.2d at 1092. With respect to an attorney’s failure to
file income tax returns, an important consideration is the
intention and motive of the attorney. Jd.; see also Worsham,
441 Md. at 132, 105 A.3d at 581. (“Generally, when the willful
failure to file is not the result of a fraudulent intent, suspen-
sion is the appropriate sanction. By contrast, disbarment is the
appropriate sanction when the misconduct was the result of
intentional dishonest conduct for personal gain.” (internal
citations omitted)).

HMI Petitioner recommends a sanction of indefinite sus-
pension with the right to apply for reinstatement after one
year. Respondent, at oral argument, suggested that the appro-
priate sanction would be either a formal or informal repri-
mand, perhaps with conditions such as monitoring.

The hearing judge found only one mitigating factor: that
Respondent fully cooperated with Bar Counsel’s investigation.

Given that Respondent is obligated under the MLRPC® to
cooperate with an investigation by Bar Counsel, we do not
place much weight on Respondent’s cooperation as a mitigat-
ing factor.

With respect to aggravating factors, the hearing judge
found eight aggravating factors including that Respondent had
been previously reprimanded by the Commission for conduct
unrelated to filing or payment of taxes, Respondent was
motivated by pecuniary gain through his tax avoidance, Re-
spondent exhibited a pattern of misconduct that persisted
from 2008 through the date of the hearing, and Respondent
violated multiple provisions of the MLRPC. The hearing judge
found that Respondent’s twenty-two years of experience prac-
ticing law was an aggravating factor. Additionally, Judge
Klavans found as an aggravating factor that Respondent was
indifferent about making restitution towards his tax obli-
gations, Another aggravating factor was that Respondent vio-
lated both federal and state law by failing to file and pay his
tax obligations, Finally, the hearing judge found that Respon-
dent obstructed the proceedings by failing to respond to Bar
Counsel’s discovery requests “in any way whatsoever.”

Petitioner’s recommendation that Respondent be indefinite-
ly suspended from the practice of law with the right to apply
for reinstatement after one year is entirely consistent with our
case law. For example, we have previously held that suspen-
sion with the right to apply for reinstatement after one year
was warranted for an attorney who violated MLRPC 8.4(b), (¢)
and (d) when she failed to file and pay federal and state
income taxes for a period of more than ten years. Atkinson,

5, Rule 8.1 provides in pertinent part:
[A]... lawyer in connection with a ... disciplinary matter, shall
not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to
respond to a lawful demand for information form an admission or
disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclo-
sure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

857 Md, at 659, 745 A.2d at 1093. In Tayback, the Court held
that the Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(b), (c) and (d) when
he willingly failed to file his federal income tax return for a
period of years in the late 1980s and then again in the early
1990s. 378 Md. at 595, 887 A.2d at 168, In that case, this Court
held that the appropriate sanction was indefinite suspension
with the right to apply for reinstatement after sixty days. Id.
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clark, the attorney failed to
timely file employee withholding tax returns, failed to remit
the taxes withheld, and failed to hold the withheld taxes in a
trust account. 363 Md. 169, 182, 767 A.2d 865, 873 (2001). This
Court issued a sanction of indefinite suspension with the right
to apply for reinstatement immediately for that attorney, who,
among other factors, had completed a payment plan with the
Comptroller to satisfy his tax obligations by the time of oral
argument before the Court. Id. at 184, 767 A.2d at 874. By
way of contrast, this Court sanctioned an attorney with disbar-
ment upon the attorney's repeated and willful failure to timely
file federal tax returns for a period of fourteen years and
“anderpaid his taxes for 15 years to the tune of approximately
$2.5 million.” Katz, 443 Md. at 409, 116 A.8d at 1011 (observ-
ing that “{tJhis misconduct is far more egregious than that of
other attorneys we have suspended for failure to file and pay
their incomes taxes.” Id.)

At oral argument, Respondent distinguished his case from
the facts of Atkinson on the basis that the attorney in that
case did not file for an extension to file her taxes, whereas
each year Respondent did file for an extension. According to
Respondent, this detail is important because it suggests that
he “was not hiding” from the IRS. It is true that this Court
noted in Atkinson that the attorney in that case

purposefully avoided almost all contact with both the state
and federal income taxing authorities and at no point exhib-
ited, over a period of eleven years, any real intention to
fulfill her duties of filing the required returns and paying
the taxes due, until the authorities discovered her delin-
quency and contacted her.

857 Ma. at 654, 745 A.2d at 1090, We, however, are unpersuad-
ed that Respondent’s act of filing for extensions each year is a
helpful distinction. Although Respondent may have had more
contact with the IRS than the attorney in Atkinson, through
his act of filing for extensions, the fact remains that Respon-
dent failed to pay the taxes owed, even when those extensions
were granted. Indeed, Respondent’s act of requesting exten-
sions then not filing the tax returns evinces a strong sugges-
tion that he did not have any real intention to confront, or
fulfill, his tax obligations.

Respondent’s case is strikingly similar to Atkinson in sever-
al other ways. The attorney in Atkinson failed to file and pay
her federal and state income taxes for over ten years. Al-
though we do not view cooperation with the IRS as a mitigat-
ing factor, we note that the attorney in Atkinson had estab-
lished a plan with the IRS to discharge her debts. 357 Md. at
657-58, 745 A.2d at 1092. Here, Respondent offered no evi-
dence at all of a payment schedule to settle his obligations.
Respondent’s tax avoidance lasted for a substantial number of
years, just as in Atkinson. Moreover, Respondent’s miscon-
duct has gone uninterrupted for at least seven years and, as
Judge Klavan noted, it “may be ongoing.” As compared to the
attorney in Tayback, who failed to file and pay his federal
income taxes for several years, we determine that Respon-
dent’s case aligns consistently with Atkinson. Respondent’s
conduct of continually failing to file or pay both his federal and
state taxes for a period of seven years and the filing of
extensions without paying his taxes warrants an indefinite
suspension from the practice of law with the right to apply for
reinstatement no sooner than one year after the date of filing
of this opinion. The suspension will begin thirty days after the
date on which this opinion is filed. As a condition of reinstate-
ment, Respondent shall comply with Md. Rule 19~752. In
addition, as a condition of reinstatement, we order Respondent
to provide documentation to Bar Counsel that he has rendered
himself in good standing with respect to his federal and state
tax obligations in the event he files a petition for reinstate-
ment,

If IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS
COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-709(b), FOR
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST
JOHN ALEXANDER GIANNETTI, JR. RESPONDENT’S
SUSPENSION SHALL COMMENCE THIRTY DAYS
FROM THE FILING OF THIS OPINION.

175 A3d 129
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
Benjamin Jeremy WOOLERY
Mise. Docket AG No. 15, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Reconsideration Denied January 18, 2018

ea)

485

lit

Argued by Raymond A. Hein, Deputy Bar Counsel (Lydia
E. Lawless, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland), for Petitioner.

Argued by William C. Brennan, Jr., Esquire of Brennan,
McKenna Manzi, Shay, Chtd. (Greenbelt, MD), for Respon-
dents.

Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald,
Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

McDonald, J.

No one who has practiced law for any appreciable time can
claim to have never made a mistake in that practice, A
mistake in the practice of law is not necessarily professional
misconduct. However, once aware of a mistake that harms
another and given the opportunity to mitigate it, a lawyer who
decides to do nothing may be guilty of misconduct.

Respondent Benjamin Woolery was appointed as personal
representative for an estate that had a single asset—real

oS

property that had served as the decedent’s home. There were
five heirs—adult children of the decedent—with different
ideas as to how to dispose of that property. In handling this
difficult estate, Mr. Woolery made a mistake. In preparing the
property for sale, he came upon a tractor that had been stored
there by one of the adult children. Without determining the
tractor’s ownership or value, he impulsively sold it to an
individual who happened to be present for what turned out to
be a small fraction of the tractor'’s actual value.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Woolery became aware of his mis-
take. Mr. Woolery was promptly informed of the ownership
and value of the tractor. Given the opportunity to remedy the
situation, Mr. Woolery chose not to do so, apparently out of
personal animus toward its owner. We hold that the choice
that Mr. Woolery made was misconduct that merits a repri-
mand.

I
Background

A. Procedural Context

On June 24, 2016, the Attorney Grievance Commission
(“Commission”) through Bar Counsel filed a Petition for Disci-
plinary or Remedial Action with this Court against Mr. Wool-
ery. The Commission charged Mr. Woolery with violations of
the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Con-
duct (““MLRPO”): 1.1 (Competence); 1.8 (Diligence); 1.7
(Conflict of Interest); 3.3 (Candor toward the Tribunal); and
8.4(a)-(d) (Misconduct)! On August 10, 2016, Mr. Woolery
filed an answer to the petition in which he admitted most of
the factual allegations, qualified his agreement with a few of

1, Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct (“MLRPC”) were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
Professional Conduct and recodified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules.
Because the conduct in question occurred prior to the recodification
and because the alleged violations were charged and litigated under the
prior codification, we refer to the MLRPC throughout this opinion.

them, and denied the conclusion of the petition that those facts
constituted professional misconduct.

In accordance with Maryland Rule 19-722(a), we designated
Judge Hassan A. El-Amin of the Cireuit Court for Prince
George’s County to conduct a hearing concerning the alleged
violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended
conclusions of law.? The hearing took place over three days on
December 7-8, 2016 and January 18, 2017. At the hearing, the
parties submitted a detailed stipulation of facts and introduced
in evidence various documentary exhibits, including much of
the record of Orphans’ Court and District Court proceedings
related to the charges against Mr. Woolery. Several witnesses,
including Mr. Woolery, testified.

On March 20, 2017, the hearing judge issued a memoran-
dum opinion in which he made detailed findings of fact and
recommended conclusions of law. In his recommended conclu-
sions of law, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Woolery
violated MLRPC 8,4(d). The hearing judge found that the
Commission failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Mr. Woolery violated MLRPC 1.7, 3.8, and 8.4(a), (b), and
(c). He also found in Mr. Woolery’s favor for the most part
with respect to the alleged violations of MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3.

Neither party filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s find-
ings of fact. Mr. Woolery filed exceptions to the hearing
judge’s conclusions of law to the extent that the hearing judge
found violations of the MLRPC. This Court held oral argu-
ment on September 6, 2017.

B. Facts

Neither party contests the hearing judge’s findings of fact
and, accordingly, we treat those findings as established. Mary-
land Rule 19-741(b)(2)(A). We summarize those findings, along

2. The Court originally assigned the matter to Judge Krystal Q. Alves.
The Court rescinded that designation on August 29, 2016, and assigned
the case to Judge El-Amin instead,

with the parties’ stipulations and admissions, and other mat-
ters uncontested in the record.

Mr. Woolery’s Law Practice

Mr. Woolery has been a member of the Maryland Bar since
December 1988. During the period pertinent to this case, Mr.
Woolery was a junior partner in the firm of McGill and
Woolery in Upper Marlboro. Mr. Woolery has had substantial
experience in the field of estates and trusts law.

The Roy Chambers Estate

On July 8, 2006, Roy L. Chambers, Jr., a resident of Prince
George’s County, passed away. His wife having predeceased
him, Mr. Chambers was survived by five adult children:
Carolyn Bowman, Mary Nicodemus, David Lee Chambers,
Kenneth J. Chambers, and Thomas Chambers. Mr. Chambers
had executed a will on January 28, 1985. According to Mr.
Chambers’ will, his five surviving children were to receive
equal shares of his residuary estate. A few days after Mr.
Chambers’ death, the Register of Wills for Prince George’s
County opened the Estate of Roy L, Chambers, Jr., Estate
No. 00000007907.

Mr. Woolery becomes Personal Representative of the
Estate

The estate had a succession of personal representatives,
including two stints by Mr. Woolery. Initially, one of Mr.
Chambers’ daughters—Carolyn Bowman—was appointed per-
sonal representative of the estate pursuant to the terms of the
will. Mr. Woolery was appointed as a successor personal
representative on December 13, 2007, until he was replaced by
another attorney on April 28, 2008. He was later reappointed

3. Mr. Woolery initially became involved with the estate at the behest of
Mary Nicodemus, but decided to “bow out” after a few months as
personal representative, Mr. Woolery was succeeded by Darryl Kelly,
who served until July 2, 2008, when Ara D. Parker was named as
personal representative, When Ms. Parker asked to be removed from
that position, citing “verbal abuse by two of the heirs,” Mr. Woolery
was appointed for the second time,

a

as personal representative of the estate on March 18, 2010,
and served until his final accounting in late 2016.

The Property of the Estate

When Mr. Woolery became personal representative of the
estate for the second time, it had one asset—a parcel of real
property that Mr. Chambers had owned free of any encum-
brances at the time of his death. The property was located at
7301 Webster Lane, Fort Washington, Maryland 20744 (“the
Webster Lane property”). The Webster Lane property con-
sisted of 1.95 acres which was improved by a house, a garage
with a residential apartment, and a large shed. Mr, Chambers
and his wife had once resided in the house. Other than the
Webster Lane property, the estate had no other assets.’

The Family Dispute

A rift among the surviving children hindered the efforts of
Mr. Woolery and the prior personal representatives to dispose
of the Webster Lane property and close the estate. The heirs
had split into two groups. One group, which the hearing judge
referred to as the “Bowman Camp,” included Carolyn Bow-
man, Kenneth J. Chambers (who both lived in Michigan), and
David Lee Chambers (who lived in Virginia), The Bowman
Camp wanted to sell the property and split the proceeds of the
property among all five children,

The other group, referred to as the “Nicodemus Camp,”
included Mary Nicodemus and Thomas Chambers, who lived
in Prince George’s County and Charles County, respectively.
The Nicodemus Camp contended that the Webster Lane
property should be conveyed to Mary Nicodemus and Thomas
Chambers because members of the Bowman Camp had al-
ready received the benefit of Mr. Chambers’ brokerage ac-
counts by operation of law outside of the estate.

Over the years after Mr. Chambers’ death, the Nicodemus
Camp made various efforts to procure the Webster Lane

4. A brokerage account titled jointly in the name of Mr. Chambers and
one of his children had been disposed of by operation of law outside the
estate.

property, including suing the estate to force conveyance of the
property, requesting dismissal of personal representatives,
and objecting to accountings. Those efforts made it difficult
for any of the personal representatives to resolve the estate.

Mr. Woolery’s Effort to Sell the Webster Lane Property

When he became personal representative for the estate the
second time in March 2010, Mr. Woolery intended to sell the
Webster Lane property. He encountered several problems in
this effort. In addition to the family discord over whether to
sell the property at all, the estate had no other assets to
finance the expense of preparing and advertising the property
for sale. Mr. Woolery’s effort to obtain a bank loan was
rejected and he was unwilling to advance money to the estate
himself.> Thus, for any professional services related to the
property, Mr. Woolery would have to hire those professionals
on a contingency basis. Moreover, by the time Mr. Woolery
became personal representative for the estate the second time,
Thomas Chambers had begun renting one or more of the
buildings on the property to various tenants. While Thomas
Chambers and the tenants thus helped maintain the property,
their presence became an obstacle to Mr. Woolery’s effort to
dispose of it.

Initially, Mr. Woolery pursued the possibility of subdividing
the property but ultimately dropped that idea. In September
2011, he obtained permission from the Orphans’ Court to sell
the Webster Lane property “as is” with a 10% commission.
Over the next two and a half years, Mr. Woolery made a few
visits to the property and entered into discussions with a
realtor. At the hearing of this case, Mr. Woolery testified that,
in light of the ongoing dispute among Mr. Chambers’ adult
children concerning disposition of the property, he had decid-
ed to “lay low in the grass.” As the hearing judge noted, Mr.

5. In an affidavit in lieu of accounting submitted to the Orphans’ Court,
Mr, Woolery indicated that he might make a loan to the estate at an
interest rate of between 5% and 7%, but he apparently decided not to
do so.

Woolery adopted a “go slow, stealth-like, indirect, and non-
confrontational approach.” Mr. Woolery felt that this approach
was best, having developed some concern, based on state-
ments of David Chambers and Carolyn Bowman, that Thomas
Chambers might resort to violence, and therefore wished to
avoid contact with Thomas Chambers,

Mr. Woolery Visits the Property in April 2014 to Take
Control
In April 2014, Mr. Woolery decided to proceed with selling
the Webster Lane property. The property had remained un-
der the control of Thomas Chambers. A tenant named Earl-
mont Bell was then living in the garage apartment on the
property. On April 25, 2014, Mr. Woolery visited the Webster
Lane property to secure possession of the property by chang-
ing the locks and posting “no trespassing” signs. He spoke
with Mr. Bell that day and agreed to let him remain on the
property for three months while a sale was accomplished.
Mr. Woolery had invited a locksmith to the property that
day to change the locks. He also hoped to sell surveying
equipment that had belonged to the decedent and that he
believed might still be on the property. To that end, Mr.
Woolery had invited an acquaintance, Andrew Duley, a sur-
veyor who Mr. Woolery thought might be interested in pur-
chasing that equipment. Mr. Duley invited another surveyor,
Stephen Wilson, to accompany him. Mr. Woolery met Mr.
Wilson for the first time that day.

Mr. Woolery Discovers and Sells a Tractor and Backhoe
for $500

While at the Webster Lane property that day, Mr. Woolery
found a Kubota tractor with an attached backhoe stored inside
the large shed. Mr. Woolery had not seen the tractor and
backhoe on the property before and did not know who owned
it or how much it was worth. He asked Mr. Duley and Mr.
Wilson if they were interested in purchasing the tractor and
backhoe. Mr. Duley was not interested, but Mr. Wilson was.
Mr. Woolery sold the tractor and backhoe to Mr. Wilson for

$500 cash; Mr. Wilson arranged for a tow truck to remove it
from the property.’ Mr. Woolery did not create any documen-
tation of the sale. Asked at the hearing why he had sold the
tractor and backhoe in that manner, Mr. Woolery testified:
“There [was] no real thought process at all. It [was] an
automatic now let’s get rid of that thing.” After selling the
tractor and backhoe, Mr. Woolery used cash from the sale to
pay the locksmith for changing the locks on the Webster Lane
property and to reimburse himself for the purchase of the “no
trespassing” signs.

Unbeknownst to Mr. Woolery at the time, the tractor and
backhoe actually belonged to Thomas Chambers, and not the
estate. Thomas Chambers had purchased it in January 2004
for $15,200.00 and was temporarily storing it at the Webster
Lane property while fixing a sinkhole there.

Mr. Woolery is Informed of the Value and Owner of the
Tractor

Within a few days, Thomas Chambers learned that Mr.
Woolery had sold his tractor and backhoe. Thomas Chambers
promptly contacted Mr. Woolery concerning his desire for its
return. In addition, on May 7, 2014, Thomas Chambers sent
Mr. Woolery a copy of his purchase invoice for the tractor and
backhoe, documenting his ownership and the price he had
paid. Mr. Woolery took no action to recover the tractor and
backhoe or to contact Mr. Wilson, either directly or through
Mr. Duley. Mr. Woolery explained to Thomas Chambers that
he would not attempt to obtain return of the tractor and
backhoe, but that Thomas Chambers could file a claim in the
Orphans’ Court against the estate.

At the hearing of this case, Mr. Woolery testified that he
believed that, because Thomas Chambers had been renting
the Webster Lane property—an asset of the estate—and
presumably collecting rent from the tenants, Thomas Cham-
bers owed the estate money. Mr. Woolery’s rationale for

6, At the hearing of this case, Mr. Wilson testified that he retained the
tractor and backhoe until sometime in 2015.

refusing to try to recover the tractor and backhoe was that
any loss Thomas Chambers suffered from its sale was offset
by the rent money he had collected with respect to the
Webster Lane property which, in Mr. Woolery’s view, rightful-
ly belonged to the estate.

Mr. Woolery Sells the Webster Lane Property

In late summer 2014, Mr. Woolery sold the Webster Lane
property to an entity called Wholesale Portfolio Partnership.
The deed transferring the property was dated August 30, 2014
and showed a sale price of $166,000.

Thomas Chambers sues Mr. Woolery

In the meantime, Thomas Chambers had sued Mr. Woolery
individually, in the District Court of Maryland for Prince
George’s County, to recover the value of the tractor and
backhoe. Thomas Chambers v. Benjamin Woolery, Case No.
05-02-0010748-2014. The case went to trial in the District
Court on October 21, 2014. At that trial, Mr. Woolery testified
about how he had sold the tractor and backhoe, Mr. Woolery
stated that he had “auctioned” it off to the “group of surveyors
who were invited to the premises.” On cross-examination, Mr.
Woolery reiterated his description of an “auction” before a
group of surveyors and suggested that their identities were
unknown to him. He testified as follows:

Counsel: And once,—oh, who did you sell the tractor to?

Mr, Woolery: I don’t know. It was group of surveyors who

were invited to the premises and 1 was looking for cash
dollars to meet the estate’s obligations. I wasn’t looking—

Counsel: You don’t know the person’s—

Mr. Woolery: —to take names and numbers,

Counsel: You don’t know the person’s name?

Mr. Woolery: No, sir.

Counsel; Don’t know the person’s phone number?

Mr. Woolery: No, sir.

As Mr. Woolery later admitted during Bar Counsel's investi-
gation, he remembered Mr. Wilson’s first name at some point

and, at the very least, could have located him through Mr.
Duley.

The District Court entered judgment in favor of Thomas
Chambers in the amount of $9,700.00—based on the court’s
estimate of the value of the tractor and backhoe when Mr.
Woolery sold it. At the trial, Mr. Woolery repeatedly told the
District Court that he had sold the tractor in his capacity “as a
fiduciary,” and insisted that any judgment be entered against
him only in his capacity as personal representative of the
estate. The District Court acceded to his request, effectively
making it a judgment against the estate.

Mr. Woolery Makes a Final Accounting

In his final accounting as personal representative of the
estate, Mr, Woolery referred to the presumed rental income
received by Thomas Chambers, which he characterized “waste
and defaleation,” to completely offset Thomas Chambers’
share of the estate as well as the judgment awarded to
Thomas Chambers in the District Court action. In that ac-
counting, Mr. Woolery requested—and was later awarded—
approximately $25,000 in fees against the estate.

It

Violations of MLRPC

The hearing judge explicitly concluded that Mr. Woolery
violated MLRPC 8.4(d), and also indicated, somewhat less
explicitly, that Mr. Woolery’s conduct failed to meet the
standards of competence and diligence required by MLRPC
1.1 and 1.8 in a certain respect. Before us, Mr. Woolery argues
that the hearing judge did not find a violation of MLRPC 1.1
or 1.8 and excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he
violated MLRPC 8.4(d).

1. The hearing judge concluded that there was not clear and convincing
evidence of violations of MLRPC 1.7 (conflict of interest), 3.3 (Candor
toward the Tribunal), 8.4(b) (criminal act that reflects adversely on
attorney’s fitness), and 8.4(c) (dishonest conduct). Bar Counsel has not
excepted to those conclusions and we do not further consider them.

Hl In an attorney discipline proceeding, we review the
hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference. Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. McDowell, 439 Md. 26, 85, 98 A.3d 711
(2014). For the following reasons, we overrule Mr. Woolery’s
exception and conclude that he violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3,
8.4(a), as well as 8.4(d).

MLRPC 1.1 and 1.8

Hl The hearing judge’s conclusions as to the alleged viola-
tions of MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3 are somewhat ambiguous. The
hearing judge indicated that Mr. Woolery’s conduct “in the
main” did not violate MLRPC 1.1 or 1.8. However, the hearing
judge went on to find that “the exception to this finding in
[Mr. Woolery’s] favor regarding [MLRPC] 1.1 and 1.8 relates
only to [Mr. Woolery’s] failure to attempt to recover the
impulsively-sold tractor-and-backhoe.” Thus, the hearing
judge appears to have concluded that Mr. Woolery’s decision
not to remedy his impulsive decision to sell the tractor and
backhoe violated those two rules. In any event, based upon the
hearing judge’s findings of fact, we conclude that Mr. Wool-
ery’s conduct violated both MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3,

We OMLRPC 1.1 requires that an attorney “provide compe-
tent representation to a client. Competent representation re-
quires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepara-
tion reasonably necessary for the representation.” An attorney
may have adequate knowledge or skill to represent a client,
but a failure to apply that knowledge or skill as necessary
violates MLRPC 1.1. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moore,
447 Mad. 258, 266, 185 A.3d 390 (2016).

The hearing judge found that Mr. Woolery had the knowl-
edge and skill to handle this estate. Indeed, it was presumably
Mr. Woolery’s prior experience in estates and trusts matters
that led the Orphans’ Court to appoint him as personal
representative of the estate. Despite that expertise, he made a
mistake when he impulsively sold the tractor and backhoe
without appraising it even informally or verifying that it
belonged to the estate. Mr. Woolery compounded that error

when he refused to correct it upon learning the true owner-
ship and value of the tractor. We understand that this estate
posed some particular difficulties for Mr. Woolery. However,
the duty to resolve those difficulties was inherent in Mr.
Woolery’s appointment as personal representative—an assign-
ment for which he claimed, and was awarded, a significant fee.
It was his responsibility to do that work competently, regard-
less of its level of difficulty. Accordingly, we find that Mr.
Woolery violated MLRPC 1.1.

MLRPC 1.8 provides that a lawyer must “act with reason-
able diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Con-
duct that violates MLRPC 1.1 will often also violate MLRPC
1.3. See, eg., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 447 Md.
258, 267, 185 A.3d 390 (2016).

Here, Mr. Woolery learned of his mistake almost immedi-
ately after making it. As the hearing judge found, if Mr.
Woolery had attempted to recover the tractor and backhoe at
that time, he likely would have been able to do so as he could
have located Mr, Wilson, who held onto the tractor and
backhoe until 2015. By refusing to make a diligent attempt to
recover the tractor and backhoe, Mr. Woolery exposed the
estate to liability that could have been avoided. Accordingly,
we find that Mr. Woolery violated MLRPC 1.3.

MLRPC 8.4(a) & (d)

Under MLRPC 8.4(a), it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to “violate or attempt to violate the [MLRPC].” Be-
cause Mr, Woolery violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.8, and 8.4(d), he
necessarily also violated MLRPC 8.4(a). Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Phillips, 451 Md. 653, 677, 155 A.3d 476 (2017).

WH oUnder MLRPC 8.4(d), it is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.” Conduct violates MLRPC 8.4(d)
when it falls “below the standards that the public normally
expects of attorneys” and when an attorney compounds that
misconduct by failing to take steps to correct it. Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 174-75, 994 A.2d
928 (2010).

The hearing judge concluded that, once Mr. Woolery
Jearned of his mistake in the sale of the tractor and backhoe,
he had a responsibility to correct—or at least attempt to
correct—that mistake. Mr. Woolery excepts to this conclusion,
asserting that “had the tractor belonged to an innocent third
party he would have immediately made every effort to effectu-
ate its prompt return.” Mr. Woolery argues that, because the
tractor and backhoe belonged to Thomas Chambers and (in
Mr. Woolery’s view) Thomas Chambers owed the estate mon-
ey, his refusal to attempt to recover the tractor was at worst a
“debatable legal strategy” rather than professional miscon-
duet.

We agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Woolery’s failure
to even attempt to recover the tractor and backhoe, after he
learned that the estate did not own it, fell below the standard
the public expects of attorneys and was prejudicial to the
administration of justice. As the hearing judge noted, Mr.
Woolery had no right to sell the tractor and backhoe in the
first place, as it did not belong to the estate. Upon receiving
notice of his mistake, Mr. Woolery had an obligation to the
estate and Thomas Chambers to correct that mistake. In
failing to do so, Mr. Woolery exposed the estate to unneces-
sary liability and ultimately a judgment against it. We agree
with the hearing judge also that this was a “clear abuse of
diseretion”—i.e., the discretion he exercised in carrying out
his fiduciary responsibilities as personal representative of the
estate. This conduct falls below the standard that we and the
public expects of attorneys, and is thus prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Wool-
ery’s exception and hold that his conduct violated MLRPC
8.4(d).

Tit

Sanction
HMMs As this Court has frequently reiterated, the purpose
of a sanction in an attorney discipline case is not so much to
punish the attorney, as it is to protect the public and deter

future misconduct. See, eg., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
James, 885 Md, 687, 665, 870 A.2d 229 (2005). To that end, the
appropriate sanction must relate to the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case and be “commensurate with the
nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which
they were committed.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stein,
373 Md, 581, 587, 819 A.2d 372 (2008).

Bar Counsel has recommended a reprimand as appropriate
discipline in this case. Consistent with his exception to any
finding of misconduct, Mr. Woolery asks that we dismiss this
matter without sanction. For the reasons explained below, we
adopt Bar Counsel’s recommendation.

There may be some basis for considering Mr. Woolery’s
initial decision to sell the tractor and backhoe without ascer-
taining whether it belonged to the estate and without deter-
mining its actual value as (in the words of the hearing judge)
an “excusable mistake.” Mr. Woolery was not aware that the
tractor and backhoe belonged to Thomas Chambers rather
than the estate, and may have assumed that his right to sell
the Webster Lane property “as is” included the right to sell
whatever he found on the property. Moreover, the sale was
not for Mr. Woolery’s own immediate personal gain. Mr.
Woolery’s decision to sell the tractor and backhoe on the spot
to Mr. Wilson was apparently an attempt to generate cash to
pay the locksmith and to reimburse himself for the estate’s
expenses related to securing the property without need for
Mr. Woolery to advance funds to the estate.

Whether or not Mr. Woolery’s decision to sell the tractor
and backhoe on the spot was excusable, it was certainly a
mistake. As Mr. Woolery repeatedly stated at the District
Court trial, he was acting “as a fiduciary”—i.e., acting with a
duty to exercise a higher standard of care for the benefit of
the estate and its beneficiaries §—when he sold the tractor and

8. See Maryland Code, Estates & Trusts Article, § 7-101(a) (“A personal
representative is a fiduciary. He is under a duty to settle and distribute
the estate .., with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable ...”);
Beyer v. ‘Morgan State University, 369 Md, 335, 351, 800 A.2d 707 (2002)

backhoe. Even if Mr. Woolery truly believed that the tractor
and backhoe belonged to the estate, it hardly seems prudent
to impulsively sell it to the only person present who expressed
any interest in it without making a minimal effort to deter-
mine its actual value. The result was that he sold it at a
discount of 95% of the District Court’s valuation of the equip-
ment. Mr, Woolery’s own testimony in the District Court trial
reveals an understanding that his fiduciary responsibilities to
the estate required more, as he characterized the sale to Mr.
Wilson as an “auction” to a “group of surveyors” and suggest-
ed that, as a result, he was ignorant of the identity of the
purchaser. At best, that testimony was a disingenuous effort
to paint his error with a patina of prudent conduct.’

As the hearing judge concluded, even if Mr. Woolery had no
malicious intent at the time of his initial mistake, his intent
was less benign in the aftermath. When apprised of his
mistake in a timely manner, Mr. Woolery chose not to remedy
his failure to act in the best interests of the estate and its
beneficiaries out of a personal animus against one of those
beneficiaries. The hearing judge found that Mr. Woolery
“displayed a contemptuous attitude” toward Thomas Cham-
bers and allowed his “antipathy” for Thomas Chambers to
“prevent him from doing what he was obligated to do for the
estate.” Moreover, the hearing judge found that Mr. Woolery
displayed “an unbefitting bravado” rather than “contrition for
his errors.”

In addition to the nature of the violations and the intent
with which they were committed, we also consider any mitigat-

(“A Personal Representative owes a duty to the beneficiaries of a will to
act in the best interests of the Estate’). At times in his testimony, Mr.
Woolery appeared to regard his status as a fiduciary more as a shield
against personal liability than as a call to higher duty.

9, The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Woolery’s testimony concern-
ing the “auction” did not amount to perjury before the District Court
because it was not material to the issues before the District Court,
which did not depend on the manner in which Mr. Woolery sold the
tractor and backhoe.

ing or aggravating circumstances.” In this case, the hearing
judge found facts that support one mitigating factor: Mr.
Woolery’s character and reputation in the legal profession,

10. The American Bar Association has recommended consideration of
the following mitigating and aggravating factors:

Mitigating factors

(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;

(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) personal or emotional problems;

(d) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify conse-
quences of misconduct;

(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative atti-
tude toward proceedings;

(®) imexperience in the practice of law;

(g) character or reputation;

(b) physical disability;

(i) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or
drug abuse when:

(1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a
chemical dependency or mental disability;

(2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the miscon-
duct;

(3) the respondent’s recovery from the chemical dependency or men-
tal disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained
period of successful rehabilitation; and

(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that
misconduct is unlikely.

G) delay in disciplinary proceedings;

(i) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;

(1) remorse; and

(m) remoteness of prior offenses.

Aggravating factors

(a) prior disciplinary offenses;

(b) dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) a pattern of misconduct;

(a) multiple offenses;

(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intention-
ally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary
agency;

@ submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive

practices during the disciplinary process;

(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;

(h) vulnerability of the victim;

@) substantial experience in the practice of law;

(j) indifference to making restitution; and

(k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled
substances.

See American Bar Ass'n, ABA 2017 Compendium of Professional Respon-
sibility Rules and Standards (2017), §§ 9.22, 9.32 at pp. 463-64.

Specifically, the hearing judge alluded to Mr. Woolery’s histo-
ry of service to the legal profession, his “outstanding reputa-
tion as an experienced practitioner in the area of estates and
trusts and elder law,” and his “excellent reputation for truth,
veracity, and good character.” In addition, we note that this is
Mr. Woolery’s first offense. There are no prior attorney
disciplinary actions against him.

The hearing judge also found two aggravating factors: re-
fusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct and
substantial experience in the practice of law. With respect to
the first factor, the hearing judge found that Mr. Woolery
failed to demonstrate an understanding that his refusal to
even try to recover the tractor and backhoe was wrongful
conduct. Regarding the second factor, at the time of his
misconduct, Mr. Woolery had practiced law for more than 25
years. As the hearing judge noted, Mr. Woolery’s experience
in trusts and estates matters meant that he “could have, and
should have taken a more objective approach to [Thomas
Chambers] generally and in trying to retrieve [the tractor and
backhoe].”

In our view, a reprimand in this case serves the primary
purposes of the sanction—to protect the public and deter
future offenses—without disrupting the attorney’s practice of
law. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Queen, 407 Md. 556, 571,
967 A.2d 198 (2009). A reprimand signals to the sanctioned
attorney, other attorneys, and the public that the Court takes
violations of the professional conduct rules seriously. Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Weiers, 440 Md. 292, 810-11, 102 A.8d
332 (2014). This was apparently Mr. Woolery’s first offense in
the nearly 30 years he has now practiced law. While hostility
toward Thomas Chambers may have motivated some of Mr.
Woolery’s conduct, the hearing judge found that Mr. Woolery
did not otherwise act with a selfish or pecuniary motive.
Moreover, as the hearing judge found, aside from his improp-
er handling of the tractor and backhoe, Mr. Woolery reason-
ably performed his duties for the estate, despite its difficulties.
Given all of this, in light of the hearing judge’s findings as to
Mr. Woolery’s reputation and character, we have no reason to

believe that his misconduct in this case is indicative of a
pattern of past misconduct or predictive of future violations.
Accordingly, we reprimand Mr. Woolery.

Iris so ORDERED. RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL Costs 4S TAXED
BY THE CLERK OF THIS CouRT, INCLUDING Costs oF ALL TRAN-
SCRIPTS PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-709(D), FoR WHICH SUM
Jupement 1s ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
Commission Against Benjamin JEREMY WOOLERY.

a

175 A8d 141
ANAND
ve
O’SULLIVAN
Pet. Docket No. 305, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A.8d 141
ANNAN, Heinin
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 258, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
611, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

=

175 ABd 141
BARBOUR, Paul Ricardo
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 339, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No,
1080, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 Ad 141
BROWN, Darius
vv
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 338, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
788, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

175 A.3d 142
BROWN-CONYERS
ve
MICHAEL AND SON SERVICES
Pet. Docket No. 316, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 897, Sept.
Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A.Bd 142
CARTER
vv.
BLUMBERG
Pet. Docket No. 324, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No, 2285,
Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

|
175 A3d 142

CHASE
v.

CHASE

Pet. Docket No. 318, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2581, Sept.Term, 2014).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

175 A.8d 142
DARAMY, Phanta
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 348, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1378, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

175 A.Bd 143
FREED, Edward

ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 232, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017
(No. 12-K-16-000682, Circuit Court for Harford County.)

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 Ad 143
FULLWOOD, Tavon
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 328, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

||

175 A.3d 143
GROSS, Reggie Antwan
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 332, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1584, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A.3d 143
GWYNN, Darnell
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 355, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
666, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

ee
||

175 A.Bd 144
HORTON, Fernando Grady
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 384, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
507, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

175 Abd 144
HURWITZ
ve
LIPITZ
Pet. Docket No. 325, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
118, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

175 Ad 144
JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL
v
WILLIAMS
Pet. Docket No. 347, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Pending in the Court of Special Appeals (No. 1890, Sept.
Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A8d 144
JOHNSON, Steven M.
ve
DPSCS
Pet. Docket No. 257, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017
(No. 21-C-16-057568, Cireuit Court for Washington Coun-
ty.)
Petition for writ of certiorari denied

|

175 A8d 145
JOHNSTON, Ralph, Jr.
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 359, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
255, Sept.Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A8d 145
JONES, Harry
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 289, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
825, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

D

175 Ad 145
LITTY
v
ISLAND BOATS
Pet. Docket No. 319, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

(No. C-17-CV-17-000079, Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s
County.)

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

175 A.3d 145
MATTHEWS, Eloy, Jr.
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 354, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2878, Sept.Term, 2014).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

7

175 A8d 146
MINTS, Lucresha
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 335, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1154, Sept.Term, 2016),

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 Ad 146
MONROE, Curtis Wayne
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 326, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
760, Sept.Term, 2015),

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

c

175 A.3d 146
MORANCY
ve
WMC MORTGAGE CORP.
Pet. Docket No. 313, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 2034,
Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A.3d 146
NIVENS, Stephen
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 309, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1333, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 Ad 147
OWENS, Tavon Anthony
v.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 308, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1517, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 Ad 147
POOLE, Bryan Lamont
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 336, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No,
2400, Sept.Term, 2014).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A.3d 147
REID, Rohan
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 322, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2379, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari and conditional cross-petition

both denied.

175 A3d 147
ROBINSON, Deonte
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 327, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
402, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

175 A.8d 148
ROUNDTREE, Burchelt
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet, Docket No. 255, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1104, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A.3d 148
SIENA, Tanasha Earlene
vy.
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 343, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1188, Sept.Term, 2015).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

| |

175 A.3d 148

SULLIVAN
ve

DEVAN
Pet. Docket No, 312, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
821, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 A.Bd 148
TERRELL, Chastian Devon
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 346, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Pending in the Court of Special Appeals (No. 1705, Sept.
Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

=

175 A.3d 149
TROUBLEFIELD
v.

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
Pet. Docket No, 314, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
767, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

175 Abd 149
VANCE, Benjamin E.
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 298, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1216, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

175 A.Bd 149
VICARINI
v
CARROLL CO. SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT
Pet, Docket No. 337, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 16, 2017

Dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals (No. 2621,
Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed

175 A.3d 149
YEAGER, Brandon Matthew
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 331, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 15, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
1777, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari denied

a

175 A.8d 150
ARMACOST, Mark
v
DAVIS, Reginald J.
Pet. Docket No. 880, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 69, Sept.Term, 2017.

175 A.8d 150
BURNSIDE, Carl Franklin
ve
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 303, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland,
December 18, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2182, Sept.Term, 2016).

Petition for writ of certiorari and conditional cross-petition
both granted. Transferred to the regular docket as No. 71,

Sept.Term, 2017.

|
175 A.38d 150
DONLON, Brian
ve
MONTGOMERY CO. PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Pet. Docket No. 829, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 68, Sept.Term, 2017.

175 A3d 150
IN RE: ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP OF H.W.
Pet. Docket No. 342, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 70, Sept.Term, 2017.

mi

175 A3d 151
LAMSON, Bernadette Fowler
vy
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
Pet, Docket No, 323, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
892, Sept.Term, 2016),

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 67, Sept.Term, 2017.

175 A.3d 151
SVF RIVA ANNAPOLIS
v
GILROY, Maureen Elizabeth
Pet. Docket No. 321, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 66, Sept.Term, 2017.

||

175 Abd 151
TATE, Brian
v
STATE of Maryland
Pet. Docket No. 310, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals unreported (No.
2828, Sept.Term, 2014).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 65, Sept.Term, 2017.

175 A8d 151
KOPP, Nancy K.
v.
SCHRADER, Dennis R.
Pet. Docket No. 419, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 20, 2017
Pending in the Court of Special Appeals (No. 1998, Sept.
Term, 2017).

Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Transferred to the
regular docket as No. 72, Sept.Term, 2017.

525

175 A8d 666

In the MATTER OF the Application of Mark
Andrew OVERALL FOR ADMISSION
TO the BAR OF MARYLAND

Mise. Docket No. 16, Sept. Term, 2017

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017
Reconsideration Denied January 18, 2018

2S
nN
16

a
Yo}

oT
ie}

Argued by Mark Andrew Overall, for Applicant.

ARGUED BEFORE: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins,
McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Adkins, J.

We consider whether to grant Mark Andrew Overall’s appli-
cation for admission to the Bar of Maryland. The Character
Committee for the Sixth Appellate Circuit (“Committee”) rec-
ommended that Overall’s application be denied because: (1) he
demonstrated a lack of candor; (2) his law license had been
suspended and not reinstated in Alabama; and (8) because he
did not accept personal responsibility for his actions. The
State Board of Law Examiners (“Board”) unanimously agreed
that Overall’s application should be denied because of his lack
of candor in the application process, and the circumstances of
his suspension in Alabama. Both the Committee and the Board
concluded that Overall had failed to demonstrate that he
possessed the necessary moral character and fitness to prac-
tice law in Maryland.

BACKGROUND
Overall graduated from law school in 2010 and was admitted
to the Bar of Alabama that same year, working primarily as a
criminal defense attorney. In October 2012, Overall received a
private reprimand from the Alabama State Bar for failing to
comply with local scheduling conflict resolution rules. Between

October 2012 and May 2018, a number of complaints were
filed against Overall with the Alabama State Bar. The com-
plaints variously alleged that Overall: (1) failed to appear on
behalf of clients, or was tardy; (2) was underprepared for
court, leading to a mistrial; (8) had been found in contempt of
court after being warned about his conduct; (4) improperly
altered a subpoena when he was not authorized to issue
subpoenas; (5) improperly filed civil complaints to avoid pay-
ing the fee for a jury demand; (6) had not informed a client
about a court hearing; and (7) failed to file a written response
to a Motion for Summary Judgment.

On May 28, 2013, Overall entered a conditional guilty plea to
multiple violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Con-
duct (“ARPC”) based on these complaints.! Overall agreed to a
91-day suspension held in abeyance and two years’ probation.
Additional complaints were filed with the Alabama State Bar
against Overall during his probationary period. The com-
plaints included circumstances leading to Overall’s conviction
in July 2018 for resisting arrest.

Overall was found in contempt of court on November 12,
2012, for failing to appear on time for a scheduled hearing. He
was fined $50.00 and court costs. Overall did not pay the fine,
At the show cause hearing, which had been continued twice at
Overall’s request, the judge imposed an additional fine and
court costs. When Overall failed to pay his fines and costs in
either matter, the judge set another show cause hearing.
Overall filed a motion to continue the hearing on the morning
it was scheduled to take place. The judge reluctantly resched-
uled the hearing. When the hearing finally took place, Overall
was held in criminal contempt, and he was charged with
resisting arrest after being taken into custody. He was con-
victed of resisting arrest in Houston County District Court.
Overall appealed, and was convicted again in Houston County
Cireuit Court in a de novo jury trial on April 22, 2015.

1, Overall pleaded guilty to multiple violations of the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct (“‘ARPC”), specifically multiple violations of Rules
1,3 [Diligence]; 1.4(a) [Communication]; 8.4(g) [Misconduct].

The other complaints alleged that Overall had engaged in
inappropriate lines of questioning after being told to desist in
a criminal trial, and had been found in contempt in another
criminal trial. After receiving these complaints, the Office of
General Counsel of the Alabama State Bar filed a Petition to
Revoke Probation based on multiple violations of the ARPC.”
In August 2018, Overall consented to the revocation of his
probation and agreed to the 91-day suspension. In the consent
agreement, Overall admitted to violating the ARPC as alleged
in the Petition to Revoke Probation. Overall was denied
reinstatement in March 2014 and October 2015.

On May 18, 2015,? Overall filed an application with the
Board for admission to the Bar of Maryland pursuant to
Maryland Rule 19-202.‘ The Board forwarded Overall’s appli-
cation to Character Committee members Alicia Wilson, and
later Kamil Ismail, for the investigation and interview re-
quired by Maryland Rule 19-208(a)(1).> Overall was unsuccess-

2. The Office of General Counsel of the Alabama State Bar alleged
multiple violations of ARPC 3.1 [Meritorious Claims and Contentions];
ARPC 3,2 [Expediting Litigation]; ARPC 3.4(c) [Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel}; ARPC 3.5(c) [Impartiality and Decorum of the
Tribunal]; ARPC 8,2(a) (Judicial and Legal Officials]; and ARPC 8.4(d)
and (g) [Misconduct].

3. Overall had applied to take the February 2015 Maryland General Bar
Examination, but his application was denied because it arrived after the
deadline and was substantially incomplete.

4. The Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland were renum-
bered effective July 1, 2016. Maryland Rule 19-202(a) (derived from
former Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Mary-
land) provides that:

(a) By Application. An individual who meets the requirement of
Rule 19-201 [Eligibility to Take Maryland General Bar Exami-
nation] or had the requirement of Rule 19-201 (a)(2) waived
pursuant to Rule 19-201 (b) may apply for admission to the Bar
of this State by filing with the Board an application for admis-
sion, accompanied by a Notice of Intent to Take a Scheduled
General Bar Examination, and the prescribed fee.

5, Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1) (derived from former Rule 5 of the Rules
Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland) provides that:

ful on the July 2015 General Bar Examination, but successful
on the February 2016 Examination,

His application disclosed his conviction for resisting arrest
in Houston County District Court, and the case number.
Overall stated that his conviction was “pending reversal due to
lack of jurisdiction.” He did not list his conviction in Cireuit
Court, although it occurred before he submitted his Bar
Application.

Overall listed some civil actions to which he was a party, but
did not list the actions that the Alabama State Bar had taken
against him. Overall also indicated that he had been admitted
to the Alabama Bar, but did not attach a certificate of good
standing, or explain why he was no longer in good standing in
the application. Overall responded affirmatively to the ques-
tion “[hJave you ever resigned from or been charged, repri-
manded, or otherwise disciplined by any school, college, or
university, or by any trade or professional organization, at any
time for any reason?” He referred to a suspension in school
when he was a child, but did not list the actions taken by the
Alabama State Bar in his primary application.

Overall answered “No” in response to the question: “Have
there been any circumstances or unfavorable incidents in your
life, whether at school, college, law school, business or other-
wise, which may have a bearing upon your character or your
fitness to practice law, not called for by the questions con-
tained in this questionnaire or disclosed in your answers?”
Overall enclosed a “Disclaimer” with his application, which
stated:

{a) Investigation and Report of Character Committee. (1) On re-
ceipt of an application forwarded by the Board pursuant to Rule
19-202 (d), the Character Committee shall (A) through one of its
members, personally interview the applicant, (B) verify the facts
stated in the questionnaire, contact the applicant’s references,
and make any further investigation it finds necessary or desir-
able, (C) evaluate the applicant’s character and fitness for the
practice of law, and (D) transmit to the Board a report of its
investigation and a recommendation as to the approval or denial
of the application for admission.

:

Please know that the enclosed application packet that is
being submitted is based on my information given to the
best_of my recollection, knowledge, and belief. Much of
what is being asked involves information dating back
several years and I may not remember such events. Any
missing or inaccurate information is simply an error
based on my inability to remember and is not designed to
be a misrepresentation or concealment of such events.
Please do not regard any inaccuracies or missing informa-
tion as a negative indication or assessment against my
character, integrity, or honesty as it is not intended to be
conveyed in this manner.
(Emphasis in the original).

Overall mailed an addendum (“Addendum”) with his Bar
Application, which contained more information than his initial
Application. He included a statement about employment ter-
minations, his driving record in Alabama, a statement of civil
actions,’ and financial disclosures. Overall provided what he
described as “an up to date copy” of his disciplinary history in
Alabama, explaining that he “hope[d] that this will paint the
correct picture of my ability and character as a lawyer and
advocate.” His disciplinary history included his contempt cita-
tions, the Private Reprimand, the Conditional Guilty Plea, the
Petition to Revoke Probation and the Consent to Revoke
Probation, Orders on the Guilty Plea and Petition, and the
Suspension Order. Overall also included the March 2014 Order
denying his reinstatement to the Bar of Alabama, and a
number of letters from judges and attorneys advocating for
his reinstatement.

At various times while his application was pending, Overall
provided supplemental information. In October 2015, Wilson
sent Overall a letter requesting additional documentation re-
garding his: (1) financial obligations; (2) civil actions; (8)
criminal actions; (4) disciplinary record with the Alabama
State Bar; (5) detailed information on his traffic violations;

6. Overall’s statement of Civil Actions did not include the actions the
Bar of Alabama had taken against him.

and (6) a “comprehensive list of any complaints and/or con-
tempts that have been filed against you through any and all
bars for which you are affiliated.” Wilson also asked Overall to
explain why each of these issues did not reflect poorly on his
“good moral character and fitness to practice law in Mary-
land.”

The May 5 and June 6, 2016 Supplements

Overall’s May 5 Supplement disclosed additional traffic cita-
tions in Maryland and Virginia, and updated employment
information. His June 6 Supplement responded to Wilson’s
October 2015 letter. He provided more information about his
financial obligations and his civil cases. With regard to most of
his civil cases, Overall asserted that these matters did not
adversely affect his moral character or fitness to practice law
because he was “merely asserting [his] constitutional right to
seek legal redress in court as provided by the First Amend-
ment.”

Overall also addressed his criminal conviction for resisting
arrest. He argued that the judge improperly failed to notify
him of his right to appeal after finding him in contempt. He
provided the case numbers for both the District Court and
Circuit Court proceedings, stated that it was the same crimi-
nal action, and identified the Circuit Court proceedings as an
“unsuccessful appeal.” He did not provide more substantial
details regarding the appeal or the proceedings, but insisted
that “[tJhe judge’s contempt adjudication was unlawful in
several respects and this judge has been cited and reversed
for his improper handling of contempt procedures with law-
yers previously by appellate courts.”

With regard to his disciplinary history, Overall explained:

I believe you have already received my disciplinary histo-
ry. Please inform me if this is not accurate, Also please
note that I had no control over the synopses that the
Office of General Counsel generated for the allegations
and many of them are wholly false and are a misrepresen-
tation based on the way they are written.

(Emphasis in the original). Overall did not disclose that he had
been denied reinstatement again in October 2015.

Overall’s Character Interview

In September 2016, Ismail interviewed Overall. At Ismail’s
request, Overall submitted additional documents, including the
judgments of guilt on both his bench trial and the jury trial.
At that time, Overall disclosed that he had taken the New
York Bar Examination. On September 30, 2016, Ismail issued
a memorandum recommending that the Committee hold a
hearing before issuing a final recommendation. He identified
several concerns regarding Overall’s fitness and suggested
that those issues merited a hearing before the Committee.
Specifically, Ismail explained that:

I was concerned about several items that I felt were not
disclosed and/or inadequately disclosed in Mr. Overall’s
application to the Maryland Bar. I raised these matters
with him in our interview, where I did not find his
explanations entirely satisfactory.
eR OR
In our interview, I asked Mr. Overall if he believed his
answers, aside from the attachments, were sufficient to
disclose his Alabama disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Overall
responded affirmatively, noting that the list attached to
his application referenced all the civil and criminal pro-
ceedings to which he was a party, along with the docu-
mentation from the disciplinary proceedings. I asked him
whether, apart from the attachments, the application it-
self contained disclosure of the disciplinary proceedings.
Mr. Overall eventually acknowledged reluctantly that it
did not.
koe

In his original application, Mr. Overall did disclose his
criminal conviction for resisting arrest, which he de-
scribed as “pending reversal due to lack of jurisdiction.”
At our interview, he could not explain this contention in a
manner that I could understand. Neither his application
nor the attachments included a second judgment of con-

viction on this charge, after a de novo jury trial. Nor did
they include an Alabama Supreme Court denial of his
appeal of the disciplinary proceedings. In light of these
omissions, I viewed Mr. Overall’s disclosure as inade-
quate. It seemed to me that Mr. Overall does not suffi-
ciently acknowledge the gravity of the Alabama Bar’s
proceedings against him.

eR
Some of Mr. Overall’s characterizations of his clashes with
the Bar and judiciary in Alabama seem at least plausible
to me. Indeed, at least one or two of the clashes appear to
have resulted at least in part from matters that arguably
reflect no more than zealous advocacy on behalf of his
clients.
At the same time, there are numerous other incidents
disclosed in Mr. Overall’s application and in materials
obtained independently from the Alabama State Bar,
including Mr. Overall’s consent to disciplinary actions,
that raise troubling questions about his diligence, can-
dor[,] and actions that have not been explained adequately
to me by Mr, Overall in our interview. Moreover, I felt
that his disclosures in his application were inadequate in
several respects, Based on the foregoing, I was unable to
conclude that Mr. Overall had satisfied his burden of
showing that he possesses the necessary good moral
character and fitness for the practice of law....

On October 25, the Chair of the Character Committee for
the Sixth Appellate Circuit, Robert Ferguson, sent a letter to
Overall notifying him of Ismail’s recommendation and explain-
ing that the Committee intended to hold a hearing to deter-
mine whether he “presently possess[es] the requisite moral
character and fitness to practice law.” 7

7. Md. Rule 19-203(a)(2) provides in relevant part that:
If the Committee concludes that there may be grounds for recom-
mending denial of the application, it shall notify the applicant in
writing and schedule a hearing. ... The applicant shall have the right
to testify, to present other testimony and evidence, and to be repre-

The December 5, 2016 and February 12, 2017 Supplements

Overall submitted further updates to his application regard-
ing traffic tickets and his financial status in December 2016,
He also included information on disciplinary proceedings in
Alabama. He explained that the Office of General Counsel
“has moved to summarily suspend me due to an alleged failure
to pay outstanding costs from previous proceedings.” Overall
claimed that the Alabama State Bar had not complied with
procedural requirements, and that “the costs at issue are
exorbitant and I cannot possibly maintain the payment plans I
have with my various creditors and pay the Alabama State
Bar thousands of dollars.” He disclosed that he had filed a
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus with the Alabama Supreme
Court to prevent the Alabama State Bar from suspending him.
He stated that the matter was “an administrative suspension”
for his failure to pay, and “not the product of any independent
misconduct.” But Overall had already been denied reinstate-
ment to the Alabama Bar the previous October, and his
characterization of the matter as an “administrative suspen-
sion” is contradicted by the facts of his ongoing suspension for
professional misconduct.

Overall filed more supplemental information on February
12, 2017. He disclosed a change in his employment, updated
financial disclosures, and a civil case he had filed in December
2016 against the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration.

The May 4, 2017 Supplement and the
Character Committee Hearing

Overall provided an additional supplement on May 4, 2017,
which identified a change in his employment, and that he had

sented by an attorney. The Committee shall prepare a report and
recommendation setting forth findings of fact on which the recom-
mendation is based and a statement supporting the conclusion, A
transcript of the hearing shall be transmitted by the Committee to the
Board along with the Committee's report. The Committee shall trans-
mit a copy of its report to the applicant, and a copy of the hearing
transcript shall be furnished to the applicant upon payment of rea-
sonable costs.

filed a civil action against Baltimore Gas & Electric in April
2017. Overall also disclosed that someone had filed an applica-
tion for a peace order against him in March 2017, but that the
case had been dismissed because the petitioner never ap-
peared in court.

The Committee held a hearing on May 4, 2017, to address
the following issues: (1) the private reprimand by the Ala-
bama Bar; (2) his probation and subsequent revocation and
suspension from the Alabama Bar; (8) the two denials of
reinstatement to the Alabama Bar; and (4) Ismail’s concern
regarding Overall’s candor and inadequacy of disclosure in his
application, Overall appeared without counsel and testified on
his own behalf.

The Character Committee’s Findings
of Fact and Conclusions

On June 5, 2017, the Committee issued a report unanimous-
ly recommending against Overall’s admission to the Bar
“based on the panel’s assessment that Overall was not candid
in his application and submissions, as well as at the hearing.”

With regard to the Alabama State Bar Disciplinary proceed-
ings against Overall, the Committee found that:
[Alfter a few years in practice, Mr. Overall became the
subject of disciplinary proceedings prompted by various
complaints, mostly from judges before whom he appeared,
who asserted instances of failure to appear in court,
improper court filings, and other matters including crimi-
nal contempt for failure to pay a civil contempt fine. At
least some of Mr. Overall’s lapses appear to have preju-
diced his clients. Mr. Overall was also the subject of Bar
complaints and a malpractice action by former clients.
Ultimately, these matters culminated in a charge of re-
sisting arrest after his conviction for criminal contempt.
Mr. Overall was initially convicted in a bench trial on this
charge of resisting arrest. He disclosed this conviction on
his Maryland Bar [A]pplication, but with the qualifier that
it was “pending reversal due to lack of jurisdiction.”

However, in his May 18, 2015 application, including his
affirmation of a full and candid disclosure, he failed to
disclose that he had also subsequently been convicted on
April 24, 2015, after a de novo jury trial. The omission of
such important information—a jury trial conviction sever-
al weeks before submitting his application—cannot be
squared with Mr. Overall’s affirmation.

The Committee panel had doubts about Overall’s candor.’ In
addition to his failure to accurately report his conviction for
resisting arrest, Overall did not affirmatively disclose recent
legal proceedings. Specifically, a woman had filed an applica-
tion for a peace order against him,° and Overall had filed a
civil proceeding against the Maryland Motor Vehicle Adminis-
tration.” The Committee also observed that Overall had seven
traffic offenses in Maryland between 2015 and 2016, including
three incidents of driving on a suspended license, and that he
had continued driving despite knowing of the suspension be-
cause he considered the suspension to be “wrongful.”

The Committee unanimously concluded that Overall had not

met his burden of demonstrating that he possessed the re-
quired moral candor and fitness to practice law, and recom-

8. The Committee expressed concern that Overall had not disclosed that
he had taken and passed the New York Bar Examination. Overall had
applied to take the New York Bar Examination after he had applied to
take the Maryland Bar Examination. Thus, he could not have reported
it on his initial Application. Overall told Ismail that he had taken the
New York Bar Examination during his character interview.

The Committee also observed that Overall failed to disclose that he
had filed a petition to be permitted to take the New York Bar Examina-
tion, Overall first mentioned this petition during the Committee hear-
ing, and stated that the court to whom he submitted his petition in New
York had not ruled on the petition, but he had been permitted to
proceed, Overall has not provided any other information about this
petition.

9. Overall included this information on a supplement dated May 4, 2017,
but that was over a month after the application for a peace order was
filed, and made the same day as his Committee hearing.

10. We recognize that Overall disclosed this proceeding in his February
12, 2017 supplement.

mended that he be denied admission to the Maryland Bar.

Specifically:
The panel was concerned about Mr. Overall’s lack of
candor ... as well as the fact of his suspension and
subsequent non-reinstatement by the Alabama Bar. Fur-
ther, the panel was troubled by his apparent rejection of
personal responsibility, including his assertions that vari-
ous outcomes were through no fault of his own. The panel
was also concerned by his apparent lack of concern for his
clients who had suffered adverse outcomes from the vari-
ous matters that were the subject of the Alabama Bar
proceedings. The panel’s assessment was that the candi-
date’s answers at the hearing were evasive, contradictory
and unsatisfactory.

As required by Md. Rule 19-203(b)," the Board held a
hearing on the record made before the Committee. The Board
considered: (1) the Alabama disciplinary proceedings; (2)
Overall’s lack of candor, including his failure to disclose recent
proceedings to which he was a party; and (8) whether Overall
demonstrated a “cumulative pattern” that “suggests a pattern
of disrespect for the law, the Courts and a lack of candor.”
The Board unanimously found that Overall had not met his
burden to demonstrate that he possessed the character and
fitness for admission to the Maryland Bar. As required by Md.
Rule 19-203(b), the Board offered Overall an opportunity to
withdraw his application before it submitted its report and
recommendation to the Court of Appeals. Overall declined to
withdraw his application.

On September 11, 2017, the Board submitted its report and
recommendation to this Court. We initially and prematurely
denied Overall’s application in an Order dated September 22,

11. Md. Rule 19-203(b), in relevant part, provides that:
Hearing by the Board. If the Board concludes after review of the
Character Committee's report and the transcript that there may be
grounds for recommending denial of the application, it shall prompt-
ly afford the applicant the opportunity for a hearing on the record
made before the Committee. In its discretion, the Board, may permit
additional evidence to be submitted. ...

2017. Overall filed exceptions, requested a hearing on the
matter, and proposed several conditions for his admission to
the Bar of Maryland.” The Board submitted a response to
Overall’s exceptions. Pursuant to Md. Rule 19-208(c)," we
held oral argument on November 6, 2017.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HN We analyze whether Overall “has met the burden of
establishing that [he] ‘possesse[s] the [requisite] moral charac-
ter to practice law in the State of Maryland.’” In re Applica-
tion of Brown, 449 Md. 669, 688, 144 A.3d 1188 (2016) (quoting
In ve application of T.Z.-A.0., 441 Md. 65, 78, 105 A.38d 492
(2014)). An applicant to the Bar of Maryland carries the
burden of proving “the applicant’s good moral character and
fitness for the practice of law.” Md. Rule 19-208(d)."" We have
explained that “[aJn applicant must possess good moral char-
acter for admission to any Bar, denoted by ‘those qualities of
truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion,
of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility” ” In re
Application of Cramer, 427 Md. 612, 622, 50 A.38d 1066 (2012)
(quoting In re Application of Strzempek, 407 Md. 102, 112, 962
A.2d 988 (2008)). In determining whether a candidate should
be admitted to the Bar, we examine the applicant’s “present
moral character” to consider “whether, ‘viewing the applicant’s

12, The Maryland Rules do not contemplate conditional admission for
new applicants.

13, Md. Rule 19-203(c)(1) provides:
If the Court, after reviewing the report of the Character Committee,
and any report of the Board, believes there may be grounds to deny
admission, the Court shall order the applicant to appear for a hearing
and show cause why the application should not be denied.

14, Md. Rule 19-203(d) provides:

(d) Burden of Proof, The applicant bears the burden of proving to
the Character Committee, the Board, and the Court the appli-
cant’s good moral character and fitness for the practice of law.
Failure or refusal to answer fully and candidly any question in
the application or any relevant question asked by a member of
the Character Committee, the Board, or this Court is sufficient
cause for a finding that the applicant has not met this burden,

character in the period subsequent to his misconduct, he has
so convincingly rehabilitated himself that it is proper that he
become a member of a profession which must stand free from
all suspicion.’ ” In ve Application of Hyland, 389 Md. 521, 585,
663 A.2d 1809 (1995) (quoting In re Application of A.T., 286
Md. 507, 514, 408 A.2d 1028 (1979)),

Hl We base our evaluation of an applicant’s moral charac-
ter on an independent review of the testimony and evidence
before the Committee and the Board. See Application of
Brown, 449 Md. at 684, 144 A.8d 1188; In re Application of
Stern, 403 Md. 615, 680, 943 A.2d 1247 (2008). This Court,
however, accords great deference to the Board’s determination
that an applicant lacks the requisite moral character and its
recommendation that an applicant be denied admission to the
Bar. See Application of Brown, 449 Md. at 684, 144 A.38d 1188;
Application of Stern, 408 Md. at 629, 943 A.2d 1247,

DISCUSSION

HM“ ‘{Albsolute candor is a requisite of admission to the
Maryland Bar,” In re Application of Strzempek, 407 Md. 102,
112, 962 A.2d 988 (2008) (quoting Application of Stern, 408
Mad. at 634, 943 A.2d 1247). Although we have recognized that
there is no hard or fast test to determine whether an applicant
for admission to the Bar possesses good moral character, we
have said that “no moral character qualification for Bar mem-
bership is more important than truthfulness and candor.” In
ve Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 688, 689, 3887 A.2d 271
(1978). Throughout the application process for his admission to
the Maryland Bar, Overall has demonstrated a lack of candor.

HM Lack of candor dooms an applicant’s chances for
admission to the Bar. See Application of Streempek, 407 Md,
at 104, 962 A.2d 988. In Strzempek, we considered whether an
applicant who failed to disclose a conviction for drunk driving
should be admitted to the Bar. Strzempek, who had been a
member of the New York Bar for some time, submitted his
application in 2005. Id. at 105, 962 A.2d 988. In April 2006,
while his application was pending, he was convicted of driving

while intoxicated and multiple related charges in Virginia. Id.
at 106, 962 A.2d 988. The arrest occurred just two weeks
before his character and fitness interview in Maryland.
Strzempek did not submit any information about his arrest
and conviction until nearly nine months later. Even after
submitting documentation regarding the arrest, he did not
include any reference to his time spent in jail, a complete list
of fines, or his suspended sentence for driving while intoxicat-
ed. Id. at 107, 962 A.2d 988. We rejected the Board’s recom-
mendation to admit Strzempek because of these alarming
omissions. Id. at 118, 962 A.2d 988. Strzempek attempted to
excuse this omission by claiming that he had waited to disclose
his conviction until he learned that he had passed the Bar
Examination because he was embarrassed by his behavior. Id.
at 108, 962 A.2d 988. We found this explanation inadequate,
and emphasized that complete “disclosure on the Bar [A]ppli-
cation and immediate and full supplementation after an inci-
dent warranting exposition is mandatory, not voluntary.” Id.
at 118, 962 A.2d 988 (emphasis added). An applicant does not
have discretion to decide “whether to disclose and under what
conditions.” Id.

Failure to make full disclosures during character review is
also evidence of lack of candor. We denied admission to a Bar
applicant who failed to fully disclose financial information on
his Bar Application. Application of Stern, 403 Md. at 633-35,
943 A.2d 1247. In response to the relevant questions on the
application, Stern failed to disclose the existence of numerous
eredit accounts, delinquent accounts, and judgments filed
against him for failure to keep these accounts current. Id.
When the Committee and Board inquired about his past due
accounts and failure to disclose, Stern did not recognize that
his omissions and conduct were wrongful. Id. at 621-22, 948
A2d 1247. Stern’s failure to make the required financial
disclosures on his Bar Application was sufficient reason for us
to deny his admission to the Maryland Bar. Id. at 634-35, 943
A.2d 1247.

On the other hand, full candor and evidence of rehabilitation
can be a saving grace for a candidate with a checkered past.

In Application of Allan S., we considered the character and
fitness of an applicant who admitted to committing a petty
theft after law school. 282 Md. at 686-87, 387 A.2d 271. Allan
admitted to stealing a tape measure from a department store.
He expressed remorse for his actions and admitted to the
theft, even though his shoplifting charge was ultimately dis-
missed. At the time of the theft, Allan, who lived on a
communal farm, felt that stealing the tape measure was a
permissible means of protesting “big institutional structures.”
Id. at 687, 387 A.2d 271. The Board recommended denying
admission, but we ruled to admit Allan, After recognizing the
“moral turpitude” of the theft offense, we considered Allan’s
candor in disclosing the incident and his admission of guilt
despite the fact that he was never convicted. Id. at 691, 387
A.2d 271. We concluded that Allan possessed the requisite
good moral character and ordered his admission because he
was “most candid,” remorseful, and acknowledged his miscon-
duct. Id.

Hl Unlike in Application of Allan S., Overall has demon-
strated a consistent lack of candor during the application
process. He failed to disclose the extent of his disciplinary
history in Alabama when he initially filed his Bar Application.
He did not supplement his Application with the fact that he
had been denied reinstatement a second time in Alabama.
Despite filing multiple supplements to his application, he has
repeatedly mischaracterized his disciplinary status. Overall
has described his suspension in Alabama as “administrative,”
or a breach of an agreement by the Alabama State Bar. We
also observe that Overall’s supplements often contained belat-
ed disclosures. For example, Overall disclosed the peace order
against him in a supplement dated the same day as the
Committee hearing, and only addressed the matter after the
Committee raised it at the hearing. He has failed to provide
any of the requested documents relating to the peace order.
Overall also made incomplete and delayed disclosures regard-
ing his application to the Bar of New York, and never com-
plied with the Committee’s request to provide copies of his
New York Bar Application and related correspondence.

We agree with the Board that Overall’s disclosure of his
conviction for resisting arrest was substantially incomplete
and reflects negatively on his candor in the application pro-
cess. Although Overall disclosed his conviction in District
Court on hig application, he did not disclose that he had been
convicted in a de novo jury trial, despite the fact that it
occurred before he submitted his application. Instead, he
stated that the District Court conviction was “pending reversal
due to lack of jurisdiction.” This statement obfuseates the true
nature of his conviction. The references in his Addendum and
Supplements to the case numbers and his vague statement
about an “unsuccessful appeal” are inadequate to resolve his
lack of candor.

I We view Overall’s conduct as equally troubling as the
conduct of the applicants in Strzempek and Stern. Just as
those applicants refused to disclose relevant information in
their initial application or subsequent supplements, Overall
has repeatedly mischaracterized his conduct or completely
failed to make necessary disclosures. Unlike the full candor
demonstrated by the applicant in Allan S., Overall has not
taken responsibility for, or admitted to his repeated lack of
candor or failure to disclose. During proceedings before this
Court, we inquired about the record before the Committee and
the Board. Overall attempted to excuse his lack of disclosure
by accusing the Committee and Board of making misrepresen-
tations about what he had disclosed and when. Overall’s
equivocation regarding his lack of candor prevents us from
concluding that he understands the gravity of his omissions.
Full and prompt disclosure of requested information on the
Bar Application is mandatory. See, ¢.g., Application of Strzem-
pek, 407 Md. at 118, 962 A.2d 988.

Overall’s disciplinary history in Alabama, beyond his lack of
candor, is relevant to our decision to deny him admission,
Alabama has suspended his license, and twice refused to
reinstate it. In a case involving the revocation of a Maryland
law license, In ve License of Thompson, 363 Md. 469, 471, 769
A.2d 905 (2000), we considered whether Maryland improvi-

a

dently licensed an out-of-state attorney. Thompson, who suc-
cessfully completed the Out-of-State Attorney Examination,
was disbarred in the District of Columbia after completing the
Maryland Examination but before he was sworn in. Id. at 471-
72, 769 A.2d 905. Thompson had disclosed that he was facing
disciplinary proceedings and had been suspended, but failed to
provide further requested information regarding those pro-
ceedings, and did not disclose that he had been disbarred. Id.
at 472-78, 769 A.2d 905. In deciding to revoke his license
because he was ineligible for admission through the Out-of-
State Attorney procedure, we also observed that his conduct
in the District of Columbia would subject him to sanctions in
Maryland, and arguably demonstrated that he lacked the
yequisite moral character to be admitted in Maryland. Id. at
478-79, 769 A.2d 905.

The Alabama Bar sanctioned Overall for a litany of inci-
dents involving professional misconduct. Specifically, his law
license was suspended after failing to appear--on numerous
occasions—for court dates on behalf of his clients. He has
been held in contempt on multiple occasions, including crimi-
nal contempt. He improperly filed court documents and failed
to follow Alabama procedure for issuing subpoenas. This mis-
conduct would violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (“MARPC”) as well.® His failure to appear
at numerous hearings for his clients or make necessary filings
would likely violate, at a minimum, MARPC § 19-301.3 (Com-
petence) and § 19-303.2 (Expediting Litigation). See, eg.,
Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Shuler, 454 Md.
200, 164 A.38d 209 (2017) (attorney disbarred following re-
peated failures to appear for client, visit clients, or file neces-
sary documents on client's behalf); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n of Maryland v. Gray, 436 Md. 518, 88 A.8d 786 (2014)
(attorney indefinitely suspended after continually delaying the
litigation of her client’s case), Overall’s misconduct in Alabama

15, Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional
Conduct were renumbered and renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules
of Professional Conduct,

leads us to conclude that his suspension in Alabama reflects
poorly on his moral character and fitness to practice law.
Overall has acknowledged that he could have done some
things differently, but he fails to recognize that he has en-
gaged in misconduct, or that his lapses could have harmed his
clients.

Overall raises two legal arguments as to why he should be
admitted to practice in Maryland. First, he asserts that our
decision to initially deny admission was based on “misrepre-
sentations and omissions” from the Board. Second, he argues
that the right to work is a “basic human right.” *

We do not find that the Board’s report contains misrepre-
sentations and omissions. The record supports the Board’s
findings.” It is evident, upon review, that some of the Commit-
tee’s findings were incorrect with regard to Overall’s supple-
mental disclosures, as we acknowledged earlier.* But the

16, Overall relies on Article 23 of the United Nations Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948), which provides:

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay
for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remu-
neration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other
means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.

The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734,
124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004), has clarified that the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human rights “does not of its own
force impose obligations as a matter of international law.” The Court
concluded that the Declaration does not “establish the relevant and
applicable rule of international law.” Id, at 735, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Courts
may treat the Declaration as supporting, or persuasive authority, but it
has no binding value.

17. Although Overall takes a different perspective on his suspension in
Alabama, he does not deny that he has been suspended, and not
reinstated.

18. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.

Board’s findings were not based on those matters. And we
agree with the unanimous conclusions of the Board and the
Committee that Overall has shown a lack of candor.

Constitutional and Other Claims by Overall

HM Overall relies on Bd. of Cosmetological Exam’rs of
Jefferson Cty. v. Gibbons, 288 Ala. 612, 198 So. 116, 119 (1940),
for the proposition that the right to follow a common occupa-
tion is “an inalienable right, one of the rights of the individual
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to conserve which
government exists.” But the Alabama Supreme Court also
acknowledged that “every business is subject to reasonable
regulation under the police power,” and that the constitution-
ality of its licensing statutes was not in doubt. Jd. In that case,
the Alabama Supreme Court decided that an individual was
not subject to the licensing statute. Jd. at 120. Overall has not
alleged that our regulation scheme is unreasonable, or that he
is not required to obtain a law license to work in Maryland as
a lawyer.

HAs Overall asserts, practicing law is a fundamental
activity protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution.” See Su-
preme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S, 274, 288,
105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Hd.2d 205 (1985); Sheley v. Alaska Bar
Ass’n, 620 P.2d 640, 642-48 (Alaska 1980). The Privileges and
Immunities Clause generally protects the right of citizens who
live in one state to work in another state without discrimina-
tion. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. 1272. But Overall
has not claimed that Maryland has denied him his law license
because he resides in a different state.

HH Overall relies on Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 38, 41, 36
S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 181 (1915), and argues that “the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the community
is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity

19. Article IV, § 2, cl.1 of the United States Constitution provides; “The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States.”

that it was the purpose of the amendment to secure.” In that
case, the Supreme Court concluded that an Arizona statute
that required companies to employ no fewer than 80% of
workers who were either qualified electors or native United
States citizens, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 40-
42, 36 S.Ct. 7. States may not “deny to lawful inhabitants,
because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of
earning a livelihood.” Jd. at 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, But Overall has not
alleged that Maryland has denied him admission to the Bar
based on his race, and the record does not demonstrate any
discriminatory behavior in his Committee or Board hearings.

HM Overall raises substantive due process claims.” The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 12 The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that the “liberty” component of the due process clause
includes “the right of the individual ... to engage in any of

20. Overall relies on several substantive economic due process cases
such as New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 S.Ct. 371, 76
L.Ed. 747 (1932), and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427,
41 L.Ed, 832 (1897). The doctrine of substantive economic due process
has been abandoned. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). As such, we do
not find these arguments persuasive.

21, Overall does not raise claims under the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, but we acknowledge that Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights expresses the same protections as the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, See City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9,
15, 136 A.2d 852 (1957),

the common occupations of life ....” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
US. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1928). States may
not interfere with this liberty interest “by legislative action
which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state to effect.” Id. at
399-400, 48 S.Ct. 625. Thus, absent infringement of a funda-
mental right or constitutionally protected property right, an
individual must demonstrate that legislative action, such as
establishing licensing standards for an occupation, has no
rational basis. See Comprehensive Accounting Serv. Co. v. Md.
State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 284 Md. 474, 488-84, 897 A.2d
1019 (1979). The individual challenging the statute must prove
“that it does not bear a real and substantial relationship to the
governmental object sought to be attained.” Id.

It is undisputed that states have a “compelling interest in
the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as
part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and
other valid interests they have broad power to establish
standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the prac-
tice of professions.” Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
778, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L,Hd.2d 572 (1975). “The interest of
the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since
lawyers are essential to the primary government function of
administering justice and have historically been ‘officers of the
courts.’” Jd. Maryland has a significant interest in ensuring
that its lawyers display good moral character and candor.

Hs “‘A State cannot exclude a person from the prac-
tice of law ... in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 358 U.S. 282,
238-39, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957). States are free to
set “high standards of qualification, such as good moral char-
acter or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to
the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connec-
tion with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.”
Id, at 239, 77 S.Ct. 752 (emphasis added). Even if the state’s
standards are appropriate, a candidate may not be denied
admission unless there is a basis for finding that he has not

met the state’s standards, or if the state action is “invidiously
discriminatory.” Id. Simply put, “a person cannot be prevented
from practicing [law] except for valid reasons.” Jd. at 239 n.5,
‘77 S.Ct. 752.

In Schware, the Supreme Court considered whether there
was a basis to conclude that Schware lacked the good moral
character to be admitted to the New Mexico Bar. The New
Mexico Board of Bar Examiners denied Schware’s application
based on: (1) his use of aliases approximately 20 years earlier
to avoid anti-Semitic discrimination; (2) several arrests with-
out trial or convictions on suspected violations of California
statutes prohibiting “criminal syndicalism” and the Neutrality
Act of 1917; (8) and his membership in the Communist Party
from 1982 to 1940. Id. at 240-44, 77 S.Ct. 752. The Court
rejected New Mexico’s rationale for excluding Schware, point-
ing out that this conduct had occurred a substantial time
earlier, Schware, the Court explained, had made a “forceful
showing of good moral character” and overcome any “substan-
tial doubts about his present good moral character.” Id. at 246,
77 S.Ct. 752. In addition to presenting substantial evidence of
his character and conduct, Schware had been entirely candid
about his history consistent with the requirements of New
Mexico Bar Admissions, and with the dean of his law school.
Id, at 235 n.2, 240, 77 S.Ct. 752. The Court concluded that
New Mexico’s decision to deny admission was not based on
any evidence that rationally justified a conclusion that
Schware lacked the moral fitness to practice law. Id. at 246-
47, TT S.Ct. 752.

During the application process, Overall did not make a
“forceful showing of good moral character.” Id. at 246, 77 S.Ct.
152. Overall submitted letters written by attorneys and judges
in Alabama recommending his reinstatement in Alabama both
in his Addendum and to this Court. But those letters are
several years old. Thus they do not provide evidence of his
current moral character and fitness. Unlike the applicant in
Schware, whose misconduct occurred long before his applica-
tion to the Bar in New Mexico, Overall’s misconduct has
occurred recently. And whereas Schware had been candid

about his history, Overall has demonstrated a lack of candor
throughout the application process. We have held that re-
peated misrepresentations in the application for admission to
the Bar reflects poorly on the applicant’s moral character. See,
eg., Application of Cramer, 427 Md. at 624, 50 A8d 1066
(denying admission to an applicant who displayed a lack of
candor and truthfulness by failing to disclose material facts on
his application).

CONCLUSION

The decisions of the Committee, Board, and this Court are
based on substantial evidence that Overall lacks the moral
fitness to practice law. Maryland has afforded Overall ample
opportunity to demonstrate his fitness. His repeated omis-
sions, mischaracterizations, and continued failure to recognize
the import of the same leads us to conclude that Overall
should not be a lawyer in Maryland. Upon consideration of the
entire record before the Committee and the Board, we hold
that Overall has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating
that he has the good moral character necessary for the
practice of law and admission to the Bar of Maryland. We
shall not order his admission.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

175 A.8d 681
STATE of Maryland
ve
Leonard Lee SIMMS
No. 19, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017

1D
LY)

55:

ow

Argued by Karinna M. Rossi, Assistant Attorney General
(Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland of Baltimore,
MD) on brief, for Petitioner.

Argued by Rachel Simmonsen, Assistant Public Defender
(Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland of Baltimore,
MD) on brief, for Respondent.

ARGUED BEFORE: Barbera, C.J.; Greene, Adkins,
McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Greene, J.

This case confronts the question of when the State may
exercise its discretion to enter a nolle prosequi! to a charge(s)
against a criminal defendant. After conviction and sentencing

1. This opinion will use the terms nolle prosequi and nol pros inter-
changeably, but the term nolle prosequi has also been referred to over
time in our jurisprudence as a nolle as well as a nolle pros and a nolle
prose. See Gilmer v. State, 389 Md. 656, 659, 887 A.2d 549, 550 n.2
(2005) (“A nolle prosequi is often shortened and referred to as a nolle
prose or nol pros.”’) (internal citations omitted).

in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for conspiracy
to violate the Controlled Dangerous Substance laws, Leonard
Simms (“Mr. Simms”) appealed to the Court of Special Ap-
peals. Before the Court of Special Appeals heard oral argu-
ments, the State, in the trial court, nol prossed the charge
underlying Mr. Simms’ conviction and sentence. Subsequently,
the State moved to dismiss the case pending before the Court
of Special Appeals as moot. The Court of Special Appeals
determined that the case was not moot and held that the State
Jacked the authority to nol pros a charge underlying a convic-
tion and sentence. Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals
reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court based on insuffi-
cient evidence, We review the issue of whether the State had
the authority to enter a nol pros of a charge that resulted in a
conviction and sentence. We affirm the Court of Special Ap-
peals, holding that because the State’s authority to nol pros
applies only to charges, the State may not use its nol pros
authority to alter a final judgment, ie. conviction and sen-
tence.

I.

The facts, taken from the parties’ agreed-upon statement of
fact, have no bearing on the procedural posture of this case
and are included only for context. On February 9, 2015,
Officer Rajesok investigated a report of individuals who had
not paid for hotel services after ejectment from the property.
The officer found Mr. Simms, along with another suspect, in
the vicinity of the hotel. The officer positively identified Mr.
Simms and discovered what he believed to be heroin and
cocaine among the items in close proximity to where Mr.
Simms was found. Mr. Simms was arrested, and it was later
discovered that Mr. Simms had ethylone, a Schedule I Con-
trolled Dangerous Substance, on his person.

The State charged Mr. Simms on February 10, 2015, and a
grand jury returned a seven-count indictment on March 18,
20152 Mr. Simms filed a Motion to Suppress drugs, which the

2. The original seven charges are as follows—count one: possession
with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance; count two:

Cireuit Court denied on May 27, 2015. Thereafter, Mr. Simms
pled not guilty on November 5, 2015 in the Cireuit Court for
Anne Arundel County, waived his right to a trial, and proceed-
ed on a previously agreed-upon statement of facts. Before
reading the statement of facts into the record, the State orally
amended the seventh count of the indictment to possession
with intent to distribute methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(“MDMA”). At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial
judge found Mr. Simms guilty of the amended count seven on
the basis that Mr. Simms had ethylone on his person at the
time of arrest. At sentencing, the State nol prossed the
remaining six charges. Subsequently, Mr. Simms noted a
timely appeal.

While the conviction and sentence of Mr. Simms was pend-
ing on appeal, but before the deadline for briefing by the State
in the Court of Special Appeals, the State entered a nol pros
in the Circuit Court of count seven, the charge on which Mr.
Simms was convicted. Subsequently, the State moved to dis-
miss the case pending in the Court of Special Appeals on the
basis that the case was moot due to its abandonment of count
seven. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court. Simms v. State, 232
Md.App. 62, 71, 155 A.8d 937, 942-43 (2017). First, the Court
of Special Appeals determined that the case was not moot
because the State lacked authority to enter a nol pros of a
charge after the defendant had been convicted of and sen-
tenced for that offense. Id. at 71, 155 A.3d at 942. Then, the
Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that
evidence of ethylone was insufficient to support a conviction
and sentence for conspiracy to distribute MDMA. Jd. at 71,
155 A.3d at 943,

possession of a controlled dangerous substance; count three: posses-
sion with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance; count
four: possession of a controlled dangerous substance; count five:
possession of a controlled dangerous substance; count six: theft less
than $1,000; and count seven: conspiracy to violate controlled danger-
ous substance laws.

The State petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we

granted to answer the following questions:

1. As a matter of first impression, does the State have the
authority to enter a nolle prosequi on a charge after a
conviction?

2. If the State does have the authority to do so, was
Simms’[ ] appeal moot because the State entered a nolle
prosequi in the circuit court as to the entire case,
without objection?

State v. Simms, 453 Md. 357, 162 A.8d 888 (2017). Because we
hold that the State does not have authority to nol pros charges
after the trial court has entered a final judgment, we need not
and do not reach the second question.

IL

This Court has never addressed directly the issue presented
to us in this case. The State urges this Court to conclude that
the State’s Attorney has the authority to enter a nol pros,
even after a final judgment based on its wide discretion to
enter a nol pros. The State contends that this broad authority
is derived from the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See
Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article V, § 8. The State also
directs us to the absence of any limitation on the powers of the
State to enter a nol pros on appeal in the language of
Maryland Rule 4-247. The State maintains, therefore, that the
Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the State could
not enter a nol pros in this case,

The legislature and the judiciary have both regarded the act
of entering a nolle prosequi as an act inherently tied to
charges against a criminal defendant, See Maryland Code,
Criminal Procedure § 1-101(k) (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2017
Supp.) (defining “nolle prosequi” as “a formal entry on the
record by the State that declares the State’s intention not to
prosecute a charge”), We have defined entering a nolle prose-
qui “as an official declaration by the State, announcing that it
will not pursue the charges in a particular charging docu-
ment.” Gilmer v. State, 889 Md. 656, 659, 887 A.2d 549, 550 n.2

(2005) (internal quotations omitted). We have previously de-
scribed it as “[t]he abandonment of the prosecution.” Barrett
v. State, 155 Md. 636, 688, 142 A. 96, 97 (1928). Md. Rule 4-247
provides the parameters for the State’s authority to enter a
nol pros:

(a) Disposition by nolle prosequi. The State’s Attorney may
terminate a prosecution on a charge and dismiss the charge
by entering a nolle prosequi on the record in open court.
The defendant need not be present in court when the nolle
prosequi is entered, but if neither the defendant nor the
defendant’s attorney is present, the clerk shall send notice
to the defendant, if the defendant’s whereabouts are known,
and to the defendant’s attorney of record. Notice shall not
be sent if either the defendant or the defendant’s attorney
was present in court when the nolle prosequi was entered. If
notice is required, the clerk may send one notice that lists
all of the charges that were dismissed.

(b) Effect of nolle prosequi. When a nolle prosequi has been
entered on a charge, any conditions of pretrial release on
that charge are terminated, and any bail bond posted for
the defendant on that charge shall be released. The clerk
shall take the action necessary to recall or revoke any
outstanding warrant or detainer that could lead to the
arrest or detention of the defendant because of that charge.

We recognize that the language of Rule 4-247 does not
explicitly preclude the State from entering a nol pros on
charges at the appellate stage or after final judgment has
been reached. Indeed, the Rule is silent on when a charge can
no longer be nol prossed. Importantly, Rule 4-247 presup-
poses the existence of charges that the State may cease
prosecuting. For example, the language suggests that “enter-
ing a nolle prosequi” has the effect of “terminat[ing] a prose-
cution on a charge.” Rule 4-247(a) also states that “{e]ntering
a nolle prosequi” results in “dismiss[al of] the charge.” Subsec-
tion (b) of the Rule again refers to a “charge,” supporting the
relationship between nol prossing and charges.

Hl When considering the effect of its entry for a defen-
dant, a nol pros “has the effect of a nonsuit.” Calvert’s Lessee
v. Eden, 2 H. & McH. 279, 317 (1789). The effect of a nonsuit
means that “the accused remains subject to be proceeded
against by another indictment for the same offence.” State v.
Morgan, 33 Ma. 44, 46 (1870). In Barrett, the Court explained
that “[t]he abandonment of the prosecution [by entry of a nol
pros] cancels that indictment and restores [the defendant] to
his original position.” 155 Md. at 688, 142 A, at 97; see State v.
Moulden, 292 Md. 666, 673, 441 A.2d 699, 702-03 (1982)
(“Although a stet permits an accused to be proceeded against
at a later date under the same charging document, a nolle
prosequi does not. The nol pros of a charging document or of a
count is ‘a final disposition’ of the charging document or
count[.)’) (citing Barrett v. State, 155 Md. 636, 142 A. 96
(1928)). Based upon that same reasoning, due to the finality of
entering a nol pros on the disposition of a charge, we denied
the State the authority to withdraw its entry of a nol pros.
Hooper v. State, 293 Md. 162, 171, 443 A.2d 86, 91 (1982) (“To
permit the State to withdraw a nolle prosequi, or have a nol
prossed indictment reinstated, would be flatly inconsistent
with the nature of a nolle prosequi under Maryland law.”).

Friend v, State is the first instance in which we dealt with
the possible implications of a nol pros for the State as to
whether it may continue prosecuting a defendant after the
entry of a nol pros. 175 Md. 352, 2 A.2d 480 (1938). In Friend,
because the nol pros was ineffective, the defendant was placed
in double jeopardy. Id. at 355, 2 A.2d at 432 (“The trial and
conviction of the appellant, therefore, was valid in law ... and
a second trial for this same offense would be in violation of the
common law and of our constitutional prohibition with respect
to placing a person in double jeopardy as to the same crime.”).
This Court in Boone v. State refined the previous explanation
of the consequences of nol prossing by explaining that a nol
pros functions as an acquittal if jeopardy has attached. 3
Md. App. 11, 25-26, 237 A.2d 787, 797 (1968) (“The effect of the
entry of a nolle prosequi is not inconsistent with this common
law meaning. If entered without the consent of the defendant

after trial has begun, jeopardy attaches because it operates as
an acquittal,”) (italics in original). In Blondes v. State, the
Court then elaborated that “[o]n the other hand, where a nolle
prosequi is entered before jeopardy attaches, the State is only
precluded from prosecuting the defendant further under that
indictment, but the defendant may be proceeded against for
the same offense by another indictment or information.” 273
Md. 485, 443-44, 330 A.2d 169, 173 (1975) (citing Barrett v.
State, 155 Md. 686, 142 A. 96 (1928)); see Gilmer, 389 Md. at
671-72, 887 A.2d at 557-58 (explicating the temporal signifi-
cance of the attachment of jeopardy to the consequences of the
entry of a nol pros for a defendant). In Bynum v. State, we
clarified “that the double jeopardy prohibition, though barring
subsequent prosecution for offenses charged in counts dis-
missed by a nolle prosequi entered without the consent of the
accused after jeopardy has attached, has no application in the
context of the same prosecution which continues on other
counts.” 277 Md. 708, 709, 357 A.2d 339, 342 (1976).

In Ward v. State, we summarized the development of our
nol pros jurisprudence. This Court explained that entry of a
nol pros after jeopardy had attached does not uniquely invoke
double jeopardy principles, but that the principles of double
jeopardy did not change when applied in circumstances involv-
ing the entry of a nol pros. 290 Md. 76, 97, 427 A.2d 1008, 1020
(1981) (“[T]he Court in Bynwm was merely stating the general
rule that the entry of an uncontested nolle prosequi, after
jeopardy attaches, ordinarily precludes a subsequent prosecu-
tion for the offense. This general rule is simply an aspect of
the basic principle that the double jeopardy clause ordinarily
prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense.”).

In answering a narrower question regarding double jeopar-
dy implications from the entry of a nol pros, we have held that
the entry of a nol pros on a lesser offense within an indictment
does not preclude further prosecution on the greater offense,
State v. Woodson, 388 Md. 322, 385-36, 658 A.2d 272, 279
(1995) (“Because an entry of a nolle prosequi on a lesser
included offense after jeopardy has attached is only an acquit-
tal on that count for double jeopardy purposes ... the contin-

uation of the trial on the greater offense is permissible.”).
Under the common law, the standard for determining whether
the entry of the nol pros was unfair and thereby impermissible
when applied to a lesser included offense is not just “that the
evidence would be sufficient for the jury to convict on that
offense; rather, the evidence must also be such that the jury
could rationally convict only on the lesser included offense.”
Burrell v. State, 840 Md. 426, 434, 667 A.2d 161, 164~65 (1995)
(italics in original); see State v. Smith, 228 Md.App. 16, 31, 115
A.38d 210, 219 (2015) (describing the standard as whether “the
evidence [is] sufficient for the jury to convict on that offense
and the evidence [is] such that the jury could rationally convict
only on the lesser included offense”).

HM Generally, entering a nolle prosequi is a part of the
“broad discretion vested in the State’s Attorney.” Food Fair
Stores, Inc. v. Joy, 288 Md. 205, 214, 389 A.2d 874, 879 (1978).
Despite our recognition that the State has wide discretion in
its choice to enter a nol pros, we have prohibited the State’s
entry of a nol pros in circumstances where a defendant’s right
to a speedy trial or a defendant’s right to a fair trial has been
undermined. First, as we stated in Curley v. State:

We hold, therefore, that when a circuit court criminal case is

nol prossed, and the State later has the same charges

refiled, the 180-day period for trial prescribed by § 591 and

Rule 746 ordinarily begins to run with the arraignment or

first appearance of defense counsel under the second prose-

cution. If, however, it is shown that the nol pros had the
purpose or the effect of cireumventing the requirements of

§ 591 and Rule 746, the 180-day period will commence to

run with the arraignment or first appearance of counsel

under the first prosecution.
299 Md. 449, 462, 474 A.2d 502, 508 (1984). Our reasoning was
applied by the Court of Special Appeals in Ross v. State,
where “the State entered the nol pros to circumvent the 180-
day limit” and, as a result, the intermediate appellate court
vacated the Circuit Court’s judgment and dismissed the
charges. 117 Md.App. 357, 370-71, 700 A.2d 282, 289 (1997).

The Court of Special Appeals again affirmed this exception to
the State’s authority to enter a nol pros in Mora v. State
despite holding that it did not apply. 128 Md.App. 699, 722,
720 A.2d 984, 945 (1998).

I The second exception we have recognized with respect
to the State’s authority to enter a nol pros is when the entry
of a nol pros undermines a fair trial. Hook v. State, 315 Md.
25, 87, 553 A.2d 238, 289 (1989) (“We believe that under the
concept of fundamental fairness with respect to a trial in a
criminal cause, the broad authority vested in a prosecutor to
enter a nolle prosequi may be fettered in the proper circum-
stances. A case-by-case evaluation is necessary.”). “Fundamen-
tal fairness essential to the very concept of justice” requires
that the entry of a nol pros conforms to “the rudimentary
demands of fair procedure” and cannot violate “the civilized
standards for [a] fair and impartial trial.” Id. at 41-42, 558
A.2d at 242 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In
Jackson, we explained that “the Hook principle is not so rare
as the impression emitted by the Court of Special Appeals,
and although by no means a common occurrence, it may be
that it can be invoked to assure a fair trial more often than the
Court of Special Appeals suggests.” Jackson v. State, 322 Md.
117, 128-29, 586 A.2d 6, 11-12 (1991). We reasoned in Burrell
that “[t]he Hook test balances the broad discretion of the
State to nolle pros charges with the danger of an unfair jury
verdict.” 340 Md. at 482, 667 A.2d at 164.

Although we have outlined Maryland’s common law with
regard to a nolle prosequi, including the general rule of
entering, the consequences of entering, and the exceptions for
entering, we have yet to define clearly the boundaries of the
State’s discretion to enter a nolle prosequi, and thus are
presented with that question now. This case is not about
exceptions to the State’s authority, such as whether the State
would have authority but for a violation of a defendant's
rights, but rather this case concerns whether the State’s nol
pros authority continues after a defendant has received a final
judgment. When confronted with this question, the Wyoming
Supreme Court stated:

“The rule at the common law seems to have been ... that
prior to trial the prosecutor has the absolute uncontrolled
power to enter a nolle prosequi; that after the empaneling
of the jury until the return of a verdict the power is subject
to the control of the court since it may not be used at that
time to the prejudice of the defendant; and that following
the return of the verdict the uncontrolled power of the
prosecutor to enter a nolle revives and continues until such
time as judgment is entered and sentence imposed.”
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 418 (Wyo. 1990) (citing to United
States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. 100, 102 (S.D. Il. 1945) (empha-
sis in original omitted)). Our past rulings have conformed to
these principles, and the Court of Special Appeals has relied
on this passage from Brokaw as well in Cross v. State,
describing Brokaw as “strongly persuasive.” 86 Md.App. 502,
507, 874 A.2d 620, 624 n.1 (1977).5
In Hooper, we tacitly affirmed the State’s entry of the nol
pros prior to trial. 298 Md. at 163-64, 443 A.2d at 87. The
State properly entered nol prosses at the end of the State’s
case in both Ward and Hook. Ward, 290 Md. at 79, 427 A.2d at
1010; Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 35, 558 A.2d 238, 288 (1989).
We have condoned the State’s entry of a nol pros prior to
sentencing. Gilmer, 389 Md. at 677, 887 A.2d at 562 (holding
that the trial court erred when it did not credit the defendant
for time served and the charges were nol prossed). Although
we have permitted the State to enter a nol pros prior to trial,
during trial, and prior to sentencing, we have never before
resolved whether the State may enter a nol pros after a final
judgment has been reached.

HEM Providing context for the nolle prosequi procedure,
Ward traced both the historical usage of a nolle prosequi as

3. We have previously relied on federal criminal procedure when devel-
oping our own common law regarding the State’s authority to enter a
nolle prosequi. See Ward v. State, 290 Md, 76, 84, 427 A.2d 1008, 1013
(1981) (citing to Dealy v, United States, 152 U.S. 539, 542, 14 S.Ct, 680,
681, 38 L.Ed. 545 (1894), and Dortch v. United States, 203 F.2d 709,
710 (6th Cir, 1953), in order to compare the differences between the
entry of a nolle prosequi and an acquittal).

well as its then-present utilization by the State. See 290 Md. at
76, 427 A.2d at 1008. We explained in Ward that, since its use
in criminal prosecutions in England, “the nolle prosequi has
been a means whereby the government exercises control over
pending criminal cases.” Id. at 82-88, 427 A.2d at 1012; see
also State v. Huntley, 411 Md, 288, 291, 9838 A.2d 160, 162 n.4
(2009) (“A nolle prosequi, or nol pros, is an action taken by the
State to dismiss pending charges when it determines that it
does not intend to prosecute the defendant under a particular
indictment.”), To enter a nol pros “is an ‘abandonment of the
prosecution.’” Ward, 290 Md. at 88, 427 A.2d at 1012 (citing
Barrett v. State, 155 Md. 686, 688, 142 A. 96, 97 (1928)). The
prosecutor has the discretion to decide whether to enter a nol
pros, and may enter a nol pros on all charges against a
defendant, on only one charge against a defendant, or even on
part of a charge against a defendant. Id. Lastly, we explicated
in depth that the entry of a nol pros does not effectuate an
acquittal of an underlying offense but only of the charge nol
prossed. Id. at 84, 427 A.2d at 1012-13 (“[W]hile a nolle
prosequi discharges the defendant on the charging document
or count which was nolle prossed, and while it is a bar to any
further prosecution under that charging document or count, a
nolle prosequi is not an acquittal or pardon of the underlying
offense and does not preclude a prosecution for the same
offense under a different charging document or count.”) (em-
phasis in original).

HH With that history in mind, we consider when, if at
all, the State’s authority to enter a nol pros on a charge ends.
“Cases—particularly criminal cases—have a beginning, and
they must, at some point, have an end.... A conviction does
not occur in a criminal case until sentence is imposed on a
verdict of guilty. That is when judgment is entered.” Chmurny
v. State, 392 Md. 159, 167, 896 A.2d 354, 358 (2006) (internal
citations omitted). Likewise, “[a] verdict of guilty alone consti-
tutes neither a conviction nor a sentence ....” Id. at 168, 896
A.2d at 358. A conviction “is the final judgment and sentence
rendered by a court pursuant to a verdict or plea of guilty... .
[A] person is not ‘convicted’ of an offense until the court

enters a judgment upon the verdict of guilty.” Myers v. State,
303 Md. 639, 645, 496 A.2d 312, 315 (1985). A conviction and
imposition of a sentence is, therefore, a final judgment entered
on the charges brought against a defendant.

The import of finality in a criminal defendant’s case was
discussed by the Court of Special Appeals in Buckner v. State,
11 Md.App. 55, 59-60, 272 A.2d 828, 881-82 (1971). In that
case, the intermediate appellate court detailed the history of a
criminal defendant’s statutory right to appeal and explained
that a criminal defendant may only appeal from a final disposi-
tion of the case, after sentencing has occurred, Id. at 58-60,
272 A.2d at 881-82. That appeal is a statutory right granted to
a defendant upon conviction and sentencing. See Md. Code,
Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 12-801 (1978, 2018 Repl.
Vol.); see also Cubbage v. State, 804 Md. 287, 241, 498 A.2d
632, 634 (1985). Section 12-801 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article grants the right of an appeal where
appropriate to any party in a civil or criminal case so long as
there is a final judgment.

Although the facts of the case before us now differ from the
facts in Ward, that case nevertheless provides a helpful con-
text for examining the principle of finality after a charge has
been nol prossed. The State had charged Ward with five
counts, including a charge of accessory to murder and another
charge of murder. 290 Md. at 78-79, 427 A.2d at 1010. Prior to
the rendering of the jury verdict, the State nol prossed two
charges, one of which included the murder charge. Id. at 79,
427 A.2d at 1010. The jury found the defendant guilty of the
other three charges, including the charge of accessory to
murder. Id. In a post-conviction proceeding, the Circuit Court
dismissed two of the convictions and granted a new trial on
the accessory charge. Id. Before commencement of the new
trial, Ward moved to dismiss the accessory charge on three
separate grounds: double jeopardy, speedy trial, and that the
common law doctrine of accessoryship rendered the charge
legally defective. Id. at 80, 427 A.2d at 1010. The Circuit Court
agreed that the accessory charge was defective based on
common law accessoryship, and it dismissed the charge. Id. at

80, 427 A.2d at 1011. The State appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals. Prior to any proceedings in that court, we
issued a writ of certiorari and reversed the Circuit Court’s
dismissal. At that time, we did not address the double jeopar-
dy issue. Ward, 290 Md. at 81, 427 A.2d at 1011. On remand,
the Circuit Court denied Ward’s motion to dismiss based upon
double jeopardy, and the defendant appealed before the new
trial commenced, and this Court issued a writ of certiorari. Id.

We then affirmed the Circuit Court, holding that a nol pros
applies only to a particular charge and not the underlying act,
which may give rise to a different or additional charges. Id. at
85, 427 A.2d at 1018 (“[T]here is nothing inherent in the
nature of a nolle prosequi which causes its entry to operate as
an acquittal of the underlying offense.”). In the new trial, the
State did not proceed against Ward on the charge of murder,
the charge on which the State had entered a nol pros, but
rather the State prosecuted Ward as an accessory to murder.
Id, at 94-95, 427 A.2d at 1018. Double jeopardy principles
precluded a second trial on murder or manslaughter, but not
the accessory charge. Id. at 95, 427 A.2d at 1018.

The circumstances in Ward did not provide us the opportu-
nity to examine whether the State may enter a nol pros after a
final judgment. Ward dealt with the issue of whether double
jeopardy attached to a particular charge or the entire underly-
ing offense, whereas the issue squarely before us now is
whether the State may enter a nol pros after conviction and
sentencing while a defendant’s appeal is pending. Notably, the
State in Ward nol prossed the charges prior to Ward’s
conviction and sentencing, when the case was still pending at
the trial stage. Id. at 79, 427 A.2d at 1010. Here, unlike in
Ward, the State nol prossed the underlying charge after Mr.
Simms had been convicted and sentenced, and while the case
was pending on appeal.

In Hooper, we attempted to clarify the appropriate method
for entering a nol pros. 293 Md. at 167-68, 443 A.2d at 89. We
explained that “[a] nolle prosequi is simply the prosecution’s
abandonment of a charging document, count, or part of a

count” that has the effect of “finally terminat[ing]” prosecution
of a “particular charging document.” Id. A nol pros “need not
be couched in any particular language or take any specific
form; it is the substance of the prosecution’s action which
controls.” Id. at 168, 443 A.2d at 89. We recounted in Hooper
the various ways in which courts had recognized the entry of a
nol pros, emphasizing that the “prosecutor’s action in light of
the circumstances ... determine[s] whether the action
amounts to a nol pros”:
Consequently, an “election” not to prosecute a particular
count has been deemed to be a nolle prosequi. The State’s
motion to amend an indictment by deleting certain matter
from two counts on the ground of duplicity was treated as a
nolle prosequi of the offenses charged in the deleted materi-
al. A motion by the prosecuting attorney to “dismiss” an
indictment has been held to be a nolle prosequi, with the
further holding that the dismissal could not be set aside by
a subsequent order reinstating the indictment. A paper filed
by the prosecuting attorney called a “disclaimer” was
deemed to be a nolle prosequi [], with the court pointing to
“the substance of what was undertaken.” The Supreme
Court of Indiana [] held that a motion by the prosecuting
attorney to “strike the case from the docket” amounted to a
nolle prosequi and that, therefore, the trial court erred in
later granting the State’s motion to reinstate the action.
Id, at 168-69, 443 A.2d at 89-90 (internal citations omitted).
We then observed that for double jeopardy purposes, while
the case was pending an interlocutory appeal, “if jeopardy had
attached at the trial, the nol pros on appeal will ordinarily
operate as an acquittal of the underlying charges because of
double jeopardy principles.” Id. at 169, 443 A2d at 90 n.3.
Hooper simply turned on whether the State could withdraw
the entry of a nol pros and, thus, did not address nol prossing
in relation to cases on appeal.

4. The State contends that the Maryland Constitution, as cited in Hooper,
supports its argument that a prosecution continues on appeal. Mary-
land Declaration of Rights, Article V, § 3. It is correct that the Mary-

Hooper came before us on appeal by the State after the trial
court dismissed the indictments against the two defendants as
duplicitous, before any trial on the merits, 298 Md. at 164, 443
A.2d at 87. The State, during oral argument, moved to dismiss
the case by way of nol prossing the appeal, Jd. at 165, 443 A.2d
at 88. In doing so, the State explained that it had filed new
charges while the appeal was pending, and, that the State
would drop the charges raised on appeal as moot once the trial
on the new charges began. Jd. at 164, 448 A.2d at 87-88 We
did not, therefore, address the issue of duplicity. Several
weeks later, the State filed a motion to withdraw its motion to
dismiss on the basis that the trial on the new charges had
been delayed for the immediate future and sought to reinstate
the appeal, so that a trial on the old charges could begin. Jd. at
167, 443 A.2d at 89. Consistent with our decision in Moulden,
we held that the act of nol prossing was a final termination of
a charge, and we did not reinstate the indictments the State
had previously nol prossed. Hooper, 298 Md. at 171, 448 A.2d
at 91,

Hooper did not present us with the question we face now.
Hooper focused on whether the State had authority to with-
draw its entry of a nol pros, and we held that the State did not
have such authority, Here, we deal with the authority of the
State, not to withdraw a previously entered nol pros, but to
enter a nol pros after the entry of a final judgment in a
criminal case. Although the State urges that Hooper is disposi-
tive with respect to the State’s authority to enter a nol pros on
appeal, the difference in when the State entered the nol pros
makes Hooper inapposite in deciding the case before us.
Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General entered a nol pros
in Hooper during oral argument in this Court by way of
moving to dismiss the case because the State had filed a new
information against the defendants, charging them with the
same crimes. Prior to the entry of the nol pros, the State had

land Constitution states generally that the Attorney General has authori-
ty to prosecute an appeal, but the provision does not give the State the
authority to enter a nol pros to charges underlying a final judgment
while the defendant’s appeal is pending.

not prosecuted the charges filed against the defendants, ex-
cept to the extent that the trial court dismissed the indict-
ments, creating the initial impetus for the appeal, The with-
drawal of the nol pros and reinstatement of the indictments in
Hooper was the sole issue on appeal. To the contrary, in Mr.
Simms’ case, the State prosecuted the charges against Mr.
Simms. Not only had the charges been prosecuted, but Mr.
Simms was convicted and sentenced, and he appealed the
conviction and sentence, The appeal initiated by Mr, Simms in
the Court of Special Appeals related to the sufficiency of the
evidence against him that resulted in his conviction, as well as
whether the hearing judge’s denial of a motion to suppress
was in error. The nol pros only became an issue on appeal as a
result of procedural maneuvering by the State while the
appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals.

Hooper cited to Friend for support of its discussion regard-
ing the appropriate procedural technique for nol prossing an
appeal, In Hooper we stated that “it would seem that a nol
pros of a case pending on appeal should normally be done in
the appellate court in which the appeal is pending at the time.”
293 Md. 162, 169, 443 A.2d 86, 90 n.8 (1982). This observation,
buried in a footnote, referred to nol prossing a pending
interlocutory appeal, not nol prossing at the appellate stage on
a charge underling a final judgment after conviction and
sentencing. The appeal arose out of dismissal of the indict-
ments before any prosecution of the charges had begun.
Furthermore, our commentary in the footnote was unneces-
sary to resolve Hooper and, therefore, was merely dicta.

A careful reading of Friend reveals, however, that the case
provides no support for the broad interpretation of footnote
three found in Hooper that the State urges us to adopt. In
Friend, a justice of the peace had issued a warrant charging
the defendant with receiving stolen goods, and during a trial
before the justice of the peace, the defendant was convicted
and sentenced. 175 Md. at 858, 2 A.2d at 481. The defendant
appealed his conviction to the Cireuit Court, and while the
appeal was pending, the State procured an indictment charg-
ing the defendant with the same crime with which the defen-

dant had already been convicted. Id. The State sought the
second indictment presumably because it believed that the
justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction in the first proceeding.
See id. at 355, 2 A.2d at 432. The State attempted to nol pros
the charges underlying the defendant’s first conviction of
receiving stolen goods then proceeded to try the defendant on
the new indictment in the Circuit Court, which resulted in a
second conviction for the same crime. Jd. at 353-54, 2 A.2d at
431, The defendant raised the issue of double jeopardy on
appeal, and we reversed the second conviction. Id. at 356, 2
A.2d at 482. We determined that the nol pros was improper,
ineffective, and therefore placed the defendant in double jeop-
ardy. Id. at 356, 2 A.2d at 432.

The State suggests that Friend stood for a tacit acceptance
of entering a nol pros of charges on appeal, and because
Hooper discussed Friend in support of entering a nol pros of
charges on appeal, the footnoted language in Hooper should
be read broadly to permit the State’s authority to nol pros, in
effect, any appeal. We did not, as the State suggests, tacitly
accept in Friend that the State has the authority to nol pros a
charge underlying a conviction and sentence on appeal. 175
Ma. at 356, 2 A.2d at 482 (stating that “[t]he nolle prosequi
... Was improper and ineffective”), Although Hooper did
permit the State to nol pros charges pending on appeal, that
holding was limited to the specific circumstance of the State’s
interlocutory appeal, prior to a final judgment on the charges
against the defendant.

Although both parties in the case before us attempt to
distinguish Friend from the present case, Friend provides
valuable guidance for answering the question raised here. We
explained in Friend that “[w]hen the indictment was found[,]
the case stood on the appeal docket for trial, by order of the
defendant, and the State had no authority to dismiss this
appeal. That was the right of the accused[.]” Jd. at 355, 2 A.2d
at 482. Later, we reiterated that “(t]he State having no
authority to dismiss the defendant's appeal, the entering of a
nolle prosequi could not be construed as a dismissal of it. The
nolle prosequi, if it could be legally entered, would effect a

final disposition of the entire prosecution originating before
the justice of the peace[.]” Id. at 355-56, 2 A.2d at 432. Lastly,
we stated, “The nolle prosequi ... under the circumstances of
this case was improper and ineffective, and left undisposed of
the case pending on his appeal, and his trial and conviction in
the Circuit Court ... placed this defendant in double jeopar-
dyL]” Id. at 856, 2 A.2d at 432.

Because the State did not have the authority to enter a nol
pros on appeal, the defendant had been convicted twice of the
same charge, and our inquiry in Friend ended there. Ward,
290 Md. at 91, 427 A.2d at 1016 (“Friend was based entirely on
the application of double jeopardy principles.”). We proceeded
on the assumption that, because the State lacked the authority
to nol pros the appeal, the original conviction and sentence for
receiving stolen goods remained, pending the appeal, while the
defendant had received a second conviction and sentence for
receiving stolen goods, a clear violation of double jeopardy
principles. Friend, 175 Md. at 356, 2 A.2d at 482. The Court
determined that the defendant had been placed in double
jeopardy only because the nol pros, which had been entered
during the appeal of the original judgment, was an “improper”
and “ineffective” use of the State’s authority. Id.

Despite different procedural contexts, Friend shares several
critical facts with the case before us. The justice of the peace
convicted the defendant in Friend, and as a statutory right,
the defendant pursued an appeal of his conviction.® As the
defendant awaited review of his appeal, the State attempted to
nol pros the appeal, which we held the State had no authority
to do. Id. Here, the trial judge convicted and sentenced Mr.
Simms, and Mr. Simms appealed, pursuant to his statutory
right. While Mr. Simms awaited appellate review of his case,

5. That the appeal in Friend fell under a de novo standard of review does
not alter the critical holding of the case; namely, the entry of a nol pros
was a nullity because the defendant had initiated an appeal of his
conviction and sentence. The State had no authority in Friend to do so,
as it lacks the authority here to nol pros while Mr. Simms’ appeal was
pending before the Court of Special Appeals.

the State sought to abandon the prosecution of the appeal by
filing a motion to dismiss.

The State suggests that we should limit the reach of Friend
and, in support, points us to one phrase in the following
statement in Friend:

The nolle prosequi, entered without the consent of the

accused, under the circumstances of this case was improper

and ineffective, and left undisposed of the case pending on
his appeal, and his trial and conviction in the Cireuit Court
for Caroline County for the same offense, under the cireum-
stances above related, placed this defendant in double jeop-
ardy, contrary to the common law and our constitutional
provisions.
175 Md. at 356, 2 A.2d at 482. The State argues that “consent
of the accused” is the dispositive phrase in the above passage
from Friend. In effect, the State urges the Court to adopt an
interpretation of the passage that would grant the State the
authority to nol pros an appeal when the defendant consents,
or waives objection, to the entry of the nol pros. The State
cites to no authority to support its proposition that a defen-
dant waives the right to appeal by failing to object to the
entry of a nol pros. Nevertheless, this interpretation of Friend
fails because it is not grounded in the history of our nol pros
jurisprudence.

In order to understand the specific phrase in Friend, we
look to cases decided before Friend. We explore the source for
the language “without the consent of the accused” because
Friend did not include a citation. Ward and Blondes contextu-
alized the line “without the consent of the accused” to cases
involving double jeopardy, the issue before the Court in
Friend. See Ward, 290 Md. at 85-86, 427 A.2d at 1013-14;
Blondes, 273 Md. at 448, 880 A.2d at 178. Both cases cite to
United States v. Shoemaker, which held that “{i]t is a rule in
criminal proceedings that nothing shall be done, within in [sic]
discretion of the court, to the prejudice of the defendant. And,
hence, in some instances, where his interests may, possibly, be
injuriously affected by an order, his consent is necessary.” 27
F, Cas. 1067, 1079, 2 McClean 114 (Cir. Ct. D. Ill. 1840).

Additionally, Ward cited to Commonwealth v. Tuck, 87 Mass.
356, 364-65 (1888), which held that the State may enter a nolle
prosequi without the consent of the defendant before a jury
has been impaneled or after a verdict, but after a jury has
been impaneled, it may enter a nolle prosequi only with the
consent of the defendant. See id. at 866 (“This practice of
entering a nolle prosequi after verdict, has prevailed without
objection for many years.... [The court] will take care that it
shall not operate to the prejudice of the defendant’s rights.”)
(italics in original), This language is in reference to aspects of
the common law about the timing of the entry of a nol pros
and portends possible double jeopardy issues with the entry of
a nol pros. Zd. at 365-66, Although the concerns of Mr. Simms
as to being placed in jeopardy are significant, the issue of
double jeopardy is not before us as the State has not tried to
prosecute Mr, Simms a second time on the charge that was nol
prossed.

As we have done previously,’ we review case law from the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in developing our
own nolle prosequi jurisprudence. Despite factual differences
between the present case and Commonwealth v. Dascalakis,
246 Mass. 12, 140 N.E. 470 (1928) (abrogated on different
grounds by Commonwealth v. Bly, 444 Mass. 640, 880 N.E.2d
1048 (2005)), the latter case, Dascalakis, espoused legal princi-
ples defining a limit on the prosecutorial discretion to enter a
nol pros after a final judgment. “The very nature of the term
[nolle prosequi] shows that it cannot spring into existence until
a criminal proceeding has been commenced by some process in
court, either complaint or indictment. It cannot remain in

6. We have previously relied upon Massachusetts decisions in the devel-
opment of our own nolle prosequi jurisprudence. See State v. Morgan,
33 Md. 44, 46 (1870) (citing to Commonwealth v. Wheeler and Common-
wealth v. Briggs); Friend v. State, 175 Md. 352, 354, 2 A.2d 430, 431
(1938) (citing to Commonwealth v. Cunningham); Ward v. State, 290
Md. 76, 84, 427 A.2d 1008, 1013 (1981) (citing to Commonwealth v.
Briggs, Commonwealth v. Tuck, and Commonwealth v. Wheeler ); Hoo-
per v. State, 293 Md. 162, 168, 443 A.2d 86, 89 (1982) (citing to
Commonwealth v. Hart).

existence after a criminal prosecution has come to an end.” Id.
at 478. The court held that “[t]he power of the court over a
prosecution for crime is bounded by a final judgment. Sen-
tence is final judgment in a criminal case. That is the end of
the case[.]” Jd. Lastly, the court stated that “the power of the
prosecuting officer cannot continue after the power of the
court to deal with the case under its general jurisdiction is
over.... [TJhe entry of a nolle prosequi cannot be made after
judgment.” Id. The nol pros principles on which Dascalakis
was decided remain good law in Massachusetts. See Common-
wealth v. Harris, 75 Mass.App.Ct. 696, 916 N.H.2d 396, 403
(2009) (“While the power to exercise a nolle prosequi is
absolute before trial, it is limited once trial has begun and will
have the effect of an acquittal if exercised after that time
without the consent of the defendant. However, the power of
the prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi is revived after a
verdict and remains until the imposition of sentence.”) (inter-
nal citations omitted).

Massachusetts is not outside the norm in limiting the scope
of the State’s authority to enter a nol pros after a final
judgment as other courts have held similarly. See Billis, 800
P.2d at 418 (“[Tyhe uncontrolled power of the prosecutor to
enter a nolle revives and continues until such time as judg-
ment is entered and sentence imposed.”); State ew rel. Nor-
wood v. Drumm, 691 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Mo. 1985) (“[Vlery few
of the cases from other jurisdictions, and none of the Missouri
decisions, involve entry of a nolle prosequi after verdict... .
The Court declines to accept respondent’s invitation to adopt a
rule [permitting entry of a nol pros after conviction] ...
because ... compelling considerations justify conditioning ex-
ercise of the authority of the prosecuting attorney to nolle
prosequi after verdict.”); State v. Charles, 188 S.C. 188, 190
S.E. 466, 468 (1987) (“[A] nolle prosequi may be entered,
namely, before the jury is impaneled, while the case is before
the jury, and after the verdict.”); In re Cain, 209 F. 40, 42
(1918) (“ ‘It is well established, therefore, that the prosecuting
officer may enter a nolle prosequi before final judgment,
notwithstanding the mandate of an Appellate Court[.] ”) (in-

ternal citation omitted). Additionally, other courts have cited
to Dascalakis in forming their own nolle prosequi jurispru-
dence. See Norwood, 691 S.W.2d at 240 (limiting the scope of
the State’s authority to enter a nol pros); District of Colwm-
bia v. Weams, 208 A2d 617, 618 (D.C. 1965) (explaining
judicially-imposed restraints on the State’s authority to enter
anol pros).

HE Consistent with the legal principles in Friend and
Dascalakis, we hold that the State does not have the authority
to enter a nol pros after a final judgment has been entered
against a defendant in a criminal case, The mere fact that the
State has entered a nol pros to underlying charges of a
conviction does not alter the existence of a final judgment, ie.
a conviction and sentence entered against the defendant. The
State had no authority to use its power to nol pros to alter a
final judgment entered in favor of or against a criminal
defendant. Final judgment is the boundary of the State’s
discretion to enter a nolle prosequi.

HM Despite the State’s characterization of expediting jus-
tice for the defendant by having him released as a result of
the entry of the nol pros as opposed to waiting for the
appellate process to finish, the State’s efforts tended to cir-
cumvent the right of Mr. Simms to appeal his conviction and
sentence. Upon receiving final judgment, Mr. Simms chose to
exercise his statutorily-granted right to appeal his conviction
and sentence, The State does not contest that the appeal had
been perfected and the matter was pending argument in the
Court of Special Appeals. As explained in Friend, “[w]hen the
indictment was found[,] the case stood on the appeal docket
for trial, by order of the defendant, and the State had no
authority to dismiss this appeal. That was the right of the
accused[.]” 175 Md. at 355, 2 A.2d at 482. We agree with the
Court of Special Appeals that, when a criminal defendant has
appealed the conviction and sentence, the State may not
employ its nol pros authority to enter a final judgment and
thereby dismiss the appeal.

HE s(Once 2 case reaches final judgment in a proceed-
ing, and a party appeals that judgment, the issue “comes
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court.” Irvin
v. State, 276 Md. 168, 172-78, 344 A.2d 418, 421 (1975).
Jurisdiction to judge the appeal shifts from the Circuit Court
to the appellate court. Raimondi v. State, 8 Md.App. 468, 475,
261 A.2d 40, 48-44 (1970) (“[TJhe perfecting of an appeal .
brings the subject matter thereof within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the appellate court and suspends the authority of the
lower court over it during the pendency of the appeall.]”).
Because Mr. Simms appealed his conviction and sentence, the
trial court had no jurisdiction to alter the conviction or sen-
tence by relying on the State’s nol pros authority. But see Md.
Rule 4-831(b)(1)(B) (“The court has revisory power and con-
trol over the judgment to set aside an unjust or improper
verdict and grant a new trial ... on motion filed within 90
days after [the Circuit Court’s] imposition of sentence.”); Md.
Rule 4-$45(e)(1) (“Upon a motion filed within 90 days after
imposition of a sentence ... the court has revisory power over
the sentence[.]”). In the present case, the nol pros entered in
the trial court as to the charge underlying the conviction and
sentence was simply a nullity, “improper” and therefore “inef-
fective.” See Friend, 175 Md. at 356, 2 A.2d at 482. In this
case, the State was not attempting to nol pros charges but
rather sought to erase a conviction and sentence, and in doing
so attempted an end run around the appellate process. Suc-
cinetly, the State did not and does not have the authority to
alter a final judgment under Rule 4-247,

HI The State has presented no justification for its asser-
tion that it has the authority to enter a nolle prosequi of a
charge underlying a conviction and sentence. It contends that
because Rule 4-247 lacks a specific limitation, the State has
authority to enter a nol pros at any point. The State explains
that the only limitation on its authority to nol pros is when
entry of a nol pros contravenes justice, and here, entry of the
nol pros did not cause any injustice to Mr. Simms. According
to the State, because Mr. Simms received efficient justice by
his prompt release from prison as a result of the State’s

decision to enter a nol pros, the exercise of its authority was
proper. Furthermore, the State contends that this Court has
yet to expressly deny the State this authority by pointing to
Friend, Ward, Cross,’ and Hooper. To be sure, we do so now
and clarify in this case that the State does not have the
authority to enter a nol pros of a charge that has resulted in a
final judgment.

Additionally, the State argues that Mr. Simms failed to
object to the entry of the nol pros and that his lack of
objection was, in effect, an agreement with the abandonment
of the prosecution. First, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the nol pros, making the nol pros ineffective, regardless
of Mr. Simms’ failure to object. Second, at no time did Mr.
Simms waive his right to appeal, nor does the record demon-
strate that Mr, Simms appreciated that failing to object meant
that he could no longer pursue his appeal. The notion that the
defendant ought to object to entry of a nol pros goes against
the letter and the spirit of Rule 4-247(a) as the Rule does not
even require the defendant’s presence in court at the time of
entry of a nol pros. Notwithstanding, we need not decide
whether Mr. Simms needed to object to the State’s action, or
whether the lack of objection equates to an agreement by Mr.
Simms, because the State lacked the authority to alter the
final judgment against Mr. Simms via the State’s nol pros
authority.

We reject the State’s suggestion that its power to nol pros
may divest a criminal defendant of his or her right to appeal a
final judgment. In this case, Mr. Simms’ interest in the
outcome of his appeal, specifically a determination of whether
the trial court properly ruled on his suppression motion and
whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him, were not
controlled by the prosecuting attorneys. That the State has
not yet re-charged Mr. Simms, or does not intend to charge

7. In Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978), we were not
presented on appeal the issue of whether the State's entry of a nol pros
was legally correct. The case was not yet on appeal when the State
entered the nol pros, making the facts of the present case distinct from
those before us in Cross,

Mr. Simms with a different crime, does not alter Mr. Simms’
right to appeal.

The State maintains that it should not be saddled with
prosecuting meritless appeals. This contention again is unper-
suasive. The State has several options on appeal, such as
conceding error or by filing no arguments with the appellate
court. The State ignores the fact that it was saddled with
prosecuting a meritless appeal in this case because of a self-
inflicted error in the trial court. The most important step for
preventing the State from having to prosecute the appeal in
this case would have been to have charged Mr. Simms with a
crime supported by the evidence against him. In limiting the
State’s authority to enter a nol pros to the period prior to a
final judgment, we do not mandate that the State, knowing
there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction against a
criminal defendant, must proceed in arguing in favor of that
conviction on appeal.

Il.

In conclusion, we hold that, after a defendant has received a
final judgment in the form of a conviction and sentencing, the
State may not enter a nolle prosequi to alter the final judg-
ment. Upon conviction and sentencing based upon an underly-
ing charge, the underlying charge is no longer pending and
the State’s authority to enter a nol pros has ended. Final
judgment terminates the case in the trial court. Mr. Simms
was convicted and sentenced. Therefore, the State lacked the
authority to nol pros in order to alter the final judgment or to
eliminate the appellate process initiated by Mr. Simms.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY

PETITIONER.

579

175 A.3d 697
Quanta BROWNLEE, et al.
ve
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO. et al.
Mise. No. 1, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017

rc)
wo

581

Argued by Christopher T. Casciano and Brian S. Brown
(Brown & Barron, LLC of Baltimore, MD) on brief, for
Appellants.

Argued by Robert L. Hoegle (Mary S. Diemer, Nelson
Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP of Washington, DC; Jean-
een J. Johnson, Stephen S. McCloskey, Semmes, Bowen &
Semmes of Baltimore, MD) on brief, for Appellees.

ARGUED BEFORE: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins,
McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Hotten, J.

This Court has been asked to answer a certified question of
law by the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. The Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law Act, Maryland Code, §§ 12-601, 12-618 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) empowers this Court

to “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the
United States...if the answer may be determinative of an
issue in a pending litigation in the certifying court and there is
no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or
statute of this State.” CJ § 12-603.

The United States District Court for the District of Mary-
Jand has asked us to answer the following question:

Would application of Georgia’s interpretation of the pollu-
tion exclusion contained in the insurance policy issued by
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company to the Salvation Army
as excluding coverage for bodily injuries resulting from the
ingestion of lead-based paint violate Maryland public policy?

We answer this question in the negative. For reasons to be
explained, we hold that application of Georgia law concerning
the pollution exclusion in the policy under the principle of lew
loci contractus does not violate Maryland public policy.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND '

Quanta Brownlee, Jamal Brownlee, Shakeira Jones, Da-
quane® Jones, and De’Aunttae Jones (collectively “Appel-
lants”) were exposed to lead-based paint at a property, owned
by the Salvation Army, located at 1114 North Calvert Street
in Baltimore City, Maryland.

In 1995, Appellants Quanta Brownlee and Jamal Brownlee
resided at the property, which contained deteriorated lead-
based paint, Appellants sustained permanent brain damage
and elevated blood lead levels as a result of the exposure to
lead-based paint. In 2001, Shakeira Jones, Daquane Jones, and
De’Aunttae Jones also resided at the property. Shakeira
Jones, Daquane Jones, and De’Aunttae Jones also sustained

1, These facts are adopted from the factual allegations set forth in
Appellants’ and Appellees’ briefs.

2. In Appellants’ brief, Daquane Jones’ name is spelled inconsistently,
sometimes being referenced as Dequane Jones, The remainder of this
Opinion will reference the Appellant as Daquane Jones.

es ©

permanent brain damage and elevated blood lead levels as a
result of the exposure to lead-based paint.

Appellants named the Salvation Army as a defendant in
their lead-based paint related tort claims in a complaint that is
now pending in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland.’ In addition to alleging that there was no
insurance available in connection with Appellants’ claim, the
Salvation Army asserted that it was immune from liability on
charitable immunity grounds, unless and until Liberty Mutual
indemnified it as responsible for Appellants’ injuries and dam-
ages. The parties do not dispute that Liberty Mutual issued
comprehensive general liability insurance policies (“the Liber-
ty Mutual insurance policies”) to the Salvation Army, or that
these policies were purchased in Georgia, and were effective
from October 1, 1998 until October 1, 2001.

Notably, the policies do not include lead-based paint exclu-
sion provisions, but the policies do include pollution exclusion
provisions. The pollution exclusion provision is written as such:

This insurance does not apply to:

@ Pollution

(1) “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out
of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants:

(a) At or from any premises, site or location which is
or was at any time owned or occupied by, or rented or
loaned to any insured ....

Complaint, Exhibit 4 at 82. “Pollutants” are defined in each of
the Liberty Mutual insurance policies as “any solid, liquid,
gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemical or waste.” Jd. at 88.

Appellants seek affirmation from this Court that Liberty
Mutual is obligated to indemnify the Salvation Army and
defend against claims brought by the Appellants. Appellee

3. Appellants brought their action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, Liberty Mutual removed the action to the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland.

Liberty Mutual asserts that it is under no obligation to
indemnify and defend Appellee Salvation Army because: (1)
the Liberty Mutual insurance policies were formed in Georgia,
thus implicating the legal principle of lew loci contractus ie.,
the law governing the contracts is the law of the place where
the contract is formed, and (2) pursuant to Georgia law, the
pollution exclusion provision in the insurance policies excluded
coverage for bodily injuries resulting from exposure to lead-
based paint,

The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that bodily injuries
allegedly resulting from the ingestion of lead-based paint are
within the pollution exclusion. See Georgia Farm Bureau of
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 298 Ga. 716, 784 S.H.2d 422 (2016).
The language of the pollution exclusion clause in Georgia
Farm is identical to the language of the pollution exclusion
clause in the Liberty Mutual insurance policies.

Liberty Mutual has moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that Maryland courts follow the doctrine of lew loci
contractus in choosing the applicable law, Cumningham v.
Feinberg, 441 Md. 310, 826, 107 Ad 1194, 1204 (2015);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 827 Md. 526, 529, 611 A.2d 100, 101
(1992) and that, under Georgia law, the insurance policy does
not cover claims for lead-based paint poisoning. To the con-
trary, Appellants contended in the federal district court that
Maryland courts would not apply Georgia’s interpretation of
the pollution exclusion clause because it violates Maryland’s
public policy. The United States District Court for the District
of Maryland asks us resolve which law applies, so that the
federal court may decide the merits on Liberty Mutual’s
Motion to Dismiss. This Court must answer whether applica-
tion of Georgia’s decision in Georgia Farm violate Maryland’s
public policy.

DISCUSSION

I. Lex Loci Contractus

HHH It is not in dispute that the doctrine of lew loci
contractus is applicable here. Both parties agree that lew loci

contractus is the proper lens through which this Court should
analyze their claims. Maryland has long recognized the doc-
trine of lex loci contractus. See De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2H. &
J. 191, 191 (1807) (applying the laws of the country where the
terms of the contract were created). When this Court applies
lex loci contractus, typically either the validity or enforceabili-
ty of a contract is at issue. Cunningham, 441 Md. at 327-28,
107 A.3d at 1205. The “doctrine requires that, when determin-
ing the construction, validity, enforceability, or interpretation
of a contract, we apply the law of the jurisdiction where the
contract was made.” Id. at 326, 107 A.3d at 1204. Therefore,
the substantive application of the law to the contract between
the parties is subject to the enforcement of the jurisdiction
where the contract was formed. Id.

HM The rile of lew loci contractus, however, has a
narrow exception. Maryland law still governs when a contrac-
tual provision is contrary to a strong Maryland public policy.
“Nevertheless, for Maryland public policy to override the lew
loci contractus rule, the public policy must be very strong and
not merely a situation in which Maryland law is different from
the law of another jurisdiction.” Hart, 827 Md. at 580, 611
A.2d at 102. See Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Hood, 895 Ma. 608, 620,
911 A.2d 841, 848 (2006) (opining that the lew loci contractus
principle is “not inflexible” and that it will not govern a
contract provision that is against Maryland public policy)
(internal citations omitted); Cunningham, 441 Md. at 887, 107
A.3d at 1211 (explaining that this Court has “long recognized
an exception to the application of lew loci contractus: we
refuse to apply the doctrine when doing so would be ‘contrary
to a strong public policy of this State[]”) (quoting Am.
Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Grp., Inc., 388 Md. 560, 578, 659
A.2d 1295, 1801 (1995); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas
& Co., 304 Md. 188, 188-89, 498 A.2d 605, 608 (1985) (recogniz-
ing the choice of law rule which has been consistently recog-
nized by this Court, “lew loci contractus does not apply to a
contract provision which is against Maryland public policy[ ]”).
Thus, absent a determination that Georgia’s law violates a
strong Maryland public policy, Georgia’s law applies.

II. Authority on Pollution Exclusion Clauses

Both Appellants and Appellees agree that, under Georgia
case law, the Liberty Mutual insurance policies in question do
not cover claims for lead-based paint poisoning. Because the
Liberty Mutual insurance policies were issued in Georgia, and
the lea loci contractus doctrine is applicable, Georgia’s law
must be examined first. The Supreme Court of Georgia exam-
ined a pollution exclusion provision using identical language as
the insurance contract currently before this Court. Georgia
Farm, 298 Ga. at 717, 784 S.H.2d at 428. See Id. (defining a
“pollutant” as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkal-
is, chemicals and waste[ ]”).

In Georgia Farm, the plaintiff, a residential tenant, sued
her landlord for injuries sustained when plaintiff's daughter
allegedly ingested lead from deteriorating lead-based paint in
the rented house. Jd. The landlord insured the residence
through a general commercial liability insurance policy issued
by Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Geor-
gia Farm”). Following an insurance claim initiated by the
landlord, Georgia Farm filed a declaratory judgment action
against Plaintiff and the landlord. Georgia Farm argued that
the daughter’s lead-based poisoning injuries were not covered
by the policy because of a pollution exclusion provision, thus
discharging Georgia Farm’s obligation to defend or indemnify
the landlord in the lawsuit. The Supreme Court of Georgia
held that lead present in paint “unambiguously qualifies as a
pollutant and that the plain language of the policy’s pollution
exclusion clause” removed plaintiff's claims against her land-
lord from coverage. Id. at 721, 784 S.H.2d at 426. The Georgia
Form Court discussed this Court’s analysis in Sullins v.
Allstate Ins, Co. when reversing the Court of Appeals of
Georgia’s determination that Georgia Farm had a duty to
defend the landlord. ‘ Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co, 8340 Md. 508,

4, The Court of Appeals of Georgia is Georgia's intermediate appellate
court, WELCOME TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA, http://

667 A.2d 617 (1995); Georgia Farm, 298 Ga. 716, 784 S.E.2d at
422. (2016); Smith v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 881
Ga.App. 780, 786, 771 S.E.2d 452, 457 (2015), cert. granted
(July 6, 2015), rev’d, 298 Ga. 716, 784 S.H.2d 422 (2016), and
vacated, 337 Ga.App. 300, 789 S.E.2d 193 (2016).

In Sullins, we reviewed an insurance policy’s pollution
exclusion clause. 840 Md. at 509, 667 A.2d at 620. The insur-
ance policy language at issue in Sullins differed from the
language in Appellants’ insurance policies. In Sullins, the
Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) issued a Deluxe
Homeowners Policy to Reverend D. Paul Sullins and Patricia
H, Sullins. Zd. at 506-07, 667 A.2d at 618. In Sullins’ policy,
under the heading “Losses We Do Not Cover,” the policy
contained the following language:

We do not cover bodily injury or property damage which
results in any manner from the discharge, dispersal, release,
or escape of:

a) vapors, fumes, acids, toxic chemicals, toxic liquids or
toxic gasses;

b) waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants.

Id. We determined that “contaminants” and “pollutants” are
susceptible to two different interpretations by a lay person. Jd.
at 509, 667 A.2d at 620. One interpretation of the two terms
could reasonably encompass lead-based paint, while another
could refer to environmental contaminants or pollutants. Id.
However, we noted that “[to] be sure that lead paint poisoning
claims were excluded from coverage, [the insurer] could have
included a provision... . explicitly excluding such claims.” Id. at
518 n.8, 667 A.2d at 624 n.8. The Sullins Court ruled that the
policy language was ambiguous and did not remove the insur-
er’s duty to defend the lead-based paint poisoning action. Id.
at 518, 667 A.2d at 624.

www. gaappeals.us/(https://perma,cc/S6FD-LS43) (last visited December
15, 2017).

po

Georgia’s intermediate appellate court, the Georgia Court of
Appeals, cited Sullins for the proposition that if an insurer
“had intended to exclude injuries caused by lead-based paint
from coverage in the policy at issue in this case it was
required, as the insurer that drafted the policy, to specifically
exclude lead-based paint injuries from coverage.” Smith, 331
Ga.App. at 785, 771 S.H.2d at 456 (footnote omitted) (internal
citations omitted). Georgia’s intermediate appellate court went
on to explain that, as in Sullins, “an insured could reasonably
have understood the provision at issue to exclude coverage for
injury caused by certain forms of industrial pollution, but not
coverage for injury allegedly caused by the presence of leaded
materials in a private residence.” Id. However, the Supreme
Court of Georgia disagreed that the insurance policy terms at
issue here created the same ambiguities. Georgia Farm, 298
Ga. at 716, 784 S.H.2d at 428. Like in Sullins, the Georgia
Farm court considered that if “a policy provision is susceptible
to more than one meaning, even if each meaning is logical and
reasonable, the provision is ambiguous and.... will be con-
strued strictly against the insurer/drafter and in favor of the
insured.” Georgia Farm, 298 Ga. at 719, 784 S.E.2d at 424-25
(internal citations omitted). The Georgia Farm court deter-
mined that the pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous
and held that the “policy contains an absolute pollution exclu-
sion clause which precludes recovery for bodily injury or
property damage resulting from exposure to any pollutant.”
Id. at 719, 784 S,E.2d at 425,

Our decision in Sullins, and Georgia’s application of the
pollution exclusion clause in Georgia Farm can coexist. The
law of our State and Georgia’s law are not so contrary because
the insurance policy terms at issue here, and the terms at
issue in Sullins, are different. Sullins required us to interpret
the pollution exclusion clause because the terms were unde-
fined and ambiguous, and thus susceptible to multiple inter-
pretations. That is not the case here. The Liberty Mutual
insurance policies define ‘Pollutants’ as “any solid, liquid,
gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemical or waste.” See

supra Complaint, Exhibit 4 at 88. The Sullins Court took
issue with ascertaining the intention of the parties because the
parties did not define the pollution exclusion’s terms as they
have here, Sullins, 340 Md. at 514, 667 A2d at 622, The
Sullins Court was then forced to analyze the historical context
and the parties’ intentions to determine the contract’s mean-
ing. Id. However, lew loci contractus does not require us to
interpret the terms of the Liberty Mutual insurance policies,
or determine the intent of the parties, because Georgia’s
Court already has determined that is not a relevant line of
analysis here. Georgia Farm, 298 Ga. at 720, 784 8.H.2d at
425.

The Sullins Court was required to perform a full review of
pollution exclusion clause history to ascertain the parties’
intentions. Similarly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, we
noted that insurance exclusion clauses in their infancy general-
ly applied to accidental contamination. Sullins, 340 Md. at
518-15, 667 A2d at 622-28; Georgia Farm, 298 Ga. at 719,
784 S.B.2d at 425, Both Sullins and Georgia Farm acknowl-
edged that in the mid~1980s, the insurance industry adopted
the “absolute pollution exclusion,” which denied coverage for
bodily injury arising from pollutants. Sullins, 340 Md, at 514~
15, 667 A.2d at 622; Georgia Farm, 298 Ga. at 719, 784 8.H.2d
at 425, At this point, the discussion in Georgia Farm and
Sullins diverges. Sullins decided that the insurance industry's
absolute pollution exclusion, which denied coverage for “bodily
injury or property damage arising out of the actual, alleged or
threatened discharge, release, or escape of pollutants” and
defined “pollutant” as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalies, chemicals and waste[,]” were environmental
terms of art, and thus the parties intended environmental
hazards, and not lead-based paint, to be excluded. Sullins, 340
Ma. at 515, 667 A.2d at 622.

Georgia Farm relied on its past decision in Reed v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 284 Ga. 286, 667 S.H.2d 90 (2008), for the
proposition that the Court should not “adopt an approach
which considered the purpose and historical evolution of pollu-

tion exclusions before looking to the plain language of the
clause itself.” Georgia Farm, 298 Ga. at 720, 784 8.H.2d at 425.
In Reed, the plaintiff claimed that she was poisoned by the
release of carbon monoxide inside her rental home. Reed, 284
Ga. at 288, 667 S.E.2d at 92. The insurance policy’s definition
of “pollutant” in Reed is the same definition provided for in
Georgia Farm, and the same definition included in the Liberty
Mutual insurance policies at issue here. The Supreme Court of
Georgia read that the plain language of the “pollutant” defini-
tion was “matter, in any state, acting as an ‘irritant or
contaminant[.) ” Georgia Farm, 298 Ga. at 720, 784 S.E.2d at
425 (quoting Reed, 284 Ga. at 288, 667 S.E.2d at 92). Specifi-
cally, the Court noted that focusing on extrinsic sources of
interpretation is what leads to the ambiguity in the pollution
exclusion clause where none exists. Georgia Farm, 298 Ga. at
‘721, 784 S.H.2d at 426,

HM Maryland Courts similarly first apply the terms of
the insurance contract itself. Lite v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 846 Md. 217, 224, 695 A.2d 566, 569 (1997) (quoting
Bausch & Lomb v. Utica Mutual, 330 Md. 758, 779, 625 A.2d
1021, 1031 (1993). Then, “[w]e construe insurance policies as a
whole to determine the parties’ intentions.” Litz, 346 Md. at
224, 695 A.2d at 569 (internal citations omitted). The Georgia
Farm court decided not to interpret the insurance contract’s
terms, and rather decided Georgia Farm on the narrower
grounds of applying the contract’s plain language. Georgia
Farm, 298 Ga. at 720, 784 S.H.2d at 425. The Sullins Court
was not afforded that luxury, because the term “pollutant”
was not defined in the parties’ contract. Had the term been
defined, the Sullins Court may not have examined the histori-
cal context and come to a different conclusion, but that is not
an issue for this Court to currently decide.

The case law of Maryland and Georgia on pollution exclu-
sion clauses is not so contrary to overcome lea loci contractus.
Suilins required us to interpret the contract’s language. We
are not charged with such a task here. Rather, we are asked
to answer the question of whether Maryland’s current public

policy is so contrary to Georgia’s decision in Georgia Farm,
which, even in light of our discussion in Swllins, is no. We
have consistently held “that the lea loci contractus principle is
not inflexible” and thus, Georgia Farm’s holding will apply to
Appellants’ claims, unless the exception applies, because such
a result would violate Maryland’s public policy. Hood, 395 Md.
at 620, 911 A2d at 848. Because Georgia Farm did not
interpret the terms that we determined had environmental
implications, the two cases are not so at odds to override
Georgia’s law. To interpret Sullins to mean that Maryland’s
public policy strongly requires lead-based paint exclusions to
be explicitly and unambiguously identified, sufficient to over-
come lew loci contractus, would be inapposite to the express
direction from the legislature and the precedent of this Court.
See Maryland Code, § 19-704(c) of the Insurance Article
(permitting insurers to include lead hazard coverage exclu-
sions in insurance policies); Szllins, 340 Md. at 518, 667 A.2d
at 624 (opining that “conflicting interpretations of the policy
language in judicial opinions is not determinative[ ]”), For the
lew loci contractus doctrine to be set aside, Maryland’s public
policy “must be very strong and not merely a situation in
which Maryland law is different from the law of another
jurisdiction.” Cunningham, 441 Md. at 387-88, 107 A.3d at
1211. For reasons to be explained, Maryland’s public policy is
not contrary to Georgia Farm, thus Georgia’s law applies,

Il. Maryland’s Public Policy

Hl Appellants contend that Georgia’s interpretation of the
pollution exclusion provision should not apply because it would
violate Maryland’s public policy concerning the protection of
victims of childhood lead-based paint poisoning. This Court
has long recognized that declaration of the State’s public
policy is the function of the legislative branch of the govern-
ment. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 183, 438 A.2d 494, 499
(1981); see Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Clark, 404
Md. 18, 36, 944 A.2d 1122, 1185 (2008) (commenting “[i]t is,
after all, the General Assembly that sets the public policy of
the State....”); Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 888 Md. 690, 715,

n. 18, 882 A.2d 801, 816, n. 18 (2005) (explaining the General
Assembly that “sets the public policy of the State, especially
economic and social policy[ ]”); Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 562,
471 A.2d 705, 710 (1984) (internal citations omitted) (opining
that the “declaration of public policy is normally the function
of the legislature,” and to evaluate the public policy we look to
statutory provisions); Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894, 908 (1983) (recognizing
that the declaration of the public policy of Maryland is normal-
ly the function of the General Assembly).

HB (Demonstration of a strong public policy, sufficient to
warrant an exception to application of another jurisdiction’s
law under lew loci contractus, is usually evidenced by explicit
legislative action, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co.,
304 Md. 183, 190, 498 A.2d 605, 608 (1985). Even though
evidence of Maryland’s public policy may be found through
explicit legislative determinations, “explicit legislative lan-
guage [is] not required always in order to reach a conclusion
that a Maryland Code provision represents strong public
policy. On occasion, we have given some weight to evolving
public policy.” Cunningham, 441 Md, at 340, 107 A.8d at 1218.
We now turn to examine Maryland’s lead-based paint and
pollution exclusion initiatives to determine whether either of
these are currently evolving areas of public policy that would
merit abandonment of the lew loci contractus choice of law
doctrine in this instance.

A, Maryland’s Public Policy Approach
to Lead-Based Paint Abatement

Neither this Court, nor this State, is blind to the deleterious
and devastating effects of childhood lead-based paint poison-
ing. Appellants thoroughly discuss the historical, legislative,
judicial, and scientific-related initiatives concerning the safety
and protection of victims of lead-based paint poisoning. Appel-
lants assert Maryland’s response to the public health issue is
evidence of “strong and steadfast” public policy. However,
Appellants misunderstand that a response to a public health
issue does not affirmatively answer the very narrow question

posed before us: whether Georgia’s application of pollution
exclusion clauses clearly violates Maryland’s public policy.

Historically, Maryland has developed a series of legislative
policies aimed at protecting Maryland’s children against the
severe and permanent effects of lead-based paint poisoning by
eradicating lead-based paint in homes. These legislative poli-
cies are indicative of a statewide commitment to eliminating
lead-based paint from homes. These policies are not evolving
toward requiring insurers to cover lead-based paint related
claims. Appellants’ contentions that Maryland’s steadfast and
continued efforts to pass laws geared towards removing lead-
based paint from homes, do not necessarily translate into a
demonstration of a strong state public policy of barring a
pollution exclusion provision sufficient to override Georgia’s
law.

Maryland has taken a strong approach in protecting chil-
dren from poisoning by lead-based paint containing sub-
stances® through legislation aimed at abatement® of lead-

5. A ‘Lead containing substance’ means:

(1) Any paint, plaster, or surface encapsulation material containing
more than 0.50 percent lead by weight calculated as lead metal in the
dried solid or more than 0.7 milligrams lead per square centimeter as
measured by an X-ray fluorescence analyzer; or

(2) Such other standards consistent with an applicable federal defi-
nition as the Department may set by regulation.

Maryland Code, § 6-1001(c) of the Environmental Article.

6. By statute, abatement is defined as follows:
(b) “Abatement” means a set of measures that eliminate or reduce
lead-based paint hazards in residential, public, or commercial build-
ings, bridges, or other structures or superstructures in accordance
with standards established by the Department which may include:
(4) The removal of lead-based paint and lead-contaminated dust, the
containment or encapsulation of lead-based paint, the replacement or
demolition of lead-painted surfaces or fixtures, and the removal or
covering of lead-contaminated soil;
(2) All preparation, cleanup, disposal, and postabatement clearance
testing activities associated with these measures; and
(3) The renovation, repair, and painting of a lead-containing sub-
stance in a residential, public, or commercial building built before
1978,

Maryland Code, § 6-1001(b) of the Environmental Article.

based paint. Childhood lead-based paint poisoning has been a
public issue of national concern for the last fifty years. See
Richard Rabin, Warnings Unheeded: A History of Child Lead
Poisoning, 79 Am. J. Pub. Health, 1668, 1668 (Dec. 1989).
Beginning in the mid-1920s, childhood lead-based paint poi-
soning gained broader recognition as a common childhood
disease, originally believed to be a condition solely stemming
from lead-painted surfaces in the home. Jd. However, later
research uncovered that major sources of lead-based paint
were also in “toys, furniture, porch railings, and window
sills...” of many residences. Jd. at 1669. Children, who typi-
eally exhibit hand-to-mouth activity, can ingest either lead-
based paint chips that have flaked, or lead dust that becomes
present due to normal wear and tear, home repair, or renova-
tion. Jane E. Schukoske, Lead Paint and the Warranty of
Habiiability in Pre-1950 Rental Housing: Maryland’s Lead
Poisoning Prevention Program Creates A Presumption of the
Presence of Lead Paint, 4 U. Balt, J. Envtl. L. 22, 29 (1994).
Consumption of lead-based paint flakes or dust, even in small
amounts, may result in poisoning. Jd. Permanent injuries
caused by lead-based paint poisoning include cognitive impair-
ments, learning disabilities, and developmental delays, Md.
Gen. Assemb. Rep. of the Lead Paint Poison. Comm’n. at 2
(May 5, 1994). Often, these permanent injuries that manifest
during childhood subsequently impact a person’s ability to
function as an adult. Id.

In many ways, Maryland’s approach to abating lead-based
paint began in Baltimore City, which has been particularly
devastated by lead-based paint poisoning. Commencing in
1935, Baltimore City embarked on a series of steps to aid in
the diagnoses and prevention of childhood lead-based paint
poisoning. See George W. Schucker, et. al., Prevention of Lead
Paint Poisoning Among Baltimore Children, 80 Pub. Health
Rep. 969, 969 (Nov. 1965). At the first signs of large-scale
lead-based paint poisoning in children, Baltimore began offer-
ing free access to physicians and hospitals for determination of
blood lead levels in children. Id. By 1949, Baltimore City

assigned a public health nurse to investigate lead-based paint
reports. Id. Baltimore initiated laboratory studies, through
which patients’ homes were visited and paint samples were
taken for testing. Jd. Baltimore distributed pamphlets and
aired television and radio broadcasts, to inform the public of
the dire consequences and risks of childhood ingestion of lead-
based paint. Id.

In 1951, Baltimore became the first city in the United
States to prohibit the use of lead-based paint through city
regulation, which was later codified in Baltimore’s City Code.
Id.; Baltimore City Rev. Code, HEALTH, § 5-402; (City
Code, 1976/83, art. 11, § 72.) (Ord. 99-548.) Even with this
regulation, a series of surveys initiated in 1957 to assess the
prevalence of lead-based paint in Baltimore homes, revealed
that between fifty-eight to seventy percent of homes contained
lead-based paint. Schucker, supra at 970. Although Baltimore
City was a pioneer in its response to the lead-based paint
issue, children in Baltimore City were at very high-risk for
lead poisoning compared to the nation as a whole. Joanne
Pollak, The Lead-Based Paint Abatement Repair & Mainte-
nance Study in Baltimore: Historic Framework and Study
Design, 6 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 89, 92 (2002).

Recognizing a public health crisis, Maryland responded with
legislation to abate the frequency of poisoning in children by
removing lead-based paint in homes. Although a positive de-
velopment, the General Assembly did not react to the lead-
based paint issue until twenty years after Baltimore City. In
1971, the General Assembly prohibited use of lead based paint
statewide on “any interior surfaces; on any exterior surfaces
where children may commonly be exposed; on any porch of
any dwelling or....any article that is intended for household
use.” 1971 Md. Laws, Ch. 495; Maryland Code, § 6-801 of the
Environmental Article (“EN”) (1982, 2018 Repl. Vol.). The
statewide prohibition of lead-based paint was still in many
ways a progressive step, with evidence suggesting that Mary-
Jand was one of only four states that had statutorily prohibited

lead-based paint use by 1974.’ William F. Greer, Jr., Lead
Paint Poisoning—Municipal, State, and Federal Approaches,
7 Urb. L. Ann. 247, 256 (1974). It was not until 1978 that the
United States Consumer Products Safety Commission prohib-
ited the use of lead in house paint throughout the nation. 16
C.F.R. § 1808.1. Later codified in the United States Code,
Congress found that the Federal response to the national
crisis was severely limited but identified a national goal of
eliminating lead-based paint hazards in housing. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 4851. However, banning lead-based paint at the national,
state, and local level did not by itself eliminate the root of the
issue: the stock of existing housing that still contained lead-
based paint. Pollak, supra at 91.

Maryland’s public policy reflects an effort to abate lead-
based paint poisoning by stopping its use in older buildings
that contained lead-based paint. Maryland’s statutory scheme
creates incentives and compliance driven initiatives requiring
homeowners, namely landlords, to remove lead-based paint
from their property. Regulatory programs incentivize land-
lords to remove lead-based paint in residential properties,
often by assessing fines or civil damages for noncompliance.
Jennifer Tiller, Zasing Lead Paint Laws: A Step in the
Wrong Direction, 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 265, 268-69 (1994).
Without the threat of civil liability, it would be in the land-
lord’s pecuniary interest to let society bear the cost of child-
hood lead poisoning. Jd. Since Maryland banned lead-based
paint in homes in 1971, the General Assembly has passed a
series of laws with the purpose of removing lead-based paint
from homes, while ensuring that landlords are compliant with
state prescribed initiatives.

Maryland took another step to abate lead-based paint in
homes by creating the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program.’

7. Cal. Civ. Code Ann, § 1942 (West 1954); La, Civ. Code Ann. art, 2694
(West 1954); Mont, Rev. Codes Ann, § 42-202 (1947); N.D, Cent. Code
§ 47-16-13 (1960); Okla, Stat. Ann. tit. 41, § 32 (1954); S.D. Compiled
Laws § 43-32-9 (1967), William F. Greer, Jr., Lead Paint Poisoning—
Municipal State, and Federal Approaches, 7 Urb. L. Ann. 247, 256 n. 52
(1974),

See generally 1994 Maryland Laws Ch. 114 (H.B. 760); EN
§§ 6-802, 6-807. The purpose of the program is “to reduce the
incidence of childhood lead poisoning, while maintaining the
stock of available affordable rental housing.” EN § 6-802.
Through the program, landlords are required to register
affected property.’ Property owners then must satisfy certain
risk reduction standards, and pass a test for lead-contaminat-
ed dust provided that flaking paint has been removed or
repainted on the exterior and interior surfaces. Id. § 6-815.
The property owner has to satisfy the statutorily prescribed
standards and pass the lead-contaminated dust test before
each occupancy turnover. Id. By statute, a State inspector
must verify the property owner’s compliance with the statute.
Id. The Lead Poisoning Prevention Commission was tasked
with measuring the law’s ability to protect children from lead
poisoning and lessen risks to responsible owners. Id. § 6-810.
See generally Schukoske, supra (discussing statutory nuances
of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program).

The General Assembly further elucidated through § 19-704
of the Insurance Article that excluding lead-based paint as a

8. The General Assembly of Maryland created the Accreditation of Lead
Paint Abatement Services. See generally LEAD PAINT ABATEMENT
SERVICES—ACCREDITATION, 1993 Maryland Laws Ch, 296 (H.B.
306); EN § 6-1004(b)(2). The Lead Accreditation Fund was comprised
of government funds or grants to assist with the “development, estab-
lishment, administration, and education and enforcement activities of
the lead paint abatement services accreditation program[.]” Id.

9. Affected property, requiring registration is defined in section 6-801(b)
as follows: (b)(1) “Affected property’ means:
@ A property constructed before 1950 that contains at least one
rental dwelling unit;
Gi) On and after January 1, 2015, a property constructed before
1978 that contains at least one rental unit; or
(ii) Any residential rental property for which the owner makes an
election under § 6-803(a)(2) of this subtitle.
(2) “Affected property” includes an individual rental dwelling unit
within a multifamily rental dwelling.
(3) “Affected property” does not include property exempted under
§ 6-803(b) of this subtitle. Jd. § 6-801.

pollutant does not run contrary to this State’s public policy.”°
1996 Maryland Laws Ch. 11 (H.B. 11); Maryland Code, § 19-
704 of the Insurance Article (“IN”). Section § 19-704(c) pro-
vides that “whenever an authorized insurer issues or renews a
policy for an affected property, the authorized insurer may
include in the policy a lead hazard coverage exclusion.” IN
§ 19-704(c). The statute’s application to “affected proper-
ties,” ™ similarly to the language in EN § 6-801 defined supra
note 9, primarily focuses on stock housing built prior to 1978
that may contain lead-based paint. The General Assembly
expressly indicated that insurers can exclude lead-based paint
related claims from insurance policies. Thus, the General
Assembly had the opportunity and means to consider lead-
based paint related insurance issues. It then follows that if the

10. In 1994, as part of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, the
General Assembly adopted §§ 734 through 737, Article 48A, of the
Insurance Code, As originally enacted, Md. Code Art. 48A, § 735(a)
provided: “[nJotwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, upon the
inception or renewal of a policy, an insurer may provide for a lead
hazard exclusion with respect to a policy of insurance covering an
affected property.” Md. Code 1957, Art. 48A, § 735(a). Section 19-704
was created through the Maryland 1996 Session Laws following a
recodification of the Insurance Article, but subsection (c) traces the
language in article 48A, § 735(a). See 1996 Maryland Laws Ch. 11
(LB. 11) (explaining ““[tJhis section is new language derived without
substantive change from former Art. 48A, §§ 734(e)(2) and 735(a)
through (Pf ]).

11, Affected property, requiring registration is defined in section § 19-
701(b)(1) as follows:
(b)(1)“Affected property” means:
@ 1. a residential rental property constructed before 1950 that
contains not more than one rental dwelling unit; or
2. a residential rental property that contains not more than one
rental dwelling unit for which the owner makes an election under
§ 6-803(a)(2) of the Environment Article; or
i) an individual rental dwelling unit within:
1, a residential rental property constructed before 1950 that con-
tains more than one rental dwelling unit; or
2. a residential rental property that contains more than one rental
dwelling unit for which the owner makes an election under § 6-
803(a)(2) of the Environment Article.
(2) “Affected property” does not include property exempted under
§ 6-803(b) of the Environment Article. IN § i9-701(b).

General Assembly considered the maximum of explicitly per-
mitting insurers to exclude coverage of lead-based paint
claims, it cannot be contrary to the State’s public policy to
exclude lead-based paint claims pursuant to a pollution exclu-
sion clause.

Hs&LN § 19-704(c) does not reference a duty for
insurers to indemnify and defend lead-based paint claims
through a pollution exclusion clause. It does not reference
pollutants at all. Rather, it plainly states that insurers have
the option to exclude coverage for lead-based paint related
claims. We should not read an interpretation into a statute
that is unambiguous. It is well established that “we neither
add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to
give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the General
Assembly used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in
an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.” Bellard
v. State, 452 Md. 467, 481, 157 A.3d 272 (2017). If the statute is
unambiguous, our legislative inquiry ends. Jd. The statute
unambiguously demonstrates that removing lead-based paint
claims from insurance policies is permissible. Further, the
General Assembly’s explicit dictation of the State’s public
policy in IN § 19-704, a year after this Court held that an
insurer had a duty to defend a lead-based paint related injury
in Sullins, illustrates that the General Assembly is responsible
for establishing public policy. Sullins, 340 Md. at 518, 667 A.2d
at 624, The statute’s application to “affected property,” ie.
older homes that may contain lead-based paint, confirms our
conclusion that the General Assembly's legislative goals are
lead-based paint abatement and holding landlords accountable
to their tenants.

Laws passed after the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program
began, and the General Assembly specifically expressed that
insurers could exclude lead-based paint related claims, also
worked toward stopping lead-based paint at its source and
assisting landlords in removing lead-based paint. Maryland
created financial protection for tenants when a landlord fails
to make the premises safe and free of lead-based paint as

required by the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program. 1997
Maryland Laws Ch. 714 (H.B. 1068); Maryland Code, § 8-
211.1 of the Real Property Article (“RP”) provides that “if a
landlord fails to comply with the applicable risk reduction
standard under § 6-815 or § 6-819 of the Environment Arti-
cle, the tenant may deposit the tenant’s rent in an escrow
account....” RP § 8-211.1(a). Maryland also initiated the
Lead Hazard Reduction Grant and Loan Programs. 2005
Maryland Laws Ch. 26 (H.B. 11); Maryland Code, §§ 4~708,
4-709 of the House and Community Development Article
(“HS”), The purpose of these programs was to “make grants
and loans to owners of residential property or child care
centers for financing lead hazard reduction activities[.]” HS
§ 4-708, In conjunction with implementing these programs,
the General Assembly found that “lead poisoning harms the
health and well-being of children and pregnant women and
causes substantial long-term public costs for medical expenses
and additional education[.]” HS § 4~702(8),

Maryland’s public policy on lead-based paint poisoning was
designed to protect victims of lead-based paint by working to
thwart its existence in stock housing. The General Assembly
evidenced this policy through direct legislation banning lead-
based paint in homes, allowing insurers to remove coverage
for lead-based paint related claims, requiring homeowners to
register properties that could be affected by lead-based paint,
protecting tenants’ financial interests who may be living in
homes with lead-based paint, funding loan and grant programs
to remove lead-based paint from homes, and establishing
healthcare funds for victims of lead-based paint poisoning.
Appellants are correct that the overarching public policy in
Maryland affords protection for victims of childhood lead-
based paint poisoning. However, Maryland’s public policy ap-
proach focused on eradicating the source of lead-based paint
and aiding victims’ health care needs, if impacted. Georgia’s
decision holding that lead-based paint is a pollutant, is not at
odds with Maryland’s public policy where our General Assem-
bly has not directly indicated otherwise, and the clear trend of
Maryland’s public policy is to remove lead-based paint in

homes and provide health care for victims. Georgia Farm, 298
Ga, at 721, 784 S.E.2d at 426,

B. Maryland’s Public Policy on Contract
Exclusion Provisions

Application of Georgia law under the lew loci contractus
doctrine further does not clearly offend Maryland’s public
policy because the General Assembly has not expressly dictat-
ed that lead-based paint cannot be excluded from insurance
policies as pollutants, and because pollution exclusion clauses
are not an evolving area of public policy. In fact, the General
Assembly has explicitly expressed that insurers “may include
in the policy a lead hazard coverage exclusion.” IN § 19-
704(c), Although Maryland has taken strong initiatives requir-
ing landlords to abate lead-based paint in housing, in those
instances where we have applied the lew loci contractus public
policy exception, the legislature has explicitly stated that the
action was void or contrary to public policy, See, eg. Bethle-
hem Steel, 304 Md. at 190, 498 A.2d at 608 (deciding against
application of lew loci contractus for a construction contract
executed in Pennsylvania as void against Maryland public
policy when the relevant statute “unequivocally told the Mary-
land judiciary that such a clause ‘is void and unenforceable’
... [and] in the same sentence of the statute, the General
Assembly expressly stated that such an indemnity provision ‘is
against public policy[ |”). See also Natl Glass, Inc. v. J.C.
Penney Properties, Inc., 836 Md. 606, 614, 650 A.2d 246, 250
(1994) (holding that a Pennsylvania choice of law provision was
void where a mechanic’s lien statute contained a clause stating
that contractual provisions made in violation of the statute
were “void as against public policy of this State.”) (citing
Maryland Code (1974, 1988 Repl. Vol.), RP §§ 9-101 et seq.).

As Appellees have highlighted, Appellants have not identi-
fied any Maryland legislative action addressing lead-based
paint as a pollutant in insurance policies. It appears, no such
legislation exists. A review of both Maryland’s legislative lead-
based paint and insurance exclusion initiatives does not reflect
a current or evolving public policy strong enough to overcome

Georgia’s pollution exclusion law. Without a statement from
the General Assembly to the contrary, we cannot conclude
that Georgia’s interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause
is clearly against Maryland’s public policy.

Despite Appellants’ contention, Clendenin Bros., Inc. v. U.S.
Five Ins. Co., is not persuasive. 390 Md. 449, 889 A.2d 387
(2006). Appellants rely on Clendenin to argue that the pollu-
tion exclusion in the Liberty Mutual insurance policies is
invalid. In Clendenin, we examined a pollution exclusion provi-
sion in the United States Fire Insurance Company’s policy
and found the provision to be ambiguous. Jd. Following the
Maryland rules of construction, we concluded that the provi-
sion did not exclude coverage for bodily injury resulting from
workplace welding fumes. Id. at 468, 889 A.2d at 399. We
determined that “products, despite their toxic nature, are not.
‘pollutants’ or ‘contaminants’ when used intentionally and le-
gally.” Id. at 468, 889 A.2d at 396 (emphasis omitted). Clende-
nin is not relevant to the certified question before this Court,
where the issue is not of intent or legality, but rather, whether
Georgia’s interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause vio-
lates Maryland’s public policy.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the application of Georgia’s interpretation
of the pollution exclusion contained in the Liberty Mutual
insurance policies does not violate Maryland’s public policy.
Absent a legislative affirmation that pollution exclusion clauses
are against public policy, we decline to declare that Georgia’s
law violates Maryland’s public policy. Therefore, Georgia’s
interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause governs here.

THE CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED AS SET
FORTH ABOVE. PURSUANT TO SECTION 12-610 OF
THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTI-
CLE, THE COSTS SHALL BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES.

Waits, J., dissents.

Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J.

Respectfully, I dissent. The United States District Court for
the District of Maryland certified to this Court the following
question of law: “Would application of Georgia’s interpretation
of the pollution exclusion contained in the insurance policy
issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company | (“Liberty
Mutual”) ] to the Salvation Army as excluding coverage for
bodily injuries resulting from the ingestion of lead-based paint
violate Maryland public policy?” Unlike the Majority, I would
answer the certified question of law with a resounding “yes,”
and hold that it is a violation of Maryland public policy to
apply Georgia case law that permits a pollutant exclusion in an
insurance policy to be interpreted as a lead-based paint exclu-
sion because Maryland has a strong public policy of protecting
children from injuries caused by lead-based paint and of
requiring exclusions for lead-based paint to unambiguously
and specifically indicate that the exclusion applies to lead-
based paint to be valid.

Under the choice of law principle of lew loci contractus,
“when determining the construction, validity, enforceability, or
interpretation of a contract, we apply the law of the jurisdic-
tion where the contract was made.” Cunningham vy. Feinberg,
441 Md. 310, 326, 107 A.3d 1194, 1204 (2015) (citations omit-
ted). Nevertheless, the principle of lex loci contractus “is not
inflexible and [ ] it does not apply to a contract provision which
is against Maryland public policy.” Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Hood,
895 Md. 608, 620, 911 A2d 841, 848 (2006) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has stated,
however, “that merely because Maryland law is dissimilar to
the law of another jurisdiction does not render the latter
contrary to Maryland public policy and that for another
[S]tate’s law to be unenforceable, there must be a strong
public policy against its enforcement in Maryland.” Id. at 620,
911 A.2d at 848 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted).

The key issue in this case—indeed, the very issue posed in
the certified question of law—is whether Maryland has a

TT

strong public policy of protecting children from lead-based
paint poisoning and in requiring that lead-based paint exclu-
sions be specifically identified in insurance policies such that
application of Georgia’s case law is unenforceable and would
offend the principle of lew loci contractus. On this key issue, I
depart from the view of the Majority, as I would conclude that
there is a strong public policy expressed by the General
Assembly in Maryland that renders the application of Ga,
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 298 Ga, 716, 784 S.H.2d
422, 428 (2016) unenforceable.

Establishing clear public policy, Md. Code Ann., Ins. (1995-
97, 2011 Repl. Vol.) (“IN”) § 19-704, derived from former Md,
Code, Art. 48A, §§ 734 and 785, concerning lead hazard
coverage for rental property, provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:

(c) Exclusion of coverage.—Notwithstanding subsection

(g) of this section, whenever an authorized insurer issues or

renews a policy for an affected property, the authorized

insurer may include in the policy a lead hazard coverage
exclusion,
An “affected property,” in turn, is defined in IN § 19-701(b)
as follows:
(1) “Affected property” means:
(i) 1. a residential property constructed before 1950 that
contains not more than one rental dwelling unit; or
2. a residential rental property that contains not more
than one rental dwelling unit for which the owner makes
an election under § 6-808(a)(2) of the Environment Arti-
cle; or
Gi) an individual rental dwelling unit within:
1. a residential rental property constructed before
1950 that contains more than one rental dwelling unit; or

1, Md. Code Ann., Envir. (1982, 1987, 2013 Repl. Vol.) (“EN”) § 6~
803(a)(2) provides that Subtitle 8, concerning reduction of lead risk in
housing, applies to, “[nJotwithstanding subsection (b) of this section,
any residential rental property, the owner of which elects to comply
with this subtitle.”

2. a residential rental property that contains more
than one rental dwelling unit for which the owner makes
an election under § 6-803(a)(2) of the Environment Arti-
cle.

(2) “Affected property” does not include property exempt-

edunder § 6-803(b) of the Environment Article”!

IN § 19-704(c) does not provide that insurance policies
containing pollutant exclusions are the equivalent of insurance
policies containing lead hazard coverage exclusions. Stated
otherwise, as IN § 19-704(c) demonstrates, a lead hazard
coverage exclusion is different from a pollutant exclusion.
Indeed, IN § 19-704(c) specifically provides that, with respect
to certain properties—affected properties as that term is
defined in IN § 19-701(b)—insurers may include within an
insurance policy a lead hazard coverage exclusion. In other
words, IN § 19-704(¢) is a very specific statute that provides
for a lead hazard coverage exclusion under detailed identified
circumstances; this statute does not authorize a pollutant
exclusion to operate as the equivalent of a lead hazard cover-
age exclusion.

Indeed, the majority opinion explicitly recognizes that IN
§ 19-704 does not apply to pollutant exclusions in insurance
policies. Without qualification, the Majority writes: “IN § 19-
704(c) does not reference a duty for insurers to indemnify and
defend lead-based paint claims through a pollution exclusion
clause. It does not reference pollutants at all. Rather, it plainly
states that insurers have the option to exclude coverage for
lead-based paint related claims.” Maj. Op. at 599, 175 A.3d at
709. With this admission, the majority opinion concedes that

2, EN § 6-803(b) provides that Subtitle 8, concerning reduction of lead
risk in housing, does not apply to:

(1) Property not expressly covered in subsection (a) of this section;
(2). Affected property owned or operated by a unit of federal, State,
or local government, or any public, quasi-public, or municipal corpo-
ration, if the affected property is subject to lead standards that are
equal to, or more stringent than, the risk reduction standard estab-
lished under § 6-815 of this subtitle; or
(3) Affected property which is certified to be lead-free pursuant to
§ 6-804 of this subtitle. .

IN § 19-704 offers no support for the proposition that it
provides guidance with respect to public policy in Maryland
concerning allowing pollutant exclusions in insurance policies
to act as lead hazard coverage exclusions. Nonetheless, the
majority opinion concludes that “Georgia’s decision holding
that lead-based paint is a pollutant, is not at odds with
Maryland’s public policy where our General Assembly has not
directly indicated otherwise[.]” Maj. Op. at 606, 175 A.8d at
710. The majority opinion apparently reasons that there is a
lack of strong public policy against pollutant exclusions being
treated as lead hazard coverage exclusions because the Gener-
al Assembly has not expressly addressed the issue of pollutant
exclusions covering lead-based paint. The majority opinion,
however, ignores the strong public policy implications of IN
§ 19-704(c)’s unambiguous permission of lead hazard coverage
exclusions only, i.¢., lead-based paint exclusions must be clear
and unequivocal.

Significantly, in Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503,
506, 509, 516, 518, 667 A.2d 617, 618, 620, 623, 624 (1995), in
response to a certified question of law from the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, in a thorough and
well-reasoned opinion, this Court determined that the terms
“contaminants” and “pollutants” in a pollutant exclusion of an
insurance policy were ambiguous and susceptible to different
meanings, including meanings not encompassing lead-based
paint, and that, in accordance with Maryland law, the insur-
ance policy at issue could not be construed to include lead-
based paint as a contaminant or pollutant, and instead was to
be construed against the insurer as the drafter of the policy,
such that the insurer was not relieved of its duty to defend in
the underlying lead-based paint poisoning lawsuit. In Sullins,
id, at 506-07, 667 A.2d at 618, the pollutant exclusion at issue,
contained in a section labeled “Losses We Do Not Cover,”
provided:

We do not cover bodily injury or property damage which

results in any manner from the discharge, dispersal, release,

or escape of:

a) vapors, fumes, acids, toxic chemicals, toxic liquids or

toxic gasses;

b) waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pol-
lutants.

In construing the terms “contaminants” and “pollutants,”
and determining whether lead-based paint was a contaminant
or pollutant, this Court observed that the terms were “suscep-
tible of two interpretations by a reasonably prudent layperson.
By one interpretation, these terms encompass lead paint; by
another interpretation, they apply only to cases of environ-
mental pollution or contamination, and not to products such as
lead paint.” Id, at 509, 667 A.2d at 620. This Court explained
that, “{wl]hile lead is clearly ‘toxic,’ a reasonably prudent
layperson may not view lead as a ‘chemical[,!” and that
“(slimilarly, a reasonably prudent layperson may not generally
think of lead as an ‘irritant,’” Id. at 510, 667 A.2d at 620. This
Court acknowledged, however, that a reasonably prudent lay-
person could consider lead to be a “contaminant” or a “pollu-
tant” under the ordinary dictionary definitions of those terms.
See id. at 511, 667 A.2d at 620. On the other hand, this Court
noted that “[a] reasonably prudent layperson may also inter-
pret the terms ‘contaminant’ and ‘pollutant’ as not including
lead paint.” Id, at 511, 667 A.2d at 620 (emphasis in original).
This Court further observed that courts in other jurisdictions
had found the term “pollutant” both ambiguous and unambigu-
ous with respect to lead-based paint. See id. at 511, 667 A.2d
at 620-21.

This Court also examined the history of the pollutant exclu-
sion, and determined that the history supported the conclusion
that a reasonably prudent layperson may not consider lead-
based paint to be either a pollutant or a contaminant. See id.
at 518, 667 A.2d at 621-22. The original pollutant exclusions
were drafted by insurers in response to environmental catas-
trophes that occurred in the 1960s to clarify that commercial
general liability insurance policies did not indemnify knowing
polluters. See id, at 514, 667 A.2d at 622. That “sudden and
accidental” pollutant exclusion, which specifically referenced
“into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or
body of water[,]’ “was intended to eliminate coverage for
damages from pollution of the environment.” Id, at 514, 667

A.2d at 622 (citations omitted). Thereafter, in 1985, the insur-
ance industry adopted the “ ‘absolute pollution exclusion[,)
which denied coverage for ‘bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,
release, or escape of pollutants’ and defined ‘pollutant’ as ‘any
solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant includ-
ing smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, chemicals and
waste,’” Id. at 514-15, 667 A.2d at 622, In adopting the
“absolute pollution exclusion,” and using environmental terms
of art such as “discharge, dispersal, release, or escape,” insur-
ers deleted as redundant reference to “into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water.” Id, at 515,
667 A.2d at 622. This Court explained that there was “no
indication that the change in the language was meant to
expand the scope of the clause to non-environmental damage.”
Id. at 515, 667 A.2d at 622 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, this Court concluded that the use of
environmental law terms of art such as “discharge,” “disper-
sal,” “release,” “escape,” “contaminant,” and “pollutant” in the
absolute pollution exclusion demonstrated that the insurance
“industry’s intention was to exclude only environmental pollu-
tion damage from coverage[.]” Id, at 515, 667 A.2d at 622-23.

Accordingly, in Sullins, this Court determined that the
history of the pollutant exclusion supported “our conclusion
that a reasonably prudent layperson may interpret the terms
‘pollution’ and ‘contamination,’ in the circumstances of the case
now before us, as not encompassing lead paint, a product used
legally and intentionally.” Id, at 516, 667 A.2d at 623 (emphasis
in original). And, because the terms “pollution” and “contami-
nation” were ambiguous, this Court held that they had to be
construed against the insurer as the drafter of the insurance
policy. See id, at 516, 667 A.2d at 623,

What can be gleaned from Sullins is that, where an insur-
ance policy contains a pollutant exclusion with ambiguous
terms—terms that could be interpreted to have multiple
meanings when viewed by a reasonably prudent layperson—
such terms must be construed against the drafter of the
policy, i.e, the insurer, Moreover, as explained in Sullins,

tracing the history of the pollutant exclusion demonstrates
that pollutant exclusions originated as a means of excluding
coverage for damage caused by environmental pollution, not
for damage caused by non-environmental pollution of the type
that could result from the legal use of products in residences,
Additionally, notably, Sullins supports the conclusion that
exclusions from coverage for injuries caused by lead-based
paint must unambiguously include lead-based paint as a pollu-
tant to be valid.

This is not the status of Georgia case law. In 2016, in Ga.
Farm, 784 S.E.2d at 428, the Supreme Court of Georgia
concluded that lead-based paint was a “pollutant” as defined
by the applicable insurance policy such that the “pollution
exclusion” in the insurance policy applied to exclude coverage
of personal injury claims arising from lead-based paint poison-
ing. This is the case that the Majority finds to be controlling.
In Ga, Farm, id, Amy Smith (“Smith”), in her individual
capacity and on behalf of her daughter Tyasia Brown
(“Brown”), sued her landlord, Bobby Chupp (“Chupp”), for
injuries that Brown allegedly sustained from lead-based paint
poisoning that occurred in the house that Smith rented from
Chupp. During the relevant time, Chupp’s house was insured
under a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by
Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Georgia
Farm”), which contained a “pollution exclusion” that provided
as follows:

This insurance does not apply to:

(f) Pollution
(1) “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of
the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release or escape of “pollutants”: (a)
At or from any premises, site or location which is or was
at any time owned or occupied by, or rented or loaned to,
any insured.
Id. (ellipsis in original). The insurance policy defined the term
“pollutant” as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or

contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkal-
is, chemicals and waste.” Id.

In the trial court, Georgia Farm argued, in pertinent part,
that the pollutant exclusion applied to Brown’s alleged injuries
from lead poisoning, i.¢., that the claims were excluded from
coverage, and that, accordingly, it was relieved of its contrac-
tual duty to defend and indemnify Chupp in the lawsuit. See
id, The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in
Georgia Farm’s favor, finding “that lead-based paint unambig-
uously fell within the policy’s definition of a ‘pollutant, and, as
a result, Brown’s alleged injuries were excluded from coverage
pursuant to the pollution exclusion clause.” Id. In so ruling,
the trial court relied on Reed v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co,, 284 Ga.
286, 667 §.E.2d 90, 92 (2008), in which the Supreme Court of
Georgia interpreted an identical pollutant exclusion contained
in a commercial general liability insurance policy insuring
residential rental property and held that, although not ex-
pressly identified in the insurance policy as a pollutant, carbon
monoxide gas was a pollutant and, therefore, the plaintiffs
injuries arising from carbon monoxide poisoning were exclud-
ed from coverage under the pollutant exclusion. See Ga. Farm,
784 S.E.2d at 423-24,

Notably, in Ga. Farm, id. at 424, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals of Georgia, that Court reversed the trial court’s
judgment in favor of Georgia Farm, observing that there
existed a conflict in other jurisdictions as to whether lead-
based paint should be considered a pollutant for purposes of a
pollutant exclusion in an insurance policy. In light of Georgia
law requiring the narrow construction of exclusions from
coverage in insurance policies, the Court of Appeals of Georgia
was persuaded to follow the example of jurisdictions that had
held that a pollutant exclusion did not bar coverage for
injuries arising from lead-based paint poisoning. See id, Signif-
icantly, the Court of Appeals of Georgia relied on this Court’s
opinion in Sullins, 840 Md. at 509-10, 667 A.2d at 620, and
concluded that, “with respect to allegations of bodily injury
arising from exposure to lead-based paint, the terms ‘contami-
nants’ and ‘pollutants’ used in a [commercial general liability]

policy’s pollution exclusion were ambiguous and should be
strictly construed against the insurer[.]” Ga. Farm, 784 8.B.2d
at 424 (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals of Georgia
determined that Georgia Farm had failed to demonstrate that
lead-based paint was a “pollutant” as defined by the insurance
policy. See id. The Court of Appeals of Georgia distinguished
Reed, the case relied on by the trial court, “finding that, while
a straightforward reading of the pollution exclusion in Reed
compelled the conclusion that carbon monoxide gas was a
pollutant, it was unclear whether identical language in the
instant policy was expansive enough to unambiguously include
lead, lead-based paint or paint as a pollutant.” Ga. Farm, 784
S.E.2d at 424 (citation omitted). Thereafter, Georgia Farm
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court of Georgia granted. See id,

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Georgia, and relied on
Georgia precedent in which Georgia courts had interpreted
pollutant exclusions to apply to all injuries caused by pollu-
tants, even those caused by something other than traditional
environmental pollution, and that the term “pollutant” applies
to any contaminant and the contaminant need not be expressly
identified in the insurance policy for a pollutant exclusion to be
valid. See id. at 425, After discussing applicable Georgia case
law, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that, “[u]nder
the broad definition contained in Chupp’s policy, ... lead
present in paint unambiguously qualifies as a pollutant and []
the plain language of the policy's pollution exclusion clause
thus excludes Smith’s claims against Chupp from coverage.”
Id, at 426 (footnote omitted). This outcome would not have
been the same had the circumstances of the case been ana-
lyzed under the principles set forth by this Court in Sullins.

The majority opinion attempts to distinguish this Court’s
holding in Sullins by inaccurately claiming that the policy at
issue in Georgia Farm was different because the policy con-
tained a definition of the term pollutant and, in Georgia Farm,
“(t]he Supreme Court of Georgia read that the plain language
of the pollutant definition was matter, in any state, acting as

an irritant or contaminant[,]” whereas in the pollution exclu-
sion at issue in Sullins, the term pollutant was not defined.
Maj. Op. at 590-91, 175 A.8d at 704 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The definition of the term pollutant
in the pollution exclusion at issue in Georgia Farm, 784 S.H.2d
at 423, was in actuality as set forth above—“any solid, liquid,
gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste”—and
the definition did not unambiguously define pollutant to in-
elude lead-based paint. Rather than relying on the plain
language of the exclusion, in reversing the intermediate appel-
late court, the Supreme Court of Georgia utilized Georgia case
law in which Georgia courts had earlier determined that the
term “pollutant” applies to any contaminant, and the contami-
nant need not be expressly identified in the insurance policy
for a pollutant exclusion to be valid. See id. at 425. Thus, in
Georgia Farm, the term pollutant was not defined in a manner
that merely allowed a plain language determination that the
term included lead-based paint, and such is not the circum-
stance in this case either.

To be sure, public policy in Maryland permits an insurance
policy to contain an exclusion for coverage for injuries caused.
by lead-based paint. IN § 19-704(c) speaks for itself, authoriz-
ing insurers to include lead hazard coverage exclusions under
certain narrow circumstances. Nevertheless, the Liberty Mu-
tual insurance policy at issue in this case does not contain a
lead hazard coverage exclusion; it contains a pollutant exclu-
sion. Indeed, the Majority specifically acknowledges that,
“{nJotably, the policies do not include lead-based paint exclu-
sion provisions, but the policies do include pollution exclusion
provisions.” Maj. Op. at 583, 175 A.3d at 700.

After conceding that the Liberty Mutual exclusion is a
pollution exclusion and not a lead hazard coverage exclusion,
the majority opinion concludes that “the General Assembly’s
explicit dictation of the State’s public policy in IN § 19-704, a
year after this Court held that an insurer had a duty to defend
a lead-based paint related injury in Sullins, illustrates that the
General Assembly is responsible for establishing public poli-

cy.” Maj. Op. at 599, 175 A.3d at 709 (citing Sullins, 40 Md. at
518, 667 A.2d at 624). The majority opinion overlooks the
legislative history of IN § 19-704. What is now IN § 19~704(c)
was originally enacted by the General Assembly in 1994 as
part of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program Act, See 1994
Md. Laws 1282, 1843 (Ch. 114, H.B. 760). The Lead Poisoning
Prevention Program Act took effect on October 1, 1994, and
the session law provided “[t]hat, notwithstanding other provi-
sions of this Act, this Act shall apply beginning on January 1,
1995 to insurance policies issued or renewed between October
1, 1994 and December 81, 1994.” Id. at 1847.

As originally enacted, Md. Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995
Supp.), Art. 48A, § 735(a)—the section that is now IN § 19-
704(¢)—provided:

(a) Provision.—Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this sec-

tion, upon the inception or renewal of a policy, an insurer

may provide for a lead hazard exclusion with respect to a

policy of insurance covering an affected property.

In 1996, as part of adding certain titles to the Insurance
Article, Md. Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Art. 48A,
§ 785(a) was recodified without substantive change as IN
§ 19-704(c), See 1996 Md. Laws 235, 286, 524-28 (Ch. 11, H.B.
11). That recodification took effect on October 1, 1997. See
1996 Md. Laws 698 (Ch. 11, H.B. 11). As recodified, IN § 19-
'704(c) provided, and continues to provide, as follows:

(c) Ewelusion of coverage.—Notwithstanding subsection

(g) of this section, whenever an authorized insurer issues or

renews a policy for an affected property, the authorized

insurer may include in the policy a lead hazard coverage
exclusion.

The history of IN § 19~704 demonstrates that the lead
hazard coverage exclusion in Maryland preceded the Court’s
decision in Sullins. It is inaccurate to link the enactment of IN
§ 19-704 to Sullins in any way. This Court issued Sullins on
November 6, 1995, after Md. Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995
Supp.), Art. 48A, § 735(a) was enacted and became effective.
However, Sullins involved an insurance policy that was issued

on September 14, 1990; ie, Md. Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995
Supp.), Art. 48A, § 735(a) would not have applied to the policy
at issue in that case. And, in Sullins, this Court did not discuss
or mention Md. Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Art. 48A,
§ 785(a) or the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program Act.

Moreover, Md. Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Art. 48A,
§ 785(a) was recodified in 1996 as IN § 19~704(c) without.
substantive change. As stated, Sullins was decided in 1995. In
recodifying Md. Code (1994 Repl. Vol. 1995 Supp.), Art. 48A,
§ 785(a) in 1996, the General Assembly would have been
aware of this Court’s decision in Sullins, and could have made
changes to the lead hazard coverage exclusion to enlarge it to
encompass pollutant exclusions generally, but the General
Assembly did not do this. It is clear that the strong public
policy in Maryland is that a lead-based paint exclusion must
be unambiguous. Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of IN
§ 19-704(c) and its predecessor is plainly to prevent insureds
from signing insurance policies and being unaware that cover-
age for injuries caused by lead-based paint is excluded.

Ultimately, in Maryland, there is a strong public policy of
protecting children from injuries caused by lead-based paint
and of requiring that lead-based paint exclusions in insurance
policies be clear and unambiguous. This is evident from stat-
utes enacted by the General Assembly. For example, in Md.
Code Ann., Hous. & Cmty. Dev. (2005-06) § 4-702, part of the
subtitle governing the lead hazard reduction grant program
and lead hazard reduction loan program, the General Assem-
bly specifically made the following findings:

The General Assembly finds that:

(1) lead paint is present in a large percentage of resi-
dential properties in the State, particularly residential rent-
al properties constructed before 1950;

(2) lead paint on the friction surfaces of windows is a
leading cause of lead poisoning;

(8) lead poisoning harms the health and well-being of
children and pregnant women and causes substantial long-

term public costs for medical expenses and additional edu-
cation; and
(4) reduction or elimination of lead in the environment
will reduce:
@ the risk of lead poisoning of children and pregnant
women;
(i) the incidence of learning disabilities and behavior-
al problems in children who live in older housing; and
ii) the cost of publicly financed medical care.
T would conclude that there is an equally strong public policy
in Maryland, as demonstrated by Md. Code (1994 Repl. Vol.,
1995 Supp.), Art. 48A, § 735(a), and its recodification without
substantive change to IN § 19~704(c) after this Court’s deci-
sion in Sullins, that for an insurance policy exclusion from
coverage of injuries caused by lead-based paint to be valid, the
exclusion must be explicit and unambiguous. Stated otherwise,
in my view, IN § 19-704(c), its predecessor, and the existence
of this Court’s decision in Sullins inescapably lead to the
conclusion that a lead-based paint exclusion in an insurance
policy must be expressly and unambiguously identified, either
through a lead hazard coverage exclusion of the type author-
ized by IN § 19-704(c) or through some other exclusion, which
expressly includes lead-based paint for purposes of the exclu-
sion. Respectfully, the Majority’s conclusion that, under Geor-
gia case law, an insurance contract with a pollution exclusion is
enforceable as a lead-based paint exclusion and that this does
not violate Maryland’s public policy is in direct contradiction
with this Court’s holding in Sullins, in which this Court
answered the same certified question to the contrary.

I would determine that the pollutant exclusion in the Liber-
ty Mutual insurance policy runs afoul of a strong Maryland
public policy on its face by failing to specifically and unambig-
uously include lead-based paint as a “pollutant” covered in the
pollutant exclusion. The definition of “pollutant” contained in
the Liberty Mutual insurance policy—“any solid, liquid, gas-
eous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste”—is

ambiguous and a reasonably prudent layperson both may and
may not believe lead-based paint to be a “pollutant” based on
the plain language of the pollutant exclusion contained in the
Liberty Mutual insurance policy. And, notably, the Liberty
Mutual pollutant exclusion contains environmental law terms
of art such as “discharge,” “dispersal,” “seepage,” “migration,
“release”, and “escape,” which, as this Court explained in
Sullins, 8340 Md. at 515-16, 667 A.2d at 622-28, supports the
conclusion that the insurance industry intended pollutant ex-
clusions to apply only to environmental pollution damage, and
not necessarily to the lawful use of products in the home, and
that a reasonably prudent layperson could “interpret the
term[ ] ‘pollution’ ... as not encompassing lead paint, a prod-
uct used legally and intentionally.” (Emphasis in original). I
would conclude that the public policy exception to the principle
of lew loci contractus is applicable, and I would answer the
certified question of law “yes,” and hold that it would violate
Maryland public policy to apply Georgia case law, specifically,
the Ga, Farm case, under the circumstances of this case
because Maryland has both a strong public policy of protecting
children from injuries caused by lead-based paint and of
requiring exclusions for lead-based paint to be unambiguous to
be valid.

For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent.

175 A.8d 720
The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, Trustee, et al.
v
Heinz Otto GEORG, et al.
No, 20, Sept. Term, 2017
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
December 18, 2017

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Argued by Ira L. Oring (M. Elizabeth Nowinski, Fedder
and Garten Professional Association of Baltimore, MD) on
brief, for Petitioners.

Argued by Gregory T. Lawrence (Daniel J. McCartin and
Michael J. Silvestri, Conti Fenn & Lawrence LLC of Balti-
more, MD) on brief, for Respondents.

ARGUED BEFORE: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins,
McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Watts, J.

This case is, as the parties themselves acknowledge, a
unique, fact-specific case involving issues of judicial estoppel,
and, specifically, whether a party’s arguments as to standing
and privity constitute inconsistent legal positions, and a deter-
mination of what constitutes a final judgment for purposes of
res judicata and collateral estoppel. To set the legal stage for
the case, we briefly describe the principle of judicial estoppel
and the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

HEM Judicial estoppel has been defined as “a principle
that precludes a party from taking a position in a subsequent

action [that is] inconsistent with a position taken by him or her
in a previous action.” Dashiell v. Meeks, 896 Md, 149, 170, 918
A2d 10, 22 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “[J]udicial estoppel applies when it becomes neces-
sary to protect the integrity of the judicial system from one
party who is attempting to gain an unfair advantage over
another party by manipulating the court system.” Id, at 171,
918 A.2d at 28. To that end,

[blefore judicial estoppel may be applied, three circum-

stances must exist: (1) one of the parties takes a [ ] position

that is inconsistent with a position it took in previous
litigation, (2) the previous inconsistent position was accepted
by a court, and (8) the party who is maintaining the
inconsistent positions must have intentionally misled the
court in order to gain an unfair advantage.

Id, at 171, 918 A.2d at 22 (citation omitted),

In Powell v. Breslin, 430 Md. 52, 63-64, 59 A.3d 581, 587-38
(2018), this Court described the doctrine of res judicata, or
claim preclusion, as well as the circumstances that must be
present for the doctrine to apply, stating:

Res judicata is an affirmative defense that precludes the
same parties from relitigating any suit based upon the same
cause of action because the second suit involves a judgment
that is conclusive, not only as to all matters that have been
decided in the original suit, but as to all matters which with
propriety could have been litigated in the first suit.

In Maryland, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the
relitigation of a suit if (1) the parties in the present litigation
are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier
action; (2) the claim in the current action is identical to the
one determined in the prior adjudication; and (8) there was
a final judgment on the merits in the previous action. The
overarching purpose of the res judicata doctrine is judicial
economy.

(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Hina similar vein, this Court has described the doctrine

of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, as follows: “[W]hen

an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to
the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. 361 Md.
871, 887, 761 A2d 899, 907 (2000) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). For the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel to apply, the following four-part test must be satisfied:

1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical

with the one presented in the action in question?

2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?

8. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party

or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?

4, Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a

fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?

Id. at 391, 761 A.2d at 909 (citation omitted), We have ex-
plained the relationship between the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel as follows:

Collateral estoppel is concerned with the issue implications

of the earlier litigation of a different case, while res judicata

is concerned with the legal consequences of a judgment
entered earlier in the same cause. The two doctrines are
based upon the judicial policy that the losing litigant de-
serves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adver-
sarial proceedings, on issues raised, or that should have
been raised.

Id, at 390-91, 761 A.2d at 909 (citations omitted).

Now, we briefly set the factual stage. Here, in 2010, a
financial institution that was the former owner of a note for a
refinance mortgage loan sued a married couple for reforma-
tion of the refinance deed of trust because the wife had not
signed the refinance deed of trust, and the former owner of
the note was thus unable to institute foreclosure proceedings
against the couple’s property, which the couple owned as
tenants by the entirety. Significantly, the former owner of the
note brought the lawsuit in its name and on its own behalf,
although it was no longer the note owner and was rather the

master servicer. Ultimately, after a bench trial, the trial court
ruled in the couple’s favor and against the former owner of the
note as to the merits of the case on the issue of mutual
mistake and as to standing to bring the lawsuit. Three years
later, in 2018, the current owner of the note and the title
insurer of the refinance mortgage loan sued the couple for
reformation of the refinance deed of trust. In the second
lawsuit, the trial court again ruled in the couple’s favor,
concluding that the current owner of the note and the title
insurer were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel
from bringing and relitigating the claims in the second lawsuit.
In go ruling, the trial court rejected an argument that the first
trial court’s ruling on the merits of the case had been a
contingent ruling and not a final judgment. The trial court also
concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply and that the
couple was not barred from asserting an argument in the
second lawsuit that the current owner of the note and the title
insurer were in privity with the former owner of the note/mas-
ter servicer. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the current owner of
the note and the title insurer filed in this Court a petition for a
writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.

Against this very distinctive legal and factual backdrop, we
decide whether: (I) the trial court in the second lawsuit
properly declined to apply judicial estoppel and properly ruled
that the couple was not barred by judicial estoppel from
asserting that the current owner of the note and the title
insurer were in privity with the former owner of the note/mas-
ter servicer; and (II) the trial court in the second lawsuit
correctly determined that the first trial court’s ruling as to the
merits of the case concerning mutual mistake was an indepen-
dent, alternative ruling, and not a contingent ruling—ze., that
the ruling on the merits was a final judgment—and that res
judicata and collateral estoppel barred the current owner of
the note and the title insurer from bringing and relitigating
their claims in the second lawsuit,

We hold that: (1) the prerequisites that must exist before
judicial estoppel may be applied are not satisfied, and, as such,

the trial court properly declined to apply judicial estoppel to
bar the couple’s argument that the current owner of the note
and the title insurer were in privity with the former owner of
the note. Specifically, because the three circumstances that
must be fulfilled for the application of judicial estoppel are not
established—the couple’s position with respect to privity is not
inconsistent with their position with respect to standing in the
first lawsuit, as standing and privity do not give rise to
mutually exclusive arguments but are instead two different
concepts—the trial court properly ruled that judicial estoppel
did not bar the couple’s privity argument; and (II) the first
trial court’s ruling as to the merits of the case concerning
mutual mistake was an independent, alternative ruling, and
not a contingent ruling, and thus, under the circumstances of
this case, constituted a final judgment for purposes of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. Accordingly, the trial court in
the second lawsuit properly determined that the elements of
res judicata and collateral estoppel were satisfied and thus
barred the current owner of the note and the title insurer
from bringing the claims in the second lawsuit.

BACKGROUND

This case involves a refinance mortgage loan for real prop-
erty located in Cockeysville, Maryland (“the Property”)!
owned by Heinz Otto Georg (“Heinz”) and his wife Susan M.
Georg (“Susan”), Respondents.” On February 15, 2002, Re-
spondents first acquired title to the Property, which was
unimproved, as tenants by the entirety. In June 2004, Respon-
dents entered into a contract with a builder for the Property.
And, on September 30, 2004, Respondents executed a deed of
trust in favor of Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. (“Chevy Chase”),
with an original construction loan amount of $807,000. Almost
two years later, on September 2, 2006, Respondents executed

1. At other places in the record, the Property is described as being in
Hunt Valley, Maryland, not Cockeysville, Maryland.

2. Due to the common surname of Respondents, we shall refer to
Respondents individually by their first names as needed.

a second deed of trust in favor of Chevy Chase for an
additional $100,000 home equity line of credit. Thereafter,
Respondents sought to refinance the construction loan and the
home equity line of credit, both of which were secured by
deeds of trust on the Property.

To that end, on October 26, 2006, Heinz executed a note in
the principal amount of $1,180,119 to First Horizon Home
Loan Corporation (“First Horizon”), a lender, for the purpose
of refinancing the construction loan and the home equity line
of credit loan (“the Note”). The Note was secured by a deed of
trust, signed that same day by Heinz, in favor of First Horizon
(“the refinance Deed of Trust”). Closing instructions for the
refinance mortgage loan—i.e., the Note and the refinance
Deed of Trust—identified the sole borrower as Heinz, and
both the Note and the refinance Deed of Trust in favor of
First Horizon also identified Heinz as the sole borrower. Only
Heinz signed the Note and refinance Deed of Trust; indeed,
neither document provided for Susan’s signature. In connec-
tion with recording the refinance Deed of Trust in favor of
First Horizon, however, both Heinz and Susan executed nota-
rized affidavits affirming that, as of October 26, 2006, the
unpaid principal balance of the construction loan secured by
the first Chevy Chase deed of trust was $807,000, and that the
unpaid principal balance of the home equity line of credit loan
secured by the second Chevy Chase deed of trust was
$100,000.

First Horizon apparently intended that the refinance mort-
gage loan would be used to release the two deeds of trust on
the Property in favor of Chevy Chase, and Old Republic
National Title Insurance Company (“Old Republic”), Petition-
er, issued a title insurance policy (“the Policy”) insuring that
the refinance mortgage loan would be secured by a first lien
against the Property and protecting First Horizon against any
issues that could occur during the execution of the mortgage.
In the event of a claim, the Policy provided Old Republic the
option to attempt to cure any defect in the refinance Deed of
Trust or to pay the claim. The Policy extended to First
Horizon and First Horizon’s successors and/or assigns and

insured that the refinance Deed of Trust would be executed by
both Heinz and Susan. Specifically, the “insured mortgage”
covered by the Policy was described as the “Deed of Trust
from Heinz [] and Susan [] to Larry Rice, Trustee, securing
First Horizon [] in the original principal amount of
$1,130,119.00 dated October 26, 2006 and recorded November
8, 2006, in the Land Records of Baltimore County, Mary-
land[.]”

In December 2006, the Note and accompanying refinance
Deed of Trust were transferred to an intermediary and then
to The Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”), Petitioner. This
transfer was completed pursuant to a “Pooling and Servicing
Agreement” dated December 1, 2006 (“the PSA”), an agree-
ment by which BNYM purchased in bulk a pool of notes and
mortgages. BNYM purchased the Note and remains the own-
er of the Note. Under the PSA, BNYM serves as Trustee for
the “First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust
2006-FA8 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
FA8” (“the Trust”), and First Horizon became the master
servicer for the Trust.’ Pursuant to the PSA, First Horizon
received compensation for serving as master servicer. Under
the PSA, as master servicer of the refinance mortgage loan
and other loans, First Horizon was obligated to “service and
administer” the pool of loans—i.e., collect payments. The PSA
also authorized First Horizon to take any action “that it may
deem necessary or desirable in connection with such servicing
and administration, including ... effectuat[ing] foreclosure or
other conversion of the ownership of the Mortgaged Property
securing any Mortgage Loan[.]”

After executing the refinance Deed of Trust and the Note,
Respondents paid monthly mortgage payments for a number
of years before they encountered financial difficulties. In June
2009, First Horizon declared Heinz in default under the Note,
and took steps to initiate foreclosure under the refinance Deed
of Trust. As a practical matter, however, because Respondents

3. Effective January 16, 2014, Nationstar became the master servicer,
replacing First Horizon.

owned the Property as tenants by the entirety, Susan’s signa-
ture on the refinance Deed of Trust had been required to
encumber the Property. Thus, in the absence of Susan’s
signature on the refinance Deed of Trust, First Horizon could
not foreclose on the Property in the event of a default on the
refinance mortgage loan by Heinz.

In a letter dated September 2, 2010, First Horizon submit-
ted to Old Republic a title claim under the Policy, explaining
that Susan was “on title but not as a borrower on the
foreclosing” refinance Deed of Trust and that “Susan did sign
the tax-property affidavit.” First Horizon explained that this
was a “defect[ that] might cause loss or damage for which [Old
Republic] may be liable[.]” First Horizon stated that it was
requesting Old Republic’s assistance to “protect the lender’s
interest in accordance with the terms of the” Policy, and that
it was “most anxious to resolve th{e] matter in order to
proceed with its foreclosure sale and convey good tile.” In an
e-mail dated September 15, 2010, the vice president and claims
counsel for Old Republic’s Corporate Legal Department ad-
vised First Horizon that Old Republic “elect[ed] to retain
counsel to file a lawsuit to reform the [refinance Deed of
Trust] to include Susan [] and/or to subordinate the interest
of Susan[.J” To that end, Old Republic retained Morton A.
Faller, Esquire (“Faller”) to represent it.

First Horizon Litigation (First Lawsuit)

On September 21, 2010, First Horizon, by and through its
attorney, Faller, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County (“the circuit court”) a complaint seeking reformation of
the refinance Deed of Trust and other equitable relief (“the
First Horizon litigation”). Later, First Horizon, by and
through its attorney, Faller, filed an amended complaint seek-
ing reformation of the refinance Deed of Trust, a declaration
that First Horizon had a valid first mortgage lien against the
Property, an order directing Susan to execute a confirmatory
joinder of the refinance Deed of Trust, a declaration that First
Horizon had a mortgage lien through equitable subrogation on
the Property, and an order establishing an equitable mortgage

against the Property under the refinance Deed of Trust.
Although BNYM had become the owner of the Note in
December 2006 and First Horizon was the master servicer of
the refinance mortgage loan when the complaint and amended
complaint were filed in the First Horizon litigation, First
Horizon brought the litigation not in a representative capacity
or as the servicer, but as the lender and owner of the Note.
For example, in the amended complaint, First Horizon identi-
fied itself as the “Lender” and stated that it was “the party
secured by the [refinance Deed of [T]rust on [the Plroper-
ty]?

Old Republic exercised control over aspects of the First
Horizon litigation. For example, in addition to recommending
that the action be instituted, Old Republic selected, retained,
paid, and regularly communicated with Faller, who served as
First Horizon’s counsel in the First Horizon litigation. Indeed,
Faller and his law firm regularly invoiced Old Republic for
costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees related to the First Hori-
zon litigation, And, with respect to the First Horizon litigation,
Old Republic discussed and approved litigation strategy, se-
lected trial witnesses, named the plaintiff, and decided wheth-
er to appeal the circuit court’s rulings,

Trial in the First Horizon litigation was set to begin on
April 23, 2012. During discovery, and in Respondents’ request
for production of documents, Respondents’ counsel asked First
Horizon’s counsel for all documents confirming that First
Horizon was the holder of the Note. In response, First Hori-
zon’s counsel stated that First Horizon was the holder of the
Note—ie., that it owned the refinance mortgage loan. This,
however, was incorrect, as First Horizon had assigned and
sold the Note to BNYM in December 2006—i¢., BNYM was
the holder/owner of the Note.

On April 23 and 24, 2012, before the Honorable Jan M.
Alexander (“Judge Alexander”), a trial in the First Horizon
litigation was held. A few days prior to trial, on April 20, 2012,
First Horizon’s counsel e-mailed to Respondents’ counsel a
document titled “Correction to Caption of Complaint and

a °°

Name of Plaintiff” (“the correction to caption”) in which First
Horizon’s counsel stated, in full, the following:

Madam Clerk:

Please note that the caption of the Amended Complaint
and name of the Plaintiff, First Horizon Loans, a division of
First Tennessee Bank National Association, should be cor-
rected to the following:

First Horizon Home Loans, a division of First Tennessee

Bank National Association, Master Servicer in its capacity

as agent for The Bank of New York Mellon, Trustee for

the Holders of the Certificates, First Horizon Mortgage

Pass-Through Certificate Series FHAMS 2006-F.A8

At the start of the trial on April 28, 2012, after the case was
called, First Horizon’s counsel, Faller, asked the circuit court
to approach the clerk to file the correction to caption. Respon-
dents’ counsel moved to strike the correction to caption and
moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that
First Horizon lacked standing. In relevant part, Respondents’
counsel argued that BNYM “for the trust itself [] would have
to have sued to reform the” refinance Deed of Trust, and that
First Horizon had “no standing to be proceeding to reform the
[refinance D]eed of [T]rust and it would be as if you sold your
house and then sued someone for trespassing on your lawn
after you moved out and you transferred,” Respondents’ coun-
sel further contended:

The attempt to substitute a new party in this case as the

plaintiff is not only strictly prohibited because now we know

that First [Horizon] has no standing to be a party in this
case, but it doesn’t even follow the protocol required by the

[Maryland Rlules. If they were going to change a party,

they would have to file an amended complaint within 30

days of trial, ... they would have to ask leave of court to

file it and filed a red line version of the complaint[.]

In response, Faller contended that he had only “recently”
learned that First Horizon was the master servicer and not
the lender, and argued that the issues in the case concerned
what happened when the parties went to settlement on the

refinance mortgage loan, and that First Horizon was the
lender at that time, and had been the “master servicer either
when it owned the loan or when it sold it to a securitized trust
continuously from 2006 to the present.”

Judge Alexander denied the motion to dismiss the amended
complaint and recessed to consider the correction to caption.
After the recess, Judge Alexander explained that, in his view,
the correction to caption was actually a motion for substitution
of plaintiff, and Judge Alexander stated that he denied “the
request to amend or substitute the plaintiff in this case[,]” and
explained that the Maryland Rules “do not allow for the
substitution of a plaintiff unless ... one of the original plain-
tiffs still remains in the case.” Immediately thereafter, Re-
spondents’ counsel moved to dismiss the case or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment based on lack of standing.
Faller responded that First Horizon “would intend to proceed
[to] trial and prove that First Horizon as serv[icler has the
authority.” In other words, First Horizon argued that it had
standing because it was authorized by the PSA to seek
reformation of the refinance mortgage loan on BNYM’s behalf
in its own name. Judge Alexander stated that he would
reserve on the motion for summary judgment and allow the
case to proceed to trial. The trial thus proceeded with First
Horizon bringing the litigation in its own name, even though it
was undisputed that, at that time, First Horizon was the
master servicer, and not the owner, of the Note and refinance
Deed of Trust.

At trial, First Horizon presented its case-in-chief, calling
three witnesses and introducing numerous exhibits into evi-
dence. First Horizon attempted to prove that Susan knew that
she was supposed to sign the refinance Deed of Trust, that she
had intended to sign the refinance Deed of Trust, and that her
failure to sign the refinance Deed of Trust was a mistake on
her part. According to First Horizon, because it had also made
a mistake in failing to have Susan sign the refinance Deed of
Trust, there had been a mutual mistake, and the circuit court
therefore had the power to reform the refinance Deed of
Trust.

a

First Horizon’s third witness, Richard Stern (“Stern”), the
vice president of asset recovery for First Horizon, testified
that First Horizon was the “agent and master servicer” for
BNYM, and that First Horizon started as the owner/servicer,
and became the master servicer, of the refinance mortgage
loan, First Horizon’s counsel asked Stern whether First Hori-
zon, as master servicer, had the authority to foreclose on a
loan owned by BNYM. Respondents’ counsel objected, and the
circuit court sustained the objection, ruling that it would
“depend on what” the PSA stated. First Horizon’s counsel
then handed Stern a copy of the PSA and asked Stern to
identify the document; Stern stated that it was the PSA
between First Horizon, as master servicer, and BNYM, as
trustee. First Horizon’s counsel asked Stern how the PSA
related to the refinance mortgage loan. Stern asked to see the
correction to caption that the circuit court had stricken. Stern
testified that, based on the correction to caption, the refinance
mortgage loan was a part of the group of loans covered by the
PSA. First Horizon’s counsel offered the PSA into evidence,
and Respondents’ counsel objected. The circuit court stated
that First Horizon could proffer what the PSA stated, and,
specifically, whether First Horizon could stand in BNYM’s
stead—i.e., whether First Horizon had standing to bring suit
on its own behalf. The circuit court stated that it would give
the parties the night to look at the PSA, and that it would take
up the standing issue and the PSA’s admissibility the next
morning. At that point, Stern’s testimony resumed.

The next day, April 24, 2012, trial resumed, and First
Horizon’s counsel identified the provisions in the PSA that he
alleged authorized First Horizon, as master servicer, to bring
the action, After reading certain provisions of the PSA, First
Horizon’s counsel contended that those provisions “author-
ize[d] First Horizon in its own name and as master servicer
with respect to th[e] loan to take all action on behalf of the
trust that it is the servicer for with respect to the mortgage
loans, and on that basis [it] would ask the [cireuit clourt to”
admit the PSA into evidence. Respondents’ counsel objected
again and argued, in relevant part, that BNYM was the

“proper party” to bring the action, and that First Horizon
could have brought the action potentially only in their capacity
as agent for BNYM, contending:

As they attempted to do, which the [circuit clourt properly
denied under the rules, they potentially could file a suit as
an agent for the trust fund to protect those interests but
this agreement does not give it the right to file on its own
behalf as a party and then attempt to have the [circuit
cJourt essentially treat it as it if is [BNYM].

Respondents’ counsel asserted that First Horizon lacked
standing because BNYM, not First Horizon, was the party
secured by the refinance Deed of Trust, and First Horizon
brought the action as a party and not as BNYM’s agent.
Respondents’ counsel also argued that the PSA was inadmissi-
ble because Schedule I, the mortgage loan schedule listing the
loans that were subject to the PSA, was not included, and, as
such, “[t]here [wa]s absolutely no way of knowing that the
Georg[ ] loan actually applies to this agreement.” Respon-
dents’ counsel explained that, absent Schedule I, First Horizon
could not prove that the PSA applied to the refinance mort-
gage loan and that they simply did not know who owned the
refinance mortgage loan.

First Horizon’s counsel responded that Stern’s testimony
established that the refinance mortgage loan was subject to
the PSA, and that the circuit court had the authority to
receive the PSA solely for the purposes of establishing stand-
ing, and that First Horizon was authorized to bring the action
in its own name. First Horizon’s counsel also stated: “I would
hope that the [circuit clourt would be inclined to try to resolve
this case on its merits.” Judge Alexander ultimately admitted
the PSA into evidence, and stated: “I think it goes to weight
as opposed to the admissibility and I will consider it in light of
arguments on both sides.”

At that point, First Horizon rested, and Respondents’ coun-
sel orally moved for judgment. Respondents’ counsel argued,
in pertinent part:

We don’t have the proper party, [First Horizon] dof[es]n’t
have standing to bring this case. The resolution of this on its
merits, to even hear further testimony would be meaning-
less, a meaningless exercise.

If they can’t bring a case, they don’t have standing, it is
just fundamental 101 and this case should be dismissed on
that basis solely. Moreover, they haven’t sued the proper
party in that you can’t seek what equitable relief against
[Susan] because she is not a party to the deed of trust, not a
party to the note. They can only seek reformation against
the party to a contract. There is no evidence that has been
offered in the case[-Jin[-lchief by the plaintiff here that
[Susan] entered into any agreement with First Horizon.
And therefore, she can’t be—she can’t be a proper party to
an action for reformation of a contract of which there is no
evidence that it was entered into, A contract is mutual
assent to agreements to the terms, They have offered
nothing. So there is nothing to reform, There is no basis
upon which to bring her into a situation in which is conceded
that she wasn’t asked to sign anything and she didn’t sign
anything. Moreover, their burden, the burden of production,
the burden of proof in this case is on them. And they have
not even tossed it over to our side on production. There is
absolutely no evidence that could establish mistake of fact
by [Susan].

They have offered what? They have offered the testimony
of persons who didn’t ask her to sign anything, They have
offered the testimony of persons who have agreed that she
didn’t ask to sign anything, that—and there was no evidence
that she was under mistake of any fact whatsoever during
this transaction.

So there is simply no basis to even continue this case on a
fundamental issue of procedure and really jurisdiction of the
[circuit clourt because we don’t have parties here that can
have the rights [] adjudicated before it. But also, on the
issue of the evidence, they have to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that [Susan] was under a mistake of fact. They
didn’t even call her as a witness. What evidence is there of

TT

her state of mind that she would—she intended to sign this
deed of trust?

First Horizon’s counsel responded “that First Horizon [could]
bring th[e] action for the reasons [ ] already discussed.” First
Horizon’s counsel also contended that the evidence demon-
strated that there had been a mutual mistake of fact in the
execution of the refinance Deed of Trust.

After hearing argument from the parties on the motion for
judgment, Judge Alexander granted the motion for judgment
based on the merits of the case, orally ruling from the bench
as follows with respect to a lack of mutual mistake:

All right. I’m granting the motion at the close of [First
Horizon}’s case, since [First Horizon] has not produced the
burden of going forward with this matter for the reasons
that I have stated from the bench. There is no evidence that
[Susan] was knowledgeable about this transaction, knowl-
edgeable that a mistake had been made or knowledgeable
that it was her intent to be included on this deed of trust.

I would note for the record the evidence is that all of
these documents were not prepared by [Respondent]s. They
were all prepared by [First Horizon]. No doubt there were
mistakes made, but the mistakes were made by [First
Horizon] in the preparation of the documents. That cannot
be impugned to [Respondent]s and it actually works against
[First Horizon]. Case law is clear against that. They were in
a position of superiority in the preparation and the conduc-
tion of this transaction. They were in complete control. They
made a mistake. They don’t get a do over unless they can
show that the mistake was mutually made by the parties
and without a showing that [Susan] knew that this mistake
had taken place, I cannot allow the case to go forward any
further.

So I am granting the motion for judgment at the close of
[First Horizon]’s case.

Immediately after Judge Alexander’s oral ruling, First Ho-
rizon’s counsel asked the circuit court to clarify two issues:

Number 1, does that mean that the [circuit cJourt finds
that there was sufficient standing established to allow this
case to be heard on the merits? I just need to make sure the
record is clear on that issue.

The second issue is has the [circuit clourt considered the
equitable subrogation argument which would say that there
was a defective deed of trust, ... that there was at least the
lender’s ability to step into the shoes of the first and second
mortgages that were satisfied with the proceeds? Because
what Your Honor is doing is dealing with one issue but not
necessarily the other.

In response, Judge Alexander addressed standing, ruling that

First Horizon lacked standing and explaining:
First of all, with regard to the standing issue, the [circuit
cjourt is not satisfied that based on documents that have
been presented for the arguments made by [Respondents’]
counsel, there is a representation in the contract[, i, the
PSA,] of an indexing of all of the loans that have been
covered by this contract. That index is not in this contract.
There is no identification of this particular loan as being
subject to this agreement. No disrespect to [] Stern’s
testimony, but it was very self[-]serving in that regard. He
has no knowledge as to whether this particular loan was
included. I think it was supposition on his part that it might
have been in the same timeframe but nothing to indicate
that this contract covers this particular loan. Any identifica-
tion numbers and loan reference numbers, the attachment is
not there.

So with regard to that, there is no standing. As I stated at
the outset, not allowing the substitution of parties, the
amended complaint references First Horizon Loans, not as
an agent for any subsequent party, not as a representative
for any subsequent party, but as the home loan holder, the
loan holder, And that’s clearly not the case based on the
evidence that has been presented. They are not the home
loan holder. If they were to have brought this case in a
representative capacity, it should have been titled as such,
should have been pled as such. All references in the docu-

TT

ment and the complaint should have said as the representa-
tive, as the agent, as the authorized agent or such language
as that, So no, I will grant the [Respondents’] motion in that
regard as well.
Judge Alexander also stated that he did not rule in First
Horizon’s favor with respect to equitable subrogation because
First Horizon could not, “as it is pled, [it is] not entitled to
that. [It] cannot step into the place of the new home loan
holder, loan note holder.”
First Horizon’s counsel interjected and the following ex-
change occurred:
[FIRST HORIZON’S COUNSEL): ... Your Honor, if the
[circuit clourt finds there is no standing to have brought this
action, the [circuit clourt has gone ahead and now made fact
determinations as if the trial had proceeded on the merits
and I’m trying to understand if there is no standing, then
there is no ability to go forward on any claims. But Your
Honor is making rulings—
THE COURT: The whole idea of the standing was subject
to this document that you were—you just presented today
and I said I would hold that under advisement until we saw
what it was.
[FIRST HORIZON’S COUNSEL]: I understand.
THE COURT: I had not read the document and it was not
pointed out to me until just a few minutes ago that it
references an index of loans that it covers.
[FIRST HORIZON’S COUNSEL]: I understand. But if
there is no standing, then there is no case to go forward.
At that time, Respondents’ counsel made the following sugges-
tion to Judge Alexander:
Grant the motion for judgment because you have heard the
evidence, you have considered the merits and the rulings on
the merits are in the alternative. So even if they had
standing, because that way the issue would be ripe so that
the [circuit clourt’s efforts in this court in hearing what they
have asked you to hear, if the [circuit clourt were to review
it, they can consider all of the issues.

Judge Alexander asked Respondents’ counsel: “So you have
no objection to me finding that there is standing?” Respon-
dents’ counsel stated:

No, I actually say in the alternative. So you can have the

ruling that if the [circuit clourt could say even if there was

standing, I have considered the presentation of evidence as

if there was standing to, for judicial economy, so that we

don’t have to have a whole new trial.
Judge Alexander then orally issued rulings on standing and
the merits, stating: “That sounds appropriate. I will say that I
do not find that they had standing, however, in the alternative,
I do not find that [First Horizon] has met its burden of
production to have the case go forward based on the evidence
for the reasons previously stated.” The trial recessed immedi-
ately thereafter.

On May 3, 2012, consistent with his oral ruling, Judge
Alexander issued an order granting judgment in favor of
Respondents, stating, in relevant part,

Trial having taken place in this matter on April [28 and]

24, 2012, [First Horizon] having concluded the presentation

of its case, this Court finds that [First Horizon] does not

have standing to bring th[e] action against [Respondent].

In the alternative, this Court finds that even if [First

Horizon] had standing to pursue th[e] action, the evidence

which [First Horizon] presented was insufficient to meet its

burden of production.

First Horizon appealed. On September 30, 2018, the Court
of Special Appeals issued an unreported opinion dismissing
the appeal due to First Horizon’s failure to file a timely notice
of appeal.

Current Litigation (Second Lawsuit)

A couple of months after the Court of Special Appeals’s
dismissal of the appeal in the First Horizon litigation, on
December 5, 2018, BNYM, as trustee, and Old Republic
initiated a second lawsuit in the circuit court by filing a
complaint against Respondents. The second lawsuit was based

on the same facts and legal basis as the First Horizon
litigation was—namely, First Horizon and Susan had made a
mutual mistake in failing to include Susan on the refinance
Deed of Trust. And, in the second lawsuit, Petitioners raised
substantially similar causes of action to those that were raised
in the First Horizon litigation—equitable claim for reforma-
tion of the refinance Deed of Trust, request for an order
compelling Respondents to “execute appropriate paperwork,
or alternatively reforming the existing refinance [DJeed of
[Tlrust[,]” equitable mortgage, equitable subrogation, and eq-
uitable lien. And, as with the First Horizon litigation, Old
Republic paid for counsel in the second lawsuit and deter-
mined who was to be named a plaintiff. Of note, Petitioners
were represented by a different law firm in the second law-
suit; Faller and his law firm were no longer counsel of record.

After discovery was completed, on June 5, 2015, Respon-
dents filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment, or for Judicial
Decision under [Maryland] Rule 2-502,” arguing as follows
with respect to the issue of privity:

[T]he undisputed material facts prove that [Petitioners] are

in privity with the plaintiff in a prior lawsuit against [Re-

spondents, the First Horizon litigation]. Moreover, the
claims and issues in this lawsuit and the prior lawsuit are
the same, and the prior lawsuit resulted in a final judgment
on the merits. Accordingly, this lawsuit is barred by res
judicata and collateral estoppel, and [Respondent]s are

4. Maryland Rule 2-502, entitled “Separation of questions for decision
by court,” provides:

If at any stage of an action a question arises that is within the sole
province of the court to decide, whether or not the action is triable by
a jury, and if it would be convenient to have the question decided
before proceeding further, the court, on motion or on its own initia-
tive, may order that the question be presented for decision in the
manner the court deems expedient. In resolving the question, the
court may accept facts stipulated by the parties, may find facts after
receiving evidence, and may draw inferences from these facts. The
proceedings and decisions of the court shall be on the record, and the
decisions shall be reviewable upon appeal after entry of an appeal-
able order or judgment.

entitled to summary judgment, or in the alternative, for a

judicial decision in their favor under [Maryland] Rule 2~502,
A few days later, on June 8, 2015, Petitioners filed a motion
for partial summary judgment, arguing that there was no
dispute as to material facts relevant to the equitable subroga-
tion claim and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law with respect to the equitable subrogation claim. Peti-
tioners also argued that they were entitled to summary judg-
ment with respect to the various defenses raised by Respon-
dents, including res judicata and collateral estoppel. By the
time of the filing of the motion for partial summary judgment,
Petitioners were represented by yet another law firm. And, on
July 6, 2015, Petitioners filed an opposition to the motion for
summary judgment or for judicial decision under Maryland
Rule 2-502, arguing, in pertinent part, that Respondents’
position that BNYM was in privity with the plaintiff in the
First Horizon litigation was “not only incorrect, but also
directly and unequivocally contrary to the position [that] they
took in successfully defending the First Horizon [litigation],
such that they are judicially estopped from asserting privity in
this action.”

On October 30, 2015, the Honorable Julie L. Glass (“Judge
Glass”) conducted a motions hearing. After hearing extensive
argument from the parties, Judge Glass advised that she
would reserve ruling. On December 9, 2015, Judge Glass
entered an opinion and order denying Petitioners’ motion for
partial summary judgment and granting Respondents’ motion
for judicial decision. On December 11, 2015, Judge Glass
issued an amended opinion and order, vacated the December
9, 2015 opinion and order, and again denied Petitioners’ mo-
tion for partial summary judgment and granted Respondents’
motion for judicial decision; on December 28, 2015, the
amended opinion and order were entered. In the amended
opinion, Judge Glass succinctly set forth the parties’ respec-
tive arguments with respect to the First Horizon litigation,
stating:

{Respondent]s argue that [Petitioner]s’ claims, in this
second lawsuit, are barred by the doctrines of res judicata

TT

and collateral estoppel, based on the May 8, 2012 Court
Order issued by [Judge] Alexander in the First Horizon
[litigation]. [Petitioner]s, in response, contend that Judge
Alexander’s Order qualifies as a contingent ruling and can-
not serve as a basis for ves judicata or collateral estoppel.

Judge Glass first addressed res judicata, summarizing the
parties’ positions and making the following findings:

In the First Horizon [litigation], counsel for [Respon-
dent]s argued that First Horizon had no standing because it
was not the holder of the [refinance mortgage] Loan and
had no right to assert a claim other than as the servicer.
BNYM is the successor to First Horizon’s interest in the
Property. Therefore, the Court finds that [Petitioner]s, Old
Republic and BNYM, are in privity with First Horizon,
satisfying the first requirement of res judicata,

eae ok

[Petitioner]s brought this second lawsuit based on the
exact same facts that gave rise to the First Horizon [litiga-
tion] and seeks the same relief as in the first lawsuit—
reformation of the [refinance] Deed of Trust, equitable
subrogation, and equitable mortgage. Moreover, Old Repub-
lic acknowledged that the first and second lawsuits were
based on the same transaction of facts (i.e. the closing of the
{refinance mortgage] Loan and the [refinance] Deed of
Trust). This Court notes that Schedule I of the [refinance
mortgage] Loan, which was not introduced at the First
Horizon [litigation], was presented by [Petitioner]s at the
October 30, 2015 hearing, The Court therefore finds that
there are immaterial differences between the first and
second lawsuit.

... At the Circuit Court level, there was a full trial where
[Petitioner]s had a full and fair opportunity to bring all of
its claims. The [] Court of Special Appeals found that the
Circuit Court’s judgment in the first lawsuit became a final
judgment when First Horizon dismissed the other defen-

dants from the case,
eee

a

In [Petitioner]s’ view, ... any ruling on the merits was at
most a contingent ruling which is not a final judgment on
the merits and has no preclusive effect. [Petitioner]s con-
tend that the decision in [a prior case] is consistent with the
fundamental concept that a contingent judgment is not a
final judgment. To further support their position, [Petition-
er]s, in their Motion, discuss a Seventh Circuit Court which
stated that a contingent judgment is not final until the
contingency materializes.

The Court finds that with regard to the third element of
ves judicata the same issue of whether [the] PSA covers
[the refinance mortgage] Loan which was determined in the
first lawsuit cannot be relitigated.

(Citation and record citations omitted). Judge Glass then ruled
on res judicata, stating:
Because this proceeding is between the same parties or
those in privity with each other and upon the same causes of
action, the principle of res judicata applies and all matters
actually litigated or that could have been litigated are
conclusive in this case and thus barred. As all [of] the
elements of res judicata have been established, the Court
finds that there is a sufficient basis based on the undisputed
facts that this second lawsuit must be dismissed.
In other words, Judge Glass rejected Petitioners’ contention
that Judge Alexander’s rulings were contingent rulings.

Next, Judge Glass made the following findings with respect
to collateral estoppel:

In addressing the first element of collateral estoppel,
[Respondent]s claim that [Petitioner]s are barred from relit-
igating the same issues of [Susan]’s intention and whether
[Heinz] owned the [refinance mortgage] Loan. [Respon-
dent]s correctly assert that [Petitioner]s’ claims for equita-
ble subrogation, equitable mortgage, and equitable lien all
center on whether [Susan] intended to sign the [refinance]
Deed of Trust, The issues sought to be precluded by [Re-
spondent]s are identical to those decided by Judge Alexan-
der in [the] First Horizon [litigation]. Therefore, as [Re-

TT

spondent]s contend the same issues were “actually and fully
litigated in the first lawsuit.”

With respect to the second element, [Respondent]s con-
tend that based on their argument set forth for res judicata
regarding a final judgment on the merits, this requirement
of collateral estoppel is satisfied. In the First Horizon
[litigation] there was final judgment on the merits, namely
that judgment was entered in favor of [Respondent]s. For
the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby incorporates
its findings that the first lawsuit resulted in a final judg-
ment on the merits,

... Although the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel are distinct, a requirement shared by both its
privity. In the context of collateral estoppel, privity is
measured by whether the allegedly precluded party could
have appealed the adverse ruling in the prior litigation. The
Court therefore incorporates its findings described above
under the privity requirement for res judicata and finds for
the reasons stated above that this element of collateral
estoppel has also been met.

Finally, under the fourth element of collateral estoppel,
[Petitioner]s had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the First Horizon [litigation]. In the first lawsuit,
BNYM was fully represented and could have but chof Jse
not to be joined as a named party. The Court finds that
[Petitioner]s had a full and fair opportunity to litigate [their]
claim in the prior litigation.

(Citations and record citations omitted). Judge Glass then
ruled on collateral estoppel, stating: “Having met all the
elements for collateral estoppel, [Petitioner]s are precluded
from bringing their claims in this second lawsuit. The Court
finds [Respondent]s’ argument for summary judgment is per-
suasive as there is sufficient [ ] evidence to invoke the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.”

Judge Glass made the following findings and ruling as to
judicial estoppel:

[Petitioner]s assert that [Respondent]s have taken inconsis-
tent positions and made inconsistent representations in the
previous litigation and in the present case....
a

At the hearing before this Court, [Respondent]s chal-
lenged [Petitioner]s claiming that judicial estoppel is not
met here since the position urged by [Respondent]s in the
first lawsuit is not inconsistent with the one asserted in this
second lawsuit.

aR OR

This Court is not convinced that the doctrine of judicial
estoppel applies to the instant case as [Petitioner]s cannot
show that [Respondent]s took contrary positions or ever
intended to mislead the Court. The Court finds that there
are insufficient facts in the instant case to support a finding
of “voluntary” conduct by BNYM to apply [Respondent]s’
defense of estoppel. Having reviewed the alleged inconsis-
tencies of the positions taken by [Respondent]s in the First
Horizon [litigation] and the present case, the Court finds
further that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable
under the circumstances of this case.

In the conclusion of the amended opinion, Judge Glass
summarized her rulings, stating:

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that no genu-
ine disputes of material fact exist in this case and as a
matter of law, [Respondent]s are entitled to summary judg-
ment, Accordingly, [Petitioner]s’ Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment shall be DENIED, and [Respondent]s’
Motion for Judicial Decision under Maryland Rule 2-502
shall be GRANTED, and there is no need to address the
merits of [Respondent]s’ summary judgment claim. Howev-
er, the Court finds that had it addressed the summary
judgment claim it would have found that no material fact is
in dispute and the moving party would be able to raise
summary judgment as a basis for relief.

5. Judge Glass also addressed arguments, and made findings and rul-
ings, as to laches, the statute of limitations, waiver, equitable subroga-

In the amended order accompanying the amended opin-
ion, Judge Glass ordered, in pertinent part, that Petitioners’
motion for partial summary judgment be denied, that Re-
spondents’ motion for judicial decision be granted, and that
Respondents’ motion for summary judgment need not be
addressed.

The day after the amended opinion and order were entered,
on December 29, 2015, Petitioners noted an appeal. On March
10, 2017, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, i¢., Judge
Glass’s ruling. Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals ex-
plained:

Because we hold that Judge Glass did not err in finding that

Judge Alexander made alternative, independent rulings in

the First Horizon trial, and because we hold that Judge

Glass correctly determined that those rulings had a preclu-

sive effect in this subsequent second trial, we affirm Judge

Glass’[s] ruling on this issue.

The Court of Special Appeals rejected Petitioners’ argument
that Judge Alexander’s two rulings—on standing and on the
merits—were contingent on one another. And, according to
the Court of Special Appeals, “Judge Glass did not err in
determining that Judge Alexander intended his rulings in the
First Horizon trial to be independent and given in the alterna-
tive.” (Footnote omitted). The Court of Special Appeals deter-
mined that, among other things, Judge Glass correctly con-
cluded that there was a final judgment on the merits in the
First Horizon litigation, and, thus, Judge Glass correctly ruled
that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Petitioners
from raising the same claims that were raised and litigated in
the First Horizon litigation again in the second lawsuit. The
Court of Special Appeals also held that Judge Glass did not
abuse her discretion in declining to apply the doctrine of

tion, the statute of frauds and parol evidence, failure to mitigate
damages, and denial of the execution of a written instrument, None of
those findings or rulings is relevant here,

judicial estoppel to Respondents’ argument on the issue of
privity.

Thereafter, Petitioners filed in this Court a petition for a

writ of certiorari, raising the following two issues:

1. Whether judicial estoppel requires a showing of an
intention to mislead the court apart from a demonstra-
tion that the party “has succeeded in persuading a court
to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial
acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceed-
ing would create ‘the perception that either the first or
the second court was misled[.!’” New Hampshire v.
Maine, 582 U.S. 742, 750 [121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Bd.2d
968] (2001).

2. Whether a ruling that a party lacked standing to assert
its claims, but subject to the caveat that if the court was
found to be wrong with regard to standing, the party
failed to prove its case on the merits, is a contingent
ruling on the merits and thus not a final judgment for
purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel, or
whether the ruling on standing and the ruling on the
merits are alternative rulings, each entitled to preclu-
sive effect[.]

(First alteration in original). On June 21, 2017, this Court
granted the petition, See Bank of New York Mellon v. Georg,
458 Md. 355, 162 A.3d 837 (2017).

DISCUSSION
I. Judicial Estoppel

The Parties’ Contentions

Petitioners contend that Respondents are judicially es-
topped from asserting privity. Specifically, Petitioners argue
that Respondents have taken inconsistent positions by arguing
that First Horizon lacked standing in the First Horizon litiga-
tion and arguing here that Petitioners are in privity with First
Horizon. According to Petitioners, in the First Horizon litiga-
tion, Respondents argued that only the entity that owned the

refinance mortgage loan would be the proper party to institute
the action, and that First Horizon had no standing because it
did not own the loan—i.e., First Horizon was instead an agent
for the owner, and had no authority to sue in its own name.
Petitioners assert that, in this case, Respondents “reversed
course” and argued that First Horizon fully represented Peti-
tioners’ interests in the First Horizon litigation. Petitioners
maintain that Respondents’ positions on standing and privity
are contrary legal positions in successive actions based on the
same facts, and that judicial estoppel applies. Petitioners
argue that, by taking inconsistent legal positions, Respondents
misled either Judge Alexander or Judge Glass, and assert that
Judge Glass’s acceptance of the privity argument “creates the
perception that [she] was misled.” According to Petitioners,
taking directly inconsistent legal positions in successive ac-
tions, considered alone, demonstrates an intent to mislead.

Respondents counter that Judge Glass properly declined to
bar their privity argument under the principle of judicial
estoppel because the requirements for the application of judi-
cial estoppel are not present. Respondents contend that they
did not take inconsistent positions in the First Horizon litiga-
tion and this case, and argue that their positions on standing
and privity are compatible. According to Respondents, in the
First Horizon litigation, they argued that First Horizon lacked
standing because it failed to prove that the PSA, to which both
it and BNYM were parties, applied to the refinance mortgage
loan; and, in this case, Respondents argued that First Horizon
and BNYM were in privity because both were parties to the
PSA, and because Old Republic controlled the prosecution of
the First Horizon litigation. Respondents argue that the issue
of whether Petitioners were in privity with First Horizon is
not the same as the issue of whether the PSA covered the
refinance mortgage loan, and, thus, the positions on standing
and privity were not inconsistent. Respondents assert that
their positions on standing and privity did not result in
obtainment of an unfair advantage and that there is no
evidence of any intent to mislead, and that such a finding is
necessary for application of judicial estoppel to factual posi-

tions. Additionally, Respondents contend that judicial estoppel
does not apply to legal positions, and that, accordingly, Peti-
tioners’ argument with respect to judicial estoppel fails on that
basis as well.

Standard of Review

Neither party expressly moved for summary judgment on
the basis of judicial estoppel. At most, in a motion for partial
summary judgment, Petitioners argued that they were enti-
tled to summary judgment with respect to the various defens-
es raised by Respondents, including res judicata and collateral
estoppel. And, in the motion for partial summary judgment,
Petitioners argued that “the doctrine of judicial estoppel now
precludes [Respondent]s from asserting that BNYM elected
not to participate in the First Horizon” litigation. Later, in
opposition to Respondents’ motion for summary judgment or
for judicial decision under Maryland Rule 2-502, Petitioners
raised judicial estoppel as a basis for why Respondents should
not be permitted to assert res judicata and collateral estoppel.

HM A trial court “shall” grant summary judgment “if the
motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judg-
ment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Md. R. 2-501(f). In Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford, 455 Md.
462, 482, 168 A.3d 824, 835 (2017), we explained that we review
without deference a trial court’s grant of summary judgment:

The question of whether a trial court’s grant of summary
judgment was proper is a question of law subject to de novo
review on appeal. In reviewing a grant of summary judg-
ment under Maryland Rule 2-501, we independently review
the record to determine whether the parties properly gener-
ated a dispute of material fact, and, if not, whether the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We
review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoy-
ing party and construe any reasonable inferences that may
be drawn from the facts against the moving party.

(Citation and brackets omitted). Similarly, we review without
deference a trial court’s ruling on legal issues. See City of
Bowie v. MIE Props., Inc., 398 Md. 657, 677, 922 A.2d 509, 521
(2007) (“Review of the legal questions decided below is not so
deferential. We examine de novo issues of law as decided
based on the [trial clourt’s sustainable findings of fact.” (Cita-
tion omitted).

Hl By contrast, denial of a motion for summary judgment,
based on judicial estoppel or other grounds, is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See Dashiell, 396 Md. at 173-74, 913 A.2d
at 24 (“[T]he motion judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying [the petitioner]’s motion to grant summary judgment
based on judicial estoppel.... The trial judge, based on the
record that was before him at the time, did not abuse his
discretion when denying the motion for summary judgment.
[The petitioner] is, however, free to continue to assert a claim
of judicial estoppel on remand and upon a more fully devel-
oped record.” (Citation omitted); id, at 165, 9138 A.2d at 19
({A] trial court may [] exercise its discretionary power to
deny a motion for summary judgment when the moving party
has met the technical requirements of summary judgment.
Thus, on appeal, the standard of review for a denial of a
motion for summary judgment is whether the trial judge
abused his discretion and in the absence of such a showing,
the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed.” (Citations
omitted)).

Hl Here, the parties dispute the standard of review appli-
cable to Judge Glass’s ruling that judicial estoppel does not
apply. Petitioners contend that Judge Glass’s decision should
be reviewed without deference for legal correctness. By con-
trast, Respondents argue that Judge Glass’s decision on judi-
cial estoppel should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. We
conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, Judge
Glass’s ruling with respect to judicial estoppel is to be re-
viewed without deference for legal correctness. Significantly,
Petitioners did not expressly move for partial summary judg-
ment on the basis of judicial estoppel, but rather moved for

a

partial summary judgment with respect to the equitable sub-
rogation claim and with respect to the defenses raised by
Respondents; Petitioners raised judicial estoppel in the mo-
tion for partial summary judgment only to counter Respon-
dents’ “estoppel defense[.]” Petitioners also raised judicial
estoppel in opposition to Respondents’ motion for judicial
decision or for summary judgment. Under these circum-
stances, we conclude that the abuse of discretion standard,
applicable where a trial court denies summary judgment, does
not apply in this case. Rather, as with a trial court’s grant of
summary judgment or ruling on a legal issue, we determine
that Judge Glass’s decision that judicial estoppel did not apply
was a legal determination that was based on applying the law
to the facts of the case and, accordingly, is reviewed without
deference,

Law

Judicial Estoppel

HMM As we stated at the outset, judicial estoppel is “a
principle that precludes a party from taking a position in a
subsequent action inconsistent with a position taken by him or
her in a previous action.” Dashiell, 396 Md. at 170, 918 A.2d at
22 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[J]udicial
estoppel applies when it becomes necessary to protect the
integrity of the judicial system from one party who is attempt-
ing to gain an unfair advantage over another party by manipu-
lating the court system.” Id. at 171, 918 A2d at 23. In
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Berrett, 395 Md. 489, 462, 910 A.2d
1072, 1086 (2006), this Court elaborated on the historical
context of judicial estoppel, stating:

Maryland has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel by

admission, derived from the rule laid down by the English

Court of Exchequer ... that a man shall not be allowed to

blow hot and cold, to claim at one time and deny at

another.... [W]e adopted the statement of that principle[:]

Generally speaking, a party will not be permitted to main-

tain inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to

a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with,
one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or
was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and anoth-
er will be prejudiced by his action.
(Citations, paragraph break, and internal quotation marks
omitted). And, in Underwood-Gary v. Mathews, 366 Md. 660,
667 n.6, 785 A.2d 708, 712 n.6 (2001), this Court noted that
“(jjudicial estoppel has been defined as a principle that pre-
cludes a party from taking a position in a subsequent action
[that is] inconsistent with a position taken by him or her in a
previous action.” (Citation omitted). In other words, judicial
estoppel applies where a party takes a position in subsequent
litigation that is inconsistent with one that the party took in
previous litigation, not where a party takes an inconsistent
position within the same litigation.
The three circumstances that must exist for judicial estoppel
to apply are as follows:
(1) one of the parties takes a [] position that is inconsis-
tent with a position it took in previous litigation, (2) the
previous inconsistent position was accepted by a court, and
(8) the party who is maintaining the inconsistent positions
must have intentionally misled the court in order to gain an
unfair advantage.
Dashiell, 396 Md. at 171, 913 A.2d at 22 (citation omitted). As
to the first circumstance, both this Court and the Court of
Special Appeals have stated that judicial estoppel applies
where a party takes inconsistent factual or legal positions; i¢.,
the application of judicial estoppel is not limited to situations
where a party takes inconsistent factual positions only. For
example, recently, in Lillian C, Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwa-
ter Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 297-99, 173 A.3d 549, 2017
WL 5507725, *12 (2017), this Court recited the three cireum-
stances that are necessary for judicial estoppel to be applica-
ble, including that “one of the parties takes a position that is
inconsistent with a position it took in previous litigation[.]”
(Citation and brackets omitted) In other words, this Court did
not state that judicial estoppel does not apply where a party

takes inconsistent legal positions, or otherwise limit judicial
estoppel to situations where a party takes inconsistent factual
positions only.

In Dynacorp Ltd. v. Aramtel Ltd., 208 Md.App. 403, 472, 56
A.8d 631, 672 (2012), cert. denied, 480 Md. 645, 62 A.3d 731
(2013), the Court of Special Appeals specifically stated that
judicial estoppel applies where a “party took an inconsistent
position—either legal or factual—in an earlier litigation[.]”
(Citation omitted). In that case, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded, upon de novo review, that the appellants were
judicially estopped from contending that the appellees were
prohibited from bringing derivative counterclaims on a compa-
ny’s behalf where, in earlier litigation, the appellants had
contended that the appellees were required to bring derivative
claims, not direct claims, on the company’s behalf. See id. at
471-72, 56 A.3d at 671-72. And, in Chaney Enters. Ltd. P’ship
vy. Windsor, 158 Md.App. 1, 39, 854 A.2d 283, 255 (2004), the
Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Workers’ Com-
pensation Commission “correctly found that Chaney’s belated
assertion of a special employer claim was barred under the
doctrine of estoppel; its use of the term ‘estoppel’ encom-
passed judicial estoppel.” (Footnote omitted). The Court of
Special Appeals explained that Chaney’s “belated attempt ...
to characterize Genstar as a special or joint employer repre-
sents the assertion of a legal position inconsistent with one
previously advanced in a legal proceeding.” Id. at 43, 854 A.2d
at 257.

In Kramer y. Globe Brewing Co., 175 Md. 461, 464-65, 471,
2 A.2d 634, 635, 638 (1938), this Court held that Globe Brewing
Company was judicially estopped from taking the position in a
workers’ compensation case that Elmer Kramer (“Kramer”)
was not its employee where, in an earlier tort action, it had
taken the position that Kramer was its employee, which
caused Kramer to dismiss the tort action. In that case, Kram-
er was injured when a beer delivery truck, in which he had
been riding as an assistant, overturned, See id. at 462-63, 2
A.2d at 634. Kramer apparently had been hired by the driver,
who had acted without Globe Brewing’s authority, and had

been paid by the driver. See id. at 468, 2 A.2d at 684, Kramer
brought a tort action against Globe Brewing and the driver,
and Globe Brewing raised in a special plea the defense of
workers’ compensation exclusivity and averred in an amended
special plea that Kramer was its employee at the time of the
accident. See id. at 463-65, 2 A.2d at 635. Kramer then
voluntarily dismissed the tort action without prejudice and
sought workers’ compensation. See id. at 465, 2 A.2d at 635,
The agency that is now the Workers’ Compensation Commis-
sion denied Kramer’s claim, and the trial court affirmed the
denial. See id, at 465-66, 2 A.2d at 635-36,

In Kramer, id, at 469, 2 A.2d at 687, we explained the
rationale underlying judicial estoppel, stating:
If parties in Court were permitted to assume inconsistent
positions in the trial of their causes, the usefulness of courts
of justice would in most cases be paralyzed; the coercive
process of the law, available only between those who con-
sented to its exercise, could be set at naught by all. But the
rights of all [people], honest and dishonest, are in the
keeping of the courts, and consistency of proceeding is
therefore required of all those who come or are brought
before them. It may accordingly be laid down as a broad
proposition that one who, without mistake induced by the
opposite party, has taken a particular position deliberately
in the course of litigation, must act consistently with it; one
cannot play fast and loose.
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Applying
that principle, this Court observed that there could “be no
doubt” that the filing of the special plea in the tort action “was
the sole reason for the dismissal of the former suit at the sole
expense of” Kramer, Id. at 469~70, 2 A.2d at 687. We observed
that the filing of a special plea by an employer effectively bars
a claimant from redress in a tort action, thereby leaving the
claimant with the option of filing a claim with what is now the
Workers’ Compensation Commission. See id. at 470, 2 A.2d at
638, Accordingly, we concluded that Kramer “was justified in
taking the action which he did take in dismissing” the tort
action, and explained:

[I]t would, in our opinion, be an injustice to him in the
present suit, to permit [Globe Brewing] after having availed
itself of an affirmative defense in the prior suit, to appear in
a subsequent proceeding involving the same matter of con-
troversy between the same parties, and deny the facts
asserted by it, or on its behalf, in the special plea.

Id, at 471, 2 A.2d at 638.

Standing and Privity

In State Ctr, LLC vy. Lexington Charles Ltd,
P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 502, 92 A.3d 400, 429-80 (2014), this Court
explained that Maryland has adopted a “ ‘cause-of-action’ ap-
proach” to standing, “which groups the traditionally distinct
concepts of standing and cause of action into a single analyt-
ical construct, labeled as ‘standing,’ to determine whether the
plaintiff has shown that he or she is entitled to invoke the
judicial process in a particular instance.” (Citations, footnote,
and some internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
G & C Gulf, Inc, 442 Md. 716, 720 n.2, 114 A.Bd 694, 696 n.2
(2015) (“Standing refers to whether the plaintiff has shown
that he or she is entitled to invoke the judicial process in a
particular instance.” (Citation, brackets, and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Indeed, “[o]ne requirement of justiciability is
that the plaintiff have standing in the sense that the person is
entitled to invoke the judicial process in a particular instance.”
Adams v. Manown, 328 Md. 468, 480, 615 A.2d 611, 619 (1992)
(citation omitted). Put simply, “[a] litigant must have standing
to maintain a judicial action.” Long Green Valley Ass’n v.
Bellevale Farms, Inc., 482 Md. 292, 318, 68 A.8d 848, 855
(2018) (citation omitted).

HH Privity is defined as “[t]he connection or relationship
between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest
in the same subject matter (such as a transaction, proceeding,
or piece of property); mutuality of interest[.]” Privity, Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Privity is required for the
application of both res judicata and collateral estoppel. See
Warner v. German, 100 Md.App. 512, 519-20, 642 A.2d 239,
243 (1994) (“One element [that] both [the doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel] share, however, is the com-
mon requirement of privity. For either doctrine to apply, the
second action must be between the same parties or those in
privity with them.” (Citations, brackets, and internal quotation
marks omitted),

HE For purposes of collateral estoppel, an analysis of
privity “focuses on whether the interests of the party against
whom estoppel is sought were fully represented, with the
same incentives, by another party in the prior matter.” Math-
ews v. Cassidy Turley Md., Inc., 435 Md. 584, 628, 80 A.3d 269,
294 (2018) (citations omitted). In Mathews, id. at 627-28, 80
A.3d at 294, the petitioner argued that the respondent was
“pound by the facts asserted in [a] bankruptcy report on the
basis of collateral estoppel because” the respondent was a
privy of a company that had declared bankruptcy. This Court
rejected that argument and explained:

[The petitioner] has not alleged that [the respondent]
shared an identity of interests with [the company] in con-
nection with the [company’s] bankruptcy proceeding. In-
deed, we do not know from the record before us what
relationship [the respondent] had to the bankrupt estate—
whether as a creditor or otherwise. It is not self-evident that
whatever contractual relationship existed between [the com-
pany] and [the respondent] in connection with the market-
ing and sale of [tenants in common] interests established
the necessary identity of interests to bind [the respondent]
by collateral estoppel as to determinations made in the
[company’s] bankruptcy proceeding.

Td, at 628, 80 A.8d at 294, Similarly, in Warner, 100 Md.App.
at 520-21, 642 A.2d at 248, the Court of Special Appeals stated
that an analysis of privity for purposes of collateral estoppel
involves examination of “the procedural rights of the party
against whom the doctrine is to be invoked[,]” and “[iln
discerning whether a party’s procedural rights have been
addressed adequately, a court may focus on the nature of the
interests binding the two parties, and, correspondingly, wheth-

er they share the same incentive in their separate litigation
attempts.” (Citations omitted).

HM For purposes of res judicata, privity “generally in-
volves a person so identified in interest with another that [the
person] represents the same legal right.” FWB Bank y. Rich-
man, 354 Md. 472, 498, 731 A.2d 916, 930 (1999) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In Ugast _v. La Fontaine,
189 Md. 227, 232-38, 55 A.2d 705, 708 (1947), this Court
explained when nonparties in a prior lawsuit are in privity
with a party in that lawsuit for purposes of res judicata,
stating:

It is well established that a judgment may not be pleaded as

res judicata by strangers to the action in which it was

rendered, but it may be pleaded only the parties to the
action and their privies. Generally, the parties to a suit are
those persons who are entered as parties of record. But for
the purpose of the application of the rule of res judicata, the
term ‘parties’ includes all persons who have a direct interest
in the subject matter of the suit, and have a right to control
the proceedings, make defense, examine the witnesses, and
appeal if an appeal lies. So, where persons, although not
formal parties of record, have a direct interest in the suit,
and in the advancement of their interest take open and
substantial control of its prosecution, or they are so far
represented by another that their interests receive actual
and efficient protection, any judgment recovered therein is
conclusive upon them to the same extent as if they had been
formal parties.

(Citations omitted).

Analysis

Here, we hold that the prerequisites that must exist before
judicial estoppel may be applied are not satisfied, and, as such,
Judge Glass properly declined to apply judicial estoppel to bar
Respondents’ argument that Petitioners are in privity with
First Horizon. Stated otherwise, because the three circum-
stances that must be fulfilled for the application of judicial
estoppel are not established, Judge Glass properly ruled that

Respondents’ privity argument was not barred by judicial
estoppel. In our view, Respondents’ position with respect to
privity in this case is not inconsistent with their position with
respect to standing in the First Horizon litigation, as standing
and privity do not give rise to mutually exclusive arguments,
but instead are two separate concepts.

HSAs to the first circumstance that must be present
before judicial estoppel may be applied—that a party “takes a
position that is inconsistent with a position [that it] it took in
previous litigation,” Dashiell, 896 Md. at 171, 918 A.2d at 22—
we conclude that Respondents’ positions on standing in the
First Horizon litigation and privity in the current litigation are
not inconsistent. Indeed, standing and privity are two distinct
concepts. Standing concerns whether a “plaintiff has shown
that he or she is entitled to invoke the judicial process in a
particular instance[.]” State Ctr., 488 Md. at 502, 92 A.8d at
480 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
By contrast, privity concerns “[t]he connection or relationship
between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest
in the same subject matter[.]” Privity, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014). In other words, standing concerns a party’s
ability to bring a lawsuit, whereas privity concerns the rela-
tionship between two parties. Standing and privity are two
distinct concepts, and they do not give rise to mutually exclu-
sive arguments, such that a party may make an argument only
as to standing or privity, but not as to both. A trial court’s
ruling that a party lacks standing does not preclude a party in
a subsequent lawsuit from being in privity with the party that
was found to lack standing; as such, it does not follow that,
because a party lacked standing, another party in a subse-
quent lawsuit would be precluded from arguing that the
opposing party is in privity with the party that lacked stand-
ing.

In the First Horizon litigation, Respondents’ argument with
respect to standing was two-fold. In large part, Respondents
argued that First Horizon—the party that brought the lawsuit
as lender and owner of the refinance mortgage loan—was not

the proper party to bring the lawsuit because it lacked stand-
ing, as it did not own the refinance mortgage loan, and coul
not sue in its own name and on its own behalf for reformation
of the refinance Deed of Trust. Respondents also argued that
First Horizon could not maintain the litigation in its own name
because, absent Schedule I of the PSA, First Horizon could
not demonstrate that the PSA even applied to the refinance
mortgage loan. In this litigation, Respondents have argue
that Petitioners—the parties that brought the second law-
suit—are barred under res judicata and collateral estoppe'
from bringing the second lawsuit because they were in privity
with First Horizon. Respondents contended that BNYM ha
the same protected, direct interest in the First Horizon litiga-
tion as First Horizon, that BNYM was First Horizon’s succes-
sor-in-interest, and that Old Republic completely controlled
the prosecution of the First Horizon litigation.

HM Respondents’ arguments on standing in the First
Horizon litigation and privity in the current litigation are
plainly not inconsistent. First Horizon’s procedural inability to
bring the First Horizon litigation in its own name and on its
own behalf—ie., First Horizon’s lack of standing—is of no
consequence to the issue of whether there is a relationship,
and ultimately privity, among First Horizon, BNYM, and Old
Republic, such that BNYM and Old Republic are precluded
from bringing the second lawsuit. Put simply, standing and
privity are two different concepts, and Respondents’ argu-
ments on those matters are not inconsistent or otherwise
contrary. Clearly, Respondents did not take a position with
respect to privity in the First Horizon litigation that is con-
trary to the one that they are taking in this litigation. Indeed,
privity was not even at issue in the First Horizon litigation
because there was no litigation prior to that lawsuit. Privity,
and the relationship between parties, for purposes of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, obviously becomes relevant
only where there are two or more lawsuits.®

6. We agree with Petitioners, however, that Respondents’ positions on
standing and privity are legal, not factual, positions, and that judicial

HH Before addressing the other two prerequisites of judi-
cial estoppel, we pause to consider whether Petitioners are in
privity with First Horizon for purposes of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, and we determine that they are. As to
BNYM, the record demonstrates that, at the time of trial in
the First Horizon litigation, First Horizon was the master
servicer of the refinance mortgage loan, but BNYM both
actually owned the refinance mortgage loan, and, under the
PSA, was the successor-in-interest to First Horizon, which
owned the refinance mortgage loan before BNYM. Indeed,
both BNYM and First Horizon were parties to the PSA, and
First Horizon was obligated under the PSA to service and
administer the refinance mortgage loan, and to take any
necessary action in connection with servicing and administer-
ing the refinance mortgage loan. BNYM thus had a direct
interest in the First Horizon litigation, and its interest was
adequately protected by First Horizon’s prosecution of the
First Horizon litigation. See Ugast, 189 Md. at 232-88, 55 A.2d
at 708 (“[W]here persons, although not formal parties of
record, have a direct interest in the suit, and ... they are so
far represented by another that their interests receive actual
and efficient protection, any judgment recovered therein is
conclusive upon them to the same extent as if they had been
formal parties.” (Citations omitted)). Indeed, under the cir-
cumstances set forth above, BNYM and First Horizon were
“so identified in interest with [one] another” that they could be
said to share “the same legal right.” FWB Bank, 354 Md. at.
498, 781 A.2d at 930 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). And, given the relationship between the two entities

estoppel is applicable where a party takes either inconsistent legal or
factual positions. As discussed, standing and privity are distinct legal
concepts concerning, respectively, whether a party is entitled to invoke
the judicial process and whether the relationship between parties is
such that res judicata and collateral estoppel may be applied. And,
Maryland appellate courts have stated that judicial estoppel applies
where a party took an inconsistent legal or factual position in an earlier
litigation, See Lillian C. Blentlinger, 456 Md, at 297-99, 173 A.3d 549,
2017 WL 5507725, at *12; Dynacorp, 208 Md.App. at 472, 56 A.3d at
672; Chaney, 158 Md.App. at 39, 854 A.2d at 255.

with respect to the PSA, with certainty, BNYM’s interests
were “fully represented, with the same incentives, by” First
Horizon in the First Horizon litigation. Mathews, 485 Md. at

+ 628, 80 A.8d at 294 (citation omitted), In sum, BNYM is in
privity with First Horizon because it had a direct interest in
First Horizon litigation, it had the same interests in that case
as First Horizon, and its interests were protected by First
Horizon’s prosecution of litigation.

HH As to Old Republic, the record demonstrates that Old
Republic issued the Policy insuring that the refinance mort-
gage loan would be secured by a first lien against the Proper-
ty, and protecting First Horizon against any issues that could
occur during the execution of the mortgage, and that the
Policy extended to First Horizon and First Horizon’s succes-
sors and/or assigns. Additionally, significantly, the record
demonstrates that Old Republic controlled the prosecution of
the First Horizon litigation—it selected and retained Faller to
file the lawsuit; it paid Faller for costs, expenses, and attor-
ney’s fees related to the First Horizon litigation; it regularly
communicated with Faller; and it discussed and approved
litigation strategy, selected trial witnesses, named the plaintiff
in the case as First Horizon, and decided whether to appeal
the cireuit court’s rulings. Clearly, Old Republic and First
Horizon “share[d] the same incentive in their separate litiga-
tion attempts[,]” Warner, 100 Md.App. at 521, 642 A.2d at 248
(citation omitted). And, Old Republic had “a direct interest in
the [First Horizon litigation], and in the advancement of th[at]
interest t[ook] open and substantial control of its prosecu-
tion[,]” Ugast, 189 Md. at 282-88, 55 A.2d at 708 (citations
omitted). Like BNYM, Old Republic is in privity with First
Horizon for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Now, returning to the circumstances that must exist for
judicial estoppel to be applicable, we examine the second
prerequisite—that “the previous inconsistent position was ac-
cepted by a court[.]” Dashiell, 396 Md. at 171, 918 A.2d at 22
(citation omitted), and we conclude that this prerequisite is not
established. To be sure, Judge Alexander certainly accepted

Respondents’ position on standing. Indeed, when pressed for a
ruling on standing, Judge Alexander ruled that First Horizon
lacked standing, stating that Schedule I of the PSA was not
included, that there was no identification of the refinance
mortgage loan being subject to the PSA, and that First
Horizon was not the owner of the refinance mortgage loan and
had failed to bring the case in a representative capacity. But,
because Respondents’ position on standing is not the same as
its position on privity, the second prerequisite for the applica-
tion of judicial estoppel is not established. Put simply, there
‘was no previous inconsistent position,

Hl Finally, there is no evidence in the record to support
a conclusion that Respondents maintained inconsistent posi-
tions to intentionally mislead either Judge Alexander or Judge
Glass to gain an unfair advantage. See Dashi at 171, 913
A.2d at 22 (The third circumstance that must for judicial
estoppel to apply is that “the party who is maintaining the
inconsistent positions must have intentionally misled the court
in order to gain an unfair advantage.” (Citation omitted)). To
state the obvious, we have concluded that Respondents have
not maintained inconsistent positions. In any event, in both the
First Horizon litigation and this litigation, Respondents have
been transparent with their arguments on standing and privi-
ty; ie, Respondents have not attempted to hide the respec-
tive arguments as to standing or privity. The record simply
does not contain any evidence of an intent to mislead Judge
Glass in the current litigation, whether to gain an unfair
advantage or otherwise. To that point, Judge Glass certainly
never found that Respondents intended to mislead her, and, to
the contrary, in actuality, ruled that Petitioners could not
show that Respondents “ever intended to mislead the [c]ourt.”
This case’s circumstances are very different from those of
Kramer, 175 Md. at 468-65, 2 A.2d at 685, in which Globe
Brewing averred that Kramer was its employee at the time of
the accident, thereby inducing Kramer to dismiss the tort
action, and later took the position in the workers’ compensa-
tion case that Kramer was not its employee at the time of the
accident. In Kramer, clearly, Globe Brewing sought to gain an

unfair advantage by taking directly inconsistent positions. The
same simply cannot be said about the circumstances of this
case,

In sum, we conclude that the three prerequisites for the
application of judicial estoppel are not established, that Judge
Glass did not err in declining to apply judicial estoppel given
the circumstances of this case, and that Respondents were not
barred from presenting their argument as to privity.

Il. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The Parties’ Contentions

Petitioners contend that Judge Alexander's ruling in the
First Horizon litigation that First Horizon lacked standing is
not a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata
or collateral estoppel, and that neither doctrine applies. Peti-
tioners argue that Maryland courts have held that a ruling on
standing is not a final judgment on the merits for purposes of
res judicata or collateral estoppel. Petitioners assert that
dismissal of a case on the basis of lack of standing does not
have preclusive effect for purposes of either res judicata or
collateral estoppel. Petitioners maintain that Judge Alexan-
der’s ruling on the merits was a contingent ruling, and not a
separate and independent ruling on the merits, and, as such,
the ruling on the merits was not a final judgment and has no
preclusive effect.

Respondents counter that Judge Alexander’s ruling on the
issue of mutual mistake, ie, the merits, is a final judgment
that has preclusive effect for purposes of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Respondents contend that Judge Alexan-
der’s ruling on standing—specifically the ruling that First
Horizon failed to prove that the PSA applied to the refinance
mortgage loan—was also a final judgment on the merits of
that issue, and has preclusive effect as to that issue, such that
Petitioners, who are in privity with First Horizon, are barred
from relitigating the issue in this case. Respondents argue
that Judge Glass properly determined that Judge Alexander’s
rulings were alternative, and not contingent, rulings, constitut-

ed final judgments, and that both rulings have preclusive
effect and bar this litigation.

In a reply brief, Petitioners contend that Judge Alexander’s
ruling on the merits was expressly contingent on reversal of
his ruling on standing, which did not occur, and that, as such,
Judge Alexander’s ruling on the merits was a contingent
ruling and not a final judgment that has preclusive effect.

Standard of Review

In Crise v. Md. Gen, Hosp., Inc., 212 Md.App. 492, 519-20,
69 A.3d 586, 552 (2018), the Court of Special Appeals explained
that the appropriate standard of review for a trial court’s
decision under Maryland Rule 2-502 is as follows:

[A trial] court decision under [Maryland] Rule 2-502, on a

discrete issue that is solely within the court’s province, is

essentially a trial by the court on the merits of that issue.

The court may hear evidence and make factual findings

necessary to its decision of the discrete issue that is within

its province to decide. Therefore, the court’s decision on the

issue is reviewed on appeal under [Maryland] Rule 8-131(c).
(Citations omitted). In turn, Maryland Rule 8-181(c) provides:

When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate

court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.

It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the

evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard

to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.

HI We review without deference, however, questions of
law, such as a determination as to the applicability of the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See, e.g.
Garrity v. Md. State Bd. of Plumbing, 447 Md. 359, 368, 135
A.8d 452, 458 (2016) (“Whether it was appropriate to grant
preclusive effect[, i.¢., the doctrine of collateral estoppell[,] to
the [Consumer Protection Divisions Final Order ... is a
legal conclusion that this Court reviews de novo.” (Citation
omitted)); Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 406 Md. 469, 502, 959 A.2d
1147, 1166 (2008) (“The deference shown to the trial court’s

factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard [of
Maryland Rule 8-131(¢)] does not, of course, apply to legal
conclusions.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Seminary Galleria, LLC v. Dulaney Valley Imp. Ass’n, Inc.,
192 Md.App. 719, 734, 995 A.2d 1068, 1077 (2010) (“We agree
... that the issue of whether res judicata applies to [a case] is
a question of law, and that it was proper for the [trial] court—
and it is appropriate for this Court—to review the legal
conclusion of the Board de novo.”); Bender v. Schwartz, 172
Md. App. 648, 664, 917 A.2d 142, 151 (2007) (“A decision under
[Maryland] Rule 2-502 is a trial on the merits, with respect to
the issues decided. Thus, as in all actions tried without a jury,
we shall review questions of law de novo and shall not set
aside the [trial] court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Law

HI In Powell, 480 Md. at 68-64, 59 A.8d at 587-88, this
Court described the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclu-
sion, as well as the circumstances that must be present for the
doctrine to apply, stating:

Res judicata is an affirmative defense that precludes the
same parties from relitigating any suit based upon the same
cause of action because the second suit involves a judgment
that is conclusive, not only as to all matters that have been
decided in the original suit, but as to all matters which with
propriety could have been litigated in the first suit.

In Maryland, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the
relitigation of a suit if (1) the parties in the present litigation
are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier
action; (2) the claim in the current action is identical to the
one determined in the prior adjudication; and (8) there was
a final judgment on the merits in the previous action.

(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In Colan-
drea, 361 Md. at 388, 761 A.2d at 908, we explained that, “if a
proceeding between parties involves the same cause of action
as a previous proceeding between the same parties, the princi-
ple of res judicata applies and all matters actually litigated or

that could have been litigated are conclusive in the subsequent
proceeding.” (Citations omitted). Indeed,
a judgment between the same parties and their privies is a
final bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action and
is conclusive, not only as to all matters decided in the
original suit, but also as to matters that could have been
litigated in the original suit.
Id. at 392, 761 A.2d at 910 (citations and emphasis omitted).
HMMs In Colandrea, id. at 387, 761 A2d at 907, this
Court also described collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
stating: “[W]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the deter-
mination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether
on the same or a different claim.” (Citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). For the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel to apply, the following four-part test must be satisfied:
1, Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical
with the one presented in the action in question?
2, Was there a final judgment on the merits?
8. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
4, Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a
fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?
Id, at 391, 761 A.2d at 909 (citation omitted). “If a proceeding
between parties does not involve the same cause of action as a,
previous proceeding between the same parties, the principle of
collateral estoppel applies, and only those facts or issues
actually litigated in the previous action are conclusive in the
subsequent proceeding.” Id. at 888, 761 A.2d at 908 (citations
omitted). Thus, when collateral estoppel applies, “facts or
issues decided in the previous action are conclusive only if
identical to facts or issues presented in the subsequent pro-
ceeding.” Id. at 388-89, 761 A.2d at 908 (citation omitted).
Stated otherwise, “collateral estoppel may be invoked when in
a second suit between the same parties, even if the cause of
action is different, any determination of fact that was actually

litigated and was essential to a valid and final judgment is
conclusive.” Shader v. Hampton Imp. Ass’n, Inc, 448 Md. 148,
161-62, 115 A8d 185, 193 (2015) (citation, emphasis, and
internal quotation marks omitted).

HM Generally speaking, for a trial court’s ruling to consti-
tute a final judgment, the ruling “must, among other things,
be an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controver-
sy.” Addison v, Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC, 411 Md. 251,
262, 983 A.2d 188, 145 (2009) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). In FWB Bank, 354 Md. at 492-98, 781 A.2d at
927-28, we elaborated on what constitutes a final judgment for
purposes of res judicata, explaining:

The basic rule of claim preclusion in this context is not
difficult: “A valid and final personal judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff
on the same claim.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 19 (1982)....

When an earlier court has actually ruled on the matter
sought to be litigated in a second court, the “same claim”
analysis is usually straightforward.... It has long been
established that a judgment between the same parties or
their privies upon the same cause of action is conclusive not
only as to all matters that have been decided in the original
suit, but as to all matters which with propriety could have
been litigated in the first suit. In dealing with that issue, we
have adopted the “transactional” approach set forth in § 24
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS:
“When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action
extinguishes the plaintiffs claim pursuant to the rules of
merger or bar ... the claim extinguished includes all rights
of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” In
deciding whether a factual grouping constitutes a “transac-
tion,” the RESTATEMENT directs a pragmatic approach,
“giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin or motivation, whether
they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treat-

ment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or
business understanding or usage.” RESTATEMENT, su-
pra, § 24(2),
(Some citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (ast
ellipsis in original).

Analysis

HI Here, we hold that Judge Alexander's rulings on the
merits and standing in the First Horizon litigation were not
contingent rulings, but rather were independent, alternative
rulings, and, as such, the ruling on the merits constitutes a
final judgment for purposes of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. We conclude that Judge Glass properly determined
that all of the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel
were satisfied, including the final judgment element, and, thus,
Petitioners were barred from bringing the claims in the
second lawsuit. Stated otherwise, the prerequisites for applica-
tion of res judicata and collateral estoppel have been estab-
lished, and Judge Alexander's ruling on the merits has preclu-
sive effect in the second lawsuit.

HM As an initial matter, we note that, on brief in this
Court, Petitioners focus on the final judgment element of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. In other words, Petitioners do
not appear to take issue with Judge Glass’s determination that
the other elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
satisfied. Thus, we, too, focus on the final judgment element.
As explained, for both res judicata or collateral estoppel to
apply, there must be a final judgment on the merits. See
Powell, 430 Md. at 63-64, 59 A.3d at 538 (“In Maryland, the
doctrine of res judicata precludes the relitigation of a suit if
... (8) there was a final judgment on the merits in the
previous action.” (Citation omitted)); Colandrea, 361 Md. at
391, 761 A.2d at 909 (For collateral estoppel to apply, one part
of a four-part test that must be satisfied is the existence of “a
final judgment on the merits[.]” (Citation omitted)).

As stated, we hold that Judge Alexander’s ruling on the
merits of the First Horizon litigation was an independent,

alternative ruling that constitutes a final judgment for pur-
poses of res judicata and collateral estoppel; i.¢., the ruling on
the merits was not a contingent ruling having no force or
effect. Our determination is supported by the record, which
reveals the following case-specific, unique sequence of events
in the First Horizon litigation. At the start of trial, Judge
Alexander denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss the amend-
ed complaint, but struck the correction to caption, treating it
as a motion to amend or substitute the plaintiff. Respondents’
counsel moved to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment, on the ground that First Horizon lacked
standing. Judge Alexander reserved ruling on the motion for
summary judgment, and allowed the case to proceed to trial.
On the second day of trial, Judge Alexander heard argument.
as to the admissibility of the PSA, and Respondents’ counsel
argued that First Horizon lacked of standing. In relevant part,
First Horizon’s counsel responded that First Horizon was
authorized to bring the action in its own name, and stated that
he hoped that Judge Alexander “would be inclined to try to
resolve this case on its merits.” Judge Alexander ultimately
admitted the PSA into evidence,

First Horizon rested and Respondents’ counsel orally moved
for judgment, arguing that First Horizon lacked standing, and
had failed to produce evidence demonstrating a mistake of fact
by Susan. After hearing argument from the parties, Judge
Alexander granted the motion for judgment based on the
merits of the case, not a lack of standing. Specifically, Judge
Alexander ruled that First Horizon had failed to produce
evidence showing a mutual mistake of fact.

Although the First Horizon litigation could have concluded
at that time, First Horizon’s counsel asked Judge Alexander
to clarify, in relevant part, whether Judge Alexander found
“that there was sufficient standing established to allow th[e]
case to be heard on the merits[.]” In response, Judge Alexan-
der ruled that First Horizon lacked standing. First Horizon’s
counsel responded that if First Horizon lacked standing, “then
there is no ability to go forward on any claims” and “there is
no case to go forward.” At that point, Respondents’ counsel

suggested that Judge Alexander issue alternative rulings as to
the merits and standing.

Significantly, Respondents’ counsel made the following sug-
gestion to Judge Alexander:

Grant the motion for judgment because you have heard the

evidence, you have considered the merits and the rulings on

the merits are in the alternative. So even if they had
standing, because that way the issue would be ripe so that
the [circuit clourt’s efforts in this court in hearing what they
have asked you to hear, if the [circuit clourt were to review
it, they can consider all of the issues,
And after Judge Alexander asked Respondents’ counsel
whether he had an objection to a ruling that there was
standing, Respondents’ counsel replied:

No, I actually say in the alternative. So you can have the

ruling that if the [circuit clourt could say even if there was

standing, I have considered the presentation of evidence as
if there was standing to, for judicial economy, so that we
don’t have to have a whole new trial.

Without objection from First Horizon’s counsel to the re-
quest that alternative rulings should be issued to avoid “a
whole new trial[,]” Judge Alexander accepted that suggestion
and orally issued alternative rulings on standing and the
merits, stating: “That sounds appropriate. I will say that I do
not find that they had standing, however, in the alternative, I
do not find that [First Horizon] has met its burden of produc-
tion to have the case go forward based on the evidence for the
reasons previously stated.” The trial recessed immediately
thereafter. Later, consistent with his oral ruling, Judge Alex-
ander issued an order granting judgment in Respondents’
favor, stating, in relevant part,

Trial having taken place in this matter on April [28 and]

24, 2012, [First Horizon] having concluded the presentation

of its case, this Court finds that [First Horizon] does not

have standing to bring th[e] action against [Respondent]s,

In the alternative, this Court finds that even if [First

Horizon] had standing to pursue thfe] action, the evidence

which [First Horizon] presented was insufficient to meet its
burden of production.

The record unmistakably demonstrates that Judge Alexan-
der’s ruling on the merits of the case was the initial ruling,
that the ruling on standing followed, and that the two rulings
were then reiterated and expressed as “alternative” rulings in
response to a request that the rulings be issued as such to
avoid the need for a new trial. Judge Alexander’s ruling on the
merits, in which he found that First Horizon had not produced
evidence showing that Susan had made a mistake of fact, was
made after First Horizon presented its case-in-chief and rest-
ed, after Respondents’ counsel moved for judgment on both
standing and the merits, and before any request for a ruling
on standing, and, thus, clearly was not contingent on his later
ruling on standing. Indeed, it is evident from the trial tran-
script that the ruling on the merits was intended to be a final
judgment on the merits, both at the time that Judge Alexan-
der initially issued the ruling without addressing standing, and
at the time that Judge Alexander reiterated the ruling in
response to Respondents’ counsel’s request for a ruling “so
that we don’t have to have a whole new trial.” Notably, it was
only after being prompted by First Horizon’s counsel that
Judge Alexander issued a ruling on standing. Moreover, when
Judge Alexander reiterated the two rulings, both orally and in
a later-issued order, the two rulings were expressed said to be
“alternative” rulings, not contingent rulings, The sequence of
the rulings in the First Horizon litigation and Judge Alexan-
der’s discussion with counsel demonstrates that the ruling on
the merits was intended to be an independent, alternative
ruling that constitutes a final judgment for purposes of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.”

7. At oral argument, Petitioners’ counsel argued that, once Judge Alex-
ander ruled on standing, the ruling on the merits could have no force or
effect. In our view, however, this argument misses the mark because it
glosses over the circumstances that the ruling on the merits was the
initial ruling and that the ruling on the merits was an independent
ruling intended to be a final judgment.

Given the sequence of events that occurred with respect to
the issuance of the rulings in the First Horizon litigation, we
find unpersuasive federal case law stating that dismissal of a
case on the basis of lack of standing does not have preclusive
effect for res judicata or collateral estoppel. To be sure,
Petitioners are correct that federal case law supports the
conclusion that dismissal of a case for lack of standing or on
other jurisdictional grounds is not a final judgment for pur-
poses of res judicata or collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Perry v.
Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 318 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A judgment on
the merits precludes relitigation of any ground within the
compass of the suit, while a jurisdictional dismissal precludes
only relitigation of the ground of that dismissal[.] ... The
determination that Perry lacked standing in [the first lawsuit]
precludes relitigation of the same standing argument in [the
second lawsuit].” (Citation, brackets, and internal quotation
marks omitted); Gillig v. Nike, Inc, 602 F.8d 1354, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“To the extent that the dismissal in the
original action was for lack of standing, there is no res
judicata bar to a second action by a party with proper
standing, but only a bar to another action by the same party
alleging the same basis for standing[.J” (Citation omitted)).

However, Petitioners fail to account for the circumstance
that this case does not involve a ruling on standing alone, or
even a primary ruling on standing with a secondary or contin-
gent ruling on the merits. As the record demonstrates, here,
Judge Alexander's primary ruling was as to the merits of the
case; it was a decisive and comprehensive ruling addressing
the heart of the merits—i.e., lack of mutual mistake—and the
case could have ended at that point. So, although federal case
law indicates that, once a case is dismissed for lack of stand-
ing, then litigation of the action by a party with standing is not
barred, that case law is not persuasive under the circum-
stances of this case, in which the record reflects that Judge
Alexander’s ruling on the merits when issued was intended to
be the final ruling with respect to the case.

Similarly, we are not convinced that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments § 20 (1982) leads to a different result.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 20 provides:

(1) A personal judgment for the defendant, although valid

and final, does not bar another action by the plaintiff on the

same claim:

(a) When the judgment is one of dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for nonjoinder or mis-
joinder of parties;

(b) When the plaintiff agrees to or elects a nonsuit (or
voluntary dismissal) without prejudice or the court directs
that the plaintiff be nonsuited (or that the action be other-
wise dismissed) without prejudice; or

(ce) When by statute or rule of court the judgment does
not operate as a bar to another action on the same claim, or
does not so operate unless the court specifies, and no such
specification is made.

(2) A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant,

which rests on the prematurity of the action or on the

plaintiff's failure to satisfy a precondition to suit, does not
bar another action by the plaintiff instituted after the claim

has matured, or the precondition has been satisfied, unless a

second action is precluded by operation of the substantive

law.
Comment e, concerning “Alternative determinations,” pro-
vides, in pertinent part:

A dismissal may be based on two or more determinations,

each of which, standing alone, would render the judgment a

bar to another action on the same claim. In such a case the

judgment operates as a bar....

A dismissal may be based on two or more determinations, at

least one of which, standing alone, would not render the

judgment a bar to another action on the same claim. In such

a case, if the judgment is one rendered by a court of first

instance, it should not operate as a bar.

Notably, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 20 does
not address the circumstance of a trial court ruling on a

motion for judgment at the conclusion of the evidence in a
plaintiffs case, which is the circumstance here. Nor does the
Restatement specifically mention dismissal for lack of stand-
ing. Rather, the Restatement refers to dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, lack of joinder and improper
joinder, and a dismissal for plaintiff's failure to satisfy precon-
ditions that may later be satisfied. The Restatement concerns
circumstances where a trial court rules on a motion to dismiss,
not where a trial court conducts a trial with respect to the
merits of the case and rules on a motion for judgment at the
conclusion of the plaintiff's case after hearing evidence. The
Restatement does not establish that, where a trial court rules
on a motion for judgment at the conclusion of the plaintiff's
evidence, and later issues a ruling as to the plaintiff's stand-
ing, those rulings must be automatically contingent on one
another, such that a ruling on the merits cannot have preclu-
sive effect. Stated otherwise, nothing in the Restatement
addresses whether a ruling on the merits after a trial court
hears evidence in a case acts as a bar to another action on the
same claim where a trial court also later rules on standing;
instead, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 20 focuses
on whether final judgments in the form of dismissals act as a
bar to future actions by the plaintiff on the same claim.

Likewise, Petitioners’ reliance on Tower Oaks Blvd., LLC v,
Procida, 219 Md.App. 376, 100 A.8d 1255 (2014), cert. di
missed, 444 Md. 691, 121 A.3d 820 (2015), for the contention
that a contingent ruling is not a separate and independent
ruling on the merits and thus has no preclusive effect is
misplaced. In Tower Oaks, 219 Md.App. at 392, 100 A.3d at
1265, in addressing a motion to dismiss the appeal for moot-
ness, the Court of Special Appeals determined that a trial
court’s rulings in denying a motion to stay and dismiss were
contingent rulings, not separate and independent rulings, In
that case, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that.
the appellant “had not been authorized to take action to
defend itself in the second foreclosure action, making the
motion to stay and dismiss ineffective.” Id. at 392, 100 A.3d at
1265. The trial court “then went on to address the merits of

the motion to stay and dismiss, opining that if the motion to
stay and dismiss had been authorized, the wrongful conduct
[of another entity] ... would not eliminate [that entity's] right
to foreclose, as a matter of law or under the unclean hands
doctrine.” Id, at 392, 100 A.3d at 1265 (emphasis omitted), The
Court of Special Appeals determined that the rulings were not
separate and independent, explaining:

The court’s “ruling” about the merits of the motion to stay

and dismiss was not a separate and independent basis on

which it denied the motion. At most, it was a contingent
ruling. The court found that [the appellant] filed an unau-
thorized and therefore ineffective motion to stay and dis-
miss; the consequence of that finding is that any “ruling” on
the merits of the motion is immaterial. It is not a separate
basis for denying the motion, independent of the lack of
authority ruling. ... In neither situation are the two rulings
separate and independent and in neither situation has there
ceased to be a live controversy between the parties so that
the case has become moot.

Id. at 392-98, 100 A.3d at 1265.

Tower Oaks is distinguishable from this case in obvious
respects. Significantly, Tower Oaks did not involve res judica-
ta or collateral estoppel, let alone what constitutes a final
judgment for purposes of those doctrines. Nor did the case
involve a motion for judgment made at the end of a party’s
case-in-chief. Thus, Tower Oaks provides no guidance in deter-
mining whether Judge Alexander’s ruling on the merits is a
final judgment on the merits that has preclusive effect.

8. We also conclude that Petitioners’ reliance on Ullery v. Fulleton, 162
Wash.App. 596, 256 P.3d 406, 409 (2011) is without merit because, in
that case, the trial court ruled that a party lacked standing to sue, and
then “noted” that, even if he had standing, he had failed to produce
“sufficient evidence” as to the merits of the breach of contract claim, In
Ullery, id, at 411-12, the Court of Appeals of Washington stated that,
“Thjaving found that [the party] lacked standing, the trial court should
not have proceeded to the merits{,]” and that “prudential consider-
ations of justiciability prevent a judgment of dismissal based on lack of
standing from constituting a judgment on the merits,” In contrast to the
order of the rulings in Ullery, in the First Horizon litigation, Judge

Hl In sum, under the distinctive circumstances of this
case, we conclude that Judge Alexander’s ruling as to the
merits in the First Horizon litigation constitutes a final judg-
ment on the merits for purposes of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. Although Petitioners do not appear to take issue
with the determination that the other elements of res judicata
and collateral estoppel are satisfied, we shall nevertheless
briefly address these elements. In doing so, we conclude that
all of the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
established. To reiterate, the following three circumstances
must be present for the doctrine of res judicata to apply:

(1) the parties in the present litigation are the same or in

privity with the parties to the earlier action; (2) the claim in

the current action is identical to the one determined in the
prior adjudication; and (8) there was a final judgment on
the merits in the previous action.
Powell, 430 Md. at 63-64, 59 A.3d at 588 (citations omitted). As
to the first and third circumstances, as we have explained,
Petitioners are in privity with First Horizon and there was a
final judgment on the merits in the First Horizon litigation.

HM As to the second circumstance that is necessary for
the application of res judicata, in Colandrea, 861 Md. at 388,
761 A.2d at 908, we explained that, “if a proceeding between
parties involves the same cause of action as a previous pro-
ceeding between the same parties, the principle of res judicata
applies and all matters actually litigated or that could have
been litigated are conclusive in the subsequent proceeding.”
(Citations omitted). Here, the record unequivocally demon-
strates that the claims, or causes of action, in this case are
identical to the claims, or causes of actions, that were deter-
mined in the First Horizon litigation. In the First Horizon
litigation, in an amended complaint, First Horizon sought
reformation of the refinance Deed of Trust, a declaration that
First Horizon had a valid first mortgage lien against the
Property, an order directing Susan to execute a confirmatory

Alexander ruled decisively on the merits, and ruled on standing only
when prompted to do so.

joinder of the refinance Deed of Trust, a declaration that First
Horizon had a mortgage lien through equitable subrogation on
the Property, and an order establishing an equitable mortgage
against the Property under the refinance Deed of Trust. In
the second lawsuit, Petitioners raised identical causes of action
for reformation of the refinance Deed of Trust, an order
compelling Respondents to “execute appropriate paperwork,
or alternatively reforming the existing refinance [D]eed of
[Tirust[,]” equitable subrogation, and an equitable mortgage.
And, significantly, the second lawsuit was based on the same
facts and legal grounds as the First Horizon litigation—
namely, that First Horizon and Susan had made a mutual
mistake in failing to include Susan on the refinance Deed of
Trust. Because the second lawsuit involves the same causes of
action as in the First Horizon litigation between the same
parties or their privies, a final judgment on the merits “is
conclusive, not only as to all matters decided in the [First
Horizon litigation], but also as to matters that could have been
litigated in the [First Horizon litigation].” Id. at 392, 761 A.2d
at 910 (citations and emphasis omitted).”

Similarly, for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the
following four-part test must be satisfied:

1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical

with the one presented in the action in question?

2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?

8. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party

or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?

4, Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a

fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?
Colandrea, 361 Md. at 391, 761 A.2d at 909 (citation omitted).
As to the second and third circumstances, for the reasons
explained above, there was a final judgment on the merits in

9. Thus, any other causes of action that were added by Petitioners in the
second lawsuit based on the same set of facts would necessarily be
barred by application of res judicata, as the causes of action could have
been brought in the First Horizon litigation.

the First Horizon litigation, and Petitioners are in privity with
First Horizon,

HSAs to the first circumstance necessary for applica-
tion of collateral estoppel, the record demonstrates that the
issue of mutual mistake of fact was “actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment,” and that “determi-
nation is conclusive in” the second lawsuit, Id. at 887, 761 A.2d
at 907 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Stated
differently, the issue decided in the First Horizon litigation—
4.¢@, Whether there was a mutual mistake of fact in failing to
have Susan sign the refinance Deed of Trust, and, specifically,
whether Susan had the requisite knowledge and intent with
respect to the execution of the refinance Deed of Trust—is
identical to the issue that was presented in the second lawsuit
brought by Petitioners. Finally, as to the fourth prerequisite
for application of collateral estoppel, Petitioners had a full and
fair opportunity to be heard in the First Horizon litigation
through their privy, First Horizon; indeed, in the First Hori-
zon litigation, First Horizon presented its entire case-in-chief,
presenting witness testimony and introducing exhibits into
evidence. Accordingly, all four circumstances necessary for the
application of collateral estoppel have been established.

Because all of the elements of res judicata and collateral
estoppel are satisfied, we conclude that Judge Glass correctly
determined that, under the circumstances of this case, the two
doctrines applied, and Petitioners were precluded from bring-
ing the second lawsuit containing causes of action and issues
identical to those that were brought and litigated, or that
could have been litigated, in the First Horizon litigation.
Accordingly, Judge Glass’s judgment was properly affirmed
by the Court of Special Appeals, whose judgment we, in turn,
affirm,

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED. PETITIONERS TO PAY COSTS.