State: Arkansas
Volume: 375
Term: 2008-2009
Jurisdiction(s): Arkansas
Source: https://static.case.law/ark/375.pdf

R.M.W. v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-505 289 S.W.3d 46

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

es
Julia B. Jackson, Public Defender Conflicts Office, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: LeaAnn J. Irvin, Ass’t Att’y
Gen., for appellee.

1M Hannan, Chief Justice. R.M.W. appeals an order of
the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Criminal Division, deny-

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ing his motion to transfer his case to the circuit court, juvenile
division, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-318 (Supp.
2005). He argues that the circuit court’s decision to try him as an adult
is clearly erroneous in that the decision is not supported by clear and.
convincing evidence. We hold that the trial court was not clearly
erroneous and that the decision is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court
Rule 1-2(6)(4).

Facts

On July 17, 2007, Tom & Jean’s Grocery was robbed. Store
owner Ghazi Hammad suffered multiple gunshot wounds and later
died. His wife Khadijah Awwad suffered a gunshot wound and
survived. R.M.W. and M. B. were charged as adults with capital
murder, attempted capital murder, and aggravated robbery. At the
time of the robbery, R.M.W. was fifteen years old, and M.B. was
seventeen years old.

R.M.W. moved to transfer the criminal action against him
to the juvenile division. At the hearing on the motion, evidence
was presented to show that while he was fifteen, he functioned at
the level of a twelve- to thirteen-year-old. Family, teachers, and a
psychologist testified that R.M.W. was childlike and immature.
They noted that he prefers the company of children who are
younger than he is because he enjoys their interests. Evidence was
presented to show that R.M.W. still plays cars with younger boys
and that he plays juvenile games that others his age long ago
abandoned. Evidence was also presented to show that R.M.W. had
never been violent or showed any tendencies toward aggressive-
ness or violence. There was additional evidence that R.M.W. was
always respectful and mannerly in his dealings with teachers and
others and that he was helpful and kind. A deputy sheriff who
works with R.M.W. in detention testified that he is very obedient
and respectful, and does not seem to understand why he is being
held. She further noted that he is easily intimidated by the other
inmates. Several witnesses testified that R.M.W. is a follower.
They stated further that he does not plan in life, and that he acts
impulsively without foreseeing consequences.

R.M.W.’s account of what happened was introduced
through his testimony and the testimony of his mother. R.M.W.
was permitted to return to his old neighborhood and stay over-
night on July 17 with his friend M.B. M.B. asked R.M.W. if he
wanted to go buy candy, and R.M.W. agreed. On the way to the

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store, M.B. stated, “I’m tired of this shit.” R.M.W. asked, “Tired
of what?” M.B. responded, “‘I’m tired of being broke. I am fixing
to rob astore. Are you down?” R.M.W. testified that he told M.B.
“No.” R.M.W. states that at this point, M.B. pulled out a gun and
put it to R.M.W.’s head saying if he ‘‘didn’t do it, he was going to
kill me.” R.M.W. further stated:

He told me to go in there and act like I was getting some candy and
stuff like that... . I went in the store and acted like I was getting
some candy. I was walking around. And I didn’t know what to
do. I was just walking around. I went on the other side of the rack,
and he came behind me and said ifI didn’t do it he was going to kill
me,

R.M.W. stated that he then pulled out his gun and pointed it at
Hammad and Awwad, telling them to raise their hands. R.M.W.
further stated that he kept his gun on Hammad and Awwad for a
while, and in trying to get out of the robbery, he handed his gun to
M.B., who took it, but handed it back to R.M.W. requiring him to
go on. Hammad then began to walk toward him and M.B., and
R.M.W. stated that he dropped his pistol because he did not want to
go through with the robbery. Hammad attacked them, and M.B. shot
Hammad. They escaped to the woods, and when M.B. fell asleep,
R.M.W. fled. He called his mother the next morning and turned
himself into the police.

M.B. testified that he and R.M.W. planned the robbery
together. He also testified that R.M.W. wanted to be armed so
they stole a pistol for R.M.W. to use in the robbery. M.B. testified
that R.M.W. was a willing participant in the robbery.

A video surveillance tape in the store recorded the robbery.
The video quality is sufficient to easily identify the people and see
the events. There is audio, but the quality is low. The gunshots can
be heard, and voices can be heard, but the voices cannot be
understood. The robbery occurred shortly after 10:00 p.m. after
the store had been closed for the day. The videotape shows
Hammad step out of view where he apparently unlocks the door to
let R.M.W. enter the store. R.M.W. goes to an aisle of merchan-
dise to look around and Hammad leans on a nearby rack while he
talks with him. M.B. did not enter with R.M.W. After speaking
with R.M.W. for a few moments, Hammad returns to the front of
the store and M.B. enters. M.B. walks around one aisle to
encounter R.M.W. from behind in what appears to be an attempt

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to conceal communication with R.M.W. M.B. walks close to
R.M.W. and does appear to communicate with R.M.W. in some
way. They then proceed together toward Hammad and Awwad.
who are near the door.

They approach Hammad and Awwad with drawn pistols.
R.M.W. has a black pistol, and M.B. has a silver pistol. R.M.W.
confronts Hammad with his pistol. There is physical contact
between the two, and Hammad brushes R.M.W. aside. R.M.W.
backs off while still holding his pistol on Hammad. Gunshots are
heard and Hammad touches his mouth, apparently indicating an
injury. M.B. is not visible at this point. M.B. steps out in front of
Hammad holding a silver pistol on Hammad. R.M.W. is off to the
right and in one camera view can be seen holding his gun on
Hammad. R.M.W. then hands his pistol to M.B. Nothing on the
tapes makes clear why this transfer of the gun occurred; however,
the gun is soon handed back to R.M.W. R.M.W. is then seen
again holding his pistol on Hammad and Awwad. M.B. makes two
trips behind the counter. Hammad then approaches R.M.W. and
M.B. They both back away. A scuffle between the three occurs,
and R.M.W.’s black pistol falls to the floor. R.M.W. escapes and
moves out of the scene toward the front of the store. A few
moments later, he returns to the fight in an apparent attempt to
free M.B. from Hammad by striking Hammad at least twice. As
R.M.W. strikes Hammad, he is drawn back into the fray. M.B.
escapes the fight and grabs the black pistol off the floor. Awwad
comes to Hammad’s aid and holds R.M.W. down. Hammad leaves
to pursue M.B. M.B. shoots multiple times and returns to free
R.M.W. from Awwad. R.M.W. moves toward the front of the
store where he remains while M.B. threatens Awwad. The boys
then leave the store.

At some point during the robbery, Awwad suffers a gunshot
wound to the hip; however, the videotape does not reveal when
that occurred. Awwad was unable to say when she was injured.
The parties agreed that all shots were fired by M.B.

Motion to Transfer to Juvenile Division

R.M.W. moved under Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-
318(e) to transfer his case to the juvenile division. He argued that
he was intimidated and manipulated into participating in the
robbery. In deciding the motion, the circuit court is to consider
the following factors:

(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protec-
tion of society requires prosecution in the criminal division of
circuit court;

(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated, or willful manner;

(3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with
greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if
personal injury resulted;

(4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning
and participation in the alleged offense;

(5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the
juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender and, ifso, whether
the offenses were against persons or property, and any other
previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical
violence;

(6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of the juvenile’s home, environment, emotional
attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated as an adult;

(7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the judge of
the juvenile division of circuit court that are likely to rehabilitate the
juvenile before the expiration of the juvenile’s twenty-first birth-
day;

(8) Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the
commission of the alleged offense;

(9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile’s
mental, physical, educational, and social history; and

(10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the judge.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g). R.M.W. appeals from the denial ofa
motion to transfer his case to juvenile court. See Otis v. State, 355 Ark.
590, 142 S.W.3d 615 (2004); Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803
S.W.2d 502 (1991). Section 9-27-318(e) permits any party to move to
transfer, and an order on a motion to transfer may be appealed by any
party. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318().

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On August 29, 2007, the State filed criminal charges against
R.M.W. in the criminal division of the circuit court. Pursuant to
Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-318(c)(2), the State could
charge R.M.W. in either the criminal division of the circuit court
or the juvenile division of the circuit court because at the time of
the crime R.M.W. was fifteen and charged with capital murder
and aggravated robbery. Upon a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that a case should be transferred to another division of the
circuit court, the circuit court may do so. See Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-27-318(h) (2); Otis, supra.

Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that
will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the
allegation sought to be established. Otis, supra. This court will not
reverse the circuit court’s decision unless it was clearly erroneous.
Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence
to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evi-
dence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed. See Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d
896 (2002).

The critical question in this case was whether, as
R.M.W. alleged, he was forced or manipulated into participating
in the robbery, or whether he willingly participated. The circuit
court found that R.M.W. “has not matured, given his age.”” The
circuit court also went on to find, as R.M.W.’s expert psychologist
Dr. Nicholaus Paul testified, that it is unlikely a person would
behave as an innocent child for fifteen years and then commit such
a robbery at gunpoint. However, in weighing all the evidence, the
circuit court concluded that R.M.W. was lying about the nature of
his involvement in the robbery, and that regardless of his back-
ground, he was a willing participant in the robbery.

The circuit court found that several facts in this case and
several events shown on the videotape contradicted R.M.W.’s
story. We agree. R.M.W. entered the store first, while M.B.
remained outside. That is inconsistent with a desire to avoid
participating. Once inside, R.M.W. had an opportunity to warn
Hammad and Awwad and provide for his safety had he wished to
do so. He did not do so.

Further, R.M.W. walked in calmly and looked at goods on
the shelves. Nothing on the videotape shows that R.M.W. was
nervous or cowering in the moments before M.B. entered the
store. Rather, he seems to be waiting for M.B.

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Additionally, R.M.W. was the first to confront Hammad, and he

did so by pointing a pistol at him. In this first conftontation, R.M.W.

-came in physical contact with Hammad. That is not consistent with a

desire to withdraw or not participate. After M.B. shot Hammad in the
face, R.M.W. continued to hold his pistol on Hammad.

Soon afterward, R.M.W. handed his pistol to M.B., how-
ever, why that was done is not revealed by the videotape. It is only
a few more moments until R.M.W, is again pointing his pistol at
both Hammad and Awwad. Shortly after this, we see Hammad
approach R.M.W. and M.B. They back away. Hammad presses
forward and a fight ensues. As this fight begins, R.M.W.’s black
pistol falls to the floor. R.M.W. states that he threw down the
pistol because he wished to stop participating in the robbery;
however, the videotape shows that he dropped it during the fight.
Hammad then pursued and grabbed M.B. R.M.W., who by this
point is several feet away, returns to strike Hammad at least twice
in an attempt to free M.B. from Hammad’s attack. Coming to the
robber’s assistance hardly serves as evidence R.M.W. did not want
the robbery to take place. Finally, once M.B. freed R.M.W. from
Awwad, R.M.W. waited for M.B. and only left the store with him.

We note that R.M.W. argues that he should be tried as a
juvenile because he turned himself in, because he was develop-
mentally delayed, because he was in special education for some
subjects, and because he was diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder. We note that he produced credible wit-
nesses who testified to his quiet, kind, and respectful demeanor.
He was by most accounts a gentle boy who would have been
thought incapable of such an act as armed robbery; however, the
videotape and Awwad’s testimony tell a different story.

We also note that contrary to R.M.W.’s assertion in his
brief, the circuit court did not find that he was guilty of the
charged crimes. Rather, the circuit court concluded that it “did
not believe that a gun was put to his head before he went in the
store.” To decide whether transfer to the juvenile court was
appropriate, the circuit court had to decide whether the clear and
convincing evidence supported R.M.W.’s story that he was a
manipulated or an unwilling participant in the robbery. At the
close of evidence in the hearing, the circuit court told R.M.W.
that the court would take a break and upon its return he would be
asked if “‘his story really happened or not.” That question was
asked, and the circuit court could not find his answer, his prior
testimony, or his story credible. In this hearing, the circuit judge

I .

sat as the finder of fact. Credibility of witnesses is an issue for the finder
of fact. Polk v. State, 348 Ark. 446, 73 S.W.3d 609 (2002). On appeal,
we have no means to assess witness credibility and may not act as the
finder of fact. Ridling v. State, 360 Ark. 424, 203 S.W.3d 63 (2005).
R.M.W. has not borne his burden of proving that the circuit court was
clearly erroneous. We are not left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.

Affirmed.

CITY of CENTERTON, a Municipal Corporation ».
CITY of BENTONVILLE, a Municipal Corporation, and George
and Nancy Huber, Daniel and Ruby Davies, Sandra and
Gary Townsend, and Lois Peters Revocable Trust

08-380 289 S.W.3d 53

Supreme Court of Arkansas ;
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

[Rehearing granted November 18, 2008."]

* ImBER, J,, would deny rehearing.

eC

Se !

Slinkard Law Firm, by: Andrew R. Huntsinger, for appellant.

Clark, & Spence, by: George R. Spence, Bentonville City Attor-
ney, for appellee City of Bentonville.

Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: L.
Kyle Heffley, for appellees George and Nancy Huber, Daniel and
Ruby Davies, and Lois Peters Revocable Trust.

im Hannau, Chief Justice. The City of Centerton appeals
an October 11, 2007 order declaring the City’s annexation
ordinance invalid. We lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

The order appealed from was entered on October 11,
2007. Centerton filed a posttrial motion to amend the judgment
on October 14, 2007. A posttrial motion extends the time within
which to file the notice of appeal to thirty days from the date the
posttrial motion is decided. See Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 4(b)(1).
However, if the circuit court fails to decide the motion within
thirty days, the motion is deemed denied as of the thirtieth day. Id.

Ho The thirty days within which the circuit court had to
decide the motion ran November 23, 2007, and the court did not
decide the motion until November 30, 2007. Thus, the motion
was deemed denied on November 23, 2007. Centerton had thirty
days from November 23, 2007, or until December 26, 2007, to file
the notice of appeal. It was filed on December 28, 2007. Pursuant
to Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 4(a), the notice of appeal had to be filed
within thirty days of entry of the judgment appealed from. See
Murchison v. Safeco, 367 Ark. 166, 238 S.W.3d 11 (2006). This
court may not hear the appeal. It is dismissed.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON GRANT OF REHEARING
DECEMBER 11, 2008

No briefs filed.

p= Curiam. J The City of Centerton petitions this
court for rehearing. This court dismissed Centerton’s ap-
peal on November 5, 2008, based on a lack of jurisdiction due to a
failure to file the notice of appeal within thirty days as required under
Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 4(a). Our decision was based on a file stamp that
appeared to indicate filing on December 28, 2007, and this conclusion
was affirmed by the signature date of December 27, 2007, on the
notice of appeal. We have now received an affidavit from the Benton
County Circuit Clerk clarifying that the notice of appeal was filed on
December 26, 2007, and not on December 28, 2007. The signature
date of December 27, 2006, was apparently a scrivener’s error. This
makes the notice of appeal timely. We grant the petition for rehear-
ing, and the appeal in this case will be heard and decided.

We also take this opportunity to address the subject of file
marks more generally. The rights of litigants, including criminal
appellants, turn on accurate file marks. Clerks should assure that
file stamps produce clear and legible file marks. They should assure
that stamps are always sufficiently inked to provide a clearly legible
mark. Those placing the file marks should check to see that the file
mark produced is clear and legible and that it is dark enough to be

legible on copies. Further, while not present in the case at issue, all
too often a file mark is placed over the top of other printing on the
page. This frequently makes the file mark unreadable or nearly
unreadable. File marks should never be stamped on top of other
printing. We also ask counsel to assure that documents have legible
file marks. They should take particular care in assuring that all
records and addenda contain copies of documents with legible file
marks.

Imper, J., would deny.

Harvie ANGLIN v.
JOHNSON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,

289 S.W.3d 28

08-453

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

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Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Stuart
P. Miller, for appellee.

1M Hannau, Chief Justice. Appellant Harvie Anglin appeals

the order of the Johnson County Circuit Court granting
summary judgment in favor of appellee Johnson Regional Medical
Center RMC). On appeal, he asserts that the circuit court erred in
determining that JRMC was entitled to charitable immunity and in
determining that it was not necessary to address the issue of govern-
mental immunity. Mr. Anglin also contends that the circuit court
erred in concluding that his amended complaint could not relate back
to the date of the original complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Mr. Anglin contends that
the circuit court erred in declaring that Rule 56 of the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure is constitutional. We affirm the circuit court.

Harvie and Margie Anglin filed a lawsuit on February 6,
2003, as husband and wife, against JRMC and AIG Insurance
Company (AIG), based upon allegations of medical injuries sus-
tained by Mrs. Anglin as a result of the alleged negligence of
JRMC that occurred on January 24, 2003. Mrs. Anglin later died,
and Mr. Anglin filed a motion to revive the original action after
being appointed special administrator of his wife’s estate. On April
14, 2003, the circuit court ordered the substitution of Mr. Anglin
as the party of interest and granted the motion for revival. Mr.
Anglin then pursued a wrongful death claim on behalf of his
deceased wife. On April 22, 2003, Mr. Anglin nonsuited AIG, and
an order dismissing AIG without prejudice was entered.

On December 5, 2003, Mr. Anglin filed a First Amended
Complaint against JRMC and TIG Insurance Company (TIG).
Mr. Anglin voluntarily nonsuited the action, dismissing it without
prejudice, on August 1, 2005.1 On August 1, 2006, Mr. Anglin
filed a complaint based on the same allegations, but he named only
JRMC as a defendant.

On November 19, 2007, JRMC filed a motion for summary
judgment, contending that JRMC was entitled to both govern-
mental and charitable immunity. In addition, JRMC asserted that
Mr. Anglin’s complaint, filed on August 1, 2006, in accordance

' While the order of dismissal does not specifically mention TIG, the order dismissed
the entire action without prejudice, and there is nothing in the record indicating that TIG was
dismissed prior to August 1, 2005. :

Po
CSF

with the savings statute, was a nullity because he failed to name the
proper defendant, TIG, JRMC’s liability insurer.

Mr. Anglin responded to the motion for summary judgment
and asserted that Rule 56 was unconstitutional and that JRMC was
not entitled to either governmental or charitable immunity. After
a hearing on the motion, the circuit court entered an order
granting JRMC’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing
with prejudice Mr. Anglin’s complaint against JRMC. The circuit
court concluded that JRMC was entitled to charitable immunity
and that because Mr. Anglin did not sue the liability insurer
directly, his complaint was a nullity. Further, the circuit court
determined that Rule 56 was constitutional. Mr. Anglin now
brings this appeal.

Mr. Anglin asserts that the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment on the basis that JRMC was entitled to
charitable immunity. The law is well settled that summary judg-
ment is to be granted by a circuit court only when it is clear that
there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Stromwall v. Van
Hoose, 371 Ark. 267, 265 S.W.3d 93 (2007). Once the moving
party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judg-
ment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and dem~-
onstrate the existence ofa material issue of fact. See id. On appellate
review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based
on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in
support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. See id. We
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences
against the moving party. See id. Our review focuses not only on
the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and documents filed by the
parties. See id.

“The essence of the [charitable-immunity] doctrine is
that agencies, trusts, etc., created and maintained exclusively for
charity may not have their assets diminished by execution in favor
of one injured by acts of persons charged with duties under the
agency or trust.’’ George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 211,
987 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1999) (citing Crossett Health Ctr. v. Croswell,
221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953)). The doctrine favors
charities and results in a limitation of potentially responsible
persons whom an injured party may sue. Id. Therefore, we give the
doctrine a very narrow construction. Id. (citing Williams v. Jefferson
Hosp. Ass’n, 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243 (1969)). To deter-

a” .

mine whether an organization is entitled to charitable immunity,
courts consider the following factors:

(1) whether the organization’s charter limits it to charitable or
eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization’s charter
contains a “‘not-for-profit” limitation; (3) whether the organiza-
tion’s goal is to break even; (4) whether the organization earned a
profit; (5) whether any profit or surplus must be used for charitable
or eleemosynary purposes; (6) whether the organization depends
on contributions and donations for its existence; (7) whether the
organization provides its services free of charge to those unable to
pay; and (8) whether the directors and officers receive compensa-
tion.

Id. at 212, 987 S.W.2d at 713. These factors are illustrative, not
exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive of charitable status. Id.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, JRMC pre-
sented the affidavit of its administrator, Larry Morse. Mr. Morse stated
that JRMC treats patients and provides medical services free of charge,
without regard for the patients’ ability to pay. He also stated that
JRMC’s charter limits it to charitable purposes and establishes it as a
not-for-profit entity. Mr. Morse further explained that JRMC is
exempt from the payments of federal and state income taxes because it
is a 501(c)(3) corporation existing, organized, and operated for chari-
table purposes. Mr. Morse also stated that JRMC derives its funds
primarily from Medicare, Medicaid, and individual patients or their
private insurers.

Mr. Morse stated that, as of September 30, 2007, JRMC had
provided approximately $849,043 in free medical services for the
year. He also stated that JRMC currently experiences an operating
margin of (9.78%), indicating a loss from operations.

Along with Mr. Morse’s affidavit, JRMC submitted its
articles of incorporation, which state that JRMC shall provide
health services on a charitable basis and not for profit, but that
nothing shall be deemed to require JRMC to furnish services
without charge to those able to pay the charges either directly or
through third parties. In addition, the articles of incorporation
state that no part of the net earnings of JRMC shall inure to the
benefit of or be distributable to its members, trustees, officers, or
other private persons, except that JRMC shall be authorized and
empowered to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered.

In response to JRMC’s pleadings accompanying the motion
for summary judgment, Mr. Anglin presented the deposition of

PC

Mr. Morse. Citing Mr. Morse’s deposition, Mr. Anglin claims that
JRMC is not entitled to charitable immunity because it is not
maintained exclusively for charity. He states that JRMC is a “big
business,” and that, while the hospital did not make a profit in
2006, it made profits in excess of $1 million in years prior to 2006.
Mr. Anglin also asserts that JRMC is not a charity because it sues
patients to collect unpaid hospital bills. Finally, Mr. Anglin con-
tends that, by virtue of the fact that JRMC carries liability
insurance, it is a business and not a charity.

HE Of the eight factors listed in George, three are clearly
established based upon evidence in the record. Those are: (1)
whether the organization’s charter limits it to charitable or elee-
mosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization’s charter con-
tains a “not-for-profit” limitation; and (7) whether the organiza-
tion provides its services free of charge to those unable to pay. The
first and second are demonstrated by JRMC’s articles of incorpo-
ration, which state that the hospital provides health services on a
charitable, not-for-profit basis. The seventh factor is established by
Mr. Morse’s affidavit, wherein he stated that the hospital provides
health services free of charge to those who cannot pay. As noted,
in the first nine months of 2007, JRMC provided $849,043 in free
medical services.

As to the fourth factor, whether the organization
earned a profit, the record shows that in some years, JRMC did
earn a profit, and in others, it did not. Mr. Morse’s affidavit
established that JRMC is currently operating at a loss. JRMC
satisfies the fifth factor, whether any profit or surplus must be used
for charitable or eleemosynary purposes, because Mr. Morse stated
any surplus shall be used to fund the hospital to fully perpetuate its
charitable community benefit of providing medical assistance to
the public.

As for the third factor, whether the hospital’s goal is
to break even, it appears from the record that JRMC’s goal is to
not operate at a loss and to use any surplus to fund improvements
for the hospital. As for the sixth factor, whether the organization
depends on contributions and donations for its existence, it does
not appear that JRMC depends on these types of funding for its
existence, as the hospital services are paid for by insurance com-
panies, whether governmental or private. As for the eighth factor,
whether the directors and officers receive compensation, the

Sa” |.

articles of incorporation state that the directors and officers can
receive reasonable compensation, but that they shall receive no
part of the net earnings.

The circuit court found that Mr. Anglin’s response to
JRMC’s motion for summary judgment did not refute JRMC’s
overwhelming evidence supporting its contention that JRMC
meets the standard governing charitable immunity under Arkansas
law. We agree.

Mr. Anglin appears to suggest that JRMC is not a
charity hospital because it has in some years earned a profit.
Indeed, it is evident that JRMC anticipated that it might make a
profit, as demonstrated by Mr. Morse’s statement that the hospital
intended to use any surplus to perpetuate its purpose of providing
healthcare for the benefit of the community. In George, we
explained:

[T]rying to break even is only one factor and certainly not a
dispositive one when applied to a hospital. Modern hospitals are
complex and expensive, technological, economic and medical
enterprises that can ill afford to come short of even in their financial
integrity. Running a small surplus should not be seen as totally
incompatible with charitable status in such cases. ... The existence
of profit is not determinative of charitable status.

337 Ark. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 713.

Further, the fact that JRMC sued patients to
collect unpaid medical bills is not determinative of its charitable
status. Mr. Anglin failed to show that in filing suit to collect unpaid
bills, JRMC was attempting to collect from patients unable to pay.
This leaves only the evidence from JRMC that suit is instituted
only against those able to pay but who refuse to do so. Based upon
a review of the totality of the relevant facts and circumstances, we
hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that JRMC
meets the requirements of a charitable entity for purposes of
asserting the defense of the charitable-immunity doctrine. Because
we affirm the circuit court’s determination that JRMC is charita-
bly immune from suit, we need not address Mr. Anglin’s argument
regarding governmental immunity.

Mr. Anglin asserts that even if JRMC is immune from tort

liability, he may still sue JRMC’s liability insurer. He contends that
the circuit court erred in concluding that his first amended

| tl

complaint, which named TIG Insurance Company as a defendant,
could not relate back to the date of the original complaint.? The
record reveals that Mr. Anglin filed his complaint against JRMC
on August 1, 2006, exactly one year after he had nonsuited his first
amended complaint, which he had filed on December 5, 2003.3 At
the time Mr. Anglin refiled suit, on August 1, 2006, Low v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670
(2005), was the law regarding the issue of charitable immunity, and
the Low decision specifically required Mr. Anglin to file a direct
cause of action against the insurer of an institution entitled to
charitable immunity. Nevertheless, Mr. Anglin did not name the
liability insurance carrier of JRMC in his complaint filed August 1,
2006, despite the fact that the Low decision was delivered on
December 15, 2005, prior to the expiration of Mr. Anglin’s savings
limitations period, which ran on August 1, 2006. In other words,
Mr. Anglin had more than eight months in which to refile his
claim against the liability insurance carrier, TIG, in accord with
the law as stated in Low.

We have previously rejected an appellant’s argument
that we apply our decision in Low prospectively in a case where the
appellant had more than two months in which to refile a claim
against a charitable defendant’s insurance company in accordance
with the law in Low. See Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., 373 Ark. 472,
284 S.W.3d 486 (2008). Mr. Anglin acknowledges the Felton
decision; however, he claims his case is distinguishable from Felton,
because in his case, the one-year savings statute expired before this
court decided Low. Mr. Anglin is mistaken. As noted above, the
one-year savings statute expired on August 1, 2006, some eight
months after our decision in Low.

Mr. Anglin’s first amended complaint, filed on De-
cember 18, 2007, in an attempt to name the hospital’s liability
insurance carrier as a defendant, is time-barred, and despite his
suggestion to the contrary, the relation-back doctrine is inappli-
cable. Pursuant to our holding in Low, Mr. Anglin was required to
file a direct cause of action against the insurer of an institution
entitled to charitable immunity. The complaint filed on August 1,

? Mr. Anglin filed a first amended complaint naming TIG as a defendant on Decem-
ber 18, 2007.

> The December 5, 2003 complaint named both JRMC and TIG as defendants.

20

2006, the day the savings statute expired, failed to include the
insurer. Therefore, that complaint was a nullity. Where the
complaint is a nullity, the relation-back doctrine is inapplicable
because there is no pleading to amend and nothing to relate back.
See Brewer v. Poole, 362 Ark. 1, 207 S.W.3d 458 (2005). Accord-
ingly, the circuit court did not err in concluding that the relation-
back doctrine was inapplicable.

Finally, Mr. Anglin contends that Arkansas Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 is unconstitutional because it denies him his right of
trial by jury as guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution. In this
case, the circuit court determined that JRMC was entitled to
summary judgment as matter of law because it was immune from
suit due to its charitable immunity. Mr. Anglin asserts that Rule 56
“encroaches on the right to trial by jury because it requires a party
to demonstrate that there are genuine issues of material fact, or the
case will be decided by the trial judge without a jury trial.” He
states that nothing in the Arkansas Constitution states that the right
to a trial by jury extends only to those cases in which there are
factual disputes. Further, Mr. Anglin contends that the issue of
whether a hospital is entitled to a defense of governmental or
charitable immunity is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
Accordingly, Mr. Anglin asserts that the circuit court’s final
judgment granting JRMC’s motion for summary judgment pur-
suant to Rule 56 was unconstitutional because he was not afforded
the right to have these fact questions heard by a jury. Article 2,
section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution provides in relevant part:

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to
all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy; but a
jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner
prescribed by law; and in all jury trials in civil cases, where as many
as nine of the jurors agree upon a verdict, the verdict so agreed upon
shall be returned as the verdict of such jury, provided, however, that
where a verdict is returned by less than twelve jurors all the jurors
consenting to such verdict shall sign the same.

The right to a jury trial under this provision is a fundamental
right. Craven v. Fulton Sanitation Serv., Inc., 361 Ark. 390, 206
S.W.3d 842 (2005); Walker v. First Commercial Bank, N.A., 317
Ark. 617, 880 S.W.2d 316 (1994). This right extends to all cases
that were triable at common law. Craven, supra; Hopper v. Garner,

sl

328 Ark. 516, 944 S.W.2d 540 (1997). That is, the constitutional
right to trial by jury extends only to the trial of issues of fact in civil
and criminal causes. Craven, supra; Jones v. Reed, 267 Ark. 237, 590
S.W.2d 6 (1979). Thus, where there is no factual dispute, there is
no constitutional right to a trial by jury.

Mr. Anglin maintains that the question of whether JRMC is
entitled to charitable immunity is a question of material fact that
entitles him to a jury trial. In support of this argument, he cites
Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548
(1953). Croswell is distinguishable from. the instant case because
there were disputed facts concerning whether the hospital was a
charity. In that case, there was evidence that the hospital had been
given land, funds, and furnishings by a lumber company that had
an interest in the hospital. Moreover, the articles of incorporation
provided that, upon liquidation of the hospital, the assets could be
distributed by the board of governors in any manner consistent
with state laws. Here, Mr. Anglin claims that because JRMC
earned a profit in some years and because JRMC sues to collect
unpaid medical bills, he has the right to present to the jury the
question of whether JRMC is a charity that is immune from suit.

HM (Where there are disputed facts concerning an orga-
nization’s charitable status, those facts should be presented to the
jury. See Croswell, supra. On the other hand, where there are no
disputed facts regarding a defendant’s charitable status, the deter-
mination of charitable status is a question of law for the court. In
George, the appellant argued that there were factual issues with
respect to the fourth, fifth, and eighth factors — whether the
organization earned a profit, whether any profit or surplus must be
used for charitable or eleemosynary purposes, and whether the
directors and officers receive compensation. We disagreed, stating:

As to the fourth, fifth, and eighth, appellant contends that these are
all questions of fact and must therefore be tried rather than resolved
on summary judgment. We disagree. While there may be fact
issues involved, they are not matters of disputed fact. Rather, they
are differing legal interpretations of undisputed facts. In such cases,
an appellate court should grant summary judgment where reason-
able persons would not reach different conclusions based upon
those undisputed facts. Leigh Winham, Inc. v, Reynolds Ins. Agency,
279 Ark. 317, 651 S.W.2d 74 (1983). When each of the remaining

Masterson{*] factors are analyzed with the relevant undisputed facts,
JRMC’s charitable status is established.

George, 337 Ark. at 212-13, 987 S.W.2d at 713.

HMM Here, the issues regarding JRMC’s profit and its
practice of filing suit to collect unpaid medical bills are not matters
of disputed fact, but rather they are differing legal interpretations
of undisputed facts. See George, supra. There are no disputed facts,
as was the case in Croswell. Therefore, in this case, because no
disputed facts existed, the circuit court correctly determined, as a
matter of law, that JRMC was a charity entitled to immunity.
Because there were no genuine issues of material fact, the circuit
court did not err in granting summary judgment. We hold that,
because a person is entitled to a jury trial only in the event that
there are factual issues, and none exist in this case, Mr. Anglin was
not unconstitutionally denied his right to a jury trial.

Affirmed.

Brown, J., dissents.

Re L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I would reverse
the grant of summary judgment in this case because the
issue of whether Johnson Regional Medical Center (“JRMC”) is a
charitable organization entitled to charitable immunity is contested by
the parties and presents a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to
resolve. The trap that the majority, and the trial court before it, fell
into was to decide these issues of fact as a “legal interpretation of
undisputed facts,” all of which runs counter to the foundational
principle in our jurisprudence that juries are fact-finders — not the
judges.

As an additional matter, I disagree that all of the eight George
factors are undisputed by the parties. See George v. Jefferson Hospital
Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999). Harvie Anglin, as the
plaintiff in this case, presented proof in deposition form that
JRMC makes a net profit in most years; that it has over six million
dollars in reserve funds; that it is the fourth largest employer in
Clarksville; that government or private insurance accounts for the

* In Masterson uv. Stambuck, 321 Ark. 391, 902 S.W.2d 803 (1995), the court adopted
the eight-factor test to determine whether an organization is entitled to charitable immunity.

——

majority of its income and it receives an insignificant portion from
donations; that charity care accounts for a very small part of the
services it provides; that it carries liability insurance; and that its
administrative employees are well paid. That evidence, at the very
least, calls into question whether JRMC’s profit and reserves are
used for charitable care and the extent of free care it offers.

But the main fallacy in the majority opinion is that it seems
to claim that, if the parties agree on the profit amounts and amount
of charitable care, there is no genuine issue of material fact for
purposes of deciding charitable immunity. But that misses the
point entirely. Even assuming that no one disputes the accuracy of
the amount of profit made by JRMC or the total amount of its
reserve funds or the amount of charitable care it gives, the ultimate
question is whether, based on all the factors, JRMC is, in fact, a
charity. That is the issue to be resolved and that is a factual inquiry.
Based on the majority’s reasoning, however, no matter how much
profit a hospital makes and no matter how little it offers in
charitable care, as long as the parties do not contest those amounts,
the hospital will never be entitled to a jury trial with respect to the
hospital’s status. That cannot be the law.

In Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 883, 256
S.W.2d 548, 552 (1953), this court made the point clearly and
undisputedly that it was up to the jury to consider the factors
militating for and against charitable status and to determine
whether “‘the Medical Center was a trust involving dedication of
its property to the public.” Moreover, this court has made it clear
that we give the doctrine of charitable immunity ‘a very narrow
construction.” Williams v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 246 Ark. 1231, 442
S.W.2d 243 (1969). And yet in analyzing the eight George factors,
the majority tilts in favor of JRMC and gives a broad construction
for charitable immunity. For example, for factor three, which is
whether the hospital’s goal is to break even, JRMC admits that
breaking even is not its goal and that any profit is used to fund
hospital improvements. Presumably, “improvements” would also
include compensation for directors and officers. The point is that
there is no suggestion that profit goes solely to charitable care. The
majority also announces that JRMC provides $849,043 in free
medical services, which is at odds with Anglin’s deposition proof.
But, in addition, does Medicare and Medicaid pay for some of this
free care? That question is unanswered in the majority’s opinion.

After today’s decision, it is difficult for me to imagine how
any of the George factors or the issue of charitable immunity itself

|
24 Pd

would ever present an issue for the jury to decide. The majority
seems to accept JRMC’s figures and to close the door on that ever
happening. As a result, deciding whether the George factors are
met, and immunity itself, becomes solely for judges to resolve as a
matter of law. Again, that is at odds with all of our summary-
judgment jurisprudence when a genuine issue of fact remains to be
resolved. In short, whether an entity is a charity is the material
factual inquiry in summary judgment, not a “legal interpretation,”
as the majority would have it. It also bears mentioning that
Arkansas is one of only four states that still provides absolute
charitable immunity for its hospitals. See Janet Fairchild, Annota-
tion, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental Charities - Modern Status, 25
A.L.R. 4th 517 (1983 & Supp. 2007).

I would deny the hospital’s motion for summary judgment
and remand for a jury trial on the question of whether JRMC is
entitled to charitable immunity. For these reasons, I respectfully
dissent.

ADVANCE AMERICA SERVICING of ARKANSAS, INC., d/b/a
Advance America Cash Advance; Advance America, Cash Advance
Centers of Arkansas, Inc.; and Advance America, Cash Advance
Centers, Inc. v. Brenda McGINNIS, Individually and on Behalf
of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons

08-492 289 S.W.3d 37

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

[Rehearing denied December 11, 2008.]

et Ci
fe

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, by: Claire Shows Hancock and Gary
D. Marts, Jr.; Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, by: Lewis S. Wiener, Phillip
E. Stano, and Brendan Ballard, for appellants.

Arnold, Batson Turner & Turner, by: Todd Turner and Dan Turner,
Scholtens & Averitt, by: Chris Averitt and Jay Scholtens, for appellee.

ONALD L. Corsin, Justice. Appellants, Advance America

Servicing of Arkansas, Inc., d/b/a Advance America Cash
Advance; Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Arkansas, Inc.;
and Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc., appeal from the
order of the Clark County Circuit Court denying their motion to
compel arbitration of a putative class-action complaint for alleged
violations of Arkansas’s Constitution and laws prohibiting usurious
interest and deceptive trade practices. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(1) as an appeal involving the
interpretation or construction of the Arkansas Constitution. On
appeal, Appellants argue the circuit court erred in concluding the
arbitration provision in question was invalid for lack of mutuality, in
looking outside the arbitration provision to other parts of the under-
lying contract, and in failing to strike the invalid portion of the
contract and to enforce the arbitration provision. We find no error
and affirm the circuit court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitra~
tion.

Appellee, Brenda McGinnis, filed a putative class-action
complaint against Appellants in circuit court on February 27,
2007, alleging Appellants had charged her and other potential class
members usurious interest, engaged in deceptive trade practices,
and violated a prior court-approved settlement agreement. Ac-
cording to the complaint, Appellee engaged in a transaction with
Appellants at their Jonesboro, Arkansas, branch office on Novem-

ed
28 es

ber 3, 2006, whereby she wrote a check for $278.83 and Appellants
gave her $250.00 in cash and agreed to hold her check until her
next payday. The complaint alleged this transaction was typical of
the transactions between Appellants and its customers in Arkansas
and amounted to a loan resulting in an effective annual percentage
rate of over 150% in violation of the prohibition of usurious
interest contained in article 19, section 13 of the Arkansas Con-
stitution. As such, the complaint alleged entitlement to twice the
amount of interest paid plus costs and attorney’s fees. See Ark.
Const. art. 19, § 13; Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-57-101 et seq. (Repl.
2001 & Supp. 2005). In addition to being a usurious loan, the
complaint also alleged this transaction was a violation of the
Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Arkansas Code Anno-
tated sections 4-88-101 et seq. (Repl. 2001 & Supp. 2003),
entitling Appellee to her actual damages plus costs and attorney’s
fees. The complaint alleged further that the transaction demon-
strated that Appellants were operating under the Check-Cashers
Act, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 23-52-101 et seq. (Repl.
2000 & Supp. 2005), and charging fees under that act in violation
of a settlement agreement to cease conducting check-cashing
transactions in Arkansas approved by the circuit court in Garrett v.

Advance America, Cash Centers of Arkansas, Inc., Clark County
Circuit Court, Case No. CIV-99-152.

Appellants moved to compel arbitration of the matters
alleged in the complaint.' They argued that Appellee’s claims arose
from six transactions between her and Appellants conducted from
September 1, 2006 to February 2, 2007, pursuant to a Deferred
Presentment Option Agreement (Customer Agreement) she ex-
ecuted with Appellants. Appellants contended that, pursuant to the
express terms of the Customer Agreement she signed, Appellee
was required to submit to arbitration the claims alleged in her
complaint. Appellants argued that Appellee did not challenge the
arbitration provision of the Customer Agreement; rather, she
asserted a challenge to the Customer Agreement as a whole and
therefore Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440

We observe that while the motion to compel arbitration was pending in state circuit
court, Appellants also filed an action in federal district court to compel arbitration and stay
the state-court proceedings. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ultimately
dismissed that action, determining that the amount in controversy did not satisfy the
requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Advance Am. Servicing of Ark, Inc. v. McGinnis, 526
E3d 1170 (2008).

ee

(2006), required the circuit court to send the case to arbitration.
Appellants attached to their motion to compel arbitration a copy of
the Customer Agreement. The portions of that Customer Agree-
ment that are at issue in this appeal are as follows:

Deferred Presentment Option Agreement

Default, Returned Check Fee, Court Costs, and Attorney’s Fee. You
will be in default under this Customer Agreement if you do not pay
us any amount you owe us under this Customer Agreement or you
cause your Check not to be honored on or after the Presentment
Date. If the Check is returned to us from your bank or other
financial institution due to insufficient funds, closed account, or a
stop-payment order, we shall have the right to all civil remedies
allowed by law to collect the check and shall be entitled to recover
areturned check fee of $25.00 as authorized by applicable Arkansas
law, court costs, and reasonable attorney’s fee paid to an attorney
who is not our salaried employee. Neither we nor any other person
on our behalf will institute or initiate any criminal prosecution
against you.

Acknowledgments. Please note that this Customer Agreement con-
tains a binding Waiver of Jury Trial and Arbitration Provision. You
acknowledge that we issued a copy of this Customer Agreement to
you. You acknowledge that we paid the proceeds of the transac-
tion to you, in cash... . You further acknowledge that you have
read, understand, and agree to all of the terms on both sides of this
Customer Agreement, including the provision on the other side of
this Customer Agreement entitled “Waiver Jury Trial and Arbitra-
tion Provision.”

WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL AND ARBITRATION PROVE
SION. Arbitration is a process in which persons with a dispute: (a)
waive their rights to file a lawsuit and proceed in court and to have
ajury trial to resolve their disputes; and (b) agree, instead, to submit
their disputes to a neutral third person (an “arbitrator”) for a
decision. Each party to the dispute has an opportunity to present

es.

some evidence to the arbitrator. Pre-arbitration discovery may be
limited. Arbitration proceedings are private and less formal than
court trials. The arbitrator will issue a final and binding decision
resolving the dispute, which may be enforced as a court judg-
ment. A court rarely overturns an arbitrator’s decision. Nothing
contained in this Waiver of Jury Trial and Arbitration Provision
(hereinafter the “Arbitration Provision’’) shall prevent or limit the
authority of the Arkansas State Board of Collection Agencies from
fully exercising its administrative remedies as set forth in Act 1216 of
1999 nor preclude you from any administrative remedies available
to you under the Act. THEREFORE, YOU ACKNOWLEDGE
AND AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

1. For purposes of this Arbitration Provision, the words “dispute”
and “disputes” are given the broadest possible meaning and include,
without limitation (a) all claims, disputes, or controversies arising
from or relating directly or indirectly to the signing of this Arbitra~
tion Provision, the validity and scope of this Arbitration Provision
and any claim or attempt to set aside this Arbitration Provision; (b)
all federal or state law claims, disputes or controversies, arising from
or relating directly or indirectly to this Customer Agreement
(including the Arbitration Provision), the information you gave us
before entering into this Customer Agreement, including the Ap-
plication, and/or any past agreement or agreements between you
and us; (c) all counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims;
(d) all common law claims, based upon contract, tort, fraud, or
other intentional torts; (e) all claims based upon a violation of any
state or federal constitution, statute or regulation; (f) all claims
asserted by us against you, including claims for money damages to
collect any sum we claim you owe us; (g) all claims asserted by you
individually against us and/or any of our employees, agents, direc-
tors, officers, shareholders, governors, managers, members, parent
company or affiliated entities (hereinafter collectively referred to as
“related third parties”), including claims for money damages and/or
equitable or injunctive relief; (h) all claims asserted on your behalf
by another person; (i) all claims asserted by you as a private attorney
general, as a representative and member of a class of persons, or in
any other representative capacity, against us and/or related third
parties (hereinafter referred to as “Representative Claims”);
and/or (j) all claims from or relating directly or indirectly to the
disclosure by or related third parties of any non-public personal
information about you.

ee

2. You acknowledge and agree that by entering into this arbitration
Provision:

(a) YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO HAVE A TRIAL
BY JURY TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE ALLEGED
AGAINST US OR RELATED THIRD PARTIES;

()) YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO HAVE A
COURT, OTHER THAN A SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,
RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE ALLEGED AGAINST US OR
RELATED THIRD PARTIES; and

() YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO SERVE AS A
REPRESENTATIVE, AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL, OR INANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE CAPAC-
ITY, AND/OR TO PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER OF A
CLASS OF CLAIMANTS, IN ANY LAWSUIT FILED
AGAINST US AND/OR RELATED THIRD PARTIES.

3. Except as provided in Paragraph 6 below, all disputes including
any Representative Claims against us and/or related third parties
shall be resolved by binding arbitration only on an individual basis
with you. THEREFORE, THE ARBITRATOR SHALL NOT
CONDUCT CLASS ARBITRATION; THAT IS, THE ARBI-
TRATOR SHALL NOT ALLOW YOU TO SERVE AS A
REPRESENTATIVE, AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL, OR IN ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY
FOR OTHERS IN THE ARBITRATION.

6. All parties, including related third parties, shall retain the right to
seek adjudication in a small claims tribunal for disputes within the
scope of such tribunal’s jurisdiction. Any dispute, which cannot be
adjudicated within the jurisdiction ofa small claims tribunal, shall be
resolved by binding arbitration. Any appeal of a judgment from a
small claims tribunal shall be resolved by binding arbitration.

In her response to Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration,
Appellee for the first time asserted a challenge to the arbitration
provision of the Customer Agreement as being unenforceable for
Jack of mutuality. Appellee relied on former case law from this
court holding similar arbitration provisions unenforceable as lack-

es .

ing the element of mutuality of obligation. See, e,g., Nat’l Cash, Inc.
v, Loveless, 361 Ark. 112, 205 S.W.3d 127 (2005). Appellee also
claimed that the lack of mutuality rendered the Customer Agree-
ment one-sided and therefore unconscionable. According to Ap-
pellee’s response, Buckeye was not applicable to her case since she
now included a challenge to the arbitration provision of the
Customer Agreement.

The circuit court held a hearing on November 20, 2007, on
the motion to compel arbitration and ruled from the bench that

the language, reserving the right to all civil remedies, when consid-
ered with the language in the arbitration agreement section of the
contract, that the arbitration agreement is invalid because the
remedies lacked mutuality of the parties, not that the whole con-
tract lacks mutuality. . . .

I’m not making any ruling with regard to the validity or
non-validity of the contract. I’m making my ruling only with
regard to the language which I think has to be considered in
conjunction with the arbitration language to determine whether or
not the arbitration clause is invalid.

The circuit court then entered an order on January 16, 2008, denying
the motion to compel arbitration for the reasons stated from the
bench. This appeal followed.

An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an
immediately appealable order. Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 2(a)(12). We
review the circuit court’s order denying Appellants’ motion to
compel arbitration de novo on the record. Nat’l Cash, 361 Ark.
112, 205 S.W.3d 127.

The first point Appellants assign as error to the trial court is
the ruling that the “all civil remedies” language in the Customer
Agreement renders the arbitration provision unenforceable for
lack of mutuality of obligation. Implicit in the circuit court’s ruling
was a finding, based upon this court’s case law, that the “all civil
remedies’’ language gives Appellants access to the circuit court
while limiting Appellee to arbitration. Appellants assert this was an
incorrect interpretation of the arbitration provision, which pro-
vides that all disputes arising under the Customer Agreement must
be resolved in either small claims court or binding arbitration.
Appellants point out that the “all civil remedies” language is
located separately and independently from the arbitration provi-

ee
sion and that the circuit court erroneously grafted the language
into the arbitration provision to find that it lacks mutuality.
Appellants assert the circuit court erred in fundamentally equating
and thereby blurring the distinction between “all civil remedies”
available to a party and the “forum” in which a party may seek
such remedies. Appellants maintain, for the first time on appeal,
that the “all civil remedies’ language is an independent-damages
provision of the Customer Agreement giving Appellants the right
to pursue “‘all civil remedies” in the event a customer’s check is
dishonored, but does not give them the right to pursue those
remedies in judicial forums.

Appellants assert five subpoints under this first assignment of
error. We address all five subpoints, but first point out that many of
these subpoints raised under this first assignment of error were not
raised below. At the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration,
Appellants’ primary argument was that Buckeye Check Cashing, 546
USS. 440, required Appellee’s complaint to be heard by an arbi-
trator. Their focus at the hearing was on the fact that Appellee
could not be in court because, according to Buckeye, her complaint
only challenged the validity of the contract as a whole and not the
arbitration provision. In addition, they argued that it was only in
response to the motion to compel that Appellee raised a challenge
to the arbitration provision; and then the challenge was not to the
arbitration provision itself but to the “all civil remedies” language,
which is found elsewhere in the Customer Agreement outside the
arbitration provision and therefore required the court to evaluate
the contract as a whole in violation of Buckeye. Thus, although
there was discussion at the hearing regarding the “all civil rem-
edies” language and mutuality of the arbitration provision, as we
discuss in the remainder of this opinion, much of what Appellants
now argue specifically on appeal simply was not raised or ruled
upon below and is therefore not preserved for appellate review.

Hl it is elementary that this court will not consider argu-
ments that are not preserved for appellate review. Seidenstricker
Farms v. Doss, 374 Ark. 123, 286 S.W.3d 142 (2008). We will not
do so because it is incumbent upon the parties to raise arguments
initially to the trial court in order to give that court an opportunity
to consider them. Id. Otherwise, we would be placed in the
position of reversing a trial court for reasons not addressed by that
court. Id.

We first dispose of those subpoints that are not preserved for
our review. These include Appellants’ arguments that (1) the fact

as.

that “‘all civil remedies” is listed on the face of the Customer
Agreement in the same sentence as returned check fee, court costs,
and reasonable attorney’s fees reflects the parties’ intent that “all
civil remedies” refer to “‘damages” and not the “forum” in which
a party may pursue such damages; and that (2) because the “‘all civil
remedies” language appears outside and independent from the
arbitration provision, it would defy the plain meaning of the
Customer Agreement and the rules of contract construction to
read the “‘all civil remedies” language as invalid for lack of
mutuality. As previously stated, this court does not address argu-
ments presented for the first time on appeal.

Turning now to Appellants’ subpoints that are preserved for
our review, we first consider the argument that the “all civil
remedies” language in the Customer Agreement merely restates
the law as codified in the Check-Cashers Act and its implementing
regulations and is therefore evidence that the “‘all civil remedies”
language is intended to ensure Appellants’ right to recover dam-
ages, not to give them access to judicial forums. Below, Appellee
cited Richard Harp Homes, Inc. v. Van Wyk, 99 Ark. App. 424, 262
S.W.3d 189 (2007), which held that a reference in an arbitration
clause to court costs, expenses of litigation, and attorney’s fees
rendered the arbitration clause ambiguous and therefore defeated
mutuality. Appellants attempted to distinguish Van Wyk based on
the fact that the language at issue in this case was a restatement of
the Check-Cashers Act.

We note that the Act and regulations do use very
similar language giving a check-casher the right to all civil rem-
edies allowed by law, including receiving the face amount of the
check purchased, a returned check fee, court costs, and reasonable
attorney’s fees. However, the mere statement of such language in
the Act does not restore the lack of mutuality of obligation in this
Customer Agreement caused by the “‘all civil remedies” language.
This court has consistently and repeatedly held that the reference
to “all civil remedies” available to only one party in a check-
cashing agreement renders the agreement to arbitrate invalid for
lack of mutuality. See, e.g., E-Z Cash Advance v. Harris, 347 Ark.
132, 60 S.W.3d 436 (2001). There, this court stated that “[tJaking
into account their line of business, it is difficult to imagine what
other causes of action against a borrower remain that [the check-
casher] would be required to submit to arbitration.” Id. at 141, 60
S.W.3d at 442. Thus, regardless of the source and the location of
the “‘all civil remedies” language, there is no other remedy for

ee

Appellants to seek in arbitration, and the “‘all civil remedies”
language therefore has the effect of allowing Appellants to go to
circuit court, thereby destroying the element of mutuality since
Appellee does not also have that right. The location of the “all civil
remedies”’ language in the Customer Agreement and the source of
the language have no effect on the issue of mutuality or lack
thereof.

HB Appellants also argue as a subpoint that mutuality of
obligation does not require mutuality of remedy. They contend
that under this Customer Agreement, the fact that the remedy or
damages available to one party may be different than the remedy or
damages available to the other party, does not defeat mutuality of
obligation in the separate and independent arbitration provision.
Contrary to Appellants’ assertion, we do not interpret the circuit
court’s ruling as requiring both parties to have the same remedies.
Even if the ruling below did so require, however, we can affirm it
for the reason that mutuality of obligation is required and is lacking
here. It is axiomatic that this court can affirm a circuit court if the
tight result is reached even if for a different reason. Office of Child
Support Enforcement v. Wood, 373 Ark. 595, 285 S.W.3d 599 (2008).

HB Appellants’ second assignment of error is the circuit
court’s holding that a term outside and independent of the arbi-
tration provision rendered the arbitration provision unenforce-
able. Appellants contend the circuit court erred in looking to
provisions of the contract outside the arbitration provision to
evaluate the validity of the arbitration provision. The circuit court
tuled that the “all civil remedies” language in the Customer
Agreement destroyed the arbitration provision’s mutuality. Appel-
lants contend that since the “‘all civil remedies” language was not
part of the arbitration provision itself, the circuit court erroneously
evaluated the contract as a whole and thereby contravened Buckeye
Check Cashing, 546 U.S. 440.

Buckeye does not stand for the proposition argued by Appel-
Jants. Buckeye holds that it is improper for a court to consider a
claim that a contract containing an arbitration clause is invalid as a
whole when there is not also a claim that the arbitration clause is
itself invalid. Buckeye does not, however, also hold that when
considering the validity of an arbitration clause, a court is con-
strained to the clause itself and prohibited from considering other

—— ee .

parts of the contract relating to the agreement to arbitrate disputes
arising from the contract. Appellants’ argument extends the hold-
ing of the Buckeye case too far.

Buckeye involved a putative class action filed in Florida state
court alleging the deferred deposit contract signed by Buckeye
Check Cashing and its customers violated Florida’s laws prohibit-
ing usury and deceptive trade practices. Buckeye Check Cashing
moved to compel arbitration of that case. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “whether a court or an
arbitrator should consider the claim that a contract containing an
arbitration provision is void for illegality.” Buckeye Check Cashing,
546 U.S. at 442. The Supreme Court observed that “[t]he crux of
the complaint is that the contract as a whole (including its
arbitration provision) is rendered invalid by the usurious finance
charge” and went on to conclude that “because respondents
challenge the Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration pro-
visions, those provisions are enforceable apart from the remainder
of the contract. The challenge should therefore be considered by
an arbitrator, not a court.” Id. at 444, 446. The Supreme Court
ultimately held that, “regardless of whether the challenge is
brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of a
contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause,
must go to the arbitrator.” Id. at 449.

Like Buckeye, the complaint in the present case does not
assert a challenge to the arbitration provision itself, but rather
asserts a challenge to the whole contract as being usurious and a
deceptive trade practice. However, unlike Buckeye where there
was no challenge to the arbitration provision itself, Appellee in the
present case asserted a claim that the arbitration provision was
invalid for lack of mutuality of obligation in her response to the
motion to compel arbitration.

The circuit court below clearly stated from the bench that it
was not making a ruling on the merits of the validity of the contract
as a whole, but was ruling that the “all civil remedies” language
appearing on the first page of the Customer Agreement rendered
the arbitration provision found in the remainder of the Customer
Agreement invalid for lack of mutuality. As we quoted previously
in this opinion, the circuit court clearly stated: “I’m not making
any ruling with regard to the validity or non-validity of the
contract. I’m making my ruling only with regard to the language
which I think has to be considered in conjunction with the
arbitration language to determine whether or not the arbitration

| LCi

clause is invalid.” This ruling does not amount to an evaluation of
the validity of the contract as a whole and therefore does not run
afoul of Buckeye.

Appellants’ third assignment of error is that the circuit failed
to strike the allegedly offensive ‘‘all civil remedies” clause and
enforce the remainder of the arbitration provision. Appellants
contend that rather than invalidating the arbitration provision, the
circuit court should have, at most, invalidated and severed only the
“all civil remedies” language, while giving effect to the intent of
the parties to arbitrate claims covered by the arbitration provision.
Appellants concede that the arbitration provision does not contain
a severance provision. They argue, however, that the essence of
the Customer Agreement is that the parties arbitrate any disputes
arising from or related to the Customer Agreement and severing
the “‘all civil remedies” language does not change the essence of
that intent to arbitrate.

Neither the addendum nor the abstract reveals that
Appellants ever asked the circuit court to strike the “all civil
remedies” language and give effect to the remainder of the
Customer Agreement. Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration
does not raise the issue. The abstract of the hearing does not
indicate this issue was ever presented to or ruled upon by the
circuit court. Because Appellants did not raise below the argument
that the circuit court should have struck the “all civil remedies”
language from the Customer Agreement that it now makes on
appeal, we do not consider that argument. Seidenstricker, 374 Ark.
123, 286 S.W.3d 142.

Appellee includes an assertion in her brief that this court
could affirm the trial court for a reason different from what it ruled
—— that the arbitration provision was unconscionable. There is no
need to address this assertion since we affirm on the lack of
mutuality. See, eg., The Money Place v. Barnes, 349 Ark. 411, 78
S.W.3d 714 (2002) (stating that because the arbitration provision
was held unenforceable for lack of mutuality, there was no need to
discuss whether the arbitration provision was unconscionable).

I We conclude that, consistent with Buckeye, it was
permissible for the trial court to rule on the validity of the
arbitration provision because Appellee challenged the arbitration
provision on an independent basis from her challenge to the
contract as a whole. Appellee’s challenge to the contract was that
it was a usurious loan, a deceptive trade practice, and a violation of

ee
38 ]

a court-approved settlement agreement. Her challenge to the
arbitration provision was that it was unenforceable as lacking
mutuality of obligation. The trial court followed the numerous
cases from this court invalidating similar arbitration provisions and
contract language as lacking mutuality of obligation and therefore
correctly denied Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration. The
order denying the motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.

Edward GRAYS v. ARKANSAS OFFICE of CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

07-1202 289 S.W.3d 12

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

Billy J. Hubbell, for appellant.
Donna D, Galloway, for appellee.

NNABELLE CLINTON ImpeR, Justice. Appellant Edward

Grays appeals from an order of the Drew County Circuit
Court granting the motion for declaratory relief filed by Appellee
Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement (“OCSE”). The
circuit court’s order granted judgment against Grays in the amount of
$13,787.63 for child-support arrears and in the amount of $1,777.72
for related court costs and fees. The circuit court also determined that
it would be inequitable for the former custodial parent to be denied
the delinquent child support admittedly incurred by Grays, despite
the fact that the child at issue had, after reaching the age of majority,
received a lump-sum payment for Social Security disability benefits
due to his father’s disability. Grays argues on appeal that the circuit
court erred in concluding that he was not entitled to credit the
payment of disability benefits to his son against his child-support
arrears. Because this case presents an issue of first impression, of
substantial public interest, and in need of clarification or development
of the law, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court
Rule 1-2(b)(1), (4), and (5) (2008). We find no error and affirm.

Pursuant to a decree of divorce filed August 10, 1990, Flossie
Grays Junior was awarded custody of her two children with
Edward Grays. Grays was ordered to pay $108 bi-weekly in
support of the children, Shagala and Shane. Grays was also assessed
an annual child-support administrative fee in the amount of $24.
Grays’s child-support obligation was subsequently altered by the
following orders:

July 17, 1998: Grays’s obligation reduced to $61 per week
because Shagala had been emancipated; $55 in costs assessed.

December 22, 1998: Judgment granted against Grays in the
amount of $3,057.20 for past-due child support; Grays ordered to
pay $61 per week in current support and $6.10 per week toward
arrears; $55 in costs assessed; attorney’s fee of $305.72 assessed.

December 21, 1999: Judgment granted against Grays in the
amount of $3,579.20 for past-due child support; Grays ordered to
pay $61 per week in current support and $9 per week toward
arrears; $55 in costs assessed.

a)
40 PO

June 23, 2000: Judgment granted against Grays in the
amount of $5,316.20 for past-due child support; Grays ordered to
pay $61 per week in current support and $9 per week toward
arrears; $410 in costs and attorney’s fees assessed.

July 13, 2001: Judgment granted against Grays in the
amount of $1,956.20 for past-due child support; Grays ordered to
pay $61 per week in current support and $9 per week toward
arrears; $380 in costs and attorney’s fees assessed.

December 17, 2003 (order amended January 13, 2004):
Judgment granted against Grays in the amount of $8,660.20 for
past-due child support; Grays ordered to pay $61 per week in
current support and $9 per week toward arrears; $320 in costs and
attorney’s fees assessed.

March 16, 2005: Judgment granted against Grays in the
amount of $12,610.63 for past-due child support; Grays ordered to
pay $36 per week in current support; order directed that no
amount be paid toward arrears because Grays had no income and
was pursuing a claim for Social Security disability benefits.

Body attachments with cash bonds were issued against Grays
on June 7, 2000; March 12, 2001; and September 2, 2005. An
order entered on October 26, 2005, dismissed the September 2,
2005, body attachment and ordered Grays to resume support
payments of $36 per week.

On October 27, 2005, a Social Security Administration
Administrative Law Judge found that Grays had been disabled
since November 21, 2001. The AL] issued a decision, based on
Grays’s June 11, 2003, application, finding that Grays was entitled
to a period of disability commencing on November 21, 2001, and
continuing through the date of the decision. As a result, Grays
received a lump-sum payment of $16,615.20 in disability back pay
for the period between June 2002 and January 2006. In 2006, he
began receiving monthly payments of $1,067.! Those payments
were increased to $1,102 per month in 2007.

On August 1, 2006, the Social Security Administration
issued a check in the amount of $15,835 to Shane, as an auxiliary
benefit to Grays’s disability status. This amount represented back

The parties stipulated to this fact below. However, other evidence in the record
indicates that Grays’s monthly payments were in the amount of $979.

Pd a

pay for the period between June 2002 and January 2006. Because
he had turned eighteen years old on January 3, 2006, Shane was
not entitled to continuing monthly payments from the Social
Security Administration. In addition, Grays’s ongoing child-
support obligation had terminated by operation of law due to
Shane’s reaching the age of majority. However, as of 2006, Grays
owed past-due support in the amount of $13,787.63 and unpaid
costs and fees in the amount of $1,753.72.?

Consequently, OCSE issued an income withholding notice
to the Social Security Administration, seeking to recover from
Grays’s disability benefits. In August of 2006, pursuant to the
notice, OCSE began receiving payments of $156 per month. This
amount was deducted from Grays’s monthly benefits payment.
The August 2006 deduction was disbursed to Flossie Junior, while
subsequent deductions were placed on ‘distribution hold” by
OCSE.

On August 22, 2006, OCSE filed its motion for declaratory
relief in the circuit court, responding to Grays’s request that the
lump-sum payment from the Social Security Administration to his
son be credited against his child-support arrears. OCSE requested
that the circuit court determine whether Grays was entitled to the
offset. Following a hearing and the submission of briefs by the
parties, the circuit court issued a letter opinion, dated July 19,
2007, and formal order, dated July 31, 2007. The court found that
the payment to Shane by the Social Security Administration did
nothing to relieve the inequities resulting from Grays’s chronic
failure to pay child support. The court specifically noted that,
while the support was intended for Shane’s benefit, Flossie bore
the costs associated with Grays’s failure to pay. Accordingly, the
court ordered that the income withholding notice would continue
until all judgments against Grays were satisfied in full and directed
that those payments that had been collected but placed on distri-
bution hold be released to Flossie and credited toward the judg-
ment for child-support arrears. Grays filed a timely notice of
appeal.

Our standard of review for an appeal from a child-support
order is de novo on the record, and we will not reverse a finding
of fact by the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. Ward v.

? This amount differs from the $1,777.72 judgment ultimately entered for costs and
fees by $24, which represents the annual administrative fee assessed at the beginning of 2007.

el
#2 PO

Doss, 361 Ark. 153, 158, 205 S.W.3d 767, 770 (2005). In review-
ing a circuit court’s findings, we give due deference to that court’s
superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Id. However, a
circuit court’s conclusions of law are given no deference on appeal.
Hd.

Grays contends that a 2004 decision by the Arkansas Court
of Appeals, Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Harris, 87
Ark. App. 59, 185 S.W.3d 120 (2004), answers the question at
issue. The court of appeals in Harris affirmed a circuit court’s ruling
permitting Social Security disability payments made to an adult
child to discharge the non-custodial parent’s child-support arrear-
age. Id. The decision relied in part upon this court’s holding in
Cash v, Cash, 234 Ark. 603, 353 S.W.2d 348 (1962), in which a
non-custodial father was permitted to displace his court-ordered
child-support payments by Social Security retirement benefits paid
to his son. Our decision in Cash was premised largely on equitable
principles, specifically the father’s supposed inability to retire if
forced to continue paying child support and his good-faith efforts
to meet his ‘moral obligation” to his son and former wife. Id, at
605-06, 353 S.W.2d at 349-50. The court of appeals in Harris,
however, was precluded from addressing equitable factors urged
by OCSE, such as the financial impact on the custodial parent, the
financial standing of the non-custodial parent, and the length of
the non-custodial parent’s disability, because such factors were not
argued at the trial level and thus not preserved for appellate review.
87 Ark. App. at 62, 185 S.W.3d at 122. OCSE argues in the instant
case that the Harris court’s inability to consider equitable factors
distinguishes it from the case at bar.

OCSE points to another critical distinction in the Harris
case. The court of appeals explicitly limited its holding as follows:

There are differing views as to whether social security benefits can
be credited toward arrearages in child support. Some courts do not
allow it. Others permit it, but allow credit only for arrearages that
accrue during the period of disability. Appellant did not argue
below that arrearages, per se, were not subject to discharge. For this
reason and because the record was not developed on this issue, we
leave that question for another day.

Harris, 87 Ark. App. at 62, 185 S.W.3d at 122 n.2 (emphasis in
original) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, our review of cases from

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Pd 8

other jurisdictions addressing this issue shows a variety of approaches.
Some jurisdictions have chosen not to permit credits against the
non-custodial parent’s child-support arrears, noting that to do so
would amount to “ordering the children to pay the accrued arrearages
for their own support.” Fuller v. Fuller, 360 N.E.2d 357, 358 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1976); see also Hennagin v. County of Yolo, 481 F. Supp. 923
(E.D. Cal. 1979). Others have allowed credits on the basis of Social
Security benefits. See, e.g., Binns v. Maddox, 327 So. 24726 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1976); Perteet v. Sumner, 269 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. 1980); Folds v.
Lebert, 420 So. 2d 715 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Cohen v. Murphy, 330
N.E.2d 473 (Mass. 1975); Hanthorn v. Hanthorn, 460 N.W.2d 650
(Neb. 1990); Griffin v. Avery, 424 A.2d 175 (N.H. 1980). The
Supreme Court of Kansas has noted as follows:

Social Security benefits paid to the [custodial parent] for the
benefit of the parties’ minor children as the result of the [non-
custodial parent’s] disability may not, however, be regarded as
gratuitous. On the contrary, the payments received by the [custo-
dial parent] are for the children as beneficiaries of an insurance
policy. The premiums for such policy were paid by the [non-
custodial parent] for the children’s benefit. The purpose of Social
Security is the same as that of an insurance policy with a private
carrier, wherein a father insures against his possible future disability
and loss of gainful employment by providing for the fulfillment of
his moral and legal obligations to his children. This tragedy having
occurred, the insurer has paid out benefits to the beneficiaries under
its contract of insurance with the [non-custodial parent], and the
purpose has been accomplished.

Andler v. Andler, 538 P.2d 649, 653 (Kan. 1975). The rationale for
permitting credits against child-support arrears has been similarly
articulated by other courts.

Still other jurisdictions have permitted credits but have
made distinctions among types of arrearages that may be dis-
charged. For example, some have disallowed credit against arrear-
ages accumulating prior to the date of disability, reasoning that
there is no excuse for the failure to pay prior to the onset of
disability. See, e.g., Frens v. Frens, 478 N.W.2d 750 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Weaks v. Weaks, 821 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1991). Others have
allowed credits only against those arrearages accruing after the
child’s receipt of benefits. See, e.g., Potts v. Potts, 240 N.W.2d 680
(lowa 1976); Miller v. Miller, 929 S. W.2d 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996);

a)
44 Po

Mask v. Mask, 620 P.2d 883 (N.M. 1980); Children & Youth Servs.
of Allegheny County v. Chorgo, 491 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
With regard to arrearages accrued during the period between the
disability date or application for benefits and the commencement
of benefits payments, several courts have looked to factors such as
whether the failure to pay was willful and whether there was a
demonstrated inability to pay. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, supra;
Children & Youth Servs. of Allegheny County v. Chorgo, supra.

Among the highly varied holdings of these and other cases,
we find one consistent similarity: the consideration of equitable
factors in an effort to reach a fair and just result. Fact-specific
inquiries, most notably the non-custodial parent’s history of failure
to support, are central to the decisions. This standard is not
inconsistent with the approach to child support taken by this court.
Child-support cases in this state have long been subject to equi-
table considerations. See Parker v. Parker, 97 Ark. App. 298, 248
S.W.3d 523 (2007); Borden v. Borden, 20 Ark. App. 52, 724 S.W.2d
181 (1987). Our Administrative Order Number 10, which sets
forth child-support guidelines, directs that it is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the amount of support calculated pursuant to the
Family Support Chart is the amount to be awarded. Ark. Sup. Ct.
Admin. Order No. 10, § 1. A court setting an award of support
“may grant less or more support if the evidence shows that the
needs of the dependents require a different level of support.” Id.
The Administrative Order specifically takes into account Social
Security disability benefits: “For Social Security Disability recipi-
ents, the court should consider the amount of any separate awards
made to the disability recipient’s spouse and children on account of
the payor’s disability.”’ Id. § 3(c). Thus, we have not foreclosed the
possibility that Social Security benefits may affect a non-custodial
parent’s child-support obligation.

Hs The fact-intensive nature of these cases from other
jurisdictions leads us to the conclusion that equity would not be
well served by the pronouncement ofa bright-line rule allowing or
disallowing credits in all situations or allowing credits for arrear-
ages accrued during particular periods of time. Rather, we hold
that equitable considerations are applicable in determining
whether a non-custodial parent may receive a credit against
past-due child support by the payment of Social Security disability
benefits to the child for whom support is owed. The discretion in
this determination is best left to the circuit court. When consid-
ering the equities involved, the instant case is most analogous to

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Cd 45

Fowler v. Fowler, 244 A.2d 375 (Conn. 1968), a decision of the
Supreme Court of Connecticut. There, the trial court found that
“for more than five years the [non-custodial parent] had com-
pletely ignored the order of court, that at no time had he made any
payment from his personal funds in obedience to the order, and
that during that time the minor children received nothing from
him until the payments from the Social Security Administration
were initiated.” Fowler, 244 A.2d at 377. The Supreme Court of
Connecticut affirmed on appeal the trial court’s conclusion that
the Social Security Administration’s payments to the custodial
parent were not allowable as a credit against the non-custodial
parent’s arrears. Id. The holding was limited to the case at bar and
did not conclude as a matter of law that such a credit would not be
allowed “where the factual situation justifies such an order.” Id.

The equities in the instant case clearly favor Flossie Junior.
She testified at length regarding her difficulty accumulating suffi-
cient income, through her sometimes sporadic jobs as a beautician
and substitute school teacher, to cover her expenses. Her expenses
include those associated with caring for her nine-year-old daugh~
ter from a subsequent marriage and for her elderly mother. Flossie
also testified that she has long relied on food stamps, the free school
lunch program, and free children’s health insurance. Moreover,
she stated that she has amassed approximately $10,000 in credit-
card debt for family expenses, which she has been unable to repay.
In addition, her child-support case against Grays had been open for
seventeen years at the time of the hearing below, and she has been
forced to obtain multiple judgments against him for his failure to
pay.

For his part, Grays points out that he is disabled and has not
been gainfully employed since his disabling injury in November of
2001. He also avers that the child-support arrears accumulated
mostly during the period of his disability. In addition, he claimed
at the hearing to have paid $5,000 in child support at one point,
although Flossie denied that this payment had ever been made.
Grays also claimed to have purchased school clothes for his son and
to have provided health insurance for him while he was enrolled in
school. He asserted at the hearing that he was still paying for his
son’s life insurance.

Flossie Junior testified that her monthly income is less than
$700. Grays’s monthly disability payments exceed that amount,
even after the $156 deduction in accordance with the income

Zz CS

withholding notice. At the time of the hearing, Flossie was
supporting her young daughter and elderly mother, while Grays
had no dependents.* Most importantly, Grays had chronically
failed to pay child support, even before his disability, despite
multiple judgments against him for arrears. We agree with the
circuit court’s assessment; the fact that Shane received $15,835
from the Social Security Administration did nothing to relieve the
inequities borne by Flossie and caused by Grays’s utter failure to
honor his child-support obligation.

We hold that, in light of the equities involved, Grays was not
entitled to discharge his child-support arrears with the payment of
Social Security disability benefits to his son. Accordingly, the
order of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Laura NEAL, Individually and as Administratrix of Arvilla
Langston, Deceased, David Langston, and Lelia Branch v.
SPARKS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

08-169 289 S.W.3d 8

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

[Rehearing denied December 11, 2008.]

3 Grays testified that he had remarried but that he and his wife were currently
separated and had never lived together. He stated that his wife did not contribute to his
household expenses.

Sam Sexton III, for appellants.

Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: C. Wayne Harris and Jason T.
Browning, for appellee.

1M GUNTER, Justice. Appellants appeal the trial court’s denial

of their motions to (1) strike appellee’s amended answer
asserting the defense of charitable immunity and (2) substitute appel~
Jee’s insurance carrier as the party-defendant. Appellants assert that
appellee’s failure to timely assert the defense of charitable immunity
was prejudicial, therefore the trial court erred in not striking the
amended answer. We agree with appellants and reverse.

On July 23, 2003, Arvilla Langston died while under the
care of Sparks Regional Medical Center (Sparks), and her children
and estate filed suit against Sparks on July 19, 2005, alleging

zz” (CS

medical negligence.' Sparks filed an answer on September 8, 2005,
and an amended answer on January 26, 2007, in which it stated for
the first time that, as a not-for-profit Arkansas corporation, it was
entitled to charitable immunity. Appellants filed a motion to strike
this amended answer as prejudicial, but the motion was denied.

On May 21, 2007, Sparks filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
its status as a charitable organization and its qualification for
charitable immunity. In their response to the motion, appellants
requested that they be allowed to substitute Sparks’s insurance
carrier, Lexington Insurance Company (Lexington), as the proper
party-defendant and to file an amended complaint naming Lex-
ington as the defendant. Appellants also asked that they be granted
a 120-day extension to conduct discovery into Sparks’s entitle-
ment to charitable immunity, in the event the court denied their
motion to substitute Lexington as the party-defendant. The court
denied the motion for a discovery extension but held a hearing on
the motion for substitution of parties.

At the hearing, held July 13, 2007, appellants conceded that
they could not meet proof with proof on the issue of summary
judgment but argued that, under the existing case law, their
motion to substitute parties should be granted. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the court indicated that the motion to substitute
would be denied. Prior to a written order to that effect being filed,
appellants filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Ark. R.
Civ. P. 59 and 60, again arguing that their motion for substitution
of parties should have been granted and also asserting various
constitutional arguments.

On July 25, 2007, the court entered an order granting
appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denying appellants’
motion for substitution of parties. The court found that the
substitution was not proper under Ark. R. Civ. P. 25, as appellants
were not attempting to substitute a party for a deceased party, nor
was it proper under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15 to allow appellants to
amend their complaint and name Lexington as the party-
defendant, because appellants had not satisfied all the elements
necessary for an amended complaint to relate back to the date of
the original complaint. Specifically, the court found that appellants

" Sparks Medical Foundation was also named as a defendant in the complaint but was
later dismissed from the action without prejudice.

ee
Po 49

had not proven that Lexington received knowledge of the action
within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint, nor had
appellant shown that Lexington knew or should have known that,
but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against Lexington. To support its
ruling, the court cited George v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n, 337 Ark.
206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999) (holding that liability carrier named
in an amended complaint was entitled to summary judgment when
initial action brought against hospital only was not the result of
mistake of identity as to proper party and thus did not support
relation back for limitation purposes). Finally, on August 8, 2007,
the court issued an order denying appellants’ motion for reconsid-
eration. Appellants then filed a timely notice of appeal to this
court.

Before addressing the merits of this case, a brief discussion of
the history of charitable immunity may be helpful. Prior to 2002,
the law was well settled that charitable organizations were immune
from execution on their property and thus were immune from tort
liability. See, e.g., Helton v. Sisters of Mercy of St. Joseph’s Hosp., 234
Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961). Our law provided a remedy,
however, in that a charitable organization’s liability insurance
carrier could be sued directly. See Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-210
(Supp. 2007); George, supra.

However, in 2002, this court decided the case of Clayborn v.
Bankers Standard Insurance Co., 348 Ark. 557, 75 S.W.3d 174
(2002). In Clayborn, this court explained in dicta that there was a
distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from
liability: immunity from suit is the entitlement not to stand trial,
while immunity from liability is a mere defense to a suit. Id. The
Clayborn decision concluded that the direct-action statute provides
for direct actions against an insurer only in the event that the
organization at fault is immune from swif in tort. Id.

This new distinction was applied by the court of appeals, see
Stracener v. Williams, 84 Ark. App. 208, 137 S.W.3d 428 (2003),
and confirmed by this court’s decision in Scamardo v. Jaggers, 356
Ark. 236, 149 S.W.3d 311 (2004) (declining to overrule Clayborn).
However, in 2005, this court decided Low v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005), which held that the
distinction created in Clayborn was out of step with precedent and
was overruled. The Low decision clarified that the “not subject to
suit for tort” language in the direct-action statute is synonymous
with a charitable organization’s immunity from tort liability, so

50 _ |_|

where a charitable organization is not subject to an action in tort
(due to charitable immunity), its liability insurance carrier is
subject to a direct action. The recent case of Sowders v. St. Joseph’s
Mercy Health Center, 368 Ark. 466, 247 S.W.3d 514 (2007), further
elucidated the state of the law: “Plaintiffs alleging injury by
charitable organizations can bring suit against the charities’ liability
insurer via the direct-action statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-210.
Further, injured plaintiffs may bring suit against employees of
charitable organizations.” 368 Ark. at 470, 247 S.W.3d at 517.
And finally, in Felton v. Rebsamen Medical Center, 373 Ark. 472, 284
S.W.3d 486 (2008), this court clarified that charitable immunity is
an affirmative defense that must be specifically pled.

It is within the context of this case law that the present case
developed. For their first point on appeal, appellants argue that the
trial court erred in denying their motion to strike appellee’s
amended answer asserting charitable immunity as a defense. Rule
15 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party
may amend its pleadings at any time without leave of the court, but
if, upon motion of an opposing party, the court determines that
prejudice would result, the court may strike the amended pleading.
Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2008). We will not reverse a trial court’s
decision allowing or denying amendments to pleadings absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. Williams v. Brushy Island Pub. Water
Auth., 368 Ark. 219, 243 S.W.3d 903 (2006).

Appellants contend that, pursuant to Clayborn, supra, and
Scamardo, supra, they filed their original complaint against appellee
only, rather than appellee and its liability carrier. Appellants note
that their complaint simply alleged that appellee was a corporation
that operated a hospital in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and in its original
answer, appellee admitted it was “a not-for-profit Arkansas cor-
poration”’ operating a hospital in Fort Smith but did not mention
the affirmative defense of charitable immunity. Appellee did not
raise this defense until approximately sixteen months later, after
the Low and Sowders decisions, when it filed its amended answer. In
its ruling, the trial court found that the additional language in
appellee’s amended answer regarding charitable immunity “did
not plead additional facts or raise any new defenses’’ and therefore
was not prejudicial to appellants. On appeal, appellants urge that
appellee’s failure to timely assert the defense was prejudicial
because, had the defense been asserted earlier, appellants could
have added or substituted Lexington as the party-defendant in a

eC:

timely manner and also could have conducted discovery on the
issue of appellee’s eligibility for charitable immunity.

We hold that the trial court erred in holding that
appellee’s amended answer did not raise any new defenses. Merely
asserting its status as a not-for-profit corporation is not equivalent
to specifically raising the affirmative defense of charitable immu-
nity, as not all not-for-profit organizations will be immune under
the doctrine. See George, supra (enumerating the eight factors to
determine whether charitable immunity applies); see also Ouachita
Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997)
(holding that public-benefit corporation was not entitled to chari-
table immunity). And, as previously mentioned, Felton, supra,
established that charitable immunity must be specifically pled.

We also agree that allowing the amended answer was
prejudicial to appellants. At the time appellee filed its original
answer, appellants were still within the 120-day period for noti-
fying Lexington of the suit for relation-back purposes under Ark.
R. Civ. P. 15(c). But, by the time appellee filed its amended
answer, any attempt to add Lexington as a party would have been
untimely. This case is distinguishable from Sowders, supra, because
in that case, the liability pool administered by the Sisters of Mercy
did not constitute insurance for purposes of the direct action
statute, so there was no liability carrier that the appellant could
have added as a defendant and thus no prejudice in applying our
holding in Low and not allowing the appellant to collect a judg~
ment from the hospital. This case is also distinguishable from
Felton, supra. In that case, the appellant filed suit against the hospital
and the liability carrier, but later nonsuited his claim against the
liability carrier. Because the hospital had asserted the defense of
charitable immunity in its original answer, there was no prejudice
in finding the appellant’s second complaint against the liability
carrier was time-barred.

Because we find merit in appellants’ first argument, we
decline to discuss appellants’ other points on appeal. The trial
court’s order denying appellants’ motion to strike appellee’s
amended answer is reversed, and, as the grant of summary judg~
ment was based on appellee’s assertion of charitable immunity, the
order granting summary judgment to appellee is reversed as well.
We remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

52 =

Sharon McGHEE, Sydney McGhee, Roberto Salas,

Charles Stewart, Henry Evans, Craig Savell, and Patrick Henry Hayes,
Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons v.
ARKANSAS STATE BOARD of COLLECTION AGENCIES
and Rusty Guinn, Jerry Markham, Randy Bynum, Opal Lang,
and Gary Frala, in Their Official Capacities as Board Members
of the Arkansas State Board of Collection Agencies

08-164 289 S.W.3d 18

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

‘ie
ree =

Amold, Batson Turner & Turner, by: Todd Turner, Scholtens &
Averitt, by: Chris Averitt, for appellants.

Thrash Law Firm, by: Thomas P. Thrash, for appellees.

Rose Law Firm, by: John T. Hardin, for intervenor Arkansas
Financial Services Association.

Deborah Zuckerman, AARP Foundation; Michael Schuster,
AARP; Jim Jackson; and Eric Halperin, Melissa Briggs, Daniel Mosteller,
Center for Responsible Lending, for amici curiae AARP, Arkansas
Advocates for Children and Families, and Center for Responsible
Lending.

Brian G. Brooks, for amicus curiae Arkansas Trial Lawyers Ass’n.

UL E. Danierson, Justice. Appellants Sharon McGhee, et

al. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “McGhee”’) ap-
peal from the circuit court’s order denying their motion for declara-
tory judgment and finding that the Arkansas Check-Cashers Act,
Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 23-52-101-23-52-117 (Repl. 2000 &
Supp. 2007), was constitutional. McGhee’s sole point on appeal is that
the circuit court erred in denying her motion and in finding the Act
constitutional. Because we hold that the Check-Cashers Act is un-
constitutional in its entirety, we reverse and remand the matter for
entry of an order consistent with this court’s opinion.

Procedurally, this particular case, initially filed in 2003,
comes to the court for the third time on appeal, following two
remands. See McGhee v. Arkansas State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 368
Ark, 60, 243 S.W.3d 278 (2006) (McGhee Il); McGhee v. Arkansas
State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 360 Ark. 363, 201 S.W.3d 375
(2005) (McGhee 1). Because the underlying facts of this case have

| Cc ltwTLTCCtsSC

been set out in this court’s two previous opinions, there is no need
to recite them in full here. Suffice it to say, the matter was
originally brought against appellees Arkansas State Board of Col-
lection Agencies and its board members in a complaint alleging an
illegal exaction and alleging that all transactions under the Arkansas
Check-Cashers Act involved interest rates that violated the usury
provision of the Arkansas Constitution. See Ark. Const. art. 19,
§ 13. In addition, McGhee sought a declaratory judgment that the
Check-Cashers Act was unconstitutional. See McGhee I, supra.

Following our decision in McGhee I, in which we held that
the circuit court erred in dismissing the case, the circuit court
permitted Arkansas Financial Services Association (AFSA) to in-
tervene in the matter.’ See McGhee I], supra. Upon the filing of
cross-motions for summary judgment and a hearing on the mo-
tions, the circuit court entered its order finding that McGhee had
no valid illegal-exaction claim, thereby requiring the dismissal of
the claim with prejudice. In addition, the circuit court found that
it lacked jurisdiction to hear McGhee’s declaratory-judgment
claim due to the fact that she had failed to exhaust her administra~
tive remedies. On appeal, we affirmed the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment on McGhee’s illegal-exaction claim, but re-
versed and remanded with respect to her claim for declaratory
judgment, holding that McGhee was not required to first seek a
declaration regarding the constitutionality of the Check~Cashers
Act before the Board. See McGhee I, supra.

Following our decision in McGhee II, the circuit court held
a hearing on November 20, 2007, during which McGhee again
asked the circuit court to rule on the Act’s constitutionality. The
circuit court honored McGhee’s request and asked that an order be
prepared declaring that the Act was constitutional. Accordingly, an
order was entered in which the circuit court denied McGhee’s
request for declaratory judgment and found that the Check-
Cashers Act was constitutional. McGhee now appeals from that
order.

McGhee asserts that the Check-Cashers Act was designed to
accomplish a single purpose — to create an exception to the usury
limit for short-term payday loans. She maintains that the legislature
violated the Arkansas Constitution when it enacted the check-

* ‘The circuit court also granted Arkansas Federal Credit Union’s motion to intervene.
See McGhee U, supra.

ee

casher statutory scheme, which she claims was obviously designed
to exempt certain transactions from usury analysis. Moreover,
McGhee claims, the Act permits check-cashers to engage in
transactions that are truly loans and that involve fees that constitute
interest for usury purposes. McGhee avers that the Act at issue does
nothing more than allow persons to register with a state agency so
that they can assess charges that are no more than illegal interest.
She claims that because the Check-Cashers Act runs contrary to
Arkansas’s anti-usury policy and violates article 19, section 13 of
the Arkansas Constitution, the circuit court erred in finding the
Act constitutional.

The Board counters, initially, that because no actual, justi-
ciable controversy was presented to the circuit court, any declara-
tory judgment on the constitutionality of the Check-Cashers Act
‘was improper. With respect to the merits of the instant appeal, the
Board asserts that both the legislature and this court have carefully
considered the current statutory regulations of the Act at issue, and
neither found the regulations were in conflict with the constitu-
tional doctrine of separation of powers, nor incompatible with the
Arkansas Constitution. The Board additionally submits that after
removing an unconstitutional provision of the statute, the General
Assembly attempted to continue regulating what was once an
unregulated industry for the public’s benefit. It avers that McGhee
cannot reasonably claim that all transactions by entities licensed
under the Act are usurious. The Board urges that because the Act
does not in any way attempt to limit or restrict these businesses’
liability for a violation of Arkansas’s usury laws, it is not clearly or
unmistakably inconsistent with or in conflict with the Arkansas
Constitution. The Board, finally, maintains that no provision of
the Act, as currently written, violates the Arkansas Constitution,
and, further, that McGhee has failed to meet her burden of proving
the Act unconstitutional.

AFSA also responds, maintaining that McGhee failed to
meet her burden of proving that the Act is unconstitutional. It
further contends that McGhee has not presented an adequate
record to this court in support of her request for relief and that
there is no evidence that there was a justiciable controversy before
the circuit court. In addition, AFSA urges that the General
Assembly’s use of definitions within the Act did not render the Act
unconstitutional. McGhee replies that this court’s prior decisions

eee

in this case demonstrate that there is a justiciable controversy and
that she was entitled to a declaration on the constitutionality of the
Check-Cashers Act.

I. Justiciable Controversy

We must first address the contention of the Board and AFSA
that no justiciable controversy exists in the instant case, and, thus,
that McGhee’s request for a declaratory judgment on the consti~
tutionality of the Act was improper. Their argument is without
merit.

As McGhee points out, we at least suggested in a prior
opinion that McGhee’s actions with respect to her request for a
declaratory judgment were proper. In McGhee II, we specifically
rejected the argument of the Board and AFSA that McGhee was
required to first seek a declaration regarding the constitutionality
of the Act before the Board itself, commenting:

Here, the heart of Appellants’ complaint is that they are being
injured by the regulations set forth in the Check-Cashers Act due to
the fact that the Board continues to license and regulate payday
lenders under this Act, thereby allowing them to charge usurious
interest rates in violation of article 19, section 13. Thus, Appellants
properly sought a declaration in circuit court that the Check-
Cashers Act was unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand this matter to the circuit court.

368 Ark. at 69, 243 S.W.3d at 285.

HB But in addition, it is clear to this court that declaratory
relief lies in the instant case. Arkansas’s declaratory-judgment
statute provides that:

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or
other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract, or franchise may have determined any question of con-
struction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance,
contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or
other legal relations thereunder.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-104 (Repl. 2006). While this section
recognizes a party’s right to a declaratory judgment, a justiciable

EE
58 _

controversy is required. See Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d
332 (2002). Declaratory relief will lie where: (1) there is a justiciable
controversy; (2) it exists between parties with adverse interests; (3)
those seeking relief have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issues involved are ripe for decision. See Donovan v. Priest, 326 Ark.
353, 931 S.W.2d 119 (1996). On appeal, the question of whether
there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue shall be reviewed de
novo on the record of the circuit court. See Jegley, supra.

Here, a justiciable controversy is indeed present between
McGhee and the Board as to the implementation, application, and
effect of the Check-Cashers Act. McGhee, as one who has
engaged in transactions authorized by an Act that she believes is
unconstitutional, and the Board, which is charged with licensing
and regulating the businesses engaged in these transactions, are
indeed parties with adverse interests. In addition, McGhee cer-
tainly has a legal interest in the Board’s exercise of its authority
under the Act, and the matter is clearly ripe for decision, where the
declaratory-relief claim is the sole remaining claim in the action, as
previously stated by this court in McGhee II. Accordingly, declara-
tory relief lies. Moreover, we have held that a declaratory judg-
ment is especially appropriate in disputes between private citizens
and public officials about the meaning of the constitution or of
statutes. See McDonald v. Bowen, 250 Ark. 1049, 468 S.W.2d 765
(1971). It is, therefore, clear to this court that declaratory relief was
proper in the instant case.

IL Constitutionality of the Check-Cashers Act

In reviewing the constitutionality of an act, we recognize
that every act carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. See
City of Cave Springs v. City of Rogers, 343 Ark. 652, 37 S.W.3d 607
(2001). The burden of proof is on the party challenging the
legislation to prove its unconstitutionality, and all doubts will be
resolved in favor of the statute’s constitutionality, ifit is possible to
do so. See id. An act will be struck down only when there is a clear
incompatibility between the act and the constitution. See id.

We previously held that section 23-52-104(b) (Repl. 2000)
of the Check-Cashers Act was ‘‘an invalid attempt to evade the
usury provisions of the Arkansas Constitution and, further, that
such an attempt violate[d] the constitutional mandate requiring
separation of powers set forth in Article 4 of the Arkansas Consti-
tution.” Luebbers v. Money Store, Inc., 344 Ark. 232, 234, 40 S.W.3d

ee.

745, 746 (2001). However, McGhee’s claim in this case is that the
Check-Cashers Act, in its entirety, violates the usury provisions of
the Arkansas Constitution. The usury provisions in our constitu-
tion provide, in pertinent part:

(a) General Loans:

(i) The maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract
entered into after the effective date hereof shall not exceed five
percent (5%) per annum above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate
at the time of the contract.

(b) Consumer Loans and Credit Sales: All contracts for con-
sumer loans and credit sales having a greater rate of interest than
seventeen percent (17%) per annum shall be void as to principal and
interest and the General Assembly shall prohibit the same by law.

Ark. Const. art. 19, § 13(a, b).

We have held that the purpose of Arkansas’s strong anti-
usury policy, as reflected by the prohibition of usury in our
constitution, is to protect borrowers from excessive interest rates.
See State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., Inc., 336 Ark. 289, 985
S.W.2d 299 (1999), Moreover, we have observed that the plain
language of subsection (b) of article 19, section 13 “mandates that
the General Assembly prohibit usurious contracts.” Id. at 294, 985
S.W.2d at 301. The question before us, then, is whether the
Check-Cashers Act permits usurious contracts.

Only if the transaction at issue constitutes a loan and if the
fees charged constitute interest will the constitutional prohibition
against usurious interest rates apply. See Luebbers, supra. Accord-
ingly, we must determine whether the transactions authorized by
the Check-Cashers Act constitute loans and whether the fees
charged constitute interest.

a. Whether the transactions constitute loans

Generally speaking, a deferred-presentment transaction, or
“payday loan,” has been described as a transaction in which the
consumer writes a check, the amount of which includes the

2 Consequently, the General Assembly repealed that subsection, See Act 1962 of
2008, § 106.

oF

amount of the cash to be advanced to the customer, plus a service
fee. See Dee Pridgen & Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Credit and
the Law § 5:6 (2008). The understanding is that the business
advancing the funds “will not attempt to cash the check until the
due date.” Id. On the due date, the customer “‘can simply allow the
check to be cashed, or can renew or ‘rollover’ the transaction by
payment” of another service fee. Id. In Arkansas, “deferred pre-
sentment option” has been defined by our General Assembly as:

a transaction pursuant to a written agreement involving the follow-
ing combination of activities in exchange for a fee:

(A) Accepting a customer’s personal check dated on the date it
‘was written;

(8) Paying that customer an amount of money equal to the face
amount of that check less any fees charged pursuant to this chapter;
and

(C) Granting the customer the option to repurchase the cus-
tomer’s personal check for an agreed period of time prior to
presentment of such check for payment or deposit. The term
“deferred presentment” includes related terms such as “delayed

deposit”, “deferred deposit”, or substantially similar terms evidenc-
ing the same type of transaction[.]

Ark. Code Ann. § 23-52-102(5) (Supp. 2007).

Hy lnitially, we must determine whether the transaction
permitted by the Act constitutes a loan, which would then call into
question whether any fee collected by a check-casher is interest.
“Loan’”’ is defined as “[a] thing lent for the borrower’s temporary
use; esp., a sum of money lent at interest.” Black’s Law Dictionary
954 (8th ed. 2004). “‘To constitute a loan, there must be a contract
under which, in substance, one party transfers to the other money
that the other party agrees to repay absolutely, together with
additional amounts as agreed for its usé, regardless of its form.”’ 47
CJ.S. Interest & Usury § 192 (2008). Likewise, this court has
observed that “[w]hen a loan is made, the money is borrowed for
a fixed time, and the borrower promises to repay such amount at a
fixed future date.” Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 380-81, 135 S.W.
896, 898 (1911).

It is clear from the statutory definition set forth above that an
Arkansas check-casher pays, pursuant to a written agreement, an
agreed-upon amount to its customer, less any fee charged pursuant

ee

to the Act, upon presentment of the customer’s check payable to
the check-casher. In addition, that customer can “‘repurchase”’ his
or her check within the agreed period of time. In other words,
when the customer “repurchases” his or her check, he or she must
pay the check-casher the amount of the check. We hold that such
a transaction is a loan, as the check-casher is clearly loaning money
to its customer for a fee with the expectation of repayment. See,
e.g., Betts v. McKenzie Check Advance of Florida, LLC, 879 So. 2d 667
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that there could be no question
that what takes place in a deferred-presentment transaction is
essentially an advance of money or a short-term loan).

b. Whether the fees charged constitute interest

HB Next, we must determine whether the fee paid to the
check-casher by the customer constitutes interest. We have pre-
viously defined “interest” as “[t]he compensation which is paid by
the borrower of money to the lender for its use, and, generally, by
a debtor to his creditor in recompense for his detention of the
debt.” Winston v. Personal Fin. Co. of Pine Bluff, Inc., 220 Ark. 580,
585, 249 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1952) (quoting Bouvier’s Law Dictio-
nary). In Winston, we held that fees charged under the Arkansas
Installment Loan Law, which were part of the lender’s overhead
expense in doing business, were “‘in reality, nothing more or less
than interest charges[.]” Id., 249 S.W.2d at 318. Our review of the
instant Act reveals that it specifically authorizes a check-casher’s
charge of “‘a reasonable fee to defray operational costs incurred{.]’’”?
Ark. Code Ann. § 23-52-104(a) (Supp. 2007). Because that fee is

2 "The statute further provides:

(b) Unless otherwise authorized by this chapter, the fees authorized by this section shall not
exceed the following:

(1) For the service of selling currency or check in exchange for checks, without regard to
whether a deferred presentment option is involved:

(A) A fee not to exceed five percent (5%) of the face amount of the check if the check is
the payment of any kind of state public assistance or federal social security benefit payable to the
bearer of the check or the check is otherwise a check issued by a federal or state governmental
entity;

(B) A fee not in excess of ten percent (10%) of the face amount of any personal check or
money order; or

ees
62 Sr

in reality an amount owed to the lender in return for the use of
borrowed money, we must conclude that the fees authorized
clearly constitute interest.

Our conclusion is further evidenced by the Act’s require-
ment that any agreement for a deferred-presentment option shall
contain a written explanation that “shall contain a statement of the
total amount of any fees charged for the deferred presentment
option expressed both in United States currency and as an annual
percentage rate.” Ark. Code Ann. § 23-52-106(c) (Repl. 2000)
(emphasis added). “Annual percentage rate,” commonly referred
to as an APR, is “[t]he actual cost of borrowing money, expressed
in the form of an annualized interest rate.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary
831 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Despite the Act’s attempt to
label these charges as fees, that does not exempt them from our
scrutiny. See, e.g., Luebbers, supra. As we have oft stated, “The law
shells the covering and extracts the kernel. Names amount to
nothing when they fail to designate the facts.” Luebbers, 344 Ark. at
239, 40 S.W.3d at 750. In other words, merely because the Act so
labels does not make it so. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
the fees authorized by the Act unmistakably constitute interest.

c. Whether the Act permits usurious charges

With these conclusions in mind, we turn to McGhee’s
claim that the Act authorizes usurious transactions. We hold that
there is no question that it does. According to our calculations,‘ if
a customer wrote a check-casher a check for $100, incurring an
interest charge of ten percent (10%), plus a $10 fee (both of which

(©) A fee not in excess of six percent (6%) of the face amount of the check in the case of
allother checks. Such a fee may be collected separately or by paying the customer an amount of
money equal to the face amount of the check less the appropriate fee under this chapter;

2) For a deferred presentment option which involves a personal check, an additional fee
not to exceed ten dollars (§10.00) may be charged by a check-casher; and

@) Inaddition to the foregoing fees, a check-casher may charge a fee of no more than five
dollars ($5.00) to set up an initial customer account and issue an optional identification card for
providing check-cashing services. A replacement optional identification card may be issued at a
cost not to exceed five dollars (85.00).

Ark, Code Ann, § 23-52-104(b) (Supp. 2007).

* According to information previously published by the Board, which is included in
the record, an APR is calculated as follows:

ee

are authorized by the Act) for a thirty-one (31) day loan,’ it would
result in an APR of 294%.‘ In the instant case, sample contracts
contained in the record reflected APR rates ranging from 168.20%
to 558.71%. Such rates of interest are clearly and unmistakably
usurious and in violation of article 19, section 13.7

HI Because the Act so clearly authorizes usurious interest
rates, it cannot stand. Here, AFSA argues that the Act regulates
two different types of businesses, check-cashing and deferred-
presentment options, and that should this court deem any portion
of the Act unconstitutional, we should remand the matter to the
circuit court to have those portions severed. We will not do so. To
determine whether the invalidity of part of an act is fatal to the
entire legislation, we look to: (1) whether a single purpose is meant
to be accomplished by the act, and (2) whether the sections of the
act are interrelated and dependent upon each other. See City of
North Little Rock v, Pulaski County, 332 Ark. 578, 968 S.W.2d 582

1. customer check amount - payment to customer = finance charge
2. payment to customer = amount financed

3. APR = finance charge / [(amount financed x days outstanding) / 365]

5 “A check-casher shall not defer presentment of any check for less than six (6)
calendar days nor more than thirty-one (31) calendar days after the date the check is sold to
the check-casher” Ark, Code Ann. § 23-52-106(d). For a six-day loan involving the same
amounts, the APR would be as much as 1521%.

© Despite the Act’s limitation on the loan amount to $400, a thirty-one day loan of that
amount would still result in an APR of 168%, and a six-day loan would result in an APR of
869%. See Ark. Code Ann. § 23-52-106(m).

7 Indeed, some commentators maintain that such transactions can result in an annual
percentage rate of unimaginable proportion. See Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson,
The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending,
25 Yale J. on Reg. 181 (2008) (suggesting 780%); Jean Ann Fox, Fringe Bankers: Economic
Predators or a New Financial Services Model?, 30 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 135 (2007) (suggesting an
annual interest rate of 390% to 780% for a $300 loan costing between $45 and $90 for a
two-week term); Joseph R. Falasco, Comment, Who's Getting Used in Arkansas: An Analysis
of Usury, Check Cashing, and the Arkansas Check-Cashers Act, 55 Ark, L. Rev. 149 (2002)
(suggesting that the Arkansas Check~Cashers Act permits interest rates in excess of 2000%);
Charles A. Bruch, Comment, Taking the Pay out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious
and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257 (2001)

* Guggesting annual percentage rates from 390% to 7300%, with an average of 500%).

ee
64 Pd

(1998). The mere fact that an act contains a severability clause is to
be considered, but is not alone determinative. See id.

While Act 1216 of 1999 does contain a severability clause in
section 19, the Act further provides that the purpose of the Act was
“to provide an Act to license and regulate check-cashing and
deferred presentment option businesses.”’ In addition, the Emer-
gency Clause of the Act proclaims that “the effectiveness of this act
on its passage or approval is essential to the operation of the
deferred presentment check-cashing and other check-cashing
business in Arkansas[.]” Act 1216 of 1999, § 21. Despite the Act’s
severability clause, it is evident to this court from both of these
statements that the General Assembly’s intent was to pass the Act as
a whole or not at all. See, e.g., City of North Little Rock, supra.
Furthermore, our review of the Act reveals that its provisions
concerning the business of check-cashing and the business of
deferred-presentment options are so intertwined that severance
would be inappropriate. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark.
251, 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994) (observing that when portions of an
act are mutually connected and interwoven, severability is not
appropriate). For these reasons, we declare the entirety of the
Check-Cashers Act unconstitutional.

On a final note, it was argued to this court both in the briefs
and at oral argument by those in favor of the Act that the
check~-cashers provide a service to Arkansas citizens that would not
otherwise be available. While such a statement might have some
semblance of truth, we simply “must refuse to allow arguments,
however plausible, to lead us away from the plain wording and
spirit of our Constitution.” Winston, 220 Ark. at 587, 249 S.W.2d.
at 319. Our duty in these types of cases was eloquently stated in a
previous decision involving a usurious loan pursuant to article 19,
section 13:

This section is clear and unambiguous. With the wisdom and
policy of it the courts have nothing to do. It is their duty to carry
into effect according to its true intent, to be gathered from its own
words, without regard to the hardships incident to the faithful
execution of such laws.

German Bank v. DeShon, 41 Ark. 331, 337 (1883) (decision under
prior version of article 19, section 13, which provided that all
contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum per annum
shall be void).

Pe és

In sum, because the Check-Cashers Act clearly authorizes
loans charging usurious rates of interest in contravention of the
limits set forth in article 19, section 13, we hold that the Act, in its
entirety, clearly and unmistakably conflicts with our constitution
and is unconstitutional. We, therefore, reverse the order of the
circuit court and remand for entry of an order consistent with this
opinion.

Wits, J., not participating.

Roger and Ruth ANDERSON d/b/a Anderson Auto Salvage v.
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY

08-232 289 S.W.3d 52

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

66 ——

eee

Eichenbaum, Liles & Heister, P.A., by: Christopher O. Parker, for
appellants.

Barrett & Deacon, P.A., by: John C. Deacon, Brandon J. Harrison,
and Andrew H. Dallas, for appellee.

ps Curiam. [J Appellants Roger and Ruth Anderson,
owners of Anderson Auto Salvage, appeal from an order
entered by the Craighead County Circuit Court that vacated a
decision by the Arkansas State Highway Commission (Commission).
Because the Andersons submitted a brief without a proper abstract in
violation of Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(5), we order rebriefing.

Rule 4~-2(a)(5) provides, in pertinent part:

The appellant’s abstract or abridgment of the transcript should
consist of an impartial condensation, without comment or empha-
sis, of only such material parts of the testimony of the witnesses and
colloquies between the court and counsel and other parties as are
necessary to an understanding of all questions presented to the
Court for decision.

The procedure to be followed when an appellant has submitted an
insufficient abstract or addendum is set forth in Ark. Sup. Ct. R.

4-2(b)(3):

‘Whether or not the appellee has called attention to deficiencies in
the appellant’s abstract or Addendum, the Court may address the
question at any time. If the Court finds the abstract or Addendum.
to be deficient such that the Court cannot reach the merits of the
case, or such as to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the
disposition of the appeal, the Court will notify the appellant that he
or she will be afforded an opportunity to cure any deficiencies, and
has fifteen days within which to file a substituted abstract, Adden-
dum, and brief, at his or her own expense, to conform to Rule
4-2(a)(5) and (8). Mere modifications of the original brief by the
appellant, as by interlineation, will not be accepted by the Clerk.
Upon the filing of such a substituted brief by the appellant, the
appellee will be afforded an opportunity to revise or supplement the
brief, at the expense of the appellant or the appellant’s counsel, as
the Court may direct. Ifafter the opportunity to cure the deficien-

pe a

cies, the appellant fails to file a complying abstract, Addendum and
brief within the prescribed time, the judgment or decree may be
affirmed for noncompliance with the Rule.

The Andersons’ brief in this case is deficient for multiple
reasons. The Andersons failed to abstract key portions of a hearing
before the Commission held on January 23, 2007; specifically, the
Andersons did not abstract arguments presented on the issue of
preemption by federal law. Further, the Andersons failed to
adequately abstract arguments on preemption and the Commis-
sion’s alleged procedural errors that were presented to the circuit
court at a hearing held on October 5, 2007.1 Finally, the Ander-
sons’ addendum omits relevant material, including requests for a
hearing before the Commission, notice of hearings, BSNF’s peti-
tion for review filed in the circuit court, and the parties’ briefs filed
in the circuit court. The appellee submitted a supplemental ab-
stract and addendum, which would normally cure the appellant’s
deficiencies. See Cortinez v. Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof
Conduct, 353 Ark. 104, 111 S.W.3d 369 (2003). However, BSNF’s
supplemental abstract is also deficient in that it does not condense
arguments and testimony presented at hearings held before the
Commission and the circuit court; instead, BSNF essentially
reproduced the transcript.

Because the Andersons have failed to comply with Rule
4-2(a)(5), we order them to file a substituted abstract, addendum,
and brief within fifteen days from the date of entry of this order. If
the Andersons fail to do so within the prescribed time, the
judgment appealed from may be affirmed for noncompliance with
Rule 4-2. After service of the substituted abstract, addendum, and
brief, BSNF shall have an opportunity to revise or supplement its
brief in the time prescribed by the Court.

Rebriefing ordered.

' The Appellants incorrectly labeled this hearing as “Hearing Before the Arkansas
Highway Commission of November 05, 2007” in their briefs Table of Contents, The
record shows that this hearing was before the circuit court, and that it was held on October
5, 2007.

68 =

Ymari Boyce REID v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1221 289 S.W.3d 54

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 6, 2008

John L. Keamey, for appellant.

No response.

eR Curiam. Appellant, Ymari Boyce Reid, by and

through her attorney, John L. Kearney, filed a motion for
rule on clerk to file her record and have her appeal docketed on
October 17, 2008. The State has not responded to the motion. The
clerk refused to accept the record because the record before us does
not show strict compliance with Arkansas Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure—Civil 5(b)(1)(C).

We have held that Rule 5(b)(1) applies to both civil
and criminal cases for the determination of the timeliness of a
record on appeal. See Bond v. State, 373 Ark. 37, 280 S.W.3d 20
(2008) (per curiam). Nevertheless, on September 18, 2008, this
court adopted a rule change to Arkansas Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure—Criminal 4, and specifically Rule 4(c), to provide for notice
to prosecutors of record extensions and a deemed consent to the

_ |__| ©

extension if the prosecutor does not object within ten days after
being served a copy of the extension motion:

A motion by the defendant for an extension of time to file the
record shall explain the reasons for the requested extension, and a
copy of the motion shall be served on the prosecuting attorney.
The circuit court may enter an order granting the extension if the
circuit court finds that all parties consent to the extension and that
an extension is necessary for the court reporter to include the
stenographically reported material in the record on appeal. If the
prosecuting attorney does not file a written objection to the
extension within ten (10) days after being served a copy of the
extension motion, the prosecuting attorney shall be deemed to have
consented to the extension, and the circuit court may so find.

In re Rules of Supreme Court & Court of Appeals, Rule 4-3, 374 Atk.
App’x 566 (Sept. 18, 2008) (per curiam).

In the instant case, counsel for Reid states “‘on infor~
mation and belief’ in her motion for rule on clerk that the
prosecutor was served with the motion for an extension of time to
file the record. The prosecutor did not file a written objection; nor
did he contest the facts set forth in Reid’s motion for rule on clerk.
Under the new rule, Rule 4(c), Reid is in compliance because the
prosecutor was served with the extension motion and filed no
objection. Though the extension granted by the trial court oc-
curred before the effective date of Rule 4(c), which was October
1, 2008, the rule is remedial, and we apply it retroactively.

Granted.

70 =

TERIS, LLC; Op-Tech Environmental Services, Inc.;
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Harold CHANDLER; Connie
Chandler; Jerry Fifer; Pearline Fifer; Benito Glosson;
Latoria Glosson; Jimmie Lark; Mildred Lark; Alvin McGhee;
Sheila McGhee; Carolyn Yarbrough; Eddie Yarbrough, Jr.

08-692 289 S.W.3d 63

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 13, 2008

Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, L.L.P., by: Thomas W. Fee, Howard
J. Klatsky, and P. Wes Black; Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey,
L.L.P., by: Matt Thomas, for appellant Teris, L.L.C.

Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Sherry
P. Bartley, for appellant Op-Tech Environmental Services, Inc.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Kevin A. Crass and R.
Christopher Lawson, for appellant CSX Transportation, Inc.

Allen P. Roberts, P.A.; John W. Walker, P.A.; Vickery & Carroll,
P.A.; and McMath Woods, P.A., for appellees.

onatp L. Corsi, Justice. This appeal of a class-action
certification is before us again after we reversed and
remanded the matter due to the fact that the certification order

n |__| -

contained two different class definitions. See Teris, LLC v. Golliher,
371 Ark. 369, 266 S.W.3d 730 (2007) (Teris I). Appellants Teris, LLC,
Op-Tech Environmental Services, Inc., and CSX Transportation,
Inc., again argue that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’
request for class certification. As this is a second appeal, our jurisdic-
tion is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(7). We find no error and
affirm.

The underlying facts of this case are sufficiently set forth in
Teris I. Suffice it to say, Appellees, who are individuals who were
within the mandatory evacuation area following an explosion and
fire at the Teris facility, filed suit against Appellants and sought
class-action status. Upon an order by the trial court granting class
certification, Appellants appealed to this court, arguing that class
certification was not warranted in several respects. See Teris I.
Because the trial court’s order contained differing class definitions,
we reversed and remanded the matter for clarification as to the
appropriate class definition.

Upon remand, Appellees filed a motion submitting an
amended and substituted order granting class certification. In the
proposed order, four plaintiffs were removed from the case caption
and the class was defined as follows:

(a) All adults;
(b) Who as of January 2, 2005;

(c) Resided or occupied a business premise in Areas A, B, or C, as
shown on Exhibit “1”; and

(@) Who, in fact, physically evacuated from Areas A, B, ot C, as
shown on Exhibit “1” because of the fire and explosion event at
Teris on that date.

In addition to removing certain named plaintiffs and modi-
fying the class definition, the proposed order sought the following
additional changes:

() Clarifies that the damages issue to be resolved in a common
trial is limited to the value of the discomfort, disruption and
inconvenience proximately caused due to each class member being
evacuated from his or her home or business premises due to the

pe z

January 2, 2005 event that gives rise to this action, and further sets
out that these claims may be tried in two subclasses of those who
returned the evening of January 2, 2005, and those who were
allowed to return the following day;

(c) Provides that the court will determine the issue of strict or
absolute liability, not the jury; and

(d) Provides that individual trials will be held, if necessary, on
elements of damages that are not common to each member of the
class. These trials will be limited to elements of damages proxi-
mately caused by the January 2,2005, incident that are not common
to the entire class, including, without limitation, (i) actual medical
expenses associated with physician visits; (ii) actual expenses related
to meals, lodging, and travel resulting from being evacuated; (iii)
lost income, earnings, or wages; (iv) expenses actually incurred, or
compensation for, removing soot and smoke residue from real and
personal property.

The trial court held a hearing on the proposed amended
order on May 2, 2008. Thereafter, the court entered of record the
amended and substituted order granting class certification. This
appeal followed.

Standard of Review

Class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf ofall only if (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties and
their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as
a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

1 |_| r

controversy. At an early practicable time after the commencement
of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained. For purposes of this
subdivision, “practicable” means reasonably capable of being accom-
plished. An order under this section may be altered or amended at
any time before the court enters final judgment. An order certify-
ing a class action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or
defenses.

Our law is well settled that the six requirements for class-action
certification include: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality,
(4) adequacy, (5) predominance, and (6) superiority. See Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Bryant, 374 Ark. 38, 285 S.W.3d 634 (2008).

The determination that the class-certification criteria have
been satisfied is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial
court, and this court will not reverse the trial court’s decision
absent an abuse of that discretion. ChartOne, Inc. v. Raglon, 373
Ark. 275, 283 S.W.3d 576 (2008); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
Hicks, 349 Ark. 269, 78 S.W.3d 58 (2002). In reviewing a
class-certification order, this court focuses on the evidence in the
record to determine whether it supports the trial court’s conclu-
sion regarding certification. Hicks, 349 Ark. 269, 78 S.W.3d 58.
Neither the trial court nor this court shall delve into the merits of
the underlying claims when deciding whether the Rule 23 re-
quirements have been met. Id. In this regard, our court has said that
“4 trial court may not consider whether the plaintiffs will
ultimately prevail, or even whether they have a cause of action.’ ”
Bryant, 374 Ark. at 42, 285 S.W.3d at 638 (quoting Carquest of Hot
Springs, Inc. v. Gen. Parts, Inc., 367 Ark. 218, 223, 238 S.W.3d 916,
920 (2006)). We, thus, view the propriety of a class action as a
procedural question. See id.

In the present appeal, in addition to challenging the class
definition, Appellants also challenge the trial court’s findings with
regard to typicality, predominance, and superiority, as well as some
procedural aspects of the certification order. Remaining mindful
of our standard in reviewing class-certification orders, we now
turn to the issues on appeal.

1. Class Definition

The first argument on appeal is whether the trial court erred
in certifying this as a class action because of an insufficient class

|
PTT 7

definition. Teris' argues that the class as defined by the amended
and substituted order does not provide sufficiently objective cri-
teria with which to identify class members. Specifically, Teris
contends that the class definition fails to define the phrase “occu-
pied a business premises” or the term “‘evacuated” and further
avers that in order to ascertain class membership, the trial court
will necessarily have to engage in an individualized inquiry as to
whether a person evacuated and the subjective reasons for doing
so. Appellees counter that the terms utilized in the class definition
are normal, everyday terms and that the definition provides a
feasible manner for determining class membership.

Hl In addressing the issue of class definition, this court has
recently said:

It is axiomatic that in order for a class action to be certified, a class
must exist. The definition of the class to be certified must first meet
a standard that is not explicit in the text of Rule 23, that the class be
susceptible to precise definition. This is to ensure that the class is
neither “amorphous,” nor “imprecise.” Concurrently, the class
representatives must be members of that class. Thus, before a class
can be certified under Rule 23, the class description must be
sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court
to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the
proposed class. Furthermore, for a class to be sufficiently defined,
the identity of the class members must be ascertainable by reference
to objective criteria.

Van Buren Sch. Dist. v. Jones, 365 Ark. 610, 613-14, 232 S.W.3d 444,
448 (quoting Hicks, 349 Ark. 269, 280-81, 78 S.W.3d 58, 64-65).
This court further elaborated that a class must be susceptible to
definition and cannot be amorphous or imprecise. Hicks, 349 Ark.
269, 78 S.W.3d 58; Ferguson v. Kroger Co., 343 Ark. 627, 37 S.W.3d
590 (2001). In Ferguson, this court pointed out that clearly defining the
class insures that those people who are actually harmed by the
defendant’s wrongful conduct will participate in the relief ultimately
awarded.

The present case is distinguishable from Ferguson and South-
western Bell Yellow Pages v. Pipkin Enterprises., Inc., 359 Ark. 402, 198
S.W.3d 115 (2004), two notable cases where this court found that

1 Neither Op-Tech nor CSX challenges the sufficiency of the class definition.

r | -

a class was not properly defined. In Pipkin, a case involving an
allegation that the appellant improperly charged interest on over-
due payments for advertising contracts, the court stated that there
were no objective criteria that the circuit court could use to
identify class members. The class was defined as: “All Arkansas
customers of Defendants who paid or were charged usurious
interest charges since November 15, 1997.” Pipkin, 359 Ark. at
405, 198 S.W.3d at 117. This court reasoned that the circuit court,
in determining class membership, would have to make a determi-
nation of the ultimate issue, which was whether each prospective
class member had been charged interest in excess of that allowed by
the Arkansas Constitution.

In Ferguson, 343 Ark. 627, 37 S.W.3d 590, this court
affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification on the basis
that there was no defined class, nor was it possible to define the
class. Ferguson involved a proposed class action against Kroger for
negligence, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, misrepresenta-
tion, and conversion stemming from allegations that the store
induced people to shop there by misrepresenting the savings from
double coupons. In ruling that there was no defined class, this
court pointed out that identifying class membership was practically
an insurmountable challenge because of all the varied facts at issue
in the case. This court concluded that under that proposed
definition, anyone could claim to have been induced to shop at
Kroger to take advantage of the double coupons, and there would
be no objective criteria, i.e., records, to verify such claim.

Here, the class is defined as all adults, who as of January 2,
2005, resided or occupied a business premise in Areas A, B, or C,
as shown on Exhibit “1”; and who, in fact, physically evacuated
from Areas A, B, or C, as shown on Exhibit “1” because of the fire
and explosion event at Teris on that date.? This definition clearly
provides objective criteria for ascertaining class membership with-
out requiring an investigation into the merits of each individual’s
claim. See, e.g., Bryant, 374 Ark. 38, 285 S.W.3d 634. Teris’s
argument that the definition is deficient for failing to define certain
terms is without merit, as those terms are capable of being
understood.

2 Exhibit 1 is a geographic map detailing the three areas near the Teris facility from
which individuals evacuated following the explosion and fire.

pe :

2. Typicality

Second, both Teris and Op-Tech! argue that the trial court’s
order should be reversed because the class members’ claims and
defenses are not typical of the class. According to Appellants, the
experiences of the named representatives with regard to existence
of an injury, nature and cause of an injury, and calculation of
damages are not typical of the purported class. According to
Appellants, the injuries of the putative class members are neither
sufficiently similar nor typical.

Appellees argue to the contrary that while the exact impact
of Appellants’ conduct on each of them may not be precisely the
same, it does not mean that the value of each claim is so different
as to warrant separate trials. In advancing their argument that they
satisfied the typicality requirement, Appellees rely on this court’s
holding in Summons v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 306 Ark. 116, 813
S.W. 2d 240 (1991), and argue that the present case is virtually
indistinguishable from Summons.

In Summons, this court affirmed the class certification of
plaintiffs who claimed they suffered a variety of damages when the
defendant’s train overturned and released volatile and toxic chemi-
cals into the area. The common issues in that case were the
existence of strict liability, and whether the railroad was negligent,
while the individual issues were proximate causation and the
extent of damages suffered by each class member. In addressing the
typicality factor in Summons, this court. referred to H. Newberg,
Class Actions § 3.13, and stated:

‘Typicality determines whether a sufficient relationship exists
between the injury to the named plaintiff and the conduct affecting
the class, so that the court may properly attribute a collective nature
to the challenged conduct. In other words, when such a relation-
ship is shown, a plaintiff's injury arises from or is directly related to
a wrong to a class, and that wrong includes the wrong to the
plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiffs claim is typical if it arises from the same
event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of
other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same
legal theory. When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was

> Reference to Op~Tech is actually reference to both CSX and Op~Tech who
submitted a joint brief in this matter, but for purposes of clarity, we will simply refer to
Op-Tech where it is necessary to distinguish among Appellants.

0 |_| -

directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought
to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually met irrespec-
tive of varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims.
[Footnotes omitted.)

306 Ark. at 121, 813 S.W.2d at 243.

HM Much like in Summons, Appellants here attempt to
argue that there is no typicality because Appellees’ claims vary,
both among each other and from other possible class members.
This argument reveals, however, the flawed analysis utilized by
Appellants in addressing the issue of typicality. As explained by
Newberg, and approved by the court in cases such as Summons and
its progeny, the correct inquiry focuses on whether the claims of
the representatives and the class members are based on the same
legal theory and include allegations that the same illegal conduct
affected the representatives and the class sought to be represented.

Here, Appellees alleged negligence and strict liability on the
part of Appellants as a result of the explosions and fires at the Teris
facility that resulted in their evacuation. These allegations are the
same for all parties. In addressing the criteria of typicality, the trial
court noted that all of the claims arose from a single event, the fire
and explosion at the Teris facility and that one element of damage
sought is common to all representatives and class members, namely
damages for discomfort, disruption, and inconvenience. The fact
that individual members of the class may have varying damages as
aresult of the single incident, the explosions and fires and resulting
evacuation, does not defeat the conclusion that typicality is satis-
fied. In fact, our case law is clear that the essence of the typicality
requirement is the conduct of the defendants and not the varying
fact patterns and degree of injury or damage to individual class
members. See BNL Equity Corp. v. Pearson, 340 Ark. 351, 10
S.W.3d 838 (2000); Summons, 306 Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that
Appellees established the requirement of typicality.

3, Predominance

As their next point on appeal, Teris and Op-Tech argue that
class certification is inappropriate in this matter because common
issues of fact and law do not predominate over individual issues.
Teris takes issue with that part of the trial court’s order that
provides that “[e]ach Plaintiff and class member . . . suffered at least

pe '

one element of damage that was common to all, namely the
discomfort, disruption, and inconvenience proximately resulting
from the evacuation.”’ According to Teris, this fact has not been
proven and the levels of alleged discomfort, disruption, and
inconvenience will be different for all class members. Op-Tech
avers that certification is not warranted where the only thing that
class members have in common is that they were exposed to an
explosion at the Teris facility. According to Op-Tech, the issue of
proximate cause is inherently individual for each class member and
is not suitable for a common trial. Finally, within this argument,
Op-Tech argues that allowing this matter to proceed as a class
action would violate their right to due process.

Appellees counter that there is commonality here, as the
issues of liability, allocation of fault, causation, and damages are
common to all class members. Moreover, because each of these
issues predominates over any individual issues it was proper for the
trial court to grant class certification. Moreover, Appellees aver
that the damages at issue were proximately caused by a single event
and were suffered by every member of the class. Finally, Appellees
argue that there is no merit to Op-Tech’s claim regarding a
violation of its constitutional rights.

In addressing the issue of predominance, the trial court
noted that it does not merely compare the individual versus
common claims, but rather must decide if the common issues
predominated over individual issues that could be resolved during
a decertified stage of bifurcated proceedings. The trial court
further noted that Appellants’ common conduct resulting in the
fire and explosion forms the basis for the class action and affected
all class members by causing their evacuation and thus predomi-
nated over any individual issues. We cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in this regard.

HB Rule 23(6) requires that “the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.” Ark. R. Civ. P.
23(b). In Johnson’s Sales Co. v. Harris, 370 Ark. 387, 260 S.W.3d
273 (2007), this court reiterated that the starting point in examin-
ing the predominance issue is whether a common wrong has been
alleged against the defendant. If a case involves preliminary,
common issues of liability and wrongdoing that affect all class
members, the predominance requirement of Rule 23 is satisfied,
even if the circuit court must subsequently determine individual
damage issues in bifurcated proceedings. Id. Moreover, this court

Ee
82 J =

has recognized that a bifurcated process of certifying a class to
resolve preliminary, common issues and then decertifying the class
to resolve individual issues, such as damages, is consistent with
Rule 23. Id.

The ultimate question to be resolved in analyzing the issue
of predominance is whether there are overarching issues that can
be addressed before resolving individual issues. Johnson’s Sales, 370
Ark. 387, 260 S.W.3d 273. However, if preliminary issues are
individualized, then the predominance requirement is not satis-
fied. See id. Indeed, a case that presents numerous individual issues
regarding the defendants’ conduct, causation, injury, and damages
will best be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Id.

This court has noted that it is more inclined to approve class
certification in mass-accident cases than in products-liability or
toxic-tort cases. See Baker v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Div., 338 Ark. 242,
992 S.W.2d 797 (1999). Baker, a products-liability case stemming
from the manufacture of certain diet drugs later discovered to
cause health problems, explained the distinction between the two
different types of mass-tort cases, stating:

Mass-tort actions, however, present unique certification prob-
Jems because they generally involve numerous individual issues as to
the defendant’s conduct, causation, and damages. Courts, however,
have recently distinguished between two different types of mass-tort
actions: 1) mass-accident cases where injuries are caused by a single
catastrophic event occurring at one time and place; and 2) toxic-
tort or products-liability cases where the injuries are a result of a
series of events occurring over a considerable length of time and
under different circumstances. See James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal
Practice § 23.47[4] (3d ed. 1999); Herbert B. Newberg & Alba
Conte, Newberg on Class Actions §§17.01 to 17.06 (3d ed.
1992); Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1783 (2d ed. 1986). Due to the enormity and complexity of the
individual issues presented by toxic-tort and products-liability cases,
class certification is more common in mass-accident cases than in
toxic-tort or products-liability case. See James W. Moore, supra
§ 23.47(4] (citing numerous products-liability and toxic-tort cases
where class certification was denied); Herbert B. Newberg & Alba
Conte, supra § 17.22 (citing several products-liability cases involving
tetracycline, bendectin, and DES where class certification was de-
nied).

pe s

338 Ark. at 247, 992 S.W.2d at 800. While this court ultimately
determined that class certification was not appropriate in Baker be~
cause there were numerous and complex individual issues that pre-
dominated over any common claims, Baker is distinguishable from the
present case.

Here, there are common questions regarding liability that
can be easily resolved and these questions predominate over any
individual issues that may arise. As the trial court reasoned, most of
the discomfort, disruption, and inconvenience claims are suffi-
ciently similar that they may be resolved in a single trial. The fact
that damages may vary for members of the class does not defeat the
finding of predominance. Appellants’ attempts to argue that some
people may claim damages for physical injuries, while others had
no physical manifestations following the fire and explosions and
thus there can be no commonality or predominance is simply
unpersuasive. In Bryant, 374 Ark. 38, 285 S.W.3d 634, this court
reiterated that the mere fact that individual issues and defenses may
be raised does not defeat class certification where there are com-
mon questions regarding a defendant’s wrongdoing. Moreover, in
examining predominance, we do not merely compare the number
of individual versus common claims. Finally, the damages sought
in this case are identical to the damages sought in Summons, 306
Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240. .

Before leaving this point, we note that we are unpersuaded
by Op-Tech’s reliance on Steering Committee v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
461 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2006), a mass-accident case stemming from
a chemical-plant fire. There, the court rejected a motion for class
certification because it found individual issues regarding exposure,
doses, health effects, and damages would dominate any common
claims. Steering Committee is distinguishable from the present case,
both factually and procedurally. First, there was no evacuation at
issue in Steering Committee but rather claims for personal injury
resulting from the exposure to the fire; whereas here, the principal
claims are for inconvenience related to evacuating, a situation
similar to that in Summons, where certification was appropriate.
Moreover, Steering Committee was decided under the federal stan-
dard for class certification, which requires a more rigorous review
that has previously been rejected by this court. Accordingly, we
find no merit in the argument that the predominance element has
not been satisfied.

Hl Finally, we note that Op-Tech argues that allowing
this case to proceed as a class action would violate their rights to

M |__| -

due process because it would result in separate juries addressing
individual issues. Appellees counter that this court has recognized
that a bifurcated process of certifying a class to resolve preliminary,
common issue, followed by a decertified process to resolve indi-
vidual issues is consistent with Rule 23. We agree.

We recently addressed and rejected a party’s argument that a
bifurcated proceeding would result in a constitutional violation in
Bryant, 374 Ark. at 52, 285 S.W.3d at 644, and stated:

Nor does the possibility of bifurcation render the instant class
certification unconstitutional. As we have previously held, we do
not know at the point of certification whether more than one jury
would ultimately be necessary, and we will not speculate on the
question of the inevitability of bifurcated trials or issue an advisory
opinion on an issue that well may not develop. See, e.g., BNL
Equity Corp. v. Pearson, 340 Ark. 351, 10 $.W.3d 838 (2000).

Accordingly, there is no merit to Op-Tech’s argument in this regard.
4. Superiority

Next, Appellants argue that reversal of the class-certification
order is warranted because a class action is not the superior method
for handling this matter. In this regard, Appellants contend that
because numerous individual issues must be resolved on a case-by-
case determination, a class action is not superior, and that this case
is not manageable as a class action under the class-certification
order. Mote specifically, Op-Tech argues that under the amended
and substituted order, the trial court’s determination that there will
be a common trial, followed by a decertified phase of individual
trials to determine damages, highlights its argument that this action
is not manageable as a class action and magnifies the constitutional
problems, specifically the violation of Appellants’ right to due
process.

Appellees argue that a class action is the superior method for
handling this matter and that this court has never before required
an explanation as to how a bifurcated proceeding complies with
the superiority element. Appellees assert that most, if not all, issues
will be resolved in the course of a common trial, and that only
some class members will have additional damages claims that
warrant an individual trial. Finally, Appellees contend that the
circuit court has the ability to manage and guide the instant
litigation.

po s

HB Rule 23(b) requires “that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 23(b). This court has repeatedly
held that the superiority requirement is satisfied if class certifica-
tion is the more “efficient” way of handling the case, and it is fair
to both sides. See Johnson’s Sales, 370 Ark. 387, 260 S.W.3d 273.
Where a cohesive and manageable class exists, we have held that
real efficiency can be had if common, predominating questions of
Jaw or fact are first decided, with cases then splintering for the trial
of individual issues, if necessary. Id. This court has further stated
that when a trial court is determining whether class-action status is
the superior method for adjudication of a matter, it may be
necessary for the trial court to evaluate the manageability of the
class. Bryant, 374 Ark. 38, 285 S.W.3d 634. Furthermore, the
avoidance of multiple suits lies at the heart of any class action. Id.

Here, the trial court found that a class action was the
superior method for proceeding because the common questions
predominate and thus a class action was the most realistic means for
disposing of a large number of claims arising out of the same event
and based on the same operative facts. We disagree with Appellants
that the trial court erred in this regard. Appellants’ argument that
there are many individual issues that will have to be decided on a
case-by-case basis is simply not supported by the record. As we
explained in Summons:

The case-by-case mode of adjudication magnifies this burden
by requiring the parties and courts to reinvent the wheel for each
claim. The merits of each case are determined de novo even
though the major liability issues are common to every claim arising
from the mass tort accident, and even though they may have been
previously determined several times by full and fair trials. These
costs exclude many mass tort victims from the system and sharply
reduce the recovery for those who gain access. Win or lose, the
system’s private law process exacts a punishing surcharge from
defendant firms as well as plaintiffs.

306 Ark. at 126, 813 S.W.2d at 245 (quoting D. Rosenberg, Class
Aactions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62
Ind. L. Rev. 560 (1986-1987)).

Moreover, we disagree with Appellants’ assertion that this
case is not manageable as a class action. Rule 23 specifically
contemplates the ability of the circuit court to decertify a class if it

w |__| -

becomes too unwieldy and states: “An order under this section
may be altered or amended at any time before the court enters final
judgment.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Finally, language from Pearson,
340 Ark. at 363, 10 S.W.3d at 845, is instructive on this issue:

‘We have no hesitancy in placing the management of this class
action in the trial court. That is what the rule contemplates, and, as
already described, real efficiencies can be obtained by resolving
common issues, both for the plaintiff class and the appellants. Were
we, on the other hand, to speculate on class management or direct
the trial court at this stage to present the parties with a management
plan, we would be interfering in matters that clearly fall within the
trial court's bailiwick.

Likewise, we recognize in the instant action that the trial court may
proceed with this class action as it deems fit. Accordingly, we find no
error in the trial court’s ruling on the element of superiority.

5. Factual Findings

HI Teris argues that the certification order should be
vacated because it includes factual findings that have never been
made or even requested. Some of those findings related to (1)
door-to-door notifications; (2) shifting winds; (3) radio broadcasts
made; (4) opinions of a fire chief and a member of the Arkansas
Geographic Information Office regarding reasonableness of any
evacuation; and (5) a finding that every adult in the evacuation area
“suffered at least one element of damage that was common to all.”
According to Teris, such findings were never requested and are not
supported by the record.

We disagree with Teris’s argument in this regard for two
reasons. First, the record reveals that CSX actually filed a request
for written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Moreover,
Rule 23 requires a trial court to include specific findings and
conclusions in a certification order. Second, Teris in advancing
this argument simply provides a list of facts it deems is not
supported by the record but fails to explain how the findings
relating to those facts are deficient. It is well settled that we will not
make a party’s argument for them or consider an argument that is
not properly developed. See Hanks v. Sneed, 366 Ark. 371, 235
S.W.3d 883 (2006).

Pe a

6. Exclusion of Some Claims

Op-Tech argues that Appellees’ plan to sacrifice the
personal-injury and property-damage claims of class members in
order to achieve certification is disingenuous and does not cure the
defects in the certification order. In this regard, Teris argues that
the amended and substituted order’s provision excluding from the
class ‘‘[a]ny person believing they suffered a permanent personal
injury, or permanent diminution in the value of their real prop~
erty” renders the class-certification order inconsistent, deficient,
and that it should be voided. In support of their argument,
Op-Tech relies on Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D.
544 (D. Minn. 1999), a case where certification was denied after
the named plaintiffs reserved certain personal injury and damages
claims. Appellees counter that they have never proposed to rep-
resent anyone with a personal-injury claim, and more importantly,
know of no one who claims to have suffered a personal injury as a
result of the event at Teris.

[There is no merit to Op-Tech’s argument. Simply
because this proposed class defines its members in a way that does
not include people with personal injuries or permanent injuries
does not render it inconsistent. Such people may pursue theit own
claims or be part of another class, which based on the hearing
before the circuit court, appears to be the case. We reiterate that
Rule 23 gives the trial court discretion to manage the class as it
deems fit.

7. Denial of a Jury Trial

Op-Tech next argues that the amended order improperly
denies it a jury trial on the strict-liability claim. In the amended
order, the trial court stated that it, not ajury, would determine the
issue of strict or absolute liability. Op-Tech argues that a claim
based on a theory of strict-liability involves issues of fact that must
be resolved by a jury. Thus, according to Op-Tech, the trial
court’s removal of the claim for strict liability from the jury’s
consideration is prejudicial and violates its Seventh Amendment
right to a trial by jury. Appellees counter that it is the law in
Arkansas that a trial court first determines whether the theory of
strict liability applies, with a jury then deciding the issues of

proximate causation and damages.
‘We are unable to address the merits of this point on
appeal, as Op-Tech is raising this specific argument for the first
time on appeal. A review of the record reveals that at the hearing

Le
88 Le |__|

on the amended and substituted order, counsel for CSX objected
to the submission of the amended and substituted order on the
basis that it went beyond the clarification of the class definition. In
so arguing, counsel mentioned, in passing, the strict-liability issue
and his belief that this provision was not in the prior class-
certification order. At no point in arguing before the circuit court
did counsel for any of the Appellants specifically challenge that
portion of the order stating that the trial court would determine
the applicability of strict liability or claim that it was an incorrect
statement of the law. As such, this argument is being raised for the
first time on appeal and this court will not reach the merits of the
argument. It is well settled that we will not consider arguments
made for the first time on appeal. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Huff,
347 Ark. 553, 65 S.W.3d 880 (2002).

8. Reliance on Evacuation Map

As a final point, Op-Tech argues that the trial court’s
reliance on the evacuation map to define the class is insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, as reliance on the map is too
speculative to satisfy the numerosity requirement. Appellees
counter that Op-Tech has failed to cite any binding authority in
support of its argument on this point and thus should not be
considered by this court. We agree. In advancing the instant
argument, the only authority relied on by Op-Tech in support of
its position is an unpublished federal district court case from
Tennessee that has no precedential effect in this court. Thus, we
decline to address the merits of this argument; there is no citation
to binding authority, and this court will not develop a party’s
argument for it. See, e.g., Hanks, 366 Ark. 371, 235 S.W.3d 883.

Affirmed.

|__| 89

Ray DOTSON d/b/a Ozark Mountain Carriages and
d/b/a Ozark Carriages v. CITY of LOWELL,
a Municipal Corporation

08-240 289 S.W.3d 55

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 13, 2008

90 Fe ||
Se

Watson Law Firm, by: K. Adell Ralston, for appellant.

Harrington, Miller, Neihouse & Kieklak, P.A., by: Thomas N.
Kieklak, for appellees.

osert L. Brown, Justice. Appellant Ray Dotson, a resi-

dent of Washington County, appeals from the Benton
County circuit judge’s November 2, 2007 order dismissing Dotson’s
amended counterclaim and granting the petition for replevin of the
appellee, the City of Lowell, an Arkansas municipal corporation and.
a city of the first class, which exists entirely within Benton County.
Dotson asserts three points on appeal. We affirm.

On October 5, 2004, the City of Lowell’s city council passed
an ordinance authorizing then-mayor Phil Biggers to purchase a
stagecoach from Dotson for $16,500. The stagecoach was intended
to serve as a symbol of the City of Lowell’s history, and it was
anticipated that the stagecoach would be used at events to promote
the city. This transaction was consummated on October 20, 2004.
In February of 2006, the City of Lowell contacted Dotson for help
in refurbishing the stagecoach. Dotson arranged for the stagecoach
to be repaired by Lantham Coach Works in Tipton, Missouri. The
City of Lowell tendered four checks to Dotson totaling $10,000 in
connection with these services. Upon return from Missouri, the
stagecoach remained with Dotson.

On May 23, 2007, the City of Lowell made a written
demand on Dotson to return the stagecoach. On that same date,
Dotson presented the City of Lowell with an itemized list of
expenses associated with the stagecoach totaling $28,248, but he
did not return the stagecoach. On June 1, 2007, Dotson claimed
that on December 11, 2006, he had entered into an enforceable
contract with then-mayor Biggers whereby he had the right to
keep the stagecoach. This document, entitled Memorandum of
Understanding, stated that in return for Dotson’s prior assistance in
procuring, refurbishing, and storing the stagecoach, Dotson would

pT a

be entitled to use the stagecoach in his private business. Dotson
demanded that the City of Lowell comply with the agreement
contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

On June 15, 2007, the City of Lowell filed a complaint and
petition for replevin in the Benton County Circuit Court, seeking
the return of the stagecoach from Dotson. Dotson next filed a
motion to dismiss in which he claimed that venue was improper in
Benton County under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-60-
116(a), which requires that an action be brought in the county in
which the defendant resides. The City of Lowell filed a response in
which it alleged that section 16-60-116(a) had been superseded by
Act 649 of 2003, now codified at Arkansas Code Annotated
section 16-55-213(a) (Repl. 2005), which allows an action to be
brought in the county in which the plaintiff resided. In an order
dated June 22, 2007, the circuit judge ruled that venue was proper
in Benton County under section 16-55-213(a).

Dotson then filed an answer and a counterclaim against the
City of Lowell for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The
City of Lowell moved to dismiss Dotson’s counterclaim and
alleged the affirmative defenses of illegality and statute of frauds. In
an order dated November 2, 2007, the circuit judge held that the
Memorandum of Understanding was void for illegality because it
allowed Dotson to use property purchased with public funds for
his private benefit in violation of article 12, section 5, and article
16, section 13, of the Arkansas Constitution and Arkansas common
law, and that, even if the memorandum of understanding was not
void for illegality, it would be unenforceable under the statute of
frauds because it lacked a reasonable description of the lease term.
The circuit judge dismissed Dotson’s counterclaim for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted and ordered him
to return the stagecoach to the City of Lowell.

I. Improper venue

For his first point on appeal, Dotson claims that the circuit
judge erred in ruling that venue was proper in Benton County
under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-213(a), which
allows civil actions to be brought in the county in which the
plaintiff resided at the time of the events giving rise to the claim.
Dotson urges that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-60-116(a),
which is a general venue statute and provides that actions must be
brought in the county in which the defendant resides, was the
controlling venue statute and, thus, Washington County was the

CO
2 re

proper venue. The City of Lowell counters that venue was proper
in Benton County because the newer general venue statute,
section 16-55-213(a), repealed by implication section 16-60-
116(a).

‘We turn then to an analysis of section 16-55-213(a) and
section 16-60-116(a). This is a matter of statutory construction,
which this court reviews de novo. See McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark.
318, 254 S.W.3d 729 (2007). The General Assembly is vested with
the power to establish venue under the Arkansas Constitution.
Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 10. It is this court’s fundamental duty, as
well as a basic rule of statutory construction, to give effect to the
legislative purpose set by the venue statutes. See Quinney v. Pittman,
320 Ark. 177, 895 S.W.2d 538 (1995).

Since 1838, the General Assembly has provided that, in the
absence of a statutory exception, the basic rule of venue is that a
defendant must be sued in the county where he or she resides or is
summoned. See id. To that end, Arkansas Code Annotated section
16-60-116(a) provides that “every other action may be brought in
any county in which the defendant or one (1) of several defendants
resides or is summoned.”’’ Nevertheless, in 2003, the General
Assembly enacted Act 649 of 2003, the “Civil Justice Reform
Act.” Although the act primarily focused on tort reform, Act 649
contained the following venue provision now codified at Arkansas
Code Annotated section 16-55-213(a):

(a) All civil actions other than those mentioned in §§ 16-60-101
—16-60-103, 16-60-107, 16-60-114, and 16-60-115, and subsec-
tion (e) of this section must be brought in any of the following
counties:

(1) The county in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred;

(2)(A) The county in which an individual defendant resided,

(B) Ifthe defendant is an entity other than an individual, the
county where the entity had its principal office in this state at
the time of the accrual of the cause of action; or

(3)(A) The county in which the plaintiff resided.

(B) If the plaintiff is an entity other than an individual, the
county where the plaintiff had its principal office in this state at
the time of the accrual of the cause of action.

Pe s

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-213(a) (Repl. 2005) (emphasis added).

HE The City of Lowell contends that venue was proper in
Benton County because Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-
213(a) repeals by implication Arkansas Code Annotated section
16-60-116(a). Repeals by implication, however, are not favored,
and this court will make every effort to read seemingly conflicting
statutes in a harmonious manner if possible. Griffin, 369 Ark. at
325, 254 S.W.3d at 737; Great Lake Chem. Corp. v. Bruner, 368 Ark.
74, 243 S.W.3d 285 (2006). Repeal by implication is recognized in
two situations: (1) where the provisions of two statutes are in
irreconcilable conflict with each other; and (2) where the legisla-~
ture takes up the whole subject anew and covers the entire ground
of the subject matter of a former statute and evidently intends the
latter statute as a substitute. Uilkie v. State, 309 Ark. 48, 827 S.W.2d
131 (1992).

Recently, in Wright v. Centerpoint Energy Resources Corp., 372
Ark. 330, 276 S.W.3d 253 (2008), this court was asked to deter-
mine whether the new statute, section 16-55-213(a), repealed by
implication section 16-60-112(a), which specifically provides that
personal injury and wrongful-death actions shall be brought in the
county where the accident occurred, or in the county where the
person injured or killed resided at the time of the accident. The
appellant in Wright was the personal representative of the estate of
the deceased, who had died from carbon monoxide poisoning in
her apartment in Craighead County. Although the deceased had
resided in Craighead County at the time of her death and the
accident had occurred in Craighead County, the appellant elected
to file a wrongful-death action in his county of residence, Crit-
tenden County, arguing that venue was proper in the county in
which he, as the plaintiff, resided under section 16-55-213(a). The
appellant argued that section 16-60-112(a) was in conflict with
section 16-55-213(a) and, thus, had been repealed by implication.

This court disagreed, however, finding that the two statutes
could be harmonized. In reviewing, section 16-55-213(a) as a
whole, this court determined that a wrongful-death action could
be brought in only three counties: (1) the county where a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred; (2) where an individual defendant resided; and (3) where
the plaintiff resided. See Wright, supra (emphasis added). This court
determined that the use of the past tense in the subsections of

0 | ld

section 16-55-213(a) showed that the General Assembly intended
for venue to be fixed “where the plaintiff or defendant resided at the
time of the events giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. (emphasis in
original). Accordingly, venue was fixed, under both statutes, at the
time of the events giving rise to the claim — here, the time of
injury or death — thereby precluding the appellant, who was
appointed personal representative of the decedent’s estate after the
accident, from being a “plaintiff’ under section 16-55-213(a).

The City of Lowell insists that Wright is distinguishable here.
We agree. First, the City of Lowell asserts that the statute at issue
here, section 16-60-116(a), is like section 16-55-213(a), in that
both are general default venue statutes that apply only when other
specific venue statutes do not, while the statute at issue in Wright,
section 16-60-112(a), was a specific venue statute applicable only
to personal injury and wrongful-death actions. Second, the City of
Lowell notes that in Wright, both statutes used the past tense in
fixing venue, whereas here the newer statute, section 16-55-
213(a), fixes venue at the time the cause of action arose and uses
the past tense, while the older statute, section 16-60-116(a), fixes
venue as defendant’s residence at the time the suit is filed, as
evidenced by the legislature’s use of the present tense “‘resides.””

We conclude that section 16-55-213(a) repeals by implica-
tion section 16-60-116(a). First, the two statutes are in irreconcil-
able conflict with each other. Section 16-55-213(a) provides that
all civil actions, excluding a few statutory exceptions, must be
brought in one of three counties: (1) the county in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred; (2) the county in which an individual defendant resided;
or (3) the county in which the plaintiff resided. Additionally, the
use of the past tense in these subsections evidences the fact that the
General Assembly intended for venue to be fixed at the time of the
events giving rise to the claim. See Wright, supra. The older statute,
section 16-60-116(a), on the other hand, provides that venue is
proper in any county where the defendant “resides,” which means
that the General Assembly intended for venue to be fixed at the
time the suit is filed. See Quinney, 320 Ark. at 185, 895 S.W.2d at
542. Therein lies the conflict. Section 16-60-116(a) provides for a
venue — a county where a defendant resides at the time the lawsuit
is filed — that is not permitted under section 16-55-213(a).

In sum, we are persuaded of this conflict by the fact that the
new general default venue statute expressly fixes venue for “[a]ll
civil actions,” with certain noted statutory exceptions. It also fixes

_ ae E

venue at the time the events giving rise to the cause of action
occurred, while the existing general default venue provision fixes
venue at the time the cause of action is filed. Both points are
evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to adopt a new general
venue scheme as a substitute for section 16-60-116(a). David
Newbern and John Watkins have noted the conflict between these
provisions in their Arkansas Practice Series on Civil Practice and
Procedure:

Act 649 seems to fall into both categories [of repeal by impli-
cation]. First, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-213(a) establishes a new
general rule for venue quite different from the former rule set forth
in Ark, Code Ann. § 16-60-116(a), thereby creating an irreconcil-
able conflict. Second, the plain language of § 16-55-213(a) —i.e.,
that “[aJll civil actions,’ with certain exceptions, “must be brought in
the following counties” —- demonstrates the General Assembly’s
intent to adopt a new venue scheme as a substitute for the old.

Newbern & Watkins, 2 Arkansas Practice Series, Civil Practice and
Procedure § 9:1 n.8 (4th ed.). We affirm the circuit judge on this
point.

II. IMlegality

For his next point, Dotson asserts that the circuit judge erred
in finding that his counterclaim failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted due to the illegality of the alleged agree-
ment. Dotson contends that the City of Lowell lacked standing to
bring an illegal exaction claim and also that there can be no illegal
exaction where there is a mutual benefit to the parties.

In arguing this point, the parties disagree over the applica-
bility of article 16, section 13, ofthe Arkansas Constitution dealing
with illegal exactions and article 12, section 5, which prohibits
lending public money to individuals. The parties also disagree over
whether the public-purpose doctrine controls the issue under our
common law. See, e.g., Chandler v. Bd. of Trs. of Teacher Ret. Sys.,
236 Ark. 256, 365 S.W.2d 447 (1963). We decline to resolve this
issue by an interpretation of the Arkansas Constitution or the
public-purpose doctrine. This court has made it clear that we will
not address a constitutional question if we can resolve the case
without doing so. Herman Wilson Lumber Co. v. Hughes, 245 Ark.
168, 431 S.W.2d 487 (1968).

We turn, rather, to Arkansas law and specifically to the
powers of municipalities set out in the Arkansas Code:

s a ls

(a) Municipal corporations are empowered and authorized to sell,
convey, lease, rent, or let any real estate or personal property owned
or controlled by the municipal corporations. This power and
authorization shall extend and apply to all such real estate and
personal property, including that which is held by the municipal
corporation for public or governmental uses and purposes.

(c) The execution of all contracts and conveyances and lease
contracts shall be performed by the mayor and city clerk or
recorded, when authorized by a resolution, in writing, approved by
a majority vote of the city council present and participating.

Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-302(a), (c) (Repl. 1998).

The record in this case is devoid of any resolution by the
City of Lowell’s city council authorizing Dotson’s private usage of
the stagecoach under the alleged Memorandum of Understanding.
We conclude, therefore, that illegality is readily established by the
fact that private use of the stagecoach by Dotson was never
sanctioned by resolution of the City of Lowell city council, as
required by section 14-54-302(c). This noncompliance was noted
by the circuit judge in his order in which he said: ‘No written
resolution has been alleged to have been approved by a majority
vote of the Lowell City Council. Accordingly, section (a) A.C.A.
§ 14-54-302 is inapplicable to the facts before this Court.”

Although the circuit judge did not address the effect of the
City of Lowell’s noncompliance with section 14-54-302(c) as the
basis for his finding that the alleged contract was illegal, it is
axiomatic that this court can affirm a circuit court if the right result
is reached even if for a different reason. See, e.g., Alphin v. Alphin,
364 Ark, 332, 219 S.W.3d 160 (2005). We hold that the absence of
the city council’s resolution is fatal to the validity and viability of
the alleged Memorandum of Understanding.’

For this reason, we affirm the circuit judge’s dismissal of
Dotson’s counterclaim and his order for the return of the stage-
coach to the City of Lowell. Because we decide this case as we do,

' Subsequent ratification of the alleged agreement by the City of Lowell’s city council
was not argued before the circuit judge or on appeal. See, e.g, Day v, City of Malvern, 195
Ark, 804, 114 S,W.2d 459 (1938). Accordingly, we do not address it.

Pe

itis unnecessary for us to address the remaining issues raised by the
parties. We further decline to address Dotson’s argument raised in
his brief on appeal that Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-58-
303 (a) applies, as no ruling on this point was made by the circuit
judge. It is well settled that issues not ruled on by the trial judge
will not be considered on appeal. See, e.g., Ghegan & Ghegan, Inc. v.
Barclay, 345 Ark. 514, 49 S.W.3d 652 (2001).

Affirmed.

MAMO TRANSPORTATION, INC. ». Artee WILLIAMS,
Director, Department of Workforce Services

08-29 289 S.W.3d 79

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 13,2008

Ne

Robinson, Staley, Marshall & Duke, by: Thomas B. Staley, for
appellant.

Allan Pruitt, for appellee.

1M GUNTER, Justice. This appeal arises from a decision of the

Board of Review of the Arkansas Department of Workforce
Services (the Board) finding that Appellant Mamo Transportation,
Inc. (Mamo) is required to pay unemployment insurance taxes for
services performed by drivers for wages because Mamo failed to meet
the three-prong test set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-210(e) (Supp.
2007). We affirm the Board’s decision.

Mamo is a Nevada corporation that provides a “‘drive-away”
service in which it transports larger vehicles from a point of origin
to a point of destination. Mamo is headquartered in Osceola,
Indiana and operates throughout the forty-eight contiguous states
and Canada. Mamo contracts with drivers to drive the vehicles. It
has dispatch offices in Indiana, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and
Arkansas. Mamo’s safety director testified that Mamo has 316
“Gndependent contractors’ on an active list. The driver calls
Mamo if he or she wants to work driving a vehicle. The drivers do
not contact customers directly, but provide services for customers
obtained by Mamo. The price is negotiated between the driver and
Mamo. If the driver makes the commitment to transport the
vehicle, Mamo notifies the customer that a driver has been
assigned to their load. Mamo gains a profit by paying the driver less

Sl:

than what the customer pays Mamo. Mamo does not have exclu-
sive agreements with its drivers. The drivers pay for their own
training, although Mamo ensures that federal safety requirements
are met. The drivers are free to drive the route decided upon by
the driver; they provide their own transportation once a run is
completed, pay for fuel and other expenses and provide tools
which might be necessary.

Sylvia Jones-Allen, a resident of Arkansas, entered into an
“Independent Contractor Driver Service Agreement” with
Mamo. During her first ninety days driving for Mamo, Allen drove
a 13'6" truck under an 11'8" bridge, causing $9,008 worth of
damage to the truck. Mamo then terminated Allen’s contract. On
April 14, 2003, Allen filed a request for unemployment benefits.
She indicated that she was an independent contractor on the
unemployment forms. Mamo agreed that Allen was an indepen-
dent contractor.

Upon review, the Arkansas Department of Workforce Ser-
vices (“Department”) determined that Mamo “exercised suffi-
cient direction and control over the drivers and other workers to
the degree necessary to establish an employer/employee relation-
ship.”” Mamo requested a fact-finding hearing, contending that the
factual determination made by the Department in applying Ark.
Code Ann. § 11-10-210(e)(1), (2), and (3) was not supported by
the facts and that the drivers and workers were not employees of
Mamo. A hearing was conducted by the Board on October 19,
2004. The Board found that Mamo was a covered employer
subject to the payment of unemployment insurance taxes because
it failed to meet Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-210(e)(2).

The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s deci-
sion. See Mamo Transp. Inc. v. Director, Dept. of Workforce Services, 101
Ark. App. 68, 270 S.W.3d 379 (2007). We granted Mamo’s
petition for review on May 15, 2008. Upon a petition for review,
we consider a case as though it had been originally filed in this
court. Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57
(2008).

On appeal, Mamo argues that (1) the Board “ignored the
plain, ordinary and common sense meaning of the language of the
statute resulting in an absurd outcome not intended by the
Arkansas legislature” and (2) the contractors at issue were inde-
pendent contractors not subject to Arkansas unemployment taxes.
Mamo specifically argues that the Arkansas legislature did not

100 _—____ =

intend for the language of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-210(e)(2) to
describe every road and highway in the United States and Canada
as a “‘place of business’? of Mamo. In response, the Department
contends that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and complies with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-210.

We affirm the decision of the Board of Review if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Coker v. Director, 99 Ark. App.
455, 262 S.W.3d 175 (2007). Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Id. We view the evidence and all reasonable infer-
ences deducible there from in the light most favorable to the
Board’s findings. Id. Even if the evidence could support a different
decision, our review is limited to whether the Board could have
reasonably reached its decision based on the evidence presented.
Id.

In this case, we are called upon to construe provisions of
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-210. We review issues of
statutory construction de novo. Ark. Comprehensive Health Ins. Pool
v. Denton, 374 Ark. 162, 286 S.W.3d 698 (2008). The basic rule of
statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General
Assembly. Id. In determining the meaning ofa statute, the first rule
is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and
usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. This court
construes the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or
insignificant, and meaning and effect are given to every word in
the statute if possible. Id. When the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there
is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Id. However,
this court will not give statutes a literal interpretation if it leads to
absurd consequences that are contrary to legislative intent. Id. This
court seeks to reconcile statutory provisions to make them consis-
tent, harmonious, and sensible. Id.

HB Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-10-210(e) states:

(ce) Service performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed
to be employment subject to this chapter irrespective of whether
the common law relationship of master and servant exists, unless
and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the director that:

(1) Such individual has been and will continue to be free ftom
control and direction in connection with the performance of the
service, both under his or her contract for the performance of
service and in fact; and

(2) The service is performed either outside the usual course of the
business for which the service is performed or is performed outside
of all the places of business of the enterprise for which the service is
performed; and

(3) The individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same
nature as that involved in the service performed.

Id. According to the statute, an employment relationship exists unless
all three of the above elements are met. Here, the Board concluded
that the first element was met, the second element was not met, and
did not rule on the third element. Therefore, we are limited in our
review to § 11-10-210(e)(2).

The Board concluded that Mamo failed to meet the second
requirement of § 11-10-210(e) in that the course of business for
both Mamo and the drivers is providing the delivery of vehicles,
and Mamo’s places of business consist of not only its office, but also
the roadways on which the drivers transport the vehicles. On
appeal, Mamo presents no argument that the Board was incorrect
in finding that delivery of the vehicles was in the course of Mamo’s
business, so we will only address whether the Board erred in its
finding regarding Mamo’s place of business.

Looking at the language of the statute, the second prong is
not met unless the service is performed outside of all the places of
business of the enterprise for which the service is performed.
Mamo provides a ‘‘drive-away” service for its customers by
transporting various types of vehicles throughout the United States
and Canada. Its business is to take vehicles from origin to destina~
tion. Therefore, the “enterprise for which the service is per-
formed”’ in this case is the transportation of vehicles. Black’s Law
Dictionary 1169 (7th ed. 1999) defines “‘place of business” as “‘a
location at which one carries on a business.”

The Board relied on Home Care Professionals of Arkansas, Inc.
v. Williams, 95 Ark. App. 194, 235 S.W.3d 536 (2006), in making
its determination that Mamo’s places of business include the
roadways. In Home Care Professionals, the court of appeals held that
Home Care Professionals (HCP) failed to meet the second prong
of the statute. HCP was a home-care referral service. HCP
maintained a list of caregivers who were able to provide home-care
services. Once HCP received a request for a service from a client,
HCP would find a caregiver willing to perform the service. The

caregiver would sign an independent contract. The client and
caregiver would negotiate a schedule and the terms of the caregiv-
er’s engagement. Once the caregiver completed the service, the
caregiver would turn in a time sheet and be paid by HCP the
amount paid by the client minus HCP’s referral fee. In holding that
HCP’s caregivers were not independent contractors, the court of
appeals stated:

In regard to the place of business aspect of the second part of the
test, an employer's place of business has been found to include not
only the location of a business’s office, but also the entire area in
which a business conducts business. See Missouri Association of Real-
tors v. Division of Employment Security, 761 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. App.
1988); Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Laramie Cabs,
Inc., 700 P.2d 399 (Wyo. 1985); and Vermont Institute of Community
Involvement, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 436 A.2d 765
(Vt. 1981). More specifically, the representation of an entity’s in-
terest by an individual on a premises renders the premises a place of
the employer’s business. See Carpetland, [Carpetland U.S.A. v. Illinois
Dep’t of Employment Security, 201 Ul.2d 351, 776 N.E.2d 166
(2002)}.

Home Care Profs, 95 Ark. App. at 199, 235 S.W.3d at 540-41. Other
states with statutes almost identical to § 11-10-210 have addressed the
issue of what constitutes a “place of business.” In Chicago Messenger
Service v. Jordan, 825 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005), the appellate
court of Illinois held that an employer’s couriers were employees,
rather than independent contractors, for the purposes of the Unem-
ployment Insurance Act. The court stated:

Finally, we reject CMS’ claim that it is merely a broker of
delivery service. This is essentially the same argument that was
made by the limousine company and rejected in O’Hare-
Midway. Here, the usual course of business involved the pickup and
delivery of packages by the couriers, similar to the pickup of
passengers that was the usual course of business in O’Hare-
Midway. As we have already noted, the couriers’ service is per-
formed by transporting the packages, like the limousine passengers,
from one location to another. Again, it stands to reason that the
company’s interests are represented during the performance of that
service and that the place of business includes travel between one
location and another. Therefore, the couriers perform their ser-
vices on the roadways, which are, then, for purposes of section

212(B), the place of business. See O’Hare-Midway, 232 Ill. App. 3d
at 113, 173 Ill. Dec. 171, 596 NE.2d 795.

Chicago Messenger Serv., 825 N.E.2d at 328. Similarly, in O’Hare-
Midway Limousine Service v. Baker, 596 N.E.2d 795 (Ul. App. Ct.
1992), the Illinois Appellate Court found that, because chauffeurs
represented the interests of the limousine company whenever they
picked up passengers, the usual course of business was on the road-
‘ways traveled.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming also addressed the place-
of-business issue in Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v.
Laramie Cabs, Inc., 700 P.2d 399 (Wyo. 1985), in which the court
interpreted a statute similar to § 11-10-210. The court found that
a taxicab company’s business consisted of providing transportation
to customers by leasing taxicabs to drivers. The court held that the
taxicabs themselves must be considered the company’s place of
business because “‘the essence of Laramie Cabs’ business is con-
ducted in cabs between the customer’s origin and destination, not
in the company office.” Laramie Cabs, 700 P.2d at 407.

HE For the purpose of defining terms under Ark. Code
Ann. § 11-10-210, we hold that “‘place of business” is the place
where the enterprise is performed. An enterprise’s place of business
must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In Home Care Professionals,
the home-care service was performed in the customer’s home; in
O’Hare-Midway, the limousine service was performed on the
roadways traveled; in Chicago Messenger Service, the service of
transporting packages was performed on the roadways; in Laramie
Cabs, the taxicab service was performed in the taxicab itself. Here,
Mamo’s enterprise, transporting vehicles, is performed in the
vehicle itself between the point of origin and the point of desti-
nation. As in Home Care, the enterprise for which the service is
performed takes place within the property of the customer. Under
the facts in this case, we hold that, in addition to the physical
locations of its dispatch offices, Mamo’s places of business include
the location of the transported vehicle.

Because Mamo has failed to meet its burden set out in
§ 11-10-210(e), it is not exempt from paying unemployment
insurance taxes on its drivers. The Board was correct in its decision
that Mamo’s drivers “‘do not perform their services outside of all
the places of Mamo’s business.” However, we hold that Mamo’s
enterprise takes place inside the trucks, rather than on the road-

Le
104 ; Le |__|

ways. Accordingly, we affirm the result reached by the Board, even
though it announced the wrong reason. See Hardy v. Wilbourne, 370
Ark. 359, 259 S.W.3d 405 (2007).

Affirmed.
Corsin and Danrexson, JJ., concur.
Brown, J., dissents.

AUL E. Danistson, Justice, concurring. I concur in the

decision to affirm the Board’s decision, but would do so
using the same rationale as the Board. As evidenced by its own
representative’s testimony, Mamo is in the business of providing its
clients transportation of the clients’ vehicles. Thus, its enterprise for
which the service is performed is, in fact, transportation.

‘While Mamo has four main offices from which it dispatches
drivers to provide Mamo’s transportation service to its clients, it is
my opinion that “all the places of business,” in this case, would
encompass the roadways on which Mamo’s drivers travel. Nothing
is unclear about the term “‘place of business.” Indeed, Black’s Law
Dictionary defines the term as “[a] location in which one carries on
a business.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1187 (8th ed. 2004). That differs
from a business’s “principal place of business,” which is defined as
“t]he place of a corporation’s chief executive offices, which is
typically viewed as the nerve center.” Id. Accordingly, the term
“all the places of business” encompasses wherever the business’s
services are performed. Here, “all the places of business”’ includes
the roadways.

In the instant case, the service being provided by Mamo,
transportation, necessarily takes place on the roadways or airways.
Transportation, by its nature, does not occur in one physical
location or place of business. It simply is a different creature from
the typical business venture. Indeed, a “‘place of business” deter-
mination will vary from case to case depending on the business in
which the employer is engaged. Here, all the places of business
includes the roadways, as found by the Board. See, e.g., Vermont
Inst. of Cmty. Involvement v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 140 Vt. 94,
436 A.2d 765 (1981) (observing that an employer’s place of
business includes not only the location of its offices, but also the
entire area in which it conducts business). Because there was
substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision, I would
affirm.

Corin, J., joins.

oBERT L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I write to draw the

General Assembly’s attention to the fact that confusion
abounds in this case over what section 11-10-210(e)(2) means and
over where the places of business of Mamo Transportation are for the
enterprise of transporting large vehicles. Four justices apparently
believe that all transporting vehicles used by all independent contrac-
tors contracting with Mamo are Mamo’s “places of business.” Two
justices interpret “places of business” even more expansively to
include every inch of roadway where the transporting vehicle used by
independent contractors is traveling. In other words, the entire road
system traversed by every transporting vehicle is a place of business for
Mamo. I interpret places of business to be those locations where
Mamo actually conducts its business, which includes its headquarters
in Indiana and its four dispatch offices.

Though, admittedly, there is a conflict of authority in
foreign jurisdictions, the reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court is persuasive to me in defining places of business. See
Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Review of the Div. of Employment &
Training, 786 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 2003). In Athol, the issue was
whether unemployment compensation benefits should be paid to
adult newspaper deliverers who delivered newspapers house to
house and elsewhere. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts interpreted the same “‘places of business” language as we have
in our Code and denied benefits. The court had this to say:

‘The division’s assertion that the News’s “places of business,” for
purposes of the second part of the ABC test, includes the geographic
area tracked by all of the News’s delivery routes, is illogical. The
one decision cited by the division in support of its position,
Richardson Bros. v. Board of Review of Dep’t of Employment Sec., 198
l.App.3d 422, 144 Il. Dec. 607, 555 N.E.2d 1126 (1990), con-
cerned truck drivers who distributed garden plants to retail outlets,
and not carriers who deliver newspapers to private homes. To the
extent that language employed by the Illinois court suggests that a
newspaper delivery route is a newspaper company’s place of busi-
ness for purposes of G.L. c. 151A, we respectfully disagree. Seé id. at
430, 144 Ill.Dec. 607, 555 N.E.2d 1126, citing Eutectic Welding

+ Alloys Corp. v. Rauch, 1 Ill.2d 328, 115 N.E.2d 898 (1953) (“where an
employing unit assigns a specific area to an individual for the
purpose of selling its product ... . that area is the place of business of
the enterprise”).

Athol, 786 N.E.2d at 372 n.11.

Similarly, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, in-
terpreted this same language in connection with taxicab drivers
who were independent contractors and dispatched from the busi-
ness premises of Town Taxi. See Comm’r of the Div. of Unemployment
Assistance v. Town Taxi of Cape Cod, Inc., 862 N.E.2d 430 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007). In holding that places of business did not include
taxi cab routes, the court said:

The service performed by the drivers occurred outside the business
premises of Town Taxi. Although the taxicabs were stored and the
dispatch system was operated at the business premises of Town
Taxi, the drivers did not transport customers on those premises.
Compare Althol Daily News, 439 Mass. at 179, 786 N.E.2d 365
(where carriers picked up newspapers from employer’s distribution
center and delivered them to individual houses, stores, bundle
drops, or vending machines, “all of the carriers ma[d]e deliveries
outside of premises owned by the [employer] or which could fairly
be deemed its ‘place of business’ ”).

Town Taxi, 862 N.E.2d at 435.

Nor does the court of appeals case in Home Health Care
Professionals of Arkansas, Inc. v. Williams, 95 Ark. App. 194, 235
S.W.2d 836 (2006), give the majority the “‘cover”’ it would like. In
that case, caregivers provided a fixed service at a fixed location, the
patient’s home, and the court of appeals held that the home
locations were places of business of the Home Health Care
enterprise. In the case before us, however, under the majority’s
interpretation, Mamo’s places of business along any roadway
would be all transporting vehicles for as long as it took the
independent contractors to travel to their destinations. That inter-
pretation is excessively broad and, to use the language of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, “illogical.”

It is clear to me that the General Assembly drew a distinction
in section 11-10-210(e)(2) between where the service is being
performed, which could include the roadways on the one hand,
and “places of business of the enterprise for which the service is
performed,” which are obviously the premises, on the other. Ark.
Code Ann. § 11-10-210(e)(2) (Repl. 2002). Yet the majority
opinion conflates the two, which adds to the confusion.

At oral argument before this court, counsel for the Depart-
ment of Workforce Services admitted that this issue had been
difficult for his agency and ‘“‘a tough one,” as he put it. While

providing unemployment benefits is a worthy purpose, the quali-
fying factors, it is submitted, should be established by the General
Assembly and not by an overbroad and illogical interpretation by
the courts.

I respectfully dissent.

CITY of JACKSONVILLE, ARKANSAS ».
CITY of SHERWOOD, ARKANSAS, Sherwood Holding Co.,
LLC, Metropolitan Realty & Development, LLC, LILAC, LLC,
Greg Heslep, and Michael B. Clayton

08-386 289 S.W.3d 90

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 13, 2008

oe

Robert E. Bamburg, for appellant.

Stephen R. Giles, for appellees.

IM GUNTER, Justice. This appeal arises from a September 11,

2007 judgment of the Pulaski County Circuit Court affirm-
ing the Pulaski County Court’s decision to grant Appellees’ petition
for annexation. We affirm the rulings of the circuit court.

On May 11, 2006, Appellee landowners Sherwood Holding
Company, LLC, Metropolitan Development, LLC, LILAC, LLC,
and Greg Heslep petitioned for four tracts of real property totaling
approximately 1951 acres to be annexed into the City of Sher-
wood. Sherwood Holding Co. is the owner of Tract 1, Metro-
politan Realty & Development is the owner of Tract 2, LILAC is
the owner of Tract 3, and Heslep is the owner of Tract 4. Tract 1,
containing approximately 640 acres, is contiguous with the north-
ern boundary of Sherwood. Tract 2, containing approximately 589
acres, is contiguous with Tract 1. Tract 3, containing 608 acres,
and Tract 4, containing 112 acres, are contiguous by virtue of their
connection with Tract 1. Appellee Michael Clayton is the autho-
rized agent appointed by the landowners, and also serves as
Sherwood’s city engineer.

Appellant City of Jacksonville submitted a resolution oppos-
ing the annexation of the properties into Sherwood. On June 20,
2006, a hearing was held regarding the petition for annexation in
Pulaski County Court. The county court granted annexation on
August 3, 2006. Appellant appealed this order to the Pulaski
County Circuit Court. The circuit court held a bench trial on May
30, 2007. On May 31, 2007, the circuit court entered its judgment,

110

affirming the order of the county court and approving the annex-
ation of Tracts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Appellant now appeals.

On appeal, Appellant asserts that (1) the circuit court erred
in affirming and approving the annexation of Appellees’ properties
into the City of Sherwood by the county court because there was
insufficient proof presented to the county court to make a deter-
mination of the Vestal criteria; (2) the circuit court erred in its
application of the Vestal criteria by failing to complete an estab-
lished statutory and case law criteria assessment of what is right,
proper, and reasonable in an annexation; and (3) the circuit court
erred in granting Appellees’ petition for annexation in ruling that
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-413 and § 14-56-426 do not prohibit
annexation into Sherwood those portions of Tracts 1, 2, and 3,
which lie within Jacksonville’s extraterritorial planning jurisdic-
tion and the air installation compatible use zones (“AICUZ
zones”).

The five criteria used to decide if annexation is proper were

set out by this court in Vestal v. City of Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321, 15
S.W. 891 (1891):

(1) Whether the property is platted and held for sale or use as
municipal lots;

(2) Whether platted or not, if the lands are held to be sold as
suburban property;

(3) Whether the lands furnish the abode for a densely settled
community or represent the actual growth of the municipality
beyond its legal boundary;

(4) Whether the lands are needed for any proper municipal pur-
poses such as for the extension of needed police regulation; and

(5) Whether the lands are valuable by reason of their adaptability
for prospective municipal uses.

See also Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-603(a) (Repl. 1998) (requiring that
the prayer of the petitioner for annexation be “right and proper”).

‘We have stated that these five criteria should be considered
in the disjunctive, and an annexation is proper ifany one of the five
factors is met. Town of Houston v. Carden, 332 Ark. 340, 965 S.W.2d

131 (1998); Gay v. City of Springdale, 298 Ark. 554, 769 S.W.2d
740 (1989) (Gay IN; Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204, 710
S.W.2d 205 (1986); Gay v. City of Springdale, 287 Ark. 55, 696
S.W.2d 723 (1985) (Gay 1). The criteria apply regardless of
whether the annexation proceeding was initiated by the city or by
adjoining landowners. Town of Houston, supra; Chastain v. Davis,
294 Ark. 134, 741 S.W.2d 632 (1987); Louallen v, Miller, 229 Ark.
679, 317 S.W.2d 710 (1958); Cantrell v. Vaughn, 228 Ark. 202, 306
S.W.2d 863 (1957). Ifa part of the proposed area does not meet
one of the five requirements, the annexation of the entire area is
void in toto. Town of Houston, supra; Gay II, supra; Chastain, supra;
Chappell v. City of Russellville, 288 Ark. 261, 704 S.W.2d 166
(1986).

HE Appellant first asserts that the circuit court’s order was |
an affirmance of a flawed county court ruling because there was
insufficient proof presented to the county court to make a deter~
mination of the Vestal criteria. In response, Appellees contend that,
regardless of how the proceeding was initiated, the circuit court
properly treated this action as an independent attack on the
annexation by holding a trial de novo.

Appellant filed a complaint in the circuit court to prevent
the annexation, and it is our responsibility to determine whether
the circuit court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. See City of
Dover v. Russellville, 346 Ark. 279, 57 S.W.3d 171 (2001). Because
our review is one from the circuit court, we are unable to address
Appellant’s argument on this issue because it erroneously seeks our
review of the county court proceeding. Id.

For its next argument, Appellant asserts that the circuit court
erred in its application of the Vestal criteria by failing to complete
the established statutory and case-law criteria assessment of what is
tight, proper, and reasonable in an annexation. In response,
Appellees contend that Appellant has failed to meet its burden of
proof that the lands proposed for annexation do not meet any one
of the statutory requirements of § 14-40-302 and Vestal.

Tracts 1 through 4 contain raw timberland and/or flood-
plain acreage ranging from 112 acres to 640 acres. This general area
lies between the cities of Sherwood and Jacksonville, with tracts
divided by Bayou Meto, a natural waterway. Appellant asserts that
the property east of Bayou Meto is part of the natural growth
pattern for Jacksonville and should not be annexed into Sherwood.
Appellant contends that the circuit court failed to complete an

assessment of the four tracts under the Vestal criteria and did not
address the factors of reasonableness set out in City of Marion v.
Guaranty Loan & Real Estate Co., 75 Ark. App. 427, 58 S.W.3d 410
(2001).

H_sIt is Appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the land
fails to meet at least one of the criteria of Ark. Code Ann.
§ 14-40-302, also known as the Vestal criteria. See Town of Houston,
supra. The circuit court concluded that the land met two of the
requirements: (1) the land is held to be sold as suburban property;
and (2) the land is valuable by reason of its adaptability for
prospective municipal purposes.

Testimony from the trial supports the circuit court’s con-
clusion. Steve Deere, a real estate developer and President of
Sherwood Holding Company, testified that the company intended
to ‘“‘probably develop mainly residential housing in that area.”
Terry Paff, President of Metropolitan Realty and Development,
testified that “[w]e develop residential subdivisions, which is the
biggest part of our plan with this property.” Andrew Collins,
President of Cypress Properties, which manages Lilac, LLC, testi-
fied that he was aware that any development in the area would
have to be approved by the Jacksonville Planning Commission.
Greg Heslep, real estate developer and owner of Tract 4, testified
that he planned to develop his land as commercial and multi-family
developments. All four real estate developers testified that they
thought that their land would be more valuable in the City of
Sherwood rather than in an unincorporated area. They also stated
that they were aware of, and would comply with, Sherwood’s land
development regulations and Jacksonville’s zoning regulations
designed to protect the fly zone of the Little Rock Air Force Base.

Michael Clayton, Sherwood’s city engineer, testified that he
was appointed as the agent for the landowners. According to
Clayton, Sherwood Wastewater had passed a one-cent sales tax
dedicated for sewer system improvements and conducted a feasi-
bility analysis for sanitary sewer for Tracts 1 through 4. He testified
that they have approximately $2.2 million dollars set aside for a
“skeleton sewer system.” He also testified that the City of Sher-
wood is preparing to extend utilities and to provide fire and police
protection to the annexed areas.

Dwight Pattison, the planning consultant for the city of

Sherwood, testified that the city adopted a ‘‘master street plan”
and “‘land use plan,” which primarily show residential develop-

ment for the annexed areas. He further testified that “‘the recom-
mended area’s highest use is suburban development.”? According
to Pattison, the only area remaining for Sherwood to expand is the
area north of its boundaries. “This annexation represents the actual
growth of Sherwood beyond its boundaries.” Based on the above
testimony, the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding
that the land is being held for development as suburban property
and that the land is adaptable for prospective municipal purposes.
Since at least one of the Vestal criteria has been met, we hold that
annexation was proper.

HL Appellant also asserts that the circuit court failed to
address the reasonableness factors set out in Marion, supra. In
Marion, the Arkansas Court of Appeals analyzed the Vestal criteria
and also a reasonableness standard utilized by other jurisdictions to
determine whether annexation was “right and proper.” First, the
circuit court did not address the Marion reasonableness standard in
its order. The failure to obtain a ruling precludes appellate review
because there is no order ofa lower court on the issue for this court
to review on appeal. Bob Cole Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Brewer, 374 Ark.
403, 288 S.W.3d 582 (2008). Second, our case law only requires us
to analyze and apply the Vestal criteria to issues regarding annex-
ation, and we are not required to adhere to the reasonableness
standard set out in Marion. Therefore, we reject Appellant’s argu-
ment that the circuit court was clearly erroneous in not addressing
the Marion reasonableness standard.

For its next point on appeal, Appellant asserts that the circuit
court erred in ruling that Ark. Code Ann. §§ 14-56-413 and
14-56-426 do not prohibit annexation of the tracts that lie within
Jacksonville’s extraterritorial planning jurisdiction and the AICUZ
zones. Reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, this court first
construes a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary
and usually accepted meaning in common language. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. D.A.N. Joint Venture III, L.P., 374 Ark. 489, 288
S.W.3d 627 (2008). When the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, conveying a clear and definite meaning, the court
does not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Id. If there is
an ambiguity, the court looks to the legislative history of the
statute and other factors, such as the language used and the subject
matter involved. Id. The court strives to reconcile statutory
provisions relating to the same subject to make them sensible,
consistent, and harmonious. Id.

We will first address section 14-56-413 (Repl. 1998), which
states, in pertinent part:

(@)(1)(A) The territorial jurisdiction of the legislative body of the
city having the planning commission, for the purposes of this
subchapter, shall be exclusive and shall include all Jand lying within
five (5) miles of the corporate limits.

(B) Ifthe corporate limits of two (2) or more municipalities of
the first or second class are less than ten (10) miles apart, the limits of
their respective territorial jurisdictions shall be a line equidistant
between them, or as agreed on by the respective municipalities.

A land use plan is meant to be just that, a plan. Taylor v. City
of Little Rock, 266 Ark. 384, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979). It is not to be
legally binding on the city. Id. A comprehensive plan “‘is a policy
statement to be implemented by zoning regulations, and it is the
latter that has the force of the law . . . . Furthermore, a compre-
hensive plan, when it has been prepared by the planning board or
agency, is generally deemed to be advisory, rather than control-
ling, and it may be changed at any time.” Id. at 387-88, 583
S.W.2d at 73-74 (citing 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 69).

The circuit court cited to Arkansas Soil & Water Conservation
Comm’n v. City of Bentonville (ASWCC), 351 Ark. 289, 92 S.W.3d
47 (2002), in its ruling that Jacksonville’s claim of extraterritorial
jurisdiction for water projects was not exclusive. In ASWCC, we
were asked to construe § 14-56-413, and § 15-22-503, empower-
ing the Commission to approve all water projects. Reading the
two statutes harmoniously, we held that the city did not have
exclusive jurisdiction over water projects in a five-mile extrater-
ritorial planning area surrounding the city and that the Commis-
sion was within its statutory authority when it adopted its plan,
even though the plan encroached on the city’s planning area.

Here, the mid-point between Jacksonville and Sherwood is
west of Bayou Meto. At the hearing, the mayor of Jacksonville,
Tommy Swaim, testified that portions of Tracts 2 and 3 east of
Bayou Meto are critical to Jacksonville because the city has plans
for construction of a water tower in the area to improve water
pressure in that area. Kirby Rowland, consulting engineer for the
Jacksonville Water Department, testified that he participated in the
development of the water department’s master plan that was
approved by the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commis-

sion. According to Rowland, the master plan provided that an-
other water supply is required to meet Jacksonville’s future needs
through 2020. Jacksonville has contracted with Central Arkansas
Water to create the infrastructure needed to provide water lines to
Jacksonville, and the service areas of Tracts 2 and 3 were included
as part of the calculated costs for this infrastructure. Michael
Clayton testified that Sherwood was preparing to extend utilities
into the annexed area, but would not object to Jacksonville
providing water services in Tracts 2 and 3.

Hl Once the land is annexed into Sherwood, Jacksonville
will lose its extraterritorial- planning jurisdiction over the land. See
City of Sherwood v. Dupree Co., 263 Ark. 442, 565 S.W.2d 425
(1978). Looking at the plain language of the statute as well as our
case law, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling that “‘Jacksonville’s
plans for the area are not superior to and do not defeat the
landowner’s right to petition for annexation to another city.”

We now turn to Appellant’s assertion that § 14-56-426
(Repl. 1998) prohibits annexation of the portions of tracts one and
three that are affected by the AICUZ zoning ordinance. Section
14-56-426 states, in pertinent part:

(a) Any city of the first class in this state within which there lies in
whole or in part an active-duty United States Air Force military
installation shall enact a city ordinance specifying that within five (5)
miles of the corporate limits future uses on property which might be
hazardous to aircraft operation shall be restricted or prohibited.

Appellant contends that, by granting annexation, the circuit
court is requiring property developers and homeowners to secure
building permits and inspections from two different municipalities
before construction can be undertaken in the area, and that such a
process is ‘neither right, proper, nor reasonable.”

The Little Rock Air Force Base is located entirely within the
Jacksonville city limits, and Jacksonville has enacted an ordinance
in compliance with § 14-56-426. That statute is not applicable to
Sherwood, although a portion of the land sought to be annexed is
covered by the provisions of the statute. The express language of
§ 14-56-426 does not prohibit annexation of the land into Sher-
wood; however, because a state statute dictates the Jacksonville
AICUZ ordinances, Sherwood is obligated to comply with those
Jacksonville ordinances. Cf. City of Dover v. City of Russellville, 363

Ark. 458, 215 S.W.3d 623 (2005) (where state statute authorized
Russellville flood-prevention ordinance and rendered its violation
a nuisance, Dover was required to comply with the Russellville
ordinances). Accordingly, we affirm the rulings of the circuit
court.

Affirmed.

Joe THELMAN »v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-444 289 S.W.3d 76

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 13, 2008

eee

Wilson Law Firm, P.A., by: E. Dion Wilson, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass’t Att’y Gen.,
for appellee.

LANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Justice. Appellant Joe Thel-

man has attempted to appeal an order of the Phillips
County Circuit Court by which he was granted immunity and
ordered to testify in the ongoing criminal trial of Edward Joshaway.
We hold that the order granting immunity is not a final, appealable
order, and we dismiss his appeal.

The State of Arkansas charged Joshaway with theft in May of
2006. The grand jury indictment alleged that Joshaway and appel-
lant Joe Thelman participated in taking money from the Helena-
West Helena School District by deception. A second grand jury
indictment charged Joshaway with conspiracy to commit theft, by
conspiring with Thelman to create false invoices to be submitted
to the Helena~West Helena School District.

The cases against Joshaway and Thelman were originally
consolidated for trial. However, Thelman and another co-
defendant, Bobby Jones, later moved for a severance from Josha-
way. That motion was granted, and Thelman and Jones were
subsequently tried and found not guilty. After those not guilty
verdicts, the State proceeded to try Joshaway alone.

As part of its prosecution, the State named Thelman as a key
witness against Joshaway.' The prosecutor, Fletcher Long, sent a
letter and accompanying subpoena to Thelman on February 25,
2008, informing him that he would be required to appear and
testify in the Joshaway trial. Thelman replied, informing Long that

* At the hearing on the State’s petition to grant immunity, the prosecutor informed
the court that he would have to dismiss the charges against Joshaway if Thelman refused
to testify.

he would not testify and would invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Long then filed a petition for
grant of use immunity pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-43-603
(Repl. 1999) and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-43-604 (Repl. 1999),
asking the circuit court to enter an order affording Thelman
immunity from the use of his truthful testimony against him in any
future proceeding that might be brought against him.

The circuit court entered such an order on March 10, 2008,
granting Thelman use immunity and directing him to “testify fully
and completely in this cause of action and responsively to any
questions [that] he may be asked by the Prosecuting Attorney or
defense counsel.”? The court’s order cautioned Thelman that his
“refusal to testify in accordance with this order constitutes a Class
B misdemeanor and that he may be imprisoned or fined for his
failure to so testify.”

Ina hearing held the same day, Thelman informed the court
that, despite the granting ofimmunity, he would not testify in the
Joshaway trial. The circuit court then stated from the bench that it
was holding him in contempt of court and ordered him confined in
the Phillips County jail until he filed a notice of appeal.-Thelman
immediately filed his notice of appeal, stating his intent to appeal
“from the ruling issued by [the circuit] court regarding [the] grant
ofuse immunity.” On appeal, he argues that the circuit court erred
in holding him in contempt for refusing to comply with the court’s
order compelling his testimony.

Before we can consider the merits of Thelman’s argument
on appeal, however, we must address an issue raised by the State in
its response to Thelman’s jurisdictional statement. The State
contends that Thelman has attempted to appeal from an order that
is not final and appealable — the order granting him use immunity
— and thus this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Thelman’s
appeal under Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 2(a)(1). We agree.

Hl As just noted, Thelman’s sole point on appeal is that
the circuit court erred in holding him in contempt for refusing to
testify after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. An order of contempt is a final, appealable order.
See, e.g., Cent. Emergency Med. Servs., Inc. v. State, 332 Ark. 592, 966
S.W.2d 257 (1998); Young v. Young, 316 Ark. 456, 872 S.W.2d 856
(1994). However, Thelman’s notice of appeal is not taken from a
contempt order. Rather, as mentioned above, Thelman’s notice of

appeal stated that he was appealing ‘‘from the ruling issued by [the
circuit] court regarding [the] grant of use immunity.”

HB Rule 3(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure pro~
vides that a notice of appeal shall, among other things, “designate
the judgment, decree, order, or part thereof appealed from.”’ Ark.
R. App. P.-Civ. 3(e) (2008). A notice of appeal must therefore
designate the judgment or order appealed from, and an order not
mentioned in the notice of appeal is not properly before an
appellate court. See Wright v. State, 359 Ark. 418, 198 S.W.3d 537
(2004) (citing Ruffin v. State, 64 Ark. App. 98, 983 S.W.2d 146
(1998)). In addition, our court of appeals has held that a notice of
appeal must be “judged by what it recites and not what it was
intended to recite.”” Rawe v. Rawe, 100 Ark. App. 90, 249 S.W.3d
162 (2007); see also Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shipman, 25 Ark.
App. 247, 253, 756 S.W.2d 930, 933 (1988) (although it was
“readily apparent” that Department of Human Services employees
intended to appeal from their contempt conviction, that matter
was not properly before the appellate court where the notice of
appeal made no reference to the contempt order).

In this case, Thelman’s notice of appeal recites that he is
appealing the circuit court’s order “regarding [the] grant of use
immunity,” not the court’s decision to hold him in contempt.
However, we have been unable to find any authority that would
support a conclusion that an order compelling testimony in ex-
change for a grant of immunity is a final, appealable order. This
court has held in an analogous context that an order denying a
protective order to quash a prosecutor’s subpoena is “‘not a final
order for appeal purposes.” In re Badami, 309 Ark. 511, 513, 831
S.W.2d 905, 906 (1992). There, we held that such an order “‘is not
a final judgment or order under [Ark. R. App. P.—Civ.] 2(a)(1),
nor is it an order under Rule 2(a)(2) which determines the
‘action.’ ” Id. at 513, 831 S.W.2d at 906. In a subsequent case,
Central Emergency Medical Services v. State, 332 Ark. 592, 966 S.W.2d
257 (1998), this court noted that there was no “final appealable
order” problem where the subject of a prosecutor’s subpoena
duces tecum appealed from the order holding it in contempt, and not
from the order denying its motion to quash the subpoena.

In a similar vein, over a century ago, the United States
Supreme Court held that an order compelling testimony and the
production of documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum was
not appealable, even where the individual whose testimony was

being compelled asserted a claim of privilege under the Fifth
Amendment. See Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).
The Court reasoned that “such an order may coerce a witness,
leaving him no alternative but to obey or be punished],] . . . but
from such a ruling it will not be contended there is an appeal.” Id.
at 121, Rather, the Court said, the court compelling the testimony
should “go farther, and punish the witness for contempt of its
order — then arrives a right of review; and this is adequate for his
protection without unduly impeding the progress of the case.” Id.
It is only when the contempt power is exercised that the “matter
becomes personal to the witness and a judgment as to him,” and
only then may an appeal be taken. Id. at 122; see also Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940) (order denying a motion to
quash a subpoena duces tecum and directing a witness to appear
before a grand jury was not a final decision that could be appealed);
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971) (order compelling the
production of documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum was
not an appealable order; concluding that the subject of the sub-
poena had another option: “the may refuse to comply and litigate
those questions in the event that contempt or similar proceedings
are brought against him’’).

HB Accordingly, applying this same reasoning, we hold
that an order requiring testimony in exchange for a grant of use
immunity is not a final appealable order. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 538
F.2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (order compelling testimony and
production of documents in exchange for immunity ‘‘stands on the
same footing as any other order compelling testimony and the
production of documents; and the Supreme Court has consistently
held that such orders are not final and hence not appealable”). Had
Thelman wished to appeal the circuit court’s order holding him in
contempt, he could have had the contempt order reduced to
writing and entered by the court. See Hewitt v. State, 362 Ark. 369,
208 S.W.3d 185 (2005) (an oral order is not effective until entered
of record); Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(2) (a judgment,
decree, or order is entered when file-stamped by the clerk).

It is the appellant’s obligation to properly preserve an issue
for review. See Hewitt, supra (holding that, where the defendant
failed to obtain an order on the motion to withdraw his plea
separate from the judgment entered on his guilty plea, he was left
with no order to appeal); Beshears v. State, 340 Ark. 70, 8 S.W.3d
32 (2000). As Thelman failed to have the circuit court reduce the
contempt order to writing and enter it in accordance with Admin-

istrative Order No. 2, and as the order granting use immunity was

not itself an appealable order, we conclude that Thelman’s appeal
must be dismissed.

ASBURY AUTOMOTIVE USED CAR CENTER ».
Patric BROSH, Mark Lunsford, Mel Anderson, NCAS, LLC
d/b/a New Century Auto Sales

08-526 289 S.W.3d 88

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 13, 2008

er
122 |

|_|
ee

Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: G. Alan Wooten and Stephanie
Harper Easterling, for appellant.

Conner & Winters, LLP, by: John R. Elrod, Todd P. Lewis, and
Kerri E. Kobbeman, for appellee Patric Brosh.

ER Curiam. In the mid-1990s, appellees Patric Brosh,

Mark Lunsford, and Mel Anderson started a business, New
Century Auto Sales (“New Century’), another appellee to this
action, to sell used cars from Wal-Mart parking lots. After developing
a business plan, and entering into a lease agreement with Wal-Mart,
New Century decided to market its plan. It approached Asbury
Automotive Used Car Center, L.L.C. (“Asbury”), the appellant in
this action, about purchasing the plan. Asbury expressed interest and
ultimately the parties signed the contracts that are the center of this
dispute — the Purchase Agreement, whereby Asbury agreed to
purchase the business plan from New Century and to enter into the
leases with Wal-Mart, and three separate Employment Agreements,
whereby Asbury agreed to employ Brosh, Lunsford, and Anderson for
an annual base salary of $300,000 per year.

By August 2003, the parties were in dispute, and Asbury
terminated its leases with Wal-Mart and its employment contracts
with Brosh, Lunsford, and Anderson. As a result, the appellees filed
suit against Asbury in Washington County Circuit Court on a
breach of contract claim. Asbury answered and filed a motion for
a stay of proceedings and to compel arbitration pursuant to
arbitration provisions in the disputed contracts. The circuit court
held a hearing on the matter, and determined that the arbitration
agreements lacked mutuality of obligation and, as a result, denied
Asbury’s motion. Asbury filed an interlocutory appeal, and this
court affirmed the circuit court, agreeing that the provisions lacked
mutuality of obligation. Asbury Auto. Used Car Ctr, L.L.C. v.
Brosh, 364 Ark. 386, 220 S.W.3d 637 (2005).

The case was then tried before a jury, which rendered a
verdict in favor of Asbury. Following the verdict, appellant filed a
motion for attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated
section 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999), requesting attorneys’ fees and
costs from the appellees. The circuit court entered an order
denying the appellant’s motion. The order specifically held that
section 16-22-308 did not apply because “the parties intended and
anticipated that in the event there was a controversy or dispute
arising out of or relating to the Agreements, or any breach thereof,
then each party would bear their own costs and attorneys’ fees.”
The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

We are unable to consider appellant’s appeal at this
time because its brief is not in compliance with Arkansas Supreme
Court Rule 4-2(a). Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 4-2(a) (2008). Our rules
require that the appellant include all relevant pleadings, docu-
ments, or exhibits, essential to an understanding of the case on
appeal, in the addendum portion of the brief. Id. R. 4-2(a)(8).
Furthermore, our rules state that:

‘Whether or not the appellee has called attention to deficiencies
in the appellant’s abstract or Addendum, the Court may address the
question at any time. If the Court finds the abstract or Addendum
to be deficient such that the Court cannot reach the merits of the
case, or such as to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the
disposition of the appeal, the Court will notify the appellant that he
or she will be afforded an opportunity to cure any deficiencies, and
has fifteen days within which to file a substituted abstract, Adden-
dum, and brief, at his or her own expense, to conform to Rule
4-2(a)(5) and (8).

Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 4-2(b)(3) (2008). Finally, the rules make clear that an
appellee may prepare a supplemental addendum if material on which
it relies is not in the appellant’s addendum. Id. R. 4-2(a)(8).

Hl In this case, the appellant failed to include photocopies
of the complete Purchase Agreement and Employment Agreement
in its addendum. These contracts form the basis of the dispute and
are essential to this court’s understanding of the case on appeal.
Furthermore, the appellees’ brief relies heavily on the severability
provisions of the contracts; however, the appellees did not prepare
a supplemental addendum including a copy of the provisions. We
note that the complete contracts are not included in the record
filed in the instant appeal. However, the appellant may use the

pertinent portions of the first record in order to bring its addendum in
compliance with Rule 4-2(a)(8). See id. R. 4-2(a)(5) (on a second or
subsequent appeal, the abstract shall include a condensation of all
pertinent portions of the transcript filed on any prior appeal); Drymon v.
State, 327 Ark. 375, 378, 938 S.W.2d 825, 826-27 (1997) (the relevant
portions of the first record do not need to be included in the record filed
in the second appeal; the record of the first trial was already filed with
the appellate court in the earlier appeal and is a public record that need
not be incorporated on the second appeal).

Accordingly, we order appellant to file a substituted brief,
curing the deficiencies in the addendum, within fifteen days from
the date of entry of this order. After service of the substituted brief,
the appellees shall have an opportunity to file a responsive brief in
the time prescribed by the supreme court clerk, or to rely on the
brief filed in this appeal.

Rebriefing ordered.

Ledell LEE v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-160 289 S.W.3d 61

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 13, 2008

a
= sid 125

Durrett & Coleman, by: Gerald A. Coleman, for appellant.

No response.

eR Curram. In 1993, the appellant, Ledell Lee, was con-

victed of capital murder and sentenced to death. His con-
viction and sentence were affirmed by this court in Lee v. State, 327
Ark. 692, 942 $.W.2d 231, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1002 (1997). Lee
then filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R.
Crim. P. 37, on grounds that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel. The circuit court appointed counsel to represent
Lee in the postconviction proceedings. Following a hearing on the
petition, the circuit court entered an order denying Lee’s request for
relief. This court affirmed the order in Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 38
S.W.3d 334 (2001). However, in 2006, we granted a motion by Lee
to recall that mandate because it was clear on the record that he had
been denied effective assistance of counsel during his first Rule 37
proceeding. Lee v. State, 367 Ark. 84, 238 S.W.3d 52 (2006). We
remanded the case to the circuit court for a new hearing on Lee’s
claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The circuit court held another Rule 37 hearing on August
28, 2007, and, on November 21, 2007, entered an order denying
Lee’s motion for postconviction relief. The order relied on testi-
mony from the August 28, 2007 hearing, stipulated testimony
from evidentiary hearings held in January and March of 1999, and
trial testimony. Appellant filed a notice of appeal in this court
alleging that the circuit court erred in denying his Rule 37 petition
with respect to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in both the
guilt and penalty phases of his trial.

We are unable to consider appellant’s appeal at this
time because his brief is not in compliance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R.
4-2(a) (2008). Our rules require an appellant to abstract all material
parts of the testimony of the witnesses and colloquies between the
court and counsel and other parties as are necessary to an under-
standing of all questions presented to the court for decision. Id. R.

4-2(a)(5). Furthermore, on a second or subsequent appeal, the
abstract must include a condensation of all pertinent portions of
the transcript filed on any prior appeal. Id. Our rules also require
that the appellant include all relevant pleadings in the addendum
portion of his brief. Id. R. 4-2(a)(8).

In this case, the appellant failed to abstract all relevant
portions of the guilt and penalty phases of his underlying criminal
trial. Lee also failed to abstract the relevant testimony from the first
Rule 37 proceeding. Finally, the addendum is deficient because
Lee failed to include a copy of his amended Rule 37 petition. Our
Rules state that:

‘Whether or not the appellee has called attention to deficiencies
in the appellant’s abstract or Addendum, the Court may address the
question at any time. If the Court finds the abstract or Addendum.
to be deficient such that the Court cannot reach the merits of the
case, or such as to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the
disposition of the appeal, the Court will notify the appellant that he
or she will be afforded an opportunity to cure any deficiencies, and
has fifteen days within which to file a substituted abstract, Adden-
dum, and brief, at his or her own expense, to conform to Rule
4-2(a)(5) and (8).

Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 4-2(b)(3) (2008).

Accordingly, we order appellant to file a substituted brief,
curing the deficiencies in the abstract and addendum, within
fifteen days from the date of entry of this order. After service of the
substituted brief, the appellee shall have an opportunity to file a
responsive brief in the time prescribed by the supreme court clerk,
or to rely on the brief previously filed in this appeal.

Rebriefing ordered.

127

08-861

INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. ».
CLARK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

289 S.W.3d 103

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 20, 2008

ee
128 es

Rose Law Firm, by: Tim Boe, Patrick J. Goss, and Robyn P.
Allmendinger, for petitioner.

Arrington Law Firm, PLLC, by: Claudene T. Arrington, for
respondent.

ONALD L. Corin, Justice. Petitioner, International Pa~

per Company, invokes this court’s jurisdiction to request
a writ of prohibition to prevent the Clark County Circuit Court from
exercising jurisdiction over matters alleged to be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission.
Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(3). We find
merit to Petitioner’s request and grant the writ of prohibition.

Our review of the pleadings reveals the following informa-
tion. On January 6, 2004, Edna Pennington suffered a fatal,
accidental injury while employed at Petitioner’s Gurdon, Arkan-
sas, facility. She was cleaning wood chips from the floor near a
Hammer Hog Wood Chipper machine when her clothing became
entangled in the shaft of the machine. Her cause of death was
craniocerebral and facial trauma; she also suffered rib fractures and
abrasions of her trunk and extremities. Petitioner had been granted
authority from the Commission to self-insure its workers’ com-
pensation obligations. Petitioner, through a claims-management
service, began paying weekly benefits to the decedent’s husband,
Gerald Pennington, and their minor son. Currently, the Death and
Permanent Total Disability Fund is set to assume liability for
payment of benefits in August of 2009.

On January 5, 2006, Gerald Pennington, individually and as
personal representative of his wife’s estate, filed a complaint in
Clark County Circuit Court. He later amended the complaint,
which stated numerous allegations, the gist of which was that Mrs.
Pennington’s injury and death were caused by Petitioner’s failure
to maintain a safe work environment and by Petitioner’s inten-
tional, deliberate, and willful conduct. The complaint alleged
further that Petitioner’s conduct was outrageous and intended to
cause severe emotional distress and mental anguish.

Petitioner first responded to the complaint by filing a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. The circuit court con-
sidered the pleadings in the light most favorable to Mr. Penning-
ton, as the party asserting the claims, and denied the motion to
dismiss by order entered May 30, 2007. Petitioner then answered.

Se
Pd 129

the complaint. Respondent filed a motion to set a pretrial sched-
uling order. Petitioner then filed its petition for a writ of prohibi-
tion in this court."

A writ of prohibition is extraordinary relief that is appropri-
ate only when the circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction.
Coonrod v. Seay, 367 Ark. 437, 241 S.W.3d 252 (2006). The writ is
appropriate only when there is no other remedy available. Id.
When considering a petition for a writ of prohibition, this court
confines its review to the pleadings in the case. Id. Prohibition is a
proper remedy when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends
upon a legal rather than a factual question. Id. Prohibition is never
issued to prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising juris-
diction. Erin, Inc. v. White County Circuit Court, 369 Ark. 265, 253
S.W.3d 444 (2007). Writs of prohibition are prerogative writs,
extremely narrow in scope and operation; they are to be used with
great caution and forbearance. Id. They should issue only in cases
of extreme necessity. Id.

In support of its request for a writ of prohibition, Petitioner
first contends that the circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction
of the claims alleged in the complaint because they are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation
Commission. We agree that, at this point in the litigation, the
circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction of the matters alleged
in this complaint.

Generally, an employer who has secured for its employees
the benefits of workers’ compensation is immune from liability for
damages in a tort action brought by an injured employee, his legal
representative, dependents, and next of kin. Gourley v. Crossett Pub.
Schs., 333 Ark. 178, 968 S.W.2d 56 (1998). This rule, known as
the exclusivity doctrine, arises from Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105
(Repl. 2002), which provides that “[t]he rights and remedies
granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on
account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and
remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents,
[or] next of kin.” This court has on occasion rendered certain

' ‘Two parties filed responses to this petition — Clark County Circuit Court Judge
John Thomas and Gerald Pennington, individually and as personal representative of his wife’s
estate. The proper party as respondent to a petition for writ of prohibition is the circuit court,
not the judge, and not an injured worker's representative. See Travelers Ins. Co. 1. Smith, 329
Atk, 336, 947 S.W.2d 382 (1997).

ee
130 es

court-defined narrow exceptions to this general rule, such as when
an employer willfully and intentionally injures an employee.
Gourley, 333 Ark. at 181, 968 S.W.2d at 57-58 (citing Hill v.
Patterson, 313 Ark. 322, 855 S.W.2d 297 (1993)).

Over ten years ago, this court recognized that its
concurrent-jurisdiction approach was resulting in duplicative liti-
gation and therefore contravening the purpose of the Arkansas
Workers’ Compensation Act, currently codified at Ark. Code
Ann. §§ 11-9-101 to -1001 (Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007), to achieve
uniformity, simplicity, and speed in the disposition of cases.
VanWagoner v. Beverly Enters., 334 Ark. 12, 970 S.W.2d 810 (1998).
This court therefore abandoned the concurrent-jurisdiction ap-
proach in favor of the administrative law rule of primary jurisdic-
tion allowing the Commission to decide the applicability of the
Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. In so doing, this court stated as
follows:

‘We hold that the exclusive remedy of an employee or her
representative on account of injury or death arising out ofand in the
course of her employment is a claim for compensation under
§ 11-9-105, and that the commission has exclusive, original juris-
diction to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction, unless the
facts are so one-sided that this issue is no longer one of fact but one
of law, such as an intentional tort. See Angle v. Alexander, 328 Ark.
714, 719, 945 S.W.2d 933 (1997) (citing Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286
Ark. 458, 461, 692 S.W.2d 615 (1985)) (explaining that, before an
employee is free to bring a tort action for damages against an
employer, the facts must show that the employer had a “desire” to
bring about the consequences of the acts, or that the acts were
premeditated with the specific intent to injure the employee). In so
holding, we overrule all prior decisions to the extent that they are
inconsistent with this opinion.

334 Ark. at 16, 970 S.W.2d at 812.

HI [fas the Respondent circuit court states in its response
to this petition, there are facts alleged in the pleadings that are in
need of further development, then, according to VanWagoner, the
Commission is the forum with the exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
mine those facts relevant to the applicability of the Workers’
Compensation Act. VanWagoner clearly states that it is the Com-
mission that has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts that
establish jurisdiction. The issue is one of “jurisdiction to deter-

Pe
es Bt

mine jurisdiction,” as distinguished from ‘‘jurisdiction to hear the
merits of the case.” Nucor Corp. v. Rhine, 366 Ark. 550, 555, 237
S.W.3d 52, 57 (2006).

Here, the complaint alleges that Petitioner committed nu-
merous acts such as failure to make reasonable inspection of the
equipment, failure to provide a safe workplace, failure to provide
safety gear and lockdown measures, and violation of governmental
safety regulations, among others. Our case law is clear that these
types of allegations are covered exclusively by the Workers’
Compensation Act, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Com-
mission, and are rarely if ever sufficient to satisfy the intentional
tort exception to the Act’s exclusive-remedy provision. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458, 692 S.W.2d 615 (1985). In
addition, the complaint alleges intentional torts involving mental
anguish such as intentional infliction of emotional distress and
outrage. However, because all the allegations in this complaint are
so intertwined, we cannot conclude the facts are so one-sided as to
render the issue no longer one of fact, but of law. See VanWagoner,
334 Ark. 12, 970 S.W.2d 810. Accordingly, at this stage of the
litigation, we conclude the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction
to determine the applicability of the Act to the matters alleged in
the complaint, and the circuit court is therefore wholly without
jurisdiction.

Hl Before granting a writ of prohibition, however, we
must next determine if Petitioner has any other adequate remedy.
As a general rule of appellate procedure, the denial of a motion to
dismiss is not an appealable order under Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 2.
Lenders Title Co. v. Chandler, 353 Ark. 339, 107 S.W.3d 157 (2003).
Moreover, this court has stated that a writ of prohibition is not the
appropriate remedy following a denial of a motion to dismiss.
Ulmer v. Circuit Court of Polk County, 366 Ark. 212, 234 S.W.3d 290
(2006). An appeal after a trial on the merits is not adequate,
contends Petitioner, because it would contravene the very purpose
of the Act and allow the floodgates of litigation to be opened
simply by alleging matters in a complaint. This court has stated that
where encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Com-
pensation Commission is clear, a writ of prohibition is clearly
warranted. W. Waste Indus. v. Purifoy, 326 Ark. 256, 930 S.W.2d
348 (1996) (citing Hill v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322, 855 S.W.2d 297
(1993)); see also Erin, Inc., 369 Ark. 265, 253 S.W.3d 444. Any
perceived error in the Commission’s decision on jurisdiction may

be tested and reviewed on appeal. Erin, Inc., 369 Ark. 265, 253
S.W.3d 444. Because at this point in the litigation the exclusive
jurisdiction of this case lies with the Commission, encroachment
on the Commission’s jurisdiction is clear, and we therefore grant
the writ of prohibition.

Because we grant the writ of prohibition on jurisdictional
grounds, we need not consider Petitioner’s argument concerning
the election-of-remedies doctrine.

Writ granted.

Cameron Duane WILLIAMS v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-619 289 S.W.3d 97

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 20, 2008

ee

James H. Phillips and Knutson Law Firm, by: Gregg A. Knutson,
for appellant.

es
= | 133

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass’t Att’y Gen.,
for appellee.

Je GuNTER, Justice. Appellant Cameron Williams was con-
victed of two counts of capital murder and now appeals his
conviction, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for directed verdict because the State failed to sufficiently corroborate
his accomplices’ testimony. Because this is a criminal appeal in which
life imprisonment has been imposed, this court has jurisdiction under
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(2). We find that appellant’s
argument is not preserved for our review and affirm.

On the night of June 5, 2006, Sean Johnson and Monte
Johnson were shot and killed in Hindman Park in Little Rock.
After a ten-month investigation, appellant, Albert Reed, and
Nathan Gilcrease were charged, as accomplices, with kidnapping
and capital murder, and Latifah Johnson, a friend of appellant’s,
and Mariah Powell, Reed’s then-girlfriend, were charged with
hindering apprehension or prosecution.

At appellant’s trial, the following pertinent testimony was
presented. Mariah Powell testified that on June 5, 2006, she and
Latifah Johnson went with the victims to a house on Reck Road,
which is where she was living at the time and where she knew
Reed was waiting. Powell testified that she knew Reed was going
to beat up Monte Johnson, with whom she had a past sexual
relationship, due to her continued contact with Monte and an
ongoing dispute between Reed and Monte over some stolen
property. She testified that when they arrived at the house on
Reck Road, she saw Nathan Gilcrease’s car parked next door. She
testified that she, Sean, and Monte walked into the house and into
a back bedroom, where appellant suddenly jumped out of the
closet holding a handgun. She testified that Gilcrease then came in
the bedroom holding a ‘“‘chopper,” meaning a rifle. She testified
that Reed began questioning the victims about his stolen property,
and appellant hit Sean in the face with the gun. Powell testified
that she had not expected there to be guns there, and she ran from
the house because she was scared. She stated that she returned to
the house on Reck Road about an hour later to pick up some of
her belongings, and she saw blood on the cover of the bed. She
testified that, after that night, she overheard appellant talking to his
girlfriend on the phone and joking about killing the victims. She
testified that appellant told her that if she went to the police, he

would kill her. Powell insisted that she had not set up the victims
to be killed and that she thought they were just going to fight.

Colleen Wright, appellant’s girlfriend and the mother of his
child, testified that about two weeks after the murders, she
contacted the police and told them she had information about the
killings. She told the police that a girl had set up the victims and
that the shooters had taken the victims to Hindman Park. She
testified that this statement was not true and that she only said it
because she was mad at appellant. Wright testified that she gave
another statement to the police on July 12, 2006, in which she
named Reed as one of the shooters and told police that Reed had
a dispute with one of the victims over his girlfriend, “Red” (one
of Powell’s street nicknames is “Red”’). She testified that she told
police that she saw appellant the day after the murders, that he told
her that he, Reed, and Gilcrease had beat up the victims and put
them in the trunk of Monte Johnson’s car, and that he had
“merked some dudes in the park.” She testified that appellant
actually told her that he hadn’t done anything in the park, and she
‘was just making up the information that she gave to the police. She
testified that appellant had never admitted to taking part in the
murders.

Detective J.C. White with the Little Rock Police Depart-
ment testified about the various statements given by Colleen
Wright and also testified about his interview with appellant after
appellant’s arrest. Appellant’s recorded statement was played for
the jury. In that statement, appellant said that he, Reed, and
Gilcrease had gone to the house on Reck Road on the night of
June 5, 2006. He stated that after Mariah Powell arrived with Sean
and Monte, Reed began questioning Monte about his stolen
property. Appellant stated that Reed began hitting Monte with his
hand and that Gilcrease had a gun pointed at Monte. Appellant said
he did not want to be a part of what was going on and wanted to
go home, so he went outside and got in Gilcrease’s vehicle to wait
for him. Appellant said that when Reed came out of the house, he
had a gun and ordered Sean and Monte into the trunk of Monte’s
car. Appellant stated that Reed then drove Monte’s car to Hind-
man Park, and he and Gilcrease followed in Gilcrease’s vehicle.
According to appellant, he stayed in the vehicle while Reed and
Gilcrease opened the trunk of Monte’s car, shot several times into
the trunk, and then asked appellant for some duct tape that was in
Gilcrease’s vehicle. Appellant said he threw them the duct tape.

| 18

Appellant stated that Monte and Sean tried to run away and were
shot by Reed and Gilcrease.

Albert Reed testified that he was involved in the murders of
Sean and Monte Johnson and that he had pled guilty to two counts
of murder in the first degree. He testified that while he was present
at Hindman Park at the time of the shooting, it was appellant and
Gilcrease who fired the guns. Reed testified that he had intended
to confront Monte about his relationship with Powell, but appel-
Jant and Gilcrease both had guns and began hitting the victims with
the guns. Reed stated that he addressed Gilcrease by name and told
him to stop hitting, and Gilcrease became angry and said “they
know who I am now” and that he had to kill them now. Reed
testified that appellant retrieved some duct tape from another
room and that Gilcrease duct-taped the victims while appellant
held them at gunpoint. Reed stated that Gilcrease put the victims
in the trunk of Monte’s car and directed Reed to drive the car to
Hindman Park. Once they were at the park, according to Reed,
Gilcrease and appellant shot the victims as they tried to run away.

At the close of the State’s case, appellant made the following
directed verdict motion:

Okay, Judge, the Defense will move for a directed verdict specifi-
cally that — by stating that the State has not — as the State has failed
to prove a prima facie case as to the kidnapping allegation, specifi-
cally, that has been alleged in the felony information. The State has
failed to produce proof which taken in the light most favorable to
the State would prove that my client participated in any — any way
with the actual kidnapping itself. As a matter of fact, the proof
actually showed to the contrary. The Defense would further move
that — no, I’ll — we’d just ask the case to be dismissed, Your
Honor.

The court denied the motion and its renewal at the close of all the
evidence. Appellant was found guilty of two counts of capital murder
and sentenced to two life sentences without the possibility of parole,
to be served concurrently. He then filed a timely appeal to this court.

This court treats a motion for directed verdict as a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence. Reese v. State, 371 Ark. 1, 262
S.W.3d 604 (2007). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict is sup-
ported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Sub-
stantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclu-

sion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. This
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Id.

Hn appeal, appellant argues that the State failed to
produce sufficient evidence of his participation in the kidnapping,
specifically by failing to corroborate the accomplice testimony of
Albert Reed and Mariah Powell. But, as illustrated by the quoted
motion above, this is not the same argument advanced by appellant
at trial. At trial, appellant advanced only the general argument that
the State had failed to prove that he participated in the kidnapping
and did not raise the issue of accomplice corroboration. We also
note that appellant did not request a finding that Reed and Powell
were accomplices as a matter or law, nor did he request a jury
instruction on the required corroboration of accomplice testi-
mony.

This court has consistently held that a party is bound by the
scope of the arguments made at trial, and we will not consider an
argument raised for the first time on appeal. Watson v. State, 358
Ark. 212, 188 S.W.3d 921 (2004). In addition, Rule 33.1(a) of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a motion for
directed verdict to “‘state the specific grounds therefor,” and this
requirement extends to any challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony. Gardner v.
State, 364 Ark. 506, 221 S.W.3d 339 (2006). The failure to
challenge the sufficiency of accomplice-corroboration evidence in
a directed verdict motion precludes appellate review on that
ground. Id. This is true even in cases where a sentence of life
imprisonment is imposed, as it is this court’s duty, pursuant to Ark.
Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), to examine the record for error on objections
decided adversely to the appellant, not to address arguments that
might have been made. Tillman v. State, 364 Ark. 143, 217 S.W.3d
773 (2005).

Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(h), the
record has been examined for all objections, motions, and requests
made by either party that were decided adversely to appellant, and
no prejudicial error has been found. Id.

Affirmed.

= 137

Justin EWELL v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-584 289 S.W.3d 101

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 20, 2008

oe

William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Brenna Ryan, Deputy
Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for
appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Eileen W. Harrison, Ass’t Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

LANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Justice. Following a bench

trial in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, appellant Justin
Ewell was convicted of aggravated robbery, theft of property, and two
counts of kidnapping. Ewell received an enhanced sentence of life
imprisonment under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(d)(1)(A) (Supp.
2007) for aggravated robbery because of his previous violent felony
convictions. The trial court also sentenced Ewell to serve three
concurrent ten-year sentences for the theft of property and kidnap-
ping convictions. On appeal, Ewell brings one point for reversal,

arguing that the trial court erred by denying this motion for a directed
verdict. We affirm.

The State presented evidence that on July 22, 2005, victims
Courtney Orange and Farren Norwood were at a carwash cleaning
a car belonging to Orange’s boyfriend. Both victims testified that
they saw Ewell approach them with a gun and demand the car
from Orange. The keys were in the ignition, but Ewell was unable
to start the car. The victims testified that Ewell then got out of the
car and ordered them, at gunpoint, to get into the car with him.
They complied. Once the car was started, with Orange and
Norwood inside, Ewell lost control of the car after exiting the
carwash, crashed it into a drainage ditch, and ran away from the
scene, Orange and Norwood later identified Ewell from a photo
line-up at the police station and he was arrested.

This court treats a motion for directed verdict as a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence. Boyd v. State, 369 Ark. 259, 253
S.W.3d 456 (2007). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict is sup-
ported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Sub-
stantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclu-
sion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. This
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. On
appeal, this court does not weigh the evidence presented at trial, as
that is a matter for the fact-finder; nor does the appellate court
assess the credibility of the witnesses. Ridling v. State, 360 Ark. 424,
203 S.W.3d 63 (2005).

Ewell specifically argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to
introduce substantial evidence that identified him as the perpetra-
tor of the theft, robbery, and kidnapping. Although victims
Orange and Norwood identified Ewell as the perpetrator in a
pretrial photo line-up and in the courtroom, when they were
asked on cross-examination whether they noticed a small tattoo on
his face, they responded that they did. However, the victims
testified that they did not report to police that the perpetrator had
any identifying tattoos. Ewell argues that the victims’ failure to
report that the perpetrator had a tattoo on his face rendered their
eyewitness testimony so inconsistent that it was insufficient to
identify him as the perpetrator.

HM Unless there is an allegation of a constitutional viola-
tion in an eyewitness identification procedure, the reliability of a

Ld
i 139

witness’s identification is a question for the fact-finder. Phillips v.
State, 344 Ark. 453, 40 S.W.3d 778 (2001). On appeal, the
fact-finder’s decision will not be disturbed when it is supported by
substantial evidence. Stipes v. State, 315 Ark. 719, 870 S.W.2d 388
(1994). This court has repeatedly held that “unequivocal testi-
mony identifying the appellant as the culprit is sufficient to sustain
a conviction.” Id. at 721, 870 S.W.2d at 389.

Here, the victims’ pretrial and in-court identification of
Ewell was unequivocal and provided sufficient evidence to support
his convictions. Even if Ewell had established that his tattoo
pre-dated the theft, robbery, and kidnapping, which he did not,
any alleged inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony became an
issue of credibility for the fact-finder to determine. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s verdict.

In compliance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), the record has
been examined for all objections, motions, and requests made by
either party that were decided adversely to Ewell, and no preju-
dicial error has been found.

Affirmed.

Gregory Christopher DECAY v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1259 . 289 S.W.3d 96

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 20, 2008

Ld
140 _

See

Denny Hyslip and Julie C. Tolleson, for appellant.

No response.

eR Curiam. Denny Hyslip and Julie C. Tolleson, full-

time, state-salaried public defenders for the Fourth Judicial
District, were appointed by the trial court to represent appellant,
Gregory Christopher Decay. Following a jury trial, Decay was con-
victed of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death as to
both counts. A notice of appeal was timely filed and a request for the
transcribed record was filed in this case.

Mr. Hyslip and Ms. Tolleson now ask to be relieved as
counsel for appellant in this criminal appeal based on the case of
Rushing v. State, 340 Ark. 84, 8 S.W.3d 489 (2000), where we held
that full-time, state salaried public defenders were ineligible for
compensation for their work on appeal. Since Rushing, the General
Assembly passed Arkansas Code Annotated § 19-4-1604(b)(2)(B)
(Supp. 2007), which states:

A person employed as full-time public defender who is not
provided a state-funded secretary may also seek compensation for
appellate work from the Arkansas Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals.

Mr. Hyslip and Ms. Tolleson’s motion states that they are
provided with a full-time, state-funded secretary. Accordingly, we
grant their motion to withdraw as attorneys. Mr. Dale Adams will
be substituted as attorney for appellant in this matter. The clerk
will establish a new briefing schedule.

SOUTHERN BANK of COMMERCE ».
UNION PLANTERS NATIONAL BANK,

08-288 289 S.W.3d 414

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 4, 2008

Branch, Thompson, Philhours & Warmouth, by: Robert F. Thomp-
son, III, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Lyons, Emerson & Cone, PLC, by: Jim Lyons, for appellee/cross-
appellant.

De. L. Cora, Justice. The instant appeal presents
the question of whether Appellee Union Planters Na-
tional Bank is a holder in due course, as defined by the Uniform
Commercial Code, and is entitled to seek payment from Appellant
Southern Bank of Commerce after a cashier’s check issued by South-
ern Bank was declined due to insufficient funds. On appeal, Southern
Bank argues that the trial court erred in finding that Union Planters
was a holder in due course. Southern Bank also argues that the trial
court’s award to Union Planters of prejudgment interest was in error.
Union Planters cross-appeals and argues that the trial court erred in
denying its request for an award of attorney’s fees. We affirm, both on
direct appeal and on cross-appeal.

This case stems from a transaction between Raymond and
Diane Crutchfield and Regions Bank, whereby Regions approved
the Crutchfields’ application for a loan that included a refinancing
of their home. At the time, Union Planters held a $97,100 Joan
against the Crutchfields’ home. Regions contracted with Julia
Gray, a closing agent with Security Title, to close the Regions
loan, including the payoff to Union Planters. Regions transferred
$129,000 to Gray to fund the Crutchfields’ new loan. Security
Title then issued a check on September 5, 2003, drawn on
Southern Bank and made payable to Union Planters in the amount
of $95,506.42, but this check was declined due to insufficient
funds, Thereafter, Union Planters contacted Gray and notified her

ee
es 49

that she must provide a cashier’s check in exchange for the
returned check. Gray then issued a personal check, drawn on First
National Bank, in the amount of $95,214.20, which she deposited
into Security Title’s account at Southern Bank, in order to obtain
a cashier’s check that was made payable to Union Planters in the
amount of $95,506.42. Gray then delivered the cashier’s check to
Union Planters on October 21, 2003, for ‘‘the payoff on the
Crutchfield loan” and to cover charges stemming from the prior
insufficient check.

According to Greg Miller, President of Southern Bank, he
received a call from the Federal Reserve on October 22, 2003,
informing him that Gray’s check drawn on First National was
being returned because it was drawn on insufficient funds. The
next day, Miller spoke with Joe Turney, an official with Union
Planters, and advised him that Southern Bank would be returning
its previously issued cashier’s check because Gray had obtained it
through fraud. Turney advised Miller to contact Union Planters’
fraud department in Memphis, Tennessee, which Miller did.
When Southern Bank received the cashier’s check on October 23,
it stamped it “refer to maker” and returned it to Union Planters.
Originally, Union Planters’ internal loan history showed that the
Crutchfields’ loan was paid in full, but the loan was returned to
Union Planters’ books after the cashier’s check was returned, and
therefore Union Planters did not release its mortgage on the
Crutchfields’ property.

Counsel for Union Planters contacted Regions Bank and
demanded that Union Planters’ mortgage be paid in full. Union
Planters threatened to foreclose on the property if Regions did not
comply. Then, however, Union Planters and Regions entered into
negotiations that resulted in a merger of the two banks. Union
Planters subsequently entered into an agreement promising not to
sue Regions or the title insurer over Gray’s fraudulent cashier’s
check. Union Planters then filed suit against Southern Bank on
February 24, 2005, alleging that it was a holder in due course of the
cashier’s check and requesting that Southern Bank be required to
pay the check.

* Gray was indicted in federal district court and ultimately pleaded guilty to one count
of bank fraud. As part of her plea agreement, Gray was ordered to pay restitution to Bank of
Paragould in the amount of $50,655.22 and to Southern Bank in the amount of
$95,506.42. At the time of the trial of this matter, Gray had been making restitution
payments to Southern Bank.

ee
144 ses

A bench trial was held in Craighead County Circuit Court
on July 3, 2007. At the conclusion of the trial, the court held that
Union Planters was not a holder in due course pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann. § 4~3-302 (Supp. 2001), because it did not give value
for the cashier’s check as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 4-3-303
(Supp. 2001). Union Planters then filed a motion under Ark. R.
Civ. P. 59 to alter or amend the judgment. After taking the motion
under advisement, the circuit court reversed its previous order,
finding that because the cashier’s check was transferred as payment
of an antecedent loan that Union Planters had against the Crutch-
fields, Union Planters was a holder in dué course. Thus, the court
entered a judgment in favor of Union Planters in the amount of
$95,506.42. The trial court entered a subsequent order on No-
vember 27, 2007, declining to award attorney’s fees to either party,
but granting an award of prejudgment interest to Union Planters in
the amount of $20,320.61 and costs of $174.58. Southern Bank
then appealed, and Union Planters cross-appealed on the order
declining to award it attorney’s fees.

As its first point on appeal, Southern Bank argues that the
trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Union Planters
because it was not a holder in due course, as it took the cashier’s
check with sufficient notice of Gray’s fraud and it did not give
value for the cashier’s check. Union Planters counters that the trial
court correctly determined that it was a holder in due course
because it took the check for value, in good faith, and without
notice that the check had been dishonored. More specifically,
Union Planters avers that it gave value for the check as it was an
instrument issued or transferred as payment of, or as security for, an
antecedent claim. Union Planters is correct.

We begin our review by turning to the applicable statutes.
Section 4-3-302(a)(2) defines a holder in due course as one who
takes “‘the instrument (j) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without
notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored[.]”
Section 4-3-303(a)(3) specifically provides that an instrument is
transferred for value if it ‘“‘is issued or transferred as payment of, or
as security for, an antecedent claim against any person[.]” Thus,
the question to be decided is whether Union Planters took the
cashier’s check for value as set out in section 4~3-303, and without
notice, so that it is entitled to holder-in-due-course status.

The issue of whether a bank was a holder in due course was
addressed by this court in Byrd v. Security Bank, 250 Ark. 214, 464
S.W.2d 578 (1971). In that case, the appellants executed blank

Cee
ss 145

promissory notes in favor ofa gin company. The gin company then
filled in the notes for varying amounts and assigned them to the
appellee Security Bank. After the notes matured and went unpaid,
Security Bank brought suit. The court found that Security Bank
was a holder in due course because the notes were taken for value
as they were accepted for “payment of, or in security, for an
antecedent claim[.]”’ Id. at 217, 464 S.W.2d 580.

Considering this court’s holding in Byrd and giving the
words of 4-3-303 their plain meaning, it appears that the trial court
correctly concluded that Union Planters was a holder in due
course, where it accepted the cashier’s check for payment of the
Crutchfields’ loan, an antecedent claim. Southern Bank’s argu-
ment that Union Planters cannot be a holder in due course because
it never acted on the cashier’s check, i.e., it never released the
mortgage on the Crutchfields’ property, is inapposite. Here, the
evidence at trial was that Union Planters never released the note,
the loan remained on the books, and the Crutchfields have made
no payments on Union Planters’ loan.? Thus, Southern Bank’s
assertion that a finding that Union Planters was a holder in due
course would result in a windfall is simply without merit, as Union
Planters’ ability to collect on the cashier’s check as a holder in due
course will simply allow it to finally discharge the Crutchfields’
mortgage that remains unpaid.

Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Southern Bank’s reliance
on American Federal Savings & Loan v. Madison Valley Properties, Inc.,
958 P.2d 57 (Mont. 1998), in support of its contention that Union
Planters cannot be a holder in due course. In that case, a customer
obtained a cashier’s check from Valley Bank by using stolen funds
and then used the cashier’s check to pay off a debt he had with
American Federal. Once American Federal learned of the custom-
er’s fraud, it stopped the payoff on the customer’s loan. In
addressing the issue of whether American Federal was a holder in
due course, the Montana court, relying on Montana’s version of
the UCC, held that the cashier’s check was not issued or trans~
ferred for value where the lending institution did not release its
security interest in the collateral before it received notice that the
check was being rescinded. The court reasoned that, while the

2 ‘The Crutchfields are making payments on the loan proceeds made available by
Regions Bank that were turned over to Julia Gray for purposes of closing the Crutchfields?
Joan,

ee
6 ss

lender had taken certain internal administrative steps toward
discharging the note and releasing the lien, those could all be
administratively rescinded and, in fact, were rescinded. The court
ultimately concluded that, by not irrevocably releasing its security
interest, the lender had not taken the cashier’s check for value by
the time it received notice.

While the fact situation is somewhat similar to the one now
before us, we disagree that the reasoning utilized by the Montana
court is applicable here. In fact, we find the case of Peoria Savings &
Loan Ass’n v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank of Peoria, 410 N.E.2d 845
( Ul. 1980), to be more instructive in the instant matter. There, the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that a bank gave value the
instant it accepted a cashier’s check, even though no bookkeeping
entry was made with respect to the deposit of the check until after
the plaintiff bank had issued a stop-payment order. The court
noted that in enacting Illinois’s version of the UCC the legislature
had not included a requirement that value was not given until the
instrument was posted or applied to an account. Accordingly, the
court opined no such requirement should be read into the statute.
Likewise, our legislature in enacting section 4-3-303(a)(3) did not
include any language requiring a party to take immediate action on
the antecedent claim in order to obtain holder-in-due-course
status, and we will not read such a requirement into the statute.
Accordingly, Union Planters took the cashier’s check for value.

Next, we must determine whether Union Planters took the
cashier’s check with knowledge of its deficiency. For the following
reasons, we conclude that Union Planters took the cashier’s check
without such notice. A person has “notice” ofa fact if the person:
(1) has actual knowledge of it; (2) has received a notice or
notification of it; or (3) from all the facts and circumstances known
to the person at the time in question, has reason to know that it
exists. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-1-202 (Supp. 2007). In addressing
the issue of notice, this court has held that the burden is on the
appellant to demonstrate that the appellee took an instrument with
actual knowledge of its infirmity or defect. See Cruce v. Dillard, 203
Ark. 451, 156 S.W.2d 879 (1941). In Cruce, the court concluded
that where the instrument was complete and regular on its face,
was acquired by appellee before it was overdue, and had not
previously been dishonored, there was no merit to the appellant’s
argument that the appellee took the instrument with knowledge of
its defect.

ee
_— 7

Here, it is undisputed that Union Planters did not learn
that the check was going to be dishonored until the day after it had
been received by Union Planters. Southern Bank avers, however,
that the notice received after the cashier’s check was transferred
prevents Union Planters from claiming to be a holder in due
course. In advancing its argument, Southern Bank points to
section 4~3-302(f) and argues that such notice was effective as it
prevented Union Planters from releasing the Crutchfields’ mort-
gage. Section 4-3-302(f) states that ‘“‘[t]o be effective, notice must
be received at a time and in a manner that gives a reasonable
opportunity to act on it.” While this section sets forth prerequisites
that must be satisfied before notice can be deemed effective, it does
not stand for the proposition that a party takes an instrument with
notice ofa defect when such notice is received after transfer of that
instrument. A person receives notice when it comes to that
person’s attention. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-1-202(e)(1). At the
time Union Planters took the cashier’s check, it did not have
notice of the check’s insufficiency, as it was not brought to Union
Planters’ attention until the day after the check was negotiated.
Accordingly, because Union Planters took the cashier’s check in
good faith, for value, and without knowledge of its insufficiency,
Union Planters was a holder in due course.

Next, Southern Bank argues that if this court affirms the trial
court’s finding that Union Planters was a holder in due course,
Union Planters is not entitled to prejudgment interest, as Union
Planters cannot demonstrate that it has been injured by Southern
Bank’s actions.

This court recently addressed an award of prejudgment
interest and stated:

Prejudgment interest is compensation for recoverable damages
wrongfully withheld from the time of the loss until judgment. See
Reynolds Health Care Servs., Inc. v. HMNH, Inc., 364 Ark. 168, 217
S.W.3d 797 (2005); Ozarks Unlimited Res, Coop., Inc. . Daniels, 333
Ark. 214,969 S.W.2d 169 (1998). Prejudgment interest is allowable
where the amount of damages is definitely ascertainable by math-
ematical computation, or if the evidence furnishes data that makes it
possible to compute the amount without reliance on opinion or
discretion. See id. This standard is met ifa method exists for fixing
the exact value of a cause of action at the time of the occurrence of
the event that gives rise to the cause of action. See Reynolds, 364
Ark. 168, 217 S.W.3d 797. Where prejudgment interest may be

ees
8 __

collected at all, the injured party is always entitled to it as a matter of
law. See id.; Ozarks, 333 Ark. 214, 969 S.W.2d 169. Nevertheless,
prejudgment interest is always dependent upon the initial measure
of damages being determinable immediately after the loss and with.
reasonable certainty. See Wooten v. McClendon, 272 Ark. 61, 612
S.W.2d 105 (1981).

Sims v. Moser, 373 Ark. 491, 509, 284 S.W.3d 505, 519 (2008). As we
stated in Sims, it is irrefutable that the key factor in determining the
appropriateness of prejudgment interest is whether the exact value of
the damages at the time of the occurrence of the event that gives rise
to the cause of action is definitely ascertainable, without reliance upon
opinion or discretion. See also Pro-Comp Mgmt., Inc. v. R.K. Enters.,
LLC, 372 Ark. 190, 272 S.W.3d 91 (2008).

Here, the issue is not one of whether the exact amount
of damages is definitely ascertainable; rather Southern Bank con-
tends that Union Planters is not entitled to prejudgment interest
because it suffered no damages. According to Southern Bank, this
case is analogous to the situation presented to this court in Sorrells
v. Bailey Cattle Co., 268 Ark. 800, 595 S.W.2d 950 (1980). There,
this court declined to award a prevailing plaintiff prejudgment
interest because the plaintiff could have taken possession of the
property they were purchasing but chose not to do so. Thus,
Southern Bank argues that Union Planters could have demanded
that Regions pay off the Crutchfields’ mortgage, but chose not to,
and therefore should be denied prejudgment interest. There is no
merit to this argument, as Union Planters’ recourse as a holder in
due course was against Southern Bank and Southern Bank’s failure
to honor the cashier’s check prevented Union Planters from
closing the Crutchfields’ loan and further caused Union Planters to
incur the present litigation in order to recover on that check.
Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court’s order of prejudgment
interest was in error.

On cross-appeal, Union Planters argues that it was entitled
to attorney’s fees pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (1999),
and thus it was error for the trial court to deny its request for such
fees. Southern Bank counters that the decision to award attorney’s
fees is discretionary, and the trial court properly determined an
award of fees was not warranted in this case. Specifically, Southern
Bank contends that Union Planters took no action to release the
Crutchfields’ mortgage, Union Planters received a large benefit

eee
—— 49

from the court’s order, and Southern Bank suffered a loss, there-
fore, it was proper to deny the request for attorney’s fees.

An award of attorney’s fees is governed by section 16-22-
308, which provides:

In any civil action to recover on an open account, statement of
account, account stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instru-
ment, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or
merchandise, or for labor or services, or breach of contract, unless
otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject
matter of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reason-
able attorney's fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.

This court has recognized that because of the trial judge’s
intimate acquaintance with the trial proceedings and the quality of
service rendered by the prevailing party’s counsel, we usually
recognize the superior perspective of the trial judge in determining
whether to award attorney’s fees. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., 304 Ark.
227, 800 S.W.2d717 (1990). The decision to award attorney’s fees
and the amount to award are discretionary determinations that will
be reversed only if the appellant can demonstrate that the trial
court abused its discretion. Nelson v. River Valley Bank & Trust, 334
Ark. 172, 971 S.W.2d 777 (1998).

HB An award of attorney’s fees under section 16-22-308 is
not mandatory; rather, it is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court. Considering the deference that we give to a trial court’s
decision regarding attorney’s fees, we cannot say that Union
Planters has demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the request for attorney’s fees.

Affirmed on direct appeal; affirmed on cross-appeal.

150

Michael BIBBS; L.D. Mason; MJ Construction Company, Inc.;
Joyce Bradley Babin, as Trustee for Lloyd Dwight Mason and
Brenda Lee Mason; and James E Dowden, as Trustee for
Michael J. Bibbs and Audrey C. Bibbs v.
COMMUNITY BANK of BENTON:

08-378 289 S.W.3d 393

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 4, 2008

el

Eichenbaum, Liles & Heister, P.A., by: James H. Penick, II, for
appellants.

Watts, Donovan & Tilley, P.A., by: David M. Donovan; and
Stuart Law Firm, P.A., by: J. Michael Stuart and Ginger Stuart Schafer, for
appellee.

152

opert L. Brown, Justice. Appellants, Michael Bibbs,

L.D. Mason, and MJ Construction Company, Inc., ap-
peal from the circuit judge’s judgment granting summary judgment
and dismissal in favor of appellee Community Bank. The appellants
assert three points on appeal. We affirm the judgment.

This dispute arises from a loan agreement between Commu-
nity Bank and Bibbs, Mason, and MJ Construction. Bibbs and
Mason are shareholders of MJ Construction — a dirt moving and
development business. In 2000, Bibbs, Mason, and MJ Construc-
tion purchased 120 acres in Lonoke County with the intent to
develop a subdivision. The purchase was financed with a three-
year, $375,000 loan from Community Bank, with Community
Bank taking a mortgage on the property as security. The loan
agreement provided that a final balloon payment for the unpaid
balance of the loan was due on April 25, 2003. According to Bibbs,
he did not expect to pay off the loan on its due date because he
believed that Community Bank would allow him to “roll over”
the unpaid balance into a new loan. Bibbs, Mason, and MJ
Construction failed to pay off the loan on its due date, and
Community Bank made demand for the final balloon payment.
When the final payment went unpaid, Community Bank sued for

foreclosure on August 1, 2003. On August 25, 2003, Bibbs filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. On February 8, 2005, Mason also filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and in doing so, he scheduled a potential
lender-liability lawsuit against Community Bank as an asset of the
estate. About four months later, Mason terminated his Chapter 7
bankruptcy and filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.

On August 8, 2005, Bibbs, Mason, and MJ Construction
filed suit against Community Bank and alleged breach of the
covenant of good faith, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
concealment, constructive fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“lender-liability
lawsuit”). On August 30, 2005, Community Bank filed an answer
in which it asserted that Bibbs, Mason, and MJ Construction
lacked standing to bring this suit.

On February 13, 2007, Community Bank moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that the appellants lacked standing be-
cause Bibbs’s and Mason’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees had the
exclusive right to prosecute the action, and they were not parties
plaintiff. On March 22, 2007, the appellants filed an amended
complaint in which Bibbs’s and Mason’s bankruptcy trustees were
added as plaintiffs. On that same date, Bibbs and Mason filed a
response to Community Bank’s motion for summary judgment in
which they argued that they were the proper parties before the
court but that “the claims have been, and continue to be pursued
on behalf of the estate.” Attached to their response to Community
Bank’s motion for summary judgment was a February 20, 2007
affidavit from James Dowden, Bibbs’s bankruptcy trustee. Mr.
Dowden’s affidavit said that during his tenure as trustee he became
“aware of [appellants’] assertion that they had a cause of action
against Community Bank’’; that appellants hired an attorney,
James Penick, to pursue the claim on a contingent fee basis; that
Mr. Dowden obtained the bankruptcy court’s approval of the
lawsuit (in September 2005, after the lawsuit had been filed) and
recorded the suit as a potential asset of the estate on December 31,
2005; that appellants’ claims were “‘being pursued on behalf of the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate by Mr. Penick as special counsel to
the Trustee,” as was “the proper way of handling such litigation”;
and that any funds obtained from a settlement or a verdict in favor
of the appellants would be payable to the bankruptcy estate.
Additionally, appellants argued that MJ Construction had standing
to bring the lawsuit, even if Bibbs and Mason did not.

On April 12, 2007, Community Bank moved to dismiss the
appellants’ amended complaint because it was filed after the
three-year statute of limitations had expired.! Community Bank
asserted, in addition, that MJ Construction lacked standing be-
cause it was not a corporation in good standing at the time either
the original complaint or the amended complaint was filed. This
assertion was supported by a certificate from the Arkansas Secre-
tary of State, showing that MJ Construction’s corporate charter
had been revoked on December 31, 2003, and was not reinstated.
until April 9, 2007.

On May 7, 2007, the circuit judge sent a letter to both
Parties stating that a hearing on Community Bank’s summary-
judgment motion regarding standing and motion to dismiss re-
garding the statute of limitations would not be scheduled until the
parties had completed mediation. The next day, on May 8, 2007,
the judge sent a second letter to the attorneys setting a hearing on
the motions for May 21, 2007. On that same date, counsel for
Community Bank sent a letter to appellants’ counsel erroneously
stating that the hearing had been scheduled for July 10, 2007.

On May 21, 2007, the circuit judge held a hearing on
Community Bank’s motions. Counsel for the appellants was not
present. The circuit judge noted for the record that he had sent a
letter fixing the date and time of the hearing to all parties.? Because
of appellants’ counsel’s absence, the circuit judge stated that he
would not hear oral argument from Community Bank’s attorney
and would instead decide the issues based on the pleadings and
briefs of the parties. The circuit judge then ruled from the bench
that he was granting Community Bank’s motion for summary
jadgment because of appellants’ lack of standing and was dismiss-
ing the suit as outside the limitations period.

On May 31, 2007, appellants moved for reconsideration,
arguing that the circuit judge had erred by conducting the hearing
without appellants’ counsel being present and also arguing why
appellants did not lack standing. On June 4, 2007, the circuit judge
entered a written order memorializing his ruling from the bench
and granting Community Bank’s motion for summary judgment
and motion to dismiss. In that order, the circuit judge found that

Appellants do not challenge the circuit judge’s finding that the statute of limitations
had run at the time the amended complaint was filed.
2 Appellants do not deny receiving this letter.

neither Bibbs nor Mason had standing to file the original com-
plaint on August 8, 2005, because both had filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy prior to that date, and, thus, their bankruptcy trustees
had the exclusive right to prosecute the cause of action against
Community Bank and had not abandoned that right. The judge
further concluded that the three-year statute of limitations had run
by the time of the filing of the amended complaint and that the
amended complaint did not relate back to the date of the filing of
the original complaint because the original complaint was void ab
initio. As a final point, he concluded that MJ Construction lacked
standing at the time the original complaint was filed due to the
revocation of its corporate charter. The circuit judge dismissed the
original complaint and amended complaint with prejudice.

Appellants Bibbs and Mason appealed to the court of ap-
peals, and the court of appeals affirmed. Bibbs v. Community Bank,
101 Ark. App. 462, 278 S.W.3d 564 (2008).? The appellants
petitioned this court for review, which this court granted. When
we grant review, we treat the appeal as if it were originally filed in
this court. Cedar Chem. Co. v. Knight, 372 Ark. 233, 273 S.W.3d
473 (2008).

I. Appellants’ Standing

For their first point on appeal, Bibbs and Mason claim that
the circuit judge erred in finding that they lacked standing to file
the original lender-liability complaint on August 8, 2005. They
assert that their cause of action accrued after Bibbs filed bankruptcy
on August 25, 2003 and that, because of this, his cause of action
was not the “property of the estate,” as defined in the Bankruptcy
Code. Next, they contend that Mason had standing because he
filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy four months after he filed for Chapter
7 in 2005, and under the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee is not granted
the exclusive right to prosecute the debtor’s cause of action in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. As an additional point, Mason seeks to
distinguish Fields v. Byrd, 96 Ark. App. 174, 239 S.W.3d 543
(2006), a case the circuit judge relied on in his ruling, because
Mason scheduled his lender-liability suit against Community Bank
as part of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy and did not conceal it as the

+ MJ Construction did not challenge on appeal the circuit judge’s standing ruling
regarding its revoked charter.

debtor had done in Fields. Finally, Bibbs maintains he had standing
because Mr. Dowden, his bankruptcy trustee, ratified the filing of
the original complaint.

The question of standing is a matter of law for this court to
decide, and this court reviews questions of law de novo. Pulaski
County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 371 Ark. 217, 264 S.W.3d
465 (2007).

A debtor’s commencement of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
creates an estate consisting of all of the debtor’s legal and equitable
interests in property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2008). Once a bank-
tuptcy trustee is appointed to administer the debtor’s estate, the
trustee has the exclusive right to prosecute causes of action that are
the property of that estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 704(1). Causes of
action that accrue prior to the filing of a petition for relief under
the Bankruptcy Code are property of the estate. See Bratton v.
Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Jackson & Tucker, 302 Ark. 308, 788 S.W.2d
955 (1990) (citing Vreugdenhil v. Hoekstra, 773 F.2d 213 (8th Cir.
1985)). A debtor lacks standing to maintain, on his or her own
behalf, a suit belonging to the estate unless that cause of action has
been abandoned by the trustee. Id.

a. Bibbs’s standing.

We first address the appellants’ contention that Bibbs’s claim
accrued after he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. If true, his cause of
action would not be the property of the bankruptcy estate and,
thus, Bibbs would have standing to file his complaint against
Community Bank on August 8, 2005.

The crux of Bibbs’s lender-liability complaint is that Com-
munity Bank’s actions concerning the repayment of the $375,000
loan forced him to declare bankruptcy. This necessarily implicates
pre-bankruptcy conduct on Community Bank’s part. Bibbs,
moreover, admits as much in both his complaint and his deposition
testimony. As one example, during his deposition, Bibbs testified:
“Tt is my belief that the bank forced me into bankruptcy. If the
bank would not have done all the things I complain of in my
lawsuit, I would not have had to file bankruptcy.”

HH Bibbs’s assertion that some of Community Bank’s
alleged misconduct occurred after he filed bankruptcy does not
change this conclusion. It is well established that a cause of action
accrues the moment the right to commence an action comes into
being. Quality Optical of Jonesboro, Inc. v. Trusty Optical, L.L.C., 365

Ark. 106, 225 S.W.3d 369 (2006). It is clear to this court that
Bibbs’s cause of action arose out of the alleged misconduct of
Community Bank concerning its strict enforcement of the loan
agreement’s April 25, 2003 due date, which, by his own assertion,
forced Bibbs into bankruptcy. In short, because his cause of action
accrued before Bibbs’s bankruptcy filing, the cause of action is the
property of his bankruptcy estate. We hold that, as a result, Bibbs
lacked standing to file the lender-liability lawsuit.

The appellants also contend that Bibbs had standing to sue
because the filing of the suit against Community Bank was
“ratified for administrative purposes” by his trustee, Mr. Dowden,
as set forth in his affidavit, and through the filing of the amended
complaint joining the trustees as plaintiffs on March 22, 2007.
Appellants’ authority for this point is the following language from
Bratton: “In this case, there is no evidence that the bankruptcy
trustee abandoned this claim or that the trustee joined in or ratified
Bratton’s filing of this complaint in circuit court. In fact, the
evidence in the record indicates the contrary.” 302 Ark. at 309,
788 S.W.2d at 956 (emphasis added). The appellants also cite Rule
17(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads in part
that no action shall be dismissed until a reasonable time has been
given for the real party in interest to ratify commencement of the
action.

We first address ratification by the trustee under the
Bankruptcy Code. As already noted, the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that the trustee has the exclusive right to prosecute lawsuits
belonging to the estate in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 323, 704(a)(1). The only exception exists in cases of abandon-
ment by the trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy after a potential
claim has been scheduled as an asset. See 11 U.S.C. § 554; Bratton,
supra. The appellants point to no provision in the Bankruptcy
Code supporting ratification by the trustee in an amended com-
plaint after an original complaint is filed by the debtor and the
statute of limitations has passed. Hence, we hold that any subse-
quent ratification of Bibbs’s lender-liability suit under these facts
did not cure the standing deficiency under the Bankruptcy Code.

There is another reason why the ratification argument fails.
This court has held that a complaint filed by a party without
standing in a wrongful-death action is a nullity. See Hubbard v. Nat’l
Healthcare of Pocahontas, Inc., 371 Ark. 444, 267 S.W.3d 573 (2007)
(wrongful death complaint filed by administratrix two weeks

before her appointment was a nullity because administratrix did
not have standing to pursue the claim prior to appointment); St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court of Craighead County, 348 Ark.
197, 73 S.W.3d 584 (2002)(a survival complaint filed by patient’s
family was a nullity where the family lacked standing to pursue the
survival action after administrator had been appointed). At the
time the lawsuit against Community Bank was filed on August 8,
2005, Bibbs lacked standing under the Bankruptcy Code and the
complaint, under the reasoning of Hubbard and St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Company, was therefore a nullity with no legal force or
effect. It is illogical to conclude that a trustee can ratify something
that, as far as the law is concerned, is void and never existed.

We are mindful of the fact that Rule 17(a) of the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for suits being pros-
ecuted in the name of the real party in interest, contemplates
ratification. Rule 17(a) provides in pertinent part:

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or
joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder or substitution shall have the same effect as ifthe
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in
interest.

Ark. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (emphasis added). Yet, even if the original
complaint was not deemed to be a nullity for lack of the debtors’
standing, we disagree that Mr. Dowden, as trustee, could ratify Bibbs’s
original complaint after the fact and thereby legitimize his debtors’
standing under these facts.

Because the Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) mirrors
Federal Rule 17(a), we turn to the Federal Advisory Committee’s
notes for guidance. According to the Advisory Committee Note to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, Rule 17(a) ‘‘should not be misunderstood or
distorted. It is intended to prevent forfeiture when determination of
the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has
been made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, Advisory Committee’s Notes to
the 1966 Amendments (emphasis added). Accordingly, most
courts have applied this part of Rule 17(a) only when the plaintiff
brought the action in his or her own name because determination
of the real party in interest was difficult or when an understandable
mistake was made. See, e.g., Crowder v. Gordons Transps., Inc., 387

F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967) (plaintiff's mistake was “understandable
and excusable” where case involved a conflicts-of-law question
with respect to whether Arkansas or Missouri law applied, and
each state’s wrongful-death statute designated a different person as
the real party in interest). See also Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront
Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding district court
erred in failing to permit substitution of plaintiffs to relate back
under Rule 15(c) and 17(a) where Advanced Magnetics was
mistaken about the legal effect of a shareholder assignment). This
court has recognized the “understandable mistake” requirement of
Rule 17(a) by inference. See Rhuland v. Fahr, 356 Ark. 382, 392,
155 S.W.3d 2, 9 (2004) (Rules 15 and 17 were inapplicable where
“no such understandable mistake occurred”).

In the instant case, when the original complaint was
filed on August 8, 2005, the real parties in interest were Bibbs’s and
Mason’s bankruptcy trustees. We have held in this opinion that the
Bankruptcy Code clearly provides that a trustee, and only a trustee,
has standing to prosecute causes of action that are property of the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 701(1). The
determination of the real party in interest was not difficult for the
appellants in this case; nor was there an understandable or excus-
able mistake by Bibbs and Mason in this regard. See Rhuland, supra
(not understandable mistake when wrongful-death statute specifi-
cally detailed who may bring suit). Accordingly, ratification by
Bibbs’s trustee did not cure Bibbs’s standing deficiency under Rule
17(a) or breathe new life into his defunct pleading. We conclude
for this additional reason that Bibbs clearly lacked standing at the
time the original complaint was filed.

b. Mason’s standing.

In the appellants’ reply brief, they claim that the lender-
liability lawsuit was abandoned to Mason, because Mason sched-
uled the lawsuit as an asset in his Chapter 7 filing on February 8,
2005, and the bankruptcy estate was closed on May 24, 2005,
without the lawsuit being administered. They emphasize that,
unless otherwise ordered by the court, any scheduled property that
is not administered at the time of the closing of the estate is
considered abandoned to the debtor. They direct this court to 11
USS.C. § 554(c), which reads:

(c) Unless the court orders otherwise, any property scheduled
under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the

time of the closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor and
administered for purposes of section 350 of this title.

As the lender-liability lawsuit was abandoned to Mason, he contends
he had standing to prosecute the litigation.

HL We refuse to address this argument for two reasons.
Our initial reason is that Mason makes the argument for the first
time in his reply brief on appeal. This is too late. See Maddox v. City
of Fort Smith, 346 Ark. 209, 56 S.W.3d 375 (2001) (“We do not
consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief because
the appellee is not given a chance to rebut the argument.”’).
Secondly, though the circuit judge made a finding in his judgment
of no abandonment, appellants did not argue section 554(c) to the
circuit judge in either their brief opposing summary judgment or
in their motion for reconsideration. See Perry v. Baptist Health, 368
Ark. 114, 243 S.W.3d 310 (2006) (“[W]e will not consider an
argument raised for the first time on appeal.”). The appellants’
argument to the circuit judge in their response brief solely re-
garded judicial estoppel and did not address abandonment under
section 554(c) and its effect on Mason’s standing.

In their petition for review, appellants contend that they did
not have the opportunity to argue the abandonment/standing
point under section 554(c) before the circuit judge due to the
circuit judge’s decision to proceed with the summary-judgment
hearing without their counsel being present. What occurred at the
hearing, however, does not change the fact that appellants raised
the abandonment argument for the first time in their reply brief on
appeal, thus precluding Community Bank from responding. See
Maddox, supra. As already mentioned, appellants could have raised
the abandonment argument in their brief to the circuit judge in
support of their response to the summary-judgment and dismissal
motions or in their motion for reconsideration, and they failed to
do so.*

We are aware that Mason reopened his Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy estate on July 25, 2006, which might suggest that any
previous abandonment by Mason’s trustee was revoked by the new

+ Appellants also argue on appeal that the circuit judge “may have” erroneously applied
the doctrine of judicial estoppel. It is not apparent to this court that the circuit judge ever
discussed the issue of judicial estoppel. Accordingly, we decline to address it.

filing. Courts are generally in agreement that unadministered assets
that are abandoned to a debtor under section 554(c) are not
automatically “‘reeled back into the estate” by reopening the case.
See, e.g., In re Menk, 241 B.R. 896 (1999); 9B Am. Jur. 2d
Bankruptcy § 3748, p. 23 (2006).

Nor do we agree that filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2005
four months after filing the original Chapter 7 bankruptcy gave
Mason standing to prosecute a scheduled lender-liability suit on
August 8, 2005. This, again, is in the nature of an abandonment
argument under section 554(c), which was not made to the circuit
judge or made to this court until the reply brief.

II. Relation Back of Amended Complaint

For their second point on appeal, Bibbs and Mason contend
that the circuit judge erred in finding that their amended com-
plaint did not relate back to the filing of their original complaint
under Rule 15(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Community Bank responds that because Bibbs and Mason lacked
standing to sue, their original complaint was a nullity and therefore
the amended complaint adding the trustees as plaintiffs cannot
relate back to a void complaint. They cite Rhuland v. Fahr, supra.

Hf This court has held that for the relation-back doctrine
to apply there must be valid pleadings to amend. See St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court of Craighead County, supra. Bibbs and.
Mason lacked standing when they filed their original complaint;
thus, the original complaint was a nullity. See Hubbard v. Nat’l
Healthcare of Pocahontas, 371 Ark. at 452, 267 S.W.3d at 578
(“{a]ppellant’s complaint was a nullity because she did not have
standing” at the time it was filed). Accordingly, when appellants
filed their amended complaint in 2007, there was not a valid
original complaint to amend and, thus, nothing to which the
amended complaint could relate back.

HB Moreover, this court held in St. Paul that an amended
complaint that substitutes out the original plaintiffs and replaces
them with entirely new plaintiffs does not constitute an amend-
ment to the original complaint but rather is the filing of a new
lawsuit. 348 Ark. at 206, 73 S.W.3d at 589. Here, the appellants
attempted to cure the deficiency of their original complaint by
joining their bankruptcy trustees as parties plaintiff in their
amended complaint. However, because the appellants were not

the real parties in interest at the time of either the filing of the
original complaint or the filing of the amended complaint under
Rule 17(a), as discussed above, the joinder of the bankruptcy
trustees in the amended complaint had the effect of substituting
entirely new plaintiffs. This was in the nature of filing a new action
and is barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the circuit
judge on this point.

III. Appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration

For their final point on appeal, Bibbs and Mason urge that
the circuit judge erred by denying their motion for reconsideration
following the summary-judgment and dismissal hearing when
appellants’ counsel was not present. Appellants urge that the circuit
judge’s decision to continue with the summary-judgment and
dismissal hearing in the absence of appellants’ counsel and despite
conflicting correspondence from the circuit judge and opposing
counsel regarding the hearing date constitutes reversible error.

We first note that this court has held that a lawyer and
litigant must exercise reasonable diligence in keeping up with the
progress of a case. Francis v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 371 Ark. 285,
265 §.W.3d 117 (2007); Amold v. Camden News Publ’g Co., 353
Ark. 522, 110 S.W.3d 268 (2003). In a letter dated May 8, 2007,
the circuit judge notified all counsel that the summary-judgment
and dismissal hearing was scheduled for May 21, 2007. To be sure,
Community Bank’s counsel erroneously notified appellants’ coun-
sel that the hearing was set for July 10, 2007, which confused
matters. But if any confusion arose from the circuit judge’s
conflicting orders or by an inconsistent date in opposing counsel’s
confirmation letter, appellants’ counsel should have inquired to
determine the correct date and time of the hearing from the circuit
judge. Furthermore, at the hearing on May 21, 2007, the circuit
judge refused to hear oral argument from Community Bank’s
lawyer on the motions due to the absence of appellants’ counsel
and stated that he would rely solely on the pleadings and the
parties’ briefs in making his decision. The judge concluded the
hearing by orally granting summary judgment and dismissal in
favor of Community Bank.

Appellants next filed a motion for reconsideration on May
31, 2007, in which they contested the holding of the hearing and
raised their standing arguments. It was only after this motion that
the circuit judge entered his order granting summary judgment
and dismissal.

Although, admittedly, conducting a hearing without the
presence of counsel for a party is an irregular and questionable
procedure, the circuit judge took pains to assure that Community
Bank would not receive an unfair advantage due to the absence of
appellants’ counsel. In addition to that, appellants’ counsel had the
opportunity to raise any pertinent arguments in the motion for
reconsideration filed before the entry of the order.

HM Asa final matter, appellants have not shown this court
how they were specifically prejudiced by their counsel’s absence at
the hearing.’ Rule 56 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure
does not give the parties an automatic right to a summary-judgment
hearing. It is discretionary with the circuit judge. Moreover, as we
have noted, the circuit judge took steps to assure no unfair
prejudice to appellants occurred. Without unfair prejudice, we are
hard pressed to reverse the circuit judge’s judgment. See Villanueva
v. CNA Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1989) (though the court
viewed with suspicion a summary-judgment conference which
terminated the litigation without plaintiff's counsel being present,
the record reveals no unfair prejudice to the plaintiff). Taking all
the factors together, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion
by the circuit judge in going forward with the hearing.

Affirmed.

5 Appellants take issue with the circuit judge’s statement that he had not read all the
documents “exhaustively” Again, appellants bave not illuminated this court on bow this
specifically resulted in prejudice to them. They also refer to “evidence” submitted at the
hearing. The only “evidence” was a marked exhibit of the judge’s letter setting the hearing
date and Community Bank’s counsel’s referencé to the revoked charter of MJ Construction
Company. Again, we fail to see how this prejudiced the appellants.

164

Kyle JOHNSON ».
THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY

08-327 289 S.W.3d 407

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 4, 2008

[Rehearing denied January 15, 2009."]

Chaney Law Firm, P.A., by: Donald P. Chaney, Jr., for appellant.

* BROWN, J., not participating.

_
Td 165

Mixon Law Firm, by: Donn Mixon, for appellee.

LANA CUNNINGHAM Wits, Justice. This is the second
appeal before our court in this case. See The Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 367 Ark. 468, 241 S.W.3d 264 (2006) (Johnson 1).

Appellant Kyle Johnson was injured in a car accident in Decem-
ber 2001. The driver of the other car was insured by the appellee, The
Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). After a trial in Novem-
ber 2005, a Greene County jury rendered a verdict in Johnson’s favor
on November 23, 2005. On December 5, 2005, Johnson filed a motion.
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial,
contending that the jury erred in its findings regarding his damages. The
circuit court granted Johnson’s motion for new trial in an order entered
on January 5, 2006, finding that the amount of the jury’s verdict was too
small because the jury failed to award damages that Johnson had proven
at trial.

Cincinnati appealed from the order granting Johnson’s mo-
tion for new trial, arguing that the circuit court had lost jurisdic-
tion to decide the motion on the thirtieth day after it was filed.
This court agreed, holding that Johnson’s motion had been
deemed denied on the thirtieth day, or January 4, 2006. Johnson I,
367 Ark. at 471, 241 S.W.3d at 266 (reversing and dismissing).

After this court’s decision in Johnson I, Johnson returned to
the circuit court and filed, on December 19, 2006, a motion under
Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(4) to set aside the November 23, 2005,
judgment. In his motion, Johnson argued that the reversal of the
circuit court’s order granting his motion for new trial had the
effect of reinstating the ‘‘erroneous judgment that was entered in
the first instance,” and he alleged that the 2005 judgment “should
be set aside based upon misrepresentation or fraud committed by
[Cincinnati’s] counsel in preparing an improper and erroneous
form of judgment.” Specifically, Johnson alleged that Cincinnati’s
counsel had prepared a judgment that did not conform to the law
and the evidence, in that it “zeroed out” the jury’s verdict
awarding Johnson $12,537.60, in light of the $25, 000. 00 paid by
the insurance carrier for the tortfeasor.

The circuit court held a hearing on November 5, 2007, and
subsequently entered an order on November 9, 2007, denying
Johnson’s motion. The court first found that this court’s mandate,
issued on October 12, 2006, deprived it of jurisdiction. In addi-
tion, the court stated that, although fraud could be a reason to set

aside a judgment under Rule 60 after the expiration of ninety days,
Johnson had failed to demonstrate the existence of constructive
fraud. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal on December 10,
2007.1

Johnson has appealed from the circuit court’s denial of his
motion to set aside a judgment pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60.
This court has noted that the only limitation on the exercise of the
power to set aside a judgment pursuant to Rule 60 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. See RLI Ins. Co. v. Coe, 306 Ark.
337, 813 S.W.2d 783 (1991). See also Watson v. Connors, 372 Ark.
56, 270 S.W.3d 826 (2008) (it is within the discretion of the circuit
court to determine whether it has jurisdiction under Rule 60 to set
aside a judgment, and the question on appeal becomes whether
there has been an abuse of that discretion). However, in a con-
structive fraud case, the court of appeals has noted that “we
evaluate the circuit court’s factual findings about the elements of
constructive fraud for clear error.” Downum v. Downum, 101 Ark.
App. 243, 274 S.W.3d 349 (2008) (quoting Knight v. Day, 343 Ark.
402, 36 S.W.3d 300 (2001)).

In his first point on appeal, Johnson argues that the circuit
court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to take any
further action on his motion to set aside the judgment after this
court handed down the mandate in Johnson I. As mentioned above,
the circuit court determined that this court’s mandate “deprived
[the circuit] court of jurisdiction to take any further action.” On
this specific issue, we conclude that the circuit court was wrong.

The mandate is the official notice of action of the appellate
court, directed to the court below, advising that court of the action
taken by the appellate court, and directing the lower court to have
the appellate court’s judgment duly recognized, obeyed, and
executed. Dolphin v. Wilson, 335 Ark. 113, 118, 983 S.W.2d 113,
115 (1998) (citing 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 776). Under
this rule, ‘an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate
from the mandate issued by an appellate court.” Id. (citing Briggs v.
Pennsylvania R., Co., 334 U.S. 304 (1948)). Whatever is before the
supreme court and disposed of in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction must be considered settled, and the lower court must

The thirty-day deadline for filing the notice of appeal fell on December 9, 2007,
which was a Sunday; therefore, the December 10, 2008, filing was timely. See Ark. R. Civ.
6).

Pd 167

carry that judgment into execution according to its mandate.
Fulkerson v. Thompson, 334 Ark. 317, 974 S.W.2d 451 (1998).

The question presented in the instant case is whether this .
court’s mandate in Johnson I deprived the lower court of jurisdic-
tion to take any further action on a Rule 60(c)(4) motion. Our
mandate in Johnson I, reversing the order granting a new trial, states
that “it is the decision of the Court that the case be reversed and
dismissed for the reasons set out in the attached opinion.” In that
opinion, this court held that the circuit court had erred in granting
Johnson’s motion for a new trial because, in waiting until the
thirty-first day to enter that order, the court lost jurisdiction to rule
on the motion under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(b). Johnson I, 367 Ark. at
471, 241 S.W.3d at 266. The court concluded its opinion with the
following:

Based upon the foregoing conclusions, we hold that the circuit
court was without jurisdiction to hold the hearing and to enter the order on
January 5, 2006, on Johnson’s motion for new trial. Accordingly, we
lack jurisdiction to consider the issues, and we dismiss the appeal. See
Murchison v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 367 Ark. 166, 238 S.W.3d 11
(2006).

Reversed and dismissed.

Id. at 472-73, 241 S.W.3d at 267 (emphasis added).

This court has noted that the trial court should look beyond
the words of reversal and look to the effect of the opinion in
proceeding upon remand. See Glover v. Woodhaven Homes, Inc., 346
Ark. 397, 57 $.W.3d 211 (2001) (quoting Kneeland v. Amer. Loan &
Trust Co., 138 U.S. 509 (1891)). Here, in the Johnson I opinion, this
court specifically dismissed only the appeal based on our lack of
jurisdiction, which in turn was premised on the circuit court’s lack
of jurisdiction to enter the order that it entered. Stated another
way, this court’s action in reversing and dismissing did not have
the effect of completely dismissing the entire proceedings in circuit court,
rather, we dismissed the appeal.

The practical effect of this court’s opinion in Johnson I was to
vacate the circuit court’s order granting Johnson’s motion for new
trial; after this court reversed the lower court on that issue, it was
as though the order granting the new trial never existed. See
Schofield v. Rankin, 86 Ark. 86, 90, 109 S.W. 1161, 1163 (1908)
(“The effect of the reversal is to annul, vacate, and set aside the

judgment or decree — to completely wipe it out as if it had never
been in existence. Nothing remains of it; it is gone.””); 5 Am. Jur.
2d Appellate Review, § 861 (‘A complete reversal generally annuls
the judgment below, and the case is put in the same posture in
which it was before the judgment was entered.”’).

HM Accordingly, following this court’s reversal of the
circuit court’s order granting Johnson’s motion for new trial, the
matter stood before the circuit court as though that order had
never been entered. In other words, the parties stood in the same
position as they were when the original judgment — the Novem-
ber 23, 2005, judgment — was entered. The circuit court was not
deprived of jurisdiction to act on a Rule 60(c) motion. Compare
Foohs v. Bilby, 95 Ark. 302, 129 S.W. 1104 (1910) (trial court
retained jurisdiction under statutory precursor to Rule 60 after
case was appealed and affirmed); Davis v. Davis, 291 Ark. 473, 725
S.W.2d 845 (1987) (circuit court retained jurisdiction to modify its
order under Rule 60(c)(4) even though the appellate court af-
firmed that order); Garrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 26 Ark. App. 199, 762
S.W.2d 3 (1988) (a trial court may modify or set aside its judgment,
or vacate its judgment under Rule 60 to allow a new trial, even
though the judgment has been affirmed on appeal). The circuit
court was wrong in its conclusion that our mandate deprived it of
jurisdiction to entertain a motion under Rule 60(c).

However, that is not the end of the matter. Johnson must
still demonstrate that he had a basis for setting aside the November
23, 2005, order pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60. Johnson urges that
the circuit court should have corrected the November 2005 order
pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(4). That rule provides as follows:

The court in which a judgment, other than a default judgment
... has been rendered or order made shall have the power, after
the expiration of ninety (90) days of the filing of said judgment with
the clerk of the court, to vacate or modify such judgment or order:

(4) For misrepresentation or fraud (whether heretofore de-
nominated intrinsic or extrinsic) by an adverse party.

Unless a party falls within this exception (or one of the other
exceptions set out in Rule 60(c), which are not at issue in this case), a

PC
ee 169

court has no power to modify or set aside an order after the expiration
of ninety days. See O’Marra v. MacKool, 361 Ark. 32, 38, 204 S.W.3d
49, 52 (2005) (citing Blackwood v. Floyd, 342 Ark. 498, 29 S.W.3d 694
(2000)).

Johnson contends that the November 2005 judgment was
entered as a result of constructive fraud, and that, therefore, the
circuit court should have set it aside. In support of his argument, he
cites Davis v. Davis, 291 Ark. 473, 725 S.W.2d 845 (1987). In
Davis, after a bench trial, the circuit court sent a letter opinion to
the parties’ attorneys directing the appellant’s attorney to prepare a
precedent awarding his client, Rex Davis, a judgment of
$12,836.14. Some time later, the attorney sent a precedent to the
court that awarded Rex $24,761.14, explaining in a cover letter to
the court that the additional money was intended to cover addi-
tional damages. The appellee, Pat Davis, did not receive a copy of
this letter. Nonetheless, the circuit court signed the precedent and
entered it on November 16, 1983. Davis, 291 Ark. at 474, 725
S.W.2d at 846.

Pat appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit
court’s judgment. Prior to the issuance of the mandate, however,
Pat filed a motion in the circuit court asking the court to correct
the judgment. The court, relying on Rule 60(c)(4), granted Pat’s
motion, entering an order correcting the judgment to reflect the
original award of $12,836.14. Rex appealed, arguing a lack of
jurisdiction, as discussed above, and that the court erred in
correcting the judgment. Id. at 475, 725 S.W.2d at 846.

On appeal, this court held that, under Rule 60(c)(4), the
circuit court could set aside the judgment upon finding that a fraud
had been practiced by the party obtaining the judgment. Noting
that a fraud can occur even in the “complete absence of any moral
wrong or evil intention,” the court held that Rex’s attorney’s
actions in submitting a judgment that did not reflect the actual
judgment of the court constituted fraud, stating that it was “‘obvi-
ous that the judgment of the trial court was intended to be in the
amount of $12,836.14. Any change, absent the knowledge and
consent of the trial court, would not be the judgment of the
court.” Id. at 477, 725 S.W.2d at 847.

Johnson argues that Davis is on all fours with his case, and
that the trial court should have found that Cincinnati committed a
constructive fraud on the court when it submitted the precedent
“zeroing out” the damages to the court for entry. Cincinnati

170 LC

responds that there was nothing fraudulent in its actions when it
prepared a precedent because it sent the proposed order to both the
court and opposing counsel.

Cincinnati urges that the more apposite case is State Office of
Child Support Enforcement v. Offutt, 61 Ark. App. 207, 966 S.W.2d
275 (1998). In Offutt, the Office of Child Support Enforcement
(OCSE) commenced an action to determine paternity of a child;
the appellee, Jerry Offutt was subsequently determined to be the
child’s father. In November of 1995, OCSE’s attorney prepared a
precedent finding that Offutt was the child’s father and establishing
child support. OCSE mailed the precedent to the court and to
Offutt’s attorney, along with a letter by which Offutt’s attorney
was asked to notify the court within seven days if there was an
objection to the precedent; OCSE also asked the court to sign and
enter the order if it did not receive an objection from Offutt within
seven days. Offutt received the letter and called the court on the
seventh day, objecting to the precedent. However, the court
entered the order anyway on November 29, 1995. Offutt, 61 Ark.
App. at 209, 966 S.W.2d at 275-76.

Offutt later filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b),
and the circuit court eventually made an oral ruling that the
November 29, 1995, order should be amended. However, the
court did not enter a written order until several months later. Id. at
209, 966 S.W.2d at 276.

OCSE appealed, arguing that the circuit court lacked the
authority to modify the November 29, 1995, order after the lapse
of ninety days. Id. In response, Offutt argued that the court
maintained its jurisdiction to act on the November 1995 order
because counsel for OCSE had committed fraud. Offutt argued
that the fraud consisted of OCSE’s sending the court a precedent
containing findings not made by the court and asking the court to
sign the order if Offutt raised no objection within seven days.
Offutt cited Davis v. Davis, supra, in support of this argument, but
the court of appeals rejected his contention. Noting that the
attorney in Davis never gave opposing counsel an opportunity to
object to the precedent, id. at 212, 966 S.W.2d at 277, the court of
appeals distinguished Davis as follows:

Here, [OCSE’s] attorney sent a copy of the precedent and
transmittal letter to both the judge and [Offutt’s] attorney. By
requesting that the judge sign the precedent only if he did not
receive an objection from opposing counsel within seven days, the

Pe
ee m1

judge was alerted to the fact that there might be an objection from
[Offuutt’s] counsel as to the form or the content of the judg-
ment. We do not interpret this action as an effort by [OCSE’s]
attorney to deceive either the judge or [Offutt’s] attorney. In fact,
we know that [Offutt’s] attorney received the precedent and letter
because she contacted the judge and voiced her objection to the
precedent, but the judge signed it anyway. We do not consider the
conduct of [OCSE’s] attorney in this case to be in any way similar to
the conduct of the attorney in Davis and certainly not fraudulent
within the meaning of Rule 60(c)(4).

Id. at 212-13, 966 S.W.2d at 277.

The facts of the instant case are much more analogous to
Offutt than they are to Davis. Here, Donn Mixon, counsel for
Cincinnati, gave Johnson’s attorney, Don Chaney, an opportunity
to review the precedent prior to having the circuit court sign it, as
evidenced by a letter sent by Chaney to Mixon on November 9,
2005.? Chaney wrote:

Do you agree that because the jury was informed of the amount
of the primary insurance policy limits of $25,000.00, that the jury’s
verdict in the total amount of $12,537.60 is all due and payable by
Cincinnati Insurance Company? If so, then I trust that you will
draft the precedent for a judgment accordingly. Ifyou do not agree,
then please let me know, and I will attempt to provide you with
some legal authority on point.

Mixon responded by sending the court a letter, copied to Chaney,
stating the following:

Attached is a precedent for a judgment in this case. We believe
it to be proper. I sent this to Don Chaney. He has not approved it,
but he did let me know that he believes that Cincinnati Insurance
should pay the $12,537.60 awarded by the jury. As you will recall,
all of this was hammered out before the trial in chambers where it
was determined that you would subtract the $25,000 from the
tortfeasor and make any other adjustments that would be necessary
in the final verdict. ...

? Chaney also conceded at the hearing before the circuit court that he had received
this letter,

‘We believe ... our precedent is accurate and appropriate for the
court’s signature. If you desire anything further from us, please let
me know.

Here, as was the case in Offutt, there is simply no proof
of fraud in this case, whether actual or constructive. This court
noted in Davis v. Davis, supra, that constructive fraud is defined as
a “breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the
moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declared fraudulent because
of its tendency to deceive.” Davis, 291 Ark. at 476, 725 S.W.2d at
847 (citing Lane v. Rachel, 239 Ark. 400, 389 S.W.2d 621 (1965)).
Here, counsel for the insurance company gave Johnson’s attorney
a copy of the precedent to review before asking the court to enter
it. Although Johnson may have disagreed with the contents of the
precedent, that fact alone does not prove that Cincinnati engaged
in fraudulent conduct in asking the court to enter it, especially
where his objection was made known to the trial court. Thus, the
trial court correctly determined that “the constructive fraud that
the plaintiff asserts as necessary to afford the court authority to act
simply does not exist under the facts of this case.”

Johnson raises three other points on appeal, contending that
the November 23, 2005, judgment was wrong and should have
been set aside for various reasons. He contends that the judgment
1) erroneously offset Johnson’s settlement with the tortfeasor from
the verdict awarded by the jury; 2) wrongfully ordered medical
benefits to be paid to Cincinnati, causing Johnson to not be “‘made
whole” by the judgment; and 3) did not reduce the medical
payment subrogation claim by the “one-third cost of collection
attorney’s fee payable to [Johnson’s] attorney for procuring the
settlement for policy limits.”

We decline to reach any of these arguments, as the
circuit court did not rule on any of them. We will not consider
arguments on appeal when a party has failed to obtain a ruling from
the circuit court. See, e.g., Beverly Enterprises-Arkansas, Inc. v.
Thomas, 370 Ark. 310, 251 S.W.3d 267 (2007); Cox v. Miller, 363
Ark. 54, 210 S.W.3d 842 (2005). Moreover, none of these issues
would constitute grounds for setting aside a judgment after the
expiration of more than ninety days under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(c).

Affirmed.
Brown, J., not participating.

= 173

Terrance Quartez JARRETT v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1295 289 S.W.3d 421

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 4, 2008

es ee
John W. Settle, for appellant.

No response.

eR Curiam. Terrance Quartez Jarrett, by his attorney,

John W. Settle, has filed a motion for rule on clerk. The
circuit court entered Jarrett’s judgment and commitment order on
July 8, 2008, and Jarrett filed his notice of appeal on July 9, 2008. The
record in this matter was thus due to be filed by October 7, 2008.
Because the record was not tendered to this court’s clerk until
November 5, 2008, it was untimely.

This court recently clarified its treatment of motions for rule
on clerk and motions for belated appeals in McDonald v. State, 356
Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004). There we said:

‘Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was
not timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the appeal is
therefore faced with two options. First, where the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by affidavit filed
with the motion or in the motion itself. There is no advantage in
declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second, where the party
or attorney believes that there is good reason the appeal was not
perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and
this court will decide whether good reason is present.

356 Ark. at 116, 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted). While this
court no longer requires an affidavit admitting fault before we will

consider the motion, an attorney should candidly admit fault where
he or she has erred and is responsible for the failure to perfect the
appeal. See id. When it is plain from the motion, affidavits, and record
that relief is proper under either rule based on error or good reason,
the relief will be granted. See id. If there is attorney error, a copy of the
opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Con-
duct. See id.

Hl [cis plain from Jarrett’s motion that there was error on
Mr. Settle’s part. Pursuant to McDonald v. State, supra, we grant
Jarrett’s motion for rule on clerk and forward a copy of this
opinion to the Committee on Professional Conduct.

Motion granted.

Billy Joe KELLEY v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-926 289 S.W.3d 421

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 4, 2008

Ne!

William P. Luppen, for appellant.

No response.

ps Curiam. Appellant Billy Joe Kelley appeals his convic-
tion for rape and sentence of life imprisonment. Because

Kelley has submitted a brief without a proper abstract, which is in
violation of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2 (2008), we order
rebriefing.

Rule 4-2(b)(3) explains the procedure to be followed when
an appellant has failed to supply this court with a sufficient brief
and states, in pertinent part:

Whether or not the appellee has called attention to deficiencies in
the appellant’s abstract or Addendum, the Court may address the
question at any time. If the Court finds the abstract or Addendum
to be deficient such that the Court cannot reach the merits of the
case, or such as to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the
disposition of the appeal, the Court will notify the appellant that he
or she will be afforded an opportunity to cure any deficiencies, and
has fifteen days within which to file a substituted abstract, Adden-
dum, and brief, at his or her own expense, to conform to Rule
4-2(a)(5) and (8). Mere modifications of the original brief by the
appellant, as by interlineation, will not be accepted by the Clerk.
Upon the filing of such a substituted brief by the appellant, the
appellee will be afforded an opportunity to revise or supplement the
brief, at the expense of the appellant or the appellant’s counsel, as
the Court may direct.

Rule 4-2(a)(5) provides, in pertinent part: “In the abstracting of
testimony, the first person (i.e., ‘I’) rather than the third person (i.e.,
‘He, She’) shall be used.”

In the present case, a jury trial was held February 5-6,
2008. Instead of abstracting the transcript of the testimony as
required by Rule 4-2(a)(5), Kelley provides a verbatim transcript
of the testimony, and the abstract is not in the first person. Because
Kelley has failed to comply with our rule, we order Kelley to
abstract the testimony and to file a substituted brief within fifteen
days from the date of entry of this order.

Rebriefing ordered.

176 |_|

James Aaron MILLER v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1297 289 S.W.3d 423

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 4, 2008

es

James W. Wyatt, for appellant.

No response.

ER CuRIAM. Petitioner, James Aaron Miller, through his

attorney, James W. Wyatt, has filed a petition for writ of
certiorari to complete the record pursuant to Rule 3-5 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court. Miller filed a certified partial record on Novem-
ber 5, 2008, and filed this petition the same day. We grant the
petition.

Miller was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death on April 7, 2008. After a timely notice of appeal was filed,
Miller’s attorney filed a motion on June 30, 2008, pursuant to Ark.
R. App. P.-Civ. 5 to extend the time for filing the transcript. The
motion asserted that the court reporter had contacted counsel to
inform him that the transcript could not be completed before the
record was due to be lodged on July 6, 2008. The State responded
that it had no objection to Miller’s motion. The circuit court thus
entered an order on July 2, 2008, extending the time for lodging
the record until November 6, 2008, seven months following the
date of the judgment.

The court reporter has been unable to complete the
record by the extended date, and Miller is requesting additional
time by means of his timely certiorari petition. We grant the
petition and direct that a writ of certiorari be issued to the Circuit

pO
Pe C—S™r 77

Court of Sebastian County to complete and file a certified supple-
mental record with our clerk within thirty days from the date of
this per curiam. At that time, a briefing schedule will be set.

DustinTUCK v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT of
HUMAN SERVICES, Minor Child

08-1240 289 S.W.3d 420

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 4, 2008

a
Booth Law Firm, PLC, by: Frank Booth, for appellant.

Gray Allen Turner, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

eR Curiam. Rule 2-4 of the Rules of the Arkansas Su-
preme Court require petitions for review to “briefly and
distinctly state the basis upon which the case should be reviewed” and
“may include citations to authority or references to statutes or
constitutional provisions.” Although subsection (b) of that rule pro-
hibits briefs in support of review petitions, it allows petitioners to
attach a copy of their petition for rehearing before the Court of
Appeals. Rule 2-3 dictates the procedure and requirements of peti-
tions for rehearing and allows a brief in support to be filed with a
petition for rehearing.
HM Appellee, the Arkansas Department of Human Ser-
vices, claimed in its petition for review that the Court of Appeals
“made errors of fact and law and should be reversed.” The petition

St
178 i =

fails to note with particularity what it believes those errors to be and
upon what grounds this court should grant review. Although Appel-
lee attached its petition for rehearing, it is a nearly identical copy of the
review petition and gives no additional argument or citation to
authority. Appellee also attached its Brief in Support of Petition for
Rehearing to its review petition, and it is in that document that
Appellee makes its substantive argument regarding the errors it
believes the appellate court made. Because Rule 2-4 prohibits this
court from accepting briefs in support of petitions for review, we
cannot consider the arguments made in the Brief in Support of the
Petition for Rehearing.

For purposes of clarification to the Bar, this court will only
consider the Petition for Review filed with this court pursuant to
Rule 2-4 and, if attached to the review petition, the Petition for
Rehearing to the Court of Appeals. It will not accept a brief in
support of the review petition and will not consider a brief in
support of the rehearing petition.

Appellee’s petition for review is denied.

Jason Joeseth POWELL v. Davelynn Felkel LANE
and Wendell Ray Lane

08-282 289 S.W.3d 440

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

Ld
Pid 181

Mary M. Rawlins, for appellant.
Bob Keeter, for appellees.

1M Hannan, Chief Justice. This is an appeal of an adoption

decree granted to the appellees, Wendell Ray Lane and
Davelynn Felkel Lane, permitting Wendell to adopt Davelynn’s
minor son, D.P., whom she conceived with appellant Jason Powell.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court in a
5-4 decision. See Powell v. Lane, 101 Ark. App. 295, 275 S.W.3d 666
(2008). The Lanes petitioned this court for review, which we granted
pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2-4 (2008). Because this
appeal is before us on a petition for review, our jurisdiction of the case
is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(e) (2008). Upon the
grant of a petition for review, we consider the case as though it had
been originally filed in this court. See, e.g., Tucker v. Office of Child
Support Enforcement, 368 Ark. 481, 247 S.W.3d 485 (2007). We affirm
the circuit court’s order granting the petition for adoption, and we
reverse the court of appeals.

It is undisputed that on December 31, 1996, Davelynn and
Jason went to the First Baptist Church in Pencil Bluff where they
were married by Reverend Bruce Tidwell. The ceremony was
traditional in that Jason stood at the head of the church and
Davelynn walked down the aisle in a creme-colored dress. When
Davelynn reached the front of the church, she and Jason ex-
changed marriage vows while family and friends witnessed the
ceremony. Davelynn’s mother was among those present. Dave-

lynn was pregnant with Jason’s child at the time of the ceremony
and later gave birth to a son, D.P., on July 9, 1997. She and Jason
lived together as husband and wife, from the date of the ceremony
until their separation in the spring of 2004, almost eight years later.

It is also undisputed that Davelynn and Powell obtained a
marriage license before the ceremony. The marriage license was
not signed by Reverend Tidwell and was never returned to the
county clerk for filing. Davelynn and Jason have never obtained a
divorce.

On June 9, 2004, Davelynn petitioned the Montgomery
County Circuit Court to establish paternity of her son, D.P.
Davelynn alleged that Jason was the natural father of D.P., a minor
child who was born out of wedlock to her on July 9, 1997. In
addition, she averred that she and Jason were not married to each
other or any other persons at the time of the conception and birth
of D.P. The petition and summons were served on Jason, but he
failed to answer and a default judgment was entered on July 23,
2004. In the order, the circuit court found that Jason was the
natural father of D.P., and that Davelynn and Jason were not
married to each other or any other persons at the time of the
conception and birth of D.P. The order set a visitation schedule,
required Jason to pay child support in the amount of seventy-five
dollars per week, and required Jason to pay one-half of D.P.’s
medical expenses. Jason did not appeal the default order. Subse-
quently, Jason moved to set aside the default judgment, but that
motion was denied.

Davelynn and Wendell were married on September 4, 2004.
On March 28, 2006, they petitioned the Polk County Circuit
Court for a decree allowing Wendell to adopt D.P. without the
consent of Jason. Davelynn consented to the adoption and alleged
that Jason had failed significantly without justifiable cause to
communicate with or support D.P. for at least one year. Jason
answered, denying the allegations and refusing to consent to the
adoption.

On May 12, 2006, Jason filed a petition for divorce against
Davelynn in Montgomery County Circuit Court in the same cause
of action as the paternity action. Davelynn moved to dismiss the
petition, asserting that the issue of the validity of the marriage had
already been resolved. The cases were consolidated in the Polk
County Circuit Court and heard on July 5, 2006.

At the hearing, Davelynn testified that she was pregnant at
the time of the wedding. She stated that she and Jason were not

Ld
id 189

married; rather, she testified that they “‘went through a cer-
emony.” Davelynn added: ‘‘You do lots of things of play acting
that’s not legal and it’s my understanding that that wasn’t legal.”
She claimed that, at the time, Jason did not want to be married
because he felt “‘trapped,” but that they had already gotten the
marriage license, her grandfather was dying, and she was an
overwhelmed pregnant teenager who did not know what to do.
Davelynn testified that she and Jason never intended to file the
license and that the preacher never saw the marriage license. In
addition, Davelynn stated that she “made a very bad decision,”’ and
that she and Jason were never married.

Davelynn also provided testimony regarding her marriage to
Wendell. She stated that they were married on September 4, 2004,
in Branson, Missouri. She further stated that Jason had not paid
child support since December 2004 and that he had not paid any
portion of D.P.’s medical bills.

Jason testified that D.P. had been diagnosed with aseptic
optic dysplasia with hypopanpituitarism. Jason stated that he was
his son’s “‘primary shot-giver’”’ and “primary medication-giver”’
during the first eight years of his son’s life. Jason admitted that he
stopped paying support to Davelynn through the Child Support
Clearinghouse, but he denied that he quit paying support, stating
that, instead, he deposited payments into a fund that he was
maintaining for D.P. Jason said that he stopped paying money to
the clearinghouse because he knew that doing so would cause the
Child Support Enforcement Office to bring him into court. Jason
stated that he believed that once he was brought into court, he
could resolve all of the other issues with Davelynn.

Jason’s sister-in-law, Melissa Powell, testified that she wit-
nessed the marriage ceremony in which Jason and Davelynn were
married. She stated: ‘We had a wedding, they kissed, they went
down the aisle, they said, I do. That’s what I seen.”

Wendell testified that he and Davelynn were married on
September 4, 2004, and have one child together. He further
testified that D.P. had resided with him and Davelynn since they
were married. Wendell stated that he wanted to adopt D.P.
because he loved him and because he felt like D.P. was his son.
Wendell also testified that he and Davelynn had received no
financial support for D.P. from Jason since their marriage.

The circuit court dismissed Jason’s divorce petition. In
doing so, the circuit court ruled that Davelynn and Jason were
never married because they failed to have the preacher who

performed their marriage ceremony sign the marriage license and
because they also failed to file the license with the county clerk.

The circuit court then granted the adoption petition of
Davelynn and Wendell. In its order granting the petition, the
circuit court found that Jason and Davelynn were not married at
the time D.P. was conceived or at any time thereafter. The circuit
court further concluded that, while there was much testimony and
conflict over whether Jason had attempted to communicate with
D.P., there was no dispute that, in excess of one year, Jason had
failed significantly, without justifiable cause, to pay child support
for D.P. Accordingly, the circuit court determined that Jason’s
consent to the adoption was not necessary. Jason filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the circuit court. Jason
appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed and remanded the
circuit court. The court of appeals held that Davelynn and Jason
were validly married and that the circuit court erred in finding
otherwise. See Powell, 101 Ark. App. at 296, 275 S.W.3d at 667.
Further, the court of appeals held: “‘In that the trial court’s finding
that [Jason] and Davelynn were never married was the determi-
nating factor regarding the remaining issues, we reverse and
remand all issues presented.” Id., 275 S.W.3d at 667. Davelynn and
Wendell now petition for review.

The Validity of the Marriage

Jason first contends that the circuit court erred in concluding
that he and Davelynn were not validly married. Davelynn claims
that the issue of the validity of the marriage was decided in the
circuit court’s July 23, 2004 default order. She points out that Jason
took no appeal from that order and that he did not raise the issue
of the validity of the marriage until nearly two years after the entry
of the order, in a petition for divorce. Accordingly, Davelynn
contends that Jason’s arguments regarding the validity of the
marriage are barred by res judicata. For his part, Jason asserts that
Davelynn’s paternity complaint did not address the validity of the
marriage and, therefore, the default order could not have resolved
the issue.

Res judicata bars relitigation of a claim in a subsequent suit
when five factors are present. These include: (1) the first suit
resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was
based upon proper jurisdiction; (3) the first suit was fully contested
in good faith; (4) both suits involve the same claim or cause of
action; and (5) both suits involve the same parties or their privies.

|
is 185

Moon v. Marquez, 338 Ark. 636, 999 S.W.2d 678 (1999). Further-
more, res judicata bars not only the relitigation of claims that were
actually litigated in the first suit, but also those that could have
been litigated. Id. The purpose of res judicata is to put an end to
litigation by preventing a party who had one fair trial on a matter
from relitigating the matter a second time. Id. This court has
applied the doctrine of res judicata in the context of family law. Id.

HEHE While Davelynn couches her argument in terms of
res judicata, it appears that she is asserting that Jason’s challenge to
the validity of the marriage is barred by collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion. Collateral estoppel requires four elements before a
determination is conclusive in a subsequent proceeding: (1) the
issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in
the prior litigation; (2) that issue must have been actually litigated;
(3) the issue must have been determined by a valid and final
judgment; and (4) the determination must have been essential to
the judgment. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Willis, 347
Ark. 6, 59 S.W.3d 438 (2001). The party against whom collateral
estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the earlier action and
must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in that
first proceeding. See id. Unlike res judicata, which acts to bar issues
that merely could have been litigated in the first action, collateral
estoppel requires actual litigation in the first instance. Id.

The default judgment states that Jason was properly served,'
and that Davelynn and Jason ‘“‘were not married to each other or
any other persons at the time of the conception and birth.” The
paternity petition asserted that Jason and Davelynn “were not
married to each other or any other persons at the time of the
conception and birth” of D.P. Thus, Jason was on notice that the
issue of the validity of this marriage was to be decided, and he had
a full and fair opportunity to be heard. He chose not to be heard.

However, the dissent states that collateral estoppel does not
apply to default judgments. In Arkansas, a default judgment is just
as binding and enforceable as a judgment on the merits. See State v.
$258,035 U.S. Currency, 352 Ark. 117, 98 S.W.3d 818 (2003).
Nonetheless, the dissent asserts that collateral estoppel does not
apply to default judgments because a default does not actually
litigate the issues. The dissent errs in its definition of “actually

"The record shows that Jason was personally served.

litigated.””? In the context of collateral estoppel, ‘‘actually liti-
gated” means that the issue was raised in pleadings, or otherwise,
that the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and
that a decision was rendered on the issue. For example, in Bradley
Ventures v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Arkansas, 371 Ark.
229, 237, 264 S.W.3d 485, 492 (2007), taking the guilty plea
decided guilt to a charge of reckless burning, but taking the guilty
plea did not decide the issue of Bradley’s intent to commit arson
with which he was originally charged. While this case does not
concern a default judgment, it is similar in that it involved a plea
that resolved the case without a full trial. To the argument of
collateral estoppel, this court stated:

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the
relitigation of issues of law or fact actually litigated by the parties in
the first suit, provided that the party against whom the earlier
decision is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in question and that issue was essential to the judgment.

Bradley, 371 Ark. at 234-35, 264 S.W.3d at 490. A guilty plea or a
default judgment may satisfy the requirement of collateral estoppel
where the issue was essential to the judgment and was properly raised
and decided by the action. Both a guilty plea and a default judgment
may provide a full and fair opportunity to heard, as in the present case.
Jason chose not to avail himself of the opportunity to be heard. A
default judgment determines the parties’ rights just as any conven-
tional judgment or decree. See Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652, 606
S.W.2d 112 (1980).

However, as the dissent notes, some courts in foreign
jurisdictions hold that default judgments are not subject to collat-
eral estoppel because default judgments do not arise from actual

2 Teappears that the confusion over the meaning of actually litigated” may arise from
the distinction between claim preclusion under res judicata and issue preclusion, or collateral
estoppel. Under claim preclusion or res judicata, the entire claim is precluded, including any
and all issues that were or might have been raised; however, under issue preclusion, or
collateral estoppel, only those issues that were directly and necessarily adjudicated (actually
litigated) are precluded. See Mason u State, 361 Ark. 357, 206 $.W.3d 869 (2005). From this
distinction comes the requirement under collateral estoppel that the issue to be precluded
must have been “actually litigated” Thus,"actually litigated” has nothing to do with whether
the judgment was obtained by default, summary adjudication, trial, or otherwise; rather, the
question is whether the issue to be precluded was adjudicated in the judgment at issue.

Le
i 187

litigation. But see, e.g., Gottlieb v. Kest, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 34 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006) (“California, on the other hand, accords collateral
estoppel effect to default judgments, at least where the judgment
contains an express finding on the allegations.””).? The courts
holding that collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments
also err, as the dissent does, in the definition of ‘“‘actually litigated.”
The citation of an Iowa case serves as an example of how the error
arises. In Blea v. Sandoval, 761 P.2d 432, 435 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988), cited by the dissent, the New Mexico Supreme Court
relied, among other cases, on Lynch v. Lynch, 94 N.W.2d 105 (lowa
1959), for the proposition that a default judgment has no collateral
estoppel effect. In Lynch, the lowa Supreme Court stated, ““Col-
lateral estoppel is usually not available in default cases.” 94 N.W.2d
at 108 (emphasis added). This appears to support the dissent’s
position; however, upon further analysis, it is clear that Lynch does
not hold that all default judgments fail to satisfy the requirements
of collateral estoppel. In making the statement about collateral
estoppel not usually applying to default judgments, the Iowa
Supreme Court cited to Matson v. Poncin, 132 N.W. 970 (lowa
1911). Matson does not state that collateral estoppel does not apply
to default judgments. Rather, there we find that “it must appear
that the particular matter was considered and passed on in the
former suit, or the adjudication will not operate as a bar to
subsequent action.” Matson, 132 N.W. at 972. The court in Matson

3 As the dissent notes in citing In re Cantrell, 329 F3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), California
does not follow the courts that hold there is a blanket rule against applying collateral estoppel
to defaultjudgments. This dates back some time as the authority cited by the court in Cantrell
indicates. “The fact that the judgment was secured by default does not warrant the
application of a special rule, ‘A default judgment is an estoppel as to all issues necessarily
litigated therein and determined thereby exactly like any other judgment.’ ” In re Harmon,
250 B3d 1240, 1246 (2001) (quoting Horton » Horton, 116 P.2d 605, 608 (Cal. 1941)). The
complete quote, which is found in Harvey ». Grifiths, 23 B2d 532, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933),
is as follows:

It is immaterial that the judgment which is assailed was procured by default. The
defendants in that action had an opportunity to appear and protect their interest.
‘They deliberately waived the right to their day in court by failing to appear and
answer the complaint. A default judgment is an estoppel as to all issues necessarily
litigated therein and determined thereby exactly like any other judgment provided
the court acquired jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter involved in the suit,

Harvey, 23 P.2d at 534 (citing 3 A.C. Freeman, A Treatise of the Law of Judgments § 1296, at
2690 (Sth ed. 1925))..

went on to state that “a matter, not embraced in the pleadings, and.
which was not necessarily determined in entering judgment could
not have been directly in issue.” Id. Thus, the phrase “collateral
estoppel is usually not available in default cases,” really meant that
collateral estoppel is not available unless the matter was raised in
the pleadings, or otherwise, and directly decided. Default judg-
ments may or may not satisfy the requirements of collateral
estoppel. The question must be considered on a case-by-case basis.

The issue of collateral estoppel and default judgments was
also discussed in Lane v. Farmers Union Insurance, 989 P.2d 309
(Mont. 1999) (also cited by the dissent). There, the court consid-
ered the question of whether a default judgment served as a final
judgment on the merits. To decide this, the court concluded it had
to determine whether the issue was actually litigated and stated a
test:

This analysis requires two things: first, that the issue was effectively
raised in the pleadings, or through development of the evidence,
and argument at trial or on motion; and, second, that the losing
party had a full and fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and
evidentially to contest the issue in a prior proceeding.

Lane, 989 P.2d at 317. Again, as in Lynch, supra, the question is
whether the issue was properly raised and whether there was a full and
fair opportunity to be heard.

HM Other courts have held that the requirement of actual
litigation was met in a default judgment:

A judgment taken by default is conclusive by way of estoppel in
respect to all such matters and facts as are well pleaded and properly
raised, and material to the case made by declaration or other
pleadings, and such issues cannot be relitigated in any subsequent
action between the parties and their privies.[*]

In re Bursack, 65 F.3d 51, 54 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Lawhorn v.
Wellford, 168 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tenn. 1943)). Still other jurisdictions

4 This language appears to have originated in 1 Henry Campbell Black, A Teatise on
the Law of Judgments § 87, at 126-27 (1891), where the above-quoted language is found.
Black goes on to state that"*while a default judgment is conclusive ofall that is properly alleged
in the complaint, its conclusive of nothing more, and as a general rule it binds the defendant
only in the character in which he is sued.” Id.

bear out this conclusion that “actually litigated” means notice and a
full and fair opportunity to be heard rather than litigation where a
matter is decided only after development and introduction of evi-
dence by both sides. A discussion in Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import
Motors, Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (D.C. Mich. 1974), is helpful:

Default Judgment — Collateral estoppel applies only to those issues
which were ‘actually’ or ‘fully litigated’ in the prior action. How-
ever, this rule does not refer to the quality or quantity of argument
or evidence addressed to an issue. It requires only two things: first,
that the issue has been effectively raised in the prior action, either in
the pleadings or through development of the evidence and argu-
ment at trial or on motion; and second, that the losing party has had
‘a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially’ to
contest the issue. The general rule therefore is that subject to these
restrictions default judgments do constitute res judicata for purposes
of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).

Overseas Motors, Inc., 375 Supp. at 516, quoted in In re Bush, 62 F.3d
1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 1995); In re Houston, 305 B.R. 111, 118 (Bankr.
M.D. Hla. 2003); In re Foster, 280 B.R. 193, 205 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2002).

In the present case, the issue of the validity of the marriage
was decided in the default judgment after personal notice and a full
and fair opportunity to be heard. The determination of Davelynn’s
marital status was essential to the judgment in the paternity action.
Davelynn asserted in the paternity action that she was not married
at the time of D.P.’s conception and birth. Jason did not offer any
evidence to the contrary, although he had the opportunity to do
so. The circuit court declared that Davelynn was not married to
Jason at the time of D.P.’s conception and birth. Thus, the issue of
marital status was ‘‘actually litigated.” The decision of paternity
was conclusive, and Jason is bound by that decision. Collateral
estoppel applies in this case. To hold otherwise would undermine
the finality of judgments. There is no bright-line rule. Each
judgment, taken by default, or otherwise, must be examined to
determine what was finally decided and whether it meets the
requirements of collateral estoppel.

In connection with his argument that his marriage to
Davelynn was valid, Jason asserts that the adoption should be void
because no home study was conducted of Davelynn and Wendell’s
home. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-212(b)(1)(A) (Supp.

2005) states: “Before placement of the child in the home of the
petitioner, a home study shall be conducted by any child welfare
agency licensed under the Child Welfare Agency Licensing Act,
§ 9-28-401 et seq., or any licensed certified social worker.”
Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-212(c), “[t]he
court may also waive the requirement for a home study when a
stepparent is the petitioner.” Jason asserts that because he and
Davelynn never obtained a divorce, Davelynn’s marriage to Wen-
dell is void; therefore, Wendell is not D.P.’s stepparent, and a
home study could not be waived.

There is a longstanding presumption against deliberate
bigamy, Bruno v. Bruno, 221 Ark. 759, 256 S.W.2d 341 (1953), and
there is a common law presumption of the validity of the second
marriage, Cole v. Cole, 249 Ark. 824, 462 S.W.2d 213 (1971). The
burden of disproving the validity of a marriage is on the one
attacking it. Bruno, supra. Here, the only argument advanced by
Jason is that the second marriage is void because he and Davelynn
were still validly married, an argument that he is collaterally
estopped from asserting. Jason has failed to overcome the pre-
sumption of the validity of the marriage between Davelynn and
Wendell. It follows that he has failed to prove that Wendell was
not D.P.’s stepparent at the time of the adoption and that a home
study was required in this case.

Consent to Adoption

Jason contends that the circuit court erred in granting the
petition for adoption because there was insufficient evidence that
he had failed significantly without justifiable cause to communi-
cate with D.P. and to support D.P. Adoption statutes are strictly
construed, and a person who wishes to adopt a child must prove
that consent is unnecessary by clear and convincing evidence. In re
Adoption of A.M.C., 368 Ark. 369, 246 S.W.3d 426 (2007). A
circuit court’s finding that consent is unnecessary because of a
failure to support or communicate with the child will not be
reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-206(a)(2) (Supp.
2005) provides in relevant part:

(a) Unless consent is not required under § 9-9-207, a petition to
adopt a minor may be granted only if written consent to a particular
adoption has been executed by:

i
PC C—is@Y 191

(2) The father of the minor if the father was married to the mother
at the time the minor was conceived or at any time thereafter... .

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-207(a)(2) (Supp.
2005) provides:

(a) Consent to adoption is not required of:

(2) a parent ofa child in the custody of another, if the parent fora
period of at least one (1) year has failed significantly without
justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to provide
for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial
decree[.]

I The circuit court concluded that, while there was
much testimony and conflict over whether Jason had attempted to
communicate with D.P., there was no dispute that the last child
support was paid in December 2004. Therefore, the circuit court
found that consent was not necessary. The failure to pay child
support, standing alone, justifies the finding that consent is unnec-
essary. At the July 5, 2006 hearing, Jason admitted that he had
“quit paying child support to [Davelynn].” He claimed that he had
child support “sitting over here in a fund.” The record reveals that
Jason’s last payment of child support to the clearinghouse was
recorded on December 6, 2004. There was no evidence that he
had otherwise paid child support. Thus, it is clear that Jason failed
to pay support in excess of one year. Failure to pay support without
justifiable cause means a failure that is voluntary, willful, arbitrary,
and without adequate excuse. See In re Adoption of K.F.H. &
K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 844 S.W.2d 343 (1993) (citing Bemis v.
Hare, 19 Ark. App. 198, 718 S.W.2d 481 (1986); Roberts v. Swim,
268 Ark. 917, 597 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. App. 1980)). Jason voluntar-
ily, willfully, arbitrarily, and without adequate excuse failed to pay
child support in excess of one year. Jason’s reason for not paying
support — that it was an attempt to get Davelynn back into court
— is not justifiable cause for failing to support his child. The
circuit court did not err in finding that consent to the adoption was
unnecessary because Jason failed to pay child support in excess of
one year.

Opportunity to Cure

Jason contends that the circuit court erred in granting the
adoption and terminating his parental rights under the provisions
of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-207 (Supp. 2005) be-

cause he was not given the opportunity to cure as provided by
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-220(c)(1) (Supp. 2005),
which provides:

In any addition to any other proceeding provided by law, the
relationship of parent and child may be terminated by a court order
issued under this subchapter on any ground provided by other law
for termination of the relationship, or on the following grounds:

(1) Abandonment.

(A) A child support order shall provide notice to the non-custodial
parent that failure to pay child support or to visit the child for at least
one (1) year shall provide the custodial parent with the right to
initiate proceedings to terminate the parental rights of the non-
custodial parent.

(B) If the notification clause required by subdivision (c)(1)(A) of
this section is not in the child support order, the custodial parent,
prior to termination of parental rights, shall notify the non-custodial
parent that he or she intends to petition the court to terminate
parental rights.

(C)@ The non-custodial parent shall have three (3) months from,
the filing of the petition to pay a substantial amount of past due
payments owed and to establish a relationship with his or her child
or children.

ii) Once the requirements under subdivision (c)(1)(C)(i) of this
section are met, the custodial parent shall not be permitted to
proceed with the adoption nor the termination of parental rights of
the non-custodial parent.

(iii) The court may terminate parental rights of the non-custodial
parent upon a showing that:

(a) Child support payments have not been made for one (1) year or
the non-custodial parent has not visited the child in the preceding
year and the non-custodial parent has not fulfilled the requirements
of subdivision (c)(1)(C)(i) of this section; and

(b) It would be in the best interest of the child to terminate the
parental relationship.

Ld
i 198

HL The record reveals that Jason had the opportunity to
“cure” his failure to pay child support, pursuant to section
9~-9-220(c)(1)(C), but he chose not to do so. The petition in this
case was filed on March 28, 2006. Under section 9-9-220(c)(1)(C),
Jason had three months from that date, or until June 28, 2006, to
pay a substantial amount of past due payments owed and to
establish a relationship with his child. No payments were made.
Although Jason contended, at the hearing on July 5, 2006, that he
paid the funds into a separate account, he never deposited those
funds into the registry of the court nor did he pay any of those
funds to the mother. Even after receiving notice that an adoption
petition was filed, he still refused to comply with the court order
regarding child support. By his own actions, Jason did nothing to
enforce any right he might have had to “cure” his failure to pay
child support.

In sum, the circuit court found that Jason’s consent was not
necessary for the adoption and that it would be in D.P.’s best
interest to grant the petition for adoption. We recognize that the
circuit court did not conclude, as we do, that Jason is collaterally
estopped from challenging the validity of the marriage. It is
axiomatic that this court can affirm a circuit court if the right result
is reached even if it is for a different reason. See, ¢.g., Alphin v.
Alphin, 364 Ark. 332, 219 S$.W.3d 160 (2005). We affirm the
circuit court’s granting of the petition for adoption.

Court of appeals reversed; circuit court affirmed.
Brown and Wuts, JJ., dissent.

Be CunnincHaM Wits, Justice, dissenting. Because I
do not agree that the default judgment entered in the
paternity action has preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, I respectfully dissent.

As the majority points out, one required element of collat-
eral estoppel is that the issue sought to be precluded must have
been “‘actually litigated.” “The question of whether an issue has
been previously litigated is interpreted very narrowly for purposes
of collateral estoppel.”’ In re Estate of Goston v. Ford Motor Co., 320
Ark. 699, 705, 898 S.W.2d 471, 473 (1995) (citing Smith v. Roane,
284 Ark. 568, 683 S.W.2d 935 (1983)). This court recently held
that “‘actually litigated” means “‘actually litigated.” Bradley Ventures
v. Farm Bureau, 371 Ark. 229, 237, 264 S.W.3d 485, 492 (2007)

(guilty plea in a criminal case is not equivalent to a criminal
conviction that has been “actually litigated’’). Similarly, in State
Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Willis, 347 Ark. 6, 16, 59
S.W.3d 438, 445 (2001), we held that where the trial judge stated
in a divorce decree that “the parties hereby have one (1) child,”
but neither party put paternity at issue and no adversary presenta-
tions of evidence on this point were made, the court’s finding of
paternity “was not the result of litigation.” By stating that the
matter must actually be litigated, we “‘emphasize[d] the necessity
for trying the issue sought to be estopped.” Willis, 347 Ark. at 16,
59 S.W.3d at 445. This court has never before held that a default
judgment satisfies the ‘‘actually litigated” prong of the collateral
estoppel doctrine. We have held default judgments conclusive for
purposes of the related doctrine of res judicata, see, e.g., Bruns Foods ~
of Morrilton, Inc. v. Hawkins, 328 Ark. 416, 944 S.W.2d 509 (1997);
however, the doctrine of res judicata does not require that the
matter have been “‘actually litigated.”

There is some disagreement among the courts of our sister
states on the question of the preclusive effect of default judgments
for purposes of collateral estoppel. The “majority view” has been
described as a finding that, with default judgments, nothing is
“actually litigated.” Gottlieb v. Kest, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006); see also Lane v. Farmers Union Ins., 989 P.2d 309 (Mont.
1999) (acknowledging the “general rule” that a default judgement
carries no collateral estoppel effect). The courts adhering to this
view often cite the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to this
effect. The case of Blea v. Sandoval, 761 P.2d 432, 435-36 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1988), is illustrative:

There is ample authority for the proposition that a default judge-
ment has no collateral estoppel effect. See Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 27, at 257 (1982); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool
Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958,
103 S.Ct. 2430, 77 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1983); In re McMillan, 579 F.2d.
289 (3d Cir. 1978); Lynch v. Lynch, 250 lowa 407, 94 N.W.2d 105
(1959). The Restatement formulation and the foregoing cases
recognize that default judgments do have res judicata effect, but
distinguish collateral estoppel from res judicata. The basis of the
distinction is the doctrine that res judicata bars consideration, in a
subsequent suit, of all matters that could properly have been raised
in the prior case, while collateral estoppel bars consideration only of
issues actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment
. ++. The Restatement and the foregoing federal cases recognize

|
PC C—sY 195

that in a default judgment, the issues are not actually litigated. The
Restatement also states that the policy of preventing endless litiga-
tion does not apply as strongly in the collateral estoppel context as it
does when parties are repeatedly attempting to relitigate the same
cause of action. Hence, while it may be proper to accord res
judicata effect to a default judgment, it is not appropriate to give
such a judgment collateral estoppel effect.

Examples of cases adhering to the general rule are Lee ex rel.
Lee v. United States, 124 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re McMillan,
579 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1978); State ex rel. Department of Economic
Security v. Powers, 908 P.2d 49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Burns v. A
Cash Construction Lien Bond, 8 P.3d 795 (Mont. 2000); Lane, supra;
McNair v. McNair, 856 A.2d 5 (N.H. 2004); Slowinski v. Valley
National Bank, 624 A.2d 85 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993);
Chambers v. City of New York, 764 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003); Martin v. Poole, 336 A.2d 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975); McGill
v. Southwark Realty Co., 828 A.2d 430 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2003); State
v. Bacote, 503 S.E.2d 161 (S.C. 1998); Horton v. Morrison, 448
S.E.2d 629 (Va. 1994); Christian v. Sizemore, 407 S.E.2d 715 (W.
Va. 1991); see also 50 CJ.S. Judgment § 797 (“Although a party
against whom a default judgment is entered certainly had an
opportunity to litigate, most courts have concluded that an oppor-
tunity to litigate should not be given the same effect as actual
litigation, unless the application of the estoppel to some subse-
quent proceeding was forseeable when the default was entered.”’);
Note, Collateral Estoppel in Default Judgments: The Case for Abolition,
70 Colum. L. Rev. 522 (1970).

Some courts have carved out limited exceptions to the
general rule, “‘where the party against whom collateral estoppel is
sought to be invoked has appeared in the prior action or proceed-
ing and has, by deliberate action, refused to defend or litigate the

* As indicated above, there are some states, including California and Tennessee, that
adhere to a different minority rule. The majority cites the decisions of these states. See, e.g,
Gottlieb, supra; Lawhorn x Wellford, 168 S.W.2d 790 (Tenn. 1943). ‘The two Iowa cases cited
by the majority are distinguishable, however. Lynch u Lynch, 94 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1959),
which stated that collateral estoppel is usually not available in default cases, turned upon the
application of res judicata rather than collateral estoppel, and the court refused to apply the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Matson . Poncin, 132 N.W. 970 (Lowa 1911), did not involve
a default judgment and the issue was whether the courtin the previous suit had made a finding
on the particular issue sought to be estopped. These Iowa rulings do not clearly depart from
the general rule that a default judgment carries no collateral estoppel effect.

charge or allegation that is the subject of the preclusion request.”
Inte Abady, 800 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); accord Treglia
v. MacDonald, 717 N.E.2d 249 (Mass. 1999) (“We can, for ex-
ample, envision circumstances in which a litigant may so utilize
our court system in pretrial procedures, but nonetheless be de-
faulted for some reason, that the principle and rationale behind
collateral estoppel would apply.”) (citing In re Gober, 100 F.2d
1195 (5th Cir. 1996) (default judgments issued as discovery sanc-
tions); In re Bush, 62 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 1995) (fraud)); see also In
re Docteroff, 133 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Bursack, 65 F.3d 51
(6th Cir. 1995); Int’l 800 Telecom Corp. v. Kramer, 591 N.Y.S.2d
313 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1992). We have no such circumstances here.?

Here, the trial court correctly ruled in its July 24, 2006 order
that the default judgment “‘was not, and could not, resolve
questions of marital status.’’ The majority concludes that the issue
was “actually litigated” because: (1) the petition for declaration of
paternity included the bald and disingenuous assertion that the
parties “‘were not married to each other . . . at the time of the
conception and birth”; and (2) Jason had a full and fair opportunity
to be heard on the issue of the validity of the marriage after he was
served with the paternity suit, and chose not to avail himself of the
opportunity. This recitation of facts does little more than restate the
ordinary factors creating a default judgment, albeit one in which
the defendant received actual notice. The doctrine of collateral
estoppel is normally inapplicable to such judgments under the
general rule. Instead, the majority’s holding is akin to the position
adopted by California, as described by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in In re Cantrell, 329 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002):

The mere fact that “judgment was secured by default does not
warrant the application of a special rule.” California law does,
however, place two limitations on this general principle. The first
is that collateral estoppel applies only if the defendant “has been
personally served with summons or has actual knowledge of the
existence of this litigation.” Collateral estoppel, therefore, only

2 Although our court of appeals has applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in one
case involving a default judgment, Reyes 1 Jackson, 43 Ark. App. 142, 861 S.W.2d 554
(1993), it did so without the depth of analysis that the weight of authority or matters
addressed above command. ‘The application of collateral estoppel to a judgment by default
should be not decreed so lightly, either by the court of appeals or by the majority in this case.

applies to a default judgment to the extent that the defendant has

actual notice of the proceedings and a “full and fair opportunity to

litigate.”
(Internal citations omitted.)* But see Walter W. Heiser, California’s
Confusing Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 San Diego L.
Rev. 509, 556 (1998) (suggesting that if the California Supreme
Court really adheres to the four-factor test of the second Restatement
of Judgments, it “should disapprove of those decisions that have
extended collateral estoppel to default judgments”). I do not agree
that this court should adopt this minority position, especially without
more analysis as to its desirability or particular applicability to the facts
of this case.*

The majority opinion repeatedly relies on the fact that Jason
had a “full and fair opportunity” to be heard on the existence or
validity of his marriage. I disagree that compliance with this
requirement satisfies the “actually litigated” prong of collateral
estoppel under Arkansas law. The requirement of a “full and fair
opportunity” to litigate “apparently developed as a due process
safeguard around the time the mutuality requirement was dropped
in Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).” Falk v. Falk,
88 B.R. 957, 962 n.5 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988). The requirement of
mutuality of estoppel has been eliminated in most jurisdictions,
including Arkansas. Id.; see also Willis, supra, Mary H. Moore,
Arkansas’ Position Regarding Defensive Collateral Estoppel and the
Mutuality Doctrine, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 701 (1994). Strangers to the first
decree may assert collateral estoppel as long as the person against
whom it is asserted had a “‘full and fair opportunity to litigate.”
This is necessary to satisfy due process concerns. See Parklane
Hoisery, supra. However, this requirement does not obviate the
“actually litigated’? prong of collateral estoppel in Arkansas. See
Willis, supra.

As noted by the court in Falk, supra, 88 B.R. at 962, “[t]he
demise of the mutuality doctrine and the development of the full
and fair opportunity to litigate concept have lead [sic] to some

> The second factor that California requires is that there be an express finding on the
point at issue.

+ Even among the jurisdictions that apply the minority view, it does not appear that
any jurisdiction has directly held that a default custody or paternity judgment, where the lack
of a valid marriage is indicated, can preclude the parties from subsequently litigating the
validity of the marriage under the collateral estoppel doctrine.

confusion with respect to the elements necessary to successfully
assert collateral estoppel.’’ The court explained as follows:

Some courts use the traditional elements based on the Restatement
of Judgments: (1) The issue sought to be precluded must be the
same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2) That issue must
have been actually litigated; (3) It must have been determined by a
valid and final judgment; and (4) The determination must have
been essential to the judgment. Other courts, however, apply
somewhat different elements: (1) The issue was identical to one in
a prior adjudication; (2) There was a final judgment on the merits;
(3) The estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication; and (4) The estopped party was given a full and
fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.

Falk, 88 B.R. at 962 (citations omitted).5

We have not, until today, adopted the latter view. Instead,
we have previously adhered to the traditional Restatement ele-
ments, including that the matter must have been “‘actually liti-
gated.” See Bradley Ventures, supra. After the demise of mutuality,
the full and fair opportunity to litigate represents the bare mini-
mum that must be afforded in light of due process concerns. I
would not depart from our historical ‘“‘actually litigated”’ test in this
regard. As noted in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27
cmt. e (1982), when approaching difficult questions regarding the
“actually litigated” requirement, “policy considerations .. . weigh
strongly in favor of nonpreclusion, and it is in the interest of
predictability and simplicity for such a result to obtain uniformly,”
These interests are not fostered by a ‘‘case-by-case”’ approach
favored by the majority.

The majority also relies upon the presumption of the validity
of a second marriage and states that Jason “failed to overcome the
presumption of the validity of the marriage between Davelynn and
Wendell.” The majority concludes that the “only argument ad-
vanced by Jason is that the second marriage is void because he and
Davelynn were still validly married, an argument which he is
collaterally estopped from asserting.” As set out above, I disagree
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable on these facts.
In addition, the presumption of the legal validity of a second

5 ‘The latter view is the law of Montana. See Lane, supra (discussed by the majority).

Lt
Ci 199

marriage is just that, a presumption, which may be overcome with
positive proof. Watson v. Palmer, 219 Ark. 178, 240 S.W.2d 875
(1951) (The “‘presumption is a rebuttable one, and may be over-
come with sufficient proof. . . and must give way to reality when
facts opposing the presumption are presented.” (quoting Gray v.
Gray, 199 Ark 152, 133 S.W.2d 874 (1939)). We have held that the
presumption of the validity of the second marriage can be over-
come with proof that the parties to the first ceremonial marriage
never obtained a divorce. See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 249 Ark. 824, 462
S.W.2d 213 (1971). The presumption is not as strong where there
has not been a considerable lapse of time between the two
marriages, Bruno v. Bruno, 221 Ark. 759, 256 S.W.2d 341 (1953).
Here, it appears from the record that Davelynn and Wendell were
married approximately two years after Davelynn’s separation from
Jason, and the trial court dismissed Jason’s divorce petition in its
July 24, 2006 order, even though it held that it was “‘clear that the
parties did participate in a marriage ceremony.”

No matter how lightly or irreverently Davelynn claims to
have entered the union, the facts show that she procured, or
participated in the procurement of: (1) a license; (2) a minister; (3)
a “‘creme-colored”’ dress; and thereafter marched down the aisle in
front of family and friends and said “I do.” In my judgment, this is
sufficient to meet the test for “solemnization” under Arkansas law
and to overcome the presumed validity of the second marriage.
The fact that the minister did not sign the license or return it is not
fatal to the validity of the marriage, and the trial judge erred in so
holding. See Fryar v. Roberts, 346 Ark. 432, 57 S.W.3d 727 (2001).6
Because the potential adoptive parents in this instance could not
have been validly married, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of
the adoption petition and remand for further proceedings. Bruno,
221 Ark. at 762, 256 S.W.2d at 343 (ceremonial marriage to a
person who has previously been married and who never obtained
a divorce is void). As the court of appeals noted, the trial judge’s
decision was based upon the erroneous conclusion that Davelynn
and Jason were never validly married.

© Additionally, Davelynn and Jason lived together as husband and wife for over eight
years after their ceremonial marriage and birth of their son. In Allen ». Wallis, 279 Ark. 149,
152, 650 S.W.2d 225, 227 (1983), this court stated that “[wJhere there is cohabitation
apparently matrimonial, a strong presumption of marriage arises which increases with the
passage of time, during which the parties lived together as husband and wife, especially where
the legitimacy of a child is concerned.”

The doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be expanded,
and the presumption of the validity of a second marriage given
conclusive effect, in order to resolve a case in which the Arkansas
law governing marriage is on one side, and the perceived equities
are on the other. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Brown, J., joins this dissent.

James A. BRYANT and Carol Sue Bryant, as Trustees of the Bryant
Family Revocable Trust, and James P. Bryant v. J.W. HENDRIX,
Mark Treadwell, and Shawn Treadwell

08-828 289 S.W.3d 402

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

Davis Law Firm, by: Steven B. Davis, for appellants.

Patterson Law Firm, P.A., by: Jerry D. Patterson, for appellee J.W.
Hendrix.

Kent Tester, P.A., by: Kent Tester, for appellees Mark Treadwell
and Shawn Treadwell.

ONALD L. Corsi, Justice. Appellants, James A. Bryant

and Carol Sue Bryant, as trustees of a revocable family
trust, and their son James P. Bryant, appeal the order of the Searcy
County Circuit Court granting summary judgment to Appellees,
J.W. Hendrix, Mark Treadwell, and Shawn Treadwell. For reversal,
Appellants contend the circuit court erred as a matter of law in ruling
that the statute of limitations had run on their claims for trespass and.
encroachment stemming from the removal of timber on adjoining
property. Specifically, Appellants contend that the provisions of Ark.
R. Civ. P. 15(c) governing relation back of amendments in pleadings
applies to substitutions of plaintiffs as well as defendants and that this
court’s decisions on this issue in wrongful-death cases should not be
extended to apply to this case. The questions presented in this appeal
require interpretation of court rules and clarification of the law.

Accordingly, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b)(5)
and (6). We find no error and affirm.

James A. Bryant and Carol Sue Bryant filed a complaint in
Searcy County Circuit Court on September 13, 2002, seeking
treble damages for trespass and removal of timber pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann. § 18-60-102 (1987). The complaint alleged that they
owned real property! adjoining that owned by J.W. Hendrix and
that, pursuant to an agteed settlement in a previous case, the
Bryants and Hendrix walked the boundary lines of their properties
and located the corners of their land. The complaint further
alleged that on or about September 1, 2002, Mark Treadwell and
Shawn Treadwell acted pursuant to Hendrix’s direction and re-~
moved the existing boundary fence between the properties and
trespassed upon the Bryants’ property to a distance of about 100
feet and removed timber therefrom, including a black cherry tree
more than 100 years old. In addition to seeking treble damages
under section 18-60-102, the complaint also sought punitive
damages, alleging the trespass was intentional. This complaint was
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on September 7, 2005.

James A. and Carol Sue Bryant then refiled their lawsuit by
filing an amended complaint on August 8, 2006. The amended
complaint noted that the boundary line between the Bryants and
Hendrix had been established by a survey. James A. and Carol Sue
Bryant amended their complaint again on December 15, 2006; this
complaint was entitled ““Third Amended Complaint” and added as
party plaintiff their son, James P. Bryant, as the owner of some of
the real property in question. The third amended complaint also
alleged the value of timber wrongfully removed to be $5,368 and
the cost of clearing debris left on their land to be $7,000. The
complaint was amended for a fourth time on November 28, 2007,
to reflect that James A. and Carol Sue Bryant were owners of the
property as trustees of the Bryant Family Revocable Trust. The
fourth amended complaint also alleged for the first time that piles
of deadfall and timber slash remaining on their land constituted a
continuing trespass and that Appellees had erected a fence along
the southern and western edge of the Bryants’ property, which was
alleged to be an encroachment and continuing trespass.

"As it turns out, they were not the owners of the land in question, as they had
previously transferred ownership to a revocable family trust they created in April 2001.

At the hearing on the Treadwells’ motion for summary
judgment,? Appellees stated that their motion was based on the fact
that the plaintiffs named in the original complaint filed September
13, 2002, James A. and Carol Sue Bryant, did not own the
property in question because it had been placed in the family trust
in April 2001. Appellees cited the trial court to Rhuland v. Fahr,
356 Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d 2 (2004), and argued that the statute of
limitations had run in the present case because, according to
Rhuland, whenever an amendment to a complaint substitutes anew
plaintiff, such amendment is a new cause of action and does not
relate back to the original complaint. Appellants responded that
Rhuland should not be applied to the present case for trespass and
encroachment because it was a wrongful-death case. Appellants
maintained that the applicable law was the doctrine of relation
back of amended pleadings as found in Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c).

The circuit court issued a letter opinion filed February 7,
2008, and entered an order on April 29, 2008, granting Appellees’
motion for summary judgment on all claims. The order stated that
the statute of limitations barred all claims and that the doctrine of
relation back did not apply to the substitution of plaintiffs. This
appeal followed.

The law is well settled that summary judgment is to be
granted by a circuit court only when it is clear that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anglin v. Johnson Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 375 Ark. 10, 289 S.W.3d 28 (2008). On appeal, Appellants do
not contend there are disputed issues of fact; rather, they argue the
circuit court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judg-
ment on the basis of the statute of limitations.

For reversal of the summary judgment, Appellants contend
that the amendment of their complaint in December 2006 to add
James P. Bryant as a plaintiff and again in November 2007 to
substitute James A. and Carol Sue Bryant as trustees of the family
trust should relate back to their original complaint, which was filed
in September 2002, well within the three~year limitations period
of the alleged trespass, which also occurred in September 2002.
Appellants rely on Rule 15(c), which provides as follows:

2 Hendrix joined in the motion for purposes of obtaining an appealable order
pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. B. 54(b). Hereinafter, Hendrix and the Treadwells are collectively
referred to as “Appellees.”

(c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment ofa pleading
relates back to the date of the original pleading when:

(1) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted.
to be set forth in the original pleading, or

(2) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the
party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (1)
is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(i) for service
of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by
amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense
on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action
would have been brought against the party.

Here, Appellants maintain that Appellees are not prejudiced
by the substitution of the proper plaintiffs because the original
complaint was timely filed, and Appellees had notice of the
complaint. Appellants contend that the ‘conduct asserted in the
amended complaint arises out of the same conduct asserted in the
original complaint, and therefore Rule 15 should operate to allow
relation back in this case. Appellants also point out that under Rule
17 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, if Appellees had
moved to dismiss the case for failure to be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest, Appellants would have been allowed a
reasonable time to substitute the real party in interest. However, as
discussed later herein, Appellants overlook the mistaken-identity
requirement of Rule 15(c)(2)(B).

a ‘We observe that our Rule 15(c) is expressly written in
terms of amendments or changes to the ‘‘party against whom a
claim is asserted[.]” Appellants ask us to hold that the rule should
be applied to allow amendments or changes to plaintiffs as well.
We decline to so hold.

The issue of substitution of plaintiffs has recently been
presented to this court in the context of claims for wrongful death
and survival. See, e.g., Rhuland v. Fahr, 356 Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d
2; see also St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court of Craighead
County, 348 Ark. 197, 73 S.W.3d 584 (2002). Very recently, we
cited these cases with approval in the context of a bankruptcy
estate. Bibbs v. Cmty. Bank of Benton, 375 Ark. 150, 289 S.W.3d 393

a
PE CC*d 205

(2008). Bibbs involved plaintiffs who filed suit asserting a claim that
was part of their bankruptcy estate. The plaintiffs originally filed
suit as individuals, but then after the statute of limitations had run,
amended the complaint to add the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff.
Bibbs observed that for the relation-back doctrine to apply, there
must be valid pleadings to amend in the first place, and there was
nota valid complaint in the first place because the original plaintiffs
lacked standing and were not the real party in interest, rather the
bankruptcy trustee was. Bibbs also cited St. Paul, one of the
wrongful-death cases cited previously herein, and stated that an
amended complaint that substitutes the original plaintiffs and
replaces them with entirely new plaintiffs does not constitute an
amendment to the original complaint but rather is the filing of a
new lawsuit. See Bibbs, 375 Ark. 150, 289 S.W.3d 393.

Although the most recent cases on this subject decided by
this court involved statutes mandating a suit be maintained by a
specific party as plaintiff, the law in this state concerning the
substitution of other types of plaintiffs has been well settled for
decades. In Ark-Homa Foods, Inc. v. Ward, 251 Ark. 662, 473
S.W.2d 910 (1971), this court cited Floyd Plant Food Co. v. Moore,
197 Ark. 259, 122 S.W.2d 463 (1938), and American Railway
Express Co. v. Reeves, 173 Ark. 273, 292 S.W. 109 (1927), and
stated “[t]hose cases stand for the proposition so well put by 8
A.L.R. 2d 57 (1949):

It is well settled that where an action is brought in the name of a
non-existing plaintiff, an amendment of complaint by substituting
the proper party to the action as plaintiff will be regarded as the
institution of a new action as regards the statute of limitations.

Ark-Homa Foods, 251 Ark. at 664, 473 S.W.2d at 911. The same
principle applies to plaintiffs who are existent, but lack standing and
are not the real party in interest. See Bibbs, 375 Ark. 150, 289 S.W.3d
393. When discussing this issue over eighty years ago in the context of
different names of corporations who were plaintiffs, this court ob-
served:

It is a matter of extreme doubt that the St. Louis S.W. R. Co. could
maintain a suit in the name of the Cotton Belt Railroad Company,
though the two names designate only one person. It would not be
amatter of mistake if it filed a suit under such name or style, because
it must recognize its own corporate existence and corporate name.
There is a difference in being made a defendant under one or two or

more names by which a person or corporation might be known and
in suing and attempting to maintain litigation under such an
appellation which it, itself, knew was not correct.

Floyd Plant Food, 197 Ark. at 265, 122 S.W.2d at 465-66.

Hl In the present case, the original complaint and subse-
quent amendments all related to the same conduct alleged as a
trespass. Appellees were on notice they would need to defend the
trespass action. It is not, however, understandable that the Bryants
or their counsel could be mistaken about the differing and distinct
identities of the Bryants as individual landowners, their son as
landowner, and their family trust as landowners. The Bryants
transferred some of their land to their son in 1986. They created
their family trust roughly one and one-half years prior to filing
their first complaint in this case. It is not a matter of mistake,
because the Bryants and their counsel must have recognized the
existence of their family trust and their deed to their son. We
therefore conclude on the facts here presented according to the
long-standing law of this state that the substitution of plaintiffs in
subsequent pleadings does not relate back to the date of the
original complaint.

‘We are aware that Appellants cite us to the corresponding
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and authority
applying that rule. See Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070 (8th
Cir. 2006); see also Crowder v. Gordons Transps., Inc., 387 F.2d 413
(8th Cir. 1967). An analysis of these federal authorities would
prolong this discussion needlessly, given the long-standing law of
this state to the contrary.

Appellants contend that even if their claim for trespass
is barred as untimely, they have also alleged a continuing trespass
and encroachment from the piles of debris left on their land as well
as the erection of a new fence. Appellants contend there is a
seven-year statute of limitations applicable to these claims. Ark.
Code Ann. § 18-61-102 (Repl. 2003). Appellants have not cited
us to any authority that this statute applies to the facts of this case,
and it is not apparent to us that it does. Moreover, although the
circuit court granted summary judgment on “all claims,” there was
no ruling in either the court’s letter opinion or the order regarding
this statute. Accordingly, this issue is not preserved for our
appellate review. We do not review on appeal matters on which

|
Ci 207

the trial court did not rule, and the party raising the point on appeal
has the burden to obtain the ruling. Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark.
454, 995 S.W.2d 341 (1999).

The order granting summary judgment is affirmed.
Imper, J., not participating.

David GATZKE, Wade Abernathy, Greg Gladden, Michael Lester,
Richard Day, Wayne Harlan, and Chad Fite v. Richard WEISS,
Anne Laidlaw, B. Alan Sugg, Lu Hardin, Robert Potts,
and May Construction Company, et al.

08-415 289 S.W.3d 455

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

Hope, Fuqua & Campbell, P.A., by: Ronald A. Hope, David M.
Fuqua, and Patrick L. Spivey, for appellants.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Jeffrey H. Moore, for appellees
CDI Contractors, LLC; DEL-JEN, Inc.; and Nabholz Construction
Corp.

Dustin McDaniel, Atty Gen.; Justin Allen, Chief Deputy Att'y
Gen., by: Lori Freno, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellees Richard Weiss
and Anne Laidlaw.

Tom Courtway, General Counsel, University of Central Arkan-
sas, for appellee Lu Hardin.

Jeffiey A. Bell, Sr. Assoc. General Counsel, University of Ar-
kansas, for appellee B. Alan Sugg.

Lucinda McDaniel, University Counsel, Arkansas State Univer-
sity System, for appellee Robert Potts.

a
iY 209

Ren L. Brown, Justice. On March 23, 2007, the
appellants, David Gatzke and others (hereinafter
“Gatzke’), as taxpayers of Arkansas, sued appellees, Richard Weiss,
Director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration;
Anne Laidlaw, interim director of the Arkansas Building Authority;
and certain public university officials. Gatzke alleged that Act 961 of
1997, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 19-4-1413, and
Act 1626 of 2001, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section
19-4-1415, (hereinafter “the Acts”) violate article 19, section 16 of
the Arkansas Constitution because they allow for state construction
projects to be entered into without competitive bidding.

Gatzke also contended in the complaint that the construc-
tion contracts entered into pursuant to the Acts were illegal and
constituted an illegal exaction under article 16, section 13 of the
Arkansas Constitution. Gatzke prayed for a declaratory judgment,
declaring that the Acts are unconstitutional and that the executed
contracts constituted illegal exactions. Gatzke also prayed to en-
join the State from entering into any contracts pursuant to the
Acts, from prospectively honoring the terms of any existing
contracts entered into pursuant to the Acts, and from making
expenditures in the future pursuant to the Acts. On August 31,
2007, Gatzke filed an amended complaint, following an order by
the circuit judge to add certain necessary parties. The amended
complaint named various private building contractors and in-
cluded the same allegations and prayer that the Acts be declared
unconstitutional.’

Weiss moved to dismiss the amended complaint on grounds
that article 19, section 16 of the Arkansas Constitution applies only
to county-funded contracts. Following a hearing on the motion,
the circuit judge treated the motion as one for summary judgment
and found that the Acts were constitutional because article 19,
section 16 “applies only to county construction projects.” He

' Gatzke named the following seventeen defendants: Richard Weiss, Director of the
Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; Anne Laidlaw, Interim Director of the
‘Arkansas Building Authority; B. Alan Sugg, President of the University of Arkansas System;
Lu Hardin, President of the University of Central Arkansas; Robert Potts, Chancellor of
‘Arkansas State University; Nabholz Construction Corporation; CDI Contractors, Inc.;
Flintco, Inc.; Baldwin & Shell Construction Company; May Construction Company, Inc;
James H. Taylor & Sons Construction Company, Inc.; F & F Construction Company, Inc
DEL-JEN, Inc; KINCO Constructors, LLC; CDI Contractors, LLC; KAJ Construction,
Inc.jand Studio Werk, PLLC. All named defendants will be referred to collectively as “Weiss.”

concluded in his order: “‘It is therefore ordered that summary
judgment be granted in favor of all defendants, and that the
plaintiffs’ amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice in its
entirety.”?

This dispute revolves around whether article 19, section 16,
of the Arkansas Constitution requires competitive bidding on all
public contracts in Arkansas, including state contracts, as argued by
Gatzke, or whether it applies only to county contracts, as found by
the circuit judge and asserted by Weiss. The Acts provide for
letting state contracts without competitive bidding in some cir-
cumstances. Act 961 of 1997, codified at Arkansas Code Anno-
tated section 9-4-1413, exempts from general statutory bidding
requirements public higher education construction projects if they
exceed $5,000,000 and 80% of the estimated project cost (exclud-
ing the cost of land) is privately finded. Act 1626 of 2001, codified
at Arkansas Code Annotated section 19-4-1415, exempts from
general statutory bidding requirements state agency construction
projects that exceed $5,000,000 (excluding the cost of land),
regardless of the source of project funds. The Acts both require
that certain procedures be followed for a contract to be awarded
under the exemptions.

In reviewing the constitutionality of statutes, this court
presumes that a statute was framed in accordance with the consti-
tution. See Reinert v. State, 348 Ark. 1, 71 S.W.3d 52 (2002). The
burden is on the challenger of the statute to prove that it is
unconstitutional, and this court will not invalidate a statute for
repugnance to the constitution unless the two are in clear and
unmistakable conflict. Id.

This court reviews a circuit court’s interpretation of a
constitutional provision de novo. See City of Fayetteville v. Wash.
Cty., 369 Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844 (2007). We are not bound by
a circuit court’s decision, but in the absence of a showing that the

2 What apparently converted this matter from a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) to
summary judgment was the attachment of an affidavit from Rebecca Burns-Hoffman, a
forensic linguist, who interpreted the meaning of article 19, section 16 in that affidavit. ‘The
judge made no reference to this affidavit at the hearing or in his order, We agree with Weiss,
nonetheless, that a forensic linguist may not testify to her conclusions related to constitutional
interpretation under the guise of Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has said: “Each courtroom comes equipped with a
‘legal expert’ called a judge” Burkhart 1 Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 B3d 1207,
1213 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Pi att

trial court erred in its interpretation of the law, that interpretation
will be accepted on appeal. Id. Language of a constitutional
provision that is plain and unambiguous must be given its obvious
and common meaning. Id. Neither rules of construction nor rules
of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and certain
meaning of a constitutional provision. Id. Furthermore, when
engaging in constitutional construction and interpretation, this
court looks to the history of the constitutional provision. See Foster
v. Jefferson Cty. Quorum Ct., 321 Ark. 116, 901 S.W.2d (1995). The
Arkansas Constitution must be considered as whole, and every
provision must be read in light of other provisions relating to the
same subject matter. Id.

We turn then to article 19, section 16, which reads:

All contracts for erecting or repairing public buildings or
bridges in any county, or for materials therefor; or, for providing for
the care and keeping of paupers, where there are no alms-houses,
shall be given to the lowest responsible bidder, under such regula-
tions as may be provided by law.

Gatzke contends that the term “‘all contracts” evidences the framers’
and voters’ intent that the provision apply to all government con-
tracts, including state contracts, and that the words “in any county”
refer to the physical location of the public buildings or bridges.
Because of this, he contends the Acts are unconstitutional.

We conclude that the plain meaning of article 19,
section 16 restricts its application to county contracts. There is,
first, the fact that the words “in any county” would lack any
significance unless they restrict the provision relating to public
buildings and bridges to county-funded contracts. It is beyond
dispute that absent an explicit restriction, sections of the Arkansas
Constitution have statewide application. See, e.g., Ark. Const.
preamble (“‘We, the people of the State of Arkansas, . . . do ordain
and establish this Constitution.”) (emphasis added). In drafting and
adopting the words “in any county,” the framers and voters of
Arkansas clearly intended to limit the lowest-responsible-bidder
restriction to county contracts. This court will interpret a consti-
tutional provision so that each word carries meaning. See, e.g.,
Merritt v. Jones, 259 Ark. 380, 387, 533 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (1976)
(every word should be expounded in its plain, obvious and
common acceptation). The circuit judge was correct in finding

that “‘the ‘in any county’ phrase does not add anything, except
. .. to limit ‘all contracts’ to ‘county contracts.’ ”

In addition to the plain language of article 19, section 16, the
historical context of the section, and its meaning in relation to the
Arkansas Constitution as a whole, support the circuit judge’s
reading. Weiss rightly points out that at the time article 19, section
16 was adopted by a vote of the people in 1874, it was immediately
preceded by section 15.3 At that time, the two sections read:

Sec. 15. All stationery, printing, paper, fuel, for the use of the
General Assembly and other departments of government, shall be
furnished, and the printing, binding and distributing of the laws,
journals, department reports, and all other printing and binding, and
the repairing and furnishing the halls and rooms used for the
meetings of the General Assembly and its committees, shall be
performed under contract, to be given to the lowest responsible
bidder, below such maximum price and under such regulations as
shall be prescribed by law. No member or officer of any depart-
ment of the government shall in any way be interested in such
contracts, and all such contracts shall be subject to the approval of
the Governor, Auditor and Treasurer.

Sec. 16. All contracts for erecting or repairing public buildings or
bridges in any county, or for materials therefor; or, for providing
for the care and keeping of paupers, where there are no alms houses,
shall be given to the lowest responsible bidder, under such regula-
tions as may be provided by law.

Ark. Const. art. 19, § 15, repealed by Ark. Const. amend. 54, § 2; art.
19, § 16.

HB Again, placing article 19, section 16 in context and
reading it in conjunction with the Arkansas Constitution as a
whole, it is clear to this court that the framers of the constitution
and the people of this state knew how to distinguish between state
contracts and county contracts. If Gatzke’s interpretation were
correct, there would have been no need for section 15 because
section 16 would have applied to all contracts, including those
state contracts for building repairs referenced in section 15. That is
not a reasonable interpretation. We decline to hold that portions of
section 15 were superfluous and unnecessary for adoption.

3 In 1974, article 19, section 15 was repealed by amendment 54,

a
i 213

Though not decisive in itself, we are also aware that signifi-
cant public functions in 1874 were performed by the counties and
not the state. See, e.g., Mansfield Digest of Statutes 1884, §§ 1089-
1139 (county buildings), including the courthouse, jail, and poor-
house. It is especially important that the superintendence of all
paupers, included specifically within article 19, section 16, was a
county function in 1874. See id. § 1108. It would be myopic for
this court to cast a blind eye to the historical context in which
article 19, sections 15 and 16 were passed.

There is, too, the fact that our case law lends support to
Weiss’s interpretation. All but one of the cases in which this court
has interpreted and applied article 19, section 16 involved county
contracts. See Carroll Cty. v. Reeves Constr. Co., 154 Ark. 434, 242
S.W. 821 (1922) (regarding county bridge contracts); Ross Drainage
Dist. v. Clark Cty., 153 Ark. 175, 239 S.W. 740 (1922) (whether a
county was obligated to pay on a bridge contract); Shackelford v.
Campbell, 110 Ark. 355, 161 S.W. 1019 (1913) (whether a county
court could amend a contract previously entered into pursuant to
the constitution and statute); Watkins v. Stough, 103 Ark. 468, 147
S.W. 443 (1912) (regarding county bridge projects); and Fones
Hardware Co. v. Erb, 54 Ark. 645, 17 S.W. 7 (1891) (petition to
enjoin a county from constructing a bridge). None of our cases
interpreting article 19, section 16 have specifically dealt with state
contracts.

The one case from this court discussing section 16 and not
dealing with a county-funded construction project is Wimberly v.
Road Improvement District No. 7,161 Ark. 79, 255 S.W. 556 (1923).4
In Wimberly, the plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin a road improve-
ment district from building a bridge within the district without
letting the project for competitive public bidding. The plaintiffs
argued specifically that the State law under which the improve-
ment district had acted was in conflict with section 16 because it
did not include a provision for the construction of bridges within
the district to be let to the lowest responsible bidder. The trial
judge upheld the validity of the act involved but enjoined the

+ We are aware that Weiss maintains that improvement districts are, in fact, agents of
the State. However, this court has not reached that precise issue in the context of article 19,
section 16.

commissioners of the district from making the improvements
without advertising for bids because he found it was contrary to
public policy.

On appeal, this court reversed in part and, in doing so, noted
that the bridge in question was built incident to the improvement
district and was not, therefore, built with county funds. In holding
that the law did not violate section 16, this court said that “[t]he
section of the Constitution referred to is a limitation upon the
expenditure of county funds for bridges, etc., in any county, and was
not intended as an inhibition against districts building projects
incident to the main improvement, by private contract.” Id.
(emphasis added). Gatzke never explains why the Wimberly court’s
pronouncement that section 16 is a limitation upon the expendi-
ture of county funds is not precedent for the instant case.

Gatzke also maintains that article 19, section 16 must be
amended for it to apply only to county contracts. He cites to
decisions from this court with regard to article 19, section 15 in
support of that argument. See Gray v. Gaddy, 256 Ark. 767, 510
S.W.2d 269 (1974), and Erxleben v. Horton Printing Co., 283 Ark.
272, 675 S.W.2d 638 (1984). In Gray, this court addressed Act 452
of 1973, which purported to clarify the contracts under section 15
that had to be submitted for competitive bidding. We held that the
act was unconstitutional because section 15 applied to all contracts
for stationery, printing, paper, and fuel. Since section 15 was all
inclusive and not unambiguous to begin with, we held that the
General Assembly lacked the authority to modify its terms.

In 1974, the people of Arkansas passed amendment 54 to the
Arkansas Constitution, which repealed article 19, section 15 and
replaced it with amendment 54, section 1. Amendment 54, section
1 requires that the “printing, stationery, and supplies purchased by
the General Assembly and other departments of government shall
be under contracts given to the lowest responsible bidder . . . .”
Ark. Const. amend 54, § 1. Ten years later, taxpayers sued alleging
that the Arkansas Office of State Purchasing violated this provision
by sending printing contracts to the Arkansas Department of
Correction Prison Industries without submitting them to public
bidding. See Erxleben, 283 Ark. 272, 675 S.W.2d 638. This court
interpreted the language of amendment 54 and held that “‘pur-
chased by’? did not mean a bookkeeping entry transferring money
from one state account to another as occurred when the State
entered into contracts with the Department of Correction. We
held that amendment 54 requires competitive bidding for printing

=i 215

purchased from commercial printers but permits the State to
produce its own printing without submitting a bid.

Gatzke urges that the term “all contracts” in section 16
should be governed by this court’s decision in Gray. This argument
is without merit because the original language of section 15 is
considerably different from that of section 16. The term “all
contracts’ in section 16 is expressly limited by the words ‘‘in any
county.” As a result, the plain language of the section already
restricts its applicability to county contracts, and an amendment is
not necessary. Gray and Erxleben are not relevant to deciding this
case.

Nor do we agree that the Fones case supports Gatzke’s
interpretation. See Fones, 54 Ark. 645. Though Fones includes
wording about the desirability of the competitive bidding process
for public construction contracts, it did not purport to interpret
article 19, section 16 to include state contracts. Moreover, the
Fones case itself involved a county contract, as already noted in this
opinion.

Gatzke asserts, as a final point, that the preposition “‘in”
should have been “‘by” in order for section 16 to apply only to
county contracts. Gatzke also contends that section 16 is written in
the passive voice, which further indicates that the intent was for it
to apply to all contracts. These arguments are conclusory, and
Gatzke cites no authority in support of them. This court has long
held that it will not address arguments unless they are sufficiently
developed and include citation to authority. See, e.g., Cole v. Laws,
349 Ark. 177, 183, 76 S.W.3d 878, 881 (2002). Gatzke’s argu~
ments regarding the structure of the language in article 19, section
16 are unpersuasive to this court.

‘We hold that there was no error by the circuit judge in
interpreting article 19, section 16 to apply only to county con-
struction contracts and in declaring the Acts constitutional. We
affirm the order of summary judgment.

Affirmed.

Wits, J., not participating.

216 mw

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION ».
Gaylord SMELSER.

07-1006 289 S.W.3d 466

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

Barrett & Deacon, A Professional Association, by: Kevin W. Cole
and Brandon J. Harrison, for appellant.

James M. Pratt, Jr., P.A., by: James M. Pratt; and Brian G.
Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for appellee.

NNABELLE CLINTON Imper, Justice. Appellant Daimler-

Chrysler Corporation appeals from a judgment entered
against it in the Circuit Court of Columbia County for violation of
the Arkansas New Motor Vehicle Quality Assurance Act (“Arkansas
Lemon Law’), codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-90-401 to -417
(Repl. 2001). The judgment awarded Appellee Gaylord Smelser the
sum of $41,489.26, plus attorney’s fees, copy costs, and mileage
expenses. Appellant raises two points of error on appeal: 1) the circuit
court erred in declining to enforce a settlement agreement negotiated
by the parties’ attorneys; and 2) the circuit court erred in allowing
Appellee to recover copy costs and mileage expenses under Ark. Code
Ann. § 4-90-415(c). Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Su-
preme Court Rule 1-2(a)(5) and (b)(1) (2008). We find no error and
affirm.

On July 14, 2003, Appellee Gaylord Smelser bought a 2003
Dodge 4WD-diesel truck manufactured by DaimlerChrysler Cor-
poration from a Chrysler dealership in Camden, Arkansas. Almost
immediately, he began having problems with the vehicle’s trans-
mission. Beginning in early August 2003, Appellee took the
vehicle back to the Camden dealership for repair. Over the course
of the next eight months, the vehicle was returned to the dealer-
ship a total of six times, but the transmission problem persisted.
Appellee, with help from his daughter-in-law, Erin Smelser, then
sent two letters to DaimlerChrysler’s customer assistance center. In
the first letter dated May 13, 2004, he demanded a repair within
ten days under the Arkansas Lemon Law. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-
406(a)(2) (Repl. 2001). After Appellant failed to respond, Appellee
sent a second letter on June 25, 2004, demanding a replacement
vehicle or a refund pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-406(b).
When Appellant failed to respond to the second letter, Appellee
hired attorney David P. Price to represent him.

A complaint was filed against Appellant in the Circuit Court
of Columbia County on October 28, 2004. The complaint alleged
claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and for viola-
tion of the Arkansas Lemon Law. One year later, on September 23,
2005, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, motion to enforce settlement, alleging that a settle-
ment had been reached on April 6, 2005, between the parties’
attorneys. In his reply to the summary-judgment motion, Appellee
disputed the validity of any alleged settlement, claiming that his
former attorney lacked authority to settle the matter. The circuit
court declined to grant the motion to enforce settlement on the
pleadings; instead, at a hearing in January 2007, the court heard
testimony concerning the alleged settlement. Shortly thereafter,
the circuit court denied Appellant’s summary-judgment motion,
finding that ‘“‘there was not a settlement of the matter.”

In the meantime, Appellee had hired his current attorney,
James M. Pratt, Jr., after Mr. Price withdrew as counsel in July
2005. Appellee eventually nonsuited the two warranty claims, and
the case went to trial in May 2007 on the remaining claim for
violation of the Arkansas Lemon Law. Following a jury verdict in
favor of Appellee, the circuit court entered its judgment on June
11, 2007, awarding Appellee the sum of $41,489.26. In a separate
order entered on July 18, 2007, the court awarded Appellee
attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts of $11,100.00 and
$197.50, respectively, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-415(c).
Appellant filed timely notices of appeal.

In its first point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit
court erred in finding that there was no settlement of the matter
between the attorneys. Appellant further suggests that the circuit
court should have declared a settlement on the terms it deemed
reasonably certain based on the proof. Appellee, on the other
hand, contends there was no settlement agreement because the
conflicting evidence shows there was no meeting of minds on a
material term.

Courts will enforce contracts of settlement if they are not in
contravention of law. McCoy Farms, Inc. v. ] & M McKee, 263 Ark.
20, 563 S.W.2d 409 (1978), reh’g denied April 17, 1978. The
essential elements of a contract include (1) competent parties, (2)
subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutual agreement, and
(5) mutual obligations. Ward v. Williams, 354 Ark. 168, 118
S.W.3d 513 (2003). We keep in mind two legal principles when

deciding whether a valid contract was entered into: (1) a court
cannot make a contract for the parties but can only construe and
enforce the contract that they have made; and if there is no
meeting of the minds, there is no contract; and (2) it is well settled
that in order to make a contract there must be a meeting of the
minds as to all terms, using objective indicators. Alltel Corp. v.
Sumner, 360 Ark. 573, 203 S.W.3d 77 (2005). Both parties must
manifest assent to the particular terms of the contract. Id. More-
over, the terms of a contract cannot be so vague as to be
unenforceable. City of Dardanelle v. City of Russellville, 372 Ark.
486, 277 S.W.3d 562 (2008). The terms of a contract-are reason-
ably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of
a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy, Id.

In the instant case, Appellant has the burden of proving the
existence of a contract. See Thompson v. Potlatch Corp., 326 Ark.
244, 930 S.W.2d 355 (1996). Whether or not there was a meeting
of the minds is an issue of fact, and we do not reverse a trial court’s
fact-finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Sanford v. Sanford, 355
Ark. 274, 137 S.W.3d 391 (2003). A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. Id. We view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the appellee, resolving all inferences in
favor of the appellee. Id. Disputed facts and determinations of the
credibility of witnesses are within the province of the factfinder.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ellison, 334 Ark. 357, 974 S.W.2d 464
(1998).

Appellant asserts that the parties’ attorneys reached a settle-
ment agreement. In support of that assertion, Appellant points to a
letter faxed by Appellant’s attorney to Appellee’s former attorney,
David P. Price, on April 6, 2005. The letter states in pertinent part
as follows:

This letter confirms that we have settled this case premised upon the
following:

1. $1,000.00 payable to you and your client to be applied toward
fees and expenses;

2. Repair of the subject vehicle in accordance with the vehicle
inspection conducted by the DaimlerChrysler field representa-
tive; this repair will be arranged through your office and will be
completed at your local DaimlerChrysler dealership; and

220 CL

3. In return, your client will execute a Release in favor of Daim-
lerChrysler.

On the same day, Appellant’s attorney faxed a letter to the circuit
court’s case coordinator informing the court that the case had been
settled and requesting that the trial scheduled for April 12, 2005, be
canceled. Shortly thereafter, on April 15, 2005, Mr. Price informed
Appellant’s attorney that Appellee refused to accept the terms of
settlement set forth in the April 6, 2005 letter. On May 10, 2005,
Appellant’s attorney sent Mr. Price a release and settlement agreement
and consent order of dismissal, but Appellee never signed the docu-
ments.

During the hearing on Appellant’s motion to enforce the
settlement, Mr. Price testified that Appellee instructed him to
initiate negotiations on a possible settlement. According to Mr.
Price, he relayed the terms of the settlement to his client on April
6, 2005, and Appellee told him to ‘‘go ahead” with the settlement.
Mr. Price admitted that he never sent Appellee the confirmation
letter drafted by Appellant’s attorney and that, during their meet-
ing on April 15, 2005, Appellee denied ever authorizing the
settlement. Mr. Price also testified to his understanding that the
settlement would include a “‘lifetime warranty’’ for the vehicle.
Mr. Price acknowledged, however, that he did not read or object
to the terms contained in the confirmation letter. Appellee testified
that Mr. Price never communicated with him about the settlement
offer. In fact, when he called Mr. Price’s office on April 11, 2005,
Appellee still thought the case was going to trial on April 12, 2005.
In sum, Appellee testified that he never authorized or agreed to the
alleged settlement terms. His testimony was corroborated by Exin
Smelser, Appellee’s daughter-in-law.

HE As stated earlier, the April 6, 2005 confirmation letter
drafted by Appellant’s attorney provides for the “[rJepair of the
subject vehicle in accordance with the vehicle inspection con-
ducted by the DaimlerChrysler field representative; this repair will
be arranged through your office and will be completed at your
local DaimlerChrysler dealership.” There is no reference in the
letter to a “‘lifetime warranty,” or any time period during which
Appellant would be responsible for the repair. Appellee’s former
attorney, however, testified without objection that it was his
understanding the “‘[t]ransmission was supposed to be fixed. . . . if
there was going to be any problems with the transmission that was
supposed to be taken care of for the duration of Mr. Smelser’s

ownership of the vehicle.” In other words, according to Mr. Price,
the settlement included a “‘lifetime warranty.” Once again, where
there is conflicting testimony, the credibility of witnesses is for the
trial judge to determine, and the court defers to the superior
position of the trial judge in matters of credibility. Koster v. State,
374 Ark. 74, 286 S.W.3d 152 (2008). Based upon our review of
the record in the instant case, we cannot say that the circuit court
clearly erred in finding that there was no settlement of the matter.
In view of our affirmance for the reasons stated above, we need not
address the issue of whether Appellee’s attorney lacked authority
to settle the case.

The circuit court ruled, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 4-
90-415(c), that Appellee was entitled to recover copy costs and
mileage expenses in the amount of $197.50. For his second point
on appeal, Appellant challenges the circuit court’s ruling, citing
Rule 54(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. According to
Appellant, Rule 54(d) delineates what costs a prevailing party may
recover, and copy costs and mileage expenses are not expressly
permitted by the rule. Appellant further posits three reasons why ©
section 4-90-415(c) should not be broadly construed to include
mileage expenses or copy costs: (1) statutes providing for costs are
strictly construed against the party seeking the award; (2) if the
statute is broadly construed, requests for all types of travel and
other expenses related to witnesses, attorneys, and paralegals will
pour forth; and (3) it is unfair to construe the statute broadly since
only “‘a consumer” can be a prevailing party under the statute.

Appellee, on the other hand, points out that, even assuming
“costs” is a term of art under Rule 54(d), section 4-90-415(c) is
not limited to the recovery of costs. The statute also allows a
consumer to recover ‘“‘expenses . . . reasonably incurred . . . for or
in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the
action.” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-415(c). Appellee asserts that
expenses in this case easily include the cost of copying exhibits and
mileage.

We review issues of statutory construction de novo, as it is
for this court to decide what a statute means. Middleton v. Lockhart,
344 Ark. 572, 43 S.W.3d 113 (2001). In this regard, we are not
bound by the trial court’s decision; however, in the absence of a
showing that the trial court erred, its interpretation will be
accepted as correct on appeal. Id. The circuit court relied upon
Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-90-415(c) in awarding copy
costs and mileage. Section 4-90~415(c) reads as follows:

ee
222 — =

A consumer who prevails in any legal proceeding under this
subchapter is entitled to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal
to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s
fees based upon actual time expended by the attorney, determined
by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the consumer for
or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the
action. :

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-415(c) (Repl. 2001).

The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature. State Office of Child Support Enforcement
v. Morgan, 364 Ark. 358, 219 S.W.3d 175 (2005). Where the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine
legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used.
Id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it
reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted mean-
ing in common language. Id. We construe the statute so that no
word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and we give
meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. Id.
When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous,
conveying a clear and definite meaning, we need not resort to the
rules of statutory construction. Cooper Clinic, P.A. v. Barnes, 366
Ark. 533, 237 S.W.3d 87 (2006). However, when a statute is
ambiguous, we must interpret it according to the legislative intent,
and our review becomes an examination of the whole act. Id. We
reconcile provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and
sensible in an effort to give effect to every part. Id. A statute is
ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or
where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable
minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. Id. We also
look to the legislative history, the language, and the subject matter
involved. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Morgan, supra.

The statute at issue does not define the terms “costs and
expenses,” or delineate what types of costs and expenses the
legislature intended to include or exclude. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-
90-415(c). The only guidance in the statute is that costs and
expenses shall include attorney’s fees and shall be “determined by
the court to have been reasonably incurred by the consumer for or
in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the
action.” Id.

Rule 54(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure spe-
cifically delineates what fees are taxable as “costs”:

Costs taxable under this rule are limited to the following: filing
fees and other fees charged by the clerk; fees for service of process
and subpoenas; fees for the publication of warning orders and other
notices; fees for interpreters appointed under Rule 43; witness
fees and mileage allowances as provided in Rule 45; fees ofa master
appointed pursuant to Rule 53; fees of experts appointed by the
court pursuant to Rule 706 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence; and
expenses, excluding attorney’s fees, specifically authorized by statute
to be taxed as costs.

Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) (2008). Even if we assume that costs are
limited to those items set forth in Rule 54(d), section 4-90-415(c) also
allows a consumer who prevails to recover “expenses,” including
attorney’s fees. We do not construe statutes to leave any word void or
superfluous. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Morgan, supra.
Thus, the legislature must have contemplated a distinction between.
costs and expenses.

“Expense,” as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, means
“[t]hat which is expended, laid out or consumed; an outlay;
charge; cost; price.” Black’s Law Dictionary 687 (Revised 4th ed.
1968). The legislature has expressly designated attorney’s fees as a
recoverable expense. Otherwise, the only limitation on the recov-
ery of any expenditure or outlay is that the court must determine
it to have been reasonable and incurred in connection with the
prosecution of an action under the Arkansas Lemon Law. Such a
limitation insures against a windfall for Lemon Law claimants. In
essence, section 4-90-415(c) seeks to make a prevailing consumer
whole.

This interpretation is consistent with other provisions that
provide a broad range of remedies to a consumer. Section 4-90-
406(b)(1)(B) provides that a consumer can recover all collateral or
reasonably incurred incidental charges as part of the replacement
or refund. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-406(b)(1)(B) (Repl. 2001).
Section 4-90-414(b)(6) provides that a consumer may not be
charged with a fee to participate in an informal dispute proceeding.
Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-414(b)(6) (Repl. 2001).

Finally, Appellant claims it is unfair to construe the
statute broadly since “only ‘a consumer’ can ever be a prevailing
party under the statute.” It is evident from the plain language of
the Arkansas Lemon Law that the legislature sought to address the
hardship a defective vehicle creates for a consumer. Ark. Code

Ann. § 4-90-402 (Repl. 2001). The legislature intended that a
good-faith motor vehicle warranty complaint by a consumer be
resolved by the manufacturer within a specific period of time. The
statute also provides for an informal dispute settlement proceeding
at the option of the manufacturer. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-414
(Repl. 2001). If the manufacturer fails to resolve a good-faith
complaint, it will be at the manufacturer’s peril to let the dispute be
resolved in court.

The circuit court determined that copy costs and mileage
expenses totaling $197.50 were reasonably incurred in connection
with the instant litigation. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit
court did not err in interpreting section 4-90-415(c) to allow for
the recovery of those expenses.

Affirmed.

Scipio JOHNSON ». BONDS FERTILIZER, INC.;
Bonds Brothers, Inc.; AGRI Group-Comp SI Fund;
CNA Insurance Company

08-269 289 S.W.3d 431

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

rel
a
a

a
Parker Law Firm, by: Tim S. Parker, for appellant.

Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: John S. Cherry, Jr. and
Michael Lee Wright, for appellees.

px DanrELson, Justice. In this third appeal of this matter,
appellant Scipio Johnson appeals from the order of the
Workers’ Compensation Commission, which found that he was
performing employment services for both appellee Bonds Fertilizer,
Inc. and the Bonds Brothers Trust, also known as the Farm, at the
time of his accident on June 28, 1995.' See Johnson v. Bonds Fertilizer,
Inc., 365 Ark, 133, 226 S.W.3d 753 (2006) (Johnson IN); Johnson v.
Union Pac. R.R., 352 Ark. 534, 104 S.W.3d 745 (2003) (Johnson 1).
Mr. Johnson asserts four points on appeal: (1) that the Commission’s
finding that he was performing work for Bonds Fertilizer on the date
of his injury was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) that the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Commission erroneously
exceeded this court’s mandate in Johnson I; (3) that the ALJ and the
Commission erred by applying the doctrines of dual employment,
loaned employee, simultaneous employment, and joint employment;

* In addition to Bonds Fertilizer, the following are also appellees, in accord with the
pleadings filed before, and the decisions by, the Commission: Bonds Brothers, Inc., AGRI
Group-Comp SI Fund, and CNA Insurance Company. For the sake of clarity, the appellees
will be jointly refered to as Bonds unless it is necessary to distinguish the parties.

and (4) that the ALJ and the Commission erred in denying his motion
to dismiss appellee Bonds Brothers, Inc., and in failing to strike its
motions and briefs. We affirm the Commission’s order.

As set forth in both Johnson Iand Johnson II, this matter arises
from an accident in which a train collided with a truck near Tamo,
Arkansas, on June 28, 1995. Mr. Johnson was a passenger in the
truck and was seriously injured when he was thrown from the
vehicle upon impact. Mr. Johnson and his wife, Bessie Johnson,
filed suit in the Jefferson County Circuit Court against Union
Pacific Railroad, Bonds Fertilizer, Inc., and Bonds Brothers, Inc.,
alleging negligence and a loss of consortium. The circuit court
granted summary judgment to both Bonds Fertilizer, Inc. and
Bonds Brothers, Inc. and granted partial summary judgment to
Union Pacific, on the issue of inadequate warning devices. Fol-
lowing a jury trial against Union Pacific on the remaining issue of
negligence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Union Pacific.
Mr. Johnson appealed to this court, and we affirmed the grant of
partial summary judgment to Union Pacific, but reversed the grant
of summary judgment to Bonds Fertilizer,” remanding the matter
to the circuit court with leave for Mr. Johnson to pursue a
determination before the Commission as to whether he was
performing employment services for Bonds Fertilizer or for the
Farm on the date of the accident.* See Johnson I, supra.

Following our remand, Mr. Johnson sought a determination
from the Commission; however, the ALJ and the Commission, in
a 2-1 decision, agreed with the argument of Bonds Fertilizer and
the Farm that since the statute of limitations had run, the Com-
mission had no further jurisdiction in the matter and was without
authority to issue an advisory opinion. See Johnson II, supra. On
appeal, this court held that the Commission erred in both of its
conclusions and reversed and remanded the matter to the Com-
mission for a determination “‘as to whether Johnson was perform-
ing employment services for Bonds Fertilizer or the Farm on the
date of the accident.” 365 Ark. at 137, 226 S.W.3d at 756.

Since our remand in Johnson II, a hearing was held before the
ALJ on July 21, 2006, and on January 10, 2007, the ALJ issued its

2 Bonds Brothers, Inc. was not a party to the first appeal. See Johnson I, supra.
2 This court’s opinion farther observed that it was not disputed that Mr. Johnson’s
injuries occurred while he was performing employment services. See Johnson I, supra.

order. In that order, the ALJ quoted the facts from our opinion in
Johnson I, stating:*

The record reflects.that, on the date of the accident, Johnson was
an employee of both the Farm and Bonds Fertilizer. Both compa~
nies, along with Bonds Brothers, were either owned or controlled
by Kenny Bonds and Brian Bonds. Kenny and Brian each owned
fifty percent of Bonds Brothers. Bonds Brothers is the sole share-
holder of Bonds Fertilizer. The Farm is a partnership comprised of
Kenny Bonds Farms, Brian A. Bonds Trust, and Bonds Brothers.
When Johnson performed work for either the Farm or Bonds
Fertilizer, he reported to the same supervisor, Allan Maxey. Some
weeks, Johnson would perform tasks for both employers, but he
would receive only one paycheck, from the company that he did the
most work for that week. The week before the accident and the
week of the accident, Johnson was paid by Bonds Fertilizer.

On the morning of the accident, Johnson was performing work
for the Farm, because one of the Farm’s employees was out sick.
That afternoon, Johnson was supposed to deliver a load of fertilizer
that was coming in at 3:00 p.m. for Bonds Fertilizer. In the
meantime, around 1:00 p.m., Maxey instructed Johnson to pick up
a tractor for the Farm and begin laying irrigation pipe. Maxey
instructed Johnson to ride with Frances Birmingham, an employee
of Bonds Fertilizer. Alyston Luster, an employee of the Farm, also
rode with them. The truck they were riding in was owned by
Bonds Brothers, and it had a 1,000-gallon water tank hooked to the
back. ’

Following the accident, Kenny Bonds reported Johnson’s acci-
dent to the insurance carrier for Bonds Fertilizer. The insurance
carrier approved the claim and paid approximately $61,000 in
medical and temporary total disability benefits to or on behalf of
Johnson. Johnson accepted these benefits for over nine months,
from July 1995 to April 1996. Subsequently, in February 1998,
Johnson made a claim for additional benefits, isting as his employer:

4 In his brief, Mr. Johnson acknowledges that this court’s recitation of the facté in
Johnson is correct and in accordance with the testimony of witnesses.”

“Bonds Fertilizer, Inc. or Bonds Brothers Farms, Inc.” That claim
was later withdrawn by Johnson, in favor of the civil suit.

352 Ark. at 539-40, 104 S.W.3d at 746-47. In addition, the ALJ’s
order set forth the relationship between Bonds Brothers Trust, Bonds
Brothers, Inc., and Bonds Fertilizer:

In the deposition of Kenny Bonds, Jr., the relationship between
the Bonds entities is explained. Bonds Brothers Trust is the oper-
ating partnership that runs the farm and was composed of Kenny
Bonds, Kenny Bonds’ Farm, Brian Bonds’ Trust, and Bonds Broth-
ers, Inc. It was commonly known as “The Farm.” Bonds Brothers,
Inc. is a corporation which is a partner in the Trust and owns the
equipment and buildings leased and used by the Farm. Bonds
Fertilizer, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bonds Brothers, Inc.
and operates a separate fertilizer business. Kenny Bonds, Jr. is the
general partner of Bonds Brothers Trust, president of Bonds Broth-
ers, Inc., and president of Bonds Fertilizer, Inc.

The ALJ determined that the preponderance of the evidence
demonstrated that Mr. Johnson was paid by both Bonds Fertilizer
and the Farm, “although he would get a check from only one of
them for any particular pay period.” The ALJ further determined,
based on the evidence, that at the time of.the accident, both Mr.
Johnson and the driver of the truck were paid by Bonds Fertilizer
and that Mr. Johnson was paid by Bonds Fertilizer both the week
before and the week of the accident. Accordingly, the ALJ
concluded, because Bonds Fertilizer paid Mr. Johnson and was not
reimbursed, there was strong evidence that Bonds Fertilizer was
Mr. Johnson’s employer at the time of the accident.

The ALJ then discussed the doctrines of joint employment
and dual employment, concluding that the credible evidence in
the case “‘demonstrate[d] that Johnson was under the control of
both employers at the same time when he was directed by his
supervisor to ride with Birmingham to help retrieve a tractor on
the Farm while waiting for the next load of fértilizer.”’ In addition,
the ALJ found that all three factors for dual employment were
“‘plainly satisfied when the undisputed facts [were] examined.”

In reviewing the loaned-employee doctrine, the ALJ noted
that, even assuming Mr. Johnson was performing work for the
Farm at the time of his accident, “there was no question but that he
was loaned by Bonds Fertilizer to the Farm at that time.” It further

found that it was clear from the evidence that Mr. Johnson
“worked for both the fertilizer business and the farm on a regular
basis and shifted from one to the other on an as-needed basis.”

Finally, the ALJ considered the simultaneous-employment
doctrine and concluded that

Johnson was performing a duty for the common benefit of both the
Farm and Bonds Fertilizer. He was traveling from one place of
business to that of the other, as he was required to do in order to
perform properly his assigned duties for the day —- which included
both fertilizer and farm work. Therefore, based on the credible
evidence, I find that Johnson was the joint employee of both the
Farm and Bonds Fertilizer and was performing employment ser-
vices for the benefit of both employers at the time of the accident.

Accordingly, the AL]’s order set forth the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law:

1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has juris-
diction of this claim.

2. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that claimant
‘was simultaneously employed by Bonds Brothers Trust a/k/a The
Farm and Bonds Fertilizer, Inc. on June 28, 1995.

3. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that claimant
was performing employment related services for both employers at
the time of the accident on June 28, 1995.

Mr. Johnson appealed the ALJ’s decision to the full Commission,
which affirmed and adopted the decision of the ALJ, including all
findings and conclusions, in a 2-1 decision. Mr. Johnson now appeals
the Commission’s decision.

I. Substantial Evidence

For his first point on appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts that there
was not substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding
that he was performing work for Bonds Fertilizer at the time of the
accident. Mr. Johnson avers that the evidence militated against the
finding by the Commission and established that he was performing
employment services solely for the Farm at the time of his injuries.

Bonds responds that Mr. Johnson was a dual employee for
both Bonds Fertilizer and the Farm on the date of the accident.
Nonetheless, Bonds avers, even if Mr. Johnson was an employee of

EE
ee 231

the Farm at the time, he was a loaned employee by Bonds Fertilizer
to the Farm. In addition, Bonds asserts, Mr. Johnson was a
simultaneous employee of Bonds Fertilizer and the Farm.

Our standard of review for decisions by the Commission is
well established:

On appeal, this court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commis-
sion’s decision and affirms that decision when it is supported by
substantial evidence. It is for the Commission to determine where
the preponderance of the evidence lies; upon appellate review, we
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commis-
sion’s decision and uphold that decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. There
may be substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision
even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we had
sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. It is exclusively
within the province of the Commission to determine the credibility
and the weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony. We will
not reverse the Commission’s decision unless we are convinced that
fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have
reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission.

Arbaugh v. AG Processing, Inc., 360 Ark. 491, 493-94, 202 S.W.3d519,
521 (2005) (internal citations omitted).

It is well settled that the ALJ’s findings are irrelevant for
purposes of appeal, as this court is required by précedent to review
only the findings of the Commission and ignore those of the ALJ.
See Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760
(2001). However, here, as in Freeman, we must review the findings
of the ALJ because the Commission made absolutely no indepen-
dent findings of its own; rather, it simply adopted each of the
findings made by the ALJ. See id. In the instant case, the ALJ
determined that Mr. Johnson was performing employment-related
services for both Bonds Fertilizer and the Farm at the time of the
accident. We, then, must determine whether that decision was
supported by substantial evidence.

_ This court has previously acknowledged the doctrines of
lent employees and dual employment, quoting from Larson’s
Workmen’s Compensation Law:

>» 7 |.

§ 48.00 When a general employer lends an employee to a
special employer, the special employer becomes liable for work-
men’s compensation only if

(a) The employee has made a contract for hire, express or
implied, with the special employer;

(b) The work being done is essentially that of the special
employer; and

(c) The special employer has the right to control the details of
the work.

South Arkansas Feed Mills, Inc. v. Roberts, 234 Ark. 1035, 1038, 356
S.W.2d 645, 647 (1962) (quoting 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation
Law § 48.00, at 710)). In Daniels v. Riley’s Health & Fitness Centers, 310
Ark. 756, 840 S.W.2d 177 (1992), we noted that the section further
provided: “When all three of the above conditions are satisfied in
relation to both employers, both employers are liable for workmen’s
compensation.” 310 Ark. at 759, 840 S.W.2d at 178.

Here, the ALJ’s order specifically found that all three factors
for dual employment were satisfied, stating:

(a) at the time of the accident, Johnson worked for both Bonds
Fertilizer and “the Farm.”

(b) the work being done on the day of the accident was
essentially that of the Farm, although by his own testimony Johnson
was also working for Bonds Fertilizer.

(c) both Bonds Fertilizer and the Farm had the right to control
the details of Johnson’s work, depending on what Johnson was
doing.

In Cash v. Carter, 312 Ark. 41, 847 S.W.2d 18 (1993), we
examined whether the appellant was a loaned employee of appel-
lee’s construction company. In doing so, this court relied on the
dual-employment doctrine, as set forth in Daniels, supra, and
observed that the most significant question regarding a loaned
employee is which company has direction and control of the
employee. See Cash, supra. With respect to this doctrine, the ALJ
found as follows:

233

It is undisputed that on the day of the accident, Johnson was
taking the place of a sick employee of the Farm. It is likewise
undisputed that before the accident, Johnson had returned from
lunch and was waiting to haul a load of fertilizer for Bonds Fertilizer,
when he was told by his supervisor that the load had been cancelled.
Johnson was told that he would not have any fertilizer to haul until
3 p.m.,and directed to go pick up a tractor with poly-pipe on it to
put out at the Farm. Under these undisputed facts, Johnson was a
“Joaned” or “temporary” employee of the Farm at the time of the
accident, and the same analysis applies as under the “dual employ-
ment” doctrine. See Cash v Carter, 312 Ark. 41, 45-46, 847 S.W.2d
18 (1993).

HB We hold that the Commission’s decision was sup-
ported by substantial evidence. The evidence demonstrates that
Mr. Johnson worked for both Bonds Fertilizer and the Farm and
that on weeks in which he worked for both, he received only one
paycheck from the company for which he did the most work. Both
the week before the accident and the week of the accident, Bonds
Fertilizer paid Mr. Johnson. On the morning in question, Mr.
Johnson worked for the Farm, and that afternoon, at 3:00 p.m., he
was to deliver a load of fertilizer for Bonds Fertilizer. However, at
1:00 p.m., his supervisor, who supervised his work for both Bonds
Fertilizer and the Farm, directed Mr. Johnson to pick up a tractor
for the Farm and to begin laying irrigation pipe. While riding with
an employee of Bonds Fertilizer and an employee of the Farm, Mr.
Johnson was injured when the truck in which he was riding was
struck by a train. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commission, was substantial evidence supporting the Com-
mission’s finding that Mr. Johnson was performing employment
services for both Bonds Fertilizer and the Farm as a dual employee
and a loaned employee. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s
decision.$

5 Because we hold that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's
decision on the bases of both the dual-employment and loaned-employee doctrines, we need
not reach the additional bases relied upon by the ALJ and affirmed by the Commission. We,
therefore, offer no comment on the doctrines of joint employment or’simultaneous employ-
ment.

In addition, we note that along with the arguments already set forth within this first
point, Mr, Johnson further asserted within his substantial-evidence challenge that: (1) the
representations of Kenny Bonds, Jr, President of Bonds Fertilizer, Inc., and Michelle Miller,

Pe
234 — |_|

Il. Law of the Case

Mr. Johnson argues, for his second point on appeal, that the
law-of-the-case doctrine barred the Commission from determin-
ing any issues other than for whom he was employed at the time of
the accident. He contends that the ALJ and the Commission
exceeded this court’s mandate by examining the four doctrines of
dual employment, joint employment, loaned employee, and si-
multaneous employment. Bonds counters that the ALJ merely
conducted the necessary proceedings to answer this court’s ques-
tion and made its conclusions based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, which the Commission then adopted.

Mr. Johnson’s argument is without merit. We have long
held that the trial court, upon remand, must execute the mandate.
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Dep’t, 356 Ark. 494,
156 S.W.3d 249 (2004). In Wal-Mart, we reviewed the history of
the mandate rule, stating:

The inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of
the case, and must carry it into execution according to the mandate.
The inferior court cannot vary it, or judicially examine it for any
other purpose than execution. It can give no other or further relief
as to any matter decided by the Supreme Court, even where there
is error apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it further than
to execute the mandate, and settle such matters as have been
remanded, not adjudicated, by the Supreme Court.

356 Ark. at 497, 156 S.W.3d at 252 (quoting Fortenberry v. Frazier, 5
Ark, 200, 202 (1843)). Citing to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
we noted that the mandate rule “binds every court to honor rulings in
the case by superior courts.” Id. at 497-98, 156 S.W.3d at 252
(quoting Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir.
1994)). Accordingly, “[a] trial court must implement both the letter

its attorney, were binding pivotal admissions on the ultimate issue; (2) Bonds Fertilizer, Inc.
was prohibited from now taking the position that Mr. Johnson was not performing work for
the Farm at the time of his injuries under the doctrines of judicial estoppel and the doctrine
against taking inconsistent positions; and (3) Bonds Fertilizer, Inc., the Farm, and Bonds
Brothers, Inc. are separate and distinct legal entities. In Johnson II, we remanded the matter to
the Commission solely to determine “whether Johnson was performing employment services
for Bonds Fertilizer or the Farm on the date of the accident.” 365 Ark. at 137,226 S,W.3d at
756. A review of the ALJ's order reveals no specific rulings on these arguments. Therefore,
we decline to address them.

es
Pd 235

and spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s
opinion and the circumstances it embraces.” Id. at 498, 156 S.W.3d at
252 (quoting Casey, supra (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985))).

Here, Mr. Johnson avers that the ALJ and the Commission
somehow exceeded this court’s mandate in Johnson IL In Johnson II,
we specifically reversed and remanded the case “‘to the Commis~
sion to make a determination as to whether Johnson was perform-
ing employment services for Bonds Fertilizer or the Farm on the
date of the accident.” 365 Ark. at 137, 226 S.W.3d at 756. In turn,
the record reflects that the Commission then remanded the matter
to an ALJ “‘to conduct any and all necessary proceedings deemed
appropriate to determine the employment relationship between
the parties and to determine for whom the claimant was perform~
ing employment services at the time of his injury.””

It is clear to this court that the Commission, as well as
the ALJ, merely executed this court’s mandate upon remand.
Directions by an appellate court to the trial court, here, the
Commission, as expressed by the opinion and mandate must be
followed exactly and placed into execution. See Dolphin v. Wilson,
335 Ark. 113, 983 S.W.2d 113 (1998). Following Johnson I, the
Commission did not consider whether Mr. Johnson was working
for Bonds Fertilizer, Inc. or the Farm at the time of the accident.
Instead, it declared that the statute of limitations had run and that
it was without jurisdiction. In Johnson II, we specifically directed
the Commission to determine for which employer Mr. Johnson
was working at the time of the accident. It was, therefore,
necessary for the Commission and the ALJ to consider the doc-

trines examined in making that determination, and they in no way .

exceeded our mandate. For these reasons, we affirm this point as
well.

III. Misapplication of the Doctrines

Relying on language in Cash, supra, Mr. Johnson urges that
his activities for the Farm were separate from those for Bonds
Fertilizer and that, on the day of the accident, his activities could
be separately identified with the Farm. For that reason, he claims,
none of the four doctrines examined by the ALJ were applicable to
the facts of his case. Bonds urges that under the undisputed facts of
the case, Mr. Johnson was a loaned or temporary employee of the
Farm at the time of the accident.

Pe
236 CT =

| | In Cash, supra, quoting Daniels, supra, we said:

Employment may also be “dual” in the sense that, while the
employee is under contract of hire with two different employers, his
activities on behalf of each employer are separate and can be
identified with one employer or the other. When this separate
identification can clearly be made, the particular employer whose
work was being done at the time of injury will be held exclusively
liable.

312 Ark. at 46, 847 S.W.2d at 20 (quoting Daniels, 310 Ark. at 759,
840 S.W.2d at 178)). In this case, the ALJ found that

it [was] clear from the evidence that Johnson worked for both the
fertilizer business and the farm on a regular basis and shifted from
one to the other on an as-needed basis. . . . The instant case is
clearly distinguishable ftom the cases in which the court has found
that the claimant was an employee of two employers, but the work
‘was separable.

Again, a review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commission, as already set forth above, reveals that there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision that Mr.
Johnson’s activities at the time of the accident were not separately
identifiable for either employer. Mr. Johnson had the same supervisor
for both jobs; was working for the Farm, but was also to work on
fertilizer jobs that day; and was paid by Bonds Fertilizer for his work
that week. Hence, we affirm the Commission on this point.

IV. Denial of Motions to Dismiss and to Strike Briefs

For his final point on appeal, Mr. Johnson maintains that the
Commission and the ALJ erroneously denied his motions to
dismiss Bonds Brothers, Inc. and to strike its briefs. He contends
that Bonds Brothers, Inc. had no interest in the litigation and that
merely because it owned stock in Bonds Fertilizer, Inc. did not
entitle it to appear as a party. Bonds maintains that the ALJ and the
Commission acted within their discretion by denying Mr.
Johnson’s motions to ensure a full adjudication of all issues
properly before the Commission.

Following the ALJ’s order of January 10, 2007, but prior to
its order of December 6, 2007, the Commission issued a separate
order in which it denied Mr. Johnson’s motions to dismiss and to
strike. We hold that the Commission did not err in doing so.

ee 237

Hy In the affidavit of Kenny Bonds, which is a part of the
record and was before the Commission, Mr. Bonds stated that

Bonds Brothers, Inc. is the sole shareholder of Bonds Fertilizer,
Inc. Bonds Brothers, Inc. owns all of the equipment, including
vehicles, used by Bonds Fertilizer, Inc. and Bonds Brothers Trust.
Bonds Brothers Trust, a partnership of Kenny M. Bonds, Jr., Bryan
A. Bonds Trust, and Bonds Brothers, Inc., is the operating entity for
the farming operation as required by Farm Service Agency.

Moreover, Mr. Johnson, at the time he originally filed his suit in
Jefferson County Circuit Court, saw fit to bring suit against Bonds
Brothers, Inc., as well as Bonds Fertilizer. Following Mr. Johnson’s
appeal of the circuit court’s order in Johnson I, we determined that the
Commission had exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine
whether Mr. Johnson’s injuries were covered by the Workers’ Com-
pensation Act and that for which employer Mr. Johnson was working
at the time of the accident was an issue of fact for the Commission to
resolve. To resolve that issue of fact, the Commission determined that
the participation of Bonds Brothers, Inc. was necessary as Bonds
Brothers, Inc. “‘[was] and continue[d] to be a necessary party” in the
matter. We, therefore, cannot say that the Commission’s decision was
erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission on this point as
well.

Affirmed.

238 ||

Michael J. BRAY v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1363 289 S.W.3d 455

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

No briefs filed.
p= Curiam. Petitioner, Michael J. Bray, has filed a
motion for ‘a on clerk. Based on the petition, however, it

appears that petitioner is seeking a writ of certiorari to complete the
record pursuant to Rule 3-5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. But,
in his partial record, filed November 21, 2008, petitioner has failed to
include any documentation indicating that the transcript was ever
ordered from the court reporter, nor has he included any notice of
appeal, which is necessary to confer jurisdiction on this court. We
therefore have no basis on which to issue the writ. See Ark. Sup. Ct.
R. 3-5.

Motion denied.

|__| 239

William Mack EUBANKS v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-953 289 S.W.3d 464

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

es ee
William M. Pearson, for appellant.

No response.

eR. Curiam. Appellant William Mack Eubanks, by and
through his attorney, William M. Pearson, has filed a
motion to file a belated brief.

Eubanks’s brief was originally due in this court on Septem-
ber 23, 2008. Attorney Pearson then sought and received a
seven-day clerk’s extension, making his brief due to be filed by
September 30, 2008. Pearson also requested a second extension,
which was granted, making his brief due on October 30, 2008.
Pearson filed a third motion for extension, citing his heavy
trial-related duties and asking for an additional fourteen days in
which to file the brief. This court granted an extension of seven
days, making the brief due on November 7, 2008; in doing so, we
noted that this was the final extension. Pearson failed to meet this
final deadline. He has now submitted the instant motion to file a
belated brief, asserting that he completed the abstract, brief, and
addendum on November 11, 2008.

We will accept a criminal appellant’s belated brief to prevent
an appeal from being aborted. See Brown v. State, 373 Ark. 453, 284
S.W.3d 481 (2008) (per curiam). However, good cause must be
shown to grant the motion. See Strom v. State, 356 Ark. 224, 147
S.W.3d 689 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that appellate counsel’s
admitted failure to timely file the brief constituted good cause to
grant motion for belated brief).

een!
240 Lee |__|

Here, Pearson accepts full responsibility and admits
fault for failing to timely file Eubanks’s brief. Accordingly, we
grant the motion to file a belated brief and refer the matter to the
Committee on Professional Conduct.

Latore Durand GOSSETT v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1356 289 S.W.3d 463

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

Justin B. Hurst, for appellant.
No response.

eR Curiam. Appellant Latore Durand Gossett, by and

through his attorney, Justin B. Hurst, has filed a motion for
rule on clerk. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to the crimes
of possession of'a schedule II controlled substance, crack cocaine, with
intent to deliver; possession of drug paraphernalia; simultaneous
possession of drugs and firearms; unauthorized use of property to
facilitate a crime; and possession ofa schedule IV controlled substance,
marijuana. He was sentenced to a term of 168 months in the Arkansas
Department of Correction. The judgment and commitment order
‘was entered on July 31, 2007, and Appellant timely filed a notice of
appeal from the judgment order on August 16, 2007.

Pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 5(a),which is applicable
pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.—Crim. 4(a), the deadline for filing the
record on appeal was November 14, 2007. Appellant timely filed a

Ll
CCCs at

motion for enlargement of time to lodge the record on October 9,
2007. However, the order granting his motion was not entered
until November 16, 2007. Although the circuit court granted
“several subsequent motions for extension of time to lodge the
record, the untimely entry of the first extension order culminated
in Appellant’s untimely tender of the record on April 16, 2008.

Despite Appellant’s failure to properly perfect this appeal,
the State cannot penalize a criminal defendant by declining to
consider his first appeal when counsel has failed to follow an
appellate rule. Franklin v. State, 317 Ark. 42, 875 S.W.2d 836
(1994) (per curiam). In McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106, 146
S.W.3d 883 (2004), we clarified our treatment of motions for rule .
on clerk and motions for belated appeals.

Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was
not timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the appeal is
therefore faced with two options. First, where the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by affidavit filed
with the motion or in the motion itself. There is no advantage in
declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second, where the party
or attorney believes that there is good reason the appeal was not
perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and
this court will decide whether good reason is present.

Id. at 116, 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted). While we no longer
require an affidavit admitting fault before we will consider the
motion, an attorney should candidly admit fault where he has erred.
and is responsible for the failure to perfect the appeal. See id. at 116,
146 S.W.3d at 891.

Mr. Hurst does not admit fault, but his fault is clear
from the record. Therefore, we direct the clerk of this court to
accept the record and docket the appeal, and we refer the matter to
the Committee on Professional Conduct.

Motion granted.

242 (375

Victor RASMUSSEN ». STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1319 289 S.W.3d 465

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

Justin B. Hurst, for appellant.

No response.

eR Curram. Appellant Victor Rasmussen, by and through

his attorney, Justin B. Hurst, has filed a motion for rule on
clerk. On March 21, 2008, a jury found Appellant Victor Rasmussen
guilty of sexual assault in the first degree for which he was sentenced
to 180 months, and sexual assault in the fourth degree, for which he
‘was sentenced to 72 months. The judgment was entered on March
24, 2008. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on April 14, 2008.
Pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 5(a), which is applicable pursuant to
Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 4(a), the deadline for filing the record on
appeal was July 13, 2008.

Appellant timely filed a motion to extend the time within
which to file the record in this court, on June 11, 2008, requesting
an additional ninety (90) days. However, the order granting his
motion was never filed with the circuit court clerk’s office and did
not comply with Rule 5(b)(1)(C) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure—Civil in that it failed to show that all parties had an
opportunity to be heard on the motion. Although the Appellant
timely filed his motion for extension of time to file the record, the
order granting his motion was never filed making the Appellant’s
tender of the record on October 10, 2008, untimely.

Rasmussen moves this court to accept a belated appeal.
Despite Appellant’s failure to properly perfect this appeal, the State
cannot penalize a criminal defendant by declining to consider his

first appeal when counsel has failed to follow the appellate rules.
Franklin v. State, 317 Ark. 42, 875 S.W.2d 836 (1994) (per curiam).
In McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004), we
clarified our treatment of motions for rule on clerk and motions for
belated appeals: .

‘Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was
not timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the appeal is
therefore faced with two options. First, where the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by affidavit filed
with the motion or in the motion itself, There is no advantage in
declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second, where the party
or attorney believes that there is good reason the appeal was not
perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and
this court will decide whether good reason is present.

Id. at 116, 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted). While this court no
longer requires an affidavit admitting fault before we will consider the
motion, an attorney should candidly admit fault where he has erred
and is responsible for the failure to perfect the appeal. See id. at 116,
146 S.W.3d at 891. When it is plain from the motion, affidavits, and
record that relief is proper under either rule based on error or good
reason, the relief will be granted. See id. If there is attorney error, a
copy of the opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Profes-
sional Conduct. See id.

Hl {cis plain from Appellant’s motion that there was error
on Mr. Hurst’s part. Mr. Hurst has also assumed responsibility for
the error. Pursuant to McDonald v. State, supra, we grant Appellant’s
motion for rule on clerk and forward a copy of this opinion to the
Committee on Professional Conduct.

Motion granted.

aad =

Kenny TRAVIS v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1320 289 S.W.3d 474

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

Craig Lambert, for appellant.

No response.

p= Curiam. Appellant Kenny Travis, by and through his
counsel Craig Lambert,' has filed a motion for a belated
appeal from the denial of his pro se petition for postconviction relief
pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. Appellant was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to a term of life imprison-
ment on August 11, 2006. He filed a timely petition for postconvic-
tion relief on January 18, 2008. The Mississippi County Circuit Court
entered an order on February 20, 2008, denying the Rule 37 petition.

Appellant filed the instant motion on November 12, 2008,
averring that it was only after recently retaining Mr. Lambert to
represent him that he discovered that the trial court had denied his
petition for postconviction relief. Attached to his motion is an
affidavit wherein Appellant states that he never received notice
that his petition had been denied or that he ever received a copy of
that order. The State has not filed a response.

This court recently addressed a similar situation in
Hampton v. State, 374 Ark. 527, 288 S.W.3d 643 (2008) (per
curiam), and granted the motion for belated appeal because good
cause was established for doing so. See also Rutledge v. State, 355

Appellant retained Mr. Lambert to represent him in the present appeal, and Mr.
Lambert filed a motion for entry of appearance, which we granted this same day.

245

Ark. 499, 139 $.W.3d 518 (2003) (per curiam). In Hampton, the
appellant averred that he never received notice of the denial of his
petition for postconviction relief, and the State did not file a
response. As a result, this court concluded that there was good
cause to grant the motion as the State’s failure to respond was
tantamount to a determination that the State could not demon-
strate that the circuit clerk promptly notified the appellant of the
court’s order. Likewise, in the present matter, Appellant has
demonstrated good cause for his failure to file a timely notice of
appeal, and we grant his motion for belated appeal.

Motion granted.

Ryan WHITESIDE v. RUSSELLVILLE NEWSPAPERS, INC.;
Paxton Media Group, LLC; Neal Ronquist; Scott Perkins;
and Janie Ginocchio

08-313 . 289 S.W.3d 461

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

Se

Henry Clay Moore, for appellant.

eR Curiam. Appellant Ryan Whiteside appeals from the
circuit court’s order granting summary judgment to appel-
lees Russellville Newspapers, Inc.; Paxton Media Group, LLC; Neal
Ronquist; Scott Perkins; and Janie Ginoccio. Mr. Whiteside further

appeals from the circuit court’s order denying his motion for new
trial. Because Mr. Whiteside submitted a brief without a proper
addendum in violation of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(8)
(2008), we order rebriefing.

Rule 4-2(a)(8) provides, in pertinent part:

Following the signature and certificate of service, the appellant’s
brief shall contain an Addendum which shall include true and
legible photocopies of the order, judgment, decree, ruling, letter
opinion, or Workers’ Compensation Commission opinion from
which the appeal is taken, along with any other relevant pleadings,
documents, or exhibits essential to an understanding of the case and
the Court’s jurisdiction on appeal.

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8). The procedure to be followed when an
appellant has submitted an insufficient abstract or addendum is set
forth in Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(6)(3):

Whether or not the appellee has called attention to deficiencies in
the appellant’s abstract or Addendum, the Court may address the
question at any time. If the Court finds the abstract or Addendum
to be deficient such that the Court cannot reach the merits of the
case, or such as to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the
disposition of the appeal, the Court will notify the appellant that he
or she will be afforded an opportunity to cure any deficiencies, and
has fifteen days within which to file a substituted abstract, Adden-
dum, and brief, at his or her own expense, to conform to Rule 4-2
(a)(5) and (8). Mere modifications of the original brief by the
appellant, as by interlineation, will not be accepted by the Clerk.
Upon the filing of such a substituted brief by the appellant, the
appellee will be afforded an opportunity to revise or supplement the
brief, at the expense of the appellant or the appellant’s counsel, as
the Court may direct. Ifafter the opportunity to cure the deficien-
cies, the appellant fails to file a complying abstract, Addendum and
brief within the prescribed time, the judgment or decree may be
affirmed for noncompliance with the Rule.

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)(3).

Here, Mr. Whiteside’s brief is deficient due to the fact
that his addendum lacks relevant pleadings essential to an under-
standing of the case. While the appellees abstracted the hearing on
the motion for summary judgment and provided their motion for

summary judgment in their supplemental addendum, Mr. White-
side’s addendum lacks certain pleadings, including, but not limited
to, the appellees’ answer to his complaint, their brief in support of
their motion for summary judgment, his response to their motion
and briefin support, their reply to his response, and his response to
their reply to his initial response.’

Because Mr, Whiteside has failed to comply with our rules,
we order him to file a substituted abstract, addendum, and brief
within fifteen days from the date of entry of this order. If Mr.
Whiteside fails to do so within the prescribed time, the judgment
appealed from may be affirmed for noncompliance with Rule 4-2.
After service of the substituted abstract, addendum, and brief, the
appellees shall have an opportunity to revise or supplement their
brief in the time prescribed by the clerk.

Rebriefing ordered.

Shelton WORMLEY v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1344 289 S.W.3d 463

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 11, 2008

* We note that it was Mr. Whiteside’s responsibility, as the appellant, to abstract the
summary-judgment heating. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(5). While the appellees did pro
vide a supplemental abstract, we offer no opinion on the sufficiency of that abstract.

a8 |__| -

Donald E. Warren, Sr., for appellant.

No response.

p= Curiam. Shelton Wormley, by counsel, John L. Kear-
ney, has filed this motion for rule on clerk. The circuit
court’s judgment and commitment order was entered on May 29,
2008, and the attorney for Wormley, Donald E. Warren, Sr., filed a
notice of appeal on June 12, 2008. The trial court granted a motion
filed by Mr. Warren to substitute John L. Kearney as counsel for
appellant on July 16, 2008. The record in this matter was due to be
filed by September 11, 2008. Because the record was not tendered to
this court until November 17, 2008, it is untimely.

Weare unable to consider the motion for rule on clerk
filed by Mr. Kearney at this time. Under Arkansas Rule of
Appellate Procedure—Criminal 16(a), once the notice of appeal has
been filed, the appellate court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
relieve counsel and appoint new counsel. Thus, because Mr.
‘Warren filed the notice of appeal on June 12, 2008, the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to relieve him and substitute Mr. Kearney as
counsel for appellant. Consequently, because Mr. Kearney was
never properly appointed as counsel, he does not represent appel-
lant, and this court will not consider a motion for rule on clerk
filed by him.

Because Mr. Warren has not been relieved as counsel of
record, we direct him to file a motion for rule on clerk on
Wormley’s behalf within thirty days. At that time, Mr. Warren
may file a motion to withdraw as counsel, and Mr. Kearney, should
he wish to represent Wormley on appeal, may file a motion with
this court for appointment of counsel.

Motion for rule on clerk denied.

|__| 249

Lili Mitchell DAVIS, Rose M. White, Jack D. Wilson,
Dennis Burnett, Wayne Nunnerly, and Owen Honeysuckle v.
BRUSHY ISLAND PUBLIC WATER AUTHORITY

08-562 290 S.W.3d 16

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

————EE

James F, Lane, P.A., for appellants.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Troy A. Price, C. Tad
Bohannon, and Michelle M. Kaemmerling, for appellee.

1M Hannan, Chief Justice. Appellants Lili Mitchell Davis,

Rose M. White, Jack D. Wilson, Dennis Burnett, Wayne
Nunnerly, and Owen Honeysuckle appeal the order of dismissal in
favor of appellee Brushy Island Public Water Authority of the State of
Arkansas (Authority), formerly known as Brushy Island Water Asso-
ciation, Inc. (Association). On appeal, the appellants contend that the
circuit court erred in dismissing their claims under the doctrines of
claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and mootness. We affirm.

Appellants are members of the former Brushy Island Water
Association, Inc. They filed a complaint seeking to invalidate the
July 15, 2003 vote whereby the Association was converted to the
Authority.

pe

The present action is the second case challenging the validity
of the conversion vote. Previously, former members of the Asso-
ciation sued the Authority and its directors, seeking a declaration
that the vote to convert the Association from a nonprofit corpo-
ration into a water authority was void and invalid. See Williams v.
Brushy Island Pub. Water Auth., 368 Ark. 219, 243 S.W.3d 903
(2006). The circuit court granted the Authority’s motions (1) for
summary judgment, (2) to strike an amendment to the Associa~
tion’s complaint, and (3) to appoint a receiver for the Authority.
See id. We affirmed the circuit court’s decision in its entirety. See
id.

While the appeal in the Williams case was pending, the
appellants in the instant case filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment in the circuit court on January 10, 2006. In the com-
plaint, the appellants requested, in relevant part, that the circuit
court declare (1) that the July 15, 2003 vote of Association
members to convert the Association to the Authority failed to
carry a two-thirds majority as required by Arkansas Code Anno-
tated section 4-28-225(a)(2) (Supp. 2003), (2) that the Authority
has no existence because the membership conversion vote failed to
carry by a two-thirds majority, and (3) that the Authority does not
have corporate existence. The circuit court dismissed the appel-
lants’ complaint, pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(8), finding that the appellants’ complaint and the then-
pending Williams case were “between the same parties arising out
of the same transaction or occurrence.” The appellants did not
appeal from this order, nor did they seek to intervene in the
Williams case. In addition, the appellants did not seek a stay of the
order in the Williams case appointing CAW as receiver. Therefore,
during the pendency of the appeal, CAW moved forward with the
improvements directed by the order.

Following the issuance of this court’s decision in the Will-
iams case, the appellants again filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment on December 22, 2006, requesting that the circuit court
find and declare that the vote to convert did not receive a
two-thirds vote of the members present at the meeting and,
pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-28-225(a) (2), the
vote failed, and the Association was not properly converted to the
Authority. Accordingly, the appellants requested that the circuit
court find and order that the Authority bas no existence and that
the Association continues to exist in the form that it held prior to
the July 15, 2003 vote. On October 8, 2007, the Authority moved

CSC
SS 251

for summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata and moot-
ness. On March 5, 2008, the circuit court dismissed the complaint
with prejudice. The appellants now bring this appeal.

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the
appellants’ complaint should have been dismissed under the doc-
trine of mootness, as the Authority contends. The Authority
claims that the complaint for declaratory judgment is moot because
it is clear from the receivership order that the circuit court’s
decision to appoint a receiver had nothing to do with whether the
assets in question were owned by a water association or a water
authority. The Authority asserts that even ifa court were to enter
judgment declaring the conversion vote invalid, the facilities of the
former Association are, and will continue to be, in receivership,
pursuant to the order in the Williams case. The appellants assert that
the Authority offered no evidence of facts, events, or occurrences
that have transpired during the course of this litigation or in the
course of the 2003 suit, including the Williams appeal, from which
the circuit court could conclude that the issue of the passage of the
conversion vote by the statutorily mandated two-thirds majority
would have no practical legal effect on the outcome of this
litigation. We disagree.

As a general rule, the appellate courts of this state will not
review issues that are moot. See Cotten v. Fooks, 346 Ark. 130, 55
S.W.3d 290 (2001). To do so would be to render advisory
opinions, which this court will not do. See id. We have generally
held that a case becomes moot when any judgment rendered
would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal
controversy. See id.

In this case, the appellants filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment, seeking, in relevant part, that the circuit court: (1)
declare that the July 15, 2003 vote of the Association members to
convert the Association to the Authority failed to carry by a
two-thirds majority, as required by Arkansas Code Annotated
section 4-28-225(a)(2); (2) declare that the Authority has no
existence because the July 15, 2003 Association membership vote
failed to carry by a two-thirds majority; and (3) declare that the
Brushy Island Public Water Authority was not properly consti-
tuted and does not, therefore, have corporate existence.

The appellants’ complaint is moot because any judgment
rendered by the circuit court would have no practical legal effect
upon the case. In its October 18, 2005 order appointing CAW as

receiver, the circuit court found that Brushy Island lacked suffi-
cient management or staff to adequately serve the needs of Brushy
Island customers and that Brushy Island lacked the necessary
infrastructure to provide Brushy Island customers with adequate
fire service protection. The circuit court also noted that the
Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services had cited
Brushy Island for several violations of the rules and regulations
pertaining to public water systems and the national primary drink-
ing water regulations. Accordingly, the circuit court found that it
was in the best interest for Brushy Island customers that CAW be
appointed as receiver for Brushy Island. In the order of receiver-
ship, the circuit court expressly empowered and authorized CAW
to perform any of the following duties:

a. to take possession and control of the Assets and any and all
proceeds, receipts, and disbursements arising out of or from the
Assets;

s

. to receive, preserve, protect, and maintain control of the Assets,
or any part or parts thereof;

c. to manage, operate, and carry on the business of Brushy Island,
including the power to enter into any agreements, incur any
obligations in the ordinary course of business, lawfully cease to
carry on all or any part of the business, or lawfully cease to
perform any contracts of Brushy Island;

d. to engage consultants, appraisers, agents, experts, auditors, ac-
countants, managers, counsel, and such other persons from time
to time on whatever basis, including on a temporary basis, to
assist with the exercise of the powers and duties conferred by this
Order;

9

to settle, extend, or compromise any indebtedness owing to
Brushy Island;

f. to purchase or lease such machinery, equipment, inventories,
supplies, premises, or other assets to continue the business of
Brushy Island or any part or parts thereof,

g. to execute, assign, issue, and endorse documents of whatever
nature in respect of any of the Assets, whether in the name of
CAW, as a receiver, or in the name and on behalf of Brushy
Island, for any purpose pursuant to this Order;

CO
————Y 253

h. to initiate, prosecute, and continue the prosecution of any and
all proceedings and to defend all proceedings now pending or
hereafter instituted with respect to Brushy Island, the Assets, or
CAW, as receiver for Brushy Island, and to settle or compromise
any such proceedings. The authority hereby conveyed shall
extend to such appeals or applications for judicial review in
respect of any order or judgment pronounced in any such
proceeding;

i. to market any or all of the Assets that are not necessary for the
operation of Brushy Island, including advertising and soliciting
offers in respect of the Assets or any part or parts therefor and
negotiating such terms and conditions of sale as CAW, as re-
ceiver, in its discretion may deem appropriate;

j. to sell, convey, transfer, lease, or assign the Assets or any part or
parts thereof out of the ordinary course of business, (i) without
the approval of this Court in respect to any transaction not
exceeding fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), provided that the
aggregate consideration for all such transactions does not exceed
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000); and (ii) with
the approval of this Court in respect of any transaction in which
the purchase price or the aggregate purchase price exceeds the
applicable amount set out in the preceding clause;

am

to apply for any permits, licenses, approvals, or permissions as
may be required by any governmental authority and any renew-
als thereof for and on behalf of and, if thought desirable by
CAW, as receiver, in the name of Brushy Island; and

|. to take any steps reasonably incidental to the exercise of these
powers.

In addition, the circuit court ordered CAW to contract for
and begin improvements to the Brushy Island water system so that
the system would meet standards for water systems operated by
CAW. Specifically, CAW was ordered to install improvements,
detailed in the order as follows:

The Improvements consist of the installation of approximately 4400
Linear Feet (LF) of 24-inch Ductile Iron (DI) pipe, 4900 LF of
12-inch DI pipe, 4900 LF of 8-inch DI pipe, 4300 LF of 3-inch
PVC pipe, and 5900 LF of 2-inch PVC pipe and appurtenances.

The Improvements will also include the installation of 10 new Fire
Hydrants, 320 new service meters and Pressure Regulators, as well
as repair and/or replacement of existing service lines as required.

The order stated that Brushy Island customers would be responsible
for paying the debt to finance the improvements and that the debt
would be recouped as a surcharge on utility bills each month.

Whether CAW is receiver for a water association or a water
authority, it is still receiver for the assets of Brushy Island pursuant
to the October 18, 2005 order. The record reveals that the
improvements opposed by the appellants are substantially com-
pleted. The debt incurred by Brushy Island to finance the im-
provements is still in effect, pursuant to the October 18 order, and
the customers are still obligated to pay certain amounts each month
as a surcharge to repay the debt for the improvements.

HJ Based on the foregoing, we hold that any judgment
rendered on the conversion vote would have no practical legal
effect upon the former Association because its facilities are now
subject to receivership. The circuit court was correct in dismissing
this case under the doctrine of mootness.! Because we so hold, we
need not address the appellants’ remaining arguments.

Affirmed.

1 We have recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. The first exception
involves issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review. Honeycutt v. Foster, 371 Ark.
545,268 S.W33d 875 (2007). The second exception concerns issues that raise considerations
of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent fature litigation. Id. The
appellants do not contend that either exception applies.

= 255

Ruth Ann COUCH,
Administratrix of the Estate of Jennifer Ann Green, Deceased v.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and
Mid-Century Insurance Company Los Angeles, California

08-389 289 S.W.3d 909

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

256 ————

Se

Blair & Stroud, by: H. David Blair, and Johnny L. Nichols, for
appellant.

Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, PLLC, by: Stuart P.
Miller and Lindsey K. Bell, for appellees.

Dex. L. Corain, Justice. This is an appeal from an.
order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees
Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., and Mid-Century Insurance
Company Los Angeles, California, a member of the Farmers group, in
acase where Appellant Ruth Ann Couch, Administratrix of the Estate
of Jennifer Ann Green, Deceased, sought recovery for underinsured-
motorist (UIM) benefits under multiple policies issued by Appellees.
Appellant raises three arguments on appeal, specifically that the trial
court erred in finding that the other insurance provisions of the
policies issued by Appellees were (1) unambiguously incorporated
into the UIM endorsement; (2) not void as being in derogation of
Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-209 (Repl. 2004); and (3) not void as against
public policy when applied to the UIM coverage..As this appeal
presents a question of statutory interpretation, our jurisdiction is
pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b)(6). We find no error and affirm.

The record reflects that on January 15, 2000, Jennifer Ann
Green was killed in a single-vehicle accident, while a passenger in
Jason Reams’s vehicle. At the time of her death, Jennifer was a
named insured on an automobile insurance policy issued by
Appellee, Mid-Century. This policy provided UIM coverage in
the amount of $50,000 for all claims arising out of injury to a single
person. After a settlement was reached whereby Reams’s insurance

PC
Pd 257

carrier paid $20,000 to Appellant, Mid-Century paid benefits of
$50,000, including $5,000 for a death benefit and $5,000 to cover
funeral expenses, under the UIM coverage of the policy upon
which Jennifer was the named insured.

Once Mid-Century paid out on Jennifer’s policy, Appellant
sought payment for UIM benefits under three additional policies
in effect with Appellees, wherein Jennifer, as a family member of
the three named insureds and a resident of the household, was an
insured under those policies. Two of the policies at issue, each
with $50,000 limits under the UIM coverage, were issued by
Farmers: Policy No. 18146299762 and Policy No. 18146299763,
with the named insureds under both policies being Joe and Ruth
Ann Couch, Jennifer’s stepfather and mother. The third policy,
Policy No. 18150550870, also with a $50,000 limit of UIM
coverage, was issued by Appellee Mid-Century and listed the
named insured as Roddy Couch, Jennifer’s sibling. Appellees
refused to pay under the three additional policies, citing to other
insurance provisions in those policies that Appellees asserted
precluded Appellant from recovering under multiple policies.

Appellant filed suit, alleging that premiums had been paid
for UIM coverage on each of the three policies, and because
Jennifer was an insured under each of those policies, they were
entitled to benefits from Farmers in the amount of $100,000, and
benefits from Mid-Century in the amount of $50,000. Appellant
also sought an award of statutory penalties, prejudgment interest,
and all costs, including attorneys’ fees. After filing an answer
denying Appellant’s allegations, Appellees filed a motion for
summary judgment. Therein, Appellees stated that Mid-Century
had paid out on the policy in which Jennifer was the named
insured and that the Appellant sought to stack the UIM benefits
from three additional policies, each of which contained anti-
stacking provisions. Appellees asserted that because of the clear and
unambiguous anti-stacking language, it was entitled to summary
judgment. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order denying the
motion for summary judgment.

Appellees filed a renewed and amended motion for summary
judgment, again arguing that the three policies at issue each
contained anti-stacking provisions that prohibited Appellant from
recovering under multiple policies. After taking the motion under
advisement, the circuit court entered a letter order on July 16,
2007, granting the motion for summary judgment. Therein, the
circuit court acknowledged that it initially denied the motion for

summary judgment, but upon review of the amended motion,
which included an argument about a specific provision within the
policies regarding stacking between multiple policies issued by the
same insurance company, determined that summary judgment was
warranted. A written order reflecting the trial court’s ruling was
entered of record on September 26, 2007. This appeal followed.

The law is well settled that summary judgment is to be
granted by a circuit court only when it is clear that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Stromwall v. Van Hoose,
371 Ark. 267, 265 S.W.3d 93 (2007). Once the moving party has
established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the
opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the
existence of a material issue of fact. See id. On appellate review, we
determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether
the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of
the motion leave a material fact unanswered. See id. We view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the
moving party. See id. Our review focuses not only on the plead-
ings, but also on the affidavits and documents filed by the parties.
See id. The facts here are undisputed by the parties. As there is not
a genuine issue of material fact, the case was appropriately deter-
mined as a matter of law. Therefore, the issue here is whether
summary judgment was granted in favor of the correct party based
upon the interpretation of the law at issue.

As her first point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit
court erred in finding that the other insurance provisions of the
policies were unambiguously incorporated in the UIM coverage
endorsement. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the anti-stacking
language contained in the UIM section is limited to intra-policy
stacking and is thus inapplicable in this case. Appellant further
argues that if the applicability of the other insurance clause is
ambiguous, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured.
Appellees counter that the anti-stacking provision is clear and
unambiguous. We agree with Appellees.

‘When presented with an issue regarding interpretation of a
contract, this court has stated:

The first rule of interpretation of a contract is to give to the
language employed the meaning that the parties intended. In
construing any contract, we must consider the sense and meaning of

LC
Pd 259

the words used by the parties as they are taken and understood in
their plain and ordinary meaning. “The best construction is that
which is made by viewing the subject of the contract, as the mass of
mankind would view it, as it may be safely assumed that such was the
aspect in which the parties themselves viewed it.” It is also a
well-settled rule in construing a contract that the intention of the
parties is to be gathered not from particular words and phrases, but
from the whole context of the agreement.

Health Resources of Ark., Inc. v. Flener, 374 Ark. 208, 211, 286 S.W.3d.
704, 706-07 (2008) (citations omitted).

In granting summary judgment, the circuit court held that
each of the four insurance policies at issue contained clear and
unambiguous anti-stacking language that applied to the UIM
coverage. Specifically, the court stated that the anti-stacking
language appeared “to be applied by reference to the Under-
Insured Motorists Endorsement and by its terms it unambiguously
provides that the policy limits of the four policies in this case
cannot be stacked.” We now turn to the policy provisions at issue.

In one of the insurance policies! issued by Farmers on behalf
of the named insureds, Joe Couch and Ruth Ann Couch, the
following language is found:

PART II— UNINSURED MOTORISTS
Coverage C — Uninsured Motorist Coverage

(Including Underinsured Motorist Coverage)

Other Insurance

4. Ifany applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you
by us or any other member company of the Farmers Insurance
Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such
policies shall not exceed the limits provided by the single policy
with the highest limits of liability.

' Bach of the policies at issue here contain the exact same language.

The following language is found in the endorsement for
Underinsured-Motorist Coverage:

Under Part II of the policy the provisions that apply to Exclusions,
Limits of Liability, Other Insurance and Arbitration remain the
same and apply to this endorsement except where stated otherwise
in this endorsement.

This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls
anything to the contrary. Itis otherwise subject to all other terms of
the policy.

HB Considering our rules of contract interpretation and
giving the language employed the meaning the parties intended,
we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that the
anti-stacking language clearly and unambiguously applied to the
UIM coverage. Nothing in the insurance contracts demonstrates
the existence of an ambiguity involving intra-policy stacking
versus inter-policy stacking, as Appellant suggests. The language
cited by Appellant, “[oJur maximum liability under the UNDER-
Insured Motorist Coverage is the limits of the UNDER Insured
Motorist Coverage stated in this policy,” is not in conflict with the
other insurance clause and simply sets forth the limits for liability
under that particular policy. Accordingly, there is no merit to
Appellant’s argument that there was an ambiguity in the insurance
contracts.

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding
that the other insurance clause when applied to UIM coverage was
not void as being in derogation of section 23-89-209. In support of
this argument, Appellant cites to this court’s decision in Heiss v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 250 Ark. 474, 465 S.W.2d 699 (1971).
Appellees counter that Heiss is inapplicable and nothing in section
23-89-209 precludes the prohibition against the stacking of poli-
cies. Appellees are correct.

We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Ryan &
Co. AR, Inc. v. Weiss, 371 Ark. 43, 263 S.W.3d 489 (2007). It is for
this court to decide what a statute means, and we are not bound by
the circuit court’s interpretation. Id. The basic rule of statutory
construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.
Id. In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to
construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and
usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. This court

construes the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or
insignificant, and meaning and effect are given to every word in
the statute if possible. Id. When the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there
is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Id. We turn
then to the statute at issue. :

Hl Section 23-89-209 sets forth the provisions for UIM
coverage and provides in relevant part:

(a)(1) No private passenger automobile liability insurance cov-
ering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of
any motor vehicles in this state shall be delivered or issued in this
state or issued as to any private passenger automobile principally
garaged in this state unless the insured has the opportunity, which he
or she may reject in writing, to purchase underinsured motorist
coverage.

Clearly, section 23-89-209 mandates that an insurer make UIM
coverage available to an insured, but an insured is allowed to reject
such coverage in writing. We fail to see, however, how the anti-
stacking provisions at issue here are in derogation of this section.
Simply because an insurer must offer UIM coverage does not translate
to a requirement that an insurer not be allowed to prohibit the
stacking of benefits. We agree with Appellees that an exclusion to
coverage cannot violate public policy where an insured can opt out of
UIM coverage altogether. See Harasyn v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.,
349 Ark. 9, 75 S.W.3d 696 (2002).

Likewise, the Heiss decision relied on by Appellant is un-
availing in this regard. In Heiss, 250 Ark. 474, 465 S.W.2d 699, a
man was killed in a collision involving an uninsured motorist. The
deceased had an insurance policy and paid separate premiums for
uninsured-motorist coverage and medical payments. The insurer
claimed that it was entitled to deduct the medical payments made
from the $20,000 limit contained in the uninsured-motorist sec-
tion of the policy. This court rejected the insurer’s argument,
holding that any such deduction for medical expenses was in
derogation of the explicit requirements of the uninsured-motorist
statute and financial responsibility laws at issue, which established
limits of payment for injuries or death. To hold otherwise would
have allowed the insurer to pay less than mandated by the legisla-
ture. Pursuant to section 23-89-209(a)(4), however, if an insurer
issues UIM coverage, such coverage must be at least equal to the

es
262 —_ =

limits prescribed for bodily injury or death in Ark. Code Ann.
§ 27-19-605 (Repl. 2008), and the amount paid by Farmers under
Jennifer’s policy exceed that statutory limit. Accordingly, our
decision in Heiss is of no import to the present case.

Before leaving this point, we note that Appellant argues that
it is unfair to allow Appellees to receive multiple premiums but
only require them to pay on one policy. In support of this
contention, Appellant cites to cases from other jurisdictions that
have held as much. First, just as we held in Chamberlin v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 343 Ark. 392, 36 S.W.3d 281
(2001), the reliance on authority from other jurisdictions is unper-
suasive, particularly where this court has previously addressed the
same issue. Moreover, the Couch family maintained four insur-
ance policies on four different automobiles, and the premiums paid
on those policies were calculated based on coverage for each
singular vehicle. At the time the Couches contracted with Appel-
lees to provide insurance coverage, they were aware that each of
those policies contained language prohibiting the stacking of
multiple policies. If we were to void the anti-stacking provisions of
these contracts, Appellees would be forced to pay quadruple
coverage in exchange for only one premium paid for the deceased.
Accordingly, we find no merit to the contention that Appellees are
gaining a windfall because it accepted multiple premiums where
those premiums were calculated on coverage for a single vehicle
and based on the explicit prohibition of stacking multiple policies.

As her final point on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial
court erred in finding that the other insurance clause, when
applied to UIM coverage, is not void as against public policy. In
support of her contention, Appellant argues that the anti-stacking
provision undermines the public policy favoring compensation of
the person wrongfully injured or killed and that limitations on
coverage are not favored. In advancing her argument, Appellant
acknowledges this court’s decisions in Clampit v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 309 Ark. 107, 828 S.W.2d 593 (1992),
and Chamberlin, 343 Ark. 392, 36 S.W.3d 281, but argues that
those cases are distinguishable and should be limited so as to not
apply to this case. Appellees counter that this court has settled the
public-policy argument and that there is no reason to deviate from
that precedent. We agree.

This court has held that unless the legislature has specifically
prohibited exclusions, courts will not find the restrictions void as
against public policy. Harasyn, 349 Ark. 9, 75 S.W.3d 696.

CO
Cid 263

Moreover, as we previously stated, an exclusion to coverage
cannot violate public policy when one considers that a driver can
opt out of the coverage altogether. Id. While acknowledging the
holding in Harasyn, Appellant avers that the decision should be
overruled or at least limited to the facts of that case. In the absence
of a compelling reason to do so, this court declines to overrule
Harasyn. It has been said that

[it] is necessary, as a matter of public policy, to uphold prior
decisions unless great injury or injustice would result. The policy
behind stare decisis is to lend predictability and stability to the
Jaw. In matters of practice, adherence by a court to its own
decisions is necessary and proper for the regularity and uniformity of
practice, and that litigants may know with certainty the rules by
which they must be governed in the conducting of their cases. Pre-
cedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly
unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable.

State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ark. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 370
Ark. 251, 257, 258 S.W.3d 736, 741 (2007) (quoting Cochran v,
Bentley, 369 Ark. 159, 174, 251 S.W.3d 253, 265 (2007).

Appellant also acknowledges this court’s holdings in Clampit
and Chamberlin upholding anti-stacking provisions as not being
violative of public policy. Appellant contends, however, that those
two cases are distinguishable and that their application should be
limited. We disagree. In Clampit, 309 Ark. 107, 828 S.W.2d 593,
a husband and wife owned two vehicles that were insured under
separate policies. The couple and their daughter were killed in an
automobile collision while occupants in one of the insured ve-
hicles. The other driver was underinsured, and personal represen-
tatives of the deceased brought an action against the insurer to
recover the limits of UIM benefits under both policies. The insurer
refused to pay under both policies, citing an owned-but-not-
insured exclusion which precluded recovery under both policies.
This court held that the exclusion to UIM coverage did not violate
the public policy of this state, explaining, by way of example, that
ifn insurer is required to insure against a risk of an undesignated-
but-owned vehicle, it is required to insure against risks that it is
unaware of and unable to charge a premium for. The court further
reasoned:

If we were to disallow the exclusions in question, the insurance
companies would have to spread the increased (and unknown) risk

Ee
264 ee |_|

among all insureds, regardless of the risk or circumstances of each
case, the end result being that multi-car owners would be acquiring
insurance at rates subsidized by single-car owners — a result we
deem neither desirable nor compatible with public policy.

Id. at 113, 828 S.W.2d at 597.

Following Clampit, this court again addressed the issue of
stacking in Chamberlin, 343 Ark. 392, 36 S.W.3d 281. In that case,
the insured, while a passenger in her husband’s vehicle, was injured
in a collision with an underinsured driver. At the time of the
accident, the insured and her husband owned three separate
insurance policies, one for each of their three vehicles, issued by
the same insurer. The insurer paid UIM benefits on only one
policy, rejecting claims on the other two policies because of
owned-but-not-insured exclusions contained in each policy. The
insured filed suit, and after the trial court granted summary
judgment, the insured appealed to this court. We affirmed the
grant of summary judgment, noting that we had considered and
rejected the appellant’s precise argument in Clampit. Although the
insured argued that this court’s position reflected a minority-
jurisdiction position, this court held that it was bound to follow its
prior law. In concluding that the anti-stacking provision was valid,
the court noted that the policy language was clear and unambigu-
ous and that the parties were free to contract as to the terms, as long
as they were not violative of state law. Finally, the Chamberlin court
noted: “Although aware of our judicial decisions . . . the legisla-
ture has not amended the governing statutes to permit stacking.
... [T]he General Assembly’s silence over ‘a long period gives rise
to an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval’ to the
court’s construction of the statute.” Id. at 398, 36 S.W.3d at 284
(quoting Chapman v. Alexander, 307 Ark. 87, 90, 817 S.W.2d 425,
427 (1991).

HI Despite the clear pronouncements in both Clampit and
Chamberlin, Appellant asks this court to deviate from its established
position that anti-stacking provisions are not contrary to the public
policy of this state. The distinction that those two cases involved
owned-but-not-insured exclusions rather than another insurance
clause is not a meaningful one. The gist of Clampit and Chamberlin
is that an insurer may prohibit the stacking of multiple insurance

- policies if those policies unambiguously prohibit the stacking of
benefits. Just as in the prior cases, at issue here are multiple policies
insuring multiple vehicles, and each of those policies contained

iL
=i 265

clear and unambiguous language excluding the stacking of poli-
cies. If we were to disallow those exclusions, we would bind
Appellees to a risk that was plainly excluded and for which
Appellant did not pay. Accordingly, we find no merit to Appel-
Jant’s argument that the trial court erred in determining that the
anti-stacking provisions were not void as violative of public policy.

Affirmed.

Bernard MARKS »v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 08-472 289 S.W.3d 923

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

a

267

Robinson & Associates, P.A., by: Luke Zakrewski, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass’t Att’y Gen.,
for appellee.

Ret L. Brown, Justice. Appellant Bernard Marks ap-
peals from his conviction for capital murder and his
sentence to life imprisonment without parole. He asserts two points
on appeal. We affirm.

Testimony at trial revealed that on the morning of July 5,
2004, Marks, Chris Claiborne, and Ricky Howard left the Three
Gables nightclub together. Howard was driving the three men ina
car he had borrowed. The three men arrived outside of the
residence of Alvin Benjamin to find Michael Walker, the ultimate
victim, standing in the front yard. The three men got out of the
vehicle, and Marks and Claiborne began to beat Walker. Imme-
diately after that, while Walker was lying unconscious in the road,
Marks got in the borrowed vehicle and proceeded to run over
Walker. In the early morning hours of July 5, 2004, Walker was
taken to the emergency room of the Jefferson Regional Medical
Center in Pine Bluff. Walker was severely injured and subse-
quently died of his injuries. Marks was later arrested and charged
with capital murder.

At Marks’s trial, Ricky Howard was called as a witness for
the State. On direct examination by the prosecutor, he testified
that he saw Marks pushing, hitting, and kicking Walker, and that
Marks stated that he was going to run Walker over. Howard
testified that he then observed Marks get into the car and start to
move it and that the car ran over Walker. On cross-examination,
Howard testified that he fled the scene when Marks got in the car.
During the prosecutor’s redirect examination, Howard testified
that he did not actually see the car run over Walker, but he heard
anoise — “‘bl-bloom, bl-bloom, bl-bloom.”’ When the prosecutor
asked Howard what the noise was, defense counsel objected: “He
said he heard it. He didn’t say he saw it.” The judge overruled the
objection and said, “If he knows, he can answer it. If not, he can
respond accordingly.” The prosecutor questioned, “What-what
happened to a body,”’ and Howard stated “Ran over.” At the
conclusion of the trial, Marks was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced accordingly.

For his first point on appeal, Marks contends that the circuit
judge erred by overruling his objection to Howard’s testimony
that the sound he heard was Marks driving over Walker. Marks
claims that Howard lacked the requisite personal knowledge to
testify under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 602. He claims that “the
record lacks any basis for a conclusion that Howard had sufficient
knowledge to distinguish the sound of a vehicle running over a

el
Cid 269

human body as opposed to some other similar object.” The State
responds that Marks has mischaracterized Rule 701 under the
Arkansas Rules of Evidence as a Rule 602 objection. The State
adds that Marks’s true argument on appeal is that Howard was not
qualified as a lay witness under Rule 701 to make the inference
that the sound he heard was that of a car driving over a human
body. The State claims that the circuit judge did not abuse his
discretion because Howard’s opinion testimony was rationally
based on his perception and the surrounding circumstances and
was helpful to a clear understanding of the determination of
whether Marks was driving the car that ran over Walker.’ Addi-
tionally, the State argues that Marks cannot show prejudice be-
cause the testimony of other witnesses established that Marks ran
over Walker with the car.

Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding evidentiary
issues, and their decisions are not reversed absent an abuse of
discretion. Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003).
This court will not reverse an evidentiary decision by the trial
court in the absence of prejudice. McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671,
42 S.W.3d 529 (2001).

As already noted, Marks first contends that Howard’s testi-
mony was inadmissible under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 602.
Rule -602 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the
matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not,
consist of the testimony of the witness himself.

Ark. R. Evid. 602.

In the case before us, sufficient evidence was intro-
duced at trial to support a finding that Howard had personal
knowledge of the matter to which he testified. It was undisputed
that Howard was present at the scene of the crime. He testified that
he witnessed Marks beating Walker, that he heard Marks state that
he was going to run over Walker, and that he saw Marks get into
the car and begin driving. Finally, immediately after running from
the scene, he heard the sound — “bl-bloom, bl-bloom, bl-
bloom.” Howard, without question, had personal knowledge of

' The fact that Walker had been run over with a car was undisputed at trial.

the events to which he testified. The circuit judge did not err in
permitting the testimony under Rule 602.

Rule 701, which the State maintains is the appropriate rule
for our analysis, reads:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are

(1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and

(2) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.

Ark. R. Evid. 701.

HB We agree with the State that Rule 701 governs this
case. In Carton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 303 Ark. 568, 798
S.W.2d 674 (1990), we set out a three-prong test for determining
admissibility under Rule 701. First, the testimony must pass the
“personal knowledge” test of Rule 602. Id. Second, it must be
rationally based, that is, the opinion must be one that a normal
person would form on the basis of the facts observed. Id. Finally,
the opinion must meet the “helpful” test. Id.

The facts in this case are these:

* Marks, Howard, and Claiborne left a club together on the
morning of July 5, 2005. The three men went to the home of
Alvin Benjamin.

* Upon arriving at Benjamin’s house, Howard observed Marks and
Claibome assaulting the victim, Michael Walker.

* Howard then heard Marks state that he was going to run Walker
over, and saw Marks get into a car and begin driving.

* When Marks started to move the car, Howard turned and ran
from the scene. While running away, Howard heard the sound
— “bl-bloom, bl-bloom, bl-bloom.”

* At trial, Howard testified that the “bl-bloom, bl-bloom” sound
was the sound of Marks running over Walker's body.

LT
Ci 271

Marks asserts that the trial judge abused his discretion in
allowing Howard to testify that the tell-tale bumping sound was
the sound of Marks driving over Walker because Howard did not
actually see what caused the sound. He contends that Howard
lacked sufficient knowledge to distinguish the sound of a vehicle
running over a human body as opposed to another object because
there was no evidence that Howard had seen or heard a vehicle run
over a human body on a prior occasion.

Marks is incorrect. For the first prong, under the
Carton test, Howard’s testimony concerning Marks driving over
Walker was based on his personal knowledge of Marks’s actions at
the scene of the crime as already noted in the opinion. See Ark. R.
Evid. 602 (‘Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need
not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself.”’). This easily
satisfies the first prong of the Rule 701 analysis.

Turning to the second prong, under Carton, Howard’s
opinion that the bumping sound he heard was Marks driving a car
over Walker’s body was formed on the basis of the facts Howard
observed at the scene of the crime and his perception of what
happened to Walker. It is not necessary that Howard actually heard
previously the exact sound a car makes driving over a human body.
Rather, it is sufficient that his opinion and inference were ones
that'a normal person would form on the basis of the facts he
observed and what he heard. In Felty v. State, 306 Ark. 634, 816
S.W.2d 872 (1991), we stated that opinion testimony by lay
witnesses is admissible “‘in observation of everyday occurrences, or
matters within the common experience of most persons.” The
common experience of most persons when coupled with the facts
Howard observed and what he heard at the scene of the crime
reasonably leads to the inference Howard made in regard to the
source of the sound.

HM Rule 701(1) speaks in terms of “‘perception”’ of the
witness. “‘Perception” is not limited to what is actually seen, as
Marks would have it. Rather, “perception” is defined in Black’s
Law Dictionary as “[a]n observation, awareness or realization, usu-
ally based on physical sensation or experience; appreciation or
cognition.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1172 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis
added). Here, Howard saw the fight, heard the threat, saw Marks
get into the car and start driving toward Walker, and then heard

ee
272 id |

the sound of the car running over the body. Based on this, he could
certainly form his opinion based on perception that Marks, in fact,
ran over Walker.

HB Finally, Howard’s opinion testimony was helpful to a
determination of a fact in issue, which is the third prong. That fact
was whether Marks was the driver of the car that ran over Walker’s
body. Because Howard’s opinion testimony satisfies the three-
prong analysis for determining admissibility under Rule 701, there
was no abuse of discretion by the circuit judge in allowing it into
evidence.

Marks next urges that the circuit judge erred by failing to
correct, sua sponte, defense counsel’s misstatement of the law
regarding the burden of proof during his opening statement. At
trial, Marks’s counsel reserved his opening statement until after the
State had presented its case-in-chief. After the prosecution rested,
Marks’s counsel began his opening statement by saying, “If you
will recall, yesterday morning the judge told you that I would
reserve my opening statement until such time as the burden shifts,
or at least until the close of the State’s case. The responsibility from
this point on is for the defendant to move forward.” Defense
counsel failed to raise an objection to his own statement.

Marks recognizes that this court does not recognize “plain-
error” and that the contemporaneous-objection rule has not been
complied with here. Marks, nevertheless, asks this court to expand
the recognized Wicks exceptions to the contemporaneous-
objection rule to include a statement that the burden of proof in a
criminal case has shifted to the defendant, when made by the
defendant’s own trial counsel, even though defense counsel did
not object to his own statement.

Marks is correct that Arkansas does not recognize the
plain-error rule, under which plain errors affecting substantial
rights may be reviewed on appeal although they were not brought
to the attention of the trial judge. Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606
S.W.2d 366 (1980). It is a fundamental rule of this court that an
argument for reversal will not be considered absent an appropriate
objection in the trial court. Id. Four exceptions are recognized: (1)
when a trial court fails to bring to a jury’s attention a matter
essential to the consideration of the death penalty; (2) when an
error is made by a trial judge himself or herself at a time when
defense counsel has no knowledge of the error and thus no
opportunity to object; (3) when the serious nature of an error

Ld
ir 273

obligates the trial judge to intervene, without objection, either by
admonition to the jury or the declaration of a mistrial; and (4)
when an evidentiary ruling affects substantial rights. Id. Our case
law is clear that Wicks presents only narrow exceptions that are to
be rarely applied. Anderson v. State, 353 Ark. 384, 398, 108 S.W.3d
592, 600 (2003).

HB Admittedly, the facts involved in this point are some~
what bizarre because Marks argues that his defense counsel erred in
his statement, did not object to his own error, but that the circuit
judge should have stepped in and corrected it. It is, of course, a
fundamental principle of criminal law that the State has the burden.
of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Marks
asks this court to determine whether a statement indicating that the
burden of proof in a criminal case has shifted to the defendant,
when made by the defendant’s own counsel, implicates the third
Wicks exception. Marks’s argument presupposes that defense
counsel incorrectly stated the burden of proof. We are not con-
vinced that he did. Defense counsel started to say that he had
reserved his opening statement until the burden shifted, but then
quickly corrected himself to say until the prosecution rested. He
then said that ‘“‘the responsibility from this point on is for the
defendant to move forward.” Nothing in these statements im-
pressed upon the jury the idea that the defendant had the burden of
proving his innocence. Rather, the statements referred to the
defendant’s ability to proceed with the presentation of defense
evidence, if the defendant so desired.

In like situations, this court will defer to the superior
position of the circuit judge to control and manage the arguments
of counsel. Anderson, 353 Ark. at 405-06, 108 S.W.3d at 606. We
note, in addition, that the correct burden of proof was stated to the
jury in the closing argument of counsel for both parties and in the
circuit judge’s final instructions. This court will not reverse the
action of a trial court in matters pertaining to its control, supervi~
sion, and determination of the propriety of arguments of counsel
in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 395, 108
S.W.3d at 598. We conclude that the defense counsel’s statements
were not so flagrantly incorrect as to compel a finding that the
circuit judge’s failure to intervene, sua sponte, and instruct the jury
as to the law was a manifest abuse of discretion.

The record in this case has been reviewed in accordance
with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(h), and no reversible error
has been found.

Affirmed.
Corain and Dantztson, JJ., concur.

JAUL E. DANIELSON, Justice, concurring. I, too, affirm

Marks’s judgment and conviction because I cannot say that
the admission of Howard’s testimony constituted reversible error.
However, I do so because, despite the circuit court’s abuse of
discretion in admitting the testimony, that error was harmless.

Here, a review of the record reveals that Howard testified to
the following on direct examination: (1) that when Marks finished
hitting Walker, Marks said that he was “going to run [Walker]
over’; (2) that Marks then’’[j]umped in the car”; (3) that Marks
moved the car; (4) that the car ran over Walker; and (5) that he
then left and went home. However, it was revealed on cross-
examination that Howard did not see Marks run over Walker.'
Howard testified that “[w]hen [Marks] jumped in the car, that’s
when I left.” He then confirmed that he “ran off before this
incident.” Following this testimony, on redirect examination,
Howard clarified his testimony, stating that he did not see Marks
run over Walker, but heard a noise. In addition, Howard testified
that he saw the car driving after him, which Marks was driving.

With respect to Rule 701, we have held that the rule today
is nota rule against conclusions, but is a rule conditionally favoring
them. See Moore v. State, 362 Ark. 70, 207 S.W.3d 493 (2005).
Here, the majority attempts to interpret and construe the rule;
however, we have already done so, and it is our prior interpreta-
tion that renders the admission of Howard’s testimony erroneous.

In Felty v. State, 306 Ark. 634, 816 S.W.2d 872 (1991), we
examined Felty’s argument that the circuit court erred in admitting
the testimony of two lay witnesses because their statements were
conclusions that could not be supported by personal knowledge.
While ignored by the majority, this court specifically discussed the
rule and the testimony it contemplates:

* Itis important to note that it was not until cross-examination that Howard testified
that he did not actually see Marks run over Walker. Thus, there is no issue regarding
preservation for our review, as Marks objected at the first opportunity.

Ll
Ce —id 275

[The rule] provides that a lay witness may give an opinion with two
(2) limitations. Limitation (1) is the requirement of firsthand
knowledge or observation. Limitation (2) is phrased in terms of
requiring testimony to be helpful in resolving issues. Witnesses
often find difficulty in expressing themselves in language which is
not an opinion or conclusion. For example, if a witness is asked,
“What kind of day was it?” he might respond, “Beautiful.” It
would be an admissible opinion. He would not have to state it was
a clear skied, sunny, 72 degree spring day with a slight breeze. The
witness can respond in everyday language which includes his
conclusion about the type of day. However, ifattempts are made to
introduce meaningless assertions which amount to little more than
choosing up sides, exclusion for lack of helpfulness is called for by
the Rule. See Advisory Committee’s Notes to Federal Rule 701.

In sum, opinion testimony by lay witnesses is allowed in observation of
everyday occurrences, or matters within the common experience of most
persons, Statements by eyewitnesses that the victim was “scared” and
“trying to get away” easily fit within the limitations imposed on lay witness
opinion.

306 Ark. at 639-40, 816 S.W.2d at 875 (emphasis added). Under this
court’s interpretation of the rule, it is clear that Howard’s testimony
did not meet the requirements of the rule, as he lacked firsthand
knowledge nor was his opinion, that Walker was run over, rationally
based on his perception of an everyday occurrence.

According to Felty, Howard’s testimony was only admis-
sible, pursuant to Rule 701, if it was rationally based on an
observation of everyday occurrences or a matter within the com-
mon experience of most persons. I simply cannot agree that the
sound “bl-bloom, bl-bloom” is an everyday occurrence or within
the common experience of most persons, as is suggested by the
majority’s analysis. For Howard to be permitted to testify that
Marks did in fact run over Walker, when Howard did not witness
such, was simply an abuse of discretion by the circuit court.

In sum, Howard’s testimony, here, ‘‘ran over,” had to be
rationally based on a perception of an everyday occurrence. It is
absurd, and clearly contrary to our case law, to suggest that an
opinion based on the sound of “‘bl-bloom, bl-bloom”’ is the
equivalent of an opinion regarding the weather or one’s impres-

sion of another, as set forth in Felty.? Indeed, Howard’s statement
that Marks ran over Walker is precisely the type of meaningless
assertion amounting “‘to little more than choosing up sides” that
the rule requires be excluded. Howard lacked personal knowledge,
and further, his testimony was not rationally based on a perception
of an everyday occurrence. For that reason, the circuit court
abused its discretion in allowing Howard’s testimony.

That being said, Howard’s testimony was merely cumulative
to that of Bobbie Riley and, further, the medical examiner. Riley
testified that Marks and Claiborne beat and kicked Walker, and,
afterward, Marks stated that he was going to run Walker over. She
further stated that before Marks ran Walker over, he pulled
Walker’s body to the middle of the road, behind the car, then
started the car and ran over Walker. In addition, the medical
examiner testified that Walker’s body surface showed “road rash,”
which was indicative of an individual being run over by a motor
vehicle.

‘We have repeatedly held that prejudice is not presumed and
that no prejudice results where the evidence erroneously admitted
was merely cumulative. See Wright v. State, 368 Ark. 629, 249
S.W.3d 133 (2007). Moreover, we do not reverse for harmless
error in the admission of evidence. See id. Because the admission of
Howard’s testimony was harmless due to its cumulative nature, I
would affirm on this point. I, therefore, concur.

Corsin, J., joins.

2 Such a sound, as described, could just as easily been a blown tire or a car driving over
the curb. Whatever inference was to be drawn from Howards testimony, prior to his
statement that Marks ran over Walker, was within the jury’s province.

|_| 277

Roy REED v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-345 289 S.W.3d 921

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

Appellant, pro se.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: LeaAnn J. Invin, Ass’t Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

Re L. Brown, Justice. Appellant Roy Reed has filed
this pro se appeal from the circuit judge’s denial of his
petition for postconviction relief, which was lodged pursuant to
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1.

The history of the case is as follows. In 2005, Reed was
convicted of possession of methamphetamine, manufacturing
methamphetamine, and possession of paraphernalia with the intent
to manufacture methamphetamine. He was sentenced as a habitual
offender to eight years, thirty years, and eight years, respectively,
to be served concurrently. He appealed and argued that the circuit
judge erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the
charge of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manu-
facture. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
See Reed v. State, CACR 06-271 (Ark. App. Nov. 29, 2006)
(unpublished).

On February 15, 2007, Reed filed the petition for postcon-
viction relief, which is at issue in this case, and raised three points:
(1) that he was subjected to double jeopardy because possession of
methamphetamine is a lesser-included offense of manufacturing
methamphetamine; (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to make an accomplice-corroboration argument; and (3)
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object with
respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant for his
residence. The circuit judge denied Reed’s petition without a
hearing and said:

Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal on
November 29, 2006 (CACR-06-271). Petitioner has filed the
instant Rule 37 petition alleging several errors on the part of his trial
counsel. The allegations are: counsel failed to make double jeop-
ardy arguments; failure of counsel to seek correction of a sentence
illegally imposed; failure of counsel to make a accomplice corrobo-
ration argument; and, failure of counsel to make specific objections
in his motion to suppress.

Ld
id 279

Because each of the allegations complained of in the Rule 37
petition could have been raised on direct appeal and were not,
Petitioner has waived the arguments. See Blair v. State, 290 Ark. 22
(1986).

The petition was then dismissed with prejudice. No findings of fact or
conclusions of law were contained in the judge’s order.

Hl There are two problems with the judge’s order. The
first is an error of law. While it is true that, ordinarily, Rule 37.1
does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised in
the trial or argued on appeal, an exception is made for errors that
are so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void
and subject to collateral attack. See Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357,
748 S.W.2d 643 (1988). This court has held that a’violation of
double jeopardy is such a fundamental error. See Rowbottom v. State,
341 Ark. 33, 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000). So too is an allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise critical issues at
the trial level on the defendant’s behalf, which prejudiced the
defendant’s right to a fair trial. See, e.g., McGehee v. State, 348 Ark.
395, 72 S.W.3d 867 (2002). It is beyond dispute that the latter issue
may be raised in a petition for postconviction relief such as we have
before us. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 through 37.5 (2008). All of
Reed’s points on appeal fall within these exceptions. Hence, the
circuit judge’s decision to dismiss Reed’s appeal on the basis of
waiver was error.

HI This leads to the second problem we face with the
judge’s order. Because of his dismissal of Reed’s petition due to
waiver, he made no written findings as required by Rule 37.3. This
court has held that Rule 37.3(a) is mandatory and requires written
findings. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 351 Ark. 619, 96 S.W.3d 732
(2003); Bilyeu v. State, 337 Ark. 304, 987 S.W.2d 277 (1999);
Williams v. State, 272 Ark. 98, 612 S.W.2d 115 (1981). It is
elementary that this court cannot reach the merits of a postcon-
viction claim for relief absent a circuit judge’s written findings of
fact because, on review, this court determines whether the findings
are supported by a preponderance of evidence. See Williams, 272
Ark. at 99, 612 S.W.2d at 115-116. Unless the findings are clearly
erroneous, they will be affirmed. Id. In short, without such specific
findings, there can be no meaningful review.

This court has, on occasion, affirmed the denial ofa Rule 37
petition notwithstanding the circuit judge’s failure to make writ-

Le
280 ss”

ten findings under Rule 37.3(a), but we have done so only in two
circumstances: (1) where it can be determined from the record that
the petition is wholly without merit, or (2) where the allegations in
the petition are such that it is conclusive on the face of the petition
that no relief is warranted. Bilyeu, 337 Ark. at 305, 987 S.W.2d at
277 (reversing and remanding where there were allegations con-
tained in the petition for postconviction relief that were supported
by assertions of fact that precluded summary dismissal); see also Long
v. State, 294 Ark. 362, 742 S.W.2d 942 (1988) (affirming the denial
of a Rule 37 petition notwithstanding the absence of trial court
findings when we could determine from the record that the
petition was without merit.) We conclude that none of Reed’s
points on appeal are so conclusive on the face of the petition or on
the face of the record to show that no relief is warranted. We take
this opportunity to emphasize that it is not incumbent on this court
to scour the record in a Rule 37 appeal to determine if the petition
is wholly without merit when there are no written findings. That
is the circuit judge’s function, if no hearing is held.

For these reasons, we reverse the circuit judge’s order of
dismissal and remand for compliance with Rule 37.3. It may well
be that the circuit judge will want to hold a hearing on Reed’s
petition pursuant to Rule 37.3(c), following which he must make
findings of fact and conclusions of law. If he does not conduct a
hearing, he must make written findings for this court to review
under 37.3(a).

Reversed and remanded.

= 281

Barbara DESCHNER, Individually and as Court Appointed
Guardian of Christopher Deschner v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, and
Allstate Insurance Company

07-1159 290 S.W.3d 6

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

|

Parker Law Firm, by: Tim S. Parker, for appellant.

Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Moore, P.A., by: Sarah E, Green-
wood, for appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany.

Benson & Wood, PLC, by: Brian Wood; and Meckler, Bulger &
Tilson, LLP, by: Peter J. Valeta, for appellee Allstate Insurance Com-
pany.

es
282 _—___ =

im GuNnTER, Justice. This appeal arises from two orders of

the Carroll County Circuit Court granting summary judg-
ment in favor of Appellees State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, Inc. (State Farm) and Allstate Insurance Company, Inc.
(Allstate). Appellant Barbara Deschner (Deschner), individually and as
the court appointed guardian of her son, Christopher Deschner,
appeals both orders of the circuit court. We affirm.

On October 31, 2002, eleven-year old Christopher De-
schner was shot in the eye by a paintball fired from a vehicle while
he was trick-or-treating. The vehicle was driven by Keith Blane
Neal. Derek Balance and Gene Jackson were passengers in the
vehicle. Christopher Deschner sustained injuries to his eye, in-
cluding loss of peripheral vision, a decrease in vision from 20/20 to
20/80 and migraine headaches associated with optic damage.
Deschner filed suit against Neal, Jackson, and Balance in Carroll
County Circuit Court alleging that they were liable for Christo-
pher’s injuries. See Deschner v. Balance, Carroll County (W.D.) No.
2002-172.

The vehicle driven by Keith Neal was insured by an auto-
mobile insurance policy issued by State Farm. Neal’s parents,
Pamela and Gordon Neal (the Neals), were also insured by a
homeowner’s policy issued by Allstate. On August 7, 2006, State
Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a decla-
ration of the rights and relations of the parties pursuant to the
automobile insurance policy issued to the Neals. In its complaint,
State Farm asserted that it did not provide liability coverage for the
claims against Balance or Jackson because they were not “using the
insured automobile.” State Farm also contended that it did not
provide liability coverage for the claims against Neal because the
claims “‘do not seek damages because of ‘bodily injury’ caused by
an ‘accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of
your car.’ ”” The circuit court granted summary judgment in the
declaratory-judgment action filed by State Farm.

On August 29, 2006, Deschner filed a third-party complaint
against Allstate, alleging that Keith Neal was covered by the
homeowner’s insurance policy issued by Allstate to his parents.
The third-party complaint stated, “[a]s a matter of law, the injuries
suffered by Christopher Deschner did not arise out of the opera-
tion, maintenance, or use of an automobile as correctly decided by
a previous order of this Court granting the motion for summary
judgment filed by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany.” Allstate answered the complaint, denying Deschner’s alle-

Le
SS 283

gations, and then filed a counterclaim and cross claim requesting
declaratory judgment that the homeowner’s policy did not cover
any of the defendants.

State Farm and Allstate filed motions for summary judgment
on February 20, 2007, and March 15, 2007, respectively. After
hearings on both motions, the circuit court granted State Farm’s
motion for summary judgment on March 19, 2007, and granted
Allstate’s motion on May 11, 2007. Deschner filed a timely notice
of appeal on May 31, 2007. On June 6, 2007, the circuit court
entered a judgment against Balance, Neal, and Jackson, finding
them jointly and severally liable for Christopher Deschner’s inju-
ries and awarding Deschner $100,000 on her negligence claims.
Deschner’s appeal of the orders granting summary judgment to
State Farm and Allstate was certified to us from the Arkansas Court
of Appeals on October 28, 2008, because it involves an issue of
substantial public interest and a significant issue needing clarifica-
tion or development of the law pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R.
1-2(b)(4) and (5) (2008).

On appeal, Deschner asserts that the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Allstate. In the alternative,
Deschner asserts that the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of State Farm.

The law is well settled that summary judgment is to be
granted by a circuit court only when it is clear that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anglin v. Johnson Reg’!
Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 10, 289 S.W.3d 28 (2008). Once the moving
party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judg-
ment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and dem-
onstrate the existence ofa material issue of fact. See id. On appellate
review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based
on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in
support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. See id. We
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences
against the moving party. See id. Our review focuses not only on
the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and documents filed by the
parties. See id.

In the present case, the circuit court ruled that neither the
State Farm automobile policy nor the Allstate homeowner's policy
provided coverage for Christopher Deschner’s injuries. Our law

regarding the construction of insurance contracts is well settled.
McGrew v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 371 Ark. 567, 268 S.W.3d
890 (2007); Elam v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 346 Ark. 291, 57
S.W.3d 165 (2001). The language in an insurance policy is to be
construed in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Norris v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 341 Ark. 360, 16 S.W.3d 242 (2000). If the
language of the policy is unambiguous, we will give effect to the
plain language of the policy without resorting to the rules of
construction. McGrew, supra; Elam, supra. Once it is determined
that coverage exists, it then must be determined whether the
exclusionary language within the policy eliminates coverage.
McGrew, supra; Norris, supra. Exclusionary endorsements must ad-
here to the general requirements that the insurance terms must be
expressed in clear and unambiguous language. McGrew, supra. If a
provision is unambiguous, and only one reasonable interpretation
is possible, this court will give effect to the plain language of the
policy without resorting to the rules of construction. Id. If,
however, the policy language is ambiguous, and thus susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation, we will construe the
policy liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the
insurer. Id.

IL. State Farm Automobile Policy

‘We will first address the circuit court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of State Farm. In its motion for
summary judgment, State Farm argued that Deschner’s claims
were not covered by the State Farm automobile policy because the
claims did not arise out of an accident resulting from the owner-
ship, maintenance, or use of the car. The State Farm policy states,
in pertinent part:

We will:
1. Pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay
because of:

a. bodily injury to others, and

b. damage to or destruction of property including loss ofits use,
caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or
use of your car.

HH Deschner concedes in her response to Allstate’s motion

for summary judgment that the.State Farm policy does not provide
coverage by stating that “the shooting of Christopher Deschner

PO
Pd 285

‘was not a proper ‘use’ or ‘occupancy’ of the automobile at issue.”
Deschner even admits in her third-party complaint against Allstate
that the State Farm policy does not provide coverage by stating,
“als a matter of law, the injuries suffered by Christopher Deschner
did not arise out of the operation, maintenance, or use of an
automobile as correctly decided by a previous order of this Court
granting the motion for summary judgment filed by State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.” Although Deschner
now attempts to revive her argument against State Farm, the
argument is inconsistent and not fully developed. Thus, because
Deschner concedes that the State Farm policy-does not provide
coverage, she has abandoned this argument on appeal, and we need
not address this issue.

IL. Allstate Homeowner's Policy

For her second point on appeal, Deschner asserts that “if
Christopher Deschner’s injuries would not be covered by the
language of the automobile policy insuring Keith Blane Neal then
they should be covered under the Neals’ homeowner’s policy with
Allstate for the unintentional negligent conduct of its insured
Keith Neal.” Specifically, Deschner contends that Allstate con-
tractually agreed that it would be obligated to pay damages up to
the applicable policy limits for acts of negligence of Keith Neal that
caused injury to Christopher Deschner.

In response, Allstate admits that Keith Neal was insured
under the homeowner’s policy issued to his parents, but asserts that
there are no issues of material fact in this case. Allstate additionally
argues that the homeowner's policy provides no coverage because
(1) the paint-ball shooting was not a covered “occurrence”; (2) the
homeowner’s policy excludes coverage for injuries resulting from.
intentional acts of the insured person; and (3) Deschner’s sole
claim against Keith Neal is based on his “‘use” and “occupancy” of
a motor vehicle.

Allstate’s homeowner’s policy states that it will provide
coverage for the following:

Subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy,
Allstate will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally
obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising
from an occurrence to which this policy applies, and is covered by
this part of the policy.

Allstate excludes the following from coverage:

1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended
by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the
intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person. This
exclusion applies even ift

a) such insured person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or
her conduct;

b) such bodily injury or property damage is of a different kind or
degree than intended or reasonably expected;

c) such bodily injury or property damage is sustained by a different
person than intended or reasonably expected.

5. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, use, occupancy, renting, loan-
ing, entrusting, loading or unloading of any motor vehicle or trailer

Deschner asserts that the exclusionary language in the Allstate policy
is almost identical to the language included in the State Farm policy.
The State Farm policy includes coverage for injuries arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, and use of a vehicle, and the Allstate policy
excludes coverage for injuries arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, use, or occupancy of a vehicle. Regarding the provisions in the
two policies, the circuit court stated:

The State Farm policy says that we cover ownership, maintenance
or use. Allstate says that we don’t cover ownership, maintenance,
use, occupancy or anything that involves that automobile we do not
cover it and in this instance I think that the policy language is pretty
definite. They say that if you want to be covered by automobile
insurance you have got to buy an automobile policy .... Sol
think, unfortunately we have a situation here that neither the
automobile policy nor the homeowners insurance would cover

I know the terms of this policy because I think the terms of
[Allstate’s] policy are much broader than the [State Farm poli-

cy]. The [Allstate] policy pretty much says that if you have any-
thing to do with an automobile it is not covered.

Hl The provision in the Allstate policy excluding cover-
age for the “ownership, maintenance, use, or occupancy” of a
vehicle is clear and unambiguous. There is no question of fact
regarding Neal’s occupancy of the vehicle. Christopher De-
schner’s injuries were the result of a paint ball fired from the Neals’
car that was occupied by Keith Neal, Derek Balance and Gene
Jackson. Giving effect to the plain language of the policy, see
McGrew, supra, we hold that Christopher Deschner’s injuries are
clearly excluded from coverage because they arise out of the
occupancy of a vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the
circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of both State
Farm and Allstate.

Affirmed.
Imper, J., not participating.

Dwain OLIVER v. Ronnie PHILLIPS, Calhoun County Election
Commission (Hon. Allen G. Watson, Chair; Hon. James Rawls;
Hon. Barbara Floss); and Hon. Charlie Daniels, in his Official
Capacity as Secretary of State, Arkansas’s Chief Election Officer

08-1209 290 S.W.3d 11

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

Tony Joe “TJ.” Huffman and Compton, Prewett, Thomas and
Hickey, P.A., by: Floyd M. Thomas, Jr., for appellant.

Robin J. Carroll, Calhoun County Prosecuting Att’y, for appel-
lee Calhoun County Board of Election Commissioners.

James M. Pratt, Jr., P.A., by: James M. Pratt, Jr., for appellee
Ronnie Phillips.

Lt
Cid 289

1m GUNTER, Justice. Appellant, Dwain Oliver, appeals his

unsuccessful challenge to his opponent’s qualifications in a
judicial race in Calhoun County. Appellant asserts the trial court erred
in holding that: (1) it lacked jurisdiction to grant appellant’s petition
and (2) the issue presented by appellant’s petition was moot. Because
this appeal pertains to elections and election procedures, this court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(4). We affirm.

On March 11, 2008, appellant and appellee Ronnie Phillips
were certified by the Calhoun County Board of Election Com-
missioners as candidates for the position of Calhoun County
District Judge. On May 19, 2008, one day before the general
election, and sixty-nine days after certification, appellant filed a
petition for declaratory relief and motion for writ of mandamus,
asserting that Phillips was a resident of Dallas County, not Calhoun
County, and was thus ineligible to be a candidate.! To support his
argument, appellant cited amendment 80, section 16(D) of the
Arkansas Constitution, which states:

All Justices and Judges shall be qualified electors within the geo-
graphical area from which they are chosen, and Circuit and District
Judges shall reside within that geographical area at the time of
election and during their period of service. A geographical area
may include any county contiguous to the county being served
when there are no qualified candidates available in the county to be
served,

Appellant requested that Phillips’s name be stricken from the ballot
and that any votes cast for Phillips not be counted. Appellant re-
quested an expedited hearing at the court’s earliest opportunity and
served notice to Phillips and the other appellees on May 19.

The general election was held on May 20, with Phillips
receiving 151 votes and appellant receiving 126 votes. On May 22,
appellant filed a motion for preliminary injunction, asking the
court to enjoin the Calhoun County Election Commission (the
Commission) and the Secretary of State from certifying the elec-
tion results.

On May 23, the Commission filed a response to appellant’s
petition for declaratory relief and writ of mandamus. In its re-
sponse, the Commission argued that because no hearing was held

Appellant named Phillips, the Calhoun County Election Commission, and the
Secretary of State, Charlie Daniels, as defendants to the suit.

Ce
290 | TY

or ruling was made prior to the election, appellant’s petition and
motion were moot. Phillips filed a separate response on May 28 in
which he also asserted appellant’s request was moot.

A hearing on the matter was held on May 28. At the hearing,
the Commission argued that the case should be dismissed for two
reasons: (1) because the petition was filed one day prior to the
election, it was impossible to have the hearing within two to seven
days pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 78(d) (2008),? and the issue is now
moot; (2) because the court did not have jurisdiction to decide a
pre-election challenge post-election. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court agreed with the Commission and found that “‘a
pre-election issue being decided post-election is outside the juris~
diction of the Court.” In its order, filed June 23, 2008, the court
made the following findings:

3. There are two types of election contests provided for by statute:
pre-election eligibility challenges and post-election, election con-
tests. Zolliecoffer v. Post, 371 Ark. 263, 264 (2007). A party wishing
to challenge a candidate’s eligibility to stand for election must bring
the challenge by way of a petition for writ of mandamus and
declaratory judgment prior to the election. Id. at 265.

4, Arkansas statutes do not provide for a post-election petition for
writ of mandamus and complaint for declaratory relief to challenge
a candidate’s eligibility. Pederson v. Stracener, 354 Ark. 716, 128
S.W.3d 818 (2003). Although Oliver’s petition was filed pre-
election, the timing of his petition made it impossible for this issue
to be resolved prior to the election.

5. Because the issue was presented but not expedited and ruled on.
prior to the election, the issue is now moot. Ball v. Phillips County
Election Commission, 364 Ark. 574, 222 S.W.3d 205 (2006). Nor
does this court have jurisdiction to decide a pre-election eligibility
issue in a post-election proceeding. Zolliecoffer, cited above.

Appellant then filed a notice of appeal to this court on July 21, 2008.

2 Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 78(4) provides:

Upon the filing of petitions for writs of mandamus or prohibition in election
matters, it shall be the mandatory duty of the circuit court having jurisdiction to fix
and announce a day of court to be held no sooner than 2 and no longer than 7 days
thereafter to hear and determine the cause.

The right to contest an election is purely statutory. Pederson
v. Stracener, 354 Ark. 716, 128 S.W.3d 818 (2003). A statutory right
to challenge the eligibility of a candidate before the election is
provided by Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-207(b) (Supp. 2007); however,
this statute only allows pre-election challenges to a candidate’s
eligibility. Zolliecoffer v. Post, 371 Ark. 263, 265 S.W.3d 114
(2007).? Post-election, the only private right to challenge an
election is found under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-801 (Repl. 2007),
which provides for a challenge by a candidate to contest certifica-
tion by the county board of election commissioners.

On appeal, appellant first asserts that the trial court erred in
finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s petition.
In its order, the trial court cited Zolliecoffer, supra, for the proposi-
tion that it had no jurisdiction to decide a pre-election eligibility
issue in a post-election proceeding. In Zolliecoffer, the losing
candidate in a mayoral election filed a petition for writ of manda-
mus and declaratory judgment two days after the election. This
court held that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider the petition because the petition was filed post-election.
Appellant argues that the case at bar is distinguishable because he
filed his petition pre-election, not post-election, and therefore the
trial court had jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits and
prior to the official vote certification.

In response, appellees argue that although appellant’s peti-
tion was filed pre-election, the lateness of the filing made it
impossible to conduct a hearing on the merits prior to the election
and within the ‘‘no sooner than 2 and no longer than 7 days”
requirement of Rule 78(d). And because Arkansas election law
does not provide for a post-election petition for a writ of manda-
mus and declaratory relief, the trial court was without jurisdiction
to hear the matter post-election. Pederson, supra.

HM Appellant did file his petition pre-election, albeit by
only one day. Consequently, the trial court had jurisdiction when
appellant’s petition was filed, and Arkansas case law has established
that “where a court once rightfully acquires jurisdiction of a cause,

> Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-5-207(b) provides in pertinent part:

No person’s name shall be printed upon the ballotas a candidate for any public office
in this state at any election unless the person is qualified and eligible at the time of
filing as a candidate for the office to hold the public office for which he or she is a
candidate[]

it has the right to retain and decide.” Wasson v. Dodge, 192 Ark.
728, 730, 94 S.W.2d 720, 721 (1936) (citing Estes v. Martin, 34
Ark. 410, 419 (1879)). Zolliecoffer and Pederson are both distinguish-
able because the appellants in those cases did not file their petitions
pre-election. Accordingly, we hold that because the action was
filed pre-election, the trial court did have jurisdiction, and that
jurisdiction was not subsequently erased by the election.

For his second argument on appeal, appellant contends that
the trial court erred in finding that the issue presented by appellant
was moot. The trial court’s order stated that “because the issue was
presented but not expedited and ruled on prior to the election, the
issue is now moot” and cited Ball v. Phillips County Election
Commission, 364 Ark. 574, 222 S.W.3d 205 (2006). In Ball, this
court held that a petition challenging the eligibility of a candidate,
filed eight days before the election, was untimely and moot. In so
holding, we stated:

Ball failed to pursue her petition for mandamus and declaratory
judgment expeditiously in order to obtain the remedy to remove
Jones’ name from the ballot before the election or before the election
results were certified. In other words, Ball’s lawsuit became moot
due to her own failure to act timely in the special proceeding.

Id. at 579, 222 S.W.3d at 208. We also noted that the candidates’
names were certified approximately thirty-eight days previously, and
Ball offered no compelling reason for waiting until eight days | before
the election to file her petition.

HB Appellant attempts to distinguish the holding in Ball by
arguing that Ball’s appeal was deemed moot but the petition itself
was only deemed untimely. However, this is a distinction without
a difference, because in Ball it was the untimeliness of the petition
that rendered the case moot. See id. at 578, 222 S.W.3d at 207
(‘‘Ball’s inability to have Jones’ name removed from the ballot . . .
was due to her decision to wait until eight days before the election
to file her petition . . . . In short, this election case is moot.”’) As in
Ball, appellant failed to pursue his petition expeditiously in order
to obtain the remedy of removing Phillips’s name from the ballot
before the election, and appellant has offered no compelling reason
for his delay in filing the petition.

In addition, waiting until the day before thé election to file

the petition rendered it impossible for the trial court to fulfill the
requirement under Rule 78(d) that the trial court hold a hearing

no sooner than two and no longer than seven days thereafter. We
established in Ball that this type of eligibility challenge should be
filed in time to resolve all relevant issues prior to the election. See
364 Ark. at 577-78, 222 S.W.3d at 207 (‘If Ball had filed her'suit
within this thirty-eight day period [after certification] . . . there
would have been ample time in which to resolve all relevant issues
raised by Ball prior to the September 21, 2004 election.”) Also,
this court has clearly stated that “[o]nce the election takes place,
the issue of a candidate’s eligibility under § 7-5-207(b) becomes
moot.” Clement v. Daniels, 366 Ark. 352, 355, 235 S.W.3d 521,
523 (2006) (citing State v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm’rs,
300 Ark. 405, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989)). We therefore affirm the
trial court’s finding that the issue presented in appellant’s petition
was moot.

Appellant also makes the argument that there is a contradic-
tion between amendment 80’s “‘at the time of the election”
provision and § 7-5-207(b)’s ‘‘qualified and eligible at the time of
filing as a candidate’”’ language. Appellant asserts that the case was
ripe, not moot, at the time it was filed at the brink of the election
because under the clear language of amendment 80, a judicial
candidate has until “at the time of election” to bring himself
within the qualifying parameters by establishing a residence in the
geographical area and becoming a qualified elector. According to
appellant, the trial court erred in “‘elevating the Election Code’s
statutory provisions and case law enforcement procedures over the
Constitution’s controlling provisions to dismiss the action below.”

HB Though the circuit court ruled on this issue from the
bench, the final written order did not address this issue. In a recent
case where the judge made a constitutional decision from the
bench, we said: “Pursuant to Administrative Order 2(b)(2), an oral
order announced from the bench does not become effective until
reduced to writing and filed.” McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection
Agencies, 368 Ark. 60, 67, 243 S.W.3d 278, 284 (2006). When the
circuit court makes no ruling on an issue, the appellate court is
precluded from reaching the issue on appeal. Travis v. State, 371
Ark. 621, 369 S.W.3d 341 (2007). Therefore, this issue is. not

. preserved for our review.

In conclusion, we hold that the trial court did have jurisdic-
tion to consider appellant’s petition, but that the trial court was
correct in its finding that the petition was moot.

Affirmed.

294 Hi
Nadine WILSON ». Dardanelle District of
the YELL COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

08-901 290 S.W.3d 1

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

Sanford Law Firm, PLLC, by: Josh Sanford and Vanessa Kinney,
for appellant.

Ralph C. Ohm, for appellee.

Pr E. Daniztson, Justice. This appeal arises from an
order of the Yell County Circuit Court denying a petition
for writ of mandamus filed by appellant Nadine Wilson against
appellee Dardanelle District of the Yell County District Court (“dis-
trict court”). On appeal, Wilson argues that the circuit court erred in
ruling that Wilson could not use the small-claims division of the
district court in her efforts to collect small-claims judgments. Wilson
further contends that the circuit court erred in ruling that she would
be required to be represented by counsel to collect those judgments.
We affirm the circuit court’s order.

Wilson owns a collection agency called Seneca Collection
Agency, Inc. and Sunstone Judgment Recovery (Sunstone), which
is a “judgment-recovery”’ business. Acting individually through
Sunstone, Wilson became the owner of assignment of judgments
in the following cases: (1) Lawrence Vaughn d/b/a Vaughn’s Truck &
Equipment v. Daniel Warren d/b/a Daniel Warren Trucking, Case No.
2005-430, in the amount of $1,091.97; (2) Paula White d/b/a Room
2 Room v. Amber Robuck, Case No. 2005-247, in the amount of
$393.88; (3) Paula White d/b/a Room 2 Room v. Katie Sue Owens,
Case No. 2005-248, in the amount of $417.61; (4) Paula White
d/b/a Room 2 Room v. Carla McNeese, Case No. 2005-249, in the
amount of $611.40; (5) J.H. Hasty Jr. v. Jeremy Thomason, Case No.
2004-208, in the amount of $353.29; (6) Hobby Shop Deluxe d/b/a
Henry Hutmacher, Charles H. Craig, Jr., and Douglas M. Harley v. Janet

Elliot and Steve Elliot, Case No. 2003-1024, in the amount of
$884.28; (7) Roger Burns and Louise Burns v. Buddy Turner d/b/a
Circle M. Movers, Case No. 2004-1, in the amount of $4,533.29; (8)
Cogswell Motors v. Anthony Thomas, Case No. 1997-137, in the
amount of $1,477.34; (9) Cogswell Motors v. Tammy Skelton, Case
No. 1998-155, in the amount of $623.71; and (10) Cogswell Motors
v. Melissa Muck, Case No. 2000-13, in the amount of $4,471.37.
After a judgment was rendered by the district court, the small-
claims, judgment-creditor plaintiffs signed an acknowledgment of
assignment that assigned all title, rights, and interest to Wilson.
The district court entered orders, acknowledging the assignment
of these judgments to Wilson, between November 22, 2006, and
March 28, 2007. These judgments were enforced through writs of
garnishment.

Subsequently, on April 20, 2007, the district court entered
an order setting aside the assignments. While not at issue in the
instant case, Wilson appealed one case, Roger and Louise Burns v.
Buddy Turner d/b/a Circle M. Movers, CV 2007-45, to circuit court.
On May 30, 2007, the circuit court found the assignment of
judgment in the Burns case valid and set aside the district court’s
order setting aside the assignment in the Burns case. In the district
court, Wilson then filed a motion to reconsider setting aside the
assignments, noting the circuit court’s order setting aside the
judgment. On July 20, 2007, the district court denied Wilson’s
motion to reconsider.

On October 1, 2007, Wilson filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in the circuit court and alleged (1) that she had a right
to collect the judgments pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated
§ 16-65-120 (Repl. 2005), and (2) that the district court misinter-
preted Rule 10(d)(4) of the District Court Rules and section 4 of
Administrative Order 18. Further, Wilson averred that she was
entitled to declaratory judgment under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-
104 (Repl. 2006), on the grounds that the language of section 4(b)
does not prevent her from filing a complaint under Arkansas Rule
of Civil Procedure 3(a). In her prayer for relief, Wilson requested
that the circuit court enter a declaratory judgment in addition to a
writ of mandamus ordering the district court “to interpret and
apply correctly all relevant laws.’”” On October 25, 2007, the
district court answered the writ, denying the allegations in Wil-
son’s petition. Wilson filed a first-amended petition for writ of
mandamus on November 13, 2007. The district court answered,
pleading affirmative defenses, on November 27, 2007.

On February 5, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing on
Wilson’s petition for writ of mandamus. On cross-examination,
‘Wilson stated that she enforced the judgment rather than collected
the judgment and that there was a “fine line” between collection
and enforcement. She further admitted that she typically received
forty percent of what she recovered. After hearing testimony and
arguments, the circuit court made the following conclusion:

There [are] two concepts that the court is concerned with.
One is as you both have pointed out that Administrative Order 18
(4)(b) provides that no action may be brought in Small Claims
Court by any collection agency or an assignee of a claim. And
further we have the concept that Mr. Ohm [representing Defen-
dant] has pointed out that a person not licensed to practice law in
the state can’t represent another, and there is Arkansas case law and.
part of the Code Annotated that deals with that.

The Court is going to find in this case that Ms. Wilson is a
collection agency or an assignee and that she cannot use the court to
collect debts on these judgments. Accordingly, your petition for
mandamus will be denied.

On March 11, 2008, the circuit court denied Wilson’s
petition for writ of mandamus and entered an order, finding that
‘Wilson was engaged in the practice of acting as a collection agency
and did not have the authority to use the district court in her efforts
to collect small-claim judgments in the small-claims division of the
district court. Further, the circuit court found that Wilson was not
a licensed attorney, was acting as a collection agent, and should
have been required to be represented by counsel in order to collect
district-court judgments in the civil division of the district court.
Subsequently, on May 13, 2008, Wilson filed a motion for relief
from the judgment pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure
60(a) (2008), and on May 23, 2008, the circuit court denied
Wilson’s Rule 60 motion. From the March 11 order, Wilson now
brings her appeal.

For her first point on appeal, Wilson argues that the circuit
court erred in ruling that she acted as a collection agency and that
she was prohibited from “enforcing her judgments.” Wilson
contends that, under section 4(b) of Administrative Order 18, she
should not be prohibited from enforcing her judgments in the
small-claims division of a district court. In response, the district
court asserts that the circuit court correctly determined that

si” /.

Wilson engaged in the practice of acting as a collection agency.
The district court asserts that the circuit court properly concluded
that Wilson attempted “‘to collect judgments on behalf of third
persons on a contingency fee basis.” Further, the district court
avers that Wilson “attempted to get around this prohibition by
having the plaintiffs sign an assignment of judgment,” which, the
district court maintains, “‘was nothing more than an attempt to
avoid Administrative Order No. 18.” The standard of review on a
denial of a writ of mandamus is whether the circuit court abused its
discretion. Dobbins v. Democratic Party of Arkansas, 374 Ark. 496,
288 S.W.3d 639 (2008).

The issue is whether Wilson, while engaging in the practice
of her judgment-recovery business, acted as a collection agency.
Section 4(b) of Administrative Order 18 provides in pertinent part:

4. Small Claims Division. The small claims division shall have
the same jurisdiction over amounts in controversy as provided in
subsection 3 of this administrative order. Special procedural rules
governing actions filed in the small claims division are set out in
Rule 10 of the District Court Rules. The following restrictions
apply to litigation in the small claims division:

(b) Entities restricted from bringing actions. No action may be
brought in the small claims division by any collection agency,
collection agent, or the assignee of a claim or by any person, firm,
partnership, association, or corporation engaged, either primarily
or secondarily, in the business of lending money at interest. “Credit
bureaus and collection agencies,” by definition, shall include those
businesses that either collect delinquencies for a fee or are otherwise
engaged in credit history or business.

This issue involves the interpretation of our court rules. The
first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute or rule
is to construe it just as it reads, giving words their ordinary and
usually accepted meaning in common language. Stanley v. Ligon,
374 Ark. 6, 285 S.W.3d 649 (2008). Court rules are construed by
the same means and canons of construction used in statutory
interpretation. Id.

Section 4(b) defines “‘collection agencies’ as “those
businesses that either collect delinquencies for a fee or are other-
wise engaged in credit history or business.”” Here, Wilson admitted

that, although she believed that she “‘enforce[d]” a judgment
rather than “collected” a judgment, she nevertheless received
forty percent of that judgment as “‘an agreement between the
judgment creditor and [her].” Thus, because Wilson “‘collect[ed]””
a “delinquenc[y] for a fee” under section 4(b), she fits the
definition of a collection agency, which is restricted from bringing
an action in the small-claims division of the district court.

Further, Wilson contends that she was assigned the
judgment under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-65-120, which provides
that a person or a party may transfer or sell a judgment or cause of
action at any time after the lawsuit has been filed. She asserts that
once a judgment was assigned to her, she had every right to collect
it. However, under section 4(b), no “assignee of a claim’ may
bring an action in the small-claims division. Here, Wilson repeat-
edly admitted that she was assigned these claims. While she takes
issue with the term of what she collected, we are left with the
language of section 4(b), which calls for the collection of “delin-
quenc[ies].”’ A delinquency is defined as “‘[a] debt that is overdue
in payment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 460 (8th ed. 2004). We
interpret “delinquency” to include the judgments or debts in this
case that Wilson collected. Therefore, based upon our interpreta~
tion of section 4(b) of Administrative Order 18, we hold that the
circuit court properly ruled that Wilson engaged in the practice of
acting as a collection agency.

For her second point on appeal, Wilson argues that even if
she were a collection agency, then she was not “bringing an
action” under section 4(b), but rather enforcing a judgment.
Specifically, Wilson contends that she is not prohibited from
acting in the district court because her act of filing acknowledg-
ments of the assignment, as well as writs of garnishment, is not ‘“‘an
action” under section 4(b). The district court responds and argues
that the circuit correctly found that Wilson was prohibited from
using the small-claims court to collect judgments. Specifically, the
district court avers that Wilson attempted to circumvent the
process by attempting to assign a small-claim plaintiff's claim to
herself and to name herself as a real party of interest.

However, the circuit court did not specifically rule on
this issue of whether Wilson brought an action under section 4(b).
Similarly, in her third point on appeal, Wilson raises the issue of
whether she was a new party, under Rule 10(d)(4) of the District
Court Rules, prohibited from bringing an action into the district

rs
300 | |_|

court. In fact, she concedes in her brief that the circuit court did
not specifically cite to Rule 10(d)(4) in its ruling. We have held
that we will not review a matter on which the circuit court has not
tuled, and a ruling should not be presumed. See Stilley v. University
of Arkansas at Ft. Smith, 374 Ark. 248, 287 S.W.3d 544 (2008).
Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits of Wilson’s second
and third points on appeal.

Finally, Wilson argues that the circuit court erred in
ruling that she should be required to be represented by counsel in
order to collect district-court judgments in the small-claims and
civil divisions of the district court. Specifically, Wilson claims that,
regardless of whether she acted as a collection agency, she is
entitled to represent herself in the enforcement of her judgments in
the small-claims and civil divisions of the district court.

We have previously discussed that, in enforcing her judg-
ments, Wilson acted as a collection agency, which is prohibited
under section 4(b). In their briefs, both Wilson and the district
court discuss whether she engaged in the practice of law. How-
ever, the circuit court did not make a specific ruling on that issue,
and therefore, we are precluded from delving into the question.
See Stilley, supra.

Affirmed.

June D. SCAMARDO ».
SPARKS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

08-820 289 S.W.3d 903

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

303

l

Law Offices of Charles Karr, P.A., by: Charles Karr, for appellant.

Davis, Wright, Clark, Butt & Carithers, PLC, by: Constance G.
Clark and Sidney P. Davis, Jr., for appellee.

LANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Justice. June Scamardo ap-

peals the order of the Sebastian County Circuit Court
granting summary judgment in favor of Sparks Regional Medical
Center (Sparks). On appeal, Scamardo argues that the circuit court
erred in refusing to apply the law of the case doctrine to preclude the
motion for summary judgment filed by Sparks. Scamardo also con-
tends that the trial court erred in holding that Sparks was entitled to
charitable immunity and in refusing to rule that the charitable immu~
nity doctrine should be abolished. Finally, Scamardo asserts that the
circuit court erred in finding Rule 56 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure constitutional. We find no error and affirm.

This is the second time these parties have been before this
court. In November 2002, Scamardo filed a medical negligence
action against Sparks, Dr. Robert Jaggers, and Sparks’s liability
insurer, Steadfast Insurance Company (Steadfast). Under Arkansas
case law governing the charitable immunity doctrine before May
2002, a plaintiff could only file an action against a qualified
charitable entity by filing the action directly against the entity’s
insurer under the direct action statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-
210. See George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n Inc., 337 Ark. 206, 987
S.W.2d710 (1999). This state of the law changed with the decision
in Clayborn v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., 348 Ark. 557, 75
S.W.3d 174 (2002), where the court distinguished immunity from
suit and immunity from liability, holding that immunity from suit
means that an entity is not required to stand trial at all, but

immunity from liability is only a defense to a suit. Therefore, under
Clayborn, the Arkansas direct-action statute — Ark. Code Ann.
§ 23-79-210 — only provided for direct action against a liability
insurer if the insured entity was immune from suit in tort. Id. In
Clayborn, this court specifically stated that it had ‘never said that
charitable organizations are altogether immune from suit.” Id. at
566, 75 S.W.3d at 179 (emphasis in original). Citing this court’s
precedent in Clayborn, the liability insurer in this case, Steadfast,
filed a motion to dismiss Scamardo’s complaint, contending that it
‘was not a proper party defendant.

Scamardo appealed from the circuit court’s order granting
Steadfast’s motion to dismiss. This court affirmed the circuit
court’s order in Scamardo v. Jaggers, 356 Ark. 236, 149 S.W.3d 311
(2004) (Scamardo d, declining to overrule Clayborn, and noting that

“the losing party’s insurer (here, Steadfast) can be bound to pay up
to its policy limits any judgment entered against the nonprofit
entity (Sparks).”” Scamardo I, 356 Ark. at 247, 149 S.W.3d at 318.
However, ‘‘the prevailing party in a lawsuit against the nonprofit
may not execute on the property or assets of the nonprofit to satisfy
any judgment.” Id.

Scamardo voluntarily nonsuited her claims against Sparks
and Dr. Jaggers a little more than a year after the decision in
Scamardo I. Approximately nine months later, this court overruled
both Clayborn and Scamardo I in Low v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005). This court held
that the direct action statute and the charitable immunity doctrine
required a tort action to be filed directly against the entity’s
insurer, because a charitable entity is completely immune from suit
and cannot be named as a defendant. Several months after Low was
handed down, Scamardo refiled her claims against Sparks and Dr.
Jaggers under the one-year savings statue — Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-56-125(a)(1) (Repl. 2005), and several unnamed defendants,
but failed to name Steadfast as a defendant. Sparks filed an answer
to Scamardo’s complaint, arguing that it was a nonprofit hospital
and immune from suit under the charitable immunity doctrine,
and, therefore, not a proper party defendant. Sparks subsequently
filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it qualified for
charitable immunity under the eight factors listed in George, supra,
and arguing that it was not a proper party defendant. The circuit
court granted this motion, dismissing Scamardo’s complaint with
prejudice. Additionally, the circuit court granted a motion filed by
Scamardo to dismiss with prejudice her claims against Dr. Jaggers

Be

CS
PS 305

and the unnamed defendants, all of whom had never been served
with process in the action. Scamardo now appeals the circuit
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Sparks.

Summary judgment is to be granted by a circuit court only
when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to
be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Health Res. of Ark., Inc. v. Flener, 374 Ark. 208, 286 S.W.3d 704
(2008). Once the moving party has established a prima facie
entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet
proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue
of fact. Id. On appellate review, this court determines if summary
judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items
presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a
material fact unanswered. Id. The court views the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was
filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party.
Id. The appellate court’s review focuses not only on the pleadings,
but also on the affidavits and documents filed by the parties. Id.

Scamardo first argues that the circuit court erred by granting
Sparks’s motion for summary judgment because the law of the case
doctrine precluded Sparks from arguing that Scamardo’s refiled
complaint against it was barred by the doctrine of charitable
immunity. Specifically, Scamardo argues that the law of the case
doctrine applies because “Sparks took the position in Scamardo I
that it was not immune from suit and that its insurance carrier was
not subject to suit under the direct action statute.” Accordingly,
Scamardo contends, Sparks should not be allowed “‘to take incon-
sistent positions in Scamardo I and Scamardo II and win on each of
them.”

This court discussed the law of the case doctrine in R.K.
Enterprises, LLC v. Pro-Comp Management, Inc., 372 Ark. 199, 203,
272 S.W.3d 85, 88 (2008), stating as follows:

[The law-of-the-case doctrine . . . “prohibits a court from recon-
sidering issues of law and fact that have already been decided in a

* Sparks’s answer to the first complaint asserted the defense of charitable immunity, but
admitting that, although it was immune from any execution against its assets, it was not
immune from suit based on the holding in Clayborn, supra. In its answer to Scamardo’s refiled
complaint, it stated that it was protected by the charitable immunity doctrine and nota proper
party defendant.

prior appeal.” Byme, Inc. v. Ivy, 367 Atk. 451, 457, 241 S.W.3d
229, 235 (2006). ‘This court has explained that “[o]n second appeal,
... the decision of the first appeal becomes the law of the case, and
is conclusive of every question of law or fact decided in the former
appeal, and also of those which might have been, but were not,
presented.” Vandiverv. Banks, 331 Ark. 386, 391, 962 S.W.2d 349,
352 (1998) (quoting Mercantile First Nat’l Bank v. Lee, 31 Atk. App.
169, 173, 790 S.W.2d 916, 919 (1990). Stated differently, “[t]he
doctrine of the law of the case . . . prevents an issue raised in a prior
appeal from being raised in a subsequent appeal unless the evidence
materially varies between the two appeals.” Vandiver, 331 Ark. at
391-92, 962 S.W.2d at 352.

There is an exception to the law of the case doctrine in this
instance. Scamardo I has been overruled. An appellate decision,
once overruled, is normally treated as if it had never been. Felton v.
Rebasmen Med. Ctr., 373 Ark. 472, 284 S.W.3d 486 (2008). We
have, therefore, made an exception to the law of the case doctrine
in the particular context of overruled decisions. See Washington v.
State, 278 Ark. 5, 643 S.W.2d 255 (1982) (the doctrine of law of

the case was inapplicable where, during the interim between the
decision in the first appeal and retrial, the first decision had been
overruled by other later cases); Am. Ry. Express Co. v. Davis, 158
Ark. 493, 250 S.W. 540 (1923) (decision of Arkansas Supreme
Court on first appeal was no longer the “law of the case” on the
second appeal, where in the meantime the United States Supreme
Court decision followed previously had been overruled).

HAs a consequence, Scamardo I was not the law of the
case and did not prevent the circuit court from applying the Low
decision, or from reaching the question of Sparks’ entitlement to
charitable immunity. See, e.g., Anglin v. Johnson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375
Ark. 10, 289 S.W.3d 28 (2008) (plaintiff could not prevail where
he had months after the decision in Low, supra, to properly name
the insurance company and failed to do so); Felton, supra; of.
Stracener v. Williams, 84 Ark. App. 208, 137 S.W.3d 428 (2003)
(plaintiffs could not prevail under prior law where they failed to
amend their complaint after Clayborn within the one-year savings
statute, and did not act diligently for purposes of the doctrine of
equitable tolling).

Turning to the question of Sparks’s entitlement to
charitable immunity, Scamardo argues that “Sparks does not
qualify for the charitable immunity defense because it was not

created and maintained exclusively for charity.” In George, supra,
this court listed eight factors to aid in determining whether an
entity is entitled to charitable immunity:

(1) whether the organization’s charter limits it to charitable or
eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization’s charter
contains a “not-for-profit” limitation; (3) whether the organiza~
tion’s goal is to break even; (4) whether the organization earned a
profit; (5) whether any profit or surplus must be used for charitable
or eleemosynary purposes; (6) whether the organization depends
on contributions and donations for its existence; (7) whether the
organization provides its services free of charge to those unable to
pay; and (8) whether the directors and officers receive compensa-
tion.

Id, at 211-12, 987 S.W.2d at 713. These eight factors are “illustrative,
not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive of charitable status.”
Id. (citing Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947
$.W.2d 780 (1997)).

Review of the evidence in the record shows that
Sparks meets six of the eight factors listed in George. The first and
second factors are satisfied by Sparks’s Articles of Incorporation,
which show that Sparks is “a public benefit corporation” under
the provisions of the Arkansas Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1993,
and that it is “organized, pledges its assets to, and shall be operated
exclusively for charitable, scientific, and educational purposes.”

HI In a sworn affidavit filed with Sparks’s motion for
summary judgment, Dan Hamman, Chief Financial Officer for
Sparks, stated that forms filed with the Internal Revenue Service
show that the Sparks’s operating margin in 2007 was 0.8% and
0.3% in 2006, indicating a loss from operations. The affidavit also
provided that any surplus of funds received by Sparks is used to
maintain its “‘charitable community benefit of providing medical
assistance to the public.” Further, the affidavit provided evidence
that Sparks provided services and care to persons unable to pay in
2007 totaling $7,562,627, and that under its Charity Care policy,
Sparks provides services free of charge to patients unable to pay at
the same level of care provided to those who are able to pay.
Additionally, the reimbursement provided by Medicare and Med-
icaid to Sparks was approximately $4.2 million under cost, and

Sparks considers this amount to constitute additional charity care.
Accordingly there was evidence that Sparks met the third, fourth,
fifth, and seventh factors.

HAs to the sixth factor, although Sparks receives contri-
butions and donations, most of its operating funds are provided
through Medicare, Medicaid, and individual patients and/or the
patients’ private insurers. In George, this court noted that the
nonprofit hospital at issue there only received donations totaling
approximately 6% of its financial obligations, but stated that “a
modern hospital, with rare exception, would find it extremely
difficult to operate wholly or predominately on charitable dona-
tions.” George, supra, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714. As was
the case in George, the fact that Sparks receives most of its funding
through sources other than contributions or donations does not
“negate its overriding charitable purpose.” Id.

Hh The eighth factor listed in George concerns an organi-
zation’s compensation to directors and officers. Article IX of
Sparks’s Articles of Incorporation provides that “[t}he Corpora-
tion shall not have or issue shares of stock and no dividends shall be
paid and no part of the income of the Corporation shall be
distributed to its members, directors, and officers.” It is undisputed
that Sparks’s Chief Executive Officer receives approximately
$350,000 per year in compensation, and that the next two ranking
officers receive approximately $250,000 and $230,000 respec-
tively. Although Scamardo argues that such compensation is evi-
dence that Sparks is “big business” rather than a charitable non-
profit, this court addressed and rejected the same argument in
George, stating:

it is not necessary for charitable organizations to have entirely
volunteer staff and management. [Jefferson Regional Medical
Center’s] size and complexity make knowledgeable, well-qualified
personnel essential. Such persons do not readily volunteer their
services or serve at rates of compensation markedly lower than
market rates.

337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714. Similarly here, such compensa-
tion for the senior administrative positions required to manage Sparks
“does not put the hospital in the position of being maintained for
private gain, profit, or advantage of its organizers.” Id.

CC
SY 309

Hl Based on the totality of the evidence shown in the
record, circumstances, and the factors this court has adopted to
help determine whether an organization is entitled to charitable
immunity, the trial court did not err in granting Sparks’s motion
for summary judgment. Although Scamardo asserts that these are
questions of fact for a jury to decide, in George this court addressed
this argument, stating:

We disagree. While there may be fact issues involved, they are not
matters of disputed fact. Rather, they are differing legal interpre-
tations of undisputed facts. In such cases, the appellate court should
grant summary judgment where reasonable persons would not
reach different conclusions based upon those undisputed facts.

Id. at 212-13, 987 S.W.2d at 713. Additionally, Scamardo argues that
the charitable immunity doctrine should be abolished. Abolishment
of charitable immunity is a public policy decision, and this court has
repeatedly stated that public policy is for the General Assembly to
decide, not the courts. Med. Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis Enters.,
Inc., 373 Ark. 525, 285 S.W.3d 233 (2008).

Le Finally, Scamardo argues that Arkansas Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 is unconstitutional, because it denies her the right to
a jury trial. This court recently examined and rejected this argu-
ment in Anglin, 375 Ark. at 21, 289 S.W.3d at 36, holding that
“‘where there is no factual dispute, there is no constitutional right
to a trial by jury.” Here, as noted above, there are no factual
disputes; instead, there are differing legal interpretations of undis-
puted facts.

Affirmed.
Brown, J., concurs.

310 | |

ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE and Noel Oman ».
PULASKI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

08-1435 289 S.W.3d 901

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

Williams & Anderson PLC, by: Jess Askew II, for appellants.
Thomas M. Carpenter, Little Rock City Att’y, for appellee.

pe Curiam. The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (ADG) and
Noel Oman petition this court for a writ of certiorari to be
issued by this court to the Pulaski County District Court. ADG asserts
that jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari lies in this court because
amendment 80 repealed Arkansas Constitution article 7, section 14.
Article 7, section 14 provided for issuance of writs by the circuit
courts to the district courts under its superintending control. Amend-
ment 80 does not so provide.

ADG asserts that only the Arkansas Supreme Court may
issue writs of certiorari. While Arkansas Constitution amendment
80, section 2(E) provides that the Arkansas Supreme Court has the
“power to issue and determine any and all writs necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction,” it is silent on the question of whether the circuit
court may issue a writ of certiorari to the district court. Although

ee
CO
PTC” ait

amendment 80 does not speak to original jurisdiction in and
issuance of writs by the circuit court, appellate jurisdiction over
the district court is placed in the circuit court. See Ark. Const.
amend. 80, § 7(A). However, Arkansas Constitution amendment
80, section 19(B)(1) indicates that the adoption of amendment 80
did not repeal the jurisdiction of the circuit court over matters
previously cognizable by that court. Thus, while superintending
control of all courts is reserved to this court! by amendment 80, the
circuit courts hold jurisdiction to review and decide issues first
raised in the district court.

Certiorari is a common law writ issued from a superior
tribunal to a lower tribunal that removes the record from the lower
to the superior tribunal for consideration there. Helena Daily World
v. Phillips County Circuit Court, 361 Ark. 146, 205 S.W.3d 134
(2005); McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040
(1940). It is of ancient origin, City Inv. Co. v. Crawley, 199 S.E. 747
(Ga. 1938), and does not necessarily depend on constitutional or
statutory enactment for its existence. 14 Am. Jur. 2d Certiorari § 8
(2000). It may be provided for by statute, but it may also issue as a
common-law writ. Id.

The writ of certiorari reviews actions taken by the lower
court. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 95
S.W.3d 772 (2003); Bell v. Conner, 176 Ark. 530, 3 S.W.2d 319
(1928). The question presented is whether the circuit court may
issue the common-law writ of certiorari. After the adoption of
amendment 80, the Arkansas Constitution is now silent on the
question.? Where the law is silent on statutory or other authority to
act, such cases “remain at common law.” Ex parte Couch, 14 Ark.
337, 338 (1854). In the absence of statutory or other authority,
under the common law, a court of general and original jurisdiction
holds jurisdiction to bring up the record of a lower court by
certiorari for purposes of review. George E. Harris, A Treatise on the
Law of Certiorari § 1 (1893). Circuit courts “are courts of original

' See Foster 2 Hill, 372 Ark, 263, 268, 275 S.W.3d 151 (2008) (“Superintending
jurisdiction is one of three types of jurisdiction held by courts of last resort that also includes
appellate and original jurisdiction.”)

2 We note that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-13-205 (Repl. 1999) provides
that circuit courts hold the power to issue writs of certiorari to an “inferior tribunal.” The

argument about section 16-13-205 was not developed by the parties and will not be
considered. See Johnson . Enconipass Ins. Co., 355 Ark, 1, 130 S.W.3d 552 (2003).

ees
ee
312 __—sS

jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned.” Ark.
Const. amend. 80, § 6.2 The power to issue the writ is inherent
under this provision. The power to issue the writ is also “inherent
in higher courts of record.” 14 Am. Jur. 2d Certiorari § 8. With
respect to the district court, the circuit court is a higher court of
record. The district court is a court of limited jurisdiction. See Jones
v. Huckabee, 369 Ark. 42, 250 S.W.3d 241 (2007). Under the
common law, as a court of general jurisdiction superior to that of
the district court, the circuit court may issue the writ of certiorari
to the district court.

HB We hold that under the common law and the Arkansas
Constitution, the circuit court holds the authority to issue writs of
certiorari to the district court. Accordingly, we reject the argu-
ment that the adoption of amendment 80 deprived the circuit
court of the authority to issue writs of certiorari. We further hold
that the circuit court is the appropriate court to petition for a writ
of certiorari directed at the district court and that any resort to this
court must be based on alleged errors occurring in the circuit
court. The petition is denied.

> See also Ack, Code Ann. § 1613-201 (Supp. 2007) (stating that circuit courts hold
original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned and that the circuit court
holds appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the district court).

= 313

John Barton HOBBS »v. Honorable David L. REYNOLDS,
Circuit Judge
CR 08-1364 289 S.W.3d 917

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

Peel Law Firm P.A., by: John R. Peel and Jennifer L. Modersohn,
for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass’t At’y
Gen., for appellee.

ER Curiam. On November 21, 2008, petitioner John
Hobbs filed a petition for writ of prohibition and, in the
alternative, a petition for writ of certiorari, as well as a motion for
temporary stay and expedited relief. We now consider these motions.

An order of protection was entered by the Faulkner County
Circuit Court on June 19, 2007. On September 4, 2007, Hobbs
was charged by misdemeanor information with a violation of order
of protection, a violation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-53-134
(Supp. 2005), and a Class A misdemeanor, in the Faulkner County
Circuit Court. The criminal information states that the misde-
meanor occurred in Faulkner County. However, the facts in the
affidavit reveal that, on August 29, 2007, Hobbs allegedly beat
Melissa Hobbs at her home in Southaven, Mississippi. A bench
‘warrant was issued on September 4, 2007; Hobbs was arrested on
May 27, 2008, and the warrant and return was filed with the
Faulkner County Circuit Court on June 2, 2008. After Hobbs’s
arrest, the circuit court set bond in the amount of $10,000, and, as
a condition of the bond, required Hobbs to submit to GPS
electronic monitoring. A petition for bail was filed on June 18,
2008. On August 18, 2008, the State filed a motion for revocation
of bond, and an order was entered revoking Hobbs’s bond. A bond
hearing was held, and on October 8, 2008, the circuit court
ordered that Hobbs was to be held without bond for violating the
terms of electronic monitoring. On November 13, 2008, Hobbs
filed a second petition for bail! On November 20, 2008, both
parties jointly stipulated that Hobbs’s alleged criminal conduct
occurred in Mississippi and that the information was incorrect in
stating that the crime occurred in Faulkner County. On Novem-
ber 17, 2008, Hobbs filed a motion to dismiss in Faulkner County
Circuit Court, and the circuit court denied his motion to dismiss
on November 20, 2008. Hobbs, a resident of Faulkner County, is
currently a pretrial detainee without bail incarcerated in the
Faulkner County Detention Center awaiting trial on the misde-
meanor charge.

In his petition for writ of prohibition, Hobbs, citing Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-1-104(a)(1) (Repl. 2006), argues that, in order for
the circuit court to have jurisdiction over prosecuting the crime,
the offense must have occurred in Arkansas. He further avers that,

1 We note that we do not find a ruling on Hobbs’s second petition for bail in the

record,

LT
PC C—*d 315

because the alleged criminal act occurred in Mississippi, the circuit
court in Arkansas is wholly without jurisdiction. He also asserts
that there is no final order from which to appeal and that no other
remedy is available. In the alternative, Hobbs contends that a writ
of certiorari should issue because he is being held on a misde-
meanor charge without bail. In his motion for temporary stay,
Hobbs requests a temporary stay of the trial court proceedings and
the establishment of a briefing schedule. On December 1, 2008,
the State filed a response, arguing that this court should deny
Hobbs any temporary or extraordinary relief.

A writ of prohibition is extraordinary relief that is appropri-
ate only when the circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction.
International Paper Co. v. Clark County Circuit Court, 375 Ark. 127,
289 S.W.3d 103 (2008). The writ is appropriate only when there
is no other remedy, such as an appeal, available. Id. When
considering a petition for a writ of prohibition, this court confines
its review to the pleadings in the case. Id. Prohibition is a proper
remedy when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends upon a
legal rather than a factual question. Jd. Prohibition is never issued
to prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising jurisdiction.
Id. Writs of prohibition are prerogative writs, extremely narrow in
scope and operation; they are to be used with great caution and
forbearance. Id. They should issue only in cases of extreme
necessity. Id.

Territorial jurisdiction over a criminal defendant is
controlled by statute: “A person may be convicted under a law of
this state of an offense committed by his or her own. . . conduct
for which he or she is legally accountable if. . . [e]ither the conduct
ora result that is an element of the offense occurs within this state.
...” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-104 (Repl. 2006). We have stated that
territorial jurisdictional claims, such as those raised by Hobbs
under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-104, can be raised on direct appeal.
See, e.g., Kirwan v. State, 351 Ark. 603, 96 S.W.3d 724 (2003).
Under Kirwan, Hobbs may raise these jurisdictional claims in a
direct appeal, and we cannot say that the circuit court is wholly
without jurisdiction. For these reasons, we deny Hobbs’s petition
for writ of prohibition.

We now turn to Hobbs’s petition for writ of certiorari to
review the circuit court’s denial of bail. Writs of certiorari have
been labeled the appropriate vehicle for relief in bail proceedings.
Walley v. State, 353 Ark. 586, 112 S.W.3d 349 (2003). Article 2,

es
316 _____ =

§ 8 of the Arkansas Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
capital offenses, when proof is evident or the presumption great.”
A criminal defendant has an absolute right before conviction,
except in capital cases, to a reasonable bail. Reeves v. State, 261 Ark.
384, 548 S.W.2d 822 (1977). See also Perroni v. State, 358 Ark. 17,
186 S.W.3d 206 (2004); Duncan v. State, 308 Ark. 205, 823 S.W.2d
886 (1992). Further, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.6
(2008) does not in noncapital cases preclude the setting of a new
and reasonable bail with whatever terms and restrictions deemed
appropriate within its provisions. Reeves, 261 Ark. at 387, 548
S.W.2d at 824. The standard of review is an abuse of discretion. See
Foreman v. State, 317 Ark. 146, 875 S.W.2d 853 (1994) (per
curiam).

The State argues that circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in denying bail because Hobbs violated the terms of his
electronic monitoring as required by his previous bond. However,
the State’s argument is misplaced. Here, Hobbs was not charged.
with a capital offense, but rather, he was charged with a Class A
misdemeanor for violating an order of protection. Under Reeves,
the circuit court should have set a new, reasonable bail in this
noncapital, misdemeanor case “with whatever terms and restric-
tions deemed appropriate within its provisions.” Reeves, 261 Ark.
at 387, 548 S.W.2d at 824. For these reasons, we hold that the
circuit court’s pretrial denial of Hobbs’s bail was an abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, we grant Hobbs’s petition for writ of
certiorari.

Further, Hobbs filed a motion for temporary stay and
expedited relief and included in his petition is a request for a
temporary stay of the trial-court proceedings and the establishment
of a briefing schedule. We deny Hobbs’s motion for temporary
stay and expedited relief.

= 317

Rodney PANKAU v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1389 289 S.W.3d 900

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

es
Kenneth R. Shemin, for appellant.

No response.

eR Curiam. Appellant Rodney Pankau, by and through

his attorney, Kenneth R. Shemin, has filed the instant
motion for belated appeal. The circuit court entered a judgment and
commitment order on September 30, 2008. The notice of appeal was
due to be filed on October 30, 2008, but was not filed until October
31, 2008.

This court recently clarified its treatment of motions for rule
on clerk and motions for belated appeals in McDonald v. State, 356
Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004). There we said:

‘Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was
not timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the appeal is
therefore faced with two options. First, where the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by affidavit filed
with the motion or in the motion itself. There is no advantage in
declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second, where the party
or attorney believes that there is good reason the appeal was not
perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and
this court will decide whether good reason is present.

356 Ark. at 116, 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted). While this
court no longer requires an affidavit admitting fault before we will
consider the motion, an attorney should candidly admit fault where

FY

he or she has erred and is responsible for the failure to perfect the
appeal. See id. When it is plain from the motion, affidavits, and record
that relief is proper under either rule based on error or good reason,
the relief will be granted. See id. If there is attorney error, a copy of the
opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Con-
duct. See id.

In accordance with McDonald, Mr. Shemin has can-
didly admitted fault. The motion is, therefore, granted. A copy of
this opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional
Conduct.

Motion granted.

Jonathan Lepresse STEVENSON v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1388 290 S.W.3d 5

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 19, 2008

Teresa Bloodman, for appellant.

No response.

P= Curiam. Attorney Teresa Bloodman filed a motion for
tule on clerk, and amended motion for rule on clerk, on
behalf of her client Jonathon Laprese Stevenson seeking an order of
this court that the clerk lodge and docket the appeal in this case. The
clerk refused to docket the appeal based on an untimely notice of
appeal. We treat this as a motion for belated appeal and grant the
motion.

Stevenson’s judgment and commitment order was filed on
December 13, 2007. Stevenson filed a motion for new trial on
January 7, 2008, an amended motion for new trial on January 14,
2008, and a second amended motion for new trial on May 14,
2008. His initial motion filed January 7, 2008, and the amended
motion filed January 14, 2008, were timely under Arkansas Rule
of Criminal Procedure 33.3(b) as posttrial motions filed within
thirty days after the date of entry of judgment. The second
amended motion for new trial was not timely as it was not filed
within thirty days after the date of entry of judgment.

HI Under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 33.3(c),
a posttrial motion is deemed denied thirty days after the motion is filed
if the circuit court neither grants nor denies the motion. Because it was
untimely, the second amended motion for new trial did not extend the

thirty days of Rule 33.3(c) after which the motion for new trial was
deemed denied. The January 14, 2008 amended motion, as the last
timely motion, was deemed denied on February 13, 2008. Pursuant to
Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure~Criminal 2(a)(3), Stevenson had.
thirty days from the February 13, 2008 date on which his amended
motion for new trial was deemed denied within which to file his notice
of appeal. No notice of appeal was ever filed on the judgment and
commitment order.

On November 12, 2008, an Amended Judgment and
Commitment Order was entered and Stevenson filed a notice of
appeal from that amended judgment on November 18, 2008.
Assuming there was a motion to amend the judgment, it would
have been a posttrial motion for relief, and if by filing it Stevenson
wished to extend the time within which to file his notice of appeal,
it had to be filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment and
commitment order. See Hadley v. State, 321 Ark. 499, 902 S.W.2d
231 (1995). Nothing in the record reflects that a motion to amend
the judgment was filed or that it was timely filed. It is the
appellant’s duty to bring before this court a record sufficient to
decide the issue presented. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 343 Ark. 552, 39
S.W.3d 739 (2001). If there was a motion to amend the judgment,
it was not a timely posttrial motion. Pursuant to Arkansas Rule of
Appellate Procedure~Civil 5, the record was untimely when there
was no timely notice of appeal to the judgment and commitment
order. The notice of appeal filed on November 18, 2008, was a
nullity.

Stevenson filed 2 motion for rule on clerk; however,
counsel’s failure to comply with the rules of this court and file a
timely notice of appeal is apparent. As we have noted, there are
only two possible reasons for an appeal not being timely perfected:
either the party or attorney filing the appeal is at fault, or there is
“good reason.” See McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d
883 (2004). As we further noted in McDonald, there is no advantage
in declining to admit fault where fault exists and when it is plain
from the motion, affidavits, and record that relief is proper under
either error or good reason, the relief will be granted. Id. If there
is attorney error, a copy of the opinion will be forwarded to the
Committee on Professional Conduct. Id. Pursuant to McDonald,
Supra, we grant this as a motion for belated appeal. We also forward
a copy of this opinion to the Committee on Professional Conduct.

= 324

Stanley D. JACKSON »v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 07-1016 290 S.W.3d 574

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 8, 2009

Janice W. Vaughn, Arkansas Public Defender Comm’n, for
appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass’t Att’y Gen.,
for appellee.

LANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Justice. At approximately

1:45 a.m. on January 22, 2005, Dumas Police Department
Investigator Chuck Blevins received a call reporting a shooting at
Debbie Dean’s, a restaurant in Dumas. Upon arriving at Debbie
Dean’s, Blevins found the body of Herman Cobb, Jr., on the floor
with a gunshot wound to the head. After the coroner arrived, Blevins
also discovered that Cobb had also been shot in the thigh. There were
indications that a fight had taken place in the restaurant, as well.

Later in the day on January 22, 2005, appellant Stanley
Jackson and his brother, Damon Freeman (who was also known as
Damon Jackson), turned themselves in to the police. After both
men gave statements to the police, Jackson was arrested and
charged with capital murder.' In March of 2007, Jackson was tried
and convicted of capital murder, and a Desha County jury sen-
tenced him to life imprisonment. Jackson filed a timely notice of
appeal, and now raises six points for reversal. We find no error and
affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first argument on appeal, Jackson contends that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict.2 We
treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency

1 Jackson was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm; however, the
circuit court subsequently granted Jackson’s motion to sever this charge from the capital
murder charge.

2 The court notes its strong displeasure with the brief in this case, Prior to the
submission of the brief, Jackson’s appellate counsel filed a motion to submit an enlarged
brief, seeking permission to file a thirty-six page brief. The court denied the motion, but we
did allow counsel to file a thirty-page brief, When the brief were submitted, counsels brief
was thirty pages long; however, even to eight of those thirty pages were single-spaced. Rule
4-1(a) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court requires briefs to be “double-spaced,
except for quoted material, which may be single-spaced and indented.” The single-spaced

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of the evidence. See Wertz v. State, 374 Ark. 256, 287 S.W.3d 528
(2008); Stephenson v. State, 373 Ark. 134, 282 S.W.3d 772 (2008).
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether
the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circum-
stantial. Wertz, supra. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient
force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclu-
sion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. On appeal, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
considering only that evidence that supports the verdict. Id,

One commits capital murder if, “with the premeditated and
deliberated purpose of causing the death of another person, [he]
causes the death of any person[.]’? Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-
101(a)(4) (Repl. 2006 & Supp. 2003). This court has said that
“[p]remeditated and deliberated murder occurs when it is the
killer’s conscious object to cause death, and he forms that intention
before he acts and as a result of a weighing of the consequences of
his course of conduct.’’ Daniels v. State, 373 Ark. 536, 285 S.W.3d
205 (2008); Carmichael v. State, 340 Ark. 598, 602, 12 S.W.3d 225,
228 (2000); see also O’Neal v. State, 356 Ark. 674, 158 S.W.3d 175
(2004) (defining deliberation as “weighing in the mind of the
consequences of a course of conduct, as distinguished from acting
upon a sudden impulse without the exercise of reasoning pow-
ers’).

This court has also noted that premeditation and delibera-
tion may be formed in an instant. Winston v. State, 372 Ark. 19, 269
S.W.3d 809 (2007); McFarland v. State, 337 Ark. 386, 989 S.W.2d
899 (1999). Moreover, while intent can rarely be proven by direct
evidence, a jury can infer premeditation and deliberation from
circumstantial evidence, such as the type and character of the
weapon used; the nature, extent, and location of wounds inflicted;
and the conduct of the accused. Fudge v. State, 341 Ark. 759, 20
S.W.3d 315 (2000).

The facts introduced at trial indicated that Cobb and Jack-
son’s brother, Damon Freeman,} were embroiled in a fight in the
early morning hours of January 22, 2005. The State’s first witness,

portions of appellant's brief, however, contain no quoted materials. Rather, they consist
primarily of summaries of various witnesses” testimony and potential jurors’ comments
during voir dire. We refer this matter to the Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Conduct.

2 Damon Freeman is also known as Damon Jackson, but for clarity’s sake, we refer to
him as “Freeman.”

Nick Ward, testified that he and Cobb had been riding around that
night and decided to stop and get something to eat at Debbie
Dean’s. About five or ten minutes after they ordered their food,
Jackson and Freeman came in; Jackson left, but Freeman ordered
something to eat. Freeman and Cobb began to argue about
something and started fighting. Jackson came back in the restau-
rant and asked who was trying to fight his brother. At the same
time, Ward said, Jackson pulled a gun out of his pants. As Jackson
began to fire the weapon, Ward “‘bumped” him, and Jackson shot
out a light fixture.

Ward testified that Jackson fired the gun again, hitting Cobb
in the leg. Ward further testified that Cobb stated, ““You shot me,
cuz.’ At some point after this shot, Jackson dropped the gun, but
Ward testified that Jackson must have picked it back up again
because he was the next person whom Ward observed with the
gun. Freeman and Cobb continued wrestling, and Freeman
slammed Cobb to the ground. Ward and Freeman both asked
Jackson not to shoot Cobb. However, despite their pleas, Ward
said that Jackson “ust shot”? and Cobb “just laid back down, fell
back down.” Ward stated that perhaps a minute or two elapsed.
between the second and third shots. He also asserted that Cobb
never reached for the gun and that he was watching the altercation
the entire time. On redirect examination, Ward identified Jackson
as the man who shot Cobb.

Lee Jones testified that he was also present at Debbie Dean’s
that night. Jones said that he was placing an order for some food
alongside Freeman when Freeman and Cobb began arguing.
Freeman stepped back from the counter, hit Cobb in the face, and
started fighting with him. Jones was attempting to break up the
fight when Jackson came in and drew his gun. Jones saw Jackson
aim the gun at Cobb and fire, and then Jones ran behind the
counter where he heard another shot. After the shooting ended,
Jones stood up and saw Jackson and Freeman standing in front of
the door, and he saw Cobb “laid out in the floor.” On cross-
examination, Jones stated that the only person he saw in the
restaurant that night with a gun was Jackson.

Other witnesses described a similar scene. Latoya Thomas
testified that Freeman and Cobb were fighting, and then shots
were fired. She said that the first shot took out the light; the second
shot hit Cobb in the leg; and “‘the third shot I was out of Debbie
Dean’s.” Thomas verified that Jackson was the one who shot Cobb

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in the leg, and she did not see anyone else with a gun. She also
stated that she heard Ward begging Jackson not to shoot Cobb
again.

Anthony Harrell, who also observed the fight between
Freeman and Cobb, saw Jackson enter the restaurant with a gun
and begin shooting at Cobb. After the first two shots, Harrell
ducked behind the counter. While behind the counter, Harrell
heard Cobb mumble, “Please don’t shoot me” or “Please don’t
kill me.” Shortly after that, Harrell heard the third shot.

«Debbie Dean, the owner of the restaurant, testified that
Cobb came in the restaurant that night and ordered some food.
Some time later, Freeman came in, and the two men began
fighting. She said that some customers tried to break up the fight,
and Harrell, her fiancé, hollered at her to call the police. During
the fight, she saw Jackson enter the restaurant, pull out a gun, and
shoot up at the ceiling. After he shot out the light, she got down on.
the floor in the kitchen. She did not see anyone else with a gun that
evening. Dean did say, however, that she heard Cobb mumble
Freeman’s name.

Kevin Knight, a police officer with the Dumas Police
Department, testified that he interviewed Jackson as part of the
investigation of the shooting.’ After Jackson was read his Miranda
tights, he gave a statement to Knight on January 23, 2005, in
which he said that he was standing outside of Debbie Dean’s when
he heard someone say there was a fight inside. Upon entering the
building, he saw his brother on the floor. Jackson said that Cobb
pulled a gun, and Jackson and Cobb “‘tussled” over the gun. The
first shot took out the lights, and after the second shot, Jackson
said, he left the building.

In his statement, Jackson contended that he had “‘no inten-
tions on anybody dying,” and he was ‘‘just defending [himself] to
keep [Cobb] from shooting [him].” Jackson then told Knight that
the gun should still be on the floor of the restaurant if no one
picked it up. Jackson denied that Freeman ever had the gun. When
Knight asked why he turned himself in, Jackson replied that he felt
like it would only get worse if he ran.

Jackson gave a second statement to Knight on January 24,
2005. In this statement, Jackson admitted that he killed Cobb, but
he claimed it was not intentional and that the gun had only gone

Jackson initially declined to give a statement in the hours following his arrest.

off as they were “‘tussling” over it. In this statement, Jackson said
that he “‘snatched” the gun from Cobb as Cobb was falling to the
ground, and that he ran outside and threw the gun in a ditch.

Dr. Frank Peretti, the Associate Medical Examiner at the
Arkansas State Crime Lab, testified that Cobb suffered from two
bullet wounds: the first appeared to have been fired from some
distance away and traveled through his thigh without hitting any
major blood vessels; the second entered Cobb’s head above his left
ear, traveled downward through the brain, and lodged in the bone
of the skull. Dr. Peretti opined that, given the location and
trajectory of the gunshot wound, it would not have been possible
for the injury to have occurred if Cobb had been “tussling”’ over
the gun by pulling or pushing it back and forth in front of him at
chest level.

On appeal, Jackson argues that the above evidence ‘“‘does no
more than prove that when [he] entered Debbie Dean’s and saw
his brother and [Cobb] fighting, he pulled a gun and shot out the
lights.” He concedes that the evidence demonstrates that he shot
Cobb in the leg, but he argues that there was no evidence showing
that he possessed the premeditation and deliberation necessary to
support a capital murder conviction.

However, it is clear that the State presented sufficient
evidence to defeat Jackson’s directed-verdict motion. No witness
testified that they saw anyone other than Jackson with the gun, and
Nick Ward testified that Jackson fired three shots. All witnesses
agreed that the first shot took out a light fixture, and Cobb suffered
two gunshot wounds: one to the thigh and one to the head.
Moreover, in his statement, Jackson himself admitted that he killed
Cobb. The fact that over a minute elapsed between the shot to
Cobb’s thigh and the shot to his head was sufficient to show
premeditation and deliberation. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 373 Ark.
536, 285 S.W.3d 205 (2008) (finding evidence of premeditation
and deliberation where security videotape showed that the defen~
dant paused before delivering the fatal stabbing blow). Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying
Jackson’s motion for directed verdict.

IL. Voir Dire Issues

In his second point on appeal, Jackson raises numerous
challenges to the manner in which voir dire was conducted. He
contends that the trial court erred in 1) failing to continue the case

—— 329

when a number of people who had been summoned for jury duty
did not show up; 2) proceeding with jury orientation when
Jackson was not present; 3) excusing certain jurors who had
expressed reservations about the death penalty, allowing the State
to ask the venire members “impermissible questions designed to
commit them to a verdict,”’ and allowing the State to death-qualify
the jury; and 4) denying Jackson’s Batson challenges.

The extent and scope of voir dire is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Price v. State,
365 Ark, 25, 223 S.W.3d 817 (2006); Williams v. State, 363 Ark.
395, 214 S.W.3d 829 (2005). The judge’s restriction of that
examination will not be reversed on appeal unless that discretion is
clearly abused. Price, supra. Abuse of discretion occurs when the
circuit judge acts arbitrarily or groundlessly. Id.; Horn v. State, 356
Ark. 156, 171-72, 148 S.W.3d 257, 267-68 (2004).

In his first subpoint, Jackson argues that the circuit court
erred when it failed to continue the trial after a number of the
venire members who had been summoned for jury duty failed to
appear. Jackson’s trial was scheduled to begin in Desha County
Circuit Court on the morning of Monday, February 26, 2007.
However, on Saturday, February 24, 2007, a tornado struck the
city of Dumas. On Monday morning, the circuit court assembled
the attorneys in chambers prior to the beginning of the proceed-
ings. At that time, Jackson had not arrived at the courthouse yet,
although the court’s clerk advised that the sheriff's office had said
they were “‘on their way from Dumas with him right now.” In
addition, one of Jackson’s attorneys, Llewellyn Marczuk, had not
yet arrived at the courthouse because he had been involved in an
auto accident on his way to court.

The judge commented that, despite the devastation in Du-
mas, he thought they could “‘select a jury from all of the other
surrounding areas. But we’ll just see who all shows up.” The judge
and counsel then discussed which attorneys would be handling
which phases of the proceedings, how many witnesses each side
would call, whether an offer had been made, and other preliminary
matters. The court also informed the attorneys that it intended to
excuse any jurors who had been directly affected by the storm.

The parties proceeded into open court, where the judge
assembled those jurors who had shown up and played a videotaped

juror orientation. After the video was over, the court began asking
questions to determine whether everyone was eligible to serve on
a jury, such as whether everyone was over the age of eighteen, a
citizen of the United States, and lived in Desha County, and
whether anyone was a convicted felon or had served on a jury
within the last two years. Two jurors were excused at this time.’

After another short period of discussion between the court
and counsel, Bing Colvin, one of Jackson’s attorneys, commented
that the proceedings had been going on without Jackson’s pres-
ence. Colvin moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury would infer,
from Jackson’s absence, that he was disinterested in the proceed-
ings. The court denied the mistrial, noting that the roll had not
been called and no jurors had been sworn in, but agreed to suspend
the proceedings until Jackson arrived.

Jackson arrived at the courthouse shortly thereafter, and the
court administered the oath to the prospective jurors. The State
announced that it was ready for trial, but Jackson’s attorneys asked
the court for a continuance based on the fact that the defense team
had not yet completed its mitigation investigation. The court
denied the motion and proceeded to call the roll of the prospective
jurors. Many of the names that were called received no response;
Jackson alleges that, of the 108 people who had been summoned,
twenty-eight failed to appear.

Hs On appeal, Jackson argues that the trial court’s failure
to continue the trial resulted in a violation of his fundamental right
to a fair trial before an impartial jury made up of a cross-section of
the community. However, as is apparent from the sequence of
events set out above, Jackson never raised a fair-cross-section
objection before the trial court. The essence of a “‘fair-~cross-
section”’ claim is the systematic exclusion of a “distinctive group”
in the community. See Harris v. State, 320 Ark. 677, 682, 899
S.W.2d 459, 462 (1995) (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986)). However, an objection on this basis must be raised in a
timely fashion. In Harris, supra, the defendant did not raise his
fair-cross-section argument until after trial in his motion for new
trial; this court held that his objection was untimely. Id. at 682-83,

5 One woman had brought her child to court with her because she could not arrange
for daycare, and one man was excused because he had sat on a jury within the last two years.

a
CY 331

899 S.W.2d at 462. Here, the argument was never raised at all.
Therefore, we decline to address it.¢

Jackson’s second subpoint concerns the court’s decision to
conduct jury orientation before he was brought to the courthouse.
As noted above, Jackson’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on
Jackson’s absence, but the trial court denied it. On appeal, Jackson
asserts that a criminal defendant has the right to be present during
the process of impaneling a jury, and that, by “moving forward
with jury selection in [his] absence,”’ the circuit court violated his
constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury made up
of a cross-section of the community, as well as his confrontation
and due-process rights.

Hl The State responds that Jackson’s argument is not
preserved, as he failed to move for a mistrial at the earliest
opportunity. We note that, at the time he made his motion, the
court had already engaged in discussions with counsel and had
played the orientation videotape for the jury. Clearly, Jackson had
been absent throughout these proceedings, but the mistrial motion
was not raised until well after these events occurred. A motion for
mistrial must be raised at the first opportunity. See Ellis v. State, 366
Ark. 46, 233 S.W.3d 606 (2006); Dorn v. State, 360 Ark. 1, 199
S.W.3d 647 (2004). This is true even when the alleged error
involves trial proceedings occurring in the defendant’s absence. See
Clayton v. State, 321 Ark. 602, 608, 906 S.W.2d 290, 294 (1995).
Here, had Jackson moved for mistrial at the first opportunity —
perhaps, say, as soon as the trial court initiated its discussion with
counsel in chambers — the court could have halted the proceed-
ings until Jackson arrived at the courthouse and avoided any
potential problems.

In his third subpoint, Jackson argues that the circuit court
“erred by excusing for cause potential jurors who expressed
reservations about imposing the death penalty; by failing to excuse

6 Jackson asserts that the circuit court should have intervened on its own accord to
address this matter, citing Wicks 1, State, 270 Ark. 781,606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). However, this
court has noted that, if we have previously rejected an attempt to argue an error on appeal
when no objection was made, or no contemporaneons objection was raised, the alleged error
cannot be within the Wicks categories. See Buckley x. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825
(2002). Therefore, as the Harris court held that a fair-cross-section challenge requires a
timely objection, the argument cannot fall under the Wicks categories of arguments that may
be raised for the first time on appeal.

those jurors who were unfit for jury duty; and by allowing the
State to ask the venire persons impermissible questions designed to
commit them to a verdict, and to use the answers to exclude from.
the jury anyone who had qualms about the death penalty.”

Jackson alleges that the court erred by allowing the prosecu-
tor to ask potential jurors a set of “A or B” questions regarding
their views on the death penalty. The questions were these:

A. I believe the death penalty is appropriate in some capital
cases, and I could return a verdict resulting in death in a proper
case; or

B. Although I don’t believe that the death penalty should be
imposed, as long as the law provides for it, could assess the death
penalty in the proper set of circumstances.

The State struck any potential juror who answered “B” to this
question. Jackson also argues that the State should not have been
permitted to read the potential jurors the aggravating circumstances
on which it was relying and ask those jurors whether they agreed that
such a factor ought to be considered an aggravator. In essence, Jackson
argues that this practice allowed the State to commit the jurors to a
verdict and select only those who were prone to imposing the death
penalty.

To the extent that Jackson objects to the “death-
qualification” of his jury, his argument is moot because he was
sentenced to life imprisonment. This court has held that, where a
defendant receives a sentence of life in prison, he lacks standing to
raise errors having to do with the death penalty. See Hamilton v.
State, 348 Ark. 532, 537, 74 S.W.3d 615, 618 (2002); King v. State,
312 Ark. 89, 92, 847 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1993) (the fact that the jury
was death-qualified and death was considered throughout the trial
as a possible sentence is of no moment when death is not the
penalty assessed). Therefore, we do not address Jackson’s argu-
ments wherein he urges that the trial court erred in 1) refusing to
grant Jackson’s cause challenges to jurors who stated that they
would be unable to consider anything but the death penalty and 2)
granting the State’s cause challenges to jurors with reservations
about the death penalty.

Nonetheless, Jackson argues that the “‘death-qualification”’

process left him with a jury that was unwilling to consider
mitigation evidence. Specifically, he points to Juror Abernathy,

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es 333

who stated that he did not believe in lesser degrees of murder, and
contends that the trial court erred in refusing to strike Abernathy
for cause. However, Jackson did not preserve his for-cause argu-
ment with respect to Abernathy.

Abernathy was one of a panel of six venire members;
the other people were Mr. Hundley, Ms. O’Leary, Mr. Mays, Ms.
Fletcher, and Mr. Regan. Jackson argues that Abernathy stated
during voir dire that “I think if you murder somebody, . . . you’ve
done it and that’s it. There shouldn’t be a lesser. If you murdered
somebody you murdered somebody.” Jackson initially moved to
strike Abernathy for cause, but the court decided to allow the
parties to attempt to rehabilitate him. When the State and the
defense reached the end of their voir dire, the court asked again if
there were any cause challenges. Jackson’s attorneys immediately
moved to strike Mr. Hundley, who was the deputy prosecutor’s
brother-in-law; this strike was granted in the following colloquy:

Tue Court: I'll grant that one. Of course, I haven’t
heard arguments, but I’ll grant that one.

Mr. Porcu: Note my exception.
Tue Court: Very well, I'll note your exception.
Tue CrerK: So Abernathy is cause?

Tue Court: No. Larry Hundley. Implied bias. Are
there any others?

Jackson’s counsel responded by naming Fletcher, O’Leary, and Mays.
No other mention was made of Abernathy. Therefore, Jackson either
failed to receive a ruling on his initial motion to strike Abernathy for
cause, or he withdrew his for-cause challenge. Thus, he has failed to
preserve his argument on appeal in regard to Abernathy. See Flowers v.
State, 342 Ark. 45, 25 S.W.3d 422 (2000).

Next, Jackson urges more generally that the State’s
deliberate selection of death-prone jurors prohibited the jury from
being able to consider any evidence of mitigation. In essence, he
contends that the death-qualification of the jury prejudiced him by
causing him to be tried by a jury prone to conviction, stating that
the jury’s “unwillingness to consider [his mitigation] evidence

manifested itselfin a verdict of guilty of capital murder, rather than
one of the lesser degrees of murder advanced” at trial. However,
the United States Supreme Court has rejected this argument, see
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (dismissing the notion that
death-qualifying a jury results in a jury that is more prone to
convict a capital defendant), as has this court. See Hickson v. State,
312 Ark. 171, 847 S.W.2d 691 (1993); Ruiz v. State, 299 Ark. 144,
772 S.W.2d 297 (1989).

Finally, Jackson argues that the trial court should have
granted his motion to strike an entire six-member panel from the
venire after the defense team received word from some of Jack-
son’s family members that they had overheard Jason Curtis, one of
the venire persons, making comments to the effect of, “If he’s a
Jackson, he’s guilty.” Jackson urges that this entire panel was
tainted and should have been stricken for cause, which would have
saved him from having to use four of his twelve peremptory strikes
on this panel.

HB We do not address Jackson’s argument because “‘it
pertains to venire persons that appellant excused through the use of
his peremptory challenges.” Willis v. State, 334 Ark. 412, 420, 977
S.W.2d 890, 894 (1998). It is well settled that the loss of peremp-
tory challenges cannot be reviewed on appeal. Id.; see also Ferrell v.
State, 325 Ark. 455, 929 S.W.2d 697 (1996). The focus should not
be on a venire person who was peremptorily challenged, but on
the persons who actually sat on the jury. Willis, 334 Ark. at 420,
977 S.W.2d at 894. Of these six venire persons, the court struck
Curtis for cause; the State exercised a peremptory challenge as to
another; and the defense exercised peremptory challenges to the
remaining four. Because Jackson excused these four out of the six
venire persons through peremptory challenges, we do not address
Jackson’s allegations of error as to them. See Willis, 334 Ark. at 420,
977 S.W.2d at 894.

In his fourth and final subpoint pertaining to alleged errors
during voir dire, Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in
denying his Batson challenges to the State’s striking of several
jarors. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), a prosecutor
in a criminal case may not use his peremptory strikes to exclude
jurors solely on the basis of race. Travis v. State, 371 Ark. 621, 269
S.W.3d 341 (2007); Ratliff v. State, 359 Ark. 479, 199 S.W.3d 79
(2004). In determining whether such a violation has occurred, a
three-step analysis is applied. The first step requires the opponent

a
iY 335

of the peremptory strike to present facts that show a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. Stokes v. State, 359 Ark. 94, 194
S.W.3d 762 (2004). This first step is accomplished by showing the
following: (a) the opponent of the strike shows he is a member of
an identifiable racial group; (b) the strike is part of a jury-selection
process or pattern designed to discriminate; and (c) the strike was
used to exclude jurors because of their race. Id. (citing MacKintrush
v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998)).

Once a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown,
the process moves to the second step, wherein the burden of
producing a racially neutral explanation shifts to the proponent of
the strike. Travis, supra. This explanation, according to Batson, must
be more than a mere denial of discrimination or an assertion that a
shared race would render the challenged juror partial to the one
opposing the challenge. Weston v. State, 366 Ark. 265, 234 S.W.3d
838 (2006). The reason will be deemed race neutral “‘[u]nless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation.”
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam). But,
according to Purkett, a trial court must not end the Batson inquiry
at this stage, and, indeed, it is error to do so. If a race-neutral
explanation is given, the inquiry proceeds to the third step, in
which the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the
strike has proven purposeful discrimination. Travis, supra. We will
not reverse a trial court’s findings on a Batson objection unless the
trial court’ decision was clearly against the preponderance of the’
evidence. Ratliff, supra.

Jackson argues his jury was disproportionately deprived of
African-American members due to the State’s exercise of peremp-
tory strikes.’ The first of Jackson’s Batson challenges was in regard
to prospective juror Charles Carr. After the State moved to strike
Carr, Jackson objected and pointed out that the State had been
asking potential jurors if they had children close to Jackson’s age,
but had only been asking that question of black jurors. The State

7 Jackson also argues that the State’s use of peremptory challenges against Aftican-
Americans violated his rights to a jury comprised of a fair cross section of the community.
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the fair-cross-section requirement
does not preclude the State from using peremptory challenges on the basis of race. See
Lockhart v McCree, 476 USS. 162, 173 (1986) (““We have never invoked the fair-cross-section
principle to invalidate the use of .. peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require
petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community
at large”); see also Holland u Ilinois, 493 US. 474 (1990).

|
336 es =

responded that it had not established a pattern of racially motivated
strikes, noting that of the five peremptory challenges it had
exercised to that point, four of them were white venire members.
The State then offered, as a racially neutral reason, that it had
excused Carr because he had answered “‘B” to the State’s “A or B”
question about his views on the death penalty. The court accepted
this as a racially neutral reason.

The other three venire members about whom Batson chal-
lenges were raised were Jessie Powell, Percy Bentley, and Lorene
Lewis. In each case, after Jackson raised his Batson challenge, the
State explained that the potential jurors had answered “‘B” to its
question on their views about the death penalty. In addition, as to
Lorene Lewis, the State explained that Lewis had said that she went
to church with Jackson’s wife and had visited with her at the
courthouse.

HB (On appeal, Jackson argues that the circuit court should
have conducted a “reasonable and sensitive inquiry into the
race-neutral reasons stated by the prosecutor.” However, the
record reflects that Jackson did not pursue any further questioning
after the State offered its racially neutral explanations to the circuit
court. In Weston v. State, 366 Ark. 265, 234 S.W.3d 848 (2006),
this court noted that it is the responsibility of the party opposing
the strike to move the matter forward at the third stage of the
process and to meet the burden of persuasion. Weston, 366 Ark. at
375, 234 S.W.3d at 856. The Weston court further stated that
“[t]his is not the trial court’s responsibility, as the trial court can
only inquire into the evidence that is made available to it.
According to this court, if the party opposing the strike does not
present more evidence, no additional inquiry by the trial court is
required.” Id.

Moreover, in Weston, supra, this court upheld the State’s use
of the same “‘A or B” questions as were utilized in this case. The
Weston court noted that, while jurors should not be excused for
cause without further questioning simply because they expressed
reservations about the death penalty, the State could use its
peremptory strikes to excuse jurors if it appeared they “would be
less likely to impose the death penalty.” Weston, 366 Ark. at 375,
234 S.W.3d at 856. Accordingly, there is no merit to Jackson’s
argument that the State’s reason for striking these jurors (i.e., they
had all answered “‘B”) was not a valid reason for eliminating
potential jurors. This is especially so when, as here, the State struck

a
es 337

every juror — not just the African-American ones — who an-
swered “‘B” to its question about their views on the death penalty.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is no merit to Jackson’s Batson
claim.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his third point on appeal, Jackson argues that the circuit
court should have granted his motion for mistrial, made during
voir dire, in response to the alleged ineffectiveness of one of his
four attorneys. As attorney Marczuk was conducting voir dire of
the fourth group of potential jurors, he raised an objection to a line
of the State’s questioning. After the court excused the venire
members so that counsel could discuss Marczuk’s objection, Marc-
zuk asked that the panel be stricken, but the prosecutor, Thomas
Deen, commented that it had been raising the same line of
questions with the previous jurors. Marczuk replied that one of the
other three attorneys had been objecting unsuccessfully to the
question, and he did “‘not mind doing it again.” Deen retorted,
“That’s probably because you were sleeping during the other
ones.”

After another defense attorney complained that Deen’s
comment was derogatory, Deen replied that Marczuk ‘thas obvi-
ously been sleeping during these proceedings.” The court then
attempted to turn the discussion to the actual objection that had
been raised, and the court ultimately denied defense counsel’s
request that the panel be stricken. At that point, defense attorney
Bing Colvin again raised Deen’s comment about Marczuk’s sleep-
ing, and the following colloquy occurred:

Corvin: Well, I’ve tried a number of cases against this
prosecution, and one of their tactics is to make snide
remarks like that. And it’s got no place in a trial where
a man’s life is at stake. And it’s only done to make us
look bad. Now, it’s just not —

Court: What is the objection —

Corvin: — got any place in the record. It’s not got any
place in front of the jury.

Deen: Look bad to who? There’s nobody but us in here.

338

Corvin: And that’s what I meant. He’s going to keep
going. I want to make a record. I made an objection
when we first got started when we were going through
that death is different.

Court: Well, let me —I understand. I think maybe it’s
my responsibility. And lead counsel for the defense
obviously has delegated the responsibility to somebody
else. But he’s alert and he’s ready to go now. Let’s
bring the jury back. The jury hasn’t — we’ve been
going several hours. But I mean, nobody is making up
anything. But, you know, he has a battery of attorneys
for the defense —

Deen: I’m not suggesting he’s suffered any prejudice by
it. I’m not suggesting that in the slightest.

Marczux: Well, apparently he has. So I’ll, we'll go
ahead and declare me ineffective, Judge. I have no
problem with that. If that’s what you want to do, I have
no problem with that. Maybe we should just start
over. I'll go ahead and ask to recuse. If I might go
ahead and ask to step aside.

Court: Well, I’m ready to go forward.
Marczur: Is that denied, Judge?

Court: Yes. I really think that if you want to be ex-
cused, you can. If you’re ready to go, that’s fine.

Marczur: No, I can’t deny it, Judge. I stayed up late last
night. I’ve fallen asleep. I’m sure not going to drive
now. Sure not going to.

Court: Now, he has three other competent attorneys.
He’s not the only counsel for the client. But in terms of
your objections, I’m ready to bring in the jurors.

On appeal, Jackson argues that his attorney’s behavior preju-

diced his ability to receive a fair trial, and the trial court’s “refusal
to grant a mistrial violated [his] Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel, as well as a fair and impartial jury.”

a
TY 339

However, it is not apparent from the above colloquy that any of
Jackson’s attorneys ever specifically moved for a mistrial. In
addition, the colloquy does not reflect that any of Jackson’s
attorneys ever argued that Jackson’s right to a fair and impartial
jury had been violated. Accordingly, neither of these arguments is
preserved for appeal. See Dorn v. State, 360 Ark. at 4, 199 S.W.3d
at 649 (a motion for mistrial, like an objection, must be both
contemporaneous and specific).

Thus, the court need only consider whether Marczuk’s
actions rendered his assistance ineffective. Under the standard set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to determine
ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show first that
counsel’s performance was deficient. Sparkman v. State, 373 Ark.
45, 281 S.W.3d 277 (2008). Second, the petitioner must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
petitioner of a fair trial. Id. The petitioner must show there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder
would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e. the
decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id.
Furthermore, unless a petitioner makes both Strickland showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in
the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. Actual
ineffectiveness claims alleging deficiency in attorney performance
are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirma~
tively prove prejudice. Id.

Jackson cites cases in support of the premise that “sleeping
counsel is tantamount to no counsel at all.”” See, e.g., United States
v. Thomas, 194 Fed. App’x 807 (11th Cir. 2006); Burdine v. Johnson,
262 F.3d 336 (2001). Cases such as Burdine, supra, and Tippins v.
Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996), have held that prejudice can be
presumed from the fact of a defense attorney’s sleeping through
critical stages of a defendant’s trial because “‘if counsel sleeps, the
ordinary analytical tools for identifying prejudice are unavailable.”
Tippins, 77 F.3d at 686. See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984) (a defendant is denied counsel not only when his attorney
is physically absent from the proceeding, but when he is mentally
absent as well, whether by being asleep, unconscious, or otherwise
non compos mentis).

However, the cases on which Jackson relies involve a
sole defense attorney sleeping through large portions of the trial.
See, e.g., Burdine, 262 F.3d at 339 (witnesses testified that attorney

340 [OO

fell asleep as many as ten times during trial, once for at least ten
minutes). Here, on the other hand, Jackson had four attorneys, all
of whom participated in voir dire. Moreover, the record does not
reflect how long Marczuk had been asleep, and even during those
periods when he was sleeping, Jackson’s other attorneys were
actively engaged in voir dire. In Ex Parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d
743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
refused to presume prejudice from lead counsel’s naps, even when
they occurred during critical stages of the trial, because the
defendant had two attorneys and was thus never without counsel.
McFarland, 163 S.W.3d at 752-53. Accordingly, because Jackson
was never without the assistance of counsel — and counsel about
whom he raises no claims of ineffectiveness — his argument lacks
merit.

IV, Exclusion of Testimony

In his fourth point on appeal, Jackson takes issue with two of
the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings: the first ruling admonished
the jury not to draw an inference from one witness’s testimony that
Damon Freeman was the one who shot Herman Cobb; the second.
ruling precluded Jackson from calling two witnesses who would
have testified about the relationship between Jackson and his
brother. The circuit court has wide discretion in making eviden-
tiary rulings, and we will not reverse its ruling on the admissibility
of evidence absent an abuse of discretion. See Wright v. State, 368
Ark. 629, 249 S.W.3d 133 (2007); Brunson v. State, 368 Ark. 313,
245 S.W.3d 132 (2006).

During Jackson’s cross~examination of witness Anthony
Harrell, Jackson engaged in a reenactment of the scene with
Harrell in an attempt to demonstrate to the jury where Jackson,
Freeman, and Cobb were located at the time Cobb was shot.
Counsel then asked Harrell, “isn’t it true that . . . [Freeman] is
right-handed, and Herman Cobb is shot in the left side of the head,
so it has to come from this angle of [Freeman], not [Jackson]? Isn’t
that correct? He was shot in the left side of the head?” Counsel
then reiterated, “That’s the side he gets shot in, the side [Freeman]
is on. Right?” The State objected, arguing that there was no
evidence that Freeman had shot Cobb and asking the court to
strike the question from the record. The court agreed, admonish-
ing the jury as follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to give you a cautionary instruc-
tion just for precautionary measures. There has not been any

P|
PTT 341

evidence presented at this time that supports that Herman Cobb
was shot by [Freeman], and no inference is to be drawn that he
was. And, if so, you are to disregard any inference that Herman
Cobb was shot by [Freeman].

Jackson did not object to the admonition at the time.
However, during the testimony of the next witness, Debbie Dean,
Jackson asked the court to withdraw the admonition when Dean
testified that she heard Cobb mumble Freeman’s name. The court
denied the request, explaining that the admonition had gone to
“that particular statement.”

HB On appeal, Jackson argues that the trial court erred by
“directing the jurors to disregard evidence that Freeman may have
killed Cobb.”” However, as the State notes, at the time the court
admonished the jury, there simply was no evidence that Freeman
had been the one who shot Cobb. All of the witnesses’ testimony
indicated that Jackson had been the only one seen with the gun,
and Nick Ward testified that Jackson fired the third shot at Cobb.
Therefore, the inference counsel wished to draw from his ques-
tioning was drawn from facts that were not in evidence. See Perry
v, State, 279 Ark. 213, 216, 650 S.W.2d 240, 243 (1983) (questions
which assume facts not in evidence are improper). Accordingly,
the circuit court did not err in admonishing the jury.

Next, Jackson contends that the circuit court abused its
discretion when it refused to allow him to call two of his sisters to
testify during the guilt phase of his trial. These sisters, whose
testimony Jackson was permitted to proffer, would have described
the relationship between Jackson and Freeman in order to show
that, by seeing his brother being beaten up by Cobb, Jackson was
somehow provoked into shooting Cobb. This, Jackson contends,
went to the heart of his defense that the shooting was an act of
manslaughter, rather than an act of capital murder. After listening
to the proffered testimony, however, the trial court ruled that it
did not see how their testimony “would be relevant on guilt or
innocence.”

HH (On appeal, Jackson urges that the circuit court’s
ruling prevented him from “present[ing] evidence to refute the
elements of capital murder’? in violation of his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to present a defense. He contends that he
wished to call his sisters to “show the reasonableness of the
provocation that led to this incident, as well as to explain [his]

emotional state at the time.” However, even assuming that the
sisters’ testimony demonstrated the close nature of Jackson’s rela-
tionship with his brother, the court’s decision to exclude the
testimony did not rise to the level of reversible error. This is so
because, regardless of that testimony, the evidence still over-
whelmingly showed that Jackson was not entitled to a manslaugh-
ter instruction, as discussed below. As such, the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in ruling that the sisters’ testimony was
irrelevant to the guilt phase of Jackson’s trial.

V. Jury Instructions on Manslaughter as a Lesser-Included Offense

As mentioned above, Jackson was charged with capital
murder. While the parties were preparing their jury instructions,
Jackson asked the court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included
offense of manslaughter. The court denied the request, finding that
the facts did not support the instruction. Jackson then proffered the
instruction to the court. On appeal, Jackson argues that the circuit
court’s rejection of his proffered jury instruction was error.

This court has stated repeatedly that it is reversible error to
refuse to instruct on a lesser-included offense when there is the
slightest evidence to support the instruction. See Boyle v. State, 363
Ark. 356, 361, 214 S.W.3d 250, 252-53 (2005) (citing Flowers v.
State, 362 Ark. 193, 208 S.W.3d 113 (2005)). However, we will
affirm a trial court’s decision not to give an instruction on a
lesser-included offense if there is no rational basis for giving the
instruction. Id. at 362, 214 $.W.3d at 253. Finally, we will not
reverse a trial court’s ruling regarding the submission of such an
instruction absent an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Grillot v. State,
353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003)).

The manslaughter instruction that Jackson wished to submit
to the jury comes from Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(1) (Repl.
1997), which provides as follows:

(a) A person commits manslaughter if. .. . [t]he person causes
the death of another person under circumstances that would be
murder, except that he or she causes the death under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
excuse.... The reasonableness of the excuse is determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circum-
stances as the actor believed them to be[.]

In order for a jury to be instructed on extreme-emotional-disturbance
manslaughter, this court has repeatedly held that there must be

a
Pd 343

evidence that the defendant killed the victim in the moment follow-
ing some kind of provocation, such as “physical fighting, a threat, or
a brandished weapon.” Boyle, 363 Ark. at 362, 214 S.W.3d at 352
(quoting Kail v. State, 341 Ark. 89, 94, 14 S.W.3d 878, 881 (2000)).

This court has also stated that the passion that will reduce a
homicide from murder to manslaughter

may consist of anger or sudden resentment, or of fear or terror; but
the passion springing from any of these causes will not alone reduce
the grade of the homicide. There must also be a provocation which
induced the passion, and which the law deems adequate to make the
passion irresistible. An assault with violence upon another who acts
under the influence thereof may be sufficient to arouse such passion.

MacKool v. State, 363 Ark. 295, 298-99, 213 S.W.3d 618, 620-21
(2005) (quoting Rainey v. State, 310 Ark. 419, 837 S.W.3d 453
(1992)). Thus, to qualify for the manslaughter instruction, there must
be evidence of a provocation resulting in an extreme emotional
disturbance, Id. The element of emotional disturbance may be proven
by evidence of an external event calculated to arouse or provoke a
reasonable person to take the actions that resulted in the victim’s
death. Bankston v. State, 361 Ark. 123, 129, 205 S.W.3d 138, 143
(2005).

Here, Jackson argues that there was evidence that he was
provoked to shoot Cobb by witnessing the altercation between
Cobb and his brother, an altercation that, by all accounts, Cobb
‘was winning. He also notes that there was testimony that he and his
brother were very close and that he looked out for Freeman.
However, Jackson points to no evidence that Cobb’s actions in
fighting Freeman were calculated to provoke Jackson to take
action.

HB We also note that, after shooting Cobb in the thigh,
there was a delay of a minute or two before Jackson fired the fatal
shot to Cobb’s head. Moreover, during this interval of time, Ward
and Freeman exhorted Jackson not to shoot Cobb. In light of this
evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that no rational basis existed for giving the jury Jackson’s
requested manslaughter instruction.

VI. Medical Examiner’s Report

Jackson’s final point on appeal concerns the circuit court’s
decision to allow the jury to take the medical examiner’s report

a |__| r

with them into the jury room during deliberations. During Dr.
Peretti’s testimony, the State moved to introduce the medical
examiner’s autopsy report, which detailed his medical findings and
conclusion as to the manner of Cobb’s death. Jackson objected,
arguing that admitting the report in addition to Dr. Peretti’s
testimony was simply “‘bolstering’”’ and ‘‘cumulative” since the
doctor had already testified. The trial court allowed the State to
introduce the report at State’s Exhibit 6. The court also allowed
the State to supplement the autopsy report with the State Crime
Lab’s toxicology report. When the jury retired to begin delibera-
tions, Jackson objected to the jury taking the report with them,
stating that the report contained information that was not in
evidence; however, the court overruled the objection.

On appeal, Jackson does not challenge the trial court’s initial
ruling allowing the report to be admitted into evidence; rather, he
argues that the court erred in letting the jurors take the report with
them into the jury room, reiterating his argument that the report
contained evidence that had never been presented to the jury.
Therefore, he claims, because neither he nor his attorneys were
present when the jury received this evidence, his right to be
present at a critical stage of the proceedings was violated, and.
prejudice must be presumed under Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218,
853 S.W.2d 882 (1993).

Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-89-125(d)(3) (Repl.
2005) provides that, “[u]pon retiring for deliberation, the jury may
take with them all papers which have been received as evidence in the
cause.” (Emphasis added.) In Anderson v. State, 367 Ark. 536, 242
S.W.3d 229 (2006), this court held that, where a videotaped
statement had been introduced into evidence, it was not error for
the trial court to allow the jury to have the videotape in the jury
room during deliberations because the defendant had been present
when the tape was played and introduced during trial. Anderson,
367 Ark. at 542-43, 242 S.W.3d at 234. Similarly, in the instant
case, because the report was introduced into evidence during the
trial, while Jackson was present and represented by counsel, the
circuit court did not err in sending the report with the jury during
deliberations.

In Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143, 167, 243 S.W.3d 866, 883
(2006), this court concluded that the jury’s taking exhibits (in that
case, audiotapes and videotapes of out-of-court statements) that
had been admitted into evidence and made exhibits at trial was not

a critical stage of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the defendant's
presence would not have contributed to the fairness of the proceed-
ings. Id. (citing Anderson, supra). Similarly, here, as noted above, the
report had been admitted into evidence. Although the report may
have contained some details about which Dr. Peretti did not testify,
this would merely have constituted cause to move for redaction of
portions of the exhibit, which Jackson did not do. However, the
report had been admitted as an exhibit, and therefore, under § 16-89-
125(d)(3), the court did not err in sending it back with the jury.

VI. Rule 4-3(h) Review

The record in this case has been reviewed for reversible error
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 4-3(h), and none has been found.

Veronica POST v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD of
ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, John Paul Pendergrass,
Herman Verkamp and Randy Hillard, in Their Official
Capacities; and Gary Zolliecoffer, Individually

08-723 290 S.W.3d 595

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 15, 2009

Butler & Green, P.A., by: Chad M. Green and Adam H. Butler,
for appellant.

Barham Law Office, P.A., by: R. Kevin Barham, for appellee Gary
Zolliecoffer.

onatp L. Corin, Justice. Appellant Veronica Post ap-

peals the order of the Franklin County Circuit Court
dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction her petition for a writ
of mandamus and request for declaratory judgment. Because this is the
second appeal of this election case, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark.
Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(4) and (7). We affirm.

Post and Appellee Gary Zolliecoffer were candidates for the
office of mayor of Altus, Arkansas, in an election held November
7, 2006. It was not disputed that Post received 123 votes and

Zolliecoffer received 136 votes.' Two days after the election, Post
initiated the litigation that comprised the first appeal; she alleged
that Zolliecoffer was a convicted felon and asked that Appellee
Franklin County Board of Election Commissioners (the ‘“‘Board’’)
declare him ineligible to run for office and remove his name from
the ballot. The circuit court found that Zolliecoffer had pleaded
guilty to burglary and grand larceny in 1965 and therefore was a
convicted felon and an ineligible candidate; accordingly, the
circuit court prohibited the Board from certifying any votes for
Zolliecoffer. Zolliecoffer appealed that order. This court reversed
and dismissed, finding that the circuit court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear a preelection eligibility challenge filed after the
election and that Post had not instituted a postelection contest
because she had stipulated that Zolliecoffer received the most
votes. Zolliecoffer v. Post, 371 Ark. 263, 265 S.W.3d 114 (2007).

While the first appeal was pending, however, and within the
time allowed by statute, the Board certified the votes cast for Post.
Zolliecoffer did not contest that certification pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann. § 7-5-801 (Repl. 2007). Post was subsequently com-
missioned by the Governor and took the oath of office of mayor in
January 2007.

This court issued its opinion in the first appeal on October
11, 2007. According to the petition she filed in the present case,
Post contends that on November 15, 2007, the Board scheduled a
meeting for November 19, 2007, to consider whether to certify
votes in favor of Zolliecoffer. Post then filed the present action on
November 19, 2007, against both Zolliecoffer and the Board. She
sought a writ of mandamus prohibiting the Board from certifying
any votes cast for Zolliecoffer and a judgment declaring that the
fifteen-day requirement for certifying votes pursuant to Ark. Code
Ann. § 7-5-701(a)(1) (Repl. 2007) was mandatory and that the
Board was not authorized to certify votes cast in favor of Zolliecof-
fer.

The circuit court held a hearing on Post’s petition on
February 28, 2008. There, the Board stated that it met to take
action following the opinion issued by this court in the first appeal,

* The record in the present appeal reveals there was some discussion as to whether Post
actually received 123 votes or 126 votes, as reflected in various pleadings filed in both cases
and in the opinion issued in the first appeal, The difference of the three votes is immaterial
for purposes of this appeal.

but that it had also been notified of pending litigation, and
therefore in the interest of preserving “judicial assets,” would just
wait until the court told it what to do. The Board also admitted
during the hearing that on November 15, 2007, it had certified the
votes cast for Post, and that now since the previously entered order
had been reversed, the Board was “prepared to certify those votes.
However, we need the Court’s guidance because of the issues that
were raised by Ms. Post, whether or not the fifteen days —
whether or not it is untimely for us to certify.”

Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order dated
March 24, 2008, dismissing Post’s petition for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. The order incorporated the circuit court’s
letter opinion of March 11, 2008, wherein the court stated that
based on the opinion of this court in the first appeal and the
doctrine of the law of the case, “‘this Court finds that it still lacks
jurisdiction of this matter on all issues before the Court with the
exception of the Defendant Gary Zolliecoffer’s request for a “Writ
of Mandamus.’ The present appeal followed.

As her first point for reversal, Post argues that she is without
an adequate remedy to challenge the Board’s unlawful actions, and
we should therefore interpret section 7-5-701(a)(1) as creating a
third type of action in election cases allowing her to challenge the
Board’s certification of results. See, e.g., Willis v. Crumbly, 368 Ark.
5, 10-11, 242 S.W.3d 600, 604 (2006) (recognizing ‘two types of
election cases provided for by statute: pre-election, eligibility
challenges and post-election, election contests’’). In essence, Post
asks this court to construe the election code to fashion a remedy for
her.

Hl This second appeal is but another attempt to achieve
the same objective as that of the first appeal. However, the decision
of this court in the first appeal is now the law of the case, as the
circuit court correctly observed. In the first appeal, Post sought to
challenge Zolliecoffer’s eligibility and certification as the winner.
In the second appeal, Post seeks the same objective, which is to

2 Apparently, based on this and other parts of the court’s order, Zolliecoffer had filed
a counterclaim for writ of mandamus, which the circuit court denied, finding that the Board
did not act wilfally in refusing to perform its duties. Iti also apparent that Zolliecoffer had
filed an additional counterclaim based in quo warranto, which the circuit court denied for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Zolliecoffer did not file a cross-appeal relating to these
counterclaims, and therefore they are not at issue here.

prevent the votes for Zolliecoffer from being certified. These
issues were decided adversely to Post in the first appeal. They are
now the law of the case. Scamardo v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375
Ark. 300, 289 S.W.3d 903 (2008). The law-of-the-case doctrine
prohibits a court from reconsidering issues of law and fact that have
already been or could have been presented in the first appeal. Id.
Inasmuch as Post is still challenging Zolliecoffer’s eligibility and
the certification of him as the winner, the circuit court was correct
in recognizing as the law of the case that it did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction. Zolliecoffer, 371 Ark. 263, 265 S.W.3d 114
(citing Pederson v. Stracener, 354 Ark. 716, 128 S.W.3d 818 (2003)).
Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing Post’s petition
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

We next consider Post’s second argument for reversal. She
contends the circuit court erroneously granted the Board an
additional fifteen days from the entry of its order to certify the
votes cast in the 2006 Altus mayoral election. Section 7-5-
701(a)(1) states as follows:

No earlier than forty-eight (48) hours after the election and no later
than the fifteenth calendar day after the election, the county board
of election commissioners, from the certificates and ballots received
from the several precincts, shall proceed to ascertain, declare, and
certify the result of the election to the Secretary of State.

Post contends the circuit court is without authority to allow the
Board’s certification beyond this statutorily prescribed period. Zol-
liecoffer responds that Post should be estopped from claiming that the
Board cannot now certify results because it was her action in obtain-
ing the order that prohibited the timely certification in the first place.

HB We first observe that the circuit court correctly inter-
preted this court’s opinion in the first appeal as reversing the order
that originally prevented the Board from timely certifying votes
for Zolliecoffer within the statutory period. Therefore, in its letter
opinion issued in this second appeal, the circuit court stated that
after the reversal of that injunction “there remains no further
impediment to the Franklin County Election Commission in
fulfilling their duties under the law and certifying the election
results as per the votes cast, within fifteen days of the filing of the
Orders in regard to this decision.” Our review of this issue,
including whether estoppel is appropriate here, is precluded be-

ee
350 _ _

cause Post has invited the alleged error of which she complains.
The doctrine of invited error provides that a person cannot
complain of an alleged erroneous action of the trial court if she
herself induced such action. Peeks v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 304
Ark. 172, 800 S.W.2d 428 (1990). This litigation began on
November 9, 2006, which was in the midst of the statutorily
prescribed period for certification, when Post requested and ob-
tained an order prohibiting the Board from certifying the results of
the election. Thus, Post sought the order that precluded the
Board’s timely certification of results. The doctrine of invited error
operates so that she cannot now be heard to complain that any
certification is now untimely following the reversal of the errone-
ously issued order.

Affirmed.
ImBER, J., not participating.

Ann C. DONOVAN v. SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE on
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

08-804 290 S.W.3d 599

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 15, 2009

351

Bob Estes, for appellant.

[|
352 PE

Stark Ligon, Executive Director, and Nancie M. Givens, Deputy
Director, Office of Professional Conduct, for appellee.

Re L. Brown, Justice. This matter is an appeal by
appellant Ann Donovan from the Findings and Order of
Panel A of the appellee Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on
Professional Conduct (“Committee”), suspending Donovan’s license
to practice law for twelve months, reprimanding her, requiring her to
pay restitution to her clients, and assessing costs. We affirm the
Findings and Order of Panel A.'

Ann Donovan has been licensed to practice law in Arkansas
since 1978. In 2005, she filed a bankruptcy action on behalf of
William and Viola Parks, and as a result of that representation, the
bankruptcy judge, Richard Taylor, referred her to the Committee
for disciplinary action. The allegations by Judge Taylor were that
Donovan had filed inaccurate schedules and petitions in the Parks
bankruptcy matter, that she took no action for over a year after she
was asked to correct the mistakes, and that she failed to commu-
nicate adequately with her clients and the bankruptcy trustee.

The Committee sent a formal complaint to Donovan, dated
August 28, 2007. The complaint was sent to Donovan’s address of
record by certified, restricted delivery, return receipt mail. The
complaint was returned unclaimed. On September 21, 2007, the
Committee resent the formal complaint, again by certified, re-
stricted delivery, return receipt mail. The Track & Confirm system
of the United States Postal Service showed that the complaint was
delivered at 8:24 a.m. on October 11, 2007. Donovan contends
that she did not receive the complaint until she picked it up at the
post office on October 16, 2007.7

The parties agree that, under section 9(B) of the Arkansas
Procedures Regulating Professional Conduct (‘Procedures’),
Donovan had twenty days after the complaint was served to file a

According to the Procedures Regulating Professional Conduct, the Committee shall
consist of two separate seven-member panels. Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Regulating Profl Conduct
§ 3(A)(1) (2008). In this opinion, “Committee” refers to the Committee as a whole. Panel A
is the specific seven-member panel of the Committee that decided Donovan's case.

2 On appeal, Donovan asserts that she became aware of the complaint on October 16,
2007. However, in her petition for reconsideration, she contended that she intended to pick
up the complaint on October 13, 2007, but did not actually receive the complaint until the
October 16, 2007.

ee
Sid 353

response to the complaint or to request an extension of time to
respond. The dispute between the parties is when the twenty-day
period began to run. According to the Committee, it began to run
on October 11, 2007, the day the Postal Service documentation
shows that the complaint was delivered. Donovan contends that
valid service of the complaint was never effectuated and, therefore,
the twenty-day period never began running. She urges in the
alternative, that even if the twenty-day period did begin to run, it
did so on October 16, 2007, the day she contends that she received
actual notice of the complaint.

On November 2, 2007, Donovan called the Committee’s
office and requested an extension of time to file her written
response. She also sent the Committee a written extension request
via facsimile transmission on the same day. On November 5, 2007,
the Committee denied her request for an extension of time on
grounds that it was received after the original twenty-day period
had expired. According to the Committee, Donovan was required
to respond to the formal complaint, in writing, within twenty days
of October 11, 2007. It contended that Donovan’s opportunity to
respond, or to request additional time, was extinguished on
October 31, 2007.

At its November 2007 meeting, Panel A of the Committee
considered the formal complaint against Donovan and suspended
her license to practice law in Arkansas for twelve months, as a
sanction for violating multiple rules of professional conduct. Panel
A also ordered that she pay restitution to her former clients in the
amount of $1,400 and assessed costs in the amount of $50.00. As a
final point, Panel A issued a reprimand, as a separate sanction for
Donovan’s failure to timely file a written response to the formal
complaint.

The Committee sent a copy of Panel A’s decision to Dono-
van by way of certified, restricted delivery, return receipt mail.
The notice accompanying the decision included information re-
garding her right to file a petition for reconsideration with the
Committee. Donovan failed to sign for the documents on two
occasions, and the mailings were returned, as undelivered. On
January 17, 2008, the Committee sent the documents to Donovan
by first class mail. The Committee included a proof of service,
which it requested that Donovan sign and return. She did not do
so.

On February 8, 2008, Donovan filed a petition for recon-
sideration of Panel A’s decision, with her proposed response to the

|
354 PE

original complaint attached as an exhibit. Panel A denied the
petition at its March 2008 meeting. The Findings and Order of
Panel A were then filed with the clerk of this court as a final order
on April 7, 2008, and Donovan was granted a stay of suspension of
her law license pending her appeal.

This court reviews an appeal from the Committee de novo.
See, e.g., Walker v. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 368 Ark.
357, 362, 246 S.W.3d 418, 421-22 (2007). The de novo review
looks to whether the factual findings were clearly erroneous, or
whether the result reached was arbitrary or groundless. Id. We give
due deference to the Committee’s superior position to determine
the credibility of the witnesses, and its findings of fact will not be
reversed unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence. Id. The Committee’s conclusions of law are given no
deference on appeal. Id.

Section 9 of the Procedures is primarily at issue in the instant
appeal. It requires that, when disciplinary action is taken against an
attorney, the Committee shall “furnish to the attorney complained
against a copy of the formal complaint and advise the attorney that
he or she may file a written response in affidavit form with any
supporting evidence desired.”’ Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Regulating Prof]
Conduct § 9(A)(1) (2008). Following effective service, the attor-
ney has twenty days to respond to the complaint in writing. Id.
§ 9(B)(1). Ifthe attorney does not respond, or request an extension
of time to respond, within the required twenty days, the factual
allegations of the complaint are considered admitted, and the
attorney’s right to a public hearing is extinguished.’ Id. § 9(C)(4).
In such circumstances, the attorney is entitled to file a petition for
reconsideration within twenty days of service of the panel’s
decision to impose sanctions. Id. § 9(C)(4)(a). The petition for
reconsideration must state, on oath, compelling and cogent evi-
dence of unavoidable circumstances sufficient to excuse or justify
the initial failure to respond. Id.

I. Untimely Request

The main thrust of Donovan’s argument on appeal is that her
request for an extension of time to respond to the formal complaint

3 The formal complaint in the instant case stated, in bold, large font, on the front
page: WARNING: Fhilure to timely file a written response to this Complaint can carry
substantial adverse consequences and penalties, including that all allegations in the complaint
will be deemed admitted, and you lose your right to any public hearing after a ballot vote.

ee
id 355

was timely because the complaint was never properly served on
her. She contends that service was not perfected because the
Committee did not receive a return receipt, signed by her,
evidencing delivery of the complaint. Because of this, Donovan
argues that the Committee should have granted her additional time
to respond and that Panel A erred in imposing sanctions without
considering her response, which was tendered after Panel A made
its findings. She further contends that Panel A erred in failing to
hold a hearing on the matter. The Committee responds, to repeat
in part, that it was not required to obtain a signed receipt and that
a properly served complaint was delivered to the appellant on
October 11, 2007. As such, her November 2, 2007 communica-
tion with the Committee, requesting an extension of the twenty-
day time period to respond, was untimely. The Committee is
correct on this point.

Throughout her briefs, Donovan cites this court, almost
interchangeably, to section 9 of the Procedures and Rule 4 of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure (“ARCP”), as they pertain to
service of process. Section 9 specifically provides that a complaint
from the Committee may be served on a respondent attorney by
“mailing a copy of the formal complaint to attorney’s address of
record by certified, restricted delivery, return receipt mail.” Id.
§ 9(A)(2)(@).

Rule 4 of the ARCP, on the other hand, specifies the way in
which service may be perfected in all civil cases. Rule 4 allows for
service “by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served
with a return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the
addressee or the agent of the addressee.” Ark. R. Civ. P.
4(d)(8)(A)(i) (2008). Rule 4 goes on to specify that service per-
fected by mail “shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or
judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt
signed by the addressee or the agent of the addressee.” Id. R.
4(d)(8)(A) Gi).

As Donovan acknowledges, this court has consistently held
that the practice of law is a privilege and not a right. See, e.g.,
Cambiano v. Neal, 342 Ark. 691, 701, 703, 35 S.W.3d 792, 799
(2000). As such, courts cannot summarily restrict a lawyer’s ability
to exercise the privilege. Ex parte Burton, 237 Ark. 441, 445, 373
S.W.2d 409, 411 (1963). Nevertheless, it is well settled that any
protections to a law license are subject only to the very lowest
review under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution. Cambiano, 342 Ark. at 703, 35 S.W.3d at 799. This

ee
356 Pe

court has also held that the Committee is in the nature of an
administrative agency and is not bound by the rules of the court.
See Sexton v. Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 299 Ark.
439, 446-47, 774 S.W.2d 114, 118 (1989). Thus, the Committee
is not required to adhere strictly to the Rules of Evidence or the
Rules of Procedure. Id.

Unlike Rule 4 of the ARCP, section 9 of the Proce-
dures does not require that the Committee produce a signed copy
of the return receipt in order for it to act if the respondent attorney
fails to respond within twenty days. In short, the language relied on
by Donovan in Rule 4(d)(8)(A) (ii) of the ARCP is notably absent
from section 9 of the Procedures. Since the Committee is not
required to follow the ARCP, section 9 of the Procedures governs.
Despite this, Donovan urges that Rule 4, while not controlling, is
instructive to reach a fair result on appeal. We agree that there may
be circumstances in attorney discipline cases where it is appropriate
to look to the ARCP for guidance, but this is not one of those
occasions. Rather, it is incumbent upon this court to apply the
Procedures, which specifically apply to the Committee, where
they differ from the ARCP, as in the instant case.

We conclude that Panel A’s finding that the Committee
properly served Donovan with a formal complaint on October 11,
2007, is not clearly erroneous. Donovan did not respond, or
request an extension of time, until November 2, 2007, which
caused her response to be untimely according to the Procedures.
Panel A, accordingly, acted within its authority in treating her
failure to respond as an admission of the factual allegations in the
complaint. We affirm the Committee on this point.

IL. Request for Reconsideration

Donovan also contends that Panel A erred in denying her
motion for reconsideration because of excusable neglect. The
Committee answers that Panel A did not err because Donovan
failed to present compelling and cogent evidence for why she did
not timely respond to the formal complaint, as required by section
9(C)(4)(a) of the Procedures.

Panel A’s findings in denying Donovan’s petition for recon-
sideration will be upheld unless they are clearly against the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. See Lewellen v. Supreme Court Comm.
on Prof'l Conduct, 353 Ark. 641, 646, 110 S.W.3d 263, 266 (2003).
Moreover, as already noted, a panel of the Committee will grant a

CT 387

petition for reconsideration if the attorney presents compelling
and cogent evidence of unavoidable circumstances sufficient to
excuse or justify the failure to respond within the required twenty-
day period. Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Regulating Profl Conduct
§ 9(C)(4)(c). This court gives deference to the panel’s superior
position to determine the credibility of the evidence and the
weight it is to be accorded. See Lewellen, 353 Ark. at 646, 110
S.W.3d at 266.

Donovan’s petition for reconsideration in the instant case
first alleged that her request for an extension was not untimely. As
discussed in the first point on appeal, that argument is without
merit. The petition for reconsideration also contained allegations
regarding her various personal difficulties during the time in which
the formal complaint was served. She states that her home was sold
in a non-judicial foreclosure sale on October 2, 2007; that she had
a doctor’s appointment which resulted in her receiving an MRI;
that she was in communication with the Judges and Lawyers
Assistance Program with respect to her depression; that her sister-
in-law was diagnosed with terminal cancer; and that her brother
was diagnosed with skin cancer. On appeal, she makes a conclu-
sory statement that “‘[s]urely illness requiring a MRI of one’s brain,
cancer in the family, and other factors of this magnitude will
qualify as unavoidable casualty or circumstances, and excusable
neglect.”

HB While the circumstances in Donovan’s life may have
given her valid grounds for requesting an extension of the initial
twenty-day response period if she had done so within that time
period, we agree with Panel A that they do not present cogent and
compelling evidence for why she failed to request the extension
before the twenty-day period elapsed. We hold that Panel A’s
finding that Donovan’s personal circumstances did not present
cogent and compelling evidence for her failure to respond was not
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.‘

* In her reply brief, Donovan asserts that the Committee's brief failed to comply with
this court’s abstracting requirements in Supreme Court Rule 4-2. She argues that the
‘Committee should have abstracted the April 5, 2007 hearing before Judge Taylor, rather than
including the transcript in its supplemental addendum. However, the hearing transcript was
part of Exhibit A, which also included Judge ‘Taylor’s letter referring Donovan to the
Committee. As an exhibit, the Committee was permitted to include the transcript in its
supplemental addendum, Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8) (2008).

III. Mandamus

Donovan has also filed a petition for writ of mandamus
directing the Committee to grant her petition for reconsideration
or afford her a new hearing before an alternate panel or both.

A writ of mandamus is appropriate only when a peti-
tioner shows a clear and certain right to relief sought in the absence
of another adequate remedy. Hanely v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n,
333 Ark. 159, 970 S.W.2d 198 (1998). More specifically, we have
said that to be adequate, the alternative remedy must be “plain and
complete and as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its
proper administration as the remedy invoked.” Id. at 164, 920
S.W.2d at 200 (quoting Gran v. Hale, 294 Ark. 563, 745 S.W.2d
129 (1988)).

In the instant case, Donovan has such an alternative, ad-
equate remedy in the form of an appeal, which is now before this
court. For this reason, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

Affirmed. Petition for writ of mandamus denied.

Emilia DUKE v. Joseph Edward SHINPAUGH
and Rebekah Shinpaugh Ogle

08-311 290 S.W.3d 591

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 15,2009

Le
PC SC——* 359

Legal Aid of Arkansas, by: W. Marshall Prettyman, for appellant.

Penix and Taylor, by: Stephen L. Taylor, for appellees.

px E. Danietson, Justice. In this consolidated appeal,
appellant Emilia Duke appeals from the circuit court’s
order in CV-2006-848-1, setting aside her warranty deed to certain
property, and the circuit court’s order in CV-2006-1169-1, finding
that her actions constituted unlawful detainer and rendering posses-
sion of the residence and property at issue to appellees Joseph Edward
Shinpaugh and Rebekah Shinpaugh Ogle, as administrators of the
Estate of Calvin Leeroy Shinpaugh, Deceased (hereinafter “the Es-
tate”). Our court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the
circuit court’s orders in a 4-1-4 decision, see Duke v. Shinpaugh, 101
Ark. App. 331, 276 S.W.3d 713 (2008), and the Estate petitioned this
court for review, which we granted. When we grant a petition for
review, we consider the appeal as though it had originally been filed
in this court. See Pest Mgmt., Inc. v. Langer, 369 Ark. 52, 250 S.W.3d
550 (2007). On appeal, Ms. Duke asserts three points of error: (1) that
the circuit court erred in disallowing testimony of statements made by
the decedent; (2) that the circuit court erred in finding that her power
of attorney was procured by undue influence; and (3) that the circuit
court erred in finding the agreement testamentary in nature and in
applying the undue-influence presumption. We affirm the circuit
court’s orders.

In 1997, Emilia Duke moved into the home of her mother,
Francis Shinpaugh, and her stepfather, the decedent, Leeroy Shin-
paugh. Ms. Duke cared for her mother, who was ill, and also
attended to matters for her stepfather. After her mother’s death on
May 15, 2005, Ms. Duke became worried about her living
situation. For that reason, she met with her stepfather, and,
subsequently, on May 24, 2005, while in the hospital, Mr. Shin-
paugh executed the following statement, entitled “AGREE-
MENT:”

I, Calvin Leroy [sic] Shinpaugh, residing at 3275 N. Wagner Road,
Fayetteville, AR 72704, Being of sound mind and competent this 24th Day
of May 2005 date [sic]; Igive to Emilia Duke one acre of land adjacent to
the north of the one acre at the corner of Wagner Road and Weir Road. Ialso
bequeath the household objects belonging to her mother and her father, James
Duke, which consists [sic] of; two rocking chairs, a Black gum desk, a
Morracan [sic] tray, and various other objects of furniture and plants. Not
included is an Acrosonic piano, Lalso give to her the contents of the banke box:
located in the Bank of Elkins, Elkins, AR, which belonged to Francis
Shinpaugh, her mother. In the box are items such as; a seventeen hundreds
[sic] coin, an ivory Buddha, a diamond ring and other items,

Emilia has lived at 3275 N. Wagner Road for eight years. We invited
her to live here. In the duration she was a caregiver for my wife Francis for
four years at six to eight hours a day with no holidays. She has cleaned,
maintained three acres, did landscaping and gardening and various othetr
[sic] tasks.

Emilia, at the time of this will, was a twenty-four hour caregiver to
Francis, an eighty-five year old stroke patient. Emilia changed her diaper,
spoon-fed her, lifted her, changed her clothes, gave her sponge baths and all
personal hygiene. She is also doing the yard work, running errands, cooking,
washing dishes and at the time of this writing, taking us to doctors
appointments,

In the duration of the time that Emilia has been living with us, she has
supported herself by building furniture and selling it to local businesses.
Supplementary to this, she helped support Calvin Duke, our grandson and
parented him. Calvin Duke was present part-time for eighteen years.

This is my only will to date. This document is not revocable. I, Calvin
Leroy [sic] Shinpaugh, am a primary beneficiary.

This document under contest will not be my will as is made clear and concise
what I wanted at signing.

signature Calvin Leroy [sic] Shinpaugh
Witness

Witness 5/24/05 Date of signing

signature Notary

The following day, on May 25, 2005, Mr. Shinpaugh, with his
counsel, executed a general durable power of attorney, naming Ms.
Duke as his “true and lawful attorney in fact and agent.”

On February 8, 2006, Ms. Duke, “Under Power of Attor-
ney dated May 25, 2005,” executed a warranty deed, granting to
herself, one acre of the 2.9 acres owned by Mr. Shinpaugh, in
consideration of the sum of $1. Almost one month later, Mr.
Shinpaugh died, and his son and daughter from a previous mar-
riage were appointed administrators of his estate.

On April 24, 2006, the Estate filed a complaint in circuit
court, CV-2006-848-1, alleging that Ms. Duke breached her
fiduciary duty as attorney in fact when she conveyed the one acre
of Mr. Shinpaugh’s property to herself. It further asserted that due
to Ms. Duke’s breach, the deed should be set aside and that an
accounting should be provided.

On June 7, 2006, the Estate filed a separate complaint in
forcible entry and detainer in the circuit court, CV-2006-1169-1.
In it, the administrators of the Estate asserted that Ms. Duke was
guilty of forcible entry and detainer and that they were entitled to
possession of the Shinpaugh residence. In response, Ms. Duke
counterclaimed, alleging that the administrators of the Estate
converted her property after a writ of possession was issued.

On December 29, 2006, a bench trial was held on both cases
with testimony presented and arguments made by both parties. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled orally, and its
ruling was memorialized in two separate orders. In CV-2006-
848-1, the circuit court’s order made several findings:

* that the agreement, despite its title, was testamentary rather than
contractual in nature;

that a confidential relationship existed between Mr. Shinpaugh and
Ms. Duke at the time that the agreement and the power of attorney
were signed by Mr. Shinpaugh;

that the existence of a confidential relationship created a presump-
tion that Mr. Shinpaugh signed the agreement and power of
attorney while under the undue influence of Ms. Duke;

that Ms. Duke failed to meet her burden of proving by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Shinpaugh executed the two
documents free from Ms. Duke’s undue influence;

* that the power of attorney signed by Mr. Shinpaugh was void;

that, even if the power of attorney were found to be valid, Ms.
Duke “exceeded her authority and powers granted under the terms
of the power of attorney in conveying the property to herself and
that she breached her fiduciary duty not to engage in self-dealing in
so doing”; and

.

.

that the warranty deed, by which Ms. Duke under power of
attorney, conveyed the one acre should be, and was set aside.

In CV-2006-1169-1, the circuit court found that Ms. Duke’s actions
in failing to vacate the Shinpaugh residence, after the circuit court’s
issuance of a writ of possession to the Estate, constituted unlawful
detainer. In addition, the circuit court found that the Estate was
entitled to permanent possession of the residence and property and
that Ms. Duke’s counterclaim was moot. Ms. Duke now appeals.

While Ms. Duke initially challenges the circuit court’s
exclusion of testimony, a proper analysis requires this court to first
examine the validity of the power of attorney, which was her
second point on appeal. With respect to the validity of the power
of attorney, Ms. Duke argues that the circuit court erred in finding
that the power of attorney was the product of undue influence,
where the Estate did not challenge the validity of the power of
attorney. She further asserts that because the Estate’s attorney
prepared the power of attorney for Mr. Shinpaugh to sign, the
Estate’s attorney would have been a necessary witness had the
power of attorney been challenged. The Estate responds that the
circuit court did not err because it did not find that the power of
attorney had been procured by undue influence, but that Ms.
Duke had failed to meet her burden of proving that the decedent
had signed the power of attorney free of undue influence. It
further points to the circuit court’s alternative finding that if the
power of attorney were valid, Ms. Duke exceeded her authority by
conveying to herself the property and urges this court to affirm the
circuit court’s orders.

Our standard of review on appeal from a bench trial is not
whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding of
the circuit court, but whether the circuit court’s findings were
clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence. See Omni Holding & Dev. Corp. v. C.A.G. Invs., Inc., 370
Ark. 220, 258 S.W.3d 374 (2007). A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that an error

has been committed. See id. Facts in dispute and determinations of
credibility are within the province of the fact-finder. See id.

That being said, we are precluded from addressing Ms.
Duke’s assertion of error regarding the validity of the power of
attorney, because she failed to challenge both independent
grounds for the circuit court’s decision. Here, in addition to its
ruling that the power of attorney was void, the circuit court
alternatively ruled that, if the power of attorney were found to be
valid, Ms. Duke “exceeded her authority and powers granted
under the terms of the power of attorney in conveying the
property to herself and that she breached her fiduciary duty not to
engage in self-dealing in so doing.’”” While Ms. Duke challenges
the circuit court’s finding that the power of attorney was void, she
does not challenge the circuit court’s alternative finding on appeal
and has given us no basis for holding that it was clearly erroneous
or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.' A review of
Ms. Duke’s brief reveals no argument that she did not exceed the
authority of the power of attorney, that she did not self deal, or that
she did not breach her fiduciary duty.? See Duke v. Shinpaugh, 101
Ark. App. at 339 n.5, 276 S.W.3d at 719 n.5 (acknowledging that
Ms. Duke did not specifically challenge the circuit court’s finding
that she exceeded the scope of her authority under the power of
attorney).

We have held that where the circuit court based its
decision on two independent grounds and appellant challenges

* As further evidence that Ms. Duke does not challenge the circuit court’s alternative
ruling on appeal, Ms. Duke states in the conclusion of her brief that the case should be
“reversed or at the very least reversed and remanded for consideration of the excluded
testimony and the effect of proper findings as to the Power of Attorney” Here, the circuit
court did make the “proper finding,” albeit an alternative one, that ifthe power of attorney was
valid, Ms. Duke exceeded her authority underit. As noted, Ms. Duke does not acknowledge
that finding, nor does she challenge this alternative ruling by the circuit court in her
arguments on appeal.

2 While Ms. Duke may make some of these arguments in her supplemental briefto this
court, she makes this argument for the first time in that brief, and the permission to file a
supplemental brief and reply does not give an appellant permission to raise points on appeal
that were not originally submitted to the court of appeals for review. See Rodriguez ». Arkan-
sas Dep’t of Human Servs,, 360 Ark. 180, 200 S.W.3d 431 (2004). Were we to consider
additional arguments in cases on review from the court of appeals, it would permit an
appellant a so-called “second bite at the apple,” after the appellant has had the benefit of the
court of appeals’ opinion. We, therefore, are precluded from considering any point on appeal
raised in a supplemental brief that was not originally submitted to the court ofappeals. See id.

only one on appeal, the appellate court will affirm without
addressing either. See, e.g., Coleman v. Regions Bank, 364 Ark. 59,
216 S.W.3d 569 (2005); Pearrow v. Feagin, 300 Ark. 274, 778
S.W.2d 941 (1989). In this case, the circuit court provided two
clearly independent grounds on which it based its decision to set
aside the deed: (1) because the power of attorney was void; or (2)
because, even if the power of attorney was valid, Ms. Duke
exceeded her authority under it by conveying the property to
herself, thereby breaching her fiduciary duty by self dealing.
Because Ms. Duke failed to challenge the latter, independent
ground for setting aside the deed, that finding stands and the circuit
court’s order in CV-2006-848-1 must be affirmed. Because we
affirm the circuit court’s order on this basis, we affirm the circuit
court’s order of possession and judgment in CV-2006-1169-1 as
well, and there is no need to address Ms. Duke’s remaining
arguments.

Affirmed.

Kenneth Dana BREWTON ». STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1042 290 S.W.3d 605

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 15, 2009

David L. Dunagin, for appellant

No response.

Pe Curiam. Appellant Kenneth Dana Brewton, by and
through his counsel David L. Dunagin, moves this court for
leave to file a belated brief! Brewton’s brief was due in this court on
October 14, 2008. After no brief'was filed, the State filed a motion to
dismiss on December 8, 2008. Thereafter, Brewton tendered his brief
and filed the instant motion requesting to file the belated brief.

We will accept a criminal appellant’s belated brief to prevent
an appeal from being aborted. See Brown v. State, 373 Ark. 453, 284
S.W.3d 481 (2008) (per curiam). However, good cause must be
shown to grant the motion. See Strom v. State, 356 Ark. 224, 147
S.W.3d 689 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that appellate counsel’s
admitted failure to timely file the brief constituted good cause to
grant motion for belated brief).

Here, Brewton’s attorney accepts full responsibility
and admits fault for failing to timely file Brewton’s brief. Accord-
ingly, we grant the motion to file a belated brief and refer the
matter to the Committee on Professional Conduct.

' Appellant’s motion is captioned as one for rule on clerk, but we will treat it as a
motion for belated brief.

366 ma

Marcus D. YOUNG v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 07-628 290 S.W.3d 605

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 15, 2009

William M. Howard, Jr., for appellant.

No response.

eR CurraM. Appellant Marcus D. Young, by and through

his attorney, William M. Howard, Jr., has filed a motion for
rule on clerk. In 2004, Appellant pled guilty to the charge of
committing a terroristic act and was sentenced to 240 months’
imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s final order on April
13, 2005, Young v. State, CACR 04-925 (Ark. App. Apr. 13, 2005)
(unpublished), and Appellant subsequently filed a petition for relief
under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. On April 3, 2007,
the trial court entered an order denying Appellant relief under Rule
37.1. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on May 1, 2007,
and on June 6, 2007, he filed a notice of appeal as to the denial of the
motion for reconsideration. Upon motion of the State of Arkansas,
this court dismissed Appellant’s appeal on April 17, 2008, on the
grounds that Appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely perfected, as

i
PC —sY 367

it did not properly reference the trial court’s order denying relief
under Rule 37.1. Young v. State, 373 Ark. 264, 283 S.W.3d 188
(2008) (per curiam).

On December 19, 2008, Appellant filed this motion for rule
on clerk, in which Appellant’s counsel explains that he erroneously
believed that the time to file a notice of appeal was tolled when he
filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s order denying Appel-
Jant’s Rule 37 petition. Mr. Howard acknowledges that the appeal
‘was not timely perfected due to an error on his part.

We must first note that Mr. Howard has improperly filed a
motion for rule on clerk where he should have filed a motion for
belated appeal. See McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d
883 (2004). Where a motion for rule on clerk is filed in error, it
will be treated as a motion for belated appeal. Id. Belated appeals in
criminal cases are governed by Rule 2(e) of the Arkansas Rules of
Appellate Procedure—Criminal. Bennett v. State, 362 Ark. 411, 208
$.W.3d 775 (2005). The rule provides in pertinent part:

The Supreme Court may act upon and decide a case in which the
notice of appeal was not given or the transcript of the trial record
‘was not filed in the time prescribed, when a good reason for the
omission is shown by affidavit. However, no motion for belated
appeal shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless application
has been made to the Supreme Court within eighteen (18) months
of the date of entry of judgment or entry of the order denying
postconviction relief from which the appeal is taken.

Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 2(e).

HB Here, the trial court entered its order denying Appel~
lant postconviction relief on April 3, 2007. After failing to timely
perfect an appeal, Appellant’s appeal in this case was dismissed. Mr.
Howard filed this motion for rule on clerk on December 19, 2008,
over twenty months after judgment was entered. Due to Mr.
Howard’s failure to satisfy the eighteen-month rule set forth in
Rule 2(e), Appellant’s appeal from the April 3, 2007 order can not
be entertained by this court. This court must, therefore, deny
Appellant’s motion. A copy of this opinion will be forwarded to
the Committee on Professional Conduct.

Motion to file belated appeal denied.

&
aD
io)

Kevin Lynn DAVIS, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-148 291 S.W.3d 164

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

Se

Daniel D. Becker, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Deborah Nolan Gore, Ass’t
Att’y Gen., for appellee.

1M Hannan, Chief Justice. Kevin Lynn Davis, Jr., appeals

his conviction for capital murder and sentence of life without
parole imposed in the death of Patricia Young. He asserts that the trial
court erred in (1) denying his motion to dismiss based on violation of
his right to a speedy trial, (2) admitting evidence excluded by an
agreement or stipulation of the State, (3) failing to hold a hearing and
make a finding on fitness to proceed, and (4) failing to instruct the jury
on a prior inconsistent statement. We affirm the circuit court. Our
jurisdiction on appeal is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2).

Speedy Trial

Hl Davis argues that the circuit court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 28.2, a criminal
defendant is entitled to have the criminal charges dismissed with an
absolute bar to prosecution if the case is not brought to trial within
twelve months from the time provided in Rule 28.2, excluding
only such periods of necessary delay as are authorized in Ark. R.
Crim. P. 28.3. Davis was arrested on November 3, 2005, and tried
on June 27, 2007, 601 days after his arrest. He thus showed that his
trial took place outside the twelve-month period of Rule 28.2.
Once a criminal defendant shows that the trial will take place more
than twelve months after the date of arrest, the burden shifts to the

State to show that the delay was the result of the defendant’s
conduct or was otherwise justified. State v. Crawford, 373 Ark. 95,
281 S.W.3d 736 (2008). “[T]his court has consistently and repeat-
edly held that a defendant is not required to bring himself to trial
or ‘bang on the courthouse door’ to preserve his right to a speedy
trial; rather, the burden is on the courts and the prosecutors to see
that trials are held in a timely fashion.” Jolly v. State, 358 Ark. 180,
193, 189 S.W.3d 40, 46 (2004).

Davis filed two motions to dismiss based on speedy trial.
Both were denied. The record shows that this case was continued
five times. It was first continued from March 7, 2006, to Septem-
ber 21, 2006, then from September 21, 2006, to December 7,
2006, then from December 7, 2006, to April 16, 2007, and finally
from April 16, 2007, to June 27, 2007.

A. March 7, 2006 to September 21, 2006

Davis first argues that the circuit court erred in excluding the
204-day period from March 2, 2006, to September 21, 2006, as
time attributable to him for his mental evaluation. Asa preliminary
matter, the State asserts that Davis’s argument on speedy trial is
foreclosed by the failure to make a contemporaneous objection.
The contemporaneous-objection rule requires a defendant to
apprise the court of alleged error “prior to making its decision.”
Marta v. State, 336 Ark. 67, 80, 983 S.W.2d 924, 931 (1999). Davis
could not apprise the court of any alleged error in exclusion of
time for the mental evaluation prior to the circuit court making its
decision because no hearing was held at which he could object.
The contemporaneous-objection rule does not apply under these
facts.

HI In the present case, the circuit court simply excluded
time on its own motion by issuance of an order. We addressed this
situation in Tanner v. State, 324 Ark. 37, 42-43, 918 S.W.2d 166,
169 (1996):

In this case, the appellant’s motion to dismiss was made before trial,
and, under the circumstances of this case, he was not required to
challenge the court-ordered exclusion of time immediately upon issuance of
the court’s order. As we stated earlier, it is the burden of the
prosecution and the courts to see that a defendant is brought to trial
on time.

(Emphasis added.) In Tanner, the circuit court reset Tanner’s trial date
on its own motion. Nothing in the record reflected that Tanner or his

Lt
Ci” 373

counsel were present when the decision was made, and the order
indicated that the prosecutor and Tanner’s counsel were notified of
the continuance by mail. The circuit court in Tanner, on its own
motion, as in the present case, “filed an order which purported to
exclude the period . . . from speedy trial computation.” Tanner, 324
Ark. at 39, 918 S.W.2d at 167. Before a criminal defendant may be
required to state a contemporaneous objection to the exclusion of
time under speedy trial, the excludability of the period must be
discussed “during a hearing where the defendant and his counsel were
present.” Deasis v. State, 360 Ark. 286, 292, 200 S.W.3d 911, 915
(2005). If there had been a hearing, where counsel was present, and at
which the propriety of the excluded period was raised and decided, an
objection would have been required. See Mack v. State, 321 Ark. 547,
905 S.W.2d 842 (1995). We reject the State’s argument that a
contemporaneous objection could have been or had to be made in
this case where there was no hearing on the excludability of the
period.

As noted, Davis argues that the circuit court erred in
excluding 204 days due to the mental evaluation. He asserts that
only a portion of those 204 days may be attributed to the mental
evaluation and cites us to Morgan v. State, 333 Ark. 294, 971
S.W.2d 219 (1998), where this court discussed the period exclud-
able due to a mental evaluation. Morgan provides that time is
excluded from the ‘‘date the exam is ordered to the report’s file
date.” Id. at 299, 971 S.W.2d at 222. Davis agrees the time
required for the mental exam as defined in Morgan is excludable
and attributable to him. He asserts, however, that only the thirty-
four-day period of February 21, 2006, to March 27, 2006 is
attributable to him. Pursuant to Morgan, the time attributable to
Davis for the mental evaluation concluded on the date the report
was filed. While the record does not reveal when the report was
filed, the State bears the burden of showing that any delay is
attributable to the defendant or otherwise legally justified. Stan-
dridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004). While the
report cover letter transmitting the report to the court is dated
March 27, 2006, the State has not shown when the report was
filed. Because the report could not have been filed prior to its
mailing, we accept the cover letter date of March 27, 2006, as the
last date of exclusion attributable to Davis on the mental evalua-
tion. This means that thirty-four days are excluded.

[The remaining 170 days, of the total 204 days excluded
by the circuit court, are not excludable based on the mental
evaluation. Nothing indicates that the 170-day delay was attrib-
uted to any other cause. As already noted, and as we have
repeatedly held, the burden is on the courts and the prosecutors to
see that trials are held in a timely fashion. Jolly, supra. A contem-
poraneous record must reveal that a delay is attributable to the
defendant or the time will not constitute an excludable period.
Moody v. Ark. County Circuit Court, 350 Ark. 176, 85 S.W.3d 534
(2002). There is nothing in the record that reveals that this delay
was properly attributed to Davis; therefore, it is not excludable.
Subtracting thirty-four: days from 601 leaves 567 days from the
date of arrest to the date of trial.

B. September 21, 2006, to December 7, 2006

Davis argues that the circuit court erred in excluding the
period of September 21, 2006, to December 7, 2006. As with the
prior excluded period, the State again argues that Davis is pre-
cluded from arguing the circuit court erred because he failed to
make a contemporaneous objection. Six days before trial, on
September 15, 2006, the State moved for a continuance of the
September 21, 2006 trial date on the ground that it had submitted
evidence to the Arkansas Crime Laboratory for testing, and that
“the Crime Lab has not completed the requested analysis and it
will not be available by September 21, 2006.”

HAs with the order on the first excluded period, the
circuit court did not hold a hearing. The State’s motion to
continue, as well as the order granting a continuance and exclud-
ing the time, were filed on September 15, 2006. The certificate of
service on the motion indicates that the motion for continuance
was mailed to Davis’s counsel on the same day, September 15,
2006. Thus, the State argues that even though no hearing was held,
Davis had to make a contemporaneous objection to the exclusion
of time entered in an order granting a motion that he did not even
know had been filed. For the same reasons as discussed under the
first excluded period, we reject the State’s argument that Davis had
to make a contemporaneous objection.

Davis next argues that the circuit court erred in ex-
cluding the seventy-seven-day period of September 21, 2006, to
December 7, 2006. The circuit court excluded the time, noting

|
PC —isY 375

that the delay was because the Arkansas Crime Laboratory “report
was not available.” Davis notes that Arkansas Rule of Criminal
Procedure 28.3(d)(1) requires that due diligence has been exer-
cised to obtain the evidence; however, no argument is developed.
We are offered this mere conclusion and are not cited to a single
case.! We are not even told by Davis how there was a lack of due
diligence. The failure to develop an argument precludes review on
appeal. Flowers v. State, 373 Ark. 119, 282 S.W.3d 790 (2008).
Thus, the seventy-seven days must be excluded. Subtracting
seventy-seven from 567 leaves 490 days between the date of arrest
and the date of trial.

C. December 7, 2006, to April 16, 2007

Davis next asserts that the circuit court erred in ex-
cluding the 130-day period of December 7, 2006, to April 16,
2007. The order resetting the trial to April 16, 2007, states that the
trial was continued to accommodate a request for three trial days.
The previous December 7, 2006 trial date was for a one-day trial.
The continuance to April 16, 2007, was ordered when Davis sent
a letter to the circuit court case coordinator stating that ‘because
of the nature of the offense and the number of witnesses, the
defense requests that the trial in this matter be scheduled for a
minimum of three days.” The circuit court interpreted this as a
request for a continuance to the first date the circuit court’s docket
was free for three days. Trial was then reset for April 16-18, 2007.
Davis states that the court misinterpreted the letter, and he asserts
that he never asked for a continuance. The letter is unclear. The
letter does not request that the December 7, 2006 trial date be
retained and additional days granted, but it does request a three-
day trial. We cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion
in concluding that Davis sought to continue his case to the next
three open trial days on the court’s docket. See, e.g., White v. State,

1 We note that the evidence was timely submitted to the Arkansas Crime Laborato
ry. What diligence was exercised by the State thereafter is not revealed by the record. How-
ever, like the Arkansas State Hospital, the crime lab is not part of the judiciary. In Mack »
State, 321 Ark. 547, 550, 905 S.W.2d 842, 844 (1995) (quoting Collins u. State, 304 Ark. 587,
590, 804 S, W.2d 680, 681 (1991)), we stated of the Arkansas State Hospital that,"“delays caused
by its operations would not be subject to the same level of scrutiny as delays caused by the
criminal justice system itself” Likewise, we will not subject delays caused by operations of the
crime lab to the same level of scrutiny as delays caused by the criminal justice system itself.

a
376 Cd =

330 Ark. 813, 958 S.W.2d 519 (1997) (no abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in excluding the time attributed to the
unavailability of a witness).

Finally, Davis argues that the circuit court erred in
excluding this time based on court congestion. Because we con-
clude there was no error in finding a request for a continuance, we
need not address this argument. Subtracting 130 days from 490
days leaves 360 days between the date of arrest and the date of trial.
Thus, trial occurred within the twelve-month period allowed. The
circuit court did not deny Davis his right to a speedy trial.

Additional periods of time were excluded by the circuit
court. We need not analyze whether these periods were excludable
because we have concluded that trial occurred within 360 days of
arrest; however, we note for the benefit of the bench and bar that
the additional periods of exclusion suffer the same problems with
the docket and record as noted above. Congestion of the court
docket was noted and relied on without explanation in a court
order. Motions were filed and orders were entered on the same day
without any hearing in court. In one instance, the certificate of
service indicated that the motion was mailed to Davis’s counsel on
the day the motion was filed and the order was entered. The circuit
court in its order denying the Motion to Dismiss on speedy trial
grounds noted that there was no objection to the delay. It would
be hard for the defendant to object to a delay before his counsel
even received notice the motion that would cause the delay was
being filed.

Stipulation to Exclude Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts

Davis argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to
enforce a stipulation that he entered into with the State that no
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts would be offered in this
case. The circuit court found that no stipulation existed and
analyzed admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b). The circuit court admit-
ted some evidence and excluded other evidence. Davis concedes
that the circuit court correctly determined admissibility of the
evidence under Rule 404(b) but asserts that no evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts could be admitted due to the stipulation he
reached with the State. Davis asserts that the stipulation was
entered into at the oral argument on his motion to disclose
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. The question presented

|
= Ct 377

then is whether Davis and the State entered into a stipulation that
no evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts would be offered at
trial.

This court defined a stipulation in McClard v. Crain Manage-
ment Group, Inc., 313 Ark. 472, 476, 855 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1993):

A stipulation is a “name given to any agreement made by the
attorneys engaged on opposite sides of a cause (especially if in
writing) regulating any matter incidental to the proceedings or trial,
which falls within their jurisdiction.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1269
(th ed. 1979). The “stipulations” filed by McClard and Stacks
were not signed by both sides. Absent agreement between the
attorneys to stipulate, Freeway Ford was within its rights to supple-
ment the record if appropriate.

Thus, a stipulation may be made in writing. A stipulation can also be
reached where both parties or their counsel appear before the court to
make an oral stipulation official. See, e.g., Smith v. Washington, 340
Ark. 460, 10 S.W.3d 877 (2000).

Davis’s motion asked the State to disclose any evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and in oral argument the pros-
ecutor stated it had no “‘404(b) evidence,”? and did not intend to
offer any. The circuit court then asked, “‘Anything further on that
motion . . . ?” Davis’s counsel responded, “‘No.”’ While this
statement by the prosecutor may be argued to be a representation
to the circuit court of what evidence the State had that might be
subject to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b), and perhaps what
evidence it intended to offer, it does not constitute an agreement
with Davis that no evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts would
be offered. Davis offers no other evidence that a stipulation was
made.?

A decision of the circuit court on whether the parties have
stipulated is a finding of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous

2 Clearly, there was evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts as evidenced by the
circuit court’s analysis and admission of evidence under Arkansas Rule of Evidence
404(b). We note that the State at trial indicated that after Davis's motion to disclose evidence
was decided, it learned of evidence it did wish to offer. The issue of what representation, if
any, that the State made to the circuit court regarding evidence at the time of the motion to
disclose was not litigated below and is not at issue on this appeal.

> The circuit court did find that if the State agreed in open court to forbear offering
evidence, the State would be held to that agreement. The State requested and was allowed to

standard. See, e.g., City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 356 Ark. 393,
155 S.W.3d 9 (2004) (finding of fact on a stipulation). “‘A finding
is clearly erroneous when, although there was evidence to support
it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” R.M.W. v. State, 375 Ark. 1, 6, 289 S.W.3d 46, 50
(2008). The circuit court found that the parties entered into no
stipulation to exclude from trial all evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts. The circuit court was not clearly erroneous in
reaching this decision. Thus, there was no error in the court
analyzing what evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts was
admissible, and again we note that Davis agrees that the evidence
admitted was properly admitted under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b).

Fitness to Proceed

Davis asserts that the circuit court erred in failing to sua
sponte hold a hearing on competency. Although Davis asked for
and received a mental evaluation, no hearing on his mental fitness
was requested and none was held. Where a mental evaluation is
undertaken, and neither party contests the evaluation, a hearing
need not be held. Green v. State, 335 Ark. 1, 977 S.W.2d 192
(1998): ‘‘A defendant in a criminal case is ordinarily presumed to
be mentally competent to stand trial, and the burden of proving
incompetence is upon the defendant.” Mask v. State, 314 Ark. 25,
32, 869 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1993).

HH However, a circuit court must order a hearing on
competency sua sponte when there is “‘reasonable doubt about the
defendant’s competency to stand trial.” Jacobs v. State, 294 Ark.
551, 553, 744 S.W.2d 728, 729 (1988) (citing Campbell v. Lockhart,
789 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1986)). It was Davis’s burden to prove there
was reasonable doubt about Davis’s competency to stand trial.
There was no duty on the circuit judge to sua sponte order a
competency hearing under the facts in this case.

Arkansas Model Jury Instruction Criminal 202

Davis alleges the circuit court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury with Arkansas Model Jury Instruction Criminal
202 (prior inconsistent statements by a witness other than the

make additional argument to the circuit court. The circuit court found that the additional
evidence to be offered through the testimony of Gracie Darby was not evidence the State had
agreed to withhold from trial.

accused) when after deliberations began, the jury requested to
review witness Marcia Flores Sperry’s testimony. This instruction
may be given when a witness testifies at trial inconsistently with
testimony provided by that witness prior to trial and should be
given at the time the inconsistent testimony is admitted into
evidence. See AMI Criminal 2d 202 note.

Sperry testified that she lied to police and gave them false
details such as where she was at the time of the crime; however, her
statements that she saw Davis kill Young remained consistent.
Davis made no request for the instruction at the time Sperry
testified at trial and did not request it when the jury was instructed.
A trial court’s ruling on whether to submit a jury instruction will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Grillot v. State, 353
Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). We find no abuse of discretion.

Rule 4-3(h) Review

The record in this case has been reviewed for reversible error
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 4-3(h), and none has been found.

Affirmed.

LARRY HOBBS FARM EQUIPMENT, INC. d/b/a Hobbs Farm
Implement and Hobbs Farm Equipment v. CNH AMERICA, LLC
d/b/a Case IH, successor in interest to DMI, Inc.

08-1056 291 S.W.3d 190

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

Easley and Houseal, P.A., by: B. Michael Easley, and Dady &
Garner, P.A., by: John D. Holland, for petitioner.

Foley and Lardner LLP, by: Michael J. Lockerby and Brian W.
McGrath, and Womack, Landis, Phelps & McNeill, P.A., by: J.V. Phelps,
for respondent.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Kevin A. Crass, and Peter B.
Rutledge, for amici curiae Association of Equipment Manufacturers
and National Association of Manufacturers.

1M Hannay, Chief Justice. This case involves three ques-

tions of law certified to this court by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in accordance with
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 (2008) and accepted by this court
on September 18, 2008. See Larry Hobbs Farm Equip., Inc. v. CNH
Am., LLC, 374 Ark. 268, 287 S.W.3d 550 (2008) (per curiam). The
questions certified are the following:

1. Under the facts of this case, whether the market withdrawal ofa
product or of a trademark and trade name for the product
constitutes “good cause” to terminate a franchise under Arkan-
sas Code Annotated § 4-72-204(a)(1).

2. Under the facts of this case, whether liability under Arkansas
Code Annotated § 4-72-310(b)(4) is created when a manufac-
turer terminates, cancels, fails to renew, or substantially changes
the competitive circumstances of the dealership agreement based
on re-branding of the product or ceasing to use a particular trade
name or trademark for a product while selling it under a different
trade name or trademark.

3. Under the facts of this case, whether the sole remedies for a
violation of the Arkansas Farm Equipment Retailer Franchise
Protection Act (AFERFPA) are: (1) the requirement that the
manufacturer repurchase inventory for a termination without
good cause, and (2) damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees that result
from the failure to purchase inventory as provided in Ark. Code
Ann. § 4-72-309, or whether other remedies are also available.

As to the first question, we conclude that the answer is no.
As to the second question, we also conclude that the answer is no.
With respect to the third question, we conclude that other
remedies are available.

ee

Ts
382 sd =

The certified questions arise from an action filed in district
court on April 17, 2008, by Hobbs Farm Equipment (Hobbs) after
the termination of a dealer agreement between Hobbs and CNH
America (CNH). CNH moved to dismiss the complaint, and the
district court granted the motion to dismiss on all claims except the
claims pertaining to the legal issues certified to this court. For
purposes of CNH’s motion to dismiss and the district court’s
certification order, the district court assumed the following facts to
be true.

Hobbs and DMI, Inc., entered into an agreement enabling
Hobbs to sell DMI products in June 1993. In early 1995, Hobbs
executed a new dealer agreement with DMI, which enabled
Hobbs to be a nonexclusive dealer of DMI products, specifically its
tillage and soil management equipment, in its trade area.

In November 1998, Case Corporation, a predecessor of
CNH, acquired DMI. Both Hobbs and each of DMI’s successors,
including CNH, continued to perform under the 1995 agreement
until August 2007.

According to the complaint, in late 2004 or 2005, CNH
began to supply Hobbs’s competitor, Heartland Equipment, Inc.,
of East Arkansas (Heartland), with the DMI tillage and soil
management equipment that Hobbs Farm Equipment had distrib-
uted since 1993. However, instead of bearing the DMI trademark
and trade name, the equipment supplied to Heartland bore the
Case IH trademark and name. Case IH is a trademark owned by
and the name of a division of CNH. The equipment supplied to
Heartland was painted red like other Case IH products, whereas
DMI products were painted blue. Stated differently, CNH en-
gaged in dual branding of identical tillage and soil management
equipment originally distributed in blue paint under the DMI
brand name but, beginning in 2004 or 2005, also distributed in red
paint under the Case IH brand name.

On August 14, 2007, Hobbs received a letter from CNH
that included the following:

CNH America LLC (“The Company”) wishes to provide you with
advance notice of its decision to withdraw from the DMI-branded
tillage business effective in 2008. As a result, Hobbs Farm Equip-
ment Co. Inc.’s last ordering period for wholegoods will run
through August 31, 2007. After that date, the Company will no
longer accept orders for any DMI-branded tillage wholegoods

products. However, Hobbs Farm Equipment Co. Inc. will be able
to continue to purchase DMI-branded replacement parts through
August 31, 2008.

The Company will continue to provide you with retail programs
throughout 2007 and the first half of 2008 to assist you in retalling
[sic] these products prior to August 31, 2008. Ifany DMI-branded
wholegoods remain at your dealership by that date, the Company
will repurchase those products in accordance with the terms of your
dealer agreement and company policy, or state law. The Company
will also repurchase your remaining DMI replacement parts accord-
ing to state law or company policy.

CNH decided that effective August 31, 2008, it would no longer sell
equipment bearing the DMI trademark and trade name but would do
so under the Case IH trademark and trade name.

Good Cause

In its brief before us, Hobbs contends that, under the plain
language of the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act (AFPA), specifi-
cally, Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-72-204(a)(1) (Repl.
2001), neither the market withdrawal of a product nor the with-
drawal of a trademark or trade name for a product constitutes
“good cause”’ to terminate a franchise. For its part, CNH contends
that the AFPA’s requirement of “good cause” for terminating an
Arkansas franchise does not prevent market withdrawal. CNH
states that, while the AFPA prohibits discriminatory termination of
a franchise, the Act does not prohibit nationwide discontinuation
of a product line or brand.

The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature. Ward v. Doss, 361 Ark. 153, 205
S.W.3d 767 (2005). Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary
meaning of the language used. Id. In considering the meaning of a
statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their
ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id.
‘We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or
insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the
statute, if possible. Id.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-72-204(a)(1) provides
that “[i]t shall be a violation of [the AFPA] to terminate or cancel
a franchise without good cause.”’ Pursuant to Arkansas Code
Annotated section 4-72-202(7) (Repl. 2001), “good cause” is
defined in the AFPA as:

(A) Failure by a franchisee to comply substantially with the re-
quirements imposed upon him or her by the franchisor, or sought to
be imposed by the franchisor, which requirements are not discrimi-
natory as compared with the requirements imposed on other
similarly situated franchisees, either by their terms or in the manner
of their enforcement; or

(B) The failure by the franchisee to act in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner in carrying out the terms of the
franchise; or

(C) Voluntary abandonment of the franchise; or

(D) Conviction of the franchisee in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion of an offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment in excess
of one (1) year, substantially related to the business conducted
pursuant to the franchise; or

(E) Any act by a franchisee which substantially impairs the fran-
chisor’s trademark or trade name; or

(F) The institution of insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings by or
against a franchisee, or any assignment or attempted assignment by
a franchisee of the franchise or the assets of the franchise for the
benefit of the creditors; or

(G) Loss of the franchisor’s or franchisee’s right to occupy the
premises from which the franchise business is operated; or

(A) Failure of the franchisee to pay to the franchisor within ten (10)
days after receipt of notice of any sums past due the franchisor and
relating to the franchise.

Hobbs points out that the franchise was not terminated for
any of these reasons and that the plain language of the statute,
coupled with the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, prohibits an interpretation of the AFPA’s list of

circumstances constituting “good cause” for termination that
includes circumstances not specifically listed in section 4-72-202.
The phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that the express designation of
one thing may be properly construed to mean the exclusion of
another. MacSteel v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d
878 (2005).

Hobbs’s argument is well taken. “Good cause” is clearly
defined by the plain language of section 4-72-202(7). In that
section, the General Assembly listed several examples of good
cause for termination, and market withdrawal was not included as
an example of good cause. Had the legislature intended to include
market withdrawal as good cause for termination, it could have
done so.

We also note that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit construed section 4-72-202(7) in Volvo Trademark
Holding Aktiebolaget v. Clark Machinery Co., 510 F.3d 474 (2007). In
Volvo, the Fourth Circuit held that the enumerated occurrences in
section 4~72-202 are the exclusive means by which a franchisor
can terminate a franchise for “good cause.” Decisions of the
federal circuit courts are not binding on this court; however, we
find the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of section 4-72-202 to be
persuasive. The Volvo court wrote:

The Arkansas Act includes a list of eight occurrences that
constitute “good cause” for termination or cancellation of a fran-
chise. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-72-202 (West 2007). The district
court held, adopting Clark’s position, that this list constituted the
exclusive means by which a franchisor may terminate a franchise for
good cause under the Arkansas Act. Volvo acknowledges that it did
not terminate Clark’s Dealer Agreement for any of the specific
reasons provided for in the Arkansas Act, but contends that those
eight occurrences are not an exclusive list of what constitutes good
cause for termination of a franchise. Appurtenant to this conten-
tion, Volvo maintains that its reasons for termination, i.e.,“Volvoiza-
tion” and “Dealer Rationalization,” also constitute good cause for a
franchise termination under the Arkansas Act.

As the district court aptly recognized, Volvo’s contention presents
an isstie of statutory construction, and a federal court sitting in
diversity is obliged to apply state law principles to resolve such a
question, utilizing such principles as enunciated and applied by the
state’s highest court. See Volvo Trademark, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 410

386

(citing Cooper Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d
262, 274 (3d Cir, 1995)). The Arkansas Supreme Court has not
resolved the statutory issue raised by Volvo, and we are therefore
obliged to interpret the Arkansas Act by applying the principles of
statutory construction that would guide an Arkansas court in
making such a decision. See CTI/DC, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of
Am., 392 F.3d 114, 118 (4th Cir. 2004).

The district court made a thorough explanation of its ruling on this
issue. According to the applicable Arkansas legal principles, if a
statute is clear, it is to be given its plain meaning, and courts are not
to search for any legislative intent. See Volvo Trademark, 416 F.
Supp. 2d at 411 (citing Hinchey v. Thomasson, 292 Ark. 1, 727
S.W.2d 836 (1987)). Arkansas also subscribes to the legal principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning “ ‘that the express
designation of one thing may properly be construed to mean the
exclusion of another.’” Id. (quoting Gazaway v. Greene County
Equalization Bd., 314 Ark. 569, 864 S.W.2d 233, 236 (1993).

Applying these controlling principles to the Arkansas Act, the
district court concluded that good cause for termination of a
franchise under the Act is limited to the eight occurrences specifi-
cally enumerated therein. See Volvo Trademark, 416 F. Supp. 2d at
412. The court deemed the Arkansas Act to be clear on its face, and
determined that the express designation of those eight occurrences
precluded any other circumstance from constituting good cause for
a franchise termination. Id. at 411. Asa result, the court concluded
that the Arkansas Supreme Court would have held that the “cir-
cumstances constituting ‘good cause’ for termination under the
[Arkansas Act] are limited to those expressly designated in” the Act
and, because Volvo’s actions did not fall under one of the enumer-
ated occurrences, it had terminated Clark’s Dealer Agreement in
violation of the Arkansas Act. Id. at 412, 416-17.

Volvo, 510 F.3d at 482-83 (footnote omitted).

We agree with the reasoning set forth in the Volvo

decision. We hold that the plain language of the statute, along with
the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
prohibits an interpretation of the AFPA’s list of circumstances
constituting “‘good cause” for termination that includes circum-
stances not specifically listed in section 4-72-202. Accordingly, we
answer the first certified question in the negative. The market
withdrawal of a product or ofa trademark and a trade name for the

product does not constitute “good cause” to terminate a franchise
under Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-72-204(a)(1).

Before leaving this point, we note that in its brief before this
court, CNH claims that by interpreting the statutory prohibition
against termination of a franchise without “good cause” as not
applying to market withdrawals, this court can avoid the prospect
of a state-imposed “‘exit toll” that would raise Commerce Clause
concerns. At our discretion, we answer questions of law certified
to us by order of a federal court of the United States. See Ark. Sup.
Ct. R. 6-8. The “exit toll” issue is not within the question of law
we accepted, and we decline to address it.

Liability Under Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-72-310(b)(4)

The second question certified to this court is whether, under
the facts of this case, liability under Arkansas Code Annotated
§ 4-72-310(b)(4) (Repl. 2001) is created when a manufacturer
terminates, cancels, fails to renew, or substantially changes the
competitive circumstances of the dealership agreement based on
re-branding of the product or ceasing to use a particular trade
name or trademark for a product while selling it under a different
trade name or trademark.

Section 4-72-310(b)(4) provides that it is a violation of the
Farm Equipment Retailer Franchise Protection Act for a manu-
facturer to:

Attempt or threaten to terminate, cancel, fail to renew, or substantially
change the competitive circumstances of the dealership agreement
based on the result of a natural disaster, including a sustained
drought in the dealership market area, labor dispute, or other
circumstances beyond the dealer’s control.

(Emphasis added.)

HB Thus, it is clear that section 4-72-310(b)(4) proscribes
only attempts or threats to terminate, cancel, fail to renew, or
substantially change the competitive circumstances of the dealer-
ship agreement. Actual termination, cancellation, failure to renew,
or substantially changing the circumstances of the dealership
agreement are not addressed in this section; therefore, no liability
is created for those actions under section 4-72-310(b)(4). Accord-
ingly, we answer the second certified question in the negative and
hold that no liability under section 4-72-310(b)(4) is created when

Ss
388 Cd Tt

a manufacturer terminates, cancels, fails to renew, or substantially
changes the competitive circumstances of the dealership agree-
ment based on re-branding of the product or ceasing to use a
particular trade name or trademark for a product while selling it
under a different trade name or trademark.

Remedies Under the AFERFPA

The final question this court must consider is whether,
under the facts of this case, the sole remedies for a violation of the
AFERFPA are: (1) the requirement that the manufacturer repur-
chase inventory for a termination without good cause, and (2)
damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees that result from the failure to
purchase inventory as provided in Arkansas Code Annotated
section 4-72-309 (Repl. 2001), or whether other remedies are also
available.

Section 4-72-309 provides:

If any wholesaler, manufacturer, or distributor fails or refuses to
repurchase any inventory covered under the provisions of this
subchapter within sixty (60) days after shipment of the inventory, he
or she shall be civilly liable for one hundred percent (100%) of the
current net price of the inventory, plus any freight charges paid by
the retailer, the retailer’s attorney’s fees, court costs, and interest on
the current net price computed at the legal interest rate from the
sixty-first day after shipment.

Hobbs states that the 1991 amendments to the AFERFPA,
adding section 4-72-310, created new rights not tied to a manu-
facturer’s inventory repurchase rights. Hobbs avers that the
AFERFPA contains two sets of rights for dealers — rights that exist
during or after the term of the dealership agreement and rights that
exist only upon termination of the dealership agreement. Hobbs
further states that, while the legislature provided farm equipment
dealers with new rights, the legislature failed to specify any
particular remedy for violation of these new rights. Still, Hobbs
asserts that it is not without a remedy because article 2, section 13
of the Arkansas Constitution requires that there be a remedy for
every right created by the legislature. That section provides:

Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries or wrongs he may receive in his person, property or
character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without purchase;
completely, and without denial; promptly and without delay;
conformably to the laws.

i
is 389

Ark. Const. art. 2, § 13.

HB Hobbs correctly states the law, but it appears to suggest
that this constitutional provision means that it is entitled to money
damages. Article 2, section 13 provides that one wronged is
entitled to a “‘certain remedy,” but it does not state that the
remedy must be in the form of money damages. “In the absence of
a statutory provision expressly authorizing it, damages cannot be
recovered by either party.” White River Land & Timber Co. v.
Hawkins, 128 Ark. 277, 279, 194 S.W. 9, 10 (1917). There is no
language in section 4-72-310 authorizing money damages. There-
fore, the remedies available under that section are limited to
remedies other than money damages, such as injunctive relief and
declaratory relief. As such, we answer the third question in the
negative. The sole remedies for a violation of the AFERFPA are
not those provided in section 4-72-309; parties may also seek
remedies other than money damages.

Certified questions answered.

Howard H. NEAL, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-859 291 S.W.3d 160

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Kent C. Krause,
Deputy Public Defender, and Bret Qualls, Deputy Public Defender,
by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass’t Att’y
Gen., for appellee.

onatp L. Corin, Justice. Appellant Howard H. Neal,

Jr., appeals his conviction for capital murder and kidnap-
ping in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. Appellant’s sole point on
appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a
witness to testify on the basis that Appellant failed to disclose in a
timely manner to the State that the witness would be testifying. As
Appellant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, our jurisdic-
tion is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(1). We affirm.

As Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction, a brief recitation of the facts
will suffice. On October 23, 2005, Jacquelyn Polk left her five-
year-old daughter, Jasmine Peoples, at the home of Polk’s friend,
Shavonda Perry. Polk was taking Perry to visit a relative in a
nursing home, while Ronald Redden and others stayed with
Jasmine and another child. While Jasmine was asleep in the front
room, and the second child was asleep in a bedroom, Appellant
walked in the front door of the apartment and exited out the back
door, where he spent about fifteen minutes wandering around the

backyard, talking to himself. Appellant then reentered the apart-
ment stating, “ ‘I want all you M-F-ers to get out of my house.’ ”
He then told Redden, “ ‘I’m going to kill every last one of y’all,
and I’m going to start with your ass.’ ’’ Appellant then attacked
Redden, stabbing him in the neck. Redden and the others fled the
apartment, inadvertently leaving behind the two children.

The Jacksonville Police Department was called to the scene,
and by the time officers arrived, Appellant had barricaded himself
in the apartment. Sergeant Chris Burrough attempted to make
contact with Appellant. He tried to convince Appellant to release
the two children, but Appellant refused to do so. Because the
apartment’s front door was blocked by furniture, the department’s
entry team, a group of officers specifically trained in making entry
into high-risk situations, was called. The entry team ultimately
accessed the apartment through the back door and took Appellant
into custody. Captain Kenny Boyd, a member of the entry team,
began searching for the two children. After moving an overturned
couch and televison set, Captain Boyd discovered a child’s body
lying face down underneath the furniture. The child, who also had
an extension cord around her neck, was later identified as Jasmine.
The second child was found unharmed. An autopsy of Jasmine
revealed numerous blunt-force and sharp-force injuries, but the
ultimate cause of her death was compressional asphyxia, which was
consistent with a heavy object or objects being placed on top of her
chest.

Appellant was charged with capital murder and kidnapping.’
He was tried before a jury, convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the charge of
capital murder and twenty-two years’ imprisonment on the charge
of kidnapping, with the sentences to be served concurrently. This
appeal followed.

As his sole point on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a witness, Melody
Perry, to testify on behalf of the defense at trial. Appellant
concedes that he violated Ark. R. Crim. P. 18.3, in that Ms.
Perry’s name was not provided to the State in a timely manner. He
argues, however, that the sanction for such a violation is left to the
discretion of the trial court, and here the trial court abused that

* Appellant was also charged with battery in the first degree relating to his attack on
Redden, but this charge was later dismissed upon motion by the State.

discretion by denying Appellant’s request that Ms. Perry be
allowed to testify. In support of this contention, Appellant avers
that there was no evidence that he deliberately violated Rule 18.3,
as he learned of Ms. Perry’s testimony the morning of trial.
Moreover, Appellant argues it was an abuse of discretion because
(1) Ms. Perry was the only known witness who could cast doubt on
the State’s theory of the case; (2) the State would not have been
surprised by Ms. Perry’s testimony as they cross-examined her
during the defense proffer of her as a witness; (3) the State could
have easily rebutted Ms. Perry’s causation testimony; and (4) it was
for the jury, not the judge, to decide if Ms. Perry’s testimony was
credible.

The State counters that no mention was ever made of Rule
18.3 at trial. The State objected to Ms. Perry testifying on the basis
that she was not named as a witness during voir dire and that the
State had not subpoenaed witnesses who could rebut Ms. Perty’s
testimony, as there was no indication that the entry into the
apartment would be an issue at trial. The State contends therefore
that it was within the trial court’s discretion to preclude Ms. Perry
from testifying. As to Appellant’s contention that the trial court
abused its discretion in judging Ms. Perry’s credibility, the State
argues that this court can affirm the trial court’s ruling for any
reason. Finally, the State avers that Appellant cannot demonstrate
prejudice resulting from the trial court’s ruling, as he all but
concedes that Ms. Perry’s testimony was not to be believed.

Matters pertaining to the admissibility of evidence are left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse such
a ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. Spring v. State, 368 Ark.
256, 244 S.W.3d 683 (2006); McEwing v. State, 366 Ark. 456, 237
S.W.3d 43 (2006). Furthermore, this court will not reverse absent
a showing of prejudice, as prejudice is not presumed. Id.

In the present case, after the jury was selected, but prior to
any opening statements, Appellant’s counsel notified the trial court
and the State that it had just learned of a witness with potentially
exculpatory information. Specifically, Melody Perry, who had
originally been approached by an investigator for the defense
regarding any knowledge she might have of the location of another
potential witness, came forward and notified Appellant’s counsel
that she was present at the time that officers from the Jacksonville
Police Department entered the apartment through the front door,
pushing over the furniture that had been piled against the front
door. Appellant requested that he be allowed to call Perry as a

Le
Pid 393

defense witness. The State objected, arguing that the jury had
already been seated and those members were selected based on
whether they knew anyone involved with the case and that it had
based its witness list on the announced witnesses. The trial court
announced that it was taking the matter under advisement.

At the end of the first day of trial, Appellant was allowed to
proffer Perry as a witness. Perry stated that she approached defense
counsel and stated that she was standing in front of the apartment
during the standoff and could see inside through a slit in the
curtain. Inside she saw furniture barricading the front door. Perry
stated that after about an hour or an hour-and-a-half, police
“started barging in the front door and the back door.” Upon
cross-examination, Perry admitted that Appellant was her first
cousin. At the conclusion of Perry’s proffered testimony, the trial
court ruled that it was not going to allow her to testify at trial since
she had come forward at the last minute and had no credibility.

Under Rule 18.3,

{sJubject to constitutional limitations, the prosecuting attorney
shall, upon request, be informed as soon as practicable before trial of
the nature of any defense which defense counsel intends to use at
trial and the names and addresses of persons whom defense counsel
intends to call as witnesses in support thereof.

Discovery in criminal cases, within constitutional limitations, must be
a two-way street. See McEwing, 366 Ark. 456, 237 S.W.3d 43. This
interpretation promotes fairness by allowing both sides the opportu-
nity for full pretrial preparation, preventing surprise at trial, and
avoiding unnecessary delays at trial. Id. In McEwing, this court held
that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting an alibi
witness from testifying on behalf of the appellant when the appellant
attempted to call the witness the morning of trial. In so ruling, this
court stated that the trial court’s decision to exclude the witness was
based on a determination that it would be unfair to the State to allow
the witness when the appellant sought to call her the morning of trial.
Id.

HEM While McEwing is distinguishable on the basis that
there was a blatant violation of Rule 18.3 involved there, the
underlying principle that it would be unfair to the State under
Rule 18.3 to allow a witness who comes forward the morning of
trial to testify is the same in both cases. Even though in the present

case it is clear that Appellant was unaware of Ms. Perry and her
potential testimony, we still cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion in excluding her as a witness. While the trial court
improperly ruled on Ms. Perry’s credibility, as credibility matters
are within the province of the jury, see, e.g., Brown v. State, 374
Ark. 341, 288 S.W.3d 226 (2008), this court can affirm the trial
court if it reached the right result even for the wrong reason. See
Jarrett v. State, 371 Ark. 100, 263 S.W.3d 538 (2007). Accordingly,
there is no merit to Appellant’s argument on appeal.

Affirmed.

Linda STOKES v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-86 291 S.W.3d 155

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

395

Matthew Lunde, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass’t Att’y Gen.,
for appellee.

1M GUNTER, Justice. This appeal arises from a decision of the
Conway County Circuit Court denying Appellant Linda
Stokes’s motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.

On July 31, 2007, Appellant and a passenger, Amy Howard,
were traveling along Interstate 40 when Officer Eric Lee noticed
that the vehicle was traveling below the speed limit at 60 miles per
hour. Officer Lee testified that once he got behind the vehicle, it

made a hasty exit off of the interstate into Plumerville. Officer Lee
could see Appellant and the passenger watching him out of the
mirrors. According to Lee, “the vehicle turned left and went
North on Highway 92 to Plumerville.” He followed the vehicle
and it eventually came to a complete stop in the road. He testified
that it seemed like they were looking for a place to turn, which
piqued his interest. The vehicle continued on Highway 92 and
turned left on Ballpark Road. Lee’s interest was piqued again
because Ballpark Road is an all-black neighborhood with a dead-
end street and the occupants of the vehicle were two white
females. He ran the vehicle’s tag, and discovered that it was
registered in Arizona. He continued down Highway 92 past
Ballpark Road and observed in his mirror that the vehicle was
backing down Ballpark Road. He turned around and the vehicle
began driving down the road again. Lee then got behind the
vehicle and initiated a traffic stop.

Lee testified that he stopped Appellant’s vehicle for careless
driving because the vehicle had backed down a city street. When
Lee approached the vehicle, he observed that Appellant was
“visibly shaking”’ and did not have identification on her. She told
Lee that she did not have identification because her license was
suspended. Lee returned to his vehicle and discovered that Appel-
lant had a suspended driver’s license out of Arizona and an expired
license out of California. Lee then approached the vehicle again
and asked Appellant to step out of the vehicle. He began asking her
questions about where they were going and what they were doing
in the area. He also asked Howard questions and testified that “the
stories they were giving me were not matching up and I didn’t feel
comfortable with both of them out there at that point.” He placed
Appellant under arrest for driving on a suspended license. As he
was placing her in the back of his car, he asked her if they were
transporting anything illegal. He testified that Appellant would not
make eye contact with him and looked away when he asked her if
there were any drugs in the car. He then began speaking to
Howard, who had the same reaction as Appellant.

Lee called a tow truck to tow the vehicle because neither
Appellant nor Howard had driver’s licenses. Another officer ar-
tived and contacted the rental company about the vehicle. Ac-
cording to the rental company, the vehicle was not supposed to be
taken out of Arizona, and neither Appellant nor Howard was listed
as the actual renter of the vehicle. Lee then conducted an inven-

LT
Ci 397

tory of the vehicle and found marijuana in the trunk. Lee did not
issue a citation for careless driving.

Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana with
intent to deliver. On September 13, 2007, Appellant filed a motion
to suppress the evidence found in the rental vehicle. The circuit
court denied the motion to suppress. Appellant entered a guilty
plea conditioned on the appeal of the motion to suppress. Appel-
lant now brings this appeal.

This case was certified to us from the Arkansas Court of
Appeals because it involves a perceived inconsistency in the
decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court, issues needing clarifica-
tion or development of the law or overruling of precedent, and
issues of substantial public interest pursuant to Arkansas Supreme
Court Rule 1-2(b)(2), (4), and (5) (2008).

For her sole point on appeal, Appellant asserts that the circuit
court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. Specifi-
cally, Appellant contends that (1) the evidence was obtained
during an unlawful stop of Appellant’s vehicle and (2) even if there
was probable cause to initiate the traffic stop, “the evidence
obtained as a result of Appellant’s arrest for a misdemeanor, rather
than the issuance of a summons, was in direct violation of Arkansas
Rules of Criminal Procedure 7.1 and should be deemed fruit of the
poisonous tree.””

The State responds, asserting that Appellant lacks standing to
challenge the suppression of the evidence. In the alternative, the
State contends that (1) there was probable cause to initiate the
traffic stop; (2) Appellant did not obtain a ruling regarding her
argument that a summons was not issued for her arrest; (3) even if
there were a ruling, Rule 7.1(b) has no application here; and (4)
the circuit court correctly refused to suppress the evidence seized
from the car because the marijuana would have inevitably been
discovered through the inventory search even if there were no
arrest.

In her reply brief, Appellant asserts that the State cannot raise
its standing argument for the first time on appeal. In the alterna-
tive, Appellant contends that she does have standing, citing
Brendlin v, California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence,
this court conducts a de novo review based upon the totality of the
circumstances, reversing only if the circuit court’s ruling is clearly

a
398 is =

against the preponderance of the evidence. Koster v. State, 374 Ark.
74, 286 S.W.3d 152 (2007). Issues regarding the credibility of
witnesses testifying at a suppression hearing are within the prov-
ince of the circuit court. Id. Any conflicts in the testimony are for
the circuit court to resolve, as it is in a superior position to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

I. Standing

HM We must first address whether the State’s standing
argument can be raised for the first time on appeal. We have held
that the issue of standing to challenge the legality of a search and
seizure is not a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first
time on appeal. See State v. Houpt, 302 Ark. 188, 788 S.W.2d 239
(1990). In Houpt, however, the State, as appellant, raised the issue
of the appellee’s standing to challenge the legality of a search and
seizure in order to obtain a reversal. We have never held that an
appellee cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal in an effort
to obtain an affirmance. See Ramage v. State, 61 Ark. App. 174, 966
S.W.2d 267 (1998). We have a long-standing rule that we may
affirm the result reached by the trial court, if correct, even though
the reason given by the trial court may have been wrong. See Mamo
Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 375 Ark. 97, 289 S.W.3d 79 (2008). Here,
the State is asking us to affirm the circuit court’s denial of
Appellant’s motion to suppress, therefore, we hold that the State
can raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal.

‘We now turn to the issue of whether Appellant has standing
to contest the legality of the search and seizure. We have held that
an appellant must have standing to assert Fourth Amendment
rights because those rights are personal in nature. State v. Bowers,
334 Ark. 447, 976 S.W.2d 379 (1998); Dixon v. State, 327 Ark.
105, 937 S.W.2d 642 (1997); Littlepage v. State, 314 Ark. 361, 863
S.W.2d 276 (1993). Whether an appellant has standing depends
upon whether he manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in
the area searched and whether society is prepared to recognized
that expectation as reasonable. Littlepage, supra.

In Littlepage, the appellant was driving a rental vehicle when
he was stopped by police. We said that in order for the appellant to
assert his Fourth Amendment rights, he must show that he gained
possession from the owner or someone with authority to grant
possession. Id. According to the rental agreement, the vehicle was
rented to a third party, and neither Littlepage nor his passenger was

Ln
Pe TTC—iY 399

authorized to use the vehicle. We held that the appellant had no
standing to challenge the officer’s search as unconstitutional be-
cause he had no expectation of privacy in the car. Id.

In Bowers, we held that the appellant who was a passenger in
a vehicle had standing to contest the search of the vehicle after an
illegal stop. None of the parties contested the fact that the initial
stop was illegal. We distinguished Bowers from Littlepage and our
other previous cases in that Bowers involved an illegal stop, and the
search for and seizure of the drugs directly followed the stop. We
said that the search on the heels of an illegal stop presents a
different issue with respect to occupants of a vehicle. Id. (citing
Dixon v. State, supra). “Similarly, the occupants of a vehicle have
standing to assert their own Fourth Amendment rights, indepen-
dent of the owner’s, such as a challenge to the initial stop, or the
seizure of their person.” Id. (quoting Dixon).

Appellant relies on Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249
(2007), for her assertion that she has standing to challenge the
legality of the stop. In Brendlin, officers stopped a car to check its
registration without reason to believe that it was being operated
unlawfully. The United States Supreme Court held that a passen-
ger, like the driver, of an automobile that was pulled over by a
police officer for a traffic stop was “seized” under the Fourth
Amendment from the moment the automobile came to a halt on
the roadside and, therefore, was entitled to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the traffic stop. Id. Here, in determining whether
Appellant was seized, the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable
person in Appellant’s position when the car stopped would have
believed herself free to “‘terminate the encounter” between the
police and herself. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255. Under the facts in this
case, a reasonable person in Appellant’s position would not have
believed that she was free to terminate the encounter between
Officer Lee and herself. Because Appellant was seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes, she has standing to challenge the stop’s
constitutionality.

This case was certified to us because of a perceived incon-
sistency between our holding in Littlepage and the holdings in
Bowers and Brendlin. There is no conflict between the decisions
because the issue of standing as it relates to the seizure of a person
‘was not an issue in Littlepage. Rather, the issue in Littlepage was
whether the appellant had standing to challenge the search of a
vehicle, which involved the seizure of property and the expectation

of privacy. Because the issues related to standing in Littlepage and
the issues related to standing in Bowers and Brendlin were different,
we find no inconsistency in the decisions.

IL. Traffic Stop

Appellant asserts that the evidence obtained was the result of
an illegal and unconstitutional traffic stop and should be deemed
fruit of the poisonous tree. In order for a police officer to make a
traffic stop, he must have probable cause to believe that the vehicle
has violated a traffic law. Sims v. State, 356 Ark. 507, 157 S.W.3d
530 (2004); Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001);
Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998). Probable cause
is defined as “facts or circumstances within a police officer’s
knowledge that are sufficient to permit a person of reasonable
caution to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person suspected.” Burks v. State, 362 Ark. 558, 210 S.W.3d 62
(2005). In assessing the existence of probable cause, our review is
liberal rather than strict. Laime, supra. Whether a police officer has
probable cause to make a traffic stop does not depend on whether
the driver was actually guilty of the violation which the officer
believed to have occurred. Id.

Here, Officer Lee testified that the vehicle driven by Appel-
lant was driving 60 miles an hour, which was below the posted
speed limit. The vehicle then made a “hasty exit” off the 112
off-ramp into Plumerville. Lee could see both Appellant and the
passenger watching him though their mirrors. Lee said it looked
like they were trying to decide which way to turn. After the
vehicle turned, Lee followed the vehicle and it ‘almost made a
complete stop in the road and again it looked like they were
looking for a place to turn.”” The vehicle turned left on Ballpark
Road. Lee said this piqued his interest because it was an all-black
neighborhood and the occupants of the vehicle were two white
women. Lee ran the tag on the vehicle and discovered it was from
Arizona. He continued past Ballpark Road and observed in his
mirror that the vehicle was backing down Ballpark Road. When
Lee turned his car around, the vehicle began driving back down
the road. Lee then pulled the vehicle over.

Lee testified that he pulled the car over for careless driving.
Arkansas Code Annotated § 27-51-104 (Supp. 2007) covers care-
less and prohibited driving, stating in pertinent part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any
vehicle in such a careless manner as to evidence a failure to keep a

Ld
Pi 401

proper lookout for other traffic, vehicular or otherwise, or in such
a manner as to evidence a failure to maintain proper control on the
public thoroughfares or private property in the State of Arkansas.

The State contends that Appellant violated subsection
(a) because she operated the vehicle “‘in such a careless manner as
to evidence a failure to keep a proper lookout for other traffic,
vehicular or otherwise” by driving her car in reverse down the
street. With regard to whether backing down a street was careless,
Officer Lee testified, “I don’t believe any cars were coming. There
were no cars behind me. There is always a danger. In the absence
of any other vehicles around I wouldn’t say there necessarily was a
danger.” Based on Officer Lee’s testimony that there were no
other vehicles around, and there was not “necessarily a danger,”
we cannot say that the facts or circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge were sufficient to permit a person of reasonable cau-
tion to believe that Appellant failed to keep a proper lookout for
other traffic by backing down the road.

The State contends that, even if Lee did not have probable
cause to stop Appellant for careless driving, he did have probable
cause to stop her for violating Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-1309(a)
(Supp. 2007), which provides that “‘[t]he driver of a vehicle shall
not back a vehicle upon any roadway, unless the movement can be
made with reasonable safety and without interfering with traffic.”
Once again, we cannot say that the facts within the officer’s
knowledge were sufficient to permit a person of reasonable cau-
tion to believe that the vehicle could not be backed down the road
“with reasonable safety and without interfering with traffic.”

Accordingly, we hold that there was no probable cause to
believe that Appellant was committing a traffic violation and that
the circuit court therefore clearly erred in denying the motion to
suppress. We therefore reverse and remand. In view of our holding
that there was no probable cause to make the stop, we need not
address Appellant’s remaining arguments.

Reversed and remanded.

402 |]

Rufus Homer ADAMS v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT of
HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES

08-806 291 S.W.3d 172

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

Val P. Price, for appellant.

Gray Allen Turner, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Pp E. Dantsrson, Justice. The instant case is a no-merit
appeal from an order of long-term protective custody filed
by counsel for appellant Rufus Homer Adams. The order awarded
long-term custody of Mr. Adams to appellee Arkansas Department of
Health and Human Services (DHS). Mr. Adams’s brief presents this
court with an issue of first impression, that is, whether a court-
appointed attorney for an alleged endangered, indigent adult can file
an Anders no-merit appeal from an order of long-term custody in an
adult-protective case. Assuming that an Anders no-merit appeal is

ee
4o4 ees

possible, counsel for Mr. Adams asserts that the circuit court did not
err when it awarded custody of Mr. Adams to DHS. We adopt herein
the Anders no-merit procedures for appeals by indigent adults subject
to orders of long-term custody, and we affirm the circuit court’s order
and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

On February 22, 2008, DHS filed a petition for emergency
custody, asserting that it should be granted custody of Mr. Adams
because

the circumstances or conditions of [Mr. Adams] are such that
returning to or continuing at [his] place of residence or in the care
and custody of a parent, guardian, or other person responsible for
{his] care presents imminent danger to [his] health or safety. [Mr.
Adams] lacks the capacity to comprehend the nature and conse-
quences of remaining in a situation that presents imminent danger
to [his] health or safety.

Attached to the petition was an affidavit from Adult Protective
Services, stating, in part, that Mr. Adams had been evaluated and was
found to be incapable “of managing his medications or his finances
and was not capable of independent living.” The affidavit stated that
Mr. Adams suffered from Type 2 Diabetes, coronary artery disease,
and hypertension, and that Mr. Adams admitted difficulty with his
memory, due to a stroke a few years prior. It further provided that Mr.
Adams continued to “be confused and have memory problems” and
appeared “‘to have little understanding of the consequences of his
actions.” As a result of the petition, the circuit court issued an ex parte
order of emergency custody.

On March 3, 2008, the circuit court filed a probable-cause
order, in which the circuit court declared Mr. Adams indigent,
appointed counsel, and set a hearing on long-term custody for
March 24. Following that hearing, the circuit court filed an order
for long-term protective custody, awarding DHS custody of Mr.
Adams. In its order, the circuit court found that

[rJespondent lacks the capacity to comprehend the nature and
consequences of remaining in a situation that presents an imminent
danger to his health or safety. More specifically: Mr. Adams has
been diagnosed with Type 2 Diabetes, coronary artery disease, and
hypertension. Dr. Jim Pang states that in his opinion Mr. Adams is
not capable of managing his medications or his finances and not
capable ofindependent living. Mr. Adams does not have any family

willing or able to assist him with independent living nor does he
believe he needs assistance. Mr. Adams claims to have an apartment
in Osceola ready to move in but has been unable to tell anyone the
address.

4. Respondent is unable to provide for his own protection
from abuse, neglect, or exploitation.

5. That the Respondent did not have a caregiver, responsible
for his protection, care, or custody.

The circuit court then found by clear and convincing evidence that
Mr. Adams was in need of placement and awarded long-term custody
of Mr. Adams to DHS. On April 22, 2008, Mr. Adams filed his notice
of appeal, and counsel for Mr. Adams has presented this court with the
instant no-merit brief and a motion to withdraw. Mr. Adams was
given thirty days to respond to his counsel’s no-merit brief, and
various documents from Mr. Adams were received September 19,
2008. We turn now to the instant appeal.

I. Adoption of No-Merit Procedures

For the first point on appeal, counsel for Mr. Adams, citing
to this court’s recent adoption of a no-merit procedure for
dependency-neglect cases, urges this court to adopt a no-merit
procedure for appeals from orders of long-term custody under the
Arkansas Adult Maltreatment Act, Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 9-
20-101—9-20-121 (Repl. 2008). Specifically, counsel requests
that ‘the Court adopt a No Merit procedure, accept this No Merit
brief as compliant with a No Merit procedure, [Jule on the merits
of the case and allow him to withdraw.” DHS responds, requesting
that counsel’s motion to withdraw be granted and the appeal be
dismissed.

In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the United
States Supreme Court, in an effort to protect an indigent defen-
dant’s right to counsel on appeal, adopted the following procedure
for counsel’s withdrawal, where counsel has conscientiously de-
termined that the appeal contains no meritorious issues:

[Counsel’s] role as advocate requires that he support his client’s
appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his case
to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he
should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw.

Lee ————————euo_ee

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406 es

‘That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A
copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time
allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court — not
counsel — then proceeds, after a full examination of all the
proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so
finds it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the
appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to
a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand,
if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and
therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indi-
gent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.

386 U.S. at 744. The question presented in the instant appeal is
whether the no-merit Anders procedures should be applied to appeals
from orders of long-term custody pursuant to the Adult Maltreatment
Custody Act.!

The purpose of the Adult Maltreatment Custody Act is to:

(1) Protect a maltreated adult or long-term care facility resident
who is in imminent danger; and

(2) Encourage the cooperation of state agencies and private
providers in the service delivery system for maltreated adults.

Ark, Code Ann. § 9-20-102 (Repl. 2008). To that extent, the Act
gives jurisdiction to the probate division of the circuit court over
proceedings for custody, temporary custody for purposes of evalua-
tion, court-ordered protective services, or an order of investigation
pursuant to the Act. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-20-108(a)(1) (Repl.
2008). The Act further sets forth the procedures to be followed under
the Act.

In Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359
Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), this court adopted the Anders
no-merit procedures for appeals by indigent parents, which stem
from termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. In Linker-Flores,
we observed that, pursuant to statute and relevant case law,

* We recently declined to consider whether the no-merit Anders procedures should
apply to appeals from civil-commitment orders, finding that the appeal at issue was moot. See
Dickinson v, State, 372 Ark, 62, 270 S.W.3d 863 (2008).

indigent parents in Arkansas had a right to counsel on appeal.
Given that right, we then examined the “extent of counsel’s
obligations when counsel believes the appeal is frivolous.” 359
Ark, at 138, 194 S.W.3d at 745. After reviewing a variety of
jurisdictions that had addressed both sides of the issue, we con-
cluded that “[bJecause . . . the benefits from the Anders protections
to the indigent parent’s right to counsel outweigh the additional
time such procedures require, the Anders procedures shall apply in
cases of indigent parent appeals from orders terminating parental
rights.” Id. at 141, 194 S.W.3d at 747.

In the same vein, we must initially determine whether an
indigent adult subject to an order of long-term custody has a right
to counsel on appeal. Indeed, such an adult is entitled to counsel
during the proceedings against him in the probate court, pursuant
to the Act itself. Under the Adult Maltreatment Custody Act, the
adult subject to custody shall be served a copy of the petition for
custody, as well as notice of the hearing to be held on the petition.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-20-111(a), (b)(1) (Repl. 2008). In addi-
tion, the pleadings served on the adult shall “include a statement of
the right to: (1) Effective assistance of counsel; (2) Be present at the
hearing; (3) Present evidence on the respondent’s own behalf; (4)
Cross-examine witnesses who testify against him or her; (5)
Present witnesses in the respondent’s own behalf; (6) Remain
silent; and (7) View and copy all petitions, reports, and documents
retained in the court file.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-20-111(c). Further
evidence regarding the adult’s right to counsel is found in Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-20-116(b)(1) (Repl. 2008), which directs the
probate court, at the probable-cause hearing, to make certain
inquiries of the adult regarding counsel, including:

(A) Whether the maltreated adult has the financial ability to
retain counsel; and

(B) Ifthe maltreated adult does not have the financial ability to
retain counsel, whether the maltreated adult is indigent.

2 ‘The pertinent statute provided:

In all proceedings to remove custody from a parent or guardian or to terminate parental
rights, the parent or guardian shall be advised in the dependency-neglect petition or the ex parte
‘emergency order and the first appearance before the court of the right to be represented by
counsel af all stages of the court proceedings and the right to be appointed counsel if indigent.

Ark, Code Ann. § 9-27-316(h)(1) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).

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408 es

In addition, the court shall inform the adult of the right to effective
assistance of counsel and, if the adult is indigent, appoint counsel for
the adult. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-20-116(b)(2). The Act, thus, makes
clear that an adult, subject to a petition for custody pursuant to the
Act, is entitled to effective assistance of counsel during the probate-
court proceedings.

While it is clear that the adult subject to the Act is
entitled to counsel in the proceedings before the probate court, no
mention is made in the Act regarding the adult’s entitlement to
counsel on appeal, which was the guiding principle for our
decision in Linker-Flores. Nonetheless, it would defy logic were we
to hold that such adults ordered into long-term custody under the
Act, who were entitled to counsel during the probate-court
proceedings, were not entitled to counsel on appeal. Here, Mr.
Adams was entitled to counsel during the proceedings before the
probate court, he was entitled to appeal the order of the probate
court, and, therefore, we hold, he is entitled to counsel on appeal.

HM Because an indigent adult subject to the Act is entitled
to counsel on appeal, it is evident to this court that the Anders
no-merit procedures would best protect Mr. Adams’s interests, or
those of any indigent adult subject to the Act, when counsel
believes there is no issue of arguable merit for appeal. Accordingly,
we hold that the Anders no-merit procedures apply to appeals by
indigent adults from long-term custody orders under the Adult
Maltreatment Custody Act. In doing so, we further hold that
appointed counsel for an indigent adult, subject to the Adult
Maltreatment Custody Act, on a first appeal from an order of
long-term custody may petition this court to withdraw as counsel
if, after a conscientious review of the record, counsel can find no
issue of arguable merit for appeal. Counsel’s petition must be
accompanied by a brief discussing any arguably meritorious issue
for appeal. The indigent adult must be provided with a copy of the
brief and notified of his or her right to file points for reversal within
thirty days. If this court determines, after a full examination of the
record, that the appeal is frivolous, the court may grant counsel’s

> There is no question that an adult subject to the Act can appeal the order of the
probate court, as Ark. Code Ann. § 28-1-116 (Repl. 2004) specifically permits an appeal of
probate orders, except an order removing a fiduciary for failure to give a new bond or to
render an account as required by the court or an order appointing a special administrator.

motion and dismiss the appeal. If, however, we find any of the
legal points arguable on their merits, we will appoint new counsel
to argue the appeal.

Because Mr. Adams’s counsel has filed a no-merit
Anders brief and a motion to withdraw in accordance with the
procedures set forth above, we will consider the instant no-merit
appeal.

II. Order of Long-Term Custody

Mr. Adams’s counsel next asserts that the probate court did
not err in granting DHS’s petition for custody. Stating that the case
is one of first impression, counsel urges this court to adopt the same
standard of review used in termination-of-parental-rights cases,
that of clear and convincing evidence. He further contends that the
evidence presented supports the circuit court’s order of long-term
custody.*

Our standard of review for probate orders is well established.
This court reviews probate proceedings de novo, and the decision
of the probate court will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous,
giving due regard to the opportunity and superior position of the
probate court to determine the credibility of witnesses. See Buchte
v. State, 337 Ark. 591, 990 S.W.2d 539 (1999) (reviewing an order
of involuntary commitment). See also Campbell v. State, 51 Ark.
App. 147, 912 S.W.2d 446 (1995) (observing, in review of an
involuntary-commitment order, that when the burden of proof in
the trial court was by clear and convincing evidence, the standard
of review was whether the trial court’s finding is clearly errone-
ous). After reviewing the evidence in the instant case, we cannot
say that the circuit court clearly erred in granting the petition for
long-term custody.

Pursuant to the Act, the probate court may order
long-term custody with DHS if the court determines that:

(1) The adult lacks the capacity to comprehend the nature and
consequences of remaining in a situation that presents an imminent
danger to his or her health or safety;

+ As already noted, in compliance with the Anders no-merit procedures, Mr. Adams
vwas notified of his right to file points for reversal. Mr. Adams did file some documents for
our review, but no actual points for reversal were filed.

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410 __

(2) The adult is unable to provide for his or her own protection
from maltreatment; and

(3) The court finds clear and convincing evidence that the
adult to be placed is in need of placementas provided in this chapter.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-20-117(c) (Repl. 2008). Here, the circuit court
made the requisite findings. Thus, the question presented is whether
the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous. They were not.

A review of the hearing before the circuit court reveals the
following testimony. Sunny Rutledge, an Adult Protective Ser-
vices case worker, testified that on February 13, 2008, DHS was
contacted and informed by a senior-care facility in Forrest City
that Mr. Adams was ready to leave the facility, “‘and that they
didn’t believe that he was able to leave on his own.” Ms. Rutledge
stated that while Mr. Adams did not want to be discharged to a
nursing home, the facility did not think him able to take care of
himself, and, further, he had no family willing to take care of him.
Ms. Rutledge testified that prior to that, Mr. Adams had been in a
nursing home in Harrisburg, and that, upon leaving against medi-
cal advice, Mr. Adams went to Cross County, where he was
incarcerated for writing hot checks.’ She stated that while in jail,
Mr. Adams went off all of his medications, and upon being
concerned when Mr. Adams’s legs began to turn black, the jail sent
Mr. Adams to the senior-care facility.

Ms. Rutledge testified that, while at the senior-care facility,
Mr. Adams was evaluated by Dr. Jerry Pang. In a letter by Dr.
Pang, which was submitted to the circuit court as an exhibit, he
stated that

[a]fter evaluating Mr. Adams, it is my opinion that Mr. Adams lacks
capacity to fully comprehend the consequences of his behavior.
Mr. Adams is an insulin dependent diabetic and also has coronary
artery disease and hypertension. He requires close supervision to
ensure that he takes medications as they are prescribed and that he
receives proper nutrition for his diabetes. Furthermore, he lacks
the capacity to manage financial matters as has already been dem-
onstrated by his writing the checks with insufficient funds.

5 The hot-check charges stemmed from Mz, Adams's attempts to purchase both a
truck and a house, using checks from accounts that had been closed for approximately two
years.

Ms. Rutledge further testified that Mr. Adams had admitted to having
problems with his short-term memory, and that in an evaluation, also
submitted to the circuit court, he was diagnosed with dementia.

Ms. Rutledge stated that, while in a Manila nursing home,
Mr. Adams struck a nurse and was asked to leave. She said that no
such problems had occurred at Mr. Adams’s current facility, but
that he had called her before the hearing, sounding delusional and
stating that he did not want to go to court in Mississippi County
because “‘his ex-wife was having sex with the Judge.” Ms. Rut-
ledge testified that some of the consequences posed to Mr. Adams
by not taking his medications as needed were a very high risk of
having another stroke and the possibility of losing his legs due to
severe complications from his diabetes. Ms. Rutledge recom-
mended that Mr. Adams remain in nursing-home care. She further
testified that she did not feel that he was able to protect himself
from abuse or neglect; that if he was on his own, he did not have
the capacity to understand that he was putting himselfin a situation
that would be putting him in imminent danger; that she believed
that he should remain in his current facility and that it was the least
restrictive alternative for him; and that his son and daughter would
still be able to visit Mr. Adams at that facility.

Ms. Janice Woods, an Adult Protective Services nursing
consultant and a registered nurse, testified that she had conducted
a two-hour assessment of Mr. Adams’s mental status and per-
formed a mini-mental status examination. She stated that while he
was aware of the type of medications that he was taking, she did
not think he fully grasped the concept of what would happen if he
did not take his medication. Specifically, she stated that upon not
taking his medications for two months and being admitted to the
hospital,

his blood sugar was 264 and a normal value would be anywhere
from 80 to 110 depending on the machine that you were using to
calibrate it. His urine creatine level was 1.9, which with high blood
sugars sometimes you can wind up with renal failure. He had a
white count of 11.17 indicating that he had an infectious process
going on. And his blood pressure was 173 over 83. He hada three
plus pitting edema in his legs. They were very swollen and he also
had cellulitis and was placed on antibiotics for that.

She commented that in those circumstances, renal failure, amputa-
tions due to the cellulitis, or another stroke due to heart dysrhythmias
could result. She further related to the court the following:

Ss
12 es

Anytime he’s been out of the nursing home and even in the
nursing home he’s had either legal issues or issues with combative
behavior. I believe one of the nursing homes he struck a residen[t]
there. At the Manila nursing home he argued with the nurse,
according to the records, because he was insistent that he was not
taking his furosemide, which is Lasix and when the nurse tried to
explain it to him, he argued that he wasn’t taking it and the nurse
turned around to leave and he grabbed the nurse in a head-lock and
started hitting the nurse in the back of the head multiple times.

Finally, she testified that she believed that it was in Mr. Adams’s best
interest to remain where he was currently placed, and that based on
her evaluations of him, she did not think that he had “the capacity to
understand that he would be placed in a situation that might cause
eminent danger to himself[.]”

Mr. Adams then testified in his own behalf and disputed the
testimony of the prior witnesses. He testified that he did not try to
write a check for a house and that he was going to borrow money
from ‘“‘the nursing home,” who “‘had a plot” for him and “also a
monument and it was eleven hundred and something dollars.”” He
later clarified his statement, based on a certificate from Roller
Funeral Home, saying that he believed the funeral home was going
to give him money to cover his check. He further admitted that
there were pending hot-check charges against him.

After reviewing the evidence before the circuit court, we
cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in awarding long-
term custody of Mr. Adams to DHS. Accordingly, we affirm the
circuit court’s order. We further grant, pursuant to the Anders
no-merit procedures adopted in this opinion, counsel’s motion to
withdraw.

Affirmed; Motion to withdraw granted.

= 413

Wesley and Tina SETH »v.
ST. EDWARD MERCY MEDICAL CENTER

07-1348 291 S.W.3d 179

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

414

McHenry, McHenry & Taylor, by: Donna McHenry, Robert
McHenry, and Greg Taylor, for appellants.

Thompson and Llewellyn, P.A., by: William P. Thompson, for
appellee.

Rew CuNNINGHAM W1LLs, Justice. Wesley and Tina Seth
appeal from an order of the Sebastian County Circuit
Court granting St. Edward Mercy Medical Center’s (St. Edward)
motion for summary judgment on the basis of the charitable immu-
nity doctrine. The Seths first argue that the trial court erred because
St. Edward waived any claim of charitable immunity from suit or
liability and that the principle of estoppel prevents application of the
defense to St. Edward. Second, the Seths argue that the trial court
erred in retroactively applying this court’s decision in Low v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005), and by
refusing to allow amendment of their complaint to name St. Edward’s
pooled liability fund owner and/or its commercial liability insurer as
proper party defendants.

On February 18, 2004, the Seths filed a medical negligence
suit against St. Edward, Arkansas Heart Center, Emergency Medi-
cine Associates, and two doctors. The complaint also named St.
Edward’s unknown insurer in the event that St. Edward asserted a
charitable immunity defense, and stated in paragraph seven of the
complaint that St. Edward “may claim immunity from suit or tort
liability as a charitable or non-profit entity,” and “‘in such case,
John Doe Insurance Company would be the appropriate Defen-
dant under the Arkansas direct action statute.” St. Edward filed an

EC
Pd 415

answer to the Seth’s complaint on March 16, 2004, averring that it
‘was a nonprofit corporation, denying negligence or causation, and
asserting certain affirmative defenses. However, St. Edward spe-
cifically responded to paragraph seven of the Seths’ complaint in its
answer by stating, “No response from this defendant is required to
paragraph 7 of the Complaint. To the extent any response is
required, the allegations in paragraph 7 are denied.”

The Seths filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
November 28, 2005, asserting that no factual issues remained to
preclude determination of St. Edward’s negligence. St. Edward
filed a response to the answer on December 30, 2005, contending
that genuine issues of material fact remained, but once again did
not raise the defense of charitable immunity.? The trial court
denied the Seths’ motion.

On January 24, 2007, St. Edward filed an amended answer to
the Seths’ complaint, asserting for the first time that it was entitled
to charitable immunity from liability and suit. On the same date,
St. Edward also filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting
that the trial court dismiss the complaint against it because it was a
charitable entity as a matter of law and, therefore, immune from
tort liability. The Seths filed a response to St. Edward’s motion for
summary judgment, arguing that Arkansas law at the time the
action arose and the complaint was filed required St. Edward to be
named as a defendant because it was not immune from suit.
Further, the Seths contended that St. Edward never asserted the
defense of immunity from suit in its original answer or the
amended answer, thus waiving such defense under Ark. R. Civ. P.
8 and 12 and under the principle of estoppel. The Seths also
argued that “[njew law,” presumably Low, supra, should not be
applied retroactively to this case. Alternatively, the Seths argued

* St, Edward also reserved the right to “file additional pleadings or amendments to its
pleadings,” and to “assert additional defenses or claims.”

2 ‘This court issued the decision in Low, supra, on December 15, 2005, that held
charitable entities are immune from suit and, therefore, the proper party defendant in a claim
against a charitable entity is the entity’s liability insurer. A petition for rehearing was filed in
Low on January 3, 2005, and the court issued its mandate on January 19, 2005.

> St. Edward claimed both immunity from suit and liability in its amended answer. In
its motion for summary judgment and brief in support, St. Edward asserted that it is immune
fiom liability rather than suit. However, St. Edward did cite Low, supra, in its brief in support
and Low’s holding that a charitable entity is immune from liability and suit.

that if St. Edward was dismissed from the complaint, the court
should allow substitution of Sisters of Mercy, a Missouri corpora-
tion that managed a pooled liability fund for St. Edward, and/or St.
Edward’s separate commercial liability insurer as proper party
defendants under the direct-action statute. The Seths also argued
that they should be allowed to amend their complaint to add the
individual employees of St. Edward as defendants under Ark. R.
Civ. P. 15. The Seths did not file a separate motion to strike St.
Edward’s amended answer as provided by Rule 15(a).

The trial court issued an order on May 9, 2007, granting St.
Edward’s motion for summary judgment “‘[p]ursuant to the case
law as set forth in George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 337 Ark. 206
(1999); Low v. Insurance Co. of North America, et al., 364 Ark. 427
(2005); and Sowders v. St. Joseph’s Mercy Health Center, 06-414 (Ark.
1-18-2007) and the cases and authorities cited in the respective
cases.” The Seths filed a timely notice of appeal after the trial court
granted the Seths’ motion to voluntarily dismiss all remaining
defendants.

This court’s standard of review for summary judgment has
been often stated as follows:

Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is
clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Once a moving party has established a prima facie entitlement
to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with
proofand demonstrate the existence ofa material issue of fact. After
reviewing undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied if,
under the evidence, reasonable minds might reach different con-
clusions from those undisputed facts. On appeal, we determine if
summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the eviden-
tiary items presented by the moving party in support of its motion
leave a material question of fact unanswered. This court views the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the
moving party. Our review is not limited to the pleadings, as we also
focus on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties.

Sykes v, Williams, 373 Ark. 236, 239-40, 283 S.W.3d 209, 213 (2008).

The Seths first argue that the trial court erred in granting St.
Edward’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of charitable
immunity because St. Edward waived any defense based on its

LC SssCis*rS
Pd a7

charitable status.‘ Specifically, the Seths’ complaint stated that St.
Edward “may claim immunity from suit or tort liability as a
charitable or non-profit entity,” and “in such case, John Doe
Insurance Company would be the appropriate Defendant under
the Arkansas direct action statute.” After asserting that it was a
nonprofit corporation, St. Edward responded to this paragraph of
the complaint by stating, “No response from this defendant is
required to paragraph 7 of the Complaint. To the extent any
response is required, the allegations in paragraph 7 are denied.”
Accordingly, the Seths assert that St. Edward denied that it would
claim immunity from either suit or liability as a charitable entity,
thus waiving the charitable immunity defense it later raised in the
amended answer.

Under Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(c), “an affirmative defense must be
set forth in the defendant’s responsive pleading.”’ Poffv. Brown, 374
Ark. 453, 454, 288 S.W.3d 620, 622 (2008). Although Rule 8 lists
a number of affirmative defenses, ‘‘the list is not exhaustive and
includes ‘any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense.’ ” Id. The “failure to plead an affirmative defense can
result in the waiver and exclusion of the defense from the case.”
Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., 373 Ark. 472, 284 S.W.3d 486
(2008). This court has clearly stated that ‘‘charitable immunity is
an affirmative defense that must be specifically pled.” Neal v. Sparks
Reg’! Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 46, 289 S.W.3d 8 (2008) (citing Felton,
supra).

St. Edward did not affirmatively plead charitable immunity
in its original answer, but contends that it may amend its answer
under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12 and 15, because Rule 15 allows a
pleading to be amended at any time, and charitable immunity is
not a defense that is waived if not asserted in an original responsive
pleading under Rule 12(h)(1).5

+ The Seths,"for the purposes of this appeal,” do not challenge St. Edward’s status as a
charitable entity.
5 Ark. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:

(h) Waiver or Preservation of Certain Defenses.

(1) A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency
of process, insufficiency of service of process, or pendency of another action between
the same patties arising out of the same transaction or occurrence is waived (A) if

Neal, supra, involved a similar situation as that presented in
this case. The appellants in Neal filed a medical negligence action
against Sparks Regional Medical Center (Sparks) in 2005. Under
Arkansas precedent at the time the suit was filed against Sparks, a
charitable entity was immune from liability but not suit; therefore,
the appellants were required to file suit against Sparks, rather than
against Sparks and its liability’ carrier. See Clayborn v, Bankers
Standard Ins. Co., 348 Ark. 557, 75 S.W.3d 174 (2002); see also
Scamardo v. Jaggers, 356 Ark. 236, 149 S.W.3d 311 (2004) (declin-
ing to overrule Clayborn). Sparks filed an answer on September 8,
2005, stating that it was a “not-for-profit Arkansas corporation,”
but did not assert that it was a charitable entity or assert the defense
of charitable immunity as to either liability or suit.

In December 2005, this court handed down its decision in
Low, supra, holding that a qualified charitable entity was immune
from suit as well as liability, and that the Arkansas direct-action
statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-210, required an action to be
filed against the charitable entity’s liability carrier. On January 26,
2007, Sparks filed an amended answer stating for the first time that
it was entitled to charitable immunity. The appellants responded
by filing a motion to strike Sparks’s amended answer as prejudicial,
but the trial court denied the motion, concluding that the
amended answer did not raise any additional defenses, and was not,
therefore, prejudicial. Sparks then filed a motion for summary
judgment, and the appellants responded by requesting that they be
allowed to substitute Sparks’s liability carrier as the proper party
defendant in an amended complaint. The trial court denied the
request under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c) because the appellant had not
proven that the liability carrier had knowledge of the suit within
120 days after it was filed, nor that it knew or should have known
that the appellants would have brought the suit against it but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.*

omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in subdivision (g), or (B) ifit
is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in the original responsive
pleading.

® Rule 15(c) provides that:
‘An amendment of pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:

(1) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, or

ee
Sd 419

On appeal, this court first held that the trial court erred in
ruling that Sparks’s amended answer did not raise any new de-
fenses, stating that “‘[m]erely asserting its status as a not-for-profit
corporation is not equivalent to specifically raising the affirmative
defense of charitable immunity, as not all not-for-profit organiza-
tions will be immune under the doctrine” Neal, 375 Ark. at 51,
289 S.W.3d at 11. We therefore held that charitable immunity had
not been affirmatively pled in the original answer. This court
further held that the trial court erred in allowing the amended
answer because it resulted in prejudice to the appellants. At the
time Sparks filed its original answer, “the appellants were still
within the 120-day period for notifying [Sparks’s liability carrier]
of the suit for relation-back purposes under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c).”
Id. However, when Sparks filed its amended answer asserting
charitable immunity for the first time, it was too late to substitute
the liability carrier as the proper party.

HI The primary distinguishing factor between Neal and
this case is that in Neal, the appellants filed a motion to strike
Sparks’s amended answer because it was prejudicial. Under Ark.
R. Civ. P. 15(a) (emphasis added), “‘[w]ith the exception of
defenses mentioned in Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), a party may
amend his pleadings at any time without leave of the court,”
unless, “‘upon motion of an opposing party, the court determines
prejudice would result.” If the court finds that prejudice results, it
may strike the amended pleading. Thus, charitable immunity is an
affirmative defense that must be specifically asserted in a responsive
pleading under Ark. R. Civ. P. 8. Because it is not a defense listed
in Rule 12(h)(1), however, it may be raised in an amended answer
under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15, unless there is a motion to strike the
pleading, and the court finds that prejudice results. Here, when St.
Edward filed its amended answer and motion for summary judg-
ment on the same day, asserting charitable immunity for the first
time, the Seths only filed a response to the motion for summary

(2) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (1) is satisfied and, within the period
provided by Rule 4(j) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be
brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits,
and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake conceming the identity
of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.

Ee
420 P|

judgment. They did not file a motion to strike the amended answer
as prejudicial. Accordingly, waiver of the defense of charitable
immunity does not result under our Rules of Civil Procedure.

Ld In addition to waiver, the Seths argue in their first
point for reversal that St. Edwards was estopped from asserting the
charitable immunity defense based on the Seths’ reliance on St.
Edward’s failure to assert charitable immunity in its original
answer. However, this argument is not well developed. It consists
of one sentence in the Seths’ brief and includes no citations to
authority or discussion of specific application of the factors of
estoppel. This court has repeatedly held that ‘something more
than a mere assertion of an argument in the pleadings is required to
preserve an issue for appellate review,” Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 347 Ark. 184, 188, 60 S.W.3d 458, 461 (2001), and that
we will not consider arguments without convincing argument or
citations to authority, Kelly v. State, 350 Ark. 238 (2002).

For their second point on appeal, the Seths argue that
“the trial court erred when it determined it would apply Low v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670
(2005) retroactively.” However, this one sentence is the extent of
the argument. For the same reasons cited above on the issue of
estoppel, we will not consider this argument. The Seths also argue
that the trial court erred by refusing to allow them to amend their
complaint to name Sisters of Mercy and/or St. Edwards commer-
cial excess liability insurer as proper party defendants.” The trial
court never ruled on this issue, raised in the Seths’ response to the
motion for summary judgment, and this court ‘“‘will not review an
issue where the circuit court has not first decided it.” Sowders v. St.
Joseph’s Mercy Health Ctr., 368 Ark. 466, 477, 247 S.W.3d 514, 522
(2007).

Affirmed.

7 Atk. R. Civ. P 15(@) provides that “a party may amend his pleadings at any time
‘without leave of the court)” with the exception of the defenses listed in Ark. R. Civ.P.12(h)(1)..

= 421

Ledell LEE v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-160 291 S.W.3d 188

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

eee

Durrett & Coleman, by: Gerald A. Coleman, for appellant.

ER CuriAM. In a per curiam opinion, handed down on

November 13, 2008, we ordered the appellant, Ledell Lee,
to file a substituted brief because the briefhe had filed did not comply
with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a) (2008). Lee, through his attorneys, has
filed a substituted brief; however, it still does not comply with our
rules.

This case has a long procedural history before this court,
which we detailed in the November 13, 2008 opinion. To restate,
Lee was convicted of capital murder in 1993 and was sentenced to
death. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence in Lee v.
State, 327 Ark. 692, 942 S.W.2d 231, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1002
(1997). Lee filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to
Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, alleging that his trial attorneys rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel, during both the guilt and penalty
phases of his trial. After holding hearings, in January and March
1999, the circuit court denied Lee’s petition. This court affirmed
in Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 38 S.W.3d 334 (2001). In 2006, we
granted a motion by Lee to recall the mandate in that case because
the record indicated that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel during the first Rule 37 proceeding. Lee v. State, 367 Ark.
84, 238 S.W.3d 52 (2006). We remanded the case for a new
hearing on Lee’s Rule 37 petition.

The circuit court held another Rule 37 hearing on August
28, 2007, at which Lee was represented by newly appointed
counsel. On November 21, 2007, the circuit judge entered find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, again denying Lee’s petition for
postconviction relief. That order specifically relied on testimony
from the August 28, 2007 hearing; stipulated testimony from the
hearings held in January and March 1999; testimony introduced
during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial; Lee’s pleadings; the
record of the case; and the arguments of counsel. Lee appealed the
November 21, 2007 findings of fact and conclusions of law to this
court, and we ordered that Lee file a substituted brief in conform-
ance with our rules. Lee v. State, 375 Ark. 124, 289 S.W.3d 61
(2008).

Hl (Our rules require an appellant to abstract all material
parts of the testimony of the witnesses and colloquies between the
court and counsel and other parties as are necessary to an under-
standing of all questions presented to the court for decision. Ark.
Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(5) (2008). Furthermore, on a second or
subsequent appeal, the abstract must include a condensation of all
pertinent portions of the transcript filed on any prior appeal. Id.
Our rules also require that the appellant include all relevant orders,
pleadings, exhibits, and documents in the addendum portion of his
brief. Id. R. 4-2(a)(8).

Lee’s substituted brief does not include a copy of the Rule
37 petition on which the circuit judge ruled in his November 21,
2007 order. Furthermore, the abstract in the substituted brief does
not appear to include the relevant testimony from all of the

“We specifically noted that Lee had failed to abstract all relevant portions of the guilt
and penalty phases of his underlying criminal trial or the relevant testimony from the frst
Rule 37 proceeding, Lee’s brief was deficient also because the addendum did not include a
copy of his amended Rule 37 petition.

; |
Cs 423

postconviction hearings.? While the substituted brief did include
abstracted testimony from the guilt and penalty phases of the trial,
Lee also abstracted various pleadings, exhibits, and orders from the
underlying trial. Our rules make clear that “true and legible
photocopies of the order . . . from which the appeal is taken, along
with any other relevant pleadings, documents, or exhibits essential
to an understanding of the case and the Court’s jurisdiction on
appeal” must be included in the addendum, not in the abstract
portion of the brief. Id. According to our rules:

‘Whether or not the appellee has called attention to deficiencies
in the appellant’s abstract or Addendum, the Court may address the
question at any time. If the Court finds the abstract or Addendum
to be deficient such that the Court cannot reach the merits of the
case, or such as to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the
disposition of the appeal, the Court will notify the appellant that he
or she will be afforded an opportunity to cure any deficiencies, and
has fifteen days within which to file a substituted abstract, Adden-
dum, and brief, at his or her own expense, to conform to Rule
4-2(a)(5) and (8).

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)(3) (2008).

Accordingly, we again order Lee to file a substituted brief,
curing the deficiencies in the abstract and addendum, within
fifteen days from the date of entry of this order. To be clear, Lee’s
brief must, at a minimum, abstract the following: All relevant
testimony from the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, all relevant
testimony from the January and March 1999 evidentiary hearings,
and all relevant testimony from the January 28, 2007 Rule 37
hearing. Also, again at a minimum, Lee’s brief must include
photocopies of the following documents in his addendum: The
November 21, 2007 findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
Rule 37 petition on which the Pulaski County Circuit Court ruled
in its November 21, 2007 order, and Lee’s notice of appeal. The
addendum must also contain photocopies of any other pleadings,
exhibits, or documents relevant to this court’s understanding of
the issues on appeal.

2 Lee abstracted testimony from the “Rule 37 Hearing” However, the brief does not
indicate which Rule 37 hearing was abstracted. Lee must abstract all relevant testimony from.
the January and March 1999 hearings, as well as from the August 28, 2007 hearing.

el

After service of the substituted brief, the appellee shall have
an opportunity to file a responsive brief in the time prescribed by
the Supreme Court Clerk, or to rely on the brief previously filed in
this appeal.

Because this is the second time this court has been forced to
order rebriefing in this case, we refer the defense attorneys to the
Commnittee on Professional Conduct.

Rebriefing ordered.

‘Walter Dewayne RAMSEY, Administrator of the Estate of Norma
Louise Ramsey; Walter Dewayne Ramsey; Wanda Grace Ramsey;
and Joyce Ann Westfall v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, INC.;
Beverly Enterprises-Arkansas, Inc.; Perennial Health Care
Management, LLC; West Memphis Healthcare Center, LLC;
Johnnie Belinda Looney; Trent P. Pierce; Bertram D. Kaplan;
Frank G. Witherspoon, Jr.; and Memphis Dermatology Clinic, PA.

08-1476 291 S.W.3d 185

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

es
rd 425

Duncan E. Ragsdale, for appellants.

Womack, Landis, Phelps & McNeill, P.A., by: Paul McNeill and
Dustin H. Jones, for appellee Trent P. Pierce.

Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell, by: J. Kimbrough
Johnson and Claire M. Cissell, for appellee Bertram M. Kaplan.

ER Curiam. Appellee Dr. Trent P. Pierce has filed a

motion to dismiss this appeal from the Crittenden County
Circuit Court on the grounds that there has not been a final judgment
entered in the case. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal
because not all of the claims against all the parties have been resolved
and there has been no certification pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) (2008) that there is no need for delay in deciding the
case with respect to the parties now before us.

Appellants filed suit against the appellees on July 7, 2006. In
an order dated September 28, 2008, the trial court granted motions
to dismiss as to appellees Frank G. Witherspoon, Jr. and Memphis
Dermatology Clinic. The trial court also granted summary judg-
ment to appellees Trent P. Pierce (as to the claim asserted by the
Estate of Norma Louise Ramsey only) and Bertram D. Kaplan on
October 8, 2008, and October 15, 2008, respectively. Appellants
filed a notice of appeal of the orders granting the motions to
dismiss as well as the order granting summary judgment to Trent P.
Pierce, on September 30, 2008, and filed an amended notice of
appeal on November 5, 2008, to include the orders granting
summary judgment.

In the notice of appeal, appellants claim to be appealing
pursuant to Rule 2(a)(11) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate
Procedure—Civil; however, Rule 2(a)(11) states that an appeal may
be taken from:

An order or other form of decision which adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties in
a case involving multiple claims, multiple parties, or both, if the
circuit court has directed entry of final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties and has made an express
determination, supported by specific factual findings, that there is
no just reason for delay, and has executed the certificate required by
Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure[.]

In this case, the individual claims filed by appellants were not dis-
missed in Pierce’s grant of summary judgment, and there are still
several claims against the remaining defendants that remain pending.
And there is no evidence in the record that a Rule 54(b) certificate
was requested of or issued by the trial court. The failure to comply
with Rule 54(b) presents a jurisdictional issue in this court, and absent
compliance with the Rule, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final
order. Ashmore v. Paccar, Inc., 315 Ark. 490, 868 S.W.2d 80 (1994).

Motion granted; appeal dismissed.

Shelton WORMLEY »v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1344 291 S.W.3d 186

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 22, 2009

Donald E. Warren, Sr., for appellant.
No response.

ER CuRIAM. Appellant Shelton Wormley, by and through

his attorney, Donald E. Warren, Sr., has filed a motion for
rule on clerk. Mr. Warren represented the appellant in the trial court
and filed a notice of appeal on his behalf on June 12, 2008. The record
in this matter was untimely, as it was tendered on November 18,
2008.

This court denied an earlier motion for rule on clerk filed by
John L. Kearney. Mr. Kearney was appointed counsel for the
appellant by the trial court after the notice of appeal was filed. We

found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to relieve Mr. Warren
and substitute Mr. Kearney as counsel for appellant. Wormley v.
State, 375 Ark. 247, 289 S.W.3d 463 (2008) (per curiam). Under
Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure—Criminal 16(a), once the
notice of appeal has been filed, the appellate court has exclusive
jurisdiction to relieve counsel and appoint new counsel. Id. Con-
sequently, this court would not consider the motion for rule on
clerk filed by Mr. Kearney. Id. Because Mr. Warren was not
relieved as counsel of record, we directed that he file a motion for
tule on clerk. Id.

This court clarified its treatment of motions for rule on clerk
and motions for belated appeals in McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106,
146 S.W.3d 883 (2004). There we said:

‘Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was
not timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the appeal is
therefore faced with two options. First, where the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by affidavit filed
with the motion or in the motion itself. There is no advantage in
declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second, where the party
or attorney believes that there is good reason the appeal was not
perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and
this court will decide whether good reason is present.

356 Ark. at 116, 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted).

While this court no longer requires an affidavit admitting
fault before we will consider the motion, an attorney should
candidly admit fault where he or she has erred and is responsible
for the failure to perfect the appeal. See id. When it is plain from
the motion, affidavits, and record that relief is proper under either
rule based on error or good reason, the relief will be granted. See
id. If there is attorney error, a copy of the opinion will be
forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct. See id.

HB Although Mr. Warren does not expressly acknowledge
that the record was tendered untimely due to an error on his part,
it is plain from the record that he erred. Pursuant to McDonald v.
State, supra, we grant Wormley’s motion for rule on clerk and
forward a copy of this opinion to the Committee on Professional
Conduct.

Motion granted.

ARKANSAS ANNUAL CONFERENCE of the AME
CHURCH, INC., and African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v.
NEW DIRECTION PRAISE & WORSHIP CENTER, INC.,
Daryl Bailey, Lloyd Worthy, and Vivian Nooner

08-167 291 S.W.3d 562

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

David O. Bowden and Mercer Law Firm, by: Christopher C. Mercer,
Jr., for appellants.

Lax, Vaughan, Fortson, McKenzie & Rowe, P.A., by: Roger D.
Rowe and Jennie L. Clingan, for appellee.

1M Hannan, Chief Justice. This appeal involves a dispute

over the ownership of church property located at 2311 Bailey
Road, in Little Rock. Appellants Arkansas Annual Conference of the
African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. (Arkansas AME) and
Aftican Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. (National AME), collec-
tively referred to as AME, appeal the judgment of the Pulaski County
Circuit Court granting a petition to quiet title in appellee New
Direction Praise and Worship Center (New Direction) and ordering
the return of personal property, including a 1999 Dodge van. AME

ee
PC
Pd 431

also appeals the circuit court’s denial of its motion for supersedeas
bond. We affirm the circuit court.

The real property that is the subject of this dispute is
described as follows:

Starting at the existing NW corner of the NE 1/4 of the NW 1/4,
Section 21, Township 1 South, Range 12 West, Pulaski County,
Arkansas, and run thence East 158.7 feet to the point of beginning;
from the point thus established run thence South 208.7 feet; thence
East 158.7 feet; thence North 208.7 feet; thence West 158.7 feet
to the point of beginning, containing 3/4 acres, more or less.

On December 27, 1969, Will Bailey, the owner of the real
property, contracted to sell the real property to the Sand Hill AME
Church (Sand Hill) for the price of $750, of which $500 was paid
at the time of the contract of sale and $250 was payable in three
years. On July 15, 1971, Geraldine Jones, as the administratrix of
the Estate of Will Bailey, Deceased, conveyed by deed the real
property to “George Bailey, Fred Jones, and Harris Bailey as
Trustees of the Sand Hill AME Church, and to their successors in
office.”

In 1971, the membership of Sand Hill consisted of members
of the Bailey family. Will Bailey was the uncle of Geraldine Jones,
the administratrix of his estate. Two of the trustees named as
grantees in the administratrix deed, George Bailey and Harris
Bailey, were nephews of Will Bailey and brothers of Geraldine
Jones. The remaining trustee named as grantee in the administra-
trix deed, Fred Jones, was the husband of Geraldine Jones.

Between 1971 and 1981, the members of Sand Hill saved to
build a meeting house on the real property. Through the volunteer
labor of relatives of the Bailey family, a concrete block meeting
house was constructed in 1981. Vivian Nooner and Brenda Kay
Webb, who were members of the congregation between 1971 and
1981, both testified that they could not recall any financial assis-
tance from the Arkansas AME or the National AME for the
purchase of the real property or the construction of the meeting
house. Revered Eugene Brannon, the presiding elder of the Little
Rock District of the AME, testified that he recalled a rally of area
congregations of AME churches to raise funds for the purchase of
the real property at issue and a second rally for the construction of
the meeting house. Reverend Brannon stated that he could not,
however, recall the amount of funds raised for the benefit of Sand
Hill.

ee
————
432 CT

In 1981, the membership of Sand Hill still consisted of
members of the Bailey family. According to Nooner, of the
trustees of Sand Hill shown on the cornerstone of the meeting
house constructed in 1981, all were members of the Bailey family.
Nooner stated that of the stewards listed on the cornerstone, all but
one, the pastor’s wife, were members of the Bailey family.

No testimony or documents were introduced by any party
regarding the formation of Sand Hill or its initial connection with
the National AME. Nooner testified that, while Sand Hill ac-
cepted pastors from Arkansas AME, it did not associate exclusively
or even primarily with other AME churches. She stated that many
of the churches with which Sand Hill associated were Baptist
churches.

Between 1971 and 1995, the membership of Sand Hill
numbered approximately ten to twelve members. Beginning in
1995 and continuing until 2004, the presence of a new pastor,
Reverend Bowers, significantly increased the membership, and
the number of members eventually grew to between fifty and
sixty. When Reverend Bowers left Sand Hill in 2004, the mem-
bership again decreased to approximately ten to twelve members.

By August 2005, Sand Hill was encountering financial
difficulties. AME policy requires AME churches to pay assessments
on a quarterly basis, with the amount of assessments based on the
number of members. Although its membership had decreased
following Reverend Bowers’s departure, the Arkansas AME did
not reduce Sand Hill’s quarterly financial obligations. By August
31, 2005, Sand Hill had only $1.26 left in its bank account.

On October 9, 2005, ten members of Sand Hill met and
voted unanimously to disassociate from the AME. Thereafter, the
members continued to meet for worship service in the meeting
house on the real property. The members also met again to
organize a new church and voted unanimously to incorporate a
new church. The trustees of the congregation incorporated New
Direction Praise and Worship Center, Inc., on November 15,
2005. The members also voted unanimously to deed to New
Direction title to the real property and to transfer title in a 1999
Dodge van to New Direction. A quitclaim deed was prepared by
the trustees of New Direction on November 17, 2005, and the
deed was filed of record on November 18, 2005. The members
were unable to find the title to the Dodge van, so title was not then
transferred to New Direction.

ee
PO
PSY 433

On November 26, 2005, the members of New Direction
invited Reverend Brannon, the presiding elder of the Little Rock
District of the AME, to meet with them at the property. They
delivered a written notice to Reverend Brannon, informing him.
that the members of the congregation formerly known as Sand Hill
AME Church were no longer affiliated or associated with AME.
Reverend Brannon asked for a key to the building, and one of the
members gave him a key. Other members retained their keys, but
when they later returned to the meeting house, they found that
their keys no longer opened the door. Arkansas AME subsequently
sent an AME minister in training to conduct services in the
meeting house. New Direction then brought a civil action for
ejectment, quiet title, and replevin. The circuit court found in
New Direction’s favor, and AME now brings this appeal.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and the Neutral-Principles Approach

The first issue that must be decided is whether the circuit
court had subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve this dispute over
church property. AME claims that the circuit court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction because this matter could not be de-
cided by neutral principles of law without resort to interpretation
of church religious beliefs, practices, customs, organization, and
polity. AME contends that the circuit court’s decision is in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Con-
stitution, as well as the similar guarantees of article 2, sections 24
and 25 of the Arkansas Constitution. New Direction asserts that
the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over this dispute
about church property because the dispute could be decided by
applying neutral principles of law.

HB Where the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a
question of constitutional interpretation, the standard of review is
de novo. Viravonga v. Wat Buddha Samakitham, 372 Ark. 562, 279
S.W.3d 44 (2008); Weiss v. McLemore, 371 Ark. 538, 268 S.W.3d
897 (2007). In Viravonga, we stated:

Both the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution
prohibit the courts from becoming involved in disputes between
members of a religious organization that are “essentially religious in
nature,” because the resolution of such disputes “‘is more properly
reserved to the church.” Gipson v. Brown, 295 Ark. 371, 374, 749
S.W.2d 297, 298 (1988).

ee
ee
434 Cs

Nonetheless, “[iJt is unquestionably the duty of the courts to
decide legal questions involving the ownership and control of
church property.” Holiman v. Dovers, 236 Ark. 211,219, 366 S.W.2d
197,204 (1963) (supplemental opinion denying rehearing). As the
United States Supreme Court has noted, “[tJhe State has an obvious
and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property dis-
putes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church
property can be determined conclusively.” Jones v. Wolf, 443 US.
595, 602 (1979). Yet, even when a property dispute is involved,
courts must refrain from settling the dispute “on the basis of
religious doctrine and practice” and instead apply only “neutral
principles of law.’ Id. at 602-03; see also Ark. Presbytery of Cumber-
land Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, 344 Ark. 332,339, 40 S.W.3d 301,
306 (2001) (expressly adopting the United States Supreme Court’s
neutral-principles approach); Gipson,295 Ark. at 377,749 S.W.2d at
300 (applying the neutral-principles-of-law analysis to determine
whether there was jurisdiction over an internal church dispute).

While “it is impermissible for the civil courts to substitute their
own interpretation of the doctrine ofa religious organization for the
interpretation of the religious organization,” Belin, 315 Ark. at 67,
864 S.W.2d at 841, a court may nonetheless have to examine
documents of a partially religious nature, such as church constitu-
tions, in resolving a property dispute. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. For
example, a court can look at “(1) the language of the deeds; (2) the
terms of the local church charters; (3) the state statutes governing
the holding of church property; and (4) the provisions in the
constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and
control of church property” in determining whether a local church
or one of its governing bodies holds title to church property. Hud-
son, 344 Ark. at 338, 40 S.W.3d at 306 (citing Jones, 443 U.S. 595).

The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that
applying the neutral-principles approach to an examination of
documents relating to a religious institution is not “wholly free of
difficulty.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. In performing its examination, the
court must be careful to scrutinize such documents in “purely
secular terms,” deferring to the religious institution itself for the
resolution of doctrinal issues. Id.; see Hudson, 344 Ark. at 339, 40
$.W.3d at 306-07.

ee
PO
Sd 435

Viravonga, 372 Ark. at 568-71, 279 S.W.3d at 49-50 (footnotes
omitted).

While it is clear that civil courts have subject-matter juris-
diction to hear cases involving church property disputes, courts
must settle the dispute by applying neutral principles of law. We
must now determine whether the circuit court did so in this case.

The first element of the neutral-principles approach is
to review the language of the deed. When we are called upon to
construe deeds and other writings, we are concerned primarily
with ascertaining the intention of the parties, and such writings
will be examined from their four corners for the purpose of
ascertaining that intent from the language employed. Hudson,
supra. In reviewing instruments, our first duty is to give effect to
every word, sentence, and provision of a deed where possible to do
so. Id. We will not resort to rules of construction when a deed is
clear and contains no ambiguities, but only when its language is
ambiguous, uncertain, or doubtful. Id. Here, the language of the
deed indicates that the local trustees of Sand Hill hold title to the
property. As previously stated, on July 15, 1971, Geraldine Jones,
as the administratrix of the Estate of Will Bailey, Deceased,
conveyed by deed the real property to “George Bailey, Fred Jones,
and Harris Bailey as Trustees of the Sand Hill AME Church, and to
their successors in office.”” (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the
language of the deed reflects that Sand Hill was held in trust for
Arkansas AME or National AME.

As to the second element, the terms of local church charters,
AME states that the 1968 edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of the
African Methodist Episcopal Church (Book of Discipline) functions as
both its charter and its general church constitution; therefore, our
review of the second element will also serve as our review of the
fourth element.' Section 2 of the Book of Discipline, titled General
Church Property, provides, in relevant part:

' The 1968 edition was in effect at the time of the 1971 conveyance to Sand
Hill, According to the testimony of Reverend Brannon, National AME’s plan of title and
governance of property of the local AME congregations was essentially carried forward
without change in the editions of the Book of Discipline that were published every four years
after 1968. At oral argument, counsel for AME stated that, while the 1968 edition of the Book
of Discipline may have governed the original transaction, the Book of Discipline was later
amended to include a provision stating that all local church property would be held in trust for

ee
ee
436 _

1. For the security of our meeting houses and the premises belong-
ing thereunto, let the following plan of a deed of settlement be
brought into effect in all possible cases wherever the law will
permit it in a State.

2. If necessary, each Annual Conference may make such modifi-
cations in the deed as may be required by the laws of any State,
so as to firmly secure the premises to the Aftican Methodist
Episcopal Church.

3. No personal or real property whatsoever of the A.M.E. Church
in any foreign district or parts thereof shall be purchased,
disposed of, sold, or otherwise encumbered except by the
written consent of the presiding bishop and trustees elected by
the Annual Conference in which the property is located.

4, The incorporation ofall our churches, where the law will permit
it, should be attended to as soon as possible. And in every
corporation of the A.M.E. Church the pastor shall be president
of the corporation and of the board of trustees, and the method
of electing trustees shall be the same as prescribed in the Book of
Discipline. Every pastor shall see that the provision is a part of
the articles of incorporation.

Also included in Section 2 is a form for a trust deed for local
church property that provided the property was to be held in trust
for the use of the members of the National AME under the rules of
the Book of Discipline. In addition, the form for a trust deed
provided:

‘Whereas some of the states and territories (and countries) have
special acts on their statue [sic] book governing religious bodies,
therefore the meaning and intent of this chapter wherever it refers
to the law of the State or Territory is to be subject to the said state
Jaw and not to any individual church corporation that is now or
may be incorporated.

The record reveals that Sand Hill was not incorpo-
rated. National AME did not introduce any evidence that it was
involved in the purchase of the property. Arkansas AME did not

the National AME. Counsel asserted that the members of Sand Hill “consented to the
amendment” by theit silence, Nevertheless, counsel conceded that AME did not make this
argument before the circuit court.

ee
PO
PSY 47

introduce any evidence that it approved Sand Hill’s purchase of the
real property in 1969, at the time of the contract of sale, or in 1971,
at the time of the delivery of the administratrix deed. In addition,
the administratrix deed did not follow the form of the trust deed
included in the Book of Discipline.

We next consider the third element, Arkansas statutes gov-
erning the holding of church property. Arkansas Code Annotated
section 18-11-201 (Repl. 2003) provides:

All lands and tenements, not exceeding forty (40) acres, that have
been, or hereafter may be, conveyed by purchase to any person as
trustee in trust for the use of any religious society within this state,
either for a meeting house, burying ground, campground, or
residence for their preacher, shall descend with the improvements
and appurtenances in perpetual succession in trust to the trustee or
trustees as shall, from time to time, be elected or appointed by any
religious society, according to the rules and regulations of the
society.

Likewise, Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-11-202
(Repl. 2003) provides:

The trustee or trustees of any religious society shall have the same
power to defend and prosecute suits at law or in equity and do all
other acts for the protection, improvement, and preservation of
trust property as individuals may do in relation to their individual
property.

New Direction points to statutory law regarding trusts.
Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-73-402(a)
(Supp. 2007), a trust is created only ift

(1) the settlor has capacity to create a trust;
(2) the settlor indicates an intention to create the trust;
(3) the trust has a definite beneficiary or is:

(A) a charitable trust;

(B) a trust for the care of an animal, as provided in § 28-73-
408; or

NE

438

(C) atrust fora noncharitable purpose,as provided in § 28-73-
409;

(4) the trustee has duties to perform; and

(5) the same person is not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary.

HI The language of the 1971 deed indicates that Will
Bailey intended to create a trust for Sand Hill AME Church, see
Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-73-402(a), which he was
authorized to do pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section
18-11-201 (Repl. 2003). Nothing in the language of the deed
suggests that Will Bailey had the intention of creating a trust in
favor of either the National AME or the Arkansas AME. Neither
the National AME nor the Arkansas AME had an ownership
interest in the property at the time of the conveyance, and neither
‘was a party to the transaction.

Hl Based upon the application of our neutral-principles
approach and based upon our de novo review of the language of
the 1971 deed, the provisions in the Book of Discipline, and Arkansas
statutory law governing property and trusts, we hold that the
circuit court did not err in quieting title in favor of New Direction,
ordering AME’s ejectment, and concluding that New Direction
was entitled to replevin of the personal property located on the real
property and the 1999 Dodge van.

Validity of the 2005 Deed

AME next contends that, even assuming that the
trustees of Sand Hill had the authority to convey the property to
New Direction, the conveyance must fail because the deed was
invalid. The circuit court concluded, and we agree, that AME had
no right, title, or interest in the real property at issue. Accordingly,
AME lacks standing to challenge the November 2005 conveyance
of the property to New Direction. As such, we do not address
AME’s arguments on this point.

Supersedeas Bond

AME contends that the circuit court erred in denying
AME’s posttrial motion for setting of a supersedeas bond to stay
proceeding pending appeal. Because we affirm the circuit court’s

judgment in favor of New Direction, AME’s argument regarding
the setting of a supersedeas bond is moot.

Motions for Award of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

Hl New Direction filed a Motion for Award of Costs and
Attorneys’ Fees Incurred By Reason of Appellants’ Insufficient
Abstract and Addendum. AME filed a response and, additionally, it
filed a Motion for Award of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees Incurred by
Reason of Appellee’s Insufficient Abstract and Addendum. Pursu-
ant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(b)(1) (2008), “‘[w]hen
the case is considered on its merits, the Court may upon motion
impose or withhold costs, including attorney fees, to compensate
either party for the other party’s noncompliance with this Rule.”
After considering the merits of this case, we do not believe that
either of the parties’ abstracts and addendums are insufficient to the
extent that costs should be imposed by this court. Accordingly, we
deny both motions.

Affirmed.

CITY of CENTERTON ». CITY of BENTONVILLE
08-380 291 S.W.3d 594

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

440

| |

Slinkard Law Firm, by: Andrew R. Huntsinger, for appellant.

Clark & Spence, by: George R. Spence, Bentonville City Attor-
ney, for appellee.

1M Hannau, Chief Justice. The City of Centerton appeals

a judgment of the Benton County Circuit Court declaring as
invalid its annexation of surrounded land described as “‘West Island.”
Centerton argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the
appellees City of Bentonville, a municipal corporation, George and
Nancy Huber, Daniel and Ruby Davies, Sandra and Gary Townsend,
and the Lois Peters Revocable Trust (collectively referred to as
“Bentonville”) satisfied their burden of proof to show that Center-

ton’s annexation of West Island failed to meet the requirements of
Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-302(a) (Supp. 2005). We
affirm the decision of the circuit court. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(b)(5).

Centerton annexed two areas of unincorporated and sur-
rounded land known as “West Island” and ‘‘East Island.”” Both
sections of land are completely surrounded by the neighboring
municipalities of Centerton and Bentonville. Only West Island is
at issue in this appeal.

As permitted under Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-
40-501 (Supp. 2005), Centerton, as the municipality with the
greatest distance of city limits adjoining West Island, passed an
ordinance to annex West Island. At about the same time, Benton-
ville annexed West Island by petition of adjoining landowners, as
permitted under Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-601
(Repl. 1998). Bentonville sued Centerton, alleging that West
Island failed to comply with the requirements qualifying the land
for annexation by Centerton under Arkansas Code Annotated
section 14-40-302(a). A judgment was entered declaring Center-
ton’s annexation invalid.

Admission by Bentonville

Centerton argues first that Bentonville’s annexation of West
Island by petition constitutes an admission by Bentonville that
West Island met not only the requirements for annexation by
Bentonville, but also for annexation by Centerton. Based on this
alleged admission, Centerton argues that Bentonville may not
assert that Centerton’s annexation was invalid. An admission is an
acknowledgment or concession of a fact. See Ferguson v. State, 362
Ark. 547, 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005).

Centerton asserts that ““Mr. Peters’ signature on that petition
is an admission that the Trust’s property met at least one of the five
criteria set out in A.C.A. § 14-40-302(a).” Peters is an owner of
property in West Island in an area referred to as the land south of
Motley Road. He, among other landowners, petitioned to be
annexed into Bentonville. Centerton cites us to City of Marion v.
Guaranty Loan & Real Estate Co.,75 Ark. App. 427, 58 S.W.3d 410
(2001), for the proposition that annexations by petition under
section 14-40-601 must satisfy at least one of the listed criteria for
annexation set out in section 14-40-302(a) before an area may be
annexed. Centerton further argues that only when the land to be

es
442 _____ =

annexed meets at least one of the criteria set out in section
14-40-302(a) is the petition “right and proper’ as required for
annexation by petition in Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-
40-603(a) (Repl. 1998).

With regard to whether the criteria of section 14-40-302(a)
apply to annexation by petition of adjoining landowners, even
though section 14-40-302(a) is not mentioned in the statutes on
annexation by petition, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 14-40-601 to -606
(Repl. 1998), this court in City of Jacksonville v. City of Sherwood, 375
Ark. 107, 111, 289 S.W.3d 90, 93 (2008), stated that “‘the criteria
apply regardless of whether the annexation proceeding was initi-
ated by the city or by adjoining landowners.” See also Town of
Houston v. Carden, 332 Ark. 340, 965 S.W.2d 131 (1998).1 Where
at least one of the criteria of section 14-40-302(a) is met, the
petition of adjoining landowners is “right and proper” under
section 14-40-603(a). Id.

HB We agree that Bentonville in the landowners’ petition
asserted that the annexation of West Island was right and proper,
and that implicit within that petition is an assertion that West
Island met at least one of the criteria of section 14-40-302(a) with
respect to the annexation by Bentonville. However, the landown-
ers’ petition makes no assertion, implicit or otherwise, that West
Island met at least one of the criteria of section 14-40-302(a) with
respect to the annexation by Centerton. That West Island met a
criterion with respect to Bentonville does not necessarily mean
that it met that same criterion or any other criteria with respect to
Centerton. For example, the actual growth of one municipality
surrounding an island might be moving into an island while the
actual growth of another surrounding municipality might not. See
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-302(a)(3). In the landowners’ petition,
neither Bentonville nor the petitioners make an admission that
West Island met the requirements for annexation by Centerton.

* Centerton argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the criteria of Arkansas
Code Annotated section 14-40-302(a) (Supp. 2005) do not apply to annexation by petition of
adjoining landowners under Arkansas Code Annotated section 1440-601 (Supp.2005). The
circuit court erred, See City of Jacksonville x City of Sherwood, 375 Ark. 107, 111, 289
S.W.3d 90, 93 (2008). However, this error does not require reversal in this case because
Bentonville also showed that none of the section 14~40-302(a) criteria were met.

ee.

Prima Facie Presumption of Compliance With Section 14-40-302(a)

Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-503(a)(2)
(Repl. 1998), Centerton next argues that when the majority of its
governing body voted for annexation, a prima facie case of
annexation was established that Bentonville had to overcome in its
suit challenging the annexation. Section 14-40-503(a)(2) provides,
“If a majority of the total number of members of the governing
body vote for the proposed annexation ordinance, then a prima
facie case for annexation shall be established, and the city shall
proceed to render services to the annexed area.” A decision to
annex becomes final in thirty days unless challenged in circuit
court. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-503(b) (Repl. 1998). The burden.
rests on those objecting to the annexation to produce sufficient
evidence to defeat the prima facie case, and that means that they
must show that the area should not be annexed. Gay v. City of
Springdale, 298 Ark. 554, 769 S.W.2d 740 (1989). The party
challenging the ordinance bears the burden of proving the annex-
ation was improper. Id. However, this court has noted that “by the
very nature of this type of litigation, there is a wide latitude for
divergence of opinion and, consequently, a high degree of reliance
must be placed upon the findings of the trial judge.” Id. at 557, 769
S.W.2d at 741. A finding by a circuit court on annexation will not
be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. Town of Houston, supra.

Annexation is proper where any one of the criteria set out in
section 14-40-302(a) is met. Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204,
710 S.W.2d 205 (1989). However, “[i]fa part of the proposed area
does not meet one of the five requirements, the annexation of the
entire area is void in toto.” Town of Houston, 332 Ark. at 348, 965
S.W.2d at 135. Section 14-40-302(a)? provides as follows:

2 Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-40-302(a) (Supp. 2005) sets out what are
sometimes referred to as the “Véstal criteria” See Utley x. City of Dover, 352 Ark. 212, 221,
101 S.W.3d 191, 194 (2003); Chastain ». Davis, 294 Ark. 134, 142, 741 S.W2d 632, 636
(1987). This court in Vestal w Little Rock, 54 Atk. 321, 16 S.W. 291 (1891), discussed the
criteria that could be met to satisfy the requirements of the then applicable statutes on
annexation. See 29 Mansfield Digest §§ 916-923, at 324-25 (1884). Annexation is a special
statutory proceeding. Posey x Paxton, 201 Ark. 825, 147 S.W.2d 39 (1941), Thus, annex-
ation is defined by statute. See Rooker v. City of Little Rock, 234 Atk. 372, 352 S.W.2d 172
(1967); Grayson 1. Arrington, 225 Ark. 922, 286 S.W.2d 501 (1956). ‘The criteria set out in
Vestal were modified and adopted into the current statutes as section 14-40-302(a)..

(a) By vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the total number of members
making up its governing body, any municipality may adopt an
ordinance to annex lands contiguous to the municipality if the lands
are any of the following:

(1) Platted and held for sale or use as municipal lots;

(2) Whether platted or not, if the lands are held to be sold as
suburban property;

(3) When the lands furnish the abode for a densely settled commu-
nity or represent the actual growth of the municipality beyond its
legal boundary;

(4) When the lands are needed for any proper municipal purposes
such as for the extension of needed police regulation; or

(5) When they are valuable by reason of their adaptability for
prospective municipal uses.

After all the evidence was admitted, the circuit court issued
a decision and stated that there was no indication that Centerton
“looks at that property as meeting any of these factors in 14-40-
302.” The circuit court went on to state that it had carefully
considered the criteria in section 14-40-302(a), and that while the
court was reluctant to overturn an action of the Centerton city
council, the “Peters property and the property below the road
[Motley] on the south simply don’t meet any of the criteria of
14-40-302.”” The evidence supports this decision. Centerton
Mayor Ken Williams testified that the Peters’ land south of Motley
Road was annexed because, ‘‘in order to take in the whole island
we had to take it in.” Williams made no reference to any
requirement of section 14-40-302(a). The land south of Motley
Road was annexed because to get the land Centerton wanted,
Centerton had to annex the land south of Motley Road as well.
Nonetheless, Centerton argues that there was no proof that West
Island did not meet the requirements of section 14-40-302(a)(3)-
(5) (Supp. 2005).

Section 14-40-302(a)(3) provides that lands may be annexed.
“when the lands furnish the abode for a densely settled community
or represent the actual growth of the municipality beyond its legal
boundary.”’ Mayor Williams testified that the area south of Motley

Road in West Island was not densely populated. He also testified
that to his knowledge, ‘“‘there are no municipal plans or uses for the
property south of Motley Road.” Williams did make reference to
a “‘small subdivision” that would be in the area south of Motley
Road, but the annexation did not represent the actual growth of
Centerton beyond its legal boundary. Further, the circuit court
found that the only evidence regarding the use of the Peters
property south of Motley Road was that is was used for farming.
Agricultural and horticultural lands are not to be annexed when
their highest and best use is agriculture or horticulture. Town of
Houston, supra.

HI Section 14-40-302(a)(4) provides that lands may be
annexed when “‘the lands are needed for any proper municipal
purposes such as for the extension of needed police regulation.” In
an October 7, 2005 letter providing notice of an annexation
hearing on West Island and East Island, Centerton stated plainly
that the annexation was necessary to protect Centerton’s loans,
funding, and plans for water service. No other reason for annex-
ation was offered. Mayor Williams was asked in cross-examination
to confirm that “the sole reason for this island annexation was to
preserve water customers for the City of Centerton.” He re-
sponded, “Correct.” He then testified that the area south of
Motley Road was not part of the water service area the annexation
was to protect. Clearly, the land south of Motley Road was only
annexed to obtain the “whole island.” Bentonville showed that
there was no municipal purpose in annexing the property south of
Motley Road. When part of the annexed land fails to meet at least
one of the five criteria of section 14-40-302(a), the entire annex-
ation is void in toto.

Section 14-40-302(a)(5) provides that lands are subject to
annexation “[w]hen they are valuable by reason of their adaptabil-
ity for prospective municipal uses.’” Mayor Williams was asked,
“To your knowledge, do you have any municipal plans, municipal
uses for this property south of Motley Road?” He responded,
“No, we don’t.” Centerton now argues that other municipal
services such as fire and police constitute evidence that the
presumption arising from the prima facie case was not overcome;
however, as the circuit court noted, Centerton was asked about
municipal services and responded that water service was the sole
reason for annexation.

The circuit court stated that it had looked carefully at the
section 14-40-302(a) criteria and that not one of the criteria was
met as to the land lying south of Motley Road. In reviewing this
matter with a high degree of reliance placed upon the findings of
the trial judge, we find no basis for Centerton’s allegation that the
circuit court’s decision declaring the annexation invalid was clearly

erroneous.
Affirmed.
Katie Zimmerebner STEHLE ».
Ernest William ZIMMEREBNER.
08-610 291 S.W.3d 573

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

_
PT 447

Lynn Frank Plemmons, for appellant.

Scarlett R. Melikian, for appellee.

Roe L. Brown, Justice. Appellant Katie Zimmereb-
ner Stehle (“Katie”) appealed the order of the circuit
judge denying her motion for change of custody of her daughter, KZ,
to the court of appeals.! That court reversed the circuit judge’s
decision and held that Katie should have primary custody of KZ based
on a material change of circumstances. The appellee, KZ’s father,
Emest William (“Billy”) Zimmerebner, petitioned this court for
review, and we granted his petition. We affirm the circuit judge’s
order, and we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

On October 4, 2001, Katie and Billy divorced, and Katie
was awarded primary custody of KZ. On August 27, 2003, the
circuit judge held a hearing on Billy’s motion to change custody of
KZ to him. That motion was granted by an order entered on
November 10, 2003, which gave Billy primary custody of KZ,
subject to visitation by Katie. On July 25, 2006, Katie moved to
change custody back to her and asserted that there had been a
material change of circumstances. Those circumstances, she con-
tended, were based on these alleged facts: (1) Billy and his
then-wife, now Amber Robertson (“Amber”), had been in a
physical altercation, and Amber had filed for divorce;? (2) KZ and
her stepbrother had to “lay on top of’ Amber to “get [Billy] to
stop attacking her’’; (3) Billy and KZ had been living in Billy’s
parents’ home since March 2006, and the sleeping arrangements
were inadequate because KZ and Billy shared a room; (4) Billy did
not have his own transportation, but used his employer's vehicle to
transport KZ; (5) KZ had been in four different schools since 2003;

' KZ, was born on September 9, 1998, and was eight-and-a-half years old when the
judge’s order was entered.

2 Billy married Amber on October 19, 2001, and they divorced on December 20,
2006. Billy and Amber separated in March 2006.

and (6) on July 2, 2006, Billy dropped KZ at Katie’s house for
summer visitation with insufficient asthma medication and failed
to respond to Katie’s calls regarding the matter.

The circuit judge heard Katie’s motion on March 20, 2007,
and, on March 23, 2007, he issued a letter opinion, giving his
reasons for denying it. On April 16, 2007, an order was entered to
the same effect. Katie appealed, and on May 21, 2008, a three-
judge panel of the court of appeals, in three separate opinions,
reversed the circuit judge’s order and held that Katie should have
primary custody of KZ.

The following facts in the instant case are undisputed. When
Billy and Katie divorced in 2001, KZ was age three and under
school age. After custody was awarded to Katie, KZ lived with her
in Conway. When Billy was awarded custody of KZ in 2003, he
enrolled KZ in school in Greenbrier. Toward the end of the school
year in 2004, Billy enrolled KZ in a magnet school in Maumelle,
where she completed kindergarten and first grade. Shortly after she
started the second grade, Billy and Amber moved to Cabot, and
KZ attended public school there for the remainder of her second-
grade year. KZ returned with her father to Maumelle, after Billy
and Amber’s marriage dissolved in 2006. KZ was enrolled in the
third grade at Academics Plus Charter School in Maumelle, the
school she attended at the time of the hearing on the change-of-
custody petition.

At the hearing before the circuit judge on March 20, 2007,
regarding her motion to change custody, Katie testified to the
following:

* Despite her many efforts, she was unable to communicate with
Billy about KZ because he would not answer her telephone calls
or share information with her regarding KZ’s educational or
medical issues.

* She attended KZ’s parent-teacher conferences, class parties, and
field trips when she was able and regularly visited KZ at school
during lunchtime; Billy did not attend KZ’s school functions;
rather, Amber had handled those matters.>

> ‘Two of KZ’s previous teachers testified that Katie was involved with them in KZ’s
education, and that Billy was not.

* KZ was on the honor roll and got As and Bs at school.4

* She had often been delinquent in paying Billy court-ordered
child support but had paid her arrearages and was current at the
time of the hearing.

On one occasion, Billy dropped KZ off for visitation with
inadequate medication, and she had to pay to have it refilled
because KZ was no longer receiving medical insurance through
the state-funded AR Kids program.

‘When she filed the motion, Billy only had one vehicle, insured
for work purposes, and, therefore, lacked adequate means to
transport KZ.5

After Billy and Amber separated, KZ remained with Amber for
six weeks, and Katie was not notified.

She had remarried and had another child since custody was
awarded to Billy.

She and her husband had recently purchased a newly-constructed
house in Vilonia, where KZ had her own room.

KZ had bonded with her younger half-sister.

If granted custody, Katie would allow KZ to finish the current
school year at the charter school in Maumelle and would consider
transferring her to public schools in Vilonia the following year.

She worked two blocks from the Maumelle chatter school, and it
would be convenient for KZ to remain enrolled there.

KZ would attend daycare after school and would return with
Katie to Vilonia when she finished work.

If granted custody, she would keep Billy updated regarding KZ’s
school and health information.

* Katie initially said that KZ’s grades were “mediocre” and then acknowledged during
cross-examination that she had made honor roll.

5 On cross-examination, Katie testified that she lacked personal knowledge that Billy’s
work vehicle was insured only for work purposes.

Amber testified at the same hearing as follows:

* When she and Billy were married, she provided the day-to-day
care for KZ, and her other children.

* She went to KZ’s parent-teacher conferences and other school
events without Billy.

* She was responsible for communicating with Katie.

* Billy and his parents, but especially his mother, said bad things
about Katie in KZ’s presence.

* During the marriage, Billy was abusive to her, and KZ witnessed
these acts of violence.‘

+ KZ would sometimes “throw a fit” before going to Katie’s house,
and once returned “with a large part of her hair missing.”

+ She had previously testified against Katie and had since changed
her mind about Katie’s fitness as a mother.

Billy also took the stand and testified as follows:

* He worked as a plumbing contractor and lived with his parents in
their three-bedroom house, in which KZ had her own room.

* His mother took KZ to school each morning, and his father
picked her up from school every afternoon.

* He returned most evenings about 30 minutes after KZ got home
from school, and then the two of them worked on her homework
and read together.

* KZ had always been an honor roll student.

* After finishing her school work, KZ had chores and then often
played with her best friend who lived across the street.

© Amber recounted one specific incident in which Billy allegedly threw her against the
wall, after which KZ and her step brother “threw themselves over” her, and KZ said “don’t
hurt my mamma anymore”

* He played on the trampoline with KZ and was teaching her to
ride a bike.

He often did not answer the phone when Katie called because she
would call as many as “30 times” in a row and would “threaten”
him when he answered.

He had not said bad things about Katie in KZ’s presence and had
admonished Amber when she had done so.

KZ returned many times from Katie’s house without having
brushed her teeth.

KZ had “resisted” going to Katie’s house and had acted unhappy
when she returned from visitation.

Amber “gets pretty crazy when she gets mad,” and he was never
violent toward Amber except as necessary to defend himself.

He owned a vehicle in addition to his work truck and was insured
to use both for personal use.

When he told Amber he would request custody of their two
children, she told him she would testify on Katie’s behalf in the
instant custody proceeding,”

Billy’s mother, Debbie Zimmerebner, testified that:

* Billy was very active with KZ and his other two children; KZ
and Billy read together every night, played on the trampoline
together, and went bike riding.

* Billy made sure KZ was clean and that she had brushed her teeth.

* She had never heard Billy make negative remarks about Katie in
front of KZ and he had stopped Amber from doing so.

* Katie called her house “non-stop,” after Amber and Billy sepa-
rated.

7 He testified that he responded to her by saying, “After all the times you've bad
mouthed [Katie] in court and bad mouthed her to teachers?” According to Billy, her response
was, “You're right. The gloves are off”

* On one occasion, she met Katie in a parking lot to retrieve
something KZ needed, and Katie screamed foul language at her.

* Sometimes she referred to Katie as “the witch” but never in KZ’s
presence.

* KZ had her own bedroom at their house, decorated in “all pink
cause that’s [KZ’s] favotite color.”

Finally, Billy’s father, David Zimmerebner, told the court
under oath that:

* He picked KZ up after work each day, and she would change her
clothes, get a snack, and start working on her homework.

* He would help her occasionally with her assignments, but some~
times she would “save[ ] it” for when Billy returned from work
because “she wanted him to work with her.”

* Billy provided the day-to-day necessities for KZ.
* Billy tucked KZ in at night.

After hearing all the testimony, the circuit judge observed
from the bench that he was concerned about the lack of stability in
KZ’s life. He said that it bothered him that Billy had moved with
KZ so often and “always seems to find his way back to his mamma
and daddy’s.” He also expressed concern that Katie only paid her
child support when she “decided to bring somebody back to
court.”” He concluded the hearing by telling the parties that he was
going to “weigh some of this credibility and some of the testi-
mony” and would then make a decision regarding the motion for
change of custody.

On March 23, 2007, the circuit judge filed his letter order,
outlining his decision to deny Katie’s motion. The judge said that
he “had an opportunity to review [his] notes, the exhibits, and to
reflect” about the best interest of the child in the instant case. He
noted his concern that, despite the fact that there are times when
Billy does engage and assist with the care of KZ, “if there is
somebody else who will do it he is more than willing to turn that
task over.” The judge commented on Billy’s tendency to “‘abdi-~
cate his responsibility as a parent.” He made it clear that “there is
no question that while the child has been in his custody she has

CO
SCS 453

continued to thrive, is a good student, and in spite of the conflicts
that have arisen not only between her mother and father but her
extended family she has continued to do well.”

With respect to Katie, the judge said that she “has stepped
up to the plate” and paid the court-ordered child support “when
she was in a position to seek relief from the Court.” He found that
Katie is engaged in KZ’s life, attends school functions when she
knows of them, and meets KZ for lunch on a frequent and
consistent basis. The judge also noted that he was “‘proud to see
that she has since our last hearing taken on a regular job.” He
found that Katie and her husband had improved their financial
situation, bought a house, and made ‘“‘a home for themselves and”
their other child.

The circuit judge next addressed each of the issues Katie
raised in her motion for change of custody. With respect to the
allegations of violence between Billy and Amber, he said that,
while it was ‘“‘absolutely not” a good situation at the time, there
was no testimony that any violence was directed toward KZ, and
the “situation has been diffused in that the ex-wife [Amber] is no
longer involved.” He found that KZ’s sleeping arrangements were
adequate at Billy’s parents’ house, and the only concern he had
regarding Billy and KZ’s living situation was Billy’s “‘tendency to
disengage.” The judge found Katie’s complaint regarding Billy’s
automobile to be a “nonissue” and was similarly unconcerned
with Katie’s allegations that Billy brought KZ to her house with
inadequate medicine.*

The judge noted that ‘‘another significant issue in [his]
mind” was how many times KZ had moved with Billy since the
last order. He observed that when he awarded custody to Billy,
“the motivating factor in [his] decision to change custody was the
stability Billy seemed to show over Katie.” He then said that Billy’s
“advantage” had “disappeared” due to the frequent moves. Nev-
ertheless, he concluded that “the child seems to have adjusted and
is currently doing well in the Academic’s Plus charter school in
Maumelle,” and that “her grades seem to speak well of her family’s
commitment to her education.”’ The judge also noted that the
school was close to where KZ was living and to where Katie was
working. After laying out his findings, the judge concluded that

® ‘The judge specifically found that it was an “isolated event” and it was not “threat
ening to the child, so long as Katie took action and spent money.”

while he was “not terribly impressed with the parenting skills of
either party,” it was his ‘determination that [Katie] has failed to
prove that a change of circumstances exists which would justify
changing custody of the minor child at this point.” Following that,
the judge filed an order to that effect on April 16, 2007.”

When this court grants a petition for review of a court of
appeals decision, we review the case as though it had originally
been filed with this court. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Barrett, 337 Ark.
460, 462, 989 S.W.2d 520, 521 (1999). It is well settled in Arkansas
that a judicial award of custody will not be modified unless it is
shown that the circumstances have changed such that a modifica~
tion of the decree would be in the best interest of the child. See,
e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 336 Ark. 379, 383, 985 S.W.2d 724, 727
(1999). In order to avoid the relitigation of factual issues already
decided, the courts will restrict evidence on a custodial change to
facts arising since the issuance of the prior order. Id. at 384, S.W.2d
at 727. This court has stated that courts generally impose more
stringent standards for modification in custody than for initial
determinations of custody in order to promote stability and con-
tinuity in the life of the child. See Alphin v. Alphin, 364 Ark. 332,
340, 219 S.W.3d 160, 165 (2005). The party seeking modification
of the custody order has the burden of showing a material change
in circumstances. Id.

We have summarized our standard of review for equity
cases, and specifically child custody cases, with regard to de novo
review and the clearly erroneous standard:

‘We review chancery cases de novo, but will only reverse if the
chancellor’s findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence. A finding is clearly erroneous
when the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted. We give due deference to the chancellor’s superior position to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony. In cases involving child custody, great deference is

In addition to denying Katie’s motion, the judge ordered that both Billy and Katie
enroll in and complete a parenting class within six months. He also directed them to attend
an anger management class within six months and ordered that a mutual retraining order,
prohibiting the parties from calling each other names and degrading each other, be contin
ued. The judge ordered that the parties must “communicate regarding the needs of this child
in writing, preferably by email” and the emails should be “short and to the point.”

Le
Cd 455

given to the findings of the chancellor. This court has held that
there is no other case in which the superior position, ability, and
opportunity of the chancellor to observe the parties carries a greater
weight than one involving the custody of minor children. The best
interest of the child is the polestar in every child custody case; all
other considerations are secondary.

See Ford v, Ford, 347 Ark. 485, 491, 65 S.W.3d 432, 436 (2002)
(citations omitted).

We take this opportunity to clarify further our standard of
review for child custody cases, as well as other equity cases, and to
dispel any confusion that may exist concerning de novo review and
our clearly erroneous standard.

Equity cases are reviewed de novo. See ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 342 Ark. 672, 30 S.W.3d 725 (2000). This means the
whole case is open for review. Id. This does not mean, however,
and we emphasize this point, that findings of fact by the circuit
judge in equity cases are simply dismissed. They are not. The
clearly erroneous standard, cited above and set out in our rules of
civil procedure, governs if the circuit judge has made findings of
fact. As Rule 52(a) states:

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous (clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence), and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of
‘witnesses.

Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (2008).

In determining whether the circuit judge clearly erred in a
finding, the appellate court may look to the whole record to reach
that decision. See ConAgra, 342 Ark. at 674, 30 S.W.3d at 727 (on
de novo review of record, court held chancery court clearly erred
in finding information at issue qualified as a trade secret); Ferguson
v. Green, 266 Ark. 556, 587 S.W.2d 18 (1979) (chancery court
reached erroneous conclusion based on de novo review of entire
record). But, to reiterate, to reverse a finding of fact by a circuit
judge, that judge must have clearly erred in making that finding of
fact, which means the reviewing court, based on the entire
evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Ford, 347 Ark. at 491, 655 S.W.3d at 436.

To summarize, de novo review does not mean that the
findings of fact of the circuit judge are dismissed out of hand and

Fd
456 sr

that the appellate court becomes the surrogate trial judge. What it
does mean is that a complete review of the evidence and record
may take place as part of the appellate review to determine
whether the trial court clearly erred in either making a finding of
fact or in failing to do so.

In the instant case, it is abundantly clear to this court
that the circuit judge’s findings, supporting his denial of Katie’s
motion for change of custody, were not clearly erroneous. We
acknowledge, and it is beyond dispute, that some circumstances
have changed since Billy was awarded custody. Billy moved
frequently with KZ, he and Amber divorced following alleged
physical conflict in their marriage, and Katie remarried and im-
proved her financial situation. Despite these facts, the circuit judge
found that they did not constitute a material change in circum-
stances so as to militate a grant of physical custody of KZ to Katie.
To repeat, the judge specifically found that, while the parenting
skills of both Katie and Billy needed improvement, KZ “thas
continued to thrive” in Billy’s custody and was “‘adjusted and is
currently doing well” in school. He also observed that the school
is “close to where the child is living and is also close to where the
child’s mother works.”

What is particularly meaningful to this court is that the
circuit judge has had these parties before him for many years, going
back to Katie and Billy’s divorce in 2001. He has heard from the
various witnesses on multiple occasions and was in a much better
position than this court to observe their demeanor and assess their
credibility. See Ford, 347 Ark. at 491, 65 S.W.3d at 436 (in custody
cases it is especially important to give great weight to the trial
court’s superior position to observe the parties). In the instant case,
the judge dutifully took the matter under advisement in order to
review his notes, the exhibits, and to reflect on the testimony in
order to determine whether the motion should be granted. The
resulting letter order specifically responded to each of Katie’s
concerns and directed the parties to take various actions to “‘im-
prove the situation.””

In sum, we hold that the circuit judge did not clearly err in
finding that Katie failed to prove a material change of circum-
stances so as to justify a change of custody for KZ. We are
particularly swayed by the circuit judge’s finding that KZ has
continued to thrive in Billy’s custody and is a good student despite
conflicts between Billy and Katie.

We affirm the order of the circuit judge and reverse the
court of appeals.

Affirmed. Court of appeals reversed.

Arthur Douglas CHAVIS, III, as Guardian for and Next Friend of
Arthur D. Chavis, IV v. Jill Frances BRACKENBURY

08-473 291 S.W.3d 570

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

[Rehearing denied March 5, 2009."]

* BROWN, J., not participating.

es

Cullen & Co., PLLC, by: Tim Cullen and Tasha C. Taylor, for
appellant.

No response.

1M GuNTER, Justice. Appellant appeals the dismissal of his

complaint for an accounting from his ex-wife, who was the
custodian of two bank accounts established in their child’s name, both
of which were closed approximately fifteen years ago. Appellant
asserts that the trial court erred in finding that (1) the child, who has
now reached the age of majority, was a necessary party to the action,
and (2) the complaint was barred by laches. We granted appellant’s
motion to transfer this case to our court; therefore, we have jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b). We find that appellant’s
arguments are procedurally barred and therefore affirm.

The parties in this case were divorced on September 14, 1992,
and had one child, Arthur, who was four at the time of the divorce.
Appellee had custody of Arthur until September 7, 2001, when custody
‘was given to appellant in an agreed order. Litigation continued between
the parties on various matters, and on July 11, 2003, the court issued an
order declining to exercise jurisdiction over appellant’s request for an
accounting of two bank accounts previously established in the child’s
name with appellee as the caretaker of the accounts. One of the
accounts, the “Worthen Bank” account, was opened in 1990 and
closed in 1991; the other account, the “Shearson Lehman” account,
‘was opened in 1992 and closed in 1996. The court did note, however,
that appellant could pursue his request for an accounting in a separate
proceeding.

On March 9, 2006, appellant filed a complaint for an accounting
of the funds in the above-mentioned accounts and requested that
appellee be ordered to repay the funds from the accounts with interest.
In pleadings filed April 14, 2006, and July 26, 2006, appellee denied any
wrongdoing, raised various affirmative defenses including laches, and
made a motion to dismiss the complaint.

Arthur’s eighteenth birthday occurred on August 30, 2006. On
May 2, 2007, appellee filed a motion to dismiss or substitute parties due
to the child reaching the age of majority. A hearing on the matter was
held on August 3, 2007. After hearing arguments from counsel, the
court orally ruled that the claim was barred by laches and the lack of a
necessary party before the court. The court found that even if the
request for an accounting was granted, the person entitled to receive
any funds, Arthur, was not before the court. Prior to the entry of the
court’s order, appellant filed a motion to reconsider on November 27,
2007, asserting that the court had erred in applying the doctrine of
laches, as appellee had failed to show a detrimental change in position
due to defendant’s delay, and that the court had erred in ruling that
Arthur was no longer a minor and appellant could not act on his behalf,
because under the Uniform Transfers to Minor Act (UTMA), a child is
considered a minor until he or she reaches the age of twenty-one. The
court entered its final order dismissing the complaint on December 20,
2007. The order stated that the complaint was dismissed because
“Arthur has reached the age of eighteen (18) years and is a necessary
party because any relief would go from Ms. Brackenbury to Arthur.
The Court also finds the complaint is barred by laches as Ms. Bracken-
bury cannot be required to produce records from 1991 forward.”
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this order on January 18, 2008.

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in relying on
the general statutory age of majority, eighteen, in deciding that
Arthur was a necessary party, instead of the specific statutory
provision of the UTMA, which defines any person under the age
of twenty-one as a minor. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-26-201(11) (Repl.
2008). Appellant also argues that the court erred in finding that
appellant was not the proper party to bring the complaint, as Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-26-219 clearly allows the minor’s guardian or an
adult member of the minor’s family to petition the court for an
accounting, and there is no requirement that the minor be joined
as a party. And finally, appellant acknowledges that only one of the
disputed accounts, the “‘Shearson Lehman” account, was expressly
created under the UTMA but argues that both it and the
‘Worthen Bank” account should be dealt with under the UTMA.

The problem with these arguments, however, is that they
are not the arguments that were presented below to the trial court.

_ | As to appellant’s argument concerning whether both accounts should be handled
under the UTMA, while this issue was discussed by the parties below, we have no ruling on

Cd
460 CTS

At the hearing, appellee’s counsel argued that Arthur was no
longer a minor under Arkansas law and should therefore be
substituted as the proper plaintiff and that appellant was not the
proper party to bring the action. In his rebuttal, appellant’s counsel
argued that “‘[a]s far as ACA 9-26-219, as that applies to uniform
gifts to minors, the way that the Act is drafted the actual gift itself
— the account — remains in effect until the child turns 21. Arthur
is still 18, which I think would address the statute of limitations.”
Later, appellant’s counsel and the court had the following ex-
change:

Mar. Puurues: Well, of course, I think as to the uniform
gift to minors account, those are valid until the juvenile
reaches the age of 21. As far as the account that actually
was Arthur’s minor account that was —

Tue Court: But Arthur is now an adult — and I know
it’s in effect until he’s 21. But he now is an adult and
has a right to assert his rights and privileges as that adult,
even for when he was a minor. But it becomes his right
when he reaches 18, does it not?

Mr. Puiturs: That’s correct. And perhaps we need to
join Arthur in the lawsuit . . . [.]

Hs This is but one instance in which the court and the
parties were clearly in agreement that Arthur was no longer a
minor, and yet on appeal, appellant is arguing that under the
UTMA, Arthur is still a minor. And, while appellee’s own counsel
pointed out below that under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-26-219, any
adult member of the minor’s family can bring the accounting
action, appellee’s counsel also suggested that the right to do so
extinguished when Arthur turned eighteen, and appellant never
rebutted this contention by making the argument that he is now
making on appeal. And while it is true that appellant raised these
arguments in his motion to reconsider, the arguments raised in that
motion are not properly before us. Under our case law, we treat a
motion to reconsider in a bench trial like a motion for a new trial.

the issue by the trial court, therefore we will not address it. See Bell v. Beshears,351 Atk. 260,
92 S.W.3d 32 (2002) (holding that a party’s failure to obtain a ruling is a procedural bar to this
coutt’s consideration ofthe issue on appeal). We also note that appellant has failed to develop
any argument on appeal that, because the “Worthen Bank” account was not expressly created
under the UTMA, common law principles would be applied to its administration.

|
CS 461

See, e.g., Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Parker, 368 Ark.
393, 246 S.W.3d 851 (2007) (finding that a motion to reconsider
was deemed denied pursuant to Rule 59 of the Arkansas Rules of
Civil Procedure). Under Rule 59, such a motion made before
entry of the final judgment becomes effective and is treated as filed
on the day after the judgment is entered. So, in this case, the
motion was treated as if it was filed on December 21, 2007, and
was deemed denied on January 21, 2008.

HB (Our case law makes clear that when a motion for new
trial has been deemed denied in accordance with Ark. R. App.
P.-Civ. 4(b)(1), the only appealable matter is the original judg-
ment order. Lee v. Daniel, 350 Ark. 466, 91 S.W.3d 464 (2002).
Under Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 4(b)(2), a notice of appeal filed before
the disposition of a posttrial motion is effective to appeal the
underlying judgment or order, but to also seek an appeal from the
grant or denial of the motion, an amended notice of appeal must be
filed within thirty days, and we have no such amended notice of
appeal in this case. Also, this court has repeatedly held that an
objection first made in a motion for new trial is not timely. Lee,
supra.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that appellant’s arguments
were not presented to the trial court in a timely manner, nor are
the arguments properly before this court on appeal. See Yant v.
Woods, 353 Ark. 786, 120 S.W.3d 574 (2003) (holding that, for the
purposes of determining the issues for which appellate review is
preserved, a party cannot change on appeal the grounds for an
objection or motion made at trial, and is bound by the scope and
nature of the arguments made at trial). We therefore are precluded
from addressing the merits of appellant’s arguments on this point
and affirm the trial court.

Because we affirm the trial court on this point, we need not
address appellant’s second argument concerning laches. See Weiss
v. McLemore, 371 Ark. 538, 268 S.W.3d 897 (2007). In addition,
we note that appellant’s second argument was also raised for the
first time in his motion to reconsider, and thus we would be
precluded from reaching the merits of his argument. Yant, supra.

Affirmed.
Brown, J., not participating.

462 r

Tony Bernard JOHNSON ». STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-930 291 S.W.3d 581

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

Ne!

William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, and Timothy A.
Boozer, Deputy Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public
Defender, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Eileen W. Harrison, Ass’t Att’y
Gen., for appellee.

AUL E. Danterson, Justice. Appellant Tony Bernard

Johnson appeals from his conviction for attempted capital
murder and his sentence to life imprisonment plus fifteen years, which
includes an enhancement for use of. firearm.' His sole point on appeal
is that the circuit court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion
in which he claimed that the State failed to introduce substantial
evidence that he acted with premeditation and deliberation. We
affirm his judgment and conviction.

A review of the testimony of Mary Rose Johnson reveals the
following. On April 27, 2007, Mary Rose, who at the time was
married to Johnson, went to see an attorney about obtaining a
divorce from him. Later that day, Mary Rose received a call from
Johnson, inquiring of her whereabouts. Mary Rose told Johnson

+ Johnson does not challenge the firearm enhancement on appeal,

es
PT 463

that she had just left her attorney’s office, to which he responded
that he hoped “‘it wasn’t what [he thought] it was about.” Mary
Rose told him that there was no other reason for her to see an
attorney, and the call soon terminated.

Upon arriving home approximately fifteen to twenty min-
utes later, Mary Rose changed clothes and began walking on her
treadmill, which was located in the garage of her home. While
walking, she looked up to see Johnson standing in the doorway,
and Johnson told her that they needed to talk, “God Damn it!”
Mary Rose then asked for ten minutes to finish walking. Johnson
repeated his statement, then walked over to the wall, and un-
plugged a cd player to which Mary Rose had been listening.

At that time, Mary Rose told Johnson to plug the cd player
back in and to give her ten minutes. After asking three times,
Johnson did plug the player back in and turned, as if he was
leaving. Mary Rose then heard a loud noise, felt a burning, and
began to hold her stomach. After that, Mary Rose fell to her knees
on the treadmill, which was still going. Johnson told Mary Rose
that she had ‘“‘throwed [him] away God Damn it!,” and she
responded that no one did so and asked Johnson to call 911.

Mary Rose began to crawl toward the door, when Johnson
looked at her and said, ‘“‘bitch, don’t make another move, just lay
there and die! . . . 1 ought to shoot you in the head.” She again
asked him to call 911 four different times, which he finally did.
After emergency crews and the police arrived, Johnson was ar-
rested. While Johnson was initially charged with criminal attempt
to commit murder in the first degree and possession of a firearm by
certain persons, the prosecutor later filed an amended information,
charging Johnson with criminal attempt to commit capital murder
and possession ofa firearm by certain persons. He was subsequently
tried, and as already set forth, convicted. He now appeals.

Johnson contends that the State failed to introduce substan-
tial evidence that he acted with premeditation and deliberation in
committing attempted capital murder. While he concedes that
substantial evidence was presented that he fired a .357 revolver at
his then-wife, Mary Rose, striking her in the stomach, he main-
tains that the State failed to prove that he shot her with the
culpable mental state required to prove attempted capital murder
— premeditated and deliberated purpose to cause death.

The State responds that substantial evidence supporting
premeditation and deliberation was presented. Specifically, the
State points to the testimony of Mary Rose, as well as to the

ws |__| -

testimony of Johnson’s co-worker, regarding threatening state-
ments made to him by Johnson relating to Mary Rose. The State
avers that the evidence showed that Johnson thought about killing
his wife long before he fired the shot, that he attempted to cause
her death by firing the shot, and that, by firing the shot, he took a
substantial step toward capital murder in a premeditated and
deliberated manner. It urges that the jury reasonably inferred, from
the deadly nature of the weapon and from the location and extent
of Mary Rose’s injury, that Johnson possessed the culpable mental
state for attempted capital murder.

On appeal, we treat a motion for directed verdict as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Hoyle v. State, 371
Ark. 495, 268 S.W.3d 313 (2007). We will affirm the circuit
court’s denial ofa motion for directed verdict if there is substantial
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support the jury’s
verdict. See id. This court has repeatedly defined substantial evi-
dence as “evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one
way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture.” Id. at 501, 268
S.W.3d at 318 (quoting Young v. State, 370 Ark. 147, 151, 257
$.W.3d 870, 875 (2007)). Furthermore, this court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only
evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. See id.

We hold that substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s
verdict, convicting Johnson of attempted capital murder. A person
commits capital murder if “[w]ith the premeditated and deliber-
ated purpose of causing the death of another person, the person
causes the death of any person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(4)
(Repl. 2006). A person attempts to commit an offense if he or she
purposely engages in conduct that ‘‘[c]onstitutes a substantial step
in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of
an offense whether or not the attendant circumstances are as the
person believes them to be.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-201(a)(2)
(Repl. 2006). We have held that premeditation and deliberation
constitute the necessary mental state for the commission of at-
tempted capital murder. See Salley v. State, 303 Ark. 278, 796
S.W.2d 335 (1990).

Deliberation has been defined as “‘a weighing in the mind of
the consequences of a course of conduct, as distinguished from
acting upon a sudden impulse without the exercise of reasoning
powers.” Ford v. State, 334 Ark. 385, 389, 976 S.W.2d 915, 917
(1998) (quoting Davis v. State, 251 Ark. 771, 773, 475 S.W.2d 155,
156 (1972)). Premeditation means to think of beforehand, and it is

465

well established that it is immaterial as to just how long premedi-
tation and deliberation exist, so long as they exist for a period of
time prior to the homicide. See id. Premeditation and deliberation
may occur on the spur of the moment and may be inferred by the
jury from the type of weapon used, the manner of its use, and the
nature, extent, and location of the wounds inflicted. See id.

HJ In this case, substantial evidence was presented to
support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation. In
addition to the testimony of Mary Rose already set forth above,
Terry Hines, who worked with Johnson at Hines’s father’s detail
shop, testified that on the afternoon in question while at the shop,
Johnson was upset that his wife might have wanted a divorce. He
stated that Johnson told him that “he was going to go home and
just handle his business the way he know how [sic].” He further
testified that Johnson told him that “the was going to shoot [Mary
Rose] if she had some divorce papers” and that “he was going to
kill the bitch.” Mr. Hines then testified that while driving Johnson
home from work, Johnson repeated that he was going to shoot
Mary Rose if she had any divorce papers. Mr. Hines stated that on

that day, Johnson had a serious look on his face. And as already
noted, Mary Rose testified that Johnson came into her garage
demanding to talk to her, shot her, and commented that she should
die. Here, there was substantial evidence to support Johnson’s
conviction for attempted capital murder, and we, therefore, affirm
Johnson’s conviction and sentence.

Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(h), the
record has been examined for all objections, motions, and requests
made by either party that were decided adversely to Johnson, and
no prejudicial error has been found.

Affirmed.

466 =

Roger and Ruth ANDERSON d/b/a Anderson Auto Salvage v.
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY

08-232 291 S.W.3d 586

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

Eichenbaum, Liles & Heister, P.A., by: Christopher O. Parker, for
appellants.

Barrett & Deacon, by: John C. Deacon, Brandon J. Harrison, and
Andrew H. Dallas, for appellee.

LANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Justice. This case requires the

court to decide whether federal law preempts an order of
the Arkansas State Highway Commission (Commission) forcing Bur-
Jington Northern Sante Fe Railway Company (BNSF) to reopen a
private “at-grade” railroad crossing! We hold that the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA) pre-
empts the Commission’s jurisdiction in this instance; therefore, we
vacate the Commission’s order.

The private railroad crossing at issue in this case is located
between the cities of Hoxie and Walnut Ridge and has been in

" An at-grade railroad crossing is on the same level of the railroad tracks, rather than
over or under them.

LS
SS 461

existence for over eighty years.? In 1999, Roger and Ruth Anderson
entered into an agreement to purchase the property accessed by the
crossing and began using the property for their salvage yard business,
Anderson Auto Salvage. BNSF and the Andersons later began nego-
tiations to enter into an “Agreement for Private Crossing.” BNSF
drafted an agreement that, among other provisions: (1) granted the
Andersons a license “to construct, maintain, and use” the crossing; (2)
required the Andersons to pay BNSF $10,000; (3) required the
Andersons to indemnify BNSF; and (4) required the Andersons to
procure and maintain liability insurance in connection with the
crossing. The draft agreement also provided that either party could
terminate the license by serving the other party thirty-days’ notice.

The Andersons refused to sign the agreement, and BNSF
later posted notice that the crossing would be closed. After the
Andersons contacted city officials in Walnut Ridge regarding the
dispute, both the Walnut Ridge city attorney and the Andersons
requested that the Commission hold a hearing on BNSF’s pro-
posed closing of the crossing. The Commission’s counsel sent
letters to BNSF asserting that an administrative hearing was
required under Ark. Code Ann. § 23-12-304(b) before BNSF
could close the crossing.’ BNSF responded by contending that the
Commission’s authority to prevent it from closing a private
crossing was preempted by federal law, and BNSF later barricaded
the crossing.

The Commission held a hearing and ordered BNSF to
reopen the crossing within ten days after it found that: the
Commission’s action was not preempted by ICCTA and was
authorized by Ark. Code Ann. § 23-12-304(b); BNSF merely held
an easement in perpetuity for railway purposes over the Ander-
sons’ property; there were no unsafe conditions that supported

2 Department of Transportation (DOT) # 667982U.
3 Ark. Code Ann. § 23-12-304(b) (Repl. 2002) provides:

(1) Ie shall be the duty of the Highway Commission, or any representative thereof,
to make a personal inspection of any designated place where it is desixed that a road
or street, either public or private, cross any railroad in this state.

2) Upon ten (10) days’ notice as required by law and after a public heating, the
commission may make such order as in its judgment shall be just and proper. The
order may provide for a crossing at grade, over or under the railroad, and shall be
enforced as other orders by the commission,

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468 er |_|

BNSP’s decision to close the crossing; and the crossing was the
Andersons’ only access to their property. Further, the Commission
ordered BNSF to draft an agreement with the Andersons, modeled
on an earlier 1921 agreement regarding the crossing that was
submitted into evidence, including a provision that stated that
“Railway Company may seek to eliminate this crossing by re-
questing a hearing for that purpose, with notice to Licensee, before
the Arkansas State Highway Commission.” The Commission’s
order also prohibited BNSF from charging the Andersons a fee
“because no fee was recited in the 1921 agreement,” and likewise
prohibited BNSF from requiring the Andersons to procure and
maintain “insurance of any kind.”

BNSF appealed the Commission’s decision to the Craighead
County Circuit Court, repeating its arguments before the Com-
mission and asserting several procedural errors underlying the
Commission’s findings and order. Upon review, the circuit court
vacated the Commission’s order, holding that ICCTA preempted.
the Commission’s authority over any matter in the case, including
the safety issues raised by BNSF as well as “the terms and
conditions which a railroad may impose in connection with
permissive use of such private crossing.” Additionally, the circuit
court held that the Commission had essentially and unlawfully
“‘prejudged” the issues underlying the dispute between BNSF and
the Andersons and committed other procedural errors, as well as
exceeded the Commission’s constitutional and statutory authority
by mandating the terms of the private crossing agreement.

The Andersons bring this appeal, arguing that the circuit
court erred in holding that the Commission’s authority was
preempted by ICCTA. The Andersons also argue that the circuit
court erred for the following reasons: their property right in the
private crossing was not a revocable license; the Commission
properly allocated the burden of proof according to the hearing
procedures set out under Ark. Code Ann. § 23-12-304; substantial
evidence supported the Commission’s findings; and that any
procedural errors ‘‘did not justify [the circuit court] declaring the
hearing officers findings and conclusion void.”

‘We review the Commission’s order under the Arkansas
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Ark. Code Ann. §§ 25-15-
201 to -218 (Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007). Review of administrative
agency decisions is limited in scope. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Bixler, 364 Ark. 292, 219 S.W.3d 125 (2005). The appellate court’s
review is directed not to the decision of the circuit court but to the

ee
PTS” 469

decision of the administrative agency. Id. The APA provides that a
reviewing court may reverse or modify the agency’s decision if the
decision: (1) violates the constitution or a statute; (2) exceeds the
agency’s statutory authority; (3) is affected by an error of law; (4)
is procedurally unlawful; (5) is unsupported by substantial evi-
dence in the record; or (6) is arbitrary, capricious, or is an abuse of
discretion. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212(h); Ark. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Bailey, 368 Ark. 518, 247 S.W.3d 851 (2007).

The primary question presented by this case is whether 49
US.C. § 10501 (b) of ICCTA preempts the Commission’s exercise
of jurisdiction to order BNSF to reopen a private crossing under
Ark. Code Ann. § 23-12-304. The Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution provides that state laws that “interfere
with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made in pursuance of
the constitution” are invalid. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
14 (1824); U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Under the principle of federal
Jaw supremacy, there are three ways that federal law can preempt
state law: (1) where Congress makes its intent to preempt state law
explicit in statutory language; (2) where state law regulates con-
duct in a field that Congress intends for the federal government to
occupy exclusively; or (3) where there is an actual conflict be-
tween state and federal law. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72
(1990). Where a federal statute contains an express preemption
clause, the focus of statutory construction is “‘on the plain wording
of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,
507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).

As the title of the legislation implies, ICCTA abolished the
Interstate Commerce Commission, while simultaneously creating
the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to replace it and to
perform many of the same regulatory functions. See Friberg v. Kan.
City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2001). ICCTA
contains an express preemption clause, stating as follows:

(b) The jurisdiction of the Board over —

(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in
this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including
car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices,
routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and

(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side

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470 Le |__|

tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to
be located, entirely in one State,

is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies
provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transpor-
tation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under
Federal or State law.

49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2000).

This court has addressed issues of federal preemption and
ICCTA in two cases — Ouachita R.R., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Union
County, 361 Ark. 333, 206 S.W.3d 811 (2005) and 25 Residents of
Sevier County v. Ark. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 330 Ark. 396, 954
S.W.2d 242 (1997). In the former, Ouachita Railroad brought an
ejectment action against a married couple, the Harbours, alleging
that they had wrongfully taken possession of the railroad’s land and
removed the company’s railroad tracks. The defendant Harbours
answered the complaint and counterclaimed, contending that they
acquired the land through adverse possession and that Ouachita
Railroad had abandoned the tracks.

Ouachita Railroad filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that “the STB had exclusive jurisdiction over the aban-
donment or discontinuation of use of the right-of-way, and that
the STB’s authority to regulate the matter preempted all state law
relating to it.” 361 Ark. at 338-39, 206 S.W.3d at 813. The
chancery court issued a letter opinion, finding that the question of
whether the property had been abandoned by the railroad could
only be resolved by the STB, but the court retained jurisdiction to
address state-law claims after the STB’s final determination. As
directed by the chancery court, the Harbours filed a petition with
the STB requesting a waiver of the filing fee, which was declined.
Ouachita Railroad then filed a supplemental motion for summary
judgment, arguing that, because the STB denied the Harbours’
request to waive the filing fee, “since the court had already
determined that the STB had exclusive jurisdiction over the
Harbours’ counterclaim, it was appropriate for the court now to
grant its motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 339-40, 206.
$.W.3d at 813. The chancery court denied the motion for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the Harbours’ equitable
defenses were within its jurisdiction, regardless of the abandon-
ment issue.

The railroad then petitioned this court for a writ of prohi-
bition, asserting that ICCTA preempted the chancery court’s

_
PC S——~* 471

jurisdiction. Upon review, this court framed the question as
“‘whether the Harbours’ counterclaim against the railroad for
abandonment and adverse possession of the railroad’s right-of-way
is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the STB.” Id. at 343, 206
S.W.3d 816. The court held that “Section 10501(b) clearly pro-
vides that the STB’s jurisdiction over the abandonment of tracks is
exclusive and preempts any remedies available under state law.” Id.
The court noted that it had previously acknowledged “‘the broad
language of § 10501(b)”’ and “‘its preemptive effect” in a case
involving the closing of a railroad agency station or depot closings,
25 Residents of Sevier County, supra. Id. The court also cited cases
involving the STB’s predecessor, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC), such as Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v.
Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 319-23 (1981), in which the
Supreme Court held that Congress granted to the ICC exclusive
and “plenary authority to regulate, in the interest of interstate
commerce, rail carriers’ cessations of service on their lines.’
Turning to the Harbours’ counterclaims involving adverse posses-
sion and other equitable defenses they asserted to establish a right
to the land at issue, the Ouachita Railroad court held that these issues
were also preempted under 49 U.S.C. § 10501, stating as follows:

As already noted, the ICC’s, and now STB’s, jurisdiction over the
“construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discon-
tinuance of . . . tracks” is exclusive. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2)
(2000). Were the circuit court to quiet title over the land in favor
of the Harbours based on their counterclaim of adverse possession
orto acknowledge any right to the land by the Harbours, this would
necessarily result in the acquisition of the right-of-way by the
Harbours and in the discontinuation of the use of the same by the
railroad. Such a determination clearly falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the STB, as demonstrated by the clear language of the
statute as well as the case law cited above. . . .

* See also Cedarapids, Inc. » Chicago, Cent, & Pac. R.R. Co., 265 E Supp. 2d 1005
(ND. Iowa 2003) (holding that to the extent that a state-law claim sought to force CC & P
to abandon the track in question, such claims were preempted by ICCTA); Thustees of the
Diocese of Vt. v. State,496 A.2d 151 (Vt. 1985) (holding that a declaratory-judgment action in
state court to determine whether an easement for railroad purposes had been abandoned
interfered with the ICC’s authority to determine the issue); City of Seattle » Burlington N.
R.R. Co,,22 P3d 260, 262. (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that language of § 10501 grants the
STB “clear, broad, and unqualified” jurisdiction over the statute's listed activities).

Because any determination by the circuit court on the matter of
title or any right to the land would interfere with STB’s jurisdiction
as provided for in the statute, we hold that the circuit court is wholly
‘without jurisdiction to determine the abandonment and adverse
possession claims but also any equitable defenses asserted by the
Harbours that seek to bestow upon them any right to the use of the
Jand. It is the STB that has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.

Ouachita R.R., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Union County, 361 Ark. at 345,
206 S.W.3d at 817.

In 25 Residents of Sevier County, supra, relied upon in Ouachita
Railroad, a railroad filed an application with the Commission to
close an agency station in Dierks, Arkansas, in order to consolidate
operations with those in a nearby city. After the Commission filed
notice of the proposed closing, which became effective ninety days
later, twenty-five residents of Dierks filed a petition requesting
that the Commission order the railroad to reopen the agency
station. The Commission requested that the parties present briefs
addressing the question of whether ICCTA preempted state juris-
diction of the discontinuation of railroad agency stations. Follow-
ing a hearing, the Commission determined that it did not have
jurisdiction over the matter, because the STB had held “exclusive
jurisdiction over ‘transportation by rail carriers’ as part of the
interstate rail network” and dismissed the residents’ petition. 330
Ark. at 398-99, 954 S.W.2d at 243 (quoting the Commission’s
order). The Pulaski County Circuit Court affirmed the Commis-
sion.

On appeal, this court examined the language of 49 U.S.C.
§ 10501(b) and first determined that, “[c]learly, the act covers
‘transportation by rail carriers’ and the discontinuation of their
carriers’ related facilities.” Id. at 400, 954 S.W.2d at 244. The
court then considered the question of whether the agency stations
were “facilities” within the meaning of § 10501(b), and held as
follows:

Given the broad language of the act itself, its statutory framework,
and considering the recent decisions interpreting the act, we believe
it is clear that Congress intended to preempt the states’ authority to
engage in economic regulation of rail carriers. The preemptive
strike, we hold, includes regulation of agency station discontinu-
ations. Accordingly, we conclude § 23-12-611, which gives the
AHT Commission the authority to regulate such closings, is pre-
empted by the ICC Termination Act of 1995.

LC
PCs 473

Id. at 401, 954 S.W.2d at 244.

Although this court held that the broad language of 49
US.C. § 10501(b) preempted state court action in both Ouachita
Railroad, Inc. and 25 Residents of Sevier County, neither case involved
railroad crossings as in the present appeal, and ICCTA does not
expressly mention railroad crossings. However, a recent decision
by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals involves railroad
crossings, and it is instructive because it is in accord with this
court’s construction of ICCTA. In Franks Investment Co. v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 534 F.3d 443 (2008), a property owner filed an
action in state court, alleging that he had a property right in four
railroad crossings, and sought an injunction to prevent Union
Pacific from closing two of the crossings, and to force it to reopen
two it had already closed. The preliminary-injunction motion and
possessory action was removed and consolidated in federal district
court, which held that the state-law claim was expressly preempted
by ICCTA.

Upon review, the Fifth Circuit framed the issue as “whether
railroad crossings fit within the purview of ‘transportation by rail
carriers,’ thereby evincing Congress’ intent to preempt state-law
claims relating to ownership of the closings.”’ Id. at 446 (quoting
49 U.S.C. § 10501 (b)).

The Franks court first recognized ICCTA’s broad definition
of “transportation” as follows:

The ICCTA defines “transportation” to include, inter alia: “a
locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard,
property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to
the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of
ownership or an agreement concerning use.”

Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9)(A)). The Franks court then noted
that the federal district court had held that crossings are within the
STB’s exclusive jurisdiction because ICCTA’s definition of “trans-
portation” includes “the movement of passengers or property . . . by
rail,” and “[iJn that regard, the district court found crossings affect
safety, drainage, and maintenance, which necessarily affect rail
travel.” Id. The Fifth Circuit agreed, rejecting the argument that,
because “‘crossings” were not explicitly listed in the ICCTA defini-
tion of “transportation,” it evidenced Congress’s intent to exclude
crossings from the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction. Instead, ICCTA’s

a
474 ee

broad language and definition of transportation — to include “ ‘prop-
erty . . . or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers
or property or both, by rail’ ”” — clearly “belies the notion that
Congress intended ‘transportation’ to include only items listed in its
definition.” Id. (emphasis in original).

At issue here, as in Franks, is whether a state proceeding to
reopen a closed railroad crossing falls within the STB’s exclusive
jurisdiction under the language of § 10501. The Andersons con-
tend that it does not, and argue that this court should follow the
North Dakota Supreme Court holding in Home of Economy v.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, 694 N.W.2d 840 (N.D.
2005). In Home of Economy, BNSF closed a private crossing on a
spur line that provided access from a road to property owned by
the appellant. Home of Economy filed suit against BNSF to reopen
the crossing, alleging that it possessed an easement for access to the
property. BNSF responded by claiming that it held easements by
prescription, necessity, and estoppel. The trial court dismissed the
suit, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because ICCTA vested the
STB with exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of railroad
operations. Id. at 841. The trial court specifically ““concluded the
closing of the grade crossing constituted regulation of rail trans-
portation under the ICCTA, because the grade crossing affected
rail cars going from State Mill and Elevator [Roads] and could also
affect liability for accidents at the crossing.” Id. Thus, the trial
court held that the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction preempted any
state court action by Home of Economy.

On appeal, Home of Economy argued that the ICCTA only
grants exclusive federal jurisdiction to the STB “‘in those cases
involving substantial economic impact on a railroad’s operations.”
Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed, holding that “IC-
CTA does not explicitly preempt state law regarding grade cross-
ings” because “[t]he preemption language in the ICCTA explic-
itly preempts many issues ‘with respect to regulation of rail
transportation,” but does not specifically refer to states’ traditional
police power regarding grade crossings.” Id. at 846 (quoting
ICCTA). Although the North Dakota Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that “some courts have broadly construed Congress’s pre-
emption language in ICCTA and have concluded that language
preempted state or local laws,” it interpreted a selection of
ICCTA’s legislative history to reflect that Congress only intended

to economically regulate the interstate railway system while leav-
ing intact states’ police power. Home of Economy, 694 N.W.2d at
844.5

The Andersons’ reliance on Home of Economy is misplaced.
First, in contrast to Home of Economy, this court specifically noted
the broad language and preemptive reach of 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)
in Ouachita Railroad, Inc., supra, and 25 Residents of Sevier County,
supra. More importantly, this court applied the language broadly to
preempt state judicial and regulatory action, respectively, in those
cases. Second, the Commission’s order in this case clearly impacts
BNSFP’s railroad operations and ‘“‘transportation by rail carriers” for
purposes of ICCTA. The Commission ordered BNSF: (1) to
reopen the private crossing within ten days; (2) to redraft a 1921
private crossing agreement to apply to the Andersons; and (3) that
“[nJo fee may be charged by the railroad for entry into this
agreement with the Andersons, as no fee was charged in the 1921
agreement” and ‘‘[n]o insurance of any kind may be required by
the railroad from the Andersons as no insurance was required in.
the original [1921] agreement.” This action, as in Franks, neces-
sarily impacts “transportation by rail,” affecting both BNSF’s
economic interests and the movement of passengers or property.
As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Franks, supra, |CCTA’s definition
of “transportation” includes “‘property . . . or equipment of any kind
related to the movement of passengers or property or both, by rail,
regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use.” 49

USS.C. § 10102(9)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).

We hold that ICCTA preempts the Commission’s
jurisdiction over this private railroad crossing dispute and we
vacate the Commission’s order. Federal law preemption deprives
the Commission’s jurisdiction under the facts presented in this case
and invests exclusive jurisdiction in the STB. 49 U.S.C.
§ 10501(b) (STB has exclusive jurisdiction over railroad opera-
tions, tracks, and facilities). Decisions of the STB may be appealed.
to the appropriate United States circuit court of appeals. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2321(a) (2006) (judicial review of STB orders); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(5) (2006) (exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity of
STB final orders lies with the courts of appeals).

5 The North Dakota Supreme Court cited H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96 (1995),
as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 807-08.

Because we hold that the Commission’s jurisdiction is pre-
empted by ICCTA, the Anderson’s remaining arguments are
moot.

Commission’s order vacated.

Lee Mark HARRIS v, STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-762 291 S.W.3d 561

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

Don Warren, for appellant.
No response.

eR Curiam. On November 27, 2007, a jury found peti-

tioner Lee Mark Harris guilty of possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver and sentenced him to 960 months’ imprisonment in
the Arkansas Department of Correction. The judgment was entered
on December 14, 2007, and on December 10, 2007, trial counsel
representing petitioner, Mr. Don Warren, filed a notice of appeal.
The appeal was not perfected and petitioner filed a pro se motion for

CL
id an

belated appeal. We treated the motion for belated appeal as a motion
for rule on clerk to lodge the record and granted it.

In our per curiam on October 2, 2008, we directed peti-
tioner’s retained counsel to file a petition for writ of certiorari to
call up the entire record, as only a partial record had been filed.
Harris v. State, CRO8-762 (Ark. Oct. 2, 2008). Mr. Warren filed
the petition as directed, and we granted petitioner thirty (30) days
to complete the record. Harris v. State, 374 Ark. 529, 288 S.W.3d
645 (2008). Thus, the record was to be completed and lodged with
this court by November 29, 2008.

; | On January 7, 2009, Mr. Warren filed a “motion to
accept belated brief on writ of certiorari,” which we will treat as a
motion to file a belated return of writ. In the motion, Mr. Warren
states that he did not receive the record until January 6, 2009. The
affidavit attached to the motion, however, states that the transcript
was delivered to the Warren Law Firm on “‘December 6, 2009.” In
any case, although Mr. Warren states that “the delay was in no part
attributable to the defendant,” and it is clear that he is attempting
to place blame on the court reporter who prepared the transcript,
this court has specifically held that it is not the responsibility of the
circuit clerk, circuit court, or anyone other than the appellant to
perfect an appeal. Branning v. State, 363 Ark. 369, 214 S.W.3d 237
(2005). Because there is presumption of prejudice arising from the
failure of counsel to perfect an appeal if counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance led to the forfeiture of the convicted defendant’s right to
pursue a direct appeal, see Langston v. State, 341 Ark. 739, 19
S.W.3d 619 (2000), we grant the motion. A copy of this opinion
will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct.

Motion granted.

478 |_|

Larry NEELY v. Lona McCASTLAIN, in Her Official Capacity as
Prosecuting Attorney of the 23rd Judicial District of Lonoke County,
Arkansas, and State of Arkansas

08-973 291 S.W.3d 585

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

a)

J. Thomas Sullivan, for appellant.

eR Curiam. Appellant Larry Neely appeals from the cir-

cuit court’s order granting summary judgment to appellees
Lona McCastlain and the State of Arkansas. Because appellant has
submitted a brief without a proper addendum in violation of Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(8) (2008), we order rebriefing.

Rule 4-2(a)(8) provides that the appellant’s brief shall con-
tain an addendum that includes a true legible photocopy of the
order or judgment from which the appeal is taken, “along with any
other relevant pleadings, documents, or exhibits essential to an
understanding of the case and the Court’s jurisdiction on appeal.”
Rule 4-2(b)(3) provides that, if the court finds the abstract or
addendum to be deficient, such that the court cannot reach the
merits of the case, or such as to cause an unreasonable or unjust

Ld
Td 479

delay in the disposition of the appeal, then the court may notify the
appellant of the deficiencies and allow appellant to file a substituted
brief.

HB Here, appellant’s brief is deficient because his adden-
dum lacks relevant pleadings essential to an understanding of the
case. While appellant has included a copy of his complaint for
declaratory judgment and writ of habeas corpus, he has failed to
include the appellees’ answers to that complaint, the appellees’
joint motion for summary judgment, and his response to that
motion. Also, as part of his argument, appellant discusses informa-
tion in two affidavits, one affidavit of his own and one affidavit of
.the investigating officer in his underlying criminal action, but
neither affidavit is included in the addendum.

Because appellant has failed to comply with our rules, we
order him to file a substituted addendum and brief within fifteen
days from the date of entry of this order. If appellant fails to do so
within the prescribed time, the judgment appealed from may be
affirmed for noncompliance with Rule 4-2. After service of the
substituted brief, the appellees shall have an opportunity to revise
or supplement their brief in the time prescribed by the clerk.

Rebriefing ordered.

STATE of Arkansas v. John BROWN
CR 08-826 291 S.W.3d 560

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen.,
for appellant.

Law Offices of John Wesley Hall, by: Patrick Benca, for appellee.

p= Curiam. The State of Arkansas appeals from the circuit
court’s grant of Appellee John Brown’s Rule 37 petition.
Because the State submitted a brief without a proper addendum in
violation of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(8) (2008), we order
rebriefing.

Rule 4-2(a)(8) provides, in pertinent part:

Following the signature and certificate of service, the appellant’s
brief shall contain an Addendum which shall include true and
legible photocopies of the order, judgment, decree, ruling, letter
opinion, or Workers’ Compensation Commission opinion from
which the appeal is taken, along with any other relevant pleadings,
documents, or exhibits essential to an understanding of the case and
the Court's jurisdiction on appeal.

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8). The procedure to be followed when an
appellant has submitted an insufficient abstract or addendum is set
forth in Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(b)(3):

‘Whether or not the appellee has called attention to deficiencies in
the appellant’s abstract or Addendum, the Court may address the
question at any time. If the Court finds the abstract or Addendum
to be deficient such that the Court cannot reach the merits of the
case, or such as to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the
disposition of the appeal, the Court will notify the appellant that he
or she will be afforded an opportunity to cure any deficiencies, and

CL
CY 481

has fifteen days within which to file a substituted abstract, Adden-
dum, and brief, at his or her own expense, to conform to Rule
4-2(a)(5) and (8). Mere modifications of the original brief by the
appellant, as by interlineation, will not be accepted by the Clerk.
Upon the filing of such a substituted brief by the appellant, the
appellee will be afforded an opportunity to revise or supplement the
brief, at the expense of the appellant or the appellant’s counsel, as
the Court may direct. Ifafter the opportunity to cure the deficien-
cies, the appellant fails to file a complying abstract, Addendum and
brief within the prescribed time, the judgment or decree may be
affirmed for noncompliance with the Rule.

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)(3).

HM Here, the State’s brief is deficient due to the fact that its
addendum lacks relevant pleadings essential to an understanding of
the case. The record reveals that at the conclusion of the hearing
on Brown’s Rule 37 petition, the circuit court requested that the
parties submit posthearing briefs in lieu of oral arguments. The
posthearing briefs appear in the record but do not appear in the
State’s addendum.

Because the State has failed to comply with our rules, we
order it to file a substituted abstract, addendum, and brief within
fifteen days from the date of entry of this order. If the State fails to
do so within the prescribed time, the order appealed from may be
affirmed for noncompliance with Rule 4-2. After service of the
substituted abstract, addendum, and brief, Brown shall have an
opportunity to revise or supplement his brief in the time pre-
scribed by the clerk.

Rebriefing ordered.

482 mI

Steve STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 09-29 291 S.W.3d 584

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 30, 2009

Gene E. McKissic, for appellant.

No response.

ps Curiam. Appellant Steve Stewart, by and through his
attomey, Gene E. McKissic, has filed a motion for rule on
clerk.

Stewart was convicted of multiple counts of perjury by an
Ashley County jury; the judgment and commitment order was
entered on June 3, 2008. On June 19, 2008, Stewart filed a timely
notice of appeal. Shortly thereafter, the court reporter informed
Gene McKissic, Stewart’s attorney that, due to the number of
appeals pending, he would need to file a motion for extension of
time to lodge the record. Mr. McKissic filed such a motion on
August 19, 2008, and the circuit court granted it on August 21,
2008. The record was tendered to this court on January 12, 2009,
and our clerk refused to accept it as it was tendered more than
seven months from the date of the entry of the judgment from
which the appeal is taken. See Ark. R. App. P.—Civ. 5(b)(2). Mr.
McKissic has now filed the instant motion for rule on clerk in
which he accepts responsibility for miscalculating the deadline for
filing the record.

This court clarified its treatment of motions for rule on clerk
in McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004). There
we said that there are only two possible reasons for an appeal not
being timely perfected: either the party or attorney filing the
appeal is at fault, or, there is “good reason.” 356 Ark. at 116, 146
S.W.3d at 891. We explained:

ee 483

Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or
attorney filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the
appeal was not timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the
appeal is therefore faced with two options. First, where the party or
attorney filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by
affidavit filed with the motion or in the motion itself. There is no
advantage in declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second,
where the party or attorney believes that there is good reason the
appeal was not perfected, the case for good reason can be made in
the motion, and this court will decide whether good reason is
present.

Id., 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted). While this court no longer
requires an affidavit admitting fault before we will consider the
motion, an attorney should candidly admit fault where he has erred
and is responsible for the failure to perfect the appeal. See id.

In accordance with McDonald v, State, supra, Mr. Mc Kissic
has candidly admitted fault. The motion is, therefore, granted, and a
copy of this opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Profes-
sional Conduct.

Billy Joe KELLEY, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-926 292 S.W.3d 297

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 5, 2009

2

+

485

Bill Luppen, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass’t Att’y
Gen., for appellee.

im Hannan, Chief Justice. A Pulaski County jury con-

victed appellant Billy Joe Kelley, Jr., of the rape of nine~year-
old M.W., and he was sentenced as a habitual offender to a term of life
imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the circuit court erred (1)
in denying his motion for directed verdict; (2) in allowing the State to
introduce into evidence that the victim testified positive for chlamy-
dia, without the testimony of the technician who performed the test;
and (3) in refusing to allow him to ask the victim’s mother if she had
chlamydia. Because this is a criminal appeal in which a sentence of life
imprisonment has been imposed, this court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(2) (2008). We affirm the
circuit court.

Kelley first contends that the circuit court erred in denying
his motion for directed verdict on the charge of rape. Specifically,

he contends that there was no evidence that penetration occurred,
and he asserts that the State provided no evidence that identified
him as the person who raped M.W.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
considering only the evidence supporting the verdict, to deter-
mine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence,
direct or circumstantial. Woolbright v. State, 357 Ark. 63, 160
S.W.3d 315 (2004). Substantial evidence is evidence forceful
enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond
suspicion or conjecture, Id. The statute under which Kelley was
convicted is Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-103(a)(3)(A)
(Supp. 2007), which provides that a person commits rape “if he or
she engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with
another person who is less than fourteen (14) years of age.”

M.W. testified at trial that Kelley engaged in sexual contact
with her in November and December 2006, while he was living in
a house with her, her mother, and three brothers. M.W. testified
that, during that time, Kelley touched her vagina with his penis.
M.W. stated that when Kelley touched her vagina with his penis,
it was on “‘the inside.” M.W. related that some of the incidents
occurred in the morning and others occurred during the evening
while her mother was at work and her brothers were not home.
M.W. stated that it “‘hurted” when Kelley did this to her, and that
she eventually told her neighbor, Phyllis Gordon, about what had
been happening because she was “‘tired of it’ and wanted it to stop.
M.W. also testified that after the incidents occurred, she noticed a
burning sensation when she went to the bathroom. M.W. stated
that sometimes her stomach hurt “after he did it.”

Dr. Maria Esquivel examined M.W. at Arkansas Children’s
Hospital on January 22, 2007. Dr. Esquivel testified that M.W.,
who was born on August 10, 1997, was about nine years old at the
time of the examination. She stated that M.W. had a very thin
hymen, and that based on this finding, she suspected that there may
have been penetration into the vagina. Dr. Esquivel stated that she
did not find any acute, or fresh, injuries, but she explained that any
injuries inflicted in November and December would have had
time to heal. She also tested M. W. for sexually transmitted diseases
and learned that a swab from M.W.’s rectum tested positive for
chlamydia. Dr. Esquivel testified that chlamydia is spread either
“by active intercourse or by very close genital to genital contact.”

Ld
Pid 487

She stated that many women who have chlamydia may be asymp-
tomatic but that some women experience burning upon urination.

Kelley contends that there is insufficient evidence to
sustain a conviction for rape because M. W. provided contradictory
testimony, with respect to when the incidents occurred and where
in the house the incidents occurred. He states that the testimony of
M.W.’s mother and brothers contradicted M.W.’s testimony as to
when and where the incidents occurred. Generally, the time a
crime is alleged to have occurred is not of critical significance
unless the date is material to the offense. Martin v, State, 354 Ark.
289, 119 S.W.3d 504 (2003). This is particularly true with sexual
crimes against children. See id. Any discrepancies in the evidence
concerning the date of the offense are for the jury to resolve. Id.
Moreover, the duty of resolving conflicting testimony and deter-
mining the credibility of witnesses is left to the discretion of the
jury. Hayes v. State, 374 Ark. 384, 288 S.W.3d 204 (2008). Here,
it was for the jury to resolve any inconsistencies in testimony with
respect to when and where the incidents occurred.

Kelley also contends that the State’s medical evidence con-
tradicts M.W.’s testimony that he put his penis inside her vagina.
He states that the only physical evidence that M.W. had sexual
contact with another person was that a swab from her rectum
tested positive for chlamydia.

HA 2p victim’s testimony may constitute substantial
evidence to sustain a conviction for rape, even when the victim is
a child. Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 341, 288 S.W.3d 226 (2008). The
rape victim’s testimony need not be corroborated, nor is scientific
evidence required. Id. More particularly, this court has stated that
the testimony of the victim which shows penetration is enough for
conviction. Gatlin v. State, 320 Ark. 120, 895 S.W.2d 526 (1995).
Under the facts of this case, M.W.’s testimony constitutes substan-
tial evidence that Kelley penetrated M.W.’s vagina with his penis.
Moreover, Dr. Esquivel’s testimony established that M.W. was
nine years old at the time the incidents occurred, and her testi-
mony regarding the appearance of M.W.’s hymen was suggestive
of a sexual assault. Finally, any inconsistencies in the testimony of
witnesses is a matter for the jury to resolve. We hold that the
circuit court did not err in denying Kelley’s motion for directed
verdict as there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for
Tape.

Prior to trial, Kelley stated that he would object to evidence
that M.W. tested positive for chlamydia unless the laboratory
technician who performed the test testified at trial. Kelley’s objec-
tion was based upon “rules of evidence,”’ chain-of-custody
grounds, and the confrontation clause. The State indicated it
would introduce the evidence through the testimony of Dr.
Esquivel, who examined M.W., but did not perform the lab work
for the chlamydia test. Prior to trial, the circuit court ruled that,
while the lab report showing M.W.’s positive test for chlamydia
was hearsay, Dr. Esquivel reasonably relied upon it in forming her
opinion that M.W. had chlamydia. Accordingly, pursuant to
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 703, the circuit court denied Kelley’s
motion to exclude evidence about the disease. The record reflects
that the circuit court did not address Kelley’s confrontation-clause
or chain-of-custody claims.

The circuit court has wide discretion in making evi-
dentiary rulings, and we will not reverse its ruling on the admis-
sibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State,
375 Ark. 321, 290 S.W.3d 574 (2009). The failure to obtain a
ruling on an issue at the trial court level, including a constitutional
one, precludes review on appeal. Jackson v. State, 334 Ark. 406, 976
S.W.2d 370 (1998). Because Kelley failed to obtain rulings on his
confrontation-clause and chain-of-custody arguments, we will not
consider those arguments on appeal.

We now turn to Kelley’s arguments that are preserved for
appeal. At trial, Dr. Esquivel testified that cultures were taken from
M.W. and sent to the lab. She testified that the lab later notified her
clinic that M.W.’s rectal culture had tested positive for chlamydia.
Dr. Esquivel stated that she treated M.W. for chlamydia with an
antibiotic.

Kelley claims that the circuit court erred when it allowed
Dr. Esquivel to testify that M.W. tested positive for chlamydia
because her testimony was hearsay. In support of his argument,
Kelley cites Llewellyn v. State, 4 Ark. App. 326, 630 S.W.2d 555
(1982), where the court of appeals held that, pursuant to Arkansas
Rule of Evidence 803(8), a drug-laboratory supervisor’s testimony
was inadmissible hearsay because he was not present when the
substance was delivered to the lab, and he had no personal
knowledge of the receipt or testing of the substance. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded in Llewellyn, and Kelley asserts that,
based upon that holding, the instant case should be reversed. We
disagree.

a
|__| Es 489

In Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (1997), the
State called a doctor to testify about, and give an opinion regard-
ing, DNA testing performed by another doctor. Goff relied on
Llewellyn and contended that the DNA testimony at his trial was
inadmissible under Rule 803(8) because it was not from the doctor
who performed the test. This court noted factual distinctions
between the two cases and went on to add that Llewellyn did not
address Arkansas Rule of Evidence 703. With respect to Rule 703,
we stated:

[A]n expert can render an opinion based on facts and data otherwise
inadmissible, including hearsay, as long as they are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Eisenberg was
qualified without objection as an expert in the field of DNA testing,
and she testified that it was “quite common” for DNA experts to
examine case files and protocols and decide whether the DNA
testing in a particular case is accurate. She said that she did so in this
case. Ferrell v. State, 325 Ark. 455, 929 S.W.2d 697 (1996). In
addition, when an expert’s testimony is based on hearsay, this court
has held that the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the
expert does not mandate the exclusion of the testimony, but instead
it presents a jury question as to the weight of the testimony. See
id.; Scott v. State, 318 Ark. 747, 888 S.W.2d 628 (1994).

Goff, 329 Ark. at 521, 953 S.W.2d at 42-43.

HI The State contends that, in this case, even though Dr.
Esquivel did not testify that she normally relies on tests performed
by the laboratory, it is axiomatic that physicians routinely rely on
the results of tests and others to diagnose and treat many injuries.
We agree. Dr. Esquivel’s testimony regarding M.W.’s chlamydia
diagnosis was based upon a lab report containing data reasonably
relied upon by physicians when diagnosing and treating patients.
This court does not reverse the circuit court’s ruling on a hearsay
question absent an abuse of discretion. Goff, supra. We find no
abuse of discretion.

I Before leaving this point, we note that Kelley also
asserts that he was denied his right to confront the witness who
performed the test in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated
section 12-12-313(b) (Repl. 2003). Although Kelley provided
notice to the State that he intended to preserve all rights under
Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-12-313(b), he did not make

this argument to the circuit court and, consequently, he received
no ruling on the issue. Accordingly, we will not consider this
argument on appeal.

For his final point on appeal, Kelley contends that the circuit
court abused its discretion when it refused to allow Kelley to ask
M.W.’s mother, Kimberly Britt, if she had tested positive for
chlamydia. A trial court’s ruling on relevancy is entitled to great
weight and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Martin, supra. Britt testified that she and Kelley had engaged in
sexual intercourse two or three times per week, without the use of
condoms, around the time the incidents with M.W. occurred, and
the record reveals that Britt tested negative for chlamydia. Kelley
contended below, as he does on appeal, that Britt’s negative
chlamydia test was relevant evidence, reasoning that if Britt did not
contract chlamydia from him, M.W. likely did not contract
chlamydia from him. Thus, Kelley suggests that Britt’s negative
test points to another perpetrator of M.W.

Hl Kelley contends that a material issue in this case was
whether M.W. contracted chlamydia from having sexual inter-
course with him. He is mistaken. The issue in this case was
whether Kelley had sexual intercourse with a person under four-
teen years of age, or more specifically, whether Kelley penetrated
the vagina of M.W. As the State points out, it is not required that
the victim contract a sexually transmitted disease in order for the
State to prove that rape occurred. Moreover, the jury never heard
that Kelley did not have chlamydia or that he refused to be tested
for it. Therefore, the question of whether Britt had a positive
diagnosis for chlamydia had no relevance to any issue at trial. In
addition, even assuming M.W. did contract chlamydia through
sexual contact with another person, it does not foreclose a finding
that she was raped by Kelley. See, ¢.g., Ridling v. State, 348 Ark.
213, 72 S.W.3d 466 (2002) (stating that evidence of sex with
another man was not relevant because, unfortunately, the minor
victim’s having sex with one older man did not prevent her from
having sex with a second older man at the same time). The circuit
court disallowed evidence that was collateral to the issue of
whether Kelley penetrated the vagina of M.W. We hold that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Kelley
to ask M.W.’s mother, Kimberly Britt, if she had tested positive for
chlamydia.

4-3(h) Review

The record in this case has been reviewed for reversible error
pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(h) (2008), and
none has been found.

Affirmed.

CITY of LITTLE ROCK ». Jung Yul RHEE,
Ashia Teriyaki, Fleishauer Family LLC, Kim C. Young, Sirrah, Inc.,
Jackson Hewitt, Charlie Bond, 12th Street Upholstery & Furniture,
Mary Rollins, Mary’s Magic Curl Beauty Salon, Pic Pac Store, Inc.,
Suk Chang, E-Z Food Mart, Thuan Nguyen, Beauty Nails, Ru Jae,
J’s Grill, Mae OkKYi

08-606 292 S.W.3d 292

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 5, 2009

Thomas M. Carpenter, City Att’y, by: Julia Hudson, Ass’t City
Att’y, for appellant.

John R. Myers, for appellee Jung Yul Rhee.

Re L. Brown, Justice. Appellant, the City of Little
ock (“the City”), appeals from the circuit judge’s order,
dismissing the City’s motion for injunctive relief against appellee Pic
Package Store, Inc. (“Pic Pac”). The City asserts three points on
appeal. We affirm the circuit judge’s order.

On January 18, 2007, in response to numerous criminal
violations that had occurred at or near a strip mall (‘‘the mall
property’’) located at 4401 West 12th Street in Little Rock, the
City filed a complaint for an injunction and order of abatement
against the owner, mortgagee, and tenants of the mall property
pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-54-1503(a),
16-105-401, and 5-74-109. Pic Pac is one of the tenants of the mall.
property. The City’s complaint alleged that approximately thirty-
four criminal violations had occurred in connection with the mall
property between August 30, 2005, and November 21, 2006,
including multiple instances of loitering, public intoxication, pos-
session of a weapon, and possession of a controlled substance. The
City’s complaint prayed that the circuit judge declare the mall
property a common nuisance, enjoin the defendants from occu-
pying the property, evict all tenants and residents from the prop-
erty, and order that the property be closed. The defendants filed
separate answers to the City’s complaint.

On March 1, 2007, the parties appeared before the circuit
judge for a hearing on the City’s complaint. At the hearing, the
parties reached a temporary agreement, whereby the defendants
stipulated that at least three criminal acts had occurred at the mall
property in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-74-
109, and at least one of the criminal acts had involved a controlled
substance in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-
105-402. In exchange, the City agreed to meet with the defen-
dants within ten days of the hearing to discuss the current status of
the mall property, the current security measures taken at the
property, and the City’s requested relief. The agreement further
provided that if the parties were unable to resolve the dispute by
agreement, then the City would seek further relief through the
circuit court. The circuit judge incorporated the parties’ agree-
ment into a written order that was entered on June 1, 2007.

On September 12, 2007, the City moved for injunctive
relief.| The City asked the circuit judge to declare Pic Pac a
common nuisance under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-74-
109(b) and abate the nuisance by ordering that Pic Pac be closed.
The City’s motion referred to the parties’ stipulation in the June 1,
2007 order that at least three criminal acts had occurred at the mall
property in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-74-
109. The City also alleged that three additional violent crimes had
occurred at the mall property since the parties’ June 1, 2007
agreement. These crimes included a murder and two batteries by
gunshot.

On December 20, 2007, the circuit judge held a hearing on
the City’s motion for injunctive relief. In an order dated February
4, 2008, the circuit judge dismissed the City’s motion with
prejudice and found that:

1. The City of Little Rock failed to establish a link of any kind
between the crimes set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Motion for
Prohibitive Injunction and an owner, agent or employee of any of
the defendant entities or individuals.

2. The City of Little Rock failed to establish that Pic Package
Store, Inc. is a common nuisance pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-74-109.

The City now appeals.

For its first point on appeal, the City urges this court to
declare that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-74-109 applies to
commercial property and not simply to drug houses. Section
5-74-109 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Intent, The intent of the General Assembly in this section is to
enact civil remedies that eliminate the availability of any premises
for use in the commission of a continuing series of criminal offenses.

(b) Common nuisance declared. Any premises, building, or place
used to facilitate the commission of a continuing series of three (3)
or more criminal violations of Arkansas law is declared to be

* The City’s motion for injunctive relief was styled “Motion for Prohibitive Injunc-
tion”

detrimental to the law-abiding citizens of the state and may be
subject to an injunction, a court-ordered eviction, or a cause of
action for damages as provided for in this subchapter.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-74-109(a)-(b) (Repl. 2005).

This court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo,
because it is for this court to determine the meaning of a statute.
McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark. 318, 254 S.W.3d 729 (2007). Our
standard of review for issues of statutory construction is well
settled:

The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent
of the legislature. Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary
meaning of the language used. In considering the meaning of a
statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their
ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. We
construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or
insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the
statute, if possible.

Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Bruner, 368 Ark. 74, 82, 243 S.W.3d 285,
291 (2006) (internal citations omitted).

At the hearing before the circuit court, the parties argued
over whether section 5-74-109 with its reference to “premises”
applied to all commercial property. The City contends that the
word ‘‘premises”’ includes commercial buildings, when given its
ordinary and usually accepted meaning.

The circuit judge, however, did not address this issue,
or rule on it, and the City admits as much in its brief when it said:
“The trial court in denying the [City’s] motion did not address the
issue that the intent of the General Assembly was to include any
premise — commercial or residential.” This court has repeatedly
held that a party’s failure to obtain a ruling is a procedural bar to
the court’s consideration of the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 375 Ark. 164, 289 S.W.3d 407 (2008); Cox v.
Miller, 363 Ark. 54, 210 S.W.3d 842 (2005). It was the City’s
burden to raise this issue and obtain a specific ruling on it. The
failure to do so now precludes this court from considering the
merits of the City’s arguments on this point.

For its second point, the City asserts that the circuit judge
erred by finding that Pic Pac was not a common nuisance under
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-74-109(b). As already noted,

the circuit judge found in his February 4, 2008 order that the City
“had failed to establish a link”’ between the alleged crimes and the
defendants. This was error, according to the City, because section
5-74-109(b) requires no more proof than a continuing series of
three criminal offenses on the property in question. In addition,
the City claims that section 5-74-109(b) does not address the
actions of people, but rather what occurs on premises and places,
and the fact that Pic Pac had taken measures to reduce crime is
irrelevant because section 5-74-109(b) does not except property
owners who take remedial measures.

To repeat in part, this court reviews issues of statutory
interpretation de novo, because it is for this court to determine the
meaning of a statute under the canons of construction previously
set forth in this opinion. See McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark. 318, 254
S.W.3d 729 (2007).

‘We quote again our statutory law, which defines what
constitutes a common nuisance and the remedies available to halt
it:

(b) Common nuisance declared. Any premises, building, or place
used to facilitate the commission of a continuing series of three (3)
or more criminal violations of Arkansas law is declared to be
detrimental to the law-abiding citizens of the state and may be
subject to an injunction, a court-ordered eviction, or a cause of
action for damages as provided for in this subchapter.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-74-109(b) (Repl. 2005).

The language of section 5-74-109(b) is plain and
unambiguous, which means the legislative intent can be deter-
mined from the ordinary meaning of the language used. Section
5-74-109(b) defines a common nuisance as “‘any premises, build-
ing, or place used to facilitate the commission of a continuing series
of three (3) or more crimes.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-74-109(b)
(emphasis added). When section 5-74-109(b) is construed just as it
reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted mean-
ing in common language, it is clear the City was required to prove
that the Pic Pac premises had been used to facilitate the commission
of the alleged crimes.

The City’s interpretation of this language, however, makes

the word “‘facilitate’’ superfluous and insignificant, which contra-
dicts our case law. See Bruner, 368 Ark. at 82, 243 S.W.3d at 291

(“This court construes the statute so that no word is left void,
superfluous or insignificant, and this court will give meaning and
effect to every word in the statute, if possible.””), Hence, the City’s
interpretation of section 5-74-109(b), which eliminated the phrase
“used to facilitate,” does not pass muster.

Giving every word in section 5-74-109(b) its ordinary
meaning, we turn next to the issue of whether the circuit judge
erred in finding that Pic Pac was not a common nuisance under
section 5-74-109(b). Our standard of review for an appeal from a
bench trial is not whether there was substantial evidence to support
the findings of the circuit judge, but whether the circuit judge’s
findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponder-
ance of the evidence. Duke v. Shinpaugh, 375 Ark. 358, 290 S.W.3d
591 (2009). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with a firm conviction that an error has been committed. Id.

The circuit judge orally declared from the bench that
the City failed to prove that the Pic Pac premises were used to
facilitate the alleged crimes.? In his later order, the judge said that
the evidence presented at the hearing showed no “link of any
kind” between the defendants and the criminal acts occurring on
their property. We affirm the finding of the circuit judge, as we
conclude that the absence of any link supports the lack of facilita-
tion by Pic Pac. In fact, we conclude that the evidence showed just
the opposite because the defendants, including Pic Pac, had taken
extensive measures to curb the criminal activity at or near the mall
property, including hiring security guards, installing flood lights
and surveillance cameras, and building a fence to keep loiterers
from going behind the building.

The circuit judge also heard the testimony of Stuart Sullivan,
a homicide detective who had investigated the shootings that had
occurred at the mall property. He testified that Pic Pac had not
been involved either directly or indirectly with any of the shootings,
which is the standard under Arkansas Code Annotated section

2 Although the circuit judge’s order discusses the City’s failure of proof in terms of
establishing a link between the crimes and the defendants, the circuit judge ruled from the
bench and said, [i}t hasn’t been presented so far that Pic Pac in any way facilitated that murder
. . vit certainly doesn’t suggest from what I read as the legislative . .. intent that Pic Pac is
facilitating particular conduct”

5-74-109(c).3 Bob Dailey, the owner of Pic Pac, testified that the
crimes in the parking lot were detrimental to his business and that
he was continually working with Mr. Rhee, the owner of the strip
mall, to improve the security of the property. Dailey added that
neither he nor any of his employees had been involved in any of
the criminal activity. We hold that the circuit judge’s finding of no
facilitation or linkage was not clearly against the preponderance of
the evidence.

The City further maintains that it was entitled to a
finding that Pic Pac was a common nuisance based on the circuit
judge’s June 1, 2007 order, in which he said: ‘‘The defendants do
not dispute that at least three criminal acts occurred on the real
property as described in the [City’s complaint] in violation of Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-74-109, and at least one of those criminal acts
involved a controlled substance in violation of Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-105-402.’* However, as the City correctly observes in its
brief: ‘‘[t]he trial court failed to address this issue.” Again, a party’s
failure to obtain a ruling is a procedural bar to the court’s
consideration of the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 375 Ark. 164, 289 S.W.3d 407 (2008); Cox v. Miller, 363
Ark. 54, 210 S.W.3d 842 (2005). It was the City’s burden to raise
this issue and obtain a specific ruling on it. The failure to do so now
precludes this court from considering the merits of the City’s
arguments on this point.

For its final point, the City urges this court to declare that
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-74-109(j) requires the circuit
judge to grant the City equitable relief upon finding that a premises
is a common nuisance under section 5-74-109(b). Because we’
hold that the circuit judge correctly found that there was no
common nuisance, it is not necessary to consider this point.

Affirmed.

> Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-74~109(c) provides that an injunction may issue
to enjoin a person from directly or indirectly permitting or maintaining a public nuisance.
The circuit judge, as already referenced, decided this case under section 5-74-109(b).

* Dailey testified at the hearing that the agreement was merely that three crimes had
occurred, not that the strip mall was a common nuisance.

Tommy Lee BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-1051 292 S.W.3d 288

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 5, 2009

a
500 _________4| |_|

John F. Gibson, Jr., for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Laura Shue, Ass’t Att’y Gen.,
for appellee.

px. E. DaNiELson, Justice. Appellant Tommy Lee Brown
appeals from the judgment and disposition order convict-
ing him of four counts of cruelty to animals, fining him $530, assessing
court costs of $150, and ordering restitution in the amount of
$5,090.51 payable to Bluebonnet Equine Humane Society (BEHS).
He asserts two points on appeal: (1) that the circuit court erred in
ordering restitution; and (2) that the circuit court erred in determin-
ing the amount of restitution. We affirm the judgment and disposition.
order.

On appeal, Brown does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions, but instead, challenges only
the order of restitution and the amount thereof. Accordingly, only
a brief recitation of the facts is necessary. See Rollins v. State, 362
Ark. 279, 208 S.W.3d 215 (2005). On September 17, 2007, Brown
appealed to the circuit court the order of the District Court of
Drew County finding him guilty of cruelty to animals, assessing
him a fine of $430,' assessing costs of $100, and ordering restitution
in the amount of $5,090.51. On February 9, 2008, a bench trial
was held by the circuit court. Testimony was presented that after
four of Brown’s horses were seized due to maltreatment by
malnourishment, Tina Shalmy, a volunteer with BEHS, took the
horses to her property where she cared for them. Ms. Shalmy
testified to the costs incurred to care for the horses, specifically:

Prosgcuror: Tell me,ifthe Court were to find you were
to get restitution, how much money have y’all been out?

Ms. Suatmy: It was five thousand and something. My
part alone is three thousand something and we had a
two thousand dollar vet bill that she was supposed to
bring with her today.

An itemized list of expenses per horse was then admitted as an exhibit.
‘With respect to the veterinarian bill, the following colloquy took
place:

1 ‘The fine consisted of a $425 fine and $5 county jail fee.

Ll
Pi 501

Prosecutor: Besides the care of those horses, you have
a vet bill, and how much is that?

Ms. SHatmy: It was two thousand and something dollars,
but the veterinarian did not appear today. She has that
bill. It was for the care of —

Circurr Court: There may be some bills in this file. It
appears to be two vet bills in the Clerk’s file from
Crystal Springs Vet Service, one for eight hundred and
six and one for eight hundred and seventy-one fifty.

Prosecutor: Does that sound correct?

Ms. SHatoy: Yes, that’s about right.

Prosecutor: And you're asking for that because they
are going to ask your society to pay that?

Ms. SHatmy: Our society has already paid it.
Prosecutor: They have already paid it?
Ms. SHatmy: Uh-huh.

In addition, Ms. Shalmy testified that BEHS was a nonprofit organi-
zation.

After finding Brown guilty on four counts of animal cruelty,
the circuit court found that it could impose restitution, pursuant to
Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-4-205 (Repl. 2006), and further
ordered restitution, in the amount already set forth above, to
BEHS. Brown now appeals.

For his first point on appeal, Brown argues that the circuit
court erred in ordering restitution pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-4-205, because the circuit court failed to make any determi-
nation that BEHS was a victim. He maintains that, while BEHS

incurred expenses caring for the horses, it was not as a result of his
crime. He further claims that BEHS voluntarily assumed the
horses’ care, which was not its duty under the law, and, thus, it was
not a victim entitled to restitution. The State responds that, in
accord with the statute, BEHS suffered monetary loss as a result of
Brown’s crimes because it treated and cared for the horses, which
required care to recover from the physical damage and injuries
Brown caused them. It avers that the broad language of the statute
allows BEHS to collect from Brown the monetary expense that it
incurred as a direct or indirect result of his crimes.

The instant case calls on us to interpret section 5-4-205. This
court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for
this court to decide the meaning of a statute. See Stivers v. State, 354
Ark. 140, 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003). We construe criminal statutes
strictly, resolving any doubts in favor of the defendant. See id. We
also adhere to the basic rule of statutory construction, which is to
give effect to the intent of the legislature. See id. We construe the
statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually
accepted meaning in common language, and if the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite
meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory
interpretation. See id. Additionally, in construing any statute, we
place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in
question and ascribe meaning and effect to be derived from the
whole. See id.

Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-4-205(a)(1) provides
that ‘“‘[a] defendant who is found guilty or who enters a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere to an offense may be ordered to pay
restitution.” The section further provides that “[w]hether a trial
court or a jury, the sentencing authority shall make a determina-
tion of actual economic loss caused to a victim by the offense.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-205(b)(1). “Victim,” for purposes of the
section or any provision of law relating to restitution, is defined as
“any person, partnership, corporation, or governmental entity or
agency that suffers property damage or loss, monetary expense, or
physical injury or death as a direct or indirect result of the
defendant’s offense or criminal episode.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-
205(c)(1). The question presented in the instant case is whether
BEHS was a victim entitled to restitution as a result of Brown’s
cruelty-to-animals offenses. We conclude that it was.

Ll
Cid 503

BEHS is a humane society registered as a foreign nonprofit
corporation here in Arkansas, of which we can take judicial
notice.? See Cloird v. State, 349 Ark. 33, 76 S.W.3d 813 (0002). See
also Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Knight, 237 Ark. 802, 803, 376 S.W.2d
556, 557 (1964) (“We take judicial notice of records required to be
kept by the Secretary of State.””); Public Loan Corp. v. Stanberry, 224
Ark. 258, 262 n.2, 272 S.W.2d 694, 697 n.2 (1954) (“We take
judicial notice of public records required to be kept.”). Further-
more, as evidenced by Ms. Shalmy’s testimony set forth above,
BEHS incurred monetary expense, either directly or indirectly, as
a result of Brown’s cruelty to the horses, when it cared for and
obtained treatment for the horses following their seizure. Here,
Brown asserts that there was no proof that he caused the horses “‘to
be in any worse shape when they were taken from the pasture than
they were when he put them there,”’and, thus, the circuit court
could not conclude that the expenses incurred by BEHS were a
result of his offense. However, Brown’s assertion belies the fact
that he was found guilty on four counts of cruelty to animals,
convictions that he does not challenge on appeal.

In addition, Brown, relying on State v. Webb, 130
$.W.3d 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), contends that in order to be
a victim, the circuit court was required to find that BEHS seized
the horses lawfully. However, this argument, too, is without
merit. The statutory definition of “‘victim” set forth in section
5-4-205(c)(1) is both plain and unambiguous and in no way
requires a finding that a victim acted lawfully, rather than volun~
tarily.

In sum, section 5-4-205 provides that a defendant found
guilty of an offense may be ordered to pay restitution and that the
sentencing authority shall make a determination of actual eco-
nomic loss caused to a victim by the offense. It is clear from the
evidence presented to the circuit court that BEHS constituted a
victim as defined by the statute. Accordingly, the circuit court did
not err when it determined that BEHS was entitled to restitution
and ordered Brown to pay restitution to BEHS.

For his second point, Brown argues that the circuit court
erred in determining the amount of restitution. Specifically, he

2 In addition, a review of the record reveals farther evidence that BEHS is a
corporation, as the expense report admitted into evidence references BEHS as Bluebonnet
Equine Humane Society, Inc.

|
504 | =

contends that the circuit court erred when it did not conduct a
hearing to determine the correct amount of economic loss sus-
tained by BEHS. The State responds that this issue is not preserved
for appellate review because Brown failed to object to the circuit
court’s determination of the amount of restitution. Alternatively,
the State urges, the facts established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, a basis for the amount of restitution ordered.

HE The State is correct; this issue is not preserved for our
review. Our review of the record reveals that Brown merely
challenged whether BEHS was a victim, and, thus, whether
restitution was proper. At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit
court orally ruled that it would order restitution in the same
amount ordered by the district court. At that time, Brown merely
questioned whether he was precluded from owning horses in the
future. After the circuit court responded affirmatively, the circuit
court inquired as to how Brown wished to pay his restitution. No
objection was made at either time regarding the amount of
restitution ordered. We have held that to preserve an issue for
appeal, a defendant must object at the first opportunity. See Price v.
State, 365 Ark. 25, 223 S.W.3d 817 (2006). Here, Brown failed to
object or raise his argument below. Accordingly, we are precluded
from reaching his second point on appeal. See Phillips v. State, 304
Ark. 656, 803 S.W.2d 926 (1991).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Brown’s judgment and
disposition.

Affirmed.

Warren LAW v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 08-231 292 S.W.3d 277

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 5, 2009

J. Blake Hendrix, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass’t
Att’y Gen., for appellee.

LANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Justice. On March 14, 2005,
emergency medical personnel were called to a residence at

ee

4701 Elmwood in Little Rock. Once there, the emergency workers
found eighty-six-year-old Geneva Law, covered in bruises and bed-
sores, with rodent feces on the bedroom floor and ants and cock-
roaches crawling on the floor, on the bed, and on Geneva. Geneva
died in the hospital about a month later. Her son, appellant Warren
Law, and her daughter, Mary Law, were both charged on September
11, 2005, with abuse of an adult pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-28-103 (Repl. 1997).!

Prior to trial, Warren filed a motion to dismiss the charges,
arguing that the statute under which he was charged was uncon-
stitutionally vague. The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied his
motion, and the case proceeded to a bench trial on April 24 and 25,
2007. At that trial, the circuit court convicted Warren of abusing
an adult and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment, with three
years suspended. On appeal, Warren challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his conviction and the constitutionality of
the adult-abuse statute.

In his first point on appeal, Warren contends that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of abusing an adult. A
motion to dismiss in a bench trial is identical to a motion for a
directed verdict in a jury trial in that it is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. See Springs v. State, 368 Ark. 256, 244
S.W.3d 683 (2006). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
asserts that the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence.
See Sales v. State, 374 Ark. 222, 289 S.W.3d 423 (2008); Flowers v.
State, 373 Ark. 127, 282 S.W.3d 767 (2008). Substantial evidence
is evidence of sufficient force and character that without resorting
to speculation and conjecture compels with reasonable certainty a
conclusion one way or the other. Sales, supra. On appeal, this court
does not weigh the evidence presented at trial, as that is a matter
for the fact-finder, nor do we assess the credibility of the witnesses.
See Woods v. State, 363 Ark. 272, 213 $.W.3d 627 (2005). We
review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and
consider only the evidence that supports the verdict, and we will
affirm where the record reveals that substantial evidence sustains
the verdict. See id.

1 Warren and Mary were also initially charged with second-degree murder, but the
State nolle prossed the murder charges. Mary pled guilty to abuse of an adult and was
sentenced to five yeats’ imprisonment.

As mentioned above, Warren was charged with abuse of an
adult in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-28-103. That statute
provides that it is “unlawful for any person or caregiver to abuse,
neglect, or exploit any person subject to protection under the
provisions of this chapter.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-28-103(a) (Repl.
1997). Although the judgment and commitment order does not
specify the particular subsection under which Warren was con-
victed, the order does state that he was convicted of a Class D
felony, and the court commented that this was a case of “extreme
neglect.” Therefore, we conclude that Warren was convicted
under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-28-103(c)(1) (Repl. 1997), which
provides as follows:

(c)(1) Any person or caregiver who neglects an endangered or
impaired adult in violation of the provisions of this chapter, causing
serious physical injury or substantial risk of death, shall be guilty of
a Class D felony and shall be punished as provided by law.

At the time of the offense, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-28-101
(Supp. 2003) provided the following definitions for the relevant
portions of the statute:

(3) “Caregiver” means a related or unrelated person ... that has
the responsibility for the protection, care, or custody of an endan-
gered or impaired adult as a result of assuming the responsibility
voluntarily, by contract, through employment, or by order of the
court;

(5) “Endangered adult” means:

(A) An adult eighteen (18) years of age or older who is
found to be in a situation or condition which poses an immi-
nent risk of death or serious bodily harm to that person and who
demonstrates a lack of capacity to comprehend the nature and
consequences of remaining in that situation or condition;

(8)(A) “Impaired adult” means a person eighteen (18) years of
age or older who, as a result of mental or physical impairment, is
unable to protect himself or herself from abuse, sexual abuse, neglect,
or exploitation, and as a consequence thereof is endangered;

iL
510 fC ——~sr

(10) “Neglect” means acts or omissions by an endangered
adult; for example, self-neglect or intentional acts or omissions by a
caregiver responsible for the care and supervision of an endangered
or impaired adult constituting:

(A) Negligently failing to provide necessary treatment,
rehabilitation, care, food, clothing, shelter, supervision, or
medical services to an endangered or impaired adult;

(B) Negligently failing to report health problems or
changes in health problems or changes in the health condition
of an endangered or impaired adult to the appropriate medical
personnel; or

(C) Negligently failing to carry out a prescribed treatment
plan[.]

Thus, to convict Warren of abuse of an adult, the State was
required to prove that: 1) Geneva was an endangered or impaired
adult; 2) Warren was a caregiver responsible for her protection,
care, or custody; 3) he neglected her; and 4) such neglect caused
serious physical injury or risk of death. Warren does not challenge
the fourth of these elements. Instead, he contends that the State
failed to prove that Geneva was endangered or impaired, that he
was her caregiver, and that he neglected her.

The first of these elements is whether Geneva was an
endangered or impaired adult. As proof on this issue, the State’s
first witness at trial, Donna Brady, introduced a report from the
Adult Protective Services Division of the Department of Health
and Human Services.? According to Brady, the report indicated
that Geneva came to the attention of Adult Protective Services
(APS) in April of 2001. At that time, Geneva was living with her
sister in Searcy because the home in Little Rock where she had
been living with her daughter had been condemned as unsanitary
and unsafe. Brady testified that a relative called APS to report that
the sister could no longer care for Geneva. The case worker’s

2 While Warren did not place a copy of the APS report in his Addendum, the report is
in the record, and this court may go to the record to affirm. See,e.g., Brown u. State,374 Ark.
341, 288 S.W.3d 226 (2008); McGehee » State, 344 Ark, 602, 43 S.W.3d 125 (2001).

report from April of 2001 indicated that Geneva was ‘“‘confused to
[the] point [that she] has to be cued to bathe.” The report
described her as “‘very confused” and, although ambulatory, she
was incapable of meeting her activities of daily living. The report
also noted that she was “very confused and could not provide
information without relying on her sister.”

Because Geneva’s sister could no longer care for her, and her
own home had been condemned as ‘“‘unfit for human habitation,”
APS contacted Warren, who eventually picked Geneva up and
took her to live with him and Mary.’ On April 18, 2001, the APS
case worker confirmed with Geneva’s sister that Geneva was
unable to care for herself. Further, Mary testified at trial that, four
years later, Geneva was still unable to care for herself and had
undergone “a rapid deterioration.”

Clearly, the State proved that Geneva was an impaired
or endangered adult. A frail, confused, elderly woman who was
incapable of meeting her own activities of daily living would
certainly have been unable to protect herself from abuse or neglect,
thus meeting the definition of “impaired.” Further, the APS

record indicated that she ‘‘showed limited signs of competency,”
was “‘very confused,” and “could not provide information with-
out relying on her sister.” One in this condition would plainly
“demonstrate[ ] a lack of capacity to comprehend the nature and
consequences of remaining” in a situation that placed her at
imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm, thus meeting the
definition of “endangered.” And as will be discussed more fully
below, Geneva’s situation most assuredly put her at imminent risk
of death or serious bodily harm. Accordingly, the State proved that
Geneva was an “endangered or impaired adult.’’*

As to the second element of the offense, Warren asserts that
the State failed to prove that he was Geneva’s caregiver. As
discussed above, a “‘caregiver”’ under section 5-28-101(3) is “a

> Mary moved in with Warren after her house was condemned in 2001.

4 Warren cites Thomas . State, 92 Ark. App. 425, 214 S.W.3d 863 (2005), for the
proposition that a victim’s condition at the time of his or her hospitalization cannot
“constitute proof of either alternative status of an ‘endangered’ or‘impaired’ adult” He urges
that the “only” evidence that Geneva was an endangered or impaired person consisted of her
age and the squalid conditions in which she was found. However, this is simply untrue, as
shown by the APS report discussed above, which demonstrated that she was endangered and
impaired at the time Warren picked her up at her sister’s house in Searcy in 2001.

Le
512 LC

related or unrelated person . . . that has the responsibility for the
protection, care, or custody of an endangered or impaired adult as
a result of assuming the responsibility voluntarily, by contract,
through employment, or by order of the court.” Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-28-101(3) (Supp. 2003). Warren argues that the State failed to
prove that he voluntarily assumed the responsibility of protecting
or caring for Geneva.

At the outset, we note that “caregiver,” as defined in
section 5-28-101(3), is one who “thas the responsibility for the
protection, care, or custody” of an endangered adult. (Emphasis
added.) The use of the disjunctive ‘‘or’’ indicates that the State
need only prove that an individual has the responsibility for one of
these aspects before he or she may be deemed a “‘caregiver.”” See,
e.g., Bailey v. State, 348 Ark. 524, 529, 74 S.W.3d 622, 624 (2002)
(“In its ordinary sense the word ‘or’ is a disjunctive particle that
marks an alternative, generally corresponding to ‘either,’ as ‘either
this or that’; it is a connective that marks an alternative.”’) (quoting
McCoy v. Walker, 317 Ark. 86, 89-90, 876 S.W.2d 252, 254
(1994)). Because the State introduced proof that Warren agreed to
pick Geneva up from her sister’s house in Searcy and bring her
home to live under his roof, there was clearly substantial evidence
that Warren voluntarily assumed responsibility for Geneva’s cus-
tody.

However, Warren raises an additional argument wherein he
asserts that he could not have been criminally responsible for
neglecting Geneva unless he met the definition of “caregiver”
found in section 5-28-101(10), which defines “‘neglect”’ as the
“intentional acts or omissions by a caregiver responsible for the care
and supervision of an endangered or impaired adult.” Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-28-101(10) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). This argu-
ment relates to a portion of the third element of the offense, set out
above, regarding whether Warren ‘‘neglected’’ Geneva.

Here, Warren argues that the state failed to prove that he
voluntarily assumed the responsibility for Geneva’s care and su-
pervision and thus could not have “neglected’’ her under section
5-28-101(10). He contends that he initially refused this responsi-
bility when Geneva’s home was condemned, taking her at that
time to live with her sister in Searcy. He also notes that it took APS
“several weeks” to locate him when the sister became unable to
care for Geneva, and he states that he ‘“‘only took Geneva into his
home when [APS] told him he had to, and only then on the

Ld
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condition that Mary was in his home to provide Geneva ‘full-time
care.’ ”’ On the basis of these factors, Warren maintains that he did
not voluntarily assume the responsibility to provide for Geneva’s
care and supervision, and the State thus failed to prove this element
of the crime.

However, while Warren may have acted grudgingly
and belatedly, the evidence introduced below supports the trial
court’s finding that he acted voluntarily and thus was Geneva’s
“caregiver” under section 5-28-101(3) and was responsible for her
“care and supervision” under section 5-28-101(10). Despite his
protests that he only took Geneva in when APS told him he “had
to,” he nonetheless took her in, instead of telling APS to take his
mother into the custody of the Department of Human Services or
place her in a nursing home. The case summary report from APS
states that APS contacted Warren and he indicated that “he would
be coming to pick [Geneva] up on [April 18, 2001] to live with
him in Little Rock.”’ That it took a few days to locate Warren’
does not refute or negate the fact that he ultimately took his
mother into his home where, according to the report, she could
“receive full time supervision.”

The report further notes that Mary “‘will also be in the home
to provide full time care.”” (Emphasis added.) The report does not,
contrary to Warren’s assertion, state that Mary’s living in the home
‘was a precondition to Warren’s decision to take his mother in, and
it does not prove that Mary was intended to be the individual with
sole responsibility for caring for Geneva. Rather, it simply indi-
cates that she would be an additional presence in the home.
Moreover, although Warren apparently preferred to have his sister
attend to Geneva’s day-to-day needs, it was nonetheless his deci-
sion to personally pick up his endangered and impaired mother and
bring her to live under his roof.‘ This decision thereafter effec-

5 In his brief, Warren argues that it took APS “several weeks” to locate him. From the
report, however, it appears that it took three or four days to locate Warren, and another six
days before he picked Geneva up from her sister’s house. The report states that the first home
visit and interview with Geneva was on April 9, 2001. APS reached Warren on April 12,
2001, and he picked her up on April 18. Thus, his statement that it took “several weeks” to
locate him is mere hyperbole.

© ‘The APS report states that Warren “advised he would come and get [Geneva] to live
with him and her daughter”

tively denied Geneva any further services from APS, as the case
summary report reflected that there was “‘[n]o further APS needed
at this time.”

Having brought her into his home under these conditions,
Warren voluntarily assumed the responsibility for the protection,
care, or custody of an endangered and impaired adult, making him
a “caregiver”’ under section 5-28-101(3), and he was responsible
for the care and supervision of that person for purposes of the
definition of “neglect”? under section 5-28-101(10).?7 Therefore,
we conclude that there was substantial evidence showing that
‘Warren was Geneva’s caregiver and that he was a caregiver as that
word is used in the definition of neglect.

This leads us to the balance of Warren’s third sub-point,
wherein he argues that the State failed to prove that he neglected
Geneva. Neglect, as defined in section 5-28-101(10), includes
“Gntentional acts or omissions by a caregiver responsible for the
care and supervision of an endangered or impaired adult consti-
tuting . . . negligently failing to provide necessary treatment,
rehabilitation, care, food, clothing, shelter, supervision, or medical
services to an endangered or impaired adult.”

Warren’s argument on the first portion of the “ne-
glect”’ inquiry focuses on his claim that he owed no legal duty to
Geneva. He notes that the statute requires an intentional act or
omission,* and he contends that, in order to demonstrate such an
act or omission, the State had to prove that he owed a legal duty to
act. See, e.g., Flippo v. State, 258 Ark. 233, 238, 523 S.W.2d 390,

7 ‘Warren’s protestations that Mary was the person responsible for Geneva's care and
supervision, and that his own health problems and work schedule prevented him from
assuming that role, go to the weight rather than the sufficiency of the evidence on this point.

* In his brief, Warren argues that the statute requires a “purposefill act or omission.”
However, at the time the crime was committed, the statute defined neglect as “intentional acts
or omissions by a caregiver” See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-28-101(10) (Supp. 2003). Subsequent
amendments to the act clarify that neglect means, in pertinent part, a “purposeful act or
omission by a caregiver . . . that constitutes negligently failing to .. . [p]rovide necessary
treatment, rehabilitation, care, food, clothing, shelter, supervision, or medical services to an
adult endangered person or an adult impaired person” Ark, Code Ann. § 5-28-101(11)(B)()
(Repl. 2007) (as amended by Act 1810 of 2005). Act 1810 did not include an emergency
clause; therefore, the amendment was not effective until ninety days after the 2005 session
adjourned on May 13, 2005. See, e.g, Reeves u State, 374 Ark. 415, 288 S,W.3d 57 (2008)
(pursuant to Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, Acts of the General Assembly that do
not contain an emergency clause or a specified effective date become effective on the

a
= Cd 515

393 (1975) (‘‘For criminal liability to be based upon a failure to act,
it must be found that there was a duty to act — a legal duty and not
simply a moral duty.”’). However, by proving that Warren was
Geneva’s caregiver under section 5-28-101(3), as well as a person
responsible for her care and supervision under section 5-28-
101(10), as discussed above, the State proved that Warren did, in
fact, have a legal duty to act.

Warren raises a further argument wherein he suggests that, at
most, Geneva was an invitee in his home and that he therefore
owed her only a duty to refrain from wantonly or willfully causing
her injury. See, e.g., Turner v. Stewart, 330 Ark. 134, 141, 952
S.W.2d 156, 160 (1997). This argument misses the mark, how-
ever, as he had a duty under the statutes discussed above to refrain
from engaging in acts or omissions such as “[nJegligently failing to
provide necessary treatment, rehabilitation, care, food, clothing,
shelter, supervision, or medical services to an endangered or
impaired adult.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-28-101(10)(A) (Supp.
2003). ““Negligently” is defined in the Arkansas Criminal Code as
follows:

A person acts negligently with respect to attendant circum-
stances or a result of his conduct when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose
of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor’s situation.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(4) (Repl. 1997).

This court has noted that negligent conduct is distinguished
from reckless conduct primarily in that it does not involve the
conscious disregard of a perceived risk. See Hunter v. State, 341 Ark.
665, 19 S.W.3d 607 (2000). In order to be held to have acted
negligently, it is not necessary that the actor be fully aware of a
perceived risk and recklessly disregard it. It requires only a finding
that under the circumstances he should have been aware of it and
his failure to perceive it was a gross deviation from the care a

ninety-first day after the legislature adjourns). As the crime here was committed in March of
2005, the earlier version of the statute is applicable.

reasonable, prudent person would exercise under those circum-
stances. Id. (citing Phillips v. State, 6 Ark. App. 380, 644 S.W.2d
288 (1982)). The facts introduced at trial satisfy this requirement.

Angela Bain, a paramedic with Metropolitan Emergency
Medical Services (MEMS), testified that she responded to a non-
emergency call at 4701 Elmwood in Little Rock on March 14,
2005. As she walked around to the back of the home, she was met
with a strong odor that ‘‘smelled like rotting flesh.” Upon entering
the house, she found Geneva, whom she described as having “all
kinds of bruises of varying age on her” and in an environment that
“‘was not... appropriate . . . for anyone to be in.”’ Bain stated that
there were rodent feces on the floor and ants and cockroaches
crawling on the bed and on Geneva. Geneva was lying on a
mattress that appeared to be soaked with urine and feces with a
deflated plastic mattress, a plastic garbage bag, and soaked news-
papers underneath her.

Sergeant Cristie Phillips of the Little Rock Police Depart-
ment testified that when she got to the scene, Geneva had already
been transported to the hospital by medical personnel, but she
could “immediately smell just an overwhelming stench of feces. It
smelled like rotting flesh.” Phillips also went to the hospital to take
photographs of Geneva, whom Phillips said was “black and blue all
over.” One of Geneva’s ears was completely swollen shut, and she
had bruises all over her face. She also had ‘‘crater-sized’”’ bedsores
that “you could have stuck your fist in.” Phillips noted that at the
time she arrived in the emergency room, there were still ants
crawling on Geneva, and nurses were “‘picking the ants off her
skin.”

Kimberly Finklestein, a crime scene specialist with the Little
Rock Police Department, testified that the house was in “disarray”
and was “‘extremely, extremely filthy.”’ She saw what appeared to
be animal feces on the floor of Geneva’s room, as well as the rest of
the house. The mattress of Geneva’s bed was soaked and stained
with urine and mold, as was the carpet underneath the bed. There
were ants and roaches “just crawling everywhere.” When Fink-
lestein went to the hospital to see Geneva, she said that she knew
she was approaching Geneva’s room because, as she was walking
down the hallway, she could smell the same stench she had smelled
in the house. On redirect examination, Finklestein testified that
there was no part of Warren’s house where one could not smell
“that smell.” :

Little Rock Code Enforcement Supervisor Sheila Reynolds
testified that she was asked to go the Elmwood residence by police.
After confirming in the property records that the house belonged
to Warren, Reynolds went to the residence some four and a half
hours after Geneva had been taken to the hospital. She stated that
when she got to the door, there was “‘such a strong odor that we
had to turn around and go back to our vehicle and get some Vick’s
and put across our nose so we could go in.” She described the smell
as being a “very strong urine smell’ and a “‘rotted-flesh type
smell.”

Reynolds described the house, stating that there was a “lot
of stuff piled on the floor.” In Geneva’s room, there were “feathers
and rat droppings, possibly rabbit droppings” on the floor by her
bed, and the bed appeared to be stained with bodily fluids. Ants
were crawling on the comforter, and there was “‘trash and stuff in
the closet, kind of like maybe an animal had lived in there.” The
remainder of the house was “unsanitary” and “‘filthy,”’ and the
bathtub was black with mold and mildew. There was nothing
between Geneva’s room and the rest of the house that would have
sealed her area off, other than a bedroom door.

The State also called Lynn Espejo, the clinic administrator
for Geneva’s former doctor, Dr. Scott Brown. Espejo testified that
Geneva had not been in to see the doctor since January of 2001. At
that time, Geneva weighed 162 pounds and was classified as
“obese.” She noted that there had been calls from the pharmacy to
refill Geneva’s blood-pressure medication, but she said that in
2004, Dr. Brown refused to confirm her prescription until she
came back in to see him.

Dr. Moses Ejiofor was the emergency room physician on call
the day that Geneva was brought to the hospital. He said that she
“looked like bone” and was very weak, disheveled, unkempt, and
malnourished. Dr. Ejiofor also described the smell of rotting flesh,
which he determined was coming, at least in part, from a large
wound on her back through which he could see the outline of her
spine. Geneva had other large ulcers on her pelvis, a large blood
clot in her left ear, and bruises all over her body; further, the
bruises were not all consistent with her having fallen. Her bedsores
were necrotic and black and appeared to have been there for some
time. Dr. Ejiofor said that he knew Geneva was in pain and he
could hear her moaning, but she was so weak that she could not
even flinch away from him. In addition to her other injuries,
Geneva also had a fluid build-up or bleeding inside her brain,

which was consistent with trauma. Cultures of her eyes revealed
the presence of three different bacteria, and “approximately eight
to nine organisms” were cultured from the ulcers.

HB Plainly, the above testimony constituted substantial
evidence that Warren should have been aware of the risk to
Geneva, and his failure to perceive the risk posed to his mother was
a gross deviation from the care a reasonable, prudent person would
exercise under those circumstances. Numerous witnesses testified
to the filth in the house and the overwhelming stench of rotting
flesh that permeated the environment. It is inconceivable that
these conditions went unnoticed,’ and it is equally inconceivable
that these conditions arose overnight. By allowing the squalor to
proliferate unchecked, and by either failing or refusing to remedy
the circumstances, it is plain that Warren, as caregiver, negligently
failed to “provide necessary treatment, . . . care, . . . shelter, [or]
supervision” for Geneva, an endangered or impaired adult. In
short, the evidence demonstrated that Warren was guilty of
neglecting Geneva.

In his second point on appeal, Warren urges that the circuit
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against
him on the grounds that the section 5-28-103 is void for vague-
ness. Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the burden of
proving otherwise is on the challenger of the statute. Bowker v.
State, 363 Ark. 345, 214 S.W.3d 243 (2005); Reinert v. State, 348
Ark. 1, 71 S.W.3d 52 (2002). If it is possible to construe a statute
as constitutional, we must do so. Bowker, supra. Because statutes are
presumed to be framed in accordance with the Constitution, they
should not be held invalid for repugnance thereto unless such
conflict is clear and unmistakable. Id.

We have said that a law is unconstitutionally vague under
due process standards if it does not give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited and it is so vague and
standardless that it allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-

? Warren did introduce the testimony of his estranged wife, Shannon Law, who stated
that Warren’s sense ofsmell was not the best. Apparently, he did not believe her when she said
she smelled gas in the house, although he eventually repaired the gas leak, which stemmed
from an extinguished pilot light. However, it was the trial court’s duty to assign whatever
weight it chose to this testimony. See, eg., Buford ». State,368 Ark. 87, 243 S.W.3d 300 (2006)
(the trier of fact alone determines the credibility of witnesses and apportions the weight to be
given to the evidence).

ment. Id. (citing Cambiano v. Neal, 342 Ark. 691, 35 S.W.3d 792
(2000)). As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statutory
provision being attacked as void for vagueness is determined by the
statute’s applicability to the facts at issue. Id.; Graham v. State, 365
Ark. 274, 229 S.W.3d 30 (2006). When challenging the constitu-
tionality of a statute on the grounds of vagueness, the individual
challenging the statute must be one of the “entrapped innocent”
who has not received fair warning. Graham, supra. If, by his action,
that individual clearly falls within the conduct proscribed by the
statute, he cannot be heard to complain. Id.

On appeal, Warren argues that section 5-28-103 is uncon-
stitutionally vague in its definition of “caregiver.” He states that
section 5-28-101(3) defines a caregiver as “‘a related . . . person
. .. that has the responsibility for the protection, care, or custody
of an endangered or impaired adult as a result of assuming the
responsibility voluntarily, by contract, through employment, or by
order of the court.”” On the other hand, in defining “neglect,”
section 5-28-101(10) imposes criminal liability only on a caregiver
who is “‘responsible for the care and supervision of an endangered
or impaired adult.” According to Warren, the statute is thus
“Snconsistent in defining who is a caregiver criminally liable for
neglect.”

However, as discussed above, the facts demonstrated
that Warren clearly met either definition of “caregiver.” He
voluntarily assumed the responsibility for the protection, care, or
custody of an endangered and impaired adult, and he was respon-
sible for the care and supervision of that person. Because the facts
adduced at trial place Warren squarely within the definitions of
“caregiver,” he is not an “entrapped innocent” and thus cannot
complain that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g.,
Talbert v. State, 367 Ark. 262, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2006).

HM Warren raises an additional point suggesting that the
word ‘‘caregiver”’ can be read so broadly as to “impose a legal duty
of care and protection on one who invites another to be his or her
roommate” or on the owner of a bed-and-breakfast. However,
this court has stated that if a statute clearly applies to the conduct
of the party challenging the statute, the fact that the statute may be
questionable in its application to speculative situations is immate-
rial. See Talbert, supra.

Affirmed.

Ernest GARCIA, Beverly Garcia, and Patsy Durham »v.
ESTATE of James M. DUVALL

08-845 293 S.W.3d 389

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 12, 2009

os
Jon R. Sanford, P.A., by: Jon Sanford, and Eubanks, Baker &
Schulze, by: J.G. “Gerry” Schulze, for appellants.

Streett Law Firm, P.A., by: Alex G. Street and James A. Street,
for appellee.

ONaLD L. Corain, Justice. Appellants Ernest and Beverly

Garcia and Patsy Durham appeal the order of the Yell
County Circuit Court denying and dismissing with prejudice their
claims against Appellee Estate of James M. Duvall. Their sole point on
appeal is that the circuit court erred in finding that their claims were
barred by the statute of nonclaim, codified at Ark. Code Ann.
§ 28-50-101 (Repl. 2004). This court assumed jurisdiction of this

' ‘The General Assembly amended section 28-50-101(a)(1) by Act 231 of 2007, and
provided for a six-month nonclaim period. Because the nonclaim period at issue here arose
in 2006, the prior version of section 28-50-101(a)(1) providing for a three-month nonclaim
period is applicable here.

case, as it involves a potential issue of statutory interpretation; our
jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b)(6). We affirm.

A review of the record reveals that prior to his death on
November 15, 2005, James Duvall entered into two separate
contracts, one with Appellants Ernest and Beverly Garcia, and the
other with Appellant Patsy Durham. The Garcia contract consisted
of a handwritten contract, in which Mr. Duvall sold a house, as is,
to the Garcias for $55,000. Five hundred dollars was due on
January 1, 2002, to be followed by a payment of $1,000 in
February 2002, and monthly payments thereafter of $450 at an
interest rate of 8.5 percent per annum. The Durham contract was
typewritten and provided for the sale of certain real property to
Ms. Durham for $12,000, with monthly payments of $150 at a rate
of 8 percent per annum.

Following Mr. Duvall’s death, personal representatives were
appointed for his Estate, and on April 19, 2006, a notice of
appointment of co-administrators was published in the Yell
County Record. On August 21, 2007, the Appellants filed a
complaint in Yell County Circuit Court against the Estate, its
personal representatives, and Mr. Duvall’s heirs. Appellants sought
certification of a class action and alleged two bases for relief: (1)
violation of the usury provision in the Arkansas Constitution,
article 19, section 13; and (2) violation of the Arkansas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. On September 5, 2007, the Estate filed an
objection and disapproval of the claims made by the Appellants.
Specifically, the Estate asserted that the claims were not made
within the time set forth by the nonclaim statute, and, thus, were
barred.

Pretrial briefs were submitted to the circuit court by both
sides, and the circuit court then held a hearing and allowed the
parties to argue their respective positions. After taking the matter
under consideration, the circuit court filed a letter opinion,
finding:

The claimants in this case contend that usury cases are a special
category for purposes of measuring the commencement of a limi-
tation period for a claim based on usury but the claimant has cited
no pertinent statutory or case law authority that a claim for usury is
an exception to the application of the non claim statute.

If the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas had intended to
make usury cases an exception to the statute ofnon claim this Court
feels that this could have been done. It has not been done.

This Court finds that the Arkansas statute of non claim has long
barred claims filed against the estate that are not timely filed. In this
case, the claims of the claimants, Garcia and Durham, were not
timely filed and the Court finds their claims are barred and dismissed
in that they were not filed within the appropriate 3 month period.

The circuit court subsequently entered an order memorializing its
letter opinion and stated, in pertinent part:

Based upon the facts as found by this Court, the Court concludes
that:

(1) The non claim period applicable to the Claimants and their
respective claims ended three months following the first publi-
cation of the notice to creditors. Since the first publication of
the notice to creditors was April 19, 2006, the non claim period
for filing or otherwise asserting a claim against the Estate
expired July 19, 2006;

(2) Claimants’ claim was not filed until August 27, 2007, over a

year after the close of the non claim period;

(3) Pursuant to the terms of the statute of non claim, the Claimants’
claims and the civil action upon which they are based are
“forever barred as against the estate, the personal representative,
or the heirs and devisees of the decedent.”

The circuit court then denied and dismissed with prejudice the claims
filed by Appellants against the Estate. This appeal followed.

As their sole point on appeal, Appellants argue that it was
error for the circuit court to deny and dismiss their claims where
they were reasonably ascertainable creditors, were given no notice
of the probate proceedings, and filed their claims within two years
of the date of the first publication of notice. Appellee counters that
the circuit court correctly determined that Appellants’ claims were
barred by section 28-50-101(a), the statute of nonclaim. Because
Appellants failed to obtain a ruling on this argument, we are
precluded from addressing it on appeal.

Appellants raised their “reasonably ascertainable creditor”
argument before the circuit court in their pretrial brief; however,
the main focus of that brief was an argument that when dealing

ee.

with a usury claim, the statute of limitations starts over each time
a party makes a new payment on a usurious note. In its letter order,
the trial court stated that Appellants failed to cite to any authority
supporting their argument about the statute of limitations for a
usury claim. In its subsequent written order, the trial court found
that the statute of nonclaim applied and barred Appellants’ claims.
The trial court made no finding as to whether Appellants were
reasonably ascertainable creditors and thus fell within the two-year
limitation set forth in section 28-50-101(h).

In sum, Appellants abandoned their original argument
regarding the applicable statute of limitations, and because they
failed to obtain a ruling on their alternative argument that they
were reasonably ascertainable creditors, we will not address their
argument on appeal. See, e.g., Parker v, BancorpSouth Bank, 369 Ark.
300, 253 S.W.3d 918 (2007) (holding that failure to obtain a ruling
on an issue from the circuit court precludes review on appeal).
Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Charles ARCHER and Linda Archer, Husband and Wife,
Individually and as Parents and Next Friends of Mason Archer v.
SISTERS of MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM, ST. LOUIS, INC.
d/b/a Sisters of Mercy Health System d/b/a St. Joseph’s
Mercy Health Center; Bethany A. McGraham, M.D.; James E.
Tutton, M.D.; Hot Springs Radiology Services, Ltd.; Mark S.
Russell, M.D.; Mark B. Robbins, M.D.; Deanna L. Shatwell,
R.N. a/k/a Deanna L. Dial, R.N.; and Paula Scheck, R.N.

08-784 294 S.W.3d 414

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 12, 2009

524

Amold, Batson, Turner & Turner, P.A., by: Todd Turner and Dan
Turner, and Wigington Rumley, LLP, by: Joe Dunn, for appellants.

eee.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Edwin L. Lowther, Jr., David
P. Glover, and Gary D. Marts, Jr., for appellee Sisters of Mercy Health
System, St. Louis Pooled Comprehensive Liability Program, et al.

Brian Brooks, for amicus curiae Arkansas Trial Lawyers Associa~
tion.

opert L. Brown, Justice. This appeal involves a medical

alpractice action brought by appellants Charles and

Linda Archer (‘the Archers’’) on behalf of their son, Mason Archer,

against multiple parties, including appellee, Sisters of Mercy Health

System, St. Louis Pooled Comprehensive Liability Program (“the

Liability Pool”). The circuit judge entered an order dismissing the
Liability Pool. We reverse and remand.

The following facts are gleaned from the Archers’ pleadings
and pretrial motions. On March 12, 2005, the Archer family was in
an automobile accident while returning to their home in Arkadel-
phia, after a trip to Hot Springs. The driver of the other vehicle
involved in the accident, who was intoxicated at the time, died in
the accident. The Archers sustained serious injuries. The injuries
suffered by Mason Archer (‘‘Mason”’), who was six years old at the
time of the accident, are the subject of the instant lawsuit.

‘When emergency personnel arrived at the crash scene, they
discovered that Mason had suffered a fractured wrist. He also had
visible facial injuries. Mason was moving all four extremities at the
scene, but the ambulance crew placed him on a spinal board and in
a cervical collar until doctors could determine whether he had
suffered any spinal cord injuries. The ambulance took Mason to
the emergency room at St. Joseph’s Mercy Health Center (‘‘St.
Joseph’s’’).

The Archers allege that St. Joseph’s and the doctors who
treated Mason acted negligently in providing medical care, with
the result that Mason is permanently paralyzed from the chest
down. Their complaint asserts that when Mason arrived at the
emergency room, he complained to a nurse of abdominal pain and
pain in his arms and legs, that he was then examined by Dr.
Bethany McGraham and subsequently by Dr. James Tutton, and

+ ‘The Archers added the Liability Pool as a named defendant in their First Amended
Complaint.

526 es

that Mason was eventually transferred to Arkansas Children’s
Hospital where it was determined that he had serious spinal-cord
injuries.

The essence of the Archers’ negligence claim is as follows:
Dr. Tutton ordered a CT scan of Mason’s head, neck, abdomen,
and pelvis at St. Jospeph’s, which was not read by a doctor for
almost four hours. When the results were eventually interpreted,
they were incorrectly determined to be negative. After the test
results came back, a nurse removed the cervical collar from Mason
and allowed him to move around.’ The collar was removed before
Mason was examined by a physician, and a nurse “‘pulled on
Mason’s arm” in an attempt to help him stand up, resulting in
permanent paralysis.

On March 9, 2007, the Archers filed suit against various
parties.’ They did not name the Liability Pool‘ then because two
months before the Archers filed their original complaint, this court
handed down a decision specifically holding that the Liability Pool
was not an insurer for purposes of the direct-action statute,
codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-79-210. See
Sowders v. St. Joseph’s Mercy Health Ctr., 368 Ark. 466, 475, 247
S.W.3d 514, 521 (2007). Later, in response to the decision in
Sowders, the Arkansas General Assembly amended the direct-action
statute to expressly state that “‘[a]ny self-insurance fund, pooled
liability fund, or similar fund maintained by a medical care pro-
vider for the payment or indemnification of the medical care
provider’s liability for medical injuries under § 16-114-201 et seq.
shall be deemed to be liability insurance susceptible to direct action
under this section.” Act of Mar. 30, 2007, No. 750, 2007 Ark. Acts
3963 (hereinafter ‘Act 750”).

On August 27, 2007, after the enactment of Act 750, the
Archers amended their original complaint to name the Liability
Pool as a defendant to the instant action. On November 9, 2007,
the Liability Pool moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the

2 St. Joseph’s has denied that the cervical collar was removed.

3 ‘The Archers initially named Sisters of Mercy Health System, St. Joseph’s Mercy
Health Center, Bethany A. McGraham, M.D. James B.Tutton, M.D., Hot Springs Radiology
Services, Ltd., Mark S. Russell, M.D., Mark B, Robbins, M.D., Deanna L. Shatwell, R.N.,and
Paula Scheck, R.N.

* St, Joseph's is a member of the Liability Pool, which is a pooled-liability fund
administered and maintained by Sisters of Mercy Health System.

ee.

basis that Act 750 could not be applied retroactively because it had
created a new cause of action against the Liability Pool. On March
11, 2008, the circuit judge held a hearing on the motion, and on
April 25, 2008, she handed down a letter ruling in which she
explained her decision to grant the Liability Pool’s motion. The
judge specifically found that:

[T]he amendment to the direct-action statute changed a fund
which was previously not insurance to insurance. This is a substan-
tive change for the Program [Liability Pool] to be prepared to pay
potential claims it had not previously been required to pay. It
created a new right to sue which tort victims did not have prior to
the law. It enlarged the responsibility of the Program [Liability Pool]
to include the accumulation of finds adequate to pay potential new
claims. All of the Arkansas cases on this subject indicate prospective
application only for such substantive changes.

On May 8, 2008, the circuit judge entered an order dismissing the
Liability Pool and a certificate of final judgment, pursuant to Arkansas
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

The Archers contend on appeal that Act 750, which permits
direct-action lawsuits against pooled-liability funds and deems
such funds to be liability insurance for such lawsuits, is remedial in
nature and, as such, should be applied retroactively so as to
effectuate the intent of the legislation.’

We first consider the Liability Pool’s claim that this court
should not consider the Archers’ arguments that the direct-action
statute should be construed liberally, that retroactive application is
necessary to effectuate its intended purpose, and that rules of
statutory construction require that Act 750 be retroactively ap-
plied. The Liability Pool initially asserts that the Archers did not
raise these issues before the circuit judge. It, however, is wrong on
this point. The record clearly indicates that the Archers raised these
issues during the March 11, 2008 hearing. Further, these points are
not separate issues on appeal. Rather, if the court determines that
Act 750 is remedial, they necessarily become part of the court’s
analysis in determining whether to apply the act retroactively.

5 The direct-action statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-79-210, which Act
750 amended, reads that “[wJhen liability insurance is cacried by any cooperative non-profit
corporation, association, or organization ... not subject to suit in tort ...the person so injured
or damaged shall have a direct cause of action against the insurer.” Ark. Code Ann.
§ 23-79-201 (Supp. 2007).

a
528 Cs”

This court has consistently set forth the law regarding
retroactive application of statutes. See, e.g., McMickle v. Griffin, 369
Ark. 318, 254 $.W.3d 729 (2007). We have said:

Retroactivity is a matter of legislative intent. Unless it expressly
states otherwise, we presume the legislature intends for its laws to
apply only prospectively. However, this rule does not ordinarily
apply to procedural or remedial legislation. The strict rule of
construction does not apply to remedial statutes which do not
disturb vested rights, or create new obligations, but only support a
new or more appropriate remedy to enforce an existing right or
obligation. Procedural legislation is more often given retroactive
application. The cardinal principle for construing remedial legisla—
tion is for the courts to give appropriate regard to the spirit which
promoted its enactment, the mischief sought to be abolished, and
the remedy proposed.

McMickle, 369 Ark. at 338-39, 254 S.W.3d at 746 (citing Bean v. Office
of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 296-97, 9 S.W.3d 520, 526
(2000)). The general rules also apply to amendatory acts. See Gannett
River States Publ’g Co. v. Ark. Ind. Dev. Comm’n, 303 Ark. 684, 799
S.W.2d 543 (1990).

This court has also observed that:

Although the distinction between remedial procedures and
impairment of vested rights is often difficult to draw, it has become
firmly established that there is no vested right in any particular mode
of procedure or remedy. Statutes which do not create, enlarge,
diminish, or destroy contractual or vested rights, but relate only to
remedies or modes of procedures, are not within the general rule
against retroactive operation. In other words, statutes effecting
changes in civil procedure or remedy may have valid retroactive
application, and remedial legislation may, without violating consti-
tutional guarantees, be construed . . . to apply to suits on causes of
action which arose prior to the effective date of the statute .... A
statute which merely provides a new remedy, enlarges an existing
remedy, or substitutes a remedy is not unconstitutionally retrospec-
tive ..

JurisDictionUSA, Inc. v. Loislaw.com, Inc., 357 Ark. 403, 412, 183
S.W.3d 560, 565-66 (2004) (citing Padgett v. Bank of Eureka Springs,
279 Ark. 367, 651 S.W.2d 460 (1983)).

We turn then to the central question of whether Act 750,
amending Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-79-210, is reme-

ee

dial in nature. In Rogers v. Tudor Insurance Co., we said, ‘“[d]irect
action statutes are remedial in nature and are liberally construed for
the benefit of injured parties and to effectuate the intended
purposes.” 325 Ark. 226, 234, 925 S.W.2d 395, 399 (1996) (citing
12A Couch on Insurance 2d §§ 45:798, 45:800, at 455, 458 (1981)).
Despite this statement of the law, the Liability Pool maintains that
the Rogers language is dicta and that this court should decline to
hold that Arkansas’s direct-action statute is remedial. In support of
its position, the Liability Pool directs this court to additional
Janguage from Couch on Insurance, which indicates that some
jurisdictions treat direct-action statutes as creating a substantive
sight in the claimant to sue the insurance company. See 7A Lee R.
Russ & Thomas Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 104:54, at 104-82
(1999).¢ According to the Liability Pool, this court should “‘con-
sider the text [Couch] in its entirety’’ because “the view of direct
action statutes being procedural in nature is not universally ap-
plied.”

We disagree with the Liability Pool’s analysis. This court
should rely on the quoted language from Rogers that direct-action
statutes are remedial in nature as precedent. The Rogers court
studied Couch on Insurance and cited as authority language from.
Couch that direct-action statutes are remedial in nature, even
though the treatise also included the reasoning that some jurisdic-
tions use to hold that direct-action statutes create substantive
rights. The clear message from Rogers is that this court was
persuaded by the view that the statute is remedial in nature.

The Liability Pool goes on and claims that Act 750 cannot be
remedial because it affords the Archers a new legal right and
imposes a new obligation on it. In essence, it argues that when the
negligence cause of action arose, the Archers did not have a right
to sue the Liability Pool, and it was not obligated to pay damages
on the claim. Accordingly, it asserts that Act 750 operates to give
plaintiffs a new cause of action against pooled-liability funds and,
therefore, cannot be remedial in nature. We disagree.

HB Act 750 did not create a new cause of action. The
negligence cause of action that is the heart of the Archers’ claim is
grounded in this state’s common law and is regulated by statute.
See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-114-201 to -212 (Repl. 2006 & Supp.

© The section cited by the Liability Pool primarily addresses choice of law issues
pertaining to direct-action statutes, which are not relevant to the current analysis.

Lr |
530 Po

2007) (Actions for Medical Injury). The statutes govern ‘‘any
action against a medical care provider, whether based in tort,
contract, or otherwise, to recover damages on account of medical
injury.” Id. § 16-114-201 (Repl. 2006). The application of the
charitable immunity doctrine, however, operates to prevent some
injured parties from recovering damages for negligence against
charitable hospitals directly. See Low v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 364 Ark.
427, 440, 220 S.W.3d 670, 680 (2005) (certain charitable entities
are immune from tort liability).

The direct-action statute, codified at section 23-79-210, is a
statutory remedy because it provides a new or substitute remedy
for the underlying claim of negligence in cases where the plaintiff
cannot recover directly from a negligent charitable hospital. See
JurisDictionUSA, Inc., 357 Ark. at 412, 183 S.W.3d at 566 (a statute
providing a new or substitute remedy can be applied retroactively).
After this court’s decision in Sowders, parties injured as the result of
negligence on the part of charitable hospitals, who did not carry
traditional liability insurance but did contribute to a pooled-
liability fund, were left without a remedy for the hospital’s
negligence. 368 Ark. 466, 247 S.W.3d 514. As already noted, the
General Assembly responded with Act 750 by amending the
direct-action statute so that it now expressly states that pooled-
liability funds are liability insurers under the statute. Contrary to
the Liability Pool’s contention, this amendment did not create a
new legal right for injured parties. Instead, it clarified that those
injured parties have a remedy against a liability pool for the
underlying claim of negligence when charitable immunity of a
hospital is involved.

Despite this, the Liability Pool relies heavily on this court’s
often-cited language that a remedial statute cannot “impose a new
obligation.” See McMickle, 369 Ark. at 339, 254 S.W.3d at 746. Its
position is that Act 750 imposed a new obligation by requiring it to
pay damages to the Archers in the event a jury finds that St.
Joseph’s was negligent in providing medical care to Mason. The
Liability Pool relies on this court’s decision in Estate of Wood v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services to support its argument. 319
Ark. 697, 894 S.W.2d 573 (1995). We do not agree that the Estate
of Wood case militates in favor of the Liability Pool’s position.

At issue in Estate of Wood was an act that permitted the
Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) to make a claim
against a decedent’s estate for medicaid payments made to the
decedent prior to death. Id. at 698, 894 S.W.2d at 574. This court

ee

refused to apply that act retroactively because it “‘appear[ed] to
create a new legal right which allow[ed] DHS to file a claim against
the estate of the deceased.”’ Id. at 701, 894 S.W.2d at 575. The
court went on to note that “[p]rior to the enactment [of the act,
the decedent] had no reason to consider the medicaid payments as
anything other than an outright entitlement. After the enactment
it was as if she had a loan from DHS to be repaid from the assets of
her estate.” Id. at 701, 894 S.W.2d at 576.

The Liability Pool contends that, like in Estate of Wood, “‘the
remedy that Appellants assert is a new legal right” and it “is now
burdened with the new obligation to plaintiffs bringing such
suits.” The Liability Pool, though, misapplies the Estate of Wood
decision to the instant matter. In that case, DHS had no right to
recover medicaid payments from a decedent’s estate prior to the
enactment of the act. In this case, the Archers already had the right
to sue in negligence and recover from a liability insurer, under the
direct-action statute, prior to the enactment of Act 750. Act 750
merely clarified an avenue of relief for the Archers to pursue under
that statute. The Liability Pool also advocates that the ‘‘obligation”
imposed on the decedent in Estate of Wood, to repay DHS the
money she received in benefits during her life, is analogous to its
“new obligation” to pay damages to the plaintiffs under the
direct-action statute. However, the proper interpretation of Estate
of Wood is that the legislative act in that case interfered with the
decedent’s vested right to receive benefits as an “‘outright entitle-
ment.” Id. at 701, 894 S.W.2d at 576. In the instant case, Act 750
does not disturb any of the Liability Pool’s vested rights.

Furthermore, the Liability Pool’s argument that Act 750
cannot be remedial because it imposes an obligation on it to pay
damages is unpersuasive because this court has held that statutes
and court rules are remedial in certain cases and can be applied
retroactively even if the result is that a party may have to pay
damages it otherwise would not have previously had to pay. See,
e.g., Steward v. Statler, 371 Ark. 351, 266 S.W.3d 710 (2007) (estate
permitted to proceed with a wrongful death claim even though it
failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the statute at
the time the suit was filed; court applied an amendment retroac-
tively); McMickle, 369 Ark. 318, 254 S.W.3d 729 (plaintiff permit-
ted to seek loss-of-life damages against a defendant even though
the statute was amended to allow for such damages after the suit
was filed; court applied the changes to the statute retroactively);
JurisDictionUSA, Inc., 357 Ark. 403, 183 S.W.3d 560 (applied an

es
592 Cs”

amendment to Ark. R. Civ. P. 55(f) retroactively and reversed a
default judgment under the previous version of the rule; allowed
the plaintiff to proceed with the claim).

Weare further influenced in our decision by the fact that the
Liability Pool is a self-insurance program administered and main-
tained by the Sisters of Mercy Health System, which does business
in many states, but in Hot Springs as St. Joseph’s. Hence, the
Liability Pool is not a separate, unrelated, and distinguishable third
party. It is a fund that clearly is under the umbrella of the same
non-profit corporation that runs St. Joseph’s. It also receives
contributions from Sisters of Mercy hospitals throughout a multi-
state region, including St. Joseph’s, to cover medical malpractice
claims. In some of those states, Sisters of Mercy hospitals are not
protected by charitable immunity, as St. Joseph’s is in Arkansas,
which means the Liability Pool pays malpractice claims against
those hospitals. It is difficult under these facts to accept the
proposition that the Liability Pool qualifies as a new party, brought
into this matter and burdened with a new obligation imposed by
virtue of Act 750.

HI Because we hold that Act 750 is remedial in nature, this
court must then apply the cardinal principle for construing reme-
dial legislation and examine what is “the spirit which promoted its
enactment, the mischief sought to be abolished, and the remedy
proposed.” McMickle, 369 Ark. at 339, 254 S.W.3d at 746. Act 750
was clearly enacted to reverse this court’s decision in Sowders and to
permit parties to recover directly from pooled-liability funds like
the Liability Pool. Act 750 operates to provide injured parties with
aremedy when there otherwise would have been none. Again, this
court has said that “direct-action statutes are remedial in nature
and are liberally construed for the benefit of injured parties.” Rogers, 325
Ark. at 234, 925 S.W.2d at 399 (emphasis added). Using these
principles of the law, we apply Act 750 retroactively, and we
reverse the circuit judge’s order, which dismissed the Liability
Pool as a defendant in the instant action.

Reversed and remanded.

= 533

William L. JACKSON v. SPARKS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER and Columbia Casualty Company

08-323 294 S.W.3d 1

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 12, 2009

[Rehearing denied March 19, 2009.]

Law Offices of Charles Karr, P.A., by: Charles Karr, for appellant.

PC
536 ____ =

Warmer, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: C. Wayne Harris and Jason T.
Browning, for appellees.

aut E. DANIELSON, Justice. Appellant William L. Jackson,

as special administrator of the Estate of Sherri Jackson,
deceased, appeals the order of the Sebastian County Circuit Court
granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Sparks Regional
Medical Center and Columbia Casualty Company. Jackson asserts
that Sparks’s motion for summary judgment was granted in error
because Sparks is not entitled to the charitable-immunity defense and
that, under the special circumstances of this case, Columbia was not
entitled to summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of
limitations and the savings statute. We affirm in part and reverse and
remand in part.

The record reveals the following facts. Jackson originally
filed a lawsuit on February 7, 2002, against Sparks, Steadfast
Insurance Company, Dr. James Patrick Bell, Emergency Medical
Services Group, P.A., Dr. Robert L. Kale, and John Does Nos.
1-10, based upon allegations of medical malpractice resulting in
the death of Sherri Jackson. Sparks and Steadfast filed a timely
answer, in which Sparks asserted it was immune from suit because
of the charitable-immunity doctrine and Steadfast denied it was
the correct liability carrier for Sparks.

On May 6, 2002, Jackson filed a First Amended Complaint,
naming Columbia, the correct liability carrier for Sparks, as a
defendant. Jackson took a voluntary nonsuit as to Steadfast and, as
a result, an order of dismissal without prejudice was entered as to
Steadfast on May 7, 2002. Subsequently, Jackson also took a
voluntary nonsuit as to Columbia and Sparks on April 6, 2004, and
July 29, 2004, respectively.

Jackson refiled his lawsuit against Sparks, Dr. James Patrick
Bell, Emergency Medical Services Group, P.A., Dr. Robert L.
Kale, and John Does Nos. 1-10, on July 25, 2005. Columbia was
not named as a defendant. Sparks again asserted charitable immu-
nity in its answer and filed a motion for summary judgment on
February 26, 2007, asserting the same. On July 6, 2007, Jackson
filed a motion to substitute Columbia for Sparks. A hearing was
held four days later, on July 10, 2007, on Sparks’s motion for
summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. On July 11,
2007, Jackson filed an Amended Complaint, naming Sparks,

Columbia, and John Does Nos. 1-10 as the defendants. An order
dismissing Sparks with prejudice was entered on July 17, 2007.

Columbia filed an answer and a motion for summary judg-
ment on September 10, 2007. In its motion for summary judg-
ment, Columbia asserted that its motion should be granted because
the medical malpractice statute of limitations and the one-year
savings statute had both expired. The circuit court granted Co-
lumbia’s motion on November 14, 2007. Jackson now appeals
from the circuit court’s orders of July 17, 2007, and November 14,
2007.

Before reaching the merits, we must address the potential
Rule 54(b) problem presented by the instant case. While neither
party raises this issue on appeal, whether or not an order has been
properly appealed pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Arkansas Rules of
Civil Procedure is a jurisdictional question, which this court may
address sua sponte. See Jones v. Huckabee, 363 Ark. 239, 213 S.W.3d
11 (2005). When Jackson refiled suit on July 25, 2005, he named
Sparks, Dr. James Patrick Bell, Emergency Medical Services
Group, P.A., Dr. Robert L. Kale, and John Does Nos. 1-10 as the
defendants. However, the record reveals that Dr. Bell, Dr. Kale,
and Emergency Medical Services Group were never served or
dismissed. There is also not a Rule 54(b) certificate in the record.
Under the old civil procedure rule, this case would be dismissed
for lack of a final order. See McKinney v. Bishop, 369 Ark. 191, 252
S.W.3d 123 (2007).

On October 9, 2008, this court approved a new rule, Rule
54(b)(5), said to be effective January 1, 2009. See In re Arkansas
District Court Rules, 374 Ark. App’x 653 (2008) (per curiam). The
new tule provides:

(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties

(5) Named but Unserved Defendant. Any claim against a named but
unserved defendant, including a “John Doe” defendant, is dis-
missed by the circuit court’s final judgment or decree.

Id, at 662.

This court must now decide whether the amended version
of Rule 54(b) should be applied retroactively to the instant case.
We construe court rules using the same means and canons of

construction used to interpret statutes. See City of Fort Smith v.
Carter, 364 Ark. 100, 216 S.W.3d 594 (2005). In Bean v. Office of
Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000), we
discussed the rules we adhere to when considering whether to
apply a statute retroactively:

Our rule on this point could not be more clear. Retroactivity
is a matter of legislative intent. Unless it expressly states otherwise,
we presume the legislature intends for its laws to apply only
prospectively. Estate of Wood v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs.,319
Ark. 697, 894 S.W.2d 573 (1995) (citing Chism v. Phelps, 228 Ark.
936, 311 S.W.2d 297 (1958)). Any interpretation of an act must be
aimed at determining whether retroactive effect is stated or implied
so clearly and unequivocally as to eliminate any doubt. In deter-
mining legislative intent, we have observed a strict rule of construc-
tion against retroactive operation and indulge in the presumption
that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, en-
acted by it, to operate prospectively only and not retroactively. See
Arkansas Rural Med. Practice Student Loan & Scholarship Bd. v. Luter,
292 Ark. 259, 729 S.W.2d 402 (1987); Chism, supra; Arkansas State
Highway Comm’n v, Hightower, 238 Ark. 569, 383 S.W.2d 279 (1964).

However, this rule does not ordinarily apply to procedural or
remedial legislation. Gannett River States Publ’g Co. v. Arkansas
Industrial Dev. Comm’n, 303 Ark. 684,799 S.W.2d 543 (1990); For-
rest City Mach. Works v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720
(1981). The strict rule of construction does not apply to remedial
statutes which do not disturb vested rights, or create new obliga-
tions, but only supply a new or more appropriate remedy to enforce
an existing right or obligation. Harrison v. Matthews, 235 Ark. 915,
362 S.W.2d 704 (1962). Procedural legislation is more often given
retroactive application. Barnett v. Arkansas Transp. Co., 303 Ark.
491, 798 S.W.2d 79 (1990). The cardinal principle for construing
remedial legislation is for the courts to give appropriate regard to the
spirit which promoted its enactment, the mischief sought to be
abolished, and the remedy proposed. Arkansas Dep’t of Human
Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 866 S.W.2d 823 (1993); Skelton v.
B.C. Land Co., 260 Ark. 122, 539 S.W.2d 411 (1976) (citing United
States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 225 U.S. 219 (1912)).

340 Ark. at 296-97, 9 S.W.3d at 526.

HB Rule 54(b)(5) is procedural and remedial and certainly
does not disturb vested rights or create new obligations. This new

es
PC 539

rule merely attempts to avoid the problems on appeal created by a
certain situation. In the Reporter’s Notes accompanying Rule
54(b)(5), it is stated that the problem under Rule 54(b), as
previously drafted, was that when, after the case had been appealed
and briefed, the appellate court discovered a forgotten defendant
whose presence destroyed the finality of the judgment being
appealed, it was a waste of litigants’ time and money and scarce
judicial resources. Therefore, we will apply the new rule retroac-
tively and allow it to serve its intended purpose.

Turning to the merits of the appeal, Jackson first argues that
summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of
Sparks because Sparks is not an entity entitled to charitable
immunity. Appellees respond that Jackson failed to establish that
Sparks is not a charitable organization based on the eight factors set
forth by this court in George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 337 Ark.
206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999).

This court’s standard of review for summary judgment is
well settled:

Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is
clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Once a moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to
summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof
and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. After
reviewing undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied if,
under the evidence, reasonable minds might reach different con-
clusions from those undisputed facts. On appeal, we determine if
summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the eviden-
tiary items presented by the moving party in support of its motion
leave a material question of fact unanswered. This court views the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the
moving party. Our review is not limited to the pleadings, as we also
focus on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties.

Sykes v. Williams, 373 Ark. 236, 239-40, 283 S.W.3d 209, 213 (2008)
(internal citations omitted).

This court has also established eight factors to consider when
determining whether an entity is entitled to charitable immunity:

(1) whether the organization’s charter limits it to charitable or
eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization’s charter

contains a “not-for-profit” limitation; (3) whether the organiza-
tion’s goal is to break even; (4) whether the organization earned a
profit; (5) whether any profit or surplus must be used for charitable
or eleemosynary purposes; (6) whether the organization depends
on contributions and donations for its existence; (7) whether the
organization provides its services free of charge to those unable to
pay; and (8) whether the directors and officers receive compensa-
tion.

George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 337 Ark. 206, 211-12, 987 S.W.2d
710, 713 (1999). We have further instructed that these factors are
“llustrative, not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive of
charitable status.” Id. (citing Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329
Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997)).

BBM A review of the evidence in the record shows that
Sparks qualifies as a charitable institution based on the factors listed
in George, supra. Consideration of the first and second factors
suggest that Sparks is charitable as illustrated by its Articles of
Incorporation, which were included in the record and state that
Sparks is “‘a public benefit corporation” under the provisions of
the Arkansas Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1993, and that it is
“organized, pledges its assets to, and shall be operated exclusively
for charitable, scientific, and educational purposes.”

Dan Hamman, Chief Financial Officer for Sparks, in a
sworn affidavit filed with Sparks’s motion for summary judgment,
stated that Sparks’s operating margin in 2006 was (0.3)% and 1.5%
in 2005, indicating a loss from operations. Hamman’s affidavit also
provided that any surplus funds are used “‘exclusively for chari-
table, scientific, and educational purposes,” more specifically, to
“perpetuate its charitable community benefit of providing medical
assistance to the public.” Further, the affidavit provided that, for
the fiscal year 2006, the total unreimbursed value of providing
charity care was approximately $3,045,284, and that under its
Charity Care policy, Sparks provides services free of charge to
patients unable to pay at the same level of care provided to those
who are able to pay. Additionally, the unreimbursed value of
providing care to persons covered by governmental programs at
below cost totaled $5,691,424, which Sparks considers to consti-
tute additional charity care. Considering this evidence in light of
the third, fourth, fifth, and seventh factors also suggests that Sparks
is entitled to a charitable status.

Es
ee oA

Hl In considering the sixth factor, we note that Sparks
does not depend solely on contributions and donations for its
existence. Most of its operating funds are provided through
Medicare, Medicaid, and individual patients or their private insur-
ers. While the nonprofit hospital in George only received donations
totaling approximately 6% of its financial obligations, this court
stated that “a modern hospital, with rare exception, would find it
extremely difficult to operate wholly or predominately on chari-
table donations.’ George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 710. As
was the case in George, the fact that Sparks receives most of its
funding through sources other than contributions or donations
does not “negate its overriding charitable purpose.” Id.

HI Finally, the eighth factor listed in George considers
whether the directors and officers receive compensation. Article
IX of Sparks’s Articles of Incorporation provides that ‘‘[t]he
Corporation shall not have or issue shares of stock and no divi-
dends shall be paid, and no part of the income of the Corporation
shall be distributed to its members, directors and officers.’’ How-
ever, Sparks’s Chief Executive Officer receives approximately
$350,000 per year in compensation, and the next two ranking
officers receive approximately $250,000 and $236,000 respec-
tively. Jackson argues that those salaries, in addition to salaries of
other full-time employees, are evidence that Sparks is “big busi-
ness.”’ This court has previously rejected that argument, stating:

[I]t is not necessary for charitable organizations to have entirely
volunteer staff and management. [Jefferson Regional Medical
Center’s] size and complexity make knowledgeable, well-qualified
personnel essential. Such persons do not readily volunteer their
services or serve at rates of compensation markedly lower than
market rates.

Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 710. Similarly, in the instant case, such
compensation for certain positions required to manage and operate
Sparks “does not put the hospital in the position of being maintained
for private gain, profit, or advantage of its organizers.” Id.

HB Based on the totality of the evidence shown in the
record, circumstances, and the factors this court has adopted to
help determine whether an organization is entitled to charitable
immunity, the circuit court did not err in granting Sparks’s motion.
for summary judgment. See also Scamardo v. Sparks Reg’! Med. Ctr.,

Pe
542 _______] =

375 Ark. 300, 289 S.W.3d 903 (2008) (Scamardo Il) (holding that
Sparks was entitled to charitable immunity).

For his second point on appeal, Jackson argues that, although
his amended complaint naming Columbia as a defendant was filed
after the two-year statute of limitations for medical-malpractice
claims and after the one-year savings statute had expired, due to
the special circumstances of this case, the circuit court’s dismissal
resulted in an injustice. Further, he asserts that the circuit court
should have found that his amended complaint related back to his
original complaint, which was timely under the savings statute, or
allowed him to proceed under the law as set out in Scamardo v.
Jaggers, 356 Ark. 236, 149 S.W.3d 311 (2004) (Scamardo I). Appel-
lees argue that the circuit court did not err because Jackson did not
prove each element as required by Rule 15(c) of the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure to have the amended complaint relate
back to the original filing. Specifically, appellees argue, as the
circuit court reasoned, that Jackson did not prove that Columbia
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought
against Columbia.

The relevant facts are more clearly explained when set out in
a time line as follows:
Feb. 2000: Alleged Malpractice

Feb. 7, 2002: Jackson timely filed a complaint against Sparks,
Steadfast Insurance, Dr. Bell, Emergency Medical
Services Group, Dr. Kale, and John Does Nos. 1-10.

May 6, 2002: Jackson filed amended complaint to substitute Co-
lumbia for a John Doe. (Columbia was the appropri-
ate liability carrier for Sparks rather than Steadfast.)

May 7, 2002: Jackson voluntarily nonsuited Steadfast.

Feb. 26, 2004: This court handed down Scamardo I, holding that a
charitable institution was not necessarily immune
from tort liability and, therefore, the statute allowing
direct suit against the liability insurer did not apply.

April 6, 2004: Jackson voluntarily nonsuited Columbia.
July 29, 2004: Jackson voluntarily nonsuited Sparks.

July 25, 2005: Jackson refiled his lawsuit against Sparks, Dr. Bell,
Emergency Medical Services Group, Dr. Kale, and
John Does Nos. 1-10.

Dec. 15, 2005: This court handed down Low v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670
(2005), overruling Scamardo I and holding that a
charitable institute was immune from tort liability.

Feb. 26, 2007: Sparks filed a motion for summary judgment, assert-
ing charitable immunity.

July 11, 2007: Jackson filed an amended complaint, adding Colum-
bia as a defendant.

The issue this court must decide is if Jackson was in fact
“‘whipsawed” by the changes that took place in the law during the
course of his lawsuit. It is undisputed that Jackson first filed his
lawsuit against both Sparks and Columbia, but took a voluntary
nonsuit against both parties in 2002 following this court’s decision
in Scamardo I. The Scamardo I decision upheld the principle estab-
lished in Clayborn v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., 348 Ark. 557,
75 S.W.3d 174 (2002), that charitable organizations are not
altogether immune from suit and that a charitable organization
may have a suit brought against it and a judgment entered against
it. Therefore, Columbia, the liability insurer for Sparks, was not
the appropriate party to sue at the time Jackson needed to refile his
lawsuit as the statute permitting direct action against a liability
insurer would not have applied.

On December 15, 2005, this court handed down its decision
in Low, specifically overruling both Scamardo I and Clayborn. We
held that charitable organizations were in fact immune from tort
liability. See Low, supra. It is clear, at that point in time, that
Jackson’s claim against Sparks became subject to summary judg-
ment, and he had lost his opportunity to file a claim against
Columbia as the one-year savings statute had expired prior to this
change in the law.

The next important filing in the case did not occur until
Sparks filed its summary-judgment motion on February 26, 2007,
based on charitable immunity. Before a hearing took place on that
motion, Jackson filed an amended complaint on July 11, 2007,
attempting to add Columbia as a defendant. Appellees’ argument is
that Jackson’s action against Columbia was not timely because the

two-year medical-malpractice statute of limitations and the one-
year savings statute had both expired at the time Jackson attempted
to amend his complaint. Jackson avers that his amended complaint
should relate back to the time of the original filing under Rule
15(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule states:

An amendment ofa pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when:

(1) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted
to be set forth in the original pleading, or

(2) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the
party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (1)
is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(i) for service
of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by
amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense
on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action
would have been brought against the party.

Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (2008).

The circuit court found that the claims clearly arose out of
the same alleged conduct or occurrence and that Columbia re-
ceived the requisite notice. However, the circuit court found that
the last requirement of Rule 15(c), subsection (2)(B), was prob-
lematic because Jackson did not attempt to amend his complaint
for eighteen months after Low was handed down. The circuit court
found that the lapse of time between Low and Jackson’s amended
complaint gave the impression that something other than a mistake
in identity was a factor. Appellees also use that reasoning in their
argument on appeal.

The circuit court relied on George v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n,
Inc., 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999), to support its finding
that Jackson could have amended the complaint before the court
ruled that the defendant was charitably immune. The court in
George opined that the plaintiff there could have sued both the
charitable institution and its liability insurance carrier initially and,
through alternative pleading, not have jeopardized its claim against
either the hospital or its insurer. 337 Ark. at 216, 987 S.W.2d at

Es
ee 545

715. However, the instant case is factually different from George.
Here, Jackson had initially named both Sparks and Columbia as
defendants, but took a voluntary nonsuit against both parties. It
voluntarily nonsuited Columbia after this court’s holding in Sca-
mardo I. Scamardo I was still the law when Jackson refiled his case
and, therefore, Columbia would not have been a proper defendant
for Jackson to name at that time.

There is nothing in the record to suggest why Jackson
waited eighteen months to attempt to amend his complaint;
however, the situation would not have been any different had he
attempted to do so immediately following Low. In theory, Sparks
could have filed its motion for summary judgment immediately
following Low as well, but it did not do so until fourteen months
later.

Appellees further argue that there was no doubt that
Jackson knew the identity of Columbia because he was provided
with Columbia’s identity after his initial lawsuit was filed against
Sparks and Steadfast. That is clearly undisputed, but is not the issue
here. Rule 15(c) states only that there needed to be a “mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party.” (Emphasis added).
While Jackson obviously knew that Columbia was the correct
liability insurer for Sparks, he was unaware that Columbia was the
proper defendant because of the change in the law. In fact,
Columbia was not the proper defendant during the time within
which he was required to refile his lawsuit. Columbia only became
the proper defendant after Low, which was not decided until after
Jackson lost his opportunity to refile against it.

Other cases have come before this court in which an
appellant argued that the retroactive application of Low was unfair
and prejudicial to their case. See Anglin v. Johnson Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
375 Ark. 10, 289 S.W.3d 28 (2008); Neal v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
375 Ark. 46, 289 S.W.3d 8 (2008); Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr.,
373 Ark. 472, 284 S.W.3d 486 (2008); Sowders v. St. Joseph’s Mercy
Health Ctr., 368 Ark. 466, 247 S.W.3d 514 (2007). However, in
the instant case, this court’s decision in Low caused Jackson to
make an understandable mistake, and not allowing Rule 15(c) to
apply would indeed have an unfair and prejudicial result. In
Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d 413, 418 (8th Cir.
1967), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that Rule 15(c)
was designed for relation back “to prevent forfeiture when deter-
mination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an

understandable mistake has been made.” Both bases apply here
given the special circumstances of this case and, therefore, we hold
that Jackson’s amended complaint relates back to his original
timely complaint under Rule 15(c). As a result, we reverse and
remand the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment as to
Columbia. The summary-judgment order granted in favor of
Sparks is, however, affirmed.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

Charles Jason BALDWIN v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 09-60 294 S.W.3d 411

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 12, 2009

J. Blake Hendrix and John T. Philipsborn, for appellant.
No response.

yer Curiam. Appellant Charles Jason Baldwin, by and

through his attorneys, has filed a motion for rule on clerk.
His attorneys, J. Blake Hendrix and John T. Philipsborn, state in the
motion that our clerk refused to accept their untimely tender of the
record,

This court clarified its treatment of motions for rule on clerk
and motions for belated appeals in McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106,
146 S.W.3d 883 (2004). There we said that there are only two
possible reasons for an appeal not being timely perfected: either the
party or attorney filing the appeal is at fault, or, there is “good
reason.” 356 Ark. at 116, 146 S.W.3d at 891. We explained:

‘Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was
not timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the appeal is
therefore faced with two options. First, where the party or attorney
filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by affidavit filed
with the motion or in the motion itself. There is no advantage in
declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second, where the party
or attorney believes that there is good reason the appeal was not
perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and
this court will decide whether good reason is present.

Id., 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted). While this court no longer
requires an affidavit admitting fault before we will consider the
motion, an attorney should candidly admit fault where he has erred
and is responsible for the failure to perfect the appeal. See id.

Hl in accordance with McDonald v. State, supra, Mr. Hen~
drix and Mr. Philipsborn have candidly admitted fault. The mo-
tion is, therefore, granted. A copy of this opinion will be for-
warded to the Committee on Professional Conduct.

Motion granted.
WAILLs, J., not participating.

Robert MAULDING v, PRICE’S UTILITY CONTRACTORS,
INC., Cincinnati Insurance Co., Second Injury Trust Fund, and
Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund

08-1449 294 S.W.3d 413

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 12, 2009

Diana M. Maulding, for appellant.

David L. Pake, for appellee Second Injury Trust Fund.

William C. Price, for appellees Price Utility Contractors, Inc.
and Cincinnati Insurance Company.

pe Curiam. Appellant Robert Maulding seeks an order
that all medical information regarding him be redacted in
the abstracts, briefs, and addendums. This motion was certified to this
court by the court of appeals because it concerns an issue of first
impression. Thus, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme
Court Rule 1-2(b)(1) (2008).

Maulding states that “this is an appeal from an Arkansas
Workers’ Compensation Commission case,” and that “the Argu-
ment, Abstract, and Addendum’? will contain ‘“‘a lot of personal
medical information” that “should not be in the public domain.”
He asks this court to order that “all medical information” be
redacted by “lining out” with a “permanent black marker.”

HM Maulding provides no reason for the requested redac-
tion. He provides no convincing argument and no authority to
show that his medical information should be excluded from the
briefs on appeal. He simply asserts it should be excluded. This
court will not consider an argument, even a constitutional one, if

CE
id 549

the appellant makes no convincing argument or cites no authority
to support it. Hendrix v. Black, 373 Ark. 266, 283 S.W.3d 590
(2008). Also, if the point argued is not apparent without research,
this court will not hear the matter. Id. .

Further, the issue is moot. At issue are documents in
the addendum. An addendum appends to the brief documents that
are found in the record. See Ark. Sup Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8) (2008) (The
addendum must include an index of where any item can be found
in the record.) Thus, the very information Maulding seeks to
redact was disclosed below and already is in the record. Although
Maulding fails to cite it, Administrative Order No. 19(VI)(A)
specifically provides that where the information has already been
disclosed in open court and is included in the verbatim transcript of
court proceedings, the information is not excluded from public
access.

The motion is denied.
James MUNSON ».
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT of CORRECTION

07-1037 294 S.W.3d 409

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 12, 2009

James Munson, pro se.

Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Renae Ford Hudson, Ass’t Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

pz Curiam. Appellant James Munson, an inmate incat-
cerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction
(“ADC”), filed a petition in Pulaski County Circuit Court forjudicial
review under Arkansas Code Annotated § 25-15-212 (Repl. 2002) to
challenge a disciplinary action against him by the appellee ADC.
Appellee moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

PO
ee 551

relief could be granted under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). The circuit court granted the motion and appellant has
lodged an appeal of that order in this court.

Appellant argues on appeal that the court erred in dismissing
the petition, that his petition stated a claim for violation of due
process, and that the ADC did not follow its own procedures. In
his petition, appellant alleged that, as a result of appellee’s failure to
follow its procedures, he had lost class status and certain privileges,
and was subjected to isolation for a period of time. Appellant
further alleged that the disciplinary action resulted from an ADC
officer’s failure to act and that the other inmate involved was not
subjected to disciplinary action.

In reviewing the circuit court’s decision on the motion to
dismiss, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view
them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Rhuland v. Fahr, 356
Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d 2 (2004). In testing the sufficiency of a
complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be
resolved in favor of the complaint, and all pleadings are to be
liberally construed. Id. A trial judge must look only to the
allegations in the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss. Fuqua v.
Flowers, 341 Ark. 901, 20 S.W.3d 388 (2000).

Here, the appellee first argues that we should affirm dismissal
of the petition by the circuit court because judicial review was not
available to appellant as an inmate. Appellee urges us to overrule
our decision in Clinton v. Bonds, 306 Ark. 554, 816 S.W.2d 169
(1991), holding that Act 709 of 1989, amending the Arkansas
Administrative Procedure Act by excluding prison inmates from
judicial review of administrative adjudications, unconstitutionally
deprives inmates of review of constitutional questions. This court
does not lightly overrule cases and applies a strong presumption in
favor of the validity of prior decisions. Echols v. State, 354 Ark. 414,
125 S.W.3d 153 (2003). It is necessary to uphold prior decisions
unless a great injury or injustice would result. Id. at 418, 125
S.W.3d at 157. The court only breaks with precedent when the
result is patently wrong and so manifestly unjust that a break
becomes unavoidable. State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 156 S.W.3d
722 (2004).

Here, it is not necessary to consider whether our holding in
Clinton v. Bonds is still valid, because it is evident that appellant’s
petition did not raise a constitutional question so as to permit
judicial review. Appellee also contends that the ADC’s disposition

of the matter here did not constitute an order for purposes of
section 25-15-212, and, as appellant’s petition did not raise a
constitutional question, we agree that it did not.

Appellant contends that his right to due process was
violated because the ADC did not follow its own procedures and
that issue was raised in his petition. He essentially claims a liberty
interest in having the ADC officials follow the procedures. But,
appellant does not have a liberty interest in the actual procedures to
be administered. See Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640 (8th Cir.
1996).

Nor can appellant show a substantive due process
violation as a result of the sanctions that were imposed by the ADC
in the proceeding. To state a case for a substantive due process
violation, appellant must have shown an atypical and substantive
deprivation that was a dramatic departure from the basic condi-
tions of his confinement. Id.; Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
(1995). Appellant’s petition did not set forth any conditions
resulting from the proceedings that would show such an atypical
and substantive deprivation.

Appellant’s petition alleged the sanctions imposed re-
sulted in a loss of class status and certain privileges, and that he was
subjected to isolation for a period of time. Under Kennedy v.
Blankenship, claims of segregation from the general prison popula-
tion do not indicate a dramatic departure from the basic conditions
of appellant’s confinement. In Arkansas, there is no liberty interest
in good time under the analysis in Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974). McKinnon v. Norris, 366 Ark. 404, 231 S.W.3d 725 (2006)
(per curiam). A loss of class status and privileges such as appellant
cited, even if impacting good time, would not compromise a
liberty interest.

HB Appellant’s petition for review did not state that sanc~
tions were imposed that were sufficient to compromise a liberty
interest, and unless such sanctions may be imposed, the ADC’s
disciplinary proceedings did not invoke due process so as to
mandate notice and hearing. Appellant’s petition did not, there-
fore, show that the ADC’s disposition of the matter did conform to
the requirements of the definition of “order” in Arkansas Code
Annotated § 25-15-202(5) (Supp. 2007). The proceedings did not
therefore result in an order for purposes of judicial review under
section 25-15-212.

Considering the facts alleged in the petition as true and
viewing those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
appellant failed to allege facts that would support a claim for
judicial review under the statute. He did not allege that the ADC
imposed sanctions sufficient to raise a liberty interest or due
process, and without such a liberty interest at stake, the ADC’s
actions did not constitute an order subject to judicial review.

Affirmed.
Brown, J., not participating.