State: Tennessee
Volume: 225
Term: 1970-1971
Jurisdiction(s): Tennessee
Source: https://static.case.law/tenn/225.pdf

Marsa Unpgrwoop
Vu
Repwine Carrrers, Ino.
462 S.W.2d 868.
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed January 18, 1971.

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Tyrus H. Coss, Shelbyville, and Jonn R. Ruoxzr,
Murfreesboro, for respondent-appellee.

Jamus L. Rosrrzs, Nashville, Parker. Nronxon & Ros-
grrs, Nashville, for petitioner-appellant.

Mr. Justios McCanuzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is a suit by Mrs. Marsha Underwood, the widow
of Jimmy Olen Underwood, who was killed in « collision
between the automobile he was driving and the truck
owned by Redwing Carriers, Inc., and driven by its em-
ployee, Robert Marvin Ayers, on Highway 231 inside the

es = =—:

corporate limits of Murfreesboro at about 2:00 o’elock
on the morning of October 21, 1965. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defend-
ant for $26,840.00. The defendant moved for a new trial
but the Circuit Court overruled the motion, and the de-
fendant appealed in error to the Court of Appeals who
affirmed the judgment of the Cireuit Court. The defend-
ant then filed a petition for the writ of certiorari which
we granted and counsel have argued the case at the bar
of this Court.

No living person other than the truck driver, Ayers,
witnessed the collision but these facts appear in the
record and are not disputed: The deceased was driving
an automobile in a southwardly direction. At the time
rain was falling, and the highway was slick. The truck
consisted of a tractor and trailer, the trailer being loaded
with fly ash, the combined weight of the tractor, the
trailer and the cargo being about 69,000 pounds. The
truck was. proceeding northwardly when the collision
oceurred. The deceased was killed instantly, and when
the vehicles came to rest his dead body was lying im-
mediately west of the paved part of the highway in the
edge of the lawn of a funeral home. The automobile was
just east of the paved portion of the highway. Most of
the tractor was in the west or south bound lane, while the
trailer occupied the middle of the pavement. The tractor
had assumed a position forming nearly a right angle
with the trailer. Debris was scattered on both sides of
the center line of the highway beginning several feet
south of where the vehicles came to rest. The right front
fender of the cab of the tractor had been bent down
against the wheel and the gasoline tank on its right side
damaged as were the front and left side of the automobile.

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There was evidence that the automobile had described a
loop on the west side of the highway in the lawn of the
funeral home and then had crossed the highway.

Soon after the accident Bill Blackburn, a former mem-
ber of the Tennessee Highway Patrol, came upon the
scene and he testified about the physical facts. He talked
with the driver of the truck, Ayers, who told him that he
did not know how the accident occurred it had happened
so fast. Other witnesses were police officers of Murfrees-
boro and a newspaper photographer who made photo-
graphs that are exhibits to his testimony.

The petitioner has assigned as error the action of the
Circuit Judge in refusing to grant its motion for a
directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence on
the ground that there was no evidence that the defendant
was guilty of any negligence which proximately caused
the death of Jimmy Olen Underwood, and that the un-
contradicted. evidence was that Underwood’s death was
proximately caused by his own negligence.

The driver of the truck, Ayers, testified to cireum-
stances that tended to show that he had been free from
negligence with respect to the collision and that it had
been caused by Underwood’s negligent operation of his
automobile. The jury adopted the theory of the plaintiff,
returned its verdict in her favor and rejected the de-
fendant’s theory and the testimony of the driver, Ayers.
The question for us to decide is whether there is material
evidence in the record to support the verdict. In Southern
Ry. Co. v. Varnell, 33 Tenn.App. 550, 232 8.W.2d 406,
the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Peabody
Howard, enunciated the applicable rule of law thus:

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“Tt is a well settled rule that this court will not dis-
turb the verdict if there is any material evidence to
support it; and in determining whether or not there
is such evidence, the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence together with every reasonable inference to
be drawn therefrom will be taken as true.’”’

The plaintiff’s evidence consists of physical facts in-
cluding the positions of the vehicles after the collision;
also there is shown the approximate weight of the ve-
hicles, the fact that rain was falling and the highway
surface was slick, and the relation of the debris to the
positions of the vehicles and that of Underwood’s body.
The photographs show the parts of the vehicles that. were
damaged. by the impact.

In Gordon’s Transports, Inc. v. Bailey, 41 Tenn.App.
365, 294 8.W.2d 313, the Court of Appeals said:

‘‘Histablished physical facts are controlling over
direct testimony when it is impossible to reconcile the
physical facts with the direct testimony.’

It is evident that the jury in reaching their verdict
rejected the testimony of Ayers and accepted the evidence
of the physical facts. See Roddy Manufacturing Co. v.
Dixon, 21 Tenn.App. 81, 105 8.W.2d 513.

The petitioner relies on McCollum. v. Guest, 207 Tenn.
651, 343 S.W.2d 359, but we are of opinion that this case
does not control the case at bar. The rule of the Mc-
Collum case is that where there.are no eye witnesses to
a collision of vehicles then testimony establishing the
positions of the vehicles without more is not enough to
establish liability and to allow the case to go to the jury.
In the McCollum case the testimony of the witnesses as

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to the positions of the vehicles conflicted. Here there is
no disagreement among seven witnesses as to the posi-
tions of the vehicles. In the McCollwm, case there was no
testimony as to the speed or relative weights of the ve-
hicles and there was no center line in the highway so that
it could be ascertained whether the defendant’s vehicle
was in its proper lane. Here there was testimony regard-
ing the speed and weights of the vehicles and photographs
which showed the positions of the vehicles and the dam-
age each had sustained and the position of the debris
and the tracks and skid marks, all of which were available
as aids to the jury in reaching its verdict. We believe
that the rule of McCollum v. Guest should not be extended
and that it does not control the result of this case.

We, therefore, affirm the judgments of the Circuit
Court and Court of Appeals.

Dvyzr, Curr Justice, and Cuartin, Creson, and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

nt

Maurice M, Acrzz, Appellant,
v.
Berry Ann Acrez, Appellee.
462 S.W.2d 870.
(Jackson, April Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed January 18, 1971.

Cuantes E. Manazss, Union City, for appellant; Manzss
& Conzey, Union City, of counsel.

Paut G. Hupems, Union City, for appellee.

Mr, Srucrat Justice Aurrep T, Apams delivered the
opinion of the Court,

This is an appeal by the defendant from a decree en-
tered by the Chancellor denying complainant’s and de-
fendant’s joint petition seeking an amendment to the
divorce decree allowing complainant a divorce and award-
ing her alimony and support for her children.

In 1968 Betty Ann Acree was awarded, an absolute di-
vorce from Maurice M. Acree. The decree awarded her
$1,000.00 monthly for alimony and child support and
directed that the money should be paid to the Clerk and
Master, and also provided that the defendant pay the
Clerk and Master $50.00 monthly as his commission for
receiving and disbursing said monthly payment.

On June 1, 1970, both husband and wife petitioned the
court for a modification of the decree so as to have the

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monthly payments made directly to the wife and thus
avoid the Clerk and Master’s fee. The court dismissed
said petition and entered its decree, the pertinent por-
tions of which are as follows:

“This cause came on to be heard on this the 1st day
of June, 1970, upon joint Petition filed by the Complain-
ant, Betty Ann Acree, and the Defendant, Maurice M.
Acree, Jr., seeking modification of the original divorce
decree in this cause and upon recommendation and
approval by counsel for both parties. After consider-
ation of all the matters alleged in the petition, the
unwillingness of Betty Ann Acree to forego her right
to cite Maurice M. Acree, Jr. for contempt in the event
he becomes delinquent the rule of this Court requiring
all payments of alimony and support to be made to
the Clerk and Master, the controversy avoided thereby
and Chapter 425 Public Acts of 1970, it is the opinion
of the court that the petition should be and is hereby
dismissed.’’

Mr. Acree prayed and was granted an appeal which
was duly perfected and Mrs. Acree, through her counsel,
joined in the assignments of error and brief filed by her
husband.

The errors assigned are as follows:

“I, The Chancellor erred in denying complainant’s
and defendant’s joint petition to modify the original
decree, both parties being capable of binding them-
selves by consent, and having consented to said modifi-
cation.

“2, The Chancery Court abused its discretion in deny-
ing complainant and defendant the right to modify the

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original decree, by consent, to the extent that both par-
ties desired the atimony and child ‘support payments
to be paid directly by the defendant to the complainant
and thereby avoid the administrative costs of Fifty
Dollars ($50.00) per month payable to the Clerk and
Master.

“3, The Court erred in interpreting and construing
Chapter 425 of the Public Acts of Tennessee 1970 as
meaning that such act was a mandate for all payments
of alimony and child support to be paid directly into
the hands of a Clerk and Master.’”’

The parties seeking an amendment to the decree in
question are sui juris, their petition is sworn to by both
of them and it alleges that it would be for the best interest
of the complainant and her children for the monthly
payments to be made directly to the complainant. Nothing
appears in the record to the contrary.

The complainant should not be required to forego a
remedy given to her by law for the enforcement of her
legal rights, should a situation arise in the future, re-
quiring its assertion.

TM The decree states that the Court has a rule ‘‘re-
quiring all payments of alimony and child support to be
made to the Clerk and Master’”’. This rule is not based
on a provision of the Code and this Court is of the opin-
ion that it is unreasonable and should not be enforced.

Chapter 425, Public Acts of 1970, which amends T.C.A.
sec. 36-820, has no application to the question here pre-
sented for decision. It states in part: ‘‘In all cases where
the husband is directed to pay child support to the Clerk
of the Court,’’ (emphasis added). The method provided

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for the enforcement of payments is then set forth. There
is no requirement that such payments must be made to
the Clerk.

Hl The above referred to section of the Code provides
in part: ‘‘The order or decree of the court may provide
that the payments for the support of such child or chil-
dren * * * shall be paid either to the clerk * * * or direct
to the mother * * *’’ (emphasis added). The law does not
require such payments to be made to the Clerk and no
mention is made of alimony payments to the wife in this
section.

Hl The Court is of the opinion that the reasons given
by the Chancellor in his decree for refusing to grant the
yelief prayed in the joint petition of the parties are in-
sufficient to support his action.

The decree of the Chancellor is set aside and the cause
remanded to the Chancery Court for action in accordance
with this opinion. The appellant will pay the costs of
this appeal.

Dyer, Carer Justice, and Caarrix, Creson and Mc-
Caness, JUSTICES, concur,

rn
LX)

Serpon Evczns Jonzs, Carn Evans Jonzs and
Wuma Exizasere Brown, Appellants,

v.
Ricuarp Paut Jonzs, Appellee.
462 S.W.2d 872.

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed January 18, 1971,

ee : 13
W. T. Goopaun, Jz, Narnanw Hansu, Gallatin, for ap-
pellants.

Tos. Borers, IV, Harotp Howssr, Gallatin, for ap-
pellee,

Mr. Spzcian Justice Ersy L. Jewxrys delivered the
opinion of the Court.

The complainants, children of Seldon D. Jones, de-
ceased, and grandchildren of R. M. Jones, deceased, filed
their original bill on October 15, 1969, for the purpose of
having the rights of all the parties determined in regard
to a farm containing approximately eighty-one acres
located in Sumner County, Tennessee, and to have said
tract of land sold and the proceeds divided according to
their respective rights.

The complainants allege that R. M. Jones died testate
on January 18, 1959, seized and possessed in fee of the
eighty-one acres of land.

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The case calls for the construction of the last will and
testament of the late R. M. Jones. The relevant provi-
sions of the will are as follows:

‘Item No. 2: I give, devise and bequeath to my wife,
Dovie Jones, all my property including personal prop-
erty and real estate to do with as she sees fit during
her life or as long as she remains my widow. (emphasis
added)

‘Ttem No. 3: At the death of my wife, Dovie Jones,
and after all of her just debts including her burial ex-
penses are paid, I will, bequeath, and devise the re-
mainder of my estate both real and personal to Charlie
Jones, Seldon Jones, Bessie Jones Lane and Paul Jones
or their heirs. (emphasis added)

“Item No. 4: If any of the children named herein were
to die before the death of the said Dovie Jones, the
sister and brothers would inherit their portion of said
estate with the exception of the ones who have bodily
heirs.”

The complainants claim that Dovie Jones, the widow
of R. M. Jones, under the provisions of the will owned
only a life estate in the real estate and that she was
powerless to convey the remainder interest and that on
the death of Seldon Jones, a one-fourth undivided in-
terest in the real estate passed to them under Item No, 4
of the testator’s will, Seldon Jones having predeceased
Dovie Jones who died on October 2, 1969.

The defendant contends that the testator’s will, and
particularly the words ‘‘to do with as she sees fit during
her life’? gave Dovie Jones an unlimited power of dis-
position so that she could convey an absolute fee under
Tennessee Code Annotated 64-106.

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The defendant demurred to the complainant’s Dill.
After the demurrer was filed and after the defendant
had filed his trial brief, the complainants sought leave
to amend their bill. The Chancellor disallowed the
amended bill, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the
pill.

The complainants have perfected their appeal to this
Court alleging as error (1) the Chancellor erred in dis-
allowing the amended bill, and (2) the Chancellor erred
in his finding that Dovie Jones was given an unlimited
power of disposition under the terms of her husband’s
will.

Hl As to the first issue as to whether the Chancellor
erred in disallowing the amended bill, it has been repeat-
edly held that in such cases, the review here is limited
to the question of whether the trial court has abused its
judicial discretion in rejecting the amended bill. The
complainants have presented no evidence of abuse of this
discretion, and the record discloses no such abuse. Ac-
cordingly, the action of the Chancellor in not allowing
the amended bill should not be disturbed on appeal.

The second issue as to whether under the terms of the
will Dovie Jones had a power of disposition so that she
could convey an absolute fee under Tennessee Code An-
notated 64-106, calls for the construction of the will of
the late R. M. Jones.

Hl For the construction of a will of the nature of the
case at Bar no hard and fast rule can be laid down for
each case is a law unto itself. Many authorities have
been examined and the prevailing view is that the court
in such cases will keep an eye singled toward what was
the meaning or desire of the testator at the time the will

16

was executed. That is the test, and if there are provisions
in the will that tend to conflict, we must look to that pro-
vision which in our opinion more nearly conveys the
testator’s wishes and reconcile or disregard the conflict-
ing portions. The primary intent must override the
secondary one if either must fail.

This general subject is discussed at length in 31 A.L.R.
3rd 6 and 31 A.L.R.3rd 169. In these annotations, several
‘Tennessee cases are cited, but none are directly in point
except the case of Redman v. Evams, 184 Tenn. 404, 199
§.W.2d 115 (1947). This is the only Tennessee case found
that interprets testamentary language similar to that
here involved.

In Redman, the testatrix, after making several specific
bequests, left the residue of her estate to her nephew
“to handle as he sees fit during his lifetime; and the bal-
ance to go to his two daughters * **.”? Redman v. Evans,
supra, at 405, 199 S.W.2d at 116. The question before
the Court was whether the language gave the life bene-
ficiary the power to sell the property. The Court an-
swered the question in the affirmative, saying: ‘“We
think it inescapable that it was the intention of the testa-
trix that this nephew might encroach upon the corpus
(of the estate) at least to the extent of his needs * * *””
Redmam v. Evans, supra, 412, 199 S.W.2d 119. In dis-
cussing the difference between the terms ‘‘the re-
mainder’’ and ‘‘the balance,’’ the Court said, ‘‘We are
unable to make any material distinction between the
phrases ‘the remainder’ or ‘what remains’ and ‘the
balance,’ ’”

HI While it is not controlling, it is quite significant
that after the death of the testator, R. M. Jones, two of

| iv

the devisees under Item No. 3 of the will, Charlie Jones
and Bessie Jones, joined with the widow, Dovie Jones,
in the execution of a deed to a third devisee, Richard Paul
Jones, the defendant in this case, the fourth devisee,
Seldon D. Jones, having predeceased his mother, Dovie
Jones.

This is indicative that those three devisees felt that
in that locality and particularly in this case, ‘‘to do with
as she sees fit’? meant just that, and when she ‘‘saw fit’”’
to sell to one of the devisees, that she was carrying out
the wishes of the testator and was abiding by the pro-
visions of the will. Of course, what the devisee, Seldon
Jones, would have done is a matter of conjecture but not
controlling. Had he lived and joined in the deed, this
lawsuit would not be here.

This matter was discussed in Baldwin v. Davidson, 37
Tenn.App. 606, 267 S.W.2d 756, wherein the words ‘‘to
be distributed as she shall see fit’’ were construed to give
the devisee full power of disposal.

Under authorities hereinabove recited and especially
on the basis of the authority of Redman v. Evans, supra,
it is concluded that this will gave the life beneficiary,
Dovie Jones, a power of disposition so that she could
convey an absolute fee under Tennessee Code Annotated
64-106.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Chancellor should be
affirmed.

Dyzr, Caer Justicr, and Cresoy, Humpurrys and Mo-
Canuuss, JUSTICES, concur.

R
rs)

James K. Mruzer et al., Appellants,
v
Hampien County Boarp or Epucation et al., Appellees.
462 S.W.2d 874.
(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed December 21, 1970.

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ee

James K. Minier, Morristown, for appellants.

Bacon & Duaerr, Morristown, for appellees.

Mr. Cuter Justice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This suit was filed under our declaratory judgment
statute to have the Court construe a contract entered into
by the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Morristown,

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Tennessee, and the Morristown School Commission,
parties of one part (referred to herein as the City), and
the Quarterly County Court of Hamblen County, Ten-
nessee, and the Hamblen County Board of Education,
parties of the other part (referred to herein as the
County). The chancellor heard and decided the case
upon stipulations giving rise to appeal directly to this
Court.

Prior to the execution of this contract in September,
1965, the City operated a high school known as Morris-
town High School, attended by students from both the
City and the County. The County operated a high school
known as Whitesburg High School, attended by students
living in the eastern section of the County. Under this
arrangement the City operated high school became over-
crowded necessitating consideration be given to further
school plant construction. To solve the problem the City
and County, Pursuant to T.C.A. secs. 49-410 to 49-414,
entered into the contract in question.

Under the contract Whitesburg High School was to be
closed, relieving the County of the burden of operating
the high school; Morristown High School was to be reno-
vated and a new high school constructed on another site,
making upon performance of the contract two high
schools to be operated. The County was to issue school
bonds necessary for the renovation and construction with
the City releasing all claims it would have to any portion
of the school bond proceeds. The City was to operate
both the renovated Morristown High School and the new
high school to be constructed, with all students in both
the City and County attending one or the other of these
high schools according to a zoning plan,

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The issue here is the contribution to be made by the
County in the operation of these two high schools under
this contract. The part of the contract pertinent to this
issue is as follows:

Beginning with the school year 1966-67 and thereafter,
the high school students residing in that portion of
Hamblen County lying outside the corporate limits
of the Town of Morristown shall have the right to at-
tend either high school, according to a zone plan
approved by Morristown School Commission. In con-
sideration for such services, Hamblen County or Ham-
blen County School Board shall pay to the Morristown
School Commission or the Town of Morristown, for
each such high school student so attending Morristown
High Schools, a sum of money equal to their propor-
tionate share of expenditures of local supplementary
funds required per child to operate the Morristown
High School Systems over and above the amount pro-
vided by State and County under the minimum pro-
gram required by the State.

The chancellor found as follows:

Estimated cost of operation of high schools.......... ~$1,008,829.34
This amount is paid by state minimum program funds

allocated to high schools and in this case............ 500,154.75
This leaves the balance of ........... 0000.00 eens $ 508,674,59

From the schedules and briefs, Hamblen County from
its general county funds allots to the high schools
the sum of . — 266,476.00

This amount should be deducted from the
$503,674.59, leaving a balance to be paid propor-
tionately under this contract by the County and
City Of ee cece e ener nets $ 237,199.00

The parties agree that the total number of students in high school is
approximately 2,000 and that the number is divided as follows:
Number of City students in high school 1,100 (55%)
Number of County students in high school 900 (45%)
Total—2,000 (106%)

22

It therefore follows that the City should pay fifty-five (55%) per

cent of $237,199.00, which is $180,459.00, and the County should

pay its share of forty-five (45%) per cent, which is $106,740.00.

It will help to clarify the issues if we consider the
operation of these two high schools pursuant to the con-
tract as if there were a third school district; the other
two school districts being the operation of grades one
through eight by the City, and the operation of grades
one through eight by the County.

I The parties agree the figure of $503,674.59 is the
sum needed from local funds in the operation of these
high schools. The City assigns error to the action of the
chancellor in allowing credit against this cost the figure
above of $266,476.00 prior to determining the fifty-five
percent the City will pay and the forty-five per cent the
County will pay.

This figure of $266,476.00 was arrived at under the fol-
lowing facts: the County levies and collects property
taxes, local sales taxes, and other miscellaneous taxes,
which are allocated by the Trustee for school purposes
on the basis of average daily attendance. The total of
these taxes for the year used in the stipulation was
$1,028,600.00. On the basis of average daily attendance
the County school grades one through eight had forty
per cent of the pupils and were allocated $411,440.00.
The City schools, grades one through eight, had thirty-
four per cent of the pupils and were allocated $350,684.00.
These two high schools had twenty-six per cent of the
pupils and were allocated $266,476.00, the sum credited
by the chancellor.

The General Education Act of 1965, Chapter 76, Public

Acts of 1965, in force at the time of the execution of this
contract, provided in Section 8(1) (c¢) as follows:

ee 28

All school funds for current operation and maintenance
purposes collected by any county * * * shall be appor-
tioned by the county trustee among the county, city,
and special school districts therein on the basis of the
average daily attendance maintained by each in grades
one through twelve, during the current school year.

The above provision is also contained in the General
Education Acts of 1967 and 1969.

Under this statute the trustee was required to allocate
these school funds on the basis of all the students attend-
ing all the schools, grades one through twelve. This the
trustee has done and we find nothing in the contract to
the contrary. Construing the language of this contract in
light of this statute, we think the chancellor was correct
in crediting the amount of $266,476.00 prior to determina-
tion of the amount the City and the County should pay.

Hl At the time this contract was negotiated there were
bonds outstanding on the Morristown High School issued
by the City. The executed contract is silent in regard to
these bonds. The City contends the annual amount neces-
sary for the retirement of these bonds should be included
each year in the total cost of the operation of these high
schools. The issue is whether the word ‘‘operate’”’ as it
is used in that portion of the contract copied above in
this opinion should include the amount necessary to re-
tire these bonds each year. The chancellor held the bond
payments due were not an ‘‘operating expense.’’ We
agree.

HM The City assigns as error the claim that the chan-
cellor pretermitted the question of local sales tax credits.
The receipt from sales tax collections by the County,
that is, the one-half thereof as required by T.C.A. sec.

24 es

67-3052, went with other County taxes to make up the
sum of $1,028,600.00 collected by the County for school
purposes as shown above in this opinion. When this
figure was broken down on the basis of average daily
attendance, we arrived at the figure of $226,476.00, which
includes the high schools’ part of the sales tax. We do
not think the chancellor pretermitted this issue, but cor-
rectly included the receipts from the sales tax in with
other county taxes for school purposes.

We note slight mathematical errors in some of the
computations, but since the figures in the stipulations are
given as a guide, changing from year to year, any such
errors are immaterial.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Cuarrin, Creson and Humpureys, Jusricus, concur.

MoCaniuss, Jusricz, not participating.

Gzoren-C. LaManna, Shelby County Assessor of
Property, Appellant,

Tur Universiry or Tennessen, Appellee.
462 S.W.2d 877.

(Jackson, April Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed January 4, 1971.

26 es

James C. Buasney and Hzarw W. Tiwweit, Memphis,
for appellant.

Tuomas R. Prewirr, AnMsrronG, ALLEN, BrapEn, Goop-
man, McBrwe & Prewirr, Memphis, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Creson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause comes to this Court on appeal from a decree
of the Chancery Court of Shelby County.

In the course of this opinion, the parties will be re-
ferred to as they appeared in the court below; that is,
appellee, The University of Tennessee, as complainant,
and appellant, George C. LaManna, as defendant.

Complainant, The University of Tennessee, is an edu-
cational institution owned and operated by the State of
Tennessee. It is managed and controlled by a Board of
Trustees appointed by the Governor, pursuant to T.C.A.
sec. 49-3301 et seq.

ee 27

Defendant, George C. LaManna, is the duly elected
Assessor of Property for Shelby County, Tennessee, and
is a party defendant in that capacity.

Both parties have filed in the record a statement, stipu-
lating certain facts pertinent to this controversy. They
are, that all property, both real and personal, of the
complainant institution, including the real estate in-
volved herein, is owned by the State in its sovereign
capacity; that defendant did assess and place on the tax
rolls of Shelby County, for the year 1970, five (5) sep-
arate parcels of real estate owned by complainant insti-
tution and situated in the City of Memphis, to-wit:
George Vincent Hotel, George Vincent Motel, University
Apartments, Dobbs House, Inc., and a Shell Service Sta-
tion; that said assessments by the defendant became
effective January 10, 1970; that the George Vincent Hotel
and Motel and the University Apartments are leased
and/or rented to the general public with the exception
of two (2) floors of the University Apartments which are
used exclusively as dormitory space for medical students ;
that the Dobbs House property is leased to Dobbs House,
Inc.; that the Service Station property is leased to Shell
Oil Company; finally, that said properties were acquired
with a view toward prospective expansion, and all net
income derived by complainant institution from said five
(5) parcels of real estate is used solely and exclusively
for educational purposes of complainant institution.

Subsequently, both parties filed an ‘‘Amendment to
Stipulation of Facts” stating that defendant has as-
sessed for the year 1970, personal property owned by
complainant and located at the George Vincent Hotel
and Motel, and the University Apartments; and that the

28 ee

personal property assessments stand on the same basis
as the real estate assessments.

Complainant averred that the five (5) parcels of real
estate assessed by defendant come within the statutory
exemption set out in T.C.A. sec. 67-502(2), which states
in part:

“Provided, however, that all property of any educa-
tional institution owned, operated, or controlled by the
state of Tennessee as trustee, or otherwise, shall be
exempt from taxation.”’

Therefore, complainant averred that said assessments
were illegal and void, and further, that defendant is with-
out authority to assess for County taxes property owned
by the State in its sovereign capacity.

Complainant prayed for a declaratory judgment and
an injunction.

Defendant first filed a plea in abatement, contesting
the Court’s jurisdiction; however, he withdrew that plea
and filed an answer. Defendant contended that the afore-
mentioned properties are subject to taxation in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 2, sec. 28, of the
Tennessee Constitution, and the language of 'T.C.A. secs.
67-501 and 67-502; that said properties were not being
used exclusively for educational purposes, but that same
were being used in competition with similar private busi-
nesses in Shelby County, which do pay property taxes.
Defendant denied that T.C.A. sec, 67-502 is applicable to
properties owned by complainant and not used solely and
exclusively for educational purposes, and further denied
that such properties are exempt from taxation.

re 29

Defendant stated further that his assessment was legal
and proper, and that he has authority to assess proper-
ties owned by the State where such properties are not
being used solely and exclusively for educational pur-
poses. Finally, defendant answered that the language
relied on by complainant in T.C.A. sec. 67-502 is repug-
nant to Article 2, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitu-
tion, and therefore not available to complainant.

The Chancellor, writing a memorandum opinion, ruled
that the properties in question were exempt from taxa-
tion by Shelby County ; that assessments made by defend-
ant and effective January 10, 1970, were illegal and void;
that defendant should be enjoined from further assess-
ments of the aforementioned properties for tax purposes;
and finally, because the Chancery Court has assumed
jurisdiction, defendant should be enjoined from prose-
cuting an appeal to the State Board of Equalization from
the adverse ruling of the County Board of Equalization
with reference to the assessments herein.

With reference to the constitutionality of T.C.A. sec.
67-502(2) raised by defendant, the court stated:

“‘The Court is of the opinion that it is not necessary
for this Court in this proceeding to determine whether
Sub-section (2) of Section 67-502 T.C.A. exceeds fhe
limits of the authority to exempt from taxation granted
by Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitu-
tion, because the Court is of the opinion that it was
well established prior to the enactment in 1937 of the
legislative provision in question that investment prop-
erty owned by the State of Tennessee and used
exclusively for public purposes was exempt from tax-
ation; and that such property was held to be used

30 ee)

exclusively for public purposes when the income there-
from was exclusively applied for public purposes,

Methodist Church v. Hinton
92 Tenn. 188 [21 S.W. 321]

Vanderbilt University v. Cheney
116 Tenn 259 [94 S.W. 90]

State ex rel. Beeler v. City of Nashville
178 Tenn. 344, 349 [157 S.W.2d 839]’’

Defendant, George LaManna, has filed three assign-
ments of error in this Court. They are:

“1, The Trial Court erred in holding that subsection 1
Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 67-502 pro-
hibited the Shelby County Assessor of Property
from taxing the property of The University of
Tennessee, both real and personal, where income
therefrom. is used solely and exclusively for public
educational purposes.

2. The Trial Court erred in holding that Tennessee
Code Annotated Section 67-502 and Chapter 110
of the Public Acts of 1937 were constitutional and
not repugnant to Article IT, Section 28 of the Con-
stitution of the State of Tennessee.

3. The Trial Court erred in holding that the assess-
ments made by the Shelby County Assessor against
the properties of The University of Tennessee
were made without authority and that such prop-
erties, although being leased for commercial pur-
poses, were exempt from taxation and therefore
the assessments were illegal and void.’’

ee 31

Defendant relies primarily on the language in Article
2, Section 28, of the Tennessee Constitution and argues
that it controls the real issue raised in this cause. That
section states in part:

‘All property real, personal or mixed shall be taxed,
but the Legislature may except such as may be held by
the State, by Counties, Cities or Towns, and used ex-
clusively for public or corporation purposes, * * *’’

Defendant states that the real issue herein is whether
the properties in question are ‘‘used exclusive for public
or corporate purposes,’’ and argues that they are not;
therefore, they cannot be exempt from taxation. De-
fendant argues further that the provision in T.C.A. sec.
67-502(2), quoted supra, relied on by complainant, is
repugnant to Article 2, Section 28, of the Tennessee Con-
stitution and unconstitutional because it does not include
the constitutional limitations stated therein, to-wit: ‘used
exclusively for public or corporation purposes.”’

Hl We cannot accept defendant’s argument. It must
be recognized that there are two standards of exemptions
provided for in T.C.A. sec. 67-502, captioned—Exemp-
tions generally—. One exempts private educational re-
ligious, charitable, or scientific institutions from taxation,
except under special circumstances; the other standard
exempts ‘‘any educational institution owned, operated,
or controlled’’ by the State. Defendant admits that the
aforementioned properties sought to be assessed are
owned by a State educational institution, namely, The
University of Tennessee.

This Court has ruled on. the same issue raised here in
State ex rel. Beeler v. City of Nashville (1914), 178 Tenn.
344, 157 S.W.2d 839, cited by the Chancellor and relied

32 ee

on by complainant. Chief Justice Green, writing for the
Court in that opinion, stated that

“The exemption is determined not by the nature of the
State’s title to the property but by the use of the
property.’’

Interpreting Acts of 1935, Chap. 47, sees. 1, 2—(now
T.C.A. sec. 67-502), Justice Green alluded to the afore-
mentioned double standard.

‘‘For the purposes of this opinion it is enough to say
that, under the Act of 1935, only such property of re-
ligious, charitable, scientific or educational institutions
as is exclusively used for carrying out one or more of
the purposes of that institution is exempt from taxa-
tion. In short, the property physically used in the work
of the institution is exempt. The property in which the
funds of the institution are invested is not exempt,
although the income be used exclusively for carrying
on the institution. Investment property of the State,
however, used. exclusively for public purposes is ex-
empt and such property is used exclusively for public
purposes when the income therefrom is exclusively so
applied. Vanderbilt University v. Cheney, 116 Tenn.
259, 262, 94 S.W. 90; Methodist Church v. Hinton, 92
Tenn. 188, 21 S.W. 321, 19 L.R.A. 289. The rule first
announced in the Hinton case was not changed by the
Act of 1935 in so far as property of the State is con-
cerned, the income of such property being exclusively
applied to a public purpose.

* * % #

It is of course conceded that education is a public
purpose.’”

re 38

See also, City of Nashville v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion (1962), 50 Tenn.App. 692, 363 8.W.2d 520.

Defendant acknowledges the existence of the Beeler
case and its ruling, but states in his brief that it should
be overruled, because it is contrary to the ‘‘modern con-
cept of taxation’’; that being that ‘‘all properties irre-
spective of ownership should bear their share of the tax
burden when they are used or leased by commercial en-
terprises which are in competition with like businesses
who are subject to taxation.”

The Court has, on numerous oceasions, held that where
a prior decision has ruled on the construction and opera-
tion of a statute, the principle of stare decisis will apply
unless the Legislature acts to change the statute. See
Miller v. Kennedy (1932), 164 Tenn. 470, 51 S.W.2d 1000;
McKesson ¢ Robbins, Inc. v. Government Employees
Department Store, Inc, (1963), 211 Tenn. 494, 365 8.W.2d
890.

Hl We are of opinion that the properties in this cause
owned by The University of Tennessee, though leased
by it to commercial enterprises, come clearly within the
ambit of T.C.A. sec. 67-502, and are exempt from taxation
by Shelby County.

The decree of the court below is affirmed. The costs
of this cause are assessed against the appellant. George
C. LaManna, in his official capacity.

Dyzr, Cur Justice, Cuarrin and MoCantass, Jus-
tiozs, and Apams, SprciaL Justice, concur.

Rurs Atey, alias, Ruta Cuanpuer, alias,
Rurs Atprince,

Sate or TENNESSEE,
463 S.W.2d 140.
(Knoaville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed January 18, 1971.

Ben Wexier and WititaMm T. Berry, Greeneville, for
plaintiff-in-error.

Davm M. Pacx, Attorney General, and Reporter, and
Rosert H. Rossrzs, Assistant Attorney General, Nash-
ville, for defendant-in-error.

SCC 35
PC
Mz. Justice Humpupnys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Ruth Allen, Alias, was convicted and sentenced to the
penitentiary for a term of three to five years for dispos-
ing of property subject to a security interest in violation
of T.C.A. sec. 39-1957, The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. We granted certiorari to consider the sufficiency
of the indictment.

The indictment as relevant is in this language:

«* * * did unlawfully and feloniously dispose of or
conceal personal property, consumer goods, to wit: one
mower, one glider and one chair, and one stereo set,
all of which were in her possession. The above per-
sonal property was valued at more than one hundred
($100.00) ; was subject to a security interest, as de-
fined under the Uniform Commercial Code—Secured
Transactions, with the felonious intent to deprive the
secured party of the property, or any part thereof, or
of the proceeds, or any part thereof,”’.

The rule with respect to the certainty and particularity
required in an indictment is best summarized in Whar-
ton’s Criminal Procedure, see. 1762, as follows:

See, 1762. Certainty and particularity.

The constitutional right of the aceused to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him requires that every material fact and es-
sential element of the offense be charged with precision
and. certainty in the indictment or information. He
has a substantive right to be informed by the indict-
ment or information in simple, understandable lan-
guage of the crime he is charged with and the acts
constituting the crime, in sufficient detail to enable
him to prepare his defense and to be protected in the
event of double jeopardy, and to define the issues so
that the court will be able to determine what evidence
is admissible, and to pronounce judgment.

It has been said that this constitutional right is
based upon the presumption of innocence and that it
requires such definiteness and certainty in the charge
in an indictment or information as will enable a pre-
sumptively innocent man to prepare for trial. When
there is a manifest and substantial repugnancy in a
material charge of a count, the count cannot be sus-
tained.

The accused cannot object that the indictment does not
state the offense with absolute certainty. It is sufficient
that it be stated with reasonable certainty, but the
charge must be stated with as much certainty as the
circumstances of the case will permit, and an informa-
tion which may apply to one of several definite offenses,
without specifying which, is fatally defective.

P| 37

A vague, general, and indefinite description of the
alleged crime is insufficient. ‘The averments must be
such as clearly to designate, not only the particular
kind of offense, but the specific criminal act for which
the accused is to answer. The true test is not whether
the indictment could possibly be made more definite
and certain, but whether it contains every element of
the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently ap-
prises the defendant of what he must be prepared to
meet, and whether, in case other criminal proceedings
are taken against him later, based on the same matters,
the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may
plead a former acquittal or conviction in bar of the
later proceedings.’’

This statement is in accord with the law on this sub-
ject in Tennessee, and the most casual reading of it
demonstrates the inadequacy of the indictment. Not only
is the description of the merchandise so general as to
border on voidness for uncertainty and impreciseness,
this fault is compounded and the indictment made fatally
faulty because it nowhere mentions the owner of the
security interest violated. Under the law quoted we con-
sider this to be indispensable to the avoidance of the
possibility of double jeopardy.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and set
aside and the case is remanded for such further pro-
ceedings as the District Attorney General may think the
case warrants.

Dysr, Cuier Justice, and Csartin, Cason and Mo-
Canauss, JUSTICES, concur.

Jmoy L. Fuoyp
v.

Traveters Insurance Company and Tomas EH. Burron
d/b/a B & B Burorrs.

463 S.W.2d 407.
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed December 21, 1970.

Petition for Rehearing Denied February 16, 1971.

es 39
a

T, Azrnur Jenkins, Manchester, for petitioner, ap-
pellee.

Garrett, Sureips & Roczrs, J. Sranuzy Rocmrs, Man-
chester, for respondents, appellants.

Mr. Justice McCanuuss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The petitioner seeks a decree for benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law of Tennessee for medical
expenses, for compensation for temporary total dis-
ability, and for compensation for permanent partial dis-
ability growing out of an accident that he sustained on
March 14, 1966. From a decree granting the petitioner

40

the relief for which he prayed the defendants, the em-
ployer and his insurer, made a motion for a new trial,
which the Chancellor overruled, and have appealed to
this Court.

The undisputed facts are that on March 14, 1966, while
the petitioner, a carpenter, and a fellow employee were
carrying a jointer, weighing about three hundred pounds,
down a flight of steps the fellow employee in some manner
lost his balance and the weight of the jointer fell on the
petitioner striking him in the groin or abdomen and
injured him. He felt a sharp pain but at the time noticed
no knot or protrusion which would have indicated that
he had sustained a hernia. Upon his return to his home
the petitioner discovered that he was passing blood in
his urine, and on March 16, 1966, two days after the acci-
dent, he saw his physician, Dr. John Shields, to whom
he described his symptoms complaining of pain in his
stomach and abdomen and at his pubis over the pelvic
bone. On that day he had an elevated blood pressure and
was admitted to the clinic of Dr. Shields, but after
twenty-four hours he was transferred to Murfreesboro
where he entered the hospital and was referred to Dr.
John M. Bryan, a urologist, who examined him with
reference to the bleeding, known technically as hematuria.
Within a few days the hematuria ceased and the peti-
tioner was discharged from the hospital. Dr. Shields
continued to see the petitioner and on July 13, 1966, he
found that the petitioner had sustained an inguinal hernia
and on July 20, 1966, Dr. Shields performed surgery on
the petitioner repairing the hernia. This procedure was
successful and. on October 1, 1966, Dr. Shields directed
the petitioner to return to work for light duty, directing
him to lift no more than twenty-five pounds.

ee 41

These facts are not controverted. The petitioner in-
sists that the hernia resulted from his injury of March
14, 1966, although it was not discovered until almost
four months later, and that his injury resulted in hyper-
tension which disabled him permanently to the extent of
twenty-five per cent. As above suggested the Chancellor
found in the petitioner’s favor and decreed accordingly.

The assignments of error, which are substantially the
same as the grounds of the motion for a new trial, are
as follows:

“1, Because the findings of the trial judge are un-
supported by material evidence.

“2. Because the judgment and decree of the court
are contrary to the law and the evidence.

“«3, Because the court erred in finding and decreeing
that the injury to the petitioner, other than the herma-
turia, arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment.

“4, Because the court’s findings of the hernia con-
dition were based on evidence of conjecture, speculation
and surmise and not in compliance with T.C.A. 50-1009,

“5, Because the court’s finding of hypertension was
based on evidence of lay testimony, which testimony
was completely discredited by the testimony of experts,
Dr. John Shields and Dr. John M. Bryan.

“<6. Because the court erred in finding the petitioner
was 25% disabled.

“7, Because the court erred in overruling the mo-
tion for a new trial.””

42 |

(1) The employer and his insurer argue that the facts
relating to the hernia do not meet the requirements of
Section 50-1009, T.C.A., and that it, therefore, is not com-
pensable. The pertinent part of Section 50-1009, T.C.A.,
is as follows:

“Hernia.—In all claims for compensation for hernia
or rupture, resulting from injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employee’s employment,
it must be definitely proven to the satisfaction of the
court:

“First. That there was an injury resulting in hernia
or rupture.

“Second. That the hernia or rupture appeared sud-
denly.

“Third. That it was accompanied by pain.

“Fourth. That the hernia or rupture immediately
followed the accident.

“Fifth. That the hernia or rupture did not exist
prior to the accident for which compensation is
claimed.’’

Tl In the case before us the petitioner felt, pain im-
mediately and because of his injury placed himself in
the hands of his physician two days later. He continued
to be examined and treated from time to time until the
hernia was discovered and repaired in July. The ques-
tion then is whether the hernia developed with sufficient
promptness to meet the requirement of the statute. The
Court’s opinion by Chief Justice Neil in Etter v. Blue
Diamond. Coal Co., 187 Tenn. 407, 215 S.W.2d 803, con-
tains the following language:

| 43

“While our statute expressly requires proof ‘that
the hernia or rupture appeared suddenly,’ or ‘immedi-
ately followed the accident,’ we would have to give it
a very narrow construction to hold that the hernia
must appear instantaneously, or at the moment of the
accident. In order to remove the question of the causes
of a hernia from the field of speculation the legislature
conceived it to be important to write into the act the
proviso : ‘That the hernia or rupture did not exist prior
to the accident for which compensation is claimed.’
‘When this is read in connection with other sections,
to which we have referred, to wit that ‘the hernia
** * appeared suddenly’ or ‘immediately followed the
accident,’ these expressions must be construed to mean
that a hernia is ‘immediate’ and compensable if it
appears so soon after the injury that it would not be
possible to attribute it to any other cause.’’

In the same opinion the following paragraph also
appears:

“The word ‘immediately’ must gather its meaning
from its application. It is not a word of absolute sig-
nificance. It depends upon the circumstances and
events in connection with which it is used. Happening
‘suddenly’ or ‘immediately following’ does not mean
happening instantaneously. Lovell v. Williams Bros.,
Mo.App., 50 S.W.2d 710, 713. When our legislature
used the word ‘suddenly’ in Code Section 6892a, here
invoked, it meant that the hernia must have developed
without warning, or, as in Lovell v. Williaans Bros.,
supra, ‘without previous notice’; and that it is not to
be attributed to any pre-existing cause.’’

In this case it has been shown that because of the na-
ture of this particular hernia its development occurred

“4

slowly and it could not be discovered at the time of, or
immediately after, the petitioner’s injury. In these cir-
cumstances we hold that the statutory requirements that
the hernia appear suddenly and that it immediately
follow the accident are complied with.

HM (2) Then the other question relates to the peti-
tioner’s claim that he sustained a twenty-five per cent
partial disability as a result of the accident because of
hypertension that he suffered as a consequence of it.
This insistence is not supported by medical evidence.
The petitioner has offered no proof other than his own
testimony that he suffers a permanent partial disability
because of hypertension resulting from his accident.
Both Dr. Shields and Dr. Bryan testified at length con-
cerning their examination and treatment of the petitioner
and neither suggested that he now suffers disabling
hypertension. Such a condition is one that must be estab-
lished if it is established at all, by expert medical testi-
mony. See Magnavox Company of Tenn. v. Shepherd,
214 Tenn. 321, 879 S.W.2d 791. Dr. Shields testified that
he could not associate hypertension with the injury. The
petitioner’s effort to prove permanent partial disability
must fail for want of material evidence.

We therefore overrule the first four assignments of
error but must sustain the fifth and sixth assignments.
We modify the decree of the Chancellor to the extent
that we disallow the twenty-five per cent partial perma-
nent disability after October 1, 1966, the day on which
the petitioner returned to work. We decree one-half of
the costs against the petitioner and one-half against the
employer and his insurer.

P| 45

Dysr, Cumr Jusrioz, and Cuarmn, Creson and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

Opinion on Petition to RewEar

The petitioner by his petition to rehear asked us to re-
mand the case to the Chancery Court in order that he
may introduce additional medical evidence. In the hear-
ing before the Chancellor he introduced the testimony of
three physicians who attended him after his injury. We
feel that he had ample opportunity to prove his dis-
ability.

‘We overrule the petition to rehear.

BR
a

Mempuis Housrre AvrHoriry

wu

Mempuis Stam Launpry-Cumayens, Inc.

463 S.W.2d 677.

(Jackson, April Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed January 18, 1971.

Petition for Rehearing Denied March 1, 1971.

EL

Hues F. Caney, Jr, and Metvin Fuziscamr, Cocuran,
Carzy, Fietscner & Muniikin, Memphis, for appellant.

J. Avaw Hanover and James B. Janenax, Hanover,
Wausau, Barnus & Jarenax, Memphis, for appellee.

48 ee
ee
Mr. Justice McCanuzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The Memphis Housing Authority instituted a proceed-
ing under the authority of Chapter 8 of Title 18, T.C.A.,
to condemn a tract of land on which is situated a large
commercial laundry in the City of Memphis. The land,
improvements, and personal property located thereon
are used in the conduct of what is referred to in the record
as the largest commercial laundry in the south, and
owned and operated by Memphis Steam Laundry-
Cleaner, Ine.

The Circuit Judge by agreement heard the case with-
out the intervention of a jury and pronounced a judg-
ment of $2,394,205.86 in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, the housing authority, the judgment
consisting of $970,000.00 for the land and buildings and
$1,424,205.86 for moving costs which were included in
the judgment as authorized by Sections 23-1414, 13-807
and 13-824, T.C.A. The housing authority perfected its
appeal in the nature of a writ of error to the Court of
Appeals which modified the judgment of the Circuit
Court. In response to the laundry’s petition we have
granted certiorari.

The petitioner, the laundry, has filed the following
assignments of error:

ee |=!

I, ‘‘The Court of Appeals erred in holding that some
of Petitioner’s equipment, machinery and fixtures,
such as telephone and public address systems, process
piping, boilers and related gauges, pumps and ma-
chinery, pumps and other equipment forming a part of
process piping, oil and water storage tanks, electric
generator and steam engine, water treatment ma-
chinery, well pumps and related machinery, excess
ventilating equipment, and process wiring were not
movable and, hence, a part of the ‘real estate.’

“This ruling of the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the final judgment of the Trial Court in this regard, is
in direct conflict with the provisions. of sec. 23-1414,
T.C.A. and the findings of fact of the Trial Court
which are supported by the overwhelming preponder-
ance of the evidence.

“The Court of Appeals thus erred in sustaining Re-
spondent’s Assignments of Error One and Two raised
below.

It. ‘The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining Re-
spondent’s Assignment of Error Four raised below
and, more particularly, erred in ordering Petitioner
to pay rent to Respondent without correspondingly
ordering Respondent to pay interest to Petitioner.”’

The housing authority has filed assignments of error
by which it insists that (1) the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that payment for’ moving expenses be made
without any requirement that such expenses shall have
actually been incurred as a prerequisite for such pay-
ment; (2) that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring
the payment of the judgment before the delivery of pos-
session to the housing authority; and (8) that it was
error for the Circuit Court to admit certain evidence.

The Court of Appeals differed with the Cireuit Court
with regard to the treatment of items of equipment, par-
ticularly with regard to a large amount of process piping
and process wiring, the Cireuit Court holding that the
removal cost should be assessed on the basis of all the
laundry machinery and equipment which could be moved
and which was functional as a part of the laundry opera-
tion, but exeluding such items as were functional with
respect to the building. The Court of Appeals was of
opinion that certain of the items that the Circuit Court
had adjudged as removable fixtures were not removable;
these items were the process wiring and the process
piping, oil and water storage tanks, and the other items
listed in the laundry’s first assignment of error, and the
Court of Appeals disallowed the cost of removing and
veinstalling such items.

Until 1951 there was no provision in the Tennessee
Statutes for the cost of removal of personal property
and fixtures in condemnation proceedings. (See: Lenzi
v. Memphis Union Station Co., 3 Tenn. CCA 218 [1913]).
Tn 1951 the General Assembly by Chapter 176 of the
Public Acts of that year amended what then was Section
3122 of the Code and which is now Section 23-1414,
T.C.A., by adding the following sentence:

‘‘Where the removal of furniture, houshold belongings,
fixtures, equipment, machinery, or stock in trade is
made necessary by the taking, the reasonable expense
of such removal shall be considered in assessing inci-
dental damages.’’

Tn 1957 the General Assembly hy Chapter 398 of the
Public Acts of that year added the third sentence of
Section 23-1414:

“The reasonable expense of the removal of such chat-
tels shall be construed as including the cost of: any
necessary disconnection, dismantling or disassembling,
the loading, and drayage to another location not more
than ten (10) miles distant, and the reassembling, re-
connecting, and installing in such new location.”

Section 23-1402 makes all of Chapter 14 of Title 23
applicable to all eminent domain proceedings unless the
contrary is expressly stated. Section 13-807, T.C.A.,
confers upon housing authorities the right to condemn
property either under Title 23, Chapter 14 or under Title
23, Chapter 15, and the amendments to the Chapters, but
by Chapters 191 and 192 of the Public Acts of 1965 re-
moval provisions applicable to housing authorities were
enacted. There is no substantial difference between the
wording of these amendments, which are identical with
each other, and the wording of the removal provision of
Section 23-1414, T.C.A.

Hl The Sections of Tennessee Code Annotated which
authorize the acquisition of real property by housing
authorities make no provision for the condemnation of
personal property, therefore housing authorities cannot
acquire personal property by the process of eminent
domain. The moving expense provisions, above quoted,
apply both to personal property and to fixtures. The
reference to ‘“‘such chattels’’ in the amendment to Section
23-1414, T.C.A., which the General Assembly enacted as
Chapter 398, Public Acts of 1957, was not intended to
restrict the payment of moving costs to personalty. As
the Section now stands the word ‘‘fixtures’’ must be
given its usual meaning, and the words ‘‘such chattels’’
be construed as referring to items of personalty. In

52 es

Hickman v. Booth, 131 Tenn. 32, 173 8.W. 438, Mr. Jus-
tice Green said:

‘In Tennessee only those chattels are fixtures which
are so attached to the freehold that, from the intention
of the parties and the uses to which they are put, they
are presumed to be permanently annexed, or a removal
thereof would cause serious injury to the freehold.
Johnson v. Patterson, 13 Lea [81 Tenn.], 626; De
Graffenreid v. Scruggs, 4 Humph. [23 Tenn.], 451, 40
Am.Dec. 658; Union Bank & Trust Co. v. [Fred W.]
Wolfe, 114 Tenn. 255, 86 S.W. 310, 108 Am.St.Rep.
903, 4 Am.Cas. 1070. The usual test is said to be the
intention with which a chattel is connected with realty.
If it is intended to be removable at the pleasure of the
owner, it is not a fixture. Johnson v. Patterson, 13 Lea
[81 Tenn.], 626; Cannon v. Hare, 1 Tenn.Ch., [22] 23.’?

Chancellor Cooper in Cannon v. Hare, 1 Tenn.Ch. 22,
which he decided in 1872, said:

“Accordingly the tendency of modern decisions is to
make the rights of the parties to fixtures and buildings
depend not on the manner in which they are affixed to
the free-hold, but upon the character of the parties, the
intention in erecting the improvements, and the uses to
which they are put.”

I The purpose of the General Assembly in provid-
ing for the payment of the costs of removal in eminent
domain proceedings was to make the property owner
whole, but in no case may the cost of disassembling;
removal, and reassembling in the new location exceed
the cost of buying and installing similar articles. It
should be made affirmatively to appear that the property
owner receives the full cost of removal or replacement,

Dr

but no more than the full cost of removal or replacement.
Subject to this rule a property owner may remove and
relocate any fixture that the condemner has not sought
by his petition to condemn.

Hl The housing authority in its first assignment of
error contends that the payment of moving expenses
should not be required until after they have been actually
ineurred. This overlooks the provision that moving ex-
penses are incidental damages. Such damages are to be
paid along with the judgment for the taking and cannot
be deferred until the cost of removal has been incurred.
This assignment of error is overruled.

In Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, sec.
14.2471[1], page 658, the following appears:

‘Nevertheless, a recent decision’’ (Jacksonville Ha-
pressway Authority v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., [Fla.]
108 So.[2d] 289) ‘emphasizes the fact that, although
market value is a useful tool in determining just com-
pensation, the just compensation which is constitution-
ally required is not synonymous with market value
and that the owner must be made pecuniarily whole so
far as possible and practicable. Conceding that in
other jurisdictions the cost of moving personal prop-
erty has no bearing on the fair market value, the court
asserted that where an owner is constitutionally guar-
anteed full or just compensation, the theory and spirit
of such a guarantee requires a practical attempt to
make the owner whole. The court said that a person
who is put to expense through no desire or fault of
his own can only be made whole when his reasonable
expenses are included in the compensation. This con-
cept is a genuine departure from the long-accepted

of

market value doctrine. More importantly, however, it
predicates some degree of damage upon the fact that
the property is taken from the owner against his will.
In other words, the sovereign must now pay something
for the right to exercise an inherent, sovereign, pre-
rogative power.”’

IBM The second assignment of error of the housing
authority that the payment of the judgment should have
been deferred until possession of the property likewise
must be overruled. The removal of the fixtures, machin-
ery and equipment of the laundry undoubtedly would
require considerable time, and so long as the removal is
in progress the property cannot be used as a laundry and
the company should not be required to pay rent or other
expenses because of its continued, though temporary,
occupation of the premises for the purpose of removal
of fixtures and personalty.

We remand the case to the Fifth Division of the Cir-
cuit Court of Shelby County for a determination of the
damages both for the taking and the incidental damages
in accordance with the foregoing opinion. The court will
consider the record as now constituted and such other
testimony as it may consider necessary. To this extent
the judgments of the Cireuit Court and Court of Appeals
are modified.

The costs including the cost of the appeal will be ad-
judged by the Cireuit Court. The funds paid into the
registry of the court by the housing authority will be
invested in marketable securities of the United States
until such time as they are ordered to be paid to the
property owner,

DD

Dyer, Curer Justicn, Caarrin and Crason, Justicss,
and Apams, Srecra, Jusricz, concur.

Oprnton on Prririon to REHEAR
Mr. Justice McCanuuss.

Memphis Housing Authority has filed a petition to
rehear by which its asks that we review our opinion. We
have carefully considered the petition and overruled it
for the reason that everything mentioned in the petition
was considered when we prepared our opinion.

Dyzr, Camr Justicn, Cuarrin and Creson, Justiczs,
and Apams, Spxcian Justicz, concur.

Nancy J. Marri
v.
Massacrusserrs Murua Lire Insurance Company.
463 S.W.2d 681.
(Jackson, April Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed January 4, 1971.
Petition for Rehearing Denied February 16, 1971.

oa
x

W. OC. Roverrs, Memphis, for appellee.

J. Kirsy Rirrex, Memphis, for appellant.

Cuarrin and Creson, Justicus, dissented.

Mr. Justice McCanuxss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Nancy J. Martin, the widow of Silas E. Martin, de-
ceased, sued Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany for $2,000.00 which she claimed to be due her for
the alleged accidental death of her husband under the
following language of a group policy:

58 ee

“Tf, as a result of accidental bodily injury which oc-
curs while an employee is insured for Personal Group
Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance such
employee suffers the loss of life, limb or sight, and if
such loss occurs within ninety days following the date
of the accident, Massachusetts Mutual upon receipt of
due proof of such loss will pay to such employee, if
living, otherwise as provided in the section entitled
‘Beneficiary,’ the benefit specified in the section below
entitled ‘Schedule of Losses and Benefits.’ ””

The company by its answer denied liability and the
case was heard by the Chancellor on a stipulation of the
facts and from his decree in favor of the complainant
the defendant has appealed. The facts as stipulated by
the parties are, as follows:

“Complainant and her former husband, Silas E.
Martin, were married May 29, 1963, at Hernando,
DeSoto County, Mississippi.

“After the first fifteen months of their marriage,
following the birth of their son, William Edward Mar-
tin, the husband became very dictatorial, arbitrary
and violent.

“He frequently, over a period of years, ‘stomped’,
beat, kicked and abused the complainant, applying the
most profane, vulgar, filthy and insulting epithets,
imposing on complainant great fear and humiliation,
on account of which she did seek third person and
police protection on numerous occasions. On one oc-
casion his brother, in response to complainant’s
sereams, intervened and restrained him, after he had
beaten, kicked, ‘stomped’, pulled out hands full of her
hair and then tied her to a tree threatening to set fire

P| 59

to her. This occurred in Haywood County, Tennessee,
their old home, where the Sheriff arrested him and the
County Court sentenced him to sixty (60) days in the
workhouse.

“By reason of her great fear of him when angry,
she never dared, physically or verbally, to resist his
vicious assaults and abuse, until she shot him as here-
after explained.

“On Friday night, March 15, 1968, he came home
at 12:00 P.M. drinking, kicked the bed on which com-
plainant was sleeping, with her on it, over against the
wall, jumped on complainant and violently assaulted
and abused her physically, she escaping only by pre-
tending to have to go to the bathroom to vomit, from
which she slipped out the front door, naked, and ran
around to the back door with him in pursuit; she
reached the phone ahead of him in time to ask a tele-
phone operator to send the police to the home. Then he
caught her, threw her on the floor furnace, grilled her
body by holding her on the floor furnace. Then he
continued to abuse complainant until the telephone
rang. Decedent answered the phone and was ques-
tioned by the police. He told the police that complain-
ant was drunk and that they should disregard her call,
as everything was now under control. Upon hanging
up, he again assaulted complainant and three times
made the threat to kill her if she had him ‘locked up,’
saying, ‘* * * even if I have to serve ten years, I mean
it, god damn it, I’m gonna kill you when I get out.’

“He told the police on arrival that complainant was
an epileptic, had had a ‘fit’, pulled out her hair, ete.
They refused to arrest and take him in until she called

60

Judge Weinman, who persuaded them to arrest de-
ceased and keep him the remainder of the night.

“He appeared at the home Monday morning, March
18, 1968, at 6:00 A.M., literally kicked complainant,
who was asleep, out of the bed, while wearing his big,
heavy, ‘truck driver’ boots, then beat her, all the while
cursing her, and told her he had come to get his ‘kids’
and when they left she ‘would be dead as a skunk when
we walk out that door.’

“Deceased then went into the bathroom and con-
tinued his verbal abuse and repeated over and over his
intention to kill complainant in the immediate future.

“Complainant, being greatly frightened for her life,
because she was afraid he might do her further harm,
happened to think of his small loaded pistol in a
dresser drawer, which she got and put in her duster
pocket; and, after a few minutes, hoping to try to
reason with him, went to the bathroom door and tried
to talk to him, when he shook a razor blade in her face
and said,‘* * * and when I get through I’m gonna cut
that god dam big fat throat of yours wide open and
take my kids to a decent house.’

“He then grabbed her by the left arm and shoulder
and pulled her up close to him, lowered the razor blade
to within a fraction of an inch of her throat, and said,
‘Now, you can go call all the god damn cops and
Judges in Memphis, but they won’t get here * * *’

“‘Complainant, being convinced that he was going
to kill her, and while standing only on her left foot,
as he had pulled her so far into the bathroom that she
was off balance and was holding her so tightly, she

61

pulled the pistol and shot him in the head twice, from
which wounds he died some two weeks later.

‘Approximately one year before his death, deceased
brought home the pistol used by complainant, allowed
the children to play with it, then some months later

told complainant that he
complainant’s drawer (the
drawers near the bed), te
might need this sometime.’
the course of cleaning the
move the pistol and careful
as she was afraid of the gu

‘*Complainant was indict

oaded it and placed it in
top drawer of the chest-of-
ling complainant that ‘We
Each month thereafter in
drawer, complainant would
y replaced it in the drawer,
nh.

ed, tried for murder on a

plea of self defense, and w:
in the Criminal Court.’’

as acquitted of all charges

The policy contained the following exclusion:

‘‘The insurance provided hereunder does not cover
any loss resulting from or caused directly wholly or
partly, by * * * D. participation in or in consequence
of having participated in the committing of a felony,
or”?

Two issues were presented to the Chancellor: (1) was
the death of the insured accidental; (2) did the deceased
lose his life while participating in or in consequence
of having participated in the committing of a felony?
The Chancellor found that the death was accidental and
that the deceased was not killed by participating in or
in consequence of participation in the committing of a
felony.

Before the deceased was taken from the home on the
night of March 15, 1968, he threatened to kill the com-

62

plainant if she had him locked up after his assault upon
her on the morning of March 18, 1968, she had removed
the pistol from the dresser drawer and concealed it upon
her person. When he returned home he threatened to cut
her throat and pulling her close to him lowered a razor
blade within a fraction of an inch of her throat where-
upon the complainant shot him. Under the facts stipu-
lated to say that the complainant was justified in taking
the life of the deceased was not to say that he knew or
should have known that she had armed herself with the
pistol and would use it in her self-defense. We are in
agreement with the Chancellor who found that this was
not so and decided the case under the authority of Union
Casualty, Ete, Co. v. Harroll, 98 Tenn. 591, 40 8.W. 1080,
in which the Court said:

‘A voluntary act is an intentional one, one which the
actor of his own will, with the power of choice, de-
termines to do or perform. So this condition is to be
read as the equivalent of one exempting the insurer
from liability where death results from an intentional
exposure of one’s self to unnecessary danger. Both
terms imply some degree of knowledge or apprehen-
sion of the danger incurred, and a purpose to take the
risk. If the danger be concealed, and unknown to the
party who ultimately suffers from it, then it cannot
be said he has voluntarily exposed himself to it,’’

In each of the following cases the death of the de-
ceased was determined not to have been accidental be-
cause in each instance he had voluntarily exposed
himself to the hazard that had resulted in his death;
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Distretti, 159 Tenn. 138, 17 8.W.2d
11; McGuire v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 164 Tenn. 32, 46 S.W.
2d. 53; Winton v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 252, 124

P| 63

S.W.2d 712; Baker v. Nat. Life & Accident Ins, Co., 201
Tenn 247, 298 S.W.2d 714; and Falster v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 216 Tenn. 137, 390 8.W.2d 673.

The Chancellor in his memorandum opinion held:

“The facts in this case do not establish such a vol-
untary exposure to danger to indicate an awareness
on the part of the deceased such as to hold his death
to be other than an accident under the authorities in
this State.

“Tt is next necessary to determine whether the
death of the husband was the result of his participa-
tion in a felony.

“Tf the deceased was only guilty of an assault and
battery upon his wife, he was committing a misde-
meanor, (T.C.A. 89-602) [T.C.A. sec. 39-602]. The
only felony he might have been guilty of was that of
an assault with a deadly weapon, or an assault to
commit a felony, in this case some degree of homicide.
To conclude that he intended to carry out his threat
to kill her, or that the razor blade was a deadly
weapon would require no more speculation than to
conclude that the Complainant only intended to threat-
en the deceased and the gun went off by accident. Nor,
considering the quantum of proof necessary in a
criminal case, would her plea of self-defense warrant
a conclusion as to his actual intention or hers.

“Considering the fact that the burden is on the
Defendant to establish this conclusion as a matter of
proof, and further the fact that the contract was
drawn by the Defendant, I find that the deceased was
not engaged in a felony under the law of this State at
the time of his death.’’

64 es

We agree with the reasoning and with the conclusions
of the Chancellor and affirm the decree.

Dyer, Cuter Justice, and Apams, Sprciau Justice,
concur.

Cuarrry and Cruson, Justices, dissent.
Oprivion on Prrition tro Renzar

The defendant insurance company has filed a petition
to rehear in which it earnestly insists that we recon-
sider and recede from our opinion. The arguments in
the petition to rehear are the same as those that were
made in the defendant’s brief.

We are of opinion that the Chancellor correctly de-
cided the case. Accordingly we must overrule the peti-
tion to rehear.

Everyn Froyp, Appellee,

v.
Tennessean Dioxen Distiuimne Company et al., Appellants,
463 S.W.2d 684.

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed February 1, 1971,

T, ArrHur Jenkins, Manchester, for appellee.

Tuomas H. Pussias, III, Trasvz, Mivicx, Srurprvanr
& Harsison, Nashville, for appellants.

Mz. Justice Humpuneys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is an appeal by the defendant employer in a
Workmen’s Compensation case. The principal question
for review is whether there is any material evidence in
the record to support the findings of the Chancellor.

The proof below on behalf of the petitioner employee,
Evelyn Floyd, consisted solely of her own testimony.

ee =|

Mrs. Floyd testified that while working for the defend-
ant, Tennessee Dickel Distilling Company, at a job that
required repeated bending, lifting and twisting, she ex-
perienced severe back pains. She further testified that
as a result of these pains she sought treatment from her
family physician, incurring certain medical expenses,
and was totally disabled for a period of some four
months. She admitted that she has since returned to full
time employment with the defendant, but testified that
were she called upon to do the same work she was doing
when the injury occurred, she could probably work only
six, rather than her former eight hours, and that she
considered herself not more than twenty-five per cent
disabled.

The defendant admitted that the parties were subject
to the Workmen’s Compensation Laws, that Mrs. Floyd’s
average earnings would entitle her to the maximum
weekly rates of Workmen’s Compensation benefits, and
that she had given the required notice of claim. The
defendant denied, however, that Mrs. Floyd sustained
any injury in the course of her employment, and further
denied that she was entitled to any benefits under the
‘Workmen’s Compensation Laws.

The Chancellor, upon hearing of the cause, found that
Mrs. Floyd had suffered a compensable injury, and
awarded benefits for temporary total’ disability for
elaimed period of total disability, benefits for permanent
partial disability of twenty-five per cent to the body as
a whole, and finally awarded her the claimed medical
expenses,

. We note that in his decree the Chancellor inadvertently referred
to these benefits as “permanent partial.” Since in our disposition of
the case there will be a remand, for rehearing of certain issues, the
decree at that time may be modified appropriately.

68 ee

From the Chancellor’s decree the defendant perfected
this appeal. The several assignments of error, with one
exception, are based upon the lack of expert medical
evidence in the record,

IBM We find, first of all, that there is material evi-
dence in the record to support the finding of the Chan-
cellor that Mrs. Floyd suffered a disabling accident in
the course of her employment. Obviously this evidence
consists primarily of Mrs. Floyd’s own testimony, and
just as obviously, it is circumstantial. Nonetheless on
the authority of Swift & Co. v. Howard, 186 Tenn. 584,
212 S.W.2d 388 (1948) a case factually very like the
instant one, we hold this evidence to be competent and
material.

We also hold, under the authority of numerous de-
cisions of this Court, that Mrs. Floyd was competent to
testify with respect to her own physical condition and
disability. See, e. g. Hamlin & Allman Iron Works v.
Jones, 200 Tenn. 242, 292 S.W.2d 27 (1956); Black Dia-
mond Collieries v. Gibbs, 161 Tenn. 413, 32 8.W.2d 1041
(1930).

It follows that there being material evidence in the
record to support his findings, the decree of the Chan-
eellor must be affirmed, at least insofar as it awards
benefits for temporary total disability.

HI We may not, however, go further in affirmance of
the decree. Even though there is material evidence in
the record to support findings of both temporary total
and a residual partial disability, there is none at all with
respect to permanence. Nor could there be in a case of
this nature, absent expert medical testimony. Minton

nn

v. Leonard, 219 Tenn. 642, 412 S.W.2d 886 (1966);
Moyers v. Oman Construction Company, Inc., 223 Tenn.
449, 446 S.W.2d 684 (1969). It follows that the award of
permanent partial disability benefits cannot be sustained
in the record.

Hl It is the opinion of the Court, however, that com-
plete justice cannot be had in this case in the absence of
medical testimony with respect to Mrs. Floyd’s perma-
nent disability. For that reason, under the authority,
given us by T.C.A. sec. 27-329, the case will be remanded.
for the taking of proof on the issues of permanence of
disability. Since this issue is so inextricably entwined
with that of the extent of any permanent disability, the
latter issue must also be opened on remand.

Hl The one assignment of error not covered in the
opinion above relates to the allowance of medical fees.

It is insisted that because Mrs. Floyd did not consult
with the defendant before obtaining the services of the
physician who treated her injury she is not entitled to
the award of medical expenses. We disagree.

The applicable statute, T.C.A. sec. 50-1004, provides
that:

“For not exceeding two years after notice of injury,
the employer or his agent shall furnish free of charge
to the employee such medical and surgical treatment
* * * as may be reasonably required. * * * The injured
employee must accept the same; provided, that the
employer shall designate a group of three or more
reputable physicians or surgeons * * * from which the
injured employee shall have the privilege of selecting
the operating surgeon or the attending physician * * *’”

70 ee

The statute is clear—after notice of injury the em-
ployer must furnish medical treatment to the employee.
In the case before us, notice of injury is admitted by the
defendant, and the record shows that medical treatment
was not furnished as required by statute. It follows that
the defendant is liable for the cost of the reasonably
necessary medical care that Mrs. Floyd obtained for
herself, Cf. Atlas Powder Co. v. Grimes, 200 Tenn. 206,
292 S.W.2d 13 (1956).?

The decree of the Chancellor is affirmed, as to the
awards of temporary total disability benefits and medi-
cal expenses, and the case is remanded with instructions
that the parties shall have sixty days from the date of
remand to offer further proof in compliance with this
opinion. The costs of this appeal to be divided equally
between the parties.

Dyer, Cater Justicxn, and Cuartry, Creson and Mc-
Cantuss, JUSTICES, concur.

* The cases relied on by the defendant in support of his assignment
of error do not conflict with this holding. These cases, Rice Bottling
Company v. Humphreys, 213 Tenn. 8, 372 S.W.2d 170 (1964); Laugh-
Tin Clinic v. Henley, 208 Tenn, 252, 345 S.W.2d 675 (1961); Proctor &
Gable Defense Corp. v. West, 203 Tenn, 188, 810 S.W.2d 175 (1957),
deal with instances in which the employer had provided medical care
as required, and the employee; without consultation with the employer,
obtained additional care. ‘These decisions are based on the employer's
right to select the physician whom he must pay. See Irwin v. Fulton
Sylphon Co., 179 Tenn. 846, 166 S.W.2d 610 (1942). Here, the em-
ployer is liable because he failed to exercise that right.

Sam Tuomas, Petitioner,

Srare or Tunnussex, Respondent.

463 S.W.2d 687.
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed February 1, 1971.

Sam R. Ravuston, Rauiston & Swarrorp, Jasper, for
petitioner.

Davmw M. Pack, Attorney General and Reporter, and
Everert H. Fanx, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville,
for respondent.

72 es

Mr. Justice Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Petitioner, Sam Thomas, who had no previous felony
record was indicted for breaking and entering and bur-
glary of a wheelbarrow valued at $20.00. He was convicted
of petit larceny and sentenced to one year in the peni-
tentiary. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted
certiorari to consider whether under the circumstances
the charge with respect to the presumption of guilt from
bare possession of the stolen article was adequate to
give petitioner a fair trial.

In brief, the facts are that in August, 1968, someone
entered an outbuilding on the land of one Violet Wake-
field and stole a wheelbarrow valued at $20.00. In Sep-
tember, nearly a month later, Sam Thomas sold the
wheelbarrow to a third party.

| 73

At the trial Thomas introduced, possibly, the only
witnesses he could, himself, his mother and his brother,
who testified to circumstances which would explain his
possession of the wheelbarrow.

There was no evidence whatsoever of any facts or
circumstances connecting Thomas with the crime other
than his possession of the wheelbarrow twenty-odd days
after the crime.

The judge gave the regular charge concerning the
presumption arising from possession of recently stolen
articles. The court’s exact charge on this point is in
this language:

“Now in the event [it] is shown beyond a reason-
able doubt that the property in question—the evidence
show beyond a reasonable doubt, that the property in
question had been recently stolen, and soon thereafter
the same property or any part of it was found in the
exclusive possession of the accused, the law presumes
his guilt, and upon such possession the jury would be
warranted in convicting the possessor, wnless the at-
tending fact or other elements so far overcome the
presumption thus raised as to create a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the jury as to the guilt of the
defendant.’’? (Emphasis added)

Under the rule as stated, the presumption arising from
bare possession displaces the presumption of innocence,
and requires proof of other facts and cireumstances
which are sufficient to overcome the presumption of guilt.

While there is no doubt the rule as stated is in accord
with our opinions in Peek v. State, 213 Tenn. 323, 375
S.W.2d 863; Cook v. State, 84 Tenn. 461, 1 S.W. 254;

7

Shaa v. State, 1 Tenn.Cas. 77, the rule in most jurisdic-
tions is that the possession of property by the defendant
soon after the commission of the alleged crime is merely
an evidentiary fact tending to establish guilt which
should be submitted to the jury to be considered in
connection with all the other facts and circumstances
disclosed by the evidence, and does not in any case raise
a presumption of law that the defendant committed the
alleged larceny. Shue v. State, 177 Ark. 605, 7 S.W.2d
815; State v. Palkimas, 153 Conn. 555, 219 A.2d 220;
Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200, 167 N.E. 129, 64 A.L.R.
1085; State v. White, 76 Kan. 654, 92 P. 829; People v.
Johnson, 215 Mich, 221, 183 N.W. 920; Jones v. State,
30 Miss. 653; State v. Swarens, 294 Mo. 189, 241 S.W.
984; State v. Lott, 40 N.M. 147, 56 P.2d 1029; State v.
Weinstein, 224 N.C, 645, 31 S.H.2d 920, 156 A.L.R, 625;
State v. Record, 151 N.C. 695, 65 S.E, 1010; State v.
Smith, 51 N.D. 180, 199 N.W. 187; State v. Larson, 41
S.D, 553, 172 N.W. 114; Boyd v. State, 24 Tex.App. 570,
6 S.W. 853; Castle v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 222, 83
S.B.2d 360; State v. Duncan, 7 Wash. 336, 35 P. 117,
overruled on another point in State v. Gifford, 19 Wash.
464, 466, 58 P. 709; State v. Etchell, 147 W.Va. 338, 127
§.B.2d 609. Sanders v. State, 167 Ala. 85, 52 So. 417;
Thompson v. State, 58 Fla. 106, 50 So. 507; Boswell v.
State, 5 Md.App. 571, 249 A.2d 490; Belote v. State, 36
Miss. 96; Cooper v. State, 29 Tex.App. 8, 13 S.W. 1011;
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 732, 58 8.H.2d 12.

50 Am.Jur.2d Larceny, sec. 160 has the following dis-
cussion of this problem:

“The law concerning the effect of evidence showing
the possession by an alleged thief of the property he

ee 75

is charged with having stolen is in an apparent state
of confusion, due in many cases to loose and inexact
methods of expression used in discussing the question.
The principal difficulty lies in determining the effect
of such evidence. The true rule is, without doubt, that
the possession of the property by the defendant soon
after the commission of the alleged crime is merely
an evidentiary fact tending to establish guilt which
should be submitted to the jury, to be considered in
connection with all the other facts and circumstances
disclosed by the evidence. According to the weight of
authority, it does not in any case raise a presumption
of law that the defendant committed the alleged
lareeny.”’

While we are not prepared to depart from our own rule
a sense of justice compels us in a case like this where
there are no other facts or circumstances in any way
connecting defendant with the crime, and the lapse of
time between the larceny and its being found in the
possession of defendant is somewhat extended to require
the case to be retried with some explanation to the jury
as to the meaning of the term ‘‘recent’’. While we recog-
nize that the term ‘‘recent’’ is a relative term incapable
of exact definition and that, except in perhaps extreme
cases, no definite time can be fixed as to when as a
matter of law possession is or is not recent, the test of
recency is subject to explanation to a jury in such a
manner as to call it particularly to the jury’s attention.
Looking again to 50 Am.Jur.2d Larceny, in sec. 162, we
find the following:

sc# * * What is ‘recent’ possession varies, within a
limited range, with the conditions and the surrounding
circumstances of each case, and is, within such range,

76 SS

ordinarily to be determined by the jury upon the facts
of the particular case. The test of recency is whether
the interval is so short as to render it morally or
reasonably certain that there could have been no inter-
mediate change of possession. In determining this
question, the particular period of time involved is an
important element to be considered, but it is not the
only one; the circumstances and character of the goods,
their salability, and whether they are cumbersome or
easily portable, are also among the factors to be con-
sidered. Ordinarily, however, the weight of such evi-
dence will be stronger or weaker in proportion to the
period intervening between the taking and the finding
in the possession of the defendant, and while such
evidence is a circumstance tending to incriminate the
accused, even though considerable time has elapsed,
it may be rendered of no weight whatever by the lapse
of sufficient time as to make it not improbable that the
goods may have been stolen by another and passed
to the accused.’

Accordingly we set aside the judgment of the trial
court and remand the case for trial in order that the trial
judge, with the foregoing statement in mind, may in-
struct the jury more fully as to the meaning of the term
“reeent?’,

Dyer, Cumr Justice, and Carr, Creson and Mc-
Canuzss, Justices, concur.

Roserr L, Manrny, Appellee-Plaintiff,

Sournern Ratiway Co, and J. L. Phipps,
Appellants-Defendants.

Joun W. Brapuey, bnf., Naomi M. Bradley,
Appellee-Plaintiff,

v.

Sournern Ramway Co. and J. L. Phipps,
Appellants-Defendants.

463 S.W.2d 690.

(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed January 18, 1971,

78 eS

Bacon, Duccrr & Jussxz, Resp & Turry, Morristown,
for appellees-plaintiffs.

Tavior, Inman, Truson & Livz, Morristown, for ap-
pellants-defendants.

ee 79
P|
McCantess, Jusricz, did not participate.

Mr. Onmr Justice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

These two suits, consolidated for trial, resulted from
an automobile-train collision in Morristown, Tennessee,
wherein plaintiff, Robert L. Martin was awarded judg-
ment against Southern Railway Company and J. L.
Phipps (the engineer operating the train at the time), in
the sum of $5,000.00, and plaintiff, John W. Bradley was
awarded a judgment against the same defendants in the
amount of $350,000.00. Upon appeal the Court of Ap-
peals has affirmed and we granted certiorari. One of
the assignments of error in this Court is as follows:

The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to order a
remittitur in Bradley, and in ‘‘assuming’’ from
argument of counsel that One Hundred and Forty
Thousand Dollars ($140,000.00) of the verdict was at-
tributable to the cost of an attendant, although ad-

mittedly there was a complete absence of proof as to
this element of damage.

80 es

Three facts are admitted which are pertinent to the
action of the Court of Appeals in refusing to suggest
a remittitur in the award made to Bradley. First, Brad-
ley will need constant care for the balance of his life;
second, there is no proof in the record as to the probable
cost of such future care; and, third, the actual proven
expenses, including loss of earnings, past and future,
was $142,000.00. Under these facts on this issue of a
remittitur the Court of Appeals said:

‘We have referred to the necessity that the patient
have an attendant during waking hours, normally 16
hours per day. As argued by his counsel, assuming
an attendant can be hired at one dollar an hour the cost
of an attendant for the period of his expectancy will
amount to approximately $140,000.00.

If the jury accepted the figures $140,000.00 and $142,-
000.00 and deducted these amounts from $350,000.00,
less than $75,000.00 was awarded as damages for pain
and suffering and deprivation of the enjoyment of
life. The jury and trial judge saw the plaintiff and
were in much better position than this court to form
an intelligent opinion of the inconvenience and discom-
fort, if not actual pain, he will suffer during the
remainder of his life. If enough intelligence remains
for him even partially to realize his condition his
injuries are indeed horrendous and devastating. The
judge and jury could have an opinion as to his remain-
ing intelligence, we can not with any assurance of
aceuracy.

Taking the proven damages of $142,000.00 from the

award of $350,000.00, we have the figure of $208,000.00,
which we would have to assume the jury awarded for the

ee 81

intangible elements of damage such as pain, suffering,
inconvenience, and deprivation of the normal enjoyments
of life,

In sustaining this award of $208,000.00 the Court of
Appeals apparently has accepted the argument of coun-
sel that the jury having proof of the need of future care
could have assumed the cost of such would be at least
$1.00 per hour, reaching by use of the life expectancy
figure the sum of $140,000.00. Southern Railway argues
the Court of Appeals by using such reasoning has, in
fact, accepted the argument of counsel to supply evidence
not in the record.

Hl We agree a court in determining the excessiveness
of an award in a personal injury case cannot justify such
by assuming a particular cost resulting from admitted
damage absent proof in the record as to such probable
cost. We will have to determine if this award is so ex-
cessive as to require a remittitur absent any figure as to
the cost of future care.

In Lambert Bros. v. Larkins, 200 Tenn. 674, 296 S.W.
2d 358 (1956), this Court held where there had been a
concurrence of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
as to the amount of damages, if such be supported by
material evidence, then this Court would not interfere.
An exception to this is where there is a claim of corrupt
verdict which is not an issue in the case at bar. We do
not think Lambert Bros. v. Larkins, supra, has any ap-
plication to this case, since in approving the award made
the Court of Appeals apparently has taken into consider-
ation a particular figure representing the cost of future
care which is not supported by evidence in the record.

82

Plaintiff Bradley, white, male, age 49, was a passenger
in the automobile involved and had retired from the
U.S. Navy a few days prior to the accident. He was in
robust health, having a life expectancy of 23.81 years.

Bradley received very serious injuries to his abdomen,
chest and head. A part of the abdomen was pushed into
the area of the lungs, necessitating an emergency chest
operation to enable Bradley to breathe. The skull was so
fractured that one-fourth of a measuring cup of the
brain had to be removed, it being the part controlling
speech and ability to concentrate. Bradley is, at times,
not fully conscious of his surroundings, often emotional
—either laughing or erying—and at times belligerent.
He ean only speak one or two words and walks with great
difficulty, due to the lack of equilibrium. He cannot con-
trol saliva and needs a cup to prevent soiling his clothing.
It is not argued Bradley is other than totally and per-
manently disabled and, as previously stated, will need
constant care the remainder of his life.

Hl Onc of the methods used in determining the issue
of excessive awards is to compare the amount awarded
in other cases having similar facts. Town of Clinton v.
Davis, 27 Tenn.App. 29, 177 8.W.2d 848 (1944).

The facts in the case at bar are similar to the facts in
Dizie Feed and Seed Co, v. Byrd, 52 Tenn-App. 619, 376
S.W.2d 745 (1963). In this case the plaintiff, Byrd, re-
ceived serious and permanent injuries leaving him para-
lyzed from the navel down, which disabilities required
that he have someone to care for him in certain particu-
lars for the remainder of his life. There was evidence
as to the cost of a nurse to care for Byrd, but the evi-
dence was conclusive a nurse was not needed, and the

| 83

court rejected the evidence as to the cost of a nurse.
After rejecting this evidence there was no evidence
as to the cost of the type of person Byrd would need for
his future care, which is the same situation as in the
case at bar,

In the Dizie Seed. case the total award was $380,000.00.
The actual proven expenses, including loss of earnings,
past and future, were $105,951.00. This left approxi-
mately $274,000.00 awarded for the intangible elements
of damage which, after the suggested remittitur, would
be reduced to $164,000.00. Considering the jury in the
case at bar awarded $208,000.00 for the intangible ele-
ments of damage, then the award in the case at bar for
such damages is $54,000.00 greater than in the Byrd ease.

Hl On this issue we can also consider the impaired
purchasing power of the dollar. Foster & Creighton Co. v.
Hale, 32 Tenn.App. 208, 222 S.W.2d 222 (1949); Monday
v. Millsaps, 37 Tenn.App. 371, 264 S.W.2d 6 (1953).

In the Dixie Seed. case the injuries were sustained in
1962, and in the case at bar in October, 1968, a span of
over five years. During this span of five years the pur-
chasing power of the dollar due to the continual rise in
the cost of all goods and services was impaired on the
average of four per cent per year or a total of twenty
per cent. This fact commonly referred to as inflation
is of such common and general knowledge the Court can
take judicial notice of such.

Since compensation means compensation in value;
that is the value of the dollar lies in what it will buy,
then in order to compare the award for the intangible
clements of damage in the Dixie Seed case against the
award for the intangible elements of damage in the case

84 es

at bar we will have to add twenty per cent to the Diwie
Seed award of $164,000.00, making for comparison pur-
poses the sum of $196,800.00. Viewed in this light there
is a difference in these awards of $11,200.00 favorable
to the award in the case at bar.

In Monday v. Millsaps, supra, the Court said:

“The amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury
to determine, and next to the jury the most competent
person to pass upon the matter is the judge who pre-
sided at the trial and heard the evidence.’’ 37 Tenn.
App. at 412, 264 S.W.2d at 25.

Hl In view of the injuries received by Bradley, which
have been described as horrendous, we cannot say the
amount awarded strikes us as unreasonable or excessive,

We have considered the other assignments of error
and agree with the disposition made of them by the
Court of Appeals.

The judgment is affirmed.

Cuartin, Creson and Humpureys, Jusricns, concur;
McCaytzss, Justice, not participating.

Auice M. Coss, Appellant,

Dr. Davin Hart Srewarr, Executor, et al., Appellees.

463 S.W.2d 693. ©

(Jackson, April Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed January 4, 1971.

Petition for Rehearing Denied February 24, 1971.

Jouw W. Norris, Rosa Haywoop, Brownsville, for ap-
pellant.

Tuyze Rem, Avex Gray, C. Tuomas Hoopsr, III,
Brownsville, for appellees.

ee
Avams, Specia Justice, did not participate.

Mr. Justice Cuarrin delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The original bill in this case was filed by Mrs. Alice
M. Cobb seeking an adjudication by the Chancellor of
her rights and interests in certain personal property of
her deceased husband, Jesse T. Cobb, who died testate
on January 15, 1968.

The defendants named in the bill are Dr. David E.
Stewart, Jr., Executor of the will; B. W. Cobb, a brother
of deceased; and certain legatees named in the will,
David Stewart, Lynn Cobb, B. W. Cobb, Jr., and Elise
Stewart.

Prior to the filing of the bill, the widow, complainant,
dissented from the will. A year’s support and the ex-
empt property were set aside to her.

The bill was filed on May 9, 1969, and it was the in-
sistence of appellant her deceased husband died intestate

88 |

as to a great part of his personal property; and that
she was entitled to same under the provisions of T.C.A.
Section 31-201. She, also, prayed her Attorneys be paid
from the general estate for their services in her behalf.

Answers were filed by all defendants.

The Chancellor heard the matter on the bill, answers
and a stipulation of facts.

He filed a memorandum opinion in which he held the
testator died testate as to all his personal property and
the widow was only entitled to one-third of all deceased’s
personalty. He allowed a fee for her Attorneys as a
general charge against the estate.

Both complainant and the executor have appealed.

The stipulation of facts shows deceased left no child
surviving him. He was survived by one brother, B. W.
Cobb, as his sole and only heir at law.

The will was executed on May 80, 1953. At that time
he owned only the real estate devised in the will. On the
date of his death, he owned other real estate which was
not devised by the will. He, therefore, died intestate as
to this realty. However, the real property is not involved
in this laavsuit.

On January 15, 1968, the date of his death, he and
R. E. Stewart were partners in a business known and
operated under the name of Cobb and Stewart Oil Com-

pany.

Deceased’s interest in the partnership, other than the
cash, credit card accounts and bank accounts, was sold
by the executor. The excluded items were divided be-
tween R. E. Stewart, Jr., and the estate of deceased. The

ee 89

sale and division of the excluded items netted the estate
the sum of $65,790.88.

He, also, owned on the date of his death certain check-
ing and savings accounts in different banks, stocks, a
note and other personalty. The value of this personalty
approximated $90,000.00.

Appellant has assigned as error the action of the
Chancellor in decreeing deceased died testate as to all
his personalty enumerated above and his widow was only
entitled to one-third of his personalty since she dissented
from the will as provided by T.C.A. Section 31-606.

A consideration of the determinative terms of the will
is appropriate. Deceased’s will, after specific bequests
of personalty to his wife and realty to his wife and
brother, B. W. Cobb, by Item VI thereof, which is the
basis of this lawsuit, provides:

“T direct that all my interest in any business or
partnership which I may own at the time of my death,
and all of my personal property shall be sold, and all
of my debts paid from the proceeds; I will and be-
queath one-fourth of the amount remaining after the
payment of my debts, to my wife, Alice Cobb; the
remaining three-fourths shall be used by my executor
hereinafter named in the purchase of real estate, the
title to which real estate shall be taken in the name of
my wife, Alice Cobb, for and during her natural life,
with the remainder interest therein vested equally in
the children of my brother, B. W. Cobb, namely B. W.
Cobb, Jr., and Lynn Cobb, and the children of my
sister, Edna Earl Stewart, namely, Elise Stewart and
David Stewart.’”

90 es

Appellant argues deceased owned bank accounts and
other personal property other than his partnership busi-
ness. That he merely directed his partnership business
and all his personal property be sold; that is, the sale of
which was necessary to reduce it to cash; and, therefore,
not necessary to be sold,

We think this case presents the application of two
well settled rules of will construction. The first, when a
controlling or predominant purpose of the testator is
expressed, it is the duty of the court to effectuate that
purpose, and to construe all subsidiary clauses so as to
bring them into subordination to such purpose. Moore
v, Neely, 212 Tenn. 496, 370 S.W.2d 537 (1963) ; William-
son v. Brownlow, 219 Tenn. 464, 410 S.W.2d 878 (1967).

The second is: ‘‘When a decedent dies testate, a strong
presumption arises that he intended disposition of his
entire estate; or, stated otherwise, he intended no partial
intestacy.’’ Williamson v, Brownlow, supra.

HI The surrounding circumstances in the light of
which we must read the will, are the testator at the time
of the execution of the will had a wife and no children.
He had a brother and the nieces and nephews named in
Item VI of the will.

It is obvious the predominant purpose of the will was
to devote the greater portion of his estate for the care
of his wife during her natural life, the remainder to go
to his brother, named in Items III and IV, and his nieces
and nephews named in Item VI of the will.

To carry out the predominant purpose of his will, the
testator by Item I of the will directed his executor to
pay his debts as soon as practicable. By Item IT he be-

| o1

queathed to his wife all household furniture and his car.
By Items III and IV he devised to his wife specific real
estate for and during her life and the remainder to his
brother. By Item V he devised to his brother specific
real estate in fee simple. We have quoted Item VI, the
last item of the will.

Hl We agree with the Chancellor the phrase ‘all
my personal property’’ includes cash on hand and in
checking and savings accounts. The word ‘‘all’’ is inclu-
sive and embraces all personal property unless excepted
therefrom by descriptive words.

‘We are of the opinion when Item VI is read in the light
of the entire will that it was the intention of deceased to
reduce all of his personalty, other than that bequeathed
to his wife by Item IT, to a liquid state for the payment
of his debts, one-fourth of the balance to go to his widow.
The remaining three-fourths to be used by his executor
to purchase real estate the title to which was to be taken
in her name during her natural life and the remainder
to his nieces and nephews.

T.C.A. Section 32-301 provides:

‘CA will shall be construed, in reference to the real
and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take
effect as if it had been executed immediately before
the death of the testator * * *.”

Hl Thus, it is clear we must construe Item VI of the
will as including all personal property owned by the
testator on the date of the will, other than that be-
queathed in Item II, as well as that thereafter acquired.

92 ee)

In the case of Fry v. Shipley, 94 Tenn, 252, 29 S.W. 6
(1895), the court quoted with approval the following
rule which is germane to the question here:

“The rule in question is, whether a general residu-
ary gift is to be limited and qualified to property
which is the subject of sale, however the testator has
added that his residuary property is to be sold for
the benefit of his residuary legatee. It is uncertain
at the making of the will what the testator’s property
may consist of at his death, and the direction to sell
implies only a general intention on the part of the
testator that his residuary property shall be converted
or collected for the benefit of his residuary legatee.’’

We agree with the Chancellor the testator did not die
intestate as to any of his personal property.

We pass now to the assignment of error of the execu-
tor to the effect the Chancellor erred in decreeing Attor-
ney fees for the widow’s Attorney should be paid out of
the general funds of the estate.

The executor, in support of his insistence, cites and
relies on Gilpin v. Burrage, 188 Tenn. 80, 216 S.W.2d
732 (1949), wherein it is said:

“Our cases seem to reflect it as a fact that the test
by which the question is to be determined is whether
the services rendered enure to the benefit of the entire
estate as distinguished from services that enure to
the benefit of one or more of the individuals interested
in the estate or trust.’’

See, also, Third National Bank v. Cohn, 194 Tenn. 637,
254 S.W.2d 741 (1953) and Marler v. Claunch, 221 Tenn.
698, 480 S.W.2d 452 (1968).

| 98

On the other hand, the widow argues there arose a
controversy between her and the executor and the suit
was not filed until more than fifteen months after the
probate of the will. That since the executor failed to
file the suit to settle the controversy she had a right to
file suit for an adjudication of the rights of the parties.

We disagree. The suit was filed to defeat the testa-
mentary intent of the testator. Should she have been
successful in her contention three-fourths of the persona:
property would have been excluded from the operation
of the will and defeated the rights of the testator’s in-
tended beneficiaries.

Moreover, her contentions were designed to benefit her
personal interest. She took the position that her husban
died intestate as to his personal property, other than
that which was necessary to be sold, involved in Item
VI; and, therefore, she would inherit all of same by vir-
tue of T.C.A. Section 31-201, which provides where any
person dies intestate as to any of his or her persona!
estate, after payment of debts, his or her personalty
shall go to the wife or husband altogether if there are
no children or descendants of children.

For this insistence, she cites and relies on Allen v.
First American National Bank, 52 Tenn.App. 544, 376
§.W.2d 713 (1963).

In the Alien case, the suit involved the right of a dis-
senting widow to maintain an action seeking the con-
struction of her husband’s will as to a certain item of the
will in which he left certain personal property in trust,
the income from which was to be paid to his widow dur-
ing her natural life and upon her death the remainder
to be disbursed by his three nephews. She insisted her

94 ee

husband died intestate as to the remainder of the per-
sonalty which he sought to place in trust for disburse-
ment by the item attacked; and that she was entitled to
recover the same as intestate property, there being no
children.

In the course of the opinion the court said a dissent-
ing widow’s rights under T.C.A. Section 31-606 is not
exclusive of her right under T.C.A. Section 31-201, but
her rights under these statutes are concurrent.

We are of the opinion this was merely dictum. because
the court construed the trust and held it to be valid.
Thus, the widow gained nothing. Had the court con-
strued it invalid, then T.C.A, Section’31-606 would have
become meaningless.

Furthermore, the legislature by the enactment of Chap-
ter 634, Section 1 of the Public Acts of 1968 (ADJ. 8.)
amended T.C.A. Section 31-606 by adding the following
sentence: ‘The benefits herein provided shall be in lieu
of all other provisions under statutes of descent and dis-
tribution.’’

We realize, as insisted by the widow, this amendment
did not take effect until after the death of Mr. Cobb.
However, it shows the legislative intent of T.C.A. Sec-
tion 31-606 and overrules the dictum set out in the Allen
opinion.

The record is silent as to the date of the dissent.

In any event, for the purposes of this case, we over-
rule that part of the opinion in which it is stated: a
widow’s right to dissent under T.C.A. Section 31-606 is
not exclusive of her rights under T.C.A. Section 31-201
but her rights under the statutes are concurrent,

| 9%

Hl It results the decree of the Chancellor insofar as
it decrees deceased did not die intestate as to any of his
personalty is affirmed. The decree insofar as it ordered
Attorney’s fees for the services of the widow’s Attor-
neys paid out of the general estate is reversed.

The case will be remanded to the Chancery Court of
Haywood County for such action as may be necessary in
conformity with this opinion. Complainant will pay the
costs of the appeal. The costs below will abide the final
disposition of the case below.

Dyer, Camr Justicr, and Creson and McCanuzss,
Justices, concur,
Apvams, Spsciat Justice, not participating.
Ow Perrrion To RewEar
Mr. Justice Cmarrrn,

The petition to rehear filed by appellant presents no
new argument, cites no new authority nor points out any
material fact overlooked by this Court in its original
opinion.

Hl A petition to rehear is intended to call attention
of the Court to matters overlooked, not things which
Counsel supposes were improperly decided after fall
consideration. Hesson v. Scott, 217 Tenn. 250, 397 S.W.2d
176 (1965) ; Rule 32 of this Court.

The petition is denied at the cost of appellant.

Dyer, Cuter Justice, and Creson and McCantzss, Jus-
‘TICES, concur.

Ava, Sproat. Justice, not participating.

Dorotny Hxiiorr, Petitioner,

Maz Lewis, Respondent.
463 S.W.2d 698

(Knoaville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed February 17, 1971.

Jouy 8. Wrinxuz, Chattanooga, for petitioner.

Sronz, Kirxiayp & Haves, Chattanooga, for respon-
dent.

98 ee
ee
Mr. Justice OCnartix delivered the opinion of the
Court.

We granted certiorari in this cause solely for the pur-
pose of considering the propriety of the Court of Ap-
peals in holding the denial of the demand-for a jury in
: this case was harmless error.

After a thorough consideration of the case, we are of
the opinion the writ was improvidently granted and adopt
' the original opinion and the opinion on petition to re-
\ hear of the Court of Appeals as the opinion of this Court,

which are hereinafter set out. .

We will hereinafter give our reason for such action.

“This is an unlawful detainer action commenced in
Hamilton County Court of General Sessions where on Oc-
tober 27, 1969, judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Mrs. Lewis for accrued rent in the amount of
$250.00. The judgment also provided that a writ of pos-
session might issue to put Mrs. Lewis in possession.

“No writ of possession was ever issued.

“On November 3, 1969, defendant was granted an ap-
peal to the Circuit Court on the pauper’s oath. No ques-

ee 99

tion of defendant’s right to appeal without giving bond
was made in the Cireuit Court.

“On December 22, 1969, the case came on for trial be-
fore the Court without a jury on the merits, resulting in
a judgment for $420.00 accrued rent and an order re-
storing plaintiff to possession of the property. The same
order granted defendant an appeal to this Court giving
bond or otherwise complying with the law. On the follow-
ing day defendant filed her pauper’s oath for appeal to
this Court.

“Plaintiff-appellee has moved for a dismissal of the
appeal on the ground defendant failed to perfect her ap-
peal by giving bond for rent pending the appeal.

Hl ‘As above pointed ont, plaintiff made no question
of defendant’s right to appeal to the Cireuit Court with-
out surrendering possession and giving bond. T.C.A. 23-
1634, however, expressly makes applicable in unlawful
detainer suits the provisions of T.C.A, 23-1821—23-1325
relating to bond and possession in actions of ejectment
pending appeal where appeals have been granted and
perfected from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court
and to this Court. See also Hawkins v. Alewander, 91
Tenn. 359, 362 [18 S.W. 882]. We must, therefore, give
first consideration to the motion to dismiss.

“These sections of the Code provide that where the
plaintiff prevails he shall be placed in immediate posses-
sion by writ of possession unless the defendant appeals
to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. In that
event the plaintiff is required to execute a bond in double
the value of two years’ rent ‘conditioned that he will pay
all costs and damages sustained by defendant from plain-
tiff’s wrongly enforcing said writ.’

100 ee)

“Tf the plaintiff executes such bond the writ of posses-
sion will issue upon his application, ‘unles the defendant
shall execute a like bond to plaintiff for rent.’ T.C.A.
23-1323,

Hl ‘‘In this case the plaintiff failed to exercise the
right to give bond as authorized by T.C.A. 23-1633 and
T.C.A. 23-1322. Until that was done defendant was not
required to elect whether to surrender possession or give
bond for the rent pending appeal. T.C.A. 23-1633 reads:

‘« (93-1623 Possession pending appeal from justice.
When. judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plain-
tiff, in any action of forcible entry and detainer, forcible
detainer, or unlawful detainer, brought before a justice
of the peace, and a writ of possession shall be awarded,
the same shall be executed and the plaintiff restored to
the possession immediately; provided, that if the de-
fendant pray an appeal, then, in that case, the plaintiff
shall execute bond, with good and sufficient security, in
double the value of one (1) year’s rent of the premises,
conditioned to pay all costs and damages accruing from
the wrongful enforcement of said writ, and to abide by
and perform whatever judgment may be rendered by the
appellate court in the final hearing of the cause.’

“Tt is to be seen this Section substantially follows the
procedure outlined in ejectment suits by T.C.A. 23-1322;
1823 which T.C.A. 23-1634 makes applicable in unlawful
detainer suits.

‘‘We think the sense and purpose of this statutory
scheme was to give to the land owner the right of im-
mediate possession as contemplated by the statute, con-
ditioned upon giving bond to protect the tenant from
damages from wrongful eviction. If the tenant wishes to

ee 101

retain possession he can do so by giving bond to protect
the land owner but it is only after the appeal has been
prayed by the defendant and the plaintiff has given bond,
that the tenant must choose whether to surrender posses-
sion or give bond. Since plaintiff never gave the bond
defendant was not called upon to elect. Thus, we do not
have here the constitutional question, advanced by de-
fendant’s counsel, that to deprive defendant of the right
to retain possession pending appeal on the pauper’s oath
would deny her the equal protection of the law to which
she is entitled under the 14th Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States. We are not called upon to
decide whether, if plaintiff had given bond, defendant
could have retained possession pending appeal without
first giving a bond for rent. It is conceded that if de-
fendant had surrendered possession she could have ap-
pealed on the pauper’s oath. If we are correct in the
above holding, it follows that she was properly allowed
to appeal on taking the oath.

“We must next consider the propriety of the action
of the Circuit Court in striking defendant’s demand for
a jury on the ground the demand came too late.

“The Sessions Judgé “rendered judgment on October
27, 1969. On November 3, 1969, defendant filed her pau-
per’s oath and was granted an appeal to the Circuit
Court. On the same day the papers were marked filed by
the Circuit Court Clerk. On November 10, 1969, defendant
through her attorney, demanded a jury.

“‘The case was set for trial on December 1, 1969. On
that date the Court sustained plaintiff’s motion to strike
the demand for trial by jury and the case was assigned
for trial on December 22, 1969, with the result already
noted.

102 ee

“'T.C.A, 27-501 allows ten days for perfecting appeals
from inferior tribunals to the Circuit Court.

“T.C.A, 27-506 provides:

«« “In such case, either party may demand trial by jury
within seven days after the right of appeal has accrued.’

“Tt is argued in support of the motion to strike that
the right of appeal ‘accrued’ the minute the Sessions
Judge pronounced judgment and that the right to de-
mand a jury expired seven days thereafter, or on Novem-
ber 3, 1969.

“The History of a Lawsuit, Gilreath, Section 319,
states:

‘« «Appeals from the judgments of justices of the peace
to the circuit court stand for trial at the term to which
the appeal is prayed, and the demand for a jury must be
made on the first day of that term, provided the appeal
is perfected and the papers filed in the circuit court on
or before that date. But if the judgment appealed from
was rendered by the justice during the sitting of the
court, it is then the duty of the justice to file the papers
within five days after the appeal was prayed, and, if the
term of the court continues for ten days thereafter, the
case stands for trial at that term, and the demand for a
jury must be made within seven days after the appeal
was granted.’

Hl ‘‘In this case the appeal was granted and per-
fected during the term of the Circuit Court. The Sessions
Court papers were filed on November 3rd, within the
five days allowed, in fact on the same date the appeal was
allowed. Defendant, therefore, had the full seven days
allowed by the statute within which to note on the Clerk’s

| 108

docket her demand for a jury trial, She made demand
within that time and counsequently her right to a jury,
under the authority cited, was improperly denied.

‘We are of the opinion, however, the denial of a trial
by jury in this case does not constitute reversible error.
‘We have very carefully reviewed the evidence preserved
by bill of exceptions and find nothing which would have
justified the submission of the case to a jury if the case
had been placed on the jury docket. Defendant has had
her day in court but failed to appear and testify or offer
any evidence in opposition to the case made out against
her. Since the undisputed evidence sustains the holding
of the court that plaintiff is entitled to possession and to
a judgment of $420.00 for past-due rents up to the date
of trial in the Circuit Court, the error in denying a trial
by jury was not prejudicial. We are forbidden to reverse
for such error. Edwards v. State, 194 Tenn. 64, 250
S.W.2d 19; T.C.A. 27-116, 27-117.

‘‘ Affirmed at the cost of appellant and remanded for
enforcement of the judgment.”’

Ow Peririon to Renzar

Hl ‘Appellant has filed a petition to rehear complain-
ing that we failed to respond to her insistence the notice
to quit on September 19, 1969, was not good since the
current month ended the following day. We find this in-
sistence wholly without merit and hold that notice to quit
on the 19th is also notice to quit one day later. ‘The law
cares not for trifles.’

Hl ‘‘It is also insisted, since defendant was improp-
erly denied a trial by jury, she was under no duty to
appear at the trial and that this court erred in not re-

104 es

manding the case for trial before the court and a jury.
We can not agree. It was defendant’s duty to appear and
present any defense she claimed to have, if for no other
reason, so that this court on appeal could determine
whether the error denying a trial by jury was prejudicial
and whether she was entitled to a remand and a new trial
on the evidence adduced. She will not be permitted in
this way to try the case piecemeal. The clerk is directed
to file no more petitions to rehear without permission of
the Court.

‘Petition denied.”

It should be further said, the record shows respondent
had been renting the property on a monthly basis to
petitioner which ended on the 20th day of each month;
and that on July 28, 1969, respondent notified petitioner
to vacate the premises on or before September 19, 1969.

The record also shows respondent offered evidence
which showed liability on the part of petitioner for the
amount of the judgment.

Petitioner did not offer any evidence to rebut any of
the above evidence.

Accordingly, there was no issue to be submitted to a
jury. Had the trial judge granted. petitioner’s demand
for a jury, under this record, it would have been his duty
to direct a verdict for the amount of the verdict which
was capable of mathematical calculation; and that the
notice to vacate was timely as a matter of law.

It is not a denial of the constitutional right to a jury
trial for the trial judge to direct a verdict when there is
no legal doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn from the
whole evidence upon the issues to be tried. Lasater Lum-

ee 105

ber Co., et al vs. Harding, 28 Tenn. App. 296, 189 S.W.2d
583 (1945)

HHI On the question of notice, which was a question
of law, see Spillman vs. Walt, 59 Tenn. 574 (1873). In
that case the tenancy was from month to month. The
landlord gave more than a month’s notice, as in this case,
and held it to be timely. To the same effect see Smith
vs. Holt, 29 Tenn.App. 31, 193 S.W.(2d) 100 (1945).

The judgments of the trial judge and the Court of Ap-
peals are affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court
for the enforcement thereof.

Dyzr, Cumr Justicr, Humpureys and McCanuass,
Justices, and Jenkins, Spectat Justice, concur.

Wuiam R. McManus, Appellant,
Uv,

State Farm Murvan Avromosia
Insvzanon Co., ‘Appellee.

463 S.W.2d 702
(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed February 16, 1971.

De

Dewnts L. Bass, Knoxville, for appellant.

Ray L. Jewxrys, Knoxville, for appellee.

Mr. Cuter Justice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case, filed under our Declaratory Judgment
Statute, T.C.A. sec. 23-1101, et seq., comes to this Court
from the action of the chancellor in sustaining a demur-
rer dismissing the bill. In this opinion the parties will
be referred to as was their status in the trial court; that
is, William R. McManus as complainant, and State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as defendant.

Complainant, the owner of a certain Ford truck, is the
named insured in a public liability policy issued by de-
fendant covering said truck, which policy was in force
when the following events are alleged to have occurred.

On May 27, 1969, complainant was having some weld-
ing done on the truck by one, H. L. Walker. During the

108 ee

process of this welding, while complainant was holding a
metal frame for a trailer hitch against the lower surface
of the truck, E. L. Walker negligently touched the gas
tank of the truck with his welding apparatus, causing a
sudden fire resulting in serious and permanent damages
to complainant. Complainant has filed suit in the Cireuit
Court against E. L. Walker for said injuries and dam-
ages.
The bill prays for the following relief:

That complainant have a declaratory judgment de-

ereeing that the insurance contract in question affords

liability coverage and that under the terms of the con-
tract State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany be required. to defend the Circuit Court suit by

William R. McManus against B. L. Walker and to pay

any judgment given against said E. L. Walker all in

accordance with their contract of insurance as afore-
described.

This policy does provide coverage for anyone using the
Ford truck with the permission of the insured and no ar-
gument is made on this point. Defendant demurred on
the ground the policy afforded no coverage under these
facts due to the following provision in the policy:

Exciustons—Szcrion I.

This insurance does not apply under: * * * (h) cover-

age A, To bodily injury to any insured or any member

of the family of an insured residing in the same house-

hold as the insured; * * *.

Complainant insists this exclusionary clause in the
policy is void on the following ground: That said policy
is on file and has been approved by the Commissioner of

ee = 309

Insurance and Banking for the State of Tennessee. That
as a result our Financial Responsibility Statute is in-
corporated in the policy and this exclusionary clause is
void, being in conflict with this statute, especially T.C.A.
sec. 59-1223. In support of this position complainant cites
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters,
223 Tenn. 80, 442 S.W.2d 614 (1969).

Our Financial Responsibility Statute is carried as
T.C.A. sec. 59-1201 through 59-1240.

In the construction of this statute we can better ascer-
tain the intention of the Legislature by examining the
statute in its entirety, taking into consideration facts
which induced the law and the evils to be remedied. First
National Bank v. Howard, 148 Tenn. 188, 253 S.W.961
(1923).

There were at the time of the enactment of this statute,
and are now, a great many accidents involving vehicles
on our streets and roads, resulting in losses suffered by
many without compensation since the party at fault was
often lacking in financial responsibility. In dealing with
this evil, under this statute, it is apparent the Legisla-
ture stopped short of requiring public liability insurance
as a condition precedent to the owning or operating of a
motor vehicle. The sanctions of this statute are not in-
volved unless and until the owner or operator is involved
in an accident resulting in bodily injuries or property
damage in excess of $100.00; until such occurs a person
is at liberty to own and operate a motor vehicle without
any insurance coverage or with as little insurance cov-
erage as desired.

Under T.C.A. sec. 59-1203, the operator of a motor ve-
hicle involved in an accident in this State resulting in

110

bodily injuries or property damage in excess of $100.00
is required, within ten days, to file a written report of
such accident with the Commissioner of Safety, which
report shall contain sufficient information to enable the
Commissioner to determine whether, under the facts, a
deposit of security will be required. The issue in such
determination is whether the operator of the vehicle in-
volved is in fact exempt from the requirements of this
statute for one of the several reasons set out in T.C.A.
sec. 59-1205. If the Commissioner determines a deposit of
security is required, then 'T.C.A. sec. 59-1204 is applica-
ble.

As to one required to take a deposit of security the
Commissioner, under T.C.A. sec. 59-1204, is required
within sixty days to revoke the license of the operator
and the registration of the vehicle unless: First, there is
deposited with the Department of Safety security in the
amount necessary to pay any judgment or judgments re-
sulting from the accident, but in no event less than
$500.00; and, Second, furnish and maintain proof of fi-
nancial responsibility for prospective liability in the man-
ner prescribed by the statute.

This requirement, after a determination by the Com-
missioner of Safety, to furnish and maintain proof of
financial responsibility makes applicable T.C.A. sees, 59-
1220-1221-1222 and 1223.

T.C.A. sec. 59-1220 provides for four alternative meth-
ods of furnishing and maintaining proof of financial re-
sponsibility among them a. certificate of insurance, and
since the case at bar involves an insurance policy, we will
refer only to this method. When an insurance policy is
used as proof of financial responsibility, T.C.A. sec, 59-

ET

1221 provides such policy be written by an insurance
carrier authorized to do business in this State, and fur-
ther the carrier certify to the Commissioner such policy
has been written for the benefit of the person required
to furnish proof of financial responsibility. T.C.A. sec.
59-1222 sets out a method for a non-resident to furnish
proof of financial responsibility and is not at, issue in
the case at bar.

As to this policy certified to the Commissioner as proof
of financial responsibility, T.C.A. sec. 59-1223 provides
such shall insure the named insured or anyone using the
vehicle with permission express or implied for damages
imposed by law within certain geographical limits and
up to stated amounts. It is also provided such policy by
agreement stated therein or by endorsement state that
the policy is issued in accord with the coverage provided
by this statute and is subject to the provisions of this
statute. Sub-section (f) of this Code section sets out cer-
tain provisions be incorporated in the policy whether
contained therein or not. Among them is one provision
that after injury or damage during the life of the policy
the liability of the insurance carrier shall become abso-
lute.

Hl In keeping with the intent of the Legislature that
the sanctions of this statute apply only after an accident,
then the requirements that an insurance policy conform
to this statute, particularly T.C.A. sec. 59-1223, would
apply only to insurance policies issued and certified to
the Commissioner of Safety as proof of financial respon-
sibility in accord with the statute.

The bill in the case at bar does not allege the insurance
policy in question had been certified to the Commissioner

112 ee

of Safety as proof of financial responsibility. The only
language in the policy in regard to financial responsi-
bility laws is as follows:

When certified as proof of future financial responsi-

bility under any motor vehicle financial responsibility

law and while such proof is required during the policy
period, this policy shall comply with such law if ap-

plicable * * *

The above language of this policy is a negation of any
argument it has been certified as proof of financial re-
sponsibility.

I The fact the insurance policy in question is on file
and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance and
Banking, pursuant to T.C.A. sec. 56-603, does not make
the policy a ‘‘certified policy’? under our financial re-
sponsibility law.

There remains the question of whether this exclusion
is void without regard to our financial responsibility stat-
utes. It has been previously held this identical exclusion
was not void. Dressler v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.,
52 Tenn.App. 514, 376 8.W.2d 700 (1963).

The judgment is affirmed. Commercial Union Ins. Co.
v. Universal Underwriters, 223 Tenn. 80, 442 S.W.2d
614 (1969), wherein conflict with this opinion is over-
ruled.

Cuartix, Creson, Humpureys and MoCanzass, Jus-
TIOES, concur.

ee 118

Emoo Wurrers, Appellant,

vu

Cart C, Sawyer and Crry or CLarKsvine,
Appellees.

463 S.W.2d 705
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed February 16, 1971.

if

Jamus C. Cuxnineuam, Cunsinenam & MuircHe..,
Clarksville, for appellant.

Franx J. Runyon, Runyon & Runyoy, Clarksville, for
appellees.

Mr. Camr Justice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

a\ppellant, Emoo Winters, appeals from the decree of
the chancellor in finding an ordinance enacted by the City
of Clarksville, Tennessee to be constitutional as a valid
exercise of the police power of the City.

ee 115

The Legislature, by Chapter 152, Public Acts of 1939,
provided a method and empowered municipalities by
ordinance to order the owner of dwellings found unfit
for human habitation to repair, close or demolish same.
This statute is now carried in T.C.A. as sec. 13-1201
through see, 13-1209.

Under authority of Chapter 152, the City of Clarks-
ville, Tennessee enacted the ordinance in question, being
No, 36-1966-67. It is admitted here on appeal this ordi-
nance strictly follows the provisions of Chapter 152 and
for this reason we do not deem it necessary to copy this
rather lengthy ordinance in this opinion.

Pursuant to this ordinance and 'T.C.A. sec. 13-1203, the
public officer designated to exercise the powers conferred
by the ordinance is the Building Inspector. On May 27,
1968, after notice and a hearing held April 15, 1968, the
Building Inspector ordered appellant to demolish and
remove certain dwellings owned by appellant, such hav-
ing been found, under the ordinance and T.C.A. sec. 13-
1202, to be unfit for human habitation.

On July 24, 1968, pursuant to the ordinance and T.C.A.
sec. 13-1206, appellant filed his bill in Chancery seeking
to have the ordinance in question declared unconstitu-
tional as being in violation of Section 1, of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and Sections 8 and 21, Article 1, of the Constitu-
tion of Tennessee. From an adverse holding of the chan-
cellor appellant duly perfected his appeal to this Court.

The sole question here is whether this ordinance en-
acted pursuant to Chapter 152, Public Acts of 1939 is a
valid exercise of the police power of the City of Clarks-
ville, Tennessee.

6 ee

Although Chapter 152 was enacted in 1939, the only
case directly or indirectly adjudicating the constitution-
ality of Chapter 152, or any ordinance enacted pursuant
thereto, is the case of Thomas v. Chamberlain, 143
F.Supp. 671 (D.0,1955). The chancellor cited and relied
upon this case.

Thomas v. Chamberlain, supra, cited Jackson v. Bell,
143 Tenn. 452, 226 8.W. 207 (1920). The Jackson case
involved a statute, Chapter 131, Public Acts of 1915,
which authorized certain public officials, acting under the
police power of the state, to order the repair or demoli-
tion of buildings found to be especially liable to fire creat-
ing a hazard to life and property, all at the owners
expense. The procedure required in the application of
the police power under Chapter 131 is very similar to
the procedure required in the application of the police
power under the statute in the case at bar. In Jackson,
as in the case at bar, it was argued Chapter 131 was in
violation of Sections 8 and 21, Article 1, Constitution of
Tennessee. The Court held Chapter 131 was a valid use
of the police power and not in conflict with the sections
of our Constitution relied upon to invalidate the statute.

Hl The police power to a large extent rests upon the
maxim ‘‘sie utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’’ (so use
your own that you do not injure that of another), and
this is the first obligation of citizenship, even though it
invokes restrictions upon certain constitutional rights.
The exercise of the police power must be on a reasonable
basis and one of the tests of reasonableness is that the
attempted regulation must tend to such ulterior public
good that even though it does infringe upon constitu-
tional rights, such infringement is necessary in the pro-
motion of the health, safety and welfare of the com-

ee 17

munity. This is in effect the holding in Jackson v. Bell,
supra, where the Court noted fire posed a great danger
to a community. Fire being such danger, then where
buildings were found to be especially liable to fire it was
a reasonable use of the police power to order their re-
moval as a protection of the community. We think this
same principle would apply to the health of the com-
munity.

Hl We think this ordinance enacted pursuant to Chap-
ter 152, Publie Acts of 1939, falls squarely within the
legitimate use of the police power. In substance, the ordi-
nance after notice and a hearing, all subject to judicial
review, requires the repair or removal of dwellings found
hazardous to the health, safety or morals of the com-
munity.

Hl We hold the ordinance in question to be valid but
will again reiterate the statement of Mr. Justice Green
in Jackson v. Bell, supra, that such statute or ordinance
should be administered with caution.

Hl Appellant insists even if the ordinance is consti-
tutional per se the findings do not indicate the dwellings
ordered removed constitute either a fire or health hazard.
We do not agree. Appellant has been ordered to remove
five dwellings, four of which, among other things, are
shown to be fire hazards due to inadequate electrical wir-
ing. The fifth dwelling is shown to be in very dilapidated
condition.

Hl Appellant also insists the ordinance is invalid un-
der Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. This Amendment does not
operate as a limitation upon the police power of the state.
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S, 465, 47 S.Ct, 183, 71 L.Ed.

118 eS

354. (1926); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S.Ct. 763,
92 L.Ed. 986 (1948); Moyers v. City of Memphis, 135
Tenn. 263, 186 S.W. 105 (1916).

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Cuartiy, Creson, Humpureyvs and McCanuess, Jus-
TICES, concur.

’ BR. E. Burrs Company, Inc.,
Plaintiff-in-Error,

wu

Jams Mackey Powstn, Defendant-
in-Error,

463 S.W.2d 707
(Jackson, April Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed January 18, 1971.
ee
as
Hewrrr P. Tomi, Jz, Watpror, Harn & Tomury,
Jackson, for plaintiff in error.

R. Y. Jarvis, Memphis, for defendant in error.

Mr. Jusrice Creson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court
of Madison County granting James Mackey Powell
Workmen’s Compensation benefits. The trial court
awarded defendant in error Workmen’s Compensation
henefits for 100% permanent total disability to the body
as a whole as a result of an accidental injury consisting
of an attack of angina pectoris, aggravating, accelerating
and contributing to arteriosclerotic heart disease and
coronary occlusion.

In the course of this opinion the parties will be re-
ferred to as they appeared in the court below; that is,
James Mackey Powell, as petitioner, and R. E. Butts
Company, Ine., as defendant.

Petitioner had been employed with defendant for
nearly two years as a truck driver. His job was to haul
poultry to various places in the United States.

On August 31, 1967, about 2:00 A.M., petitioner ar-
rived in Guntersville, Alabama, after having driven from
Perryville, Missouri, to pick wp a load of chickens. His

| 12

rig was loaded with chickens in coops, and petitioner be-
gan to secure the load by throwing chains over the
chicken coops and securing the chains to both sides of
the truck bed. Petitioner testified that this was the usual
and ordinary method to secure a load of chicken coops;
that he would stand on the ground and throw the chains,
weighing about 15 pounds each, over the top of the
chicken coops stacked ten high and in twelve to fifteen
rows on the truck bed; that the truck was equipped with
one chain per row of chicken coops; and that he had
thrown two chains, and was throwing the third when a
sharp pain struck him in his chest. Petitioner testified
further that the chest pain caused him to become nause-
ated and sick; that he hired two of the men there to
finish securing the load and that he left Guntersville and
started {o Corydon, Indiana, stopping numerous times
along the way to relieve his nausea and pain.

Further testimony revealed that near his destination,
petitioner was assisted by a fellow employee; that upon
arriving at Corydon, Indiana, petitioner telephoned de-
fendant to report his illness and delayed arrival; and,
thereafter, petitioner was driven home to Milledgeville,
Tennessee, by a fellow employee, and entered the VA
Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, on September 5, 1967.
His condition was diagnosed as arteriosclerotic heart
disease and angina pectoris. Petitioner has not been gain-
fully employed since he entered the hospital on Septem-
ber 5, 1967, and has been a patient in the VA Hospital in
Memphis almost continuously since that date, except for
occasional leaves of absence.

Six doctors offered medical testimony in this case.
Their testimony revealed that petitioner had been suffer-
ing for some time with an arteriosclerosis heart disease,

122 es

and on August 31, 1967, petitioner suffered an attack
of angina pectoris. Further, all six doctors testified
that exertion such as that which petitioner engaged in
while securing his load ‘‘could’* have or ‘‘might’’ have
caused the attack of angina pectoris. Five of the doctors
were of opinion that petitioner’s exertion could have
accelerated or aggravated his arteriosclerotic heart dis-
ease to the point that it produced angina pectoris; the
sixth doctor was of the opposite opinion; that is, it
could not. All six doctors stated, too, that angina pectoris
could be experienced by merely lying down or walking.

The trial judge was of opinion:

“That the Petitioner sustained a compensable injury
under the workmen’s compensation law of the State
of Tennessee on August 31, 1967, while employed by
R. E. Butts Company, Inc.; that said injury consisted
of an attack of angina pectoris, aggravating, accelerat-
ing and contributing to arteriosclerotic heart disease
and coronary occlusion.’”

Further, the court found that the petitioner had ‘‘sus-
tained 100% permanent total disability to the body as
a whole as a result of the accidental injuries set out in
the petition. * * *’’? The Court awarded petitioner com-
pensation in the amount of $42.00 per week for 400
weeks, beginning August 31, 1967, plus the sum of $3,-
500.00 for necessary and reasonable medical treatment.

Defendant, R. E. Butts Company, Inc., filed a motion
for a new trial, which was overruled, and has prayed
for and perfected an appeal in the nature of a writ of
error to this Court.

Defendant assigns as error the decision of the trial
judge that petitioner sustained a compensable injury

| 128

on August 31, 1967. Defendant’s position is that there
has not been an accident nor a compensable injury to
petitioner ; that medical proof was to the effect that pe-
titioner had for a long time suffered from an arterio-
sclerotic heart disease, and that sooner or later he would
have had an angina pectoris attack anyway; that the
pain petitioner suffered in his chest as a result of an-
gina pectoris could not cause arteriosclerosis, but was
only a symptom: of the already existing disease; and that
no doctor testified specifically that petitioner’s exertion
on August 31, 1967, did cause angina pectoris, or did ac-
celerate his arteriosclerosis to produce angina pectoris,
but, rather, five of the six doctors only said it ‘‘might’’
or that it ‘‘could’’. Defendant argues that such language
is not enough upon which to base an award; and that
petitioner’s own testimony and defendant’s work records
revealed that petitioner did not exert himself out of the
ordinary, nor had he worked an unusually long or strenu-
ous week,

Defendant relies heavily upon Hagewood v. E. L. Du-
pont (1960), 206 Tenn. 239, 332 S.W.2d 660, as stating
the proposition that:

‘The mere manifestation of a heart condition without
any proof of strain or overexertion at work does not
show an accidental injury though the development of
the heart disease may have been hastened by the em-
ployee’s usual and ordinary wark.’’

Defendant also cites and relies upon Walker’s Cash
Stores, Inc. v. Livesay (1965), 215 Tenn. 306, 385 S.W.2d
745, and cases cited therein; and Travelers Insurance
Co. et al. v. Evans (1968), 221 Tenn, 199, 425 8.W.2d
611, and cases cited therein,

124 es

We have read and studied the cases cited by both peti-
lioner and defendant, and are of opinion that the deci-
sion of the court below, in the instant case, must be
affirmed. It must always be borne in mind that the
Tennessee Compensation Act compensates for the acci-
dental result. Through the course of prior decisions runs
a clear thread to this effect; and the heart cases compose
the classic example.

This Court adheres to the ‘‘accidental result’? rule
alluded to in Larson’s Workman’s Compensation Law,
page 565, Sec. 38.83. There, it is said:

“There must still be an unexpected result, and there
must still be an exertion—some exertion—capable
medically of causing the collapse.’’

See also, 58 Am.Jur. p. 705 (Workmen’s Compensation,
Sec. 196); Huey Brothers Lumber Co, et al. v. Kirk
(1962), 210 Tenn. 170, 357 S.W.2d 50; Central Motor
Express, Inc. v. Burney (1964), 214 Tenn 118, 377 S.W.
2d 947 ; Lawrence Leather Co. v. Britt (1967), 220 Tenn.
444, 414 S.W.2d 830.

The issue upon which cases of this nature are deter-
mined is factual; that is, whether the employee experi-
enced the disabling injury which may have accelerated
an existing disease while at work on the job. If so, this
Court has held in numerous cases that the injury is
accidental and compensable under our Workmen’s Com-
pensation Statutes, even though the employee was not
engaged in any spectacularly unusual strain or extraordi-
nary exertion. See Coleman v. Coker (1959),.204 Tenn.
310, 321 S.W.2d 540, and cases cited therein; Huey
Brothers Lwmber Oo. et al. v. Kirk, supra; Ward v.
Commercial Insurance Co. and Faircloth Chevrolet Co.

| 125

(1963), 218 Tenn. 100, 372 S.W.2d 292, and cases cited
therein, with particular reference to Patterson Transfer
Co, et al. v. Lewis (1953), 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182.

The case last cited above holds:

“The elaborate argument that this testimony was spec-
ulation, is not persuasive, since expert medical opin-
ion on the mysterious functioning of the human body
must always be more or less speculative, and we are
not called on to draw a line between expert ‘specula-
tion’ and expert ‘opinion’ since the acceptance of the
testimony and the credibility of witnesses are fore-
closed by the decision of the trial judge.’’

Further, the Court said:

“Our Workmen’s Compensation Act, Code sec. 6852
(d) (now T.C.A. sec. 50-902(d) ), provides compensation.
for ‘injury by accident’. There is no suggestion in the
statute that such ‘injury by accident’ is limited to in-
jury caused by ‘violent, external, accidental’ means
as provided in many policies of accident insurance.
In the case before us, the dislodgment. or displacement
of an arterial clot caused an occlusion or stoppage in
the heart which was fatal. The dislodgment of the clot
was internal, but it was, nevertheless, accidental and
an injury, compensable under the statute.’’

The cases cited by defendant on this point all contain
factual situations in which the Court has seriously in-
quired as to whether the petitioner’s activities which led
to his injury oceurred on the job or off. In each case the
Jourt concluded that there was no causal connection be-
tween petitioner’s work and the injury; that is, the cas-
ualty was not related,

126 eS

Such is not the factual situation here. In the present
case, there is ample evidence to conclude that petitioner
was doing the work that he was employed to do at the
time he suffered the attack which resulted in his dis-
abling injury, as found by the trial court.

We are of opinion that there is material evidence to
support the lower court’s award of compensation to
petitioner. The judgment of the court below is affirmed ;
the costs of the cause being assessed against R. E. Butts
Company, Ine.

Dyrr, Cumr Jusrice, Cuartin and MoCantass, Jus-
tices, and Apams, SprciaL Jusricz, concur.

Lorenz Detoris Meexs, Administratrix of the Hstate of
Bobby Gene Meeks, Deceased, Plaintiff-in-Error,

wv

Tue Tunnesser Farmers Muruat Insurance Company,
Defendant-in-Error,

463 S.W.2d 942.

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed February 8, 1971.

128 es

Haynes, Wiseman & Huut, Tullahoma, for plaintiff in
error.

Howry, McCorp, Forresrer & Ricnarpsoy, Tullahoma,
for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM.

We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the
trial court; that is, the Administratrix will be referred
to as plaintiff, and Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance
Company as defendant.

Plaintiff filed this action seeking damages for the
alleged breach of two policies of automobile liability
insurance. One of the policies had been issued to Bobby
Gene Meeks, Deceased; and the other to Mrs. Josephine
Sargent, a sister of Deceased.

Deceased was driving Mrs. Sargent’s automobile with
her permission in July, 1969, at which time a collision
occurred between the car he was driving and one owned
and operated by Hershel Kenneth Owens.

Owens carried no automobile lability insurance.

As a result of the collision both drivers were killed.

Plaintiff alleged the negligence of Owens in the opera-
tion of his car was the direct and proximate cause of the
collision and death of Meeks.

The declaration further alleged plaintiff was ‘‘entitled
to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an
uninsured automobile because of * * * death * * *,”? an
amount in excess of the combined applicable limits of
the two policies of insurance.

The declaration set forth the provisions of the policies
which are identical relating to the liability of the de-
fendant where death results due to the negligence of the
operation of an uninsured automobile under certain
conditions.

Defendant demurred to the declaration on the ground
plaintiff could not maintain this suit until legal liability
of Owens had been established.

The trial judge sustained the demurrer and dismissed
the suit.

Plaintiff prayed and was granted an appeal to this
Court on August 13, 1970,

An appeal was perfected by the execution. of an appeal
bond on September 10, 1970, and a certified copy of the
record filed in this Court on October 7, 1970. However,
plaintiff has not filed assignments of error and brief.

On November 30, 1970, defendant filed a motion to dis-
miss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial judge
on the ground plaintiff had failed to timely file assign-

130 ee

ments of error and brief as required by Rules 14 and 15
of this Court.

On December 7, 1970, the first day of the December
‘Term of this Court in Nashville, plaintiff filed a motion
requesting this Court to treat her appeal in error as a
writ of error and allow her ten days in which to file her
assignments of error and brief and set the hearing for a
later date.

Hl We ave of the opinion plaintiff’s motion must be
overruled and the motion of defendant be sustained.

Rule 14 provides, in part:

“Counsel for appellant or plaintiff-in-error in all
civil cases shall file with the clerk of this court not
more than twenty-five (25) days after the date of the
filing of the transeript of the record assignment of
errors and brief in support of same, typewritten or
printed in accordance with Rule 3.”’

Rule 15(2) provides:

“When appellants, or plaintiffs-in-error, in civil
eases, fail or refuse to file an assignment of errors
and brief, as required by this rule, it will be taken as
an abandonment of the appeal or writ of error, and
the decree or judgment will be affirmed.’

Hl An appeal and writ of error are alternative reme-
dies, When a party perfects an appeal in the nature of
a writ of error by giving bond and filing the transcript
in due time, then he cannot later pursue the alternate
method of applying for a writ of error. Burcham v.
Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 221
S.W.2d 888 (1949) ; Crowe v. Birmingham and N. W, Ry.
Co., 156 Tenn. 349, 1 S.W.2d 781 (1928).

EE

Where assignments of error and brief are not filed
within the twenty-five days period after filing of the rec-
ord and motion to dismiss on such grounds is made and
relied on with no good excuse for failure to do so appear-
ing this Court must sustain the motion. Chattanooga v.
Swift, 223 Tenn, 46, 442 S.W.2d 257 (1969).

It is so ordered.

132 |

Ratex Bray Massey and Danny Raza Massey,
Appellants,

Vv.
Suruivan Country, Tennzssez, Appellee.
464 S.W.2d 548.
(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed March 1, 1971.

Dav 8. Haynes, Bristol, for appellants.

Waxrer O. Wanvey, Kingsport, for appellee.

re 138

Maz. Justics Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Plaintiffs, Ralph Billy Massey and Danny Rhea Mas-
sey, sued Sullivan County, Tennessee, to recover
$3,255.00, one-half of the amount allegedly paid in settle-
ment of a suit against them for damages for injuries to
person and property, growing out of an automobile
collision in which Sullivan County was allegedly a tort-
feasor. The suit was pitched squarely on the new Uni-
form Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, sec. 23-3101
et seq. The particular sections invoked are sec, 23-3104
(a) T.C.A, and sec. 23-3105(a).*

293.3104, Enforcement of contribution-Procedure-Limitation—
(a) Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against
two (2) of more tort-feasors for the same injury or wrongful death,
contribution may be enforced by separate action in the cireuit or
chancery courts to be tried according to the forms of chancery.”

“93.3105. Effect of release or covenant not to sue upon Uability of
other tort-feasors—When a release or covenant not to sue or not to
enforce judgment is given in good faith to one (1) of two (2) or
‘more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful

leath;

“(a) It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide;
but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount
of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; * * *,”

The collision having occurred prior to the enactment
of the new Act, and the suit being predicated upon a
retroactive application of the Act, Sullivan County de-
murred on the grounds of this retroactive application and
on the further ground, that, if the provisions of the Act
invoked were to be given retroactive application, still,
there could be no recovery, because the release on which
the suit was predicated did not release Sullivan County
from any liability it might have in the premises.

The first question we have is whether the provisions
of the Act involved should be applied retroactively, and
the answer to this question lies in the answer to the
question whether the Act is purely procedural, or affects
substantive rights.

With respect to this, regardless of what may have
been said by other courts in other cases, the conclusion
is inescapable that the purpose of this Uniform Act is
to change the general rule that there is no contribution
among joint tort-feasors and so to make a substantive
change in the law. Anderson v. Saylors, 40 Tenn, 551
(1859) ; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Contribution, sec. 33.

Cases from other jurisdictions pro and con on this
point are cited in the Court of Appeals opinion in Jacob
G. Miller v. Dennis Sohms, filed December 3, 1969, Knox-
ville, with which we agree, holding the Act does not apply
retroactively are: F. H. Ross & Co. v. White, 224 Ga.
324, 161 S.H.2d 857 (1968) ; Klaas v. Continental South-
ern Lines, 225 Miss. 94, 82 So.2d 705 (1955) ; Commercial
Casualty & Insurance Co. v. Leonard, 210 Ark. 575, 196
S.W.2d 919 (1946); Kansas City Southern Ry Co, v.
McDaniel, 181 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1942) (applying Ark.
Law) ; Norfolk & Southern R. Co. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744,

| 185

125 S.H. 678 (1924) ; and Bargeon v. Seashore Trams. Co.,
196 N.C. 776, 147 S.B. 299 (1929).

That this purpose is accomplished by an Act which
mentions the procedures by which this primary change
is to be availed of, does not change the true nature of the
Act as substantive, and make it procedural.

The validity of these general observations is challeng-
able in this state as to the right of contribution among
tort-feasors, because, by case law, prior to the Act, the
common law rule had been changed from no contribution
to right of contribution, without regard to the active and
passive negligence test. Davis v. Broad Street Garage,
191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950) ; American Gas Co.
u. Billingsley, 195 Tenn. 448, 260 S.W.2d 173 (1953); 7
Vanderbilt Law Review 948; 12 Vanderbilt Law Review
1367; 16 Vanderbilt Law Review 860; 16 Vanderbilt Law
Review 895.

But, this does not alter the ease. Plaintiffs rely as a
basis of their suit on sec. 23-3105(a) and (c) T.C.A.
This section of the Act radically changes the settled com-
mon law with respect to the effect of releases. This rule
is stated in the History of a Lawsuit, 7th Ed., sec. 266,
as follows:

“A release of one of two or more joint wrongdoers
operates as a release and discharge of them all, and
may be pleaded in bar of any subsequent action
brought by the party injured against any of the
others.’’

So, here again, we have an alteration of the common
law, resulting in the deprivation of a valuable common
law right to those who might be affected by this sweep-

136 ee

ing change. Under such a circumstance, this section of
the Act cannot be given retroactive application. So to
do would result in unconstitutionality. Constitution of
Tennessee, Article 1, Section 20,

Under the circumstances, we are of opinion plaintiffs
should pursue their right of contribution under the
remedy provided by the case law to which we have re-
ferred, without reference to the Act. Thereunder, they
may have a remedy, depending upon the facts. However,
we do not decide this.

Any indication on our part of a retroactive application
of the Act would be fraught with the hazard of the pos-
sible impairment of vested rights, a result we can and
do avoid by the course taken, and still leave plaintiffs
the right to pursue their remedy.

The case is remanded with leave given plaintiffs to
amend their suit so as to delete reference to the Uniform
Act, and so as to invoke the case law principles of con-
tribution, subject to the effect of the release, as a com-
mon law release, as to which we do not decide. Costs
are adjudged against plaintiffs-in-error and their sure-
ties,

Dyer, Cuter Justice, Cuartin and McCanuzss, Jus-
tices, and Jenkins, Spectan Jusricr, concur.

Scare or Trwyesszz ex rel, Rupecca Care Hocus

Jesse Burier.
464 S,W.2d 550.

(Knoaville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed March 1, 1971,

138 eS

Rozerr W. Ritcuim, Knoxville, for appellant.

Rozert L. Crosstey, Knoxville, for appellee.

Ma. Justics McCayzess delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The relator filed a petition for mandamus against the
judge of the municipal court of Knoxville, a committing
magistrate by the terms of Section 38-301, T.C.A. She
alleged that she is the defendant in three criminal cases
in which she is charged with the violation of statutes
and municipal ordinances which prohibit the possession
of marijuana, legend and hallucinagenic drugs; that a
police officer had presented an affidavit and obtained a
search warrant from the defendant authorizing the
search of certain premises in Knoxville; that when the
eases came on for preliminary hearing before the de-
fendant he refused to grant a hearing as provided by

ee 189

Section 40-514, T.C.A., the grounds on which the search
warrant had been issued being controverted as set forth
in the relator’s petition to suppress the evidence; and
that the relator had petitioned for a preliminary hearing
under the provisions of Section 40-1101, et seq., T.C.A.,
but had been bound to the grand jury which was in ses-
sion though not then meeting. She prayed for a manda-
mus requiring the defendant to hold a hearing on the
grounds alleged in the affidavit for the search warrant.

The defendant interposed a demurrer which the Cir-
cuit Court sustained. The relator has appealed.

HBB contest of the ground on which a search war-
rant is issued, Section 40-514, T.C.A. would be a part
of the preliminary hearing procedure prescribed by
Section 40-1101, ete., T.C.A., but is subject to the provi-
sions of Section 40-402, T.C.A. The latter section pro-
vides that if the grand jury of the county where the
offense is charged to have been committed is in session
the magistrate shall not iry the case except on a plea of
guilty but shall bind the defendant to the grand jury.
“But it is not necessary that the grand jury shall sit
continuously or day after day, but its sessions may be so
timed as the business before it demands.’’ Davis v. State
ex rel. Arwood, 104 Tenn. 553, 58 S.W, 237.

Since the grand jury of Knox County was in session,
although not then meeting, the defendant properly bound
the relator to the grand jury without conducting the
hearing under Section 40-514, T.C.A., for which she
petitioned.

‘We may observe that should the grand jury return an
indictment against the relator she will have the right in
the trial court to controvert the legality of the search

140 ee

warrant and of the search made under its authority.
Section 40-519, T.C.A.

We affirm the judgment of the Cireuit Court at the
relator’s cost.

Dyer, Carer Justicz, Cuarrix and Humpureys, Jus-
aices, and Jenxiys, Specia, Justice, concur,

ee 141

James Hpear Norrucorr and wife, Lexta Rute
Norrsoorr, Appellants,

Uv

Jess Cauvin Hotnroway, Eumer L. Cocuran, Jr, Eumer
L. Cocurayn, 8r., individually and d/b/a Cochran
Trucking, Inc., Ideal Baking Company, Inc., and

Ideal Distributing Company, Appellees.
464 S.W.2d 551.
(Jackson, April Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed February 16, 1971.

Dwicut Hawks, Humboldt, Jony F, Kizer, Milan, for
appellants.

2 es

Franxitw Muroutson, Jackson, for Elmer 1. Cochran,
Sx., Ideal Baking Co., Inc., and Ideal Distributing Co.

Spraeivs, Menzies & Raney, Jackson, for Jess Calvin
Holloway and Elmer L. Cochran, Jr.

Mr. Curer Justice Dysr delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case comes to this Court from the action of the
trial judge sustaining a plea in abatement and dismiss-
ing the action. In this opinion James Edgar Northcott
and wife, Lella Ruth Northcott, will be referred to as
plaintiffs, and Jess Calvin Holloway, Elmer L. Cochran,
Jr., Elmer I. Cochran, Sr., individually and dba Coch-
ran Trucking, Ine., Ideal Baking Company, Inc. and
Ideal Distributing Company, as defendants.

On August 23, 1969, plaintiffs, residents of Madison
County, Tennessee, suffered injuries and damages in a
vehicle collision on the highways of Madison County,
Tennessee, involving a vehicle owned and used by de-
fendants, all non-residents of Tennessee. Later plaintiffs
moved and established residence in Gibson County, Ten-

ee 143

nessee. On March 13, 1970, plaintiffs, while residents of
Gibson County, Tennessee, filed suit in Madison County,
Tennessee, against defendants, non-residents of Tennes-
see, seeking recovery for the injuries and damages sus-
tained in the automobile collision of August 23, 1969, in
Madison County, Tennessee. Service of process was had
on defendants through the Secretary of State by virtue
of T.C.A. sec. 20-224.

Defendants filed a plea in abatement, the second para-
graph of which is as follows:

That these defendants are now and have always been
non-residents of the State of Tennessee; that at the
time of the filing of this action the plaintiffs were resi-
dents of the State of Tennessee but not residents of
Madison County; and that the venue and jurisdiction
for the action is not in Madison County, Tennessee.

Since service of process was obtained on defendants
as non-residents of Tennessee under authority of T.C.A.
sec, 20-224, then for venue purposes defendants are
treated as residents of that county in which plaintiff
resides and this statute (20-224) as to venue is construed
in pari materia with our general statutes regulating
venue in civil actions. Carroll v. Matthews, 172 Tenn.
590, 118 S.W.2d 742 (1938); Carter v. Schackne, 173
Tenn. 44, 114 S.W.2d 787 (1938).

The decision here will require construction of T.C.A.
sec, 20-401 as applied to these facts. This statute reads
as follows:

Tn all transitory actions, the right of action follows
the person of the defendant, unless otherwise expressly
provided. If the plaintiff and defendant both reside

144 ee

in the same county in this state, such action shall be
brought in the county of their residence. (Kmphasis
supplied).

Since, under the facts of this case for venue purposes,
the residence of both parties is determined by the resi-
dence of the plaintiffs, then the italicized language of
T.C.A, sec, 20-401 is applicable, which language restricts
venue to that county of plaintiff’s residence. Curtis v.
Garrison, 211 Tenn. 339, 364 8.W.2d 933 (1963).

The decision here requires us to determine if venue
is fixed by the residence of plaintiffs at the time of the
collision on August 23, 1969, or at the time of filing suit
on March 13, 1970.

We have not been cited, nor have we found any previ-
ous decision on the point in issue. However, defendants,
supporting their position that the time of filing controls,
take comfort from the following language in Curtis v.
Garrison, supra:

Finally, we interpret this statute (20-401) to mean that
so long as the plaintiff and the defendant continue to
reside in the same county, then the subject matter is
localized to the county of their residence and the Court
of that county is the only Court having jurisdiction to
entertain the action or make an award through the
remedies provided by law.

Tn Curtis v. Garrison, supra, the plaintiff and defend-
ant resided in the same county, both at the time of the
oceurrence of the events giving rise to the action, and
at the time of filing suit. This case is not authority to
support a decision either way on the issue in the case at

| 145

bar. Though we agree, the language of this opinion
copied above does give some comfort, if not support to
defendants’ position, such language was used without
consideration (such not being necessary) to the issue
in the case at bar.

HEME After consideration, based largely upon a literal
reading of the statute, we think the residence of the
plaintiff and defendant as used in this statute refers to
their residence at the time the suit is brought.

This holding is in conformity with the language of
T.C.A. sec, 20-903, which statute sets out grounds for
abatement of suits; the fourth ground pertinent to this
issue being as follows:

Where the plaintiff and defendant both reside, at the
time suit is brought, in the same county, and the action
is instituted in another county.

Under the above copied language of T.C.A. sec. 20-
903(4), a suit could be abated if brought in a county
other than the county of the residence of the parties
where both parties resided in the same county at the
time suit was brought; and this would be true regardless
of the residence of either of the parties when the events
occurred giving rise to the action.

In 92 C.J.S. Venue sec, 111, the following statement
is made:

Residence within the meaning of venue statutes means
residence at the time the suit is instituted.

The above statement from C.J.S. is supported by the
following cases: Lewallen v. Rogers, 100 Ga.App. 267,
110 S.E.2d 596 (1959) ; DesJardin v. Lynn, 6 Mich.App.

146 es

439, 149 N.W.2d 228 (1967); and Gates v. Stucco Cor-
poration, 112 S0.2d 36 (Fla.App.1959).

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Cuartm, Creson, and McCanuzss, Justices, and
Apams, Sporn Justice, concur.

bet
is
a

Koxurrve-Sournsry and Amertcan Morvan Iysuraxcr
Company

v.
Epwarp L. Burwerre.
464 8.W.2d 820.
(Knoauville, September Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed November 16, 1970.

Petition for Rehearing Denied December 21, 1970.

Bisnor, Tuomas, Lerryer, Mann & Mizzurn, Chatta-
nooga, for appellants, defendants.

Joun L. Wuuener, Chattanooga, for appellee, peti-
tioner.

ee 149

Mx. Justice McCanuzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Edward L. Burnette filed his petition under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law against his employer,
Koehring-Southern, and its insurance carrier, American
Mutual Insurance Company, on September 10, 1969. He
averred that while in the employment of the defendant,
he received an average weekly wage in excess of one hun-
dred dollars, that the parties had accepted and were
acting under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, that
on April 2, 1969, he had sustained an injury which arose
out of and during the course of his employment and that
while he was removing a large and heavy sheet of steel
from a shearing machine in the defendant’s plant the
crane he was using gave way, and he suffered several
fractured bones in his left foot and a severe injury to
his back and spine.

The petitioner further averred that during the early
part of October, 1968, he had suffered an earlier injury
arising out of and in the course of his employment when
he had moved a heavy load of steel on a wheeled jack on
the defendant’s premises and his foot had slipped and
he had fallen onto the concrete floor sustaining a frac-
ture of his lower spine and a ruptured intervertebral
disc, as the result of which accident he had been required
to undergo surgery, and that while he had been in a
weakened condition from that. injury and operation he
suffered the latter injury mentioned and by reason of all
of which he was now totally disabled, his employer hav-
ing terminated his employment on July 23, 1969. The
petitioner averred that he had been accorded none of the
benefits to which he was entitled under the law, and
prayed that his rights be adjudicated and that he be

150 es

given a decree against the defendants for the amount to
which he was entitled.

The defendants by their answer filed on October 27,
1968, admitted the injury of October, 1968, but said that
the petitioner had made no claim for Workmen’s Com-
pensation benefits as a result of that injury but had made
application and received benefits under his employer’s
group hospitalization program insured through John
Hancock Mutual Insurance Company and under his
employer’s group hospitalization program insured.
through Tennessee Hospital Service Association also
known as Blue Cross. They charged that the petitioner
was now estopped to assert a compensation claim on
account of his injury of October, 1968. They averred
that the petitioner had made a full and complete recovery
from the injury of April 2, 1969, that he had suffered no
compensable injury as a result of his fall in October,
1968, and that he had been paid all benefits including all
medical expenses which had been submitted and which
had resulted from his 1969 injury.

The petitioner on February 25, 1970, amended his
petition to aver that he had been admitted to the hospital
on September 8, 1969, that it had been determined after
the removal of some enlarged lymph nodes from the
right side of his neck that they were malignant and he
was now totally disabled and incapacitated, that this
condition had not previously manifested itself and al-
though he did not know that he had been afflicted with
cancer before suffering the compensable injuries he
averred that if he had been so afflicted the condition was
dormant and that the injuries which he had suffered
while employed by the defendant had greatly weakened
him thereby causing or contributing to the origin and

re 151

spread of the cancer, and that as a result of which he
had become totally and permanently disabled within the
meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. He
prayed a decree for his medical expenses and for the
amount to which he was entitled because of his total
and permanent disability.

The defendant answered the amended petition and
denied that either injury of which the petitioner had
complained caused, aggravated or contributed to peti-
tioner’s present disability resulting from cancer.

a\t the hearing before the Chancellor twelve witnesses
were introduced; most of them, including the petitioner,
testified in person. A few days after the hearing the
Chancellor filed a memorandum opinion from which
counsel prepared the final decree. The Chancellor found
the petitioner to have been totally and permanently dis-
abled as the result of his two injuries and awarded him
compensation on that basis and the full amount of his
medical expenses. The court did not allow the defend-
ants’ plea of estoppel or their contention that the peti-
tioner had made an election of remedies which precluded
his recovery in this suit of benefits on account of the
accident of October, 1968.

The defendants have appealed from the court’s decree
and have assigned errors, which are:

“1, There is no proof or medical evidence in the
record to support the Chancellor’s conclusion that
there existed a causal connection between petitioner’s
work-related injuries and the total and permanent
disability found by the Court resulting from petition-
er’s cancer or its spread.”

152 eS

“2, The Court erred in awarding petitioner medi-
cal expenses and temporary total disability payments
for the first industrial accident where petitioner had
already elected and received nonoccupational benefits
under his employer’s group insurance plans.’’

Six doctors testified; they describe the petitioner’s
condition in much detail. The uncontradicted medical
testimony was that in September, 1969, swollen lymph
nodes were removed from the petitioner’s neck and upon
examination were found to be cancerous, the type of
cancer being known. scientifically as metastatic, poorly
differentiated, squamous cell carcinoma. The cancer was
secondary to a primary cancer in some other part of
petitioner’s body but which the doctors were unable to
locate. Cancers of this type spread through the lymph,

the blood, and sometimes directly to adjacent parts of
the body. If the cancerous part of the body receives
some traumatic impact it is thought that the trauma
will cause the cancer to spread more rapidly than other-
wise it would. The petitioner’s counsel contend that this
happened because of the accident of April 2, 1969.

The averments of the petition are fully established by
the testimony of witnesses with the single exception of
the cause of the origin and spread of the petitioner’s
cancer. The case on both sides has been prepared and
tried with commendable thoroughness and the doctors’
testimony was most interesting. It appears that none of
them knows the cause of the petitioner’s cancer. Much
of their testimony is to the effect that its spread might
have been or could have been caused by the accidental
injury of April 2, 1969, when the large sheet of steel
slipped from the conveyer, fractured the toes of the
petitioner’s left foot, and caused him to strain his back

ee 153

when he pushed the steel away from his body. The
following colloquy occurred between the Chancellor and
Dr. Nicholas B, Norris:

“The Court: Doctor, considering the accident of
April 1969, in connection with the condition that pres-
ently exists physically with regard to cancer, and the
——in the petitioner, is it reasonable to conclude that
the trauma, accident of April, 1969, accelerated or
aggravated the condition that he is suffering from now
or caused it to metastasize?

“A T think it probably caused it to metastasize,
Your Honor, when he was straining to keep that steel
off him, and he may have well messed the shoulder up
in the right neck at that time.”’

The Chancellor found that ‘‘the traumatic effect of
the accidents or either of them activated a dormant con-
dition or accelerated an existing malignancy, to the ex-
tent that it was caused to spread to other parts of the
body and rendered petitioner totally and permanently
disabled.’’

This case is not the first Workmen’s Compensation
ease in which the Courts of Tennessee have had to con-
sider the cause of cancer and its spread where a claim
for compensation under that law has been made. In
Boyd et al. v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 8.W.2d 10, the
Court, speaking through Chief Justice A. B. Neil, said:

«We think there is material evidence to support the
conclusion of the trial court, conceding that the medi-
eal experts were in agreement that no one knows the
cause of cancer. We think it is reasonable to conclude
that the deceased had a cancerous condition of the

154 ee

spine at the time of the accident, because at the time
of the operation it was the size of a grapefruit and
had spread into the surrounding tissue and muscles
of the neck and upper back. It is really unreasonable
to think that this unnatural and unhealthy condition
could have developed from the time of the accident to
the time of the operation which was approximately
four months.

“The determinative issue is whether or not the lift-
ing of the thirty (30) or forty (40) pound box of
cheese by the deceased was such a strain upon the
muscles which were connected, or nearly so, with the
diseased tissues, i. e. the cancer, that it accelerated its
growth and further development and was a. contribut-
ing cause of his death. It is doubtless true that sooner
or later the deceased would have died from the cancer,
but the case is still compensable if the accident so
accelerated or aggravated it that it was a contributing
cause to the shortening of his life.”’

Hl We believe that the Chancellor’s opinion and the
decree of the court were supported by material evidence
and that we are bound by his findings. Arrowhead, Inc.
v. Gammons, 219 Tenn. 594, 412 8.W.2d 214; Brewer v.
Pocahontas Fuel Co., 221 Tenn. 130, 425 S.W.2d 582. In
Lynch v. La Rue, 198 Tenn. 101, 278 S.W.2d 85, it was
observed that ‘‘if the findings of the trial judge are sup-
ported by inferences which may reasonably be had from
the evidence, though that evidence be reasonably capable
of opposing inferences, a reviewing court will not dis-
turb those findings.’’ It follows that we overrule the
defendants’ first assignment of error.

Hl With respect to the second assignment of error
it must be noticed that when the petitioner claimed and
received benefits from John Hancock Mutual Insurance
Company and the Tennessee Hospital Service Associa-
tion, so far as the pleadings and proof show, he made no
representation to the defendants.

‘An essential element which is the basis of the law
of estoppel in pais is that one who pleads the estoppel
shall have relied on the words, acts, or omissions of
the party against whom the estoppel is asserted.”
Kelly v. Cliff Pettit Motors, Inc, 191 Tenn. 390, 234
S.W.2d 822.

So, since the petitioner made no representation to the
defendants, they did not rely on such representation and
the plea of estoppel cannot be sustained.

HM The defendants contend that by filing his claims
against the carriers of the group insurance the petitioner
made an election of remedies which precludes his assert-
ing a claim against the defendants. The record does not
disclose the terms of the policies of these two carriers
so that it cannot be successfully contended that the peti-
tioner made an election of remedies. For there to be
such an election a party must choose one which is in-
consistent. with another that may be available to him.
Such has not been shown to be the case in this suit.

In White v. Henry, 199 Tenn. 219, 285 S.W.2d 353, it
was said:

“‘ Appellants, in making such insistence, have, we
think, overlooked the fact that in order for such an‘
election of remedies to be irrevocable, the remedies
must be inconsistent, Grizzard v. Fite, 187 Tenn. 103,

156 es

107, 191 S.W. 969, L.R.A.1917D, 652, and have over-
looked the fact that the two remedies involved here
are not inconsistent. This is because there may be
error of law apparent in the decree, without regard
to whether the preceding order pro confesso was
legally entered.’’

Hl Neither John Hancock Mutual Insurance Company
nor Tennessee Hospital Service Association is a party to
this suit. The fact that either or both of these companies
made payments to the petitioner to which he was not
entitled does not give the defendants a right to such funds
by offset or otherwise.

In American Bridge Division, United States Steel
Corp. v. McClung, 206 Tenn. 317, 333 S.W.2d 557, this
Court said:

‘‘With reference to assignment 8, it appears that sub-
stantial payments of non-occupational benefits were
made by the insurance Company and hospital benefits
under the Blue Cross. The Company now insists that
it is entitled to credit or setoff of these payments.
We do not think so. The only thing paid out by the
Company in this regard was one-half of the premium,
the other half of which was paid by the petitioner. If
on any basis these payments are to be recovered by
anybody, they would necessarily be recovered by the
person or firm making the payments. Neither of these
non-occupational insurors, however, is a party in this
action and we do not see how the question is relevant
in any way.’’

The second assignment of error is overruled.

We affirm the decree of the chancery court.

ee 157

Dyer, Cumr Justion, and Cuarrin, Creson and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

Opmvion on Perrrion to REHEAR
Mr. Justice McCanuzss.

Koehring-Southern and American Mutual Insurance
Company have filed a petition to rehear by which they
insist that the Court’s opinion contains errors which
require a conclusion other than that announced. The
petition, however, contains no matter which the Court
did not fully consider while the case was under advise-
ment.

We, therefore, overrule the petition to rehear.

Dver, Ourer Jusricz, and Cuarrin, Crrson and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

158

Jacos G. Mune, Plaintiff-in-Error,
v.

Dennis R. Souns, Defendant-in-Error.
464 S.W.2d 824
(Knoaville, September Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed March 1, 1971,

C. S. Ramwarer, Jz., Rarvwater & Rarnwarer, Dan-
dridge, for plaintiff in error.

re 159

J. Wayne Woirenparcer, Rutledge, for defendant in
error.

Mr. Justice Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals, East-
ern Section, in this case because it involves the Uniform

160 ee

Contribution Among Tort Feasors Act: the particular
question being whether the Act could be applied retroac-
tively under the facts of this case.

Sohns filed suit for personal injury and property dam-
age against Miller, Jurich and Phelps, after a three-car
accident involving the parties, in which Sohns was in-
jured.

On August 21, 1968, immediately prior to trial Sohns
entered into a covenant not to sue with defendants Phelps
and Jurich in consideration of their payment to him of
$5,000.00. Sohns then took a voluntary nonsuit as to these
defendants. The case then proceeded to trial against
Miller on that same day, with the jury returning a ver-
dict against Miller for $5,000.00.

Again, on that same day, defendant Miller, relying on
the Uniform Contribution Among Tort Feasors Act,
T.C.A. sec. 23-3101, et seq., orally and in writing, moved
the court to reduce the amount of the judgment by the
sume of $5,000.00, because that was the amount paid to
Sohns for his covenant not to sue. Defendant Miller also
filed a motion for a new trial.

After hearing, both motions were overruled, at which
time the trial judge suggested a remittitur of $300.00,
which was accepted by plaintiff Sohns. Judgment was
then entered in the amount of $4,700.00 in favor of Sohns
and against defendant Miller.

Miller appealed to the Court of Appeals, Eastern Sec-
tion, assigning as error (1) that there was no evidence
to support the verdict, and (2) that the court erred in
overruling defendant’s motion to reduce the verdict and
judgment by the amount the plaintiff had been paid for

ee 161

his covenant uot to sue, all in accordance with a pro-
vision of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort
Feasors Act, T.C.A. sec, 23-3105."

The first assignment of error, respecting the evidence,
was overruled, the Court of Appeals holding, with which
we agree, was that there is evidence to support the ver-
dict of the jury.

The second assignment of error was overruled, and
lecause of the novelty of the question, and the involve-
ment of the new statute, we granted certiorari.

The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act
became law in this State on April 3, 1968. This accident
oceurred on October 29, 1967. The covenant not to sue
was made on August 21, 1968, the day of the trial.

Hl The argument in the Court of Appeals and here
is that this particular part of the Act affects only the
parties’ remedies and does not alter their substantive
yights, so that it has retroactive application as a pro-

‘23.3105. Effect of release or covenant not to sue upon liability
of other tort-feasors.—When a release or covenant not to sue or not
to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one (1) of two (2) or
more persons Hable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful
death; .

“(a) It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide;
but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount
of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and

“(b) It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all
liability for contribution to any other tort-feasor.

“(c) No evidence of a release or covenant not to sue received by
another tort-feasor or payment therefor may be introduced by a
defendant at the trial of an action by a claimant for injury or wrong-
ful death, but may be introduced upon motion after judgment to re-
duce a judgment by the amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant or by the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever
is greater.”

162: ee)

cedural, remedial statute. As did the Court of Appeals,
we disagree.

At the time of the occurrence of the accident, October
29, 1967, at. which time the substantive rights of plaintiff
Sohns accrued, one of these rights was for a considera-
tion, to make a covenant not to sue, without the amount
paid by the alleged joint tort-feasor reducing the amount
he might recover in a subsequent suit.

History of a Lawsuit, 7th Hd., sec. 266, at page 307,
says with respect to this, the following:

‘‘A mere covenant not to sue one of two or more
wrongdoers does not operate to extinguish the plain-
tiff’s right of action against the others and cannot be
pleaded in bar by them; nor can the sum received by
the plaintiff under it be shown by the defendant in
mitigation of damages.’

This text is supported by citation of a number of cases
by this Court and the Court of Appeals.

So, the question is, in view of this impairment of
Sohns’ substantive, valuable right, will this Court con-
strue this particular section of the Act as applying retro-
actively. And, the answer must be, in accordance with
rules of law well settled in this State, that the Act will
not be so construed and applied.

Hl This general rule derives from the Constitution
of Tennessee, Article 1, sec, 20, providing ‘‘that no retro-
spective law, or law impairing the obligations of con-
tracts, shall be made.’? While this. constitutional pro-
vision does not mean that absolutely no retrospective
law shall be made it does forbid the making of any law
which divests or impairs vested rights. Pursuant to this

| 163

constitutional provision it was expressly held in Chicago,
St. L. & N. O. RB. Co. v. Pownds, 79 Tenn. 127 (1883),
“that the rights of parties, growing out of personal in-
juries fixed under existing law, cannot be changed by
subsequent laws.’’

Again, in Hannum. v. MeIniurf, 65 Tenn. 225, it is made
clear that the test of impairment is whether the right in
full existing at the time of its accrual would be dimin-
ished by application of the statute.

This general proposition is dealt with in the innumera-
ble cases annotated under Article 1, sec. 20, Constitution
of Tennessee, annotated in Vol. 1 of T.C.A.

Since, as the trial court, the Court of Appeals and this
Court find, the application of the statute would impair a
right vested in plaintiff Sohns at the time of the commis-
sion of the tort against him, the statute cannot be so
applied. The judgment of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are affirmed.

Dyer, Cuter Justice, Caarrmy and McCanuzss, Jus-
tics, and Jenkins, Speciau Justice, concur,

164 ee

Tuomas D. Benson, Commissioner of the
Department of Revenue, State of
Tennessee, Plaintiff-in-Error,

Vv

Unrrep Starrs Stemi Corporation,
Defendant-in-Error.

465 S.W.2d 124

(Nashwilie, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed March 1, 1971.

ee 165

Dav M. Pack, Attorney General, Paun E, Jennies,
Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, for plaintiff in
error.

Tyres B. Tiarris, IV, Hooxer, Knesin, Dopson & Har-
zis, Nashville, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Crzson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause comes before the Court for review of a
judgment of the Circuit Court of Davidson County.

In the course of this opinion, the parties will be re-
ferred to as they appeared in the court below; that is,
United States Steel Corporation, plaintiff, and Thomas
D. Benson, Commissioner of Revenue, defendant.

United States Steel is a foreign corporation, domesti-
cated under the laws of Tennessee. The defendant,
Thomas D. Benson, is the Commissioner of Revenue, and
is a litigant in this suit in his official capacity only.

The controversy revolves around the meaning and ap-
plication of T.C.A. sec. 67-3004—Application of property
by contractor—, T.C.A. see. 67-3026—Interest and pen-

166 es

alties for delinquency—, and T.C.A. sec. 67-101(12)—
Powers of Commissioner of Revenue.

The facts as they appear from the record are that
plaintiff is engaged in the manufacture, distribution,
erection and use of steel and steel products, and particu-
larly, in this case, fabricated steel for use in bridges
constructed by its American Bridge Division. Prior to
March, 1957, plaintiff reported and paid its sales and
use tax owed to Tennessee based upon the fair market
value of its steel when used, pursuant to T.C.A. sec. 67-
3004, That statute then read, in part:

“Application of property by contractor—Where a
manufacturer, producer, compounder or contractor
erects or applies tangible personal property, which he
has manofactured, produced, compounded or severed
from the earth, for the account of or under contract
with the owner of realty or other property, such per-
son so using the tangible personal property shall pay
the tax herein levied on the fair market value of such
tangible personal property when used, without any de-
ductions whatsoever.’’

In March, 1957, the Legislature amended that statute to
read in part as follows:

“provided, however, the foregoing shall not be con-
strued to apply to contractors or subcontractors who
fabricate, erect or apply tangible personal property
which becomes a component part of a building, and
which is not sold by them as a manufactured item.’’

Upon passage of that amendment plaintiff changed its
tax basis, from the fair market value of fabricated steel
when used, to the cost price of the materials purchased

ee 167

or acquired by plaintiff and used in fabricating the steel
used in Tennessee.

Plaintiff's tax representative explained that after care-
ful study and analysis, the tax department of United
States Steel concluded that the amendment applied to it
because United States Steel sold fabricated steel only by
design and. specification, and never ‘‘shelved’’ or stock-
piled it and sold it as a ‘‘manufactured item.’’ Testi-
mony of the State showed that the cost to United States
Steel of raw materials to manufacture steel is $9.88 per
ton, as compared with $120.00 per ton of steel at final
fabrication.

Approximately one year later, in April, 1958, the
American Bridge Division of United States Steel was
audited by the Department of Revenue for the period

from January 1, 1953 through February 2, 1958. At this
point, there appear confusion and conflict in the testi-
mony as to what was said to plaintiff’s tax representa-
tive conducting the audit on behalf of the corporation.
Plaintiff claims that the three auditors from Tennessee
were advised fully of its change in tax basis; that Mr.
Roy W. Webb, the auditor in charge, was noncommittal
and advised plaintiff that he would report its change to
his supervisor in Nashville; and if the new basis was
wrong, plaintiff would hear from the Revenue Depart-
ment. To buttress its claim, plaintiff introduced into evi-
dence a memo dated 4/25/58, and written by Mr. R. G.
Gourley, plaintiff’s tax representative at the audit, two
days after the audit was completed. It stated, in effect,
what transpired during the audit; that the State auditors
were made aware of plaintiff’s change in tax basis; but
that plaintiff would hear from the Commissioner in Nash-
ville if the change met with disapproval.

168 es

The testimony of Mr. Roy Webb for the Revenue De-
partment is uncertain and confused although, in essence,
contrary to that of the plaintiff. Mr. Webb admitted that
he could not recall in detail his conversation with Mr.
R. G. Gourley, nor all that transpired while he was there.
He did testify that he and two other auditors were in
Pittsburgh, Pa., in April, 1958, auditing the sales division
of American Bridge; that while there, he was informed
by plaintiff that it had changed its tax basis on fabri-
eated steel pursuant to amended T.C.A. sec. 67-3004; that
he informed plaintiff’s tax representatives then that the
changed basis was wrong, and the tax basis was ‘‘* * *
on the fabricating labor on any of the products that they
used in building the bridges.’’? Mr. Webb further testi-
fied that he did not recall advising Mr. Gourley spe-
cifically that he would hear from Nashville, but did recall
that upon arriving in Nashville, he reported to Mr. Ken-
neth Herrell and advised him that the department should
make an audit of the contracting division of American
Bridge because ‘‘* * * I felt like if they didn’t change
iheir method of keeping tax that they would owe us a
sizeable amount of tax.’’ Finally, under thorough cross-
examination by plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Webb admitted
that the memo he wrote on January 17, 1967, to Mr.
Kenneth Herrell, recalling the audit of American Bridge
in Pittsburgh, Pa., in April, 1958, was lacking in many
respects because his recollection of what actually tran-
spired was vague; and that the construction contract
books of American Bridge were not examined even
though he knew that it had changed its method of com-
puting the use tax owed to Tennessee on construction
contracts.

Testimony by Mr. R. G. Gourley, plaintiff’s only wit-
uess, disputed Mr. Webb’s testimony with regard to the

| 169

audit in April, 1958, at almost every point. With regard
to American Bridge’s construction contract books, Mr.
Gourley testified :

“OROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. RICE:

Q.

Mr. Gourley, were you requested to furnish any
records relating to American Bridge contracting
operations?

. Yes, sir.

. What was the purpose of the request, what was

your understanding of the purpose?

. For the auditors to audit our construction cost and

basis we were using in reporting use tax to the
State of Tennessee.

. Was any liability—
. Yes, sir.
. —discovered on either of these dates?

. Yes, sir. No additional liability, I mean, there was

reported liability but no additional assessed lia-
bility on the audit report due to construction ac-
tivities.

. You think you understand the difference under the

State tax law in sales by a corporation and con-
tracts entered into by a corporation?

. Yes, sir.

. And they specifically asked you for records con-

cerning contracts by American Bridge Company?

. Yes, sir, construction contracts.

o

Oo >

AL

o

AL

Q.

. As distinguished from sales?

. As distinguished from sales.

. And they found only approximately one hundred

dollars additional liability by you on two questiona-
ble transactions?

. Initially there were more than two questionable

transactions but later the exemption certificates
were furnished by the vendors and so forth. In the
final analysis I think it resulted in two transactions,
sales transactions being taxable.

. Did you consider that they saw all the records they

would need to make a complete audit of American
Bridge Company during the time they were there?

Yes, sir.

. Do you think such an audit could he made in two

or three days?

Yes, sir.

. You disagree with Mr. Webb’s statement that it

would take about four weeks to do that?

. I make this statement on the basis of my experi-

ence in conducting audits with other States.

Would there not have to be some cost analysis type
audit made to determine if the liability that Ameri-
can Bridge Company might have just on account of
the use of the raw material tax basis reported un-
der Tennessee Use Tax?

| IL

A. Yes, and those cost records were made available
and we scrutinized them closely and went over them
line for line.

Q. You would then contradict Mr. Webb when he says
such an audit would take three to four weeks?

A. I would, yes, sir.’’

Nevertheless, the proof shows that plaintiff heard
nothing more from the Department of Revenue, and con-
tinued to make its returns and pay its tax computed on
the cost of the raw materials to manufacture steel beams
used in construction of bridges. In July, 1965, during a
conference in Nashville, plaintiff was informed that an
audit was going to be conducted on the construction con-
tracts of its American Bridge Division. In late 1966, such
an audit was conducted for the period from November 1,
1960, through September 30, 1966, and plaintiff was as-
sessed a tax deficiency of $196,811.24; including $33,-
567.45 penalty.

On December 19, 1966, plaintiff paid the assessment in
full, acquiescing in the Revenue Department’s interpre-
tation of the 1957 amendment to T.C.A. see, 67-3004, as
excluding plaintiff corporation from the effect of the
amendment. The $33,567.45 penalty was paid under pro-
test, however, and plaintiff immediately filed a petition,
pursuant to T.C.A. sec. 67-101(12), with the Commis-
sioner of Revenue for a waiver of penalty. In addition,
to avoid the statute of limitations, plaintiff filed an action
in Cireuit Court, pursuant to T.C.A. sec. 67-2301 et seq.,
seeking recovery only of the sum collected as penalty.

172 ee

In early January, 1967, prior to trial, the Commis-
sioner of Revenue, under the supervision of Mr. Ken-
neth Herrell, wrote a Memorandum of Finding of Facts,
and filed a copy with the Attorney General, pursuant to
T.C.A. sec. 67-101 (12). Said Memorandum stated the sub-
stance of plaintiff’s claim for waiver of penalty, and con-
cluded that $17,948.47 of the aforementioned penalty
should be waived and refunded to plaintiff corporation
on the ground it reflected that portion of the tax that was
assessed on

««* * * special fabrication and transportation charges
applicable to personal property when the articles were
applied to structures, other than buildings.’’;

and that $14,572.87 of the aforementioned penalty should
not be waived because it reflected that portion of the tax
that was assessed on the fair market value of fabricated
«# * * standard items of tangible, personal property usu-
ally and normally sold by United States Steel Corpora-
tion.’? The Memorandum showed further that the
remaining portion of the penalty, some $1,046.11, re-
flected the tax assessed on equipment imported into Ten-
nessee and used by plaintiff in Tennessee.

The record reveals that plaintiff did not contest the
$1,046.11 of the penalty, but sought only to recover the
$14,572.87 disallowed by the Commissioner.

Further, proof by the plaintiff showed that the Attor-
ney General’s Office did not concur initially with the
Commissioner’s memorandum; that during a conference
in September, 1967, with the Attorney General, plaintiff’s
tax representative explained what had transpired be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, what plaintiff’s under-
standing of its tax basis should be; and that at some

| 173

later date, the Attorney General concurred; and plain-
tiff received a check for the sum of $17,948.47.

In the court below, Judge James Swiggart, writing a
memorandum opinion, ordered the Commissioner to re-
fund to United States Steel the remaining $14,572.87,
plus $2,513.83 interest; a total of $17,086.69 (sic).

Judge Swiggart was of opinion that although the dis-
cretionary power of the Commissioner under T.C.A. sec.
67-101(12) was not subject to judicial review, suit could
still be brought against the Commissioner pursuant to
T.C.A. sec. 67-2301, et seq., because the refund for penal-
ties illegally assessed became a matter of right rather
than discretion. Judge Swiggart then limited his decision
to whether plaintiff was legally entitled to a refund of
the penalty and found that it was, on two grounds:

First, that T.C.A. sec. 67-3026, which authorized as-
sessment of penalties, was ambiguous in that it could
be interpreted ‘‘* * * as imposing one or two condi-
tions upon the imposition of penalty.’’; that under the
rule stated in Tennessee Products and Chemical Corp.
». Dickinson (1953), 195 Tenn. 63, 256 S.W.2d 709,
T.C.A. sec. 67-3026 must be construed ‘‘liberally in
favor of the taxpayer’’; and therefore, if the taxpayer
either makes a return or pays the tax, though not the
proper amount of tax, there can be no penalty, in ab-
sence of fraud.

Second, that the case of East Tennessee Brewing Co.
v. Currier (1912), 126 Tenn. 535, 150 S.W. 541, estab-
lished the long standing rule in Tennessee that the
courts have authority to refuse enforcement of a pen-
alty where the taxpayer was honestly mistaken as to
the amount of tax owed, or that the taxpayer was sin-

174 ee)

cerely doubtful of the validity of the tax. Judge Swig-
gart stated that, although this suit is brought in Cir-
cuit Court, the court has concurrent jurisdiction with
Chancery to consider tax refunds on equitable princi-
ples in cases brought pursuant to T.C.A. sec, 67-2308;
and that in the case at bar, where the only dispute is
the method of valuation, there can be no penalty as-
sessed without first a demand from the State.

“Penalties are for the evasive, careless, negligent or
recalcitrant taxpayer, not for those who act in good
faith by filing returns covering the transaction in
question.’

The Commissioner of Revenue has perfected an ap-
peal to this Court, and has assigned three errors. They
are:

“1, The lower court erred in ordering a refund of pen-
alties imposed by Legislature through statutory
directives for the reason that it had no jurisdic-
tion to entertain such suit.

2. The lower court erred in holding that the penal-
ties herein were illegally assessed and in holding
that T.C.A. Section 67-3026 was ambiguous in its
requirement that a return be filed and the tax be
paid.

3. Even if the lower court has jurisdiction to grant
the relief prayed, it erred in its determination that
‘equity principles’ were applicable in the instant
case.””

By the first assignment of error the defendant contests

the jurisdiction of the courts of Tennessee to remit the
penalty here involved. For this insistence, the cases of

| 15

Swarte v. Atkins (1958) 204 Tenn. 28, 315 8.W.2d 393;
Combustion Engineering Co. v. McFarland (1961) 209
Tenn. 75, 349 S.W.2d 188; and General Electric Co. v.
Butler (1962) 211 Tenn. 196, 364 S.W. 2d 361, are relied
upon. The argument is ‘‘that the door is closed on further
litigation in the area of sales tax penalties so far as the
sales tax statute itself, or the equitable powers of the
court, might be regarded as offering an avenue of relief.”’

Anyone advising the Commissioner of Revenue or the
Legislature in this connection, or the Judge designated
to write an opinion of this Court on the subject, would
be remiss, indeed, if the opinion in Hast Tennessee Brew-
ing Co. v. Currier (1912) 126 Tenn. 535 150 S.W. 541 was
not revisited. There, then Mr. Justice Grafton Green,
later the revered Chief Justice of this Court for decades,
with characteristic industry, discrimination, eloquence
and a profound knowledge of the principles involved,
splendidly delineated the privilege taxing power of the
State, limitations upon the taxpayer’s right of challenge,
and the traditional jurisdiction of the judiciary of Ten-
nessee to remit illegal or inequitable penalties. The prin-
ciples there stated, or restated, are as valuable and virile
today as they were then.

This brings us to consideration of just what is the
true rationale of the cases so emphatically relied upon
by defendant Commissioner. The brief on behalf of Com-
missioner appears to take great comfort from the opinion
in General Electric Co. +. Butler, supra, as stating the
proposition that a mistaken interpretation of the law re-
lating to sales and use tax on the part of the taxpayer is
not sufficient to authorize remittance of penalty. Close
examination of that opinion reveals that the substance of
the case was certain sales made by General Electric to

176 es

vendees possessing resale certificates. However, on ex-
amination of the record, the Court found that even
though said vendees possessed resale certificates, Gen-
eral Electric knew, or should have known, that its prod-
ucts were, in fact, being purchased for ultimate use; this,
because of the obvious nature of the vendee’s business.
Citing the prior opinion in Swartz v. Atkins, supra, the
holding of the Court is that equity was not properly in-
voked for the reason that General Electric should have
avoided the prejudicial situation in which it later found
itself. The gravamen of what was said there is that equity
could not rightly be invoked to remit the interest and
penalty sued for because General Hlectrie should have
known that its merchandise was, in fact, being purchased
for ultimate consumption—that is, that the taxpayer’s
dilemma was referrable to nothing other than its own
negligence of omission.

In Combustion Engineering Co. v. McFarland, supra,
the case was heard on stipulated facts. Consideration of
this opinion reflects ‘‘that in each instance the failure to
report certain items was due to errors, oversights, im-
proper coding of machines * * * of its various record
keepers and accountants, whose duty it was to attend to
this phase of the business.’’ Further, the Court laid much
stress on the fact that the stipulation did not show that
the failure to make timely tax returns on these several
items was due to the taxpayer being misled.

In the case of Swarte v. Atkins, the Court was con-
fronted with the situation that penalties were based upon
the taxpayer’s failure, for some four or five years, to
pay the base use tax on various machines which were
placed on locations in restaurants and other public places
for the purpose of testing, demonstrating and advertising

es V7

them, which machines were at all time for sale. The rea-
son advanced by the taxpayer, though stated variously,
in its essence is that he was unaware of the fact that
such taxes were owed. This resolves itself to nothing
more than a taxpayer’s reliance upon his isolated per-
sonal ignorance of the import of the sales and use tax
law, not inspired in anywise by the Tax Department’s
action or inaction.

It can fairly be said that, in the instant case, the tax-
payer’s primary reliance is upon this Court’s former
opinion in Tennessee Products and Chemical. Corp. v.
Dickinson (1953) 195 Tenn. 63, 256 S.W. 2d 709. This
prior opinion is relied upon by the taxpayer for the fun-
damental proposition that where the equities of the case
demand, the courts will exercise their power to remit
penalties imposed under the sales and use tax act. In
that case, the Court relieved the taxpayer of penalties
imposed under the Sales and Use Tax Act for the reason
that the equities of the case so demanded. The opinion
makes it clear that at the time of the accrual of the pen-
alties involved, the Sales and Use Tax Act was complex,
provocative of much uncertainty, and new. The case was
heard on bill and answer.

While the defendant in the instant case seems to hold
the decision in Tennessee Products and Chemical Corp.
v. Dickinson, supra, up to some scorn, we cannot agree.
It is, however, correct to say that later decisions, herein
cited, have distinguished that case in the process of con-
cluding in each of these later cases that complainants
therein had not made out a case for equitable relief. We
must concede, also, that the later decisions have, to a
degree, limited application of some of the broad language
of that case, particularly that which places emphasis on

178 Ce]

(1) the complexity of the statute when new; and (2) that
a misunderstanding of the extent of liability on the part
of the taxpayer, standing alone, would justify granting
equitable relief against penalties. However, it simply can-
not be said that this Court has overruled that case; and,
indeed, it must be said that none of the subsequent cases
lave impugned the basic principle of the Tennessee Prod-
ucts case—that where the equities demand, the Courts
will exercise their power to remit penalties.

Hl in support of its third assignment of error, de-
fendant cites T.C.A. sec. 67-101 (12), arguing that when
the Legislature amended that Section in 1965, the Com-
missioner of Revenue was given discretionary authority
{o waive statutory penalties. The argument continues,
however, to the conclusion that the Legislature thus
manifested an intent to make waiver of tax penalties ex-
clusively an administrative matter within the discretion
of the Commissioner. It seems to us, and we hold, that
the above constitutes uo more than an alternative to the
traditional right of the taxpayer to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of equity to roid those penalties justifiably found to
be illegal or inequitable. That is to say, that the statute
just alluded to, and the amendment thereof, authorize
the Commissioner, in proper cases, to avoid some of the
voluminous litigation which this rather complex tax
statute has provoked. .

It is worthy of note that following the 1965 amend-
ment to T.C.A. sec. 67-101, the Attorney General’s Office,
upon request, produced ‘‘guidelines’’ to be used by the
Commissioner in determining what cases present a good
and reasonable cause for penalty relief. Those guidelines
are as follows:

P| 179

‘*(1) The taxpayer incurred the deficiency as a result
of having been misled by erroneous advice upon the
part of officials charged with the enforcement of the
statute.

(2) The taxpayer incurred the deficiency as a result of
legal misadvice from an ostensibly competent inde-
pendent source (lawyer, accountant, etc.).

(3) The provisions of the pertinent law or regulations
were at the time the deficiency was incurred unsettled,
unclear or misleading to a reasonable person and the
taxpayer acted in good faith upon a reasonable though
mistaken application of such law or regulations, with
the result that the tax deficiency in question was in-
curred.

(4) The deficiency resulted from reliance by the tax-
payer upon factual misrepresentations made by per-
sons with whom he dealt in the course of his business,
the taxpayer having no reason to doubt or question
such misrepresentations.’?

‘While we wish to make it entirely clear that this Court
docs not at all mean to imply any ulterior motives, this
record does support the insistence of plaintiff as to its
being misled by the course of events at the time of and
following the original discussion between the auditors of
plaintiff and those of defendant.

HM With regard to defendant’s second assignment of
error, we must point out that the lower court did not hold
that the penalties were ‘‘illegally assessed’’. That court
held, rather, that the penalties were not ‘‘properly as-
sessed under the statute’’. The defendant argues against
the conclusion of the court below that T.C.A. sec, 67-3026

180 |

was ambiguous, as a basis for the conclusion there
reached, We do not deem this to need discussion. If the
trial court reached the correct result, the judgment below
is entitled to affirmance, irrespective of the reason stated.

Hl In conclusion, the Court is of opinion that the fore-
going clearly brings this case within the rationale of
Tennessee Products and Chemical Corp. v. Dickinson,
supra, and the principle there stated and reiterated in
subsequent cases; that is, that where the equities of the
ease demand, the Court will exercise its power to remit
tax penalties.

It follows, therefore, that defendant’s assignments of
error are overruled for the reasons above stated; and the
judgment of the lower court affirmed, without costs to
plaintiff.

Dyer, Curer Jusricz, and Cuarrix, Jusricz, concur.

Humpureys and McCanuess, Justices, not participat-
ing.

| 181

Harrera Vatiey Urirrms Districr or Davinson AND
Wruitamson Countiss and Steel City Construction Com-
pany for the use and benefit of the United States Fidelity

and Guaranty Company

James P. Duz and James H. Campzrenu, partners, d/b/a
Campbell and Due Contractors, or Campbell and Due
Construction Company.

465 §.W.2d 353.
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed March 1, 1971.

Petition for Rehearing Denied April 5, 1971.

182 re
|

GooppasturE, Carpenter, Woops & Courryey, Nash-
fille, for complainants-respondents.

J. Suursy Corry, Jz., Columbia, for defendants-
petitioners.

Mr. Justice McCannuss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

ee 183

Harpeth Valley Utilities District of Davidson and
Williamson Counties filed their bill for the use of United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company against James
P. Due and James H. Campbell, partners, doing business
as Campbell and Due Contractors, or Campbell and Due
Construction Company. From a decree for the defend-
ants the complainants appealed to the Court of Appeals,
who, by a divided Court, reversed the Chancery Court
and from their decree the defendants have filed a peti-
tion for the writ of certiorari which we have granted.
For convenience and clarity we shall refer to the parties
as the complainant and the defendants, respectively.

The facts which gave rise to this suit, and about which
there is no serious dispute, are these:

The complainant contracted with Steel City Construc-
tion Company to install a water distribution system,
Steel City Construction Company, in turn, entered into
a sub-contract with the defendants. The sub-contract
contained the following provision:

“Indemnity agreement: the Subcontractor covenants
to indemnity and save harmless and exonerate the
Contractor and the Owner of and from all liability,
claims and demands for bodily injury and property
damage arising out of the work undertaken by the
Subcontractor, its employees, agents or its subcontrac-
tors, and arising out of any other operation no matter
by whom performed for and on behalf of the Sub-
contractor, whether or not due in whole or in part to
conditions, acts or omissions done or permitted by the
Contractor or Owner.”

Persons brought suits for damages against the com-
plainant and the defendants by which the plaintiffs

184 es

therein sought recoveries for death, personal injuries
and property damages which they alleged resulted from
the removal by the defendants of a sign at a highway
intersection. The complainants demanded of the defend-
ants that they defend the damage suits and hold the
complainants harmless from the claims therein asserted
in accordance with the indemnity provision in the sub-
contract, above quoted. The defendants failed to defend
the damage suits and upon such failure the complainant’s
insurer, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company,
employed attorneys to defend them and it is to recover
the fees and expenses of the attorneys that the com-
plainants brought this suit.

The defendants interposed a demurrer to the com-
plainant’s bill which the court overruled. The defendants
then answered, testimony was introduced, and when the
court heard the case on the merits the Chancellor dis-
missed the bill for want of sufficient evidence. The com-
plainant appealed and the Court of Appeals in reversing
the Chancery Court held that the decree overruling the
demurrer became the law of the case and that the de-
fenses made by their demurrer no longer were available
to the defendants. The Court of Appeals found that the
complainant was entitled to a recovery and awarded a
decree against the defendants for the amount of the fees
and expenses paid by the insurer of the complainant to
the complainant’s attorneys for their services.

The defendants in support of their petition for certi-
ovavi have assigned errors, as follows:

Hl (1) The Court of Appeals was in error in holding
that it was without authority to reexamine the merits
of the cause de novo but was bound by the preliminary

De 185

action of the Chancellor overruling the demurrer. We
sustain this assignment of error. With the defendants’
answer they include the grounds on which they had
relied in their demurrer and these grounds were subject
to review by the Court of Appeals and now by us. Judge
Felts in his opinion in Third National Bank in Nashville
v. Carter, 31 Tenn.App. 520, 218 S.W.2d 66, said:

“Tt is said for the bank that the Chancellor over-
ruled the demurrers without granting appellants leave
to rely upon the demurrers in their answers and that
this ruling was final and is not now open to review.
It is true it was final and binding upon the Chancellor.
Upon appeal, however, it is open to review by the
appellate courts. Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, 3d Ed.,
sec. 315; Boyd v. Sims, 87 Tenn. 771, 774, 11 S.W. 948;
Evans v. White et al. 184 Tenn, 435, 441, 201 S.W.2d
207."

Hl (2) The defendants by their second assignment
averred that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the complainants were entitled to recover the attorney’s
fees under the indemnity agreement above quoted. It
is our opinion, and we hold, that under the facts of the
case and because of the neglect of the defendants to pro-
tect them from liability it became necessary for the
complainants and their insurer to engage the services
of attorneys to protect their interest in the damage suits
that had been filed against them.

Our Court in City of Bristol v. Bostwick, 146 Tenn.
205, 240 S.W, 774, said:
“The language of the bond assuring the city indemnity

is plain, broad, and unambiguous; it is an undertaking
by the surety, for compensation, to hold the city harm-

186 ee

less against claims of every description incurred in
suits or otherwise growing out of the prosecution of
the work. That the city rightfully brought suit to
enforce the obligations of the defendants has been
determined, and it is clear that the bond is sufficiently
comprehensive to include the fees of counsel incurred
by the city in good faith and made necessary by reason
of the default of the contractor for whose faithful per-
formance the surety stood bound.”’

The indemnity agreement on which the complainants
rely and which is the basis of their suit is broad enough
to include the right to recover the attorneys’ fees which
the defendants’ refusal to act made it necessary for the
complainants to incur. We overrule this assignment of
error.

(8) We consider that the third assignment of error
in which the defendants except to the action of the Court
of Appeals in holding that the complainant’s insurer
was subrogated to the rights of the insured need not be
noticed in view of our treatment of the other assign-
ments.

(4) The defendants have assigned as error the
amount of the judgment and deeree of the court awarded
the complainants and against them. We find that the
amount of the fee was $1,750.00 and the expenses in-
curred were $234.70, a total of $1,984.70 for which we
award a decree in favor of the complainants and against
the defendants with interest from April 5, 1966, the date
of the filing of the bill, and the costs of the cause in-
cluding the costs of the appeal.

Dyzr, Cuter Justics, and Cxarrin, Creson and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

| 187

Lowe Smexogr and Linnie Smetcer b/n/f
Lucy Kate Smelcer

Rozerr (Bossy) BroyiEes
465 S.W.2d 355.
(Knoaville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed March 1, 1971.

Petition for Rehearing Denied April 5, 1971,

188 a
Pe

Ben K. Wexuer, Kyte K. Kine, Greeneville, for ap-
pellant.

Joun A. Armstrong, Greeneville, for appellee.

Mr. Justice McCanuzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This suit involves the validity of orders of the Ju-
venile Court in a proceeding under Chapter 2 of Title
36, Tennessee Code Annotated, enacted originally as
Chapter 186 of the Public Acts of 1955. The record shows
that the parties introduced no evidence in the proceeding
and that the orders were entered by consent and on
motions based entirely on the record.

The petitioner by her petition filed July 6, 1967, al-
leged that she, an unmarried woman, had become the

ee 189

mother of a child of which the defendant was the father
and she prayed that he be required to furnish education
and support for the child. On July 28, 1967, an order
was entered by agreement by which it was adjudged
that the defendant should pay petitioner $40.00 a month
for the support of the child until such time as the child
should reach the age of eighteen years or be sooner
emancipated and the petitioner’s attorney $100.00. The
defendant personally, by his own signature, approved
the order.

By a pleading filed on December 4, 1969, the petitioner
averred that the defendant had made none of the
monthly payments and was in arrears in the amount of
$400.00, and prayed that process issue for the de-
fendant compelling him to appear before the court on
December 12, 1969, and be required to pay the petitioner
the amount in arrears and give bond for the making of
future payments. On February 27, 1970, on motion of
the defendant, all the parties being present, the court
declared the order of July 28, 1967, coram non judice
and void because the defendant had not been adjudged
to be the father of the child. The order bears date of
March 2, 1970.

Hl The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
who transferred the case to this Court. The Court of
Appeals properly transferred the appeal. The orders
were by agreement and on motion upon consideration
of the record. The case was ‘‘finally determined in the
lower court on demurrer or other method not involving
a review or determination of the facts, or in which all
the facts have been stipulated.’’ Section 16-408, T.C.A.
The provision of Section 36-235, T.C.A., that appeals in
proceedings of this nature shall be to the Court of Ap-

190 |

peals must be read along with Section 16-408, T.C.A.,
and the appeals in such cases must be to the Supreme
Court when the judgments of the Juvenile Court are
entered by consent of the parties and without the intro-
duction of evidence,

HM We have here a consent order—one which, under
the holding of our Court, can be impeached only for
fraud in its procurement and the defendant does not so
much as suggest that he was imposed upon in the pro-
curement of the judgment. In Boyce v. Stantion, 83
Tenn, 346, this Court said of consent decrees:

“‘The record imports absolute verity, and the parties
may not contradict its recitals. It recites that certain
parties appeared and admitted certain facts, and there-
fore, by agreement of parties, certain things are de-
creed; that is, the parties described make an agreement
in open court, not only as to what the facts are, but
also what are the legal consequences. It is a written
judicial contract, duly acknowledged and executed, and
conclusive upon the parties. It may be impeached and
rescinded for fraud in its procurement; but otherwise
it must stand. The parties may not appeal from it, or
otherwise correct its error. They may not recede from
it, or withdraw their consent to it. Of course protest
and exception avail them nothing (Dillard v. Harris,
2 Tenn.Ch., 196), except as mere notice of the dis-
satisfaction of the parties so protesting and except-
ing.”

I The defendant insists that since the court did not
adjudge that he was the father of the petitioner’s child

ee 191
the court was without jurisdiction to enter its order
requiring him: to provide monthly support for the child.
We cannot agree with this contention. In Steele v.

Register, a bastardy case, decided in 1816, and reported
in 4 Tenn. 37, the Court said:

“On the 25th of October, 1814, the County Court or-
dered a capias upon a former warrant not returned.
This capias was executed and returned to the same
court at the same term at which he entered into bond
to indemnify the county against a bastard child. The
Court gave judgment against him for the fine. At the
same term, a motion was made for an allowance. It
was continued on the defendant’s affidavit to February
term, 1815; then continued again to April, 1815. Both
appeared then, and, on motion, an order is made for
three and a half years’ maintenance, including the
lying-in expenses; and execution was ordered to issue.
The defendant appealed to the Circuit Court; that
court reversed the judgment and there was an appeal
to this court. The defendant was compelled to enter
into bond to indemnify the county, and to pay the fine.
This shows that he was adjudged to be the father by
those whom the law appoints. And besides, he is ipso
facto so by the oath of the woman; the law adjudges
him, so.”

By agreeing to the order of July 28, 1967, the defend-
ant by inference admitted he was the father of the child.
We are of opinion that the court had jurisdiction to
enter the order and, therefore, it was not coram. non
judice. We hold that the order of July 28, 1967, was

2 ee

valid but that the order of March 2, 1970, was erroneous
and void and we remand the case to the Juvenile Court
for the enforcement of the order of July 28, 1967. We
adjudge the costs of the appeal against the defendant.

Dyer, Curer Justice, Cuarrin, and Humpureys, Jus-
aicrs, and Jenxins, Spucia, Justice, concur.

es 198

Stars or Tewnssex, Depr. or Hicnways, David M. Pack,
Commissioner, Petitioner,

Unsan Esratus, Inc., and The Metropolitan Government
of Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, Respondents.

465 S.W.2d 357.
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed February 10, 1971.
Petition for Rehearing Denied April 5, 1971.

BR
©

4.

|

Davin M. Pack, Attorney General, and Reporter,
Howszi & Fisuer, Nashville, for petitioner.

D. L. Lanspex, Wanter, Lanspen, Dorron & Davis,
Nashville, for respondents.

Mr. Justice Cuarri delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is an eminent domain proceeding in which the
State condemned 6.07 acres of land as a right-of-way for
Interstate I-65 Highway. The State deposited $10,-
015.00 with the clerk as compensation for the property.

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and David-
son County has no interest in the controversy except for
the collection of taxes. Urban Hstates is the only inter-
ested landowner.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent,
Urban Estates, for the sum of $15,157.00.

In his judgment, the trial judge found the Metropoli-
tan Planning Commission had adopted subdivision regu-
lations preventing the use of property for subdivision
purposes where such property is shown as a thorough-

196 ee

fare on the Master Plan of the proposed subdivision;
that the State had furnished the Planning Commission
with a center line survey of Interstate I-65 prior to
February 5, 1963; and that pursuant to the foregoing
subdivision regulations, the Planning Commission re-
quired the subdivision plan filed February 5, 1963, re-
serve the 6.07 acres here involved as a right-of-way for
1-65. On the basis of these facts, the trial judge awarded
interest at the rate of 6% per annum on $15,175.00 from
February 5, 1963, to September 8, 1966, and interest at
the same rate on the unpaid balance from September 8,
1966, until the payment of that sum into court.

The State perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals
and assigned as error the above action of the trial judge
after the jury had returned its verdict. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the case with instruc-
tions as to the method of trial involving the factual
question of the ‘‘date of taking,’’ that should be followed
in the second trial. This Court granted certiorari.

In April, 1962, respondent purchased 45.9 acres of
land from Hailey and wife. At approximately the same
time Suburban Properties acquired an adjacent tract
of 76 acres from Mayes and wife.

Marvin Barry was the Chief Hxecutive Officer and
controlling shareholder of both corporations. The tracts
were purchased for subdivision purposes.

Subsequent to acquiring the two tracts, James L. Mur-
phy Company was employed to survey the property and
lay it out in lots consistent with the zoning regulations of
the Metropolitan Planning Commission.

Mr. Murphy discussed the matter with the Commis-
sion and as a result thereof he prepared a preliminary

ee 17

plan for the subdivision dated January 28, 1963, which
is an exhibit in the record. This plan shows the proposed
right-of-way of 6,07 acres for Interstate Highway 1-65.

Mr. Barry, at the time he purchased the properties for
respondent and Suburban Properties, did not know the
proposed. right-of-way traversed these properties. He
learned this when he employed Murphy to make the
survey some six or eight months after the purchases.

Since the right-of-way traversed both tracts, it was
impossible to develop the two tracts as one subdivision.

Thereafter, Murphy prepared a plan for the subdivi-
sion of the tract purchased by Urban Estates. This plan
was submitted to the Planning Commission on February
5, 1963, and received preliminary approval on March 4,
1963. On the same date, February 5, 1963, Murphy sub-
mitted a plan for the development of Oak Park Sub-
division and this plan was preliminarily approved by the
Commission on March 4, 1963.

Sewers and the trunk lines for the subdivisions. were
finished in the early part of 1964.

In March, 1964, all the land embraced in the subdivi-
sions was sold to F. J. Moran, Trustee. The 6.07 acres
shown on the plans as a right-of-way for the proposed.
Interstate Highway I-65 were retained by Urban Estates.

The State filed its petition on August 22, 1966, seeking
to acquire the 6.07 acres of land as a right-of-way for
Interstate Highway I-65.

The order of condemnation and appropriation was
entered on September 8, 1966.

198

In its answer filed on September 14, 1966, respondent
did not question the right of the State to condemn the
property; nor did respondent contend the ‘‘date of
taking’’ was other than September 8, 1966. In fact, it
was orally stipulated at the trial by Counsel for the
parties the ‘‘date of taking’’ was September 8, 1966.

The trial was held in June, 1969, The trial judge
charged the jury as follows:

‘* All of the issues made in this suit have been agreed
upon by the parties litigating except the value of the
land acquired by the State. It is, therefore, the duty
of you, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, to fix the
value of the parcel of the land on the date the same
was acquired by the State.’’

* 8 # 8 & #

“When you return to report your verdict you will
be asked for your verdict as to the fair cash market
value of the land that was taken, and this amount
will be reported without interest as interest is a fixed
legal charge which will be computed by the court on
the amount you fix as the fair cash market value.”’

The Court of Appeals held the trial judge erred in
awarding interest prior to September 8, 1966, but was of
the opinion respondent was due some compensation for
impairment to its property prior to this date. That Court
yeversed and remanded the entire case for a new trial
with instructions the issues of the date of taking and
the fair market value of the property as of such date be
submitted to the jury.

The State has filed two assignments of error in this
Court.

ee 199

The first assignment insists the Court of Appeals erred
in refusing to void the trial court’s award of interest
from February 5, 1963, to September 8, 1966, and revers-
ing the entire judgment of the trial court and ordering
anew trial. We agree this assignment is good and should
be sustained.

Hi From a complete and thorough review of the rec-
ord, it is clear the parties orally stipulated at the trial
of the case the date of taking was September 8, 1966.
Having made this stipulation, the parties are bound
thereby.

“When a party makes a concession or adopts a
theory by stipulation and his cause of action is deter-
mined on this concession or theory, then that party
must abide by his decision even on appeal by certi-
orari. Lewis & Sons v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 150 Tenn. 94,
259 S.W. 908; Stearns v. Williams, 12 Tenn.App. 427.

‘These stipulations will be rigidly enforced by the
courts of this State. State ew rel. Weldon v. Thomason,
142 Tenn. 527, 221 S.W. 491; Tucker v. International
Salt Co., 209 Tenn. 95, 349 S.W.2d 541.’ Bearman v.
Camatsos, 215 Tenn. 231, 385 S.W.2d 91 (1964).

Hence, the oral stipulation by the parties the date of
taking was September 8, 1966, controls and is binding
on this appeal.

For the same reason, it was error for the Court of
Appeals to reverse and remand the case for a new trial
to litigate the fact of the date of taking which had been
stipulated by the parties in the trial court.

Interest is allowed on the amount awarded by a jury
in excess of the amount deposited with the clerk of the

200 eS

trial court in a condemnation proceeding by the State
“from the date of the taking of possession of the prop-
erty or property rights condemned by the condemner
provided, however, that no interest shall be allowed on
the amount deposited with said clerk.’? T.C.A. Section
23-1526,

All'the evidence introduced on behalf of respondent
in this case as to the fair market value of the land con-
demned was as of the stipulated date of taking, Septem-
ber 8, 1966. This was the date upon which the jury found
the value of the property under instructions of the trial
judge.

Respondent cannot now successfully contend this prop-
erty was appropriated on February 5, 1963, and seek
interest on the verdict from that date. Respondent
elected to stipulate the date of taking. Respondent can-
not elect a date of taking for valuation and a prior date
for interest on the jury’s award.

However, respondent insists its rights under our State
and Federal Constitutions will be violated unless re-
spondent is justly compensated for the taking of the
property on February 5, 1963.

Hl This argument overlooks the fundamental rule
constitutional provisions for one’s benefit and protection
may be waived, especially when no question of public
policy or morals is concerned. State ea rel. Barnes v.
Henderson, 220 Tenn, 719, 423 8.W.2d 479 (1967).

“Tt seems that constitutional provisions intended to
protect property may in all instances be waived.”’ 16
Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law, Section 131, page 328.

ee 201

Hl Respondent knowingly, intentionally and volun-
tarily relinquished its right to be compensated for any
taking of its property on February 5, 1963, by stipulating
the date of taking as of September 8, 1966.

We are also of the opinion the second assignment of
error of the State should be sustained. This assignment
challenges the action of the Court of Appeals in direct-
ing the trial court on the second trial to consider re-
spondent is entitled to be compensated for impairment
to the value and usefulness of its property caused by
acts of the State prior to the actual taking.

Hl It is well settled in this State that the value of
property for purposes of condemnation must be ascer-
tained without considering any enhancement or deprecia-
tion which occurred before the taking because of the
anticipation of the public improvement for which the
taking is made. City of Memphis v, Bolton, 56 Tenn. 508
(1872) ; Woodfolk v. Nashville & C. Railroad, 32 Tenn.
421 (1852); State Department of Highways v. Jennings,
58 Tenn.App. 594, 485 S.W.2d 481 (1968).

It results the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed. The judgment of the trial court is modified
to the extent of the allowance of interest from February
5, 1963, to September 8, 1966, is vacated; and in all other
respects is affirmed.

Respondent will pay the costs of the appeal. The State
will pay the costs below.

Dyzr, Curer Jusrics, and Cresox and Humpnreys,
JUSTICES, concur.

McCaninss, Jusricz, not participating.

202 ee

Ow Petition to REHEAR

Mr, Justice Onarrin.

Petitioner has filed an earnest petition to rehear. The
opinion was released on February 10, 1971. The petition
to rehear was filed on February 26, 1971.

Hl Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground the petition was filed more than
ten days after the opinion was announced. The motion
should be granted. Supreme Court Rule 32.

However, we have considered the petition and find
there is no new argument made, no new authority ad-
duced, and no material fact is pointed out as overlooked.

Tl Office of petition to rehear is to call attention of
the Court to matters overlooked, not those things which
Counsel supposes were improperly decided after full
consideration. Know v. Batson, 217 Tenn. 620, 399 S.W.
2d 765 (1966).

The petition is denied at the cost of petitioner.

Dyer, Cumr Jusricz, and Creson and Humpureys,
Justicgs, concur.

McCanuzss, Justicsz, not participating.

Cowsotiparep ALuminum Corporation and Sucurrry
Insuranoz Company of Hartford, Plaintiffs-in-Hrror,

Jutmy D. Harper, Defendant-in-Error.
465 S.W.2d 727.
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed April 5, 1971,

204
a

Tomas H. Raney, Spracins, Menzies & Rainey, Jack-
son, for plaintiffs in error.

Waitam A, Drnineron, Jn., Camden, for defendant
in error.

Mr. Justicz Creson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Cireuit Court
of Humphreys County, granting Jimmy D. Harper,
Workmen’s Compensation benefits. The trial court
awarded defendant in error Workmen’s Compensation
benefits in the sum of $42.00 per week for ten weeks for
temporary total disability ; $42.00 per week for one hun-
dred weeks for permanent loss of vision in his left eye,
and a sum for medical bills incurred, said sum to be
agreed upon by both parties.

ee 205

In the course of this opinion the parties will be re-
ferred to as they appeared in the court below; that is,
Jimmy D. Harper as petitioner, and Consolidated Alumi-
num Corporation and Security Insurance Company of
Hartford as defendants.

Petitioner became employed with Consolidated Alumi-
num Corporation on July 26, 1967. Prior to that date he
underwent a physical examination by the company doc-
tor and was found in good physical condition, with no
impairment of his eyes. On the first day of work, July
26, 1967, petitioner was assigned to work close to the
“pots”. Testimony revealed that these ‘‘pots’’ were
electric furnaces which generated heat of some 1700 to
1800 degrees Fahrenheit. Petitioner’s particular job was
to remove waste materials, which he described as burned
earbon blocks, from these furnaces. Petitioner testified
that he wore long sleeves, a safety helmet, and clear
safety goggles.

Petitioner further testified that he worked twelve hours
that day, from 7:00 o’clock A.M. to 7:00 o’clock P.M.,
and that during the course of the day he felt a burning
sensation on his face; he testified that it was very hot
and that he was not used to working in such a hot place.
Further testimony was to the effect that when petitioner
got home that night his face was very red; his eyelids
were swollen, the left eyelid more swollen than the right;
that he complained of pain; that he did not eat supper
but took a bath and went to bed; and that upon waking
the following morning he did not go to work because of
swollen eyelids and a burning sensation around his face.

The testimony of petitioner, his wife and his brother,
was to the effect that on the 28th day of July, 1967, he

206 eS

was still unable to return to work, but that his brother
drove him to the plant where he informed his foreman,
Mr. Bryan Hall, of his injury and was advised by Mr.
Hall to go to the hospital. Petitioner’s brother then
drove petitioner to see Dr. Capps, in Waverly, Tennes-
see. Dr. Capps was puzzled by petitioner’s condition
and advised him to go to Nashville and see Dr. John R.
Smith, an ophthalmologist. The following day, on July
29, 1967, petitioner saw Dr. Smith in Nashville, and Dr.
Spencer Thornton, also an ophthalmologist, whose office
was in the same building with Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith
advised petitioner to enter a hospital in Nashville; how-
ever, petitioner refused to be hospitalized in Nashville
and requested to enter a hospital in Dickson, Tennessee.
Upon entering the Goodlark Hospital in Dickson, peti-
tioner was treated by a family doctor, Dr. James Jack-
son. Petitioner stayed in the hospital only a few days;
then, over Dr. Jackson’s objection, insisted on going
home. While in the hospital, his vision in his left eye
improved; however, upon returning home, it became
worse, and eventually petitioner lost sight in his left eye.

On October 23, 1967, petitioner returned to work for
defendant, Consolidated Aluminum Corporation, and has
worked since.

The depositions of three doctors were taken and sub-
mitted to the court below for review. Dr. James Jack-
son stated in his deposition that he was a general surgeon
and had no special education with regard to eye diseases.
Tn fact, Dr. Jackson was very honest in noting several
times his lack of expertise in the field of ophthalmology.

“Q. Dr. Jackson, how much formal training have you
had with regard to treatment of the eye?

AL

. None.

# # # & 8  &

Did you see any maculae scar in this patient’s
left eye?

I didn’t. I wouldn’t call myself an expert on that.

. Can a patient develop clorioretinitis or maculae

iritis in a very short period of time, couple of
days?

. Well, I wouldn’t make a statement on that, I am

not experienced enough to say, but I would cer-
tainly—I don’t see why it couldn’t. I see no
reason at all why it couldn’t.

* # £ # 8 &

Have you personally ever treated a case or read
of a case of clorioretinitis having been caused
from heat or light?

Well, no, I haven’t—I’m not an expert in this
field and I wouldn’t want to venture any state-
ment on that.

Are you familiar with a medical work on retinal
diseases known as Duke-Hlder’s System of Oph-
thalmology?

No.”

It was his diagnosis, however, that petitioner was suffer-
ing from maculae retinitis, which he described as eye
inflammation. Dr. Jackson stated that he first saw peti-
tioner on July 29, 1967, and, at that time, petitioner told

208 es

him that he had injured his left eye while at work for
Consolidated Aluminum Corporation, and that he was
unable to see anything from his left eye. Dr. Jackson
stated further that he had been a family doctor for some
time and, to his knowledge, petitioner had no prior im-
pairment of his eyes. Upon being asked the question as
to whether or not petitioner’s exposure to the intense
heat and light while working near electric furnaces
could have aggravated a prior disease in his left eye,
Dr. Jackson stated that he was of the opinion that it
could. In addition, however, Dr. Jackson’s testimony
continued as follows:

“Q. Speaking logically, and we can let the ophthal-
mologist express his opinion, but you have a right
to express your opinion, too, do you feel that this
condition was brought on by the man’s employ-
ment?

A. Like I say, putting together—as the family physi-
cian, I was never aware of any problem in his
left eye. And his wife, who is a very intelligent
woman. and I’ve got no reason to doubt her word,
said he had never had any problem with his eyes
as far as she knew.

And the fact that he had been employed—ac-
cording to his statement, to me, now, had been
told he had 20/20 vision, you know, just shortly
before this, and the fact that he went to the Doc-
tor immediately thereof, and complained of his
total loss of vision—he had total loss of vision—
T would have to assume that whatever the under-
lying problem was in his eye, that the blindness
was precipitated by this—on this date that he
told us.

ED

Q. In the course of his employment?

A. I would just have to assume that.

Q. You mean by assuming, that’s your opinion?
A. Yes, I have no—nothing else to base it on.’’

Dr. John Smith’s deposition was to the effect that peti-
tioner had an eye disease called chorioretinitis active,
with some scarring of the retina; that this condition
could not appear suddenly but that it would take several
weeks to develop; that it was his opinion the petitioner’s
chorioretinitis was present in his left eye before July
26, 1967, because the lesion and pigmentation that was
present when he, Dr. Smith, observed petitioner, takes a
considérable longer time than three days to develop; and,
further, that petitioner could have such scarring on his
retina without noticing it because the position of the
scar would not affect his central vision. Dr. Smith
further stated that he measured the pressure in both
eyes and found that the pressure in petitioner’s left eye
was lower than that in his right eye, indicating inflamma-
tion in the left eye, and that it was his opinion ‘‘the
active lesion was over two days old.’’ Dr. Smith stated
that the type lesion that he observed would not come
from the type burn experienced by petitioner; however,
Dr. Smith did not express an opinion on whether the
burn experienced by petitioner would aggravate the
chorioretinitis in petitioner’s left eye. Finally, Dr.
Smith was unable to explain the meaning of the term
“maculae retinitis’, the descriptive diagnosis given by
Dr. Jackson, and flatly said that he had never heard of it.

Dr. Spencer Thornton expressly stated in his deposi-
tion that he was in full agreement with Dr. Smith’s diag-

210 es

nosis of chorioretinitis active, with scarring of the retina.
Dr. Thornton’s deposition states, in part:

“A, The patient stated to Dr. Smith in my presence
that he injured his eye at work and all the prob-
lems that he had developed immediately after the
injury. He stated that he had had his vision
checked two or three weeks or sometime recently
prior to the accident, and that it was perfectly
normal. However, in my experience, visual loss
to the point of total blindness as a result of cho-
vioretinitis just does not occur in this short length
of time, nor does pigmentation occur to the de
gree that he had it in this short length of time,
nor is it probable that a man looking at the light
that he claims to be responsible for his injury,
not to have any involvement in the opposite eye.

Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the
condition that you found on July the 29th, 1967,
existed prior to July the 26th, 1967?

A. I would say in my opinion that this lesion had
to be present prior to three days which was the
time that we examined him. I do not believe
that a lesion of this extent with total blindness,
no involvement of the opposite eye, could have
caused this much damage in the time he stated.

Q. Why is this? Why do you have such an opinion?

A. The lesion was limited to the posterior pole, the
visible lesion. The man denied light even when
light was directed off of the lesion in the peri-
pheral retina. You can easily demonstrate that

vision remains in the portion of the eye not in-
volved by simply holding your hands in front of
your eye and blocking out vision. If you move
your hands to the side, you still see it, even with
a cataract or an injury in the retina, the total
absense of light perception, which he claimed just
does not happen only as a result of chorioretin-
itis.

It could result from damage to the optic nerve,
an optic neuritis or inflammation of the optic
nerve in which there is swelling of fibers of the
optie nerve to block all sensation coming from
the entire retina. It could happen from a lesion
in the brain. It could happen from many other
things, but not just from a central posterior
chorioretinitis.

Q. Was there anything else to indicate to you that
this condition that you found in Mr. Harper’s
left eye on July the 29th existed prior to July
26th, 1967?

A. Other fhan the points that I mentioned, I can
think of nothing more specific. We have to accept
ihe history as given by a patient as the basis for
our initial examination and diagnosis. The prob-
ability of 20/20 vision prior to the type injury he
claims to have sustained is the thing that first of
all brought it—this case from Dr. Smith’s office
to mine. It’s most unusual.

Q. Would you say that it would be probable or im-
probable?

A. Highly improbable.

212

A.

‘What significance did you place upon the lesion
that you observed in his left eye as it regards to
the time element here, that is, the three days
between the alleged time of the injury and the
time that you saw him?

Those of us who have done light coagulation or
surgery of the eye have seen pigmented lesions
begin to develop within a week to ten days to the
point where you can see the haze and the vitreous
as a result of high intensity directed light. I
should parenthesize that. You don’t get total
blindness from this lesion even when fully de-
veloped, but the lesion itself takes more than
three days to develop.

The lesion that you saw would have taken more
than three days to develop?

Yes. I should mention, too, that if his blindness
is caused by optic atrophy, the condition termed
optic atrophy does not occur just like that, im-
mediately. It takes several weeks to occur. The
only thing that would cause total instantaneous
blindness with the involvement of the optic nerve
would be something that severed the nerve or
crushed the nerve.

. Anything that would cause—

A.

(Interposing). To have total permanent blind-
ness within three days would have to be virtually
a disaster to the optic nerve or even farther back
in the brain.

. Did you see any evidence of trauma or—to this

eye?

Le

A. None, no, sir,

Q. Was there any history of an injury to the head
or from an external blow?

A. No, six.

Q. Was there any injury or damage to the anterior
portion of the eye?

A. No, sir. I beg your pardon. You said injury.
Q. Trauma?
A. Trauma, no, * * *’?

Further, in answer to a question by defendant’s counsel
as to what is the meaning of maculairitis, the condition
in petitioner’s left eye as diagnosed by Dr. Jackson,
Dr. Thornton replied, ‘‘There is no such thing as macu-
lairitis, no such thing.”

The trial judge, in a memorandum opinion, concluded
that while Dr. Jackson was not an expert in the field of
ophthalmology, his testimony must nevertheless be con-
sidered medical opinion and not lay opinion. The court
evidently disregarded the depositions of Dr. Smith and
Dr. Thornton, and ruled that petitioner’s exposure to the
extreme heat and strong light radiated by the electric
furnaces aggravated any existing disease in his left eye,
thereby resulting in an accidental injury and subsequent
loss of sight in that eye.

Defendant, Consolidated Aluminum Corporation, filed
a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and has
prayed for and perfected an appeal in the nature of
writ of error to this Court.

old es

Defendant’s assignment of error is that there is no
material evidence to sustain the trial court’s conclusions
and judgment, because the court erred in accepting lay
testimony and testimony of a general surgeon on the
question of causation; disregarding the testimony of two
ophthalmologists. The trial court was in error in finding
that petitioner sustained an accidental injury arising
out of and in the course of his employment when there
was competent evidence that the pre-existing condition
in petitioner’s left eye was caused by a disease process
which did not arise from an employment risk, nor was
it aggravated, nor did it qualify as an occupational dis-
ease. We do not agree with the contention first stated
in this assignment of error with respect to the testimony
of a general physician or surgeon on a question of causa-
tion. Nonetheless, our disagreement in this respect is
not effective to change the conclusion we must reach.

The only purpose of a factual review by this Court
in eases of this nature is to determine if there is any
competent material evidence to support the trial court’s
judgment. We are unable to find any in this particular
case, with respect to causation of permanent loss of use
of the eye. This, however, does not resolve the question
of temporary disability, which will be commented upon
a little later.

It is evident that the only issue presented here is
whether petitioner’s resultant permanent blindness in
his left eye was causally related to his employment. This
being the issue, pathology, the expert medical testimony
in the field of ophthalmology, becomes the dominant fac-
tor. On critical examination, the process of assumption
which Dr. Jackson candidly and repeatedly enunciates,
simply cannot be said to equate an expert medical opin-

Le

ion based upon utilization of medical science with the
reasonable medical certainty. We cannot disregard the
depositions of Dr. John Smith and Dr. Spencer Thorn-
ton, both acknowledged ophthalmologists, to the effect
that petitioner’s left eye was in a diseased condition,
called ‘‘chorioretinitis active’’, prior to July 26, 1967;
that said disease must progress over a period of several
weeks before it results in total blindness in the eye; and
that petitioner’s exposure to intense heat and light on
the job simply could not cause chorioretinitis, nor cause
his loss of vision in the left eye.

Hl For reasons stated herein, we can only conclude
that the material evidence of the qualified medical wit-
nesses in this case on the pivotal question of causal con-
nection between permanent injury and employment
interdicts the award made to the petitioner by the trial
court. The law of this State is to be found in the previ-
ous decision of this Court in American Enka Corporation
v. Sutton (1965) 216 Tenn. 228, 391 S.W.2d 643. This is
an opinion written by the late and muchly lamented Jus-
tice Weldon White. The significance which must be given
here to the testimony of Drs. Smith and Thornton is
clearly and forcefully delineated in that opinion. Like-
wise, the lack of probative value of the testimony of Dr.
Jackson is enunciated with equal clarity. See also Tib-
bals Flooring Company, Inc. v. Stamfill (1967) 219 Tenn.
498, 410 S.W.2d 892; Ferguson v. Tennessee-Carolina
Transportation Co., Inc. (1968) 221 Tenn. 557, 428 S.W.
2d 783.

HM As it appears heretofore, the trial judge allowed
some ten weeks of total temporary disability, plus medi-
cal expenses incurred. This disability is causally related
to the employment by the evidence in the cause. For this

216 ee

reason we must affirm the trial court’s allowance of re-
covery of total temporary disability and medical benefits.

It follows, therefore, that the judgment below is re-
versed in part and affirmed in part. Judgment may be
entered in this case in accordance with the opinion; as-
sessing the costs of the cause against plaintiffs in error.

Dyzr, Outer Justice, and Caarmn, Humpareys and
McCanuzss, Justicus, concur,

F. H. Lawsox Company, et al., Appellants,

Lenvit D. Ramzo, Appellec.

465 S.W.2d 732.

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed April 5, 1971,

Cuartes ©, Trasve, III, Trasuz, Minicx, Srurpivant
& Hanrsison, Nashville, or appellants.

J. Travis Price, Springfield, for appellee.

218
PC

Mrz. Justice Cruson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause comes to this Court on appeal from a judg-
ment of the General Sessions Court of Robertson County.
That court awarded Lenvil D. Rambo compensation
benefits in the sum of $1,299.95 for an alleged injury re-
sulting in a herniated condition.

In the course of this opinion, the parties will be re-
ferred to as they appeared in the Court below; that is,
Lenvil D. Rambo as petitioner, and F, H. Lawson Com-
pany, et al. as defendants.

It appears from the record in this cause that petitioner
moved to Springfield, Tennessee from Ohio in 1962, and
began working for Nutone, Inc. He continued employ-
ment with Nutone, Inc. until the early part of 1968,
At that time, F. H. Lawson Company purchased
the property and facilities of Nutone. Defendant com-
pany continued to employ petitioner in a similar ca-
pacity; that is, a quality inspector. Petitioner was not

re 219

given a physical examination by a doctor employed or
retained by defendant company,

Petitioner’s testimony was that on July 12, 1968, he
was working on the paint line; that when he reached out
to take hold of an object on the line, he felt a sharp pain
in his left side; that he told the paint foreman, Thomas
W. Cannon, of his sudden pain, whereupon Mr. Cannon
recommended petitioner sit down for a while; and that
after he had sat for a while, he felt better and went back
to work. Further evidence revealed that July 12, 1968,
was on a Friday; that the following Monday petitioner
yeturned to work and worked four days, although ex-
periencing recurring pain and appearance of a hernia on
his left side; that each of these recurrences of pain was
known by petitioner’s supervisor because petitioner was
forced to discontinue work and rest for a while; and
finally, that on the 18th of July, petitioner could no
onger push the hernia back in and would have to seek
medical attention.

On July 19, 1968, petitioner entered the hospital. The
following day surgery was performed for an inguinal
hernia on the left side. He remained in the hospital for
two weeks, remaining off work and under the doctor’s
care until September 3, 1968. On that date he returned
o his regular employment, but voluntarily resigned some
months later.

Petitioner testified that he only seeks benefits for
temporary total disability for six weeks, and for medi-
cal expenses incurred. Petitioner testified on direct that
he experienced a hernia on his right side in the 1940s;
but that prior to July 12, 1968, he had never experienced
a protrusion or a herniated condition on his left side,

220

nor was he bothered by any sensitivity or weakness on
his left side. However, upon cross-examination, peti-
tioner contradicted himself. His testimony is as follows:

“Q. Now, you had actually had some trouble with
your left side way back in 1964, had you not?

A. In 1964, that’s when I was working with Lawson,
yves—well—

Q. Tam talking about back in December, 1964.

A, I mean with Nutone.

Q. While you were working with Nutone you had
some trouble with your left side where that hernia
is now, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Am I correct about the date, December of 1964?

A. "Well, it was in that neighborhood, what I mean,
I don’t remember that.

Q. Were you down here in Springfield then when
you had that trouble?

A. Yes.

Q. When you had that trouble in December, 1964

you were sent to a doctor here in Springfield is
that correct?

Yes.

. That was Dr. Qualls in Springfield?

Yes.

And Dr. Qualls diagnosed you as having a hernia
on the left side back in December, 1964, did he
not?

. Yes.

And recommended you have surgery for that
hernia back in December, 1964, did he not?

. Well, he mentioned it, what I mean—

Well, he recommended you have surgery?

A. Yes.

But at that time, back in December of 1964, you
were able to push that hernia back in so you
didn’t have surgery, isn’t that true?

That’s right.

And following that time, from December, 1964,
you were able to continue with your work?

Yes,

But still, every now and then, that hernia on the
left-hand side would come out and you would
push it back in, isn’t that true?

It wasn’t giving me no trouble, what I mean—

I am not asking whether it was hurting, I want
to know if, as a matter of fact, following that
examination by Dr. Qualls in December, 1964,
you continued to work but while you continued
to work every once in awhile this hernia on the
left side would come out and you would push
it back in, isn’t that true?

222 ee

A, Yes. What I mean, it wasn’t paining or any-
thing.

Q. I understand it wasn’t paining you but it would
protrude and you would push it back in,

a. It would get back in.

Q. You would push it back in, isn’t that correct?

A, Yes.

Q. And that condition continued right on up until
the date of the last accident and when was it, in
July of 1968?

A. No, sir, it hadn’t given me any trouble for about,
way over a year.

Q. I understand it hadn’t given you any trouble—
A. What I mean, I didn’t have to do anything to it.
Q. But you had been pushing it back in?

A. Yes.”

Defendants did not put on any proof, but rather made
a motion at the end of petitioner’s proof to dismiss the
ease on the ground that petitioner’s hernia is not com-
pensable within T.C.A. sec, 50-1009,

The trial court found for petitioner and awarded him
$619.95 for medical expenses incurred and $680.00 for
‘total temporary disability loss of wages’’; totaling
$1,299.95.

Defendants assign as errors that the court erred in
finding petitioner’s hernia compensable; that the Court
erred in awarding temporary total benefits without ma-
terial evidence; and that the court erred in awarding

| 223

petitioner his actual loss of wages contrary to the pro-
visions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Without answering assignments of error II and III,
we are of opinion that this case must be reversed and
dismissed. In view of the foregoing testimony of peti-
tioner, we can only conclude that petitioner’s injury and
resulting hernia is non-compensable; that is, outside the
scope of T.C.A. sec. 50-1009. The pertinent language of
that statute is as follows:

“Tn all claims for compensation for hernia or rupture,
resulting from injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of the employee’s employment, it must
be definitely proven to the satisfaction of the court:

First. That there was an injury resulting in hernia
or rupture.

Second. That the hernia or rupture appeared sud-
denly.

Third. That it was accompanied by pain.

Fourth. That the hernia or rupture immediately fol-
lowed the accident.

Fifth. That the hernia or rupture did not exist prior
to the accident for which compensation is claimed.’’

Petitioner argues that when defendant company
bought the facilities and property of Nutone, Ine., it did
not give petitioner a physical examination, and, there-
fore, took petitioner in the physical condition that he
then was. This is the usual rule, but this Court has held
that the Legislature did not intend for the general rule
to apply to a herniated condition. Matthews v. Harda-

224 es

way Contracting Co. et al. (1942) 179 Tenn. 98, 163 S.W.
2d 59, Justice Neil, writing for this Court in that case,
stated :

“The Tennessee act expressly provides in subsection
5 that it must be definitely proven ‘that the hernia or
rupture did not exist prior to the accident for which
compensation is claimed.’ While we are pleased to
give a liberal construction to the act, we cannot ignore
what we consider a clear and unequivocal provision
of the act. The foregoing is not in conflict with deci-
sions of this Court which have been cited by counsel,
wherein it was held that injuries which aggravate an
existing physical ailment or disease are compensable,
because in the cases referred to where the rule was
applied there were no statutory limitations upon the
right to recovery;”’

* & & & e &

“We think the legislature clearly intended to place
certain limitations and restrictions upon the right to
recover compensation for injuries causing a hernia
and also to the aggravation or enlargement of a pre-
existing hernia. The statute undertakes to point out
and distinguish the injuries that are compensable and
those that are non-compensable, and for the injured
employee to recover he must bring his case within the
provisions of the amendatory act. There are many
injuries that are noncompensable and which cannot be
made compensable under the Court’s rule of liberal
interpretation.’”

In view of the foregoing, it appears to this Court that
the material evidence in this case in contrary to the

| 225

finding of the trial judge. Thus, we reverse the court
below, and dismiss. The costs of this case are assessed
against petitioner, Lenvil D. Rambo,

Dyer, Camer Justice, and Caartix, Humpsreys and
McCanuuss, Justicus, concur.

226

Ayya Ruru Sizemorg, Plaintiff-in-Error,

EB. T. Barwick Ixvusrrims, Lxo., Defendant-in-Error.

465 S.W.2d 873.

(Knogville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed April 5, 1971.

©
a

Joun H. Cary, Knoxville, for plaintiff in error;
Haynes, Ginrratn & Cary, Knoxville, of counsel.

Wiu1am Groover, Knoxville, for defendant in error;
Cuxex, Taytor & Groover, Knoxville, of counsel.

228 CCS
ee
Mr. Justice Cuarrin delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is a workmen’s compensation proceeding on a
direct appeal from an order of the trial judge sustaining
the plea of the statute of limitations of defendant-in-
error.

We will refer to the parties as they appeared in the
trial court; that is, Anna Ruth Sizemore as petitioner,
and E, T. Barwick Industries as defendant.

Petitioner alleged on October 4, 1968, she fell down a
flight of stairs during the course of her employment at
defendant’s plant and injured her back.

She further alleged defendant’s insurance carrier
made voluntary payments of temporary total benefits to
her and certain medical expenses; and that the last such
payment being made to Dr. Robert Whittle on February
14, 1969.

Petitioner further averred she was unable to work at
her regular employment; and is, therefore, entitled to
additional benefits.

Defendant filed the following plea:

“That the defendant ceased making payments in
this case on February 12, 1969, rather than on Febru-
ary 14, 1969, as alleged in the petition; and, therefore,

ee 229

this ease is barred by the statute of limitations as set
out in T.C.A. Section 50-1003.’”

Petitioner joined issue on the plea.

Defendant offered the testimony of Mr. Henry Morton,
Claim Manager of defendant’s insurance carrier, in sup-
port of the plea which comprises the bill of exceptions
filed in the case.

Morton testified the draft to Dr. Whittle was issued
and mailed on February 12, 1969; and that all other pay-
ments to petitioner and Dr. Whittle had been made
through the mail.

It was stipulated Dr. Whittle’s office was closed on
February 13, 1969; and that the draft had been indorsed
by Dr. Whittle and cashed on February 14, 1969.

The irial judge found defendant ceased making pay-
ments on February 12, 1969, when the draft to Dr. Whit-
tle was mailed rather than when it was received and
cashed by him. He further found suit was not filed until
February 14, 1970; and, therefore, the action was barred
by the one year statute of limitations as provided: by
T.C.A. Section 50-1003 and dismissed the suit.

Petitioner excepted to the order and prayed an appeal
to this Court which was perfected.

Petitioner assigns as error the action of the trial judge
in holding defendant ceased making payments on Febru-
ary 12, 1969.

We are of the opinion the assignment must be sus-
tained and the cause reversed and remanded.

T.C.A. Section 50-1003 provides, in part:

230

«* © * provided that, within said one (1) year period
voluntary payments of compensation are paid to the
injured person or his dependents, an action to recover
any unpaid portion of the compensation, payable un-
der this law, may be instituted within one (1) year
from the time the employer shall cease making such
payments, except in those cases provided for by Sec-
tion 50-1024.”’

“The law as regards the tolling of the one year
statute of limitations for compensable injuries is that
voluntary payments of compensation by the employer
or his insurance carrier within one year of the injury
toll the running of the statute. T.C.A. Section 50-1003;
Adams v. Patterson, 199 Tenn. 603, 288 S.W.2d 453
(1956). Voluntary payments of medical expenses also
toll the running of the statute. John Sevier Motor
Company v. Mullins, 205 Tenn. 227, 326 S.W.2d 441
(1959); Chandler v. Travelers Insurance Company,
212 Tenn. 199, 369 S.W.2d 390 (1963).’? City of Bristol
v, Reed, 218 Tenn. 173, 402 S.W.2d 124 (1966).

The sole issue to be resolved in this Court is whether
petitioner brought her action within the statutory
period.

We hold payments ceased when the last draft was re-
ceived by Dr. Whittle on February 14, 1969.

Hl In doing so, we recognize the following rule:

“While this Court is bound by the findings of the
trial judge on questions of fact, whenever there is any
evidence to sustain the findings, it is not bound by
the conclusions drawn by the trial judge from un-
disputed facts, and may reach a different conclusion
from that of the trial court on the same findings of

ee 231

fact.’ Travelers Ins. Co. v. Googe, 217 Tenn. 272, 397
S.W.2d 368 (1965).

Hl The word ‘‘payment”’ has a well defined meaning
in law; as said in Sullivan v. Tigert, 1 Tenn.App. 262
(1925) :

‘“A payment is a delivery of money or its equiva-
lent in either specific property or services by one per-
son from whom it is due to another person to whom it
is due, In a legal sense there must be—(1) a delivery,
(2) by the debtor, or his representative, (3) to the
creditor or his representative, (4) of money or some-
thing accepted by the creditor as the equivalent there-
of, (5) with the intention on the part of the debtor to
pay the debt in whole or in part, and (6) accepted as
payment by the creditor.’’

We observe Mr. Morton referred to the instrument
as a draft while Counsel for both parties refer to it as
a check.

It is common knowledge the terms are sometimes used
interchangeably.

HI While we recognize a draft is distinguishable
from a check by the fact that the drawee of a check is a
bank, while the drawee of a draft may be any person or
firm, we think the following rules as to payment apply
by either means.

Hl it is fundamental a check is not money but is a
mere order to the drawee bank to pay a sum of money
at some future time. ‘‘That a check for money is not
money until it has been paid is too self-evident to admit
of argument——.’’ Lytle v. Etherly, 18 Tenn, 389 (1837).

282 eS

HE When a check is given and accepted the presump-
tion is that it is not accepted by the creditor as absolute
payment. Whether it is so accepted or not is a question
of fact. Springfield v. Green, 66 Tenn. 301 (1874).

“The delivery to, or acceptance by, the creditor of
his debtor’s check, although for convenience often
treated as a passage of money, is not payment, even
though the check is certified before delivery, in the
absence of any agreement or consent to receive it as
payment * * *”? 70 C.J.S. Payment sec. 24, pages
233, 234.

Hl The generally accepted rule is that where a check
delivered to a creditor is paid in due course, the debt is
discharged pro tanto as of the time the check was re-
ceived. 70 C.J.S. Payment sec. 24, page 235.

HH In the case of Sturgill Lumber Company v. May-
nord, 447 S.W.2d 638 (Ky.1969), the employer’s insur-
ance carrier made voluntary payments of compensation
to the claimant, the last of which was made by check
issued on September 10, 1965, for the period from July
30, to August 31, 1965. The claimant filed his application
for compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation
Board on September 9, 1966. The employer’s argument
was that voluntary payment ceased as of the last day of
the period for which the last payment was made. Under
the Kentucky statute requiring that application for com-
pensation be filed with the Board ‘‘within one year after
the cessation of voluntary payments, if any have been
made,” the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held:

‘We think the plain meaning of the statute is that
‘payment’ is the receipt by the workmen of an instru-
ment of payment, and payment will be deemed to have

re 233

ceased as the day of the last instrument of payment
was received. The voluntary payments to Maynard
thus must be held to have ceased when he received the
September 10 check, which was less than one year be-
fore he filed his application for compensation.’’

Tn the case of Seliga v. American Mutual Liability In-
surance Company, 174 So.2d 878 (La.App.1965) volun-
tary payments were made to the claimant by check, the
last such check being dated November 21, 1961. Suit was
filed on November 23, 1962. The trial court sustained
the defendant’s plea of the statute of limitations and
dismissed the ease. The Court of Appeals of Louisiana
reversed and remanded.

The Louisiana statute of limitations provides that
where an employer makes voluntary compensation pay-
ments, the limitation period for bringing a workmen’s
compensation claim ‘‘shall not take effect until the ex-
piration of one year from the time of making the last
payment.’’ Under this statute the Louisiana Court of
Appeals held:

“Tt is necessary to remand the instant case for the
purpose of determining the date on which the check
was received by Mrs. Seliga or her attorney. If the
instrument was cashed, and we believe that it was, the
time of making the last payment of compensation
within the purview of LSA-R.S. 23:1209 was the date
of actual receipt. Assuming the check was honored
when presented, if one year had not expired between
the time of its receipt and the time this suit was filed,
the exception must be overruled. If one year had ex-
pired between the time of receipt and the date on which
suit was filed, the exception must be maintained and
the suit dismissed.’’

234 ee

Defendant’s sole authority for its position that volun-
tary payments ceased on the date the last draft was
issued and mailed to petitioner’s doctor is the case of
Brandtjen and Kluge, Ine. v. Pope, 28 Tenn.App. 679,
192 S.W.2d 496 (1946), wherein the court quoted the
following from 48 C.J., Section 9, page 594:

‘‘Remittance by mail or other carrier. Payment is
not effectuated by sending the amount due to the
ereditor by mail or other public carrier until the re-
mittance gets in the hands of the creditor, unless he
expressly or by implication directs or consents that
payment be so made, or such mode of payment is
according to the usual course of dealings between the
parties, from which the creditor’s assent can be in-
ferred.”

However, we think the facts in that case are distin-
guishable from those of the instant case. Pope, a resi-
dent of Shelby County, purchased a printing press and
other equipment from Brandtjen and Kluge, a foreign
corporation, under a conditional sales contract and exe-
euted notes to cover the deferred balance.

Pope mailed checks as the notes became due to the
company which were accepted.

The company later filed a replevin suit on ground of
default in the payment of certain notes. The suit was
tried in Chancery Court before the Chancellor and a
jury. :

At the trial, the evidence showed all notes had been
paid by Pope by checks deposited in the mail, the last
two of which had been returned to Pope, on the ground
Pope had failed to purchase insurance on the equipment
payable to complainant in case of loss.

ee 235

The Chancellor charged the jury: ‘‘The only ground
that has been produced that would warrant the com-
plainant to repossess the property is—were the monthly
payments in default, and in default more than ten days.”’

He further charged: ‘‘The mailing is sufficient pay-
ment. The depositing of the check in the mail is delivery
under the law and within the time.’’

The company assigned this charge as error on the
contention the place of payment was at the home office
of the company, and this place of payment having been
agreed on, the payments to be valid must have been made
there.

After quoting the above rule from 48 C.J., supra, the
Court of Appeals said:

“Certainly under the facts and the course of dealing
between complainant and defendant the complainant
consented that the payments might be made by use of
the ordinary mails.”’

It is clear the court did not hold the mere depositing
of a check in the mail amounted to an absolute payment
as of the date of mailing.

Reversed and remanded at the cost of defendant.

Dyer, Carer Justice, and Humpnreys and McCanuuss,
Justices, and Jenkins, Specian Justice, concur.

236

Suamnock Homesuripsers, Inc,

Curroxze Insurance Company,

466 S.W.2d 204,

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed April 5, 1971,

|
|

Cunninenam & Mrroneni, Clarksville, for appellant.

Goopterr, Pray & Hurt, Runyon & Ruwyvon, Clarks-
ville, for appellee.

238 Ce CCis
a
Mr. Justice McCanuzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Hl The Cherokee Insurance Company, appealed to
the Court of Appeals from the decree of the Chancery
Court. Because all the facts had been stipulated the
Court of Appeals should have transferred the case as
provided by Section 16-408, T.C.A. We granted certi-
orari and will dispose of the case as though it had been
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. State ex ret v.
Retail Credit Men’s Association, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.
2d 918.

Cherokee on March 27, 1967, issued to Shamrock
Homebuilders, Inc., a builder of homes in Clarksville,
a builder’s risk insurance policy protecting homes then
under eonstruction and thereafter to be built by Sham-
rock. Among the provisions of the policy were the fol-
lowing which are important to the determination of this
suit:

“*Coverage shall cease when the interest of the As-

sured ceases or when the property has been accepted

by the owner, purchaser, or when this policy has ex-
pired or been cancelled, whichever shall first occur.’’

‘The Insured shall as soon as practicable report in
writing to the Company or its agent every loss, dam-
age or occurrence which may give rise to a claim under
this policy and shall also file with the Company or its

ee 23!

agent within ninety (90) days from date of discovery
of such loss, damage or occurrence, a detailed sworn
proof of loss.’’

se ee #

“No suit, action or proceeding for the recovery of any
claim under this policy shall be sustainable in any
court of law or equity unless the same be commenced
within twelve (12) months next after discovery by the
Insured of the occurrence which gives rise to the
claim, ** *”

Shamrock sued Cherokee to recover under the terms
of the policy. The facts pertinent to the determination
of its suit, and as they appear from the record, are these:

Shamrock negotiated a sale of a residence, then under
construction, to Billy J. McGregor and his wife, Sara,
and on December 19, 1967, the parties executed the docu-
ments required for the closing of the transaction; there-
after the deed and the deed of trust were filed for record.
The McGregors did not get possession of the property
until January 3, 1968, when they entered the house and
found that water pipes had frozen and burst and that
flooding had seriously damaged the house. They notified
Shamrock immediately and demanded that the trans-
action be rescinded; however, Shamrock disclaimed re-
sponsibility for the damages and declined to cancel the
trade. On April 15, 1968, the McGregors sued Shamrock
in the Chancery Court at Clarksville to rescind the pur-
chase of the property and on April 16, 1968, Shamrock
notified Cherokee of the pendency of the suit and on
April 23, 1968, that it was claiming under the policy for
the damage to the house. On May 6, 1968, Cherokee,
through its adjusters, wrote Shamrock’s attorneys and

240 ee

denied liability on the ground that the water damage
had occurred after Shamrock had conveyed it to the
McGregors and, therefore, after the coverage had
expired.

The Chancellor filed his opinion in the MeGregors’
suit on November 18, 1968, by which he found that the
sale of the property by Shamrock ‘‘had not been com-
pleted.’’ The decree was entered March 10, 1969.

On November 29, 1968—that. is, after the Chancellor
had filed his opinion—Shamrock again demanded that
Cherokee pay the damage in accordance with the terms
of its policy. After some further correspondence, that it
is not necessary to consider here, Cherokee on March 27,
1969, denied liability on the grounds (1) that Shamrock
had not owned the property when the loss occurred,
(2) that Shamrock had not given Cherokee notice of the
loss within ninety days as required by the policy, and
(3) that it had not brought suit for recovery within
twelve months as also required by the policy.

Shamrock filed this suit against Cherokee on May 21,
1969, and the McGregors, claiming subrogation, inter-
vened. Cherokee has defended on the same grounds set
out in its letter of March 27, 1969, and has assigned them
as error in its appeal.

Hl (1) We are unable to agree with Cherokee’s con-
tention that the McGregors and not Shamrock owned the
property when the damage occurred. The court, in the
former ease, in its decree found:

“Under the facts as shown by the proof, and there
is no dispute on any material point, the mere fact that
a deed had been executed and placed to record does

not amount to a delivery so as to preclude cancellation
of same, and it is clear that under the circumstances at
hand, the transaction was not completed and would
not have been until the Complainants, that is the pur-
chasers, were placed in possession of the property.
The seller had clearly not fulfilled its part of the obli-
gation under the contract. The sale had not been
completed.’

This ground is, in effect, a collateral attack on the
decree in the former case, and we cannot sustain it.

HM (2) After the McGregors and Shamrock discov-
ered the damages on January 3, 1968, there arose a
serious disagreement between them as to which party
had sustained the loss. Shamrock contended that the
sale had been completed on December 19, 1967, and that
therefore the McGregors had become the owners and
must bear the loss. The parties did not resolve their dis-
agreement and the McGregors sued. Immediately there-
after Shamrock gave notice to Cherokee. In the cireum-
stances shown by the record the failure to give the notice
within ninety days after January 3, 1968, and the delay
of a few days thereafter, must be considered to be justi-
fied and that the giving of the notice on May 21, 1968,
was a substantial compliance with the notice provision
of the policy.

Hl (3) With respect to the argument that the failure
of Shamrock to sue Cherokee ‘‘within twelve months
next after discovery by the Insured of the occurrence
which gives rise to the claim’’, we hold that so long as
it was defending the suit of the McGregors it could not
consistently sue Cherokee and in that suit claim to have
been the owner of the property when the loss occurred.

49 eS

Shamrock’s defense of the McGregor suit, though un-
successful, was in Cherokee’s interest as well as its own.
A suit of Shamrock against Cherokee during the pen-
dency of the McGregor suit would have been inconsistent.
‘We agree that the rule of Smithart v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 Tenn, 513, 71 S.W.2d 1059, that
the Chancellor quoted in his opinion, must govern this
case:

“We quote from Joyce on Insurance, vol. 1, p. 588
(section 221a) : ‘So it is declared that it is well settled
that when liability has become fixed by the capital
fact of loss within the range of the responsibility as-
sumed in the contract, courts are reluctant to deprive
assured of the benefit of that liability by any narrow
or technical construction of the conditions and stipu-
lations which prescribe the formal requisite by means.
of which this accrued right is to be made available for
his indemnification.’ ’”

“It is the function of a court to interpret and enforee
contracts as they are written notwithstanding they may
contain terms which may be thought harsh and unjust.
A court is not at liberty to make a new contract for
parties who have spoken for themselves. But the
parties to a contract in litigation are not to be pre-
sumed to have intended to interpose an impossible
condition to its performance, wholly repugnant to the
primary purpose expressed by their formal and solemn
undertaking. When such result is apparently required
by a literal application of the language employed, an
ambiguity is developed which invokes judicial discre-
tion. If repugnant clauses cannot be harmonized so as

a

to give effect to both, and one is subordinate to the
principal purpose and intent of the contract, a court
will disregard it rather than permit it to destroy and
nullify the eontract.’’

We therefore affirm the decree of the Chancery Court
and remand the cause for such further action as may be
required for its enforcement.

Dyer, Curer Justicz, and Cuatrry, Creson and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

Inreewationa, Harvester Company, International
Harvester Credit Co., Appellants,

Joz C. Carr, Secretary of State, State of Tennessee,
and Thomas D. Benson, Commissioner of Revenue,
State of Tennessee, Appellees,

466 S.W.2d 207.

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed April 5, 1971.

| | |

Ervxest Wiitiams, ITI, Hzisxert, Donsison, Apams,
Wriusams & Wait, Memphis, Roy A. Miras, Jz., Nashville,
for appellants.

246 es

Davp M, Pack, Attorney General and Reporter, State
of Tennessee, Kvererr H. Faux, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Nashville, for appellees.

Mz, Justice Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Appellants filed continuation statements, to continue
the perfection of security interests in the inventory of
their farm implement dealers, in the office of Joe C. Carr,
Seeretary of State. Against appellants’ protests, Thomas
D. Benson, Commissioner of Revenue of the State of
Tennessee, collected a privilege tax on this recordation
under the terms of sec. 67-4102 T.C.A. Item S(b). Appel-
lants then sued te recover the taxes paid under protest.
The Davidson County Chancery Court denied recovery of
the taxes and the International Companies have appeal-
ed.

In their original bill they alleged that the taxes levied

on the filings of continuation statements, filed pursuant
to the Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 47-9-403(3) T.C.A.,

ee = =— 27

were illegal and unauthorized. They averred that they
were the secured parties named in certain enumerated
security agreements which were perfected in 1964 by filing
financing statements with the Secretary of State of Ten-
nessee pursuant to sec. 47-9-401 T.C.A., and that in order
to continue perfection of their security interests they
presented to the Secretary of State continuation state-
ments pursuant to sec. 47-9-403(3), for the purpose of
continuing the effectiveness of the previously filed
financing statements. That defendant Carr refused to file
the continuation statements without payment of the priv-
ilege taxes required by sec, 67-4102 T.C.A. Item S(b), so
complainants paid the privilege tax under protest in the
total amount of $5,470.48, and filed their continuation
statements. Complainants then prayed for a decree for
the total amount of the taxes so paid.

After defendants answered, the cause was heard on
stipulated facts, and the entire record, upon which the
Chancellor held that the taxes had been legally assessed
and collected, and dismissed the original bill. The com-
plainants have appealed and assign eleven errors pre-
senting the precise issues, whether the filings of continu-
ation statements as contemplated by sec. 47-9-403(3)
T.C.A. are taxed by sec. 67-4102 Item S(b), and if so,
whether the taxing act is constitutional when so applied.

Section 67-4102, Item S(b), provides, in part, as fol-
lows:

“Prior to the public recordation of any instrument
evidencing an indebtedness, including but not limited
to mortgages, deeds of trust, conditional sales con-
tracts, financing statements contemplated by the uni-
form commercial code and liens on personalty, other

248 es

than on motor vehicles, there shall be paid a tax, for
state purposes only of ten cents (10¢) on each one
hundred dollars ($100) or major fraction thereof of the
indebtedness so evidenced * * * In any case where the
consideration or stipulation of indebtedness does not
appear on the face of the instrument being offered for
record, the recording official shall require a separate
statement, to be made under oath, indicating the
amount of indebtedness so secured, * * *”

The clear import of this statute is to impose a tax on
the privilege of recording instruments, with certain enu-
merated exceptions, relating to secured transactions in
real and personal property. The basis for the tax imposed
is the amount of indebtedness evidenced by the instru-
ment offered for recordation. Where the amount of the
indebtedness does not appear on the face of the instru-
ment, as in the case of financing statements, the statute
provides a method for determining the amount of indebt-
edness upon which the tax can be based.

The financing statements referred to in the tax statute
as those contemplated by the Uniform Commercial Code,
are such security interests in personal property created
by contract as are covered by sec. 47-9-102, 47-9-401, and
47-9-402 T.C.A.

Section 47-9-102 is a part of the U.C.C. Chapter titled,
Uniform Commercial Code—Secured—Transactions. In
comments to the official text the purpose of this chapter is
stated to be: ‘‘This Article (Chapter) sets out a com-
prehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests
in personal property and fixtures. It supersedes existing
legislation dealing with such security devices as chattel
mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor’s liens

ee =!

and assignments of accounts receivable.’? The comment
continues : ‘‘The aim of this Article (Chapter) is to pro-
vide a simple and unified structure within which the
immense variety of present-day secured financing trans-
actions can go forward with less cost and with greater
certainty.

“Under this Article (Chapter) the traditional distine-
tions among security devices, based largely on form, are
not retained; the Article (Chapter) applies to all transac-
tions intended to create security interests in personal
property and fixtures, and the single term ‘security in-
terest’ substitutes for the variety of descriptive terms
which has grown up at common law and under a hundred-
year accretion of statutes.’’

Section 47-9-401 provides, in part, that a security in-
terest such as that created by a financing statement (the
formal requisites of which are contained in sec. 47-9-402),
shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State.

Section 47-9-403 T.C.A. provides, in part, that a filed
financing statement may be effective for a period of five
years from the date of filing, according to its terms. This
statute also provides for continuation statements. As to
this it provides that a continuation statement may be filed
by the secured party within specified time periods; that
such a continuation statement must be signed by the
secured party, identify the original statement by file
nuwnber and state that the original statement is still effec-
tive; and upon timely filing of the continuation statement
the effectiveness of the original statement is continued for
five years after the last date to which the filing was effec-
tive, whereupon it lapses unless another continuation
statement is filed prior to such lapse. This statute also

250 es

provides that succeeding continuation statements may be
filed in the same manner.

By these means the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vides for recordation of open-ended security agreements
covering nonpossessory after acquired personal property,
thereby enabling inventory financing where the amount
of indebtedness secured at any given time varies with
changing inventory collateral. See sec. 47-9-204 T.C.A.
And continuation statements are an integral and essential
part of the notice of filings contemplated by the Uniform
Commercial Code to perfect security interests beyond a
period of five years, covering inventory on hand and any
new inventory added during the ensuing five years.

In an opinion of the office of the Attorney General of
Tennessee, dated December 6, 1967, and addressed to
Thomas D. Benson, Commissioner of Revenue of Tennes-
see, the subject of correlating the provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code with sec. 67-4102 Item S(b) was
discussed in part as follows:

“Tt should be noted at the outset that the taxing item
in question has been upon the statute books for several
decades and that the nature and incidence of the tax
has been well understood throughout this period. The
tax has been consistently held to. be upon the privilege
of having recorded instruments evidencing a security
interest in specific property, with the measure thereof
being the amount of indebtedness so secured. The 1967
amendments do not alter concepts and do not purport to
do so. They merely extend coverage of the tax to the
recordation of security instruments by persons other
than the County Register who receive them for recorda-
tion in accordance with law. The taxable incident very

clearly remains ‘the public recordation of any instru-
ment evidencing an indebtedness’. Upon its face this
language necessarily implies an indebtedness in being
at the time of recordation. Such was the construction
accorded to the pre-existing statute and nothing ap-
pears in the statute as amended to suggest a different
interpretation. It would therefore appear that the in-
debtedness comprising the measure of the tax cannot
be held to include future indebtedness or indebtedness
contingent upon the happening of some future event.

“The amended statute recites five illustrations
of instruments within the contemplation of the taxing
item. These are mortgages, deeds of trust, conditional
sales contracts, and liens upon personalty, in addition
to financing statements. The first four of these, as here
listed, rather unmistakingly relate to and contemplate
specific property in being in which the debtor has a
present alienable interest.

‘The intendment of the term ‘financing statement’
standing alone is of course much broader. It covers
virtually every type of security interest in property,
present and future. No means however is provided for
the ascertainment of anything other than present in-
terest in present property. Under the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis, the indicated legislative intent was to
confine the meaning of the term for tax purposes to
such interests.

«What must be further borne in mind here is that the
original scope of Item S(b) has in recent years been
eroded without any expressed intention to do so by
the enactment of the motor vehicle title statute and
the Uniform Commercial Code. These statutes provide

252 es

new. and different methods and places for the recorda-
tion of certain types of security instruments. One of
the manifest objects of the amendments to Item S(b)
was to bring these instruments back within the scope
of the popularly referred to ‘mortgage tax.’ When we
view the new statute against this background, it seems
clear that the legislative intent was to include within
the scope of the tax only those financing statements
setting forth security interests in property which would
have been subjects of taxation under the original Item
S(b). These are those statements which can fairly be
said to be substitutes for mortgages, deeds of trust and
conditional sales contracts.

“Tt is therefore the opinion of this office that financ-
ing statements are includable within the measure of
the tax in question only when they undertake as se-
eurity for a present indebtedness to state a present
interest in specific property in which the debtor has a
present alienable interest.’’

In a subsequent opinion letter dated March 7, 1969, and
addressed to Commissioner Benson, continuation state-
ments as well as financing statements, were further dis-
cussed, in part as follows:

“In my letter to you dated December 6, 1967, it was
concluded that financing statements were includable
within the taxing item in question where they repre-
sented substitutes for mortgages, deeds of trust or
conditional sales contracts, or where they undertake
to evidence security for a present indebtedness of a
present interest in specific property where the debtor
has a present alienable interest.

ee =— 2:

“The sample statement which you enclose purports
to cover all present and future accounts and contract
rights of the debtor. Insofar as the tax is concerned,
it is the opinion of this office that it is applicable to
such portion of the indebtedness secured as is presently
(that is as of the date the statement is offered for re-
cordation) in heing. Of course, no present evaluation
can be made of future indebtedness.

“As for continuation statements, I am constrained
to the opinion that they stand upon the same footing
as continuations of mortgages, deeds of trust, condi-
tional sales contracts and liens upon personalty. The
original recording of these are subject to the tax, but
continuations are not except to the extent that they
undertake to secure additional indebtedness incurred
since the original filing.”’

On the basis of the foregoing the Commissioner of
Revenue states his basic position with respect to this
tax and its imposition on the filing of continuation state-
ments as follows:

“The defendants’ basic position, therefore, is that
taxes on the filing of continuation statements are au-
thorized and required by T.C.A. sec, 67-4102, Item
S(b), and that the basis for the imposition of the tax
is the amount of indebtedness secured at the time of
the filing of a continuation statement. To the extent
that the filings of the original financing statements
were subject to the privilege tax prescribed by
T.C.A., sec. 67-4102, Item S(b), the presumption
against double taxation for the exercise of the same
privilege would operate to exclude the filing of subse-
quent continuation statements for imposition of the

254 es

tax, Since the presumption against double taxation
would preclude imposition of the tax on the filing of
continuation statements only where and to the extent
that the amount of indebtedness secured has previously
served as a basis for the tax, T.C.A. sec, 67-4102, Item
S(b) requires the levy of taxes on the filings of con-
tinuation statements where no taxes were levied on the
filings of the original financing statements, or where
new indebtedness has been incurred since the original
filings to the extent of the new indebtedness.”

The International Companies’ basic position is, of
course, that the filing of continuation statements are not
taxed by the tax statute and that the tax has been illegally
collected for the several reasons mentioned in their as-
signments of error.

We agree with the Commissioner of Revenue that the
tax was due and payable and affirm the decree of the
Chancery Court.

Hl In their first and tenth assignment of error com-
plainants contend that a continuation statement is neither
a ‘‘financing statement’? nor an ‘‘evidence of indebted-
ness’? and go no tax should be paid upon its filing.

This contention is in the teeth of the statute, sec. 67-
4102 Item S(b) T.C.A., which taxes the public recordation
of “any instrument evidencing an indebtedness, includ-
ing but not limited to * * * financing statements contem-
plated by the uniform commercial code * * *,”. Since the
statute applies to the public recordation of any instru-
ment evidencing an indebtedness, and a continuation
statement evidences an indebtedness, and must be re-
corded to be effective, the tax statute clearly applies.

ee =— 255

It is obvious that without the continuation statement
the arrangement for security would be at an end after
five years. But, that by means of the continuation state-
ment, security is extended as to both new and old indebt-
edness for another five year period, and so is a new
‘‘evidence of indebtedness’’.

Hl Complainants’ second contention, that there is no
firm and certain indebtedness on which the tax can be
levied, since a continuation statement is merely a docu-
ment evidencing the continuation of an existing and
continuing security interest fluctuates over the period of
financing of a dealer on the dealer’s inventory, is, like-
wise, unsound. At any given time the indebtedness
secured by this open-ended security arrangement can be
ascertained. The tax statute fixes that time of ascertain-
ment at the time the evidence of indebtedness is offered
for recordation. This furnishes a. certain basis for the
assessment of the tax. The fact that, as is evident, inven-
tory collateral may be greater or less from time to time
and so the amounts secured vary, can furnish no basis
for striking down a privilege tax which in express terms
applies to this very situation; which situation is, itself,
provided for by the Uniform Commercial Code.

HE We do not think that sec. 67-4102 Item S(b) is void
for establishment of arbitrary and capricious classsifica-
tions. It is argued that since the statute does not impose
a tax on financing statements covering motor vehicles,
while applying the tax where farm equipment is covered,
the whole statute is void for arbitrary and capricious
classification contrary to Article 11, sec. 8 of the Consti-
tution of Tennessee.

256

The only case cited by complainants is Jack Cole Com-
pany v. MacFarland, 206 Tenn. 694, 337 S.W.2d 453,

Not only does this opinion not apply, being concerned
with the unconstitutionality of a particular privilege tax
on the ground it was an income tax and so prohibited by
Article 2, sec, 28 of the Constitution of Tennessee, the
case more aptly could be cited for the appellees since
therein it is recognized that Article 2, sec. 28, expressly
provides ‘‘* * * the Legislature shall have power to tax
Merchants, Peddlers, and privileges, in such manner as
they may from time to time direct.’’

The legislature has in the tax statute under considera-
tion directed the taxation of the recordation of particular
instruments evidencing indebtedness, and has excluded
others. This lies within the prima facie power of the
legislature under the constitutional permission to tax
privileges as it sees fit. See Camden Fire Ins. Assn, v.
Haston, 153 Tenn. 675, 284 S.W. 905; Seven Stprings
Water Co. v. Kennedy, 156 Tenn. 1, 299 8.W. 792, 56
ALR. 496; Humphries v. Carter, 172 Tenn, 392, 112
8.M.2d 833; Hooten v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 282, 209 S.W.2d
273,

The right of taxation is inherent in this state, It is a
prerogative essential to the perpetuity of the government.
The claimant who would say a tax statute is beyond
the power of the legislature because it contravenes a
constitutional provision must put his finger on the express
constitutional provision, and the contravention must be
clear. Vertrees v. State Board of Elections, 141 Tenn.
645, 214 S.W. 737. While Article 11, sec. 8 is pointed out
as being offended no good reason is given and no author-
ity in point is cited.

Ln

We point out it would be our duty to elide the provision
objected to rather than to strike down the taxing statute
should the complainants-appellants prevail in their argu-
ment. Because, the evident, primary intent of the statute
is to tax ‘‘any instrument evidencing an indebtedness”’
while the exclusion is a secondary consideration.

The question of the effect of the unconstitutional ex-
emption of a class of property on an omnibus tax statute
was discussed in McLaughlin v. Chadwell, Collector et al.,
54 Tenn. 389, 399:

‘What, however, would be the result should the
Legislature see proper to exempt property from taxa-
tion, in violation of the spirit of the Constitution above
quoted, we do not say. Would it result that all the tax
imposed by the act upon other property would there-
fore be illegal, and not susceptible of collection? This
would be to give an unusual effect to an unconstitu-
tional law,—that because certain property is improper-
ly exempted, therefore no tax can be collected from
other property that is properly taxed. Would not a
more reasonable view be that the part of the law pro-
viding for the improper exemption should be declared
void.

“Tf the argument be sound that the exemption of
these bonds was a violation of the condition in the act
of Congress upon which the right to tax national bank
stock is founded, it would seem to follow that the ex-
emption is also in violation of that part of our State
Constitution above quoted, requiring equal taxation;
and if this be true, then it would result that the ex-
emption was in violation of the Constitution, and
should have been disregarded altogether. And this

258

would certainly be more rational than to defeat the en-
tire tax law because of the fact that a part of it is
unconstitutional.”

Though this proposition is dealt with only theoretically
in McLaughlin, the resolution of the problem there sug-
gested is sound and has been followed in several cases
since. In State v. Scott, 98 Tenn. 254, 39 S.W.1, 36 LRA.
461, it was held the unconstitutionality of a clause of the
Revenue Act of 1897 did not affect any other part of the
act. State National Bank v. City of Memphis, 116 Tenn.
641, 94 S.W. 606, 7 L.R.A.,N.S., 663, held that the un-
constitutionality of a provision in an act allowing the
deduction of the value of state bonds from the value of
shares of corporate stocks in assessing the shares of stock
would not affect the validity of the provision of the tax
act for their assessment as a whole. In Ogilvie v. Hailey,
141 Tenn, 392, 210 S.W. 645, it was held that even though
a penalty provided for non-payment of privilege tax on
pleasure automobiles should be held to be unconstitutional
as excessive, it would not vitiate the remainder of the
tax act. In Corn v. Fort, 170 Tenn. 377, 95 S.W.2d 620,
106 A.L.R. 647, it was held that the inclusion of partner-
ships in a classification of an act imposing privilege taxes
on various forms of business endeavors, while in itself
unconstitutional, would not affect the validity of the
balance of the act. And in Logan’s Supermarkets, Inc.
v, Atkins, 202 Tenn. 438, 304 S.W.2d 628, it was held that
the portion of the act which increased the amount of
privilege tax imposed on trading stamp companies was
not voided by the unconstitutional classification of mer-
chants who used trading stamps as a trade incentive.

The Commissioner and Secretary of State argue that
the exclusion under attack is not arbitrary, capricious

and unreasonable, because there is a comprehensive sys-
tem of motor vehicle registration, sec. 59-801 et seq.,
T.C.A., upon which the exclusion could have been based.
While this is true, we are not required to sustain the
validity of this particular exclusion in this case, we are
only required to decide whether or not its presence in the
tax statute sec. 67-4102 Item S(b) T.C.A. invalidates the
entire act, and we hold that it does not.

Hl The fourth assignment of error, that the tax act
is drafted so as to permit double taxation upon the same
event is without merit. Revenue statutes are to be con-
strued, in the absence of express words disclosing a
contrary intent, against an intention to subject the same
business to double taxation. Commercial Standard Ins.
Co. v. Hiason, 175 Tenn. 239, 133 8.W.2d 493; State v.
Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 139 Tenn. 406, 201 S,W. 738;
Bell v. Watson, 71 Tenn. 328. This same general proposi-
tion is stated slightly differently in Williams v. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 221 Tenn. 508, 427 S.W.2d
845, where it is said that there is a presumption against
the legislative intent to enact statutes resulting in double
taxation.

On top of this there was no double taxation or threat
of double taxation. To the contrary only one tax was
collected and it was collected under opinion letters of the
Attorney General which take the subject of possible
double taxation into consideration and instruct the com-
missioner how to avoid this happening.

While it is well settled that revenue statutes are to be
liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer and strictly
construed against the taxing authority, Memphis Pea-
body Corp. v. MacFarland, 211 Tenn. 384, 365 S.W.2d 40,

260

it is equally clear that the plain import of the language
of the act is to be given effect, United Inter-Mountain
Telephone Co. v. Moyers, 221 Tenn, 246, 426 S.W.2d 177,
and that the legislative intent to tax must not be thwarted
by the strict construction rule. See Tennessee Products
& Chemical Corp. v. Dickinson, 195 Tenn. 63, 256 S.W.2d
709.

So, while ‘‘continuation statements’’ are not specifi-
cally named in the tax statute, they are, as we have held,
‘instruments evidencing an indebtedness’’, having in
general the same security purpose as ‘‘financing state-
ments’’ (which latter are expressly subjected to the re-
cordation tax), so that under the strictest construction of
the tax statute, the privilege tax would apply.

Il For reasons we have heretofore mentioned we
disagree with complainants-appellants’ contention that
the tax statute is so vague and uncertain in its terms
that it is void. We find nothing vague and uncertain in
the statute terms. It specifically defines the classes of
instruments to which the privilege tax is applicable and
makes clear and definite provision for the ascertainment
of the base of the tax. The assignment in this regard is
without merit.

Hl Likewise, the assignment that the present statute
is void, because it is broader than the caption of the act
originating the tax, is without merit. It is fundamental
that upon. the incorporation of this tax act into Tennes-
see Code Annotated, and the subsequent amendment of
that Code by reference to the Code section the relation-
ship of the amendments to the original caption are not
available for an attack on the statute. Defects in the
captions of the original and amendatory acts, if any, are

a

cured through codification adopted by a codifying act.
Keaton v, State, 212 Tenn. 690, 372 S.W.2d 163. The
legislative history of this tax act is set out parentheti-
cally under sec, 67-4102 T.C.A. Item S(b), but this infor-
mation is not a part of the Tennessee Code Annotated
so as to bring forward the old caption. City of Memphis
v. Yellow Cab, 201 Tenn. 71, 296 S.W.2d 864.

The ninth assignment of error, that the judgment of
the chancery court is contrary to both the law and the
weight of the evidence is too general to consider. So for
this and for all the reasons we have heretofore mentioned
for sustaining the tax it is overruled.

The assignment of error that there was no taxable
event upon which the tax could be imposed is without
merit. For reasons heretofore given sustaining the tax,
it is overruled.

For the reasons stated all assignments of error are
overruled, and the decree of the Chancellor is affirmed.

Dysr, Cumr Justice, and Cuarin and Cruson, Jus-
TICES, concur.

McCantzss, Justice, not participating.

262

Kenvet M. Hanvy, a minor, by next friend and mother,
Geraldine Hanvy, Appellant,

Crosman Arms Company, Ino., Appellee.

466 S.W.2d 214

(Nashwille, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed April 5, 1971.

263

|| |

J. Vioror Barr, Jz, Davm C. Rutwerrorp, Nashville,
for appellant.

Dan E. McGvuern, Warxiss, McGuern, Fincn & Mc-
Netuiy, Nashville, for appellee.

Mr. Justicze Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

264 es

This is an appeal in error from the Circuit Court of
Davidson County. The sole question for decision is the
correctness of the trial judge in sustaining the defend-
ant’s plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court.

The parties will be referred to as they were in the court
below. The plaintiff, Kendel M. Hanvy, a minor suing
by his next friend, is the plaintiff-in-error, and the de-
fendant, Crosman Arms Company, Inc., a New York
corporation, the defendant-in-error.

Plaintiff instituted this action by service of process on
the Secretary of State. His declaration alleged in sub-
stance that, while working at a Nashville merchandising
company, he suffered the permanent loss of his left eye
when a fellow employee fired at him with an air rifle
manufactured by defendant. This injury, it is alleged,
was caused by the negligence of defendant in its factory
testing of the air rifle, which resulted in the shipment
of the rifle from defendant’s factory into this State in a
loaded and dangerous condition.

The defendant, appearing specially in the case, filed a
plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the Court, which
it set out below:

“1, On, prior to and subsequent to March 22, 1969,
the date in question in this suit, the defendant was not
qualified nor authorized to do business in Tennessee
and it did not transact business or conduct affairs in
Tennessee and the provisions of Section 48-1202, Ten-
nessee Code Annotated have no application to it.

“9, This alleged cause of action did not arise from

(a) the transaction of any business within the State
by this defendant;

ee 265

(b) any tortious act or omission by it within this
State;

(c) the ownership or possession of any interest in
property located within this State;

(d) the entering into of any contract of insurance,
indemnity, or guaranty covering any person, property
or risk located within this State at the time of con-
tracting;

(e) the entering into a contract for services to be
rendered or for materials to be furnished in this State.

Wherefore, Section 20-235, Tennessee Code Anno-
tated has no application to it.

«3, This defendant has never appointed the Secre-
tary of State of Tennessee as its agent for the Service
of Process and he is not and has never been its Agent
for Process whether by appointment or by operation
of law.

“4, This defendant is a New York corporation situ-
ated in Fairport, New York. On, prior to and subse-
quent to March 22, 1969, it had no office, no agency, no
agents and did no business in Tennessee. Orders were
mailed by Service Merchandise, Inc. in the United
States Mail and received by this defendant in its office
and plant in Fairport, New York, where, upon being
accepted by this defendant, it shipped the merchandise
ordered from its Fairport, New York plant to Service
Merchandise, Inc. hy common carriers in Interstate
Commerce.’’

Tr. pp. 7-8
Plaintiff then moved the trial court to dispose of the
plea. On hearing, by consent of the parties, plaintiff’s

266

motion was treated as a demurrer to the plea. The trial
court overruled the demurrer and sustained the plea in
abatement, from which action the plaintiff appealed.

Although the assignments of error and brief filed by
the plaintiff are somewhat vague in nature, they raise
with sufficient clarity one point of law which is the basis
of our decision. This involves the application, to this
case, of T.C.A. sec. 20-235 (b), which confers jurisdiction
to Tennessee courts over nonresidents ‘‘as to any action
or claim to relief arising from * * * [a]ny tortious act
or omission within this State * * *.’”

Hl The question for our decision, one of first impres-
sion in this Court, is whether the legislature intended,
in enacting T.C.A. sec. 20-235(b), to confer jurisdiction
to our courts over nonresident tort-feasors in situations,
like the instant one, when the allegedly negligent conduct
occurred without, but. the resulting tortious injury oc-
curred within, the State. For the reasons set out below
we are persuaded that such was the intention of the legis-
lature.

We note first of all, that the language of the act in
question does not clearly reveal the intent of the legis-
lature. That is, the words ‘‘tortious act or omission’’
might be read as referring only to acts physically per-
formed, or not performed, in Tennessee, or, by paying
particular attention to the adjective ‘tortious’, the words
might be read as referring to a total act, embodying both
negligent conduct and proximately caused injury. That
these words are susceptible to such diverse constructions
is amply shown by the conflicting opinions of courts in-
terpreting similar statutes. See, e. g., (allowing juris-
diction) Vandermee v. District Court of County of Arap-

re 267

ahoe, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967); Johnson v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 22 A.D.2d 138, 254 N.Y.S.2d
258, affirmed 18 N.Y.2d 933, 277 N.Y.S.2d 136, 223 N.H.2d
562 (1964) ; State ex rel. Western Seed Production Corp.
v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968); Wiaon v.
Cohm, 62 Wash.2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963). Not allowing
jurisdiction, see Southern New England Dist. Corp. v.
Berkeley Fin, Corp., 30 F.R.D. 43 (D.C.Conn.1962) (ap-
plying Connecticut law) ; Longines-Witinauer Watch Co.
v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 448, 261 N.Y.S.2d
8, 209 N.H.2d 68, 24 A.L.R.3d 508 (Cert. denied, Estwing
Mfg. Co. v. Singer 382 U.S. 905, 86 S.Ct, 241, 15 L.Hd.2d
158 (1965).

The Federal District Courts in Tennessee have con-
sidered our own statute, also with diverse constructions.
(Allowing jurisdiction) Tate v. Renault, Inc., 278 F.Supp.
457 (H.D.Tenn.1967); Kroger Co. v. Adkins Transfer
Co., 284 F.Supp. 371 (M.D.Tenn.1968) ; Fayette v. Volks-
wagen of ‘America, Inc., 273 F.Supp. 323 (W.D.Tenn.
1967) (Not allowing jurisdiction).

Since it is apparent the statutory language alone does
not clearly reveal the intention of the legislature, we must
look further in finding that intention.

Our Long Arm Statute very closely resembles that of
Tilinois, perhaps the oldest such statute in the Country.
Tn 1961, four years prior to the adoption of T.C.A. sec.
20-285, the Illinois Supreme Court construed TL Rev.Stat.
1959, Chap. 110, sec. 17(1) (b), which is almost identi-
cal to T,C.A. sec. 20-235(b).* This statement, ‘‘almost

?The Illinois Statute reads: “Any person * * * submits to the
jurisdiction of the Courts of this State as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of any such acts as: * * * (b) the commission

of a tortious act within this State.” IllRev.Stat. Chap. 110, sec.
17(1) (b) (1959).

268 es

identical’’ qualifies our statement in Darby v. Superior
Supply Company, 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423, wherein
it was said the two statutes are identical.

It will be seen that the sole difference between the Illi-
nois subsection (b) and our own (b) is the addition to
our statute of the words ‘‘or omission,’’ following the
word—act. The case. Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Tll.2d 432, 176 N.B.2d 761
(1961), involved a plaintiff who was injured in Illinois by
the explosion of a hot water heater. The explosion was
caused by a defective safety valve which had been manu-
factured by the defendant outside the State and sold to
a Pennsylvania firm which installed the valve in Pennsyl-
vania and shipped the complete heater into Illinois. The
Tllinois Court held that the defendant had committed a
“tortious act,’’ for the purpose of the Long Arm Statute,
in Illinois. We set out in full the pertinent portion of the
opinion:

“The wrong in the case at bar did not originate in
the conduct of a servant physically present here, but
arose instead from acts performed at the place of
manufacture. Only the consequences occurred in Illi-
nois. It is well established, however, that in law the
place of a wrong is where the last event takes place
which is necessary to render the actor liable. Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws, sec. 377. A second indication
that the place of injury is the determining factor is
found in rules governing the time within which an
action must be brought. In applying statutes of limi-
tation our court has computed the period from the time
when the injury is done. Madison v. Wedron Silica Co.,
352 Ill. 60, 184 NE. 901; Leroy v. City of Springfield,

ee 269

81 Hil. 114. We think it is clear that the alleged negli-
gence in manufacturing the valve cannot be separated
from the resulting injury; and that for present pur-
poses, the tort was committed in Tllinois.

“Titan seeks to avoid this result by arguing that
instead of using the word ‘‘tort,’’ the legislature em-
ployed the term ‘‘tortious act’’; and that the latter
refers only to the act or conduct, separate and apart
from any consequences thereof. We cannot accept the
argument. To be tortious an act must cause injury.
The concept of injury is an inseparable part of the
phrase. In determining legislative intention courts will
read words in their ordinary popularly understood
sense. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm. v. Einfeldt,
12 TiL.2d 499, 147 N.H.2d 53; Farrand Coal Co. v. Hal-
pin, 10 Til. 2d 507, 140 N.E.2d 698. We think the intent
should be determined less from technicalities of defi-
nition than from considerations of general purpose
and effect. To adopt the criteria urged by defendant
would tend to promote litigation over extraneous issues
concerning the elements of a tort and the territorial
incidence of each, whereas the test should be concerned
more with those substantial elements of convemence
and justice presumably contemplated by the legislature.
As we observed in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ti.2d 378, 143
N.E.2d 673, the statute contemplates the exertion of
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent
permitted by the due-process clause.’’ (Emphasis sup-
plied)

It is greatly persuasive to us that our legislature, in
adopting a statute so very similar to that of Illinois, had
before it this construction of the Illinois statute.

270 es

Moreover, so far as our research shows, of the State
Courts construing similar statutes since the Gray deci-
sion, only one jurisdiction has refused to follow it and
that decision was subsequently repudiated by the legis-
lature.?

In Darby v. Superior Supply Company, 224 Tenn. 540,
458 S.W.2d 423, in which we first dealt with our long-arm
statute, we cited with approval Nelson v. Miller, 11 Til.2d
378, 143 N.H.2d 673, and Southern Machine Co. Inc., v.
Mohasko Industries, 6 Cir., 401 F.2d 374, and said: ‘We
hold that our statute, sec. 20-235 et seq T.C.A., was en-
acted with the intention to assert jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants to the extent permitted by the due
process clause.

Since, as this Court agreed, this was the primary pur-
pose of the statute, it would follow that the words ‘‘with-
in this state’’ should be read in aid of this jurisdiction,
as relating to the requirements of the due process clause,
rather than as a limitation on the definition of tortious
act which would greatly narrow the statute’s application.

Under the pleadings which we must take as true, this
is the place the boy-plaintiff was blinded by Crosman’s
negligence. This is the place and society in relation to
which his damages must be fixed. This is the place where
the witnesses, factual and medical, are to be found. This
is the place where economy and convenience dictate the
suit should be tried. Should all of this be set at naught
because of an ambiguity in the statute? Not as long as
our statute reaches, as we have already said, as far as

* Longines-Whittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, supra, was
deprived of effect in 1966 by sec. 302(a) (2) of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules, which made plain the intent of the legislature
to follow the Gray decision,

ee 271

the Constitution of the United States permits, to serve
these purposes. See Footnote.

Hl We are of the opinion the service of process was
valid. Accordingly, the assignments of error are sus-
tained, the judgment of the trial court is set aside, and
the case is remanded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings.

Dyzr, Curr Jusricz, and McCanzass, Justice, concur.

OCuarmn, Justice, dissents in an opinion in which
Cresox, Justicr, concurs.

Footnote:

The provision for service of process with respect to
“transaction of any business’’ is followed by the words
“within this state’’, just as the provision for process in
a tort case. But these words have never been thought by
anyone to require the entire business transaction to take
place here.

Mr. Jusrice Cuartin, (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion hold-
ing personam jurisdiction of defendant, Crosman Arms
Company, was acquired by a ‘‘tortious act or omission
by it within this State.’’

The words of the statute must be taken in their ordi-
nary sense and without any forced or subtle construction
to extend their meaning. Phillips & Buttorff Mfg. Co. v.
Carson, 188 Tenn, 132, 217 S.W.2d 1 (1949); Burks v.
State, 194 Tenn. 675, 254 S.W.2d 970 (1953) ; Ford Motor
Company v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (1960).

“The whole purpose of statutory interpretation is
to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent;

272 |

and all rules of construction are but aids to this end.
Woodroof v, City of Nashwille, 183 Tenn. 483, 489, 192
8.W.2d 1013. Where the words of a statute are clear
and plain and fully express the legislative intent, there
is no room to resort to auxiliary rules of construction.”
Anderson v. Outland, 210 Tenn. 526, 360 S.W.2d 44
(1962).

Unambiguous statutes must be construed to mean what
they say. Montgomery v. Hoskins, 222 Tenn. 45, 432
S.W.2d 654 (1968).

There is no ambiguity in the words ‘‘any tortious act
or omission within this State.’’

The record shows the ‘‘tortious act or omission’’ of
defendant alleged occurred in New York State and not
‘within’? this State.

Defendant did nothing in this State. It shipped the
rifles to this State by common carriers.

The occurrence of an injury in this State cannot serve
to transmute an out-of-state tortious act or omission into
one committed within this State under the wording of
our statute. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.¥.2d 448, 261 N.Y.8.2d 8, 209 N.H.2d
68, 24 A.L.R.3d 506, cert. den. Estwing Mfg. Co. v. Singer,
382 U.S. 905, 86 S.Ct. 241, 15 L.Hd.2d 158 (1965).

There remains whether jurisdiction in this case may
be upheld under paragraph (a) which reads: ‘‘The
transaction of any business within the state.’”’

By demurring to the plea in abatement, plaintiff
admitted all facts well pleaded but not the conclusion of
the pleader.

oe

ee 218

Plaintiff states in his brief:

“The defendant has a large volume of sales in
Tennessee, and the accident involved here resulted
from its extensive sales activities in the state, so that
no problem of minimum contact is involved.’

However, the declaration does not bear out this state-
ment. The declaration alleged :

“That in the loading and unloading of merchandise,
a shipment of Crosman BB rifles had come into the
warehouse; and one of the boxes, containing a Crosman
V-350 BB rifle, had come open and another high school
boy, named Terry Cathey, who was working after
school with your minor plaintiff, did remove a new
Crosman V-350 BB rifle from its container and loaded
one BB shot into the barrel of the said rifle and fired
at an empty box, causing a hole to be torn in same.
That the said Terry Cathey cocked the said rifle again,
and believing said rifle to be empty, did pull the trigger
again. That there was another BB shot in the rifle,
and it struck the minor plaintiff in his left eye, and
said BB shot directly and proximately causing the loss
of said eye.”’

This allegation does not, in my opinion, satisfy the
‘minimum contacts’’ test as announced in International
Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154,
90 L.Hd. 95, 161 A.L.R. (1945). The Supreme Court of
the United States has consistently adhered to the
“minimum contact’? test of state jurisdiction over non-
residents.

In the following cases due process was held violated,
under the circumstances involved, by subjecting a non-

or es

resident to the jurisdiction of the local courts on the basis
of an isolated transaction involving the sale of property.
All such cases are based upon the provision of the State’s
long arm statute containing the provision ‘‘transact[ing]
of any business within this State’. Morgan v. Heckle
(D.C.IIL.) 171 F.Supp. 482 (1959) ; Purdy Co. v. Argen-
tina, 333 F.2d 95, cert. den. 379 U.S. 962, 13 L.Hd.2d 557,
85 S.Ct. 653 (1964); Coun v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250,
342 P.2d 871 (1959); Chassis-Trak, Inc. v. Federated
Purchaser, Inc., (D.C.N.J.) 179 F.Supp. 780 (1960) ;
Perlmutter v. Standard Roofing and Tinsmith Supply
Company, 43 Misc.2d 885, 252 N.Y.8.2d 583 (1964) ; Old
Westbury Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Mitchell, 44 Mise.
2d 687, 254 N.Y.8.2d 679, affd. 24 A.D.2d 636, 26 N.Y.2d
438, affd. 18 N.Y.2d 670, 273 N.Y.S.2d 418, 219 N.H.2d
868 (1964); Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,
Ine, (C.A. 4 N.C.) 239 F.2d 502. (1956); Darby v.
Superior Supply Company, 224 Tenn, 540, 458 S.W.2d
423 (1970).

Defendant had no offices, representatives, salesmen, or
any other contact with this State, under this record,
other than to accept orders from Service Merchandise,
Inc., through the United States mail and ship the
material by common carriers in Interstate Commerce.

I would sustain the judgment of the trial court.

I am authorized to say Mr. Justice Creson joins me
in this opinion.

on

Ss |
Mary Grace Curtis, Appellee,
Hamizron Brock Compaxy, Ixc., et al, Appellants.
466 S.W.2d 220

(Knozville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed April 5, 1971,

276

CunnincHam, Crurcurmip & McAuister, Chatta-
nooga, for appellants.

Busan, Puruies, & Bean, Chattanooga, for appellee.

Mr. Curer Justice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is a workmen’s compensation case presenting the
issue of whether James Curtis (deceased) was, at the
time of his death, an employee within the meaning of
the Act, or an independent contractor. The trial judge

ee 27

finding deceased was an employee of Hamilton Block
Company, Ine. awarded death benefits due the widow
and minor children.

Hamilton Block Company, Ine. (herein referred to as
Hamilton) is a large manufacturer of conerete building
blocks and allied materials. Prior to 1952 Hamilton both
manufactured and delivered their products to their cus-
tomers. In 1952 Hamilton decided to go out of the
business of delivering its products and in furtherance
of this decision a separate corporation was, organized
designated as ‘‘Construction Services and Supply, Inc.’’
Hamilton then contracted with Construction Services to
deliver its products, paying Construction Services an
agreed amount for each block or other material delivered.
Construction Services purchased and owned the trucks
used to deliver these products and the operators of the
trucks were carried as employees of Construction
Services. The only part Hamilton had in the delivery of
these products was that employees of Hamilton loaded
the trucks at Hamilton’s plant and directed the truck
operators where to deliver its products.

In addition to the agreement with Construction
Services, Hamilton also had agreements with four or five
individuals to deliver its products on a similar basis as
with Construction Services. Hamilton designated these
individuals as ‘‘contract haulers’’ and there was a pos-
sibility of one earning more as a contract hauler than as
an employee of Construction Services, dependent on busi-
ness conditions. On September 9, 1969, deceased became
a contract hauler, and died by accident on December 9,
1969, while delivering Hamilton’s products.

78 a

Prior to September 9, 1969, deceased was an employee
of Construction Services, driving one of their delivery
trucks. About this time, John Hill, one of the ‘‘contract
haulers,’’ desired to change his status to that of an em-
ployee of Construction Services. Learning of this de-
ceased went to Mr. Chester Parker, an officer of Hamil-
ton, and asked permission to purchase John Hill’s truck.
Mr. Parker agreed and deceased changed his status from
employee of Construction Services to one of ‘contract
hauler,’’ taking over the John Hill truck. These contract
haulers would have great difficulty in financing the pur-
chase of a truck and Hamilton in effect loaned its credit
for such purchases. Hamilton made financial arrange-
ments to purchase the truck, taking title to the truck in
itsname. Mr. Parker stated that this procedure of taking
title to the truck in Hamilton’s name was used to protect
Hamilton on the debt. At the time deceased went to Mr.
Parker to get permission to purchase the Hill truck, the
title to said truck was in Hamilton’s name and so re-
mained during the time deceased used the truck. In fact,
the particular truck was being used by Hamilton pre-
sumably in the same capacity on the date of the trial,
March 16, 1970.

The ‘contract haulers’? would report each working
day with their trucks to Hamilton’s plant and remain
during normal working hours. When Hamilton had a
haul for one of the ‘‘contract haulers’’ an order would
be written showing the number of its products and the
destination and given to the ‘‘contract hauler.’’ The
“contract hauler’’ kept a copy of these orders, turning
them in to the office once a week to have the amount due
him computed and paid. Hamilton deducted from these
weekly checks payments due on the truck, or payments on

P| 279

any other debt due Hamilton. Hamilton did not deduct
any sum as withholding or social security nor were these
“eontract haulers’? listed by Hamilton with his work-
men’s compensation carrier. The ‘‘contract haulers’’
were responsible for the purchase of gasoline and the
upkeep on the trucks.

The ‘‘contract haulers’? wore a designated uniform
with Hamilton’s name thereon, and the trucks also
carried Hamilton’s name. Mr. Parker stated Hamilton
desired such be done but did not require it. This is done
as a part of Hamilton’s advertisement and Hamilton
paid a part of the cost.

Mr. Parker, when asked what would be Hamilton’s
action in the event one of these contract haulers was
unduly absent when needed, stated: ‘‘I may terminate
my contract with him.”

Tl Since there is no material conflict in the factual
situation regarding the relationship of the parties the
question here of whether deceased was an employee or an
independent contractor is one of law. Brademeyer v.
Chickasaw Bidg. Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S.W.2d 323
(1950); Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41
(1959) ; Cromwell General Contractor, Inc. v. Lytle, 222
Tenn. 633, 439 S.W.2d 598 (1969).

Under the terms of our workmen’s compensation
statutes, T.C.A. sec. 50-918, we are required to give the
statute a broad or liberal construction to effect the
objects and purposes of the statute. This we have con-
sistently done. Johnson Coffee Co. v. McDonald, 143
Tenn, 505, 226 S.W. 215 (1920); Portin v. Portin, 149
Tenn. 530, 261 S.W. 362 (1923); Cherokee Brick Co. v.

280 |

Bishop, 156 Tenn. 168, 299 S.W. 770 (1927); Frost v.
Blue Ridge Timber Corporation, 158 Tenn, 18, 11 S.W.2d
860 (1928) ; Seals v. Zollo, supra.

In Seals v. Zollo, supra, on the issue here, this Court
stated:

“Tn determining whether or not claimant in workmen’s
compensation proceeding was an employee or inde-
pendent contractor, the Supreme Court has duty to
give Workmen’s Compensation Act a liberal construe-
tion in favor of fact that claimant is an employee,
vather than a strict construction. 205 Tenn. at 470,
827 S.W.2d at 44.

In Frost v. Blue Ridge Timber Corporation, supra,
the Court stated:

The power of an employer to terminate the employ-
ment at any time is incompatible with the full control
of the work which is usually enjoyed by an inde-
pendent contractor, and hence is considered as a strong
circumstance tending to show the subserviency of the
employee. Indeed, it has been said that no single fact
is more conclusive, perhaps, than the unrestricted right
of the employer to end the particular service whenever
he chooses, without regard to the final result of the
work itself.”’ 158 Tenn. at 22, 11 S.W.2d at 862.

Hl Under the broad or liberal view we are required
to take in regard to the factual situation here, we think
the trial judge was correct in finding deceased was an
employee of Hamilton within the meaning of the Work-
men’s Compensation Statute, on the ground Hamilton
had the power to direct and supervise deceased’s work
whether this power was exercised or not.

ee 281

The only practical difference between one delivering
Hamilton’s products as an employee of Construction
Services and as a ‘‘contract hauler’’ was in the case of
the ‘‘contract haulers’’ there was a possibility of making
more money. Truck drivers for Construction Services
came to and remained at work the same hours as ‘‘con-
tract haulers’’ and both delivered Hamilton’s products
as needed. Employees of Construction Services could be
terminated at any time; and in the case of ‘‘contract
haulers’’ their contract could be terminated at any time.
In either case, the same result is reached. As stated in
Frost v. Blue Ridge Timber Corporation, supra, this is
incompatible with the full control of the work usually
enjoyed by an independent contractor.

Hl Error is assigned by Hamilton of admission into
evidence of portions of the discovery deposition of the
witness, Alvin Hale. Evidence here objected to is cum-
mulative and if such admission were error, it was harm-
less error. As we have stated, there is no material dis-
pute as to the factual situation.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Cuartix, Humpureys and McCayuzss, Justices and
Jexxrys, Sprcran Jusrice, coneur.

Gayrwoy Vance, Plaintiff in Error,

MicuarL Burean, Defendant in Error.
466 S.W.2d 223
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed April 5, 1971.

James O. Nonaxp and Jouy J. Husruz, Nonann,
Caranano & Husriz, Clarksville, for plaintiff in error.

R. H. Batson, Danmn, Harv, Batson & Noxan,
Clarksville, for defendant in error.

Mr. Jusricn Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries
arising from an automobile accident which occurred on
April 7, 1966, in Montgomery County, Tennessee. The
original summons in the cause, addressed to the Sheriff
of Montgomery County and listing the address of the
defendant, Michael Blegan as Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
was issued on November 17, 1966, and was received by
the Secretary of State the following day. The affidavit
of the Secretary of State required by T.C.A. sec. 20-227
was sent to the Cireuit Court Clerk of Montgomery
County on December 12, 1966. It showed that the
registered letter containing a copy of the summons and
notice of the action to the defendant had been returned
undelivered, with the notation ‘‘unknown’’.

Subsequently, the plaintiff caused to be issued in three
of the next four terms of the Cireuit Court an ‘‘alias
summons’’, each listing a different out-of-state address
for the defendant. In each instance: the affidavit of the
Secretary of State showed the letter of notice to the
defendant to have been returned undeliverd.

ee 285

The third ‘‘alias summons”’ was issued on October 17,
1967. On October 8, 1968, a fourth ‘‘alias summons’’ was
issued. This time the registered letter of notice was
delivered, the return receipt having signed by ‘‘Mrs.
M. Blegan.’’

Subsequently the defendant filed a plea in abatement
to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that by
failing to cause pluries summons to issue during each
successive term of court following the issuance of the
original summons, the plaintiff had allowed his cause of
action to lapse, and that therefore the ‘‘alias summons’’
of October 8, 1968, instituted a new action, well beyond
the statutory one year period of authority of the Secre-
tary of State to accept service of process as the agent
of a non-resident motorist.

This plea was sustained by the trial court and the
plaintiff appealed, assigning error as follows:

“1, The lower court erred in holding that the State’s
statute of limitations barred the plaintiff from bring-
ing this action against the defendant because the plain-
tiff had failed to keep his action alive and complete
service of process upon the defendant within the one
year statute of limitations for personal injuries.

“2, The lower court erred in holding that the State
statute of limitations barred the plaintiff from bring-
ing action against the defendant, even if this Honorable
Court should find that the action was not kept alive
and service was not completed on the defendant until
one year after the cause of action accrued because even
if this is true, under the Soldiers and Sailors Relief
Act the one year statute of limitations is extended on
the basis of the federal law, and that service of process

286 ee

was completed within the time prescribed by the Ten-
nessee Statute of Limitations taken in conjunction
with the federal law.’’

Hl We first dispose of the second assignment of
error. This case is before us on the technical record
only, and there is nothing in that record from which we
can conclude that the defendant was at any time a mem-
ber of the armed forces. Hence we cannot consider the
applicability of the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act to
the case and we find the assignment of error based there-
on to be without merit.

Hl As to the first assignment of error, we agree with
the conclusion expressed in the defendant’s reply brief
that it seems to have missed the point. Under any view
of the case, since less than one year passed between the
issuance of the third and fourth ‘‘alias summons”’ in the
cause, for the purpose of the Statute of Limitations, the
date of the fourth ‘‘alias summons’’ would relate to that
of the original process. T.C.A. sec. 28-105; Bryant v.
Mulder, 163 Tenn. 600, 45 S.W.2d 48 (1932). The real
issue before the Court is, as pointed out by the defendant,
whether suit is barred by expiration of the one year
period from the date of the accident during which T.C.A.
sec. 20-224 authorizes the Secretary of State to accept
service of process for non-resident motorists.

The position of defendant in this regard is two-fold.
First, he argues that in order to have the time of com-
mencement of a suit to relate to the date of issuance of
the original summons when no statute of limitations is
involved, alias and pluries summons must be issued in
each successive term of the court in which the action was
brought, As authority he cites Hunter v. May, 161 Tenn.

ee 287

155, 25 S.W.2d 580 (1930), as approved by Bryant v.
Mulder, 163 Tenn. 600, 45 S.W.2d 48 (1932). On this rea-
soning it is said that the issuance of the fourth ‘‘alias
summons’’ cannoi relate to the date of the original sum-
mons, and so has the effect of instituting a new action
well after one year from the date of the accident.

Secondly, the defendant argues that this Court held in
Speight v. Miller, 223 Tenn. 259, 448 S.W.2d 657 (1969),
that the service of process which T.C.A. sec. 20-224 author-
izes the Secretary of State to accept is limited to proc-
ess which is sued out prior to the expiration of one year
from the date of the accident and which is ‘‘addressed’’ to
the Secretary of State. Thus it is contended that the Sec-
retary was not authorized to accept service of the fourth
“alias summons’’, which was neither ‘‘addressed”’ to him
(it, like the original summons was addressed to the Sher-
iff of Montgomery County) nor sued out within a year
of the accident.

Basic to both of the defendant’s arguments is the sup-
position that the original summons in this case was in-
effective. We say supposition because it is clear from the
reason and authority of Noseworthy v. Robinson, 203
Tenn. 683, 315 S.W.2d 259 (1958) that such was not the
case. In Noseworthy v. Robinson, the Secretary of State
had received the summons and copy of the declaration
within a year of the accident, but due to an incorrect ad-
dress the registered letter sent to the defendant was
returned unclaimed. Subsequently, more than a year after
the accident, an alias summons with the defendant’s cor-
rect address was served on the Secretary of State. A
copy of this summons, and the other required information
did reach the defendant. On this set of facts the Court
held that service of process, under T.C.A. sec. 20-224,

288 |

was accomplished by the original summons. It was point-
ed out that T.C.A. sec, 20-224 validly makes use of the
highways of this state by a nonresident motorist an
appointment of the Secretary of State as an agent to
receive process, and that service of that process on the
Secretary of State as agent, within the authorized period,
satisfied the requirements of that statute.

It is true of course, that under T.C.A. sec. 20-226 the
Secretary is required to send a copy of the summons to
the defendant together with written notice that service
had been made, and that under T.C.A. sec. 20-227 service
is not ‘‘consummate’’ until the Secretary sends to the
Clerk of the trial court the proper notification that serv-
ice has been made and the defendant notified. But, by the
plain words of T.C.A. sec. 20-224, and on the authority
of Noseworthy v. Robinson, the only ‘‘service of process’’
necessary is that on the Secretary of State, and notice to
the defendant, though vital, is a separate matter,

Hl A complicating factor in cases like this one is that
the legislature has not furnished any specific procedure
relating to the problem. The legislature might have pro-
vided, as have other states, a procedure for staying pro-
ceedings in the trial court, with whatever time limitations
thought necessary, until the required notice to the de-
fendant had been given. But they have not done so. We
have no doubt, however, that the plaintiff has a duty to
furnish the Secretary with the defendant’s correct ad-
dress, and, in the absence of a statutory time limitation,
to furnish it at least with due diligence. See Nickerson v.
Fales, 342 Mass. 194, 172 N.H.2d 832 (1961).

Hl In this regard it is pertinent to note that the legis-
lature, in enacting T.C.A. sec. 28-105, has established the

| 289

policy of the state as to the diligence which must be ex-
ercised by a plaintiff in order to prevent the statute of
limitations from running once his suit has been filed.
There it is considered sufficient if suit is reinstituted
within one year after a summons has been returned un-
executed. We perceive no reason why identical policy
considerations should not apply in this case, and since
the plaintiff in this case furnished the Secretary with
defendant’s correct address within one year of the last
unsuccessful attempt to give notice, we hold that the
fourth ‘‘alias summons”’ served as a satisfactory exercise
of plaintiff’s duty to provide with due diligence a correct
address,

We note that, since the original summons is accepted as
service, by the Secretary, the ‘‘alias’’ and ‘‘pluries sum-
mons,’’ as process, must be without effect. Nevertheless,
this procedure was the only one used in Noseworthy v.
Robinson, and it manifestly serves the purpose of provid-
ing the Secretary with the necessary information and is
concrete evidence of the plaintiff’s diligence or lack of
it. While a different procedure, specifically tailored to the
needs of the situation, might be more desirable, such a
development is properly within the province of the legis-
lature. .

Hl Finally we note defendant’s argument that the
original process must be ‘‘addressed’’ to the Secretary.
The use of the word ‘‘addressed’”’ by this Court in
Speight v. Miller, supra, is not to be taken as meaning
that the summons must contain language directing the
Secretary of State to summon the defendant. According
to the clear words of the statute, the summons is served
on and not by the Secretary. Rather, ‘‘addressed’’ was
used there to describe a summons which is sent to the

290 es

Secretary of State and not given to the Sheriff for serv-
ice within the county. The statute, T.0.A. sec. 20-226,
requires only that the summons be ‘“‘lodged with’’ and
not, in the technical sense, ‘‘addressed to’’ the Secretary.

From all of the above it follows that the trial court
erred in sustaining the plea in abatement, and the cause
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Dyzr, Carer Justicz, and Cnartix, Creson and Mc-
Caness, JUSTICES, concur.

Anye Burrow, Appellant,

Joun M. Haxwoop, Appellee.
466 S.W.2d 892
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed May 8, 1971

292 ee

MacKaruanp, Contey, Buank & Jack, Columbia, for
appellant.

Tuomas E. Humpurey, Jz., Columbia, for appellee.

Mr: Justicz Cuarrin delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is an appeal from the decree of the Chancellor
sustaining the demurrer of appellee, John M. Haywood,
to the bill of appellant, Anne Burrow. We affirm the
action of the Chancellor in sustaining the demurrer.

Appellant filed the bill seeking a sale for partition of
fifty-two acres of land with improvements thereon located
in Maury County.

The bill alleged she was the owner of a life estate in
the entire premises and appellee was the owner of the
remainder interest of same by virtue of the will of Mrs.
Selma Burrow, Deceased.

Appellant alleged the property was not susceptible of
partition in kind and it was to the best interest of the
parties the property be sold and the proceeds divided
according to the rights and interests of the parties.

| 293

The prayer of the bill is for a determination of the
rights and interests of the parties to the property; and
that the property be sold and the proceeds divided be-
tween the parties according to their respective interests.

Appellee demurred to the bill on the ground a life ten-
ant of the whole property could not force a partition
sale against the owner of the remainder interest.

Appellant assigns as error the action of the Chancellor
in sustaining the demurrer.

Appellant frankly admits this Court has construed
T.C.A. Section 23-2101 to mean a life tenant of the whole
of the premises sought to be partitioned cannot maintain
a bill against the owner of the remainder interest to force
a sale of same for partition.

However, appellant argues there is no language in the
statute which prohibits a life tenant of the whole prop-
erty from maintaining such an action to force a sale.

T.C.A. Seetion 23-2101 provides:

“Any person having au estate of inheritance, or for
life, or for years, in lands, and holding or being in
possession thereof, as tenant in common or otherwise,
with others, is entitled to partition thereof, or sale for
partition, under the provisions of this Chapter.””

We disagree. The statute plainly states a life tenant
in lands ‘‘and holding or being in possession thereof, as
tenant in common or otherwise, with others, is entitled
to partition thereof, or sale for partition * * *.”’

Unambiguous statutes must be construed to mean
what they say. Montgomery v. Hoskins, 222 Tenn. 45,
432 S.W.2d 654 (1968).

294 |

Hl Appellant is not holding or in possession of the
property with appellee. In other words, there is no con-
current holding or possession of the parties. Therefore,
appellant, the owner of a life estate in the entire prop-
erty, does not enter into the scheme of partition against
the wishes of appellee. Holt v. Hamlin, 120 Tenn. 496,
111 S.W. 241 (1908) ; Fehringer v. Fehringer, 212 Tenn.
75, 367 S.W.2d 781 (1963).

Appellant points out in the case of Fehringer v. Feh-
ringer, supra, this Court held a life tenant in a one-half
undivided interest in a farm could maintain an action
for partition against the owner of the fee of a one-half
interest in the same farm.

Counsel for appellant must agree there was a concur-
rent holding or possession of the farm by the parties to
that suit.

Nevertheless, appellant insists there is no logic to the
reasoning a life tenant in a one-half undivided interest
in a tract of land can maintain an action for partition
against the owner of a one-half undivided interest in the
same tract. And a life tenant in the whole tract cannot
force partition against remaindermen.

In support of this argument, appellant states:

“Tf there was any logic in such a situation in years
gone by, then there is certainly no logic to support it
today. I assume that originally the idea was to keep
the title in land in such a condition so that the widow
or the life tenant, whoever he or she may be, could not
sell it. Today, however, it is often far more advantage:
ous to the widow, or to the life tenant, as in this case,
that she be allowed to sell it, and to have her interest

ee 295

figured mathematically so that she can at least benefit.
from her life estate.’’

Hl The fallacy in this argument is there is no law of
which we are aware that prohibits a life tenant of a whole
tract of land from selling such interest privately. As we
have pointed out herein, the statute is unambiguous, To
construe it as insisted upon by appellant, we would have
to give it another meaning, which may not be done by
judicial construction. Henry v. White, 194 Tenn. 192,
250 S.W.2d 70 (1952).

The Chancellor’s decree is affirmed at the cost of ap-
pellant.

Dyer, Crier Justicn, and Cresox, Humpureys and
McCanuess, Justiczs, concur.

Pzorzes Savines anp Loan or Nasevitur Co., and County
Savings and Loan Company of Chattanooga,

Davin M. Pack, Commissioner of Insurance and Banking,
and Gzorcr F, MoCanuzss, Attorney General.

467 S.W.2d 578

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed April 19, 1971

Petition on Rehearing Denied June 7, 1971

Ceci Bransretrer and Puture Carpen, Nashville, for
appellants.

C. Haves Coongy, Assistant Attorney General, State
of Tennessee, Nashville, for appellees.

W. Ovi Cotuiys, Jr., Nashville, Intervenor for Ten-
nessee Savings and Loan League, Inc.

298 ee

PER CURIAM.

The Peoples Savings & Loan of Nashville Co. and the
County Savings & Loan Company of Chattanooga filed
their declaratory judgment suit against the Commis-
sioner of Insurance and Banking and the Attorney Gen-
eral by which they sought to have decreed invalid as
violative of both the State and Federal Constitutions
Chapter 275 of the Public Acts of 1969, which they copied
into their original bill, as follows:

“AN ACT to amend Tennessee Code Annotated,
Seetion 45-2006.

“BEIT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEM-
BLY OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, That Ten-
nessee Code Annotated, Section 45-2006, be deleted and
the following substituted in lieu thereof:

“42-2006. Corporate titles. Every corporation in-
corporated or qualified under this Chapter shall be
known as an Industrial Loan and Thrift Company,
and may use the words ‘Industrial Loan and Thrift
Company’ or any part thereof as part of its cor-
porate title. It shall be unlawful for any company
organized after July 1, 1968, and qualified under the
provisions of this Chapter to use as a part of its com-
pany title the words ‘savings and loan’. Hach company

| 299

organized prior to July 1, 1968, and using such words
as a part of its company title, as a condition precedent
to its registration or re-registration under Tennessee
Code Annotated, 45-2011, shall agree to include with
each use of its company title, in advertising the issu-
ance or sale of certificates of investment or mdebted-
ness, in lettering at least two-thirds the size of the
lettering im its title and directly beneath the title so
as to be plainly visible, the following addendum: ‘(not
federally insured)’.

“BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act take
effect from and after its passage, the public welfare
requiring it.”

The effect of the enactment of Chapter 275 was to add
to Section 45-2006 the last sentence which for convenience
we have italicized. The complainants averred that they
had been incorporated in 1964 and 1965, respectively,
under the provisions of the Industrial Loan and Thrift
Act (Chapter 20 of Title 45, T.C.A.); that each had ex-
pended large swms in advertising and promoting good-
will for their corporate names including the words, ‘‘sav-
ings and loan’’, and that they had acquired valuable
property rights in their names and that the effect of
Chapter 275 would be to deprive them of such rights
without due process of law consistent with Article XI,
sec. 8, of the Constitution of Tennessee and with the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.

The complainants prayed for a temporary injunction
prohibiting the defendant Commissioner from enforcing
the Act against them pending the further orders of the
court and that upon the hearing the complainants have

300 es

a declaratory decree declaring the Act ‘‘unconstitutional,
void and of no effect insofar as it purports to deprive the
complainants of the right to continue their business
under their lawful corporate names after July 1, 1969,
without adding negative words relating to insurance,’’
and that upon the hearing the temporary injunction be
made permanent.

Both defendants answered the bill by which they as-
serted the validity of the statute and by leave of the
court the Tennessee Savings and Loan League, Inc., in-
tervened and filed an answer by which they too contended
for the validity of the statute.

After the hearing, which was upon oral testimony, the
Chancellor decreed that Chapter 275 was not violative
of either the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitu-
tion of the United States and dismissed complainants’
bill.

From the Chancellor’s decree the complainants have
appealed and have filed eight assignments of error, which
we will consider in order.

Hl (1) The appellants’ first assignment is that the
Chancellor erred in not holding that the statute, as it
affects them, is void because the Commissioner refused
the appellants’ request to give them ‘‘guidelines’’, The
appellants have cited no authority in support of this
assignment, and since Chapter 275 does not require that
the Commissioner construe it as a condition to its be-
coming effective, we overrule this assignment.

Hl (2) By their second assignment the appellants
insist that the Chancellor erred in failing to declare the
statute void because its subject is not expressed in its
caption and because its body is broader than its caption.

ee 301

In Industrial Development Board of County of Sevier v.
First United States Corp., 219 Tenn. 156, 407 S.W.2d 457,
we said:

“The caption of the amendatory act meets the re-
quirements of captions under settled decisions of Ten-
nessee. Our courts have held that in captions of
amendatory laws, a reference to the law to be amended
by its section number of the Code wherein codified is
sufficient compliance with Article II, Section 17, of the
Constitution. Gamble v. State, 159 Tenn. 446, 19 S.W.
2d 279; Basham v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines,
184 Tenn. 532, 201 8.W.2d 678; Pharr v. Nashville C. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 186 Tenn. 154, 208 S.W.2d 1013. The
caption of the amendatory act in question refers to a
section of the official annotated code of Tennessee to
be amended and therefore meets all of the require-
ments of Article II, Section 17, under well-settled au-
thorities hereinbefore cited.’’

This holding is our authority for overruling the second
assignment.

Hl (8) The third assignment is that the Chancellor
“erred in failing to hold that the complainants have
vested property rights in their corporate names and the
goodwill promoted thereunder.’’ It must be noticed that
the statute does not deny the complainants the right to
use their corporate names but provides, rather, that when
they use their names in their advertisements they must
add the words ‘‘not federally insured’’. The Court takes
judicial knowledge of the fact that throughout the State
there are many Federal Savings and Loan Associations
which are federally insured, and we hold that it is not
an unreasonable exercise of the police power for the

302 eS

General Assembly to enact legislation which will distin-
guish corporations organized under the Loan and Thrift
Act from corporations having similar names and which
are insured by an agency of the Federal Government.
In Ford Motor Company v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335
S.W.2d 360, the Court said: ‘‘Legislative power is not
static and helpless but arises to adjust and face new
conditions as they appear to affect the people of the
State. Of course, the Legislature of the State cannot
prohibit an ordinary business but it may, however, regu-
late the business to promote the health, safety, morals or
general welfare of the public.’? We overrule the third
assignment of error.

(4) By their fourth assignment the appellants insist
that the Chancellor committed error in failing to hold
that the ‘‘complainants have a vested contract right to
the perpetual use of their corporate names in their busi-
nesses.’’ The statute does not prohibit the use by the
complainants of their corporate names but regulates
the use of the names of companies chartered under the
Loan and Thrift Act, when such names include the words,
“savings and loan’’, in their advertising. For the reason
that we overruled the third assignment we overrule this
one.

The appellants insist that by granting them charters
that included the words ‘‘savings and loan’’ in their
corporate names the State made a contract with them
which the enforcement of Chapter 275 would violate.
With this contention we do not agree. We direct atten-
tion to sec. 48-713, T.C.A., which was in effect when the
State granted the complainants a Charter and which
provides, ‘‘Nothing in this Chapter, or implied from any
of its provisions, shall affect, alter or modify the general

ee 308

police and taxing power of the legislature, or the right
of the legislature to repeal, annul, modify or amend all
charters granted hereunder.’’ In Liles v. Creveling, 151
Tenn. 61, 268 S.W. 625, this Court held that ‘‘A contract
cannot be interposed to defeat the exercise of the police
power, neither can prescription.”

(5) By the fifth assignment the appellants contend
that the Chancellor erred in refusing to declare the Act
invalid ‘‘insofar as it attached a prohibitive condition
to the continued exercise of its right to use and advertise
its lawful business in its corporate name.’? For the
reason we overruled the appellants’ fourth assignment
we overrule this one.

(6) The sixth assignment is that the Chancellor erred
in his failure to declare the Act ‘‘invalid as an attempt
to grant a selected group an exclusive copyright in the
commercial use of the words, ‘savings and loan,’ con-
trary to general federal and state law on copyrights and
trade names.’’ The appellants are mistaken in their con-
struction of the statute as one granting a copyright. The
appellants themselves are not prohibited the use of the
phrase in their corporate titles, but we have previously
said in this opinion the General Assembly was within the
authority of its police power to regulate the use of the
phrase ‘‘savings and loan’”’ in advertisements by appel-
lants and other Industrial Loan and Thrift companies
having the phrase in their corporate titles.

(7) By their seventh assignment the appellants con-
tend that the Chancellor should have declared the statute
void on the ground that it is vicious class legislation and
not a general law and that he was in error in failing to
do so. As we have observed heretofore we do not regard

304 ee

the Act as vicious class legislation or a denial of the
complainants’ righis to the equal protection of the laws.
In Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 8.W. 177, L.R.A.
1916F, 177, this Court citing as authority Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 387, 55
L.Ed. 369, said:

‘(1) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of
the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that re-
gard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
(2) A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against that clause merely because it is not
made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice
it results in some inequality. (3) When the classifica-
tion in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,
the existence of that state of facts at the time the law
was enacted must be assumed. (4) One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis, but is essentially arbitrary.’’

We overrule the seventh assignment of error.

(8) The eighth assignment is that the Chancellor erred
in failing to declare the Act void for vagueness. The
Act is not vague. Its meaning is entirely clear and we
accordingly overrule this assignment,

305

Having disposed of appellants’ eight assignments of
error and having overruled all of them, we affirm the
Chancellor’s decree at the cost of the appellants.

Dyer, Cuter Justice, and Cnarrin, Creson, and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

McOanusss, Justice, not participating.

306

Vera K. Grover and husband, Wmi1am Howarp Gover,
Appellants,

Trewyussee Farmers Murvan Insurance Company,
Appellee.

468 S.W.2d 727

(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed June 7, 1971

ee 307

James F. Scuarrrer, of Scuarrrer & Kez, Memphis,
for appellants.

Wiu1am I. McLarm, Memphis, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Humpurers delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether
the uninsured motorist statute, secs. 56-1148 through 56-
1153 T.C.A. authorizes an insured to bring suit on the
casualty policy directly against the insurer. The trial
judge held on demurrer this could not he done. The in-
sured has appealed and assigned this as error. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Glovers sued Tennessee Farmers alleging that
they were insured by four policies of liability insurance
issued by that company, and that under the uninsured
motorist endorsement they were entitled to recover for
serious personal damage sustained by Vera K. Glover,
and for loss of services and medical and other related
expenses by William Howard Glover, her husband, in a
collision with one Ralph Murphy, an uninsured motorist,
who negligently caused the collision.

308 ee

Tennessee Farmers filed what was in effect a plea in
abatement and a demurrer, the two grounds amounting
to a demurrer making the proposition that the Glovers
had no right to bring an action directly against it for un-
insured motorist benefits. This demurrer was sustained
and we now have the case on the single question first
mentioned.

As stated, we are of opinion the trial court properly
disposed of the case, for reasons which we shall state.

It should first be noted that, although the suit is
brought against Tennessee Farmers as a result of the
uninsured motorist endorsement, the right to sue the
insured directly is not sought to be sustained by any pro-
vision in the insurance policy. There is no allegation in
the declaration that the policies contain any stipulation
authorizing a direct suit. And, in fact, the insurance
policies are not even before the Court. The right to sue
the insurer directly is predicated entirely on the conten-
tion that this is authorized by the uninsured motorist
statute.

Hl We take it to be fundamental in a case where,
because of the terms of the insurance contract there is
no right to sue the insurer thereon and the reliance for
this right is on a statute, the right would have to be given
by the statute either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion. And with respect to this, noting that the Glovers
make no reference to any particular provision of the
statute as satisfying this requirement, we have examined
the statute carefully and find nothing in it which even
Jeans in the direction of authorizing such a suit. To the
contrary, we find provisions which indicate an opposite
intention.

ee 309

The first such provision is that made by sec. 56-1153.
This code section invalidates insurance contract provi-
sions for arbitration of uninsured motorist claims, and
sets out the course of procedure whereby an insured can
reduce an uninsured motorist claim to judgment.’ As we
read the code section it suggests no alternative to the
procedure there established. And, while it might be
argued (we think without warrant) that the language
“if any action is instituted against the owner and oper-
ator of an insured motor vehicle,’’ permits an alternative
course of action, we are compelled to read the words ‘‘if
any action’’ as amounting to ‘‘when any action’’. This
interpretation is forced by the fact that the legislature,
while in the very act of setting up procedure for recovery
on uninsured motorist endorsements, although it of
necessity knew how to do this by direct suit, made no
such provision.

This conclusion, that sec. 56-1153 provides the sole
court remedy, is sustained by the further provision of the
code section ‘‘that the evidence of service upon the in-
surance carrier shall not be made a part of the record’’.
Here we have clear evidence of a legislative intention

+ “56-1158, Service upon the insurance carrier—Arbitration not re-
quired —Any insurer intending to rely on the coverage required by
secs, 56-1148—56-1158 shall, if any action is instituted against the
owner and operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, serve a copy of
the process upon the insurance company issuing the policy in the
manner prescribed by law, as though such insurance company were a
party defendant; such company shall thereafter have the right to file
pleadings and take other action allowable by law in the name of the
owner and operator of the uninsured motor vehicle or in its own name;
provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall prevent such
owner or operator from employing counsel of his own choice; provided,
further, that the evidence of service upon the insurance carrier shall
not be made a part of the record.

“The uninsured motorist provision shall not require arbitration of
any claim arising thereunder nor shall the insured be prevented in
any manner from employing legal counsel or instituting legal proceed-
ings.”

310 |

that the fact of insurance cannot be interjected as a
prejudicing factor in uninsured motorist litigation.

So, we ask, if the language used to set up the procedure
is expressly limited so as not to permit the fact of insur-
ance to appear, how can it be said with any reasonable-
ness that two or three words can be picked out of the
statute and given the effect of permitting a suit directly
against the insurer; whereby the very condition ex-
pressly provided against will be the more evident? The
answer must be given such an interpretation.

Another statute provision indicating an intention con-
trary to that insisted upon by the Glovers is sec. 56-1151."
This code section gives the insurer the right of subro-
gation with respect to any settlement or judgment re-
cqvered by the insured against the uninsured motorist.
Since this code section does not provide for subrogation
except where the insurer has paid off a settlement or
judgment recovered by the insured against the uninsured
motorist, and there would be no right of subrogation in
a case where an insured recovered a judgment on an
insurance policy against his insurer, and no right in the
insurer to proceed against the uninsured motorist on any
other basis, it necessarily follows that the statute cannot

2456-1151. Payment by insurer—Subrogation—In the event of
payment to any person under the coverage required by secs. 56-1148—
56-1158, and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage,
the insurer making such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be
subrogated to all of the rights of the person to whom such payment
has been made, and shall be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement
or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery
of such person against any person or organization legally responsible
for the bodily injury for which such payment is made including the
proceeds recoverable from the assets of an insolyent insurer; and
payment by an insurer under the coverage required by secs. 56-1148—
56-1153 shall not constitute a satisfaction of the liability of the party
or parties responsible for such bodily injury under the financial re-
sponsibility of laws of this state.”

es 31)

be construed as the Glovers insist. So to do would de-
prive the insurer, by an unsupported interpretation, of
the right of subrogation expressly granted by the statute.
This cannot be done.

Finally, there is the provision in sec. 56-1148 * that the
uninsured motorist coverage made mandatory by this
code section is ‘‘for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including
death, resulting therefrom,’’. While it may be argued
that this phrase supports the right to sue the insurer,
since the tortious infliction of injury would result in legal
entitlement to damages without judgment, still, it cannot
be denied that the limitation of this duty of the insurer
is to furnish ‘‘protection”’, and this means ‘‘protection’’
as defined by the statute, which is liability to pay the
judgment the insured recovers from the uninsured motor-
ist. This interpretation of the ‘‘protection’’ the insurer
must provide is supported, not only by the fact that
casualty insurers against motor vehicle injury loss are

* “56-1148. Automobile liability insurance—Uninsured Motorist—
Required Coverage—No automobile liability insurance, covering li-
ability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any
motor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state
with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto, in not less than limits for bodily injury or death d ibed
in sec. 59-1206, subject to provisions filed with and approved the
insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured there-
under who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided,
however, that the coverage required under this section shall not be
applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject the
coverage; provided further that, unless the named insured requests
such coverage in writing, the coverage need not be provided in or
supplemental to, a renewal policy where the named insured had
rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to
him by the same insurer.”

312 ee

not customarily parties to the action in which the loss to
be protected against is determined, but, by the interpre-
tation we have given the other provisions of the Un-
insured Motorist Act. We quote from a case discussing
a similar statute:

«# * * Subsection (a) of that Codé section, as previ-
ously quoted, requires that the insurance company
afford coverage against any loss sustained by the
insured as the result of an accident involving an un-
insured automobile, which loss the insured ‘shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner
or operator thereof.’ This language cannot be con-
strued other than as imposing upon the insured’s
insurer the duty of assuming the position of an insurer
of the uninsured motorist’s legal liability as respects
the claim of the plaintiff insured against such un-
insured motorist. We deem the language quoted as
equivalent to a requirement that the defendant insurer
pay such sums as such uninsured motorist would be
legally liable to pay to its insured up to the limits
required by the statute.

‘Legal liability means, with respect to insurance con-
tracts, a liability which the courts of justice will en-
force as between parties litigant. Abbott v. Aetna Cas.
& Surety Co., D.C.Maryland, 42 F.Supp. 793, 806;
Globe & Republic Ins. Co. v. Independent Trucking Co.,
OK, 387 P.2d 644, 646. Substantially to the same effect
see the ruling of the Supreme Court in Arnold v. Wal-
ton, 205 Ga. 606, 611, 54 S.H.2d 424. It is fundamental
that the legal liability of one person to another can be
ascertained only in an action brought against such
person by the other in a court of competent jurisdic-

a

tion. Code sec. 110-501. No mere action against the
insurance company to which the known uninsured
motorist is not a party and in which could not be made
a party (Arnold v. Walton, supra) could adjudicate
this question so as to affect the legal liability of the
uninsured motorist to the insured.’’ State Farm Mu-
tual. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Girtman, 113 Ga.App. 54,
147 §.B.2d 364.

Hl This interpretation of the act will not, as the
Glovers argue, require a suit against the insurance com-
pany after recovery of a judgment against the uninsured
motorist. It is clear that when the requirement of sec.
56-1153, with respect to affording the insurance carrier
the right to defend the uninsured motorist is complied
with, the insurance carrier is bound by the judgment.
The whole intent and purpose of the uninsured motorist
act, is, in essence, to provide protection by making the
insurance carrier stand as the insurer of the uninsured
motorist, with two necessary consequences. (1) The suit
has to be brought against the uninsured motorist, with
the fact of insurance excluded as a possible prejudicing
factor, as in any other such case; and (2) the insurance
company is bound by the judgment rendered in that suit,
to the extent of its policy limits, where it is afforded the
statutory opportunity to defend the uninsured motorist.
See Holt v. Bell, Okl., 392 P.2d 361; Boughton v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange, Okl., 354 P.2d 1058, 79 A.L.R.2d 1245;
Moore v. Smith, 177 Va. 621, 15 S.E.2d 48; Hartford
Acc. & Ins. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 238 Wis. 124, 297
N.W. 436.

In deciding this case consideration has been given to
the numerous authorities cited on both sides. Some of

314 es

these cases support the Glovers,‘ while other cases sup-
port the insurer.®

The cases relied on by the insurance carrier are more
in point, because they deal with statutes more nearly
like ours. But, since in statute construction cases we
must depend, finally, upon our own interpretation of the
statute, we shall not lengthen this opinion by particular
reference and citation from these cases, nor attempt to
distinguish those we do not follow. We do wish to point
out however, that Hickey v. Insurance Company of North
America, E.D.Tennessee (1965), D.C., 239 F.Supp. 109,
cited by the Glovers, was decided prior to the enactment
of our uninsured motorist act, in 1967, and so has no
application to this case; and that the only other case
construing Tennessee law on this subject, Rogers v.
United Services Automobile Association, 410 F.2d 598
(6th Cir. 1969), which is not in point, held that the in-
surance company was entitled to have its liability de-
termined by arbitration (the liability having acerued
prior to the enactment of our act, and the policy pro-

“Wortman v. Safeco Inswrance Company of America, E.D.Ark.
1968, 227 F.Supp. 468; Hickey v. Inswrance Company of North
‘America, E.D.Tenn,1965, 289 F. Supp. 109; Hill v. Seaboard Pire &
Marine Insurance Company (1968), Mo. App., 874 S.W.2d 606; Wright
v, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, 270 N.C. 77, 155
S.B.2d 100 (1967); Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insurance
Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 878 (1965).

* State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Girtman, 118 Ga.App. 54,
147 S.E.24 864; Turner v. Associated Indem. Corp., 118 Ga.App. 225,
147 S.E.2d 788; Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 114°Ga.App. 127, 150
$.B.2d 354; Gulf American Fire & Cas. Co. v. McNeal, 115 Ga.App.
286, 154 S.E.2d 411; King v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. 117
Ga.App. 192, 160 S.B.2d 280; O'Brien v. Govt. Employees Ins. Co.,
872 F.2d 885 (1967) CCA 8rd Cir.; Guthrie v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co. D.C.S.C., 279 F.Supp, 837 (1968); Doe v. Brown, 203
Va. 508, 125 5.H.2d 159; Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 888,
184 S.E-2d 206; Hatchett v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425,
137 S.B.2d 608; Squires v. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 247 S.C.
58, 145 ‘8.8.20 678; Levy’ v. American Auto Ins, Co., 31 Il.App. 2d
187, 175 N.E.2d 607; Holt v. Bell, 392 P.2d 361 (Ok1.).

es 215

viding therefore) or by having Rogers’ action against
the uninsured motorist prosecuted to judgment.

The assignments of error are overruled and the judg-
ment of the trial court is affirmed.

Dysr, Camr Jusrice and Cuartin, Crrson and Mc-
Cantess, JUSTICES, concur.

316

Larry Bi. Harvey, Plaintiff in Error,
v
Srave or Tennesser, Defendant in Error.
468 S.W.2d 73
(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed June 21, 1971.

P|
Rozerr J. Suocxey, Chattanooga, for plaintiff-in-
error,

ee 317

Davm M. Pack, Attorney General, W. Cotzins Bonps,
Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, State of Tennes-
see, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Cruson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case comes to this Court by order of transfer
from the Court of Criminal Appeals on the ground that
the sole question presented is the constitutionality of a
statute, to-wit: T.C.A. sec. 40-2403—Failure of defendant
to testify—Order of testimony—.

During the course of this opinion the parties will be
referred to as they appeared in the court below; that is,
Larry E. Harvey as defendant, and the State.

The facts are that defendant, in the late afternoon of
August 5, 1969, took a 1969 blue Pontiac ambulance from
the parking lot of Moore’s Ambulance Service, Chatta-
nooga, Tennessee. The act was observed by a neighbor-
ing merchant who immediately telephoned Moore’s Am-
bulance Service and reported the theft. The police were
then notified; and subsequently, about 8:30 P.M. that
same evening, two city police officers spotted the am-
bulance and gave chase. Following a wild chase in which

aig

one police car was forced off the road, defendant wrecked
the ambulance and was arrested.

The record reveals that defendant Harvey was indict-
ed for four offenses in separate counts, to-wit; larceny
of an ambulance; receiving a stolen ambulance; conceal-
ing a stolen ambulance; and unlawfully using said am-
ulance without the owner’s consent. Defendant pled not
guilty and upon trial by jury he was found guilty of
“Taking and Using a Vehicle Without the Owner’s Con-
sent (Joy Riding) * * *’’, fined $50.00, plus costs, and
sentenced to 11 months and 29 days in the County Work-

Ouse, :

In addition, defendant was charged with the offense
of reckless driving. He pled guilty and voluntarily waived
his right to a Grand Jury hearing and indictment, and
voluntarily waived his right to jury trial. Subsequently,
he changed his plea to not guilty and, upon presentation
of proof and oral argument before Judge Campbell Car-
den, the court found him guilty as charged. Defendant
was fined $50.00, plus costs, and sentenced to 90 days in
the County Workhouse. Defendant’s motion for new trial
was overruled.

Defendant’s assignment of error herein contests the
constitutionality of T.C.A. sec. 40-2403 as being violative
of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution for the reason that said stat-
ute is a mandate that if defendant elects to testify in his
own defense, he must do so before other testimony is
offered in support of such defense.

The alleged error on which defendant relies occurred
at the conclusion of the State’s proof, at which time
defense counsel moved the court to allow defendant to

Po

deviate from T.C.A. sec. 40-2403; that is, allow the de-
fense to put on testimony of other witnesses before hear-
ing the testimony of defendant himself. This motion was
denied. Defendant argues primarily that Tennessee is
in the minority in making it mandatory that a defendant,
if he chooses to testify, must do so as the first witness
for the defense; that the majority of states provide that
the order of proof lies within the discretion of the court.
The argument is that such mandatory provision impedes
the right of a defendant to conduct his own defense; and
that such a provision indulges a presumption that a de-
fendant will not speak the truth unless he testify first.

Defendant’s argument is not convincing, and certainly
does not move this Court to declare T.C.A. sec. 40-2403
violative of defendant’s right to fair trial, due process
and equal protection of the law. That section reads:

“Failure of defendant to testify—Onder of Testi-
mony.—The failure of the party defendant to make
such request and to testify in his own behalf, shall not
create any presumption against him. But the defendant
desiring to testify shall do so before any other testi-
mony for the defense is heard by the court trying the
case.”?

In the court below, defendant chose not to testify first.
The two defense witnesses, defendant’s father and Dr.
David McNaughton, a psychiatrist, testified only to de-
fendant’s mental condition before and immediately after
his arrest. Dr. McNaughton stated that it was his opin-
ion that at the time defendant took the ambulance, he
was in a disassociative state of mind; that is, he was not
in complete conscious control of his actions; and that
this state of mind was a direct result of extreme pres-

320 ee

sure and stress experienced by defendant during combat
in Vietnam. The defense introduced no other proof. We
cannot conclude that defendant was prejudiced in any
way by the trial court’s adherence to the rule stated in
T.C.A. seo. 40-2403,

Further, as argued by the State in its brief, this Court
has ruled previously on this issue. In Clemens v. State
(1893), 92 Tenn. 282, 21 S.W. 525, this Court stated:

“The terms of the statute are so plain as to admit of
but one construction; they are imperative, and must
be enforced by the courts in every case. The provision
is that the defendant may be the first witness in his
own behalf, but not the second, third, or fourth. He
may testify at one particular stage of the case, but at
none other, under any circumstances. This is the rule
established by the positive words of the act. The leg-
islature made no exception; the courts can make none.’’

HEME We are of opinion, therefore, that the trial court
did not err in disallowing defendant to deviate from es-
tablished procedure in this State; nor in its holding that
T.C.A. see. 40-2403 is not unconstitutional as violative
of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed; costs to be assessed against defendant.

Dyer, Carer Justice, Jenkins and McAmis, Sprcian
Justices and McCanuess, Justicz, coneur.

321

T. Epwarp Ports, Appellant,

Everzrr L. Gisson et al., Appellees.

469 8.W.2d 130

(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed June 21, 1971.

324

Cuartes Hampron Warre, Tuomas I. Carnron, Jr.
Corneius, Couiins, Hiecins & Warts, Nashville, for ap-
pellant.

Swarrorp & Loonzy, Crossville, for appellees.

Mr. Spxcray Justice Luxe M. McAmis delivered the
opinion of the Court.

T. Edward Potts, a teacher with tenure, filed the bill
in this case challenging the action of the Board of Edu-
cation of Cumberland County, transferring him from
the position of Principal of Cumberland County High
School to the position ‘of Principal of Pleasant Hill Hle-
mentary, School,

ee 325

The bill charges that the transfer resulted in a reduc-
tion in salary, some inconvenience in traveling to Pleas-
ant Hill Elementary School and a reduction in status
and responsibilities and, under the authorities, was in
effect a dismissal entitling complainant to notice of a
hearing before the Board, Complainant charges that this
right, among others, was denied him by the Board. The
Board tacitly concedes that its proposed action was of
such nature as to entitle complainant to an administra-
tive hearing, after notice, but insists that ample notice
was given.

After a full hearing the Chancellor dismissed the bill
based upon a finding that the evidence sustained the
Board’s finding of neglect of duty and incompetence;
that the action taken by the Board was not arbitrary,
capricious or unlawful as charged in the bill but was
solely for the welfare of the High School and its proper
and efficient operation. Complainant has appealed. No
question is raised by the assignments that the Chancellor
erred in hearing evidence not heard by the Board.

The assignments are in general directed to the sufii-
ciency of the notice, the lack of substantive evidence of
neglect of duty and incompetence and the fairness of
the hearing before the Board, at which some of the mem-
bers of the Board testified as witnesses, It is also insisted
that in some respects the evidence went beyond the pur-
view of the purported written notice of the charges pre-
ferred against complainant.

Hl The filing of the bill entitled complainant to a re-
view de novo of the Board’s action. T.C.A. sec, 49-1417.

Hl The review in this Court is de novo, accompanied
by a presumption of the correctness of the decree unless

326 ee

the evidence preponderates against the findings on which
the decree is based. T.C.A. sec. 27-304; Kernodle v. Peer-
less Life Ins. Co., 213 Tenn. 631, 378 S.W.2d 744; Robert
Arthur Management Corp, v. State ex rel. Canale, 220
Tenn. 101, 414 S.W.2d 638.

Complainant Potts had been the Principal of Cumber-
land County High School for a number of years prior
to March, 1970. At a meeting of the Board on March 17,
1970, all Board members opposed renewing his contract
for the school vear 1970-1971. Mr. Strachn, a member of
the Board and a personal friend of complainant, was
delegated the duty of interviewing complainant to see
if he wished voluntarily to relinquish his position. Mr.
Strachn’s report to the Board indicated that complain-
ant wanted to resign if the Board considered his services
unsatisfactory but that he wished to give the matter some
thought before giving the Board a final answer. Later,
complainant, by letter, requested an administrative hear-

ing.

Against this background, Mr. Gibson, the Superintend-
ent of Education of Cumberland County, at the instance
of the Board, on April 17, 1970, outlined in letter form
the charges which the letter stated would be heard by
the Board on April 28, 1970. We quote the material
portion of the letter:

“1, Public relations

a. Widespread demand of public for change in high
school administration.

b. Poor public relations with Jaycee organization
in two Bowl games.

| 327

e. Failure to work effectively with bus drivers and
with personnel of State Department of Transporta-
tion in solving bus problems.

‘2, Poor management of high school funds

a. Deficit in athletic department making financial
hardship on athletic teams.

b. Failures in following financial procedures in pur-
chasing band and athletic supplies.

ec. Failure to pay basketball coaching supplements.

‘3, ‘Permissive’ attitudes resulting im discipline and
maintenance problens

a. Degrading of offices of principal and assistant
principal in shower incident last year.

b. Lack of administrative supervision in care of the
building, resulting in excessive damages to school
property beyond the normal wear and tear of fa-
cilities.

e, Allowing obsenity and vulgarity to remain in some
parts of the building, creating atmosphere of dis-
respect.

“This is to notify you officially that I have recom-
mended to the Board of Education that you be trans-
ferred to the position of principal of Pleasant Hill
School for the school year 1970-1971 in case the Board
holds to its decision to replace you as high school prin-
cipal. I sincerely hope that you will accept this posi-
tion if the Board retains its earlier decision. I assure
you that I will work with you in every way possible
to make your school year a success. The decision to
accept or reject this position, of course, remains in

328 |

your hands. The matter of public or private hearing
is also your decision.’’

After the hearing on April 28, 1970, Mr. Bristow,
Chairman of the Board, wrote complainant referring to
an apparent misunderstanding on the part of complain-
ant and his counsel regarding ‘‘the grounds’’ of the
proposed trarisfer and stating that, although not spe-
cifically mentioned, the Board considered that the charges
outlined in the letter of April 17, 1970, would, if sub-
stantiated, ‘‘form the basis’’ for a finding of ‘‘incom-
petence and neglect of duty’? which would constitute a
“legal basis’? for the transfer.

Thereafter, with this definition of terms a continua-
tion of the hearing was held on May 21, 1970, following
which the Board ordered the transfer of complainant to
Pleasant Hill Elementary School.

We deal first with the sufficiency of the notice.

HM Our cases recognize and to some degree emphasize
the right of a teacher having tenure to notice of a hearing
before the Board before he can be transferred to a posi-
tion with less responsibilities and where he will be re-
quired to serve at a reduced salary. State v. Yoakwm,
201 Tenn. 180, 297 S,W.2d 635; State ex rel Taylor v.
Rasnake, 209 Tenn. 229, 352 S.W.2d 427; Blain et al. v.
Mayo et al., 224 Tenn. 108, 450 S.W.2d 582.

The statute, T.C.A. secs. 49-1414, 49-1415, merely pro-
vides that charges against a teacher having tenure rights
shall be made in writing ‘specifically stating the offenses
which are charged.’’. It is to be seen no guide lines are
laid down by the statute as to the degree of specificity
required. There appears to be a dearth of authority as
to the requirentents of the statute in this respect.

The brief for complainant cites Hayden v. City Coun-
cit of Memphis, 100 Tenn. 582, 47 S.W. 182, and McKee
eb al. v. Board of Elections, 173 Tenn. 276, 116 8.W.2d
1033, 117 S.W.2d 755. The first of these cases was a pro-
ceeding to remove a member of the council of the City of
Memphis; the second involved a judicial review by cer-
tiorari of the action of the State Board of Elections.

In McKee, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Chambliss, later Chief Justice, reiterated the principle
of Hayden v. Memphis that the charges must be ‘‘spe-
cifically stated with substantial certainty; yet the techni-
cal nicety required in indictments is not necessary’’.

Hl The procedure prescribed by the statute is de-
signed to insure the teacher a full hearing before the
Board upon every issue under consideration by that
body. To accomplish this the first essential is a notice
sufficient in substance and form to fairly apprise the
teacher of the charge against him and enable him to pre-
pare his defense in advance of the hearing.

“Where the contents of the notice are ambiguous and
obscure, so that the teacher is not clearly informed of
the nature of the charge, the notice is generally held in-
sufficient.’? City of Knoaville Board of Education v.
Markelonis (1970), 62 Tenn. App.—, 460 S.W.2d 362.

Hl To comport with notions of fair play and due
process and to constitute notice in the legal sense the
means employed should equal or exceed that which one
desirous of actually informing the opposite party would
employ. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865, cited in Burden
v. Burden, 44 Tenn.App. 312, 313, S.W.2d 566.

330 ee

Hl Except in the clearest case of a material disregard
by the Board of the procedural requirements of the stat-
ute or a showing of prejudice, where a trial de novo has
been had in which the teacher appeared and fully partici-
pated the appellate court should not interfere with the
action of the Board on procedural grounds. Compare
Mayes v. Bailey, 209 Tenn. 186, 352 S.W.2d 220.

Tl In this case the letter of March 17, 1970, set forth
with considerable particularity the nature of the com-
plaints. This was followed by the first sitting of the
Board on April 28, 1970, more than a month later, with
no final action until May 21, 1970, almost a month later.
In the meantime, as above shown, the charges were clari-
fied by the letter stating that the Board considered the
charges to be tantamount to a charge of incompetence
and neglect of duty. When so considered and in view of
the subsequent trial de novo at which complainant was
accorded a full hearing the complaint of insufficiency of
the notice was reduced to a bare technicality devoid of
substance.

Hl We also find no merit for much the same reasons
in complainant’s related contention that the proof went
beyond the purview of the notice. Under the explanation
in writing that the specific charges leveled by the letter
of March 17, 1970, were components of the charge of
incompetence and neglect of duty this argument in our
view becomes untenable.

On the merits, the Chancellor found that complainant
was given a fair and impartial hearing before the Board;
that the Board’s action was not arbitrary or unreason-
able but, on the contrary, that the evidence was ‘‘heavily
in favor”’ of the Board’s findings of neglect of duty and

| 331

incompetence in the exercise of the executive authority.
‘We quote from the Chancellor’s written findings of fact:

“The evidence is heavily in favor of the proposition
that the complainant did not exercise with competence
the executive authority vested in him as principal of
Cumberland County High School. The proof was
strongly in favor of the propositions that the panic
hardware on many of the doors of the building was
broken and inoperative the greater part of the time;
one or more doors designed to be used for ready exit
in case of fire remained chained and locked; waste
receptacles were almost constantly running over with
highly inflamable waste paper; many signs of con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages were in evidence in
the building and on the campus; much highly improper
bodily contact between male and female students was
permitted to go unchallenged on the part of the com-
plainant; the building itself, which is relatively a new
structure, has been allowed to deteriorate to an ex-
treme degree; and vulgarities were condoned in writ-
ing about the building, such as allowing the letter ‘y’
to be obliterated over the entrance to the Study Hall
so that the words read ‘Stud Hall’.”’

I The conditions described by the Chancellor were
so long continued, so flagrant and so open and obvious
that to say that complainant was unaware of them would
at the same time necessitate a finding of gross negligence
or indifference to the good order of the school over which
he was expected to exercise executive authority as well as
the safety and moral atmosphere of the scholastic com-
munity.

‘We cannot say the evidence preponderates against the
findings and conclusions of the Chancellor.

332 es

HM We cannot agree that the effect of these findings
is mitigated by complainant’s reliance upon teachers
under his authority to perform disciplinary duties or
upon the maintenance superintendent to keep the building
safe and in good repair. Although perhaps not solely
responsible, as we view it, complainant was the ‘‘Captain
of the Ship’’ to whom was confided the overall operation
and supervision of the school, its personnel and the phys-
ieal facilities, all of which were immediately under his
authority and control.

HH But, it is said, the entire proceeding should be
vacated because members of the Board, prior to the hear-
ing, had determined the issues against complainant and
because five of the nine member Board testified as wit-
nesses in favor of the transfer and then sat in judgment
upon their own testimony.

The argument unquestionably has foree and appeal.
The practice does not commend itself as best suited to
the ascertainment of truth and justice. It can be sane-
tioned, if at all, on the ground of necessity growing out
of the existing system of administrative control over
school systems.

It is inevitable that members of a school board should
form an opinion, good or bad, of teachers and especially
school principals within the system. And by reason of
their official duties the members may possess valuable
information either for or against individual members of
the teaching and executive staff and consequently can
offer valuable testimony at a disciplinary hearing before
the board. Yet, the law makes no provision for a hearing
before another tribunal. Much of the mischief which
could result from the system is obviated by the right to
a trial de novo conferred by T.C.A, sec. 49-1417.

| 338

We reach the conclusion that as a matter of necessity
the findings and conclusions of the Board cannot be upset
on the grounds asserted, absent a showing of bias and
prejudice. Happily, in this case as the Chancellor found
the record shows without question that members of the
Board were actuated solely by a desire to promote the
best interest of the schools and, at the same time, avoid
any unnecessary embarrassment or injury to complain-
ant, by placing him in a school attended by younger
children and a smaller number of children where the
Board apparently felt he could better serve the school
system of the County.

The difficulty in all cases of this nature is to strike a
proper balance between that degree of flexibility neces-
sary for the Board of Education to maintain its admin-
istrative authority over schools and school personnel and.
the duty of the Courts to intervene to protect the tenure
rights of teachers. In this case we think the Board acted
within the sphere of administrative authority into which
under the facts of this case the Court should not intrude.

Affirmed.

Dyer, Curr Justice, Creson and McCanxsss, Justices
and Jenkins, Speci Justiog, concur.

Loxpa Frayces Nicnois

Bryco Prastics, Inc.

469 S.W.2d 135

(Knoaville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed July 6, 1971.

ee 335
—
be

Auten M. Extiorr, Knoxville, for plaintiff in error.

Pauw E. Parker, O’Ne, Parker & Witiiamson, Knox-
ville, for defendant in error.

336 ee

Mr. Spscian Justice Luxe M. McAmis delivered the
opinion of the Court.

By Chapter 86, Acts of 1969, T.C.A. sec. 25-109, the
Legislature conferred upon wives the right to sue for
loss of consortium. At issue in this case is the right of
a wife whose husband is covered by the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act to sue for loss of consortium, notwith-
standing T.C.A. sec. 50-908, providing:

“Right to compensation exclusive. The rights and
remedies herein granted to an employee subject to the
Workmen’s Compensation Law on account of personal
injury or death by accident, including a minor whether
lawfully or unlawfully employed, shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of such employee, his personal rep-
resentative, dependents, or next of kin, at common law
or otherwise, on account of such injury or death.”
(Italics supplied)

Linda Frances Nichols sued Benco Plastics, Incorpo-
rated, alleging loss of consortium of her husband Henry
J. Nichols who as the result of an accident while working
in the industrial plant of defendant was rendered perma-
nently and totally disabled.

Defendant filed a plea in abatement averring that at
the time of the injury to plaintiff’s husband the parties
were governed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
that the husband of plaintiff was injured by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment. It
was further averred that the employee has received and
continues to receive Workmen’s Compensation benefits
as provided by the Act. The plea invoked the provisions
of T.C.A, see. 50-908 above quoted.

ee 337

Plaintiff demurred to the plea in abatement and from
the action of the Court overruling her demurrer plaintiff
prosecutes this appeal.

In Napier v. Martin, 194 Tenn. 105, 250 §.W.2d 35, this
Court held that under the provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act above quoted the wife of an injured
employee cannot maintain an action at common law for
loss of services and consortium. For the wife, it was
contended that since the enactment of the Woman’s
Emancipation Act, Chapter 126, Acts of 1919, the wife
had the same right to sue at common law for loss of con-
sortium as the husband. Without reaching that question
the Court held that any right the wife might otherwise
have had was cut off by the Workmen’s Compensation
Act under which the husband admittedly was being paid
benefits. The Court reasoned:

“Code Sections 6858, 6879, 6880, 6883 and 6884 contain
express provisions for the wife, children and all other
dependents of an employee who dies as the result of
injury received in a compensable accident thereby clearly
evidencing a legislative intent to bring the entire family
group of which the employee is the head within the pur-
poses and coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.”

Cases from other jurisdictions uniformly sustain the
employer’s right to invoke the immunity of the Act in
actions by the wife or widow for loss of services and
consortium on the ground that the right of the husband
1o benefits under the Act is exclusive not only as to him
but where the Act so provides as to dependents as well.
Ziegler v. United States Gypsum Co., 251 Iowa 714, 102
N.W.2d 152; McCain v. Travelers Ins. Co., La.App., 153

338

So.2d 124; Roseberry v. Phillips Petrolewm Co., 70 N. M.
19, 369 P.2d 408; Moran v. Nai Corp., 370 Mich. 536, 122
N.W.2d 800; Balcer v. Leonard Refineries, Inc., 370 Mich.
531, 122.N.W.2d 805. And see 101 C.J.S. Workmen’s
Compensation sec. 980, p. 452; Anno. 104 A.L.R. 346.

HH it is held that this provision of Workmen’s
Compensation legislation is not subject to attack on the
ground that it violates the due process clauses of Federal
and State constitutions and particularly the 14th Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States because it
is not a taking of a right without due process of law.
Holder v. Elms Hotel Company, 338 Mo. 857, 92 8.W.2d
620, 104 A.L.R. 339. The spouse of an employee has no
vested right to sue in tort for an act yet to be committed
when the Act was passed. The legislature may abolish
remedies recognized at common law and create new ones
to attain a permissible legislative object. Silver v. Silver,
280 U.S, 117, 50 S.Ct. 5% 58, 74 L.Ed. 221, 65 A.L.R. 939.

It is clear that by the Act of 1919 the Legislature in-
tended to create rights in favor of the employee and his
dependents in substitution for the right to sue in dam-
ages for an act of negligence committed by the employer
and to protect the employer against being subjected to
liability to dependents both at common law and under
the compensation statute by taking away the right of
dependents to sue at common law ‘‘or otherwise’’.

It results that the demurrer was properly overruled
unless, as insisted, the 1969 Act giving the wife the right
to sue for loss of consortium repealed by implication
T.C.A. sec. 50-908 in so far as it purports to deprive the
wife as a dependent of the right to sue for loss of con-
sortium.

re 339

Hl We begin our consideration of this question bear-
ing in mind that repeals by implication are not favored
and it is only where the terms of an earlier statute are
completely irreconcilable with the provisions of a later
enactment that the earlier statute can be said to have
been repealed by implication. Tennessee-Carolina
Transp., Inc. v. Pentecost, 211 Tenn. 72, 362 S.W.2d 461;
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Vogue, 54 Tenn.App. 624, 393
S.W.2d 164.

“A general later law does not abrogate an earlier
special one by mere implication.’’ Burnett v. Maloney,
97 Tenn. 697, 37 S.W. 689.

After citing other cases to the same effect Mr. Justice
Neil, later Chief Justice, in Grubb v. Mayor and Alder-
men, 185 Tenn. 114, 122, 203 S.W.2d 593, quoted as ‘‘sup-
porting authority’’ the following from Sutherland on
Statutory Construction (3Hd.), Vol. 1, Section 2021:

“‘An implied repeal of prior statutes will be restricted
to statutes of the same general nature, since the legisla-
ture is presumed to have known of the existence of prior
special or particular legislation, and to have contem-
plated only a general treatment of the subject matter by
the general enactment. Therefore, where the later gen-
eral statute does not propose an irreconcilable conflict,
the prior special statute will be construed as remaining
in effect as a qualification or exception to the general
law.’?

This is the correct rule and a necessary corollary of
the general rule that repeal by implication is not favored
and will not be found except in cases of complete irrec-
oncilability between the former and later statutes. See
State ex rel. Safley, Chairman, 172 Tenn. 385, p. 389, 112

340

S.W.2d 831, citing, Black on Interpretation of Laws and
Sedgwich on the Construction of Statutory and Consti-
tutional Law.

Il To apply these principles to the case under con-
sideration: The exclusion clause, T.C.A. sec. 50-908, is a
special provision of an act dealing with the general
subject of Workmen’s Compensation. This special pro-
vision deals with ‘‘dependents’’ in the generic sense,
without specific reference to the right of the wife or
widow of the employee to sue at common law for loss of
consortium, Its effect is limited to dependents of em-
ployees coming within the protection of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. It would not apply to a wife whose
husband was not so protected.

The later act, T.C.A. sec. 25-109, deals directly with
an entirely different subject, namely, the general right
of all wives without regard to the husband’s employment
or his right to Workmen’s Compensation benefits, to sue
for loss of consortium, the objective being to place wives
on a parity with husbands who, under the common law,
had the right to sue for loss of consortium.

Thus we have a special provision of a general enact-
ment followed by a general statute dealing generally
with the right of wives to sue for loss of consortium. Un-
der the authorities the second enactment is not to be
given the effect of repealing by implication the special
provisions of the former act. The mind of the Legisla-
ture in passing the 1969 Act was directed to the broader
subject and not to the special impediment of wives of
employees coming under Workmen’s Compensation. Nor
can it be supposed that the Legislature by the 1969 Act
intended in this indirect fashion to increase the liability

| 341

of employers subject to Workmen’s Compensation lia-
bility. To so construe the 1969 Act would raise the con-
stitutional question of the body of the Act being broader
than the caption, a result always to be avoided if possible
in the judicial construction of statutes.

Affirmed.

Dyer, Cuter Justicz, Creson and McCan ess, Justices,
and Janxins, Sprcian Jusricn, concur.

Buvesr Rent-A-Car or Knoxvitze, Inc., et al.

Car Szrvicss, Inc., et al.

469 S.W.2d 360

(Knoaville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed June 7, 1971.

es
peg
&>

Exy & Huy, Knoxville, for complainants.

Ricwarp L. Carson, Jonarnan H. Burverr, Knoxville,
for defendants.

344 ee
|

Mr. Justice McCanuzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The complainants, Budget Rent-a-Car of Knoxville,
Ine., Harry 8. Hall, Jy., and Freddie E. Turner of Knox
County filed their original bill on October 16, 1970,
against Car Services, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, and
Edward Wallace and George Wallace of Knox County,
and against Budget Rent-a-Car Corporation of America,
an Illinois corporation with its office in Chicago, and
Jules W. Lederer, a resident of Illinois. By their bill the
complainants averred that in the year 1962 the com-
plainant, Hall, contracted with the defendant, Lederer,
representing Budget Rent-a-Car Corporation of America,
and obtained for the complainant, Budget Rent-a-Car of
Knoxville, Inc., a franchise to operate a rental car busi-
ness in Knoxville and vicinity. They averred further that
as a result of a conspiracy by the defendants the com-
plainants were forced in March, 1965, to sell their busi-
ness to the defendants Wallace and Car Services, Inc.,
but that they did not sell the right to use the name,
Budget Rent-a-Car of Knoxville, Inc., to said defendants.
They sued for a recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages and prayed that an injunction issue to prevent
the use by the defendants of the name Budget Rent-a-Car
in Knoxville and in other places in Hast Tennessee.

Personal service was had upon the defendants Wallace
and Car Services, Ine., and service upon the defendants
Lederer and Budget Rent-a-Car Corporation of America
was had by means of the procedure provided by Section
20-235, T.C.A., et seq., sometimes known as the Long
Arm Statute.

The defendants, Edward Wallace, George Wallace,
and Car Services, Inc., demurred to the bill on two
grounds: (1) that on its face it showed that the com-
plainants’ cause of action, if any, had acerued more than
three years before the filing of the bill and therefore was
barred by the provisions of Section 28-305, T.C.A., and
(2) that the Chancery Court.was without jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the suit which was one to recover
unliquidated damages for tort. The defendants, Jules W.
Lederer and Budget Rent-a-Car Corporation of America,
filed separate but similar pleas in abatement by which
they challenged the sufficiency of the service of process
on them under the provisions of Section 20-235, T.C.A.,
et seq.

After they had filed their Dill the complainants
amended it to show that the date of the sale to the
defendants was 1964 rather than 1965, whereupon the
defendants, Wallace and Car Services, Inc., amended
their demurrer so as to plead laches by the complainants.

The parties entered into a stipulation by which they
agreed that the defendant, Lederer and another employee
of Budget Rent-a-Car Corporation of America were in
Tennessee on five different days in 1962 and 1963
negotiating a franchise with the complainant, Hall. There
is nothing in the record to establish any presence or
activity in the State by these defendants or by any one
representing them incidental to the alleged conspiracy
on which this suit is grounded.

The exhibits made part of the record by the stipulation
show that the defendants Wallace and Car Services, Ine.,
acquired the right to use the stationery and advertising
of Budget Rent-a-Car of Knoxville, Inc, when they

346 |

bought the business. The stipulation negatives the charge
that these defendants were using the name without
authority.

The Chancellor heard the case on the bill, the pleas in
abatement of the defendants, Lederer and Budget Rent-
a-Car Corporation of America, the complainants replica-
tion thereto, and upon the stipulation with respect to
the pleas in abatement and upon the demurrer of the
defendants, Wallace and Car Services, Inc. He sustained
the plea in abatement of the defendant, Lederer, but
overruled it as to Budget Rent-a-Car Corporation of
America. That defendant then adopted the demurrer of
the defendants, Wallace and Car Services, Inc., which the
court sustained as to all demurrants and dismissed the
complainants’ bill. The complainants have appealed.

(1) If the defendants, Budget Rent-a-Car Corporation
of America and Jules W. Lederer, are before the court,
it is by reason of the service upon them under the pro-
visions of Section 20-235, T.C.A. That Section is, as
follows:

“Jurisdiction of persons unavailable to personal
service in state—Classes of actions to which applicable.
—Persons who are nonresidents of Tennessee and
residents of Tennessee who are outside the state and
cannot be personally served with process within the
state are subject to the judisdiction of the courts of
this state as to any action or claim for relief arising
from:

(a) The transaction of any business within the
state;

(b) Any tortious act or ommission within the state;

(c) The ownership or possession of any interest in
property located within this state;

(a) Entering into any contract of insurance, in-
demnity, or guaranty covering any person, property,
or risk located within this state at the time of con-
tracting;

(e) Entering into a contract for services to be
rendered or for materials to be furnished in this state.

«¢ Person’ as used herein shall include corporations
and all other entities which would be subject to service
or process if present in this state. Any such person
shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of this state who acts in the manner above described
through an agent or personal representative.”’

Hl The record, however, shows that neither the cor-
poration through its representative nor Jules W. Lederer
ever engaged in any activity in Tennessee which author-
izes service under this Section of the Code. The statute
under which service was had upon the nonresident de-
fendants in this case was considered by our Court in the
recent opinion by Mr. Justice Humphreys in Darby v.
Superior Supply Company, 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d
423, in which it was said:

“But, even so, we are of opinion, as before indicated,
that the statute does not apply in the present case.
Tested by the rule laid down in McGee [McGee v. In-
ternational Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78
S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Hd.2d 223 (1957)], that a nonresident
must do some act by which ‘it purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protec-

348 ee

tion of its laws.’, the service of process in this case is
invalid.”

In this case the record shows no act by the defendants,
Budget Rent-a-Car of America or Jules W. Lederer, or
by either of them, from which the alleged conspiracy may
be said to have arisen and the service on them was
ineffectual. They are not before the court and the court
properly so held.

IBM (2) The defendants, Wallace and Car Services,
Ine., rely upon the defense of the statute of limitations of
three years, Section 28-305, T.C.A. Conspiracy is a tort
and is subject to the running of the statute of three years.
The period of limitation begins to run from the time of
the last overt act, which, according to the allegations of
the bill, was March 10, 1964, the date of the sale, and more
than six years before the complainants filed their bill.
‘*A civil action for injury lies for a conspiracy only from
the time that an overt act causing such damage has been
created or enacted.’? Emerson v. Machamer, 221 Tenn.
739, 431 8,W.2d 283. The complainants’ cause of action,
if any existed, became barred three years after the sale.

Hl (3) All the defendants insist that the Chancery
Court is without jurisdiction of the suit because it is one
for unliquidated damages resulting from tort. The
complainants on the other hand argue that because in-
junctive relief is sought the court takes jurisdiction for
all purposes. With this we cannot agree. The ground for
the injunction failed and with it failed also the only
ground on which the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court
is asserted. Union Planters’ Bank & Trust Co. v. Mem-
phis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 649, 189 S.W. 715; Tucker v.
Simmons, 199 Tenn. 359, 287 S.W.2d 19. As this Court

ee

3

said many years ago in Marsh v. Haywood, 25 Tenn. 210,
‘‘When the jurisdiction fails, all the power of the court
fails, except to give judgment for costs.’? Here the
Chancery Court is without jurisdiction.

We affirm the decree and adjudge the costs against the
appellants.

Dyzr, Carer Justice, Creson, Justicz, and McAmts
and Jenxuxs, Spuctan Jusrices, concur.

350 ee

Mary Bowp Cuirron Sayxrorp, Plaintiff-in-Error,

Tur Loursvinte ann Nasuvitie Ratzroap,
Defendant-in-Error,

469 S.W.2d 363
(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed July 6, 1971,

| 351
nn

Aurrep B. Prrrman, Otay N. Saunprrs, Memphis, for
plaintiff in error.

Joun B. Macs, Kent B. Monyreny, Jr., Memphis, for
defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Plaintiff, Mary Bond Clifton Sanford, has appealed
from a judgment of the Cireuit Court sustaining defend-
ant Louisville and Nashville Railroad’s demurrer to her
amended declaration, and dismissing her suit.

By her amended declaration Mrs. Sanford alleged that
she is the sole remainderman with respect to certain
lands devised by will by Edward Fitzgibbon in 1899;
that defendant instituted a condemnation proceeding in
1899 with respect to a portion of these lands and that her
rights to compensation were not protected in that pro-
ceeding. That the value of the land condemned was paid
into the hands of the Clerk of the Cireuit Court of Shelby
County in 1899 by defendant, but no funds now remain
to compensate her for her interest in said payment into
court, and that she is entitled to damages in the amount
of $100,000.00.

Defendant’s amended demurrer is grounded upon
T.C.A. sec. 23-1406,! and the doctrine of virtual repre-

+ «93.1406. Parties Defendant—All parties having any interest in
any way in such land or rights may be made defendants, and the
proceedings shall only cover and affect the interest of those who are
actually made parties, unborn remaindermen being, however, bound
by proceedings to which all living persons in interest are parties.”

ee 368

sentatiox whereby unborn remaindermen are bound by
proceedings by which all living persons in interest are
parties. The amended demurrer points out that the dec-
laration and stipulation of the parties show that the
plaintiff was ix posse in 1899; that all persons then living
with an interest in the property sought to be condemned
were made parties to the 1899 condemnation proceeding;
that the court was advised as to the possible interests of
remote contingent remaindermen; that the fair value of
the condemned land was paid into court by defendant
pursuant to a court order; that the court did protect the
interest of plaintiff therein; that control of these funds
was taken over by chancery court under an order dated
1902 which specifically protected the rights of remote
contingent remaindermen; that twenty-seven years after
the condemnation proceeding of 1899 the chancery court,
in 1925, without participation or fault on defendant’s
part, ordered these funds then on hand to be paid over
without security to Thomas W. Clifton, plaintiff’s grand-
father.

At the hearing on the amended demurrer plaintiff con-
tended that defendant failed to comply with the statutory
provisions relating to condemnation, providing that the
owner shall be named, and if unknown, notice of the fact
given by publication. Also, that the failure of defendant
to comply with these statutory requirements could not
be eured by the doctrine of virtual representation, where
the rights of the party represented were ignored. That
in sustaining the demurrer the court denied plaintiff her
just compensation guaranteed by the Tennessee and
United States Constitution.

The amended declaration shows that in the year 1899,
Edward Fitzgibbon devised by will certain lands in

354 re

Shelby County, Tennessee. The devise affecting land
involved in this suit was considered ambiguous, and was
finally construed by this Court in 1901, whereby the
rights of the various devisees were determined and set-
tled. The devise was in this language:

“T hereby will and bequeath the 70 acres more or less
lying west of the homeplace, and the 70 acres afore-
mentioned, to Thomas Clifton and his children for
their lives, with the remainder to their heirs after the
death of my wife and son, James Fitzgibbon.”

With respect to this devise, this Court held as follows:

“*(4) Thomas W. Clifton and his children under the
said will, take a vested remainder for life, with the
remainder to their heirs in fee, which will ripen into
an estate in possession immediately on the death of
James Fitzgibbon, whether he dies leaving issue sur-
viving or dies leaving no issue surviving, in and to
these 70 acres, west of the two 70 acre tracts mentioned
in the next two preceding paragraphs, being the west-
ernmost 70 acres of the 210 acre tract mentioned and
described in Paragraph I of this decree.”

Meanwhile, in the year 1899, defendant brought suit
to condemn portions of this land for railroad purposes.
The Court was advised by defendant that the interests
of the respective parties named as defendants were not
clear, and a copy of the Fitzgibbon will was introduced
and made a part of the records of the proceeding. Among
others, Thomas W. Clifton, his wife, and his only two
children, who were minors, were named as defendants.
Thomas W. Clifton was appointed as guardian ad litem
for his two minor children. An answer opposing the
condemnation proceeding was filed in the cause by

ee 355

Thomas W. Clifton, his wife and children. So far as the
family of Thomas W. Clifton is concerned, all persons
then in being with an interest in the land were named as
party defendants and were before the court. Plaintiff,
the sole heir of Thomas W. Clifton, his wife and children,
was not in being in the year 1899.

In the suit, $2,752.00 was awarded for the land con-
demned, and an order was entered stating that defendant
had paid this amount to the circuit court clerk for the use
and benefit of the defendants in the condemnation action.

The clear inference is that the allegation in the con-
demnation petition with respect to the uncertain state of
the title, together with the copy of the will, advised the
cireuit court of the necessity of retaining jurisdiction
over the award, because it was not paid out to the named
defendants, but retained in court; with the exception of
$168.00, loaned to John Fitzgibbon, a defendant with an
interest in the land, on his secured note.

In 1902, Thomas W. Clifton instituted proceedings in
the Chancery Court of Shelby County to determine the
interests of the respective parties in the funds held by
the cireuit court clerk. Defendant-appellee herein was
named as a defendant in this suit. On August 8, 1908,
an order was entered by the Chancellor that $661.80 and.
$459.00, respectively, of the $2,752.00 paid to the cirenit
court clerk, belonged to the ‘‘defendant James Fitzgib-
bon for life, and to the plaintiffs Thomas W. Clifton and
his children, Lorene Mai Clifton and Thomas Hdward
Clifton, in remainder for their lives, with remainder to
their heirs in fee’’. The chancellor further ordered ‘‘the
fund so paid into the cirenit court by the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company in the condemnation pro-

356 Ce]

ceeding is to be treated as real estate and stand as dis-
posed of by the will of Edward Fitzgibbon and that under
the facts as they exist in this case, no partition of said
funds can be had, as between the life tenant and remain-
dermen.’’ The funds were ordered loaned out to James
Fitzgibbon upon proper surety.

In July 1925, after the death of James Fitzgibbon, and
after repayment to the clerk and master of chancery
court of the funds loaned’to him in 1902, a subsequent
chancellor ordered the clerk and master to pay this
money, amounting to $1,120.80, to Thomas W. Clifton
and his children. The order for payment did not require
security.

Hl Plaintiff’s first assignment of error, that defend-
ant did not comply with see. 23-1405 T.C.A.,° providing
that in condemnation suits the owner shall be named,
and if unknown, notice of the fact given by publication,
is not good. Because it is based on an interpretation of
the statute that ‘‘unknown owners’’ are the same as
unborn remaindermen, and this is not the case.

Sec. 23-1404 T.C.A. says that the petition for condem-
nation shall state the name of the owner, or, if unknown,
state the fact. It also says that if the owner is unknown,
notice shall be given by publication.

These statutes do not. justify interpreting ‘‘unknown
owner’? as including unborn remaindermen. An ‘‘un-

* «93.1405. Notice of petition—Notice of this petition shall be
given to the owner of the land or rights, or, if a non-resident of the
county, to his agent, at least five (5) days before its presentation. If
the owner is a nonresident of the state or unknown, notice ‘shall be
given by publication, as provided in this Code in similar cases in
chancery.”

ee 857

known owner’’, of necessity, must be wm! esse, a condition
obviously opposite to that of an unborn remainderman.

Sec. 23-1406 T.C.A. removes any doubt about this
matter by providing that ‘“‘unborn remaindermen”’ are
bound by proceedings to which all living persons in in-
terest are parties. This provision removes any possi-
bility that unborn remaindermen are ‘‘unknown owners’’
under the statute.

Plaintiff argues that by reason of sec. 23-2202 T.C.A.
publication is the recognized procedure for bringing
unborn contingent remaindermen before the court. While
it is true that sec. 23-2202 T.C.A. does provide for bring-
ing unborn remaindermen before the court by publica-
tion, this statute was initially enacted as Acts of 1919,
Chapter 13, section 2, long after the condemnation pro-
ceeding in this case, which was in 1899, and applies, in
terms, to suits to quiet, perfect and adjudge titles. (I
have not found in a rather cursory search that service of
process on unborn heirs by publication is even mentioned
in the 1916 Edition of Gibbon’s Suit in Chancery.)

Hl Plaintiffs second point for reversal, that the in-
terests of the unborn contingent remaindermen were not
recognized and protected in the condemnation proceed-
ing that the doctrine of virtual representation does not
apply, is not good. Defendant apprised the court of the
problem with the title in its petition and by filing a copy
of the will, and the court recognized the problem and
acted to protect the unborn remaindermen by holding
the fund. The fund was not only protected by the cireuit
court’s holding it, in addition, it was further protected
by a chancery court decree in a proceeding to which the
defendant-appellee was a party, providing that these

358 eS

funds were to be treated as real estate and no partition
could be had as between the life tenants and the remain-
dermen.

On these facts we hold that plaintiff’s interest in the
property was recognized and that proper steps were
taken to protect it.

The fact that twenty-seven years later the chancery
court, in 1925, authorized payment of plaintiff’s interest
to her grandfather, her aunt and her father, without
security, can in no way militate against the overall effect
of that which had previously been done by the circuit
and chancery court to recognize and protect plaintiff’s
contingent remainder interest.

Likewise, the fact that the protection afforded the
fund did not result from a. petition exactly defining
plaintiff’s contingent interest and praying for process by
publication for unborn heirs, nor from an allegation in
the petition expressly invoking the doctrine of virtual
representation, is immaterial. Process was served as
required by the condemnation statutes, the will and the
petition did notify the court of the state of the title, all
the living parties in interest were before the Court, and
the Court acted exactly as it would have acted had every-
thing now complained of been done. This complies with
the condemnation statute, and is enough.

The ease of Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Tenn. 378, 239 S.W.
423, taken with the condemnation law, supports this par-
ticular conclusion, and is authority, generally, for the
proposition that plaintiff, as a contingent remainderman,
was before the Court by virtual representation, about
which we shall say more, presently.

ee 359

HI Although plaintiff’s third proposition, that by
sustaining the demurrer the trial court has denied her
the just compensation guaranteed by the Tennessee and
United States Constitution, has not been separately sup-
ported by citation of law or argument, we take it that
she is relying on the proposition that she has not had her
day in court, not having been made a party. We disagree.
We have already shown that defendant complied with the
condemnation statutes by making all owners of any in-
terest in the property parties defendant, and by filing
with the court the muniment of title, the will, showing
who the owners were, and the interests of unborn re-
maindermen. So that plaintiff, by the terms of the con-
demnation act, was before the Court.

We point out further, that, independent of the
condemnation statute, plaintiff was before the court by
operation of the doctrine of virtual representation under
the opinion of this Court in Bransford Realty Co. v.
Andrews, 128 Tenn. 725, 164 S.W. 1175 and Jordan v.
Jordan, supra. In Bransford, the realty company sought
specific performance of a written contract whereby
Andrews had agreed to buy a lot. Among other defenses,
Andrews objected that he could not get title because
certain parties in being and unborn heirs had not been
parties to the case in which the land had been sold to
Bransford Realty Company. Responding to this, Justice
Green, later Chief Justice, writing for the Court, said:

‘“As heretofore stated, she, the life tenant, was a party,
her two children were parties, and the trustee was a
party to this suit. We think that a valid decree of sale
was made, with these parties before the court.

“The doctrine of virtual representation is thoroughly
established in Tennessee, It is well settled that con-

360 |

tingent limitations and executory devises to persons
not in being, or uncertain and indeterminable at the
time of the proceedings, may be bound by a decree
against the person then claiming the vested estate. In
suits to enforce a trust, or with reference to trust
property, so limited in remainder, if the holder of the
legal title, the life tenant, and the persons in being in
whom the remainder would become a vested estate if
the life estate then fell in—if all these are parties, a
valid decree may be pronounced,’’ 128 Tenn. 735, 164
S.W. 1178.

Among the cases cited as authority for this statement
in Bransford Realty Company is Miller v. Texas &
Pacific R. Co. et al., 132 U.S, 662, 10 S.Ct. 206, 33 L.Ed.
487, from which we quote:

“We think that the supreme court of Texas was right
in holding that all the necessary parties were before
the court. * * * The entire estate was represented be-
fore the court,—a particular estate in the widow, and
the fee-simple remainder in the infant son. The
interests of the appellants, Thomas H. Miller and
others, as devisees under the will, was a mere con-
tingent interest, a mere executory devise. In such a
case, it is sufficient to bind the estate, in judicial
proceedings, to have before the court those in whom
the present estate of inheritance is vested.’’

In Jordan v. Jordan, supra, the question whether a
contingent remainderman would be bound by virtual
representation when no member of the contingent class
was im esse, was thoroughly examined and it was again
held that unborn contingent remaindermen were before

ee 361

the Court by virtual representation when the life tenant
is a party.

In summary, we affirm the judgment of the trial court:
(1) because plaintiff was before the Court under the
eminent domain law; (2) because plaintiff was before
the Court by operation of the doctrine of virtual repre-
sentation. We so hold, because the muniment of title
showing ownership was before the Court and all living
owners were before the Court; (3) because plaintiff’s
rights were taken into account and protected by the
action of the circuit court; (4) because plaintiff’s in-
terests in the condemnation award were protected by a
decree of the chancery court; and (5) because with no
apparent notice to any of the parties to the chancery suit
in which this decree had been made, and without fault on
defendant railroad’s part, but acting exclusively under
the jurisdiction retained over the case in the last decree
made therein, a chancellor ordered the funds paid out to
plaintiff’s grandfather, Thomas W. Clifton, her Father,
Thomas E. Clifton, and her aunt, Lorene Mae Clifton.

All assignments are overruled and the costs are taxed.
against plaintiff-appellant and her surety.

Dysr, Carer Justicr, and Carry, Oneson and
MoCantass, Justicus, concur.

Riemann Apxisson, Petitioner-Defendant,

Kant Hurrmay, Administrator of R. B. Huffman,
Deceased, Respondent-Plaintiff.

469 S.W.2d 368

(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed June 7, 1971.

Van Dyxe & Duntap, Paris, for petitioner.

Brown & Guinn, Paris, for respondent,

Mr. Cumr Jusricn Dyzr delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case comes to us by the granting of the writ of
certiorari to the Western Section of the Court of Ap-
peals. After hearing argument and considering the
matters, we are pleased to adopt the opinion of the Court

364 |

of Appeals as the opinion of this Court. The Court of
Appeals opinion is as follows:

The plaintiff below, Earl Huffman, Administrator of
R. B. Huffman, deceased, has appealed from a judgment
of the Circuit Court of Henry County awarding him only
$625.00 damages for the death of his decedent, R. B.
Huffman. The case was tried to a jury upon a writ of
inquiry of damages after default judgment had been
entered against the defendant, Richard Adkisson, in
favor of the plaintiff as provided by T.C.A. sec. 25-108.

His Honor the Trial Judge had overruled a motion
by defendant’s attorney to set aside the default judg-
ment but he did permit the filing of pleas of not guilty
and contributory negligence to the plaintiff’s declaration.
He permitted the defendant to testify that the decedent,
R. B. Huffman, was drinking shortly before the accident
and that decedent walked across the highway in front of
the defendant Adkisson’s automobile and was struck and
killed.

He did not charge the jury that the defendant, because
of the default judgment, was guilty of proximate negli-
gence as a matter of law. However, he did charge the jury
that the plaintiff was entitled to damages and that they
had three alternatives: (1) they could award the plaintiff
normal compensatory damages; (2) they could mitigate
normal compensatory damages in proportion to the
amount of contributory negligence of which they found
the plaintiff’s decedent guilty; and (3) they could award
the plaintiff only nominal damages.

The decedent was 44 years of age at the time of his
death, in good health, earning an average of $50.00 per
week. He had been separated from his wife for four or

ee 365

five years and had a son who lived with his mother in
the State of Michigan. He had a life expectancy of 24
years.

By appropriate assignments of error the appellant,
Earl Huffman, Administrator, insists that His Honor the
Trial Judge was in error in allowing the defendant to
plead and argue contributory negligence on the part of
decedent after the default judgment; was in error in
allowing the defendant to argue to the jury both proxi-
mate and remote contributory negligence on the part of
the deceased ; and was in error in charging the jury with
regard to remote contributory negligence on the part of
ihe deceased.

Plaintiff’s declaration averred that the negligence,
recklessness, and carelessness of the defendant, Richard
Adkisson, in the operation of his automobile was the sole
and proximate cause of the plain, suffering, and ultimate
death of R. B. Huffman; that the defendant, prior to
striking said R. B. Huffman, saw or, by the exercise of
ordinary care, could have seen R. B. Huffman at or near
the scene of the accident in a position of being struck by
defendant’s automobile; and that the defendant, by the
exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided striking the
deceased. Count II of the declaration charged the viola-
tion of T.C.A. secs. 59-858, 59-853 and 59-836 relating to
reckless driving, excessive speed, requiring drivers to
exercise due care and to avoid striking a pedestrian along
the highway, and sounding the horn when necessary.

The deceased was killed August 8, 1966. Suit was filed
on August 7, 1967, and personal service was had on the
defendant on August 15, 1967. The declaration was filed
January 29, 1968. Default judgment was taken against

366 ee

the defendant on March 6, 1969. In April, 1969, the de-
fendant hired a lawyer who filed a petition to set aside
the default judgment.

At the May, 1969 Term the trial court overruled the
petition to set aside the default judgment but allowed
pleas to be filed to the declaration. The defendant pleaded
not guilty to the allegations of the declaration and also
pleaded proximate contributory negligence on the part
of the deceased in bar of the plaintiff’s claim for
damages.

Upon the trial to determine the plaintiff’s damages,
plaintiff introduced no evidence concerning the manner
in which the accident oceurred but only proof as to the
age of the deceased, family, health, and work habits; the
qualification of the plaintiff administrator and the names
of his survivors, namely his wife and child, entitled to
receive an award for the decedent’s alleged unlawful
death.

The defendant, over the objection of the plaintiff, testi-
fied that he was on the way from Paris, Tennessee, to
‘Trezevant to see his father and the deceased, R. B. Huff-
man, asked for permission to ride out to ‘‘Skyway Grill.””
The defendant stopped the car at Skyway Grill and the
deceased got out. The defendant agreed to pick decedent
up on his way back home. Defendant said at that time
he could smell alcohol on the deceased but he would not
say how much he had been drinking. The defendant
further testified that after he visited in Trezevant with
his father and stepmother he started back home and
stopped at the Skyway Grill to pick up the deceased and
found that he had already left; that as he, the defendant,
had almost reached defendant’s home the deceased, R. B.

ee 367

Huffman came running across the road from defendant’s
left in front of defendant’s automobile and that the de-
fendant swerved to his left to try to avoid hitting the
deceased but the right front fender struck the deceased ;
that the reason he did not apply his brakes he figured he
would skid right into the deceased. It was dark at the
time of the accident and the defendant’s lights were on
his automobile and the deceased was already on the road
when the defendant first saw him. Decedent had on dark
clothes. The plaintiff did not offer any proof to contra-
dict the testimony of the defendant but insisted that the
defendant’s testimony relating to the manner in which
the accident occurred was inadmissible and. incompetent.
The objection was overruled by the trial judge.

T.C.A. sec. 25-108 provides as follows:

If the defendant fail to appear and defend at the time
prescribed by law, judgment by default may be taken
against him. In such case, the judgment is final if the
amount of the plaintiff’s claim can be ascertained by
simple calculation from the papers; when the amount
cannot be thus readily ascertained, the damages will
he assessed by a jury impaneled at the same term for
the purpose.

In the case of Union Bank v. Hicks, Ewing & Co., 23
Tenn. 327 (1843), the plaintiff Hicks, Ewing & Co.
brought suit against the Union Bank for failure of the
Bank to make demand for payment of certain notes and
for failure to give notice to the endorsers on the notes
that the maker had failed to pay the notes at maturity.
The Bank suffered judgment to go by default. A jury was
impaneled to inquire of the plaintiff’s damages. Upon
the trial for damages, the Bank sought to prove that the
endorsement on one of the notes given to the Bank for

368 ee

collection was a forgery. The trial judge held that this
evidence was incompetent and that the judgment by de-
fault was an admission of the endorsement as described
in the declaration. From the opinion of the Supreme
Court we quote as follows:

It is laid down in all the books on practice, and is
unquestionable, that a judgment by default is an ad-
mission of the cause of action. Tidd’s Pr. 580; Bing.
on Judg. 17. As a necessary consequence, upon an in-
quiry of damages, evidence showing that no cause of
action existed is inadmissible. Now, what is the cause
of action stated in this declaration? Does it consist
only in the allegation that the defendant neglected to
make the demand, and notify the parties whose names
were upon the paper? Certainly not. The declaration
alleges that the notes were executed by A. Dale & Co.,
and were endorsed by R. F. Knott & Co. The facts of
the endorsement of the notes, and of the negligence,
by reason of which the defendants failed to fix the
liability of the endorsers, constitute the cause of action.
If the notes were not endorsed, there could be no cause
of action. For all the bank was called upon to do was
to take the steps necessary to fix the liability of the
endorsers, and if the endorsements were forgeries, the
bank could have given that in evidence under the
general issue, and the action would have been defeated;
the facts, therefore, that these notes were executed,
were endorsed as described, were placed in the bank for
collection, and that it failed to make demand and give
notice to the parties, are all necessary ingredients and
indispensable parts of the cause of action as stated in
this declaration.

ee 369

We are of the opinion, therefore, that the circuit court
committed no error in stating that the judgment by
default was an admission of the validity of the en-
dorsement.

In the case of Turner v. Carter and. Pulliam, 38 Tenn.
520 (1858), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages
for breach of contract. The declaration was filed at the
November Term 1857. On the same day the declaration
was filed the defendant filed an informal plea in abate-
ment alleging the pendency of another action between
the same parties involving the same matters set forth
in the plaintiff’s declaration. The plaintiff demurred and
the trial court sustained the demurrer. The defendant
filed a motion to plead over to the merits along with a
strong affidavit showing, if true, a meritorious defense
to the plaintiff’s action. The trial court refused to per-
mit the defendant to plead over presumably because of
some default of defendant to make defense under an or-
der which the court had made requiring a trial at the
March, 1857 term. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant was entitled to plead to the declaration after
the plaintiff’s demurrer was sustained because the No-
vember 1857 term was, in fact, the appearance term.
However, for an additional reason the Supreme Court
said that the trial court was in error even if it considered
the defendant was in default, ‘‘The judgment on the de-
murrer was interlocutory, the damages being unliqui-
dated and a writ of inquiry was awarded to ascertain the
amount which the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. This
came on to be executed at a subsequent term.’’ Upon the
writ of inquiry the plaintiff offered testimony showing
the damages he sustained by the defendant’s non-
performance of the contract and the jury set this amount

370 re

at $1,452.00 and final judgment was rendered thereon.
Defendant offered witnesses to establish that the plain-
tiffs had not sustained any damages and were entitled
to no recovery but the trial court refused to permit the
defendant to offer any evidence.

Before proceeding to empanel the jury, the court was
moved to set aside the judgment and allow the defend-
ant to plead, on grounds disclosed by affidavit, but the
motion was refused.

In the aspect in which this case is presented we do not
think it proper to enter into discussion of the question,
whether, upon the assumption that the facts offered to
be proven by the defendant are true, the plaintiffs have
any just ground of recovery. That inquiry must be
postponed until the defendant shall have had the op-
portunity of presenting his proof in such a form as
that ‘its proper force and effect can be legitimately
considered of and determined.

All that we propose at present, as to this part of the
case, is to determine whether the defendant, on the
inquisition of damages, has a right to be heard, or to
offer evidence for any purpose. And we hold it to be
clear that he had, to a limited extent.

The legal effect of the interlocutory judgment, which,
for the present purpose, may be supposed to have been
properly entered, was simply to establish the plain-
tiffs’ naked right to maintain their action, and conse-
quently, to recover some damages, though they might
be merely nominal. But the quantum of damages re-
mained an open one, to be ascertained by proof; and
upon this question both parties had an equal right to
be heard. The defendant was no further compromitted

ee 37h

by the judgment by default, than to preclude him from
denying the plaintiff’s right to nominal damages. But,
subject to this qualification, he had the right to show,
if in his power, that the plaintiffs had no legal claim
to damages; and, if successful in the attempt, the
plaintiffs would have been entitled to nothing more
than merely nominal damages.

Tn simple justice to the defendant, whose rights have
been so entirely ignored in these proceedings, we feel
constrained to reverse and set aside both the inter-
locutory and final judgments, and to remand the cause,
with liberty to the defendant to plead to the merits of
the action, in such manner as may be thought necessary
for his defense. Judgment reversed.

In Warren v. Kennedy, 48 Tenn, 437 (1870), the plain-
tiff brought suit for damages for conversion of’ a mare,
seven mules, and a bridle. Judgment by default was
entered against the defendant and upon writ of inquiry
the jury found for the plaintiff but assessed his damages
at only five cents. Plaintiff had proven the livestock to
be worth $500.00. The defendant, at the writ of inquiry,
did not offer any proof but defended solely upon the
ground that there was no evidence that he was present
at the taking of the property or had anything to do with
the taking of the property. The plaintiff’s counsel asked
the trial judge to charge the jury that the judgment by
default admitted the plaintiff’s right of action and that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount of
damages shown by the evidence. The trial judge refused
to give such charge but in effect charged the jury that
it was the exclusive judge of the amount of damages that
could be allowed from the proof and that it could allow
any amount from one cent to the full amount claimed in

372 ee

the declaration. The Supreme Court differentiated the
case of Turner v. Carter and Pulliam, supra, and cited
Union Bank v Hicks, Ewing & Co., supra, with approval.
From the opinion of the Supreme Court we copy as
follows:

** * And we hold that, where there is a failure to
plead, and a judgment by default at law, the effect of
the judgment is the same as that of a judgment pro
confesso in equity, which admits the allegations in the
bill. See Code, 4871; Stone v. Duncan, 1 Head, [103]
104; Jackson v. Honeycut, 1 Cooper’s Overton, 30-31;
Douglas[s} +. Evans & Wheaton, Ibid, 82-83, and
Meigs’ Reports, 358. In the case under consideration,
the defendant, in suffering judgment by default, ad-
mitted that he had wrongfully taken the property, and
there was no necessity to prove that fact before the
jury. The only proof that was incumbent on the plain-
tiff to make, was as to the value of the property thus
admitted to have been wrongfully taken; and his Honor
erred, in not instructing the jury, as requested, to
assess the plaintiff’s damages at the value ascertained
by the proof. .

In Grace v. Curley, 3 Tenn.App. 1 (1926), the plaintiff,
Mrs. Grace, brought suit for damages for personal in-
juries sustained as a result of a collision with the defend-
ant’s automobile. No pleas were filed to the declaration
and judgment by default was entered. Later, an appli-
cation to set aside the default judgment was overruled.
A jury was impaneled to assess plaintiff’s damages and
proof was submitted by both parties, plaintiff and
defendant. Plaintiff appealed because of the inadequacy
of the verdicts. They alleged certain errors by the trial
court in charges relating to plaintiff’s injuries and other

ee 378

alleged error by the trial court in preventing one of the
plaintiffs from continuing as attorney for his wife in
the other case. None of the assignments of error related
to alleged contributory negligence either proximate or
remote on the part of the plaintiff. However, from the
opinion of Judge Crownover we quote as follows:

As judgments by default were entered, the complaints
are now directed to a-review of the assessment of dam-
ages. A judgment by default is an admission of
the truth of the cause of action and of the sev-
eral averments of facts in the declaration, and of the
fair inferences and conclusions of fact to be drawn
from the averments. It establishes the plaintiffs’ right
to maintain the actions and to recover some damages.
It has the same effect, in law cases, as a judgment pro
confesso in equity, which admits the allegations of facts
in the bill. A final judgment may be immediately en-
tered when the amount is ascertainable by simple
calculation from the papers, but in other cases, where
the amount is not liquidated, the judgment is inter-
loculatory, and the damages must be ascertained by a
jury upon proof. Upon this question both sides have
an equal right to be heard, but the proof must conform
to the averments of the declaration, as in other cases.
See Shannon’s New Code, Sec. 4678, Note 9, and Sec.
4679; Caruthers’ History of Law Suits (5 Hd.), 147-8;
180-1; Turner v. Carter, 1 Head, 520, 34 C.J. 173-177.
“The legal effect of the judgment by default was
simply to establish the right of the defendant in error
to maintain his action, and consequently to recover
some damages. But the plaintiff in error was no further
compromitted by the judgment by default than to pre-
clude him from denying the right of the defendant in

at

error to nominal damages. Subject to this qualification,
he had the right to show that the defendant in error
had no legal claim to damages, and if successful in
this, the defendant would have been entitled to nothing
but nominal, damages.’’ See [Memphis ¢ 0.] Railroad
v. Dowd, 9 Heisk, [179] 185; Shannon’s Code 4678,
Note 9.

Hence, after default, the burden of proof to show dam-
ages, other than nominal damages is on the plaintiff;
and proof, both in aggravation and mitigation of
damages, is open to consideration by the jury in assess-
ing the damages, the same as in other cases. See 17 C.J.
1049, Sec. 353-4.

In the case of Boyd v. Merchants Delivery Company
and Clarkson, 7 Tenn.App. 416 (1928), the plaintiff,
Boyd, brought suit for damages for personal injuries
against the defendants, T. A. Clarkson and Merchants
Delivery Company. Default judgment was entered
against both defendants and a writ of inquiry of the
damages was ordered. Upon the trial to assess damages,
the defendants were denied permission to file pleas of
accord and satisfaction and res adjudicata but the Court
permitted the defendants to read into evidence the record
of a trial held several years prior thereto between the
same parties in which the plaintiff, Carl Boyd, then a
minor recovered judgment in the same court for personal
injuries arising out of the same accident in the amount
of $150.00 against defendant Clarkson, which judgment
had been paid. At the time of the first suit Boyd was a
minor and the second suit was brought within a short
time after he reached his majority. The trial court there-
upon held that the evidence of the prior suit was res
adjudicata and precluded the plaintiff Boyd recovering

ee 375

any damages in the present suit and instructed the jury
that the plaintiff’s present suit was being dismissed. The
plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals, Faw, P. J.,
held that the record of the earlier judgment was compe-
tent evidence to go to the jury by way of reduction of
damages. The lower court was reversed and the cause
remanded for an assessment of the plaintiff’s damages.
Judge Faw quoted with approval from 17 C.J., pages
1049, 1050 as follows:

On this subject, in 17 Corpus Juris, pp. 1049-1050, it
is said:

‘As the default admits a cause of action, proof there-
of need not be offered, and plaintiff is entitled to nom-
inal damages without introducing evidence. His peti-
tion is not, however, to be taken as true, and if he
would recover a greater amount he must prove the
same, Generally speaking, all evidence conforming to
the pleadings and tending to show the amount of the
demand or matters in aggravation of the injury is
admissible; while under like limitations evidence tend-
ing to mitigate or reduce the damages is admissible on
behalf of defendant. Evidence of matters which would
have constituted a good plea in bar to the cause of
action is generally held to be inadmissible. It may,
however, happen that evidence which might, if used,
have been available to prevent a judgment may after
judgment be available to reduce the damages to a mere
nominal sum.’’

In the case of Wileman v. Mayor and ‘Aldermen of
Town of Tullahoma, 29 Tenn. App. 172, 195 8.W.2d 325
(1946), plaintiffs Wileman and wife brought suit against
the Town of Tullahoma to recover damages for injuries

316 es

to real estate resulting from raising of the level of a
street. The defendants, Town of Tullahoma, failed to
plead and a default judgment was entered against it. In
an ex parte proceeding the jury assessed damages of
$3,250.00. The defendant filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment which was overruled but the trial court
did grant a new trial as to the amount of damages, On
the second trial the jury returned a verdict of only
$1,500.00 which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Judge Hickerson made the following statement:

A default judgment only admits that plaintiff has
stated a cause of action in the pleadings. Therefore,
evidence which questions the right of action is inad-
missible. Defendant may introduce evidence, however,
on the question of damages, although a default judg-
ment has been entered against it on the question of
liability. Boyd v, Merchants Delivery Company and
Clarkson, 7 TennApp, 416.

In 15 A.L.R.3d 607, in the annotation entitled ‘‘De-
fault-Damages-Notice and Hearing’’ we find a general
statement that upon the assessment of damages following
the entry of a default, a defaulting defendant has the
right to cross-examine plaintiff’s witnesses and to in-
troduce affirmative testimony on his own behalf in miti-
gation of the damages.

In Tennessee Procedures in Law Cases, Higgins &
Crownover, at page 175, Section 448, we find a very un-
usual statement of the right of a defendant after default
judgment. We copy Section 448 in full as follows:

448, Rights of Defendant after Writ of Inquiry
Awarded; Range of Proof—After such judgment is
pronounced the plaintiff may proceed to a hearing upon

his writ of inquiry without giving the defendant notice
of the time. But if the defendant is aware of, or be-
comes informed of, the time of the hearing, he may
appear and controvert every issue in the case, and may
present witnesses for the purpose of reducing the
damages, even to the extent of showing there were no
damages. But, under no circumstances will he be able
to defeat the plaintiff in his recovery of some damages.
The default judgment precludes him from doing that.
Nevertheless, he may overthrow every averment of fact
set forth in the plaintif’’s declaration for the purpose
of showing that the uttermost of plaintiff’s claim
should be a judgment for nominal damages (Emph-
asis supplied).

No case is cited by the authors to support the last
sentence which we have italicized. It does not appear
to be followed. Such a rule would encourage delay on
the part of defendants and minimize the penalty of a
judgment by default.

HL We are cited to no cases in Tennessee or else-
where which allow a defendant in automobile personal
liability case to prove remote contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff to mitigate damages where the
defendant had suffered a default judgment when the
plaintiff’s declaration alleges the defendant to be guilty
of proximate negligence. We apply the general rule an-
nounced by our Tennessee Supreme Court in the old case
of Warren v. Kennedy, supra, to the effect that the de-
fendant by suffering a default judgment to be entered
against him impliedly confesses all of the material alle-
gations of fact contained in the plaintiff’s declaration
except the amount of the plaintiff’s damages.

378 |

Hl In the case at bar the declaration of the plaintiff,
Karl Huffman, Administrator, avers

The negligence, reckless (sic) and carelessness of the
defendant, Richard Adkisson, in the operation of his
automobile as hereinabove alleged was the sole and
proximate cause of the pain, suffering and ultimate
death of R. B. Huffman.

Since this allegation of fact was impliedly confessed by
the entry of the default judgment, we hold that it was
incompetent for the defendant to argue and prove Huff-
man’s contributory negligence on the trial to assess
plaintiff’s damages.

Accordingly, we hold that His Honor, the trial judge,
in the instant case was in error in allowing the jury to
consider remote contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff’s intestate, R. B. Huffman, in mitigation of
the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled.

The assignments of error are sustained, the judgment
of the lower court is reversed and the cause remanded
for a new trial consistent herewith, Appellee is taxed
with the cost of this appeal.

Maruerne, Juper. Carney, JUDGE.

Neary, JupGE.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and
the case remanded.

Cuarrin, Creson, Humpureys, and McCaniass, Jus-
TICES, concur.

I

Macro Anrorp

Nationa, Emsiem Insurance Company.

469 S,W.2d 375.

(Knowville, September Term, 1970)

Opinion filed June 21, 1971.

Kenners E. Haut, Hozrron, McArse, ARMISTEAD,
Davis & McCorp, Knoxville, for petitioner.

ee

380

AgrHur D, Byrne, Poore, Cox, Barer, McAviey, Ray
& Byrnz, Knoxville, for respondent.

Mn. Justicn McCanunss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is a suit brought by the insured under an auto-
mobile liability insurance policy against his insurer to
yvecover the amounts of judgments pronounced against
him in excess of the policy limits. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff and against the company and
judgment was entered thereon. The insurer perfected its
appeal in the nature of a writ of error, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and
dismissed the suit, and we have granted certiorari.

ee — 331

The question for determination is whether there was
material evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

On May 23, 1966, while there was in force a policy
issued by National Emblem Insurance Company to Maceo
Alford his automobile driven by his son collided with
a bieycle ridden by William James Hayworth, age four-
teen, resulting in injuries consisting of a fractured
femur, chipped teeth, and bruises and lacerations, The
fracture caused a permanent shortening of the injured
leg. Medical expenses of about $1,500.00 were incurred.

On May 17, 1967, the grandmother and guardian of
the boy sued Alford for $5,000.00 for medical, hospital,
and other expenses incident to the injuries, and on the
same day he by his next best friend sued Alford for
$25,000.00 for personal injuries. The two suits were tried
together and the jury returned verdicts in the total
amount of $25,000.00. The defendant, Alford, moved for
a new trial, and the Cireuit Judge suggested a remittitur
of $6,000.00 thus reducing the judgments to a total of
$19,000.00. Alford did not appeal. The insurance com-
pany paid $10,000.00 and costs of the suit, the limit of
its liability under the terms of its policy, leaving $9,-
000.00 unpaid. It was to recover this excess that Alford
filed this suit by which he charged that the company had
made no effort to settle the suits, had failed to give equal
consideration to the interest of the insured that it gave
to its own interest, and that in failing to make settlement
it had not used diligence and good faith, and that it had
been guilty of bad faith and negligence in refusing to
settle within the limits of the policy.

The company filed its plea by which it denied the alle-
gations of negligence and bad faith. The issues thus

382

joined were tried before a jury, the trial resulting in a
verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Alford,
and against the defendant, National Emblem Insurance
Company, for $9,000.00 and interest.

‘When the insurance company received notice of the
injury to William James Hayworth, it caused an investi-
gation of the facts to be made, and when the boy and his
guardian filed their suits for damages about eleven
months after the date of the injury the company retained
an experienced trial lawyer to represent the defendent,
Alford. The attorney saw the insured and his son on
several occasions, visited the scene of the collision, and
interviewed a number of witnesses. He did not talk with
the police officer who made an investigation immediately
after the collision occurred, but he examined the officer’s
report. The company made no offer to settle. At some
time before the trial the attorney representing the plain-
tiffs encountered the attorney representing the Alfords
and asked if he would be willing to pay the amount of
the medical expenses and something besides that amount
to settle the case and received a negative reply. He testi-
fied that he made his inquiry of the defendant’s attorney
to try to open negotiations, but that he would not have
aceepted such a small settlement.

The defendant’s attorney was disappointed in two wit-
nesses on whom he expected to rely. One of them insisted
that he leave and return to work before he could give
his testimony, and the other, on the day of the trial, gave
the defendant’s attorney a different statement from one
he had previously given and he was not introduced as a
witness.

While the court was in recess, after the plaintiffs had
rested their case and just before the trial was to resume,

|

ee = =—333

their attorney presented the defendant’s attorney with a
letter by which he offered to settle the case for $15,000.00
or for the limits of the policy whichever might be the
smaller of those amounts. The defendant’s attorney made
no reply to this suggestion, and the trial resumed and
concluded with the results already mentioned.

The petitioners insist that the company acted negli-
gently and in bad faith in making an inadequate investi-
gation of the facts and in its failure to try to settle the
suits within the limits of the policy. If there is any proof
from which the jury might reasonably and fairly con-
clude that the company’s conduct was in bad faith and
resulted in the judgment in excess of the limits of the
policy then neither the Court of Appeals nor we could
disturb the verdict.

In Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris, 35
Tenn.App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785, the Court of Appeals in
an opinion by Judge McAmis which has become the lead-
ing case on the subject of suits of this kind said:

“Tf the proof, in the light of all the relevant cireum-
stances, and inferences to be drawn therefrom is such
as to leave a reasonable basis for disagreement among
reasonable minds, the question of good faith of the
insurer in the handling of the claim and conducting
compromise negotiations is for the jury.’

Conversely if the proof is insufficient to support a con-
clusion of bad faith then the suit must fail.

The attorney who represented Alford in the damage
suit testified that he thought he could win the suit and
for that reason made no offer to settle it, and that he did
not consider it necessary for him to interview the investi-

384

gating officer. The petitioners have not presented proof
which refutes this testimony.

In Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v.
Hammond, 200 Tenn. 106, 290 S.W.2d 860, this Court
said:

‘‘We think our cases, and the authorities generally,
support the complainant’s contention that there is no
liability upon an insurer for judgments in excess of
the policy limits except in case of bad faith.”

In State Automobile Insurance Co. of Columbus, Ohio
v, Rowland, 221 Tenn. 421, 427 8.W.2d 30, it was said:

“We do not hold that the insurance company has an
affirmative duty to negotiate with an injured claimant
in all cases. We would only say that a refusal to dis-
cuss a settlement may be considered along with other
evidence in determining the issue of bad faith. We
would disagree with the ruling in the case of Cowden
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d
223 (1957), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that a refusal to negotiate was insufficient evidence
of bad faith when there was an honest belief on the
part of the insurer that the insured’s act was not the
proximate cause of the accident, and that all liability
could be avoided on that basis.’’

In this case in retrospect it appears that the attorney
representing the defendant would have acted prudently
had he made an effort to compromise the Hayworths’
claim within the limit of the policy, but he was of opinion,
erroneously as it turned out, that his client could prevail
at the trial of the suit. Nowhere is there a suggestion
that he acted otherwise than in good faith in his repre-

es — 335

sentation of the insurance company and of the insured.
As the Court of Appeals observed in their opinion, pre-
pared by Judge Parrott:

“Our law has never imposed upon counsel for an
insurance company the duty to settle a claim merely
because settlement could have been reached within the
policy limits. If failure to negotiate a settlement is the
result of a reasonable business judgment made after
weighing all the interest, then no liability ensues even
if the decision not to settle later turns out to have been
quite wrong. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co,
v. Canale [6 Cir.] 257 F.2d 183."

The testimony viewed in the light most favorable to
the petitioner did not justify the jury in returning a
verdict against the defendant insurance company for the
amount of the excess. We, therefore, affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals dismissing the suit.

Dysr, Cuter Justicn, Creson, Justicn, and MoAmis
and Jenkins, Sproia. Justiczs, concur.

386 ee

Dr. Max Hueues, Appellant,

Cart R. Hassives, Appellee

469 S.W.2d 378

(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed June 7, 1971.

Frepv E. Ivy, Jz., Newson, Norvert, Witson, McRaz,
Ivy & Farmer, Memphis, for appellant.

Hearn W. Tiowert, Lester F. Lir, Memphis, for
appellee,

|

Mr, Jusricz Creson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause is before this Court on petition for certio-
ravi heretofore granted.

In the course of this opinion, the parties will be re-
ferred to as they appeared in the trial court; that is, Carl
R. Hastings as plaintiff, and Dr. Max Hughes as defend-
ant,

This is the second time this case has come before this
Court. The first was in November, 1968, on petition for
certiorari to review judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court reversed judgment of the Circuit Court of
Shelby County in favor of defendant, by direction of the
court, and remanded the case for new trial. This Court
denied certiorari.

This case originated in October, 1966, upon a declara-
tion filed by plaintiff, Carl Hastings, alleging three acts
of negligence in one count and res ipsa loquitur in a sec-

388

ond count. Upon trial, the court directed a verdict for
defendant, Max Hughes, at the end of all proof. On ap-
peal, Judge Lois Bejach, writing for the Court of Ap-
peals in the reported decision of Hastings v. Hughes
(1968), 59 Tenn.App. 98, 438 S.W.2d 349, reversed and
remanded on the ground that the evidence presented
questions for the jury as to whether defendant fell below
the standard of care of a physician practicing anesthesi-
ology in Memphis, Tennessee.

The testimony becomes a vital factor as to the applica-
bility or non-applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Therefore, considerable attention will be given
it in this opinion.

Plaintiff’s proof in chief revealed the following facts:

In the afternoon of October 25, 1965, about 2:30 P.M.,
plaintiff was admitted to St. Joseph Hospital for an
exploratory lumbar laminectomy recommended by his
personal physician, Dr. Peter B, Wallace. On the follow-
ing morning, October 26, 1965, plaintiff was given a pre-
operative injection by a nurse to make him ‘‘woozy’’ or
“drunk”’, and instructed to inform the doctors in the
operating room that he, plaintiff, had three capped teeth.
Upon being wheeled into the operative suite, plaintiff
was met by Dr. Wallace and introduced for the first time
to defendant, Dr. Max Hughes. Plaintiff was told that Dr.
Hughes was an anesthesiologist, and would administer
the anesthesia. Plaintiff was then told by Dr. Wallace
that he was to receive local anesthesia, called a ‘‘spinal’’.
Plaintiff refused to be given a ‘‘spinal’’, and demanded
to be put to sleep. After futile efforts to convince plain-
tiff of the advantages of local anesthesia, Dr. Hughes
agreed to give plaintiff a ‘‘general’’; that is, put him
to sleep.

Plaintiff’s testimony is that he had never seen Dr.
Hughes before the morning of October 26, 1965, in the
operating room; that defendant did not examine his
mouth and teeth before administering the anesthesia;
that the last thing he, plaintiff, remembered before be-
ing put to sleep from an injection of sodium pentothal
was telling defendant to ‘watch my teeth, because they
had caps on them * * *’’; and that when he later waked
up in the recovery room, he was given a jar with the
pieces of tooth in it and told by some hospital attendant
or intern that one of his teeth had been broken and a
second cracked by accident. Further testimony by plain-
tiff was that he knew nothing about how his teeth were
broken and damaged; that he was completely unconscious
during his operation; and that as a result he has suffered
considerable pain and discomfort, and incurred sizeable
dental and drug expense.

Other proof by plaintiff was the testimony of Mrs.
Mary Williams, the medical records librarian at St.
Joseph Hospital, and testimony of plaintiff’s wife. Mrs.
Williams verified plaintiff’s entry into the hospital and
subsequent admission to surgery, as aforementioned, and
further testified to the contents of two progress reports
signed by Dr. Hughes stating the cause of the accident
resulting in damage to plaintiff’s teeth. Plaintiff did not
introduce expert testimony on his behalf, nor did he in-
troduce any evidence to support the first count of his
declaration, based upon specific allegations of negligence.

Cross-examination revealed that plaintiff had three
capped teeth. The two that were damaged were the upper
left and upper right front incisors. The left incisor had
been devitalized ; that is, a hole had been drilled up inside
the back of his tooth, and nerves and blood vessels re-

390

moved, The hole was plugged with a metal pin or ‘‘peg”’,
and this ‘‘peg’’, together with a small portion of the
tooth remaining below the gum line, was covered by a
porcelain cap. On the back of this tooth, near the gum
line, was a very small gold inlay. The right incisor was
not devitalized, but had been ground down and covered
with a porcelain cap. The caps were held in place by ce-
ment. Plaintiff stated further that the two upper front
incisors had been capped for about a year; that although
he could eat most anything he wanted, close examination
would reveal that the teeth were capped; but that the peg
in the left front incisor was hidden, and could not be seen
nor felt.

Testimony of Mrs. Carl Hastings on cross-examination
was that before plaintiff’s operation his teeth looked
normal; that they looked like regular teeth.

At the end of plaintiff’s proof, defendant moved for
a directed verdict. The motion was denied.

Defendant’s proof consisted of the testimony of de-
fendant and his expert witness, Dr. William C. North.
The testimony of Dr. Hughes was a detailed outline of
the standard of care of a practicing anesthesiologist in
Memphis, Tennessee; of the procedures used by him in
administering general anesthesia to plaintiff; and an
explanation of the cause of the accident resulting in dam-
age to plaintiff’s teeth.

Dr. Hughes testified that it is his habit after surgery
every day, between 4:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M., to check the
surgeon’s schedule for the names of patients to be
admitted to surgery on the next day; that he then goes
to the room of each patient, studies his chart for every-
thing pertaining to lab work and/or medication, reads

ee 391

notes made by the nurse, and talks to the patient about
his general physical condition; that he checks with the
patient about previous surgery, previous anesthesia,
contact lenses, dental work, etc.; and that this routine is
the standard procedure used by most anesthesiologists in
Memphis. Defendant further testified that he did not
examine plaintiff on October 25, 1965, the day before his
surgery, because plaintiff’s name had not been placed on
the surgeon’s schedule; that he did not know that plain-
tiff was scheduled for surgery until 10:00 A.M. on the
morning of October 26, 1965, when he was informed of
that fact by a nurse in surgery; that he, defendant, was
in surgery all morning on October 26, 1965; and that he
did not see plaintiff at all until approximately 1:15 P.M.
on October 26, 1965, when plaintiff was brought into the
operative suite.

Defendant testified that when plaintiff arrived in
surgery he was woozy from a light pre-operative injec-
tion of atropine and demerol; that plaintiff demanded
general anesthesia instead of a ‘‘spinal’’, and he, de-
fendant, and Dr. Wallace, consented; that he read plain-
tiff’s chart to which was attached a surgical check list
prepared by the nurse in plaintiff’s room, and which
listed all medication given to plaintiff and other informa-
tion concerning false teeth, glasses, artificial limbs, ete. ;
that plaintiff’s chart showed none of these; and that he,
defendant, proceeded to put plaintiff to sleep.

Dr. Hughes stated that he lifted plaintiff’s lips and
“casually and routinely’’ looked at the front upper and
lower teeth; that he saw nothing to cause him concern or
to warrant a more detailed examination of plaintiff’s
mouth and teeth; and that he then proceeded to administer
anesthesia. First, a shot of sodium pentothal rendered

392 es

plaintiff unconscious. Secondly, a muscle relaxant solution
called anectine was administered intraveneously to make
plaintiff completely flaccid. Thirdly, Dr. Hughes inserted
an endotracheal tube in the plaintiff’s throat, through
his vocal cords, and into the trachea. Defendant ex-
plained that this was done with the aid of a laryngoscope,
an instrument with a light on it that is inserted into the
throat to put light on the vocal cords so that the endo-
tracheal tube can be safely guided through them. A small
balloon on the end of the endotracheal tube was inflated
with 4 cc of air to make the tube fit snugly in the trachea,
and prevent saliva from flowing into the lungs or gas
from escaping up through the mouth. Dr. Hughes then
inserted a plastic airway into plaintiff’s mouth and over
the base of his tongue to hold the tongue up. The airway
and endotracheal tube were taped together and both
taped to plaintiff’s cheek to hold them in place. After
the endotracheal tube was inserted into plaintiff’s
trachea, it was attached to a ‘‘gas machine’’ which de-
fendant used to breathe for plaintiff. Dr. Hughes ex-
plained that the gas machine was calibrated to administer
to plaintiff anesthesia composed of 98 per cent oxygen
and 1% to 2 per cent fluorthane.

Dr. Hughes explained that for the type of back surg-
ery that plaintiff had, it was necessary that Mr. Hastings
be nearly 100 per cent relaxed; that the anectine and
fluorthane drugs were continuously administered in order
to maintain that condition; that while in that condition
plaintiff’s respiratory system was completely arrested
and the only thing functioning was his heart; and that
since plaintiff was face down on the operating table, the
plastic airway was necessary to (1) prevent the tongue
from obstructing the air passage, and (2) to prevent

ee 393

plaintiff from biting down on the plastic endotrachea’
tube, thereby cutting off his air supply.

Dr. Hughes testified that the surgery went fine, an
that about 10 to 15 minutes before Dr. Wallace finishe
suturing the skin and applying a dressing, he, defendant,
cut off the flow of anectine for the purpose of getting
Mr. Hastings to begin breathing on his own. When Dr.
Wallace finished and left the operating room, plaintiff
was put into the care of defendant. Dr. Hughes testifie
that plaintiff was still face down, so he and a group o
nurses and orderlies turned plaintiff over and laid him
on a recovery room stretcher; that he then removed the
tape binding the plastic airway and endotracheal tube
together, and disconnected the gas machine, because
plaintiff was breathing well; and that he aspirate
plaintiff’s mouth and throat and removed the endo-
tracheal tube. Defendant testified further that he then
listened closely to plaintiff’s breathing for 30 to 60
seconds for the purpose of making sure that there was
no obstruction in his air passage, and that it was clear;
that while he was listening and before plaintiff was re-
moved to the recovery room, Mr. Hastings suddenly bit
down hard on the plastic airway still in his mouth and
throat, breaking into pieces one tooth and cracking an-
other; and that it happened so quickly that he could do
nothing to stop it.

“The first thing you do when you go to sleep is relax,
and the first thing you do when you wake up is clamp
down on the muscles of the body.

Mr. Hastings just that quick (snapping fingers) just
bit down on this airway, and before I could do any-
thing, the tooth just disintegrated and went into pieces.
I took the pieces of tooth out.”

394 ee

Dr. Hughes explained that the plastic airway was kept
in plaintiff’s mouth and throat because plaintiff, although
breathing on his own, was still unconscious; that it was
imperative that plaintiff’s tongue be kept up and away
from his air passage; and that this procedure was stand-
ard. In fact, defendant testified that ordinarily an air-
way was left in a patient’s mouth until the patient either
spit it out or gagged on it, because either of those oc-
currences was an assurance that the patient was awake
and in control of his breathing. Defendant explained
further that he was with plaintiff when the accident oc-
curred; that he inspected plaintiff’s mouth and removed
all tooth fragments; that he noted on plaintiff’s chart
that a tooth had been broken as a result of plaintiff biting
the airway due to a reaction of the masseter muscles in
the jaw.

Defendant further testified that all the instruments
he used in administering general anesthesia. to plaintiff
were customarily used in Memphis; that the use of anec-
tine is a matter of choice, but is used by four out of five
anesthesiologists; that the fluorthane gas machine is
widely used in Memphis, and the most proper machine
available; that he looked at plaintiff’s teeth before start-
ing the anesthesia, but saw nothing to cause him concern;
that he had no knowledge of a devitalized tooth; that
there is no way a physician can anticipate when a patient
will react and bite down on the airway; and that such a
reaction of the masseter muscles can occur regardless
of the care, skill and caution of an anesthesiologist.

Dr. William C. North, who at time of trial was chair-
man of the department of anesthesiology at the Uni-
versity of Tennessee, and a practicing anesthesiologist,
testified on direct examination to the standard of care

ee 395

of an anesthesiologist in Memphis, Tennessee. Dr. North
was shown various instruments used by defendant, and
testified that they were the standard and prescribed
equipment used in Memphis to administer general anes-
thesia. Dr. North was shown two types of airways and
testified that the plastic one used by Dr. Hughes was
more commonly used. Dr. North testified as to how the
airway was used and why. Dr. North testified further that
the drugs anectine and fluorthane used by defendant
were standard drugs administered during general anes-
thesia. In short, there were no material discrepancies
between Dr. North’s testimony and that of defendant.
Upon being questioned by defendant’s counsel on a hypo-
thetical question describing the procedures used by Dr.
Hughes, Dr. North stated his opinion that said procedure
was the ‘‘* * * routine and accepted anesthesia procedure
** * used by a considerable number of physicians and
anesthesiologists of good standing, trained and experi-
enced in this community.’? Further, Dr. North was of
opinion that the reaction of the masseter muscle causing
a patient to bite the airway, breaking teeth, could occur
regardless of the care and skill exercised by an anesthesi-
ologist.

On cross-examination of Dr. Hughes, and his expert
witness, Dr. William C. North, plaintiff’s counsel at-
tempted to show the court and jury three specific acts or
theories of negligence. First, that defendant failed to
make inquiry or examine plaintiff’s teeth both before ad-
ministering anesthesia and afterwards; secondly, that
defendant failed to use certain precautions to avoid
breaking plaintiff’s teeth; and thirdly, that defendant
failed to exercise due care as required of a physician
administering general anesthesia in Memphis, Tennes-

396

see. Plaintiff’s counsel showed some alleged discrepan-
cies between defendant’s testimony on direct, and his
testimony at the first trial with regard to examination
of plaintiff’s teeth. Plaintiff tried to show that had a
rubber mouth guard been placed over plaintiff’s front
teeth, or if rubber ‘‘bite blocks’? had been placed in the
rear of plaintiff’s mouth between his teeth, the accident
would not have happened. Both defendant and Dr. North
discredited these methods, and testified that neither of
these methods were used by anesthesiologists in Mem-
phis.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, and before the
court’s charge to the jury, there was considerable argu-
ment, absent the jury, about the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur. The trial court concluded that although plaintiff
had alleged res ipsa loquitur and had relied upon the
doctrine in his proof in chief, defendant’s explanation of
the accident, coupled with plaintiff’s attempt to show acts
of negligence, destroyed the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur, relying upon Ross v. Griggs (1955), 41 Tenn.
App. 491, 296 S.W.2d 641, and Wooten v. Curry (1962),
50 Tenn.App. 549, 362 S.W.2d 820.

The court, therefore, did not charge res ipsa loquitur,
but submitted to the jury plaintiff’s three theories of
negligence, as aforementioned.

The jury returned a verdict for defendant, Dr. Max
Hughes. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the case for a third trial. That Court was of opinion that
the trial court should have charged res ipsa loquitur for
the reasons that at the close of all the evidence the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff’s injury did not clearly appear;
that there was basis for difference among reasonable

| 397

minds as to the proximate cause; and that defendant’s
proof did not clearly show a lack of negligence. The
Court concluded that where plaintiff’s proof failed to
establish acts of negligence, a jury should be informed
why they have the case for consideration; and that such
could best be accomplished by a proper charge of res
ipsa. loquitur.

Defendant’s assignments of error in this Court pre-
sent, primarily, one question; that is, whether the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the case at bar?

The law of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been
often stated in the reported decisions of Tennessee ap-
pellate courts and this Court. Also, its proper applica-
tion in medical malpractice cases has been carefully
enunciated. It would be no more than mere supereroga-
tion to again belabor the rationale of these various
decisions. The function of the doctrine, its limitations
and its consequences in cases of the nature of the case at
bar are adequately stated in Poor Sisters of St. Francis
v. Long (1950), 190 Tenn. 434, 230 S.W.2d 659, and
Wooten v. Curry (1962), 50 Tenn.App. 549, 362 S.W.2d
820, and the authorities cited therein. Suffice it to say
we have again thoroughly reviewed medical malpractice
decisions in this state; and are convinced that res
ipsa loquitur cannot be given application in this case.
The reasons are twofold—(1) that evidence was offered
at the trial of a specific act or acts of negligence; and
(2) this record is abundantly clear that what occurred
in the instant case could not be prevented by any tech-
nique known to and recognized by the medical profession.
Compare Quinley v. Cocke (1946), 183 Tenn. 428, 192
S.W.2d 992. It is equally apparent that all plaintiff’s
theories of negligence were submitted to the jury by the

398 ee

trial court and rejected by that body which, as stated,
returned a verdict in favor of defendant Hughes.

The result is that the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is reversed; and that of the trial court affirmed.
The costs are assessed against Carl R. Hastings.

Dysr, Cumr Jusrice, and Cuarmn, Humpureys and
McCanusss, Justices, concur.

Optxion on Prrrrioy to ReHrar
Mr. Jusrior Creson.

In this case we have been presented a petition to re-
hear filed on behalf of Carl R. Hastings. Upon consid-
eration we find that this petition constitutes no more than
a reargument of those things considered and determined
in the original opinion.

Clearly, the above does not conform to the objective
purposes of petitions to-rehear as enunciated in Rule 32
of the rules of this Court. After consideration, we are
of opinion that the petition should be, and the same is
denied,

Dyzr, Cumr Justice, and Cuarrix, Humpureys and
McCanuess, Justices, concur.

Arr Tueater Guitp, Ixc., an Ohio Corporation, d/b/a

Studio Art Theater, and William Kendall,
Plaintiffs-in-Error,

Srars or Tannzsses ex rel. Luoyp Ruopzs, District
Attorney General, Pro Tem, Defendant-in-Error.

469 S.W.2d 669
(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed July 19, 1971.

|
{I

W. J. Micnazn Copy, Burcu, Portzr & Jounson, Mem-
phis, for plaintiffs in error.

Davip M. Pack, Attorney General, C. Haves Cooney,
Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, for defendant in
error.

Mr. Justice Creson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause comes to this Court on direct appeal from
the Criminal Court of Shelby County. That court de-

| 401

termined that a movie film, ‘Without a Stitch’’, ex-
hibited and displayed on the screen in Memphis, Tennes-
see, by plaintiffs in error, was obscene and in violation
of T.C.A. sec. 39-3003 through sec. 39-3007; and ulti-
mately permanently enjoined plaintiffs in error from
further exhibiting, displaying or showing said film.

During the course of this opinion, the parties will be
referred to as they appeared in the court below; that is,
State of Tennessee as petitioner, and Art Theater Guild,
Inc., and William Kendall, as defendants.

The issues raised on this appeal question the constitu-
tionality of Tennessee’s obscenity statutes; more spe-
cifically, T.C.A. secs. 39-3003; 39-3005 through 39-3007.

The record in this case shows that petitioner received
a complaint that the film ‘‘Without a Stitch’’, shown at
the Guild Theater, 1705 Poplar Avenue, Memphis, Ten-
nessee, was obscene. As a result of that complaint, cer-
tain members of the Vice Squad, members of the local
community, and members of the District Attorney Gen-
eral’s office, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, viewed the film
in question at a commercial showing at the Guild Theater.
The following day, March 28, 1970, the State filed a peti-
tion to temporarily enjoin defendants from showing the
film ‘‘Without a Stitch’’ until final determination of the
obscenity vel non of said film; and further to perma-
nently enjoin the showing of said film if and when the
film be declared obscene. This petition was filed pursuant
to T.C.A. sees. 39-3003 and 39-3005. On that same date,
the Criminal Court of Shelby County heard the State’s
petition and issued a fiat instructing the clerk to serve
process upon defendants, and to issue a temporary in-
junction. Said injunction was issued on the same day,
restraining defendants from further showing said film

402 es

and from disposing of the film, pending determination
upon the merits of the case.

On March 30, 1970, pursuant to order, the film was
shown to attorneys and potential witnesses.

Defendants filed their answer, joining issue with the
State’s petition, on July 27, 1970. The essentials of de-
fendant’s answer are as follows: (1) that the film
‘“‘Without a Stitch’’ is not obscene, and does not violate
the definition of obscenity found in T.C.A. see. 39-3007;
(2) that the advertisement of the film was not a flagrant,
open appeal to the prurient interest of ordinary persons;
(3) that the film was not a detriment to the morals of the
community; (4) that the film was shown to adult audi-
ences only, and has been shown in numerous parts of
the country without incident; (5) that T.C.A. sec. 39-3005
is unconstitutional because of lack of procedural safe-
guards preliminary to the issuance of a temporary in-
junction against alleged obscene material; and (6) that
T.C.A. sec. 39-3007, defining obscenity, is unconstitu-
tional.

On July 28, 1970, after hearing testimony and argu-
ment, and after viewing the film, the court below held:

“That the film ‘Without a Stitch’ as a whole predomi-
nantly appeals to the prurient interest of the ordinary
person; that it is patently offensive to the public; goes
substantially beyond the customary limits of candor;
and is devoid of any literary, scientific, educational,
or artistie value; and further is without any social
importance or value. This Court further finds as a
matter of fact that the film ‘Without a Stitch’ is ob-
scene under the standards set forth by Tennessee Code

Annotated 39-3005.”

es 408

The questions raised herein are not new. The consti-
tutionality of these statutes has been considered by this
Court in its prior decisions in New Riveria Arts Theatre
and H.W. Hill v. State of Tennessee ex rel. Davis (1966),
219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890; and Robert Arthur Man-
agement Corporation v. State of Tennessee ea rel. Ca-
nale (1967), 220 Tenn, 101, 414 S.W.2d 638, and cases
cited therein.

This Court has viewed the film ‘Without a Stitch’
and has carefully reviewed this record. We are of opin-
ion that the judgment below should be affirmed.

Brief and argument of defendants, together with the
brief of amicus curiae, contend strongly that the issuance
of the temporary injunction without notice to the adverse
party, or a chance to be heard, is ex parte and unconsti-
tutional. This is said to follow because it amounts to
prior restraint before final judicial determination; and
that, as such, is a violation of due process in an area
involving freedoms protected by the First Amendment.

Hl We must immediately point out that the temporary
relief granted to the State in this instance was devoted
and directed to the sole purpose of holding the status
quo to the end that the facts might be judicially de-
termined. The action complained of adjudicated nothing.
The arguments on behalf of defendants embody a serious
misconception of the Tennessee practice with respect to
the office of a temporary injunction. The origin, history
and limits of temporary injunctive relief is splendidly
delineated in Secs. 847 and 848 of Gibson’s Suits in
Chancery (5th ed.), pp. 51, et seq. Just how the action
of the court in holding the subject matter of the litiga-
tion in status quo pending fixation of the issues between

404 ee

the parties can amount to an unconstitutional deprivation
of anything totally escapes us. In some manner not
entirely clear, defendants take much comfort in the idea
that the opinion of this Court in Robert Arthur Manage-
ment Corporation v. State of Tennessee, supra, was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. It is
correct that this decision was reversed but the per
curiam opinion of the United States Supreme Court does
not touch upon either the constitutionality of Tennessee’s
obscenity statutes or the injunctive procedures followed.
Particularly we might point out, also, that the Federal
District Courts, sitting in Tennessee, have upheld the
constitutional validity of the statutes here under attack,

Hl Defendants also question the correctness of the
action of the court below in admitting into evidence a
“continuity study”’; that is, a selection of certain ‘scenes
and accompanying remarks by the actors and actresses
taken from the movie. Upon reading the record, it is
apparent that at the time the ‘‘continuity study”? was
offered into evidence, the State did not have the entire
film in its possession, and the defense had not yet intro-
duced same into evidence. It further appears that the
trial judge, sitting as sole trier of fact, stated at the time
of objections to the ‘‘study’s’’ admissibility, that he had
already viewed the film in its entirety. In view of those
facts, plus no showing by defendants that they were
prejudiced by said admission, we are of opinion that
error, if any, of admitting the ‘‘study’’ into evidence
was at most harmless. See T.C.A. sec. 27-117.

HBB Lastly, defendant argues that the film ‘‘ Without
a Stitch’’ is not obscene. The defense offered eight wit-
nesses who all stated that, in their opinion, said film was

rs 405

not obscene. The State produced six witnesses who testi-
fied to the opposite. Obscenity vel non is a fact question,
and that issue has been resolved by the trial judge ad-
versely to defendants. The Court below has found that
fact to be that the film in question here is obscene. There
are two frailties with the defendants’ argument on this
aspect of the case: (1) the case comes to us with a pre-
sumption of correctness of this finding. We see no cause
to disagree with such presumption; and (2) we agree
with the substance of the finding.

In view of the foregoing, defendants’ assignments of
error are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court
affirmed. Costs assessed against plaintiffs in error.

Dver, Cuter Justice, and Cuarrin, Humpnreys and
McCantess, JustIcEs, concur.

406

Tar Cornecricur Inpemyiry Company, Petitioner,

Jonny D, DeGatuerorp, Jr., Respondent.

470 S.W.2d 5

(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed August 2, 1971.

407

Bisnop, THomas, Lurrver, Maxx & Muitpury, Chatta-
nooga, for petitioner,

Brown & Wauker, Chattanooga, for respondent.

408

Mn. Cuter Jtsrice Dvzr delivered the opinion of the
Court.

‘This case comes to this Court by grant of writ of certi-
orari directed to the Court of Appeals. In this opinion
the Connecticut Indemnity Company will be referred to
as the insuror, and John D. DeGalleford, Jr., as the
insured.

On January 22, 1968, the insuror issued its policy to
insured, insuring on the basis of actual cash value, a
1967 Chevrolet and a 1962 Volkswagen against loss by
theft. The policy period was for six months with the
right of renewal by payment of renewal premiums. Prior
to the expiration of the policy period the insuror would
mail insured a notice of renewal premium due, which
notice described the vehicle covered and the amount and
type of insurance. Upon payment of the renewal pre-
minum, this notice became a part of the policy of insur-
ance. The first policy period ended on July 1, 1968, and
insuror mailed a notice of renewal, which described the
vehicles insured as a 1967 Chevrolet and a 1962 Volks-
wagen. Insured paid this renewal premium. Prior to the
expiration of the second policy period the insuror mailed
to insured its renewal notice again, describing the ve-
hicles insured as a 1967 Chevrolet and a 1962 Volks-
wagen. Insured paid this renewal premium.

In October, 1968, during the second policy period, in-
sured sold the 1967 Chevrolet and replaced it with a

ee 409

1964 Chevrolet. Neither the insuror nor its agent were
notified of this change. On April 2, 1969, during the third
policy period, the 1964 Chevrolet was stolen. Insuror
denied coverage, resulting in this suit by insured. The
theory upon which the suit was filed and tried was that
this 1964 Chevrolet was an ‘‘owned automobile’’ within
the meaning of the policy in that it ‘‘replaced an owned
antomobile’’ as defined in the policy. The pertinent pro-
visions of the policy are as follows:

“Owned Automobile’? means

(a) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile
described in this policy for which a specific premium
charge indicates that coverage is afforded,

(c) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile
ownership of which is acquired by the named insured
during the policy period, provided

(1) it replaces an owned automobile as defined in
(a) above, or

(2) the company insures all private passenger, farm
and utility automobiles owned by the named insured
on the date of such acquisition and the named in-
sured notifies the company during the policy period
or within 30 days after the date of such acquisition
of his election to make this and no other policy is-
sued by the company applicable to such automobile,
or

* * © © # &
The chancellor found, as insured contended, this 1964

Chevrolet was an ‘‘owned automobile’? under the terms
of the policy in that it replaced an ‘‘owned automobile’’

410 ee

and coverage was afforded. On this holding the Court of
Appeals reversed the chancellor.

On this issue the insuror contended that in order to
constitute an ‘‘owned automobile’’ under the terms of
the policy, insured was required to notify the insuror
of the purchase of the 1964 Chevrolet, replacing the 1967
Chevrolet, within thirty days, or at least within the
policy period. Without such notice there was no cover-

age.

It is admitted the stolen 1964 Chevrolet was not a
vehicle described in the policy, or any renewal thereof,
and that insured had obtained title thereto during the
policy period prior to the period in which the loss oc-
curred. Coverage is then determined by the construction
to be placed on sub-section (c), copied above. There is
no ambiguity in the language of this sub-section. As
applied to the facts of this case it clearly states that for
this 1964 Chevrolet to become an ‘‘owned automobile,”’
for which coverage would be afforded, without said
vehicle being described in the policy, insured would have
to acquire ownership during the policy period.

Hl We agree with the Court of Appeals that the chan-
cellor was in error in holding the policy afforded cover-
age to this 1964 Chevrolet.

The Court of Appeals then reached the same conclu-
sion as the chancellor by reforming the contract on the
ground there had been a mutual mistake of fact. The
insuror assigns error to this action of the Court of Ap-
peals on the ground reformation was not an issue in the
trial court and the bill contained no specific prayer for
such relief,

ee 411

Hl The rule is well settled in this state that under a
prayer for general relief the court may grant any other
and different relief from that specifically indicated and
prayed for which is justified by the pleadings and the
proof. Tennessee Ice Co. v. Raine, 107 Tenn. 151, 64 8.W.
29 (1901) ; Holston National Bank v. Wood, 125 Tenn. 6,
140 S.W. 31 (1911); Rhodes v. Johnson, 32 Tenn.App.
127, 222 S.W.2d 38 (1949); Haralson v. Jones, 33 Tenn.
App. 572, 232 8.W.2d 415 (1950) ; Montgomery v. Nicely,
42 Tenn.App. 223, 301 S.W.2d 379 (1956). The issue here
then is whether under the pleadings and proof the Court
of Appeals was justified in reforming this contract.

In the early case of Dodd v. Benthal, 51 Tenn. 601
(1871), on this issue the Court said:

While the rules of pleading in a court of equity are
more flexible and liberal than in a court of law, yet it
is generally true that a court of equity can grant no
relief unless such relief be within the purview and
spirit of the equities set forth in the bill. But a court
of equity regards not mere forms, but looks to the sub-
stance of things; and if the facts appear upon the face
of the bill, that entitle the party to a specific relief, the
court will grant such relief, although the forms of
speech adopted in the bill be not technically the most
appropriate, and although the form of prayer does not
in totidum verbis embrace the specific relief to which
the facts stated entitles the complainant. The cardinal
rule is, that the bill must not be so vague that the
defendant may be surprised by a case that he could
not be prepared to meet: * * * Even if the complainant
should mistake the relief to which he is entitled, yet
if his equities be clear upon the facts, if he have a
prayer for general relief, the court will so mould its

a2

decrees as to give him the specific relief to which the
facts entitle him. And it is held, that a prayer for gen-
eral relief, without a special prayer of the particular
relief to which the complainant thinks himself entitled,
is sufficient, and that the particular relief which the
case requires may at the hearing be prayed at the bar.
But this relief must be agreeable to the case made by
the bill, and not different from it: * * * But the court
will not grant relief which is without the scope of the
complainant’s bill, and not prayed for specifically. 51
Tenn. at 608-610.

In Caldwell v. Huff stutter, 173 Tenn. 225, 116 8.W.2d
1017 (1938), this Court referred to the above language
in Dodd v. Benthal, supra, as follows:

Whatever liberality Court of Equity may have exer-
cised or approved as proper in granting, under a gen-
eral prayer, relief not specifically prayed for, there
are certain well recognized limitations which may not
be overlooked. Certain of these are noted in the lan-
guage just above quoted from Dodd v. Benthal, supra.
The relief granted must be clearly within the scope of
the bill, and it must not be either antagonistic to, or
altogether different from, that specifically prayed for.
Certainly, the Court would not be warranted in treat-
ing a prayer for general relief as a prayer for relief,
“not in consonance with the practice of courts of
equity.”’? 173 Tenn. at 229-230, 116 S.W.2d at 1019.

In Southern Housing Co. v. Morton, 35 Tenn.App. 109,
242 S,W.2d 843 (1950), the applicable rule is stated in the
following language:

The power of a court of equity to grant relief under a

general prayer where the equities demand it, is liber-

ee 413

ally regarded, but the Supreme Court has said that
‘« ‘the cardinal rule is, that the bill must not be so
vague that the defendant may be surprised by a case
that he could not be prepared to meet’ ’’; and the “ ‘re-
lief must be agreeable to the case made by the bill, and
not. different from it’’’; ‘it must not be either
antagonistic to or altogether different from, that
specifically prayed for’. Caldwell v. Huffstutter, 173
Tenn. 225, 116 8.W.2d 1017, 1019, and cases cited. 35
Tenn.App. at 132, 242 S.W.2d at 853.

In the case at bar the original bill alleges the 1964
Chevrolet is a replacement automobile and as such there
is coverage thereon by the terms of the policy. The
prayers are for a decree for the amount due under the
policy and for general relief. The insuror answered de-
nying the 1964 Chevrolet was such a replacement auto-
mobile and also denied insured gave notice of the
purchase of a 1964 Chevrolet or the sale of the 1967
Chevrolet.

The proof entered supports the facts we have previ-
ously set out in this opinion; that is, the purchase and
renewal of the insurance, the sale of the 1967 Chevrolet,
and the purchase and loss the 1964 Chevrolet. There is
also testimony in the record insured or his wife at-
tempted, but were not successful in notifying the insuror
in regard to the exchange of these automobiles.

Hl To reach a decision we need to consider another
factor; that is, what allegations are necessary to save
from demurrer a bill filed to reform a contract on the
grounds of mutual mistake in order that we may test the
bill in the case at bar against such requirements. The
bill in the case at bar will have to meet such require-

4d es

ments, since, as stated in Caldwell v. Huf'stutter, supra,
the relief granted must be clearly within the scope of the
pill. The requirements of such a bill were discussed at
length in Lebo v. Green, 221 Tenn. 301, 426 S.W.2d 489
(1968). In a bill to reform a contract on the ground of
mutual mistake it is necessary to allege the circumstances
causing the mistake and the fact the complainant was
free of any fault in the matter.

HH In the case at bar admitting as upon demurrer all
the facts alleged, we find no facts on which the Court
would be justified in reforming this contract.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
the cause dismissed.

Cuartiy, Creson and McCanuzss, Justices, and Mc-
Amis, Speciat Justice, concur,

es 415

Bruce Law: and Marti Brooxs Norrimer, Appellants,

Jon Lynn Wiiarre, Appellee.
470 S.W.2d 8
(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed August 2, 1971.

Bruce Law, Marvin Brooxs NorFueer, pro se.

Joun T, Wiixrnson, Jz., Memphis, for appellee.

Mr. Cuter Justice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case comes to this Court from the action of the
trial judge sustaining a demurrer to the declaration dis-
missing the case. In this opinion we will refer to the par-
ties as they appeared in the trial court; that is, Bruce
Law and Marvin Brooks Norfleet as plaintiffs, and Joe
Lynn Wilhite as defendant. The facts admitted here
upon demurrer giving rise to this action are as follows:

On September 11, 1968, Shirley Wilhite, wife of de-
fendant, filed her suit for divorce, obtaining from the
court an order restraining defendant from ‘‘harming or
threatening bodily harm to her.’’? Among other things,
she prayed for alimony, child support, and attorneys’
fees pendente lite. On October 16, 1968, defendant filed
an answer and a cross-bill for divorce. At this stage of
the proceedings, plaintiffs, as attorneys for Shirley Wil-

ee 47

hite, entered this divorce case for the first time. On
October 23, 1968, Shirley Wilhite, by written agreement,
employed plaintiffs to represent her in this divorce pro-
ceeding and obligated herself to pay plaintiffs certain
stated or computable amounts. Plaintiffs prepared an
amendment to the original bill and answer to the cross-
bill, filing same on November 12, 1968. Plaintiffs con-
tinued their work as attorneys for Shirley Wilhite and
on February 5, 1969, took the pre-trial deposition of
defendant. The parties thereafter became reconciled and
on January 5, 1970, the original bill and cross-bill were
dismissed without prejudice.

On May 19, 1970, plaintiffs filed the case now before
the Court against defendant, as the husband of Shirley
Wilhite, to recover fees due for services rendered Shirley
Wilhite in the divorce action on the ground such legal
services were ‘‘necessaries’’ justifying Shirley Wilhite
pledging the credit of defendant in order to secure same.
To this action a demurrer was filed and sustained on the
ground the allegations in this bill did not state a cause
of action.

In Greggory v. Greggory, 1 Tenn.App. 570 (1925), the
wife brought suit against her husband seeking support
for herself and their children. The gist of the bill was
that the wife and children were destitute while the hus-
band had means for their necessary support but failed
or refused to provide such. The husband induced the
wife to sign an agreement whereby he agreed to furnish
her and the children their necessary support and the
wife’s bill was dismissed. Attorneys employed by the
wife to file her petition then filed their petition to have
the court fix a reasonable attorneys’ fee, which petition
was treated as an original bill against the husband. The

418 es

Court held the husband liable for his wife’s attorneys’
fees and in the course of the opinion quoted from 30 C. J.
Husband and Wife secs. 147, 155 and 153, as follows:

“The authorities are in conflict, as to whether legal
services rendered the wife are necessities for which
the husband is liable. They are in conflict not only as
to the general rule but also as to its application to
legal services rendered in particular classes of cases.’’
Td., see, 147.

“Where the husband without good cause deserts the
wife and fails to furnish her with such support as his
means will warrant, the services of attorneys in insti-
tuting and prosecuting a statutory suit or proceeding
to compel the husband to maintain the wife becomes
an immediate necessity of the wife for which the hus-
band is liable as much as he would be for necessary
food or clothing purchased by the wife on the hus-
band’s eredit.’’? Id., see. 155,

«Where it appears that a suit for judicial separation
or divorce a mensa et thoro, is for the protection and
support of the wife, and the conduct of the husband is
such as to render its institution and prosecution
reasonable and proper, or, in other words, where the
suit is reasonably and justifiably instituted, the wife’s
attorney may recover, in an independent action against
the husband, for his services.’’ Id., sec. 153. 1 Tenn.
App. at 573.

In Haynes v. Haynes, 192 Tenn. 486, 241 8.W.2d 540
(1951), the wife brought suit against her husband for
separate maintenance and later amended to pray for an
absolute divorce, The gist of the action was that the hus-
band, although financially able to provide for the wife

Dn 419

and their infant child, had failed or refused to do so.
Following the filing of the original petition and amend-
ment thereto the parties were reconciled and the wife’s
petition dismissed. Whereupon the attorney employed
by the wife to file her petition then filed his petition to
recover attorneys’ fees from the husband for services
rendered the wife. This cause then came to this Court
as a discretionary appeal after the overruling of a de-
murrer. This Court held, under these circumstances,
there could be a recovery with the right to recover de-
pending upon whether or not the wife was justified in
pledging her husband’s credit in order to secure legal
assistance. In the course of this opinion the Court quoted
from Schouler Divorce Manual, Section 237, as follows:

‘“‘Whether a wife can pledge her husband’s credit for
legal services depends as in case of other necessaries
on the facts and circumstances. If the wife is wilfully
living apart from the husband without his fault, she
may have forfeited her right to pledge his credit for
necessaries. Where this condition does not exist, the
husband may be liable for reasonable counsel fees that
are reasonably necessary for the wife’s protection.’’
192 Tenn. at 490-491, 241 S.W.2d at 542,

There is an element in Haynes v. Haynes, supra, we
think we should note. The wife in her petition admitted
her husband had provided or attempted to provide her
an income from rent of a building in the monthly amount
of $638.89, but the record, as brought to this Court, did
not show whether she had ever received any of this in-
come nor to what extent it was adequate for her support.
The cause being here on demurrer, the Court accepted
as true the allegation the husband abandoned the wife
and child with nothing to maintain themselves. The fact

420

of this rental income, if received, could have been a
factor in determining upon remand if the wife was justi-
fied in pledging the husband’s credit to secure legal
assistance.

The case of Levine v. Raymond, 3 A.D.2d 36, 157 N.Y.S.
2d 799 (1956), involved a similar situation to the case at
bar and the Court said:

I think, from this collation of the decided cases, it
may fairly be said that the weight of American au-
thority is in favor of the maintenance of an action like
the present. To succeed in it, the plaintiff must show
affirmatively that the suit was for the protection and
support of the wife, and that the conduct of the hus-
band was such as to render its institution and prose-
eution reasonable and proper. This latter rule as to
the quantum of proof required is the corollary of the
element of proof required of the tradesman or other
furnisher of necessaries than when husband and wife
do not live together, it is part of the plaintiff’s affirma-
tive case to offer proof that the wife was not suitably
provided for and that the separation was not due to
the fault of the wife.

In the case at bar the petition filed by plaintiffs alleges
Shirley Wilhite at the time she employed plaintiffs was
‘‘without counsel representing her in said divorce cause
and needing same therein for her and her said minor
children’s protection and relief.’’ The bill further alleges
in detail the services plaintiffs performed for Shirley
Wilhite and that payment has not been made for said
services.

The bill for divorce filed by Shirley Wilhite, if true,
reflects the following facts: That upon this marriage

| 421

Shirley quit attending college to go to work in order that
defendant would be able to complete his medical educa-
tion. Defendant is now a thoracic and cardiovascular
surgeon, That defendant has been guilty of numerous
acts of physical and mental cruelty toward his wife, in-
cluding a threat that defendant could easily have her
committed to a mental institution. It is also alleged
that defendant has been guilty of adultery. That with
the exception of a home held by the entireties, the prop-
erty of the parties is held in the name of the defendant.
To support the issuance of the temporary restraining
order, Shirley Wilhite alleged she was nervous, upset
and unable to defend herself.

The cross-bill filed by the defendant also makes serious
charges against Shirley Wilhite.

The case at bar is controlled by the holding in Haynes
v. Haynes, supra. In the case at bar, as in Haynes, the
trial court will have to make a determination whether,
under all the cireumstances, Shirley Wilhite was justified
in pledging defendant’s credit when she employed plain-
tiffs.

In the case at bar there is a circumstance similar to
the monthly rental the husband in Haynes v. Haynes,
supra, agreed to pay his wife, referred to above in this
opinion. Under this record Shirley Wilhite was awarded
$900.00 monthly for alimony and child support pendente
lite, and her attorney at the time was awarded $200.00
pendente lite. Under this record here on demurrer we
do not know if these sums have or have not been paid.
This is one of the circumstances to be considered bearing
on the ultimate decision.

422 |

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for a
hearing on the merits.

Cuarrm, Creson, Humpareys and McCanzzss, Jus-
TICES, concur.

ee 423

Susaw Tracy Fitmors

Lentanp A. Fruumors.

470 S.W.2d 11

(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed August 16, 1971,

a
Buuy W. Perry and E. Micuart Eusis, Cump &
O’Connor, Knoxville, for complainant-appellant.

424 be a

Exmer EK. Estey, Eeuew & Esten, Kingston, for de-
fendant-appellee.

Mr. Justice McCanuuss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Susan Tracy Fillmore, the widow of Oswald L. Fill-
more, deceased, filed her bill against Leland A. Fillmore,
whom she described as the executor of the estate of her
deceased husband and his son, to have decreed void a
transfer of $12,000.00 by her deceased husband to the
defendant under circumstances on which she relies to
establish the transfer as a fraud upon her rights as the
widow of Oswald L. Fillmore. She recited that her hus-
band had died testate; that his will had been probated;
that she had dissented from the will; and that because of
such dissent she had become entitled along with each of
these three children to one-fourth of his personal estate.

ee 425

She prayed for a recovery of $3,000, one-fourth of the
$12,000.00 so transferred, together with interest on that
amount and for general relief.

The defendant demurred to the bill, assigning several
grounds. The Chancellor by his decree sustaining the
demurrer and dismissing the bill gave no reason for his
action, but from the briefs and the oral arguments of
the solicitors it appears that he sustained the demurrer
on the ground that since the estate of Oswald L. Fillmore
was being administered in the County Court, the Chan-
cery Court was without jurisdiction.

The purpose of this suit by the widow is to recover
her distributive share of the estate which, according to
the averments of her bill, includes $3,000.00, or one-
fourth of the $12,000.00 she charges her husband fraudu-
lently transferred to Leland A. Fillmore. In addition to
this principal amount she prays for a decree for interest
and the costs of the cause. This prayer does not take
into account the condition of the estate—the costs of
administration, possible estate and inheritance taxes,
and the indebtedness. These things, as well as the cir-
cumstances of the alleged transfer, must be determined
in order that an adjudication may be made whether the
complainant may recover, and, if so, the amount of her
recovery.

Section 31-612, Tennessee Code Annotated, provides:

“Any conveyances made fraudulently to children or
others, with an intent to defeat the widow of her dower,
or distributive share, shall be voidable, and such widow
shall be entitled to dower in the land so fraudulently
conveyed, as if no conveyance had been made.”’

426 es

The words, ‘‘or distributive share’’, had not been in-
eluded in the section until they were added in the 1932
revision of the Code. The Court of Appeals in their
opinion in Sherrill v. Mailicote, 57 Tenn.App. 241, 417
S.W.2d 798, construed the 1932 amendment as having the
effect of giving the section application to fraudulent
transfers of personalty having the effect of defrauding
widows of their distributive shares, and that a suit in
chancery to set aside the transfer is the proper remedy.
Undoubtedly such was the purpose of the amendment,
and such a suit is the remedy.

We are of opinion that under the facts averred in the
bill there is no need for the Chancery Court to appoint
an administrator or to assume the administration of the
estate. Sueh might be the case if there were complica-
tions requiring the attention of a chancery court, but
there are no such complications here. Any decree pro-
nouneed in this suit should be limited to an adjudication
of the issue whether there was a fraudulent transfer, and,
if so, its date and amount, and for execution, if necessary,
with the proceeds to be paid into the county court for
distribution. The deeree can he filed in the administra-
tion proceedings in the county court as proof of the
complainant’s claim.

We call attention to Section 782, Phillips’ Prichard,
in which the following sentences appear:

“The application to compel payment of legacies or
shares is made by bill or petition, brought by any one
or more of the legatees or distributees, in any of the
courts having jurisdiction. All the legatees or dis-
tributees are necessary parties, and those not joined as
complainants must be made defendants,”

| 427

We overrule the demurrer and remand the cause to
the Chancery Court for further proceedings in accord-
ance with this opinion. The adjudication of the costs
will await the final determination of the cause.

Dyer, Camr Justicr, Oreson, Justicr, and McAmts
and Jenkins, Spot. Justicss, conenr.

428

Cuarrz Apams, Executor of Estate of Jim Adams, and
J. L. Apams, Appellant,

Virernta Apvams Unverwoop, Claimant-Appellec.

470 S8,W.2d 180

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed June 7, 1971.

tl
'

429

Wii D. Bamp, R. Davin Auten, Lebanon, for ap-
pellant.

MacFarianp, Reep & Kinnarp, Lebanon, for claimant-
appellee.

MemoranpUM

PER CURIAM.

Heretofore, the Court granted certiorari to review the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, Middle Division,
affirming the judgment of the Wilson County Circuit
Court, whereby Virginia Adams Underwood was award-
ed $5,600.00 for services rendered her father, Jim Adams,
in the last sixty-three months of his life. The opinion
of the Court of Appeals is as follows:

‘OpInion

“‘Qlaire Adams, Executor of the estate of Jim Adams,
has appealed from a jury verdict and judgment sustain-
ing the claim of Virginia Adams Underwood for services
to the deceased, Jim Adams.

“The claim filed by claimant reads as follows:

‘During the sixty-three (63) consecutive months pre-
ceding the death of my father, Jim Adams of Lebanon,
Wilson County, Tennessee, I did render to him per-
sonal services for which I have earned, and am entitled
to and have not been paid the amount of Thirty-eight
Dollars ($38.00) per week for two hundred seventy-
three (273) weeks. The total claim amounting to Ten
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-four ($10,374.00)
Dollars.

‘During each and every one of these weeks I have
cared for my father until his death maintaining a
household for him, cooking special meals for him and
during the month of his last illness purchasing food
and necessities for him when he would not allow a
sufficient amount for proper foods and nutrition for

| 431

himself. During each of these weeks I waited on him
in person by cooking and serving his meals and staying
with him as much as was required for his health, com-
fort, and general well-being.

‘At the insistence of my father, Jim Adams, I left
my own home with my family and moved into his house
for the purpose of giving my father, Jim Adams,
proper care during which time my own home: has
physically deteriorated into a practicably unliveable
condition. During much of this time I saw to and took
eare of the renting of houses and the rental property
which my father owned during which time I acted as
caretaker for his home and property.’

“The jury returned a verdict in favor of claimant in
the amount of $5,600.00, and judgment was entered
thereon,

“The first and third assignments of error assert that
there was no evidence to support the verdict and that
the trial court erred in overruling the motion of the ex-
ecutor for a directed verdict.

“The executor insists that there is no evidence of (a)
a contract between claimant and deceased, for payment
for services, or (b) any intention of deceased that cluim-
ant be paid, or (c) any expectations by claimant of com-
pensation.

‘The claimant presented witnesses who testified that,
prior to 1963, she resided with her husband and two
children on their 100 acre farm near Lebanon, that her
husband had been employed for many years at Lebanon
Woolen Mills; that she transported him several miles to
and from work each day because he did not drive an
automobile; that her mother and father lived in Lebanon

432

near the woolen mills; that, following the death of her
mother in 1963, at the request of her brother, J. L.
Adams, she discussed and agreed with her father upon a
plan whereby her entire family was moved to the home
of her father so that she might care for her father; that
the father insisted upon living in his own home, but was
afraid to live alone; that claimant and her family lived
with deceased from 1963 until his death in 1968; that she
paid no rent, but their farm home remained vacant; that
she drove to the farm every day to care for the livestock;
that deceased gave her some money, but not enough to
buy his groceries; that claimant cooked special food for
deceased according to his prescribed diet; that she cooked
special food for his dogs; that she cared for and nursed
deceased ; that she attended to the collection of rents and
repair of the rental property of deceased; that he was
physically and mentally incapable of caring for himself
or property ; and that the reasonable value of her services
was $38.00 per week.

“No evidence was offered by the executor.

‘Appellant correctly states that there is no evidence
of an express contract whereby deceased agreed to pay
claimant anything. Nor is there any evidence that de-
ceased ever gave any indication that he intended for
claimant to be paid. There is likewise no testimony by
claimant that she expected payment.

The issue of law presented here is whether or not
special circumstances may create a valid claim for serv-
ices to deceased, even in the absence of contract, inten-
tion to pay or intention to be paid.

“The special and persuasive cireumstances of this case
are as follows:

|

ee 438

“1, Deceased had three children, Only claimant would
help him—the others refused.

“2, Deceased was illiterate, senile, lonely, ‘just like a
child,’ physically and mentally unable to attend to his
business, would hardly know what he was doing for three
weeks at a time,

«3, Claimant furnished deceased the care and nursing
which no one else seemed willing to furnish.

“The trial judge charged the jury in part as follows:

‘Now, gentlemen of the jury, I charge you that serv-
ices rendered by a child while living with the parent
during the latter’s old-age and ill-health, though long
continued, are presumed to have been gratuitously
rendered from motives of affection and duty. For a
child to recover compensation for services rendered
the father, she must overcome this presumption by a
preponderance of the evidence, showing either a con-
tract, or such exceptional facts and circumstances as
to establish an intention on the part of the Claimant to
charge and on the part of Decedent to pay for such
services notwithstanding the relationship.

‘If you find from a preponderance of the proof that
the Claimant, Mrs. Underwood, performed the services
claimed and Decedent accepted the same under such
circumstances that no reasonable man would have sup-
posed Claimant meant to do the work and render the
services for nothing, Decedent’s estate would be liable
to pay for the services. The doing of the work consti-
tuted the offer and the permission to do it and the ac-
quiescence in its being done constituted the acceptance.
I further charge you that when one renders service to

434 ee

another with the hope or expectation of a legacy,
devise or other provisions by Will without any con-
tract, express or implied, but relying solely upon the
generosity of the person for which such services are
rendered she cannot recover for such services because
of the failure of such person to make testamentary
provisions in Claimant’s behalf.

‘Now gentlemen of the jury, if you find from a pre-
ponderance of the proof in this case, that there was a
contract, expressed or implied, as heretofore explained
to you, between Complainant and Decedent whereby
Complainant wants to be paid for the services ren-
dered and the Decedent, Jim Adams, failed to carry
out such contract agreement, I charge you that De-
cedent’s estate would be liable to Claimant for the
reasonable value of the services rendered and your
verdict should be in favor of the Complainant if you
find that there was an implied contract that she was
to be paid for the services she rendered.’

“Under this charge, which was unexcepted to, the jury
found for the claimant. Inherent in such a verdiot is a
finding that the circumstances were such as to imply an
obligation to pay.

“In Gorrell v. Tayior, 107 Tenn. 468 [568], 64 S.W.
888 (1901), the services were performed by a daughter
and her husband who lived with deceased. The court
disallowed the claim for services, but stated:

‘Children performing services of this character for
a parent are presumed to act gratuitously, from mo-
tives of affection and duty, and to entitle them to re-
cover compensation therefor, the burden is upon them
to overcome the presumption by showing either an

ee 435

express contract or such exceptional facts and circwm-
stances as will establish an intention on the one part
to charge and on the other to pay, not withstanding the
relationship of kinship. 107 Tenn., p. 570 [64 S.W.
888].’ Emphasis supplied.

“Tn the present case, the claimant was not living with
her father until the urgency of his needs and demands
required that she abandon her home in order to care for
him. Services rendered to a fellow member of a house-
hold are in an entirely different category from those
which require the sacrifice of a separate abode in order
to serve the deceased. The jury evidently found, with
cause, that there were ‘such exceptional facts and cir-
cumstances as will establish an intention on the one part
to charge and the other to pay * * *’

“In Key v. Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 8.W. 235: (1905)
the services were rendered to a sister weak of mind,
almost helpless, unable to move from her chair or bed
without assistance, as helpless as a baby. It was further
shown that, but for the services of the claimant, the
deceased would have been a public charge. In said case,
the Supreme Court allowed one half of the compensation
fixed by the trial court on grounds of ordinary justice
and necessities furnished to an incompetent,

“In the present case, there is evidence to support the
conclusion by the jury that deceased was physically and
mentally unable to care for himself, that other children
had refused to care for him, and that, but for the services
of claimant, deceased would have been dependent upon
the aid of outsiders, which certainly would not have been
gratuitous. Thus the verdict of the jury is justifiable
upon the theory of necessities furnished. Coincidentally,

436 es

in the present case, the jury allowed approximately one-
half of the amount claimed.

“In Cotton v. Roberts Estate, 47 Tenn.App. 277, 337
S.W.2d 66 (1960), the court denied the claim of a nephew
who occupied a house on the farm of deceased and tilled
her farm on a crop-sharing basis. Deceased was active,
healthy, intelligent and business-like.

“In the present case, there was evidence to show, and
the jury evidently found, that the deceased was not as
competent and able to care for his affairs as was Mrs.
Roberts, supra.

“Appellant urges that claimant herein occupied the
home of deceased for five years rent-free; however,
during the same period, claimant’s own home stood va-
cant and untended; and claimant thus received no benefit
from the use of the home of deceased. She was present
there, not to save rent, but to satisfy and serve her
father.

“Appellant urges that deceased was reasonably active
and managed his own affairs. There is evidence to this
effect, but there is also evidence otherwise which the jury
evidently believed and followed in its verdict.

“Appellant relies upon a statement from Key v. Har-
ris, supra, as follows:

‘It is said that the reason underlying the rule is that
family life abounds in acts of reciprocal kindness
which tend to promote the comfort and convenience
of the family, and that the introduction of commercial
consideration into the relations of persons so closely
bound together would expel this spirit of mutual benef-
icence and to that extent mar the family unity,

‘The reason of the law is the soul of the law. When
that fails, the law itself fails,’

“The exclusion of the commercial consideration from
eases such as this would enable children who are un-
moved by the needs of a parent to shirk all responsibility
therefor and place the entire burden upon the only child
who will care for the parent and then to demand that
estate of the parent be divided equally among the chil-
dyen. This would discourage services to parents by any
child unless firm contractual relations were established,
and this would, indeed, mar the family relationship.

“The reason of the law is, indeed, the soul of the law,
and should not fail. In the present case reason and jus-
tiee require that there be some difference between the
inheritance of the attentive daughter and the inattentive
sons. The jury has determined from competent évidence
that unusual circumstances exist which justify an in-
ference of contract, or a quasi contract for necessaries.
Being supported by material and substantial evidence,
the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed. Kroger Co.
vr. Giem, 215 Tenn. 459, 387 S.W.2d 620 (1964); Clark v.
Allison 58 Tenn.App. 355, 480 S.W.2d 784 (1967) and
many other authorities cited in Tenn. Digest, Vol. 2,
Appeal and Error, see. 930(1).

“The second assignment of error that:

‘The verdict of the Jury was contrary to the weight
and preponderance of the evidence. T.R., P. 11.’

is not proper for consideration in this Court and is re-
spectfully overruled. Ewing v. Birthright, 60 Tenn.App.
454, 448 S.W.2d 71 (1969); Cherry v. Floyd, 60 Tenn.
App. 521, 448 S.W.2d 444 (1969); Leach v. Leach, 52
Tenn.App. 606, 376 S.W.2d 739 (1964).

428

‘“‘The fourth assignment is that the verdict of the jury
is excessive.

“Appellant urges that the rental value of claimant’s
occupancy of the home of deceased, should reduce if not
eradicate the claim. The insistence has been dealt with
heretofore.

“Appellant urges that the convenience of the home of
the deceased to the work of claimant’s husband should
mitigate the claim. There is evidence that daily trips
to the farm were made to attend the livestock which
would largely balance the nearness to employment, and
the general verdict of the jury for approximately one-
half of the claim includes consideration of this factor.
Appellant insists, correctly, that claimant has not shown
the precise amount she spent for the benefit of deceased
or the precise number of hours or minutes she spent in
his service, and that the verdict is therefore based upon
speculation.

HH The amount of recovery allowed may not be
based upon speculation, but may be, and usually is,
based upon estimation.

“Tn 25A, O..S., Damages, sec. 162(2), pp. 80, 81 is
found the following:

‘Proof of the amount of loss with absolute or mathe-
matical certainty is not required, and it does not mat-
ter that the determination of damages depends to some
extent on the consideration of contingent events. So,
it has been held sufficient if a reasonable basis of com-
putation is afforded, even though the result may be
only approximate, or to adduce evidence which is the
best the case is susceptible of under the circumstances

ee 439

and which will permit a reasonably close estimate of
the loss. * * *”

‘*No authority has been cited, and none has been found,
which denies to the jury the prerogative of exercising
its common sense and common experience in estimating
the value of goods and services, especially where the
claimant has placed a given value thereon and the jury
sees fit to place a lesser value thereon without other
testimony. There are areas in which jurors are entitled
to call upon their own knowledge and experience which
is shared by all reasonably well informed and experi-
enced persons.

“The claim was for $10,374.00 for about five years
work at $38.00 per week. Whether the jury found for a
lesser period, or for a lesser charge per week, the verdict
was for about one half the amount claimed. There is evi-
dence to support the finding of the jury as to the fair
amount due, and, upon appeal, the amount of the verdict
could hardly be revised without re-weighing the contro-
verted evidence, which action is not within the province
of this Court.

“The fourth assignment of error is respectfully over-
ruled.

“Hach assignment of error has been overruled for the
reasons given, The verdict of the trial jury and the judg-
ment thereon is affirmed. The cause is remanded for
further appropriate proceedings. All costs of the cause,
including costs of this appeal, are taxed against the ap-
pellant-executor.

‘‘ Affirmed and Remanded.”’

440 ee]

While this Court is not in disagreement, in general,
with this opinion, certiorari was granted because the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed in spite of a
finding by the Court of Appeals that there was no evi-
dence of contract, whatsoever.

Hl If in fact there is no evidence whatsoever of con-
tractual intent, the special circumstances relied on by
the Court as justifying the award, being of the same
general character as those held to be inadequate for this
purpose in Gorrell v. Taylor, 107 Tenn. 568, 64 S.W.
888, could not amount to such exceptional facts and cir-
cumstances as are contemplated in that case. It is
important to note that the ‘‘exceptional facts and cir-
cumstances’? contemplated by Gorrell v. Taylor, supra,
as adequate to sustain a recovery are not facts which
prove the rendition of arduous, valuable services, but
facts which will, as the opinion in Gorrell states it, ‘‘es-
tablish an intention on the one part to charge and on
the other to pay.’’ p. 570, 64 S.W. p. 88.

So, being concerned that the Court of Appeals opinion
would leave the inference that Gorrell v. Taylor could
be satisfied by the volume of personal services rendered,
we granted certiorari: not for the purpose of reversing,
but for the purpose of pointing out that the record does
contain evidence which tends to show that the arrange-
ment under which Mrs. Underwood rendered services to
her father, Jim Adams, was consensual in nature, in
that there was a specific request for these services on
the one hand and the furnishing thereof on the other,
and that this calls into operation a rule which sustains
the recovery. We quote from the transcript:

es 441

‘*Q. Now, Mrs. Underwood, do you recall the exact
eireumstances under which your father first came to
live with you in your home?

‘tA. T went to live with him.
“*Q. You went to live in his home?
“A, Yes, sir,

“Q. Do you recall the exact circumstances, though,
under which all of this began?

“A, Well, the first thing, J. L. called us, out on the
farm, and he said my Daddy wanted to see us, and I
said what was the matter, and he said he was wanting
to see us about coming to live with him and take care
of him, and he said for us to come up there—he’d
meet us a certain time, and so we got ready and my
husband and I went up there, and J. brought my Daddy
over there and met us, and we talked a little and he
said. he wanted to see us about coming to live with him,
that he did not * * *

“MR. BAIRD: If Your Honor please, we except to
any statements that * *

“COURT: Who was there when this was going on
now?

“‘A, J. L. called me on the telephone, out on the farm,
and I think I talked to my Daddy.

“MR. KINNARD: Your Honor, I believe both of these
men are party defendants to the suit, and * * *,

“COURT: Were they present?

“MR. KINNARD: I think she can say what J. L.
Adams said.

440 es

“MR. BAIRD: I’m not objecting to what J. L. said—
I’m objecting to what her father said over there * * *

“COURT: Well, she can’t tell us what her father said,
or a transaction with the deceased—she can’t tell about
that.

“MR. KINNARD: I thought Mr. Baird was except-
ing to what J. * * *.

“COURT: No, she can tell what J. L. said and what
Claire said, or any understanding or transaction she
had with them, but * * *

“WITNESS: I can’t say nothing that my Daddy said?
“MR. KINNARD: No, ma’am, we can’t admit state-
ments that your father made.

‘A, Well, J. L. called me to come up there, my hus-
band and myself, and we went up there and he left us
with my father and went off and told us when he would
come back and he came back and got us * * * if I can’t
say nothing my Daddy said.

* * * * * * *

Cross-Examination

“Q. You said that J. L. called you on the telephone
and wanted you and your husband to come up there
to talk with your father, that’s right, isn’t it?

“A, That is right, he called me and then I talked to
my father,

*Q. And then you came up there?

“A, That is correct—he wanted us to come stay with
him,”’

Z

| 443

This testimony together with other testimony in the
case shows that Mrs. Underwood left her own home and
entered the home of her father, not to reestablish a
family relationship, but to render services according to
a pre-arrangement. Under such circumstances, a number
of respectable courts hold that the presumption of gratui-
ty is either done away with, or loses its full force and
effect. In Mathias v. Tingey, 39 Utah 561, 118 P. 781, 38
LRB.A., N.S., 749, it was held that an adult child who was
no longer a member of the parent’s family but was sup-
porting himself through his own efforts, who returned
to his parent’s home at the parent’s request to perform
certain services for the parent would not be prevented
from recovering by the gratuity presumption, which
would lose its full force and effect in such a case,

In Cramer v. Clark, 121 Wash. 507, 209 P. 688, 24
A.L.R. 970, it is said:

“The ordinary presumption that services when ren-
dered are in expectation of payment is not rebutted
(referring to the case sub judice) by the mere fact
that the parties to the transaction stood in the relation
of parent and child. The courts make a distinction
between cases where the child has become of age, been
away from home and then returned on the request of
the parent, and one where the child has continued to
live with the parent after arriving at age. Where the
child has established a separate abode, the presump-
tion that services performed by him for the parent
are gratuitous no longer prevails’’, (Parenthesis
added)

This same proposition is exemplified by the holdings
in Marietta v. Marietta, 90 Iowa 201, 57 N.W. 708; Mar-

444 eS

key v. Brewster, 10 Hun 16, affirmed 70 N.Y. 607; Free-
man v. Freemam, 65 Ill. 106; Patterson v. Rehfuss, 250
Ala. 508, 35 So.2d 330,

Cases related in effect to this proposition which it may
be of benefit to read are Estate of Grossman, 250 Wis.
457, 27 N.W.2d 365, and Wilsey v. Franklin, 57 Hun 382,
10 N.Y.S. 833, and Ronsiek v. Boverschmidts Admr., 63
Mo.App. 421. Also, Macomber v. King, 288 Mass. 381,
192 N.E. 926.

Hi In sun, where, as in this case, an adult or emanci-
pated child, by pre-arrangement with a parent, gives up
an established home and moves into the home of the par-
ent, not for the purposes of reestablishing a family rela-
tionship, but for the purpose of rendering services of an
extraordinary burdensome nature, over a long period
of time, the presumption of gratuity need not apply.
These facts may constitute ‘‘such exceptional facts and
circumstances as will establish an intention on the one
part to charge and on the other to pay, notwithstanding
the relation of kinship.’’ (quoted from Gorrell).

The Court of Appeals envisioned this to be the rule, but
it did not specify the facts and circumstances giving rise
to the application of this rule in its particularization of
“‘exeeptional’’ circumstances, nor was authority cited.

Hl In conclusion let us point out that we are in no
way departing from the general rule that services ren-
dered to a parent by a child are presumed to be gratu-
itous, we are simply holding that facts and circumstances
such as are present in this case tend to show the services
were rendered as the result of an agreement, not family
relationship, from which it could reasonably and lawfully
follow that consideration is involved.

ee 445

The other assignments are the same as those dealt with
by the Court of Appeals, with whose action thereon we
concur.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Wilson County, is
affirmed.

Oprinton on Prrrrion to Renear

A petition to rehear has been filed based on the con-
tention that neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court
considered and ruled on the Hxecutor’s third assignment
of error.

The Executor is mistaken in this contention. The third
assignment of error makes the point that the trial judge
erred in refusing to direct a verdict on motion of the
Executor, which motion was in this language: ‘If Your
Honor please, at this time the defendants to this lawsuit,
that is Executor of this estate, moves the court to return
a verdict of not guilty.’

This motion raised the question whether there was any
material evidence on which a jury verdict could be predi-
cated. Both the Court of Appeals and this Court re-
sponded to this question. The Court of Appeals in its
opinion considered, together, the first and third assign-
ments of error, and expressed the opinion that the two
assignments made the single question whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the verdict against a motion
for a directed verdict. In the course of considering that
question the Court of Appeals thoroughly and exten-
sively reviewed the pertinent facts, and overruled the
assignment of error. This Court, being satisfied that the
Court of Appeals had ruled correctly, concurred in the
Court of Appeals action,

446 ee

Hl Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court re-
sponded to the argument that the trial judge’s action in
overruling the motion for a new trial was reversible
error because the trial judge stated that his reason for
so doing was that the case was being tried by a jury and
that if he were trying the case as a non-jury case he
would sustain the motion for a directed verdict. This
argument, was not considered because it did not merit
attention. However, since this proposition is again in-
sisted upon by the petitioner to rehear, we respond by
pointing out to the Nxecutor that it is a fundamental
yule of law that an appellate court will not reverse a
correct judgment of a trial court which is based upon an
insufficient or wrong reason therefor. Some twenty-five
or more cases wherein this rule has heen applied are
collected in 2 Tennessee Digest, Appeal & Error, 854(2).

Tt follows that the petition to rehear should be, and
hereby is, denied,

Sournern Founpry Suppry, Inc., Petitioner,

Spane & Company, Respondent,
470 S.W.2d 187
(Knoaville, September Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed July 6, 1971.

Tuomas O. Hetron, Sropnen, Carpwen. & Hxeere,
Chattanooga, for petitioner.

448

Joun T. Henniss, Wirt, Garruer, Apernatay & Wit-
son, Chattanooga, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Southern Foundry Supply Co. Inc., a Tennessee cor-
poration, sued Spang & Company, a Pennsylvania cor-
poration, for breach of a lease contract, and obtained
service of process by means of Tennessee’s Long Arm
Statute, sec. 20-235 T.C.A. Spang & Company challenged
the process, and so the jurisdiction of the Court, by plea
in abatement. (See Appendix 1). The plea in abatement
was overruled, the case tried, and damages awarded

Southern Foundry Supply, Ine.
Spang & Company appealed to the Court of Appeals

on a transcript abbyeviated by its designation in accord-
* ance with secs. 27-323, 324, 325 T.C.A., and Rule I of the

ee =!

Rules of this Court, assigning the Chancellor’s action in
overruling the plea in abatement as error.

The Court of Appeals sustained the assignment of
error, holding on the facts, (see Appendix 2), Spang &
Company did not transact any business in Tennessee
which would sustain the service of process, citing Darby
v. Superior Supply Company, 224 Tenn. 540, 458 8.W.2d
423, and dismissed. This Court granted certiorari.

The transcript before the Court of Appeals. contains
only the part of the record designated by Spang & Com-
pany, and consists of the following:

1. The complaint.

2. The subpoena to answer with the return of service.
8. The plea in abatement.

4, The order overruling plea in abatement.

5.

. The Chancellor’s memorandum opinion, filed De-
cember 5, 1969.

6. The final decree,

The designation concludes with the statement ‘“We
desire no other parts of the record or papers in said
cause put into the transeript’’.

It will be observed from this designation, as appears
from the transcript, that, there is not only no bill of
exceptions, there is no record as to how the plea in abate-
ment was heard by the Chancellor, whether upon de-
murrer or replication. See secs. 187, 188, The History
of a Lawsuit, 8th Ed.

The order overruling the plea in abatement does not
supply this latter omission. It reads:

450 ee

“‘The plea in abatement of the defendant, Spang &
Company, to the bill in this cause, coming on to be
argued in open Court on March 10, 1969, and upon the
brief filed by the complainant and upon the memoran-
dum opinion which has been filed by the Court over-
ruling the plea in abatement, now, thereupon, it is
ORDERED and DECREED that the plea in abatement
is overruled and that the defendant is allowed ten (10)
days to answer the bill.’ Tr. p. 15.

From this order it appears that the Chancellor had
already written the memorandum opinion overruling the
plea in abatement at the time of the proceedings resulting
in the order. Since the memorandum opinion of the
Chancellor was not designated for inclusion in the tran-
seript, and in fact is not in the transcript, it cannot be
known whether the memorandum opinion was based on
a demurrer to the plea in abatement or upon a replica-
tion, as to which there was no proof or stipulation, or
both.

With the transcript in this condition there was no evi-
dence before the Court of Appeals, just as there is no
evidence before this Court, upon which error could be
assigned to the Chancellor’s decree overruling the plea
jn abatement, and no evidence to support the fact finding
of the Court of Appeals on which its judgment was based.
It is fundamental that review of any issue of fact depends
upon a bill of exceptions authenticated by the trial judge
or a minute entry, and that in the absence of one of these
it is conclusively presumed the evidence was sufficient to
justify the judgment. See cases annotated under sec. 27-
109 T.C.A., Notes 8 and 17.

This Court is aware that no error has been assigned,
either in the Court of Appeals or here, with respect to

he matter here considered. However, since a Dill of
exceptions cannot be supplied by action of the parties,
ut only by the trial judge, sec. 27-109 T.C.A. Note 6,
no course is open to this Court except to notice the con-
dition of the record as reflected by the transcript, and to
reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate
he judgment of the lower court. It is so ordered.

Appenpix 1,

“The defendant Spang & Company, for plea. in abate-
ment to the complaint filed against it in this cause, shows
o the Court that:

“1, Spang & Company is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania and having its principal office and place of business
at 120 Htna Street, Butler, Pennsylvania, where its offices
are located and its books and records are kept.

“2, Spang & Company is not registered or qualified
to do business in Tennessee.

“3, Spang & Company has never appointed anyone
to receive service of process in Tennessee.

“4, Spang & Company has at no time had any office
or place of business in Tennessee.

“5, Spang & Company has at no time had any officer
or managing or general agent in Tennessee.

“6, Spang & Company is engaged in the manufacture
of drilling tools for the oil, gas, and water well drilling
industries and refractory mortars and cements for the
steel industry; in job machining; in the fabrication of
light structural steel; and in the processing of steel mill
slag, but it has at no time performed any of such busi-

ness in Tennessee, nor does it own or possess any assets
in Tennessee.

“7, Spang & Company has never solicited any busi-
ness in Tennessee or had any employee, bank account,
loan payable, telephone, telephone listing, or business
listing in Tennessee.

“8, Spang & Company has done no advertising in
Tennessee.

“9, With specific reference to T.C.A. 20-235, the de-
fendant has at no time engaged in, and the complaint
does not arise from:

““(a) the transaction of any business within the State
of Tennessee;

“(b) any tortious act or omission within the State of
Tennessee;

“*(g) the ownership or possession of any interest in
property located within the State of Tennessee;

“¢(d) entering into any contract of insurance, indem-
nity or guaranty covering any person, property, or
risk located within the State of Tennessee at the time
of contracting; or

“(e) entering into any contract for services to be ren-
dered or for materials to be furnished in the State of
_ Tennessee.

“10. The complaint avers that the defendant sent
an agent to Chattanooga to inspect the magnet in ques-
tion sometime prior to leasing the same, but does not
aver that this suit arises from such visit. In fact, the
suit does not arise from such visit, and such visit fur-

Dn

nishes no basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant within the State of Tennessee.

“11, As conceded on the fact of the complaint, the only
other pertinent actions of the defendant consisted of
submitting a ‘purchase order’ for said magnet from
Butler, Pennsylvania, and then accepting delivery of
said magnet in Lorain, Ohio. The magnet subsequently
proved defective and was picked up from the defendant
in Lorain, Ohio, by the General Electric Company on
behalf of, and on instructions from the complainant. The
complainant then had said magnet returned to Tennessee,
again by General Blectric Company acting on its behalf.
The complainant now charges that the defendant negli-
gently used and abused said magnet in Lorain, Ohio, but
wholly fails to allege any basis for jurisdiction over the
defendant in the State of Tennessee. The defendant rep-
resents to the Court that no such basis exists in fact or
in law.

“12. As further ground for its plea in abatement, the
defendant states that’ this is a suit for unliquidated dam-
ages for injuries to property not resulting from a breach
of oral or written contract, and that this Court, there-
fore, has no jurisdiction of the subject matter hereof.’’

APPENDIX 2.
From the Opinion of the Court of Appeals

«The facts necessary for a decision of this issue are
undisputed by the parties. In the spring of 1968 the
complainant nationally advertised the sale or lease of its
used Stearns 65 inch lifting magnet. In late March or
early April, 1968, an agent of the defendant came to the
complainant’s place of business in Chattanooga, Ten-
nessee, for the purpose of inspecting the magnet. On

FS

454 es

April 4, 1968, [after the agent returned to Pennsylvania
and reported to company officials] Mr. J. C. Marinsky,
buyer for Ferroslag, a division of Spang & Company,
located in Butler, Pennsylvania, issued its purchase or-
der No, 20061 to the complainant, Southern Foundry
Supply, Inc, in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Under the
terms of that purchase order the magnet was to be rented
at a price of $800.00 per month. The purchase order also
provided as follows:

‘This magnet to be in top operating condition when
tured over to Ferroslag, and Ferroslag will return in
the condition received, less normal wear.

‘Ferroslag will be responsible for minor repairs and
for any breakage or damage caused by negligence or
abuse.

“Tn addition to the above, under a portion of the pur-
chase order entitled ‘Conditions of Purchase’ the fol-
lowing condition is found:

“1, ACCEPTANCE. If this order is accepted, your
acknowledgement indicating your acceptance of the
order and all conditions herein stated, must be sent to
buyer.

“Finally, under the terms of the purchase order the
shipment of the magnet was to be F.O.B. Chattanooga,
Tennessee.

“The magnet was shipped to the defendant in accord-
ance with the terms of the purchase order, and the de-
fendant kept the magnet for approximately two months,
*** After the magnet completely ceased to operate, the
defendant returned the magnet to Birmingham, where it

es — 55

was repaired at considerable expense to complainant.
After settlement attempts failed, complainant brought
this action for unpaid rent and for damage resulting from
the defendant’s abuse of the magnet.’’

Pr Curtam Opinion on Petition to REHEAR

A petition to rehear has been filed making the point
that although this was a chancery case, reference was
made to the History of a Lawsuit as authority for the
Court’s holding that there was no factual basis for the
opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing the Chancellor.

Although it is true that both Gibson’s Suits in Chan-
cery, sec. 359, and T.C.A. sec. 21-608 provide for. testing
the legal sufficiency of pleas in abatement in chancery
court by setting them down for argument, rather than
by demurrer as at law, it does not follow that the opin-
ion is wrong. A motion to set a plea for argument is, of
course, in the nature of a general demurrer, Gibson’s
Suits in Chancery, sec. 359, Note 18, and our courts have
disregarded the formal difference between the two plead-
ings by treating a demurrer filed in chancery as motion
to set for argument, or by acting on it. Witt v. Ellis, 42
Tenn. 38, 40 (1865) ; Klepper v. Powell, 53 Tenn. 503, 506
(1871). The point of the original opinion was that the
record was insufficient simply because it failed to show
that the Chancellor’s decision was solely on the legal
sufficiency of the plea, regardless of what pleading was
used to raise the question. ,

As we pointed out in our opinion, the Chancellor’s
order overruling the plea in abatement was based upon a
memorandum opinion not included in the transeript. It
therefore did not ‘‘affirmatively show that the plea in
abatement was heard on the question of its sufficiency

456 ee]

as a matter of law.’’ and so we were compelled to reverse
the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the Chan-
cellor. Motors Insurance Corp. v. Lipford, 194. Tenn.
216, 250 S.W.2d 79 (1952).

We note further that the facts of this case as con-
sidered by the Court of Appeals, and as set out in the
briefs filed by the present movant, differ from those of
the plea in abatement, which could not be the case if the
plea in abatement had been tried on its legality.

Although this Court greatly favors the policy of ab-
breviating records, we simply cannot presume to decide
eases on facts not properly before the Court.

The petition to rehear is denied.

Kenyera R. Frywy, Appellant,

W. R. Camp, Jz., d/b/a Camp Industrial Chemicals, and
ABC Compounpine Company, Inc., Appellees.

470 S.W.2d 347

(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed June 7, 1971,

Petition to Rehear Denied September 7, 1971

458 es
PC

Franx L. Frywy, Jr., Knoxville, for appellant.

J. W. Baxer, Knoxville, for W. R. Camp, Jr.

O’New, Parker & Wrutiamson, Knoxville, for ABC
Compounding Co., Inc.

Ye
Mr. Cumr Justice Dyur delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Le 459

This case comes to this Court from the action of the
trial judge in sustaining a demurrer filed by one defend-
ant and a plea in abatement filed by the other defendant
dismissing the suit as to all defendants. In this opinion
the parties will be referred to as was their status in the
trial court; that is, Kenneth R. Flynn as plaintiff, and
W. R. Camp, Jr., doing business as W. R. Camp Indus-
trial Chemicals, and ABC Compounding Company, Inc.,
as defendants, or by name.

This suit was first filed in the United States District
Court on June 3, 1970, where a non-suit was entered and
the case refiled in the Cireuit Court of Knox County,
Tennessee. The non-suit is not material to the decision
here and in this opinion we will use the filing date of
June 3, 1970,

Defendant, ABC Compounding Company, Inc., is a
manufacturer of chemicals which are distributed and sold
by defendant, W. R. Camp, Jr. The declaration alleged
that on or about April 16, 1969, defendant W. R. Camp,
Jr. sold and delivered certain of these chemicals to plain-
tiff’s employer, Temperature Control, Inc. That on July
11, 1969, plaintiff, as an employee of Temperature Con-
trol, Ine., received serious personal injuries in the han-
dling of these chemicals due to the fact the packaging
was defective in design and unreasonably dangerous at
the time the product was sold. It is admitted recovery
is sought for liability of what is termed ‘‘produets lia-
bility cases.”? The trial judge dismissed the suit on the
ground it was not filed within one year as required by
T.C.A. see. 28-304, which statute prior to the amend-
ment hereafter referred to read as follows:

Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false im-
prisonment, malicious prosecution, criminal conversa-

460 ee

tion, seduction, breach of marriage promise, and
statutory penalties, shall be commenced within one
(1) year after cause of action accrued.

The Legislature, by Chapter 293, Public Acts of 1969,
effective May 20, 1969, amended T.C.A. sec. 28-304, by
adding thereto the following language:

Srorion 1. Section 28-304, Tennessee Code Annotated,
is amended by adding at the end, the following:

For the purpose of this section, insofar as products
liability cases are concerned, the cause of action for
injury to the person shall accrue on the date of the
personal injury not the date of the negligence or the
sale of a product.

Sxorton 2. This act shall not apply to causes of action
accruing prior to the effective date of this act.

It is admitted this suit was barred by T.C.A. sec.
28-304, prior to the amendment, since it was not brought
within one year of the sale and delivery of the product.
Jackson v. General Motors, 223 Tenn. 12, 441 8.W.2d 482
(1969). The decision here requires construction of this
1969 amendment as applied to the facts of this case, more
particularly the legislative intent by the use of the lan-
guage contained in Section 2 of the amendment.

Under the facts of this case and the construction placed
on T.C.A. sec. 28-304, prior to the 1969 amendment,
plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on the date of the sale
and delivery of the product (April 16, 1969), and the
statute of limitations begin to run from that date. The
Legislature was well aware such was the law of this
State, since by Section 1 of this amendment it proceeded
to change such as to products liability cases in that the

ee 461

date to compute the running of the statutes of limitations
was changed from the date of sale and delivery to the
date of the injury. Having done so, the Legislature then
proceeded in what we consider clear language to say
which of these causes of action shall not be affected by
this 1969 amendment; that is, those ‘‘accruing prior to
the effective date of this act.’? The cause of action in the
case at bar accrued prior to the effective date of the 1969
amendment; that is, on April 16, 1969, and this 1969
amendment to T.C.A. sec. 28-304 is not applicable to the
ease at bar.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Cuattin, Humpsreys and McCanusss, Justices, and
Jenxins, Sprom. Jusricz, concur.

462 ee

J. W. Hazerove, Appellant,

‘W. L. Newsome, d/b/a Maturrars Hanning Services
and Keriey Company, Inc., Appellees.

470 S.W.2d 348
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed June 7, 1971.

Petition to Rehear Denied September 7, 1971

ee 463

Wisuam W. Haut, Dickson, Otiver B, Dickins, Gur-
tetr, Srpece, Sanrorp, Roprsson & Merrirr, Nashville,
for appellant.

J.C, Summers, Howser, Tuomas, Summers & Binkiey,
Nashville, for W. L. Newsome, dba, Materials Handling
Services.

464 ee

Joun K. Manor, Jz., Gracey, Buck, Mappin & Cowan,
Nashville, for Kelley Company, Inc.

Mz. Cuter Jusrice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case comes to this Court from the action of the
trial judge in sustaining demurrers filed in answer to the
declaration, dismissing the suit, In this opinion the
parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial
court; that is, J. W. Hargrove, as plaintiff, and W. L.
Newsome, dba, Materials Handling Services, and Kelley
Company, Inc., as defendants, or by name.

Plaintiff is an employee of the Schrader Division of
Scoville Manufacturing Company. On July 8, 1966,
Schrader purchased a mechanical dock from the de-
fendant Newsome, which dock was manufactured by the

ee 465

defendant Kelley. On September 22, 1967, plaintiff, while
acting in the course of his employment with Schrader,
was seriously injured due to an alleged malfunction of
the mechanical dock. This suit was filed on September
16, 1968 against both defendants on the theory of (1)
common law negligence, (2) express and implied war-
ranty, and (3) strict liability sounding in tort.

The negligence and strict liability counts were dis-
missed as being barred by the one-year statute of limita-
tions under T. C. A. sec. 28-304 in effect prior to its
amendment by Chapter 293, Public Acts of 1969. The
warranty counts were dismissed for lack of privity of
contract.

At this point we would like to express our appreciation
for the help afforded this Court by the excellent briefs
filed by counsel for all parties,

Hl Counsel for plaintiff frankly and candidly admits
under previous decisions of this Court the trial judge
was correct in sustaining the demurrers. The thrust of
the argument here is that the requirement of privity of
contract in warranty actions is neither justified by past
authority or by any public policy argument.

We agree as plaintiff argues the courts of several
states feeling a need for a more satisfactory remedy in
products liability cases for consumers injured by de-
fective products to obtain redress generally against
remote manufacturers accomplished this end by abolish-
ing the requirement of privity of contract in warranty
actions. In view of the Uniform Sales Act adopted in
most jurisdictions various expedients have been used to
circumvent the requirement of privity of contract; among
them (1) the theory of third-party beneficiary contract,

466 ee

(2) agency theory, and (3) warranty running with the
goods similar to a covenant running with the land. These
methods and others have been praised by some writers
and condemned by others. Be that as it may, it is not
necessary for the decision in the case at bar for us to
discuss the merits of these methods.

On this issue plaintiff cites as the landmark case
Henmingsen v. Bloomfield: Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960). In view of the more recent New Jersey
cases of Santor v. A & M Karagheusiam, Inc., 44 NJ. 52,
207 A.2d 305 (1965), and Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
44.N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), it is likely true as stated
jn an article in Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 698, that
in New Jersey ‘‘privity has no vitality.’’ In reading these
three New Jersey cases it is difficult to determine whether
they were decided upon the principle of strict liability
in tort or upon the theory of implied warranty. Although
the Uniform Sales Act and the more recent Uniform
Commercial Code were both adopted in New Jersey, the
Uniform Commercial Code being effective January 1,
1963, these cases on the issue of privity give scant con-
sideration to these statutes. These three cases and the
Uniform Commercial Code are discussed in the above
mentioned Rutgers Law Review.

On the theory plaintiff argues, particularly on the
public policy argument, the case of Chapman v. Brown,
198 F.Supp. 78 (D.C.1961), affirmed 304 F.2d 149 (9 Cir,
1962), is well reasoned. This case deals directly with the
issue of privity and its relation to the Uniform Sales Act
in a products liability case.

We have considered all the authority cited by plaintiff
giving the reasons for the need of now abolishing privity

| 467

of contract in warranty actions. Under the view we take
of the matter it is not necessary to again list or discuss
these reasons,

In products liability cases this Court has consistently
required privity of contract in warranty actions. Kyker
v. General Motors Corp., 214 Tenn, 521, 381 S.W.2d 884
(1964) ; Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co., 220 Tenn. 459, 418
S.W.2d 430 (1967). The reasons and authority therefor
are stated in these opinions. Plaintiff does cite the recent
ease of Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396,
455 S.W.2d 594 (1970), to support a statement that ‘In
this case (Layman) this Court hinted that it recognized
the need for abolishing vertical privity requirements at
least among members of the distributive chain.’’ The
only issue in Layman was the statute of limitations ap-
plicable to the facts of the case. Layman does not modify
the holdings in Kyker and Olney.

We might well be persuaded by the arguments based
on public policy in regard to the need for dispensing with
the requirement of privity in warranty actions, except
for one reason we consider controlling. Plaintiff had a
remedy under either his count on negligence or under the
count on strict liability in tort. The fact plaintiff under
both these counts is unfortunately barred by a statute
of limitations is not material to our decision since all
civil actions are sooner or later barred by a statute of
limitations,

Hl It is next argued under the Uniform Commercial
Code adopted in this state and made effective July 1,
1964, by enactment of Chapter 81, Public Acts of 1963,
this Court should reconsider the requirement of privity
in warranty actions, The events giving rise to Kyker v.

Pe

468 ee]

General Motors Corp., supra, and Olney v. Beaman Bot-
tling Co., supra, occurred prior to adoption in this state
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the point raised
here in reference to this Code is of first impression in this
State. The section of the Uniform Commercial Code per-
tinent to this issue is T.C.A. sec. 47-2-318, which reads
as follows:

A seller’s warranty whether express or implied ex-
tends to any natural person who is in the family or
household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.

The effect of this statute is to abolish the require-
ment of privity of contract for personal injuries received
under certain circumstances as to a member of the buy-
er’s family, his household or a guest in his home in
warranty actions brought against the buyer’s immediate
vendor. To this extent this statute changes the law in
this state. The argument here is that this legislative
change in our law should be extended to include all per-
sons foreseeably affected by the products’ defects, it
being admitted plaintiff does not fall into any of the
listed categories.

The Uniform Commercial Code was written under
the direction of the Permanent Editorial Board and rec-
ommended to the legislatures of the various states for
passage on the ground it would make the law uniform in
all states regarding commercial transactions covered by
the Code, The value of the Code depends to a large meas-
ure on its uniformity, particularly as to the judicial

ee 469

construction courts give to the language used. This
should inhibit courts from either extending or contract-
ing the language used, particularly where the language
as in T.C.A. sec. 47-2-318, on the issue here, is clear con-
taining no ambiguities.

During the time this Code was being written the issue
of privity of contract in products liability cases was
being discussed pro and con in opinions by a number of
courts and also by various other legal scholars, In the
preparation of Section 2-318 the issue of privity was
considered. One version of this section (generally re-
ferred to as the Virginia-Wyoming version) which abol-
ished privity of contract was considered by the Perma-
nent Editorial Board and rejected. The legislatures of a
number of states in adopting the Uniform Commercial
Code modified Section 2-318, which modifications gen-
erally went further in abolishing the requirement of
privity of contract than does Section 2-318 as recom-
mended by the Permanent Editorial Board. We consider
these facts pertinent since the Tennessee Legislature
chose to adopt the version of Section 2-318 recommended
by the Permanent Editorial Board.

Hl In consideration of this matter we conclusively
presume the Legislature at the time of its enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code had knowledge that under
the law of this state privity of contract was required in
warranty actions involving products liability cases.
Further, the Legislature with this knowledge enacted
T.C.A. sec. 47-2-318, which does change the law as to
privity of contract in warranty actions, but also clearly
delineates the extent of the change. Under these circum-
stances to extend to any person not within the categories
mentioned in the statute the right to bring an action upon

470 ee

warranty without privity of contract would, in effect, be
amending the statute under the guise of judicial construc-
tion. This we should not do.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Cuartrix, Cresson, Humpureys and McCanusss, Jus-
TICES, concur.

Ow Suprtemenra Briers

After the above opinion had been prepared, consid-
ered and approved by the Court, plaintiff filed a supple-
mental brief directed to the counts of common law
negligence and strict liability sounding in tort. Reply
briefs have been filed and we have again considered the
case as to these two counts.

HM The negligence and strict liability counts were
dismissed on authority of Jackson v. General Motors
Corporation, 223 Tenn, 12, 441 S.W.2d 482 (1969). In the
supplemental brief plaintiff cites three recent cases aris-
ing out of the United States District Courts in Tennessee
to support an argument that under the facts of the case
at bar Jackson v. General Motors Corporation, supra, is
not applicable. We have carefully considered the federal
cases cited and are of the opinion Jackson v. General
Motors Corporation, supra, is applicable to the case at
bar. In Jackson v. General Motors Corporation, supra,
we held the applicable statute, T.C.A. sec. 28-304, (prior
to amendment) commences to run at the date.of the
wrongful act or omission whether the damages occa-
sioned were on the same date or later. In the case at bar
the wrongful act or omission was occasioned on the date
of sale (July 8, 1966), and suit was not filed within one
year from that date.

ee 471

The Court was at the time of its consideration of Jack-
son v. General Motors Corporation, supra, and is now,
fully aware that the decision in Jackson could and very
likely would cause hardships in certain cases. The de-
cision in Jackson was controlled by the decision in Albert
v. Sherman, 167 Tenn, 133, 67 S.W.2d 140 (1934), and in
both of these cases the Court. was careful to point out the
fact such hardships could result. Even so, during the
thirty-four year period between Albert to Jackson the
Legislature did not see fit to change the language of the
statute at issue. Since Jackson, the Legislature has seen
fit to make material changes in the statute.

Plaintiff also cites a recent opinion by the Court of
Appeals styled Harts v. Tennessee Liquified Gas Cor-
poration. This case is now in the appellate procedure and
we do not deem it proper to comment on same at this
time.

The judgment is affirmed.

472

Gary Wituam Damey, Petitioner,

Srarz or Tennesser, Respondent.
470 8.W.2d 608
(Knoaville, September Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed September 7, 1971.

Epwarp C. Freeman, Knoxville, for petitioner.

Davw M. Pack, Arrorney Generar, Lanoz D. Evans,
Assistant Arrorney Generat, Nashville, Heisxer. H.
Winsreap, District Arrorney Genzra, Rogersville, for
respondent.

P| 473

Mr. Carer Justice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case presents the issue of whether Chapter 475,
Section 1, Public Acts of 1970, amending T.C.A. sec.
27-111, operates retrospectively. This statute which be-
came effective February 20, 1970, reads as follows:

Notwithstanding the foregoing time limitations, in
eriminal cases the Court of Criminal Appeals or the
Supreme Court, upon application of the defendant or
the state and for good cause shown, shall be empowered
at any time to order the filing of the bill of exceptions
or any portion thereof in the appropriate appellate
court, so as to give the appellate court jurisdiction to
consider the same. Upon the receipt of such an order
from the appellate court, the trial judge shall see to it
that the bill of exceptions or the relevant portion
thereof is signed, filed in the trial court and promptly
forwarded to the appropriate appellate court for filing
therein.

Petitioner, while represented by retained counsel, was
convicted of malicious shooting. The motion for a new

“74 es

trial was overruled on April 22, 1969, and ninety days
allowed to prepare and file the bill of exceptions. On July
14, 1969, after a hearing, the trial court found petitioner
to be indigent and in accord with such finding appointed
counsel to represent petitioner on appeal and directed
the bill of exceptions to be prepared at the expense of
the State. The bill of exceptions was prepared and
promptly authenticated and filed on July 22, 1969, one
day past the ninety days allowed for such filing. The
Court of Criminal Appeals held the bill of exceptions
having been filed late could not be considered, and ex-
amining only the technical record affirmed the judgment.

On the issue of a statute operating retrospectively, this
Court in Collins v. East Tenn., Va. & Ga, Railroad Co.,
56 Tenn. 841 (1872), said:

Tt is a general rule, that a Statute is to operate pro-
spectively, unless upon its face it imports a retrospect-
ive operation; but it is not every retrospective law that
is objectionable in a Constitutional sense. It is said that
a vested right of action is property, just as tangible
things are, and is protected from any arbitrary inter-
ference by the Legislature; but this doctrine is refer-
able to such rights of action as spring from contracts
or from the Common Law. * * * But the right to a
particular remedy, says the same authority, is not a
vested right. * * * The State has complete control over
the remedies of its citizens in the Courts. It may give a
new and additional remedy for a right already in ex-
istence—or may abolish old and substitute new rem-
edies. * * * It may modify an existing remedy—or
remove an impediment in the way of judicial proceed-
ings. Thus it is said by this Court, that retrospective
laws may be made when they do not impair the obli-

P| 415

gation of contracts, or divest or impair vested rights:
—such as, laws providing new and additional remedies
for a just right already in being, laws modifying or
changing remedies, and all other strictly remedial
laws; and there are many other laws that are retro-
spective according to the letter, yet not prohibited by
the Bill of Rights. Wynne v. Wynne, 2 Swan, 405, 410.
The doctrine has no reference to laws which merely add
cwnulative remedies to a right already in existence.
(citing cases). 56 Tenn. at 847-848,

In Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn, 206, 264 8.W.2d 824, 266
S.W.2d 357 (1954), the Court on this issue cited with ap-
proval the language from 50 AmJur., sec, 482, as
follows:

«cs * * remedial statutes, or statutes relating to rem-
edies or modes of procedures, which do not create new
or take away vested rights, but only operate in further-
ance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing, do not come within the legal conception of a
retrospective law, or the general rule against the
retrospective operation of statutes. To the contrary
statutes or amendments pertaining to procedure are
generally held to operate retrospectively, where the
statute or amendment does not contain language
clearly showing ‘a contrary intention. Indeed, in the
absence of any savings clause, a new law changing a
rule of practice is generally regarded as applicable to
all cases then pending. A fortiori, a statute or amend-
ment which furnishes a new remedy, but does not im-
pair or affect any contractural obligations or disturb
any vested rights, is applicable to proceedings begun
after its passage, though relating to acts done previ-
ously thereto, Sometimes, the rule is stated in the form

“16 es

that, when a new statute deals with procedure only,
prima facie, it applies to all actions—those which
have accrued or are pending and future actions.’’ 196
Tenn. at 211-212, 264 S.W.2d at 826.

In Brandon v. Warmath, 198 Tenn. 38, 277 S.W.2d 408
(1955), this Court held a statute remedial in nature ap-
plied to an action pending at the time the statute was
enacted.

Under T.C.A. sec. 27-111, prior to this 1970 amend-
ment, this Court had consistently held a bill of exceptions
not filed within the time limitations set out in the statute
was, in effect, a nullity and could not be considered on
appeal. This 1970 amendment, applicable only to criminal
cases, simply empowers the appellate courts to order the
filing of a bill of exceptions without regard to time limi-
tations. As stated in Collins v. East Tenn., Va. & Ga.
Railroad Co., supra, the effect of such amendment is to
“remove an impediment in the way of judicial proceed-
ings.’’ In the case at bar an impediment is the right of
full appellate review. The statute in no way creates any
new rights nor does it take away any vested rights.

The factual situation existing prior to and at the time
of the-enactment of this 1970 amendment is indicative of
the legislative-intent that this amending statute operate
as remedial legislation.

The United States Supreme Court, in opinions released
prior to this 1970 amendment to T.C.A. sec. 27-111, held
that any time a defendant was denied full appellate
review due to ‘‘state action’? such was error requiring
a new trial. The failure to timely file bills of exceptions
in cases involving indigent defendants, denying such de-
fendants a full appellate review, was deemed to be the

ee 417

result of ‘‘state action,’’ This generally resulted in the
indigent defendant so denied his full appellate review
filing a post-conviction proceeding to have the judgment
against him declared void and being successful the State
was required to again put him to trial. This resulted in
three separate proceedings when, in most cases, one
should have been sufficient, which not only put the State
to extra expense, but further clogged the already clogged
appellate and trial court dockets. These were substan-
tially the facts when. the Legislature enacted this 1970
amendment, and it is obvious such was intended to rem-
edy this situation,

Hl A remedial statute should be liberally construed
in furtherance of its purpose. Bryant v. Mulder, 163
Tenn. 600, 45. 8.W.2d 48 (1932).

Hl We hold this 1970 amendment to T.C.A. sec, 27-111
is remedial legislation operating retrospectively. The
statute empowers the appellate courts, exercising their
discretion, to order the filing of a late bill of exceptions
for good cause shown on motion of the defendant or the
State, and in the interest of justice by the court on its
own motion.

In the case at bar we order the bill of exceptions filed
to give the appellate court jurisdiction. The case was
not considered by the Court of Criminal Appeals on its
merits and for this purpose the cause is remanded to the
Court of Criminal Appeals.

Crrason and McCanuess, Jusrices, and McAmts and
Jeyxins, Spzcian Justices, concur, :

®
Bey
Co

Stars or Tennusszz, Appellant,

Harry T, Crawrorp, Jr., Appellee,

470 S,W.2d 610

(Knowville, September Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed September 7, 1971,

Davy M. Pack, Attorney General, Tuomas BE. Fox,
Deputy Attorney General, Nashville, Lewis W. May,
District Attorney General, Mountain City, for appellant.

Burxerr McIyrurrr, Kingsport, Ricnarp W. Prcrot,
Johnson City, for appellee,

Mr. Spzcian Justice Ersy L. Jewxrys delivered the
opinion of the Court.

The defendant below was tried in the Washington
County Criminal Court in February of 1969 for the
alleged murder of his wife, Jo Anne Crawford. He was
convicted by a jury of the offense of second degree
murder and his punishment was fixed at fifteen years in
the State Penitentiary. Motion for a new trial was over-
ruled by the trial judge, and the defendant appealed to

480 es

the Court of Criminal Appeals, which court in a split
decision reversed and remanded the matter, and this
Court granted certiorari.

The State’s case is made out of circumstantial evidence
alone, and thus, this Court in determining the issues
presented is in effect sitting as a jury to determine
whether or not the facts as revealed to the trial jury
were in our opinion strong and convincing enough to
sustain the conviction and to warrant the sentence in the
penitentiary imposed by the jury below.

The facts surrounding the death of the deceased, Jo
Anne Crawford, as revealed by a very careful reading
and re-reading of the record are as follows. The defend-
ant and his wife were, as far as can be determined,
happily married, lived in a comfortable apartment in the
Boone’s Creek community, and the defendant was em-
ployed as a laboratory technician at the Holston Valley
Community Hospital. The record reveals no motive on
his part to kill her.

On November 2, 1968, the defendant and his wife were
accompanied by a young single couple to dinner and they
had a number of alcoholic drinks. After going to the —
theater and after dinner, the two couples went to a
night club known as the Crow’s Nest where they danced
and consumed more alcoholic drinks. During the evening
and early morning hours, the four of them had consumed
a fifth and a pint of whiskey, this being over a six or
seven hour period. The record does not reveal how much
the defendant and his wife consumed, but apparently
they were at least partially intoxicated when they re-
turned home at about 1:30 a.m., the single couple leaving
about an hour later. The defendant and his wife went to

ee 481

bed and engaged in sexual relations. After smoking a
cigarette they finally went to sleep about 3:00 a.m.

At 6:00 a.m. the defendant, having been awakened by
an alarm clock, went to the living-room, sat down on
the couch and fell asleep again. At about 7:20 a.m. he re-
awakened and telephoned his place of employment to
report that he would be late. He noticed that his wife
was still asleep. He drove to the hospital, arriving there
at about 7:40 a.m. where he worked all day, no evidence
being presented that he acted in any manner other than
his usual self. Much was made of the fact that the defend-
ant clocked out at 4:00 p.m. but left some time earlier or
about 3:00 p.m., but this, according to fellow-workers,
was a common practice. He drove home, arriving there
at about 3:20 p.m. When he entered the bedroom and
saw his wife had been killed, he immediately called the
police, and this call was recorded by the operator to have
been placed at 3:22 p.m., some two minutes after the
defendant arrived home from work.

The defendant’s wife had been brutally murdered,
having been beaten over the head with a rifle barrel
owned, by the defendant and strangled by a pair of panty
hose knotted in the back.

The defendant readily submitted to questioning for
hours and steadfastly denied that he had killed his wife.
At one point in the interrogation he stated, ‘‘General, I
can care less what you do with me,’’ and at another
time he is quoted as saying, ‘‘Here’s the damn shirt I
wore today, I don’t give a damn what you do with me.’’

While there was some insistence that someone: un-
known could have entered from a trap door in the attic
and killed the deceased, this is purely speculative, except

462 es

that it was shown that there were some foot prints on top
of the water heater. The time of death could not be ascer-
tained, rigor mortis having set in and no technical wit-
ness was introduced with reference to the time of death.

Hl In reviewing a conviction such as this where the
defendant is convicted on circumstantial evidence alone,
the mind of the Court must rest easy as to the certainty
of guilt of the defendant, it of course, being the law that
when a case is made by circumstantial evidence alone,
that the circumstances must be so strong and cogent as
to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the
guilt of the defendant, and that beyond a reasonable
doubt. While it is true that a jury verdict overturns the
presumption of innocence, where it is apparent that jus-
tice has gone astray, there is precedent for this Court to
review a question of fact in cases of this nature.

In C. M. Stuart v. State, 60 Tenn. 178, 1 Baxter, (1873),
this Court cited with approval Judge Green’s statement
of the law contained in Davis v. State, 2 Hum., wherein.
Judge Green said as follows:

“In Davis v. State, 2 Hum., Judge Green said: ‘The
rule that this Court will not grant a new trial upon the
facts, unless the jury shall appear to have been guilty
of great rashness, does not apply to criminal cases. In
such cases new trials have been constantly granted by
this Court upon its conviction that the verdict was not
warranted by the proof.’ This rule has been uniformly
followed ever since. The verdict of a jury is entitled to
weight, it removes the presumption of the prisoner’s
innocence; we must, beyond doubt, recognize the su-
perior advantages possessed by the jury and Judge
below, in seeing and hearing the witnesses and a full

ee 483

examination of the case, and they can judge better of
the credibility of witnesses; making due allowance for
all this, however, shall we give the same effect to the
verdict of a jury by which a person is sentenced to
death that we would where it simply settles the title
to a horse or a cow? Without hesitation we say no.

“A plaintiff in a civil case is only required to make
out his case by a preponderance of proof; if he obtains
a verdict and judgment in his favor, and the case comes
to this Court upon a mere conflict between witnesses,
this Court will not undertake to weigh and balance
testimony, to see upon which side the mere preponder-
ance is.

“But in a case involving the life or liberty of the citi-
zen, we cannot escape the responsibility. We cannot,
in law or in conscience, affirm a judgment, when, after
making all due allowance for the superior advantages
of a jury, we can yet see that the jury were not war-
ranted upon the facts in finding him guilty.’”

Hi Thus, the Court cannot and will not sit idly by and,
in effect, commit this defendant to the penitentiary when
there remains a reasonable doubt that such judgment
might be in error, and if upon a careful reading of the
record of the trial court there is any doubt as to the guilt
or the innocence of the defendant, such doubt must be
weighed in favor of the defendant.

This case has given this Court great concern. The
jury heard the witnesses and saw their demeanor, and
the trial judge put his stamp of approval upon the ver-
dict, but this Court would be remiss in its duty did we
not examine with care the questions of fact under which
the defendant was convicted. We will not close our eyes

484 es

to such questions and address ourselves only to questions
of law and remain oblivious to the rights of defendants
in criminal cases who stand convicted by circumstances
as has this defendant. The facts must pass through the
needle’s eye of the Court. The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals, as aforesaid, reversed and remanded the case in
a split decision, thus, as aforesaid, we sit as a jury to
decide a question of fact. This is not an easy task. Again,
we realize the awesome responsibility faced by juries in
criminal cases and also the great burden placed on trial
judges.

IBM Im order to convict on circumstantial evidence
alone, the facts and circumstances must be so closely in-
terwoven and connected that the finger of guilt is pointed
unerringly at the defendant and the defendant alone, A
web of guilt must be woven around the defendant from
which he cannot escape and from which facts and cireum-
stances the jury could draw no other reasonable inference
save the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. Mere suspicion and straws in the wind are not
enough for circumstances take strange forms. Under
our form of government and the administration of crimi-
nal justice, the defendant is clothed with a mantle of
innocence and that presumption of innocence hovers over
and protects him throughout the trial. Until this is over-
turned by strong proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, not an imaginary or captious doubt but an honest
doubt engendered after a consideration of all the evi-
dence so that the minds of the jurors cannot rest easy as
to the certainty of guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

It is argued that the defendant, after discovering his
wife’s body made no outcry to the neighbors; that after
the police arrived he smoked a cigarette; that there was

| 485

some controversy or some discrepancy about who bathed
last the night or the morning before her death, and that
he made the statements to the officers cited herein above.

It must be admitted in this case, as in most all cases,
that there are some contradictions that could be con-
strued as evidence of guilt. But, as we see it, these
straws in the wind are not numerous or important enough
to weave a net of guilt around the defendant from which
he cannot escape. We cannot speculate a defendant into
the penitentiary or permit a jury to do so.

‘Who among us can say what. would be normal conduct
or behavior of a man finding his wife brutally murdered
under these circumstances. The pattern of human be-
havior in a time of emergency, crisis or grief is unpre-
dictable. Sometimes, innocent men act guilty; on the
other hand, sometimes guilty men portray a picture of
innocence. We cannot attribute too much weight to what
the defendant did or did not do at this juncture.

From a careful reading of the record, the defendant
may be guilty. On the other hand, he may he innocent.
Some bits of evidence indicate one, some the other, but
those bits of evidence indicating guilt do not meet the
requirements heretofore defined.

Therefore, under the facts of the record, the cold neu-
trality of impartial justice dictates that we affirm the
action of the Court of Criminal Appeals in remanding
this case for a new trial.

Dyer, Curr Justicn, and Creson and McCanuzss,
JusTICcEs, concur.

McAmis, Sprciat Justicz, not participating.

486

Forp Moron Company

Mrs. Leo Bursoy ct al.

470 S.W.2d 941

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed September 7, 1971.

ee 487
een!

Wi11am Moors, General Counsel, Department. of Em-
ployment Security, Gzorez E. Barrer, of Barrett &
Mircuetu, Nashville, for appellants.

Wrson Sims and Orro B, Gzruacn, IIT, Bass, Burry &
Sims, Nashville, for appellee.

488 ee)
_
Mr. Justice McCanuuss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The Commissioner of Employment Security of Ten-
nessee and one hundred eighty-two employees of Ford
Motor Company at its Nashville glass plant have ap-
pealed from a decree of the Chancery Court which re-
versed and disallowed an award of unemployment
benefits by the Board of Review of the Department of
Employment Security.

On September 7, 1967, their labor contracts having
expired, the employees of all Ford Motor Company
plants in the United States, numbering one hundred or
more, went on strike. Their representative and bargain-
ing agent nationally and locally was the United Automo-
‘bile Workers.

Negotiations for new contracts, which had been in
progress since July, continued on both the national and
local levels and on October 22nd the company and the
union reached an agreement, subject to local ratification,
on a master contract. In the meantime the company and
the local had agreed on the local issues at the glass plant.
On October 25th the members of the local ratified both
the national and the local contracts, and the officers of
the local withdrew the pickets and notified the company
that their members were ‘‘ready, able, and willing’’ to

ee 489

resume their employment. Limited production com-
menced but the plant did not resume full operation until
November 11th.

The employees, who are appellants, seek benefits for
the period from October 25th to November 11th, con-
tending that their unemployment during that time was
involuntary and was under circumstances which entitled
them to benefits. The company, on the other hand, con-
tends that such unemployment resulted from a labor
dispute in active progress and the employees are dis-
qualified to receive benefits under the terms of Section
50-1324, subd. D., T.C.A., which provides that an em-
ployee shall be disqualified: ‘‘for any week with respect
to which the commissioner finds that his total or partial
unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is in active
progress * * *,’?

The Board of Review found that the labor dispute had
ceased to exist when all national and local issues were
settled between the glass plant and its employees and
that after that date the appellants’ unemployment was
not due to the existence of a lahor dispute in active
progress.

Ford Motor Company sought a review of the Board’s
action by certiorari in the Chancery Court. The Chan-
cellor, reversing the Board, in his memorandum opin-
ion said:

‘What was the cause of complainants’ unemploy-
ment? The unemployment in the case of Dawis v.
Aluminum Company of America, 204 Tenn. 135 [316
S.W.2d 24], cited by both parties, was due to the time
required to repair damages done to the plant as a

490 es

result of the labor dispute, after all negotiations had
ceased and all matters in dispute had been settled. The
unemployment in the case of Special Products Com-
pany v. Jennings, 209 Tenn. 316 [353 S.W.2d 561], was
due to the fact that there were no jobs available at the
time the strike ended, since jobs had been previously
filled. The unemployment of complainants in the case
at bar must be viewed in the light of the complex and
highly integrated operations of Ford, the structure of
the bargaining procedure and the settlement agree-
ment. It is thus clear that the unemployment of the
complainants at the Ford Glass Plant in Nashville re-
sulted from active labor disputes in other locals.

“The Court holds that those unemployed at the
Nashville Plant before November 11, 1967, were un-
employed because of the continued existence of a labor
dispute in active progress, which dispute terminated
on November 11, 1967, by the terms of the settlement
agreement.’’

The appellants have assigned error by which they have
challenged the Chancellor’s decree on two grounds: (1)
that he erred in making a factual determination different
from the facts as determined by the Board of Review,
and (2) in allowing a waiver by the union in its master
contract of the appellants’ unemployment compensation
benefits.

There is no disputed fact in this record though the
Chancellor reached a different legal conclusion from his
consideration of the facts than the Board had reached
from their consideration of them. As this Court said in
Aladdin Industries v. Scott, 219 Tenn. 71, 407 S.W.2d 161
(1965) :

| 491

“The appellant here contends that the chancellor
erred in his holding that the question of whether work
offered the employee was suitable was a factual issue
and not a legal issue. As stated before, it is our opin-
ion from reading this record that the issue was legal
vather than factual. There was no disagreement or
dispute about the facts.’’

That the conclusions of the Chancellor differed from
those of the Board indicate only that he reached different
legal conclusions and not that he found the facts to be
different. The facts, undisputed, were the same.

HI The employees of Ford Motor Company are
bound by the terms of the contracts that their union en-
tered into with the company and which they ratified.
Bridges v. Cavalier Corp., 212 Tenn. 237, 369 S.W.2d 548.
One of the stipulations of the master contract, by which
they are bound and of which they are beneficiaries, ap-
pears in Section 5:

“The term ‘the Effective Date’ as used in the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement and any other agreement,
letter or other document supplementary or related
thereto or associated therewith, shall be deemed to
mean the date upon which the strike is terminated at
all locations whenever such term is used in conjunction
with the establishment of an effective date for a change
stated in terms of ‘ninety days after the Effective
Date’.

“The Company will waive the provision of the new
Collective Bargaining Agreement prohibiting or limit-
ing the right to strike with respect to each plant where
the strike continues for the duration of the continuance
of the strike at such plant, with the understanding that

492 a

time lost by employees at other plants in the Contract
unit as a result of such waiver is acknowledged by the
parties to be time lost in the strike.’’

Hl The company argues that that language defines the
labor dispute as being in active progress in all the plants
until all local agreements should be reached in every
other plant. The employees insist that since their pickets
had been withdrawn and they had become available for
work and had so notified the company on October 25th,
the labor dispute had not been in active progress after
that date and that the stipulation contained in Section 5
violates this provision of Section 50-1349, subd. A:

“No agreement by an individual to waive, release
or commute his rights to benefits, or any other rights
hereunder, shall be valid.’

The Court dealt with this language in Bridges v. Cava-
lier Corp., supra. There the labor contract stipulated
that during vacations the wages of the employees should
be paid at a lesser rate than when they should be at work.
The Court disallowed the insistence that this provision
stipulated a period of unemployment without benefits
and was in violation of Section 50-1349, subd. A, T.C.A.

The record establishes the fact that Ford Motor Com-
pany is a large and elaborate manufacturing complex
composed of many plants which are dependent one on
another for parts and materials on one hand and as users
or consumers thereof on the other.

The chairman of Ford Motor Company’s national bar-
gaining committee explained the purpose of Section 5
of the master contract thus:

ee 498

“We had agreed on the economic issues at the
National Bargaining level and to that extent we had
completed work on our negotiations. However, from
the beginning of the negotiations we had been anxious
to insure that we did not have a situation as we did in
1964 where the National contract was settled but the
strikes continued at several local plants. Therefore,
we tied the National settlement to the settlement of
all of the local issues. What we agreed to at the Na-
tional level was not effective until all of the local plants
ratified the National contract and settled their local
issues. None of the economic benefits which were
gained by the Union in the National settlement would
be paid to any employee anywhere in the country until
all plants had ratified the National agreement and
settled all of their local issues. For example, the Ford
Glass plant in Nashville settled their local issues and
ratified the National Agreement in the same meeting
on October 25th, but they did not draw any of the
benefits from the National settlement until every other
Ford plant had settled their issues and ratified the
National Agreement. When this was done, on Novem-
ber 11th, all of the benefits began and some of these
were retroactive to October 25th. In other cases where
benefits were tied to a sixty or ninety day waiting
period from the date of settlement that date was post-
poned until sixty or ninety days after November 11th,
which was the date on which the final local plants
settled their local issues and ratified the National
Agreement.’’

Hl We find from the record that the operation of the
several plants of Ford Motor Company are so complex
and so highly integrated as to have made it impracticable

494 es

to so operate the Nashville glass plant as to employ the
appellants during the period from October 25th to No-
vember 11th, and that it cannot be deemed to have been
a separate factory within the meaning of Section 50-1324,
subd. D(2), T.C.A.

In this case the company’s delay in recalling the ap-
pellants to work was because the local issues had not
been settled by agreement in many of the plants. The
labor dispute was in active progress under the terms of
the master agreement until the local contracts were made
in all the plants and that did not occur until Novem-
ber 11th.

These facts differ from Davis v. Aluminum Co. of
Amer., 204 Tenn. 135, 316 S.W.2d 24. In the Davis case
the strike had been settled and the employees were not
recalled to work for some time because of the need to
repair some of the equipment. This language is from
the opinion :

“And this Court’s opinion is that an employee is
not disqualified within the meaning of Code, Section
50-1324, subd. D from receipt of unemployment bene-
fits of the Tennessee Employment Security Law by
reason of unemployment following settlement of all
matters in controversy in the labor dispute for the
period thereafter required for repair of damages done
the plant by the dispute.’”’

In the Davis case the delay occurred because of the
time required for repairs; here it was because the labor
dispute was in active progress.

In at least four other states employees of Ford Motor
Company have made claims of the same kind as that

ee 495

which we now are considering. All grew out of the 1967
Ford Motor Company strike and in them the claimants
sought unemployment compensation benefits for that
time which following ratification of the master and local
contracts and the time the company recalled them and
resumed full production.

In New Jersey and California the appeals boards held
the claimants to be ineligible for henefits and the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals in Burrell v. Ford Motor Co.
[1970], 24 Mich.App. 651, 180 N.W.2d 645, affirmed the
judgment of the Circuit Court which in turn had affirmed
the action of the appeals examiner and appeal board who
had declared the claimants ineligible for benefits. The
circumstances of all these cases are similar to that which
we now have before us. The Supreme Court of Minne-
sota in Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. [1971], 184 N.W.2d
786, held the claimants were entitled to benefits.

For the reasons we have given we overrule the appel-
Jants’ assignment, dismiss their appeal, and affirm the
decree of the Chancery Court. The costs will be deereed
against the appellants and their sureties.

Dyer, Caer Justice, Creson and Humpureys, Jus-
aices, and Jenxrys, Spectan Justice, concur.

496 ee

Tur Honoraste AnpRew J. Dovun et al., Appellants,

Tun Metroponrran GOVERNMENT or NASHVILLE AND
Davipson County, Tenwzsszn, Appellee.

471 S.W.2d 871

(Nashwille, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed September 7, 1971.

ee 497
|

HLKIN GaRFINKLE, Jacoss H. Doyzz, Nashville, for ap-
pellants.

Minton H. Srrrow, Associate Metropolitan Attorney,
Nashville, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Creson delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit is before the Court upon direct appeal from
the Chancery Court, Part One, at Nashville, as the cause
below was heard on bill and answer.

498 ee

For the purposes of this Opinion the parties will be
referred to as they appeared below; that is, the Metro-
politan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,
Tennessee, as complainant, and The Honorable Andrew
J. Doyle, Dennis W. Summers and Donald L. Washburn
as defendants, sued in their individual and their official
capacities. The defendants are Judges of the Metropoli-
tan Court Division I, II and IU, respectively. The bill
below also joined as a party defendant Percy L. Allen,
Clerk of the Metropolitan Court, but he did not perfect
an appeal to this Court.

The complainant in the instant case filed its bill seek-
ing a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against
the defendants. The complainant seeks a determination
of the validity of Ordinance No. 70-1183 as passed by the
Council of Metropolitan Government pursuant to the
authority granted by Chapter 220 of the Public Acts of
1969, now codified in T.C.A. sec, 6-202(16).

The defendants in their answer aver that Ordinance
No. 70-1183 is null and void because Chapter 220 of the
Public Acts of 1969 is in violation of Article 11, Section
9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The ordinance in the
instant case imposes court costs on defendants in the
Metropolitan Court of Nashville and Davidson County
who pleaded guilty or were convicted of offenses.

The allegations which give rise to the present contro-
versy are as follows:

The Council of Metropolitan Government by proper
resolution on August 19, 1969, ratified Chapter 220 of
the Public Acts of 1969 and thereafter the Council passed
Ordinance No. 70-1183. On July 14, 1970, the defendants,

ee 499

sitting en bane, ruled that Ordinance No. 70-1183 was
invalid and informed the Clerk of the Metropolitan Court
that henceforth court costs would not be collected by him
as provided in the ordinance. As a result of the actions
of defendants in the prior case in the Metropolitan Court
ruling the ordinance invalid, this present suit was pre-
cipitated. From an adverse ruling in the Chancery Court
the defendants have seasonably perfected an appeal to
this Court:

Chapter 220 of the Public Acts of 1969 provides:

“AN ACT to amend Tennessee Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 6-202(16), by granting to cities the power to set
court costs incident to the imposition and collection of
fines for violation of its ordinances,

Be tt enacted by the General Assembly of the State of
Tennessee:

Szcrion 1. That Tennessee Code Annotated, 6-202
(16) is hereby amended by adding a new sentence
which reads ‘any city having a metropolitan form of
government shall be authorized to impose and collect
fines and forfeitures for breaches and violations of its
ordinances and to impose reasonable court costs
necessary to support the maintenance and operation of
the various municipal courts.

Szorion 2. This Act shall have no effect unless ap-
proved by the legislative body of any metropolitan
form of government affected thereby. Its approval or
non-approval shall be proclaimed by the presiding
officer of said body and certified by him to the Secre-
tary of State.

500 ee

Section 3. This Act shall take effect from and after
its passage and ratification as provided for in Section

2, the public welfare requiring it.
Passep: May 1, 1969

Wuiiam L, Jenxis,
Speaker of the Howse of Representatives

Frank C, Gorrei,
Speaker of the Senate

APPROVED: May 7, 1969

Burorp Exuineron,

Governor.”’

Article 11, Section 9 of the Constitution which the
above Act of the General Assembly is said to violate
became a part of our Constitution adopted as Amendment
No. 6 by the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1953.
The pertinent part of Article 11, Section 9 is:

«* * * any act of the General Assembly private or local
in form or effect applicable to a particular county or
municipality either in its governmental or its proprie-
tary capacity shall be void and of no effect unless the
act by its terms either requires the approval by a two-
thirds vote of the local legislative body of the munici-
pality or county, or requires approval in an election by
a majority of those voting in said election in the
municipality or county affected.”

The issue presented for determination in this case is
whether or not Chapter 220 of the Public Acts of 1969
is an Act which is ‘‘private or local in form or effect
applicable to a particular county or municipality.’’

re 501

Hl We cannot conceive that the provisions of Article
II, Section 9 prohibit this legislation. In the case of
Shelby County v. Hale (1956), 200 Tenn. 503, 292 8.W.2d
745, this Court was very explicit in pointing out that the
provisions of the Constitution now under consideration
do not prohibit the Legislature from enacting ‘‘* * * any
kind of local legislation * * * provided certain things
therein set forth are done.’’ From the cases called to
our attention by the briefs of counsel and from our own
independent research, we are unable to find any intima-
tion that the constitutional mandate was intended to
interdict such general legislation as we conceive this to
be. Article 11, Section 9 does not proscribe general laws
applicable to a home rule municipality, but the constitu-
tional prohibition rather embraces a private or local Act
being made applicable to the municipality without the
consent of the local legislative body or without an affirma-
tive vote by the local electorate,

We believe that the Act in question cannot in any sense
of the term he said to be one that is local or private in
terms or effect. Further, it is enabling in character, not
mandatory, and the Act has embedded in it the concept
of local option. See Section 2, supra. This Act is not in
its purport nor in its substance ‘‘private or local in form
or effect’? and in addition it is quite apparent that this
Act applies throughout the State to all those who desire
to come within its purview. ‘‘If is a general rule that ‘a
statute which relates to persons or things as a class is
a general law, while a statute which relates to particular
persons or things of a class is special.’ ’’? Nashville Gas
& Heating Co. v. City of Nashville (1941), 177 Tenn. 590,
152 8.W.2d 229.

Nowhere in the terms of Chapter 220 of the Public
Acts of 1969 can we glean any intention of the Legisla-
ture that this Act was to apply solely to the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County. Rather,
this Act was an amendment to T.C.A. sec. 6-202(16)
which deals with the general powers of municipal cor-
porations. The Legislature, by this provision, was dele-
gating to corporate courts the authority to impose costs
on defendants found guilty of ‘‘breaches and violations
of its ordinances’’ after the appropriate local legislative
body has approved the legislative act by proper resolu-
tion. This Court has held that it is well within the power
of the Legislature to specify the reach of the jurisdiction
of the corporate courts in exercising their functions.
Hill v. State ex rel, Phillips (1965), 216 Tenn. 508, 392
S.W.2d 950; Constitution Article 6, Section 1.

We are not unmindful of the holding of this Court in
Durham v. Dismukes (1960), 206 Tenn. 448, 333 S.W.2d
935. In the Durham case this Court was dealing with a
statute which related to the General Sessions Court for
Sumner County, solely, and did not purport to be a stat-
ute of general application as is the one before us in the
instant case. Accordingly, we held that the statute as re-
lating to Sumner County was within the provisions of
Article 11, Section 9. The Act of the Legislature in the
instant case does not come within the principles an-
nounced in Durham since Chapter 220 is an Act of
general application and deals with the powers of munici-
palities to assess court costs for those found guilty of
violations of its ordinances.

T.C.A. sec. 6-3701 et seq., which establish a procedure

for the consolidation of functions as between a county
and the principal city located within the county, provides

ee 503

a new form of local organization to administer the gov-
ernmental and corporate functions within a metropolitan
area. However, this consolidated government can adopt
the general laws of this state as they relate to municipal
corporations. The Legislature at T.C.A. sec. 6-3711(a)
has, in clear and unambiguous language, provided that
the Charter of a metropolitan government must contain
a provision therein that the metropolitan government is
“vested with (i) any and all powers which cities are, or
may hereafter be, authorized or required to exercise
under the Constitution and general laws of the State of
Tennessee, as fully and completely as though the powers
were specifically enumerated therein, except only for
such limitations and restrictions as are provided in this
Chapter or in such Charter * * *.’”’? We find no such
‘imitations and restrictions’ imposed by Title 6, Chap-
ter 37, T.C.A., or imposed by the Charter of the com-
plainant in this particular case.

(I The legislative Act having been determined by us
jo be one of general application as it relates to the powers
of a municipality to impose reasonable court costs and
to be enabling in character, it follows that Chapter 220
does not violate any Constitutional inhibition found in
Article 11, Section 9. The Metropolitan Government has,
by proper resolution, approved Chapter 220 consistently
with the provisions of T.C.A., sec. 6-3711(a). By a similar
provision in the Charter, the Metropolitan Council was
empowered to pass an ordinance relating to court costs
for violations of its ordinances. For the above reasons
the decree of the Chancellor is affirmed.

The costs are assessed against the appellants.

Dyer, Cater Justice, Humpureys and McoCanuzss,
Justices, and Juxyxrys, Specian Justice, conenr.

504 ee

O. L. Wager

Decora, Inc., et al.
471 8.W.2d 778
(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)
Opinion filed August 16, 1971.

Petition for Rehearing Denied October 11, 1971.

507

W. W. Lackey, Savannah, Guewn H. Waurriow, Sel-
mer, for plaintiff.

W. J. Reynoups, Selmer, Prence Winyinenam, Jp,
Jackson, AsHLey, Matonn, AsHLEey & Lawson, Dyersburg,
Ross, Ross & Hopper, Savannah, for defendants.

Mr. Justicr McCanzuss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

0. L. Walker, 2 merchant in Adamsville, brought suit
for damage to his property and business resulting from
the installation of a floor in his grocery store. He sued
(1) Decora, Ine., of Cincinnati, Ohio, as the originator,

508 ee

supplier and developer of the material employed in the
laying of the floor; (2) Premium Finishes, Inc., also of
Cincinnati, Ohio, the manufacturer of the material; (3)
Pioneer Materials, Inc., of Dyer County, the distributor
of the material; and (4) Hobart Landreth of McNairy
County, the installer of the floor.

The defendants, other than Premium Finishes, filed
pleas and defended the suit. Premium Finishes, which
was served with process in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by Chapter 67 of the Public Acts of 1965, now
carried in Tennessee Code Annotated as Sections 20-235
to 20-240, inclusive, did not defend the suit, and the court
entered judgment by default against it.

The plaintiff sued each of the four defendants on the
theories of (1) tortious misrepresentation, (2) strict lia-
bility in tort, (3) negligence, and (4) breach of warranty.
At the conclusion of all the proof the Cireuit Judge
directed verdicts in favor of the defendants, Pioneer and
Landreth, on all four counts of the declaration; in favor
of Decora on the breach of warranty count; and in favor
of the plaintiff and against Decora on the tortious mis-
representation, strict liability, and negligence counts.
Under a writ of inquiry the jury ascertained the amount
of damages against Premium Finishes, against whom
the default judgment had been pronounced and against
Decora on the three counts, tortious misrepresentation,
strict liability in tort, and negligence, on which he had
directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against
Decora. The jury returned its verdict against the de-
fendants, Premium Finishes and Decora in the amount
of $11,500.00.

ee 509

The motion of Decora for a new trial was overruled
and it perfected’ its appeal in the nature of a writ af
error to the Court of Appeals. The plaintiff moved for a
new trial, and assigns as error, if any assignment of
error of Decora be sustained, the action of the trial court
(1) in directing a verdict in favor of Pioneer and Lan-
dreth, (2) in directing a verdict in favor of Decora as to
the breach of warranty count, (3) in refusing to permit
plaintiff to read in evidence a pre-trial discovery deposi-
tion of the president of Premium Finishes, and (4) in
refusing to grant an additur in view of what he contends
to be an inadequacy of the judgment and verdict. He
perfected his appeal in the nature of a writ of error.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court in directing a verdict in favor of Decora and
Pioneer Materials on the breach of warranty count of
the declaration, but as to the other counts reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial. As to Landreth the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
eourt and remanded the case for a new trial on all four
counts. We granted certiorari.

During the presentation of his evidence the plaintiff
read the discovery deposition of Glen Hall to which was
exhibited a statement signed by him and by Harold Kail,
Jimmy M. Evans, and Ray Heylmun, that part of the
statement which recited the existence of liability insur-
ance having been read to the jury over the objection of
Decora.

Hl The plaintiff sought to read the deposition of
Ronald R. Savin, President of Premium Finishes, which
he had taken under the discovery deposition statute, but
upon objection the court excluded it for the reason that

510 ee]

Premium Finishes having suffered a default judgment
to be entered against it, was no longer a party to the
suit within the meaning of Section 24-1208, T.C.A. In
making such ruling the trial judge was in error. The fact
that Premium Finishes had made no defense and was not
an active participant in the litigation made it no less a
party and amenable to the processes and judgments of
the court.

Decora filed thirteen assignments of error in the Court
of Appeals, which we will consider under three headings:
that the court erred (1) in admitting in evidence the
signed statement of the officers and employees of Decora
and Pioneer Materials; (2) in refusing to direct a verdict
in favor of Decora and in directing a verdict against it;
and (3) in failing to instruct the jury as to the proper
measure of damages and as to the law applicable to the
assessment of damages.

There is no dispute about these facts: carly in 1967
Decora arranged with Pioneer Materials, which for this
purpose adopted the trade name, Decora of the South,
to distribute its seamless floor material known as Decor-
Rock in a number of states including Tennessee. Decora
was not the manufacturer but bought its materials from
Premium Finishes which applied Decora labels and de-
livered the materials according to Decora’s instructions.
The advertising matter referred to Decora as the ‘‘origi-
nator, supplier, and developer’’ of the material, which
consisted of rock aggregate of various colors with which
two fluid components were mixed in equal parts; the
resulting mixture, known as the base coat, was applied
to the floor with a trowel, and after that coat had set a
second application of the liquids, referred to in the record
as a flow coat, was applied.

De BIL

In the dealings between Decora and Pioneer Materials
so far as they concern the issues in this case Ray Heyl-
mun, president of Decora, represented his company, and
Glen W. Hall, vice-president of Pioneer Materials,
represented his company.

Early in 1967 employees of Pioneer Materials laid a
floor of Decor-Rock in the cafeteria of an industrial plant
at Adamsville in which Hobart Landreth was employed
as a maintenance man. Landreth became interested in
the process and went to Dyersburg on more than one
occasion to witness and to take part in the laying of
floors. He bought from Pioneer Materials a sales kit
which contained samples of the floors and brochures
which advertised them. The floor of the grocery store
in Adamsville that was owned and operated by O. L.
Walker was worn and Walker agreed for Landreth to
install a new floor of Decor-Rock, relying on Decora’s
literature and on Landreth’s representations. Landreth
engaged the services of Harold Kail, an employee of
Pioneer Materials, but who on this occasion was em-
ployed by and paid by Landreth and who was a person
who had had experience in installing the floors. After
the store had been closed on the evening of Saturday,
May 27, 1967, they with two helpers mixed the materials
and laid the base coat, finishing the work after one o’clock
on Sunday morning. On the following morning, after
Kail had returned to Dyersburg, Landreth and a helper
applied the flow coat. There seems to be no question but
that both the base and flow coats were properly installed.

After Walker returned home from his church service
on Sunday morning he visited the store and found that
the material that had been laid on his floor was giving
off an offensive odor. The doors and windows of the

oi2 es

store had been left closed and no ventilation had been
provided. Walker opened the doors but the odor con-
tinued, and on Monday it was still strong. He communi-
cated with Landreth who telephoned Pioneer Materials.
Someone at Pioneer Materials in turn called Heylmun,
the president of Decora in Cincinnati, who telephoned
Landreth and told him not to worry that everything
would be taken care of. A truck from Memphis was sent
to the scene and an effort was made to deodorize the
store but without success.

The odor was so strong that it penetrated a brick
wall which divided the store from the place of business
next door, and when it appeared to Walker within the
next few days that the stench had contaminated almost
all his merchandise he moved the merchandise out of the
store, most of it being taken to the junk heap. He then
had the floor torn out down to the joists and replaced by
a new wood floor on which he installed asphalt tile. He
repainted the interior. The store was closed for about
thirty days for these repairs.

It appears from the testimony of the president of
Premium Finishes that before the floor was laid in Wal-
ker’s store Decora had had the formulas of the flow coat
liquids changed. Previously the same liquids which had
been used as a binder for the rock aggregate had also
been used as the flow coat, but the new material contained
a thinner and thus flowed on more easily. Decora had
recommended the new material to Pioneer Materials but
had given no warning that an objectionable odor would
result from its use. The liquids were packed and dis-
tributed in sealed cans..

Since the plaintiff sued each of the four defendants
‘under. four separate theories of liability incorporated in

ee 518

the four counts of his declaration, we will consider each
theory separately as it applies to the several defendants.
As we have said, the defendant, Premium Finishes, made
no defense and judgment by default was entered against
it.

HM (1) We first consider the theory of tortious
misrepresentation. The Circuit Judge on this count of
the declaration directed a verdict in favor of Pioneer
Materials and Landreth and against Decora. The Court
of Appeals was of opinion that the issue of the liability
of Landreth, Pioneer Materials, and Decora, under this
theory, should have been submitted to the jury. We dis-
agree. The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that
Decora had prepared and circulated the brochure by
which it recommended the material for use as it was used
and that such use resulted in the damages complained of.
We hold that the Cireuit Judge properly directed a ver-
dict on this theory in favor of the plaintiff and against
Decora, and instructed the jury to determine the amount
of the damages. There is no evidence from which the jury
might have found that Pioneer Materials tortiously mis-
represented the product to Landreth, and on this count
the court properly directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant. There is evidence that the defendant, Lan-
dreth, made representations to the plaintiff which would
have supported a finding against him on this count. The
plaintiff testified, ‘‘I was relying on the literature and
Mr. Landreth, of course.’’ The rule of Ford Motor Co. vr.
Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 8.W.2d 240, is applicable.

(2) The Court of Appeals reversed the action of the
Cireuit Court for directing a verdict against Decora and
for Pioneer Materials and Landreth on the strict liability

si es

count of the declaration. We agree with the Court of
Appeals in affirming the directed verdict against Decora,
put are of opinion that under the record the doctrine of
strict liability cannot be applied to Pioneer Materials
and Landreth, and that the Cirenit Judge properly di-
rected a verdict on this count for these two defendants.

Hl ‘‘In a number of cases it has been held that one
who labels a product with his own name or otherwise
represents it to be his own is to be treated on the same
basis as if he had manufactured it, and so is liable for any
negligence on the part of the actual maker.’’ Prosser,
Law of Torts, 3rd Ed., Section 96. Decora, though it did
not manufacture the product, labeled it with its own
name and in its advertising material represented itself
as being the originator and distributor.

With respect to Decora, and the manufacturer, Prem-
jum Finishes, the rule of strict liability must apply. In
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 8.W.2d 240,
the following language appears:

“There seems to be no unfairness in holding that a
manufacturer who markets a product which is not only
defective but unreasonably dangerous should be re-
sponsible for any physical harm which results to
person or property, even though no privity of contract
and no negligence can be established. It might be
added that where the plaintiff can sustain the heavy
burden of showing, as he must, that the product was in
a dangerously defective condition at the time it left
the hands of the manufacturer, it is quite likely that
some negligence was involved even though this cannot
be proved.’’

ee 515

“Tt seems unfair to place increasing burdens on re-
tailers, even as to latent defects, and to exempt from
responsibility the manufacturer, who normally deter-
mines what safety precautions shall be taken before
the product is placed on the market, and who is the
one most likely to have been careless when a particular
item proves to be defective and unreasonably danger-
ous. It might be added that in many cases it is the
manufacturer who can best pass on the costs of this
increased protection to the users or consumers of his
products, and to the extent that this has been done
because of a more strict liability already imposed in
many large states, consumers and users of products in
this state already are paying for increased protection.’’

Hl In neither the Lonon case nor in Olney v. Beaman
Bottling Co., 220 Tenn. 459, 418 S.W.2d 430, has the doe-
trine of strict liability been applied to a merchant who
sells the product in a sealed container and who is afforded
no reasonable opportunity to inspect. The two cases that
we have cited go no further than to hold that manufac-
turers under appropriate cireumstances are to be held
liable under the rule of strict liability. In the absence of
legislation we are unwilling to extend the doctrine to
merchants under such circumstances as exist in this case.

HM (8) By the third count in his declaration the
plaintiff seeks to hold each of the defendants liable on
the theory of negligence. There is material evidence from
which the jury was warranted in finding that the damage
sustained by the plaintiff resulted from the negligence
of Decora, but we find no evidence from which they might
have coneluded that the damage resulted from the negli-
gence of Pioneer Materials. With regard to Landreth,
there is evidence that he failed to read carefully the in-

56 es

structions to ventilate the room in which the material
was being applied, but it does not appear that this omis-
sion contributed to the plaintiff’s damages. The court
committed no error in directing a verdict in his favor on
this count.

HM (4) For liability to be imposed because of a
breach of warranty privity must exist between the plain-
tiff and a defendant charged with the breach. Olney x.
Beaman Bottling Co., supra. The statute imposing lia-
bility for breaches of implied warranty is a part of the
Uniform Commercial Code and is as follows:

“‘47-2.315, Implied warranty—Fitness for particular
purpose.—Where the seller at the time of contracting
has reason to know any particular purpose for which
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suit-
able goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.’’

HM The exceptions are not applicable to the facts of
this case. The language is clear and for the purpose of
this suit requires no construction. Landreth was the only
defendant in privity with the plaintiff, and the record
discloses facts sufficient to support a finding that there
was an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose for
which the floor was installed in the plaintiff’s store. This
count should have heen submitted to the jury with re-
spect to Landreth.

HH A statement dated June 27, 1967, relating to the
installation of the floor in plaintiff’s store was signed
by Glen W. Hall, Harold Kail, and Jimmy M. Evans,
all officers or employees of Pioneer Materials and by Ray

| SLT

Heylmum, president of Decora. These persons were all
active in the transaction out of which this suit grew, and
were the only officers and employees of Pioneer Materials
and Decora who had knowledge of the transaction, The
statement, which had been exhibited by the witness, Hall,
in his discovery deposition was properly introduced as
evidence, but that part which indicated that liability as
to certain defendants was protected by liability insurance
was incompetent and should not have been read to the
jury.

To summarize, we hold (1) that a directed verdict
should have been rendered in behalf of Decora on the
breach of warranty count, but that the only material
evidence in the record supports the other three counts
against Decora; (2) that the record contains no material
evidence by which Pioneer Materials can be held liable
and that this defendant was entitled to a directed verdict
on all counts; (3) that Landreth was entitled to a directed
verdict on the strict liability and negligence count, but
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a submission
to the jury as to this defendant on the tortious misrep-
resentation and breach of warranty counts.

HEME ‘The defendant, Decora, requested the trial
judge to include certain language in this charge regard-
ing the measure of damages. The court granted the
request. From the record it appears however, that he
omitted all else from his charge. This was an omission
which constituted reversible error. The defendant,
Premium Finishes, although in default, is entitled to the
benefit of a full charge as to the measure of damages.
The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion with which
we agree.

518 es

It follows that the judgment of the trial court is re-
versed and the case remanded to the Cireuit Court for a
new trial as to all defendants, except the defendant,
Pioneer Materials, as to whom the case is dismissed.

Dyer, Curer Justice, and Cuarrin, Crrson and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

Opinion on Petition 10 Remzar
We deny O, LL. Walker’s petition to rehear.

“We are constrained to state, again, as has been said
many times in variant language, that the office of a
petition to rehear is to call the attention of the Court
to matters overlooked, not those things which counsel
supposes were improperly decided, after full consider-
ation. Further, this Court has said, and says again,
that a petition for rehearing should never be used for
the purpose of rearguing the case on points already
considered and determined, unless some new and de-
cisive authority has been discovered which was over-
looked by this Court. Rule 32 of this Court governs
the subject of rehearing and says, ‘‘A rehearing will
be refused where no new argument is made, and no new
authority adduced, and no material fact is pointed out
as overlooked.’ ”? Knox v, Batson, 217 Tenn. 620, 399

S.W.2d 765.

| 519

Syivain SHarz et al.

Roszrr L, Pamires et al.

471 S.W.2d 944

(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed October 4, 1971.

Exam, Guascow & Taynzr, Union City, for petitioners.

Hearucock & Croys, Union City, for respondents.

ee 521

Mr. Justick McCanuzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Sylvain and Elaine Shatz by their petition for the
common law writ of certiorari sought to have declared
invalid the action of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the
City of Union City upholding the action of the municipal
building inspector who, under the authority of Section
11-2003(b) of the Municipal Code, had denied the peti-
tioners the right to use the property of which they were
in possession for the assembling, processing, and storage
of certain used and waste materials. |

The Chancellor filed an opinion in which he found all
the facts pertinent to the issues and on which he based
his decree dismissing the petition. The petitioners ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the Chan-
cellor. We have granted certiorari.

The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiffs developed
some of them by the testimony of witnesses and the par-
ties stipulated the rest.

For the reasons we shall explain we reverse the Court
of Appeals.

The petitioners are husband and wife and are part-
ners under the trade name Union City Iron & Metal
Company in a salvage business in Union City. They
buy, process, and re-sell scrap metal of various kinds.
At a location on a lot lying west of the railroad, east of
Depot Street, and south of Grove Street, they operate
an out of doors junk yard where large piles of scrap iron
are processed and stored. Directly across Depot Street
and west of it they occupy a building that they lease

522 ee

from a family owned corporation and inside which they
assemble, process, aud pack for sale different kinds of
non-ferrous scrap, such as aluminum, copper, and brass.
There they also store previous to selling them old auto-
mobile batteries and radiators. This activity, on the west
side of Depot Street, conducted inside the building, is the
activity which the building inspector and the Board of
Zoning Appeals have forbidden.

The Chancellor, in his memorandum opinion, found:

“The complainant’s building is modern, attractive,
and other than the sign thereon, a casual passer would
not know what business was being carried on in said
building. Further, the complainant’s operations in
said building are free from noise, odor, fumes, and
other objectionable features. There is no machinery
in said building; there have been no complaints by
the neighbors; they create no traffic problem and no
fire hazard, * * *’”

and
‘The present and past use of the property, so far as

the Court can see, is no more objectionable than many
other permitted uses * * *.’”

The Court of Appeals in their opinion said:

‘“All the storing, sorting, grading and packaging of
the non-usable metal is done within the building on the
property in question. The building is an ordinary ma-
sonry building and when viewed from the outside there
is no indication what type operation is being carried
on within the building. There is no smoke, fumes, noise
or other objectionable feature to the operation carried
on by the complainants.’’

| 528

The Chancellor and the Court of Appeals, therefore,
have concurred in their finding that nothing objectionable
results from the conduct in the building of the activities
which the building inspector and the board have for-
bidden.

The applicable sections of the Union City zoning ordi-
nance adopted under the authority of Title 13, Chapter
7 of Tennessee Code Annotated, are Sections 11-2001 to
11-2006, inclusive of the Municipal Code, as follows:

“11-2001. General. Within all areas designated M-1,
M-2 on the Zoning Map of the City of Union City,
Tennessee, the regulations set out in this Chapter shall
apply.

“*11-2002. Intent and purpose. (a) The M-1 and M-2
Districts are designated to provide areas for uses of
land and buildings for administration, research, manu-
facturing, processing, fabrication, assembly, freight
handling, storage, and similar operations.

“‘(b) The regulations governing M-1 and M-2 Districts
are designed to: promote stability of industrial devel-
opment; protect industrial development from uses in-
compatible and detrimental to industry; protect non-
industrial uses in areas adjacent to industrial districts;
and to encourage industrial development in order to
improve the basic economy of Union City and thus pro-
mote the health, safety, convenience, prosperity, and
welfare.

‘11-2003. Principat uses and structures permitted. (a)
Any industrial use that will comply with the standards
of this Chapter is by virtue of such compliance a per-
mitted use, provided, that the expense of any tests,

524 es

engineering reports, etc., required to assure compli-
ance with these standards shall be borne by the person,
persons, firm or corporation applying for a building
permit and further, that the recipient of the building
permit understands that these standards, like all other
provisions of this ordinance, are continuing obliga-
tions, and that all new industrial uses will be expected
to operate in compliance with these standards.

“(b) The storage and/or salvaging of junk and other
used material not pertinent to a manufacturing or fab-
rication use on the premises is permitted only in the
M-2 Districts (Heavy Industry) and such storage or
salvage operations shall be enclosed by a wall, tight
fence, or compact evergreen hedge not less than six
(6) feet in height.

“11-2004. Permitted accessory uses and structures.
Accessory buildings or uses incidental to and eusto-
marily associated with any permitted industrial use.

“11-2005. Special exceptions. The judgment of the
Board of Zoning Appeals shall be guided by a desire
to encourage industrial development in order to im-
prove the basic economy of Union City. Such interest
will include the promotion of orderly industrial dis-
triets containing industries and other uses compatible
with each other. Judged against this interest will be
considerations of the effect of the industry, or other
use, on the environs and the general character of the
entire community.

“After public notice and hearing, and appropriate
conditions and safeguards, the Board of Zoning Ap-
peals may permit the following uses or similar and no
more objectionable uses:

Dn 525

‘Any retail use or service permissible in the B-3 Dis-
trict (General Business), provided such use serves, or
is directly auxiliary to, the needs of industrial uses or
employees thereof.

“11-2006. Prohibited uses and structures. (a) Dwell-
ing units, other than those provided in a hotel, motel,
or tourist court permitted as a special exception.

“(b) Any other uses and structures not specifically
permitted or permissible on appeal or any other use
which in the opinion of the Board of Zoning Appeals
would be detrimental to the industrial districts and
adjacent districts.”

The lot which is the subject of this suit, on the west
side of Depot Street, is in a district designated on the
zoning map as an M-1 (Light Industry) District. Ac-
cording to the terms of the sections of the Municipal
Code, copied above any lawful industry may be carried
on in an M-2 District (Heavy Industry). With~a single
exception any lawful industry may be carried on in an
M-1 District (Light Industry). The exception is that
“The storage and/or salvaging of junk and other used
material not pertinent to a manufacturing or fabrication
use on the premises’’ is allowed only in an M-2 District
(Heavy Industry).

The ordinance does not define the designations, ‘‘M-1
District (Light Industry)’’ and ‘‘M-2 District (Heavy
Industry) ’’ and under its language the only difference in
what is allowed in them is that no matter how conducted,
“the storage and/or salvaging of junk and other used
material’’ is not allowed in an M-1 District (Light Indus-
try). The operation in an M-1 District (Light Industry)

526

of a wood working plant, a foundry or a slaughter house
would meet the restrictions of the ordinance.

Hl The question for our determination is: Does Sec-
tion 11-2003(b) of the Municipal Code of Union City have
the effect of being arbitrary and of working an unrea-
sonable discrimination on the use of the petitioners’ lot
on the west side of Depot Street? We must answer this
question in the affirmative making it necessary that we
declare the section void insofar as it applies to the uses
of the property described in the record.

Our Court through Mr. Justice Tomlinson has said:

“In whatever form presented, ultimately the question
for judicial determination is the same, to wit: Does the
zoning ordinance in question have any reasonable con-
nection or relation with the protection of public safety,
health, morals and natural wellbeing of the people?’
Meador v. City of Nashville, 188 Tenn. 441, 220 S.W.2d
876 [1948].

Then the Court, again through Mr. Justice Tomlinson,
said:

‘“Hiqually as well settled is the fact that a zoning
ordinance enacted pursuant to such statute is valid,
except where that ordinance may be in some respect
unreasonable or arbitrary. If there be a discrimina-
tion between. properties in zoning, such discrimination
will not be disturbed if it may be rested upon some
reasonable basis, and is not forbidden by the Charter.’’
Henry v. White, 194 Tenn, 192, 250 S.W.2d 70 [1952].

Under the facts before us there is discrimination:
that is, the petitioners are forbidden to do with their
property in an M-1 District (Light Industry) what those

| 527

with real estate located in an M-2 District (Heavy In-
dustry) are allowed to do. This discrimination would
not of itself be sufficient to justify the Court in deciding
that the discrimination is such as to render the applica-
tion of the ordinance invalid; but nowhere in the record
does it appear that the discrimination is a reasonable one
—quite the contrary—it clearly appears that the peti-
tioners’ use of the property would not be such as to
cause any result justifying the exercise of the police
power under the municipality’s zoning authority.

In Brooks v. City of Memphis, 192 Tenn. 371, 241 S.W.
2d 432 [1951], the Court said:

“Where an affected property owner makes an attack
upon an amendment to a Zoning Ordinance, and where
municipal authority has observed all other require-
ments of due process, to support a charge that as to
him or her, the amendment is arbitrary and confisca-
tory, the property owner has the burden of showing
that the amendment was not adopted in the public
interest, but was directed at him or her, to his or her
disadvantage and prejudice.’?

The petitioners assail a section of the ordinance which
is not an amendment but which is a part of the ordinance
as originally adopted. At the time of its adoption the
petitioners were not in possession of their property.
Nevertheless, the section in its application to the prop-
erty is directed to the petitioners, the occupants of the
property, ‘‘to their disadvantage and prejudice’. The
requirements of Brooks v. Memphis, under the facts as
found concurrently by the Chancellor and by the Court
of Appeals brings this case within the exception to the
general rule of the case quoted above.

528 ee

To apply the terms of Section 11-2003(b) of the Mu-
nicipal Code to the property under consideration is to
act in an arbitrary manner and to discriminate unrea-
sonably and unlawfully against the petitioners and
against their property.

“Restraints upon land use cannot be capricious or
unduly discriminatory. There cannot be discrimination
between persons or property not reasonably related to
the service of an essential public need. Welch v. Swa-
sey, 214 US, 91, 29 S.Ct. 567, 53 L.Ed. 923 (1909) ;
Washington National Insurance Co, v. Board of Re-
view, 1 N.J. 545, 64 A.2d 443 (1949). This is peculiarly
so in the exercise of the zoning police power. Constitu-
tional uniformity and equality requires that classifica-
tion be founded in real and not feigned differences
having to do with the purposes for which the classes
are formed.”’ Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400, 122 A.2d
506 [1956].

“To be a valid exercise of power, a zoning restriction
must have some rational connection with the promo-
tion of public health, safety, morals, or welfare.’’ Reg-
ner v. County of McHenry, 9 Ill.2d 577, 138 N.H.2d
545 [1956].

In Yokley’s ‘‘Zoning Law and Practice’, 3rd Ed.
[1965], at Section 2-16, the author wrote:

‘A zoning ordinance cannot unfairly discriminate
against a particular parcel of land, If the general
scheme of the zoning is sound and valid, nevertheless
the courts may properly inquire as to whether the
scheme of classification and districting has been ap-
plied fairly and impartially in each instance.”’

| 529

In the 1970 supplement to this work this author wrote:

‘Stating the matter differently, where the gain to
the public is small as compared with the hardship
imposed upon the owners of the land by a certain zon-
ing restriction, no valid basis exists for the exercise of
the police power.’’

Hl The defendants contend that the petitioners should
be repelled because they knew of the existence of the
ordinance and its restrictions when they assumed occu-
pancy of their property. This contention cannot prevail.
The petitioners had the right to dispute the validity of
Section 11-2003(b) as it applied to their use of the prop-
erty after they had taken possession of it.

‘‘Purchase of property with knowledge of the re-
striction does not har the purchaser from testing the
validity of the zoning ordinance since the zoning ordi-
nance in the very nature of things has reference to
land rather than to owner (Bassett on Zoning, p. 177).
Knowledge of the owner cannot validate an otherwise
jnvalid ordinance.”’ Vernon Park Realty vr. Mt. Vernon,
307 N.Y. 498, 121 N.H.2d 517 [1954].

We conclude that the application of Section 11-2003(b)
of the Municipal Code of the City of Union City diserim-
imates unfairly and unlawfully in its application to the
lot occupied by the petitioners located on the west side of
Depot Street in Union City and described in this record.
We therefore decree that the section is void in its appli-
eation to the petitioners’ uses of the property.

We adjudge the costs against the defendants.

Dysr, Curr Justice, and Caarrm and Cresoy, Jus-
TICES, concur.

530

Humpureys, Justice, concurs in a separate opinion.
Mr. Justice Humpureys (concurring).

My Brother McCanless has, I think, written thoroughly
and well on this case. However, because it is a case in-
volving zoning in which this Court overrules both the
Chancery Court and the Court of Appeals, I am con-
strained to make some observations of my own.

As I see it, the question presented, stated in its sim-
plest terms, is, whether a municipality, in the exercise
of its power to zone, can prescribe an area in which light
and heavy industry shall operate, divide the area into
two zones, and. say to both light and heavy industry that
either one or both of you can operate on either or both
sides of this dividing line, except that a scrap metal
processing industry, or junkyard, which is classified as
a heavy industry in the zoning ordinance, must be oper-
ated on one particular side of that line. It is evident that
the answer must be, that a municipality does not have
the power to do this.

Once having said that heavy industry can operate in
either or both of the two districts, there is no reason for
saying this particular type of heavy industry, which is
not obnoxious within itself as a nuisance, which as a
subject cannot be dealt with. by zoning laws, must be
carried on on one particular side of the dividing line.
Such a zoning is arbitrary and unreasonable, and dis-
eriminates against this particular heavy industry. This,
because it singles this industry out for discriminatory
treatment, resulting in serious limitation of the owner’s
land use, with no apparent reason therefor.

I well understand the concern of the municipality to
regulate the location of scrap metal processors and junk-

|

ee 531,

yards, but it cannot, after saying that heavy and light
industry, which by definition includes such scrap metal
processors and junkyards, may use land in either one or
both industrial districts for ‘‘administration, research,
manufacturing, processing, fabrication, assembling,
freight handling, storage and similar operations.’’, Or-
dinance sec, 11-2002 by which the municipality intended
to permit every character of both heavy and light indus-
trial activity to operate anywhere in either or both dis-
tricts, pick a particular type of business which is within
the ordinance definition of industry, and limit that
business to a particular district.

I should also like, in this concurring opinion, to be
explicit as to my conception of the constitutional author-
ity of this Court to invalidate the part of the zoning
ordinance here dealt with. Every zoning ordinance is an
exercise of the police power, inherent in the state, which
has first been limited in exercise by the constitution of
the state, and has then been delegated by proper statute
to the municipality. Holdredge v. City of Cleveland, 218
Tenn, 239, 402 S.W.2d 709 (1966) ; State ex rel. Lightman
v. City of Nashville, 166 Tenn. 191, 60 S.W.2d 161 (1938) ;
Spencer-Sturla Company v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn.
70, 290 S.W. 608 (1927).

The limitation on the exercise of this police power is
found in our state constitution in Article 1, sec. 8, and
Article 11, sec. 8, These two constitutional provisions
prohibit classification against individuals as well as in
favor of individuals, They admit of the exercise of a wide
scope of discretion in classification for police power pur-
poses, but prohibit classification which is arbitrary and
without any reasonable basis, as in this case. Motlow v.
State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S.W. 177 (1911) ; Nance v. O. K.

582 ee

Houck Piano Co., 128 Tenn. 1, 155 S.W. 1172 (1918);
Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 272, 6 S.W, 401 (1888) ; Stratton
Claimants v. Morris Claimants, 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S.W. 87
(1891); Southern Ry. Co. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267,
148 S.W. 662 (1912); Consumers Gasoline Stations v.
Pulaski, 200 Tenn. 480, 292 S.W.2d 735 (1956) ; Livesay v.
Tennessee Board of Watchmaking Examiners, 204 Tenn.
500, 822 S.W.2d 209 (1959).

So, I concur in the reversal of the appellate court, on
the ground that the particular provision of the zoning
ordinance under consideration is unconstitutional and
void as arbitrary and unreasonable classification, in vio-
lation of Article 1, sec. 8, and Article 11, sec. 8 of the
Constitution of Tennessee.

Mas. Witui L. Escun, Appellee-Petitioner,

Lex Tiare Divsston or RoperrsH#aw Coxtrois,
\ppellant-Defendant.

472 S.W.2d 228.

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed August 2, 1971.

534.

Vezster Neat Aces, Lebanon, for appellee-petitioner.

Soron Firzparrick, Carthage, for appellant-defendant.

a
a

Mr. Carer Justicn Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is a workmen’s compensation case wherein Mrs.
Willie L. Eseue (employee) filed a petition against Lux
Time Division of Robertshaw Controls (employer) pur-
suant to T.C.A. sec. 50-1025, seeking an increase in com-
pensation benefits over and above those previously
awarded. The employer appeals from an award of addi-
tional benefits.

The original award was for benefits based on tempo-
rary total disability ending January 1, 1967, and then
an award of weekly benefits of $36.00 for one hundred
twenty weeks for permanent partial disability. Under
this award the last weekly payment was due April 20,
1969, The petition in the case at bar was filed April 25,
1969, under T.C.A. see. 50-1025, raising the issue it was
filed too late.

Hl The original award made in this case was subject
to modification under T.C.A. see. 50-1025, but a. petition
for modification was required to be filed within the time
the weekly payments were being made, since after all

536 ee

payments were made and the judgment fully discharged,
the Court would lack jurisdiction over the case. Nelson
v. Cambria Coal Co., 178 Tenn. 389, 160 S.W.2d 412
(1942), and American Snuff Company v. Helms, 201
Tenn. 622, 301 S.W.2d 348 (1957). The parties admit such
is the law and further admit, as found by the trial judge,
this petition to modify the original award was filed five
days too late. The issue here is whether the employer, as
found by the trial judge, is estopped to raise this issue
under the following facts:

The original award was being paid by employer’s in-
surance carrier. The insurance company mailed checks
monthly in the amount necessary to compensate employee
for four weeks’ benefits due to employee’s counsel in
Lebanon, Wilson County, Tennessee. Counsel, after en-
dorsement, forwarded same to employee in Portland,
Sumner County, Tennessee. On or about April 9, 1969,
the insurance company forwarded its check no, 3472336,
in the amount of $216.00, representing six weeks’ benefits
due to employee’s counsel who, after endorsement, for-
warded this check to employee. Employee received check
no. 3472336 about the middle of April, 1969, and without
endorsement returned same to the insurance company.
It is admitted check no. 3472336 represented the final
payments due on the original award.

Check no, 3472336 on the line designated ‘‘For’’ car-
ried the following entry: ‘“‘Compensation: 3-25 to 5-6
(Final Payment.)’’ Employee alleged she relied on the
dates 3-25 to 5-6 entered by the insurance company and
was led to believe by these dates that she was entitled to
weekly payments through May 6, 1969. The trial judge so
found holding the employer was estopped to raise this
issue.

HME We do not think the facts here support the ap-
plication of the doctrine of estoppel. It is essential to
estoppel that the person claiming it was himself not only
destitute of knowledge of the facts, but without available
means of obtaining such knowledge since there can be no
estoppel where both parties have the opportunity and
means of ascertaining the truth. Rambeau v. Farris, 186
Tenn. 503, 212 8.W.2d 359 (1948). The truth sought here
is the date the final payment was due on the original
award which when fully paid discharged the judgment
and denuded the court of jurisdiction. This date could be
easily ascertained by the court records open equally to
both parties.

The employee has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal
grounded on the fact the employer failed to file a motion
for a new trial necessary to perfect the appeal.

Appeals in workmen’s compensation cases are con-
trolled by T.C.A. sec. 50-1018, which prior to the enact-
ment of Chapter 311, Public Acts of 1969, required a
motion for a new trial in order to perfect an appeal.
Strader v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 411,
403 S.W.2d 765 (1966). Upon enactment of this 1969
amendment the requirement of a motion for a new trial
was abolished. This 1969 amendment was effective May
21, 1969.

Employee filed the petition to increase benefits on
April 25, 1969, and the decree of the trial judge was
entered on July 16, 1969.

The gist of the argument by employee is that this 1969
amendment does not apply to the case at bar since it was
filed prior to the effective date of the amendment: Em-
ployer argues the 1969 amendment is remedial or proce-

538 ee

dural and applies to the case at bar since it was in effect
at the time (July, 1969) the case was up for appeal.

Hl We think this 1969 amendment is applicable to the
ease at har. This amendment affects only a procedural
matter and in no way affects the vested rights of any
of the parties. Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S.W.2d
824 (1954) ; Brandon v. Warmath, 198 Tenn. 38, 277 8.W.
2a 408 (1955).

The decree allowing additional benefits is reversed.
The insurance carrier for the employer has paid into
court the balance of the benefits of $216.00 due under the
original decree and the cause is remanded for any orders
necessary to pay this sum to employee.

Cuartin, Crason, Humpureys and McCanuess, Jus-
TICES, concur.

Berry Barramwe Price, Appellant,

Nosrz Ray Price, Appellee.

472 8.W.2d 732.

(Nashville, December. Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed November 1, 1971.

Wayne 8. Tavtor, James R. Omer, Nashville, for ap-
pellant.

Haroip Howssnr, Gallatin, for appellee.

Mr. Carer Jusricn Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case presents the issue of whether the decree
awarding a judgment in an amount certain for alimony
in solido, but payable in installments, bears interest
either by proper construction of the language of the
decree, or as a. matter of statutory law from date of entry.
Jurisdiction upon appeal is properly in this Court, the
facts being stipulated.

| B41

On July 23, 1969, appellant, Betty Barthine Price,
was awarded an absolute divorce from appellee, Noble
Ray Price. The decree awarding alimony in solido, con-
taining the following language, is now in dispute:

Further, Complainant, Betty Barthine Price, is award-
ed a judgment against Defendant, Noble Ray Price, in
the amount of $133,980.33 and to secure the same a lien
is impressed upon the note payable to defendant de-
posited with Jordan Stokes, III, attorney, and also
upon the Trust Fund deposited with Commerce Union
Bank to secure payment of the note, and payments
upon the aforesaid judgment will be paid in equal in-
stallments as the note payments are made the payment
being one-half (14) the yearly payment due upon the
amount of $38,290.09, and in addition one-half (4%) the
accrued interest payments * * *

The parties agree the installments on this judgment
were paid in full when due and as of July 2, 1971, the
balanee of the full amount of the judgment of $133,980.33
was paid. The only issue here is whether appellant is
due interest.

The trial judge held:

The Court is of the opinion that the above language
in the decree did not contemplate payment of interest
on the $183,980.33, but provided instead for the pay-
ment on the judgment, one-half the accrued interest
on the note in addition to the one-half yearly payment,
which amount is set out in the decree. The Court fur-
ther finds that the alimony in solido in the amount as
hereinabove shown was payable at future dates in in-
stallments and in the manner shown in the decree and

waa es

that the alimony award would draw interest only sub-
sequent to nonpayment on the due date.

Appellant claims interest is due under the language of
the decree above copied, construing this language in this
manner; that her judgment was payable in equal in-
stallments with the dates the installments were due set
as the same dates the installments were due on the note
deposited with Jordan Stokes, III. That the amount of
the installment payments were set as being one-half of
the amount of the installment payment on the principal
of the note deposited with Jordan Stokes, III, such being
one-half of $38,280.09, That having made the payment of
this judgment due in installments and fixed both the date
and amount of installment in relation to the note depos-
ited with Jordan Stokes, ITI, the decree said:

And in addition one-half the accrued interest pay-
ment * **,

which language the appellant construes as follows:

That she was to receive this one-half accrued interest,
being interest earned by the note deposited with Jordan
Stokes, ITI, as interest on her judgment and not as a
payment on the principal of her judgment.

Hl We do not agree with appellant’s construction of
this language of the decree. First, under this decree
appellant has been awarded alimony in solido, a judg-
ment against appellee in the amount of $133,980.33. Sec-
ondly, for the purpose of securing the payment of this
judgment, the court has impressed a lien upon a note
owned by appellee and deposited with Jordan Stokes, ITT,
and also a lien upon a trust fund in the Commerce Union
Bank. Thirdly, the court has decreed this judgment be

ee 543

paid in equal installments, with the due date of the in-
stallments being set as the same date of the installments
on the note deposited with Jordan Stokes, III. The court
has decreed the amount of the installments be computed
by taking one-half of the yearly installments of $38,-
280.09, due on the note deposited with Jordan Stokes,
TI, and add these to one-half of the accrued interest on
the said note, which two figures combined would make up
the full amount of an installment due on appellant’s judg-
ment.

The words ‘‘and in addition one-half the accrued inter-
est payment’? in this decree are the key words determin-
ing the difference between the construction we have given
the language and that insisted upon by appellant. In light
of the fact that these key words are found in that part
of the decree fixing the amount of installment due on
appellant’s judgment, and also in light of the plain mean-
ing of the words ‘‘and in addition,’’ we think to hold the
decree by this language awarded appellant interest on
her judgment would be to give the language a most
strained construction.

Appellant next insists she is entitled to interest on this
judgment by the mandate of T.C.A. sec. 47-14-110, which
reads as follows:

Interest shall be computed on every judgment from the
day on which it was entered of record.

Hl Interest is the compensation allowed by law or
fixed by the parties for the use, detention, or for balance
of money or its equivalent. 45 Am.Jur.2d, Interest &
Usury sec. 1, and cases there cited.

T.C.A, sec, 47-14-103 defines interest as follows:

sad

Interest is the compensation which may be demanded
by the lender from the borrower, or the creditor from
the debtor, for the use of money.

We have not been cited, nor have we found a case in
this jurisdiction directly in point. There are a number of
cases cited under T.C.A. sec. 47-14-110, all holding by
virtue of this statute judgments bear interest from the
date final judgment is entered in the trial court, but in all
these cases the person securing the judgment was entitled
to have the use of the proceeds of the judgment from and
after the judgment was entered.

Tl In the case at bar appellant was awarded a money
judgment against appellee in the amount of $133,980.33,
which judgment was entered and became final on July 28,
1969. On this date appellant became a creditor and the
appellee a debtor, but what is fatal to appellant’s claim
for interest beginning on this date is that on this date
she was not entitled to the use of any of the money rep-
resented by this judgment. The judgment is payable in
installments and appellant only became entitled to the use
of any part of the money represented by this judgment
on the date the first installment was due, and the parties
agree such was paid in full on that date.

This principle is stated in Gibson’s Suits in Chancery
(4th Ed.) sec. 564, in the following language:

Henee, it is safe to say, that in all such cases interest
should be allowed from the day the complainant had a
right to the motiay he sues for.

In 33 A.L.R.2d 1455, under the heading ‘‘Right to In-
terest on Unpaid Alimony,” the editorial staff gives a
summary of the cases in the following language:

| 545

In the greater number of cases dealing with the ques-
tion, interest has been allowed on unpaid alimony.
Thus, where the problem arose in respect of judgments
for alimony in gross, interest has been allowed from
the date payment was due under the judgment until
payment was made, and, as to unpaid instalments, in-
terest has been allowed from the date the particular
instalment matured. Likewise, interest has been al-
lowed on unpaid instalments of alimony against the
estate of a deceased divorced spouse. The theory upon
which interest is allowed in these cases is that a judg-
ment awarding alimony is in the nature of a money
judgment. The same result has been reached even
where the judgment or instalment became due and pay-
able pending an appeal of the judgment awarding the
alimony, on the theory that the party awarded alimony
should not be deprived of it by the prosecution of an
appeal.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Creson, Humpureys and MoCanunss, Justices, and
Jenkins, Sprciuat Justice, concur.

F. D. C. Corroration

Kanu C. Buregss.
473 S.W.2d 186
(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed November 15, 1971,

Kirk C .Warre, Jn., Srevremerer, & Wustsroon, Nash-
ville, for complainant-appellant.

Waurer E. Nessrr, Columbia, for defendant-appellee.

| BAT

Mr. Justice McCanxzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

On February 11, 1971, the complainant, F. D. (. Cor-
poration filed its complaint against Earl C. Burgess in
the Chancery Court at Columbia by which it sought a new
hearing on the merits of a suit between the same parties
and in which a final decree had been pronounced and en-
tered on June 24, 1970. It prayed and was granted an
injunction inhibiting further proceedings in the cause.

The complainant alleged that on August 20, 1969, it
had filed its original bill in the Chancery Court by which
it had sought a deficiency judgment against the defend-
ant, Harl C. Burgess, on a secured promissory note and
that the defendant had answered the bill and filed a cross-
bill by which he had averred a violation of the Uniform
Commercial Code in the sale of a 1968 model White
Sleeper Cab, claiming damages of $6,977.20. The com-
plainant further charged that the suit had been heard
on two days, April 29 and June 24, 1970, and on the latter
date the court had dismissed the complainant’s bill, had

548

sustained the defendant’s cross-bill, and had entered
judgment on the cross-bill and against the complainant
for $6,977.20 and the costs of the suit.

The following paragraph appears in the complaint:

“On July 24, 1970 the complainant and cross-de-
fendant filed its appeal bond with the Clerk and Master
of Maury County. The complainant and cross-defendant
prior to the expiration of the time within which to per-
fect its appeal made an effort to file its bill of excep-
tions but was informed that the Chancellor was out-
side the State of Tennessee and was unavailable to
sign the bill of exceptions.’’

Thereafter the complainant averred that it was entitled
to perfect its appeal, that it had been prevented from
doing so through no fault of its own, that it had not been
guilty of laches or negligence, but that the Chancellor
had not been available for some weeks before the expira-
tion of the time allowed for the filing of the bill of excep-
tions. Attached to the complaint as an exhibit is a tran-
seript of the previous hearing. The defendant, Earl C.
Burgess, filed a plea of res adjudicata which the Chancel-
lor sustained dismissing the complaint.

Since the suit was finally determined by a method not
involving a review or determination of facts the appeal
was to this Court. Section 16-408, Tennessee Code An-
notated.

Hl Lt will be noticed that this suit—an original action
to compel a new trial of the former suit—was begun after
the Rules of Civil Procedure had become effective and
since Rule 7 abolishes pleas and provides for the deferise
of civil actions by answer the plea will be considered as

ee 549

the defendant’s answer—an answer by which the defend-
ant asserted the single defense of res adjudicata.

Chancellor Gibson in Section 336, Gibson’s Suits in
Chaneery [5th Edition], said:

“Tf the same controversy has already been adjudi-
cated on its merits between the same parties, or their
privies, in a Court of competent jurisdiction, the judg-
ment or decree of such Court may be pleaded in bar
{to the second suit. Such plea must, however, show that
the issue and the subject matter in the two suits were
the same, and that the former suit was between sub-
stantially the same parties as the present suit; and so
much of the former bill and answer must be set forth
as is necessary to show that the same point was there in
issue.”

But the object of the suit before us is to obtain a re-
hearing of the former suit and is a direct attack upon
the decree in that suit. The parties are the same in both
actions but the subject matter is altogether different. It
follows that the defense of res adjudicata is not available
to the defendant Burgess and inasmuch as it is the only
defense which the defendant asserted we must adjudge
the answer to be insufficient.

We consider, however, that under the facts as they
appear in the record and as counsel related them in their
oral arguments we should not dispose of the appeal
without a discussion of the applicable law. This will be
of guidance to the parties on remand of the suit to the

Chancery Court.

The contention of F. D. C. Corporation is that it was
deprived of its bill of exceptions, without which its ap-

550 es

peal would have been in vain, because the Chancellor be-
fore whom the case was tried was outside the State of
Tennessee and had been unavailable to sign the bill of
exceptions.

The complainant invokes the equitable powers of the
Chancery Court to award it a rehearing in this case. That
power has been recognized by this Court in many cases
—the earliest of which were Kingsley and. Nichols v.
State Bank and Kearney and Moore v. Smith and Jack-
som, both of which were decided at the March term, 1832,
and are reported at pages 107 and 127 of 3 Yerg. [11
Tenn.].

In Dennis v. State, 187 Tenn. 548, 195 S.W. 162 [1917],
this Court for the first time held where a defendant in a
criminal case was denied his constitutional and statutory
right of appellate review by failure to settle his bill of
exceptions within the time allowed without fault on his
part such defendant was entitled to a new trial, The
Court in this case said:

“Tt is clear that through no fault of plaintiff in error
le had been denied rights to which he was entitled
under our Constitution and statutes. He was entitled
to the benefit of having the exceptions he reserved dur-
ing the trial presented to and acted upon by the judge
who presided at the trial and saw and heard all that
there occurred, and he was entitled to have that judge
pass upon the merits of those exceptions and upon the
merits of his motion for a new trial. These important
rights he had been deprived of, not by his own fault,
but by the fault of the judge whose duty it was to see
that these rights be accorded him.’’

| 551

The effect of State ex rel. Terry v. Yarnell, 156 Tenn.
327, 5 S.W.2d 471 [1928], was to apply the holding in
Dennis v. State, supra, to actions in the law court and to
hold that the aggrieved party desiring an appeal could
file a bill in equity to compel the Circuit Court to grant
him a new trial. In Tenn. Central R. Co. v. Tedder, 170
Tenn. 639, 98 S.W.2d 307 [1936], it was said that the de-
terminative question in such a case is, ‘‘Has the com-
plainant been deprived of his right to a hearing on
appeal, on the merits, through no fault of his own?’

It should be observed that the facts necessary to be
shown in order for equity to grant a new trial in a suit
filed in a law court as set out in Section 1271 of Gibson’s
Suits in Chancery are different from the facts necessary
for equity to grant a new trial in a suit filed in a law
court under the rule of State ex rel. Terry v. Yarnell,
supra. Under State ea rel. Terry v. Yarnell the facts
necessary are that the aggrieved party desiring an ap-
peal has been denied such by failure to settle his bill of
exceptions within the time allowed without any fault or
negligence on his part.

This Court has never ruled on whether a Chancery
Court can grant a rehearing as to one of its own decrees,
otherwise final, where a party to the decree has been
prevented from having an appellate review by failing to
settle his bill of exceptions within the time allowed with-
out fault or negligence on his part.

Hl We hold, therefore, that in a proper case the Chan-
cery Court may grant a party a new trial, as in the law
cases, when he has been prevented from filing his bill of
exceptions in a cause in that court within the time al-
lowed and without his fault or negligence.

552 ee]

We remand the cause to the Chancery Court for a
rehearing with permission for the parties to amend their
pleadings within the Chancellor’s discretion, and that
thereafter he pronounce such decree as may be appro-
priate. The costs of this appeal will be borne equally by
the parties. The Chancellor will adjudge the costs in the
Chancery Court.

Dyvrr, Curr Justicz, Creson and Humpureys, Jus-
aiczs, and Jenkins, Sprcian Justice, concur.

ee) 553

Stare or Tenxxsser ex rel. THomas R. UypERwoop,
Relator,

v
Dr. Orne Li, Avams, Jr., et al.
473 S.W.2d 188
(Knoxville, September Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed November 15, 1971.

Rozert LL, Crosstry, Knoxville, for appellants.

Warrex R. Wesster, Knoxville, for appellee.

Mr. Justice McCanuess, delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Thomas R. Underwood, Supervisor of Elementary Ed-_
ucation in the Knoxville School System, brought a man-
damus suit against the Superintendent of Schools and
the members of the Board of Education of Knoxville. The
Chancellor granted him relief and on appeal the Court of
Appeals reversed the Chancellor’s decree and dismissed
the suit. We granted certiorari and heard arguments at
the recent term in Knoxville.

IBM After considering the arguments of counsel, and
the record, we are of opinion that the Court of Appeals,
in their opinion prepared by Judge Clifford E. Sanders,
correctly decided the suit and we adopt that opinion as
our own. Tt is as follows:

“This suit was brought in the Chancery Court of Knox
County seeking a mandamus to require the city school
board to restore the Relator to a position in the echelon
of command in the school system equal to one formerly
held by him and to increase his salary commensurate
with his duties.

“<The parties will be referred to as Relator, Thomas
R. Underwood, and Defendants, Dr. Olin lL. Adams, Jr.,
Superintendent of Knoxville City Schools, Charles R.
Burehett, Lewis S. Howard, J. W. Carty, Sarah M.
Greene, John §. Humphreys, Howard Temple, Luther

556 ee

Woods, Kenneth Bailes and Baynard Erskine, Knoxville
Board of Education.

“The Relator was appointed to the position of super-
visor of elementary education in the Knoxville school
system in 1965 and wag reappointed cach succeeding
school year, including the 1968-1969 term. His length of
employment in this position had been sufficient to give
him tenure under Section 178 of the Charter of the City
of Knoxville, the pertinent part of which is as follows:

“« See. 178. Same-Dismissal, demotion or change in
position at reduced salary; reduction in number of
employees; temporary employees.

‘ ‘Neither the board of education, nor any member
thereof, nor the Superintendent of Schools, nor any
other official of the department of education shall have
any right to dismiss, discharge, demote or change any
employee made subject to civil service or permanent
tenure by the provisions of this act, from one position
or class to another position or class within the depart-
ment of education or otherwise at a reduced salary,
unless and until charges as specified hereinafter shall
have been filed and sustained against such employee in
the manner hereinafter provided; * * *.’

“According to the organizational chart of the school
system, as in effect prior to April, 1969, the supervisor of
elementary education was under the direct supervision
of the assistant superintendent of instruction. Other
positions in the system of equal status were supervisor
of secondary education, coordinator of special education
and supervisor of nurseries.

ee 587

“Tn April, 1969, the school board decided to make some
substantial changes in the organizational setup of the
school system. Among the changes were the creation of
the position of administrative assistant to the superin-
tendent, the addition of two assistant superintendents,
and the creation of the positions of director of secondary
education and director of elementary education. The
position of supervisor of secondary education was abol-
ished, but the position of supervisor of elementary edu-
cation was not abolished and the Relator still retains this
position in the school system.

“Immediately after the reorganization setup was
adopted, there was some confusion as to the position of
the Relator and he was advised that his duties were being
changed and that he would be in a different department.
But this was corrected and the Relator was reassigned
as supervisor of elementary education long before this
suit was filed.

“Under the new organizational chart of the school sys-
tem, the director of elementary education is under the
direct supervision of the assistant superintendent of in-
struction and the supervisor of elementary cducation is
under direct supervision of the director. The Relator is
now one step further removed from the assistant super-
intendent than under the former organization plan.

“Although there have been some changes in the duties
of the Relator under the reorganization, which he de-
scribes as a reduction in duties, there has been no reduc-
tion in his salary. As a matter of fact, he received an
increase of approximately $700 per year.

“The purpose of creating the positions of directors
of both elementary and secondary education was to up-

558

grade the school system. One of the minimum require-
ments for these positions is, among others, ‘the doctor-
ate degree or work beyond a master’s with definite dates
for completing the doctorate,’ and these new positions
will pay a salary ranging from $13,000 to $15,000 per
annum, depending upon experience.

“Dr, Earl Henry, who was formerly supervisor of sec-
ondary education, and who meets the minimum require-
ments, was appointed director of secondary education.
The record does not indicate that the Relator meets these
minimum requirements for director of elementary educa-
tion and that position has not been filled although the
school board has been advertising for applicants with the
leading universities throughout the country.

“The Relator filed his suit on the theory that the re-
organization of the school system as now constituted
amounts to his being demoted; that he should be placed
in the position of director of elementary education and
that his salary should be increased commensurate with
that of the director of elementary education, and he seeks
by his bill, as amended, to have the court, by mandatory
injunction, require the board of education to go act.

“The Defendants filed a demurrer to the bill. The prin-
cipal grounds, as now pertinent, are that Petitioner failed
to allege any reduction in salary or other impairment of
his tenure rights and that he is not, as a matter of law,
entitled to an increase in salary.

“The Chanceéllor overruled the demurrer and Defend-
ants filed their answer. The case was tried before The
Honorable Len G. Broughton, Jy., Chancellor, after
which he filed a. memorandum opinion, finding the issues
in favor of the Relator.

ee 559

“In keeping with the memorandum opinion, a decree
was subsequently entered in which the court decreed: (1)
That an injunction issue requiring the Defendants to
eliminate from the organizational structure of the board
of education the position of director of elementary edu-
cation. (2) Or, in the alternative, the Defendants are
directed to appoint the Relator to the position of director
of elementary education. (3) That the board of education
fix the Relator’s salary commensurate with the position
of director of elementary education and this be reported
to the court and if the court is not satisfied with the sal-
ary the court will redocket the case and determine the
salary that the Relator should have been paid for the
school years 1969-1970 and the salary that shall be paid
for the school year 1970-1971. (4) Enjoined the Defend-
ants from employing any person other than the Relator
in the position of director of elementary education or in
any way divesting or withholding from him any of the
powers, authorities and responsibilities had or exercised
by him in his capacity as supervisor of elementary edu-
cation prior to April 7, 1969.

“The Defendants have perfected their appeal to this
court and assigned errors.

‘Defendants’ assignments of error are as follows:

“<« Assignments of Error No. 1. The Court erred
in overruling the defendants’ demurrer to the bill be-
cause the bill showed on its face that the Relator had
not been dismissed, discharged, demoted, or changed
from one position or class to another at a reduced
salary, but rather the bill showed that the Relator’s
complaint was about transfer and failure to receive as
large an increase as he wished.

560 ee

“ “Assignment of Error No, 2. The Court erred in
finding and holding that the alteration of the Relator’s
duties by the Board of Education was a demotion
within the meaning of Section 178 of the Charter of
the City of Knoxville. This was error for the reason
that the pertinent section of the City Charter does not
prohibit change in position or class except where the
same involves a reduction of salary. There was no
allegation or evidence that the Relator’s salary had
been reduced, nor was there any evidentiary basis for
the Relator’s allegation that he was entitled to par-
ticular salary increments by law.

“+ Assignment of Error No. 3. The Court erred by
directing the defendants in the final decree ‘‘to elimi-
nate from the organizational structure of the Board of
Education the position of ‘‘Director of Elementary
Education’’ so as to return the relator to a position
as head of the elementary division of the Knoxville
City School System, or in the alternative, * * * to ap-
point the relator to the position of Director of Ele-
mentary Education; * * * to revise the salary of the
yelator’’ and prohibit the defendants from ‘‘employ-
ing any person other than the relator in the position
of Director of Elementary Education, or in any way
divesting or withholding from him any of the powers,
authorities, and responsibilities had or exercised by
him in his capacity as Supervisor of Elementary Edu-
cation prior to April 7, 1969’’.

“<The foregoing is error for the reason that it in-
serts the Chancery Court directly into the management
of the School System of the City of Knoxville and in-
tervenes in a lawful discretionary function of that
Board by guaranteeing that the Relator will for life or

| 561

good behavior have charge of the Department of Hle-
mentary Instruction in the City School System.’

“Tn our construction of Section 178 of the City Char-
ter, we think that before an employee’s tenure rights are
violated through demotion or change from one position
or class to another position or class, it must be accompan-
ied with a reduction in salary and as long as there is no
reduction in salary the school board is at liberty to make
such changes as, in its discretion, it considers to be in
the best interest of the school system, The substance of
this section is: ‘Neither the board of education * * * nor
any other official of the department of education shall
have any right to * * * demote or change any employee
* * * from one position or class to another position or
class * * * at a reduced salary * * * unless and until
charges * * *,’ (Emphasis ours)

‘‘Relator, in his brief, insists that the words ‘at a re-
duced salary’ could not be applied to the words. ‘dismiss’
(ov) ‘discharge’ or the antecedent ‘demote’ since these
three words are in the same series and ‘demote’ cannot
be modified by the later words ‘otherwise at a reduced
salary.’ He insists that the words ‘at a reduced salary’
must be applied solely to the word ‘otherwise.’

“We cannot agree. Relator cites ug to a number of
cases which hold ‘a statute must be construed as a
whole, giving effect to each word.’ Anderson Fish &
Oyster Co. v. Olds [197 Tenn. 604], 277 S.W.2d 344;
Medic Ambulance Service v. McAdams, 392 S.W.2d 103,
216 Tenn. 304; Carter v. Jett, 370 S.W.2d 576, 51 Tenn.
App. 560; Mayhew +. Mayhew, 376 8.W. 2d 324, 52 Tenn.
App. 459.

562 eS

‘« «Where words in statute seem in conflict with one
another, statute should be construed as entirety with
view to harmonizing all its parts, if practicable, and
courts mpst lean in favor of construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may
make some words idle or nugatory.’ Day v. North Am.
Rayon Corp. [D.C.}, 140 F.Supp. 490.

“ «Tn construing the statute, the whole is to he exam-
ined with a view to arrive at true intention of each part
and effect is to be given, if possible, to whole instrument
and to every section and clause.’ Tiger Creek Bus Line
v. Tiger Creek Transp, Ass’n, 216 S.W.2d 348, 187 Tenn.
654.

“ «Tt is not in accord with any rule of statutory con-
struction to lift one sentence out from the statute and
construe it alone, without reference to the balance of the
statute.’ Rose v. Blewett, 303 S.W.2d 709, 202 Tenn. 153;
State ex vel. Rector vr. Wilkes [222 Tenn. 384], 436 S.W.
2d 425.

“To apply the words ‘at a reduced salary’ to only the
word ‘otherwise’ would he to lift it out of the statute and
construe it without construing the entire statute.

“Had it been the intention of the legislature not to
modify the words ‘demote or change any employee from
one position or class to another position or class’ with
the words ‘at a reduced salary,’ they doubtless would
have said ‘demote or change any employee from one
position or class or reduce the salary of any employee
* * * unless and until charges * * *?

“Nowhere in the court’s memorandum opinion or in
the final decree does he find that the Relator had a re-
duction in salary. The court held that the creation of the

De 563

position of director of elementary education and making
the position of supervisor of elementary education sub-
ordinate to that position constituted a ‘demotion’ of the
Relator in violation of his tenure rights. Neither does
the Relator, himself, insist that he had a reduction in
salary. His insistence and the insistence of the chancellor
are that he should have an increase in salary commen-
surate with that of the director of secondary education.

“We think the assignments of error of the Defendants
are well taken and are affirmed.

“The judgment of the trial court ix reversed and the
case dismissed. The cost of this appeal as well as the
cost of the trial court are taxed to the Relator and the
sureties on his cost bond.’”

Dyer, Cater Justice, (reson and Humpureys, Jvs-
vices, and Jenxiys, Specian Jvsrice, concur.

Suzanna Suniivan, b/n/f, Appellant,

wv

Roserr D. Hurserr et al., Appellees.

Marez Sunrivan, Appellant,
v.

Roszrt D. Herperr et al., Appellees.

Peres Sunzivan, Appellant,
vw.

Rosser D. Hurserr et al., Appellees.

473 8.W.2d 453

(Nashville, December Term, 1970.)

Opinion filed September 7, 1971.

Petition on Rehearing November 15, 1971.

a

Joun K. Manor, Jz., Gracey, Buck, Mappry, & Cowan,
Nashville, for appellants.

Howarp Brinces, Department of Law, Metropolitan
Government, Nashville, for appellees.

566 SC“ CS
Ce
Mr. Justice Humesrers delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The Sullivans sued Robert D. Herbert and Metropoli-
tan Government for damages growing out of an automo-
bile accident at the intersection of Cantrell Avenue with
Westmont Avenue in Davidson County, Tennessee. The
trial judge sustained Metropolitan Government’s demur-
rers, the Sullivans nonsuited Herbert, and appealed to
this Court.

The declarations alleged that Marge Sullivan, with her
minor child, Suzanna Sullivan, riding with her as a
passenger, drove her automobile northward on Cantrell
Avenue into the intersection of Cantrell Avenue with
Westmont Avenue where it was struck by Herbert’s au-
tomobile, which was going westward at the time on West-
mont. It is alleged that vandals had removed a traffic
sign requiring motorists entering into the Westmont
intersection as the Sullivans did to stop before doing so.
And that the absence of the sign made the intersection
dangerous. The declarations charged that, under all the
facts and cireumstances Metropolitan Government was
guilty of negligence and of committing a nuisance. This
fault was spelled out in the declarations as follows:

“1, Plaintiff here and now adopts and incorporates by
reference all allegations of the First Count hereof and,
in addition thereto, alleges that Cantrell Avenue and

ee 567

‘Westmont Avenue at all times mentioned herein were
public highways within the corporate limits of the
defendant Metropolitan Government and were on
rights of way owned by said defendant in its proprie-
tary capacity and it was the duty of said defendant to
maintain said highways and the intersection of said
highways in good repair and safe condition and to
maintain adequate traffic signs at said intersection.
Prior to August 29, 1969, said defendant had placed
and maintained for many years a stop sign on the
rights of way owned hy it for said highways near the
southeast corner of said intersection which displayed
the word ‘stop’, facing to the south toward traffie on
Cantrell Avenue approaching said intersection from
the south, so as to warn such traffic to stop before enter-
ing said intersection. On August 29, 1969, said stop
sign was removed and agents and officials of said de-
fendant were given notice that said stop sign had been
removed.

“2. The defendant Metropolitan Government was neg-
ligent in that it failed to replace said stop sign after
veceiving notice that it had been removed and in that
jt allowed said intersection to be and remain in an ex-
tremely dangerous and defective condition without said
stop sign.

“3. As a direct and proximate result of said negligence
of the defendant Metropolitan Government, concurring
with the negligence of the defendant Herbert as alleged
in the First Count, plaintiff suffered the damages, in-
juries and losses set out in the First Count hereof, to
which reference is here made.”’ Tr, p. 4-5.

By amendment to the fifth count it is charged that the
procedure for replacement of stop signs followed by

Metropolitan Government results in many days’ delay
between notice and replacement and that this amounts to
negligence resulting in a dangerous and hazardous condi-
tion.

568

By another count, making the same allegations, it is
charged that the failure to maintain the stop sign at this
intersection constituted a nuisance.

Hl The trial judge sustained Metropolitan Govern-
ment’s demurrer based on governmental immunity, and
the Sullivans have appealed. While the trial court was
likely correct under Powell v. City of Nashville, 167
Tenn. 334, 69 S.W.2d 894, we do not reach that question,
because of a fatal defect in the declarations of which
we must take notice: the failure to allege facts which if
proved would show the absence of the stop sign to be the
proximate cause of the collision.

Reduced to their essentials, that is to their facts, the
declarations allege that for some time prior to the acci-
dent there had been a stop sign at the intersection but
that on the day of the accident there was no stop sign at
the intersection. Insofar as the Sullivans might be af-
fected thereby these are all the facts alleged.

It is true that the declarations allege that Metropolitan
Government was negligent in failing to replace the stop
sign after notice of its removal; and thereby also com-
mitted a nuisance. And it is true the declarations allege
that Metropolitan Government allowed the intersection

to be and remain ‘‘in an ex!
tive condition without said
conceded that these allega

remely dangerous and defec-
stop sign.’’? But it must be
ions of negligence and nui-

sance and dangerous and defective condition are simply

conclusions, And it must a.

so be conceded that conclu-

| 569

sions of a pleader amount to nothing; not even being
necessary to proper pleading. Cotton Oil Co. v. Shamblin,
101 Tenn. 263, 47 S.W. 496; Cumberland Etc. Co. v. Cook,
103 Tenn. 730, 55 S.W. 152. In History of a Lawsuit,
sec. 108, the rule is stated, ‘‘A declaration must allege
facts and not more conclusions. ... A defendant cannot
meet mere conclusions with proof, and he is entitled to
know the facts alleged against him in advance of the
trial’.

Specifically, absent from the declarations are allega-
tions of the particular facts which show that this street
intersection was made dangerous and hazardous by the
absence of the stop sign. The conclusion of the pleader
that this was the case is not enough.

‘We have noticed the shortcomings in the averments
of the declarations, without specification of errors by
Metropolitan Government, and have tested the averments
severely, because we think any rule we might adopt ex-
tending a municipality’s governmental immunity beyond
its present boundaries, see Powell v. City of Nashville,
supra, must include a statement by us of the particular
condition of the intersection on which such liability
might possibly be predicated.

Hl With respect to this proposed municipal tort lia-
bility in intersection cases, in consideration of the gen-
eral validity of the doctrine of governmental immunity,
and in consideration of the heavy duty imposed by law
on motorists at intersections, laws which both obligate
and protect the motorist and serve to make intersection
crossing safe, if this Court is to hold the failure to main-
tain a traffic stop sign at an intersection is actionable
negligence, (nuisance as a basis of action is excluded

570 ee)

entirely by Powell v. City of Nashville, supra), it must
be upon a case showing that the intersection is, in fact,
virtually a trap, and as such, a causative factor in the
accident. See Walker v. Willioms, 215 Tenn. 195, 384
S.W.2d 447, for definition of a trap.

Such a requirement would not be harsh in view of the
present general rule against liability. And this manner
of stating what we would require gives the fact trier
something more concrete than the ordinary, more or less
nebulous proximately causal negligence rule by which to
measure liability.

When the Superior New Jersey Court was called upon
to review its previous holding that its municipal cor-
porations were immune from tort liability for injuries
due to traffic signal maintenance and operation, Vickers
v. Camden, 122 N.J.L. 14, 3 A.2d 618, it indicated that it
was willing to hold local governments responsible ‘‘for
failure to properly maintain and operate a traflie con-
trol device’, where, ‘‘a municipality had notice of the
malfunction or a sufficient time had elapsed so that it
could be chargeable therewith and that the resulting
situation was a realistically causative factor in the oc-
currence giving rise to the asserted cause of action.’’
Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649, 651.

“Realistically causative factor’’ is some stronger than
ordinary proximate cause, but not strong enough to make
it clear to a jury just what is required. We think the
word ‘‘trap’’ will make this clear.

Cruson, Justice, would affirm the judgment of the trial
court on the authority of Powell v. Nashville, et al., 167
Tenn. 334, 69 S.W.2d 894, and Gainesboro v. Gore, 131
Tenn. 35, 173 S.W. 442.

ee 571

The assignments of error are overruled and the judg-
ment of the trial court is affirmed.

Dyvsr, Curr Justicz, Creson and McCanusss, Jus-
tics, and Jenkins, Sproran Justice, coneur.

Oprion on Petition to Renzar
Mr. Justice Humprreys.

In our opinion in this case handed down on September
7, 1971, we dismissed plaintiffs’ suit on inadequacies
found in their declaration, which we recognized without
assignment of error; being of opinion these were fatal
to plaintiffs’ cause of action. Plaintiffs have filed a
petition for rehearing pointing out that justice requires,
and T.C.A. sec. 27-329 permits, remand under these cir-
cumstances. We agree, and it is ordered on the petition
to rehear that the case be remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

Dyzr, Cumr Jusricz, Creson and McCanuzss, Jus-
tick, and Jexxins, Srrciat Justice, concur,

572 ee

Consotipation Coan Company, Appellant,

Exmzr J. Browy, Appellee.

Consotipation Coat Company, Appellant,

Cuanume Purips, Appellee.
474 S.W.2d 416

(Knozville, September Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed December 6, 1971.

Dowatp I, Paryn, Knoxville, for appellant.

J. H. Hovers, Knoxville, J. Carsox Rmexovn, Clinton,
for appellee.

Mr. Justice Creson delivered the opinion of the Court.

574 |

This opinion involves two appeals perfected by the
employer of the appellees from the Law Division of the
Law and Equity Court of Anderson County. The trial
judge determined that appellees were suffering from the
occupational disease of pneumoconiosis or silicosis which
rendered them permanently and totally disabled within
the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and
that this disease arose out of and in the course of appel-
lee’s employment with appellant.

It was also further determined that appellee Phillips
was entitled to recover certain material expenses from
appellant in the amount of $63.50.

In this opinion the parties will be designated by their
adversary status in the trial court; that is, Elmer J.
Brown and Charlie Phillips, as petitioners, and Consoli-
dation Coal Company, as defendant.

Each of the petitioners filed his petition seeking com-
pensation. The material allegations of each petition are
identical. The substance of both petitions is that, prior
to March 31, 1970, defendant operated a coal mine near
Devonia, Tennessee; that petitioners were employed by
defendant and worked in the mine at Devonia; that while
performing their duties petitioners were exposed to and
forced to breathe air which contained great concentra-
tions of dust, silica particles and other deleterious
materials; that petitioners continued working in this
atmosphere until March 31, 1970, when defendant ceased
to operate the mine at Devonia; that after being ex-
amined by a physician on April 17, 1970, petitioner
Brown learned for the first time that he was suffering
from the disease of silicosis; that petitioner Phillips
learned on June 17, 1970, that he was suffering from the

disease of silicosis, after being examined by Dr. William
Swann; that this malady was brought about by working
in dust laden air; and that petitioners are permanently
and totally disabled within the meaning of the Work-
men’s Compensation Law and justly entitled to relief.

Defendant filed its answer to each petition. In each
answer, defendant admits that petitioner was employed
by defendant, and had worked in the coal mine for a num-
ber of years. Defendant denied that petitioners were ex-
posed to silica dust while working in its mine and that
petitioners were totally and permanently disabled. De-
fendant further avers that if petitioners are suffering
from silicosis, then petitioners knew, or should have
known, that they were suffering from this disease more
than one year prior to commencement of their suits
against defendant. Defendant denies that petitioners
contracted silicosis from working in the coal mine at
Devonia.

The evidence presented at the hearings on the two
petitions may he summarized as follows:

Petitioners have spent their entire economic lives
working in coal mines, and neither of the petitioners has
had the benefit of much formal education. Petitioner
Brown has worked in the coal mining industry for forty-
eight years and has an eighth-grade education. On the
other hand, petitioner Phillips has spent twenty-seven
years in the coal mines, and has a third-grade education.
Mr. Brown has worked for defendant for seventeen years
while Mr. Phillips has been in the employ of defendant
at Devonia mine for fifteen years.

Both petitioners testified that they experienced ex-
treme difficulty in breathing and that their breathing has

576 es

been severely strained for the past one or two years.
Petitioners stated that they were unaware of what caused
the shortness of breath until they visited physicians
after the mine closed on March 31, 1970. Petitioner
Brown stated that he thought that his breathing difficul-
ties were caused by ‘‘heart trouble”’ since his father and
one of his brothers had died of heart disease.

On April 17, 1970, Mr. Brown was examined by Dr.
William Rogers. He learned for the first time that he
had a great accumulation of rock and coal dust in his
lungs. Petitioner Brown testified that he was told by
Dr. Rogers that this condition was incurable and would
continue to become more acute, Mr. Brown further testi-
fied that his breathing has become progressively more
strained and difficult since he was examined by Dr.
Rogers.

Mr. Phillips was examined by Dr. William Swann on
June 17, 1970. After the examination was completed,
Mr. Phillips likewise was informed that he had con-
tracted silicosis. Petitioner Phillips further testified that
he has experienced more difficulty in breathing since he
was originally examined on June 17, 1970.

At the hearing on their respective cases, each peti-
tioner stated that he was not able to perform any type
of work, Petitioner Brown testified that he had tried to
mow his lawn and run the vacuum cleaner for his wife
but that he could not perform these simple tasks since
his breathing was impaired. Mr. Phillips stated that he
had tried ‘‘to make a garden’’ but he could not finish
this task since he could not breathe a sufficient quantity
of air.

ee BIT

At the hearings below petitioners’ wives, Josephine
Brown and Edith Phillips, also testified. Their testimony
corroborated the testimony of petitioners, in every re-
spect.

a\t the hearing on Mr. Brown’s petition, the deposition
of Dr. Rogers was introduced into evidence. Dr. Rogers
stated that he found Mr. Brown’s physical condition to
be as follows:

‘‘He had rather marked nodulation in his lung fields,
all through both lung fields, some small rounded
nodules maybe a millimeter in diameter, and other
nodules that would be as large as three or four milli-
meters in diameter, some of them somewhat irregular.
This was certainly compatible with coal workers
pneumoconiosis or silicosis, and I put this in either
stage two, if you are talking about silicosis, or the
more modern term of category two. I felt he had very
definite coal workers disease and more than just a
small amount.”’

Dr. Rogers further said that the condition described
above is permanent and that it may get worse.

at the hearing on My, Phillips’ petition, the déposition
of Dr. William Swann was received into evidence. Dr.
Swann stated that after examining Mr. Phillips, he found
that petitioner had contracted silicosis. After petitioner
Phillips’ disease was diagnosed by Dr. Swann, Dr.
Rogers examined him. In his deposition, which was also
introduced into evidence, Dr. Rogers stated that Mr.
Phillips had contracted silicosis and that this condition
would be permanent.

From each adverse judgment below defendant has
seasonably perfected an appeal-in-error to this Court,

oT8

Defendant assigns three errors in the judgment rendered
for petitioner Brown. The substance of these assign-
ments are: (1) that the trial court erred in adjudging
petitioner Brown permanently disabled since this finding
is not supported by expert medical evidence; (2) the
finding of fact that petitioner is totally disabled is in-
conclusive sinee the trial judge disregarded material
evidence in the record that Mr. Brown was not totally
disabled ; (3) petitioner’s right to compensation is barred
by T.C.A. sec, 50-1108 since he did not commence his
suit until more than one year after he knew that he had
contracted the disease.

Defendant has also assigned three errors to the judg-
ment below rendered for petitioner Phillips. The sub-
stance of these assignments are: (1) that the trial court
erred in adjudging petitioner Phillips permanently dis-
abled since this finding is not supported by expert medi-
eal evidence; (2) the finding of fact that petitioner is
totally disabled is inconclusive since the trial judge dis-
regarded material evidence in the record that Mr. Phil-
lips was not totally disabled; (3) the trial court erred
in allowing medical expenses for treatment hy a physi-
cian not designated by defendant.

We will proceed to consider and discuss together the
first assignments to the judgments below, then we will
consider the second assignments of error to judgments
since this will facilitate our determination of the instant
case. Finally, the third assignment of error to each judg-
ment will be considered separately since these assign-
ments raise two distinct issues.

Hl At this juncture, it must be pointed out that the
scope of review of facts in workmen’s compensation cases
is limited by the material evidence rule. The findings of

ee 579

fact in the court below will not be disturbed on appeal if
supported by material evidence. Travelers Insurance
Company v. Googe (1965) 217 Tenn. 272, 397 S.W.2d 368.

Hl In its first assignment to each of the judgments
rendered in favor of petitioners, defendant assails the
finding of the trial judge that petitioners were perma-
nently disabled since there is no medical evidence in the
record to support this finding. Defendant relies on our
earlier case of Minton v. Leonard. (1967) 219 Tenn. 642,
412 S.W.2d 886. In Minton v. Leonard we reversed the
trial court because its finding that the injured workman
was permanently disabled was not supported by any
material evidence. The records in the cases at Bar show
beyond any shadow of doubt that Dr. Rogers and Dr.
Swann stated that the disease that afflicts petitioners is
permanent. The finding of the trial judge is supported
by material evidence.

HI Defendant asserts in the second assignments to
each of the judgments below that the finding by the trial
court that petitioners were totally disabled is inconclu-
sive since the trial judge disregarded material evidence
to the contrary. Defendant contends that there was com-
petent medical cvidence in the record that petitioners
were not totally disabled.

This contention of defendant is without merit. In
Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Insurance
Company v. Cameron (1967) 220 Tenn. 636, 422 S.W.2d
427, we pointed out that there are differences in the
meaning of disability in a medical and legal sense. We
said:

“This Court recognizes that there are differences be-
tween the medical and the legal meaning of disability

580

under the Workmen’s Compensation statutes. Chief
Justice Burnett, in Lunsford v. A. C. Lawrence Leather
Co, (1949) 189 Tenn 293, 225 S.W.2d 66, and the late
Justice White, in McKenzie v. Campbell & Damn Mfg.
Co. (1962) 209 Tenn. 475, 354 S.W.2d 440, have ably
delineated the variance. The measures of disability
in a medical sense, are substantially more narrow than
those contemplated by the Workmen’s Compensation
statutes. In determining what may constitute perma-
nent total disability, the concepts embodied in Work-
men’s Compensation take into account many pertinent
factors, including skill, education, training, duration
and job opportunity for the disabled.”

The records in the instant case reflect that the trial
judge was guided by the criteria discussed in the Feder-
ated Mutual case in determining that petitioners were
totally disabled. This finding is supported by material
evidence, and we will not disturb it.

Tl In reference to the judgment recovered by peti-
tioner Brown in the court below, defendant assigns as
error the failure of the trial judge to rule that the suit
was barred by T.C.A. sec. 50-1108. The pertinent part
of 'T.C.A. sec. 50-1108 provides:

“‘Timitations.—The right to compensation for oecupa-
tional disease shall be forever barred unless suit there-
for is commenced within one (1) year after the
beginning of the incapacity for work resulting from an
occupational disease.’’

In Tennessee Products & Chemical Corporation v.
Reeves (1967) 220 Tenn. 148, 415 S.W.2d 118, we dis-
cussed the statutory provision quoted above. We said:

| 581

“Tt results before the statute of limitations in oceupa-
tional disease cases begins to run there must be: First,
an incapacity for work; Second, either actual or con-
structive knowledge and occupational disease is the
cause of the incapacity for work. In relating the in-
capacity for work to the disease an employee is re-
quired to exercise reasonable care and diligence; and
if he does not he could be charged with constructive
notice.’?

There is not one iota of evidence that petitioner Brown
ever had any knowledge that his incapacity was caused
by the occupational disease of silicosis until he was ex-
amined on April 17, 1970, by Dr. Rogers, nor is there any
evidence that petitioner failed to use reasonable diligence
to ascertain that he was afflicted with an occupational
disease. Mr. Brown’s suit which was commenced on
April 28, 1970, was instituted within the period of the
statute of limitations.

Hl Finally, defendant contends that the trial judge
erred in allowing petitioner Phillips to recover medical
expenses in the amount of $63.50. These expenses arose
out of the tests and examination by Dr. Swann on June
17, 1970. This was prior to the time petitioner notified
defendant that he had contracted silicosis and brought
suit. Defendant contends that it is not liable for these
medical expenses since they were incurred in treatment
of petitioner by a physician not designated by defendant.

T.C.A. sec, 50-1004 provides that the employer shall
furnish

‘«.., free of charge to the employee such medical and
surgical treatment, medicine, medical and surgical
supplies, crutches, artificial members, and other ap-

582 es

paratus, such nursing services as ordered by the at-
tending physician and hospitalization, including such
dental work made reasonably necessary by accident as
herein defined, as may be reasonably required ... .
The injured employee shall accept the same; provided,
that the employer shall designate a group of three (3)
or more physicians or surgeons not associated together
in practice if available in that community from which
the injured employee shall have the privilege of select-
ing the operating surgeon or the attending physician;
”

In Consolidation Coal Company v. Pride (1970) 224
Tenn. 188, 452 S.W.2d 349, we held that an employee
could not recover medical expenses for treatment of an
occupational disease from a physician not designated by
his employer after he became aware that he had con-
tracted the disease. After the employee learns that he is
afflicted with an occupational disease, he is ‘‘under a
duty to consult with his employer . . . before incurring
additional medical expenses.’’

However, in the case of Charnes v. Burk (1959) 205
Tenn. 371, 326 S.W.2d 657, we allowed an employee to
recover medical expenses incurred in the diagnosis of
his disease which arose prior to notice of claim for com-
pensation and institution of suit. The medical expenses
in Charnes v. Burk were incident to the employee’s ascer-
taining for the first time that he had contracted an
occupational disease. This is exactly the same situation
that we have before us in petitioner Phillips’ case. The
trial judge did not err by awarding petitioner his medical
expenses incurred in the diagnosis of his condition.

ee

All assignments of error in the cases at bar are over-
ruled and the judgments of the court below affirmed.
Costs of the two appeals are taxed to defendant.

Dyszr, Cuter Justice, Humpureys and McCantass, Jus-
vices, and Jenxins, Spucran Justice, concur,

584 ee

NarHan Sxipper, Appellee-Petitioner,

Great Cexrrat Insurance Compayy,
Appellee-Defendant,

and

Cuartes E, Wortey, in his capacity as Treasurer of the
State of Tennessee, and as Custodian of the Second
Injury Fund, Appellant-Defendant.

474 §,W.2d 420

(Knoxville, September Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed December 6, 1971.

585

Norsart J. Suovis, Knoxville (Locxsrr, Snow, &
Weaver, Knoxville, of counsel), for appellee-petitioner.

Srvart F. Dys, Knoxville (Kamer, Dy, Greenwoop,
Jounson, Rayson & MoVuten, Knoxville, of counsel), for
appellee-defendant.

Davin M. Paox, Attorney General, C. Hayzs Coonzy,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant-defendant.

Mr. Curr Justice Dyzr delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This is an appeal by Charles H. Worley, Treasurer of
the State of Tennessee, and Custodian of the Second
Injury Fund, pursuant to T.C.A. sec. 50-1027, from a
judgment awarding Nathan Skipper, designated herein
as employee, benefits payable out of said Fund.

Employee, male, age 37, attained a 9th grade education.
At the age of eleven months employee contracted polio-
myelitis, resulting in the following permanent physical
weaknesses: marked muscle weaknesses in both feet and
legs; deformity of the left foot and heel, claw toes on
both feet with weak dorsiflexors of both ankles and a drop
foot gait bilaterally; a waddling gait necessary in order
to clear the floor during the swing through. At about the
age of twenty-seven, employee suffered a permanent
injury to his right eye when a battery exploded, leaving
little vision in this eye.

Employee with these handicaps had for the past twelve
or so years worked in various grocery stores, handling
stock, operating the cash register, and helping in the
meat department. On June 1, 1970, while employed by

ee 587

the Thirteenth Street Grocery he got his left hand caught
in a conveyor belt, which injury required amputation of
some of the fingers on the hand. As a result of his injury
employee brought this suit against Great Central Insur-
ance Company, the insurance carrier for his employer,
and Charles E. Worley, in his capacity as Custodian of
the Second Injury Fund. Employee sought benefits from
Great Central Insurance Company for one hundred per
cent loss of use of his left hand and benefits from the
Second Injury Fund on the basis he was now totally and
permanently disabled.

The chancellor awarded employee benefits based on
fifty per cent permanent partial loss of use of the left
hand in the amount of $3,379.05, payable by the Great
Central Insurance Company. The chancellor finding
employee was now totally and permanently disabled,
awarded employee the remaining benefits due for such
disability, the commuted amount being $11,948.42, pay-
able from the Second Injury Fund. Charles EH. Worley,
as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, appealed, as-
signing one error as follows:

That the trial court erred in awarding a recovery
from the Second Injury Fund on the ground that there
is no material evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that the Petitioner is permanently and totally
ineapacitated as required under T.C.A. see. 50-1027.

Employee deseribed the manner in which he was able
to work in his handicapped condition prior to the injury
to his left hand. Employee returned to work about Oc-
tober 21, 1970, for the same employer and described how
his work after the injury to his hand by the use of his
right hand and the heel of his left hand, Employee stated

588 |

his work after the injury to his left hand was more diffi-
cult than before, and in its use he suffered pain.

John Valentine, an employee of the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Employment Security for 16 years, with the duty
of obtaining employment for applicants, testified as fol-
lows: That he would not consider employee to be
mmemployable, but that a person of employee’s education,
abilities and infirmities would he very difficult to place.

Dr. John H. Bell, an orthopedic surgeon, stated em-
ployee ‘‘has a total permanent medical impairment at
the present time of approximately fifty per cent to the
body as a whole.’’? Dr. Bell also stated in view of em-
ployee’s physical condition and education, he ‘‘can be
expected to have extreme difficulty in obtaining employ-
ment in occupations he is able to handle.”

My. Harl Davis, owner of the Thirteenth Street Gro-
cery, testified employee had been working for him for
about three years, operating the cash register and looking
after stock; that when employee returned {o work after
the injury he was assigned the same duties, but in the
use of his left hand he had slowed down; that he paid
employee the same wages by the ‘hour after the injury
as he had paid him before the injury.

The custodian of the Second Injury Fund argues un-
der the definition of permanent total disability set out in
T.C.A. see. 50-1007(e), employee is not permanently and
totally disabled as required by T.C.A. sec. 50-1027, since
it is conclusively shown employee after the injury to his
left hand returned to work in the same type of employ-
ment and at the same wages as he had prior to his injury.

ee 589

The pertinent part of T.C.A. sec. 50-1007(e), defining
permanent total disability reads as follows:

‘When an injury... totally ineapacitates the employee
from working at an occupation which brings him an
income, such employee shall be considered ‘‘totally
disabled’’.

The controling issue here is whether the fact employee
after the injury to his left hand returned to work in the
same type of employment, at the same wages, per se,
precludes a finding by the court that employee is totally
disabled as these words are used in T.C.A. sec, 50-
1007(e).

On this issue the trial judge reasons as follows:

In my opinion this man will never be back in Court
again, and this is his last erack, because I think he is
totally disabled as far as the labor market is concerned,
and that’s what the courts look to. I don’t know that
he falls in the odd-lot classification referred to in
Larson, because he does have some skills. He has
worked in a grocery store for thirteen and one-half
years, but whether he falls within that or within a
grocery store employee, in either event the expert who
has been in this field for sixteen years says that he
doubts that he could find employment for him as an
odd-lot man or as a grocery store employee. I put the
question as bluntly to him as I knew how, that if his
present employer, Mr. Davis, who testified here, no
longer had the opportunity to employ him and Mr.
Skipper came in to get employment, could he place him,
and he said he doubted it very seriously. It confirms
the Court’s view on the matter, and I do find that he
is unemployable. He is to be commended for the fact

590

that he has not been supported by the Government up
to this point, but that he has made a strenuous effort
successfully to support himself and his wife and family
by her prior marriage. But in the state of his hand as
it now is and all of his combined conditions, it is the
Court’s opinion that he could not obtain employment
elsewhere,

T have studied the medical reports and looked at the
man’s hand and heard his testimony as to its useful-
ness or lack thereof, the pain that he suffers in two of
his fingers when they come in contact with anything. ...

\t the threshold we should note we treat the rating
given employee of fifty per cent permanent total dis-
ability to the body as a whole by Dr. Bell as a clinical
or medical percentage. Dr. Bell meant this percentage to
he such as clearly shown by the use of his words ‘‘medical
impairment’’ and his observation that employee would
fmd it extremely difficult to obtain employment. The
difference between medical disability and disability
within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation
statute is clearly expressed by Mr. Justice Creson in
Federated Mutual I & H Insurance Co. v. Cameron, 220
Tenn. 636, 422 S.W.2d 427 (1967), in the following
language:

This Court recognizes that there ave differences he-
{ween the medical and the legal meaning of disability
under the Workmen’s Compensation statutes. Chief
Justice Burnett, in Lunsford v. A. C. Lawrence Leather
Co, (1949) 189 Tenn, 293, 225 S.W.2d 66, and the late
Justice White, in WeKengie v. Campbell & Dann Mfg.
Co, (1962) 209 Tenn. 475, 354 S.W.2d 440, have ably
delineated the variance. The measures of disability,

in a medical sense, are substantially more narrow than
those contemplated by the Workmen’s Compensation
statutes. In determining what may constitute perma-
nent total disability, the concepts embodied in Work-
men’s Compensation take into account many pertinent
factors, including skill, education, training, duration
and joh opportunity for the disabled.

While not directly in point, the reasoning of the Court
in Greeneville Cabinet Co. +. Ramsey, 195 Tenn. 409, 260
S.W.2d 157 (1953), is persuasive in the decision in the
ease at bar. Tn Ramsey the Court was considering the
Janguage of the last paragraph of Subsection (¢) of
T.CLA. sec. 50-1007, as it read prior to amendment by
Chapter 111, Public Acts of 1953. Under this statute at
the time certain cases of permanent partial disability
were compensated on the basis of ‘‘the difference be-
tween [the wage of the workman] at the time of the
injury, and the wage ‘he is able to earn in his partially
disabled condition’.’’

In Ramsey, the employee did return to work after the
injury for the same employer, in the same type of em-
ployment, and for the same or better wages. This being
true, it was insisted under the statute in effect at the time
employee was not entitled to any compensation. The
Court, finding the words of the statute ‘‘is able to earn’’
were not synonymous with ‘‘is earning’’, held the em-
ployee was not precluded from receiving benefits solely
on the ground the employee is earning as much after the
accident as he was before. The Court stated the test to
he followed in the following language:

The question is whether, in the open labor market, in
his disabled condition, the employee, after the injury,

592 ee)

is able to earn in spite of his disability, as much as he
was able to earn before the injury. 195 Tenn. at 416,
260 S.W.2d at 159,

Hl We hold the fact employee is employed after the
injury in the same type of employment and at the same
wages does not per se preclude the court from finding
he is totally disabled as the words are used in T.C.A.
see, 50-1007(e). To hold otherwise would have the result
of discouraging those few hardy individuals who try to
work under great physical handicap, by the threat of
denying them compensation which they might otherwise
he’entitled to if they did not work. We do not think it
was the intent of the Legislature that the Workmen’s
Compensation Statutes be so construed.

Hl In determining permanent total disability as such
is defined in T.C.A. sec, 50-1007(e), this fact of employ-
ment after injury is a factor to be considered along with
all other factors involved when applying the test, which
is whether employee, in light of his education, abilities,
physical and/or mental infirmities, is employable in the
open labor market.

Hl Under this test there is ample material evidence
to support the finding of the chancellor that the injury
to employee’s left hand, added to his prior physical im-
pairment, resulted in him becoming ‘‘permanently and
totally ineapacitated’’ as required by 'T.C.A. sec. 50-1027.

The judgment is affirmed.

Crrson, Humpureys and McCawuzss, Justices, and
Jexxrys, Spectan Justice, concur.

593

Cuarntus H. Wuaxs and wife, Hurun J. Wzanzs,
Appellants,

Gary T. Gruss and wife, Barpara J. Gruss, Appellees.

474 S.W.2d 424

(Nashville, December Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed December 6, 1971.

594 OC
a
Wayne S. Tavior, Nashville, for appellants.

Reav E. Fork, Jr., Nashville, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Humeurrys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Gary T. Gress and wife, Barbara J. Gress, filed suit in
the Chancery Court for Davidson County, alleging that
Charles H. Weaks and wife, Helen J. Weaks, had sold
and conveyed by warranty deed with covenant against
encumbrances, a piece of property held by the Weaks as
tenants by the entirety, at a time when a judgment lien
had been attached to Charles H. Weaks’ interest therein,
in accordance with sec. 25-501 et seq., T.C.A., our Lien
of Judgment Statutes. The Gresses sought to have the
Weaks remove the judgment lien as a cloud on their title,

| 595

and asked that they be awarded a decree against both
Charles H. Weaks and Helen J. Weaks in an amount
sufficient to clear the title; and that if necessary the
interest owned by Helen J. Weaks in a separate piece of
property be subjected to the judgment of the Gresses.
The Weaks demurred on the ground that as a matter of
law they had conveyed a good and marketable title to
the Gresses, based on the legal proposition that the
property of the Weaks, which was held by them as ten-
ants by the entirety, was conveyed free from the judg-
ment lien where only one of the tenants by the entirety
was a judgment debtor. The demurrer was also based on
the proposition that Helen J. Weaks had conveyed good
and marketable title to the property insofar as she was
concerned, so that the bill stated no cause of action
against her,

Kimbrough-Kavanaugh Associates, who were made
defendants to the bill, answered, disclaiming knowledge
of any of the allegations except that there was a trust
deed in their favor on the separate piece of real property
of Helen J. Weaks, in the amount, at that time, of
$11,522.18.

The demurrer was overruled with leave to rely thereon
in an answer, but the Weaks were granted a discretionary
appeal to this court on the court’s ruling on the demurrer.
Here, errors are assigned on the court’s action therein.

HHH Although there appears to be respectable au-
thority to the contrary, we are of opinion that the judg-
ment lien existing at the time of the conveyance was a
lien against Charles H. Weaks’ interest therein so that
the sale of it free from encumberances was a breach of
covenant. 2 Washburn Real Property, p. 658. We predi-

596 ee]

cate this conclusion on our Lien of Judgment Statutes,
sec, 25-501 et seq. T.C.A., which in our opinion are in-
tended to subject every alienable interest in land to the
lien of a judgment, when the requirements of the statutes
are met, and on two cases to which we shall refer.

Section 25-501 provides that judgments and decrees
obtained in any court of record in this state, in the
county where the debtor resides at the time of rendition,
shall be liens upon the debtor’s land in that county from
the time the same were rendered.

Section 25-503 makes it evident that the reference in
sec. 25-501 to ‘‘debtor’s land’’ is descriptive of every
interest in land by its reference to ‘‘equitable interest”’
as being covered. The words ‘‘debtor’s land’’ would not,
ordinarily, include equitable interests. So, when we are
told, in effect, by sec. 25-503 that such interests are in-
eluded, we have ciear evidence that the words are used in
their broadest sense.

Section 25-504 makes provision for fixing a judgment
lien on both legal and equitable interests in personal
property.

Thus, we have a scheme for making every character of
alienable property right subject to the lien of a judgment.
In consideration which there is no valid reason for ex-
cluding the interest owned by the husband in property
held by the entirety, if it is alienable.

Hl Two of our cases, Ames v. Norman, 36 Tenn, 683,
and In re Guardianship of Plowman, 217 Tenn. 487, 398
S.W.2d 721, make it clear the interest of a husband in
a tenancy by the entirety is alienable. In Ames, the facts
were that Ames and his wife owned land as tenants by
the entirety. A judgment was recovered against Ames

P| 597

and the land was levied on and sold at execution in satis-
faction of this judgment. Norman, a creditor of Ames,
redeemed the land from the purchaser at the execution
sale, Ames’ wife sued Ames for divorce, and sued Nor-
man contending he owned no interest in the property by
reason of the peculiar nature of a tenancy by the entirety.
In a well reasoned opinion, taking into consideration of
this peculiar nature of such a tenancy, it was held the
husband had an interest that could be subjected to
execution and sale. With respect to this it was said:

“Tt seems, therefore, that notwithstanding the pe-
culiar nature of this tenancy, the husband, during the
coverture, acquires substantially the same rights, and
power of disposition of the estate thus held, that he
does in regard to the wife’s individual estate owned by
her at the time of her marriage. Consequently it follows
that the husband, without the consent or concurrence
of the wife, can charge such estate at law with his
debts; that he may transfer it; that it may be seized
and sold by his creditors. But the assignee of the hus-
pand, or purchaser at execution sale, can acquire no
other or greater interest than was vested in the hus-
band; and, consequently, he holds in subordination to
the contingent right of the wife, who, in case she
survives the husband, becomes the absolute owner of
the whole estate. So, on the other hand, if the husband
survives, the purchaser from him or at execution sale
becomes owner in fee of the entire estate. 1 Dana,
242; 15 Wend., 615; 19 id., 175.’’ 36 Tenn. 693.

In the Ames opinion the Court, by way of dictum, said
that Norman, becoming invested with the rights of the
husband as they existed at the time of the sale, had the
right to oceupy and enjoy the profits of the land as owner

598 ee

during the joint lives of the husband and wife. This
dictum was nullified in Cole Manufacturing Co. v. Collier,
95 Tenn, 115, 31 S.W. 1000, 30 L.R.A. 315. In that case,
the husband’s interest in the estate by the entirety had
been sold at an execution sale to satisfy his debts, and
it was held that the purchaser did not step into the shoes
of the husband. That the only interest purchased at the
execution sale, was the right to succeed to the estate in
the event the wife predeceased the husband.

Tn the case of In re Guardianship of Plowman, 217
Tenn. 487, 398 S.W.2d 721, this Court expressly affirmed
mes, as modified by Cole, and approved the holding in
Stegall v. Chattanooga, 16 Tenn.App. 124, 66 S.W.2d 266
(1932), that the Act of 1919, Chapter 126, now codified as
sec. 36-602, reestablished tenancies by the entirety after
their abolition by the Married Woman’s Emancipation
Act, Chapter 26, Publie Acts of 1913, sec. 36-601 T.C.A.,
exactly as such tenancies had existed prior to the Eman-
cipation Act so that the common law primacy of the
husband in relation to such a tenancy exists at the
present time.

This holding leaves the interest of the husband in the
estate alienable and thus subject to judgment lien.

It follows from what we have said that the judgment
lien is valid, and that the covenant against encumbrances
was breached by the sale of the property against which
the lien had attached.

The case is remanded for such further pleadings and
action thereon as may be required to determine whether
Helen J. Weaks did make a covenant against encum-
lances which should be enforced against her. This is
necessary because the Weaks’ deed is not described in

detail in the original bill, nor is it exhibited to the bill.
And, while there are allegations in the bill as to the
contents of the deed, these are more conelusionary than
factual. Additionally, the case is here on discretionary
appeal and so should be remanded in order that appel-
lants may make any other defense against the original
bill that is available to them.

Dyer, Carer Justice, (reson and McCanuass, Jus-
tices, and Jenxins, SpeciaL Justice concur.

600 ee

Tue American Nationan Bank anp Trust Company or
Cuarranooca, Executor of the Estar of Inzz Brown,
Deceased, Appellee-Appellant.

Txomas D. Benson, Commissioner of Revenue, State of
Tennessee, Appellant-Appellee.

474 S.W.2d 427.

(Nashville, December Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed December 6, 1971.

ee =—

Davi M. Paox, Attorney General, Hvererr H. Farx,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant-appellee.

Howarp I. Levine, Miuer, Martiy, Hrrcenie, Treton,
Lentaan, & Warnrnousn, Chattanooga, for appellee-
appellant.

Mz, Justics Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The American National Bank and Trust Company of
Chattanooga, sued Thomas D. Benson, Commissioner of
Revenue, State of Tennessee to recover inheritance taxes
and interest paid under protest by it as executor of the
estate of Inez Brown. After a trial on answer and stipu-
lation, a decree was entered awarding recovery as to a
portion of the tax, and denying recovery as to the other
portion. Both parties have appealed and assigned error.

The material facts of the case as admitted and stipu-
lated are that decedent, Inez Brown, was the trustee

602 re

under a declaration of trust. Under the terms of the trust
Inez Brown was to enjoy the income from the trust for
life, and, upon her death, the corpus of the trust was to
be distributed to the sister of Inez Brown, Mary B.
Harding, and/or her issue, subject to a power of appoint-
ment in Inez Brown to appoint the corpus to members of
this class in such portions as she might see fit. At the
time Inez Brown died, Mary B. Harding was dead, and
the class of possible appointees so far as appears from
the record, included John Slosson Harding, her son, and
Elizabeth Harding Wolf, her daughter, and three chil-
dren of Elizabeth Harding Wolf.

At her death on December 28, 1967, Inez Brown exer-
cised her power of appointment in her will and appointed
the trust corpus to John Slosson Harding and the three
children of Elizabeth Harding Wolf. John Slosson Hard-
ing was appointed one-half of the trust corpus and the
three children of Elizabeth Harding Wolf were appointed
the other half in equal shares. Nothing was appointed
to Elizabeth Harding Wolf, who, prior to the death of
Inez Brown, had been adjudged legally incompetent and
continued as such until her death, intestate, approximate-
ly eight months after the death of Inez Brown,

Because of the testamentary exercise of the power of
appointment by Inez Brown, the Commissioner of Revenue
included the corpus of the trust estate Inez Brown ap-
pointed for inheritance tax purposes, pursuant to T.C.A.
sec. 30-1602(h), and assessed additional inheritance taxes
in the amount of $101,442.19, plus interest. The American
National Bank, as executor, paid this assessment under
protest and sued to recover it,

a =8=— 603

The executor’s theory of suit was that John Slosson
Harding took under the power of appointment the same
interest in the trust that he would have taken had the
power not been exercised, and so no tax was payable.
The executor’s contention with respect to the portion of
the trust fund appointed to the three children of Eliza-
beth Harding Wolf was that since Elizabeth Harding
Wolf was incompetent to make any disposition of her
property by will, by force of the facts, her children were
in much the same situation as their uncle, John Slosson
Harding, in that they would have ultimately received
through the laws of descent and distribution the same
interest appointed to them; with the result, as contended
for in John Slosson Harding’s case, that no inheritance
tax was due the State of Tennessee.

The Chancellor held in a memorandum opinion that
the inheritance tax should not have been imposed on the
portion of the trust corpus appointed to John Slosson
Harding, and that the inheritance tax was properly im-
posed on the portion appointed to the three children of
Elizabeth Harding Wolf. Decree was entered accordingly,
and both the commissioner and the executor have ap-
pealed,

The errors assigned by the executor to the Chancellor’s
holding that the appointment to Mrs. Wolf’s children was
taxable are:

(1) That the Wolf portion of the trust corpus was al-
ready vested in the appointees and so no taxable trans-
fer resulted from Miss Brown’s exercise of the power
of appointment under sec. 30-1602(h) T.C.A,

604 ee)

(2) That the designation by Miss Brown of the re-
cipients of the Wolf portion was not an effective exer-
cise of the power of appointment.

(8) That the Tennessee Inheritance Tax Law does not
tax the mere exercise of a power of appointment.

The Commissioner’s assignments of error make the
contention that the Chancellor erred in holding that Miss
Brown’s exercise of the power of appointment to John
Slossom Harding was not taxable as in form only and
transferred nothing to the appointee, because, in law and
in fact, a taxable act, the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment, as prescribed by sec. 30-1602(h) T.C.A., had oc-
curred.

We are of opinion the assignments of error of the
executor are not well taken and must be overruled, while
the assignments of error of the Commissioner must be
sustained.

Dealing first with the contention that the inheritance
tax law does not tax the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment, we deem it unnecessary to discuss and distinguish
the executor’s authorities, being of opinion the statute,
itself, supports, in fact requires, the tax. Section 30-
1602(h) provides that ‘‘transfers under powers of
appointment shall be taxable in like manner and to the
same extent as if property of the testator or donor was
transferred.’’ It is impossible to read this statute, bear-
ing in mind the result sought, without appreciating that
the tax is laid upon the exercise of the power of ap-
pointment, so that common law concepts as to the nature
of powers of appointment and the interest of the donee
of the power and the appointees thereof are inconse-
quential.

ee = 605

The tax is laid on ‘‘transfers under powers of appoint-
ment’? which, in context, purpose and intent, means the
exercise of the power of appointment; and upon the
privilege of receiving, pursuant to the exercise of’ the
power, This interpretation of the statute is consistent
with its provision that the tax is levied, not with respect
to the act of the donor of the power, but, with respect
to an act by the donee, a ‘‘transfer’’, which can only be
accomplished by the exercise of the power of appoint-
ment.

This statutory conception results in the taxation of
the receipt of property by will, statutes of descent and
distribution, and the exercise of the power of appoint-
ment; an arrangement encompassing the various means
by which the devolution of property is accomplished.

Bridgewater v, Turner, 161 Tenn, 111, 29 S.W.2d 659
(1929), on which the executor relies, is not in point. That
ease did not involve the inheritance tax statutes. It
dealt with the common law theory of vesting of unap-
pointed interests, and held that where the life tenant
died without exercising a testamentary power of appoint-
ment in favor of a class consisting of nephews, that not
only the surviving nephews, but their representatives,
took as a class in whom the estated had vested on the
creation of the power. This holding is consistent with
the common law theory that property which is the sub-
ject of the donation of a power vests in the possible
appointees by implication of a gift to a class in default
of appointment. Rogers v. Rogers, 39 Tenn. (2 Head)
660; Bridgewater 1. Turner, supra.

However, this argument, that the property vests in the
possible appointees on the creation of the power so that

606 es

there is no taxable transfer on the death of the donee,
has been made in tax cases before this time, and, where
the tax is laid upon the exercise of the power, as in our
statute, it has not prevailed. We quote from Chamler v.
Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 27 S.Ct. 550, 51 L.Ed. 882 (1907) :
‘However technically correct it may be to say that the
estate came from the donor and not from the donee of
the power, it is self-evident that it was only upon the
exercise of the power that the estate in the plaintiffs in
error became complete. Without the exercise of the power
of appointment the estates in remainder would have gone
to all in the class named in the deeds of William B. Astor.
By the exercise of this power some were divested of their
estates and the same were vested in others. It may be that
the donee had no interest in the estate as owner, but it
took her active appointment to finally transfer the estate
to some of the class and to take it from others.’’ While
the case quoted from is different from this one on its
facts, the proposition of law quoted is particularly ap-
plicable.

The contention that the exercise of the power of ap-
pointment in favor of the Wolf children is not taxable as
an empty exercise of the power of appointment, is not
valid. This contention is based on New York cases.’ But,
under the rule as stated in the New York cases this ap-
pointment would be taxable. The New York rule is that
the exercise of a power is not taxable to the estate of
the appointee where the appointment is identical in
amount and persons with those who would have taken in
default of exercise of the power or where a beneficiary

*In re Matter of Lansing’s Estate, 182 N.Y. 288, 74 N.E. 882
(1905); In re Duryea’s Estate, 277 N.Y. 310, 14 N.E, 2d 369 (1988).

Dn

receives less than he would have taken in default of the
exercise.

Tt is evident that under the New York rule the ap-
pointment of a portion of the property to the Wolf chil-
dren would be taxable. This is true because, in the
absence of an appointment, under the trust agreement
Mrs. Wolf would have taken as a surviving child of Mrs.
Harding and the grandchildren would have received
nothing.

The exercise of the power of appointment in favor of
John Slosson Harding is taxable, because the power
of appointment was exercised in his favor, he did not
yenounce the appointment so as to risk the hazard of the
amount he would take under the trust, and the power of
appointment was, in balance, beneficial to him.

Section 30-1602(h) T.C.A. taxes the exercise of the
power of appointment and makes no exceptions such as
that contended for by the executor. While the courts of
other states may he at liberty to import exceptions into
the written provisions of a taxing statute, our case law
is against this. It is settled in Tennessee that, where,
according to the language of the statute, there has been
a taxable incident, it shall be taxed unless there is in the
statute, itself, some language which furnishes a basis for
foregoing taxation. American Natl. Bank v. MacFarland,
209 Tenn. 263, 268, 352 S.W.2d 441; Karsch v. Atkins, 203
Tenn. 350, 313 S.W.2d 253.

This rule, which recommends itself for many reasons,
one which is that it simplifies the administration of tax
laws by avoiding construction by tax officials of compli-
cated testamentary and trust instruments, is not without
fairness. In the present case, John Slosson Harding had

608 ee

the choice to take under the appointment or to renounce
it. He took under the appointment, so he must pay the
tax. This arrangement is fair to both the state and the
appointee.

We are aware that the New York rule in its ultimate
elaboration requires no renunciation. (As perforce had to
be the case once this doctrine was announced). But, hav-
ing decided that we cannot follow the New York rule, we
must also reject the non-necessity of a renunciation of
appointment.

Our conclusion that the appointment was not empty,
but beneficial, is predicated on the provisions of the
declaration of trust creating the power of appointment.
These pertinent provisions are as follows:

“3. Tam to enjoy the income from the trust estate
during my life, but I received the trust estate from
Elizabeth W. Wheeler subject to the trust that the
principal should, at my death, go, free from trust, to
said Mary B. Harding and/or her issue, subject to the
power of appointment hereinbelow set out. It was and
is a part of the trust agreement that I should determine
and designate in my will which of the possible bene-
ficiaries mentioned in the preceding sentence hereof
shall receive said principal. The only persons whom I
could, under the original trust agreement, designate
in my will to receive said principal were limited to
said Mary B. Harding and/or her issue. Since said
Mary B. Harding is now dead, the only persons whom
I can so designate in my will are those persons who
are the issue of said Mary B. Harding; but, within
those limits, I can designate any of those persons whom
I decide proper, in my discretion, and I can determine,

ee = =— 0

in my diseretion, the respective proportions of the prin-
cipal to be received by the persons designated by me,
and I can omit any one or more of such persons from
my designation, subject to the condition that I must so
designate one or more of the persons who are the issue
of said Mary B. Harding.”

Jnder the broad powers of appointment created by this
trust, Harding was not entitled by appointment to any
fixed portion of the trust estate. He was entitled, in the
absence of an appointment in his favor, to a child’s share
of the unappointed portion of the trust estate. To explain:
The trust estate was to go to ‘‘Mary B. Harding and/or
her issue’’ in the absence of the exercise of the power
of appointment. This power of appointment was limited
only to the issue of Mary B. Harding, which did not
necessarily include John Slosson Harding. So, when one-
half of the trust property was appointed to grandchildren,
and their mother, Mrs. Wolf, was passed over, if there
had been no appointment to Harding, or if Harding had
yenounced his appointment, this would have left one-half
io pass under the terms of the trust: one-fourth to Hard-
ing and one-fourth to Mrs. Wolf.

While we, by no means, intend to decide the questions
which we have suggested might have arisen on renuncia-
tion, the avoidance of the possible result we have men-
tioned, or expensive litigation about it, by taking under
the appointment, could have been beneficial to Harding.

In sum, we dismiss the original bill and tax the execu-
tor bank with the costs.

Dyer, Cuter Justice, Creson and McCanuzss, Justices,
and Jenxixs, Speciat Justice, concur.

610 |

Rovat Inpemyrry Company

Suimury Ann Scumm
474 S.W.2d 647.

(Knoxville, September Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed December 6, 1971.

612 ee
Pt
Pau E, Parker, O’Nem, Parker & Witiiamsoy, Knox-

ville, for appellant.

Darton L. Townsenp, Knoxville, for appellee.

Mr. Justics McCanzess delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Shirley Ann Schmid, the widow of William F. Schmid,

as her husband’s executrix, brought suit in the Chancery
Court to recover $4,432.89, with interest, of the Royal

| 618

Indemnity Company, the workmen’s compensation car-
rier of the employer of her husband. In her bill the com-
plainant averred that William F. Schmid, in the scope of
his employment by Ransom Enterprises, Inc., was killed
in an automobile accident ; that she had filed suit in Hamil-
ton County against certain third parties for the wrongful
death of her hushand and obtained a judgment against
them in the amount of $78,900.00; and that she had recov-
ered $25,000.00 of the judgment.

The complainant further averred that in compliance
with a judgment in the Circuit Court of Knox County,
Royal Indemnity Company had paid the complainant and
other dependents of William F. Schmid weekly work-
men’s compensation benefits of $42.00 and that at the
time of the pronouncement of the judgment in Hamilton
County it had paid a total of $2,688.00. The complainant
recited that pursuant to an order of satisfaction of judg-
ment entered in the Cireuit Court of Knox County the
defendant. then discontinued its payments and that be-
eause of the defendant’s subrogation rights the complain-
ant then paid it $1,689.55, after the deduetion of attor-
neys’ fees and pro-rated expenses.

The complainant charged that under the Workmen’s
Compensation Law the defendant would have been liable
to the complainant and the other dependents of William
F. Schmid in the amount of $16,000.00 and that because
of the judgment against the third parties and its satis-
faction in excess of the statutory death benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law, she had saved the de-
fendant $13,312.00, discounting the $2,688.00 which had
heen reimbursed, after deducting attorneys’ fees and pro-
rated expenses.

eu es

Royal Indemnity Company at first demurrer to the bill
and, upon its demurrer being overruled, answered inter-
posing the defenses of res adjudicata, of accord and satis-
faction, and that when the complainant filed her bill there
had been a recovery of $25,000.00 of which the dependents
had received a net amount in excess of $17,000.00 in work-
men’s compensation benefits and recovery from the re-
sponsible third party, such amount being in excess of
the applicable workmen’s compensation benefits. The
company defended the complainant’s suit also on the
ground that the bill asserted a workmen’s compensation
claim which could not be prosecuted by the executrix.

The parties stipulated all the facts, which we have
heretofore summarized.

The Chancellor filed his opinion in which he sustained
the complainant’s suit and on the basis of the opinion a
decree in favor of the complainant and against the de-
defendant for $4,432.89 was entered. The defendant has
perfected its appeal to this Court and has assigned the
following errors:

“1, It was error to allow the prosecution of this
suit by an executrix and to allow a recovery against a
Workmen’s Compensation Insurance carrier for bene-
fits other than those prescribed by the Act.

“2. The Court erred in failing to sustain the de-
fendant’s plea of accord and satisfaction and res judi-
cata.

“<3, The rights of the parties are controlled by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act which provides that the
carrier’s liability for future payment is to be credited
with the net amount recovered from responsible third

| 615

party. The Court erred in failing to adjudicate the
rights of the parties as provided by T.C.A. 50-914.”

(1) By its first assignment of error the appellant, the
Royal Indemnity Company, insists that the Chancellor
erred in allowing the executrix to bring and prosecute this
suit and to sue a workmen’s compensation insurance
carrier for benefits other than those prescribed by the
Workmen’s Compensation Law.

HEME This suit grows out of the workmen’s compensa-
tion claim but is not one that stems from ‘‘the rights and
remedies’? granted by the Workmen’s Compensation
Law. For that reason we are of opinion that the claim
on which it is based did not have to be asserted in the
workmen’s compensation proceeding in the Circuit Court.
The complainant describes herself in the caption of the
bill as her husband’s executrix but in the body of the bill
she shows that she asserts her claim for her personal
benefit and for the benefit of the other dependents of
William F. Schmid. Her suit cannot, in justice, be allow-
ed to fail because of an incorrect designation of the com-
plainant or because of a failure to join other necessary
complainants by name. If it were necessary to a proper
decision of the suit to do so, we would allow such errors
and omissions to be corrected and supplied. Sec. 27-329,
T.C.A.; McCallum v. Woolsey, 65 Tenn. 308 [1873] ;Ed-
gington v. Edgington, 179 Tenn. 83, 162 S.W.2d 1082
[1941].

We overrule the first assignment of error.

(2) By its second assignment the appellant contends
that the court erred in failing to sustain its plea of
accord and satisfaction and res adjudicata.

616

Hl The insistence of the appellant is that by an order
entered in the workmen’s compensation suit in the
Cireuit Court, pursuant to correspondence between the
attorneys representing the respective parties, there was
an accord and satisfaction of the claim presented in this
suit and that the issues of this suit, by that order, were
rendered res adjudicata. With this insistence we do not
agree. The letter of Mrs, Schmid’s attorney enclosed a
check for $1,689.55 tendered in settlement of the subro-
gation clause of Royal Indemnity Company and in it the
question of the company’s further liability was reserved.
The order entered in the Circuit Court went no further
than to provide for the termination of the workmen’s
compensation payments. It appears not to have been the
purpose of the attorneys, by their correspondence or
by the order, to settle the claim of Mrs. Schmid for reim-
bursement of attorneys’ fees incurred on account of the
collection of that part of the wrongful death judgment
that inured to the benefit of the insurer.

We overrule the second assignment of error.

(3) We now have for consideration the third assign-
ment by which the appellant insists that it should not be
subjected to a judgment for attorneys’ fees for the col-
lection of the amount of the wrongful death judgment
that inured to its benefit and which operated to relieve it
of its obligation to make further payments of workmen’s
compensation benefits.

The question is whether the insurer can properly be
required to pay the cost of collecting that part of the
judgment of which it became the beneficiary; or more
precisely, whether it can be made to reimburse the appel-
lee whose recovery has been reduced by thé amount of

| 617

the attorneys’ fee, or whether it may be credited with so
much of the collected judgment as remains after the de-
duction of the attorneys’ fee, even though the credit
should equal the entire amount remaining. This is sub-
stantially the situation in this case.

The Chancellor in his opinion and the appellee in her
brief rely on the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the
case of Martin v. Town of McMinnville, 51 Tenn.App.
503, 369 S.W.2d 902 [1962]. In that case the workmen’s
compensation liability was $12,500.00 and paid at the rate
of $112.48 each four weeks. The wrongful death recovery
was $13,600.00, The court allowed credit on the compen-
sation award of its full amount less an attorney’s fee of
one-third or $4,166.66, or a net credit of $8,333.34.

But soon after the Court of Appeals had delivered its
opinion in Martin v. Town of McMinnville, supra—indeed
before this Court had denied the insurance carrier’s peti-
tion for certiorari—our General Assembly had enacted
Chapter 333 of the Publie Acts of 1963, which includes
the following provisions applicable to the case under con-
sideration and which are codified in sec. 50-914, T.C.A.

“When the injury or death for which compensation
is payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law
was caused under circumstances creating a legal liabil-
ity against some person other than the employer to pay
damages, the injured workman, or his dependents, shall
have the right to take compensation under such law,
and such injured workman, or those to whom his right
of action survives at law, may pursue his or their
remedy by proper action in a court of competent juris-
diction against such other person. In the event of a
recovery from such other person by the workman, or

618 ee

those to whom his right of action survives, by judg-
ment, settlement, or otherwise, the attorney represent-
ing such injured workman, or those to whom his right
of action survives, and effecting said recovery, shall
be entitled to a reasonable fee for his services, and
said attorney shall have a first lien therefor against
said recovery;...

“In event of such recovery against such third person
by the workman, or by those to whom his right of
action survives, by judgment, settlement, or otherwise,
and the employer’s maximum liability for workmen’s
compensation under chapters 9 through 12 of this title
has been fully or partially paid and discharged, the
employer shall have a subrogation lien therefor against
such recovery and the employer may intervene in any
action to protect and enforce such lien. Provided, fur-
ther, that in event said net recovery by the workman,
or by those to whom his right of action survives, ex-
ceeds the amount paid by the employer, and the em-
ployer has not, at said time, paid and discharged his
full maximum liability for workmen’s compensation
under chapters 9 through 12 of this title, the employer
shall be entitled to a credit on his future liability, as it
accrues, to the extent the net recovery collected exceeds
the amount paid by the employer. Provided further,
however, that in event the workman, of those to whom
his right of action survives, effects a recovery, and col-
lection thereof, from such other person, by judgment,
settlement, or otherwise, without intervention by the
employer, the employer shall, nevertheless, be entitled
to a credit on his future liability for workmen’s com-
pensation, as it accrues under chapters 9 through 12 of
this title, to the extent of said net recovery.’”

Le 619

I The provision of the law now—but not a part of
the law that governed Martin v. Town of McMinnville,
supra is that an employer and its insurance carrier are
entiteld to credit for ‘‘the net recovery’’ from a third
party. Such net recovery may or may not exceed the
workmen’s compensation liability of the employer and
its insurer; but whether it is less or more than the work-
men’s compensation liability the credit must be allowed
for the full amount collected minus the expense of col-
lecting it—including attorneys’ fees. Such credit is allow-
able under the clear meaning of the statute as it was
amended in 1963. The employer and its insurer are en-
titled to it although it may, as in this case, equal and thus
terminate the workmen’s compensation liability.

We therefore are of opinion and hold that the credit
claimed by the appellant is a proper credit under the pro-
visions of the statute and does not constitute an unjust
enrichment of the appellant.

We sustain the third assignment of error and dismiss
the appellee’s original bill.

Dyer, Curr Justicz, Creson and Humpureys, Jus-
viozs, and Jenxins, SrectaL Justice, concur.

620 ee

Barry Haze, bnf Wallace Hale

Svare Fara Murua Insurance Co. and Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co,

Watiace Hane

Srarz Farm Murua Insurance Co. and Nationwide
Mutual Insurance .Co,

474 S.W.2d 905.
(Knoxville, September Term, 1971.)
Opinion filed December 6, 1971.

Petition on Rehearing Denied January 7, 1972.

622

| |
1 1

Jack H. McPurrson, Jr., Bapezr & McPuerson, King-
ston, for Barry Hale and Wallace Hale.

Jess KE, Pearman, Harriman, for State Farm Mutual
Insurance Company.

Roserr B. Ray, Poorz, Cox, Baxzr, McAuiey, Ray &
Byryz, Knoxville, for Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company.

ee 623

|

Pe —C“C;sSCSCSCSCiés

Mr. Justice Cruson delivered the opinion of the Court.

The instant case is before us on appeal from the Cir-
cuit Court of Roane County. Our jurisdiction is directly

invoked to determine the present controversy since the
facts have been stipulated below.

In this opinion the parties will be designated by their
adversary status in the trial court; that is, Barry Hale
and Wallace Hale, as plaintiffs, and State Farm Mutual
Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, as defendants.

624 es

The plaintiffs in the instant case filed declarations
seeking to recover for alleged breaches of insurance con-
tracts by defendants. The declarations of plaintiffs set
forth identical allegations upon which recovery is based.
The plaintiffs aver that prior to June 25, 1967, State
Farm and Wallace Hale entered into a contract of in-
surance; that the agreement between State Farm and
Wallace Hale provided among other things to idemnify
the named insured or his family for damages suffered
by virtue of the negligence of an uninsured motorist;
that prior to aforementioned date Nationwide entered
into a contract of insurance with Herman O. Wilkerson;
and that the policy issued by Nationwide provided
that Nationwide would compensate the insured or his
guest for damages sustained through the negligence of
an uninsured motorist.

Plaintiffs further allege that on June 25, 1967, Barry
Hale, the minor son of Wallace Hale, sustained serious
bodily injury in an automobile accident while riding in
the vehicle of Herman O. Wilkerson as a guest passen-
ger; that the automobile accident was the result of the
negligence of Joyce Rievley, an uninsured motorist; that
on June 20, 1968, Barry Hale, by his next friend Wallace
Hale, filed suit against Joyce Rievley seeking recovery
for the damages sustained in the automobile accident;
that on the same date Wallace Hale instituted an action
against Joyce Rievley to recover for loss of services of
his minor son; that both defendants were promptly noti-
fied of the filing of these suits; that on September 18,
1969, a judgment was entered in favor of Barry Hale in
the amount of $4,800.00 and Wallace Hale was adjudged
to be lawfully entitled to the sum of $5,000.00 for his loss
of services of his minor son; that after these judgments

ee 625

became final demand was made upon both defendants for
payment of the damages sustained; and that defendants
have willfully refused to pay in violation of their con-
tractual obligations.

Nationwide filed its plea to the declaration asserting
that it did not promise as the plaintiff alleges and that
it does not owe the plaintiff.

State Farm in its plea admits that it issued a policy
of liability insurance to Wallace Hale prior to the date
of the accident; that Barry Hale was riding as a guest
passenger in the automobile of Herman O. Wilkerson
when it was involved in an accident with a vehicle
driven by Mrs. Rievley; that Barry Hale did receive
some injuries in this accident but that the extent of these
injuries is unknown; that on June 20, 1968, plaintiffs
filed their actions against Joyce Rievley and Sue W.
Humphreys, Administratrix of the Estate of Herman
O. Wilkerson; that on September 18, 1969, the plaintiffs
took a default judgment against Mrs. Rievley, but that
plaintiffs took a non-suit against Sue W. Humphreys,
Administratrix, thus waiving any claim against the
estate of Herman O. Wilkerson, who was insured by
defendant Nationwide Insurance Company; and that the
trial court entered judgments for plaintiffs in the afore-
mentioned amounts against Mrs. Rievley. State Farm
denies that it was promptly notified of the pendency of
the actions by plaintiffs against Joyce Rievley and Mrs.
Humphreys in her representative capacity in that it was
not served with a copy of the original summons until
January 9, 1969.

State Farm further alleges that it is not liable under
the policy to pay the judgments for various reasons.

626

These reasons are: (1) that plaintiffs acted ‘‘in bad
faith’’ by taking a non-suit against Sue W. Humphreys,
Administratrix, and a default judgment against the un-
insured motorist without the knowledge or consent of
State Farm; (2) that by the provisions of the policy the
judgments entered in favor of the plaintiffs are not con-
clusive against State Farm as to either responsibility for
injury or the amount of damages incurred since the
action was prosecuted without the written consent of the
company; (3) that by taking a voluntary non-suit against
Mrs. Humphreys the plaintiffs made a settlement with a
person who may be legally liable for the injury sustained
without the consent of the insurer which by the terms of
the policy relieves State Farm from any liability; (4)
that plaintiffs failed to furnish defendant State Farm
with a copy of the declaration filed against Rievley and
the administratrix which is required by the terms of the
contract under the uninsured automobile coverage; (5)
that State Farm has no liability in that there was ‘‘other
similar insurance’ available to the plaintiffs and by the
express terms of the policy the coverage provided by
State Farm ‘‘shall apply only as excess insurance over
any other similar insurance’’ which is available to the
insured.

The parties in the court below entered into a number
of stipulations. The substance of these stipulations is:

Nationwide had liability insurance on the vehicle of
Herman O. Wilkerson. This policy provided for un-
insured motorist coverage with a policy limit of $30,-
000.00. Prior to any actions being instituted by plaintiffs
against Joyce Rievley and Sue Humphreys, Administra-
trix, Nationwide paid the total amount of its coverage

ee

ee 627

under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy to
the estate of Herman O. Wilkerson.

On January 9, 1969, defendants were notified of the
pendency of the actions by plaintiffs against Mrs. Rievley
and Mrs. Humphreys. Defendants were notified by serv-
ice of process in compliance with the provisions of T.C.A.
sec. 56-1153; however, State Farm denies that the statute
is applicable to the case at bar.

On September 18, 1969, a non-suit was taken against
the administratrix, and the plaintiffs took a default
judgment against Mrs. Rievley. The judgments against
the uninsured motorist have not been satisfied as Joyce
Rievley is execution proof.

Joyce Rievley is an uninsured motorist within the
definition of that term in the insurance policies issued by
both defendants. Both policies containing the uninsured
automobile coverage were in full force and effect at the
time of the accident. Plaintiffs have made demand on
defendants to pay the judgments, but defendants have
declined to pay any amount to plaintiffs.

T.C.A. sec. 56-1153 provides as follows:

“Service upon the insurance carrier—Arbitration not
required.—Any insured intending to rely on the cover-
age required by secs. 56-1148—56-1153 shall, if any
action is instituted against the owner and operator of
an uninsured motor vehicle, serve a copy of the process
upon the insurance company issuing the policy in the
manner prescribed by law, as though such insurance
company were a party defendant; such company shall
thereafter have the right to file pleadings and take
other action allowable by law in the name of the owner
and operator of the uninsured motor vehicle or in its

628 ee

own name; provided, however, that nothing in this
paragraph shall prevent such owner or operator from
employing counsel of his own choice; provided, further,
that the evidence of service upon the insurance carrier
shall not be made a part of the record.

The uninsured motorist provision shall not require
arbitration of any claim arising thereunder nor shall
the insured be restricted or prevented in any manner
from employing legal counsel or instituting legal pro-
ceedings. (Acts 1967, ch. 871, sec. 6.)’”

The trial judge, after argument by counsel and viewing
the entire record, dismissed plaintiffs’ suits against de-
fendant Nationwide. However, the trial judge viewed
plaintiffs’ cause of action against defendant State Farm
to be well taken and ordered State Farm to pay plain-
tiffs the amounts that had previously been awarded
plaintiffs against the uninsured motorist, Mrs, Rievley.

From this judgment, State Farm excepted, prayed and
perfected an appeal. Likewise, plaintiffs excepted to the
action of the court below in dismissing their causes of
action against Nationwide, and the Hales have season-
ably perfected their appeals to this Court.

State Farm has assigned five errors to the judgment
of the court below. These assignments are:

“1, The Court committed error in failing to dismiss
the suit against State Farm for bad faith because
Barry and Wallace Hale, without notice or con-
sent of State Farm, took a non-suit in the case
against the host driver-joint tortfeasor; and fur-
ther by taking a default judgment against the
uninsured motorist. By this method, the Hales

ee 629

3.

. The Court committed error in failing to dismiss

abandoned their claims against the host driver-
joint tortfeasor, the full amount of which would
have been recoverable from Nationwide Insurance
under coverage ‘Ki’.

the suit against State Farm as the judgments of
the Hales against the uninsured motorist are not
conclusive, either as to liability or damages as
provided in the State Farm policy under: ‘IN-
SURING AGREEMENT III — UNINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE’, Coverage U, para-
graph 2.

The Court committed error in failing to dismiss
the suit against State Farm as taking a non-suit
by the Hales against the host driver-joint tort-
feasor amounted to a written consent or settlement
with any person who may be liable for his injury,
thus violating the insurance contract under: ‘HX-
CLUSIONS — INSURING AGREEMENT TIP’
‘Insurance Agreement Does not Apply (a)’:

. The Court committed error in failing to dismiss

the suit against State Farm because the Hales
‘instituted suit, before payment was made by this
company, against the uninsured motorist and the
host driver-joint tortfeasor without furnishing
copies of the summons and complaints as provided
in: ‘CONDITIONS—INSURING AGREEMENT
TIT’ ‘12 Netice of Legal Action.’

. The Court committed error in failing to dismiss

the suit against State Farm as the host driver,

630 re

Herman O. Wilkerson, had other similar insur-
ance available to the Hales. The result being
State Farm’s uninsured automobile coverage was
not applicable under: ‘CONDITIONS — INSUR-
ING AGREEMENT III’ ‘14 Other Insurance.’ ’’

The Hales have one assignment of error. It is:

‘1. The trial court erred in dismissing the Plaintiff’s
suit against Nationwide Insurance Company.”’

In this opinion the assignments of State Farm will be
considered first, then plaintiffs’ sole assignment will be
considered. The basic contention urged by State Farm
in its first four assignments boils down to the proposition
that plaintiffs, by pursuing their legal remedy against
Mrs. Rievley, so breached the contract of insurance that
State Farm was relieved of its contractual obligation to
indemnify the Hales for damages incurred by the negli-
gence of an uninsured motorist. This argument is not
supported by the record in the instant case, and no
amount of semantics can transform the persistent in-
action of State Farm into legally justifiable excuse for
avoiding its contractural obligations.

Hl Im its first assignment State Farm earnestly in-
sists that plaintiffs in prosecuting the suits against the
drivers of the automobiles involved in the accident were
guilty of “‘bad faith’? by taking a non-suit against the
estate of the host driver. Defendant State Farm urges
that if plaintiffs had not abandoned their claims then the
full amount would have been recoverable against the
co-defendant Nationwide. It is the opinion of this Court
that State Farm’s first assignment is bottomed on sur-

| 631

mise and speculation which cannot be indulged in. The
plain truth is that there is no basis in the record to sup-
port such a contention. The first assignment is without
merit.

In its second assignment State Farm asserts that the
judgment obtained in plaintiffs’ original action is not
conclusive as to the insurer because of the following
provision in the policy:

“No judgment against any person or organization
alleged to be legally responsible for the bodily injury
shall be conclusive as between the insured and the com-
pany, of the issues of liability of such person or organi-
zation or of the amount of damages to which the
insured is legally entitled unless such judgment is en-
tered pursuant to an action prosecuted by the insured
with the written consent of the company.”’

Hl The second assignment is equally as untenable as
the first. In the case of Sexton v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
(1928) 7 Tenn.App. 273, it was stated that conduct on
the part of the insurer which is inconsistent with an in-
tention to insist upon a strict compliance with the pro-
visions of a policy may constitute an implied waiver.
Under the facts presented in the instant case we hold
State Farm waived the above quoted provision in the
insurance contract. State Farm was served and notified
of the pendency of the first action instituted by plaintiffs
over eight months prior to time judgment was entered
against Mrs. Rievley. After being notified State Farm
was inert,

In reference to the third assignment, State Farm con-

tends that it is relieved of its contractual obligations
because the taking of a non-suit against Mrs. Humphreys,

632

Administratrix, is equivalent to a settlement with a per-
son who may be liable in violation of the terms of the
policy.

HHH It is impossible for us to see how a non-suit can
be equated with a settlement. The rule is well established
that voluntary dismissal or non-suit does not deprive a
plaintiff from bringing a subsequent suit and does not
yelieve a wrongdoer of any liability, Lindsay +. Allen
(1904) 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S.W. 171. It is also settled
beyond dispute that a settlement will discharge a tort-
feasor of any liability. When the plaintiffs took the
non-suit against Mrs. Humphreys, Administratrix, in
their original action, the Hales did not release the estate
of the host driver from any potential liability. We find
no merit in the third assignment.

Under the fourth assignment State Farm takes the
position that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss
the suit against it because plaintiffs breached the con-
tract by failing to give proper notice of the action pend-
ing against the estate of the host driver and Mrs. Rievley.
The insurance contract provides:

“Notice of Legal Action. If, hefore the company makes
payment of loss hereunder, the insured or his legal
representative shall institute any legal action for
bodily injury against any person or organization le-
gally responsible for the use of an automobile involved
in the accident, a copy of the summons and complaint
or other process served in connection with such legal
action shall be forwarded immediately to the company
by the insured or his legal representative.’

Tt is undisputed that plaintiffs did not give State Farm
a copy of the declaration filed in the original suit. How-

ee 633

ever, the only conclusion that can be reached from the
facts in the instant case is that State Farm has waived
the provision in the policy requiring that a copy of the
declaration be delivered to the insurer when the sum-
mons is served on them. Sexton v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., supra.

Hl As has heen previously pointed out, State Farm
was notified of the pendency of the first action eight
months prior to the time judgment was entered against
the uninsured motorist. During this period of time State
Farm made no demand that it be furnished a copy of the
declaration. Such conduct is a waiver of the provision
that a copy of the declaration be provided to the insured.

In its final assignment of error, State Farm insists
that it is not liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiffs since the coverage provided by the policy is
applicable only as ‘‘excess insurance over any other
similar insurance available’ to the insured. Defendant
State Farm contends that ‘‘other similar insurance’’
was available to the plaintiffs in that they were within
the coverage provided by Nationwide under the policy
issued to Herman 0. Wilkerson. The other insurance
clause of the State Farm policy is:

“14, Other Insurance. With respect to bodily injury
to an insured while occupying an automobile not owned
by a named insured under this coverage, the insurance
hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over
any other similar insurance available to such occupant,
and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount
by which the applicable limit of liability of this cover-
age exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability
of all such other insurance.

634

Subject to the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has
other similar insurance available to him against a loss
covered by this coverage, then the damages shall be
deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other in-
surance, and the company shall not be liable under
this coverage for a greater proportion of the applicable
limit of liability of this coverage than such limit bears
to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance.’’

The situation presented in the case at bar is indis-
tinguishable from our recent case of United Services
Automobile Association v. Hartford Accident & Indem-
nity Company (1967) 220 Tenn. 120, 414 S.W.2d 836, In
case just previously cited, United Services had issued a
policy of automobile liability insurance covering Lt. Col.
Jacob Helms. Hartford had issued a policy of liability
insurance to U-Haul Rental Corporation. Both of these
policies were in full force and effect at the time Lt. Col.
Helms was involved in an accident while driving a truck
which had been rented from U-Haul. Three lawsuits
were instituted against Lt. Col. Helms to recover the
damages sustained in the accident. After these three
claims had proceeded to judgment, but prior to their
satisfaction, United Services filed suit against Hartford
seeking a declaratory judgment that Hartford’s liability
was primary and the coverage provided under policy
issued by United constituted only excess insurance.

In the United. Services case we held that the other in-
surance clauses were ‘‘repugnant to the general insur-
ance provisions of the policies; and therefore void.’”’

Hl The other insurance provision in the policy issued
by State Farm is identical to the other insurance clause

ee 635

previously considered by this Court, and we hold that
the other insurance provision in the State Farm policy
is void. State Farm’s final assignment is without merit.

Plaintiffs, in their sole assignment, insist that the trial
court erred in dismissing their suits against Nationwide.
It is the contention of plaintiffs that since defendants
undertook to provide coverage, then both defendants
should be required to pay to plaintiffs the damages in-
curred in proportion to the amount of insurance provided
under the two policies.

The record reflects that Nationwide paid to the estate
of Herman O. Wilkerson the full amount of the uninsured
motorist coverage provided in its policy prior to the time
plaintiffs instituted their original actions against Mrs.
Rievley and Mrs. Humphreys, Administratrix. In its
brief, defendant Nationwide asserts that it has, in good
faith, completely exhausted its entire coverage, and the
coverage of State Farm, which is still intact, should be
used to indemnify the Hales.

HB While it is true that in United Services, supra, we
required ‘‘a proration between the two insurance com-
panies in proportion to the amount of insurance provided
by their respective policies,’’ we do not think that pro-
ration is required in the case at bar. The opinion in the
prior case clearly points out that neither of the insurers
there involved had fulfilled their contractual obligations.
In contrast, Nationwide has completely fulfilled its obli-
gation by paying the full amount of coverage to the estate
of the deceased host driver. At the time of this payment
plaintiffs had filed no claim with Nationwide nor had
they instituted their original actions against the drivers
of the vehicles involved in the accident. Under these
circumstances it would only frustrate the purpose of

636 |

insurance and cause future vexatious delay by holding
that Nationwide is obligated to indemnify plaintiffs in
proportion to the amount of coverage it provided in
relation to the damage sustained.

All assignments of error are overruled and the judg-
ment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are assessed
against State Farm.

Dyzr, Carer Justice, and Humpurers and McCantass,
JUSTICES, concur,

Jenkins, Specran Justice, not participating.

Mars. W. L. Sanvers, Administratrix of the Estate of
W. L. Sanders, Deceased, Appellee,

Forcum-Lannom, Ixc., Appellant.

475 S.W.2d 172

(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed January 3, 1972,

638 ee
P|
MacFartanp, Couey, Branx & Jacx, Columbia, for

appellee.
Asuiny, Asuimy & Lawrencu, Dyersburg, for appel-

lant.
Le

Mrz, Jusriczn Creson delivered the opinion of the Court.

The instant case involves a discretionary appeal from
the Chancery Court of Dyer County. Grooms Herron,

ee 639

Chancellor, sitting by interchange, overruled appellant’s
demurrer to the bill and granted a discretionary appeal
to this Court.

Tn this opinion the parties will be referred to as they
appeared in the trial court; that is, Mrs. W. L. Sanders,
Administratrix of the Estate of W. L. Sanders, deceased,
as complainant, and Foreum-Lannom, Ine., as defendant.

In the original bill complainant seeks to have a con-
structive trust imposed on the proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy paid to defendant as beneficiary under the
policy. The policy was issued on the life of W. L. San-
ders, the decedent.

Complainant avers that prior to his death W. IL.
Sanders operated a proprietorship under the name of
Sanders Plumbing and Electric Company; that in the
operation of the business ‘‘W. L. Sanders had from time
to time performed work under sub-contract arrangements
with the defendant’’; that on January 27, 1966, defend-
ant was considering entering into a contract for the
construction of certain additions to a hospital in Dyers-
burg, Tennessee; that at defendant’s request, W. L.
Sanders applied for and was issued a policy of term life
insurance by the Life and Casualty Insurance Company
of Tennessee; that the amount of insurance coverage
provided under this policy was $100,000.00; that the
decedent was the ‘‘insured and/or premium payer”’’
under the policy; and that defendant was the heneficiary
under the poliey.

Complainant further avers that W. L. Sanders died on
August 3, 1967; that after the death of W. L. Sanders,
complainant, with the permission of the County Court
of Maury County, continued to operate the proprietor-

640

ship for the sole purpose of completing performance of
all contracts of the deceased; that the estate of W. L.
Sanders did perform the contractual obligation with
defendant without ‘‘loss or shortage’’; that the estate
of the decedent ‘‘did suffer a substantial loss as a result
of the completion of the contract’? with defendant; that
on December 17, 1968, ‘‘a final settlement and disbursal’’
was made on the contract between defendant and the
decedent; that at this time complainant learned of the
existence of the life insurance policy; and that the pro-
ceeds under the policy had been paid to defendant. Com-
plainant alleges that defendant had no insurable interest
other than that of assuring that its contract with de-
ceased was performed without loss and that since de-
fendant suffered no loss under the contract as result of
the death of W. L. Sanders, then defendant should hold
the proceeds of the policy as trustee for payment to the
estate of the decedent.

Defendant demurred to the bill. The grounds of the
demurrer are: (1) complainant is not entitled to any
legal or equitable interest in the proceeds of the policy
since the bill admits that defendant had an insurable
interest in life of decedent, that decedent applied for and
obtained the life insurance policy naming defendant as
beneficiary, and that the insurance company paid the
policy benefits to defendant upon the death of the named
insured; (2) the bill shows on its face that the insurance
policy was a contract to pay defendant a certain sum of
money on the insured’s death and that it was not a con-
tract of indemnity for loss or an assignment to secure
the performance of a contract; and (8) the bill fails to
allege any legal or equitable rights or interest of com-
plainant upon which a constructive trust could be im-
pressed upon the proceeds of the policy.

ee

The Chancellor was of the opinion that the demurrer
was not well founded. He overruled the demurrer and
granted a discretionary appeal to this Court pursuant
to T.C.A. sec. 27-305.

The sole question in this case is whether or not the
pill is sufficient as a matter of law to sustain an action
to impress a constructive trust upon the proceeds of the
life insurance policy in question.

I Im considering the propriety of the Chancellor’s
order overruling the demurrer we consider only the
sufficiency of the averments as a matter of law to support
the action. In Schneider v. Lagarov (1965) 216 Tenn. 1,
390 S.W.2d 197, we said:

“(1) To begin with, it is not our intention to, nor do
we, pass upon the merits of this contest. We are con-
cerned only with the sufficiency of the averments in
the petition to sustain it'as a matter of law and not as
a matter of fact. It is well established as a part of the
procedural law of this State that demurrers are not
looked upon with favor and are sustained only when
it clearly appears that averments and charges upon
which the complaint rests are fatally defective in sub-
stance.

(2,3) This Court must take the averments of the bill
as true on review of the chancellor’s decree overruling
the demurrer. It has been repeatedly held that by
demurring the defendant confesses the truth of all
properly pleaded facts as set forth in the complaint
and relevant inferences of fact deductible (sic) from
such alleged facts. Zager v. Cobb, 192 Tenn. 79, 237
S.W.2d 560 (1951) ; Wilkams v. McElhaney, 203 Tenn.

642

602, 315 S.W.2d 106 (1958); Southall v. Billings, 213
Tenn, 280, 375 S.W.2d 844 (1963).’’

Tl It is the well established rule in this State that a
constructive trust arises contrary to intention and in
invitum, against one who, by fraud, actual or construc-
tive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of
wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, arti-
fice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any
way against equity and good conscience, either has ob-
tained or holds the legal right to property which he
ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy.
Covert v. Nashville, C. é St. L. Railway (1948) 186 Tenn.
142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1 A.L.R.2d 154; Central Bus Lines
v. Hamilton Nat. Bank (1951) 34 Tenn.App. 480, 239
8.W.2d 583.

It is defendant’s contention that the policy of life in-
surance in question was not to secure the performance
of the building contract between decedent and defendant,
but that the life insurance policy was merely a policy
which was procured by W. L. Sanders naming defendant
as beneficiary. From this premise defendant argues that
is was not only entitled to performance under the con-
tract, but that it was also entitled to retain the proceeds
of the life insurance policy.

In support of its contentions, defendant relies on the
case of Wurzburg v. New York Life Ins. Co, (1918) 140
Tenn. 59, 203 S.W. 332. The Wureburg case involved a
suit by an administrator against the decedent’s employer
to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy where
the employer was named as the beneficiary under the
policy. The insurance policy was what would be termed
a “key man’? policy with the employer procuring the

ee 648

policy and paying the premiums. The deceased employee
was not indebted to his employer at the time the policy
was issued. In Wurzburg v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
supra, this Court held that the employer was entitled to
the proceeds of the policy and had an insurable interest
in the life of its employee since ‘‘a corporation is often
quite dependent upon the service of particular officers
for its prosperity.’’ Justice Green noted in this opinion
that the Court was not dealing with the situation where
a life insurance policy was assigned as security for the
performance of an underlying obligation; we further
stated that ‘‘a policy of life insurance . . . is not now held
to be a mere contract of indemnity, but is a contract to
pay the beneficiary a certain sum of money in the event
of death.’’

In the case at bar we are confronted with a situation
which is indistinguishable from Wurzburg v. New York
Life Ins. Co., supra. The most that can be said about the
original bill is that W. L. Sanders, the insured, obtained
a policy of life insurance and made the defendant the
beneficiary under the policy. It is admitted in the bill
that defendant had an insurable interest in the life of the
decedent. After Mr. Sanders died, the insurer paid the
sum due under the life insurance contract to defendant.
There is no allegation in the original bill that the life
insurance was procured in order to indemnify or that the
policy was assigned as security for the performance of
the building contract.

Hl The complainant fails to allege any fraud, abuse
of confidence, duress or any other unconscionable conduct
that would justify the imposition of a constructive trust
on the proceeds of the life insurance policy. In fact, the
only conclusion that can be drawn from reading the orig-

644 |

inal bill is that defendant held the proceeds. of the life
insurance policy in accordance with the rights conferred
upon it as the beneficiary under the policy.

The order of the Chancellor overruling defendant’s
demurrer is reversed and the case is remanded to the
trial court for such further proceedings as may be
deemed necessary or proper, not inconsistent with this
opinion. The costs of this appeal are assessed against the
complainant, with costs in the court below to abide the
ultimate result of the case.

Dyn, Cumr Justice, Humpnreys and McCanuzss,
Justicss, and Jenkins, Sprcian Jusrion, concur.

Mr. Justice Humpureys (concurring).

Since on remand appellee is permitted to amend the
original bill to the same extent it could have been
amended had the decree of the Chancellor been the decree
of this Court, I concur in tlie results.

645

Roserr H. Hackman

Bryant Reep Hargis et ux, Marrua Haskins Hannis.

475 S.W.2d 175

(Nashville, December Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed January 8, 1972.

646

Kwox Bicuam, Lewisburg, for complainant-appellee.

Guratp Grizzeu, Grizzetn, & Tavior, Shelbyville, for
defendants-appellants.

Mr. Justioz McCanuuss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Robert H. Hackman on November 5, 1969, filed his
original bill against Bryant Reed Harris and his wife,
Martha Haskins Harris, by which he sought the specific
performance of a contract in writing by which he averred
the defendants had agreed to sell him their farm in
Marshall County in consideration of $25,000.00 cash. The
complainant alleged that the defendants had refused to
perform the contract.

| 647

After they had obtained two extensions of time the
defendants filed their answer on January 5, 1970, con-
eluding it with this sentence: ‘‘Defendants hereby de-
mand a jury to try the issues of fact in this cause.’’

On May 29, 1970, the defendants filed proposed issues
of fact with the Clerk and Master. When the cause came
on for trial on June 1, 1970, the complainant objected to
the empaneling of a jury on the ground that the defend-
ants had not complied with a rule of court applicable to
the Chancery Courts of the Fifth Chancery Division,
which had been in effect since July 16, 1941:

“Tn causes where the party is entitled to a Jury, in
order to make proper preparations therefor, demand
must be made for a jury in the pleadings, or in open
Court, on or before the first day of the term at which
said cause is for trial, and at the same time file with
the Master the issues which he proposes, furnishing
the opposing Counsel with a copy, who shall have 5
days in which to file other issues, or objections to those
filed; the Clerk & Master will then pass the file to the
Chancellor who will determine the issues to be sub-
mitted to the jury, and unless both the demand and the
issues are so made and entered of record, a jury trial
will be conclusively deemed to be waived; provided,
additional issues may be submitted at the hearing, if
deemed proper and material by the Court.’

The Chancellor sustained the complainant’s objection
but empaneled what he designated as an ‘‘advisory jury”’
to whom he submitted issues and to whom the parties
submitted the evidence in the cause.

As their defense to the complainant’s bill, the defend-
ants in their answer admitted that they had signed a

cag es

paper which the complainant had prepared and handed
them but that the paper had not been read to them and
they had not had an opportunity to read it under the
circumstances and were not given a copy of it; that the
signatures appearing on the paper exhibited to the bill
could be the defendants’ signatures but as they did not
have sufficient knowledge either to admit or deny the
execution of it, they denied it and demanded proof of the
paper’s authenticity. For their further answer the de-
fendants said that if they had signed the exhibit, their
execution of it had been obtained upon the complainant’s
false representation that it was a contract for the sale of
only. one tract owned by the defendants which they had
therefore agreed to sell to the complainant for $25,000.00
and which is one of five tracts described in the bill; that
the defendants at no time had agreed to sell the com-
plainant their entire farm for $25,000.00 which is a
grossly inadequate consideration for the purchase of a
three hundred and forty acre farm.

After the ‘‘advisory jury’’ reported that they were
unable to agree upon the issues the Chancellor discharged
them and entered a decree granting the complainant the
relief for which he had prayed and which contained the
following language:

“The Court finds that the allegations of the original
pill as amended are supported by the evidence; that
the Defendants were and are the owners of the realty
described in the bill; that the Defendants entered into
a contract in writing, signed by them and delivered
to the Complainant, to convey to the Complainant for
the consideration of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars
($25,000.00), good and merchantable title to said realty
by general warranty deed; that the Complainant has

ee 649

complied with the terms of the contract but the De-
fendants have, without cause, failed and refused to
convey title in accordance with the contract; that the
Complainant is entitled to specific performance.”’

The defendants filed a petition to rehear, which was
overruled, and they then appealed and assigned errors
to the Court of Appeals. That court in their opinion by
which they affirmed the decree of the Chancery Court
said:

“Tn the present case, the Chancellor found that there
was no fraud, and the preponderance of the evidence
supports this finding. The Chancellor found that the
inadequacy of consideration, if any, was not so gross
or shocking as to be of itself satisfactory evidence of
fraud. The evidence preponderates in favor of this
finding.

“Defendants executed a valid contract to sell and
eonvey their farm to complainant. Therefore they
were obligated to convey when performance was de-
manded. Defendants admit their refusal to convey.
The Chancellor correctly found that defendants had
not sustained their defense or shown ‘just cause’ for
their refusal to convey and correctly decreed specific
performance.”

Hl The parties introduced a large amount of evidence
in support of their respective contentions from which the
Chancellor and the Court of Appeals found concurrently
the facts for which the complainant contends and which
support the averments of his bill. They are supported
by the proof and we cannot go behind them; they are

850 ee

binding on us. Tanksley v. Tanksley, 145 Tenn. 468, 239
S.W. 766; Park National Bank v. Goolsby, 179 Tenn, 194,
164 S.W.2d 545.

There remains for our consideration the assignment
that the Chancellor’s error in denying the defendants a
trial by jury was harmless error.

HBB We cannot agree with the premise of this assign-
ment; we are of opinion and hold that the Chancellor’s
action in applying the rule of court which we have quoted
with the result that the defendants lost their right to a
trial of the issues before a jury was not error. Although
we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that the
issues submitted by the defendants were not determina-
tive of the cause, we also are of opinion that the pro-
vision of the rule that requires the party demanding a
jury in his pleading or on the first day of the term at
which the cause is for trial is reasonable. Futhermore,
we consider it a just provision that failure to observe this
requirement operates as a waiver of a trial by jury. The
defendants deprived themselves of the right to a jury
by their failure seasonably to submit issues for the Chan-
cellor’s consideration.

The statute which authorized the Chancellor to promul-
gate the rule in question was one which had been in effect
for many years and later became Section 16-627, T.C.A.,
and authorized Chancellors to make rules of practice for
the purpose of expediting business in their Chancery
Divisions. This Section was repealed by Chapter 227 of
the Public Acts of 1965 and in its Section 6, carried in
the Code as Section 16-117, authorized the adoption of
supplementary rules of practice.

| 651

The rule of the Fifth Chancery Division is not in con-
flict with any statute or with any other rule of practice
to which our attention has been called. This circumstance
distinguishes the case under consideration from World
Granite Co. v. Morris Bros., 142 Tenn. 665, 222 S.W. 527
[1919]. In that case the local rule deprived a defendant
of the right to a jury trial under conditions which af-
forded him such right under the applicable statute. The
Court held the statute to be mandatory and struck down
the rule.

We overrule the assignment of error, affirm the Court
of Appeals and the Chancery Court, and remand the
cause to the Chancery Court for enforcement of its
decree.

Dyer, Carer Justice, and Cuatrix, Crzson and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

Srarz or Tunnussex, Petitioner,

Joun Wuiiam Wricet, Respondent.

475 §.W.2d 546

(Nashwille, December Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed January 17, 1972.

ee 653
P|
Davi M. Pacx, Attorney General, Barr Dunnam, As-
sistant Attorney General, State of Tennessee, Nashville,
Nost R. Baewuux, District Attorney General, Clarksville,
for petitioner.

Jamzs O,. Nowanp, Canon A. Caranano, Clarksville, for
respondent.

Mr. Curr Justice Dyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.

A history of this case will serve to clarify the issue.

On January 22, 1965, John William Wright was con-
vieted of (1) burglary in the third degree, and (2) of being
an habitual criminal. This case was seasonably appealed

654 ee

to this Court and affirmed by an opinion styled Wright v.
State, 217 Tenn. 85, 394 S.W.2d 883 (1965).

Subsequently Wright filed a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus, under which, inter alia, he raised the fol-
lowing issue: That the habitual criminal conviction was
void inasmuch as one of the prior convictions (referred
to as the 1956 conviction) necessary to support the habit-
ual criminal conviction was void. This 1956 conviction
was alleged to be void on the ground that neither upon
the indictment nor upon the minutes is there any indica-
tion the indictment being endorsed ‘‘a true bill,’’ or signed
by the foreman of the grand jury. The trial court dis-
missed this petition for the writ of habeas corpus. An
appeal was taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals,
which court affirmed the action of the trial court by an
unpublished opinion dated December 30, 1968. The Court
of Criminal Appeals, in denying Wright any relief upon
the allegation this 1956 conviction was void, did so on the
ground the validity of these prior convictions supporting
the habitual criminal conviction was adjudicated by this
Court on direct appeal in our case of Wright v. State,
supra. The pertinent part of the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals opinion, unpublished, dated December 30, 1968, is
as follows:

By his second assignment, the petitioner says that his
conviction under the habitual criminal count is void
because one of the convictions relied on was void
because it was based on an invalid indictment, in that
the minutes of the Court did not show that it was en-
dorsed ‘‘a true bill’’ and signed by the foreman of the
grand jury.

In considering the petitioner’s appeal in Wright v.
State, supra, our Supreme Court said:

7 be} 655

“(1) The proof shows without any doubt that there
were three previous convictions of this plaintiff in
error within the purview of T.C.A. sec. 40-2801, entitled
‘Persons Defined as Habitual Criminals’, and with the
conviction of burglary in the third degree under the
first count in this case it was sufficient to warrant the
punishment under the statute (T.C.A. sec, 40-2802) of
the defendant as an habitual criminal.’’ 217 Tenn. at
87, 394 S.W.2d a 884.

We think the validity of the petitioner’s prior convic-
tions has already been adjudicated on direct appeal
and that this assignment is without merit. Further-
more, he is*confined under a valid judgment and sen-
tence for burglary in the third degree. (Court of
Criminal Appeals Opinion dated December 30, 1968,
unpublished.)

On September 10, 1969, Wright filed the petition now
before the court for post-conviction relief pursuant to
T.C.A. sec. 40-3802 et seq. In this petition Wright again
raises the issue this 1956 conviction is void on the same
grounds as set out in his petition for habeas corpus.
Based upon the prior adjudication of this issue by the
Court of Criminal Appeals, in its unpublished opinion
dated December 30, 1968, the trial court refused to hear
any proof touching on this issue. Upon appeal the Court
of Criminal Appeals, by a divided court, remanded the
cause for a hearing on this issue. We granted certiorari.

Wright, in order to be successful under this petition
filed pursuant to our post-conviction statutes, must. show
the error relied upon to void this 1956 conviction is a
constitutional error. T.C.A. sec, 40-3805 sets out the relief
to be granted under our post-conviction statutes in the
following language:

656 | a

Relief under this chapter shall be granted when the
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of
the abridgement in any way of any right guaranteed by
the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the

United States, including a right that was not recog-

nized as existing at the time of the trial if either Con-

stitution requires retrospective application of that
right.

Even though the failure of the indictment to reflect the
endorsement ‘‘a true bill’? or be signed by the foreman
of the grand jury could be a reversible error on direct
appeal, such is not necessarily a constitutional error. In
Tipton v, State, 160 Tenn. 664, 28 S.W.2d 635 (1930), this
Court considered the constitutional requirements as to the
substance of an indictment in the following language:

By article 1, sec. 9, of the Constitution it is provided
that ‘‘in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath
the right to be heard by himself and his counsel; to
demand the nature and cause of the aceusation against
him, and to have a copy thereof.”’

Article 1, sec. 14 provides: ‘‘That no person shall be
put to answer any criminal charge but by presentment,
indictment * * * or impeachment.’’

These constitutional guaranties of the Constitution of
1870 are phrased in substantially the same language in
the Constitutions of 1834 and 1796.

The constitutional requirements as to the substance of
an indictment or presentment are, therefore, only that
it state ‘‘the nature and cause of the accusation.”

Tt was held at an early date that it is ‘‘left to the Leg-
islature to prescribe what shall constitute the ‘accusa-

| a 657

tion—’ in what form the crime shall be charged.’’ Sizge-
more v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head), 26; State v. Ste-
phens, 127 Tenn., 282, 154 S.W. 1149. (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 160 Tenn. a 669-670, 28 §.W.2d at 636.

Hl Under the allegations of this petition it is admitted
this 1956 indictment contained ‘‘the nature and cause of
the aceusation’’ against Wright. The error alleged is not
an abridgment of Wright’s constitutional rights and no
relief can be granted under this petition filed pursuant
to our post-conviction statutes.

Hl Even without regard to the lack of a constitutional
error, relief would be denied under this petition for
another reason, T.C.A. sec. 40-3811 precludes examina-
tion of issues previously determined. T.C.A. sec. 40-3812
defines when an issue has been previously determined in
the following language:

When ground for relief is ‘‘previously determined.’’—
A ground for relief is ‘‘previously determined” if a
court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits
after a full and fair hearing.

The issue of the validity of these prior convictions
including this 1956 conviction supporting the habitual
criminal conviction was raised on direct appeal and as
shown in that part of the unpublished opinion of the
Court of Criminal Appeals copied above, we, in Wright
x. State, supra, have previously determined this issue.

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.

Creson, Humpureys, and MoCanuzss, Justices, and
Jenkins, SPECIAL JUSTICE, concur.

Dorzoruy W. Exuiorr, Appellant,

Dotiar GeyeraL Corporation et al., Appellees.
475 S.W.2d 651.
(Knoxville, September Term, 1970.)
Opinion filed February 1, 1971.

Petition On Rehearing April 15, 1971.

| 659

Joun S. Wrarvxxn, Chattanooga, for appellant.

Bissop, Tuomas, Lerryer, Mann & Mizpurn, Chatta-
nooga, for appellee, Williams.

Campsety & CampseLL, Chattanooga, for appellee, Dol-
lar General Corp.

Mr. Specian Justicu Jenxins delivered the opinion of
the Court.

The plaintiff below, Dorothy W. Elliott, hereinafter
referred to as the plaintiff, sued the defendants, Dollar
General Corporation, the lessee of the premises, Joe V.
Williams, Jy., individually and as Trustee, and Robert
Scholze Williams, individually and as Trustee, the owners
and lessors of the premises, claiming damages for per-
sonal injuries in the amount of $50,000.00. The defendants
demurred to the declaration, and said demurrers were
sustained by the trial judge and the plaintiff has ap-
pealed.

The declaration in short says that plaintiff entered the
defendant’s mercantile establishment which was old and

660 ee

run down and that in the course of her shopping, she was
confronted with an emergency and had to go to the rest
room, Plaintiff says that she was directed to the rest
room, also old and run down and unlighted; that in order
to see she lowered the commode seat, climbed thereupon,
and was reaching for a pull cord to illuminate the place
when she, due to a defective commode seat and lid, fell
one foot in the commode and one out as a result of which
she was severely injured and damaged.

The defendants demurred to plaintiff’s declaration on
several grounds, the main one, that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence in climbing on the com-
mode and reaching for the light cord; that the commode
was to sit on for the purpose for which it was made, in-
stalled and maintained.

The trial court sustained the demurrer and the plain-
tiff has appealed.

The issue is simple. Was the plaintiff guilty of such
contributory negligence as a matter of law which would
bar a recovery herein? To decide this question, we, of
necessity, must consider the facts as alleged and the sur-
rounding circumstances and the law applicable thereto.

When plaintiff entered this private of all private
places, referred to in the pleadings as a rest room, a
water closet, bathroom—and by the country term privy
—she looked about and saw the commode or toilet (she
apparently could see the seat and seat cover thereon) and
desiring more illumination in said rest room, she saw an
electric light cord hanging from the ceiling, and she
lowered the seat and lid, and then proceeded to mount
the same on foot. This, she either accomplished or was
in the act of accomplishing, when she slipped or was

ee 661

caused to fall therefrom, landing with one foot in the
commode or water closet, the other foot and rest of her
body falling backward onto the floor, said fall from her
perch on the closet lid causing her serious injuries.

The record does not reveal whether the plaintiff was
accustomed to running water and lights in the house and
the convenience of an inside toilet, and while the defend-
ants’ toilet, bathroom or rest room did not measure up to
the standards of luxury as described in The Ladies Home
Journal or Good Housekeeping with brilliant lighting,
bath towels, soap and other accessories pastel colored and
delicately scented, we cannot say that it was dangerous
or unsafe to the public if it had been used for the purpose
for which it was designed. It is true that according to the
pleadings it was nearer in construction to the old outside
privy referred to in the defendants’ brief. This, we vivid-
ly remember, for ‘‘how dear to our hearts are the scenes
of our childhood,’’—except ‘‘in-the good ole winter time.’’

The defendants go into great detail about what a com-
mode is for, quoting Funk & Wagnall to support their
contention. This makes us wonder if the defendants think
this Court has reached the point in life where we need
a re-education along this line. We know that counsel can-
not be too presumptuous but it must be presumed that
the Court knows at least the elementary principles of
our way of life, and we do not need to be told what a
toilet, rest room or privy is used for. It is a matter of
common knowledge that the older one gets the more ac-
customed one becomes to that fact. Judicial notice in this
instance is indeed not necessary.

The defendants, in their brief, ask the Court to use our
imagination and take judicial knowledge of ‘‘the general

662 ee

construction of a water closet seat, usually being oval
or rounded and sloping toward the inside. Usually the
seat is designed to conform generally to the contours of
the human posterior. Sometimes the set is a complete
oval and sometimes it is so designed as to leave an open-
ing at one end.’’ This, we can and will do—not that it
helps either side or the Court in the decision of this case.

The defendants, in their brief, also ask this Court to be
violently presumptuous and to take judicial knowledge of
the following, and we quote: ‘‘that when the commode
seat is in use by a member of the feminine gender that the
standard or usual method of approach to it is to draw
near, to then turn to face away from it, and to assume
a sitting position with a portion of the user’s weight on
the user’s feet.’? This, we cannot do, for never having
witnessed such a described approach, whether proper or
improper, and having no desire to do so, we would have
io use our jaded imagination in this respect. We have
no desire to do that. So, the matter of the proper way
for a person of the female gender to approach a. toilet
or commode is left to the conclusion of the pleader.

We cannot, as suggested, take judicial knowledge of
any mathematical formula whereby so much percentage
of the user’s weight shall rest on the posterior and so
much on the feet. We are not aware that toilet makers
(the modern-day Chick Sales) have progressed to such a
scientific point.

The defendants say that the plaintiff should have called
for help when she saw or failed to see the commode so as
to use it in the proper manner. But we are not advised by
the pleadings whether she was shy, or in a hurry; and we
admire her tenacity, whether born of desperation or mod-

ee 663

esty, and are notin position to criticize her action in
this moment of crisis. But, are we to say that the defend-
ants are to be charged with negligence as a result of her
predicament?

The defendants move to strike a portion of the plain-
tiff’s brief, reading as follows:

“Doubtless, the members of this Court know from ex-
perience that an ordinary commode seat and lid is
strong and safe.

“Tn my own bathroom the medicine cabinet with fluo-
rescent lights is turned on and off by by a small switch
at the side of the cabinet; but the overhead light is
controlled by a light switch at the entrance of the
bathroom, and it has overhead a large light bulb, and
this is shaded by a glass light shade in the form.of a
bowl upside down, screwed into the ceiling. This light
bulb is almost directly over the commode; and it burns
out about every twelve or eighteen months and it is
necessary to unscrew the screws holding up the light
shade so as to get in and remove the light bulb and
place a new one in its place. I weigh 185 pounds and
instead of going to the basement to get a step ladder, I
let down the commode seat and the commode lid and
step upon it and unscrew the light shade with a screw
driver. I know of my own knowledge that it has never
broken or even cracked ...’’

The Court views this as a conclusion of the pleader,
interesting reading, and harmless. The Court envies
plaintiff’s attorney’s agility and ability to perform such
acrobatic feats from a toilet seat, but questions his judg-
ment and feel we must warn said attorney to cease and

664 ee

desist such conduct lest he befall the same fate as did
his client in the instant case.

While the toilet seat or commode may have been un-
safe to stand on, there is nothing in the record to show
that it was unsafe to sit on or use in the conventional
manner, so we must conclude that the plaintiff was put-
ting the toilet seat and lid to a use that the defendants
could not foresee, when she heisted herself thereon and
was standing or attempting to turn on a light when she
fell.

It is a fact recognized down through the ages, or since
the toilet seat has been in general use, that it was de-
signed for one part of the body, the human posterior. It
was not designed to fit the pedal extremity or to be used
as a step stool or a ladder.

Hl Even though plaintiff’s declaration alleges that the
defendants’ acts constituted ‘‘negligence that was almost
gross negligence,’ (a new degree), such allegations are
nothing more than conclusions of the plaintiff which are
not admitted by the defendants’ demurrers. A demurrer
does not admit inferences from facts or conclusions of
law, Ashaorth v. Carnation Co. (1950) 190 Tenn. 274,
228 S.W.2d 337,

Hl But even if it can be assumed that the defendant,
Dollar Genera] Corporation, was negligent, the plaintiff
is nevertheless barred from any recovery. The declara-
tion states conduct on behalf of the plaintiff which, absent
any explanation, compels reasonable minds to conclude
that she was guilty of contributory negligence which
proximately caused her injuries. McCampbell v. Central
of Georgia Ry. Co. (1952), 194 Tenn. 594, 253 S.W.2d

| 665

763, In Stewart v, City of Nashville (1896), 96 Tenn. 50,
at page 57, 33 S.W. 613, at page 615, it was said:

“Whenever plaintiff’s own case... raises a presump-
tion of negligence on his part, the burden of repelling
it is at once placed upon him. (A)nd where the circum-
stances attending the injury were such as to raise a
presumption against him in respect to the exercise of
due care, the law requires him to establish affirmatively
his freedom from contributory negligence.”’

This rule has been applied to pleadings. McCampbell
v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., supra.

Therefore, where the plaintiff, as an invitee on the
premises, alleges that she stood upon a commode lid in
order to reach a light cord, knowing full well that the
lid was not intended for such a purpose, we must hold as
a matter of law that she did not exercise ordinary care
for her own safety; and any resulting injury was neces-
sarily attributable to her own negligence.

Since the declaration discloses on its face facts from
which proximate contributory negligence can be inferred
and does not manifest other facts to rebut the inference,
we are of the opinion that the trial judge was correct
in sustaining the demurrers.

Neither may plaintiff’s unwise actions be excused sim-
ply because she was confronted with an emergency, i. e.,
she found it necessary to use the rest room. The declara-
tion alleges that the rest room was dark if the door was
closed, but that the plaintiff could see the light cord hang-
ing down. If there was sufficient light for the plaintiff to
see the light cord, then there was sufficient light for the
plaintiff to use the commode for its intended purpose.

666 ee

For the foregoing reasons the order of the trial judge
sustaining the demurrers is affirmed.

Dysr, Cuter Justice, and Creson, Humpurnys and Mc-
Canuass, Jusricrs, concur.

Opinton on Prrrrion to Rewear

Mr. Spero. Justicn JenKiys.

The plaintiff’s attorney has, ten days after the time
prescribed by our rules, filed a lengthy petition to rehear
in which he re-argues the case.

The Court, having considered the petition, finds there
is nothing new presented, and the petition is hereby
denied.

Dyer, Cuimr Justicn, and Creson, Humpureys and Mo-
Can.ess, JUSTICES, concur.

| 667

Bossy Huex Crumuzy, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Tue Traveters Inpemniry Company,
Defendant-Appellant.

475 S.W.2d 654.

(Nashville, December Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed January 17, 1972.

668

|
||

Witson N. West, H. Stantey Auten, Jr., Nashville, for
plaintiff-appellee.

Guascow, Apams & Taytor, Nashville, for defendant-
appellant.

Ce) 669

Mr. Justicr Humpureys, delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case is before the Court upon grant of the petition
for writ of certiorari. The parties will be referred to by
name: the petitioner, Bobby Hugh Crumley as Crumley,
and the respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company, as
Travelers or the Insurer.

Travelers issued to Crumley an automobile liability
insurance policy containing ‘‘uninsured motorist’? pro-
tection. The pertinent provisions of the policy are:

“The Travelers Indemnity Company—agrees—:

“COVERAGE C—PROTECTION AGAINST UNIN-
SURED MOTORISTS (BODILY INJURY ONLY)

To pay all sums which the insured or his legal repre-
sentative shall be legally entitled to recover as dam-
ages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury sustained by the in-
sured, caused by accident and arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile ;
provided...

“ Eaelusions
(b) This policy does not apply:
under Coverage C,

(q) to bodily injury to an insured, or care or loss of
services recoverable by an insured, with respect to
which such insured, his legal representative or any
person entitled to payment under this coverage shall,

670 lr

without written consent of the company, make any set-
tlement with or prosecute to judgment any action
against any person or organization who may be legally
liable therefor;

CONDITIONS

If, before the company makes payment of loss under
Coverage C, the imsured or his legal representative
shall institute any legat action for bodily injury against
any person or organization legally responsible for the
use of an automobile involved in the accident, a copy of
the summons and complaint or other process served in
connection with such legal action shall be forwarded
immediately to the company by the insured or his legal
representative.

Part 1—Coverages B and C—Part II No action shall
lie against the company unless, as a condition prece-
dent thereto, there shall have been full compliance
with all the terms of this policy, nor, under Part II,
until thirty days after proof of loss is filed and the
amount of loss is determined as provided in this poli-
cy.”’? (Emphasis supplied.)

‘*h) for the purposes of this coverage, determination
as to whether the insured or such representative is
legally entitled to recover such damages and if so the
amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between
the insured or such representative and the company or,
if they fail to agree, by arbitration.”’

Crumley thereafter, on October 25, 1965, suffered prop-
erty damage and personal injury in a collision with a car
operated by an Arkansas resident. Crumley then filed
for, and received from Travelers payments for property

ee 671

damage and medical expenses under the ‘‘collision’’ and
‘medical payments’’ sections of the policy. Sometime
prior to September 1, 1966 Crumley retained Wilson
West, a lawyer with his office in Nashville, Tennessee,
to seek damages for his personal injuries. West con-
tacted Travelers’ agent, also in Nashville, by telephone
and asked for and received permission wider the policy
to start court proceedings to collect the personal injury
claim against the out-of-state motorist. He also asked,
if permission to sue were to be granted, if Travelers
wanted him to prosecute their subrogation claim for
property damage.

On September 1, 1966 Mr. West wrote the Travelers’
agent as follows:

“T represent Bobby Hugh Crumley whose automobile
was hit on October 25, 1965 at about 11” P.M. on High-
way 70. He was insured by the Travelers Indemnity
Company, and the policy carried, as I understand it, an
uninsured motorist provision.

“As a result of my telephone conversation with you
I am requesting all the information you can provide
me concerning this accident and also as to any infor-
mation which you might have on the defendant’s name
and whereabouts.

“We would like to obtain permission from the com-
pany under the policy to start court proceedings
against the defendant. I understood in talking to you
that your company was trying to collect the collision
loss and had located the defendant in Arkansas. If we
bring our suit, please advise whether or not you want
‘your collision loss included in the suit which we intend
to bring if permitted to do so by your company.

67a ee

‘Time is rather short in this matter, and your prompt
attention to this will be sincerely appreciated. Yours
very truly.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

On September 9, 1966, the agent replied:

“This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated
September 1, 1966 which was written im regard to our
telephone conversation on that date.

“We would like very much to have you represent the
Travelers Insurance Company im a recovery attempt
for the $540.00 collision payment under this insured’s
policy and this will be done on a continued (sic) fee
basis.

“Also in regard to your request concerning the owner
of the other vehicle involved we are showing this owner
to be as follows: Hlmer E. Kuske, Route 2, Box 406,
Little Rock, Arkansas.

“Immediately following receipt of this letter, you
should have sufficient information concerning the de-
tails of this accident to help you in your recovery at-
tempt. If I may be of any further help, please feel free
to call upon me at your convenience.’’? (Emphasis

added.)

On October 12, 1966, West filed suit in the Circuit
Court of Wilson County, asking $50,000.00 damages.
Process was served upon the Secretary of State. Travel-
ers was not notified of the filing, and was not given
eopies of the process.

On April 6, 1968 a declaration was filed, no copy being
sent to Travelers.

| 673

On April 5, West wrote to Travelers’ agent:

“The case of Crumley v. Kuske et al is set for trial
Monday, April 22, at 9:00 A.M. in Lebanon, Tennessee.
The letter which I received from you on September 9,
1966 indicated Elmer F. Kuske to be the owner. There
seems to be some question as to whether Kuske or
DeBosier was the owner. I have sued both of them but
will need to non-suit at the time of the trial as to one
of them since I understand that DeBosier was the reg-
istered owner and Kuske had purchased the truck a
few days prior to the accident. One of your adjusters
evidently checked this matter out in Arkansas and veri-
fied the ownership. Please advise me immediately
concerning this matter.’

The above was the first communication with Travelers
since the letter of September 1, 1966. But, even though
the agent was in Nashville, and could have reached West
by phone to talk about the case, he made no effort to
do so.

Upon hearing of the cause on April 22, 1966, a jury was
waived and the deposition of Crumley’s physician, which
had been taken ex parte and without notice to Travelers,
was presented, together with Crumley’s testimony. A
default judgment was entered nunc pro tune for the trial
date, against the defendants for $5,000.00 personal in-
juries and $796.80 for property damage.

On June 19, 1968 West wrote Travelers’ agent:

“T took judgment against Elmer F. Kuske and Robert
Daughenbaugh in the amount of $5,000 for personal
injuries and $796.80 property damage in Lebanon,
Tennessee. I have run an execution in Wilson County

er

which was returned with no property to be found in
the county belonging to the defendants. It was neces-
sary that I non-suit as to T. C. DeBosier since your
information was that he did not own the truck at the
time of the accident. We need the help of your Little
Rock office in attempting to find and running execution
against Kuske and Daughenbaugh.

“The policy of Mr. Bobby Hugh Crumley of course
provides under Part I for protection against uninsured
motorists, and I have been unable to find that the de-
fendants were insured. I am by this letter making
demand upon your company for the $5,000 under said
policy.

“Please contact concerning this matter at your earliest
convenience.’’

Afterwards Travelers and Crumley were unable to
settle, Travelers eventually denying its liability on the
basis of Crumley’s noncompliance with policy conditions.
Crumley then filed the action in the instant case against
Travelers to recover on the policy. Upon hearing, Mr.
West presented the testimony (together with exhibits)
of himself, an associate and Mr. Crumley as to the
matters set out above, and a certified copy of an ‘‘Order
of Suspension’’ of the Arkansas State Revenue Depart-
ment revoking the licenses, license plates and registra~
tion of the Arkansas defendants for failure to maintain
proof of financial responsibility as required by Arkansas
statutes.

Travelers presented the testimony of its agent, who
admitted that the testimony of Mr. West was correct,
and further that because of the delay between his com-
munication with Mr, West in 1966 and that in 1968 he

ee 675

had ‘‘closed the file’’ and sent it to Travelers’ home office.
He stated that upon receiving West’s letter notifying
him of the trial date he sent for the file, which did not
reach him for two weeks, or one week after the trial date.

From all the above, the trial court found for the plain-
tiff, Crumley, giving judgment for the $5,000 against
Travelers, and, in addition, 25 per cent of that amount
as a penalty for bad faith causing the plaintiff additional
expenses, as provided by T.C.A. sec. 56-1105.

Travelers appealed, and the Court of Appeals, Todd,
Justice, reversed, holding that Crumley had failed to
perform conditions precedent to the policy, that these
conditions were not waived, and that consequently Crum-
ley could not recover.

Thereupon Crumley petitioned this Court for the writ
of certiorari.

Hl It may be conceded, for the purposes of this opin-
ion, that the policy requirements pertaining to written
permission to proceed to judgment and of providing a
copy of the summons and complaint were not strictly
complied with. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that
the record in this case shows conduct on the part of the
insurance company so clearly inconsistent with an in-
tention to insist upon a strict compliance with those pro-
visions of the policy as to constitute an implied waiver.
Seaton v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,7 Tenn.App. 273 (1928) ;
Hale v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins, Co., 225
Tenn. 620, 474 S.W.2d 905.

In Hale v. State Farm, supra, policy provisions simi-
lar to those here were considered by this Court. In that
case the complete inaction of the uninsured motorist

676

carrier, after it was notified of the pendency of suit
against the uninsured motorist, was held to constitute a
waiver of policy provisions requiring that the insuror be
furnished a copy of the declaration and that written con-
sent of the insuror for the suit to be obtained. Here, the
insuror’s conduct does much beyond mere inaction. In-
deed, it is difficult to imagine conduct more inconsistent
with an intention to hold the insured to strict compliance
with the ‘‘notice’’ and ‘‘permission to sue’’ provisions
of the policy than that of the insuror in this case.

Hl After being advised, by telephone and in writing,
that Mr. Crumley’s suit for personal injuries was about
to be brought, and after being requested to give ‘‘per-
mission . .. under the policy to start court proceedings,’’
Travelers not only cooperated fully with Mr. West in
garnering information about the out-of-state defendants,
but employed him to prosecute its own subrogation claim,
necessarily in conjunction with Mr, Crumley’s action.’

It may be, as insisted by Travelers, that Mr. West
should not have let so long a. time go by without advising
it of the status of the action against the Arkansas defend-
ants. At the same time, having heen notified of the suit,
and having employed West to represent it, and having
its own responsibility under the policy, Travelers was
more at fault than West. The record is clear that Travel-
ers was notified a week prior to the trial date and failed

+ There can be no doubt, from an examination of the correspond-
ence alone, that Travelers knew its subrogation claim was to be
prosecuted as a part of Mr. Crumley’s action. Indeed, Travelers could
hardly have been unaware that its subrogation right would otherwise
be lost, since the cause of action against the Arkansas defendants
could not be split into separate suits for personal injury and property
damages. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins, Co, v. Cleveland, 162 Tenn. 83,
34 S.W.2d 1059 (1931); National Cordova Corporation v. City of
Memphis, 214 Tenn, 371, 380 S.W.2d 793 (1964).

ee 677

to take any action whatsoever. Travelers certainly had
sufficient time at least to contact Mr. West, and to take
further action based on information received from him.
And it cannot. be excused because its file was not in Nash-
ville. It was aware of the existing potential liability
under the policy because it had been notified of the suit.
And for it to close the file with the case in this condition
amounts to neglect, and neglect cannot excuse.

We have carefully read the opinions in the cases from
other jurisdictions to which we have been cited, and
which our own research has disclosed, and find none in
which the facts are sufficiently similar to aid us in our
decision of this case. Suffice it to say that in this particu-
lar case, we find that the record shows conduct of the
insurance company clearly constituting an implied waiv-
er of the ‘‘notice’’ and ‘‘permission to sue” policy pro-
visions. Hale v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., supra;
Seaton v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra.

Hl Since Travelers waived the policy provisions on
which it relies, (which would necessarily include the
policy provision with respect to arbitration, which
Travelers would have to call into operation prior to
waiving its rights under the policy with respect to the
suit), it necessarily follows that the trial of the personal
injury damage suit proceeded with Travelers implied
consent. So, Travelers is bound by the outcome thereof.
This is especially true in the absence of any indication
in the case sub judice that the judgment awarded by the
Circuit Court in the damage suit was not fully sustained
by the proof. The present case was tried on Travelers
plea of nil debit. Travelers made no effort to plead or
prove that Crumley’s original judgment was not warrant-
ed by the extent of his injuries. Or, that anything had

678 ee

been done with respect thereto which was fraudulent or
illegal.

Hl We are of opinion the trial judge entered the
proper judgment in this case, except with respect to the
twenty-five per cent statutory penalty awarded. because,
although the case does smack of neglect on Travelers’
part, in failing to give its insured the attention he was
entitled to under his policy, we do not think its conduct
therein arises quite to the level of bad faith. After all,
it is necessary to draw the inferences from the facts
which we have drawn before the implication of waiver
can be adjudged to exist. And we doubt if Travelers can
be charged with bad faith in not drawing these infer-
ences.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is set aside and
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, except with
respect to the allowance of the statutory penalty of
twenty-five per cent.

Dyer, Cater Jusricn, Creson and McCanuzss, Jus-
vious, and Jenxuns, Specian Jusricn, concur.

a

Commrrce Union Bank, Petitioner,

Joun H. Horron, Administrator, Respondent.

475 8.W.2d 660

(Nashville, December Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed January 17, 1972.

680

!

Aurrep E, Assey, Russert H. Hire, Jr., Trasvn,
Minick, Srurpivant & Harsison, Nashville, or petitioner.

Awnprew D, Tanner, Nashville, for respondent.

Mx. Justice Humpureys delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case is before the Court by certiorari to the Court
of Appeals. The administrator sued the bank to recover
on a bank deposit. The bank pleaded the presumption of’
payment arising after the lapse of sixteen years. The
trial judge recognized and applied the presumption. The
Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge and awarded
judgment. This Court granted certiorari, after full con-
sideration, because it is of opinion the presumption of
payment after the lapse of sixteen years applies to a

| 681

deposit in a bank of this character: a deposit in a check-
ing account.

The facts are that in 1950 the administrator’s intestate
deposited $1,251.38 in a checking account in the bank.
She was issued a bank book which still contains a single
entry in the amount of this deposit. This bank book is
to be distinguished from a savings account passbook, as
to which, possibly different rules apply.*

The depositor died in 1968, and plaintiff was appointed
her administrator in April 1969. Thereafter, he pre-
sented the bank book to the bank and made formal de-
mand for payment. This demand, after thorough search
and after no record could be found concerning this ac-
count except the original signature card of the depositor,
which was found in a. closed-out file, was rejected. The
proof was that under the bank’s usual procedure the sig-
nature card would be placed in the closed-out file when
the account was paid out. The officers of the bank further
testified that its records were routinely purged and rec-
ords more than ten years old destroyed. They also testi-
fied that the bank no longer had microfilm records
pertaining to the years 1950 to 1955. They also testified
that they had not examined all of the microfilm records
made of all checks passing through the bank each day
because this would be practically impossible, as the mi-
erofilm records of checks were not matched to any par-
ticular account.

Hl The administrator introduced five witnesses who
testified that decedent had discussed her bank account
with him prior to her death. This testimony was rejected

* Section 45-445 T.C.A. enacted subsequent to this suit, now regu-
lates bank deposit records.

oa2 es

on objection by the bank that it was hearsay, but was
admitted to make a record. It was not considered by the
trial judge. And not coming within any exception to the
hearsay evidence rule, is inadmissible.

This recitation discloses that the bank, after pleading
payment, relied on the presumption of payment after the
lapse of sixteen years, and, in addition to this defense,
sought to show by an examination of its records that as
a matter of fact, there was no such account as that sued
on then in the bank. Against this, the administrator
sought by the introduction of hearsay evidence to prove
there was such an account, and on the general equity of
the case, involving as it does a single deposit in an
amount which it would not hurt the bank to pay, have
this case treated as an exception to the presumption of
payment rule. All of this calls into consideration the
validity of the presumption of payment from a lapse of
time.

The best discussion of this rule that we have found is
under the title ‘‘Payment’’ in 21 R.C.L., sec. 144 et seq. as
follows:

“In General.—In all civilized countries where the law
is administered as a science, having reference to the
peace, quiet, and progress of society, as well as to the
protection of individual rights, it has been thought
wise that there should be some limit to litigation, some
boundary beyond which contests or matters open to
contest should be regarded as settled. Early in the
judicial history of England the presumption of pay-
ment was raised after a great lapse of time between
the creation of an obligation and an attempt to enforce
it in the courts. This presumption became a part of

ee 683

the law of the United States and is applied in all juris-
dictions. It originated in equity in the application of
the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura sub-
veniunt, but was soon engrafted in the common law,
and has since been steadily applied. It is not to be
confused with the equitable doctrine of laches, since
laches is generally regarded as being not delay alone,
but rather delay working a disadvantage to another.
Lapse of time may also set up the show that no claim
ever existed as well as to raise a presumption of pay-
ment.’”’ 21 R.C.L, sec. 144, p. 128,

Since the Court of Appeals seemed to equate the pre-
sumption of payment to the statute of limitations, and
seemed to decide the case on statute of limitations cases,
we quote with approval the following from the same
authority:

“Statute of Limitations Distinguished—The presump-
tion of payment from the lapse of time differs essen-
tially from a statute of limitations which presupposes
an established substantive right, but forbids its en-
forcement by the customary remedies. The presump-
tion of payment may be rebutted by sufficient evidence,
no matter how long the time may be; but a statute of
limitations cuts off the right of action, although it may
pe admitted that no payment has ever been made. A
statute of limitations must ordinarily be pleaded and
relied on by the defendant, while the presumption of
payment arising from the lapse of time is usually
drawn from the plaintiff’s own case, and when so
dawn it can hardly be regarded as a matter of affirma-
tive defense.” 21 R.C.L. sec 146, p. 130.

684 ee

And, in this connection we point out that the statute
of limitations was not pleaded by the defendant and so
was not involved in this case.

The reasonableness of this presumption early im-
pressed itself on this Court, resulting in this statement
in Thompson v. Thompson, 39 Tenn. 405, 407 (1859) :
“The rule so often recognized by this Court, that if a
bond, or a note under seal, be suffered to lie dormant for
a space of sixteen years, without demand being made,
or payment of interest, or other explanatory circum-
stances to show it still in force, payment will be pre-
sumed upon the mere fact of the lapse of time, is not
now to be questioned’’.

Harlier and later, cases recognizing and applying this
rule are, Blackburn v. Squib, 7 Tenn. 60 (1823); Ander-
son v, Settle, 37 Tenn. 202 (1857) ; Yarnell v. Moore, 43
Tenn. 173 (1866); Harris v. Vaughn, 2 Tenn.Ch. 483
(1875) ; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dumscomb,
108 Tenn. 724, 69 S.W. 345 (1902); Poole v. First Natl.
Bank of Smyrna, 29 Tenn.App. 327, 196 S.W.2d 563
(1946).

Hl While none of these cases involved a bank deposit,
we see no reason why an exception to this most salutary
rule should be made in favor of a deposit in a checking
account in a bank. To the contrary, bearing in mind the
nature of a checking account, which, since it foregoes the
interest usually paid on a savings deposit, carries with it
the idea of current or contemporary use, we consider it
most reasonable that the presumption of payment after
sixteen years lapse of time should apply. Moreover, we
are of opinion that a requirement that a bank must for-
ever retain the evidence of payment of its indebtedness

ee 685

is not only contrary to the rule of law we have been dis-
eussing, but contrary to the public policy of the State of
Tennessee as evidenced by its statute law on the subject.
For example, T.C.A. sec, 45-422, at the time this suit was
brought, provided that no bank was required to keep
cancelled checks more than six years from the date of
payment and T.C.A. sec. 45-432 provided that banks were
not required to preserve records relating to statements
of account longer than six years from the date of the
statement.

So far as we have been able to determine the applica-
bility of the presumption of payment arising from lapse
of time to a bank deposit has been considered in only
two reported cases from other jurisdictions, and in both
of them the presumption was held to apply. Boscowite
». Chase Nat. Bank, 202 Misc. 1016, 111 N.Y.S.2d 147
(N.Y.Mun.Ct.1952); Blackstone v. First Nat. Bank of
Cody, 64 Wyo. 818, 192 P.2d 411 (1948).

Hl The upshot of the matter is that this Court is of
opinion the presumption of payment after the lapse of
sixteen years should have been applied to this checking
account.

We find nothing in the evidence with respect to the
bank’s examination of its records which in any way re-
buts this presumption. The bank examined all of its
existing records, with the exception of the microfilm dis-
cussed below, and found no record of any account with
the decedent. Specifically, the record search disclosed
that there was no current account in the decedent’s name,
and that no such account had been closed since 1955, the
earliest date from which the bank had any pertinent rec-
ords. The clear implication is that the account was closed

686 ee

sometime during the period between the date of deposit
and 1955. It is true that the bank did not examine the
microfilm made daily of each check that cleared the bank.
The bank did have such microfilms dating back to some
time in the period between 1955 and 1960. We think it
was excused from making such a search by the utter un-
reasonableness of such a requirement,” together with the
fact that there was total absence in any other records in
the bank of any evidence that the deposit continued in
the bank so as to require such an examination.

After all, all hank deposits are made and held on the
presumption of honesty and good faith, and when wit-
nesses who are in no way discredited, testify to fruitless
searches of the bank records, this testimony must not be
received as simply negative evidence, but as some evi-
dence that the records which would ordinarily evidence
the existence of the deposit in the bank are not to be
found, and consequentially that there is no such deposit.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is set aside, and
the judgment of the Circuit Cowt of Davidson County
is affirmed.

Dyer, Come Justice, Ciarrix, Cresox and MoCan-
Luss, JUSTICES, concur.

- Cheeks are not microfilmed so that they ean be related to a
particular deposit or account. All checks presented each day are
microfilmed so unless some particular time period can be designated
eyery picture of every check, which must run into hundreds of
thousands of pictures, would have to be examined to exhaust this re-
mote possibility of evidence.

Azrwa Oasuatry & Surery Company
and Arraur Zarer Ropaox,
Petitioners-Plaintiffs,

Tewnesser Farmers Muruat Insurance Company,
Petitioner-Defendant,

AwntHory Martwzz et al., Respondents-Defendants.

475 S.W.2d 663

(Knoxville, September Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed January 17, 1972.

J. H. Dovenry, Hovers, Doverry & Carsoy, Knoxville,
for Aetna Casualty & Surety Company.

Catvix N. Tavtor, Cpe, Tavitor & Groover, Knox-
ville, for Arthur Zafer Roback.

ee 8 68)

Awnprew Jouysoy, Kramer, Dyn, Greenwoon, JoHN-
son, Rayson & McVuicu, Knoxville, for Tennessee Farm-
ers Mutual Insurance Company,

Pauy BH, Parker, O’Nem, Parker & Wii1amson, Knox-
ville, for respondents.

Mr. Cuter Justicr Dyzr delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case, filed under our Declaratory Judgment Stat-
utes, T.C.A. sec, 23-1101, et seq., comes to this Court by
grant of the writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals.

690 ee

The contest, is essentially between insurance companies
and a statement of the facts and insurance coverage pro-
vided the different parties will help clarify the issues.

There is no serious dispute as to the facts. The father
of one of the parties, Arthur Roback, had for a number
of years rented a small lot of land near the TVA & I
Fair held yearly in Knoxville, Tennessee, for the pur-
pose of parking automobiles for those attending the fair
and for which he received a fee of $2.00 per car. This
business was operated generally in September of each
year for a period of cight days. In September, 1968, the
father was ill and his son, Arthur Roback, obtained a
leave from his usual employment to take over this park-
ing operation for his father. Arthur Roback was in full
charge of this parking during this eight days in Septem-
ber, 1968, working thirteen to sixteen hours a day, park-
ing and moving automobiles and collecting these fees.
These fees, less expenses, were turned over by Arthur
Roback to his father. The automobiles were parked on
this lot in such a manner as to often necessitate the mov-
ing of one of the automobiles hy Arthur Roback in order
that another automobile could he driven off the lot. To
accomplish this it was necessary that those parking on
this lot leave the keys in their automobiles.

On a day in September, 1968, while Roback was operat-
ing this parking lot, Steve Brantley drove his 1960 Chev-
rolet on this lot, paying his fee to park, and at the request
of Roback left his keys in the automobile. During the
time this 1960 Chevrolet was on this lot Roback found
it necessary to move it in order for another automobile
parked on the lot to get out. In moving the 1960 Chev-
rolet, Roback drove it out into the street and was in-

ee 691

volved in a collision with an automobile driven by
Anthony Martinez, resulting in personal injuries to An-
thony Martinez and Anna Martinez, a passenger at the
time in the Martinez automobile.

As a result of this accident Anthony Martinez and
Anna Martinez brought suit for personal injuries in the
Cirenit Court for Knox County against Aetna Casualty
& Surety Company, Arthur Roback, and Edith Brantley,
the titled owner of the 1960 Chevrolet. Upon demand,
the Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company and
The Home Insurance Company refused to provide any
coverage under their policies issued to Edith Brantley
and Arthur Roback.

Upon this refusal by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insur-
ance Company and The Home Insurance Company, Aetna
and Roback filed the suit now before the Court against
Anthony Martinez, Anna Martinez, Edith Brantley, Ten-
nessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company and The
Home Insurance Company seeking to have the court de-
clare Roback was insured (1) under the non-owned auto-
mobile provision in the policy issued to Roback by The
Home Insurance Company, and (2) as a permittee under
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company’s policy
issued to Edith Brantley.

The insurance coverage afforded the parties involved
is as follows:

Roback, as named insured, had coverage for public
liability under a policy issued by The Home Insurance
Company covering the use of a non-owned automobile,
except where maintained or used by the insured when
“employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile busi-

692 ee

ness.’’ This policy defined automobile business as, among
other things, the ‘‘storing or parking automobiles.’’

Edith Brantley was the title owner of the 1960 Chev-
rolet and had a publie liability policy on this automobile
issued by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Com-
pany. Steve Brantley was the eighteen-year-old son of
Edith Brantley and Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insur-
ance Company had knowledge Steve was to operate and
use this automobile, having general unrestricted use
thereof.

The Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
policy provided coverage to Edith Brantley as named
insured and to ‘‘(3) any other person using the auto-
mobile with the permission of the named insured pro-
vided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his
actual use thereof is within the scope of such permis-

sion....”

The Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
policy provided this insurance would not apply under,

(e) coverages A (Bodily Injury Liability) and B
(Property Damage Liability), except as to the named
insured, to the automobile while used in an automobile
business, except coverages A and B shall apply, as
excess insurance over any other collectible insurance,
to a resident of the same household as the named in-
sured, to a partnership in which such resident or the
named insured is a partner, or to any partner, agent
or employee of the named insured, such resident or
partnership; ....

As in The Home Insurance Company policy the Ten-
nessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company policy de-

ee = — 693

fined ‘‘automobile business’? as, among other things, the
“storing or parking automobiles.”’

The Martinez automobile was covered by a public lia-
pility policy issued by Aetna Casualty & Surety Com-
pany which, among other things, contained an uninsured
motorist provision.

Hl The first issue for determination is whether Ro-
back was operating the 1960 Chevrolet, at the time of the
collision, while engaged in the ‘“‘automobile business’’
within the meaning of this exclusion as contained in both
The Home Insurance Company and Tennessee Farmers
Mutual Insurance Company policies. On this issue the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found in the affirma-
tive, and we agree. The Court of Appeals said:

Without question in our mind, Arthur Roback’s access
to the Brantley automobile and the necessity for him
to drive the Brantley automobile arose out of and was
a part of the business of ‘‘parking automobiles,’’ which
under the policy definitions of ‘‘automobile business’”’
brings into play the policy exclusions set out above,
.... The fact that Roback operated the parking lot for
only 8-days a year and then only to assist his father
is not sufficient to take him from under the policy ex-
clusions. The key to coverage is the nature of the use
of the automobile by Roback at the time of the acci-
dent. As pointed out by the court in Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hoffman, 21.Ti.App. [2d 314] 214, 158 N.H.2d 428,
430, ‘‘it is not uncommon for an insured to have a busi-
ness in addition to his regular and customary occupa-
tion which he may pursue primarily or even wholly for
purposes other than pecuniary gain; but such collateral
business would nonetheless constitute a business or an

694 ee

occupation while so pursued.’’ See also Seaford v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 253 N.C. 719, 117
S.H.2d 733 and Voelker v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,
(CA 7 Til.) 260 Fed. [2d] 275.

Upon holding Roback at the time of the collision was
engaged in the ‘‘automobile business’’ the Court of ‘Ap-
peals, as to The Home Insurance Company policy, stated :

The policy issued Roback by Home Insurance Com-
pany is an ‘“‘owner’s’’ policy and provides the cover-
age required by the Financial Responsibility Act for
such a policy. T.C.A. 59-1223(b) (2). The limitation
placed on coverage of the insured under the policy was
limited to the use or maintenance of a non-owned au-
tomobile by the insured while the insured ‘‘is employed
or otherwise engaged in the automobile business.”’

This court has held that such an exclusion is reasonable
in view of the increased hazard growing out of the use
of non-owned automobiles by a person operating a
parking lot or a parking garage. Pollard v. Safeco
Insurance Company, 52 Tenn.App. 583, 376 8. W.2d 730.

“‘Hxclusionary clauses like the one here involved have
been held reasonable because of the increased hazard
growing out of the use of non-owned cars by such
establishments while in their legal custody. Anno. 47
A.L.R.(2d) 556. They have been frequently applied
under circumstances not unlike those presented in this
case. Anno. 47 A.L.R.(2d) 558 et seq.; Insurance Law
and Practice, Appelman, Vol. 7, Section 4372; 5A Am.
Jur. 103, Automobile Insurance, Section 102. * * *

«# * * Tt would be grossly unfair to the insurer to hold

that an insured engaged in the automobile business
could take out a policy on his privately owned and op-

ee =—695

erated ear and then on the basis of the same small
premium claim protection for any and all un-owned
automobiles used in such business. Policies of that na-
ture providing general coverage for such business
carry a much higher premium rate.’’ Pollard v. Safeco
Insurance Company, supra, at pages 587 and 593.
[376 S.W.2d 730]

As to the Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Com-
pany policy the Court of Appeals found under the facts
of this case Roback had actual permission of Steve
Brantley to drive the 1960 Chevrolet for the limited pur-
pose of moving it to permit passage of other automobiles
on the parking lot and had implied permission of the
named insured, Edith Brantley, to drive this automobile
for that purpose. The Court of Appeals then noted this
policy made no attempt to limit the class of permittees,
but did undertake through the exclusion (copied above)
to limit the scope of coverage afforded a permittee and
to give the permittee less coverage than was given the
named insured. The Court of Appeals, apparently with
great reluctance, felt this exclusion as to the scope of
coverage afforded a permittee was void under our opinion
in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Universal Under-
writers Insurance Company, 223 Tenn. 80, 442 S.W.2d
614 (1969), and that the Tennessee Farmers Mutual
Insurance Company policy afforded coverage to Roback.

The holding in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v.
Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, supra,
which the Court of Appeals felt compelled the result it
reached as to the Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance
Company policy is to this effect: That this policy had
been approved and was on file with the Department of

696 ee

Insurance and Banking of the State of Tennessee, the
result being our financial responsibility statutes, partic-
ularly T.C.A. sec. 59-1223(b) (2) must be read into and
considered a part of the policy. This exclusionary clause
being in conflict with this statute, such was void.

The Court of Appeals opinion was prepared and filed
prior to release of our opinion in McManus v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 225 Tenn. 106,
463 S.W. 2d 702 (1971). In McManus we expressly over-
ruled the holding in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v.
Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, supra, re-
lied upon by the Court of Appeals.

HEE Under this record neither The Home Insurance
Company nor the Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance
Company policies were certified policies within the mean-
ing of our Financial Responsibility Statute, T.C.A. secs.
59-1201 to 59-1240, and this Chapter is not applicable in
the decision of this case. The question here then is
whether this exclusion in the Tennessee Farmers Mutual
Insurance Company policy as to use of the automobile in
the ‘‘automobile business”’ relieves Tennessee Farmers
Mutual Insurance Company from any liability to afford
coverage to Roback. To remove a problem we should
note in this declaratory judgment suit no issue is made
as to coverage afforded the named insured under the
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company policy.

The language of this exclusion in the Tennessee Farm-
ers Mutual Insurance Company policy is not ambiguous.
When the insured automobile is used in the ‘‘automobile
business’’ the named insured is covered and as to a cer-
tain group of persons identified in the exclusion the scope
of coverage is reduced. As to all others, the group into

| 697

which Roback falls, there is no coverage. This exclusion
is reasonable for the same or similar reasons and under
the authority cited above in this opinion holding the
exclusion in The Home Insurance Company policy valid.

Hl It is insisted The Home Insurance Company is
estopped to deny coverage to Roback because of its fail-
ure to respond to a notification from the Financial Re-
sponsibility Division of the Department of Safety that
Roback had filed an SR-21 form stating he had automo-
bile liability coverage under the policy issued by Home.
On this issue the Court of Appeals, with which we agree,
said:

The majority of the courts which have dealt with this
question have held that the act of an insurance com-
pany in filing an SR-21 form, or in some other manner
confirming insurance coverage of an accident, does not
estop the company from thereafter disclaiming cover-
age where none exists under the policy. Seaford v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 253 N.C. 719, 117
§.E.2d 733; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Hubbard, (272 Ala. 181), 129 So.2d 669; Fidelity
and Casualty Co. of New York v. McConnaughby, [Me-
Connaughy] 228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117; Marley v. Lewis,
(189 Kan. 658), 369 P.2d 783; Insurance Company of
North America v. Atlanta [Atlantic] National Insur-
ance Co., 329 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. Va.) See also: Kurz
v. Collins, 6 Wis.2d 538, 95 N.W.2d 365. 7 Am.Jur.2d,
Automobile Insurance, Section 7, p. 299.

As succinctly pointed out in Seaford v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company, supra, [117 S.H.2d] at
page 737,

698 es

“The purpose of the SR-21 form ... seems to be a
means of protecting one’s driving privilege by proving
insurance in the minimum amount required by this
State, and was not intended to be a contract. The re-
quired filing of the SR-21 form does not show intent on
the part of the Legislature that once the insurer files
the form showing that the policy is in effect, such act
affects the contractual rights of the parties, or pre-
cludes the insurance company from thereafter seeking
to deny its liability under the policy.

“The plaintiff contends that the filing of the SR-21
form should have the effect of estopping the insurer
from later denying coverage under the policy, and cites
a Wisconsin case, Behringer v. State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., 275 Wis. 586, 82 N.W.2d 915, in support
of his contention. As a result of the holding in the
Behringer case, supra, the laws of Wisconsin were
amended so as to change the holding of that case. In-
deed, since the law has been changed in Wisconsin the
Supreme Court of that state has allowed the insurance
company to raise a defense subsequent to the filing of
the SR-21 form. Kurz v. Collins, 6 Wis.2d 538, 95 N.W.
2d 365.

“The better rule seems to be that by the mere filing of
an SR-21 form as required by the law of this State, the
insurer is not estopped to later deny coverage under
the policy.”’

It results, and we so hold, that Tennessee Farmers
Mutual Insurance Company and The Home Insurance
Company are relieved of any liability arising out of the
suit in the Circuit Court wherein Anthony Martinez and
Anna Martinez, as plaintiffs, are attempting to recover

| 699

damages from the defendants therein, Aetna Casualty
and Surety Company, Arthur Roback and Edith Brant-
ley.

Creson, Humpureys and McCanzzss, Justices, and
Jznxins, Specian Justice, concur.

Prot Ox Corporation, Appellant,

Pzart Rute Sexuuzrs, Individually and as Parent and
Natural Guardian of MicHarn Srevre Seniers and
Louruzr Sranuzy Senimrs, Appellees.

475 S.W.2d 668.
(Knoaville, September Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed January 17, 1972.

701

Rosset R, Campsett, Knoxville, for appellant.
Jerry A. Farmer, Knoxville, for appellees.

Mr. Justicr Humpurrys, delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Pilot Oil Corporation has appealed from a final judg-
ment in favor of Pearl Ruth Sellers, individually, and as
parent and natural guardian of Michael Stevie Sellers
and Luther Stanley Sellers, wherein they were awarded
partial dependency benefits under the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Law against appellant Pilot Oil Corporation,
because of the accidental death of Danny Ray Sellers,
arising out of and in the course of his employment. Sev-
eral errors are assigned, none of which we consider of
importance, except the assignment charging error be-
cause the trial judge declined to take into account, in
determining the contribution made by the deceased minor
to the support of the family, the cost of deceased’s own
support.

In his finding of fact and final judgment the trial
judge, acting upon his understanding of 2 Larson,
Workmen’s Compensation, and his disagreement with
the holdings of this Court over the past years, held that
“the cost to the family fund of Danny Ray Sellers, room,
board and other expenses does not affect the fact or
extent of the petitioner’s partial dependency.’’ He then

ee 708

awarded benefits on the basis of the gross sum turned
over by the deceased minor to his mother, Mrs. Sellers,
for the use of the whole family.

The holding of the trial court is unexceptional, except
with respect to this matter presently being considered.
In sum, he correctly finds that Pearl Ruth Sellers, de-
cedent’s mother, and Michael Stevie Sellers and Luther
Stanley Sellers, his minor brothers, are partial depend-
ents of Danny Ray Sellers, deceased, under the Work-
men’s Compensation Law; that Danny Ray Sellers
turned over to his mother $68.00 per week of his earnings
from his employment with defendant for use by the
family, and that the partial dependency of the appellees
should be determined as provided by T.C.A. sec. 50-1013.

While this Court has leaned heavily on Larson’s work
on Workmen’s Compensation in those areas where there
is no statutory mandate, we cannot do so in this case,
because we have a statute which is contrary. Section
50-1013 (b) defines partial dependents as ‘‘Any member
of a class named in subdivision (a) (3) who regularly
derived part of his support from the wages of the de-
ceased workman at the time of his death and for a
reasonable period of time immediately prior thereto shall
be considered his partial dependent, and payment of
compensation shall be made to such dependents in the
order named.’’ Subsection 10 of this Code section pro-
vides: ‘‘Partial dependents shall be entitled to receive
only that proportion of the benefits provided for, actual
dependents which the average amount of the wages regu-
larly contributed by the deceased to such partial de-
pendent at, and for a reasonable time immediately prior
to the injury, bore to the total income of the dependent
during the same time.”

704. ee

Under these Code provisions partial dependency com-
pensation payments are made only on the basis of the
“<support from the wages of the deceased workman”’ each
partial dependent receives on a statutory ‘“‘proportion of
the benefits provided for actual dependents.””

Hl Under this statutory language partial dependency
compensation payments are to be determined on the
actual support contributed by the employee to each mem-
per of the dependent class, not necessarily the gross sum
turned over to the parent by the minor decedent.

It would be contrary to the statute to follow cases cited
by Larson,! which give consideration to the common law
right of the parent to the wages of an unemancipated
minor, or the concomitant right of the minor to receive
his necessary support: from his parents. The statute in-
volves third parties who are required to make the com-
pensation payments, and who are entitled to have this
obligation determined by the statute, and not by common
law considerations which have not been recognized and
brought into operation by the statute.

While this Court has not considered this particular
question in relation to the language of the statute, it has
in at least two cases clearly indicated that the amount of
support to be taken into consideration in apportioning
is the actual support received by each member of the
partially dependent class, and not the gross amount which
a minor employee might place, for one reason or another,

2 Air Castle, Iric. v. Industrial Com’n, 894 Il, 62, 67 N.E.2d 177
(1946); Blue Ribbon Pie Kitchens v. Long, 230 Ind. 257, 108 N.E.2d
205 (1952); Murphy v. Franklin County, 259 Iowa 703, 145 N.W.2d
465 (1966); Harvey v. Rocklin Mfg. Co., 237 Towa 1058, 24 N.W.2d
402, (1946) ; G. I. Construction Co. v. Osborn, 208 Okl, 554, 257 P2d

P| 705

in the hands of his parent. Know v. Washer, 153 Tenn.
630, 284 S.W. 888; Sweeton v. Tennessee Consolidation
Coal Co., 179 Tenn. 216, 164 S.W.2d 1010,

In reaching this conclusion we have not been insensitive
to the demand for a liberal interpretation of the Work-
men’s Compensation Law. We have simply yielded to
the obvious intent of the statute that the partial depend-
ency benefits shall be determined on the basis of the
actual support given to each member of the class.

‘We have examined Larson’s Workmen’s Compensa-
tion, 2d Edition with some care, and find that he does
not propose the solution adopted by the trial judge as
the better rule. 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation,
secs. 63-12, 63-22 (1970).

In fact, although they relate primarily to the question
of whether dependency exists, Larson cites the following
cases in which it has been held that, when the cost of the
decedent’s contribution is offset by the value of the board
and room received, he is doing nothing more than to
“‘pull his own weight’’, leaving nothing over to represent
support of dependents. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Yeager,
219 Ark, 20, 239 S.W.2d 1019 (1951); Pufahl v. Tamak
Gas Prods, Co., 238 Ark. 895, 385 8.W.2d 640 (1965) ; Mc-
Garvie v. Frontenac Coal Co., 103 Kan. 586, 175 P. 375
(1918) ; Britt v. Nashville Bridge Co., 171 So. 493 (La.
App.1937) ; Mosesso’s Case, 327 Mass. 525, 99 N.H.2d 859
(1951) ; Kennedy v. Keller, 225 Mo. App. 561, 37 S.W.2d
452 (1931); Wilson v. Mason, 78 N.M. 27, 426 P.2d 789
(1967) ; Goldsmith v. Good Humor Corp., 23 A.D.2d 901,
259 N.Y.8.2d 364 (1965); Martorana v. Tensolite Insul-
ated Wire Co., 14 A.D.2d 462, 216 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1961) ;
Walz v. Holbrook, Cabot é Rollins Corp., 170 App.Div. 6,

706 ee

155 N.Y.S. 703 (1915) ; Beagle v. Groff, 198 App.Div. 453,
191 N.Y.S. 807 (1921) ; Zurich Gen. Acc. é Liab. Inc. Co.,
v. Industrial Com’n of Wisconsin, 196 Wis. 159, 216 N.W.
187, 220 N.W. 377 (1928).

Hl In this state of affairs, the case must be remanded
to the trial court for determination of the support re-
ceived by each member of the class from the decedent,
under the statute as construed in this opinion.

Hl In determining the extent, if any, by which the
support contributions should be reduced by the part
thereof expended in decedent’s own support, the cost of
decedent’s own support may be credited with the value
of his personal services to his mother and his minor
brothers, if this service has monetary value. C.f. Wamser,
Stewart & Vaughn, Inc. v. Teasley, 205 Tenn. 78, 325
9.W.2d 540 (1959).

Hl One of the major items of expense relied on to
reduce the contribution made by decedent relates to an
automobile. The facts with respect to this are that the
automobile was titled to the mother. The insurance on it
was bought in her name. The tires were bought on
credit in her name. The parts needed for its overhauling
and repair were bought in her name. And, while it was
operated by decedent, it is also the case that no one else
in the family could operate it. Moreover, the automobile,
while used once or twice a week by decedent on dates,
was operated primarily for the family. It was used to
carry both the mother and decedent back and forth to
their jobs. And, after decedent’s death, the mother had
to give up her job for lack of regular transportation.
The automobile was used for the family shopping. It
was used for the benefit of the other minor children, In

ee 707

fact, it was the family automobile. And, we think the
expense of its operation should be charged to the mother
as the head of the family.

In this connection, we point out that the operation of a
family automobile was in keeping with the mother’s
financial situation. The proof is that she had, in addition
to her own earnings and the contributions of the minor
decedent, a monthly income of $400.00, which is exempted.
by statute from consideration in determining dependency
and support benefits. Sec. 50-1013 T.C.A.

HI We have considered appellees’ contention that
dependency is the test, and that the award should be
sustained because of the fact of dependency. We point
out that while dependency is a test, it is only part of the
statutory arrangement for determining the liability of
the employer, and that after dependency has been de-
termined to exist, the question then becomes, what was
the amount of the support contribution made by the
decedent employee to each member of the dependent class,
and then awards are based on this determination. The
case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.

Dysr, Cuimr Justicn, Casson and McCanusss, Jus-
gices and Jenxins, Sprcran Justice, concur.

Trenz Gunray

Tus Liuy Company and Reniance
Insurance Company.

476 S.W.2d 252.
(Jackson, April Term, 1971.)
Opinion filed December 20, 1971.

Petition to Rehear Denied February 22, 1972

709

Wruevrr J. Cutaprtia, Cutaretia & Parise, Memphis,
for appellant.

Joun H. Harness, Jz., Caanpizr, Manien, Jonnson, &
Harris, Memphis, for appellees.

a
e
So

Mr. Justice McCanuuss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Irene Gentry filed her bill against The Lilly Company,
the employer of her husband, Ralph Gentry, and against
its insurance carrier, to recover on behalf of her hus-
band’s five dependent minor children and on her own be-
half the death benefits provided by the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Law. The Chancellor decreed that when he was
killed, Ralph Gentry had deviated from the scope of his
employment and that his death was not compensable. He
dismissed the complainant’s bill and she has appealed.

Ralph Gentry was a mechanic employed by The Lilly
Company to service fork lifts and other equipment. Usu-
ally he worked in Memphis but from time to time he serv-
iced equipment at other places.

On June 15, 1970, Gentry left Memphis in a truck

owned by The Lilly Company to go to Mississippi to work
on the machines of several of the company’s customers.

| TL

The company had furnished him a service order for
each piece of equipment he was to repair. The company
required that he maintain daily cost cards on which he
showed his itinerary and the time he had spent on each
job.

On the afternoon of the fifteenth Gentry worked in
Tupelo and Aberdeen, Mississippi, and then drove to
Corinth, Mississippi, where he spent the night. On the
next day he worked in Corinth, servicing equipment in
two locations, and spent that night there. On that day,
the sixteenth, he had a telephone conversation with The
Lilly Company’s shop superintendent, Bill White, and
arranged to have certain parts sent him, Mr. White gave
him another service order which he remembers was for
work at the Wurlitzer Plant in Holly Springs, Missis-
sippi.

On the seventeenth Gentry worked in Corinth until five
o’clock in the afternoon and then went to Holly Springs.
After the call at the Wurlitzer plant he had no other
work and in due course would thereupon have driven back
to Memphis. Under the company’s rules he would have
returned his truck to the office of The Lilly Company if
he had arrived there before five o’clock, but if after five
o’clock he was allowed to take the truck to his home.

Ralph Gentry was killed in a collision between the
truck he was driving and another vehicle on June 18,
1970, at about twenty minutes after one o’clock in the
morning on Swinnea Road, less than two miles from his
home and on what was the direct route between Holly
Springs and his home.

Both Gentry and the driver of the other vehicle were
killed in the collision. The passenger in the other vehicle

712 es

was seriously hurt and had no recollection of the occur-
rence, The record contains no evidence about the condi-
tion of the two vehicles or their respective positions after
they had collided.

The medical examiner, a pathologist, drew samples of
blood and of urine from the bodies of Ralph Gentry and
the driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision.
Gentry’s blood had an alcohol reading of .23 per cent,
which the pathologist testified was sufficient to evidence
intoxication.

Gentry’s business at the Wurlitzer plant in Holly
Springs had been concluded at about half past six in the
afternoon. The distance home was about fifty miles and
the time required to drive it was about an hour; but
the fatal collision did not occur for nearly seven hours
and there is no accounting for this long lapse of time.

The Chancellor found and the defendants insist that
the lapse of time and the intoxicated condition of Gentry
at the time of his death establish a deviation from the
employment which precludes the recovery of workmen’s
compensation benefits. This is the only issue presented
by the appeal. If the delay or the intoxication or their
combination constituted a deviation, then there can be
no recovery; but if there was no deviation when the fatal
collision took place, then the complainant is entitled to
the recovery for which she has sued.

Professor Larson in his ‘‘Workmen’s Compensation
Law”’ has said:

*<30,00 Misconduct of the employee, whether negli-
gent or wilful, is immaterial in compensation law,
unless it takes the form of deviation from the course

ee 713

of employment, or unless it is of a kind specifically
made a defense in the jurisdictions containing such a
defense in their statutes,’’

He also said:

‘*34.00 Voluntary intoxication which renders an em-
ployee incapable of performing his work is a departure
from the course of employment. Otherwise, apart from
special statute, evidence of intoxication at the time of
injury is ordinarily no defense, at least unless intoxi-
eation was the sole cause of injury... .’

The applicable Tennessee statute is carried into the
Tennessee Code as Section 50-910 and is as follows:

“‘No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or
death due to the employee’s willful misconduct or in-
tentional self-inflicted injury, or due to intoxication,
or willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance
or perform a duty required by law. If the employer
defends on the ground that the injury arose in any or
all of the above stated ways, the burden of proof shall
be on the employer to establish such defense.’’

Hl The burden of proving that the injury was due to
misconduct or intoxication rests on the employer. Frost
wv. Blue Ridge Timber Corp., 158 Tenn. 18, 11 8.W.2d 860
[1928] ; Coleman. (American Casualty Co.) v. Coker, 204
Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.24 540 [1959]. In the record before
us we have no proof from which it may be found that the
intoxication of Ralph Gentry caused or contributed. to
the collision in which he was killed. The record does not
show on which side of the roadway were the respective
yehicles, what were their rates of speed, or the other
things that cause and contribute to motor vehicle col-
lisions.

es

74 ee

We quote from a recent opinion of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin :

‘On the issue as to causal connection between intox-
ication and accident, the employer and insurance car-
rier presented no additional proof, by way of expert
testimony or otherwise. Instead they relied to prove
causation upon the absence of evidence as to tire blow-
out, steering mechanism failure, deer crossing the road
or other distraction that might account for the car hit-
ting the bridge abutment. In meeting a burden of proof,
absence of testimony is not the same as presence of
testimony. It is true that the employer and insurance
carrier were not required to negate all possible ex-
planations of the car veering to hit the abutment. But
they were required to establish a causal link between.
the condition of intoxication and the injury. This they
did not do. Their expert witness did not testify that the
29% alcohol in the blood, standing alone with no cor-
roborating physical evidence, was the cause of the car
hitting the abutment. In fact, he did not give an opin-
ion as to the cause of accident and death. With no
causal relationship established between condition of
intoxication and causation of the accident, the case
becomes analogous to and controlled by the case of
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
above cited. There the claimant’s injury resulted from
a fall down a flight of stairs. There was evidence of in-
toxication but no evidence as to how the accident oc-
curred. There the court stated:

«cc# * * No find Tate’s injury was caused by intoxi-
cation on the record presented would be speculative
and conjectural. The appellant’s contention of intox-

ee 715

ication based on the evidence gives rise at the most
only to a suspicion that such might be the case. * * *
But assuming Tate was intoxicated, there is no proof
the intoxication caused the injury. * * * ’’’

Haller Beverage Corp. v. Dept. of Industry, Labor &
Human Rel., 49 Wis.2d 233, 181 N.W.2d 418 [1970].

Hl We conclude that it was not proved in this case
that intoxication was the proximate cause of Ralph Gen-
try’s death or that at the time of the occurrence of the
fatal collision he was deviating from his employment by
The Lilly Company. The defendants failed to carry the
burden of proving these things.

Hl The defendants insist that under the facts as prov-
ed, Ralph Gentry had departed from his employment
when he was killed and that for that reason his death is
not compensable. It is argued that from the time he left
Holly Springs—sometime after half past six in the after-
noon—until he was killed while in an intoxicated condi-
tion at about twenty minutes after one o’clock the next
morning, a period of nearly seven hours had passed, by
far the greater part of which is unaccounted for, and that
this amounted to a deviation from his employment which
continued until his death. Assuming a deviation—and we
do not know the facts—Gentry was on the way home,
following the usual and best route, and driving the com-
pany truck, when the collision occurred. If he had de-
viated he at some time had resumed his duty and was on
the way home with the truck in performance of his duty.

We conclude that for whatever reason the journey
home may have been interrupted, there did not exist at
the time of the fatal collision a deviation or departure
from Ralph Gentry’s employment.

16 ee

Hl We do not disturb the findings of fact of the trial
court in a workmen’s compensation case when such find-
ings are supported by material evidence. Brewer v Poca-
hontas Fuel Co., 221 Tenn, 180, 425 S.W.2d 582 [1968].
But this opinion is authority also for the rule that we
may reach conclusions of law that differ from the con-
clusions of the trial judge.

We are of opinion and hold that the complainant, for
herself and for the minors for whom she also sues, is
entitled to an award as provided by the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Law against the defendant, The Lilly Com-
pany, and its insurer, Reliance Insurance Company. We
remand the cause to the Chancery Court for a determina-
tion of the amount due the widow and to each of the
children. A decree will be entered accordingly.

Humpzrzys, Justion, and Jmenxins, Srzom. Jusricz,
coneur.

Dyzr, Carer Justicn, and Crxson, Jusrion, dissent.
Mr. Cumr Justics Dysr, (dissenting).

As I view this case the issne here on appeal is whether
there is any evidence in the record to support the finding
of the chancellor the death of Gentry did not arise out
of and in the course of his employment.

The evidence supports there is a lapse of seven hours
between the time Gentry completed his last work of the
day for his employer, at which time he was one hour
from home. There is also evidence to support a finding
he spent the greater part of this time on a mission of his
own; that is, imbibing alcoholic beverages. The in-

ee TAT

toxication enters into the case not as a defense under
T.C.A. sec. 50-910, but as an element to show the em-
ployee had, in fact, left his employment to go off on a
mission of his own.

After proof of the above facts, there is proof Gentry
returned to the highway, which was his normal route
home and while traveling on this route he was killed in
an accident. The question then is whether Gentry re-
enters his employment so as to be entitled to workmen’s
compensation benefits when he reaches his normal travel
route home after having left his employment for a mis-
sion of his own.

In deciding this issue I think the evidence has to be
viewed as a whole to determine if there is any material
evidence to support the chancellor. I do not think there
is any hard and fast rule that if an employee, after leav-
ing his employment, returns to his normal travel route
necessitated by his employment he re-enters his employ-
ment.

In determining whether an employee has deviated from.
his employment and then returned, or has, in fact, aban-
doned his employment, at least for the day in question,
the reasonableness of the deviation should be considered.
In considering the reasonableness of the deviation, the
time elements and the activities of the employee should
be carefully examined and considered.

I think there is material evidence to support the find-
ing of the chancellor that the employee had, in fact, at
least for the balance of the day in question, abandoned
his employment to go off on a mission of his own, and

718 ee
that his death did not arise out of and in the course of
his employment.

As I view the matter, willful misconduct under T.C.A.
sec. 59-910 is not an issue in this case.

I respectfully dissent.

Crrson, Justice, joins in this dissent.

es 719

Cotumsia Bonprve Company and Bam WersstEr

Sratz or TENNESSEE
476 S.W.2d 633

(Nashville, December Term, 1971).

Opinion filed February 7, 1972,

Davym M. Pack, Atiorney General, Roserr H. Roserrs,
Assistant Attorney General, Prine Tomzson, Jr.,
Maury County Attorney, Columbia, for petitioners,

Jerry C, Conner, McFarnanp, Comnzy, Buanx & Jack,
Columbia, for respondent.

Mz. Justice McCanuzss delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The County Criminal Court of Maury County entered
a final judgment of forfeiture on a bail bond in the
penalty of $500.00, given by Michael Thompson as prin-
cipal and by Columbia Bonding Company and Bam
‘Webster as sureties, to secure Thompson’s appearance
in the Court of General Sessions, Part II, at Mount

ee 721.

Pleasant on the 25th day of July, 1969, at 4 o’clock, P.M.,
to answer the offense of reckless driving. From this
judgment the sureties perfected their appeal in the nature
of a writ of error to the Court of Criminal Appeals. In
an opinion by Judge Russell, in which Judge Galbreath
concurred, that court adjudged the bond to be a nullity
and reversed the judgment of the County Criminal Court.
Judge Oliver dissented, expressing the opinion that the
suit was a civil one of which the Court of Criminal
Appeals had no jurisdiction. We granted certiorari.

The General Assembly, by Chapter 226 of the Public
Acts of 1967, created the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Section 8 of that statute, which defines the court’s juris-
diction and which is codified as Section 16-448, Tennessee
Code Annotated, is as follows:

“The jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals
shall be appellate only and shall extend to all criminal
eases, both felony and misdemeanor. The court shall
likewise have jurisdiction over all cases arising under
any post-conviction procedure act, involving or at-
tacking the validity of a final conviction or judgment
in a criminal ease.

‘‘Provided further, the court shall not have or take
jurisdiction of any case, wherein the sole and single
question for determination involves the constitution-
ality of a statute or municipal ordinance.’’

Before the establishment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals in 1967 cases involving bail bonds in criminal
cases were appealed directly to the Supreme Court and
not to the Court of Appeals. Examples of such appeals
are Goldsby v. State, 159 Tenn. 396, 19 S.W.2d 241 [1929],
and Wallace v. State, 196 Tenn. 577, 269 S.W.2d 780

722 ee

[1953]. In neither of these two opinions is the question
of jurisdiction mentioned and the Court and counsel
assumed, evidently, that the appeals should follow the
procedure prescribed for appeals in criminal cases. In
Loy v. Loy, 82 Tenn.App. 470, 222 8.W.2d 873 [1949],
which dealt with the validity of a bail bond given by the
defendant in a. divorce suit who had been cited for con-
tempt, the appeal was perfected to the Court of Appeals
who accepted it, again without mentioning the matter
of jurisdiction.

Hl A proceeding to forfeit a bail bond and to pro-
nounce judgment thereon is a statutory proceeding. Its
primary purpose is to collect the amount of the penalty of
the bond. Another purpose (and an important one) is to
enforce the apprehension and attendance in court of the
absent defendant. If we concede that such proceeding
is a civil one it is, nevertheless, an adjunct to a criminal
proceeding. Before 1967, as we have said, appeals in
such procedings were to the Supreme Court—this be-
cause criminal appeals were to this Court. Must we now
say that one effect of the language of Section 16-448,
T.C.A., has been to reserve to the Supreme Court juris-
diction of appeals in criminal bail bond cases or should
we hold that the jurisdiction passed to the Court of
Criminal Appeals as a part of that court’s jurisdiction
of criminal appeals? We decide that such jurisdiction is
in the Court of Criminal Appeals and that that court
properly accepted jurisdiction in this case.

The sureties on the bond in question have assigned
one error in the Court of Criminal Appeals:

“The Trial Judge erred in dismissing sureties pe-
tition to set aside the conditional judgment and in

ee 728

entering an order making final the judgment for for-
feiting the bond to the General Sessions Court, in that
the bond was to the General Sessions Court and that
Court only and these sureties executed no other bond
to the County Criminal Court.’’

‘We glean the following facts from the technical record:

R. D. Sanford, ‘‘THP’’, (which we construe to mean
Tennessee Highway Patrol) made oath before Judge
‘Wm. G. Hardin on July 24, 1969, ‘‘that on the 24 day of
July, 1969, the offense of Reckless Driving involved in a
one car wreck, property damage (one mail box and tele-
phone line) ... has been committed and charges Michael
R. Thompson thereof.’’? Judge Hardin issued a warrant
for the arrest of Michael R. Thompson for the offense
described in the affidavit, and R. D. Sanford made his
return on the warrant, ‘‘Hixecuted on the 24 day of July,
1969°’,

Then in the record appears the bail bond by which
Thompson undertook to ‘‘appear at the Court of General
Sessions, Part IT at Mt. Pleasant, Tenn., on the 25 day
of July, 1969, at 4 o’clock P.M., to answer the offense of
Reckless Driving and does not depart the court without
leave,’’ We notice that the name of the principal appears
in the body of the bond as ‘‘Mitchell M. Thompson’’ but
that his name is signed to it as ‘‘Michael R. Thompson’’
and that the bond bears date of July 22, 1969, and is
endorsed as having been filed on July 22, 1969. The bond
also bears the endorsement, ‘‘Approved Lawson White,
Sheriff, By Baucom’’.

On August 8, 1969, Judge Hardin of the Court of
General Sessions entered the following order:

724 ee

“Defendant failed to appear for trial. It appearing
from testimony in the case that there is probable cause
to believe the defendant guilty of the offense of which
he stands charged, it is adjudged that he be held to
answer at the next term of the Circuit Court of Maury
County, Tennessee. The offense being bailable, the
amount of such bail is fixed at $500.00.’’

The Grand Jury indicted Michael R. Thompson on
August 27, 1969, and on October 1, 1969, the court entered
a conditional forfeiture against him and the sureties on
his bond and entered a final judgment against them on
April 21, 1970.

There are errors and inconsistencies in the record: (1)
according to the dates appearing in the affidavit made
for the warrant for Thompson’s arrest, he committed
the offense of reckless driving two days after he and his
sureties had given their bond to guarantee that he would
appear and answer the charge, and (2) the bond’s ap-
proval was by ‘‘Lawson White, Sheriff, By Baucom”’,
neither the identify nor the authority of Baucom ap-
pearing.

TH So far as concerns the date we can only conclude
that some one made a mistake when he wrote it. It would
be less than reasonable to assume that Michael R. Thomp-
son was able to predict two days before the event that on
July 24, 1969, he would be charged with the offense of
reckless driving ‘‘property damage (one mail box and
telephone line)’’ and that he would have then the pru-
dence and foresight to enter into bond for his appearance
to answer the charge on the twenty-fifth. But the incon-
sistency in the dates is not fatal or material and the pro-
ceedings incident to Thompson’s arrest and incident to

ee 725

his making bond are not rendered invalid because of it.
Swan v. Hodges, 40 Tenn. 251 (1859).

n State v, McCoy, 60 Tenn. 111 [1873], the Court said:

“There had been no examination of the case and no
commitment at the time the bail-bond was given. In-
deed a commitment before examination would have
een in violation of a positive statute. No person can
e committed to prison for any criminal matter until
examination thereof be first had before some magis-
trate. Code, Sec. 5,017.* The scire facias shows on its
face that the 27th of September was the day fixed for
an examination of the charge and that the matter had
een adjourned over until that day. There being no
commitment then, the officer had no right to take bail
in such a case, Code, Sees. 5,066, 5,144. He has no such
power except in the cases specified by statute. The bond
was therefore a nullity, and the scire facias was prop-
erly quashed.’’

Hl Here the bond was taken before commitment by
one Baucom who assumed to act for Sheriff White; but
the Sheriff, himself, was without authority to take bail
before commitment of the prisoner. Section 40-1208,
T.C.A. The taking of bail in this case was irregular and
void, and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly so
adjudged.

Hl The bond committed Thompson to appear in the
Court of General Sessions on the afternoon of July 25,
1969. Forfeiture was taken because he did not appear in

* The three code sections cited in this quotation have been carried
into our present code without substantial change as Section 40-604,
40-1119, and 40-1208, respectively.

726 |

the County Criminal Court, Beasley v. State, 134 Tenn.
660, 185 S.W. 687 [1915], is authority for the rule of law
that the giving of bail for an appearance in one court
does not bind one to appear in another court. The amend-
ment to Section 40-1204, T.C.A., providing for the con-
tinuance of bail pending appeal is not applicable here
because there was no appellate review to make that pro-
vision pertinent.

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals.

Dyzr, Cumr Juszrice and Cuarrin, Creson and Hum-
PHREYS, JUSTICES, concur.

Buu Frence and Ronnie Wauxer, Petitioners,

Tuomas H, Sunriver, District Attorney General,
Respondent.

476 S.W.2d 636.

(Nashville, December Term, 1971.)

Opinion filed February 7, 1972.

728

Herserr R, Riou, Nashville, for petitioners; Pam
M. Carpgy, Nashville, of counsel.

Davin M. Paox, Attorney General of Tennessee, C.
Haves Coonny, Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee,
for respondent.

729
Ln}

Mr. Justice Cuartin delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This matter is before this Court on a petition for the
common law writs of certiorari and supersedeas. The
petition was granted by a member of this Court and set
for hearing at the December 1971 Session of this Court.
It was ordered arguments and briefs be confined to the
following issues:

“(1) Whether T.C.A. Section 39-3003, et seq., pro-
vide exclusive methods of procedure for the prosecu-
tion of actions arising thereunder; and

‘*(2) If such procedures are not exclusive, whether
the procedure used in the case now before the Court
has any foundation under the laws of the State of Ten-
nessee.’’

After careful consideration, we are of the opinion the
writs heretofore granted should be sustained and the
proceedings in the trial court superseded and dismissed.

On September 9, 1971, an Assistant Attorney General
for Davidson County purchased two alleged obscene
magazines and took photographs of other alleged obscene
material at the Swingers Adult News and Peep Show,
an alleged business operated by petitioners for the pur-
pose of sale, display, distribution or exhibition of obscene
material in violation of our Obscenity Laws, T.C.A. See-
tion 39-3003 et. seq.

730 es

Pursuant to acquiring this information, the Assistant
Attorney General appeared before Honorable John T.
Boone, Jr., Judge of the Metropolitan General Sessions
Court, Part ITI, and made affidavit for the issuance of a
search warrant.

The warrant was issued and directed the officer to make
an inventory of the business house operated by peti-
tioners of certain alleged obscene material displayed or
exhibited for sale and distribution; and that the war-
vant and inventory be returned before the judge issuing
the warrant.

On the same day, after the search warrant had been
returned with the inventory, the District Attorney Gen-
eral filed a petition in the criminal court of Davidson
County for a show cause order against petitioners re-
quiring them to appear before the Judge of the Criminal
Court, Division I, of Davidson County, on September 13,
1971, at two P.M., and show cause why the items de-
scribed in the search warrant and inventory exhibited to
the petition should not be ordered subject to seizure.

Judge John L. Draper granted the petition and caused
the scire facias or show cause order to issue and be
served on petitioners together with the petition.

Also, on the same day, the Clerk of the Criminal Court
issued a subpoena duces tecum to which was attached a
copy of the inventory to the search warrant requiring
them-to bring with them one copy of all the magazines and
other alleged obscene material set forth in the inventory
at the hearing on September 13, 1971.

On September 13, 1971, the parties appeared in court
as directed. Petitioners filed a. motion to quash the sub-

ee 731

poena, to withdraw the show cause order, to dismiss the
petition for the show cause order and quash the search
warrant.

The trial judge overruled the motion. The matter was
set for hearing on October 15, 1971.

On October 11, 1971, petitioners filed their petition in
this Court for writs of certiorari and supersedeas.,

The petition alleged the trial court acted illegally and
beyond its jurisdiction in sustaining the petition for the
writ of scire facias or show cause order.

Petitioners concede T.C.A. Section 39-3003 et seq., are
not exclusive in the sense they preclude the use of other
legal methods of procedure for the prosecution of actions
arising thereunder.

HI However, they insist those code sections are ex-
clusive with respect to seizure and suppression of any
obscene material.

T.C.A. Section 39-3003 provides in part:

“Tt shall be 2 misdemeanor for any person to know-
ingly sell, distribute, display, exhibit, possess with the
intent to sell, distribute, display or exhibit; or to pub-
lish, produce, or otherwise create with the intent to
sell, distribute, display or exhibit any obscene mate-
rial. This paragraph shall not be construed to permit
the seizure or suppression of any material obscene or
otherwise, such seizure or suppression to be lawful
only as expressly provided for by law. Provided how-
ever, that if the district attorney-general is of the
opinion that this section is being violated, he may file
a petition in a circuit, chancery, or criminal court of

732 ee

his district relating his opinion, and request the court
to issue a temporary injunction enjoining the person
named in said petition from removing the obscene
material from the jurisdiction of the court pending an
adversary hearing on said petition. Where a temporary
injunction is so issued, such adversary hearing shall
be held within two (2) days after joinder of issues, at
which hearing the court will determine whether or not
the material in question is, in fact, obscene. On a find-
ing of obscenity, the court shall continue its injunction
in full force and effect for a period not to exceed forty-
five (45) days or until an indictment on the matter
has been submitted to the grand jury. If forty-five (45)
days elapse and the grand jury has taken no action,
the injunction terminates on the grand jury return-
ing a not true bill. On the return of a true bill of in-
dictment, the court shall order the obscene material
delivered into the hands of the court clerk or district
attorney-general, there to be held as evidence in the
case,’?

In support of petitioners’ insistence they rely on the
second sentence of the above quoted paragraph to the
effect the paragraph shall not be construed to permit the
seizure or suppression of any alleged obscene material
other than as expressly provided by law.

T.C.A. Section 39-3008 provides:

‘‘Hixcept as expressly herein provided, the provi-
sions of secs 39-3003—39-3008 shall not be construed
as repealing any provision of any other statutes but
shall be supplementary thereto and cumulative there-
of”?

ee 738

Respondent admits the procedure followed is not ex-
pressly provided for by any statute of this State dealing
with the writ of scire facias. He insists, however the
scire facias or show cause order based upon the search
warrant is not without foundation under the common law
of this State.

It is evident T.C.A. Section 39-3003 creates a new
right by authorizing the district attorney general to in-
stitute proceedings against persons who he is of the
opinion are dealing in obscene material in the manner
stated therein. It, also, prescribes the remedy for its
enforcement.

“Tt is a general principle that when a right is given
by statute, and a remedy provided in the same Act, the
right can be pursued in no other mode.’ Flatley v.
Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company, 56 Tenn.
230 (1872) ; Turner v. Harris, 198 Tenn. 654, 281 S.W.
2d 661 (1955).

We conclude T.C.A. Sections 39-3003 et seq., provide
an exclusive method to be followed by the district attor-
ney general and the court when he elects to proceed to
enforce the statute as in this case.

Hl We are of the further opinion the procedure used
in this case for the seizure of the alleged obscene material
has no foundation under the common law.

As pointed out, the search warrant was issued by a
General Sessions Judge and returned to his court.

It is true a purported copy of the search warrant and
return thereof was filed as an exhibit to the petition for
the show cause order. It was not certified to by the judge
or clerk of the court.

734 eS

Consequently, the search warrant was not of record
in the Criminal Court of Davidson County when the peti-
tion for the scire facias or show cause order was filed
and granted.

“We need hardly observe, that the basis of the scire
facias is a record of the court from which it issues,
that writ would be inappropriate as a remedy in the
circuit court in the present case, the recognizances not
being records of that court, and we are not aware of
any statute authorizing them to be transferred to and
become a part of its records.’ State, to Use of Bullard
v. Gassaway, 30 Tenn. 203 (1850).

“*A scire facias can issue only from the court having
possession of the record on which it is founded, be-
cause the writ is founded and must rely for its support
on the record of the court which issues it. * * *”? 79
C.J.S. Scire Facias sec. 6, page 460.

‘(A scire facias can issue only out of the court having
the record on which it is founded.’’ 42 Am.Jur. Section
23, page 474.

Hl This Court, or a member thereof, has authority to
grant the writ of certiorari and the writ of supersedeas
in aid thereof to review an interlocutory order of the trial
court where such court has exceeded the jurisdiction con-
ferred and there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy. T.C.A. Section 27-801; Clements v. Roberts, 144
Tenn. 129, 230 8.W.2d 30 (1920).

This Court being of the opinion the court below was
without jurisdiction to grant the scire facias or show

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cause order, the petition for writs of certiorari and
supersedeas is sustained, and the proceedings in the trial
court will be superseded and the petition dismissed.

Dyer, Curer Justice, and Creson, Humpnreys and
McCantzss, Justices, concur.