State: Massachusetts
Volume: 477
Term: None-None
Jurisdiction(s): Massachusetts
Source: https://static.case.law/mass/477.pdf

DECISIONS

OF THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

OF

MASSACHUSETTS

CommonweattH vs. Nicnotas R. Coro:

Middlesex. December 9, 2016. - May 4, 2017.

Present: Gawrs, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Gaziano, JI.

Homicide. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of
statement, Sentence. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness
of statement, Joint enterprise, Prior misconduct, Intoxication. Joint Enter-
prise. Intoxication. Mental Impairment. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal,
Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness
of statement, Instructions to jury, Jury and jurors, Empanelment of jury,
Argument by prosecutor, Sentence.

A Superior Court judge properly denied the criminal defendant's pretrial motion
to suppress the statement he made to police after speaking with his uncle,
where the evidence did not support the defendant’s claim that he was
emotionally and intellectually incapable of voluntarily making his statement,

iy

477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

given that, in the audio recording of his interview with police, he appeared
to understand his circumstances and sounded lucid and coherent; and where
the defendant’s contention that his uncle coerced him into making the
statement was unavailing, given that the defendant was twenty-one years old
at the time of his statement and that the record did not support his claim.
[9-11]

At a murder trial, the judge did not err in instructing the jury on joint venture,
where there was ample evidence that, even assuming the defendant’s com-
panion was not involved in the stabbing, he was present at the scene as the
defendant stabbed the victim repeatedly, and drove the defendant home after
the two had left the victim in the woods. [11-12]

At a murder trial, the admission in evidence of a baseball bat not used in the
murder was not error, where the bat was admitted to establish the defendant's
state of mind and his intent to harm the victim, and where the defendant’s
hiding of the bat permitted the jury to infer that he had planned in advance
to harm the victim; similarly, the judge did not err in admitting in evidence
two sheathed knives from the defendant’s mother’s house, where the knives
were admissible as weapons potentially used to stab the victim and were
relevant to support the suggested inference that the defendant returned to his
home to retrieve a knife he planned to use on the victim, [12-14]

At a murder trial, no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arose from the
jury instruction concerning the relationship between the defendant’s volun-
tary consumption of drugs or alcohol and the question of criminal respon-
sibility, where, although the judge’s instruction did not precisely match the
wording of model instructions set out in decisions of this court issued after
the trial in this case, the judge’s instruction did not provide any leeway for
the jury to find both that the defendant was criminally responsible because of
his alcohol and drag consumption and that his mental defect or disease alone
caused him to lack substantial capacity to conform his conduct to legal
requirements, [14-16]

At a criminal trial, the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to strike
for cause a juror who had impending travel plans, another who initially noted
an ambivalence toward a defense of lack of criminal responsibility, and two
who had family connections to law enforcement officers, [16-17]

Ata murder trial, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from
the prosecutor’ reference in closing argument to an incident described in the
defendant’s medical records, where the prosecutor used details of the inci-
dent in the medical record, which had been introduced by the defendant, not
as substantive evidence but to refute the opinion offered by the defendant’s
expert that the incident demonstrated the defendant’s lack of criminal re-
sponsibility. [17-18]

‘There was no merit to a criminal defendant’s claim that, given his mental
instability at the time he committed murder, sentencing him to life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. [18-19]

Inpicmenr found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on September 10, 1998.

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 3

Commonwealth v. Colton.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Charles
T. Spurlock, J., and the case was tried before Paul A. Chernoff, J.

Michael J. Traft for the defendant.

Casey E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney, for the Common-
wealth.

Lenk, J. In December, 2000, the defendant was convicted of
murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty
and deliberate premeditation in the August, 1998, stabbing death
of his cousin, Robert McDonald. At the time of the killing, the
defendant was twenty-one years old. On appeal, the defendant
argues that a statement he made to police was not voluntary and
should not have been admitted at trial. He also challenges certain
evidentiary rulings, and he argues that there were errors in the jury
instructions and that the judge abused his discretion in failing to
dismiss several jurors for cause. In addition, the defendant claims
that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper and that his
mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole violates the United States Constitution and the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights. Finally, the defendant seeks extraor-
dinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Having carefully reviewed the entire record, we discern no
error warranting reversal, nor any reason to exercise our authority
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or order a new
trial. We therefore affirm the defendant’s conviction.

1. Background. a. Facts. We recite the facts the jury could have
found, reserving certain details for later discussion.

i. Day of the stabbing. The victim and the defendant had grown
up together and had continued their friendship as adults.t On the
evening of August 15, 1998, the defendant and his friends Mark
Heymann and Kenneth Scott Cronin picked up the victim at his
cousin’s house in Newton.”

The four then drove to a liquor store near Pettee Square in
Newton, where the defendant purchased a “30-pack” of Budweiser
beer and a two-liter bottle of Bacardi Limon rum. They joined a

‘Approximately three years earlier, the defendant and the victim had gotten
into a dispute because the defendant suspected that the victim was involved with
the defendant's girl friend, but thereafter they seemed to have retuned to their
former “good” friendship.

2 The victim was working in New Hampshire for the summer but was in Newton
visiting his cousin, Donna D'Angelo, for the weekend. Her husband, Richard
D’Angelo, who was also the defendant’s uncle, went outside to greet the defendant
and his friends as they arrived. At that point, the defendant appeared to be sober.

4 477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

larger group of people who were drinking beer at a nearby park.
Although the defendant remained fairly sober, the victim soon
became highly intoxicated. The defendant told several people that
he was angry with the victim and that he intended to beat him up.
One of those individuals responded that the defendant “should be
aman about it and wait till the next day and . . . settle it one-on-one
straight, [and] not do it while . . . everybody’s drunk.” The
defendant responded that he probably would follow that advice.

Later in the evening, the group of people at the park began to
disperse. At some point, Cronin left. Around 10:30 pM., the
defendant, the victim, and Heymann left in Heymann’s vehicle, a
blue Oldsmobile Cutlass. The group arrived at around 11 pm. at
the defendant’s mother’s house in Newton, where the defendant
was then living and where he kept a collection of knives.? The
three men thereafter headed to Minute Man National Historical
Park in Lincoln, approximately thirteen miles away. At some
point during the drive, Heymann stopped the vehicle in a parking
lot. The defendant then attacked the victim with a knife. Defen-
sive wounds on the victim’s hands and wrists demonstrate that he
attempted to fend off the attack. Bloodstains on the tops of his
feet and in the area surrounding the vehicle suggest that he got
out of the vehicle during the attack. Ultimately, the victim was
stabbed eighty-six times, both inside and outside the vehicle,
including at least once after he died. The victim’s body was then
dragged across a hiking trail in the park and left in the woods.

ii. The investigation. The next day, August 16, 1998, two hikers
walking on the trail found the body approximately twenty-five
feet from the trail, and contacted a park ranger, who notified
police. Police made casts of tire tracks at the scene and of
footprints found near the victim. The following day, shortly after
a conversation with the victim’s father, State police Troopers
Owen Boyle and David Burke went to the home of the defend-
ant’s uncle, Richard D’ Angelo, and, after one-half hour of con-
versation with him, went to the defendant’s mother’s house. They
found Heymann sitting in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, parked
in the driveway. One of the officers walked over and spoke with
Heymann, who remained in his vehicle.

When the defendant walked out of the house, Boyle asked him

®The defendant’s next door neighbor saw Heymann’s motor vehicle arrive in
front of her house and heard someone get out and begin vomiting in the street.
She attempted to call 911 but in the time it took her to disconnect the Internet
from her telephone line, the vehicle pulled away.

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 5

Commonwealth v. Colton.

about the victim’s whereabouts shortly before his death. The
defendant said that he had last seen the victim on the night of
August 15, 1998, when he and two other friends had met the
victim on their way to Pettee Square to drink beer with a group
of friends. He said that, at some point, Heymann had driven the
victim to the Eliot Street Massachusetts Bay Transportation Au-
thority (MBTA) station so that the victim could go to Chelsea to
purchase “crack” cocaine from someone named “EJ.”4 When the
trooper told the defendant that the victim had been found dead in
Lincoln, the defendant became “upset” and “emotional.” He took
off his sunglasses, threw them to the ground, and sat down on the
front steps, “cradl[ing] his head in his hands” for some time.
When Boyle asked for more information, the defendant stated
that he was done talking to him and would not respond to any
additional questions. At that point, Boyle went to speak with
Heymann, whose account of the evening was essentially the same
as the defendant’s. The defendant and Heymann also gave their
friend Cronin a similar account when he asked what had taken
place after the defendant, Heymann, and the victim left the party.

Investigators also spoke with others who had been at the party.
One partygoer, Matthew Bosselman, said that, earlier on the day
of the killing, he had seen the defendant take an aluminum bat
from Heymann’s vehicle and hide it by the railway tracks near
Pettee Square. Bosselman reported that the defendant had said he
was angry with the victim and intended to beat him up. Police
later discovered an aluminum baseball bat in a shack near the
railroad tracks, which Bosselman identified at trial.

Police then went to Heymann’s house to examine the tires on
his vehicle. When they arrived, they found the vehicle in the
driveway with a number of cleaning products on its roof. The
vehicle was impounded for analysis. There were numerous blood-
stains on the back seat; all of the blood matched that of the victim.
There was a fingerprint smeared in the victim’s blood near the
switch on the interior dome light. The fingerprint belonged to
Heymann. The tire treads on the vehicle matched tire imprints
found near the hiking trail where the victim had been dragged.

Soon thereafter, police learned that the defendant and a man
fitting Heymann’s description had gone to a junkyard to purchase
parts from the interior of a vehicle similar to Heymann’s Olds-

Police later identified EJ and learned that he had been incarcerated at that
time.

6 477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

mobile Cutlass. They were unable to purchase the parts, and were
asked to leave because the vehicle they had been examining,
without permission, was in a restricted area of the yard. After
learning of the visit to the junkyard, police decided to speak to the
defendant. In an effort to locate him, they spoke with D’ Angelo,
who arranged for the defendant to go to Pettee Square, where
Boyle and two other officers were waiting. The defendant agreed
to go to the Newton police station for questioning, and was
brought there in a police cruiser. D’Angelo followed in his own
vehicle. The officers took the defendant to an interview room.
Boyle observed that he appeared to be steady on his feet, did not
smell of alcohol, and did not appear to be intoxicated.

Boyle read the defendant the Miranda rights from a preprinted
card. The defendant signed the card indicating that he understood
each of the rights and agreed to waive his rights and speak to police.
He repeated the account that he had given two days earlier, stating
that he had last seen the victim walking to the Eliot Street MBTA
station on his way to purchase crack cocaine. Boyle then said that
he “had some information that led [him] to believe that [the
defendant] was not telling . . . the truth about what had happened”
that night. He told the defendant that he had reason to believe the
defendant had been in the area of Pettee Square with a baseball bat
earlier that day, and that the victim had been with the defendant and
Heymann later than they had suggested. Boyle also said that the tire
treads on Heymann’s vehicle matched those found near the location
where the victim’s body had been discovered. At that point, the
defendant asked if he could speak with Boyle alone.

After the other officers left the room, the defendant asked Boyle
if he needed a lawyer. Boyle responded that he could not decide for
the defendant but added that, if the defendant thought it would be
helpful, he could consult with his uncle D’Angelo, who was
downstairs. The defendant assented. Boyle brought D’ Angelo to
the interview room and left the two alone. The substance of the
conversation that followed is disputed, but it appears that, at some
point, the Federal death penalty was discussed. After about ten
minutes, D’Angelo opened the door and told Boyle that the de-
fendant wanted to cooperate with police. D’ Angelo commented that
the defendant was concerned about the possibility of the Federal
death penalty;> Boyle told the defendant that, as this was a State
matter, the death penalty could not be imposed.

®Minute Man National Historical Park, where the victim’s body was found, is
Federally owned land.

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 7

Commonwealth v. Colton.

The defendant then provided a different account of events on
the night of the victim’s death.* The defendant said that he,
Heymann, and the victim had driven around for a while after
leaving Pettee Square, with no particular destination in mind. At
some point, Heymann stopped the vehicle and left it to relieve
himself. While Heymann was away from the vehicle, the defend-
ant said that the victim attacked him with a knife, and that he
killed the victim in self-defense. He said that Heymann had no
involvement in the killing, but did not remember whether he had
assisted in moving the body. He remembered that he and
Heymann had disposed of their bloody clothing in a Dumpster
near Newton South High School, and he had thrown the knife in
the Charles River. When Boyle asked the defendant why he had
been seen in the area of Pettee Square with a baseball bat earlier
that day, the defendant responded, “I don’t know, maybe I was
trying to be a tough guy, I don’t know.”

The defendant then agreed to have his statement audio re-
corded. His recorded statement was similar in most respects, with
a few exceptions. The defendant said that he could not recall the
baseball bat and that he had been very drunk and had “kind of
blacked out” after the victim drew a knife on him. The defendant
also noted that he had drunk two alcoholic beverages before
speaking with police, and that he had taken a Klonopin pill at
approximately the same time. At that point, Boyle asked the
defendant whether he understood what Boyle was saying and
whether he was comfortable speaking with Boyle. The defendant
responded affirmatively. At the conclusion of the interview, the
defendant was arrested. He then led officers to the bridge where
he had disposed of the knife. The following morning, a State
police dive team retrieved a knife in a sheath from the water
beneath the bridge. The knife contained no fingerprints.” Police
also recovered two knives from the defendant’s mother’s house.

b. Trial proceedings. The defendant filed a motion in limine to
suppress his statement at the police station, arguing that it had not
been voluntary because of his unstable mental condition and the
coercive presence of his uncle, D’Angelo. After an evidentiary
hearing at which Boyle, D’Angelo, another police officer, and a
defense expert testified, a Superior Court judge denied the mo-

SD’ Angelo sat next to the defendant throughout both the unrecorded and the
recorded statements.

7The officer who conducted the fingerprint testing on the knife testified at trial
that the knife’s submersion in water could have dissolved any fingerprints on it.

8 477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

tion. The judge found that the defendant’s “Miranda waiver was
voluntary and that his statement[ | to law enforcement officials
and to others [was] voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
defendant sought reconsideration, proffering testimony by a psy-
chiatrist with new information on his mental impairment. After an
evidentiary hearing, a different motion judge denied that motion.*

At trial, the defendant did not dispute that he had stabbed the
victim. Rather, the theory of the defense was that the defendant had
lacked the substantial capacity to conform his behavior to the
requirements of the law, and thus was not criminally responsible for
the killing. The defense also argued that, at the time of the stabbing,
the defendant had lacked the capacity for premeditation. Two expert
witnesses testified that the defendant suffered from “intermittent
explosive disorder,” temporal lobe epilepsy, and a number of other
mental conditions that prevented him from conforming his behavior
to the law. The prosecution presented its own expert, who testified
that the defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder, and
that he was criminally responsible for the killing. The jury con-
victed the defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of
extreme atrocity or cruelty and deliberate premeditation.

2. Discussion. On appeal,® the defendant argues that (1) his
motion to suppress should have been allowed; (2) the judge
improperly permitted the jury to consider the theory of joint
venture; (3) the judge erred in allowing admission of the baseball
bat found near Pettee Square and two knives found in the de-
fendant’s mother’s house; (4) the jury instructions on the rela-
tionship between voluntary consumption of alcohol and other
intoxicants and criminal responsibility were erroneous; (5) four
jurors should have been struck for cause; (6) portions of the
prosecutor’s closing argument were improper; (7) the mandatory
sentence of life without parole violates the defendant’s right
against cruel and unusual punishment under the United States
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (8)
this court should exercise its authority to grant relief pursuant to
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

In his decision, the judge stated that, after listening to the audio recording of
the interview, he determined that the defendant sounded lucid, “alert and
coherent.” He also noted that the “record is absent of any evidence of coercive
behavior of D’ Angelo towards the defendant.”

*The record does not make clear why the defendant’s direct appeal has taken
sixteen years to reach this court. As we have noted previously, “a delay of this
length can pose significant difficulties.” Commonwealth y. Celester, 473 Mass.
553, 560 n.8 (2016).

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 9

Commonwealth v. Colton.

a. Motion to suppress. The defendant argues that the statement
he made to police after speaking with his uncle D’Angelo, in
which the defendant admitted that he killed the victim, should
have been suppressed. He contends that the statement was not
voluntarily made, as his will was overborne due to his limited
emotional and intellectual capacity, along with coercion by his
uncle. In “reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept
the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, ‘but
conduct an independent review of [the judge’s] ultimate findings
and conclusions of law’ ” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 40 (2015).

It is axiomatic “that a confession or an admission is admissible
in evidence only if it is made voluntarily.” Commonwealth v.
Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 206 (2011). A statement is voluntary
when it is “the product of a ‘rational intellect’ and a ‘free will,’
and not induced by physical or psychological coercion” (citation
omitted). Jd. at 207. The appropriate inquiry concerns whether,
“in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement, the will of the defendant was overborne
to the extent that the statement was not the result of a free and
voluntary act.” Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663
(1995). Factors that may be considered in assessing whether a
defendant’s will was overborne include, inter alia, “promises or
other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant’s age,
education, intelligence and emotional stability . . . and the details
of the interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410,
413 (1986). The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s confession was
voluntary.” Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 468 (2015).

In this case, we discern no reason to disturb the findings of the
two motion judges who denied the defendant’s motion to sup-
press and denied reconsideration of that motion. The defendant’s
assertion that he was emotionally and intellectually incapable of
voluntarily making his statement to police is not supported by the
evidence. Both judges determined, after listening to the audio
recording of the defendant’s interview with police, that he ap-
peared to understand his circumstances and that he sounded lucid
and coherent. Nothing in the audio recording of the defendant’s
interview suggests otherwise.'° During the interview, Boyle twice
asked the defendant if he was comfortable with the proceedings

10Where a judge bases a legal conclusion on facts found in a recording, we are
in the same position as the judge in reviewing that recording, and take an

10 477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

and could understand the questions he was being asked. Both
times, the defendant answered affirmatively. He then provided an
exculpatory explanation of the killing, “indicating an awareness
of the consequences of waiving his rights and speaking to the
police.” Commonwealth v. Beland, 436 Mass. 273, 281 (2002).

The defendant’s contention that his uncle D’Angelo coerced
him into making the statement is similarly unavailing. To begin,
the defendant relies on a line of cases involving a statutory right
provided to juveniles to consult with an interested adult before
waiving their Miranda rights. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith,
471 Mass. 161, 162 (2015). We have concluded that, in some
circumstances, the presence of a so-called “interested adult” may
be psychologically coercive to the extent that it affects the vol-
untariness of a juvenile’s statement. See Commonwealth v. Adams,
416 Mass. 55, 61 (1993). It was undisputed that, for much of his
life, the defendant’s uncle D’ Angelo had served as a father figure.
The concerns regarding any coercive pressure from an interested
adult, however, are inapplicable to the defendant, who was twenty-
one years old at the time of his statement.

In addition, the record does not support the defendant’s con-
tention that D’Angelo coerced him such that his statement to
police was involuntary. The defendant’s argument in this regard
is based on his own affidavit, in which he said that D’ Angelo had
pressured him to cooperate with police and tell them everything
he knew, and told him that he could face a Federal death penalty
if he did not. He stated in the affidavit that D’ Angelo had repeated
the threat of the death penalty many times while they were alone
in the interview room, and also that D’Angelo, who was sitting
next to the defendant, “continually prodded” him during the
interview, and told the defendant that he “needed to keep speak-
ing and provide all the information [that he] had about” the case.
The transcript of the interview does not reflect any statement by
D’ Angelo."

Moreover, the defendant's accountis inconsistent with D’ Angelo’s
testimony at the first suppression hearing. D’ Angelo testified that
he did not coerce the defendant and, to the contrary, suggested that
the defendant might want a lawyer. The first motion judge deemed
D’Angelo’s testimony credible. See Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 205

independent view of its significance, without deference. See Commonwealth v.
Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 341 (2012), and cases cited.

“The quality of the audio recording, however, does not allow us to discern the
nature of various ambient background noises during the interview.

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 11

Commonwealth v. Colton.

(“[ql]uestions of credibility” are left to “motion judge who had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses”). In addition, both Boyle
and D’Angelo testified at the first evidentiary hearing that D’ Angelo
asked them about the potential of the Federal death penalty in the
presence of the defendant, and that Boyle replied that it was not
a possibility in this case. The defendant did not dispute the
account, where any potentially coercive impact of the specter of
the death penalty had been ameliorated before the defendant made
his statement. Furthermore, when the defendant made his state-
ment to police, he showed no signs of intoxication, and answered
the officers’ questions readily, while responding affirmatively
when asked whether he understood what he was saying.

In sum, we cannot conclude that the two motion judges, who
each conducted evidentiary hearings, and considered, separately,
the conduct of the defendant’s interview with police and the
defendant's acknowledged mental conditions, abused their dis-
cretion in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and his
request for reconsideration of that motion.

b. Instruction on joint venture. The defendant contends that,
given the insufficiency of the evidence as to a joint venture be-
tween himself and Heymann,” the trial judge erred in instructing
the jury on joint venture. As there was no objection to the
instruction, we review for a substantial likelihood of a miscar-
riage of justice. Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294
(2002). Because the evidence supported the judge’s instruction,
we discern no error.

An instruction “is proper if it is supported by any hypothesis of
the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 689
(2001). To establish a joint venture, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “knowingly partici-
pated in the commission of the crime charged, alone or with others,
with the intent required for that offense.” Commonwealth v. Zanetti,
454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009). Here, there was ample evidence to
support the instruction on joint venture.

Heymann drove the defendant and the victim, in his own
vehicle, thirteen miles to a secluded wooded area. Even assuming
that, as the defendant claimed, Heymann was not involved in the
stabbing, he was present at the scene as the defendant stabbed the

‘Heymann was charged separately from the defendant, and was not a
codefendant in this trial. He eventually pleaded guilty to manslaughter and
received a sentence of not less than nineteen nor more than twenty years of
imprisonment.

12 477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

victim repeatedly; Heymann’s fingerprint, with the victim’s blood
on it, was on the vehicle’s dome light. After the victim was left
by the two in the woods, Heymann drove the defendant home.
According to the defendant’s own statement, Heymann assisted
in disposing of the bloody clothes and the knife that had been
used in the stabbing. In the days that followed, Heymann and the
defendant provided the same, false account of what had taken
place that night, including to one of their joint acquaintances,
Cronin. In addition, Heymann made several efforts to conceal
evidence of the crime, by attempting to clean the blood from the
interior of his vehicle, and by going with the defendant to obtain
replacement parts for those that had been covered in the victim’s
blood. Given this evidence, and the reasonable hypothesis that
could be drawn from it, the judge’s instruction on joint venture
was appropriate. See Silanskas, 433 Mass. at 689.

c. Prior bad act evidence. The defendant claims error in the
admission of a baseball bat and two sheathed knives. Bosselman
testified that he had seen the defendant conceal a baseball bat on
the day of the victim’s death, and the knives in question were
found by police in the defendant’s mother’s house, where the
defendant was living at the time. The defendant argues that these
objects were highly prejudicial evidence of his prior bad acts.

It is axiomatic that “[e]vidence of prior misconduct is not
generally admissible to prove bad character or a propensity to
commit crimes.” Commonwealth v. Libran, 405 Mass. 634, 640
(1989). Such evidence is admissible only if relevant for some
other purpose, such as to establish “knowledge, intent, motive,
[or] method, material to proof of the crime charged.” Common-
wealth v. Imbruglia, 377 Mass. 682, 695 (1979), quoting Com-
monwealth v. Murphy, 282 Mass. 593, 598 (1933). The “pros-
ecution [is] entitled to present as full a picture as possible of the
events surrounding the incident itself,” Commonwealth v. Robi-
doux, 450 Mass. 144, 158 (2007), as long as the probative value
of the evidence is not “outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice
to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228,
249 (2014). The weighing of these factors is left to the “sound
discretion of the judge, whose decision to admit such evidence
will be upheld absent clear error.” Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476
Mass. 539, 550 (2017), quoting Robidoux, supra.

We discern no error in the admission of the baseball bat, which
was introduced not as evidence of the defendant’s bad character
but to establish the defendant’s state of mind and his intent to

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 13

Commonwealth v. Colton.

harm the victim. Based on the location where the bat was found,'®
Bosselman’s testimony that the defendant had concealed it, along
with testimony from a number of witnesses concerning the de-
fendant’s anger and his stated intent to “beat” the victim, the jury
could have inferred that the defendant had a plan to harm the
victim on the night of his death. That the defendant ultimately
stabbed the victim rather than hitting him with the bat does not
diminish its relevance in this regard.

Moreover, the jury could have inferred from the act of hiding
the baseball bat that the defendant did not, as his expert witnesses
testified, simply “snap” and assault the victim but, rather, had
planned in advance to harm him. See Commonwealth v. Phil-
brook, 475 Mass. 20, 27-28 (2016). The probative value of the
baseball bat to the Commonwealth’s case outweighed any poten-
tial prejudice to the defendant. See id. Without the admission of
the baseball bat and its corroboration of Bosselman’s testimony,
“the killing could have appeared to the jury as an essentially
inexplicable act of violence.” See Commonwealth v. Bradshaw,
385 Mass. 244, 269 (1982).

The knives recovered from the defendant’s mother’s house
were admissible as weapons potentially used to stab the victim.
Although the defendant told police that the knife found in the
Charles River was the weapon used in the stabbing, it contained
no fingerprints, and thus was not necessarily the murder weapon.
The Commonwealth’s medical examiner testified at trial that, due
to the “variable” nature of the wounds, the precise length and
width of the blade used to kill the victim could not be deter-
mined.* There was also evidence that the defendant returned
home after the killing and thereby had an opportunity to store the
murder weapon there. Accordingly, the knives properly were
admitted not as bad act propensity evidence but as the means by
which the defendant might have stabbed the victim. See Com-
monwealth y. Ashman, 430 Mass. 736, 743-744 (2000) (“Evi-
dence that a defendant possessed a weapon that could have been
used to commit a crime is relevant to prove that the defendant had
the means of committing the crime”); Commonwealth v. James,
424 Mass. 770, 779-780 (1997) (knives found at defendants’
residences relevant to show they had means of committing mur-

The police found the bat hidden near train tracks close to where the
gathering had taken place in Pettee Square.
One of the knives was larger than the other, and both were sheathed.

14 477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

ders, even without direct proof that those particular knives were
used in commission of offense).

Moreover, the knives were relevant to the Commonwealth's
theory of deliberate premeditation. Cronin testified at trial that he
had not seen the defendant carrying a knife at the gathering in
Pettee Square. He also testified that the defendant had a collection
of knives at his house. The Commonwealth presented evidence at
trial, largely through the testimony of the defendant’s neighbor,
that the defendant returned home briefly after the gathering in
Pettee Square and before taking the victim to Minute Man Na-
tional Historical Park. Based on this evidence, the Common-
wealth argued that the defendant had returned to his mother’s
house to retrieve a knife. The knives were relevant to corroborate
Cronin’s testimony concerning the existence of the defendant’s
knife collection and to support the Commonwealth’s suggested
inference that the defendant returned to his home after the gath-
ering in Pettee Square in order to get a knife he planned to use on
the victim.

In sum, there was no abuse of discretion in the decision to
allow the admission of the baseball bat and the knives.

d. Instruction on criminal responsibility. The defendant argues
that the instruction concerning the relationship between the vol-
untary consumption of drugs or alcohol and the question of
criminal responsibility did not conform to the instructions pro-
vided in Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 617-618 & n.9
(2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014), and revised in Common-
wealth v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424, 439 (2011) (Appendix), and
thereby created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.'® In

©The judge instructed:

“The issue has been raised that the defendant may not have been crimi-
nally responsible for his alleged actions due to use of drugs or alcohol, or
at least in part. Voluntary intoxication with drugs or alcohol is not by itself
a mental disease or defect that will support a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity. The normal consequences of drug and alcohol addiction are
not a basis for relieving a defendant of criminal responsibility. However,
there may be situations where a defendant who is addicted to drugs or
alcohol might have the defense of lack of criminal responsibility available
to him. You may consider whether the defendant had a mental disease or
defect apart from his drug or alcohol addiction such that he lacked
substantial capacity at the time of his crime to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. In addition, you may consider whether the defend-
ant’s voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol activated a latent mental
disease or defect apart from the addiction itself. If as a result of the

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 15

Commonwealth v. Colton.

particular, the defendant argues that the judge’s instruction in this
case was flawed insofar as it could have caused the jury to
discount the defendant’s mental incapacity defense solely be-
cause he had consumed alcohol and drugs on the night of the
victim’s death, and had some recognition that doing so could
have an impact on his behavior.

Although Berry and DiPadova were decided a decade after the
defendant’s trial, “he is entitled to the benefit of changes in
decisional law that are announced after trial and pending his
direct review.” Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 704
(2014). Because there was no objection to the instruction at trial,
we review to determine if the instruction created a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Id.

Although the language of the judge’s instruction did not pre-
cisely match the wording of the model instructions subsequently
set out in Berry and DiPadova, there is no merit to the defend-
ant’s contention that such a difference was meaningful to the
jury’s finding. The concern animating our decisions in Berry and
DiPadova was that a jury might conclude “erroneously . . . that
even if the defendant’s mental illness by itself caused him to lack
substantial capacity, ‘because [he] had consumed [drugs] that
contributed to [his] incapacity, that would render the lack of
criminal responsibility defense moot.’ ” DiPadova, 460 Mass. at
436, quoting Berry, 457 Mass. at 418. The instruction given here,
however, raises no such cause for concern.

The judge instructed that the jury should “consider whether the
defendant had a mental disease or defect apart from his drug or
alcohol addiction such that he lacked substantial capacity at the
time of his crime to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law.” This language mirrors our model instructions in Berry and
DiPadova. Compare DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 439 (“where a
defendant . . . has a mental disease or defect that itself causes him
to lack the substantial capacity . . . , he is not criminally respon-
sible for his conduct regardless of whether he uses or does not use
alcohol or drugs”). The judge’s instruction did not provide any

activation of that latent mental disease or defect the defendant lost the
substantial capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, the defendant would
lack criminal responsibility. However, if the defendant knew or subjec-
tively had reason to know under the circumstances that his use of drugs or
alcohol would activate the mental disease or defect, he may not rely on that
disease or defect to assert a lack of criminal responsibility.”

16 477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

leeway for the jury to find both that the defendant was criminally
responsible because of his alcohol and drug consumption and that
his mental defect or disease alone caused him to lack substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to legal requirements. We note in
this regard that none of the evidence presented at trial suggested
that the defendant knew or should have known that the consump-
tion of alcohol or drugs would aggravate his preexisting mental
condition. The evidence before the jury was to the contrary,
instead suggesting that the defendant used these substances in an
attempt to treat his multiple mental difficulties.*®

e. Jury empanelment. The defendant contends that the judge
erred in not striking four jurors for cause. One potential juror had
impending travel plans, another initially noted an ambivalence
toward a defense of a lack of criminal responsibility, and two had
family connections to law enforcement officers.

The first juror said during voir dire on November 28, 2000, that
he had airplane tickets for December 14, 2000. The judge
empanelled the juror after telling him that the trial likely would
conclude by the time of the flight. That forecast proved wrong
and, when trial had not concluded by December 14, the deliber-
ating juror was excused and replaced with an alternate. “Although
judges must exercise caution in discharging a deliberating ju-
ror, . . . the judge has discretion to decide whether a juror is
unable to perform his or her functions . and whether good
cause, personal to the juror, exists for dismissal” (citations omit-
ted). Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 306 (2008).
Although it is doubtless better practice to avoid empanelling
jurors with travel plans that are very close to the anticipated end
of the trial, see id. at 307 n.16, we cannot say on this record that
the judge abused his discretion by empanelling and later dis-
charging the juror due to the juror’s impending flight. See id. at
306-307 (judge did not abuse her discretion by discharging juror
who had nonrefundable airplane tickets).

The defendant also challenges the judge’s decision to empanel
the alternate juror. The alternate juror initially responded during
voir dire that he had a “hard time with [the] concept of” the
“defense of a lack of criminal responsibility.” The judge then
explained the operative law further and asked whether the juror
“could be fair both to the defendant and the Government in this

16One of the defense experts testified that the defendant used “drugs and
alcohol” to “medicate himself.”

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 17

Commonwealth v. Colton.

case.” The juror responded, “Yes, I think so.” Although trial
counsel did not object to the empanelment of the juror on these
grounds, the defendant argues on appeal that the juror’s response
was ambiguous and that the judge should have explored the
juror’s concerns further before deciding whether to empanel him.

As a general principle, it is an abuse of discretion to empanel
a juror who will not state unequivocally that he or she will be im-
partial. See Commonwealth v. Long, 419 Mass. 798, 804 (1995)
(trial judge abused discretion in empanelling juror who could not
unequivocally state that he would be impartial); Commonwealth
vy. Somers, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 920, 921-922 (1998) (same).
Because the juror’s subsequent response here fairly could be
viewed as unequivocal, and the judge apparently credited it as
such, we discern no abuse of discretion in the empanelment of the
juror. Contrast Long, supra (juror’s response to question concern-
ing whether he could be fair to defendant — “I would really hope
that I could be” — not unequivocal).

The defendant contends also that the judge erred in empanel-
ling two jurors who had family connections — uncles, a brother,
and a cousin — to law enforcement. The judge credited their
representations that such connections would not affect their abil-
ity to be impartial. That a juror has family members who work in
law enforcement does not, without more, mean that the juror is
incapable of being impartial. See Commonwealth v. Ascolillo,
405 Mass. 456, 460-461 (1989), and cases cited. Given that the
defendant points to no other basis for potential bias, the judge’s
decision to empanel these jurors was not an abuse of discretion.

f. Prosecutor’s closing argument. The defendant contends that
the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper because she
referred to an incident described in the defendant’s medical
records, which had been introduced by the defendant, to argue
that the defendant was criminally responsible for the killing. In
her closing, the prosecutor described the defendant’s assault of a
staff member at a mental health facility where he had resided as
a juvenile. She emphasized that the defendant had said after the
assault that he would have been sorry if the assault had happened
to someone else, but that the particular staff member “deserved
it.” Such conduct, the prosecutor argued, demonstrated that the
defendant was “able and capable of holding a grudge and acting
out in revenge,” which supported the Commonwealth’s theory
that the defendant killed the victim in revenge for an earlier
dalliance with the defendant’s girl friend rather than due to a

18 477 Mass. 1 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Colton.

mental disease or defect. The defendant maintains that the re-
marks impermissibly used evidence from his medical records
substantively, and that the account of the incident constituted
inadmissible hearsay. Because there was no objection at trial, we
review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. at 704.

Although medical records are admissible substantively only if
they bear certain indicia of reliability, see Commonwealth v. Wall,
469 Mass. 652, 667 (2014), the prosecutor did not use facts in the
medical records as substantive evidence in her closing. Rather,
she used details of the incident in the medical record, introduced
by the defendant, to refute the opinion offered by the defendant’s
expert that the incident demonstrated the defendant’s lack of
criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass.
798, 809 (1990) (prosecutor’s use of defendant’s statements to his
doctor in refutation of defense witness’s opinion did not consti-
tute attempt to turn those statements into substantive evidence).
Moreover, any potential prejudice to the defendant was mitigated
by a comprehensive limiting instruction, given before the prose-
cutor’s closing, that the jury were to consider any reference to the
defendant’s statements to a mental health assessor only with
respect to the mental health assessor’s evaluation of the defend-
ant’s criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Donahue,
430 Mass. 710, 717-718 (2000) (judge’s limiting instruction
concerning defendant's statements to psychiatrist cured any po-
tential prejudice).

g. Constitutionality of sentence. The defendant argues that,
given his mental instability at the time of the offense, sentencing
him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and art. 26 of the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights. The gravamen of the defendant’s
argument is that the same principles underlying the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,
470 (2012) (“mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juve-
niles violate the Eighth Amendment”), and this court’s decision
in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass.
655, 670-674 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (holding that
imposing sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole on juveniles violates art. 26), suggest that the defendant’s
sentence was unconstitutional.

The analysis in Miller and Diatchenko was limited to juveniles,
and relied on the fact that juveniles, due to their general imma-

477 Mass. 1 (2017) 19

Commonwealth v. Colton.

turity, impulsiveness, and impressionable nature, are “constitu-
tionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller,
567 U.S. at 471. Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 660, 663. This prin-
ciple is inapplicable to the defendant, who was twenty-one years
old at the time of the offense. We decline the defendant’s invita-
tion to extend our holding in Diatchenko in this manner.

h. Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Having carefully
reviewed the entire record, we discern no reason to exercise our
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to set aside the verdict or to
reduce the degree of guilt. Notwithstanding the defendant’s ac-
knowledged history of troubled behaviors as a child and as a
teenager, the weight of the evidence supports the defendant’s
conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme
atrocity or cruelty and deliberate premeditation.

Judgment affirmed.

20 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

Commonweattu vs. EArt T. FULGIAM
(and thirteen companion cases’).

Suffolk. October 11, 2016. - May 5, 2017,

Present: Gants, C.J., Botsrorp, Lenk, Hines, Lowy, & Buon, JI.”

Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Robbery. Firearms, Cellular Telephone, Con-
stitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause. Search and Seizure,
Warrant, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Evidence, Fingerprints, Expert
opinion, Prior misconduct, Relevancy and materiality. Witness, Expert. Prac-
tice, Criminal, Capital case, Warrant.

At a murder trial involving two defendants, no substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice arose from the admission in evidence of historical cell
site location information (CSLI) associated with one defendant's cellular
telephone number, which the Commonwealth had obtained pursuant to a
court order without a search warrant, where, in the application for the order,
the Commonwealth offered specific and articulable facts showing that there
were reasonable grounds to believe that the CSLI was relevant and material
to the ongoing investigation into the murders in question [26-28]; further, the
other defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress CSLI and text messages from that defendant’s cellular telephone,
where the application for the court order that permitted the Commonwealth
to obtain that information recited facts that were more than sufficient to
establish that that defendant’s subscriber and call detail information was
relevant and material to the investigation into the murders, where the
Commonwealth’s access to that CSLI did not create a substantial likelihood
of a miscarrage of justice, and where, although a warrant was required to
obtain access to the content of that defendant’s text messages, and a motion
to suppress challenging the Commonwealth’s access likely would have been
successful, the text messages were not likely to have influenced the jury’s
conclusion, given that much of the information about one victim’s status as
a high level drug dealer came in through other evidence, and given that,
based on evidence wholly independent of the text messages, that defendant’s
involvement in the murders was not a close question [28-38].

At a murder trial, the judge did not err in admitting in evidence, under the
business record exception to the hearsay rule, “ten-print” fingerprint cards,
where, given the duty of the officers creating such cards to ensure that they
are created with accurate information and the arrestees’ legal obligation to

48ix against Earl 'T. Fulgiam and seven against Michael T. Corbin.
Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 21

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

provide accurate information, the identifying information on the cards is
reliable; further, admission of the ten-print cards did not violate the defend-
ants’ right to confront witnesses against them, where fingerprint records are
not testimonial, in that they are created in the ordinary course of business in
good faith for the administration of the State police’s affairs rather than to
establish or prove some fact at trial. [38-43] Lowy, J., concurring, with whom
Gants, C.l., joined.

At a murder trial, the admission in evidence of the testimony of the Common-
wealth’s fingerprint expert witness did not create a substantial likelihood of
a miscarriage of justice, where, although the witness presented her findings
(based on her application of a particular methodology to latent prints found
at the scene) as fact rather than opinion, portions of the witness’s testimony
implicitly suggested the fallibility of fingerprint analysis; and where the
Commonweaith’s evidence linking the defendants to the crime, separate and
apart from the fingerprint evidence, was strong: moreover, the witness’s
testimony that another fingerprint analyst had reviewed her work did not
amount to improper vouching or hearsay expert testimony, [43-46]

‘There was no merit to a criminal defendant’s claim that, at trial, the Common-
wealth improperly and repeatedly referenced the defendant’s gang affiliation.
[46-47]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on December 21, 2011.

The cases were tried before Peter M. Lauriat, J.

Elizabeth Caddick for Earl T. Fulgiam.

Esther J. Horwich for Michael T. Corbin.

Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (John P. Pappas,
tant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

Hines, J. On July 25, 2011, armed intruders entered the apart-
ment occupied by the victims, Kevin Thomas, Jr., and Billie
Marie Kee, who were robbed and killed. In May, 2013, a Superior
Court jury found the defendants, Earl T. Fulgiam and Michael T.
Corbin, guilty as joint venturers of murder in the first degree of
both victims based on the theories of deliberate premeditation,
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder with armed rob-
bery as the predicate felony. The defendants also were convicted
of unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a
large capacity feeding device.* On appeal, the defendants assert
error in the admission of (1) certain cellular telephone records in

As

®The defendants’ convictions of armed robbery of the victims were dismissed
as duplicative and their convictions of unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm were
filed with the defendants’ consent. The defendants were sentenced to consecu-
tive terms of life without the possibility of parole for the murders; from four
to five years on the firearm convictions, to be served from and after the sentences
for murder; and from nine to ten years on the unlawful possession of a large

22 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

violation of their rights under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Dec-
laration of Rights and the Fourth and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution; (2) fingerprint cards attributed to the
defendants without proper authentication or reliability; and (3)
expert testimony related to the fingerprint analysis. Corbin inde-
pendently claims that repeated references to gang affiliation cre-
ated a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. We affirm
the convictions and decline to grant relief pursuant to G. L.
c. 278, § 33E.

Background. We summarize the evidence as the jury could
have found it, reserving additional facts for later discussion. On
July 25, 2011, a couple who lived on the second floor of an
apartment building on Hyde Park Avenue, in the Hyde Park
section of Boston, awoke to the sound of gunshots at around
11:55 pm. They heard between six and eight gunshots that the
woman believed came from an apartment below. The couple
looked out of their bedroom window, and saw six or seven men
running out of the entrance to their building. The woman tele-
phoned 911 at 11:57 pm.4

The men split up. Some of them ran straight across Hyde Park
Avenue. At that moment, a passenger in a vehicle approaching
the victim’s apartment building saw three men run in front of her
vehicle; one of the men carried what looked like a white pillow
case. The men got into a grey or silver sedan so quickly that a
man’s foot was hanging outside the vehicle as it sped away. None
of the witnesses was able to give more than a general description
of the men, except that one man was heavyset;® the witnesses
could only guess at the race or ethnicity of the men they observed.

At 12:41 a.m. on July 26, 2011, Boston police responded to the
scene and were directed to the victim’s apartment. They found a
large watch on the floor near the front entrance to the building.
Kee, dressed in a bloody shirt and underwear, was found lying
face down on the floor just inside the apartment. She had suffered
four gunshot wounds and multiple stab wounds, and she was
pronounced dead at the scene. Kee’s cause of death was gunshot
wounds to the torso and injuries to the lungs, ribs, and spine.

capacity feeding device convictions, to be served concurrent with the firearms
convictions.

4This neighbor placed four cellular telephone calls to 911 that evening. Only
the calls placed at 11:57 pM, and 12:41 a.m. are relevant here.

5Fulgiam’s height and weight are listed on his State police fingerprint card as
five feet, ten inches tall and 300 pounds.

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 23

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

Thomas, dressed in a T-shirt, shorts, and socks, was found in
the front bedroom, lying on his back over a pile of clothing; his
legs were bound at the ankles with black wire. He had suffered
seven gunshot wounds and four stab wounds to his body, and he
was pronounced dead at the scene. Thomas’s cause of death was
gunshot wounds to the torso and neck.

The victims’ apartment had been ransacked. Broken glass and
blood were on the floor, clothes were strewn about, and the
cabinets and drawers were open in the kitchen and bathroom.
There were no signs of forced entry; the front door was ajar, with
the lock intact, and the back doors were locked from the inside.
Although the officers observed no “land line” telephone in the
apartment, they did not recover any cellular telephones. A curling
iron with its cord cut and two knives with brownish-red stains
were found near Kee’s body. The curling iron cord matched the
wire that was used to bind Thomas’s ankles.

In the front bedroom, in a tall bureau, officers found a packet
of photographs, two of which depicted Thomas with Fulgiam and
Corbin, at Thomas’s apartment, sitting on the couch in front of
stacks of United States currency. Near Thomas's body officers
found a black backpack with what appeared to be a bag of
marijuana inside.

On July 27, 2011, a subsequent search of the basement revealed
two plastic bags of what appeared to be “crack” cocaine, and two
digital scales. Based on all of the evidence that the police officers
had found during their investigation, they surmised that the
assailants were likely known to the victims and that the murders
were likely the result of a drug robbery.

In the front yard, officers recovered a loaded nine millimeter
semiautomatic pistol with a magazine and a loaded .38 caliber
silver revolver. A diamond encrusted ring was found on Hyde
Park Avenue.

John Golden, Thomas’s best friend, testified that Thomas sold
large amounts of marijuana and cocaine. On the day of the
murders, Golden saw approximately $5,000 in the bureau. When
Golden was shown the photograph depicting Thomas, Corbin,
and Fulgiam with the bundles of cash, Golden estimated the
amount to be between $12,000 and $13,000. Police were able to
determine the date of the photograph as May 11, 2011. Golden
also identified the watch and the ring that had been recovered as
belonging to Thomas. Golden described Thomas as being “para-
noid,” so much so that he insisted that even trusted friends call
before coming to his apartment.

24 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

On July 29, 2011, a latent print from the nine millimeter
semiautomatic pistol recovered from the scene was “individual-
ized,” or matched, to Fulgiam. Thirteen spent nine millimeter
shell casings, eight spent nine millimeter bullets, and four bullet
fragments were recovered from the scene and from the victims.
Analysis of the firearms revealed that the nine millimeter semi-
automatic contained a magazine that held twenty rounds of am-
munition; eight were recovered in the magazine. All of the
bullets, bullet fragments, and shell casings had been fired from
the nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol.

A detective learned that the victims’ cellular telephones had not
been recovered, so he requested and obtained traces on both.
Thomas’s cellular telephone records showed that a certain cellu-
lar telephone number was listed in Thomas’s telephone records
for July 25, 2011. Police learned that this telephone had been
stolen that afternoon between 4:30 pm. and 5:30 pm. The owner
told police that he did not recognize Thomas's cellular telephone
number or the number later identified as Fulgiam’s cellular tele-
phone number, both of which were listed in his call detail records
for July 25, 2011. The Commonwealth issued administrative
subpoenas for Fulgiam’s cellular telephone call detail records and
for a cellular telephone number ending in 2898, which was later
connected to Corbin.® The police discovered that Corbin and
Thomas had been in contact, via short message service messages
(text messages) or telephone calls, several times on July 25, 2011.
Fulgiam and Corbin also had been in telephonic contact that day.

On August 8, 2011, two detectives interviewed Fulgiam at his
home. At this time the police had not sought an arrest warrant for
Fulgiam. Fulgiam told the detectives that he and Thomas had
known one another since the early to mid-2000s, and that he
knew Thomas very well. Fulgiam admitted that he and Thomas
were in the drug business together and that he would meet with
Thomas one or two times per month, at one of their homes, to

®Fulgiam’s call detail and subscriber information was originally obtained
through an administrative subpoena, discussed infra, issued on August 4, 2011.
On August 16, 2011, additional administrative subpoenas issued for both
Fulgiam and Corbin’s subscriber and call detail information. Both Fulgiam and
Corbin’s cellular telephone records information, including call detail informa-
tion records, subscriber information, cell site location information (CSLI), and,
for Corbin, the content of text messages, were subsequently obtained through a
court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006), also discussed infra.

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 25

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

conduct business. He estimated that it had been about one month
since he had last met with Thomas, but he could not remember
whether it had been at his home or at Thomas’s home. He last
communicated with Thomas via text message on July 17.
Fulgiam had Thomas’s cellular telephone number, and he stated
that he changed his own cellular telephone number two weeks
prior? because a woman had been stalking him. Fulgiam was not
aware of Thomas having disputes with anyone and noted that
Thomas had a lot more money than he did. Fulgiam opined that
whoever killed Thomas had to have been close to him.

The two detectives interviewed Corbin at his home on August
10, 2011. At that time, he was not under arrest. One of the
detectives had previously been in telephonic contact with
Corbin,* who agreed to meet with the detectives. Corbin told the
detectives that he had known Thomas since Corbin was thirteen
years old. Corbin was equivocal about when his last communi-
cation with Thomas had occurred; he first said it had been a
month prior, but later said it could have been weeks or days
before Thomas was killed. He stated that the last time he was in
Thomas’s apartment was on May 1, 2011, but that he had been in
the apartment many times. Corbin mentioned that Thomas was
not a showy guy, and that he had a watch and ring, but only wore
them on the weekends. He also noted that Thomas was a smart
and careful person and that one had to inform Thomas before
coming to his home.

On September 14, 2011, police learned that fingerprint analysts
had individualized to Corbin’s right thumbprint a latent print
found on the curling iron that had been recovered from the
victim’s home. On October 27, 2011, pursuant to a search war-
rant, detectives seized Corbin’s cellular telephone ending with the
number 2898 (2898 number) and discovered photographs of
Fulgiam, as well as both Fulgiam and Thomas’s numbers pro-
grammed into the contact list. That same day, the police obtained
arrest warrants for Corbin and Fulgiam.

7The murders occurred exactly two weeks before the day of Fulgiam’s
interview.

®Corbin’s cellular telephone account was not listed in his name, nor did the
address given match where Corbin was living at the time of his interview with
police, Corbin’s cellular telephone service provider, Metro PCS, is an advance
pay company which offers a plan providing thirty days of service for a monthly
fee of forty dollars. The company does not conduct a credit check or verify
customers” identification information,

26 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

Discussion. 1. Admission of cellular telephone records. a. Ful-
giam’s claim. On August 15, 2011, after a review of Thomas’s
cellular telephone records, the Commonwealth sought and re-
ceived a court order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006)
(§ 2703[d] order), for the historical cell site location information
(CSLD® and other cellular telephone account information for
several cellular telephone numbers that were in contact with
Thomas’s cellular telephone on July 25, 2011, the day of the
murder. Under the authority of the § 2703(d) order, the Common-
wealth obtained Fulgiam’s CSLI for the period from July 20,
2011, through July 30, 2011.

A review of the CSLI associated with Fulgiam’s cellular tele-
phone number revealed that on the evening of July 25, 2011,
Fulgiam’s cellular telephone activated a cell tower located at an
address which is located directly behind the victim’s apartment,
six times between 11:30 pm. and 11:55 pm. The last time Ful-
giam’s cellular telephone activated the cell tower at that location
was the same time that the neighbors awoke to gunshots and two
minutes before one of them telephoned 911 the first time.

Fulgiam argues that the Commonwealth improperly obtained
the CSLI for his cellular telephone without probable cause and
that, in any event, the application for the § 2703(d) order was
insufficient to show that his CSLI would be “relevant and mate-
rial to an ongoing criminal investigation.”!° 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
We disagree.

®“{CSLI] ‘refers to a cellular telephone service record or records that contain
information identifying the base station towers and sectors that receive trans-
missions from a [cellular] telephone.’ ” Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass.
852, 853 n.2 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 231
nl (2014) (Augustine D, S.C. 470 Mass, 837 and 472 Mass, 448 (2015).
“ ‘Historical’ CSLI refers to CSLI relating to and generated by cellular tele-
phone use that has already occurred at the time of the order authorizing the
disclosure of such data.” Augustine I, supra.

*°Pulgiam also argues that the Commonwealth relied on information obtained
by an invalid administrative subpoena issued on August 4, 2011, pursuant to
G. L. c. 271, § 17B, to support its August 15, 2011, application for a § 2703(d)
order. We agree that this administrative subpoena was of questionable validity
where it was signed on behaif of the assistant district attorney by an adminis-
trative assistant. Section 17B requires strict compliance with the provision that
such administrative subpoenas are issued by attorneys general or district attor-
neys. See Commonwealth v. Feodoroff, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 727 (1997)
(common-law exception to § 17B’s requirement, which allows assistant attor-
neys general and assistant district attorneys to sign such subpoenas), However,
the information that the Commonwealth obtained pursuant to the August 4
subpoena did not prejudice Fulgiam. See id. at 728. By August 8, 2011, the

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 27

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

i. Standard of review. In Commonwealth vy. Augustine, 467
Mass. 230, 232 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015),
we concluded that government-compelled production of CSLI by
cellular telephone service providers was a search in the constitu-
tional sense, requiring a warrant under art. 14 of the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights. We determined, however, that the
warrant requirement was a “new” rule applicable only to those
cases where the defendant raised the warrant issue before or
during the trial and the defendant’s conviction was not final at the
time that Augustine I was decided. See id. at 257. Although
Fulgiam’s case was on direct appeal when Augustine I was
decided, he did not challenge the sufficiency of the § 2703(d)
order as a basis for access to his CSLI either before or during the
trial. Therefore, we review to determine “whether the unobjected-
to admission of the CSLI evidence that was obtained without a
search warrant created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of
justice.” Commonwealth v. Broom, 474 Mass. 486, 493 (2016).

ii. Analysis. Because Fulgiam does not have the benefit of
Augustine I, the Commonwealth only had to meet the standard set
forth in § 2703(d) in order to obtain Fulgiam’s CSLI. See Broom,
474 Mass. at 492. Section 2703(d) requires that an order “shall
issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articul-
able facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to
an ongoing criminal investigation.” The Commonwealth met that
burden.

The application recited the following facts that, taken together,
established reasonable grounds to believe that Fulgiam’s CSLI
was “relevant and material” to the ongoing investigation into the

police already had connected Fulgiam to his cellular telephone account when
Fulgiam met with detectives and provided his cellular telephone number to
them. Based on this knowledge, the police were able to connect Fulgiam’s
cellular telephone number to the stolen cellular telephone, as the police already
had the call detail records for that account. The only information that the police
were able to obtain through the August 4 subpoena that was not already in their
possession was the fact that Fulgiam’s cellular telephone had contact with
Corbin’s cellular telephone on July 25, 2011. However, even without the
connection to Corbin, the Commonwealth’s application for a § 2703(d) order
contained sufficient facts showing that Fulgiam’s cellular telephone information
would be relevant and material to the ongoing criminal investigation. Conse-
quently, the information the Commonwealth obtained from Fulgiam’s cellular
telephone account from the August 4 subpoena did not create a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

28 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

Thomas and Kee murders. First, based on the review of Thomas’s
cellular telephone records, the police were aware that Thomas’s
cellular telephone was involved in an ongoing text message
dialog with the stolen cellular telephone between 11:05 pm. and
11:32 pm. on the night of the murders and that the stolen cellular
telephone was in contact with Fulgiam’s cellular telephone twice
that day. Fulgiam’s last communication with the stolen cellular
telephone was a text message sent at 11:37 pM., at or near the time
of the murders. At 11:57 pm., shortly after this last contact
between Fulgiam’s cellular telephone and the stolen cellular
telephone, the police received the first 911 call for a disturbance
at the victims’ apartment. Second, Fulgiam had admitted to police
that he knew Thomas and that they were in the drug business
together. Based on the affiant’s training and experience, that
business connection, the lack of forced entry into the apartment
(suggesting that the victims knew the assailants), and the ran-
sacked condition of the crime scene placed Fulgiam’s cellular
telephone records squarely within the realm of information “rel-
evant and material” to the ongoing investigation into the murder
of the victims. Thus, Fulgiam cannot demonstrate that the § 2703(d)
order was invalid and that as a consequence, the Commonwealth’s
access to his CSLI created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage
of justice. See Broom, 474 Mass. at 493.

b. Corbin’s claims. Using the § 2703(d) order issued on August
15, the Commonwealth obtained Corbin’s cellular telephone sub-
scriber and call detail information, CSLI, and text messages for
the period from July 20 through July 30, 2011. Corbin, like
Fulgiam, did not challenge the Commonwealth’s access to these
records either before or during the trial. On appeal, however,
Corbin argues that the Commonwealth’s access to and use of
these records at trial was unlawful on statutory and constitutional
grounds, and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
in failing to file a motion to suppress the records. More specifi-
cally, Corbin claims that (1) the application for the § 2703(d)
order (§ 2703[d] application) failed to make the required showing
that the records were “relevant and material” to an ongoing
criminal investigation; (2) the Commonwealth’s access to and use
of eleven days of his CSLI was improper and prejudiced him; and
(3) the access to and use of the content of his text messages at trial
was improper because the § 2703(d) application failed to estab-
lish probable cause to believe “that a particularly described
offense has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and that

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 29

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

[the content of the text messages being sought] will produce
evidence of such offense or will aid in the apprehension of a
person who the applicant has probable cause to believe has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit such offense” as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) and art 14. Augustine I, 467
Mass. at 256, quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass.
808, 825 (2009). These claims fail.

i. Standard of review. Where, as here, the defendant has been
convicted of murder in the first degree, we review his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether the alleged
lapse created a “substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of jus-
tice,” a standard more favorable to the defendant than the con-
stitutional standard otherwise applied under Commonwealth v.
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). Commonwealth v. Wright, 411
Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). We
focus more broadly on whether there was error and, if so, whether
any such error “was likely to have influenced the jury’s conclu-
sion.” Jd. If the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is based on the failure to file a motion to suppress, he
must “show that the motion to suppress would have been suc-
cessful, and that failing to bring such a motion . . . created a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.” Common-
wealth v. Banville, 457 Mass. 530, 534 (2010).

If the failure to file a motion to suppress resulted from coun-
sel’s tactical decision not to do so, the defendant must demon-
strate that this strategic choice was “manifestly unreasonable”
when made (quotations and citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015). Here, however, the record
is unclear as to whether counsel’s decision was tactical, as the
defendant did not file a motion for new trial on this ground,
clarifying the record on trial counsel’s reason for his choice.

ii. Likelihood of success on the motion to suppress. Because the
analysis of the likelihood of success on a motion to suppress the
subscriber and call detail information is governed by a legal
standard that is different from that applicable to text messages, we
consider each category of information separately.

A. Subscriber and call detail information. To secure a § 2703(d)
order allowing access to subscriber and call detail information, the
application must establish “specific and articulable facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the [information
sought is] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investi-
gation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Corbin argues that the Common-
wealth’s application was insufficient to meet this test. We disagree.

30 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

The § 2703(d) application, reciting a series of calls and text
messages between Thomas and Corbin on the day of the mur-
ders," was more than sufficient to establish that Corbin’s sub-
scriber and call detail information was “relevant and material” to
the investigation into the murders of Thomas and Kee. Id. The
application included information that (1) Thomas and Corbin
personally knew one another; (2) there appeared to be no forced
entry at the crime scene, suggesting the victims knew the assail-
ants; (3) the crime scene had been ransacked and, based on the
affiant’s training and experience, the murders appeared to be a
result of a drug robbery; (4) drug dealers tend to communicate via
cellular telephone to coordinate drug purchases; and (5) on the
day of the murders, Corbin’s cellular telephone number had
multiple telephonic communications, including text messages,
with both Fulgiam and Thomas. Given these facts, a motion to
suppress on this ground was demonstrably lacking in merit. Thus,
Corbin has failed to meet his burden to establish that the failure
to file a motion to suppress the use of the subscriber and call
detail information created a substantial likelihood of a miscar-
riage of justice.

B. CSLI. Corbin contends also that the Commonwealth’s access
to and use of eleven days of his CSLI was improper and prejudiced
him. Corbin, however, cannot show that the Commonwealth’s
access to and use of eleven days of his cellular telephone’s CSLI,
pursuant to § 2703(d), created a substantial likelihood of a mis-
carriage of justice. See Broom, 474 Mass. at 493. Corbin, like
Fulgiam, did not object to the access and use of his CSLI prior to
or during trial, and thus did not have the benefit of Augustine I.
As a result, the Commonwealth merely had to demonstrate that
Corbin’s CSLI would be “relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). The Common-
wealth’s application for the § 2703(d) order established that
Corbin’s subscriber and call detail information were “relevant and
material” to the investigation, and thus, lawfully obtained. Id.
Because we analyze the Commonwealth’s access to and use of
Corbin’s CSLI under the same § 2703(d) standard, the applica-
tion’s recitation of calls and text messages between Corbin and
Thomas on the day of the murders also met this standard, and

“After securing Thomas’s cellular telephone records, the police focused their
investigation on the calls to and from Thomas’s cellular telephone. The Com-
monwealth had associated Corbin with his cellular telephone account prior to its
§ 2703(d) application and used such information in the application,

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 31

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

therefore the CSLI was also lawfully obtained, pursuant to Broom.
Moreover, where Corbin’s CSLI did not place him at or near the
scene (unlike Fulgiam), the prosecutor’s inference that Corbin’s
failure to bring his cellular telephone to the scene showed con-
sciousness of guilt is insufficient to demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See Broom, supra.

C. Text messages. Corbin argues that counsel was ineffective in
failing to file a motion to suppress the content of the text mes-
sages where the Commonwealth obtained access without a war-
rant under 18 U.S.C. § 2073(a) and art. 14. We agree that, on both
statutory and constitutional grounds, a warrant was required to
obtain access to the content of Corbin’s text messages and that a
motion to suppress challenging the Commonwealth’s access on
these grounds likely would have been successful.

IL. Warrant requirement for access under § 2703(a). Access to
the “contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic
storage” is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), which provides that
“[a] governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider
of electronic communication service") of the contents of a wire
or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty
days or less only pursuant to a warrant... (in the case of a State
court, using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent
jurisdiction” (emphases supplied). Because it is undisputed that
Corbin’s “electronic communications” (text messages) met the
temporal requirement of § 2703(a), the dispositive issue is
whether this content was held in “electronic storage” by “a
provider of electronic communication service.” Id.

The Commonwealth argues that the warrant requirement of
§ 2703(a) does not apply to Corbin because text messages are
held by a provider of a “remote computing service’! rather than
an “electronic communication service” and that, as a consequence,

2The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006), defines
an electronic communication service as “any service which provides users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18
U.S.C, § 2510(15) (2006). See 18 U.S.C. § 2711.

124 “remote computing service” is defined as “the provision to the public of
computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communi-
cations system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006). In practice, this phrase is under-
stood to refer to the use of “remote computers [to] store extra files or process
large amounts of data” by commercial customers. See Kerr, A User’s Guide to
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72
Geo. Wash. L. Rev, 1208, 1213-1214 (2004),

32 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

access may be obtained without a warrant under § 2703(b). We
reject the Commonwealth’s argument because we agree with the
defendant that the text messages at issue here were held by a
provider of an “electronic communication service” for less than
180 days, which triggered the warrant requirement.'*

Although the United States Supreme Court has not defined
“electronic communication service” as used in § 2703(a), we
adopt the approach in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529
F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds sub nom.
City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 756 (2010), where the
court’s analysis focused on the actual services offered to the
consumer to determine whether the entity is a provider of “elec-
tronic communication service” or “remote computing service.”
See id. at 900, 901. Relying on the plain language of the statute,
the Quon court concluded that the definition of “electronic com-
munications service” as “any service which provides users . . . the
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications,” 18
U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006), applied “[o]n its face” to the text
messaging service at issue in that case. /d. at 901. That same logic
applies here to the text message service provided by Corbin’s
cellular telephone carrier.

This interpretation is consistent with the heightened protection
for the content of electronic communications. In Riley v. Cali-
fornia, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), the Supreme Court held that
police officers must secure a search warrant prior to searching a
cellular telephone, as modern cellular telephones contain “vast
quantities of [digital] personal information.” Jd. at 2485. See
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010)
(electronic mail messages “require[ ] strong protection under the
Fourth Amendment; otherwise, the Fourth Amendment would
prove an ineffective guardian of private communication, an
essential purpose it has long been recognized to serve”). A
search of the content of text messages implicates similar privacy
interests. Just as the government may not intercept private tele-

'4General Laws c. 271, § 17B, is the analog to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), which
treats the government's access to the content of electronic communications in a
different manner from noncontent information, Both laws demand a higher
standard of proof, beyond “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation,” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), to access the content of electronic communica
tions. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (allowing access to content of electronic
communications stored in electronic communications service for 180 days or
less only pursuant to warrant), with G. L. c, 271, § 17B (specifically excluding
access to content of electronic communications from statute).

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 33

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

phone calls or written communications without a warrant, we
conclude that the Commonwealth may not obtain the content of
text messages without a warrant. See United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (warrantless searches of letters and
other sealed packages is presumptively unreasonable); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

Il. Warrant requirement under art. 14. Because the Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether access to the content of text
messages requires compliance with the warrant requirement of
§ 2703(a), we consider the issue under art. 14, as articulated in
Augustine I. We conclude that a warrant was required to obtain
access to the content of Corbin’s text messages. Access to the
content of a text message constitutes a search requiring a showing
of probable cause, which in this context means “probable cause to
believe ‘that the particularly described offense has been, is being,
or is about to be committed, and that [the text message content
being sought] will produce evidence of such offense or will aid in
the apprehension of a person who the applicant has probable
cause to believe has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit such offense.’ ” Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 256, quoting
Connolly, 454 Mass. at 825.

A warrant with probable cause was required because Corbin
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his text
messages. “The measure of the defendant’s [reasonable] expec-
tation of privacy is (1) whether the defendant has manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the search, and
(2) whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable.” Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301
(1991). See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). As the
Commonwealth notes, the defendant did not file a motion for a
new trial or a motion to suppress, and for that reason, the judge
did not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Corbin
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of the text
messages from the 2898 number. The record, however, estab-
lishes that Corbin had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
content of his text messages. See Montanez, supra at 301.

As mentioned above, Corbin provided the police with his
cellular telephone number prior to his arrest. At trial he offered
the CSLI associated with the cellular telephone account as evi-
dence that he was not in Hyde Park on July 25, 2011, implicitly
claiming ownership of the cellular telephone account; and the
cellular telephone associated with the 2898 number was seized

34 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

from Corbin pursuant to a search warrant prior to his arrest.
Moreover, the Commonwealth consistently attributed the cellular
telephone account to Corbin. See Commonwealth v. Augustine,
472 Mass. 448, 452 n.6 (2015) (Augustine IJ) (cellular telephone
owned by another treated as belonging to defendant where he
paid bills and used it exclusively). To be sure, the fact that a
defendant’s name is not listed as the subscriber of the account
could diminish his subjective expectation of privacy. However,
on the facts of this case, Corbin’s implicit acknowledgment of
ownership satisfied his burden. See Commonwealth v. Genest,
371 Mass. 834, 836 (1977) (defendant has burden to show rea-
sonable expectation of privacy).

Similarly, Corbin had an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in his text messages. In Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 255, we
recognized an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a
defendant’s CSLI records. We further stated “that the nature of
cellular telephone technology and CSLI and the character of
cellular telephone use in our current society render the third-party
doctrine of [United States v.] Miller[, 425 U.S. 435 (1976),] and
Smith [v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979),] inapposite.” Augustine
I, supra at 245. The same result applies here with respect to the
content of text messages stored on a cellular telephone service
provider’s servers.

Because we conclude that probable cause was required to
obtain the content of Corbin’s text messages, we next consider
whether the application established the requisite probable cause
for access to Corbin’s text messages. See id at 256.

The application established a personal relationship between
Thomas and Corbin, that Corbin was in telephonic contact with
both Thomas and Fulgiam on the day of the murders, and that the
circumstances of the murders suggested a connection to drugs.
Although the fact that Thomas and Corbin may have used their
cellular telephones to communicate with each other on the day of
the murders elevated their relationship to a matter of importance
in the investigation, it did not, without more, justify intrusion into
the content of that communication.® In contrast to Fulgiam,

*5On July 25, 2011, between 2:15 pm. and 7:27 eM. Corbin and Thomas
exchanged the following text messages:

Tuomas: “What hapnd bro i need that”

“Tneed 2 ¢ u like yesterday i have 2 get a whip manana n i def need that
bread i would appreciate if u didnt hold me up”

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 35

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

nothing in the application indicated a drug connection between
Corbin and Thomas, such that Corbin might have a motive for
murder. Other than the cellular telephone communication be-
tween Thomas and Corbin, the application failed to recite any
facts that might have implicated Corbin in the crimes or sug-
gested that the content of his text messages would aid in the
apprehension of a suspect in the murders. See Augustine I, 467
Mass. at 256. Given these shortcomings in the application, we
conclude that the Commonwealth failed to establish the requisite
probable cause and, therefore, improperly obtained the content of
Corbin’s text messages.

The Commonwealth argues that, in any event, Corbin lacked
standing to challenge the access to the content of the text mes-
sages because the cellular telephone account was held under a
fictitious name or held by someone other than Corbin. “A de-
fendant has standing either if [he] has a possessory interest in the
place searched or in the property seized or if [he] was present
when the search occurred.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 453
Mass. 203, 208 (2009). The Commonwealth argues that the de-
fendant has not made the requisite showing that he had a posses-
sory interest in the cellular telephone account for the 2898 num-
ber because Corbin did not move for a new trial and file an
affidavit averring such a possessory interest in the account, or
present any affirmative evidence showing such an interest. How-
ever, the Commonwealth consistently has asserted that the listed

“This is what i didnt want 2 happen we discussed this b4 bro straightn me
first remember dnt make it bad bro”

Corpin: “Bro u know i do what i can 2 get u first but i called u, I cant hold
these niggers up.”

Tiomas: “n my bread u feel me wit out me it neva would have been there
2 flip anything”

“U cant hold anyone up when its not there bread thats free money i should
have mine off the top than play with urs not mine bro we talkd about this
ur flip”

Corpin: “I see u going through some thing cause we never kicked it like
this, im going 2 put as much 2gether 4 u not in 2 long”

Tuomas: “Good look lol naw cause someone did somethng simular just
cause i say im somewhre u cant assumd my schedule or do ur own thng
thats all im tryna say talk”

“2 you when u come bro”

36 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

account holder for the 2898 number was Corbin. In its § 2703(d)
application, the Commonwealth associated the 2898 number with
Corbin. Throughout the trial the Commonwealth asserted that
Corbin sent the text messages it offered in evidence, and it offered
Corbin’s CSLI to show that there was no activity on his cellular
telephone during the murders. Moreover, a detective testified that
another detective was in telephonic contact with Corbin using the
2898 number. Finally, the cellular telephone associated with the
2898 number was seized from Corbin and searched pursuant to a
search warrant.'® Given these facts, Corbin has standing to chal-
lenge the warrantless search of the content of the text messages
sent from the 2898 number.'? See Williams, supra at 208.

Last, we reject the Commonwealth’s argument that customers
of cellular service providers such as Metro PCS, which are
advance-pay services, assume the risk that the content of infor-
mation stored on its servers will be disclosed to third parties. To
support its argument, the Commonwealth notes that companies
such as Metro PCS do not conduct credit checks or verify the
identity of its customers and that, as a consequence, customers
who engage the services of such companies have a less objec-
tively reasonable expectation of privacy. In determining a sub-
scriber’s reasonable expectation of privacy, we decline to distin-
guish between those who choose not to submit to a credit check,
or do not have credit, or are not the named account holder on a
cellular telephone account and those customers who identify
themselves or have established credit.

iii. Substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. We now
ask whether the admission of the text messages, which could have

46The Commonwealth obtained Corbin’s cellular telephone pursuant to a
search warrant on October 27, 2011; however, it previously had obtained the
content of his text messages pursuant to its August 15 § 2703(d) application.

17Corbin established standing here, in part, through his implicit acknowledg-
ment of ownership of the cellular telephone account associated with the 2898
number, prior to and during trial, We note that a defendant, connected to a
cellular telephone account with a cellular telephone service provider under an
assumed name, will not automatically have standing to challenge the search of
the information relating to the cellular telephone account. Such a defendant, as
here, must establish both standing and a reasonable expectation of privacy in
order to challenge such a search. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass.
203, 207-208 (2009). Additionally, we acknowledge that the posture of this case
made the determination of standing and reasonable expectation of privacy more
difficult. The better practice is to assert this claim through a motion for a new
trial and present affirmative evidence to support a defendant’s entitlement to
challenge such a search.

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 37

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

been suppressed, created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage
of justice and “likely . . . influenced the jury’s conclusion.”
Williams, 453 Mass. at 205, quoting Wright, 411 Mass. at 682.
We conclude that it did not.

Corbin’s defense was that he was innocent and that Thomas, as
a high-level drug dealer, was in a dangerous business. Corbin
claimed that many people knew Thomas was a drug dealer and,
for that reason, he was a target for drug robbery. Corbin’s
argument that the content of his text messages was the only
evidence from which the jury could find a motive and opportunity
for Corbin to commit the murders is belied by the record. Much
of the information about Thomas’s status as a high-level drug
dealer came in through other evidence.'*

In addition, based on evidence wholly independent of the text
messages, Corbin’s involvement in the murders was not a close
question. The discovery of Corbin’s fingerprint on the barrel of
the curling iron found near Kee’s body was highly inculpatory, as
was the evidence of Corbin’s telephonic contact with Fulgiam,
Thomas, and the stolen cellular telephone on the day of the
murders. The inference that Corbin was in possession of the
cellular telephone stolen a few hours before the murders, and that
he used this telephone to contact Thomas on multiple occasions,
including within two hours of the murders, also was highly
inculpatory. The jury also heard evidence that Thomas, Corbin,
and Fulgiam were involved in the drug business together and that
the murders were likely connected to a drug robbery. Moreover,
although we recognize that trial counsel was faced with the task
of down-playing the impact of the text messages once they were
admitted in evidence, he affirmatively used this content in his
closing argument to establish that (1) Thomas had a significant
amount of drugs and money in his apartment most of the time; (2)
Thomas was a “tempting” target for robbery; and (3) the nature of
Thomas’s business was such that persons other than Corbin could
have a motive to kill Thomas. Against the backdrop of this highly
incriminating evidence, we cannot say that the jury’s exposure to

*8Thomas’s best friend testified that Thomas was selling “a few thousand
dollars” worth of marijuana per week and approximately $4,000 or $5,000
worth of cocaine per week, Additionally, that friend testified that it was common
in the drug business for a higher-level dealer to supply drugs to “street-level”
dealers for sale, and the jury heard evidence that Fulgiam admitted to being in
the drug business with Thomas and that Thomas had a lot more money than
Fulgiam.

38 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

Corbin’s text messages likely influenced the jury’s verdict.
Therefore, Corbin cannot meet his burden to establish that trial
counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the content of his
text messages created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of
justice.

2. Fingerprint analysis. The Commonwealth presented the
following evidence to prove its contention that the fingerprint
analysis placed both defendants at the scene of the crime during
the murders. Although police criminalists were able to obtain
several latent fingerprints’? from items at the scene, ultimately,
only five latent prints were individualized”® to the defendants.
Four latent prints were recovered from the magazine of the nine
millimeter semiautomatic pistol, and one thumbprint was recov-
ered from the barrel of the curling iron found near Kee’s body.

During her testimony, a fingerprint analyst explained that latent
print analysts compare the latent prints recovered from crime
scenes to known prints, i.e., fingerprint impressions taken in a
controlled setting, either in ink or on a scanner. Insofar as relevant
here, police produced a card, known as a “ten-print” card, which
includes the ten fingerprint impressions, the name of the person
who is being fingerprinted, typically a signature of that person,
and other identifying information, such as date of birth and
address. Police latent print analysts access the known prints
through certain databases. The latent print analysts use a method
known as analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification, or
ACE-V, to compare the latent prints recovered to known prints.

With respect to Corbin’s fingerprint, the analyst explained that
she began by using the ACE-V methodology to determine that the
latent print had sufficient quality and quantity of detail for com-
parison purposes. Next, she obtained possible matches through a
fingerprint database, including the ten-print card of Corbin that
was maintained by the State police and created on July 7, 2005.?"
Finally, after performing the ACE-V methodology again, the
analyst “individualized the right thumb” of Corbin to the latent
print recovered from the curling iron.

1A Jatent print is “a fingerprint that generally can’t be seen right away, and
[one] would need further processing in order for it to be seen.”

?°Individualization is “when a latent print examiner comes to a conclusion
that there is a sufficient amount of detail of quality and quantity of those details
between the latent print and the known fingerprint to arrive at that conclusion,
to establish that the latent print originated from the known print or that donor.”

24Corbin’s ten-print card was admitted in evidence over objection.

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 39

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

With respect to Fulgiam’s fingerprints, four of seven latent
fingerprints that were recovered from the magazine of the nine
millimeter semiautomatic pistol were individualized to him. The
analyst explained, over objection, that she generated Fulgiam’s
known ten-print card, maintained by the State police and created
on July 18, 2011, for comparison with the recovered latent
prints.* Next, applying the ACE-V methodology, she individu-
alized the four latent prints to Fulgiam.

a. Ten-print cards. The defendants argue that the judge erred in
admitting the ten-print cards under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule. See G. L. c. 233, § 78; Mass. G. Evid.
§ 803(6)(A) & note (2017). More specifically, the defendants
argue that because the statements underlying the ten-print card
were made by persons having no business duty to report the
information accurately, the statements fall outside the scope of
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree.

The business records exception to the hearsay rule provides, in
relevant part: “a writing or record, ... made as a memorandum
or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall not be
inadmissible in any civil or criminal proceeding as evidence of
the facts therein stated because it is transcribed or because it is
hearsay or self-serving.” G. L. c. 233, § 78. A record falls within
the scope of the business records exception to the hearsay rule, set
forth in § 78, “if the judge finds that it was (1) made in good faith;
(2) made in the regular course of business; (3) made before the
action began; and (4) the regular course of business to make the
record at or about the time of the transaction or occurrences
recorded.” Beal Bank, SSB v. Eurich, 444 Mass. 813, 815 (2005),
citing DiMarzi v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 105
(1983). If such findings are made, the record “is presumed to be
reliable and therefore admissible.” Wingate v. Emery Air Freight
Corp., 385 Mass. 402, 406 (1982).

This presumption, however, does not automatically extend to
the out-of-court statements made by a secondary source that the
record preparer relies on when creating the record. The essential
element underlying the presumption of reliability is the theory
that “entries in these records are routinely made by those charged
with the responsibility of making accurate entries and are relied

22As discussed infra, both Corbin and Fulgiam vigorously contested the
assertion that the ten-print cards associated with them actually contained their
fingerprints because the ten-print cards lacked certain identifying information,
including both Corbin and Fulgiam’s signatures.

40 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

on in the course of doing business.” Jd. Where the person pro-
viding information to the preparer is unconnected to the business,
and thus is under no business duty to provide accurate informa-
tion, this essential element is lost. Although § 78 provides that
preparer’s personal knowledge (or lack thereof) goes to the
record’s weight, not its admissibility, this provision does not
negate the requirement that, where the information contained
within the record is offered for its truth, the source from which the
preparer obtained the information “must carry the same indicia of
reliability, arising from regularity and business motives, that
bring his own act of recording the information within the statu-
tory exception.” Id.

To demonstrate that the preparer’s hearsay source bears the
same indicia of reliability as the preparer, the proponent need not
produce each speaker. Beal Bank, SSB, 444 Mass. at 816. Rather,
the proponent need only present evidence demonstrating that the
hearsay source “reported the information as a matter of business
duty or business routine.” Wingate, 385 Mass. at 406. Such was
the case in Beal Bank, SSB, where the proponent bank introduced,
as its own business record, a printout of a report produced and
provided to it by the bank’s loan servicing agent (agent). Beal
Bank SSB, supra at 816. In determining that the judge did not
abuse his discretion in admitting the document as a business
record, we noted that because the agent serviced the bank’s loans
pursuant to a contract, the bank manager’s testimony regarding
the records was sufficient to support the admission of the docu-
ments. Jd. at 817. Key to this determination was the existence of
a business relationship between the bank and its agent. We noted,
“this is not a case where the bank is simply receiving information
from another business. Rather, [the agent] is the bank’s servicing
agent; it has a business duty [to accurately report] the information
to the bank; and the bank routinely accesses and relies on that
information.” Jd.

In this case, the Commonwealth introduced two ten-print cards
created by the State police, each of which bore ten fingerprints
and identifying information associated with the defendants.* As
a threshold matter, we determine that the ten-print cards meet the

28Specifically, one of the ten-print cards reflected Corbin’s name, aliases, date
of birth, sex, race, place of birth, height, weight, eye and hair color, and Social
Security number. The other reflected Fulgiam’s name, date of birth, sex, race,
place of birth, height, weight, and eye and hair color. Neither ten-print card
reflected the signature of the person fingerprinted, although the ten-print card
provides space for such information,

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 41

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

statutory requirements under the business records exception.
The admissibility of the identifying information provided by the
persons being fingerprinted and reflected on the ten-print card,
however, is not so easily established. Unlike in Beal Bank, SSB,
here, the persons being fingerprinted had neither a contractual
obligation nor a business duty to provide accurate and reliable
identifying information. Thus, the protections that “arise[ ] from
regularity and business motives,” Wingate, 385 Mass. at 406, are
inapplicable here.

Here, the officer who creates the ten-print card has a duty to
ensure that the person who is being fingerprinted is accurately
identified. Otherwise, such cards would have little value to law
enforcement. Moreover, G. L. c. 268, § 34A, states: “[w]hoever
knowingly and willfully furnishes a false name or Social Security
number to a law enforcement officer or law enforcement official
following an arrest shall be punished by a fine or not more than
$1,000 or by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more
than one year or by both such fine and imprisonment.” Therefore,
based on the officers’ duty to ensure that the ten-print cards are
created with accurate information, and the arrestees’ legal obli-
gation to provide accurate information, we conclude that the
identifying information on the cards is reliable and brings the
identifying evidence reflected on the ten-print card within the
scope of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See
Wingate, 385 Mass. at 406.

The defendants argue that the ten-print cards do not fall within
the scope of the business records exception to the hearsay rule
because the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that the
person taking the fingerprints verified the identities of the persons
fingerprinted. See United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, 77 (1st
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1172 (2000) (admission of
sender’s name, address, and telephone number reflected on West-
ern Union “To Send Money” form for truth was error where
Western Union did not have practice of verifying such informa-
tion). Although we agree that verification may be a best practice,
we conclude that the presence or absence of independent verifi-

24The Commonwealth’s witness, a State police trooper, testified that the
ten-print records were maintained in the State police’s identification unit,
located in Sudbury, and confirmed that such records were typically produced,
entered, and maintained for administrative purposes in good faith, in the
ordinary course of business of the State police. The trooper also confirmed that
the ten-print cards were created prior to the commencement of the case.

42 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

cation bears on the weight of the record rather than its admissi-
bility under the business records exception. In addition, the de-
fendants point out that important information, including signa-
tures of the person taking the fingerprints and signatures of the
persons being fingerprinted, are missing. These issues also go to
the weight, which may be subject to intense scrutiny on cross-
examination, rather than the admissibility of the evidence.

We are also not persuaded by Corbin’s argument that the
ten-print cards were inadmissible because the Commonwealth
presented testimony from a witness who did not actually take or
maintain the ten-print cards. Section 78 makes clear, as has this
court, that the admissibility of a document under the business
records exception does not turn on the personal knowledge of the
record’s preparer. See Wingate, 385 Mass. at 406, quoting G. L.
c. 233, § 78 (“ ‘personal knowledge by the entrant or maker’ is a
matter affecting the weight [rather than the admissibility] of the
record”). Accordingly, we conclude that the ten-print were prop-
erly admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay
rule.?5

Last, the defendants argue that the admission of the ten-print
cards violated the right of confrontation as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. We disagree. The
Supreme Court has made clear that the confrontation clause
“guarantees a defendant the opportunity to confront any person,
in the ‘crucible of cross examination,’ whose ‘testimonial’ state-
ments are introduced against him.” Commonwealth v. Siny Van
Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 552 (2011), quoting Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52, 61 (2004). Similarly, art. 12 “com-
mands that ‘every subject shall have a right . . . to meet the
witnesses against him face to face.” Commonwealth v.
Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 628 (1997), quoting art. 12. “It is the
testimonial character of any item of evidence that triggers the
confrontation right, notwithstanding its admissibility under stat-
ute, State rule, or a common-law hearsay exception.” Siny Van
Tran, 460 Mass. at 552, citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305, 323 (2009). However, “[m]Jost of the hearsay
exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not tes-
timonial — for example, business records or statements in further-

25Because of our conclusion, we need not address Corbin’s argument that trial
counsel’s failure to object to the validity of the ten-print card constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 43

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

ance of a conspiracy.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324, citing
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. The Court clarified, “[b]usiness and
public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not
because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but
because — having been created for the administration of an
entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact at trial — they are not testimonial.” Melendez-Diaz,
supra.

Fingerprint records are nontestimonial because they are created
for the “administration of an entity’s affairs” rather than to
establish or prove some fact at trial. Commonwealth v. Weeks, 77
Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2010). See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
Here, the trooper testified that ten-print cards are created in the
ordinary course of business in good faith, and Corbin and
Fulgiam’s ten-print cards were created prior to the commence-
ment of the trial. The ten-print cards were business records under
G. L. c. 233, § 78. Because the ten-print cards are business
records, we conclude that the admission of the ten-print cards did
not violate the defendants’ right to confront witnesses against
them protected by the Sixth Amendment and art. 12.

b. Testimony of fingerprint analyst. The defendants challenge
the admission of the Commonwealth’s fingerprint expert witness
testimony on several grounds. The defendants first argue that the
Commonwealth’s expert witness improperly testified to the result
of her fingerprint analysis in absolute terms, stating that she had
individualized the defendants’ fingerprints to prints found at the
scene of the crime. According to the defendants, the introduction
of expert fingerprint testimony stating the results of fingerprint
analysis in absolute terms is inconsistent with recent science
questioning the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint analysis
and the ACE-V methodology. Because the defendants did not
object to this aspect of the testimony at trial, our inquiry is
whether any error created a substantial likelihood of a miscar-
riage of justice. Wright, 411 Mass. at 682.

We have on several occasions addressed the issue of the
ACE-V methodology and expert testimony based on it. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 724-728 (2010), and
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 641-655 (2005). In
Gambora, supra at 724, we discussed in great depth a 2009 report
published by the National Research Council for the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS Report), which raised several issues
regarding the reliability of certain aspects of the ACE-V meth-

44 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

odology and the expert testimony that relies upon it.2° The central
issue raised in the NAS Report was “the need to prevent over-
statement of the accuracy of fingerprint comparisons, and for
additional research.” Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176,
181 (2014), quoting Gambora, supra at 726. Although we stated
that “courts historically have found fingerprint evidence to be
admissible,” Joyner, supra at 180, quoting Patterson, 445 Mass.
at 644, we also noted that “[tlestimony to the effect that a latent
print matches, or is ‘individualized’ to, a known print, if it is to
be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact, and
opinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the infallibility
of, an ‘individualization’ of a print should be avoided.” Gambora,
supra at 729 n.22.

The defendants contend that the fingerprint expert witness
failed to heed this court’s cautionary advice and presented her
findings based on her application of the ACE-V methodology to
latent prints found on the scene as fact rather than opinion. We
agree, but we are persuaded that the testimony did not create a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Wright, 411
Mass. at 682.

Fingerprint analysts testifying as expert witnesses must clearly
frame their findings in the form of an opinion to avoid improper
testimony. See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 & note (2017). See also
Joyner, 467 Mass. at 183 n.9 (“Gambora permits a fingerprint

6In Gambora we stated:

“The [NAS] report does not appear to question the underlying theory
which grounds fingerprint identification evidence; as the report states,
there is scientific evidence supporting the theory that fingerprints are
unique to each person and do not change over a person’s life. . .. However,
the NAS report adds, ‘ulniqueness and persistence are necessary condi-
tions for friction ridge identification [i.e., fingerprint identification] to be
feasible, but those conditions do not . . . guarantee that prints from two
different people are always sufficiently different that they cannot be
confused, or that two impressions made by the same finger will also be
sufficiently similar to be discerned as coming from the same source’ ”
(citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass, 715, 724-725 (2010), citing National
Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States, A Path
Forward 143-144 & n.34 (2009) (NAS Report), Moreover, we stated that although
the NAS Report does not draw the conclusion that fingerprint evidence lacks such
reliability that courts should no longer deem it admissible, the report does “stress
the subjective nature of the judgments that must be made by the fingerprint
examiner at every step of the ACE-V process, including an examiner’s ultimate
conclusion that a latent print is ‘individualized’ to a specific, identified, known
print.” Gambora, supra at 725, citing NAS Report at 139, 141.

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 45

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

expert to opine on whether two fingerprints match,” thus it is
“helpful” to ask expert to testify as to his or her opinion). Here,
the analyst testified that individualization signifies that the print
examiner has “come[ ] to the conclusion that there is a sufficient
amount of quality and quantity of those details between the latent
print and the known fingerprint . . . to establish that the latent
[print] originated from the known print or that donor.” She
testified on several occasions that she individualized fingerprints
of the defendants to latent prints found at the scene of the crime.

However, portions of the analyst’s testimony implicitly sug-
gested the fallibility of fingerprint analysis. Contrast Common-
wealth v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192, 205 (2014) (fingerprint
analyst improperly testified as to her belief of “no error rate in
[her] area of science”). For example, she agreed that latent prints
are obtained from an “uncontrolled setting,” and that various
factors, including pressure, can affect the way the fingerprint is
recorded. Moreover, as in Gambora, we note that the vigorous
cross-examination of the analyst countered any possible miscon-
ception that individualization is infallible. Specifically, defense
counsel for Fulgiam questioned her on her inability to determine
when the latent prints were deposited, and counsel highlighted the
fact that fingerprints are “somewhat delicate.” Defense counsel
for Corbin also questioned her on issues regarding the surface
from which the latent print on the curling iron was taken and
regarding the fact that the latent print recovered is not “exactly
similar” to the known prints.

Finally, the Commonwealth’s evidence linking the defendants
to the crime, separate and apart from the fingerprint evidence,
was strong. Thus, even though we conclude that the analyst’s
testimony regarding individualization was erroneously presented
as fact, we determine that the error did not create a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

The defendants also argue that the judge erred in allowing the
analyst to testify that another fingerprint analyst had reviewed her
work.?? According to the defendants, this testimony amounted to
“improper vouching” and hearsay expert testimony.

We are not persuaded that this testimony was error. Expert
testimony as to the opinions or conclusions of a second, nontes-

27During the analyst’s testimony, counsel for Fulgiam preemptively objected
to any questioning by the Commonwealth regarding whether the analyst's
findings were verified by another fingerprint examiner. While the judge sus-
tained the objection, the judge indicated that the witness would be allowed to
testify that another fingerprint analyst reviewed her work.

46 477 Mass. 20 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

tifying expert constitutes inadmissible hearsay. See Common-
wealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 421-422 (2011). Here, the
judge allowed the analyst’s testimony that the other analyst
“reviewed” her work, but did not allow testimony that the second
analyst verified her work.?® The analyst testified as to the ACE-V
process, wherein verification or review by another fingerprint
analyst is a step in the process, and did not testify as to the second
analyst’s independent conclusions. The analyst’s testimony stands
in stark contrast to the expert testimony at issue in Whitaker,
where the fingerprint analyst expert witness testified that two
secondary analysts “concurred” with his conclusions regarding
individualization. Id. at 421. Accordingly, we conclude that the
judge did not err in admitting the fingerprint analyst’s testimony
confirming that another fingerprint analyst reviewed her findings.

Nonetheless, judges must use caution in allowing testimony
regarding the verification step in ACE-V analysis, as “verifying”
suggests that a nontestifying expert concurs with the testifying
expert’s conclusion. Such testimony would be improper hearsay
testimony. See Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 Mass. 191, 202
(2015).

3. Gang references. Corbin argues that the Commonwealth
improperly and repeatedly referenced gang affiliation during the
trial, despite the fact that the judge granted Fulgiam’s motion in
limine to exclude such references. This argument has no merit.
Corbin merely speculates that the jury would conclude that the
defendants were affiliated with gangs based on the neighborhoods
in which the men grew up.”* Additionally, the prosecutor’s clos-
ing argument was proper; there was testimony that six or seven
men were seen fleeing the victim’s apartment building immedi-
ately after the witnesses heard gun shots. It is within permissible
bounds for the prosecutor to infer that a “team” of men commit-
ted the murders. There was no error. See Commonwealth v.

28Despite the judge’s ruling prohibiting the Commonwealth from questioning
the analyst regarding whether another analyst verified her work, following the
colloquy, the Commonwealth questioned whether her work was “verified.”
After the analyst testified in the affirmative, Fulgiam objected. The judge
sustained the objection as to the use of the word “verified,” but reiterated that he
would allow the testimony regarding what the second analyst did when he
examined the analyst's findings.

2°During their interviews with detectives, Fulgiam and Corbin told the detec-
tives that Fulgiam was originally from the Academy Homes Development in the
Roxbury section of Boston, Corbin was from Humboldt Avenue in Roxbury, and
‘Thomas was from Heath Street in the Jamaica Plain section of Boston.

477 Mass. 20 (2017) 47

Commonwealth v. Fulgiam,

Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516-517 (1987).

4. Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. After a full review
of the trial record, we affirm the convictions and decline to grant
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

So ordered.

Lowy, J. (concurring, with whom Gants, C.J., joins). I agree that
the ten-print card qualifies for the business record exception to the
tule against hearsay. However, I write separately because the card
in this case involves two levels of hearsay: the ten-print card itself
and the information provided by the individual to fill out the card.
I believe the court does not precisely address each level.

The business records exception to the rule against hearsay
allows information recorded for a business purpose and contained
in a business record in evidence for its truth. See Mass. G. Evid.
§ 803(6)(A) (2017). This rule includes out-of-court statements: if
the statement is recorded for a business purpose and the indi-
vidual making the statement does so for a business purpose, the
statement is admissible for its truth. See id. If an out-of-court
statement contained in a business record is not made pursuant to
a business purpose, it still may be admissible if the out-of-court
statement is recorded for a business purpose and the statement
falls within another hearsay exception or exclusion. As the court
points out, an arrestee’s /egal obligation does not equate with a
business purpose.

However, I believe that the information provided to fill out the
ten-print card fell within the hearsay exclusion for an opposing
party’s statement. Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(A) (2017). For the
reasons stated by the court, including the defendant’s legal obli-
gation to provide identifying information, the totality of the
circumstances established a more than adequate basis for the
judge to conclude — as a preliminary question of fact on which
admissibility depends and as a matter of conditional relevance —
that Corbin was the individual who provided the information. See
Mass. G. Evid. § 104(a), (b) (2017). The ten-print card was
properly admitted because the information in the ten-print card
was admissible under an exclusion from the rule against hearsay,
and the ten-print card was admissible as a business record. Mass.
G. Evid. §§ 801(d)(2)(A), 803(6)(A).

48 477 Mass. 48 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

Commonweattu vs. Bossy Lesuir
(and five companion cases’).

Suffolk. November 7, 2016. - May 9, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Borsrorp, Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, J.”

Firearms. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Constitutional Law, Search
and seizure, Privacy. Search and Seizure, Multiple occupancy building,
Cuntilage, Expectation of privacy.

A Superior Court judge properly allowed the criminal defendants’ motions to
suppress a sawed-off shotgun that police had discovered during a warrantless
search of the porch and side yard of a multifamily home where one of the
defendants resided, where the side yard was a constitutionally protected area
within the home’s curtilage, and a police officer’s physical intrusion into that
area to search for a weapon therefore implicated the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the
Declaration of Rights. [52-58]

This court declined to address claims of error that were not raised in argument
before a Superior Court judge and therefore were waived. [58]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on December 16, 2014.

Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Charles J.
Hely, J.

An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal
was allowed by Hines, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the
Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an applica-
tion for direct appellate review.

Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
Bobby Leslie.

MarySita Miles for Lacy Price.

Hines, J. The defendants, Bobby Leslie and Lacy Price, were
indicted on charges of unlawful possession of a sawed-off shot-

*Two against Bobby Leslie and three against Lacy Price.
Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

477 Mass. 48 (2017) 49

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

gun,? G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c); unlawful possession of a loaded fire-
arm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and possession of ammunition without
a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1).4 The
indictments arose from a May, 2014, warrantless search of the
porch and side yard of a three-family home in the Dorchester
section of Boston where the defendant Price resided. The search
revealed a loaded sawed-off shotgun under the porch. Leslie was
arrested at the scene, and after further investigation, Price was
arrested. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendants’
motions to suppress the sawed-off shotgun on the ground that a
warrant was required to search the area under the porch in light
of Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013), and art. 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal from the allowance
of the defendants’ motions to suppress. A single justice of this
court granted leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal and reported
the case to the Appeals Court. We allowed the defendants’
application for direct appellate review to clarify the application of
the Jardines warrant requirement to a search in a multifamily
home. Following the analytical framework set out in Jardines,
569 U.S. at 5-10, we conclude that the side yard of the defend-
ant’s multifamily home was a “constitutionally protected area,”
and that the intrusion into that area to search for a weapon
implicated the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and art. 14. Because the warrant-
less intrusion into this constitutionally protected area was an
unreasonable search that violated the defendants’ Federal and
State constitutional rights, we affirm the order allowing the de-
fendants’ motions to suppress.

Background. We recite the facts as found by the motion judge,
“supplemented by evidence in the record that is uncontroverted
and that was implicitly credited by the judge.” Commonwealth v.
Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 531 (2016), citing Commonwealth v.
Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286 (2015). On May 29, 2014, at around
2 pm., Boston police Detective Daniel Griffin was working in the

°General Laws c. 140, § 121, defines a sawed-off shotgun as “any weapon
made from a shotgun, whether by alteration, modification or otherwise, if such
weapon as modified has one or more barrels less than [eighteen] inches in length
or as modified has an overall length of less than [twenty-six] inches.”

“Price was also indicted as a subsequent offender on the charge of unlawful
possession of a firearm, G. L. ¢. 269, § 10 (d).

50 477 Mass. 48 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

drug control unit® as a plainclothes officer, driving an unmarked
vehicle, in the neighborhood of Bowdoin Street and Geneva
Avenue in Dorchester. Based on information from Officer Eric
Merner, another member of his unit, Detective Griffin began
observing a group of four men walking down Everton Street from
Olney Street, toward Geneva Avenue. The men appeared “ner-
vous.”’® Once Detective Griffin realized that the men were ap-
proaching a certain residence on Everton Street (residence), he
communicated to Officer Merner that the residence was a known
location of gang associates and that the neighborhood in which
the residence is located was a “hotspot” for shootings and fire-
arms offenses.”

The property at the residence, which is a three-family home,
was fenced in on the front and left side. A chain link fence, with
an attached gate at the walkway leading to the sidewalk, ran
across the edge of the front yard. A tall wooden fence ran along
the left side* of the lot, five to six feet from the side of the porch
and the house. The left-side porch area was blocked by a large
blue recycling bin, which obstructed the view of the area from
Everton Street.

After repositioning his vehicle down from and opposite the
residence,® Detective Griffin observed the four men, including
Leslie, enter the front gate of the residence and meet a fifth man,

The unit consisted of a sergeant detective, Detective Daniel Griffin, and five
other police officers.

Although the men were described as looking “nervous,” Detective Griffin
did not see Leslie grab at his waist, which can indicate that an individual
possesses a firearm without a holster, but he noted that Leslie swiveled his head
in a surveillance-conscious manner while walking towards a certain residence
on Everton Street.

Detective Griffin was familiar with that neighborhood of Dorchester, and
specifically with Everton Street, from his experience in the youth violence strike
force and the drug control unit. He had arrested an individual with a firearm on
the front porch of the residence sometime in the previous five years, but could
not recall the date more specifically. Additionally, Detective Griffin had previ-
ously made other arrests in that neighborhood and on Everton Street. However,
neither defendant was present during the previous arrest at the residence and
none of the men present at the residence on May 29, 2014, was known to
Detective Griffin or the other officers present.

®The fence was on the left side of the property from a vantage point of facing
the front of the home.

*Everton Street is a one-way street running from Olney Street to Geneva
Avenue. Detective Griffin initially observed the residence from the right side of
Eyerton Street directly across from the residence. However, to avoid detection,
he drove around the block and parked on the right side of Everton Street, about

477 Mass. 48 (2017) 51

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

Price, on the porch. Approximately five minutes after the men
arrived, Leslie walked off the front porch, swiveling his head
from side to side in a surveillance-conscious manner, toward the
left side of the front yard to the side porch area. Although
Detective Griffin's view was obstructed by the recycling bin, two
trees, and some motor vehicles, he was able to observe Leslie
crouch down and appear to manipulate something under the side
porch. Detective Griffin could not see what object Leslie was
manipulating. Based on Detective Griffin’s experience with one
hundred or more prior firearm arrests, Leslie’s crouching down
and swiveling his head more rapidly as he approached the side
porch area were consistent with an individual who illegally
possessed a firearm.

Next, Detective Griffin observed Price walk over to the side
porch area as Leslie had done previously, also swiveling his head
in a surveillance-conscious manner, bending down, looking under
the porch, and then returning to the group on the front porch.
Detective Griffin observed Leslie return to the side porch area
two more times, each time swiveling his head as before, bending
down, and manipulating something on the ground. On Leslie’s
third trip to the area, as he stood back up after having bent down,
he made a distinctive gesture that Detective Griffin described as
imitating the firing of a shotgun or rifle in the air. Leslie raised his
hands and forearms near his shoulders, with one hand near the
trigger area, as he simulated recoil.

From these observations, Detective Griffin suspected that a
firearm was hidden under the left-side porch area. He was aware
from his experience as a police officer that individuals often place
illegal firearms nearby but not on one’s person, for easy access.
Detective Griffin then contacted the other members of his unit
and members of the youth violence strike force for assistance.
The officers intended to approach the men at the residence to
conduct field interrogation observations to “see what [the men]
were up to.”2°

The officers, seven in total, walked through the front gate at the
walkway and proceeded to the front porch. Detective Griffin

four houses away. He estimated that the trip around the block took him about ten
seconds.

104 “field interrogation observation’ . . . has been described as an interaction
in which a police officer identifies an individual and finds out that person's
business for being in a particular area.” Commonwealth y. Warren, 415 Mass.
530, 532 n.5 (2016), quoting Commonwealth y. Lyles, 453 Mass. 811, 813 n.6
(2009).

52 477 Mass. 48 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

could not recall whether the gate was open, but it was not locked.
The officers approached the men on the porch and began to
engage them in conversation. Detective Griffin, however, veered
off the walkway and walked to the left side of the yard, where
Leslie and Price previously had gone. He saw a sawed-off shot-
gun on the ground under the porch. The wooden handle of the
shotgun protruded out from under the porch. Although the shot-
gun was not visible from the street or from the gate near the
sidewalk, it was plainly visible if one were present in the left side
of the yard and walked behind the recycling bin.

Detective Griffin immediately notified the other officers of the
presence of the sawed-off shotgun, and Leslie was placed under
arrest after officers determined that he did not have a firearm
identification card." The officers obtained identifying informa-
tion from the other men on the porch, and following further
investigation, Price was also arrested in connection with the
weapon. Subsequently, the officers learned that Price lived at the
residence in the second-floor apartment,'? but Leslie was not a
resident.

Discussion. The judge allowed the motions to suppress, ruling
that the search was governed by Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11-12, in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless
search of the front porch of a single-family home with a drug-
sniffing dog violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned
that the porch was part of the curtilage to which the police could
lawfully approach but that in bringing a drug-sniffing dog, the
police exceeded the scope of their implied license to enter the
defendant’s property. The judge recognized that Jardines in-
volved a single-family home, but he concluded that Price (and by
extension Leslie) had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
side yard of the small three-family home where the search oc-
curred. The intrusion into the side yard to search for a suspected
hidden weapon was no different from bringing a drug-sniffing
dog to the front porch of a single-family home. Thus, the search
required a warrant.

The Commonwealth claims error in the judge’s order, arguing
that because Jardines does not apply to a multifamily home, the
motion properly could be granted only if the defendants estab-

“When Leslie was asked whether he had a license to carry a firearm he
answered, “For what? I don’t have a gun on me.”

"Nothing in the record establishes whether Price owned the residence or
whether he resided there as a tenant.

477 Mass. 48 (2017)

wn
w

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

lished that Price had either exclusive control over the home or a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. The
Commonwealth also argues that even if the intrusion into the side
yard was a search of a constitutionally protected area, the judge
erred in finding that the police lacked probable cause and exigent
circumstances to justify the search. We address these arguments
in turn.

1. Standard of review. “In reviewing a ruling on a motion to
suppress, we accept the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact absent
clear error... .” Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. 137,
142 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646
(2004). “However, ‘[w]e review independently the application of
constitutional principles to the facts found.’ ” Warren, 475 Mass.
at 534, quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393
(2004). Where, as here, the issue is whether a search occurred
within the curtilage of a home, “we undertake our independent
review cognizant that there is no ‘finely tuned formula’ that
demarcates the curtilage in a given case.” Fernandez, supra,
quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).

2. The entry into the side yard. As a threshold matter, we briefly
address the issue of standing. “When a defendant is charged with
a crime in which possession of the seized evidence at the time of
the contested search is an essential element of guilt, the defendant
shall be deemed to have standing to contest the legality of the
search and the seizure of that evidence.” Commonwealth v.
Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 601 (1990). Here, the defendants were
charged with possession of a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition.
Therefore, they have standing to challenge the legality of the
search and seizure. The Commonwealth argues that even if the
defendants have automatic standing, they cannot meet their bur-
den to show that a search in the constitutional sense occurred.

In considering application of Jardines to a multifamily home,
we begin with the observation that the Court’s holding does not
rest on the fact that the property was a single-family home.
Rather, the warrant requirement followed from the Court’s deter-
mination that the police entry onto the porch of the home with a
drug-sniffing dog was an unlicensed “physical intrusion [into] a
constitutionally protected area.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5, quoting
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment). We interpret the Jardines holding
as a clarification of the appropriate framework for the analysis of
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment protection against an

54 477 Mass. 48 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

unreasonable search rather than a pronouncement limited only to
single-family homes. Thus, we decline to limit Jardines‘ holding
to single-family homes or to fashion a rule categorically excluding
areas associated with multifamily homes as curtilage and thus
placing them beyond the reach of the protections of the Fourth
Amendment and art. 14.

We agree also that “[d]istinguishing Jardines based on the
differences between the front porch of a stand-alone house and
the closed hallways of an apartment building draws arbitrary
lines.” United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir.
2016). Moreover, “a strict apartment versus single-family house
distinction is troubling because it would apportion Fourth
Amendment protections on grounds that correlate with income,
race, and ethnicity.” Jd. Thus, we reject the Commonwealth’s
argument that in cases involving a search in a multifamily home,
the validity of the search turns on the defendant’s exclusive
control or expectation of privacy in the area searched. The teach-
ing of Jardines is that when the search is in or about a person’s
home, the essential question is whether the area searched is
within the home or its curtilage.

In Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6, the Court refocused the analysis of
“constitutionally protected area” to emphasize the words of the
Fourth Amendment, noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment ‘indi-
cates with some precision the places and things encompassed by
its protections’: persons, houses, papers, and effects.” /d., quoting
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984). Among the
traditional property interests expressly protected by the Fourth
Amendment, “the home is first among equals.” Jardines, supra.
Accordingly, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has developed to
accommodate a home’s place in the hierarchy of protected inter-
ests. It regards “the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated
with the home’ — what our cases call the curtilage — as ‘part of
the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’ ” Jd., quoting
Oliver, supra at 180. And “[t]he front porch is the classic exem-
plar of an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of
home life extends.’ ” Jardines, supra at 7, quoting Oliver, supra
at 182 n.12. Indeed, the “right [to be free of unreasonable gov-
ernment intrusion] would be of little practical value if the State’s
agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for
evidence with impunity.” Jardines, supra at 6. Thus, the essential
question here is whether the side yard of the home was within the
curtilage of the defendant’s home. If so, the police intrusion
constituted a search requiring a warrant.

477 Mass. 48 (2017)

nr
a

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

In the years since Jardines, the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed whether porches and side yards of a multifamily home
are within the constitutionally protected curtilage. However, the
United States Courts of Appeals overwhelmingly have applied
the four-factor test announced in Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, to deter-
mine whether, in the multifamily home and apartment context, a
particularly described area is curtilage. See, e.g., United States v.
Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 522
(2016); United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir.
2016); United States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir.
2015); United States v. Jackson, 728 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1347 (2014). Therefore, we rely on
these cases for guidance in our analysis whether the side yard of
the defendant Price’s multifamily home was within the curtilage
and apply the Dunn factors in resolving this issue. Dunn, 480
US. at 301.

In Dunn, the Supreme Court introduced a four-factor test to
determine whether an area searched was within the home’s
curtilage: (i) “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to
the home”; (ii) “whether the area is included within an enclosure
surrounding the home”; (iii) “the nature of the uses to which the
area is put”; and (iv) “the steps taken by the resident to protect the
area from observation by people passing by.” Jd. The Court
cautioned, however, that “combining these factors [does not]
produce[ ] a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically ap-
plied, yields a ‘correct’ answer to all extent-of-curtilage ques-
tions.” Id. Instead, “these factors are useful analytical tools only
to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally
relevant consideration — whether the area in question is so
intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under
the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Jd.
Application of the Dunn factors to the facts found here supports
the judge’s conclusion that the porch and side yard of the resi-
dence were within the curtilage. See Fernandez, 458 Mass. at
144-145.

a. Application of the Dunn factors. i. Proximity. The porch was
physically connected to the home itself, and as the Court in
Jardines noted, “[t]he front porch is the classic exemplar of an
area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home life
extends.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7, quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at
182 n.12. Although the sawed-off shotgun was found under the
porch area, the side yard was very close in proximity to the porch

56 477 Mass. 48 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

and, by extension, the house. This factor weighs in favor of a
determination that the porch and side yard were part of the
home’s curtilage.

ii. Enclosure. The front yard was enclosed with a chain link
fence and the left border of the front yard was enclosed with a
large wooden fence about five to six feet away from the porch
where the sawed-off shotgun was recovered. Additionally, the
chain link fence enclosed both the house and the porch area,
allowing the inference that the porch and side yard “should be
treated as an adjunct to the house.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302. As the
Supreme Court noted in both Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12, and
Dunn, supra, “for most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage
will be clearly marked; and the conception defining the curtilage
— as the area around the home to which the activity of home life
extends — is a familiar one easily understood from our daily
experience.”

iii. Nature of use. The record reflects that the defendants were
using the porch as an extension of Price’s home. Price waited for
his guests on the porch as they arrived, and the five men were on
the porch and in the front yard for the entirety of the visit. Price
used the porch area as an extension of his living room, to greet
and entertain guests. Compare Dunn, 480 U.S. at 303 (strong
odor of chemicals and sound of engines running suggested that
defendant was not using barn as extension of his home). Although
there is no evidence of Price’s exclusive use of the porch and side
yard, that fact is not dispositive, as it is merely a single factor in
the calculus. On balance, the nature of Price’s use of the porch
and side yard allows the inference that those areas were inti-
mately connected to his home.

iv. Steps taken to protect from observation. Here, steps were
clearly taken to obscure the view of the side yard and the area
under the porch where the sawed-off shotgun was found. A large
blue recycling bin was placed in front of the area, which ob-
structed the view from the street. Additionally, the large wooden
fence obscured the view of the area from the left side of the yard
where the sawed-off shotgun was found. Although Detective
Griffin testified that the fence in the front yard did not obstruct his
view completely, his testimony established that he could not see
what Leslie was manipulating under the porch because his view
from the street was obscured.

Taking all four factors into consideration, we conclude that the
porch and side yard area at the residence were part of the home’s

477 Mass. 48 (2017) 57

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

curtilage and thus entitled to Fourth Amendment and art. 14
protections against an unreasonable search and seizure. We em-
phasize the relevance of the Dunn factors for our courts in
determining whether a challenged police action occurring within
the boundaries of a home, which under the Fourth Amendment is
expressly designated as a “constitutionally protected area,” is
compliant with its protections. Application of the Dunn factors in
appropriate cases follows Jardines, eschewing the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” inquiry that is deemed necessary only
when the issue is whether the area is a “constitutionally protected
area.” Thus, because Detective Griffin’s search was a physical
intrusion into the constitutionally protected area of the residence,
Price and by extension Leslie are relieved of the burden to show
that Price had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
searched. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10-11, citing United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408-409 (2012) (reasonable expectation of
privacy test “is unnecessary to consider when the government
gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally pro-
tected areas”). “That the officers learned what they learned only
by physically intruding on [Price’s] property to gather evidence is
enough to establish that a search occurred.” Jardines, supra.

b. Police officer’s physical intrusion into curtilage. Because we
have determined that Detective Griffin entered into a constitu-
tionally protected area, “we turn to the question of whether it was
accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.” Jardines,
569 U.S. at 7. If so, the intrusion amounts to a search that must
be justified by probable cause and a warrant or exigent circum-
stances. See id. at 5.

As the Court explained in Jardines, a police officer, like any
other citizen, has an implied license to walk up the path to the
front door of a home and knock on the front door. That license,
however, is limited in scope, purpose, and duration. See id. at 8-9.
Here, Detective Griffin and the other officers were entitled to
open the front gate, walk up the path and onto the porch, and
engage Price and his guests in conversation. In veering off the
path and venturing into the side yard of the home for the purpose
of conducting a search for the weapon, Detective Griffin engaged
in the precise conduct that Jardines found offensive to the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 9 (“the background social norms that invite
a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a
search”). Just as the police officers in Jardines exceeded the scope
of their license when they used a drug-sniffing dog to search the

58 477 Mass. 48 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Leslie.

front porch, here Detective Griffin had neither express nor implied
license to search the side yard and porch area. See id. at 10 (“their
behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which
is not what anyone would think he had license to do”). We
conclude, therefore, that Detective Griffin’s unlicensed physical
intrusion into the curtilage of the defendant’s home was a search
for constitutional purposes.

3. Probable cause and exigent circumstances. Having deter-
mined that a constitutional search occurred, we briefly address the
Commonwealth’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal,
that Detective Griffin demonstrated probable cause and exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless search. Although the
motion judge noted in passing that the evidence in this case failed
to show probable cause or exigent circumstances, we decline to
address the Commonwealth’s claim of error in that finding on the
merits. The Commonwealth failed to raise this argument below,
and therefore it is waived.’* “[I]t is rare for us to consider an
argument for reversal of a lower court which is first raised on
appeal and is dispositive in favor of the party belatedly raising the
issue.” Commonwealth v. Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 631, 633 (2006),
quoting Commonwealth v. Morrissey, 422 Mass. 1, 4 n.5 (1996).

Conclusion. Because we conclude that the sawed-off shotgun
was recovered as a result of an unlawful physical intrusion into
the curtilage of the residence, and therefore in violation of the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, the
allowance of the defendants’ motions to suppress is affirmed.

So ordered.

"The Commonwealth similarly failed to raise the argument that the search
could be justified by reasonable suspicion below. This argument is without
merit. The Commonwealth’s citations to Terry-type frisk cases are inapposite.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). Our laws do not recognize an
exception to the warrant requirement based solely on reasonable suspicion, nor
do we recognize a legal basis to “frisk” a private residence without a warrant.
“Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling
house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant.”
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 451 (1971), quoting Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).

477 Mass. 59 (2017) 59

Commonwealth Garvey.

ComMonweatti vs. JAMES GARVEY.

Suffolk. December 8, 2016. - May 9, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Borsrorb, Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ."

Habitual Offender. Controlled Substances. Grand Jury. Practice, Criminal,
Dismissal, Grand jury proceedings.

This court concluded, based on an examination of the history of G, L. c. 279,
§ 25 (a), which provides for an enhanced penalty where a defendant has two
prior convictions resulting in State or Federal prison sentences of three years
or more, as well as on a comparison of other statutes providing for enhanced
penalties and consideration of the rule of lenity, that § 25 (a) requires that the
underlying convictions arise from separate incidents or episodes of criminal
behavior, [61-67]

This court concluded that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to provide
sufficient evidence to permit the grand jury properly to find probable cause for
the habitual offender portion of indictments against the defendant, where the
grand jury heard no evidence that would allow them to conclude that the de-
fendant’s prior convictions stemmed from separate criminal episodes. [67-68]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on April 1, 2014.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Carol S. Ball, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Kathleen Celio,
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

Robert A. O’Meara (Joseph M. Perullo also present) for the
defendant.

Bupp, J. This case requires us to interpret G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a),
one provision in the habitual criminal statute, G. L. c. 279, § 25.
Section 25 (a) provides for an enhanced penalty where a defend-
ant has two prior convictions resulting in State or Federal prison
sentences of three years or more (qualifying sentences). We
conclude that § 25 (a) requires that the underlying convictions
arise from separate incidents or episodes of criminal behavior. We

‘Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

60 477 Mass. 59 (2017)

Commonwealth Garvey.

also conclude that, in this case, the Commonwealth failed to
provide the grand jury with sufficient evidence to support the
habitual offender portions of the indictments. We therefore affirm
the order dismissing the habitual offender portions of the indict-
ments currently pending against the defendant.

Background. The defendant, James Garvey, was indicted on
charges alleging violations of the controlled substances law, G. L.
c. 94C. After returning eight indictments relating to the charged
drug crimes, the grand jury received evidence concerning the
defendant's prior convictions, which the prosecutor introduced to
establish probable cause for enhanced penalties to be available in
relation to these drug offenses. In particular, the grand jury heard
that on March 13, 2002, the defendant was convicted of four
offenses, each described in a separate count of a single indict-
ment, and was sentenced to at least three years in State prison on
each offense. The offenses were (1) kidnapping, (2) receiving
stolen property, (3) possession of a firearm with an obliterated
serial number, and (4) unlawful possession of a firearm. The
grand jurors did not, however, hear any evidence as to when these
offenses occurred.? The grand jury also heard that on December
5, 2002, the defendant was convicted of distribution of a class B
substance and conspiracy to violate the controlled substance act,
but they did not hear any testimony related to sentencing on those
offenses.

Based on the evidence presented relating to the alleged current
drug offenses and the prior convictions, the grand jury ultimately
voted to indict the defendant for trafficking in 200 grams or more
of oxycodone and hydromorphone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (c) (4);
trafficking in thirty-six grams or more of morphine, G. L. c. 94C,
§ 32E (c) (2); five counts of possession of a class B substance
with the intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a), each as a
subsequent offender, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (b); and possession of
a class E substance with the intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C,

2Based on the defendant's representation in his brief and on the Common-
wealth’s statement of the case in connection with the 2002 convictions, which
the defendant filed as an exhibit to his motion to dismiss, it appears that the four
convictions stemmed from an attempted armed robbery of a store in Arlington
in 2001. The defendant and one other person arrived in a stolen motor vehicle.
During the robbery, the two threatened the store clerks, locking one of the clerks
in the basement. When the police arrived and arrested the robbers, they found
two firearms in the store. The Commonwealth does not appear to dispute the
defendant’s representation that the four prior convictions shared a single date of
offense.

477 Mass. 59 (2017) 61

Commonwealth Garvey.

§ 32D (a), as a subsequent offender, G. L. c. 94C, § 32D (b). Each
charge also carried habitual criminal and school zone enhance-
ments. See G. L. c. 279, § 25; G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.

The defendant moved to dismiss the habitual offender portions
of the indictments, arguing that the grand jury heard no evidence
that his four underlying 2002 convictions arose from different
criminal episodes. A Superior Court judge allowed the motion in
a margin endorsement, writing that “to be a[ ] habitual offender,
one must have at least two prior convictions with qualifying
sentences resulting from separate, prior criminal episodes” (em-
phasis in original; quotation omitted). The Commonwealth ap-
pealed from the judge’s order. See G. L. c. 278, § 28E; Mass. R.
Crim. P. 15 (a) (1), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). We
transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion.

Discussion. Section 25 (a) requires a judge to sentence a person
found guilty of the underlying felony to the maximum penalty
prescribed by law for that felony, where that person has at least
two prior convictions with qualifying sentences. See Common-
wealth vy. Luckern, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 269, 269-270 (2015). In
reviewing the judge’s decision to dismiss the habitual offender
portions of the indictments pending against the defendant, our
task is to interpret the meaning of this statute. We address that
question first, before considering whether the Commonwealth
presented adequate facts to enable the grand jury to make a
probable cause determination.

1. Statutory interpretation. We review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. Commonwealth v. Martin, 476 Mass. 72,
75 (2016). General Laws c. 279, § 25 (a), as amended by St.
2012, c. 192, § 47, provides:

“Whoever is convicted of a felony and has been previously
twice convicted and sentenced to [S]tate prison or [S]tate
correctional facility or a [F]ederal corrections facility for a
term not less than [three] years . . . shall be considered a
habitual criminal and shall be punished . . . for such felony
for the maximum term provided by law.”

To determine the Legislature’s intent, we look to the words of
the statute, “construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the
language, considered in connection with the cause of its enact-
ment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main
object to be accomplished.” Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v.
Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 720 (2002), and cases cited. “We derive

62 477 Mass. 59 (2017)

Commonwealth Garvey.

the words’ usual and accepted meaning from sources presumably
known to the statute’s enactors, such as their use in other legal
contexts and dictionary definitions.” Commonwealth v. Campbell,
415 Mass. 697, 700 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. Zone
Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). Where the statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends. Commis-
sioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep’t of the Trial Court
for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 124 (2006).

Both the Commonwealth and the defendant contend that the
statute is unambiguous, but each interprets it differently. The Com-
monwealth argues that the plain meaning of the statute requires
simply that a defendant have two prior convictions with qualifying
sentences in order to be considered a habitual criminal, regardless
of whether those convictions stem from the same or different
episodes. The defendant, on the other hand, contends that the
statute’s plain meaning includes a separate-episode element be-
cause of the Legislature’s use of the word “habitual” in the text of
the statute. His argument is that a “habit” is generally defined as “a
settled tendency of behavior” or “a behavior pattern acquired by
frequent repetition,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
1017 (2002), and that, therefore, a habitual criminal is someone
who has committed a certain number of criminal acts on separate
occasions.

We do not find § 25 (a)’s meaning, at least in relation to the
issue whether the necessary two prior convictions must relate to
different criminal incidents, to be as clear and obvious as the
Commonwealth and the defendant do. Accordingly, we look to
the history of the statute and our past decisions interpreting it, as
well as to the rest of the statutory scheme, for guidance.* See
Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 355 (2015); Com-
monwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 329 (1983). See also Com-
monwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 433 (2011) (“we turn to
the history of the statute” where there is “lack of clarity”).

a. History of § 25 (a). The Legislature developed a series of
incarnations of repeat offender statutes, beginning in 1818, before
enacting what is now § 25 (a). Contrary to the Commonwealth’s

*Although legislative intent controls, we note that G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a), is
generally described as a “three strikes” law. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Dickhaut, 834
F, Supp. 2d 10, 15-16 (D. Mass. 2011) (“The statute operates as a ‘three-strikes-
and-you’re-out’ law . . .”). Although we do not depend (solely) on the rules of
a sport for interpretation, we consider it relevant that most persons using that
analogy would also understand that, in baseball, one cannot incur two strikes on
a single pitch.

477 Mass. 59 (2017) 63

Commonwealth Garvey.

assertion, the full statutory history of the habitual criminal statute
demonstrates that the requirement of separate criminal episodes
has been a crucial assumption underlying the statute’s develop-
ment.

Earlier statutes, including those cited by the Commonwealth,
provided for an enhanced penalty upon a second conviction, with
further aggravation upon a third. See St. 1817, c. 176, §§ 5-6;
St. 1827, c. 118, $§ 19-20; St. 1832, c. 73, § 1; St. 1833, c. 85,
§§ 1-2; St. 1836, c. 4, §§ 17, 20-22; St. 1843, c. 80. Although
there were slight variations among these statutes,‘ the constant
concept throughout was the Legislature’s focus on separate prior
incidents. In 1853, the Legislature repealed the statute. St. 1853,
c. 375. In 1887, the Legislature enacted the earliest version of the
modern statute. In doing so, it chose to omit the requirements that
there be discharges between the commission and conviction of
each prior crime, and to omit an enhanced penalty for second
convictions, leaving enhanced penalties only for those criminals
who were convicted a third time. See St. 1887, c. 435, § 1, in
amended form at G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a). See also Commonwealth
v. Richardson, 175 Mass. 202, 208 (1900). When it took these
steps, the Legislature added the phrase “habitual criminal” to the
statute. Id. at 202-203. Against the backdrop of the earlier stat-
utes, with their clear focus on separate and distinct convictions,
we understand these changes as showing that the Legislature
sought to provide again for additional punishment for those
criminals who had prior convictions for separate incidents; the
intended effect was to limit these additional penalties to those

4The Commonwealth argues that changes to the statute in the 1830s support
its interpretation: in 1832, the Legislature required prior convictions, sentences,
and discharges, but it removed the discharge requirement in 1836. Compare St.
1832, c. 73, with St. 1836, c. 4, §§ 17, 20-22. The 1836 amendment allowed two
prior convictions to qualify even where there had not been a term of liberty
between any of the crimes. However, we disagree with the Commonwealth’s
argument that the 1836 amendment also allowed prior convictions stemming
from a single incident to qualify. In fact, the decision the Commonwealth cites
for the concept that “the previous convictions and sentences only need be
shown,” Commonwealth y. Richardson, 175 Mass. 202, 207-208 (1900), was
concerned with whether discharges between sentences on the prior qualifying
convictions also must be shown, rather than with determining which convictions
could qualify. Moreover, the Richardson court may well have assumed that
qualifying convictions must stem from separate episodes: the facts of that case
involved prior convictions that, while tried in the same “term” of court, arose
from separate criminal episodes occurring at different times and in different
cities. Id. at 203, 206.

64 477 Mass. 59 (2017)

Commonwealth Garvey.

facing a felony conviction after two previous convictions from
separate incidents.

This construction of § 25 (a) aligns with earlier decisions
interpreting the statute and its prior incarnations. In these prior
cases, although the issue has not been directly raised, we and the
Appeals Court have assumed that § 25 (a) requires that the
underlying convictions be for “separate” or “distinct” criminal
acts committed on different occasions. In Richardson, 175 Mass.
at 208, the court emphasized that through the habitual criminal
statute, the Legislature sought both to reform criminals and to
protect the public from individuals who “persist[] in crime not-
withstanding [prior] discipline.” We held that “two previous
distinct convictions” resulting in consecutive sentences could
qualify as the underlying convictions resulting in enhanced pen-
alties, id. at 205, and, through the statement of the underlying
facts, made clear that the two convictions were for two distinct
criminal incidents. See id. at 203. The Appeals Court has held
that concurrent prison sentences also qualify under the statute, but
similarly has emphasized that the qualifying convictions were for
“separate and distinct offences.” See Commonwealth v. Hall, 19
Mass. App. Ct. 1004 (1985), S.C., 397 Mass. 466 (1986). See also
Commonwealth v. Keane, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 656, 660 (1996),
citing Hail, supra. More recently, where the two prior convictions
stemmed from separate cases in Middlesex County and New
Hampshire, the Appeals Court held that suspended sentences
could qualify as well. Luckern, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 273. Thus,
the concept that the prior convictions must stem from separate
episodes has been an implied assumption in our earlier holdings.

b. Statutory scheme and effects. The Commonwealth further
argues that the defendant’s interpretation is not supported by a
review of other statutes providing for enhanced penalties. It
points out that the Legislature has enacted other statutes punish-
ing repeat offenders® and armed career criminals,® which contain
language specifically requiring that the prior conviction be based
on distinct offenses; and that, in 2012, the Legislature added a

5See, e.g., G. L. ¢, 266, § 40 (“whoever is convicted . . . of three distinct
larcenies, shall be adjudged a common and notorious thief, and shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or
in jail for not more than two and one half years”).

®See, e.g., G. L. ¢, 269, § 10G (b) (providing for enhanced penalty where
defendant has prior convictions, “arising from separate incidences,” for two
violent crimes, two serious drug offenses, or one of each).

477 Mass. 59 (2017) 65

Commonwealth Garvey.

“violent habitual offender” provision to § 25, which also specifies
that the prior convictions must relate to “separate and distinct
incidents.”? See G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b).

The Commonwealth’s claim is that the Legislature’s inclusion
of explicit references to the need for separate incidences in other
statutes and especially in another section of § 25 itself, ie.,
§ 25 (b), implies that the Legislature intentionally excluded the
“separate and distinct incident” element from § 25 (a). We have
generally been wary of the maxim of negative implication. See
Halebian vy. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 628 (2010) (“the maxim of
negative implication — that the express inclusion of one thing
implies the exclusion of another — ‘requires great caution in its
application’ ” [citation omitted]). Caution is particularly justified
here, where the statutes cited by the Commonwealth vary signif-
icantly. Two of these statutes — the armed career criminal act and
the common and notorious thief statute — do not aid the Com-
monwealth’s argument, as the language and structure are different
from § 25 (a).* The third provision, § 25 (b), was added as part of
criminal justice reform legislation enacted in 2012. See St. 2012,

7Section 25 (b) provides for enhanced penalties without parole for violent
offenders who have two prior convictions from a list of nearly forty violent
crimes, and limits prior convictions to “charges separately brought and tried,
and arising out of separate and distinct incidents that occurred at different times,
where the second offense occurred subsequent to the first conviction.”

Although the former, G. L. c. 269, § 10G, provides for enhanced penalties
for “armed career criminals” with prior convictions, limited to those convictions
“arising from separate incidences,” the phrase “career criminal” does not appear
in the body of the statute. Thus, unlike § 25 (a), which includes the concept of
separate episodes via the phrase “habitual criminal” in the text, § 10G explicitly
states “separate incidences” to achieve that meaning. See generally Common-
wealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455 (2016).

The latter, G. L. ¢. 266, § 40, requires “distinct” convictions of specified
crimes in the body of the statute, which provides for consolidated sentences for
“common and notorious thie[ves}.” However, because it has a completely
different purpose and structure from § 25 (a), it is unclear why we should read
§ 40 as similar enough to affect our interpretation of § 25 (a). See Common-
wealth v, Crocker, 384 Mass, 353, 355 & n.2 (1981) (§ 40 focuses on sentencing
and requires consolidated sentence, whereas § 25 [a] must be alleged by
indictment and requires separate trial); Commonwealth v. McKnight, 289 Mass.
530, 548 (1935) (“[§ 40] and [its] procedure are quite different from cases where
a heavier sentence is imposed [after prior convictions] and where there must be
an allegation of the previous conviction as an integral part of the offence”). See
also Resende, 474 Mass, at 466 (different structure and language between
Federal and State armed career criminal acts implied that State Legislature had
different sentencing scheme in mind).

66 477 Mass. 59 (2017)

Commonwealth Garvey.

c. 192, § 47. Those amendments added § 25 (b) in order to
remove the possibility of parole for habitual violent offenders,®
id., and broadened § 25 (a) to include suspended and Federal
sentences. See Luckern, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 269-270, 273. See
generally Commonwealth vy. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812-813
(2007) (considering purpose of amendments as aid in interpreta-
tion). However, because the Legislature did not further amend
§ 25 (a), there is no indication that it intended to make material
changes to the rest of § 25 (a). Luckern, supra at 270. See Colturi,
supra at 812 (because we presume Legislature is aware of our
prior decisions, “reenact{ment of] statutory language without
material change” implies adoption of prior construction). To the
extent that § 25 (b) includes more specific language about distinct
occurrences, it does not negate this court’s and the Appeals
Court’s prior assumptions about § 25 (a).

Thus, viewing § 25 (a) in light of its history, the statute’s
proper interpretation aligns with that adopted by the defendant
and the motion judge: the two prior convictions with qualifying
sentences must have arisen from two separate criminal episodes
or incidents.

c. Statute’s effects and rule of lenity. Moreover, taking the
Commonwealth’s proposed interpretation of § 25 (a) to its logical
conclusion, the Commonwealth, in its discretion, could seek a
habitual offender enhancement for any single incident in which a
defendant committed three felonies, by parsing them into two
separate prosecutions: one with two substantive charges, and one
with both a third substantive charge and a habitual criminal
enhancement. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a), 378 Mass. 859 (1979);
E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 25:56 (4th ed.
2014) (prosecutor has broad discretion). For example, a prosecu-
tor could split a drug-and-firearm transaction into two cases: the
first case charging the defendant with possession of a firearm and
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and
the second charging conspiracy and a habitual criminal enhance-
ment, based on the drug and firearm convictions in the first case.
See Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 372 Mass. 573, 576-577 (1977)
(discussing separate prosecutions of conspiracy and substantive

®Norton, Patrick Will Sign Sentencing Bill, Expects More Debate Early Next
Session (luly 31, 2012), _ http://www.statehousenews.com/news/2012860
[https://perma.cc/HU9P-KL8J] (“bill . . . eliminate[s] parole eligibility for
certain three-time violent offenders, a measure that proponents say targets the
‘worst of the worst’ and will improve public safety”).

477 Mass. 59 (2017) 67

Commonwealth Garvey.

act). Alternatively, prosecutors who were successful in prosecut-
ing two charges may later learn of new facts that would support
a third charge. In both scenarios, there would be two prior
convictions and sentences before the defendant was prosecuted
for the third charge, even though all three charges arose from a
single episode. Thus, the statute’s application would depend not
on habitual criminal conduct but on how the Commonwealth
chooses to prosecute any one criminal episode. This cannot be
what the Legislature intended. See Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass.
572, 578-579 (2006), quoting Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of
Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336 (1982) (“we will not adopt a construc-
tion of a statute that creates ‘absurd or unreasonable’ conse-
quences”).

Further, to the extent that the Commonwealth’s argument raises
a valid question about the meaning of § 25 (a), the rule of lenity
supports the interpretation advocated by the defendant and ac-
cepted by us. See Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455, 469
(2016) (in sentencing and substantive provisions, where “statute
is ambiguous” or legislative intent is unclear, “the defendant is
entitled to the benefit of any rational doubt” [citation omitted]).
Therefore, we conclude that § 25 (a) calls for enhanced penalties
for defendants with two prior convictions with qualifying sen-
tences only where those convictions stem from separate criminal
incidents.

2. Probable cause. Citing Commonwealth v. O’ Dell, 392 Mass.
445, 451 (1985), and other cases, the Commonwealth argues that
even if there is in § 25 (a) a requirement of a separate criminal
incident, at the grand jury stage, the Commonwealth only had to
present evidence establishing that there were two prior convic-
tions, not that those convictions related to distinct criminal epi-
sodes. A court will normally avoid examining the evidence before
the grand jury. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160,
161-162 (1982). However, we will inquire into the proceeding
where, as here, the defendant alleges that the grand jury heard no
evidence as to a charge or an essential element of a charge.!° See
Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 40-42 (2014) (considering
whether grand jury heard “any” evidence as to elements of pos-
session of child pornography).

"Given the practical reality that a large majority of criminal cases are
resolved by guilty pleas, the possibility of requiring no evidence of separate
episodes until trial is of particular concern here, because the dismissal of a
habitual offender charge can be a powerful motivator for defendants considering
plea agreements,

68 477 Mass. 59 (2017)

Commonwealth Garvey.

Here, the grand jury heard no evidence that would allow them
to conclude that the defendant’s prior convictions stemmed from
separate criminal episodes. As described supra, after the grand
jury returned indictments on the new substantive drug charges,
they heard testimony regarding four of the defendant’s prior
convictions. However, the grand jury did not hear any informa-
tion as to the underlying criminal acts. In particular, they heard no
information regarding when the offenses took place or how they
were related to each other."" Therefore, they would not have been
able to determine whether the defendant’s prior convictions arose
out of separate episodes or out of a single criminal incident or
spree. As a consequence, without hearing any evidence of separ-
ate criminal events, the grand jury could not conclude that there
was probable cause to believe that an essential element of the
habitual offender statute existed. See Commonwealth v. Hum-
berto H., 466 Mass. 562, 565-566 (2013) (“complaint application
must include information to support probable cause as to each
essential element of the offense”). Thus, the Commonwealth did
not meet its burden for the grand jury properly to find probable
cause for the habitual offender portions of the indictments.

Conclusion. The order of the Superior Court allowing the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the habitual offender portions of
the indictments is affirmed.

So ordered.

“Because the grand jury heard no testimony that would support a determi-
nation that the prior convictions stemmed from separate criminal incidents or
episodes, we do not opine whether testimony regarding the underlying scenario,
described in note 2, supra, would permit such a finding.

477 Mass. 69 (2017) 69

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

Commonweattu vs. Victor Rosario.

Middlesex. November 8, 2016. - May 11, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Borsrorp, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.*

Burning a Dwelling House. Homicide. Fire. Constitutional Law, Admissions
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Evidence, Admissions and
confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Ad-
missions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.

Discussion of the standard of review applicable to a motion for a new trial where
a confluence of factors may combine to create a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. [77-78]

A Superior Court judge properly allowed the defendant’s motion for a new trial
on charges of arson and murder, where a diagnosis of the defendant having
suffered from delirium tremens at the time of his confession rather than from
psychosis could have been highly relevant to the jury’s consideration of the
voluntariness and reliability of that confession, particularly in light of trans-
lation issues, as well as the use of interrogation techniques that had the
potential to elicit a false confession from someone suffering from the
defendant’s condition [78-80]; and where new fire science evidence pre-
sented by the defendant at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, had it
been available at the time of trial, could have provided a basis for the jury
to question further the defendant’s confession, as well as the Common-
wealth’s evidence regarding how the fire developed [80-81].

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on June 30, 1982.

A motion for a new trial, filed on October 19, 2012, was heard
by Kathe M. Tuttman, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney (Thomas F.
O'Reilly, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Com-
monwealth.

Lisa M. Kavanaugh, Committee for Public Counsel Services
(Andrea Petersen also present) for the defendant.

M. Chris Fabricant, Karen Newirth, James C. Dugan, Vincent
P. Iannece, Lara S. Kasten, & Kathryn J. Ranieri, of New York,

‘Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

70 477 Mass. 69 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

Stephanie Roberts Hartung, & Sharon L. Beckman, for New
England Innocence Project & others, amici curiae, submitted a
brief.

Bupp, J. The defendant, Victor Rosario, was convicted in 1983
of one count of arson in a dwelling house and eight counts of
murder in the second degree; all the charges stem from a fire that
occurred in 1982. In 2012, the defendant filed the motion for a
new trial at issue here, arguing principally that newly discovered
evidence regarding fire science and the conditions under which he
confessed to the crime warranted a new trial. Following an
evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge who was not the trial
judge allowed the motion, ruling that the defendant had presented
newly discovered evidence, which cast real doubt on the justice
of his convictions. The Commonwealth appealed. We allowed the
defendant’s application for direct appellate review, and we affirm
the order allowing the defendant’s motion for a new trial, but on
different grounds.”

Background. 1. Evidence presented at trial. We summarize
relevant evidence introduced at trial. The fire started on the first
floor of a multiunit apartment building in Lowell, and was ac-
companied by the sound of breaking glass. The first telephone
call to 911 was placed shortly after 1 a.m. on March 5, 1982.
Police officers arrived, minutes later, to find the building “fully
engulfed in flames.” It took fire fighters approximately one hour
to get the fire under control. They recovered eight bodies from the
building, all victims of the fire.

Because of the rapid escalation of the fire and the associated
deaths, the arson unit was called to the scene. Investigators found
that the heaviest burning and charring was concentrated in the
front, right, and left sides of the exterior and first-floor interior of
the building. Based on the burn patterns in the front hallway,
living room, and kitchen, investigators believed that the fire had
been concentrated along the floor and baseboards. Although no
wicks or flammable liquids were detected in the apartment, the
investigators believed that the burn marks were consistent with
flammable liquids with points of origin being the front hall and
kitchen. Thus, they concluded that the fire was not accidental and
could have been started by multiple incendiary devices, such as

2We acknowledge the amicus brief of the New England Innocence Project,
the Innocence Project, Inc., and the Boston College Innocence Program.

477 Mass. 69 (2017) 71

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

“Molotov cocktails.”*

There were several witnesses to the fire. One witness had seen
three men standing in front of the building minutes before the
fire; he said that he heard the sound of breaking glass and then
saw a man with his arm raised.‘ A woman who lived across the
street stated that the defendant used drugs at her apartment that
night and that she saw him breaking windows after she learned of
the fire. Red Cross workers treated the defendant for a cut on his
hand at the scene and sent him to the hospital.

This evidence led investigators to the defendant, who was
interrogated by Lowell police officers at the fire department
headquarters during the night of March 6 and into March 7. The
defendant, whose first language was Spanish, was provided with
a civilian interpreter.* Although the defendant appeared calm and
responsive when he arrived at approximately 11 pm., soon after
that he indicated that he was beginning to hear voices, and his
mental state deteriorated over the course of the night. A few hours
into the interrogation, after the defendant had made two state-
ments about the fire, one of the officers told the defendant that
they had “certain information” and wanted “to know if he was
part of it.” The defendant broke down, sobbing and praying on
the floor. The breakdown lasted ten to twenty minutes, but the
defendant later appeared to recover.

The questioning resulted in three statements prepared by the
police interrogators and signed by the defendant. In the first,
signed at approximately 12:15 a.m., the defendant admitted to
being at the scene of the fire and stated he broke a window to help
rescue children from the building. Hours later, he signed a second

2A “Molotov cocktail” is a breakable container with a wick filled with a
flammable liquid. It is used by lighting the wick and throwing the container
against a hard surface so that it breaks, igniting the fluid inside the bottle, and
starting a fire.

4When this witness was asked to make an identification at the police station,
he described one of the men as Puerto Rican and approximately five feet, five
or six inches tall with a thin mustache, but he did not pick the defendant out of
a photographic array. After the defendant’s photograph appeared in the news-
paper the witness told police that he recognized the defendant as one of the three
men who had been on the street before the fire.

5The interpreter, who was an active leader in the Lowell Hispanic community
at the time, had previously assisted the Lowell police as an interpreter in at least
one other interrogation in relation to another suspicious fire that had occurred in
the same building. Some months after the interrogation, before the defendant’s
trial in early 1983, the interpreter became a deputy sheriff for Middlesex County
at the Billerica house of correction.

72 477 Mass. 69 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

statement, admitting to being at the scene as a “look out” for two
other men, one of whom threw a Molotov cocktail through a
window in the building. Finally, toward the end of the question-
ing, the defendant signed a final statement indicating that he and
the other two men threw Molotov cocktails into the building,
starting the fire. The statement also said that before they had left
for a bar that evening, he watched the two other men make three
Molotov cocktails in the basement of his house;* they planned to
start the fire because one of the men “wanted to get [one of the
victims] over drugs.” At approximately 6:30 a.m., the defendant
was arrested after signing the final statement.

Following his booking, the defendant descended into total
incoherence. He repeatedly said that he was “the son of God,”
believed that the back of his head had been cut off, and did not
recognize his girl friend when she came to visit him. He event-
ually was transferred to the house of correction in Billerica for a
psychiatric examination. State psychiatrists there and at
Bridgewater State Hospital (hospital) diagnosed the defendant as
psychotic. He was treated at the hospital and eventually recov-
ered. His symptoms never recurred, and the defendant was
deemed competent to stand trial.

The defense theory of the case at trial was that the defendant
was at the scene of the fire because he and his friends were
walking home from a bar and stopped by a house close to the fire
to purchase drugs. The defendant, who testified, told the jury that
he hurt his hand when he broke a window in his attempt to rescue
children from the flames. Both in a motion to suppress and at
trial, the defense relied on the diagnosis of psychosis to argue that
the defendant's statements during the interrogation were invol-
untary. The defendant testified that he did not remember making
any of the statements attributed to him and that he had never
heard of a Molotov cocktail before the interrogation. As the
voluntariness of his confession was at issue throughout the trial,
the trial judge instructed the jury on the humane practice rule.7
During their deliberations, the jury requested, but were not pro-

®When the police searched the common basement of the defendant’s apart-
ment building, they found a gasoline can and a paint can with a beer bottle and
other trash inside, At an apartment belonging to one of the other men, the police
found a can of “Red Devil” paint remover, which had been purchased days
before the fire.

7 The humane practice rule requires that the Commonwealth prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary before the jury may consider
it. See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, cert. denied, 457 U.S.

477 Mass. 69 (2017) 73

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

vided, transcripts of the doctors’ testimony, and the doctors’
reports were not admitted in evidence. The jury convicted the
defendant of arson and eight counts of murder in the second
degree.

2. The motion for new trial. In 2012, the defendant filed his
motion for a new trial, citing newly discovered evidence. The
motion judge conducted an evidentiary hearing over the course of
six days in 2014. She credited the following evidence introduced
at the hearing.

a. The interrogation. According to the affidavit of the inter-
preter who had assisted the police at the time the defendant was
interrogated in 1982,* despite the written statements, the defend-
ant had actually stated neither that he acted as a lookout nor that
he threw a Molotov cocktail into the building. Instead, the officers
themselves suggested these details during the interrogation and
then included them in the written statements that the defendant
signed. Although the first and second statements were interpreted
from English into Spanish before the defendant signed them, the
third statement, the only one in which he admitted to throwing a
Molotov cocktail into the house, was not. The interpreter also
indicated that the defendant had been incoherent at the time he
signed the second and third statements, and that even before his
breakdown, the defendant had referred constantly to being pos-
sessed by the devil and to being the son of God. He also told the
interpreter that he had injected heroin before coming to the
station for the interrogation.

The defendant’s two psychiatric experts at the hearing on the mo-
tion for a new trial testified that rather than psychosis, the defendant
suffered from delirium tremens (DTs) at the time of his confession.
DTs, also known as alcohol withdrawal delirium, begins when a
person who drinks a significant amount of alcohol abruptly reduces

1137 (1982). If the voluntariness of the statement is contested, the judge must
also find that it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was
voluntary. /d. The judge instructed the jury to examine the defendant's state-
ments made during the interrogation in order to determine whether they were
“the product of coercion, threats, physical or psychological intimidation, which
had the result of overriding or overbearing the free will of the defendant.”

Spy 2014, the interpreter had moved to Puerto Rico. Although he initially
agreed to travel to Massachusetts to testify at the evidentiary hearing, he later
refused to appear voluntarily. Insofar as relevant here, as the interpreter could
not be compelled to appear, the motion judge allowed defense counsel to
introduce in evidence a redacted version of the interpreter’s affidavit, signed in
2009, for the purposes of this most recent motion for a new trial,

74 477 Mass. 69 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

his alcohol intake. It is a neurologic, neurocognitive disorder that
disrupts neurotransmitters in the brain. The condition is marked
by derangement of mental processes resulting in disorientation,
confusion, behavioral disturbances, and hallucinations. It leaves
one highly suggestible, unable to process information reliably,
and unable to make rational decisions.

The symptoms of the condition worsen over the course of five
days. Within twelve hours, the person may be confused or agi-
tated but knows where he is and who he is. By the second day of
withdrawal, the person may experience auditory hallucinations,
as well as a sense of persecution. The most characteristic symp-
toms of DTs develop on the third day, when the person may
experience visual, tactile, olfactory, and auditory hallucinations.
From the third day onward, the person becomes extremely dis-
oriented and agitated, and other functions of the nervous system
start to break down. The hallucinations peak at day three or day
four. DTs is an acute syndrome and subsides as the person
recovers from alcohol withdrawal, typically beginning at around
days five, six, and seven.

The defense introduced evidence that the defendant was par-
ticularly prone to DTs due to a prior serious head injury and a
history of heavy drug and alcohol abuse: he drank approximately
a case of beer per day and hard liquor, often beginning at about
9 aM. He had been drinking more heavily than usual in the days
prior to the fire, but following the fire, he dramatically reduced
his intake. His girl friend’s son and others saw him behaving in
extreme, unusual ways they had never seen before. As a result,
the defense experts opined that as the defendant arrived at the
police station for the interview, forty-six hours after the fire, he
was finishing day two of his withdrawal and entering day three,
and he began to experience full-blown symptoms of DTs. He was
very suggestible at this time and could not make rational deci-
sions or process information reliably.

The defense experts also testified to their opinions concerning
why the previous psychiatrists had diagnosed the defendant in-
correctly. They hypothesized that because the previous psychia-
trists did not examine him when his symptoms were most aligned
with delirium, by the time the defendant was diagnosed, eight or
more days after the fire, his alcohol withdrawal had progressed
such that the residual symptoms of DTs might present as a
psychotic disorder. One of the experts further hypothesized that
the language barrier made it difficult to get a complete history,
including the defendant’s history of alcohol abuse.

477 Mass. 69 (2017) 75

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

b. The fire science. The defendant additionally presented two
fire science experts who testified that more recent fire science
research, some of which was not completed until 2005, had led to
new protocols for evaluating the source of a fire. Applying these
protocols to the fire in question, the experts both determined that,
rather than being arson started with Molotov cocktails at multiple
locations, the forensic evidence was equally susceptible to an
interpretation that the fire was accidental, involved no flammable
liquids, and had a single point of origin. The experts explained
that “flashover” likely took place: flashover is a phenomenon that
occurs when the fire goes from being controlled by fuel to being
controlled by the oxygen available in the room depending upon
the ventilation. Once flashover occurs, there is “full room in-
volvement,” where the intensity of the fire — and, as a result, the
burn patterns — may vary depending upon the areas of ventila-
tion. Once this happens, the point of a fire’s origin cannot be
accurately identified because the fire causes the most damage in
areas where there is more oxygen available, generally near doors
and windows. They further explained that because irregular
curved or pool-shaped patterns are common in postflashover
conditions and may result from the effects of hot gases, smolder-
ing debris, and melted plastics, the presence of flammable liquids
should be confirmed by laboratory analysis and should not be
based on appearance alone.

The original fire investigators believed that the fire was arson
because there were two apparently separate areas of heavier
damage that did not appear to have communicated with one an-
other. However, the defendant’s experts explained that the fire
likely traveled from the living room into the hallway and kitchen
because there was more oxygen in those areas. One of the defense
experts also opined that one of the original investigators’ conclu-
sions, i.e., that a burn pattern observed near the rear kitchen door
was consistent with flammable liquid flowing under the door, was
a misconception about fire science because experts now know
that hot gases in one room can cause burning on the other side of
a closed door. Further, the blistering effect that was thought to be
consistent with the use of flammable liquid is now known to be
found in many types of fires, whether or not flammable liquids
were present.

Ultimately, the defense experts opined that the fire was con-
sistent with an accidental fire originating in the living room or
elsewhere, and spreading from there, but that the cause was un-
determined.

76 477 Mass. 69 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

3. The motion judge’s rulings of law. The motion judge granted
the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the psychiatric
experts’ diagnosis of DTs. She concluded that the determination
that the defendant had been suffering from DTs was newly
discovered, reasoning that it could not have been uncovered by
defense counsel’s due diligence by the time of trial, and that it
cast real doubt on the justice of the convictions, specifically the
voluntariness of the defendant’s confession, especially when
combined with the coercive interrogation techniques used by the
police.® See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607,
616-617 (2015).

She also determined that the fire science evidence was newly
discovered because it did not exist at the time of trial and differed
significantly from the principles relied upon at that time. She
concluded, however, that, by itself, the new science evidence did
not cast real doubt on the justice of the defendant’s convictions.
See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306 (1986).1°

The motion judge alternatively ruled that the DTs diagnosis
entitled the defendant to a new trial under a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice analysis. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). See also Commonwealth v.
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002). She concluded that the
fact that the defendant was experiencing DTs during the interro-
gation, combined with testimony about the interrogation tech-
niques that were used, could lead a reasonable fact finder to
conclude that the defendant's statements were involuntary. In her
view, this would have been a real factor in the jury’s delibera-
tions, especially in combination with the newly discovered fire

The motion judge also found that information about the police officers’
interrogation practices was newly discovered, but that it alone would not
warrant a new trial.

1°The judge explained that if a jury found that the defendant’s statement that
he threw a Molotoy cocktail through the window was voluntary, then the
Commonwealth’s theory regarding arson would have been corroborated, so the
new fire science alone would not suffice. Although the defendant’s statement
may have corroborated the arson theory, we note that, on the other hand, the new
fire science evidence may have caused the jury to question whether the fire was
intentionally set and, therefore, whether the statement itself was corroborated.
See Commonwealth vy, DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 430 (2004) (we require
“corroboration that the underlying crime was in fact committed”). At any rate,
the judge also recognized in a footnote that if the diagnosis of DTs or the
questionable interrogation tactics undermined the voluntariness of the state-
ments, the new fire science would cast further doubt on the justice of the
convictions.

477 Mass. 69 (2017) 71

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

science evidence, and provided a separate ground for a new trial.

Although we do not agree that the DTs diagnosis was newly
discovered," we nevertheless affirm based upon the totality of the
judge’s findings and the “confluence of factors” analysis devel-
oped subsequent to her decision in this case. Commonwealth v.
Brescia, 471 Mass. 381, 396 (2015). See Commonwealth v. Ellis,
475 Mass. 459, 481 (2016); Commonwealth v. Epps, 474 Mass.
743, 767 (2016).

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. A judge “may grant a new
trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done.”
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b). “Our decisions have crafted a lattice-
work of more specific standards designed to guide judges’ deter-
minations . . . as to whether a new trial should be ordered.”
Brescia, 471 Mass. at 388. Examples include, “a serious doubt
whether the result of the trial might have been different had the
error not been made” (citation omitted), Randolph, 438 Mass. at
297 (unpreserved claim of nonconstitutional error); evidence
“would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s delibera-
tions,” Grace, 397 Mass. at 305 (newly discovered evidence); and
the behavior of counsel “[fell] measurably below that . . . from an
ordinary, fallible lawyer [and such failing] likely deprived the
defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of de-
fen[s]e,” Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974)
(ineffective assistance of counsel). See generally Brescia, supra
at 388-391.

As mentioned in Brescia, 471 Mass. at 388, the principle of
finality of convictions remains a valuable and important concept
in our jurisprudence, see Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass.
169, 175 (1999), as does the principle that a defendant “is entitled
to a fair trial but not a perfect one” (citations omitted). Brescia,
supra at 391. Nevertheless, in rare cases, in order to fulfil the
obligation incorporated in Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) to determine
whether “justice may not have been done,” a trial judge may need
to look beyond the specific, individual reasons for granting a new

“Because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the DTs diagnosis was not
an available diagnosis at the time of trial, it cannot be considered newly
discovered. See Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 268, 272 (2005) (“evi-
dence does not meet the test for ‘newly discovered’ evidence [if] it was available
prior to trial”). To the contrary, defense experts at the hearing on the motion for
a new trial testified that DTs was widely recognized at the time, and that the
defendant was experiencing a “textbook” demonstration of DTs symptoms at the
time of his confession.

78 477 Mass. 69 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

trial to consider how a number of factors act in concert to cause
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and therefore warrant
the granting of a new trial. See Brescia, 471 Mass. at 389-390,
391 n.11. See also Epps, 474 Mass. at 767-768. Where the trial
judge grants the motion, the appellate court must determine
whether the judge abused his or her discretion. See Brescia, supra
at 397. See also Ellis, 475 Mass. at 476.

In the Brescia case, the motion judge concluded that justice
may not have been done where the defendant’s undetected stroke
affected his ability to testify in a coherent manner, and could well
have damaged his credibility with the jury. Brescia, 471 Mass. at
387. We affirmed the order granting a new trial even though none
of the usual reasons for doing so (e.g., constitutional error, newly
discovered evidence, or ineffective assistance of counsel) were
present. Id. at 387, 396-397. Similarly in the Ellis case, we
concluded that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion in
granting a new trial where a combination of newly discovered
evidence together with other evidence presented at trial warranted
it. Ellis, 475 Mass. at 481. There, the motion judge had focused
on a conflict of interest that was newly discovered; the victim in
that case, a police officer, had participated in a corruption scheme
with the detectives who investigated his murder. Id. at 465-466.
The defendant also presented evidence showing that the investi-
gators failed to pursue other leads. Jd. at 469-472. We affirmed
the motion judge’s conclusion that these two factors could have
acted in concert to influence the jury’s deliberations, reasoning
that the defendant could have argued that the corrupt detectives’
priority was concealing their own wrongdoing, rather than ident-
ifying the killer. Jd. at 478, 481.

This case, too, presents a situation in which a confluence of
factors combined to create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice.

2. Confluence of factors. The motion judge’s analysis, which
focuses on whether “justice may not have been done,” Mass. R.
Crim. P. 30 (b), aligns with our decisions in the Brescia, Epps,
and Ellis cases. She considered the unique confluence of events in
light of the totality of the circumstances, that is, the irregularities
in the defendant’s interrogation leading to his confession (includ-
ing the defendant’s neurologic condition) combined with the new
fire science in determining that the defendant is entitled to a new
trial.

a. The interrogation. The voluntariness of the defendant’s
statements was thoroughly argued at trial and considered by the

477 Mass. 69 (2017) 79

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

jury. However, there are substantial differences between psycho-
sis and DTs that may have made a real difference in the jury’s
verdicts. Although psychosis is a mental disorder that does not
necessarily cause cognitive impairment, DTs is a neurologic
disorder with an underlying physical cause that disrupts the
ability to process information and leaves one disoriented, con-
fused, and highly suggestible. Because voluntariness was at issue,
the jury were required to determine whether the defendant’s
statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before they
were permitted to use them in reaching their verdicts.'2 See
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1137 (1982). The DTs diagnosis, with its underlying physi-
cal rather than psychological origin, could have been highly
relevant to the jury’s consideration of the voluntariness and
reliability of the defendant’s confession — the most compelling
part of the Commonwealth’s case."® See id. (“a defendant’s
statement is usually the key item in the proof of guilt, and
certainly one of overpowering weight with the jury” [quotations
and citation omitted]). If the jury had concluded that the state-
ments were not made voluntarily, then the Commonwealth’s case
would have been significantly weakened.

The defendant’s condition was only one part of the problem
with the interrogation. The motion judge made significant find-
ings regarding the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s
confession. She credited the interpreter’s sworn affidavit in which

12Indeed, it seems evident that the jury were concerned about the defendant’s
mental status insofar as they requested transcripts of the psychiatrists’ testi-
mony, which were not provided.

18Tpis evidence does not fall neatly into one of the categories usually relied
upon to argue for a new trial. Although the DTs diagnosis was “discoverable,”
and therefore not “newly discovered” evidence, we cannot say that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to discover it. He relied upon the expertise of
others — three psychiatrists who examined the defendant while he was in
custody opined that the defendant was psychotic at the times they examined
him, one opined only that he was not suffering from a mental illness at the time
of questioning, and an expert witness retained by the defense opined that the
defendant was psychotic during the interrogation — in a field in which the
attorney was not himself trained. It would be a high hurdle indeed to expect
counsel to continue to search for an alternative diagnosis where he reasonably
could not be expected to know that one existed. See Commonwealth v. Buck, 64
Mass. App. Ct. 760, 764 (2005). This is especially so where several different
psychiatrists concluded that the defendant had suffered from psychosis either
during the interrogation or after booking, even if the judge was later persuaded
that this diagnosis was incorrect.

80 477 Mass. 69 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

he stated that the police officers added their own accusations about
the origin of the fire, e.g., that the defendant threw a “Molotov
cocktail” into the building, into the statements they prepared for
the defendant to sign. This significant flaw was compounded by
the fact that the third, and most incriminating, statement was not
interpreted into Spanish before the defendant signed it.

In addition, three of the tactics used during his interrogation
have the potential to elicit false confessions. See Commonwealth
v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 208 (2011). Although not newly dis-
covered evidence, we consider these flaws in evaluating whether
justice requires a new trial under the totality of the circumstances.
See Ellis, 475 Mass. at 480-481. First, although the defendant
said that he had stopped at the location because he observed the
fire and wanted to help people escape the building, the officers
falsely told the defendant that a witness had placed him at the
scene before the fire began. See note 4, supra. Second, the officers
motivated the defendant to confess; they said that if his friends
had caused the fire, they might blame him, and he would be left
“holding the bag.” Third, the officers engaged in “formatting,”
meaning that they told the defendant some corroborating details,
which the defendant then adopted as part of his confession: that
he acted as a lookout for his friends; that there were three points
of origin for the fire; and that the fire was started with Molotov
cocktails. These details were later included in the written state-
ments. Such tactics are of particular concern where, as here, a
suspect is already suggestible and was never given a translation
of the last, most critical statement. We note that the defendant
claimed that he had never heard of a Molotov cocktail before the
interrogation. Until the last statement, he denied causing the fire
and repeatedly stated that he had sought to save children from the
burning building. The fact that the defendant was suffering from
DTs increased the possibility of a false confession.

b. The fire science. At trial the defense did not introduce any
testimony to challenge the Commonwealth’s arson experts. Al-
though the new fire science evidence presented by the defendant
at the hearing on the motion for a new trial certainly does not
prove that the fire was accidental, it does provide an alternative
theory as to cause (accidental, unknown origin) and explains that
the burn patterns alone could not prove that flammable liquids
were involved. Thus, additional sources of evidence were neces-
sary for the Commonwealth to meet its burden of proving arson.
Had this new fire science evidence been available at the time of

477 Mass. 69 (2017) 81

Commonwealth v. Rosario.

trial it might have changed the defense strategy. This new evi-
dence could have provided a basis for the jury to question further
the defendant’s confession, as well as the Commonwealth's evi-
dence regarding how the fire developed.

Conclusion. The loss of eight lives in the fire in 1982 was
unquestionably tragic, and without a doubt must have weighed
and must continue to weigh heavily on the victims’ families as
well as the community. Nevertheless, under our Constitution and
system of laws, every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial
where, to the extent possible, justice is done.

The DTs diagnosis, the information from the interpreter, and
the data on coercive interrogation tactics all call into question
whether the defendant’s statements were made voluntarily. The
new fire science provides an alternate theory regarding the start
and spread of the fire. These factors taken together could have
influenced the jury’s verdicts. Although the evidence presented in
support of the defendant’s motion for a new trial does not
necessarily mean that he is innocent, the judge concluded, after
what was clearly a painstaking review of the trial record, that
justice was not done. See Ellis, 475 Mass. at 460. We conclude
that in reaching this determination, the judge did not abuse her
discretion. Commonwealth v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 461 (2014).
As a result, we affirm her order granting a new trial.

So ordered.

82 477 Mass. 82 (2017)

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

Feperat Nationa MorrcGace Association vs. Evvirria M.
Marroguin & others.'

Essex. January 9, 2017. - May 11, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Luvx, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Mortgage, Foreclosure, Real estate. Real Property, Mortgage, Sale. Notice,
Foreclosure of mortgage.

This court concluded that its holding in Pinti v. Emigrant Mtge. Co., 472 Mass.
226, 227, 232 (2015), i.e., that a foreclosure by statutory power of sale
pursuant to G. L. c. 183, § 21, and G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C, is invalid unless
the notice of default strictly complies with paragraph 22 of the standard
mortgage (which informs the mortgagor of, among other things, the action
required to cure the default and the right of the mortgagor to bring a court
action to challenge the existence of a default or to present any defense to
acceleration and foreclosure), applies in any case where the issue was timely
and fairly asserted in the trial court or on appeal before July 17, 2015.
[86-89]

In a summary process action, the Housing Court judge properly granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant homeowners, where the foreclosing
mortgagor’s notice of default did not strictly comply with paragraph 22 of
the standard mortgage, and therefore, the foreclosure sale was void. [89-90]

Summary process. Complaint filed in the Northeast Division of
the Housing Court Department on June 18, 2012.

The case was heard by David D. Kerman, J., on motions for
summary judgment.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Cody J. Cocanig for the plaintiff.

Dayne Lee (Eloise P. Lawrence also present) for Elvitria M.
Marroquin.

Joshua T. Gutierrez, Daniel D. Bahls, & Andrew S. Webman,
for Lewis R. Fleischner & another, amici curiae, submitted a
brief.

Gants, C.J. In Pinti v. Emigrant Mtge. Co.,472 Mass. 226, 227,
232 (2015), we held that a foreclosure by statutory power of sale
pursuant to G. L. c. 183, § 21, and G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C, is in-

‘Julio E, Vasquez and Christopher Vasquez.

477 Mass. 82 (2017) 83

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

valid unless the notice of default strictly complies with paragraph
22 of the standard mortgage, which informs the mortgagor of,
among other things, the action required to cure the default, and
the right of the mortgagor to bring a court action to challenge the
existence of a default or to present any defense to acceleration
and foreclosure. We applied this holding to the parties in Pinti but
concluded that our decision “should be given prospective effect
only.” Jd. at 243. We therefore declared that the decision “will
apply to mortgage foreclosure sales of properties that are the
subject of a mortgage containing paragraph 22 or its equivalent
and for which the notice of default required by paragraph 22 is
sent after the date of this opinion,” which was issued on July 17,
2015. Id. We did not reach the question whether our holding
should be applied to any case pending in the trial court or on
appeal. /d. at 243 n.25. We reach that question here, and conclude
that the Pinti decision applies in any case where the issue was
timely and fairly asserted in the trial court or on appeal before July
17, 2015. Because we conclude that the defendants timely and
fairly raised this issue in the Housing Court before that date, and
because the notice of default did not strictly comply with the re-
quirements in paragraph 22 of the mortgage, we affirm the judge’s
ruling declaring the foreclosure sale void.

Background. In December, 2005, the defendants? secured a
mortgage loan in the amount of $312,000 from American Mort-
gage Express Corporation (American Mortgage) and, as security
for the loan, granted a mortgage on their home to Mortgage Elec-
tronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), which American
Mortgage had designated as the mortgagee in a nominee capacity.
MERS subsequently assigned the mortgage to Bank of America,
N.A. (Bank of America), as successor by merger to BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP, formerly known as Countrywide Home
Loans Servicing, LP.

After the defendants failed to make their mortgage payments,
the loan servicer, Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, on
October 17, 2008, mailed the defendants a notice of intention to
foreclose (notice of default). The notice informed the defendants

2The mortgage loan was secured by the defendants Elvitria M. Marroquin and
Julio E, Vasquez. The limited record before us suggests that Christopher
Vasquez is Marroquin’s son, and that a motion filed by the Federal National
Mortgage Association to amend the summons and complaint to include him was
granted by the Housing Court judge. For convenience, we refer to “the defend-
ants” throughout this opinion.

84 477 Mass. 82 (2017)

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

that they were in default and set forth the amount due to cure the
default. The notice warned in relevant part:

“Tf the default is not cured on or before January 15, 2009,
the mortgage payments will be accelerated with the full
amount remaining accelerated and becoming due and pay-
able in full, and foreclosure proceedings will be initiated at
that time. As such, the failure to cure the default may result
in the foreclosure and sale of your property. . .. You may, if
required by law or your loan documents, have the right to
cure the default after the acceleration of the mortgage pay-
ments and prior to the foreclosure sale of your property if all
amounts past due are paid within the time permitted by law.
. .. Further, you may have the right to bring a court action to
assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense you
may have to acceleration and foreclosure.”

The defendants did not cure the default, and in March, 2012,
Bank of America gave notice and conducted a foreclosure sale by
public auction of the mortgaged home. Bank of America was the
high bidder at the foreclosure auction and subsequently assigned
its winning bid to the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae or plaintiff), which properly recorded the foreclo-
sure deed conveying title of the property in May, 2012. On June
18, 2012, Fannie Mae initiated a summary process action in the
Housing Court to evict the defendants from the property. On June
19, 2012, the defendants, representing themselves but assisted by
counsel, filed an answer in which, by checking a box, they
proffered as a defense to the eviction that “[t]he plaintiff's case
should be dismissed because it does not have proper title to the
property and therefore does not have standing to bring this action
and/or cannot prove a superior right to possession of the prem-
ises.”

For reasons not apparent from the record, Fannie Mae did not
move for summary judgment until June, 2015, where, among
other arguments, it contended that Bank of America had complied
with the terms of the mortgage in exercising the power of sale,
and specifically asserted that the notice of default had complied
with paragraph 22 of the mortgage.? On September 23, 2015, the
defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment in which

3Paragraph 22 of the mortgage provides that in the event the borrower
commits a breach of any term of the mortgage, prior to acceleration of the loan
the lender must notify the borrower of

477 Mass. 82 (2017) 85

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

they argued that the notice of default failed to strictly comply
with the terms of paragraph 22 of the mortgage and that the
defendants should be entitled to the benefit of our decision in
Pinti even though the notice of default was sent well before the
issuance of that opinion.

In October, 2015, the judge granted the defendants’ cross
motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion.
The judge found that the issue in Pinti had been “timely and fairly
raised,” and concluded that our decision in Pinti should apply to
all cases similarly situated that were pending in the trial court or
on appeal where the issue had been timely and fairly raised before
July 17, 2015. The judge also concluded that the notice of default
failed to strictly comply with the requirement in paragraph 22 of
the mortgage that the notice shall inform the borrower “of the
right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court
action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense
of the borrower to acceleration and sale.” The judge found that,
by stating, “You may, if required by law or your loan documents,
have the right to cure the default after the acceleration of the
mortgage payments and prior to the foreclosure sale of your
property ...,” and “you may have the right to bring a court action
to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense you
may have to acceleration and foreclosure” (emphasis added), the
notice “significantly, and inexcusably, differed from, watered . . .
down, and overshadowed the notice that was contractually and
legally required by the mortgage.” He added that “there was no
excuse for the difference in language” and that it was impossible
to imagine any purpose for drafting a notice that failed to track
the language of the mortgage “unless, of course, the purpose was
to discourage [b]orrowers from asserting their rights.”

After the judge issued his decision, the Appeals Court held in

“(a) the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not
less than [thirty] days from the date the notice is given to [the defendants],
by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default
on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of
the sums secured by [the mortgage].”

Paragraph 22 further provides that such notice must inform the borrower “of
the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to
assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense of the borrower to
acceleration and sale.” It also declares that, if the default is not timely cured, the
lender “may invoke the statutory power of sale.”

“The judge analogized the warning in the notice of default to a Miranda
warning that informed a suspect before interrogation:

86 477 Mass. 82 (2017)

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Murphy, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727
(2015), that the Pinti decision applies to cases pending on appeal
where the claim that the notice of default failed to strictly comply
with the notice provisions in the mortgage had been “raised and
preserved” before the issuance of the decision. Although the issue
was not before it, the Appeals Court declared that “the Pinti rule”
did not extend to cases pending in the trial court. Jd. at 732.
Relying on this dictum, the plaintiff moved to vacate the judg-
ment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). The
judge denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. We allowed
the defendants’ application for direct appellate review.
Discussion. 1. Application of the Pinti decision to pending
cases. Our decision in Pinti was grounded in the requirement in
G. L. c. 183, § 21, that, before a mortgagee may exercise the
power of sale in a foreclosure, it must “first comply[ ] with the
terms of the mortgage and with the statutes relating to the fore-
closure of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale.” Because
the power of sale is a “substantial power” that permits a mort-
gagee to foreclose without judicial oversight, we followed the
traditional and familiar rule that “ ‘one who sells under a power
[of sale] must follow strictly its terms’; the failure to do so results
in ‘no valid execution of the power, and the sale is wholly void.’ ”
Pinti, 472 Mass. at 232-233, quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 646 (2011). See Pryor v. Baker, 133
Mass. 459, 460 (1882) (“The exercise of a power to sell by a
mortgagee is always carefully watched, and is to be exercised
with careful regard to the interests of the mortgagor”).
Although it had long been established in law that the failure to
strictly comply with the terms of a mortgage renders void an
otherwise valid foreclosure sale, we gave our decision “prospec-
tive effect only, because the failure of a mortgagee to provide the
mortgagor with the notice of default required by the mortgage is
not a matter of record and, therefore, where there is a foreclosure
sale in a title chain, ascertaining whether clear record title exists
may not be possible.” Pinti, 472 Mass. at 243. Our concern was
that a third party who purchases property that had once been sold

“You [may] have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right [and
if you have that right], anything you say or do [may] ear-and-will be used
against you in a court of law, You [may] have the right to an attorney. If
you cannot afford an attorney [and if you have that right], one [may] wilt
be appointed for you, Do you understand these rights as they have been
read to you?”

477 Mass. 82 (2017) 87

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

at a foreclosure auction would not, through a title search, be able
to determine whether the notice of default strictly complied with
the terms of the mortgage. It would therefore be nearly impos-
sible to eliminate the risk that the foreclosure sale would later be
declared void and that the title would be returned to the fore-
closed property owner. See id. We presumed that, after our
decision in Pinti, mortgagees “as a general matter” would address
this uncertainty by executing and recording “an affidavit of com-
pliance with the notice provisions of paragraph 22 that includes a
copy of the notice that was sent to the mortgagor pursuant to that
paragraph.” Jd. at 244. However, we applied our ruling to the
parties in Pinti, id. at 243, citing Eaton v. Federal Nat’! Mtge.
Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 589 (2012), and deferred the question
whether our holding “should be applied to any other class of
cases pending on appeal.” Pinti, supra at 243 n.25.

In Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 467
Mass. 160, 167-170 (2014), we addressed that same issue in a
closely parallel context. In Eaton, 462 Mass. at 571, we declared
that a foreclosure by power of sale is invalid unless a foreclosing
party holds the mortgage and also either holds the underlying
note or acts on behalf of the note holder. We applied this rule to
the parties in Eaton, but otherwise gave the ruling prospective
effect only. Jd. In Galiastro, supra at 168, we extended the benefit
of our decision in Eaton to litigants who had preserved this issue
and whose cases were pending on appeal at the time that Eaton
was decided. We declared that “[w]here multiple cases await
appellate review on precisely the same question, it is inequitable
for the case chosen as a vehicle to announce the court’s holding
to be singled out as the ‘chance beneficiary’ of an otherwise
prospective rule.” Galiastro, supra at 167-168, citing United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 555 n.16 (1982), and Common-
wealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 736 (2007). Limiting the
application of prospective rulings to such a “chance beneficiary”
would mean that something as arbitrary as the speed at which a
case is litigated might determine its outcome, as only the first case
raising this issue to reach the Supreme Judicial Court would get
the benefit of the ruling. It also would greatly diminish the
“incentive to bring challenges to existing precedent” by depriving
similarly situated litigants “of the benefit for the work and ex-
pense involved in challenging the old rule.” Galiastro, supra at
169, quoting Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650, 664 (1987).

The same principles underlying our decision in Galiastro to
extend the Eaton rule to cases pending on appeal cause us to

88 477 Mass. 82 (2017)

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

extend the Pinti rule to cases pending in the trial court where the
Pinti issue was timely and fairly raised before we issued our
decision in Pinti. In such cases, the homeowner-mortgagors are
similarly situated to the plaintiffs in Pinti, because they presented
the same arguments in the trial court that the Pinti plaintiffs
presented to this court on appeal. All that distinguishes the
homeowners in Pinti from the homeowners in this case is the
pace of the litigation. The summary process complaint in this case
was first filed in June, 2012; the complaint in Pinti seeking a
judgment declaring that the foreclosure sale was void was filed in
January, 2013. If this case had proceeded to judgment more
promptly in the Housing Court, this appeal, rather than Pinti,
might have been the one that established the so-called Pinti rule.5

Having so ruled, we now consider whether the homeowner
defendants in this case timely and fairly raised a Pinti defense
before the issuance of our Pinti decision. The judge found that
they had, and we conclude that he was not clearly erroneous in so
finding.

We recognize that the defendants did not specifically allege that
the mortgagee’s notice of default failed to strictly comply with
the terms of paragraph 22 of the mortgage until they filed their
cross motion for summary judgment on September 23, 2015,
more than two months after the issuance of our opinion in Pinti.
But more than three years before that opinion, in June, 2012, they
filed an answer as self-represented litigants where they checked
the box proffering as a defense to the eviction that the plaintiff did
not have “superior right to possession of the premises.” We need
not consider whether the assertion of this affirmative defense
alone was sufficient to give fair notice of a Pinti defense, because
it is apparent from the plaintiff's memorandum in support of its

5We recognize that this ruling will increase the impact our Pinti decision may
have on the validity of titles, but we expect the increase to be modest and that
it will simply be part of the inherent “unevenness [that] is an inevitable
consequence of any change in doctrine.” Galiastro v, Mortgage Elec. Registra-
tion Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 170 (2014), quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. v.
Bowes, 381 Mass. 278, 283 n.4 (1980).

®The full text of the defense, marked box no. 67 on the answer, states:

“The plaintiff’ s case should be dismissed because it does not have proper
title to the property and therefore does not have standing to bring this action
and/or cannot prove a superior right to possession of the premises. Wayne
Inv. Corp. v. Abbott, 350 Mass. 775 (1966) (title defects can be raised as
defense in summary process); G. L. c. 239, § 1 (summary process available
to plaintiff only if foreclosure carried out according to law).”

477 Mass. 82 (2017) 89

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

motion for summary judgment, which was filed one month before
the issuance of our Pinti decision, that the plaintiff recognized
that the defendants had alleged that the notice of default failed to
comply with the terms of paragraph 22 of the mortgage. In that
memorandum, the plaintiff argued that it had complied with the
requirements of paragraph 22 and that it would be “irrational and
fundamentally unfair” to declare the foreclosure proceeding void
because of the purported minor differences between the language
of the notice of default and that of the mortgage. Where the
plaintiff recognized that the defendants had raised the Pinti issue
as a defense before our Pinti decision, the judge did not err in
finding that the defendants fairly and timely raised the issue and
therefore were entitled to the benefit of the Pinti decision.

2. Obligation of strict compliance. Having determined that the
defendants are entitled to the benefit of our holding in Pinti, we
must now address whether the notice of default strictly complied
with paragraph 22 of the mortgage. It did not.

Once a borrower has defaulted on a mortgage, G. L. c. 183,
§ 21, authorizes the mortgagee to foreclose and sell the premises,
provided it “first compl[ies] with the terms of the mortgage and
with the statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the
exercise of the power of sale.” Pinti, 472 Mass. at 232, quoting
G. L. c. 183, § 21. As we explained in Pinti, supra at 236, “the
‘terms of the mortgage’ with which strict compliance is required
— both as a matter of common law under this court’s decisions
and under § 21 — include not only the provisions in paragraph 22
relating to the foreclosure sale itself, but also the provisions
requiring and prescribing the preforeclosure notice of default”
(footnote omitted). See Foster, Hall & Adams Co. v. Sayles, 213
Mass. 319, 322-324 (1913).

The notice of default in this case communicated much of what
paragraph 22 requires but fell short in several crucial respects.
Paragraph 22 requires that the notice “inform [the borrower] of
the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a
court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other
defense of [the borrower] to acceleration of sale.” Despite this
language in the plaintiff's own uniform mortgage instrument, the
notice declared that the borrower “may, if required by law or [the
borrower’s] loan documents, have the right to cure the default
after the acceleration of the mortgage payments and prior to the
foreclosure sale of [the borrower’s] property if all amounts past
due are paid within the time permitted by law” (emphasis added).

90 477 Mass. 82 (2017)

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

Similarly, the notice declared that the borrower “may have the
right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a
default or any other defense [the borrower] may have” (emphasis
added). We agree with the judge that this language in the notice
“significantly, and inexcusably, differed from” the language in
paragraph 22 of the mortgage, and “watered .. . down” the rights
provided in that paragraph to the mortgagor homeowner.

The phrase, “you may, if required by law or your loan docu-
ments, have the right to cure the default after acceleration,”
suggests that the right to cure and reinstate is not available to
every mortgagor, and that any such right is contingent upon the
law or the provisions of other loan documents. But paragraph 19
of the mortgage specifically grants a mortgagor the right to re-
instatement after acceleration, and sets forth the steps required to
do so. This phrase instead suggests that the homeowner may need
to perform legal research and analysis to discern whether the right
to cure and reinstate is available.

Similarly, rather than unequivocally inform the borrower of the
right to bring a court action to attempt to prevent a foreclosure by
asserting that there was no default or by invoking another de-
fense, the notice of default stated that the borrower may have the
right to bring such an action. Here, too, the implication is that the
right is merely conditional, without specifying the conditions, and
that the mortgagor may not have the right to file an action in
court. The plaintiff contends that it accurately informed borrow-
ers that they “may have” the right to bring a court action because
they would have no such right if their court action lacked a good
faith basis. But neither paragraph 22 of the mortgage nor the
notice identified a bad faith exception to this right, and we cannot
reasonably infer that a borrower would understand that the “may
have” language referenced such an exception.”

We agree with the judge that, because the Pinti decision applies
to this case and because the notice of default did not strictly
comply with the requirements of paragraph 22 of the mortgage,
the foreclosure sale is void.*

7Because we find that the notice of default was not in strict compliance with
paragraph 22, we need not address the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff
waived its argument that the notice was in strict compliance when it conceded
that it was only in substantial compliance in the memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment and at the hearing in the Housing Court.

*Nothing bars the plaintiff from reinitiating the foreclosure process with a
notice of default that strictly complies with paragraph 22 of the mortgage.

477 Mass. 82 (2017) 91

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Marroguin.

Conclusion. The allowance of the defendants’ cross motion for
summary judgment, as well as the denials of the plaintiff's

motions for summary judgment and for relief from judgment, are
affirmed.

So ordered.

92 477 Mass. 92 (2017)

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

CoMmMISSIONER oF ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE VS.
ComMonweaLtH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BoaRD
& another.!

Suffolk. January 5, 2017. - May 12, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Commonwealth Employment Relations Board. Labor, Unfair labor practice,
Duty to bargain. Commonwealth, Financial matters, Collective bargaining.

The actions of the Secretary of the Executive Office of Administration and
Finance, when submitting to the Legislature a request for an appropriation to
fund collective bargaining agreements between the Commonwealth and two
public employee unions, in including information about the anticipated fiscal
effects of a legislative decision to fund the agreements did not violate the
Commonwealth’s duty to support an appropriations request pursuant to G. L.
c. 150E, § 7 (b) [95-98], or its duty to bargain in good faith pursuant to G. L.
c. 150E, § 10 (a) [98-99]; further, given the distinct and different points of
temporal focus found in the respective statutes’ plain language, it could not
be said that a violation of § 7 (b), in and of itself, constituted a failure to
negotiate in good faith under § 10 (a) (5) [100-101].

Appeat from a decision of the Division of Labor Relations.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Robert L. Quinan, Jr, Assistant Attorney General, for the
plaintiff.

T. Jane Gabriel for the defendant.

Alan H. Shapiro (John M. Becker also present) for the inter-
vener.

Matthew D. Jones, for Massachusetts Teachers Association,
amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Lowy, J. In June, 2010, near the height of the global economic
downturn that became known as the Great Recession, the Secre-
tary of the Executive Office of Administration and Finance (Sec-
retary) submitted to the Legislature a request for an appropriation
to fund collective bargaining agreements between the Common-
wealth and two public employee unions reached more than thir-
teen months earlier. In the letter containing the request, the Sec-

‘Coalition of Public Safety, intervener.

477 Mass. 92 (2017) 93

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

retary informed the Legislature that several similar requests for
salary increases had been rejected by the Legislature; that at-
tempts to renegotiate the agreements with the unions had failed;
and that approval of the request would require renegotiating
several other collective bargaining agreements that the Legisla-
ture had already approved.

The unions both filed a charge of prohibited practice with the
Division of Labor Relations (division), arguing, in essence, that
the letter was a violation of the Commonwealth’s purported duty
to support an appropriation’s request pursuant to G. L. c. 150E,
§ 7 (b), and also that the letter constituted a failure to bargain in
good faith, in violation of G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5). In January,
2014, a hearing officer with the division agreed with the unions
and found that the Commonwealth had violated its § 7 (b) duty
and had committed a prohibited practice under § 10 (a) (5) by
failing to bargain in good faith. The Commonwealth Employment
Relations Board (board)? affirmed, the Commonwealth appealed
from the decision, and we transferred the case to this court on our
own motion.

We reverse the board’s decision and conclude that the Secre-
tary’s inclusion of information about the anticipated fiscal effects
of a legislative decision to fund the collective bargaining agree-
ments in his request for an appropriation did not violate § 7 (b) or
constitute a prohibited practice.

Background. The facts of this case are not in dispute. In April,
2009, the Commonwealth, represented by the Executive Office of
Administration and Finance, and the Coalition of Public Safety
(COPS) entered into collective bargaining agreements for the
periods of July 1, 2009, through June 30, 2010, and July 1, 2010,
through June 30, 2013 (2010-2013 agreement). The 2010-2013
agreement called for annual salary increases of one per cent, three
per cent, and three per cent, respectively, over the three years it
covered. The Commonwealth had also entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the Massachusetts Correction Officers
Federated Union (MCOFU) that covered the same period as the
COPS 2010-2013 agreement and that also contained cost items
that required appropriation.

In June, 2009, then Governor Deval Patrick submitted a revised
appropriation recommendation to both houses of the General

2Formerly the Labor Relations Commission. See G. L. c. 23, $90, as
appearing in St. 2007, c. 145, § 5. References to the Commonwealth Employ-
ment Relations Board (board) include the former Labor Relations Commission.

94 477 Mass. 92 (2017)

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

Court for fiscal year 2010 (July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010). In his
accompanying message, the Governor estimated that there would
be about $1.5 billion less in revenue compared with earlier pro-
jections because “Massachusetts continue[d] to experience the ef-
fects of a global economic downturn unseen since the Great
Depression.”

In June, 2010, the Secretary* submitted the cost items for both
of the 2010-2013 agreements to the Legislature for funding
pursuant to his obligation under § 7 (b). In the letter that accom-
panied the request, the Secretary, addressing the respective chairs
of the committees on ways and means of the Senate and House of
Representatives, wrote:

“In addition to previous requests, I am fulfilling my stat-
utory obligation to ask your consideration of the attached
additional collective bargaining items in Section 2 of H.2, the
Governor’s fiscal year 2011 budget proposal. These items
fund the collective bargaining agreements negotiated some
time ago with [MCOFU] (Unit 4) and [COPS] (Unit 5). We
are submitting them now because their costs first occur in
fiscal year 2011.

“These items provide for collective bargaining salary in-
creases similar to contracts that were not funded during
calendar year 2009. We have worked with the MCOFU and
COPS leadership to reach agreement on contracts similar to
those signed by other unions for this fiscal year and have
failed to reach an agreement. Funding of these items will
trigger a reopener in collective bargaining agreements that
the Legislature recently did fund only because they contained
delays in the salary increases.”

The Legislature did not appropriate funds in fiscal year 2011
for the cost items contained in the 2010-2013 agreements. Since
that time COPS and the Commonwealth have entered into two
successor agreements — one of which covered the 2010-2013
period — that were fully funded by the Legislature. The succes-

® The positions of the Secretary of Administration and Finance (Secretary) and
the Commissioner of Administration were effectively merged in 2012. See G. L.
c. 7, § 4, as amended through St. 2012, ¢. 165, § 33. The parties do not dispute
that it is now the Secretary who is responsible for submitting budget requests
pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), and that the former Secretary acted in that
capacity.

477 Mass. 92 (2017) 95

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

sor agreement covering the 2010-2013 period, however, resulted
in the delay of each of the wage increases by one year.

About one week after the Secretary’s June, 2010, request letter,
COPS filed a charge of prohibited practice with the division,
alleging that the Commonwealth failed to bargain in good faith,
as required by § 10 (a) (5), because the Secretary’s letter did not
support the 2010-2013 agreement.* A complaint was issued fol-
lowing the division’s investigation. The parties waived a hearing
and submitted the case to the hearing officer on a stipulated
record.

In January, 2014, the hearing officer found that the Common-
wealth had violated the law because it had refused “to take all
necessary and appropriate steps to support the collective bargain-
ing agreement.” The hearing officer ordered the Commonwealth
to “[s]ubmit to the Legislature a request for an appropriation to
fund the cost items and take all appropriate steps to support the
[2010-2013 agreement].”

The Commonwealth appealed to the board, which affirmed the
decision of the hearing officer.» The Commonwealth appealed
from the board’s decision to the Appeals Court, G. L. c. 150E,
§ 11 (i), and we transferred the case to this court on our own
motion.

Standard of review. This court reviews the board’s decisions in
accordance with the standards laid out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7),
which provides that a final administrative agency decision will be
set aside if, among other grounds, it is “[u]nsupported by sub-
stantial evidence,” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e), or “[a]rbitrary or
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law,” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g). See G. L. c. 150E, § 11 ().
See also Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations
Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 567-568 (2015).

Discussion. A crucial point in the board’s decision is the
connection between the Commonwealth’s statutory duty to re-
quest appropriations for cost items in executed collective bar-
gaining agreements under § 7 (b) and its obligation to bargain in

“The Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union (MCOFU) filed a
similar charge three months later, and the cases were consolidated. MCOFU
subsequently withdrew its complaint on the ground that the issue had become
moot.

5Because the board incorporated the facts set forth by the hearing officer, fully
affirmed the officer’s analysis, and agreed with all of his conclusions, we refer
to the two decisions collectively as the board’s.

96 477 Mass. 92 (2017)

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

good faith under § 10 (a) (5). The board concluded that by failing
to affirmatively support the agreement, as required by § 7 (b), the
Commonwealth had committed a breach of its duty to bargain in
good faith, as required by § 10 (a) (5).

We are not persuaded that the two provisions operate in the
manner suggested by the board. In our view, there are three flaws
in the board’s decision. First, the board erred in determining that
§ 7 (b) requires an employer not only to submit but also affirma-
tively to support a §7 (b) appropriation request; second, its
conclusion that the Commonwealth failed to bargain in good faith
in violation of § 10 (a) (5) is unsupported by substantial evidence;
and third, the board erroneously conflated the employer’s obli-
gations under the two statutory provisions.

a. Employer’s duty under § 7 (b). General Laws c. 150E, § 7 (b),
provides in relevant part:

“The employer . . . shall submit to the appropriate legis-
lative body within thirty days after the date on which the
agreement is executed by the parties, a request for an appro-
priation necessary to fund the cost items contained
therein . . . . If the appropriate legislative body duly rejects
the request for an appropriation necessary to fund the cost
items, such cost items shall be returned to the parties for
further bargaining.”

We have previously discussed what constitutes a violation of
§7 (b) and its statutory predecessor. We have held that an
employer fails to comply with the statute when the employer
refuses even to submit a request for appropriations to the appro-
priate legislative body, Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v.
School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 474-475 (1976) (mayor
required to transmit school committee’s request for appropria-
tions to city council, notwithstanding mayor's special veto
power);* Mendes v. Taunton, 366 Mass. 109, 118-119 (1974)
(successor mayor must submit request to city council even though

®In Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass.
455, 474-475 (1976), we stated that “[t]he mayor, of course, may recommend
disapproval of the request.” It is important to note that in that case it was the
school committee that negotiated with the unions and not the mayor, and thus if
the mayor recommended his disapproval it could not have been argued that the
negotiations took place in bad faith based on the mayor’s subsequent conduct.
See Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU, AFL-CIO v, Secretary of Admin., 413 Mass. 377,
380, 382-383 (1992) (Alliance) (successor governor may recommend disap-

477 Mass. 92 (2017) 97

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

predecessor negotiated collective bargaining agreement), or when
the employer submits a request that makes full funding of the
agreement contingent on voters passing an override to cover a
budget shortfall, Local 1652, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v.
Framingham, 442 Mass. 463, 464 (2004) (Framingham) (offi-
cials did not fulfil obligation under § 7 [b] where budget submit-
ted to town meeting made full funding of collective bargaining
agreement contingent on voters passing property tax override).
We have also held that although successor officials must submit
the request, they may not be compelled to publicly support a
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their predecessors,
because the successor officials’ “constituents are entitled to the
unfettered exercise of their judgment on matters of policy.” Labor
Relations Comm'n v. Selectmen of Dracut, 374 Mass. 619, 625
(1978).

Contrary to a number of board decisions cited by the board and
COPS, we have never required officials affirmatively to support a
§ 7 (b) request. Contrast Town of Belmont, 22 M.L.C. 1636, 1639
(1996); Town of Rockland, 16 M.L.C. 1001, 1005 (1989); City of
Chelsea, 13 M.L.C. 1144, 1149-1150 (1986); Worcester Sch.
Comm., 5 M.L.C. 1080, 1083 (1978). Based on our review, these
cases trace back to Turners Falls Fire Dist., 4 M.L.C. 1658, 1662
(1977), where the board stated: “It is well-settled law that an
employer’s refusal to take affirmative steps to support the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement before the legislative body
constitutes a violation of its duty to bargain in good faith.” The
board cites only to Mendes v. Taunton, 366 Mass. 109 (1974), for
that proposition of law. The Mendes decision, however, merely
requires that an official, even a successor official, must submit a
request to the appropriate legislative body. Jd. at 118-119.

We cited several of these board cases with approval in
Framingham. See Framingham, 442 Mass. at 469-470 & n.6. See
also id. at 479-480 (Sosman, J., dissenting). Those cases were
cited, however, to illustrate that the obligation to seek funding
is “unconditional” in the sense that requests for funding may not
be conditioned on the occurrence of another event under the
language of § 7 (b). Id. at 469. To the extent that these cited
decisions of the board (and any dicta in Framingham) suggest
that a lack of affirmative support inevitably constitutes a violation
of § 7 (b), they rest on an error of law, and we do not follow them.

proval); Labor Relations Comin’n v. Selectmen of Dracut, 374 Mass. 619, 626
(1978) (same for successor selectmen).

98 477 Mass. 92 (2017)

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

Accordingly, when an employer submits a § 7 (b) request to the
appropriate legislative body for an appropriation to fully fund
cost items in a collective bargaining agreement and the request
includes pertinent information concerning fiscal and public policy
matters, it does not violate its statutory obligation under § 7 (b).
See Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU, AFL-CIO vy. Secretary of Admin.,
413 Mass. 377, 380 (1992).7

Here, the employer submitted the § 7 (b) request to the Legis-
lature and did not condition funding the request on the occurrence
of another event. Thus, there was no violation of § 7 (b), and the
board’s conclusion to the contrary was an error of law.

b. Good faith in collective bargaining. Under the public em-
ployee collective bargaining statute,* G. L. c. 150E, both the
employer and the exclusive representative of the employee orga-
nizations must “negotiate in good faith.” G. L. c. 150E, § 6.°
Refusing to “bargain collectively in good faith” is a prohibited
practice. G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5).!° The duty to bargain in good
faith is the duty to meet and negotiate in good faith. See School
Comm. of Newton vy. Labor Relations Comm’n, 388 Mass. 557,
572 (1983). “ ‘Good faith’ implies an open and fair mind as well

7In Alliance, 413 Mass. at 379, during the final days of Governor Michael
Dukakis’s administration, the Secretary signed a collective bargaining agree-
ment with a number of unions. The §7 (b) request obligation fell to the
successor administration of Governor William Weld. /d. at 380. At the time of
the § 7 (b) request, Governor Weld also sent a written message to the Legislature
urging it to reject the appropriation request because of the financial circum-
stances of the Commonwealth. /d. In that case, neither party raised the issue
whether Governor Weld’s message violated § 7 (b), and the court, without itself
remarking on the issue, had no trouble determining that the Governor’s actions
in sending the message were appropriate. Id. at 382-383.

®The Commonwealth is a public employer, and the unions are employee
organizations within the meaning of G. L. c. 150, § 1.

General Laws c. 150E, § 6, provides in relevant part:

“The employer and the exclusive representative shall . . . negotiate in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, standards or productivity and
performance, and any other terms and conditions of employment . . . .”

1°General Laws c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), provides in relevant part:

“(a) It shall be a prohibited practice for a public employer or its des-
ignated representative to:

“() Refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the exclusive
representative as required in [$6] ....”

477 Mass. 92 (2017) 99

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

as a sincere effort to reach a common ground.” Id.

A comprehensive analysis of the precise contours of what
constitutes good faith during negotiations would fill volumes, but
a few examples may be helpful. Appellate courts in the Com-
monwealth have held that a public employer violates the obliga-
tion to bargain in good faith when the employer refuses to bargain
at all, id. at 574-575, or when it reaches an agreement with a
union but then makes its execution contingent on approval by a
supervisory entity, Springfield Hous. Auth. v. Labor Relations
Comm'n, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 654, 658-659 (1983) (bad faith
where housing authority ratified agreement with condition that it
be approved by agency of Executive Office of Communities and
Development, which had supervisory functions over housing
authorities).

What emerges from the case law is that for a public employer
to comply with the obligation to bargain and negotiate in good
faith, it must have an open and fair mind during the negotiating
and bargaining process. A contrary conclusion would run afoul of
the plain language of G. L. c. ISOE, §§ 6 and 10 (a) (5). See
Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983) (“In construing a
statute, words are to be accorded their ordinary meaning and
approved usage”).

Here, the board concluded that the Commonwealth failed to
bargain in good faith in 2009 because it included statements
regarding the fiscal consequences of approving the submitted
appropriation in its § 7 (b) request submitted in June, 2010. This
conclusion was unsupported by substantial evidence.

There was no evidence presented to the board alleging bad faith
on the part of the Commonwealth at the time the agreement was
reached. The only purported evidence of bad faith was the letter
from the Secretary containing pertinent information concerning
the fiscal implications of funding the 2010-2013 agreement, sent
thirteen months after negotiations concluded and while the Com-
monwealth continued to find itself in the throes of a nearly
unprecedented economic crisis.

The temporal gap is indisputable, and there was no evidence
presented suggesting that the Secretary’s characterization of the
economic consequences of funding the agreement was inaccurate.
In these circumstances, it cannot reasonably be said that the
employer did not have an “open and fair mind” when it concluded
its agreement with the unions, simply based on the Secretary’s
letter.

100 477 Mass. 92 (2017)

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

c. Connection between § 7 (b) and § 10 (a) (5). Our review of
the board’s decision in the case, as well as its prior decisions,
suggests that the board has viewed the employer’s obligation to
submit an appropriations request under § 7 (b) as directly linked
to its obligation to bargain in good faith under § 10 (a) (5).

In essence, the board appears to have used its interpretation of
§ 7 (b) to impose an ongoing obligation on the employer that
covers the period of time between the conclusion of negotiations
and the submission of the § 7 (b) request. Under this view, the
employer’s failure to affirmatively support an agreement shows
that it did not have an “open and fair mind” when negotiating a
collective bargaining agreement because the “affirmative sup-
port” obligation reaches back to the moment in time when the
bargain is struck and thus could be said to be dispositive of the
employer’s state of mind during negotiations. See, e.g., Turners
Fails Fire Dist., 4 M.L.C. at 1662.

That logic fails. The plain language of § 7 (b) and § 10 (a) (5)
focuses on two distinct moments in time. Section 10 (a) (5) focuses
on the state of mind of the employer during the negotiations, up
until the negotiations are concluded. Indeed, § 10 (a) (5) contem-
plates that negotiations may not even result in an agreement and
imposes no obligation to reach an agreement. Section 7 (b), how-
ever, contemplates action occurring after a collective bargaining
agreement has been finalized and executed:

“The employer . . . shall submit to the appropriate legislative
body within thirty days after the date on which the agreement
is executed by the parties, a request for an appropriation
necessary to fund the cost items contained therein... .”""

Because of the distinct and different points of temporal focus
found in the respective statutes’ plain language, it cannot be said
that a violation of § 7 (b) (e.g., submitting a contingent request),
in and of itself, constitutes a failure to negotiate in good faith
under § 10 (a) (5).

That is not to say, however, that the form, contents, or legality
of a § 7 (b) request may not be probative of whether the employer
negotiated in good faith. Under certain circumstances, a § 7 (b)
request may indicate that the employer engaged in bad faith

“Although submission of the § 7 (b) request occurred outside the thirty-day
window mentioned in the quoted statute, neither party suggests the timing has
any bearing on the case.

477 Mass. 92 (2017) 101

Commissioner of Administration and Finance x. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.

negotiations. For example, a particularly negative letter request-
ing an appropriation but recommending rejection sent shortly
after negotiations concluded would be probative of a lack of good
faith during negotiations. Such circumstances might constitute
evidence that the employer had entered into the agreement with
the intention of repudiating it before the legislative body. Those
circumstances are not present here, however.

Conclusion. We reverse the board’s decision finding that the
Commonwealth violated G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (b), and committed a
prohibited practice in violation of G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5). The
board’s order is vacated.

So ordered.

102 477 Mass. 102 (2017)

Modica v. Sheriff of Suffolk County.

Georce Monica vs. SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK CouNnTY
& others."

Suffolk. January 5, 2017. - May 15, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Correction Officer. Words, “Bodily injury.”

This court concluded that a correction officer who began to experience an
accelerated heart rate (sinus tachycardia) accompanied by lightheadedness
and difficulty breathing as a result of having broken up inmate fights did not
suffer a bodily injury within the meaning of G. L. c. 126, § I8A, where the
sinus tachycardia had not led to structural heart damage and therefore was
not a physical impairment or injury. [103-105]

Civ. acrion commenced in the Superior Court Department on
October 24, 2014.

The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on motions for
summary judgment.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Noah A. Winkeller for the plaintiff.

Allen H. Forbes, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the
defendants.

Bupp, J. Through G. L. c. 126, § 18A, and G. L. c. 30, § 58, the
Legislature has afforded correction officers additional compensa-
tion to close the gap between workers’ compensation benefits and
an employee’s salary if the employee sustains bodily injury as a
result of inmate violence during the course of his or her duties.
The plaintiff, George Modica, a correction officer in the Suffolk
County sheriff's department, sued the defendants — the sheriff of
Suffolk County, the Suffolk County sheriff's department, and the
Commonwealth — to obtain compensation under the statutes. At
issue in this case is the meaning of “bodily injury” as the term is
used in the two statutes. We conclude that bodily injury is that
which results in physical injury; because the plaintiff has not
suffered such an injury, he does not qualify for compensation
under the statute.

‘The Commonwealth and the Suffolk County sheriff's department.

477 Mass. 102 (2017) 103

Modica v. Sheriff of Suffolk County.

Background. The pertinent facts, taken from the record, are
undisputed. As a result of breaking up inmate fights in March and
April of 2010, the plaintiff began to experience an accelerated
heart rate (sinus tachycardia) accompanied by light-headedness
and difficulty breathing.

The defendants initially paid workers’ compensation benefits
voluntarily but soon after discontinued them. The plaintiff filed a
claim for further workers’ compensation benefits, and insofar as
relevant here, the plaintiff underwent two independent medical
examinations. Both doctors concurred that the defendant’s symp-
toms were a physiological response to stress, that the sinus
tachycardia was neither the result nor the cause of any physical
harm, and that there was no evidence of structural heart disease.”

The parties eventually settled the plaintiff's workers’ compen-
sation claim, stipulating that the plaintiff's injury was a physi-
ological response to his involvement in inmate altercations. The
plaintiff thereafter applied for compensation under G. L. c. 126,
§ 18A, and G. L. c. 30, § 58, which the defendants denied.? The
plaintiff commenced an action in the Superior Court. Both parties
filed motions for summary judgment, which were heard by a
Superior Court judge. The judge denied the plaintiff’s motion and
allowed the defendants’ motion. He concluded that the tachycar-
dia “amountfed] to a change in function without physical dam-
age” and that therefore the condition was not a bodily injury
entitling the plaintiff the extra compensation. The plaintiff ap-
pealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own
motion.

Discussion. Where the record is undisputed and the case was
decided below on motions for summary judgment, “one of the
moving part[ies] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”
(quotation omitted). Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v.
Berkshire Bank, 475 Mass. 839, 841 (2016). “The single issue
raised is one of statutory interpretation, and we review the motion
judge’s decision de novo.” Jd. General Laws c. 126, § 18A,
provides in relevant part:

2The plaintiff adopted these findings in pleadings he filed with the Depart-
ment of Industrial Accidents.

®The plaintiff made claims under both G. L. ¢. 126, § 18A, and G. L. ¢. 30,
§ 58. The former applies to county employees, the latter to State employees;
they are otherwise indistinguishable. For the sake of simplicity, we refer only to
§ 18A in the remainder of this opinion, but we interpret G. L. c. 30, § 58, in
identical fashion in all relevant respects.

104 477 Mass. 102 (2017)

Modica v. Sheriff of Suffolk County.

“An employee . . . who, while in the performance of duty,
receives bodily injuries resulting from acts of violence of
patients or prisoners in his custody, and who as a result of
such injury would be entitled to benefits under [G. L. c. 152
(the worker’s compensation statute)], shall be paid . . . the
difference between the weekly cash benefits to which he
would be entitled under [c. 152] and his regular salary... .”

Thus, in order to be entitled to compensation under the statute, a
correction officer must show (1) bodily injury (2) resulting from
an act of violence (3) committed by a prisoner who was (4) in the
plaintiff's custody and (5) resulting in the plaintiff being entitled
to worker’s compensation. The parties dispute only whether the
plaintiff suffered a “bodily injury,” a term that is not defined in
the statute.

“When a statute does not define its words we give them their
usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are
consistent with the statutory purpose. . . . We derive the words’
usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to
the statute’s enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts and
dictionary definitions.” Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Mass. 118,
124 (2004), quoting Commonwealth vy. Zone Book, Inc., 372
Mass. 366, 369 (1977). Bodily injury has been statutorily defined
in the criminal context as a “substantial impairment of the physi-
cal condition, including any burn, fracture of any bone, subdural
hematoma, injury to any internal organ .. ..” G. L. c. 265, § 13J.
See also G. L. c. 265, $§ 13K (a), 39 (b). Certain civil statutes
also make use of this definition of bodily injury. See G. L.c. 111,
§ 72K (abuse and neglect of patients or residents in long-term
care); G. L. c. 208, § 31A (parent’s abuse a factor in determining
custody of children); G. L. c. 209, § 38 (same); G. L. c. 209C,
§ 10 (same). Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary 906 (10th ed.
2014) defines bodily injury as “[p]hysical damage to a person’s
body.” Additionally, in the insurance context, the phrase “bodily
injury” has been construed as referring to physical injury. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 654, 656 (1988) (“ ‘Bodily
injury’. . . encompasses only physical injuries to the body and the
consequences thereof”).

Thus, we conclude that for the purposes of § 18A, bodily injury
refers to physical impairment or damage, i.e., physical injury. As
the plaintiff's sinus tachycardia is an impairment of function
which has not led to structural heart damage, it is not a physical

477 Mass. 102 (2017) 105

Modica v. Sheriff of Suffolk County.

impairment or injury. Therefore, the plaintiff does not have a
bodily injury within the meaning of the statute.

The plaintiff's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He
contends that because it is unknown when or if his symptoms will
subside, his condition falls within the meaning of bodily injury in
the statute. This reasoning conflates the duration of an injury with
the type of injury. Clearly the duration of an injury has nothing to
do with whether it is a bodily injury: emotional injuries, too, may
be long-lasting.

The plaintiff also suggests that we should broadly construe
“bodily injury” in order to provide this special class of employees
the extra protection intended by the statute. To bolster this argu-
ment, he points out that we have done so with other portions of
the statute. See, e.g., Conroy v. Boston, 392 Mass. 216, 219-220
(1984) (inmate’s escape was act of violence under statute).
Adopting this view would require us to overlook the fact that the
Legislature chose to use the term “bodily injury” rather than
“personal injury” (or simply “injury”). Personal injury, as the
term is used in the workers’ compensation statute, encompasses
physical as well as mental or emotional disabilities.t See G. L.
c. 152, § 1 (7A). See also Bisazza’s Case, 452 Mass. 593, 598
(2008). As G. L. c. 126, § 18A, expressly refers to the workers’
compensation statute, we must assume that the Legislature used
the narrower term intentionally. See Polaroid Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Revenue, 393 Mass. 490, 497 (1984) (“words of a statute
must be construed in association with other statutory language and
the general statutory plan”).

Conclusion. Although the plaintiff may well have sustained an
injury, he is unable to show that he has a bodily injury within the
meaning of G. L. c. 126, § 18A. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.

So ordered.

4Additionally, Black’s Law Dictionary 906 (10th ed. 2014) defines personal
injury in the context of workers’ compensation as “any harm . . . that arises in
the scope of employment” (emphasis added), In the insurance context, “[t]he
term ‘personal injury’ is broader and includes not only physical injury but also
any affront or insult to the reputation or sensibilities of a person. ‘Bodily injury,’
by comparison, is a narrow term and encompasses only physical injuries to the
body and the consequences thereof.” Allstate Ins, Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass.
654, 656 (1988).

106 477 Mass. 106 (2017)

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

Ricuarp Crowe. vs. Massacnuserts Paro.e Boarp.
Suffolk. January 6, 2017. - May 15, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hives, Gaztano, Lowy, & Buop, JU.

Parole. Practice, Criminal, Parole. Americans with Disabilities Act. Practice,
Civil, Action in nature of certiorari, Motion to dismiss.

This court reversed the dismissal of a complaint in the nature of certiorari
alleging that the parole board, in denying the plaintiff's petition for parole,
had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and cognate State consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, and remanded for further proceedings,
where the plaintiff had stated a claim on which relief could be granted and,
given the plaintiff's allegations, the only appropriate way for the judge to
evaluate the claim was through a review of the administrative record (which
the parole board had not provided) upon a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. [108-110]

Observations regarding the consideration that the parole board should give to the
application of the Americans with Disabilities Act and cognate State con-
stitutional and statutory provisions when presented with a petition for parole
by a petitioner with a mental disability. [110-114]

This court concluded that the commutation of a prisoner’s sentence from life
with the possibility of parole to from thirty-six years to life did not reduce
that prisoner’s sentence to an indeterminate one that would entitle him to a
parole hearing on an annual basis. [114-116]

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
April 2, 2014.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Ra/fi N. Yessayan, J., and a
motion for reconsideration was considered by him.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Tabitha Cohen (John D. Fitzpatrick also present) for the plain-
tiff.

Todd M. Blume, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

James R. Pingeon, for American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Bupp, J. On April 2, 2014, the plaintiff, Richard Crowell, filed
a complaint in the nature of certiorari in the Superior Court,
alleging that, in denying his petition for parole, the Parole Board
(board) had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

477 Mass. 106 (2017) 107

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (ADA), and cognate State provisions, art.
114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution and
G. L. c. 93, § 103. A judge of that court allowed the board’s
motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsid-
eration. We reverse and remand for further development of the
record.’ Further, we conclude that, contrary to the plaintiff's
assertion, his commuted life sentence remains a “life sentence”
within the meaning of 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 301.01(5) (1997).

Background. The limited record before us, presented in the
form of exhibits to the plaintiff's complaint, includes the follow-
ing facts, which are undisputed by the parties.

1. Prior parole proceedings. The plaintiff pleaded guilty to
murder in the second degree in 1962 in connection with an armed
robbery that resulted in a homicide.? He was sentenced to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole pursuant to G. L.
c. 265, § 2.3 In 1974 the plaintiff’ s life sentence was commuted to
one that was from “[thirty-six] years to life.” He was paroled in
November, 1975. Between 1975 and 1990 the plaintiff was re-
turned to custody on five occasions (1977, 1980, 1982, 1989, and
1990) for failing to adhere to his conditions of parole, including
repeated problems with alcohol and assaultive behavior. In 1987
he sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI), which caused defi-
ciencies in his memory, speech, and cognition. He attributes the
loss of his job while on parole as well as an exacerbation of his
alcohol problems to TBI.

The plaintiff was denied parole following review hearings
before the board in 1991, 1994, and 1997. In 2003, he was again
paroled on the condition that he complete a long-term residential
program and attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings at least
three times per week. Less than one month later, his parole was
revoked for failure to complete the residential program. He has
been incarcerated since that time.

2. 2012 parole hearing and decision. In August, 2012, the
plaintiff had a review hearing before the board. During that hear-

"We acknowledge the amicus brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts, the Center for Public Representation, the National Disability
Rights Network, and Prisoners’ Legal Services.

2The plaintiff was the getaway vehicle’s driver.

®The plaintiff was also sentenced to serve from fifteen to twenty years for
assault with intent to rob or murder, from three to five years for assault by means
of a dangerous weapon, and from fifteen to twenty years for armed robbery, all
to be served concurrently with his life sentence.

108 477 Mass. 106 (2017)

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

ing, one of the board members noted that TBI had “caused
cognitive functioning [and] emotional functioning deficits,” re-
sulting in uncooperative behavior that was “secondary to [the
plaintiff's] brain injury.” The board member stated that this was
a chronic, life-long condition that “might get worse . . . [s]o [the
plaintiff] would need to be in some sort of setting where [he]
could be managed and cooperate with people forever.” She also
expressed concern about the fact that the programs the plaintiff's
counsel had looked into were voluntary programs that would
require his full cooperation.

Ultimately the board issued its decision denying the plaintiff
parole, stating that the plaintiff “was unable to offer any concrete,
viable release plan that could assure the [bJoard that he would be
compliant on parole after his history of defiance and non-com-
pliance” and that he “has not sought or achieved the rehabilitation
necessary to live safely in the community.” The board also stated,
“Crowell was unable to address the concerns related to his
combative attitude and . . . gave the clear impression that he feels
entitled to parole .. . .” The board denied the plaintiff's request
for reconsideration.

3. Certiorari action. On April 2, 2014, the plaintiff timely filed
a complaint seeking certiorari review of the board’s decision by
way of G. L. c. 249, § 4, alleging that the board’s denial was a
violation of his rights under the ADA and cognate State provi-
sions, and that the board’s decision to grant him a review hearing
only every five years (rather than annually) was unlawful. He
sought immediate release or a hearing at which the board would
be prohibited from considering his disability as a reason to
prevent him from being paroled. The plaintiff further asked the
court to direct the board to use its resources to find an appropriate
placement for him in the community.

The judge allowed the board’s motion to dismiss, concluding
that the board had not discriminated against the plaintiff in its
decision denying him parole because it considered many factors,
only one of which was his disability related to the TBI. The
plaintiff appealed and obtained a brief stay of the appeal to pursue
an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration on the limited issue
whether he is serving a life sentence or a sentence for a term of
years. We transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own
motion.

Discussion. 1. The motion to dismiss. We review a judge’s
order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Boston Med. Ctr.

477 Mass. 106 (2017) 109

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

Corp. v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Health & Human Servs.,
463 Mass. 447, 450 (2012). The plaintiff asserts that the motion
judge erroneously allowed the board’s motion to dismiss because
the board failed first to file the administrative record pursuant to
a standing order of the Superior Court. Superior Court Standing
Order 1-96(2) applies to actions in the nature of certiorari under
G.L. c. 249, § 4, and requires the agency to file its administrative
record within ninety days of service of the complaint.‘ It also
extends the deadline for certain motions, including those brought
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) and (e), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), to
twenty days after service of the record. The board contends that
it complied with both Superior Court Standing Order 1-96 and
tule 12 (b) (“A motion making any of these defenses shall be
made before pleading . . .”). Although the board was free to file
a motion to dismiss, it was error for the judge to allow it as the
plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.
That is, he alleged in his complaint that the result of the parole
board hearing (a quasi judicial administrative proceeding) was
arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or
otherwise an error of law. See Hoffer v. Board of Registration in
Med., 461 Mass. 451, 458 n.9 (2012) (discussing what plaintiff

“The relevant portions of Superior Court Standing Order 1-96 provide:

“2, The administrative agency whose proceedings are to be judicially
reviewed shall, by way of answer, file the original or certified copy of the
record of the proceeding . .. within ninety (90) days after service upon it
of the [clomplaint. . . .

“3. The following motions raising preliminary matters must be served . . .
not later than twenty (20) days after service of the record by the admin-
istrative agency.

“(a) Motions authorized by Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b) or 12(e).

“Any party failing to serve such a motion within the prescribed time
limit, or within any court-ordered extension, shall be deemed to have
waived any such motion . . . and the case shall proceed solely on the basis
of the record. . ..

“4, A claim for judicial review shall be resolved through a motion for
judgment on the pieadings, Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(c), .. . except as otherwise
provided by this [s]tanding [olrder, unless the [clourt’s decision on any
motion specified in part 3 above has made such a resolution inappro-
priate...”

110 477 Mass. 106 (2017)

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

must show to obtain certiorari review).*

Given the plaintiff's allegations, the only appropriate way for
the court to evaluate the claim is through a review of the admin-
istrative record upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See
School Comm. of Hudson v. Board of Educ., 448 Mass. 565,
575-576 (2007), citing St. Botolph Citizens Comm., Inc. v. Boston
Redey. Auth., 429 Mass. 1, 7 (1999) (“Certiorari is a limited
procedure reserved for correction of substantial errors of law
apparent on the record created before a judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal’). Requiring a defendant agency to file the administrative
record as a matter of course is an implicit acknowledgement of
that fact.° See Firearms Records Bur. v. Simkin, 466 Mass. 168,
180 (2013), citing Cambridge Hous. Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
7 Mass. App. Ct. 586, 587 (1979). For this reason, we vacate the
dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

2. The disability claim. In his Superior Court complaint, the
plaintiff asserted that the board’s decision to deny his parole
petition was unlawful to the extent that the decision relied on his
disability and faulted him for failing to seek out an appropriate
release plan. He claimed that the decision violated the ADA,” as
well as art. 1148 and G. L. c. 93, § 103.9 Because we vacate the

®A motion to dismiss may be appropriate, however, where a plaintiff has not
met the time limitations for certiorari review, where the claim is moot, where a
plaintiff lacks standing, or where certiorari review is not otherwise proper. See,
e.g., Indeck v. Clients’ Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 380-381 (2008).

Although it did not explain its reasoning, the Appeals Court came to the
same conclusion in Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct.
531, 541 n.10 (2014). There, the Superior Court judge had a “near complete
record” before him by the time he considered the board’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, and the Appeals Court affirmed the judge’s decision,
citing the parties’ agreement to proceed on a partial record. Id. The court
cautioned, however, that “[i]n future cases, certiorari review should be con-
ducted under [Mass. R. Civ. P.] 12(c), in accordance with Superior Court
Standing Order 1-96, and not under rule 12(b)(6).” Id.

7Title IL of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides: “[N]o
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).

*Article 114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution provides: “No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap,
be excluded from the participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subject to
discrimination under any program or activity within the [Clommonwealth.”

General Laws c. 93, § 103, provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person
within the [C[ommonwealth, regardless of handicap . . . shall, with reasonable

477 Mass. 106 (2017) Wl

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

dismissal on procedural grounds, we need not reach the merits of
the plaintiff’s disability claim. That being said, it is clear from the
limited information we have — i.e., a partial transcript and the
board’s written decision — that the board’s decision to deny the
parole petition does not appear to have considered adequately the
application of the ADA and our own relevant constitutional and
statutory provisions. We therefore make the following observa-
tions.

The ADA and State provisions “prohibit the same conduct:
disabled persons may not be ‘excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of’ services, programs, or activities [of a
public entity], and they may not ‘be subjected to discrimination’ ”
(citation omitted). Shedlock v. Department of Correction, 442
Mass. 844, 854 (2004). The plaintiff alleges, and the board clearly
assumed (both during the review hearing and in its decision
denying his petition for parole), that the plaintiff suffers from a
disability: cognitive and behavioral limitations resulting from
TBI. The plaintiff also alleges that he has been denied the benefits
of a State program, i.e., a fair hearing and parole review decision
process, to which he was statutorily entitled. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131(1)(B) (2012) (“public entity” includes State agencies);
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210
(1998) (ADA applies to prisoners); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d
890, 896-897 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 921 (2003)
(ADA applies to parole proceedings, including substantive deci-
sion-making).'° Therefore, the only open question is whether the
plaintiff was excluded from the program, or discriminated against

accommodation, have the same rights as other persons . . . to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings . . . , including, but not limited to, the rights
secured under [art. 114].”

1See also United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Ex-
amples and Resources to Support Criminal Justice Entities in Compliance with
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Jan, 2017), https://www.ada.gov/
cjta.html [https://perma.cc/4W6S-9TSN | (DOJ Examples) (State programs may
include “determining whether to revoke probation or parole, . . . parole and
release programs, and re-entry planning”). The guidance document further
explains that State entities must “[e]nsure that people with mental health
disabilities . . . have an equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from the
entities’ programs, services, and activities.” Id. To provide equal opportunities,
State entities must “[m]ake reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when necessary to avoid disability discrimination in all interactions
with people with mental health disabilities . . . , unless the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” Id.

112 477 Mass. 106 (2017)

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

in the form of denial of parole, by reason of his disability. See
Thompson, supra at 896, 898 n.4 (describing this inquiry as
asking whether prisoner was “otherwise qualified”).

The board’s decision to grant parole is limited by statute; it
may only do so where it finds, “after consideration of a risk and
needs assessment, that there is a reasonable probability that, if the
prisoner is released with appropriate conditions and community
supervision, the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law and that release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society.” G. L. c. 127, § 130.1" No prisoner is entitled
to parole, Deal v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 307,
322 (2016), and we give the board’s determination “considerable
deference,” Greenman vy. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 405 Mass.
384, 387 (1989).

However, this deference is not without limits. First, the board
clearly may not categorically exclude any prisoner by reason of
his or her disability. See Thompson, 295 F.3d at 898 n.4. Second,
both the ADA and the parole statute, G. L. c. 127, § 130, require
the board to take some measures to accommodate prisoners with
disabilities. Where the board is aware that a mental disability may
affect a prisoner’s ability to prepare an appropriate release plan in
advance of a parole hearing, the board should make reasonable
modifications to its policy, for example, by providing an expert or
other assistance to help the prisoner identify appropriate
postrelease programming. See 28 C.ER. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016);”
28 CER. § 35.130(b)(8) (2016).12 In accommodating prisoners
with mental disabilities, the board should also consider whether

“General Laws c. 127, § 130, further provides:

“In making this determination, the parole board shall consider whether,
during the period of incarceration, the prisoner has participated in avail-
able work opportunities and education or treatment programs and demon-
strated good behavior. The board shall also consider whether risk reduction
programs, made available through collaboration with criminal justice
agencies would minimize the probability of the prisoner re-offending once
released.”

2Title 28 CER. § 35.130(b(7) (2016) provides:

“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, prac-
tices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid dis-
crimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demon-
strate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of the service, program, or activity.”

"Title 28 CER. § 35.130(b)(8) (2016) provides:

477 Mass. 106 (2017) 113

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

there are risk reduction programs designed to reduce recidivism
in those who are mentally disabled. See G. L. c. 127, § 130.

These provisions do not require the board to make modifica-
tions that would “fundamentally alter” the nature of parole. 28
C.ER. § 35.130(b)(7). See 28 C.ER. § 35.139 (2016). To the
contrary, those who would pose a danger to society even with risk
reduction programs should not be released on parole. G. L. c. 127,
§ 130. In addition, the board’s important role in protecting society
from the early release of dangerous persons means that the board
must be able to consider whether the symptoms of a prisoner’s
disability mean that he or she has a heightened propensity to
commit crime while released on parole. See Thompson, 295 F.3d
at 898 1.4.

The interaction of these requirements means that once the
board became aware that the plaintiff's disability could poten-
tially affect his ability to qualify for parole, it had the responsi-
bility to determine whether reasonable modifications could en-
able the plaintiff to qualify, without changing the fundamental
nature of parole.'* Here, the board indicated its awareness both of
the plaintiff's disability and of how symptoms stemming from
that disability could affect his behavior both in the parole hearing
and on parole. In addition, although one board member discussed
the possibility that the plaintiff would need to be in a “very struc-
tured setting” while on parole, there is no indication in the limited
record before us whether the board actually considered any such
modification and whether it would make him a more qualified

“A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen
out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of
individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service,
program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for
the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.”

14Tn interpreting art. 114 and the ADA, we have previously examined whether

the disabled individual requested reasonable accommodations from a State
prison. See Shedlock v. Department of Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 856-859
(2004). In that case, however, we noted that prison officials, while aware of the
prisoner’s disability, might have been unaware that he needed further accom-
modation. /d. at 856-857. Here, the board — as reflected in the board member’s
comments and in the board's written decision — was clearly aware of the
plaintiff's disability and that he would need further accommodation if parole
were to work. As a result, the board had an obligation to consider whether
reasonable modifications could mitigate any risk that the plaintiff would pose
were he released on parole. See DOJ Examples, supra (“The reasonable modi-
fication obligation applies when an agency employee knows or reasonably
should know that the person has a disability and needs a modification . . .”).

114 477 Mass. 106 (2017)

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

candidate for parole. Further, the board negatively considered the
plaintiff's attitude during the parole hearing and his own failure to
identify what the board considered to be appropriate parole pro-
grams, without considering whether these behaviors were the
result of his TBI.

In short, while the judge correctly noted that in its decision, the
board had considered a broad set of factors, including the plain-
tiff's behavior before his TBI, the record before us shows no
consideration of how the plaintiff's limitations affect his parole
eligibility, whether these limitations could be mitigated with
reasonable modifications,"® and whether other factors would nev-
ertheless disqualify him from parole.'* More importantly, it is
impossible to determine the weight the board gave to the disabil-
ity and associated limitations relative to other factors in its
analysis. Once the board has submitted the administrative record,
upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion judge
will have a better basis for considering the plaintiff's claims.‘7

3. Frequency of parole review. General Laws c. 127, § 133A,
governs parole eligibility for “[e]very prisoner who is serving a
sentence for life,” with limited exceptions. It provides for an
initial hearing fifteen years into a life term, and rehearings every
five years if parole is not granted. Id. 120 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 301.01(5). In contrast, with limited exceptions not relevant
here, all other prisoners denied parole are entitled to a rehearing
on an annual basis. 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 301.01(2) (1997).

To the extent that the plaintiff's disability prevents him from seeking out
such reasonable modifications himself, it may be inappropriate for the board to
place the burden on him to put forward his own parole programming proposal.

46Tn this case, at least with respect to the plaintiff’s limitations due to TBI and
how those limitations interact with the criteria for parole, it is difficult to see
how the board could proceed without a professional evaluation of the plaintiff's
condition and recommendation regarding a postrelease plan that might diminish
the risk of recidivism. See 28 C.ER. § 35.130(h) (2016) (assessment whether
safety requirements that exclude persons with disabilities are nevertheless
legitimate must be “based on actual risks, not on mere speculation, stereotypes,
or generalizations about individuals with disabilities”); 28 C.ER. § 35.139(b)
(2016) (assessment whether individual poses “direct threat” must rely “on
current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence . . . to
ascertain” nature of risk and whether it could be reasonably mitigated).

‘7We note that, even if the plaintiff is successful in demonstrating a violation
of the ADA upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, he is not automati-
cally entitled to the relief he seeks (release on parole), but rather to a parole
hearing and decision that considers reasonable modifications in light of his
disability.

477 Mass. 106 (2017) 115

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

The plaintiff argues that the commutation of his original sentence
from life with the possibility of parole to from thirty-six years to
life reduced his sentence to an indeterminate one, such that it is
no longer governed by § 133A, and that he is entitled to review
on an annual basis.'* We disagree.

The case to which the defendant cites undermines his argu-
ment, as the court held that the nature of a prisoner’s sentence
depends on the maximum term, which sets “the maximum
amount of time that the prisoner will serve in prison if he . . . is
not granted parole,” whereas the minimum term “serves as a base
for determining his parole eligibility date.” Connery v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 254 (1992), S.C.,
414 Mass. 1009, 1011 (1993), citing Commonwealth v. Hogan,
17 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 189 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Haley,
23 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 18 (1986). Because judges sentencing on
convictions for murder in the second degree now must fix a
minimum term as a parole eligibility date, G. L. c. 279, § 24, if
we adopted the defendant’s view it would essentially mean that
no sentences other than a life sentence without the possibility of
parole would be a “life sentence.” This would render § 133A
meaningless. See Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass'n v. Boston, 435
Mass. 718, 721 (2002), quoting Victory Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div.
of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 435 Mass. 136, 140 (2001) (“We
interpret statutes so as to avoid rendering any part of the legis-
lation meaningless”). Instead, the board has determined that
§ 133A and the associated regulations govern parole hearings for
all “individuals serving a sentence that contains life as the maxi-
mum term of the sentence.” 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 100.00
(2001). Therefore, the plaintiff’s sentence remains a “life sen-

1®The plaintiff also argues that because his commuted sentence is similar to
that described in the home invasion statute, G. L. c. 265, § 18C (“for life or for
any term of not less than twenty years”), his sentence should be governed by
G. L. c. 127, § 133 (annual review), rather than G. L. c. 127, § 133A (review
every five years). He reasons that in Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772,
774-717 (2000), we mentioned that a defendant convicted under the home
invasion statute was subject to § 133. However, the plaintiff ignores the fact that
unlike himself, the defendant in Brown was not sentenced to life, but instead to
from twenty years to twenty years and one day. Id. at 773.

The plaintiff further argues that we should adopt California’s rule, citing
three decisions in which that State’s highest court held that a sentence of from
a term of years to life is not a life sentence. These decisions are distinguishable
from the plaintiffs case, however, as all three involved crimes committed when
the defendants in question were minors.

116 477 Mass. 106 (2017)

Crowell x, Massachusetts Parole Board,

tence,” and his parole is governed by § 133A.
Conclusion. We reverse the dismissal of the complaint and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 117 (2017) 117

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

Brian Benorr vs. Crry or Boston
(and a consolidated case‘).

Suffolk. January 9, 2017. - May 16, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Workers’ Compensation Act, Compensation, Public employee, Decision of
Industrial Accident Reviewing Board, Insurer. Public Employment, Suspen-
sion, Worker’s compensation, Municipal Corporations, Officers and employ-
ees.

This court concluded that nothing in G. L. ¢. 152, § 12 (1), the enforcement
provision of the workers’ compensation act, precluded two Superior Court
judges hearing actions to enforce an order of the Department of Industrial
Accidents (department) from determining whether G. L. c. 268A, § 25,
which permits suspension of an officer or employee of a county, city, town,
or district during any period during which the officer or employee is under
indictment for misconduct in his or her office or employment, proscribed
enforcement of that order [120-121]; further, this court concluded that the
defendant city had not waived its argument regarding G. L.c. 268A, § 25, by
failing to raise it at the administrative level, where such an argument was
beyond the scope of the department’s jurisdiction [121].

This court concluded that G. L. c. 268A, § 25, did not proscribe the receipt of
workers’ compensation benefits by a correction officer who had been sus-
pended from his position while under indictment, where such benefits did not
constitute compensation within the meaning of § 25, in that, although such
benefits are triggered by injuries that arise in the course of employment, they
are not in exchange for services rendered during that employment. [121-126]

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
November 24, 2014.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Linda E. Giles, J.

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
November 3, 2015.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

John M. Becker for the plaintiff.

E. David Susich (Thomas A. Pagliarulo also present) for the
defendant.

*The consolidated case involves the same parties.

118 477 Mass. 117 (2017)

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

Lenk, J. On September 5, 2011, after working almost twenty
years as an emergency medical technician and paramedic for the
defendant city’s emergency medical services (EMS), the plaintiff
suffered an incapacitating ankle injury while transporting a pa-
tient. Unable to work, he received workers’ compensation pay-
ments for almost one year pursuant to G. L. c. 152, the workers’
compensation act.

Learning that the plaintiff had been indicted on October 31,
2012, on charges relating to misuse of controlled substances
intended for EMS patients, the defendant suspended him indefi-
nitely without pay pursuant to G. L. c. 268A, § 25 (suspension
statute). After the defendant, a self-insured municipal employer,
discontinued the plaintiff's workers’ compensation payments, he
took the matter to the Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA);
the defendant was ordered to restore those payments.

When the defendant did not comply with the DIA order, the
plaintiff sought enforcement in the Superior Court pursuant to
G.L. c. 152, § 12 (1). The defendant argued then, as now, that the
provision of the suspension statute requiring that suspended pub-
lic employees “shall not receive any compensation or salary
during the period of suspension” prevails over the requirements
of the worker’s compensation act, and that the DIA order requir-
ing proscribed payments should accordingly not be enforced. A
Superior Court judge agreed and dismissed the enforcement ac-
tions.? We conclude that workers’ compensation benefits are not
“compensation” as defined in the suspension statute, because they
are not payments made “in return for services rendered.” G. L.
c. 268A, § 1 (a). The Superior Court actions brought by the
plaintiff to enforce the orders of the DIA accordingly were dis-
missed in error.?

1. Background.* The plaintiff began working for the city of
Boston as an emergency medical technician in 1996, and was

2The plaintiff brought two enforcement actions; one during his suspension
and one after his resignation from the defendant’s employment. He argued in the
latter action that G. L. c. 268A, § 25 (suspension statute), no longer precluded
him from receiving workers’ compensation payments because he was no longer
suspended.

8Given our conclusion, we do not reach the plaintiff's contentions that
attorney’s fees, expenses, and court fees do not constitute compensation under
G. L. ¢. 268A, § 25, nor his argument that he is entitled to workers’ compen-
sation for the periods before and after his suspension.

4We accept as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. See Burbank
Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 474 Mass. 107, 116 (2016).

477 Mass. 117 (2017) 119

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

promoted to paramedic in 2004. On September 5, 2011, he suf-
fered a significant ankle injury while helping bring a patient to his
ambulance. As a result of the plaintiff's incapacitation, the de-
fendant paid workers’ compensation benefits to him from Sep-
tember 5, 2011, until August 4, 2012.5

In August, 2012, the defendant notified the plaintiff that his
workers’ compensation payments would be terminated.* The
plaintiff filed a claim contesting the termination of the payments
with the DIA on October 23, 2012. Just over a week later, the
plaintiff was indicted on seventy-three counts of criminal mis-
conduct involving controlled substances in his ambulance. The
defendant suspended the plaintiff’ s employment shortly thereafter
pursuant to the suspension statute.”

The DIA conducted a hearing regarding the plaintiff's workers’
compensation claim on September 30, 2013. On October 6, 2014,
the DIA ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant
to resume making workers’ compensation payments. The defend-
ant appealed from the DIA’s decision and did not comply with
the order. On November 24, 2014, the plaintiff brought an action
in the Superior Court to enforce the DIA’s order against the
defendant pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1).° A Superior Court
judge granted the defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss on

®The defendant is obliged to make workers’ compensation payments to its
employees who suffer job-related injuries because it is a “self-insurer” under the
workers’ compensation act. See G. L. c. 152, § 25A.

®The defendant apparently contested the plaintiff’s claim that the injury was
accidental. Upon the defendant’s suspension in connection with criminal
charges, the defendant asserted that the payments were also proscribed by virtue
of the suspension statute,

7General Laws c. 268A, § 25, provides in relevant part:

“An officer or employee of a county, city, town or district, howsoever
formed, including, but not limited to, regional school districts and regional
planning districts, or of any department, board, commission or agency
thereof may, during any period such officer or employee is under indict-
ment for misconduct in such office or employment or for misconduct in
any elective or appointive public office, trust or employment at any time
held by him, be suspended by the appointing authority, whether or not such
appointment was subject to approval in any manner.”

®The review board of the Department of Industrial Accidents eventually
affirmed the order.

©The enforcement provision of the workers’ compensation act, G. L. c. 152,
§ 12 (1), provides, in relevant part:

“Whenever any party in interest presents a certified copy of an order or
decision of a board member or of the reviewing board and any papers in
connection therewith to the superior court department of the trial court for

120 477 Mass. 117 (2017)

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

the ground that the suspension statute prohibited the plaintiff
from receiving workers’ compensation payments while he was
suspended because it constituted “compensation” under the stat-
ute. See G. L. c. 268A, § 25 (“Any person [suspended pursuant to
the statute] shall not receive any compensation or salary during
the period of suspension . . .”). The plaintiff appealed from the
decision.

On August 5, 2015, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to one felony
count and seventeen misdemeanor counts and resigned from his
employment with the defendant. He then brought another en-
forcement action in the Superior Court on the basis that the
suspension statute no longer barred his compensation payments
because he was no longer suspended. A different Superior Court
judge granted the defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss,
concluding that the suspension statute still barred the plaintiff
from receiving workers’ compensation because his suspension
had not been lifted prior to his resignation. The plaintiff appealed
from the ruling; his request that both cases be consolidated
pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 3 (b), 365 Mass. 845 (1974), was
allowed in the Appeals Court. We transferred the cases from the
Appeals Court on our own motion.

2. Discussion. Given that all of the plaintiffs objections to the
two Superior Court judges’ rulings concern questions of law, our
review is de novo. See Commonwealth v. Diggs, 475 Mass. 79, 81
(2016). The plaintiff advances three claims in his appeal. His
main contention is that the judges erred in their determinations
that workers’ compensation payments are proscribed by the sus-
pension statute, and in dismissing his enforcement actions on that
basis. He also contends both that G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1) (“the court
shall enforce the order’), by its terms, requires the Superior Court
to enforce his DIA order, and that the defendant waived its
argument under the suspension statute by failing to raise it before
the DIA. We first address only briefly the latter two issues and
then turn to the matter of chief concern, viz., the apparent conflict
between the workers’ compensation act and the suspension stat-
ute.

a. Required enforcement of the DIA order pursuant to G. L.
c. 152, § 12 (1). The plaintiff maintains that the Superior Court

the county in which the injury occurred or for the county of Suffolk, the
court shall enforce the order or decision, notwithstanding whether the
matters at issue have been appealed and a decision on the merits of the
appeal is pending.”

477 Mass. 117 (2017) 121

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

judges were obliged to enforce the DIA’s order pursuant to the
unambiguous terms of G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1), and were required
to do so irrespective of any potential conflict with the suspension
statute. This contention misses the mark. The Superior Court,
when asked to do so, must determine whether the statutory
enforcement mechanism it is to employ conflicts with another
potentially superseding statute. See Keenan, petitioner, 310
Mass. 166, 179 (1941) (Superior Court “is a court of original and
general jurisdiction and possesses the inherent powers of such a
court under the common law, unless expressly limited, as well as
those conferred by statute” [citation omitted]). Language in the
enforcement statute stating that a “court shall enforce” an order is
not to the contrary — it means only that, when asked to enforce
the order, a Superior Court judge cannot second-guess the merits
of the DIA’s decision. That is not the situation here.

b. Waiver. The plaintiff also contends, similarly without merit,
that the defendant waived its argument concerning the suspension
statute by failing to raise it at the administrative level. The DIA’s
jurisdiction, however, is limited to the interpretation and appli-
cation of the workers’ compensation act, and the defendant thus
could not have raised the issue of G. L. c. 268A, § 25, before the
DIA. See Hayes’s Case, 348 Mass. 447, 452-453 (1965), quoting
Levangie’s Case, 228 Mass. 213, 216-217 (1917) (“The [Indus-
trial Accident Board, a predecessor to the DIA,] ‘is not a court of
general or limited common|[-]law jurisdiction; . . . it is purely and
solely an administrative tribunal, specifically created to adminis-
ter the [workers’] compensation act in aid and with the assistance
of the Superior Court . . . , and as such possesses only such
authority and powers as have been conferred upon it by express
grant or arise therefrom by implication as necessary and inciden-
tal to the full exercise of the granted powers’”). Accordingly, the
defendant appropriately raised the issue in the Superior Court.

c. Whether the suspension statute prohibits suspended employ-
ees from receiving workers’ compensation. The plaintiff contends
that workers’ compensation does not constitute “compensation”
within the meaning of the suspension statute. That statute states,
in relevant part, that any employee suspended pursuant to it “shall
not receive any compensation or salary during the period of
suspension.” G. L. c. 268A, § 25. The term “compensation” is in
turn defined as “any money, thing of value or economic benefit
conferred on or received by any person in return for services
rendered or to be rendered by himself or another.” G. L. c. 268A,
§ 1 (@). We first set forth an overview of the relevant statutes.

122 477 Mass. 117 (2017)

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

i Statutory overview. A. The suspension statute. The suspen-
sion statute, “which applies to county, municipal, and district
officers, is identical in its operative language to G. L. c. 30,
§ 59, . . . which applies to officers and employees of the Com-
monwealth.” Springfield v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.,
398 Mass. 786, 788 (1986), quoting Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd., 397
Mass. 734, 739 n.8 (1986). The suspension statute was enacted in
1972, see St. 1972, c. 257, to “remedy the untenable situation
which arises when a person who has been indicted for misconduct
in office continues to perform his public duties while awaiting
trial . . . by allowing for the temporary removal of such employ-
ees from office, and by precluding the payment of compensa-
tion... during the period of their suspension.” Springfield, supra
at 788-789, quoting Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., supra at
739. Because the statute does not include any exception, it “is
dominant in its purpose and its terms” (quotation omitted).
Springfield, supra at 789.

We have interpreted the term “compensation,” as it appears in
the suspension statute, as encompassing “a broader meaning than
the word ‘salary.’ ” Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790. The term is to
be “read in light of” the purpose of the suspension statute, i.e., to
effect “a complete severance of the relationship between public
employer and employee.” See id., quoting Brown v. Taunton, 16
Mass. App. Ct. 614, 620 (1983).

B. The worker’s compensation act. The workers’ compensation
act, originally enacted in 1911, guarantees workers certain ben-
efits as the exclusive remedy for injuries they suffer in the course
of employment, regardless of the employer’s fault. See Estate of
Moulton vy. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 483 (2014), citing St. 1911,
c. 751, pt. 1, § 5, and pt. 5, § 1. The act “was intended to guaran-
tee that workers would receive payment for any workplace inju-
ries they suffered, regardless of fault; in exchange for accepting
the statutory remedies, the worker waives any common-law right
to compensation for injuries.” Estate of Moulton, supra. The
workers’ compensation scheme “provides predictability for both
employee and employer, balancing protection for workers with
certainty for employers.” Jd.

The worker’s compensation act operates by requiring each
employer in the Commonwealth to obtain workers’ compensation
coverage from an insurer that will make workers’ compensation
payments to injured employees or, alternatively, to obtain a license

477 Mass. 117 (2017) 123

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

“as a self-insurer” — i.e., an employer that makes workers’
compensation payments to its employees. See G. L. c. 152, § 25A.
Failure to do so may result in, among other things, the imposition
of civil penalties upon employers, who also may forfeit immunity
from suits by employees. See G. L. c. 152, §25C (11). An
employee may opt out of the workers’ compensation scheme and
retain the right to sue the employer in tort by making such an
intention clear in writing upon hire. See G. L. c. 152, § 24;
Wentworth v. Henry C. Becker Custom Bldg. Ltd., 459 Mass. 768,
TB 0.6 (2011).

Under the worker’s compensation act, an employee who suffers
an injury arising out of employment is entitled to an array of
benefits depending on the nature of the injury. In general, an
employee who suffers such an injury will recover medical ex-
penses arising out of the injury, G. L. c. 152, § 30, and receive,
for some period of time, weekly payments based upon the
employee's salary prior to her injury. In the event of certain
specific and debilitating injuries, employees are also to receive an
additional lump sum payment. See G. L. c. 152, § 36. Should an
employee succumb to a work related injury, certain survivors will
receive weekly payments in the employee’s stead. See G. L.
c. 152, § 31.

ii. Analysis. The question before us is whether the meaning of
the statutory term “compensation” in the suspension statute en-
compasses such workers’ compensation benefits. It is axiomatic
that “a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordi-
nary and approved usage of the language, considered in connec-
tion with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection
to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end
that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.” Yeretsky v.
Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315, 319 (1997), quoting Board of Educ. v.
Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513 (1975). “In interpret-
ing the meaning of a statute, we look first to the plain statutory

1°The period of time during which the injured employee will receive pay-
ments is dependent upon the extent and duration of the employee’s incapacity
for work. See G. L. c. 152, § 35 (compensation for partial incapacity extends to
260 weeks or to 520 “if an insurer agrees or an administrative judge finds that
the employee has, as a result of a personal injury under [the act], suffered a
permanent loss of seventy-five percent or more of any bodily function or sense
specified in” G. L. c. 152, § 36); G. L. ¢. 152, § 34 (compensation for total
incapacity extends to 156 weeks); G. L. c. 152, § 34A (compensation for total
and permanent incapacity extends for entirety of employee's life).

124 477 Mass. 117 (2017)

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

language.” DiCarlo v. Suffolk Constr. Co., 473 Mass. 624, 629
(2016), quoting Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass.
134, 138 (2013). Applying these principles to the present case, we
conclude that workers’ compensation benefits do not fall within
the ambit of the suspension statute.

While the statutory term “compensation” is defined broadly,
see Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790, its scope is not unbounded. The
Legislature defined “compensation” as “any money, thing of
value or economic benefit conferred on or received by any person
in return for services rendered” (emphasis added). G. L. c. 268A,
§ 1 (@). The phrase “in return for services rendered,” given its
plain meaning, denotes a reciprocal relationship between the
benefits received and the services provided. See, e.g., Killoran v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 709 F.2d 31, 31-32 (9th Cir.
1983) (taxicab driver’s tips were paid “in return for services
rendered” and were therefore income for Federal income tax
purposes). In order for a benefit to qualify as compensation that
a suspended public employee may not receive, it must be pro-
vided as recompense for the employee’s services, i.e., in return
for services rendered.

How strictly that requisite reciprocity is to be understood is
central to the question before us: whether workers’ compensation
benefits are received in return for services the injured employee
rendered. If reciprocity means only payments akin to wages, the
broad meaning of “compensation” intended by the Legislature
would be vitiated. On the other hand, if reciprocity could mean,
as the defendant seems to suggest, any benefit stemming from a
“put for” nexus formed by the employee relationship itself —i.e.,
any benefit arising from even a tangential connection to employee
services — the phrase “in return for services rendered” effec-
tively would be written out of the statutory definition. See
Chatham Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 362 Mass. 216, 219 (1972)
(“every word of a legislative enactment is to be given force and
effect”).

In determining that certain benefits constitute compensation
under the suspension statute, our cases suggest a middle course,
one which takes the phrase to mean a reciprocity where the
benefits in question are interwoven with, and received primarily
as a result of, services rendered. Benefits in this category include
sick pay, Brown, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 620 (entitlement received
as part of compensation package and provided in lump sum upon
termination if not used); return on an investment received in

477 Mass. 117 (2017) 125

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

exchange for technical advice given, Commonwealth v. Canon,
373 Mass. 494, 497 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978)
(investment opportunity in exchange for engineering advice by
city engineer constituted compensation); and unemployment ben-
efits, Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790-791 (employer obliged to pay
such benefits as result of employee having rendered wage-earning
services to employer). In each instance, the reason the employee
received the benefit was primarily as the result of services he
rendered as an employee.

The receipt of workers’ compensation benefits differs from
these because, while such benefits are triggered by injuries that
arise in the course of employment, see Derinza’s Case, 229 Mass.
435, 441-442 (1918), they are not in exchange for services
rendered during that employment. The reciprocal exchange that
occurs in the workers’ compensation context is not between
services and benefits, but between the waived right to sue the
employer in tort for injuries and the guarantee of benefits when
injured. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Dep't. of La-
bor, 449 U.S. 268, 282 n.24 (1980) (“Employees . . . give up the
right of suit for damages for personal injuries against employers
in return for the certainty of compensation payments as recom-
pense for those injuries” [citation omitted]); Estate of Moulton,
467 Mass. at 483 (“in exchange for accepting the statutory
remedies [of the workers’ compensation act], the worker waives
any common-law right to compensation for tort injuries”). The
various payments, medical and otherwise, provide comprehen-
sive recompense for “lost wages and lost earnings capacity and
medical expenses resulting from work-related injuries.” Neff v.
Commissioner of the Dep’t. of Indus. Accs., 421 Mass. 70, 75
(1995). Such payments are in the nature of insurance benefits
received pursuant to a policy taken out by the employer for the
employee’s benefit, see Derinza’s Case, 229 Mass. at 441; the
policy is, in effect, purchased in consideration for the employee’s
waiver of his or her right to sue the employer. Moreover, the
workers’ compensation act does not implicate the employer-
employee relationship — it concerns the relationship between an
employee and her insurer. See Insurance Co. of the State of Penn.
v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 473 Mass. 745, 750 (2016) (“although
the employer purchases the workers’ compensation policy, a
workers’ compensation insurer is directly liable to an injured
employee for the workers’ compensation benefits provided by
law; the insurer does not reimburse the employer for its payment

126 477 Mass. 117 (2017)

Benoit 1: City of Boston.

of these benefits”).

Our decision in Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790-791, is not to the
contrary, notwithstanding certain superficial similarities between
unemployment and workers’ compensation benefits. Enacted in
1935, the unemployment compensation statute, G. L. c. 151A,
§ 24, serves as a temporary economic stabilization mechanism
for terminated employees who meet the statutory criteria. See id.
(describing statutory criteria for benefits). The over-all “purpose
of the law is to provide temporary relief for those who are
realistically compelled to leave work through no ‘fault’ of their
own, whatever the source of the compulsion, personal or em-
ployer-initiated.” See Raytheon Co. v. Director of the Div. of
Employment Sec., 364 Mass. 593, 596 (1974); G. L. c. 151A,
§§ 29, 30. Employers fund this mechanism, G. L. c. 151A, § 14,
which is administered by the department of unemployment as-
sistance, and employees do not contribute to it in any manner. The
employee gives up neither rights nor money to receive such
benefits, which are, in effect, a statutorily mandated temporary
extension of his or her compensation package beyond the em-
ployee’s termination. The receipt of such benefits is primarily as
the result of services rendered during employment.

Because workers’ compensation benefits do not constitute com-
pensation for purposes of the suspension statute, that statute
accordingly does not proscribe the receipt of such benefits by
suspended employees.

3. Conclusion. The judgment is reversed, and the matter is
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

So ordered.

“The defendant's obligation to make workers’ compensation payments to its
employees stems from its role as a self-insurer under the worker’s compensation
act rather than its position as an employer.

12 A¢ that time, Federal law required for the first time that each State enact and
administer a worker’s compensation program. See Witte, Development of Un-
employment Compensation, 55 Yale L.J. 21, 32-35 (1945) (describing devel-
opment and implementation of “[FJederal-[S]tate system of unemployment
compensation”).

477 Mass. 127 (2017) 127

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

Commonweatti vs. AMARAL Montronp.
Plymouth. February 14, 2017. - May 17, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Homicide. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Confrontation of wit-
nesses. Intoxication. Evidence, Intoxication, Prior misconduct, Relevancy
and materiality, Expert opinion, Witness, Expert. Practice, Criminal, Capital
case, Assistance of counsel, Confrontation of witnesses.

At a murder trial, although the defendant's counsel’s strategic decision not to
introduce evidence of the defendant’s intoxication on the night of the
shooting was manifestly unreasonable, no error arose from the denial of the
defendant’s motion for a new trial, where this court was substantially
confident that, had the error not been made, the jury’s verdict would have
stayed the same, in light of all the evidence and the strength of the Com-
monwealth’s case. [133-136]

At a murder trial, although the defendant's counsel was ineffective in not
objecting to references to an Internet Web site of the most wanted fugitives
in Massachusetts that were more prejudicial than probative, this court was
substantially confident that the references did not alter the jury’s verdict,
given the judge’s curative instructions, reasonable inferences from the evi-
dence, and the strength of the Commonwealth’s case. [136-137]

Ata murder trial, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to move to strike
a statement by the medical examiner, where counsel’s effective cross-exami-
nation caused the medical examiner to recant her improper opinion shortly
after she offered it. [137-138]

At a murder trial, even assuming that testimony elicited from a medical exam-
iner regarding the results of a third party’s toxicology report on the victim
violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him, any error in
the admission of such testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
given the other evidence on that issue, which was not contested at trial.
[138-139] Lowy, J., concurring.

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on November 16, 2007.

The cases were tried before Paul E. Troy, J.; a motion for a
new trial, filed on July 12, 2012, and a motion for postconviction
discovery, filed on May 2, 2013, were considered by him; fol-
lowing remand by this court, the motion for a new trial was heard
by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J.

Leslie W. O’Brien for the defendant.

128 477 Mass. 127 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

Laurie Yeshulas, Assistant District Attorney, for the Common-
wealth.

Lenk, J. The defendant appeals from his conviction of murder
in the first degree* on a theory of deliberate premeditation in the
shooting death of Carlita Chaney on August 16, 2007, and from
the denial of his motion for a new trial. The defendant’s consoli-
dated appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his
motion for a new trial first came before this court in November,
2014, when, following oral argument, we stayed the appeal and
remanded the matter to the Superior Court to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing concerning the defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim and the location of certain telephone records. After
that hearing, the defendant renewed his motion for a new trial,
which the judge denied.

On appeal, the defendant argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective, and that his right of confrontation pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated
by virtue of certain testimony from the Commonwealth’s medical
examiner. He also contends that both motion judges erroneously
denied his motion for a new trial. Finally, the defendant asks that
we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the
degree of guilt. We conclude that there was no error requiring
reversal, and discern no reason to exercise our extraordinary
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Accordingly, we affirm the con-
victions.

1. Background. a. Facts. Based on the evidence at trial, the jury
could have found the following. The defendant and the victim had
been involved in a romantic relationship and had two children
together. They lived together in Brockton from 1997 until 2002,
when they broke up. The victim then moved to Ohio with the
children and had a child with someone else. In 2006, she and the
three children moved to Spartanburg, South Carolina. Although
her romantic relationship with the defendant had ended, the
victim would bring the children to Brockton for one month every
summer, and would stay with the defendant and his family.?

In early October, 2006, the victim’s younger sister, Kenyisha

‘The defendant also was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm,
unlawful possession of ammunition, and being an armed career criminal.

The defendant lived with his parents and his brother at the parents’ house in
Brockton.

477 Mass. 127 (2017) 129

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

Chaney,® learned that the defendant was listed on the Internet
Web site, MassMostWanted. She told this to the victim, who was
then living in South Carolina; at that time, the defendant was
staying at the victim’s house. Shortly after Kenyisha informed her
of the defendant’s “wanted” status, the victim alerted the South
Carolina police. The defendant was arrested at the victim’s house
and was returned to Massachusetts. Subsequently, he was re-
leased on bail.*

In July, 2007, the victim returned to Brockton to stay with the
defendant’s family for one month. Although the victim did not
spend the entire month at the defendant’s parents’ house, she was
staying there on the night of August 15, 2007. That night,
Kenyisha spoke with the victim by cellular telephone at approx-
imately 11:30 pm. Kenyisha testified at trial that she heard the
defendant in the background telling the victim to get off the
telephone and that the victim told her that the defendant had an
“attitude” toward her and had called her a “snitch.”>

Around | a.m. on the morning of August 16, 2007, the defend-
ant shot the victim in the head at close range as she reclined on
the couch in the basement of the Montronds’ home. According to
the defendant’s parents, who were awakened by the sound of the
gunshot, they rushed downstairs and saw the defendant screaming
and crying, “accident, accident.” He appeared to be suicidal. Jose
Montrond, the defendant’s father, told Maria Montrond,® the
defendant’s mother, to retrieve the gun, which was on the floor,
and put it upstairs. Maria picked up the gun and gave it to Jose,
who put the gun in a plastic bag and placed it inside a kitchen
cabinet. The Montronds testified that they did nothing further
with the gun, which police found with the safety lock engaged.

Because Carlita Chaney and her sister, Kenyisha Chaney, share a last name,
we refer to Kenyisha by her first name.

4The defendant’ s sister, Patricia Montrond, testified at trial that the defendant
spoke with her at some point shortly after his 2006 arrest, and said that he did
not harbor any ill will toward the victim for turning him in, commenting that she
“had her reasons.”

°The content of this conversation was a contested issue at trial. In her grand
jury testimony, Kenyisha testified that the victim had told her over the telephone
that the defendant had “called her a snitch.” In an interview with a police officer
two years later, Kenyisha stated that she actually had heard the defendant in the
background referring to the victim as “the snitch of the day.” Kenyisha was
extensively cross-examined on this issue.

Because the defendant’s parents, Jose and Maria Montrond, his brother,
Maradona Montrond, and his sister, Patricia Montrond, share a last name, we
refer the them by their first names.

130 477 Mass. 127 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

No one telephoned 911.

Shortly thereafter, Patricia Montrond, the defendant’s sister,
received a frantic telephone call from their brother, Maradona
Montrond, telling her that “something bad happened” and that she
should come to the Montronds’ house immediately. She arrived
to find the defendant crying, pounding his head, and yelling that
the shooting was an accident. She telephoned 911 and told the
dispatcher:

“This is an emergency. My brother just told me he was
playing with a gun. He thought the gun was on safety. He just
killed his girl friend. He just killed his girl friend downstairs
on the couch by mistake. A gun was — he thought the gun
was — my brother thought the lock — the gun was locked
when he was playing with it. He killed his girl friend by
mistake. My brother thought his gun was on lock, I guess. He
was playing with it and pointing it at his girl friend. She’s
dead; she’s dead on the couch.”

Brockton police Officer Jason Ford was one of the first re-
sponders. When he entered the house, he saw the defendant
wearing a “soiled” t-shirt and staring at the ground with red,
glassy eyes; the defendant looked as if he had been crying. Ford
retrieved the gun from the cabinet where the defendant’s parents
had placed it, noted that the safety lock was on, and put it in the
trunk of his cruiser. The defendant was arrested and read the
Miranda rights.

b. Trial and posttrial proceedings. At trial, the theory of the
defense was that the shooting was accidental. In particular, trial
counsel argued that the defendant thought that the safety lock was
engaged when the firearm fired the fatal shot. The jury convicted
the defendant of murder in the first degree and the firearms
offenses.”

In July, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of his
right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The defendant
argued that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance
by failing (1) to present evidence that the defendant was intoxi-

7 The defendant was convicted of being an armed career criminal in a separate,
jury-waived proceeding.

477 Mass. 127 (2017) 131

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

cated at the time of the shooting; (2) to object to the admission
of testimony regarding the defendant’s name appearing on
MassMostWanted; and (3) to seek to strike an answer by the
Commonwealth’s medical examiner that, in her opinion, the
shooting was a homicide. The defendant’s contention that he had
been deprived of his right to confrontation was based on a
statement by the medical examiner, who was permitted to testify,
over trial counsel’s objection, to the results of toxicology testing
that she had not conducted.

The first motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the
motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing. The judge
rejected the ineffective assistance claim involving evidence of the
defendant’s intoxication for three reasons: first, he did not credit
the affidavits submitted by the defendant; second, he concluded
that Ford’s testimony was not sufficient to establish “an inference
that [the defendant] was so debilitated by alcohol that his ability
to form the requisite criminal intent was impaired”; and third, he
determined that the evidence of intoxication could have under-
mined the defense of accident. The judge denied the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim arising from trial counsel’s failure to
object to references to the defendant’s name appearing on
MassMostWanted both because the references were properly ad-
missible to show the defendant’s motive and because, even if they
were admitted in error, there was no substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice. With respect to the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim concerning the medical examiner’s opinion that the
killing was a homicide, the judge determined that trial counsel
had mitigated the impact of the testimony by following up on the
examiner’s answer and ultimately causing her to recant her opin-
ion.

As to the medical examiner’s testimony concerning the toxicol-
ogy testing she had not performed, the judge concluded that there
had been a violation of the defendant’s rights under the confron-
tation clause, but that trial counsel had mitigated the erroneous
admission of the medical examiner’s testimony through an effec-

In support of the assertion that he had been intoxicated, the defendant
submitted his own affidavit and that of one of his friends, each stating that the
defendant had been drinking heavily on the evening of the shooting, as well as
the grand jury testimony of Brockton police Officer Jason Ford. Ford testified
before the grand jury but not at trial that when he first arrived at the Montronds’
house, he noticed that the defendant “reeked of B.O., like sweat and B.O., and
of alcohol.”

132 477 Mass. 127 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

tive cross-examination and that the error did not contribute to the
verdict. The judge also denied the defendant’s motion for ex-
panded discovery, which would have required the Commonwealth
to provide any telephone records in its possession that indicated
calls from Kenyisha’s telephone to the victim on the night of the
shootings.®

c. First oral argument. We initially heard oral argument in
November of 2014. The defendant’s direct appeal was consoli-
dated with his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial,
and raised all the arguments that he made in that motion. He also
challenged the denial of his motion for postconviction discovery,
and asked that this court exercise its extraordinary powers to
reduce the degree of guilt. As stated, we remanded the matter to
the Superior Court so that a limited evidentiary hearing could be
conducted, at which trial counsel could be summonsed to testify.

d. Proceedings on remand. Pursuant to the order of remand, a
hearing was conducted in April, 2015, at which trial counsel
testified regarding the telephone records*® and the decision not to
introduce any evidence suggesting that the defendant had been
intoxicated on the evening of the shooting. Trial counsel testified
that the main reason he had not introduced evidence of the
defendant’s intoxication was because it could have provided the
jury with an incentive to find the defendant guilty of murder in the
second degree. When pressed, trial counsel stated that he decided
not to introduce the intoxication evidence because he was “going
for all the marbles” — i.e., an acquittal — and that he had been
concerned that introducing evidence of intoxication evidence
might run counter to achieving that result.

*The defendant's appellate counsel stated in the motion that she had reviewed
“the defendant’s trial file and ha[d] been unable to locate the records.” She also
noted in an affidavit attached to the motion that she had been unable to contact
trial counsel, who had been suspended from the practice of law.

10Trial counsel testified at the April, 2015, evidentiary hearing that he had a
“clear memory of being satisfied” that the telephone call that was the subject of
the defendant’s motion for posttrial discovery took place, but that he did not
have a copy of the relevant telephone records. Following that hearing, the
Commonwealth complied with our subsequent order compelling it to produce
the records in question so that it would be possible to determine whether a call
had taken place between the victim and Kenyisha on the evening of the
shooting. The Commonwealth produced the records in question, which con-
firmed that Kenyisha had spoken with the victim for approximately twelve
minutes around 11:30 rm. that evening.

477 Mass. 127 (2017) 133

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

The second motion judge" ultimately denied the defendant’s
motion for a new trial. Applying the standard set out by this court
in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974), he con-
cluded that trial counsel’s failure to introduce the intoxication
evidence was “manifestly unreasonable,” but that it did not de-
prive the defendant of a substantial ground of defense or affect
the jury’s verdict. Although the judge credited counsel’s expla-
nation that his goal had been an outright acquittal, the judge noted
that this strategy was undercut by trial counsel’s successful
request for a jury instruction concerning involuntary manslaugh-
ter. Moreover, the judge observed that evidence of intoxication
“would have supported [counsel’ s pursuit of an outright acquittal]
by giving the jury a reason to believe that the defendant did not
realize the safety was disengaged.”

He ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial,
however, because he determined that “a good deal of evidence to
support the defendant’s argument that the shooting was an acci-
dent” had been elicited at trial, and that the omission of the
intoxication evidence “did not deprive the defendant of that
defense” nor, given the strong evidence of the defendant’s mo-
tive, “change[ ] the result of the trial.”

2. Discussion. a. Ineffective assistance. On appeal, the core of
the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance remains trial coun-
sel’s failure to introduce evidence suggesting that the defendant
was intoxicated on the night of the victim’s death. The defendant
also argues that trial counsel’s decision not to object to repeated
references to the defendant’s name being listed on MassMost-
Wanted, and his failure to move to strike a nonresponsive answer
by the medical examiner, constituted ineffective assistance. We
consider each claim in turn.

Pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, “we consider claims of inef-
fective assistance to determine ‘whether there was an error in the
course of the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the
judge) and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have
influenced the jury’s conclusion.’ ” Commonwealth v. Spray, 467
Mass. 456, 472 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 411
Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). Should we
determine “that counsel erred by failing to raise a substantial
defense, ‘a new trial is called for unless we are substantially

1The judge who conducted the evidentiary hearing was not the trial judge,
who initially had denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The trial judge
had since retired.

134 477 Mass. 127 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

confident that, if the error had not been made, the jury verdict
would have been the same’ [citation omitted].” Commonwealth v.
Sena, 429 Mass. 590, 595 (1999), cert. denied, 441 Mass. 822
(2004).

i. Intoxication evidence. When a defendant raises a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel where the case is reviewed under
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we do not consider the adequacy of trial
counsel’s performance pursuant to Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96, but,
rather, consider whether there was “an error in the course of the
trial.” Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. “A strategic decision by an
attorney . . . constitutes error ‘only if it was manifestly unrea-
sonable when made.’ ” Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz, 465 Mass.
557, 562-563 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458
Mass. 791, 804-805 (2011). We agree with the second motion
judge that, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel’s stra-
tegic decision not to introduce evidence of the defendant's in-
toxication on the night of the shooting was manifestly unreason-
able and was thus error. Because we are substantially confident
that, had this error not been made, the jury verdict would have
stayed the same, however, we discern no error in the denial of the
renewed motion for a new trial.

As to trial counsel’s strategic decision regarding evidence of
the defendant’s intoxication, the record makes plain that trial
counsel did not pursue an all-or-nothing strategy. Trial counsel
successfully argued, over the Commonwealth’s objection, for an
instruction concerning involuntary manslaughter, and mentioned
— albeit briefly — that theory in his closing argument. Evidence
that the defendant was intoxicated could have undercut the Com-
monwealth’s theory that the shooting was intentional, see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Sama, 411 Mass. 293, 298 (1991),!2 and
thereby have given the jury more of a basis to find the defendant
guilty of involuntary manslaughter rather than murder in the first
degree by deliberate premeditation.

Further, we are unpersuaded that the intoxication evidence
would have detracted in any meaningful way from the primary
defense of accident. The defendant’s accident defense rested on
the Montrond family’s testimony concerning the defendant’s rea-

Although the parties dispute whether Ford’s testimony would have been
sufficient to warrant an instruction on intoxication, even without such an
instruction, the jury independently could have concluded that the consumption
of alcohol gave rise to a reasonable doubt whether the defendant formed an
intent to kill, and with deliberate premeditation.

477 Mass. 127 (2017) 135

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

ction to the shooting. This was a slender reed. The jury heard no
theory as to how the defendant came to be handling a loaded
firearm in the basement of his parents’ house, or why he pulled
the trigger while the victim was sitting on a couch and the gun
was aimed at her head. Without the intoxication evidence, and in
the face of strong evidence as to motive, the jury were left with
essentially two ways of understanding the shooting: inexplicable
carelessness or an intended act. As the second motion judge
concluded, evidence suggesting that the defendant was intoxi-
cated at the time of the shooting likely would have bolstered his
case for acquittal by giving the jury a plausible explanation as to
how he could have accidentally pulled the trigger.

In this regard, we also recognize that the jury could have
deemed the defendant reckless irrespective of his alcohol con-
sumption, and guilty of murder in the second degree or of
involuntary manslaughter. Leveling a gun at point blank range at
a victim’s head without first ascertaining whether the safety is on
could certainly satisfy the Welansky standard for wanton or
reckless conduct, i.e., when an “ordinary normal man under the
same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the dan-
ger.” Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 398-399 (1944).
In light of all this, the defendant had very little to lose, and
something to gain, by introduction of the intoxication evidence.
All in all, trial counsel’s strategic decision not to present evidence
suggesting that the defendant was intoxicated on the night of the
killing was “manifestly unreasonable.” Commonwealth v. Ace-
vedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442 (2006). Nonetheless, this error does not
require a new trial. In light of all the evidence and the strength of
the Commonwealth’s case, we are substantially confident that the
jury’s verdict would have been the same had the error not been
made and the intoxication evidence instead introduced. Most
significantly, there was solid evidence of the defendant’s motive,
lessening the impact of any potential intoxication as the expla-
nation for the shooting. The Commonwealth presented compel-
ling evidence that the defendant shot the victim in revenge for
having turned him in to police — most notably Kenyisha’s
testimony that the defendant had referred to the victim as a
“snitch” shortly before her death, which was largely unrefuted.*

Even if the Commonwealth's evidence of motive had been less

18The inconsistencies emphasized by trial counsel on cross-examination did
little to mitigate Kenyisha’s testimony. Although her account of the telephone
call with the victim on the night of the shooting varied slightly, she consistently

136 477 Mass. 127 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

powerful, the proffered intoxication evidence likely would not
have been strong enough, standing alone, to change the jury’s
verdict. That evidence of intoxication was tepid at best, consisting
only of one first responder’s somewhat equivocal description of a
detected hybrid odor: “reek[ing] of B.O., like sweat and B.O., and
of alcohol,” along with observed emotionally freighted behavior
consistent with causes that may or may not have been alcohol
related. This hardly would have given rise to a compelling infer-
ence that the defendant was so intoxicated he could not appreciate
the need to check the safety lock before pointing a loaded gun at
someone’s head and pulling the trigger."* See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Mountry, 463 Mass. 80, 93 (2012).

Accordingly, although the intoxication evidence could have
been somewhat helpful to the defendant’s case and should have
been introduced, we are substantially confident that, had it been
introduced, the jury’s verdict would have been the same. The
failure to introduce this evidence does not warrant a new trial.

ii. MassMostWanted. The defendant contends that his trial
counsel’s failure to object to references to the Internet Web site,
MassMostWanted, also constituted the ineffective assistance of
counsel. Two such references were in Kenyisha’s testimony at
trial and one was in the Commonwealth’s closing argument; trial
counsel did not object to any of these references.

“Tt is long established that evidence of uncharged criminal acts
or other misbehavior is not admissible to show a defendant’ s bad
character or propensity to commit the charged crime, but may be
admissible if relevant for other purposes such as ‘common
scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake,
identity, intent or motive.’ Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457
Mass. 773, 793 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011), quoting
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128 (2006). This rule
reflects the “inherent danger” that a jury will assume that, because
a defendant has previously misbehaved in some way, he “must
have committed the crime charged.” See id. at 793-794. None-
theless, “[e]ven if the evidence is relevant to one of these other
purposes, the evidence will not be admitted if its probative value
is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).

stated that, with whatever adjectives, the defendant had called the victim a
“snitch.”

44Tp addition, the Commonwealth also argued that the defendant had placed
the safety lock back in place after killing the victim in support of its contention
that the shooting was not accidental.

477 Mass. 127 (2017) 137

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

Applying these principles to the present case, it was error for
trial counsel not to have objected to the references to Mass-
MostWanted, which were more prejudicial than probative. The
defendant’s potential motive for killing the victim was well es-
tablished by evidence demonstrating his awareness that the vic-
tim had turned him in to police. Whatever minor probative value
the references might have had in bolstering evidence of motive
was outweighed by the potential prejudice to the defendant. The
jury likely would infer from the references to MassMost-
Wanted that the defendant was what the Web site said — one of
the Commonwealth’s most wanted fugitives — and therefore that
he was accused of committing a serious crime similar to the one
that he was accused of in this case.

Notwithstanding this, we are “substantially confident” that the
references to MassMostWanted did not alter the jury’s verdict
(citation omitted). See Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 Mass. 150,
157 (2015). In his final charge, the judge gave a curative instruc-
tion, helping to alleviate the prejudice from the statements. See
Commonwealth v. Costa, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 827 (2007). In
addition, given the properly introduced testimony that Massachu-
setts police went to South Carolina to pick up the defendant, the
jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant’s other
alleged crimes were quite serious. Most significantly, the strength
of the Commonwealth’s case, and the weight of the other evi-
dence, cuts against the potential impact of the error.

iii. Medical examiner’s testimony. The defendant argues that
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
move to strike a statement by the medical examiner. We disagree.
On cross-examination, the medical examiner was asked if the
path of the bullet allowed her to opine whether the shooting was
intentional or accidental; she responded, “My opinion on this case
is that it’s a homicide.” In response to further probing questions
by trial counsel, she clarified that her observations of the victim’s
wound, including the path of the bullet and the close range from
which the shot was fired, did not permit her to say whether the
shooting was intentional or accidental.!* The motion judge found
that, although the medical examiner’s statement was improper,

‘Immediately after the medical examiner’s statement that she believed the
shooting was a homicide, trial counsel asked her, “Did you understand my
question . . . 2” to which she responded, “Not particularly.” Shortly thereafter,
trial counsel asked whether, based on the evidence, she could tell if the shooting
had been accidental or intentional, and she replied, “Absolutely not.”

138 477 Mass. 127 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

trial counsel ameliorated the harm by his following inquiries.
Although a medical examiner generally may not offer an opinion
that a death is a homicide, it is apparent from the record that trial
counsel’s effective cross-examination caused the medical exam-
iner to recant her opinion shortly after she offered it.

b. Confrontation clause. The defendant contends also that other
testimony elicited from the medical examiner violated the de-
fendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The
medical examiner testified to the results of a toxicology report
created by another analyst pursuant to the autopsy on the victim,
which showed that the victim had a blood alcohol level of .04,
and the equivalent of two or more doses of oxycodone in her
system at the time of her death. “The confrontation clause bars
the admission of testimonial out-of-court statements by a witness
who does not appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable to
testify and the defendant had an earlier opportunity for cross-
examination.” Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 617, cert.
denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012). See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-
setts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-311 (2009) (confrontation clause applies
to certificates of drug analysis admitted to prove substances are
illegal drugs). A violation of the right to confrontation requires a
new trial unless it can be established, “beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the erroneously admitted [evidence] had little or no
effect on the verdicts.” Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass.
350, 362 (2010).

The first motion judge concluded that the testimony concerning
the specific findings in the toxicology report violated the defend-
ant’s right of confrontation, but that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not have any impact on
the verdict. The Commonwealth does not dispute that the testi-
mony concerning the results of the toxicology report was testi-
monial but contends that the motion judge correctly determined
that such error was harmless. Assuming without deciding that it
was error to admit the testimony in question,'® we agree that any
such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Vasquez,

1The issue whether evidence akin to the toxicology reports is testimonial
admits of different views. Compare Commonwealth v. Lezynski, 466 Mass. 113,
116 (2013) (expert witness reading verbatim into record toxicology report
created by another violated right of confrontation of defendant charged with
possession of class B substance with intent to distribute), and United States v.
Ignasiak, 667 F3d 1217, 1232 (11th Cir. 2012) (autopsy report testimonial
because “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later

477 Mass. 127 (2017) 139

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

456 Mass. at 362.

The results of the toxicology report supported the Common-
wealth’s testimony that the victim was asleep when the shooting
occurred. It was uncontested at trial, however, that, at the time of
the shooting, the victim was reclining on a sofa, with a blanket
draped over her, at approximately 1 a.m. Hence, the jury separ-
ately had good reason to believe that she had been asleep at the
time of the shooting regardless of the precise amount of alcohol
and oxycodone in her system; in any event, the issue whether the
victim was asleep appears not to have been contested at trial.

c. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Having reviewed the entire
record in accordance with our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we
discern no reason to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new
trial.

Judgments affirmed.

Lowy, J. (concurring). I agree with the court’s analysis and
resolution of the issues in this case. I write separately to make
explicit that the court does not decide whether, as a general matter
or on the facts of this case, the toxicology report of the victim
constitutes testimonial hearsay, such that the defendant would
have a right to confront the particular individual who prepared the
report. If such a report is not testimonial, and is otherwise
admissible as a business record, an expert witness may reference
the report’s context during direct testimony.

In Massachusetts, an expert may not testify on direct exami-
nation to facts that are not in evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 391-393 & n.13 (2008); Department of
Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531 (1986). See also
Mass. G. Evid. § 703 (2017). Whether a toxicology report itself,
however, created as part of a routine autopsy, constitutes testi-
monial hearsay is, in my view, an open question. Compare United
States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1231-1232 (11th Cir. 2012)

tial” [citation omitted]), with United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 101-102 (2d
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (toxicology report was nontes-
timonial because “[tJhere [was] no indication . . . in the record that a criminal
investigation was contemplated during the inquiry into the cause of [the vic-
tim’s] death”), and People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, {¥ 128-138 (autopsy
reports not testimonial).

10f course, an expert may testify to facts of which he or she has personal
knowledge, if the testimony is otherwise admissible.

140 477 Mass. 127 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Montrond.

(autopsy reports testimonial because “made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial” [citation
omitted]), with State v. Mattox, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 136, 145 (2017)
(toxicology report requested by medical examiner conducting
autopsy was not testimonial because “primary purpose was to
identify the concentration of the tested substances in biological
samples . . . as part of [the] autopsy to determine the cause of
death — not to create a substitute for out-of-court testimony or to
gather evidence . . . for prosecution”), and People v. Leach, 2012
IL 111534, {] 137 (autopsy report not testimonial because primary
purpose was not to provide evidence in criminal case).

The court does not — and need not — resolve today whether
a toxicology report itself conducted as part of an autopsy consti-
tutes testimonial hearsay. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009) (“[W]e do not hold, and it is not the
case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establish-
ing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy
of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the
prosecution’s case”). See also Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50,
86 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (raising “difficult, important”
question as to “[h]ow . . . the [c]onfrontation [c]lause appl[ies] to
the panoply of crime laboratory reports and underlying technical
statements written by [or otherwise made by] laboratory techni-
cians”). If such a report does not constitute testimonial hearsay
and is otherwise properly admitted in evidence, an expert would
be permitted to testify to its contents during direct examination.
See Nardi, 452 Mass. at 391-393 & n.13.

477 Mass. 141 (2017) 141

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

Lynne Biancuarp & others! vs. Steward Carney Hosprtar,
Inc., & others.?

Suffolk. November 7, 2016. - May 23, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Botstorp, Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Buon, JJ.9

“Anti-SLAPP” Statute. Constitutional Law, Right to petition government. Prac-
tice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Words, “Based on.”

Discussion of the purpose of G. L. ¢. 231, § 59H, the “anti-SLAPP” statute, to
counteract lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances; of the statute’s provisions for early dismissal of the disfavored
lawsuits and the award of attorney’s fees to successful special movants; and
of the threshold showing a special movant must make and the nonmoving
party’s burden if that threshold showing is met. [147-148]

In denying a special motion to dismiss a defamation suit under G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H, a Superior Court judge erred in determining that the communications
by the defendant hospital president to a newspaper did not constitute peti-
tioning activity, where the statements fairly could be said to have been
closely and rationally related to a then-pending investigation by the Depart-
ment of Mental Health (department) and in furtherance of the objective of
the hospital’s petitioning (ie., the preservation of the hospital’s license to
operate its adolescent psychiatric unit), and where the statements were issued
in a manner that was likely to influence or at least reach the department;
however, the judge correctly determined that an electronic mail message that
the hospital president sent to all hospital employees concerning the termi-
nation of the plaintiff nurses’ employment was not petitioning activity, where
there was no showing that the message had reached the department or was
reasonably likely to do so, and where nothing in the content of the message
itself suggested that it was intended to influence the department, [148-153]

In remanding to the Superior Court a civil action alleging defamation, in which
the defendants, who brought a special motion to dismiss under G, L. ¢. 231,
§ 59H, had met their threshold burden of demonstrating that the individual
defendant’s communication to a newspaper was solely based on petitioning
activity, this court concluded that, to ensure that only “SLAPP” suits (.e.,

4Gail Donahoe, Gail Douglas-Candido, Kathleen Dwyer, Linda Herr, Cheryl
Hendrick, Kathleen Lang, Victoria Webster, and Nydia Woods.

2Steward Hospital Holdings, LLC; Steward Health Care System, LLC; and
William Walczak.

Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

142 477 Mass. 141 (2017)

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

those without merit that are primarily brought to chill legitimate petitioning
activities) are subject to early dismissal under § 59H and its attendant
financial penalties, the judge, in determining whether the plaintiffs had met
their burden to defeat the special motion, must permit the plaintiffs to
demonstrate either that the defendants’ petitioning activity lacked any rea-
sonable basis in fact or law and caused the plaintiffs injury or, failing that, to
establish that their defamation claim, viewed as a whole, was nonetheless not
a “SLAPP” suit; further, this court ordered that if the plaintiff's could not
meet their burden under this augmented framework, the defendants’ special
motion to dismiss must be allowed as to so much of the defamation claim as
was based on the communication, with an appropriate award of attorney’s
fees and costs. [153-161]

Civ. action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
May 24, 2013.

Special motions to dismiss were heard by Linda E. Giles, J.

After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court
granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

Jeffrey A. Dretler (Joseph W. Ambash also present) for the
defendants.

Dahlia C. Rudavsky (Ellen J. Messing also present) for the
plaintiffs.

Donald J. Siegel & Paige W. McKissock, for Massachusetts
AFL-CIO, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Lenk, J. In the spring of 2011, following reports of abuse at the
adolescent psychiatric unit (unit) of Steward Carney Hospital,
Inc., then president of the hospital, William Walczak, fired all of
the registered nurses and mental health counsellors who worked
in the unit. Walczak subsequently issued statements, both to the
hospital’s employees and to the Boston Globe Newspaper Co.
(Boston Globe), arguably to the effect that the nurses had been
fired based in part on their culpability for the incidents that took
place at the unit. The plaintiffs, nine of the nurses who had been
fired, then filed suit against the defendants for, among other
things, defamation.

The hospital defendants‘ responded by filing a special motion
to dismiss the defamation claim pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H,

4For convenience and, in particular, to distinguish them from other defendants
who were named in the complaint but are not part of this appeal, we refer to
Steward Camey Hospital, Inc.; Steward Hospital Holdings, LLC; Steward
Health Care System, LLC; and William Walezak as “the hospital defendants” or
“the defendants.”

We refer to the plaintiffs as “the plaintiff nurses,” “the nurses,” or “the
plaintiffs” interchangeably as well.

477 Mass. 141 (2017) 143

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

the “anti-SLAPP” statute. A Superior Court judge denied the
motion, concluding that the hospital defendants had failed to meet
their threshold burden of showing that the claim was based solely
on their petitioning activity. The hospital defendants filed an
interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court as of right. See Fabre
v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521-522 (2002). The Appeals Court
then reversed the motion judge’s decision in part. See Blanchard
v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 98 (2016).
We granted the parties’ applications for further appellate review.
We conclude that a portion of the plaintiff nurses’ defamation
claim is based solely on the hospital defendants’ petitioning
activity. The hospital defendants as special movants thus having
satisfied in part their threshold burden under Duracraft Corp. v.
Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-168 (1998) (Dura-
craft), the matter must be remanded to the Superior Court, where
the burden will shift to the plaintiff nurses to make a showing
adequate to defeat the motion.

Under current case law, the plaintiff nurses, as nonmoving
parties, could defeat the special motion only by showing that the
hospital defendants’ petitioning activity upon which a portion of
the plaintiff's defamation claim is based was a sham, i.e., without
a reasonable basis in fact or law, a showing that the record
suggests may be difficult to make. Insofar as the record also
suggests the possibility that the plaintiff nurses’ claim may not
have been brought primarily to chill the hospital defendants’
legitimate exercise of their right to petition, however, the case
underscores a long recognized difficulty in the statute. It is one
rooted in the fact that both parties enjoy the right to petition,
including the right to seek redress in the courts. The anti-SLAPP
statute is meant to subject only meritless SLAPP suits to expe-
dited dismissal, yet it nonetheless may be used to dismiss meri-
torious claims not intended primarily to chill petitioning.

Because the statute as thus construed remains at odds with
evident legislative intent, and continues to raise constitutional
concerns, we take this opportunity to augment the framework set
forth in the Duracraft case (Duracraft framework) by broadening
the construction of the statutory term “based on.” While a non-
moving party may still defeat a special motion to dismiss by
demonstrating that the special movant’s petitioning activity is a
sham, we hold that a nonmoving party’s claim also is not subject
to dismissal as one solely based on a special movant'’s petitioning
activity if the nonmoving party can establish that its claim was

144 477 Mass. 141 (2017)

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

not “brought primarily to chill” the special movant’s legitimate
exercise of its right to petition. See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161
(1998), quoting 1994 House Doc. No. 1520. On remand, the
plaintiff nurses may attempt to make such a showing in satisfac-
tion of their burden.

1. Background. The unit at Steward Carney Hospital, Inc., in
Boston (hospital), is licensed by the Department of Mental Health
(DMH) and the Department of Public Health (DPH).° In April,
2011, there were four incidents involving alleged patient abuse or
neglect at the unit. The hospital immediately reported these
incidents to DMH, DPH, and the Department of Children and
Families. DMH commenced an investigation into the incidents,
and required that there be no new admissions to the unit. DMH
also considered revoking the hospital’s license to operate the unit
pending the hospital’s response to the reports of abuse.

The hospital soon placed all but a small number of unit em-
ployees, including managers, nurses, and mental health counsel-
lors, on paid administrative leave. It also hired Scott Harshbarger,
then senior counsel at the law firm Proskauer Rose LLP, to
conduct an investigation into the incidents, to recommend reme-
dial actions, and to represent the hospital’s interests in its dealings
with the State agencies. Upon concluding his investigation,
Harshbarger recommended to Walczak that, in light of what he
termed a “code of silence” amongst the unit’s staff, “it would be
prudent to replace the current personnel in order to ensure quality
care for these vulnerable patients.”

After reviewing Harshbarger’s recommendation, Walczak in-
formed each of the plaintiff nurses that he was terminating her
employment. The following day, he sent an electronic mail (e-
mail) message to all hospital employees, which began by noting
that the hospital “has a rich tradition of providing excellent care
to [its] patients.” After providing the hospital’s employees with
credit for this successful commitment to patient care, the message
continued, in relevant part:

“Recently, I have become aware of the alleged incidents
where a number of [hospital] staff have not demonstrated this
steadfast commitment to patient care. I have thoroughly in-

®The unit typically treats mentally and physically challenged teenagers in
“acute states,” who are admitted from other facilities as a “last resort.” Many of
them are under the custody of the Department of Children and Families and
have little involvement with their families.

477 Mass. 141 (2017) 145

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

vestigated these allegations and have determined that these
individual employees have not been acting in the best interest
of their patients, the hospital, or the community we serve. As
a result, I have terminated the employment of each of these
individuals.”

In a Boston Globe article about the incidents two days after the
plaintiff nurses were fired, Walczak was quoted as saying that,
when he read Harshbarger’s report, he “decided to replace the
nurses and other staff on the unit.”* Walczak said that the report
recommended that he “start over on the unit” and that his “goal
[was] to make it the best unit in the state.” The article noted that
Walczak “would not provide details of the alleged assault or
patient safety concerns, or comment on why the entire staff was
dismissed, given that the allegation involved one employee and
one patient.” Approximately one month later, the Boston Globe
published another article on the incidents at the hospital, quoting
Walczak as stating that “[t]he Harshbarger report indicated it
wasn’t a safe situation” and stating that the report “underscored
his decision to fire the entire staff of the unit.”

In June, 2011, DMH issued its reports on each of the four
incidents. The reports concerning the first three incidents con-
cluded that there had been wrongdoing by a single mental health
counsellor, while the fourth report concluded that unspecified
staff on duty during the incident had acted improperly.”

2. Prior proceedings. In May, 2013, in a five-count complaint
brought against the hospital defendants, along with Harshbarger
and Proskauer Rose LLP (Proskauer defendants),* the plaintiff

The article stated that Harshbarger had been investigating an employee’s
alleged sexual assault of a patient and “conditions on the 14-bed locked unit for
extremely troubled teens.”

7In May, 2011, the union that represented the plaintiff nurses, the Massachu-
setts Nurses Association, filed grievances on behalf of each of the unit’s nurses,
including each of the plaintiff nurses. Pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement between the hospital and this nurses association, the grievances were
subject to arbitration. The first arbitration involved five of the plaintiff nurses:
Douglas, Hendrick, Hert, Lang, and Woods. The arbitrator found in favor of the
nurses and ordered, inter alia, their reinstatement. The hospital appealed from
that ruling; the appeal is apparently still pending.

®The complaint also included a claim against the hospital defendants for
violation of the health care provider whistleblower statute, G. L. c. 149, § 187,
and plaintiffs Lang and Donahoe claimed that the hospital defendants retaliated
against them for performing their obligations under the mandatory reporting
statute, G. L. c. 119, §51A. In addition, all of the plaintiff nurses asserted a

146 477 Mass. 141 (2017)

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

nurses claimed that the hospital defendants and the Proskauer
defendants had each defamed them. The plaintiff nurses alleged,
in one count of their complaint, that the hospital defendants
defamed them both by the e-mail message sent to hospital em-
ployees announcing their terminations, as well as by communi-
cations made to and published by the Boston Globe. The plaintiff
nurses asserted that such statements falsely suggested that “after
a thorough investigation, [Walczak] had determined . . . that each
of the terminated plaintiffs had demonstrated inadequate commit-
ment to patient care and that each had provided such deficient
patient care that her employment had to be terminated.”®

In their defamation claim against the Proskauer defendants, the
plaintiff nurses asserted that Harshbarger’s preliminary and final
written reports had defamed them by falsely suggesting that they
had “adhered to a ‘code of silence,’” had failed to report “a
variety of problems, . . . including misconduct,” of which they
were aware, and had been derelict in their duties in a number of
other respects.

Both sets of defendants responded by filing special motions to
dismiss the defamation counts under the anti-SLAPP statute. See
G. L. c. 231, §59H.1° A Superior Court judge allowed the
Proskauer defendants’ special motion to dismiss, but denied the
hospital defendants’ motion. The hospital defendants appealed."
The Appeals Court reversed in part, allowing the defendants’
special motion to dismiss with respect to Walczak’s comments to
the Boston Globe, affirming the denial with respect to the e-mail
message, and denying the hospital’s motion for attorney’s fees
and costs. Blanchard, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 98, 111 & n.14. We
granted the parties’ cross applications for further appellate re-
view.

claim of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress against Harsh-
barger and Proskauer Rose LLP.

©The plaintiff nurses claimed that Walczak’s “statements implied the exis-
tence of undisclosed facts, namely, that the decision to terminate each of the
plaintiff nurses was based on her actions in connection with undisclosed inci-
dents involving patients in the unit, which were known to Walczak and had been
“thoroughly investigated.’ ”

*Both sets of defendants also filed motions to dismiss the other claims under
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). At a hearing on the motions
to dismiss, the defendants waived their motions under rule 12 (b) (6).

‘Defendants Harshbarger and Proskauer Rose LLP filed a stipulation of
dismissal prior to the proceedings in the Appeals Court, and they have no role
in this appeal.

477 Mass. 141 (2017) 147

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

3. Discussion a. The anti-SLAPP statute. The Legislature en-
acted the anti-SLAPP statute to counteract “SLAPP” suits, de-
fined broadly as “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
petition for the redress of grievances.” Duracraft, 427 Mass. at
161, quoting 1994 House Doc. No. 1520. See G. L. c. 231, § 59H.
See also Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 488
n.14 (2017) (explaining catalyst for legislation). The main “ob-
jective of SLAPP suits is not to win them, but to use litigation to
intimidate opponents’ exercise of rights of petitioning and speech.”
Duracraft, supra. To forestall such suits, the anti-SLAPP statute
provides a “procedural remedy for early dismissal of the disfa-
vored” lawsuits. Jd. This remedy is the special motion to dismiss,
which can be brought prior to engaging in discovery, and is
intended to dispose of “civil claims, counterclaims, or cross
claims” that are based solely on a party’s exercise of its right to
petition. See G. L. c. 231, § 59H. The statute also mandates the
award of attorney’s fees to successful special movants. /d.

To prevail on such a motion, a special movant, such as the
hospital defendants here, “must make a threshold showing
through pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it ‘are
“based on” the petitioning activities alone and have no substantial
basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.’ ”
Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 Mass. 861, 865 (2010), quoting
Duracraft, supra at 167-168. See Fabre, 436 Mass. at 524 (spe-
cial movant must demonstrate that “the only conduct complained
of is . . . petitioning activity”)."* The anti-SLAPP statute defines
a party’s exercise of its right to petition broadly to include:

“[1] any written or oral statement made before or submitted
to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other
governmental proceeding; [2] any written or oral statement
made in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other governmental proceeding; [3] any statement reason-
ably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue

"The statute also requires a special movant to demonstrate that it was
exercising “its own right of petition” in both the statutory and the constitutional
sense. See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 486-489 (2017);
G. L. c, 231, § 59H (“In any case in which a party asserts that the civil claims,
counterclaims, or cross claims against said party are based on said party’s
exercise of its right of petition under the [C]onstitution of the United States or
of the [Clommonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to dismiss”).

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Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

by a legislative executive, or judicial body or any other
governmental proceeding; [4] any statement reasonably
likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such
consideration; or [5] any other statement falling within con-
stitutional protection of the right to petition government.”

G. L. c. 231, § 59H.

If the hospital defendants are able to make a threshold showing
that the plaintiff nurses’ claim is based solely on the hospital
defendants’ petitioning activities, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
nurses to establish “by a preponderance of the evidence that the
[hospital defendants] lacked any reasonable factual support or
any arguable basis in law for its petitioning activity,” Baker v.
Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 553-554 (2001), and that the hospital
defendants’ sham petitioning activity caused the plaintiff nurses
“actual injury.” G. L. c. 231, § 59H. See Fustolo, 455 Mass. at
865.

b. Petitioning activity. As part of its threshold burden, the
hospital defendants must show that the conduct complained of
constitutes the exercise of its right to petition. See Baker, 434
Mass. at 550. The hospital defendants contend that the motion
judge erred in determining that Walczak’s communications to the
Boston Globe and to the hospital employees did not constitute
petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The hospital
defendants argue that Walczak’s statements to the Boston Globe,
and his e-mail message to all hospital employees, were the
exercise of the hospital defendants’ right to petition because such
statements were made “in connection with an issue under con-
sideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body,
or any other governmental proceeding.” See G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H. Given that DMH was considering whether to revoke the
hospital’s license to operate the unit when the statements were
made, the hospital defendants contend that both communications
were part of the hospital’s efforts to maintain its license to operate
the unit by demonstrating that it was taking remedial steps.

The initial question before us is thus whether Walczak’s com-
munications to the Boston Globe and to the hospital employees
were each made “in connection with” DMH’s investigation of the
incidents and its decision regarding the hospital’s license to
operate the unit, such that they constitute petitioning activity

"he defendants do not contend that Walczak’s communications fall under
any of the other definitions of petitioning activity in the anti-SLAPP statute.

477 Mass. 141 (2017) 149

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

under the anti-SLAPP statute. In determining whether statements
constitute petitioning, “we consider them in the over-all context
in which they are made.” North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. Part-
nership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 862 (2009). To fall under the
“in connection with” definition of petitioning under the anti-
SLAPP statute, a communication must be “made to influence,
inform, or at the very least, reach governmental bodies — either
directly or indirectly.” Id., quoting Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon
New England, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 605 (2005). The key
requirement of this definition of petitioning is the establishment
of a plausible nexus between the statement and the governmental
proceeding.

The archetypical demonstration of this nexus involves a party’s
statement regarding an ongoing governmental proceeding made
directly to a governmental body. See, e.g., Office One, Inc. v.
Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 123 (2002) (communications with Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation seeking favorable outcome con-
stituted petitioning activity).'* Failing something this clear cut,
courts look to objective indicia of a party’s intent to influence a
governmental proceeding. See North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd.
Partnership, 452 Mass. at 862-863 (statement was petitioning
activity where context in which it was made suggested it was
intended to influence governmental body). This intent to influ-
ence is manifested in statements that are “closely and rationally
related to the [governmental proceeding]’” and “in furtherance of
the objective served by governmental consideration of the issue
under review.” Plante v. Wylie, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 159
(2005). Contrast Global NAPs, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 607
(statements to newspaper containing oblique reference to defend-
ant’s petitioning activity not protected under anti-SLAPP statute);
Burley v. Comets Community Youth Ctr., Inc., 75 Mass. App. Ct.
818, 823 (2009) (defendant failed to demonstrate “statements
were made in conjunction with its protected petitioning activ-
ity .. . as opposed to being incidental observations that were not
tied to the petitioning activity in a direct way” [quotations and
citation omitted]).

We turn to the two types of communications at issue here.

i. Statements to the Boston Globe. Walczak’s statements to the

'4Such activity also would fall under the first definition of petitioning activity
in the anti-SLAPP statute. See G. L. c. 231, § 59H (defining petitioning activity
as “any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding”).

150 477 Mass. 141 (2017)

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

Boston Globe commented on DMH’s inquiry into the incidents of
abuse at the unit, and the hospital’s attempts to address the
situation. Walczak’s comments had a plausible nexus to DMH’s
investigation based on their content and the high likelihood that
they would influence or at least reach DMH.

Based on their content, it can be reasonably inferred that
Walczak’s statements to the Boston Globe were intended to
demonstrate to DMH the hospital’s public commitment to ad-
dress the underlying problems at the unit. It is undisputed that
DMH was considering whether to revoke the hospital’s license to
operate the unit at the time that Walczak made his comments to
the Boston Globe. DMH’s decision whether to do so turned on
the hospital’s implementation of remedial steps to prevent future
incidents.'® The content of Walczak’s statements directly ad-
dresses DMH’s concern.

In the first article, published on May 28, 2011, Walczak’s
statements implied that he had decided to terminate the nurses’
employment as a remedial action, based on Harshbarger’s rec-
ommendation. He is quoted as stating that the Harshbarger report
described “serious concerns about patient safety and quality of
care on the unit” and that the report recommended he “start over
on the unit.” Walczak’s statements in the second article, dated
June 22, 2011, noted that the Harshbarger report indicated “it
wasn’t a safe situation [at the unit]” and that the reports of
additional incidents “required a much deeper look at what was
going on in the unit.”'* In both of these statements, Walczak
emphasized that he was following the advice contained in the
Harshbarger report in addressing the unit’s problems.

By making clear that the hospital was following Harshbarger’s
recommendations, the statements communicated to readers, likely
including some of the licensing decision makers at DMH, that
progress was occurring at the hospital, and that its license to
operate the unit should not be revoked. These statements were
neither “tangential” nor “unrelated to governmental involvement,”
Global NAPs, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 607, but rather went to

The then director of licensing at the Department of Mental Health (ODMH)
testified at an arbitration hearing regarding the nurses’ claim for reinstatement
to the unit that the decision whether to revoke the hospital’s license to operate
the unit centered on the hospital’s “plan. . . to make [the situation] right.”

‘The article noted that, at the time, DMH had confirmed the first three
incidents at the unit and was still investigating the fourth asserted incident of
abuse.

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the heart of a government agency’s decision whether to terminate
the hospital’s license to operate the unit. The statements directly
related to DMH’s then-pending investigation and, in particular, to
DMH’s decision whether to pull the plug on the hospital’s license
for the unit. Walczak’s statements can fairly be said to have been
“closely and rationally related” to DMH’s investigation and “in
furtherance of the objective” of the hospital’s petitioning — the
preservation of the hospital’s license to operate the unit. Plante,
63 Mass. App. Ct. at 159.

Walczak’s statements, moreover, were issued in a manner that
was likely to influence or, at the very least, reach DMH. He made
his statements to the Boston Globe, a newspaper “widely circu-
lated in Boston and throughout the Commonwealth.” Brauer v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 54 (1966). Decision makers
at DMH, and members of the public wishing to weigh in on the
licensing decision, could reasonably have been expected to read
Walczak’s statements. The timing of Walczak’s statements to the
Boston Globe indicates, as well, a plausible nexus between the
communications and DMH’s licensure decision, the statements
having been made while DMH’s investigation was still ongoing.

The plaintiff nurses contend that Walczak made the statements
primarily to defend the unit’s reputation to the public. This goal,
however, hardly can be seen as unrelated to the hospital’s objec-
tive of convincing DMH to leave intact the hospital’s license to
operate the unit. The greater the public’s confidence in and
support for the hospital, the more complex any decision to revoke
the hospital’s license to operate the unit would become. Ulterior
motives, in any event, do not bear on the petitioning nature of the
statements to the Boston Globe. See North Am. Expositions Co.
Ltd. Partnership, 452 Mass. at 863 (“the fact that . . . speech
involves a commercial motive does not mean it is not petition-
ing”). Accordingly, we conclude that Walczak’s statements to the
Boston Globe were protected petitioning activity under the anti-
SLAPP statute.

ii. Internal e-mail message. In contrast, Walczak’s e-mail mes-
sage to all hospital employees concerning the termination of the
plaintiff nurses’ employment was not petitioning activity. Neither
the content of the e-mail message, nor any evidence offered by
the hospital defendants, suggests any audience for the message
other than hospital employees. The explanation of troubling
events at their workplace that was presented to hospital employ-
ees in an e-mail message by the hospital’s president has no

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plausible nexus to the hospital’s efforts to sway DMH’s licensing
decision.

In this regard, the defendants have not shown that the e-mail
message to employees had reached, or was reasonably likely to
reach, DMH. A private statement to a select group of people does
not, without more, establish a plausible nexus to a governmental
proceeding. It stands to reason that statements cannot be “in
furtherance of” petitioning the government if they are not rea-
sonably geared to reaching it. Plante, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 159.
The defendants have not shown that the hospital or someone on
its behalf had forwarded the e-mail message to DMH or even had
informed DMH that it had been sent to hospital employees. Nor
have the defendants shown that someone in the hospital’s employ
receiving the e-mail message reasonably would be expected to or
did communicate its message to DMH. Walczak’s conclusory
affidavit stating that he intended the e-mail message to come to
DMH’s attention’? does not indicate any mechanism through
which the statement could arrive at the agency.'* See Burley, 75
Mass. App. Ct. at 823-824 (defendants’ message to employees
was not petitioning activity despite defendants’ contention that
they intended message to be conveyed to police). Walczak’s
intent alone does not suffice in the circumstances to establish the
requisite nexus.

Moreover, nothing in the content of the e-mail message itself,
stating in essence that the terminated nurses deviated from the
hospital’s “rich tradition of providing excellent care to [its]
patients,” suggests that it was intended to influence or reach
DMH. The e-mail message begins by lauding the hospital’s
“performance on national quality and safety standards,” and notes
that the “employees and caregivers at” the hospital are the reason

17Walczak attested that he had sent the electronic mail (e-mail) message “not
only to communicate to the hospital employees what was happening, but to give
assurances to the regulatory agencies” in the process of determining whether to
revoke the hospital’s license to operate the unit “that the deficiencies which
ha[d] been reported on the [uJnit would not continue.” Yet the defendants fail to
establish that DMH likely would have encountered the message, let alone that
what employees were told would influence DMH’s decision concerning the
hospital’s license to operate the unit.

The defendants also note that, in his affidavit, Harshbarger stated that he
communicated to the general counsel of DMH “the action [that the hospital’ s]
leadership was taking in response to the [iJncidents.” Harshbarger’s summation
of the hospital’s efforts, however, does not affect the analysis of whether
Walczak’s e-mail message was intended to or did influence DMH.

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for its exemplary performance. Walczak then states that he had
“thoroughly investigated” allegations concerning the incidents at
the unit, “determined that [the plaintiff nurses] have not been
acting in the best interest of their patients, the hospital, or the
community we serve,” and concluded by addressing the plaintiff
nurses’ termination. There is nothing in this text to suggest that it
was intended to influence, inform, or reach anyone other than the
hospital employees to whom an explanation of concerning events
at their workplace was given.

In light of this, we conclude that while Walczak’s statements to
the Boston Globe were protected petitioning activity, his e-mail
message to hospital employees was not an exercise of the hospital
defendants’ right of petition.

c. The meaning of “based on.” Given the foregoing, the hos-
pital defendants take the view that they have met their threshold
burden by showing that the portion of the defamation claim based
on the Boston Globe articles is solely based on such petitioning
activity. They maintain that if the nurses cannot show that this
petitioning activity was, in essence, a sham, so much of their
claim as asserts that the Boston Globe statements defamed them
should be dismissed, with the plaintiff nurses made to pay a
proportionate amount of the defendants’ legal fees and costs. The
plaintiff nurses, in contrast, maintain that because some of their
unitary defamation claim rests on nonpetitioning activity, the
hospital defendants fail to show that the defamation claim is
solely based on the defendants’ petitioning activity.

Although we have said that a complaint should be evaluated
count by count for anti-SLAPP purposes, see Wenger v. Aceto,
451 Mass. 1, 9 (2008) (granting special motion to dismiss with
respect to two specific counts in nonmoving party’s complaint),
we have not had occasion to consider whether, at the threshold
burden stage, the special movant can meet its burden by showing
that a portion of the nonmoving party’s claim is based on peti-
tioning activity. Because the outcome of the threshold burden
inquiry so often proves dispositive of the special motion, the
permutations of that preliminary stage have largely occupied the
field of appellate consideration.'® This case involves yet another
variation on that theme. However, it also involves more than that.

1°Twelve out of the seventeen cases decided by this court and the majority of
the cases decided by the Appeals Court that address the anti-SLAPP statute in
depth have centered on the special movant’s threshold burden. This appellate
jurisprudence has split the special movant’s threshold burden into three parts.
First, the special movant must establish that its complained of conduct is

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Each of the positions advanced by the parties as to what “solely
based on” should entail at the threshold burden stage has some
merit, but our resolution of that issue cannot reach or settle the
deeper problem that is laid bare in this appeal. That problem is

petitioning activity. See, e.g., Hanover v. New England Regional Council of
Carpenters, 467 Mass. 587, 590-595 (2014); Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp...
463 Mass. 394, 397-400 (2012); North Am. Expositions Co. Lid. Partnership v.
Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 861-862 (2009); Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448
Mass. 242, 250 (2007); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 63
Mass. App. Ct. 600, 606-607 (2005). Second, the special movant must establish
that the activity is its own petitioning activity. See, e.g., Cardno ChemRisk, LLC
v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 485-486 (2017); Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 Mass.
861, 869 (2010); Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 330 (2005). Third, the
special movant must demonstrate that the nonmoving party’s claims are solely
based on its petitioning activity. See, e.g., Matter of the Discipline of Attorney,
442 Mass. 660, 673-674 (2004); Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113,
121-123 (2002); Fabre v, Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 522-523 (2002); McLarnon v.
Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 348 (2000); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp..
427 Mass. 156, 167-168 (1998).

Similarly, Appeals Court cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute center
chiefly on the special movant’s threshold burden. See Chiulli v. Liberty Mut.
Ins., Inc., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 234 (2015); Keystone Freight Corp. v. Bartlett
Consol., Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 316 (2010); Brice Estates, Inc. v. Smith,
76 Mass. App. Ct. 394, 396-397 (2010); Burley v. Comets Community Youth
Ctr, Inc., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 823-824 (2009); Dickey v. Warren, 75 Mass.
App. Ct. 585, 588-589 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 926 (2010); Ehrlich v.
Stern, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 537-538 (2009); Guiffrida v. High Country
Investor, Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 243 (2008); Moriarty v. Mayor of
Holyoke, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 442, 447-448 (2008); Fisher v. Lint, 69 Mass. App.
Ct. 360, 363-365 (2007); SMS Financial V, LLC v, Conti, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 738,
745-747 (2007); Kalter v. Wood, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 586-591 (2006);
Global NAPS, Inc., supra at 603-607; Wynne v. Creigle, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 246,
251-255 (2005); Plante v. Wylie, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 157-161 (2005); Adams
v. Whitman, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 852-858 (2005); MacDonald v. Paton, 57
Mass. App. Ct, 290, 294-295 (2003); Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 Mass. App. Ct.
740, 748-749 (2002).

By contrast, only a handful of cases from this court address the nonmoving
party’s second-stage burden under the anti-SLAPP statute in a substantial way.
See Van Liew v, Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 36-41 (2016); Benoit v. Frederickson,
454 Mass. 148, 153-154 (2009); Wenger v. Aceto, 451 Mass. 1, 6-9 (2008);
Fabre, 436 Mass. at 324-525; Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 553-554 (2001).
Similarly, only a smattering of Appeals Court opinions address substantively the
nonmoving party’s burden. See The Gillette Co. v, Provost, 91 Mass. App. Ct.
133, 137-140 (2017); Demoulas Super Mkts. v. Ryan, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 259,
263-268 (2007); DiPiero v. Burke, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 154, 158-161 (2007);
Garabedian y. Westland, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 434 (2003); Donovan v.
Gardner, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 599-601 (2000); Vittands v. Sudduth, 49 Mass.
App. Ct. 401, 414-415 (2000).

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whether the plaintiff nurses’ defamation claim is, in fact, a
“SLAPP” suit at all. Otherwise put, even if it were shown that the
Boston Globe-based portion of the nurses’ defamation claim
arises from and is, in that limited sense, solely based on their
hospital employer’s quite legitimate petitioning activity, it nev-
ertheless remains unclear whether this qualifies as a disfavored
“SLAPP” suit meriting early dismissal. Under current case law,
the inquiry ends without permitting confirmation that the funda-
mental statutory concern is satisfied, much like the proverbial
unacknowledged elephant in the room. To ensure that only
“SLAPP” suits — those without merit primarily brought to chill
legitimate petitioning activities — are subject to early dismissal
and its attendant financial penalties, we conclude that the statu-
tory term “based on” must be accorded broader meaning than it
has at present.

We turn first, then, to what the threshold burden demands of the
special movant seeking early dismissal under the anti-SLAPP
statute. In essence, the Duracraft framework imposes the thresh-
old burden as an initial screening device, requiring the special
movant to show in the first instance that the claims against it in
fact arose only from its own petitioning activities. It stands to
reason that, in doing so, the special movant must take the adverse
complaint as it finds it, and cannot fairly be expected to overcome
the manner in which a nonmoving party has chosen to structure
its complaint. Thus, however reasonable it may have been for the
nurses to frame their defamation claim against the hospital de-
fendants as one count including two types of communications, we
agree with the Appeals Court that, when ascertaining whether
petitioning activity is the sole basis of a claim, the structure of the
nonmoving party’s complaint ordinarily cannot be dispositive of
the matter. See Blanchard, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 111 n.13. Were
it otherwise, nonmoving parties could undercut the anti-SLAPP
statute and its salutary purpose by combining into a single count
claims that are based on both petitioning and nonpetitioning
activities. Where, as here, the claim structured as a single count
readily could have been pleaded as separate counts, a special
movant can meet its threshold burden with respect to the portion
of that count based on petitioning activity.

That being said, the plaintiff nurses’ contrary position as to the
scope of the threshold burden finds support in Erhlich v. Stern, 74
Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (2009), which notes the considerable
potency of the sweeping early dismissal remedy provided by the

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anti-SLAPP statute. In an effort to assure that this remedy is
confined only to suits meriting such harsh treatment, the Appeals
Court construed the threshold burden strictly, stating that “the
anti-SLAPP inquiry produces an all or nothing result as to each
count the complaint contains . . . and the statute does not create
a process for parsing counts to segregate components that can
proceed from those that cannot.” Jd. While, as explained, we
depart from the Ehrlich view of the threshold burden, we recog-
nize the well-founded concerns that underlie it and that prompt us
now to revisit the Duracraft framework.

Under current law, there are only two ways for a nonmoving
party, such as the nurses here, to resist the early dismissal of their
claim as a “SLAPP” suit. One way is to argue that the special
movant has not met its threshold burden. Failing that, the other
way is to argue that the special movant’s petitioning activity was
not legitimate but instead a sham, i.e., lacking any reasonable
basis in fact or law. Because it is often difficult to make the latter
showing,”° the dispositive issue tends to be whether the special
movant’s threshold burden has been met. But, as this case illus-
trates, even where that burden has been met and the petitioning
activity in question may be entirely legitimate, such inquiry is not
entirely adequate to the task of determining whether the special
motion should be allowed.

Particularly in instances where, as here, the classic indicia of a
“SLAPP” suit, see Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161-162, appear to be
absent," the present framework does not provide adequate means

20Under current case law, in order to meet its second-stage burden under the
anti-SLAPP statute, a nonmoving party must, in essence, demonstrate through
pleadings and affidavits that there is no credible factual or legal basis for the
special movant’s petitioning activities. See Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154 n.7;
Wenger, 451 Mass. at 7-8. Given the high bar for nonmoving parties that this
generally represents, it is little wonder that the plaintiff nurses focused almost
entirely on the hospital defendants’ purported failure to meet their threshold
burden. See Blanchard, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 109 (concluding that plaintiff
nurses did not attempt to make showing that hospital defendants’ statements to
Boston Globe were “devoid of factual or legal support” and thus failed to meet
their second-stage burden).

24Contrast Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 476 Mass. at 480-483 & n.10, where the
plaintiff nonmoving party, an established scientific consulting firm, brought
defamation claims in two States against individual environmental activists of
modest means, while not having brought such claims against parties of apparent
financial capacity and public stature who had published similar allegedly de-
famatory statements. Following its receipt of discovery from the individual
defendants but before responding to the defendants’ discovery requests, and

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Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

to distinguish between meritless claims targeting legitimate peti-
tioning activity and meritorious claims with no such goal.” It is
only the former, the actual “SLAPP” suit, that the Legislature
intended to stop early in its tracks. The Legislature did not intend
the expedited remedy it provided, the special motion to dismiss,
to be used instead as a cudgel to forestall and chill the legitimate
claims — also petitioning activity — of those who may truly be
aggrieved by the sometimes collateral damage wrought by an-
other’s valid petitioning activity. We are mindful that the thresh-
old burden was itself crafted to address this underlying concern
and its genesis accordingly remains instructive.

The threshold burden, not appearing in the anti-SLAPP statute
itself, was prudently imposed upon special movants as a means of
bridging the discrepancy between the statute’s evident purpose
and its language and, thereby, of addressing constitutional con-
cerns otherwise raised. Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167-168. While
the Legislature passed the anti-SLAPP statute to counteract
“meritless” lawsuits brought to chill a party’s petitioning activity,
ie., “SLAPP” suits, id. at 161, the Duracraft court realized that
the “statutory language fails to track and implement such an
objective.” Jd. at 166. See id. at 163 (“In the statute as enacted,
the Legislature . . . did not address concerns over its breadth and
reach, and ignored its potential uses in litigation far different from
the typical SLAPP suit”).

The statute as written does not focus on ascertaining whether
the nonmoving party’s claim is in fact a “SLAPP” suit. Instead,
it looks only to whether the special movant’s own legitimate
petitioning activity forms the basis of that claim. This leaves open
the possibility that a special movant, whose legitimate petitioning
activity forms the basis of a meritorious adverse claim that is not
primarily geared toward chilling such petitioning, may nonethe-
less use the special motion to eradicate that nonmoving party’s
adverse claim.2* As has long been recognized, this potential
infringement of an “adverse party’s exercise of its right to peti-

during the pendency of the defendants’ ultimately successful appeal from the
denial of their special motion to dismiss, the plaintiff moved voluntarily to
dismiss its lawsuit; the motion was denied. /d. at 483 n.8.

22The plaintiff nurses, for their part, maintain that they supported the goal of
the hospital defendants’ petitioning, which was to preserve the hospital's license
to operate the unit.

28The Illinois Supreme Court described the problem succinctly when address-
ing Illinois’s anti-SLAPP law, which in many respects mirrors that of the
Commonwealth. The court wrote:

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Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

tion, even when it is not engaged in sham petitioning . . . has
troubled judges and bedeviled the  statute’s application.”
Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 166-167.24

To ameliorate this constitutional infirmity and to ensure that
only “SLAPP” suits are subject to dismissal, the Duracraft court
imposed upon special movants the burden of showing that the
claims against them are “solely based on’ protected petitioning
activity. See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 165, 167 (“Because the
Legislature intended to immunize parties from claims ‘based on’
their petitioning activities, we adopt a construction of ‘based on’
that would exclude motions brought against meritorious claims
with a substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning
activities implicated’). The goal of this framework was to “dis-
tinguish meritless from meritorious claims, as was intended by
the Legislature.” Jd. at 168.

“The sham exception tests the genuineness of the defendants’ acts; it
says nothing about the merits of the plaintifi’s lawsuit. It is entirely
possible that defendants could spread malicious lies about an individual
while in the course of genuinely petitioning the government for a favorable
result. For instance, in the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that defendants
defamed him by making statements that plaintiff abused children, did not
get along with colleagues, and performed poorly at his job. Assuming
these statements constitute actionable defamation, it does not follow that
defendants were not genuinely attempting to achieve a favorable govern-
mental result by pressuring the school board into firing the plaintiff. If a
plaintiff’s complaint genuinely seeks redress for damages from defamation
or other intentional torts and, thus, does not constitute a SLAPP, it is
irrelevant whether the defendants” actions were genuinely aimed at pro-
curing favorable government action, result, or outcome” (footnote and
quotations omitted).

Sandholm vy. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, { 53.

4Both the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights provide a right to petition that includes the right to seek judicial
resolution of disputes. Sahli v. Bull HN Information Sys., Inc., 437 Mass. 696,
700-701 (2002) (noting “constitutional right to seek judicial resolution of
disputes under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art.
11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights’ ). See First Amendment (“Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition
the Government for a redress of gtievances.”); att. 11 (“Every subject of the
Commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws,
for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or
character”); art. 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (“The people
have aright. . . to request of the legislative body, by the way of . .. petitions . . .
redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer”). See also
Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 333.

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While the Duracraft framework limited the reach of the statute
and mitigated the problem, subsequent experience has shown that
it did not eliminate it. The statute continues to permit, in certain
circumstances, the expedited dismissal of a nonmoving party’s
meritorious claim that does not seek primarily to chill protected
petitioning activity, ie., non-“SLAPP” suits. The reason the stat-
ute can still “be misused to allow motions for expedited dismissal
of nonfrivolous claims in contravention of the Legislature’s in-
tent,” Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 442 Mass. 660, 673
(2004), is its exclusive focus on the special movant’s petitioning
activity in determining whether the nonmoving party’s claim is a
“SLAPP” suit. Without also considering the nonmoving party’s
claim, however, a court cannot adequately assess whether it is a
meritless “SLAPP” suit aimed primarily at chilling a special
movant’s right to petition or, instead, a valid exercise of the
nonmoving party’s own right to petition.

d. Augmenting the Duracraft framework. To ensure that the
anti-SLAPP statute will “distinguish meritless from meritorious
claims, as was intended by the Legislature,” Duracraft, 427
Mass. at 168, we once again narrow the problematic sweep of the
statute by broadening the meaning of the term “based on.” A
nonmoving party’s claim is not subject to dismissal as one “based
on” a special movant’s petitioning activity if, when the burden
shifts to it, the nonmoving party can establish that its suit was not
“brought primarily to chill” the special movant’s legitimate ex-
ercise of its right to petition. See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161,
quoting 1994 House Doc. No. 1520. In other words, a claim that
is not a “SLAPP” suit will not be dismissed.

As a practical matter, the expedited special motion to dismiss
will proceed as follows, still in essentially two stages, taking
place early in the litigation and with limited discovery available
only by leave of court. See G. L. c. 231, § 59H. At the first stage,
a special movant must demonstrate that the nonmoving party’s
claims are solely based on its own petitioning activities. This is
the familiar Duracraft threshold inquiry, which will remain un-
changed. At the second stage, if the special movant meets this
initial burden, the burden will shift, as it does now, to the
nonmoving party. The nonmoving party may still prevail, as at
present, by demonstrating that the special movant’s petitioning
activities upon which the challenged claim is based lack a rea-
sonable basis in fact or law, i.e., constitute sham petitioning, and
that the petitioning activities at issue caused it injury. G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H.

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If it cannot make this showing, however, the nonmoving party
may henceforth meet its second-stage burden and defeat the
special motion to dismiss by demonstrating in the alternative that
each challenged claim does not give rise to a “SLAPP” suit. It
may do so by demonstrating that each such claim was not
primarily brought to chill the special movant’s legitimate peti-
tioning activities. To make this showing, the nonmoving party
must establish, such that the motion judge may conclude with fair
assurance, that its primary motivating goal in bringing its claim,
viewed in its entirety, was “not to interfere with and burden
defendants’ . . . petition rights, but to seek damages for the
personal harm to [it] from [the] defendants’ alleged . . . [legally
transgressive] acts.” Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, (57.
The nonmoving party must make this showing with respect to
each such claim viewed as a whole.”

In applying this standard, the motion judge, in the exercise of
sound discretion, is to assess the totality of the circumstances
pertinent to the nonmoving party’s asserted primary purpose in
bringing its claim. The course and manner of proceedings, the
pleadings filed, and affidavits “stating the facts upon which the
liability or defense is based,” G. L. c. 231, § 59H, may all be
considered in evaluating whether the claim is a “SLAPP” suit.
See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161-162 (listing classic indicia of
“SLAPP” suits).2° A necessary but not sufficient factor in this
analysis will be whether the nonmoving party’s claim at issue is

25At the first stage of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, courts assess whether the
nonmoving party’s claim is solely “based on” the special movant’s petitioning
activity in the sense that the nonmoving party’s claim itself arises only from and
complains only of that petitioning activity. See Fabre, 436 Mass. at 524. If the
special movant meets this threshold burden, and the nonmoving party then fails
to show that such petitioning activity was sham petitioning, the nonmoving
party may now attempt to establish, under the augmented Duracraft framework,
that its claim is not “based on” the special movant’s legitimate petitioning
activity because its primary motivating goal in bringing the claim was not to
chill such petitioning. Because at this stage the motion judge is to assess in a
holistic fashion whether the claim at issue is a “SLAPP” suit, the nonmoving
party’s showing in this regard is as to the entirety of its claim. Otherwise put,
the plaintiff nurses on remand may attempt to demonstrate that their primary
motivating goal in bringing a purportedly meritorious defamation claim against
the hospital defendants — alleging as defamatory both the e-mail message to
employees and the Boston Globe articles — was not to chill the hospital
defendants’ legitimate exercise of their right to petition government in aid of
retaining the hospital’s licensure of the unit.

26This type of inquiry is not unknown in the anti-SLAPP context. In Matter
of the Discipline of an Attorney, 442 Mass. 660, 674 (2004), an attorney facing

477 Mass. 141 (2017) 161

Blanchard », Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.

“colorable or . . . worthy of being presented to and considered by
the court,” see L.B. v. Chief Justice of Probate & Family Court
Dept., 474 Mass. 231, 241 (2016), i.e., whether it “offers some
reasonable possibility” of a decision in the party’s favor. See
Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 504 (1979).

On remand, then, the plaintiff nurses may seek to demonstrate
that the hospital defendants’ petitioning activity, i.e., the state-
ments in the Boston Globe article, lacks any reasonable basis in
fact or law and caused the nurses injury. Failing this, under the
augmented Duracraft framework, they may seek to establish that
their defamation claim, viewed as a whole, is nonetheless not a
“SLAPP” suit. If the plaintiff nurses cannot meet their second-
stage burden under the augmented framework, the hospital de-
fendants’ special motion to dismiss shall be allowed as to so
much of the defamation claim as is based on the Boston Globe
articles, and an appropriate award of attorney’s fees and costs
shall be made.

4. Conclusion. The denial of the hospital defendants’ special
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ defamation claim as to Walczak’s
statements to the Boston Globe is vacated. In all other respects,
the order is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the Superior
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

disciplinary charges for allegedly attempting to influence a witness improperly
responded by filing a special motion to dismiss. Because we determined that bar
counsel did not have an improper purpose in bringing charges against the
attorney, we denied the attorney’s special motion. Jd, We based our conclusion
on two factors: (1) bar counsel had “sought to sanction the respondent for
‘conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,’ an undoubtedly
meritorious charge if a witness had been influenced by improper means;” and
(2) “the less than careful means of communication employed by the respondent
left his conduct at least open to the interpretation urged by bar counsel.” Id.

162 477 Mass. 162 (2017)

477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC.

477 Harrison Ave., LLC vs. JACE Boston, LLC,
& another.

Suffolk. January 5, 2017. - May 23, 2017.

Present: Gawts, C.J., Botstorp, Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Buon, JJ.”

“Anti-SLAPP” Statute, Constitutional Law, Right to petition government. Prac-
Civil, Motion to dismiss. Abuse of Process. Consumer Protection Act,
fair or deceptive act.

Discussion of the provision in G. L. ¢, 231, § 59H, the “anti-SLAPP” statute, for
early dismissal of lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances; and of the threshold burden a special movant must meet and, if
that threshold burden is met, the ways that the nonmoving party can meet its
burden to defeat the special motion to dismiss. [167-168]

In an appeal from the denial of a special motion to dismiss under G. L. ¢. 231,
§ 59H, sought by the defendants in a civil action alleging abuse of process
and violation of G. L. c. 93A, this court concluded that, with respect to the
abuse of process claim, the defendants had met their threshold burden of
demonstrating that the claims against them were based solely on their
petitioning activity, where the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants
had engaged in any conduct germane to the plaintifi’s abuse of process claim,
apart from the defendants’ invocation of process, that could provide a
substantial basis for the plaintiff's claim [168-171]; however, with respect to
the claim for a violation of G. L. c. 93A, this court concluded that the
defendants had not met their threshold burden, where the plaintifi’s allega-
tion that the defendants had filed false insurance claims against the plaintiff's
construction company provided a substantial nonpetitioning basis for the
claim of unfair or deceptive practices [171-172].

In remanding to the Superior Court a civil action alleging, inter alia, abuse of
process, in which the defendants, who sought a special motion to dismiss
under G. L. c. 231, § 59H, had met their threshold burden of demonstrating
that those claims against them were based solely on their petitioning activity,
this court concluded that, because the defendants’ legitimate petitioning
activity was protected by the statute, unless the plaintiff could show that the
entirety of its abuse of process claim was not a “SLAPP” suit (ie., that the
plaintiff's primary motivating goal in bringing its claim, viewed in its
entirety, was not to interfere with and burden the defendants’ petition rights

*Arthur Leon.

Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

477 Mass. 162 (2017) 163
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

but to seek damages for the personal harm to the plaintiff from the defend-
ants’ alleged legally transgressive acts), the plaintiff could proceed only on
so much of its abuse of process claim as alleged illegitimate process.
[172-176]

Civit action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
March 23, 2015.

A special motion to dismiss was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Mark S. Furman (Emily C. Shanahan also present) for the
defendants.

Andrew E. Goloboy (Ronald W. Dunbar, Jr., also present) for
the plaintiff.

Lenk, J. This case involves the application of G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H, the “anti-SLAPP” statute, to a dispute between adjoining
building owners. In 2011, the plaintiff purchased a parcel of
property located at 477 Harrison Avenue in Boston with the goal
of redeveloping it. The defendants own an abutting parcel.? Over
the course of the next several years, the defendants opposed the
plaintiff's redevelopment plans in various legal and administra-
tive arenas. The plaintiff eventually filed a complaint against the
defendants, raising claims of abuse of process and a violation of
G. L. c. 93A, § 11. The defendants responded by filing a special
motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H. A Superior
Court judge denied the motion, the defendants appealed, and we
allowed their application for direct appellate review.

We consider first whether the defendants have met their thres-
hold burden under the anti-SLAPP statute of showing that each
claim is solely based on the defendants’ petitioning activity. See
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167
(1998) (Duracraft). We conclude that they have done so as to the
abuse of process claim, but not as to the G. L. c. 93A claim. The
judge correctly denied the special motion to dismiss the latter
claim. The defendants having met their threshold burden as to the
abuse of process claim, however, the burden then shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the petitioning activity on which that claim
is based lacks a reasonable basis in law or fact and has caused it

Although Arthur Leon is the sole owner of JACE Boston, LLC, we refer to
him and JACE Boston, LLC, as the “defendants” throughout the opinion for the
sake of convenience. We denote Leon separately in instances where the plaintiff
alleges that Leon personally engaged in a course of conduct.

164 477 Mass. 162 (2017)
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

actual injury, i.e., is not a valid exercise of the right to petition.
On the record before the motion judge, who did not reach the
issue, it is evident that only a portion of the defendants’ petition-
ing activity that forms the basis for the plaintiff's abuse of process
claim was shown to lack such a reasonable basis. Given this,
predating today’s decision in Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hos-
pital, Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 159-161 (2017) (Blanchard), the plain-
tiff could proceed on only so much of its abuse of process claim as
alleges the invalid exercise of the right to petition, with the re-
mainder dismissed pursuant to the special motion. Notwithstand-
ing this, however, in light of Blanchard, which augments the
Duracraft framework, we remand the matter to the Superior Court.
The plaintiff will then have the opportunity to show that the
entirety of its abuse of process claim was not primarily brought to
chill the defendants’ legitimate petitioning activity. A successful
showing in this regard will defeat in full the special motion to
dismiss.

1. Background. We summarize the relevant facts from the
pleadings and affidavits that were before the motion judge. See
Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 149 (2009). In December
of 2011, the plaintiff purchased a parcel of property located at 477
Harrison Avenue (477 Harrison) containing a five-story brick
building with the intent to redevelop it for residential use. In
preparation for this redevelopment, the plaintiff's building man-
ager, John Holland, met with Arthur Leon, the sole owner of
JACE Boston, LLC, which owned the building at 1234 Washing-
ton Street (1234 Washington) that shared a wall with the plain-
tiff’s building.* According to the plaintiff, Leon asked Holland to
delay the redevelopment of 477 Harrison so that the defendants
could redevelop 1234 Washington. Richard J. Leon attested that
his cousin, the defendant Leon, told him of “his intention to wait
[the plaintiff] out until [the plaintiff] fell into bankruptcy on the
loan and that [he] would then purchase 477 Harrison Avenue
from the bank for” a fraction of what the plaintiff paid to purchase
the property.® The plaintiff did not accede to Leon’s purportedly
requested delay.

“The plaintiff alleges that Holland met with Leon after he learned that Leon
had engaged in a protracted effort to obstruct another abutting developer's
redevelopment plans. The record contains an abuse of process claim filed
against the defendants by that developer. It also contains an order denying the
defendants’ subsequent special motion to dismiss the developer’s claim.

®The defendants deny that Leon made these comments.

477 Mass. 162 (2017) 165

477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC.

Years of conflict between the parties followed. The first front in
the ongoing struggle opened with the plaintiff's request for zon-
ing relief in early 2012. When the plaintiff sought such relief from
the zoning board of appeal of Boston (ZBA), Leon’s attorney
contacted the ZBA on his behalf to oppose it. Despite this, the
ZBA unanimously voted to grant the plaintiff's requested vari-
ances and conditional use permits. The defendants appealed from
the ZBA’s decision in August of 2012. During the same time
frame, the plaintiff also requested a small project review of its
redevelopment proposal from the Boston Redevelopment Au-
thority (BRA). Leon wrote to the BRA to oppose this.

During the summer of 2012, the defendants brought a declara-
tory judgment action regarding rights to the parties’ shared wall.
The defendants’ claim rested on an indenture and agreement
dated June, 1926, which provides that the owner of the “garage
building” then under construction at 1234 Washington Street
would have the “right and easement” “to tie unto and to use for
the support of said garage building the northeasterly wall . . . of
the stable” then at 477 Harrison Avenue “to a height not exceed-
ing two stories nor more than thirty four feet above the line of the
present curbstone at the westerly corner of Harrison Avenue and
Perry Street.” In September, 2014, a Superior Court judge ruled
that this agreement referenced the parties’ respective buildings,
and that it precluded the plaintiff from demolishing the party wall
between the two properties below the height specified in the
agreement.

With these matters pending and its redevelopment plans
thereby stalled, the plaintiff opted for what it hoped would be a
faster path forward. In September, 2013, as the parties’ summary
judgment motions awaited resolution in the Superior Court, the
plaintiff abandoned its request for zoning relief, then on appeal, to
pursue instead an “as of right project.”¢ The plaintiff obtained a
short form building permit from the inspectional services depart-
ment (ISD) in October of 2013, from which the defendants
promptly appealed. Armed with the permit, however, the plaintiff
notified the defendants that it intended to commence work on the
parties’ shared wall in late November, 2013. The defendants
immediately sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the plain-
tiff’s construction. Rejecting the defendants’ application for eq-

©The new proposal, which omitted the lucrative penthouses initially planned
for the project, required only a conditional use permit.

166 477 Mass. 162 (2017)

477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC.

uitable relief, a Superior Court judge instead entered an order
allowing the plaintiff to remove the undisputed portions of the
wall. In the meantime, the ISD issued the plaintiff a permit
allowing it to trespass on the defendants’ property for the purpose
of protecting the roof of the defendants’ building during the
removal of the undisputed portions of the wall.

And with that, the plaintiff finally began redeveloping its
property in January, 2014, two years after it initially had told
Leon about its plans. Prior to commencing construction, the
plaintiff provided the defendants with copies of the ISD short
form permit, the order from the judge permitting removal of the
undisputed portions of the wall, project plans, and an insurance
certificate. The defendants again sought injunctive relief to pro-
hibit the plaintiff from entering onto their property, and a Supe-
rior Court judge again denied the relief sought. The judge also
issued an order expressly allowing the plaintiff to enter onto the
defendants’ property to protect it from damage.

As the construction began, the conflict continued,” coming to a
climax in December, 2014. At that time, Leon filed a police report
reflecting that Holland’s employees were standing on the defend-
ants’ roof and thereafter brought an application for a criminal
complaint alleging that Holland had trespassed illegally on his
property.* The clerk-magistrate at the Boston Municipal Court
found insufficient probable cause to support the charge, and
dismissed the complaint. In January, 2015, the plaintiff again
sought to construct penthouses on its property, and requested the
requisite zoning relief from the ZBA. The defendants provided a
written opposition, but the ZBA granted the plaintiff its requested
relief. The defendants once again appealed from this determina-
tion to the Superior Court.

Shortly thereafter, and more than three years after the plaintiff
first had begun pursuing its redevelopment plans, the plaintiff
filed a complaint against the defendants in the Superior Court,
claiming abuse of process and a violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11.
With regard to the abuse of process claim, the plaintiff maintained

7Apart from the litigation and the administrative disputes, the defendants also
filed claims with the plaintiff's insurer in May and December, 2014, against the
plaintiff's construction company, asserting damage to the defendants’ property.

®The criminal complaint indicates that Arthur Leon told police that “[the
plaintiff’s construction workers] ha[d] left construction equipment on his roof,
[including] nails, construction debris, and [that the workers] had used chemicals
on the building.”

477 Mass. 162 (2017) 167
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

that the defendants “wrongfully used process for ulterior pur-
poses, including” delaying or preventing the development of the
plaintiff's property so that the defendants could (1) “bankrupt 477
Harrison Ave., LLC and purchase [it] from the bank at a discount
price”; (2) develop their own property at 1234 Washington Street
prior to the development of the plaintiff's property; (3) gain
leverage over the plaintiff to coerce it into removing any windows
providing views over the defendants’ property at 1234 Washing-
ton Street; and (4) extort the plaintiff into paying off the defend-
ants. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants’ actions con-
stituted “unfair or deceptive acts or practices and/or unfair
competition in violation of [G. L. c. 93A] and the Attorney
General’s regulations promulgated thereunder.”

In response to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants filed a
special motion to dismiss pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. A
Superior Court judge denied the special motion, concluding that
the defendants “[could not] meet their burden under [the anti-
SLAPP statute] to establish that the plaintiff's suit [was] solely
based on their petitioning activity and [had] no other substantial
basis” (emphasis in original).

2. Discussion. The defendants maintain that they have met their
threshold burden and that the plaintiff has not then shown — as
it must under Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167, in order to defeat the
special motion to dismiss — that the defendants’ petitioning
activity lacked a reasonable factual or legal basis. They argue that
the judge accordingly erred in denying their special motion to
dismiss. The defendants are correct only in part. They have met
their threshold burden as to the abuse of process claim but not as
to the G. L. c. 93A claim, and the judge correctly denied the
motion as to the latter claim. As to the abuse of process claim, the
defendants are correct that the plaintiff has not shown that the
entirety of the defendants’ petitioning activities of which the
plaintiff complains lack a reasonable basis in law or fact. How-
ever, given our decision today in Blanchard, augmenting the
Duracraft framework, the matter must be remanded to afford the
plaintiff an opportunity to show that its abuse of process claim is
nonetheless not a “SLAPP” suit. See Blanchard, 477 Mass. at
143-144.

a. Special motion to dismiss. The anti-SLAPP statute provides
a “procedural remedy for early dismissal of” “lawsuits brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances”
(citation omitted). Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161. That remedy is

168 477 Mass. 162 (2017)
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

the special motion to dismiss, which allows a special movant to
seek dismissal of “civil claims, counterclaims, or cross claims”
based solely on its exercise of the right of petition. See G. L.
c. 231, § 59H. To prevail on this motion, the burden falls first on
the special movant, here the defendants, to “make a threshold
showing through pleadings and affidavits that the claims against
it ‘are “based on” [its] petitioning activities alone and have no
substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning
activities.’ ” See Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 147, quoting Fustolo v.
Hollander, 455 Mass. 861, 865 (2010).

If the special movant is able to make this showing, the burden
shifts to the nonmoving party, here the plaintiff, to defeat the
special motion to dismiss. Following today’s decision in
Blanchard, the nonmoving party can now meet its second stage
burden in two ways. It may first establish “by a preponderance of
the evidence that the [special movant] lacked any reasonable
factual support or any arguable basis in law for its petitioning
activity,” Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 553-554 (2001), and
that the petitioning activity caused the nonmoving party “actual
injury” — i.e., that its petitioning activity is illegitimate. G. L.
c. 231, § 59H. If the nonmoving party cannot make this showing,
it may then attempt to meet its burden under the augmented
Duracraft framework as set out in Blanchard by showing that its
claim was not “brought primarily to chill,” see Blanchard, 477
Mass. at 159, quoting Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161, the special
movant’s legitimate petitioning activities but rather “to seek
damages for the personal harm to [it] from [the] defendants’
alleged . . . [legally transgressive] acts.” See Blanchard, supra at
160, quoting Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, 957.

b. Defendants’ threshold burden. In order to meet its threshold
burden, the special movant must demonstrate that the nonmoving
party’s claims are “solely based on” the special movant’s peti-
tioning activities (emphasis and quotations omitted). Duracraft,
427 Mass. at 165. A special movant’s motivation for engaging in
petitioning activity does not factor into whether it has met its
threshold burden. See Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113,
122 (2002). Rather, the key inquiry here is whether “the only
conduct complained of is . . . petitioning activity.” Fabre v.
Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 524 (2002). In assessing the conduct that
is complained of, a judge considers only the allegations that are
relevant to the discrete causes of action brought.

i. The abuse of process claim. An abuse of process claim
involves three elements: “[1] that process was used, [2] for an

477 Mass. 162 (2017) 169
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

ulterior or illegitimate purpose, [3] resulting in damage” (quota-
tions and citation omitted). Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v.
Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627, 636 (2010). The tort “has been
described as a ‘form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage,
not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the sur-
render of property or the payment of money.’” Viftands v.
Sudduth, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 406 (2000), quoting Cohen v.
Hurley, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 442 (1985). Given that the
invocation of process necessarily constitutes petitioning activity
for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, see G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H (petitioning activity includes “any written or oral statement
made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other governmental proceeding”), an actionable
abuse of process claim will always be, at least in part, based on
a special movant’s petitioning activities.

As we noted in Fabre, however, this does not mean that an
abuse of process claim will always be solely based on a special
movant’ s petitioning activities. See Fabre, 436 Mass. at 524 n.10.
Although a party’s invocation of process alone may give rise to
a colorable abuse of process claim in certain circumstances, see,
e.g., Carroll vy. Gillespie, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 12, 26 (1982)
(upholding abuse of process claim where automobile repair shop
owner filed criminal complaint against customer to pressure her
to pay repair bill), a cognizable claim can also involve a subse-
quent misuse of such process by the offending party that is not
itself petitioning activity. See Kelley v. Stop & Shop Cos., 26
Mass. App. Ct. 557, 558 (1988) (“subsequent misuse of the
process . . . constitutes the misconduct for which liability is
imposed” [citation omitted]). See also Adams v. Whitman, 62
Mass. App. Ct. 850, 855-856 (2005), and cases cited (discussing
these two types of abuse of process claims). For example, a
party’s attempt to use an invocation of process to extort an
opposing party constitutes a substantial nonpetitioning basis for
an abuse of process claim. See, e.g., Keystone Freight Corp. v.
Bartlett Consol., Inc., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 315-316 (2010).
Subsequent misuse of process, as long it as it is not also peti-
tioning activity, may thus provide a nonpetitioning basis for a
nonmoving party’s abuse of process claim. The question here
then is whether the plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in
any conduct germane to its abuse of process claim, apart from
their invocations of process, which can provide a “substantial
basis” for its claim.

170 477 Mass. 162 (2017)

477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC.

The plaintiff avers that its abuse of process claim rests on two
grounds other than the defendants’ invocations of process: (1) the
two insurance claims filed by the defendants against the plain-
tiff’s construction company; and (2) Leon’s alleged statements
indicating an ulterior motive behind the defendants’ use of pro-
cess. Neither of these, however, constitutes substantial nonpeti-
tioning bases for the plaintiff's abuse of process claim.

The defendants’ allegedly false insurance claims fail to provide
a substantial nonpetitioning basis for the plaintiff's abuse of
process claim because they do not bear any apparent relation to it.
Filing an insurance claim does not constitute process in and of
itself, see Jones v. Brockton Pub. Mkts., Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 390
(1975) (process defined as “the papers issued by a court to bring
a party or property within its jurisdiction’’), and the defendants do
not suggest any connection between the insurance claims and the
defendants’ use of process. As such, the insurance claims do not
support the plaintiff’s claim of abuse of process.

Although Leon’s statements have obvious relevance to the
second element of the tort (use of process for an ulterior or
illegitimate purpose), the inquiry here is not as to the sufficiency
of the complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754
(1974). The inquiry instead is whether, in connection with the
statutory special motion to dismiss, the defendants have satisfied
their threshold burden, an inquiry that focuses on the actual
conduct complained of, and not the defendants’ motivations for
engaging in it. See Fabre, 436 Mass. at 523-524 (special mov-
ant’s purported statements suggesting ulterior motivation behind
petitioning activity did not provide “substantial basis other than
or in addition to the petitioning activities implicated” [emphasis
in original; citation omitted]). See also North Am. Expositions Co.
Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 863 (2009) (“the
fact that . . . speech involves a commercial motive does not mean
it is not petitioning”); Office One, Inc., 437 Mass. at 122 (focus
in initial stage of anti-SLAPP inquiry is “on the conduct com-
plained of, and, if the only conduct complained of is petitioning
activity, then there can be no other ‘substantial basis’ for the
claim” regardless of the “motive behind [the] petitioning activity”
[emphasis and citation omitted]). Otherwise put, the focus at the
threshold burden stage is on whether the conduct complained of
consists only of the defendants’ petitioning activity; here, the
only conduct complained of is the process the defendants used.
Although the statements at issue may explain the motivation

477 Mass. 162 (2017) 171
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

behind the defendants’ use of process, they are not themselves the
conduct on which the plaintiff rests its abuse of process claim
and, accordingly, cannot provide a substantial nonpetitioning
basis for that claim.° The defendants have met their threshold
burden as to the plaintiff's abuse of process claim.'°

ii. Chapter 93A claim. The plaintiff's G. L. c. 93A claim is
based on the same factual allegations as the plaintiff's abuse of
process claim. The predicate for a G. L. c. 93A claim differs in
material respects, however, from that of an abuse of process
claim, and rests here in part on acts that are not petitioning
activities. Because the plaintiffs allegation that the defendants
filed two false insurance claims against the plaintiff's construc-
tion company provides a substantial nonpetitioning basis for its
G. L. c. 93A claim, the defendants cannot show that the claim is
solely based on their petitioning activity.

While less than ideally pleaded, the plaintiff's complaint un-
mistakably alleges that the defendants’ filing of false insurance
claims against the plaintiff's construction company formed part
of the unfair or deceptive practices that the defendants engaged in
to halt the plaintiff's redevelopment projects and thereby harm
the plaintiff financially." See Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 469 Mass. 813, 820 (2014) (plaintiff bringing

°The outcome might well be different if Leon’s statements themselves con-
stituted the underlying conduct upon which the plaintifi’s claim rested. For
example, an allegation that Leon had stated to the plaintiff that he would
continue invoking process unless the plaintiff paid him a certain amount of
money — i.e., made a statement in an attempt to extort the plaintiff through his
use of process — could provide a substantial nonpetitioning basis for the
plaintiff's claim.

‘The plaintiff's contention that its claims are not based on, but are rather “in
response to,” the defendants’ petitioning activity is also unavailing. This argu-
ment rests on language in a footnote in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 168 n.20, stating
that, in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute, “based on” does not mean “in
response to.” The remaining language of the note, however, makes clear that the
clause that the plaintiff cites stands only for the proposition that counterclaims
are not automatically “based on” a special movant’s petitioning activity. See id.

“The defendants maintain that the insurance claims do not support the
plaintiff's G. L. c. 93A claim because they were submitted to the plaintiff's
construction company’s insurance carrier rather than the plaintiff’s insurance
carrier. A special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, unlike a
motion to dismiss brought under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754
(1974), does not test the sufficiency of the complaint. Instead a “special movant
must take the adverse complaint as it finds it,” see Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 155,
in order to determine whether it concerns only the defendants’ petitioning
activities. Thus, the only relevant inquiry is whether the complained of conduct

172 477 Mass. 162 (2017)

477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC.

claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, must demonstrate “(1) that the
defendant engaged in an unfair method of competition or com-
mitted an unfair or deceptive act of practice, as defined by G. L.
c. 93A, § 2, or the regulations promulgated thereunder; (2) a loss
of money or property suffered as a result; and (3) a causal
connection between the loss suffered and the defendant’s unfair
or deceptive method, act, or practice” [footnote omitted]); Com-
monwealth vy. Decotis, 366 Mass. 234, 241, 242 (1974) (G. L.
c. 93A, § 2, does not provide definition for “unfair practice,” and
“[t]he existence of unfair acts and practices must be determined
from the circumstances of each case”). See also Linkage Corp. v.
Trustees of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 27, cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1015 (1997) (“[A] practice is unfair if it is ‘within . . . the
penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established
concept of unfairness; [i.e.,] is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous . . .”” [citation omitted]). The allegedly false in-
surance claims asserted as part of the G. L. c. 93A claim are acts
distinct from the related but separate assertedly unfair or decep-
tive acts concerning the defendants’ use of process. Unlike the
use of process, however, the filing of false insurance claims does
not constitute petitioning. Accordingly, the defendants have
failed to meet their threshold burden with respect to the plaintiff's
G. L. c. 93A claim, and the trial judge’s denial of the special
motion to dismiss is affirmed with respect to that count.

c. The plaintiff's second-stage burden. Because the defendants
have met their threshold burden with respect to the plaintiff's
abuse of process claim, the plaintiff may defeat the special motion
to dismiss this claim by demonstrating, “by a preponderance of
the evidence,” that the defendants’ petitioning activity upon
which its abuse of process claim is based is illegitimate — i.e.,
that it “lacked any reasonable factual support or any arguable
basis in law,” Baker, 434 Mass. at 553-555, and caused it “actual
injury,” G. L. c. 231, § 59H. If it cannot make this showing, the
plaintiff may now also prevail by establishing to the judge’s fair
assurance that its abuse of process claim is not a “SLAPP” suit
under the augmented Duracraft framework — i.e., “that its pri-
mary motivating goal in bringing its claim, viewed in its entirety,
was ‘not to interfere with and burden defendants’ . . . petition
rights, but to seek damages for the personal harm to [it] from [the]

relevant to the plaintiff's discrete cause of action provides a substantial
nonpetitioning basis for the plaintiff's claim.

477 Mass. 162 (2017) 173
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

defendants’ alleged . . . [legally transgressive] acts.’” Blanchard,
477 Mass. at 160, quoting Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443, 1.57.

i. Legitimacy of the defendants’ petitioning activities. The
plaintiff's abuse of process claim rests on numerous instances
where the defendants employed process and thereby engaged in
petitioning activity. To defeat the special motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff must show that each such instance lacked a reasonable
basis in law or fact. Save for Leon’s application for a criminal
complaint against Holland, the plaintiff has not carried its burden.

We note two relevant considerations in determining whether
this little-discussed second-stage burden has been met. First, a
plaintiff cannot meet its burden merely by presenting affidavits
contradicting the factual basis of the special movant’s petitioning
activities, see Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154 n.7, or demonstrating that
the petitioning activities were unsuccessful. “The critical deter-
mination is not whether the petitioning activity in question will be
successful . . . ”; it is instead whether the petitioning activity
“contains any reasonable factual or legal merit at all.” Wenger v.
Aceto, 451 Mass. 1, 7 (2008). Second, the defendants’ motivation
for engaging in petitioning activity does not factor into whether
their petitioning activity is illegitimate.” See id. at 8 (nonmoving
party’s contention that special movant filed criminal complaint
with ulterior motive irrelevant because criminal complaint had
reasonable basis in law). Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether
the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendants’ petitioning
activity lacks an objectively reasonable basis. See G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H (inquiry concerns whether petitioning activity was “devoid
of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law’).

Our review of the record suggests that the defendants engaged
in six separate instances of petitioning activities: (1) the sub-
mission of written and oral statements to the BRA and the ZBA;

By contrast, the motivation behind the defendants’ petitioning activities
could well be relevant to the inquiry under the augmented Duracraft framework,
discussed infra, as to whether the plaintiff’s abuse of process claim is in fact a
“SLAPP” suit.

"The anti-SLAPP statute defines petitioning activities broadly to include:

“[1] any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding:
[2] any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other governmental proceeding; [3] any statement reasonably likely to
encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative executive,
or judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; [4] any statement

174 477 Mass. 162 (2017)
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

(2) the filing of the zoning appeals in the Superior Court in 2012
and 2015; (3) the filing of the declaratory judgment action with
respect to the indenture and agreement; (4) the filing of the police
report; (5) the application for a criminal complaint against Hol-
land; and (6) the communications with ISD and various permits
granted by ISD. Although the plaintiff assails the motivation
behind all of these activities, it only challenges the factual and
legal basis for two invocations of process — Leon’s police report
and application for a criminal complaint against Holland for
trespassing.

The plaintiff's argument that Leon’s police report lacked a
reasonable basis in fact or law is unavailing. The police report
recounts Leon’s observation that the plaintiff's workers were
standing on his roof — which the record suggests they were,
albeit on planking supported by rubber tires — and that they
remained there despite his warnings to the plaintiff that they were
trespassing. Given that the record supports this account of the
events, the police report does not itself lack a reasonable basis in
fact or law.

The plaintiff is on firmer ground in his argument concerning
Leon’s application for a criminal complaint. The application was
purportedly filed in response to the presence of the plaintiff's
construction workers, along with various materials and chemi-
cals, on the roof of 1234 Washington Street. The application for
a criminal complaint was dismissed for lack of probable cause.
Although this in and of itself is not fatal to the defendants’
petitioning activity, see Benoit, 454 Mass. at 153-154, Leon’s
application for a criminal complaint came after a Superior Court
judge explicitly granted the plaintiff the affirmative right to tres-
pass on the defendants’ property to protect it from damage. The
combination of the lack of probable cause finding and the Supe-
rior Court order supplies the requisite preponderance of the
evidence in favor of the conclusion that the criminal complaint
lacked any reasonable basis in fact or law.

The plaintiff also has demonstrated that the defendants’ appli-
cation for a criminal complaint caused it actual injury. Holland
stated in an affidavit that he suffered “embarrassment” from the
criminal complaint, that he had to attend a probable cause hear-

reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such
consideration; or [5] any other statement falling within constitutional
protection of the right to petition government.”

G. L. ¢. 231, § 59H.

477 Mass. 162 (2017) 175

477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC.

ing, and that he feared for the financial health of the plaintiff if the
complaint had spawned criminal charges. This is enough to
constitute “actual injury” for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP
statute. See Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC, 456 Mass. at 645
(emotional, reputational, and fiscal harms of malicious prosecu-
tion constituted legitimate categories of harm to plaintiff).

This then presents the novel issue as to whether all or only
some of a special movant’s petitioning activities must be shown
to be illegitimate in order to defeat a special motion to dismiss.
The text of the anti-SLAPP statute is silent on the point, and we
look to the intent of the Legislature for insight. See Hanlon v.
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). The legislative purpose of
the anti-SLAPP statute is to provide for the expeditious dismissal
of suits targeting the “valid exercise of the constitutional right[ ]
of . . . petition for the redress of grievances.” See Duracraft, 427
Mass. at 161, quoting 1994 House Doc. No. 1520.

Applying this legislative purpose to the case at hand, the
petitioning activity that has been shown to lack a reasonable basis
in law or fact is not the “valid petitioning” that the statute
protects. The situation is different as to the remaining petitioning
activity, which the plaintiff has failed to show is illegitimate and
is therefore presumptively protected. We therefore determine that
the defendants’ legitimate petitioning activity is protected by the
statute. Were we to conclude otherwise, a nonmoving party
effectively could elude the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute
if it could prove that one small portion of a special movant’s
petitioning activity was illegitimate. What this means is that,
unless the plaintiff can, on remand, show that the entirety of its
abuse of process claim is not a “SLAPP” suit under the aug-
mented Duracraft framework, see Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 159-
161," it may proceed only on so much of its abuse of process
claim as alleges illegitimate process, i.e., Leon’s application for a
criminal complaint. In that event, the special motion to dismiss
such portion of the abuse of process claim arising out of the de-
fendants’ protected petitioning activities shall be allowed and an

14That the plaintiff only in met its second-stage burden of showing that
the defendants’ petitioning activities were illegitimate is, however, irrelevant to
its burden on remand under the augmented Duracraft framework as set out in
Blanchard. To meet its new burden on remand, the plaintiff must show that its
primary motivating goal in filing its abuse of process claim, in its entirety, was
not to chill the defendants’ legitimate petitioning activity. See Blanchard, 477
Mass. at 159-161. Moreover, if the plaintiff can make the requisite showing, then
the defendants’ motion to dismiss is defeated in full. Id.

176 477 Mass. 162 (2017)
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

appropriate award of attorney’s fees and costs made.®

ii. Remand. In light of our decision in Blanchard, we remand
this case to the Superior Court to allow the plaintiff to show that
its abuse of process claim is not a “SLAPP” suit under the
augmented Duracraft framework. See Blanchard, 477 Mass. at
159-161. “It may do so by demonstrating that [its abuse of
process claim] was not primarily brought to chill the special
movant’s legitimate petitioning activities,” i.e., by establishing,
“such that the motion judge may conclude with fair assurance,
that its primary motivating goal in bringing its [abuse of process
claim], viewed in its entirety, was ‘not to interfere with and
burden defendants’ . . . petition rights, but to seek damages for the
personal harm to [it] from [the] defendants’ alleged . . . [legally
transgressive] acts.” Id. at 160, quoting Sandholm, 2012 IL
111443, 457.

3. Conclusion. The denial of the defendants’ special motion to
dismiss is affirmed with respect to the plaintiff's claim under
G. L. c. 93A, § 11, and vacated with respect to its abuse of pro-
cess claim. Given that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the
entirety of the defendants’ petitioning activities lacks a reasona-
ble basis in fact or law, it may attempt to make the showing out-
lined in Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 159-161, upon remand. The matter

"The plaintiff suggests that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard
laid out in Baker, 434 Mass, at 553-555, violates its right to a jury trial under
art. 15 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (“in all suits between two or
more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used
and practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury”). We discern no merit
in the plaintiff's argument. “The right to a jury trial does not grant to a party the
right to put to a jury any question he or she wishes.” English v. New England
Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass, 423, 426 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
The right attaches only to questions of fact material to the merits of a party’s
claim. See id. A special motion to dismiss, however, presents a question of law
separate from the merits of the plaintiff's claim — the question whether the
defendant’s complained-of petitioning activity falls within the protective ambit
of the anti-SLAPP statute. See Benoit, 454 Mass, at 158 n.3 (Cordy, J.,
concurring) (“A finding by the judge that the plaintiff has met his burden and the
case can go forward is... nota judgment on the merits of the claim, but rather
an evaluation whether the defendant's prior petitioning activity falls within the
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute”). As with the similar doctrine of qualified
immunity for government officials, the special motion inquiry is “separate from
the merits of the underlying action . . . even though a reviewing court must
consider the [nonmoving party’s] factual allegations in resolving the . . . issue.”
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 US, 511, 528-529 (1985).

477 Mass. 162 (2017) 177
477 Harrison Ave., LLC x. JACE Boston, LLC,

is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

178 477 Mass. 178 (2017)

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

Deputy Cuter CounseL FoR THE PuBLIC DEFENDER Drvision
OF THE COMMITTEE FOR PuBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES
& another! vs. Actinc First Justice or THe Lowe
Division or THE District Court DEPARTMENT.

Suffolk. November 9, 2016. - May 24, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Committee for Public Counsel Services. District Court, Drug court session.

This court concluded that under the plain language of G. L. c. 211D, § 5, which
is reinforced by S.J.C. Rule 3:10, § 5, the Committee for Public Counsel
Services has sole authority to assign counsel to indigent criminal defendants,
including those in a drug court session in District Court. [183-187]

Civit action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk on February 23, 2016.

The case was reported by Duffly, J.

Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Ryan
M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present)
for the plaintiffs.

Joseph M. Ditkoff, Special Assistant Attorney General (Beth-
any L. Stevens also present) for the defendant.

Hwes, J. This matter is before us on a reservation and report, by
a single justice of this court, of a petition for relief under G. L.
c. 211, § 3. The petition, brought by the Deputy Chief Counsel for
the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Coun-
sel Services and the Deputy Chief Counsel for the Private Coun-
sel Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services (col-
lectively CPCS), sought an order affirming CPCS’s independent
authority under G. L. c. 211D to select and supervise attorneys for
indigent defendants in the pilot program it had launched in the
drug court session of the Lowell Division of the District Court
Department (drug court). The issue arose after the Acting First
Justice of the Lowell District Court (Justice), citing the need for
a “team” approach to cases in the drug Court, removed CPCS
attorneys from drug court cases to which they had been assigned

*Deputy Chief Counsel for the Private Counsel Division of the Committee for
Public Counsel Services.

477 Mass. 178 (2017) 179

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

and excluded CPCS attorneys from assignment to any new case
in the drug court.

The single justice, in her reservation and report, observed that
“the matter raises some important legal questions that ought to be
decided by the full court, concerning specialty courts in general
and adult drug courts in particular, and the respective roles and
responsibi ities of judges, [CPCS], and individual defense attor-
neys.” The issue highlights the tension that may arise between an
attorney’s duty to zealously advocate for the rights of the drug
court defendant and a drug court model that favors a collaborative
and nonadversarial approach to supervision of the drug court
defendant. We recognize that the success of drug court outcomes
depends in large part on an unconditional commitment to the goal
of treatment from all members of the drug court team, including
the drug court defendant. Nonetheless, we conclude that CPCS
has the sole authority under G. L. c. 211D for the assignment of
counsel to indigent criminal defendants and that a judge may not
override that authority to accommodate a preference for attorneys
willing to assume a collaborative and nonadversarial role in drug
court proceedings.

Background. 1. The drug court model. Drug courts have been
developed to provide the option of treatment as an alternative to
incarceration in cases where the underlying criminal behavior is
thought to be motivated by a defendant’s substance abuse. Ex-
ecutive Office of the Trial Court, Adult Drug Court Manual, A
Guide to Starting and Operating Adult Drug Courts in Massa-
chusetts 2-3 (2015) (drug court manual). Drug courts are defined

s “problem-solving courts that operate under a specialized
model in which the judiciary, prosecution, defense bar, probation,
law enforcement, substance use, mental health, and social service
communities work together to provide treatment to people with
substance use challenges” with the ultimate goal of public safety
and reduction of recidivism. /d. at 3.

To accomplish these purposes, drug courts necessarily are
different from regular criminal sessions during which a judge
may impose probation to accommodate a need for treatment
rather than a sentence of incarceration. A defendant’s success
with substance abuse treatment in such circumstances more often
than not depends on his or her self-motivation and the availability
of resources to support the treatment alternatives. Drug courts, by
contrast, are premised on the truism that successful treatment,
though achievable, is difficult for a defendant with little more

180 477 Mass. 178 (2017)

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

than sincere motivation and good intentions at his disposal. Thus,
drug courts are distinguished from regular criminal sessions by
the “integration of treatment and services with judicial case
oversight and intensive court supervision.” Jd. at 39. In accor-
dance with this formula for success, the drug court model incor-
porates features, described infra, not common in regular criminal
sessions.

The structure of the drug court is informed by “evidence-based
best practices” emphasizing the necessity of a team approach to
the development and oversight of the defendant’s prescribed
course of substance abuse treatment. /d. at 3. A judge is the leader
of the drug court team and, in that capacity, assembles the team
which typically includes the “program coordinator, assistant dis-
trict attorney, defense attorney, probation officer(s), clerk, case
manager, specialty court clinician, treatment providers, local law
enforcement, and representatives from local organizations that
provide services to drug court participants.” Jd. at 8. In keeping
with the treatment purpose, team members must have expertise in
substance use disorders and therapeutic options, and be sensitive
to issues of gender, age, race, language, and cultural issues that
may bear on the drug court defender’s likelihood of success. Id.
Collectively, the team members have the knowledge and experi-
ence to develop an appropriate treatment plan for each drug court
defendant. Just as important, they are adept at identifying the
personal and societal causes of failure and the ways to undercut
their impact on the treatment goals.

The probation officer, clerk, and treatment providers are essen-
tial to the mission of the team. They are present at each drug court
session, providing a consistency in the oversight of drug court
defendants at each drug court session. Participation by the assist-
ant district attorney and defense counsel is encouraged but not
always possible. Defense counsel has no formal role in the drug
court sessions because in the post-adjudicative setting, the drug
court defendant has no right to counsel. However, if a drug court
defendant is issued a probation violation notice, defense counsel
is appointed and is expected to “zealously advocate for the rights
of his or her client.” Jd. at 8.

The work of the drug court is accomplished during the weekly
session over which the judge presides with the assistance of the
other team members. In preparation for each drug court session,
the team is assembled for a “staffing,” the purpose of which is to
review the progress of each drug court defendant who will appear

477 Mass. 178 (2017) 181

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

before the court that day. Jd. at 27. During the staffing, the team
determines whether sanctions are necessary. However, if sanc-
tions are to be considered, the discussion is deferred until defense
counsel has been notified and given the opportunity to appear.
After the staffing, the formal drug court session is held with the
defendant in attendance. Only drug court cases are on the session
docket. During the session, the judge interacts personally with
each drug court defendant and offers words of encouragement or
praise. The session is open to all drug court defendants scheduled
to appear that day with the expectation that the opportunity to
“see the consequences of others’ actions [will] build[ ] a sense of
mutual support among the participants.” Jd. at 28.

In accordance with the drug court manual, drug courts are
encouraged to have “clear, objective, and specific eligibility cri-
teria” for admission. Id. at 15. Typically, a defendant must meet
three eligibility criteria for admission to the drug court: (1) the
defendant must have a substance use disorder; (2) the defendant
must have been found guilty, pleaded guilty, or admitted to
sufficient facts for a continuance without a finding; and (3) the
defendant must have been placed on supervised probation. Jd. An
eligible defendant is entitled to the advice of counsel on the risks
and benefits of drug courts.

Drug court defendants must agree to a one-year commitment
during which they may be required to submit to “random and
comprehensive drug and alcohol testing multiple times weekly,
weekly meetings with the probation officer and attendance at a
weekly or bi-weekly status hearing before the judge.” Jd. at 21.
These conditions purposely are more demanding based on the
underlying philosophy that drug court defendants must exhibit an
unconditional commitment to engage in and comply with a rig-
orous substance abuse treatment program. Jd. at 19. And, as with
any probationer, the drug court defendant risks a violation of
probation if he or she fails to comply with the conditions of
probation.

2. The pilot program in the Lowell drug court. The drug court
commenced operations in June, 2014, and from its inception, the
Justice has been the judge with primary responsibility to oversee
the court. In July, 2015, CPCS initiated a drug court pilot program
(pilot), which, in a departure from CPCS’s long-standing policy,
permitted the assignment of counsel to indigent drug court de-
fendants for every stage of the drug court proceedings. CPCS’s
policy was driven by the legal principle that in the drug court

182 477 Mass. 178 (2017)

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

postdisposition proceedings, drug court defendants had no right
to counsel; the right to counsel attached only if the defendant was
subject to a probation violation hearing. CPCS was constrained as
well by budgetary considerations. No funding had been appro-
priated to defray the costs associated with the assignment of
counsel to this class of defendants beyond the reach of the right
to counsel provided by G. L. c. 211D.

The impetus for the pilot was a series of discussions that began
in December, 2013, among CPCS, judges, and other representa-
tives of the Administrative Office of the Trial Court. The advo-
cacy for this expanded access to defense counsel was informed by
the experiences of judges in other drug court sessions who touted
the efficacy and desirability of assigned counsel at all stages of
the drug court sessions. These judges and others involved in the
management of the drug court sessions believed that a drug court
defendant's likelihood of success in substance abuse treatment
would be enhanced if defense counsel gained expertise in addic-
tion issues and was familiar with the team’s view of the defend-
ant’s participation. This pilot innovation permitted assigned
counsel to participate in drug court “staffings” which ordinarily
would not involve the presence of appointed counsel.

The pilot began after the Justice was notified by a letter dated
July 15, 2015, of CPCS’s proposal to locate the pilot program in
the drug court. This letter advised that “the task of assuring
counsel for participants already determined indigent in the trial
session will be handled by our staff office and by Middlesex
Defense Attorneys . . . just as is done in all court sessions.” The
record contains no evidence that the Justice rejected these con-
ditions for the implementation of the pilot in the drug court.

Although the record does not establish the precise date on
which the pilot commenced, disagreement between the Justice
and CPCS attorneys surfaced on September 15, 2015, in an
incident involving one of the CPCS attorneys chosen to partici-
pate in the pilot. It is not necessary to recite the details of that
incident; the upshot was that the Justice removed the attorney
from the assigned case and informed the attorney in charge of the
CPCS office in the Lowell Division of the District Court Depart-
ment that this attorney would not be permitted to represent
probationers in the drug court. The Justice removed the attorney
without specifying the reason or providing an opportunity for the
attorney to be heard. On November 16, 2015, CPCS attorneys
filed a motion for recognition of counsel and for the recusal of the

477 Mass. 178 (2017) 183

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

Justice on behalf of the probationer who had been represented by
the attorney removed by the Justice. On December 10, 2015, the
Justice issued a memorandum of decision, denying the motion as
moot.?

On several occasions in December, 2015, the Justice declined
to recognize previously assigned CPCS attorneys and appointed
bar advocates as substitute counsel. Eventually the Justice an-
nounced a categorical ban on CPCS attorneys in the drug court,
effectively terminating the drug court pilot. Although the Justice
did not explain his reasoning for the categorical ban on CPCS
attorneys, he later expressed the belief that CPCS attorneys in the
Lowell office were “extremely hostile” to the drug court mission
and that they refused to “participate fully” as team members.

Discussion. The petitioners argue that under G. L. c. 211D and
S.J.C. Rule 3:10, as amended, 416 Mass. 1306 (1993), CPCS has
independent authority to assign counsel to indigent criminal de-
fendants and that a judge may not remove assigned counsel
without notice and the opportunity to be heard, or categorically
exclude CPCS attorneys from assignments in the drug court. The
Justice concedes these limitations on a court’s role in the assign-
ment of counsel to indigent criminal defendants. He argues,
however, that in the exercise of his authority to choose drug court
“team” members and to insure fidelity to the drug court model, he
may bypass the statutorily mandated system for assignment of
counsel to give preference to volunteer “team” attorneys in pro-
bation violation cases. We do not doubt the desirability and
efficacy of a collaborative and nonadversarial approach in the
drug court, and we recognize its value in making the drug court
an effective intervention for defendants who would otherwise
recidivate because of their substance abuse issues. We conclude,
however, that this purpose, laudable as it may be, cannot trump
the statutory mandate that CPCS, not the court, is to assign
counsel for indigent defendants.

When G. L. c. 211D was enacted in 1983, the Legislature had
the benefit of decades of public advocacy for a “comprehensive,
coordinated, and independent” system to insure an indigent crimi-
nal defendant’s right to counsel. See Rosenfeld, The Right to
Counsel and Provision of Counsel to Indigents in Massachusetts:
The Hennessey Era, 74 Mass. L. Rev. 148, 148 (1989) (Hennessey

2The issue became moot after the Justice readmitted the defendant to proba-
tion, thereby making the appointment of counsel unnecessary.

184 477 Mass. 178 (2017)

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

Era). See also St. 1983, c. 673. That advocacy followed this
court’s decisions in Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 471,
475-476 (1957) (recognizing right to counsel where defendant
lacked sufficient intelligence to represent himself), and Brown v.
Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 476, 482-483 (1957) (violation of art.
12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights where defendant was
not represented by counsel), both of which were decided well
before the United States Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339, 343-344 (1963). In the
aftermath of these decisions, the Supreme Judicial Court promul-
gated S.J.C. Rule 10, 337 Mass. 813 (1958), which required the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in noncapital
felony cases in the Superior Court.*

In 1960, the Legislature created the Massachusetts Defenders
Committee, the first Statewide publicly funded defender agency.
St. 1960, c. 565. Plagued by a shortage of resources, however, the
defender’s committee was unable to deliver on its mission to
provide counsel to all indigent defendants eligible to receive the
service. Goodwin, Comment, Massachusetts’ Struggle to Adhere
to the Gideon Mandate: Will the Lavallee Decision, Coupled With
Legislative Reform, Finally Establish a State Indigent Criminal
Defense System that is Constitutionally Sound? 32 New Eng. J.
on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 77, 84 (2006). Twenty years after
the creation of the defender’s committee, it was still responsible
for “less than one-half” of the cases of indigent criminal defend-
ants. Id. at 86-87. The patchwork of county defender programs
that operated as a complement to the defender’s committee was
itself inadequate to have any salutary effect on the system for the
appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Jd. at
87. Also, until the decision in Abodeely v. County of Worcester,
352 Mass. 719 (1967), private attorneys appointed under the
authority of S.J.C. Rule 3:10 had no constitutional or statutory
right to payment for their services. Abodeely, supra at 723-724.

°Rule 10 of the Supreme Judicial Court Rules, 337 Mass. 813 (1958), was
amended three times thereafter. In 1962, the rule was amended to allow the
appointment of counsel in any case warranted by the circumstances. 345 Mass.
792 (1962). In 1964, the rule was amended a second time to require the
appointment of counsel in all cases where a sentence of imprisonment was a
possible consequence of conviction. 347 Mass. 809 (1964) In 1969, the court
amended what was by then S.J.C. Rule 3:10 to require the assignment of the
Massachusetts Defenders Committee unless exceptional circumstances dictated
otherwise. 355 Mass. 803 (1969). See 351 Mass. 791 (1967) (renumbering rules
of Supreme Judicial Court).

477 Mass. 178 (2017) 185

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

Concern about these and other serious shortcomings in the
indigent defender system prompted then Chief Justice Edward
Hennessey to establish a committee,* chaired by Associate Justice
Herbert Wilkins (Wilkins committee), to “set out guidelines and
standards for defender programs, including such requirements as
caseload controls, training, vertical representation and provision
of support services.” Rosenfeld, Defense of Indigents in Massa-
chusetts: A New Approach, 28 Boston B.J. 22, 22 (Nov./Dec.
1984). See Hennessey Era, supra at 149. Chief Justice Hennessey
envisioned an indigent defender system that was “centrally ad-
ministered and financed . . . , within the judicial branch but
independent of the [cJourt.” Jd. at 151. The Wilkins committee
issued reports in 1976 and 1979, identifying the primary impedi-
ments to the system envisioned by Chief Justice Hennessey as the
lack of (1) a central administrative and funding mechanism, (2)
standards for quality control; and (3) requirements for training
and education. Jd. at 149-150. Armed with the work of the
Wilkins committee and other advocacy groups supporting his
vision, Chief Justice Hennessey personally supported legislative
initiatives intended to accomplish this purpose. Jd. at 151.

Leading up to the enactment of G. L. c. 211D in 1983, the
Legislature also had the benefit of appellate cases documenting
abuses of the then-existing system for the appointment of counsel
to indigent defendants.* Under that system, judges, despite the
obvious constitutional conflict in exercising that role, had exclu-
sive authority for the appointment of counsel.®

Against this historical backdrop, the Legislature enacted G. L.

“The committee, officially named the “Committee on Appointment of Com-
petent Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants in District and Municipal
Courts” (Wilkins committee), was established in 1976. The Wilkins committee
released its interim report on December 16, 1976, and its final report on March
21, 1979.

5See, e.g., Matter of McKenney, 384 Mass. 76, 77, 89, 101 (1981) (Appendix)
(public censure and retirement of former judge for misconduct including favor-
itism in appointment of counsel for indigent defendants); Matter of Scott, 377
Mass. 364, 369-370, 376-377 (1979) (Appendix) (censure for failing to ensure
that counsel was appointed for indigent party); Matter of Troy, 364 Mass. 15,
36, 73 (1973) (discipline for conditioning the right to court-appointed counsel
on defendant’s surrender of right to post bail).

°The appointment of counsel by judges creates — at the least — the
appearance that lawyers are being assigned cases to move dockets and that
lawyers may be more loyal to the judge than to the client.” See Innocence
Protection Act of 2001, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,

186 477 Mass. 178 (2017)

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

c. 211D in 1983, establishing CPCS as the sole statutory entity
with the authority to “plan, oversee, and coordinate the delivery
of criminal . . . legal services” to indigent defendants. G. L.
c. 211D, § 1. General Laws c. 211D created a centralized agency
with the responsibility for every aspect of the system for provid-
ing counsel for indigent defendants. /d. That responsibility begins
with the duty to establish, subject only to the approval of the
Supreme Judicial Court, the indigency standards to be applied in
determining a defendant’s right to appointed counsel. G. L.
c. 211D, § 2. For the benefit of those defendants qualifying for
the appointment of counsel, CPCS is charged with the duty to
oversee the “training, qualification and removal of counsel” who
accept appointments as counsel for indigent defendants. G. L.
c. 211D, § 4. Vested with this authority, CPCS has the ability to
insure that indigent defendants have access to effective assistance
of counsel. The statute also has an egalitarian approach to the
appointment of counsel, allowing that CPCS create a rotating
appointment system to “encourage open access among attorneys
participating within the private counsel division.” Jd. As ex-
plained, infra, the over-all statutory scheme addressed a range of
issues that, prior to 1983, undermined the goal of a comprehen-
sive and unified system for the assignment of counsel to indigent
defendants.

The plain language of G. L. c. 211D, § 5, viewed in the context
of the entire statutory scheme, supports our conclusion that CPCS
has sole authority to assign counsel to indigent criminal defend-
ants. The procedure in G. L. c. 211D, § 5, contemplates a two-
step process for the assignment of counsel. The first step is the
determination of indigency, a duty within the exclusive authority
of the judge. Jd. The statute is clear that, in the second step, “[a]
justice or associate justice shall assign a case to [CPCS]’ (em-
phasis supplied). Jd. This statutory division of authority between
the judge and CPCS is reinforced in S.J.C. Rule 3:10, § 5, which
provides that “the judge shall assign [CPCS] to provide repre-
sentation for the party, unless exceptional circumstances, sup-
ported by written findings, necessitate the use of a different
procedure that is consistent with G. L. c. 211D and the rules of
this court” (emphasis supplied). Therefore, we discern no ambi-
guity in the respective roles of the judge and CPCS. The judge’s

107th Cong., Ist Sess. on S, 486, at 40 (June 27, 2001) (statement of Stephen
B, Bright).

477 Mass. 178 (2017) 187

Public Defender Div. of the Comm. for Public Counsel Servs. v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't

role is to determine indigency and to assign the case to CPCS; the
role of CPCS is to assign the case to an attorney with responsi-
bility to represent the defendant.”

The Justice does not dispute this interpretation of G. L.
c. 211D, § 5. Rather, he argues that we should recognize an
exception for the drug court based on the need for the team
approach deemed essential to the success of the drug court model.
To the extent that the social science research validates the efficacy
of a nonadversarial “team” approach in the adult drug court
model, we take no issue with that proposition. Nonetheless, the
statute provides no authority for a judge to craft an exception for
a drug court, and the Justice cites none. As framed by the Justice,
the judge, as the leader of the drug court team, may use his
authority to select the team members to give preference to vol-
unteer attorney “team’? members in the appointment of counsel
for probation violation matters. Although important, the authority
to select team members is an administrative duty that must give
way to the clear statutory duty of CPCS to assign counsel.
Further, this exception to the statutorily mandated procedure
would effectively remove CPCS attorneys from the pool of at-
torneys in the drug court. “The carving out of any exceptions to
[a] clear [statutory] mandate is for the Legislature, not the judi-
ciary.” D’Avella v. McGonigle, 429 Mass. 820, 822 (1999).

Conclusion. Although we acknowledge and appreciate the im-
portant and special role of the drug court in achieving important
public policy interests, we are constrained to follow the clear
dictates of G. L. c. 211D and S.J.C. Rule 3:10, which vest CPCS
with sole and independent authority to assign counsel for indigent
defendants. Where a drug court defendant who is indigent is
alleged to have violated the terms of probation, the judge must
appoint CPCS as counsel. Counsel assigned by CPCS may be
removed only for cause after a hearing.

So ordered.

7According to CPCS, except for CPCS staff attorneys, CPCS does not assign
individual attorneys to CPCS cases. Instead, CPCS contracts with the various
county bar advocate programs which in turn make the assignments in accor-
dance with the statutory mandate to fairly apportion the cases among available
attorneys.

188 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

Mary E. Datey, personal representative, vs. SECRETARY OF
He Executive Orrice or Heacra AND HUMAN SERVICES
& another.”
Lionet C. Napeau vs. Director oF THE OrFIcE oF MeEpicaip.

Worcester. January 5, 2017. - May 30, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Luvx, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Medicaid. Trust, Irrevocable trust. Real Property, Life estate, Ownership.

‘This court concluded that neither the grant in an irrevocable trust of a right of
use and occupancy in a primary residence deeded to that trust, nor the
retention of a life estate in a primary residence after deeding it to such a trust,
makes the equity in the home owned by the trust a countable asset for the
purpose of determining an applicant’s eligibility for long-term care benefits
under the Federal Medicaid Act; therefore, this court vacated the judgments
in two cases that relied on a finding that the home was a countable asset but
remanded each matter for further findings regarding other possible sources of
countable assets contained in the trust at issue in each matter, [199-205]

Civ. acrion commenced in the Superior Court Department on
February 11, 2015.

The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J., on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Civ. acrion commenced in the Superior Court Department on
December 23, 2014.

The case was heard by Shannon Frison, J., on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Lisa Neeley (Patrick Tinsley also present) for Lionel C. Nadeau.

Brian E. Barreira (Nicholas G. Kaltsas also present) for Mary
E. Daley.

Ronald M. Landsman, of Maryland, for National Academy of
Elder Law Attorneys, Inc.

Elizabeth Kaplan & Julie E. Green, Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, for Director of the Office of Medicaid & another.

*Of the estate of James Daley.
Director of the Office of Medicaid.

477 Mass. 188 (2017) 189

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

Patricia Keane Martin, for National Academy of Elder Law
Attorneys (Massachusetts Chapter), was present but did not ar-
gue.

Leo J. Cushing & Thomas J. McIntyre, for Real Estate Bar
Association for Massachusetts, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a
brief.

Gants, C.J. These two cases require this court to navigate the
labyrinth of controlling statutes and regulations to determine
whether applicants are eligible for long-term care benefits under
the Federal Medicaid Act (act) where they created an irrevocable
trust and deeded their primary asset — their home — to that trust
but retained the right to reside in and enjoy the use of the home
for the rest of their life. The Director of the Massachusetts Office
of Medicaid (MassHealth) determined that the applicants in these
two cases were not eligible for long-term care benefits because
their retention of a right to continue to live in their homes made
the equity in their homes a “countable” asset whose value ex-
ceeded the asset eligibility limitation under the act. The appli-
cants unsuccessfully challenged MassHealth’s determinations in
the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. We granted
Mary E. Daley’s application for direct appellate review and
transferred Lionel C. Nadeau’s appeal to this court on our own
motion. We conclude that neither the grant in an irrevocable trust
of a right of use and occupancy in a primary residence to an
applicant nor the retention by an applicant of a life estate in his
or her primary residence makes the equity in the home owned by
the trust a countable asset for the purpose of determining Med-
icaid eligibility for long-term care benefits. We therefore vacate
the judgments that rely on such a finding and remand the matters
to MassHealth for findings regarding two other possible sources
of countable assets contained in the trusts.*

Background. The act, enacted in 1965 as Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., created a coop-
erative State and Federal program to provide medical assistance
to individuals who cannot afford to pay for their own medical
costs. See Arkansas Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn,
547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006). The general administration of Medic-

3We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the National Academy of
Elder Law Attorneys, Inc., in both cases; the amicus brief submitted by the Real
Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., in Mary E. Daley’s case; and the
amicus brief submitted by the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys
(Massachusetts Chapter) in Lionel C. Nadeau’s case.

190 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

aid is entrusted to the United States Secretary of Health and
Human Services, who in turn exercises authority through the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). /d.4 Al-
though the Medicaid program is voluntary for States, participat-
ing States must comply with certain requirements imposed by the
act and regulations promulgated by the Secretary through CMS.
See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990).
Massachusetts has opted to participate in Medicaid via the estab-
lishment of a State Medicaid program known as MassHealth. See
G. L. c. 118E, § 9 (establishing program of medical assistance
“pursuant to and in conformity with the provisions of Title XIX”).

Participating States are required to cover the costs of care for
the “categorically needy,” which the act defines as those indi-
viduals who are unable to cover the costs of their basic needs and
who already receive or are eligible for certain forms of public
assistance. See Roach v. Morse, 440 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2006).
States have the option to cover the costs of care for the “medically
needy,” Haley v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 394 Mass. 466,
467-468 (1985), which the act defines as people who have income
and resources to cover the costs of their basic needs but not their
necessary medical care. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C).

Medicaid has become one of the largest programs in the Fed-
eral budget as well as a major expenditure for State governments,
which must finance a significant portion of Medicaid benefits on
their own. See R. Rudowitz, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured, Medicaid Financing: The Basics (Dec. 2016)
(Medicaid is third largest domestic program in Federal budget,
exceeded only by Medicare and Social Security); Massachusetts
Medicaid Policy Institute & Massachusetts Budget and Policy
Center, Understanding the Actual Cost of MassHealth to the State
(Nov. 2014) (reporting net cost of MassHealth and health reform
programs as twenty-three per cent of State budget). As of 2015,
the Medicaid program provided health and long-term care cov-
erage to nearly 70 million low-income Americans, including,
among many others, poor senior citizens who are also covered
by Medicare. See Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid at 50
(2015), http://kff.org/medicaid/report/medicaid-at-50 [https://
perma.cc/TK7Q-72KR].

Until 2001, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services were known as
the Health Care Financing Administration. See Centers for Medicare & Med-
icaid Services Statement of Organization, Functions and Delegations of Au-
thority, and Reorganization Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 35,437-03 (2001).

477 Mass. 188 (2017) 191

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

The demand for Medicaid long-term care benefits, which cover
nursing home care as well as other forms of personal long-term
care services, has grown steadily as a result of our country’s
aging population and the expense of paying privately for nursing
homes or other long-term care. See Cohen v. Commissioner of the
Div. of Med. Assistance, 423 Mass. 399, 402 (1996), cert. denied
sub nom. Kokoska v. Bullen, 519 U.S. 1057 (1997). See also
Bernstein, With Medicaid, Long-Term Care of Elderly Looms as
a Rising Cost, N.Y. Times, Sep. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/09/07 /health/policy/long-term-care-looms-as-rising-medicaid-
cost.html [https://perma.cc/2JB6-L6NM] (describing Medicaid as
“the only safety net for millions of middle-class people whose
need[ ] for long-term care, at home or in a nursing home, outlast
their resources”). A recent survey estimated that the median an-
nual cost of nursing home care for a senior in a semiprivate room
in Massachusetts was more than $128,000. See Genworth 2015
Cost of Care Survey, Massachusetts, https://www.genworth.com/
dam/A mericas/US/PDFs/Consumer/corporate/cost-of-care/
118928MA_040115_gnw.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RNC-6P5G]. Pri-
vate long-term care insurance can cost more than $3,000 annually.
See AARP, Understanding Long-Term Care Insurance (May 2016),
http://www.aarp.org/health/health-insurance/info-06-2012/
understanding-long-term-care-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/
56MK-DYZ2]. Because many individuals cannot afford these
expenses, Medicaid pays for the care of two-thirds of people in
nursing homes in the United States. See Zernike, Goodnough, &
Belluck, In Health Bill’s Defeat, Medicaid Comes of Age, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 2017. See also E.L. Reaves & M. Musumeci,
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid
and Long-Term Services and Supports: A Primer (Dec. 2015),
http://kff.org/medicaid/report/medicaid-and-long-term-services-
and-supports-a-primer [https://perma.cc/KJZ5-5WJR]. The cost
of Medicaid’s long-term care benefit is expected to rise by fifty per
cent over the next decade, and State and Federal officials are re-
portedly “scrambling to control spending.” Gorman & Feder Ostrov,
Long-Term Care Is an Immediate Problem — For the Government,
Kaiser Health News, Aug. 1, 2016, http://khn.org/news/long-term-
care-is-an-immediate-problem-for-the-government [https://perma.cc/
N9V9-5QKE].

In order to qualify for Medicaid in Massachusetts, MassHealth
requires that “[t]he total value of countable assets owned by or
available to” an individual applicant not exceed $2,000, 130 Code

192 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

Mass. Regs. § 520.003(A)(1) (2014).5 For a couple living together,
the limit is $3,000. 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 520.003(A)(2)
(2014). This asset limit often requires applicants to “spend down”
or otherwise deplete their resources to qualify for Medicaid
long-term care benefits when they enter a nursing home. See
Lebow v. Commissioner of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 433 Mass.
171, 172 (2001).®

Through “Medicaid planning,” individuals attempt to transfer
or otherwise dispose of their assets long before they need long-
term care so that, when the need arises, they may satisfy the asset
limit and qualify for Medicaid benefits. In essence, the purpose of
Medicaid planning is to enable persons whose assets would
otherwise render them ineligible for long-term care benefits to
become eligible for Medicaid benefits by transferring to their
children or other loved ones the assets they would otherwise use
to pay for long-term care, shifting to the taxpayers the burden of
paying for that care. See generally Cohen, 423 Mass. at 402-403.
As a report of the House of Representatives’s committee on
energy and commerce declared in 1985, “When affluent individu-
als use Medicaid qualifying trusts and similar ‘techniques’ to
qualify for the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and
State resources from low-income elderly and disabled individu-
als, and poor women and children.” H.R. Rep. No. 265, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985), quoted in Cohen, supra at
404.

Congress has imposed two substantial constraints on such
Medicaid planning. The first is the so-called “look-back” rule,

®This asset limit is not codified in Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. Instead, Federal law and guidance from Federal regula
tors generally instruct the State Medicaid programs that their treatment of
applicants’ resources in determining eligibility may not be more restrictive than
the methodology that would be employed under the Federal supplemental
security income (SSI) program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C));_ State
Medicaid Manual, Health Care Financing Administration Pub, No, 45-3, Trans-
mittal 64 § 3257.B.4 (Nov. 1994). But see Mistrick v. Division of Med. Assis-
tance & Health Servs., 154 N.J. 158, 174-175 (1998) (specific Congressional
legislation regarding Medicaid eligibility supersedes general rule that State
Medicaid eligibility rules may be “no more restrictive” than SSI). The asset limit
for SSI beneficiaries is $2,000, See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).

®As we discuss later in this opinion, an applicant’s principal residence is
generally not considered to be a countable asset in the eligibility determination
and thus an applicant does not have to sell his or her home in order to qualify
for Medicaid long-term care benefits. See 20 C.ER. § 416.1212(b); 130 Code
Mass. Regs. §§ 520.007(G)(3), 520,008(A) (2014).

477 Mass. 188 (2017) 193

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

which imposes a penalty for any asset transfer for less than fair
market value made by an individual within five years of the
individual’s application for Medicaid benefits. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(c)(1)(B)Gi). See generally D. Westfall, G.P. Mair, J.R.
Buckles, N.M. Oliveira, & W. Murieko, Estate Planning Law &
Taxation § 13.05 (2017) (Westfall). In its present form, the “look-
back” rule provides that, if such a transfer occurs, the applicant is
ineligible for Medicaid benefits for a period of time determined
by dividing the value of the transfer by the average monthly cost
of the nursing home facility. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(E).
Thus, if an applicant transfers $100,000 in assets during the
look-back period, in a State where the average monthly cost of a
nursing home is $10,000, the applicant will be ineligible for
Medicaid benefits for ten months. See Westfall, supra.

Second, where an applicant has created an irrevocable trust and
transferred assets to that trust, “if there are any circumstances
under which payment from the trust could be made to or for the
benefit of the individual, the portion of the corpus from which, or
the income on the corpus from which, payment to the individual
could be made shall be considered resources available to the
individual, and payments from that portion of the corpus or
income (I) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be con-
sidered income of the individual, and (II) for any other purpose,
shall be considered a transfer of assets by the individual.” 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(B)(@). This is commonly referred to as the
“any circumstances” test. See Heyn v. Director of the Office of
Medicaid, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 312, 315 & n.7 (2016).” The effect
of the test is that if the trustee is afforded even a “peppercorn of
discretion” to make payment of principal to the applicant, or if the
trust allows such payment based on certain conditions, then the
entire amount that the applicant could receive under “any state of
affairs” is the amount counted for Medicaid eligibility. See
Cohen, 423 Mass. at 413.*

Under the “any circumstances” test, where the grantor of the

7The cognate Massachusetts regulation states: “Any portion of the principal
or income from the principal (such as interest) of an irrevocable trust that could
be paid under any circumstances to or for the benefit of the individual is a
countable asset.” 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 520.023(C)(1)(a) (2014).

®To illustrate the operation of this rule, Federal regulators provide the ex-
ample of a trust containing $50,000 in principal under which payment of
principal may be made to the Medicaid applicant only in the event that the
applicant requires a heart transplant. Because it is possible the applicant could
require a heart transplant, “this full amount is considered as payment that could

194 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

irrevocable trust gives the trustee any “leeway to respond to
emergency and unexpected circumstances,” the total amount
available to be paid to address such circumstances is counted as
fully available to the grantor, even if the trust provisions other-
wise limit the trustee’s discretion to pay for long-term care. See
id. at 418-420. Consequently, where the terms of an irrevocable
trust give the trustee discretion to pay both income and principal
to the grantor for various purposes, but limit that discretion in an
attempt to assure the grantor’s eligibility for public assistance
despite the considerable resources otherwise available to the
grantor, the full amount of the trust, both principal and income, is
the amount deemed available for purposes of determining Med-
icaid eligibility. Jd. at 421-422.

The “any circumstances” test is qualified by an important
caveat: if the amounts that may be paid to the Medicaid applicant
come only from the income of the trust, those income payments
do not render the principal of the trust available as an asset;
rather, they are treated as income that may affect the amount of
Medicaid benefits to be received but not the applicant’s eligibility
for such benefits. See Guerriero v. Commissioner of the Div. of
Med. Assistance, 433 Mass. 628, 632 n.6 (2001); 130 Code Mass.
Regs. § 520.026 (2013). See also J.A. Bloom & S.M. Cohen,
Nursing Home MassHealth Eligibility, in Estate Planning for the
Aging or Incapacitated Client in Massachusetts § 26.3.2 (Mass.
Cont. Legal Educ. 4th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2015) (explaining gen-
eral rule that anyone whose income is less than monthly cost of
his or her nursing home may be eligible for MassHealth).

The application of this labyrinth of statutes and regulations is
best understood by examples. If a married couple without any
savings forgoes Medicaid planning and continues jointly to own
in fee simple a single family home, then when one spouse needs
long-term care and applies for MassHealth benefits, the appli-
cant’s primary residence is not a countable asset for MassHealth
eligibility purposes, so long as its value does not exceed an
annually adjusted limit (currently $828,000). See 130 Code Mass.
Regs. § 520.008(A) (2013); 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 520.007(G)(3)
(2014). See also 20 C.ER. § 416.1212(b) (SSI regulation).® Thus,
the spouse may be admitted to a nursing home and be covered by

be made under some circumstances, even though the likelihood of payment is
remote.” See State Medicaid Manual, Health Care Financing Administration
Pub. No, 45-3, Transmittal 64 § 3259.6(E) (Nov. 1994).

°If the applicant’s spouse, child under the age of twenty-one, disabled child,
or caretaker child, among others, remains living in the home, the value of the

477 Mass. 188 (2017) 195

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

MassHealth without having to sell the home. However, Federal
law requires that MassHealth must attempt to reclaim the costs of
long-term care benefits provided to such an applicant from the
applicant's estate after his or her death. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a), (b).
See 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 515.011(A) (2014). As a result,
where the house is the only asset in the applicant’s estate and is
sold by the estate after both spouses have died, the children will
be able to inherit only the proceeds of the sale that exceed the
amount of the MassHealth recovery claim.

If a married couple who owns no primary residence but has
substantial liquid assets engages in Medicaid planning, they could
create an irrevocable trust and transfer all of their assets to that
trust. If, under the terms of the trust, the trustee were authorized
to pay them only income from the trust and could not under any
circumstance pay them a penny of principal, and if the transfer to
the trust complied with the “look-back” rule because it occurred
more than five years before either spouse applied to MassHealth
for long-term care benefits, the applicant would be eligible for
such benefits because the assets of the trust would not be count-
able as his or her assets. See Cohen, 423 Mass. at 419-420 (where
trust is written to deprive trustee of any discretion to pay principal
and allows payment only of income, principal will not be counted
as assets for Medicaid purposes); Heyn, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 314
(where properly structured, irrevocable trust may be used to place
assets beyond grantor’s reach and permit grantor to be eligible for
Medicaid benefits).

In essence, a wealthy person may decide five years in advance
of applying for Medicaid to either give away all of his or her
assets to the children or transfer them to an irrevocable trust with
the children as beneficiaries, reserving only the receipt of income,
and therefore become someone with less than $2,000 in assets
who is eligible for Medicaid benefits. The inclusion of the pri-
mary residence among the assets transferred to the irrevocable
trust allows the grantor to avoid the estate recovery claim against
his or her primary residence that would occur had the grantor
obtained Medicaid long-term care benefits and continued to own
the home until it was transferred to his or her heirs as part of the
probate estate.

Although the transfer of assets to an irrevocable trust through
Medicaid planning offers substantial benefits to the grantor, it also

home will not be counted even if it exceeds the limit. 130 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 520.007(G)(8)(b) (2013).

196 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

poses considerable risks. Having been stripped of all assets, the
grantor may be unable to pay unforeseen nonmedical expenses,
and may need to look to children or other relatives for payment.
If the grantor were to require nursing home care sooner than
expected, he or she would face a significant penalty under the
look-back rule. See A.K. Dayton, J.A. Garber, R.A. Mead, &
M.M. Wood, Advising the Elderly Client § 29.82 (2016) (“plan-
ning only for Medicaid eligibility severely restricts planning
options for other goals, and often the adverse impact of Medicaid
planning outweighs the benefit if the client is advised thor-
oughly . . . [and] consideration should be given to . . . possible
loss of autonomy, pride, and dignity” involved in process). If the
grantor of the irrevocable trust leaves open even a “peppercorn”
of discretion for the trustee to pay the grantor from the principal
of the trust under any circumstance, the entire principal of the
trust will be deemed available to the applicant and therefore will
be treated as a “countable asset,” making the applicant ineligible
for Medicaid benefits. Where the grantor transfers his or her
primary residence to the irrevocable trust, the value of the home,
which would not be a countable asset if he or she were to continue
to own it (provided its value does not exceed $828,000), would
become a countable asset if it were found to be among the
“resources available to the individual” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(d)(3). And if the terms of the trust were to bar the trustee
from paying the grantor’s nursing home expenses, the grantor
might have no ability to pay for long-term care.

The risks of Medicaid planning are highlighted by these two
cases, where the plaintiffs challenge the determinations by
MassHealth that their primary residence was a countable asset
that rendered them ineligible to receive Medicaid long-term care
benefits because they had transferred ownership of the home to an
irrevocable trust but retained the ability to reside in their home for
the balance of their life. A key difference between these two cases
is the property interest that was transferred to the irrevocable
trust: in one, the home was transferred in fee simple but the terms
of the trust granted the settlors the right of use and occupancy for
their lifetimes; in the other, the settlors retained a life estate in the
home and transferred only the remainder interest to the irrevo-
cable trust. We look now to the terms of the irrevocable trust at
issue in each case and to the MassHealth determinations.

Nadeau Trust. On March 27, 2001, plaintiff Lionel C. Nadeau
and his wife (collectively, Nadeaus) deeded their primary resi-

477 Mass. 188 (2017) 197

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

dence in Webster to an irrevocable trust (Nadeau Trust) in return
for nominal consideration, naming their daughter as sole trustee.
Under the terms of the trust, the trustee may pay to the Nadeaus,
or on their behalf, whatever income she determines in her sole
discretion to be necessary for their “care and well-being.” The
trustee, apart from two exceptions, must hold the principal until
the termination of the trust, which shall occur upon the death of
the Nadeaus or when the trustee, in her sole discretion, deter-
mines that the trust should be terminated. The first exception is
that the Nadeaus may appoint “all or any part of the trust property
then on hand to any one or more charitable or non-profit organi-
zations over which [they] have no controlling interest.” The
second is that the trustee may distribute principal to the Nadeaus
“to the extent that the income of the trust generates a tax liability”
so that they may pay that tax liability. As earlier mentioned, the
terms of the trust grant the Nadeaus “the right to use and occupy
any residence that may from time to time be held” by the trust.
Upon termination of the trust, the “trustee shall . . . [p]ay the
remaining principal and undistributed income in equal shares to
[the Nadeaus’] children.”

Thirteen years later, and after the passing of his wife, Nadeau
was admitted to a skilled nursing facility and applied for Mass-
Health long-term care benefits. At the time, the assessed value of
the residence held by the Nadeau Trust was $173,700, and
Nadeau, then eighty-nine years old, had only $168.15 in cash
assets. MassHealth denied Nadeau’s application based on its find-
ing that the home remained a “countable asset,” placing Nadeau
above the $2,000 asset limit for long-term care eligibility. Mass-
Health determined that he needed to spend down $171,868.15 of
his assets in order to qualify for the requested benefits.

Daley Trust. On December 19, 2007, Mary E. Daley and her
husband (collectively, Daleys) deeded their primary residence in
Worcester to their children as trustees of an irrevocable trust
(Daley Trust) in return for consideration of less than one hundred
dollars, but retained a life estate in the property. Under the terms
of the trust, the trustees are to pay to Daley or her husband “so
much of the net income of the Trust as either Donor shall request
in writing,” but “[t]he Trustee[s] shall have no authority or dis-
cretion to distribute principal of the Trust to or for the benefit of
either Donor.” However, as with the Nadeau Trust, the trustee
may pay principal as needed to satisfy any tax obligation arising
from the payment of income to the Daleys.

198 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

Six years later, Daley’s husband was admitted to a skilled
nursing home; he applied for MassHealth long-term care benefits
on February 21, 2014. At the time, he was eighty-seven years old,
he had $18,176 in a bank account, and the principal of the Daley
Trust had a value of $150,943. Daley was still living in the home.
MassHealth denied her husband’s application because it found
that the trust principal was countable. While Daley was permitted
a spousal resource allowance of $117,240, the value of the
residence still placed her husband about $50,000 over the $2,000
eligibility limit.

In both cases, the MassHealth determination was appealed to a
MassHealth hearing officer, who upheld the determination by
finding that, because the applicant retained the ability to reside in
the home, the home is “available” to the applicant and must be
deemed acountable asset under 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 520.023(C)(1)(@),
which provides:

“The home or former home of a nursing-facility resident or
spouse held in an irrevocable trust that is available according
to the terms of the trust is a countable asset. Where the home
or former home is an asset of the trust, it is not subject to the
exemptions of 130 [Code Mass. Regs. §] 520.007(G)(2) or
(G)(8).""°

The hearing officers also found that the provision in the trusts that
permit the trustee to pay the grantors’ tax obligations arising from
the payment of trust income does not render the entirety of the
trust principal available under the “any circumstances” test. They
specifically did not reach the issue of how much of the principal
could be paid in that circumstance and therefore become count-
able, declaring that, if eligibility were to rest on that determina-

10The exemptions in these two provisions apply only to “real estate owned by
the individual and the spouse.” 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 520.007(G)(1). Under
130 Code Mass. Regs. § 520.007(G)(2), the value of real estate is exempt
as a countable asset for nine months after the date of notice by MassHealth
provided that the applicant executes an agreement within thirty days of the date
of notice to sell the property at fair market value. Under 130 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 520.007(G)(8), where an applicant moves out of his or her home with no intent
to return in order to enter a medical institution where placement is expected to
continue for at least thirty days, the home becomes a countable asset unless a
spouse, a child who is less than twenty-one years of age, a child who is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or other designated relatives reside in the
home.

477 Mass. 188 (2017) 199

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

tion, the matter would have to be remanded to MassHealth to
make such findings.

Discussion. The Medicaid program in Massachusetts was es-
tablished “pursuant to and in conformity with the provisions of”
the act. G. L. c. 118E, § 9. If a person meets the Federal financial
eligibility requirements for Medicaid, MassHealth may not deny
the person long-term care benefits. Jd. (“[P]rovided that such
persons meet the financial eligibility requirements of [the act], .. .
long-term care services shall be available to otherwise eligible
persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the
costs of their medical care as determined by the financial eligi-
bility requirements of the program”). See Cruz v. Commissioner
of Pub. Welfare, 395 Mass. 107, 113 (1985) (“The language of
this section clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the
[Medicaid] benefits program to comply with the Federal statutory
and regulatory scheme” [citation omitted]). “When there is a
conflict between State and Federal regulations, the Legislature
intended that [MassHealth] comply with the Federal rule.” Cruz,
supra.

Under Federal law, “[flor purposes of determining an individu-
al’s eligibility for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under
[the act] .. . , the rules specified in paragraph (3) shall apply to
a trust established by such an individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(1).
“[T]he rules specified in paragraph (3)” provide that “if there are
any circumstances under which payment from the trust could be
made to or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the
corpus from which, or the income on the corpus from which,
payment to the individual could be made shall be considered
resources available to the individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3).
Therefore, the issue we must decide is whether 130 Code Mass.
Regs. § 520.023(C)(1)(d), which MassHealth interprets to mean
that the equity in a home that is part of the corpus of an irrevocable
trust is a countable asset where the grantor of the trust retains the
authority to reside in or otherwise enjoy the use of the home, is
consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3).

The plaintiffs contend that § 1396p(d)(3) makes an asset in the
corpus of an irrevocable trust countable only where there are
circumstances in which principal from the trust might be paid to
them or for their benefit. They contend that, because they can
only reside in the home but not reach any of the equity in the
home under the trust, the equity should not be countable as an
asset because it may not be paid to them. MassHealth argues that
interpretive guidance from the Health Care Financing Adminis-

200 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

tration (HCFA)" in its State Medicaid Manual (Manual), which
provides instruction to State officials in applying the provisions of
Federal Medicaid law, indicates that a right to use and occupancy
can be a form of “payment” to a Medicaid applicant. Transmittal
64, issued in November, 1994, includes a section entitled “Treat-
ment of Trusts,” which states:

“For purposes of this section a payment from a trust is a
disbursal from the corpus of the trust or from income gen-
erated by the trust which benefits the party receiving it. A
payment may include actual cash, as well as noncash or
property disbursements, such as the right to use and occupy
real property.”

State Medicaid Manual, HCFA Pub. No. 45-3, Transmittal 64
§ 3259.1.A.8 (Nov. 1994).

The Manual is comprised of the various transmittals issued by
HCFA and, later, by CMS. The transmittals contained in the
Manual do not carry the force of regulations and are not entitled
to the deference that we give to regulations that reflect an agen-
cy’s interpretation of a statute it is obliged to enforce. See
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984); Springfield v. Department of
Telecomm. & Cable, 457 Mass. 562, 567-568 (2010). However,
we consider such guidance carefully for its persuasive power. See
Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 568 U.S. 627, 643 (2013) (inter-
pretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines lack force of regulations and “do not
warrant Chevron-style deference,” but are “ ‘entitled to respect’
in proportion to their ‘power to persuade’ ” [citations omitted]);
Atlanticare Med. Ctr. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Med. Assis-
tance, 439 Mass. 1, 9 & n.12 (2003).

We conclude that HCFA Transmittal 64 accurately interprets the
meaning of “payment from the trust” in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3).
We also conclude that MassHealth has misinterpreted the meaning
of these words in both the statute and the transmittal. Section
1396p(d)(3) recognizes that a “payment from the trust” may be
made from the “corpus” of the trust or from “income on the
corpus.” Where a home is transferred to a trust, the home becomes
another asset of the trust. Like any other asset, a home adds to the
corpus of the trust, in that it may be sold for its fair market value;

“See note 4, supra.

477 Mass. 188 (2017) 201

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

a home also increases the trust’s capacity to generate income, in
that rent may be collected for its use and occupancy. Where the
trustee retains the discretion to pay income produced from the
corpus to the grantors, as in the Nadeau and Daley Trusts, the
trustee may pay any rental income earned from any real estate in
the corpus of the trust to the grantors. Where the terms of the trust,
as in the Nadeau Trust, grant a right of use and occupancy to the
grantors for their lifetime, the grantors receive from the trust the
right to receive any income that may be generated from the rental
of the home, as well as the right to forgo that rental income by
residing in the home themselves. See Hinckley v. Clarkson, 331
Mass. 453, 454-455 (1954) (right of use and occupancy grants
“right to the income of the property [for] life,” but not right to
“alienate or consume” property). See also Langlois v. Langlois,
326 Mass. 85, 87-88 (1950). HCFA Transmittal 64 accurately
recognizes that, where a trust grants the use or occupancy of a
home to the grantors, it is effectively making a payment to the
grantors in the amount of the fair rental value of that property.
To illustrate with an example, if a grantor transfers to an
irrevocable trust ownership of a condominium unit and the trustee
decides to rent the unit to a third person and pay the rental income
to the grantor, there is a payment of rental income from the trust
to the grantor. If the grantor instead exercises his or her right of
use and occupancy under the terms of the trust, and decides to
reside in the unit or permit a family member to reside there
without the payment of rent, the fair market value of the rent that
otherwise would have been earned and treated as actual trust
income is deemed paid to the grantor under Transmittal 64.
This payment, however, is not a payment from the corpus of the
trust; the grantors do not have the power through their right of use
and occupancy to sell the property under any circumstances. It is
instead a payment from the “income on the corpus.” Such pay-
ments, whether actually received as rental income or imputed as
the fair market rental value of the grantors’ occupancy of the
home, may be countable as income of the grantors, but the value
of the home is not thereby countable as their asset.'* Such
payments, therefore, do not affect an applicant’s eligibility for

2Under the Massachusetts regulations implementing the Federal Medicaid
act, countable income includes income to which an applicant, a person already
receiving Medicaid benefits, or a spouse “would be entitled whether or not
actually received when failure to receive such income results from [their] action
or inaction.” See 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 520.009(A)(4) (2014). “In determin-
ing whether or not failure to receive such income is reasonably considered to

202 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

Medicaid long-term care benefits, but they may affect how much
the applicant is required to contribute to the payment for that care.
Just as the payment of income from the liquid assets of an
irrevocable trust does not make those assets “available to the
individual” under § 1396p(d)(3) and therefore countable assets
for purposes of Medicaid eligibility, the payment of what is
essentially rental income from real estate owned by the trust does
not make the equity in that real estate a countable asset.

The MassHealth regulation, 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 520.023(C)(1)(d),
accurately interprets § 1396p(d)(3) in providing, “The home or
former home of a nursing-facility resident or spouse held in an
irrevocable trust that is available according to the terms of the trust
is a countable asset.” There is no doubt that, where the terms of
the trust grant the trustee the discretion in any circumstance to sell
the grantors’ home and distribute to them the proceeds, the home
is a countable asset for Medicaid eligibility. Where MassHealth
errs is in interpreting its regulation to mean that a home “is
available according to the terms of the trust” simply because the
terms of the trust give the grantors the right of use and occupancy
of the home. Such a right is not a circumstance that would give
the trustee the discretion to sell the home and distribute the
proceeds to the applicant, and therefore is not a circumstance that
may render the home a countable asset.

As the United States Supreme Court has declared, “the prin-
ciple of actual availability .. . has served primarily to prevent the
States from conjuring fictional sources of income and resources
by imputing financial support from persons who have no obliga-
tion to furnish it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that
attributes nonexistent resources to recipients.” Heckler v. Turner,
470 U.S. 184, 200 (1985). The “any circumstances” test for trusts
requires an additional layer of analysis, but it does not depart
from this fundamental purpose. See Guerriero, 433 Mass. at 634
(trust assets not available to applicant where trustee did not have
“any legal discretion” to pay any part of trust principal to her). By
declaring the equity in a home owned by an irrevocable trust to
be actually available to an applicant where the trustee has no
power to sell the home and distribute the proceeds to the appli-
cant under any circumstance, Massachusetts is effectively “con-
juring [a] fictional” resource (the applicant’s home) by “imputing

result from such action or inaction, the MassHealth agency will consider the
specific circumstances involved.” Id.

477 Mass. 188 (2017) 203

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

financial support” from a person who has no authority to furnish
it (the trustee).

Because the MassHealth determination that Nadeau was ineli-
gible to receive Medicaid long-term care benefits rests solely on
the availability of his home as a resource, we vacate the judgment
affirming this finding and remand the matter to MassHealth to
evaluate two other possible sources of countable assets. As earlier
discussed, the terms of the Nadeau Trust permit the equity in the
Nadeau home to be paid at the Nadeaus’ direction or for their
benefit during their lifetimes in two circumstances.

First, the Nadeaus may “appoint . . . all or any part of the trust
property . . . to any one or more charitable or non-profit organi-
zations” over which they have no controlling interest. Had
Nadeau received care at a nursing home operated by a nonprofit
organization, he could have used the assets of the trust, including
his home, to pay the nonprofit organization for his care. Because
approximately one-fourth of the nursing homes in Massachusetts
are operated by nonprofit organizations," albeit not the nursing
home where he received care, it is appropriate for MassHealth to
consider whether this possibility fits within the “any circum-
stances” test.

Second, because the trust is intended to be construed as a
“grantors trust” under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
§ 677(a), with all income distributed to the grantors taxable to
them, the trustee may pay any tax liability arising from such
distributions from the corpus of the trust. MassHealth may de-
termine that this portion of the corpus is a countable asset under
the “any circumstances” test and may ascertain, under § 1396p(d)(3),
the size of the “portion of the corpus from which . . . payment to
the individual could be made” in this circumstance.

Our analysis is different for the Daley Trust because, in contrast
with the Nadeau Trust, the Daley Trust did not own the home in
fee simple; the Daleys retained a life estate and deeded only the
remainder interest in their home to the trust. Their continued
residence in the home, therefore, cannot be deemed putative
income received from the trust through a right of use and occu-
pancy, because the trust has no property interest in the home
during the Daleys’ lifetime. Instead, the life estate is an asset of
the Daleys that can be sold, mortgaged, or leased. See Hershman-

18See MatchNursingHomes.org, Massachusetts Nursing Homes and Resources,
http: //matchnursinghomes.org/state/ma-nursing-homes [https://perma.cc/G7CS-
2G3B] (citing 2011 data).

204 477 Mass. 188 (2017)

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

Tcherepnin v. Tcherepnin, 452 Mass. 77, 88 n.20 (2008), quoting
H.J. Alperin & L.D. Shubow, Summary of Basic Law § 17.5, at
586 (3d ed. 1996) (“[a] life estate is alienable by the life tenant,
and he can accordingly convey his estate to a third person, or
mortgage it, or lease it for a term of years”). Moreover, when the
underlying property itself is sold, the life tenant has a right to a
portion of the sale proceeds, pursuant to an actuarial evaluation of
the life estate. See JA. Bloom & H.S. Margolis, Elder Law § 12:3
(2016). Although we do not decide the question, it appears that
MassHealth does not consider a life estate in an applicant’s
primary residence to be a countable asset for Medicaid eligibility
purposes.'*"5 Where the irrevocable trust does not own the life
estate in the applicant’s primary residence, the continued use of
the home by the applicant pursuant to his or her life estate interest
does not make the remainder interest in the property owned by
the trust available to the applicant. Therefore, we vacate the
judgment affirming the finding that the equity in the Daleys’
home is available to them and is accordingly a countable asset for
purposes of Medicaid eligibility. Because the Daley Trust, like the
Nadeau Trust, is intended to be construed as a “grantors trust” and
the trustee may pay any tax liability arising from income distri-
butions to the grantors from the corpus of the trust, we remand the
matter to MassHealth to determine whether this portion of the
corpus is a countable asset under the “any circumstances” test and
to ascertain under § 1396p(d)(3)(B)(i) the size of the “portion of

‘4 Heyn vy. Director of the Office of Medicaid, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 312, 313
n.3 (2016), MassHealth declared in its brief that it is “a correct statement of law”
that retention of a life estate in a primary residence does not make an individual
ineligible for Medicaid benefits.

15We note that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) gives States the option to expand
their estate-recovery procedures for Medicaid expenses to include assets beyond
those within the individual’s probate estate, including “any other real and
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or
interest at the time of death... , including such assets conveyed to a survivor,
heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.” Massa-
chusetts has not chosen to expand its estate recovery provisions in this fashion.
See G. L. c. 118E, §31 (c). In States that have exercised this option under
§ 1396p(b)(4)(B) and increased the scope of estate recovery, the remainder
interest in life estates retained by Medicaid beneficiaries are ultimately subject
to recovery after the beneficiary’s death. See, e.g., Matter of the Estate of
Peterson v. Peterson, 157 Idaho 827, 836 (2014) (“When assets of a Medicaid
recipient are conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign by the termination of a ‘life
estate,’ the assets remain part of the recipient's ‘estate’ pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p[b][4][B] and Idaho Code section 56-218[4][b]”).

477 Mass. 188 (2017)

ey
S
a

Daley », Executive Office of Health & Human Services. Nadeau v, Office of Medicaid,

the corpus from which . . . payment to the individual could be
made” in this circumstance.

Conclusion. We reverse the judgments in both cases, and re-

mand to MassHealth for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

So ordered.

206 477 Mass. 206 (2017)

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

Commonweatti vs. ANDRES PacHEco.
Middlesex. February 14, 2017. - May 30, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Luvx, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Constitutional Law, Sentence, Assistance of counsel, Double jeopardy. Due
Process of Law, Sentence, Assistance of counsel, Notice, Practice, Criminal,
Sentence, Assistance of counsel, Double jeopardy, Probation.

A Superior Court judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth’s motion to
correct and clarify a criminal defendant’s sentence, where the defendant had
not been resentenced to a term of consecutive probation when the original
sentencing judge granted the defendant's prior motion to vacate a portion of
his sentence; where the proceedings at the hearing on the motion to vacate
had lacked the procedural protections of a sentencing hearing; and where
principles of double jeopardy barred the imposition of a consecutive term of
probation at the hearing on the motion to correct and clarify, conducted
almost eight years after the completion of the defendant’s original sentence.
[210-216]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on September 30, 2004.

A motion to vacate sentence, filed on June, 18, 2008, was
heard by Leila R. Kern, J., and a motion to correct and clarify
sentence, filed on November 30, 2014, was heard by Kathe M.
Tuttman, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Rebecca Kiley for the defendant.

Michael Klunder, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Gaziano, J. At issue in this case is whether a consecutive
sentence of eight years of probation, imposed in 2015 by a judge
who was not the plea judge, violated the protections against
double jeopardy, where the defendant originally had been sen-
tenced in May, 2005, to an eight-year term of probation, concur-
rent with his ten-year prison sentence. In June, 2008, after he had
served approximately three and one-half years of incarceration,
the defendant filed, pro se, a motion to vacate the imposition of
community parole supervision for life (CPSL), in light of this

477 Mass. 206 (2017) 207

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161, 162
(2005).

At a hearing on that motion in July, 2008, where the defendant
was not represented by counsel, and had not waived his right to
representation, the plea judge allowed the motion to vacate, and
then, at the Commonwealth’s request, imposed several additional
conditions on the defendant’s terms of probation, while ordering
that “[t]he original sentence on [May 26, 2005,] stands except the
lifetime community parole was vacated.” In November, 2015,
approximately two months before the defendant’s then-scheduled
release date, the Commonwealth filed a “Motion to Correct and
Clarify the Sentence.” The Commonwealth argued that, at the
2008 hearing when the plea judge vacated the imposition of
CPSL, she had resentenced the defendant to a consecutive term of
probation of eight years, from and after his ten-year sentence of
incarceration. At a hearing in December, 2015, after the original
sentences in this case had terminated, a different Superior Court
judge sentenced the defendant to a consecutive term of probation
of eight years. The defendant appealed, and we allowed his
motion for direct appellate review.

The defendant argues that he was not resentenced to a term of
consecutive probation when the original sentencing judge vacated
the CPSL portion of his sentence; the proceedings at that hearing
lacked the procedural protections of a sentencing hearing; and
principles of double jeopardy bar the imposition of a consecutive
term of probation by a different judge, almost eight years later, at
a hearing conducted after the completion of the defendant’s
original sentence. We agree and, accordingly, reverse.

1. Facts and prior proceedings. In September, 2004, the de-
fendant was indicted on three charges of rape of a child by force,
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A; kidnapping, in violation of
G. L. c. 265, § 26; indecent assault and battery on a person age
fourteen or older, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H; and assault
and battery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A, for the September
11, 2014, attack on his then long-term girl friend’s fifteen year
old niece, who knew him as her “godfather.”

On May 26, 2005, the defendant pleaded guilty to all of the
indictments. A Superior Court judge sentenced him to a term of
imprisonment of from ten years to ten years and one day on each
of the convictions of rape, to be served concurrently. On the
conviction of kidnapping, the judge sentenced the defendant to a

208 477 Mass. 206 (2017)

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

term of probation of eight years,t to be served concurrently with
his committed sentence, and ordered that, “while incarcerated
[the defendant] submit[ ] for sexual offender evaluation, offender
evaluation and treatment as ordered by and through the institu-
tions.” When asked if he agreed with those conditions, the
defendant answered, “Yes.” The judge also ordered that the
defendant be placed on CPSL. The two other convictions were
placed on file.

On June 16, 2008, having served approximately three and
one-half years of both his ten-year term of incarceration and his
concurrent eight-year probationary term, the defendant filed, pro
se, a “Motion To Vacate Sentences Pursuant to Massachusetts
Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a)[, as appearing in 435 Mass.
1501 (2001)],” seeking to vacate so much of his sentence as
imposed CPSL, in light of this court’s decision in Pagan, 445
Mass. at 162.

On July 23, 2008, the sentencing judge conducted a hearing on
the defendant’s pro se motion to vacate. At the hearing, where the
defendant was not represented by counsel, the prosecutor agreed
that the CPSL portion of the defendant’s sentence had been
determined to be unconstitutional, but asked the court “to add
some special conditions of [the defendant’s] probationary period
when he in fact is released from [S]tate prison.”

The prosecutor, who was not the prosecutor at the plea hearing,
did not request that the defendant’s sentence be restructured, or
that his sentence of probation be modified to be served consecu-
tively to his sentence of incarceration. Rather, the prosecutor gave
the sentencing judge the erroneous impression that the defendant
previously had been sentenced to a consecutive eight-year term of
probation. The prosecutor said that the additional special condi-
tions of probation she was requesting had not been sought origi-
nally as part of the probationary sentence “so not to interfere with
any of the conditions that community parole, or what would be
involved with the community parole statute.” She also stated,

‘Taking into account the sentence credit that the defendant received for time
served awaiting trial, the period of probation ended within one month of the
period of incarceration,

2The entry on the docket sheet indicates that the defendant was sentenced to
“Probation 8 yrs., . .. this sentence to be served concurrently with the sentence
imposed this day in [counts nos. 001, 002, and 003, indictments charging rapes
of a child with force]. Deffendant] to submit to evaluation and treatment for
sexual offenders, defendant agrees in open court.”

477 Mass. 206 (2017) 209

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

incorrectly, that the original sentence included a requirement that,
upon release, the defendant “submit to sex offender evaluation
and any treatment that is recommended as a result of that sex
offender evaluation.”

The sentencing judge announced her ruling on the defendant’s
motion to vacate as follows:

“[T]he sentence that was imposed back on . . . May 26,
2005 . . . will remain in effect, but the additional provision of
lifetime community parole will be deleted or vacated from
the original sentence. In its place this [c]ourt agrees that the
conditions of probation that include staying away from the
victim and her family, staying away from children under the
age of [sixteen], and then all the usual probation conditions
will apply. Furthermore, it is now mandatory, but at that time
in [2005] it was discretionary, this [c]ourt will, under my
discretion, add the condition of a [global positioning system
(GPS)] device during the probationary period . . . .”

After a further brief discussion between the prosecutor and judge,
the defendant asked, “Will they send me a paper?” The clerk then
announced the court’s ruling:

“[A]ll conditions that are imposed on May [26, 2005,]
stand, except the lifetime community parole is revoked.
Special conditions, no contact with the victim or the family,
no contact with a child under the age of [sixteen] years of
age, plus the [clourt orders that you be — you wear the
[global positioning] system, and the fee for the GPS system
is waived until you become gainfully employed.”

The defendant then said, “So the earlier parole —,” and the judge
interjected, “Yes. The parole is vacated.” Other than this, the
defendant did not say anything during the hearing.

The defendant completed his original eight-year sentence of
probation on May 26, 2013, and his ten-year prison sentence on
September 15, 2014. On November 3, 2015, the Commonwealth
filed a “Motion to Correct and Clarify the Sentence.”* On De-
cember 9, 2015, a different Superior Court judge (the plea judge
having retired), conducted a hearing on the Commonwealth’s
motion and then allowed it, imposing a term of eight years of

"The defendant remained in custody after the completion of his prison
sentence because of the previously imposed sentence on an unrelated case.

210 477 Mass. 206 (2017)

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

probation “to run from and after the committed sentence[es]” that
had been imposed at the defendant’s initial sentencing. The
motion judge did so because she determined that, in 2008, the
sentencing judge both had vacated the imposition of CPSL and
had resentenced the defendant, modifying the eight-year sentence
of probation from a concurrent to a consecutive term. The de-
fendant appealed, and we allowed his petition for direct appellate
review.

2. Discussion. In 2005, this court concluded that first-time sex
offenders could not be sentenced to CPSL, because the statutory
guidelines for sentencing such offenders to CPSL were unconsti-
tutionally vague. See Pagan, 445 Mass. at 162. Consequently, any
first-time sex offender who was sentenced to CPSL is entitled to
have the CPSL portion of the sentence vacated.* See id. at 169-
173; Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 469 (2013),
citing Pagan, supra at 161. Where CPSL is vacated, and a de-
fendant is still serving the original sentence, a judge may choose
to resentence the defendant and “restructure the over-all sentence
to provide a lengthy period of probation supervision in place of
parole supervision that would have been provided with CPSL,”
“provided that the total length of incarceration imposed on the
defendant for that conviction is not increased.” Commonwealth v.
Sallop, 472 Mass. 568, 569, 570 (2015).

The requirement that the over-all length of the sentence may
not be increased arises as a result of the protection against double
jeopardy. See id.; Cumming, 466 Mass. at 473-474. A judge may
not restructure the sentence in a way that “increase[s] the aggre-
gate punishment imposed under the original sentence” (quota-
tions omitted). Sallop, supra. See Cumming, supra. In Sallop,
supra at 571-572, for instance, we determined that a defendant
whose sentence of CPSL had been vacated properly could be
resentenced to a shorter term of incarceration, with ten years of
probation to be served consecutively. If the defendant violated a
condition of probation, however, the defendant could be sen-
tenced to a period of incarceration of no longer than two years, in
order to avoid unlawfully increasing the aggregate punishment
beyond the initial ten-year period of incarceration. Jd. at 569, 572.
See Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014)
(double jeopardy considerations prohibit resentencing defendant

“In 2014, we determined that imposition of community parole supervision for
life is unconstitutional. See Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 295 (2014).

477 Mass. 206 (2017) 211

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

to any additional period of incarceration or probation if, at time
of resentencing, defendant has served entire sentence other than
CPSL component); Cumming, supra (defendant who violated
term of probation could not be required to serve more than initial
ten-year sentence).*

In this case, the parties dispute the effect of the judge’s 2008
order, issued at the hearing on the defendant’s motion to vacate
CPSL, and whether the order was, indeed, a resentencing. The
Commonwealth contends that the sentencing judge vacated the
CPSL portion of the sentence and implicitly resentenced the
defendant to a consecutive eight-year term of probation. The
defendant maintains that the sentencing judge merely vacated the
imposition of CPSL, and that, accordingly, there was no error in
the absence of counsel at the proceedings. The defendant argues
further that, had the judge intended to resentence him at that
point, any attempt at resentencing was structural error, because
the judge did not comply with the due process requirements for
resentencing. Both sides agree that, if the defendant was not
resentenced at the 2008 hearing, the motion judge could not per-
missibly have allowed the Commonwealth’s motion to “clarify
the sentence” in 2015, after the defendant had served both the
committed portion of the sentence and the eight-year term of
probation.

In considering whether the resentencing in 2015 violated the
protections against double jeopardy, we turn first to the sentenc-
ing judge’s actions at the 2008 hearing on the defendant’s motion
to vacate.

Where there is a direct conflict between an oral pronouncement
of a sentence and the written judgment and commitment, “the oral
pronouncement, as correctly reported, must control. The only
sentence that is legally cognizable is the actual oral pronounce-
ment in the presence of the defendant.” United States v. Hicks,
997 F2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1993), quoting United States v.
Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974).

5Here, the defendant initially was sentenced to ten years of incarceration on
the rape charges, with eight years of concurrent probation on the charge of
kidnapping. The offense of rape of a child by force permits a maximum sentence
of up to life in prison, see G. L. ¢, 265, § 22A, and the maximum term of
incarceration for the offense of kidnapping (without extortion) is ten years. See
G. L. ¢. 265, § 26. Therefore, under the terms of the 2015 sentence, were the
defendant to have violated the terms of probation, he could have been subject to
an additional term of ten years’ imprisonment, which the court could have
imposed consecutively to any prison sentence the defendant was then serving.

ie)
nv

477 Mass. 206 (2017)

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

When the parties appeared before the sentencing judge in July,
2008, on the defendant’s pro se motion to vacate CPSL, the
Commonwealth did not move for resentencing, and did not pro-
vide the defendant with notice of that possibility. See Common-
wealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 311 (2014) (“resentencing need
only occur where the Commonwealth moves for resentencing; in
the absence of such a motion, a judge would simply allow the
defendant’s motion to vacate the CPSL sentence and leave the
remainder of the sentence unchanged”). The pro se defendant was
not asked if he wanted counsel, nor if he waived his right to
counsel. He also was not asked if he wished to introduce any
evidence in mitigation before any new sentence was pronounced.

Nor was the defendant provided notice of any change in his
sentence other than the statement by the prosecutor that “we’re
just adding the conditions now, in lieu of the lifetime community
parole, of stay away from the victim, the victim’s family, and any
child under the age of [sixteen]”; the statement by the clerk that
“all conditions that are imposed on May [26, 2005,] stand, except
the lifetime community parole is revoked”; and the response by
the judge to the defendant’s question, “So the earlier parole —”
that “Yes. The parole is vacated.” After stating that all previously
imposed conditions stood except for CPSL, the clerk restated the
“special conditions” imposed at the hearing, and then added,
“plus the [court orders that you be — you wear the GPS system,
and the fee for the GPS system is waived until you become
gainfully employed.” If indeed the judge meant by these rulings
that the defendant’s sentence had been increased by a period of
eight years of probation, these statements were not calculated to
inform the defendant of that order, particularly given that he
previously had been subject to GPS monitoring as one of the
conditions of CPSL.

On the other hand, it is clear from the transcript of the hearing
on the motion to vacate that the judge did not immediately recall
the sentence she had imposed in 2005, asking the prosecutor, for
instance, whether the committed sentence had been for ten and
one-half years. When the prosecutor later stated, “I would just
note also for the record that I do see in the docket sheet a
condition that upon the defendant’s release he is also to submit to
sex offender evaluation and any treatment that is recommended as
aresult of that sex offender evaluation,” the judge stated, “For the
record any condition that was imposed at that time will remain.”
Thus, it may well be, as the defendant contends, that the judge did

477 Mass. 206 (2017) 213

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

not appoint counsel because she had no intention of restructuring
the sentence, something that the Commonwealth had not re-
quested, and did not in fact intend any change in the concurrent
probationary period.

Moreover, at the hearing in December, 2015, on the Common-
wealth’s November, 2015, motion to clarify the defendant’s sen-
tence,* the Commonwealth misinterpreted the sentencing judge’s
statements at the plea colloquy in 2005. The prosecutor argued
that the sentencing judge plainly had intended that the defendant
be subject to ongoing treatment after release. She stated that the
sentencing judge had imposed the probationary condition of
completion of sex offender treatment while the defendant was
incarcerated because of safety concerns that the defendant would
pose upon being released.

The transcript of the 2005 plea colloquy makes clear, however,
that the sentencing judge ordered the defendant to attend sex
offender treatment as a condition of probation, to be imposed
while the defendant was incarcerated, at the Commonwealth’s
urging. The parties, the judge, and the session clerk discussed in
some detail how the sentence could be structured such that the
defendant would be required to, as the Commonwealth requested,
“submit to a [s]ex [o]ffender [t]reatment [p]rogram while he is
incarcerated” or, in the judge’s phrasing, “take advantage of sex
offender treatment if available in any place he’s incarcerated” and
“for whatever length of time he’s in [S]tate prison.” The judge
explicitly declined the defendant’s counsel’s suggestion that a
requirement of completion of the sex offender treatment program
be imposed as a condition of probation on one of the charges with
a shorter period of incarceration — such as assault and battery —
rather than sentencing the defendant to probation on the rape
charge, which carries a maximum sentence of life in prison, as a
means of deterring a repeat offense. The judge noted that the real
incentive to complete such a program, if an incarcerated defend-
ant chose to do so, was in an effort to avoid possible future civil
commitment as a sexually dangerous person.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guarantee a
criminal defendant the right to counsel at all “critical” stages of
acriminal prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Neary-French, 475

®At that point, the defendant was scheduled to be released from custody in
January, 2016.

214 477 Mass. 206 (2017)

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

Mass. 167, 170-171 (2016), and cases cited. It is well established
that sentencing is a critical stage at which there is a right to
counsel. See Osborne v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 104, 114
(1979); Mass R. Crim. P. 28 (b), 378 Mass. 898 (1979). “[T]he
necessity for the aid of counsel in marshalling the facts, intro-
ducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aid-
ing and assisting the defendant to present his case as to sentenc-
ing is apparent.” Osborne, supra, quoting Mempa v. Rhay, 389
US. 128, 135 (1967). A defendant who is deprived of the assis-
tance of counsel at sentencing has a right to have the sentence
vacated and to be resentenced after a hearing at which the
defendant and defense counsel are present. See McConnell v.
Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3 (1968); Osborne, supra, at 114-115.

The Commonwealth argues that the defendant did not have the
right to counsel at the July, 2008, hearing, because his motion to
vacate CPSL was a motion for postconviction relief. See Parker
v. Commonwealth, 448 Mass. 1021, 1023 (2007). The Common-
wealth claimed also before the motion judge, as it does before us,
that in July, 2008, the sentencing judge “restructured” the defend-
ant’s 2005 sentence, arguing, “it is clear from the record that the
intent of [the sentencing judge] was to add the additional condi-
tions of probation for the defendant upon release from probation.”

The defendant maintains that, in July, 2008, the sentencing
judge did not resentence him to a consecutive term of probation
from and after his committed sentence. The defendant argues, in
the alternative, that if the sentencing judge indeed resentenced
him to a consecutive term of probation of eight years from and
after his committed sentence, she did not provide him with notice
of the resentencing hearing or a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.

While, in many postconviction proceedings, a judge has dis-
cretion to decide whether to assign counsel to represent a defend-
ant, see Parker, 448 Mass. at 1023; Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (5),
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), there is no such discre-
tion at a hearing on a motion for resentencing, where a judge is
required to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant.
Further, whether acting pro se or through an attorney, a defendant
has a right to be present at sentencing (or resentencing) and to
present information in an effort to mitigate the sentence. Green v.
United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961). Commonwealth v. Will-
iamson, 462 Mass. 676, 685 (2012). See Commonwealth v. Jones,
14 Mass. App. Ct. 991, 991 (1982), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P.

ie)
an

477 Mass. 206 (2017)

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

28 (b) (either defendant or defendant’s attorney must be allowed
to be heard at sentencing). Where a defendant is not afforded the
right to be heard at sentencing, the defendant is entitled to seek
resentencing. Commonwealth v. Whitford, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 448,
455 (1983), citing Katz v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 305, 315-
316 (1979).

Similarly, although there is no per se requirement that a judge
or clerk announce all components of a defendant’s sentence in
open court in order for the sentence to be effective, a defendant
must have notice of its terms at the time the sentence is imposed.
See Williamson, 462 Mass. at 685; Commonwealth v. Power, 420
Mass. 410, 421 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996).

“ *® criminal defendant has the right to be present at his own
sentencing.’ United States v. Vega-Ortiz, 425 F.3d 20, 22 (1st
Cir. 2005). Consistent with this right, the oral pronounce-
ment of a sentence generally controls over the written ex-
pression where there exists a ‘material conflict’ between the
two. United States v. Ortiz-Torres, 449 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.
[2006]) . . . . However, ‘no material conflict exists where the
defendant is on notice that he is subject to the terms included
in the written judgment.’ Id.”

Williamson, supra. See Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 435 Mass.
1005, 1006 (2001). Any ambiguity in the terms of probation will
be construed in favor of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Ruiz,
453 Mass. 474, 481-482 (2009).

Here, at the hearing on the defendant’s motion to vacate CPSL,
the judge ordered that “1) The original sentence on [May 26,
2005,] stands except the lifetime community parole was vacated.
2) Additional special conditions of probation: a) No contact with
the victim or her family[;] b) No contact with children under
sixteen years of age[;] c) GPS upon release on probation[;] d)
GPS fee is waived.”

We need not engage in the speculation that both parties urge
concerning the sentencing judge’s intent when she allowed the
defendant’s motion to vacate CPSL. As the defendant concedes,
because his sentence had not been completed at that point, the
judge permissibly could have restructured it, albeit not in such a
way so as to increase the over-all scheme of punishment. See
Sallop, 472 Mass. at 570-572. Nothing in our review of the
transcripts indicates that the judge stated an intention to impose

216 477 Mass. 206 (2017)

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

an additional eight-year term of probation. It is also clear that the
unrepresented defendant was not provided notice, and was not
provided an opportunity to present any evidence in mitigation. If
the judge intended to restructure the defendant’s sentence, and
did so without counsel present and without the defendant’s
waiver of counsel, that would have been structural error requiring
resentencing. See Osborne, 378 Mass. at 114, quoting Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. at 135; Commonwealth v. Brennick, 14 Mass.
App. Ct. 952, 953 (1982), and cases cited. At this stage, however,
it would be impossible to discern what the now-retired judge
would have intended had she not been under a misapprehension
concerning the terms of the sentence she previously had imposed.

Moreover, the defendant had completed both his term of pro-
bation and his term of incarceration well before the Common-
wealth’s November, 2015, motion to “clarify” the defendant’s
sentence. Thus, any attempt in 2015 to require an additional term
of probation would have been in violation of the prohibitions
against double jeopardy. “[T]he constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy protects a defendant not only against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction but
also against multiple punishments for the same offense” (quota-
tions and citation omitted). Commonwealth vy. Goodwin, 458
Mass. 11, 19 (2010). For this reason, a defendant cannot be
resentenced for the same offense after completion of the original
sentence. Id. at 19-20.

In this case, because the defendant’s sentence was not restruc-
tured in July, 2008, whatever the judge’s intent at that hearing, the
defendant’s eight-year sentence of probation, which began in
May, 2005, terminated in 2013. The defendant’s ten-year sen-
tence of incarceration, also begun in May, 2005, terminated in
2014.7 Therefore, because all parts of the defendant's sentence
had been completed at the time of the November, 2015, motion,
at that point the sentence could not have been modified in any
way. Id.

3. Conclusion. The order allowing the Commonwealth’s mo-
tion to correct and clarify the sentence is vacated and set aside.
The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order

7 The defendant received credit for the time he was held in pretrial detention,
beginning in 2004,

477 Mass. 206 (2017) 217

Commonwealth » Pacheco,

dismissing the motion as moot, on the ground that the defendant’s
sentence had been completed before the motion was filed.

So ordered.

218 477 Mass. 218 (2017)

Van Arsdale », Van Arsdale.

Susan Van ArspDALE VS. WILLIAM VAN ARSDALE.
Essex. March 6, 2017. - May 31, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Modification of judgment. Due Process of
Law, Retroactive application of statute, Statute, Retroactive application.

This court concluded that the application of the durational limits in the Alimony
Reform Act, St. 2011, c. 124 (act), to an alimony agreement that predated the
act was not unconstitutionally retroactive, where no new legal consequences
attached from the bargain struck by the parties in their alimony agreement,
in that the durational limits created merely a presumption of termination of
alimony that the recipient spouse could rebut by showing that deviation from
the limits was required in the interests of justice; and in that the requisite
temporal focus of the circumstances of the parties was the “here and now,”
thus ensuring that the durational limits were not the result of actions that
predated the act. [220-223]

A Probate and Family Court judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing a
husband’s complaint for modification of an award of alimony that predated
the enactment of the Alimony Reform Act, St. 2011, c. 124 (act), and in
declining to deviate from the durational limits set by the act, [223]

Comp.ainr for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the Pro-
bate and Family Court Department on October 30, 1996.

A complaint for modification, filed on September 1, 2015, was
heard by Mary Anne Sahagian, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

David E. Cherny (Erin M. Shapiro also present) for the wife.

Paul M. Kane (Allison R. McNulty also present) for the hus-
band.

Lowy, J. This appeal raises the constitutionality of applying the
durational limits of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 (act), St.
2011, c. 124, to certain alimony agreements predating the act’s
effective date. We conclude that the application of the act’s
durational limits to certain alimony agreements that predate the
act is not unconstitutionally retroactive because the statute does
not attach “new legal consequences to events completed before
its enactment.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270

477 Mass. 218 (2017) 219

Van Arsdale », Van Arsdale.

(1994). We also conclude that the Probate and Family Court judge
did not abuse her discretion when she declined to deviate from
the durational limits in this case.

Background. 1. The Alimony Reform Act of 2011. The act chang-
ed neither the essential purpose nor the basic definition of alimony:
“the payment of support from a spouse, who has the ability to pay,
to a spouse in need of support.” G. L. c. 208, § 48. See Hassey v.
Hassey, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 518, 522 (2014). It did, however, make
several changes to the Commonwealth’s alimony laws. See gen-
erally Kindregan, Reforming Alimony: Massachusetts Reconsid-
ers Postdivorce Spousal Support, 46 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 13, 26
(2013).

The relevant change on appeal is the creation of durational
limits — or presumptive termination dates — for alimony obli-
gations arising from marriages lasting fewer than twenty years.
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b). This presumption that alimony should
terminate after a certain length of time may be overcome, how-
ever, by showing that the payment of alimony beyond the relevant
durational limit is “required in the interests of justice.” Jd. See
George v. George, 476 Mass. 65, 69-70 (2016).

The Legislature provided that the durational limits, in contrast
to the remainder of the act, may be applied to alimony judgments
that entered before the act’s effective date of March 1, 2012, with
certain delineated exceptions not relevant here. St. 2011, c. 124,
$$ 4, 7. See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 536 (2015). See also
George, supra at 68.

2. Facts. William Van Arsdale and Susan Van Arsdale married
in 1979 and divorced in 1997." They had two children, who were
unemancipated at the time of divorce. The divorce judgment in-
corporated and merged the parties’ separation agreement, which
provided for William to pay $3,333.33 in child support and
$3,333.33 in alimony to Susan each month. The agreement pro-
vided that the alimony payments would continue until either
party’s death or Susan’s remarriage. Notwithstanding those ter-
mination provisions, the parties agreed to review William’s ali-
mony payment obligations when the parties’ youngest child be-
came emancipated and when William retired from full-time em-
ployment, provided he was at least sixty-two years of age.

In 2005, William filed a complaint for modification in which he
alleged that the parties’ youngest child was emancipated. That

Because they share a last name, we refer to the parties by their first names.

220 477 Mass. 218 (2017)

Van Arsdale », Van Arsdale.

complaint led to a 2006 modification agreement, which merged
with the modification judgment, wherein the parties agreed to
discontinue the child support payments and to increase alimony
payments to $7,571.26 per month.

In 2015, William filed another complaint for modification seek-
ing to terminate his alimony obligation based upon the act’s
durational limits and because he had retired from full-time em-
ployment. Susan filed an answer and a counterclaim seeking to
increase both her alimony payments and the amount of life
insurance William was obligated to maintain on his life for her.
She was later permitted to amend her answer to add her challenge
to the constitutionality of the durational limits.

After a trial, the Probate and Family Court judge issued an
order terminating William’s obligation to pay Susan alimony be-
cause the act’s relevant durational limit had been exceeded? and
Susan had not shown that deviation from them was necessary.
The judge reasoned that deviation was not necessary because
Susan’s medical condition had not precluded her from employ-
ment and that she had been terminated from her job on account of
her failure to “heed constructive criticism.” Although the judge
declined to rule on Susan’s constitutional arguments, she noted
that Susan should not have had an expectation that the alimony
payments would continue in perpetuity because of the provision
in the agreement allowing for a review of William’s alimony
obligation upon his retirement. Susan appealed, and this court
granted her application for direct appellate review.

Discussion. 1. Constitutional challenge. Susan argues that the
application of the act’s durational limits to the alimony agreement
between her and William is unconstitutionally retroactive.

a. Retroactivity. When a party argues that a statute is imper-
missibly retroactive we first “must determine whether the law. . .
has a retroactive effect. If not, and assuming the law is otherwise
constitutional, no further inquiry is necessary.” Moe v. Sex Of-
fender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 606 (2014).*

2For marriages lasting longer than fifteen years but less than twenty years,
like the Van Arsdale’s, the durational limit — which is expressed as a percent-
age of the length of the marriage — is “[eighty] per cent of the number of
months of the marriage.” G. L. c, 208, § 49 (b) (4).

5If the statute is determined to be retroactive we must ask two more questions:
“whether the Legislature clearly intended it to be retroactive” and “[w]here it so
intended, . . . whether retroactive application is constitutional.” Moe v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 606 (2014).

477 Mass. 218 (2017) 221

Van Arsdale », Van Arsdale.

To answer the question, we employ the “new legal conse-
quences” test as articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-270. See Moe, 467 Mass. at 607.
“[T]he court must ask whether the new provision attaches new
legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The
conclusion that a particular rule operates ‘retroactively’ comes at
the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent
of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the
operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.” Landgraf,
supra.

b. Analysis. Before discussing whether the durational limits
presumption has a retroactive effect, we must first address obser-
vations we made in George and Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass.
653, 661 n.9 (2014). In George, we stated plainly that the
durational limit provisions of the act were “retroactive.” George,
476 Mass. at 68, citing Rodman v. Rodman, 470 Mass. 539, 544
(2015), Chin, 470 Mass. at 536, and Holmes, supra. That state-
ment, however, was merely a recognition that the durational
limits presumption applies to alimony agreements that predate the
act. We did not comment on whether the limits have a retroactive
effect in the constitutional sense. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269
(“statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is
applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s
enactment”).

We now turn to whether the act’s durational limits presumption
has a retroactive effect (i.e., whether it attaches new legal con-
sequences to agreements that predate the act).

In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3839 v. Sex Offender
Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 492, 497 (2015) (Doe No. 3839), we
examined whether G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, the sex offender
registry law, had an unconstitutionally retroactive effect. The law
provides that individuals convicted of, or adjudicated as a delin-
quent juvenile by reason of, a sex offense have to register with the
Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB). The registration require-
ment applies to people who were convicted or adjudicated delin-
quent prior to the statute’s enactment. Doe No. 3839, supra at
496-497. The statute, however, allows SORB to relieve individu-
als such as the plaintiff in that case from the obligation to register
as a sex offender. Id. at 497. Because the law made the plaintiff
merely eligible for registration and allowed him an opportunity to
prove to SORB that he should not have to register, we held that
the law did not necessarily attach new legal consequences to the

ey
v
v

477 Mass. 218 (2017)

Van Arsdale », Van Arsdale.

plaintiff's pre-statute adjudications and that the statute applied
prospectively to him. Jd.

By contrast, in Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 787, 793 (2008) (Doe No.
8725), we held that a prior version of the sex offender registry law
was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff because it required
him to register as a sex offender (i.e., attached new legal conse-
quences to him) “solely by virtue of his prior conviction.” Jd. at
784. Unlike the plaintiff in Doe No. 3839, the plaintiff in Doe No.
8725 did not have an opportunity to prove that he should not have
to register. Doe No. 8725, supra at 787. This lack of opportunity
to escape the effects of a statute attaching new legal consequences
and enacted after the plaintiff's conviction was the crucial dis-
tinction between an unconstitutionally retroactive statute (ie.,
Doe No. 8725) and a constitutional one (i.e., Doe No. 3839).

Here, as in Doe No. 3839, Susan had an opportunity to show
that the durational limits should not apply to her. See G. L. c. 208,
§ 49 (b). The durational limits merely create a presumption of
termination that a recipient spouse such as Susan can rebut by
showing that deviation from the limits is “required in the interests
of justice.” Jd. Applying such a presumption is not impermissibly
retroactive. See Doe No. 3839, 472 Mass. at 497 (presumption of
registration does not attach new legal consequence to events prior
to sex offender registry law). See also Tobin’s Case, 424 Mass.
250, 255 (1997) (“[E]stablishment of a rebuttable presumption
also does not violate due process. Presumptions are simply rules
of evidence that fall within the general power of government to
adopt”). Thus, the act compels no new legal consequences to the
bargains struck by parties in merged alimony agreements entered
into prior to the act’s effective date.

The constitutionality of the application of the act’s durational
limits presumption to agreements that predate the act is further
demonstrated by the standard for deviation beyond those limits
articulated in George. There, we held that the G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b),
“fnterests of justice” standard should focus on the circumstances
of the parties in the “here and now.” George, 476 Mass. at 70. By
requiring such a temporal focus, the statute ensures that any new
legal consequences that result from the durational limits are not the
result of actions that predated the act, but rather are based on the
circumstances of the parties as they exist before the judge deciding
a modification complaint. See Doe No. 3839, 472 Mass. at 497
(individual’s obligation to register was based on contemporane-

477 Mass. 218 (2017) 223

Van Arsdale », Van Arsdale.

ous evaluation of risk to reoffend and dangerousness, rather than
on convictions prior to sex offender registry law).

Because we hold that the act’s durational limits are not retro-
active in the constitutional sense, no further inquiry is necessary.
See Moe, 467 Mass. at 606.

2. Abuse of discretion. “[A] judge enjoys considerable discre-
tion in fashioning an appropriate modification judgment.” Holmes,
467 Mass. at 661, quoting Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 293
(2009). Here, the judge concluded that Susan’s health did not
preclude her from employment; that she had two residences, one of
which could be rented out; that she had over $170,000 in cash and
more than $1 million in assets; and that her lifestyle had not been
negatively impacted since the 2006 modification. Further, the judge
properly examined the circumstances of the parties in the “here and
now.” George, 476 Mass. at 70. The judge did not abuse her
discretion in declining to deviate beyond the act’s durational limits.

Conclusion. The durational limits of the act are not impermis-
sibly retroactive, and the judge did not abuse her discretion in
declining to deviate beyond the limits.

Judgment affirmed.

224 477 Mass. 224 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Dayton.

Commonweatru vs. Timorny O. Dayton.
Berkshire, January 9, 2017, - June 1, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., LENK, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 10.

Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Constitutional Law, Preventive
detention. Statute, Construction.

This court concluded that, under the rule of lenity, the ambiguous language of
G. L. ¢. 276, § 58A, does not permit the Commonwealth to seek pretrial
detention without bail when a defendant has two prior convictions of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and is charged
with a third such offense. [225-228] Lowy, J., dissenting.

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on October 5, 2015.

A motion for pretrial detention was heard by John A. Agostini,
J., and a question of law was reported by him.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Ryan D. Smith, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the
defendant.

Joseph G.A. Coliflores, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Hines, J. A Superior Court judge reported the question whether
G. L. c. 276, § 58A, permits the Commonwealth to seek pretrial
detention without bail where a defendant has two prior convic-
tions of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol (OUD, G. L. c. 90, § 24, and is charged with OUI, third
offense. Because § 58A requires three OUI convictions before a
defendant can be so detained, we answer the question in the neg-
ative.

Background. In October, 2015, the defendant, Timothy O.
Dayton, was charged in the Superior Court with eight motor
vehicle violations, including two indictments for OUI, third of-
fense, in relation to two separate incidents pending in the District
Court. Each OUI indictment alleged that Dayton had been con-
victed of OUI twice before — in 1988 and in 1989.

The Commonwealth moved for a dangerousness hearing pur-
suant to § 58A. The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that

ey
i)
nr

477 Mass. 224 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Dayton.

§ 58A permits a dangerousness hearing only after three prior OUI
convictions, not two.

A Superior Court judge initially agreed with the defendant, and
denied the Commonwealth’s motion and its motion for reconsid-
eration. However, the Commonwealth sought review by a single
justice of this court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single
justice ordered the judge to hold the dangerousness hearing, at the
same time acknowledging that the language of § 58A was “un-
clear” and noting that the judge was “not precluded from report-
ing the question to the [Appeals Court].”

After hearing, the judge determined that the defendant was
dangerous within the meaning of § 58A and ordered him held
without bail pending trial. On the defendant’s motion, the judge
reported the following question to the Appeals Court:

“Whether a defendant with two prior convictions for [OUT],
pursuant to G. L. c. 90, [§ 24 (1) (a) (1)], who is arrested and
charged with [OUI], [t]hird [o]ffense, may be held without
the right to bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, [§ 58A (1)].”

Before the question was resolved, the defendant pleaded guilty to
the eight pending charges." We subsequently transferred the re-
ported question to this court on our motion.

Discussion. Primarily, the Commonwealth argues that the OUI
clause of §58A, and our cases discussing it, permit pretrial
detention when a defendant has only two prior OUI convictions.
The OUI clause of § 58A provides, in relevant part, that the Com-
monwealth may seek detention based on dangerousness when a
defendant is “arrested and charged with . . . a third or subsequent
conviction for a violation of [G. L. c. 90, § 24].” G. L. c. 276,
§ 58A (1).

We begin with the language of the statute itself, and “presume,
as we must, that the Legislature intended what the words of the
statute say.” Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713
(2009). “[C]lear and unambiguous” statutory language must be
given its ordinary meaning (citation omitted). Williamson, supra.

‘Of course, the defendant's plea rendered the reported question moot because
it ended his period of pretrial detention. Regardless, we will answer the question
because it is important to the administration of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and is likely
to recur, yet evade appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Murchison, 428
Mass. 303, 305 (1998).

226 477 Mass. 224 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Dayton.

However, where the language of a criminal statute plausibly can
be found ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that the defendant
receive the benefit of the ambiguity.2 Commonwealth vy. Con-
stantino, 443 Mass. 521, 525 (2005).

The OUI clause of § 58A is ambiguous. Even setting aside the
significant syntactical defects that arise when the OUI clause is
read in the entire context of § 58A (1), we do not know what it
means to be “arrested and charged with” a “conviction.” G. L.
c. 276, § 58A (1). This formulation is at war with itself. Although
it hardly needs explication, being “arrested” and “charged” with
a crime is wholly distinct from a “conviction” for that crime. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 130 (10th ed. 2014) (“arrest” is “the
apprehension of someone for the purpose of securing the admin-
istration of the law, esp. of bringing that person before a court”);
id. at 282 (“charge” is “[a] formal accusation of an offense as a
preliminary step to prosecution”); id. at 408 (“conviction” con-
templates “the state of having been proved guilty”). Given this
ambiguity, we interpret § 58A as requiring three, not two, prior
OUI convictions.*

In essence, the Commonwealth asks the court to avoid this
ambiguity by performing surgery on the OUI clause — removing
the words “conviction for a” and leaving behind “arrested and
charged with . . . a third or subsequent . . . [OUT] violation.” This
we cannot do. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620,
623 (2012) (when interpreting statute, no words are to be re-
garded as superfluous). The defendant, on the other hand, pro-
poses that the plain language of the OUI clause contemplates a
situation where an indictment for OUI, fourth offense, “charges”
a defendant with his three prior OUI convictions. Although that
suggestion seems plausible based on the indictments in this case,
the language of § 58A leaves us unsure whether this is really what
the Legislature had in mind. In any event, it comports with our

2We recognize that § 58A is not a “criminal” statute in the sense of enumer-
ating the elements of a particular crime. However, it applies only where some-
one has been charged with a crime, and it opens the door to a potentially severe
curtailment of a defendant’s liberty pending trial. See generally G. L: c. 276,
§ 8A. See also Commonwealth v. Madden, 458 Mass. 607, 610 (2010) (§ 58A
contemplates “increasingly graduated levels of restraint”), Therefore, the rule of
lenity applies.

3Of course, the Legislature is free to change § 58A if it disagrees with our
interpretation, and, indeed, revisions for the sake of clarity would be welcome.
Cf. Commonwealth y, LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 825 (2016) (Gants, C.J., con
curring).

477 Mass. 224 (2017) 227

Commonwealth ¥. Dayton.

conclusion under lenity principles.

The Commonwealth also argues that its interpretation finds
support from a comparative reading alongside the other predicate
offenses in § 58A, as well as alongside the “escalating penalty
structure” for OUI, third offense, in G. L. c. 90, § 24. However,
these provisions deepen, rather than resolve, the ambiguity. For
instance, the increasing penalties for OUI offenses can just as
easily be read as support for the defendant’s position — that only
when a defendant reoffends after facing the more severe penalties
attached to a third OUI conviction is the defendant dangerous
enough to potentially merit pretrial detention. This argument also
mistakenly assumes that § 58A is punitive in nature, when instead
it presumes a defendant’s innocence and focuses on protecting
the public and ensuring the defendant’s appearance at trial. See
Commonwealth v. Madden, 458 Mass. 607, 610 (2010).

Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the Commonwealth points out
that this court has, on two prior occasions, appeared to endorse
the Commonwealth’s reading of § S8A. See Commonwealth v.
Young, 453 Mass. 707, 715-716 (2009) (pretrial detention pos-
sible when individual is arrested and charged with violation “that
could result in a third or subsequent [OUT] conviction”); Common-
wealth v. Dodge, 428 Mass. 860, 864 n.7 (1999) (§ 58A “specif-
ically includes charges that could result in a third or subsequent
[OUI] conviction”). The Commonwealth concedes that this lan-
guage in Young and Dodge was “initially dicta.” However, it
argues that the Legislature, by readopting § 58A in the wake of
those cases — and without changing the OUI clause — has
adopted our dicta.

This argument fails. The Commonwealth is correct that we
“presume that when the Legislature amends a statute it is ‘aware
of the prior state of the law as explicated by the decisions of this
court,’ . . . and where it has reenacted statutory language without
material change, [the Legislature is] ‘presumed to have adopted
the judicial construction put upon it’ ” (citations omitted). Com-
monwealth vy. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812 (2007). However,
where the Commonwealth agrees that this court has discussed the
relevant language of the statute only in nonbinding dicta, it can
hardly be said that we have “explicated” the statute or put our
“judicial construction” on it — quite the opposite, at least until
today. It is one thing to infer the Legislature’s intent based on an
implied awareness of our express holdings; it is quite another to
infer it based on dictum in our opinions.

228 477 Mass. 224 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Dayton.

Alternatively, the Commonwealth points us toward the residual
clause of § 58A. This clause provides, in relevant part, that the
Commonwealth “may move, based on dangerousness, for an
order of pretrial detention or release on conditions for . . . any
other felony that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person of another may result” (empha-
sis added). G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1). The Commonwealth argues
that even if OUI, third offense, does not trigger § 58A under the
OUI clause, it does so as an “other felony” under the residual
clause.

We are not persuaded by this argument. We have already
concluded that the OUI clause of § 58A is ambiguous such that
the rule of lenity necessitates an interpretation requiring three,
and not two, prior OUI convictions. To then interpret the residual
clause as permitting the application of § 58A based on just two
prior OUI convictions would defeat the application of the rule of
lenity in this case, and we decline to do so. Relatedly, the
Commonwealth’s reading of the residual clause conflicts with the
principle of statutory construction that where the Legislature used
specific language in one part of an enactment (here, the OUI
clause), but not in another (here, the residual clause), the lan-
guage should not be implied where it is not present. See Dodge,
428 Mass. at 865. In other words, it would make little sense for
the Legislature to adopt a statute that in one clause specifically
requires three prior OUI convictions as a prerequisite, but then,
via a residual clause, requires only two prior OUI convictions as
a prerequisite. Because “we shall not construe a statute . . . to
produce absurd results” (citation omitted), Commonwealth v.
Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 745 (2009), we decline to adopt the
Commonwealth’s alternative argument.

Conclusion. For the reasons discussed, the reported question is
answered in the negative.

So ordered.

Lowy, J. (dissenting). I disagree with the court’s reading of
G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1). As indicated by our prior interpretations
of this provision, I do not believe that the statutory language
presents the degree of ambiguity suggested by the court.

The relevant portion of the statute provides, “The commonwealth
may move, based on dangerousness, for an order of pretrial de-

477 Mass. 224 (2017) 229

Commonwealth ¥. Dayton.

tention or release on conditions for . . . arrested and charged with .. .
a third or subsequent conviction for a violation of [G. L. c. 90,
§ 24].” Although it is true that a person cannot be “arrested and
charged with” a conviction, I disagree with the court that the
language is so ambiguous that the provision “is at war with itself.”
Ante at 226. Rather, I believe it is apparent that the Legislature
intended to enable the Commonwealth to seek pretrial detention for
individuals who were “arrested and charged with” what could be
their third OUI conviction.

Indeed, this is precisely how this court has interpreted the
provision in the past, albeit in dicta. In Commonwealth v. Young,
453 Mass. 707, 715 (2009), we wrote that pretrial detention is
available when the individual has committed an offense that
“evinces a disregard for the safety and well-being of others.” As
an example, we stated that “the Commonwealth may seek pretrial
detention if an individual has been arrested and charged with a
violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24, that could result in a third or
subsequent conviction of operating while under the influence”
(emphasis added). Id. at 715-716. See Commonwealth v. Dodge,
428 Mass. 860, 864 n.7 (1999) (grounds for pretrial detention
“specifically include[ ] charges that could result in a third or
subsequent conviction for operating [a motor vehicle] while un-
der the influence of liquor” [emphasis added]). I believe that we
made these observations in dicta because they reflect a common-
sense understanding of the statute.

Because I interpret § 58A (1) to allow for the Commonwealth
to seek pretrial detention for individuals arrested and charged
with what could be the third or subsequent OUI conviction, I
respectfully dissent.

230 477 Mass. 230 (2017)

Rockland Trust Company »: Langone.

Rock.anp Trust Company vs. Ropert J. LANGoneE.
Suffolk. February 7, 2017. - June 1, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., LENK, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 10.

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Civil,
Counterclaim and cross-claim, Motion to dismiss. District Court, Jurisdic~
tion, One-trial system.

This court concluded that a District Court judge, pursuant to G. L. ¢. 218, §§ 19
and 19A, may not grant a plaintiff's motion to dismiss a compulsory
counterclaim under Mass R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (10), as appearing in 450 Mass.
1403 (2008), because the counterclaim is reasonably likely to result in the
recovery of more than $25,000, where the plain meaning of the term “plain-
tiff? in §§ 19 and 19A does not include plaintiffs-in-counterclaim [231-233],
and where allowing the District Court to proceed with a counterclaim that
exceeds the procedural amount in § 19 is consistent with the Legislative
intent behind the one-trial system and this court’s prior interpretation of the
enacting legislation [233-236].

Civit action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk on January 6, 2016.

The case was considered by Spina, J.

Jason W. Morgan for the plaintiff.

Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant.

Lowy, J. The question before us is whether, pursuant to G. L.
c. 218, §§ 19 and 19A, a District Court judge may grant a
plaintiff's motion to dismiss a compulsory counterclaim under
Mass R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (10), as appearing in 450 Mass. 1403
(2008), because the counterclaim is reasonably likely to result in
the recovery of more than $25,000. We conclude that the judge
may not.

Background. The dispute between the parties stems from two
promissory notes executed in 1984 and 1987 to Rockland Trust
Company (Rockland) from the Aunyx Corporation, of which the
defendant, Robert Langone, was a former officer and principal
owner. Alleging that Langone was a guarantor for the notes,
Rockland sued Langone in the District Court in 2003, after
Aunyx defaulted. Langone filed counterclaims asserting damages
of $6,500. Initially, Rockland prevailed, but, for reasons not rele-
vant here, the judgment was later vacated in 2014.

477 Mass. 230 (2017) 231

Rockland Trust Company »: Langone.

Subsequently, Langone brought an additional counterclaim,
asserting damages of $110,000. Citing rule 12 (b) (10), and G. L.
c. 218, §§ 19 and 19A (b), Rockland moved to dismiss the
counterclaim! arguing that the District Court could not proceed
with a counterclaim in excess of $25,000.2 The judge denied the
motion, concluding that she had discretion to retain the case.
Rockland appealed to a single justice of the county court under
G. L. c. 211, § 3, who denied its petition without a hearing.
Rockland appealed to the full court.

“Because the issue raised relates to the efficient administration
of justice in the trial courts, we have elected to decide the case
under our power of general superintendence, G. L. c. 211, § 3,
second par.” Sperounes v. Farese, 449 Mass. 800, 802 (2007). We
affirm the single justice’s denial of Rockland’s petition.

Discussion. Generally, the District Court may proceed with a
case “only if there is no reasonable likelihood that recovery by
the plaintiff will exceed $25,000.” G. L. c. 218, § 19.8 See G. L.
c. 218, § 19A (b).4 This limitation is, however, merely procedural,
not jurisdictional. Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 806-807. See G. L.

"The parties do not address whether Langone’ s counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive, Langone’s allegation of fraud, seeking $110,000, stems from pur-
ported collaboration between Rockland and another Aunyx employee to issue a
“loan proceeds check payable to [the employee], instead of Aunyx.” It appears
that the loan proceeds check relates to the same promissory notes at issue in
Rockland’s allegations. Accordingly, we treat Langone’s counterclaim as com-
pulsory and do not address the application of Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (10), as
appearing in 450 Mass. 1403 (2008), and G. L. c, 218, §§ 19 and 19A, in the
context of permissive counterclaims.

2The parties do not dispute that Langone is reasonably likely to receive more
than $25,000 should he prevail on the counterclaim, See G. L. c. 218, § 19.

3General Laws c. 218, § 19, provides, in relevant part:

“Except as otherwise provided by law, the [Dlistrict [C]ourt and Boston
[Municipal [Court [Departments shall have original jurisdiction of civil
actions for money damages. The actions may proceed in the courts only if
there is no reasonable likelihood that recovery by the plaintiff will exceed
$25,000, or an amount ordered from time to time by the [SJupreme
[Judicial [CJourt.”

4General Laws c. 218, § 19A (b), provides, in relevant part:

“If it appears to the court from the statement of damages by the plaintiff
that there is no reasonable likelihood that the estimated damages will be
consistent with the civil money damage limits of the court, as set forth in
[8] 19, the judge, after receiving written responses from the parties and
after a hearing, if requested by any party, may dismiss the case without
prejudice for failure to comply with the requirements of said [§] 19

nN
o
ie)

477 Mass. 230 (2017)

Rockland Trust Company »: Langone.

c. 218, § 19 (vesting District Court with “original jurisdiction of
civil actions for money damages,” but providing that actions
“may proceed” only if no reasonable likelihood plaintiff will
recover more than $25,000). If a defendant makes a timely
objection to a plaintiff's claim that is reasonably likely to obtain
more than $25,000, the judge must dismiss the claim without
prejudice. Sperounes, supra. If, however, the defendant does not
assert the procedural limit as a defense in a timely manner, the
District Court judge may, in his or her discretion, retain the case.
Id. at 807.5

Rockland contends that a District Court judge may not proceed
with a compulsory counterclaim in excess of the $25,000 proce-
dural amount set forth in § 19 when the amount is timely asserted
as a defense. Because the procedural amount in § 19 applies to
the potential recovery “by the plaintiff.” Rockland’s argument
requires interpreting “plaintiff” to include a plaintiff-in-counter-
claim. G. L. c. 218, § 19. We decline to adopt this interpretation.
Based on the plain language of the statute and the legislative
history of the one-trial system in Massachusetts, we conclude that
the Legislature intended for the District Court to proceed with
cases properly before it, even if a compulsory counterclaim
exceeds the procedural amount of § 19.

1. Plain meaning of §§ 19 and 19A. Whether $§ 19 and 19A
require dismissal of counterclaims seeking more than $25,000 in
the District Court is a question of statutory interpretation, which
we review de novo. Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 209 (2016).
Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to “effectuate the
intent of the Legislature in enacting” the statute (citation omit-
ted). Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. v. Secretary of the Common-
wealth, 462 Mass. 538, 550 (2012). “The language of a statute is
interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, and if the
language is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the
intent of the legislature” (citation omitted). Meikle, supra at 210.

“Plaintiff,” as the term is ordinarily used, does not include
plaintiffs-in-counterclaim. The plain meaning of the term “plain-
tiff’ is “[t]he party who brings a civil suit in a court of law.”

regarding the amount necessary for proceeding in the [DJistrict [C]ourt or
Boston [Municipal [Court [D]epartments.”
®The parties also dispute whether Rockland’s assertion of the procedural
amount defense was timely. Because we conclude the rule 12 (b) (10) motion
was properly denied on other grounds, infra, it is unnecessary to resolve the
timeliness of Rockland’s response.

477 Mass. 230 (2017) 233

Rockland Trust Company »: Langone.

Black’s Law Dictionary 1336 (10th ed. 2014). Where a defendant
files a compulsory counterclaim against a plaintiff, the plaintiff is
still the individual responsible for initiating the suit.

Further, when the Legislature has intended to address plaintiffs-
in-counterclaim, it has done so explicitly. For example, in G. L.
c. 21E, § 4A (h), the Legislature defined “plaintiff” to include an
“original plaintiff, third-party plaintiff, plaintiff-in-counterclaim
and plaintiff-in-crossclaim.” Similarly, in G. L. c. 231, § 104,
where the Legislature made removal procedures available to a
plaintiff-in-counterclaim,® the Legislature explicitly referred to a
“plaintiff against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim”
had been brought. By contrast, § 19 refers only to “the plaintiff.”
Because of the ordinary meaning of “plaintiff” and because the
Legislature has specified when procedural rules should apply to
plaintiffs-in-counterclaim, we do not interpret the plain meaning
of § 19 to include plaintiffs-in-counterclaim.”

2. Legislative intent of the one-trial system. Allowing the
District Court to proceed with a counterclaim that exceeds the
procedural amount in § 19 is consistent with the Legislative intent
behind the one-trial system and our prior interpretation of the
enacting legislation.

In 2004, the Legislature enacted a Statewide “one-trial system
for civil cases.” Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 800, citing St. 2004,
c. 252. The one-trial system took effect gradually, at first appli-
cable only in select counties, and eventually expanded to apply

®As discussed infra, the Legislature has since rendered this mechanism for
removal unavailable.

7Rockland also argues rule 12 (b) (10) explicitly applies to counterclaims. We
disagree. First, rule 12 (b) (10) allows, in relevant part, a motion to dismiss
based on an “{i]mproper amount of damages . . . in the District Court as set forth
inG. L.c. 218, § 19.” Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (10). The basis for dismissal under
rule 12 (b) (10) is coextensive with § 19. Thus, because our interpretation of
“plaintiff” in § 19 does not include plaintifis-in-counterclaim, neither does rule
12 (b) (10). Second, this interpretation does not render meaningless the refer-
ence to counterclaims in rule 12 (b), as suggested by Rockland. By stating that
the defenses enumerated in rule 12 (b) may be used in defense of various claims,
including counterclaims, rule 12 (b) does not purport to expand the circum-
stances in which each defense may apply. Rather, rule 12 (b) allows a party to
assert by motion one of the enumerated defenses when the defense is substan-
tively available. Because rule 12 (b) (10) is coextensive with § 19, a motion to
dismiss pursuant to rule 12 (b) (10) is not substantively available for counter
claims, The term “counterclaim” is not rendered meaningless in rule 12 (b)
because one of the ten enumerated defenses does not apply to compulsory
counterclaims.

234 477 Mass. 230 (2017)

Rockland Trust Company »: Langone.

Statewide. See Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627, 632
n.7 (2003). See also St. 1996, c. 358; St. 2000, c. 142; St. 2002,
c. 70; St. 2004, c. 252. The “intent or purpose of the one-trial
system [is] to increase the efficacy of trials in the District and
Superior Courts over the inefficient remand-removal system that
had previously been in effect.” Zizza v. Zizza, 456 Mass. 401, 407
(2010).

One of the primary mechanisms for increasing the efficiency of
trials is the expansion of the jurisdiction of the District Court. The
one-trial system gives the District Court “the same equitable
powers and jurisdiction as is provided for the [S]uperior [C]ourt”
for cases that were previously subject to the remand-removal
system. Herman v. Home Depot, 436 Mass. 210, 214 (2002). See
Ravnikar, 438 Mass. at 634 (“[T]he District Court may exercise
the same equitable powers and jurisdiction as the Superior Court
to resolve the entire case”). The one-trial system further autho-
rizes the District Court to hold jury trials, with six jurors. See
G. L. c. 218, § 19B (a).

In enacting the jurisdiction of the District Court as part of the
one-trial system, the Legislature rendered certain provisions of
the remand-removal system, including G. L. c. 231, § 104, no
longer applicable. See St. 2004 c. 252, §22 (G. L. c. 231,
§§ 102C, 103, 104, 104A, 106, and 107, “shall not apply to civil
actions commenced in the [D]istrict [C]ourt, Boston [M]unicipal
[C]ourt, and [Superior [C]ourt [D]epartments on or after August
31, 2004’”).* Section 104 allowed, among other things, a plaintiff
against whom a counterclaim was brought, or a defendant asserting
a compulsory counterclaim, to “file in the [D]istrict [CJourt ...a
claim of trial by the [SJuperior [C]ourt,” if the counterclaim
exceeded $25,000. G. L. c. 231, § 104. On receiving a timely
request, the District Court clerk transmitted the papers and fees to
the clerk of the Superior Court for the case to “proceed as though
then originally entered there.” Jd. If the right of removal was “not
properly exercised [the case was] tried in the [D]istrict [C]ourt.”
Id.

By rendering § 104 no longer applicable to the one-trial sys-
tem, the Legislature eliminated the mechanism by which a de-
fendant-in-counterclaim (i.e., the plaintiff) could remove a suit to
the Superior Court because the counterclaim sought more than

®The one-trial system as set forth in St. 2004, c, 252, § 23, applies to all
proceedings in the enumerated trial court departments subsequent to August 31,
2004, even if the suit commenced before 2004.

477 Mass. 230 (2017)

Rockland Trust Company »: Langone.

$25,000. In St. 1996, c. 358, § 8, the Legislature made clear its
intention that such cases proceed in the District Court by stating
that, in the applicable counties, all such actions that were “for-
merly subject to . .. removal and appeal, pursuant to [G. L. c. 231,
§§ 97-107],° shall be subject to one trial, with or without a jury of
six, in the [D]istrict [CJourt’ (emphasis added). See St. 2000,
c. 142 (expanding effect of St. 1996, c. 358, to additional coun-
ties); St. 2002, c. 70 (same). In 2004, the Legislature rendered
§ 104 inapplicable throughout the Commonwealth. St. 2004,
c. 252, § 22. Accordingly, if grounds for removal would have
existed under the remand-removal system, which included § 104,
the Legislature’s explicit command now requires that, under the
one-trial system, the case proceed in the District Court.

This interpretation is also supported by the expansion of Dis-
trict Court’s jurisdiction as part of the enactment of the one-trial
system. See Ravnikar, 438 Mass. at 633-634. Significantly, § 19
grants the District Court original jurisdiction of all “civil actions
for money damages,” and only procedurally limits claims in
excess of $25,000. G. L. c. 218, § 19. See Sperounes, 449 Mass.
at 806. It follows that the Legislature intended the District Court
to have the ability to try cases in which a counterclaim seeks more
than $25,000. We have also interpreted the one-trial system to
allow the District Court to decide a claim “which would normally
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court, as
long as at least one other claim in the same action is within the
traditional jurisdiction of the District Court.” Ravnikar, supra at
634.

Under the old remand-removal system of G. L. c. 231,
Rockland would have been able to remove the case, pursuant to
§ 104, to the Superior Court based on Langone’s compulsory
counterclaim seeking more than $25,000. Pursuant to the one-
trial system, however, the Legislature intended that such claims
remain in the District Court. Further, requiring the District Court
to dismiss Langone’s counterclaim and refile it in the Superior
Court “would create ‘the anomalous situation of requiring bifur-
cated claims,’ at the District Court and Superior Court levels,
‘with separate trials and appeals.’ ” Ravnikar, 438 Mass. at 634,

nN
wo
a

"Prior to St. 2004, c. 252, the one-trial system legislation rendered G. L.
c. 231, §§ 97-107, ineffective. St. 1996, c. 358, § 8. That act rendered G. L.
c. 231, §§ 102C, 103, 104, 104A, 106, and 107, inoperable, while making
modifications to other sections of the former remand-removal system. See, e.g.,
St. 2004, ¢, 252, §§ 13, 14.

236 477 Mass. 230 (2017)

Rockland Trust Company »: Langone.

quoting Herman, 436 Mass. at 215.*° Such a requirement cannot
be reconciled with the Legislature’s goal of a “one-trial system.”
Zizza, 456 Mass. at 407.

Conclusion. Given the plain language of §§ 19 and 19A and the
purpose of the one-trial system, the District Court may proceed
with a case properly before it, where a counterclaim exceeds the
$25,000 procedural limit. We therefore affirm the single justice’s
denial of Rockland’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.

So ordered.

10Rockland argues that the Superior Court would have the ability to consoli-
date the smaller, original claim from the District Court with the Superior Court
claim. Although Rockland did not specify the appropriate mechanism, counsel
appears to have been referring to G. L. c. 223, § 2B. Section 2B provides that
the Superior Court “may” order the transfer of an action from the District Court
if the actions are “between the same parties” and “aris[e] out of ... the same...
event or transaction” (emphasis added). G. L. c. 233, § 2B. Section 2B presumes
that the separate claims are already filed in different trial court departments and
cannot be fairly read to require dismissal of a properly joined compulsory
counterclaim pending in a single trial court department, so that the counterclaim
may be refiled in another. Further, the transfer rule under § 2B is permissive, not
mandatory, meaning that Rockland’s interpretation could result in two actions
stemming from the same facts proceeding in separate departments of the trial
court. Such a possibility is plainly contrary to the Legislature’s goal to increase
-y and the expansion of the District Court’s jurisdiction under the
ial system. See Zizza, 456 Mass. at 407.

477 Mass. 237 (2017) 237

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

ComMonweatrH VS. GABRIEL CoRDERO.
Berkshire, February 14, 2017, - June 1, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Luvx, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable sus-
picion, Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Reason-
able suspicion. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Controlled Sub-
stances.

A Superior Court judge erred in denying a criminal defendant's pretrial motion
to suppress evidence seized by a police officer from the trunk of the defend-
ant’s vehicle during a routine traffic stop, where, although the officer was
authorized to stop the defendant for civil traffic infractions and to conduct a
related roadside investigation [241-242], the officer did not have a legitimate
basis to further detain the defendant in order to investigate unrelated criminal
drug activity, in that reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in
such activity could not arise from the defendant’s nervousness and evasive
ness, the officer’s opinion that the location of the stop was a major drug
source city, or the defendant’s prior convictions [243-247].

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on May 11, 2015.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John A.
Agostini, J.

An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal
was allowed by Duffly, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the
Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an applica-
tion for direct appellate review.

Merritt Schnipper for the defendant.

Joseph G.A. Coliflores, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Gaziano, J. We address in this case the authority of a police
officer to prolong a routine traffic stop in order to investigate
suspected, unrelated criminal activity. The defendant argues that
State police troopers and local police officers unreasonably de-
tained him beyond the time required to accomplish the purposes
of a traffic stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Dec-

238 477 Mass. 237 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

laration of Rights, and thus that evidence seized from the trunk of
his vehicle must be suppressed. The Commonwealth contends, in
contrast, that an officer is not required to ignore incriminating
facts that arise during the traffic stop, and that the facts gave rise
to a reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was
engaged in criminal activity. After a Superior Court judge denied
the defendant’s motion to suppress, a single justice of this court
allowed the defendant’s motion for interlocutory review by the
Appeals Court, and we allowed the defendant’s application for
direct appellate review. We conclude that once a police officer has
completed the investigation of a defendant’s civil traffic viola-
tions, and the facts do not give rise to reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, the officer is required to permit the defendant to
drive away. Therefore, we reverse the order denying the defend-
ant’s motion to suppress.!

1. Facts. We present the facts as found by the motion judge,
supplemented by uncontroverted testimony at the motion hearing.
Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450
Mass. 818 (2008). On the evening of February 19, 2015, at
approximately 6:50 pm., as State police Trooper Noah Pack left
the Massachusetts Turnpike in Lee, he observed a Toyota Camry
being driven ahead of him with broken tail and brake lights. He
also noticed that the vehicle’s windows were illegally tinted. Pack
did not immediately stop the vehicle. Rather, he followed it while
driving along Route 20, through Lee and Lenox, for approxi-
mately five miles.

While he followed the vehicle, Pack used his onboard computer
to determine that the vehicle was owned by and registered to the
defendant. He also learned that the defendant’s driver’s license
was current and valid and that the vehicle was properly regis-
tered, inspected, and insured. Further, he obtained a photograph
and other biographical information of the defendant, and learned

1We need not reach the defendant’s second argument, that the Common-
wealth failed to prove that he unambiguously and voluntarily consented to the
search of the trunk of his vehicle. “Where the defendant seeks to suppress
information obtained after unlawful police conduct, the issue is whether the
evidence challenged has been obtained by exploiting the illegality.” Common-
wealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 458-459 (1985), citing Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S, 471, 488 (1963). Because we conclude that the prolonged
seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional, any consent given during the
illegal seizure was invalid. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 163
(1997) (“consent obtained during an illegal detention is ineffective to justify an
otherwise invalid search”).

477 Mass. 237 (2017) 239

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

that there were no warrants for the defendant’s arrest and that the
defendant had no pending criminal charges. Pack also discovered
that the defendant lived in Holyoke,? had been convicted of
charges of firearms violations, drug offenses, and assault and
battery on a police officer, and had been incarcerated for the
drug-related convictions.

Pack stopped the vehicle, approached the driver’s side, and
asked the defendant to roll down the window. The trooper ob-
served that the driver appeared to be the person in the Registry of
Motor Vehicles photograph and that another man was seated in
the passenger seat. Pack asked the defendant for his driver’s
license and registration.

While the defendant looked for these items, the trooper noticed
that he seemed to be “extremely nervous,” not making eye con-
tact, stuttering when he answered questions, and offering infor-
mation unrelated to the stop.? Pack asked the defendant “what
brought him out this way” and “where he was coming from.” The
defendant answered that he was headed to a chain restaurant “up
the road.” Pack did not believe this statement because, while he
had been following the defendant, they had driven past one such
restaurant in Lee, and because the defendant had not specified the
location of the restaurant where he was headed. When asked
where he was coming from, the defendant said that he had been
at his cousin’s house “just behind him.” Given that Pack had been
following the defendant for more than five miles, he also doubted
this explanation.

The defendant produced his driver’s license but could not
locate the vehicle’s registration. The trooper asked the passenger
for identification, and returned to his cruiser to run a records
check on that information. Once inside the cruiser, Pack “called
for assistance” and waited in his cruiser until a second trooper
arrived “a few minutes later.”

After the arrival of a second trooper, Pack returned to the
defendant’s vehicle “to test the window tint and have a brief
conversation with [the defendant].” Proffering some paperwork,
the defendant said that the brake light was out because he recently

2Based on his law enforcement experience, the trooper believed that Holyoke
is a “major drug source city” and that a “good percentage of the drugs coming
into Berkshire County” came from Holyoke.

®The trooper testified that the defendant “was very talkative in that he offered
his own speech about his own issues and what I perceived as an attempt to
control the conversation and distract me.”

240 477 Mass. 237 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

had been in an accident; he asked to get out of his vehicle to look
at the tail light. The two went to the rear of the vehicle, where
Pack pointed out the damaged lights and tested the vehicle’s
window tint.

Pack then told the defendant that he was “confused by [the
defendant’s] travel for the day” and questioned the defendant,
who continued to show signs of nervousness, about his travels. In
response, the defendant said that he was going to see a friend, but
did not provide the friend’s name. Pack told the defendant that he
suspected the defendant of drug activity and asked for permission
to search the vehicle. The defendant said that he did not have any
drugs in the vehicle and that “it ain’t got to be like that.” Pack
interpreted this remark as a refusal of consent. He left the de-
fendant standing with the second trooper at the rear of the vehicle
and went to question the passenger. When the passenger also
showed signs of nervousness and gave a different account of
where the two had been that the trooper did not believe, he called
over the police radio for a canine to be brought to the location to
conduct a drug sniff.

Pack testified that, while they were waiting, the defendant
asked the second trooper whether he could sit in the police cruiser
to get out of the cold. Pack testified that the second trooper told
the defendant that he could do so, but first would be required to
submit to a patfrisk and then be handcuffed; the second trooper
said that the defendant consented. A frisk of the defendant re-
vealed $1,900 in cash in one of his pockets. After he had been
handcuffed and placed in the back of the cruiser, the defendant
told the second trooper that there was some marijuana in the
glove box. Pack asked for permission to retrieve the marijuana
from the vehicle, and did so after the defendant agreed.‘

Eventually, a Pittsfield police officer arrived on the scene. The
officer asked the defendant if he would consent to a search of the
trunk. The defendant responded only that he wanted to go home
to his children. The officer asked a second time for the defend-
ant’s consent to search, and the defendant responded that all he
had in his trunk was a plastic bag of clothes. When, for a third
time, the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, according
to the officer, the defendant “gave consent for it.”

After a search of the vehicle’s trunk revealed roughly 2,000
bags of what the officers believed to be heroin, the defendant was

4The amount of marijuana in the vehicle was not criminal.

477 Mass. 237 (2017) 241

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

placed under arrest. The entire duration of the roadside stop was
between forty and forty-five minutes.

The defendant was charged with trafficking in heroin, G. L.
c. 94C, § 32E (c); distribution of a class A substance as a sub-
sequent offender, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b); motor vehicle lights
violations, G. L. c. 90, § 7; and nontransparent window obstruc-
tion, G. L. c. 90, § 9D. The defendant was arraigned and filed a
motion to suppress evidence seized from him during the traffic
stop. A Superior Court judge denied the defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during the traffic stop.

2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. “In reviewing a ruling on
a motion to suppress evidence, we accept the judge’s subsidiary
findings of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the
responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be
given . . . testimony presented at the motion hearing. . . . We
review independently the application of constitutional principles
to the facts found” (quotations and citations omitted). Common-
wealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016). See Commonwealth
v. Cassino, 474 Mass. 85, 88 (2016) (“We make an independent
determination of the correctness of the judge’s application of
constitutional principles” [quotations and citation omitted]).

b. Permissible bounds of a routine traffic stop. A routine traffic
stop may not last longer than “reasonably necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop” (citation omitted). Amado, 474 Mass. at
151. “It is well settled that a police inquiry in a routine traffic stop
must end [when the purpose of the stop is accomplished] unless
the police have grounds for inferring that ‘either the operator or
his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime . . . or
engaged in other suspicious conduct’ ” (citation omitted). Com-
monwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 (1997). See Common-
wealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999) (“Citizens do not
expect that police officers handling a routine traffic violation will
engage . . . in stalling tactics, obfuscation, strained conversation,
or unjustified exit orders, to prolong the seizure in the hope that,
sooner or later, the stop might yield up some evidence of an
arrestable crime”).

In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015),
the United States Supreme Court held that “the tolerable duration
of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the
seizure’s ‘mission’ to address the traffic violation that warranted
the stop.” See United States vy. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985);
Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 80 n.9 (2005), cert.

242 477 Mass. 237 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

denied, 546 U.S. 1187 (2006) (“It goes without saying that the
driver cannot be held indefinitely until all avenues of possible
inquiry have been tried and exhausted”). Police authority to seize
an individual ends “when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are —
or reasonably should have been — completed.” Rodriguez, supra.
The police do not earn “bonus time” to conduct additional inves-
tigations by an expeditious performance of the traffic-related
investigation. The reasonableness of the stop depends on what the
police, in fact, do to complete the purpose of the stop. Id. at 1616.

Here, it is undisputed that the trooper was authorized to stop the
defendant for civil traffic infractions. See Amado, 474 Mass. at
151 (“Where the police have observed a traffic violation, they are
warranted in stopping a vehicle” [citation omitted]); Common-
wealth v. Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644 (1980) (same). The trooper
also was justified in conducting a roadside investigation related to
the broken tail and brake lights, and the impermissible degree of
the window tint. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (“A seizure
for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that vio-
lation”). The stop of the defendant’s vehicle, however, could not
last “longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the stop” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass.
459, 465 (2011).

By the time the trooper stopped the defendant’s vehicle, he had
acquired information from his onboard computer concerning the
vehicle (i.e., that it was properly registered and insured) and the
registered owner of the vehicle (i.e., that the defendant was a
licensed operator who had no outstanding warrants). Thereafter,
the trooper’s roadside investigation reasonably included confir-
mation of the identity of the driver, testing the percentage of the
vehicle’s window tint, and writing citations for the motor vehicle
violations. See Torres, 424 Mass. at 163 (investigation of routine
traffic stop ends when purpose of stop is accomplished).

Once the defendant got out of his vehicle and the trooper
finished testing the window tint and discussing with the defendant
the broken tail and brake lights, these tasks were completed.
Accordingly, because “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when
tasks tied to the traffic infraction are — or reasonably should have
been — completed,” the investigation that followed was unrea-
sonable unless supported by additional justification. See Rodri-
guez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. See also Torres, 424 Mass. at 158
(police inquiry in routine traffic stop must end upon production of
valid license and registration).

477 Mass. 237 (2017) 243

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

c. Reasonable suspicion to extend investigation. We turn next
to consider whether, after the trooper had finished discussing the
broken vehicle lights and window tint with the defendant, the
trooper had reasonable suspicion to justify his investigation of
criminal drug activity.

“In order to expand a threshold inquiry of a motorist and
prolong his detention, an officer must reasonably believe that
there is further criminal conduct afoot, and that belief must be
based on ‘specific and articulable facts and the specific reasona-
ble inferences which follow from such facts in light of the
officer’s experience’ ” (citation omitted). Feyenord, 445 Mass. at
77° “The dispositive issue, therefore, is whether, after [the de-
fendant] had complied with the usual requirements associated
with a [traffic code] violation, a legally sufficient basis existed, in
terms of reasonable suspicion grounded in specific, articulable
facts... .” Torres, 424 Mass. at 158.

When the trooper finished discussing with the defendant the
broken lights and the window tint, the facts known to the trooper
did not provide reasonable suspicion for a drug investigation. At
that point, the trooper knew the following: the vehicle was owned
by and registered to the defendant; the defendant’s driver's li-
cense was current and valid and the vehicle was properly regis-
tered, inspected, and insured; there were no outstanding warrants
for the defendant’s arrest; the driver of the vehicle was its
registered owner;® and the defendant had no pending criminal
charges.”

The Commonwealth’s arguments that the trooper had reason-
able suspicion of drug activity so as to justify further investiga-
tion are unavailing. First, the Commonwealth notes that the
defendant was “extremely nervous, making no eye contact and
stuttering his speech in answering questions,” and offering unre-
lated information to the trooper. That the defendant exhibited
signs of nervousness and evasiveness in the context of an invol-

5While a combination of nonsuspicious facts cumulatively may establish
reasonable suspicion, see Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 541, 545 (1991)
(“a combination of factors that are each innocent of themselves may, when taken
together, amount to the requisite reasonable belief”), “[a] hunch will not suf-
fice.” Commonwealth v, Wren, 391 Mass. 705, 707 (1984).

®The trooper’s onboard computer had provided him with an identifying
photograph of the defendant.

7 The defendant’s failure to produce his registration provided the trooper with
the authority to issue a citation for a fine of thirty-five dollars under G. L. ¢. 90,
§§ 11 and 20, for failure to carry a license or registration certificate.

244 477 Mass. 237 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

untary police encounter cannot, without more, generate reasona-
ble suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 457 Mass. 14, 21
(2010), quoting United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir.
2005) (“Nervousness is a common and entirely natural reaction to
police presence”). See also Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 668-669
(officer's observation that passenger in taxicab was acting ner-
vously did not support reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v.
Evans, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 693 (2015) (“our cases have
consistently held that ‘a defendant’s nervous movements or ap-
pearance alone is insufficient’ to create reasonable suspicion”
[citation omitted]).

Second, the defendant’s evasive answers about where he had
come from and where he was going did not give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity. See Rodriguez, 135
S. Ct. at 1615 (“Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic
ticket, an officer’s mission includes . . . such inquiries . . . [as]
checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the auto-
mobile’s registration and proof of insurance” [citation omitted]).
That the defendant had driven past a building housing one chain
restaurant en route to another such restaurant is innocuous, not
sinister, and the inference to the contrary was unreasonable.
Similarly, the defendant’s statement that he was coming from his
cousin’s house “just behind him,” which the trooper doubted
given that he had followed the vehicle for over five miles, cannot
support reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Warren, 475
Mass. 530, 538 (2016) (“evasive conduct in the absence of any
other information tending toward an individualized suspicion that
the defendant was involved in the crime is insufficient to support
reasonable suspicion”); Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass.
367, 371 (1996) (“Neither evasive behavior, proximity to a crime
scene, nor matching a general description is alone sufficient to
support the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop and
frisk”).

Third, the trooper’s opinion that Holyoke was a “major drug
source city” and that a “good percentage of the drugs coming into
Berkshire County” came from there did not give rise to reason-
able suspicion. The introduction in evidence of the trooper’s
opinion raises the same concerns that we have addressed in the
context of “high crime” neighborhoods. We have held that a “high
crime” neighborhood may be a proper factor in the reasonable
suspicion analysis, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 454 Mass. 159,

tw
s
am

477 Mass. 237 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

163 (2009), but “[jJust being in a high crime area is not enough
to justify a stop.” Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135,
139 (2001). We repeatedly have urged caution in the use of this
consideration, pointing out that “many honest, law-abiding citi-
zens live and work in high-crime areas. Those citizens are entitled
to the protections of the Federal and State Constitutions, despite
the character of the area” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 512 (2009). “The exercise of that caution
necessarily means that we look beyond the term ‘high crime area’
to determine whether the inferences fairly drawn from that char-
acterization ‘demonstrat[e] the reasonableness of the intrusion’ ”
(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 238
(2017).

Similarly, a suspect’s connection to a location that is called a
drug “source city” cannot, standing alone, support reasonable
suspicion. Those traveling from a “source city” comprise “a very
large category of presumably innocent travelers . .. who would be
subject to virtually random seizures” were the “source city”
consideration to justify a seizure. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438, 441 (1980) (per curiam). “[T]ravel from [a source city] can-
not be regarded as in any way suspicious” because “the probabil-
ity that any given . . . passenger from [a source city] is a drug
courier is infinitesimally small. Such a flimsy factor should not be
allowed to justify — or help justify — the stopping of travelers
....” United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 566 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979). See United States v. Lambert, 46
F.3d 1064, 1070-1071 (10th Cir. 1995) (no reasonable suspicion
where only information known to agents was that suspect de-
parted from drug-source city, was flying alone, had one-way
ticket he had purchased with cash, had checked one piece of
luggage, and appeared nervous); United States v. Grant, 920 F.2d
376, 378-379, 384-385 (6th Cir. 1991) (no reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity even though suspect came from “source city”
for drug couriers, appeared nervous, did not produce his plane
ticket on request, and did not have his name on flight manifest);
United States v. White, 890 F2d 1413, 1417-1419 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825 (1990) (no reasonable suspicion to
justify detention of suspect after suspect deplaned from drug-
source city, even though suspect arrived early in morning, pur-
chased one-way ticket with cash, held carry-on bag closely with
both hands, and appeared nervous). See also United States v.
Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 125 (4th Cir. 1991) (source city factor plays
relatively insignificant role in reasonable suspicion analysis).

246 477 Mass. 237 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

Lastly, here, the defendant’s prior convictions, without further
specific and articulable facts indicating that criminal activity was
afoot, could not create reasonable suspicion. While Massachu-
setts courts have commented that “knowledge of a person’s arrest
record or unspecified ‘criminal conduct’ [may] be considered in
a reasonable suspicion evaluation” (citation omitted), further
evidence is required to support reasonable suspicion. Common-
wealth v. Wright, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 383 (2014), and cases
cited. See id. at 384 (vehicle occupants’ prior narcotics convic-
tions, when combined with strong odor of air freshener and
suspect’s use of leased vehicle registered in State where neither
occupant lived, supported reasonable suspicion).

The Commonwealth relies on Feyenord, supra, to justify the
duration and intrusiveness of the search. See J.A. Grasso, Jr. &
C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law
§ 4-5[b] (2017) (“Even during an initially lawful stop, the char-
acter of the stop can change quickly”). The circumstances here,
however, are not akin to those in Feyenord, 445 Mass. at 73,
where the police officer stopped a suspect for a civil traffic
violation. The officer’s investigation of the traffic infraction
evolved into a reasonable investigation of other potential crimes
because the suspect “was unable to produce a [driver’s] license,”
provided a Massachusetts registration that was not in his name,
and gave the officer a false name and birth date. Jd. at 73-74.

The facts in this case differ in two important respects. First,
unlike in Feyenord, 445 Mass. at 78, the trooper’s investigation
of the traffic infraction revealed no facts that were manifestly
suspicious, and, second, the trooper had completed most of his
investigatory tasks before stopping the defendant, thereby reduc-
ing the time necessary for his roadside investigation. See Com-
monwealth vy. Locke, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 497, 501-502 (2016) (no
reasonable suspicion despite odor of unburnt marijuana, presence
of air fresheners, suspect’s nervousness, and fact that passenger
was staring silently ahead); Commonwealth v. Brown, 75 Mass.
App. Ct. 528, 533, 537, 539 (2009) (suspect’s “nervous looks”
and “tense” appearance were “general descriptions [that] fall
short of the ‘specific and articulable facts’ which are required to
demonstrate reasonableness. . . . It is not by itself sufficient that
the point of encounter with police occurs in a high crime area... .
Although in hindsight [the officer’s] hunch proved to be correct,
we view the reasonableness of the search and seizure from the
vantage preceding the discovery of the [evidence], and on that

477 Mass. 237 (2017) 247

Commonwealth ¥. Cordero.

basis the actions of the police here exceeded constitutional
grounds” [quotations and citations omitted]); Commonwealth v.
Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 128 (2005) (no reasonable sus-
picion where suspect did not have his driver’s license or vehicle
registration in his possession, and where stop occurred in high
crime area).

Ultimately, by the time the trooper finished discussing with the
defendant the broken lights and the window tint, the investigation
of the civil traffic violations was complete. Because this investi-
gation did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, the trooper did not have a legitimate basis to detain the
defendant, and the defendant should have been allowed to drive
away. See Torres, 424 Mass. at 163 (continued detention of
defendant and passenger no longer necessary after defendant had
satisfied purpose of stop by producing his license and registra-
tion; therefore, all evidence seized after that point must be sup-
pressed as fruit of poisonous tree).

Order denying defendant's
motion to suppress reversed.

248 477 Mass. 248 (2017)

Commonwealth , Denton,

ComMonwWEALTH vs. Scypio DENTON.
Essex. March 9, 2017, - June 1, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Controlled Substances. Entrapment. Evidence, Prior conviction.

At the trial of indictments charging, inter alia, distribution of heroin, in which
the defendant raised the affirmative defense of entrapment, the judge abused
his discretion in permitting the Commonwealth, over the defendant’s objec-
tion, to respond by introducing evidence of three prior convictions, where,
although the facts in at least two of the prior cases bore a remarkable
similarity to the case at bar, given that the most recent act was at least
nineteen years old, the probative value regarding predisposition did not
outweigh the potential prejudice to the defendant; further, the limiting
instruction to the jury was not sufficient to mitigate the error, [250-252]

Inpicwent found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on February 6, 2014.

The case was tried before James F. Lang, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

James E. Methe for the defendant.

Quentin R. Weld, Assistant District Attorney (Elin H. Graydon,
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

Bupp, J. Following a jury trial, the defendant, Scypio Denton,
was convicted of distribution of heroin, in violation of G. L.
c. 94C, § 32 (6). At trial, the defendant raised the affirmative
defense of entrapment. The judge permitted the Commonwealth
to respond by introducing evidence of three prior convictions,
despite the defendant’s objection that they were too stale to be
probative of his predisposition to commit the crime. The defend-
ant’s principal argument on appeal concerns the decision to admit

*Following his conviction on the substantive crime, the defendant pleaded
guilty to being a subsequent offender. The judge sentenced the defendant to from
three and one-half years to three and one-half years and one day in State prison,
the mandatory minimum sentence for subsequent drug offenders.

477 Mass. 248 (2017) 249

Commonwealth , Denton,

this evidence.? We reverse on that ground.

Background. We recite the facts the jury could have found.

1. 2013 distribution. On December 17, 2013, the defendant was
approached by an undercover police officer posing as a drug
addict.? The officer told the defendant he “was dope sick and. . .
looking to get hooked up . . . because [he] wasn’t feeling well.”
He asked the defendant for “a forty” of “brown”* and explained
that his dealer was not answering his telephone calls because he
owed the dealer money. At the time of the undercover operation,
there was an unwritten rule among drug users that if somebody
was “dope sick” from heroin withdrawal, another user would help
them to find more heroin, as he or she could sympathize with the
feeling.’ The officer believed that this approach for targeting
heroin distribution was successful approximately twenty to thirty
per cent of the time.

The defendant agreed to help, and they got into an unmarked
motor vehicle driven by another undercover officer. While they
were in the vehicle, the defendant used an officer’s cellular
telephone to tell someone that “he wanted to come by and grab a
bag.” They then proceeded to a destination the defendant gave
them. When they arrived, an officer gave the defendant forty
dollars and took the defendant’s cellular telephone as collateral.
The defendant entered a building and returned with a bag of a tan
powdered substance, which he gave to the officer who claimed to
be “dope sick.” One of the officers gave the defendant five dollars
in exchange for obtaining the drugs.

2We transferred the case from the Appeals Court to this court on our own
motion.

"During his sixteen years working undercover, the police officer had made
approximately 850 undercover purchases. On the day that the officer approached
the defendant, the officer and his colleagues were not focused on any one
individual but, rather, on reducing open-air drug sales in the area.

4The officer explained that this was a reference to an amount of heroin worth
forty dollars.

5At trial, the officer explained why other users would help when someone
claimed to be “dope sick”:

“[W]hen a user cannot obtain heroin to use, they face . . . withdrawals,
ranging from sweats, to the chills, severe aching in the muscles and joints,
nausea... [I]t’s... quite a bad scene. ... [Drug users] understand . .
the pain and what they’re suffering through. And they are going to do
pretty much anything they can to help you, because at some point they may
be in that position themselves, and they’re going to want someone to help
them out.”

250 477 Mass. 248 (2017)

Commonwealth , Denton,

The tan powdered substance was later tested and found to be a
mixture of heroin and caffeine. A warrant issued for the defend-
ant’s arrest, which was carried out at a later date to protect the
identity of the undercover officers.

2. Prior convictions introduced at trial. After the judge deter-
mined that the defendant had raised the issue of entrapment, the
prosecutor was allowed to present the following evidence of three
former convictions to show the defendant’s predisposition to
commit the crime.

In 1993, a police officer saw the defendant place a pipe on the
floor and a bag of marijuana under a door. The defendant stated
that he was buying drugs for two other men. Based on the
substance found in two other bags that were found on or near the
defendant, he was ultimately convicted of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine.

In 1994, an undercover police officer asked the defendant to get
him twenty dollars’ worth of “crack” cocaine. The defendant
agreed to help him. The defendant went to a nearby apartment on
the officer’s behalf to obtain the cocaine. When the defendant
returned with a bag containing a substance that looked like crack
cocaine, he asked for some money for his role in the deal. He was
again convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

In 1991, the defendant was convicted of possession of a class
A substance with intent to distribute.®

Discussion. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discre-
tion. Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 400 (2010). Al-
though admissible to show motive and modus operandi, and for
other purposes, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts, including
evidence of past crimes, is generally inadmissible to show a
defendant’s propensity to commit the crime with which he or she
is charged. See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2017). Cf. Alegata v.
Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 300 (1967) (“The concept of ‘once
a criminal always a criminal’ is abhorrent to our law”). However,
where a defendant raises the defense of entrapment, the Common-
wealth may respond with propensity evidence. See Commonwealth
v. Buswell, 468 Mass. 92, 106 (2014); Mass. G. Evid. § 405(b).

An entrapment defense is, at bottom, a claim by the defendant
that he or she ordinarily would not have committed the charged
crime had officers not enticed him or her to do so. In response, the
Commonwealth is entitled to refute that claim by introducing

For this crime, the prosecutor did not present the underlying facts.

477 Mass. 248 (2017) 251

Commonwealth , Denton,

evidence to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit
the charged crime because he or she had committed similar bad
acts in the past, i.e., that police officers did not entice an otherwise
innocent person to commit a criminal act. See Buswell, supra;
Mass. G. Evid. § 405(b). The bad acts must be “sufficiently similar
to the crime charged to ensure that their probative value outweighs
the strong likelihood of prejudice.”? Buswell, supra, citing Com-
monwealth v. Vargas, 417 Mass. 792, 795 (1994).

In evaluating the admissibility of prior bad act evidence in an
entrapment case, a judge also must consider whether sufficiently
similar prior bad acts are recent enough that they remain proba-
tive of the defendant’s predisposition to commit the charged
crime. Recent bad acts tend to show that a defendant was pre-
disposed to commit a similar crime, so they have strong probative
value that will likely outweigh the prejudice to the defendant. See
Buswell, 468 Mass. at 106-107, citing Vargas, 417 Mass. at 795.
However, over time, as the defendant has had the opportunity to
reform himself or herself, the balance between probative value
and unfair prejudice shifts incrementally toward the latter. See
Commonwealth vy. Dingle, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 274, 284 (2008)
(probative value of predisposition evidence was outweighed by
its prejudice where prior bad acts were “old, the most recent
dating back more than thirteen years”); Commonwealth v. Childs,
23 Mass. App. Ct. 33, 37-38 (1986), S.C., 400 Mass. 1006 (1987)
(when introduced at trial in 1984, prejudicial effect of prior
convictions from 1950s and 1960s was more pronounced). Thus,
prior convictions must “not be too remote in time” or they lose
their probative value as to whether the defendant was predisposed
to commit this most recent crime. Cf. Commonwealth v. Butler,
445 Mass. 568, 574 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Barrett,
418 Mass. 788, 794 (1994) (probative value of prior bad acts
decreases over time); G. L. c. 233, § 21 (imposing time limits on
admission of prior convictions to impeach witness credibility).

Here, the parties and the judge discussed at length what evidence
the prosecutor could introduce to rebut the defendant’s entrap-

7 This is similar to the exacting standard we employ for the admission of prior
bad act evidence by the prosecution where there is no defense of entrapment.
See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass, 228, 249 & n.27 (2014) (prior bad act
evidence is inadmissible “if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice to the defendant”); Mass. G. Evid, § 404(b)(2). Contrast Mass.
G. Evid. § 403 (relevant evidence that does not concern prior bad acts is
admissible unless “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of . . . unfair prejudice” [emphasis added).

i)
n
he)

477 Mass. 248 (2017)

Commonwealth , Denton,

ment defense by showing that he was predisposed to commit the
crime. The prosecutor stated her intention to elicit testimony that
would show the facts and certified convictions of two prior cases,
as well as a certified conviction from a third case, all of which
ultimately were introduced at trial. The defendant moved to exclude
the proffered evidence of these convictions, arguing that their age
made them more prejudicial than probative. The judge denied the
motion to exclude, concluding that the possible prejudicial impact
of the evidence did not outweigh their probative value.

The judge appeared to have given the age of the convictions
careful consideration. However, in the circumstances of this case
it was error to admit the prior bad acts. Although the facts in at
least two of the defendant’s prior cases bore a remarkable simi-
larity to those in this case (i.e., acting as a “middleman” in a drug
transaction), the initially high probative value of the convictions
dropped sharply over time. The acts underlying the convictions
all took place in or before 1994, nineteen years before the crime
charged in this case. The Commonwealth was unable to identify
any case where past crimes this old were used as propensity
evidence to rebut an entrapment defense, nor have we found any.
See Dingle, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 284 (evidence of bad acts from
thirteen or more years earlier was erroneously admitted). Here,
where the most recent act was at least nineteen years old, the
probative value regarding predisposition no longer outweighed
the potential prejudice to the defendant. In addition, the limiting
instruction® to the jury was insufficient to mitigate the error given
the inherent dangers in admitting evidence of predisposition. See,
e.g., Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 516 (Ist Cir. 1961)
(cautioning that admission of prior convictions “is subject to the
defects inherent in any retrospective appraisal of past conduct”).

Conclusion. Because the introduction of the prior convictions
was not harmless error, a new trial is required.®

Judgment reversed.

Verdict set aside.

®The judge instructed: “You may consider this evidence solely for whatever
light it sheds on the issue of whether the [dJefendant was predisposed and ready
to commit the offense with which he is charged. You are not to consider it for
any other purpose.”

®The defendant further attributes error to the introduction of a statement by a

i)
n
ow

477 Mass. 248 (2017)

Commonwealth , Denton,

retired police officer who testified regarding a prior conviction and to the
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. He also argues that the prosecu-
tor erred in remarking that jurors are average people who would not know
vernacular drug terms, referring to undercover police operations in other types
of criminal cases, and stating that the Commonwealth did not have sufficient
evidence to charge the dealer. Because we conclude that evidence of the
defendant’s prior convictions warrants a new trial, we need not address these
arguments.

i)
a
&

477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

Saunpra R. Epwarps vs. CommMonweatru & another.'

Essex. February 6, 2017. - June 8, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.l., Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, & Lowy, JJ.

Governor. Privileged Communication. Evidence, Privileged communication.
Libel and Slander.

Discussion of the conflicting policy considerations regarding the recognition of
an absolute privilege shielding certain high-ranking State officials from
defamation claims for statements made within the scope of their official
duties. [260-262]

In a civil action alleging defamation arising from statements to the media that
the former governor made in connection with his removal of the plaintiff
from her position as chair of the Sex Offender Registry Board, the judge
erred in denying the former governor's motion to dismiss the complaint,
where the plaintiff failed to allege that the former governor made the
statements in question with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that they
were false or with reckless disregard of their falsity. [262-267]

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
December 31, 2014.

Motions to dismiss were heard by Richard E. Welch, HI, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Michael J. Pineault for Deval Patrick.

William H. Sheehan, III (Thomas J. Flannagan also present)
for the plaintiff.

Gaziano, J. On September 16, 2014, then Governor Deval
Patrick removed Saundra R. Edwards from her position as chair
of the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB). A few days later, in
response to media inquiries about Edwards’s abrupt departure,
Patrick explained that, among other reasons, he had decided to
replace Edwards because she inappropriately had attempted to
pressure a SORB hearing officer to change the outcome of one of
his decisions on an offender’s classification level. In subsequent
comments to the media, after Edwards had filed an action for
defamation and wrongful termination in the Superior Court, Pat-

*Deval Patrick.

477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

i)
n
a

tick repeated his explanation that he had decided to remove
Edwards from office because she had interfered with the inde-
pendence of a SORB hearing officer. Edwards filed an amended
complaint, asserting a wrongful termination claim against the
Commonwealth, and two defamation claims against Patrick, in-
dividually, one for each of the two statements.

Patrick moved pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365
Mass. 754 (1974), to dismiss Edwards’s amended complaint on
two grounds. He argued that the court should conclude, consistent
with Federal law and with a number of other jurisdictions, that he,
as governor, had an absolute privilege for statements made in the
course of his official duties. In the alternative, Patrick argued that
he had a qualified privilege, because the statements were made
while acting within the scope of his official duties concerning
Edwards’s status as a public official, and that the allegations in
the amended complaint were not sufficient to overcome that
privilege. Because, Patrick maintained, the amended complaint
contained only bare conclusory assertions of actual malice with-
out allegations of facts sufficient to support those assertions
beyond the level of mere speculation, the complaint did not meet
the pleading requirements for a defamation claim under Jan-
nacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008). A
Superior Court judge denied Patrick’s motion to dismiss the
defamation claims, and denied the Commonwealth’s motion to
dismiss the wrongful termination claim. Patrick appealed from
the denial of his motion, and both defendants sought a stay in the
Superior Court pending the resolution of that appeal. We allowed
Patrick’s motion for direct appellate review.

Considering first whether the amended complaint alleges facts
sufficient to overcome a qualified or conditional privilege, we
conclude that it does not assert facts sufficient to demonstrate that
Patrick’s statements to the media were made with actual malice,
and thus the complaint against him properly should have been
dismissed. Given this conclusion, we need not reach Patrick’s
argument as to the existence of an absolute privilege against
defamation claims for a governor, or other high-ranking State
official, for statements made in the course of his or her official
duties.

1. Background. We recite the facts asserted in the amended
complaint, taking them as true for purposes of evaluating the
motion to dismiss. SORB is an administrative agency within the
Executive Office of Public Safety and Security (EOPSS). SORB

256 477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the sex offender
registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, and promulgates rules,
regulations, and guidelines to implement those provisions. See
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1). The chair of SORB is “appointed by and
serve[s] at the pleasure of the governor.” Jd.

Edwards had been a member of the Massachusetts bar for
almost twenty-five years when Patrick appointed her as chair of
SORB on November 5, 2007. Edwards served in that role until
September 16, 2014. Prior to her appointment, Edwards had
served as an assistant district attorney in Plymouth County for
thirteen years. She specialized in prosecuting sex offenses, child
abuse, and domestic violence.

a. Sigh-Paglia matter. According to the amended complaint, in
September, 1993, Patrick’s brother-in-law, Bernard Sigh, pleaded
guilty to a charge of spousal rape in California; in his plea he
admitted that he “accomplished an act of sexual intercourse with
[his] wife against her will by means of force.” He was sentenced
to a term of incarceration followed by five years of probation.
Sigh moved to Massachusetts in 1995, but did not register as a
sex offender? when the Legislature enacted the sex offender
registry law in 1996.3

In December, 2006, almost a year before Edwards's appoint-
ment as chair, SORB notified Sigh of his duty to register as a level
1 (lowest risk) sex offender. Sigh sought a hearing to challenge
the determination that he had been convicted of a “like offense”
to the offense of rape as defined in Massachusetts law. SORB
scheduled a hearing on his petition and assigned the matter to one
of its board members. While that hearing was pending, SORB
referred to the office of the Attorney General the question whether
a conviction of spousal rape under California law was a “like
offense” to rape under Massachusetts law, thus requiring a Mas-
sachusetts resident to register with SORB.

SORB hearing officer Attilio Paglia replaced the previously
assigned board member, and scheduled a hearing on Sigh’s peti-

2A sex offender is defined as a person who has been convicted of any
violation of enumerated Massachusetts sex offenses, as well as like violations in
other jurisdictions. See G. L. c. 6, § 178C. See generally Doe, Sex Offender
Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 615
(2010).

8The sex offender registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, requires that
anyone who has been convicted as a sex offender must register with SORB and
with the local police department where the individual lives, unless, in limited
circumstances, an individual has been deemed exempt. See G. L. ¢. 6, § 178E.

477 Mass. 254 (2017) 257

Edwards », Commonwealth.

tion. SORB officials authorized Paglia to decide preliminary
motions in the case, but instructed him to continue the hearing
pending the Attorney General’s review of the legal question
concerning the status in Massachusetts of Sigh’s offense.

Notwithstanding these instructions, Paglia began the hearing
on August 1, 2007. After being informed of the hearing, Paglia’s
supervisor ordered him not to issue a decision in the matter
pending a determination by the Attorney General. Paglia contin-
ued to hear evidence on August 10 and 31 and issued an oral
decision finding that the California crime of spousal rape is not a
like offense to the Massachusetts crime of rape. Accordingly, he
relieved Sigh of the obligation to register as a sex offender. Paglia
did not issue a written decision, as is required by SORB regula-
tions.

b. Edwards's involvement in the Sigh-Paglia matter. Edwards
took office on November 5, 2007, several months after the Sigh
hearing and the oral decision. She was advised by SORB’s
counsel and other SORB officials of the disagreement between
SORB administrators and Paglia. She also learned that, as a result
of his actions with respect to the Sigh matter, Paglia had been
disciplined for insubordination.

On May 9, 2008, Edwards met with Paglia to discuss the Sigh
matter. She informed Paglia (who is not an attorney) of the legal
elements of rape as defined under Massachusetts law, and told
him that the California crime of spousal rape is a like offense to
the Massachusetts crime of rape because “rape is rape.” After
consulting with EOPSS and SORB’s general counsel, Edwards
directed that a written decision issue in the Sigh case. SORB also
enacted an emergency regulation to permit it to correct errors of
law by hearing officers. To prevent further classification errors,
Edwards also instituted a training program on the elements of
Massachusetts sex offenses and on conducting classification hear-
ings.

Paglia resigned from his position at SORB and commenced a
“whistleblower” action, G. L. 149, § 185, in the Superior Court
against SORB, Edwards in her official capacity, and other SORB
officials, claiming retaliation for his decision in the Sigh matter.*

4Edwards’s amended complaint alleges that Paglia, for an unknown reason,
“took the extraordinary step” of removing the case from the previously assigned
board member and assigning the case to himself.

5Because Edwards referenced Paglia’s complaint in her amended complaint,
and Patrick attached the Paglia complaint to his motion to dismiss, the Paglia

258 477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

Paglia claimed that the SORB defendants, including Edwards,
engaged in repeated and unsuccessful efforts to change the result
of the Sigh hearing, and created a hostile work environment,
characterized by harassing electronic mail messages and tele-
phone calls, and poor performance reviews. Paglia also claimed
that he had complained to Edwards about “unlawful conduct that
occurred prior to and during her tenure as Chair,” and that Edwards
retaliated by accusing him (through the deputy counsel of EOPSS)
of insubordination and performance deficiencies. Paglia further
asserted that Edwards had attempted to influence the indepen-
dence of hearing officer decisions by instituting a regulation
permitting SORB to revise or overturn decisions, known internally
as the “Paglia Regulation,” and hiring a hearing decision editor to
“subject the finality of hearing examiner decisions to doubt and
ambiguity.”

c. Edwards’s termination. According to the amended com-
plaint, on September 15, 2014, Edwards was ordered to attend a
meeting the next day at the governor’s office, with the general
counsel and chief of staff of EOPSS, and Patrick’s director of
boards and commissions, Kendra Foley. Edwards was not given
an explanation for the meeting.

Edwards met with Foley on September 16, 2014. She was joined
by Patrick’s legal counsel and a representative of human resources
from EOPSS. Patrick was not present at this meeting. Foley told
Edwards, “As you know, you serve at the Governor’s pleasure. He
has decided to replace you as the Chairperson of the Sex Offender
Registry Board.” Edwards asked Foley if there was “a problem,”
or if she had done something wrong. Foley replied that Edwards
had not done anything wrong, but repeated that her employment
was being terminated. To avoid the stigma of being terminated,
Edwards asked if she could tender a letter of resignation. Edwards
was allowed to resign effective that day.

d. Patrick’s statements to the media. The amended complaint
further states that Patrick made two statements to the media
concerning Edwards’ s removal as SORB chair. On September 22,
2014, he said during a press conference:

“The final straw was the settlement of a lawsuit, which
happened about not quite a year ago now, that involved some

complaint is included in the record and may be considered by this court. See
Coghlin Elec. Contrs., Inc. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 472 Mass. 549, 552 n.5 (2015);
Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 n.4 (2004).

477 Mass. 254 (2017) 259

Edwards », Commonwealth.

inappropriate, at least, maybe, unlawful, pressuring by the
Chair and the Executive Director of a hearing officer to
change the outcome of a case. The hearing officer did not
ultimately do that. It turns out that the case is the case that
arose out of my brother-in-law’s experience way back at the
beginning of the first campaign when the Republican Party,
sorry to say, aided by the [Boston] Herald, nearly destroyed
their lives.”*

On January 2, 2015, Patrick made additional comments to the
media concerning his reasons for removing Edwards:

“You know, people do things like this when they’ve been,
sometimes when they’ ve been called out, and, you know, it’s
part of the business. The fact is that she influenced inappro-
priately, or attempted to influence inappropriately, a hearing
officer, and that’s a matter of record. That hearing did involve
my brother-in-law, that is true. We’ve never made a secret of
that, but it’s still inappropriate, and that’s the reason why I
asked for her resignation.

“We can’t have officials inappropriately interfering with
the independence of hearing officers. It undermines the
whole process whether it involves someone I know or not.”

e. Edwards’s complaint. On December 31, 2014, Edwards filed
a complaint in the Superior Court against the Commonwealth,
claiming wrongful termination for her removal as SORB chair,
and against Patrick individually, alleging that his September 22,
2014 statements to the media “accusing her of wrongdoing” were
defamatory. Thereafter, on March 2, 2015, Edwards filed an
amended complaint, adding a second claim of defamation based
on Patrick’s January 2, 2015, response to media inquiries follow-
ing the filing of Edwards’s initial complaint.

Patrick moved to dismiss the defamation claims on grounds of
absolute and qualified or conditional privilege. A Superior Court
judge denied the motion,” noting that the matter of an absolute
privilege had not been recognized by this court, and determining

Patrick also stated that he had lost confidence in Edwards's ability to lead the
SORB for other reasons: * several cases where the [Supreme Judicial Court] has
reversed them”; “ critici[sm] for not updating their regulations”; and “a number
of reports about the work environment not being positive.”

7The judge also denied the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the wrongful
termination claim. The Commonwealth has not appealed from that decision, and

260 477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

that Edwards had overcome the qualified privilege by pleading
sufficient facts to establish actual malice. We allowed Patrick’s
application for direct appellate review.*

2. Discussion. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de
novo, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Curtis v.
Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). In assuming
the facts as alleged, however, “[w]e do not regard as ‘true’ legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Leavitt v.
Brockton Hosp., Inc., 454 Mass. 37, 39 n.6 (2009). To survive a
motion to dismiss, the facts alleged must “ ‘plausibly suggest[ ]
(not merely be consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief.” Jannacchino,
451 Mass. at 636, quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007) (Twombly). See Schatz v. Republican State Lead-
ership Comm., 669 F3d 50, 56 (Ist Cir. 2012) (court applies
Twombly pleading standard in defamation action by isolating and
ignoring “actual malice buzzwords”).

a. Absolute privilege. Patrick argues first that he is immune
from Edwards’s defamation claims because his statements to the
media were made in the discharge of his official duties as gov-
ernor and thus are, or should be, protected by an absolute privi-
lege. “An absolute privilege provides a defendant with a complete
defense to a defamation suit even if the defamatory statement is
uttered maliciously or in bad faith.” Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410
Mass. 631, 634 (1991). In Massachusetts, the existence of an ab-
solute privilege has been recognized in “comparatively few
cases,” Vigoda v. Barton, 348 Mass. 478, 484 (1965), and has
been “limited to cases in which public policy or the administra-
tion of justice requires complete immunity.” Ezekiel v. Jones
Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 385 (1978). See Sriberg v. Raymond,
370 Mass. 105, 108-109 (1976) (statements by party, counsel or
witness made in relation to judicial proceeding); Sheppard v.
Bryant, 191 Mass. 591, 592-593 (1906) (statements by witness
testifying before legislative committee which were pertinent to
questions and subject of examination).

Patrick argues that, as the majority of States to have considered
the question have done, we should adopt the Federal standard,

the matter has been stayed as to both defendants pending resolution of this
interlocutory appeal.

®The denial of Patrick’s motion to dismiss, which raised claims of absolute
and qualified privilege, was immediately appealable under the doctrine of
present execution. Visnick v, Caulfield, 73 Mass, App. Ct. 809, 811 n.4 (2009).

477 Mass. 254 (2017) 261

Edwards », Commonwealth.

which affords certain high-ranking Federal officials absolute im-
munity from defamation claims based on statements made within
the scope of their official duties. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483, 498 (1896); 1 Sack on Defamation, Libel, Slander, and Re-
lated Problems § 8.2.5 (4th ed. 2010) (Sack).

The United States Supreme Court has expressed two significant
policy reasons for the adoption of an absolute privilege. See Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-576 (1959). First, Federal officials
should be able to discharge their duties uninhibited by the fear
and distraction of lawsuits. Id. at 571-573. Second, an absolute
privilege furthers free speech by allowing Federal officials to
speak with complete candor concerning matters of public impor-
tance. Jd. at 577 (Black, J., concurring). The Court has recognized
that application of an absolute privilege may result in an injustice
to defamed citizens left without a remedy, but has deemed this a
necessary sacrifice for the “greater good” given the specific
positions at issue. Jd. at 576.

As Patrick points out, consistent with the holding in Barr, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 591 (2002) provides for an
absolute privilege for defamation claims brought against high-
ranking Federal and State executive officers, including governors
or State “superior executive officers.” According to the Restate-
ment, “[a]n absolute privilege to publish defamatory matter con-
cerning another in communications made in the performance of
his official duties exists for (a) any executive or administrative
officer of the United States; or (b) a governor or other superior
executive officers of the state.” Jd.

A majority of States have been persuaded by this reasoning,
and have adopted an absolute privilege which shields the gover-
nor, or cabinet-level State officials, from defamation claims for
statements made in the course of their official duties. See Sack,
supra at § 8.2.5. See, e.g., Blair v. Walker, 64 Ill. 2d 1, 6-11
(1976) (adopting absolute immunity to shield Illinois governor
from defamation claim); Jones v. State, 426 S.W.3d 50, 55-56
(Tenn. 2013) (cabinet-level State officials such as commissioner
of Department of Correction immune from defamation claims
arising from their official duties); Salazar v. Morales, 900 S.W.2d
929, 932 (Tex. App. 1995) (Texas Attorney General had absolute
privilege to publish defamatory statements in communications
associated with official duties).

Nonetheless, other jurisdictions have recognized strong, coun-
tervailing considerations against extending an absolute privilege

262 477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

to a State governor and cabinet-level State officials. See, e.g.,
Clark v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 613, 618 (1980) (“Public office does
not carry with it a license to defame at will, for even the highest
officers still exist to serve the public, not to denigrate its mem-
bers”). Chief Justice Earl Warren, dissenting in Barr, observed
that the public should have a right to criticize government offi-
cials without being “subjected to unfair — and absolutely privi-
leged — retorts.” Barr, 360 U.S. at 584. Consistent with this
view, a substantial minority of State courts that have considered
the issue have concluded that a qualified or conditional privilege
is sufficient to protect high-ranking public officials from liability
where their statements are made in good faith and without malice.
See, e.g., Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 161
(Alaska 1987) (application of absolute privilege to defamation
suit against governor “would do little more than protect unprivi-
leged defamatory statements leaving injured plaintiff without a
remedy”); Goddard v. Fields, 214 Ariz. 175, 178-180 (2007)
(court declined to grant Attorney General absolute immunity to
defend comments made in press release).

As the motion judge noted in his decision, this court has not
decided whether an absolute privilege shields the governor, or
other high-ranking State officials, from liability for all defamation
claims arising out of statements made in the performance of their
official duties. See Barrows v. Wareham Fire Dist., 82 Mass.
App. Ct. 623, 630 n.10 (2012). We considered the issue in
considerable depth in two cases, Mulgrew, 410 Mass. at 634-635,
and Vigoda, 348 Mass. at 483-484. In Mulgrew, supra at 634, a
police chief argued that he had an absolute privilege to defend
public comments he made regarding a police officer’s fitness for
duty. In Vigoda, supra at 481, 483, a social worker brought a
defamation claim against the superintendent of Boston State
Hospital, in connection with written evaluations, and the super-
intendent claimed that his official statements should be protected
by an absolute privilege. In both cases, we declined to apply an
absolute privilege because a qualified privilege in those circum-
stances was sufficient to shield the public official from liability.
See Mulgrew, supra at 635; Vigoda, supra at 484.

Given the conflicting policy considerations discussed above, it
is more prudent to examine whether Edwards pleaded sufficient
facts to state a cognizable claim for defamation. We conclude that
she did not.

b. Adequacy of the complaint. Edwards was required to allege
sufficient facts to establish that (1) Patrick made a statement

477 Mass. 254 (2017) 263

Edwards », Commonwealth.

concerning her to a third party; (2) the statement was defamatory
such that it could damage her reputation in the community; (3)
Patrick was at fault for making the statement; and (4) the state-
ment caused her to suffer economic loss or was actionable with-
out economic loss. Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627,
629-630 (2003). In addition, as a public figure, Edwards is re-
quired to allege that Patrick made a false and defamatory state-
ment with knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of its
falsity. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-280 (1964); id. at 270 (First Amendment to United States
Constitution protects debate on public issues even where debate
includes “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials”). See also Murphy v.
Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 48 & n.8 (2007) (discussing
application of actual malice requirement to defamation action
brought by judge); Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 431 Mass. 748, 755
(2000) (“As New York Times Co. vy. Sullivan{, supra,| and sub-
sequent cases have made clear, a plaintiff who is a public official
may not recover damages for defamation related to his or her
public office unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant made the false statement with actual
malice”).

The actual malice standard requires the public figure to prove
that the statement was made either with knowledge that it was
false, or with reckless disregard as to whether it was false. See
Rotkiewicz, 431 Mass. at 755. Thus, to survive a motion to
dismiss, Edwards must allege sufficient facts to establish that
Patrick knew the statements were false, or acted with reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity. See Vigoda, 348 Mass. at 485
(“Where the official believes the matter to be true . . . and has not
acted with actual malice . . . or with reckless indifference to the
rights of the individual citizen, his conditional privilege is not
abused” [citations omitted]). Reckless disregard requires more
than negligence; a plaintiff must prove that the individual making
the alleged defamatory statement “entertained serious doubts as
to the truth” of the statement. Murphy, 449 Mass. at 48, quoting

®Patrick’s status as governor also provides an independent basis for the
imposition of the actual malice standard, Edwards brought her defamation claim
against Patrick for statements made while Patrick was acting within the scope
his official duties. He was protected, at a minimum, by a qualified privilege
when speaking to the media about Edwards’s removal. See Mulgrew v. Taunton,
410 Mass. 631, 635 (1991); Vigoda v. Barton, 348 Mass. 478, 484 (1965).

264 477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). The actual
malice test is subjective. “That information was available which
would cause a reasonably prudent man to entertain serious doubts
is not sufficient. In order to negate the privilege, the jury must find
such doubts were in fact entertained by the defendant.” Stone v.
Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 867-868 (1975).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974).

Because it is rare to garner direct evidence of an individual’s
state of mind, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to
prove that a defendant had actual knowledge that the statements
were false, or had serious doubts about their accuracy. Levesque
v. Doocey, 560 F.3d 82, 90 (Ist Cir. 2009). See Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 196 (1st Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (subjective determination whether
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts about truth of state-
ment may be established by inference “as it would be very rare
for a defendant to admit such doubts”). See also Murphy, 449
Mass. at 57-58 (determination of defendant’s subjective state of
mind may be made based on circumstantial evidence).

Edwards advances three distinct theories to support her claim
that the amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish
actual malice. First, she points to a Patrick administration offi-
cial’s assurance that she had done nothing wrong as indicating the
falsity of Patrick’s subsequent statements accusing her of wrong-
doing. Second, she notes that the Paglia lawsuit, which Patrick
referenced in his comments, did not accuse Edwards of pressur-
ing Paglia to change his decision. Third, Edwards contends that
Patrick’s spite and ill will toward her establish actual malice. We
address each argument in turn.'®

The amended complaint asserts that Edwards and Foley, Pat-
tick’s director of boards and commissions, met on September 16,
2014. During that meeting, Foley informed Edwards: “As you
know, you serve at the Governor’s pleasure. He has decided to
replace you as Chairperson of the Sex Offender Registry Board.”

‘Edwards also claims that inconsistencies between Patrick's September 22,
2014, statement and his January 2, 2015, statement demonstrate that he lied
about her removal. This argument is without merit, Patrick’s January 2, 2015,
remarks focused on the primary allegation that Edwards improperly sought to
influence the independence of a hearing officer. His failure to mention the
purported systemic difficulties at SORB, as he had in his statement in Septem-
ber, as a further reason to remove Edwards from her position as chair did not
constitute evidence that he believed that Edwards’s job performance had been
satisfactory,

477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

ie)
fon
a

Responding to Edwards’s inquiry about the reasons for her re-
moval, the complaint alleges that Foley assured Edwards that she
had not done anything wrong. Yet, after Edwards’s meeting with
Foley, Patrick twice informed the media that Edwards was re-
moved from her position for interfering with the independence of
a hearing officer.

Edwards concedes that Foley’s statements are not directly
attributable to Patrick. She contends, however, that Foley’s as-
surance that Edwards had done nothing wrong is evidence of
what Patrick actually believed. Edwards urges us to draw the
following inferences: (1) Patrick spoke with Foley before the
September 16 meeting; (2) Patrick informed Foley that he had the
authority to replace Edwards in the exercise of his discretion; (3)
Patrick told Foley that Edwards had done nothing wrong; and (4)
Patrick accused Edwards of interfering with the independence of
a SORB hearing officer although he knew she had done nothing
wrong. All of these inferences strung together, Edwards argues,
are sufficient to prove that Patrick’s subsequent statements that he
removed Edwards for interfering with a hearing officer were
knowingly false or were made in reckless disregard of their
falsity.

This attempt to ground the allegation of actual malice on a
statement purportedly made by Foley at the termination meeting
does not satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Jannacchino,
451 Mass. at 636. The theory that Foley’s statement somehow
reflected Patrick’s personal view of Edwards’s job performance
would require a fact finder to jump from one inference to another
absent any of the necessary factual support. Edwards’s assertions
regarding Patrick’s likely state of mind, based on Foley’s alleged
statement to Edwards, are too speculative to support a claim of
actual malice. See Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 83 (1st Cir. 2012)
(“inquiring court need not give weight to bare conclusions, un-
embellished by pertinent facts”); Biro v. Condé Nast, 963 F. Supp.
2d 255, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 807 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“Not only is ‘[p]roving actual malice a heavy burden, . . . but in
the era of [Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),] and Twombly,
pleading actual malice is a more onerous task as well” [quotations
and citation omitted]). See also Sanford, Libel and Privacy § 13.3,
at 13-62 (2d ed. Supp. 2017) (noting difficulty in pleading actual
malice in light of heightened pleading standards); 2 Sack on
Defamation, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § 16:2.2 (not-
ing courts’ “insistence that litigation in which ‘actual malice’

266 477 Mass. 254 (2017)

Edwards », Commonwealth.

must be established by the plaintiff provides no exception to the
Iqbal and Twombly pleading requirements”).

In her second argument, Edwards contends that the allegations
in the amended complaint are sufficient to establish actual malice
because it is reasonable to infer that Patrick read the complaint in
the Paglia action, and knew that the asserted pressure brought to
bear on Paglia occurred before Edwards was appointed to be
SORB chair. This inference, however, is not supported by Ed-
wards’s own allegations in the amended complaint concerning the
Paglia lawsuit, nor by the plain language in the Paglia complaint
that was submitted as an exhibit to the Superior Court. In her
amended complaint, Edwards acknowledges that Paglia did bring
a complaint against her for retaliation, and that he filed that claim
after Edwards discussed the Sigh classification decision with him,
and stated that she disagreed with his decision because “rape is
rape.” Moreover, the Paglia lawsuit described in some detail
Edwards’s alleged role in the Sigh matter. Paglia’s complaint
clearly alleged that Edwards pressured him to withdraw his
classification decision and to classify Sigh as a sex offender under
Massachusetts law, and retaliated against him for his failure to do
so. The complaint also alleged that Edwards “verbally berated”
Paglia, “at one point making him so nervous and panicked that
[he] had to go to the hospital.” Accordingly, no view of the
allegations in the Paglia lawsuit would support a claim that
Patrick was on notice, after reading the complaint, that Edwards
did nothing wrong.

Edwards’s third theory concerning the sufficiency of her com-
plaint is that Patrick’s ill will and spite over her role in his broth-
er-in-law’s case support a claim of actual malice. In this view,
Patrick’s statements were motivated by hostility toward Edwards
for having “nearly destroyed the lives of his sister and brother-in-
law.” Thus, Patrick’s statements to the media accusing Edwards of
wrongdoing were strictly personal, meant to harm Edwards’s repu-
tation, and served no public purpose.

Evidence of ill will or spite is insufficient, standing alone, to
establish actual malice. In Rotkiewicz, 431 Mass. at 755, quoting
Stone, 367 Mass. at 867, we held:

“In the context of defamation, the term ‘actual malice’
does not mean the defendant's dislike of, hatred of, or ill will
toward, the plaintiff. Rather, actual malice means that the
‘defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it
was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false.’ ”

477 Mass. 254 (2017) 267

Edwards », Commonwealth.

Regardless of Patrick’s alleged spiteful, negative feelings toward
Edwards, which we take, as we must, as true for purposes of
considering the sufficiency of the complaint, Edwards was re-
quired to allege specific facts to prove that Patrick made his
statements to the media with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. That Patrick might have
harbored ill will toward Edwards for “nearly destroy[ing]” the
lives of some members of his family does not substitute for proof
of actual malice. See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389
U.S. 81, 82 (1967) (“personal spite, ill will or a desire to injure
plaintiff’ is not equivalent of actual malice).

Order denying motion to
dismiss reversed.

268 477 Mass. 268 (2017)

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

GUARDIANSHIP oF YOSSELIN GUADALUPE PENATE.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE! vs. MANUEL
Morates Lopez & another.”

Suffolk. January 6, 2017. - June 9, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Alien. Probate Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Probate Court.

Discussion of the special immigrant juvenile status provisions of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), which enable immigrant
children who have been subject to abuse, neglect, or abandonment by one or
both of their parents to remain in the United States and apply for lawful
permanent residence. [273-274]
This court concluded that a Probate and Family Court judge, if requested by an
immigrant child under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), may not decline to make
special findings of fact necessary to the legal determination by the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services of that child’s entitlement to special
immigrant juvenile status under that statute; further, this court concluded that the
immigrant child’s motivation is irrelevant to the judge’s special findings, and
that the judge’s obligation to make the special findings applies regardless of
whether the child presents sufficient evidence to support a favorable finding
under each of the criteria set forth in § 1101(a)(27)(J); finally, this court directed
that the special findings be limited to the parent with whom the child claims
reunification is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. [274-276]
In a proceeding on a petition for appointment of a guardian for a minor
immigrant, in which the minor filed a motion for special findings of fact
necessary to a legal determination of her entitlement to special immigrant
juvenile status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), a Probate and Family Court
judge erred in focusing on the alleged motive behind the petition for
guardianship and the motion for special findings rather than determining
whether the child’s mother had abandoned or neglected her under Massa-
chusetts law, and further erred in not making findings as to the dependence
of the child on the Probate and Family Court and whether it was in her best
interests to return to her country of origin; moreover, the judge erred in not
making special findings of fact with regard to the child’s father, as requested
in a separate motion. [276-277]

n a proceeding on a complaint to establish paternity, in which the immigrant
child, appearing as an interested party, moved for special findings pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), the Probate and Family Court judge erred in

a

*On behalf of Norma Cecilia Mauricio Guzman.
?E.G. (a pseudonym), interested party.

477 Mass. 268 (2017) 269

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

failing to make any factual findings with respect to the motion, and therefore,
because this court stood in the same position as did the motion judge with
respect to evaluating the written evidence and reaching a conclusion as to the
special findings determination, this court directed the judge to find that the child
was dependent on the Probate and Family Court, that reunification with her
father was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and that it was not
in the child’s best interest to return to her country of origin, [277-278]

‘This court declined to reach an issue that had no bearing on the outcome of the
case at issue, [278-279]

Perrrion for appointment of a guardian filed in the Suffolk
Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on Sep-
tember 14, 2015.

A motion for special findings of fact was heard by Virginia M.
Ward, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Comptamt to establish paternity filed in the Suffolk Division of
the Probate and Family Court Department on November 25, 2014.

A motion for special findings of fact was heard by Virginia M.
Ward, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Valquiria C. Ribeiro for Marvin H. Penate.

Jennifer B. Luz (Joshua M. Daniels also present) for E.G.

Elizabeth Badger for Kids in Need of Defense & others.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, William C. Peachey, Erez Reuveni, & Joseph A. Darrow, of
the District of Columbia, for the United States.

Mary K. Ryan & Meghan S. Stubblebine for American Immi-
gration Lawyers Association, New England Chapter, & others.

Hwes, J. In these appeals brought by E.G., an eight year old
undocumented immigrant from Guatemala, and Yosselin Guada-
lupe Penate, a nineteen year old undocumented immigrant from
EI Salvador, we consider for the second time® the statutorily
mandated role of the Probate and Family Court (and the Juvenile
Court) in a juvenile’s application for special immigrant juvenile

3See Recinos v. Escobar, 473 Mass. 734, 739-743 (2016) (recognizing
Probate and Family Court jurisdiction to make special findings under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101[al[27I[J] [2012], in cases involving persons between eighteen and
twenty-one years of age).

270 477 Mass. 268 (2017)

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

status (SIJ) under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). Congress es-
tablished the SIJ status classification “to create a pathway to
citizenship for immigrant children,” Recinos v. Escobar, 473
Mass. 734, 737 (2016), who have been abused, neglected, or
abandoned by one or both parents. The issue presented in these
appeals is whether a judge may decline to make special findings
based on an assessment of the likely merits of the movant’s
application for SIJ status or on the movant’s motivation for
seeking SIJ status. The judge implicitly determined that neither
child would be entitled to SIJ status based on her interpretation of
the statute and declined to make special findings. This was error.

We now clarify the role of the judge with respect to a juvenile’s
motion for special findings necessary to apply for SIJ status under
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Because immigration status is a matter
solely within Federal jurisdiction, the merits of a juvenile’s
application for SIJ status will be determined in immigration
proceedings in accordance with Federal law. See Recinos, 473
Mass. at 738. Under the statute, the judge’s sole function is to
make the special findings, and to do so in a fashion that does not
limit Federal authorities in determining the merits of the juve-
nile’s application for SIJ status. Therefore, we conclude that on a
motion for special findings, the judge shall make such findings
without regard to the ultimate merits or purpose of the juvenile’s
application. To avoid any unnecessary entanglement in interpret-
ing whether SIJ status requires a showing of neglect or abandon-
ment by one or both parents, we also conclude that the judge shall
make special findings only as to the parent named in the motion.t

Background.5 1. Yosselin Penate. Yosselin® was born in 1997 in
El Salvador to Marleny D. Penate-Velasquez. The father aban-
doned Marleny before Yosselin was born, and is not listed on her

4We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the United States in E.G.’s case
in support of neither party; and the amicus briefs submitted in each case in support
of the appellants by the American Immigration Lawyers Association, New Eng-
land Chapter; the Boston College Immigration Clinic; the Catholic Charitable
Bureau of the Archdiocese of Boston, Inc.; the Central West Justice Center; the
Children’s Law Center of Massachusetts; Community Legal Services and Coun-
seling Center; Greater Boston Legal Services; the Immigration Legal Assistance
Program of Ascentria Care Alliance; Justice Center of Southeast Massachusetts;
Kids in Need of Defense; Massachusetts Law Reform Institute; MetroWest Legal
Services; and the Political Asylum/Immigration Representation Project.

5We recite the facts as drawn from the limited record before us.

“Because Yosselin and her uncle Marvin share a last name, and her mother’s
last name is similar, we refer to the family members by their first names.

477 Mass. 268 (2017) 271

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

birth certificate. Yosselin has never had any contact with her
father and does not know his identity. Until her teenage years,
Yosselin lived in a small house with her mother, grandfather,
uncle, three brothers, and two cousins. Of the adults living in the
household, only Yosselin’s uncle was employed. Having his own
children to provide for, the uncle’s income was rarely sufficient to
cover food and clothing for Yosselin and her siblings.

Because her mother was unemployed, Yosselin did not have
access to medical treatment. At age fourteen, Yosselin took a job to
help with family expenses. While working, Yosselin continued to
attend school, but her job responsibilities frequently prevented her
from completing her homework. Although she added to the family’s
income, Yosselin’s living conditions remained poor. In 2013, when
Yosselin was fifteen years of age, she began receiving death threats
from a local gang. The gang demanded that she either join the gang
or be killed. Because Marleny was unable to properly provide
financial resources for Yosselin or protect her from the gang,
Marleny determined that it would be best for the family if Yosselin
left for the United States to live with her uncle, Marleny’s brother,
Marvin H. Penate, who lives in Massachusetts. In accordance with
her mother’s wishes, Yosselin traveled to the United States and has
lived with Marvin in Revere since that time. Since her arrival in the
United States, Yosselin has had access to proper medical care, is
enrolled in school, and has adequate food and clothing. Although
Yosselin remains in contact with her mother in El Salvador, she
wishes to continue living with Marvin in the United States.

In September, 2015, when Yosselin was seventeen years of age,
Marvin filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court seeking
guardianship of her, and she then filed a motion seeking the
requisite special findings for SIJ status. In her motion for special
findings, Yosselin asserted that she was dependent on the Probate
and Family Court, that reunification with her mother was not
viable due to neglect, and that return to El Salvador was not in her
best interests.” Following a short hearing, the Probate and Family
Court judge issued a written decision, dismissing the guardian-
ship petition and declining to make special findings as to the first
and third prongs. With respect to the second prong, the judge
stated, “The sole problem here is that [Yosselin] must find a legal
way to re-enter this country if in fact she is deported. This [c]ourt

7Yosselin filed a second motion for special findings in December, 2016,
asserting neglect and abandonment by her father. That motion is pending in the
Probate and Family Court.

nN
a
nv

477 Mass. 268 (2017)

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

does not find that ‘reunification with one or both of the immi-
grant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment,
or similar basis found under State law’ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).”
Marvin appealed from this decision, and we transferred the case
to this court on our own motion.

2. E.G. E.G. was born in Guatemala in 2008 to Norma Cecilia
Mauricio Guzman. After finding out that Guzman was pregnant,
E.G.’s father, Manual Morales Lopez, abandoned Guzman, and
he moved to the United States before E.G. was born. Following
his move to the United States, Lopez made no effort to contact or
take care of E.G. and offered Guzman negligible financial sup-
port. After E.G.’s birth, Lopez stopped providing financial sup-
port altogether. Because Lopez ignored Guzman’s efforts to in-
form him of E.G.’s birth and had no relationship with E.G.,
Guzman did not list Lopez on E.G.’s birth certificate.

During the early years of E.G.’s life, she and her half-brother were
raised by their mother in Guatemala. As a single mother, Guzman
was unable to earn enough money to support her two children. She
left for the United States without her children when E.G. was three
years old and her half-brother was ten years old. Once in the United
States, Guzman remained in contact with her children and attempted
unsuccessfully to secure reliable care from members of E.G.’s
extended family and a woman whom Guzman paid for child care
services. Neither proved reliable. Consequently, E.G. was looked
after by her half-brother or, when he was at school, left completely
alone. Although initially E.G. attended kindergarten in Guatemala,
after three months she had to stop going because the walk to school
was far and too dangerous for E.G. to walk alone. On one occasion,
E.G. suffered a head injury and was hospitalized after falling into
a large hole. On another occasion, she was attacked by a stray dog
when she was out on the street alone.

In 2014, with no possibility of a safe or secure life in Guate-
mala, E.G. and her brother left Guatemala for the United States.
The two children were captured while attempting to cross into the
United States from Mexico. Following their capture in Texas, the
Office of Refugee Resettlement contacted Guzman, who by then
lived in Massachusetts, and released the children to her custody.
Since that time, both children have lived with their mother and
other members of their family in Massachusetts. Unlike in Gua-
temala, in the United States, E.G. lives with responsible adults
who care for her, and she attends school.

After moving to the United States, Lopez made no effort to
contact E.G. E.G. met Lopez for the first time when he appeared

477 Mass. 268 (2017) 273

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

for a court-ordered paternity test, which the Department of Rev-
enue had sought on E.G.’s behalf. Since that time, Lopez has not
been in contact with E.G. and has provided little meaningful
financial support. Although Lopez is aware that E.G. now lives in
Massachusetts, the State where he also resides, he has expressed
no interest in establishing a relationship with her.

Appearing as an interested party to the paternity suit, E.G. filed a
motion for special findings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J),*
as well as an affidavit from her mother. In her motion, E.G. stated
her intent to petition for SIJ status and argued that she was
dependent on the Probate and Family Court, that reunification
with her father was not viable due to neglect and abandonment,
and that it was not in her best interest to return to Guatemala.
During the hearing on the paternity issue, the Probate and Family
Court judge denied E.G.’s motion for special findings. While the
judge did not explicitly articulate a reason for denying E.G.’s
motion, she noted, “[E.G.] is in the custody of her mother, so ’'m
not doing special findings.” E.G. appealed from this decision, and
we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

Discussion. 1. Statutory overview. We begin by providing an
overview of the SIJ status provision. In 1990, Congress created the
SIJ provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act to enable im-
migrant children who have been subject to abuse, neglect, or aban-
donment by one or both of their parents to remain in the United States
and apply for lawful permanent residence. Recinos, 473 Mass. at 734,
737, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 C.ER. § 204.11 (2016).
Applying for SIJ status entails a multistep process involving both
State courts and Federal agencies. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). To
apply to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS)® for SIJ status, the “immigrant child’? must first obtain
the following special findings from a “juvenile court”: (1) the

®The State court must find (1) that the minor is “dependent on a juvenile
court”; (2) that his or her “reunification with [one] or both . . . parents is not
viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State
Jaw”; and (3) that “it would not be in [his or her] best interest to be returned”
to his or her home country. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).

°The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) bears
responsibility for lawful immigration to the United States. See Recinos, 473
Mass. at 735 n.2.

1For purposes of special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status, “child” is defined as
a person under twenty-one years of age who is unmarried. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).

“For the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), a “[jJuvenile court” is
defined broadly as “a court located in the United States having jurisdiction under

274 477 Mass. 268 (2017)

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

child is dependent on a juvenile court, or under the custody of an
agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity
appointed by the court or State; (2) reunification with one or both
parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and
(3) returning the child to his or her country of origin would not be
in the child’s best interest. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).

After obtaining special findings, the immigrant child must file
a petition, including the special findings, with USCIS. 8 C.ER.
§ 204.11. Once submitted, USCIS conducts a plenary review of
the petition. Jd. See USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 6, pt. J(4) (2016).
As the United States notes in its amicus brief, during this review,
USCIS generally defers to the juvenile court’s determinations
and does not reweigh the evidence insofar as it relates to matters
of State law. See USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 6, pt. J(3). Ulti-
mately, USCIS, on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security,
makes the final determination whether to grant SIJ status. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(DGii); USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 6, pt.
J(4)(E)(1) (noting that Department of Homeland Security del-
egates authority to consent to grant of SIJ classification to
USCIS).

2. The role of the Probate and Family Court. Although “[t]he
process for obtaining SIJ status is ‘a unique hybrid procedure that
directs the collaboration of [S]tate and [F]ederal systems,” Recinos,
473 Mass. at 738, quoting H.S.P. v. J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 209 (2015),
a person’s immigration status remains a matter governed solely by
Federal law. Thus, whether a child qualifies for SIJ status and
whether to grant or deny an immigrant child’s application for SIJ
status is beyond the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court.
The State court’s role is solely to make the special findings of fact
necessary to the USCIS’s legal determination of the immigrant
child’s entitlement to SIJ status. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)() ii).
Congress delegated this task to State courts because it recognized
“the distinct expertise State courts possess in the area of child
welfare and abuse,“ which makes them best equipped to shoulder
“the responsibility to perform a best interest analysis and to make
factual determinations about child welfare for purposes of SIJ
eligibility.“ Recinos, supra.

State law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of
juveniles.” 8 C.ER. § 204,11(a). In Massachusetts, determinations regarding the
care and custody of juveniles fall within the jurisdiction of both the Juvenile
Court and the Probate and Family Court, and thus both courts may make the
requisite special findings under § 1101(a)(27)(J). Recinos, 473 Mass. at 738.

477 Mass. 268 (2017)

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

nN
Pa)
On

Because this fact-finding role is integral to the SIJ process, the
Probate and Family Court judge may not decline to make special
findings if requested by an immigrant child under § 1101(a)(27)(J).
Acting within the limits of this fact-finding role, the judge must
make the special findings even if he or she suspects that the
immigrant child seeks SIJ status for a reason other than relief from
neglect, abuse, or abandonment. The immigrant child’s motiva-
tion for seeking the special findings, if relevant to the child’s
entitlement to SIJ status, ultimately will be considered by USCIS
in its review of the application. The immigrant child’s motivation
is irrelevant to the judge’s special findings.

The judge’s obligation to make the special findings also applies
regardless of whether the child presents sufficient evidence to
support a favorable finding under each of the criteria set forth in
§ 1101(a)(27)(J). See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 373 (1990),
quoting Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R., 223
U.S. 1, 57-58 (1912) (“ ‘The existence of the jurisdiction cre-
at[ed] an implication of duty to exercise it,’ . .. which could not
be overcome by disagreement with the policy of the [F]ederal
Act”). To conclude otherwise would upset the balance struck
between the State and Federal roles in the SIJ status determina-
tion, and intrude in the area of immigration that lies exclusively
within the purview of the Federal government. See Recinos, 473
Mass. at 738.

As further guidance for the judge to whom a motion for special
findings has been presented, we direct that the findings be limited
to the parent with whom the child claims reunification is not
viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Thus, where an im-
migrant child asserts in her or his motion for special findings that
reunification is not viable with only one parent, the Probate and
Family Court shall limit its findings to that parent. In the event
that the child asserts that reunification is not viable with both
parents, the court shall make findings as to both parents. In our
view, no more and no less is required of the Probate and Family
Court to meet its statutorily mandated role.

We recognize the disparate approaches among State courts to
this prong of the special findings required under the statute. Some
State courts have interpreted the statute to mean that the immi-
grant child must establish that reunification is not viable as to
both parents, while others have proceeded on the assumption that
reunification is not viable if only one parent has been shown to
have abused, neglected, or abandoned the immigrant child. See,

276 477 Mass. 268 (2017)

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

e.g., In re Israel O., 233 Cal. App. 4th 279, 288-289 (2015); In re
Estate of Nina L., 2015 IL App (1st) 152223, | 27; In re Interest
of Erick M., 284 Neb. 340, 345-346 (2012); Matter of Marcelina
M.-G. vy. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 110-111 (N.Y. 2013). We
doubt the wisdom in joining the debate among State courts over
whether the immigrant child must demonstrate that reunification
is not viable with only one or with both parents. We have
considered and are persuaded by the reasoning in the United
States’s amicus brief and by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
H.S.P., 223 N.J. at 213, that interpretation of the “[one] or both”
statutory language is not necessary. The State court’s duty to
make special findings is not dependent on the resolution of the
ambiguous language, and thus we decline to endeavor to do so.
See id. (declining to construe “[one] or both” language as used in
§ 1101[a][27][J] because “[s]uch a task is exclusively the prov-
ince of the [FJederal government”).

3. Special findings for Yosselin. In the Probate and Family
Court judge’s written judgment of dismissal on the petition for
appointment of guardianship, the judge addressed Yosselin’s mo-
tion for special findings, but only as to the viability of the parental
reunification prong. After concluding that Yosselin’s mother did
not intend to abandon her, the judge posited that the sole reason
for the guardianship petition was to allow Yosselin to request
special findings and ultimately “take advantage of the [SIJ]
[s]tatus program.” The judge went on to note,

“While it appears from her affidavit that she may have good
reasons for leaving El Salvador, as an emancipated eighteen
year old adult, Yosselin may now choose herself where she
wishes to live. She is in a voluntary living arrangement with
her uncle. The sole problem here is that she must find a legal
way to re-enter this country if in fact she is deported. This
[cJourt does not find that ‘reunification with one or both of
the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or similar basis found under State law.’ ”

Here again, the judge’s special findings determination crossed
into territory reserved to the Federal authorities. Instead of de-
termining whether Yosselin’s mother abandoned or neglected her
under Massachusetts law, the judge focused on the alleged motive
behind the petition for guardianship and the motion for special
findings. This was error, as was the judge’s failure to make find-
ings as to the dependence on the Probate and Family Court and

477 Mass. 268 (2017) 277

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

best interests prongs of the special findings as required by
§ 1101(a)(27)()@)-Gi). The Probate and Family Court judge
must make factual findings as to all three prongs of the special
findings analysis, under all circumstances. Therefore, we reverse
and remand Yosselin’s case to the Probate and Family Court for
further fact finding consistent with this opinion.

Moreover, although Yosselin asserted in her motion for special
findings that reunification is not viable due to abuse and neglect
by her mother, the record establishes that Yosselin also filed a
motion for special findings as to her father. Yosselin is entitled to
special findings on this motion as well, regardless of whether
reunification with the mother is viable. To ensure that Yosselin,
who is approaching her twenty-first birthday, may timely exercise
her right to seek SIJ status, the Probate and Family Court shall
conduct a hearing forthwith on both motions for special findings.
While we express no view as to the substance of the special find-
ings as to the mother, we note the judge’s acknowledgement that
Yosselin has never known her father and that, in fact, he is
“unknown.” In these circumstances, a finding that reunification
with the father is not viable due to neglect or abandonment is
difficult to avoid.

4. Special findings for E.G. In E.G.’s case, the Probate and
Family Court judge failed to make any factual findings with
respect to E.G.’s motion for special findings. Based on the record,
the judge’s reason for declining to make the special findings was
due, at least in part, to the fact that E.G. is in her mother’s
custody. As we have said here, such a rationale for declining to
make special findings is inconsistent with the role of the Probate
and Family Court under § 1101(a)(27)(J). Therefore, we reverse
and remand E.G.’s case to the Probate and Family Court for
further fact finding consistent with this opinion.

Because the Probate and Family Court judge declined to make
special findings based on her review of documentary evidence,
we “stand[] in the same position as did the [motion] judge” with
respect to evaluating the written evidence and reaching a conclusion
as to the special findings determination. See Commonwealth v.
Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004), quoting Berry v. Kyes, 304 Mass.
56, 57 (1939). Accordingly, we direct the Probate and Family
Court judge to make the following findings: (1) E.G. is dependent
on the Probate and Family Court; (2) E.G.’s reunification with her
father is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and (3)
it is not in E.G.’s best interest to return to Guatemala.

278 477 Mass. 268 (2017)

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

Based on the record before us, it is clear that E.G.’s father, the
parent on whom the allegation of neglect and abandonment is
predicated, has at the very least neglected, if not also abandoned,
the child. The Massachusetts Code of Regulations defines “[n]e-
glect” as

“failure by a caretaker, either deliberately or through negli-
gence or inability, to take those actions necessary to provide
a child with minimally adequate food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, supervision, emotional stability and growth, or
other essential care; provided, however, that such inability is
not due solely to inadequate economic resources or solely to
the existence of a handicapping condition” (emphasis in
original).

110 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.00 (2008). Since E.G.’s birth, Lopez
has made no attempt to establish a parental relationship with E.G.
or materially support her in a meaningful way. Prior to appearing
for a court-ordered paternity test, Lopez made no effort to even
meet E.G., despite her presence in Massachusetts.

Because it is clear from the record that Lopez has, at the very
least, neglected E.G., she is, as a matter of law, “dependent on the
Probate and Family Court for the opportunity to obtain relief.”
Recinos, 473 Mass. at 743. With respect to the second inquiry —
whether E.G.’s reunification with “[one] or both” of her parents
is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment — we
reiterate that the court’s findings will be limited to E.G.’s father.
Thus, the fact that E.G. lives in the United States with her mother
has no bearing on the judge’s duty to make the special findings,
or the substance of the finding. Accordingly, E.G. meets the
criteria for the second prong of the special findings analysis.

Last, the record clearly establishes that E.G.’s interests are not
best served by returning to Guatemala, the country of origin. If
returned to Guatemala, E.G. would, once again, live with little if
any adult supervision. In fact, her circumstances if forced to
return to Guatemala would be even more dire considering that her
adolescent brother, who looked after her when the two were
living in Guatemala, also lives in the United States.

5. Guardianship. Marvin also urges this court to find error in
the Probate and Family Court judge’s dismissal on the petition for
appointment of a guardian. Because the outcome of the guardi-
anship petition has no bearing on the outcome of this case, we

477 Mass. 268 (2017) 279

Guardianship of Penate. Department of Revenue ¥. Lopez

decline to reach the issue.'? First, any guardianship would have
terminated on Yosselin’s eighteenth birthday. Second, under
Recinos, 473 Mass. at 743, if Yosselin can establish that reunifi-
cation with her mother or father is not viable due to abuse,
neglect, or abandonment, she as a matter of law is dependent on
the Probate and Family Court for the opportunity to obtain SIJ
status relief.

Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judg-
ments of the Probate and Family Court as to E.G.’s and
Yosselin’s motions for special findings, and remand the matters
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

12We also decline to issue a stay sua sponte, as amici urge, for two reasons.
First, although Marvin moved for a stay below, he has not moved for a
reconsideration of the denial of the motion, nor has he raised the issue in his
brief on appeal. Second, amici’s arguments fail to justify a stay sua sponte.

280 477 Mass. 280 (2017)

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

PropLe For THE EruicaL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC. vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL Resources & another."

Suffolk. February 6, 2017. - June 14, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.l., Lenk, Gaztano, Lowy, & Bunp, JI.

Public Records. Agriculture. Animal. Statute, Construction. Privacy.

This court concluded that application of the public safety exemption in G. L.
c. 4, §7, Twenty-sixth (n), to the disclosure of information contained in
public records required analysis of the exemption’s two prongs together,
given the inverse correlation between them (ie., the more that a record
sought resembles the records enumerated in the statute, the lower the burden
on the custodian of those records in demonstrating that it exercised reason-
able judgment in determining that disclosure of the record was likely to
jeopardize public safety, and vice versa); therefore, this court vacated the
determination made in a civil action that names, addresses, telephone num-
bers, and other information contained in animal health certificates in the
custody of the Department of Agricultural Resources were exempt from
disclosure and remanded the matter for further consideration. [286-291]

‘This court vacated the determination made in a civil action seeking information
contained in animal health certificates in the custody of the Department of
Agricultural Resources, that the privacy exemption in G. L. c. 4, § 7,
‘Twenty-sixth (c), to the disclosure of information contained in public records
permitted the redaction of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers
identifying persons as consignees, consignors, or veterinarians, and re-
manded the matter for consideration whether the redacted information per-
tained to home or business addresses of public or private entities; whether,
and to what extent, that information was available from other sources; and
whether, and to what extent, the defendant could identify specific informa-
tion demonstrating that a significant risk to an individual's personal safety
was posed by the disclosure of a home address or telephone number that
might be among the redacted information, [291-295]

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
October 14, 2014.

The case was heard by Christopher J. Muse, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

David Milton for the plaintiff.

4Commissioner of the Department of Agricultural Resources.

477 Mass. 280 (2017) 281

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.

Laura Rétolo & Jessie Rossman, for American Civil Liberties
Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Jessica White, for Prisoners’ Legal Services of Massachusetts,
amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Lenk, J. This case concerns the scope of two exemptions from
the statutory definition of “public records.” Specifically, it probes
whether information, such as names, addresses, telephone num-
bers, and other information, contained on animal health certifi-
cates in the custody of the Department of Agricultural Resources,
is subject to disclosure in response to a public records request. A
Superior Court judge determined that such information is pro-
tected from disclosure under statutory exemptions G. L. c. 4, § 7,
Twenty-sixth (1) and (c), implicating, respectively, public safety
and privacy. For the reasons that follow, we vacate that order and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Background. 1. Public records framework. At all times rel-
evant to this case, two statutes governed access to public records:
G. L. c. 66, § 10, and G. L. c. 4, § 7.2 General Laws c. 66, § 10,
sets forth the conditions under which government entities,
through their records custodians, must provide access to public
records. “The primary purpose of G. L. c. 66, § 10, is to give the
public broad access to governmental records.” Worcester Tel. &
Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 436 Mass. 378,
382-383 (2002).

The term “public records,” in turn, is defined by G. L. c. 4, § 7,
Twenty-sixth. The definition sweeps in a wide array of documents
and data made or received by employees, agencies, or other
instrumentalities of the Commonwealth. See Hull Mun. Lighting

2We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts and Prisoners’ Legal Services of Massachusetts.

"Since the entry of judgment in this case, G. L. c. 66, § 10, has been
substantially revised, with the changes taking effect on January 1, 2017. Com-
pare G. L. c. 66, § 10, as amended by St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 58-59, with G. L.
c. 66, §§ 10, 10A, as amended by St. 2016, ¢. 121. General Laws c. 4, § 7,
‘Twenty-sixth (n) (exemption [n]), also has been revised, albeit in a less sub-
stantial way. See St. 2016, c. 121, $§ 1-3 (inserting phrase “cyber security” into
exemption [n]). This opinion refers to the versions of G. L. c. 66, § 10, and G. L.
c. 4, § 7, that existed through 2015, the time period relevant to the adjudication
of the plaintiffs public records request, Although not raised by the parties and
while the point need not be settled today, it appears that, going forward, such
revisions would not significantly alter our analysis as to the exemptions and
their application.

282 477 Mass. 280 (2017)

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 414 Mass.
609, 614 (1993), citing G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (1990 ed.).
This expansive definition of “public records” is statutorily limited
by twenty enumerated exemptions in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth
(a)-(u).

Together, these statutes, and our cases interpreting them, favor
disclosure of public records in two primary ways. First, G. L.
c. 66, § 10, imposes a presumption that the record sought is public
and places the burden on the records custodian to “prove with
specificity” that an exemption applies. G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c). To
that end, “a case-by-case review is required to determine whether
an exemption applies.” Matter of a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 445
Mass. 685, 688 (2006). Second, the statutory exemptions in G. L.
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, are to be “strictly construed.” Hull Mun.
Lighting Plant, 414 Mass. at 614.

The two statutory exemptions at issue in this case are found in
subsections (1) (exemption [7]) and (c) (exemption [c]) of G. L.
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. Exemption (7) concerns records related to
public safety. Specifically, it allows a records custodian to with-
hold an otherwise public record if the record is sufficiently related
to the safety or security of persons or infrastructure, and if
disclosure of the record, in the “reasonable judgment of the record
custodian,” is “likely to jeopardize public safety.” G. L. c. 4, § 7,
Twenty-sixth (7).

Exemption (c) concerns records related to privacy. It permits a
records custodian to withhold an otherwise public record if it is a
personnel or medical file, or if it relates to a specifically named
individual and its disclosure may constitute an unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy. G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c).

These two exemptions share a common characteristic in that
they both require consideration of the likely consequences of
releasing the record sought. Exemption (7), however, is unique
among the statutory public records exemptions in including the
“reasonable judgment of the record custodian” as part of the
calculation. See generally G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.

2. Facts. In February, 2014, People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, Inc. (PETA), submitted two requests under G. L. c. 66,
§ 10, to the Department of Agricultural Resources (department).
The first sought access to “any and all permits, licenses, health
certificates, and other documentation related to the export and/or
import of nonhuman primates in Massachusetts during 2013.”
The second sought access to “all records referencing, reflecting,

477 Mass. 280 (2017) 283

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

or relating to alleged or claimed safety risks posed to animals
(including but not limited to nonhuman primates), people and
buildings involved with housing and transporting non-human
primates.”

The department responded in April, 2014. With respect to the
first request, the department provided copies of eleven pages of
interstate health certificates for nonhuman primates. The depart-
ment redacted from the certificates three categories of informa-
tion: (1) the names and addresses of consignors and consignees,
(2) United States Department of Agriculture license or registra-
tion numbers, and (3) the names, addresses, telephone numbers,
and license numbers of all veterinarians whose information ap-
peared on the health certificates.* The department expressed its
view that disclosing such information “could compromise the
security of locations housing non-human primates, thus increas-
ing the risk to public safety of the animals as well as the people
and buildings involved with housing and transporting the ani-
mals.” As a result, the department believed the information was
exempt from the definition of “public records” pursuant to ex-
emption (7).

The department’s response also referenced, and provided a
copy of, a 2013 memorandum from the United States Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA memorandum). In the VA memorandum,
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Office of the Veterans
Health Administration advised its FOIA field officers “not to
release any personal information” about “personnel engaged in
any way in animal research in response to requests for that
information.”

With respect to PETA’s second request, the department stated
that it did not have any records regarding alleged or claimed
safety risks posed to animals, people, or buildings involved with
the housing and transport of nonhuman primates.

PETA appealed from the department’s response to the super-
visor of public records, pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b). In June,
2014, the supervisor of public records resolved the appeal in the
department’s favor, noting its reliance on the VA memorandum
and upholding its redactions. The supervisor of public records
stated that “[a]lthough the FOIA exemptions cited in the [VA]

4Although not specified in this initial response, the Department of Agricul-
tural Resources (department) later asserted that the redacted information en-
compassed information pertaining to both facilities and specifically named
individuals.

284 477 Mass. 280 (2017)

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

memorandum are not available to the [dJepartment as a means of
responding to [PETA’s] request, the manner in which this infor-
mation is treated by the [F]ederal government is persuasive when
examining the [d]epartment’s [e]xemption (7) claim.”

3. Procedural history. In October, 2014, PETA filed a com-
plaint in the Superior Court challenging the department’s redac-
tions and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, per G. L.
c. 66, § 10 (b). In essence, the complaint alleged that the depart-
ment had failed to meet its burden of showing that the sole
exemption it relied on in making the redactions — exemption (n)
— applied to the redacted information, and therefore that the
department’s refusal to provide unredacted copies of the health
certificates violated G. L. c. 66, § 10.

After answering the complaint, the department filed an emer-
gency motion for a protective order to stay discovery. The de-
partment argued that discovery was unnecessary because it had
relied on only three documents in determining that exemption (1)
applied: (1) the VA memorandum, discussed supra; (2) a 2013
decision of the supervisor of public records applying exemption
(n) to an earlier, similar public records request from PETA; and
(3) a 2013 memorandum from the department’s legal division
explaining its view that exemption (n), as well as the privacy
exemption under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012), authorized
the withholding of much, but not all, of the information redacted
from PETA’s 2014 request. PETA opposed the motion, arguing
primarily that exemption (7) requires a fact-intensive inquiry that
justified its discovery requests. After a hearing, the Superior
Court judge deferred ruling on the motion in order to allow the
department to file a “comprehensive statement in support of its
reasons” for claiming that exemption (7) applied, as well as an
anticipated dispositive motion.

The department then filed a memorandum in support of its
motion. In it, the department argued that it properly relied on
exemption (7) in redacting the information described above. It
also argued, for the first time, that exemption (c) authorized the
redaction of names, addresses, and telephone numbers pertaining
to individuals (as opposed to facilities), which also appeared on
the health certificates. PETA argued in opposition that neither

®Specifically, this memorandum expressed the view that the name, address,
and telephone number of the consignor “can be disclosed” under State and
Federal law. With respect to PETA’s 2014 request, however, such information
was redacted.

477 Mass. 280 (2017) 285

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

exemption applied. Both sides attached numerous exhibits to their
memoranda.

After another hearing, the judge ruled largely in the department's
favor. He determined that because exemption (7) includes such
“deferential language” as “reasonable judgment” and “likely to
jeopardize public safety,” it required the court to give “a heightened
level of deference to the keeper and supervisor of public records.”
Thus, based on the VA memorandum and other documents sub-
mitted by the department, the judge concluded that the department
had demonstrated with sufficient specificity that, in the depart-
ment’s reasonable judgment, release of information on the health
certificates pertaining to “persons and facilities located in the
Commonwealth” was likely to jeopardize public safety, and there-
fore was protected under exemption (n).° Further, the judge con-
cluded that the names, addresses, and telephone numbers ident-
ifying individual persons as consignees, consignors, or veterinarians
are protected from disclosure under exemption (c).7

PETA appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our
own motion.

Discussion. It is uncontested that the animal health certificates
that PETA requested fall within the general definition of “public
records.” Thus, despite its unusual procedural background,® this
appeal turns on two questions of statutory construction: the scope
of exemptions (1) and (c).° We exercise de novo review of such

©The judge also concluded that similar information related to persons and
facilities located outside of Massachusetts was not protected by exemption (n).
Neither party appeals from this component of the judgment. Therefore, we do
not review it.

7The decision below does not discuss whether other information redacted
from the certificates, such as license numbers, accreditation numbers, permit
numbers, and premises identification numbers, fall within the scope of the
claimed exemptions. Nor do the parties discuss those pieces of information in
their briefs. Accordingly, we do not address them here.

*Primarily, this appeal requires us to review the grant of judgment to the
department. It is unclear on the record before us precisely which rule of the
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure the judge relied upon in granting
judgment to the department. Even assuming, as the parties urge, that the judge
effectively granted summary judgment to the department, our approach would
be the same because, given our interpretation today of the scope of exemptions
(n) and (c), it cannot be said that “the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law” (citation omitted). Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v.
Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 564 (2010).

®PETA also argues that the judge abused his discretion by entering judgment
in the department’s favor without permitting PETA further development of the

286 477 Mass. 280 (2017)

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

questions. See Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 569-570
(2015).

1. Exemption (n). Exemption (1) contemplates the withholding
of

“records, including, but not limited to, blueprints, plans, poli-
cies, procedures and schematic drawings, which relate to
internal layout and structural elements, security measures,
emergency preparedness, threat or vulnerability assessments,
or any other records relating to the security or safety of
persons or buildings, structures, facilities, utilities, transpor-
tation or other infrastructure located within the common-
wealth, the disclosure of which, in the reasonable judgment
of the record custodian, subject to review by the supervisor
of public records under [G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b)], is likely to
jeopardize public safety.”

G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (1).

The parties essentially agree that applying this exemption re-
quires a two-part analysis. First, it requires a threshold determi-
nation concerning the nature of the requested record. Id. Second,
it requires the records custodian to exercise “reasonable judg-
ment” in determining that disclosure of the requested record is
“likely to jeopardize public safety.” Jd.

That being said, however, the parties disagree as to precisely
what these two components mean, the relationship between them,
and whether they were satisfied in this case. In particular, they
disagree about whether the animal health certificates that PETA
requested are swept within the scope of the exemption by the
“any other records” clause. Further, they disagree about what
constitutes “reasonable judgment” in predicting “jeopard[y] [to]
public safety,” terms that are not defined in the statute.

Construing the scope of exemption (7) appears to be a question
of first impression for this court. “Our primary duty is to interpret
a statute in accordance with the intent of the Legislature.” Pyle v.
School Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285 (1996). Dis-
cerning the intent of the Legislature with respect to exemption (1)
requires us to examine the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage, and to draw upon the canons of construction known as

factual record through discovery. On remand, the judge should consider whether
additional discovery may be necessary or appropriate in light of the scope of the
relevant exemptions discussed in this opinion.

477 Mass. 280 (2017) 287

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

noscitur a sociis (“it is known by its associates”) and ejusdem
generis (“of the same kind or class”), as well as the legislative
history of the enactment. See Black’s Law Dictionary 631, 1224
(10th ed. 2014).

We begin by examining the plain meaning of the statutory
language, for if that language is “clear and unambiguous, it is
conclusive as to the intent of the Legislature.” Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, 471 Mass. 248, 253
(2015). Upon examining the language of exemption (n), however,
it is immediately apparent that the language is neither clear nor
unambiguous as to the scope of the exemption.

With respect to the first part of exemption (7), we confront a
general term (“records”), followed by a nonexhaustive list of
specific examples, followed by the general phrase “or any other
records relating to the security or safety of persons or buildings.”
G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (7). As the department points out, if
we focus too closely on the listed examples, we risk giving too
little weight to the Legislature’s decision to include the “any
other records” clause, thereby improperly narrowing the scope of
exemption (7). On the other hand, as PETA points out, if we focus
too closely on the breadth suggested by the “any other records”
clause, we risk giving too little weight to the list of examples that
the Legislature saw fit to include, thereby improperly expanding
exemption (7) beyond what the Legislature intended. The latter
approach also would contravene our usual practice of interpreting
exemptions to the public records laws narrowly. See Hull Mun.
Lighting Plant, 414 Mass. at 614. With respect to the second part
of exemption (7), the language of the statute offers no specific
guidance as to what the Legislature intended by the phrases
“reasonable judgment” and “likely to jeopardize public safety.”
G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (7).

When faced with a similar interpretive issue in the past, we
have, on occasion, applied the canon of noscitur a sociis, which
counsels that “ordinarily the coupling of words denotes an inten-
tion that they should be understood in the same general sense.”
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 432 (2011), quoting
2A N.J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:16, at
352-353 (7th ed. 2007). In other words,

“[a] general term in a statute or ordinance takes meaning
from the setting in which it is employed. The literal meaning
of a general term in an enactment must be limited so as not

288 477 Mass. 280 (2017)

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

to include matters that, although within the letter of the
enactment, do not fairly come within its spirit and intent.”

Kenney v. Building Comm’r of Melrose, 315 Mass. 291, 295
(1943). We also have applied a close relative of this doctrine
known as ejusdem generis. See Banushi v. Dorfman, 438 Mass.
242, 244 (2002). This canon counsels that “[w]here general words
follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general
words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” /d.,
quoting 2A N.J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:17,
at 273-274 (6th ed. 2000).

Applying those canons here suggests a narrow interpretation of
exemption (7). In particular, they caution against interpreting the
general language regarding “any other records relating to the
security or safety of persons or buildings” as enlarging the scope
of the statute beyond the legislative raison d’étre evinced by the
enumerated list of examples. In other words, while the class of
records that may qualify for exemption (7) is open, and not
closed, we must interpret the “any other records” clause as
embracing only those records that, when released, are “likely to
jeopardize public safety” in a similar way to one of the examples
listed in exemption (1).

Where, as here, the language of a statute itself is not conclusive
as to the Legislature’s intent, we also may seek guidance from the
legislative history. ENGIE Gas & LNG LLC v. Department of
Pub. Utils., 475 Mass. 191, 199-200 (2016). Much of that history
further supports a narrow interpretation of exemption (7).

Exemption (7) was enacted as one of twelve sections in “An
Act providing protections against terrorism” (act). See St. 2002,
c. 313. That title speaks for itself in terms of the Legislature’s
thinking at the time it adopted exemption (n). Its thrust is rein-
forced by other contextual clues, including the timing of the
enactment and contemporaneous media coverage. Specifically,
the act was passed by the Legislature and signed into law in
September, 2002 — the one-year anniversary of the September
11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
See Anti-Terror Bill Sent to [then Acting Governor Jane M.]
Swift’s Desk, State House News Service, Sept. 3, 2002; Swift
Signs Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Executive Department Press
Release, Sept. 10, 2002.

The preenactment history behind exemption (7) corroborates
the notion that protecting the public from terrorist attacks in a

477 Mass. 280 (2017) 289

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

post-September 11, 2001, world was the animating principle un-
derlying its adoption. Exemption (7) was proposed by Acting
Governor Swift. See Letter from Acting Governor Swift to Senate
and House of Representatives, June 26, 2002. The letter makes
clear that the acting Governor believed that such an exemption
was necessary following the events of September 11, 2001. Jd.
She described the legislation as “carv[ing] out a very narrow
exemption to the definition of public records for those materials
pertaining to public safety including threat assessments, security
plans and certain records depicting critical infrastructure.” Jd. The
letter indicates that the acting Governor had in mind “certain
records pertaining to state and local government’s ability to
protect its resources as well as other sensitive infrastructure” and
hoped to “encourage private industries to share sensitive infor-
mation regarding their respective security plans with law enforce-
ment without the risk of automatic public disclosure.” Id. Simi-
larly, the Executive Office of Public Safety described exemption
(n) as encompassing records of “the type that terrorists would find
useful to maximize damage, such as threat assessments, security
plans and structural documents depicting critical infrastruc-
ture.”!° Memorandum, Executive Office of Public Safety, Sep-
tember 5, 2002 (EOPS Memorandum).

Given this legislative history and the canons of statutory con-
struction operative here, we conclude that the following construc-
tion of exemption (7) strikes the appropriate balance.

The first prong of exemption (7) probes whether, and to what
degree, the record sought resembles the records listed as ex-
amples in the statute. The touchstone of this inquiry is whether,
and to what degree, the record is one a terrorist “would find useful
to maximize damage,” EOPS Memorandum, and in that sense
jeopardize public safety.

10The Legislature’s only substantive change to the language that Acting
Governor Swift proposed for exemption (n) was to modify the “reasonable
judgment of the record custodian” by adding the phrase “subject to review by the
supervisor of public records [G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b)].” See Amendment to House
Doce. No. 5272 dated July 24, 2002. While any decision by a records custodian
to withhold records already was subject to review by the supervisor of public
records, see G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b), the Legislature’s emphasis on the availability
of such review indicates its understanding that exemption (n) was not an
unbounded, unreviewable expansion of the discretion of records custodians.

“The statutory language makes clear that this jeopardy to public safety
contemplates damage to “persons or buildings . . . or other infrastructure.” G. L.
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (n).

290 477 Mass. 280 (2017)

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

The second prong of exemption (7) probes the factual and
contextual support for the proposition that disclosure of the
record is “likely to jeopardize public safety.” G. L. c. 4, §7,
Twenty-sixth (7). Because the records custodian must exercise
“reasonable judgment” in making that determination, the primary
focus on review is whether the custodian has provided sufficient
factual heft for the supervisor of public records or the reviewing
court to conclude that a reasonable person would agree with the
custodian’s determination given the context of the particular
case.

These two prongs of exemption (n) must be analyzed together,
because there is an inverse correlation between them. That is, the
more the record sought resembles the records enumerated in
exemption (7), the lower the custodian’s burden in demonstrating
“reasonable judgment” — and vice versa.

In some cases, the first prong of exemption (7) will yield a
strong resemblance between the record sought and the types of
records listed in the statute — for instance, when a requestor
seeks access to exactly one of the types of records listed in
exemption (7), such as a blueprint or emergency preparedness
plan. In those cases, with respect to the second prong of exemp-
tion (7), the custodian still bears the burden of demonstrating that
it exercised “reasonable judgment” in determining that disclosure
of the record is “likely to jeopardize public safety,” G. L. c. 4, § 7,
Twenty-sixth (7). But this burden will be at its lowest.

Conversely, as the resemblance between the record sought and
the listed examples in exemption (n) decreases, the custodian’s
burden for demonstrating “reasonable judgment” increases. Thus,
when the requested record bears little or no resemblance to the
listed examples, the custodian’s burden for demonstrating that it
exercised “reasonable judgment” in determining that disclosure
of the record is “likely to jeopardize public safety” will be at its

12Ohn this point, we observe that the Secretary of the Commonwealth, through
regulations and a guide, appears to view exemption (n) as uniquely permitting
a records custodian to inquire into the requestor’s purpose for seeking a
particular record before determining whether to release it. See 950 Code Mass.
Regs. § 32.06(2)(h)(1) (2017); Secretary of the Commonwealth, Division of
Public Records, A Guide to the Massachusetts Public Records Law 27 (updated
Jan. 2017). We do not decide whether this inquiry is appropriate, as that issue
is not directly before us. We note, however, that nothing we have discovered in
our review of the legislative history indicated an intent to depart radically from
the typical public records procedure, which would not permit such an inquiry.
See 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 32.06(2)(h). See also note 10, supra.

477 Mass. 280 (2017) 291

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

highest.

We recognize that the Superior Court judge did not have the
benefit of our construction of exemption (n) when he granted
judgment to the department. Therefore, we vacate the decision
and remand the matter for consideration of PETA’s request in
light of this opinion. See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 660, 666
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (reversing and re-
manding for further consideration in light of court’s interpretation
of governing statute).

In this regard, it is well to note that exemption (7) is unique
among the public records exemptions in its inclusion of the
phrase “reasonable judgment of the record custodian.” See gen-
erally G. L.c 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. Such language neither requires
or even invites any heightened level of deference to the records
custodian’s initial determination whether to disclose or withhold
a record. Rather, we agree with the department’s concession at
oral argument: that a court should review the custodian’s deter-
mination de novo. Cf. Wakefield Teachers Ass'n v. School Comm.
of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 796 (2000) (application of statutory
exemption from definition of “public records” is question of
statutory interpretation); Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473 Mass.
86, 89-90, 96 (2015) (following supervisor of public records’
decision, court reviewed de novo order allowing judgment on
pleadings).

2. Exemption (c). The judge also approved the department’s
redaction of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers ident-
ifying individual persons as consignees, consignors, or veterinar-
ians. The judge concluded that exemption (c) protects such in-
formation from disclosure because the identified individuals “have
a considerable privacy interest in their identities, addresses, and
telephone numbers” that is not substantially outweighed by the
public interest in releasing that information.

Unlike exemption (1), exemption (c) previously has been the
subject of our consideration in a number of different contexts.
Exemption (c) permits the withholding of “personnel and medical
files or information,” as well as “any other materials or data
relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of
which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy.” G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c).

Exemption (c) requires a balancing test: where the public in-
terest in obtaining the requested information substantially out-
weighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private

292 477 Mass. 280 (2017)

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

interest in preventing disclosure must yield. See Champa, 473
Mass. at 96. On one side of the scale, we have looked to three
factors to assess the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1)
whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an
individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials
sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature;"® and
(3) whether the same information is available from other sources.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 419 Mass.
852, 858 (1995). We have also said that “other case-specific
relevant factors” may influence the calculus. Jd. On the other side
of the scale, we have said that the public has a recognized interest
in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties
in a law-abiding and efficient manner." Id.

PETA argues that the judge erred by presuming that publicly
available business contact information implicated a privacy in-
terest, and thereby inappropriately shifted the burden to PETA to
show that the public interest in disclosure substantially out-
weighed a nonexistent privacy interest. The department did not
advance a privacy rationale until well after it made the redactions
in question. Nevertheless, it now urges us to adopt the judge’s
reasoning that the information in question does implicate a mea-
surable privacy interest (stemming from the purported safety
risks associated with releasing such information), and that this
privacy interest is not substantially outweighed by any public
interest in the release of the information.

Exemption (c) requires a nuanced analysis. At the outset, the
application of exemption (c) in this case must account for the
difference between the privacy interest in one’s home address and

8 ooking to the Federal counterpart to exemption (c) as a guide, we have
said that such “intimate details” may include “marital status, legitimacy of
children, identity of fathers of children, medical condition, welfare payments,
alcohol consumption, family fights, [and] reputation” (citations omitted). Attor-
ney Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of the Real Prop. Dep’t of Boston, 380 Mass. 623,
626 n.2 (1980), and cases cited. We also have said that the “[nJames and
addresses of adults are not ‘intimate details’ of a ‘highly personal nature’ ”
(citation omitted). Cape Cod Times v. Sheriff of Barnstable County, 443 Mass.
587, 595 (2005).

MPETA has not attempted to articulate a public interest in obtaining the
information sought. Instead, it has argued that because there is no privacy
interest whatsoever in business contact information, the burden has not yet
shifted to PETA to articulate a public interest that might overcome the privacy
interest. Accordingly, if the judge on remand finds some privacy interest does
exist in the redacted information, PETA must be afforded an opportunity to
articulate a public interest on the other side of the balancing test.

477 Mass. 280 (2017) 293

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

the privacy interest in one’s business address.‘* Compare Federal
Labor Relations Auth. v. United States Dep’t of Navy, Naval
Communications Unit Cutler, E. Machias, Me., 941 F2d 49,
55-56 (Ist Cir. 1991) (privacy interest in one’s name and home
address is “discernible” and “real enough to be worthy of recog-
nition and protection in appropriate circumstances”), with Cape
Cod Times vy. Sheriff of Barnstable County, 443 Mass. 587, 595
(2005) (“Names and addresses of adults are not ‘intimate details’
of a ‘highly personal nature,’ ” therefore exemption [c] “does not
bar inspection of records containing the names and addresses of
individuals who serve as reserve deputy sheriffs” [citation omit-
ted]); Pottle v. School Comm. of Braintree, 395 Mass. 861, 864
(1985) (public school employees’ names and home addresses do
not fall within exemption [c]); and Hastings & Sons Publ. Co. v.
City Treasurer of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812, 818 (1978) (municipal
payroll records, which included names and addresses of employ-
ees, “not the kind of private facts that the Legislature intended to
exempt from mandatory disclosure” with exemption [c]).

We acknowledge that cases like Cape Cod Times and Pottle
dealt with the home addresses of public employees, whereas this
case appears to implicate the business addresses of nonpublic
employees. See Georgiou v. Commissioner of the Dep’t of Indus.
Accs., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 435-436 (2006) (recognizing pub-
lic employees’ diminished expectation of privacy in certain in-
formation). But exemptions to the public records laws must be
applied on a case-by-case basis, Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp.,
436 Mass. at 383-384, and “the same information about a person,
such as his name and address, might be protected from disclosure
as an unwarranted invasion of privacy in one context and not in
another.” Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984). Accor-
dingly, the exemption (c) balancing test in this case should account
for the different privacy interests in a home address versus a
business address, and held by a public employee versus a private

‘5PETA appears to assume that the redacted information related to individuals
(as opposed to facilities) pertains only to their place of business; the department
does not directly refute this point. Because of the department’s redactions, the
record itself sheds no light on the subject. On remand, in order to allow the judge
to calibrate the privacy balancing test properly, the parties may stipulate as to the
precise nature of this information, or the judge may employ some other mecha-
nism, such as in camera review, for discerning the nature of the information
sought. See Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 436
Mass. 378, 384-385 (2002) (discussing various mechanisms for judicial inspec-
tion).

294 477 Mass. 280 (2017)

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

one.

Relatedly, the exemption (c) balancing test must account for the
fact that the gravity of any putative invasion of privacy resulting
from disclosure of the records sought may be reduced if “sub-
stantially the same information is available from other sources.”
Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 157 (1979).
Indeed, one reason that a person’s business address normally will
give rise to a lower privacy interest than her home address is that
business addresses typically are widely shared with others and, in
this case at least, may well be exposed to scrutiny by researchers,
government agencies, shippers, and possibly others.1® See Brown
v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223, 1235 (10th Cir. 2016) (“It is not intuitive
to us that the referee physicians possess a cognizable privacy
interest in their business addresses — after all, it is in their
economic interests to make their office locations generally avail-
able to the public, so that patients can visit for evaluation and
treatment”).

Finally, the department raises the suggestion that risks to the
personal safety of individuals from the release of certain re-
quested information should be factored into the exemption (c)
balancing calculus. Given the record and the briefs before us, it is
a suggestion to be approached quite gingerly.

On the one hand, we have not located any cases of this court
interpreting or applying exemption (c) in the way the department
proposes. Indeed, our cases have cabined the scope of exemption
(c) in a way that would seem to minimize the relevance of
potential security concerns to the privacy calculus.'” See, e.g.,
Hastings & Sons Publ. Co., 374 Mass. at 817-818 (municipal

16The department's observation that “PETA does not suggest that the iden-
tities of the same persons identified in the certificates at issue here have already
been disclosed” rings somewhat hollow; PETA could not know the identities on
the certificates because the department redacted them. If the department decides
to pursue that point on remand, it carries the burden of showing that the
exemption applies, See G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c). Consequently, as mentioned in note
15, supra, some type of stipulation or in camera inspection might be necessary
to determine whether some or all of the information is already available in the
public domain before a ruling on the privacy exemption is possible.

17] appears that precisely such concerns motivated the adoption, in 1996, of
G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d), third par., as amended through St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 58-59,
which, at the time relevant to this case, exempted from the definition of “public
records” the “home address and home telephone number of law enforcement,
judicial, prosecutorial, . . . and any other public safety and criminal justice
system personnel.” See, ¢.g., Memorandum, Office of the Governor’s Legal
Counsel, Mar. 12, 1996 (subsection [d], third par. aimed “to protect persons

477 Mass. 280 (2017) 295

People for the Ethical ‘Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources.

police officers’ names and addresses not protected by exemption
[c]); Cape Cod Times, 443 Mass. at 594 (same regarding names
and addresses of reserve deputy sheriffs). On the other hand, we
have said that “the same information about a person, such as his
name and address, might be protected from disclosure as an
unwarranted invasion of privacy in one context and not in an-
other.” Torres, 391 Mass. at 9. Accordingly, we are unwilling to
eliminate wholly the possibility that, in very limited circum-
stances where the department can identify specific information
demonstrating that a significant risk to an individual’s personal
safety is posed by the disclosure of a home address or telephone
number, that non-dispositive factor can add weight to whatever
privacy interest exists on that side of the balancing test.

In sum, the exemption (c) analysis should be tailored to the
several “case-specific relevant factors,” Globe Newspaper Co.,
419 Mass. at 858, that PETA’s request presents. Among them are
(1) whether the redacted information pertains to home or business
addresses of public or private entities; (2) whether, and to what
extent, that information is available from other sources; and (3)
whether, and to what extent, the department can identify specific
information demonstrating that a significant risk to an individu-
al’s personal safety is posed by the disclosure of a home address
or telephone number that may be among the redacted informa-
tion.

Conclusion. The entry of judgment for the defendant is vacated
and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

whose employment might subject them or their family members to harassment
or retaliation”),

296 477 Mass. 296 (2017)

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

AIDS Support Group or Care Cop, Inc. vs. Town oF
BarnstaB_e & others.!

Barnstable. February 14, 2017. - June 14, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Luvx, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Hypodermic Needle.

This court concluded that neither G. L. c. 94C, § 27, nor G. L. c. 111, § 215,
prohibited private individuals or organizations from distributing free hypo-
dermic needles, where the plain language of the statutes did not proscribe the
free distribution of hypodermic needles by a private individual or organiza-
tion that does not operate a program implemented by the Department of
Public Health (department), and where nothing in the legislative history,
including amendments made in 2006, revealed a legislative intent to restrict
access to needles only to sales pursuant to § 27 or distribution by a depart-
ment-approved needle exchange program pursuant to § 215, [299-306]

Civ. acrion commenced in the Superior Court Department on
November 10, 2015.

A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Raymond
P. Veary, Jr., J., and the case was reported to the Appeals Court
by Robert C. Rufo, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Bennett H. Klein (Andrew Musgrave also present) for the
plaintiff.

Charles S$. McLaughlin, Jr., Assistant Town Attorney (Ruth J.
Weil, Town Attorney, also present) for the defendants.

Andrew H. DeVoogd, Kate F. Stewart, & Tiffany M. Knapp, for
Massachusetts Infectious Diseases Society & others, amici cur-
iae, submitted a brief.

Lenk, J. Prior to 2006, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, provided criminal
penalties for the possession, delivery, sale, or exchange of hypo-
dermic needles without a prescription. In 2006, the Legislature
amended the statute to regulate only the sale of such needles,
thereby decriminalizing, inter alia, the possession of hypodermic
needles. See St. 2006, c. 172, §§ 2, 3 (2006 act).

*Board of health of Barnstable and director of public health of Barnstable.

477 Mass. 296 (2017) 297

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

Since 2009, AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. (ASGCC),
has been operating a free hypodermic needle “access” program in
Hyannis, a village in Barnstable. It provides clean syringes with-
out charge to those who use intravenous drugs, in order to prevent
the spread of diseases such as human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) and hepatitis C. Claiming that ASGCC, which did not first
seek local approval of its program, is in violation of two State
statutes, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, and G. L. c. 111, § 215, the town of
Barnstable? (town) ordered the cessation of the program.

General Laws c. 94C, § 27, in essence prohibits the sale of
hypodermic needles to those under eighteen, while G. L. c. 111,
§ 215, authorizes the Department of Public Health (DPH) to
operate nonsale needle exchange programs with local approval.
The town maintains that the statutes provide the only two legal
methods for the sale and distribution of hypodermic needles in
Massachusetts: sale by pharmacists and distribution by a locally
approved DPH program. ASGCC contends that neither statute
regulates the private nonsale distribution of hypodermic needles.

In response to the town’s cease and desist order, ASGCC
brought an action in the Superior Court, seeking injunctive relief
as well as a declaration that its nonsale needle “access” program
is not prohibited by either statute. After enjoining the town
preliminarily from enforcing its cease and desist order, the judge
reported the question without decision to the Appeals Court, and
we allowed ASGCC’s application for direct appellate review. We
conclude that neither statute prohibits the subject program and,
accordingly, that the town’s cease and desist order cannot stand.*

2For convenience, we refer to the defendants the town of Bamstable, its board
of health, and its director of public health collectively as the “town.”

We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Massachusetts Infectious
Diseases Society; Massachusetts Public Health Association; Association of
Behavioral Health; Harvard Pilgrim Health Care; Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Massachusetts; Baystate Health, Inc.; National Alliance of State and Territorial
AIDS Directors; Partners HealthCare System, Inc; UMass Memorial Health
Care, Inc.; Greater Lawrence Family Health Center; Lynn Community Health
Center; Outer Cape Health Services, Inc.; Duffy Health Center; Fenway Health;
Manet Community Health Center, Inc.; Massachusetts Association of Aleohol-
ism and Drug Abuse Counselors; Massachusetts Association of Community
Health Workers; Tapestry Health Systems, Inc.; Victory Programs; Multicultural
AIDS Coalition; AIDS Project Worcester, Inc.; MassEquality.org, the Campaign
For Equality; New England AIDS Education and Training Center; Massachu-
setts Chapter of The National Association of Social Workers; The Dimock
Center; Justice Resource Institute; John Snow, Inc.; North Shore Health Project;

298 477 Mass. 296 (2017)

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

1. Background and prior proceedings.* ASGCC is a nonprofit
organization that operates programs in Hyannis, Provincetown,
and Falmouth for those suffering from drug addiction and its
attendant illnesses. At its site in Hyannis, ASGCC distributes free
hypodermic needles and syringes as part of a comprehensive
program of services for people who use intravenous drugs. Be-
cause sharing needles is a leading cause of the spread of blood-
borne diseases, notably HIV and hepatitis C, ASGCC seeks to
ensure that its clients use a clean needle every time they inject
opiates or other drugs. ASGCC therefore conducts an initial
assessment of each person who requests needles or other services
and provides only as many needles as staff believe will be
necessary so that the client will be able to use a clean needle for
each injection.’ ASGCC provides a collection receptacle for the
return of used needles at its facility, encourages clients to return
needles, and gives each client an individual “sharps container” for
storing used needles before they are returned, but does not require
a return of the same number of needles distributed in order to
provide additional needles.* It also offers additional services for
users of intravenous drugs, such as medical case management,

Community Research Initiative of New England; and Center For Human De-
velopment, Inc.

‘The facts are taken from the agreed-upon statement of facts in the parties’
joint motion to report the case the Appeals Court, and we reference additional,
‘uncontroverted facts where necessary to supplement the discussion.

5In his decision allowing the motion for a preliminary injunction filed by
AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. (ASGCC), the Superior Court judge
noted ASGCC’s report that, in its then most recent fiscal year, it had issued
112,604 syringes and received back 115,209 syringes, “for a rate of return of
102 [per cent].” He noted also:

“Both sides have responded to [the risk of improperly discarded needles].
The [tlown has installed sharps receptacles at four of its five fire sta-
tions. ... ASGCC, in addition to distributing individual sharps containers
and maintaining its own disposal kiosk, has also conducted sweeps of its
own neighborhood to locate and secure discarded materials. Both sides
have also shown a willingness to expand these efforts and to coordinate
their resources in doing so (e.g.[,] installing secure sharps receptacles in
public comfort facilities, increasing public awareness and education). This
willingness, to the court’s view, shows the most promise, in both focus and
scope, to address the [town’s foremost concen.”

®Consistent with ASGCC’s own “harm reduction” goal of clients using a
clean needle every time they inject, the Department of Public Health (DPH) also
does not require programs contracted under its auspices, pursuant to G. L.
¢. 111, § 215, to insist on a one-to-one exchange of needles in order for a client
to participate in the program.

477 Mass. 296 (2017) 299

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

peer support, housing, nutritional programs, testing for diseases
such as HIV, and risk reduction strategies. ASGCC does not sell
hypodermic needles, is not operating a program implemented by
DPH, and has not sought approval from the town to operate its
programs.

In 2015, the town discovered improperly discarded hypodermic
needles in public places and traced the origin of at least some
of these needles to ASGCC. Soon thereafter, the town ordered?
ASGCC to cease distributing hypodermic needles at its Hyannis
site, citing violations of G. L. c. 94, § 27, and G. L. c. 111, § 215.
The order indicated in this regard that, in failing to obtain ap-
proval of its program from the town council, ASGCC had vio-
lated G. L. c. 111, § 215, and that its program was not in com-
pliance with G. L. c. 94, §27, which permits only licensed
pharmacists or wholesale druggists to sell hypodermic needles.

As noted, on November 10, 2015, ASGCC commenced an
action in the Superior Court seeking a declaration that the town’s
order was in contravention of Massachusetts law because nothing
in the language of G. L. c. 94C, § 27, or G. L. c. 111, § 215,
prohibits private individuals or organizations from distributing
free hypodermic needles. ASGCC also sought equitable relief to
preliminarily and permanently enjoin enforcement of the order.

After an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge prelimi-
narily enjoined the town from enforcing the cease and desist order
against ASGCC or otherwise interfering with ASGCC’s distribu-
tion of hypodermic needles. The parties thereafter jointly re-
quested that the case be reported for determination by the Ap-
peals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423
Mass. 1403 (1996). The judge allowed that motion, and we
allowed ASGCC’s application for direct appellate review.

2. Discussion. The question before us is whether G. L. c. 94C,
§ 27, or G. L. c. 111, § 215, prohibits private individuals or
organizations from distributing free hypodermic needles. ASGCC
maintains that we need look no further than the plain language of
the statutes, given that neither contains language relevant to
ASGCC’s program or services. The town argues that, notwith-
standing the plain statutory language, the legislative history in-

7The town of Barnstable (town) issued two orders, described, collectively, as
the “order.” The Barnstable police department hand-delivered the first order on
September 22, 2015, which stated that it was a “warning.” The Barnstable
director of public health mailed ASGCC a letter and a second order on Sep-
tember 23, 2015.

300 477 Mass. 296 (2017)

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

dicates that the Legislature intended G. L. c. 111, § 215, to pro-
vide the sole means by which an organization may operate free
needle distribution programs outside the requirements of G. L.
c. 94C, § 27. According to the town, were we to conclude
otherwise, only DPH-implemented exchange programs would
require local approval, while similar private programs would be
unregulated, a result the town considers absurd. We disagree. The
statutory language is clear that programs such as ASGCC’s are
not prohibited, the legislative history does not evidence an intent
to the contrary, and interpreting the two statutes to allow private
entities to operate nonsale needle exchange programs does not
give rise to an absurd result.

a. Statutory language. Our primary goal in interpreting a statute
is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and “the statutory
language is the principal source of insight into legislative pur-
pose.” Bronstein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 390 Mass. 701, 704 (1984).
Therefore, “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unam-
biguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent.” Worcester v.
College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013), quoting
Martha’s Vineyard Land Bank Comm’n v. Assessors of W. Tisbury,
62 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 27-28 (2004). Accordingly, turning first to
the plain language of the statutes, it is clear that, by their words
alone, neither G. L. c. 94C, § 27, nor G. L. c. 111, § 215, pro-
scribes ASGCC’s activities.

General Laws c. 94C, § 27, regulates only the sale of hypoder-
mic needles and syringes. It provides:

“Hypodermic syringes or hypodermic needles for the ad-
ministration of controlled substances by injection may be
sold in the commonwealth, but only to persons who have
attained the age of [eighteen] years and only by a pharmacist
or wholesale druggist licensed under the provisions of [G. L.
c. 112], a manufacturer of or dealer in surgical supplies or a
manufacturer of or dealer in embalming supplies. When
selling hypodermic syringes or hypodermic needles without
a prescription, a pharmacist or wholesale druggist must re-
quire proof of identification that validates the individual’s
age.”

At the time of the cease and desist orders issued in 2015, G. L.
c. 111, § 215, stated, in relevant part:

“The department of public health is hereby authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of

477 Mass. 296 (2017) 301

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

not more than ten pilot programs for the exchange of needles
in cities and towns within the commonwealth upon nomina-
tion by the department. Local approval shall be obtained
prior to implementation of each pilot program in any city or
town.”®

In sum, the plain language of the statutes simply does not pro-
scribe free distribution of hypodermic needles by a private indi-
vidual or organization, such as ASGCC, that does not operate a
program implemented by DPH. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
USS. 357, 363 (1978).

b. Legislative history. The town asserts, however, that the plain
language does not, in this case, accurately reflect the intent of the
Legislature, and that other canons of statutory construction must
be used in order to avoid an absurd result. See Sullivan v.
Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001) (“A fundamental tenet of
statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given
effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of
the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result’).
The legislative history of G. L. 94C, § 27, and G. L. c. 111, § 215,
the town maintains, indicates a legislative intent to restrict access
to hypodermic needles to one of two methods: sale by pharma-
cists or distribution by a DPH-sponsored needle exchange pro-
gram. Where “the language of the statute is plain and unambigu-
ous, . . . legislative history is not ordinarily a proper source of
construction.” Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37
(1977). Nonetheless, as the town argues, we also must “construe
statutes that relate to the same subject matter as a harmonious
whole and avoid absurd results.” Canton v. Commissioner of the
Mass. Highway Dep’t, 455 Mass. 783, 791 (2010). Therefore, we
consider the town’s assertion that the successive legislative de-
cisions to regulate the sale of hypodermic needles, and to regulate
free distribution through DPH programs, indicate a clear intent
to proscribe other types of free distribution, and that allowing a

®General Laws c. 111, § 215, was amended in 2016, but those amendments,
while removing any restriction on the number of DPH programs, did not expand
the provision to reference anything other than DPH programs. The statute
currently provides:

“The department of public health may implement needle exchange
programs for the exchange of needles in cities and towns. Prior to imple-
mentation of a needle exchange program, approval shall be obtained from
the board of health in the hosting city or town.”

302 477 Mass. 296 (2017)

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

private program like ASGCC’s to exist, outside the ambit of
DPH-implemented programs, would be absurd.

The town asserts that, by amending G. L. c. 94C, § 27, in 2006,
the Legislature “anointed” pharmacists as the “gatekeepers” of
“sale and distribution” of hypodermic needles. The town con-
tends further that, by enacting these amendments to G. L. c. 94C,
§ 27, while retaining G. L. c. 111, § 215, the Legislature intended
the provisions of G. L. c. 111, § 215, to regulate any organization
that wished to distribute free hypodermic needles, outside the
regulations on sales set forth in G. L. c. 94C, § 27. In addition, the
town points to prior, unsuccessful efforts to amend G. L. c. 94C,
§ 27, before implementation of the 2006 act, subsequent unsuc-
cessful efforts to amend G. L. c. 111, § 215, and the 2016 ex-
pansion of G. L. c. 111, § 215, as evidence of legislative intent to
restrict nonsale possession of hypodermic needles in enacting the
2006 act. In particular, in the town’s view, the expansion of G. L.
c. 111, § 215, in 2016, confirms that, in 2006, the Legislature did
not authorize the establishment of private programs that distribute
free hypodermic needles but, rather, limited needle exchange
programs to those implemented by DPH.®

The legislative history of G. L. c. 94C, § 27, does not support
the town’s contention that that statute, read in conjunction with
the decision not to repeal G. L. c. 111, § 215, regulates nonsale
distribution. Prior to 2006, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, provided criminal
penalties for the possession, delivery, sale, or exchange of hypo-
dermic needles without a prescription. See G. L. c. 94C, § 27 (a),
as amended through St. 1993, c. 224, § 2 (“No person, not being
a [licensed professional] shall have in his possession a hypoder-
mic syringe [or] hypodermic needle. . .” [emphasis added]); G. L.
c. 94C, § 27 (b), as amended through St. 1993, c. 224, § 2 (“No

°In support of this argument, the town relies extensively on a Superior Court
judge’s interpretation of G. L. c. 111, § 215, in Holyoke City Council vs.
Holyoke, Mass. Super. Ct, No. 12-0837 (Hampden County Mar. 14, 2016),
which the town argues represents the proper analysis of the interplay between
the two statutes that regulate hypodermic needles. The issue before the Superior
Court in that case, however, was whether a town council or town board of health
was the proper “local authority” to approve DPH-sponsored needle exchange
programs, a question quite distinct from the one before us. The judge himself
indicated as much in a decision on a motion for reconsideration, stating that he
was not confronted with the question whether G. L. c. 111, § 215, is applicable
to private entities. Since the decision in that case, the Legislature has amended
G.L.c. 111, § 215, to clarify that a local board of health is now the approving
authority for DPH programs. See St. 2016, c. 133, § 65.

477 Mass. 296 (2017) 303

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

such syringe, needle or instrument shall be delivered or sold to, or
exchanged with, any person except a [licensed professional]”
[emphases added]). In enacting “An Act relative to HIV and
Hepatitis C prevention,” St. 2006, c. 172, $§ 2, 3, the Legislature
removed from G. L. c. 94C, § 27, all references to possession,
delivery, and exchange, choosing to retain only the word “sold.”
See G. L. c. 94C, § 27, as appearing in St. 2006, c. 172, § 3.
Given the elimination of all references to possession, delivery,
and exchange, we cannot infer, as the town suggests, that the
Legislature intended the current version of G. L. c. 94C, § 27, to
continue to regulate possession, delivery, and exchange. “Where
the Legislature has deleted . . . language, apparently purposefully,
the current version of the statute cannot be interpreted to include
the rejected requirement. Reading in language that the Legislature
chose to remove . . . violates basic principles of statutory con-
struction and impermissibly interferes with the legislative func-
tion.” Commonwealth v. Porges, 460 Mass. 525, 530 (2011),
quoting Kenniston v. Department of Youth Servs., 453 Mass. 179,
185 (2009).!°

The conclusion that G. L. c. 94C, § 27, applies only to the sale
of hypodermic needles is required also by the statutory and
common-law definitions of “sale” and “distribution.” General
Laws c. 94C, § 1, defines the word “[d]istribute” as “to deliver
other than by administering or dispensing a controlled sub-
stance.” While “sale” has no statutory definition, it is commonly
understood as meaning “[t]he transfer of property or title for a
price.” Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 513 n.3 (2012),
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1454 (9th ed. 2009). “Sell” is
defined as “[t]o transfer (property) by sale.” Black’s Law Dic-
tionary 1567 (10th ed. 2014). Sale thus is legally distinct from
distribution. See Keefner, supra (“[T]he term ‘sell’ or ‘sale’ is

10The town points to language in three prior proposed amendments to G. L.
c. 94C, § 27, over the course of ten years, that would have exempted from
criminal penalties the distribution of hypodermic needles by any program,
whether private or public. The town maintains that these efforts demonstrate the
Legislature’s consideration and rejection of the concept of allowing private
organizations to distribute hypodermic needles. See 1995 Senate Doc. No. 554;
1997 Senate Doc. No. 517; 1999 Senate Doc. No. 537. We do not consider
proposed legislation that was never enacted as being indicative of legislative
intent; rather, we look to the statutory language that the Legislature in fact
adopted. See, e.g., Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156,
162-164 (1998). In any event, certain of the proposed exemptions were included
in G. L. ¢. 94C, § 27 (f) (now repealed).

304 477 Mass. 296 (2017)

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

narrower than the term ‘distribution’ and we agree with the judge
that they are not synonymous”). The town’s contention that G. L.
c. 94C, § 27, codified the role of pharmacists as gatekeepers for
both “sale and distribution” of hypodermic needles is accordingly
unavailing.

The town also claims that cross references contained within
prior versions of G. L. c. 94C, §§ 27 and 27A, and G. L. c. 111,
§ 215, provide evidence of legislative intent that G. L. c. 111,
§ 215, continues to apply to nonsale programs, such as the
ASGCC program. This contention is unpersuasive, for the reason,
if no other, than that the 2006 act eliminated the very cross
references upon which the town relies.

In previous versions of the statutes, portions of the language of
G. L. c. 94C, § 27, and G. L. c. 111, § 215, did reference each
other. Prior to 2006, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, included subsection (/),
which explicitly exempted from criminal liability the possession
of needles without a prescription “as part of a pilot program
approved by [DPH] in accordance with [G. L. c. 111, § 215].”
The 2006 act repealed G. L. c. 94C, § 27 (f). See St. 2006, c. 172,
§ 15. With respect to currently effective legislation, the 2006 act
added a new section, G. L. c. 94C, § 27A, which requires DPH,
along with the Department of Environmental Protection, to de-
sign and implement programs for the collection of used hypoder-
mic needles; the section does not reference programs imple-
mented by DPH."

In short, following the extensive amendments of the 2006 act,
decriminalizing the possession of hypodermic needles without a
prescription, G. L. c. 94C, § 27, no longer contains any reference
to programs implemented by DPH under the authority granted to
itin G.L.c. 111, § 215. Although, as the town argues, the statutes
“relate to the same subject matter,” Canton, 455 Mass. at 791, we
do not read words into a statute that the Legislature saw fit to
remove. See Porges, 460 Mass. at 530. The removal from G. L.
c. 94C, § 27, of all statutory references to G. L. c. 111, § 215, is
consistent with the legislative purpose of decriminalization; once
criminal penalties had been eliminated, the exception to criminal
liability for possession of needles acquired through a DPH pro-
gram was no longer needed. Nothing in these cohesive changes

“The 2006 act also contained a single reference to programs established
under G. L. c. 111, § 215, in a section that was not codified, which required DPH
to “perform a comprehensive study and review of the existing needle exchange
programs established pursuant to [G. L. ©. 111, § 215].” St. 2006, ¢, 172, § 15.

477 Mass. 296 (2017)

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

w
S
a

reveals a legislative intent that G. L. c. 111, § 215, would restrict
possession of needles acquired by any means other than sales
pursuant to G. L. c. 94C, § 27. Indeed, the proponents of the 2006
act stated, in no uncertain terms, that “[w]ithout providing the
opportunity for a clean needle it’s like spreading disease and
condoning it.” State House News Service (Senate Sess.), June 1,
2006 (statement by Sen. Steven Tolman). See State House News
Service (Senate Sess.), June 1, 2006 (statement by Sen. Robert
O'Leary) (any policy based on restricting access to needles is
“fundamentally flawed”).

In an effort to buttress its contention that the Legislature
intended to retain nonsale restrictions, the town calls attention to
two unsuccessful efforts to amend G. L. c. 111, § 215, subsequent
to enactment of the 2006 act,!” and to the later expansion of G. L.
c. 111, § 215, in 2016. None of these efforts sheds any light on the
Legislature’s intent in 2006, when it enacted the now controlling
G. L. c. 94C, § 27, “An Act relative to HIV and Hepatitis C
prevention.” See Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 653,
660-662 (2016), quoting Massachusetts Comm’n Against Dis-
crimination vy. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186, 194 (1976)
(“the views of a subsequent [Legislature] form a hazardous basis
for inferring the intent of an earlier one”); Cook v. Patient Edu,
LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 555 n.14 (2013) (“We do not draw conclu-
sions concerning the intent of the Legislature based on the failure
to enact a subsequent amendment”). Nor does the 2016 legisla-
tion amending G. L. c. 111, § 215, advance the town’s argument
in this regard. That legislation removed restrictions on the num-
ber of programs that DPH may implement, changed the status of
such programs from “pilot” to permanent, and clarified that the
local approval needed for such programs was to come from
boards of health. The amendment is silent, as before, as to any
restrictions on private providers of the same service. To the extent
that this 2016 legislation in any way illuminates the Legislature’s
intent ten years before, it suggests an ongoing legislative effort to
expand, rather than limit, nonsale access to hypodermic needles.

Finally, we do well to note that the town’s position stands in
tension with the basic and fundamental legal principle that an
activity not prohibited or restricted by law is lawful. See 1 W.

"See Proposed Amendment No. 77 to 2016 House Doc. No. 3944; 2016
Senate Doc. No. 2305, § 87.

306 477 Mass. 296 (2017)

AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. 1. Barnstable.

Blackstone, Commentaries *45. “To punish a person because he
has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process
violation of the most basic sort . . . .” Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at
363. Concluding that ASGCC’s services are unlawful under
either G. L. c. 94C, § 27, or G. L. c. 111, § 215, would be
tantamount to doing just that.

3. Conclusion. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court
for entry of a declaration that G. L. c. 94C, § 27, and GL. c. 111,
§ 215, do not prohibit ASGCC from engaging in free distribution
of hypodermic needles, and an injunction permanently enjoining
enforcement of the town’s order to cease and desist.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 307

Commonwealth » Jones,

CommonweattH vs. Maurice Jones.
Suffolk. January 10, 2017. - June 20, 2017
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hives, Gaztano, Lowy, & Buop, JU.

Homicide. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Empanelment
of jury, Challenge to jurors, Hearsay, Instructions to jury. Evidence, Identity,
Consciousness of guilt, Hearsay. Constitutional Law, Self-incrimination.

At a murder trial, the judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a
required finding, where, although the discrete pieces of evidence regarding
the identity of the shooter, standing alone, might not have been sufficient to
sustain a conviction, together they formed a “mosaic” of evidence such that
the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was
the shooter. [316-318]

At a criminal trial, the judge abused her discretion by declining to require the
prosecutor to provide an adequate and genuine race-neutral reason for her
peremptory challenge to an African-American member of the venire, where
consideration of all relevant circumstances compelled the conclusion that the
defendant had made the limited showing necessary to make out a prima facie
showing of discrimination, [319-326]

Discussion of issues likely to occur at a new trial on indictments charging
murder, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and unlawful
possession of a firearm relating to the propriety of the introduction of
evidence that the defendant refused to go to a hospital to be viewed by a
surviving victim [326-328], the admissibility of hearsay evidence of a police
radio broadcast [328-329], the propriety of an instruction to the jury on
circumstantial evidence [329], and the need for a particular instruction
[329-330].

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on June 26, 2013.

The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J., and a motion to
set aside the verdict was heard by her.

James L. Sultan (Kerry A. Haberlin also present) for the
defendant.

Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney (Julie Sunkle
Higgins, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Com-
monwealth.

Lenk, J. The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury
of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premedita-
tion and extreme atrocity or cruelty in connection with the shoot-

308 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

ing death of Dinoriss Alston on April, 17, 2012.1 The identity of
the shooter was the central issue at trial. On appeal, the defendant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and asserts a number
of errors in the trial proceedings. He maintains that the judge
erred in failing to require the Commonwealth to explain its
peremptory challenge of a prospective juror; improperly allowed
the admission of evidence as to the defendant’s refusal to go to
the hospital to be shown to the surviving witness and as to a
police radio broadcast describing the shooter; incorrectly in-
structed the jury that circumstantial evidence would suffice while
failing to instruct that mere presence was not enough; and im-
properly limited the defendant’s cross-examination of a Com-
monwealth witness. The defendant asserts also that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel and requests relief under G. L.
c. 278, § 33E.

We conclude that, while the evidence at trial was not by any
means overwhelming, it was sufficient to sustain the defendant's
convictions. The judge’s failure to require an explanation of the
prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of a prospective juror who is
African-American, however, requires the convictions be vacated.
We address other claimed errors only insofar as they may recur at
any new trial.

1. Background. Because the defendant challenges the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, we discuss in some detail the facts the
jury could have found.

a. The shooting. On the afternoon of April 17, 2012, Alston and
his girl friend, Ashley Platt, were sitting in her vehicle near a park
on Dunreath Street in the Roxbury section of Boston when they
were struck by multiple gunshots. Platt was in the driver’s seat,
and Alston was in the front passenger’s seat. The primary issue at
trial was the identity of the shooter.

Platt testified that, on April 17, 2012, an unseasonably warm
day, she and Alston went to the beach after she left work at around
11 a.., and later decided to drive to a park in Roxbury where they
frequently spent time, arriving at approximately 3:40 or 3:45 pm.
Platt did not tell anyone about their plans for the day. Alston spoke

"This was the defendant’s second trial on these charges; the first trial ended
in a mistrial when the jury were unable to reach a verdict. The defendant also
was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and
unlawful possession of a firearm, He was acquitted of armed assault with intent
to murder on charges stemming from the nonfatal shooting of the victim’s girl
friend, Ashley Platt,

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 309

Commonwealth » Jones,

on his cellular telephone “a couple of times” during the afternoon,
including making a call at about 3:07 pM. to a person identified as
“Suncuz.”? At some point on the drive from the beach to the park,
the two stopped at a location in the Grove Hall neighborhood of
Roxbury, where Alston spoke briefly to a man Platt did not know;
when he returned to the vehicle, Alston’s demeanor remained
“normal.” Platt then drove to a convenience store, where Alston
made a purchase while she remained in the vehicle, and the two
then made their way to Dunreath Street near the park. After they
stopped, they remained in the vehicle smoking marijuana, while
Platt used her cellular telephone to send messages.

Twenty to thirty minutes later, at around 4:03 pm., someone
opened fire on the vehicle. Bullets came through the windshield
and struck Alston, who was in the front passenger’s seat, multiple
times in the right side of his neck, the right side of his chest, and
through his right elbow.‘ Alston reached down and put the vehicle
in gear and told Platt, who was in the driver’s seat, to “go.” Platt
drove rapidly away from the scene and sought help at a nearby
gasoline station on the corner of Moreland Street and Blue Hill
Avenue. Emergency responders pronounced Alston dead at the
scene, and discovered that Platt also had been shot; she was
transported to the hospital in the ambulance that had been sum-
moned for Alston.

b. The investigation. i. Flight from the scene. Platt did not see
the shooting itself or anyone carrying a firearm; she saw the
windshield cracking and glazing and an individual walking
calmly away from the parked vehicle, along Dunreath Street, who
ignored her screams for help. She did not see anyone else nearby.
At trial, Platt described the individual, whom she saw only from
behind, as a black male wearing a white and red shirt, khaki cargo
shorts,* a black and red hat, and Chuck Taylor sneakers, a dis-

2"Suncuz” was never identified.

®The video surveillance system at the convenience store showed Alston
entering the store, making a purchase, and leaving the store without speaking to
anyone other than the cashier.

‘The medical examiner who performed the autopsy testified that Alston died
of gunshot wounds, and that three of the five wounds independently could have
been fatal.

5Cargo pants are “loose-fitting, casual pants having a number of cargo
pockets, some typically on the side of the upper leg.” A cargo pocket, in turn,
is “a capacious pocket sewn onto the outside of a garment or bag, often having
a flap and side pleats.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary 226 (5th ed.
2016).

310 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

tinctive brand of shoes that were primarily black but have a white
“rubber front.” She lost track of him after driving past him on
Dunreath Street.

Because Platt did not see the shooter’s face, and thus was
unable to identify him, the Commonwealth relied on testimony
from a number of other witnesses to establish the defendant’s
familiarity with the area near the shooting. His former girl friend,
who lived in that neighborhood, testified that the defendant had
grown up in the neighborhood and continued to come by fre-
quently to visit her. She testified that she spent the evening of the
shooting with the defendant “like a normal day,” and that he had
been “shocked” by the fact that a shooting had taken place
nearby.

Another of the defendant’s friends testified that, before the
shooting, he had seen the defendant in the neighborhood several
times a week, but, after the shooting, saw him in the area much
less frequently. When asked why he no longer spent time in the
area, the defendant replied “the block is hot,” which his friend
understood to mean that “there [are] cops everywhere.”

In addition to Platt’s description of the shooter, the Common-
wealth introduced testimony from a number of witnesses along
the purported path of flight away from the scene of the shooting.
Byrain Winbush was at home watching television, near the corner
of Warren Street and Dunreath Street, when he heard a series of
shots, which sounded as though they had been fired from a
semiautomatic firearm. He looked out his window and telephoned
911. Both in his testimony and in the audio recording of the 911
call, which was played for the jury, he described seeing a black
male, whom he could see only from behind, wearing “yellow
shorts,” a “white shirt,” and socks and sneakers, without a hat,
running up the street. He could see the individual’s hands and did
not notice a weapon. Although he heard screaming and the
sounds of “scattering” feet, he did not see anyone else. The
individual with the white shirt and yellow shorts remained in
view until he reached the corner of the nearby park.

Leonor Woodson was sitting near the window of her home on
Dunreath Street, across the street from the park, when she heard
multiple gunshots and looked out the window. Her sister, Leila
Jackson, also heard the shots and ran to the window.* Both saw a
black man wearing light pants with pockets on the side, a dark

Leila Jackson died before the second tral. Her testimony from the first trial
was read in evidence.

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 311

Commonwealth » Jones,

colored jacket,’ and a cap® “gallop[ ]” or run quickly down Dun-
reath Street, turn into the park, then run through the park and turn
left onto Copeland Street. As the man ran, he held his right side,
either near the hip or the mid-thigh, as if there were something in
the pocket. Jackson said that the item appeared to be “weighing
him down.” The sisters lost sight of the man soon after he left the
park and turned onto Copeland Street. While the man was run-
ning past their house, Woodson saw a light-colored vehicle drive
quickly down Dunreath Street.

Nicolas Guerrero and Bryan Santiago were playing basketball
with Santiago’s young son in the park between Dunreath and
Copeland Streets when they heard gunshots. A few seconds after
the shooting stopped, Santiago saw a white vehicle with a shat-
tered passenger’s side window go past. Soon thereafter, both
Guerrero and Santiago saw a man run past and then leave the
park. Both described him as holding the right pocket of his shorts;
Guerrero described the shorts as cargo shorts, and Santiago
described them as being in between “light brown” and “dark
brown.” Santiago believed the man was holding something rela-
tively heavy in that pocket.

Jerome Baker was sitting on the porch of his house on
Copeland Street, across the park from Dunreath Street, when he
heard gunshots, which sounded like they were coming from the
other side of the park. He looked up and saw a vehicle “speed
away” down Dunreath Street. He then saw a man he knew at that
point only as “Mo,” but whom he identified during his testimony
as the defendant, run through the park. He testified that he
believed the defendant had been wearing jeans, but agreed that he
had little recollection of the defendant’s clothing and may have
thought that simply because the defendant frequently wore jeans.

Joan and Joy Andrews® were standing near each other on the
Copeland Street side of the park, watching a young girl who was
Joan’s grandniece and Joy’s granddaughter ride her bicycle
around the playground. They heard multiple gunshots in rapid
succession, coming from Dunreath Street. Both were focused on
protecting the child, but each saw at least one person running.

7Jackson described the jacket as “black.” Woodson said it was dark, but that
it “wasn’t black.”

Jackson described the cap as black with a white brim, while Woodson
suggested it was brown.

Because they share a last name, we refer to Joan and Joy Andrews by their
first names.

w
nv

477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

Joan testified that, after she left the park and had crossed the
street, she saw a man running out of the park, alone, wearing
cargo shorts. She said that the pocket on the right side of his
shorts was swinging as though it contained a heavy object. She
only saw the man from the side so was unable to distinguish his
face. He continued running on Copeland Street until he reached
Langford Park, a small, dead-end street, where he turned. Al-
though Joan knew a man “by the name of Mo,” she could not
identify him as the person whom she saw running. Joy testified
that she saw “Mo” around the neighborhood “every day,” and
recognized him as the first man from the area to get a job; she
identified him as the defendant in court. She recalled that, imme-
diately after hearing gunshots, she saw several people, including
Mo, running out of the park and onto Copeland Street, but did not
remember what Mo had been wearing.

Brian McClain was on the porch of his house on Langford
Park. He saw “Mo,” whom he had known much of his life, and
whom he identified in court as the defendant, walking past and
spoke briefly to him. McClain was unable to remember anything
about the clothes the defendant had been wearing, did not re-
member seeing the defendant running or clutching a leg or
pocket, and did not remember the defendant sweating or breath-
ing heavily as though he had been running. McClain saw “Mo”
walk down the street toward a hole in the fence that separated the
dead-end Langford Park from the properties on Perrin Street.
McClain did not see him go through the hole in the fence.

ii. Interviews of Platt. Investigating officers interviewed Platt
several times in order to obtain a description of the shooter. At
each interview, she gave generally consistent accounts that varied
somewhat in their detail. When police first spoke to Platt at the
gasoline station, she was “very upset,” crying, and unable to stand
still. She described the shooter as a younger black male, wearing
a white T-shirt and khaki pants.'° The interview ended after only
a few minutes, when the responding officer realized that Platt also
had been shot, in the hip, and she was transported to the hospital.
At 4:08 pa., the officer broadcast Platt’s initial description over

194 police officer interviewed a man who was nearby and whose description
matched that of the shooter. He was an African-American male wearing a white
T-shirt, khaki shorts, and a black and gray Boston Bruins cap. During a brief
conversation, the man asked calmly, “Is he dead?” Police completed a field
interrogation and observation report, but there is no indication that they pursued
any further investigation of this man.

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 313

Commonwealth » Jones,

the police radio. An audio recording of this broadcast was played
for the jury.

Detective Donald Lee, who had gone directly to the hospital,
spoke with Platt three times later that afternoon. During the first
interview, conducted while Platt awaited treatment, she described
a young black male, wearing a white T-shirt and khaki pants.
After another officer joined them, Lee and that officer conducted
another, recorded, interview. During that interview, Platt de-
scribed the man as a black male wearing a white shirt, khaki
shorts, a hat, and Chuck Taylor sneakers. Lee broadcast this de-
scription over the police radio at 5:07 pm. This broadcast, too, was
played for the jury.

Lee returned to the hospital later that afternoon and obtained a
second recorded statement, also played for the jury, in which Platt
specified that the man had been wearing “solid black” Chuck
Taylor sneakers, a black hat “with a red brim,” and, after some
prompting, agreed that the white shirt “might a had some red in
it”

At trial, Platt testified that she saw a black male wearing “khaki
cargo shorts,” a shirt with a “white and red combination,” a black
hat with a red brim, and Chuck Taylor sneakers.

iii. Cell site location information. Cell site location information
(CSLI) indicated that the defendant’s cellular telephone had been
near the scene of the shooting at the relevant time." State police

“The jury learned that, to make or receive calls, a cellular telephone transmits
messages through radio waves to a particular cellular service provider’s network
of cell site towers. Each tower (base station) serves a particular “sector”
(geographic region) in the provider's network. The cell towers send signals to
each other, and, as an individual on an active call moves from an area served by
one cell tower to another, the call will be handed off to a different cell tower. By
determining which cell site received the telephone’s signals at any given time,
it is possible to determine, within certain limitations, the approximate location
of the telephone. Because a cell tower’s signal extends from two to ten miles,
a given cellular telephone call may be within range of multiple cell sites at any
given time.

State police Sergeant David Crouse testified that, at the beginning of a call,
a cellular telephone will connect to the cell site which provides the strongest
signal, typically, albeit not always, the nearest one. Because the telephone may,
thereafter, be routed to a number of different cell sites within range, he prepared
his testimony on the basis of the cell sites to which the telephone at issue
initially connected. Both the sergeant and the records custodian acknowledged
that locations derived from CSLI are not exact.

See, e.g., Commonwealth y. Gonzalez, 415 Mass. 396, 400 n.12 (2016);
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 236-239 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass.

314 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

Sergeant David Crouse testified that, on the evening prior to the
shooting, the CSLI showed a cellular telephone that the defendant
used routinely” located in a “wedge shaped” cell tower sector
that included the area of the shooting. Records indicated that, the
following morning, the cellular telephone was in a sector that
included the defendant’s house on Cardington Street. That after-
noon, the CSLI showed the telephone at various locations in
Roxbury other than the defendant’s house.

The shooting occurred at approximately 4:03 pm. on April 17,
2012. According to Crouse, the CSLI showed that, at 3:58 pm., a
call was made from the defendant’s cellular telephone while it
was located in a sector that included the scene of the shooting,
and at 3:59 pM., a call was made while the telephone was located
in an adjacent sector. Those two sectors overlapped in a relatively
small area covering the location of the shooting. Crouse testified
that, to have moved from one sector to the other within such a
short period of time, the person using the cellular telephone was
probably “really close to where those two sectors meet.” The
telephone was not used again, for incoming or outgoing calls,
until 4:09 pm., at which point the CSLI showed it as being located
in the vicinity of the shooting. At 4:14 pm., a call was made from
a sector including the area near the defendant’s house. At 4:34
pM., police spoke with the defendant near his house.

iv. The defendant’s encounters with police. Boston police Of-
ficer Brian Johnson, who knew the defendant from prior interac-
tions, had spoken to him on the evening of April 16, 2012, near
the area where the shooting took place the following day. That
evening, the defendant was wearing a black hat with a red Ralph
Lauren Polo brand emblem. The following day, Johnson was
called to respond to a shooting. When he learned that it had taken
place at the park on Dunreath Street, he went to the defendant’s
house — located roughly an eighteen-minute walk, and less than
a five-minute drive, away from the crime scene — in order to
speak to him, as he knew the defendant regularly frequented the
area around that park. Johnson received an initial description of
the suspect, i.e., a black male with a white T-shirt and khaki pants.
Around 4:34 pm., while en route to the defendant’s house, John-
son saw the defendant walking on Cobden Street, approximately

837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).

12A though the defendant’s mother was the listed subscriber in the telephone
company’s records, the defendant told detectives that the telephone number was
his.

477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

w
an

one block from his house. He was wearing a white T-shirt with a
large gray and red design on the front, the same black Polo cap
with a red emblem that he had worn the previous night, khaki
cargo shorts, black sneakers with a red stripe near the sole, and
short white athletic socks. Johnson performed a patfrisk of the
defendant and found no weapons.

The defendant told Johnson that he was on his way to a nearby
pharmacy to meet his mother. After the defendant left, police
went to the defendant’s mother’s house and spoke briefly with
her. She said that, although she had spoken to the defendant
earlier in the day, she had no plans to meet him.

After police received Lee’s broadcast from the hospital, con-
taining Platt’s somewhat more detailed description of the suspect,
and noted that it remained generally consistent with that of the
defendant, Johnson and his partner were asked to speak with the
defendant again. They again found him on Cobden Street, near
his house. One of the officers asked the defendant if he would
speak with them for a few minutes, and he agreed to do so. At that
point, the defendant’s demeanor was “very casual.” Soon there-
after, two detectives who had been at the hospital joined them. At
some point, an officer took photographs of the defendant,” and of
a friend who was with him. When the detectives began the
interview, the defendant was polite but was “showing some signs
of anxiety.” He reiterated that he had been at his house all day,
and that he had not been near the park on Dunreath Street.

The detectives made a series of requests of the defendant. The
defendant agreed to be photographed, and to give the detectives
his and his mother’s cellular telephone numbers. He also agreed
to have his hands tested for gunshot residue,'* but declined to go
to the hospital to be viewed by Platt.1* The defendant told the
officers that he was left-handed, but subsequently he was seen
signing a document with his right hand. After some discussion,
the defendant asked if he was free to leave and, when told that he
was, walked away.

v. Forensic evidence. Sergeant Detective Paul McLaughlin and
other members of the Boston police department’s homicide unit

18Several of these photographs of the defendant were introduced at trial.

14One of the police officers testified that when a gun is fired, “gases, smoke
and remnants of gunshot” are discharged. This can leave residue on the hands
of the individual who fired it.

©The officers testified that they in fact had not intended to perform gunshot
residue testing or to bring the defendant to the hospital, but made both requests
to gauge the defendant’s reaction.

316 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

arranged for Platt’s vehicle to be towed to Boston police head-
quarters. It had bullet holes through the hood and the windshield,
a bullet lodged in the hood, and two bullets in the passenger
seat.'* In addition, police recovered shell casings from Dunreath
Street. The shell casings, the bullets recovered from the vehicle,
and the bullets removed from Alston’s body all came from the
same semiautomatic .45 caliber firearm.

2. Discussion. a. Sufficiency of the evidence. As stated, the
primary issue at trial was the identity of the shooter. The defend-
ant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter
of law to support his conviction of murder in the first degree, and
therefore that his motion for a required finding should have been
allowed.'? We consider this claim to determine whether, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
any rational finder of fact could have found each of the elements
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v.
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). A conviction may rest
exclusively on circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that
evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Commonwealth. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass.
309, 312 (1992). A conviction may not, however, be based on
conjecture or on inference piled upon inference. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399 (1987).

The Commonwealth primarily relied on three types of evidence
to establish that the defendant was the shooter. First, the Com-
monwealth introduced evidence of the flight path of the single
person seen at the scene of the shooting who generally matched
the description of the defendant. In light of witness testimony that
this man ran alone, from near the victim’s vehicle down Dunreath
Street and into the park, clutching something in his pocket con-
sistent with a firearm, the jury reasonably could infer that he was
the shooter. Although witnesses gave somewhat varying descrip-
tions, all (save two who could not identify his race) described him
as black or dark-skinned, and most agreed he was wearing cargo
shorts. Those who saw him from behind were confident that he
was wearing a white or primarily white T-shirt, while those who

16The vehicle was tested for fingerprints. Although some were recovered,
there was “nothing that led. . . anywhere in the investigation.”

*7The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the
Commonwealth's case and at the close of all the evidence. The judge denied the
motions, She later denied the defendant’s motion for postconviction relief,
seeking to set aside the verdict.

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 317

Commonwealth » Jones,

saw him from the front provided a more varied description of his
clothing. Multiple witnesses described him as wearing a black
cap and sneakers; Platt provided a more specific description of
each, identifying a black cap with some red and the sneakers as
black Chuck Taylor ones.

The unidentified runner was linked with the defendant in sev-
eral ways. First, he was seen turning onto Langford Park as he
fled; the defendant’s friend McClain testified that he saw the
defendant on Langford Park that afternoon. Second, shortly after
the shooting, police encountered and photographed the defendant
wearing clothes consistent with the descriptions given by eyewit-
nesses: a black and red hat, a white shirt with a dark design on the
front, khaki cargo shorts, and black sneakers — albeit not the
distinctive Chuck Taylor brand. Also, several witnesses, some of
whom had known the defendant since childhood, testified to the
defendant’s knowledge of the scene. The jury could have found
that the defendant grew up in the area and spent time there
multiple times per week. More particularly, through the CSLI
information concerning the location of the defendant's cellular
telephone, and the identifications by several witnesses who had
lengthy acquaintances with the defendant, the jury could have
found that the defendant was present at or near the park on
Dunreath Street at the time of the shooting.

In addition, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of the
defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Such evidence is probative
and can, in conjunction with other evidence, support a verdict of
guilt. See Commonwealth vy. Doucette, 408 Mass. 454, 461
(1990). The Commonwealth presented evidence that the defend-
ant lied to police, both about his whereabouts on the day of the
shooting, claiming that he had been home all day despite evi-
dence linking him to the neighborhood of the shooting, and about
his dominant hand. The jury also heard evidence that, although
the defendant previously had spent time in the area of the shoot-
ing regularly, after the shooting, he avoided the area; when asked
why he had not been around, he explained that there was a heavy
police presence.

Although these discrete pieces of evidence, standing alone,
might not be sufficient to sustain a conviction, together they
formed a “mosaic” of evidence such that the jury could conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the shooter.
Commonwealth v. Salim, 399 Mass. 227, 233 (1987). Cf. Lydon,
413 Mass. at 312-313 (upholding conviction based on defend-

318 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

ant’s regular presence at location of shooting, his capture in
vehicle generally consistent with one identified at scene, his
consciousness of guilt, his prior threats to victim, and recovery of
weapon used in killing on road traveled by defendant). While not
overwhelming, the evidence would have permitted the jury to
infer guilt from the combination of the defendant’s presence in
the area of the shooting, his consciousness of guilt, and the
similarity between his clothing and the clothing worn by the sole
person seen fleeing the scene.'® There was no error, therefore, in
the judge’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a required
finding.'®

1®The defendant's effort to analogize the circumstances here to cases such as
Commonwealth vy. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399-400 (1987), is unavailing. In that
case, we determined that the defendant’s mere presence at the scene of the
crime, at a time that could not be connected to the victim’s death, coupled with
evidence of consciousness of guilt, was insufficient to sustain a conviction. See
id. Here, by contrast, there was evidence that the defendant was present at the
scene at the time of the shooting and that his physical description matched, at
least to some degree, a number of witnesses’ descriptions of the sole person
leaving the scene.

1A though the defendant does not contend that the evidence was insufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the remaining elements of murder in the first
degree by deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty, we neverthe-
less have reviewed the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E,
and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction on both
theories.

To prove murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation,
the Commonwealth must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intentionally caused the victim’s death and that he or she did so with deliberate
premeditation. That the shooter carried a loaded gun to the scene and shot an
unarmed victim five times was sufficient to make this showing. See Common-
wealth v. Andrews, 427 Mass. 434, 440-441 (1998).

‘To prove murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty,
the Commonwealth must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
caused the victim’s death with the intent to kill, with the intent to cause grievous
bodily harm, or with the intent to do an act that the defendant should have
known was likely to cause death. It must further prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty. The evidence
was sufficient to show intent to kill and at least two of the seven Cunneen factors
sufficient to establish extreme atrocity or cruelty. See Commonwealth v.
Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983). That the victim remained conscious long
enough to put the vehicle in gear showed his consciousness of suffering, see
Commonwealth v. Brown, 474 Mass. 576, 579 (2016), and expert testimony that
three of the five gunshots each independently might have been enough to kill the
victim established a disproportion between the means necessary to cause death
and those employed. See Commonwealth v. James, 427 Mass. 312, 313-314

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 319

Commonwealth » Jones,

b. Peremptory challenge of a prospective juror. The defendant
contends that the judge abused her discretion by declining to
require the prosecutor to provide an adequate and genuine race-
neutral reason for her peremptory challenge to an African-Ameri-
can member of the venire. See Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476
Mass 539, 545 (2017).

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibit a
party from exercising a peremptory challenge on the basis of
race.° See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986); Com-
monwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979). While the inquiries under the Federal and State
Constitutions each have a different focus, they lead to the same
conclusion. See Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218
n.6 (2008). The Federal inquiry turns on the right of the prospec-
tive juror to be free from discrimination in the exercise of his or
her right “to participate in the administration of the law.” /d.,
quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880). The
question under our Declaration of Rights, on the other hand,
focuses on the defendant’s right to be tried by a fairly drawn jury
of his or her peers. See Benoit, supra; Soares, supra at 488.
“Regardless of the perspective from which the problem is viewed,
[however,] the result appears to be the same.” Benoit, supra. A
party may no more seek to strike a single prospective juror on the
basis of his or her race than attempt to strike all members of a
particular race. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478
(2008); Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431
(2016).

A challenge to a peremptory strike, whether framed under State
or Federal law, is evaluated using a burden-shifting analysis. In
the initial stage, the burden is on the party challenging the
peremptory strike to make a prima facie showing that the strike is
improper. If the party does so, the burden shifts to the party
attempting to strike the prospective juror to provide a group-
neutral reason for doing so. The judge then must determine
whether the proffered reason is adequate and genuine. See, e.g.,
Benoit, 452 Mass. at 218-220. An appellate court reviews the trial

(1998).

20 peremptory challenge on the basis of membership in other constitution-
ally protected groups, such as sex, also is prohibited. See J.E.B. v, Alabama ex
rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127, 130 (1994); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,
488-489, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).

320 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

judge’s decision to allow the juror to be struck for abuse of dis-
cretion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 10 (2013).
The question in this case is whether, as to the first part of this
three-part inquiry, the judge abused her discretion in declining to
find that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of
impropriety in the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of prospec-
tive juror no. 143.

The defendant first lodged an objection to the prosecutor’s use
of the peremptory challenge after the Commonwealth had chal-
lenged juror no. 113B, an African-American.** At that point, no
African-Americans had been seated, and the prosecutor had used
peremptory challenges to exclude four prospective jurors who
were African-American, and seven prospective jurors of other
races. The judge determined that the defendant had made a prima
facie showing of improper use of the peremptory challenge, and
required the prosecutor to provide an adequate and genuine
race-neutral reason for her decision to strike. The prosecutor
provided such an explanation, pointing out that the prospective
juror, whose native language was not English, seemed to have
some difficulties with his comprehension of English. The judge
deemed the explanation satisfactory, and noted additional con-
cerns the juror had raised about his young child, who was facing
surgery. The defendant does not contest this determination on
appeal.

The defendant again challenged the prosecutor’s use of pe-
remptory strikes after she attempted to strike juror no. 143, also
an African-American. Between the dismissal of juror no. 113B
and the voir dire of juror no. 143, one African-American juror
and one juror of another race had been seated without challenge
by either party,” and, in addition to juror no. 143, the prosecutor
had struck one juror who was not African-American. Thus, at that
point, the Commonwealth had used peremptory challenges
against five prospective jurors who were African-American and
eight other prospective jurors, while one African-American and
six jurors of other races had been empanelled. The defendant had
exercised eight peremptory strikes that were not challenged; the
record is silent as to the race of any of those jurors.

217Two members of the venire were identified in the record as “Juror number
113.” Following the lead of the parties, we refer to the challenged juror, who
was the second of the two to be called to voir dire, as “juror no. 113B.”

22The African-American who had been empanelled was juror no, 117. This
juror was the next to be called to voir dire following the defendant's first
Batson-Soares challenge.

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 321

Commonwealth » Jones,

In considering the defendant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s
exercise of a peremptory challenge to strike juror no. 143, the
judge, persuaded by the presence of a single African-American
on the empanelled jury, determined that the defendant had not
met his prima facie burden. After some initial confusion regard-
ing the racial composition of the seated jurors, the judge declined
to require the prosecutor to offer an adequate and genuine race-
neutral reason for the strike. The judge commented:

“T think we’re still in the same position as we were the last
time relative to the prima facie showing of irregularity. There
are no — strike that. I just noticed there is an African-
American woman on the jury. I forgot about her, the woman
who works as a member of the Board of Bar Overseers. That
being the case, . . . I cannot find that you have made a prima
facie showing, because I’m entitled to look at the composi-
tion of the jury. And of the seven [empanelled] jurors there
is an African-American woman on this jury.”

It is this decision which the defendant maintains was an abuse
of discretion; we agree. Peremptory challenges are presumed to
be proper, but rebutting the presumption of propriety is not an
onerous task. By their nature, peremptory challenges “permit[ ]
‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate’ ”
(citation omitted). Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. In light of this, and in
order “to ensure that the important protections set forth in [Batson
and Soares] are fully adhered to, the burden of making [the prima
facie] showing ought not be a terribly weighty one.” Common-
wealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463 n.4 (2003).

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
called the first stage burden “not substantial.” Sanchez v. Roden,
753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting Aspen v. Bissonnette,
480 F.3d 571, 574 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 934 (2007),
appropriately characterizing it as being merely a burden of pro-
duction, not persuasion. See Sanchez, supra at 306. See also
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (rejecting re-
quirement that discrimination be “more likely than not” in order
to make prima facie showing); Aspen, supra at 575 (rejecting
requirement that discrimination be “likely”). Given the relative
ease with which a party can make the necessary prima facie
showing, we have urged “judges to think long and hard before
they decide to require no explanation . . . for [a] challenge.” Jssa,

w
nv
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477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

466 Mass. at 11 n.14.2°

When evaluating whether the party challenging the strike has
met the relatively low bar of a prima facie showing, a trial judge
is to consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances. See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 299-300. The inquiry
ordinarily begins with the number and percentage of group mem-
bers who have been excluded. See Issa, 466 Mass. at 9. This
factor can, in certain circumstances, itself suffice to make the
requisite prima facie showing. See id. Other factors to consider
may include:** the possibility of an objective group-neutral ex-
planation for the strike or strikes;?> any similarities between
excluded jurors and those, not members of the allegedly targeted
group, who have been struck; differences among the various
members of the allegedly targeted group who were struck;?*
whether those excluded are members of the same protected group
as the defendant or the victim;?” and the composition of the jurors
already seated. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005);
Issa, 466 Mass. at 10-11; Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 302; State v. Rhone,
168 Wash. 2d 645, 656, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1011 (2010).

In many respects, this case is similar to Sanchez, in which the

23Some jurisdictions have eliminated the need to make a prima facie showing,
and require a race-neutral reason whenever a Batson challenge is made. See
Commonwealth vy. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v.
Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v.
Johans, 613 So, 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939
(Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State vy. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302,
305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds, State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114
(1996).

°4This list of factors is neither mandatory nor exhaustive; a trial judge and a
reviewing court must consider “all relevant circumstances” for each challenged
strike. See Batson y. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). See also People v.
Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d 481, 501 (2006) (citing seven such factors); State v. Rhone,
168 Wash. 2d 645, 656, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1011 (2010) (listing eight factors
and noting they are “not exclusive”).

25This factor overlaps with the analysis at the second and third stages, in
which the proponent of the strike must provide an adequate and genuine
group-neutral reason to justify it; such considerations may play a role in the
first-step analysis as well.

26Because the record does not reveal which of the prospective jurors struck by
the Commonwealth, other than jurors nos. 113B and 143, were African-Ameri-
can, we cannot evaluate this factor,

27This factor does little to tip the balance in either direction here. The
defendant and both of the alleged victims were members of the same protected
group as the excluded juror. See Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 11 (2013).

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 323

Commonwealth » Jones,

First Circuit concluded that the judge abused his discretion in
failing to find that the defendant had made a prima facie showing
of impropriety in a peremptory strike. See Sanchez, 753 F.3d at
299. We look to many of the same factors as the Sanchez court
did, and turn first to the numerical considerations: the raw number
of African-American prospective jurors struck up to that point,
and the percentage of such jurors struck.

The raw number of African-American prospective jurors struck,
standing by itself, is inconclusive here. The prosecutor excluded
five African-American members of the venire, a number compa-
rable to the four persons of color whose exclusion was challenged
in Sanchez, supra at 303. Cf. Issa, 466 Mass. at 10 (judge could
have found, but was not required to find, prima facie showing
where prosecutor excluded one African-American prospective
juror, who was last such juror in venire).

On the other hand, the percentage of African-American pro-
spective jurors struck suggests that the defendant made the nec-
essary prima facie showing.”* At the time when the defendant
raised his second Batson-Soares objection, to the peremptory
strike of juror no. 143, the prosecutor had struck five African-
American prospective jurors and one such juror had been em-
panelled. For comparison, the prosecutor had struck eight pro-
spective jurors of other races, but six jurors of other races had
been empanelled. Because the record does not disclose whether
one or more African-Americans had not been challenged by the
Commonwealth, but subsequently had been struck by the defend-
ant, we cannot say with certainty, as the defendant would have us
do, that the prosecutor struck five of six — or more than eighty-
three per cent — of African-Americans whom the judge declared
indifferent. Nevertheless, it seems that the prosecutor exercised a
disproportionate number of her peremptory challenges against
African-Americans, challenging a much higher percentage of
African-American members of the venire than of prospective
jurors of other races. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 411 Mass.
313, 316-317 (1991) (concluding prima facie showing had been
made solely on basis that prosecutor challenged sixty-seven per
cent of African-American members of venire compared to four-
teen per cent of Caucasian members of venire). Contrast Issa, 466
Mass. at 10 (no indication of disproportionate use of peremptory
strikes).

28s was the case in Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 307, the record is not entirely clear.

324 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

Moving beyond purely numerical considerations, the possibil-
ity that juror no. 143 was struck because of her race is heightened
by the fact that the record reveals no race-neutral reason that
might have justified the strike. See Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 303
(“Juror . . . answered all . . . questions appropriately, and noth-
ing . . . casts doubts on his ability to... follow . . . instructions
or evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially’). Like all of the
jurors who had been seated, juror no. 143 gave brief, straightfor-
ward, and appropriate answers to the voir dire questions, and no
issues of bias or competence were raised. Contrast Issa, 466
Mass. at 11, where our determination that the judge did not abuse
his discretion in failing to find a prima facie showing of discrimi-
nation took into account the prosecutor’s possible recognition of
the prospective juror whom she struck. Here, on the other hand,
we discern no objective reason that juror no. 143 could not have
served.

The significant similarities between juror no. 143 and other
prospective jurors to whom the prosecutor did not object further
strengthen the possibility that juror no. 143 was struck because of
her race. See, e.g., Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 302 (focus on “whether
similarly situated jurors [of other races] were permitted to serve”
[citation omitted]). The prosecutor only briefly questioned juror
no. 143 before exercising the peremptory strike, and the questions
she asked her had not been asked of most of the previous
prospective jurors, so any detailed comparison is difficult. Com-
pare id. at 304 (record permitted detailed comparison with one
particular juror who was not African-American). It is, nonethe-
less, telling that the prosecutor did not strike prospective jurors
with characteristics similar to those of juror no. 143, who either
were not African-American or whose race is not evident from the
record.

In response to questioning from the prosecutor, juror no. 143
revealed that she worked by herself rather than with others, that
she or a member of her family previously had served on a jury,
and that she had attended high school outside the United States.
With the exception of her education outside the United States,
elicited in response to a question asked of too few jurors to al-
low for comparison, her responses did not differentiate her from
other prospective jurors. At least two other prospective jurors,
including a non-African-American juror who was seated, had
previous experience with jury service, while others, again in-
cluding a non-African-American who was seated, did not work

477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

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with others.?°

In concluding that the defendant had not met his minimal prima
facie burden, the judge appears to have relied primarily, if not
exclusively, on the presence of the single African-American who
at that point had been seated. That juror, juror no. 117, was seated
immediately following the defendant's first Batson-Soares chal-
lenge to juror no. 113B, where the judge without hesitation had
determined that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of
discrimination.*°

While it is permissible for a judge to consider the composition
of the empanelled members of the jury, insofar as it may affect
whether he or she infers discrimination in the strike under review,
see Commonwealth v. Scott, 463 Mass. 561, 571 (2012); Scott v.
Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2016) (denying habeas corpus in
same case), that is only one factor among many, and must be
assessed in context. The presence of one empanelled African-
American juror, as appears to have been the case here, cannot be
dispositive. Indeed, in Sanchez, five African-Americans already
had been seated. See Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 303. As the court
explained in that case, to place undue weight on this factor not
only would run counter to the mandate to consider all relevant
circumstances, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, but also would
send the “unmistakable message that a prosecutor can get away
with discriminating against some African Americans . . . so long
as a prosecutor does not discriminate against all such individuals”
(emphasis in original). See Sanchez, supra at 299.

Consideration of all relevant circumstances compels the con-
clusion that the defendant made the limited showing necessary to
make out a prima facie showing of discrimination, and that the
judge abused her discretion by finding otherwise. Had the judge
allowed the inquiry to go forward, the prosecutor might well have
proffered an adequate and genuine race-neutral reason for her
strike of juror no. 143. Because the judge did not do so, and be-
cause a Batson-Soares error constitutes structural error for which

2°Tn addition, the prosecutor struck several jurors who reported that they did
work with others.

8°While a judge must evaluate each such challenge on the facts known at the
time, we note that little had changed since the judge had found a prima facie
showing of discrimination. Between the two challenges, the prosecutor had
exercised two peremptory strikes, one against juror no. 143, an African-Ameri-
can, and one against a juror who was not African-American. The proportion of
the Commonwealth's strikes exercised against African-Americans, therefore,
actually had increased slightly, from four out of eleven to five out of thirteen.

326 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

prejudice is presumed,*! we vacate the convictions and remand
the case to the Superior Court for a new trial.?

c. Issues on retrial. We discuss briefly those issues which may
occur at a new trial.®*

i. Refusal evidence. On cross-examination of Johnson, one of
the investigating officers who spoke with the defendant, defense
counsel elicited testimony that the defendant willingly spoke to
police, that he was polite, and that he consented to have his hands
swabbed for gunshot residue. On redirect examination of Johnson,
and again on direct examination of Sergeant Thomas O’Leary, the
Commonwealth then elicited testimony that the defendant refused
to go to the hospital to be viewed by Platt, the surviving victim.

To be sure, absent a defendant “opening the door” to such
testimony, admission of “refusal” evidence violates a defendant’s
right against self-incrimination. See art. 12 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights; Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139,
141-142 (1999), S.C., 443 Mass. 60 (2004). To the extent that
the defendant leaves the jury with a false or misleading impres-

31In this case, we reach only the first step of the Batson-Soares analysis, and
acknowledge the constitutionally permissible option of remanding for an evi-
dentiary hearing at which the Commonwealth would bear the burden of estab-
lishing a race-neutral justification for the challenge which would render the
judge’s error harmless. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 307 (1st Cir.
2014). We have long disfavored this approach, however, on the ground that “the
conditions of the empanelment . . . cannot be easily recreated.” Soares, 377
Mass. at 492 n.37. See Issa, 466 Mass. at 11 n.14 (error in failing to find prima
facie showing of discrimination “unlikely to be harmless”).

%2We discern no merit in the Commonwealth’s argument that the defendant
waived the Batson-Soares issue either by failing to object a second time
following the judge’s determination that he had not made the necessary prima
facie showing, or by mentioning only Soares, 377 Mass. 461, rather than both
Soares and Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69.

38We do not reach the defendant’s claim that the judge improperly limited his
cross-examination of Detective Donald Lee, noting only that the trial judge has
discretion to determine the proper scope of cross-examination. See Common-
wealth v. Johnson, 431 Mass. 535, 540 (2000). Nor do we address the defend-
ant’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

*4For example, while a defendant’s compelled production of a writing ex-
emplar does not violate his or her privilege against self-incrimination, the
Commonwealth ordinarily may not introduce evidence of a defendant's refusal
to participate voluntarily in such a procedure; the latter, unlike the former, is
testimonial evidence protected under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. See Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1209 (1992) (discussing
difference between testimonial and real evidence). While this distinction is well
established as a matter of Massachusetts law, the United States Supreme Court
has reached the opposite conclusion under the cognate provision of the Federal

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 327

Commonwealth » Jones,

sion, however, he thereby opens the door to the Commonwealth’s
introduction of pertinent refusal evidence on that issue to correct
the misimpression created. See Commonwealth v. Beaulieu, 79
Mass. App. Ct. 100, 104 (2001) (where defense counsel elicited
testimony that defendant was not subjected to field sobriety test,
Commonwealth was entitled to elicit testimony that defendant
refused); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 398,
405-406 (1999) (where defendant testified that he “did not dis-
guise his voice” during identification procedure, Commonwealth
was entitled to elicit testimony that defendant twice failed to
show up for voice identification). Cf. Commonwealth v. Toolan,
460 Mass. 452, 471 (2011) (where defendant puts voluntariness
of statement at issue, prosecutor may introduce post-Miranda
silence to show voluntariness). To the extent that defense counsel
elicited on cross-examination of Johnson that the defendant had
been willing to be swabbed for gunshot residue, was willing to
turn over his and his mother’s telephone numbers, and was other-
wise generally cooperative, the door was surely open to refusal
evidence as to the topics he raised. The question here is how
widely the door was opened. Otherwise put, the question is
whether the defendant, by eliciting evidence to show he cooper-
ated in certain respects, thereby allowed the Commonwealth to
elicit refusal evidence showing he did not cooperate in a different
respect.

In decisions to date, the admitted refusal evidence has been
confined to the discrete issue with regard to which the defendant
elicited evidence. See Beaulieu, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 104; John-
son, 46 Mass. App. Ct. at 405-406. In addition to assuring that the
risk of undue prejudice from the proffered testimony does not
outweigh its probative value, see Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470
Mass. 228, 249 & n.27 (2014), it is the better part of wisdom, in
such circumstances, given the constitutional protection accorded
to testimonial refusal evidence, to view the door as having been
left ajar rather than wide open. Had the defendant only elicited
testimony that he had consented to gunshot residue testing, re-
fusal evidence, if any, limited to that discrete issue, would be
proper. That being said, to the extent that the defendant here
elicited considerable evidence creating the impression of full

Constitution, see South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983) (refusal to
take breathalyzer admissible under Fifth Amendment to United States Consti-
tution), as have many other States under the cognate provisions of their State
Constitutions.

328 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

cooperation with the police, evidence as to his refusal to cooperate
by allowing Platt to see him at the hospital was probative of that
issue. Given this, it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the
Commonwealth to inquire on redirect examination of Johnson as
to the challenged refusal evidence. Because such evidence should
be admitted charily, however, it should not have been allowed to
come in a second time on the direct examination of O’Leary.*

ii. Police radio broadcast. At trial, the Commonwealth played
a police radio broadcast in which Lee, one of the detectives who
interviewed Platt at the hospital, thereafter relayed the description
of the suspect that Platt had given him: “a young male with khaki
shorts, Chuck Taylor sneakers, a white and red shirt, and a black
and red baseball cap.” The defendant maintains that this broad-
cast was hearsay and should not have been admitted. The Com-
monwealth contends that it was admissible for two reasons: to
show the state of police knowledge, and as an earlier out-of-court
identification of the defendant by a testifying witness. Neither is
persuasive.

As to the first reason, the Commonwealth argues that the radio
broadcast showed the state of police knowledge and thereby
provided the jury with context for the detectives’ decision to
speak repeatedly to the defendant after the shooting. See Com-
monwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 659 (1972). Hearsay admit-
ted for this purpose, however, rarely should give such a specific
description; instead, “a statement that an officer acted ‘upon
information received,’ . . . or words to that effect” is sufficient.
See Commonwealth vy. Rosario, 430 Mass. 505, 510 (1999),
quoting McCormick, Evidence § 249 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
Even in that event, such evidence would require a limiting in-
struction, not given here, that it cannot be used for the truth of the
description it contains.

In reliance on Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C) (2017), and cases
cited, the Commonwealth also maintains that the radio broadcast
is admissible for its truth insofar as Platt testified at trial and the
broadcast “identifies the person as someone the declarant [Platt]

25The Commonwealth also contends that the admission of refusal evidence
was proper to rebut a defense of insufficient police investigation. See generally
Commonwealth v, Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1980). Insofar as police, by their
own admission, did not intend to have the defendant viewed by the surviving
victim even if he had consented, this argument fails. Contrast Commonwealth v.
Beaulieu, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 103-105 (2001) (police intended to perform
field sobriety testing if defendant consented).

477 Mass. 307 (2017) 329

Commonwealth » Jones,

perceived earlier.” Quite apart from the failure to overcome the
totem pole hearsay aspect of the challenged broadcast, Platt did
not see the shooter, nor could she identify the defendant as the
shooter. While in certain instances a description of a person’s
characteristics, rather than an identification of a specific person,
can constitute an identification for purposes of the aforesaid rule,
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 72 (1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984) (approving admission of
detailed facial description of perpetrator), the description here
was simply too vague to qualify.

iii. Instruction on circumstantial evidence. The judge informed
the venire, before empanelment, that the case likely would turn on
circumstantial evidence, and that such evidence, like direct evi-
dence, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
was a correct statement of the law, and often is given during a
judge’s charge. See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533,
556 (1990). See also Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Prac-
tice Jury Instructions § 1.3 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2d ed. 2013).
To the extent that the defendant contends that such an instruction,
while appropriate after the close of all the evidence, is inappropriate
to give to the venire before trial, we disagree. In Commonwealth v.
Andrade, 468 Mass. 543, 548-549 (2014), for example, we held that
a judge does not abuse his or her discretion by taking the stronger
step of asking prospective jurors individually whether they would
be able to convict on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and
striking for cause those who answer in the negative.

iv. Instruction on mere presence. The defendant contends that
he is entitled to an instruction that his mere presence at the scene
of the shooting is not sufficient to convict. While such an instruc-
tion is permissible, we decline to require it, insofar as the standard
instructions regarding the elements of the offenses adequately
cover the issue. See Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395,
412 (2014) (no specific instruction necessary where Common-
wealth’s burden of proof adequately explained by standard in-
struction). The judge correctly instructed the jury that, in order to
convict the defendant of murder in the first degree, they must find
that the defendant “caused the death” of the victim and that he
“consciously and purposefully intended to cause” the victim’s
death.** A reasonable jury could not find these elements beyond
a reasonable doubt based on the defendant’s mere presence in a

°4Similarly explicit instructions were given regarding the elements of the
other crimes with which the defendant was charged.

330 477 Mass. 307 (2017)

Commonwealth » Jones,

public park.

3. Conclusion. The defendant’s convictions are vacated and set
aside. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 331 (2017) 331

Commonwealth 1. George.

Commonweattu vs. RicHarp GEORGE.
Worcester. December 8, 2016. - June 21, 2017,

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Sex Offender. Constitutional Law, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sex
offender, Substantive rights. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion, Rel-
evancy and materiality. Witness, Expert.

This court concluded that, at a proceeding to determine if an individual is a
sexually dangerous person pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, a diagnosis of antiso-
cial personality disorder is a sufficient predicate for a finding of sexual
dangerousness so long as other evidence establishes a nexus between that
condition and the factors warranting the individual’s confinement to a secure
facility. [335-338]

At the trial of a petition filed by the Commonwealth pursuant to G. L. ¢. 123A,
§ 12, seeking commitment of the defendant as a sexually dangerous person,
although the judge did not err in admitting the testimony of two qualified
examiners on the defendant's likelihood of reoffense [338-339], the judge did
err in admitting their testimony regarding the defendant’s risk category labels
on the Static-99R risk assessment tool (ie., that the defendant had a “mod-
erate high” or “high” risk of reoffense), where such testimony does not aid
the jury in determining sexual dangerousness, in that the meaning of the
labels is often unclear, there is an absence of accepted standards or metrics
connecting the labels to specific meanings, and substantial variation exists
among sex offenders ascribed identical labels [339-341]; however, given the
limited nature of the use of the Static-99R in the qualified examiners’
over-all risk assessment analysis of the defendant, the error was
nonprejudicial and did not require reversal [341-342].

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
October 11, 2013.

The case was tried before Beverly J. Cannone, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

David B. Hirsch for the defendant.

Nathaniel R. Beaudoin, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Hes, J. After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant,
Richard George, was determined to be a sexually dangerous per-
son (SDP) pursuant to G. L. c. 123A. In accordance with the

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477 Mass. 331 (2017)

Commonwealth 1. George.

statute, the judge committed the defendant to the Massachusetts
Treatment Center (treatment center) for an indeterminate period of
from one day to life. The defendant filed a timely appeal challenging
the commitment on the grounds that (1) a diagnosis of antisocial
personality disorder (ASPD) is a constitutionally inadequate basis
for commitment as an SDP; and (2) the judge erroneously admitted
expert opinion testimony on the likelihood of reoffense and the re-
sults of the Static-99R risk assessment tool. We allowed the de-
fendant’s application for direct appellate review to clarify the rele-
vance of an ASPD diagnosis in the sexual dangerousness calculus.

We conclude that an ASPD diagnosis is a sufficient predicate
for sexual dangerousness so long as other evidence establishes a
nexus between that condition and the factors warranting confine-
ment to a secure facility. Also, we discern no error in the judge’s
evidentiary rulings requiring reversal. Therefore, we affirm the
judgment and order for the defendant’s civil commitment to the
treatment center as an SDP.

Background. 1. Pretrial proceedings. In October, 2013, the
Commonwealth filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12,
seeking an adjudication that the defendant is an SDP. In April,
2014, a Superior Court judge found probable cause to believe that
the defendant is an SDP and committed him to the treatment
center for examination and diagnosis. Two qualified examiners*
submitted reports, opining that the defendant is an SDP within the
meaning of G. L. c. 123A, § 1. The trial on the Commonwealth’s
petition commenced in September, 2015.

2. The trial. Through records admitted at trial pursuant to G. L.
c. 123A, § 14 (c), and the testimony of the two qualified exam-
iners, the Commonwealth presented evidence from which the jury
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory ele-
ments necessary for the defendant’s commitment as an SDP. This
evidence detailed the defendant’s prior convictions of sexual
offenses and included expert opinion testimony on two issues: (1)
whether the defendant suffered from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that predisposes him to commit sexual of-

‘A qualified examiner is either (1) a physician who is licensed by the
Commonwealth and certified or eligible to be certified in psychiatry by the
American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology; or (2) a psychologist who is
licensed by the Commonwealth. In all cases, a qualified examiner is designated
as such by the Department of Correction and has at least two years of experience
with diagnosis or treatment of sexually aggressive offenders.” Green, petitioner,
475 Mass. 624, 625 n.3 (2016), citing G. L. c. 123A, § 1.

477 Mass. 331 (2017) 333

Commonwealth 1. George.

fenses; and (2) whether the defendant likely would reoffend be-
cause of that mental condition if not confined to a secure facility.
The defendant offered no evidence at trial.

The jury could have found the following facts. The defendant
was convicted of two different sexual offenses as defined in G. L.
c. 123A, § 1. In 1978, when the defendant was seventeen years of
age, he sexually assaulted a nine year old girl. After first going
down a bike path with the victim’s eleven year old sister, the
defendant asked the victim if she too wanted to go down the bike
path. As they went down the path, the defendant pushed the
victim down to the ground, got on top of her, and, over the vic-
tim’s clothing, fondled her breasts and genital area.

After the victim began to scream for her sister, the defendant let
her get up from the ground and warned if she told anyone, she
would be killed. Thereafter, the defendant was charged and con-
victed of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of
fourteen. Following conviction, the defendant was sentenced to a
term of probation for three years.

Approximately twelve years later, the defendant was convicted
of aggravated rape and rape. The convictions stemmed from the
rape of a forty-nine year old woman, who was the mother of a
woman the defendant had dated previously. The defendant went
to the victim’s home and asked to speak with her daughter, who
was not home. Following a conversation with the victim, the
defendant asked if he could use her restroom. He reported to the
victim that the toilet was not functioning. When the victim went
to investigate, the defendant attacked her. Putting his hands around
her throat, the defendant pulled the victim down to the floor and
sexually assaulted her vaginally and anally. After sexually as-
saulting the victim, the defendant physically assaulted her with an
iron and a knife. The victim sustained a broken jaw, a fractured
skull, and a cut on her neck.

Based on the sexual and physical assault, the defendant was
convicted of several rape charges, including one count of aggra-
vated rape and two counts of rape. As a result of the aggravated
rape conviction, the judge sentenced the defendant to imprison-
ment for a term of from fifteen to twenty-five years.

At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence from the two
qualified examiners, Gregg A. Belle, Ph.D., and Dr. Katrin Rouse-
Weir, Ed.D. Both qualified examiners interviewed and diagnosed the
defendant with ASPD, and agreed that this particular mental con-
dition constituted a personality disorder as defined by G. L. c. 123A,

334 477 Mass. 331 (2017)

Commonwealth 1. George.

§ 1. In support of the diagnosis, the examiners considered a range
of factors, including the defendant’s disciplinary history while in-
carcerated, his history of sex offender treatment, and statements the
defendant made in other evaluations regarding his sexual offenses.
Dr. Belle characterized the defendant’s incarceration and disciplin-
ary history as “somewhat difficult.” Specifically, the defendant
received approximately fifty-three disciplinary reports alleging vio-
lations of prison rules, some of which resulted from threatening and
sexually explicit statements the defendant allegedly made to female
staff. Another disciplinary report resulted from an incident where
the defendant masturbated in front of a female correctional officer.
The defendant’s sexually threatening and explicit behavior was a
factor in his transfer to a higher security facility.

Although the defendant participated in sex offender treatment,
he was terminated from the treatment program on several occa-
sions. He was terminated on one occasion because of sexually
explicit letters he wrote to female staff. The defendant also made
sexually threatening statements regarding his plans on release,
warning that he was going to commit a rape when he was released
from prison and identifying the female staff member that he
planned to rape. In 2006, the defendant was again terminated
from the treatment program for engaging in consensual oral sex
with a wheelchair bound inmate.

Considering the defendant’s criminal sexual history together
with the nature of the numerous violations of institutional rules,
Belle explained that this conduct exemplified “one of the hall-
mark traits of an antisocial personality disorder.” Belle also
concluded that the defendant has demonstrated, “over a period of
time, a persistent pattern . . . [of] an inability to control his sexual
impulses.” According to Belle, the defendant’s continued engage-
ment in a “pervasive pattern” of sexually threatening behavior
while incarcerated “speak[s] to the statutorily defined personality
disorder” that he characterized as ASPD. Similarly, Dr. Rouse-
Weir noted that the statements made to female staff “involved
sexual aggression, which is relevant . . . with regard to his risk.”
Rouse-Weir went on to note that the defendant’s aggression,
irritability, lack of remorse, and lack of regard for the rights of
others had “a sexual element.” She added that the continued
demonstration of aggression with sexualized elements directed
toward female staff exclusively was a “chronic characteristic
associated with [his ASPD].”

Belle and Rouse-Weir also opined on the significance of the

477 Mass. 331 (2017)

Commonwealth 1. George.

w
o
a

defendant’s score on the Static-99R risk assessment tool.? The
Static-99R risk analysis completed by Belle yielded a score of
four, which Belle opined translated to a “moderate-high” risk to
sexually reoffend. Belle also explained that a score of four cor-
responded to an eleven per cent risk that the defendant would
reoffend sexually over a five-year period. Rouse-Weir, on the
other hand, opined that the defendant’s Static-99R risk analysis
yielded a score of six, which falls within the “high-risk category”
as defined by the Static-99R.

Discussion. The defendant challenges the commitment, arguing
that commitment as an SDP based on an ASPD diagnosis violates
substantive due process and that the erroneous admission of
expert opinion testimony on the likelihood of reoffense and the
scores on the Static-99R predicting a “moderate high” or “high”
risk of reoffense usurped the jury’s role as fact finder. We address
both arguments in turn.

1. Antisocial personality disorder. Raising the issue for the first
time on appeal,’ the defendant claims that commitment as an SDP
based on an ASPD diagnosis as the predicate mental condition
violates substantive due process. Borrowing from the United
States Supreme Court’s analysis of a civil commitment statute in
Kansas vy. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002), the defendant contends
that the use of the ASPD diagnosis sweeps too broadly, permit-
ting what amounts to unconstitutional preventive detention. As
the argument goes, the ASPD diagnosis fails to distinguish “the
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnor-
mality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal
case.” Id. at 413. We reject the defendant’s argument as it
misapprehends the evidentiary weight to be accorded to an ASPD
diagnosis in the sexual dangerousness calculus.

2The Static-99R is an actuarial tool, designed to predict the recidivism risk of
sexual offenses in adult male sex offenders who have been convicted of at least
one sexual offense. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 636 n.33 (2011). Initially developed in
1999, the Static-99 has since been revised and renamed “Static-99R.”

“Although the defendant raised this argument in a motion in limine, defense
counsel withdrew the motion prior to the start of trial. Also, the defendant did
not object to the antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) diagnosis at trial or
move for a directed verdict. Thus, the issue is waived. However, we address the
issue to determine whether the admission of the evidence created a substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 583
n9, cert denied, 135 S.Ct. 150 (2014).

336 477 Mass. 331 (2017)

Commonwealth 1. George.

The definition of an SDP in G. L. c. 123A, § 1, makes it
abundantly clear that an ASPD diagnosis, standing alone, does
not justify commitment as an SDP. An SDP is defined as any
person “who has been . . . convicted of . . . a sexual offense and
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not
confined to a secure facility.” A “personality disorder” is defined
as “a congenital or acquired physical or mental condition that
results in a general lack of power to control sexual impulses.” Id.
Although we have not been called on to parse the definition of
“personality disorder,” the Appeals Court has correctly recog-
nized ASPD as a type of personality disorder that, in conjunction
with other relevant evidence, may justify commitment as an SDP.
See, e.g., Souza, petitioner, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 169 (2015)
(noting that ASPD diagnosis is “adequate to satisfy the defini-
tional requirements of an SDP in G. L. c. 123A, § 1”); Common-
wealth v. Husband, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2012) (same);
Commonwealth v. Mazzarino, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 369 (2012)
(commitment based on ASPD diagnosis “combined with other
evidence” suggesting ASPD made respondent likely to reoffend
sexually if not confined does not violate due process protections
under Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution or
art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).

Accordingly, a “personality disorder” as defined in G. L.
c. 123A, § 1, is relevant to the sexual dangerousness calculus
only if the “condition . . . results in a general lack of power to
control sexual impulses.” Contrary to the defendant’s assertion,
our law does not permit the indefinite and indiscriminate com-
mitment of persons solely because of an ASPD diagnosis. The
diagnosis requires an individualized review, and it is relevant
only if it is predictive of a lack of control over the proclivity for
criminal conduct and the conduct is likely to be sexual in nature.
Not all offenders diagnosed as having ASPD can be so catego-
rized. Instead, our cases have held true to the underlying statutory
purpose to subject only those persons who because of a pre-
scribed mental condition cannot control their impulses to commit
a sexual crime to the possibility of civil commitment as an SDP®

‘The Commonwealth does not contend that the defendant suffered from a
“mental abnormality.”

5The defendant urges this court to follow the reasoning in Matter of State of
MY. v, Donald DD, 24 N.Y.3d 174, 190 (2014) (ASPD diagnosis alone absent
diagnosis of any other “condition, disease or disorder alleged to constitute a

477 Mass. 331 (2017) 337

Commonwealth 1. George.

Here, two qualified examiners opined that the defendant suf-
fered from ASPD and determined that because of this condition
the defendant was likely to engage in sexual offenses if not
confined in a secure facility. The qualified examiners did not base
their opinion on this diagnosis alone. Rather, they also relied on
evidence, separate and apart from the defendant's criminal his-
tory, suggesting that ASPD made the defendant “likely to engage
in sexual offenses” if not civilly committed. G. L. c. 123A, § 1.
Belle predicated his conclusion that the defendant lacked the
ability to control his sexual impulses not only on the defendant’s
criminal history, but also on his incarceration history. Belle noted
that he considered behaviors in which the defendant has engaged
as constituting a “persistent pattern in which he has shown an in-
ability to control his sexual impulses.” While incarcerated, the de-
fendant had a history of making “physically threatening,” “sexu-
ally assaulting,” and sexually explicit statements directed toward
female staff members, including threatening to break a woman’s
leg and threatening to rape another.

Similarly, Rouse-Weir based her conclusion on the defendant’s
criminal history as well as his incarceration history, including his
participation in sex offender treatment programs, and his disci-
plinary history. Rouse-Weir noted that the defendant participated
in, but failed to successfully complete, sex offender treatment,
and received fifty-three disciplinary reports and associated sanc-
tions. With respect to disciplinary reports, Rouse-Weir, like Belle,
pointed out that during the initial period of the defendant’s
incarceration, his disciplinary reports related to the use of threat-
ening language and sexually aggressive statements toward female
staff, which sometimes resulted in the defendant being transferred
to higher security facilities.

Both Belle and Rouse-Weir conceded that ASPD affects a large
percentage of the ordinary prison population,® and that the dis-

mental abnormality” is insufficient to meet test set out by Supreme Court in
Kansas v. Crane, 534 US. 407, 413 [2002]). However, we are not persuaded by
the court’s analysis, which, as the dissent in that case points out, concludes that
because ASPD does not, in every case, predispose the individual to commit sex
crimes, the diagnosis can never satisfy the definitional requirements of the
statute, Id, at 194 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). As we conclude here, G. L. ¢, 123A,
requires a determination on a case-by-case basis whether in a given case the
ASPD diagnosis meets the definition of an SDP.

®0n cross-examination, Belle affirmed ASPD is prevalent in fifty to seventy
per cent of the general prison population. Similarly, the United States Supreme
Court has noted that an estimated forty to sixty per cent of the male prison

338 477 Mass. 331 (2017)

Commonwealth 1. George.

order tends to “burn out or mitigate” once an individual reaches
his forties. However, Rouse-Weir explained that unlike other
individuals diagnosed with ASPD, the defendant’s lack of re-
morse and his lack of regard for others’ rights “ha[d] a sexual
element.” Moreover, although Belle determined that the defend-
ant did not meet the criteria for a paraphilic disorder,’ a factor
highly relevant to the SDP calculus, Rouse-Weir opined that the
defendant showed “a deviant sexual interest.” This “deviant
sexual interest,” combined with the defendant’s ASPD, where it
resulted in an inability to control sexual impulses, was a sufficient
predicate for sexual dangerousness.

2. Qualified examiner testimony. Prior to trial, the defendant
filed motions in limine to exclude expert opinion testimony
regarding his likelihood of reoffense and to preclude the admis-
sion of “subjective, value judgment labels” for the scores derived
from the Static-99R. Both motions were denied. He argues on
appeal that the judge erred in denying the motions because the
qualified examiner testimony on both issues improperly invaded
the province of the jury.

a. Expert testimony regarding likelihood of reoffense. To com-
mit a person as an SDP, the jury must determine that the person
has been “convicted of a sexual offense, suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that renders him a menace to
the health and safety of others, and is likely to engage in sexual
offenses if not confined.” Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574,
580, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014), citing G. L. c. 123A,
§§ 1, 14. The defendant correctly concedes that our law allows
for expert opinion testimony to “touch on an ultimate issue of the
case [where] that testimony aids the jury in reaching a decision.”
Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 459 Mass. 148, 163 (2011). See
Mass. G. Evid. § 704 (2017). Nevertheless, he contends that the
qualified examiners’ testimony was improper because it would
not aid the jury in determining whether the mental abnormality or

population is diagnosable with ASPD. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, citing
Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 Soc. Psychia-
try & Psychiatric Epidemiology 231, 234 (1999).

7A paraphilic disorder is characterized as recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving (1) nonhuman objects,
(2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one’s partner, or (3) children or
other nonconsenting persons that occur over a period of at least six months.
Paraphilic disorders, as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, include, but are not limited to, exhibitionistic disorder,
fetishistic disorder, and pedophilic disorder.

477 Mass. 331 (2017) 339

Commonwealth 1. George.

personality disorder is likely to cause the individual to reoffend
unless confined. We disagree.

A qualified examiner’s opinion testimony is “the essential basis
for a finding of sexual dangerousness.” Green, petitioner, 475
Mass. 624, 630 (2016). In an SDP trial, the jury’s task involves
assessing the risk of reoffending, which in turn involves a com-
plex balance of factors, including “the seriousness of the threat-
ened harm, the relative certainty of the anticipated harm, and the
possibility of successful intervention to prevent that harm.” Com-
monwealth v. Boucher, 438 Mass. 274, 276 (2002). “Because the
trier of fact in G. L. c. 123A proceedings must decide ‘[w]hether
a person suffers from a mental abnormality or personality defect,
as well as the predictive behavioral question of the likelihood that
a person suffering from such a condition will commit a sexual
offense,’ and because these are ‘matters beyond the range of
ordinary experience,’ expert evidence is required in order to
commit a person to the treatment center or to keep a person
confined there.” Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 549-550
(2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Dube, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 476,
483 n.12 (2003). See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489,
511 (2000).

Thus, the expert’s role in opining on the ultimate issue to be
decided by the jury is settled in our jurisprudence. The judge did
not err in admitting qualified examiner testimony on the ultimate
issue. Indeed, given the centrality of expert opinion testimony to
the SDP adjudication, it would have been an error of law for the
trial judge to exclude that testimony.

b. Static-99R risk category labels. The defendant argues that
the admission of the qualified examiners’ testimony categorizing
his Static-99R score as “moderate-high” and “high” also invaded
the jury’s province and, thus, constituted error. He contends that
the Static-99R categories represent a “wholly subjective” assess-
ment and create a risk that the jury will shift responsibility for
determining the likelihood of reoffense to the qualified examin-
ers. We conclude that the risk categories lack probative value in
the sexual dangerousness calculus and should not be admitted at
trial.

The Static-99R measures ten static risk factors that have been
shown to increase one’s risk for sexual recidivism, and adjusts the
numerical score upward or downward depending on risk factors
that the qualified examiner determines are significant in the
particular individual’s case. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

340 477 Mass. 331 (2017)

Commonwealth 1. George.

No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 636 0.33
(2011). Each numeric score corresponds to a percentage reflect-
ing the risk of sexual reoffense and a risk category label (“low,”
“low-moderate,” “moderate-high,” and “high’). See Hanson,
Babchishin, Helmus, Thornton, & Phenix, Communicating the
Results of Criterion Referenced Prediction Measures: Risk Cat-
egories for the Static-99R and Static-2002R Sexual Offender Risk
Assessment Tools, 29 Psychological Assessment 582, 584 (2017).

As a threshold matter, the Static-99R is itself a limited tool; it
estimates only the “the relative risk of sexual recidivism based on
commonly available demographic and criminal history informa-
tion.” Id. It does not identify the likelihood of sexual recidivism
for a specific individual. As Belle explained in his testimony, the
Static-99R results were not specific to the defendant, and “[o]ne
of the cautions about the Static-99R is that it is looking at groups
of individuals that may or may not be similar to [the defendant].”

While the combination of the Static-99R raw score and the
corresponding percentage reflecting the risk of sexual reoffense
provide “precise, numeric estimates of recidivism risk,” the cat-
egory labels do not. Jd. at 583. The test’s developers have ack-
nowledged that the meaning of risk category labels is often
unclear. “There is only a loose association in natural language
between verbal labels for likelihood [e.g., ‘low,’ ‘low-moderate,’
‘moderate-high,’ and ‘high’] . . . and numeric probabilities.” Id.
Further, test developers have conceded that the lack of clarity is
exacerbated by the absence of accepted standards or metrics
connecting the risk category labels to “specific meanings, such as
recidivism rates, psychological features, or expected treatment
needs.”* Jd. Consequently, “substantial variation” exists among
sex offenders ascribed identical risk category labels. Id.

Given this view of the risk category labels by the experts who
develop and use them, we are not persuaded that such testimony
aids the jury in determining sexual dangerousness. Cf. Simon v.

®To resolve the shortcomings of the Static-99R risk category labels, test
developers have created new risk category labels. We take no position on the
admissibility of those labels. See Hanson, Babchishin, Helmus, Thornton, &
Phenix, Communicating the Results of Criterion Referenced Prediction Mea
sures: Risk Categories for the Static-99R and Static-2002R Sexual Offender
Risk Assessment Tools, 29 Psychological Assessment 582, 592 (2017) (new risk
categories “have sufficiently improved conceptual coherence and have sufficient
empirical support to replace the original categories”).

477 Mass. 331 (2017) 341

Commonwealth 1. George.

Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 105 (1982) (“expert testimony on matters
within the witness’s field of expertise is admissible whenever it
will aid the jury in reaching a decision”). Accordingly, we con-
clude that the admission of qualified examiners’ testimony char-
acterizing the defendant’s Static-99R score as “moderate-high” or
“high” was error.

The defendant filed a pretrial motion to exclude the Static-99R
tisk category labels, which the judge denied. Thus, we must
determine whether the improper admission of Static-99R risk
category labels was nonprejudicial, that is “whether ‘the error did
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect." Common-
wealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 563 (2000), quoting Com-
monwealth vy. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). See Com-
monwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 718, 721 (2016). We
conclude that the erroneous admission of testimony regarding the
Static-99R risk category labels does not warrant reversal.

The expert testimony regarding the defendant’s Static-99R risk
category was appropriately limited; it was presented as only one
of many factors in the SDP calculus. For example, Rouse-Weir
explained that the Static-99R is an actuarial tool only, and that
examiners have agreed to use the actuarial instrument “in a
limited fashion.” Also as explained to the jury, the qualified
examiners considered several “dynamic factors,”® which the
Static-99R test does not take into account. For example, Belle and
Rouse-Weir considered matters such as substance abuse history,
“deviant sexual interests,” “cognitive distortions,” and “intimacy
deficits,” all of which are relevant to sexual dangerousness. In
addition, the qualified examiners included in the sexual danger-
ousness calculus the defendant’s family history, educational and
work background, incarceration records, treatment history, and
release plans. Given the limited nature of the use of the Static-
99R in the qualified examiners’ over-all risk assessment analysis
of the defendant, we conclude that the admission of testimony
regarding the risk category labels was non-prejudicial.

Recognizing that our holding as to risk category labels modifies
the manner in which the Static-99R may be used in SDP pro-
ceedings, we take this opportunity to clarify that our holding is
limited. Both the Static-99R score and the corresponding percent-
age reflecting the risk of sexual offense in qualified examiners’
testimony continue to be admissible. Our holding makes inad-

*Dynamic risk factors are “more fluid” and can change over time.

342 477 Mass. 331 (2017)

Commonwealth 1. George.

missible the risk category labels only, as the risk category labels,
unlike the Static-99R score and the corresponding percentage
reflecting the risk of sexual reoffense, provide little aid to the jury
in rendering its decision.

Conclusion. Under G. L. c. 123A, an ASPD diagnosis is
adequate to satisfy the definitional requirements of an SDP where
the Commonwealth also proves that, as a result of the ASPD, the
individual is likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined,
and in this case there was no error requiring reversal. Therefore,
we affirm the judgment and order for the defendant’s civil com-
mitment as an SDP.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 343 (2017) 343

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

Mount VERNON Fire INsuRANCE Company vs. VISIONAID,
Inc.*

Suffolk. December 5, 2016. - June 22, 2017,

Present: Gants, C.l., Luk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Buop, & Cyeure, JJ.

Insurance, Insurer’s obligation to defend.

‘This court concluded that an insurer with a contractual duty to defend an insured
is not required, under either the contractual language or the “in for one, in for
all” rule, to prosecute an affirmative counterclaim on the insured’s behalf.
[348-353] Gants, C.J., dissenting, with whom Levk, J., joined.

This court concluded that an insurer’s contractual duty to pay defense costs has
the same scope as an insurer’s contractual duty to defend, and that, accord-
ingly, an insurer’s contractual duty to pay defense costs does not require the
insurer to pay the costs of prosecuting a counterclaim on behalf of the
insured, [353-354]

CerriicaTion Of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court
by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Kenneth R. Berman (Heather B. Repicky also present) for the
defendant.

James J. Duane, HI (Scarlett M. Rajbanshi also present) for the
plaintiff.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Marshall Gilinsky for United Policyholders.

Laura Foggan, of the District of Columbia, & Rosanna Sattler
for American Insurance Association & others.

Michael F. Aylward for American International Group, Inc., &
another.

Gaziano, J. In this case we are called upon to answer three
certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit involving the scope of an insurer’s duty to
defend, and whether that duty extends to a counterclaim brought
by the insured. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
where an insurance policy provides that the insurer has the “duty
to defend any claim” initiated against the insured, the insurer’s
duty to defend does not require it to prosecute affirmative coun-

*Formerly known as H.L. Bouton Co., Inc.

344 477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

terclaims on behalf of its insured.?

1. Facts and prior proceedings. We recite the facts based on the
United States District Court judge’s memorandum of decision,
the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, and the undisputed documents in the record. VisionAid,
Inc. (VisionAid),? is a manufacturer of lens cleaning and eye
safety products. It purchased an employment practices liability
insurance policy from Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company
(Mount Vernon), which covered, among other things, wrongful
termination claims brought against VisionAid from May, 2011,
through May, 2012.

As relevant here, the policy imposed two duties on Mount
Vernon with respect to any wrongful termination claim brought
against VisionAid. The policy provided that Mount Vernon had
“the right and duty to defend any Claim to which this insurance
applies,” and that it was obligated to “pay one hundred percent
(100%) of the Defense Costs for the [covered] Claim” up to the
policy limit. Under the terms of the policy, “Claim” was defined

s “any proceeding initiated against [VisionAid] . . . seeking to
hold [VisionAid] responsible for a Wrongful Act.” “Defense
costs” was defined as “reasonable and necessary legal fees and
expenses incurred by [Mount Vernon], or by any attorney desig-
nated by [Mount Vernon] to defend [VisionAid], resulting from
the investigation, adjustment, defense, and appeal of a Claim.”*

2We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by United Policyholders:
American Insurance Association, Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Asso-
ciation, and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America; and American
International Group, Inc., and Massachusetts Insurance Federation, Inc.

8When it obtained the insurance policy at issue, Vision Aid was known as H.L.
Bouton, Co., Inc. The company changed its name shortly after the policy was
issued.

“The policy also provided:

“Notice: This is a Claims Made Policy. This Policy covers only those
Claims first made against the Insured during the Policy Period or Extended
Reporting Period, if purchased, Defense Costs shall be applied against the
Retention.

“1, Insuring Agreement

“A. The Company will pay on behalf of the Insured, Loss in excess of the
Retention not exceeding the Limit of Liability shown on the policy
Declarations for which this coverage applies that the Insured shall become
legally obligated to pay because of Claims first made against the Insured

we
&
am

477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

In September, 2011, VisionAid discovered through a forensic
audit that one of its employees, Gary Sullivan, appeared to have
misappropriated several hundred thousand dollars of company
funds. In October, 2011, VisionAid terminated Sullivan. In Au-
gust, 2012, Sullivan commenced an action for wrongful termina-
tion before the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimina-
tion (MCAD), asserting that VisionAid had terminated him due to
his age. Pursuant to the insurance policy, Mount Vernon ap-
pointed panel counsel Todd Bennett to defend VisionAid.* Ben-
nett filed an answer stating that VisionAid had had three nondis-
criminatory reasons for terminating Sullivan’s employment: his
poor job performance, insubordination, and suspected misappro-
priation of company funds.

Bennett then attempted to reach a settlement with Sullivan.
Initially, Sullivan demanded $400,000, but eventually agreed to
dismiss his complaint if VisionAid signed a mutual release agree-
ment that it would not pursue him for the misappropriated funds.
VisionAid would not agree to the mutual release, as it intended to
bring a claim against Sullivan for the misappropriation.

during the Policy Period or during any Extended reporting Period, if
applicable, for Wrongful Acts arising solely out of an Insured’s duties on
behalf of the Organization.

“B. The Company has the right and duty to defend any Claim to which this
insurance applies, even if the allegations of the Claim are groundless, false
or fraudulent.

“VIII. Defense and Settlement.

“B.... [I]f a Claim is made against an Insured for Loss that is both
covered and uncovered by this Policy, the Company will pay one hundred
percent (100%) of the Defense Costs for the Claim, until such time that the
Limits of Liability of this policy are exhausted by payment of a covered
Loss or the Claim for the covered Loss is resolved by settlement, verdict
or summary judgment.”

5Law firms that agree to become “panel counsel” “sign a standard retainer
agreement” with an insurer. The agreement limits the amount of fees and
expenses that panel counsel may incur over a given period of time, requires
preapproval from the insurer for any fees in excess of a specified amount, and
restricts the number of partners, associates, and paralegals who may work on a
given case, Bennett was appointed as panel counsel in December, 2011, when
VisionAid first informed Mount Vernon that Sullivan was asserting an age
discrimination claim.

346 477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

In February, 2013, Sullivan filed a complaint in the Superior
Court, and the MCAD action was dismissed. He asserted claims
of age discrimination; unlawful termination, in violation of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of contract; and
promissory estoppel. Mount Vernon again appointed Bennett to
defend VisionAid, this time under a “reservation of rights,” in
which Mount Vernon disputed whether VisionAid’s insurance
policy obligated Mount Vernon to defend against the wrongful
termination claim.* Bennett filed an answer again asserting that
Sullivan had been terminated as a result of poor job performance,
insubordination, and misappropriation of VisionAid’s funds. Ben-
nett did not file a counterclaim for misappropriation.

VisionAid informed Mount Vernon that if Bennett did not
prosecute the counterclaim, it would exercise its rights pursuant
to the reservation of rights, and select independent counsel for its
representation, at Mount Vernon’s expense. Mount Vernon then
withdrew its reservation of rights, but continued to maintain that
the policy did not require it to prosecute the counterclaim for
misappropriation of funds, arguing that the duty to defend did not
include the duty to prosecute an affirmative counterclaim.

Mount Vernon filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
seeking a ruling that its duty to VisionAid did not require that it
prosecute or pay for the prosecution of the counterclaim for
misappropriation of funds. VisionAid filed a counterclaim seek-
ing a judgment declaring that Mount Vernon’s duty to defend
included an obligation to prosecute VisionAid’s counterclaim for
misappropriation of funds, and that Mount Vernon was required
to appoint VisionAid independent counsel because Mount Ver-
non’s position that it was not obligated to prosecute the counter-
claim had created a conflict of interest with VisionAid.

A United States District Court judge issued a judgment declar-
ing that Mount Vernon’s duty to defend VisionAid did not require
it to prosecute the counterclaim for misappropriation of funds,
and that the absence of such a duty did not create a conflict of

®A “reservation of rights” allows an insurer to defend an insured while
disputing whether the policy requires the insurer to defend the underlying claim.
Sarnafil, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 418 Mass. 295, 309 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting in part). If an insurer defends under a reservation of rights, the
insured may elect to proceed with its own defense counsel, at the insurer’s
expense, Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 387,
406-407 (2003).

477 Mass. 343 (2017) 347

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

interest with VisionAid, so that Mount Vernon was not required
to pay the costs of independent counsel.

VisionAid appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit. That court concluded that the appeal raised an
issue of State law that had yet to be addressed by this court, and
certified three questions to us.

2. Discussion. The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit certified the following questions:

1. “Whether, and under what circumstances, an insurer
(through its appointed panel counsel) may owe a duty to
its insured — whether under the insurance contract or the
Massachusetts ‘in for one, in for all’ rule — to prosecute
the insured’s counterclaim(s) for damages, where the in-
surance contract provides that the insurer has a ‘duty to
defend any Claim,’ i.e., ‘any proceeding initiated against
[the insured]’?”

2. “Whether, and under what circumstances, an insurer
(through its appointed panel counsel) may owe a duty to its
insured to fund the prosecution of the insured’s counter-
claim(s) for damages, where the insurance contract requires
the insurer to cover ‘Defense Costs,’ or the ‘reasonable and
necessary legal fees and expenses incurred by [the insurer],
or by any attorney designated by [the insurer] to defend [the
insured], resulting from the investigation, adjustment, de-
fense, and appeal of a Claim’?”

3. “Assuming the existence of a duty to prosecute the
insured’s counterclaim(s), in the event that it is determined
that an insurer has an interest in devaluing or otherwise
impairing such counterclaim(s), does a conflict of interest
arise that entitles the insured to control and/or appoint inde-
pendent counsel to control the entire proceeding, including
both the defense of any covered claims and the prosecution
of the subject counterclaim(s)?”

We conclude that (1) an insurer with a contractual duty to
defend an insured is not required to prosecute an affirmative
counterclaim on the insured’s behalf, pursuant either to the con-
tractual language in the policy at issue or the common-law “in for
one, in for all” doctrine; (2) the duty to pay defense costs has the
same scope as the duty to defend, and thus does not require an
insurer to pay the costs of prosecuting a counterclaim on behalf

348 477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

of the insured; and (3) because of our answers to the first two
questions, we do not reach the third question.

a. Insurer’s duty to defend. i. Contractual duty. We turn first to
the insurer’s contractual duties arising from the insurance policy.
As with any contract, in interpreting an insurance policy, we
begin with the plain language of the policy. Boston Gas Co. v.
Century Indem. Co., 454 Mass. 337, 355 (2009). “We interpret
the words of the standard policy in light of their plain mean-
ing, .. . giving full effect to the document as a whole[,] . . .
consider[ing] ‘what an objectively reasonable insured, reading
the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered’. . .
[and] interpret[ing] the provision of the standard policy in a
manner consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme that
governs such policies” (citation omitted). Golchin v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 156, 159-160 (2013).

VisionAid’s employment practices liability insurance policy
obligates Mount Vernon to “defend” VisionAid against any
“Claim” i.e., “any proceeding initiated against [VisionAid] . . .
seeking to hold [VisionAid] responsible for a Wrongful Act.”
While the meaning of “Claim” thus is defined in the policy, the
policy is silent on the definition of the term “defend.” Therefore,
we construe the word “defend” using its “usual and accepted
meaning.” See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass’n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329,
334 (2016), citing Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477-478
(2008). In common usage, to “defend” means to “deny or oppose
the right of a plaintiff in . . . a suit or wrong charged.” Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 591 (1993). “Defense,” in
ordinary usage, is defined as “a defendant’s denial, answer, or
plea . . . an opposing or denial of the truth or validity of the
plaintiff's . . . case.”? Jd. As the plain meaning of the word
“defend” is clear, we do not deviate from it. See Certain Inter-
ested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Stolberg, 680 F.3d 61,
66 (1st Cir. 2012) (“ambiguity — unlike beauty — does not lie
wholly in the eye of the beholder. .. . A policy provision will not
be deemed ambiguous simply because the parties quibble over its
meaning”).

Accordingly, in the language of VisionAid’s contract, the es-
sence of what it means to defend is to work to defeat a claim that

7Prosecute,” on the other hand, is defined as “to institute legal proceedings
against; [especially] to accuse of some crime or breach of law or to pursue for
redress or punishment of a crime or violation of law in due legal form before a
legal tribunal.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1820 (1993).

477 Mass. 343 (2017) 349

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

could create liability against the individual being defended.
VisionAid and Mount Vernon entered into a contractual agree-
ment that VisionAid would pay a certain amount of money to
insure against a particular risk. See Red Head Brass, Inc. v.
Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 135 Ohio App. 3d 616, 629 (1999)
(insured “bargained only for the insurer to pay for defending the
insured against litigation. It did not bargain for legal representa-
tion where the insured is the plaintiff’). The agreement in this
case, memorialized in the written insurance policy, required
Mount Vernon to “defend” VisionAid in any claim “first made
against [it] during the Policy Period,” and no more. See 1 A.D.
Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes: Representation of In-
sureds & Insurers § 4:41 (6th ed. 2013) (“An insurer, being
obligated only to defend claims brought ‘against’ the insured, is
not required to bear the cost of prosecuting a counterclaim on
behalf of the insured”).

VisionAid advances a number of policy arguments in support
of its position, some of which the dissent urges upon us, that an
insurer should be obligated to prosecute an affirmative counter-
claim on behalf of its insured. In light of the plain language of the
policy, however, even if we were inclined to do so, we are unable
to adopt these suggestions. Where the language of an insurance
policy is clear and unambiguous, we rely on that plain meaning,
and do not consider policy arguments in interpreting the plain
language. “[T]he question whether a bargain is smart or foolish,
or economically efficient or disastrous, is not ordinarily a legiti-
mate subject of judicial inquiry.” 11 R.A. Lord, Williston on
Contracts § 31:5, at 455 (4th ed. 2012). See Towne Realty, Inc. v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 193 Wis. 2d 544, 569-570 (Ct. App. 1995) (Cane,
PJ., dissenting) (pursuing affirmative counterclaim “might be a
good defense strategy ... but. . . [there is no] obligation beyond
the terms of the insurance policy which is to defend against any
suits filed against its insured”).

We note that courts in a number of other jurisdictions have
considered similarly worded insurance policies, and have reached
a similar determination that the meaning of the word “defend” is
not ambiguous. Those courts have concluded that the duty to
“defend” requires an insurer to work to defeat a claim brought
against the insured, but not to prosecute an affirmative claim
against the plaintiff in the underlying suit, no matter how advan-
tageous that claim would be to the insured. See, e.g., Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP v. Hanover Ins. Co., 929 F. Supp. 764, 771
(D.N.J. 1996) (“Nowhere in the policy is there any mention that

350 477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

[the insurer] would pay for affirmative prosecution of a civil
action by [the insured]. The court finds the policy language to be
clear and unambiguous”); Shoshone First Bank v. Pacific Em-
ployers Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510, 516 (Wyo. 2000) (“We accept the
general premise that ‘[a]n insurer, being obligated to defend
claims “against” the insured, is not required to bear the cost of
prosecuting a counterclaim on behalf of the insured’ ”; “if an
insurance policy fails to specify coverage for prosecuting coun-
terclaims, the policy language will not be ‘tortured’ to create an
ambiguity”). See Aldous v. Darwin Nat'l Assur. Co., 851 F.3d
473, 483 (Sth Cir. 2017) (under Texas law, duty to defend entire
lawsuit does not give rise to duty to prosecute helpful or inextri-
cably intertwined claims).

By contrast, courts in some jurisdictions have concluded that
the meaning of the word “defend” in an insurance contract was
ambiguous, and therefore have interpreted the duty to “defend” in
the manner the dissent suggests, to require insurers to prosecute
affirmative counterclaims in certain instances. See Great West
Cas. Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 315 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (duty to defend requires insurer to bring affirmative coun-
terclaims that would reduce insured’s liability on underlying
claim); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co.,
TTT F, Supp. 980, 984 (D.D.C. 1991) (duty to defend requires
insurer to bring any claim that reasonable defense attorney would
bring); Safeguard Scientifics, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 766 F.
Supp. 324, 333-334 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (duty to defend requires
insurer to bring any counterclaim that is factually “inextricably
intertwined” with underlying claim).

VisionAid maintains that the duty to “defend” under its insur-
ance policy may be understood as meaning anything a reasonable
defense attorney would do to reduce the liability of the insured.
VisionAid does not contend that this definition of “defend” was
intended by the parties but, rather, that it is one possible reason-
able interpretation of the contract language. In support of this
argument, VisionAid relies on a canon of contract interpretation
for insurance contracts requiring that, where “the language [of an
insurance policy] permits more than one rational interpretation,”
a reviewing court must interpret the contract in the light most
favorable to the insured, see Boston Symphony Orch., Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 406 Mass. 7, 12 (1989), quoting
Palmer v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 352 Mass. 304, 306 (1967),
and argues that thus we must embrace VisionAid’s interpretation
of the policy language.

477 Mass. 343 (2017) 351

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

The plain language here, however, does not, by itself, permit
the interpretation that VisionAid propounds. To adopt this inter-
pretation would require us to read in a number of provisions that
the parties did not include in the policy and, as the dissent puts it,
place an additional duty on the insurer “[wJhere the insured’s
defense is intertwined with a compulsory counterclaim, where
any reasonable attorney defending that proceeding would bring
such a counterclaim, and where the insured agrees that any
damages awarded to the insured on that counterclaim will offset
any award of damages against the insured that the insurer is
required to indemnify.” Post at 355. Not only is this proposition
found nowhere in the language of the contract, it would result in
extensive preliminary litigation to determine what claims are
sufficiently intertwined, litigation that would be brought by “any
reasonable attorney.” This, in turn, would require a fact finder to
undertake a cost benefit analysis of, among other things, the
additional attorney’s fees that would be required to pursue the
counterclaim, where the insurer bears the burden of persuasion
and the likelihood of recovery from an insured who might be
judgment proof. Parties who wish to require such calculations are
of course free to do so in their written contracts. Imposing such
requirements where none was included explicitly is far beyond
interpreting the language of the contract.

ii. The “in for one, in for all” rule. The “in for one, in for all”
rule requires that, where an insurer is obligated to defend an
insured on one of the counts alleged against it, the insurer must
defend the insured on all counts, including those that are not
covered. See GMAC Mige., LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 464
Mass. 733, 738 (2013); 3 J.E. Thomas, New Appleman on In-
surance Law Library Edition § 17.01[3][a] (2016) (“Virtually all
courts agree that if an action involves both potentially covered
and noncovered claims — a so-called ‘mixed’ action — the
insurer must defend the entire action”). The “central policy be-
hind ‘in for one, in for all’ . . . [is] that parsing multiple claims is
not feasible.” GMAC Mtge., LLC, supra at 741. This rule greatly
enhances efficiency for litigants, attorneys, and judges, where
there are multiple claims and a question whether one or more of
the claims is covered by a particular insurance policy. It allows
the parties to reach the merits of the underlying action quickly,
rather than litigating whether the insurer had a duty to defend and
the extent of that duty, prior to placing the matter before the fact
finder. Id. See Simplex Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429

we
a
he)

477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

Mass. 196, 199 (1999) (“That some, or even many, of the under-
lying claims may fall outside the coverage does not excuse [the
insurer] from its duty to defend these actions”); PTC, Inc. v.
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 123 F. Supp. 3d 206, 216 (D. Mass.
2015) (“Under Massachusetts law, if an insurer has a duty to
defend any aspect of a litigation, it is ‘in for one, in for all,’
meaning that it must defend all other claims within the litiga-
tion”).

VisionAid argues that because the “in for one, in for all” rule
expands the duties of an insurer beyond those explicitly set forth
in the contract, the policy also expands the insurer’s duty to
include the obligation to prosecute an affirmative counterclaim.
While the “in for one, in for all” rule did expand the class of
actions that an insurer is obligated to defend, it did not change the
meaning of the word “defend.” We are persuaded that the better
course under the “in for one, in for all” rule is to require an
insurer to defend claims brought against its insured, but not to
require an insurer to assert affirmative claims on behalf of that
insured. See Duke Univ. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 95 N.C.
App. 663, 680 (1989) (even in State with “in for one, in for all”
tule, insurer’s duty to defend did not compel it to bring affirma-
tive counterclaim on behalf of insured).

Expanding the “in for one, in for all” rule in the manner that
VisionAid urges misaligns the interests of the party who stands to
benefit from the counterclaim (the insured) and the party who
bears the cost of prosecuting the counterclaim (the insurer). As a
result, allowance of such a rule would increase the total number
of counterclaims brought by insured parties. It also, in effect,
would result in additional litigation in virtually every case in-
volving insurance on whether a “reasonable” attorney hired
separately by (and paid by) the insured would file the counter-
claim in the given circumstances. Such an expansion of the “in
for one, in for all” rule also would lead to increased litigation
between insurers and insured parties on the question whether a
successful counterclaim would result in reduced liability on the
underlying claim. See International Ins. Co. v. Rollprint Pack-
aging Prods., Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1015 (2000); Red Head
Brass, Inc., 135 Ohio App. 3d at 629. An increase in litigation
between insurer and insured is precisely what “in for one, in for
all” seeks to avoid. See Shoshone First Bank, 2 P.3d at 517
(allowing insurers to defend only covered claims “would lead to
judicial inefficiency and a failure to resolve actions timely and
consistently”).

477 Mass. 343 (2017) 353

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

We are persuaded by the analysis of a judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, describing
the particular policy reasons for not including counterclaims
among insurers’ duties to defend. See Barletta Heavy Div., Inc.
vs, Travelers Ins. Co., No. 12-11193-DPW (D. Mass. Oct. 25,
2013). In that case, the Federal District Court judge declined to
expand an insurer’s duty to defend, noting that if insurers were
obligated to prosecute affirmative counterclaims on behalf of
insured parties, “an insured would have every incentive — and
little disincentive — to file suit, knowing that it could reap the
benefits of success — however unlikely — while transferring the
costs of an otherwise predictably unsuccessful suit onto its in-
surer.” Id. See Reynolds v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 278 F.
Supp. 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (requiring insurer to “pros-
ecut[e] . . . counterclaims would no doubt entail extra expendi-
tures on the part of the insurance carrier . . . [and] would be
manifestly unfair”); Towne Realty, Inc., 193 Wis. 2d at 570 (Cane,
PJ., dissenting) (duty to defend does not compel insurers “to
pursue counterclaims which by their very nature are for the
benefit of the person pursuing the counterclaim”: the insured).

b. Insurer’s obligation to pay for defense costs. The second
certified question asks whether an insurer’s obligation to pay for
an insured’s “defense costs” requires the insurer to fund counter-
claims on behalf of the insured. The policy at issue here defines
“defense costs” as “reasonable and necessary legal fees and
expenses incurred by [Mount Vernon] to defend [VisionAid],
resulting from the investigation, adjustment, defense, and appeal
of a [c]laim.” By defining “defense costs” in this way, the policy
creates a duty to pay the costs of defense that is coextensive with
the duty to defend. The duty to defend arises when the insurer is
involved in a case at the beginning of the litigation; the duty to
pay defense costs arises if the insurer becomes involved in the
matter after a verdict has been reached (or, regardless of timing,
if there is a conflict of interest between the insurer and insured).

Although courts in some other jurisdictions have distinguished
the duty to pay defense costs from the duty to defend, in Mas-
sachusetts, where an insurer has both the duty to defend and the
duty to pay defense costs, the scope of the duty to defend and the
scope of the duty to pay defense costs are identical. Rubenstein v.
Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 429 Mass. 355, 356 (1999) (insurer who
failed to comply with its duty to defend was required to pay costs

354 477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

of defense and costs of declaratory judgment action to determine
that it had duty to defend); Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 414 Mass. 747, 762 (1993) (breach of duty to defend
requires insurer to pay defense costs). Cf. Health Net, Inc. v. RLI
Ins. Co., 206 Cal. App. 4th 232, 259 (2012) (duty to pay defense
costs, without more, requires insurer to pay for costs of defending
only covered claims, while duty to defend requires insurer to
defend entire lawsuit, as long as at least one claim is covered).

Because the duty to pay defense costs is coextensive with the
duty to defend, we apply the same analysis to question two that
we applied to question one, and conclude that the duty to pay
defense costs does not require an insurer to fund the prosecution
of any counterclaim on behalf of the insured.*

3. Conclusion. We answer the certified questions as follows.

Question one: An insurer with a contractual duty to defend
an insured is not required to prosecute an affirmative coun-
terclaim on the insured’s behalf, pursuant to either the con-
tractual language or the “in for one, in for all” rule.

Question two: The duty to pay defense costs has the same
scope as the duty to defend; accordingly, it does not require
the insurer to pay the costs of prosecuting a counterclaim on
behalf of the insured.

Question three: Because of our responses to the other
questions, we do not reach this question.

The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of this
opinion to the clerk of this court. The clerk in turn will transmit
one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, as the answer to the
questions certified, and will also transmit a copy to each party.

Gants, C.J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk, J., joins). In answer
to the certified questions submitted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, the court concludes “that where the
insurance policy provides that an insurer has the ‘duty to defend
any claim’ initiated against the insured, the insurer’s duty to
defend does not require it to prosecute affirmative counterclaims
on behalf of its insured.” I respectfully disagree. Based on the

Because of the decision we reach on the first two questions, we do not reach
the third question.

477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

we
a
a

language of the insurance policy, an insurer’s “duty to defend any
claim” means the duty to defend the insured in “any proceeding
initiated against any Insured . . . seeking to hold such Insured
responsible for a Wrongful Act.” Where the insured’s defense is
intertwined with a compulsory counterclaim, where any reason-
able attorney defending that proceeding would bring such a
compulsory counterclaim, and where the insured agrees that any
damages awarded to the insured on that counterclaim will offset
any award of damages against the insured that the insurer is
required to indemnify, I conclude that an insurer’s duty to defend
the insured in “any proceeding” includes the duty to prosecute
such a compulsory counterclaim.

T agree with the court that, “in interpreting an insurance policy,
we begin with the plain language of the policy.” Ante at 348. See
Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 156, 159-160 (2013)
(“We interpret the words of the standard policy in light of their
plain meaning, . . . giving full effect to the document as a
whole[,] . . . consider[ing] ‘what an objectively reasonably in-
sured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be
covered’ . . .” [citation omitted]). But where the language of an
insurance agreement permits more than one rational interpreta-
tion, we apply the interpretation most favorable to the insured.
See Boston Symphony Orch., Inc. vy. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
406 Mass. 7, 12 (1989).

Under Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company’s policy with
VisionAid, Inc. (VisionAid), the insurer’s duty to defend is not
limited to defending causes of action arising from a wrongful act
as defined in the agreement. It includes the “duty to defend any
Claim to which this insurance applies.” A claim is not defined
under the policy as a cause of action; rather, it is defined under the
policy as “any proceeding initiated against any Insured . . .
seeking to hold such Insured responsible for a Wrongful Act.”
Therefore, the duty to defend a claim under the policy means the
duty to defend the insured in a proceeding where the insured is
alleged to be responsible for a wrongful act covered by the policy.

We have held under our so-called “in for one, in for all” rule
that, where a proceeding includes one cause of action alleging a
wrongful act covered under a general liability policy, an insurer’s
duty is not limited to defending that specific cause of action but
encompasses the duty to defend the insured against all the causes
of action in that proceeding. See GMAC Mige., LLC v. First Am.
Title Ins. Co., 464 Mass 733, 738 (2013), quoting Liberty Mut.

356 477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir.
2001) (“Because ‘[i]t is not uncommon for a lawsuit against an
insured to assert some claims that are covered by the insurance
policy and others that are not,’ the general rule in Massachusetts
in the general liability insurance context is that ‘an insurer must
defend the entire lawsuit if it has a duty to defend any of the
underlying counts in the complaint’ ”); Symplex Techs., Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 196, 199 (1999) (“that some, or
even many, of the underlying claims may fall outside the cover-
age does not excuse [the insurer] from its duty to defend’).
The “in for one, in for all” rule is needed in general liability
policies because it would be impractical and deleterious to an
effective defense to parse the various counts and have one attor-
ney appointed by the insurer defend against some and an attorney
retained by the insured defend against others. See GMAC Mtge.,
LLC, 464 Mass at 739, citing A.D. Windt, Insurance Claims and
Disputes: Representation of Insureds & Insurers § 4.13, at 128
(1982) (dividing representation between covered and noncovered
claims is impractical); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. American Home
Assur. Co., 999 F. Supp. 2d 511, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev'd on
other grounds 667 Fed. Appx. 8 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying Mas-
sachusetts law; “a defense of an action with both covered and
uncovered claims may benefit from a unified defense and legal
arguments, and it is illogical to separate them based on insurance
coverage”). As the California Supreme Court noted in Buss v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 16 Cal. 4th 35, 49 (1997):

“To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immedi-
ately. ... To defend immediately, it must defend entirely. It
cannot parse the claims, dividing those that are at least
potentially covered from those that are not. To do so would
be time consuming. It might also be futile: The ‘plasticity of
modern pleading’ . . . allows the transformation of claims
that are at least potentially covered into claims that are not,
and vice versa.” (Citations omitted.)

Without the “in for one, in for all” rule, the insured would be
represented by two attorneys who would prepare and respond to
discovery and other pretrial motions, prepare and depose wit-

"The “in for one, in for all” rule of general liability insurance defense does not
apply to title insurance because “title insurance is fundamentally different from
general liability insurance.” GMAC Mige., LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 464
Mass 733, 740 (2013).

477 Mass. 343 (2017) 357

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

nesses, and try the case. The attorneys would need to coordinate
settlement discussions and pretrial strategy, and at trial might
provide separate opening statements and closing arguments, ex-
amine witnesses separately, raise separate objections to questions
and answers, and proffer separate jury instructions and objections
to the judge’s instructions. For these and other reasons, one
prominent insurance defense counsel has concluded that “[i]n
almost all situations it is totally impracticable to have two law-
yers defending the same client.” See Neumeier, Serving Two
Masters: Problems Facing Insurance Defense Counsel and Some
Proposed Solutions, 77 Mass. L. Rev. 66, 80 (1992). Such dupli-
cation, of course, also would lead to longer, more expensive
litigation and adjudication, and would place greater strain on
judicial resources.”

The same reasoning that yielded the “in for one, in for all” rule
compels the conclusion that the insurer’s duty to defend a pro-
ceeding includes an obligation to prosecute compulsory counter-
claims that are intertwined with the insured’s defense, where any
reasonable attorney defending that proceeding would bring such
acompulsory counterclaim, and where the insured agrees that any
damages awarded to the insured on that counterclaim will offset
any award of damages against the insured that the insurer is
required to indemnify. In such circumstances, the insurer cannot
reasonably fulfil its duty to defend the insured in the proceeding
without also prosecuting such counterclaims because it would be
impractical and deleterious to an effective defense to fail to do so.

The facts of this case amply demonstrate why this is true. As
the court notes, VisionAid, through the insurer’s appointed attor-
ney, filed an answer identifying the suspected misappropriation of
company funds by one of its employees, Gary Sullivan, as a
defense to Sullivan’s claim of a wrongful termination based on
age discrimination. There is no dispute that VisionAid’s affirma-
tive claim for misappropriation of company funds is a compul-
sory counterclaim that VisionAid must either timely bring or

2Without the “in for one, in for all” rule, the presence of two attorneys
separately representing the defendant might also cause a jury to infer that at least
some portion of liability is covered by an insurer, We generally do not allow
plaintiffs to introduce evidence demonstrating that the defendant is covered by
insurance because such evidence may “lead to undeserved verdicts for plaintiffs
and exaggerated awards which jurors will readily load on faceless insurance
companies supposedly paid for taking the risk.” Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass.
800, 808 (1974), citing 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 282(a) (3d ed. 1940). See
Mass. G, Evid. § 411 (2017).

358 477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

waive. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (a) (1), 365 Mass. 754 (1974);
Mass. R. Civ. P. 13 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1405 (1996).
id’s defense is intertwined with the compulsory counter-
se, if VisionAid can prove that it terminated Sullivan
because it learned that he was stealing company funds, it will
defeat Sullivan’s claim that his termination was motivated by age
discrimination. Even if Sullivan were to prevail on his age dis-
crimination claim because VisionAid did not know of Sullivan’s
theft until after his termination, VisionAid might still be able to
limit the scope of damages that Sullivan can recover because an
employee who suffered a discriminatory termination might not be
entitled to front pay beyond the date that he or she would have
been terminated for another, legitimate reason, such as stealing
company funds. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co.,
513 US. 352, 361-362 (1995); Springfield v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
469 Mass. 370, 378 n.14 (2014). No reasonable attorney repre-
senting a defendant in this proceeding under these circumstances
would fail to file this compulsory counterclaim. Prosecuting such
a counterclaim would be entirely consistent with the defense, and
would substantially strengthen the insured’s negotiating position,
as reflected in this case by the plaintiff's willingness to dismiss
his complaint in return for a release from VisionAid.? Where the
insured agrees that any award of damages arising from the com-
pulsory counterclaim would offset any such award arising from
the complaint that the insurer would be obligated to indemnify, a
successful compulsory counterclaim would benefit both the in-
sured and the insurer.

The court takes a narrower view of the duty to defend by
focusing on the meaning of the word “defend” in isolation and
declaring that, “in the language of VisionAid’s contract, the
essence of what it means to defend is to work to defeat a claim
that could create liability against the individual being defended.”
Ante at 348-349. I take a broader view of the duty to defend
because I focus on what it means to defend a proceeding, which
is the duty the insurer agreed to assume in the insurance contract.
Because the duty to defend a “claim” under the contract means to
defend the

2Under the insurance policy, the insurer “has the right to. . . negotiate the
settlement of any Claim whether within or above Retention.” Where the terms
of any settlement for the insured would be significantly and favorably affected
by the existence of a compulsory counterclaim that is intertwined with the
defense, the insurer’s obligation to act in good faith towards its insured in
settlement negotiations suggests an obligation to bring such a counterclaim.

477 Mass. 343 (2017) 359

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

insured in any proceeding where a wrongful act is alleged, not
simply to defend the insured against the causes of action alleging
wrongful acts, the broader view of the duty to defend includes the
duty to prosecute compulsory counterclaims that are intertwined
with the insured’s defense. This broader view is consonant with
what any reasonable attorney representing the insured would do
to defend a proceeding; the narrower view is not.

The concerns raised by the court if we were to recognize a duty
to prosecute a counterclaim within the scope of the duty to defend
do not apply where that duty is limited to the prosecution of
compulsory counterclaims that are intertwined with the insured’s
defense, where any reasonable attorney defending that proceed-
ing would bring such a compulsory counterclaim, and where the
insured agrees that any damages awarded to the insured on that
counterclaim will offset any award of damages against the insured
that the insurer is obliged to indemnify. This limited duty would
not expand the total number of counterclaims brought by in-
sureds, because it is limited to compulsory counterclaims that
must be brought or waived. See ante at 352. Nor would it result
in any significant increase in litigation between insured parties
and insurers over who must prosecute the counterclaim because it
will be clear in most cases whether a compulsory counterclaim
that any reasonable attorney defending that proceeding would
bring is intertwined with the insured’s defense. See id. Nor would
it “misalign[ ] the interests of the party who stands to benefit from
the counterclaim (the insured) and the party who bears the cost of
prosecuting the counterclaim (the insurer),” see id., because the
insurer would be obligated to prosecute the compulsory counter-
claim only where the insured agrees that any award of damages
arising from the compulsory counterclaim would offset any such
award arising from the complaint that the insurer would be
obligated to indemnify.

The court also notes that “courts in a number of other juris-
dictions have considered similarly worded insurance policies, and
have reached a similar determination that the meaning of ‘defend’
is not ambiguous” and excludes the prosecution of any counter-
claim. See ante at 349. But, as the court also notes, other courts
in other jurisdictions have determined that the meaning of the
word “defend” in the insurance contract was ambiguous, and
have held that an insurer’s duty to defend may include the
prosecution of certain counterclaims that are defensive in nature.
See ante at 350. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Vita Craft

360 477 Mass. 343 (2017)

Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company ¥. VisionAid, Inc.

Corp., 911 FE Supp. 2d 1164, 1183 (D. Kan. 2012); Ultra
Coachbuilders, Inc. v. General Sec. Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 284,
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Oscar W. Larson Co. v. United Capitol Ins.
Co., 845 F. Supp. 458, 461 (W.D. Mich. 1993), aff'd, 64 F3d 1010
(6th Cir. 1995). In fact, at least one insurance law treatise de-
scribes such decisions as embodying the majority rule. See 1 D.L.
Leitner, R.W. Simpson, & J.M. Bjorkman, Law and Practice of
Insurance Coverage Litigation § 4.22 (2016 Supp.) (“While some
courts rule otherwise, the general test to determine whether the
insurer must bear such “offense costs“ is whether the claims are
[1] defensive in nature, as well as [2] reasonable and necessary to
limit liability” [footnote omitted]). If the meaning of “defend”
were truly without ambiguity, it is doubtful that so many courts
would define the term so differently.

Because I would interpret the insurer’s duty under the insur-
ance policy to defend the insured in “any proceeding initiated
against any Insured” to include a duty to prosecute VisionAid’s
compulsory counterclaim for misappropriation of funds, I re-
spectfully dissent.

477 Mass. 361 (2017) 361

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

Joun Dor, Sex OrreNDER Recistry Boarp No. 326573 vs.
Sex OFFENDER Recistry Boarp (and a consolidated case’).

Suffolk. February 7, 2017. - June 23, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Luvx, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act.
Internet.

This court concluded that a level two sex offender is “reclassified” — and
therefore subject to the publication of his or her registry information on the
Internet by the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) — only where a hearing
officer allows the board’s motion to increase the sex offender’s classification
based on new information indicating an increased risk of sexual recidivism,
not where the hearing officer denies the board's motion for reclassification
and retains the earlier level two classification, or where the hearing officer
denies an offender’s motion to be reclassified as a level one offender.
[366-370]

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
November 21, 2014.

A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Gregg J.
Pasquale, J., and the case was reported by him to the Appeals
Court.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
June 22, 2015.

A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Heidi E.
Brieger, J.

A proceeding for interlocutory review was allowed in the
Appeals Court by Judd J. Carhart, J. The Supreme Judicial Court
granted an application for direct appellate review.

Andrew S. Crouch for John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board
No. 326573, & another.

John P. Bossé for the defendant.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 15890 vs. Sex Offender Reg-
istry Board,

362 477 Mass. 361 (2017)

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

Dana Goldblatt, for Committee for Public Counsel Services,
amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Gants, C.J. In Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass.
598, 616 (2014), we permanently enjoined the Sex Offender
Registry Board (SORB) “from publishing on the Internet the
registry information of any individual who was finally classified
as a level two sex offender on or before July 12, 2013, unless the
individual is subsequently reclassified a level two or level three
sex offender.” SORB contends in these two cases that, when it
unsuccessfully seeks after July 12, 2013, to reclassify a level two
sex offender as a level three sex offender, the individual is
reclassified a level two sex offender for purposes of Moe, and
SORB may therefore publish the individual’s registry informa-
tion on the Internet. We disagree. We conclude that, under Moe,
a sex offender is “reclassified” only where a hearing officer
allows SORB’s motion to increase his or her classification based
on new information indicating an increased risk of sexual recidi-
vism, not, as here, where the hearing officer denied SORB’s
motion for reclassification and retained the earlier level two
classification. We therefore remand these cases to the Superior
Court for the issuance of a permanent injunction barring publi-
cation of each plaintiff's registry information on SORB’s Web
site on the Internet unless and until the offender is reclassified a
level three sex offender.”

Background. For over two decades, the Commonwealth has
maintained a registration system for individuals convicted of a
sex offense as defined by the sex offender registry law, G. L. c. 6,
§§ 178C-178Q. See St. 1996, c. 239, § 1. A sex offender is
required to register with SORB upon release from custody or, if
not sentenced to confinement, upon notification by the court of
the obligation to register. See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (a), (c). “Upon
review of any information useful in assessing the risk of reoffense
and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public by the sex
offender, including . . . any materials submitted by the sex
offender,’ SORB prepares a “recommended classification” of
each offender. G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1). The offender has the right
to challenge SORB’s recommended classification, and where the
offender chooses to exercise that right, a panel of three SORB
members or a hearing examiner designated by SORB finally

2We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee for Public
Counsel Services.

477 Mass. 361 (2017) 363

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

classifies the offender into one of three “levels of notification
depending on the degree of risk of reoffense and the degree of
dangerousness posed to the public by the sex offender.” See G. L.
c. 6, §§ 178K (2), 178L (1) (@), (2).

The three levels of notification are defined as follows:

* “Where [SORB] determines that the risk of reoffense is low
and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is not
such that a public safety interest is served by public avail-
ability, it shall give a level [one] designation to the sex
offender.” G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a).

* “Where [SORB] determines that the risk of reoffense is
moderate and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public
is such that a public safety interest is served by public avail-
ability of registration information, it shall give a level [two]
designation to the sex offender.” G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).

* “Where [SORB] determines that the risk of reoffense is
high and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is
such that a substantial public safety interest is served by
active dissemination, it shall give a level [three] designation
to the sex offender.” G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2).

Over time, the Legislature has revised the required forms of
public notification for the different levels of sex offender classi-
fication. As amended in 1999, the sex offender registry law
mandated that information regarding level two offenders could be
obtained by a member of the public only through a request to
SORB or a police department. St. 1999, c. 74, § 2. See G. L. c. 6,
§§ 1781, 178J, 178K (2) (b). In contrast, a level three sex offend-
er’s registry information was subject to “active dissemination” by
way of a “community notification plan,” in which the police
department in the community where the level three sex offender
resided or worked was required to notify individuals and com-
munity organizations that were likely to encounter the sex of-
fender. St. 1999, c. 74, § 2. See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c).

In 2003, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 6, § 178D, to require
Internet publication of registry information for level three sex
offenders only. St. 2003, c. 140, § 5. A decade later, effective on
July 12, 2013, the Legislature again amended § 178D, this time to
require Internet publication of registry information for both level
two and three sex offenders. See St. 2013, c. 38, §§ 7, 9. Plaintiffs

364 477 Mass. 361 (2017)

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

who were classified as level two sex offenders prior to the 2013
amendments filed suit, arguing that retroactive application of the
statute to mandate Internet publication of their registry informa-
tion would be unreasonable, and therefore violate their right to
due process under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. See Moe, 467 Mass. at 599, 616. We agreed and declared
unconstitutional the retroactive application of the amendments
“to the extent they would require the Internet publication of the
registry information of individuals who were finally classified as
level two sex offenders on or before July 12, 2013.” Id. at 616.

In our Moe decision, we highlighted the inequity that would
result from retroactive application of the 2013 amendments. The
imposition of a “substantial new legal consequence” in the form
of Internet publication would transform offenders classified as
level two prior to the amendments “into something akin to level
‘two and one-half’ offenders.” Moe, 467 Mass. at 609. But when
SORB gave such an offender a level two classification prior to the
amendments, it had “implicitly determined that the offender was
not so dangerous” that Internet publication was necessary to
protect the public. /d. at 614. “Thus, the practical consequence of
the [2013] amendments is that offenders whose degree of dan-
gerousness, according to SORB, was not so substantial that
Internet publication of their information was needed to protect the
public safety would now be subject to Internet publication of their
registry information.” Jd. The unfairness of such retroactive ap-
plication of the amendments was compounded by the likelihood
that some offenders classified as level two prior to the amend-
ments had decided not to challenge that classification based on an
accurate understanding that a level two classification did not
carry the consequence of Internet publication. Id. at 614-615.
Accordingly, we remanded the case for entry of an order “per-
manently enjoining SORB from publishing on the Internet the
registry information of any individual who was finally classified
as a level two sex offender on or before July 12, 2013, unless the
individual is subsequently reclassified a level two or level three
sex offender.” Jd. at 616.

The sex offender registry law permits a sex offender's final
classification to be reclassified in one of two ways. First, SORB
may seek reclassification where new information is received
“which is relevant to a determination of a risk of re-offense or
degree of dangerousness.” G. L. c. 6, § 178L (3). Although the
statute would permit SORB to seek a higher or lower reclassifi-

w
a
a

477 Mass. 361 (2017)
Doe, SORB No. 326573 x: Sex Offender Registry Board.

cation level where new information is received that would sug-
gest either an increase or a decrease in the risk of sexual recidi-
vism, the SORB regulations authorize it to seek only a higher
classification level based on the “[r]eceipt of any information that
indicates the offender may present an increased risk to reoffend or
degree of dangerousness.” 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(10)(a)
(2013).8 Where SORB does so, the sex offender may reject the
recommended reclassification level and request a reclassification
hearing that follows the same procedures as a classification
hearing. 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(10)(c) (2013). Second, a
sex offender may seek reclassification based on a showing that
the offender’s risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness has
decreased since his or her final classification. 803 Code Mass.
Regs. § 1.37C(1) (2013).4

Both plaintiffs, John Doe, SORB No. 326573 (Doe No.
326573), and John Doe, SORB No. 15890 (Doe No. 15890),
pleaded guilty to sex offenses and received a final classification as
a level two offender before the 2013 amendments to the sex of-
fender registry law. In separate proceedings, SORB sought to re-
classify each as a level three offender after the amendments based
on new information. In each case, the hearing officer concluded that
a reclassification of the original classification was not warranted
and that the offender remained a moderate risk to reoffend. As to
Doe No. 326573, the hearing officer found that the “reclassification
record does not provide any new or different insight into his

After the denial of reclassification in these two cases, the Sex Offender
Registry Board (SORB) promulgated new regulations, which continue to pro-
vide that SORB may seek only a higher classification based on new information
relevant to a sex offender's risk of sexual recidivism, 803 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 1.32(1) (2016). In addition to substantive changes, the 2016 regulations are
also numbered differently. In order to avoid confusion, we refer to the 2016
regulations only in footnotes. Unless otherwise noted, the language in the 2013
regulations that we discuss is also present in the 2016 regulations.

4A sex offender who is classified as a level two or level three offender may
file a motion for reclassification no sooner than three years after the final
classification, but a sex offender who has been convicted of a new sex offense
may not file such a motion until ten years after the final classification, 803 Code
Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(2) (2013). The 2013 regulations also provide that a sex
offender who has experienced a material change in circumstances related to a
medical condition may file a motion for reclassification “sooner than five years
after the date of his or her prior classification.” 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(3)
(2013). Under the 2016 regulations, an offender may file such a motion “sooner
than three years after the date of his or her prior classification.” 803 Code Mass.
Regs. § 1.31(3) (2016).

366 477 Mass. 361 (2017)

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

capacity to sexually reoffend or the danger he poses to the com-
munity as a sex offender than was the case at the time of his original
classification.” As to Doe No. 15890, the hearing officer found that,
although much of SORB’s evidence was “credible and concerning,
[she did] not find these events are enough to warrant [him] to now
present a high risk to reoffend or high degree of danger.”®

After the hearing, SORB informed Doe No. 326573 that, be-
cause of the hearing officer’s decision, his registry information
would be made available on the SORB Web site. Doe No. 326573
filed, in the Superior Court, a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief and a motion for a preliminary injunction seek-
ing a stay of the Internet publication. A Superior Court judge
allowed the motion and issued an order enjoining SORB from
publishing Doe No. 326573’s registry information until further
notice. The parties then filed a joint motion to report the case to
the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended,
423 Mass. 1403 (1996), which the Superior Court judge allowed.
After the case was docketed in the Appeals Court, we granted Doe
No. 326573’s application for direct appellate review.

Doe No. 15890 filed a complaint in the Superior Court for
judicial review of the hearing officer's decision, as well as a
motion for a preliminary injunction to stay Internet publication of
his registry information. After a judge denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction, a single justice of the Appeals Court al-
lowed Doe No. 15890's request for interlocutory relief, stating
that allowing Internet publication of Doe No. 15890’s registry
information would effectively permit SORB to “circumvent” this
court’s holding in Moe. After the case was entered in the Appeals
Court, we granted Doe No. 15890’s application for direct appel-
late review. We then consolidated the appeals because of the
common issue they present.

Discussion. SORB contends that, where it moves to reclassify
a level two offender as a level three offender based on new
information relevant to the offender’s risk of sexual recidivism
and where the hearing officer issues a decision after July 12,
2013, that the new information does not warrant any change in

5After SORB moved to reclassify John Doe, SORB No. 15890 (Doe No.
15890), upward to a level three sex offender, he moved for reclassification
downward to a level one offender. The hearing officer denied both motions in the
same decision. As to Doe No. 15890’s motion, the hearing officer found that his
“risk to sexually reoffend and his degree of dangerousness have not decreased
since his last classification.”

477 Mass. 361 (2017) 367

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

the offender’s classification, the offender has been “subsequently
reclassified a level two . . . sex offender” and therefore falls
outside the scope of the injunction in Moe, 467 Mass. at 616, that
bars Internet publication of the offender’s registry information.
The premise of SORB’s argument is that its motion for reclassi-
fication triggers a review of the offender’s classification and,
where that occurs after July 12, 2013, a determination by the
hearing officer that the offender’s classification should remain at
level two is made with knowledge that such a classification will
trigger Internet publication, thus curing the violation of due
process identified in Moe.

The flaw in SORB’s premise is that a decision in a reclassifi-
cation hearing, in contrast with the original classification, is not
written on a clean slate. Where initiated by SORB, it is essentially
a hearing on a motion to increase the classification from level two
to level three based on new information allegedly indicating an
increased risk of sexual recidivism. The burden rests with SORB
to prove that the new information warrants a reclassification to a
higher offense level.* Where, as here, the hearing officer deter-
mines that SORB failed to meet that burden, the motion for
reclassification is denied and the original level two classification
remains. Because the original classification issued on or before
July 12, 2013, has not changed, the denial does not result in the
offender’s subsequent reclassification as a level two offender
within the meaning of Moe.

Similarly, where the offender moves to reduce his or her
classification from a level two to a level one, the burden rests with
the offender to prove that his or her risk of sexual recidivism has
decreased since final classification. 803 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 1.37C(1), (2)(c) (2013).? “Motions for reclassification shall be
based on new and updated information not available at the time of

®SORB’s burden of proof in these two cases was proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.10(1), 1.37C(10)(c) (2013). The
regulations were amended after we held in John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.
No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass, 297, 314-315 (2015), that
because the consequences of registration as a sex offender have become more
severe, SORB must prove the appropriateness of an offender’ risk classification
by “clear and convincing evidence” in order to satisfy due process. SORB’s
burden under the new regulations for an upward classification is now proof by
clear and convincing evidence. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.03, 1.14(1)
(2016).

7The offender’s burden of proof had been proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(1), (2)(c) (2013), But under the
new SORB regulations, the offender must prove by clear and convincing

368 477 Mass. 361 (2017)

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

the original classification,” 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(5)(e)
(2013), but the hearing officer is not foreclosed from considering
the information relied on in determining the original classification
level. /d. Where the offender fails to meet this burden, the motion
for reclassification is denied and the original level two classification
remains in place.

SORB argues that, where it moves for reclassification to a
higher level and the offender rejects the recommended reclassi-
fication, the regulations provide that “he or she may request a
hearing that follows the procedures detailed in [803 Code Mass.
Regs. §§ 1.08 through 1.25 (2013)],” 803 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 1.37C(10)(c), which include the provision in § 1.10(1) that the
hearing “shall be a de novo review” limited to determine whether
SORB has met its burden to prove the offender's final classifi-
cation. SORB contends that, because the reclassification hearing
is a “de novo review,” the denial of reclassification should be
treated as a new final classification. But the regulations make
clear that SORB may initiate a reclassification hearing based only
on its receipt of new information and only to increase the offend-
er’s classification. The hearing officer upon SORB’s application
for reclassification decides only whether to increase the original
classification based on the new information; where the regula-
tions give SORB no authority to apply for a lower classification,
the hearing officer, in the absence of a motion by the offender for
reclassification, has no reason to reach beyond the scope of
SORB’s motion and reduce the classification.*

evidence that his or her risk of sexual recidivism has decreased since the final
classification. 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(c) (2016). Consequently, even
where the offender proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a lower
classification is warranted in light of his or her reduced risk of sexual recidivism,
the offender’s motion for reclassification will be denied. Because the constitu-
tionality of this regulation is not at issue in this case, we do not address

As a technical matter, the regulations permit the hearing offi
decrease, or increase” the SORB recommendation in a reclassification hearing.
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.22(2) (2013). But where only SORB seeks
reclassification, the regulations render a decrease in classification virtually
impossible, because they permit SORB to seek reclassification based only on an
increased risk. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(10). At oral argument,
SORB’s attorney was asked if a hearing officer had ever reclassified a level two
offender as a level one offender after SORB moved to reclassify an offender
from level two to level three. SORB replied in a letter pursuant to Mass. R. A. P.
16 (1), as amended, 386 Mass. 1247 (1982), that it had located one case where this
had occurred. However, in the decision attached to the letter, the hearing officer
noted that, after SORB moved to reclassify the level two offender at level

477 Mass. 361 (2017) 369

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

In essence, SORB’s argument is that, when it moves to reclas-
sify a level two offender who was classified on or before July 12,
2013, it is “heads, we win, tails, you (the offender) lose.” If
SORB prevails on its motion to reclassify the offender from level
two to level three based on its new information, it may publish the
offender’s registry information on its Web site on the Internet. If
it fails to prevail on its motion, the offender will be reclassified a
level two offender, and it may publish the offender’s registry
information on its Web site on the Internet. We decline to adopt
such a rule. The denial of SORB’s motion to reclassify level two
offenders who were finally classified on or before July 12, 2013,
cannot transform them “into something akin to level ‘two and
one-half’ offenders.” See Moe, 467 Mass. at 609. Such a result
would not respect our conclusion in Moe that retroactive appli-
cation of the 2013 amendments requiring Internet publication of
registry information for these level two offenders “would be
unreasonable and inequitable, and therefore unconstitutional as a
violation of due process.” Jd. at 615. Nor does it respect the
gravity of Internet publication of an offender’s registry informa-
tion, which magnifies the “risk of serious adverse consequences
to that offender, including the risk that the sex offender will suffer
discrimination in employment and housing, and will otherwise
suffer from the stigma of being identified as a sex offender, which
sometimes means the additional risk of being harassed or as-
saulted.” Id. at 604. See Doe v. Attorney Gen. (No. 2), 425 Mass.
217, 221-222 (1997).®

We also decline to adopt SORB’s argument that, where a level
two offender who was classified on or before July 12, 2013,
moves to be reclassified as a level one offender, the denial of his

three, the offender moved for reclassification as a level one sex offender. The
hearing officer essentially denied SORB’s motion to reclassify upward and
allowed the offender’s motion to reclassify downward.

“Our opinion in Moe identified three reasons why this is so: first, Internet
publication allows the offender’s registry information to be accessed anony-
mously by persons from the comfort of their own home; second, once published
on the SORB Web site, an offender’s registry information will likely be
republished elsewhere on the Internet and remain publicly available even if
SORB were later to reduce or eliminate the offender’s registration requirement;
and third, search engines may reveal the registry information even to those
persons who searched the offender’s name for other reasons. Moe v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 605 (2014), citing D.J. Solove, The
Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet 78 (2007)
(“When one puts information on the Internet, it can easily become like Fran-
kenstein’s monster, escaping the dominion of its master”).

370 477 Mass. 361 (2017)

Doe, SORB No. 326573 ¥. Sex Offender Registry Board.

or her motion means that the offender has been subsequently
reclassified a level two offender and his or her registry informa-
tion may now be published on the SORB Web site. Under the
regulations in effect when Doe No. 15890 moved to reduce his
classification, his failure to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that his classification should be reduced based on new
information does not transform his level two classification into
“something akin” to a level two and one-half classification. It
means simply that his motion for reclassification is denied. If it
meant more, level two offenders who were classified on or before
July 12, 2013, would be deterred from ever seeking to move to
reduce their classification level, because the denial of that motion
would result in publication of their registry information on the
SORB Web site on the Internet.1°

Conclusion. We conclude that, under Moe, a sex offender is
“reclassified” only where a hearing officer allows SORB’s motion
to increase his or her classification based on new information
indicating an increased risk of sexual recidivism, not, as here,
where the hearing officer denied SORB’s motion for reclassifi-
cation and retained the earlier level two classification. We affirm
the judge’s allowance of the motion for a preliminary injunction
in Doe No. 326573’s case and reverse a different judge’s denial
of the motion in Doe No. 15890’s case, and remand these cases
to the Superior Court for the issuance of a permanent injunction
barring publication of each plaintiff's registry information on
SORB’s Web site on the Internet unless and until the offender is
reclassified a level three sex offender.

So ordered.

10That deterrent would be even stronger under the new regulations, where an
offender’s motion for a lower classification will be denied unless the offender
proves by clear and convincing evidence that his or her risk of sexual recidivism
has decreased since final classification. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31(2)(c).
See note 7, supra.

477 Mass. 371 (2017) 371

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

Roserr Grorce & others' vs. Nationa, WATER Main
Creatine Company & others.”

Suffolk. February 14, 2017. - June 26, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lew, Hmvss, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Supreme Judicial Court, Certification of questions of law. Massachusetts Wage
Act. Labor, Wages, Failure to pay wages, Damages. Damages, Interest.
Interest. Judgment, Interest. Practice, Civil, Interest, Judgment, Damages.

This court concluded that under Massachusetts law, statutory prejudgment
interest pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6H, is to be added by the clerk of court
to the amount of lost wages and other benefits awarded as damages on
judgments pursuant to the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 150, but is not to be
added to the additional amount of the award arising from the trebling of those
damages as liquidated damages. [372-381]

Cernicarion Of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial
Court by the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts.

Adam J. Shafran (Jonathon D, Friedmann also present) for the
plaintiffs.

Richard L. Alfred (Dawn Reddy Solowey & Anne S. Bider also
present) for the defendants.

John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Annette Gonthier Kiely, Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, &
Timothy J. Wilton, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attor-
neys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Gants, C.J. Several employees of National Water Main Clean-
ing Company filed a class action suit against the company and its
parent company, Carylon Corporation, in the Superior Court,
alleging, among other claims, nonpayment of wages in violation
of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage

’Michael Curvin, Mark Bassett, Kevin Colvin, Justin Kordas, Carlos
Villarreal, Paul Docket, Jon Eldridge, Chris Myers, Zef Zeka, Paul LeDoux,
Erik Paiva, Jeffrey David, and Chris Mirisola, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated.

2Carylon Corporation, Dennis Sullivan, Antonino LaFrancesca, and Carl
Cummings.

w
Pel
nv

477 Mass. 371 (2017)

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

Act). After the case was removed to the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, the judge granted final
approval of a class settlement agreement that resolved all out-
standing issues except one question of law. To resolve that
question, the judge certified to this court the following question
pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700
(1981):

“Ts statutory interest pursuant to [G. L. c. 231, § 6B or 6C,]
available under Massachusetts law when liquidated (treble)
damages are awarded pursuant to [G. L. c. 149, § 150]?”

In answer to the question, we declare that, under Massachusetts
law, statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6H,
shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of lost wages
and other benefits awarded as damages pursuant to G. L. c. 149,
§ 150, but shall not be added to the additional amount of the
award arising from the trebling of those damages as liquidated
damages.®

Interpretation of the certified question. Before we answer the
certified question, which the judge issued at the joint request of
the parties, we must first ascertain its meaning. The question is an
inquiry into the availability of statutory interest pursuant to two
statutes: G. L. c. 231, § 6B, which directs the clerk of court to add
interest at the rate of twelve per cent per year to awards of
judgment “for personal injuries to the plaintiff or for . . . damage
to property”; and G. L. c. 231, § 6C, which directs the clerk to add
interest at the same twelve per cent rate to awards of judgment
“TiJn all actions based on contractual obligations.” The parties
appear to treat the certified question essentially as two questions:
first, whether Wage Act claims fall within the scope of either § 6B
or § 6C, and second, if they do, whether prejudgment interest
should be added to the award of damages for lost wages and other
benefits where § 150, as amended in 2008, provides for the
trebling of those damages and characterizes such an award as
“liquidated damages.” We decline to answer the first of these
questions because, even if prejudgment interest could not be
added to Wage Act awards under § 6B or § 6C, it plainly could be
added under G. L. c. 231, § 6H, which declares that interest at the
rate of twelve per cent per year shall be added to the award of

2We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New England Legal
Foundation and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys.

477 Mass. 371 (2017) 373

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

damages “[iJn any action in which damages are awarded, but in
which interest on said damages is not otherwise provided by law.”
The question we shall answer, which we consider to be the true
gist of the certified question, is whether the Legislature, when it
amended § 150 in 2008 to require the award of treble damages on
Wage Act judgments and characterized the award as “liquidated
damages,” intended that prejudgment interest not be added to any
part of this award because such interest was included within the
scope of “liquidated damages.”* See Tyler v. Michaels Stores,
Inc., 464 Mass. 492, 499 n.12 (2013) (declining to limit answer
to narrow confines of certified question where broader discussion
was necessary to articulate law regarding issue presented).

Discussion. The Wage Act was enacted “to protect wage earn-
ers from the long-term detention of wages by unscrupulous
employers.” Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 170 (2012),
quoting Cumpata v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 2d 164, 167 (D. Mass. 2000). Employers violate the Wage
Act when they fail to pay “each . . . employee the wages earned”
and when they fail to do so within the time period set by statute.
See G. L. c. 149, § 148.

Before the 2008 amendment, G. L. c. 149, § 150, provided that
an aggrieved employee may initiate “a civil action for . . . any
damages incurred, including treble damages for any loss of wages
and other benefits” and, if he or she prevails, “shall be entitled to
an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorney
fees.” St. 2005, c. 99, § 2. In Wiedmann v. The Bradford Group,
Inc., 444 Mass. 698, 709 (2005), we noted that the text of this
statute “states only that a plaintiff ‘may’ institute a suit for
damages that includes a request for treble damages,” and con-
cluded that “there is nothing in the plain language of the statute
that requires an award of treble damages.” We declined to require

4We note from the record that the parties initially had agreed that the
unresolved legal issue in their settlement agreement would be resolved through
this court's answer to the certified question in Travers v. Flight Servs. & Sys.,
Inc., 808 F3d 525, 551 (Ist Cir. 2015), which asked: “Did [G. L. c. 149, § 150,]
impliedly repeal [G. L. c. 231, § 6B,] as to cases in which a party was awarded
liquidated damages under § 150 and is eligible for prejudgment interest under
§ 6B, such that the award of prejudgment interest is precluded?” That resolution
became impossible when the Travers case settled and the certified question was
withdrawn, That certified question assumed that an award under the Massachu-
setts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 150 (Wage Act), would include prejudgment
interest under § 6B unless the Legislature had impliedly repealed that provision
as applied to Wage Act awards.

374 477 Mass. 371 (2017)

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

a judge to award treble damages to a prevailing plaintiff where the
plain language of § 150 did not require it, and declared that the
award of treble damages in Wage Act cases was a decision left to
the discretion of the judge. /d. at 710. This conclusion was similar
to the conclusion we reached in Goodrow v. Lane Bryant, Inc.,
432 Mass. 165, 178-179 (2000), where we rejected the argument
that the award of treble damages was mandatory once a plaintiff
requested such an award for an employer’s failure to pay required
overtime compensation, in violation of G. L. c. 151, § 1B.
Wiedmann, supra. We noted that we had declared in Goodrow
that “treble damages are punitive in nature, allowed only where
authorized by statute, and appropriate where conduct is ‘outra-
geous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others.’ ” Wiedmann, supra, quoting
Goodrow, supra at 178.

Three years after we decided Wiedmann, the Legislature “ef-
fected a critical change in the language of the statute, removing
the provision that treble damages ‘may’ be awarded, and replac-
ing it with the directive that treble damages ‘shall be awarded.’ ”
Rosnov v. Molloy, 460 Mass. 474, 479 (2011). Under G. L. c. 149,
§ 150, as amended through St. 2008, c. 80, § 5, where an ag-
grieved employee prevails in a civil action seeking damages
under the Wage Act, the employee “shall be awarded treble
damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and other
benefits and shall also be awarded the costs of the litigation and
reasonable attorneys’ fees.” By its plain language, the 2008
amendment to § 150 mandates the award of treble damages for

®General Laws c. 149, § 150, provides, in pertinent part:

“An employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of [G. L. c. 149,
§33E, 52E, 148, 148A, 148B, 148C, 150C, 152, 152A, 159C, or 190,
or G. Lc. 151, § 19,] may, [ninety] days after the filing of a complaint
with the attorney general, or sooner if the attorney general assents in
writing, and within [three] years after the violation, institute and prosecute
in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others
similarly situated, a civil action for injunctive relief, for any damages
incurred, and for any lost wages and other benefits; provided, however,
that the [three-]year limitation period shall be tolled from the date that the
employee or a similarly situated employee files a complaint with the
attorney general alleging a violation of any of these sections until the date
that the attorney general issues a letter authorizing a private right of action
or the date that an enforcement action by the attorney general becomes
final. An employee so aggrieved who prevails in such an action shall be
awarded treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and

477 Mass. 371 (2017)

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

w
Pel
On

lost wages and benefits once an aggrieved employee prevails on
a Wage Act claim; the plaintiff no longer need show that the
defendant’s conduct was “outrageous” to obtain such an award.

The 2008 amendment did more than mandate the award of
treble damages to a prevailing plaintiff in a Wage Act case; it
characterized the treble damages “as liquidated damages.” The
crux of this appeal is to ascertain what the Legislature intended
by this characterization. The defendants contend that the inclu-
sion of this phrase reflects the intent of the Legislature that, apart
from the award of reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs of
litigation, the judgment in favor of a prevailing plaintiff shall be
limited to three times the amount of lost wages and benefits; it
shall not include any prejudgment interest, whether under § 6B,
6C, or 6H, because prejudgment interest is included within the
award of liquidated damages. The plaintiff contends that the
inclusion of this phrase reflects the intent of the Legislature that
treble damages be treated as compensatory in nature, rather than
punitive, and does not reflect an intent to deprive employees of
prejudgment interest they would otherwise be due as a matter of
statute for their lost wages and benefits.

“Liquidated damages” is a term derived from contract law to
identify the amount of damages that the parties agree must be
paid in the event of a breach. See Cochrane v. Forbes, 267 Mass.
417, 420 (1929) (“Liquidated damages . . . mean damages, agreed
upon as to amount by the parties, or fixed by operation of law, or
under the correct applicable principles of law made certain in
amount by the terms of the contract, or susceptible of being made
certain in amount by mathematical calculations . . .”). See also 24
R.A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 65:1 (4th ed. 2002). “A
liquidated damages provision will usually be enforced, provided
two criteria are satisfied: first, that at the time of contracting the
actual damages flowing from a breach were difficult to ascertain;
and second, that the sum agreed on as liquidated damages rep-
resents a ‘reasonable forecast of damages expected to occur in the
event of a breach.’ ” NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 451 Mass. 417, 420

other benefits and shall also be awarded the costs of the litigation and
reasonable attorneys’ fees.”

General Laws c. 149, § 150, also provides that “[tJhe attorney general may
make complaint or seek indictment against any person for a violation of
[§ 148],” an additional enforcement mechanism not at issue in this case. See
Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 170 (2012) (“Wage Act provides for both
public and private enforcement”).

376 477 Mass. 371 (2017)

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

(2008), quoting Cummings Props., LLC vy. National Communica-
tions Corp., 449 Mass. 490, 494 (2007). “Where damages are
easily ascertainable, and the amount provided for is grossly
disproportionate to actual damages or unconscionably excessive,
the court will award the aggrieved party no more than its actual
damages.” NPS, LLC, supra.

The term is used in the damages provision of the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which pro-
vides, “Any employer who violates the provisions of [$ 206 or
207] of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” The United
States Supreme Court has declared that liquidated damages under
the FLSA “are compensation, not a penalty or punishment by the
[glovernment.” Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S.
572, 583 (1942). “The retention of a workman’s pay may well
result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate
other than by liquidated damages.” Jd. at 583-584. Liquidated
damages under the FLSA “constitute[ ] a Congressional recog-
nition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on time may be
so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living
“necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of work-
ers’ and to the free flow of commerce, that double payment must
be made in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the
worker to that minimum standard of well-being” (footnote omit-
ted). Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).

Although the legislative history is silent regarding the Legis-
lature’s purpose in characterizing treble damages as “liquidated
damages” in the 2008 amendment to the Wage Act, we infer that
the Legislature knew that

* the FLSA had characterized the “additional equal amount”
of unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensa-
tion as “liquidated damages”;

* the United States Supreme Court had regarded liquidated
damages as compensatory in nature rather than punitive; and

* the characterization of treble damages as “liquidated dam-
ages” could be used to defend an award of treble damages
from the constitutional challenge that such an award was
punitive in nature and therefore required a finding that the

477 Mass. 371 (2017) 377

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

employer's conduct had been “outrageous.” See Matamoros
v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 140 (Ist Cir. 2012) (de-
fendant employer’s argument that treble damages under
Wage Act violate due process in absence of finding of em-
ployer “reprehensibility” was “misplaced” because, “[bly
definition, . . . liquidated damages are not punitive dam-
ages”).

The defendants contend that we should make one further in-
ference: that, by characterizing treble damages as “liquidated
damages” under the Wage Act, the Legislature intended to adopt
Federal law and preclude a plaintiff from receiving any prejudg-
ment interest on the award, including the award of lost wages and
benefits. We conclude that this is one inference too far.

We recognize that the Supreme Court has declared that Con-
gress, by providing an award of liquidated damages under the
FLSA, “meant to preclude recovery of interest on minimum
wages and liquidated damages.” Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at
715-716. The Court described “liquidated damages” as “compen-
sation for delay in payment of sums due under the [FLSA].” Id.
at 715. Consequently, according to the Court:

“Since Congress has seen fit to fix the sums recoverable for
delay, it is inconsistent with Congressional intent to grant
recovery of interest on such sums in view of the fact that
interest is customarily allowed as compensation for delay in
payment. To allow an employee to recover the basic statutory
wage and liquidated damages, with interest, would have the
effect of giving an employee double compensation for dam-
ages arising from delay in the payment of the basic minimum
wages. . . . Allowance of interest on minimum wages and
liquidated damages recoverable under § 16 (b) tends to pro-
duce the undesirable result of allowing interest on interest.”
(Citation omitted.)

Td.

We are not persuaded that the Legislature shared the Congres-
sional intent in this regard. When the FLSA was enacted, there
was no Federal statute generally mandating the payment of pre-
judgment interest. See Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat. Gypsum
Co., 515 US. 189, 194 (1995). The payment of prejudgment
interest in Federal court, in the absence of a statute regarding
prejudgment interest, “is governed by traditional judge-made

378 477 Mass. 371 (2017)

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

principles.” Jd. In contrast, as noted earlier, the payment of
prejudgment interest in a Massachusetts court is governed by
statute, either G. L. c. 231, § 6B, 6C, or 6H. The enactment of
§ 6H, St. 1983, c. 652, § 1, mandating the payment of prejudg-
ment interest where “not otherwise provided by law,” reflects the
Legislature’s intent that prejudgment interest always be added to
an award of compensatory damages.

Where § 6H provides for the award of prejudgment interest
whenever compensatory damages are awarded, an interpretation
of § 150, as amended, that would preclude the payment of pre-
judgment interest on the award of lost wages and benefits under
the Wage Act would be an implied repeal of § 6H with respect to
Wage Act awards. Under our “long standing rule of statutory
interpretation,” the implied repeal of a statute by a subsequent
statute has “never been favored by our law.” Commonwealth v.
Hayes, 372 Mass. 505, 511 (1977), quoting Commonwealth v.
Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349, 352 (1939). Where two statutes
appear to be in conflict, we do not mechanically determine “that
the more ‘recent’ or more ‘specific’ statute . . . trumps the other.”
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 725 (2005). Instead,
we “endeavor to harmonize the two statutes so that the policies
underlying both may be honored.” Jd. “[A] statute is not to be
deemed to repeal or supersede a prior statute in whole or in part
in the absence of express words to that effect or of clear impli-
cation.” Id., quoting Hayes, supra at 512. Repeal is not clearly
implied “[uJnless the prior statute is so repugnant to and incon-
sistent with the later enactment that both cannot stand.” Hayes,
supra at 511.

Here, amended § 150 is in conflict with § 6H only if we
conclude that the Legislature intended the trebled “liquidated
damages” to incorporate all prejudgment interest. But, because
we disfavor implied repeal, we may reach that conclusion only if
§ 150 expressly states that “liquidated damages” includes all
prejudgment interest or otherwise negates the entitlement in § 6H
to prejudgment interest (which it does not), or if the addition of
prejudgment interest to an award of lost wages and benefits is
clearly inconsistent with the characterization of treble damages as
“liquidated damages” (which it is not). Before § 150 was amended
in 2008, an aggrieved employee who prevailed on a Wage Act
claim was entitled to prejudgment interest on an award of lost
wages and benefits. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Commonwealth Energy
Sys., 68 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 768, 771 (2007) (upholding award of

477 Mass. 371 (2017) 379

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

prejudgment interest on damages for lost wages and benefits under
Wage Act). Where the employer’s conduct was so outrageous as
to justify punitive damages, prejudgment interest would not be
added to the trebled punitive damages award, but the award of
punitive damages did not mean the deprivation of prejudgment
interest on the award of lost wages and benefits. Cf. McEvoy
Travel Bur., Inc. v. Norton Co., 408 Mass. 704, 717 & n.9 (1990)
(prejudgment interest added to actual damages in G. L. c. 93A
judgment, but not to multiple punitive damages). There is nothing
in the legislative history of the 2008 amendment of § 150 to
suggest that the Legislature intended to deprive an employee of
prejudgment interest on lost wages and benefits when it charac-
terized what had been punitive damages as liquidated damages. To
do so would mean that an employee who was deprived of wages
and benefits because of the outrageous conduct of his or her
employer would receive the same treble damages under the
amended § 150 as he or she would have obtained before the
amendment, albeit as liquidated damages rather than punitive
damages, but would obtain a lesser judgment because of the
preclusion of prejudgment interest. Section 6H may be read in
harmony with the amended § 150 simply by recognizing that the
Legislature intended no change in the payment of prejudgment
interest.®

Nor is there anything in the legislative history to suggest that
the Legislature intended that the amended § 150 mirror the FLSA
with respect to “liquidated damages.” We can infer that the
Legislature did not intend the Wage Act fully to replicate the
FLSA because it declined to adopt a good faith exception to the
Wage Act’s mandatory damages requirement. As a result of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1947), liquidated damages

®Because we recognize that the Legislature intended no change in the pay-
ment of prejudgment interest, we also conclude that the Legislature did not
intend that prejudgment interest be awarded on the liquidated portion of the
award of damages. If it did, an employee under the amended § 150 who was
deprived of wages because of a good faith error by the employer would obtain
a significantly larger judgment than he or she would have obtained before the
amendment where the deprivation of wages arose from the employer’s outra-
geous conduct, because prejudgment interest would be added to the “liquidated
damages” portion of the award but it would not have been added to the punitive
damages portion of the award under the previous version of the statute. Under
the amended § 150, prejudgment interest is to be calculated based on the portion
of damages reflecting lost wages and benefits alone. The plaintiff does not
contend that the class members are entitled to prejudgment interest beyond this.

380 477 Mass. 371 (2017)

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

under the FLSA must be remitted “if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to
such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds
for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the
[Act].” See Reich v. Southern New England Telecomm. Corp.,
121 E3d 58, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1997). By contrast, following the
passage of the 2008 amendment to the Wage Act, the Legislature
declined to accept the Governor’s proposed amendments — simi-
lar to those in the Portal-to-Portal Act — that would have allowed
an exception to mandatory treble damages for employers who
violated the Wage Act in good faith. See Rosnov, 460 Mass. at
482 n.9. The amended § 150 became law without the Governor’s
signature. Id.

Moreover, prejudgment interest and § 150 damages are differ-
ent in kind and accomplish distinctly different purposes. Prejudg-
ment interest is not generally included within “liquidated dam-
ages” under our common law of contract. In fact, prejudgment
interest is not even a category of damages; where liquidated
damages are awarded in a civil contract action, prejudgment
interest is added to the award of liquidated damages. See Sterilite
Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 840 (1986) (pre-
judgment interest under G. L. c. 231, § 6C, paid on both liqui-
dated and unliquidated damages); Cochrane v. Forbes, 267 Mass.
417, 420 (1929) (under common law, prejudgment interest on
liquidated damages runs from date of demand).

Prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a plaintiff for
the depreciation of the eventual recovery arising from the often
substantial delay between the commencement of the action and
the judgment. See Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 462
Mass. 370, 375 (2012). In the context of a violation of the Wage
Act, “liquidated damages” properly would include the various
additional costs that might be incurred by an employee who has
not been timely paid his or her full wages, but who still needs to
pay for the family’s housing, transportation, food and clothing,
tuition, and medical expenses. The damages arising from delay in
paying the wages due might be considerable, depending on the
employee’s circumstances, but they would be difficult to quantify
with precision. In contrast, prejudgment interest on the amount of
lost wages and benefits is simple to quantify, and would not
properly be a subject of “liquidated damages.”

In short, we conclude that the Legislature’s characterization of
treble damages as “liquidated damages” in the 2008 amendment

477 Mass. 371 (2017) 381

George v. National Water Main Cleaning Company.

to § 150 was not intended to produce any change in the award of
prejudgment interest in Wage Act judgments. Prejudgment inter-
est is still to be added to the amount of lost wages and benefits,
and is still not to be added to the trebled portion of the judgment
that previously had been punitive damages and is now character-
ized as liquidated damages.

Conclusion. For the reasons stated, in answer to the certified
question, we declare that, under Massachusetts law, statutory
prejudgment interest shall be added by the clerk of court to the
amount of lost wages and other benefits awarded as damages
pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, but shall not be added to the
additional amount of the award arising from the trebling of those
damages as “liquidated damages.”

The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of this
opinion to the clerk of this court. The clerk in turn will transmit
one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, as the
answer to the question certified, and will also transmit a copy to
each party. See, e.g., DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454
Mass. 486, 497 (2009).

382 477 Mass. 382 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

ComMmonweattH vs. Casanpra B. Lirties.
Essex. March 9, 2017, - June 28, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J, LENK, Haves, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.
Larceny. Fraud. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Harmless error. Due

Process of Law, Inference. Constitutional Law, Harmless error. Error,
Harmiess. Evidence, Fraud, Prima facie evidence, Inference.

This court concluded that the designation in G. L. ¢. 266, § 37, of the act of
making, drawing, uttering, or delivering a check that an individual wrote
knowing that there were insufficient funds in the account from which the
check draws as prima facie evidence of that individual’s intent to defraud and
of his or her knowledge of insufficient funds, unless the maker or drawer
pays the holder of the check the amount due within two days after receiving
notice that such check had not been paid by the drawee, and a model jury
instruction derived from that statutory designation, were unconstitutional,
where an individual’s failure to pay a check within two days of notice of
dishonor does not have a sufficiently strong, logical connection to the
individual’s knowledge of insufficient funds or intent to defraud at the time
the check was written [384-389]; however, this court further concluded that,
at the trial of a criminal complaint charging the defendant with larceny by
uttering a false check, the judge’s instruction based on the statutory desig-
nation was harmless error, where the instruction permitted the jury to find
intent and knowledge from the defendant's failure to address bounced checks
within two days but did not require them to do so, and the strength of the
Commonwealth’s case, juxtaposed against the defendant's testimony ex-
plaining her conduct, nullified any effect that the minor instructional error
might have had on the jury or their findings [389-391].

Comp.aint received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division of
the District Court Department on January 21, 2014.

The case was tried before Michael A. Uhlarik, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Philip A. Mallard, Assistant District Attorney (Lindsay M.
Nasson, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Com-
monwealth.

Joseph K. Kenyon, Jr., for the defendant.

Lowy, J. The case before us challenges the constitutionality of
a jury instruction for the crime of drawing or uttering a fraudulent

477 Mass. 382 (2017) 383

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

check. The challenged instruction informed the jury that they
could infer that the defendant had both (1) knowledge of insuf-
ficient funds and (2) fraudulent intent if they found that the
defendant “failed to make good on thfe] check within two days
after she was notified that the bank had refused payment because
of insufficient funds.” The instruction stems from G. L. c. 266,
§ 37, which designates the failure to make the required payment
on the bad check within two days of notice as “prima facie
evidence” of the defendant’s intent and knowledge. We conclude
that the statute’s designation of prima facie evidence and the
corresponding instruction are constitutionally infirm because a
defendant’s failure to pay a check within two days of being
notified of its dishonor is, without more, insufficient to warrant a
jury in finding the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, we conclude that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, and therefore we
affirm the defendant’s convictions.

Background. The jury could have found the following facts.
Between July 26 and 28, 2013, the defendant deposited four
checks, totaling $15,000, into certain bank accounts she held at
TD Bank via automated teller machines (ATMs). The funds were
credited to the respective accounts electronically on the day of the
transaction, before the checks were finally negotiated. Each check
was drawn from a single Citizens Bank account in the defend-
ant’s name that had been closed for years. All four checks
eventually bounced and were returned to TD Bank by July 31,
2013.

Between the time she deposited the checks and the negotiation
of the checks, the defendant transferred funds between her ac-
counts at TD Bank, in the manner of a “check-kiting” scheme.*
After transferring the funds, but before the checks had been

‘The United States Supreme Court has described a “check-kiting” scheme as
follows:

“The check kiter opens an account at Bank A with a nominal deposit. He
then writes a check on that account for a large sum, such as $50,000. The
check kiter then opens an account at Bank B and deposits the $50,000
check from Bank A in that account. At the time of deposit, the check is not
supported by sufficient funds in the account at Bank A. However, Bank B,
unaware of this fact, gives the check kiter immediate credit on his account
at Bank B, During the several-day period that the check on Bank A is
being processed for collection from that bank, the check kiter writes a
$50,000 check on his account at Bank B and deposits it into his account
at Bank A. At the time of the deposit of that check, Bank A gives the check

384 477 Mass. 382 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

returned, the defendant made a number of expenditures, including
nearly $3,000 on Walt Disney World and Sea World tickets, nearly
$600 on her cellular telephone bill, over $700 on clothing and
shoes, and a $2,000 cash withdrawal. The defendant ultimately
overdrew her accounts at TD Bank by roughly $12,000.

In early August of 2013, a representative of TD Bank contacted
the defendant by telephone and informed her that the checks had
been returned. The defendant responded that she was out of town,
but would remedy the situation when she returned. The defendant
never did so, however, and testified at trial that she “forgot” and
was overwhelmed by her own, and her mother’s, health problems.
By August 21, 2013, no repayment had been made and TD Bank
sent a demand letter informing the defendant that she owed TD
Bank $11,664.20. Within a week, the defendant still had not made
any deposit. When TD Bank attempted to follow up with the
defendant, it discovered that the defendant’s cellular telephone
number was no longer in service.

At trial, the defendant testified that she believed that her
account at Citizens Bank was still open and that her tax refund
had been deposited into that account. There was evidence, how-
ever, that the Citizens Bank account had been closed for years,
and that she already had spent much of her $13,000 tax refund,
which had been previously deposited into one of her accounts at
TD Bank, well in advance of the four bounced checks.

The jury convicted the defendant on four counts of larceny by
uttering a false check. The defendant appealed, and we trans-
ferred the case to this court on our own motion.

Discussion. Pursuant to § 37, an individual commits larceny if,
with the intent to defraud, she obtains goods or services in
exchange for a check that the individual wrote knowing there
were insufficient funds in the account from which the check

Kiter immediate credit on his account there, and on the basis of that grant
of credit pays the original $50,000 check when it is presented for collec-
tion,

“By repeating this scheme, or some variation of it, the check kiter can
use the $50,000 credit originally given by Bank B as an interest-free loan
for an extended period of time. In effect, the check kiter can take advan-
tage of the several-day period required for the transmittal, processing, and
payment of checks from accounts in different banks . . . .” (Citation
omitted.)

Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 281 n.1 (1982).

477 Mass. 382 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

w
ge
a

draws.? Section 37 further provides that the act of “making,
drawing, uttering or deliver[ing] such a check” constitutes “prima
facie evidence of intent to defraud and of knowledge of insuffi-
cient funds ... , unless the maker or drawer shall have paid the
holder thereof the amount due thereon . . . within two days after
receiving notice that such check . . . has not been paid by the
drawee.”

Based on the statutory language, the District Court has pro-
mulgated a model supplemental instruction in larceny by check
cases in which the defendant does not take the requisite action
within two days of notice of dishonor. Instruction 8.460 of the
Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court
(2009). The instruction given in this case over the defendant’s
objection, which conformed with the model instruction, stated:

“There has been some evidence in this case suggesting that
the defendant failed to make good on this check within two
days after she was notified that the bank had refused payment
because of insufficient funds. If you find that to have been
proved, it may be relevant to the issues of the defendant's
knowledge and intent.

“Tf the defendant failed to make good on a check within two
days after being notified that it had bounced, you are per-
mitted to infer two other things: that at the time when the
defendant originally wrote the check, she knew that there
were insufficient funds or a line of credit to cover it at the
bank, and also that she wrote the check with the intent to
defraud. You are not required to draw such an inference of
knowledge and intent, but you may.

“Even if there has been contrary evidence, you may still
consider a failure to make good on the check within two days
of notice as some evidence on the questions of knowledge
and intent, and you may weigh it in your deliberations along
with all the rest of the evidence on those two issues.”

The defendant argues that the prima facie designation in § 37
and the related instruction are unconstitutional, because an indi-

2In relevant part, G. L. c. 266, § 37, states: “Whoever, with intent to defraud,
makes, draws, utters or delivers any check, draft or order for the payment of
money upon any bank... , with knowledge that the maker or drawer has not
sufficient funds or credit . . . for the payment of such instrument . . . , and if
money or property or services are obtained thereby shall be guilty of larceny.”

386 477 Mass. 382 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

vidual’s failure to pay a check within two days of notice of
dishonor does not have a sufficiently strong, logical connection to
the individual’s knowledge of insufficient funds or intent to
defraud at the time the check was written. We agree. Because the
defendant objected to the instruction at trial, we will affirm the
convictions only if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Commonwealth vy. Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177, 189
(2011). Cf. Commonwealth vy. Klein, 400 Mass. 309, 314-315
(1987) (instruction did not create substantial risk of miscarriage
of justice).

1. Statutory designation of prima facie evidence in criminal
statutes. In criminal cases in the Commonwealth, when the Leg-
islature designates “evidence ‘A’ [to be] prima facie evidence of
fact ‘B,’ then, in the absence of competing evidence, the fact
finder is permitted but not required to find ‘B’ beyond a reason-
able doubt.” Commonwealth v. Maloney, 447 Mass. 577, 581
(2006). See Mass. G. Evid. § 302(c) (2017). The designation of
prima facie evidence in this context is “structurally the same as”
a “permissive inference.” Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass.
286, 292-293 (1975). In other words, the permissive inference
satisfies the Commonwealth’s burden of production as to one or
more elements of a crime. As reflected in the judge’s instruction
in this case, when contrary evidence is introduced, the basic fact
(i.e., the first fact) continues to be some evidence of the inferred
fact (i.e., the second fact or resultant fact). Mass G. Evid.
§ 302(c).

When a jury may find an inferred fact based on proof of a basic
fact, there must be a strong, logical connection between the two
facts to ensure that the defendant receives the full benefit of the
reasonable doubt standard. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463, 467-468 (1943). See generally Pauley, 368 Mass. at 294-
299, An instruction explaining a permissive inference should be
given only where it will “not undermine the factfinder’s respon-
sibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find
the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” County Court of
Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). Provisions
designating prima facie evidence, such as § 37, “do not... alter
the Commonwealth’s substantive burden of proof... . Rather,
when properly employed . . . , such provisions are merely a matter
of administrative convenience that eliminate uncertainty as to
what will constitute sufficient proof.” Maloney, 447 Mass. at
581-582.

477 Mass. 382 (2017) 387

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

We have yet to address the constitutionality of the prima facie
designation in § 37. See Klein, 400 Mass. at 315 (not reaching
constitutionality issue). But see id. at 316-320 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (relationship between initial and inferred facts in § 37
not sufficiently rational to satisfy due process). The key inquiry in
assessing the constitutionality of a permissive inference is the
strength of the relationship between the basic fact and the inferred
fact “in light of present-day experience.” See Barnes v. United
States, 412 U.S. 837, 844-845 (1973). The constitutionally re-
quired connection between the two facts has been described as a
“rational connection,” a connection that is “more likely than not,”
and as a connection that leaves no “reasonable doubt.” Jd. at
841-843, and cases cited. Yet, this “ambiguity is traceable in large
part to variations in language and focus rather than to differences
of substance.” Jd. at 843. Accordingly, other circumstances in-
volving permissive inferences in criminal statutes are illustrative.

a. The connection between the basic fact and the inferred fact.
In Pauley, 368 Mass. at 289, 292, 297, we found no constitutional
infirmity in a regulation that permitted the fact finder to presume
that the registered owner of an automobile was responsible for
evading a toll. We concluded that the relationship between the
basic fact (ownership of the vehicle) and the inferred fact (that the
owner was the individual driving the vehicle) was sufficient to
allow the fact finder to find the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Jd. at 298. Similarly, in Barnes, 412 U.S. at
843-846, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of drawing “an inference of guilty knowledge . . . from
the fact of unexplained possession of stolen goods,” where the
defendant possessed “recently stolen Treasury checks payable to
persons he did not know.” In these circumstances, the Court
determined that the unexplained possession of such items was
“sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that [the] petitioner knew the checks were stolen.” Jd. at 845-846.

Where courts have rejected the sufficiency of the connection
between the initial and inferred facts, they typically have done so
where the inferred fact has a sufficiently probable, noncriminal
explanation. For example, in Tot, 319 U.S. at 466, 472, the
Supreme Court reversed a conviction premised on an inference
that a defendant who possessed firearms and ammunition after
being convicted of a violent crime had received the alleged illicit
material via interstate commerce — an element of the Federal
crime. In the absence of additional evidence regarding the mecha-

388 477 Mass. 382 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

nisms by which the defendant received the material, “there [was]
no reasonable ground for a[n] [inference] that its purchase or
procurement was in interstate rather than in intrastate commerce.”
Id. at 468. Compare United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 69-71
(1965) (upholding inference that person’s unexplained presence
at illegal still could be used to infer guilt for participation in crime
of illegal distilling), with United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136,
141-144 (1965) (striking down inference that person’s unex-
plained presence at illegal still could be used to infer guilt for
crime of possessing illegal still).

b. The permissive inference of § 37. We agree with the dissent
in Klein that the prima facie designation in § 37 and the corre-
sponding jury instruction are unconstitutional; that is, the basic
fact (that the defendant did not make good on a check with
insufficient funds within two days of being notified that it had
bounced) does not constitute prima facie evidence of the two
inferred facts, both of which are elements of the crime: that the
defendant, at the time the check was issued, (1) knew there were
insufficient funds and (2) had fraudulent intent.

The instruction in this case informed the jury that, based on the
defendant’s failure to make good on the checks within two days
of notice of dishonor, “[they were] permitted to infer two other
things: that at the time when the defendant originally wrote the
check, she knew that there were insufficient funds or a line of
credit to cover it at the bank, and also that she wrote the check
with the intent to defraud.” This instruction suggested that no
more evidence was needed to prove these elements, which the
Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. A
permissive inference cannot have the effect of reducing the Com-
monwealth’s burden to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Maloney, 447 Mass. at 581-582.

Without a stronger, rational connection between a defendant’s
failure to correct a bad check within two days of notice and the
defendant’s knowledge and intent, “the combination of natural
chance and absence from the evidence of an explanation consis-
tent with innocence” does not prove the two inferred facts beyond
a reasonable doubt. Pauley, 368 Mass. at 293. “Surely, a defend-
ant’s inability to make restitution for a bad check within two
business days after notice of dishonor does not warrant a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that an honest mistake or inattention
was not the genesis of the check.” Klein, 400 Mass. at 319
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Tot, 319 U.S. at 468 (inference

477 Mass. 382 (2017) 389

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

invalid in light of probable, innocent explanation). Further, the
essential question is whether the defendant had the requisite
knowledge and intent at the time she wrote the check. Section 37
does not establish any temporal limitation between the writing of
the check and notice of dishonor. If, for example, a defendant
received notice of dishonor regarding a check written three
months earlier, the defendant’s failure to pay the check within
two days of the notice would say little about her state of mind at
the time she wrote the bad check.

Unlike the possession of stolen checks made out to persons
unknown to a defendant and knowledge that the checks were
stolen, Barnes, 412 U.S. at 844-846, the defendant’s failure to
make the appropriate payment after notice of dishonor does not
tilt the “balance of probabilities . . . in favor of the Common-
wealth.” Klein, 400 Mass. at 319 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See
Tot, 319 U.S. at 468. See also Pauley, 368 Mass. at 292-293.
Because the designation of prima facie evidence in § 37 effe
tively dilutes the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, it is consti-
tutionally infirm and thus the instruction given by the judge was
invalid.

2. Harmless error. When faced with a preserved constitutional
error, we reverse a conviction unless we are satisfied that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Petetabella, 459 Mass.
at 189. “Finding that an improper instruction was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt is the equivalent of saying that the error
was ‘unimportant in relation to everything else the jury consid-
ered on the issue in question,’ requiring the reviewing court ‘to
make a judgment about the significance of the [inference] to
reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence
considered by those jurors independently of the [inference].’ ”
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 218 (2007), quoting
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 (1991).

This analysis involves two steps. First, we determine “what
evidence the jury actually considered” by evaluating the instruc-
tions given to them, and assuming that the jury considered “rel-
evant evidence on a point in issue when they are told that they
may do so.” Nolin, 448 Mass. at 218. Second, we weigh the
probative effect of the evidence actually considered against the
probative effect of the inference. Jd. at 218-219. For a conviction
to survive the second step, we must conclude that “the evidence
considered was ‘so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reason-
able doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have

390 477 Mass. 382 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

been the same in the absence of the [improper inference].’ ” Id.
at 219, quoting Commonwealth v. Medina, 430 Mass. 800, 803
(2000). Both steps are satisfied in this case.

As to the first step, we have acknowledged already that the
instruction incorrectly informed the jury that proof of the defend-
ant’s failure to address the bounced checks within two days was
sufficient to infer the defendant’s knowledge of insufficient funds
and intent to defraud. However, unlike the instruction challenged
in Nolin, 448 Mass. at 219, the instruction did not go so far as to
“direct” the jury to find knowledge and intent on proof of the
defendant’s failure to make the checks good.* Rather, the instruc-
tion in this case told the jury that they were permitted to find
intent and knowledge, but not required to do so.

The instruction further made clear to the jury that, if evidence
contradicted the defendant’s knowledge and intent, they could
consider the failure to pay as some evidence of knowledge and
intent. Because the defendant testified that she did not have the
knowledge or intent, we presume that the jury considered the
basic fact in this manner. See Nolin, 448 Mass. at 218; Klein, 400
Mass. at 314. Therefore, the jury were instructed in a manner that
conveyed that the unconstitutional permissive inference did not
apply in this case, due to the defendant’s testimony that she
lacked the requisite knowledge and intent.

Although an insufficient basis to find the requisite knowledge
and intent, a defendant’s failure to make good on a bad check
may still be relevant evidence to support those elements.* We can
then resolve the second step of the Nolin analysis by determining
whether instructing the jury that the failure to make good on the

"In Commonwealth v, Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 217 (2007), the judge informed
the jury that “a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts, So, in considering intent, remember that.”

4In many cases, if a defendant knowingly wrote a check with insufficient
funds with the intent to defraud, the defendant would not voluntarily make the
aggrieved party or parties whole. Thus, the defendant's failure to make good on
the check may make it “more probable” that the defendant knew of the
insufficient funds and intended to defraud than “it would be without the
evidence.” Mass, G. Evid. § 401 (2017). Simply because evidence is relevant,
however, does not require that an instruction be given to the jury explaining its
relevance. Nor does the statute mandate the provision of an instruction. A
prosecutor may argue a defendant’s failure to pay as evidence of intent, and a
defendant may introduce evidence to the contrary. Similarly, a trial judge may
consider a defendant’s failure to make good on a bounced check as evidence of
knowledge or intent, when considering whether to grant a motion for a required
finding of not guilty.

477 Mass. 382 (2017) 391

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

check within two days after notice of dishonor constitutes revers-
ible error. Because the instruction was unnecessary, although its
substance was not legally incorrect, it should not have been
given. We are convinced, however, that any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt in light of all of the evidence. Com-
monwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 362 (2010) (error harm-
less when other evidence is so overwhelming that it nullifies any
effect).®

The overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the defendant
knowingly with the intent to defraud, rather than mistakenly as
she testified, wrote checks that drew funds from a long-closed
account. Further, the defendant utilized ATM deposit systems that
posted funds electronically, allowing her to move funds before
the checks cleared — which she promptly did in the manner of a
check-kiting scheme. Finally, the defendant did not merely fail to
make good on the checks within two days of notice of dishonor,
but did not enter into a repayment agreement for an additional
nine months. The strength of the Commonwealth’s case, when
juxtaposed against the defendant’s testimony explaining her con-
duct, “nulliffies] any effect” that the minor instructional error
“ “might have had’ on the fact finder or the findings.” Vasquez,
456 Mass. at 362, quoting Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass.
676, 704 n.44 (2010).

Conclusion. The designation of prima facie evidence in § 37 is
unconstitutional and, thus, so too was the corresponding instruc-
tion. The instruction suggested that proof of a defendant’s failure
to make good on a bad check within two days of being notified
was sufficient to infer that the defendant (1) knew of the insuf-
ficient funds and (2) possessed the intent to defraud. Each of the
inferred facts is an essential element of the crime that must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof of the basic fact
alone does not warrant finding the inferred facts by that standard.
Nevertheless, the defendant offered contrary evidence through
her testimony, and the jury were instructed that, where there is
contrary evidence, they may consider a failure to honor the check
within two days of notice only as “some evidence” of the de-
fendant’s knowledge and intent. In light of the overwhelming
evidence of the defendant’s knowledge and intent, the instruc-

5We need not decide whether the error of unnecessarily providing this
instruction should be viewed as constitutional or prejudicial error, because even
under the less forgiving constitutional standard, we conclude that reversal is not
warranted.

392 477 Mass. 382 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Littles.

tional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We there-
fore affirm the defendant’s convictions.

Judgments affirmed.

477 Mass. 393 (2017) 393

Commonwealth » Sanborn,

Commonweatru vs. RicHarp R. SANBORN.
Worcester. January 6, 2017. - June 29, 2017,
Present: Gants, C.l., Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cyne, II.

Abuse Prevention. Constitutional Law, Investigatory stop. Due Process of Law,
Abuse prevention. Practice, Civil, Service. Threshold Police Inquiry.

This court concluded that G. L. ¢, 209A does not authorize the police to
effectuate a motor vehicle stop to serve a civil abuse prevention order;
instead, c. 209A requires law enforcement to take reasonable measures to
serve abuse prevention orders, and in order for the service of such orders to
be reasonable, the manner of service must comply with the terms of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, [394-396] Gants, C.J., concurring,
with whom Gazino and Bupp, JJ., joined.

Comptamnt received and sworn to in the Fitchburg Division of
the District Court Department on May 18, 2015.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Christo-
pher P. LoConto, J., and a question of law was reported by him
to the Appeals Court.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Merritt Schnipper (Robert M. Cassesso, Jr., also present) for
the defendant.

Lowy, J. The question before us was reported by a judge in the
District Court: “Whether G. L. c. 209A authorizes the police to
effectuate a motor vehicle stop to serve a civil abuse prevention
order?” We answer the question in the negative. We conclude that
G. L. c. 209A requires law enforcement to take reasonable
measures to serve abuse prevention orders. In order for the
service of the orders to be reasonable, the manner of service must
comply with the terms of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights.

Background. At a hearing regarding a motion to suppress
evidence obtained during a motor vehicle stop, the motion judge

394 477 Mass. 393 (2017)

Commonwealth » Sanborn,

found the following facts. On May 16, 2015, a Lunenberg police
sergeant was parked outside a local bar. In the course of randomly
checking the registration status and owner information of vehi-
cles parked outside the bar, he inquired about a license plate
number registered to Richard Sanborn, the defendant. The ser-
geant recalled that a civil abuse restraining order issued pursuant
to G. L. c. 209A had not yet been served on the defendant. An-
other officer from the Lunenberg police department delivered the
restraining order to the sergeant. Subsequently the defendant left
the bar, entered his vehicle, and drove away.' The sergeant fol-
lowed the defendant and eventually stopped his vehicle. Based on
the sergeant’s observations of the defendant after the stop, the
defendant was placed under arrest for operating while under the
influence of liquor.

The defendant moved to suppress evidence relating to, and
discovered as a result of, the stop, arguing that his Fourth Amend-
ment and art. 14 rights had been violated. At the hearing on the
defendant’s motion, the sergeant testified that he had stopped the
defendant after observing multiple lane violations. The motion
judge discredited that testimony, however, and found that the
purpose of the stop was to serve the abuse prevention order. The
judge granted the defendant’s motion and reported the question
above to the Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as
amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004). We transferred the case to this
court on our own motion.

Discussion. General Laws c. 209A serves a critical government
interest in the “[p]reservation of the fundamental human right to
be protected from the devastating impact of family violence.”
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 769, 772-773 (2005),
quoting Champagne v. Champagne, 429 Mass. 324, 327 (1999).
Accordingly, G. L. c. 209A, § 7, requires law enforcement officers
to “use every reasonable means to enforce . . . abuse prevention

1At oral argument, the Commonwealth argued that the sergeant was across
the street from the bar to receive delivery of the restraining order when he saw
the defendant driving away from the bar. The sergeant testified that he was not
sure when he received the order but that, as he drove across the street to meet
the officer bringing the restraining order, the sergeant observed the defendant
driving out of the bar’s parking lot. However, the judge’s findings reflect that the
sergeant received the order and that the defendant left “[s]ubsequently.” See
Commonwealth vy. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. 46, 50 (2004) (absent clear error,
appellate court accepts factual findings of judge ruling on motion to suppress).
Resolution of this potential factual discrepancy is not material to our holding in
this case.

477 Mass. 393 (2017)

Commonwealth » Sanborn,

w
Nel
a

orders.” Reasonable means to enforce abuse prevention orders
logically include law enforcement officers’ ability to utilize rea-
sonable means to serve them. We therefore interpret G. L.
c. 209A, § 7, to require law enforcement to use “every reasonable
means” to serve abuse prevention orders. In order for a stop to
constitute reasonable means, however, the stop must comply with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14. See
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 773 (2015) (“police
stop of a moving automobile constitutes a seizure, and therefore,
any such stop, whatever its purpose, must comply with the Fourth
Amendment . . . and with art. 14”).

A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is presump-
tively unreasonable. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006). See Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 773-774. Warrantless sei-
zures may be reasonable, however, if the circumstances of the
search fall within an established exception to the warrant require-
ment.? See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 818, 823
(2009) (warrantless home entry justified based on objectively
reasonable belief in emergency); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424
Mass. 117, 123-124 (1997) (law enforcement may stop motor
vehicle in public place when law enforcement has probable cause
that vehicle contains contraband); Commonwealth v. Bacon, 381
Mass. 642, 643-644 (1980) (motor vehicle stop reasonable where
police have reasonable, articulable suspicion of crime or of civil
traffic violation). Cf. Rodriguez, supra at 777-778 (motor vehicle
stop unreasonable when based on reasonable suspicion of civil
violation unrelated to traffic violation).

We may not read G. L. c. 209A to circumvent the constitutional
protections of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14. Therefore,
c. 209A cannot authorize a stop in the absence of a constitutional
justification, such as a warrant, reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity or a civil traffic violation, or a reasonable belief that emer-

2The Commonwealth does not argue that the facts of this case fit within any
of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. Relying on Common-
wealth v, Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 776 (2015), the Commonwealth contends
that we should balance the intrusion into the defendant's privacy against the
governmental interest in preventing domestic abuse and resolve the balance in
favor of the governmental interest. In Rodriguez, however, we invoked this
balancing test based on the existence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the defendant was engaged in illegal, albeit noncriminal, activity. /d. Based on
the facts found by the judge in this case, there was no reasonable suspicion of
criminal or civil wrongdoing at the time of the stop.

396 477 Mass. 393 (2017)

Commonwealth » Sanborn,

gency intervention is required.* Ultimately, whether a stop to
serve ac. 209A order is a reasonable measure to avert the harm
from an emergency depends on an objective assessment of the
necessity of doing so, in light of all facts known to law enforce-
ment at the time. See Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231,
235 (2017). In such circumstances, the justification for the stop
stems not from G. L. c. 209A, but from the constitutional excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. When a stop is not constitution-
ally justified, reasonable means for service would include the
mechanisms typically employed for service: in-person delivery,
leaving the order at the defendant’s home, or service by mail, as
appropriate. See G. L. c. 276, § 25 (service of criminal summons
may be made by in-person delivery, by leaving summons at the
defendant’s last known address with person of suitable age, or by
mail to last known address); Mass. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (1), as amended,
370 Mass. 918 (1976) (service of civil summons and complaint
may be made in person, by delivery to defendant’s last and usual
place of abode, or by delivery to defendant’s agent).*

Conclusion. The answer to the reported question is “no.” We
remand the case to the District Court judge for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Gants, C.J. (concurring, with whom Gaziano and Budd, JJ.,
join). I agree with the court’s answer of “no” to the reported
question to the extent that it declares that G. L. c. 209A does not
independently authorize the police to effectuate a motor vehicle
stop in order to serve notification of an abuse prevention order. I
also agree that any such stop must comply with the requirements

3We agree with the concurrence that, given the nature and importance of
abuse prevention orders under G. L. c. 209A and the lesser expectation of
privacy in motor vehicles, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-393 (1985),
effecting a motor vehicle stop to serve an abuse prevention order may be
constitutionally justified in some circumstances, such as an emergency or other
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Because the con-
stitutionality of a stop depends on its reasonableness based on the totality of the
circumstances, we limit our holding today due to the absence of facts that have
matured through litigation that would allow us to apply the doctrinal framework
in a meaningfully helpful manner.

4Following a motor vehicle operated by a defendant until it stops and the
defendant leaves the vehicle would constitute a constitutionally satisfactory
method of service.

477 Mass. 393 (2017) 397

Commonwealth » Sanborn,

of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Ante at 393. I
write separately because I believe that a stop for the purpose of
serving an abuse prevention order may be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment and art. 14 where the exigent circumstances
fall short of the standard for an “emergency” under the “emergency
aid” doctrine. See Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 818, 819
(2009) (police may enter home without warrant “when they have an
objectively reasonable basis to believe that there may be someone
inside who is injured or in imminent danger of physical harm’).

The ultimate touchstone of both the Fourth Amendment and
art. 14 is reasonableness. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass.
767, 775 (2015). “[T]o evaluate the permissibility of particular
law enforcement practices, including police stops of moving
vehicles where there is no probable cause to suspect the vehicle’s
involvement in criminal activity, courts have balanced the intru-
siveness of the police activities at issue against any legitimate
governmental interests that these activities serve.” Jd. at 776,
citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). We deem
it reasonable for a police officer to open the unlocked door of a
stopped vehicle where the driver fails to respond to the officer’s
repeated attempts to attract his or her attention and the driver
appears to be in some kind of difficulty. See Commonwealth v.
Leonard, 422 Mass. 504, 505, 509, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 877
(1996). We also deem it reasonable to allow officers under limited
and defined circumstances to stop vehicles on roadways at fixed
location sobriety checkpoints to ensure that motorists are not
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. See Commonwealth v.
McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 143-144 (1983). See also Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (“the
balance of the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the
extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that
interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists
who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of [sobriety check-
points]”).

The need to protect ill, injured, or inebriated drivers, and to
protect the public from them, is comparable to the need to protect
the victims of domestic abuse who have obtained abuse preven-
tion orders under G. L. c. 209A, § 4, by demonstrating a “sub-
stantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse.” Domestic vio-
lence is a substantial threat to public safety. See Custody of
Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 595 (1996) (“abuse by a family member

398 477 Mass. 393 (2017)

Commonwealth » Sanborn,

inflicted on those who are weaker and less able to defend them-
selves . . . is a violation of the most basic human right, the most
basic condition of civilized society: the right to live in physical
security, free from the fear that brute force will determine the
conditions of one’s daily life”). Last year, more than twenty
domestic violence-related killings occurred in Massachusetts. See
Jane Doe Inc., Overview of Domestic Violence Homicides in
Massachusetts Year to Date 2016, http://www.janedoe.org/site/as
sets/docs/Learn_More/DV_Homicide/2016_YTD_DV_Homicides
-asof_2017_05_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/83KK-94XE].

The issuance of an abuse prevention order matters little if it is
not served. General Laws c. 209A, § 7, recognizes the importance
of service by requiring that an abuse prevention order issued be
transmitted “forthwith” to the police for service upon the defend-
ant and by requiring that police “promptly” make return of ser-
vice to the court. See Commonwealth of Massachusetts Trial
Court, Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Pro-
ceedings 91-92 (rev. Sept. 2011), http://www.mass.gov/courts/
docs/209a/guidelines-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9MV-8ZXZ]
(“In-hand service should be obtained if at all possible... . Further
abuse will not be deterred if the defendant does not know the
order exists . . . [, and] successful prosecution for violation of an
order of which the defendant is unaware is probably impossible”).

Service generally can be accomplished by the usual means,
without any need to stop the defendant in a motor vehicle. But
there are circumstances where service by the usual means proves
futile or is plainly going to be futile, such as where the abusive
partner has left his or her residence indefinitely, perhaps never to
return, without any notice of where he or she can be reached and
without any employment address where he or she can be found.
Where service through the usual means has proved futile or is
demonstrably futile, I would find it reasonable and therefore
constitutional to stop the defendant’s vehicle in order to serve the
order. The circumstances in this case fall well short of meeting
that standard.

477 Mass. 399 (2017) 399

Commonwealth », Mora,

ComMonweEAttH vs. STEVEN Mora.
Suifolk. February 6, 2017. - une 29, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Firearms. Motor Vehicle, Firearms. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Warrant,
Probable cause. Practice, Criminal, Interlocutory appeal, Judicial discretion,
Motion to suppress, Warrant, Grand jury proceedings, Indictment, Sentence.
Probable Cause. Evidence, Grand jury proceedings. Grand Jury.

A trial court judge did not abuse his discretion in granting a criminal defendant
an extension of thirty additional days, beyond the thirty days he had previ-
ously granted the defendant, to file an application to a single justice of this
court for leave to appeal from the denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress evidence, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in
422 Mass, 1501 (1996); therefore, the defendant’s application, filed in
accordance with the grant of additional time, was timely. [402-404]

A Superior Court judge erred in denying a criminal defendant's pretrial motion
to suppress a gun, a magazine, and ammunition that were seized by the
police from a safe in the defendant’s motor vehicle pursuant to a search
warrant, where the affidavit filed in support of the warrant failed to provide
a nexus between any suspected criminal activity and the safe, [404-406]

This court exercised its powers pursuant to G. L. c, 211, § 3, to reverse a
Superior Court judge’s denial of a criminal defendant's motion to dismiss the
sentence enhancement portions of two indictments charging him as an armed
career criminal pursuant to G. L. ¢. 269, § 10G (b), where the Common-
wealth failed to establish that the defendant’s prior conviction of robbery
was a conviction of a violent crime under § 10G (b), in that the grand jury
heard only that the defendant had been convicted of robbery, without
evidence that the defendant had used, attempted to use, or threatened to use
physical force. [406-408]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on October 22, 2014.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James R.
Lemire, J.

An application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal was
allowed by Botsford, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her.

Civit action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk on June 20, 2016.

400 477 Mass. 399 (2017)

Commonwealth », Mora,

The case was reported by Botsford, J.

Richard J. Shea for the defendant.

Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Bupp, J. This case is here on the reservation and report of two
related matters involving the defendant, Steven Mora, who was
indicted on various charges in connection with the possession of
an unlicensed firearm. Two of those charges included sentence
enhancement as an armed career criminal pursuant to G. L.
c. 269, § 10G (b). We conclude that the search warrant that
yielded the gun, a magazine, and ammunition lacked probable
cause and that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence to the grand jury to support the armed career criminal
enhancements.

1. Background. a. The search. We summarize the facts pro-
vided in the affidavit that a Worcester police officer filed in
support of an application for a warrant to search a safe found in
a motor vehicle driven by the defendant. See Commonwealth v.
O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003) (“our inquiry as to the suf-
ficiency of the search warrant application always begins and ends
with the ‘four corners of the affidavit’ ” [citation omitted]).

One summer evening in 2014, that police officer was conduct-
ing surveillance and observed a man engaged in what appeared to
be hand-to-hand drug transactions in the parking lot of a conven-
ience store. This lot was known to be a location where “numerous
drug arrests” had occurred. Approximately thirty minutes into the
surveillance, the defendant drove into the lot in a station wagon
and approached the suspected drug dealer. As the two stood
together, a third man approached the drug dealer, who appeared to
conduct a brief transaction with that individual as the defendant
looked around nervously.

Following this interaction, the defendant, the drug dealer, and
a woman entered the station wagon and left the parking lot. The
officer alerted other officers in the area, and the vehicle was
stopped shortly thereafter. A patfrisk of the defendant yielded
several hypodermic needles, and the officer learned that the
defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended. A search of the
vehicle produced more needles and other drug paraphernalia
along with a small safe marked “Fort Knox,” which was on the
floor of the vehicle behind the driver’s seat. No illegal narcotics
were found either in the vehicle or in the possession of any of its
occupants.

477 Mass. 399 (2017) 401

Commonwealth », Mora,

The defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended li-
cense, and the motor vehicle, which was not registered in his
name, was towed. Police took possession of the safe pursuant to
an inventory search and determined that there was a heavy metal
object inside. Police learned through research that the safe was
designed to secure pistols. As a result, the officer sought a search
warrant for the contents of the safe, averring that, in his training
and experience, heroin addicts often steal anything of value to
support their addiction; drug dealers often keep contraband inside
of safes to secure their drug supply; and on numerous occasions
he had found illegal narcotics, firearms, money, and drug trans-
action notes in safes belonging to drug dealers. A warrant for the
contents of the safe issued; inside police found a handgun and
magazine, two boxes of ammunition, two pill bottles bearing the
defendant’s name, and two hypodermic needles.

b. The indictments. Based on the evidence seized from the safe,
a grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant with
possession of a large capacity feeding device, possession of am-
munition without a firearm identification card, and illegal pos-
session of a firearm. With regard to the latter two indictments, the
defendant also was charged as an armed career criminal pursuant
to G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b) (act), on the basis that he had been
previously convicted of two violent or serious drug offenses and
therefore was subject to enhanced sentencing."

c. Procedural history. The defendant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence recovered from the safe. A Superior Court judge
denied the motion. The defendant filed a notice of appeal from the
judge’s order and, subsequently, an application to a single justice
of this court for leave to appeal pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P.
15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996).

The defendant also moved to dismiss the sentence enhance-
ments, arguing that there could be no probable cause for them
where the grand jury heard no evidence that his second predicate
conviction, for unarmed robbery, was a “violent crime” as re-
quired by G. L. c. 269, § 10G (e). That motion was denied by a
different Superior Court judge. The defendant then filed a petition
in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking review
of the denial of his motion to dismiss the armed career criminal

“A sentence enhancement pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b), would result in
additional “imprisonment in the state prison for not less than ten years nor more
than [fifteen] years” above that imprisonment already imposed in connection
with the underlying crime.

402 477 Mass. 399 (2017)

Commonwealth », Mora,

enhancements.

A single justice reserved and reported both matters for consid-
eration by the full court.

2. Discussion. a. Motion to suppress. i. Timeliness. As an initial
matter, the Commonwealth argues that we should reject as un-
timely the defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to
suppress. The Commonwealth claims that the motion judge did
not have the authority to extend, for as long as he did, the
defendant’s time for filing his application for leave to appeal. We
disagree.

There are two steps to perfecting an interlocutory appeal from
an order on a motion to suppress: (1) filing a notice of appeal with
the trial court; and (2) applying to a single justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court for leave to appeal. Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (b) (1), as
appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). At the time of the events in
this case, the party seeking to appeal had ten days from the entry
of the order to file the notice of appeal, or such additional time as
a judge in the trial court or a single justice of this court may
allow.? Jd. The trial court’s authority to extend the time for filing
a notice of appeal is limited to thirty additional days beyond the
time set by rule 15 (b) (1). Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c), as amended, 378
Mass. 928 (1979). See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 469 Mass. 134,
141-143 (2014) (discussing interplay of Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 and
Mass. R. A. P. 4, and limitation on extension of time that lower
court may grant for filing notices of appeal).

Here, the order denying the motion to suppress was entered on
the Superior Court docket on April 13, 2016, and the defendant
filed his notice of appeal on April 22, 2016. The Commonwealth
takes no issue with the timeliness of the defendant’s notice of
appeal. The dispute lies with the second step in the process, i.e.,
filing the application in the county court for leave to pursue an
interlocutory appeal.

At the same time that he filed his timely notice of appeal, the
defendant filed in the trial court a motion to extend the time to file
his application for leave to appeal by thirty days. The motion
judge allowed that request. On May 20, 2016, the defendant filed

2Rule 15 (b) (1) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure has since
been amended, effective August 1, 2016, to provide that the notice of appeal and
the application for leave to appeal must be filed within thirty days of the date of
entry of the order being appealed from, or such additional time as the lower
court or the single justice may order. Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (b) (1), as appearing
in 474 Mass. 1501 (2016).

477 Mass. 399 (2017) 403

Commonwealth », Mora,

a second motion for an extension of time, asking for an additional
thirty days to file the application, which also was allowed. The
defendant filed his application for leave to appeal on June 20,
2016. The Commonwealth argues that the judge’s authority to
grant an extension of time for filing the application was limited to
thirty days beyond the initial ten-day period, which the judge
exhausted by granting the defendant’s first motion for an exten-
sion, and thus that the judge had no authority to grant the second
motion for a further extension. To support its argument, the Com-
monwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Demirtshyan, 87 Mass.
App. Ct. 737, 740-741 (2015), in which the Appeals Court in-
terpreted the holding in Jordan, 469 Mass. at 140-142, and stated
that the authority of a judge in the trial court to grant an extension
for filing an application for leave to appeal is, by analogy, the
same as the judge’s authority to grant an extension for filing a
notice of appeal, i.e., no more than thirty days beyond the
expiration of the original time period prescribed by the rule.

We pointed out in Jordan, 469 Mass. at 141-142, that the
limitation on a trial court judge’s authority to extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal derives from Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c). The
same cannot be said of the judge’s authority with respect to filing
the application. “It is important to note that rule 4 (c) governs
only extensions of time for filing a notice of appeal in the trial
court. Neither rule 4 (c) nor any of the other appellate rules gov-
erns extensions of time for the . . . period set out in Mass. R.
Crim. P. 15 (b) (1) for filing an application to a single justice of
this court for leave to pursue the interlocutory appeal. The au-
thority of a trial court judge or a single justice to extend the time
for filing an application derives from rule 15 (b) (1), not from the
appellate rules.” Jordan, supra at 141 n.15. Rule 15 (b) (1) speaks
only of “such additional time as either the trial judge or the single
justice . . . shall order.” Simply put, there is no express limitation
in the rules on a trial court judge’s authority to grant an extension
of time for filing the application for leave to appeal. A trial court
judge, like a single justice of this court, has discretion to deter-
mine a reasonable and appropriate amount of time in the circum-
stances.*

Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (b) (1), the motion judge in
this case was well within his discretion to grant thirty additional

To the extent that Commonwealth y. Demirtshyan, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 737
(2015), states otherwise, it is incorrect.

404 477 Mass. 399 (2017)

Commonwealth », Mora,

days beyond the thirty days previously granted for the filing of
the application. The defendant’s application, filed on June 20,
2016, in accordance with the judge’s grant of additional time, was
therefore timely.

ii. Search warrant. “Because a determination of probable cause
is a conclusion of law, we review a search warrant affidavit de
novo.” Commonwealth v. Foster, 471 Mass. 236, 242 (2015). The
defendant argues that the search warrant for the safe was improp-
erly issued, as the affidavit in support of the application failed to
establish the necessary probable cause. “[T]he magistrate [must
have] a substantial basis to conclude that a crime [was] commit-
ted . . . and that the items described in the warrant were related to
the criminal activity and probably in the place to be searched”
(citation omitted). O’Day, 440 Mass. at 298. The warrant affidavit
established probable cause that drug transactions occurred, and
that drug dealers often use safes to hide contraband such as
narcotics, firearms, and money. However, it did not adequately
connect the drug dealing, or any other criminal activity, to the
safe in the motor vehicle that the defendant was driving.

The affidavit does not make clear whom the police were tar-
geting. As a warrant application must draw a nexus between the
area to be searched and criminal activity — not a particular
person — it is not necessary for the application to identify a
suspect. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 410,
416-417 (2017) (probable cause analysis focused on nexus be-
tween suspected child pornography crimes and certain computers,
not certain users). Here, however, in an attempt to create a basis
for probable cause, the affidavit seems to conflate observations of
the suspected dealer with observations of the defendant as though
the two were one individual. An examination of the actions of and
circumstances surrounding each individual is in order.

First, although there clearly was probable cause to believe that
the first male observed was a drug dealer, the affidavit did not
reveal a nexus between his activities and the safe. Despite the fact
that the affidavit states that “drug dealers often keep contraband
inside of safes to secure their drug supply,” this particular safe
was behind the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle in which the drug
dealer took a short trip just prior to the stop. The affidavit did not
indicate whether the drug dealer had prior access to the motor
vehicle, whether he would have had physical access to the safe
based on where he was sitting, or whether he would have had
time to access the safe given the short period of time that he was
in the vehicle.

477 Mass. 399 (2017) 405

Commonwealth », Mora,

Although the defendant, as the driver of the vehicle, has an
arguable connection to the safe, there must be a nexus between
the safe and criminal activity. The affidavit included no “specific
allegations or particularized information based on police surveil-
lance” that the defendant was a dealer. Commonwealth v. Pina,
453 Mass. 438, 442 (2009). Rather, the patfrisk of the defendant
and sweep of the motor vehicle yielded hypodermic needles in-
dicating drug use, not drug dealing. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wilson,
441 Mass. 390, 401 (2004) (intent to distribute marijuana sup-
ported by, inter alia, “absence of any smoking paraphernalia”
undermined claim of possession for personal use). Further, nei-
ther the fact that a hand-to-hand drug transaction was conducted
in the defendant’s presence nor the fact that the defendant there-
after gave the drug dealer a ride permits an inference that the
defendant was a participant in the drug dealer’s distribution
activities. Contrast Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. 137,
141 n.9 (2010) (search for evidence of drug dealing warranted
where defendant seen personally conducting hand-to-hand drug
transactions).

As there is no plausible nexus between the safe and drug
dealing, we look to whether there is probable cause to believe that
there is a nexus between the safe and any other criminal activity.
As discussed supra, there was probable cause to believe that the
defendant was a drug user, and the affiant averred that in his
training and experience, heroin addicts may steal anything of
value “to sell or trade the items to support” their habit. Impor-
tantly, however, the affiant also stated that dealers, not addicts,
tend to hide contraband in safes. Because the affidavit made no
connection between drug use and safes, there was no probable
cause to believe that evidence of the defendant’s drug use could
be found in the safe.

Finally, the affidavit did provide probable cause to believe that
there was a firearm in the safe. However, the licensed possession
of a firearm is not a crime, and on the facts here, there was no
probable cause to believe that the defendant did not have a li-
cense to carry the weapon. If anything, the fact that a handgun is
properly secured in a gun safe makes it more likely that its owner
has a license. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 476 Mass. 341,
346-347 & n.10 (2017). The mere fact that the defendant may
have been a heroin user does not give rise to the inference that
the firearm was unlicensed. See Commonwealth v. White, 374
Mass. 132, 141 (1977), aff'd (by an equally divided Court), 439

406 477 Mass. 399 (2017)

Commonwealth », Mora,

U.S. 280 (1978) (evidence of drug use does not furnish probable
cause for additional criminality). Further, “mere possession of a
handgun [is] not sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was illegally carrying that gun.” Common-
wealth v. Couture, 407 Mass. 178, 183, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951
(1990).

As the affidavit failed to provide a nexus between any sus-
pected criminal activity and the safe, the warrant was invalid and
the fruits of the search must be suppressed.

b. Motion to dismiss sentence enhancements. The defendant
also asks us to exercise our extraordinary powers pursuant to
G.L.c. 211, § 3, to reverse the denial of his motion to dismiss the
sentence enhancements.

The armed career criminal statute imposes enhanced penalties
on a person convicted of possession of a firearm or ammunition
where that person was previously convicted of two violent crimes
or serious drug offenses. G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b). The two pred-
icate crimes that the Commonwealth presented to the grand jury
in this case were assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon and robbery. The defendant argues that the Common-
wealth failed to establish that his conviction of robbery was a
conviction of a violent crime, and that therefore the sentence en-
hancements must be dismissed. The Commonwealth argues that
the fact that the defendant was convicted of robbery is enough to
establish probable cause that he committed a violent crime. We
agree with the defendant.

The act uses the definition of “[v]Jiolent crime” found in G. L.
c. 140, § 121:

“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year . . . that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use
or threatened use of physical force or a deadly weapon
against the person of another; (ii) is burglary, extortion, arson
or kidnapping; (iii) involves the use of explosives; or (iv)
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious risk of
physical injury to another.”

See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (e). Only the first part of this definition

‘Because we conclude that all of the evidence seized from the safe must be
suppressed, for all practical purposes it would appear that the Commonwealth
may be required to dismiss its case. Nevertheless, the single justice reserved and
reported this issue because it is likely to continue arising in other cases, and we
reach it accordingly.

477 Mass. 399 (2017) 407

Commonwealth », Mora,

in G. L. c. 140, § 121, is relevant here.* “Physical force” as used
in that clause means “violent or substantial force capable of
causing pain or injury.” Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass.
809, 818 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass.
App. Ct. 8, 18 (2011).

Pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 19 (b), the crime of robbery (i.e.,
unarmed robbery) is defined as follows:

“Whoever, not being armed with a dangerous weapon, by
force and violence, or by assault and putting in fear, robs,
steals or takes from the person of another, or from his
immediate control, money or other property which may be
the subject of larceny, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for life or for any term of years.”

Thus, one can commit a robbery either by “force and violence”
or by “assault and putting in fear.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 362
Mass. 83, 86 (1972), quoting G. L. c. 277, § 39. In both circum-
stances, “the degree of force is immaterial so long as it is
sufficient to obtain the victim’s property ‘against his will’ ”
(citation omitted). Jones, supra at 87. Importantly, the victim
need not resist; as “long as the victim is aware of the application
of force which relieves him of his property, . . . the requisite
degree of force is present to make the crime robbery” (citation
omitted). Id. at 89.

Even in a case where the robbery is committed by “force and
violence,” it is not necessary that the victim be placed in fear.®
Thus, conduct that may be sufficient to meet the definition of
robbery may not satisfy the definition of “violent crime” for pur-
poses of a sentence enhancement under the act. See United States
v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2016) (robbery is not
“violent crime” within meaning of Federal armed career criminal
statute, from which Massachusetts statute borrows its definition).

5Robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in the second and third
clauses of G. L. c. 140, § 121, and we recently determined that the fourth clause
is unconstitutionally vague. Commonwealth v. Beal, 474 Mass. 341, 350-351
(2016).

®For example, in Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 83, 85 (1972), the
defendant was convicted of robbing a woman who “described the taking as
follows: ‘Ireally couldn’ tell you what he did, All I knew he was standing there.
Next thing I knew, I felt something off my arm. I realized my bag was gone.’ ”
This court upheld the conviction, holding that “although the action may be so
swift as to leave the victim momentarily in a dazed condition, the requisite
degree of force is present to make the crime robbery.” Id, at 89.

408 477 Mass. 399 (2017)

Commonwealth », Mora,

Because the crime of robbery can encompass conduct satisfy-
ing one of several definitions, not all of which are violent, to
determine whether robbery is a violent crime for purposes of the
act, the Commonwealth must provide not only the certified record
of conviction but also evidence of the circumstances surrounding
the robbery.” See Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 816-817, citing Colon,
81 Mass. App. Ct. at 15.

Because the grand jury in this case heard only that the defend-
ant had been convicted of robbery, without evidence that the
defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical
force, there was no reasonable basis to find probable cause that he
had committed a “violent crime.” Commonwealth v. Hanright,
466 Mass. 303, 312 (2013) (evidence before grand jury must
contain “reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to
warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the defendant had
committed .. . an offense” [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v.
McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982). Thus, the sentence en-
hancements must be dismissed.

3. Conclusion. The matters are remanded to the county court. In
no. SJ-2016-275, a judgment shall enter reversing the order of the
Superior Court denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evi-
dence recovered pursuant to the search warrant. In no. SJ-2016-
276, a judgment shall enter allowing the defendant’s petition for
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and reversing the Superior Court
order denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the armed career
criminal portions of the indictments.

So ordered.

7As a practical matter, the necessary extrinsic evidence is slight. The Com-
monwealth need only demonstrate which statutory or common-law definition
was the basis of the prior conviction by, for example, presenting the police
report or calling an officer to testify, See Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass.
809, 816 (2012), citing Commonwealth v, Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 16 n.8
(2011).

477 Mass. 409 (2017) 409

Commonwealth v. Hebb.

ComMonweatti vs. WiiiAM J. Hess.
Suffolk. February 7, 2017. - June 30, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hives, Gaztano, Lowy, & Buop, JU.

Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Constitutional Law, Double
jeopardy. Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, Verdict.

Principles of double jeopardy did not preclude the Commonwealth from retrying
the defendant on a criminal complaint charging a violation of G. L. ¢. 90,
§ 24 (1) (a) (1), on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle with a per-
centage of alcohol in his blood of .08 or greater (per se violation), after a jury
had acquitted him on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor (impaired ability violation), where the
statute as written provides that a defendant may be convicted under one or
both violations, and where the jury’s verdict on the impaired ability violation
charge did not resolve the factual element necessary to establish a per se
violation, [411-414]

Civit action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk on July 19, 2016.

The case was reported by Spina, J.

Christopher DeMayo for the defendant.

Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Timothy St. Lawrence, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Hines, J. In this case, we decide whether double jeopardy prin-
ciples preclude the Commonwealth from retrying the defendant
on a complaint charging a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1),
on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle with a percentage of
alcohol in his blood of .08 or greater (per se violation), after a jury
acquitted him on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor (impaired ability vio-
lation). The Commonwealth prosecuted the one-count complaint
on both theories, and after the jury returned a verdict on the
impaired ability violation only, the judge declared a mistrial on
the per se violation. A new complaint issued charging only a per
se violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1). Claiming that retrial
violated his double jeopardy rights where the complaint issued
after an acquittal on the impaired ability violation, the defendant

410 477 Mass. 409 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Hebb.

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The judge denied the
motion.

The defendant sought relief in the county court pursuant to
G.L. c. 211, § 3. The case is before us on a reservation and report
from a single justice of this court. We conclude that double
jeopardy principles do not preclude retrial where the Common-
wealth prosecuted the case on both theories and the jury reached
a verdict on only one of those theories.

Background. We set forth the facts the jury could have found.
On May 16, 2013, the defendant was struck by a vehicle while he
was operating his motorcycle on a public way.' At the scene of
the collision, the defendant admitted to having had several alco-
holic beverages and was uncooperative with the paramedics.
After the defendant complained of pain, he was transported to the
Milford Hospital emergency department.

The treating physician observed that the defendant’s skin ap-
peared “flushed” and that his speech was slurred, and detected
“an odor of alcohol on [his] breath.” Based on these observations,
the physician determined that the defendant was “intoxicated[,]
probably with alcohol.” With the defendant’s consent, medical per-
sonnel drew blood samples for alcohol levels to be determined.
Subsequent testing of the blood samples by a blood analyst in the
State police crime laboratory showed a blood alcohol level of .133.
On cross-examination, the blood analyst acknowledged that the
tubes holding the defendant’s blood samples also contained an anti-
coagulant to prevent blood clotting and that if the anticoagulant is
not properly activated, the blood sample could clot, and yield an
artificially high blood alcohol test result.

During closing arguments, defense counsel urged a finding that
the defendant had not been impaired while operating his motor-
cycle, and that the blood alcohol test results were unreliable
because the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that the
anticoagulant was properly activated prior to testing. The pros-
ecutor argued that (1) the defendant’s behavior and appearance at
the scene of the collision and at the hospital proved the impaired
ability violation; and (2) the defendant’s blood alcohol level of
-133 proved the per se violation.

The verdict slip conformed to the complaint, charging both the
impaired ability violation and the per se violation, and provided

"The parties stipulated that the defendant was operating his motorcycle on a
public way.

477 Mass. 409 (2017) 411

Commonwealth v. Hebb.

the jury the following options: (I) “Operating a Motor Vehicle
Under the Influence of Liquor: 1. Not Guilty; 2. Guilty”; and (II)
“Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Blood Alcohol Level of .08%
or greater: 1. Not Guilty; 2. Guilty.” During the deliberations, the
jury reported in writing the following: “Made decision on first
count; however, saw evidence that was supposed to be redacted,
swaying our decision [on the second count]. What is our next
step?” In response, the judge summoned the jury to the court
room and conducted a voir dire. During the colloquy, the judge
learned that although the information indicating that the defend-
ant was being prosecuted for a fourth offense had been redacted
from the exhibits, the jury were able to discern the word “fourth”
next to OUL. This information swayed the jury’s decision as to
option II, the per se violation, but not as to option I, on which the
jury returned a not guilty verdict. The jury left the verdict slip
blank for option II, marking neither “not guilty” nor “guilty.”
Accordingly, the judge accepted the verdict on option I and
declared a mistrial on option II.

In December, 2015, a second criminal complaint issued against
the defendant, charging one count of operating with a blood
alcohol level percentage of .08 or greater, fourth violation, under
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (@ (1). The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that retrial violated his double jeopardy rights. A
second judge denied the motion, and the defendant filed a petition
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking review of that judge’s order.
A single justice of this court reserved and reported the case to the
full court on August 12, 2016.

Discussion. Generally, “[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss in a
criminal case is not appealable until after trial, and we have
indicated many times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to
circumvent that rule.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008,
1009 (2002). However, we have recognized a limited exception
“where a defendant’s motion to dismiss raises a double jeopardy
claim of substantial merit.” Azubuko v. Commonwealth, 464 Mass.
1002, 1003 (2012). Because the double jeopardy issue raises a
question of law, our review of the judge’s decision is de novo. See
Commonwealth vy. Rodriguez, 476 Mass. 367, 369 (2017); Com-
monwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 72 n.7 (2007).

In its broadest sweep, “[t]he double jeopardy principle ‘pro-
tects against three specific evils — “a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same

412 477 Mass. 409 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Hebb.

offense’ (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Brown, 470
Mass. 595, 603 (2015). The “evil” to be prevented by the double
jeopardy principle in the circumstances presented by this case is
a second prosecution after an acquittal. Thus, the issue to be
decided here is whether an acquittal of only one of the charged
violations is, in effect, an acquittal of both violations. We con-
clude that it is not.

First, the statute as written provides that a defendant may be
convicted on one or both violations. In 2003, the Legislature
amended G. L. c. 90, § 24 (OUI statute), “to strengthen the pro-
tections afforded the public from drivers who might be impaired
by the consumption of alcohol.” Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448
Mass. 809, 813 (2007). With this amendment, “the Legislature
added language to the OUI statute, making it a violation to
operate a motor vehicle not only under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor [(impaired ability violation)], but also with a blood
alcohol level of .08 or more [(per se violation)].” Jd. at 811. Thus,
the statutory framework created by the 2003 amendment estab-
lished alternative theories under which a violation of the OUI
statute could be charged and proved, each containing a factual
element not necessary to prove the other. See Commonwealth v.
Filoma, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 16, 20 (2011). In other words, to prove
a per se violation of the OUI statute, the Commonwealth need not
establish that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1). See also Filoma,
supra. Likewise, to prove an impaired ability violation of the
statute, the Commonwealth need not show that the defendant’s
blood alcohol level was .08 per cent or more. See id. at 20-21.

Here, the complaint charged the defendant with an impaired
ability violation and, in the alternative, a per se violation. Thus,
the charging decision was consistent with the legislative purpose
to minimize the risk to public safety from drivers who are either
actually impaired or presumed to be impaired based on their
blood alcohol level. Consistent with its charging decision, the
Commonwealth affirmatively pursued both alternatives at trial,
and the verdict slip permitted the jury to choose either or both
alternatives.

Second, “the protection of the [dJouble [jJeopardy [c]lause by
its terms applies only if there had been some event, such as an ac-
quittal, which terminates the original jeopardy.” Commonwealth
vy. Johnson, 426 Mass. 617, 625 (1998), quoting Richardson v.
United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984). And, as we have said,

477 Mass. 409 (2017) 413

Commonwealth v. Hebb.

“where a verdict does not specifically resolve all the elements of
the offense charged, it is defective and cannot operate as either an
acquittal or a conviction,” Brown, 470 Mass. at 603-604, and thus
does not trigger double jeopardy protections. Therefore, double
jeopardy protections were not triggered here, because the jury’s
not guilty verdict on the impaired ability charge did not resolve
the factual element necessary to establish a per se violation —
that the defendant operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol
level of .08 per cent or greater. The jury’s resolution of that
factual element, a live issue in the prosecution, was foreclosed by
the mistrial declaration. In sum, the double jeopardy bar does not
prohibit the Commonwealth from seeking to retry a defendant
“where other theories (supported by evidence at a first trial)
would support a defendant’s conviction in the second.” Marshall
v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 538 (2012).

Our conclusion that double jeopardy principles do not bar
retrial on the per se violation where the defendant was acquitted
on the impaired ability violation is consistent with this court’s
application of double jeopardy principles in cases involving trials
for murder under multiple theories. For example, in Common-
wealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 459-461 (2009), we held that
the Commonwealth could retry a defendant for murder on a
theory on which the jury had not reached a verdict at the first trial.
Likewise, in Brown, 470 Mass. at 605-606, we held that where
the jury in the first trial failed to reach a verdict on the “facts and
merits” of the charge of murder in the first degree on the theory
of deliberate premeditation, double jeopardy principles did not
prohibit the Commonwealth from retrying the defendant on that
theory at a second trial. “The ‘interest in giving the prosecution
one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its
laws’ justifies treating the jury’s inability to reach a verdict as a
nonevent that does not bar retrial.” Yeager v. United States, 557
U.S. 110, 118 (2009), quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 509 (1978).

The defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978), fore-
closes retrial on the per se violation because the jury acquitted
him on the impaired ability violation. We disagree. In Sanabria,
the trial judge entered an acquittal on the entire count charging
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, “without specifying that [the
judge] did so only with respect to one theory of liability.” Zd. at
67. Because Sanabria is distinguishable from this case, it does

414 477 Mass. 409 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Hebb.

not advance the defendant’s argument.

Conclusion. For the reasons explained above, we remand the
matter to the county court for entry of an order denying the
defendant's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 415

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

ComMonweEALTH VS. CHRISTIAN MULLER.
Worcester. December 9, 2016, - July 11, 2017,

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Gaziano, JI.

Homicide. Armed Assault with Intent to Murder. Armed Home Invasion. Fire-
arms. Mental Impairment. Insanity. Intoxication. Evidence, Insanity, Intoxi-
cation. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Argument by
prosecutor.

At a murder trial, although the judge, in instructing the jury, erred in failing to
clarify that the voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol does not preclude
the defense of lack of criminal responsibility where the mental disease or
defect, standing alone, causes the defendant to lose the substantial capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law, the error did not create a substantial likelihood
of a miscarriage of justice, where the defendant presented no evidence that,
at the time of the shootings, his mental disease or defect was active, such that
he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the law, [424-429]

At a criminal trial, although the judge, in instructing the jury on nine offenses,
erred in neglecting, on three of the offenses, to instruct the jury that if they
found that the Commonwealth had failed to prove each element beyond a
reasonable doubt, they must find the defendant not guilty, no substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose, where the jury were properly
instructed regarding the burden of proof on several occasions during the
charge and, viewed as a whole, the charge indicated that it was the jury’s
duty to determine whether the Commonwealth had met its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before they could
convict, [429-430]

At a murder trial, the judge’s error in an instruction to the jury regarding the
inference of sanity did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of
justice, where the judge ameliorated the error by specifically instructing the
jury that they did not have to draw such an inference, especially in light of
the jury’s view of the expert witness testimony, [430-431]

Although, in closing argument at a murder trial, the prosecutor's characteriza-
tion of the defense of lack of criminal responsibility was better left unsaid,
the characterization did not rise to the level of creating a substantial likeli-
hood of a miscarriage of justice; similarly, certain of the prosecutor’s
statements about the defendant were rhetorical and did not prejudice the
defendant, especially in light of evidence of the defendant’s malingering and
exaggeration of the symptoms of his mental illness; finally, there was no
merit to the claim that the prosecutor misstated the law or the evidence, or
to the assertion that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of
certain witnesses, [431-433]

416 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

This court declined to exercise its power under G. L. ¢. 278, § 33E, to reverse
two murder convictions and either order a new trial or enter judgments of not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. [433]

Inpicrwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on August 23, 2007.

The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J.

Deirdre L. Thurber for the defendant.

Susan M. Oftring, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Hones, J. During an armed home invasion of an apartment in
Dudley, the defendant, Christian Muller, and an accomplice’ shot
and killed two of the occupants and critically wounded a third.
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of
murder in the first degree, on the theories of deliberate premedi-
tation and felony-murder,? armed assault with intent to murder,
armed home invasion, and unlawful possession of a firearm.

At trial, the defendant admitted that he had shot the victims; his
primary defense was that he lacked criminal responsibility be-
cause of mental illness and cocaine addiction. On appeal, the
defendant argues that (1) the jury instruction on criminal respon-
sibility and voluntary intoxication was erroneous because it failed
to comply with Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602 (2010),
S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014), and Commonwealth v. DiPadova,
460 Mass. 424 (2011); (2) certain of the other jury instructions
were fatally flawed; and (3) the prosecutor’s closing argument
was improper. We affirm the convictions and decline to grant
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Background. 1. The trial. We summarize the facts as the jury
could have found them, reserving additional details for later
discussion.

a. The Commonwealth’s case. On the evening of July 8, 2007,
Joanne Mercier was in her bedroom in the third-floor apartment
that she shared with her brother, Aaron Bash, in Dudley. Bash
was asleep in his bedroom, and their friend, Denise Johnston, was
sleeping on a sofa in the living room. Shortly after midnight on
July 9, the defendant and Marc Letang kicked down the back door

“According to the Commonwealth, the accomplice ultimately pleaded guilty
to several charges.

2The predicate felony for Muller’s convictions of felony-murder in the first
degree was armed home invasion.

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 417

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

and entered the apartment with their guns drawn.? The men
walked through the kitchen and entered Mercier’s bedroom,
asking where Bash was. After Mercier told them that Bash was
asleep in his bedroom, the men left Mercier’s room and awoke
Bash. As Mercier followed the men into Bash’s bedroom, she
heard the defendant asking Bash whether he was sleeping with
the defendant’s wife. Bash denied the accusation.

Letang went into the living room and brought Johnston into
Bash’s bedroom at the defendant’s request. The defendant was at
the foot of the bed facing the victims, who were all sitting on the
bed, while Letang stood in the corner of the room. The defendant
continued to accuse Bash of sleeping with his wife, and Bash
repeatedly denied it, stating that he would not do that to his
friend. Finally, the defendant told Bash that if he just admitted it
and told the defendant what he wanted to hear, this would all be
over. When Bash refused to admit to the defendant’s accusations,
the defendant said, “Fuck this,” and shot Johnston in the head. As
Bash asked the defendant, “What the eff are you doing?” the
defendant shot Mercier in the head. When Mercier regained
consciousness a few minutes later, she realized that the defendant
and Letang were gone, and discovered that Johnston was still
breathing despite the gunshot to her head.

Mercier had not yet comprehended that she had been shot, but
knew she needed to call an ambulance for Johnston. She retrieved
her cellular telephone and then called to Bash. When Bash failed
to answer her, she looked at him and saw that he had been fatally
shot in the head. Mercier was so distraught that she had to
telephone 911 twice because, at first, she could not remember
where she was.

Shortly after midnight on July 9, 2007, a patron was leaving a
nearby bar when he heard five to seven loud noises she assumed
were fireworks. Approximately one minute later, he observed two
men, whom he was able to describe, running around the corner;
one of the men was carrying a firearm. The witness heard someone
say, “Go. Let’s go,” as the men got into a vehicle and drove away.

When officers entered the apartment, they observed Mercier
conscious and bleeding from her head. She was in shock, crying

3Barlier in the evening of July 8, 2007, the defendant attempted to gain entry
into Aaron Bash and Joanne Merciet’s apartment, looking for Bash. The
defendant was banging on the door and calling Bash’s name; Bash told Mercier
not to answer the door, and eventually the defendant left without further
incident.

418 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

and “yelling things,” but was able to communicate that “Chris-
tian” shot her.

Officers then discovered Bash and Johnston. Bash was found on
the bed; he was dead from two gunshot wounds to his head.
Johnston was found near the end of the bed, and she appeared to
be alive. She later died at a hospital of a gunshot wound to her head.

Right before the shootings, the defendant and Letang had been
at the home of a friend of the defendant, who lived in Webster; a
woman and a man were also there. Both the woman and the
defendant had been smoking “crack” cocaine. The woman testi-
fied that the more crack the defendant smoked, the more “crazy”
he became. The defendant was agitated; he was pacing back and
forth, waving his gun around, saying that he was going to put
bullets in their heads. He also said that Bash owed him money for
drugs and that Mercier was “just a stupid bitch.” Prior to leaving
the house, the defendant said he was going to “take care of some
business” and left with his firearm.

The defendant and Letang returned to the friend’s home. They
came running up the stairs, saying that they had just murdered
some people. The defendant and Letang told the woman that if
she said anything about their involvement in the murders that they
would “put a cap in her head.” There was discussion about killing
the woman because she knew and had seen too much. The
defendant eventually went outside the house and demanded that
the woman join him. He was pacing in the road with his firearm,
telling the woman both that he did not mean to do it and that he
did not commit the murders. Ultimately, however, the defendant
told her that he “shot the motherfucker,” referring to Bash, and
that he put the three victims on the bed and shot them execution
style. He put the gun to the woman’s head several times, threat-
ening to shoot her in the head if she said anything about his
involvement in the murders.

The woman and the defendant walked down the street where
the defendant stopped to hide his gun, which the defense stipu-
lated was used to shoot the victims, in the cellar of a home. He
warned the woman not to tell anyone where he hid the gun. Next,
they walked to the defendant’s parents’ home, where he changed
out of his bloody clothing. Finally, they walked through town and

4Until one week prior to the shootings, the defendant and Mercier had been
ina short romantic relationship outside the defendant’ s marriage. Mercier ended
the relationship because the defendant became angry with her; when she left in
a vehicle without him, he fired a gun at the vehicle.

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 419

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

ended up back at the friend’s home where they slept until later
that morning.

When they woke up, the police had the house surrounded. The
defendant got up, saying, “I didn’t do it,” as he left the house and
ran into some woods behind the home, where he was arrested.

The defendant was interviewed by two State police troopers at
the Dudley police department. Although the defendant initially
declined to speak with the officers, after he spoke to his wife and
mother, he agreed to the interview. The defendant admitted that
he was in Webster the night before and “smoked a bunch of
crack,” but initially denied seeing Bash.

However, after the defendant figured out that Mercier had
survived and was told that the police had found his gun, he
admitted to committing the shootings and stated that he knew he
was going to jail. The defendant stated that he had been doing a
lot of drugs that night, and after “the gun went off’ and he shot
Johnston, he thought, “If I leave them alive, I’m going to jail for
my life, so I [shot Bash and Mercier].”

He also told the officers, “When I’m on drugs, I see. . . lots of
things. I get real crazy. I hallucinate . . . I have psych attacks. I get
rages. I am a different total person.” The defendant told the
officers that he was off his medications and that he was bipolar
and schizophrenic, had anxiety, and suffered from panic attacks
and paranoia. He also noted that when he is off his medication, he
gets even more paranoid and goes “cuckoo.”

b. The defendant's case. The defendant offered five witnesses
in support of his lack of criminal responsibility defense, including
three expert witnesses.
cappa. Mezzacappa, a clinical psychiatrist,
evaluated the defendant at an organization providing mental
health services, in February and June, 2006, one year before the
murders.® As part of her psychiatric evaluation of the defendant,
Mezzacappa also interviewed the defendant’s family, including
his wife, sister, stepfather, and mother. Based on Mezzacappa’s
evaluation of the defendant and interviews with his family,
Mezzacappa diagnosed the defendant with schizoaffective disor-
der.* At the time of Mezzacappa’s February, 2006, evaluation, the

5Dr. Giulia Mezzacappa estimated that she saw the defendant no more than
three times in 2006, for a total of approximately two to two and one-half hours.
®Mezzacappa defined schizoaffective disorder as “a chronic mental illness
that’s characterized by recurrent episodes of affective symptoms, either depres-
sion or mania or a mixed state, and chronic psychotic symptoms, like halluci-

420 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

defendant had stopped taking his prescribed antipsychotic and
anxiety medications. As a result of her evaluation, Mezzacappa
prescribed an antipsychotic mood stabilizer. During his evalua-
tions, the defendant and his family freely reported the defendant’s
use of heroin, marijuana, and crack cocaine.

Mezzacappa opined that “substance abuse can definitely
worsen any mental illness, especially a psychotic disorder or
mood disorder,” and agreed that drug usage can also trigger
psychotic effects in an individual suffering from a mental disease
or defect. She noted that she had no reason to believe that the
defendant was exaggerating his symptoms or malingering, espe-
cially where his family also supported his history. Nonetheless,
she did believe that the defendant was aware of the effect drugs
like cocaine and heroin had on him, although she could not opine
as to the degree of his knowledge. Finally, Mezzacappa had no
opinion as to whether the defendant was criminally responsible
for his actions at the time of the murders.

ii. Dr. Hanya Bluestone. Bluestone, a forensic psychologist
employed by the courts, evaluated the defendant’s competence to
stand trial and criminal responsibility, pursuant to G. L. c. 123,
§ 15 (a), on July 10, 2007. In order to evaluate the defendant's
competence and criminal responsibility, Bluestone spoke with the
defendant and reviewed his court clinic file, which contained a
prior competency evaluation conducted by a colleague of
Bluestone, an evaluation regarding the defendant’s need for in-
voluntary commitment for substance abuse treatment in 2006,
and the police report for the killings. She also spoke with
Mezzacappa regarding the defendant’s psychiatric treatment in
2006.

During Bluestone’s evaluation, the defendant had some diffi-
culty recalling dates and placing events in time, and he expressed
some paranoia and persecutory ideation. Bluestone was con-
cerned about psychotic symptoms the defendant reported, espe-
cially command auditory hallucinations, which he said com-
manded him to commit violent acts. She also noted that the
defendant’s psychotic symptoms were consistent with his prior
evaluations. She could not, however, determine the etiology of

nation, delusional ideation, or thought disorder.” She further defined psychotic
symptoms as “hallucination, abnormal perception, sensory perception, that don’t
correspond to reality, such as hearing voices or seeing things that are not there,
or physical sensation that is not related to anything realistic. There is an ideation
or fixed beliefs that don’t correspond to reality.”

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 421

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

the defendant’s psychotic symptoms — whether those symptoms
were primarily related to a mental illness or to the defendant’s
ongoing and varied substance abuse — because his symptoms
were consistent with mental illness and substance abuse and
withdrawal from substance abuse. Bluestone concluded that
based on the defendant’s symptoms during her evaluation alone,
he should be further evaluated at Bridgewater State Hospital
(Bridgewater).”? She did not offer an opinion regarding the de-
fendant’s criminal responsibility.

iii. Dr. Paul A. Spiers. Spiers, a neuropsychologist,* evaluated
the defendant for his competence to stand trial and criminal
responsibility in April, 2009.° In preparation for his evaluation of
the defendant, Spiers reviewed the defendant’s records from the
Department of Youth Services and the Department of Social
Services, school records, prior psychiatric treatment notes, and
records from the defendant’s prior incarcerations. He also re-
viewed expert reports regarding the defendant’s competence and
criminal responsibility created for the trial, including reports from
Bridgewater and a corresponding evaluation from a clinical psy-
chologist on staff at Bridgewater, and the videotape of the de-
fendant’s interview with the State police. He also administered
neuropsychological tests to determine whether the defendant’s
neuropsychological functioning was appropriate.

Spiers determined that the defendant was deficient in many
critical areas, such as reading ability and vocabulary, which
invalidated some of the testing results, because of the danger of
false positive results. Specifically, Spiers noted that tests, such as
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), were
inappropriate for the defendant, because they required the test-
taker to possess a seventh or eighth grade reading level, which the

7x. Hanya Bluestone interviewed the defendant for approximately forty
minutes, and she spent an additional eight hours preparing his competency
evaluation, In addition to her interview with the defendant, Bluestone also spoke
with the defendant’s wife, who reported that when the defendant was using
illicit drugs, his mental illness would get out of control and he would emotion-
ally and physically abuse her. His wife opined that the defendant used illicit
drugs to manage the symptoms of his mental illness.

*Dr, Paul A. Spiers defined “neuropsychology” as “an investigation of the
relationship between the brain and behavior, . . . [The brain is] responsible for
all our interactions with the world around us. It’s responsible for all of our
behavior, and it’s responsible for how we understand and control our behavior.”

®Spiers met with the defendant once, for two or three hours in April, 2009, to
conduct his evaluation.

422 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

defendant did not have. Spiers further noted that the MMPI is
made up of 560 true or false questions, which help evaluators not
only to diagnose psychological disorders but also to gauge effort
and malingering, based on how the test-taker answered the ques-
tions. The defendant had been evaluated previously using the
MMPI and other tests, the results of which led another psycholo-
gist to conclude that the defendant was a malingerer and that he
exaggerated his symptoms at Bridgewater in 2007. Spiers noted,
however, that although he agreed with the methodology of the
defendant’s previous testing, he took issue with the conclusions
regarding that testing because of the defendant’s intellectual
limitations.

Spiers concluded that the defendant showed evidence of de-
fective functioning in the left frontal lobe of his brain,'® such that
he would experience difficulty with reasoning and controlling his
behavior. In Spiers’s opinion, the defendant continues to have the
neurodevelopmental deficits he had as a child and young adult,
including oppositional defiant disorder and attention deficit dis-
order. Spiers opined that, as a result of the defendant’s neuro-
developmental deficits, mental illness, and drug intoxication, at
the time of the shootings, the defendant was unable to conform
his behavior to the requirements of the law, and thus was not
criminally responsible."! Spiers further opined that it was highly
probable that because of the defendant’s mental illness, the de-
fendant could not form the specific intent to commit murder under
theories of premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty, or to
commit an assault with intent to murder.

iv. The defendant’s family. The defendant’s wife and cousin
testified regarding their experiences with the defendant’s mental
illness and drug addiction. The defendant’s wife testified that, in
2007, the defendant was receiving Social Security disability
benefits for his mental disabilities. She described the defendant as
very mean, angry, and abusive when he was using drugs’ and
stated that he did not take his prescription medications when he

1Spiers concluded that the defendant had defective functioning in the frontal
lobe of his brain, but Spiers did not have the benefit of functional magnetic
resonance imaging of the defendant’s brain in aid of his diagnosis.

“Spiers opined that at the time of the shootings, the defendant had the sub-
stantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.

!2The defendant’s wife testified, however, that when the defendant was on his
medication and not taking illegal drugs he was a good father and would
participate fully in taking care of their children and the household, and main-
tained a close relationship with their extended families.

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 423

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

consumed illegal drugs. His wife said that he was taking heroin,
crack cocaine, and pills, such as OxyContin, Percocet, and
Vicodin. Two weeks prior to the shootings, the defendant's wife
barred him from the family home because he was consuming a
large amount of illegal drugs and was accusing her of cheating on
him.’ The defendant attempted to come back home five or six
times during the two-week period, but she refused unless the
defendant sought help for his drug addiction. The defendant’s
wife also stated that on four or five occasions throughout their
marriage, she observed the defendant talking to himself and when
she asked who he was talking to, he answered, “his friends,”
although no one else was present; this occurred whether or not he
was on medication.

The defendant’s cousin testified that the defendant began ex-
hibiting symptoms of mental illness after his father died when the
defendant was twelve or thirteen years of age. He became
untrusting and had behavior issues. The defendant began to use
illegal drugs during this time period as well. Approximately one
or two days before the shootings, the defendant visited his cousin,
who testified that the defendant was “binging” drugs and that he
told his cousin that he had not slept or eaten in days. His cousin
fed the defendant and noted that he was having a conversation
with himself. His cousin had observed similar behavior from the
defendant on countless occasions since their teenage years.

In his cousin’s opinion, there was a drastic difference in the
defendant’s personality when he was taking his antipsychotic
medications and off illegal drugs. The defendant appeared to be
unstable while using drugs. The defendant’s cousin also stated
that the defendant did not seem to remember what he did when he
was abusing drugs, and his cousin would have to recount the
defendant’s activities to him. Finally, his cousin stated that, while
on drugs, the defendant held objectively untrue beliefs about
those close to him, especially his wife.

c. The Commonwealth’s rebuttal expert. Dr. Karin Towers, a
forensic psychologist and attorney, first evaluated the defendant
in July and August, 2007, for competency to stand trial and
criminal responsibility, during his forty-day hospitalization at

'5In 2006, the defendant was admitted to a substance abuse treatment center
after his wife filed a petition to have him involuntarily committed pursuant to
G. L. c. 123, § 35. He had been previously treated for substance abuse at other
inpatient facilities without sustained success.

424 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

Bridgewater, and again during the summer of 2010 for the pur-
poses of a criminal responsibility evaluation. During his hospi-
talization at Bridgewater in 2007, Towers and other staff mem-
bers administered psychological tests to the defendant. Towers
deemed the defendant’s MMPI and Structured Interview of Re-
ported Symptoms test results invalid because his answers demon-
strated that he was malingering and exaggerating symptoms.
Observations from Towers and other staff members confirmed the
test results.'*

Towers concluded that the defendant’s answers demonstrated
an unsophisticated attempt to appear to have more symptoms than
he was genuinely experiencing. She was unable to make a de-
finitive mental illness diagnosis because of the defendant’s ex-
aggerated or feigned symptoms and his lengthy history of illegal
drug abuse. She stated that, in these circumstances, it can be more
difficult to assess whether a patient actually has a mental illness,
whether the symptoms are caused by illegal drug use, or whether
there is an underlying mental illness that has been triggered or
exacerbated by the drug use.

After viewing the videotape of the defendant’s police inter-
view, Towers concluded that the defendant exhibited volitional
behavior, meaning that the defendant was aware of his surround-
ings and circumstances, was able to advocate for himself, and
could assert his wishes. Towers opined that the defendant clearly
met the criteria for antisocial personality disorder and that he very
likely had some sort of psychotic disorder, or substance abuse-
induced psychotic disorder. Towers further opined that the de-
fendant was criminally responsible for his acts on July 8-9, 2007,
despite the fact that he was likely experiencing psychological
symptoms, because his symptoms did not interfere with his
ability to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.'®

2. Discussion. On appeal, the defendant (1) challenges the jury

‘During the defendant's forty-day hospitalization at Bridgewater State Hos-
pital, he admitted to making an insincere suicidal gesture because he was
unhappy with the medications prescribed by his treating psychiatrist. Addition-
ally, Towers and other staff members interpreted his behavior, in which he
grossly exaggerated his symptoms, as drug-seeking behavior.

Towers noted a number of factors that were significant in rendering her
opinion regarding the defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law. He decided to shoot Bash and Mercier, after he initially shot
Johnston, to avoid leaving witnesses; he was able to control his behavior, such
as when he left the scene of the crime; and he acted to avoid apprehension in

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 425

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

instructions on criminal responsibility as inconsistent with the
law governing the interplay between mental illness and the vol-
untary consumption of drugs or alcohol; (2) argues that certain of
the other jury instructions were flawed; (3) contends that the
Commonwealth’s closing argument was improper; and (4) re-
quests that we exercise our power pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E,
to reverse his convictions and either order a new trial or enter
judgments of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsi-
bility. We address each argument in turn.

a. Criminal responsibility and voluntary intoxication instruc-
tions. The defendant argues that the judge’s instructions on crimi-
nal responsibility were erroneous in failing to comport with Berry
and DiPadova.* Although the defendant’s challenge to this as-
pect of the jury instructions lacks precision, it appears to be based
ona claim that the judge erroneously charged the jury to consider
whether the defense of lack of criminal responsibility was vitiated
by the defendant’s knowledge that his voluntary consumption of
drugs or alcohol would activate a “latent” mental disease or
defect. We discern no error in the instructions on that ground. We
conclude, however, that the judge’s instructions were erroneous
in failing to clarify, as required in Berry, that the voluntary
consumption of drugs or alcohol does not preclude the defense of
lack of criminal responsibility where the mental disease or defect,
standing alone, causes the defendant to lose the substantial ca-
pacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of the law. Berry, 457 Mass.
at 618. Notwithstanding the error, reversal is not required.

We briefly summarize the governing principles of law as back-
ground for our analysis of the defendant’s claims of error. In
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544 (1967), we established
the basic principle of law for determining criminal responsibility.
We held that a defendant is not criminally responsible for his
actions if, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked the
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. Jd. at

threatening the woman who was at his friend’s house, hiding the gun, and
changing his clothing.

16The defendant is entitled to the benefit of Commonwealth v. Berry, 457
Mass. 602 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014); and Commonwealth v. Di-
Padova, 460 Mass, 424 (2011), because his trial commenced approximately
seven months after Berry was released, and his direct appeal was pending when
DiPadova was released. See Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 704
(2014).

426 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

546-547. Since McHoul, our cases have evolved, addressing the
impact of a defendant’s voluntary consumption of drugs or alco-
hol on criminal responsibility. In Commonwealth v. McGrath,
358 Mass. 314, 319-320 (1970), we emphasized that a mental
disease or defect is the sine qua non of a lack of criminal
responsibility defense, holding that the defense is not available
where the defendant’s loss of the substantial capacity to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his behavior to
the requirements of the law is caused by the voluntary consump-
tion of drugs or alcohol as opposed to a mental disease or defect.
Later cases affirmed the necessity of a causal relationship be-
tween a mental disease or defect and lack of criminal responsi-
bility. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 376 Mass. 765, 767
(1978).

In Berry, we revisited the relationship between the defendant's
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol and lack of criminal
responsibility. We set forth jury instructions that included a
provision that allowed for a defense of lack of criminal respon-
sibility even where the defendant voluntarily consumed drugs or
alcohol: “Where a defendant has an active mental disease or
defect that caused [him] to lose the substantial capacity to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct or the substantial capacity
to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of the law, the
defendant’s consumption of alcohol or another drug cannot pre-
clude the defense of lack of criminal responsibility.” Berry, 457
Mass. at 618. In DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 432, we considered
again the interplay between a mental disease or defect that, unlike
in Berry, did not independently cause the defendant to lack
criminal responsibility, and the voluntary consumption of drugs
and alcohol. We clarified that in these circumstances, the defense
is available but only if the defendant lacked knowledge that the
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol would trigger a “la-
tent!” mental disease or defect that would cause him to lack
criminal responsibility. Jd.

Here, the judge gave the following instruction regarding the
impact of the voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol on the
defendant’s entitlement to a lack of criminal responsibility de-
fense:

‘7Here, in making the reference to a “latent” mental disease or defect, the
judge did not have the benefit of our caution in DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 432
1.10, that “the use of such terms [‘latent’ and ‘activation’], particularly in jury
instructions, may be confusing.” In any event, the use of the terms did not
constitute error.

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 427

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

“The issue has been raised that the defendant may not have
been criminally responsible for his alleged actions due to his
use of drugs or alcohol. Voluntary intoxication with drugs or
alcohol is not by itself a mental disease or defect that will
support a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The
normal consequences of drug and alcohol addiction are not a
basis for relieving a defendant of criminal responsibil:
However, there may be situations where a defendant who is
addicted to drugs or alcohol might have a defense of lack of
criminal responsibility available to him. You may consider
whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect, apart
from his drug or alcohol addiction, such that he lacked
substantial capacity at the time of his crime to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.

“In addition, you may consider whether the defendant’s
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol activated a latent
mental disease or defect apart from the addiction itself. If as
a result of the activation of that latent mental disease or
defect, the defendant lost the substantial capacity to under-
stand the wrongfulness of his conduct . . . or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law, the defendant would
Jack criminal responsibility. However, if the defendant knew
or subjectively had reason to know under the circumstances
that his use of drugs or alcohol would activate the latent
mental disease or defect, he may not rely on that disease or
defect to assert lack of criminal responsibility. In deciding
what the defendant subjectively had reason to know, you
should consider the question solely from the defendant’s
point of view, including his mental capacity.

“Thus, if the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant knew or had reason to know
that his consumption of alcohol or drugs would activate a
mental disease or defect, then you must find that the defend-
ant was criminally responsible for his actions. It is not
necessary that the defendant knew or had reason to know that
he had a mental disease or defect, as long as he knew that his
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol would trigger
inappropriate conduct.”

As the Commonwealth notes, the jury instructions substantially
comported with the generally accepted Superior Court jury in-

428 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

structions for explaining the impact of the voluntary consumption
of drugs or alcohol on criminal responsibility. See Massachusetts
Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury Instructions, §§ 3.1,
3.1.1(b) (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 1999 & Supp. 2003). The
defendant, however, takes issue with this instruction, claiming
that the reference to a “latent” mental disease or defect was
improper under DiPadova in the absence of evidence that the
defendant knew of the effect of drugs or alcohol on his mental
illness and that it was otherwise inconsistent with Berry.

The defendant's argument that the instructions were erroneous
under DiPadova fails. The Commonwealth presented ample evi-
dence that the defendant knew his consumption of drugs would
exacerbate the symptoms of his mental illness, especially in his
confession to police. See DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 436-437. Thus,
we discern no error in this aspect of the judge’s instructions.

For reasons unknown, however, the judge and parties failed to
avail themselves of the revised instruction in Berry. Although the
judge correctly instructed the jury to “consider whether the de-
fendant had a mental disease or defect, apart from his drug or
alcohol addiction, such that he lacked substantial capacity at the
time of the crime to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law,” he neglected to inform the jury that in such a case, the
defendant’s consumption of alcohol or another drug cannot pre-
clude the defense of lack of criminal responsibility. Thus, the
failure to instruct in accordance with Berry was error. See Berry,
457 Mass. at 617-618.

Because the defendant did not object to the jury charge on this
ground (or raise the issue in his brief), we review the error for a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See id. at 618.
“In analyzing a claim under the substantial likelihood standard,
we review the evidence and case as a whole and consider whether
any error made in the course of the trial was likely to have
influenced the jury’s conclusion.” Id., citing Commonwealth v.
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992). We conclude that the erro-
neous jury instructions regarding the impact of voluntary con-
sumption of drugs on the lack of criminal responsibility defense
did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

In assessing prejudice, the issue we decide is whether the
failure to inform the jury that the voluntary consumption of drugs
or alcohol does not vitiate the defense if the defendant’s mental
illness was an independent cause of his lack of criminal respon-
sibility likely influenced the jury’s verdicts. We conclude that it
did not.

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 429

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

Here, the defendant presented no expert evidence that at the
time of the shootings, his mental disease or defect alone caused
him to lack the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
law.'® See DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 434; Berry, 457 Mass. at 615.
Of the defendant’s three expert witnesses, only Spiers opined that
the defendant lacked criminal responsibility at the time of the
murders. Although Spiers agreed that the defendant was able to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, Spiers believed that
the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law, based on his neuro-
developmental deficits, mental illness, and drug addiction. The
jury heard Mezzacappa’s opinion, however, that the defendant
suffered from schizoaffective disorder, but that the symptoms of
mental illness can worsen with substance abuse. Bluestone tes-
tified that she could not determine the source of the defendant’s
reported symptoms because of his ongoing, varied substance
abuse, where his symptoms were consistent with mental illness
and substance abuse and withdrawal from substance abuse. None
of the expert testimony suggested that mental illness alone was
the cause of the defendant’s alleged lack of capacity. Cf. id. See
DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 432. Therefore, the judge’s omission of
the Berry instruction, although erroneous, did not prejudice the
defendant where there was no evidence that the defendant’s
mental illness, regardless of his consumption of illegal drugs,
caused him to lose substantial capacity. Berry, supra.

b. Other jury instructions. The defendant argues that certain
other jury instructions were flawed. Specifically, he argues that
two of the instructions, concerning armed home invasion and
armed assault with intent to murder, impermissibly contained
language requiring a guilty finding where the jury found that the
Commonwealth proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
He also argues that three instructions, concerning armed assault
with intent to murder, voluntary manslaughter, and unlawful
possession of a firearm, failed to include language instructing the
jury that, if they found that the Commonwealth failed to prove
each element beyond a reasonable doubt, then they must find the
defendant not guilty. The defendant’s arguments are unavailing.
Because the defendant did not object to the jury charge, we
review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See

18The experts for the Commonwealth and the defendant who opined on the
matter agreed that the defendant had the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct.

430 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 437 Mass. 554, 559 (2002). “Error
in a charge is determined by reading the charge as a whole, and
not by scrutinizing bits and pieces removed from their context.”
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 267
(1998).

The judge charged the jury on nine offenses. For all nine, the
judge instructed the jury that, if they found that the Common-
wealth had proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt, then
they must return a guilty verdict. In addition, six of the nine
instructions included the instruction that if the jury found that the
Commonwealth had failed to prove each element beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, then they must find the defendant not guilty. In the
instructions for armed assault with intent to murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and illegal possession of a firearm, the judge ne-
glected to add the latter instruction. Although this was error, there
was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The jury
were properly instructed regarding the burden of proof on several
occasions during the charge. “Viewed as a whole, the charge to
the jury indicated that it was the jury’s duty to [determine if] the
Commonwealth has met its burden of proving every element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before they could convict.”
Commonwealth v. Giguere, 420 Mass. 226, 232 (1995), quoting
Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 234 (1980).

c. Inference of sanity instruction. In Commonwealth v. Lawson,
475 Mass. 806, 815 (2016), we concluded that “the inference that
the defendant is criminally responsible because the great majority
of persons are criminally responsible is not sufficient alone to
warrant a rational finder of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant is criminally responsible.” We further
determined that “given the meager weight of this inference and
the risk of juror confusion regarding the burden of proof, judges
should not instruct juries regarding this inference.” /d. at 815 n.8.
Here, the jury were instructed as follows:

“In determining whether the defendant was sane at the time
of the alleged crime, you may consider the fact, if you so
desire, that a great majority of men are sane and the resulting
probability that any particular man was sane. It is for you to
decide whether to draw that inference. The fact that I have
given you this inference does not mean that you must adopt
it. Itis something you may not adopt, depending on how you
view all of the evidence, including medical evidence given

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 431

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

by the psychologists and other witnesses who have testified
in this case.”

This is substantially similar to the instruction that we discon-
tinued in Lawson, supra at 815 n.8.1° Here, the defendant is
entitled to the benefit of Lawson, as that case was released while
the defendant’s appeal was pending on direct review. See Com-
monwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 704 (2014). Therefore,
although the defendant did not raise this claim of error on appeal,
we review to determine whether this error created a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v.
Griffin, 475 Mass. 848, 863 (2016). We conclude it does not.

Although the instruction regarding the inference of sanity was
error, the judge ameliorated the error where he specifically in-
structed the jury that they did not have to draw such an inference,
especially in light of the jury’s view of the expert medical
testimony. “Where the trial judge strongly and specifically in-
structed that the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove crimi-
nal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt and where there was
substantial evidence supporting the jury’s finding of criminal
responsibility, we conclude that this instruction did not create a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.” Griffin, 475
Mass. at 863.

d. Prosecutor’s closing argument. The defendant argues that
the prosecutor improperly demeaned the defense of lack of crimi-
nal responsibility, misstated the evidence and the law, and
vouched for the credibility of the defendant’s witnesses. The
defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s closing argument, so
we review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 329 (2007). “Closing
arguments must be viewed ‘in the context of the entire argument,
and in light of the judge’s instruction to the jury, and the evidence
at trial.’ ” Jd. at 328-329, quoting Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz,
408 Mass. 533, 553 (1990).

During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the
defendant was using his mental illness as a “crutch.” He referred
to the defendant’s statements to a family member made during a
telephone call that was recorded during his police interview. The
defendant told his family member, “I need all my psych papers,

1°This instruction has since been removed from the Model Jury Instructions
on Homicide. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 475 Mass. 848, 863 (2016), citing
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 1-12 (2013).

432 477 Mass. 415 (2017)

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

all my medical papers ready, everything, all my history.” The
prosecutor told the jury that it was then that the defendant created
his defense. He went on to say, “[i]t’s a crutch, is what it is. As
I said, [the defendant] may have some [mental] infirmities, but
he’s using it as a crutch to say that he wasn’t responsible.”
Although the prosecutor’s characterization of the defense of lack
of criminal responsibility was better left unsaid, it did not rise to
the level of creating a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of
justice. He was properly suggesting that the defense of lack of
criminal responsibility was weak, and that although the defendant
may suffer from mental illness, he was criminally responsible on
July 8-9, 2007. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119,
129-130 (2013).

Similarly, in his closing argument the prosecutor suggested that
the defendant was “not a raving lunatic,” that he was “rational,”
and that “he wasn’t some recluse in a darkened room with the
shades pulled, not going out.” These statements were rhetorical
and referenced the evidence of the defendant’s ability to be an
active parent and spouse when he was not on drugs. See Com-
monwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 586 (2001). Especially
where the jury heard evidence of the defendant’s malingering and
exaggerating the symptoms of his mental illness, the prosecutor’s
comments did not prejudice the defendant. Compare Lewis, 465
Mass. at 128-130 (reversal warranted where prosecutor suggested
that entire defense was “sham” and insulted defendant by repeat-
edly referring to him as “street thug” during closing argument),
with Simpson, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427
Mass. 336, 350 (1998) (prosecutor’s characterization of defense
argument as “insult” and “ ‘enthusiastic rhetoric’ not ground for
reversal and juries presumed to have measure of sophistication to
sort out excessive claims”).

The defendant’s argument that the prosecutor misstated the law
is without merit. Although the defendant correctly notes that the
Commonwealth’s burden was to prove that the defendant had the
substantial capacity to conform his behavior to the requirements
of the law, it was not improper for the prosecutor to refer to the
defendant’s behavior as “rational.” Moreover, the prosecutor’s
characterization of the defendant as a “faker” was based on
evidence, as Towers opined that the defendant was exaggerating
and feigning symptoms while he was hospitalized at Bridgewater.

Finally, the defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly
vouched for the credibility of Mercier and Towers. We disagree.

477 Mass. 415 (2017) 433

‘Commonwealth v. Muller:

“Improper vouching occurs if ‘an attorney expresses a personal
belief in the credibility of a witness, or indicates that he or she has
knowledge independent of the evidence before the jury.’ ” Com-
monwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550, 560 (2007), quoting Common-
wealth v. Ortega, 441 Mass. 170, 181 (2004). Here, the prosecu-
tor did not express any personal belief in the credibility of the
witnesses, nor did he suggest that he had any personal knowledge
that supported the witnesses’ credibility. See Kee, supra. The
prosecutor merely observed that Mercier was “a very moving
witness, a very candid and honest witness in all of her answers,
on both direct and cross,” and that Towers gave a “very candid
appraisal of the defendant’s mental state.” The prosecutor’s com-
ments were proper. See id.

e. Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The defendant
requests that this court exercise its power under G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, to reverse his convictions and either order a new trial or
enter judgments of not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect. “When we undertake review under § 33E, we do not
function as a second jury. . . . That is, we do not determine what
verdict we would have returned, but whether the verdict ‘was
against the law or weight of the evidence, or because of newly
discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice may
require’ ” (citation omitted). Johnston, 467 Mass. at 705, quoting
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We have examined the entire case and con-
sidered the law and the evidence, and conclude that the defendant
is not entitled to any relief from the judgments against him. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 167 (1978).

Judgments affirmed.

434 477 Mass. 434 (2017)

Boston », Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association.

Crry or Boston vs. Bosron Poiice ParROLMEN’S
ASSOCIATION.

Suffolk. December 5, 2016. - July 12, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Luvx, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Arbitration, Confirmation of award, Authority of arbitrator, Municipal Corpo-
rations, Police. Police, Discharge. Public Employment, Police, Termination.
Public Policy.

Discussion of the standard of review applicable to a matter submitted to
arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. [439-440]

In an arbitration proceeding initiated by a Boston police officer seeking rein-
statement following his termination for using a choke hold in arresting an
unarmed suspect for disorderly conduct and making false statements in the
ensuing departmental investigation, the arbitrator did not intrude on
nondelegable powers of the Boston police commissioner, where, under G. L.
c. 150E, § 7 (d), the terms of a collective bargaining agreement tramp any
authority enumerated under the State’s collective bargaining law; where
courts are reluctant to allow broad discretionary powers to subsume bar-
gained-for provisions; and where the parties bargained to arbitrate any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, a broad clause that left discipline well within the arbitrator’s
ambit, [440-442]

No public policy considerations argued against confirmation of an award in an
arbitration proceeding initiated by a Boston police officer seeking reinstate-
ment following his termination for using a choke hold in arresting an
unarmed suspect for disorderly conduct and making false statements in the
ensuing departmental investigation, where, although the policy condemning
the excessive use of force against a civilian is well defined and refraining
from excessive force is integral to a police officer’s duties to protect the
public and keep the peace, the arbitrator found that the officer’s use of force
was reasonable and that, as a consequence, the officer’s characterization of
events had been truthful. [442-445]

Statements offering prospective guidance in the wake of this court’s confirma-
tion of an arbitration award reinstating a police officer following his termi-
nation for using a choke hold in arresting an unarmed suspect for disorderly
conduct. [445-447]

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
July 22, 2013.

The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J.

477 Mass. 434 (2017) 435

Boston », Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Kay H. Hodge (Geoffrey R. Bok also present) for the plaintiff.

Alan H. Shapiro (John M. Becker also present) for the defend-
ant.

Hwes, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior
Court confirming an arbitrator’s award reinstating a Boston police
officer terminated for using a choke hold in arresting an unarmed
suspect for disorderly conduct and making false statements in the
ensuing departmental investigation. The arbitrator found that the
officer, David Williams, had applied a choke hold, but that the
choke hold had not actually choked the citizen, that the force was
reasonable in the circumstances, and that the officer’s subsequent
characterization of events was thus truthful. Accordingly, the
arbitrator ruled that the city of Boston (city) lacked just cause to
terminate Williams, and ordered his reinstatement with back pay.

In July, 2013, the city filed a complaint in the Superior Court
to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The court dismissed the com-
plaint in June, 2015, and the city appealed. We granted the city’s
application for direct appellate review. Because the award neither
exceeds the arbitrator’s authority nor violates public policy, and
because we are not free to vacate it where no underlying mis-
conduct was found, we affirm.

1. Background. a. Facts. On January 18, 2012, the city dis-
charged Williams based on specifications arising from a disor-
derly conduct arrest on March 16, 2009. The specifications were
use of excessive force, in violation of Boston police department
rule 304 on use of nonlethal force, and untruthfulness in the
subsequent investigation, in violation of rule 102, § 23, on truth-
fulness. Chosen by mutual agreement of the city and the Boston
Police Patrolmen’s Association (union) pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), an arbitrator held three days of
hearings, concluded that the city had proved neither charge, and
ordered Williams’s reinstatement with back pay. He based his
conclusion on the following factual findings.

In 2009, Boston’s Saint Patrick’s Day Parade took place on
Sunday, March 15. Among the revelers that day were Michael
O’Brien and his friends Thomas Cincotti and Eric Leverone.
Having consumed some alcohol during the daytime celebrations,
the three proceeded to a Faneuil Hall bar where O’ Brien received
free drinks by virtue of knowing the staff and owners. Because
Leverone had recently returned from active military duty, patrons

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purchased him many drinks, and he became extremely intoxi-
cated.

From that bar, the three walked to Cincotti’s apartment in the
North End neighborhood of Boston. While his friends waited on
the sidewalk, Cincotti moved his motor vehicle to avoid getting
a parking citation the next day. In doing so, he backed across a
double yellow line and into a double-parked vehicle occupied by
Guy Fils-Aime. Cincotti got out of his vehicle, asked O’Brien to
move it out of the street, and approached Fils-Aime. O’Brien
testified that, before moving the vehicle to a legal parking space,
he heard Fils-Aime say, “I am a federal agent and you are
fucked.”

Fils-Aime called 911 just after midnight to report the accident.
On that recorded call, he can be heard to say, “No, no, no. Don’t
worry. I work for Homeland Security. I’m a Federal agent. You’re
not going to get in trouble. Relax.” After describing the accident
to the dispatcher, Fils-Aime added, “They’re drunk.”

Officers Williams and Diep Nguyen arrived on scene at 12:08
AM. O’Brien described their interaction as immediately hostile
and aggressive, while the officers characterized O’Brien and his
friends as drunk and uncooperative. O’Brien, who like Cincotti
and Leverone is Caucasian, appeared further provoked by the
officers’ friendliness with Fils-Aime, who like Williams is Afri-
can-American. As the officers spoke with Fils-Aime, O’Brien
approached and demanded that they issue a citation to Fils-Aime
for double-parking, and find out whether he was in fact a Federal
agent. Receiving no answer, O’Brien began to film the officers
with his cellular telephone as he repeated his demands from the
middle of Hanover Street, where he was blocking traffic.”

After O’Brien failed to heed multiple warnings to get out of the
street, Nguyen decided to arrest him for disorderly conduct.
O’Brien pushed Nguyen away, and the two struggled as Nguyen
attempted to handcuff him; he managed to cuff one wrist. Seeing
this struggle from the cruiser where he had been writing a citation
for Cincotti, Williams came to Nguyen’s aid and tackled O’Brien
to the ground; Nguyen was “fighting off’ Cincotti and Leverone.
In an effort to extricate O’ Brien’s uncuffed hand from underneath

‘Michael O’Brien was at the time employed as a deputy sheriff and correction
officer, and said that Guy Fils-Aime’s comments made him concerned both for
his employment and for his pending military candidacy.

2The video recording was not in evidence, as O’Brien testified that he no
longer was in possession of that cellular telephone.

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O’Brien’s body, Williams pressed his upper left arm and shoulder
against the right side of O’Brien’s neck. He characterized this
maneuver as a “semi-bear-hug hold.” Nguyen testified that Wil-
liams had his arm “around [O’Brien’s] neck” in a “chokehold.”
O’Brien testified that he could not breathe and began to lose
consciousness.

Williams called for assistance using a police radio attached to
his uniform, and the eight officers who soon arrived arrested
O’Brien. As he was being taken to a police wagon, O’Brien
announced his employment with the sheriff's office and shouted
the names of officers he knew. Once in the wagon, he realized that
he had urinated in his pants.

O’Brien was charged with resisting arrest, assault and battery
on a police officer (Nguyen), and disturbing the peace. He was
booked at 12:40 a.m., with a bruise visible on his left temple and
an abrasion on the right side of his forehead. Lieutenant James
Leary, who was duty supervisor at that time, examined O’Brien
and noted nothing unusual. Twenty minutes later, O’ Brien com-
plained of chest pain and head pressure, and emergency medical
technicians thereafter transported him to Massachusetts General
Hospital. The triage nurse, in notes recorded at 2:30 a.m., ob-
served O’Brien to be under the influence of alcohol. At 3:43 a.M.,
O’Brien reported to the attending physician, Dr. Andrew Liteplo,
that he had been beaten and choked by police. Liteplo noted
petechiae, which are sometimes associated with choking, on
O’Brien’s face. O’Brien was otherwise asymptomatic.

On March 19, 2009, O’Brien filed a complaint with the internal
affairs division (IAD) of the Boston police department (depart-
ment). Although IAD assigned the complaint to an officer, little
investigation was done, and O’Brien’s counsel withdrew it in
May, 2009. Williams did not learn of the allegations against him
until September 24, 2009, when O’Brien filed a Federal lawsuit
alleging unreasonable use of force, unconstitutional arrest, and
assault and battery. The next day, counsel filed another IAD
complaint; when IAD still had taken no action in January, 2010,
counsel sent a letter demanding that the matter be investigated.
Sergeant Philip Owens conducted initial interviews of the officers
in April, 2010, but not until February, 2011, was Williams placed
on administrative leave.

A second round of IAD interviews occurred in March, 2011. In
June, 2011, the department exonerated Nguyen, but issued two
specifications against Williams: the use of unreasonable force, in

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violation of rule 304, § 2,° and untruthfulness during the IAD
interview, in violation of rule 102, § 23.4 The departmental trial
board held hearings in November and December, 2011, and
sustained the charges. The city terminated Williams on January
18, 2012, and settled O’Brien’s civil lawsuit for $1.4 million
shortly thereafter.

The union filed a grievance, contending that the city lacked just
cause to terminate Williams.’ The case went before an arbitrator
to determine whether the city had just cause to terminate Wil-
liams, and whether the city violated the CBA by placing Williams
on administrative leave in February, 2011. A hearing was held in
September, October, and December, 2012.

b. The arbitrator’s award. In June, 2013, the arbitrator issued
his decision based on the premise that Williams had been termi-
nated for use of excessive force, not for application of a choke
hold (“The Department evidently credited O’Brien’s charge that
[Williams] attacked him for no reason, knocked him to the

3Boston police department rule 304, “Use of Non-Lethal Force.” provides in
relevant part:

“Because there are an unlimited number of possibilities, allowing for a
wide variety of circumstances, no rule can offer definitive answers to every
situation in which the use of non-lethal force might be appropriate, Rather,
this rule will set certain specific guidelines and provide officers with a
conerete basis on which to utilize sound judgment in making reasonable
and prudent decisions, attending to the spirit over the letter of the rule.

“Section 1, Definitions... . 1. Reasonable Amount of Force is the least
amount of force that will permit officers to subdue or arrest a subject while
still maintaining a high level of safety for themselves and the public.

“Section 2. General Considerations. The policy of the Boston Police
Department is to use only that amount of force that is reasonably necessary
to overcome resistance in making an arrest or subduing an attacker.

“The right to use non-lethal force is extended to police officers as an
alternative in those situations where the potential for serious injury to an
officer or civilian exists, but where the application of lethal force would be
extreme.”

4Boston police department rule 102, “Conduct and General Rights and
Responsibilities of Department Personnel,” provides in relevant part:

“Section 23. Truthfulness. . . . Reports submitted by employees shall be
truthful and complete. No employee shall knowingly enter, or cause to be
entered, any inaccurate, false or improper information.”

5Article V(A), § 1, of the collective bargaining agreement provides as fol-
lows: “No bargaining unit member who has completed his one-year probation-
ary period shall be disciplined or discharged without just cause.”

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Boston », Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association.

ground, grabbed him around the neck, and strangled him almost
to the point of unconsciousness”).

Characterizing the case as contingent on a credibility determi-
nation, the arbitrator rejected O’ Brien’s account of the incident as
“not truthful,” and concluded that Williams used only the amount
of force reasonably necessary to overcome O’Brien’s resistance
to arrest. In support of his finding that “O’Brien was not a
credible witness about any of the events of March 16,” the
arbitrator cited several factors. First, the arbitrator found that
O’Brien had been drunk; as a result, the accuracy of O’Brien’s
memory was diminished, and the likelihood that he had displayed
the conduct Williams and Nguyen described increased. Second,
the arbitrator found that the professional repercussions potentially
facing O’Brien for his drunk and disorderly conduct provided a
motive to fabricate these allegations against the officers. Third, he
found the objective physical evidence of choking scant. Finally,
he noted as further reasons to discredit O’Brien that the cellular
telephone video recording was unavailable, and that neither
Cincotti nor Leverone came forward to corroborate O’Brien’s
account.

As to Williams, the arbitrator found that he had “knock[ed]
O’Brien to the ground and tightly gripp[ed] him in a manner that
placed [Williams’s] upper right arm and shoulder against the right
side of O’Brien’s neck. It would be accurate to call this a
chokehold.” Nguyen, who the arbitrator credited as a “conscien-
tious and credible witness,” agreed that Williams had used a
choke hold and explained that police were not trained in this
maneuver. Nonetheless, Nguyen opined that Williams had not
choked O’Brien and had used reasonable force in the circum-
stances, and the arbitrator agreed. Accordingly, the arbitrator
concluded that Williams’s IAD interviews had been truthful, and
that there was no just cause for termination. He ordered Williams
reinstated with back pay.

2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. “A matter submitted to
arbitration is subject to a very narrow scope of review.” Plym-
outh-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 407 Mass.
1006, 1007 (1990). Especially where parties have elected to
arbitrate disputes as part of a CBA, see School Dist. of Beverly v.
Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 229 (2001) (Cordy, J., concurring), we
defer to that election and are “strictly bound by an arbitrator’s
findings and legal conclusions, even if they appear erroneous,
inconsistent, or unsupported by the record.” Lynn v. Thompson,

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435 Mass. 54, 61 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1131 (2002)
(Thompson).

In arbitrations pursuant to collective bargaining agreements,
awards may be vacated only on statutorily enumerated grounds.
G.L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3) (“superior court shall vacate an award
if... the arbitrators exceeded their powers or rendered an award
requiring a person to commit an act or engage in conduct pro-
hibited by state or federal law”). The city argues both grounds
exist here, and we address each in turn.

b. Nondelegability of police commissioner’s powers and scope
of arbitrator’s authority. The city argues that the award must be
vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his authority by intruding
on the nondelegable powers of the Boston police commissioner
(commissioner) to discipline officers. The union counters that
discharge and discipline are at the heart of collective bargaining,
and the arbitrator merely interpreted the relevant terms of the
parties’ agreement.

Some powers may not be delegated, even with the consent of
the parties. Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed’n, 466
Mass. 210, 216 (2013). “An arbitrator exceeds his authority when
he intrudes upon decisions . . . left by statute to the exclusive
managerial control of designated public officials.” Massachusetts
Bd. of Higher Educ./Holyoke Community College v. Massachu-
setts Teachers Ass’n/Mass. Community College Council/Nat’l
Educ. Ass’n, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 32 (2011).

The city asserts that the so-called “police commissioner’s stat-
ute” leaves discipline and discharge of officers for excessive force
or untruthfulness to the commissioner’s exclusive managerial
control. St. 1906, c. 291, as appearing in St. 1962, c. 322, § 11
(“police commissioner shall have cognizance and control of the
government, administration, disposition and discipline of the
department, and of the police force of the department and shall
make all needful rules and regulations for the efficiency of said
police”). This argument fails for three related reasons.

First, the terms of a CBA trump any authority enumerated
under the State’s collective bargaining law. G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d)
(If a collective bargaining agreement . . . contains a conflict
between matters which are within the scope of negotiations

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pursuant to [§ 6] of this chapter® and . . . the regulations of .. .a
police commissioner . . . the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement shall prevail”). Accordingly, the CBA’s just cause
provision permits the arbitrator to interpret regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the commissioner’s statute, and usurps no
authority in so doing.

Second, this conclusion is consistent with courts’ reluctance to
allow broad discretionary powers to subsume bargained-for pro-
visions. See Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct.
172, 182 (1997), citing School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Rela-
tions Comm'n, 388 Mass. 557, 564-566 (1983) (“where the
governmental employer acts pursuant to broad, general manage-
ment powers, the danger is presented . . . that to recognize the
statutory authority as exclusive would substantially undermine
the purpose of G. L. c. 150E, § 6, to provide for meaningful
collective bargaining”).

Finally, although we have recognized the breadth of the com-
missioner’s authority in a long line of cases, those cases have
largely confined nondelegable matters to the administrative realm
and have never reached the core matters of discipline and dis-
charge. See, e.g., Boston Police Superior Officers Fed’n, 466
Mass. at 215 (commissioner has exclusive, nondelegable au-
thority to assign and transfer police officers).” Indeed, where the
parties bargained to arbitrate “any dispute concerning the inter-

General Laws c. 150E, § 6, provides that parties “shall negotiate in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, standards or productivity and performance,
and any other terms and conditions of employment.”

7See also, e.g., Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n, 403 Mass. 680,
684 (1989) (nondelegable management prerogative to assign one officer, as
opposed to two, to marked patrol vehicle); Nolan v. Police Comm’r of Boston,
383 Mass. 625, 629-630 & n.4 (1981) (authority to determine by way of
psychiatric examination officer’s fitness to perform duties); Broderick v. Police
Comm’ of Boston, 368 Mass. 33, 41 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976)
(authority to question officers regarding private conduct); Boston Police Patrol-
men’s Ass’n v. Boston, 367 Mass, 368, 371-372 (1975) (authority to require
officers seeking elective office to take leave of absence without pay during
campaign); Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed’n, 52 Mass. App. Ct.
296, 301 (2001) (sole discretion to make and end temporary assignments);
Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 269, 271-273
(1996) (authority to determine and assign overtime); Boston v. Boston Police
Superior Officers Fed’n, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1990) (nondelegable
matters include staffing levels, assignments, uniforms, weapons, and definition
of duties); Boston y. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 220,
226-227 (1979) (sole authority to determine whether officer should be reissued
service weapon).

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Boston », Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association.

pretation or application” of the CBA, G. L. 150E, § 8, such a
broad arbitration clause, see AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communica-
tions Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986), leaves discipline
well within the arbitrator’s ambit. Boston Police Patrolmen’s
Ass’n v. Boston, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 676-677 (2004) (severity
with which municipal employer treats its police officers in disci-
plinary proceedings can be subject of grievance).

c. Public policy exception. The city argues that the award must
be vacated because Williams’s reinstatement violates public
policy. The union contends that this exception is unavailable
because the court is bound by the arbitrator’s finding that Wil-
liams committed no misconduct.

Our deference to arbitration notwithstanding, we recognize the
primacy of certain policy matters over expediency, and will not
allow an arbitrator to order a party to engage in an action that
violates well-defined public policy. G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3).
Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass'n, 443 Mass. 813, 818,
823 (2005) (Patrolmen’s Association). If an arbitration award
violates public policy, “we are obliged to refrain from enforcing
it.” Massachusetts Highway Dep’t v. American Fed’n of State,
County & Mun. Employees, Council 93, 420 Mass. 13, 16 & n.5
(1995), quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l
Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of
Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).

In determining whether this narrow public policy exception
requires the vacation of an arbitrator’s award, we apply a “strin-
gent, three-part analysis.” Patrolmen’s Association, 443 Mass. at
818. First, the policy at issue “must be well defined and dominant,
and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed pub-
lic interests.’ ” Massachusetts Highway Dep’t, 420 Mass. at 16,
quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766. Second, the excep-
tion does not address “disfavored conduct, in the abstract, but
[only] disfavored conduct which is integral to the performance of
employment duties” (emphasis in original). Massachusetts High-
way Dep’t, supra at 17, quoting Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 671 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989). “Finally, we require[ ] a showing
that the arbitrator’s award reinstating the employee violates pub-
lic policy to such an extent that the employee’s conduct would
have required dismissal.” Patrolmen’s Association, supra at 819,
quoting Thompson, 435 Mass. at 63. The question in the third

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Boston », Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association.

prong is not whether the employee’s behavior violates public
policy, but whether an award reinstating him or her does so.
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am.,
Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62-63 (2000).

The first two prongs of this test are easily satisfied in cases of
alleged police misconduct toward civilians, as the Superior Court
recognized below. See, e.g., O’Brien v. New England Police
Benevolent Ass'n, Local 911, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 376, 381 (2013)
(in police excessive force case, it is “clear” that first two prongs
of public policy test were met). It is inarguable that well-defined
public policy condemns excessive force by police officers. See
Commonwealth vy. Adams, 416 Mass. 558, 563 (1993); Human
Rights Comm’n of Worcester v. Assad, 370 Mass. 482, 487
(1976).

Similarly, there is no question that refraining from excessive
force is integral to a police officer’s duties to protect the public
and keep the peace. Patrolmen’s Association, 443 Mass. at 819.
See Attorney Gen. v. McHatton, 428 Mass. 790, 793-794 (1999),
quoting Police Comm’r of Boston v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22
Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371 (1986) (“Police officers must comport
themselves in accordance with the laws that they are sworn to
enforce and behave in a manner that brings honor and respect for
rather than public distrust of law enforcement personnel. They are
required to do more than refrain from indictable conduct. . . . In
accepting employment by the public, they implicitly agree that
they will not engage in conduct which calls into question their
ability and fitness to perform their official responsibilities”).

Thus, only the exception’s third prong remains contested here.
“To prevail, the city must therefore demonstrate that public policy
requires that [Williams’s] conduct, as found by the arbitrator, is
grounds for dismissal, and that a lesser sanction would frustrate
public policy” (emphasis added). Patrolmen’s Association, 443
Mass. at 819. Because the arbitrator found that Williams acted
reasonably and truthfully, the public policy exception cannot bar
his reinstatement.

The arbitrator found that Williams “placed [his] right arm and
shoulder against the right side of O’Brien’s neck.” Nguyen, who
the arbitrator found to be “a conscientious and credible witness,”
testified that Williams had his arm “around [O’Brien’s] neck” in
a “chokehold.” But he also found that Williams was terminated
not for use of a choke hold, which is nowhere prohibited by
department rules, but for excessive force in choking O’Brien.

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Because the arbitrator concluded that Williams’s use of force was
reasonable and had not actually restricted O’Brien’s breathing, he
also found that Williams’s characterization of events had been
truthful and that there was no just cause for termination.

Without doubt, de novo analysis of whether Williams’s actions
constituted excessive force in the totality of the circumstances
could support a conclusion very different from the one reached by
the arbitrator. This was an arrest for disorderly conduct. Williams
gave no verbal commands, and used neither of the methods of
nonlethal force in which he was trained before applying a choke
hold,® despite his training to avoid a suspect’s neck area.® Wil-
liams is significantly larger than O’Brien, who was unarmed. It is
unreasonable to justify a choke hold — as the arbitrator did — on
the grounds that a suspect could always “grab” an officer’s
service weapon, because this is true of any civilian interaction
with police and would obviate any continuum of force.!?

This is especially true given the unpredictably lethal nature of
choke holds. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
116-117 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is undisputed that
chokeholds pose a high and unpredictable risk of serious injury or
death”); Thompson v. Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 2006)
(officer’s application of choke hold contributed to suspect’s death
by asphyxia); Maddox v. Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th
Cir. 1986) (officer’s application of choke hold for twenty to thirty
seconds caused suspect’s death). Cf. Commonwealth v. Stockwell,

®The department authorizes the use of the following nonlethal force methods:
verbal commands, pepper spray, wrist locks, and batons. It is uncontested that
Williams attempted none of these methods before tackling O’Brien.

Beyond requiring that officers use “the least amount of force” and “only that
amount of force that is reasonably necessary to overcome resistance in making
an arrest,” rule 304 on the use of nonlethal force confines officers to the use of
procedures on which they have been trained and found “proficient.” Nguyen and
Williams each admitted that this training did not include choke holds as an
appropriate means of force, and the IAD investigator explained that Boston
police officers are trained to avoid contact with a person’s head or neck due to
the high risk of injury.

10Indeed, the notion that an unarmed suspect must nonetheless be treated as
dangerous because he or she interacts with an armed police officer (“[e]ven if
O'Brien was unarmed, there was always the possibility that he would grab
Neguyen’s gun”) controverts clear United States Supreme Court precedent, see
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Tennessee vy. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 11 (1985), and we reject the troubling presumption of a citizen’s dangerous-
ness that this proposition would create.

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426 Mass. 17, 19 n.2 (1997) (posited among methods of stran-
gulation supporting conviction of murder in first degree, choke
hold occurs when “the aggressor’s forearm is placed on the neck
of the victim’).

Where the city failed to recognize those dangers in any rule,
however, we are not free to redefine terms the parties bargained
over. Had the city prohibited choke holds as excessive force, an
arbitrator who found a choke hold reasonable would have ex-
ceeded his authority. See G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3) (“the superior
court shall vacate an award if. . . the arbitrators exceeded their
powers”); School Dist. of Beverly, 435 Mass. at 229 (Cordy, J.,
concurring), quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (“[A]n arbitrator’s ‘award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement’ that he is confined to interpret and apply”).
In other words, that a de novo factual analysis would permit a
finding of felonious conduct does not permit us to proceed as if
the arbitrator actually made that finding.

We are aware of no prior application of the public policy
exception to vacate an award ordering reinstatement where the
arbitrator found no underlying misconduct. See Patrolmen’s As-
sociation, 443 Mass. at 820-821, 823 (vacating reinstatement of
police officer found by arbitrator to have committed felonious
misconduct of perjury and filing of false police reports); Boston
vy. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass'n, 74 Mass App. Ct. 379, 382
(2009) (vacating reinstatement of police officer found by arbitra-
tor to have committed off-duty felonious misconduct of assault by
means of dangerous weapon). The question, in other words, is not
whether Williams’s conduct justified termination, but whether it
required termination, such that any lesser sanction would violate
public policy. See Thompson, 435 Mass. at 63. Because the
arbitrator found that Williams used reasonable force and was not
untruthful in subsequent investigations, the award reinstating him
must be upheld.

d. Prospective guidance. Today’s decision should not be read to
view the city — and more importantly, the citizens of Boston —
as without remedy moving forward. First, it is incumbent on the
city to clarify its own policies with respect to excessive force and
specifically choke holds if it does not wish in the future to
relinquish interpretive control of that term.

As a threshold matter, it cannot be that when a choke hold is
applied, the excessive force determination nonetheless depends

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Boston », Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association.

on the extent of resulting harm. See Stamps v. Framingham, 813
F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that inadvertent
excessive force is shielded from scrutiny under Fourth Amend-
ment to United States Constitution, reasoning that “[t]he defend-
ants’ proposed rule has the perverse effect of immunizing risky
behavior only when the foreseeable harm of that behavior comes
to pass”). If anything, it is the unpredictable dangerousness of
choke holds that warns against their use at all. Indeed, it is
untenable to assert both that choke holds are so potentially
dangerous that reinstating officers who use them violates public
policy and that the commissioner retains the discretion to deter-
mine whether a choke hold is excessive force in any given case.
As discussed supra, it is because choke holds are unpredictably
lethal that both officers and the public deserve a bright-line rule.

Second, the city must investigate allegations of excessive force
with substantially more alacrity than was evidenced here. Pursu-
ant to its own existing rules," the department owes a duty, both
to the public and to its own officers, to investigate allegations of
excessive force thoroughly and promptly. As with the tension
between a choke hold’s dangerousness and the commissioner’s
desire to retain discretionary review of their use, it is difficult to
reconcile the department’s position that an officer’s use of a
choke hold requires termination with its protracted inaction in
this case. See Massachusetts Highway Dep’t, 420 Mass. at 21 1.8
(“In determining that the safety of the work environment was not
sufficiently threatened by [the employee’s] behavior to require
permanent discharge, the arbitrator could consider the fact that
the department waited nearly one year after the [misconduct] was
discovered” before bringing disciplinary action). There was a
two-year delay on meaningful internal investigation; the depart-
ment concedes, as it must, that it mishandled an inquiry that took
entirely too long. Officers deserve notice of allegations against
them, and citizens deserve investigations not contingent on the
filing of Federal lawsuits.

Last, we are troubled by the prospect that any use of force not
explicitly prohibited by a rule of conduct is essentially unre-
viewable. It is difficult to fathom why we elevate the values of
“expediency” and “judicial economy” so high as to eclipse the
substantive rights of citizens who have no seat at the bargaining

“See Boston police department rule 304, “Use of Non-Lethal Force,” § 7,
“Investigation of Use of Force.”

477 Mass. 434 (2017) 447

Boston », Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association.

table. We recognize, of course, that public employers may or may
not choose to adopt rules for the protection of the public from the
excessive use of force. Without the benefit of such rules, however,
arbitrators remain free to find reasonable any level of force that
does not explicitly require termination. Absent legislative au-
thority for a broader review of arbitration decisions, we are
constrained in our ability to review the use of excessive force by
public safety officials.

3. Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the
Superior Court’s decision confirming the arbitrator’s award.

So ordered.

448 477 Mass. 448 (2017)

Commonwealth 1: Cooley.

Commonweatri vs. Epwarp Cootey.
Hampden, March 10, 2017. - July 13, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J. Gaztano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Homicide. Robbery. Firearms. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Joint venturer, Ex-
culpatory. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Capital case.

At a murder trial, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a joint
venturer in an armed robbery that resulted in the victim’s death, where there
were several indications of the defendant's intent to commit armed robbery
of the victim, including a pattern of telephone calls between the defendant
and an unidentified caller that, together with evidence that the defendant had
accurate information about the victim’s whereabouts, allowed for the infer-
ence that the defendant and the unidentified caller were together prior to and
during the shooting; further, there was ample evidence that either the de-
fendant possessed a firearm or his coventurer possessed one and the defend-
ant knew about it; moreover, evidence that the defendant took the victim’s
cellular telephone and a paper bag after the shooting allowed for the
inference that the defendant completed the robbery; finally, the defendant’s
actions, including hiding his blood-stained leather jacket, and his misstate-
ments regarding his interactions with the victim prior to the shooting de-
monstrated his consciousness of guilt, [450-453]

A Superior Court judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the criminal
defendant's motion for a new trial on indictments charging murder and
armed robbery, based on the Commonwealth’s failure to produce exculpa-
tory evidence, where the evidence of a third party’s claimed admission of
having shot the victim was more likely to fill in the gaps of the Common-
wealth’s theory of a joint venture (by identifying the second participant) than
to demonstrate the defendant’s innocence. [453-455]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on June 29, 2010.

The cases were tried before Mary-Lou Rup, J., and a motion
for a new trial, filed on October 24, 2011, was heard by her.

Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant.

David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Bupp, J. In the early morning hours of March 20, 2010, Nicho-
las Hiller was shot and killed in Springfield while sitting in his
motor vehicle. The defendant, Edward Cooley, was indicted and
ultimately convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree on a

477 Mass. 448 (2017) 449

Commonwealth 1: Cooley.

theory of felony-murder,' as well as of unlawful possession of a
firearm and wilful interference with a criminal investigation. In
this consolidated appeal, the defendant claims that the judge erred
in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty of
murder in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm.
The defendant further argues that the judge improperly denied his
motion for a new trial, which was based on the Commonwealth’s
failure to disclose allegedly exculpatory evidence that had been
specifically requested. We affirm the defendant’s convictions and
the judge’s order denying his motion for a new trial. After a
review of the entire record, we also decline to reduce or set aside
the defendant’s murder conviction under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

1. Background. We summarize the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for
discussion of specific issues. At approximately 12:20 a.m. on
March 20, 2010, in a Springfield neighborhood, a witness heard
two shots fired. She looked out her window and saw two men
speaking in a “panicking way”; the men then ran in opposite
directions. Other witnesses also heard the gunshots, soon fol-
lowed by the sound of a motor vehicle crashing. The victim’s
motor vehicle had crashed through a fence, struck another ve-
hicle, and come to a stop in the yard of one of the witnesses. The
victim was slumped over in the driver’s seat and bleeding heavily.

As the witnesses approached the vehicle, the defendant, wear-
ing a leather jacket, ran up yelling, “It’s my god-brother,” and
“Don’t call the cops[;] the guy[’]s got weed on him.” He climbed
into the vehicle, pulled the victim slightly toward him while
patting him down, and took the victim’s cellular telephone. He
also took a bag from behind the victim’s seat, where police later
found two bags containing marijuana. After getting out of the
motor vehicle, the defendant told the witnesses to telephone the
police and left the scene. First responders found that the victim
sustained injuries consistent with a bullet traveling through his
right arm and into his chest. He was pronounced dead a short time
later at a hospital.

Police were directed to the defendant, who had since returned
to the area (without his leather jacket). The defendant was inter-
viewed at the scene and twice more at the police station. As
investigators uncovered further evidence, the defendant changed
portions of his statement. For example, after first denying it, he

"The predicate offense was armed robbery.

450 477 Mass. 448 (2017)

Commonwealth 1: Cooley.

eventually admitted that the leather jacket, found hidden a short
distance away from where the victim and his vehicle had crashed,
was his. The jacket tested positive for gunshot primer residue on
the cuffs, indicating that the jacket may have been within three
feet of a gun when it was fired. The jacket also was stained with
blood that matched the major deoxyribonucleic acid profile of the
victim. The defendant admitted to taking the victim’s cellular
telephone from the motor vehicle after the crash only after police
recovered it from a motor vehicle belonging to the defendant’s
girl friend.

Other portions of the defendant’s statements to police were
proved false at trial. For example, the defendant stated that he had
happened to meet the victim at a pharmacy store hours before the
shooting, but surveillance video recordings from inside and out-
side the store showed the victim there alone. The defendant’s
claim that he had been on the telephone with the victim at the
time of the shooting was belied by telephone records that showed
that there were no telephone calls between the defendant and the
victim at any point prior to the shooting.

The telephone records also showed that, although there were no
calls between the defendant and the victim, both were in touch
with a third party, who had a telephone number ending in 7471,
in the hours before the killing. There were numerous calls be-
tween the victim’s number and the 7471 number, culminating
with a call made minutes before the shooting. In addition, the
records indicated that there were calls during the night prior to the
shooting between the defendant’s number and the 7471 number
until 9:42 pm. Another call was made from the defendant’s
number to the 7471 number soon after the defendant finished
giving his second statement at the police station.

2. Sufficiency of the evidence. At trial, the Commonwealth's
theory was that the defendant and an unidentified person were
involved in a joint venture to rob the victim, that either one or the
other shot the victim during the course of the robbery, and that the
defendant completed the robbery after the shooting at the site of
the crash.

The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him as a joint venturer in an armed robbery that resulted
in the victim’s death.? “To succeed in a claim for insufficient
evidence, [the defendant] must show that, in viewing the evi-

The defendant also asserts insufficient evidence was presented to prove
unlawful possession of a firearm. Because one of the elements of armed robbery

477 Mass. 448 (2017) 451

Commonwealth 1: Cooley.

dence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, no
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v.
Mendez, 476 Mass. 512, 523 (2017), citing Commonwealth v.
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).

Applying that standard here, to find the defendant guilty of
felony-murder with armed robbery as the predicate offense, a
rational juror must have been able to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant participated in an armed robbery and that
the victim’s death occurred in the commission or attempted
commission of that robbery. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 475
Mass. 705, 710 (2016); Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass.
449, 467-468 (2009). The participants need only have had the
intent to commit the underlying felony, not necessarily the intent
to commit murder. See Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass.
303, 307 (2013), and cases cited.

In order for the jury to find the defendant guilty of armed
robbery, the Commonwealth was required to prove either that the
defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon or that he knew
that a coventurer was so armed, and that he or his coventurer
assaulted the victim and took money or property from that victim
with the intent (or shared intent) to steal it. See Williams, 475
Mass. at 710; Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 100 (2013).
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth presented insuffi-
cient evidence of (1) intent, (2) knowledge of an accomplice’s
gun, and (3) actual taking or stealing of property. We disagree.

There were several indications of the defendant’s intent to
commit armed robbery of the victim. He was aware that the
victim sold marijuana, and had purchased it from the victim in the
past. He admitted to patting the victim down looking for mari-
juana minutes after the shooting, and he took a brown paper bag,
as well as the victim’s cellular telephone, from the motor vehicle.
Further, the telephone calls between the victim and the unidenti-
fied caller, and between the defendant and the unidentified caller,
support an inference that the defendant and a coventurer planned
the victim’s robbery. The records indicate that both the victim and
the defendant were in contact with the same telephone number,
ending in 7471, on March 19, 2010, the day before the killing.

is possession of a dangerous weapon, the discussion of that charge is included
in our analysis of the sufficiency of proof of the armed robbery, infra.

452 477 Mass. 448 (2017)

Commonwealth 1: Cooley.

There were multiple telephone calls between the defendant and
the 7471 number in the early morning hours of March 19, one call
on the afternoon of March 19, and one at 9:42 pm. that night.
These patterns of calls, along with evidence that the defendant
had accurate information about the victim’s whereabouts prior to
the killing, allowed for the inference that the defendant and the
unidentified caller were together prior to and during the shooting.
The defendant also made a telephone call to the 7471 number at
11:40 a.m. on March 20, which was shortly after the defendant
left the police station. See Commonwealth v. Caswell, 85 Mass.
App. Ct. 463, 472 (2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1440 (2015)
(numerous telephone calls between defendant and coventurer
exchanged “shortly before and after the victim was killed” per-
mitted jury inference that defendant participated in planning
crime).

In addition, there was a series of telephone calls between the
victim and the 7471 number starting at 8:51 pm. on March 19, up
until 12:17 a.m. on March 20. The victim was shot at approxi-
mately 12:20 a.m. The user of the 7471 number did not call the
victim’s telephone after the victim was shot and killed.

There was also ample evidence that either the defendant pos-
sessed a firearm or his coventurer possessed one and the defend-
ant knew about it. The victim’s brother testified that the victim
had possessed a duffle bag containing a large quantity of mari-
juana and often had a large sum of money with him. The defend-
ant admitted that he knew the victim sold drugs. A reasonable
juror could conclude that a plan to rob a drug dealer would
include a gun where the victim’s resistance was reasonably
anticipated. See Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 Mass. 462, 470
(2007); Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 702-703 (2003).
Further, the gunshot residue on the cuffs of the defendant’s jacket
indicated that the defendant either fired a gun or was very close
by when a gun was fired, permitting the inference that the de-
fendant was aware that his coventurer had a gun. See Common-
wealth v. Johnson, 463 Mass. 95, 107 (2012).

In addition, the evidence that the defendant took the victim’s
cellular telephone and a paper bag after the shooting allowed for
the inference that the defendant completed the robbery. Although
the defendant offered alternative explanations for his actions, in
determining whether a reasonable jury could find each element of
the crime charged, we do not weigh supporting evidence against
conflicting evidence. Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779
(2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011).

477 Mass. 448 (2017) 453

Commonwealth 1: Cooley.

Finally, the defendant’s actions, including hiding his blood-
stained leather jacket, and his misstatements, including his sup-
posed interactions with the victim prior to the shooting, demon-
strated his consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Vick,
454 Mass. 418, 424 (2009) (“While a conviction may not be
based solely on evidence of consciousness of guilt, . . . indica-
tions of a defendant's state of mind, coupled with other evidence,
can be sufficient to establish guilt” [citation omitted]).

Although circumstantial, the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, was indeed sufficient to prove
the defendant’s guilt. See Commonwealth v. White, 452 Mass.
133, 135 (2008), and cases cited (circumstantial evidence is com-
petent to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt). Accordingly,
the judge properly denied the defendant’s motion for a required
finding.

3. Motion for new trial. The defendant also argues that the
motion judge, who was the trial judge, erred in denying his
motion for a new trial based on the Commonwealth’s failure to
produce exculpatory evidence. Given the nature of the evidence
and the parties’ arguments at trial, there was no error.

The evidence in question was a police report from an interview
of an individual named Marcus Dixon about an unrelated murder.
During that interview, the police learned that another man, Bryan
Ingram, had said that he (Ingram) shot the victim in the homicide
in which the defendant had been charged.* The Commonwealth
concedes that the evidence was not provided to the defendant
despite a specific request for “any police reports or witness
‘statements,’ ” and other evidence regarding “any and all coop-
erating witnesses . .. who [have] provided information and given

8Dixon said that Ingram had told Dixon that Ingram had “shot that white kid,”
referring to the victim.

The only reference to Ingram during the trial was struck from the record.
Although Ingram’s alleged admission to Dixon was not disclosed before trial,
the defendant was or should have been aware that Ingram had been investigated
in connection with the victim’s murder; during pretrial discovery, the Common-
wealth provided the defendant with a different statement relating to both the
defendant and Ingram. That statement alleged that the defendant had admitted
to another person that he was involved in a robbery with Ingram, and Ingram
had told that person that the defendant “just better hold it down.” In that
statement, the person also mentioned that Ingram lived on a street that was later
associated with the 7471 number, at an address which the defendant later
investigated. Both parties anticipated the possibility that this statement would
come in evidence; however, that person was ultimately not called to testify, and
the statement was not introduced in evidence.

454 477 Mass. 448 (2017)

Commonwealth 1: Cooley.

a statement regarding the defendant.” Given the specific request,
as well as the judge’s finding that the evidence was exculpatory,*
we must determine “whether we can be confident that, even if the
prosecution had supplied the report to the defendant[ ] in timely
fashion, the report or available evidence disclosed by it would not
have influenced the jury.” Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass.
672, 679-680 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass.
719, 729 (1992). Nevertheless, the defendant had the burden to
“demonstrate that a substantial basis exist[ed] for claiming pre-
judice from the nondisclosure” in order to receive a new trial
(citation omitted). Healy, supra at 680.

The judge declined to grant the defendant’s motion for a new
trial because the Commonwealth’s main theory was that the
defendant had participated in the armed robbery and murder as a
joint venturer.® After examining the evidence that the Common-
wealth introduced at trial, the judge concluded that the exculpa-
tory evidence did not affect the strength of the evidence support-
ing the view that the defendant was a joint venturer, even if not
the shooter. In other words, proof that the defendant was not the
shooter was immaterial given the strength of the evidence that he
was present at the time of the shooting and participated in the
armed robbery.

“The decision to deny a motion for a new trial lies within the
sound discretion of the judge and will not be reversed unless it is
manifestly unjust or the trial was infected with prejudicial con-
stitutional error. . . . Reversal is particularly rare where the judge
who acted on the motion was also the trial judge.” Common-
wealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 803 (2011), citing Common-
wealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 669-670 (2004). Given the

‘The judge found that although Ingram’s admission to being the shooter
would not preclude the defendant’s participation in the armed robbery, it would
have forced the Commonwealth to prove the defendant's role as a coventurer
only, and not as the principal.

®The prosecutor’s closing argument relied almost entirely on the theory that
the defendant was guilty as a joint venturer:

“I said in my opening that the evidence may not show that the defendant
shot the victim himself. But the evidence will show that if he didn’t, he
was with somebody who did, And you know this, in part, because of the
gunshot residue on the cuffs of his jacket. . . . The evidence further shows
that the defendant was communicating with someone else... . [T]he
people on the street don’t see a gun in [the defendant’s] hand, so the
defendant, indeed, may not have shot the victim himself. But if he didn’t
do it himself, it happened during the commission of a joint venture.”

477 Mass. 448 (2017) 455

Commonwealth 1: Cooley.

circumstances of this case, the judge’s denial of the motion was
not an abuse of discretion. The Commonwealth’s theory of the
case was joint venture and focused on the user of the 7471
telephone number as the defendant's coventurer. See Zanetti, 454
Mass. at 465 (“jurors may all agree that the defendant knowingly
participated in the commission of the crime but differ as to
whether he did so as a principal or a joint venturer’”). As a result,
here, as the judge implicitly recognized, the evidence of Ingram’s
claimed admission of having shot the victim was more likely to
fill in the gaps of the joint venture (by identifying the second
participant) than to demonstrate the defendant’s innocence. Con-
trast Commonwealth y. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 21-22 (1978)
(nondisclosed evidence tended to show that defendant was not
involved in joint venture). Thus, in the circumstances of this case,
the judge was warranted in concluding that a new trial was not
called for.

4. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. After a careful review of
the entire record, we discern no reason to reduce the degree of
guilt or grant a new trial pursuant to our powers under G. L.
c. 278, § 33E.

Judgments affirmed.

Order denying motion for a
new trial affirmed.

456 477 Mass. 456 (2017)

Barbuto »: Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC.

Cristina Barsuto vs. ADVANTAGE SALES AND MARKETING,
LLC, & another.

Suffolk. March 9, 2017. - July 17, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, 1J.

Marijuana, Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap, Employee, ‘Termination of
employment. Employment, Discrimination, Termination, Practice, Civil,
Motion to dismiss.

Discussion of St. 2012, c. 369, which states that there should be no punishment
under State law for qualifying patients for the medical use of marijuana, and
of the status of marijuana under Federal law. [459-460]
In a civil action arising from the plaintiff's termination from employment after
she tested positive for marijuana as a result of her lawful medical use of
marijuana, a Superior Court judge erred in dismissing the counts of the
complaint alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of handicap,
where the plaintiff was a “handicapped person” within the meaning of G. L.
c. 151B; where the plaintiff was capable of performing the essential func-
tions of her position with some form of accommodation; and where an
accommodation that would permit the plaintiff to continue to be treated with
medical marijuana in her home was not per se unreasonable, despite mari-
juana being illegal to possess under Federal law, and, in any event, the
employer owed the plaintiff an obligation, before terminating her employ-
ment, to participate in an interactive process with her to determine whether
there was an alternative, equally effective medication she could use that was
not prohibited under the employer’s drug policy. [460-468]
a civil action arising from the plaintiff's termination from employment after
she tested positive for marijuana as a result of her lawful medical use of
marijuana, a Superior Court judge properly dismissed the count of the
complaint alleging violation of St. 2012, c. 369, which states that there
should be no punishment under State law for qualifying patients for the
medical use of marijuana, where that statute did not create a separate private
cause of action for aggrieved employees [468-470]; likewise, the judge
properly dismissed the count of the complaint alleging a claim of wrongful
termination in violation of the public policy of protecting an employee's
right to use marijuana for medicinal purposes, where a competent employee
has a cause of action for handicap discrimination under such circumstances
[470-471].

a

Civ. acrion commenced in the Superior Court Department on
September 4, 2015.

‘Joanne Meredith Villaruz.

477 Mass. 456 (2017) 457

Barbuto »: Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Robert N. Tochka, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Matthew J. Fogelman (Adam D. Fine also present) for the
plaintiff.

Michael K. Clarkson (M. Tae Phillips also present) for the
defendants.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Elizabeth Milito, of the District of Columbia, & Gregory D.
Cote for NFIB Small Business Legal Center.

Reid M. Wakefield & Constance M. McGrane for Massachu-
setts Commission Against Discrimination.

David A. Russcol & Chetan Tiwari for Massachusetts Employ-
ment Lawyers Association & others.

Gants, C.J. In 2012, Massachusetts voters approved the initia-
tive petition entitled, “An Act for the humanitarian medical use of
marijuana,” St. 2012, c. 369 (medical marijuana act or act),
whose stated purpose is “that there should be no punishment
under [S]tate law for qualifying patients. . . . for the medical use
of marijuana.” Jd. at § 1. The issue on appeal is whether a
qualifying patient who has been terminated from her employment
because she tested positive for marijuana as a result of her lawful
medical use of marijuana has a civil remedy against her employer.
We conclude that the plaintiff may seek a remedy through claims
of handicap discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 151B, and
therefore reverse the dismissal of the plaintiff's discrimination
claims. We also conclude that there is no implied statutory private
cause of action under the medical marijuana act and that the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, and therefore affirm the dismissal of
those claims.”

Background. “We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss
de novo.” Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674,
676 (2011). In deciding whether a count in the complaint states a
claim under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), we
accept as true the allegations in the complaint, draw every rea-

2We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Massachusetts Com-
mission Against Discrimination; the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness Small Business Legal Center; and the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers
Association, the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, GLBTQ
Legal Advocates & Defenders, Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee,
Union of Minority Neighborhoods, the Jewish Alliance for Law and Social
Action, and Health Law Advocates.

458 477 Mass. 456 (2017)

Barbuto »: Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC.

sonable inference in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether
the factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief
under the law. Id.

As alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff, Cristina Barbuto, was
offered an entry-level position with the defendant Advantage
Sales and Marketing, LLC (ASM), in the late summer of 2014,
and accepted the offer. An ASM representative later left a mes-
sage for Barbuto stating that she was required to take a mandatory
drug test. Barbuto told the ASM employee who would be her
supervisor that she would test positive for marijuana. Barbuto
explained that she suffers from Crohn’s disease, a debilitating
gastrointestinal condition; that her physician had provided her
with a written certification that allowed her to use marijuana for
medicinal purposes; and that, as a result, she was a qualifying
medical marijuana patient under Massachusetts law. She added
that she did not use marijuana daily and would not consume it
before work or at work.

Typically, Barbuto uses marijuana in small quantities at her
home, usually in the evening, two or three times per week. As a
result of her Crohn’s disease, and her irritable bowel syndrome,
she has “little or no appetite,” and finds it difficult to maintain a
healthy weight. After she started to use marijuana for medicinal
purposes, she gained fifteen pounds and has been able to maintain
a healthy weight.

The supervisor told Barbuto that her medicinal use of mari-
juana “should not be a problem,” but that he would confirm this
with others at ASM. He later telephoned her and confirmed that
her lawful medical use of marijuana would not be an issue with
the company.

On September 5, 2014, Barbuto submitted a urine sample for
the mandatory drug test. On September 11, she went to an ASM
training program, where she was given a uniform and assigned a
supermarket location where she would promote the products of
ASM’s customers. She completed her first day of work the next
day. She did not use marijuana at the workplace and did not report
to work in an intoxicated state. That evening, the defendant
Joanna Meredith Villaruz, ASM’s human resources representa-
tive, informed Barbuto that she was terminated for testing posi-
tive for marijuana. Villaruz told Barbuto that ASM did not care if
Barbuto used marijuana to treat her medical condition because
“we follow [Flederal law, not [S]tate law.”

Barbuto filed a verified charge of discrimination against ASM
and Villaruz with the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-

477 Mass. 456 (2017) 459

Barbuto »: Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC.

crimination (MCAD), which she later withdrew in order to file a
complaint in the Superior Court. The complaint included six
claims: (1) handicap discrimination, in violation of G. L. c. 151B,
§ 4 (16); (2) interference with her right to be protected from
handicap discrimination, in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4A);
(3) aiding and abetting ASM in committing handicap discrimi-
nation, in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (5); (4) invasion of
privacy, in violation of G. L. c. 214, § 1B; (5) denial of the “right
or privilege” to use marijuana lawfully as a registered patient to
treat a debilitating medical condition, in violation of the medical
marijuana act; and (6) violation of public policy by terminating
the plaintiff for lawfully using marijuana for medicinal purposes.
The second and third claims were brought against Villaruz alone;
the rest were brought against both ASM and Villaruz. After
unsuccessfully attempting to remove the case to United States
District Court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint in the Superior Court.

The judge allowed the motion as to all counts except the
invasion of privacy claim. At the request of the plaintiff, the judge
entered a separate and final judgment on the dismissed claims,
and stayed the invasion of the privacy claim pending appeal. The
plaintiff filed a notice of appeal regarding the dismissed claims,
and we allowed the plaintiff's application for direct appellate
review.

Discussion. 1. Massachusetts medical marijuana act. Under
the medical marijuana act, a “qualifying patient” is defined as “a
person who has been diagnosed by a licensed physician as having
a debilitating medical condition”; Crohn’s disease is expressly
included within the definition of a “debilitating medical condi-
tion.” St. 2012, c. 369, §§ 2 (K), (C). The act protects a qualifying
patient from “arrest or prosecution, or civil penalty, for the
medical use of marijuana’ provided the patient “(a) [p]ossesses
no more marijuana than is necessary for the patient’s personal,
medical use, not exceeding the amount necessary for a sixty-day
supply; and (b) [p]resents his or her registration card to any law
enforcement official who questions the patient . . . regarding use
of marijuana.” St. 2012, c. 369, § 4. The act also provides, “Any
person meeting the requirements under this law shall not be
penalized under Massachusetts law in any manner, or denied any
right or privilege, for such actions.” Id.

Like Massachusetts, nearly ninety per cent of States, as well as
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, allow the limited

460 477 Mass. 456 (2017)

Barbuto »: Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC.

possession of marijuana for medical treatment. See Congressional
Research Service, The Marijuana Policy Gap and the Path For-
ward 7 (Mar. 10, 2017). See also National Conference of State
Legislatures, State Medical Marijuana Laws (2017), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9V Y Y- Y MP8] (reporting that twenty-nine States,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam allow for “comp-
rehensive public medical marijuana and cannabis programs,”
while seventeen other States allow use of “ ‘low THC, high can-
nabidiol . . . products’ for medical reasons in limited situations or
as a legal defense”).* Yet under Federal law, marijuana continues
to be a Schedule I controlled substance under the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1), (c) (2012), whose pos-
session is a crime, regardless of whether it is prescribed by a
physician for medical use. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27
(2005) (“The [Controlled Substances Act] designates marijuana
as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing mari-
juana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the
drug has no acceptable medical uses” [emphasis in original]).
Consequently, a qualifying patient in Massachusetts who has
been lawfully prescribed marijuana remains potentially subject to
Federal criminal prosecution for possessing the marijuana pre-
scribed. It is against this unusual backdrop that we review the
judge’s dismissal of every claim in the complaint except for the
privacy claim.

2. Handicap discrimination. Under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), itis
an “unlawful practice . . . [flor any employer . . . to dismiss from
employment or refuse to hire... , because of [her] handicap, any
person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of
performing the essential functions of the position involved with
reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate
that the accommodation required to be made to the physical or
mental limitations of the person would impose an undue hardship
to the employer’s business.”* “In interpreting the meaning of
these provisions, we give ‘substantial deference’ to the guidelines

3In November, 2016, Massachusetts voters approved another initiative peti-
tion that legalized the recreational possession and use of marijuana by persons
over twenty-one years of age. See St. 2016, c. 334. This initiative is irrelevant
to this appeal, because the plaintiff's possession and use of marijuana for
medical treatment was already lawful at the time her employment was termi-
nated for its use.

“The law defines the term “handicap” to mean “(a) a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities of a

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interpreting G. L. c. 151B, promulgated by the MCAD, although
we recognize that the guidelines do not carry the force of law.”
Gannon v. Boston, 476 Mass. 786, 792 (2017), citing Dahill v.
Police Dep’t of Boston, 434 Mass. 233, 239 (2001). “We remain
mindful that the Legislature instructed that G. L. c. 151B ‘shall be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes.’ ”
Gannon, supra at 793, quoting G. L. c. 151B, § 9.

The plaintiff alleges that she is a “handicapped person” because
she suffers from Crohn’s disease and that she is a “qualified
handicapped person” because she is capable of performing the
essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation
to her handicap; that is, with a waiver of ASM’s policy barring
anyone from employment who tests positive for marijuana so that
she may continue to use medical marijuana as prescribed by her
physician.® She adequately states a claim for handicap discrimi-
nation in violation of § 4 (16) if the allegations in her complaint,
accepted as true, suffice to make a facial showing that she is a
“qualified handicapped person” who was terminated because of
her handicap. See Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimi-
nation, Guidelines: Employment Discrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, Chapter 151B § IX.A.3 (1998) (MCAD Guidelines).

Where Crohn’s disease is characterized as a “debilitating medi-
cal condition” under the medical marijuana act, see St. 2012,
c. 369, § 2 (C), and where the complaint alleges that, as a result
of this condition, combined with irritable bowel syndrome, the
plaintiff has “little or no appetite” and has difficulty maintaining
a healthy weight, we conclude that she has adequately alleged

person; (b) a record of having such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having
such impairment.” G. L. c, 151B, § 1 (17). “[H]andicapped person” means “any
person who has a handicap.” G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (19). A “qualified handicapped
person” is “a handicapped person who is capable of performing the essential
functions of a particular job, or who would be capable of performing the
essential functions of a particular job with reasonable accommodation to the
handicap.” G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (16).

5*Reasonable accommodation” is not a defined term in G. L. ¢, 151B, § 1, but
it is defined in guidelines regarding handicap discrimination issued by the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination: “A ‘reasonable accommo-
dation’ is any adjustment or modification to a job (or the way a job is done),
employment practice, or work environment that makes it possible for a handi-
capped individual to perform the essential functions of the position involved and
to enjoy equal terms, conditions and benefits of employment” (footnote omit-
ted). Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Guidelines: Employ-
ment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap Chapter 151B § ILC (1998)
(MCAD Guidelines).

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that she has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities and therefore is a “handicapped person”
as defined in § 1 (19).°

Where a plaintiff is handicapped and where she suffered an
adverse employment action even though she was capable of
performing the essential functions of her position with some form
of accommodation, the plaintiff adequately alleges a claim of
handicap discrimination if the accommodation that she alleges is
necessary is facially reasonable. See Godfrey v. Globe Newspa-
per Co., 457 Mass. 113, 120 (2010). Because a reasonable ac-
commodation claim may arise in a wide variety of contexts,
courts are reluctant to set “hard and fast rules” as to when an
accommodation is facially reasonable. See Reed v. LePage Bak-
eries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001). Generally
speaking, however, a plaintiff must at least show that the accom-
modation is “feasible for the employer under the circumstances.”
Id. at 259.

The defendants argue that Barbuto has failed to state a claim of
handicap discrimination for two reasons. First, they contend that
she has not adequately alleged that she is a “qualified handi-
capped person” because the only accommodation she sought —
her continued use of medical marijuana — is a Federal crime, and
therefore is facially unreasonable. See Garcia v. Tractor Supply
Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1229 (D.N.M. 2016) (“medical mar-
ijuana is not an accommodation that must be provided for by the
employer”); Ross v. Raging Wire Telecomm., Inc., 42 Cal. 4th
920, 926 (2008) (California’s statute prohibiting handicap dis-
crimination “does not require employees to accommodate the use
of illegal drugs”). Second, they contend that, even if she were a
“qualified handicapped person,” she was terminated because she
failed a drug test that all employees are required to pass, not
because of her handicap.

As to the defendants’ first argument, where an employee is
handicapped because she suffers from a debilitating medical

®Barbuto’s complaint does not specify which “major life activity” her
Crohn’s disease impairs. However, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint
as true, it appears that the disease significantly impairs her ability to work,
which is a major life activity. See G. L. c. 151B, §1 (20); New Bedford v.
Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 440 Mass. 450, 464-465
(2003), We also note that eating is widely recognized as a major life activity
under Federal antidiscrimination case law. See Kapche v. Holder, 677 F3d 454,
461 & n.6 (D.C. Cir, 2012), and cases cited.

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condition that can be alleviated or managed with medication, one
generally would expect an employer not to interfere with the
employee taking such medication, or to terminate her because she
took it. If the employer, however, had a drug policy prohibiting
the use of such medication, even where lawfully prescribed by a
physician, the employer would have a duty to engage in an
interactive process with the employee to determine whether there
were equally effective medical alternatives to the prescribed
medication whose use would not be in violation of its policy. See
Godfrey, 457 Mass. at 120 (“If the accommodation proposed by
the employee appears unduly onerous, the employer has an ob-
ligation to work with the employee to determine whether another
accommodation is possible”). See also Massachusetts Bay
Transp. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination,
450 Mass. 327, 342 n.17 (2008) (when handicapped employee
requests accommodation, “employer is obligated to participate in
the interactive process of determining one”); MCAD Guidelines,
supra at § VII.C (once handicapped employee notifies employer
of need for accommodation to perform essential functions of job,
“the employer should initiate an informal interactive process”
with employee to “identify the precise limitation resulting from
the handicap and potential reasonable accommodations that could
overcome those limitations”).

Where no equally effective alternative exists, the employer
bears the burden of proving that the employee’s use of the
medication would cause an undue hardship to the employer’s
business in order to justify the employer’s refusal to make an
exception to the drug policy reasonably to accommodate the
medical needs of the handicapped employee. See Godfrey, 457
Mass. at 120, quoting Cox v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 414
Mass. 375, 386 n.3 (1993) (“Once an employee ‘make[s] at least
a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible,’ the
burden of proof [of both production and persuasion] shifts to the
employer to establish that a suggested accommodation would
impose an undue hardship”). Because the burden of proving
undue hardship rests with the employer, where an employee
brings a handicap discrimination claim following her dismissal
for the use of her prescribed medication, her complaint will state
a claim for relief that will survive a motion to dismiss where it
adequately alleges that she is a “qualified handicapped person”
because she could have competently performed her job with the
medication, and that allowing her to use the medication was at
least facially a reasonable accommodation.

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Here, the defendants contend that, because the prescribed
medication is marijuana, which is illegal to possess under Federal
law, an accommodation that would permit the plaintiff to continue
to be treated with medical marijuana is per se unreasonable. They
also contend that, because such an accommodation is facially
unreasonable, they owed the plaintiff no obligation to participate
in the interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation
before they terminated her employment. We are not persuaded by
either argument.

Under Massachusetts law, as a result of the act, the use and
possession of medically prescribed marijuana by a qualifying
patient is as lawful as the use and possession of any other
prescribed medication. Where, in the opinion of the employee’s
physician, medical marijuana is the most effective medication for
the employee’s debilitating medical condition, and where any
alternative medication whose use would be permitted by the
employer’s drug policy would be less effective, an exception to
an employer’s drug policy to permit its use is a facially reason-
able accommodation. A qualified handicapped employee has a
right under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), not to be fired because of her
handicap, and that right includes the right to require an employer
to make a reasonable accommodation for her handicap to enable
her to perform the essential functions of her job.

Our conclusion finds support in the marijuana act itself, which
declares that patients shall not be denied “any right or privilege”
on the basis of their medical marijuana use. St. 2012, c. 369, § 4.
A handicapped employee in Massachusetts has a statutory “right
or privilege” to reasonable accommodation under G. L. c. 151B,
§ 4. If an employer’s tolerance of an employee’s use of medical
marijuana were a facially unreasonable accommodation, the em-
ployee effectively would be denied this “right or privilege” solely
because of the patient’s use of medical marijuana.”

The act also makes clear that it does not require “any accom-

7The language of the Massachusetts medical marijuana act distinguishes this
case from a California Supreme Court decision that denied an employee’s
challenge under the State’s handicap discrimination law to a termination based
on the employee’s use of medical marijuana. The California medical marijuana
law at issue in Ross v. Raging Wire Telecomm. Inc., 42 Cal. 4th 920, 927-928
(2008), did not contain language protecting medical marijuana users from the
denial of any right or privilege.

In other published cases where State Supreme Courts have rejected employ-
ees” claims for relief from their termination of employment because of their use
ijuana, the employees did not bring handicap discrimination

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modation of any on-site medical use of marijuana in any place of
employment.” St. 2012, c. 369, § 7 (D). This limitation implicitly
recognizes that the off-site medical use of marijuana might be a
permissible “accommodation,” which is a term of art specific to
the law of handicap discrimination.

The fact that the employee’s possession of medical marijuana
is in violation of Federal law does not make it per se unreasonable
as an accommodation. The only person at risk of Federal criminal
prosecution for her possession of medical marijuana is the em-
ployee. An employer would not be in joint possession of medical
marijuana or aid and abet its possession simply by permitting an
employee to continue his or her off-site use.

Nor are we convinced that, as a matter of public policy, we
should declare such an accommodation to be per se unreasonable
solely out of respect for the Federal law prohibiting the posses-
sion of marijuana even where lawfully prescribed by a physician.
Since 1970 when Congress determined that marijuana was a
Schedule I controlled substance that, in contrast with a Schedule
Il, Ill, IV, or V controlled substance, “has no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States,” nearly ninety per
cent of the States have enacted laws regarding medical marijuana
that reflect their determination that marijuana, where lawfully
prescribed by a physician, has a currently accepted medical use in
treatment.® See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B). To declare an accom-
modation for medical marijuana to be per se unreasonable out of
respect for Federal law would not be respectful of the recognition
of Massachusetts voters, shared by the legislatures or voters in the

claims. In Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P3d 849, 851 (Colo. 2015), the
plaintiff brought a wrongful termination claim, alleging that his termination was
in violation of a State statute that barred an employer from discharging an
employee based on the employee’s participation in “lawful activities” off-site
during nonworking hours, The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the dis-
missal of the claim, concluding that the Legislature did not intend the statute to
apply to an activity, such as the possession of marijuana, that was unlawful
under Federal law. Id. at 853. In Roe v, Teletech Customer Care Mgt. (Colorado)
LLC, 171 Wash. 2d 736, 760 (2011), the Washington Supreme Court affirmed
the allowance of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the plaintifi’s
wrongful termination claims, holding that the State’s medical marijuana law did
not create a private right of action and did not proclaim a public policy
prohibiting the discharge of an employee for medical marijuana use.

®See National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Bell, 488 F.
Supp. 123, 134-137 (D.D.C. 1980) (discussing legislative history of Controlled
Substances Act); id, at 135 (in 1970 “few reliable scientific studies existed that
could give accurate information to the legislators”).

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vast majority of States, that marijuana has an accepted medical
use for some patients suffering from debilitating medical condi-
tions. Cf. Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 35 (2014) (“the
fact that [marijuana possession] is technically subject to a Federal
prohibition does not provide [the Commonwealth] an independent
justification for a warrantless search”).®

In addition, even if the accommodation of the use of medical
marijuana were facially unreasonable (which it is not), the em-
ployer here still owed the plaintiff an obligation under G. L.
c. 151B, § 4 (16), before it terminated her employment, to par-
ticipate in the interactive process to explore with her whether
there was an alternative, equally effective medication she could
use that was not prohibited by the employer’s drug policy. This
failure to explore a reasonable accommodation alone is sufficient
to support a claim of handicap discrimination provided the plain-
tiff proves that a reasonable accommodation existed that would
have enabled her to be a “qualified handicapped person.” See
Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1061-1062
(7th Cir. 2014) (employer found liable for disability discrimina-
tion where it “turn[ed] a blind eye” to plaintiff's sleep impairment
and terminated her without interactive dialogue where she could
have demonstrated through such dialogue availability of narco-
lepsy medication that would have enabled her to perform essen-
tial functions of job).

As to the defendants’ second argument, where a handicapped
employee needs medication to alleviate or manage the medical
condition that renders her handicapped, and the employer fires
her because company policy prohibits the use of this medication,
the law does not ignore the fact that the policy resulted in a person
being denied employment because of her handicap. By the de-
fendants’ logic, a company that barred the use of insulin by its
employees in accordance with a company policy would not be
discriminating against diabetics because of their handicap, but
would simply be implementing a company policy prohibiting the
use of a medication. Where, as here, the company’s policy

©The defendants in this case have waived the argument that Federal preemp-
tion requires the conclusion that an employee’s use of medical marijuana is
facially unreasonable as an accommodation. We note that the Oregon Supreme
Court rested its decision that an employee’s use of medical marijuana was not
a reasonable accommodation under the State’s disability act on this ground.
Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 348 Or. 159,
189-190 (2010).

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prohibiting any use of marijuana is applied against a handicapped
employee who is being treated with marijuana by a licensed
physician for her medical condition, the termination of the em-
ployee for violating that policy effectively denies a handicapped
employee the opportunity of a reasonable accommodation, and
therefore is appropriately recognized as handicap discrimination.
Cf. School Comm. of Braintree vy. Massachusetts Comm’n
Against Discrimination, 377 Mass. 424, 425 (1979) (employment
policy that prohibited teachers from using accrued sick leave for
pregnancy-related disabilities that occur in extended maternity
leaves was gender discrimination).

Our conclusion that an employee’s use of medical marijuana
under these circumstances is not facially unreasonable as an
accommodation for her handicap means that the dismissal of the
counts alleging handicap discrimination must be reversed. But it
does not necessarily mean that the employee will prevail in
proving handicap discrimination. The defendant at summary
judgment or trial may offer evidence to meet their burden to show
that the plaintiff's use of medical marijuana is not a reasonable
accommodation because it would impose an undue hardship on
the defendants’ business. See Godfrey, 457 Mass. at 120. See also
GL. c. 151B, § 4 (16) (listing factors considered in determining
whether accommodation would create undue hardship). For in-
stance, an employer might prove that the continued use of medi-
cal marijuana would impair the employee’s performance of her
work or pose an “unacceptably significant” safety risk to the
public, the employee, or her fellow employees. See Gannon, 476
Mass. at 800.

Alternatively, an undue hardship might be shown if the em-
ployer can prove that the use of marijuana by an employee would
violate an employer’s contractual or statutory obligation, and
thereby jeopardize its ability to perform its business. We recog-
nize that transportation employers are subject to regulations pro-
mulgated by the United States Department of Transportation that
prohibit any safety-sensitive employee subject to drug testing
under the department’s drug testing regulations from using mari-
juana. See 49 C.ER. §§ 40.1(b), 40.11(a) (2001). See also United
States Department of Transportation, DOT “Medical Marijuana”
Notice (updated June 20, 2017), https://www.transportation.gov/
odapc/medical-marijuana-notice [https://perma.cc/FY 24-SEMZ].
In addition, we recognize that Federal government contractors
and the recipients of Federal grants are obligated to comply with

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the Drug Free Workplace Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 8102(a), 8103(a)
(2012), which requires them to make “a good faith effort . . . to
maintain a drug-free workplace,” and prohibits any employee
from using a controlled substance in the workplace.!°

Whether the employer met its burden of proving that the
requested accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the employer’s business is an issue that may be resolved through
a motion for summary judgment or at trial; it is not appropriately
addressed through a motion to dismiss. Because the plaintiff's
continued use of medical marijuana under these circumstances is
not facially unreasonable as an accommodation for her handicap
and because the plaintiff has adequately alleged that ASM failed
to participate in an interactive process with the plaintiff to deter-
mine whether there was a reasonable accommodation for her
handicap, we reverse the dismissal of count 1, alleging handicap
discrimination. We also reverse the dismissal of counts 2 and 3
against Villaruz, which allege that she aided and abetted ASM’s
handicap discrimination and interfered with the plaintiff’s exer-
cise of her right to be free from handicap discrimination.

3. Implied private cause of action under the medical marijuana
act. The plaintiff alleges in count 4 of her complaint that her
termination was in violation of the medical marijuana act, which
suggests that she claims she has a private cause of action under
the act against an employer who terminates her employment for
the lawful use of medical marijuana. When the voters approved
the act through the initiative petition, two New England States,
Rhode Island and Maine, already had enacted comparable statutes
that expressly included provisions prohibiting employers from
taking adverse employment action against an employee for his or
her lawful use of medical marijuana. See R.I. Gen. Laws. § 21-
28.6-4(b) (2006 & Supp. 2017) (“No school, employer or land-
lord may refuse to enroll, employ or lease to or otherwise penal-
ize a person solely for his or her status as a [registered qualifying
patient]”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2423-E (West 1964 &
Supp. 2016) (“A school, employer or landlord may not refuse to
enroll or employ or lease to or otherwise penalize a person for
that person’s status as a qualifying patient .. . unless failing to do
so would put the school, employer or landlord in violation of
[F]ederal law or cause it to lose a [F]ederal contract or funding”).

1°As noted earlier, we recognize that the Massachusetts medical marijuana act
does not require any employer to permit on-site marijuana use as an accommo-
dation to an employee. See St. 2012, c. 369, § 7 (D).

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The Massachusetts act did not include such language. Therefore,
we consider whether, despite the absence of such language, a
private right of action of an employee who was terminated for her
lawful use of medical marijuana exists under the act by implica-
tion.

Legislative intent is “the determinative factor in deciding
whether a private cause of action can be implied from a statute.”
Loffredo v. Center for Addictive Behaviors, 426 Mass. 541, 543
(1998), and cases cited. “[W]e have generally been reluctant to
infer a private cause of action from a statute in the absence of
some indication from the Legislature supporting such an infer-
ence.” Id. at 544. Where a statute was enacted by the voters
through an initiative petition, “it is to the wishes of the people,
not the Legislature, that we must look.” Bates v. Director of
Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 173 (2002).

In considering whether there is any such indication from the
voters, we look to the closest equivalent to legislative history,
which is the Information for Voters guide that is prepared by the
Secretary of the Commonwealth and sent to each registered voter
before the election." See Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Mgt.
(Colorado) LLC, 171 Wash. 2d 736, 747 (2011) (“If there is
ambiguity in an initiative, the court may look to extrinsic evi-
dence of the voters’ intent such as statements in the voters’
pamphlet”). There is no indication from the guide that the voters
understood they were creating a private right of action through
passage of the initiative; the guide is silent with respect to adverse
employment action arising from an employee’s use of medical

“The voter information booklet prepared by the Secretary of the Common-
wealth (Secretary) “is a single, comprehensive collection of the information that
is officially available to voters in advance of the election. For each ballot
question, the guide contains (i) the title given to the question by the Attorney
General and the Secretary; (ii) the Attorney General’s summary in full; (iii) the
two one-sentence statements prepared by the Attorney General and the Secre-
tary describing the effect of a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’ vote; (iv) a statement prepared by
the Secretary of Administration and Finance describing the fiscal impact of the
proposed act; (v) any legislative committee majority reports, together with the
names of the majority and minority members of the committees that may have
considered the proposed act; (vi) a statement of votes of the General Court on
the proposed act, if any; (vii) arguments, not exceeding 150 words each, for and
against the proposed act submitted by its proponents and opponents; and (viii)
the full text of the proposed act itself.” Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651,
660 n.14 (2016), citing art. 48, General Provisions, IV, of the Amendments to
the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 108 of the Amendments; and
G. Lic. 54, §§ 53, 54,

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marijuana.

We also consider whether the absence of a private cause of
action would render the statute ineffective, and frustrate the
voters’ purpose in approving the initiative. See Bates, 436 Mass.
at 173-174, quoting Boston Elevated Ry. v. Commonwealth, 310
Mass. 528, 548 (1942) (“We will not impute to the voters who
enacted the clean elections law an ‘intention to pass an ineffective
statute’). Here, where a comparable cause of action already
exists under our law prohibiting handicap discrimination, a separ-
ate, implied private right of action is not necessary to protect a
patient using medical marijuana from being unjustly terminated
for its use. The Legislature’s provision of a separate remedy,
especially, as here, a separate civil remedy, “weighs heavily
against recognizing” an implied private right of action in a
statute. See Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 373
(2008). Cf. Loffredo, 426 Mass. at 547, quoting Transamerica
Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (“[W]here
a statute expressly provides a partic remedy or remedies, a
court must be chary of reading others into it”).

In addition, as noted earlier, the drafters of the act appear to
have recognized the existence of a cause of action for handicap
discrimination by specifically not requiring “on-site” medical
marijuana use as an “accommodation.” St. 2012, c. 369, § 7 (D).
The drafters also barred the denial of a “right or privilege” for
marijuana use, which suggests a preexisting right or privilege, not
a right created by the act. Id. at § 4.

We interpret statutes, where we can, to be in harmony with each
other. See Carleton vy. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 791, 809
(2006); Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 582-583
(1994). Recognizing an implied private right of action under the
medical marijuana act for an employee could conflict with the
employee’s right of action under our antidiscrimination law. G. L.
c. 151B. In contrast to our antidiscrimination law, which sets
forth limitations such as the employer’s undue hardship defense,
G. L. c. 151B, § 3 (16), the medical marijuana act provides no
guidance as to what the appropriate contours of the implied right
of action would be. We will not imply a separate private cause of
action for aggrieved employees under the medical marijuana act,
where such employees are already provided a remedy under our
discrimination law, and where doing so would create potential
confusion.

4. Wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The
plaintiff alleges in count 6 of her complaint a claim of wrongful

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termination in violation of public policy, where the public policy
is the protection of an employee’s right to use marijuana for
medicinal purposes. “As an exception to the general rule that an
employer may terminate an at-will employee at any time with or
without cause, we have recognized that an at-will employee has
a cause of action for wrongful termination only if the termination
violates a clearly established public policy.” King v. Driscoll, 418
Mass. 576, 582 (1994), S.C., 424 Mass. 1 (1996). We “consis-
tently [have] interpreted the public policy exception narrowly,
reasoning that to do otherwise would ‘convert the general rule...
into a rule that requires just cause to terminate an at-will em-
ployee.’ ” Jd., quoting Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the
Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 150 (1989). Be-
cause a competent employee has a cause of action for handicap
discrimination where she is unfairly terminated for her use of
medical marijuana to treat a debilitating medical condition, we
see no need and no reason to recognize a separate cause of action
for wrongful termination based on the violation of public policy
arising from such handicap discrimination. We also note, as we
did in rejecting an implied private cause of action under the act,
that recognizing such a wrongful termination claim would invite
confusion as to whether its parameters mirror those for handicap
discrimination.

Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the
judge’s allowance of the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim
for handicap discrimination and the related claims under G. L.
c. 151B, and affirm the allowance of the motion as to the counts
claiming an implied private cause of action under the act and
wrongful termination in violation of public policy. We remand the
case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

So ordered.

472 477 Mass. 472 (2017)

Commonwealth », Veiovis.

CommonweattH vs. Carus VEIOvIS.
Berkshire, November 10, 2016. - July 19, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Lowy, 1.

Homicide. Evidence, Photograph, Relevancy and materiality, Inflammatory evi-
dence, Prior misconduct, Identity, State of mind, Motive. Practice, Criminal,
Capital case, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury.

At a murder trial, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant, with the intent to kill, knowingly
participated in the premeditated murder of the three victims. [479-481]

At a murder trial, the probative value of photographs of anatomical drawings
from a medical textbook with images of human dissections and amputation
of body parts, some of which were presented as a collage hung on the wall,
which were found during the search of the defendant’s apartments, out-
weighed the risk of unfair prejudice, where they were probative of the
identity of the defendant as one of the three men who participated in the
killings, i.e., they were evidence of idiosyncratic conduct by the defendant
that, in light of the specific evidence of the crime, tended to identify the
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime; where they were probative of the
state of the defendant’s mind as a person fascinated by amputation and
human dissection, and of an intent to seize the opportunity of these killings
to engage in actual amputations and human dissection; and where the
evidence of the defendant's apparent fascination with amputation and human
dismemberment offered an explanation for what otherwise would be inex-
plicable; moreover, the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting in
evidence photographs of a machete, a cleaver, hatchets, and various knives
found in the defendant’s apartment, where such evidence was relevant to
demonstrate that the defendant had the means of committing the crimes and
the items could not reasonably be excluded as weapons that were used in the
commission of the dismemberments; on the other hand, the judge abused his
discretion in admitting in evidence a photograph of a baseball bat with
spikes, in that there was no evidence that that weapon could have been used
in the commission of the killings or the dismemberments, but given the other
admissible evidence depicting what was found in the search of the defend-
ant’s apartment, the error was not prejudicial: finally, the absence of an
instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the photographs did not create
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. [481-487] Lowy, J.,
dissenting, with whom Lenk, J., joined.

Ata murder trial, the judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the
probative value of a statement made by the defendant regarding scars on his
arm outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, where, in the unusual context of
the case, the statement was probative of the defendant’s identification as the

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third assailant, [487-488]

‘There was no merit to a criminal defendant's claim that, at a murder trial, the
prosecutor in closing argument had improperly argued a number of points
based on facts not appearing in the record. [488-489]

This court declined to exercise its power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a
new trial of indictments charging murder in the first degree or to direct the
entry of verdicts of a lesser degree of guilt, where the judge’s deviation, in
his instructions to the jury, from the reasonable doubt instruction in Com-
monwealth v, Webster, 5 Cush, 295, 320 (1850), did not create a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. [489-490]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on October 6, 2011.

The cases were tried before C. Jeffrey Kinder, J.

Dana Alan Curhan (Christie L. Nader also present) for the
defendant.

David F. Capeless, District Attorney for the Berkshire District,
for the Commonwealth.

Gants, C.J. The defendant was found guilty by a Superior
Court jury on three indictments charging murder in the first
degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation for the grisly
killing of David Glasser, Edward Frampton, and Robert
Chadwell.t The Commonwealth’s theory of the case was that the
defendant participated in these killings with Adam Lee Hall and
David Chalue to prevent Glasser from testifying against Hall in
two criminal cases. They kidnapped Frampton, who was
Glasser’s roommate, and Chadwell, who was Glasser’s neighbor,
simply because Frampton and Chadwell had the misfortune of
being in Glasser’s apartment when they entered to kidnap and
later kill Glasser, and then killed Frampton and Chadwell to
ensure their silence regarding the kidnapping and killing of
Glasser. After the three victims were killed, the defendant, Hall,
and Chalue dismembered their bodies and placed the body parts
in plastic bags, and Hall arranged for the burial of the plastic
bags.?

The defendant presents four primary claims on appeal: (1) that
the evidence of his knowing participation in these crimes was
insufficient as a matter of law to support his convictions; (2) that
the judge abused his discretion in admitting evidence of other acts

"The defendant was also found guilty on three indictments charging kidnap-
ping and three indictments charging witness intimidation.

2Adam Lee Hall and David Chalue were found guilty of the three murders in
separate trials that preceded the defendant's trial.

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the probative value of which was outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice; (3) that the judge abused his discretion in admitting in
evidence a statement by the defendant regarding the scars on his
right arm; and (4) that the prosecutor presented facts in closing
argument that were not supported by the evidence at trial. We
affirm the convictions and conclude that the defendant is not
entitled to relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Background. Because the defendant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence at trial, “we recite the evidence in the Common-
wealth’s case-in-chief . . . in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 611-
612 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016). We focus
primarily on the evidence implicating the defendant in the joint
venture, because the defendant does not dispute that there was
abundant evidence that Hall and Chalue participated in the kill-
ings.

The circumstances leading up to the killings began in July,
2009, when Hall beat Glasser with a baseball bat because he
believed that Glasser had stolen and sold motor vehicle parts that
belonged to Hall. While Glasser was being interviewed by a State
police trooper two days later, Hall threatened Glasser in a tele-
phone call. The State police arrested Hall that day and recovered
a baseball bat from Hall’s vehicle.

In July, 2010, while the charge against Hall of assault and
battery by means of a dangerous weapon was pending, Hall
concocted a scheme to discredit Glasser by framing him on a
false kidnapping charge. As part of this scheme, a friend of Hall,
Nicole Brooks, falsely reported to the police that Glasser kid-
napped her and shot at her when she escaped; another friend of
Hall, Scott Langdon, planted Brooks’s wallet and a revolver in
Glasser’s truck, where they were found by police during a search
of the truck. The scheme resulted in Glasser’s arrest, but the
police soon exonerated Glasser and brought criminal charges
against Hall and those who participated with him in the scheme.

The defendant began spending time with Hall and Chalue in the
latter half of August, 2011. Hall was a “sergeant [at] arms” in a
local chapter of the Hells Angels motorcycle club and was
described as an “enforcer.” The defendant was not a member of
the Hells Angels, but there was evidence that he wanted to be. He
began to wear a vest with a Hells Angels insignia on the front and
kept a Hells Angels sticker in his Jeep and apartment. Hall told a
witness in the defendant’s presence of the possibility that the

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defendant would get a motorcycle and become a prospective
member of the Hells Angels. The defendant’s employer told the
police that the defendant had wanted to establish credit because
he wanted to buy a motorcycle and that “you cannot be in the
Hells Angels without buying the motorcycle.”

The time line of events before and after the killings is important
in evaluating the weight of the evidence implicating the defend-
ant as a participant in the killings. On Friday, August 26, 2011,
Hall picked up a friend, Katelyn Carmin, in the tan Buick vehicle*
he had purchased earlier that month; the defendant and Chalue
were with him. While driving around to various bars, Hall went
into a tirade about a person he called “Drummer Dave,”* who he
said had robbed him and then “snitched” on him. Hall said he was
“going to kill that motherfucker.” The defendant, along with
Chalue, responded to Hall by assuring him that Hall will “get
him.” Later that evening, they drove to the Hells Angels club-
house in Lee, where they rode in an all-terrain vehicle. Hall told
Carmin to be careful because he needed the defendant and Chalue
for “a job.”

On Saturday, Hall was seen outside the building where the
defendant's girl friend resided, talking to the defendant while
sitting in the girl friend’s pickup truck. In the early afternoon,
Hall, Chalue, and the defendant went to a party held by the
Springfield chapter of the Hells Angels at a tavern in Springfield;
Hall and the defendant left the party together early in the after-
noon and returned at approximately 4:30 pm. Hall, Chalue, and
the defendant left the tavern together at approximately 6:30 pM.,
and drove away in Hall’s Buick. Later that evening, Hall, Chalue,
and the defendant were at the Hells Angels clubhouse in Lee;
they left later to go to the defendant’s house in Pittsfield. Hall
drove to the defendant’s home in his own vehicle but first stopped
at Steven Hinman’s home in Lenox. Hall showed Hinman a .45
semiautomatic pistol that he had in his vest, as well as a “dog
food bag” that contained a .44 Magnum revolver, a sawed-off
AR-15-type weapon, and a small revolver.

The defendant and Chalue traveled to the defendant’s home
with two women, Allyson Scace and Kayla Sewall, in Sewall’s
vehicle after stopping at a liquor store. When Hall arrived at the

®The Buick at other times during the trial was described as gold in color.
4Andrew Johnston, a childhood friend of Robert Chadwell, testified that
people often referred to David Glasser by his nickname, “Drummer Dave.”

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defendant’s home, he pulled the firearms out of the dog food bag
and asked the defendant where he kept brake cleaner and gloves.
The defendant directed him to a cabinet and went upstairs with
Sewall. While they were upstairs, Hall and Chalue disassembled
and cleaned the firearms. The defendant asked Sewall to stay, but
she declined and left with Scace at approximately 9 pM., leaving
Hall, Chalue, and the defendant alone in the apartment.

The kidnapping of the three victims in Glasser’s apartment in
Pittsfield occurred shortly before midnight that Saturday or early
Sunday morning. Glasser’s upstairs neighbor asked Glasser to
move his truck at approximately 10:30 pm. that Saturday, and saw
the three victims (and a fourth man) in the kitchen of Glasser’s
apartment at that time. The last telephone call made from
Chadwell’s cellular telephone was at 11:21 pm. Shortly after
midnight, the upstairs neighbor heard banging from the front
downstairs hallway, and heard the voices of Glasser and
Frampton, as well as some unfamiliar voices. Hall later told a
friend, Rose Dawson, that, when they arrived at Glasser’s apart-
ment, one of the victims was using a computer and another was
playing a video game.

The defendant’s girl friend had returned from a hiking trip on
Friday night and was at her home on Saturday night. She made a
telephone call to the defendant’s cellular telephone at 12:09 a.m.
on Sunday, but the defendant did not answer and she left a
voicemail message. She sent him a text message on his cellular
telephone at 1:20 a.m., but received no reply. She telephoned him
again at 1:40 a.m., and again left a voicemail message after the
call was not answered.

At approximately 1:30 a.m. on Sunday, Hall appeared at
Dawson’s home in Pittsfield. He asked to borrow Dawson’s
cellular telephone, which she gave to him; he said he would be
back soon. He entered the passenger seat of a vehicle described as
a Jeep Wrangler® and left; the defendant owned a Jeep Wrangler.

Hall was next seen at a convenience store in Pittsfield at
approximately 5:30 a.m., where he purchased three candy bars
and a pack of cigarettes. Hall returned a few minutes later and
purchased a pack of Black and Mild cigars. The police seized the

®There was some confusion as to the color of the vehicle that was at Rose
Dawson’s residence at 1:30 a.m. Edwin Sutton, Rose’s father described it as a
Jeep Wrangler and testified that, although he was not sure, he thought it might
have been yellow. Ocean Sutton, one of Edwin’s daughters, described it as a
green Jeep Wrangler. The defendant’s Jeep is black.

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defendant’s Jeep seven days later and subsequently searched it;
they found a Black and Mild cigar wrapper inside. On September
12, in a search of the defendant’s apartment, to which he had
recently moved, the police found four or five Black and Mild
cigar wrappers in a duffle bag.

The store clerk observed that Hall had mud on his shirt and that
his boots and blue jeans were wet, as was the cash he handed over
to pay for the items. Tropical Storm Irene had reached western
Massachusetts during the night, bringing heavy rain and high
winds for much of the night and into the morning.

Shortly thereafter, Hall returned to the Dawson residence and
parked his Buick on the front lawn. The defendant’s Jeep arrived
behind the Buick. Hall walked from the Buick to the Jeep and left
in the Jeep.

At approximately 10:30 a.m., Hall returned to the Dawson
residence with Chalue and the defendant in the defendant’s Jeep,
which Hall was driving. Hall, who was wet and not wearing
shoes, asked Dawson and her friend, Alexandra Ely, who was
staying overnight with Dawson, to come to Hall’s home to make
breakfast. Hall gave them money, which was soaking wet, and
told them to buy breakfast food and bleach; he also told them to
wash their hands after handling the money. As Dawson and Ely
drove to a supermarket in Hall’s Buick, Hall telephoned Ely and
told her to skip the bleach and not look in a bag in the vehicle.
They looked inside the bag and saw what looked like a “batting
glove or golf glove.”

When they arrived at Hall’s house, the defendant’s Jeep was
parked in front; Hall, Chalue, and the defendant were inside. Hall
returned Dawson’s cellular telephone to her and told her to delete
her call log and tell no one that he had borrowed it. Chalue was
in bed, and the defendant sat in a recliner “sleeping” and looking
“tired.” Dawson and Ely left later in Hall’s Buick to return home.
Hall, Chalue, and the defendant retrieved the Buick from
Dawson’s home later that day.

At approximately 2 pm., Hall arrived at the home of David
Casey in Canaan, New York, approximately eighteen miles from
Pittsfield, in the Buick. Hall said that he was having trouble with
his vehicle and asked Casey if he knew anywhere nearby where
he could park it overnight. Casey called a friend, Alan Pavoni,
who agreed to let Hall park the vehicle in Pavoni’s driveway in
Becket. Hall then told Casey that he had killed Glasser, as well as
“a fat guy” and a black man who were with Glasser. He explained

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that he had held Glasser down and pulled the trigger, but the gun
misfired. As he tried to rechamber another round, Glasser ran into
the woods. “Davey” ran after him and shot him, but did not kill
him. “Davey” brought Glasser back to Hall, who then shot him.
Hall said the other two men were stabbed to death. He said they
thought the black man was dead and left him but, when they came
back, they saw him sitting on a log, moaning. Hall also said that
they “chopped [the victims] up,” and added that “one of the guys
really enjoyed torturing and cutting them up.” Hall noted that it
was “raining very hard” while this was happening.

Hall asked if Casey was still working with an excavator at a
property in Becket, and Casey said that he was. Hall then asked
if Casey would do him a favor; he wanted Casey to dig a hole to
bury the bodies. Hall added that, if Casey did this favor for him,
he would not harm Langdon.* Hall wanted to go with him to dig
the hole that day, but Casey said he would meet him there on
Monday morning.

Between 5 and 6 p., Hall drove his Buick to Pavoni’s property
and parked it there; another person was with him in the Buick. A
“Jeep-like vehicle” also arrived and picked up Hall.

Hall, Chalue, and the defendant were seen late in the afternoon
standing near the defendant’s Jeep in the parking lot of the
apartment building in Pittsfield where the defendant’s girl friend
resided.

Casey met Hall as scheduled at approximately 8:30 a.m. on
Monday at Pavoni’s property.” Hall was with a man he identified
as “Davey,” whom Hall assured Casey he could trust because the
man was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, and a person had
to kill someone to become a member; Casey identified this man
at trial as Chalue. Hall opened the trunk of the Buick and said that
it was “starting to smell.” Hall later drove the Buick to the
property where Casey kept the excavator. Casey used the exca-
vator to dig a large hole, and Hall opened the trunk and dropped
a number of plastic garbage bags, which Hall said contained body
parts, into the hole.

On Monday afternoon, Hall and Chalue brought the Buick to a
salvage yard and sold it for scrap, where it was later placed in a

SDavid Casey testified that Scott Langdon was living with and planned to
marry Casey’s sister. Casey knew that Langdon was cooperating with the police
regarding the pending charges against Hall.

7 The defendant arrived for work as usual on Monday morning at the design
firm where he was employed as a gardener.

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crusher. The interior carpets were coated with liquid, the back
seat was mostly missing, and the carpet had been removed from
the trunk. On Sunday, September 4, Hall, Chalue, and the de-
fendant drove past the salvage yard in the defendant’s Jeep, and
then drove back in the other direction, arguably for the purpose of
checking to see that Hall’s Buick had actually been crushed. After
they were stopped by police at a nearby gasoline station, the
police seized and searched the Jeep, but found nothing of evi-
dentiary value.

On Friday, September 9, after Casey had revealed to police the
location of the bodies, the police dug up the plastic bags contain-
ing the victims’ body parts. The autopsy of the body parts
revealed that all of the victims had been shot and stabbed; their
neck, arms, and legs had been removed, and two of the bodies had
been cut through the torso. Most of the dismemberment had been
accomplished by chopping or hacking with a sharp instrument
such as a butcher knife.

On September 10, the defendant was arrested and brought to
the Pittsfield police station. At the station, a State police lieuten-
ant told the defendant that he was protecting a “rat,” referring to
Hall, because Hall had offered to cooperate with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation regarding the Hells Angels clubhouse in
Lee a year earlier. As the defendant was walking back to his cell,
the defendant said to Chalue, “[Y]ou hear what they’re saying
about our partner? They’re saying he’s a stoolie.”

On September 12, the police executed search warrants at two
apartments in the same building in Pittsfield: an apartment where
the defendant lived and an apartment from which he had recently
moved. In the apartment where he lived, among other items that
will be described later in this opinion, the police found a Sep-
tember 6 edition of a newspaper with an article describing the
disappearance of the three victims, and an article dated Septem-
ber 8, describing the search for the missing men.

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing a claim
of insufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, “after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis in
original). Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire, 470 Mass. 338, 343
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677
(1979). The defendant notes accurately that there was no percipi-
ent witness who testified to the defendant’s participation in the

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killing and dismemberment of the three victims, and no forensic
evidence that linked him to the crimes. Circumstantial evidence,
however, “alone may be sufficient to meet the burden of estab-
lishing guilt.” Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713,
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014). We conclude that the
evidence was sufficient in this case to support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant, with the intent to kill,
knowingly participated in the premeditated murder of the three
victims. See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467
(2009).

A reasonable jury could have found that the defendant was
aware on the Friday before the killings that Hall planned to kill
Glasser in order to silence him as a witness. They also could find
that the defendant had a motive to assist Hall in killing Glasser,
because he wanted to be a member of the Hells Angels chapter
where Hall served as sergeant at arms, and helping Hall in the
killing would curry favor with Hall and cause Hall to believe him
worthy of trust.

On Saturday evening, shortly before the victims were kid-
napped and killed, the defendant was with Hall and Chalue at the
defendant's home when they disassembled and cleaned multiple
firearms that Hall had just brought. At approximately the time of
the kidnappings and killings, the defendant failed to answer two
telephone calls and a text message from his girl friend. As
described by Hall in his conversation with Casey, Hall, Chalue,
and a third assailant brought the victims to the woods in the heavy
downpour of the tropical storm, killed them, and dismembered
their bodies.* It can reasonably be inferred that the dismember-
ment of the victims took a substantial period of time to accom-
plish and that it would have been bloody and messy work in a
tropical storm. It is therefore probative that Hall was a passenger
in what reasonably could be inferred to be the defendant’s Jeep at
approximately 1:30 a.m., when Hall stopped at the Dawson resi-
dence. It can also reasonably be inferred that Chalue and the
defendant were still with Hall at approximately 5:30 a.m., because
Hall purchased three candy bars at the convenience store and a
brand of cigars smoked by the defendant. This inference grows

SHall’s statements to Casey were admissible for their truth against the
defendant because they were made to induce Casey’s cooperation in burying the
bodies and therefore were made in the course of and in furtherance of the joint
venture. See Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 522 (2016), and cases
cited.

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stronger when one considers that the defendant’s Jeep followed
Hall when he dropped the Buick off at the Dawson residence
shortly after leaving the convenience store, and that Hall imme-
diately left in the Jeep. Because nothing of evidentiary value was
found in the Jeep, it can be inferred that the victims’ dismem-
bered bodies by this time were in the trunk of the Buick. The
defendant was still with Hall and Chalue when they returned to
the Dawson residence at 10:30 a.m., with Hall now driving the
defendant’s Jeep, and continued with them to Hall’s house later
that morning in the Jeep, where the defendant appeared to be
sleepy.

There was credible evidence that a third person participated in
the killings and dismemberments with Hall and Chalue, and that
the defendant was the only third person with Hall and Chalue
immediately before and immediately after the killings. Moreover,
Hall was seen in the defendant’s Jeep at or around the time period
when the bodies were likely being dismembered. If the defendant
had not participated in the killings, it is unlikely that he would
have chosen to keep newspaper articles about the disappearance
and the search for the victims in his apartment or that he would
have referred to Hall in a conversation with Chalue as “our
partner.” In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the third
person who participated in the killings and subsequent dismem-
berments.

2. Admission of photographs of items found in defendant's
apartment. The defendant argues that the judge abused his dis-
cretion in admitting photographs of items found during the search
of the defendant's apartments because their probative value was
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The defendant moved
in limine to bar these items from evidence, but the judge denied
the motion. The objected-to photographs show (1) anatomical
drawings from a medical textbook with images of human dissec-
tions and amputation of body parts, some of which were pre-
sented as a collage hung on the wall; and (2) a machete, a cleaver,
hatchets, various knives, and a baseball bat with spikes.

The nature of so-called prior bad act (or other act) evidence
under Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2017) is that it reflects badly on
the character of the defendant and might show a propensity to
commit the crime charged, which poses a risk of unfair prejudice
to the defendant. If it is offered solely for that purpose, it is not
admissible. But if it is offered for a purpose other than character

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or propensity, such as to establish motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or pattern of operation, the
evidence is admissible where its probative value is not out-
weighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014). See also
Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 79 (1986), S.C., 447
Mass. 635 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385
Mass. 244, 269 (1982) (prosecution may not introduce evidence
that defendant previously misbehaved for purpose of showing his
or her bad character or propensity to commit crime charged, but
such evidence may be admissible if “relevant for some other
purpose”); Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 206 (1985)
(prior bad act admissible where it is not offered to demonstrate
that defendant acted in conformity with his or her past actions but
rather to “prove a relevant subsidiary fact”). See generally Mass.
G. Evid. § 404(b). We give great deference to a trial judge’s
exercise of discretion in deciding whether to admit a prior bad
act, and we will reverse for an abuse of discretion only where the
judge made “ ‘a clear error of judgment in weighing’ the factors
relevant to the decision, .. . such that the decision falls outside the
range of reasonable alternatives.” L.L. vy. Commonwealth, 470
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), quoting Picciotto v. Continental Cas.
Co., 512 F.3d 9, 15 (ist Cir. 2008).

Here, there were three relevant, noncharacter purposes to the
admission of the amputation drawings and the collage of ana-
tomical drawings. First, their admission was probative of the
identity of the defendant as the third man who participated in the
killings. A critical piece of evidence in this case was the state-
ment made by Hall in furtherance of the joint venture that “one of
the guys really enjoyed torturing and cutting [the victims] up.”
Evidence that the defendant chose to put on his wall anatomical
drawings showing the dissection of the human body and chose to
possess drawings depicting the amputations of arms and legs
tends to identify the defendant as the person who likely fit Hall’s
description of the third accomplice as someone who enjoyed
“cutting [the victims] up.” If Hall had said that the third person
who participated in the killings was fascinated by medieval
weapons, it would have been highly probative of identity if one
of his friends had photographs of such weapons on his wall and
a collection of such weapons on his mantel. The collage and
drawings in the defendant’s apartment are no less probative of
identity.

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Generally, we characterize other act evidence that is admissible
to show identity as “modus operandi” evidence and allow its
admission only where “the prior events and the circumstances of
the crime charged have such similarities as to be meaningfully
distinctive” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Jackson, 417
Mass. 830, 836 (1994). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holliday, 450
Mass. 794, 815, 555, cert. denied sub. nom. Mooltrey v. Massa-
chusetts, 555 U.S. 947 (2008); Commonwealth v. Montez, 450
Mass. 736, 743-746 (2008). The theory underlying its admission
is that the distinctive commonality between the prior or subse-
quent conduct and the charged act creates “a sufficient nexus to
render the conduct relevant and probative” on the issue of identity
(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 202
(2004). We require a tight nexus because modus operandi evi-
dence poses a high risk of unfair prejudice in that it allows the
jury to learn about prior or subsequent bad acts of the defendant
that are similar in nature to the crime charged. The commonalities
among the crimes, therefore, need to be so distinctive that their
probative value in identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of
the crime charged outweighs the substantial risk of unfair pre-
judice.

We do not suggest that the anatomical drawings found in the
defendant's apartment are admissible as modus operandi evi-
dence. The method or location of the amputations shown in the
drawings in the defendant’s apartment are not so similar to the
method or location of the actual dismemberment of the victims as
to permit a finding that the drawings demonstrate the method of
operation of the dismemberment. See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 251
(pornographic drawings found in defendant's jail cell not admis-
sible as evidence of modus operandi “where the drawings had
only a general similarity to the child pornography” found on
public library computer he was charged with having possessed).

Rather, the anatomical drawings are admissible as a different
species of identity evidence: evidence of idiosyncratic conduct by
a defendant that, in light of the specific evidence in a case, tends
to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime. Generally,
the probative weight of such identity evidence need not be as
great as modus operandi evidence because it does not involve the
commission of similar crimes, and therefore poses less risk of
unfair prejudice (although we do not minimize the risk of such
prejudice arising from the drawings in this case). The probative
weight of this type of identity evidence depends on its connection

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to the other evidence in the case that ties the idiosyncratic
conduct to the identity of the perpetrator, as in our medieval
weaponry example.® Here, the anatomical drawings would not be
admissible as identity evidence if Hall had not identified the third
assailant as someone who enjoyed “cutting [the victims] up.” The
drawings have probative weight as to identity only because the
drawings tend to identify the defendant as a person well known to
Hall who appeared to have an unusual interest in the amputation
and dissection of the human body.

Apart from identity, a second relevant, noncharacter purpose
for admitting the drawings is to show state of mind. One of the
extraordinary features of these killings is the dismemberment of
the victims, which appears to have had no pragmatic purpose and
which must have taken a considerable amount of time to com-
plete, especially in the midst of a tropical storm. The collage and
drawings in the defendant’s apartment are probative of the de-
fendant’s state of mind as a person fascinated by amputation and
human dissection, and of an intent to seize the opportunity of
these killings to engage in actual amputations and human dissec-
tion. Cf. Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 739-740
(2014) (confrontations between defendant and victim three
months prior to workplace shooting and between defendant and
another employee were relevant to defendant’s motive and state
of mind).

Third, the motive for the killings was to silence Glasser, who
would have testified against Hall in two criminal cases, and to
silence the other two victims, who would otherwise have been
witnesses to Glasser’s killing. But these motives do not explain
the victims’ dismemberment. We have admitted other act evi-
dence where, without it, a crime may appear to be an inexplicable

In dissent, Justice Lowy argues that our decision to admit the anatomical
drawings is improper because “the connection between the defendant’s other
conduct and the charged conduct is squarely based on an impermissible pro-
pensity inference.” Post at 493. While the admission of any evidence that sug-
gests the defendant’s bad character risks inviting the jury to draw the improper
inference that the defendant acted in conformity with his past conduct, the
admission of the drawings in this case is not premised on such an improper
inference. Rather, the drawings invite the jury to conclude that the defendant
matched Hall’s description of the third participant in the crime. While it would
be improper to admit the drawings for the purpose of demonstrating that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, there is nothing improper about
asking the jury to infer that the uncommon trait Hall attributed to the crime’s
third participant is also attributable to the defendant.

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act of violence. See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 68
(1998); Drew, 397 Mass. at 78-79. The defendant’s apparent
fascination with amputation and human dismemberment offers an
explanation for what would otherwise be inexplicable.

Where there were three relevant, noncharacter purposes for the
admission of the anatomical drawings, the judge did not abuse his
discretion in ruling that, “[iJn light of the other evidence in the
case, I do believe they have some probative value which out-
weighs the prejudicial effect.” In Commonwealth v. Guy, 454
Mass. 440, 443-444 (2009), we concluded that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion where the probative weight of the evi-
dence was less compelling than it was here, and where the risk of
unfair prejudice was equally significant. Where an apparently
randomly chosen victim was murdered in a park by stabbing,
strangulation, and blunt trauma, we found no abuse of discretion
in the admission of evidence that the defendant “spoke to co-
workers about serial killings, and that he often read books about
murder and serial killings” (footnote omitted). Jd. at 441, 443. We
concluded that evidence of the defendant’s fascination with mur-
der “was relevant to the defendant’s motive and state of mind and
to explain what otherwise might be seen as an inexplicable act of
violence.” Id. at 443. We reach a comparable conclusion as to the
anatomical drawings in this case.

Our analysis is different with respect to the admission of the
photographs depicting the cutting objects found in the defend-
ant’s apartment. “A weapon that could have been used in the
course of a crime is admissible, in the judge’s discretion, even
without direct proof that the particular weapon was in fact used in
the commission of the crime,” because “[s]uch evidence is rel-
evant for demonstrating that the defendant had the ‘means of
committing the crime.’ ” Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass.
116, 122 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Ashman, 430 Mass.
736, 744 (2000). Based on the testimony of the medical examiner
and forensic anthropologist, the machete, cleaver, hatchets, and
various knives found in the defendant’s apartment were consis-
tent with the types of tools used to dismember the victims, and
could have served as the means to accomplish the dismember-
ment. Although they tested negative for blood at the time of the
search of the defendant’s apartment on September 12, approxi-
mately two weeks after the killings, and therefore were not seized
for further testing, they could not reasonably be excluded as
weapons that were used in the commission of the dismember-

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ment. Therefore, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his
discretion in admitting the photographs of the machete, cleaver,
hatchets, and knives.

In contrast, the judge did abuse his discretion in admitting the
spiked baseball bat, which had no probative value and posed a
needless risk of unfair prejudice. “Where a weapon definitively
could not have been used in the commission of the crime, we
have generally cautioned against admission of evidence related to
it.” Barbosa, 463 Mass. at 122, citing Commonwealth v. Toro,
395 Mass. 354, 357-358 (1985). Because there was no evidence
that the baseball bat with spikes could have been used in the
commission of the killings or the dismemberments, we conclude
that the judge erred in admitting the photograph depicting it. We
also conclude that, given the other admissible evidence depicting
what was found in the search of the defendant’s apartment, the
error was not prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Graham, 431 Mass.
282, 288, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1020 (2000), quoting Common-
wealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994) (error not preju-
dicial “if we are sure that the error did not influence the jury, or
had but very slight effect’).

We note that the defendant, although he unsuccessfully moved
in limine to exclude this other act evidence and timely objected to
its admission, did not seek a limiting instruction regarding the
jury’s consideration of this evidence, and the judge did not give
one. As a result, the jury were not told that this evidence may not
be considered by them as evidence of the defendant’s bad char-
acter or his propensity to commit the crimes charged.'? See
Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice §§ 7.7.2, 7.7.3
(Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2013). Because there was no motion for
a new trial, we do not know whether the absence of a request for
a limiting instruction arose from a tactical choice by defense
counsel not to focus the jury’s attention on this evidence, or from
an error of judgment by counsel. Regardless, we review the
absence of such a limiting instruction under G. L. c. 278, § 33E,
to determine whether it created a substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 Mass.
799, 809 (2002) (substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice
standard applied to absence of limiting instruction in case of
murder in first degree). See also Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433

10The judge did instruct the jury that the defendant’s affiliation with the Hells
Angels may not be considered as evidence of a bad character or a criminal
personality.

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Mass. 45, 48, 61 (2000).

The jury are always free to consider evidence without limita-
tion whenever a judge fails to give a limiting instruction under
Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b), but we do not always conclude that the
absence of such an instruction creates a substantial likelihood of
a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460
Mass. 277, 290 (2011). One factor in considering whether its
absence produced a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of
justice is whether the prosecutor in his or her closing argument
misused the other act evidence to invite the jury to consider it as
proof of the defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit
the crime. Cf. Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461,
479-480 (2010) (prior bad act evidence not mentioned in prose-
cutor’s closing argument). In Guy, 454 Mass. at 443-444, we
noted that “[t]he prosecutor elicited the testimony and referred to
it in his closing in a technical, analytical manner, without drama
or undue emphasis that might have released its potential for
unfair prejudice.” The same could be said here; the prosecutor did
not speak of this testimony in his closing argument, and alluded
to it only when he argued that the murders were not just an
attempt to keep three men from testifying in court “but of satis-
fying some retribution and intent to take apart humanity piece by
piece. . . . [T]he defendant, quote, really enjoyed torturing and
cutting them up.” In short, the prosecutor alluded to this evidence
for its relevant, noncharacter purposes. Where those purposes
were themselves compelling, the absence of a limiting instruction
did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

3. Statement by defendant regarding scars on his right arm.
Hinman testified that, on an unspecified date, Hall brought the
defendant to Hinman’s property, and Hinman stared at the scars
on the defendant’s right arm. Over objection, Hinman testified
that the defendant told him, “See these scars[;] imagine what I
can do to somebody else.” The defendant contends that the judge
abused his discretion in determining that the probative weight of
this statement outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, and con-
sequently admitting it in evidence.

We recognize that this statement generally would be relevant
only for the forbidden purpose of suggesting the defendant’s
violent character and his propensity to commit acts of violence,
and therefore would be inadmissible. But in the unusual context
of this case, it, like the collage of human dissections on the
defendant's apartment wall, is relevant to identify the defendant

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as the third person participating in the killings who Hall described
as someone who “really enjoyed torturing and cutting [the vic-
tims] up.” In essence, through this statement, the defendant was
describing himself as someone who is capable of extraordinary
acts of violence against other persons, which tends to identify him
as someone who would enjoy torturing and dismembering other
persons, and which therefore permits the inference that he is the
third person referred to by Hall in speaking with Casey. Where
this statement is probative of the defendant’s identification as the
third assailant, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his
discretion in concluding that its probative weight outweighed the
tisk of unfair prejudice.

4. Prosecutor’s closing argument. The defendant contends that
the prosecutor in closing argument “argued a number of points
based on facts that do not appear in the record.” Where there was
no objection to the closing argument, we review the record to
determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of a mis-
carriage of justice. We conclude that there was not.

The defendant identifies four instances where the prosecutor
allegedly argued facts not in evidence. First, he claims that there
was no evidence supporting the prosecutor’s statement that the
three assailants had “the instruments in bags available for the
dismemberment,” which the prosecutor argued showed that the
killings and dismemberments were planned. The defendant is
correct that no witness testified to this fact, but the prosecutor is
entitled to argue that it was a fair inference that the assailants had
the tools with them when they killed the victims, even though it
was also possible that they retrieved the tools after the killings
based on Hall’s statement that they left the scene believing that
the black man was dead and were surprised to find him still alive
when they returned.

Second, the defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly
suggested that the cleaver found in the defendant’s apartment was
used to dismember the bodies. The prosecutor properly noted that
the three assailants had access to the types of tools that could have
been used to dismember the victims, including the cleaver. He
also properly argued that the jury should not infer that the cleaver
was not used in the killings because it did not test positive for
blood, asking rhetorically, “Wouldn’t you expect that [the
cleaver] would test positive unless it was very carefully
cleaned .. . 7” Where a kitchen cleaver would routinely be used
to cut meat, and therefore would be expected to have blood

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residue if not carefully cleaned, this was not an improper argu-
ment.

Third, the defendant takes issue with the prosecutor’s sugges-
tion to the jury that the defendant was the third assailant whom
Hall said “really enjoyed torturing and cutting them up.” This was
fair argument based on inferences from the evidence in the case.

Finally, the defendant claims that the prosecutor misstated the
evidence by telling the jury that the defendant had “boasted to
Steve Hinman that he had scarred himself.” This was a fair
inference from the defendant’s statement to Hinman in which he
invited Hinman to imagine what he could do “to somebody else.”

5. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. As part of our plenary
review of the case, we note that the judge, in defining reasonable
doubt in his final jury instructions, told the jury that “the evidence
must convince you of the defendant’s guilt to a reasonable and
moral certainty,” but omitted the phrase from the reasonable
doubt instruction in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 320
(1850), that clarified the meaning of that phrase: “a certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason
and judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it.” Because the defendant did not object, we review to
determine whether the judge’s deviation created a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v.
Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 220 (2014).

“A constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction
amounts to a structural error which defies analysis by harmless
error standards.” Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 468
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Pinckney, 419 Mass. 341, 342
(1995). But “[t]he Constitution does not require that any particu-
lar form of words be used in advising the jury of the govern-
ment’s burden of proof.” Russell, supra, quoting Pinckney, supra.
It suffices that the words used “impress[ ] upon the factfinder the
need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the
accused.” Russell, supra, quoting Pinckney, supra at 344."

The phrase “moral certainty” if used “in isolation, without
further explanation, might amount to an erroneous instruction on
reasonable doubt.” Pinckney, supra at 345, citing Commonwealth

1 Commonwealth v, Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 477-478 (2015), we exercised
“our inherent supervisory power to require a uniform instruction on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that uses more modern language, but preserves the
power, efficacy, and essence of the Webster charge.” The trial in this case
resulted in verdicts in 2014, before the new instruction was mandated.

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v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 571 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1091 (1995). But its use was not reversible error “where it was
used with an additional instruction which impressed upon the
factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of
the guilt of the accused.” Pinckney, supra at 344, citing Victor v.
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1994). Although the phrase must be
linked with “language that lends content to the phrase,” Pinckney,
supra at 345, “[w]e have never held that ‘moral certainty’ must be
immediately followed by content-lending language, only that it
must be linked with such language” (emphasis in original). Com-
monwealth v. LaBriola, 430 Mass. 569, 573 (2000). Additionally,
we have said that use of the phrase “abiding conviction” in
conjunction with the moral certainty language “does much to
alleviate any concerns that the phrase ‘moral certainty’ might be
misunderstood in the abstract.” Jd. at 572-573, quoting Victor,
511 US. at 21. The judge’s use of the phrase “abiding convic-
tion” in conjunction with “moral certainty,” coupled with his
fidelity to the Webster instruction in every respect except for the
noted omission, convinces us that the omission did not create a
risk that the jury failed adequately to understand the reasonable
doubt standard, and therefore did not create a substantial likeli-
hood of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Beldotti,
409 Mass. 553, 562 (1991) (no error where moral certainty
language used as part of Webster charge).

Having addressed this omission in the reasonable doubt in-
struction, we conclude that the verdicts of murder in the first
degree are fully consonant with justice and we decline to exercise
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to
direct the entry of verdicts of a lesser degree of guilt.

Judgments affirmed.

Lowy, J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk, J., joins). I agree with
the court that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the
defendant’s convictions. Because I disagree with the court’s
analysis of the admission of photographs of items found in the
defendant’s apartment, however, I respectfully dissent.

Today, the court purports to announce a new brand of identity
evidence, which involves the use of similar, but not distinctive,
conduct of a defendant to infer that the defendant acted in
conformity with that conduct on another occasion. If this sounds

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like the language often used to describe the type of character
inference that fact finders are roundly prohibited from making,
that is because it is.

The court sets forth three “relevant, noncharacter purposes” for
which it holds the photographs were admissible: (1) identity, (2)
state of mind, and (3) motive. I address each in turn, and finally,
T assess the prejudicial effect in this case.

1. Identity evidence. 1 agree with the court that the posters
hanging in the defendant’s apartment were not sufficiently similar
to the methods by which the victims’ bodies were dismembered
to qualify as modus operandi evidence.* I also agree that evidence
may be admissible to prove a defendant’s identity, absent such
similarity, when the evidence is ultimately relevant because the
evidence makes it more likely than it would be without the
evidence that the defendant is the individual responsible for the
crime. This latter category of “identity” evidence, however, does
not permit the use of the defendant’s conduct “to prove [his]
character in order to show that on a particular occasion [he] acted
in accordance with the character.” Mass G. Evid. § 404(b)(1)
(2017). This rule limiting the use of a defendant’s prior conduct
applies without regard to the probative strength of the conduct.

“One of the oldest principles of Anglo-American law is that a
person ‘should not be judged strenuously by reference to the
awesome spectre of his past’ ” (citation omitted). D.P. Leonard,
The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence § 1.2, at 2 (2009)
(Wigmore). “For nearly two centuries, courts have excluded the
evidence not because of its lack of probative value but primarily
because of the dangers it is thought to present. Most commonly
cited is the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at 6. This prohibition
on character evidence includes using a defendant’ s other, relevant

‘When asked whether the dismemberment of the victims was consistent with
the surgical illustrations, the Commonwealth’s expert said, “They do show
amputation of limbs, so that portion is consistent. I can’t say if the exact location
on the bone is consistent in some of them. I can see at least one is inconsistent
in terms of location. Sometimes I just can’t tell what part of the bone I'm
looking at.” The prosecutor then asked whether the victims’ limbs were dis-
membered at the site of the joint (as depicted in the illustrations), the witness
responded, “They were chopped through sometimes near a joint but they were
chopped through mostly right to the bone itself. In terms of the vertebrae, a lot
of the chopping was aimed between two bones, so both bones were damaged but
they were separated where they normally separate.” Further, on cross-examina-
tion, defense counsel asked, “There's nothing in that diagram that’s consistent
With the multiple large chopping injuries which you just discussed, com
The witness answered, “That's correct.”

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conduct to prove his or her “propensity” to commit the charged
crime. Jd. at 2-3. See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b). The danger of
admitting such character evidence against the defendant is not
that it is irrelevant. Rather, the danger is that the jury will over-
value the evidence. Wigmore, supra at 5-7.

To say that other conduct is permissibly probative of “identity,”
rather than impermissibly probative of character, merely because
a defendant's character makes him more likely to be guilty, is an
exercise in circular logic that renders the prohibition on the
character inference inert. Thus, the court’s reasoning today, at
best, dilutes the stringent requirements for modus operandi evi-
dence, or, at worst, eviscerates the rule prohibiting use of a
defendant’s other conduct to show his propensity to commit the
crime charged.

I would classify admissible evidence that is probative of iden-
tity into two categories: (1) modus operandi, and (2) what I will
call “identity-based evidence.” Unlike modus operandi, identity-
based evidence does not require a high level of distinctiveness
shared between the defendant’s other conduct and the charged
conduct.” Rather, such other conduct constitutes admissible iden-
tity-based evidence when introduced for a nonpropensity pur-
pose, such as, motive, opportunity, knowledge, state of mind, or
many other purposes, but the nonpropensity purpose is ultimately
relevant to “identify” the defendant as the individual who com-
mitted the charged crime. See P.C. Giannelli, Understanding
Evidence 174-175 (4th ed. 2013) (Giannelli).

The following example of identity-based evidence is illustra-
tive. If shortly before committing armed robbery, a defendant
steals a particular weapon to commit the armed robbery, evidence
that the defendant stole the weapon would be admissible to
establish that he had the means or opportunity — because he had
the particular weapon used to commit the crime. See Giannelli,
supra at 174, That the defendant had the means to commit the
crime is relevant to his “identity” as the perpetrator of the armed
robbery. See id. The judge, however, must still balance the
probative value of the theft of the weapon against the danger of
undue prejudice that the jury will consider the theft as evidence

2As the court notes, ante at 483-484, a similarity that is merely general is a
reason to exclude evidence of other conduct. The danger that a jury will consider
prior conduct as propensity evidence is at its apex when the prior conduct
resembles the charged conduct, but is not sufficiently similar for purposes of
modus operandi.

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of bad character. See Mass. G. Evid. § 403. Yet, there is minimal
danger that a jury would impermissibly consider the theft as
indicative of the defendant’s propensity to commit armed rob-
bery, i.e., that the defendant showed his bad character by stealing
a firearm, and that it was more likely that he committed the crime
due to this bad character. Rather, the more probable and logical
inference is that the evidence “identifies” the defendant as the
individual who committed the crime because he possessed the
weapon used in its commission. The latter conclusion is not based
on an impermissible propensity inference.

In this case, the connection between the defendant’s other
conduct and the charged conduct is squarely based on an imper-
missible propensity inference. The other conduct is hanging post-
ers depicting medical amputations. The charged conduct is chop-
ping up three human beings. The logical connection between the
two is that the defendant acted in conformity with the character
trait demonstrated by displaying images of amputation by bru-
tally chopping up the victims on a subsequent occasion — a stark
contrast to the firearm example above, which involves no such
impermissible character inference.

The court conditions the admissibility of the drawings on
Adam Lee Hall’s statement that “one of the guys really enjoyed”
chopping the victims up. The court says that the anatomical
drawings are thus probative of identity in the same way that
posters of medieval weapons would be admissible identity evi-
dence if Hall had said one of the participants was fascinated by
medieval weapons.

The court’s example is not analogous to the present case.
Unlike the present case, the court’s example does not implicate a
propensity inference, because the medieval weapons referred to
in the hypothetical example do not relate to the commission of the
crime. Thus, the example does not ask the jury to conclude that,
because the defendant had posters of medieval weapons, he is the
type of person who would participate in three brutal murders. In
the hypothetical example, Hall’s statement serves only to identify
a person who has an interest in medieval weapons. The medieval
weapons posters are relevant because they show an interest of the
accused, and the hypothetical statement identifies an individual
who has that interest as a participant in the crime. The posters in
no way suggest that the defendant acted in accordance with that
interest in killing the victims.

By contrast, in this case Hall stated that one of the participants
enjoyed the act of torturing and chopping up people. The ana-

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tomical drawings only corroborate this statement if one presumes
that the defendant acted in accordance with his interest in ana-
tomical dismemberment on a subsequent occasion by chopping
up the victims in a manner that did not meaningfully resemble the
dissections depicted in the drawings. Regardless of whether the
defendant’s display of the posters makes it more likely that he
was the third participant than it would be without such evidence,
this is the quintessential, impermissible propensity inference.

2. State of mind. The court concludes that the fact that the
dismemberment of the victims “appears to have had no pragmatic
purpose and . . . must have taken a considerable amount of time
to complete” was an indication of the defendant’s state of mind.
Ante at 484. Even setting aside the evidence suggesting that there
was in fact a pragmatic purpose for dismembering the bodies,?
this evidence still requires a jury to assume that an individual who
is “fascinated by amputation and human dissection,” demon-
strated only by display of posters, would “seize the opportunity of
these killings to engage in actual amputations and human dissec-
tion.” Id.

Under this rubric, the court’s theoretical path of admissibility is
“jdentity-based” evidence: a person who is fascinated with am-
putation is more likely to engage in the act of physically dismem-
bering people. The court may be correct that displaying the
posters is probative of the defendant’s state of mind, which
ultimately is relevant to identify him as the perpetrator of the
crime. But, we do not allow in evidence simply because it is
relevant. See Wigmore, supra at 5. This theory still requires the
quintessential prohibited inference, although labeled as “state of
mind,” in this application. To be relevant to the defendant’s state
of mind, one must conclude that he acted in conformity with his
other conduct of hanging the posters on a subsequent occasion by
participating in the murders.

®The court concludes that the dismembered bodies were likely all placed in
Hall’s Buick. Ante at 481, Further, after the killings, Rose Dawson and Alex-
andra Ely, who were not alleged participants in the killings, drove in the Buick
to a supermarket. They did not look in the trunk, but they also did not testify that
they saw any blood or body parts in the cabin of the automobile. Moreover,
David Casey testified that he later observed Hall open the trunk of the Buick and
drop a number of plastic garbage bags into the hole Casey had dug. Accordingly,
chopping up the bodies may well have been a practical measure for purposes of
transporting three bodies in the trunk of the vehicle, while still retaining the
vehicle for limited use until the time it could be destroyed. Whether the
dismemberment of the bodies had any practical purpose was not an issue at trial
and was not argued by the Commonwealth on appeal.

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The Commonwealth itself described the state of mind only as
“depraved.” This is a thin veil. It is difficult to imagine an
interpretation of this argument that is not a bald assertion that the
defendant’s bad or “depraved” character makes him more likely
to be guilty of murder. See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass.
228, 251-252 (2014) (jury prohibited from inferring that defend-
ant’s interest in child pornography meant he must have been
person who accessed child pornography in library). Admitting the
photographs as “state of mind” evidence where the photographs
reflect only a general character trait of the defendant eviscerates
any distinction between evidence of a character trait and that of
state of mind.

The admission of this evidence was coupled with testimony
from one witness that she observed “a lot of creepy shit every-
where” inside the defendant’s apartment. On this theory of ad-
missibility, the Commonwealth does not attempt to factually or
temporally tie this so-called “state of mind” evidence to the crime
at issue. Contrast Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 78-79
(1986), S.C., 447 Mass. 635 (2006) (defendant's participation in
Satanic rituals relevant to prove involvement in ritualistic kill-
ings). Accordingly, I would conclude that the posters were not
admissible to prove the defendant’s state of mind.

3. Motive. The court concludes that the posters were indepen-
dently probative of the defendant’s “motive.” The court relies on
cases in which we have allowed the Commonwealth to establish
a “context for the killing” when it would otherwise appear to the
jury as an “inexplicable act of violence” (citation omitted). Com-
monwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 68 (1998). The circum-
stances of this case do not resemble those relied on by the court.
See, e.g., id. (Commonwealth allowed to introduce significant
detail regarding defendant’s relationship with victim and wit-
nesses involved in drug business connected to murder); Common-
wealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269-270 (1982) (Common-
wealth permitted to introduce evidence of defendant’s activities
on day of murder because they were “inextricably intertwined
with the description of events on the [day] of the killing”). See
also Commonwealth v. Guy, 454 Mass. 440, 443 (2009) (Com-
monwealth permitted to admit evidence of defendant’s fascina-
tion with serial killings in absence of any other evidence of
motive).

The court relies primarily on Guy, 454 Mass. at 443-444, which
is not analogous. In that case, the Commonwealth had significant

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physical evidence tying the defendant to the crime, but was faced
with a peculiar situation of having no explanation for the jury as
to why the defendant had committed the crime.‘ By contrast, Hall
orchestrated David Glasser’s death to prevent his testimony. The
other two victims were murdered to eliminate witnesses to
Glasser’ s killing. The defendant, as the Commonwealth argued at
trial, was motivated to assist Hall because the defendant was
aspiring to become a member of the Hells Angels motorcycle
club. The Commonwealth did not, and does not on appeal, argue
that the defendant was motivated to participate in the crime to
seize the opportunity to dismember human beings, or that the
dismemberment had no practical purpose.

4. Prejudicial effect. For the reasons set forth above, I would
conclude that the anatomical drawings were probative only of the
defendant's character and were thus inadmissible. Accordingly, it
is unnecessary to weigh the probative value against the danger of
undue prejudice, since this evidence has no probative value other
than propensity. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the error
created a “reasonable possibility that . . . might have contributed
to the jury’s verdict.” Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 23
(1999). The Commonwealth bears not only the burden to show
the lack of error, but also the “risk of doubt when any exists” as
to whether the error influenced the jury’s verdict. Jd. The Com-
monwealth does not even argue that the evidence, if erroneously
admitted, was not prejudicial. That may well end the inquiry, but
there are five factors that I believe enhanced the danger of
prejudice in this case.

First, even if the evidence had been admissible, it should have
been accompanied by a limiting instruction. No limiting instruc-
tion was requested or given at trial, despite the palpable danger of
undue prejudice of the evidence. Without a limiting instruction,
the photographs were before the jury for all purposes, including
as impermissible propensity evidence. This danger created a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. G. L. c. 278,

“There was also a greater quantum of evidence that the defendant in Guy, 454
Mass. at 443-444 & n.3, had a significant fascination with serial killings,
including a large number of books seized from his home (which were not
themselves admitted in evidence, but were referenced) and testimony from his
coworkers attesting to his ongoing fascination. Here, the only evidence of the
defendant’s “fascination” was that he had placed posters on his wall, and the
record suggests that the posters had not been displayed on the wall for a long
period of time because the defendant was still in the process of moving his
belongings from his previous residence into this residence.

477 Mass. 472 (2017) 497

Commonwealth », Veiovis.

§ 33E. See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 252 (illustrations too prejudi-
cial to justify admission, even with limiting instruction).

Second, in other cases, we have found that the failure to give a
limiting instruction did not warrant reversal, when other circum-
stances mitigated the danger of unfair prejudice. For example, in
Guy, 454 Mass. at 443-444 & n.3, in which we did not discuss a
limiting instruction, we noted that the prosecutor utilized evi-
dence of the defendant’s interest in books about serial killings —
which were not admitted in evidence — in a “technical, analytical
manner, without drama or undue emphasis that might have re-
leased its potential for unfair prejudice.” Further, the prosecution
in that case had compelling physical evidence connecting the
defendant to the crime, reducing the probability that the jury
would return a guilty verdict based on the defendant’s macabre
interest.

This case is distinguishable from Guy. Unlike the books in
Guy, the posters themselves, depicting graphic images, were
admitted in evidence. Also, the prosecutor was not especially
cautious in avoiding drama or character-related implications in
his closing argument, to mitigate the danger of unfair prejudice.
Rather, the prosecutor made a graphic emotional appeal to the
jury, referring to the defendant’s intent “not just . . . to keep three
men from testifying in court but of satisfying some retribution
and intent to take apart humanity piece by piece.” The court
concludes that this statement, clearly referring to the horrendous
nature of the dismemberment and not any pertinent evidentiary
point, is comparably “technical and analytic.” I disagree.

Third, although the prosecutor did not explicitly refer to the
photographs in his closing argument, defense counsel quite un-
derstandably addressed the evidence in his closing argument
three times, in an effort to dampen its prejudicial force.

Fourth, the judge gave proper limiting instructions regarding
the defendant’s association with the Hells Angels and Hall’s
history with Glasser. By informing the jury that there was specific
evidence that they should not consider as evidence of bad char-
acter, the jury were left to infer that the remainder of the evidence
could be considered as evidence of the defendant’s bad character.

Finally, the likelihood that the jury considered the evidence for
a prohibited purpose was further enhanced by the entirely cir-

498 477 Mass. 472 (2017)

Commonwealth », Veiovis.

cumstantial nature of the case against the defendant.® As in
Crayton, 470 Mass. at 250, the primary issue at trial was the
defendant’s identity. Due to the lack of direct evidence and a
limiting instruction, the jury were more apt to use the photo-
graphs as character evidence to infer the defendant’s guilt. Con-
trast Guy, 454 Mass. at 442-444, 447 (evidence of defendant’s
interest in serial killings used to establish his identity as killer, but
also deoxyribonucleic acid evidence matched defendant). Even
with the impermissible character evidence, the issues were diffi-
cult enough to resolve that the jury deliberated nearly five full
days before reaching verdicts.

I believe that the Commonwealth did not satisfy its burden to
demonstrate that there was no “reasonable possibility” that the
erroneous admission of these photographs contributed to the
jury’s verdicts. Accordingly, I would reverse the defendant’s
convictions and grant a new trial.

50f course, the Commonwealth is entitled to prove its case entirely by
circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth y. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713, cert.
denied, 134 S, Ct. 2855 (2014).

477 Mass. 499 (2017) 499

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

Commonweattu vs. AMANDA L. Hammonp.
Plymouth. October 6, 2016. - July 21, 2017.
Present: Gawts, C.l., LENK, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cypuzr, JI

Rape. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of state-
ment, Sentence, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sentence, Sex offender.
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Evidence, Ad-
missions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Videotape, Sexual
conduct. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of
statement, Redaction, Argument by prosecutor, Sentence.

A Superior Court judge properly denied the criminal defendant's pretrial motion
to suppress statements she made during a police interview, where a police
detective’s reference to the defendant's children did not constitute improper
coercion, where the detectives did not improperly minimize the gravity of the
crime to elicit a confession, and where the detectives’ misstatements (to the
extent that they could be described as false and deceptive) did not overbear
the defendant’s will. [502-505]

At a criminal trial, the judge did not abuse his discretion in not redacting two
statements from a redacted version of the video recording of the defendant's
interview with police, where the statements, made by police officers, pro-
vided context. [505-506].

At a criminal trial, any errors in the prosecutor’s closing argument did not
prejudice the defendant, where the judge gave curative instructions. [506-
508]

This court concluded that the sex offender registration statute, G. L. c. 6,
§§ 178E to 178P, which categorically deprives a sentencing judge of au-
thority to relieve a defendant of the obligation to register in any case
involving a sex offense against a child, was not unconstitutional as applied
to the defendant, where the governmental interest in ensuring that law
enforcement has accurate information on the defendant, who was at the first
stage of the registration process, outweighed her liberty interest in not having
to mail her registration information to the Sex Offender Registry Board.
[508-513] Hives, J., dissenting, with whom Lenk and Buon, JJ., joined.

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on August 10, 2012.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Richard
J. Chin, J.; the cases were tried before Cornelius J. Moriarty, II,
J., and a motion for postverdict relief was heard by him.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

500 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
the defendant.

Stacey L. Gauthier, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Lowy, J. The defendant, a twenty-two year old woman, was
convicted of raping a thirteen year old boy, a fourteen year old
boy, and a fifteen year old boy, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23.
On appeal, the defendant claims that there were three main
defects with her prosecution: (1) the incriminating statements she
made to police should have been suppressed; (2) the video
recording of these statements that was shown at trial should have
been further redacted; and (3) the prosecutor’s closing argument
was improper. In addition, the defendant contends that the trial
judge’s lack of authority to relieve her from registering as a sex
offender under G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), constitutes a due process
violation, as applied to her.

We conclude that there was no reversible error and affirm the
convictions. We further conclude that, based upon the record
before us, there is no as-applied due process violation.

1. Background. We summarize the evidence the Common-
wealth adduced at trial, reserving further details for discussion of
the specific issues raised on appeal.

The charges in this case stem from two separate but related
episodes that took place in June, 2012, in Brockton. The first
episode began when the defendant met up with two of the
victims, Roy," then age thirteen, and David, then age fourteen,” in
a park. The boys, whom she knew before these events, accom-
panied her to a liquor store and waited outside. When the de-
fendant left the store she was with a man named Mike, who was
in his thirties. They had purchased beer and “nip” liquor bottles.
The defendant seemed “relatively intoxicated” and was drinking
alcohol after leaving the liquor store.

The group made their way into the woods at the park. Mike
asked Roy and David if they had ever had sex before. Roy
responded with a “snide remark about [Mike] trying to have sex
with [him],” but Mike said he was talking about them having sex
with the defendant. Roy replied, “Oh, okay.” Mike then asked the

‘We refer to all of the underaged boys discussed in this opinion by pseud-
onyms.

2The only evidence in the record of the precise age of David and another of
the Victims is the equivocal testimony of Roy. The defendant does not contest
the ages that were asserted,

477 Mass. 499 (2017) 501

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

defendant if “she was okay” with performing oral sex on the
boys. She responded, “Yeah.” The defendant then performed oral
sex on each boy, as well as on Mike. This first episode in the
woods lasted about ten to fifteen minutes.

Roy, David, and the defendant then went to a friend’s house
that was near the park. At the house were two other boys, the third
victim, James, then age fifteen, and Arthur, who was twelve. The
group spent about one-half hour at the house. During this time,
Roy told James about his sexual encounter with the defendant.
James asked Roy to “get [the defendant] to do it again.” The boys
convinced the defendant to go with them to a store. All five
walked toward the store via a path through the park. The defend-
ant was stumbling as she walked, aided by two of the boys.

The second episode began as the group proceeded down the
path. Roy and James coaxed the defendant into having sex with
them. The defendant had vaginal intercourse with James, Roy,
and David. She also had oral sex with James during the second
episode. Arthur did not participate.

As the group left the woods, Arthur’s father, who had been
searching for his son, was waiting. Arthur told his parents what
he had observed, and the police were called.

Several weeks after the incidents, Brockton police went to the
defendant's house, and she agreed to accompany them to the
police station for an interview. There, she spoke with two detec-
tives who had observed an earlier interview of James. During the
defendant’s interview, she acknowledged that she had had oral
sex with Roy and David during the first episode and vaginal sex
with Roy, David, and James during the second episode. At the
end of the interview, the defendant was placed under arrest. She
was eventually indicted on six counts of statutory rape of Roy,
David, and James in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23.

Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress her statements to
police. The motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing.

Following a jury trial where Roy and Arthur both testified
under grants of immunity, the defendant was convicted on the
three indictments charging vaginal intercourse and found not
guilty on the three indictments charging oral penetration. The
judge imposed concurrent three-year probationary sentences with
several conditions. The judge also concluded that he could not
relieve the defendant from registering with the Sex Offender
Registry Board (SORB), G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), but stayed the
registration requirement pending an appeal. We granted the de-
fendant’s application for direct appellate review.

502 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

2. Discussion. a. Voluntariness of confession. Before trial, the
defendant moved to suppress statements she made during the
police interview, alleging they were obtained in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-474 (1966), and that they
were not voluntary. The judge denied the motion in a written
memorandum. On appeal, the defendant argues only that this
decision was in error because the Commonwealth did not meet its
burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that her confession
was voluntary because the police (1) threatened to adversely
affect her child custody situation; (2) minimized the conse-
quences of confessing to statutory rape; and (3) used false and
deceptive tactics when they characterized Arthur’s allegations
against her. Commonwealth v. O’ Brian, 445 Mass. 720, 724, cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 898 (2006).

When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we “review
de novo any findings of the motion judge that were based entirely
on documentary evidence.” Commonwealth vy. Monroe, 472
Mass. 461, 464 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469
Mass. 531, 539 (2014). Because there is a video recording of the
defendant’s interview with police, “we are in the same position as
the motion judge to determine what occurred during the inter-
view.” Monroe, supra, quoting Thomas, supra at 535 n.4.

“The test for voluntariness . . . is ‘whether, in light of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement, the will of the defendant was overborne to the extent
that the statement was not the result of a free and voluntary act.’ ”
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 207 (2011), quoting
Commonwealth vy. Souza, 428 Mass. 478, 483-484 (1998). A
statement is voluntary when it is “the product of a ‘rational
intellect’ and a ‘free will,’ and not induced by physical or psy-
chological coercion.” Monroe, 472 Mass. at 468, quoting
Tremblay, supra. “Under this “totality of the circumstances’ test,
we consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the
interrogation and the individual characteristics and conduct of the
defendant.” Tremblay, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Selby,
420 Mass. 656, 663 (1995).? The Commonwealth must establish

Factors that are relevant to the totality of the circumstances inquiry include,
but are not limited to, “promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant,
the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience
with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the
initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the
police), and the details of the interrogation.” Commonwealth v, Selby, 420 Mass.

477 Mass. 499 (2017) 503

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v.
Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 (2012).

i. Alleged coercion relating to defendant’s children. The de-
fendant claims that the detectives improperly threatened that she
might not regain custody of her children if she did not cooperate.
Concern for a child or loved one can, in certain circumstances,
make a statement involuntary. See Monroe, 472 Mass. at 469;
Commonwealth v. Scott, 430 Mass. 351, 355 (1999). Those cir-
cumstances are not present here. In Monroe, supra, we held that
the police tactics were improperly coercive in part because the
interrogation was “rife with threats to the defendant’s ability to
maintain contact with his infant daughter.” There, “the detectives
threatened the defendant with the loss of contact with his child by
repeatedly and falsely claiming that if he did not tell them what
happened, the child could be taken away and raised by strangers.”
Td.

The references to the defendant’s children in the instant case
were quite different. As the detectives urged the defendant to
confess, the defendant said, “I have children. I’m trying to protect
myself.” One of the detectives responded:

“Tf that’s what’s hanging you up is you're afraid if you tell
us, you’re never going to get your kids back, is that what
you're afraid of? That’s it, isn’t it? Yeah, okay. I mean, and
I understand that, okay. But listen, you’re not doing yourself
any good lying to us and we know you're lying to us. I can
see it.”

This exchange is far from the “barrage” of references to the
suspect’s daughter in Monroe. See Monroe, 472 Mass. at 467.

ii. Alleged minimization. The defendant claims that her confes-
sion was not voluntary because the detectives improperly “mini-
mized” the consequences of confessing to the crime of statutory
rape. Specifically, the defendant claims that by threatening her
with a charge of rape by force,‘ her only choice was to confess to
statutory rape.

Minimization, combined with other factors, may render a con-
fession involuntary because it can serve as an implied promise

656, 663 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v, Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413
(1986). No one factor is dispositive. See Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass.
246, 256 (2012); Selby, supra at 664.

‘During the police investigation, James initially said in an interview that he
had been forcibly raped by the defendant.

504 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

that the requested confession will result in leniency. Common-
wealth vy. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 439 (2004). Here, the
detectives’ tactics were not improper. One of the detectives was
aware that James had said in his interview that the defendant
forced him to have sex. The police were trying to understand
what had happened; they were not improperly minimizing the
gravity of the crime of statutory rape to elicit a confession.

iii. Alleged false and deceptive tactics. The defendant argues
that the detectives’ characterization of Arthur’s allegations was
false and deceptive because the detectives suggested that the boy
had claimed that he was “propositioned” by the defendant, and
that Arthur had agreed with James’s characterization of the rapes
as forcible.

The use of false and deceptive tactics by police, while not
strictly forbidden, can cast doubt on the voluntariness of a state-
ment. See DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 432-433, and cases cited.
Such tactics are inappropriate. They will not by themselves ordi-
narily render a statement involuntary, as their use is one factor in
the analysis of the totality of the circumstances. See Tremblay,
460 Mass. at 208; Selby, 420 Mass. at 663-664.

The detectives falsely claimed that Arthur had said the defend-
ant “propositioned” him on one occasion, and they never explic-
itly said that Arthur was unsupportive of James’s claim of forc-
ible rape. These statements constituted a fraction of the approx-
imately forty-minute interview. Further, at the time of the inter-
view there was a real question whether the rapes were forcible
based on James’s interview. To the extent that these misstate-
ments in the interview could be described as false and deceptive,
we conclude that the defendant’s will was not overborne. See
Selby, 420 Mass. at 664-665 (confession voluntary even though
police improperly used photocopy of random handprint to sug-
gest defendant was at crime scene).

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the judge was
correct in ruling that the defendant’s confession was voluntary.
The defendant appeared sober and oriented during the interview.
She was provided Miranda warnings even though she was not in
custody, and she was specifically told that she could leave and get
an attorney if she so chose. Moreover, the defendant demon-
strated the ability and mental agility to deny any sexual contact
with the boys through her initial rendition of what had occurred.

477 Mass. 499 (2017) 505

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

We affirm the order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.®

b. Redaction of video recording. The defendant argues that the
judge committed prejudicial error by failing to redact the follow-
ing two statements by the detectives from the video recording of
the defendant’s interview with police: (1) “You're talking rape by
force or statutory, okay,” and (2) “You want to know why I know
you are telling the truth? . . . You are telling [Arthur]’s story
verbatim right now. Other than he knows the order. He remem-
bers the order.” The judge allowed the first statement to provide
context to what the judge found to be the “implied admissions” of
the defendant during the interview.* The judge allowed the sec-
ond statement because it provided context for the defendant’s
statement that she could not recall the order in which she had sex
with the boys.

“Whether evidence is relevant and whether its probative value
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect are matters
entrusted to the trial judge’s broad discretion and are not dis-
turbed absent palpable error.” Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456
Mass. 182, 192 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434
Mass. 570, 578-579 (2001). We will conclude that there has been
an abuse of discretion only if the judge has “made ‘a clear error
of judgment in weighing’ the factors relevant to the decision, .. .
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alter-
natives” (citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass.
169, 185 n.27 (2014).

The judge worked diligently with the attorneys in this case to
redact any potentially prejudicial statements in the recording. The
full recording of the defendant’s interview with police was more

®The defendant also claims that her poor educational and mental health
background contributed to her vulnerability to coercion. The defendant does
nothing more to support these claims than point to her own statements in the
interview that she was “kind of slow” and suffered from depression and bipolar
disorder. On this record, there is nothing indicating that any shortcomings in the
defendant’s educational or mental health background rendered her confession
involuntary, See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass, 344, 350, 351, 357,
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004) (affirming denial of motion to suppress where
expert testimony from both defendant and Commonwealth showed defendant
had intellectual functioning between “mildly mentally retarded to borderline”);
Commonwealth vy. Beland, 436 Mass. 273, 282 (2002) (affirming denial of
motion to suppress where defendant had prior diagnosis of schizophrenia and
psychosis).

According to the judge, the “implied admissions” made by the defendant
were the following statements: “The way to look at it it’s bad”; “People mess
up”; and “But you still have to have the consequences.”

506 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

than forty minutes, while the recording ultimately shown at trial,
after careful redaction, was less than one-half hour, and there are
nearly twenty transcript pages describing the discussion between
the judge and the attorneys of what to redact. The decision not to
redact two statements by police to provide context in an interview
of more than twenty-seven minutes was well within the range of
reasonable alternatives.”

c. Closing argument. The defendant asserts that the prosecu-
tor’s closing argument was “rife” with improper arguments that
warrant the grant of a new trial.

After reviewing the six statements the defendant identifies, in
light of the prosecutor’s entire argument and in light of the
judge’s instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial, we
conclude that any errors in the prosecutor’s closing argument did
not prejudice the defendant. Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458
Mass. 776, 785 (2011).

Four of the six statements were proper. First, the prosecutor did
not improperly shift the burden to the defendant when he argued
that it was more likely that the defendant would have gone to the
police after the first episode when Mike was involved if she had
truly been a victim, rather than returning to the woods with two
of the same boys. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132,
142 (2007) (prosecutor entitled to invite jury to draw fair infer-
ences from evidence). Second, the prosecutor urged the jury to
decide the case on the facts when he asked a rhetorical question
that implored the jury to regard the case no differently from how
they would if the victims were female and the defendant male.
See Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987) (proper
for prosecutor to argue for conviction based on evidence). Third,
the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for Roy and Arthur
when he mentioned that they were immunized, because it is
proper to argue that the motivation of witnesses is to tell the truth

7The defendant further complains that the prejudicial effect of these two
statements was enhanced because the jury had access to the recording during
deliberations and watched it multiple times. After the jury began deliberations,
the prosecutor asked the judge if the jury could have the recording. The judge
stated, “If they request it, sure.” Defense counsel did not object to this. Where
evidence is admissible, it is not error for the jury to view it during deliberations
in its admissible form, It was not an abuse of discretion to allow the jury to view
during deliberations the defendant’s recorded statements that had been admitted
in evidence. Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 305, cert. denied, 493
U.S. 940 (1989) (“Because the tapes were admitted in evidence, the jury were
free to listen to them as often as they pleased during deliberations”).

477 Mass. 499 (2017) 507

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

and to mention the possibility of perjury charges if a witness
testifies untruthfully. Commonwealth v. Webb, 468 Mass. 26, 36
(2014). Fourth, the prosecutor’s statement regarding the timeline
of the day of the crimes was a reasonable inference from the
evidence.

Two of the prosecutor’s statements were improper. The first
improper statement was the prosecutor's invocation of his oath to
suggest his personal belief in the defendant’s guilt.* Defense
counsel objected to this statement, and the trial judge agreed that
the reference to taking an oath would have been “better left
unsaid.” The judge gave a curative instruction on this issue during
his final instructions.® Although the prosecutor’s reference to his
oath was improper, it was not overly prejudicial when viewed in
context of the entire argument and in conjunction with the judge’s
effective curative instruction. See Commonwealth v. Robidoux,
450 Mass. 144, 162-163 (2007). The jury are presumed to have
followed the judge’s instruction. Jd.1°

The second improper statement occurred when the prosecutor
told the jury that the purpose of the statute under which the de-
fendant was charged was to protect minors." The judge agreed
with the defendant that this remark “should not have been stated.”

®The prosecutor said, “Frankly, I have a little bit of sympathy for [the
defendant]. But I took an oath to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to
faithfully and fairly prosecute the laws of the Commonwealth. And you as jurors
took an oath to follow the rules of law as explained to you by [the judge].”

©The judge’s instruction was: “[T]here was reference by one of the attorneys
during the closing arguments that he had taken an oath. Ladies and gentlemen,
I suggest to you the mere fact that the assistant district attorney may have taken
an oath does not give him any greater knowledge as to the credibility of any
witness. It is for you to determine the credibility of all the witnesses in this
case.”

1°The defendant also argues that the prosecutor’ s reference to the jurors’ oath
was improper. This was not a call upon the jury to do their “job” by convicting
the defendant. Contrast Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 328-329
(2000) (improper argument to tell jurors to “do your job” where it implicitly
meant jury had duty to convict). Here, the prosecutor was not suggesting to the
jurors that their oath obliged them to convict, rather he was telling the jury to
follow the law given to them by the judge. See Commonwealth y. Adams, 434
Mass. 805, 822 (2001).

“The prosecutor argued, “And I suggest to you that there is a darn good
reason for this statute. Because young people under the age of sixteen aren’t
mature enough to make the decision to engage in sex. They don’t truly
understand the potential ramifications, be it unwanted pregnancy or sexually
transmitted diseases. It doesn’t matter whether the boys wanted the sex, enjoyed
the sex, or whether they wanted to testify in court. None of that matters. We as

508 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

The prosecutor’s statement was improper. Jurors decide facts and
apply those facts to the law. An appeal to policy reasons for the
enactment of criminal statutes is inappropriate argument. The issue
at trial is not whether rape of a child is wrong. It is. The issue is
whether the Commonwealth has proved penetration and that the
age of the complainant is under sixteen beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge, however, gave a corrective instruction.’2 Where
there is an improper argument, “we must and do recognize that
closing argument is identified as argument, the jury understands
that, instructions from the judge inform the jury that closing
argument is not evidence, and instructions may mitigate any
prejudice in the final argument.” Kozec, 399 Mass. at 517. Given
the pointed curative instruction and the judge’s entire charge,
including instructing the jury not to decide this case on sympathy,
we cannot say that this statement by the prosecutor was prejudi-
cial.

d. Due process challenge. Before imposing the sentence of
straight probation, the judge ordered the defendant to undergo a
sex offender evaluation performed by a licensed clinical social
worker. The social worker reported that the defendant was not a
pedophile and not sexually dangerous. Based on this, the defend-
ant asked the judge to stay her obligation to register as a sex
offender pursuant to G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C to 178P. The judge
concluded that he had no authority to relieve the defendant of her
obligation to register because her offenses involved children, see
G.L. c. 6, § 178E (f), but agreed to stay her obligation to register
pending appeal.

The defendant now argues that the statute, which categorically
deprives a sentencing judge of authority to relieve a defendant of
the obligation to register in any case involving a sex offense
against a child, is unconstitutional as applied to her under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

We begin with an overview of the relevant portion of Massa-
chusetts sex offender registry laws to clarify the due process
issue, and then turn to the particulars of the defendant’s claim.

a society have a greater interest in protecting minors from themselves in these
kind of situations.”

"2The judge told the jury, “In [the prosecutor]’s closing argument to you he
referenced what he believed to be the purposes of the statute. Your focus is upon
the evidence. Itis not upon the purposes of the statute. Alll right? So to the extent
that there is some suggestion that you should be influenced by the purposes of
the statute, and I am not suggesting that there was, you should disregard it.”

477 Mass. 499 (2017) 509

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

i. Massachusetts sex offender registry scheme. In 1999, the
Legislature overhauled the sex offender registry law after an
earlier version was successfully challenged on due process
grounds. See Roe vy. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 422-423
(2001). The 1999 statute requires adults convicted of a sex
offense (as well as juveniles adjudicated as having committed a
sex offense) to register with SORB. G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C, 178E,
178K. The registration process essentially involves two stages.

During the first stage, which occurs shortly after sentencing,
those who must register submit their information to SORB, which
then transmits the data to local police and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (c); 803 Code Mass.
Regs. § 1.06(1) (2016). A sentencing judge has the authority in
certain circumstances to relieve the offender of this preliminary
obligation and thus allow the offender to avoid the registration
process entirely. For example, a judge who does not sentence an
offender to immediate confinement has the authority — and
indeed is directed — to determine whether that person should be
required to register at all. G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f).!" The judge, how-
ever, is precluded by the statute from relieving any person who,
like the defendant, has been convicted of a sex offense with a
child from registering as a sex offender. See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (/).
Those who are not relieved of the obligation to register by the
sentencing judge will then go through the second stage of the
process.

During the second stage, SORB prepares an initial classifica-
tion of the offender as a level one, two, or three offender, based
on the person’s dangerousness and the degree of risk (from low
to high) that the person poses to reoffend. G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2)
(a)-(c). Following the initial classification, offenders required to
register have a right to challenge SORB’s decision at a de novo
administrative hearing. G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2). At this hearing,
SORB has the burden to prove the appropriateness of its classi-
fication by clear and convincing evidence. Doe, Sex Offender

'8“Tn the case of a sex offender who has been convicted of a sex offense . . .
and who has not been sentenced to immediate confinement, the court shall . . .
determine whether the circumstances of the offense in conjunction with the
offender’s criminal history indicate that the sex offender does not pose a risk of
reoffense or a danger to the public. If the court so determines, the court shall
relieve such sex offender of the obligation to register under sections 178C to
178P, inclusive. The court may not make such a determination or finding if the
sex offender . . . has been convicted of a sex offense involving a child...” G. L.
c. 6, § 178E (f).

510 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass.
297, 298 (2015). The determination reached after the de novo
hearing is considered the final classification. G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2).
Following the hearing, the offender has a right to appeal from the
final classification decision to the Superior Court. See G. L. c. 6,
§ 178M; G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

For certain sex offenses, SORB, like the sentencing judge, has
the authority to relieve the offender of the obligation to register
because his or her circumstances do not indicate a risk of
reoffense or a danger to the public. G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d)."4
SORB, like the judge during sentencing, however, is precluded
from relieving any person who has been convicted of a sex
offense with a child of his or her registration obligation (unless
that person has already been registered for ten years). Id. Signif-
icantly, if an offender is relieved of the registration obligation by
the board at the second stage of the process, the information
received from the offender during the first stage and transmitted
to the local police and FBI is removed from the registry and the
police and FBI are so notified. Id.

ii. The defendant’s claim. When government action interferes
with a protected liberty or property interest, procedural due
process concerns arise. Roe, 434 Mass. at 427 (2001), citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Where there is
interference with such an interest, a court must look at “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action . . . the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest.” Mathews, supra. Procedural due process requires a
“pragmatic and flexible” analysis, as opposed to a “rigid [and]
hypertechnical” one. Roe, supra. Due process “calls for such

'4The board may, upon making specific written findings that the circum-
stances of the offense in conjunction with the offender’s criminal history do not
indicate a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public and the reasons therefor,
relieve such sex offender of any further obligation to register, shall remove such
sex offender’s registration information from the registry and shall so notify the
police departments where said sex offender lives and works or if in custody
intends to live and work upon release, and where the offense was committed and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. . . . The provisions of this subsection shall ...
not apply if a sex offender has been convicted of a sex offense involving a child
or a sexually violent offense, and such offender has not already registered
pursuant to this chapter for at least ten years ....” G, L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d).

477 Mass. 499 (2017) Sil

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Jd.,
quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

A defendant’s due process rights are implicated in different
ways during the first stage and the second stage of the registration
process!

A. Stage one. The defendant’s case currently resides in stage
one of the SORB process, where the only recognized interest at
stake for the defendant is having to send her registration infor-
mation to SORB, which would then transmit that information to
law enforcement. Roe, 434 Mass. at 428. She is not being clas-
sified at this stage, and, as we explain below, is not precluded
from seeking relief from the registration requirement at stage two.
Her information would not be publicly disseminated at this stage.
She is only being required to send her information to the board.
This requirement infringes to some extent on her liberty, see id.
(“[t]he mere fact that a citizen is being forced to take some action
[unconnected from the citizen’s own desire to engage in a form of
regulated activity] infringes, to at least some extent, on his
liberty”), but her interest is slight compared to the considerable
governmental interest at this stage.

The government interest at stake here is the protection of “the
vulnerable members of our communities from sexual offenders.”
St. 1999, c. 74, emergency preamble. In crafting the law, the
Legislature found “the danger of recidivism posed by sex offend-
ers, especially sexually violent offenders who commit predatory
acts characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior, to be
grave and that the protection of the public from these sex offend-
ers is of paramount interest.” St. 1999, c. 74, § 1. “It also found
that ‘law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect their commu-
nities’ from sex offenders are ‘impaired by the existing lack of

15We distinguish the issue in this case from the issue in Commonwealth v.
Dalton, 467 Mass. 555 (2014). In that case, the sentencing judge concluded that
the use of “may not” in G. L. ¢. 6, § 178E (), see supra note 13, gave a judge
discretion to relieve a defendant convicted of a sex offense involving a child and
not sentenced to immediate confinement from the obligation to register with
SORB. Jd. at 555-556, We held that the plain language of the statute precluded
such discretion, /d. at 559, Here, the Commonwealth is correct to point out that
Dalton precludes the defendant from relief from registration based on the
statute, That does not mean, however, that the defendant may not challenge the
statute on constitutional grounds. See Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 442
(2001) (facial validity of statute does not preclude as-applied due process
challenges).

512 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

information known about sex offenders who live within their
jurisdictions’; that the registration of sex offenders is a proper
exercise of police powers ‘regulating present and ongoing con-
duct, which will provide law enforcement with additional infor-
mation critical to preventing sexual victimization’; and that the
‘registration by sex offenders is necessary in order to permit
classification of such offenders on an individualized basis accord-
ing to their risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness’ ”
(emphases omitted). Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v.
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 789-790 (2008) (Doe
No. 8725), quoting St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.

On balance, and on the record before us, we conclude that the
governmental interest in ensuring that law enforcement has ac-
curate information on the defendant, who was convicted on three
indictments charging child rape, at this preliminary stage of the
registration process significantly outweighs the defendant’s lib-
erty interest in not having to mail her registration information to
SORB. Roe, 434 Mass. at 430-431. There is, in short, no due
process violation in the defendant’s having to send her informa-
tion to SORB, or in the judge’s being unable under the statute to
relieve her of the obligation to do so.

B. Stage two. Because we do not find a due process violation in
the first stage of the sex offender registration process, the defend-
ant will have to move forward into the second stage. That is, after
she submits her information to SORB she will then undergo the
SORB classification process. This stage of the SORB process,
which can result in a defendant being classified as a sex offender,
implicates much more serious liberty interests for the defendant
that are entitled to strong procedural due process protections. See
Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 143 (1997). See also Doe
No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 792. The defendant, however, is not yet
at that stage. The only claim she has made so far — indeed, the
only claim she can properly make at this time in the context of
this direct appeal from her convictions — is her due process
challenge to the sentencing judge’s authority at the first stage,
which we have already addressed. In the context of this criminal
case it would be imprudent for us to attempt to go further and
decide whether the forthcoming SORB classification process will
itself result in a due process violation.*®

16We note that the vast majority of cases that challenge various aspects of the
sex offender registration scheme on due process grounds come to the court in the

477 Mass. 499 (2017) 513

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

We are not blind to the virtual certainty that the defendant will be
classified as at least a level one sex offender. The statute does not
permit the board to relieve any offender who has been convicted of
an offense involving a child. See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d). Nothing
we have said, however, prevents the defendant from reasserting her
as applied due process challenge during stage two of the process.
SORB will have a fuller record than the sentencing judge on which
to assess the defendant’s dangerousness and risk of reoffense.
Although SORB as an administrative agency does not have the
authority to find the statute unconstitutional on its face or as
applied, Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender
Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 628 (2011), there appears to be
nothing in the statute that would prevent it, when making its
classification decision, from finding that the defendant presents no
risk of reoffense or danger to the public, if that is the case. The
defendant would be able to present that favorable finding (or
challenge any adverse finding) in an appeal to the Superior Court
under G. L. c. 6, § 178M, and G. L. c. 30A, § 14, or in a declaratory
judgment action, and argue that the mandatory registration require-
ment of G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d), constitutes a due process vio-
lation. A Superior Court judge would then have the benefit not only
of the sentencing judge’s assessment, but also of SORB’s insight
into her risk of recidivism and dangerousness when addressing her
due process claim.

3. Conclusion. The judgments are affirmed. We also hold that
there has been no due process violation in the judge’s declining
to relieve the defendant of her obligation to register as a sex
offender.

So ordered.

Hones, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom
Lenk and Budd, JJ., join). Although I agree that the court prop-
erly rejected the defendant’s appeal from the denial of her motion
to suppress and other alleged errors, I write separately to express
disagreement with the court’s resolution of the defendant’s claim
that G. L. c. 6, § 178E (jf), is unconstitutional as applied to her.
The court spurns the defendant’s constitutional claim, taking the

context of civil litigation where SORB is a party and the statutory and consti-
tutional challenges have been fully briefed. Here, the challenge is part of a
criminal appeal where the bulk of the arguments are focused on the defendant's
trial, its surrounding circumstances, and her sentencing.

514 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

position that no due process right is implicated by the defendant’s
provision of the registration data to the Sex Offender Registry
Board (SORB) and SORB’s transmission of that information to
law enforcement authorities. In my view, this analytical approach
fails to take the full measure of the liberty interest at stake for this
defendant who, having been convicted of statutory rape under
G. L. c. 265, § 23, but determined by the trial judge to present no
danger to the “vulnerable” population protected by the statute, is
subject to mandatory registration, with all its attendant conse-
quences. Therefore, I dissent.

Contrary to the court’s view, the burden on the defendant’s
liberty interest is not simply in having to provide her registration
data to SORB and live with the consequences of having that
information transmitted to law enforcement authorities. That mea-
sure for a protected liberty interest may be appropriate in circum-
stances where the outcome of the registration process is not fixed,
as where SORB has the authority to determine that the defendant
presents no risk of sexual reoffense and may be relieved of the
obligation to register at all. See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d) (relief
from registration based on “risk of reoffense or a danger to the
public” cannot be granted to a “sex offender [who] has been
convicted of a sex offense involving a child” and “has not already
registered . . . for at least ten years”).

Here, of course, the irrebuttable presumption of dangerousness
compels at least a level one classification which imposes certain
restraints on the defendant’s liberty. See Doe, SORB No. 380316
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 308 (2015); G. L.
c. 6, § 178K (2) (a). Where a defendant is forced to register,
despite posing no danger to the community, this “presents an
‘importantly distinct kind of constitutional danger,’ because it
‘forces an action on the person required to register. It is a
continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person
[her]self.” ” Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 792 (2008) (Doe No.
8725), quoting Doe vy. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 149 (1997)
(Fried, J., concurring). Even though registration data is not re-
leased publicly, the defendant will be “singled out and brought to
the attention of the law enforcement agencies in the municipali-
ties in which [she] live[s] and work[s]” because SORB immedi-
ately shares that information with local law enforcement and the
FBI (citation omitted). Doe, No. 8725, supra at 791. G. L. c. 6,
§ 178E (c). The defendant’s ability to move from her home,

477 Mass. 499 (2017) S15

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

work, or place of higher learning is restricted because she must
provide SORB ten days’ notice before moving. G. L. c. 6,
§ 178E (h)-(j). Further, if she is a homeless person, the defend-
ant must verify her registration every thirty days. G. L. c. 6,
§ 178F. The police and SORB may release the registration data
of level one offenders to the Department of Children and Fami-
lies, which may question the safety of the defendant’s children.
G.L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a). See Adoption of Anton, 72 Mass. App.
Ct. 667, 668 (2008). Thus, the defendant’s liberty interest is not
de minimis.

The court has come to this bridge before. In Doe, No. 8725, 450
Mass. at 785-786, the court acknowledged that, “where the record
would establish ‘that Doe poses no risk at all [of reoffense]’ the
application of the statutory provisions that permanently foreclose
his being relieved of the duty to register may be ‘constitutionally
vulnerable.’ ” Jd., quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.
1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 750, 762 (2006).
See Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 445 (2001) (“While the
Legislature is justified in providing for the dissemination of
registration data to law enforcement authorities when the persons
the Legislature seeks to regulate may be dangerous and at risk of
committing another offense, it is not justified in doing so with
respect to those persons who neither the Legislature nor [SORB]
could rationally find present a threat to vulnerable persons”).
Therefore, I am persuaded that the defendant’s liberty interest is
not so narrow as to forgo any consideration of due process
protections. For that reason, the court should consider whether
the time has come to answer the unresolved constitutional ques-
tion that hangs over this case, and provide guidance for similarly
situated defendants.

As Ihave noted above, the issue is significant for this defendant
and others who are able to credibly establish that they are not
dangerous to vulnerable persons. And the issue is presented here
on a record that has not been challenged as lacking in credibility.
Therefore, I see no reason to avoid the issue by sending the
defendant on a journey where the end will be the same as the
beginning. SORB has no authority to relieve her of the obligation
to register. Nor does the Superior Court have such authority; the
limitations on the trial judge in this case are the same as those
faced by the Superior Court in a G. L. c. 30A review of the SORB
classification decision. Because the issue ultimately will come to
this court and the defendant has no other means to raise this

516 477 Mass. 499 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Hammond.

claim, she is entitled to a determination by this court whether the
statute is unconstitutional as applied to her. Instead of sending the
defendant on this futile quest for relief, this court should just
decide the issue.

Notwithstanding the importance of the issue, it has not been
properly briefed by the parties, making it unwise to go further
than a recognition that the nature of the liberty interest at stake
justifies further consideration by this court. Therefore, I would
order supplemental briefing by the parties and invite amicus
briefs by interested parties, including the Attorney General, and
preserve the option for argument on the issue.

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 517

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

Sreynuon Lunn vs. Commonweatrn & another.!
Suffolk. April 4, 2017. - July 24, 2017
Present: Gants, C.l., Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cyne, II.

Alien. Arrest.

Discussion of civil immigration enforcement [521-523], the use of civil immi-
gration detainers [523-526], and the voluntary nature of such detainers
[526-527].

This court concluded that what the Federal Department of Homeland Security
asks for when it requests in a civil immigration detainer that a Massachusetts
custodian hold a person for up to two days after he or she would otherwise
be entitled to release from State custody constitutes an arrest as a matter of
Massachusetts law. [527-528]

This court concluded that court officers in Massachusetts, who have the same
power to arrest while on court house premises as Massachusetts police officers,
lack authority under either Massachusetts common law [528-531] or Massa-
chusetts statutory law [531-532] to arrest an individual pursuant to a request
contained in a Federal civil immigration detainer to hold that individual for
up to two days after he or she would otherwise be entitled to release from
State custody; further, this court declined to adopt, as a matter of Massa-
chusetts law, the theory of inherent authority to carry out such detainer
requests as a basis for authorizing civil immigration arrests [532-537].

Civit action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk on February 7, 2017.

The case was reported by Lenk, J.

Emma C. Winger, Committee for Public Counsel Services
(Mark Fleming, of New York, & Alyssa Hackett, Committee for
Public Counsel Services, also present) for the petitioner.

Joshua S. Press, of the District of Columbia, for the United
States.

Jessica V. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General (Allen H. Forbes,
Special Assistant Attorney General, & Sara A. Colb, Assistant
Attorney General, also present) for the Commonwealth & another.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Sabrineh Ardalan, of New York, Philip L. Torrey, Mark C.
Fleming, & Laila Ameri for Immigration and Refugee Clinical

‘Sheriff of Suffolk County (sheriff), intervener.

518 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

Program at Harvard Law School.

Christopher N. Lasch, of Colorado, for David C. Baluarte &
others.

Karen Pita Loor for Criminal Defense Clinic at Boston Uni-
versity School of Law.

Omar C. Jadwat, of New York, Spencer E. Amdur, of Penn-
sylvania, Cody H. Wofsy, of California, Matthew R. Segal, Jessie
J. Rossman, Laura Rotolo, Carlton E. Williams, Kirsten V. Mayer,
Kim B. Nemirow, & Laura Murray-Tjan for Bristol County Bar
Advocates, Inc., & others.

By tHe Courr. After the sole pending criminal charge against
him was dismissed, the petitioner, Sreynuon Lunn, was held by
Massachusetts court officers in a holding cell at the Boston
Municipal Court at the request of a Federal immigration officer,
pursuant to a Federal civil immigration detainer. Civil immigra-
tion detainers are documents issued by Federal immigration of-
ficers when they wish to arrest a person who is in State custody
for the purpose of removing the person from the country. By
issuing a civil detainer, the Federal officer asks the State custo-
dian voluntarily to hold the person for up to two days after he or
she would otherwise be entitled to be released from State custody,
in order to allow Federal authorities time to arrive and take the
person into Federal custody for removal purposes.

The United States Supreme Court has explained that, “[a]s a
general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain
present in the United States,” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
387, 407 (2012), and that the Federal administrative process for
removing someone from the country “is a civil, not criminal,
matter.” Id. at 396. Immigration detainers like the one used in this
case, for the purpose of that process, are therefore strictly civil in
nature. The removal process is not a criminal prosecution. The
detainers are not criminal detainers or criminal arrest warrants.
They do not charge anyone with a crime, indicate that anyone has
been charged with a crime, or ask that anyone be detained in
order that he or she can be prosecuted for a crime. Detainers like
this are used to detain individuals because the Federal authorities
believe that they are civilly removable from the country.

It is undisputed in this case that holding someone in circum-
stances like this, against his or her will, constitutes an arrest under
Massachusetts law. The question before us, therefore, is whether
Massachusetts court officers have the authority to arrest someone

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 519

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

at the request of Federal immigration authorities, pursuant to a
civil immigration detainer, solely because the Federal authorities
believe the person is subject to civil removal. There is no Federal
statute that confers on State officers the power to make this kind
of an arrest. The question we must answer is whether the State
law of Massachusetts authorizes such an arrest. To answer the
question, we must look to the long-standing common law of the
Commonwealth and to the statutes enacted by our Legislature.
Having done so, we conclude that nothing in the statutes or
common law of Massachusetts authorizes court officers to make
a civil arrest in these circumstances.?*

Background. Lunn was arraigned in the Boston Municipal
Court on October 24, 2016, on a single count of unarmed robbery.
The day before the arraignment, the United States Department of
Homeland Security (department) issued a civil immigration
detainer against him. The detainer document was a standard form
document then in use by the department. It requested, among
other things, that the Massachusetts authorities continue to hold
Lunn in State custody for up to two days after he would otherwise
be released, in order to give officers of the department time to
arrive and take him into Federal custody.*

Bail was set at the arraignment in the amount of $1,500. Lunn
did not post bail and, according to the trial court docket, was
committed to the custody of the sheriff of Suffolk County (sheriff)

2Given this conclusion, we do not address whether such an arrest, if autho-
rized, would be permissible under the United States Constitution or the Mas-
sachusetts Declaration of Rights.

®We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Immigration and Refu-
gee Clinical Program at Harvard Law School; the Criminal Defense Clinic at
Boston University School of Law; Bristol County Bar Advocates, Inc., Massa-
chusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Pilgrim Advocates, Inc., and
Suffolk Lawyers for Justice, Inc.; and thirty academics in the field of immigra-
tion law.

We also acknowledge the brief filed by the United States as amicus curiae. In
addition, we allowed the motion of the United States to participate in the oral
argument of the case, Mass. R. A. P. 17, as amended, 426 Mass. 1602 (1998).

‘The detainer was addressed to the Boston police department and any other
Massachusetts authorities that subsequently assumed custody of Lunn. The
detainer form states, “This request takes effect only if you serve a copy of this
form on the subject . . .,” and provides space for “the law enforcement agency
currently holding the subject of the notice” to indicate when and how it was
served. Lunn does not appear to have been served with a copy of the detainer
by the police, the sheriff, or the court, although he acknowledges that he was
told of it by his counsel.

520 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

at the Suffolk County jail in lieu of bail.*

Lunn was brought back to court for trial on February 6, 2017.°
He was transported from the jail to the court house by personnel
from the office of the sheriff, and was delivered into the custody
of the trial court’s court officers. Because the Commonwealth was
not ready for trial at that time, the judge dismissed the case for
lack of prosecution.” At that point there were no longer any
criminal charges pending against Lunn in Massachusetts. Lunn’s
counsel informed the judge of the outstanding detainer and asked
that Lunn be released from custody notwithstanding the detainer,
the criminal case having been dismissed. The judge declined to
act on that request.* Lunn remained in the custody of the court
officers; it appears that he was kept in a holding cell in the court
house. Several hours later — the record before us does not
specify exactly how long — department officials arrived at the

An entry was made on the trial court docket stating that the petitioner was
“held on... . [the] detainer.” This entry, to the extent it suggests that the
petitioner was actually being held in custody pursuant to the Federal immigra-
tion detainer, is misleading. At no point before trial was he actually held
pursuant to the detainer. He was held in lieu of bail while awaiting trial in the
present case and, for a brief period, on a criminal sentence in a separate case (see
note 6, infra). The detainer by its own terms requested that he be detained only
if and when he was to be released from State custody.

Several additional events occurred between the time of arraignment and the
time of trial that, although not essential to our decision, are worth noting. First,
Lunn was transferred at some point to the custody of the sheriff of Norfolk
County to serve a sentence (at the Norfolk County house of correction) in a
separate criminal case from Norfolk County. When that sentence was com-
pleted, on or about January 13, 2017, he was returned to the custody of the
sheriff of Suffolk County and held in lieu of bail awaiting trial in this case.

Second, on November 21, 2016, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth’s
motion to amend the criminal complaint in the case, with Lunn’s consent, by
reducing the charged offense from unarmed robbery (G. L. c. 265, § 19 [b]) to
larceny from a person (G. L. c. 266, § 25 [b]) .

Third, on January 20, 2017, a judge in the Superior Court, acting on a request
for bail review, G. L. c. 276, § 58, reduced the amount of Lunn’s bail to $750.
Although Lunn was financially able to post that amount, he declined to do so on
the belief that he would then be held anyway on the outstanding detainer.

7This was the second scheduled trial date. The Commonwealth had not been
ready for trial on the first date, so the case was continued to February 6, 2017.

®The docket entry in this respect originally stated that Lunn’s request to be
released had been “heard and denied.” The entry was later changed (after the
case was entered in this court) to state that “[nJo action” was taken on the
request. The parties agree that the amended entry accurately reflects the judge’s
statement, made in response to Lunn’s request, that he “decline[d] to take any
action on the detainer.”

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 521

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

court house and took Lunn into Federal custody.

The following morning, February 7, 2017, Lunn’s counsel filed
a petition in the county court on his behalf, pursuant to G. L.
c. 211, § 3, asking a single justice of this court to order the Boston
Municipal Court to release him.® The petition alleged, among
other things, that the trial court and its court officers had no
authority to hold Lunn on the Federal civil detainer after the
criminal case against him had been dismissed, and that his con-
tinued detention based solely on the detainer violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and arts. 12 and 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
By that time, however, Lunn had already been taken into Federal
custody. The single justice therefore considered the matter moot
but, recognizing that the petition raised important, recurring, and
time-sensitive legal issues that would likely evade review in
future cases, reserved and reported the case to the full court.

Discussion. 1. Civil versus criminal immigration enforcement.
The principal statute governing immigration in the United States
is the Immigration and Nationality Act (act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et
seq. It sets forth in elaborate detail the terms, conditions, and
procedures for admitting individuals into the United States who
are not citizens or nationals of this country (referred to in the act
as “aliens,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101[a][3]), as well as the terms, condi-
tions, and procedures for removing those individuals from the
country. Some violations of the act are criminal offenses. It is a
crime, for example — punishable as a misdemeanor for the first
offense — for an alien to enter the country illegally. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a).1° Immigration crimes are prosecuted in the Federal
District Courts, like any other Federal crimes.

Many violations of the act are not criminal offenses. Being

®Previously, two other Supreme Judicial Court single justices, acting on similar
petitions pursuant to G. L. c, 211, § 3, had ruled that Massachusetts trial courts
have no authority to hold a defendant, or otherwise order him or her to be held,
on a Federal civil immigration detainer, Nelson Maysonet vs, Commonwealth,
Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, No. SJ-2016-346 (Aug. 12, 2016).
Santos Moscoso vs, A Justice of the E. Boston Diy. of the Boston Mun. Ct.,
Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, No. $J-2016-168 (May 26, 2016).

‘Other immigration crimes include failing to carry a registration card, 8
U.S.C. § 1304(e); wilfully failing to register, making fraudulent statements in
connection with registration, or counterfeiting registration documents, id. at
§ 1306; knowingly bringing in, transporting, or harboring an alien, id, at § 1324;
engaging in a pattern or practice of illegally hiring aliens, id. at § 1324a(f);
operating a commercial enterprise for the purpose of evading immigration laws,
id, at § 1325(d); and illegally reentering the country after having previously

522 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

present in the country illegally, for example, is not by itself a
crime. Illegal presence without more is only a civil violation of
the act that subjects the individual to possible removal. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B). See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407; Melendres v.
Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1000-1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[U]nlike
illegal entry, mere unauthorized presence in the United States is
not a crime”).

Significantly, the administrative proceedings brought by Fed-
eral immigration authorities to remove individuals from the coun-
try are civil proceedings, not criminal prosecutions. See Arizona,
567 US. at 396. See also 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, S. Yale-Loehr,
& R.Y. Wada, Immigration Law and Procedure § 71.01[4][al
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2016) (acknowledging “the uniform
judicial view, reiterated in numerous Supreme Court and lower
court holdings, . . . that [removal] is a civil consequence and is not
regarded as criminal punishment”). This is true even where the
alleged basis for removal is the commission of a criminal offense.
Aliens are subject to removal from the country for a variety of
reasons. For example, an individual is subject to removal if he or
she was inadmissible at the time of entry into the country or has
violated the terms and conditions of his or her admission, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(A)-(D); has committed certain crimes while in the
country, id. at § 1227(a)(2); is or at any time after admission into
the country has been a drug abuser or addict, id. at § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii);
presents certain security or foreign policy risks, id. at § 1227(a)(4);

been removed, id, at § 1326, There is no indication in the record before us that
Lunn entered the country illegally or committed any immigration crime.

“Other civil immigration violations include engaging in unauthorized work,
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)Qi); failing to remove alien stowaways from vessels and
aircraft, id, at § 1253(¢)(1); and wilfully failing or refusing to depart from the
country after a final order of removal, id, at § 1324d(a). The latter potentially has
both civil and criminal consequences. See id. at §§ 1253(a), 1324d(a).

Although there was a final order of removal outstanding against Lunn, issued
in 2008, there is no indication in the record before us that he wilfully failed or
refused to depart pursuant to that order. The United States represents in its brief
that the reason Lunn was not actually removed pursuant to the 2008 order is that
“his country of origin declined to provide travel documents.” He was instead
released from Federal detention in 2008 on supervision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a).
We note that he was again released from Federal detention, for the same reason,
in May, 2017, approximately three and one-half months after he was taken into
Federal custody in this case. Boston Globe, Immigrant Who Can’t Be Deported
to Cambodia Released from Detention, May, 2017, https:/Avww.bostonglobe
.com/metro/2017/05/24/immigrant-who-can-deported-cambodia-challenges-his
-detention/JZ6PUrPNY K125ZbdKbaMON/story.html [https://perma.cc/3S8E-
SXIB].

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 523

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

has become a public charge, id. at § 1227(a)(5); or has voted
illegally, id. at § 1227(a)(6). Removal proceedings are heard and
decided by executive branch immigration judges appointed by the
United States Attorney General, who operate within the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review. Id. at
§ 1101(b)(4).

2. Use of civil immigration detainers. The type of immigration
detainer issued by the department in this case was Form I-247D,
entitled “Immigration Detainer — Request for Voluntary Ac-
tion.” It was one of three different types of forms then being used
by the department to notify State authorities that they had in their
custody a person believed by the department to be a removable
alien, and to indicate what action the department was asking the
State authorities to take with respect to that person.'?

Form I-247D was to be completed and signed by a Federal
immigration officer. In part 1.A of the form, the officer was asked
to indicate, by checking one or more of six boxes, a basis on
which the department had determined that the person in custody
was “an immigration enforcement priority.”'® The officer in this
case checked the box stating that Lunn “has been convicted of a
‘significant misdemeanor’ as defined under [department] policy.”
There was no indication on the form what that misdemeanor was,
whether it was a Federal or State offense, when it occurred, or
when he was convicted.

Part 1.B of the form stated that the department had determined
that there was probable cause to believe that the person in custody
was a removable alien, and required the officer completing the
form to indicate, by checking one or more of four boxes, the basis
for that determination. In this case the officer checked two boxes:
the first stated that there was “a final order of removal against the
[petitioner]”; and the second stated that there was “biometric
confirmation of the [petitioner’s] identity and a records check of

227 he other two forms were Form I-247N, entitled “Immigration Detainer —
Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority Alien,” and
Form I-247X, entitled “Request for Voluntary Transfer.” Neither of those forms
was used in this case. The Federal government has since rescinded all three
forms and replaced them with a single new form, described in note 17, infra.

*27The “enforcement priority” language referred to certain prioritized bases for
removal that were set forth in a “priority enforcement program” that was then
in effect. The program is no longer in effect. It has been terminated pursuant to
an executive order of the President of the United States, See Exec. Order No.
13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed.
Reg, 8799, 8801, at § 10(a) (Jan. 25, 2017).

524 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in
addition to other reliable information, that the [petitioner] either
lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is remov-
able under [United States] immigration law.” The detainer did not
provide any specific details as to the order of removal.'*

The detainer form stated that the department “requested” the
custodian of the subject of the detainer to do three things: (1)
“Ts]erve a copy of this form on the subject and maintain custody
of him/her for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS beyond the
time when he/she would otherwise have been released from your
custody to allow [the department] to assume custody”;® (2)
notify the department at a given telephone number “[a]s early as
possible prior to the time you otherwise would release the sub-
ject”; and (3) “[nJotify this office in the event of the subject’s
death, hospitalization or transfer to another institution.”**

In short, this was a civil immigration detainer. It alleged that
Lunn was subject to, and was being sought by the Federal
authorities for the purpose of, the civil process of removal. It was
not a criminal detainer or a criminal arrest warrant. It did not
allege that the Federal authorities were seeking Lunn for a crimi-
nal immigration offense or any other Federal crime, for purposes
of a criminal prosecution.'7

In Massachusetts, an immigration detainer form of this type

“The final order of removal was issued in 2008. Despite the order, the
Federal authorities were unsuccessful in actually removing Lunn. See note 11,
supra. There is no indication in the record that they did not know how to find
him in 2016 when they issued the detainer in this case, that he presented a flight
risk, or that the reason they were unable to remove him previously had subsided.

15.45 stated in note 4, supra, there is no indication in the record before us that
a copy of the form was ever served on Lunn by any of his Massachusetts
custodians — the police, the sheriff, or the trial court. The parties stipulate that
he was not served by the sheriff or by the court. The United States claims in its
brief that it appears that he was served, citing the page of the trial court docket
that states he was “held on . . . [the] detainer” (see note 5, supra), although the
docket makes no mention of the detainer having been served. The only copy of
the detainer in the record is blank in the spaces provided for date and manner of
service.

16This case involves only the first request in the detainer, i.e., that a custodian
continue to hold an individual after he or she is entitled to be released. The other
two requests are not at issue in this case, and we therefore need not and do not
address them.

'70n March 24, 2017, the Federal government, effective April 2, 2017,
rescinded Forms [-247D, I-247N, and I-247X, and replaced them with a single
new form, Form I-247A, entitled “Immigration Detainer — Notice of Action.”
Like Form I-247D, it states that the Department of Homeland Security (depart-

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 525

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

will typically travel with its subject as he or she is transferred
between custodians. In this case, for example, the detainer, origi-
nally issued by the department to the Boston police, would have
been given by the police to the court officers at the time Lunn was
brought into court for arraignment; by the court officers to the
sheriff following the arraignment, when Lunn was committed to
the sheriff's custody in lieu of bail; and by the sheriff back to the
court officers when the defendant was brought into court for trial.

The parties stipulate that it is common in Massachusetts, as
apparently happened here, that the courts and law enforcement

ment) has determined that probable cause exists to believe that the subject is a
removable alien, and requires the immigration officer completing the form to
indicate, by checking one or more boxes, the basis on which that determination
was made, It also states that “[t]he alien must be served with a copy of this form
for the detainer to take effect,” and it provides blank spaces, to be filled in by
the custodian, indicating the date and manner of service. Significantly, like Form
1-247D, it “request[s]” that the custodian “[nJotify [the department] as early as
possible (at least 48 hours, if possible) before the alien is released from [the
custodian’s] custody,” and “[mlaintain custody of the alien for a period NOT TO
EXCEED 48 HOURS beyond the time when he/she would otherwise have been
released from [the custodian’s] custody to allow [the department] to assume
custody.”

Pursuant to a written policy dated March 24, 2017, of United States Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement, the agency within the department respon-
sible for identifying and apprehending removable aliens, new Form 1 247A must
be accompanied by one of two other forms: Form I 200, entitled “Warrant for
Arrest of Alien,” or Form I 205, entitled “Warrant of Removal/Detention.” The
latter applies when the individual named in the detainer is subject to a final order
of removal, and may be signed by any of the thirty-two types of immigration
officials designated in 8 CER. §241.2(a)(1); the former applies when the
named individual is a removable alien not yet subject to a final order of removal,
and may be signed by any of the fifty-three types of immigration officials
designated in 8 C.ER. § 287.5(e)(2), These are civil administrative warrants
approved by, and directed to, Federal immigration officials. Neither form
requires the authorization of a judge. Neither form is a criminal arrest warrant
or a criminal detainer.

Unlike old Form 1-247D, new Form 1-247A does not contain a statement
indicating that the individual named in the detainer is an “enforcement priority,”
or any specific basis for such a determination. See note 13, supra, Without this
information, the State custodian will not know, from the new form, the reason
alleged for seeking removal, e.g., whether the individual is believed to be a
threat to national security or has just briefly overstayed a lawfully issued visa.
In cases where Form 1-205 is used, i.e., when there has been a final order of
removal, the immigration officer completing that form must indicate the provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (act) on which the order was
based; this may provide the State custodian with some information on the
claimed basis for removal.

526 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

agencies do not actually serve the subject with a copy of the
detainer, as the form requests. The parties further stipulate that
“TiJndividual law enforcement agencies in the Commonwealth
may or may not have policies on the subject of [immigration]
detainers,” and that “[pJolicies and practices vary from one Com-
monwealth law enforcement agency to another as to whether, or
under which circumstances, to honor [such] detainers.”

3. Voluntariness of detainers. Federal immigration detainers
like Form I-247D, and now Form I-247A, by their express terms
are simply requests. They are not commands, and they impose no
mandatory obligations on the State authorities to which they are
directed. The Federal government, through the detainer, “re-
quests” that it be notified when a person in State custody, whom
the Federal government believes to be a removable alien, is
scheduled to be released, and it “requests” that the State authori-
ties voluntarily keep the person in custody for up to two addi-
tional days, so that the department can arrive and assume custody
of the person.

The United States, in its brief as amicus curiae, concedes that
compliance by State authorities with immigration detainers is
voluntary, not mandatory. The government's concession is well
founded for at least two reasons. First, the act nowhere purports
to authorize Federal authorities to require State or local officials
to detain anyone. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 641 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“The [a]ct does not authorize [Flederal officials to
command [S]tate or local officials to detain suspected aliens
subject to removal”)."® Second, the Tenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits the Federal government from
compelling States to employ their resources to administer and

48One of the regulations promulgated pursuant to the act states in part: “(d)
Temporary detention at [dJepartment request. Upon a determination by the
[d]epartment to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal
justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not
to exceed [forty-eight] hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in
order to permit assumption of custody by the [dJepartment” (emphasis added).
8 CER. § 287.7(d). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
explained, the regulation’s use of the word “shall,” correctly understood in the
context of the entire statutory and regulatory scheme, does not change the
voluntary nature of the detainer. Galarza v, Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir.
2014) (“it is hard to read the use of the word ‘shall’ in the timing section to
change the nature of the entire regulation”). The United States concedes in its
amicus brief that this paragraph of the regulation only “defines the maximum
length of time that an alien with an immigration detainer may be held. It does
not require local law enforcement agencies to hold anyone.”

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 527

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

enforce Federal programs. See id. at 643-644, citing Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (analyzing constitutional concerns
associated with interpreting detainers to be mandatory; “a con-
clusion that a detainer issued by a [FJederal agency is an order
that [S]tate and local agencies are compelled to follow . . . is
inconsistent with the anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth
Amendment”). In other words, even if the Federal government
wanted to make State compliance with immigration detainers
mandatory, the Tenth Amendment likely would prevent it from
doing so. The Federal government also has made the same
concession in litigation elsewhere, and in various policy state-
ments and correspondence, that State compliance with its
detainers is voluntary. See Galarza, supra at 639 n.3, 641-642
(summarizing cases and statements; “In short, the position of
[Flederal immigration agencies has remained constant: detainers
are not mandatory”).

4. The requested detention constitutes an arrest. What the
department is asking for, when it requests in a civil immigration
detainer that a Massachusetts custodian hold a person for up to
two days after he or she would otherwise be entitled to release
from State custody, constitutes an arrest as a matter of Massa-
chusetts law. An arrest occurs in Massachusetts, with or without
a warrant, when “there is (1) an actual or constructive detention
or seizure, (2) performed with the intention to effect an arrest, and
(3) so understood by the person detained. See Commonwealth v.
Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 580 (2011)[, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1262
(2012)]; Commonwealth v. Limone, 460 Mass. 834, 839 (2011).
The subjective understanding of the officer or of the defendant
does not control. Commonwealth v. Avery, 365 Mass. 59 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 413 Mass. 598 (1992).” J.A. Grasso,
Jt, & C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts
Law § 6-1 (2017). The United States acknowledged at oral argu-
ment in this case that a detention like this, based strictly on a
Federal immigration detainer, constitutes an arrest. The govern-
ment has made similar concessions in other cases as well. See,
e.g., Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (stating that Federal defendants “concede that being de-
tained pursuant to an . . . immigration detainer constitutes a
warrantless arrest”). Cf. Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208,
217 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[W]hile a detainer is distinct from an arrest,
it nevertheless results in the detention of an individual. . . .

528 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

Because Morales was kept in custody for a new purpose after she
was entitled to release, she was subjected to a new seizure for
Fourth Amendment purposes — one that must be supported by a
new probable cause justification”).

To be sure, it is permissible in certain limited circumstances for
a police officer, on making an otherwise lawful stop, to briefly
detain an individual for investigatory purposes, even though the
individual’s liberty is thereby temporarily restrained and he or
she is not free to leave. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sinforoso,
434 Mass. 320, 325 (2001); Commonwealth v. Willis, 415 Mass.
814, 819-820 (1993); Commonwealth v. Sanderson, 398 Mass.
761, 765-767 (1986). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). But that is not what happens with a Federal immigration
detainer. When a Massachusetts custodian holds an individual
solely on the basis of a civil detainer, the custodian has no
investigatory purpose. Indeed, by its very nature, the detainer
comes into play only if and when there is no other basis for the
State authorities to continue to hold the individual (e.g., after he
or she has posted bail or been ordered released on personal
recognizance; or after he or she has completed serving the com-
mitted time on a criminal sentence; or, as in this case, after
pending charges have been dismissed). The sole purpose of the
detention is to maintain physical custody of the individual, so that
he or she remains on the premises until the Federal immigration
authorities arrive and take him or her into Federal custody to face
possible removal. Moreover, the requested detention is not nec-
essarily brief. The department, by its detainer, asks for a detention
of up to two full days.

What happened in this case, therefore, was plainly an arrest
within the meaning of Massachusetts law. Lunn was physically
detained in a holding cell, against his will, for several hours. He
was otherwise entitled to be free, as no criminal charges were
then pending against him and there was no other basis under
Massachusetts law to hold him. The sole basis for holding him
was the civil immigration detainer. The question, then, is whether
the court officers who held him had the authority to arrest him on
the basis of a civil detainer.

5. Authority of court officers to arrest. Court officers in Mas-
sachusetts, while on court house premises, have the same power

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 529

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

to arrest as Massachusetts police officers. G. L. c. 221, § 70A.°
The authority to arrest is generally controlled by Massachusetts
common law and statutes, which confer the power and also define
the limits of that power. Our State law may authorize Massachu-
setts officers to enforce Federal statutes and make arrests for
Federal offenses (unless preempted by Federal law), but it need
not do so. Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 33 (2014), and
cases cited. In the absence of a Federal statute granting State
officers the power to arrest for a Federal offense, their authority
to do so is a question of State law. Id. See United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 589-590 (1948) (authority of State officers to make
arrests for Federal crimes is, absent Federal statutory instruction,
matter of State law); Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475-476
(9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Hodgers-Durgin v.
De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that Arizona officers had authority as matter of State law to
enforce criminal provisions of Federal immigration law). We
must therefore carefully examine Massachusetts common law,
Massachusetts statutory law, and any Federal statutory law that
may possibly give Massachusetts officers the power to arrest in
these circumstances.

a. Massachusetts common law. Under the common law of
Massachusetts, police officers have the authority to make war-
rantless arrests, but only for criminal offenses, and then only in
limited circumstances. First, an officer has authority to arrest
without a warrant any person whom he or she has probable cause
to believe has committed a felony. See Commonwealth v.
Gernrich, 476 Mass. 249, 253 (2017); Commonwealth v. Hason,
387 Mass. 169, 173 (1982). Second, an officer has authority to
arrest without a warrant any person who commits a misdemeanor,
provided the misdemeanor involves an actual or imminent breach
of the peace, is committed in the officer’s presence, and is
ongoing at the time of the arrest or only interrupted by the arrest.
See Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 629-630 (2015);
Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332, 334 (1989); Muniz v.
Mehlman, 327 Mass. 353, 357 (1951); Commonwealth v.
Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 297-299 (1934), and numerous authori-
ties cited.

*Court officers and those authorized to act as court officers within the
judicial branch may perform police duties and have police powers in or about
the areas of the court to which they have been assigned when so designated by
the chief justice of the trial court, the chief justice of the supreme judicial court
or the chief justice of the appeals court, as appropriate.” G. L. c. 221, § 70A.

530 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

“Breach of the peace” in this context generally means an act
that causes a public disturbance or endangers public safety in
some way. See, e.g., Jewett, 471 Mass. at 629-630 (reckless
operation of motor vehicle, including erratic driving on public
streets, near-collision with parked vehicle, failure to stop, and
chase through residential area, involved breach of peace); Howe,
405 Mass. at 334 (operating motor vehicle while under influence
of alcohol); Commonwealth v. Mullins, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 954,
954-955 (1991) (blaring loud music “turned up to full blast” and
shouting obscenities from apartment window, thereby disturbing
neighbors and resulting in gathering of neighbors outside). See
also Black’s Law Dictionary 189 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “[b]reach
of the peace” as “violations of public peace or order and acts
tending to a disturbance thereof . . . disorderly, dangerous conduct
disrupting of public peace”); 4 C.E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal
Law § 503 (15th ed. 1996).?¢

That is the sum and substance of the power of police officers to
make warrantless arrests under Massachusetts common law. Con-
spicuously absent from our common law is any authority (in the

20The breach of the peace requirement for a misdemeanor arrest has its roots
in English common law, see Regina y. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 1301, 92 Eng.
Rep. 349, 352-353 (K.B. 1710), quoted with approval in Commonwealth v.
Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 297 (1934), and has become firmly embedded in the
common law of Massachusetts. “Arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor not
amounting to a breach of the peace was impermissible at common law.”
Commonwealth v. Conway, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 550 (1974). Not only have
our cases cited the breach of the peace requirement repeatedly as a correct
statement of our common law, but we also have consistently enforced the
requirement, when necessary, by holding warrantless misdemeanor arrests that
were not authorized by statute and that did not involve any breach of the peace
to be unlawful. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mekalian, 346 Mass. 496, 497-498
(1963) (misdemeanor offense of registering bets without license did not involve
breach of peace; arrest without warrant or statutory authorization was unlawful,
resulting in suppression of evidence seized incident to arrest); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 158 Mass. 149, 158-159 (1893) (misdemeanor offense of possessing
“short lobsters” with intent to sell did not involve breach of peace; arrest without
warrant or statutory authorization was unlawful); Commonwealth v. O'Connor,
7 Allen 583, 584-585 (1863) (arrest for drunkenness in private that did not
create breach of public peace was unlawful); Commonwealth y. Ubilez, 88 Mass.
App. Ct. 814, 820-821 (2016) (misdemeanor offense of operating motor vehicle
with revoked or suspended registration, absent evidence of erratic or negligent
operation or other danger to public, did not involve breach of peace; arrest
without warrant or statutory authorization unlawful). Contrast Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327-355 (2001) (surveying common law; holding that
Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution does not require breach of
peace for warrantless misdemeanor arrest).

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 531

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

absence of a statute) for police officers to arrest generally for civil
matters, let alone authority to arrest specifically for Federal civil
immigration matters.2*??

b. Massachusetts statutory law. Apart from the common law,
the parties and the amici have directed us to numerous and varied
Massachusetts statutes that authorize arrests by police officers
and other officials, both with and without warrants. See, e.g.,
G.L. c. 12, § 11J (constitutional and civil rights violations); G. L.
c. 41, § 98 (public disturbances and disorder); G. L. c. 90, § 21
(certain motor vehicle offenses); G. L. c. 91, § 58 (misdemeanors
committed in or upon certain Massachusetts waterways); G. L.
c. 94C, § 41 (controlled substance offenses); G. L. c. 209A, § 6 (7)
(domestic violence offenses); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (unlicensed
firearm offenses); G. L. c. 276, § 28 (various misdemean-

21The parties and the United States, as amicus curiae, have brought to our
attention a change in the standard immigration detainer form that occurred
shortly before the oral argument in this case, and the fact that immigration
detainers are now accompanied by either Form I 200 or Form I 205. See note
17, supra. The latter forms are Federal administrative warrants issued by
Federal immigration officials to other Federal immigration officials. They ap-
pear to have no bearing on the question whether Massachusetts officers have
authority under Massachusetts law to make civil immigration arrests. They do
not transform the removal process into a criminal process, nor do they change
the fact that Massachusetts officers, absent a statute, have no common-law
authority to make civil arrests. Simply stated, the fact that a Federal officer may
have the authority under Federal law to take custody of an individual pursuant
to one of these forms for removal purposes does not mean that Massachusetts
officers have the authority under Massachusetts law to do so.

We note that the Federal government’s stated reason for now issuing admin-
istrative warrants with civil immigration detainers is to counteract a recent
ruling by a Federal District Court judge that, in the absence of a showing of risk
of flight, invalidated arrests made by Federal officers pursuant to detainers as
impermissible warrantless arrests under the act. See Moreno v. Napolitano, 213
FE Supp. 3d 999, 1005-1009 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2016), quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2) (authorizing Federal immigration officers to arrest without warrant
only if, among other things, they have “reason to believe that the alien so
arrested . . . is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest”).
See also United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Policy No.
10074.2: Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers § 2.4,
at 2 n.2 (Mar. 24, 2017).

2s we have said, this case concerns detention based solely on a civil
immigration detainer. This was not a situation where a detainer provided an
officer with probable cause that a Federal criminal offense had been committed.
We therefore do not address the authority or obligations of Massachusetts
officers who, by a detainer or otherwise, acquire information of a Federal
criminal offense.

532 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

ors); G. L. c. 279, § 3 (probation violations). However, no party
or amicus has identified a single Massachusetts statute that au-
thorizes a Massachusetts police officer or court officer, directly or
indirectly, to arrest in the circumstances here, based on a Federal
civil immigration detainer. Simply put, there is no such statute in
Massachusetts.

The parties and amici also have identified several Massachu-
setts statutes that authorize the noncriminal detention of individu-
als in certain circumstances. See, e.g., G. L. c. 111B, § 8 (pro-
tective custody for incapacitated and intoxicated persons); G. L.
c. 123, § 12 (emergency hospitalization due to mental illness);
G. L. c. 123, § 35 (involuntary commitment of persons with
alcohol and substance abuse disorders); G. L. c. 123A (sexually
dangerous persons); G. L. c. 215, §§ 34, 34A (civil contempt for
noncompliance with spousal or child support order); G. L. c. 276,
§§ 45-49 (material witnesses in criminal proceedings). Again,
however, none of these statutes either directly or indirectly au-
thorizes the detention of individuals based solely on a Federal
civil immigration detainer.

c. Argument of the United States. The United States, as amicus
curiae, asks us to hold that officers in Massachusetts have “in-
herent authority” to carry out the detention requests made in
Federal civil immigration detainers — essentially, to make arrests
for Federal civil immigration matters as a form of cooperation
with the Federal authorities. See, e.g., United States v. Santana-
Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193-1194 (10th Cir. 2001) (State and
local police officers have “implicit authority” to investigate and
arrest for violations of Federal immigration law, presumably both
civil and criminal, absent State or local law to contrary).* But see
Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 475 (State law must affirmatively grant

25We do not see any meaningful difference between “inherent authority” (the
term used by the United States in its brief) and “implicit authority” (the term
used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit), The term
“inherent authority” likely derives from a memorandum of the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, dated April 3, 2002, which espoused the
theory in that way. The 2002 memorandum essentially reversed course from a
1996 opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, which had reflected the Depart-
ment of Justice’s historical view that, absent express authorization, State and
local police lack authority to arrest or detain aliens solely for purposes of civil
immigration proceedings. See Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immi-
gration Federalism, 2016 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1197, 1210-1211; Lewis, Gass, von
Briesen, Master, & Wishnie, Authority of State and Local Officers to Arrest
Aliens Suspected of Civil Infractions of Federal Immigration Law, 7 Bender’s
Immigr. Bull, 944, 944-945 (Aug. 1, 2002).

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 533

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

authority to State and local officers to enforce Federal immigra-
tion law before arrest can be made on that basis).

“The assertion that [S]tate and local officials have inherent civil
enforcement authority has been strongly contested in the acad-
emy, in police departments, and in the courts” (footnotes omit-
ted). Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Fed-
eralism, 2016 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1197, 1211 (Armacost). More-
over, it is questionable whether a theory of “inherent” or “im-
plicit” State authority continues to be viable in the immigration
context after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Arizona, supra, which severely curtailed, on Federal preemption
grounds, the power of State and local police to act in Federal
immigration matters. See I.J. Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook
425 (15th ed. 2016) (“The notion of ‘inherent authority’ to arrest
and detain undocumented persons . . . has been seriously under-
mined” by Supreme Court’s holding); Armacost, supra at 1211-
1215 (arguing that inherent authority theory has been foreclosed
by Supreme Court’s decision). Assuming that the theory remains
viable, and has not been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Arizona, a point of Federal law that we need not
decide, we nevertheless decline to adopt it as a matter of Mas-
sachusetts law as a basis for authorizing civil immigration arrests.

As we have said, the common law and the statutes of this
Commonwealth are what establish and limit the power of Mas-
sachusetts officers to arrest. There is no history of “implicit” or
“inherent” arrest authority having been recognized in Massachu-
setts that is greater than what is recognized by our common law
and the enactments of our Legislature. Where neither our com-
mon law nor any of our statutes recognizes the power to arrest for
Federal civil immigration offenses, we should be chary about
reading our law’s silence as a basis for affirmatively recognizing
a new power to arrest — without the protections afforded to other
arrestees under Massachusetts law? — under the amorphous
rubric of “implicit” or “inherent” authority. Recognizing a new
common-law power to effect a Federal civil immigration arrest
would also create an anomaly in our common law: a State or local

24 mong other things, an individual arrested without a warrant in Massachu-
setts has a statutory right to be considered for bail and, if not admitted to bail,
a constitutional right toa prompt determination of probable cause to arrest,
made by a neutral magistrate, generally within twenty-four hours of arrest. See
Jenkins y. Chief Justice of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 416 Mass, 221, 238-245
(1993).

534 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

police officer in Massachusetts (or, as in this case, a court officer)
would be able to effect a warrantless arrest for a criminal mis-
demeanor only if it involves a breach of the peace (see part 5.a,
supra), but would be able to arrest for a Federal civil matter
without any such limitation; in other words, the officer would
have greater authority to arrest for a Federal civil matter than for
a State criminal offense. See generally Bach, State Law to the
Contrary? Examining Potential Limits on the Authority of State
and Local Law Enforcement to Enforce Federal Immigration
Law, 22 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 67 (2012).

The prudent course is not for this court to create, and attempt
to define, some new authority for court officers to arrest that
heretofore has been unrecognized and undefined. The better
course is for us to defer to the Legislature to establish and
carefully define that authority if the Legislature wishes that to be
the law of this Commonwealth.?*

The United States, as amicus, also points to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g)(10) for the proposition that State officers may cooper-
ate with Federal immigration authorities by detaining and arrest-
ing pursuant to an immigration warrant. To understand what
§ 1357(g)(10) accomplishes, it is necessary to consider § 1357(g)
as a whole.

Section 1357(g) generally concerns situations in which State
and local officers can perform functions of a Federal immigration
officer. Section 1357(g)(1) provides specifically that States and
their political subdivisions may enter into written agreements
with the Federal government that allow State or local officers to
perform functions of an immigration officer “at the expense of the
State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with
State and local law.” Such agreements are commonly referred to
as “287(g) agreements,” referring to the section of the act that
authorizes them, § 287(g), which is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
Among other things, State and local officers performing Federal
functions under such agreements must be trained in the enforce-
ment of Federal immigration laws, must adhere to the Federal laws,
may use Federal property and facilities to carry out their functions,
and are subject to the supervision and direction of the United States
Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2)-(5). No State or political
subdivision is required to enter into such an agreement. See 8

25We express no view on the constitutionality of any such statute, or whether
such a statute would be preempted by Federal law. It would be premature for us
to rule on those questions unless and until a specific statute is enacted.

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 535
Lunn v, Commonwealth
U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9).7°

The specific language relied on by the United States in this case
is the final paragraph of § 1357(g), which provides:

“(10) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
require an agreement under this subsection in order for any
officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a
State . . . (A) to communicate with the Attorney General
regarding the immigration status of any individual, including
reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully
present in the United States; or (B) otherwise to cooperate
with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension,
detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the
United States.”

Significantly, the United States does not contend that
§ 1357(g)(10) affirmatively confers authority on State and local
officers to make arrests pursuant to civil immigration detainers,
where none otherwise exists. See Craan, 469 Mass. at 33 (rec-
ognizing that Federal statute may confer authority on State offi-
cers to arrest for Federal offenses). See also Di Re, 332 U.S. at
589-590. In other words, it does not claim that § 1357(g)(10) is an
independent source of authority for State or local officers to make
such an arrest. Rather, it cites § 1357(g)(10) as a part of its
argument that State and local officers have inherent authority to
make these kinds of arrests; specifically, it relies on this provision
for the proposition that such arrests, when performed at the
request of the Federal government, are a permissible form of
State participation in the Federal immigration arena that would
not be preempted by Federal law. We have already rejected the
argument that Massachusetts officers have an inherent authority
to arrest that exceeds what is conferred on them by our common
law and statutes.

Further, it is not reasonable to interpret § 1357(g)(10) as affir-
matively granting authority to all State and local officers to make
arrests that are not otherwise authorized by State law. Section
1357(g)(10), read in the context of § 1357(g) as a whole, simply
makes clear that State and local authorities, even without a 287(g)
agreement that would allow their officers to perform the functions

26This case does not involve such a written agreement. We therefore express
no view whether the detention of an individual pursuant to a Federal civil
immigration detainer by a Massachusetts officer who is operating under such an
agreement would be lawful.

536 477 Mass. 517 (2017)

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

of immigration officers, may continue to cooperate with Federal
immigration officers in immigration enforcement to the extent
they are authorized to do so by their State law and choose to do
so.?7

In those limited instances where the act affirmatively grants
authority to State and local officers to arrest, it does so in more
explicit terms than those in § 1357(g)(10). See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(10) (permitting Attorney General to authorize State
and local officers, with consent of their department or agency, to
perform all powers and duties of immigration officers in emer-
gency cases of “actual or imminent mass influx of aliens off the
coast of the United States, or near a land border”); id. at § 1252c

27Nothing in the legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) or the department’s
very thorough “Guidance on State and Local Governments’ Assistance in
Immigration Enforcement and Related Matters” (accessible at https://dhs.gov/
xlibrary/ assets /guidance-state -local -assistance-immigration enforcement pdf
[https://perma.cc/STUA-6S4E]), suggests that § 1357(g)(10) constitutes an af-
firmative grant of immigration arrest authority to States,

The United States cites three cases that mention § 1357(g)(10), but none of
them resolves the exact question presented here, which is whether the statute
confers authority on State officers to arrest on a Federal civil immigration
detainer even where State law does not authorize such an arrest. Those cases
principally addressed whether the actions of State officers were done in coop-
eration with Federal officers, or unilaterally such that they would be preempted
by Federal law. Those courts were not asked to decide whether State officers are
independently authorized by § 1357(g)(10) to do acts, in the name of “coop-
eration,” that they are not authorized to do under State law. See United States v.
Ovando-Garzo, 752 F3d 1161, 1163-1164 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that North
Dakota highway patrol trooper who detained suspect at request of United States
Border Patrol agent acted cooperatively pursuant to § 1357[g][10], not unilat-
erally, and thus did not exceed scope of authority so as to trigger preemption; no
issue whether officer’s actions were authorized by North Dakota law); Santos v.
Frederick County Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465-466 (4th Cir, 2013), cert.
denied, 134 $. Ct. 1541 (2014) (holding that detention by State deputy sheriffs
before confirmation that immigration warrant was active was not cooperation
for purposes of § 1357[g][10], thereby triggering preemption, because arrest
was not made pursuant to Federal direction; no issue whether detention was
authorized by Maryland law); United States v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237 (8th Cit.
2010) (noting in single sentence that North Dakota highway patrol trooper who
stopped defendant for traffic violation was authorized by § 1357[g][10] to assist
Federal agent in arresting detainee; no issue whether detention was authorized
under State law).

We also have considered other cases that mention § 1357(g)(10). None of
them addresses the specific question we have here, i.c., whether the statute
independently and affirmatively confers authority on State officers to arrest on
immigration detainers where such an arrest is not authorized by State law.

477 Mass. 517 (2017) 537

Lunn y, Commonwealth,

(authorizing State and local officers, “to the extent permitted by
State and local law,” to arrest and detain convicted felons who
have been previously deported but are presently in country ille-
gally); id. at § 1324(c) (authorizing arrest, by designated immi-
gration officers “and all other officers whose duty it is to enforce
criminal laws,” of persons who commit criminal offense of ille-
gally bringing in, transporting, or harboring aliens); id. at
§ 1357(g)(1)-(9) (authorizing State and local officers trained pur-
suant to written agreements with Federal government to perform
duties of immigration officers).

Conclusion. The case is remanded to the county court for entry
of a judgment stating that Lunn’s case is dismissed as moot, and
declaring that Massachusetts law provides no authority for Mas-
sachusetts court officers to arrest and hold an individual solely on
the basis of a Federal civil immigration detainer, beyond the time
that the individual would otherwise be entitled to be released
from State custody.

So ordered.

538 477 Mass. 538 (2017)

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

D & H Disrriputinc Company vs. COMMISSIONER OF
REVENUE.

Suffolk. April 3, 2017. - July 31, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cyrurn, J

Taxation, Sales and use tax. Internet. Constitutional Law, Commerce clause,
Interstate commerce, Taxation. Interstate Commerce.

Discussion of the statutory framework for the collection of sales tax, which
distinguishes between retail sales transactions and sales-for-resale transac-
tions, as well as between retailers that are engaged in business in Massa-
chusetts and those that are not; discussion of the statutory framework for the
use tax; and discussion of the “drop shipment rule,” which offers an alter-
native to the consumer-reported use tax scheme. [539-542]

‘The Appellate Tax Board correctly concluded that the taxpayer, which sold
consumer goods to retailers at wholesale and delivered the goods to Mas-
sachusetts consumers and others on behalf of those retailers, was not entitled
to an abatement of taxes assessed by the Commissioner of Revenue (com-
missioner) pursuant to the “drop shipment rule.” where the commissioner
provided support for the validity of the assessment, which the taxpayer failed
to rebut; and where the drop shipment rule did not discriminate against
interstate commerce. [544-548]

Appeat from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Philip S. Olsen (Jonathan A. Block also present) for the tax-
payer.

Julie E. Green, Assistant Attorney General, for Commissioner
of Revenue.

Cypuer, J. If a consumer enters his or her neighborhood sport-
ing goods store in Massachusetts and purchases a baseball glove,
the store, as the “vendor,” collects the Massachusetts sales tax
owed from the consumer and remits it to the Department of
Revenue (department). See G. L. c. 64H, §§ 1, 2. This case
evaluates a more complex transaction in which a Massachusetts
consumer instead finds a hypothetical baseball glove online, and
purchases it from an out-of-State retailer who then orders the
glove from a Massachusetts wholesaler and directs the wholesaler

477 Mass. 538 (2017) 539

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

to deliver the glove directly to the doorstep of the Massachusetts
consumer. In that more complicated transaction, known as a
“drop shipment sale,” the wholesaler is considered to be the
vendor, and is obligated to collect sales tax and remit it to the
department.

The taxpayer, D & H Distributing Company (D & H), is a
company in the position of the hypothetical wholesaler just
described. It appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board
(board) in which the board concluded that under a provision of
the Massachusetts sales tax statute known as the “drop shipment
tule,” D & H was responsible for collecting and remitting the
sales tax due on products it sold to the out-of-State retailers and
then delivered to consumers. G. L. c. 64H, § 1. We agree with the
board’s conclusion, and also reject D & H’s argument that the
statutory drop shipment rule violates the dormant commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm
the decision of the board.

1. Statutory framework. a. Sales tax. General Laws c. 64H
distinguishes between retail sales transactions and sales-for-resale
transactions. Retail sales of goods and services are subject to tax
in Massachusetts. G. L. c. 64H, § 2. In contrast, sales for resale —
that is, sales of goods by a wholesale supplier to a retailer that
will ultimately sell to an end consumer — are not subject to tax;
only the subsequent retail sale is. See G. L. c. 64H, § 1 (defining
“retail sale” as “a sale of services or tangible personal property or
both for any purpose other than resale”); G. L. c. 64H, § 2
(imposing sales tax upon “sales at retail’).

The statute also distinguishes between a retailer that is engaged
in business in Massachusetts and one that is not. Where a retailer
is engaged in business in Massachusetts but purchases the goods
it sells a Massachusetts consumer from a wholesaler, sales tax is
charged on the final sale to the customer, and the retailer is the
“vendor,” G. L. c. 64H, § 1, responsible to pay the tax. G. L.
c. 64H, § 2. However, if a retailer is not engaged in business in
Massachusetts in the sense that the retailer does not have any
in-State physical presence, Massachusetts cannot require the re-
tailer to collect and remit sales tax. See Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314-315 (1992) (retailers without in-State
physical presence may not be compelled to collect State sales
tax); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill.,

540 477 Mass. 538 (2017)

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) (same).! In light of the Supreme Court's
physical presence requirement, in the previously described hypo-
thetical, if the out-of-State retailer of the baseball glove pur-
chased online by the Massachusetts consumer had no physical
business presence here, it could not be compelled to collect
Massachusetts sales tax.

b. Use tax. The use tax, under G. L. c. 641, was designed to
prevent loss of sales tax revenue from such out-of-State retail
purchases. Commissioner of Revenue v. J.C. Penney Co., 431
Mass. 684, 687 (2000). The use tax obligates consumers to remit
tax to the Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner) “upon the
storage, use or other consumption in the commonwealth of tan-
gible personal property or services purchased from any vendor,”
G.L. c. 641, § 2, that was not subject to sales tax upon the original
sale. G. L. c. 641, § 3. In practice, however, consumers seldom
remit use tax of their own volition, and are not likely even to be
aware of the requirement. See Tenczar, DOR to Taxpayers: Don’t
Forget Use Tax, Commonwealth Mag. (Winter 2014) (Massachu-
setts 2012 use tax compliance rate estimated at under two per
cent; commissioner believes “people don’t pay because they
really don’t understand how the use tax works”).? States that rely
on use tax lose substantial tax revenue. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v.
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1127 (2015) (low compliance with use tax
leads to significant revenue loss).*

c. The drop shipment rule. The drop shipment rule, G. L.

"The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Quill v. North Dakota, 504
U.S, 298 (1992), has been roundly criticized, including in a recent Supreme
Court concurrence, but remains binding on this court, See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v.
Brohl, 135 8, Ct. 1124, 1134-1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing
Quill as “inflicting extreme harm and unfairness on the States” in light of “the
dramatic technological and social changes that [have] taken place in our in-
creasingly interconnected economy,” and comparing $180 billion of United
States mail-order sales in 1992 to $3.16 trillion of electronic commerce sales in
2008),

2The Commonwealth Magazine article is available at https://commonwealth
magazine.org/economy/003-dor-to-taxpayers-dont-forget-use-tax [https://perma
.cc/6NPJ-7BZX]. See also N. Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns
in Other States, Research Department of the Minnesota House of Representa-
tives, at 8 (updated Apr. 2015), http://www. house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/
usetax.pdf[https://perma.cc/B9PZ-E7QV] (Massachusetts use tax revenues
have inereased in wake of more explicit reporting structures).

3See also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v, Brohl, 814 E3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016) (“The regimes differ greatly in effectiveness —
compliance with the sales tax is extremely high, and compliance with the use tax
is extremely low”); D., Bruce, WE Fox, & L, Luna, State and Local Government

477 Mass. 538 (2017) 541

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

c. 64H, § 1, offers an alternative to the consumer-reported use tax
scheme. The rule applies to a sales transaction such as the
hypothetical online baseball glove purchase. When the wholesale
supplier is engaged in business in the Commonwealth but the
retailer is not, the drop shipment rule requires the Massachusetts
wholesale supplier to collect and remit the sales tax due on the
ultimate retail sale to the consumer. G. L. c. 64H, § 1.4 Because
the sales and use tax schemes are “complementary,” Town Fair
Tire Ctrs., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 454 Mass. 601, 605
(2009), transactions subject to tax under the drop shipment rule,
as retail sales, are exempt from use tax. G. L. c. 641, § 7 (@).
The commissioner has consistently interpreted and enforced
the statutory drop shipment rule in the manner just described
since the sales tax statute became effective in 1968, following the
Supreme Court’s National Bellas Hess decision that the Court
reaffirmed in the Quill case. See, e.g., Letter Ruling 79-43 (Oct.
25, 1979); Letter Ruling 80-76 (Oct. 27, 1980); Letter Ruling
81-85 (Sept. 17, 1981); Letter Ruling 84-26 (Apr. 27, 1984);
Letter Ruling 85-35 (Feb. 27, 1985); and Technical Information
Release 04-26 (Oct. 21, 2004), 1 Official Mass Tax Guide, at
PWS-112, PWS-451, PWS-481, PWS-521, PWS-640, PWS-696

Sales Tax Revenue Losses from Electronic Commerce, at 4 (2009) (forecasting
across Federal, State, and local uncaptured 2012 electronic commerce tax
revenue at $11.4 billion). But see Henchman, Internet Sales Tax Collections
Falling Far Short of Experts’ Estimates, Tax Found. (Mar. 18, 2013), https://tax
foundation.org/internet-sales-tax-collections-falling-far-short-experts-estimates
[https://perma.cc/2U43-27QM] (tax revenue in California and New York from
online sales, although substantial, was much lower than forecast).
4Specifically, the drop shipment rule, which is set out as part of the definition
of “[sJale at retail,” provides:
“When tangible personal property is physically delivered by an owner,
a former owner thereof, a factor, or an agent or representative of the owner,
former owner or factor, to the ultimate purchaser residing in or doing
business in the commonwealth, or to any person for redelivery to the
purchaser, pursuant to a retail sale made by a vendor not engaged in
business in the commonwealth, the person making or effectuating the
delivery shall be considered the vendor of that property, the transaction
shall be a retail sale in the commonwealth by the person and that person,
if engaged in business in the commonwealth, shall include the retail selling
price in its gross receipts, regardless of any contrary statutory or contrac-
tual terms concerning the passage of title or risk of loss which may be
expressly or impliedly applicable to any contract or other agreement or
arrangement for the sale, transportation, shipment or delivery of that
property. He shall include the retail selling price of the property in his
gross receipts.” (Emphases added.)

G. L. ¢, 64H, § 1.

542 477 Mass. 538 (2017)

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

(Thomson Reuters 2017). See also National Bellas Hess, Inc.,
386 U.S. at 758. The rule is undergirded by the separate statutory
presumption that a sale is a taxable retail sale, with the burden of
proving otherwise placed upon the vendor. G. L. c. 64H, § 8 (a).5

2. Background. D & H sells consumer goods to retailers at
wholesale and delivers the goods to Massachusetts consumers
and others on behalf of those retailers. D & H appeals from a
decision of the board rejecting its claim to abate sales taxes
assessed by the commissioner pursuant to the drop shipment rule
for the period from September 1, 2006, to March 31, 2009. D &
H challenges the manner in which the commissioner applied the
tule to its business, arguing that the drop shipment rule required
the commissioner to prove, for each challenged sale transaction,
that the out-of-State retailer was not engaged in business in the
Commonwealth and thus not itself compelled to collect sales tax.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the commissioner
and the board correctly determined that D & H was responsible as
the vendor for collecting and remitting the sales tax due on
products it sold to the out-of-State retailers and then delivered to
consumers where it failed to meet its burden of proving that the
retailers were engaged in business in Massachusetts. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the decision of the board.

a. Facts. We summarize the findings of fact made by the board.
See G. L. c. 58A, § 13 (“The decision of the board shall be final
as to findings of fact”). D & H is a wholesale supplier of con-
sumer products, including computer products, home electronics,
and sporting goods, which it sold primarily to retailers like “big
box stores” and their electronic commerce equivalents. At all
times relevant to this case, D & H was incorporated and head-
quartered in Pennsylvania and had six warehouse distribution
centers throughout the country. It employed a sales representative
who lived and worked in Massachusetts. D & H considered this

5General Laws c. 64H, § 8, provides in relevant part:

“(a) It shall be presumed that all gross receipts of a vendor from the sale
of services or tangible personal property are from sales subject to tax until
the contrary is established. The burden of proving that a sale of services or
tangible personal property by any vendor is not a sale at retail shall be
upon such vendor unless he takes from the purchaser a certificate to the
effect that the service or property is purchased for resale, and such
certificate is received and made available to the [Commissioner of Rev-
enue} ....”

477 Mass. 538 (2017) 543

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

presence sufficient to establish nexus for sales tax purposes.®

Before contracting with retailers to sell and deliver goods, D &
H required that all retailers submit a customer application. As part
of that application, retailers were required to list all States in
which they did business, and to provide copies of resale certifi-
cates swearing that all goods were purchased for resale, with sales
tax to be collected by the retailer on ultimate sale to the end
consumer. See G. L. c. 64H, § 8. The terms and conditions of the
application stated that retailers would be billed sales tax until they
furnished such certificates. This was an attempt by D & H to
ensure that sales by D & H would not be characterized as taxable
sales.”

The drop shipment transactions at issue were structured as
follows. First, a Massachusetts consumer purchased a product
from an out-of-State retailer. Second, the out-of-State retailer
purchased the product from D & H. Finally, at the retailer’s
direction, D & H packaged and shipped the product directly to the
Massachusetts consumer. Neither D & H nor the retailer collected
sales tax on these drop shipment sales.

The commissioner conducted an audit of D & H records for the
years 2006-2009, focusing on drop shipment transactions. The
auditor identified the drop-shipment transactions as those with a
ship-to address (i.e., the address of the end consumer) in Massa-
chusetts but a bill-to address (that of the retailer) outside Massa-
chusetts. From this group, the auditor first eliminated sales to
retailers known to be engaged in business in Massachusetts, such
as Best Buy and Target. The auditor similarly removed from
consideration sales to retailers registered as Massachusetts ven-
dors for sales tax purposes.

Having thus winnowed the list of taxable drop-shipment trans-
actions, the auditor provided the list to D & H so that it had an
opportunity to demonstrate the nontaxable nature of any con-
tested transaction. D & H provided several resale certificates that
were sufficient to establish a nontaxable transaction. As to the

®Engaged in business in the commonwealth” is one means of establishing
nexus for sales tax purposes; in this opinion, we use “engaged in business”
interchangeably with “nexus.” See Technical Information Release 96-8 (Oct. 16,
1996), 1 Official Mass Tax Guide PWS-37 (Thomson Reuters 2017).

7Specifically, the application required retailers to certify, “[I]f any property or
service so purchased tax-free is used or consumed by the firm to make it subject
to a Sales or Use Tax, we will pay the tax due directly to the proper taxing
authority when the state law so provides or informs the seller for added tax
billing.”

544 477 Mass. 538 (2017)

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

rest, D & H offered no evidence that the sales at issue were made
to retailers engaged in business in the Commonwealth that would
thus be responsible for collecting sales tax. At the audit’s con-
clusion, the commissioner assessed D & H additional taxes,
interest, and penalties totaling $525,024.17 for the periods at
issue. The auditor used the wholesale resale price as a proxy for
the final sales price.

b. Procedural history. Following the audit, D & H sought an
abatement, which the commissioner denied. D & H then appealed
from this decision to the board. In its hearing before the board, D
& H offered documentary evidence and the testimony of its
comptroller, and the commissioner presented her case through the
auditor’s testimony. The board issued its decision for the com-
missioner in October, 2014, followed by findings of fact and
report in April, 2016. D & H then filed its appeal in the Appeals
Court, and we transferred the case to this court on our own
motion.

3. Discussion. a. Standard of review. “We will not disturb the
board’s findings so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence and a correct application of the law.” Bell Atl. Mobile of
Mass. Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 451 Mass. 280, 283
(2008). Although we resolve questions of law de novo, in doing
so we give “substantial deference” to the board’s reasonable
interpretation of tax statutes because the board is an agency
charged with administration of tax law (citation omitted). Attor-
ney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 450 Mass. 311, 319 (2008).

b. Burden of proof. D & H argues that before the commissioner
may assess sales tax against a wholesale deliverer of retail goods
pursuant to the drop shipment rule, the commissioner must es-
tablish that the retailer in the transactions at issue did not do
business in Massachusetts. Although the commissioner must pro-
vide an evidentiary basis for an assessment, we reject D & H’s
contention that the commissioner failed adequately to do so here.

The validity of a tax assessment is presumptively correct, and
the taxpayer bears the burden of proving he or she is entitled to
an abatement as a matter of law. Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great
Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974). See Boston Professional
Hockey Ass’n v. Commissioner of Revenue, 443 Mass. 276, 285
(2005), quoting Koch v. Commissioner of Revenue, 416 Mass.
540, 556 (1993) (“The taxpayer has the burden of proving as a
matter of law [its] right to an abatement of the tax”). See
generally General Elec. Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591,

477 Mass. 538 (2017) 545

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

599 (1984) (“taxpayer bears the burden of persuasion of every
material fact’). This is consistent with the general principle that
the moving party bears the burden of proof, and finds additional
support in several “compelling rationales” unique to tax law.
Raleigh y. Mlinois Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 21 (2000).
“[N]ot to be disregarded lightly,” these “powerful justifications”
for the taxpayer’s burden include “the vital interest of the gov-
ernment in acquiring its lifeblood, revenue”; “the taxpayer’s
readier access to the relevant information,” and “the importance
of encouraging voluntary compliance by giving taxpayers incen-
tives to self-report and to keep adequate records in case of
dispute” (citations omitted). Id.

Certainly, the taxpayer’s burden of proof does not relieve the
department of its obligation to provide support for the validity of
its assessment.® See First Nat’l Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of
Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 559 (1971). See also In re Healthco
Int’l, Inc., 257 B.R. 379, 382-383 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001), aff'd
as to sales tax issue, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 01-40047-JLT (D. Mass.
July 8, 2001) (comm: ner failed to meet burden of production
where department had destroyed all audit records and could
neither substantiate nor even explain assessment amount). In the
absence of supporting evidence for a tax assessment, a taxpayer
will be entitled to an abatement. See First Nat’! Stores, Inc., 358
Mass. at 559. See also In re Healthco Int'l, Inc., 257 B.R. at 383,
citing Waban, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 22 Mass. App.
Tax Bd. Rep. 31, 38 (1997) (taxpayer entitled to abatement where
department introduced no documentary evidence and scant testi-
mony supporting its assessment); Coan v. Commissioner of Rev-
enue, 25 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 763, 766 (2000) (same, where
department was unable to establish evidentiary basis for its as-
sessment despite readier access to relevant records).

In this case, the department established a factual basis for the
validity of its assessment, which D & H failed to rebut. D & H had
a business practice of requiring any retailer customer to disclose
the States in which it did business; the auditor compiled a list of
drop shipment transactions in which the retailer was not regis-

®The Department of Revenue (department) may verify by audit the accuracy
of any filed tax return. G. L, e, 62C, § 26 (b). Where such an audit identifies a
deficiency, the department may assess the proper tax and make a demand for
payment. G. L. c. 62C, §§ 26 (b), 31. A taxpayer disputing the assessment may
apply for abatement, and any tax found “excessive in amount or illegal” shall be
abated, in whole or in part. G. L. ¢. 62C, § 37.

546 477 Mass. 538 (2017)

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

tered as a Massachusetts vendor and no tax had been collected,
affording D & H the opportunity to rebut the conclusion that the
retailers did not do business in Massachusetts; and D & H did not
do so. Particularly where D & H has “readier access to the
relevant information” than does the commissioner, its failure to
demonstrate that its retail customers were doing business in the
Commonwealth ends the inquiry. See Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 21;
William Rodman & Sons, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 373 Mass.
606, 611(1977) (“[a]s a matter of sound policy,” burden should be
placed on wholesaler with best access to records). Moreover, D &
H bore the burden of proving otherwise pursuant not only to the
general principle that the burden rests with the taxpayer claiming
an abatement, but also to G. L. c. 64H, § 8 (a) (absent resale
certificate from purchaser, “[t]he burden of proving that a sale of
services or tangible personal property by any vendor is not a sale
at retail shall be upon such vendor”).

c. Dormant commerce clause. D & H also challenges the drop
shipment rule on constitutional grounds, contending that the rule
discriminates against interstate commerce. See art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of
the United States Constitution; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (State tax does not unconstitu-
tionally burden interstate commerce if tax is applied to activity
having substantial nexus with State, is fairly apportioned, does
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related
to services provided by State). Addressing a constitutional chal-
lenge to a tax measure “begin[s] with the premise that the tax is
endowed with a presumption of validity and is not to be found
void unless its invalidity is established beyond a rational doubt.”
Andover Sav. Bank v. Commissioner of Revenue, 387 Mass. 229,
235 (1982).

A tax is discriminatory in violation of the dormant commerce
clause when it results in “differential treatment of in-[S]tate and
out-of-[S]tate economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter.” Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of
Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). D & H argues that
wholesale suppliers with a Massachusetts nexus are penalized for

“Article I, § 8, cl. 3, of the United States Constitution — the commerce clause
— expressly grants Congress broad power to regulate interstate commerce.
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S, Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015)
(Wynne). Where Congress has neither preempted nor approved State regulation,
the negatively implied dormant commerce clause still operates to limit State
interference with interstate commerce. id.

477 Mass. 538 (2017) 547

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

doing business with out-of-State retailers, because transactions
with in-State retailers do not cast wholesale suppliers as vendors
obligated to collect sales tax. But even assuming this disparity for
the sake of argument, such a scheme would establish for Massa-
chusetts retailers a disadvantage at odds with the concerns ani-
mating the dormant commerce clause. See Department of Rev-
enue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-338 (2008) (“The modern
law of what has come to be called the dormant [c]lommerce
[c]lause is driven by concern about ‘economic protectionism —
that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-[S]tate eco-
nomic interests by burdening out-of-[S]tate competitors’ ”[cita-
tion omitted]).

Moreover, by focusing on the party collecting the tax, D & H
fails to demonstrate any unconstitutional burden created by the
tax itself.° See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312 (“the [c]lommerce
[c}lause and its nexus requirement are informed not so much by
concerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by struc-
tural concerns about the effects of [S]tate regulation on the
national economy’). See also Genentech, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Revenue, 476 Mass. 258, 272 (2017). Such an unconstitutional
burden exists when a State taxes a transaction “more heavily
when it crosses [S]tate lines than when it occurs entirely within
the State.”Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S.
Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015), quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S.
638, 642 (1984)." Here, “the same sales tax would be imposed on
the transaction if it had happened entirely within [Massachu-

‘Because the drop shipment rule requires that vendors include the retail
selling price in gross receipts, G. L. c. 64H, § 1, D & H Distributing Company
(D & H) argues that it lacks the necessary information for compliance because
it has knowledge only of the wholesale price. But a wholesale supplier like D
& H is better positioned than the Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner) to
solicit this information in its contractual dealings with thousands of out-of-State
retailers, See Lyon Metal Prods., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 58 Cal. App.
4th 906, 912 n.3 (1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 916 (1998). Alternatively, a
standard markup may be codified. See 2 .R, Hellerstein &W. Hellerstein, State
Taxation § 18,04[1|[b]liv] Gd ed. 2002) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18,
§ 1706[c][2], which calculates retail price using ten per cent markup on drop
shipper’s price absent other evidence). We do not resolve the issue here, where
the commissioner assessed sales tax based only on the lower wholesale price.

“1A State tax subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of “multiple
taxation” also creates an undue burden. Wynne, 135 S, Ct. at 1794, D & H argues
that the drop shipment rule does this by subjecting the same transactions to both
sales and use tax. This argument misapprehends the complementary nature of
our sales and use tax schemes, discussed supra, under which any transaction
subject to sales tax is exempt from use tax. G. L. c. 641, § 7 (a). Even ignoring

548 477 Mass. 538 (2017)

D & H Distributing Company v, Commissioner of Revenue.

setts].” Lyon Metal Prods., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 58
Cal. App. 4th 906, 912 (1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 916 (1998)
(finding no commerce clause violation under California’s cognate
tule). Because transactions with retailers in and out of State are
equally subject to tax, there is no greater burden on the interstate
transaction and thus no violation of the dormant commerce
clause.

Decision of the Appellate
Tax Board affirmed.

the low consumer compliance with the use tax, any use tax collected in error on
a drop shipment entitles the consumer to a credit.

477 Mass. 549 (2017) 549

Commonwealth v, James.

CoMMONWEALTH VS. STEVEN JAMES.
Sulfolk. March 6, 2017, - August 1, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.I., Lenk, Hives, Lowy, & Bupp, Il

Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Postconviction relief.

‘This court concluded that a juvenile who has been convicted of murder in the
first degree, and whose conviction has been affirmed by this court after
plenary review, is thereafter subject to the gatekeeper provision of G. L.
¢. 278, § 33E. [550-552]

Civit action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk on February 9, 2016.

The case was reported by Hines, J.

Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (Dennis M. Toomey also present)
for the defendant.

Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Common-
wealth.

Hines, J. The narrow question before us, here on a reservation
and report from a single justice of the county court, is whether a
juvenile who has been convicted of murder in the first degree, and
whose conviction has been affirmed by this court after plenary
review, is thereafter subject to the gatekeeper provision of G. L.
c. 278, § 33E. We conclude that the gatekeeper provision applies.
The case should now proceed in the county court as a gatekeeper
matter,

Background. The defendant, Steven James, was convicted in
1995 of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity
or cruelty. He was sentenced to a mandatory term of life without
the possibility of parole, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended
through St. 1982, c. 554, § 3. See Commonwealth v. James, 427
Mass. 312, 313, 318 (1998). He was seventeen years old when the
killing occurred in 1994, id. at 315, and under the law at that time
was considered an adult for purposes of the criminal proceedings.
See Watts v. Commonwealth, 468 Mass. 49, 50-51 (2014). On
appeal, this court “reviewed the entire record and conclude[d]
that relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, [was] not warranted,”
and affirmed James’s conviction. James, supra at 318.

550 477 Mass. 549 (2017)

Commonwealth v, James.

In 2013, James filed a motion for a new trial in the Superior
Court, with multiple subsequent supplements. A judge other than
the trial judge, who had since retired, held a nonevidentiary
hearing and denied the motion. However, because James was
under the age of eighteen at the time of the killing, he was
resentenced to life with the possibility of parole. See Diatchenko
vy. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 658
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (“imposition of a sentence of
life in prison without the possibility of parole on individuals who
were under the age of eighteen when they committed the crime of
murder in the first degree violates the prohibition against ‘cruel or
unusual punishments’ ”). James thereafter filed an application in
the county court, pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of G. L.
c. 278, § 33E, seeking leave to appeal from the denial of his
motion for a new trial. He subsequently supplemented the peti-
tion, arguing that he is not subject to the gatekeeper provision at
all, since he now has been resentenced and is no longer sentenced
to the most severe sentence recognized in Massachusetts, life
without parole eligibility. The single justice reserved and reported
that threshold procedural question, namely, “whether the
postconviction case of a defendant who was tried on an indict-
ment for murder in the first degree and was convicted of murder
in the first degree, but who was a juvenile at the time of the crime
and thus subject to a lesser penalty than life without the possi-
bility of parole, is a ‘capital case’ as defined in § 33E.” See Mass.
R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996).

Discussion. As the single justice recognized, James was “tried
on an indictment for murder in the first degree and was convicted
of murder in the first degree.” G. L. c. 278, § 33E. On direct
appeal, this court reviewed the whole case, including both the law
and the evidence, and affirmed his conviction. See Common-
wealth v. Gunter, 459 Mass. 480, 485-487, cert. denied, 565 U.S.
868 (2011); James, 427 Mass. at 318. Irrespective of the subse-
quent resentencing, after his direct appeal concluded, James con-
tinued to stand convicted of murder in the first degree, and
remained convicted of a “capital case” for purposes of the statute.
See Commonwealth vy. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 137 (2007);
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 447 Mass. 161, 165 (2006). In such a
case, the statute plainly and expressly prohibits a subsequent
appeal from “any motion” filed in the Superior Court unless
authorized by a single justice “on the ground that it presents a
new and substantial question.” G. L. c. 278, § 33E. See Com-

477 Mass. 549 (2017) 551

Commonwealth v, James.

monwealth v. Davis, 410 Mass. 680, 683 (1991).1

We recognize that, following the court’s decision in Diat-
chenko, 466 Mass. 655, a juvenile defendant is no longer subject
to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. We left open
the question in Commonwealth v. Brown, 474 Mass. 576, 592 n.9
(2016), whether “a juvenile convicted of murder in the first
degree is entitled to plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and
is subject to the gatekeeper provision of that statute; or whether
such a defendant is not entitled to plenary review but is entitled
to aright of appeal from the denial of all motions for a new trial.”
This case does not present an occasion to decide that question,
however, because this is not James’s direct appeal and the single
justice did not report that question. James already has had his
direct appeal, received plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E,?
and, following that review, continues to stand convicted of mur-
der in the first degree.

It follows that, after receiving the benefit of this “uniquely
thorough review,” James is thereafter afforded “a narrower op-
portunity for appeal of postconviction motions than other crimi-
nal defendants.” He must comply with the gatekeeper provision.
Dickerson y. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 744 (1986) (“since
we have already reviewed the ‘whole case’ as required by G. L.
c. 278, § 33E, the capital defendant justifiably is required to
obtain leave of a single justice before being allowed once again

‘In contrast, when a verdict has been reduced from murder in the first degree
after plenary review under G. L. c, 278, § 33E, the defendant no longer stands
convicted of a “capital case,” and therefore is not subject to the statute’s
gatekeeper restriction governing future appeals. See Commonwealth v. Gilbert,
447 Mass. 161, 165 n.7 (2006); Commonwealth v. Perry, 424 Mass. 1019, 1020
(1997); Commonwealth y, Lattimore, 400 Mass. 1001, 1001 (1987).

2Plenary review under the statute has been described as a “uniquely thorough
review.” Dickerson y. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 744 (1986).

“Under G. L. ¢. 278, § 33E, this court has extraordinary powers in
reviewing capital convictions on direct appeal: we consider the whole
case, both the law and the evidence, to determine whether there has been
any miscarriage of justice. . . . Unlike appellate review of convictions of
other crimes, our consideration of first degree murder cases is not limited
to issues based on objections rendered at trial... . We are empowered
under G. L. c, 278, § 33E, to consider questions raised by the defendant for
the first time on appeal, or even to address issues not raised by the parties,
but discovered as a result of our own independent review of the entire
record.” (Citations omitted.)

Id. See Commonwealth v, Gunter, 459 Mass. 480, 485-487, cert. denied, 565
U.S, 868 (2011).

552 477 Mass. 549 (2017)

Commonwealth v, James.

to appear before the full court”). Plenary review (for the direct
appeal) and the gatekeeper provision (for subsequent appeals) are
interconnected and complementary component parts of the G. L.
c. 278, § 33E, process. See Gunter, 459 Mass. at 486-487. See
also Dickerson, supra at 743-744. As we have said, once plenary
review has been given, “[iJnterests of judicial economy are best
served by having a single justice ‘screen out’ postconviction
motions which do not present a ‘new or substantial question.’ ”
Davis, 410 Mass. at 683, quoting Dickerson, supra at 744-745.
See Leaster v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 549-550 (1982).
See also Commonwealth vy. Lanoue, 409 Mass. 1, 8 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). This is no less true for a juvenile
defendant than it is for an adult defendant.?

Conclusion. We answer the reported question as follows: the
gatekeeper provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, applies to a juvenile
defendant who, like James, has had a direct appeal, has received
plenary review and, following that review, remains convicted of
murder in the first degree. The case shall proceed in the county
court for consideration of James’s gatekeeper application, spe-
cifically whether the issues presented in his new trial motion are
“new and substantial” for purposes of § 33E. See Gunter, 459
Mass. at 487-488.

So ordered.

3In Patrick P. v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 186, 193-194 (1995), the court
held that the determination of what constitutes a “capital case” for purposes of
the exercise of plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, takes “into account not
only the requirement of a first{-Jdegree murder indictment, but also the possible
severity of the punishment involved.” Similarly, in Dickerson, 396 Mass. at 744,
the court described plenary review as being “warranted by the infamy of the
crime and the severity of its consequences.” Those cases do not aid the
defendant’s position. They simply described who is entitled to plenary review
and why. They do not suggest that plenary review and the gatekeeper provision
should be decoupled in any circumstances, Indeed, once the court has conducted
plenary review, so long as the defendant remains convicted of murder in the first
degree, he or she continues to be a capital defendant for purposes of the
gatekeeper provision of the statute, and the same rationale for the gatekeeper
provision continues to apply, irrespective of any ensuing alteration of sentence.

477 Mass. 553 (2017) 553

‘Commonwealth », Field.

Commonweatru vs. Euntce M. Frevp.
Plymouth, March 10, 2017, - August 1, 2017.
Present: Gawrs, C.J., Hives, Lowy, & Bupp, JI.

Homicide. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Admissions and confes-
sions, Voluntariness of statement. Mental Impairment. Evidence, Admissions
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Videotape, Competency, Prac-
tice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Admissions and confes-
sions, Voluntariness of statement, Competency to stand trial.

A Superior Court judge properly denied the criminal defendant’s motion for a
new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, where, although coun-
sel’s failure at least to consult with a mental health expert regarding the
defendant’s mental impairment at the time of the killing was error, there was
no basis on which to conclude that consultation with such an expert would
have altered the jury’s conviction of murder in the first degree based on
deliberate premeditation [556-558]; where, even if video recordings of two
interviews of the defendant by police should have been suppressed, and even
if the second interview formed the sole basis of the jury’s finding as to
extreme atrocity or cruelty, there was sufficient evidence of deliberate
premeditation independent of the interviews that the admission of the re-
cordings at trial was not likely to have influenced the jury’s decision to
convict the defendant on the theory of deliberate premeditation [558-561];
and where the defendant did not meet her burden to raise a substantial doubt
as to her competency to stand trial [561].

Inpictment found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on October 21, 2010.

The case was tried before Charles J. Hely, J., and a motion for
a new trial, filed on June 16, 2014, was heard by him.

Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant.

Stacey L. Gauthier, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Lowy, J. In August, 2010, the victim, Lorraine Wachsman, was
stabbed to death. A jury in the Superior Court found the defend-
ant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The defendant
appeals from her conviction and from the denial of her motion for
a new trial.

The defendant asserts several claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, centering on trial counsel’s failure to consult with a

554 477 Mass. 553 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Field.

mental health expert regarding (1) a defense of mental impair-
ment, including impeaching the Commonwealth’s mental health
expert; (2) the suppression of statements made by the defendant
during two police interviews; and (3) the defendant’s competency
to stand trial. Although we conclude that trial counsel erred by
failing to consult with a mental health expert, the error does not
require reversal of the defendant’s conviction. See Common-
wealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 220 (2007); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).
We also decline to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Background. We recite the facts the jury could have found in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain
details for our analysis of the issues.

The defendant, who was prescribed medication for bipolar
disorder, and who had a history of substance abuse, came to know
the victim through Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). The defendant
and the victim had a strained relationship for some time leading
up to the victim’s death. The victim was close with the defend-
ant’s former longtime girl friend and acted as the girl friend’s AA
“sponsor.” The defendant blamed the victim for the defendant’s
romantic relationship with the girl friend ending in early 2010.
Even before the events leading to the end of her romantic rela-
tionship with the girl friend, the defendant harbored resentment
toward the victim. According to the defendant, the victim pre-
vented her from visiting a sick mutual friend in the hospital, prior
to that friend’s death.

On the night before the victim’s death, the defendant tele-
phoned the victim and arranged to meet her the following morn-
ing. That night, the defendant wrote on her page on the Web site
Facebook, “Tic toc, tic toc. I’m going to finish my book tomor-
row. You're all going to be real interested in it because you're all
in it. The title is Tormented Minds by Eunice Field.” At around
the same time, the defendant wrote a note, addressed to the
former girl friend, which stated that the victim would “get what
she deserves for coming between you and me,”! and that the
defendant had “snapped” because of her bipolar disorder.

‘The note stated:

“[ love you with all my heart. I know you know that. I'm sorry for not
giving you a better life. My heart aches for what I have done to you. But
remember to always follow your heart. My mind is tired now, so I have to
go. Your [sic] the best thing that ever happened to me. I will love you
always for that, but something happened to me, with my bipolar and all,

477 Mass. 553 (2017) 555

‘Commonwealth », Field.

The defendant traveled to the victim’s apartment in Bridge-
water on the morning of August 9, 2010, and killed the victim by
stabbing her nine times with a knife in the neck, chest, and back.
After killing the victim, the defendant drove herself to the
Brockton police station. When she arrived, she remained in her
motor vehicle. Officers found the defendant, complaining of chest
pain. As they helped the defendant out of her automobile, they
saw that she was covered in blood. After being asked about the
blood, the defendant stated that she had just killed someone.

The defendant was brought into the police station and seated on
a bench in the lobby, where she repeated that she had killed
someone, and when asked, gave the victim’s name. She also
provided the officers with the name of the apartment complex in
which the victim lived. The defendant was taken to an interview
room. She was read the Miranda rights, and she responded that
she understood them and that she wished to waive them. Police
conducted a videotaped interview in which the defendant made
incriminating statements.

The defendant was then transported to the Bridgewater police
station. After the standard booking procedure, she again waived
her Miranda rights. The police conducted another videotaped
interview, during which she made additional incriminating state-
ments. The police searched the victim’s apartment that afternoon.
They found the victim’s body near the doorway and bloodstains
throughout the apartment.

The two videotaped interviews were introduced at trial. The
Commonwealth also called an expert who testified that, in watch-
ing the interviews of the defendant, he saw no evidence of manic
behavior, depression, delusions, or hallucinations, and stated that
he believed that she was criminally responsible for her actions.

The defendant did not contest that she had killed the victim.
Counsel argued essentially that the defendant’s severe bipolar
disorder prevented her from forming the requisite intent to com-
mit murder in the first degree. Counsel did not consult a mental
health expert but did cross-examine the Commonwealth’s expert
about the severity of the defendant's bipolar disorder.

In October, 2012, the defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree. While her direct appeal was pending in this court, the

T snapped. Lorraine will get what she deserves for coming between you
and me. I love you. . . Eunice. P.S, Someday we will all know the real truth,
PSS, [sic] . . . Tell Truth, ‘Wasn't my pain real’? by Eunice Field.”

556 477 Mass. 553 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Field.

defendant filed a motion for a new trial, in which newly appointed
counsel argued that trial counsel had been ineffective on the same
grounds that she asserts in this appeal. After an evidentiary
hearing at which a mental health expert testified for the defend-
ant, the judge, who also had been the trial judge, denied the
motion. He determined, in essence, that any errors committed by
trial counsel did not affect the evidence that the defendant delib-
erately premeditated the murder. The defendant timely appealed,
and the appeal was consolidated with her direct appeal.

Discussion. “When this court reviews a defendant’s appeal
from the denial of a motion for a new trial in conjunction with his
direct appeal from an underlying conviction of murder, we review
both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E” (citation omitted). Common-
wealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 145 (2013). The defendant’s
arguments on appeal stem from the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims she made in her motion for a new trial.

In capital murder cases, we review ineffective assistance of
counsel claims by first determining “whether the alleged lapse
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, a
standard more favorable to the defendant than the constitutional
standard otherwise applied under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366
Mass. 89, 96 (1974)” (quotations and citation omitted). Common-
wealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 29 (2017). We determine
whether trial counsel erred and whether any such error was likely
to influence the jury’s conclusion. Jd. Where an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim is based on a tactical or strategic
decision, we find error only if the decision was manifestly un-
reasonable when made. See Commonwealth v. LaCava, 438
Mass. 708, 713 (2003). See also Commonwealth v. Kolenovic,
471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015).

1. Failure to consult an expert and trial strategy. Faced with
overwhelming evidence, including noncustodial admissions from
the defendant? counsel’s goal from the beginning of the trial was
to obtain a verdict of murder in the second degree. The defendant
claims that, had counsel consulted with a mental health expert at
the time of trial, counsel would have been better able to mount a
defense to the charge of murder in the first degree, by presenting

2Although, as discussed infra, the defendant asserts that her custodial state-
ments made to both Brockton and Bridgewater police officers should have been
suppressed, she does not contest the admissibility of her earlier noncustodial
statements to the Brockton police, in which she admitted that she had killed the
victim.

477 Mass. 553 (2017) 557

‘Commonwealth », Field.

evidence regarding her mental impairment at the time of the
killing and by assisting him with the cross-examination of the
Commonwealth’s expert witness. Although we agree that trial
counsel’s decision not to consult with an expert was error, the
defendant has not established that this failure was likely to have
influenced the jury’s verdict of murder with deliberate premedi-
tation. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 225 (2005).

Trial counsel apparently recognized, as evidenced by his ex
parte motion for expert funds prior to trial, that the defendant’s
mental state was central to his strategy of obtaining a verdict of
murder in the second degree. Further, trial counsel knew that the
defendant had claimed that she had run out of her prescription
bipolar medication several days before the killing, and that in her
handwritten note to her former girl friend, the defendant claimed
that she had “snapped” due to her bipolar disorder.

Although trial counsel’s overarching strategy to avoid a con-
viction of murder in the first degree may have been the best
available defense, it was apparent from facts known and available
to counsel that the defendant’s mental impairment would be
central to this defensive strategy. Nonetheless, trial counsel never
consulted with an expert regarding the defendant’s mental im-
pairment at the time of the killing. Cf. Commonwealth v. Roberio,
428 Mass. 278, 279-280 (1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 245 (2003)
(failure to investigate criminal responsibility defense manifestly
unreasonable “if facts known to, or accessible to, trial counsel
raised a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s mental condition”
[citation omitted]). Contrast Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass.
15, 23 (2016) (decision not to offer medical records for mental
health issue was not unreasonable when counsel had retained two
experts to review records). In his testimony at the hearing on the
motion for a new trial, trial counsel did not provide a tactical
justification for his failure to consult an expert. See Common-
wealth vy. Alcide, 472 Mass. 150, 167-168 (2015) (“This is not a
case where arguably reasoned tactical or strategic judgments . . .
are called into question .. . . Rather, . . . defense counsel did not
investigate the only realistic defense . . . to the charge of murder
in the first degree” [quotations and citation omitted]). Trial coun-
sel stated only that he did not consult with an expert because he
thought he understood the issues and he was skeptical that the
defendant could have “underst[oo]d what was going on.” Accord-
ingly, we conclude that trial counsel erred by failing at least to
consult with an expert regarding the defendant’s mental impair-
ment at the time she killed the victim.

558 477 Mass. 553 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Field.

Because of this conclusion, we now examine whether that error
was likely to have affected the jury’s verdict of murder in the first
degree. Walker, 443 Mass. at 225. In order to prevail on a motion
for a new trial based on a claim of ineffective assistance, the
defendant must establish that consulting with an expert would
have enabled trial counsel to mount an effective defense based on
her lack of capacity for murder in the first degree. See Kolenovic,
471 Mass. at 673 (defendant bears burden to prove ineffective-
ness). Moreover, where a jury have returned a conviction of
murder in the first degree based on more than one theory, the
verdict remains even if only one theory is sustained on appeal.
See Nolin, 448 Mass. at 220.

At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the defendant's
expert contested that the defendant’s confession had been volun-
tary and that she had had the capacity to act with extreme atrocity
or cruelty. He did not testify that the defendant lacked the
capacity to deliberately premeditate. Indeed, the expert agreed
that there was evidence to support the conclusion that the defend-
ant had formulated a plan to kill the victim and had executed that
plan.* Contrast Roberio, 428 Mass. at 280-281 (at hearing on
motion for new trial, defense expert testified that defendant was
unable to conform conduct to law). Therefore, even assuming that
the expert would have assisted the defense argument that the
defendant could not have committed the murder with extreme
atrocity or cruelty, the record does not establish that the expert
could have assisted trial counsel in either presenting a defense to,
or more effectively cross-examining the Commonwealth’s expert
regarding, deliberate premeditation. As the judge noted at the
hearing on the motion for a new trial, there is no basis on which
to conclude that consultation with the expert would have altered
the jury’s conviction of murder in the first degree based on
deliberate premeditation.

2. Failure to suppress the two police interviews. The defendant
argues that, had trial counsel consulted with an expert, he could
have successfully suppressed both video-recorded police inter-
views for being involuntary, based on her state of mind. Without

®We note also that the judge instructed the jury regarding lack of criminal
responsibility, even though the motion judge noted that the defendant had, at no
time, demonstrated that lack of criminal responsibility was an available ground
of defense. The defendant does not, however, argue on appeal that she was not
criminally responsible. Nor did the defense expert so testify at the new trial
motion hearing.

477 Mass. 553 (2017) 559

‘Commonwealth », Field.

these recordings, the defendant contends, the jury would not have
had a sufficient basis to find either premeditation or extreme
atrocity or cruelty.

Trial counsel believed that allowing the jury to view the video
recordings of both police interviews and to observe her strange
behavior firsthand would increase the likelihood that the jury
would find that the defendant had not premeditated the killing or
acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty. Trial counsel’s choice not
to challenge the admissibility of the interviews, therefore, was a
tactical decision that was not without justification.* We do not,
however, need to resolve whether counsel’s judgment was mani-
festly unreasonable because even if we were to assume that it
was, as discussed below, we cannot conclude on this record that
the admission of the video-recorded interviews was likely to have
affected the jury’s verdict of murder by deliberate premeditation.
See Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 29 (where defendant's ineffective
claim is based on failure to move to suppress, defendant must
show motion would have succeeded and that failure created
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice).

a. The Brockton police interview. In the interview at the
Brockton police station, the defendant made incriminating state-
ments, including that she intended to kill the victim before she
went to the victim’s apartment and that she brought the murder
weapon with her to the victim’s apartment. The defendant con-
tends that, without this evidence, the jury could not have con-
victed the defendant of murder in the first degree based on
deliberate premeditation. We disagree.

The defendant’s expert testified at the hearing on the motion for
a new trial that the defendant exhibited some strange behaviors
during the interview, such as slurred speech, requests for ques-
tions to be repeated, and long pauses between words when
answering questions. The expert further testified that the defend-
ant may have been experiencing auditory hallucinations. Based
on these behaviors, the expert stated his opinion that the defend-
ant was not capable of voluntarily making these statements or
waiving her Miranda rights.

Even if we assume, however, that the Brockton interview was
involuntary and should have been suppressed, there was still

4Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt separate and distinct from the
video-recorded interviews, it was reasonable to allow the jury to see the
defendant’s behavior for themselves, rather than having witnesses describe it in
an antiseptic fashion.

560 477 Mass. 553 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Field.

compelling evidence of premeditation. Most significantly, the
defendant had written a note in which she said the victim would
get what “she deserves” for interfering with the defendant’s
relationship with her girl friend. Additionally, the defendant
telephoned the victim the night before the killing to arrange the
meeting — the same night that the defendant wrote a Facebook
post that, although not directly alluding to the victim or a plot for
murder, allowed the jury to conclude that the defendant was
preparing to take some sort of drastic action the following day.
Finally, the defendant harbored ill feelings toward the victim for
at least several years before the killing, and had arranged to meet
the victim that morning.

b. The Bridgewater police interview. The defendant argues that
the second recorded interview formed the evidentiary basis that
allowed the jury to conclude that the defendant had acted with
extreme atrocity or cruelty. The defendant asserts that the inter-
view could have been suppressed based on either a lack of
voluntariness due to her mental state or the defendant's assertion
that she wanted to stop answering questions until she received
food and a cigarette. See Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass.
721, 735 (2014) (when defendant decides to stop answering
questions, that decision must be “scrupulously honored” [citation
omitted]).

Many of the incriminating statements from the second inter-
view supported the Commonwealth’s theory of extreme atrocity
or cruelty, providing evidence of conscious suffering by the
victim and the defendant's indifferent attitude towards that suf-
fering. See Commonwealth vy. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227
(1983). For example, the defendant told police that the victim had
repeatedly asked her “why?” during the attack, and that, after the
stabbing, she lay down on the floor with the victim, looked into
her eyes, and told her she was “feisty” and needed to mind her
own business. The defendant also stated that she felt good about
what she had done.

Even assuming, however, that the Bridgewater interview
formed the sole basis of the jury’s finding as to extreme atrocity
or cruelty and that the interview should have been excluded, the
defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree would still
stand, based on the compelling evidence of deliberate premedi-
tation. Accordingly, even if the defendant were to have prevailed
on a motion to suppress, the evidence of deliberate premeditation
from other sources (such as her confessional note, her social

477 Mass. 553 (2017) 561

‘Commonwealth », Field.

media post, and her arranging the meeting with the victim) was so
overwhelming that we cannot say admission of the video record-
ing was likely to have influenced the jury’s decision to convict
her on the theory of premeditation. Wright, 411 Mass. at 682.

3. Defendant's competency to stand trial. Finally, the defendant
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult an
expert to ascertain her competency to stand trial. Such an inquiry
is appropriate where there is a “substantial question of possible
doubt” regarding the defendant’s competency (citation omitted).
Commonwealth vy. Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 48-49 (2005),
S.C., 472 Mass. 1004 (2015). Although the Commonwealth bears
a burden to demonstrate a defendant’s competency when the issue
is raised before trial, Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. 393,
400 (1984), the defendant bears the burden to demonstrate inef-
fectiveness when seeking a new trial. See Kolenovic, 471 Mass.
at 673. The defendant has not met that burden.

The defendant has presented no evidence, beyond trial coun-
sel’s statement that he was not sure that the defendant understood
the mental impairment defense, that the defendant was incompe-
tent to stand trial. As noted by the trial judge, there was no
testimony that the defendant lacked the ability to consult with a
reasonable degree of understanding. Although the defendant ar-
gues on appeal that consulting with an expert may have helped
trial counsel realize that the defendant lacked that ability, the
defendant presented no evidence to support such a conclusion.
The defendant’s expert did not testify at the hearing on the
motion for a new trial that the defendant was incompetent to
stand trial. Accordingly, we are unable to say, on this record, that
the defendant has raised a substantial doubt as to her competency
to stand trial. See Companonio, 445 Mass. at 48-49.

Conclusion. We have reviewed the entire record pursuant to our
obligation under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Although counsel unrea-
sonably failed to consult with a mental health expert for trial, we
conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that such a
consultation would have provided a basis to challenge the Com-
monwealth’s theory of premeditated murder. Because we con-
clude that, even if the interviews should have been excluded and
even if the second interview formed the sole basis for the jury’s
finding of extreme atrocity, there was ample evidence of premedi-
tation independent of the interviews, the conviction of murder in
the first degree stands. Accordingly, neither trial counsel’s short-
comings nor the interests of justice require entry of a lesser

562 477 Mass. 553 (2017)

‘Commonwealth », Field.

degree of guilt or a new trial. The defendant’s conviction and the
order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial are affirmed.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 563 (2017) 563

Fergus v. Ross.

Josrpu Fereus vs. Steven A. Ross.!
Suffolk. April 4, 2017, - August 2, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hives, Gaaano, Lowy, & Bupp, I.

Agency, Scope of authority or employment, Attorney at Law, Attorney-client
relationship.

This court concluded that, in a civil action, a Superior Court judge erred in
concluding that the defendant attorney, in his individual capacity, was
negligent for his part in financing a real estate loan to the plaintiff, where,
although the facts of the case may well have been sufficient to conclude that
a third party was the defendant's agent with respect to the loan, the judge did
not find any conduct of the defendant that related specifically to his acqui-
escence to, or ratification of, the third party’s conduct regarding an unsecured
side loan on which the third party later defaulted [566-569]; further, this
court declined to reach the question whether the defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty of care as the “closing agent” for the transaction, where the theory of
negligence was premised on imputing the third party’s knowledge of the side
Joan to the defendant as a result of their agency relationship [569-570].

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
August 31, 2010.

The case was heard by Frances A. McIntyre, J.

After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court
granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

Arnold E. Cohen for the defendant.

Gordon E. Feener (Danielle F. Wehrli also present) for the
plaintiff.

Lowy, J. In a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge deter-
mined that the defendant, Attorney Steven A. Ross, was negligent
for his part in financing a real estate loan to the plaintiff, Joseph
Fergus. The judge found that the defendant had conferred appar-
ent authority on an individual, Bernard Laverty, Jr., to act as his
agent for the loan. In the course of arranging the loan, unbe-
knownst to the defendant, Laverty asked the plaintiff to use a
portion of the loan from the defendant to make a secured “side
loan” to Laverty. The plaintiff agreed. Ultimately, however, the

‘Individually and as trustee of the Wisconsin Avenue Lending Trust.

564 477 Mass. 563 (2017)

Fergus v. Ross.

side loan was unsecured and Laverty defaulted. Relying on the
rule that imputes the knowledge of an agent to the principal, the
judge found that the defendant was negligent for failing to inform
the plaintiff prior to the closing that the side loan was not secured.
We now reverse, concluding that the facts found by the trial judge
failed to establish that Laverty had the apparent authority to bind
the defendant with respect to the side loan.

Background. The judge made the following factual findings,
which the parties do not dispute on appeal.

The plaintiff, a regular purchaser and seller of real estate,
needed between $75,000 and $100,000 to complete renovations
of a property in the Dorchester section of Boston. Unable to
acquire conventional financing for the project, he inquired about
private financing through a mortgage broker, who referred the
plaintiff to Laverty.

Laverty had an existing relationship with the defendant, who
operated a private lending operation through his law firm. Laverty
had received five or six loans from the defendant and had previ-
ously referred potential borrowers to the defendant. Laverty in-
formed the defendant of the plaintiff's desire for a loan. Although
the defendant had paid Laverty referral fees on other occasions,
he did not do so for the plaintiff's loan.

When the plaintiff and Laverty met, Laverty implored the
plaintiff to seek more money than he needed for the renovations,
so that the plaintiff could make a side loan to Laverty. Laverty
needed $120,000 to close on a residential property in Marshfield.
Laverty offered to provide the plaintiff “a deed-in-lieu” of a
mortgage to secure the side loan. The plaintiff agreed. Notwith-
standing his ultimate failure to do so, Laverty intended to provide
the deed-in-lieu and to repay the $120,000.

Prior to the closing, the plaintiff had no direct contact with the
defendant. Rather, all discussions with the defendant and the law
firm regarding the loan were conducted by Laverty, outside of the
plaintiff's presence. Although the defendant insulated himself
from any direct contact with the plaintiff, the parties arranged,
through Laverty, for the defendant's wife to inspect the
Dorchester property, on the law firm’s behalf. She was told that
the proceeds of the loan would be used for the renovations.

The law firm set the value of the loan to the plaintiff at
$260,000, which included the costs of the loan itself such as
prepaid interest, origination fees, and appraisal and legal fees.
This amount provided sufficient funds for the plaintiff to spend

477 Mass. 563 (2017) 565

Fergus v. Ross.

the necessary $75,000 to $100,000 on renovations at the Dorches-
ter property and make the $120,000 side loan to Laverty. The law
firm created an entity for the sole purpose of providing the loan,
as had apparently been its practice for other loans, called the
Wisconsin Avenue Lending Trust (trust). The trustee for this
entity was an apparently fictitious individual named “Ronald
Williams,” although it was not clear that the entire trust was built
of straw.

The trust formally communicated its offer for the $260,000
loan (Dorchester loan) by way of a commitment letter, signed by
the defendant on behalf of the trust. On September 10, 2007,
Laverty brought the commitment letter specifying the terms to the
plaintiff, who accepted that day. The plaintiff also agreed to pay
the $2,500 legal fees of the lender. The letter did not mention the
side loan. Nevertheless, the plaintiff signed the letter and gave it
to Laverty to give to the law firm, relying on Laverty’s represen-
tations that the defendant would serve as the closing agent for
both the Dorchester loan and the side loan.

On the same day, the plaintiff also handwrote a letter to the
defendant, explaining that Laverty was to receive a $120,000 loan
from the plaintiff, drawn from the proceeds of the Dorchester
loan. The letter authorized the defendant to arrange the requisite
paperwork for the side loan. Laverty also took this letter, repre-
senting to the plaintiff that he would deliver it to the defendant.
He never did so.

The next day, Laverty drove the plaintiff to the defendant's
office for the closing, where the plaintiff and the defendant met
for the first time. The plaintiff signed all of the loan documents,
without reading them, but with an understanding of the funda-
mental requirements: he would be obligated to pay back the
principal within ninety days and he was granting a mortgage. The
side loan, however, was not mentioned at the closing or refer-
enced in any of the documents. Nor did Laverty have title to the
Marshfield property such that he could provide the plaintiff a
deed-in-lieu of a mortgage. The plaintiff signed the documents
with a willingness to be bound by them. The next day, the
plaintiff obtained a bank check in the amount of $120,000,
payable to Laverty. Laverty subsequently declared bankruptcy
and did not repay the plaintiff.

The judge concluded that the defendant had a duty as the
“closing agent” for the transaction to advise the plaintiff regard-
ing the deficiencies of the side loan. Although the defendant did

566 477 Mass. 563 (2017)

Fergus v. Ross.

not have actual knowledge of the side loan or its terms, the
defendant was deemed to have constructive knowledge through
his agent, Laverty. The defendant did not inform the plaintiff that
Laverty lacked title to the property that was to serve as security
for the side loan, and thus, the judge found, the defendant com-
mitted a breach of this duty. The judge credited the plaintiff's
testimony that he would not have proceeded with the side loan if
he had known it was unsecured.

The defendant timely appealed, and the Appeals Court af-
firmed. Fergus v. Ross, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 535-536 (2016).
We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate re-
view and now reverse.

Discussion. On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge
erred in two key respects. First, the defendant argues that the
judge lacked an adequate basis to find that the defendant had
conferred apparent authority on Laverty with respect to the side
loan. Second, the defendant claims that he owed no duty to the
plaintiff regarding the side loan as the “closing agent” for the
Dorchester loan.

We agree that there was an insufficient basis to conclude that
the defendant conferred apparent authority on Laverty for the side
loan. As a result, the defendant lacked constructive knowledge of
the side loan, which was essential to the breach of the alleged
duty. Thus, the finding of negligence must be reversed.

1. Agency. “[T]he question of agency is usually an issue for the
fact finder.” Theos & Sons, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 431 Mass.
736, 742 (2000) (Theos). Thus, the question before us is whether
there was an adequate basis for the judge to conclude that an
agency relationship existed, pursuant to Laverty’s apparent au-
thority.

Generally, an agency relationship is created by express or
implied mutual consent that an agent will “act on behalf and for
the benefit of the principal, and subject to the principal’s control.”
Theos, 431 Mass. at 742. See Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 1.01 (2006). See also Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 498
(2006) (judge’s finding of agency not clearly erroneous). The
agent may impose legal obligations or otherwise bind the prin-
cipal, based on the agent’s either actual or apparent authority to
do so. Theos, supra at 743. A principal is liable for the agent’s
conduct when the agent acts with “the actual or apparent au-
thority of the principal in that transaction.” Jd. In this case, the
judge found an agency relationship between the defendant and
Laverty based exclusively on apparent authority.

477 Mass. 563 (2017) 567

Fergus v. Ross.

Apparent authority exists when the principal, by his or her
words or conduct, causes a third person to reasonably believe that
the principal consents to the agent acting on the principal’s
behalf. Licata v. GGNSC Malden Dexter LLC, 466 Mass. 793,
801 (2014). Critically, “[o]nly the words and conduct of the
principal, . . . and not those of the agent, are considered in
determining the existence of apparent authority.” Jd. The princi-
pal’s manifestation of apparent authority does not need to be
direct communication with the third party. See Restatement
(Third) of Agency, supra at §§ 2.03, 3.03. See also Menard & Co.
Masonry Bldg. Contractors v. Marshall Bldg. Sys., Inc.,539 A.2d
523, 526 (R.I. 1988). The principal can also ratify an agent’s
conduct after the fact, by “acquiesc[ing] in the agent’s action, or
fail[ing] promptly to disavow the unauthorized conduct after
disclosure of material facts” (citation omitted). Licata, supra at
802.

The judge found that the defendant’s conduct allowed the
plaintiff reasonably to conclude that Laverty had the authority to
act on the defendant’s behalf with respect to the side loan, relying
primarily on four facts. First, the defendant had no contact with
the plaintiff until the closing. All communication from the de-
fendant to the plaintiff, and vice versa, went through Laverty.
Thus, it was through Laverty that the defendant’s wife inspected
the property on behalf of the law firm. Second, the plaintiff never
requested a specific amount for the loan, but rather the terms in
the commitment letter were set by the law firm, ostensibly pur-
suant to Laverty’s representations. Third, Laverty had, in the past,
referred borrowers to the defendant in exchange for a fee, al-
though no such fee was paid in this case. Fourth, the closing took
place in the law firm’s office, where Laverty brought the plaintiff.
Laverty remained there throughout the closing, urging the plain-
tiff to sign the papers.

These facts may well have been sufficient to conclude that
Laverty was the defendant’s agent with respect to the Dorchester
loan. See DeVaux v. American Home Assur. Co., 387 Mass. 814,
816-817, 819 (1983) (fact finder could conclude that attorney’s
secretary, who answered telephone, gave advice to prospective
client, and misfiled client’s letter requesting service, had apparent
authority to bind attorney who lacked actual knowledge). As
such, the defendant could have been liable for any fraudulent,
negligent, or deceitful conduct by Laverty. The judge, however,
specifically found that Laverty lacked any fraudulent intent, and

568 477 Mass. 563 (2017)

Fergus v. Ross.

she did not make any finding that Laverty was negligent.?

Instead, the defendant’s liability was premised on Laverty’s
theoretical apparent authority to bind the defendant to assume
some form of responsibility for the side loan. Yet, the judge did
not find any conduct of the defendant that related specifically to
his acquiescence to, or ratification of, Laverty’s conduct regard-
ing the side loan.

Although the judge identified facts suggesting that Laverty
was, in some capacity, the defendant’s agent, they do not connect
any manifestation of acquiescence by the defendant to the side
loan. See Licata, 466 Mass. at 801-802 (alleged agent’s signature
as authorized representative did not establish apparent authority
in absence of manifestation of assent by principal). To the con-
trary, the plaintiff knew from the outset that he was receiving a
loan from the trust, through the defendant and his law firm, and
the judge did not find that the plaintiff believed that Laverty was
the defendant’s employee. Contrast De Vaux, 387 Mass. at 819 &
n.10 (factual question whether attorney’s secretary had actual or
apparent authority to establish attorney-client relationship). Only
the words and conduct of the would-be agent, Laverty, connected
the defendant to the side loan, and they are insufficient to create
apparent authority as to the side loan. See Licata, supra at 801;
Theos, 431 Mass. at 745.

Nor do the findings of the judge support a conclusion that the
defendant ratified Laverty’s representations after the fact. Where
authority is premised on ratification by the principal, the “[r]ati-
fication must be based upon full knowledge of all material facts,”
or evidence of wilful ignorance. Licata, 466 Mass. at 802, quot-
ing Kidder v. Greenman, 283 Mass. 601, 615 (1933). By the same
token, a principal does not have an obligation to disavow the
agent’s conduct, in the absence of actual knowledge. Licata,
supra at 803, citing See v. Norris, 234 Mass. 345, 348 (1920).
The judge did not find that the defendant knew about the side
loan, and specifically found that the defendant did not know that

2We note also that, although the judge found that the defendant “entirely
insulated himself” from direct contact with the plaintiff, the judge did not find
that the defendant was wilfully ignorant of the side loan. See Licata v. GGNSC
Malden Dexter LLC, 466 Mass. 793, 802 (2014) (there may be ratification of
agent’s conduct “when [the principal] shuts his eyes to means of information
within his own possession and control, and ratifies an act deliberately” [citation
omitted]). Furthermore, the judge rejected the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to
G. L. ¢. 93A, for breach of contract, and for fraudulent misrepresentation, and
the plaintiff does not appeal from those rulings.

477 Mass. 563 (2017) 569

Fergus v. Ross.

Laverty lacked the title for the property intended to serve as
security for the side loan.* Further, the judge did not find that the
defendant was wilfully ignorant of these facts.

Moreover, the commitment letter and loan documents prepared
by the defendant made no mention of the side loan. Thus, if the
plaintiff had read the documents, he would have seen that the
defendant was not contemplating the side loan to Laverty as part
of the Dorchester loan to the plaintiff. See Licata, 466 Mass. at
802. See also Haufler, 446 Mass. at 501 (“The general rule is,
that, in the absence of fraud, one who signs a written agreement
is bound by its terms whether he reads and understands it or not”
[citation omitted]). Based on these findings by the judge, it was
not reasonable for the plaintiff to rely “on everything that was
told [to him by Laverty] about getting this loan,” instead of the
contents of the loan documents.* See Licata, supra.

2. Duty of care. The defendant also argues that he could not
owe a duty to the plaintiff as a “closing agent” for the transaction,
where the judge found that the defendant and plaintiff did not
form an attorney-client relationship. We need not examine
whether a duty would have been owed if Laverty had possessed
the apparent authority to impose a duty of care upon the defend-
ant, or whether Laverty’s representation that the defendant would
“take care of everything” constituted an enforceable promise on
these facts. See Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 404
Mass. 515, 524, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989) (“[A]n attorney

®The Appeals Court and the parties have made much of the judge’s “belie[f]”
that the defendant “may well have known” about the side loan, based on the
amount by which the Dorchester loan exceeded the cost of the renovations. See
Fergus v. Ross, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 533-534 (2016). Whether this constitutes
a finding that the defendant knew generally of the side loan is not clear. The
judge's findings, however, are clear that the defendant did not actually know the
details of the side loan that he failed to disclose (ie., that the side loan was not
secured). Instead, the defendant’s liability was premised exclusively on con-
structive knowledge pursuant to his agency relationship with Laverty. There-
fore, anything that the defendant might — or should — have known about the
side loan or Laverty’s lack of title is irrelevant to the theory of negligence for
which the defendant was ultimately found liable. We make no ruling as to
whether the defendant could have been found liable using a different theory of
negligence on these facts.

“The judge found that the plaintiff expected to receive the deed-in-lieu of a
mortgage for the Marshfield property at some later point in time. The judge’s
findings do not specify whether the plaintiff understood that he was not signing
any documents related to the side loan at the closing. The judge’s findings,
however, appear to reflect that the plaintiff did not understand the documents he
was signing, and also that he did not read them.

570 477 Mass. 563 (2017)

Fergus v. Ross.

owes a duty to nonclients who the attorney knows will rely on the
services rendered”).

In this case, the theory of negligence was premised on imputing
to the defendant Laverty’s knowledge of the side loan, as a result
of their agency relationship. See Sunrise Props., Inc. v. Bacon,
Wilson, Ratner, Cohen, Salvage, Fialky & Fitzgerald, P.C., 425
Mass. 63, 66-67 (1997) (agent’s knowledge imputed to principal
in absence of fraud by agent that does not benefit principal).
Because Laverty lacked the requisite apparent authority, Laverty’s
knowledge is not imputable to the defendant. See id. Therefore,
the defendant cannot be negligent for failing to disclose or
disavow that which he did not know, either actually or construc-
tively.

Conclusion. The facts found by the judge are insufficient to
conclude that Laverty had apparent authority from the defendant
to bind the defendant as a closing agent for the side loan. No
conduct of the defendant manifested acquiescence to participa-
tion in the side loan. Nor did the defendant ratify Laverty’s
conduct after the fact, because the loan documents drafted by the
defendant contained no reference to the side loan. Thus, the
theory of negligence on which the defendant was found liable
fails, because it was premised on the imputation of Laverty’s
knowledge to the defendant pursuant to the alleged agency rela-
tionship.

Judgment reversed.

477 Mass. 571 (2017) 571

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

Enercy Express, Inc.! ys. DEPARTMENT oF Pustic Utmries.
Suffolk. May 4, 2017. - August 3, 2017,

Present: Gants, C.l., Luk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Buop, & Cyeure, JJ.

Gas Company. Public Utilities. Department of Public Utilities. Words, “Cus-
tomer.”

The Department of Public Utilities (department) did not commit an error of law
or abuse its discretion in interpreting “customer,” as used in G. L. c. 164,
§ 94E, not to include marketers as recipients of a refund of an excessive rate
charged for natural gas capacity by an interstate pipeline, where the depart-
ment’s interpretation of “customer” as an entity that purchases natural gas or
related services for its own consumption was reasonable [575-579]; further,
the department's interpretation did not violate the Federal “filed rate” doe-
trine [579-580] or conflict with the department’s policy to allow the com-
petitive market to determine the most efficient outcome [580].

Civit action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk on September 22, 2016.

The case was reported by Lowy, J.

William S. Harwood for the intervener.

Kirk G. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Shaela McNulty Collins & Kenneth W. Christman, for Bay
State Gas Company, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Lowy, J. Prior to 1999, the supply, transportation, and distri-
bution of natural gas to consumers in the Commonwealth were
“bundled” together and provided by a State-endorsed monopoly,
referred to as a “local distribution company” or “LDC.” The
Legislature “unbundled” these components, allowing private
companies, referred to as “marketers,” to compete as suppliers of
natural gas in the Commonwealth. Transportation and distribution
of gas, however, remained the sole province of the LDCs. To
ensure that consumers who opted to purchase gas from marketers
continued to receive a sufficient supply of gas, the Department of
Public Utilities (department) required LDCs to assign to market-
ers a proportional share of the “capacity” along interstate pipe-
lines, based on the needs of the marketers’ customers.

’Doing business as Metromedia Energy, Inc., intervener.

572 477 Mass. 571 (2017)

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

Under Federal law, the interstate pipeline companies may be
required to issue refunds to companies like LDCs who purchased
pipeline capacity. Then, under State law, the LDCs may be
required to pass that refund on to its “customers.” G. L. c. 164,
§ 94F. The issue in this case is whether the assignment of capacity
by an LDC to a marketer causes the marketer to become a
“customer” of the LDC, such that it is entitled to a share of that
refund under G. L. c. 164, § 94F Given the deference we afford
the department in interpreting the statutes and regulations for
which it is responsible, we accept the department’s conclusion
that only an end consumer, and not a marketer, is entitled to the
refund.

Background. There are three primary components to the natural
gas industry: (1) the gas commodity itself; (2) “upstream capac-
ity,” which involves the transmission and storage of gas from the
source in pipelines, often across State boundaries; and (3) local
distribution of gas to the consumer. Historically, in Massachu-
setts, the LDC provided all three components. The gas company
in this case, Bay State Gas Company (Bay State),? is an LDC.

In the 1990s, Massachusetts partially “unbundled” the industry.
D.T.E. 98-32-B, at 8, 27-28 (1999) (Unbundling Order I). See
generally 220 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 14.00 (2008). The department
determined, however, that of the three primary components of the
gas industry, only the unbundling of the gas commodity itself was
feasible.* Unbundling Order I, supra at 27-28. The department
was concerned that allowing competition for the second compo-
nent, upstream capacity, “would run the risk that interstate ca-
pacity could be diverted to serve markets outside the Common-
wealth or other non-traditional customers within the [S]tate
market ... .” Jd. at 8. The department did not envision opening
the third component, distribution, to competition. See id. at 7-8.
Thus, unbundling was limited to the sale of the commodity itself.
Id. at 7-8, 27-28. Consumers could elect to purchase natural gas
from marketers, such as the intervener in these proceedings,
Energy Express, Inc. (Energy Express), instead of an LDC.

Because the department did not open upstream capacity to pri-
vate competition, LDCs remain responsible for entering into con-

2Bay State does business in Massachusetts under the name Columbia Gas of
Massachusetts.

®The department revisited the unbundling of the market in 2005, but again
concluded that the circumstances of the natural gas industry in Massachusetts
still would not support a competitive market for upstream capacity. D.T.E. 04-1,
at 26 (2005).

477 Mass. 571 (2017) 573

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

tracts for upstream capacity on the interstate pipelines. Accord-
ingly, Bay State, as an LDC, must procure sufficient capacity
along interstate pipelines based on the gas needs of both custom-
ers who continue to purchase the bundled service from them
(“sales customers”) and those who elect to purchase gas from
marketers (“transportation customers”). Thus, even consumers
who purchase their gas from Energy Express, a marketer, remain
customers of Bay State, an LDC, for purposes of the second and
third components of the natural gas industry (i.e., upstream ca-
pacity and local distribution).

As a result of the unbundling process, some consumers were
now purchasing their gas from one entity (a marketer) and having
it transported to them by another (an LDC). In light of this
change, the department had to determine the best way to ensure
that those consumers could depend on the reliable delivery of
their natural gas. To that end, the department adopted a manda-
tory “slice-of-system” assignment approach for upstream capac-
ity. Unbundling Order I, supra at 34-35. Under this system, the
LDC must secure all the upstream capacity necessary for both its
sales and transportation customers. /d. at 12-13. Then, the LDC
proportionally assigns capacity to each marketer, based on the pro
rata gas needs of its customers who elect to purchase gas from
that marketer. /d. This ensures that there will be sufficient capac-
ity along the interstate pipelines to transport the gas “upstream”
from the supply source to consumers. See id. at 34-35.

Pursuant to the LDC’s assignment of capacity, a marketer like
Energy Express directly pays the proportional costs of capacity to
a pipeline, on behalf of its customers, just as an LDC like Bay
State does for its sales customers. /d. at 12-13 (marketer “as-
sume[s] the same cost structures with regard to the assigned
capacity”). LDCs pass that cost on to their customers in compli-
ance with applicable regulations and its department-approved
rates, 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 14.03(4)(c), (d) (2009), while
marketers have the ability to freely negotiate the extent to which
they pass these costs on to their customers. See 220 Code Mass.
Regs. § 14.04 (2008).

The upstream capacity cost is determined by Federal law,
through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

“There is a third type of customer, for whom the LDC is not responsible for
procuring upstream capacity, referred to as “capacity-exempt” customers. The
supply, transportation, and distribution of gas to these customers has no bearing
on this case.

574 477 Mass. 571 (2017)

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

FERC may set maximum rates that pipelines may charge to LDCs
for upstream capacity. See 15 U.S.C. § 717d (2012). Sometimes,
a pipeline may charge a rate, subject to FERC’s review. If FERC
subsequently determines that the rate was too high, FERC will
order the pipeline to refund the excess payment to the appropriate
LDCs. See G. L. c. 164, § 94F; 18 C.ER. § 154.501(a) (2010). In
Massachusetts, the department can then order the LDC to pass on
the refund to its customers. G. L. c. 164, § 94F

That is precisely what happened in this case. The Portland
Natural Gas Transmission System (pipeline) was permitted to
charge a certain rate, subject to FERC review. Bay State paid that
rate to the pipeline. Subsequently, FERC determined that the
pipeline had charged too much and ordered the pipeline to issue
a refund. Because Bay State was the contracting party with the
pipeline, and not the marketers, Bay State received the full
refund.

The department ordered Bay State to issue a refund to its sales
and transportation customers, which it did. G. L. c. 164, § 94F
Energy Express requested to intervene in the pertinent adminis-
trative proceedings and was permitted to do so.® Energy Express
argued that it, and not its customers (i.e., Bay State’s transporta-
tion customers), should receive a proportional share of the refund
directly, an amount exceeding $250,000, because Energy Express
paid the upstream capacity costs up front. In a written order,® the
department rejected Energy Express’s position and concluded
that neither § 94F nor basic fairness required Bay State to provide
a proportional share of the refund to Energy Express. Energy
Express appealed to the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 25, § 5,
and a single justice granted Energy Express’s unopposed motion
to reserve and report the case to the full court. We affirm.

Standard of review. When reviewing a decision of the depart-
ment that does not raise a constitutional question, but is limited to
evaluating whether the department committed legal error, “[t]he
burden of proof is on the appealing party to show that the order
appealed from is invalid, and we have observed that this burden

Initially, Bay State planned to issue refunds only to its sales customers, and
not its transportation customers. As a result of the proceeding in which Energy
Express intervened, the department determined that this refund method would
disproportionately benefit Bay State’s sales. Both parties agree that the refund
should not be limited to Bay State’s sales customers.

Neither Bay State nor Energy Express requested an evidentiary hearing, but
filed briefs and a joint stipulation of facts.

477 Mass. 571 (2017) 575

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

is heavy.” Bay State Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 459
Mass. 807, 813 (2011), quoting DSCI Corp. v. Department of
Telecomm. & Energy, 449 Mass. 597, 603 (2007).

We afford the department deference, based on its “expertise and
experience in areas where the Legislature has delegated decision-
making authority” to the department. Bay State Gas Co., supra at
813-814, quoting DSCI Corp., supra, and citing G. L. c. 30A,
§ 14. Accordingly, we uphold the department’s decision “unless
it is based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial evi-
dence, unwarranted by facts found on the record as submitted,
arbitrary [or] capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.” Bay State Gas Co., supra at 814, quoting
DSCI Corp. supra, and citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Discussion. Energy Express argues that (1) the department
committed an error of law and abused its discretion in interpret-
ing “customer” as used in § 94F to exclude marketers; (2) the
department’s interpretation violates the Federal “filed rate” doc-
trine; and (3) the department’s interpretation conflicts with its
policy to allow the competitive market to determine the most
efficient outcome. We address each argument in turn.

1. Interpretation of “customer.” General Laws c. 164, § 94F,
governs where a gas company, such as Bay State, must refund
excess upstream capacity costs to its “customers.” Once Bay
State receives the FERC-ordered refund from the pipeline, Sec-
tion 94F empowers the department to

“order said gas company to refund to its customers any sums
refunded to said gas company for the period subsequent to
the effective date of the order of the department approving
rates for the gas company as above set forth and may impose
such restrictions, limitations, terms and conditions in such
order as are considered necessary by it... .”

In this case, Bay State received a refund from a pipeline,
pursuant to FERC’s determination that the pipeline had over-
charged for upstream capacity. The department then ordered Bay
State to pass that refund on to its customers. Energy Express
claims that it, as an assignee of Bay State with respect to up-
stream capacity along the pertinent pipeline, should be interpreted
as a “customer” under § 94F. In support of this position, Energy
Express argues that the department misinterprets the plain lan-
guage and legislative history of § 94F; that Energy Express paid,
and was ultimately responsible for, the costs associated with

576 477 Mass. 571 (2017)

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

upstream capacity; and that the department’s interpretation im-
poses an unfair result on Energy Express, while providing its
customers a windfall. We disagree.

When interpreting a statute, we ascertain the intent of the
Legislature by relying on all of the statute’s “words construed by
the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accom-
plished” (citation omitted). Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 210
(2016). Yet, we simultaneously afford deference to the depart-
ment’s reasonable interpretations of the statutes that it adminis-
ters. Bay State Gas Co., 459 Mass. at 813-814.

Energy Express claims that it became a “customer” of Bay
State for the purposes of § 94F when Bay State assigned Energy
Express its proportional share of the upstream capacity. Energy
Express argues that the language and purpose of § 94F suggest
that the refund should go to the party who actually paid the
department-approved rate, which FERC subsequently concluded
was excessive. This misconstrues § 94 and mischaracterizes the
marketers’ role with respect to upstream capacity.

The department interprets “customer,” in the context of the
natural gas market, to mean an entity that purchases natural gas or
related services for its own consumption. The department points
out that its regulations define a “retail customer” as one “located
in Massachusetts that purchases natural gas for its own consump-
tion and not for resale in whole or in part.” 220 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 14.02 (2008). Although this may not be the only possible
definition of customer, it is the one adopted by the department, is
reasonable, and is entitled to our deference. Bay State Gas Co.,
459 Mass. at 813-814.

The legislative history of § 94F supports interpreting “cus-
tomer” to mean the entity that consumes the natural gas. In
Central States Elec. Co. v. Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138, 140-141
(1945), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a
utility company or the consumers were entitled to a natural gas
rate refund. The Court opined that, although the purpose of the
Federal Natural Gas Act was “to protect the ultimate consumer at
retail,” that legislation left to the States the regulation of intrastate
distribution and sales. Jd. at 144. The refund at issue in that case
stemmed from such intrastate activity, and thus the Court con-
cluded that only the State’s law could provide the mechanisms by
which the refund could reach the consumer. Id. at 144-146. The

477 Mass. 571 (2017) 577

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

enactment of § 94F in 1953 — just eight years after Central
States Elec. Co. — provided such a mechanism. See St. 1953,
c. 331. Under § 94EF the department may order an LDC to issue
that refund to its intended beneficiaries, who are, according to the
Supreme Court, the “ultimate consumer at retail.”” Central States
Elec. Co., supra at 144. Thus, Energy Express does not purchase
gas for its own consumption and, therefore, does not qualify as a
customer under the department’s interpretation, based on the
plain language and purpose of § 94F,

Further, we defer to the department’s determination that the
consumers of natural gas, and not the marketers, are ultimately
responsible for the upstream capacity costs. See Unbundling
Order I, supra at 12 (“Under mandatory assignment, [customers
who purchase gas from marketers] will retain the responsibility
for the costs associated with the capacity procured and main-
tained by the [LDC]”). Bay State must procure sufficient up-
stream capacity on behalf of both its sales and transportation
customers. D.T.E. 04-1, at 53 (2005) (Unbundling Order II).
Therefore, Bay State is the upstream capacity provider for its
transportation customers. The upstream capacity is procured on
the transportation customers’ behalf, and the costs of that pro-
curement are “inextricably linked” to Bay State’s obligation to
procure capacity for them. Unbundling Order I, supra at 6. See
Unbundling Order II, supra at 53 (directing LDCs to “continue to
plan for and procure upstream pipeline capacity” for both sales
and transportation customers). As a practical administrative ne-
cessity to ensure an adequate and reliable supply of gas for its
transportation customers, Bay State assigns the transportation
customers’ proportional share of upstream capacity to the mar-
keters that sell gas to those transportation customers. See Unbun-
dling Order I, supra at 34-35 (adopting mandatory “slice-of-
system” assignment of upstream capacity to marketers as
necessity for reliability); Unbundling Order II, supra at 52-53
(declining to deviate from mandatory capacity assignment
adopted in Unbundling Order I).

That marketers such as Energy Express pay those costs up front
does not alter the transportation customers’ ultimate responsibil-
ity for their pro rata share of the capacity costs. Bay State also
pays these costs up front. Yet, Bay State is not entitled to the

7We note also that the natural gas industry was unbundled in 1999, more than
forty years after the enactment of § 94F, which has never been amended. St.
1953, c. 331. This would further suggest that marketers such as Energy Express
were not the “customers” the Legislature had in mind.

578 477 Mass. 571 (2017)

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

refund, which demonstrates its customers’ ultimate responsibility
for the costs. See G. L. c. 164, § 94F Energy Express is merely
the assignee of Bay State with respect to the transportation
customers’ upstream capacity. See Unbundling Order I, supra at
34-35. Energy Express cannot independently purchase capacity
from Bay State or the pipeline, nor does it provide capacity to
customers. See Unbundling Order II, supra at 26 (declining to
open upstream capacity to private competition).

Rather, Energy Express acquires its own customers who remain
dependent on Bay State to procure and provide upstream capac-
ity. Bay State then adds together the total upstream capacity
requirements of Energy Express’s customers, obtains that capac-
ity from a pipeline, and assigns it to Energy Express. Energy
Express simply stands in Bay State’s shoes. Thus, just as Bay
State initially pays the upstream capacity costs to the pipeline on
its sales customers’ behalf, Energy Express does the same for its
customers. It follows that Energy Express’s contracts with its
customers determine the extent to which it passes on these costs,
in a manner parallel to how Bay State’s department-approved
rates pass such costs on to its sales customers. See 220 Code
Mass. Regs. § 14.03(4)(c), (d) (LDCs’ rates established pursuant
to regulatory requirements and codified in “tariff’). Regardless of
such recovery, these customers are the parties responsible for the
cost and thus the parties entitled to the refund. See G. L. c. 164,
§ 94E. See also Central States Elec. Co., 324 U.S. at 144.

Further, if an LDC’s transportation customer switches market-
ers, or if a marketer leaves the market, the department has
determined that the upstream capacity allotment and its associ-
ated costs must follow the transportation customer. See Unbun-
dling Order I, supra at 31. These costs do not become attached to
the marketer who paid them on the transportation customer’s
behalf. /d. In other words, no matter who is selling natural gas to
the customer, the customer requires — and receives — the same
capacity, which is accompanied by the same costs.

For these reasons, it is reasonable for the department to attri-
bute the final responsibility of upstream capacity costs to the
transportation customers, while requiring the marketers to pay
that cost initially.

Energy Express’s argument that the department’s interpretation
unfairly enriches the customers also fails. Energy Express claims
that giving its customers the refund results in those customers
receiving a windfall. Yet, whether the customers receive a wind-

477 Mass. 571 (2017) 579

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

fall depends on the extent to which Energy Express passes on the
costs of the upstream capacity that Bay State assigned Energy
Express on behalf of that customer. As the department noted in its
order, if Energy Express passed on the cost and received the
refund, it would be Energy Express that received the windfall.
This distribution of cost is set by Energy Express’s private
contract. We accept the department’s determination that the terms
of the private contract between Energy Express and its customers
cannot absolve the customers of their ultimate responsibility for
the upstream capacity costs.

2. The filed rate doctrine. The filed rate doctrine, as applicable
in this case, requires that “interstate power rates filed with FERC
or fixed by FERC must be given binding effect by [S]tate utility
commissions determining intrastate rates.” Nantahala Power &
Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962 (1986). As a result,
Bay State submits to the department its “Distribution and Default
Service Terms and Conditions” (referred to as a “tariff”), which
includes the terms on which it may assign upstream capacity to
marketers. Once the department approves the tariff, Bay State
must comply with the provisions of the tariff. 220 Code Mass.
Regs. § 14.03(2), (4)(c), (d). Charging a rate exceeding the limi-
tations of the tariff would constitute a violation of the filed rate
doctrine. See Nantahala Power & Light Co., supra.

Energy Express argues that giving the refund to its customers
has the effect of requiring Energy Express to pay an amount for
upstream capacity that exceeds Bay State’s filed rate. To support
its position, Energy Express points out that the tariff assigns the
upstream capacity to marketers at the maximum FERC rate. The
pipeline in this case charged a rate that FERC subsequently
determined was too high. Energy Express paid that rate to the
pipeline initially. Thus, Energy Express contends that if it does
not receive the refund, it paid a rate exceeding what FERC
allowed, which would then in turn violate the tariff. We disagree.

Energy Express’s argument is again premised on a mischar-
acterization of the nature of the transaction. As noted above,
Energy Express is not the party responsible for the upstream
capacity costs — its customers are. Energy Express merely paid
the upstream capacity cost on behalf of its customers. Energy
Express was able to decide how much of that cost to pass on to
its customers. If Energy Express did not recover those costs, it
elected not to do so pursuant to the freely negotiated terms of its
private contracts with those customers. The department’s man-
datory “slice-of-system” assignment procedure did not obligate

580 477 Mass. 571 (2017)

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

Energy Express to absorb those costs.

3. Department policy. Finally, Energy Express argues that the
department’s order is contrary to its own policy to allow the
competitive market to lead to the efficient outcome. This court
will not second guess the department’s implementation of its own
policy, in the absence of a legal justification for doing so, which
Energy Express has not provided. Bay State Gas Co., 459 Mass.
at 813-814, citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). Moreover, Energy
Express’s argument is internally flawed, as it once again hinges
on the erroneous position that Energy Express’s initial obligation
to pay for the upstream capacity equates to an ultimate respon-
sibility for those costs. As discussed above, although Energy
Express pays the upstream capacity costs up front, it does so on
behalf of its customers who, for valid regulatory reasons, bear the
final responsibility for those costs.

Energy Express argues that the department interfered in the
private market by ordering a refund to customers who freely
negotiated the price they would pay to their marketers. Critically,
however, Energy Express sells the gas commodity to its custom-
ers. It does not sell upstream capacity. Indeed, it cannot sell
upstream capacity to these customers because upstream capacity
has not been opened to private competition in Massachusetts. See
Unbundling Order II, supra at 26. Although Energy Express
incurred the upfront costs for upstream capacity in order to sell to
these customers, it may pass these costs on to them as well.
Energy Express is also free to decline to pass on the full cost to
these customers. This option gives Energy Express a seemingly
significant competitive advantage over Bay State, which is bound
by its department-approved tariff. See 220 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 14.03(4)(c), (d). If, however, Energy Express chooses to retain
some or all of those costs, that choice does not entitle Energy
Express to a refund, which is intended to benefit the consumers to
whom it sells natural gas. See G. L. c. 164, § 94E See also
Central States Elec. Co., 324 U.S. at 140. The extent to which
marketers decide to assume part of their customer’s upstream
capacity costs, however, is precisely the type of determination
best left to the competitive markets.*

Conclusion. The department reasonably interpreted “customer”

®To the extent the Maine Public Utilities Commission, in a decision cited by
Energy Express, reached a different result based on Maine’s distinct regulatory
scheme, we accept the department’s conclusion that the Maine decision is
distinguishable. The mandatory slice-of-system assignment requirement utilized

477 Mass. 571 (2017) 581

Energy Express, Inc. ». Department of Public Utilities.

as used in § 94F to include only those entities that consume the
natural gas provided or transported by Bay State. This interpre-
tation does not include Energy Express, which does not consume
the gas. Therefore, § 94F does not entitle Energy Express to a
refund. Energy Express’s arguments that the filed rate doctrine
entitles it to the refund and that the department has violated its
own policy by providing the refund to transportation customers
are similarly premised on a faulty characterization of Energy
Express’s role in the natural gas market.

Order affirmed.

in the Commonwealth, which is a significant factor in attributing responsibility
for upstream capacity costs to the consumer, is not the rule in Maine.

582 477 Mass. 582 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Francis.

CommonweattH vs. Rocer D. Francis.
Plymouth. April 3, 2017. - August 11, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lax, Hives, Lowy, up, & Cyr, JJ.

Practice, Criminal, Plea.

In granting the criminal defendant’s motion for a new trial in 2013, a Superior
Court judge abused her discretion in deciding to enforce a 1994 plea
agreement, where the record did not indicate that the prosecutor had made
any enforceable promise to the defendant that he need not be in custody for
a parole hearing or that the defendant had relied on the alleged promise to his
detriment. [585-587]

Inpictwent found and returned in the Superior Court on May
11, 1967.

Following review by this court, 355 Mass. 108 (1969), a motion
for a new trial, see 411 Mass. 579 (1992), and the withdrawal of a
plea of guilty and a second trial, see 450 Mass. 132 (2007), a
motion for a new trial, filed on August 5, 2013, was heard by Linda
E. Giles, J.

A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Botsford, J., in
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.

Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Common-
wealth.

Leslie W. O’Brien for the defendant.

Lowy, J. The Commonwealth claims that an order granting the
specific performance of a plea agreement constituted error. We
agree.

Background. In 1967, the defendant, Roger Francis, was con-
victed of murder in the first degree for killing his fifteen year old
girl friend. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 355 Mass. 108, 108-
109 (1969). In 1989, a Superior Court judge allowed the defend-
ant’s motion for a new trial because of errors in the reasonable
doubt jury instruction given in his 1967 trial. Thereafter, after a
single justice of this court granted the Commonwealth leave to
appeal pursuant to the gatekeeper provisions of G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, the court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Francis, 411 Mass.
579, 580 (1992).

477 Mass. 582 (2017) 583

Commonwealth v, Francis.

In May, 1994, the defendant reached a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth: the defendant would plead guilty to murder in
the second degree in exchange for the opportunity to immediately
seek parole, which the Commonwealth would not oppose. If the
parole board declined to grant the defendant parole, the agree-
ment allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and
proceed to trial on the murder in the first degree charge. After the
plea agreement had been reached, the defendant pleaded guilty on
May 25, 1994, before a Superior Court judge (plea judge). At the
plea hearing, the defendant’s counsel made representations that
there was an understanding between the parole board and the
defendant that the defendant would not be required to be in
custody to be considered for parole.? To effectuate the under-
standing as it was represented,? the plea judge — over the
Commonwealth’s objection — stayed the execution of the sen-
tence on the charge of murder in the second degree while the
defendant’s parole application was being considered. The parole
hearing was scheduled for August, 1994.

Before the scheduled parole hearing, the parole board informed
the parties and the plea judge of its position that pursuant to the
terms of G. L. c. 127, § 133A,‘ the defendant had to be in custody
in order for the parole board to have jurisdiction over him.
Because the defendant disagreed with returning to custody, the
August parole hearing was canceled.

In September, 1994, in response to the parole board’s position,
the plea judge issued a revised order that would terminate the stay
of the defendant’s sentence once the parole board commenced its
hearing. The order was designed to accommodate the defendant’s
request to avoid custody.

*At the time of the defendant’s 1994 plea, he had already served more than
fifteen years in prison. Those convicted of murder in the second degree in 1967
were eligible for parole after fifteen years. St. 1965, c. 766, § 1.

2Nothing occurred during the plea colloquy to suggest that the Common-
wealth had agreed as a condition of the plea that the defendant need not be in
custody during the parole hearing.

Tt is questionable at best whether there was ever an understanding between
the parole board and the defendant that the defendant need not be in custody
during his parole hearing.

4General Laws c. 127, § 133A, provides: “Every prisoner who is serving a
sentence for life in a correctional institution of the commonwealth . . . shall be
eligible for parole at the expiration of the minimum term fixed by the court . ..”
(emphasis added).

584 477 Mass. 582 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Francis.

The parole hearing was rescheduled for March, 1999.° This
hearing was canceled in part due to the defendant’s resistance to
returning to custody. The parole hearing was rescheduled for
March, 2000. Because the defendant would have to return to
custody to have his parole hearing, he filed a motion to continue
the stay of his sentence, or, alternatively, to withdraw his plea.

At the hearing on this motion, in March, 2000, a different judge
attempted to craft a solution that would allow the defendant to
remain out of custody while conforming with the parole board’s
position that the defendant must be in custody for it to conduct a
hearing. The judge proposed that the stay be continued until the
moment the parole hearing commenced (in keeping with the 1994
plea judge’s order), and that the stay be automatically reimposed
following the parole hearing if the defendant were denied parole,
so that he could withdraw his plea. The Commonwealth objected
to this proposal. The judge then granted the defendant’s alterna-
tive request for relief, allowing the defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea to murder in the second degree.

The defendant was retried on the original indictment for mur-
der in the first degree in 2003 before a third Superior Court judge
and jury. His conviction of that crime was upheld by this court.*
See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 133 (2007). In
2013, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel and that his 1967 sentence was
cruel or unusual. Although the judge — who was the judge at the
defendant’s 2003 trial — found the defendant’s arguments un-
availing, “[iJn light of the extenuating facts of this case,” she
granted the motion based on “principles of fundamental fairness
and due process,” even though she found that the Commonwealth
had not reneged on the plea offer. The judge ordered specific
performance of the 1994 plea agreement, and allowed the de-
fendant to plead guilty to murder in the second degree. The judge
reasoned that this was the correct result because “another party to
the negotiation, the court, adopted an interpretation of the [s]tat-
ute — that the [p]arole [bloard could entertain the defendant’s

®This five-year gap was the result of the defendant requesting that his attorney
not pursue a parole hearing and, apparently, the Commonwealth losing track of
the defendant’s case. In 1998, the prosecutor’s office was informed by the
Superior Court clerk’s office in Brockton that the court was still holding the
defendant’s bail money, and the case began to proceed.

Prior to this trial, the defendant filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement,
which the trial judge denied.

477 Mass. 582 (2017) 585

Commonwealth v, Francis.

request for parole and conduct a hearing at the [bJoard’s office
without his surrendering into [Department of Correction] custody
— on which the defendant relied to his detriment.”? The Com-
monwealth petitioned a single justice of this court pursuant to
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, who allowed the petition.

Discussion. The decision whether the Commonwealth enters
into a plea agreement with the defendant is the prosecutor’s
alone. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 500
(1991). See also Commonwealth v. Hart, 149 Mass. 7, 8 (1889)
(“Only an attorney authorized by the Commonwealth to represent
it has authority to declare that he will not further prosecute a case
in behalf of the Commonwealth. A court is not a prosecuting
officer . . .”). As a general matter, when a judge accepts a
defendant’s plea of guilty to murder in the second degree to an
indictment for murder in the first degree over the objection of the
Commonwealth, she usurps “the decision-making authority con-
stitutionally allocated to the executive branch.” Gordon, supra at
501, and cases cited. A judge may, however, enforce a plea
agreement over the Commonwealth’s objection if she finds that
the defendant has reasonably relied on a prosecutor’s promise to
his or her detriment. Commonwealth v. Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 521
(1981). Whether an enforceable promise exists is primarily a
question of contract law, id. at 521-522, but, in addition, “[w]e
would go beyond contract principles to order specific perfor-
mance of a prosecutor’s promise even where no contract may
have existed, if, on principles of fundamental fairness encom-
passed within notions of due process of law, the promise should
be enforced.” Id. at 522.

The issue before us is whether the judge in 2013 abused her
discretion in deciding to enforce the 1994 plea agreement be-
tween the Commonwealth and the defendant. More particularly,
the issue is whether the prosecutor made an enforceable promise
to the defendant that he need not be in custody for the parole
hearing.

Applying contract principles, the record does not indicate that
the Commonwealth made any enforceable promise to the defend-
ant that he would not have to go into custody before his parole
hearing could take place. Indeed, the record is to the contrary.
Thus, we apply a two-prong test to determine whether fundamen-

7As we explain, infra, the court is not a party to plea negotiations, and, more
importantly, the defendant never relied to his detriment on any promise related
to custody.

586 477 Mass. 582 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Francis.

tal fairness requires us to find an enforceable promise in the plea
agreement: first, we ask “whether the defendant had reasonable
grounds for assuming his interpretation of the bargain,” Smith,
384 Mass. at 523, quoting Blaikie v. District Attorney for the
Suffolk Dist., 375 Mass. 613, 616 n.2 (1978); and second, we ask
“whether [the defendant] relied on that interpretation to his det-
riment.” Smith, 384 Mass. at 523.

Here, the defendant’s argument fails both prongs of the test.
There were no reasonable grounds for the defendant to believe
that the prosecutor acquiesced to his not being in custody during
the parole hearing process. The prosecutor consistently objected
to the stay of the defendant’s sentence throughout the plea pro-
cess and continued to object to it over the course of subsequent
hearings. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 610,
612 (2010). The prosecutor’s objection demonstrates that it had
made no enforceable promise that the defendant would avoid
custody at the time he would be considered for parole. This view
is consistent with the judge’s finding that the Commonwealth
never reneged on its offer.

Even if there were reasonable grounds for the defendant to
believe that the Commonwealth had promised him that he would
not have to be in custody for the parole board to conduct its
hearing, the defendant’s argument also fails the second prong of
the test, because there is no evidence that he relied on the alleged
promise to his detriment. The parole board did not hold a hearing
between 1994 and 2000 while the defendant was at liberty. The
defendant, therefore, took advantage of his interpretation of the
plea agreement (adopted by the court) that he be allowed to
withdraw his plea if he were required to go into custody as a
condition of his parole hearing. Contrast Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 261-262 (1971) (detrimental reliance where de-
fendant pleaded guilty based on promise of prosecutor to make no
sentencing recommendation, but prosecutor subsequently broke
promise and recommended maximum sentence); Commonwealth
v. Benton, 356 Mass. 447, 448-449 (1969) (detrimental reliance
where defendants pleaded guilty based on promise of prosecutor
to enter nolle prosequi to certain charges, but prosecutor subse-
quently indicted defendants on charges that had been so dis-
posed). The defendant never relied to his detriment on any
alleged promise from the Commonwealth. His plea agreement
specifically allowed him to withdraw the plea and have the trial
he requested. The plea bargaining process did not put the defend-

477 Mass. 582 (2017) 587

Commonwealth v, Francis.

ant in a worse position than he would have been if the prosecutor
had never agreed to the bargain in the first place. Smith, 384
Mass. at 522. The defendant withdrew his plea, and he was then
left with the adequate remedy of proceeding to trial. Jd.*

A judge may not use the vantage point of hindsight to second
guess the decisions of a defendant in rejecting a plea agreement.
See Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442 Mass. 11, 17 (2004). That is
what happened here. There was no enforceable promise made by
the Commonwealth that the defendant did not have to ever go
into custody. Thus, there were no grounds for the judge to allow
the defendant to plead guilty to murder in the second degree.® We
conclude that the judge abused her discretion in granting the
defendant’s motion for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Yardley
¥., 464 Mass. 223, 227 (2013) (grant or denial of motion to
challenge or enforce plea reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Conclusion. The grant of the defendant’s motion for a new trial
is reversed.

So ordered.

*This situation is different from that presented by Commonwealth v. Mahar,
442 Mass. 11 (2004). In that case, we held that a fair trial does not ameliorate
the harm of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea consideration
process. Id. at 14-15, Here, where the judge below rejected the defendant’s
ineffective assistance claim, nothing impeded the defendant during plea nego-
tiations besides his refusal to go back into custody so that the board could
conduct a hearing.

*We note that following the 2003 trial, the judge had the authority to reduce
the verdict of murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree under
Mass. R. Crim, P. 25 (b) (2), 379 Mass. 896 (1979). There is no argument before
us that the judge’s action in 2013 was undertaken pursuant to this rule.

588 477 Mass. 588 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

Commonweatti vs. Kevin A. Mauricio.
Bristol. April 4, 2017. - August 14, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cypurr, IJ.

Firearms. Receiving Stolen Goods. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.
Search and Seizure, Search incident to lawful arrest, Inventory, Fruits of
illegal search.

A District Court judge erred in denying the criminal defendant's pretrial motion
to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a digital camera
found in his backpack, where the search of data contained in the camera fell
outside the scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights [591-
595], and where the search of the camera exceeded the bounds of the
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement because the search
was investigatory in nature [595-596]; however, the illegal search of the
camera’s contents did not require suppression of a ring found in the back-
pack, where the connection between the ring and the illegality was too
tenuous [596-597].

Ata criminal trial, the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, was not sufficient to establish that the value of a ring
that had been stolen exceeded $250; however, where it was undisputed that
the Commonwealth had proved all the other elements of the offense charged,
this court concluded that a finding of guilty of the lesser included offense of
receiving stolen property with a value of $250 or less should enter against the
defendant. [597-598]

Compaint received and sworn to in the Taunton Division of the
District Court Department on July 10, 2014.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas
L. Finigan, J., and the case was tried before him.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Mathew B. Zindroski for the defendant.

Stephen C. Nadeau, Jr., Assistant District Attorney (Shawn
Guilderson, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the
Commonwealth.

Hones, J. After a jury trial in the Taunton Division of the District
Court Department, the defendant, Kevin A. Mauricio, was con-
victed of carrying a firearm without a license, in violation of G. L.

477 Mass. 588 (2017) 589

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

c. 269, § 10 (a); and receiving stolen property with a value in
excess of $250, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 60. The charges
stem from a search of the defendant’s backpack after he was
arrested for possession of a controlled substance and breaking
and entering a residence in Taunton. During the course of the
search, the police discovered a digital camera, a ring, and other
items. The firearm conviction was based on images retrieved after
a warrantless search of the digital camera. The images depicted
the defendant next to firearms later determined to have been
stolen. The receiving stolen property conviction was based on the
ring discovered in the defendant’s backpack.

The defendant appealed from the convictions, arguing that the
judge erred in denying the motion to suppress the images discov-
ered as the result of the warrantless search of the digital camera,
and that the evidence offered at trial was insufficient to sustain the
conviction of receiving stolen property with a value in excess of
$250. We granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate
review, and conclude that the warrantless search of the digital
camera constituted neither a valid search incident to arrest nor a
valid inventory search. Accordingly, the images discovered in the
unlawful search should have been suppressed. We conclude fur-
ther that, although the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction of receiving stolen property with a value in excess of
$250, a conviction of the lesser included offense must stand.

Background. We summarize the judge’s findings of fact on the
motion to suppress the images, supplementing where appropriate
with uncontroverted testimony from the suppression hearing.
Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286 (2015). We reserve
for later the recitation of the facts germane to the defendant’s
argument that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
sustain the conviction of receiving stolen property.

On May 28, 2014, Taunton police Officer Brett Collins re-
ceived a report that two “suspicious parties” were seen running
out of the side door of a residence on Downing Drive in Taunton.
According to the neighbor who called in the report, one of the
individuals was a man wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and red
gloves and carrying a backpack. The second person, a female,
was wearing a gray sweatshirt.

Shortly thereafter, Collins located two individuals nearby
largely matching the neighbor’s descriptions. The man was iden-
tified as the defendant. Following a brief conversation, Collins
pat frisked the defendant and searched his backpack. Inside the

590 477 Mass. 588 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

backpack, Collins found various items, including the digital cam-
era at issue, jewelry, hypodermic needles, prescription medica-
tions, and coins. Collins then drove the defendant back to Down-
ing Drive, where the neighbor who made the report identified the
defendant as the man he saw running from another residence on
the street. The police arrested the defendant.

At the police station, Detective Dora Treacy, the evidence
officer for the Taunton police department, conducted an inventory
search of the defendant’s backpack. Believing the camera to have
been stolen, Treacy, in the course of her inventory search, turned
the camera on and viewed the digital images it contained in the
hope of identifying its “true” owner. In doing so, Treacy came
across an image of a man with firearms. Because Treacy knew a
fellow detective, Michael Bonenfant, had been investigating a
housebreak on Plain Street in Taunton where two firearms and
jewelry had been reported stolen, Treacy showed Bonenfant the
digital images.

Bonenfant, suspecting that the firearms in the digital images
matched the firearms stolen from the Plain Street residence,
contacted the homeowner and showed him a printed photograph
of one of the digital images. After viewing the photograph, the
homeowner confirmed that the firearms and the other items in the
photograph were taken from his home during the break-in.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. The defendant filed two
motions to suppress, both of which were ultimately denied. In his
first motion, the defendant sought to suppress “all physical evi-
dence and any alleged statements obtained by law enforcement
authorities as a result of a search and seizure by the Taunton
[pJolice [d]epartment.” Initially, the motion judge, who also de-
cided the defendant’s subsequent motion to suppress, granted the
defendant’s motion, concluding that the backpack search consti-
tuted neither a valid search incident to arrest nor a valid patfrisk
for weapons. The judge explained that, at the time of the search,
the defendant was “detained upon specific articulable facts that he
might be responsible for a housebreak,” but that the defendant
was not under arrest and, therefore, the search of the backpack by
Collins could not be justified as a search incident to arrest. Nor
could it be justified as part of a patfrisk for weapons, because
Collins lacked specific facts warranting a reasonable person to
believe that he was in danger. Based on these conclusions, the
judge granted the defendant’s first motion to suppress.

Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the judge’s ruling on this first motion to suppress, arguing

477 Mass. 588 (2017) 591

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

that because the contents of the backpack would have been
discovered during a later search incident to arrest, they were
admissible under the “inevitable discovery” exception to the
exclusionary rule. Persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument,
the motion judge granted the motion for reconsideration and
denied the motion to suppress. Accordingly, the Commonwealth
could introduce all the items in the backpack at trial. Because this
ruling did not specifically address the search of the digital cam-
era, the defendant filed a second motion to suppress focusing
exclusively on that issue. The judge denied the motion on the
ground that the viewing of the digital images was part of a valid
inventory search.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge wrongly denied
the motion to suppress the images recovered from the warrantless
search of the digital camera because the search did not fall within
the purview of the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement and exceeded the scope of a valid inventory
search. We agree.

a. Standard of review. In evaluating the grant or denial of a
motion to suppress, “we accept the judge’s subsidiary findings of
fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the responsibility of
determining the weight and credibility to be given oral testimony
presented at the motion hearing.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441
Mass. 390, 393 (2004). However, “[w]e review independently the
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Jd.
Our inquiry, therefore, is whether the search of the digital camera
was proper on either of the grounds on which the judge relied in
denying the motion to suppress.

b. Search incident to arrest. The judge denied the defendant’s
first motion to suppress the search of his backpack, agreeing with
the Commonwealth’s position on the motion for reconsideration
that the items in the backpack inevitably would have been dis-
covered as part of a search incident to a lawful arrest for breaking
and entering. On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the
search of the backpack. Instead, he argues that the search of the
digital camera cannot be justified on this ground. Specifically, the
defendant argues that the principles underlying Riley v. Califor-
nia, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), which foreclosed the application of
the search incident to arrest exception to cellular telephones (cell
phones), also forecloses the application of this exception to
warrantless searches of digital cameras under both the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the

592 477 Mass. 588 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Commonwealth coun-
ters that Riley does not apply because digital cameras, lacking the
ability to function as computers, are not analogous to cell phones
for Fourth Amendment purposes. We decline to address the
constitutionality of the search of the digital camera on Fourth
Amendment grounds, but we apply the reasoning in Riley in
holding that the search of the camera violated art. 14.

A search incident to a custodial arrest is well established as an
exception to the warrant requirement under both the Fourth
Amendment and art. 14. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.
800, 802 (1974), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Santiago,
410 Mass. 737, 742-743 (1991), and cases cited. Under both
Fourth Amendment and art. 14 jurisprudence, the purpose of the
search incident to arrest exception is twofold: (1) to prevent the
destruction or concealing of evidence of the crime for which the
police have probable cause to arrest; and (2) to strip the arrestee
of weapons that could be used to resist arrest or facilitate escape.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969); San-
tiago, supra at 743.

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has grappled
with defining the contours of the search incident to arrest excep-
tion in our increasingly digital world. In Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494,
the Supreme Court addressed whether the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones,
and concluded that it does not. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that applying the search incident to arrest doctrine
to the search of digital data serves neither of the two justifications
announced in Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-763: “harm to officers and
destruction of evidence.” Riley, supra at 2484-2485.

This reasoning presents a compelling basis to exclude digital
cameras from the reach of the search incident to a lawful arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. Like the cell phone, the
twin threats of “harm to officers and destruction of evidence” are
not present with regard to the data on a digital camera. See id.
Once the camera has been secured and potential threats elimi-
nated, “data on the [camera] can endanger no one.” Id. at 2485
(officers free to “examine the physical aspects of a phone to
ensure that it will not be used as a weapon” [emphasis supplied]).
Likewise, the risk of destruction of incriminating data is also
mitigated once the camera has been secured. Although the con-
cern regarding the destruction of cell phone data via remote
wiping and data encryption was considered and rejected by the

477 Mass. 588 (2017) 593

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

Supreme Court, see id. at 2486, this issue poses even less of a risk
with respect to digital cameras, which, like the camera at issue
here, may lack Internet or network connectivity.

Also, like cell phones, digital cameras “place vast quantities of
personal information literally in the hands of individuals.” Jd. at
2485. See Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170
(D. Or. 2012) (noting that “[e]lectronic devices such as . . . digital
camera[s] hold large amounts of private information, entitling
them to a higher standard of privacy”). But see United States v.
Miller, 34 F. Supp. 3d 695, 699-700 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (suggest-
ing cameras do not implicate same privacy concerns as cell
phones because cameras do not “boast the extensive amount of
personal information commonly present in cell phones”). Al-
though digital cameras do not allow storage of information as
diverse and far ranging as a cell phone, they nevertheless possess
the capacity to store enormous quantities of photograph and often
video recordings, dating over periods of months and even years,
which can reveal intimate details of an individual’s life. As the
United States Supreme Court aptly recognized, “an individual’s
private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs
labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot
be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a
wallet,” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489, and “the fact that a search in the
pre-digital era could have turned up a photograph or two in a
wallet does not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital
gallery.” Id. at 2493.

While this logic supports the applicability of Riley to digital
cameras, the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the
Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches of digital cam-
eras as a search incident to a lawful arrest.1 Thus, we hesitate to
extend the holding in Riley under the Fourth Amendment to

*Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California,
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), no Federal Courts of Appeals and only three Federal
District Courts have decided the issue. See, e.g., United States V. Miller, 34 F.
Supp. 3d 695, 700 (E.D. Mich, 2014) (noting, without deciding whether Riley
extends to digital cameras, that cameras do not implicate same privacy concerns
as cell phones because cameras “contain a limited type of data . . . that do not
touch the breadth or depth of information that a cell phone’s data offers”);
United States vs. Whiteside, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 13 Cr. 576 (S.D.N.Y. June 29,
2015) (concluding that “Supreme Court’s grant of protection to a device with
the capacity to store a vast number of images directly applies to search of
[defendant’s] digital camera”); American News & Info. Servs., Inc. vs. Gore,
US. Dist. Ct, No. 12-CV-2186 BEN (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (dismissing
plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim on qualified immunity

594 477 Mass. 588 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

digital cameras when the Supreme Court has not yet done so.
Instead, we decide the issue based on our State Constitution,
bearing in mind that “art. 14. . . does, or may, afford more
substantive protection to individuals than that which prevails
under the Constitution of the United States.” Commonwealth v.
Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 68 n.9 (1987). We hold, for the same
reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in Riley and as set forth
above, that digital cameras may be seized incident to arrest, but
that the search of data contained in digital cameras falls outside
the scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement. See Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 160
(1988) (“We have excluded evidence under art. 14 without regard
to whether the evidence was inadmissible under [the] Fourth
Amendment . . .”).? Indeed, with the twin threats justifying the
search incident to arrest exception mitigated here because the
camera was secure in the custody of the police, the officers had
ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.

The Commonwealth argues that because the defendant failed to
establish that he owned, and thus had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in, the digital camera, he has no standing to challenge the
search. The Commonwealth, however, failed to raise this issue in
the proceedings below. As a result, the merits of the issue were
never meaningfully addressed during the motion to suppress
hearing, and the motion judge made only the single factual
finding that the camera “may or may not have been owned by the
defendant.” Because the Commonwealth failed to raise the issue
below, it is waived. Therefore, we decline to address the merits of
the issue here. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209
(1981) (government may forfeit argument that defendant lacks
reasonable expectation of privacy in area searched where issue
not raised “in a timely fashion during the litigation”). See also
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 327 (2011),
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Campbell, 475
Mass. 611 (2016) (“Whether a defendant has a reasonable expec-

grounds, where it is open question whether Riley applies to video cameras, but
acknowledging that “[t]here are qualities associated with cell phones, significant
in the court’s analysis, that are both similar to and different from cameras”).

2General Laws c. 276, § 1, which codifies the search incident to arrest
exception, and which we have recognized, “is more restrictive than the Fourth
Amendment.” Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 607 (2003), quoting
Commonwealth v. Blevines, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 89, 93 (2002). Where the search
of the digital camera should have been suppressed under art. 14, we need not
address whether suppression would also be required under § 1.

477 Mass. 588 (2017) 595

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

tation of privacy may not be challenged for the first time on
appeal by the Commonwealth . . .”); Commonwealth v. Martinez,
74 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249-250 (2009) (same).

Furthermore, we decline the Commonwealth’s invitation to
apply the doctrine that allows an appellate court “to affirm a
ruling on grounds different from those relied on by the motion
judge if the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is supported
by the record and the findings.” Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe,
425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997). Aside from the motion judge’s single
finding that the camera “may or may not have been owned by the
defendant,” the record is devoid of factual findings supporting the
Commonwealth’s argument. Although we have determined that
“if the facts found by the judge support an alternative legal
theory, a reviewing court is free to rely on an alternative legal
theory,” id., no such facts were found here.

c. Inventory search. The motion judge ruled, on the defendant’s
second motion to suppress the warrantless search of the digital
camera, that the search constituted a valid inventory search. The
defendant claims error in this ruling, arguing that the search was
investigatory in nature and, therefore, outside the scope of the
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement.

Our cases have determined that “the police, without a warrant,
but pursuant to standard written procedures, may inventory and
retain in custody all items on [a] person [to be placed in a cell],
including even those within a container.” Commonwealth v. Vuthy
Seng, 436 Mass. 537, 550, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002), and
cases cited. The exception is predicated on the need to “safeguard
the defendant’s property, protect the police against later claims of
theft or lost property, and keep weapons and contraband from the
prison population.” Jd. at 550-551. Thus, an inventory search is
not intended to be investigatory or an occasion for police to “hunt
for information by sifting and reading materials taken from an
arrestee which do not so declare themselves.” Jd. at 553, quoting
Commonwealth v. Sullo, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 770 (1989).

Applying these principles, we conclude that the search of the
digital camera exceeded the bounds of the inventory search
exception to the warrant requirement because it was investigatory
in nature. The investigative purpose is established by the judge’s
finding that Treacy, suspecting that the camera was stolen, took
steps to investigate its ownership by activating the camera and
viewing the stored images. The Commonwealth argues that
Treacy’s “sole objective was to identify its true owner.” But this

596 477 Mass. 588 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

objective confirms rather than refutes the conclusion that the
examination of the digital camera was an investigatory search
rather a benign inventory of the contents of the backpack.
Treacy’s objective is founded on the assumption that the camera
was stolen. Indeed, during the motion hearing, before explaining
that she viewed the camera’s stored images, Treacy pointed out
that the camera “came in as — with a bunch of stolen property.”
Treacy also explained that while she does not usually go through
an individual’s electronic property, the camera “was stolen prop-
erty.”

Given these facts, we cannot conclude that Treacy’s conduct
was “noninvestigatory.” See Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 552-554.
See also Commonwealth v. White, 469 Mass. 96, 101-102 (2014)
(officer’s examination of pills seized from unlabeled pill con-
tainer found during inventory of defendant’s vehicle exceeded
parameters of inventory search exception where officer examined
pills “solely for an investigative rather than an inventory pur-
pose”). Therefore, the search exceeded the scope of and was
inconsistent with the purposes underlying the inventory search
exception to the warrant requirement, and is thus at odds with our
law. See Vuthy Seng, supra at 554, quoting Sullo, 26 Mass. App.
Ct. at 772 (“In making an inventory . . . the police are to act more
or less mechanically, according to a set routine, for to allow then
arange of discretion in going about a warrantless search would be
to invite conduct which by design or otherwise would subvert
constitutional requirements”).

Because the Commonwealth has failed to show that the war-
rantless search of the digital camera fell within one of the “ ‘per-
missible exceptions’ to the warrant requirement,” Commonwealth
v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 588 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v.
Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 28 (2014), the search was unreasonable
and, thus, art. 14 requires the exclusion of evidence seized during
the search. Accordingly, the denial of the defendant’s motion to
suppress the images found on the digital camera was error.

d. Suppression of the ring. The defendant contends that the ring
should also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. “The
“fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine . . . has been applied to
evidence derived from violations of both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution” (citation omit-
ted). Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444, 453 (2005).
Unlike in the cases relied on by the defendant, here the police did
not discover the ring as either a direct or indirect result of

477 Mass. 588 (2017) 597

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

unlawful conduct. Compare Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484, 487-488 (1963) (excluding narcotics seized from an-
other individual where they were discovered only as result of
statements made by defendant following police officers’ unlawful
entry into defendant’s home and unlawful arrest of defendant).

Nevertheless, the defendant argues that the fruit of the poison-
ous tree doctrine should be applied because, but for the investi-
gation stemming from the unlawful search of the camera, the
police never would have learned the significance of the ring —
that it was stolen. We disagree. Where the connection between the
ring and the illegality — the unlawful search of the camera — is
so tenuous, the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine would risk untethering it from its underlying principles.
See Damiano, 444 Mass. at 453-454 (“[[nfection will be held to
have occurred when the illegality of the police behavior is suf-
ficiently grave and the connection between the illegality and [the
evidence discovered] is sufficiently intimate”).

2. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant last argues that
the judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not
guilty of receiving stolen property with a value in excess of $250,
where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence of
the value of the ring. To review a claim of sufficiency of the
evidence we ask whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt” (emphasis in original). Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire,
470 Mass. 338, 343 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). In determining the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider “the evidence in its entirety, including, not
excluding, that admitted [at] trial but found inadmissible on
appeal.” Commonwealth vy. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 46
(1992), quoting Glisson v. Georgia, 192 Ga. App. 409, 410
(1989).

To obtain a conviction of receiving stolen property, the Com-
monwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant (1) bought, received, or aided in the concealment of
property that was stolen or embezzled; and (2) knew the property
had been stolen. Commonwealth v. Yourawski, 384 Mass. 386,
387 (1981). Under G. L. c. 266, § 60, the “value of the property
stolen determines the punishable offense.” Commonwealth v.
Tracy, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 467 (1989). Because a finding that
the value of the stolen property received is in excess of $250

598 477 Mass. 588 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Mauricio.

triggers an increased sentencing range, the value must be treated
as an element of the crime, and thus proved by the Common-
wealth beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Beale,
434 Mass. 1024, 1025 (2001).

Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Common-
wealth, the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that the
value of the ring exceeded $250. The Commonwealth presented
testimony that the mesh ring was of the Tiffany brand and
submitted to the jury a photograph of the ring. However, there
was no evidence of the ring’s value. Nor was the jury presented
with the ring itself. It is true, as the Commonwealth points out,
that the trier of fact may employ “common sense” and common
experience to determine the valuation issue. See Commonwealth
vy. Muckle, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 643 (2003), citing Common-
wealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 385-386 (1926). Here, how-
ever, equipped only with the brand and photograph of the ring, we
cannot conclude that the application of common sense and expe-
rience is sufficient to fill the evidentiary gap. Compare Muckle,
supra (noting jury may apply “common sense” to conclude that
value of vehicle exceeded $250), with Tracy, 27 Mass. App. Ct.
at 467 (concluding common experience of jurors insufficient to
establish that value of firearm exceeded one hundred dollars).
Although the evidence of the ring’s value was insufficient as a
matter of law to prove the value of the property, it is undisputed
that the Commonwealth proved all the other elements of the
offense charged. Thus, we conclude that a finding of guilty of the
lesser included misdemeanor offense of receiving stolen property
with a value of $250 or less, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 60,
shall enter against the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Deberry,
441 Mass. 211, 224 (2004).

Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, the order denying the
motion to suppress the images from the digital camera is re-
versed. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction of carrying a
firearm without a license, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), is
vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. With respect to the defendant’s
conviction of receiving stolen property valued over $250, the
judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District
Court, where a finding of guilty of the lesser included offense of
receiving stolen property with a value of $250 or less shall enter.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 599 (2017) 599

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

Commonweattu vs. Gaupy AsENJO.
Essex. February 6, 2017, - August 15, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Budd, JJ.

Rape. Evidence, First complaint, Expert opinion. Witness, Expert. Battered
Woman Syndrome.

At a rape trial, the judge erred in permitting the Commonwealth to call a police
officer as the first complaint witness on the ground that the complainant first
disclosed the defendant’s participation in the rape to that witness despite
having made multiple prior disclosures, where the first complaint rule does
not require the identification of the perpetrator as a prerequisite to admissi-
bility, where the first person to whom the complainant revealed the rape was
available to testify and was not biased or motivated to minimize or distort the
complainant’s remarks, and where the erroneous admission of the officer’s
testimony was prejudicial, given the substance of that testimony implicating
the defendant, together with the witness’s status as a police officer. [602-605]

At a rape trial, the judge erred in permitting the complainant to testify on direct
examination that she had made four separate disclosures of the rape, where
her testimony likely served no additional corroborative purpose and may
have unfairly enhanced her credibility; further, her statements were not
admissible as prior inconsistent statements. [605-606]

At a rape trial in which the defendant asserted the defense of duress, the judge
erred in excluding proffered expert witness testimony regarding the defend-
ant’s battered woman syndrome diagnosis, where nothing in G. L. c. 233,
§ 23K, required the defendant to introduce evidence of abuse in order to
present such testimony, [607-609]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on May 22, 2013.

The cases were tried before James F. Lang, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Emily A. Cardy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
the defendant.

David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney (Jennifer S.
Kirshenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the
Commonwealth.

Hnes, J. In January, 2015, the defendant, Gaudy Asenjo, was

600 477 Mass. 599 (2017)

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

convicted by a Superior Court jury of three counts of aggravated*
rape of a child.2 The complainant was the defendant’s niece,
Sara,? who was fourteen years of age at the time of the rape. The
defendant appeals from the convictions, claiming that the judge
erred in (1) interpreting the first complaint rule to require the
disclosure of the perpetrator’s identity to the first complaint
witness and allowing a police officer to testify as the first com-
plaint witness; (2) allowing the complainant to testify to multiple
disclosures of the sexual assault in violation of Commonwealth v.
King, 445 Mass. 217 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006),
and its progeny; and (3) precluding expert testimony in support of
her defense based on battered woman syndrome. We conclude
that the essential feature of first complaint evidence is the report
of a sexual assault, not the identity of the perpetrator. Conse-
quently, the admission of the police officer’s testimony as first
complaint evidence was error, which, after viewing the evidence
as a whole, was prejudicial. We conclude also that the judge erred
in admitting the complainant’s testimony as to her multiple
disclosures of the rape. Last, we conclude that a defendant
asserting duress under G. L. c. 233, § 23F, based on battered
woman syndrome, is not required to present affirmative evidence
of abuse as a predicate to the defense. The judge erred in
excluding the proffered expert testimony on this ground. There-
fore, based on the foregoing, we reverse and order a new trial.

Background. We summarize the evidence the jury could have
found. In February, 2011, Sara and her twin sister spent most of
their February school vacation at the home of the defendant, their
maternal aunt. One evening, toward the end of the week, Sara,
Sara’s sister, the defendant’s daughter, the defendant, and the
defendant's then boy friend, Luis Rivera, were present in the
home socializing and drinking alcohol. Rivera and the defendant
had been in a relationship for a long time, such that Sara consid-
ered him an uncle. That evening, Sara was upset with her sister
and the defendant’s daughter. Although they were all drinking
alcohol, the other girls were also smoking marijuana without
including Sara.

'The aggravating factor was the age difference of more than ten years
between the defendant and the complainant, who was a child over the age of
twelve and under the age of sixteen. See G. L. c. 265, § 23A.

2In a separate trial in April, 2015, her codefendant, Luis Rivera, was acquitted
on three counts of aggravated rape of a child.

3A pseudonym. See G. L. c. 265, § 24C. Sara was born in March, 1996, and
she was eighteen years of age at the time of trial.

477 Mass. 599 (2017) 601

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

After the other two girls went upstairs to go to bed, Sara stayed
downstairs talking with the defendant. At the time, Sara was
“really close” with the defendant and thought of her as a “second
mom.” During the conversation, the defendant inquired about
Sara’s sexual experience and told Sara how satisfying her sexual
relationship with Rivera was. Later that evening, the defendant
telephoned Rivera, who had left the residence earlier, and asked
him to return because Sara wanted him to come back. After the
defendant told Sara that Rivera was returning, Sara stated that she
had not showered that day. The defendant instructed Sara to go
into the bathroom and wipe her vagina clean. The defendant
helped Sara remove her pants, and Sara cleaned herself. As the
defendant inspected Sara’s vagina, she told Sara that Rivera
would like it and that he would be “really happy.”

Approximately ten minutes later, Rivera arrived at the defend-
ant’s home. The defendant suggested that the three of them go
into the bathroom, where Sara was instructed to lie down on the
floor on her back. After the door was closed and locked, the
defendant turned off the lights and illuminated the room with the
flashlight application on her cellular telephone. Rivera pulled
Sara’s pants and underwear down, but left her shirt on. Rivera
performed oral sex on Sara, as the defendant sat on the edge of
the bathtub watching and asking Sara whether she liked it. Sara
did not answer, and instead focused on her upcoming birthday so
that she would not have to think about what was happening to her.
A few minutes later, Rivera inserted something into Sara’s vagina
that hurt her. Sara did not know whether it was his finger or his
penis. Rivera directed the defendant to perform oral sex on Sara
while he had vaginal intercourse with the defendant.

After the assault ended, Sara went upstairs, where her sister and
the defendant’s daughter were sleeping. Sara was scared because
Rivera was still in the home, but she eventually went back
downstairs to use the bathroom. Rivera asked Sara whether she
wanted to do it again, but she ignored him, used the bathroom,
and ran back upstairs without incident. Sara was hurt and con-
fused, thinking that it was her fault and that she could have done
something to stop it. The next morning, the defendant did not
speak about the assault, and Rivera returned to the home to bring
everyone breakfast. Although Rivera did not speak to Sara that
morning, he touched her backside each time he was alone with
her.

Sara continued to visit the defendant’s home after the assault.
Each time Sara visited, she tried to ensure that Rivera was not

602 477 Mass. 599 (2017)

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

present. A few weeks after the assault, Sara asked the defendant
whether it was possible that Sara was pregnant because she was
having stomach pains and had not menstruated that month. The
defendant stated that she did not know whether Sara was preg-
nant, but that if Sara were, she should tell her parents that the
father was a boy from school, rather than Rivera.

Over a period of two years after the rape, Sara disclosed the
attack on four different occasions. Sara first disclosed the assault
within weeks of the incident when she told her cousin Mary‘ that
Rivera had raped her at the defendant’s home. Sara mentioned the
defendant’s presence during the rape, but did not disclose her
participation. Sara did not mention the defendant’s participation
because Sara still loved her and did not want to get her into
trouble. In December, 2012, Sara disclosed the rape for the
second time to her sister and some of their friends at a sleepover
while playing a game they called “if you really knew me.” Sara
revealed that the defendant was present when it happened but
again did not disclose her participation. Sara made the third
disclosure to her mother within days of the sleepover without
mentioning the defendant’s role in the rape. Finally, Sara repeated
the details of the rape to Detective Ashley Sanborn of the
Danvers police department, revealing for the first time the de-
fendant’s participation.®

Sanborn appeared as the Commonwealth’s first complaint wit-
ness and testified that on January 2, 2013, she spoke with Sara
and Sara’s family, at the family’s request, at the Danvers police
station. After Sara’s father left the room, Sara disclosed that she
had been raped by the defendant and Rivera. Sara’s sister also
testified regarding Sara’s December, 2012, disclosure.

Discussion. 1. First complaint evidence. On the first day of
trial, the Commonwealth moved to introduce the testimony of
Sanborn as first complaint evidence. The defendant objected,
arguing that Sanborn was not in fact the first complaint witness
because Sara had disclosed the rape to others on at least three

4A pseudonym. See G. L. ¢. 265, § 24C. Mary’s mother is the sister of both
the defendant and Sara’s mother.

5Sara made two disclosures to Detective Ashley Sanborn on January, 2, 2013.
The first, which was the basis for Sanborn’s first complaint testimony at trial,
occurred in the presence of Sara’s mother and sister. Sara gave a second, more
detailed statement after her mother and sister left the room, in the presence of
Sanborn and another detective. Although the judge originally ruled that the
Commonwealth could elicit testimony regarding both statements, he later de-
termined that the second statement was inadmissible.

477 Mass. 599 (2017) 603

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

prior occasions. In a written order, the judge allowed the Com-
monwealth’s motion. He ruled that Sara’s prior disclosures did
not meet the test for first complaint evidence because the state-
ment to Sanborn was “the first time [Sara] disclosed that the de-
fendant had committed sexual offenses against her and partici-
pated with . . . Rivera in offenses that he committed as a
principal.”

The judge’s order allowing the Commonwealth’s motion to
designate Sanborn as the first complaint witness was error for two
reasons. First, as our cases recounting the history of the first
complaint doctrine confirm, its essential feature is the report of
the sexual assault, not the identity of the perpetrator. As we
discussed in King, 445 Mass. at 228-229, the original purpose of
the “fresh complaint” rule was to combat the traditional, albeit
outdated, notion that a true victim of sexual assault should raise
a “hue and cry,” or report the sexual assault in a timely manner.
Although the first complaint doctrine evolved from the fresh
complaint rule, the underlying purpose of first complaint evi-
dence is still “to counterbalance or address inaccurate assump-
tions regarding stereotypes about delayed reporting of a sexual
assault or about sexual assault victims in general,” rather than
affirmative evidence that the alleged sexual assault actually oc-
curred. Id. at 240. See Mass. G. Evid. § 413(a) (2017). “At its
core, therefore, the doctrine exists to facilitate credibility deter-
minations where an allegation of sexual assault is at issue.”
Commonwealth v. Mayotte, 475 Mass. 254, 260 (2016). The fact
that Sara identified the defendant as a perpetrator for the first time
in the statement to Sanborn did not supplant the three prior
disclosures that, in revealing that a rape actually had occurred,
met the substantive test for admissibility as first complaint evi-
dence. Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 446 (2008)
(disclosure of actual sexual assault necessary to constitute com-
plaint). Thus, the interpretation of the first complaint rule to
require the identification of the defendant as a prerequisite to
admissibility was error.

Second, given our interpretation of the first complaint rule to
require only the report of the sexual assault, Sanborn was im-
properly designated as the first complaint witness. Sara’s testi-
mony established that Mary was the first person to whom Sara
reported the rape, about one month after it occurred. Where a
complainant has reported the sexual assault to multiple persons,
the designation of the first complaint witness is solely a temporal

604 477 Mass. 599 (2017)

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

consideration; it must not be subject to manipulation based on the
likely value of the witness’s testimony. The Commonwealth may
not “pick and choose among various complaint witnesses to
locate the one with the most complete memory, the one to whom
the complainant related the most details, or the one who is likely
to be the most effective witness.” Murungu, 450 Mass. at 446.
Unless, for some reason, Mary were unavailable as the first
complaint witness, she, not Sanborn, should have been designated
as such.

In certain limited circumstances, our law permits one witness
to be substituted for another to provide first complaint evidence.
We address briefly whether Sanborn properly could be designated
as the first complaint witness under this rubric. “[W]hen the first
person told of the alleged assault is ‘unavailable, incompetent, or
too young to testify meaningfully,’ the trial judge may admit
testimony from a substitute first complaint witness.” Common-
wealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 292 (2009), quoting King, 445
Mass. at 243-244. Additionally, a judge may substitute the first
complaint witness where the victim’s disclosure to the “first
person does not constitute a complaint,” or where the victim
makes a complaint to a person who “has an obvious bias or
motive to minimize or distort the victim’s remarks.” Murungu,
450 Mass. at 446. See Mass. G. Evid. § 413(a) & note. Mary was
available to testify and there was no evidence that her testimony
was biased or that she had motive to “minimize or distort [Sara]’s
remarks.” Murungu, supra. Because the Commonwealth failed to
demonstrate the propriety of a substitution on either ground,
Sanborn’s testimony as the first complaint witness could not be
admitted on this basis.

The defendant objected to the erroneous admission of San-
born’s first complaint testimony. Therefore, we must determine
whether the error was prejudicial. See Commonwealth v. Fle-
botte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). We conclude that it was. Here,
the defendant was indicted on three counts of aggravated rape:
one as a principal, and two as an aider and abettor. Mary’s
testimony® would have established only that the defendant was
present while Rivera raped Sara. Thus, if Mary, the proper first
complaint witness, had testified, the only evidence of the defend-
ant’s participation in the rape would have come from Sara’s testi-

®Prior to trial, Sanborn interviewed Mary by telephone. During the interview,
Mary explained the circumstances and details of Sara’s first disclosure of the
rape. A transcript of that interview was included in the record on appeal.

477 Mass. 599 (2017) 605

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

mony. The substance of Sanborn’s first complaint testimony
implicating the defendant in the rape, taken together with her
status as a police officer, likely tipped the scales unfairly in favor
of Sara’s credibility. See King, 445 Mass. at 243. Because the
Commonwealth cannot show that the error “did not influence the
jury, or had but very slight effect,” the defendant is entitled to a
new trial. Flebotte, supra.

2. Admission of the complainant’s multiple disclosures. On
Sara’s direct examination, the judge allowed her testimony that
she made four separate disclosures of the rape: (1) to Mary a few
weeks after the rape; (2) to her sister and friends during the
sleepover in December, 2012; (3) to her mother shortly after the
sleepover; and (4) to Sanborn in January, 2013. In overruling the
defendant’s objection to this testimony, the judge explained that
the evidence was admissible because “the Commonwealth is
entitled to elicit why [Sara] waited to make the disclosure regard-
ing this particular defendant, and why she came forward when
she did.” Although the judge noted his concern about “any piling
on,” he determined that the risk of prejudice was not as high for
the defendant because Sara’s prior disclosures did not actually
implicate the defendant.’ The admission of multiple disclosures
in the circumstances of this case was error.

The judge’s reliance on King, 445 Mass. at 245, for the propo-
sition that a complainant may testify to multiple disclosures of the
alleged sexual assault to give temporal context to the first com-
plaint was misplaced. King states that “the complainant may . . .
testify to the details of the first complaint . . . and also why the
complaint was made at that particular time.” Jd. This was not,
however, an invitation to allow a complainant to testify on direct
examination to multiple disclosures in her explanation of why the
first complaint was made at a “particular time.” See id. at 243.

We acknowledge that Sara’s testimony that she made multiple
disclosures may not have had the same impact as multiple wit-
nesses testifying to Sara’s report of the sexual assault. Nonethe-
less, the admission of her testimony created the same risk of
prejudice that we sought to prevent by the limitations we imposed
in King. Sara’s testimony, like that of multiple first complaint

7Although the judge was under the misapprehension that Mary would testify
as a defense witness, the decision to allow Sara to preemptively testify about her
disclosure to Mary was error because Sanborn was the designated first com-
plaint witness. See Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 242-243 (2005),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006).

606 477 Mass. 599 (2017)

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

witnesses, “likely serve[d] no additional corroborative purpose,
and may [have] unfairly enhance[d] [her] credibility.” Jd. Be-
cause this testimony was merely corroborative, it created the very
type of prejudice that we cautioned against in King. The first
complaint doctrine’s limitation to one witness was intended to
vitiate the possibility of undue prejudice to the defendant because
it eliminated “prejudicial ‘piling on’ of such witnesses.” Id. at
245

Defense counsel’s use of the prior disclosures to attack Sara’s
credibility did not cure the prejudice to the defendant. Sara’s
testimony regarding her prior disclosures was admitted substan-
tively, without an instruction limiting the evidence to impeach-
ment purposes. See G. L. c. 233, § 23. This evidence was par-
ticularly prejudicial to the defendant in light of the improperly
substituted first complaint witness’s testimony, which was the
only evidence corroborating the defendant’s participation in the
rape. Moreover, the judge compounded the error by allowing Sara
to explain, during each of the disclosures, why she did not
previously implicate the defendant. See King, supra.

We have recognized that the first complaint doctrine does not
“prohibit the admissibility of evidence that, while barred by that
doctrine, is otherwise independently admissible.” Commonwealth
v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 220-221 (2009). The Commonwealth,
relying on Arana, argues for the first time on appeal that the
evidence of Sara’s multiple complaints was independently admis-
sible as prior inconsistent statements, see Mass. G. Evid.
§ 613(a)(1) & note (2017), and that, in any event, no prejudice
resulted because of defense counsel’s use of the statements on
cross-examination. We disagree.

Sara’s statements were not admissible as prior inconsistent
statements because the Commonwealth did not offer them as
such. See id. The judge admitted the evidence of Sara’s prior
disclosures to allow the Commonwealth to explain why Sara
waited to make the disclosure about the defendant’s participation
in the rape and why she came forward when she did. Moreover,
the Commonwealth did not attempt to prove that Sara made prior
statements that were inconsistent with her present testimony, nor
did it “lay a foundation by asking [Sara] if the prior statements
were in fact made and . . . givfe] [Sara] an opportunity to
explain,” as required. Mass. G. Evid. § 613(a)(1). See G. L.
c. 233, § 23. Sara’s testimony to the multiple disclosures, there-
fore, was not independently admissible.

477 Mass. 599 (2017) 607

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

3. Battered woman syndrome evidence. In support of her duress
defense, the defendant sought to introduce expert witness testi-
mony regarding her battered woman syndrome diagnosis. The
judge excluded the defendant’s expert witness testimony on the
ground that the defendant failed to lay a proper foundation for
such evidence. The judge determined that such testimony was
“irrelevant, and hence inadmissible, absent competent evidence
before the jury to support the putative expert testimony. The
expert's recitation of what the defendant told her is inadequate in
that regard, as it may only be considered by the jury with respect
to the validity of the doctor’s proffered opinion.”* This was error.

As discussed infra, G. L. c. 233, § 23F, provides the defendant
the statutory right to present such evidence. Nothing in § 23F
requires that a defendant proffer evidence of abuse in order to
present expert witness testimony, where certain specified de-
fenses are asserted. Moreover, the judge’s reliance on Mass. G.
Evid. § 703 (2017) to exclude the defendant’s expert witness
testimony was misplaced where § 23F provides an independent
statutory basis to admit such evidence.

Because G. L. c. 233, § 23E, is not so narrowly construed, we
take this opportunity to provide guidance regarding the statutory
requirements to admit evidence under G. L. c. 233, § 23F.

General Laws c. 233, § 23K, states:

“In the trial of criminal cases charging the use of force
against another where the issue of defense of self or another,
defense of duress or coercion, or accidental harm is asserted,
a defendant shall be permitted to introduce either or both of
the following in establishing the reasonableness of the de-
fendant’s apprehension that death or serious bodily injury
was imminent, the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief

*The judge stated that “there has to be some quantum of admissible compe-
tent evidence of some history of psychological or physical abuse, that could
support the opinion that [the defendant’s expert witness] would be offering.”
The judge noted that he was not setting an “overly high threshold,” but insisted
that there must be some admissible evidence, such as a witness who could testify
to the abuse, to establish a foundation to support the defendant’s proposed
expert witness testimony.

General Laws ¢, 233, § 23K, permits the defendant to introduce “either or
both” evidence that she was a victim of abuse or expert evidence regarding
battered woman syndrome; therefore, it was error for the judge to require the
defendant to establish evidence of abuse as a predicate to introducing expert
witness testimony. See G. L. c. 233, § 23E

608 477 Mass. 599 (2017)

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

that [s]he had availed [her]self of all available means to
avoid physical combat or the reasonableness of a defendant's
perception of the amount of force necessary to dealt with the
perceived threat:

“(@ evidence that the defendant is or has been the victim
of acts of physical, sexual or psychological harm or abuse;

“(b) evidence by expert testimony regarding the common
pattern in abusive relationships; the nature and effects of
physical, sexual or psychological abuse and typical re-
sponses thereto, including how those effects relate to the
perception of the imminent nature of the threat of death or
serious bodily harm; the relevant facts and circumstances
which form the basis for such opinion; and evidence whether
the defendant displayed characteristics common to victims of
abuse.

“Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to preclude the
introduction of evidence or expert testimony as described in
clause (a) or (b) in any civil or criminal action where such
evidence or expert testimony is otherwise now admissible.”

The Commonwealth contends that § 23F requires foundation
testimony or evidence supporting an instruction on one of the
defenses specified in order to trigger the application of § 23. We
do not agree. In order to present evidence under § 23F, a defend-
ant need not present affirmative evidence of abuse because § 23F
provides that, where a defendant asserts the defense of self-
defense or defense of another, duress or coercion, or accidental
harm, the “defendant shall be permitted to introduce” certain
evidence to establish the reasonableness of his or her apprehen-
sion that death or serious bodily harm was imminent (emphasis
supplied). G. L. c. 233, § 23E

Section 23F is more permissive than the common-law bases for
expert opinions outlined in Mass. G. Evid. § 703. Compare G. L.
c. 233, § 23E with Mass. G. Evid. § 703 (facts or data on which
expert witness may base opinion include “[a] facts observed by
the witness or otherwise in the witness’s direct personal knowl-
edge; [b] evidence already in the record or that will be presented
during the course of the proceedings . . . ; and [c] facts or data not
in evidence if the facts or data are independently admissible in
evidence and are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in
formulating an opinion”). Section 23F does not restrict expert

477 Mass. 599 (2017) 609

Commonwealth 1, Asenjo.

witness testimony to facts in evidence, require the witness’s
personal knowledge or observation, or require that the basis for
the expert’s opinion be independently admissible. Instead, the
statute merely requires that the defendant assert certain specified
defenses to render admissible evidence of the defendant’s past or
current abuse and expert witness testimony regarding abusive
relationships and the impact such abuse had on the defendant. See
G. L. c. 233, § 23.

Additionally, the Commonwealth’s contention that § 23F ap-
plies only to criminal cases “charging the use of force against
another,” id., is without merit. The Commonwealth reads § 23F
too narrowly. Although the statute provides that a criminal de-
fendant in cases “charging the use of force against another. . .
shall be permitted to introduce” certain evidence, it does not
require that the use of force is an essential element of the crime
in order for § 23F to apply. Jd. See Commonwealth v. Anestal,
463 Mass. 655, 675-676 (2012) (applying § 23F in murder in first
degree case, notwithstanding fact that “force” is not essential
element of crime of homicide).

On retrial, where the defendant asserts the defense of duress,
expert witness testimony regarding the defendant’s past abuse
and battered woman syndrome diagnosis, and the impact thereof,
shall be admissible, pursuant to § 23E, with proper notice. See
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (A), as appearing in 463 Mass. 1501
(2012).

Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s
convictions of aggravated rape of a child are reversed and the
verdicts are set aside. The case is remanded to the Superior Court.

So ordered.

610 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

ComMonweattH vs. CESAR SANTANA.
Essex. January 10, 2017. - August 17, 2017.

Present: Gawrs, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Gaziano, JI.

Homicide. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of
statement. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of state-
ment, Hearsay, Expert opinion, Witness, Expert. Practice, Criminal, Capital
case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of
statement, Mistrial, Argument by prosecutor, Plea.

A Superior Court judge properly denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to
suppress statements that he made to police during an interview, where there
was no suggestion in the record that the defendant did not understand
Miranda warnings given orally and in writing, which plainly informed the
defendant that his statements could not be held confidential; and where, apart
from the language of the warnings disavowing any promise of confidenti-
ality, the record indicated that the defendant could not have believed that his
statements would be confidential and did not rely on a police officer’s
promise of confidentiality in making his statement. [616-620]

Ata murder trial, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from
the admission in evidence of certain hearsay evidence [620-621]; further, the
judge did not err in admitting testimony regarding the defendant's presence
at the scene, where the testimony was not admitted for its truth but to
contextualize a statement by the defendant that was arguably exculpatory
[621-622]; finally, no violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to
confront witnesses against him arose from the admission of the testimony of
a substitute medical examiner [622-623].

At a criminal trial, although the judge erred in declining to give an instruction
regarding the jury’s use of a police interrogation that was not recorded in its
entirety, the error was not prejudicial, where the defendant's statement from
that interrogation was at least partly exculpatory. [623-624]

At a criminal trial, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the
defendant’s motions for a mistrial based on the jury’s exposure to inadmis-
sible evidence, where the judge issued a strong cautionary instruction to
disregard the improper evidence. [624-626]

At a criminal trial, although the prosecutor in closing argument impermissibly
argued that the victim had enhanced hearing due to her temporary blind-
folding, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose, where the
isolated remark was excusable hyperbole and was cumulative of other
evidence regarding the number of assailants; further, no prejudicial error
arose from the prosecutor’s statement regarding an indentation in duct tape
that had been found at the crime scene; finally, the prosecutor’s remarks
regarding deoxyribonucleic acid evidence did not constitute error, [626-628]

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 611

Commonwealth », Santana,

This court declined to exercise its power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce a
conviction of murder in the first degree, where the Commonwealth’s offer of
a plea agreement during trial did not provide a ground on which to grant such
relief, [628-629]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on December 12, 2008.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence, filed on June 8, 2009,
and amended October 3, 2011, was heard by Kimberly S. Budd,
J.; a second pretrial motion to suppress evidence, filed on April
12, 2012, was heard by Howard J. Whitehead, J.; a third pretrial
motion to suppress evidence, filed on June 4, 2013, was heard by
Richard E. Welch, III, J.; and the cases were tried before David A.
Lowy, J.

Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant.

Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Hoes, J. In January, 2014, a Superior Court jury convicted the
defendant, Cesar Santana, of murder in the first degree of Rafael
Castro, on the theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-
murder with home invasion and armed burglary, assault on oc-
cupant as the predicate felonies. On appeal, the defendant asserts
error in (1) the denial of his motion to suppress statements; (2) the
admission of hearsay testimony from various witnesses; (3) the
denial of a requested DiGiambattista jury instruction; (4) the
denial of the motions for a mistrial following the jury’s exposure
to inadmissible evidence; and (5) certain improper statements
made in the prosecutor’s closing argument. The defendant also
requests that we exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, to reduce the murder conviction or to order a new trial. We
affirm the defendant’s convictions and decline to grant relief
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Background. 1. The murder. We summarize the facts the jury
could have found, reserving certain details for our discussion of
the alleged errors. On the night of August 25, 2004, Norma
Cedeno and her stepfather, Rafael Castro, were attacked by a
group of men as the two entered Castro’s Lawrence apartment.t

Cedeno, who entered the apartment first and did not turn on any
lights, walked to the bathroom, where she was grabbed by a man.

*Norma Cedeno testified to the details of the attack at trial under a grant of
immunity concerning her involvement in drug dealing with her mother and
stepfather.

612 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

Although she could not see the man’s face, she felt something
“like a gun” on her back. Hearing Cedeno scream, Castro ran into
the apartment, and two men came out of the kitchen. As the men
struggled, Cedeno, who had been pushed down to the floor and
told to keep her head down, heard a gunshot, saw Castro on the
floor, and heard men arguing in Spanish, some of whom asked,
“Why did you shoot him?” Based on the voices she heard and the
feet she could see walking around the apartment, Cedeno deduced
that four men were involved in the incident.

Thereafter, Cedeno was taken into a bedroom and made to lie
on the floor. A pillowcase was put over her head. Although the
men were initially going to use duct tape to bind her hands and
feet together, they complied with her plea not to tie her up.
Instead, one man remained in the bedroom with her. Cedeno
could hear Castro’s voice, which although clear at first, became
fainter as time passed. During the time the men were in the
apartment, Cedeno heard them “screaming,” hitting and threat-
ening Castro, and demanding that he make a telephone call. At
one point, the men brought Cedeno into the bedroom with Castro,
removed her shirt, and threatened to burn her with an iron unless
Castro agreed to make the call.

Eventually, one man said to Cedeno, “Three of us are leaving
and I’m staying here . . . and after I leave[.] if you call the police
or someone for help we’re just going to come back for you.”
Although Cedeno did not know the men, they seemed to be
familiar with Castro. After all of the men left the apartment,
Cedeno went to the other bedroom and found Castro, taped up,
bleeding from the gunshot wound on his head, and unable to talk.
Cedeno cut the duct tape binding Castro and, eventually, tele-
phoned 911.

Paramedics who arrived in response to the 911 call determined
that Castro had “no obvious signs of life.” Castro’s cause of death
was the gunshot wound to his head.

2. The investigation. The police recovered evidence from the
apartment including two rolls of duct tape, one of which had
blood on it, several pieces of duct tape, one piece of which was
found in the bathroom trash barrel, and samples of bloodstains
and pools in various areas of the apartment.

A latent fingerprint from a roll of duct tape recovered from the
scene was determined to be consistent with the known fingerprint
of Joonel Garcia. Also, a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) swab was
taken from a “small indentation” near the torn end of the piece of

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 613

Commonwealth », Santana,

duct tape found in the bathroom trash barrel. It contained a
mixture of the DNA of at least two individuals, including the
defendant, whose DNA “matched” the major profile of the mix-
ture.

The police interviewed Jessica Encarnacion, who was the girl
friend of Garcia and lived with him in an apartment in Lawrence.
At trial, Encarnacion testified that four men — Garcia, the de-
fendant, and two others — arrived at around midnight at Garcia’s
apartment. Garcia was covered in blood. Ignoring Encarnacion’s
questions about what was going on, Garcia told her to pack
because they had to leave the country. Thereafter, she and the four
men drove to New York, stopping only to dispose of the gun.
Once in New York, Garcia and Encarnacion purchased one-way
tickets to the Dominican Republic and left the United States.

In August, 2004, the defendant initiated a conversation with his
probation officer, during which he stated that he would be willing
to provide information about a shooting in Lawrence in exchange
for financial compensation. The defendant told this officer that a
man named “Joonie” shot someone in the head, and that the
defendant knew the location of the firearm used in the shooting.
The probation officer passed the information on to the Boston
police department.? In March, 2005, the defendant initiated a
second conversation with his probation officer about the shooting
in Lawrence. This time he told the officer that he had significant
legal concerns and added that the shooting in Lawrence was
actually a drug-related “homicide.”

On March 4, 2005, the police interviewed the defendant. At
that time, the defendant was being held in a house of correction
on unrelated charges. Present were Trooper Robert LaBarge of
the State police and Detective Carlos Cueva of the Lawrence
police department. Although the defendant indicated that he
spoke and understood English, LaBarge asked Cueva to serve as
a Spanish translator because Spanish was the defendant's primary
language.‘ Initially, the defendant agreed to allow the police to
audio record the interview. His demeanor was “cautious,” but he

At the time, the defendant was on probation for an unrelated matter.

2 {The trial record lacks evidence of the Boston police department's response
to the probation officer’s first report.

‘Detective Carlos Cueva spoke both English and Spanish, and considered
Spanish to be his native language. Although Cueva grew up speaking Spanish
in his family home and studied Spanish in high school, he had no formal training
in Spanish translation.

614 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

did not exhibit signs of emotional distress. The tone of the
interview was conversational. During the recorded portion of the
interview, the defendant was provided Miranda warnings in Span-
ish and the defendant read the warnings out loud in Spanish. After
the defendant acknowledged that he understood and signed the
written warnings, LaBarge began questioning the defendant about
the murder of Castro.

During the interview, in response to the suggestion that he was
inside the apartment at the time of Castro’s murder, the defendant
stated that he was actually outside the apartment, arriving only
after the incident occurred. The defendant told the police that
after he received a call from Garcia requesting a ride, he drove to
an apartment building, picked up Garcia and two other men, and
dropped them off at Garcia’s Lawrence apartment. During the
drive to the Lawrence apartment, the men discussed the fact that
Garcia had shot Castro. After remaining in Garcia’s apartment for
a period of time, the defendant drove Garcia and Encarnacion to
Boston. The firearm used in the murder was buried before Garcia
and Encarnacion left for the Dominican Republic. The day before
the murder, the defendant had transported a bag of firearms to
Garcia’s Lawrence apartment. In exchange, the defendant re-
ceived money and drugs. At the conclusion of the interview,
LaBarge asked the defendant to sign the contemporaneous hand-
written notes transcribing the conversation, but the defendant
refused.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. The defendant filed three
motions to suppress statements he made during the March 4,
2005, interview with the police. Insofar as relevant here, in 2013,
the defendant filed a third motion to suppress, reasserting the
voluntariness issue that had not been reached in any previous
ruling. A judge (motion judge) denied this motion, ruling that
“[a]ny understanding that [the] statements would be confidential
and not used in court, was completely dissipated” after the
defendant was given the Miranda warnings and voluntarily
waived those rights. The defendant challenges only the motion
judge’s ruling denying the motion to suppress on the ground that
his statement was voluntary.

We recite the facts as found by the motion judge who “fully
[iJndorsed and incorporate[d]” the facts found by a different
judge who had denied one of the defendant’s earlier motions to
suppress. We supplement the facts “with evidence in the record
that is uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited by the

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 615

Commonwealth », Santana,

motion judge.” Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286
(2015).

The defendant met with the police at the jail where he was
being held on unrelated charges. The officers were in plainclothes
and did not have their credentials or firearms with them during
the interview. The tone of the interview was conversational.
Because the defendant did not always understand English, Cueva
translated. However, the translation of LaBarge’s statements was
neither word for word nor always accurate. Cueva also commu-
nicated information in Spanish to the defendant without translat-
ing it into English for LaBarge. When LaBarge asked the defend-
ant if he would consent to having the interview recorded, Cueva
did not translate the defendant’s response: “Okay, no problem . . .
okay . . . as long as it is not used in court . . . better if not used
in court . .. whatever I say to you be confidential.” Instead, Cueva
replied to the defendant, “No, do not worry,” in Spanish.

After this colloquy between the defendant and Cueva and prior
to asking any questions about the murder, LaBarge inquired
whether the defendant could read and write Spanish. When the
defendant replied, “Yeah, perfect,” LaBarge provided him with
Miranda warnings written in Spanish. LaBarge asked the defend-
ant to read aloud each warning and say whether he understood it.
The defendant did so and indicated that he understood the warn-
ings.

Following the Miranda warnings, LaBarge stated to the defend-
ant, “We are going to use the information . . . I have to be honest,
my goal is not to, to save you and to help you out. My goal is to
find the truth.” Cueva translated this statement as follows: “Any
information that you give us now, [LaBarge would] go to the
court and they’d talk with the judge and the lawyer and to say that
look, Cesar came, talked to me, gave me that and, we're going to
try to help you, but he wouldn’t give you er. . . er, you know.”
Near the end of the recorded portion of the interrogation, the
defendant said in Spanish, “Tell him that it was me who had him
come over, it wasn’t him who looked for me — it was me who
asked for him to come over.”

Relying on the transcript of the recorded portion of the inter-
view, the motion judge also found that the tone of the interview
was “conversational,” the defendant was “relaxed throughout,”
and “appeared to be chuckling or laughing” on occasion. Regard-
ing the defendant’s language skills, the judge found that the
defendant “plainly can speak and understand a fair amount of

616 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

English,” although Spanish is “obviously” his “primary lan-
guage.” The judge further found that “the defendant plainly
understood each [Miranda] right,” provided to him in Spanish,
and “at times [he] corrected LaBarge as to the numbering of these
rights.” Last, the judge determined that although “Cueva’s trans-
lation, obviously, could have been much better,” the defendant
nevertheless “fully understood what was going on.”

a. Standard of review. In this case where the motion judge’s
findings were based in part on his review of the transcript of the
defendant’s interview with the police and in part on a different
judge’s findings after an evidentiary hearing, we apply the ap-
propriate standard of review to each in our review of the denial of
the defendant’s motion to suppress. To the extent that the motion
judge’s findings are based on the documentary evidence available
to this court in the appellate record, our review is de novo. We
give no deference to those findings as “this court stands in the
same position as . . . the [motion] judge, and reaches its own
conclusion unaffected by the findings made by the [motion]
judge.” Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004),
quoting Berry v. Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 57 (1939). Insofar as the
motion judge’s findings incorporate the other judge’s findings,
“we accept [those] findings of fact and will not disturb them
absent clear error. ” Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199,
205 (2011). However, “[w]e make an independent determination
as to the correctness of the judge’s application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found.” Jd.

b. Analysis. In deciding the issue of voluntariness, the motion
judge acknowledged that the defendant’s initial statement that he
would speak to the officers “as long as it was not used in court”
was “concerning,” and Cueva’s response, “No, don’t worry,” was
“even more concerning.” Nonetheless, the motion judge con-
cluded that, “[aJny understanding that his statements would be
confidential and not used in court, was completely dissipated after
Trooper LaBarge requested that the defendant read his Miranda
rights and when the defendant voluntarily waived those rights.”
Additionally, the motion judge concluded that LaBarge further
dispelled the notion that the defendant’s statements would not be
used against him when he “went out of his way to explain to the
defendant, who obviously understood some English, that he was
not making any promises to the defendant,” and that he would
report the defendant’s statements to the prosecutor and or the
court. On this basis, the motion judge concluded that the defend-

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 617

Commonwealth », Santana,

ant’s statement was voluntary and a product of the defendant’s
“free will.” There was no error.

“Tt is well established that a confession or an admission is
admissible in evidence only if it is made voluntarily.” Tremblay,
460 Mass. at 206. A statement is voluntary when it is “the product
of a ‘rational intellect’ and a ‘free will,’ and not induced by
psychological coercion.” Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass.
461, 468 (2015), quoting Tremblay, supra at 207. The burden is
on the Commonwealth to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
‘in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement, the will of the defendant was [not]
overborne,’ but rather that the statement was ‘the result of a free
and voluntary act.’ ” Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 595-
596 (2010), S.C., 475 Mass. 657 (2016).

Because “the issue of voluntariness turns on ‘all the surround-
ing circumstances,’ ” Baye, 462 Mass. at 256, quoting Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000), we have declined to
adopt a “ ‘bright-line rule[ ]’ that the use of improper interrogation
techniques [such as promises of confidentiality] will always result
in suppression of a defendant's incriminating statements as invol-
untary.” Baye, supra, quoting Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 210-211.
However, we have warned, “assurances that a suspect’s statements
will not be used to prosecute him will often be sufficiently coercive
to render the suspect’s subsequent admissions involuntary even
when the suspect shows no outward signs of fear, distress[.] or
mental incapacity” (quotations omitted). Baye, supra at 262. We
conclude, as did the motion judge, that the assurance of confiden-
tiality in the particular circumstances of this case was dissipated by
the timing of the Miranda warnings and other factors tending to
show that the defendant did not rely on that assurance in making his
statement to the police.

Here, the Miranda warnings were given orally and in writing
after Cueva’s response, “No, don’t worry,” to the defendant’s
expressed concern that his statement not be used against him in
court. The motion judge found that the defendant understood the
warnings because they were written in Spanish, the defendant’s
native language. To ensure that the defendant understood the
warnings, LaBarge required him to read each warning out loud,
and verbally indicate whether he understood after each. The
defendant did so as to each, and signed the Miranda waiver form.
Further, the defendant’s familiarity with the warnings and his
correction of the officer’s recitation of the warning supports this

618 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

finding.® There is no suggestion in this record that the defendant
did not understand the warnings, which plainly informed the
defendant that his statements could not be held confidential.
LaBarge’s caution that the defendant’s statement would be con-
veyed to the prosecutor and the court sufficiently dispelled any
assurance that the defendant’s statements would not be used
against him. Thus, the plain language of the Miranda warnings,
which the defendant understood, communicated that the state-
ments could not be held confidential.

We recognize, however, that the recitation of Miranda warnings
is not dispositive. See Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 41
(2015) (“Whether made in a custodial or noncustodial setting, and
even where there has been a valid waiver of Miranda rights, we
must consider the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement’).
Rather, it is only one of several factors we consider when review-
ing the voluntariness of a statement. See Monroe, 472 Mass. at
468. Apart from the language of the Miranda warnings disavow-
ing any promise of confidentiality, we are persuaded by the
judge’s findings that the defendant could not have believed that
his statement would be confidential and that the defendant did not
rely on that promise of confidentiality in making his statement.

After Cueva’s, “No, do not worry,” statement to the defendant
and after the Miranda warnings, the police communicated in
unambiguous terms that the statement would not be confidential
and the precise manner in which the statement would be used.
Although Cueva’s translation of LaBarge’s statements was far
from perfect, he nevertheless communicated to the defendant that
the police were making no promise to keep the defendant’s
statement confidential. In fact, Cueva told the defendant that they
would report the information to “the [prosecuting] attorney that is
going to be against [him] when [he] goes to court.”® Cueva also

®The third warning (translated into English) read, “Anything that you say can
be employed against you.” After reading the warning out loud in Spanish,
Trooper Robert LaBarge asked him if he understood “number two,” to which
defendant responded “Yes,” clarified, “That's number three,” and indicated he
also understood number two.

“Although we conclude that the defendant’s statement was voluntary, we
stress that Cueva’s inaccurate translation, particularly his failure to translate for
LaBarge the defendant's request for confidentiality and Cueva’s response to the
request, brought this case close to the line that otherwise would require sup-
pression. This case makes plain the need for law enforcement to use capable,
trained translators who will report verbatim the question asked and the response
given.

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 619

Commonwealth », Santana,

explained to the defendant that LaBarge was not there to promise
that if he made a statement, the police would let him go or that his
case would “come out well without problems.”

Further, Cueva’s statement to the defendant that the officers
would speak of his cooperation with the court and try to help him
does not undermine our conclusion. We have recognized that an
officer is not prohibited from “suggest[ing] broadly that it would
be ‘better’ for a suspect to tell the truth, [and] may indicate that
the person’s cooperation would be brought to the attention of
public officials or others involved, or may state in general terms
that cooperation has been considered favorably by the courts in
the past.” Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 209, quoting Commonwealth v.
Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 564 (1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S. 39
(1980). See Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 643 (2009)
(officer’s statement indicating police would help defendant and
that defendant could help herself by telling truth did not consti-
tute assurance forbidden by Meehan, supra); Commonwealth v.
Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 414 (1986) (statement not involuntary
where defendant initiated discussion of leniency and affirmatively
sought deal, and where officer indicated only that prosecutor
would “discuss leniency’).

Moreover, as the Commonwealth points out, the defendant’s
request to cease audio recording shortly after being provided his
Miranda rights and his refusal to sign Trooper LaBarge’s con-
temporaneous transcription at the conclusion of the interview
because he “didn’t know where he stood in the case,” suggest that
the defendant understood the statement could be used against
him. Thus, this case is distinguishable from Baye, 462 Mass. at
257, where the officers “employed multiple problematic tactics”
throughout the ten-hour interrogation, including exaggerating the
strength of the evidence and dissuading the defendant from
speaking with an attorney by “clearly implying” that his state-
ments would not be used against him.

Last, the defendant was motivated by self-interest and the fear
of repercussions from Garcia when he approached his probation
officer offering to provide information about the murder. As the
judge found, the defendant was not concerned about providing
information to the police, he was particularly concerned with
retaliation from “that young [nineteen year old] guy, that little
guy has about [four] deaths under his belt.” The defendant added,
“that young guy has me, he has me, you know, he has me under
a lot of pressure and terrified.”

620 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

Accordingly, in light of the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statement was
made voluntarily. Therefore, any initial promise of confidentiality
that Cueva conveyed to the defendant did not render his statement
involuntary.

2. Evidentiary rulings. a. Bite mark testimony. The defendant
argues LaBarge’s testimony that the duct tape found in the
bathroom trash barrel of Castro’s apartment “had . . . what was
believed to be a bite mark or dental impression, where it looked
like — I was told maybe somebody had bit it, when they were
ripping it” constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his right
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. The testimony was admitted in the direct examination of
LaBarge regarding forensic evidence that the police processed
during the investigation in an effort to identify possible suspects.
LaBarge’s response constituted impermissible hearsay and
should not have been admitted.

Because there was no objection at trial, our inquiry is
“whether the impropriety created a substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice.”? Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341,
351 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569,
579-580 (2002). We conclude that it did not. The defendant's
defense was that he was not in the apartment at the time of
Castro’s murder, and that his DNA was possibly inadvertently left
on an indentation near the ripped edge of an approximately
twelve-inch piece of duct tape when he brought the bag of guns

7Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine that sought to exclude
evidence of the “tooth mark.” This motion, however, does not properly preserve
the defendant's claim of error with respect to LaBarge’s inadmissible hearsay
testimony. In Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016), we con-
cluded that we would no longer require an objection to the admission of
evidence at trial where the defendant sought to preclude the admission of the
evidence through a motion in limine. However, we cautioned that our ruling “is
not as broad as it may seem.” Id. Specifically, “[a]n objection at the motion in
limine stage will preserve a defendant’s appellate rights only if what is objec-
tionable at trial was specifically the subject of the motion in limine.” Id. In his
motion in limine, the defendant objected to the admission of the “tooth mark”
evidence because “the Commonwealth does not intend to call any expert with
sufficient education, training, or familiarity with the subject matter of the
anticipated testimony.” Because LaBarge’s hearsay testimony was not the
subject of the motion in limine and the defendant failed to object at trial, the
error was not properly preserved,

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 621

Commonwealth », Santana,

to Garcia’s Lawrence apartment. This explanation strains credu-
lity, as it required the jury to believe one of two scenarios: (1) that
a piece of duct tape with the defendant’s DNA near the ripped
edge was transported in a bag along with the guns to Garcia’s
apartment and then placed in the bathroom trash barrel of
Castro’s apartment; or (2) that the defendant’s DNA was inad-
vertently transferred to the roll of duct tape and remained on the
tape after it was handled, ripped, and placed in the bathroom trash
barrel by someone else. Accordingly, we conclude that no sub-
stantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice resulted from the
impermissible hearsay testimony.

b. Testimony regarding the defendant’s presence at the scene.
The defendant argues that the trial judge erred when the judge
permitted LaBarge to testify that he told the defendant that he had
information that the defendant was in the apartment at the time of
the crime because it constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated
the defendant’s confrontation rights.* The defendant’s argument
is unavailing.

It is well established that “if a defendant is charged with a crime
and unequivocally denies it, that denial is not admissible in evi-
dence.” Commonwealth y. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 838 (2015),
quoting Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 360, 375 n.20 (2014).
But, we have also recognized that “accusatory statements shed their
hearsay character when they are offered not for the truth of the
matter asserted, but to provide context for admissible statements of
the defendant.” Bonnett, supra at 838 n.13. Such was the case here.

As the trial judge pointed out, the accusation was not offered
for its truth, but rather to contextualize the defendant’s statement
that is “arguably exculpatory.” Absent the prefatory statement to
contextualize the defendant’s response (that he was outside the
apartment that night), it improperly suggests that the defendant,
without any prompting, generously put himself at the scene of the
murder. Because the statements were not introduced for the truth
of the matter asserted, their admission did not violate the defend-

Specifically, the following colloquy between the prosecutor and Trooper
LaBarge was admitted at trial:

‘Tie prosecutor: “Trooper, did you . . . tell Mr. Santana that you believe that
he was inside the apartment that night, and that you had information that he was
there that night?”

Tie wrrvess: “Yes.”

‘Tite prosecutor: “What was his response to that?”

‘Tite wrrvess: “He denied being in the apartment.”

622 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

ant’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The
[Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the
matter asserted”).

To ensure that the jury did not use the statements for an
improper purpose, the judge instructed the jury that LaBarge’s
statement was not admissible for its truth, or for any information
that the trooper did or did not have. See Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 838
n.13 (it may be appropriate for defendant to request instruction
“limiting the jury’s consideration of the . . . [accusatory] state-
ments to its nonhearsay purpose”). Additionally, the judge em-
phasized that the jury were to use the statement only for the
purpose of understanding, weighing, and considering the answer
that the defendant gave in response to the trooper’s question.
Accordingly we conclude that the judge committed no error in
admitting LaBarge’s statement.

c. Substitute medical examiner testimony. The defendant main-
tains that the judge erred in allowing the admission of the testi-
mony of a substitute medical examiner, who did not conduct the
autopsy of Castro and who based her testimony, in part, on the
drawings of the nontestifying medical examiner.® The defendant
filed a motion in limine seeking exclusion of the testimony, and
also objected at trial. The defendant argues that the admission of
the testimony violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth
Amendment and under art. 12. We disagree.

In Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875 (2013), we out-
lined the parameters of the opinion testimony that a substitute
medical examiner may offer at trial. Specifically, we instructed
that “[a] substitute medical examiner who did not perform the
autopsy may offer an opinion on the cause of death, based on his
review of an autopsy report by the medical examiner who per-
formed the autopsy and his review of the autopsy photographs.”
Id. at 883. We allow the substitute medical examiner to opine on
this issue because autopsy reports by other medical examiners
and autopsy photographs “are documents upon which experts are
accustomed to rely, and which are potentially independently
admissible through appropriate witnesses.” Jd.

Here, the substitute medical examiner’s testimony remained

°The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of Castro in August,
2004, was no longer employed by the office of the chief medical examiner at the
time of trial.

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 623

Commonwealth », Santana,

largely within the parameters we set forth in Reavis. The medical
examiner opined on Castro’s cause of death (gunshot wound),
how the gunshot likely led to his death, and the amount of time
that could have elapsed between the gunshot wound and his
death, all of which were permissible areas of inquiry under
Reavis. See Reavis, 465 Mass. at 883. To the extent that the
substitute medical examiner’s opinion ventured into inadmissible
territory — specifically, the location of the gunshot wound — it
was limited when the judge sua sponte paused the direct exami-
nation of the witness, held a colloquy between the parties at
sidebar, and struck the improper testimony from the record.

Nevertheless, the defendant contends that he could not mean-
ingfully cross-examine the substitute medical examiner about the
reliability of the drawings produced by the medical examiner
responsible for performing Castro’s autopsy; thus, the admission
of the testimony was inconsistent with Commonwealth v. Gre-
ineder, 464 Mass. 580, 595, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 865 (2013).
We are not persuaded. In Greineder, we reiterated that where the
pathologist responsible for performing the autopsy was unavail-
able to testify at trial, the substitute expert witness was prohibited
from testifying to the pathologist’s autopsy findings. Id. at 585.
However, consistent with previous cases, we reaffirmed that in-
dependent expert opinion testimony, even where based on facts
and data originating from a nontestifying examiner’s report, does
not infringe on a defendant’s right of confrontation because the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness on
“the foundation of [her] opinion.” /d. at 584-589. Here, the
substitute medical examiner testified to her independent opinion
and was available for cross-examination on the foundation of that
opinion. Thus, the testimony was consistent with this court’s
mandates in Reavis and Greineder, and its admission was not
error.

3. DiGiambattista instruction. At trial, the defendant asked the
judge to instruct the jury pursuant to Commonwealth v.
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (2004). The judge denied the
request, reasoning that because defendant requested the audio
recording device to be turned off, he was not entitled to the
instruction. The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in
declining to give a DiGiambattista instruction where a portion of
the defendant’s interview with the police was not audio recorded.
We agree.

In DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 447, we held, “when the
prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant’s confession or

624 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

statement that is the product of a custodial interrogation or an
interrogation conducted at a place of detention . . . , and there is
not at least an audiotape recording of the complete interrogation,
the defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury instruction.” We
further determined that “the instruction is appropriate for any
custodial interrogation, or interrogation conducted in a place of
detention, without regard to the alleged reasons for not recording
that interrogation.” Jd. at 448. Although it would have been
permissible for the prosecution to raise as a justification for the
incomplete recording the defendant’s affirmative request to cease
recording, it “[did] not obviate the need for a cautionary instruc-
tion.” Id. at 449. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707,
721 n.15, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014) (defendant entitled
to DiGiambattista instruction “even where . . . the defendant
affirmatively requests that that the interview not be recorded”).
Thus, it was error for the judge to deny the defendant’s request
for a DiGiambattista instruction.

Because the error was preserved, we must determine “whether
‘the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight
effect,’ ” and thus was nonprejudicial. Commonwealth v. Chris-
tian, 430 Mass. 552, 563 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v.
Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). Applying this standard, we
conclude that the error was nonprejudicial. We have noted that
“the value of [a DiGiambattista] instruction is lessened where . . .
the defendant’s statements, dubious as they may be, were largely
exculpatory.” Woods, 466 Mass. at 721. Here, the defendant’s
statement was at least partially exculpatory, as the defendant
claimed that he was not at the apartment at the time of the murder,
and only went to the apartment because Garcia called him for a
ride. In fact, the defendant’s defense strategy was, at least in part,
dependent on the jury believing his statement.’° Therefore, we
conclude that the denial of the DiGiambattista instruction con-
stituted nonprejudicial error, and thus does not warrant reversal.

4. Motions for a mistrial. The defendant contends that the
denial of his motions for a mistrial constituted error where the
jury were repeatedly exposed to inadmissible evidence. Prior to
trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent
reference to his prosecution in a later Superior Court case in

14 major theme of defense counsel’s closing was the fact that the defendant,
unlike the other people involved, cooperated with the police and gave a
statement because the defendant did not commit the crime, and had no idea that
the guns he previously delivered to Garcia would be used in the robbery.

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 625

Commonwealth », Santana,

Suffolk County involving some of the same individuals involved
in Castro’s killing. The trial judge did not explicitly rule on the
motion after the prosecutor indicated that she was not seeking to
introduce the evidence. At trial, when asked about another troop-
er’s role in the investigation of Castro’s murder, Trooper LaBarge
explained that he asked the other trooper to compare the latent
print found from the roll of duct tape in Castro’s apartment
against “four individuals that were arrested in the city of Boston.”
Defense counsel immediately objected, requested to go to sidebar,
and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the testimony, at least by
inference, implicated the defendant. After a colloquy outside the
presence of the jury, the judge denied the motion, but indicated he
would strike the testimony from the record and give a curative
instruction.

Following the sidebar, the judge instructed the jury that the
trooper’s testimony regarding four individuals being arrested in
the city of Boston was not evidence in the case as it was struck
from the record, and not for the jury to consider “in any regard to
this case.” The judge further instructed:

“When an answer is stricken from the record, it doesn’t
exist. When you determine what the facts are from the case,
you are sworn to determine those facts solely and exclusively
from the evidence presented in the case, and you may never
consider evidence anything that’s been stricken from the
record.”

Despite the judge’s instruction, on the resumption of LaBarge’s
direct testimony, in response to the prosecutor’s question regard-
ing the fingerprints he asked the other trooper to compare,
LaBarge responded, “The four individuals I previously spoke of.”
Again, defense requested a sidebar, and renewed his motion for a
mistrial. The judge again denied the motion, struck the testimony,
and gave a curative instruction. In his instruction, the judge not
only reminded the jury of his previous instruction, he also reit-
erated that when an answer has been struck, “it doesn’t exist in
the evidence, and you may not consider it in anyway.”

The defendant argues that LaBarge’s testimony constituted
“prejudicial subsequent bad acts evidence” that carried the risk of
“distracting the jury from the main issue.” The denial of a motion
for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.
Gallagher, 408 Mass. 510, 517 (1990). Given the trial judge’s

626 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

“broad discretion in deciding whether to declare a mistrial,” we
have instructed that “this court should defer to that judge’s
determination of whether [there was] prejudicial error, how much
any such error infected the trial, and whether it was possible to
correct that error through instruction to the jury.” Commonwealth
vy. Amran, 471 Mass. 354, 359 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 157 (1999). This is because “[a] trial
judge is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial, an
extreme measure available to a trial judge to address error, is
necessary, or whether a less dramatic measure, such as a curative
instruction, is adequate.” Amran, supra at 360.

Here, Trooper LaBarge’s two references to “four individuals
that were arrested in the city of Boston” were improper. Although
the trial judge noted during the colloquy outside the presence of
the jury that the trooper’s comment was “entirely inappropriate,”
he also pointed out that the jury did not actually learn that the
defendant was arrested for home invasion in Suffolk County. Nor
were the jury ever made aware that the defendant was prosecuted
and served time in prison for the home invasion. Thus, the judge
ultimately determined that the error could be cured by striking
both responses and giving a “strong cautionary instruction.” See
id. (“Where the judge promptly struck the improper testimony
and gave a highly specific curative instruction, the judge acted
appropriately and within her discretion”). The curative instruction
made clear that the trooper’s response was not evidence, and thus
not to be considered. Moreover, as the Commonwealth points out,
the trial judge previously had instructed the jury that the defend-
ant “is on trial for the indictments before the court, and those
indictments only.” It is well settled that “[t]he jury are presumed
to follow the judge’s instruction” to disregard the evidence, id.,
and the record in this case does not suggest otherwise. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying the motions for mistrial.

5. The prosecutor’s closing argument. The defendant argues
that certain remarks by the prosecutor during her closing argu-
ment were prejudicial. “Remarks made during closing arguments
are considered in the context of the whole argument, the evidence
admitted at trial, and the judge’s instructions to the jury.” Com-
monwealth v. Whitman, 453 Mass. 331, 343 (2009).

a. Witness’s “enhanced” hearing. The defendant first contends
that it was error for the prosecutor to argue that Cedeno’s hearing
was enhanced because she was blindfolded. According to the

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 627

Commonwealth », Santana,

defendant, there were neither facts in evidence nor expert testi-
mony to support such a claim. Because the defendant did not
object to this statement at trial, we must determine whether the
statement was improper, and “if so whether [it] created a sub-
stantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.” Commonwealth v.
Fritz, 472 Mass. at 351, quoting Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437
Mass. at 579-580.

“A prosecutor must limit comment in [the] closing statement to
the evidence and fair inferences that can be drawn from the
evidence” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470
Mass. 1, 22 (2014). Although “a prosecutor may argue zealously
in support of inferences favorable to the Commonwealth’s case,”
the requirement that the inferences “reasonably may be drawn
from the evidence” remains. Jd. Such was not the case here. The
record is devoid of evidence, much less expert evidence, suggest-
ing that Cedeno had enhanced hearing due to her temporary
blindfolding.

Although impermissible, we conclude that no substantial like-
lihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from the prosecutor’s
statement. We have observed, “[i]n [certain] circumstances, [an]
isolated remark does not warrant a new trial. ‘Excusable hyper-
bole is not a ground for reversal, and the jury are presumed to
have a certain measure of sophistication in sorting out excessive
claims on both sides.’ ” Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182,
195 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 835
(2004). Moreover, as the Commonwealth points out, the prose-
cutor’s enhanced hearing statement was cumulative of other
evidence suggesting that there were four assailants present in the
apartment with Cedeno and Castro, including Cedeno’s testimony
that she knew four people were present because she saw “feet
walking around the apartment.” Last, when raising his objections
to the prosecutor’s closing argument, defense counsel neither
objected nor requested a curative instruction on this ground. See
Commonwealth vy. Ahart, 464 Mass. 437, 442 (2013) (“the ab-
sence of any objection or request for a curative instruction by
experienced defense counsel is some indication that the comment
by the prosecutor could not have created a substantial likelihood
of miscarriage of justice”).

b. Bite mark on the duct tape. The defendant next contends that
the prosecutor improperly argued that the indentation in the duct
tape found in the bathroom trash bin was a bite mark. The
Commonwealth argues that, based on the evidence presented at

628 477 Mass. 610 (2017)

Commonwealth », Santana,

trial, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the indentation
on the duct tape found in Castro’s bathroom was a tooth mark
produced by someone who tore the tape. We agree. Three pieces
of evidence presented at trial support our conclusion: (1) the end
of the duct tape was torn, (2) the presence of DNA was detected
on the duct tape, and (3) saliva is among the human biological
fluids that provides a source of DNA. Therefore, we conclude that
no prejudicial error arose from the prosecutor’s statement.

c. Characterization of DNA testimony. The defendant last ar-
gues that the prosecutor improperly equated the DNA statistics of
a 99.999 per cent match with the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. We disagree. As pointed out by the trial judge, a close
reading of the record reveals that the Commonwealth’s remarks
regarding the DNA statistics did not equate reasonable doubt to a
percentage. Rather, the prosecutor’s remarks focused on the cer-
tainty, described in terms of percentages, of the defendant’s DNA
matching the major profile in the DNA mixture on the piece of
duct tape found in the bathroom trash bin. Accordingly, the
prosecutor’s remarks did not constitute error.

Even if the remarks were error, they did not create a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Here again, that fact that
defense counsel neither objected nor sought a curative instruction
provides some indication that the remarks did not create a sub-
stantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Ahart, 464 Mass. at
442. Indeed, in raising his objections to the prosecutor’s closing
argument, defense counsel stated that because of the way the
prosecutor characterized the DNA statistics, he did not believe it
mischaracterized the reasonable doubt standard, and thus did not
object. Additionally, the trial judge twice instructed the jury —
before and after closing arguments — on the purpose of closing
arguments, noting they are an opportunity for the attorneys to be
zealous advocates for their respective clients, and cautioning that
the judge, not the attorneys, instruct on the law that applies to the
case. As we have observed, in cases where “close questions arise
whether the prosecutor has gone over the line between fair and
improper argument,” we recognize that “closing argument is
identified as argument, the jury understands that, instructions
from the judge inform the jury that closing argument is not
evidence, and instructions may mitigate any prejudice in the final
argument.” Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 517 (1987).

6. Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We have conducted a
complete review of the record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and

477 Mass. 610 (2017) 629

Commonwealth », Santana,

we discern no basis to grant relief. The defendant argues that we
should exercise our powers under § 33E to reduce his murder in
the first degree conviction to a conviction of manslaughter or
murder in the second degree. In support of this request, the
defendant points out that during trial, the Commonwealth, for the
second time, offered him a plea to the lesser included offense of
manslaughter with a term of imprisonment of from fifteen years
to fifteen years and one day, which the defendant declined. That
the Commonwealth offered the defendant a plea arrangement
does not provide grounds on which to grant relief pursuant to
§ 33E and “is irrelevant to our inquiry.” Commonwealth v.
Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 525 (2001), overruled on another ground
by Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 242 (2009). Thus, the
defendant’s argument is unavailing, and we decline to exercise
our power pursuant to § 33E on this ground.

Judgments affirmed.

630 477 Mass. 630 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

Commonweatru vs. Perer J. Duarr.
Dukes County. May 4, 2017. - August 17, 2017.
Present: Gawts, C.l., LENK, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cypuzr, JI

Judge. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Disqualification of judge, Assistance of
counsel.

Discussion of the standard of review applicable to the denial of a motion for a
new trial, [634]

A Superior Court judge properly denied the criminal defendant’s motion for a
new trial, where the judge’s son’s employment as an assistant district
attorney in the district where the defendant's trial was held, without more,
did not provide a basis upon which the judge’s impartiality reasonably could
be questioned and, thus, did not require disclosure to the defendant in
advance of his waiver of his right to a jury trial [635-636]; and where,
although the failure of the defendant's counsel to disclose to the defendant,
prior to the jury-trial waiver colloquy, the trial judge’s familial relationship
with an assistant district attorney in that district constituted ineffective
assistance, the defendant did not suffer prejudice as a result, where, in the
circumstances, there was not a reasonable possibility that a reasonable
person in the circumstances of the defendant would have chosen a jury trial
had he received constitutionally effective advice [636-640].

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on April 5, 2010.

A motion for a new trial, filed on February 18, 2015, was heard
by Charles J. Hely, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Afton M, Templin for the defendant.

Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Hnes, J. Following a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court,
the defendant, Peter Duart, was convicted of rape, subsequent
offense, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b); and indecent assault and battery on
a person age fourteen or older, as a lesser included offense of
assault and battery on a person with an intellectual disability.
The judge sentenced the defendant to from ten years to ten years

“The indictment charged indecent assault and battery on a “mentally re-
tarded” person, subsequent offense, in violation of G. L. c, 265, § 13F. On

477 Mass. 630 (2017) 631

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

and one day in State prison on the rape and subsequent offender
convictions, and to a probation term of three years on the indecent
assault and battery conviction.

In a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b),
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), the defendant challenged
the convictions on the grounds that (1) his jury waiver was
neither knowing nor intelligent because the trial judge did not
disclose that his son was employed as an assistant district attor-
ney in the office of the district attorney for the Cape and Islands
district, which prosecuted the indictments; and (2) defense coun-
sel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to disclose the
judge’s relationship to the prosecutor's office in counsel’s advice
on the strategic choice to waive the right to a trial by jury. A
different judge held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion
in a written decision. The defendant filed a timely appeal, and we
transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

We conclude that the trial judge’s failure to inform the defend-
ant of his familial relationship with a member of the prosecuting
attorney’s office during the jury-waiver colloquy was not error,
and thus the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial on
this ground was not an abuse of discretion. As to the defendant’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that
although defense counsel’s failure to inform the defendant of the
trial judge’s familial relationship with a member of the prosecut-
ing attorney’s office constituted behavior “falling measurably
below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible
lawyer,” Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974),
counsel’s failure to do so was not prejudicial. Therefore, we
affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Background. We summarize the relevant facts on the motion
for a new trial as found by the motion judge, supplemented as
necessary with uncontested facts from the motion hearing. See
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 451 Mass. 370, 372 (2008). In April,
2010, the defendant was indicted by a Dukes County grand jury
on charges of indecent assault and battery on a person with an

November 2, 2010, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 265, § 13F, substituting the
terms “mentally retarded person” with “person with an intellectual disability”
and “be mentally retarded” with “have an intellectual disability,” in order to
eradicate the term “mentally retarded” from the General Laws. See Common-
wealth v, St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 351 (2015), citing St. 2010, c. 239, §§ 71-72.
Although the amended version was not in effect when the defendant was
indicted, we nevertheless use the terms “person with an intellectual disability”
and “have an intellectual disability” here.

632 477 Mass. 630 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

intellectual disability, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 265, § 13F;
and rape, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b). The alleged
offenses occurred at the victim’s apartment in the early morning
hours of January 30, 2010.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion for a change of
venue, which the Commonwealth joined, predicated on the con-
cern that the defendant could not receive a fair trial from a Dukes
County jury. Specifically, the defendant contended there would be
a “serious risk” that some of the jurors would have knowledge of
the defendant’s previous conviction, which had garnered substan-
tial news media attention and notoriety on Martha’s Vineyard,
where the new indictments were set to be tried. The judge denied
the motion without prejudice, noting that he would be willing to
reconsider the order if seating a jury became “impractical.”

In light of the denial of the defendant’s motion for a change of
venue, defense counsel discussed with the defendant the possi-
bility of waiving his right to a trial by jury. Following consulta-
tion with his attorney, and at the defendant’s request, the judge
held a jury-waiver colloquy with the defendant on October 4,
2010. During the colloquy, the defendant indicated that he had
had sufficient time to consider the waiver, and signed and filed a
written waiver of trial by jury. The judge accepted the waiver,
concluding that it was made intelligently and with knowledge of
its consequences. The jury-waived trial commenced before the
judge on October 5, 2010, and concluded on October 6, 2010.

At the conclusion of the trial, the judge found the defendant
guilty of rape and guilty of the subsequent offender portion of the
indictment. With respect to the charge of indecent assault and
battery on a person with an intellectual disability, subsequent
offense, the judge found the defendant guilty of the lesser in-
cluded offense of indecent assault and battery. The defendant
appealed from his convictions, which were affirmed by the Ap-
peals Court in an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant
to its rule 1:28, with the exception of a remand to the Superior
Court requiring the trial judge to issue a more definitive order
regarding sex offender treatment. See Commonwealth v. Duart,
82 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (2012). Thereafter, the defendant filed a
motion for a new trial, which is the subject of this appeal.

Before the trial judge ruled on the motion for a new trial, the
defendant filed, on August 12, 2013, a motion for recusal and, on
September 26, 2013, a motion for leave to file a substitute motion
for a new trial, arguing that he had just learned that the trial

477 Mass. 630 (2017) 633

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

judge’s son was an assistant district attorney in the Cape and
Islands district. The trial judge granted the motion for leave to file
a substitute motion for a new trial and, after a hearing, also
granted the motion for recusal, concluding that although he
harbored no bias against the defendant and remained convinced
that the defendant received a fair trial, he would recuse himself
from consideration of the defendant’s motion to “assure that any
appearance of partiality is avoided.” Consequently, another Su-
perior Court judge (motion judge) was assigned to hear the
defendant’s motion for a new trial.

At the hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial before
the motion judge, the trial judge’s son, defense counsel for the
defendant, and the defendant testified. In a written order, the
motion judge found that defense counsel had “great faith and
confidence” that the trial judge would be fair and impartial in a
jury-waived trial for the defendant, and conveyed these senti-
ments to the defendant during their conversations regarding the
possibility of a jury waiver. The motion judge also found that
defense counsel was aware that the trial judge’s son was an
assistant district attorney in the Cape and Islands district,? which
prosecuted cases in Barnstable, Dukes, and Nantucket Counties.
Despite the trial judge’s son’s employment as an assistant district
attorney, defense counsel remained confident that the trial judge
would be fair and impartial in a jury-waived trial. The defendant
denied having knowledge of the trial judge’s son’s employment
prior to waiving his right to a trial by jury, but the motion judge
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to determine
whether the defendant in fact knew of the trial judge’s son’s
employment at the time of his jury waiver.

During his employment in the Cape and Islands district, the
trial judge’s son had no involvement with the defendant’s case.
His case assignments were limited to the District Court in
Barnstable and Nantucket Counties, with the addition of some
appeals. Because of the trial judge’s assignment in Dukes County,
his son made a point to refrain from working on any Superior
Court criminal cases prosecuted in Dukes County.* Moreover, the

2The trial judge’s son resigned from the office of the district attorney for the
Cape and Isiands district in July, 2011, to enter private practice.

8During the time period of the defendant's trial, the Superior Court in Dukes
County commonly held only two one-month, one-judge trial sessions per year.
Similar to other judges, the trial judge on occasion was assigned to a one-month
Dukes County trial session.

634 477 Mass. 630 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

trial judge’s son did not have any supervisory role in the office
during his employment.

Ultimately, the motion judge denied the defendant’s motion for
a new trial, concluding that the “defendant’s jury waiver and trial
did not present an issue of whether the [trial] judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” For this reason, the trial judge
was not under any obligation to disclose to the defendant that his
son was employed as an assistant district attorney in the same
district. The motion judge also rejected the defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that because the trial
judge’s son’s employment as an assistant district attorney was
limited to counties where his father was not assigned, the issue
did not present a reasonable, objective basis for questioning the
trial judge’s impartiality. Thus, defense counsel’s failure to raise
the issue with the defendant did not fall outside “the range of
reasonable, competent representation.” The motion judge deter-
mined that defense counsel’s performance was not inadequate,
but nonetheless went on to consider and summarily reject the
claim of prejudice, concluding that the defendant failed to show
that counsel’s advice deprived him of a substantial ground of
defense.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. A judge may grant a motion
for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) “if it appears
that justice may not have been done.” Commonwealth v. Moore,
408 Mass. 117, 125 (1990). Such motion “is addressed to the
sound discretion of the judge” /d. Therefore, we review the denial
of a motion for a new trial for “a significant error of law or other
abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469,
488 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303,
307 (1986). In particular, we “accept[ ] the motion judge’s find-
ings of fact, made after an evidentiary hearing, if they are sup-
ported by the record, . . . and defer[ ] to the judge’s assessments
of credibility” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Cadet, 473
Mass. 173, 179 (2015). The discretion afforded to the motion
judge, however, is not “boundless and absolute.” Commonwealth
v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 (2015), quoting Commonwealth
v. Genius, 402 Mass. 711, 714 (1988). “Under the abuse of
discretion standard, the issue is whether the judge’s decision
resulted from ‘a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors
relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the
range of reasonable alternatives.’ ” Kolenovic, supra, quoting
L.L. vy. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

477 Mass. 630 (2017) 635

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

2. Judicial disclosure. The motion judge concluded that the
judge’s son’s employment with the Cape and Islands district,
without more, did not provide a basis upon which the judge’s
impartiality reasonably could be questioned and, thus, did not
require disclosure to the defendant in advance of his jury waiver.
Under the relevant canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
commentary then in effect, we agree.

Among the vital rights provided by art. 29 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights is the “the right of every citizen to be tried
by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of human-
ity will admit.” A defendant’s right to an impartial judge is
affirmed in the Code of Judicial Conduct, S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon
3 (E) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1301 (2003), which provides
that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding
in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned.” Conversely, where such impartiality may not be reason-
ably questioned, the Commentary to Canon 3 (E) (1) makes clear
that “a judge may, but is not required, to disclose on the record
information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers
might consider relevant to the question of disqualification.”* See
Commonwealth vy. Leventhal, 364 Mass. 718, 725 (1974)
(“[JJudge was under no obligation to make any disclosure to
counsel unless he thought his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned”). The motion judge correctly assessed that the trial
judge was under no obligation to disclose the relationship with
his son because it did not reasonably call into question his
impartiality or otherwise require disqualification or recusal in the
defendant's trial.

We consistently have held that “[i]n general, the question of
disqualification is left to the judge’s discretion.” Commonwealth
v. Gogan, 389 Mass. 255, 259 (1983), and cases cited. Thus, we
may disturb a judge’s decision on recusal only if there is an abuse

4We note that while the trial judge’s lack of disclosure was appropriate under
S.1.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 3 (E) (1), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1301 (2003), which
was in effect at the time, amendments to the rules were adopted on October 8,
2015, and became effective on January 1, 2016. Among the amendments, the 2016
rules recommend broader judicial disclosure. In particular, the Commentary to
S.L.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 2.11 (A), formerly $.J.C, Rule 3:09, Canon 3 (E) (1).
recommends that a judge “disclose on the record information that the judge
believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a
possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis
for disqualification.” We do not address whether, in these circumstances, a judge
would have an obligation of disclosure under the 2016 rules.

636 477 Mass. 630 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

of discretion. See Haddad vy. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 862
(1991). Here, the trial judge’s son had no involvement in the
defendant’s case, and in fact did not handle any criminal cases
prosecuted in the Superior Court in Dukes County, where his
father was assigned. Rather, his caseload was limited to criminal
cases in Barnstable and Nantucket Counties, and some appellate
cases. Moreover, the trial judge’s son did not serve in a supervi-
sory capacity at the district attorney’s office such that his over-
sight responsibilities may have extended to cases prosecuted in
Dukes County. On these facts, we discern no basis to hold that the
judge abused his discretion in failing to disclose his relationship
to an attorney in the district attorney’s office.

Likewise, the circumstances here do not fit within one of the
enumerated instances requiring recusal under S.J.C. Rule 3:09,
Canon 3 (E) (1). Although not binding on this court, we find
persuasive Opinion No. 2001-16 (Nov. 16, 2001) of the Commit-
tee on Judicial Ethics (committee) — on which the trial judge
relied in his order on the defendant’s motion for judicial recusal
— addressing an issue nearly identical to the issue presented here.
The committee explained that the “mere fact” that the judge’s son
was employed in the district attorney’s office did not require
recusal from criminal cases in which other attorneys from that
district attorney’s office appeared. Jd. See Commentary to S.J.C.
Rule 3:09, Canon 3 (E) (1) (“A judge is not necessarily disquali-
fied if a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a legal organi-
zation with which the spouse or a relative of the judge is affili-
ated”).

Our conclusion today is also consistent with numerous other
jurisdictions deciding this issue. See, e.g., Adair v. State, 474
Mich. 1027, 1029-1030 (2006) (concluding recusal policy “that
no judge can hear any case in which a party is represented by a
law firm or a prosecutor’s office in which a relative of that judge
is employed, even if that relative has no personal involvement in
the case and stands to gain nothing materially by its outcome. . .
constitutes an unfair and unwise policy”). See also State v. Logan,
236 Kan. 79, 87-89 (1984); State v. Fero, 105 N.M. 339, 342-343
(1987); State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 659-660 (1996), and
cases cited.

Accordingly, the motion judge’s denial of the motion for a new
trial on this ground did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant next argues
that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial on

477 Mass. 630 (2017) 637

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion was
predicated on defense counsel’s failure to disclose to the defend-
ant the trial judge’s familial relationship with an assistant district
attorney in the Cape and Islands district, prior to the jury-trial
waiver colloquy.

Where the defendant seeks a new trial on the basis of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate that “there has
been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel
— behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which
might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer — and, if that
is found, then, typically, whether it has likely deprived the de-
fendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence.”
Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.

a. Representation fell measurably below that which might be
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer. A defendant’s right to
a trial by jury “is preserved as a basic and fundamental right in
our judicial system.” Commonwealth v. Osborne, 445 Mass. 776,
780 (2006), citing art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. Ultimately, the “decision regarding waiver of the jury”
must be made by the defendant, not his or her counsel, Osborne,
supra at 781, and must be the “exercise of a free and intelligent
choice.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
275 (1942). See Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 507
(1979) (“a conviction cannot stand which follows upon a jury
waiver that is not freely and knowingly given’). To protect this
fundamental right, our cases have emphasized the importance of
the jury-trial waiver colloquy, wherein the judge must not only
“advise the defendant of his constitutional right to a jury trial,”
but also “satisfy himself that any waiver by the defendant is made
voluntarily and intelligently.” /d. at 509. Whether a defendant has
conferred with his counsel about the waiver is one of the con-
siderations relevant to the judge’s determination. Jd. This sug-
gests that communication with defense counsel is critical to the
defendant understanding the nature of the right that he is giving
up and to his “mak[ing] an over-all estimate as to where he will
fare better, before a judge or before a jury.” Commonwealth v.
Dietrich, 381 Mass. 458, 461-462 (1980), quoting H. Kalven &
H. Zeisel, The American Jury 28 (1966). “[A]n intelligent waiver
does not require that the accused have the skill or knowledge of
a lawyer”; rather, “the defendant, being competent, must simply
have indicated a comprehension of the nature of the choice.”
Ciummei, 378 Mass. at 510, quoting Maynard v. Meachum, 545
F.2d 273, 279 (Ast Cir. 1976).

638 477 Mass. 630 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

To ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the
choice, counsel must communicate information within his or her
knowledge that is relevant to, or bears on the defendant’s choice
to waive the right to a jury trial. More specifically, to the extent
that counsel possesses information germane to the question of
judicial disqualification, regardless of whether a genuine basis for
disqualification exists, it is incumbent on counsel to convey that
information so as to allow the defendant to raise and discuss any
concerns that he or she might have. To be clear, our holding does
not create an obligation for counsel to investigate the presiding
judge, as it would unduly encumber defense counsel and encour-
age unwarranted suspicion of the judiciary. But where defense
counsel already has information about the trial judge that reason-
ably could bear on a right as fundamental as the right to a jury
trial, defense counsel has an obligation to disclose the informa-
tion to his or her client.

Unlike the trial judge, who, under the canons of the Code of
Judicial Conduct then in effect, was under no obligation to
disclose his familial relationship with a member of the office of
the district attorney for the Cape and Islands district, Rules 1.2
and 1.4 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct
require that an attorney fully advise and assist the client in
making decisions that ultimately must be made by the client
himself or herself, including the decision to waive a jury trial. See
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1313 (2015);
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1319 (2015).
Moreover, “[i]n determining the level of performance required of
an ordinary fallible lawyer, we look to the ‘professional standards
of the legal community.’ ” Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473
Mass. 42, 51 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460
Mass. 30, 45 (2011). Thus, it is notable that the Committee for
Public Counsel Services performance standards governing the
representation of indigent individuals in criminal cases mandates
that “[t]he attorney shall explain to the client those decisions that
ultimately must be made by the client and the advantages and
disadvantages inherent in those choices.” Committee for Public
Counsel Services, Assigned Counsel Manual, c. 4, at § I(C)(6)
(Oct. 2011). See Commonwealth v. Myers, 82 Mass. App. Ct.
172, 181 n.12 (2012), citing Standard 4-5.2 of the ABA Standards

Shttps://www publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_manual/CURRENT_MAN
UAL_2012/MANUALChap4CriminalStandards.pdf _[https://perma.cc/9MBW-
ETEB |.

477 Mass. 630 (2017) 639

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

for Criminal Justice: Control and Direction of the Case (3d ed.
1993) (noting that “decisions which are to be made by the
accused after full consultation with counsel” include whether to
waive trial by jury [emphasis added]).

Here, defense counsel knew of the trial judge’s son’s employ-
ment in the office of the district attorney for the Cape and Islands
district. The defendant denied that he was aware that the trial
judge’s son was employed as an assistant district attorney in that
office. The motion judge found the evidence insufficient to de-
termine whether the defendant knew of the judge’s son’s employ-
ment at the time of the jury waiver. Even though defense coun-
sel’s knowledge of the trial judge’s son’s employment as an
assistant district attorney did not affect counsel’s own confidence
that the trial judge would be a fair and impartial fact finder, the
decision whether the defendant’s “interests [were] safer in the
keeping of the judge than of the jury,” Adams, 317 U.S. at 278,
was for the defendant, and the defendant alone, to make based on
his informed and competent judgment. Accordingly, we conclude
that defense counsel’s failure to inform the defendant of the trial
judge’s son’s employment as an assistant district attorney in the
office of the district attorney for the Cape and Islands district
constituted “behavior of counsel falling measurably below that
which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer.”
Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.

b. Prejudice. We next determine whether defense counsel’s
performance inadequacy caused the defendant to suffer prejudice.
See Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96. To make this determination, we
draw on our cases addressing claims of ineffective assistance in
the context of immigration consequences of a guilty plea. To
satisfy the “prejudice” requirement in cases such as this, “the
defendant has the burden of establishing that ‘there is a reason-
able probability that, but for counsel’s errors,’ ” he would not
have waived his right to being tried by a jury. See Lavrinenko,
473 Mass. at 55, quoting Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47. “At a mini-
mum, this means that the defendant must aver that to be the case.”
Lavrinenko, supra, quoting Clarke, supra. The defendant also
“bears the substantial burden” of “convinc[ing] the court” that a
decision to exercise his right to a jury trial “would have been
rational under the circumstances.” Lavrinenko, supra at 55-56,
quoting Clarke, supra. Finally, based on the motion judge’s
evaluation of the facts, including the credibility of the defendant
and other witness, “[t]he judge must determine . . . whether there

640 477 Mass. 630 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

is a reasonable probability that a reasonable person in the cir-
cumstances of the defendant would have chosen [a jury trial] had
he or she received constitutionally effective advice from his or
her criminal defense attorney.” Lavrinenko, supra at 55.

Here, the defendant averred in an affidavit accompanying the
motion for a new trial that had he known of the relationship
between the trial judge and an assistant district attorney in the
prosecuting district attorney’s office, he would not have opted for
a jury-waived trial and, instead, “would have made different
strategic decisions.” During his testimony at the hearing on the
motion for a new trial, the defendant reiterated this point.

Weighing against the defendant’s assertion that he would have
chosen a jury trial had he been effectively advised, however, is the
defendant’s concern prior to trial that he would not receive a fair
trial from a Dukes County jury. This concern was concrete
enough to cause the defendant to file a motion for a change of
venue, which the Commonwealth joined, and was well founded
considering that the defendant’s previous 2004 rape conviction
on Martha’s Vineyard had a level of notoriety and that the
defendant — an elected member of the planning board and the
finance and advisory committee of Martha’s Vineyard, a former
football coach, and former manager of the largest grocery store
on the island — was well known on the island. Additionally, the
2004 rape conviction was for the same charge of indecent assault
and battery on a person with an intellectual disability and in the
same county, and the defendant was a registered sex offender in
the town of Tisbury at the time of his arrest for this offense.
Furthermore, determining whether a potential juror knew about
and would be biased by the defendant’s 2004 rape conviction
might have been difficult to determine during voir dire of the
potential jurors. As the motion judge correctly pointed out, voir
dire of the jury would not necessarily prompt the juror’s memo-
ries of the defendant’s 2004 rape case. Given these facts, we are
not convinced that there is a “reasonable probability” that “a
reasonable person in the circumstances of the defendant would
have chosen [a jury trial] had he . . . received constitutionally
effective advice” from his counsel. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 55.
Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant did not suffer pre-
judice from defense counsel’s inadequate performance.

477 Mass. 630 (2017) 641

Commonwealth ¥, Duart,

Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the order denying the
defendant’s motion for a new trial is affirmed.

So ordered.

642 477 Mass. 642 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

ComMonwWEALTH VS. WALTER SHELLEY.

Middlesex. February 7, 2017. - August 24, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cyeuer, JJ."

Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Lesser included
offense. Limitations, Statute of.

‘This court concluded that, at a murder trial, the defendant was not entitled to a
jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter, where the
defendant could not be convicted of that offense because the statute of
limitations for that offense had lapsed, but that the defendant could have
elected to waive the statute of limitations and invoke his right to the lesser
included offense instruction. [643-648] Bupo, J., dissenting, with whom Lenx
and Hines, JJ., joined.

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on May 26, 2011.

The cases were tried before Janet Kenton-Walker, J

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Robert L. Sheketoff for the defendant.

Laura Kirshenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Lowy, J. We now address whether a defendant charged with
murder is entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense
of manslaughter, even when the statute of limitations for man-
slaughter has lapsed. We conclude that, under Massachusetts law,
a defendant is not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction
when the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense due to the
statute of limitations. A defendant may, however, elect to waive
the statute of limitations and invoke his or her right to the lesser
included offense instruction. The trial judge correctly presented
this choice to the defendant, who declined to waive the statute of
limitations. We affirm the defendant’s convictions.

Background. On September 13, 2013, a Middlesex County jury
found Walter Shelley, the defendant, guilty of murder in the first

“Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her retire-
ment.

477 Mass. 642 (2017) 643

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

degree, as a participant in a joint venture.? On the defendant’s
motion, the trial judge reduced the murder conviction to murder
in the second degree pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), 379
Mass. 886 (1979). The charges stemmed from his involvement,
along with two friends, in the 1969 death of fifteen year old John
McCabe, the victim.

An indictment for murder was not returned against the defend-
ant until after the investigation into the crime recommenced
around 2007. Subsequently, the defendant and the two friends were
charged with murder.? Although there is no statute of limitations
for murder, there is a six-year statute of limitations for man-
slaughter. G. L. c. 277, § 63. There is no dispute that the defend-
ant would have been entitled to a manslaughter instruction had
the limitations period not run. Accordingly, we only briefly sum-
marize the facts.

In 1969, the then seventeen year old defendant was upset with
the victim for flirting with the defendant’s girl friend. The de-
fendant, along with his two friends, drove to confront the victim.
One friend forced the victim into the vehicle. The victim asked to
be let out. The defendant instead drove to a large vacant area off
of a dirt road in Lowell.

On arriving, they pulled the victim out of the vehicle and a brief
altercation ensued. With the victim lying face down on the
ground, one friend tied the victim’s ankles and wrists with rope.
The friend tied another piece of rope around the victim’s neck,
which he then tied to the rope binding the victim’s ankles. The
victim’s eyes and mouth were taped shut. The defendant and his
friends drove away, leaving the victim behind. The trio returned
approximately forty-five minutes later to discover that the victim
was not breathing. The defendant and his friends again drove
away. Police discovered the victim’s body the next day.

Discussion. During his trial, the defendant requested that the
judge instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involun-
tary manslaughter. Generally, a defendant is entitled to an instruc-
tion on a lesser included offense of the charged crime, when the
facts could support the lesser offense. See Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 638 (1980); Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass.
659, 662-663 (1998). Allowing a jury to convict a defendant of a

2 The defendant also was convicted of misleading a police officer, in violation
of G. L. ¢, 268, § 13B.

2One of the friends was tried separately and acquitted, and the other reached
a cooperation agreement with the Commonwealth and testified.

644 477 Mass. 642 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

lesser included offense gives the jury a third option, beyond
acquittal or conviction, that “ensures that the jury will accord the
defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard.”
Beck, supra at 633-634, citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S.
205, 208 (1973). This rule mitigates concern that a jury would
return a guilty verdict for the greater crime, even if they believe
the prosecution has not proved each element, because the jury
believe that the defendant’s conduct warrants some form of
punishment. In some cases, the prosecution may request the lesser
included offense instruction to increase its likelihood of obtaining
some conviction for a defendant’s criminal conduct. See Wood-
ward, supra.

The defendant's request for a lesser included offense instruc-
tion in this case, however, presents a complication that this court
has not addressed: how a trial judge should treat a request for a
lesser included offense instruction when a conviction of that lesser
included offense is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The trial judge applied a rule articulated in Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v.
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 623-624 (2016). The United States
Supreme Court in Spaziano allowed a defendant to obtain an
instruction on a lesser included offense that is time barred only if
the defendant waives the statute of limitations defense. Spaziano,
supra at 455-456. The judge declined to adopt two ostensibly
more protective rules from other jurisdictions, as proposed by the
defendant. The defendant declined to waive his statute of limita-
tions defense, and the judge did not instruct the jury on man-
slaughter.

On appeal, the defendant argues that we should adopt one of
the more protective alternative rules as a matter of State consti-
tutional law, and the Commonwealth argues that we should apply
the Spaziano rule. We decline to adopt the alternative rules
suggested by the defendant. We conclude that due process in Mas-
sachusetts does not require more than the Federal rule articulated
in Spaziano.

1. The three rules. In the Federal and State courts, three distinct
tules have developed. First, as a matter of Federal due process, as
articulated in Spaziano, a defendant’s entitlement to the lesser
included offense instruction is contingent on his or her waiver of
the statute of limitations defense. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455-456.
A majority of States that have considered the issue have adopted
the rule from Spaziano. See People v. Burns, 250 Mich. App.

477 Mass. 642 (2017) 645

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

436, 442-443 (2002), and cases cited. Second, in State v. Short,
131 .N.J. 47, 62-63 (1993), the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the defendant is entitled to the lesser included offense in-
struction, without telling the jury that finding the defendant guilty
of that offense would result in acquittal. See State vy. Muentner,
138 Wis. 2d 374, 391-393 (1987) (same). Finally, in State v.
Delisle, 162 Vt. 293, 305 (1994), the Vermont Supreme Court
adopted a rule that upholds the defendant’s entitlement to the
lesser included offense instruction, but also requires instructing
the jury that finding the defendant guilty of the time-barred
offense would result in acquittal. We first set out the Spaziano
tule. Then, we address the two rules suggested by the defendant,
and we explain why we decline to adopt each.

a. The Spaziano rule. In Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455-456, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that a defendant’s en-
titlement to a lesser included offense instruction, pursuant to
Beck, did not extend to circumstances in which the statute of
limitations for that lesser offense had lapsed. The Court reached
this conclusion because Beck did not espouse a rule that “a lesser
included offense instruction in the abstract” is required for a trial
to be fair. Spaziano, supra at 455. Rather, entitlement to an
instruction based on Beck exists only where “the evidence would
permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser
offense and acquit [that defendant] of the greater.” Beck, 447 U.S.
at 635, quoting Keeble, 412 U.S. at 208. Thus, the purpose of the
tule in Beck is to enhance the rationality of the jury’s decision.
Spaziano, supra. But, “[w]here no lesser included offense exists,
a lesser included offense instruction detracts from, rather than
enhances, the rationality of the process.” Id.

For reasons discussed infra, among the three rules adopted by
various jurisdictions, the Spaziano rule strikes the best balance
between protecting the “rationality of the process” and a defend-
ant’s due process rights. When a defendant charged with murder
cannot be convicted of manslaughter because of the statute of
limitations, a jury cannot “rationally . . . find [the defendant]
guilty of the lesser offense.” See Beck, 447 U.S. at 635, quoting
Keeble, 412 U.S. at 208. In such circumstances, the rationale
from Beck does not apply. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455-456.
Similarly, due process as a matter of State constitutional law does
not require a judge to deceive the jury by instructing them on a
lesser included offense for which the defendant cannot be found
guilty. See Delisle, 162 Vt. at 304 (“allowing a jury to find a

646 477 Mass. 642 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

defendant guilty of a crime for which the defendant cannot be
punished, even if the jury [have] no say in what the punishment
will be, makes a mockery of the trial”). If, however, the defendant
elects to waive the statute of limitations as a defense, then the
defendant may be convicted of the lesser offense and, as such, he
or she would be entitled to the lesser included offense instruc-
tion.t See Spaziano, supra at 455-456; Woodward, 427 Mass. at
662-663.

b. The Short rule. In New Jersey, a trial judge must give the
jury an instruction on a time-barred, lesser included offense.
Short, 131 N.J. at 62-63. However, the trial judge may not inform
the jury that a conviction of that offense would be dismissed, due
to the statute of limitations. Jd. The New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded that this rule does not objectionably deceive the jury
because jurors are precluded from “consider[ing] factors that may
improperly [skew] their determinations of criminal guilt or inno-
cence.” Id. at 60. The court reasoned that the jury’s job is “to
express an ultimate judgment of culpability” (quotation omitted).
Id. Although this rule is maximally protective of the defendant’s
rights, allowing the jury to believe incorrectly that they are
rendering a valid conviction directly undermines the jury’s role in
expressing a judgment of the defendant’s culpability. See
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 456 (“Beck does not require that the jury be
tricked into believing that [they have] a choice of crimes for
which to find the defendant guilty, if in reality there is no
choice”).

Additionally, this deception may have the deleterious effect of
undermining jurors’ faith in the court system. See Spaziano, 468
US. at 456; Delisle, 162 Vt. at 302-303. Although, as the de-
fendant points out, in certain contexts we keep evidence from the
jury, this does not deceive the jury into falsely believing that they
have convicted a defendant of a crime. Evidence is kept from a
jury due to a constitutional principle; to further some compelling
point of public policy; or, in many circumstances, because of
concerns regarding the evidence’s reliability. See, e.g., Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) (testimony that vio-

‘Contrary to the dissent’s concerns, that Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449, and Beck,
447 USS, at 637-638, were death penalty cases only strengthens the basis for our
resolution of this case. If due process in death penalty cases does not require
allowing a defendant to obtain the benefit of both his or her right to a lesser
included offense instruction and the statute of limitations defense, due process
does not require that result in nondeath penalty cases.

477 Mass. 642 (2017) 647

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

lated defendant’s right to confront witnesses should have been
excluded); Martel v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 403 Mass.
1, 4 (1988) (subsequent remedial measures excluded for “public
policy unrelated to the fact-finding process, that ‘a contrary rule
would discourage owners from making repairs to dangerous pro-
perty’ ” [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass.
214, 224 (1986) (propensity evidence excluded because it can be
“highly prejudicial”). Ensuring the fairness of a defendant’s trial
does not require deceiving the jury.® See Spaziano, supra; Delisle,
supra.

c. The Delisle rule. Vermont has adopted a rule similar to the
Short rule, but different in one critical respect. Like in Short, a
defendant is entitled to the lesser included offense instruction
without waiving his or her statute of limitations defense. Delisle,
162 Vt. at 304-305. If the defendant asserts the statute of limi-
tations defense, however, the defendant may “obtain[ ] an instruc-
tion informing the jurors that, because the passage of time pre-
cludes prosecution for the lesser offense, they must acquit the
defendant if they conclude that the evidence would support a
conviction of the lesser crime only.” Jd. at 305.

Although this rule is intended to afford greater protection of the
defendant's rights than did Spaziano, it does not. Rather, the jury
face the same all-or-nothing proposition that exists in the absence
of the lesser included offense instruction, except now the jury
have been instructed that such conduct constitutes a crime for
which the defendant will not be punished. In these circumstances,
the jury no longer simply believe that the defendant may be
“guilty of some offense” (emphasis in original). Beck, 447 U.S. at
634, quoting Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212-213. Instead, the jury have
determined that the defendant is guilty of criminal conduct, and
they know that if they return a guilty verdict for that conduct, the
defendant will escape punishment due solely to the statute of
limitations. We agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court that
“telling the jury that [a] defendant would go free if convicted of

5Nor do we interpret G. L. ¢. 278, § 12, to require allowing the defendant to
benefit from both the lesser included offense instruction and the statute of
limitations instruction. See post at 649. In the event a defendant is acquitted of
part of the indictment, § 12 merely permits a defendant to be “adjudged guilty”
of a ctime, “if any,” that is “substantially charged” by the “residue” of the
indictment. If a lesser included offense is time barred, the defendant cannot be
adjudged guilty of that crime, and, as we conclude supra, a defendant's entitle-
ment to a lesser included offense instruction extends only to those of which he
or she can be convicted.

648 477 Mass. 642 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

manslaughter . . . all but invite[s] the jury to disregard the
manslaughter instruction.” Short, 131 N.J. at 58.%

Conclusion. The trial judge correctly applied Spaziano and
allowed the defendant to choose between asserting the statute of
limitations defense or his right to a manslaughter instruction.

Judgments affirmed.

Bupp, J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk and Hines, JJ., join).
Hewing closely to the ruling in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984), the court concludes that where a defendant seeks an
instruction on a time-barred lesser included offense, the defendant
must first waive the statute of limitations. Because I believe that
under Massachusetts law a defendant cannot be forced to choose
between having a jury consider an applicable lesser included
offense and asserting a viable defense, I respectfully dissent.

1. Statutory protections. This case concerns the intersection of
two important statutory protections afforded to criminal defend-
ants: the statute of limitations and the right to have a jury consider
lesser included offenses.

a. Statute of limitations. A defendant’s right to present a de-
fense against the government’s accusations is rooted in the Sixth
Amendment, art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
and G. L. c. 263, § 5. The right entitles a defendant to introduce
evidence in his or her own defense and to advance alternative
theories of the case based on all the evidence presented. Where
such theories and evidence permit an inference that rises to the
level of an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the Common-
wealth to disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 780-781 &
n.37 (2010). The statute of limitations is such an affirmative
defense. See id. at 780.

In Massachusetts, the Legislature has set time limits on the
prosecution of all criminal offenses except murder and certain
types of sexual assault; the time limit for manslaughter is six
years. See G. L. c. 277, § 63. Statutes of limitations in criminal
cases are common generally. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282;
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-401; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5107; Ohio

®In cases in which the statute of limitations is contested, its applicability
should be posed to the jury as a special question, prior to the remainder of the
jury charge.

477 Mass. 642 (2017) 649

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

Rev. Code Ann. § 29-2901.13. Statutes of limitations represent a
policy choice by legislatures to let some individuals who commit
crimes go unpunished where the government fails to prosecute
within a specified period of time. See Model Penal Code § 1.06
comment, at 86 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). In
enacting a statute of limitations, a legislature recognizes that the
deterioration of evidence over time, the value of finality to a
community, and the possibility that a criminal may redeem him-
self or herself mean that, at some point, punishment of the
wrongdoer is no longer desirable. See id.

Although we have held that a defendant may be deemed to
have waived the statute of limitations by failing to raise it at or
before trial, see Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 455-
456 & n.21 (2010), we nevertheless have looked carefully at the
implications of such a waiver. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 792-793 (1994) (dismissing some indict-
ments and vacating others because defendant's waiver of statute
of limitations defense was due to ineffective assistance of coun-
sel). In any event, an inadvertent waiver, or a voluntary waiver of
the statute of limitations as a part of a plea agreement, is quite
different from requiring waiver of the defense in order to secure
an instruction on a lesser included offense, as the latter infringes
on the defendant’s vested right no longer to be punished for a
particular offense.

b. Lesser included offenses. In Massachusetts, the power of a
jury to find that a defendant has committed a lesser included
offense is expressly provided for by statute:

“Tf a person indicted for a felony is acquitted by the verdict
of part of the crime charged, and is convicted of the residue,
such verdict may be received and recorded by the court, and
thereupon the defendant shall be adjudged guilty of the
crime, if any, which appears to the court to be substantially
charged by the residue of the indictment, and shall be sen-
tenced and punished accordingly.”

G. L. c. 278, § 12. This statute gives juries the opportunity to
determine, as precisely as possible, what the prosecution has, and
has not, proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Further, by distin-
guishing between a conviction by the jury and an adjudication by

‘In Massachusetts, the concept of a lesser included offense is framed in terms
of a power (and duty) of a jury as an aspect of a fair trial, It stems from the
English common law, was codified by the Massachusetts Legislature shortly

650 477 Mass. 642 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

the judge, the statute provides that the jury’s factual findings set
the basis for the judge to figure out the appropriate judgment and
sentence for the defendant. In fact, the words “if any” foresee that
there may be some convictions found by a jury that do not result
in entry of a judgment of guilt — such as, for example, where the
statute of limitations provides that, although manslaughter is a
crime, it is no longer punishable by law. Cf. State v. Muentner,
138 Wis. 2d 374, 384 (1987) (“although the jury may return a
verdict convicting the defendant of the misdemeanor offenses,
when submitted, the court is precluded from entering a judgment
of conviction” due to statute of limitations).

As the court notes, our jurisprudence holds that either the
Commonwealth or the defendant may request a lesser included
offense instruction where “the evidence would permit a jury
rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and
acquit [that defendant] of the greater.” Ante at 645, quoting Beck
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635 (1980). Accord Commonwealth v.
Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 662-664 (1998). In determining
whether a jury could rationally find a defendant guilty of a lesser
included offense, our courts have historically considered only
whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find every
element of the lesser included offense; we have ignored objec-

following the enactment of the Constitution of 1780, and has changed very little
since. See St. 1784, c. 66, § 11; Commonwealth y. Gosselin, 365 Mass. 116,
118-119 (1974).

Because Massachusetts treats lesser included offenses as an inherent part of
a jury’s consideration of guilt, rather than purely as a procedural request that
parties may make at trial, the ability of a jury to consider lesser included
offenses is a much more fundamental aspect of a jury trial under our Constitu-
tion. See Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557, 594-595 (1878) (practical
exposition of Constitution by administrative and legislative branches, “espe-
cially if nearly contemporaneous with the establishment of the Constitution, and
followed and acquiesced in for a long period of years afterwards, is never to be
lightly disregarded, and is often conclusive”). Accord Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821) (using Judiciary Act of 1789 as contempora-
neous exposition of Constitution and thus as tool of constitutional construction).

?The court states: “If a lesser included offense is time barred, the defendant
cannot be adjudged guilty of that crime, and, as we conclude supra, a defend-
ant’s entitlement to a lesser included offense instruction extends only to those of
which he or she can be convicted.” Ante at note 5. This holding, however,
renders meaningless the provision in § 12 that provides that a jury’s verdict on
the “residue” (a lesser included offense) may not be translated into a judgment
of guilt. In addition, taken literally, this holding would preclude postverdict
rulings by the judge, including those on renewed motions for a required finding
of not guilty.

477 Mass. 642 (2017) 651

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

tions based on the credibility of the evidence or on any other
ground.? See Commonwealth v. Spinucci, 472 Mass. 872, 876-
877 (2015); Woodward, supra at 663-664; Commonwealth v.
Roby, 12 Pick. 496, 506-508 (1832). Although it can be a distinct
advantage to the prosecution,‘ the instruction is also an important
protection for the defendant, as “it affords the jury a less drastic
alternative than the choice between conviction of the offense
charged and acquittal.” Beck, supra at 633. See Woodward, supra
at 662 n.6, 664-665.

2. Application of the statutes. Together, the limitations statute,
G. L. c. 277, § 63, and the lesser included offense statute, G. L.
c. 278, § 12, require that a jury be instructed on any applicable
lesser included offenses if a defendant so requests, and that the
defendant be able to assert a statute of limitations defense if
applicable.

The language of a statute is to be interpreted in accordance with
its plain meaning, and if the “language is clear and unambiguous,
it is conclusive as to the intent of the Legislature.” Commissioner
of Correction v. Superior Court Dep’t of the Trial Court, 446
Mass. 123, 124 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. Clerk-Magis-
trate of the W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 439 Mass.
352, 355-356 (2003). Further, “[c]riminal statutes are to be con-
strued strictly against the Commonwealth and in favor of the
defendant,” and we interpret “[c]riminal limitation statutes . . . in

®The court changes this traditional approach by creating an exception for
cases where the statute of limitations has run on the lesser included offense. The
court then concludes that, where the statute of limitations is in dispute, the
defendant is not entitled to have the jury simultaneously instructed on both
defenses; instead, a special question regarding the statute of must be given to the
jury prior to the bulk of the instructions. See ante at note 6. This is not the rule
in the Commonwealth, as instructions on affirmative defenses are usually given
alongside the rest of the jury instructions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White,
475 Mass. 724, 732-734 (2016) (statute of limitations instruction was given
toward end of full jury charge); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 18 (2013)
(instruction on affirmative defense of self-defense “may be given . . . prior to the
murder instruction or inserted within the murder instruction”). See also Com-
monwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 780-781 (2010) (“We have repeatedly
referred to the statute of limitations defense as an affirmative defense . . .”). The
court fails to explain this change in our jurisprudence, or why the statute of
limitations should differ from any other disputed affirmative defense.

4“If the [Commonwealth fails] to produce sufficient evidence to prove the
crime charged, it might still persuade the jury that the defendant was guilty of
something.” Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984), citing Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980). See Commonwealth v, Woodward, 427
Mass. 659, 664-665 (1998).

652 477 Mass. 642 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

favor of repose.” Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241,
250 (2000). Nothing in the language of either the statute of
limitations or the statute governing lesser included offenses indi-
cates that one statute should give way to the other simply because
both happen to apply. In my view, there is no ambiguity in either
statute, and both should be applied as written. Because the
defendant has demonstrated that both statutes apply, he is entitled
to both the lesser included offense instruction and the statute of
limitations defense.*

3. The role of the jury. Given the role that Massachusetts juries
play in our criminal justice system, the defendant’s assertion of a
statute of limitations defense must not be part of the jury’s
deliberations. In the Commonwealth, we have separated the du-
ties of the jury from those of the judge. The jury’s role is to find
facts and ensure that a defendant is not punished unless the Com-
monwealth has presented proof of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. When jurors are instructed on lesser included offenses,
they are asked to consider what the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, and what it has not. In reaching a
verdict, jurors may not consider the legal consequences of that
verdict, including what, if any, punishment a defendant may
receive. See Commonwealth vy. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 911
(1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Burke, 373 Mass. 569, 576 n.3
(1977); E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 36:53
(4th ed. 2014). Trial judges purposely do not tell jurors what the
result of their work will be, and for good reason: we ask juries to

®This accords with the approach taken by courts in New Jersey, see ante at
646-647, and Wisconsin. See State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 56-58 (1993); State v.
Muentner, 138 Wis. 2d 374, 392-393 (1987).

In Short, 131 N.J. at 54-55, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that the
statute of limitations created a vested right in the defendant that could not be
withdrawn by the courts without an express exception in the statute or com-
mentary. The court also concluded that “the right to have the jury consider lesser
included offenses implicates ‘the very core of the guarantee of a fair trial’ ”
(citation omitted). /d. at 53. As a result, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the defendant was entitled both to a jury instruction on manslaughter and to raise
the statute of limitations following the verdict. Jd. at 60, citing Muentner, supra
(“A defendant's right to a fair trial cannot be conditioned on his or her giving
up a vested right to a statute of limitations defense, and a defendant's vested
right to a statute of limitations cannot be conditioned on his or her giving up the
right to a fair trial”).

®In contrast, in some States, like Florida, by statute, the jury must be
instructed on the penalty for the offense for which the accused is being charged.
See Fla. Stat. § 918.10(1).

477 Mass. 642 (2017) 653

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

focus on the facts specifically to avoid “result-oriented verdicts
and possible deviation from the basic issues of a defendant’s guilt
or innocence.”? Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 396 Mass. 108, 112
(1985), citing Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 379 Mass. 878, 882
(1980). Only after a jury find the facts by way of a verdict does
the judge attach legal significance to those facts with a judgment
or sentence. Thus, where, as here, the statute of limitations is not
a fact in dispute, it is not a question of fact to be determined by
the jury. The actual operation of that statute does not involve the
jury’s role as fact finder and should not play any role in the jury’s
deliberations.

The court expresses concern that giving a defendant the oppor-
tunity to assert a statute of limitations defense in connection with
a lesser included defense, without informing the jury that the
defendant may not be punished due to the fact that the limitations
period has run, tricks the jury and would thereby undermine their
faith in the court system. Ante at 646, citing Spaziano, 468 U.S.
at 456. I acknowledge this concern; however, the same could be
said any time a judge allows a motion for a required finding of
not guilty after the verdict — in each situation, the jury play their
role and the judge, hers.* Further, G. L. c. 278, § 12, appears to
have foreseen precisely such a result, as it provides that once a
defendant is “convicted of the residue” of a charged crime, the
court shall “adjudge[ ]” the defendant “guilty of the crime, ifany,
which appears to the court to be substantially charged by the
residue” (emphasis added). Thus, the Legislature has expressly
provided that in some cases, even where the jury have found the
defendant guilty, he or she will not be adjudged guilty or pun-
ished for a crime. This is at least facially similar to other situa-
tions in which jurors may be surprised, and even dismayed, to
learn that a defendant faces a longer period of incarceration than
they might have expected or, if they could have chosen, than they
would have imposed. Moreover, as the court points out, courts
keep information from juries all the time due to the operation of

7See, ¢.g., Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 11 (“[Y]our decision should
be based solely on the evidence and the law of this case, without regard to the
possible consequences of the verdicts. You may not consider sentencing or
punishment in reaching your verdicts”).

It is also worth noting that, if Massachusetts, like Florida, informed the jury
of the sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict (see note 6, supra), then
dismissed the case due to the statute of limitations, that truly would be tricking
the jury.

654 477 Mass. 642 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

our constitutional, statutory, and common law. The situation
before us is no different from the examples provided by the court:
the goal in each instance is to ensure that the jury base their
findings solely on lawfully obtained evidence that is relevant to
the question of guilt.”

Because this situation is not substantially different from others
where the jury are “kept in the dark,” at bottom, the concern
appears to be that, where a defendant is convicted but cannot be
punished due to the statute of limitations, the jury will feel that a
defendant who committed a crime unfairly goes without punish-
ment.'® Given that the purpose of the statute is to bar prosecutions
past a certain time period, such an outcome is clearly a possibility
contemplated by the Legislature for any criminal act where the
statute has run. Had the Legislature wanted to, it could have
specified exceptions in either the limitations statute or the lesser
included offense statute to avoid such an outcome." See Mc-
Laughlin, 431 Mass. at 250 (“The appropriate statute of limita-

®It bears noting that information withheld from the jury or suppressed
evidence is often evidence that bears directly on a defendant’s guilt or inno-
cence. Here, information regarding the operation of the statute of limitations has
nothing at all to do with the defendant’s culpability and would serve no other
purpose than to invite the jury to return a “result-oriented” verdict. For that
reason I do not subscribe to the approach, outlined in State v. Delisle, 162 Vt.
293, 304-305 (1994), in which the judge not only instructs the jury on the lesser
included offense but also informs them that the statute of limitations will bar any
punishment for that offense.

10This sentiment is not limited to juries. Following the verdicts in this case,
the judge reduced the degree of guilt with respect to the murder conviction to
murder in the second degree. The judge declined to consider reducing the
defendant’s degree of guilt to manslaughter, reasoning that even if the weight of
the evidence were consistent with that degree of guilt, reduction to manslaughter
would not be consonant with justice because the statute of limitations would
preclude punishment for the crime. This view misapprehends the statute of
limitations and overlooks its purpose. If a defendant's acts would constitute
manslaughter, but the statute of limitations has run, then the Legislature has
expressly prohibited punishment for that crime in those circumstances.

“For example, the Legislature could have chosen to take the approach taken
by Maine and Utah, where the statute of limitations is not a bar to an instruction
(and punishment) for a lesser included offense so long as the statute of limita-
tions has not run on the greater offense with which the defendant was charged.
See Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 8(7) (on condition that “there is evidence which
would sustain a conviction for the crime charged’); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-305.
Alternatively, the Legislature could have removed entirely the statute of limi-
tations for manslaughter. See, e.g., Short, 131 N.J. at 57 (discussing New Jersey
Legislature’s decision to remove all time bars for manslaughter by amending
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-6).

a

477 Mass. 642 (2017) 65.

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

tions is a matter for the Legislature”).

In any case, a juror’s potential disappointment with how a case
might turn out is hardly a reason to read into our statutes provi-
sions that simply are not there, see Boulter-Hedley v. Boulter, 429
Mass. 808, 811 (1999), or to upend our long tradition of how we
treat a jury verdict in a criminal trial. See note 1, supra.

4. The court’s approach. The court’s approach allows the
choice of applying either the statute of limitations or the statute
governing lesser included offenses when, as outlined above, both
should apply.

Citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the
Spaziano case," the court here concludes that “[w]here no lesser
included offense exists [ie., because the defendant cannot be
punished for the lesser included offense due to the statute of
limitations, the] lesser included offense instruction detracts from,
rather than enhances, the rationality of the process.” Ante at 645,
quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455. I disagree.

In my view, the court relies too heavily on Spaziano, a Florida
case involving the death penalty, in determining a defendant’s
rights in Massachusetts. The United States Supreme Court’s
decisions in both the Beck and Spaziano cases could be read to
require a lesser included offense instruction only where the de-
fendant faces the death penalty. See Adlestein, Conflict of the
Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199, 229 (1995) (“After Beck, Spaziano, and
Schad,"*! the Constitution would thus appear to require a state
court to provide a lesser offense option to the charged offense

2 Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447, has been overtumed in part by Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616, 623-624 (2016). In Spaziano, supra at 457-467, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was
constitutional even where some of the aggravating factors resulting in the death
penalty were found by a judge rather than a jury. The Court overruled that part
of the decision in Hurst, reasoning that the jury’s opinion could not be advisory
ina capital trial. Even though the Court did not overturn the portion of Spaziano
concerning lesser included instructions, Hurst represents a shift in perspective
regarding the role of the jury. See Hurst, supra at 624 (“Time and subsequent
cases have washed away the logic of Spaziano”).

"In Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), the United States Supreme Court
held that due process was satisfied where a jury considering an indictment for
capital felony-murder was also instructed on murder in the second degree. Id. at
646-648, The Court reasoned that Beck provided for a lesser included offense
only to avoid “an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and innocence.”
Id. at 646-647, quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455. Thus, because the jury were
instructed on second-degree murder, the defendant was not constitutionally

656 477 Mass. 642 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

only if the charged offense is punishable by death . . .”). Thus, for
States that do not have the death penalty, Spaziano arguably
would not require a court to give a lesser included offense
instruction at all as a matter of Federal constitutional law. More-
over, the Supreme Court has stated that so long as any lesser
included offense instruction with support in the evidence is given,
Federal due process is satisfied. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S.
624, 645-648 (1991).'* In Massachusetts, however, as discussed
previously, a defendant is entitled by statute and common law to
have a jury consider lesser included offenses, regardless of
whether the offense is time barred.

5. Conclusion. The court reasons that requiring the defendant to
choose between the statute of limitations defense and having the
jury receive a lesser included offense instruction “strikes the best
balance between protecting the ‘rationality of the process’ and a
defendant’s due process rights.” Ante at 645. I believe, instead,
that forcing a defendant to make a choice between the application
of one statute or the other, when he or she is entitled to both,
undermines, rather than protects, the rationality of the process,
and elevates the speculative concerns of a jury over the statutory
rights of a defendant."

entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of robbery. /d. at
645-648.

14Tn response, the court states that the United States Supreme Court’s opin-
ions in Spaziano and Beck only support its position that “due process does not
require [a lesser included offense instruction] in non-death-penalty cases” where
the statute of limitations has passed. Ante at note 4. See ante at 644 (“We
conclude that due process in Massachusetts does not require more than the
Federal rule articulated in Spaziano”). This misses the point. The important note
here is that Massachusetts already provides a more protective standard than the
Federal rule, as we give defendants the right to a lesser included offense
instruction even though they do not face the death penalty. Moreover, unlike the
Federal rule, Massachusetts generally entitles both the defendant and the Com-
monwealth to request all of the lesser included offense instructions that would
reasonably be supported by the evidence adduced at trial; otherwise, this case
would likely not be before us, as this defendant did receive an instruction on the
lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. See Woodward, 427
Mass. at 662 (where judge instructed jury on murder in first degree and murder
in second degree, Commonwealth could also request instruction on involuntary
manslaughter). In concluding that this defendant is not entitled to a more
protective rule than that articulated in Spaziano, the court fails to acknowledge
the existing differences between the Federal rule and ours, and why Massachu-
setts provides a more protective standard.

15 Although I disagree with the court’s prioritization of the jury’s speculative
concerns, an alternative approach is available to avoid diminishing the defend-

477 Mass. 642 (2017) 657

Commonwealth v. Shelley.

The approach of the court has the effect of forcing the defend-
ant to choose between an all-or-nothing defense (depriving him of
the right to be found guilty of no more than what the Common-
wealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt) and waiving the
statute of limitations on the lesser included offense (a viable
affirmative defense). Given our statutory law, this Hobson’s
choice is untenable. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

ant’s rights. In cases where an essential element of the charged crime is in
dispute but a lesser included offense is theoretically barred by the statute of
limitations, a trial judge could instruct the jury to retum a general verdict with
a special question as to the essential element in dispute (in this case, malice).
Where the jury’s answer to the special question reveals that the disputed element
is not present, and the appropriate verdict would be a time-barred offense, the
judge would enter a judgment of “not guilty” because of the statute of limita-
tions.

658 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

ComMonweattu vs. Jason Barsosa.

Suffolk. February 10, 2017. - August 25, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Hives, Lowy, & Bupp, 10."

Homicide. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Joint venturer, Expert opinion, Hearsay,
Spontaneous utterance, Opinion. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Opening
statement, Argument by prosecutor, Assistance of counsel, Indictment.

Ata murder trial, in which the Commonwealth proceeded on mutually exclusive
theories of joint venture but in which there was no codefendant on whose
actions the defendant’s conviction relied, the evidence was sufficient to
permit the jury reasonably to find that the defendant knowingly had partici-
pated in the premeditated murder with the requisite intent. [664-667]

At a murder trial, the judge did not err in admitting in evidence the testimony
of a police detective regarding gangs, where the detective’s extensive expe-
rience with gangs generally, and with the victim and defendant specifically,
qualified him as an expert and provided direct personal knowledge for the
testimony he offered; and where the judge took precautions to minimize any
prejudicial impact of the gang opinion testimony. [667-669]

At a criminal trial, no error arose in the prosecutor’s opening statement, where
the prosecutor's statements regarding the jury’s view of the crime scene were
merely enthusiastic rhetoric and were not evidence; similarly, no error arose
in the prosecutor's closing argument, where the challenged statements either
were proper or fell within the category of permissible rhetoric. [669-671]

At a murder trial, the judge did not err or abuse her discretion in admitting in
evidence statements from certain witnesses, where the statements were not
admitted for their truth and thus were not hearsay [671-672]; further, the
judge did not err in admitting statements from the victim’s girl friend, where
the statements met both of the criteria of spontaneous utterances and sup-
ported the Commonwealth’s theory that the murder was motivated by an
ongoing feud between gangs [672-673]; finally, the judge did not err in
permitting a police detective to testify regarding a discrepancy between a
bar’s video surveillance footage and the defendant’s global positioning
system data, where the detective’s testimony properly assisted the jury in
evaluating the evidence and understanding the time discrepancy [673-674].

There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that his counsel at a murder trial was
ineffective for failing to direct the jury’s attention to certain pieces of evidence
or to seek their admission, where the defendant failed to demonstrate that these
alleged failures likely influenced the jury’s verdict. [674-675]

Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case and authored this
opinion prior to her retirement.

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 659

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

A Superior Court judge did not err in denying the criminal defendant’s motion
to dismiss the indictments against him, where the Commonwealth presented
to the grand jury sufficient evidence to sustain an indictment for murder in
the first degree as part of a joint venture. [675-676]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on May 23, 2012.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Charles J. Hely, J., and the
case was tried before Christine M. McEvoy, J.

Patricia A, DeJuneas for the defendant.

Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M.
Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Com-
monwealth.

Hes, J. On February 23, 2012, Anthony Depina was shot and
killed outside a bar in the Roxbury section of Boston. The
defendant, Jason Barbosa, was indicted on the charges of murder
in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm as an
armed career criminal.? The Commonwealth proceeded against
him on the theory of deliberate premeditation. Specifically, the
Commonwealth’s theory at trial was that the shooting was com-
mitted as part of a joint venture wherein the defendant was a
knowing participant, either as the shooter or as an accomplice.
The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree,
and did not specify whether they found the defendant guilty as a
principal or as a joint venturer.

On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the Commonwealth
presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction as both
the shooter and as a knowing participant with shared intent to kill;
(2) the judge abused her discretion in admitting prejudicial gang
evidence; (3) the prosecutor’s opening statement and closing
argument were improper; (4) the judge allowed inadmissible state-
ments, which unfairly bolstered the Commonwealth’s theory of
gang retaliation and allowed improper interpretive testimony; (5)
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; and (6) the
motion judge erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss the indictments. We affirm the conviction and decline to grant
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Background. We recite the relevant facts the jury could have
found. We reserve certain details of the evidence presented to the
grand jury for later discussion of the defendant’s motion to dis-

®Prior to trial, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi as to the firearm
charge.

660 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

miss. The defendant and the victim had ties to rival Cape Verdean
gangs. The defendant was a member of the Woodward Avenue
gang, and the victim was associated with the Wendover Street
gang. Although the groups were aligned at one point, around
2005, the relationship between them deteriorated and they be-
came involved in an ongoing feud active through February, 2012,
when the victim was murdered.

On December 24, 2011, the defendant and two other members
of the Woodward Avenue gang, Kenneth Lopes and Manuel
Montrond, were involved in an altercation with several members
of the Wendover Street gang, including the gang’s leader, at a
gasoline station in Boston. The defendant and Lopes were injured
during the altercation, but neither cooperated with the police
investigation.

Two months later, on February 23, 2012, around 9:30 pm., the
defendant, who was on probation and wearing a global position-
ing system (GPS) tracking bracelet, and Montrond arrived at a bar
near the intersection of Burrell Street and Norfolk Avenue in
Roxbury in a black Cadillac CTS automobile rented by
Montrond. Minutes later, Lopes alighted from a different vehicle.
Montrond signaled Lopes by flashing his headlights twice. The
three men entered the bar* The actions of the defendant,
Montrond, and Lopes were captured by the bar’s eleven video
surveillance cameras. The cameras inside the bar were continu-
ously recording, while the cameras outside the bar were motion-
activated. Analysis of the time stamp on the video surveillance
and the defendant’s GPS data‘ revealed that the time stamp on the
video recordings was approximately four minutes and thirty sec-
onds fast. Other actions that were relevant were tracked by the
coordinates of the GPS and involved streets that were near the
bar.

Once inside the bar, the men socialized with the defendant’s
former girl friend and her cousin. A few minutes after the men ar-
rived, Montrond left the bar and went outside to sit in the Cad-
illac. The victim walked by and waved at Montrond on his way
into the bar.

2Montrond and Lopes were mentioned by name at trial as possible joint
venturers. However, it appears that neither man was ever charged in connection
with the murder.

4A representative from the Department of Probation, which administered the
defendant’s GPS monitoring, testified that the time stamp on the GPS data
points use the atomic clock, which is more accurate than the time stamp from
the bar’s video surveillance footage.

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 661

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

Although the bar is located in territory claimed by Woodward
Avenue gang members, members of the Wendover Street gang,
including the victim, also patronized the bar. The defendant and
the victim grew up together and were friends when they were
younger, but their relationship changed when the defendant, who
had been affiliated with the Wendover Street gang, began to
associate with members of the Woodward Avenue gang. Despite
the change in their relationship, when the victim arrived at the bar
just before 10 pm. with Maria Teixeira, the victim greeted the
defendant with a handshake and then walked to the end of the bar.

The defendant and the victim each left the bar at different times
and returned without incident, including when the defendant was
in Montrond’s vehicle while the victim walked by. At one point,
however, the defendant left the bar and drove around, returning to
the area of the bar at around 10:20 pM., and then drove to Wood-
ward Avenue. The defendant returned to Burrell Street and walked
toward the bar. The victim and Teixeira left the bar just before
10:30 pm. and stopped by the victim’s home before leaving again.
Meanwhile, the defendant appeared to be searching the area; he
walked down Burrell Street, where the victim’s vehicle had been
parked, and then turned around, returning to his vehicle and driving
to Albion Street, where Teixeira lived. At around 10:45 pm., the
defendant returned to the area of Burrell Street and Norfolk Av-
enue, followed by Montrond’s rented black Cadillac. The defendant
alighted from a small, dark-colored sport utility vehicle (SUV) and
went inside the bar. A black Cadillac followed the vehicle the
defendant had been in. Once inside the bar, the defendant looked
around the interior of the establishment, searching the bar area,
pool room, lounge, and bathroom before leaving less than a minute
after arriving.

At around 11 pm., the victim and Teixeira returned to the area
of Burrell Street and Norfolk Avenue near the bar. The victim
previously had made plans with Joseph Rosa, a member of the
Wendover Street gang, and two women to meet at the bar for
drinks. The victim and Teixeira arrived in the victim’s vehicle and
parked on Burrell Street, with the driver’s side of the vehicle next
to the sidewalk, near a dark alley. Although the plan was to have
drinks at the bar, the people the victim was meeting decided not
to go inside. Instead, the victim and Teixeira walked over to
Rosa’s vehicle and spoke with the occupants through the passen-
ger-side window while standing on the sidewalk. While the group

662 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

was talking, the defendant pulled up driving a small black SUV,
and stopped alongside Rosa’s vehicle. The defendant said some-
thing to the effect of, “You don’t belong here.” The victim said
something back to the defendant, and the defendant quickly drove
away, followed by the black Cadillac.

As a result of the interaction with the defendant, Rosa and one
of the women encouraged the victim to leave, but he refused,
insisting that he was a “tough kid” and that no one could tell him
where he can go. Rosa and the two women left. The victim and
Teixeira went back to the bar, intending to have a drink. Teixeira
went inside the bar to use the bathroom; the victim stayed outside
and smoked a cigarette. The defendant drove past the bar slowly
in the small black SUV. As the defendant drove by, the victim
stood by the front door of the bar and pointed at the defendant.

Seconds later, the victim went inside the bar; he first went to the
bathroom and then waited for Teixeira at the bar, declining a
drink. When Teixeira joined him at the bar, he told her that he had
changed his mind and wanted to leave. The victim did not tell
Teixeira why he had changed his mind and appeared normal, but
a little “mad.” As the victim and Teixeira left the bar and walked
to his vehicle, they had a conversation about the earlier interac-
tion with the defendant at Rosa’s vehicle. As Teixeira and the
victim approached his vehicle, headlights from a vehicle up the
street flashed four times. The victim looked toward the street.
Teixeira heard him use the defendant’s nickname and say, “Are
you for real, Little J?” Teixeira looked down the street and saw an
individual walking in the middle of the street, but she could not
see the individual’s face.* Immediately thereafter, another indi-
vidual fired multiple gunshots at the victim from the nearby
alley.* The victim was shot in the head and torso, and he fell to
the ground, face up, in between the driver’s-side door of his
vehicle and the curb.

At or about the time of the shooting, which was approximately
11:10:43 p., the defendant’s GPS data points? established that at
11:10:05 pm., he was located on Burrell Street, near Batchelder

®On cross-examination, Teixeira noted that the individual appeared to be
male, with short braids. The defendant had short, braided hair, Teixeira also
acknowledged that she did not see a gun in the individual’s hands.

°Teixeira testified that she did not see another individual besides the person
in the middle of the street and that the shots rang out within a second of the
victim’s statement, “Are you for real, Little J?”

7A GPS data point with the defendant’s location was to be recorded every
thirty seconds and included information about his location and speed and the

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 663

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

Street, traveling zero miles per hour. At 11:10:36 pM., the defend-
ant was on Burrell Street headed toward Norfolk Avenue, near the
bar, traveling two miles per hour. There was a missing data point
directly after the murder, which should have recorded at 11:11:06
pm. Seconds after the shooting, the dark-colored SUV drove
down Burrell Street, turned right on Norfolk Avenue, and then
took another right onto Marshfield Street.* At that time, 11:11:35
pM., the defendant’s GPS coordinates show him traveling on
Marshfield Street at thirty-eight miles per hour. Minutes after the
shooting, the defendant returned to a house on Woodward Av-
enue.”

After Teixeira heard the gunshots, she ran across the street and
back inside the bar. Although Teixeira saw the victim go down,
she did not realize he had been shot when she fled the gunfire. As
she re-entered the bar, Teixeira kept saying “shots fired, shots
fired.” Eventually, she went back outside to discover the victim’s
body, lying face-up between his vehicle and the curb. The bar-
tender telephoned 911.

When police officers arrived at around 11:15 pM., Teixeira was
hysterical. Officers had to physically restrain her as well as hold
her upright because she was distraught, screaming, and crying.
She was transported to Boston police headquarters. On the way,
she stated, “They’re going to kill me for this.” In the interview
room at the police station, she was still so emotionally upset that
she became physically ill. Shortly thereafter, she was asked some
questions. She stated, “These people want to kill people because
of the fucking street.” After she identified the victim, Teixeira
announced, “I’m going to die for this. I’m going to tell you
anyway.” In response to the detective’s question “Who shot?”
Teixeira replied, “Little J, Jason.”

The victim suffered gunshot wounds to the head and torso, both
of which were independently fatal and caused his death within
seconds. Although ballistics evidence was recovered from the
victim’s body and the crime scene, analysis was inconclusive
whether the bullet fragments were fired from the same weapon.

strength of the GPS signal; the location information is accurate to within fifteen
feet.

8A neighbor who lived on Norfolk Street near the bar testified that he heard
gunshots at around 11 em. that night and then saw a black “SUV-type car”
driving “way too fast” on Norfolk Avenue.

©The house was a “clubhouse” and hang out spot for Woodward Avenue gang
members.

664 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

The shell casings were identified as nine millimeter Luger caliber
and were fired from the same semiautomatic pistol. No firearm
was recovered in connection with the victim’s shooting.

As part of the investigation, detectives sought to identify and
locate the Cadillac that Montrond had rented and the small black
SUV the defendant was driving on the night of the shooting. The
small black SUV was never located. Although the rental contract
on the Cadillac was set to end on February 29, 2012, Montrond
returned the vehicle the day after the shooting, canceled the
contract, and established a new rental contract for a 2012 Buick
Lacrosse.'°

Two days after the shooting, the defendant and Montrond were
stopped by police, who seized the defendant’s cellular telephone.
Pursuant to a search warrant, detectives searched the defendant’s
cellular telephone and telephone records. The telephone records
established that approximately two minutes before the shooting,
the defendant telephoned one of the leaders of the Woodward
Avenue gang, and that approximately one minute after the shoot-
ing, at 11:12 pM., the defendant made a telephone call to another
leader of the Woodward Avenue gang. Between 11:13 pM. and
11:20 pM., the defendant received a telephone call from Lopes,
made an outgoing call to Montrond, and received another incom-
ing call from Lopes.

The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the
close of the Commonwealth’s case, which was denied. The judge
also denied the defendant’s renewed motion for a required finding
of not guilty at the close of all evidence.

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant chal-
lenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction. Specifi-
cally, he argues that because the jury returned a general verdict,
and the Commonwealth proceeded on mutually exclusive theo-
ries of joint venture liability, his conviction must be reversed
where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that he was both the shooter and a knowing participant with
the shared intent to kill, beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of
his argument, the defendant’s relies on Commonwealth v. Akara,

104 representative of the rental company testified that this situation was
unusual. Generally where a customer is unhappy with a rental car, the company
merely switches out that vehicle without closing the rental contract and notes the
customer-service issue, rather than establish a new rental contract. The repre-
sentative also confirmed that there were no mechanical issues or damage to the
Cadillac.

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 665

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

465 Mass. 245, 254-256 (2013), for the proposition that where the
Commonwealth proceeds on mutually exclusive theories of joint
venture, it must prove the sufficiency of the evidence as to each
theory. We disagree.

The rule we apply in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence
was articulated in Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 468
(2009):

“we will examine whether the evidence is sufficient to permit
a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant knowingly participated in the commission of
the crime charged, with the intent required to commit the
crime, rather than examine the sufficiency of the evidence
separately as to principal and joint venture liability.”

As we noted in Akara, 465 Mass. at 254, the circumstances of that
case were “unusual,” such that we departed from our traditional
analysis under Zanetti, supra. In Akara, supra at 254-255, two
defendants were tried jointly, but the evidence presented did not
support the conclusion that both defendants could have fired the
weapon. Paradoxically, the strongest evidence against each de-
fendant was that he knowingly participated in the charged crime
by pulling the trigger. /d. at 254. Given the unique factual cir-
cumstances of the case, this court considered “whether the evi-
dence, . . . in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
support[ed] the conclusion that each defendant, although not the
shooter, participated in and shared the requisite intent to commit
the crime” to ensure that each conviction was legally supportable.
Td.

This case, however, does not call for such a departure from
Zanetti. Although the defendant correctly notes that here, as in
Akara, the Commonwealth proceeded on mutually exclusive
theories of joint venture (e.g., the defendant as the shooter and as
a coventurer), there was no codefendant upon whose actions the
defendant’s conviction relies. See Akara, 465 Mass. at 254. Thus,
the Commonwealth’s burden here is to demonstrate that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Common-
wealth, supported the conclusion that the defendant “knowingly
participated in the commission of the crime charged, alone or
with others, with the intent required for that offense,” Zanetti, 454
Mass. at 468, rather than prove each “theory” separately.

“In order to have committed murder in the first degree with
deliberate premeditation, a defendant must have had or shared an

666 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

‘intent to kill or cause death,’ [Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass.
131, 139 (2012)], which was the ‘product of “cool reflection.” ’”
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 434-435 (2015), quot-
ing Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 455. “In evaluating whether the evidence
at trial was sufficient to support these elements, we ‘view the
evidence presented in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth and ask whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez,
475 Mass. 396, 407 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Simpkins,
470 Mass. 458, 461 (2015). “[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt[, and t]o the extent that
conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is for the
jury to decide which version to credit” (citation omitted). Com-
monwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 113 (2010), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 1013 (2011), S.C., 474 Mass. 1008 (2016).

From the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that the
defendant was motivated by anger at the ongoing feud between
the Woodward Avenue gang and the Wendover Street gang,
especially after the altercation at the gasoline station between the
defendant, Lopes, and Montrond, and members of the Wendover
Street gang, which occurred two months prior to the murder,
resulted in the injury to the defendant and Lopes. The jury also
could have found that the defendant’s threat, “You don’t belong
here,” was evidence of his motivation to kill because the victim,
an associate of the Wendover Street gang, was present in Wood-
ward Avenue gang “territory.”

Based on the surveillance footage from the interior and exterior
of the bar and the defendant’s GPS data, the jury also could have
found that after the defendant left the bar the first time, he began
stalking the victim, thus demonstrating his knowing participation
and shared intent to commit the premeditated murder. See Zanetti,
454 Mass. at 455. Specifically, the defendant traveled to the area
near the bar around 10:20 pM., before returning to Woodward
Avenue. Approximately ten minutes later, after the victim and
Teixeira left the bar, the defendant walked to Burrell Street where
the victim had been parked and then turned around. Thereafter,
the defendant drove to Albion Street, where Teixeira lived, and
later returned to the bar and searched for the victim at 10:45 pm.
At around 11 pm., the defendant threatened the victim, stating,
“You don’t belong here,” and approximately eight minutes later,
he slowly drove by the bar where the victim was smoking a

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 667

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

cigarette outside. This interaction made the victim change his
plan of getting a drink at the bar, and instead he insisted that he
and Teixeira leave the bar. Finally, a vehicle’s headlights flashed
four times signaling the victim’s arrival at his vehicle.

The inference of the defendant’s participation in the joint
venture is even stronger based on the victim’s statement as he
approached his vehicle, “Are you for real, Little J?” and Tei-
xeira’s observation of a man in the middle of the street with short
braided hair, which matched the description of the defendant.
Also, the defendant’s GPS data places him walking on Burrell
Street, near the victim’s vehicle, at or about the time of the
murder. Seconds later, gunshots rang out from the alley, killing
the victim.

The defendant’s flight from the scene less than a minute after
the shooting, traveling thirty-eight miles per hour on Marshfield
Street and eventually arriving on Woodward Avenue, and tele-
phone calls with his suspected coventurers immediately before
the shooting and in the thirty minutes after, allow the reasonable
inference of the defendant’s participation in and shared intent to
commit the murder. See Miranda, 458 Mass. at 113; Zanetti, 454
Mass. at 455.

Therefore, the jury could reasonably have found that the de-
fendant knowingly participated in the premeditated murder, with
the requisite shared intent. See Zanetti, supra at 468.

2. Gang opinion testimony. The judge conducted a voir dire to
assess — and to allow the defendant to challenge — the founda-
tion for the opinions of the Commonwealth’s gang expert, Detec-
tive Martin O’Malley. At trial, the jury heard about O’Malley’s
background and experience with Cape Verdean gangs. The defend-
ant contends that the judge abused her discretion in allowing this
testimony, both because O’Malley was not qualified and because
his testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay. The Common-
wealth argues that the evidence was properly admitted to prove
motive, and was based on the qualified expert’s personal knowl-
edge. There was no error.

Expert opinion testimony “must rest on a proper basis, else
inadmissible evidence might enter in the guise of expert opinion.”
Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 803 (1996). Proper bases
include facts within the witness’s direct personal knowledge, or
unadmitted but independently admissible evidence. See Mass. G.
Evid. § 703 (2017); Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398
Mass. 516, 531 (1986). Here, O’Malley’s extensive experience

668 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

with Cape Verdean gangs generally, and with the victim and
defendant specifically, qualified him as an expert and provided
direct personal knowledge for the testimony he offered. O’Malley
served as lead investigator from the Boston police department in
an approximately two-year joint investigation with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation into Woodward Avenue gang members,
which concluded in January, 2013. Before that, he was a patrolman
in the Dorchester section of Boston for seven years, and assigned
to the youth violence strike force gang unit for another two. In both
capacities, O’Malley logged countless conversations with Cape
Verdean residents — including concerned citizens, cultivated in-
formants, and admitted gang members — and from these interac-
tions, he made determinations of gang affiliation. He testified to
individual affiliations within the Woodward Avenue and Wendover
Street gangs; to the territorial reach of each gang; and to the history
of the gangs as aligned until about 2005, when a split gave rise to
a feud active at the time of the victim’s death. O’Malley knew the
victim since about 2005, and had observed him with Wendover
Street gang associates and at the addresses of the gang’s headquar-
ters on several occasions. He was similarly familiar with the
defendant, whom he had observed wearing Woodward Avenue
gang colors and in the presence of Woodward Avenue gang leaders
on multiple occasions. O’ Malley also testified that the defendant
had left the Wendover Street gang for the Woodward Avenue gang
in 2006 and that, as a result, animosity remained between the
defendant and a leader of the Wendover Street gang.

O’Malley’s testimony, based on his personal knowledge, was
admissible. Mass. G. Evid. § 703. See Commonwealth v. Smith,
450 Mass. 395, 399, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008) (rejecting
hearsay challenge to officer’s gang opinion testimony based on
“use of informants, street sources of information, the school po-
lice, teachers, probation officers, enemies,” where officer had
personal familiarity with victim, defendant, and their respective
gangs).

The Commonwealth's theory was that there was a joint venture
motivated by this ongoing rivalry between the Woodward Avenue
and Wendover Street gangs. Evidence of the defendant's affilia-
tion with the Woodward Avenue gang was probative of motive,
and provided necessary context for the defendant’s statement to
the victim (“You don’t belong here’). See Commonwealth v.
Correa, 437 Mass. 197, 201 (2002) (“[W]here evidence of gang
affiliation is relevant to the defendant’s motive, it is within the

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 669

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

discretion of the judge to weigh the probative value of the
evidence against its prejudicial effect”).

Moreover, the judge took precautions to minimize any preju-
dicial impact of the gang opinion testimony. She conducted
individual voir dire with each juror, using three agreed-upon
questions to confirm the juror’s capacity to consider the evidence
only for its limited purpose. Each time the evidence was intro-
duced, it was accompanied by a thorough limiting instruction,
which was repeated in the final charge. Especially where the
judge carefully cabined properly admitted testimony with limit-
ing instructions, voir dire, and exclusion of any references to
prior acts of gang-related violence, admitting that testimony in
evidence was not an error. See Smith, 450 Mass. at 400, and cases
cited.

3. Prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument. The
defendant argues that the prosecutor’s opening statement and
closing argument, to which the defendant did not object, were
improper. “Although not dispositive, we consider the fact that the
defendant did not object to the statements at trial as ‘some
indication that the tone [and] manner . . . of the now challenged
aspects of the prosecutor’s argument were not unfairly prejudi-
cial.’ ”” Commonwealth vy. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 471 (1998),
quoting Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 380 (1995). We
conclude that there was no error.

“The proper function of an opening is to outline in a general
way the nature of the case which the counsel expects to be able
to prove or support by evidence.” Commonwealth v. Croken, 432
Mass. 266, 268 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Fazio, 375
Mass. 451, 454 (1978). “[A] claim of improper [opening state-
ment] by the prosecutor must be judged in light of the entire
[statement], the judge’s instructions to the jury, and the evidence
actually introduced at trial.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 439 Mass.
249, 260-261 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429
Mass. 146, 158 (1999). Here, the defendant argues that the pro-
secutor improperly appealed to the jury’s emotions by reminding
them that they saw where the shooter emerged from the alley
during the view of the crime scene, and by using phrases such as
“killing team” and “stalking and hunting,” during his opening
statement. The prosecutor’s statements were not improper, as they
were merely “enthusiastic rhetoric.” See Commonwealth v. Simp-
son, 434 Mass. 570, 586 (2001). Moreover, “to the degree the
recitation of the evidence was inflammatory, that was inherent in

670 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

the odious . . . nature of the crime[ ] committed” (citation omit-
ted). Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 749 (1999). The
jury were properly instructed before the opening statements, and
in the final charge, that the statements were not evidence.

Similarly, “[c]losing arguments must be viewed ‘in the context
of the entire argument, and in light of the judge’s instruction to
the jury, and the evidence at trial.’ ” Commonwealth v. Braley,
449 Mass. 316, 328-329 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Co-
lon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 553 (1990). The defendant claims that
the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury’s emotions when
he encouraged the jurors to use their recollections of the view to
evaluate the evidence. He also claims that the prosecutor used
improper forceful rhetoric in describing the victim’s murder and
the defendant’s actions and that the prosecutor engaged in mis-
conduct when he asked the jurors to hold the defendant account-
able for his actions.

The prosecutor properly encouraged the jury to use their ob-
servations from the view to evaluate the evidence and aid in
reaching their verdict. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass.
443, 448 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass.
194, 199 (2011) (“[a]lthough what is seen on the view may be
used by the jury in reaching their verdict, in a ‘strict and narrow
sense a view may be thought not to be evidence’ ”). Similarly, the
prosecutor’s forceful rhetoric was based on the evidence without
focusing on any unnecessarily emotional or inflammatory aspects
of the evidence. See Lyons, 426 Mass. at 472. Moreover, the
prosecutor’s description of the victim’s murder was based on the
evidence and was relevant to establish the nature of the crime.
See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 376 (1989), quo-
ting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 521 (1987) (“Al-
though this line of argument may evoke sympathy for the vic-
tim[ ], the argument went to the issues in the case and was ‘based
on what the jury saw and heard’ ”). The judge instructed the jury
prior to the arguments and in the final charge that closing state-
ments were not evidence, and specifically instructed the jury to
“not decide this case in any way based on sympathy towards the
victim or the victim’s family or any sympathy towards the de-
fendant.” The prosecutor’s statement reminding the jury that the
victim’s murder occurred nearly two years prior to the trial and
that now was the time for the defendant’s accountability was not
improper. Although the statement regarding the defendant’s ac-
countability was better left unsaid, “[t]he prosecutor’s remarks

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 671

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

were characteristic of ‘enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and
excusable hyperbole,’ and did not cross the line between fair and
improper argument.” Lyons, supra, quoting Commonwealth v.
Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 107 (1997). Contrast Commonwealth v.
Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 464-465 (2002) (improper argument where
prosecutor asked jury to “answer the call for justice and hold [the
defendant] accountable for what he did”). The prosecutor’s state-
ment “falls within the category of permissible rhetoric and . . . there
was no error.” Conumonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 243, 255 (2012).

The defendant claims that the prosecutor also improperly en-
couraged the jurors to use evidence that Montrond returned the
rented Cadillac the day after the murder as evidence of the
defendant’s participation in the joint venture. We do not agree.
The prosecutor was entitled to argue inferences from the evidence
that are favorable to the Commonwealth’s case. See Lyons, 426
Mass. at 472. The jury reasonably could infer that in order to
cover up his participation in the joint venture, Montrond returned
the Cadillac the day after the murder, before the end of his rental
contract. The jury could further infer the defendant’s knowing
participation based on his presence in the Cadillac that evening
and the surveillance footage depicting the Cadillac following the
defendant’s vehicle on multiple occasions that evening. See id.

Finally, the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor improp-
erly suggested that the jury’s job was “easier” because they could
find the defendant guilty of joint venture without determining
whether he was the shooter or a coventurer is without merit. The
prosecutor correctly stated the law of joint venture and the
Commonwealth’s burden. See Commonwealth v. Deane, 458
Mass. 43, 50-51 (2010) (“the Commonwealth is not required to
prove exactly how a joint venturer participated in the murder[ ],
. .. or which of the [coventurers] did the actual killing” [citation
omitted]).

4. Evidentiary rulings. The defendant argues that the judge
committed reversible error in (1) allowing inadmissible state-
ments that unfairly bolstered the Commonwealth’s theory of gang
retaliation and (2) allowing improper “interpretive” testimony
from the lead homicide detective. We address these arguments in
turn.

a. Statements by the victim’s friends. The defendant challenges
the admission of statements from Rosa and one of the women
who were with him that night describing their concern for the
victim after the defendant’s statement, “You don’t belong here.”

672 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

The admission of the statements was not improper, as they were
not admitted for their truth and, thus, not hearsay. See Mass. G.
Evid. § 801 (2017). The judge noted that the witnesses’ state-
ments were admissible “to put in context” the victim’s statement
of intent to go inside the bar and have a drink. There was no error
or abuse of discretion in admitting these statements. See L.L. v.
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

b. Teixeira’s statements. The defendant challenges three of
Teixeira’s statements, made after she discovered that the victim
had been murdered, admitted under the excited or spontaneous
utterance hearsay exception through the testimony of a police
officer. As Teixeira was being transported to Boston police head-
quarters, she exclaimed, “They’re going to kill me for this.”
Thereafter, while she was waiting to be interviewed by homicide
detectives, Teixeira stated, “These people want to kill people
because of the fucking street.” And during her interview with
homicide detectives, Teixeira said, “I’m going to die for this.”
There was no error.

A statement is “[a] spontaneous utterance if (A) there is an
occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the
normal reflective thought processes of the observer, and (B) the
declarant’s statement was a spontaneous reaction to the occur-
rence or event and not the result of reflective thought.” Mass. G.
Evid. § 803(2) (2017). See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass.
620, 623 (2002). “[T]here can be no definite and fixed time limit
[between the incident and the statement]. Each case must depend
upon its own circumstances.” Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2) note, quoting
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 223 (1973). “[T]he
nexus between the statement and the event that produced it is but
one of many factors to consider in determining whether the
declarant was, in fact, under the sway of the exciting event when
she made the statement.” Santiago, supra at 625. A trial judge’s
determination that an utterance meets the test of admissibility
should be given deference and “only in clear cases .. . of an
improper exercise of discretion should [the judge’s] ruling be
revised” (citation omitted). McLaughlin, supra.

Here, the Commonwealth used Teixeira’s statements to support
its theory that the victim’s murder was motivated by the ongoing
feud between the Wendover Street and Woodward Avenue gangs
and by retaliation for the defendant’s and Lopes’s injuries from
the December, 2011, altercation with a leader of the Wendover
Street gang. Her statements occurred after she discovered the

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 673

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

body of the victim, whom she had been seeing romantically, after
he had been shot to death. Teixeira was hysterical. Prior to her
first challenged statement, she was found by police lying on the
sidewalk screaming and crying. Officers had to physically restrain
Teixeira from returning to the victim’s body and hold her up so
that she did not collapse, as she was unable to stand on her own.
Based on her behavior and body language, it was plain that her
presence during the victim’s shooting and the discovery of his
body was a sufficiently startling event. See Commonwealth v.
Trene, 462 Mass. 600, 607, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012)
(“We have viewed the circumstances of being shot, or witnessing
a shooting, as sufficiently startling to impede normal reflective
thought processes”). Additionally, just prior to Teixeira’s state-
ments at police headquarters, she was so emotional that she
became physically ill. Teixeira’s emotional demeanor and physi-
cal illness shortly after the victim’s murder and the discovery of
his body are sufficient to demonstrate that Teixeira’s statements
were “a spontaneous reaction to the [victim’s murder] and not the
result of reflective thought.” Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2). “Because
both criteria of the spontaneous utterance exception were satis-
fied, the testimony was admissible.” Irene, supra.

c. “Interpretive” testimony. The defendant challenges the ad-
mission of the testimony of Detective Brian Black, one of the lead
investigators on the case, on the ground that it was improper
interpretive testimony that went beyond the bounds of proper lay
witness testimony. Because the defendant objected to Black’s
testimony, we review any error for prejudicial error. See Com-
monwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 545 (2013).

Here, Black testified regarding the approximately four minute
and thirty second time discrepancy between the bar’s video
surveillance footage and the defendant’s GPS data. The judge
allowed Black to review a compilation of the video surveillance
footage side-by-side with the GPS data to help explain the inves-
tigative significance of the evidence when the time discrepancy is
accounted for. Black testified that he had assisted in the creation
of the compilation, discerned the extent of the time discrepancy
between the video surveillance footage and the defendant’s GPS
data, and had detailed familiarity with the evidence. His testi-
mony properly assisted the jury in evaluating the evidence and
understanding the time discrepancy. See Mass. G. Evid. § 701 &
note (2017). Moreover, the defendant was not prejudiced by
Black’s testimony regarding the time discrepancy because the

674 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

defendant’s own witness gave similar testimony, opining that the
time discrepancy was approximately four minutes and thirty-five
seconds. The defendant’s witness also attempted to resolve the
time discrepancy by synchronizing the bar’s surveillance footage
and the defendant’s GPS data. There was no error.

5. Ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant argues that
trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in
failing to present evidence that would have countered the Com-
monwealth’s theory of gang retaliation. Specifically, the defend-
ant asserts that trial counsel should have “offered or directed the
jury’s attention to” (1) a Boston police memorandum detailing
the December 24, 2011, altercation, which included a non-
exhaustive list of active Wendover Street gang and Woodward
Avenue gang associates, and which failed to list the victim as a
Wendover Street gang associate; (2) the voir dire testimony of the
victim’s sister that he was an “associate,” not a member, of the
Wendover Street gang; and (3) the defendant’s GPS data and
cellular telephone evidence that would counter the Common-
wealth’s theory that the defendant had been stalking or searching
for the victim.

“Where, as here, the defendant has been convicted of murder in
the first degree, we review his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel to determine whether the alleged lapse created a ‘sub-
stantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,’ a standard more
favorable to the defendant than the constitutional standard other-
wise applied under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96
(1974).” Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 29 (2017),
quoting Wright, 411 Mass. at 681-682. “We focus more broadly
on whether there was error and, if so, whether any such error ‘was
likely to have influenced the jury’s conclusion.’ ” Fulgiam, su-
pra, quoting Wright, supra. “The burden is on the defendant to
demonstrate that something inappropriate was likely to have
unfairly influenced the jury’s verdict.” Commonwealth v. Pain-
ten, 429 Mass. 536, 550 (1999).

Here, the defendant argues that counsel’s failure to direct the
jury’s attention to the aforementioned pieces of evidence or seek
their admission likely influenced the jury’s verdict. We disagree.
The defendant failed to establish how admission of the police
memorandum and the testimony of the victim’s sister that the
victim was not a full-fledged member of the Wendover Street
gang would have countered the Commonwealth’s theory of gang
retaliation. See id. The Commonwealth provided evidence that

477 Mass. 658 (2017) 675

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

the victim was an “associate” of the Wendover Street gang and
that he had a friendship with a leader of that gang, who was
involved in the December 24, 2011, altercation with the defend-
ant, Lopes, and Montrond. Similarly, evidence that the defendant
traveled in the same area prior to seeing the victim at the bar does
not counter the reasonable inference that after the defendant left
the bar, having seen the victim, the defendant was searching the
area for the victim as part of a joint venture to commit premedi-
tated murder. See id. The defendant’s assertion that trial counsel
was ineffective is unavailing.

6. Motion to dismiss indictments. The defendant argues that the
motion judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss indictments,
pursuant to Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 161-
163 (1982), because the Commonwealth failed to establish prob-
able cause to believe that the defendant committed the victim’s
murder. This argument has no merit.

“Probable cause to sustain an indictment is a decidedly low
standard.” Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 M 03, 311 (2013).
“[A]t the very least the grand jury must hear sufficient evidence to
establish the identity of the accused, . . . and probable cause to
arrest him’ (citation omitted). McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 163. “Prob-
able cause has been defined as ‘reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
defendant had committed or was committing an offense.’ ” Han-
right, supra at 311-312, quoting Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362
Mass. 20, 26 (1972). “Where, as here, the liability of a joint
venturer is at issue, the Commonwealth must present the grand jury
with evidence that the defendant both participated in, and shared
the requisite mental state for, each crime charged.” Hanright, supra
at 312. When reviewing the sufficiency of an indictment, the grand
jury evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 Mass 880, 885
(2009).

Here, the Commonwealth presented to the grand jury sufficient
evidence to sustain an indictment for the murder in the first
degree of the victim as part of a joint venture. The evidence
established that the defendant, Lopes, and Montrond were at the
bar on the night of the murder. Video surveillance footage from
the bar established that the SUV driven by the defendant and the
Cadillac driven by Montrond were circling the area of the bar that
night. Thirty minutes before the shooting, the defendant searched
the bar. Prior to the shooting, the defendant told the victim he

676 477 Mass. 658 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Barbosa,

should not be in the area before speeding off, which made some
of the victim’s friends concerned. Despite Rosa’s suggestion
otherwise, the victim decided to go into the bar and have a drink.
The victim changed his mind after smoking a cigarette outside the
bar and decided to leave. The victim told Teixeira about the
defendant’s threat as they were walking toward the victim’s
vehicle and confirmed that the defendant was the person who
made the threat. Teixeira saw a man with braids, who she iden-
tified as the defendant, walking toward the vehicle and heard the
victim say something like, “You gonna do me like this, J?” before
the victim was shot. Finally, the defendant’s GPS data placed him
within fifteen feet of the victim at or about the time of the
shooting. Based on the evidence presented to the grand jury,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there
was probable cause to believe that the defendant knowingly
participated and shared in the intent to commit the premeditated
murder of the victim. See Hanright, 466 Mass. at 312.

7. Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. After a full review
of the trial record, we affirm the conviction and decline to grant
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Judgment affirmed.

477 Mass. 677 (2017) 677

Commonwealth » Perez,

ComMoNWEALTH VS. FERNANDO PEREZ.
Hampden, April 3, 2017. - August 25, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cypuer, 1.

Constitutional Law, Sentence. Due Process of Law, Sentence. Practice, Crimi-
nal, Sentence.

This court concluded that where a juvenile is sentenced for a nonmurder offense
or offenses and the aggregate time to be served prior to parole eligibility
exceeds that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder, the sentence can-
not be reconciled with art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
unless, after a hearing considering the appropriate factors, the judge makes
a finding that the circumstances warrant treating the juvenile more harshly
for parole purposes than a juvenile convicted of murder. [681-688] Lowy, J..
dissenting, with whom Cypuea, J., joined.

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on February 16 and March 2, 2001.

Following review by the Appeals Court, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 912
(2004) and 67 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2006), a motion for resen-
tencing, filed on March 7, 2016, was considered by Daniel A.
Ford, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant.

Elizabeth Dunphy Farris, Assistant District Attorney (Kather-
ine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the
Commonwealth.

Merritt Schnipper, for Committee for Public Counsel Services,
amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Hoes, J. In the early morning hours of December 23, 2000, the
juvenile defendant, Fernando Perez, who was then seventeen
years of age, embarked on a crime spree in downtown Spring-
field. Accompanied by his adult uncle and armed with a handgun,

Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case and authored this
opinion prior to her retirement.

678 477 Mass. 677 (2017)

Commonwealth » Perez,

the defendant committed two robberies, both within a span of
thirty minutes. While attempting a third robbery, he shot the
intended victim, a plain-clothed Springfield police officer. In
November, 2001, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant
of armed robbery, armed assault with intent to rob, assault and
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and related firearms
offenses. The judge sentenced the defendant to multiple concur-
rent and consecutive terms, resulting in an aggregate sentence of
thirty-two and one-half years,” with parole eligibility after twenty-
seven and one-half years.

In 2015, after our decision in Diatchenko v. District Attorney
for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013) (Diatchenko I), S.C.,
471 Mass. 12 (2015), the defendant filed a motion for resentenc-
ing under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass.
1501 (2001), arguing that the aggregate sentence imposed vio-
lated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the
cognate provision of art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, by requiring him to serve twelve and one-half years
longer before parole eligibility than a juvenile defendant con-
victed of murder. He also argued that the sentence violated his
right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights and that, as a consequence, he was entitled
to be resentenced to a term of years allowing parole eligibility on
the same terms as a juvenile convicted of murder. A Superior

2The judge dismissed certain indictments, and on the remaining indictments,
he imposed the following sentences. On the first set of indictments, the judge
sentenced the defendant as follows: armed robbery (count 1), from five to seven
and one-half years in State prison; armed robbery (count 3), from five years to
five years and one day in State prison, to run from and after the sentence for
count 1; armed robbery (count 5), ten years’ probation to run from and after the
sentence on count 4 in the second set of indictments; and unlawful possession
of a firearm (count 7), two and one-half years in a house of correction, con-
current with the sentence for count 3.

On the second set of indictments, the judge sentenced the defendant as
follows: armed assault with the intent to rob (count 2), from seven and one-half
to ten years in State prison, to run from and after the sentence on count 3 in the
first set of indictments; assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon
(count 4), from nine years and 364 days to ten years in State prison, to run from
and after the sentence for count 2; unlawful possession of a firearm (count 5),
two and one-half years in a house of correction, concurrent with the sentence for
count 7 of the first set of indictments; and unlawful discharge of a firearm (count
6), one day in a house of correction, concurrent with the sentence for count 5.

477 Mass. 677 (2017) 679

Commonwealth » Perez,

Court judge denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. We
granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate review.*

On appeal, the defendant relies primarily on Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (invalidating death penalty for juve-
niles), and its progeny‘ to support his claim that the aggregate
sentence violates the proscription against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the Eighth Amendment and art. 26. We decline the
invitation to decide the issue on Eighth Amendment grounds,
especially where the United States Supreme Court has not inter-
preted the Eighth Amendment as broadly as urged by the defend-
ant. Instead, we resolve the issue under art. 26, which we have
interpreted more broadly than the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Eighth Amendment.’ We conclude that where a juvenile is
sentenced for a nonmurder offense or offenses and the aggregate
time to be served prior to parole eligibility exceeds that appli-
cable to a juvenile convicted of murder, the sentence cannot be
reconciled with art. 26 unless, after a hearing on the factors ar-
ticulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-478 (2012)
(Miller hearing), the judge makes a finding that the circumstances
warrant treating the juvenile more harshly for parole purposes
than a juvenile convicted of murder. Accordingly, we remand the
matter to the Superior Court for a Miller hearing to determine
whether the sentence comports with the requirements of art. 26.
If not, then the defendant must be resentenced.

Background. 1. Facts. We recite the facts the jury could have
found. On December 23, 2000, around 1 a.m., the defendant,
then aged seventeen, committed two robberies and attempted a
third. The three crimes occurred within thirty minutes of each
other and within a several-block radius of downtown Spring-
field. The defendant was armed with a handgun, and his uncle,
Tito Abrante, shuttled him from crime to crime.* The defendant
first robbed a married couple at a train station and then robbed a

*We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Youth Advocacy Divi-
sion of the Committee for Public Counsel Services.

4See Graham vy. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (prohibiting life sentence
without possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses);
and Miller vy. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life
sentence without parole for juveniles convicted of murder).

See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 668
(2013) (Diatchenko I), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).

°Tito Abrante has a criminal history and, at the time, had been recently
released from prison. He was charged with crimes related to these events, but
was tried separately from the defendant.

680 477 Mass. 677 (2017)

Commonwealth » Perez,

man walking on Main Street. In the third incident, he approached
Carlo D’ Amato, an off-duty detective with the Springfield police
department. Detective D’Amato said, “What’s up?” to which the
defendant replied, “I’m going to rob you . . . .” In response,
Detective D’Amato said, “I don’t think so. You should really
think about this. I’m a Springfield police officer and you should
think about what you’re doing.” As Detective D’Amato reached
for his badge, the defendant shot him; the defendant continued to
fire the weapon as he retreated from the scene. Detective D’ Amato
suffered serious injuries that required multiple surgeries. On Janu-
ary 30, 2001, the police arrested the defendant in Scranton, Penn-
sylvania. In statements to Scranton and Springfield police, the
defendant admitted to shooting Detective D’Amato but claimed
Abrante committed the other robberies.

2. Sentencing. Prior to sentencing, the trial judge ordered a
G.L. c. 123, § 15 (e) , evaluation in aid of sentencing, which was
performed by Dr. Michael Sherry, a designated forensic psy-
chologist. In addition, a Superior Court probation officer in
Hampden County, Laura Periera, prepared a presentence inves-
tigation report at the court’s direction. The judge previously had
received and reviewed two reports from Dr. Pamela Dieter-Sands,
a licensed psychologist and the defendant’s expert witness.” In
her report, Dieter-Sands detailed the defendant’s upbringing, how
he lived under the extreme stress of his father’s violence, and the
vacuum that was left when an uncle who had nurtured and
supported the defendant was murdered in the spring of 2000. The
defendant filled the void left by this “loving father figure” with
Abrante, whom he first met about one month after his uncle’s
death. Periera reported that “this defendant believed that if he did
not follow through with [Abrante’s] orders, he would be sub-
jected to bodily harm.

The Commonwealth sought concurrent life sentences on two of
the defendant’s armed robbery convictions, and term-of-years
sentences totaling twenty to thirty years on the remaining felony
convictions. The defendant requested a sentence of ten years in
State prison and urged the judge to consider the defendant’s
evaluations and his “horrible upbringing.” Before pronouncing
sentence, the trial judge stated, “I recognize . . . that at the time
of these offenses [the defendant] was only [seventeen] years old.

7Dr. Pamela Dieter-Sands testified at trial regarding the defendant’s mental
state at the time he committed his offense.

477 Mass. 677 (2017) 681

Commonwealth » Perez,

And young men of the age of [seventeen] frequently do not have
the maturity to make good judgments. But the law makes them
responsible for their acts as adults, nonetheless.”* The judge
sentenced the defendant to an aggregate term of thirty-two and
one-half years imprisonment, resulting in parole eligibility after
twenty-seven and one-half years.

3. Posttrial proceedings. The defendant appealed from his sen-
tences to the appellate division of the Superior Court, which dis-
missed the appeal. On February 15, 2002, the defendant filed
identical motions to revise and revoke his sentences on the grounds
of “basic fairness and justice, and the [d]efendant’s personal cir-
cumstances and background,” pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, 378
Mass. 899 (1979). On January 3, 2006, the trial judge denied the
motions.

On October 25, 2004, the Appeals Court affirmed the convic-
tions. Commonwealth v. Perez, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 914
(2004). On December 27, 2005, the defendant filed a motion for
a new trial, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435
Mass. 1501 (2001), on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing, and the
Appeals Court affirmed the denial. Commonwealth v. Perez, 67
Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2006) (unpublished opinion).

On March 7, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for a resentenc-
ing hearing pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), relying on our
decision in Diatchenko I. The motion judge® denied the motion,
concluding “that a sentence providing for parole eligibility after
[twenty-seven and one-half] years is not the functional equivalent
of a life sentence without parole, and therefore that the sentence
imposed in this case was not constitutionally infirm.” On Novem-
ber 15, 2016, the judge denied the defendant’s motion to recon-
sider, and the defendant filed an appeal in the Appeals Court. On
January 18, 2017, this court granted the defendant‘s application
for direct appellate review.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review the denial of a
motion brought under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) for an abuse of

SAt the time of the conviction in 2001, the age threshold for a juvenile
offender was seventeen years of age. However, in 2013, the Legislature
amended various provisions of G. L. c. 119, including § 72, which raised the age
threshold from seventeen to eighteen years of age. See G. L. ¢. 119, § 72, as
amended through St. 2013, c. 84, §§ 21-22A (effective Sept. 18, 2013). See also
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 630-631 (2013).

®Because the trial judge had retired, the motion was heard by the same judge
who had presided over Abrante’s trial.

682 477 Mass. 677 (2017)

Commonwealth » Perez,

discretion. Commonwealth v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 461 (2014).
Under that standard, the issue is whether the judge’s decision
resulted from “ ‘a clear error of judgment in weighing’ the factors
relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the
range of reasonable alternatives” (citation omitted). L.L. v. Com-
monwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

2. Constitutionality of the sentence. The Commonwealth ad-
vances a litany of arguments against the defendant's right to a
review of the sentence, none of which is persuasive. We agree
that a judge has broad discretion in sentencing and that “[iJt is not
within the power of this court to review an otherwise lawful
sentence . . . [where] [t]his authority is delegated to the [a]ppel-
late [d]ivision of the Superior Court under G. L. c. 278, §§ 28A-
28C.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 379 n.7 (1989).
Nonetheless, we have the power to review a sentence to deter-
mine whether it is unconstitutional, and we exercise that power
where, as here, it is appropriate to do so.

The defendant contends that his aggregate sentence — which
requires him to serve twenty-seven and one-half years before he is
eligible for parole — violates art. 26, because juveniles convicted
of the more serious crime of murder at the time of his offenses were
eligible for parole after fifteen years. The crux of his argument is
that our decision in Diatchenko ['° created a presumptive ceiling
on parole eligibility for crimes less serious than murder, and that
a sentence that treats him more harshly than a juvenile convicted
of murder therefore violates the principle of proportionality in-
herent in art. 26.

We begin by outlining the parameters of the constitutional pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In Diatchenko I, 466
Mass. at 667, we interpreted art. 26 more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment." See

"In Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 667, we declared unconstitutional G. L.
¢. 265, § 2, to the extent that it mandated a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for a juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree, We
also determined that G. L. c. 127, § 133A, barring parole eligibility for defend-
ants convicted of murder in the first degree, was inapplicable to juveniles, Id. at
673. Thus, under Diatchenko I, a juvenile sentenced for murder in 2002 would
be eligible for parole after fifteen years, In this case, we analogize the juvenile
defendant’s eligibility for parole to a juvenile defendant convicted of murder in
2002.

“Under the United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment juvenile
sentencing jurisprudence, an offender’s status as a juvenile places only narrow
limitations on the range of permissible sentences. For example, although in

477 Mass. 677 (2017) 683

Commonwealth » Perez,

Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (mandatory sentence of life in prison
without parole for juvenile offenders violates Eighth Amend-
ment; individualized sentence required). Based on the science
undergirding the Supreme Court’s determination that “children
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentenc-
ing,” id. at 471, we held that a life sentence without the possibility
of parole violates art. 26, regardless of whether such a sentence is
mandatory or imposed in the sentencing judge’s discretion.
Diatchenko I, supra at 671. The point of our departure from the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence was our determination that,
under art. 26, the “unique characteristics of juvenile offenders”
should weigh more heavily in the proportionality calculus than
the United States Supreme Court required under the Eighth
Amendment. /d. The touchstone of art. 26’s proscription against
cruel or unusual punishment, however, remains proportionality.
See id. at 669, citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
The essence of proportionality is that “punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the
offense” (citation omitted). Miller, supra at 469. Our specific
inquiry here is whether the requirement of proportionality bars
the imposition, on a juvenile defendant, of consecutive sentences
for nonmurder offenses with a resulting parole eligibility date that
exceeds that applicable to juveniles convicted of murder.
Although we have not been called upon to decide proportion-
ality in this nonmurder context for juvenile defendants, we have
considered proportionality as it pertains to adult defendants. See
Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 496 (1981) (chal-
lenging constitutionality of sentence of forty years for possession
of sawed-off shotgun). We followed in that case “a tripartite
analysis to determine whether a defendant has met his burden” to

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for juveniles, the Court has not
eliminated the possibility that a juvenile may be sentenced to imprisonment for
life. Miller, 367 U.S. at 489, prohibits only a mandatory sentence of life without
the possibility of parole. With respect to juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
offenses, the Eighth Amendment has not been construed to impose a temporal
limitation on the sentence that may be imposed. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Rather,
taking into account the distinctive attributes of offenders who are juveniles at the
time of the crime and the nature of the offense, the Eighth Amendment requires
only a “meaningful opportunity” for, not a right to, parole. Id.

12In Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 497-499 (1981), we held
that the defendant’s sentence of from forty to fifty years in State prison for
possession of a machine gun, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c), was not so

684 477 Mass. 677 (2017)

Commonwealth » Perez,

establish a disproportionality of constitutional dimensions. Id. at
497, citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 910 (1976).

“The first prong of the disproportionality test requires
inquiry into the ‘nature of the offense and the offender in
light of the degree of harm to society.’ . .. The second prong
of the disproportionality analysis involves a comparison be-
tween the sentence imposed here and punishments prescribed
for the commission of more serious crimes in the Common-
wealth. . . . The final prong this court examines in the
disproportionality analysis is a comparison of the challenged
penalty with the penalties prescribed for the same offense in
other jurisdictions.”

Cepulonis, supra at 497-498. That tripartite analysis, supple-
mented with the greater weight given to a juvenile defendant’s
age, provides a useful framework for our consideration of this
juvenile defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of his sen-
tence. See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669.

We examine first “the nature of the offense and the offender in
light of the degree of harm to society” (emphasis supplied).
Jackson, 369 Mass. at 910. With respect to the first part, we do
not discount the severity of the defendant’s multiple offenses —
among other crimes, he shot a police officer during an attempted
armed robbery, after having committed two other armed robber-
ies only minutes earlier. The evidence established that the police
officer suffered serious injuries necessitating multiple surgeries.
In the abstract — i.e., without considering the offender — the
nature of the multiple offenses, and the “degree of the harm to
society,” id., was such that a judge in the exercise of discretion
might be warranted in imposing consecutive sentences for the
crimes, aggregating to a sentence of thirty-two and one-half years
with parole eligibility after twenty-seven and one-half years.
Disproportionality is not, however, an abstract inquiry. The first
prong of the disproportionality test also requires consideration of
the particular offender. In Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 670, quoting
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, we reasoned that the unique character-
istics of juvenile offenders, including their “diminished culpabil-
ity and greater prospects for reform,” made imposition of a life

disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment and art, 26.

477 Mass. 677 (2017) 685

Commonwealth » Perez,

sentence without parole eligibility unconstitutional.'* Because of
those characteristics, imposition of an aggregate sentence of
thirty-two and one-half years — with parole eligibility exceeding
that available to a juvenile defendant convicted of murder —
while perhaps within the range of a judge’s discretion, may sa-
tisfy the first prong of the disproportionality test only if the
factors described in Miller, supra at 477-478, are considered by
the sentencing judge.

We come to a similar conclusion under the second prong of the
proportionality calculus. Under that prong, we consider the dis-
parity “between the sentence imposed [on the juvenile] and
punishments prescribed for the commission of more serious
crimes in the Commonwealth.” Cepulonis, 384 Mass. at 498. On
its face, the aggregate sentence imposed on this juvenile defend-
ant, albeit for serious crimes, is more severe — at least as to
parole eligibility — than a sentence that could be imposed on a
juvenile convicted of murder, the most serious criminal offense
under our law.'* A facial disproportionality of this magnitude in
the punishment for nonmurder offenses is presumptively beyond
that which can be tolerated by art. 26. In this regard, we are
persuaded by the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Graham, 560 U.S. at 69, that juvenile “defendants who do not
kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categori-
cally less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than
are murderers.” We agree that under art. 26, “[t]here is a line
“between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the
individual.’ ” Id., quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
438 (2008). In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, which
we discuss infra, this line must not be crossed to treat a juvenile
convicted of a nonmurder offense, or multiple nonmurder of-
fenses, more harshly than a juvenile convicted of murder. The

"27 he juvenile defendant was sentenced in 2002. Although, as the dissenting
opinion describes, the sentencing judge “considered the factors relating to the
defendant’s age, competency, culpability, background, and familial influence,”
post at 688, the judge did not have the benefit of “current scientific research on
adolescent brain development, and the myriad significant ways that this devel-
opment impacts a juvenile’s personality and behavior” (footnote omitted).
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669.

"4S¢e G. L. ¢. 279, § 24, which provides in relevant part: “In the case of a
sentence of life imprisonment for murder in the first degree committed by a
person on or after the person’s fourteenth birthday and before the person’s
eighteenth birthday, the court shall fix a minimum term of not less than [twenty]
years nor more than [thirty] years...”

686 477 Mass. 677 (2017)

Commonwealth » Perez,

juvenile defendant’s aggregate sentence fails the second prong of
the disproportionality test. We therefore need not discuss the third
prong.

Based on the Cepulonis analysis, therefore, a juvenile defend-
ant‘s aggregate sentence for nonmurder offenses with parole
eligibility exceeding that applicable to a juvenile defendant con-
victed of murder is presumptively disproportionate. That pre-
sumption is conclusive, absent a hearing to consider whether
extraordinary circumstances warrant a sentence treating the juve-
nile defendant more harshly for parole purposes than a juvenile
convicted of murder. That inquiry, ultimately whether the sen-
tence is proportionate to the offender, as a juvenile, and to the
particular offenses, must be assessed in light of the Miller factors
as set forth infra.

We turn next to the details of a Miller hearing, conducted to
identify any extraordinary circumstance where the presumptive
disproportionality of a juvenile sentence may have been dis-
pelled. In addition to the factors a judge ordinarily would con-
sider in exercising discretion in sentencing, see Commonwealth v.
Costa, 472 Mass, 139, 147 (2015), the judge must weigh factors
specifically related to the juvenile’s age. See Miller, 567 U.S. at
477-478 (identifying factors relevant to consideration of juve-
nile’s age in sentencing). Drawing from the factors articulated in
Miller, we conclude that the judge must weigh (1) the particular
attributes of the juvenile, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) “the family and
home environment that surrounds [the juvenile] from which he
cannot usually extricate himself”; and (3) “the circumstances of
the . . . offense, including the extent of [the juvenile’s] partici-
pation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may
have affected him.” Jd. at 477. Only after the judge weighs those
factors, applies them uniquely to the juvenile defendant, and
considers whether a punishment exceeding that applicable to a
juvenile convicted of murder (at least with respect to parole el-
igibility) is appropriate in the circumstances, may such a sentence
be imposed. See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 668.

Contrary to the dissent’s view of the sentencing hearing, the
judge expressly declined to consider the juvenile defendant’s age
as a mitigating factor, which, as we have said, is required in the
circumstances of this case. Defense counsel went to great lengths
in emphasizing the juvenile’s age, his family circumstances, and
the uncle’s role in encouraging the juvenile’s involvement in the

477 Mass. 677 (2017) 687

Commonwealth » Perez,

offenses, factors that take on greater significance when, as here,
a sentencing decision must be informed by a Miller hearing.
Presaging the United States Supreme Court’s assessment of the
attributes of youth in the Roper line of cases, the judge accepted
that “young men at the age of [seventeen] frequently do not have
the maturity to make good judgments.” However, without the
benefit of the United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and our interpretation of art. 26
in Diatchenko I, the judge did not consider this as a mitigating
factor. Instead, he concluded that “the law makes them respon-
sible for their acts as adults, nonetheless.” Although the judge
was correct that a juvenile defendant’s age does not excuse
criminal conduct, it does not appear that he gave appropriate
consideration to the defendant’s age as a mitigating factor in the
sentencing. Accordingly, the purpose of the Miller hearing has
not been met in this case.

To be clear, we do not suggest that a juvenile convicted of
nonmurder offenses may never be sentenced to consecutive terms
or to a term with parole eligibility exceeding that available for a
juvenile convicted of murder. That option remains open to a
sentencing judge in an appropriate case, after weighing the fac-
tors considered in the Miller hearing, and when the art. 26 re-
quirements as articulated here are met.

3. Right to resentencing for parole eligibility after fifteen years.
The defendant argues that his right to due process compels
resentencing to conform his parole eligibility to that available to
juveniles convicted of murder. He claims that the court’s reason-
ing in Costa, 472 Mass. at 144, should be applied to him. He is
mistaken. Costa was not decided on constitutional grounds, and
therefore, it has no bearing on the due process claim asserted by
the defendant. Id. at 145. On the contrary, Costa is sui generis.
Costa, a juvenile defendant, was sentenced to consecutive life
sentences for murder, on the apparent assumption that the struc-
ture of his sentence was irrelevant; at the time, he was not eligible
for parole at all. Jd. at 141-142. Because of the change in the
sentencing of juveniles convicted of murder brought by Diat-
chenko I, it simply was not possible to know if the sentencing
judge would have made the same “somewhat symbolic” choice to
impose consecutive sentences. Costa, supra at 143. For that
reason only, Costa was entitled to a resentencing hearing. The
court emphatically did not hold that Costa was entitled to be
resentenced to concurrent life terms to allow parole eligibility

688 477 Mass. 677 (2017)

Commonwealth » Perez,

after fifteen years. Id. at 144. Thus, our ruling in Costa does not
advance the defendant’s argument that he is entitled to be resen-
tenced to a term that permits parole eligibility on the same terms
as a juvenile convicted of murder.

Conclusion. Because the juvenile defendant’s sentences are
presumptively disproportionate under art. 26, and the judge im-
posed the sentences without the benefit of a Miller hearing, we
vacate the denial of the defendant’s rule 30 motion. We remand
the case to the Superior Court for a Miller hearing and, if
necessary, for resentencing.

So ordered.

Lowy, J. (dissenting, with whom Cypher, J., joins). I disagree
with the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s sentence violates
art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights based on the
test from Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495 (1981).
The ultimate purpose of the three-prong test is to determine
whether the punishment is “so disproportionate to the crime that
it ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” Diatchenko v. District Attorney for
the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 669 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12
(2015), quoting Cepulonis, supra at 497. The sentence in this case
is not so disproportionate.

I would conclude that the first prong of the Cepulonis analysis,
which requires consideration of the underlying crimes and the
defendant’s personal characteristics, is satisfied. See Cepulonis,
384 Mass. at 497. The judge meticulously considered both fac-
tors. The judge noted the seriousness of the crimes and even
presciently considered the factors relating to the defendant’s age,
competency, culpability, background, and familial influence that
the United States Supreme Court, in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 477-478 (2012), would subsequently mandate for juveniles
in capital cases."

"The judge explicitly considered that the defendant was seventeen years old
and that “young men at the age of [seventeen] frequently do not have the ma-
turity to make good judgments.” The judge also noted the defendant's intellec-
tual limitations, difficulty in his upbringing, and susceptibility to his uncle's
influence, and a psychological report detailing his desire to please adults.
Nevertheless, the judge was within his discretion to conclude that there was “no
question that [the defendant] was old enough, intelligent enough, [and] capable
of knowing right from wrong” such that his “bad judgment” in committing three
armed robberies could not be “excused by age or by any of the other circum-

477 Mass. 677 (2017) 689

Commonwealth » Perez,

The second prong, which requires comparing the aggregate
sentence given to the defendant with sentences for more serious
crimes in the Commonwealth, is also satisfied. See Cepulonis,
384 Mass. at 498. Given the number and the seriousness of the
convictions, I would not conclude that the aggregate sentence in
this case is out of proportion with sentences for more serious
crimes. Although a defendant convicted of a single count of mur-
der, as the court points out, would become parole-eligible before
twenty-seven and one-half years had elapsed, the defendant here
was convicted of, and sentenced for, multiple crimes: three counts
of armed robbery, two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm,
one count of armed assault with the intent to rob, one count of
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and one
count of discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a dwelling.
Precluding a judge from entering consecutive sentences for these
serious offenses, particularly when a judge had already closely
considered the defendant’s youth and its signature features,
would unduly hamper a judge’s sentencing discretion. See Com-
monwealth v. Lucret, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 628 (2003) (judicial
discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive discretion is
“[flirmly rooted in common law”). That an aggregate sentence for
multiple crimes may exceed the sentence for a single, more
serious crime does not in itself establish an art. 26 violation for a
juvenile, as the court today indicates.

Looking to the sentences in other jurisdictions, I would also
conclude that the third prong is satisfied in this case. See Cep-
ulonis, 384 Mass. at 498. States such as New Hampshire and
Indiana allow for a comparable sentence for crimes similar to the
defendant’s most serious convictions. For example, four of the
defendant’s convictions — three of armed robbery, N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 636:1(II1), and one of assault and battery by means
of a dangerous weapon, id. at § 631:1(1)(a) — could each result
in twenty-year sentences. Jd. at § 651:2(II-g). Judges in New
Hampshire retain the well-established common-law discretion to
impose consecutive sentences. Duquette v. Warden, N.H. State
Prison, 154 N.H. 737, 743-744 (2007). Similarly, in Indiana the de-
fendant’s three convictions of armed robbery would likely qualify

stances of [the defendant's] life.” As the judge stated, he looked to “the offense
and to the victim of the offense, as well as to the defendant,” just as the
Cepulonis analysis requires.

690 477 Mass. 677 (2017)

Commonwealth » Perez,

as two felonies at level two and one felony at level three,? Ind.
Code § 35-42-5-1, which would carry sentences of between ten
and thirty years, and between three and sixteen years, respec-
tively. Id. at §§ 35-50-1-2(a)(12), 35-50-2-4.5, 35-50-2-5(b).
Judges in Indiana have statutory authority to impose consecutive
sentences for crimes of violence, which include both level two
and level three armed robbery, without limiting the duration of
the consecutive sentence. Id. at § 35-50-1-2(c).

For these reasons, I believe the defendant’s sentence satisfies
art. 26. I respectfully dissent.

2Indiana classifies robbery as a level two felony if there was serious bodily injury
resulting to any person other than the defendant, and it classifies robbery as a level
three if the robbery was committed while armed with a deadly weapon or results
in bodily injury to any person other than defendant. Ind, Code § 35-42-5-I(a)(1).

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 691

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

JanMaL BRANGAN vs. COMMONWEALTH.

Suffolk. May 2, 2017. - August 25, 2017.

Present: Ganrs, C.J., Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cypuer, JJ.*
Bail. Indigent. Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees.

Discussion of the standard of review applicable when a party appeals from an
adverse judgment by a single justice under G. L. c. 211, § 3. [697]

This court concluded that a Superior Court judge was obliged to consider a
criminal defendant’s financial resources in setting bail [697-700]; further,
although this court concluded that unaffordable bail is not unconstitutional
per se, this court recognized that the imposition of unaffordable bail is
subject to certain due process requirements, and further concluded that
where, based on a judge’s consideration of all the relevant circumstances,
neither alternative nonfinancial conditions nor an amount the defendant can
afford will adequately assure his or her appearance for trial, the judge may
set bail at a higher amount, but no higher than necessary to ensure the
defendant's appearance [700-702]; specifically, this court concluded that a
judge may not consider a defendant’s alleged dangerousness in setting the
‘amount of bail (even though a defendant’s dangerousness may be considered
as a factor in setting other conditions of release), the judge must provide
findings of fact and a statement of reasons for the bail decision either in
writing or orally on the record when it appears that the defendant lacks the
financial resources to post the amount of bail set by the judge and that the
bail amount will therefore likely result in the defendant’s long-term pretrial
detention, and a judge reconsidering or reviewing a bail order relating to a
defendant who has been detained due to his or her inability to post bail must
consider the length of the defendant's pretrial detention and the equities of
the case [702-710].

Civit action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Suffolk on February 26, 2016.

The case was heard by Lenk, J.

Merritt Schnipper for the petitioner.

Amal Bala, Assistant District Attorney, for the Common-
wealth.

Shira Diner & Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel
Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus
curiae, submitted a brief.

Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case and authored this
opinion prior to her retirement.

692 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

Hwes, J. The practice of releasing a defendant on bail prior to
trial has been part of Massachusetts law since its beginnings as a
colony. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 343 Mass. 162, 165 (1961).
The Body of Liberties (1641), the oldest known compilation of
Massachusetts Colonial law, provided that:

“18. No mans person shall be restrained or imprisoned by
any Authority whatsoever, before the law hath sentenced him
thereto, If he can put in sufficient securitie, bayle or main-
prise, for his appearance, and good behaviour in the meane
time, unlesse it be in Crimes Capital, and Contempts in open
Court, and in such cases where some expresse act of Court
doth allow it.”

See Baker, supra.

This statement, although nearly four centuries old, summarizes
well the dual functions of bail. On the one hand, release on bail
preserves the liberty of the accused until he or she has been
afforded the full measure of due process in a criminal trial. “This
traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unham-
pered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction
of punishment prior to conviction. . . . Unless this right to bail
before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured
only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning” (citation
omitted). Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).? On the other hand,
the giving of security serves to assure that the defendant will
appear in court when called to do so. “The right to release before
trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance
that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.” Jd.
Where, as in this case, the defendant is unable to give the nec-
essary security for his appearance at trial because of his indi-
gence, the purpose of bail is frustrated. The cost to the defendant
is the loss of liberty and all the benefits that ordinarily would
accrue to one awaiting a trial to determine his guilt or innocence.

See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The
practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo-American law, is not a
device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found
convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to
enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty. Without this
conditional privilege, even those wrongly accused are punished by a period of
imprisonment while awaiting trial and are handicapped in consulting counsel,
searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a defense”).

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 693

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

The petitioner in this case, Jahmal Brangan, has been held at
the Hampden County jail since January 17, 2014 — more than
three and one-half years — because he has been unable to post
bail in the amounts ordered by a Superior Court judge following
his arrest and indictment for armed robbery while masked. In this
appeal from a judgment of a single justice denying his petition for
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, Brangan contends that the single
justice’s denial of his bail review request should be reversed
because the Superior Court judge’s bail order is unconstitutional.
In particular, he argues that the bail order violated his right to due
process because the judge failed to give adequate consideration to
his financial resources, and set bail in an amount so far beyond his
financial means that it resulted in his long-term detention pending
resolution of his case.

In resolving the issues Brangan raises, we address the extent to
which a judge must consider a criminal defendant’s financial
resources in setting bail, whether such a defendant is constitu-
tionally entitled to an affordable bail, and the due process require-
ments that apply if the judge settles on a bail amount that is more
than the defendant can pay, resulting in pretrial detention. For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that in setting the amount
of bail, whether under G. L. c. 276, § 57 or § 58, a judge? must
consider a defendant’s financial resources, but is not required to
set bail in an amount the defendant can afford if other relevant
considerations weigh more heavily than the defendant's ability to
provide the necessary security for his appearance at trial. Where,
based on the judge’s consideration of all the circumstances,
including the record of defaults and other factors relevant to the
likelihood of the defendant’s appearance for trial, neither alter-
native nonfinancial conditions nor a bail amount the defendant
can afford will adequately assure his appearance for trial, the
judge may set bail at a higher amount, but no higher than neces-
sary to ensure the defendant’s appearance for trial. We conclude
further that where it appears that a defendant lacks the financial
resources to post the amount of bail set, such that his indigency
likely will result in a long-term pretrial detention,‘ the judge must
provide written or orally recorded findings of fact and a statement

3We use the term “judge” here as a shorthand reference to the entire range of
judicial officers who are authorized to set bail under G. L. c, 276, §§ 57 and 58.

4We use the phrase “long-term pretrial detention” to mean detention for a
period of time longer than the defendant might need to collect cash or collateral
to post bail.

694 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

of reasons for the bail decision. Based on the record before us, it
does not appear that the judge here considered Brangan’s finan-
cial resources in setting the bail. Therefore, we reverse the
judgment of the single justice and remand this matter to the
county court to direct the Superior Court judge to conduct a new
bail hearing for Brangan as soon as possible in accord with the
standards set out in this opinion.®

Background. On January 17, 2014, a man wearing a cap, scarf,
and sunglasses robbed a bank in Springfield by passing a note to
the bank teller demanding money and stating that he had a wea-
pon. The teller handed over less than $1,000 to the robber, who
then fled. The police arrested Brangan later that same day after
finding his thumbprint on the robbery note.®

At the time, Brangan was on probation following a prison
sentence of from eight to twelve years for rape of a child and
related charges.” Consequently, the probation department filed a
notice of surrender, and when Brangan appeared on February 10,
2014, a judge of the Superior Court set bail at $20,000 cash or
$200,000 surety based on the probation violation notice. A grand
jury subsequently indicted Brangan for armed robbery while
masked under G. L. c. 265, § 17. On March 10, 2014, at Bran-
gan’s arraignment on the robbery charge, the judge set bail in the
amount of $50,000 cash or $500,000 surety. Brangan remained in
custody pending his trial.

In March, 2015, Brangan was tried and convicted on the armed
robbery charge, after which the judge revoked his bail. Shortly
after the entry of a guilty verdict, however, the trial judge declared
a mistrial due to certain statements in the prosecutor’s closing
argument, and ordered Brangan to be retried;* the Common-
wealth then appealed from the mistrial order. In the wake of the
mistrial ruling, the judge held another bail hearing on April 10,
2015, and reinstated the original bail at $50,000 cash or $500,000

®We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee for Public
Counsel Services in support of Jahmal Brangan’s appeal.

At trial, Brangan did not contest that the thumbprint on the robbery note was
his.

7In 2001, Brangan pleaded guilty to indictments charging three counts of rape
of a child with force and four counts of indecent assault and battery on a child
under the age of fourteen. He was sentenced to from eight to twelve years in
prison with five years of probation from and after the prison sentence.

SBrangan orally moved for a mistrial at the end of the Commonwealth’s
closing argument. After the jury verdict, the trial judge accepted briefing and
heard additional argument on the motion, which he ultimately granted.

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 695

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

surety. Brangan unsuccessfully sought reduction of the bail in the
Superior Court on July 15, 2015, and December 28, 2015.

In January, 2016, this court granted Brangan’s application for
direct appellate review of the Commonwealth’s appeal from the
trial judge’s mistrial order. We subsequently held that the Com-
monwealth had no right to appeal from the mistrial order, leaving
the armed robbery charge to stand for retrial. See Commonwealth
vy. Brangan, 475 Mass. 143, 148, 149 (2016) (Brangan 1.®

Meanwhile, Brangan followed a long and tortuous path to seek
relief from his pretrial detention, filing four successive petitions
in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single
justice denied Brangan’s first petition without prejudice due to his
failure to file the record materials necessary to support his claims.

On considering Brangan’s second petition, the single justice
observed that the judge who had denied Brangan’s motion for
reduction of bail on December 28, 2015, had not made any oral
or written findings or otherwise explained his decision. Accord-
ingly, the single justice remanded the matter for a hearing to
determine bail based on the factors set forth in G. L. c. 276, § 58.
A judge of the Superior Court then conducted a bail hearing and
issued a written decision retaining the original bail in the amount
of $50,000 cash or $500,000 surety for the armed robbery charge
and $20,000 cash or $200,000 surety for the probation violation.

After Brangan filed a third petition, the single justice remanded
the matter to the Superior Court for consideration in light of this
court’s decision in Brangan I, which had been issued in the
interim. A Superior Court judge then conducted another hearing
and entered an order, dated September 19, 2016, that reduced the
defendant’ s bail to $20,000 cash or $200,000 surety for the armed
robbery charge and retained the original bail in the amount of
$20,000 cash or $200,000 surety for the probation violation.

®In Commonwealth v. Brangan, 475 Mass. 143 (2016) (Brangan 1), Brangan
also argued that a retrial of the armed robbery charge was barred by double
jeopardy, but we concluded that this argument was not properly before us at that
time because he had failed to timely appeal from the trial judge’s ruling that
double jeopardy would not bar a retrial. See id, at 148-149. We subsequently
denied Brangan’s petition for rehearing on that issue, without prejudice to his
filing a motion to dismiss in the trial court and, if that motion was denied, seeking
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. In November, 2016, Brangan filed a motion in the
trial court to dismiss the armed robbery indictment on double jeopardy grounds
and, after the judge denied that motion, filed a petition for relief in the county
court, which also was denied. We allowed Brangan’s appeal from that denial to
proceed in light of the special consideration we have given to double jeopardy
claims. That appeal is scheduled to be heard by this court in the coming term.

696 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

Using a District Court form captioned “Reasons for Ordering
Bail, G. L. c. 276, § 58,” the judge checked off the following boxes
as grounds for denying Brangan’s release on personal recogni-
zance without surety: the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged; the potential penalty he faced; his history of mental
illness; his record of convictions; the fact that his alleged acts
involved “abuse” as defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1; his history of
orders issued against him under G. L. c. 209A; and his status of
being on probation. In additional notes on the form, the judge
stated that he had considered the matter in light of Brangan I in
accord with the single justice’s remand order and heard oral
argument and reviewed the parties’ submissions. As further grounds
for the bail determination, he cited Brangan’s prior sentence to
State prison for multiple counts of rape of a child; the fact that he
faced a substantial penalty if convicted of armed robbery; his
history of c. 209A orders; and the fact that he was on probation
at the time he allegedly committed the armed robbery. The judge
also ordered that, if Brangan posted bail, his release would be on
condition that he wear a global positioning system (GPS) bracelet,
observe a curfew, and stay away from the alleged victims.

Brangan then filed a fourth petition with the county court,
arguing that the Superior Court judge had failed to give mean-
ingful consideration to his inability to make the bail, to the
equities in the case, and to his alternative proposal to post $5,000
cash bail and wear a GPS bracelet. Brangan further asked the
single justice to conduct a bail hearing de novo. In support of this
petition, Brangan filed an affidavit stating that the Superior Court
judge had found him to be indigent when he was first charged in
January, 2014; that he had been represented at trial and on appeal
by court-appointed attorneys; that his financial condition was far
worse than when he was first charged, since he had been incar-
cerated and unable to work; and that there was no way he could
hope to post the $40,000 bail that the judge had set.

The single justice denied the fourth petition, ruling that Bran-
gan’s inability to make a particular bail amount did not render the
Superior Court judge’s order a functional denial of bail, and did
not establish, without more, that Brangan was entitled to extraor-
dinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. The defendant appealed from
the single justice’s order pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended,
434 Mass. 1301 (2001). This court ordered the appeal to proceed
with briefing and argument. We noted that filing a petition pur-
suant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, is the proper means for seeking relief

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 697

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

from bail determinations in the Superior Court, see Commesso v.
Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 372 (1975), and that Brangan had
no other means of obtaining adequate appellate review.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. When a party appeals from
an adverse judgment by the single justice under G. L. c. 211, § 3,
we review the single justice’s order for clear error of law or abuse
of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Chism, 476 Mass. 171, 176
(2017); Leo v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 1025, 1026 (2004). We
must also consider the propriety of the Superior Court judge’s
underlying bail order. See Chism, 476 Mass. at 176-179 (evalu-
ating underlying trial court order in appeal from single justice
judgment concerning that order). In reviewing both the single
justice’s judgment and the bail judge’s order, we must consider
the legal rights at issue and independently determine and apply
the law, without deference to their respective legal rulings. See
The Boston Herald, Inc. v. Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 603 (2000).

2. Consideration of criminal defendant's financial resources in
setting bail. The parties dispute whether the Superior Court judge
was obliged to consider Brangan’s financial resources in setting
bail. Based on our review of the applicable statute and relevant
decisions, we are persuaded that a judge must consider a criminal
defendant’s financial resources in setting bail.

We have held that G. L. c. 276, § 57, rather than § 58, is the
applicable statute governing bail proceedings in the Superior Court.
See Querubin vy. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 111 (2003); Serna
vy. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2002). We reached that
conclusion because § 57 specifically authorizes judges of the
Superior Court, among others, to admit a prisoner to bail, whereas
$58 does not. See Serna, 437 Mass. at 1003. And as the
Commonwealth pointed out at oral argument, unlike § 58, § 57
does not specifically reference a defendant’s financial resources
as a factor to be considered in setting bail."

A Superior Court judge, however, must still consider a defend-

"General Laws c. 276, § 57, applies to “[a] justice of the supreme judicial or
superior court, a clerk of courts or the clerk of the superior court for criminal
business in the county of Suffolk, a standing or special commissioner appointed
by either of said courts or, in the county of Suffolk, by the sheriff of said county
with the approval of the superior court, a justice or clerk of a district court, [or]
a master in chancery.” General Laws c. 276, § 58, applies to “[a] justice or a clerk
or assistant clerk of the district court, a bail commissioner or master in chancery.”

4 Although § 57 contains a list of factors to be considered in setting bail that is
similar to the list in § 58, § 57 omits a defendant’s financial resources as a factor,
and it only references these factors in the context of a case where a defendant has

698 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

ant’s financial resources when setting bail as a matter of common
law. We have said that, under § 57,

“the factors that a judge is to consider when conducting a bail
hearing are ‘(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, (2) the accused’s family ties, (3) his financial re-
sources, (4) his length of residence in the community, (5) his
character and mental condition, (6) his record of convictions
and appearances at court proceedings or of any previous
flight to avoid prosecution or (7) any failure to appear at any
court proceedings’ ” (emphasis added).

Commonwealth v. Torres, 441 Mass. 499, 504 (2004), quoting
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 115 n.6. These are common-law histori-
cal factors for bail, see Querubin, 440 Mass. at 115 n.6, 120,
which must be reviewed by a Superior Court judge in setting bail
in all cases, even though § 57 does not explicitly list them all.”

In addition to the common law, constitutional principles also
mandate consideration of a defendant’s financial resources in
setting bail. Both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights

been charged with certain acts involving abuse, domestic violence, assault, or
violations of abuse prevention orders. See G. L. c. 276, § 57, second par.

12,5 noted above, the Superior Court judge set Brangan’s bail using a District
Court form that referenced G. L. c. 276, § 58, and in its briefs for the single justice
and for us, the Commonwealth argued that the Superior Court judge properly
exercised his discretion by considering the necessary factors under § 58. Thus,
the Commonwealth arguably waived its § 57 argument by omitting it from its
briefs for the single justice and for us. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended,
367 Mass. 921 (1975). We nevertheless address this argument in light of the
limitations on briefing in proceedings under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and S.J.C. Rule
2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), and the principle that a reviewing
court may affirm a lower court ruling on any ground supported by the record,
including legal theories not argued by the Commonwealth or considered by the
judge in the proceedings below. See Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 205, 214 (2013);
Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997). We also consider the
Commonwealth's argument because it presents “an important public question
whose resolution will affect more persons than the parties to the case .. . [and
which] is primarily a matter of statutory interpretation, not dependent on the facts
of the particular case.” Department of Community Affairs v. Massachusetts State
College Bldg. Auth., 378 Mass. 418, 424 (1979), quoting Lahey Clinic Found.,
Inc. v. Health Facilities Appeals Bd., 376 Mass. 359, 372 (1978).

‘Because these “common-law considerations are among the same as those
contained in G. L. c. 276, § 58,” Querubin, 440 Mass. at 120, it is not surprising
that Superior Court judges sometimes rely on § 58 in their bail orders, as the bail
judge did in this case, even though they are proceeding under § 57.

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 699

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

prohibit excessive bail.‘t The United States Supreme Court has
said that bail is “excessive” when it is “set at a figure higher than
an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill” the purpose of assur-
ing the presence of the accused at future proceedings. Stack, 342
U.S. at 5. To be reasonable, that calculation must be based on the
individual character and circumstances of each defendant, includ-
ing his or her financial circumstances. “[T]he fixing of bail for
any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant
to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant” (em-
phasis added). Jd. at 5. These standards, which include “the
financial ability of the defendant to give bail,” “are to be applied
in each case to each defendant.” Jd. at 5 & n.3, citing former Fed.
R. Crim. P. 46(c). “Each defendant stands before the bar of justice
as an individual. . . . The question when application for bail is
made relates to each one’s trustworthiness to appear for trial and
what security will supply reasonable assurance of his appear-
ance.” Id. at 9 (Jackson, J., concurring).

Each eligible defendant’s right to an individualized bail deter-
mination that takes his or her financial resources into account is
further supported by the constitutional principles of due process
and equal protection. For this reason, courts have opined that it is
unconstitutional to use master bail bond schedules to set the same
bail amount for everyone for a particular offense, without regard
to individual financial circumstances or alternative conditions of
release. See, e.g., Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th
Cir. 1978) (“The incarceration of those who cannot” meet master
bond schedule, “without meaningful consideration of other pos-
sible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal pro-
tection requirements”); Walker vs. Calhoun, U.S. Dist. Ct., C.A.
No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, slip op. at 49 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016),
vacated on other grounds by Walker v. Calhoun, 682 Fed. Appx.
721 (2017) (“Any bail or bond scheme that mandates payment of
pre-fixed amounts for different offenses to obtain pretrial release,
without any consideration of indigence or other factors, violates
the Equal Protection Clause” [citing cases]).

A bail that is set without any regard to whether a defendant is
a pauper or a plutocrat runs the risk of being excessive and unfair.
A $250 cash bail will have little impact on the well-to-do, for

“The United States Supreme Court has said that the restrictions in the Eighth
Amendment apply to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, see Hall vy. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014),
although the Court has not specifically so held in a case concerning excessive bail.

700 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

whom it is less than the cost of a night’s stay in a downtown
Boston hotel, but it will probably result in detention for a home-
less person whose entire earthly belongings can be carried in a
cart. “What would be a reasonable bail in the case of one de-
fendant may be excessive in the case of another.” Bennett v.
United States, 36 F.2d 475, 477 (Sth Cir. 1929). In setting bail, a
judge must always keep in mind the question once posed by
United States Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas: “Can
an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not,
because he does not happen to have enough property to pledge for
his freedom?” (Citation omitted.) Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d
1189, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on rehearing en banc, 572
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).

In this case, nothing in the bail judge’s September 19, 2016, order
or in the record establishes that he considered Brangan’s financial
resources in setting bail at $40,000. We cannot say for sure whether
he did or did not. But as we explain below, the judge must address
this issue in writing or orally on the record in every case where bail
is set in an amount that is likely to result in a defendant’s long-term
pretrial detention because he or she cannot afford it.

3. Whether bail must be affordable. The arguments that Bran-
gan and the amicus present also raise the question whether
unaffordable bail is unconstitutional per se. We conclude that it is
not, but in doing so, we recognize that the imposition of unaf-
fordable bail is subject to certain due process requirements.

We previously have stated that an “amount of bail [is] not
excessive merely because [a defendant] could not post it.” Leo v.
Commonwealth, 442 Mass. at 1026. Other courts have similarly
concluded that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a bail
that is affordable. See, e.g., United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d
105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) (“a bail setting is not constitutionally
excessive merely because a defendant is financially unable to sat-
isfy the requirement”); White v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th
Cir. 1968) (“The mere fact that petitioner may not have been able
to pay the bail does not make it excessive.”); Hodgdon v. United
States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1029 (1967) (same); State v. Pratt, 2017 VT 9, {15 (“the Con-
stitution does not require that a defendant have the ability to pay
the required bail if it is otherwise reasonable”). Even Justice
Jackson, in arguing for the importance of an individualized bail
determination in Stack, qualified his point by noting that “[t]his is
not to say that every defendant is entitled to such bail as he can

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 701

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

provide.” Stack, 342 U.S. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring). Al-
though the judge must take a defendant’s financial resources into
account in setting bail, that is only one of the factors to be
considered, and it should not override all the others. Bail that is
beyond a defendant’s reach is not prohibited. Where, based on the
judge’s consideration of all the relevant circumstances, neither
alternative nonfinancial conditions nor an amount the defendant
can afford will adequately assure his appearance for trial, it is
permissible to set bail at a higher amount, but no higher than
necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance.

This conclusion is also supported by our previous decisions
upholding the constitutionality of pretrial detention in Mendonza
v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771 (1996), and Querubin, 440
Mass. 108. In Mendonza, which upheld pretrial detention of a
demonstrably dangerous defendant where it is necessary to en-
sure the safety of other persons or the community pursuant to
G. L. c. 276, § 58A, we noted that although the statute precludes
a judge “from imposing a financial condition that results in
pretrial detention in order to assure the safety of other persons, . . .
financial conditions having that effect are not precluded for the
purpose of assuring [the defendant’ s] appearance before the court.”
Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 774.%° In Querubin, we upheld the
constitutionality of pretrial detention without bail of a defendant
who poses a serious flight risk to ensure that they will appear at
future court proceedings. See Querubin, 440 Mass. at 116, 118-
119. If it is permissible within the bounds of due process for a

"General Laws c. 276, § S8A (3), provides that “[a] justice may not impose
a financial condition under this section” — i.e., due to the defendant’s danger-
ousness — “that results in the pretrial detention of the person,” but “[n]othing
in this section shall be interpreted as limiting the imposition of a financial
condition upon the person to reasonably assure his appearance before the
courts.” Brangan cites language in the Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c)(2) (2012), which simply states that “[tJhe judicial officer may not
impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person,”
without the qualification that appears in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3). But the Senate
report accompanying the Federal Bail Reform Act makes it clear that “[the
purpose of this provision is to preclude the sub rosa use of money bond to detain
dangerous defendants,” and that “its application does not necessarily require the
release of a person who says he is unable to meet a financial condition of release
which the judge has determined is the only form of conditional release that will
assure the person’s future appearance.” Sen. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin, News 3182, 3199 (1984).
In light of this commentary, Federal courts have rejected the argument that this
statutory provision means that a defendant's “relative penury entitles him to a
lower bond.” United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991).

702 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

judge to hold a defendant without any bail to assure his future
appearance before the court, as we held in Querubin, then it must
also be permissible for a judge to hold a defendant on an unaf-
fordable bail for that same purpose.'¢

But having concluded that a defendant is not constitutionally
entitled to an affordable bail, it is important for us to be clear about
the strict standards that due process imposes when a defendant is
held on an unaffordable bail. We turn to that subject next.

4. Due process requirements. We begin by reviewing basic
constitutional due process principles and our previous decisions
applying these principles to pretrial detention. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and arts. 1, 10, and
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights establish a funda-
mental right to liberty and freedom from physical restraint that
cannot be curtailed without due process of law. See Lavallee v.
Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 234
(2004); Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112; Mendonza, 423 Mass. at
718-779; Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 676-677 (1993).

‘6Brangan and the amicus cite decisions by this court and by the United States
Supreme Court recognizing the general principle that the constitutional rights of
equal protection and due process prohibit punishment of indigent persons solely
for their poverty, unless there is no other adequate alternative to serve the State’s
interests in punishment and deterrence. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.
660, 672-673 (1983) (imprisonment of probationer for failure to pay fine or
restitution, “simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay . . .
would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Commonwealth v. Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 122 (2016) (“imposing
restitution that the defendant will be unable to pay violates the fundamental
principle that a criminal defendant should not face additional punishment solely
because of his or her poverty”); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 407 Mass. 206, 212
(1990), quoting Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (“Generally, ‘the Con-
stitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then
automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full’ ”). Pretrial detention, however,
is not a form of punishment; it is regulatory in character, because it is intended
to serve the governmental goals of protecting the public and assuring the
presence of the accused at future proceedings. See United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 746-747 (1987); Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 677-678
(1993), citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-537 (1979). Holding a defend-
ant on bail beyond his or her ability to pay is not, therefore, tantamount to
punishing the defendant for his or her poverty. See Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d
at 550, quoting United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 388-389 (Ist Cir. 1985)
(‘when faced with a risk of flight, judge is entitled to set bail at level he finds
reasonably necessary; if defendant cannot afford bail, and must be detained
pending trial, it is ‘not because he cannot raise the money, but because without
the money the risk of flight is too great’ ”).

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 703

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

Pretrial detention encroaches on that fundamental right insofar as
it subjects a defendant to governmental restraint without having
received the full measure of due process to which the defendant
is entitled before he or she can be punished under the criminal law.
See Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 778-779.

In our previous decisions analyzing the constitutionality of
pretrial detention, we have considered two aspects of due process
— substantive and procedural — following Supreme Court prec-
edents. Under the test of substantive due process, “[w]here a right
deemed to be ‘fundamental’ is involved, courts ‘must examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regu-
lation,’ Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977), and
typically will uphold only those statutes that are narrowly tailored
to further a legitimate and compelling governmental interest.”
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112, quoting Aime, 414 Mass. at 673.
“When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be
implemented in a fair manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976). This requirement traditionally has been referred to as
‘procedural’ due process.” Querubin, 440 Mass. at 116, quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).

Applying these standards, we have held that in certain limited
circumstances a judge may properly detain a defendant before
trial, where such detention is demonstrably necessary to ensure
the defendant’s appearance at future proceedings or to protect
public safety. In Querubin, we affirmed a Superior Court judge’s
order denying bail under G. L. c. 276, § 57, to a defendant in-
dicted for drug trafficking who plainly posed a serious flight risk:
he had fled from police who sought to arrest him on a default
warrant; had used an alias; had failed to appear in court in re-
sponse to a summons; and had been apprehended by border patrol
officers as he attempted to flee into Mexico. See Querubin, 440
Mass. at 109-110, 119. After reviewing the statutory procedures
and common-law standards for determining whether a defendant
should be held without bail because he is likely to flee, we
concluded that these procedures are “narrowly tailored to the
State’s legitimate and compelling interest in assuring the defend-
ant’s presence at trial,” id. at 116, and that the hearing require-
ment afforded the defendant sufficient procedural protection, see
id, at 117-119.

In Mendonza, we upheld the statutory scheme in G. L. c. 276,
§ 58A, which was enacted in 1994 to authorize temporary pre-

704 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

ventive pretrial detention of a defendant charged with certain
violent or dangerous crimes due to his or her dangerousness. We
noted that the statute’s application is limited to cases where
probable cause has been found to charge a defendant with certain
serious offenses (such as crimes involving force, the risk of force,
abuse, or violation of domestic violence protection orders); that
the judge must conduct an evidentiary hearing at which the
defendant has the right to testify, present evidence, and cross-
examine witnesses; and that the judge may order pretrial deten-
tion only where the judge finds, based on clear and convincing
evidence, that no conditions of release will reasonably assure the
safety of any other person or the community. See Mendonza, 423
Mass. at 774, 780-781, 792; G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1), (3), and (4).
We also pointed out that these safeguards were similar to those
contained in the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142, on which § 58A was modeled, and we relied extensively
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, which
upheld a similar preventive detention scheme in that statute. See
Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 780-781, 786-788.

Conversely, in Aime we invalidated earlier 1992 amendments
to the bail statutes that would have allowed a judge to detain a
defendant on high bail due to his or her perceived dangerousness,
without adequate due process safeguards to ensure the accuracy
of that determination. In that case, a District Court judge ordered
an alleged drug dealer to be held on bail of $100,000 cash or $1
million surety because he was a danger to the community. See
Aime, 414 Mass. at 669 & n.2. The judge relied on amendments
to G. L. c. 276, § 58, that authorized judicial officers, in setting
bail, to take into account the “seriousness of the danger to any
person or the community that would be posed by the prisoner’s
release.” Aime, supra at 671, quoting St. 1992, c. 201, § 4. We
determined that these amendments did not meet the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment because they “essen-
tially grant[ed] the judicial officer unbridled discretion to deter-
mine whether an arrested individual is dangerous” and lacked
“procedures ‘designed to further the accuracy’ of the judicial
officer’s determination.” Aime, supra at 682, quoting Salerno,
481 U.S. at 751. See Aime, supra at 683.

In sum, “in our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior
to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Aime,
414 Mass. at 677, quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83
(1992). Although the Federal Constitution and the Massachusetts

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 705

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

Declaration of Rights do not prohibit pretrial detention, they
permit it only “in carefully circumscribed circumstances and sub-
ject to quite demanding procedures.” Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 790.

With this background, we now turn to the present case. In her
judgment denying Brangan’s most recent petition, the single jus-
tice ruled: “That [Brangan] is unable to pay a particular amount
of bail does not, contrary to [his] assertion, necessarily render it
a functional denial of bail. Nor does it establish, without more,
that [he] is entitled to the extraordinary relief available under
G. L. c. 211, § 3.” We disagree.

It is certainly true that “a defendant does not have a constitu-
tional right to be released on bail prior to trial.” Querubin, 440
Mass. at 112. Still less does a defendant have a constitutional
right to an affordable bail, as we discussed above. But where a
judge sets bail in an amount so far beyond a defendant's ability
to pay that it is likely to result in long-term pretrial detention, it
is the functional equivalent of an order for pretrial detention, and
the judge’s decision must be evaluated in light of the same due
process requirements applicable to such a deprivation of liberty.
See Aime, 414 Mass. at 676.17

Here, the record shows that Brangan is indigent and that bail
has been set in an amount that is unattainable for him, resulting
in his long-term pretrial detention. Accordingly, we must analyze
the bail judge’s order and the record below in light of the re-
quirements of due process applicable to pretrial detention. Based
on that review, we discern three particular areas of concern, for
which we articulate three corresponding due process standards
applicable to such cases.

First, a judge may not consider a defendant’s alleged danger-
ousness in setting the amount of bail, although a defendant’s
dangerousness may be considered as a factor in setting other

"7In Aime, the Commonwealth argued that the 1992 amendments allowing a
judge to consider a defendant's dangerousness in setting a bail amount “merely
added an additional, unremarkable factor to the bail statute” and did not enact
a preventive detention scheme. Aime, 414 Mass. at 676. We rejected that
argument. We reasoned that, even though the amendments did “not explicitly
provide for preventive detention,” they effectively sought “to accomplish this
goal through the use of the surety which an arrestee must post in order to be
admitted to bail,” by “setting unattainable surety in order to secure the detention
of an arrestee.” Id. at 676 & n.12. We therefore concluded that “[t]he amend-
ments infringe{d] on the individual interest in freedom from detention” and must
be analyzed on that basis. Id. at 676.

706 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

conditions of release.’* Using unattainable bail to detain a de-
fendant because he is dangerous is improper. If the Common-
wealth wishes to have a defendant held pretrial because he poses
a danger to another person or the community, it must proceed
under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and comply with that statute’s proce-
dural requirements.

We emphasize this point because the Commonwealth’s briefs
submitted to us and to the single justice repeatedly present
arguments concerning Brangan’s dangerousness, stating for ex-
ample that he “fails to acknowledge the danger that he poses to the
community,” “created a public safety risk,” “endangered the pub-
lic,” and “poses a threat to public safety” and “a security risk,”
while citing his rape convictions, the abuse prevention orders
issued against him, and his alleged failure to register as a sex
offender. These would be proper arguments if the Commonwealth
had sought to detain Brangan under § 58A, but it never did so. The
use of dangerousness as a discretionary factor in setting bail
without the kind of procedural safeguards found in § 58A and in
the Federal Bail Reform Act is precisely what Aime prohibits. See
Aime, 414 Mass. at 680 (“State may not enact detention schemes
without providing safeguards similar to those which Congress
incorporated into the Bail Reform Act”). See also Mendonza, 423
Mass. at 774 (under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, “judge is precluded from
imposing a financial condition that results in pretrial detention in
order to assure the safety of other persons,” which “should end any
tendency to require high bail as a device for effecting preventive
detention”). We recognize the importance of protecting public
safety by providing “preliminary relief for the government in
incapacitating persons who pose a particular danger to the public.”
Id. at 781. But this relief must be obtained through the constitu-
tionally appropriate process in § 58A.

18A defendant’s dangerousness may be considered as a factor in setting
conditions of pretrial probation under G. L. c. 276, § 87, which requires the
defendant’s consent. Regardless of the defendant’s consent, G. L. c. 276, §§ 57
and 58, also authorize a judge to impose conditions on a person’s release in
certain domestic abuse cases to ensure “the safety of the alleged victim, any
other individual or the community,” as well as “the appearance of the person
before the court.” G. L. ¢. 276, §§ 57, second par, & 58, second par. More
generally, § 58 authorizes a judge to order a defendant “to abide by specified
restrictions on personal associations or conduct including, but not limited to,
avoiding all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and any potential
witness or witnesses who may testify concerning the offense, as a condition of
release.” G. L. c. 276, § 58, first par. Our ruling here does not prohibit a judge
from setting conditions of release under these provisions.

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 707

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

We might be less concerned about the Commonwealth’s dan-
gerousness arguments if it were clear from the record that the bail
judge’s determination was based solely on Brangan’s risk of flight.
But the bail order does not specifically weigh that risk. We also
note that the evidence that Brangan posed a serious flight risk
seems relatively equivocal, taking into account his voluntary
appearance when the police sought to talk with him after the
robbery and the evidence that he never missed a court appearance.

Second, where, based on a defendant’s credible representations
and any other evidence before the judge, it appears that the defend-
ant lacks the financial resources to post the amount of bail set by the
judge, such that it will likely result in the defendant’s long-term
pretrial detention, the judge must provide findings of fact and a
statement of reasons for the bail decision, either in writing or orally
on the record.‘ The statement must confirm the judge’s consid-
eration of the defendant’s financial resources,”° explain how the
bail amount was calculated, and state why, notwithstanding the
fact that the bail amount will likely result in the defendant’s
detention, the defendant’s risk of flight is so great that no alter-
native, less restrictive financial or nonfinancial conditions will
suffice to assure his or her presence at future court proceedings."

‘Judges in the District Court, Boston Municipal Court, and Juvenile Court
routinely make findings, based on the factors in G. L. c. 276, § 58, in support of
their bail decisions. Thus, a requirement of written or oral findings on the record
does not impose an undue hardship in the setting of bail. In setting bail under
G.L.c. 276, § 57, a judge may rely on the factors set forth in G. L. ¢. 276, § 58,
to demonstrate that a defendant's right to due process has been given appropri-
ate consideration. Although the District Court form, captioned “Reasons for
Ordering Bail, G. L. c. 276, § 58,” may be useful in making the findings required
in this opinion, we caution that further elaboration of the findings may be
prudent where the bail is likely to result in a defendant’s long-term detention.

?°As the amicus suggests, consideration of a defendant's financial resources
may be facilitated by reviewing the report prepared by the probation department
to determine whether a defendant qualifies as indigent for court-appointed
counsel. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 7 (a) (3) and 7 (b) (2), as appearing in 461 Mass.
1501 (2012); S.J.C, Rule 3:10, § 5 (a), as appearing in 475 Mass. 1301 (2016);
G. L.¢. 211D, § 2A (a)-(0).

21For example, where a judge imposes a bail amount that is greater than what
a defendant represents that he can pay, that amount might be justified where the
judge states on the record that she has considered alternative nonfinancial
conditions and a lesser bail amount, but has concluded that they would not be
sufficient to assure the defendant’s appearance at future proceedings given the
defendant’s record of defaults or other indications that the defendant poses a
flight risk. The judge also is not bound by a defendant’s representation as to what
bail he can reasonably afford, and may indicate that she is not convinced, based

708 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

We borrow these requirements, with some modifications, from
United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1991),
which addressed a comparable situation where the bail imposed by
the Federal District Court judge exceeded the defendant’s means,
resulting in his pretrial detention. In that case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the District
Court judge could properly insist on a financial condition that the
defendant could not afford to pay, resulting in his detention,
provided that the judge complied with the procedural requirements
for a valid detention order, including written findings of fact and
a written statement of reasons for determining that the financial
condition imposed was an indispensable condition for release. See
id. at 550-551. In particular, the First Circuit found the District
Court judge’s bail order to be deficient because it gave “no
indication of the reasons underlying the district court’s calculation
of the bond,” and did not explain “why the district court thought
a $200,000 bond was necessary in the face of the defendant’s
representation that he could not afford such a bond.” /d. at 551.

Although the rulings in Mantecon-Zayas were based on the
language and legislative history of the Federal Bail Reform Act,
the same requirements are also dictated by the constitutional
demands of due process. A statement of findings and reasons,
either in writing or orally on the record, is a minimum require-
ment where a defendant faces a loss of liberty.2 See Common-
wealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 484 (2016) (“Due process
requires that a judge issue a written statement regarding the
evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation”); id.
at 484 n.8 (due process requirement is satisfied where judge
makes oral statements on record and transcript is available); Dou-
cette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 539
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 113
(1990) (“The minimum requirements of due process include ‘a
written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking . . . parole’ ”). Requiring a particularized
statement as to why no less restrictive condition will suffice to

on the record, that the defendant cannot post bail in the amount set by the judge.

We recognize the practical difficulty in determining whether a particular
bail amount will result in the defendant's pretrial detention and whether, in that
case, the judge must make findings in accordance with due process justifying the
bail order. Therefore, to ensure that findings are made, the better practice is to
make findings in every case where the defendant is not released on personal
recognizance and the defendant represents in good faith to the judge that he or
she is unable to make the bail set by the judge.

477 Mass. 691 (2017) 709

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

assure the defendant’s presence at future court proceedings is
appropriate in light of the applicable standard of substantive due
process, that the procedure be “narrowly tailored to the State’s
legitimate and compelling interest in assuring the defendant’s
presence at trial.” Querubin, 440 Mass. at 116. It also is important
because holding a defendant on an unaffordable bail amount
defeats bail’s purpose of securing pretrial liberty.2*

Measured against these requirements, the bail order here is
deficient. The order lists the factors the judge considered in
ordering bail and cites Brangan’s previous sentence for rape of a
child, the potential penalty he faced if convicted of armed robbery,
the previous orders issued against him under G. L. c. 209A, and
the fact that he was on probation when he allegedly committed the
robbery. Although these are appropriate matters to take into
account in setting bail, the order does not evidence any consid-
eration of Brangan’s financial resources and does not explain how
the judge calculated the bail amount, how Brangan’s criminal
history demonstrated that he posed a serious flight risk, or why that
risk was so great that it necessitated a bail amount beyond his
means. Furthermore, the order does not explain why the judge
rejected Brangan’s alternative proposal that he be released on
$5,000 cash with the condition that he wear a GPS tracking
bracelet.

Third, when a bail order comes before a judge for reconsidera-
tion or review and a defendant has been detained due to his
inability to post bail, the judge must consider the length of the

28There are also practical reasons why it is sensible to avoid detaining a
defendant on unaffordable bail unless it is truly necessary. Pretrial detention
disrupts a defendant’s employment and family relationships, with often tragic
consequences. See Pinto, The Bail Trap, The New York Times Magazine (Aug.
13, 2015). Pretrial detention disproportionately affects ethnic and racial minority
groups. See Jones & Forman, Exploring the Potential for Pretrial Innovation in
Massachusetts, The Massachusetts Institute for a New Commonwealth, Justice
Reinvestment Policy Brief Series, at 3-4, 5 (Sept. 2015); Bail Fail: Why the U.S.
Should End the Practice of Using Money for Bail, Justice Policy Institute, at
15-16 (Sept. 2012) (Bail Fail), Moreover, funds expended on pretrial detention
might be better spent on treatment and supervision. See Jones & Forman, supra
at 5-6, Research indicates that alternatives to cash bail and secured bonds, such
as unsecured bonds, pretrial supervision, and court notification systems, may be
just as effective in assuring that a defendant appears at future court proceedings.
See Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial
Release Option, Pretrial Justice Institute (Oct. 2013); Bail Fail, supra at 27-35;
Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform, Harvard Law School
Criminal Justice Policy Program, at 14-18 (Oct. 2016).

710 477 Mass. 691 (2017)

Brangan v. Commonwealth,

defendant’s pretrial detention and the equities of the case. In
upholding pretrial detention of a defendant to assure his or her
future presence in court or safeguard other persons or the com-
munity, we have emphasized the temporary nature of this deten-
tion. See Querubin, 440 Mass. at 118 (“If a defendant is held
pending trial, the consequences to him, although significant, are
temporary”); Mendonza, 423 Mass. at 781, 790 (“the conclusion
of the trial itself provides an inevitable end point to the State’s
preventive authority,” and detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, is
“temporary and provisional”). That justification for pretrial de-
tention erodes the longer a defendant has been held.

In this case, Brangan has been held for more than three and
one-half years. In their briefs the parties exchange accusations as
to the underlying reasons for the delay in bringing Brangan to
trial, and we do not purport to assess where the fault, if any, lies.?4
We only note that the delay is an additional factor to be consid-
ered in determining whether Brangan’s continued pretrial deten-
tion is justified.

Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the order
of the single justice and remand this case to the county court for
entry of an order directing the Superior Court judge to conduct a
new bail hearing for Brangan as soon as possible in accord with
the standards set out in this opinion.

So ordered.

24Much of the delay appears to have resulted from the mistrial that the trial
judge ordered based on the prosecutor’s closing statement, and by the Com-
monwealth’s interlocutory appeal from that order, which we rejected in Brangan
Ton the ground that the judge’s order was not appealable. Brangan I, 475 Mass.
at 145-146, 148, 149. In the context of determining whether a defendant’s
speedy trial rights have been violated, the United States Supreme Court has
observed that “an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid
reason that justifies delay,” but “a delay resulting from an appeal would weigh
heavily against the Government if the issue were clearly tangential or frivolous.”
United States y. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315-316 (1986). Brangan’s pending
appeal on double jeopardy grounds, which we declined to consider as part of
Brangan I, supra at 148-149, also appears to have delayed his retrial.

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 711

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

CoMMONWEALTH VS. JONATHAN VILLAGRAN.

Norfolk. March 7, 2017. - August 29, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cypuer, JI.

Firearms. Controlled Substances. Disturbing the Peace. Constitutional Law,
Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion, Probable cause. Search and
Seizure, Reasonable suspicion, Protective frisk, Probable cause. Probable
Cause.

A Superior Court judge erred in denying the criminal defendant’s pretrial
motion to suppress marijuana and a firearm discovered after a patfrisk of the
defendant and a search of his backpack, where, with regard to the patfrisk,
the police sergeant responding to a call from school officials for assistance
with regard to a nonstudent on school property lacked reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity and that he was armed
and dangerous; and where, with regard to the search of the backpack, the
sergeant lacked probable cause to search the backpack, and the exception to
the requirement of a warrant for a search incident to a lawful arrest did not
apply because there was no crime for which the sergeant lawfully could have
arrested the defendant. [716-722] Lowy, J., dissenting, with whom CyrHer,

joined.

This court vacated the defendant’s conviction of disturbing a school and
remanded the matter for a new trial, where, although the evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant wilfully acted and that the act of
bringing a loaded, concealed firearm onto a high school’s campus, while he
was in possession of marijuana and under the influence of alcohol, was
unreasonably disruptive within the meaning of G. L. ¢. 272, § 40, the de-
fendant’s conviction was based, at least in part, on his possession of a firearm
that should have been suppressed. [724-727] Lowy, J., dissenting, with
whom Cypuer, J., joined.

Comptamnt received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of the
District Court Department on March 26, 2015.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Diane E.
Moriarty, J., and the cases were tried before Robert P. Ziemian,
J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case and authored this
opinion prior to her retirement.

712 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

Mathew B. Zindroski for the defendant.

Laura A. McLaughlin, Assistant District Attorney (David M.
Ringius, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Com-
monwealth.

Hines, J. After a jury trial in the Quincy District Court, the
defendant, Jonathan Villagran, was convicted of carrying a fire-
arm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); carrying a dangerous
weapon on school grounds, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (/) ; possession of a
firearm without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h);
disturbing a school, G. L. c. 272, § 40 ; and possession of a class
D substance with intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, 32C.2 The
complaint issued after a police officer, responding to a report of
an unauthorized person on the property of Milton High School
(school), searched the defendant’s backpack and discovered a
firearm, money, and marijuana.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress state-
ments and physical evidence seized during the search of his
backpack, arguing that the police officer lacked a constitutionally
permissible basis for the patfrisk and the subsequent search. A
judge of the District Court denied the motion. The defendant
appealed, asserting that the denial of the motion to suppress vio-
lated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights.* He also challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support
the conviction of disturbing a school.

We transferred the case to this court on our own motion and
take this opportunity to reaffirm the distinction between the
traditional standard applicable to a police officer’s conduct im-
plicating the Fourth Amendment and the less stringent standard
applicable to a school official who does the same. When a police
officer conducts a patfrisk, the applicable standard for assessing
its constitutionality is reasonable articulable suspicion, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), and when a police officer conducts
a search, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant based on
probable cause unless the search is justified by probable cause
and an exception to the warrant requirement. Commonwealth v.
Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 684 (2010). Although the question has not
been presented directly, we previously have assumed that a police

2The trial judge allowed the defendant’s motion for a required finding of not
guilty on a charge of minor in possession of alcohol, G. L. ¢. 138, § 34C.

"The defendant does not challenge the denial of the motion to suppress
statements.

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 713

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

officer’s conduct in a school setting is governed by the traditional
Fourth Amendment standard. Commonwealth v. Carey, 407 Mass.
528, 535 n.4 (1990) (discussing distinction between standard ap-
plicable to police officers and school officials). On the other hand,
when a school official conducts a search, it is constitutionally
permissible under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 so long as it
is “reasonable | under all the circumstances.” New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (.L.0.).

Applying the Terry standard to this case, we conclude that the
police officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that the
defendant had committed a crime and that the circumstances of
the encounter with the defendant did not warrant a reasonable
belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous to the officer
or others. Nor was the search permissible under any exception to
the warrant requirement. Thus, because neither the patfrisk nor
the search of the defendant’s backpack was justified on any of
these grounds, the denial of the motion to suppress was error.
Therefore, we vacate his convictions of the firearms and drug
charges. Because the conviction of disturbing a school was based,
at least in part, on his possession of a firearm, which should have
been suppressed, we vacate that conviction and remand for a new
trial.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. a. Standard of review. “In
reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we accept
the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error and leave
to the judge the responsibility of determining the weight and
credibility to be given . . . testimony presented at the motion
hearing.” Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 234 (2017),
quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004).
“A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by the
evidence, or when the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is
left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Commonwealth v. Hilton, 450 Mass. 173, 178 (2007). “We re-
view independently the application of constitutional principles to
the facts found.” Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151
(2016), quoting Wilson, supra.

b. Facts. In the written order denying the defendant’s motion to
suppress, the judge found the following facts based on the testi-
mony of two Milton police officers, Sergeant Kristen Murphy and

714 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

a detective.*

“On March 25, 2015, at approximately 2:00 pM., [school]
officials observed an unknown individual on the grounds of
the school. Later identified as [the defendant], he entered the
facility and told school officials that he was a student and
needed to get back into the building. He eventually changed
his story stating that he needed to use the restroom, after
presenting an obviously fictitious name to the school official.
The [defendant then exited the building, but could be seen
pacing around the school parking lot.

“At this time, the principal and vice principal approached
the [dJefendant and noticed a strong smell of marijuana. The
[d]efendant proceeded to tell them that he was waiting for a
[sixteen] year old girl to meet him at the school. At this point
the principal and vice principal worried about the surround-
ing students filling the area and ushered the [d]efendant into
a conference room in the school.

“Sergeant [Murphy] of the Milton Police Department ar-
rived and smelled an overpowering scent of marijuana on the
defendant. Sergeant [Murphy] was informed that the [d]e-
fendant had lied about his identity and his reason for being
there, and that the [dJefendant tried to sneak into the school.
Both school and law officials were suspicious of the [d]e-
fendant’s strange demeanor as well as his blatant lying and
reasonably agreed that he may have contraband on him.
Sergeant [Murphy] then conducted a pat-frisk on the [d]e-
fendant and found marijuana in his sweatshirt, in addition to
a wad of money in the amount of $2,964.88 in his pants pock-
et. After searching the [d]efendant’s person Sergeant [Mur-
phy] pat-frisked the exterior of the backpack, despite the
defendant’s objections, and felt a hard object. Sergeant [Mur-
phy] then opened the bag, as she feared the hard object may be
a weapon. In the bag Sergeant [Murphy] discovered a bottle of
alcohol, another bag of marijuana, a scale, and a loaded
handgun. [Murphy] immediately removed the gun from the
[d]efendant’s reach and read him his Miranda rights. The
school was then placed on lockdown. . . . ”

The defendant contends, and the Commonwealth concedes,

4None of the school officials who interacted with the defendant on March 25,
2015, testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress.

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 715

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

that portions of these findings, central to the judge’s ruling
denying the motion to suppress, were not supported by the evi-
dence and, thus, are clearly erroneous.® See Hilton, 450 Mass. at
178-180. Specifically, the evidence does not support the judge’s
findings that:

(1) At the time of the frisk, Murphy knew the defendant
“entered the facility and told school officials that he was a
student and needed to get back into the building. He event-
ually changed his story stating that he needed to use the
restroom, after presenting an obviously fictitious name to the
school official. The [dJefendant exited the building but could
be seen pacing around the school parking lot.”

(2) “Sergeant [Murphy] was informed that the [d]efendant
had lied about his identity and his reason for being there, and
that the [dJefendant tried to sneak into the school.”

(3) The sergeant was “suspicious of the [d]efendant’s strange
demeanor as well as his blatant lying and reasonably agreed
that he may have contraband on him.”

(4) “Sergeant [Murphy] then opened the bag, as she feared
the hard object may be a weapon.”

Instead, Murphy described in unequivocal terms the extent of her
knowledge of the events that occurred prior to her entry into the
conference room where the defendant had been brought by school
officials. “The call was given out that . .. a male party was trying
to gain entry into the high school. That’s what I knew. When I got
there [the vice-principal] told me we have a kid in the conference
room, he’s not a student here. Basically, that’s what I knew.”
In addition to the findings that survive the clear error standard,
the evidence at the motion to suppress hearing also established
the following. On her arrival, Murphy observed that the vice-
principal, whom she had known for over twenty years, was
“excited” and that both the vice-principal and the principal ap-
peared to be “rattled.” Once inside the building, the sergeant and
the vice-principal proceeded to the conference room where the
principal was waiting with the defendant, who was seated at a
table. The principal told Murphy, “Something’s wrong. Some-

5The Commonwealth conceded at oral argument and in its brief that the
judge's findings regarding what Sergeant Murphy knew when she initiated the
frisk lacked support in the evidence.

716 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

thing’s not right with this kid. Something’s not right. He has
something on him. I know he has something on him.” The
principal did not, however, explain the basis for his “hunch” that
the defendant had contraband in his possession or express a
concern that the contraband might be a firearm. Murphy did not
inquire further to determine the basis of the principal's suspicion
that the defendant “had something on him.” Nor was Murphy told
of the defendant’s interactions with school officials or the sub-
stance of his lies to gain entry into the school® before she com-
menced the patfrisk that culminated in the search of the backpack.

c. Analysis. The judge concluded that Murphy conducted a
lawful patfrisk of the defendant’s person and his backpack based
on Murphy’s “reasonable apprehension of fear, danger and un-
known factors present during the period of [the dJefendant’s
interaction with the school and law officials” and, therefore, all of
the evidence seized from the defendant was admissible. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the judge expressly relied on the finding that
Murphy was aware of the defendant's “blatant lies” to gain entry
into the school. We consider the constitutionality of the patfrisk
and the search of the backpack, omitting the clearly erroneous
findings related to Murphy’s knowledge of the circumstances of
the defendant’s entry into the school but taking cognizance of
those facts supported by the evidence and supplemented by un-
controverted evidence that was implicitly credited by the judge.
Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286 (2015).

Although the police conduct at issue here occurred in a public
school, the less stringent standard of T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 —
“reasonableness[ ] under all the circumstances” — does not
apply. In T.L.0., the United States Supreme Court emphasized
that its holding applied only to “searches carried out by school
authorities acting alone and on their own authority” and not to
searches carried out by police officers or school officials acting in
conjunction with police officers. Jd. at 341 n.7. The less stringent
standard for the school setting was necessary to accommodate
both “the privacy interests of schoolchildren [and] the substantial
need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order
in the schools.” /d. at 341. However, when a police officer rather
than a school official engages in conduct that implicates the
Fourth Amendment and art. 14, we apply the traditional standard

®Murphy learned that the defendant had lied to school officials, but she
became aware of that fact only after she had initiated the patfrisk during which
the defendant admitted, without specificity, that he had lied.

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 717

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

as articulated in Terry and followed by our cases. Thus, the
patfrisk at issue here must be justified by reasonable and ar-
ticulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal
activity and that the defendant was armed and dangerous. Com-
monwealth v. Narcisse, 457 Mass. 1, 9 (2010). The subsequent
search of the defendant’s backpack must be justified by probable
cause and an exception to the warrant requirement. See Common-
wealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990).

i. The frisk. Because the “stop” in this case was conducted by
school officials, we need not address the propriety of the stop.
Rather, our inquiry is whether the frisk was justified by a reason-
able suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity
and that he was armed and dangerous. Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 9.
Whether the facts as found by the judge established reasonable
articulable suspicion that the defendant was committing a crime
presents a close question, but we are persuaded they do not.

We acknowledge that the defendant, a nonstudent, was on
school property surrounded by school officials who believed he
possessed contraband of some sort. When Murphy arrived, how-
ever, she knew only that school officials had a male nonstudent
detained in the conference room and that the police had been
called for assistance in the matter. See Commonwealth v. Mendez,
476 Mass. 512, 515 (2017). The principal voiced his strong sus-
picions of the defendant, but neither he nor the vice-principal
reported any conduct suggestive of criminal activity. The odor of
marijuana, which Murphy appreciated upon her entry into the
conference room, also was not sufficient to support reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,
472 Mass. 767, 775 (2015) (“[W]Jhere the only factor leading an
officer to conclude that an individual possesses marijuana is the
smell of . . . marijuana, this factor supports a reasonable suspicion
that that individual is committing the civil offense of possession
of a small quantity of marijuana”). See also Commonwealth v.
Meneide, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 448, 451 n.4 (2016) (smell of burnt
or unburnt marijuana insufficient basis for either reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause).

What is left then is the defendant’s mere presence, a possible
criminal trespass in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 120. However,
reasonable suspicion of a criminal trespass did not arise where
none of the information available to Murphy suggested that the
defendant “remain[ed] in or upon the building . . . of another...
after having been forbidden so to do by the person in lawful
control of said premises.” Jd. Murphy was not told that the de-

718 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

fendant had been asked to leave the premises.” For these reasons,
we discern no basis for reasonable articulable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity.

Even if the defendant’s conduct led to a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, the frisk was not justified. When Murphy pat
frisked the defendant, she had no information from school offi-
cials to suggest that the defendant was armed. The principal’s
unsubstantiated hunch that the defendant “had something on
him,” alone, was insufficient for a reasonable belief that the de-
fendant was armed and dangerous, especially where the principal
had invited the defendant to return to the school, the defendant
had already emptied his pockets at the principal’s direction, and
the reasonable inference was that the principal believed that the
defendant had marijuana or some other controlled substance on
his person based on the strong odor of marijuana present in the
room. See Wilson, 441 Mass. at 394. See also Commonwealth v.
Martin, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 733, 740-741 (2017) (possession of
marijuana, without more, insufficient for reasonable suspicion
that defendant was armed).

Moreover, the principal’s hunch combined with Murphy’s ob-
servations of the defendant’s nervousness and Murphy’s testi-
mony that both the principal and the vice-principal appeared to be
“rattled” still did not establish a reasonable belief that the de-
fendant was armed and dangerous where the defendant was
compliant and did not make any furtive gestures or reach into his
pockets in a manner that would suggest that he was carrying a
weapon. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 528,
534 (2009) (“nervous or anxious behavior in combination with
factors that add nothing to the equation will not support a rea-
sonable suspicion that an officer’s safety may be compromised”).
Also, Murphy’s testimony is devoid of any reference to her
suspicion that the defendant was armed or her fear for her safety
or for the safety of the school. Therefore, nothing in the record of
the hearing on the motion to suppress established the specific and
articulable facts required to show that Murphy’s patfrisk was the
result of her reasonable belief that the defendant was armed and
dangerous. See Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 374
(2007), citing Wilson, 441 Mass. at 394.

7The evidence at trial, which revealed that the defendant had attempted to
leave but was detained by school officials to await the arrival of the police,
explains the unlikely inference of a criminal trespass at the time of the encounter
in the school’s conference room.

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 719

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

ii. The search of the backpack. As is well established, the
search of the backpack must be justified by probable cause and an
exception to the warrant requirement. See Tyree, 455 Mass. at
684. The Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to justify the
search of the backpack on this basis.

First, the facts fall far short of the showing necessary for
probable cause. Because the patfrisk was not justified, Murphy’s
observation that a “hard object” was present in the backpack
cannot be considered in the probable cause analysis. Nor was the
presence of a “hard object” sufficient to establish that it was a
firearm. Cf. Commonwealth v. Flemming, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 632,
638 (2010) (search under defendant’s clothing unreasonable where
there was no evidence that hard object felt like weapon). Second, a
search incident to a lawful arrest, the only plausible exception that
fits the circumstances of this case,* does not apply. Under our law,
Murphy could have searched the backpack for the “fruits, instru-
mentalities, contraband and other evidence of the crime . . . and
remov[ed] any weapons that the arrestee might use to resist arrest
or effect his escape.” G. L. c. 276. § 1. See Commonwealth v.
Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 160 (1988) (search incident to arrest
under art. 14 permissible to retrieve weapon or evidence of
crime). This exception fails, however, because as discussed
above, there was no crime for which the defendant lawfully could
have been arrested.

The dissent rejects the bedrock constitutional principles that a
patfrisk of a suspect must be justified by reasonable articulable
suspicion of both criminal activity and dangerousness and that a
warrantless search must be justified by probable cause and an
exception to the warrant requirement as dictated by Terry and its
progeny. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. See, e.g., Narcisse, 457 Mass. at
6-7; Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. 46, 71 (2004);
Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 672 (2001). Instead,
the dissent contends that a person who enters upon school prop-
erty, where public access is restricted, lacks the same expectation
of privacy as one in a public place and, as a consequence, a
patfrisk and search need not be justified by reasonable articulable
suspicion or probable cause. Post at 728. Without citing case law
supporting this alternative view of the protections inherent in the
Fourth Amendment and art. 14, or articulating the contours of this

Consent is eliminated as a possibility based on the judge’s finding that the
defendant explicitly objected to Murphy touching the backpack.

720 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

diminished expectation of privacy, the dissent relies instead on
highly publicized examples of school violence as support for the
proposition that the very nature of the place, a school, justifies a
less rigorous constitutional standard. Post at 729. We discern no
such limitation in the protections guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment or art. 14.

We acknowledge that our cases have taken judicial notice of
“the actual and potential violence in our public schools.” Com-
monwealth v. Milo M., 433 Mass. 149, 156 (2001). See id. at
156-157 & n.8; Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 85 Mass. App. Ct.
134, 138-139 (2014) (reciting instances of school shootings as
basis for “heightened sensitivity” and reasonable suspicion for
patfrisk and search of backpack where defendant was dressed in
camouflage attire, openly displayed weapons, and affixed threat-
ening decals to vehicle). However, that fact alone has not been
used to limit a defendant’s constitutional rights. In Milo M., supra
at 150-151, the court’s reference to school violence arose in the
context of a juvenile’s challenge to a delinquency finding based
on a violation of the Massachusetts threat statute, G. L. c. 275,
§ 2. The juvenile argued that the judge focused on the apprehen-
sion of the teacher, who was the recipient of the threat, and that
her subjective state of mind was insufficient to establish that he
had the intent and ability to carry out the threat. Milo M., supra
at 151-152. The court rejected this argument. Relying on the
judicially noticed fact of “actual and potential violence in our
public schools,” the court concluded that the teacher’s apprehen-
sion was objectively reasonable where the threats could come to
fruition. Jd. at 156-158. Thus, the recognition of school violence
served an evidentiary purpose only; it was accorded no constitu-
tional significance as the dissent suggests it should have in this
case.

As a second basis for rejecting the traditional Fourth Amend-
ment and art. 14 analytical framework, the dissent contends that
in the school setting, the defendant had a diminished expectation
of privacy such that neither reasonable articulable suspicion for
the patfrisk nor probable cause for the search were required. Post
at 728. In reaching this conclusion, the dissent applies the test for
determining whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place searched such that he or she may invoke the
protections of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 against unrea-
sonable searches. In that analysis, the inquiry is whether the de-
fendant has a subjective expectation of privacy in the place

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 721

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

searched and, if so, whether society is willing to recognize that
expectation of privacy as reasonable. See California v. Ciraolo,
476 US. 207, 211 (1986). See also Commonwealth v. Montanez,
410 Mass. 290, 301 (1991). The dissent then summarily con-
cludes that society would be unwilling to recognize a nonstu-
dent’s expectation of privacy in the school setting as reasonable.
Post at 728-729.

Nothing in the Fourth Amendment or our art. 14 jurisprudence
supports such limitations on a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. Even in T.L.O., the Supreme Court did not tie its less
stringent standard to an assumption that a student had a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in the school setting. Rather, the
court’s holding reflects a judgment that a balancing of the stu-
dent’s privacy interests and the school’s interest in maintaining
order could be fairly accomplished without offending the funda-
mental Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness. See
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-343.

Last, the dissent, quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 454
Mass. 159, 164 (2009), reasons that “[w]here a warrantless search
is based on a reasonable suspicion that an individual presents a
danger, ‘[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
[person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his [or her] safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” Post at
727-728. This is not our law. We have never held that a warrant-
less search may be justified on this basis. As noted earlier, a
police officer may initiate a patfrisk if she has reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity and that the suspect is armed and
dangerous. Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 9. A search, however, requires
probable cause and a warrant unless the circumstances excuse the
warrant requirement. The search in this case, lacking both, was not
lawful.

We do not underestimate the threat of violence in schools and
other public places. Recent history bears out the folly of doing so.
Nonetheless, our task is to respect the jurisprudence that has
developed under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14. And we do
so with confidence that public safety and constitutional rights are
not inherently incompatible. We acknowledge that school offi-
cials, likely cognizant of other incidents where unauthorized per-
sons entered school property and engaged in conduct with tragic
consequences, are pressed to exercise caution in circumstances
where they lack control of the person or the situation. The school
officials in this case were appropriately cautious of the defendant

722 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

and did what was expected of them to insure the safety of the
students in their charge: they called the police. Thus, it is impor-
tant to emphasize here that our ruling does not bear on what
school officials themselves can and should do to insure the safety
of students. Nor does our ruling handicap school officials in
responding to behavior that presents a potential or real threat to
student safety. What we have said here relates only to conduct of
police officers, who as the Supreme Court noted in T-L.0., 469
US. at 343, are “school[ed] . . . in the niceties of probable cause”
and other constitutional requirements. Where school officials who
engage in protective activity are “not acting ‘in conjunction with
or at the behest of law enforcement agencies,’ ” their actions are
governed by a less stringent constitutional standard. Common-
wealth v. Lawrence L., 439 Mass. 817, 820-821 (2003), quoting
T.L.O., supra at 341 1.7

2. Sufficiency of the evidence at trial. The defendant argues that
the evidence — possession of a concealed firearm in the absence
of disruptive, violent, or threatening behavior — is insufficient to
support the conviction for disturbing a school, G. L. c. 272, § 40,°
and that the conviction must be reversed. We disagree. In deter-
mining the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider “the evidence
in its entirety, including, not excluding, that admitted [at] trial but
found inadmissible on appeal.” Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto,
414 Mass. 37, 46 (1992), quoting Glisson v. Georgia, 192 Ga. App.
409, 410 (1989). See Lockhart vy. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34 (1988).
Considering the entirety of the evidence, we reject the defendant’s
argument that the evidence was insufficient and that the conviction
must be reversed. Nonetheless, we conclude that because the con-
viction was based, at least in part, on the defendant’s possession of
a firearm that should have been suppressed, we vacate the convic-
tion and remand for a new trial.

a. Facts. We recite the facts the jury could have found based on
the evidence presented at trial. On March 25, 2015, the defendant
approached the entrance of the school, carrying a backpack. He
arrived at the school approximately five minutes before dismissal.
The school is a “lockdown” facility; it employs a double door entry
system, requiring visitors to the school to ring the office to gain
entry through two sets of locked doors. When the defendant rang
the buzzer, the administrative assistant on duty viewed him on

©The issue is preserved, as the defendant filed a motion for a required finding
of not guilty at the close of the evidence.

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 723

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

video surveillance and then allowed him into the office. He first told
the assistant that he needed to use the bathroom; however, when she
replied that the bathrooms were not for public use, the defendant
told her that he was a student whose last name was “Cruz” and that
he needed to get back into the school to access his locker. The
assistant was suspicious; as she began to walk back to her desk to
verify his identity in the school database, the defendant asked to be
let back out of the building, because he had left his automobile
running.

The assistant became alarmed as she viewed the defendant on
the surveillance monitors quickly leave the building but not the
property. She contacted the principal and the vice-principal to
communicate her concerns that someone was trying to gain entry
into the school. The principal and the vice-principal asked for a
description of the defendant and immediately went outside the
school to locate him. They did so in the school parking lot, just
after classes had been dismissed. They approached the defendant,
noting the odor of unburnt marijuana’? and the defendant's red,
glassy eyes. They asked the defendant what he was doing at the
school, why he misrepresented his identity, and his purpose for
being on the premises. The defendant replied that he was there to
meet a girl. He complied with their request to follow them back
into the school “to discuss a little more as to what he was doing
[at the school] and . . . why he tried to gain access to the
building.”

They brought the defendant into a conference room, adjacent to
the main office. Milton police were alerted. The principal ques-
tioned the defendant, asking him why he was at the school, why
he lied about being a student, and whether he had been drinking
alcohol or smoking marijuana. The defendant replied that he was
at the school to meet a girl, but did not know her name. He denied
drinking or smoking and apologized for lying about his identity.
At the principal’s request, the defendant emptied the pockets of
his pants. The defendant was apologetic and asked whether he
could leave, but he was not allowed to do so.

When Murphy arrived at the school, the vice-principal, who
appeared to be upset, greeted her at the front entrance to the
school. She was led into a conference room where the defendant
and the principal were waiting. Murphy noticed the strong odor of

The vice-principal also noticed a faint odor of alcohol on the defendant’s
person.

724 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

marijuana as she entered the room. The defendant was seated at
the head of the conference table; a black backpack and items from
his pockets were on the table. Murphy noted that the principal
also appeared to be upset.

The defendant appeared to be nervous; he was seated, but his
legs were shaking. Murphy asked for the defendant’s name and
the principal gave her the defendant’s Massachusetts identifica-
tion card. She then asked the defendant to stand up and pat frisked
his person.

As a result of the patfrisk, Murphy recovered a large bag of
what appeared to be marijuana and a “wad” of money from the
pocket of his hooded sweatshirt. Murphy asked about the back-
pack; the defendant replied that it was his backpack but that she
did not have the right to look inside. Murphy “patted down” the
outside of the backpack and felt something hard inside, so she
opened it and removed the contents, including a bottle of alcohol,
more money, a pair of sneakers, and a small, silver firearm with
a pearl-colored handle. Murphy immediately slid the firearm
away from the defendant, placed him in handcuffs, read him the
Miranda warnings, and sat the defendant back down at the table.

Murphy alerted Milton police that the high school was on
lockdown and requested that all available officers respond. When
a detective arrived, the school was already in lockdown. As the
detective entered the conference room, he noticed the strong odor
of marijuana. Murphy informed the detective that she had read
the defendant the Miranda warnings and left the room. The
detective secured the firearm and placed it in his pocket. He then
asked the defendant whether he understood the Miranda warnings
and whether he would agree to speak with him. The defendant
told the detective that he understood the Miranda warnings and
agreed to speak with him. He told the detective that he arrived in
Milton from Watertown and was meeting a female student at the
high school at her request. The defendant admitted that he did not
have a license to carry a firearm or a firearm identification card.
After the lockdown was lifted, the detective drove the defendant
to the police station where he was booked.

b. Analysis. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to allow any rational trier of
fact to find the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass.
671, 676-677 (1979). General Laws c. 272, § 40, provides, in

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 725

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

pertinent part, “Whoever wilfully interrupts or disturbs a school
or other assembly of people met for a lawful purpose shall be
punished .. . .” To sustain a conviction under the statute, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s conduct was willful and “create[d] an interruption or
disturbance of the normal functioning of a school.” Common-
wealth v. Bohmer, 374 Mass. 368, 372 (1978).

The parties urge starkly different interpretations of the evidence
necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute. The defendant
argues that the possession of a concealed firearm in the absence
of disruptive, violent, or threatening behavior does not meet the
Latimore standard. The Commonwealth counters that the evi-
dence was sufficient, where the lockdown was a “disturbance of
the normal functioning of a school” and was the natural and
probable consequence of the defendant's wilful act in bringing a
loaded firearm onto school property. The Commonwealth argues
further that notwithstanding the lockdown, the defendant’s con-
duct prior to the arrival of police officers was sufficiently alarm-
ing to disrupt the school’s function. Thus, the essential questions
we must answer here are (1) whether the defendant’s conduct was
wilful and (2) whether a lockdown of the school’s campus is a
“disturbance of the normal functioning of a school.” Bohmer,
supra at 372.

i. Wilful conduct. “The wilfulness requirement of G. L. c. 272,
§ 40, demands . . . only that the acts of the defendant[ ] be wil-
fully performed; so long as the acts were intentional and not due
to accident or inadvertence, the requirement is satisfied.” Jd. at
377. The specific intent to cause a disturbance is not an essential
element of the crime. /d. Here, the defendant does not challenge
the wilfulness element of the crime. We consider, therefore, only
his claim that the act of bringing a loaded, concealed firearm onto
the school campus, while he was in possession of marijuana and
under the influence of alcohol, was not unreasonably disruptive
within the meaning of the statute.

ii. Disturbance of the school’s normal functioning. We analyze
disruptive conduct using a two-prong standard: first, whether the
conduct is such that “most people would find to be unreasonably
disruptive,” and second, whether the conduct “did in fact infringe
someone’s right to be undisturbed.” Commonwealth v. Orlando,
371 Mass. 732, 734-735 (1977). The first prong is objective and
“protects potential defendants from prosecutions based on indi-
vidual sensitivities”; the second prong “requires that the crime

726 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

have a victim,” and only punishes activities that “have detrimen-
tal impact.” Jd. at 735.

Disruptive conduct is context specific and is necessarily depen-
dent on its location and timing; therefore, conduct that would be
acceptable in one situation may be disruptive in another. See id.
In Bohmer, 374 Mass. at 370, we upheld the defendant’s convic-
tions under G. L. c. 272, § 40, where the defendant, in two sep-
arate incidents, interrupted classes in progress at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology to address the students in the classes
after the professors asked him to leave. Although classroom an-
nouncements in some situations may not be objectively disrup-
tive, in Bohmer, the defendant did not have permission to make
the announcements, interrupted the classes in session, and had to
be forcibly removed. See id. The possession of a loaded, con-
cealed firearm in certain situations may not be objectively unrea-
sonably disruptive, but where, as here, that possession results in
the lockdown of a high school, the jury reasonably could con-
clude that “most people would find [a school lockdown] unrea-
sonably disruptive.” Orlando, supra.

In addition, the defendant’s conduct had a measurable impact
on those present in the school. After Murphy discovered the
firearm in the defendant’s backpack, the school was placed in
lockdown for approximately two hours." Although the defendant
was brought into the school shortly after school dismissal, many
people, both students and nonstudents, were present, as many
afterschool and community activities are conducted there. When
the school is placed in lockdown, all staff members are trained to
get into the first lockable room that they are near. The doors are
locked and faculty and students are told to barricade themselves
in the room so that no one can gain entrance. Movements are
restricted in the building; no one is allowed to move freely
through the hallways except for police personnel, the principal,
and the vice-principal. Parents are restricted from picking up their
children, and no one may leave until the lockdown is lifted. As a
result of the lockdown on March 25, 2015, approximately twenty
Milton police officers were dispatched to the school and some
school officials were not able to leave until hours after the lock-

"1A lockdown occurs at the school when there has been a breach of security.
An indication is given to those in the building that they need to lock their doors
and follow protocols, such as barricading the doors and restricting movement, to
ensure that all the students and adults are safe.

477 Mass. 711 (2017) R27

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

down ended.!?

Based on the totality of the facts that could have been found by
the jury, the sufficiency of the evidence is not a close question.
Thus, the defendant’s claim that retrial is barred lacks merit. See
Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 456 Mass. 411, 434-435 (2010), S.C.,
460 Mass. 723 (2011), quoting Commonwealth y. Kater, 421 Mass.
17, 18 (1995) (“If the evidence admitted at the trial was sufficient
to send the case to the jury, but is insufficient to send the case to the
jury if all improperly admitted evidence is disregarded, double
jeopardy principles nevertheless do not bar a retrial’). Because,
however, the conviction was based, at least in part, on the defend-
ant’s possession of a firearm which should have been suppressed,
we vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.

Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that
the police lacked a reasonable belief that the defendant was
armed and dangerous and, therefore, the patfrisk and search of the
backpack was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
art. 14. Therefore, we vacate the convictions of carrying a firearm
without a license, carrying a dangerous weapon on school grounds,
possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, and
possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute, and
remand those matters to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We vacate the conviction of disturbing
a school and remand for a new trial.

So ordered.

Lowy, J. (dissenting, with whom Cypher, J., joins). I disagree
with the court’s conclusion that it was unreasonable for Sergeant
Murphy of the Milton police department to search the defendant’s
bag in the circumstances. Accordingly, I would affirm the defend-
ant’s convictions, including his conviction of wilful disturbance.

The “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights is reasonableness. Commonwealth v. Blais, 428 Mass.
294, 297 (1998). Where a warrantless search is based on a rea-
sonable suspicion that an individual presents a danger, “[t]he
officer need not be absolutely certain that the in dividual is armed;
the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circum-

"The vice-principal testified that he was unable to leave the school until 6 RM.
or 7 RM, as a result of the lockdown.

728 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

stances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety or
that of others was in danger.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 454
Mass. 159, 164 (2009), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968). In determining the reasonableness of a search, “we have
consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the
fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.” Blais, supra at
297, quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). See
Commonwealth v. Sanborn, 477 Mass. 393, 396 n.3 (2017) (ac-
knowledging possibility that warrantless seizures to serve domes-
tic abuse prevention orders may be reasonable). See also id. at
396-397 (Gants, C.J., concurring) (same, even where facts do not
satisfy existing exception to warrant requirement).

Considering the totality of circumstances in this case, I con-
clude that the defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy and
that Murphy’s search of the defendant’s backpack was reasona-
ble, based on the potential danger to students. Cf. New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (Z.L.O.) (in “certain limited
circumstances neither [probable cause nor reasonable suspicion]
is required” [citation omitted]).

An individual who attempts to gain entry to a school, where
public access is restricted, does not have the same expectation of
privacy as an individual in a home, on a street corner, or even in
a motor vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290,
301 (1991) (search in “constitutional sense” takes place where
police intrude on constitutionally protected reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy). Determining whether such a reasonable expec-
tation exists is a two-step inquiry: “(1) whether the defendant has
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
search, and (2) whether society is willing to recognize [the
reasonableness of] that expectation.” Id.

Although the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy, I conclude that society would not be willing to accept the
reasonableness of the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the
circumstances of this case.t The government has a vital interest in
ensuring the safety of our schools and the children who attend

1] do not dispute that students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their schools. The reasonableness of that expectation, however, is lesser than the
expectations of privacy that are typically applicable in other contexts, because
students may be subject to search in the absence of either probable cause of
criminality or reasonable suspicion that they are armed. See New Jersey v.
TLO., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). The question here, however, is what expec-
tation a person with no apparent relationship to a school, its students, or its

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 729

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

them. In T.L.0., 469 U.S. at 340, it was the “school setting” itself
that required “some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit
activity needed to justify a search.” See id. at 352-353 (Black-
mun, J., concurring) (“Indeed, because drug use and possession of
weapons have become increasingly common among young people,
an immediate response frequently is required not just to maintain an
environment conducive to learning, but to protect the very safety of
students and school personnel”).

Even dating back to 2001 — well before the highly publicized
tragedies at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univer-
sity (Virginia Tech) and in Newtown, Connecticut — we had
taken judicial notice of the danger of violence in schools. Com-
monwealth v. Milo M., 433 Mass 149, 156-157 & n.8 (2001). See
Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 134, 138 (2014)
(taking judicial notice of school shootings in Columbine, Colo-
rado; Santee, California; and Newtown, Connecticut). Given this
widely-known backdrop, individuals attempting to enter a school
— particularly without any apparent relationship to the school or
the people there — have, at best, an expectation of privacy to
their persons and their belongings that is significantly less than
their expectation of privacy in their homes or motor vehicles, or
while on a street corner. See Commonwealth v. Pina, 406 Mass.
540, 545, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990) (nature of location of
search is relevant to its reasonableness). See also T:L.0., 469 U.S.
at 340 (school setting reason for reducing “level of suspicion”).
Rather, such an individual attempts to gain entry into a place
where safety is of paramount importance and must be vigilantly
safeguarded.

Further, the circumstances of this case differ from those involv-
ing searches of students, such that the distinction between
searches conducted by law enforcement and those conducted by
school officials does not bear the same import. Although school
officials may face dangers when searching students, they are
searching individuals with whom they have some familiarity.
Ostensibly, school officials are generally equipped to deal with
problems stemming from students. To conclude that, on these
facts, a search by officials at Milton High School (school) of a

faculty should have when attempting to enter school grounds. I agree with the
court that the analytical framework from 7.1.0 is not applicable. The lesser
expectation of privacy possessed by students, at least with respect to searches by
school officials, is a helpful point of reference in analyzing the defendant’s
expectation of privacy.

730 477 Mass. 711 (2017)

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

nonstudent would have been subject to reduced Fourth Amend-
ment and art. 14 scrutiny could have the undesirable effect of
encouraging school officials to confront potentially dangerous
individuals, rather than encouraging them to seek assistance from
law enforcement with the appropriate training to handle such
scenarios.

Murphy’s own knowledge at the time of the search established
a reasonable basis to search the defendant in the circumstances.”
She knew that school officials had requested police assistance to
deal with a nonstudent who, by duplicity, had tried to gain entry
to the school.? Murphy arrived in the conference room where the
school officials were with the defendant, and it was thus reason-
able for her to believe that the defendant was the nonstudent
about whom she had been called. Murphy knew the school
officials from previous interactions, and she observed that they
were visibly distraught throughout this ordeal. Murphy also no-
ticed that the defendant appeared to be nervous, and she noted the
smell of marijuana and alcohol in the school conference room.
Finally, Murphy arrived shortly after classes had ended for the
day, making it likely that students would be out and about the
school grounds, increasing their likelihood of exposure to the
potentially intoxicated defendant, should he have been released.

I conclude that the combination of the defendant’s reduced
expectation of privacy, the heightened government interest in
school safety, and Murphy’s knowledge made frisking* the de-

2Murphy may well have had probable cause to believe the defendant had
committed trespass or attempted criminal trespass, in which case the defendant
may have been subject to a search incident to arrest for that crime. See
Commonwealth v, Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 481-482 (2007) (search incident
to arrest may take place before arrest as long as search and arrest are “substan-
tially contemporaneous”). This issue, however, is not argued on appeal, and in
any event, I would affirm based on the defendant’s reduced expectation of
privacy.

2As the court concludes, the facts did not support the judge's findings that
Murphy had actual knowledge of the defendant’s specific lies. The parties did
not argue, and thus the court does not address, whether the “collective knowl-
edge” doctrine, which generally imputes the knowledge of one police officer to
other police officers who are engaged in a cooperative effort, could be extended
to apply to school officials in this case, See Commonwealth y. Gullick, 386
Mass. 278, 283-284 (1982) (evaluating probable cause based on collective
knowledge of officers).

4Because Murphy felt the exterior of the bag and felt a hard object before she
opened it, it is unnecessary to address whether the sergeant could have simply
opened the bag, Although Murphy did not explicitly testify that she believed the

477 Mass. 711 (2017) 731

Commonwealth »: Villagran,

fendant’s person and backpack reasonable. Even without specific
facts to suggest that he was armed, the location, the timing, the
suspicious nature of the defendant’s conduct, and his potential
intoxication warranted the officer’s concern for the safety of
students at the school. See Johnson, 454 Mass. at 164. The only
alternative — apart from potentially arresting the defendant for
trespass, which would have allowed for a search incident to arrest
— would have been to return the backpack and release him,
without knowing what the bag contained, at a time students were
likely to be milling about the school grounds. I believe it was
eminently reasonable — and prudent — in these circumstances
for Murphy to feel the bag for weapons before potentially return-
ing it to the defendant and allowing him to leave.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

hard object was a weapon, the judge inferred that Murphy opened the bag
because she suspected the object was a weapon. This inference was reasonable
considering Murphy’s testimony as a whole, in which she described moving the
bag out of the defendant's reach and hearing a “clank” when she did so.

732 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

ComMonweEALTH vs. Maxwe_i Wicerns, Jr.
(and twenty-eight companion cases

Hampden, February 10, 2017. - September 6, 2017.
Present: Gawrs, C.J., Hives, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.”

Homicide. Home Invasion. Robbery. Evidence, Identification, Cross-examina-
tion by codefendant'’s counsel, Relevancy and materiality, Photograph. Iden-
tification. Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Identi-
fication of defendant in courtroom, Severance, Mistrial, Argument by
prosecutor, Sentence. Constitutional Law, Sentence.

At a murder trial, no prejudicial error arose from three witnesses’ in-court
identifications of the defendants, despite the suppression of out-of-court
identifications that the witnesses had made as a result of an improperly
suggestive procedure, where there was an independent source for the in-court
identification made by one witness; where the second witness identified in
court one defendant whom she had identified by name before the suggestive
procedure; and where the third witness’s in-court identification, viewed in its
totality, was equivocal, given that the witness had made an equivocal
identification of that defendant prior to the suggestive procedure, [736-738]

Ata murder trial, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from
the admission in evidence of the testimony of a police officer about a
witness’s out-of-court identification of one defendant, and the judge did not
abuse his discretion in denying that defendant’s motions to sever and for a
mistrial based on co-counsel’s cross-examination of the identifying witness
that led to the police officer’s testimony, where that defendant failed to object
to his codefendant’s counsel’s cross-examination, to the prosecutor's redirect
examination, or to the witness’s in-court identification of the second defend-
ant; further, no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from
the admission in evidence of that witness’s out-of-court identification, [738-
742]

At a murder trial, no error arose in the admission in evidence of deoxyribo-
nucleic acid test results. [742]

At a murder trial, the judge did not err in allowing the Commonwealth, over
objection, to elicit testimony that someone who was not a member of law
enforcement removed two bandanas from one defendant's property bag
while that defendant was in custody, where the evidence was relevant to
rebut the defendants’ attempted defense of an incomplete police investiga-

"Thirteen against Maxwell Wiggins, Jr., and fifteen against Swinkels Laporte.
Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

477 Mass. 732 (2017) 733

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

tion; further, given that the judge carefully considered the options to reduce
any possible prejudice to the defendants from the admission of this evidence,
the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that its probative value
outweighed its potential for prejudice [743-744]; further, the judge did not
abuse his discretion in admitting an autopsy photograph of the victim, where
the judge carefully analyzed its relevance and probative value before admit-
ting it [745-746].

At a criminal trial, even if the prosecutor in closing argument misstated key
identification evidence, the defendants failed to establish how any error
would have influenced the jury’s verdicts, [746-747]

This court vacated the sentences of a juvenile convicted of home invasion and
armed robbery in addition to murder in the first degree, where the judge in
revising the sentence on the murder conviction may not have given the same

ration to how the defendant’s other convictions would affect his

ibility for parole, [747-748]

This court declined to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce
the conviction of an eighteen year old defendant to match the sentence given
to his seventeen year old codefendant. [748]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on September 25, 2007.

Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Cornelius
J. Moriarty, II, J.; and the cases were tried before Peter A. Velis,
J.

Alan Jay Black for Maxwell Wiggins, Jr.

Jeffrey L. Baler for Swinkels Laporte.

Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Bupp, J. On the evening of August 29, 2007, two armed and
masked men entered a home in Springfield, assaulting and rob-
bing its occupants at gunpoint. As they left, the homeowner,
Tracy Bennett, who was returning home, was shot and killed.
Swinkels Laporte and Maxwell Wiggins were identified as the
assailants and, following a joint jury trial in the Superior Court,
were found guilty of murder in the first degree, as well as other
offenses related to the home invasion.

On appeal, they primarily claim that witnesses were improperly
allowed to identify them as the perpetrators during the trial. They
also raise various evidentiary issues, and claim error in the
prosecutor’s closing argument. Wiggins further challenges the
denial of his motions to sever and for a mistrial, based on
co-counsel’s cross-examination of a witness regarding a previ-
ously suppressed out-of-court identification. Laporte separately
challenges his nonmurder sentences. Finally, both defendants
seek relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

734 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

We discern no reversible error and, after a thorough review of
the record, decline to reduce or set aside the verdicts under G. L.
c. 278, § 33E. Accordingly, we affirm the defendants’ convic-
tions. However, we remand for resentencing Laporte’s convic-
tions of home invasion and armed robbery while masked.

Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have
found, reserving certain details for discussion of the issues.

Tracy Bennett lived with her adult daughter, Susan; her eigh-
teen year old son, Daniel; Susan’s three young children; and a
seventeen year old family friend, Angel Colon.* The defendants
were friends of Daniel and visited him frequently at the Bennett
home, where they would often see Susan, Tracy, and Colon as
well. The defendants and Daniel usually spent their time in
Daniel’s room, where they played video games on Daniel’s new
Xbox video game console. In his room, Daniel kept a safe
containing money and marijuana that he sold to friends; the
defendants were aware of the safe and had seen its contents. A
couple of weeks before the killing, Colon thought he overheard
the defendants discussing wanting to take the Xbox.

On the evening of August 29, 2007, Tracy had gone out; Colon
and Susan were watching television in Susan’s room, and Daniel
was with his girl friend in his room. At approximately 10 p.M., two
masked African-American men carrying guns entered the home.
One was short and skinny; the other was tall and stocky. They
wore dark hooded sweatshirts, dark pants, and dark baseball caps.
One of the sweatshirts had a zipper, and the other was a pullover,
like sweatshirts Colon had seen Wiggins and Laporte wear on
multiple occasions. The intruders also wore black bandannas over
their noses and mouths. Colon, who looked down the hallway to
see whether Tracy had come home, saw the two proceed toward
him and thought that Daniel’s friends, Wiggins and Laporte, were
playing a joke. He quickly learned the intruders’ intentions when
the shorter one said, ““Where’s the fucking shit? We ain’t playing.
This ain’t no joke,” and punched him in the face. Colon and
Susan were forced to lie face down on the bed as the shorter
assailant took items from the room, including Susan’s cellular
telephone, a piggy bank, and a small camcorder.

Because Tracy, Susan, and Daniel share a last name, we refer to them using
their first names.

4 According to the record, at the relevant time, Laporte was five feet, eight
inches, and weighed approximately 130 pounds. Wiggins was six feet, one inch
tall, and weighed about 200 pounds.

477 Mass. 732 (2017) 735

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

Simultaneously, the taller intruder banged on Daniel’s locked
bedroom door and then forced the door open. He pointed a gun at
Daniel’s face and said, “Give me your shit. I know you’ ve got it.”
The two struggled briefly, then the intruder hit Daniel in the head
with the gun, and Daniel opened the safe. The intruder instructed
Daniel to put cash, marijuana, the Xbox console, games, and
digital video disc (DVD) movies into a large trash bag.

As soon as Colon heard the two men leave the house, he
telephoned 911. As he was on the telephone with the dispatcher,
he, Daniel, and Susan heard a gunshot. They ran outside and
found Tracy shot in the face and bleeding profusely.

First responders arrived at the scene shortly after 10 pM. to
attend to Tracy and investigate the crime. Colon reported to an
officer that “Swinkels and Max” committed the crimes and told
him where each lived. At approximately 10:45 p., officers
arrived at Laporte’s home, where they found the defendants. A
search of that home yielded items that appeared to have been
stolen from the Bennett home, including an Xbox console and
components, games, DVD movies, cash and coins, jewelry boxes,
and a digital scale. The officers also collected other items, in-
cluding ammunition, three black hooded sweatshirts, and other
clothing.

The State police crime laboratory performed forensic testing on
the sweatshirts. The cuffs of one sweatshirt tested positive for
gunshot residue (GSR) as well as occult blood. A second sweat-
shirt also tested positive for occult blood. Investigators also
performed deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on swabs taken
from the wear areas of the sweatshirts. DNA testing of samples
from the sweatshirt with GSR did not produce any conclusive
matches. However, the investigators found that the second sweat-
shirt contained a DNA profile matching that of Laporte and a
third sweatshirt contained a DNA profile matching Wiggins.

At trial, the defendants sought to convince the jury that any
identification of the defendants as the intruders was a mistake.
They argued that Daniel had only mentioned their names to the
police when he was asked whether he had any African-American
friends and that the police had inappropriately focused on them.
Laporte in particular argued that, although the stolen property had
been found at his home and his DNA profile matched a sample
from one of the black sweatshirts also found there, the robbery
could have been committed by his brother, which would also
explain those facts. We discuss the defendants’ arguments in
more detail below.

736 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

Discussion. 1. In-court identification of the defendants. Al-
though the defendants’ theory was misidentification, this is not a
case where the alleged perpetrators were unknown to the eyewit-
nesses. Daniel, Susan, and Colon had known the defendants for
some time. The jury heard testimony that Wiggins and Daniel had
been friends for a couple of years prior to the robbery and
shooting, and Wiggins frequently visited Daniel. Daniel had
known Laporte for approximately six months, during which time
Laporte visited Daniel with Wiggins on multiple occasions. Both
Susan and Colon saw the defendants when they visited Daniel.
Colon, who had already known Laporte for several years, would
sometimes play video games with Wiggins, Laporte, and Daniel
in Daniel’s room. However, despite the witnesses’ familiarity
with the defendants, compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson,
420 Mass. 458, 459-460 (1995) (armed robbers were unknown to
defendant), the defense argued that because the intruders wore
masks, the witnesses mistook them for the defendants.

On the night of the break-in and shooting, each of the witnesses
viewed each defendant separately in what was later determined to
be an unnecessarily suggestive showup procedure.* As a result,
the motion judge suppressed the out-of-court identifications that
Colon and Susan had made during the showup and that Daniel
had made afterwards at the police station. Nevertheless, the judge
allowed all three to make in-court identifications of the defend-
ants at trial: Colon identified both defendants as the intruders;
Susan identified Laporte as one of the two intruders; and Daniel
identified Wiggins as one of the intruders, although the identifi-
cation was equivocal. The defendants assert that this was preju-
dicial error. We disagree.

Colon testified that despite the masks, he recognized the in-
truders as Wiggins and Laporte as they walked toward him. He
recognized the defendants by voice, clothes, build, and the way
they walked. He told police at the scene who the assailants were

5The police took each of the witnesses in turn (Daniel, Colon, Susan, and
Daniel’s girl friend) to Laporte’s residence. The defendants were handcuffed
and shown to each witness from twelve feet away. After the witness was
instructed to look at the subject’s height, weight, and build, a police officer
asked each witness what he or she had heard the intruder say, and then instructed
the respective defendant to repeat it to each witness. The motion judge deter-
mined that there was good reason for the one-on-one visual confrontations.
However, he found that the voice identification procedures were both unneces-
sarily and impermissibly suggestive, pursuant to Commonwealth v, Marini, 375
Mass. 510, 516-517 (1978).

477 Mass. 732 (2017) 737

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

and where they lived. Colon further pointed out Laporte as the
intruder who punched him in the mouth during the home inva-
sion. Although the defendants objected to Colon’s in-court iden-
tifications, there was an independent source for that identification
because Colon unequivocally identified the defendants as the
perpetrators prior to the suggestive showup procedure.

In court, Susan identified Laporte as the shorter intruder with-
out objection. She testified that although he wore a mask, she
recognized Laporte as he walked down the hall toward her by his
walk, voice, size, and build. She testified that she told a police
officer at the scene that she believed the person who robbed her
was Laporte, but she could not recall who she spoke with (no
officer confirmed her statement). Because Susan’s testimony that
she identified Laporte by name before the suggestive procedure
would be admissible regardless of the admissibility of her in-
court identification, we conclude that there is no substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising from defense coun-
sel’s failure to object to her in-court identification.

As for Daniel, on direct examination by the Commonwealth,
and without objection, Daniel identified Wiggins as the intruder
who came into his room.® He testified further (without objection)
that despite the hood and bandanna, he recognized Wiggins from
Wiggins’s build, skin tone, and voice, but he later stated that he
could not be sure.? Although Daniel did not directly identify
either of the defendants prior to the tainted showup, he effectively
made at least an equivocal identification of Wiggins by his actions
at the scene of the crime: Daniel testified that after the shooting
he took his mother’s keys, got into her vehicle, and planned to go
to Wiggins’s home to see whether Wiggins had been the intruder
in his room. When Colon took the keys away, Daniel telephoned
Wiggins’s home and Wiggins’s sister in an attempt to locate him.
This evidence would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that, at
a minimum, Daniel had made an equivocal identification of
Wiggins as a perpetrator prior to the suggestive procedure. As a

SDaniel also identified both defendants as his friends, and stated their names
for the record.

7[t is worth noting that during his examination, Daniel wavered back and forth
several times on his identification of Wiggins. He testified that he told police
initially that he did not think the intruder was Wiggins because it was “kind of
hard to think that my best friend would rob me and... shoot my mom.” And
despite having identified Wiggins at trial as the assailant, he later testified during
direct examination that he still could not be sure that Wiggins was the person
who came into his room.

738 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

result, we conclude that there is no substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice arising from the failure by Wiggins’s at-
torney to object to an in-court identification that, viewed in its
totality, also was equivocal.

2. Daniel’s out-of-court identification. Wiggins asserts that
there was error in admitting testimony of a police officer about
Daniel’s out-of-court identification of Wiggins because it had
previously been suppressed. Wiggins also argues that the trial
judge erred in denying his motions to sever and for a mistrial
based on co-counsel’s cross-examination of Daniel that led to the
police officer’s testimony. We conclude that there was no abuse of
discretion in denying Wiggins’ motions. Further, we conclude
that there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice
in admitting evidence of Daniel’s out-of-court identification.

The out-of-court identification, made during police questioning
following a showup procedure on the night of the murder, was
suppressed because the showup was found to be unnecessarily
suggestive. See note 5, supra. During cross-examination by
Laporte’s counsel, Daniel was questioned about his ability to see
the perpetrator given the lighting and the mask, as well as his
failure to identify Wiggins to the police as one of the perpetrators
until much later in the night, when police informed him that his
mother had died. This included multiple questions pertaining to
the previously suppressed out-of-court identification by Daniel of
Wiggins.® Wiggins did not object to this questioning at the time.
Wiggins also did not object when the prosecutor, in turn, asked

At trial, the following exchange occurred during cross-examination of Dan-
iel by Laporte’s counsel:

Q.: “[Y]ou knew the items [shown to you] were stolen; correct?”

As “Yes.”

Q.: “So when you saw they had been recovered, your testimony is somehow
the fact that the items were recovered made you more certain at the time that
Maxwell Wiggins robbed you?”

As “Yes.”

Q.: “Isn’t it true, sir, that you never told the cops that you were sure or pretty
sure that Maxwell Wiggins robbed you until after they told you your mom is
dead, this is no game, we need to know who the robbers are, or robber is; is that
correct?”

A. “Thad an idea before that, yes.”

Q.: “And when the police told you that your mother was dead, they just told
you right there in the interview room at the police department; isn’t that right?”

477 Mass. 732 (2017) 739

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

Daniel about his out-of-court identification of Wiggins during
redirect examination. However, both defendants later objected to
the prosecutor’s questioning of the detective who had taken
Daniel’s statement, which included Daniel’s identification of
Wiggins. The defendants also moved for a mistrial. The judge
denied the motion but ordered the prosecutor not to inquire “in
the slightest fashion, regarding anything that [the motion judge]
suppressed.”

The next morning, the prosecutor asked the judge to allow her
to question the detective about the identification of Wiggins,
arguing that Laporte had “open[ed] the door” and Wiggins had
failed to object. In response, Wiggins moved to sever and for a
mistrial. The judge denied both motions. In addition, after re-
viewing the transcripts, the judge ruled that Wiggins had waived
his right to enforce the suppression ruling, at least as to whether
Daniel had identified Wiggins at the police station. The judge
allowed the prosecutor to elicit the same testimony as Laporte’s
counsel, i.e., that after Daniel heard that his mother had died, he
identified Wiggins as the robber.®

Laporte waived any objection to the admission of Daniel’s

A. “Yes.”

2.

“You obviously reacted with great emotion; isn’t that true?”
Yes.”

Q.: “You were sobbing; right?”

As “Yes.”

Q.: “And then you gave the name Maxwell Wiggins as being the robber from
your room; is that right?”

As “Yes.”

®The prosecutor asked the detective the following:

Q.: “And did he tell you how he knew Maxwell Wiggins?”
2 “Yes.”
Q.: “And did he describe Maxwell Wiggins for you?”
Az “Yes.”

Q.: “And did he tell you he had seen Maxwell Wiggins earlier the night this
happened?”
“That’s correct.”

Q.: “And then at some point you told him that his mother had passed away,
is that right?”
Av: “That's correct.”

2.

“What was his demeanor then?”
: “At that point he even became more upset and a lot of crying.”

740 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

out-of-court identification based on his counsel’s cross-examina-
tion of Daniel on this topic; thus, had the defendants been tried
separately, Laporte would have “opened the door,” allowing the
Commonwealth to respond. See Commonwealth v. Alcantara,
471 Mass. 550, 557 n.6 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 379 Mass. 600, 604-605 (1980) (where defendant waives
issue by using challenged statements, he “open[s] the door to
their use by the Commonwealth’). Accord Pettijohn v. Hall, 599
F.2d 476, 481 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979) (“Once
a defendant attempts to introduce testimony that is intimately
interrelated with previously suppressed testimony, the defendant
waives his objections to the introduction of that related evi-
dence”). Wiggins contends, however, that Laporte’s counsel’s
actions could not waive Wiggins’s rights, for due process reasons.
We agree. Cf. Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675, 676
(1998) (defendant’s waiver of right to jury trial did not affect
codefendant’s right). Accord United States v. White, 887 F.2d
267, 269-270 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

However, although Laporte could not waive Wiggins’s rights,
Wiggins failed to object to his codefendant’s cross-examination
of Daniel, to the prosecutor's redirect examination, or to Daniel’s
in-court identification of Wiggins. As a result, where admission of
any of the related identifications would have been error, we
consider how those errors could have combined to cause a sub-
stantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in the context of the
evidence adduced at trial.*° See Commonwealth v. DePina, 476
Mass. 614, 623 (2017). Based on Daniel’s in-court identification

Q.: “And after he was allowed to compose himself, you spoke to him
further?”

Ax: “That's correct.”
Q.: “And was it then that you began a typed statement from him?”
Av: “That's correct.”

Q.: “And in the course of taking that statement, after he was told that his
mother died, is that when he said Maxwell Wiggins was the robber in his room?”

Ax: “That’s correct.”

1 lthough Wiggins did not make a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
on appeal, see Commonwealth v. Francis, 411 Mass. 579, 584 (1992) (“pursuant
to [G. L. c, 278,] § 33E, we afford such appeals plenary review”), to the extent
that counsel's failure to object to Laporte’s and the Commonwealth’s lines of
questioning could support such a claim, this would not change our analysis. See
Commonwealth v. Holley, 416 Mass. 114, 121 (2016), citing Commonwealth v.
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014) (“under § 33E

477 Mass. 732 (2017) 741

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

of Wiggins as one of the perpetrators, Daniel’s actions to check
Wiggins’s whereabouts following the killing, and the fact that
Colon named Wiggins to police officers at the scene of the crime,
the jury had a reasonable basis to conclude that Wiggins had
participated in the robbery. In this context, Laporte’s line of
questioning did not cause a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage
of justice. We reach the same conclusion as to the Common-
wealth’s examination of the police detective on this issue, as the
prosecutor was not permitted to inquire beyond the testimony that
had already been elicited by Laporte." Compare note 8 with note
9, supra.

Further, in the circumstances, we conclude that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in denying Wiggins’s renewed motion
for a mistrial and his motion to sever. See Commonwealth v.
Gallagher, 408 Mass. 510, 517 (1990) (mistrial is subject to
judge’s discretion); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 391 Mass. 749,
759 (1984), quoting Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369,
387 (1977) (ground for mistrial “must be called to the attention of
the judge immediately, or when the aggrieved party first learns of
it”); Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 (1982) (abuse
of discretion upon timely motion to sever). Wiggins failed to
object in a timely manner to both the examinations by the
codefendant and the Commonwealth.

The failure to make a timely objection to Laporte’s examina-
tion of Daniel is particularly noteworthy given that there was a
break shortly after the testimony in question; thus, any concern
about drawing attention to the testimony in front of the jury could
have been mitigated by raising the issue and moving to sever
while the jury were not present. In addition, Wiggins’s counsel
indicated that he had discussed his concerns regarding the exami-
nation with Laporte’s counsel during the break, yet he did not
raise the issue with the court until four days later, when the
Commonwealth pointed out Wiggins’s failure to object. Because

review, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is reviewed under substantial
likelihood of miscarriage of justice standard”).

“Laporte elicited the details of this identification to show the jury that Daniel
had only identified Wiggins as one of the intruders because he was distressed
about his mother’s death. In fact, Wiggins later elicited testimony to emphasize
that Daniel had not identified him prior to learning about the death. Further,
Daniel testified that he was still not sure whether Wiggins was one of the
intruders. This, combined with the limitation on the prosecutor’s inquiry, meant
that there is no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice from allowing
the prosecutor to elicit the identification.

742 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

Wiggins did not make these motions in a timely manner, the judge
reasonably could have inferred that Wiggins had made a con-
scious decision not to object. Therefore, there was no abuse of
discretion in denying Wiggins’s motions.

3. DNA evidence. Laporte argues separately that the judge
incorrectly admitted inconclusive DNA evidence in the form of a
chart showing DNA test results from one of the sweatshirts. The
judge had excluded testimony that DNA testing of the sweatshirt
was inconclusive as to Laporte.'* However, the jury were exposed
to a chart showing that Wiggins and the victim were excluded as
sources of the sample from one sweatshirt, but also showed that
the results were inconclusive as to Laporte. After the chart was
introduced alongside testimony from a State analyst,"® but before
the chart was given to the jury during deliberations, the judge
redacted Laporte’s DNA profile from the chart. Laporte’s profile
was not redacted from other exhibits, which showed that Laporte
was excluded from a second sweatshirt sample and matched the
major DNA profile on a third sweatshirt sample. He argues that
because the jury had seen his DNA profile on the chart in question
before it was redacted, and because the jury had his profile available
to them from other exhibits, they may have tried to com-
pare his profile to the inconclusive results. This argument fails.

The Commonwealth was entitled to have the analyst testify as
to those results that showed an exclusion or a match, and the
exhibit in question showed the full comparison that was made at
the State crime laboratory. Moreover, the analyst did not testify as
to Laporte’s result compared to the sweatshirt, and the judge
redacted Laporte’s profile before the exhibit went to the jury.
Because the jury were entitled to see Laporte’s profile with
respect to the other DNA comparisons, there was no error in
declining to redact his profile from the other exhibits."*

"Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results are inconclusive if they neither
include nor exclude a person as a match due to an insufficient or degraded
sample. Commonwealth v. Almonte, 465 Mass. 224, 238 (2013). With limited
exceptions, such evidence is normally too prejudicial to be admissible. See
Commonwealth vy. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 253-254 (2008).

The analyst testified that the decedent was included in a sample from one
area of the sweatshirt, and that the decedent and Wiggins were excluded from a
sample of another area from the sweatshirt. She did not testify as to any results
for Laporte from that sample.

‘4Even if there had been error, it would have been harmless viewed in the
context of the trial as a whole. The State analyst did not testify as to the
inconclusive result. However, there was a match between Laporte’s DNA and

477 Mass. 732 (2017) 743

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

4. Bandannas. The defendants argue that the judge erred in
allowing the Commonwealth, over objection, to elicit testimony
that someone who was not a member of law enforcement re-
moved two bandannas from Laporte’s property bag while Laporte
was in custody. The bandannas had been collected along with the
rest of Laporte’s personal items during booking. More than one
year later, someone removed the bandannas when trading new
clothes on behalf of Laporte.** The Commonwealth offered the
testimony to show why the bandannas were not available as
evidence. The defendants argue that, because they did not chal-
lenge the police investigation as inadequate (also known as a
Bowden challenge, see Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472
[1980]), the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. We
disagree.

Evidence is admissible only if it is relevant, that is, “if (a) it has
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would
be without the evidence and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2017). See id. at
§ 402. See Commonwealth v. Carey, 463 Mass. 378, 387 (2012).
The defendants argue that the evidence regarding the removal of
the bandannas was not relevant to the case. In their view, the jury
only needed to hear that the bandannas were found on Laporte
when he was arrested. They also argue that there was no evidence
that these bandannas were the ones involved in the incident.
However, the very fact that the defendants contested the lack of
evidence surrounding the bandannas is what made their removal
relevant to rebut the defendants’ attempted Bowden defense.'* At
trial, the defendants argued at sidebar that the perpetrators had
been observed wearing bandannas, but not necessarily the ban-
dannas that had been taken from Laporte’s property bag. The

another sweatshirt that was found in the same location and showed a positive
result in the presumptive test for blood. Colon testified that Laporte had worn
that sweatshirt during the robbery and on other occasions.

15 correction officer testified that the sheriff's department required that any
new items brought to inmates must be traded for old items from the inmate’s
property bag.

16See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 803 n.25 (2009);
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980). Even though the judge
ultimately determined that the defendants had not made a showing sufficient to
warrant a Bowden instruction, we are unpersuaded by the defendants’ argument
that there was no attempt to make a Bowden challenge; the defendants clearly
claimed throughout trial that there were problems with the police investigation,
and the principal theory of the defense was misidentification, yet the bandannas
had not been tested.

744 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

bandannas had been removed, so the Commonwealth could not
introduce them in evidence, nor could it test the bandannas for
gunshot residue, blood, or DNA in an attempt to show that they
were the bandannas used during the home invasion.'? Because it
appeared that the defendants attempted to raise a Bowden de-
fense, and because they attacked the integrity and adequacy of the
investigation throughout the trial, the Commonwealth was en-
titled to respond. See Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744,
754-755 (2009); Commonwealth vy. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass.
782, 803 n.25 (2009).

The defendants further argue that even if the removal of the
bandannas from Laporte’s property bag were relevant to the case,
the judge erred in admitting that evidence because its probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair pre-
judice. See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2017). See Carey, 463 Mass. at
387-388. In particular, they argue that the jury may have inter-
preted the removal of the bandannas as showing consciousness of
guilt. Indeed, the judge recognized that telling the jury that it was
a member of Laporte’s family who exchanged clothing for the
bandannas could be unduly prejudicial to the defendants. As a
result, following a lengthy sidebar discussion, the judge limited
the prosecutor to eliciting testimony that someone who was not a
member of law enforcement picked up the bandannas, so long as
the witness also explained to the jury that the policy required an
exchange of clothes. The judge reasoned that omitting the family
member’s name and including the inventory policy would
“soften[] any prejudicial impact.” The judge also gave an instruc-
tion immediately after that testimony to warn the jury not to draw
any negative inference against the defendants. See Common-
wealth v. Tennison, 440 Mass. 553, 558 (2003), citing Common-
wealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 328 (2000) (“jury are presumed
to follow the judge’s instructions”). In this context, where the
judge carefully considered the options to reduce any possible
prejudice to the defendants, there was no abuse of discretion. See
Commonwealth v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 436-437 (2015).

17To the extent that the defendants argue that the evidence of removal was
irrelevant because the Commonwealth knew about the bandannas immediately
after the arrest but did not seize or test them, their argument is misplaced, as the
bandannas were not lost or destroyed as a result of the Commonwealth’s
negligence. Contrast Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 401 Mass. 749, 756 (1988)
(“loss and destruction of highly relevant evidence by the Commonwealth and its
agents defeated the defendant’s opportunity effectively to present a defense”).

477 Mass. 732 (2017) 745

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

5. Autopsy photograph. The defendants claim that the judge
erred in admitting an autopsy photograph of the victim. The
photograph showed how the victim’s face looked after the medi-
cal examiner had removed the sutures and other fixes used by the
emergency medical technicians who sought to stem the bleeding
and save the victim’s life. With the sutures removed, the photo-
graph showed a portion of the inside of the victim’s mouth and
sinus cavity. In the defendants’ view, the photograph was cumu-
lative of other evidence and was so gruesome and inflammatory
that its probative value was outweighed by the potential for
prejudice. There was no error.

We have warned judges to be especially careful regarding
photographs taken after a medical examiner has modified the
victim’s body in the course of an autopsy. See Commonwealth v.
Carlino, 429 Mass. 692, 696 n.2 (1999), citing Commonwealth v.
Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86, 106 (1980). In Carlino, supra, for
example, photographs of damaged internal organs were unneces-
sary where the Commonwealth had introduced other “photo-
graphs of the exterior of the body, . . . a chalk depicting the
location of the wounds, and extensive expert medical testimony
as to the nature, extent, and severity of the wounds.” However,
“we do not exclude evidence just because it is gruesome or
inflammatory.” Jd. Therefore, the judge may admit a photograph
if it is relevant, not gratuitous, and probative beyond its “distaste-
ful nature.” Id. See Bastarache, supra.

In this case, although the photograph did not show alterations
of the nature made in Carlino and Bastarache, the judge recog-
nized that it still held a potential for prejudice. Compare Carlino,
429 Mass. at 696 (photograph showed victim’s internal organs
and abdominal cavity); Bastarache, 382 Mass. at 105-106 (pho-
tograph showed inside of skull after brain had been removed to
show bullet holes). In fact, the judge initially declined to allow
the Commonwealth to introduce the photograph through the State
medical examiner. However, he eventually changed that ruling
because one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, a State expert in
ballistics, explained that the photograph was an important tool for
determining the type of firearm and force used, as well as the
distance from the weapon to the victim’s face. During a lengthy
discussion with the prosecutor and both defendants’ counsel, the
judge reasoned that these facts were probative of premeditation
and whether the killing had been committed with extreme atrocity
or cruelty. He also noted that the ballistics expert had stated that

746 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

the autopsy diagrams alone had been insufficient for him to make
the determinations. As a result, the judge admitted the autopsy
photograph in evidence and gave a contemporaneous cautionary
instruction to the jury.

In light of the judge’s careful analysis of the relevance and
probative value of the photograph before admitting it in evidence,
and the curative instruction, there was no abuse of discretion.

6. Closing argument. The defendants argue that the prosecutor
misstated key identification evidence in her closing argument. In
particular, they contend that the Commonwealth improperly ar-
gued that the jury “kn[e]w with absolute certainty” that Colon
identified the defendants as the intruders because, she argued, the
police sought out the defendants based on Colon’s identification
of them in the immediate aftermath of the shooting.'* In their
view, this was a misstatement of the evidence because, they
claim, Daniel’s statement to the police, rather than Colon’s, could
have led the police to the defendants. Because the defendants did
not object to this portion of the argument at trial, they must show
that the alleged misstatement or counsel’s failure to object caused
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Common-
wealth v. Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 273, 276 (1998). This they
cannot do.

Daniel testified that when he spoke to the police at the crime
scene he identified only Wiggins, and he did so in response to the
police asking if he had any African-American friends; thus, he
identified Wiggins as a friend, not a suspect.'® In contrast, Colon
and a police officer both testified that when Colon spoke to police
at the crime scene, he named the defendants as the intruders and
told police the streets where the defendants lived. According to
police testimony, after speaking with Daniel and Colon they
sought both of the defendants.

18The prosecutor said:

“[A]s you look to decide this case, start with the things that you know
for certain, the things that are given. . .. And you know with absolute
certainty that Angel Colon identified those two men, the defendants, as the
intruders to police at the scene. Angel Colon told you. Officer Ed Kalish
told you, And, ladies and gentlemen, you know that that happened. You
know Angel Colon identified them because the police went looking for the
two of them.”

However, officers present at the scene testified that Daniel named both
defendants. Whether the jury believed Daniel gave one or both names to the
police ultimately does not matter, as the police still would have been searching
for both defendants.

477 Mass. 732 (2017) 747

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

“A prosecutor may argue ‘forcefully for a conviction based on
the evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence.’ * Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 Mass. 372,
383 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514,
516 (1987). Here, the police were looking for both Laporte and
Wiggins, not just Wiggins. In addition, it was Colon who gave the
police the names of the streets where the defendants lived. Thus,
it was fair for the prosecutor to argue that the jury could infer that
the police based their search for the defendants on Colon’s
statement (rather than Daniel’s). See Commonwealth v. Rolon,
438 Mass. 808, 816 (2003) (prosecutor may “point to reasons
why a witness’s testimony, or portions of a witness’s testimony,
should logically be believed”). Further, the judge instructed the
jury that counsel’s arguments are not evidence. In any event, even
if the defendants were correct, their argument nonetheless indi-
cates (as does the Commonwealth’s) that someone had identified
them at the scene, so they have failed to establish how any error
would have influenced the jury’s verdicts.

7. Laporte’s sentence. Because Laporte was a juvenile at the
time of the offense, his sentence was revised, and he is eligible for
parole on his conviction of murder after fifteen years. See Miller
vy. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); Commonwealth v. Brown,
466 Mass. 676, 688-689 (2013), S.C., 474 Mass. 576 (2016);
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass.
655, 658-659 (2013), S.C.,471 Mass. 12 (2015). Laporte also was
convicted of other crimes, including home invasion and robbery
while masked, for which he was sentenced to from thirty to
thirty-five years and from twenty to thirty years in State prison,
respectively, and is eligible for parole after thirty years and
twenty years, respectively.?° Laporte argues that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights require reduc-
tion of the minimum terms on the latter sentences to no more than
fifteen years, to allow for the same parole eligibility as does his

201 aporte’s sentence for home invasion was initially to be served from and
after the life sentence, with sentences for the other nonmurder convictions to be
served concurrently with the sentence imposed for home invasion. These sen-
tences were all changed to be made concurrent with the murder sentence by the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court. Following our holding in Diatchenko
v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 658-659 (2013), 8.C..
471 Mass. 12 (2015), the Department of Correction noted that Laporte would be
eligible for parole after fifteen years on his life sentence. Parole eligibility for
the other convictions remains unchanged.

748 477 Mass. 732 (2017)

Commonwealth v. Wiggins.

conviction of murder.

As in Commonwealth vy. Costa, 472 Mass. 139, 143-146
(2015), the original sentencing judge could not have foreseen our
decisions in Diatchenko and Brown. At the time the defendant
was sentenced on his nonmurder convictions, the sentencing
judge likely believed that the defendant would never be eligible
for parole on his murder conviction. See Costa, supra. Thus, the
judge may not have given the same consideration to how the
defendant’s nonmurder convictions would affect his eligibility for
parole. Jd. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 682-687
(2017). As a result, we vacate Laporte’s nonmurder sentences and
remand for resentencing in light of his revised murder sentence.
See Costa, supra at 143.

8.G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Even though Wiggins was an adult at the
time of the crime, he argues that it is unfair for Laporte to receive
the benefit of parole eligibility while Wiggins does not, as
Wiggins is only months older than Laporte. In his view, we
should exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce his
conviction so their sentences will match. Although we recognize
his point, particularly as contrasted against Laporte’s juvenile
status at the time of the homicide, the fact that Wiggins was only
a few months past his eighteenth birthday does not, in itself, give
us reason to reduce his conviction. See Commonwealth v.
Chukwuezi, 475 Mass. 597, 610 (2016), citing Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (age of eighteen “is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
adulthood”); Brown, 466 Mass. at 684-685 (Legislature’s “com-
prehensive sentencing scheme . . . remains valid as applied to
adults”). Thus, we decline to exercise our § 33E power based on
the comparative ages of the defendants.

We have considered the defendants’ other arguments and find
them without merit. Therefore, we decline to exercise our power
under § 33E to reduce the defendants’ verdicts or grant them a
new trial.

Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the de-
fendants’ convictions. However, we remand Laporte’s convic-
tions of home invasion and armed robbery while masked for
resentencing in accordance with Perez, supra.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 749 (2017) 749

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

Beacon ResmeNTIAL MANAGEMENT, LP vs. R.P.t

Suffolk. April 6, 2017. - September 14, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ.

Summary Process. Practice, Civil, Summary process, Intervention.

Discussion of Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2), which governs intervention in a civil
action as of right, [752-755]

This court concluded that a mother had the right to intervene in a summary
process action brought by a landlord against the mother’s husband and their
young children as the named defendants, where the mother, who asserted that
she had sought to be added to the lease and was a victim of domestic abuse
by her husband, claimed an interest as an otherwise qualified applicant of
public housing, and where the mother, as the parent with sole custody of the
minor children, sufficiently alleged that they had interests entitling her to
intervene on their behalf under both State and Federal law, [755-758]

Summary process. Complaint filed in the Boston Division of the
Housing Court Department on July 27, 2015.

A motion to intervene was heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J.

An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal
was allowed in the Appeals Court by Gregory I. Massing, J. After
review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted
leave to obtain further appellate review.

David Emer (Alison T. Holdway also present) for the mother.

Therese Quijano for the plaintiff.

Julia Devanthéry, for Casa Myrna & another, amici curiae,
submitted a brief.

Dorothy Bourassa & Eileen M. Fava, for Women’s Bar Asso-
ciation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Bupp, J. In this case we consider whether a mother® has the
right to intervene in an eviction action brought by a landlord
against the mother’s husband and their young children as the
named defendants where, although she is not a named tenant on

1A pseudonym.
2Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

®The prospective intervener.

750 477 Mass. 749 (2017)

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

the lease, she has lived with her family in the apartment through-
out the tenancy and alleges domestic violence in the home. We
conclude that she may intervene both on her own behalf and on
behalf of her children.*

1. Background. This case is before us on the mother’s appeal
from the denial, by a judge of the Housing Court, of her motion
to intervene in a summary process action brought by Beacon
Residential Management, LP (Beacon), the agent of the apart-
ment owner, Georgetowne Homes Two, L.L.C. (George-
towne Homes) (collectively, landlord). We recite relevant allega-
tions from the mother’s motion to intervene and proposed answer,
as supplemented by the testimony at the hearing before the
motion judge.®

In October, 2009, the mother, together with her husband, R.P.,
and their son, moved into a federally regulated and subsidized
apartment in the Hyde Park section of Boston; the apartment was
owned by Georgetowne Homes.® Initially both the mother and
R.P. signed the lease. Soon thereafter the landlord informed them
that the Federal government would not subsidize the rent due to
the mother’s immigration status; thereafter, the couple removed

4We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the Women’s Bar Association, and
Casa Myrna and Jane Doe, Inc.

5In this case the landlord premised its notice to quit on the ground that there
was an “unauthorized individual” — the mother — living in the apartment who
had been involved in a “disturbance” on the property. In the proposed answer
appended to the mother’s motion to intervene, she claimed that she would raise
affirmative defenses to both of the grounds listed in the notice to quit. Accord-
ingly, a trial on the merits of the summary process action or on the merits of the
defenses raised in the mother’s proposed answer would involve the same factual
circumstances as the question whether the mother claims an interest in the
subject of the proceeding. In these circumstances, for the reasons we discuss
infra, the motion to intervene is to be determined on the allegations in the
motion, attached pleadings, and supporting testimony and documents. See
American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 E2d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert, denied sub nom, Chicago Inv. Corp. v, American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
of Chicago, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985) (discussing analogous Federal rule).

®The project-based housing was available through the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development housing choice voucher program,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C, § 1437f (2012) and implementing regulations, See Figgs
v, Boston Hous. Auth., 469 Mass. 354, 355 & n.2 (2014). In eligible housing,
commonly referred to as “Section 8” housing, the Federal government, through
the local public housing agency, “pays rental subsidies so eligible families can
afford decent, safe and sanitary housing.” Id. at 355 n.2, quoting 24 CER.
§ 982.1(a)(1) (1999).

477 Mass. 749 (2017) 751

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

the mother from the lease.” At that time, February, 2010, R.P.
remained in the apartment and signed a new lease for subsidized
rent for himself and the son, and the mother and son moved to
R.P.’s parents’ home. The two returned to the apartment in June,
2010, but neither the mother nor R.P. took steps to amend the
lease to include the mother as a household member.

In June, 2012, the mother was approved as a permanent resi-
dent. She returned to the landlord’s office with her immigration
paperwork, including her green card, and asked the landlord to
add her name to the lease. The landlord’s policy was to give an
“add-on” application to anyone who requested one, and the
landlord’s agent testified that had the mother completed an
add-on application, she would have been added to the lease as a
matter of course, as long as R.P. agreed. However, although the
mother asked to be added to the lease, she was not given an
add-on application. The mother testified that the landlord’s agent
told her that only R.P. could add her name to the lease. She further
testified that R.P. refused to do so as a way of controlling her.

On May 1, 2015, the mother obtained an abuse prevention
order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (209A order) against R.P.* The
order required him to stay away from the apartment and from the
mother’s workplace; it also ordered him not to contact the mother
or their two children® and granted full custody of the children to
the mother. The order was subsequently extended for a full year.

On May 26, 2015, the landlord served a notice to quit on R.P.
and the two children. The notice stated that the mother was an
“unauthorized individual” living in the apartment, and that she
was “involved in a disturbance on the property.”?° In July, 2015,
the landlord filed a summary process action in the Boston Divi-
sion of the Housing Court Department based on the notice to quit.

7At the time, as a noncitizen, the mother needed documentation that she was
legally in the United States.

®She had previously obtained an abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L.
c. 209A (209A order) against R.P. in 2012. In 2013, R.P. tried — unsuccessfully
— to obtain an order against the mother. Although the Housing Court judge
permitted the parties to introduce the relevant orders in evidence at the inter-
vention hearing, he did not permit them to introduce evidence related to the
underlying facts for any of these actions, ruling that such evidence was “not
relevant to [the] proceedings” on the motion to intervene.

°The mother gave birth to a second child after the family moved into the
apartment but before the summons and complaint for summary process were
filed.

The mother claims that the disturbance was related to the 209A order and
thus was an impermissible ground for eviction under the Violence Against

752 477 Mass. 749 (2017)

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

The mother filed a motion to intervene and a proposed answer,"
arguing that the housing provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-11 (2012 & Supp. I) (VAWA),
and G. L. c. 239, § 2A, prohibited the eviction because it was
predicated on domestic violence. See 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-11
(housing protections for victims of domestic violence).

The landlord opposed the mother’s motion to intervene, and the
judge permitted both parties to introduce documents and testi-
mony in an evidentiary hearing, at which the mother and the
landlord’s leasing agent testified. The judge issued oral findings
in which he did not credit most of the mother’s testimony and
found that she and R.P. made a joint decision not to add her to the
lease, to enjoy the benefit of lower rent. In addition, he found that
the landlord’s failure to give the mother an add-on application
was due to negligence and not related to domestic violence, so the
mother had not been discriminated against as an applicant under
VAWA. As a result, the judge determined that the mother did not
have an interest that allowed her to intervene as of right, but he
allowed the mother to amend the motion to seek intervention on
behalf of her children. He later denied the motion as amended,
stating that the mother could not represent the children because
she had acted fraudulently by living in the apartment without
being named as a tenant on the lease. Finally, because R.P. did not
appear, the judge entered a judgment of default.!? The mother
timely appealed to the Appeals Court the denial of her motion to
intervene and the judgment of default. In an unpublished memo-
randum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals
Court affirmed the denial. We allowed the mother’s application
for further appellate review and vacate both the denial of the
motion to intervene and the judgment of default.

2. Discussion. a. Legal standard. We begin with the language
of the relevant rule governing intervention as of right. “Upon

Women Act (VAWA). The factual and legal bases for this claim would be
properly litigated in a trial on the merits.

“Jn the Housing Court, the mother also had moved for permissive interven-
tion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (b), 365 Mass. 769 (1974). Because we
conclude that she is entitled to intervene as of right, we need not consider the
judge’s denial of permissive intervention, which is subject to considerable
discretion. See Cruz Mgt. Co. v. Thomas, 417 Mass. 782, 785 (1994) (“A judge
has broad discretion in deciding whether to permit intervention”).

12For reasons that are not apparent, the judgment of default was entered not
only against R.P., but also against the children (who had been dismissed from
the case) and the mother (who had not been permitted to intervene).

477 Mass. 749 (2017) 753

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing
parties” (emphasis added). Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2), 365 Mass.
769 (1974). Whether the prospective intervener has met “the
requirements for intervention is a question of law,” and therefore
we review the ruling de novo. See Commonwealth v. Fremont
Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 217 (2011). In interpreting this rule,
we look for guidance to decisions of Federal courts concerning
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a), as the Massachusetts rule on intervention
is nearly identical to this analogous rule. See Fremont Inv. &
Loan, supra at 218.

Rule 24 (a) (2) “does not articulate explicit criteria for deter-
mining the sufficiency of the asserted interest.” Bridgeman v.
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 484 (2015),
quoting Bolden vy. O’Connor Café of Worcester, Inc., 50 Mass.
App. Ct. 56, 62 (2000). Cf. Commonwealth v. One Hundred
Twenty-Five Thousand One Hundred Ninety-One Dollars, 76
Mass. App. Ct. 279, 281-282 (2010) (in civil drug forfeiture
cases, inquiry is similar to injury prong of standing analysis).
Thus, the type and degree of interest that suffice for intervention
depend on “the nature of the action in which intervention is
claimed.” Care & Protection of Zelda, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 869,
871 (1989). In the context of this proceeding, the question is
whether the prospective intervener claims an interest relating to
the unit subject to eviction proceedings notwithstanding the fact
that she is not listed on the lease as a tenant.

What a prospective intervener must show to intervene is central
to this case. We note, first, that “Rule 24 (a) (2) requires only that
the applicant claim an interest relating to the property in suit,”
even if the claim may ultimately fail on the merits. See American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 F.2d 577, 585 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago Inv. Corp. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985).
Because the question of intervention is a threshold inquiry, see
United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
resolution of the merits of the prospective intervener’s proposed
pleading (an answer, in this case) or of the existing case would be
inappropriate, so the motion to intervene “cannot be resolved by

754 477 Mass. 749 (2017)

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

reference to the ultimate merits of the claim the intervener seeks
to assert unless the allegations are frivolous on their face.” Turn
Key Gaming, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 164 F.3d 1080, 1081 (8th
Cir. 1999), citing Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d
261, 265 (2d Cir. 1984). See Securities & Exch. Comm’n vy.
Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 993 (1980). Instead, in these cases, “[t]he situation is some-
what akin to that presented on a motion for summary judgment or
on a motion to dismiss,” Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912,
917 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963), and the
judge should “take all well-pleaded, nonconclusory allegations in
the motion to intervene, the proposed complaint or answer in
intervention, and declarations supporting the motion as true ab-
sent sham, frivolity or other objections.” Southwest Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“the propriety of intervention must be determined before discov-
ery”). See Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d 316, 321 (7th
Cir. 1995). Cf. Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 509 v.
Department of Mental Health, 469 Mass. 323, 329 (2014), S.C.,
476 Mass. 51 (2016), and cases cited (on motion to dismiss for
lack of standing, court “take[s] as true all facts alleged in the...
complaint”). See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623,
636 (2008). Although a motion judge may hear arguments on the
motion, or hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve ambiguities
where the motion to intervene is not clearly understood, see
Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra, it is legally inap-
propriate at such an early stage to make findings regarding a
prospective intervener’s claimed interest, at least where, as here,
such a determination would go to the merits of the proposed
pleading or of the underlying case.”

Thus, the prospective intervener should not be required to
demonstrate the merits of his or her claim at an evidentiary

"Citing Demoulas y. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 509, 510
(1997), and Mass. R. Civ, P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996), the
landlord argues that upon the review of a denial of a motion to intervene, the
motion judge’s findings must stand absent clear error. Indeed, this court stated
as much as dictum in Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209,
217 (2011). However, we note that the case cited in Fremont to support the
proposition that we allow factual findings to stand absent clear error relied on a
case that had nothing to do with intervention or any analogous pretrial situation.
More importantly, adopting such a rule would overlook the procedural context
of a motion to intervene. Indeed, the sources cited by the landlord concern
appellate review following a full trial on the merits, whereas a motion to
intervene is generally filed prior to discovery.

477 Mass. 749 (2017) 755

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

hearing. Instead, the claim of intervention should be evaluated
based on the allegations of the claim itself, and related docu-
ments; its merits are to be decided with all other claims. To hold
otherwise would require a judge to rule on the merits of a
prospective intervener’s claimed interest — including where that
interest concerns the merits of a case that would go to a jury —
rather than determining only whether the prospective intervener
has claimed an interest. See American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 750 F.2d at 585.

b. Application. The mother argues that both she and her chil-
dren have an interest in the subject of the eviction proceedings
that is not adequately represented by the existing parties.‘t The
judge ruled that the mother did not have a sufficient interest in the
proceedings because she is neither a tenant nor an “otherwise
qualified applicant” within the meaning of VAWA, and that, as
described below, she could not represent the children’s interest
because she committed fraud. We disagree and conclude that she
is entitled to intervene on behalf of herself pursuant to VAWA and
on behalf of her children pursuant to both VAWA and G. L.
c. 239, § 2A.

i. Mother's interest in the proceedings. Among other protec-
tions, VAWA provides that tenants and otherwise qualified appli-
cants of public housing programs may not be denied or be evicted
from housing on the basis that the tenant or applicant is a victim
of domestic violence. See 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-11(b)(1). The
mother asserts that she is an otherwise qualified applicant because
she sought to be added to the lease and was a victim of domestic
abuse by R.P. The motion judge concluded, however, that the
mother was not “otherwise qualified” under VAWA, finding that
she committed fraud by living in the apartment without being
added to the lease to avoid an increase in rent. This was error.

As discussed above, because the issue to be determined in
deciding a motion to intervene is simply whether the prospective
intervener has alleged plausible facts that claim an interest, not
whether she would ultimately prevail in the underlying action, we
take the mother’s allegations in her motion, testimony, and sup-

144s the judge noted, R.P. was no longer permitted to live with the family due
to the abuse prevention order, so he had very little incentive to act in the
mother’s or children’s interest. See Frostar Corp. v. Malloy, 77 Mass. App. Ct.
705, 712 (2010), quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188,
191 (2d Cir, 1978) (“burden of showing that representation may be inad-
equate... ‘should be treated as minimal’ ”).

756 477 Mass. 749 (2017)

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

porting documents as true, and we draw reasonable inferences in
her favor. In other words, we consider only whether the mother
has claimed an interest here as an otherwise qualified applicant.
As the landlord’s contrary allegations — that she was an unau-
thorized occupant and committed fraud — go to the merits of the
eviction case, they should not have been considered at the motion
to intervene hearing.

VAWA does not expressly define what it means to be otherwise
qualified, including whether this definition refers only to factors
such as income and family size. However, this motion arose in a
preliminary stage of the case. Because the mother claims that she
tried to apply and that R.P. was abusive and prevented her from
being added to the lease as a way of controlling her, she has
alleged sufficient facts to permit an inference that she was an
otherwise qualified applicant, and is entitled to intervene in the
eviction proceeding. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi-
cago, 750 F.2d at 585 (opposing party’s defenses to intervener’s
counterclaim did not defeat motion to intervene). Any further
determination of the credibility of her factual allegations as to
whether she is otherwise qualified would be properly adjudicated
at a later stage. Id.

ii. Children’s interest in the proceedings.*® The mother also
seeks to intervene in the eviction action on behalf of her children.
We note that as to any interest claimed by the children, it is
appropriate for the mother to intervene, as she is the parent with
sole custody and they are minors.'* We conclude that the mother

15The unqualified judgment of default against R.P. means that if the lower
court decision stands, the children will be forced to move. Normally, where
minor children are living in an apartment with one parent, the question whether
they have an interest sufficient to intervene is irrelevant because the parent is
presumably an adequate representative of their interests. Here, however, R.P.
was barred from contact with the children as a result of the 209A order, and he
failed to appear in court. That does not automatically mean that the children
have no recourse to prevent eviction. Cf. Arsenault v. Chicopee Hous. Auth., 15
Mass. App. Ct. 939, 941 (1983) (where custodial parent abandoned child and
apartment, child who was lawful occupant could assert right to grievance
procedures before eviction, even if success on merits was not guaranteed).

164s the 209A order against R.P. awarded sole custody of the children to the
mother, it is appropriate for her to be the one to intervene on their behalf. Cf.
Mass. R. Civ. P. 17 (b), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1402, 1402-1403 (2009);
Arsenault, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 939-940 (natural father brought action on
child’s behalf as next friend). In this case we find that any potential deficiencies
in the mother’s claims asserted in support of her motion to intervene as a party
in her own right do not prevent her from meeting her threshold burden to

477 Mass. 749 (2017) 757

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

has sufficiently alleged that the children have interests entitling
them to intervene, pursuant to both Federal and State law.!7
VAWA provides that tenants may not be denied occupancy
tights “solely on the basis of criminal activity directly relating to
domestic violence . . . that is engaged in by a member of the
household of the tenant or any guest . . . if the tenant or an
affiliated individual of the tenant is the victim or threatened
victim of such domestic violence.” 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-
11(b)(3)(A). Here, the landlord seeks to evict the family, includ-
ing the children, alleging that the parents committed fraud.'* The
children qualify as tenants for purposes of VAWA because they
are lawful occupants and members of the “assisted family,” see
81 Fed. Reg. 80,724, 80,730 (Nov. 16, 2016), and their mother is
an “affiliated individual” of them, see 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-
11(a)(1)(A) (including “parent” and “child” in definition of “af-
filiated individual”). Here, accepting as true the mother’s claim
that she was prevented from adding her name to the lease as a part
of R.P.’s abuse, it follows that we also accept as true the propo-
sition that the criminal activity, i-e., fraud, alleged by the landlord
was a result of domestic violence. As a result, the landlord’s
attempt to evict the children violates 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-
11(b)(3)(A). Therefore, under VAWA, the children are tenants
with an interest in the unit and the right to defend against

intervene in her representative capacity on behalf of the two children, Moreover,
as discussed supra, these are issues that should properly be resolved on the
merits in the summary process proceeding itself.

"7Because the mother has alleged that the lease violations claimed by the
landlord were the result of domestic abuse by R.P, she also has alleged sufficient
facts for the children to have an interest under other provisions of VAWA,
including 42 U.S.C. § 14043e-11(b)(2) (2012 & Supp. II), which provides:

“An incident of actual or threatened domestic violence . . . shall not be
construed as —

“(A) a serious or repeated violation of a lease for housing assisted under
a covered housing program by the victim or threatened victim of such
incident; or

“(B) good cause for terminating the assistance, tenancy, or occupancy
rights to housing assisted under a covered housing program of the victim
or threatened victim of such incident.”

‘Fraud may fall under the category of “criminal activity” for purposes of
VAWA. See United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, The
HUD Handbook 4350.3: Occupancy Requirements of Subsidized Multifamily
Housing Programs, at 8-26 to 8-27 (Nov. 2013) (concerning Section 8 housing,
“[flraud can be handled as a civil and/or criminal violation”).

758 477 Mass. 749 (2017)

Beacon Residential Management, LP». R.P.

wrongful eviction; thus, they have an interest sufficient to inter-
vene in the action.

The children also have a viable defense to eviction based on
Massachusetts law. Under G. L. c. 239, § 2A, there is a rebuttable
presumption that an eviction action commenced within six
months of a household member seeking a 209A protective order
is retaliatory. Here, the 209A order was entered on May 1, 2015,
and the notice to quit was dated May 26, 2015. Thus, there are
sufficient facts to permit a presumption of retaliation. Accord-
ingly, the mother may intervene on behalf of the children on this
basis as well.

3. Conclusion. It perhaps goes without saying that success on a
motion to intervene in an action does not guarantee success on the
merits of that action. In this case, it means simply that the mother
is permitted to assert affirmative defenses to the eviction action
on behalf of herself and her children. Because we conclude that
the motion judge prematurely reached the merits of the case, we
vacate the judgment of default, reverse the denial of the motion
to intervene, and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 759 (2017) 759

Koshy » Sachdev.

Gerorce T. Kosny vs. AnupaM SACHDEV.

Middlesex. May 2, 2017. - September 14, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hives, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cyeuer, JJ."

Corporation, Dissolution, Officers and agents, Practice, Civil, Contempt. Con-
tempt.

Discussion of the corporate dissolution statute, G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, and the
elements required to prove that a true deadlock exists between a corpora-
tion’s directors. [764-768]

In a civil action between the two shareholders and directors of a close corpo-
ration, in which one party petitioned for dissolution of the corporation under
G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, due to a deadlock between the parties, the evidence
was sufficient to conclude that the conflict between the parties constituted a
deadlock, where the acknowledged facts underscored corporate paralysis
with respect to a number of key matters, where each party had the ability to
prevent the other from enacting any policy with which he disagreed, where
there was no indication that either party had engineered the dispute in bad
faith, and where the parties operated based on a relationship of mutual
distrust and antipathy [768]: further, no mechanism existed to break the
deadlock [768-770], and the fundamental nature of the deadlock threatened
irreparable injury to the corporation [770-771]; therefore, this court re-
manded the matter to the Superior Court for determination of the appropriate
remedy [771-772].

In a civil action between the two shareholders and directors of a close corpo-
ration, the judge correctly concluded that the defendant did not commit a
breach of his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, where the defendant had a
legitimate business purpose for the actions that the plaintiff challenged.
[772-773]

In a civil action between the two shareholders and directors of a close corpo-
ration, the judge erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for contempt to
the extent that the complaint asserted violations of the terms of a preliminary
injunction that took place between the end of the trial on the merits and the
expiration of the preliminary injunction. [773-774]

Civ action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
June 28, 2012.

The case was heard by Bruce R. Henry, J., and a complaint for
contempt, filed on March 2, 2015, was also heard by him.

‘Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

760 477 Mass. 759 (2017)

Koshy » Sachdev.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Charles M. Waters for the plaintiff.

Maureen Mulligan (Timothy M. Pomarole also present) for the
defendant.

Thomas J. Carey, Jr., for Brian JM Quinn & others, amici
curiae, submitted a brief.

Lenk, J. We are called upon in this case to construe for the first
time G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, the corporate dissolution statute.
That statute allows a shareholder to petition a judge of the
Superior Court to dissolve a corporation in the event of a dead-
lock between its directors. See G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2) (i).

George T. Koshy and Anupam Sachdev are the sole sharehold-
ers and directors of Indus Systems, Inc. (Indus). After years of
deepening dissension and acrimony between the two, Koshy filed
a petition in the Superior Court in 2012, pursuant to the corporate
dissolution statute, seeking to dissolve Indus. Koshy also brought
claims against Sachdev for breach of fiduciary duties and, after a
jury-waived trial had taken place, but prior to the issuance of the
judge’s decision, filed a separate claim for contempt of court. The
judge rejected all of Koshy’s claims and Sachdev’s counter-
claims, and dismissed Koshy’s complaint for contempt. Koshy
appealed, and we transferred the matter to this court on our own
motion.

We conclude that the utter impasse as to fundamental matters of
corporate governance and operations shown to exist in these
circumstances gave rise to a state of “true deadlock” such that the
remedy of dissolution provided by the statute is permissible. See
comment to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, 25A Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
at 71 (Thomson/West 2005). Since dissolution is a discretionary
remedy, however, we remand the matter to the Superior Court for
a determination whether it is the appropriate remedy in these
circumstances. In addition, because a number of the claims in the
complaint for contempt were not raised at trial, we vacate and set
aside the judgment dismissing that complaint, and we remand the
matter for consideration of the allegations in the complaint con-
cerning conduct that occurred after the trial.”

2We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Brian JM Quinn, Niloufar
Abae, and Alex Pena.

477 Mass. 759 (2017) 761

Koshy » Sachdev.

1. Background. We recite the facts found by the trial judge.®
supplemented with references to undisputed facts in the record.

a. Formation and growth of Indus. As one of the motion judges
observed, “[t]his case concerns the demise of a long-standing
business relationship between two men who were once close
friends.” The parties formed Indus in April, 1987, after working
together for several years at another company. Indus provides
“computer aided design” (CAD) services, creating and storing
digital renderings of “existing manual drawings, sketches and
other information supplied by client organizations.” Koshy and
Sachdev each own fifty per cent of Indus’s shares and serve as its
sole directors. They are both authorized to act on the company’s
behalf.

After a few years of growing pains, Indus developed a steady
market for its services. By the end of 1997, the company was
generating revenues of approximately $700,000 annually. In
June, 1999, Indus was awarded a United States Government
Services Administration contract, which allowed it to bid on
projects for agencies of the Federal government. To help meet the
new wave of demand created by this contract, the parties estab-
lished eSystems Software Pvt. Ltd. (eSystems), an Indian corpo-
ration, to provide support services to Indus.‘

Building upon its success, Indus obtained a Federal “stream-
lined technology acquisition resources for services” contract
(STARS contract) in 2004. It allowed government clients to
purchase products and services from Indus without having to go
through a competitive bidding process. The STARS contract,
which was effective through November 30, 2011, gave Indus
access to a new Client base and provided approximately sixty per
cent of the company’s revenue from 2004 to 2010. By 2007,
Indus’s revenues exceeded $2 million annually.

b. Parties’ dispute. Sometime in the late 2000s, the relationship
between the parties began to fall apart. They developed a funda-
mental difference of opinion concerning the future of Indus.
While Koshy wanted the company to focus primarily on its
existing services for government agencies, Sachdev believed that
it should explore new markets. Both parties viewed their coun-

At argument before us, the parties acknowledged that they do not contest the
judge’s factual findings.

4George T. Koshy and Anupam Sachdev each own 49.9 per cent of eSystems
Software Pvt. Ltd. (eSystems). It is not apparent from the record who owns the
remaining shares.

762 477 Mass. 759 (2017)

Koshy » Sachdev.

terpart’s vision of Indus’s future as gravely flawed. Koshy saw
Sachdev’s efforts to develop new markets as quixotic and costly,
while Sachdev considered Koshy’s focus on existing clients myo-
pic and shortsighted. This difference in viewpoints bred growing
distrust as well, as is evident from a dispute arising around 2010
in connection with payments made from Indus to eSystems.
While Sachdev preferred to make prepayments to eSystems for
services to be performed, Koshy favored payments only for
services rendered. Koshy believed that prepayments, which could
not easily be recovered due to jurisdictional obstacles, provided
Sachdev with a means clandestinely to direct company resources
into new projects. Notwithstanding Koshy’s stated concerns,
Sachdev routinely made prepayments to eSystems without con-
sulting with Koshy.

As these disagreements strained the parties’ relationship, an
incident in the fall of 2011 furthered its disintegration. At that
time, Indus had approximately $1.4 million in retained earnings.
Koshy wanted this money to be paid out to himself and Sachdev
as a distribution, while Sachdev did not. In November, 2011,
Koshy wrote himself a check from Indus’s corporate account, in
the amount of $690,000, as a distribution, without Sachdev’s
consent. Koshy encouraged Sachdev, who was in India at the
time, to take a matching distribution. Sachdev instead reacted by
effectively locking Koshy out of the company. He initiated a
lawsuit against Koshy on behalf of Indus, seeking a return of the
distribution; stopped payment of Koshy’s salary; terminated his
company credit cards; and changed the locks on the door of
Indus’s offices. He also refused to consent to a tax distribution to
the parties, as had been the practice in prior years. Koshy sub-
sequently placed the $690,000 in an escrow account.

As this dispute was ongoing, each party offered to buy out the
other, based on evaluations of Indus’s worth created by consul-
tants that each had hired. Sachdev offered to purchase Koshy’s
shares for $480,000. Koshy rejected that offer and tendered his
own offer to purchase Sachdev’s shares for approximately $2.8
million; Sachdev rejected that proposal. Ultimately, the $690,000
was returned to Indus, and in June, 2012, the complaint was
dismissed. Koshy’s salary, company credit cards, and access to
his office were restored. The relationship between the parties,
however, continued to spiral downward.

The parties’ welling antipathy for and toxic distrust of each
other inevitably began to impinge upon the day-to-day operations

477 Mass. 759 (2017) 763

Koshy » Sachdev.

of Indus. In December, 2011, without consulting Koshy, Sachdev
hired Michael Xifaras to help with the company’s sales. Xifaras
replaced Roger Geilen, a long-time Indus salesperson, who had
worked largely with Koshy. Koshy and Xifaras did not get along,
as Koshy believed that Sachdev had hired Xifaras, in effect, as his
replacement. The hostility between the two broke out into open
conflict when Xifaras sent an extremely critical electronic mail
message to Koshy, with a copy to Sachdev, which included a
variety of insults.’ In response, Koshy informed Sachdev that he
would be firing Xifaras, and provided Xifaras notice of the
termination. Sachdev responded by saying that he agreed with
Xifaras’s criticisms and that Koshy had no authority to fire
employees without Sachdev’s consent; Xifaras retained his posi-
tion at Indus. A few months later, Koshy again attempted to
terminate Xifaras, with the same result. At the time of trial in
October, 2013, Xifaras still worked for Indus.

Finally, in June, 2012, Koshy commenced in the Superior
Court the underlying action in this case. The complaint asserted
that Sachdev had committed a breach of his fiduciary duty to
Koshy, as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; the complaint also asserted that the parties were dead-
locked and sought corporate dissolution on that ground. Sachdev
filed counterclaims alleging breach of fiduciary duties by Koshy
and abuse of process.

Koshy also sought a preliminary injunction enjoining Sachdev
from taking certain actions purportedly intended to freeze out
Koshy. A Superior Court judge (who was not the trial judge)
granted the motion in part, enjoining Sachdev from (1) blocking
or impeding regular tax distributions to Koshy; (2) making any
non-payroll-related disbursement or expenditure in excess of
$5,000 on behalf of Indus without providing written notice to
Koshy in advance; (3) hiring or firing any employee without
providing written notice to Koshy in advance; (4) making any
payments on behalf of Indus to eSystems for services not yet
performed without Koshy’s prior written consent; and (5) taking
any action for the purpose of “forcing or pressuring [Koshy] to
sell his shares for less than fair market value.” Shortly thereafter,
Sachdev approved a tax distribution to the parties. In September,
2012, Sachdev sought to have the preliminary injunction dis-

5Among other things, Xifaras called Koshy “the greatest impediment for the
company achieving its potential” and “dishonest and self serving.” He also said
that Koshy did “not have the experience and knowledge to lead.”

764 477 Mass. 759 (2017)

Koshy » Sachdev.

solved. The judge denied the motion and instead modified the
order such that the same provisions also were applicable to
Koshy.

In March, 2015, nearly one and one-half years after the trial in
October, 2013, and while a decision on the issues raised at trial
was still pending, Koshy filed a complaint seeking a judgment of
contempt against Sachdev for asserted repeated violations of the
preliminary injunction. The trial judge ultimately dismissed the
complaint for contempt when he issued his ruling in August,
2015, on the claims litigated at trial.

c. Trial proceedings. Following an eight-day, jury-waived trial,
the judge denied all of Koshy’s claims and Sachdev’s counter-
claims. He rejected Koshy’s claim that the parties were dead-
locked such that dissolution was appropriate. He also concluded
that Sachdev had not committed a breach of his fiduciary duty to
Koshy, because Sachdev had had a “legitimate business purpose”
for all of the conduct Koshy challenged. For similar reasons, the
judge denied Koshy’s claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The judge also dismissed Koshy’s com-
plaint for contempt on the ground that it “rehash[ed]” issues that
had been litigated at trial. Concluding that Koshy had neither
committed a breach of his fiduciary duty to Sachdev nor brought
his claims for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose, the judge also
denied Sachdev’s counterclaims.

Koshy appealed from the judgment,® and we transferred the
case to this court on our own motion.

2. Discussion. On appeal, Koshy raises three arguments. He
contends that the trial judge erred in concluding that the parties
were not deadlocked; in denying Koshy’s claim for breach of
fiduciary duty; and in dismissing the complaint for contempt. We
address each in turn.

a. True deadlock. i. Statutory overview. The corporate dis-
solution statute, G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, provides “grounds for
the judicial dissolution of corporations at the request of the
[C]ommonwealth, a shareholder, a creditor, or a corporation
which has commenced voluntary dissolution.” See comment to
G.L.c. 156D, § 14, 25A Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. at 70.” The statute

®Sachdev initially cross-appealed from the trial judge’s dismissal of his
claims against Koshy for breach of fiduciary duties and abuse of process. He
ultimately decided not to pursue the appeal.

7The corporate dissolution statute, G. L. c. 156D, is part of the Massachusetts
Business Corporation Act. In interpreting the statute, we are guided by the

477 Mass. 759 (2017) 765

Koshy » Sachdev.

allows any shareholder or group of shareholders who hold forty
per cent of “the total combined voting power of all the shares of
[a] corporation’s stock outstanding” and are “entitled to vote on
the question of dissolution” to petition the Superior Court for
dissolution of the corporation on the basis of director or share-
holder deadlock. See G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2).

A judge may allow a petition for dissolution due to deadlock
between a corporation’s directors only in cases of “true dead-
lock.” See comment to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, 25A Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. at 71 (“the general policy of Massachusetts corpora-
tion law [is] that involuntary dissolution should be available as a
mechanism for resolving internal corporate disputes only in the
case of true deadlock”). To establish the existence of a “true
deadlock” between directors, the petitioning party must prove
that (1) “the directors are deadlocked in the management of the
corporate affairs”; (2) “the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock”; and (3) “irreparable injury to the corporation is threat-
ened or being suffered.” See G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2) (i)
(§ 14.30 [2] [i]).* If the petitioning party can establish a “true
deadlock,” then the statute vests the judge with the discretion to
order dissolution as a remedy. G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30.

A judge’s determination whether a true deadlock exists is a
matter of law, reviewed de novo. Cf. Merola v. Exergen Corp.,
423 Mass. 461, 463 (1996) (determination whether actions con-
stituted breach of fiduciary duties was matter of law). Whether
such deadlock warrants dissolution is a matter of discretion. See
comment to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, 25A Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
at 70 (“This section states that a court ‘may’ order dissolution if
a ground for dissolution exists. Thus there is discretion on the part
of the court as to whether dissolution is appropriate even though
grounds exist under the specific circumstances”).

ii. Analysis. We have not previously had occasion to address the
corporate dissolution statute. As with all statutes, “[oJur primary
duty in interpreting [it] is ‘to effectuate the intent of the Legis-
lature in enacting it.’ ” MacLaurin v. Holyoke, 475 Mass. 231,
238 (2016), quoting Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insol-
vency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601 (2010), S.C., 465 Mass. 297
(2013).

“comments prepared by the task force . . . that drafted the act, ‘which included
more than fifty experienced Massachusetts corporate lawyers.’ ” See Chitwood
v. Vertex Pharms., Inc., 476 Mass. 667, 669 (2017), quoting Halebian y. Berv,
457 Mass. 620, 625 (2010).

®The statute does not define any of these terms.

766 477 Mass. 759 (2017)

Koshy » Sachdev.

A. Deadlock. The first part of the test for “true deadlock”
concerns whether the “directors are deadlocked in the manage-
ment of the corporate affairs.” G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2) (i.
Since neither the statute nor the drafters’ comment defines the
term “deadlock,” we look to its ordinary meaning. See Interna-
tional Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 (1983) (“We
begin with the canon of statutory construction that the primary
source of insight into the intent of the Legislature is the language
of the statute”). The plain meaning of “deadlock” is “a state in
which progress is impossible, as in a dispute, produced by the
counteraction of opposing forces.” Webster's New Universal
Unabridged Dictionary 512 (2003). Other courts to have consid-
ered the matter have reached a comparable understanding of the
term. See Donovan v. Quade, 830 F. Supp. 2d 460, 489 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (deadlock existed due to directors’ mutual distrust, lack of
communication, and inability harmoniously to manage affairs of
corporation); Belio v. Panorama Optics, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 4th
1096, 1103-1104 (1995) (deadlock exists when board has even
number of directors who are equally divided or incapable of
electing successor board); Black v. Graham, 266 Ga. 154, 155
(1996) (deadlock occurs when corporation has two shareholders
who are “wholly unable to agree on the management of the
business”).

Based on this common definition, we conclude that at least four
factors are relevant in determining whether a deadlock exists. The
first factor is whether irreconcilable differences between the di-
rectors of a corporation have resulted in “corporate paralysis.”
See Laskey v. L. & L. Manchester Drive-In, Inc., 216 A.2d 310,
314-315 (Me. 1966); Petition of Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382,
395 (1949); Kim, The Provisional Director Remedy for Corporate
Deadlock: A Proposed Model Statute, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
111, 119 (2003) (Kim) (“Deadlock generally refers to ‘an im-
passe in corporate decisional processes’ ” [citation omitted]). By
“corporate paralysis,” we refer to a stalemate between the direc-
tors concerning “one of the primary functions of management.”
See Laskey, supra at 314. Examples of such primary functions
include payroll, client services, hiring and retention of employ-
ees, and corporate strategy.

A second factor in discerning whether a deadlock exists is the
size of the corporation at issue. A deadlock is more likely to occur
in a small or closely held corporation, particularly one where
ownership is divided on an even basis between two shareholder-

477 Mass. 759 (2017) 767

Koshy » Sachdev.

directors. See comment to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, 25A Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. at 72 (dissolution remedy “particularly impor-
tant in small or family-held corporations in which share owner-
ship may be divided on a [fifty-fifty] basis”); Kim, supra at 121
(‘The distinguishing features of close corporations make them
particularly vulnerable to deadlock”). Moreover, in closely held
corporations, the lack of a ready market for a shareholder’s stock,
and the greater likelihood that a shareholder is reliant on the
corporation for a salary, tends to increase the potential for dead-
lock and accompanying oppressive tactics. See Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 588-589 (1975)
(structure of close corporation can lend itself to oppressive con-
duct); Kim, supra at 121-122.°

A third relevant factor in determining whether deadlock has
occurred is an indication that a party has manufactured a dispute
in order to engineer a deadlock. In such circumstances, a court
should view the party’s claim with skepticism. See comment to
G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, 25A Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. at 71 (cor-
porate dissolution statute not intended to permit dissolution in
instances of “gamesmanship in the negotiation of internal corpo-
rate disputes”); Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 136 Il. App. 3d 571,
582 (1985) (rejecting claim of shareholder who committed breach
of fiduciary duty to company to force its dissolution); Lien v.
Lien, 2004 S.D. 8, {[ 10, 23 (rejecting claim of director who
boycotted directors’ election meeting and then claimed deadlock
due to failure of corporation to elect directors).

A fourth factor in determining whether a deadlock exists is the
degree and extent of distrust and antipathy between the directors.
See, e.g., Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 158 (Del. 2017) (distrust
between directors of corporation contributed to deadlock); Black,
266 Ga. at 155 (“hostile and static situation” constituted dead-
lock). Mutual antipathy can transform what may begin as a run of
the mill disagreement into irreconcilable conflict and stalemate
where hostility precludes compromise. See Misita v. Distillers
Corp., 54 Cal. App. 2d 244, 250 (1942) (dispute between parties
calcified into deadlock meriting dissolution as result of “ill-
feeling, dissension, hatred, mutual hostility and distrust” between

®A claim of oppressive shareholder conduct of the sort described in Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 580-584 (1975),
however, is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding of deadlock. While a breach
of the directors’ fiduciary duties would be relevant to whether a deadlock exists
between them, a deadlock could result even in instances where the directors are
acting in good faith.

768 477 Mass. 759 (2017)

Koshy » Sachdev.

board members).

Given the undisputed evidence, the conclusion that the conflict
between the parties constitutes a deadlock is inescapable. Apply-
ing the first factor, the acknowledged facts underscore corporate
paralysis with respect to a number of key matters. The parties
have profoundly different opinions regarding both Indus’s daily
operations and its future. They disagree on such basic matters as
staffing needs, as well as dividend and tax distributions, and even
more fundamentally, they hold diametrically opposed views as to
long-term corporate strategies and goals. The areas of disagree-
ment between the parties appear to far outweigh the few areas of
agreement. Over the past few years, the parties appear to have
agreed only on the matter of employee raises and the need to hire
a new salesperson. As the Xifaras incident demonstrates, their
agreement on the latter issue was superficial at best. The parties
are diametrically opposed on nearly every issue of importance
concerning Indus’s current operations and its future.

The second factor also argues in favor of deadlock. Since the
parties each own fifty per cent of Indus, each has the ability to
prevent the other from enacting any policy with which he dis-
agrees, on any subject; their stalemate thereby effectively para-
lyzes Indus on all of the issues on which the two disagree. As to
the third factor, we discern no indication in the judge’s findings
that either party engineered the dispute in bad faith. Rather, the
facts reflect a genuine disagreement between the parties concern-
ing the most basic aspects of company policy.

Looking to the final factor, the parties do not contest the trial
judge’s finding that they operate based on a relationship of
mutual distrust and antipathy. The judge was well warranted in
concluding that Koshy “views all of Sachdev’s actions as an
attempt to freeze him out of the management of the company”
and that “Sachdev questions all of Koshy’s actions.” The record
is replete with personal insults, questioning of motives, and
general acrimony between the parties. This mutual antipathy in a
two-director corporation has prevented the parties from compro-
mising and has inspired increasing levels of brinksmanship. Ac-
cordingly, we conclude that Koshy has met his burden to show that
the parties are deadlocked within the meaning of § 14.30 (2) (i).

B. Irreconcilability of the deadlock. The second part of the test
for “true deadlock” under § 14.30 (2) (i) requires that the “share-
holders are unable to break the deadlock.” The critical inquiry

477 Mass. 759 (2017) 769

Koshy » Sachdev.

with respect to this part of the test is whether the shareholders are
able to work around the deadlocked directors. See, e.g., Goldstein
v. Studley, 452 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Mo. 1970) (shareholders unable to
break deadlock where shares evenly divided and board contained
four directors). If the shareholders are able to do so, then there is
no need for a court to dissolve the company in order to break the
deadlock.

In making this determination, a reviewing court must decide
whether there is a mechanism by which the deadlock can be
broken. In closely held corporations, two of the more common
such mechanisms are buy-sell agreements and agreements pro-
viding for methods of alternative dispute resolution such as
third-party mediation of disputes. A buy-sell agreement is a
contract or other legal mechanism that provides for “the manda-
tory or optional repurchase of a stockholder’s shares by the
corporation or by the other stockholders upon the occurrence of
a certain event,” such as a deadlock. See Stephenson v. Drever,
16 Cal. 4th 1167, 1173 (1997). See also Hoberman, Practical
Considerations for Drafting and Utilizing Deadlock Solutions for
Non-Corporate Business Entities, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 231,
232 (2001) (Hoberman) (“Perhaps the most common deadlock
solution . . . is the ‘buy-sell agreement’ .”). An agreement
requiring alternative dispute resolution in instances of deadlock
also may provide shareholders with a mechanism to break it. See
Hoberman, supra at 233.

The record contains no indication that such a mechanism exists
in this case. Sachdev points to section five of the articles as a
potential means by which the deadlock could be broken.!° That
provision, however, requires the parties to agree upon an arbitra-
tor who then will value the selling shareholder’s stock. We
discern no indication in the record that the parties would agree
upon such an arbitrator, particularly given their previously de-
monstrated inability to agree on the price for a buyout of each
other’s shares. In light of this, Koshy has met his burden of
establishing that the shareholders are unable to break the dead-

19Under section five of the articles, a shareholder who desires to divest
himself of his shares first must notify the directors of the price at which he is
willing to sell and provide the name of an arbitrator, Within thirty days, the
directors either must accept the offer or notify the shareholder of the name of
another arbitrator. The two arbitrators then select a third; after this panel of
arbitrators is constituted, it may ascertain the value of the stock. Following the
evaluation, the directors have thirty days in which to purchase the stock at the
set price; if they do not, the shareholder may dispose of the stock as he sees fit.

710 477 Mass. 759 (2017)

Koshy » Sachdev.

lock.

C. Irreparable injury. The final part of the “true deadlock” test
requires that “irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or
being suffered.” Since the term “irreparable injury” is not defined
in the statute, but has a long-standing meaning at common law,
we assume that the Legislature intended to incorporate the com-
mon-law meaning. See Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 Mass.
745, 747 (2011) (“Where the Legislature does not define a term,
we presume that its intent is to incorporate the common-law
definition of that term, ‘unless the intent to alter it is clearly
expressed’ ” [citation omitted].

At common law, an irreparable injury is a harm that cannot be
vindicated by litigation on the merits. See Packaging Indus.
Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 616 (1980) (irreparable
injury occurs when party “suffer[s] a loss of rights that cannot be
vindicated should it prevail after a full hearing on the merits”).
An irreparable injury need not be financial in nature. See Mordka
v. Mordka Enters., Inc., 143 Ariz. 298, 305 (Ct. App. 1984)
(profitability not sole criterion in considering irreparable injury);
comment to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, 25A Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
at 72 (irreparable injury standard “may be met in a corporation
that is operating at a profit”). A corporation may suffer irreparable
injury due to severe corporate dysfunction or a frustration of the
company’s purpose, or by placing the company’s business in
jeopardy. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 159 (profitable company sub-
ject to irreparable harm due to “irretrievably dysfunctional” man-
agement structure); Fernandez v. Yates, 145 So. 3d 141, 146 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (deadlock preventing effective use of com-
pany’s sole asset created irreparable injury); Black, 266 Ga. at
155 (inability of sole and equal shareholders to agree on man-
agement of business presented threat of irreparable injury). A
court may also consider “harm to a corporation’s reputation,
goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale” (citation
omitted). See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 161.

The plain meaning of the term “threatened” implicates an
assessment of the substantial likelihood that irreparable harm will
occur. See Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1975
(2003) (defining “threaten” as “to be a menace or source of
danger to”). In this respect, the term is analogous to the concept
of “substantial risk” in our jurisprudence on preliminary injunc-
tions. See Packaging Indus. Group, Inc., 380 Mass. at 617
(preliminary injunction requires showing of “substantial risk of
irreparable harm’).

477 Mass. 759 (2017) 71

Koshy » Sachdev.

In determining whether a corporation is “threatened” with
irreparable injury, a court must look beyond its current, short-
term status. While a presently declining revenue stream, the
departure of employees, or the depletion of clients may signal a
threat of irreparable injury, the present well-being of a corpora-
tion does not preclude such a threat. A deadlock that prevents
corporate management from effectively addressing the vital func-
tions of the corporation creates a threat of irreparable injury even
if the company appears financially profitable. Accordingly, a
court must examine the nature and impact of a deadlock to
determine if the company can remain viable in the long term. If
not, then the corporation is threatened with irreparable injury.

In the circumstances here, we conclude that the fundamental
nature of the deadlock between the parties threatens irreparable
injury to Indus, because the parties’ mutual antipathy renders
them unable effectively to manage the company. Their impasse
regarding nearly every major corporate decision has cast a cloud
on Indus’s future. The parties cannot agree on anything of sub-
stance, and as the Xifaras situation demonstrates, the palpably
corrosive acrimony between them prevents them from function-
ing even in areas of theoretical agreement. Meanwhile, as their
dysfunctional relationship continues to deteriorate, the parties
repeatedly have resorted to costly litigation, in efforts to outma-
neuver each other and gain the upper hand in steering the corpo-
ration. Resort to management by litigation is neither a viable
means of corporate governance nor an adequate substitute for
functional management and planning. On the record before us,
the trajectory of Indus plainly points south and a threat of irrepa-
rable injury has been shown. We therefore conclude that the
parties’ dispute constitutes a “true deadlock” within the meaning
of § 14.30 (2) (i.

D. Remedy. The corporate dissolution statute provides that a
Superior Court judge “may dissolve a corporation” if the three-
part test for “true deadlock” set forth in § 14.30 (2) (i) is met.
Given that the statute authorizes the “extreme” remedy of disso-
lution, see comment to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, 25A Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. at 71-72, we conclude that it also authorizes lesser
remedies, such as a buyout or the sale of the company as an
ongoing entity. See Brodie v. Jordan, 447 Mass. 866, 873 n.7
(2006) (“In most of these States, statutes authorize the more
drastic remedy of involuntary dissolution, and thus courts have
understandably inferred the power to order the lesser remedy of

772 477 Mass. 759 (2017)

Koshy » Sachdev.

a buyout”); Shawe, 157 A.3d at 160 (affirming Court of Chan-
cery’s decision to appoint custodian to hold public auction of
company in light of director deadlock); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363
N.W.2d 269, 275 (lowa Ct. App. 1984) (statute that provided for
dissolution allowed for other equitable relief); 27 West, Inc. v.
Meadowgreen Trails, Inc., 913 S.W.2d 858, 867 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (“Courts are not limited to the remedy of dissolution and
may, in equity, consider appropriate alternative forms of relief,
including ordering the corporation to pay the petitioning share-
holders their proportionate share in money”).

The appropriate remedy should be decided in the first instance
by the trial judge, and we remand the matter for such a determi-
nation.

b. Breach of fiduciary duties. Koshy contends that Sachdev
committed a breach his fiduciary duty to Koshy by refusing to
consent to tax and dividend distributions in late 2011 and early
2012, and by making an unreasonably low offer for Koshy’s
shares in early 2012.

Shareholders in a close corporation owe fiduciary duties to both
their fellow shareholders and the corporation itself. See
Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 528-
529 (1997); Donahue, 367 Mass. at 593. Like partners, they owe
to one another a duty of “utmost good faith and loyalty.”
Donahue, supra. Accordingly, they may not “act out of avarice,
expediency or self-interest” towards their fellow shareholders. Id.
If a shareholder is able to demonstrate a “legitimate business
purpose” for a challenged action, however, he or she will not be
liable “unless the wronged shareholder succeeds in showing that
the proffered legitimate objective could have been achieved
through a less harmful, reasonably practicable, alternative mode
of action.” Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 650, 657 (1988).

The trial judge concluded that Sachdev had a legitimate busi-
ness purpose for the actions that Koshy challenged. In his find-
ings of fact, the judge credited Sachdev’s reasons for declining to
agree to tax and dividend distributions and rejected Koshy’s
assertion that those reasons were a pretext to freeze him out of the
company. The judge also found that Sachdev’s buy-out offer was
a “low-ball” offer, but that it was not advanced in bad faith. We
review the judge’s factual determinations for clear error, but we
review de novo his determination that Sachdev did not commit a
breach of his fiduciary duties to Koshy. See Merola, 423 Mass. at
464.

477 Mass. 759 (2017) 773

Koshy » Sachdev.

At trial, Sachdev testified that he had refused to agree to
dividend distributions in 2012 because of his concern over the
loss of revenue following the expiration of the STARS contract in
2011. Sachdev also testified that he would not agree to a tax
distribution because of the fiscal uncertainty caused by Koshy’s
unilateral $690,000 distribution to himself. We discern no error in
the trial judge’s rulings of law that these actions did not constitute
a breach of fiduciary duty, because Sachdev had a “legitimate
business purpose” for his conduct. See Zimmerman, 402 Mass. at
657. Sachdev’s objection to a dividend distribution on the eve of
the expiration of one of Indus’s chief contracts was not unrea-
sonable, and Koshy does not suggest a plausible “alternative
mode of action” given these circumstances. See id. The same
holds true for Sachdev’s reluctance to sign off on a tax distribu-
tion when nearly three-quarters of a million dollars of Indus’s
retained cash was in escrow. There is no indication that Sachdev
acted out of the “avarice, expediency or self-interest” that under-
girds a breach of fiduciary duty in taking these actions. See
Donahue, 367 Mass. at 593.

With regard to Sachdev’s “low-ball” offer, the judge found that
it was not made in bad faith. Absent an agreement establishing
such obligations, a shareholder in a close corporation does not
owe a fiduciary duty to a fellow shareholder in purchasing the
other’s shares in the corporation. See Goode v. Ryan, 397 Mass.
85, 90-91 (1986) (no obligation for shareholders to purchase
other shareholders’ stock in corporation in absence of agreement
to the contrary). No such obligation is contained in Indus’s
articles of incorporation, nor do these circumstances suggest any
compelling reason to extend to the present case the duty set out
in Donahue. Accordingly, we conclude that Sachdev did not
commit a breach of his fiduciary duties to Koshy.

c. Contempt. Koshy maintains also that the judge erred in
dismissing his complaint for contempt. In that complaint, Koshy
asserted that Sachdev repeatedly had violated the terms of the
preliminary injunction, both before and after the trial.

The “purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial.”
Demoulas, 424 Mass. at 571. A complaint for contempt “is
‘intended to achieve compliance with the court’s orders for the
benefit of the complainant.’ ” Mahoney v. Mahoney, 65 Mass.
App. Ct. 537, 540 (2006), quoting Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass.
137, 141 (1980). We review the decision to dismiss the complaint
for abuse of discretion. See Massachusetts Comm’n Against
Discrimination v. Wattendorf, 353 Mass. 315, 317 (1967).

774 477 Mass. 759 (2017)

Koshy » Sachdev.

The judge dismissed the complaint, determining that it “re-
hash[ed] many of the issues and arguments made during the trial
of the underlying claims” in the case, and discerning “no reason
to revisit those matters by way of a trial on the complaint for
contempt.” While some of the claims indeed reiterated issues
litigated at trial, several others asserted violations that took place
between the end of the trial in October, 2013, and the expiration
of the preliminary injunction, which remained in effect through
the entry of judgment in August, 2015. Among these are asser-
tions that, in January, 2014, Sachdev canceled checks that Koshy
had written to a subcontractor; in March, 2014, Sachdev made a
payment in excess of the limits in the injunction; in December,
2014, Sachdev executed a contract with a third-party vendor
without Koshy’s consent; during all of 2014, Sachdev refused to
authorize a tax distribution; and, in February, 2015, Sachdev
denied Koshy access to payroll.

While claims duplicative of a prior action are subject to dis-
missal as improper claim splitting, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (9),
as amended, 450 Mass. 1403 (2008), this proscription extends
only to claims that raise the same issues as did the prior action.
See M.J. Flaherty Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 61
Mass. App. Ct. 337, 339 (2004) (“Rule 12 [b] [9] provides for the
dismissal of a second action in which the parties and the issues
are the same as those in a prior action still pending in a court of
this Commonwealth”). Given that the complaint for contempt
asserted a number of violations of the preliminary injunction that
occurred after the trial, the judge should not have dismissed the
complaint on the ground that it merely rehashed issues raised at
trial. On remand, the trial judge should consider separately those
issues involving conduct after the end of trial but during the
pendency of the proceedings.

3. Conclusion. The judgment is vacated and set aside. The
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment
that the parties have reached a “true deadlock” within the mean-
ing of G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30, and for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 775 (2017) 715

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

Commonweatru vs. Toomas J. GerHARDT.

Worcester. January 6, 2017. - September 19, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ."

Marijuana, Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Evidence, Field
sobriety test.

This court concluded that in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of marijuana, a police officer may not testify to the
administration and results of field sobriety tests as an officer would do in a
prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, but may testify to observations made during the administration of
roadside assessments to the extent that they are relevant to establish a
driver's balance, coordination, mental acuity, and other skills required to
safely operate a motor vehicle; however, an officer may not testify, on direct
examination, that a driver’s performance on an assessment established that
the driver was under the influence of marijuana, or that an individual
“passed” or “failed” any assessment. [780-785]

This court concluded that in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of marijuana, a police officer may not testify as a lay
witness to the effects of marijuana consumption or offer an opinion that a
defendant was intoxicated by marijuana [785-786], but may testify concern-
ing a defendant’s observable appearance, behavior, and demeanor [786-787]:
further, the jury may use their own common sense about the effects of
marijuana [787].

Comp.aint received and sworn to in the Worcester Division of
the District Court Department on April 24, 2013.

A motion for a hearing to challenge the admissibility of certain
evidence was heard by Andrew M. D’Angelo, J., and questions of
law were reported by him to the Appeals Court.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.

Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel Ser-
vices, for the defendant.

Michelle R. King, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

‘Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

716 477 Mass. 775 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

Steven S. Epstein & Marvin Cable, for National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, amicus curiae, submitted a
brief.

Michael A. Delsignore & Julie Gaudreau, for National College
for DUI Defense, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Gaziano, J. In this case we are asked to consider the admissi-
bility of field sobriety tests (FSTs) where a police officer suspects
that a driver has been operating while under the influence of
marijuana. Police typically administer three FSTs — the “hori-
zontal gaze nystagmus test,” the “walk and turn test,” and the
“one leg stand test” — during a motor vehicle stop in order to
assess motorists suspected of operating while under the influence
of alcohol or other drugs. These tests were developed specifically
to measure alcohol consumption, and there is widespread scien-
tific agreement on the existence of a strong correlation between
unsatisfactory performance and a blood alcohol level of at least
.08 per cent.

By contrast, in considering whether a driver is operating while
under the influence of marijuana, there is as yet no scientific
agreement on whether, and, if so, to what extent, these types of
tests are indicative of marijuana intoxication. The research on the
efficacy of FSTs to measure marijuana impairment has produced
highly disparate results. Some studies have shown no correlation
between inadequate performance on FSTs and the consumption of
marijuana; other studies have shown some correlation with cer-
tain FSTs, but not with others; and yet other studies have shown
a correlation with all the most frequently used FSTs. In addition,
other research indicates that less frequently used FSTs in the
context of alcohol consumption may be better measures of mari-
juana intoxication.

The lack of scientific consensus regarding the use of standard
FSTs in attempting to evaluate marijuana intoxication does not
mean, however, that FSTs have no probative value beyond alco-
hol intoxication. We conclude that, to the extent that they are
relevant to establish a driver’s balance, coordination, mental
acuity, and other skills required to safely operate a motor vehicle,
FSTs are admissible at trial as observations of the police officer
conducting the assessment. The introduction in evidence of the
officer’s observations of what will be described as “roadside
assessments” shall be without any statement as to whether the
driver’s performance would have been deemed a “pass” or a
“fail,” or whether the performance indicated impairment. Be-
cause the effects of marijuana may vary greatly from one indi-

477 Mass. 775 (2017) 7771

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

vidual to another, and those effects are as yet not commonly
known, neither a police officer nor a lay witness who has not been
qualified as an expert may offer an opinion as to whether a driver
was under the influence of marijuana.”

1. Background. a. Prior proceedings. Following a motor ve-
hicle stop, Thomas Gerhardt was charged in the District Court
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
marijuana, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24. Gerhardt filed a
motion for a Daubert-Lanigan hearing, seeking to challenge the
admissibility of evidence concerning his performance on FSTs
conducted after the stop. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-595 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan,
419 Mass. 15, 24-27 (1994). After an evidentiary hearing, a
District Court judge reported four questions to the Appeals Court,
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501
(2004).

“1, Whether police officers may testify to the administra-
tion and results of standard [FSTs] in prosecutions for [o]p-
erating [uJ]nder the [i]nfluence of [mJarijuana as they do in
[o]perating [u]nder the [i]nfluence of [a]lcohol prosecutions?

“2. Are the effects of marijuana consumption sufficiently
within the common knowledge and experience of a lay
person, such that a non-expert witness may offer opinion
evidence whether a person is ‘high’ on marijuana?

“3. May a police officer, who has not been qualified as an
expert witness, testify to the effects of marijuana on a person
such as bloodshot eyes, lack of coordination and/or balance,
reaction times, slow speech, paranoia, or relaxed re-
sponses[?]

“4, May a juror rely on their own experience and common
sense about the effects of marijuana as they may do in an
[o]perating [u]nder the [i]nfluence of [a]lcohol prosecution?”
(Footnote omitted.)

We granted Gerhardt’s application for direct appellate review.
After oral argument, we remanded the matter to the District Court
judge who had reported the questions for further findings on
eleven specific issues. Following the return of the judge’s find-
ings, we again heard oral argument in the matter.

2We acknowledge the amicus briefs in support of the defendant submitted by
the National College for DUI Defense and the National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws.

718 477 Mass. 775 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

b. Facts. The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts as to
the evidence that the Commonwealth would seek to present at
trial. On February 13, 2013, at approximately 12:20 a.m., Trooper
French of the State police® observed a blue Suzuki Grand Vitara
motor vehicle traveling south on Route 146, without the rear
lights on. French followed the vehicle as it left Route 146 at exit
8. He activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle on
Elmwood Street in Millbury.

French approached the vehicle on the passenger side. There
were three occupants in the vehicle: the driver, later learned to be
Gerhardt, and two passengers. French saw smoke inside the
vehicle, and as soon as the front passenger window was lowered,
he detected “the distinct odor of burnt marijuana.” He also saw a
large amount of what he identified as cigar tobacco on the floor,
and a cigar slicer on the key ring in the ignition. The trooper
asked the driver for his driver’s license and registration. Gerhardt
handed him the license and said that he did not have his regis-
tration.

French asked Gerhardt how much marijuana was in the vehicle.
Gerhardt responded that there were “a couple of roaches” in the
ashtray; he pulled two largely consumed rolled cigarettes from
the ashtray and handed them to French. French then asked when
the occupants had smoked marijuana. One of the passengers
responded that they had smoked about twenty minutes previ-
ously. Gerhardt said that it had been about three hours earlier.
French walked to the driver’s side of the vehicle and noticed that
the light switch was in the “off” position. He asked Gerhardt how
much he had smoked. Gerhardt responded that he had smoked
approximately one gram of marijuana.

French then asked Gerhardt to step out of the vehicle to
perform FSTs. French administered a number of FSTs, including
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN);* the nine-step walk-

®Trooper French’s first name is not apparent in the record.

4“Nystagmus is ‘[aJn abnormal and involuntary movement of the eyeballs
from side to side or up and down, but usually from side to side.’ ” Common-
wealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 186 (1997), quoting State v. Merritt, 36 Conn.
App. 76, 84 (1994). An officer administers the HGN test by having the subject
focus on a moving object and observing whether the subject is able to follow the
object smoothly with his or her eyes, whether the subject’s eyes bounce at the
extremes of the field of vision, and whether they exhibit nystagmus, where there
is an angle of less than forty-five degrees between the eyes and the object.
Sands, supra at 186-187. Introduction of the results of this test at trial requires
expert testimony. See id. at 188.

477 Mass. 775 (2017) 7719

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

and-turn test (WAT); and the one-leg-stand test (OLS). French
also asked Gerhardt to recite the alphabet from D to Q and to
count backward from seventy-five to sixty-two.

Gerhardt had no nystagmus indicators and was able to recite
the requested portion of the alphabet and to count backwards. He
did not perform the WAT as instructed, even after several expla-
nations and a demonstration by the trooper in response to
Gerhardt‘s first answer in the negative when asked whether he
understood the instructions. Rather than standing heel to toe, with
his right foot in front and his left toes touching his heel, as he had
been shown, Gerhardt moved his feet so that they were side by
side; he also did not turn around as instructed. French determined
that “the results of this test indicated that Gerhardt was impaired.”
The trooper then provided instructions and gave a demonstration
of the OLS test, and Gerhard indicated that he understood. In
performing the test, however, Gerhard did not remain upright on
one foot, instead putting his foot down multiple times, and
swayed. French determined that “the results of this test indicated
that Gerhardt was impaired.”

After administering these tests, French concluded that Gerhardt
was under the influence of marijuana. French informed Gerhardt
that he was not under arrest but had him sit in the back of
French’s cruiser. Both passengers were asked to step out of the
vehicle and were pat frisked. They, too, were told that they were
not under arrest, and they were placed in the back seat of the
cruiser. A second trooper arrived at the scene. During a search of
the vehicle, the troopers recovered two more marijuana “roaches”
and a marijuana stem.

On April 24, 2013, a criminal complaint issued against Ger-
hardt charging him with operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of drugs, pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1),
and traffic violations.

2. Discussion. a. Field sobriety tests. The FSTs, which were
designed to detect alcohol impairment, are administered and
evaluated in a standardized manner. The two tests primarily
administered in the context of alcohol impairment are the WAT
and the OLS, which are designed to assess an individual’s bal-
ance, coordination, dexterity, ability to follow directions, and
ability to focus attention on multiple subjects at the same time.®

There are a number of other FSTs, such as the “Romberg balance test,” in
which the subject stands with heels and toes together and arms at the side of the

780 477 Mass. 775 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

In performing the WAT, the subject is directed to take nine
steps, walking heel-to-toe, along a real or imaginary straight line.
The subject then turns on one foot and returns in the same
manner. An officer administering the WAT looks for eight specific
indicators of impairment: losing balance while listening to the
instructions, beginning before the instructions are finished, stop-
ping to regain balance while walking, failing to walk heel-to-toe,
stepping off the line, using arms to balance, making an improper
turn, or taking an incorrect number of steps. Where the consump-
tion of alcohol is at issue, there is an established correlation
between performance on the test and blood alcohol content
(BAC), with some research indicating that as many as seventy-
nine per cent of individuals who exhibit two or more of these
indicators have a BAC of 0.08 per cent or higher.

In performing the OLS, the subject stands with one foot raised
approximately six inches off the ground while counting aloud for
thirty seconds. An officer conducting the test looks for four
indicators of impairment: swaying while balancing, using arms to
balance, hopping to maintain balance, and putting the foot down.
Research has indicated that as many as eighty-three per cent of
individuals who exhibit two or more of these indicators have a
BAC of 0.08 per cent or higher.

b. Admissibility of the FSTs in the context of marijuana. While
using marijuana is no longer a crime in Massachusetts for adults
who are at least twenty-one years old,® operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of marijuana remains a criminal of-
fense. See G. L. c. 90, § 24. In a prosecution for operating while
under the influence of marijuana, it is the Commonwealth’s
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in addition to the
other elements of the offense, that a defendant’s consumption of
marijuana impaired his or her ability to drive a motor vehicle
safely. See Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 756 (2013),
quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 173 (1985)
(in prosecution for operating while under influence of alcohol or
marijuana, the Commonwealth “need not prove that the defendant
actually drove in an unsafe or erratic manner, . . . [but] it must
prove a diminished capacity to operate safely”).

Unlike alcohol, marijuana does not act as a general central

body and tips his or her head back slightly and estimates the passage of thirty
seconds, and the “finger to nose test,” which are less frequently used in the
context of alcohol impairment.

See St 2016, c. 334, “The Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana Act.”

477 Mass. 775 (2017) 781

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

nervous system depressant, impairing functions throughout the
body. Nonetheless, the primary psychoactive substance in mari-
juana, tetrahydrocannibol (THC), is known to have an impact on
several functions of the brain that are relevant to driving ability,
including the capacity to divide one’s attention and focus on
several things at the same time, balance, and the speed of pro-
cessing information. While not all researchers agree, a significant
amount of research has shown that consumption of marijuana can
impair the ability to drive. There is ongoing disagreement among
scientists, however, as to whether the FSTs are indicative of
marijuana impairment. In recent years, numerous studies have
been conducted in an effort to determine whether a person’s
performance on the FSTs is a reliable indicator of impairment by
marijuana.” These studies have produced mixed results.* For
example, researchers found that the FSTs were mildly sensitive to
the effects of marijuana, with the OLS being the most sensitive.
That study, however, also indicated that the OLS produced nu-
merous false positives.° Other researchers found that the OLS
was a somewhat more reliable indicator of marijuana impairment
than the WAT.'° In a more recent study, by contrast, a different
group of researchers found that the WAT was a better indicator of
marijuana impairment than the OLS." Researchers conducting
another study found that marijuana significantly impaired perfor-
mance on the HGN, the WAT, and the OLS." Other studies have
shown no correlation between performance on the HGN and
consumption of marijuana, even where the OLS or WAT showed

7The judge noted several of these studies in his findings on remand from this
court. In addition, both parties provided numerous such studies in the record,
and one of the amici did as well.

®The number of studies in this field is vast; we cite only a few representative
examples.

®Bosker, Theunissen, Conen, Kuypers, Jeffery, Walls, Kauert, Toennes,
Moeller, & Ramaekers, A Placebo-Controlled Study to Assess Standardized
Field Sobriety Tests Performance During Alcohol and Cannabis Intoxication in
Heavy Cannabis Users and Accuracy of Point of Collection Devices for De-
tecting THC in Oral Fluid, 223 Psychopharmacology 439, 443-444 (2012)
(Bosker).

‘Papafotiou, Carter, & Stough, An Evaluation of the Sensitivity of the
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) to Detect Impairment Due to Mari-
juana Intoxication, 180 Psychopharmacology 107, 113 (2005) (Papafotiou).

“Declues, Perez, & Figueroa, A 2-Year Study of Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabi-
nol Concentrations in Drivers: Examining Driving and Field Sobriety Test
Performance, 61 J. Forensic Sci. 1664, 1669 (2016).

Papafotion, supra at 111-113.

782 477 Mass. 775 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

some sensitivity to marijuana consumption,"® while others have
found no correlation between the consumption of marijuana and
any of these FSTs.1*

As a result of these varied results, some researchers have sug-
gested development of another group of FSTs, combining the
currently less frequently used Romberg balance test and the nose-
touch test, see note 5, supra, with a to-be-developed test on pupil
constriction, or adding a scoring factor of head movements or
jerks to the standard FSTs.*¢ Other researchers are working on a
tongue or cheek swab test that directly measures levels of THC
shortly after consumption.'” It is clear from the above, as the
judge stated in his findings on remand, that the scientific com-
munity has yet to reach a consensus on the reliability of FSTs to
assess whether a driver is under the influence of marijuana.

The lack of scientific agreement, however, does not, by itself,
resolve the question whether a driver’s performance on an FST is
relevant evidence in a trial on a charge of operating while under
the influence of marijuana. “The relevance threshold for the
admission of evidence is low. ‘Evidence is relevant if it has a
“rational tendency to prove an issue in the case,” ’” Common-
wealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 144 (2004), quoting Common-
wealth v. LaCorte, 373 Mass. 700, 702 (1977), or to “render a
‘desired inference more probable than it would be [otherwise],’ ”
Arroyo, supra, quoting Commonwealth vy. Fayerweather, 406
Mass. 78, 83 (1989). To be relevant, evidence “need not establish
directly the proposition sought; it must only provide a link in the
chain of proof.” Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 750
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002), quoting Common-
wealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 744 (1990).

The absence of scientific consensus regarding the use of stan-
dard FSTs in attempting to evaluate marijuana intoxication does
not mean that they have no probative value. A police officer
makes numerous relevant observations in the course of an en-

13Hartman, Richman, Hayes, & Heustis, Drug Recognition Expert (DRE)
Examination Characteristics of Cannabis Impairment, 92 Accident Analysis &
Prevention 219, 226 (2016) (Hartman).

14 See generally Jones, Donnelly, Swift, & Weatherburn, Driving Under the
Influence of Cannabis: The Problem and Potential Countermeasures, 87 Crime
& Just. Bull. 1 (2005); Neavyn, Blohm, Babu, & Bird, Medical Marijuana and
Driving: A Review, 10 J. Med. Toxicology 269 (2014)

15See Hartman, supra at 226.

14Sce Papafotiou, supra at 108.

17See Bosker, supra at 442, 445.

477 Mass. 775 (2017) 783

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

counter with a possibly impaired driver. There is no doubt that an
officer may testify to his or her observations of, for example, any
erratic driving or moving violations that led to the initial stop; the
driver’s appearance and demeanor; the odor of fresh or burnt
marijuana; and the driver’s behavior on getting out of the vehicle.

In our view, certain of the FSTs also may provide information
that is relevant to the question of a defendant’s impairment, and
a police officer may testify, as a lay witness, to his or her
observations of the defendant’s performance. In particular, obser-
vations of the performance of the OLS and the WAT may be
admissible as evidence of a defendant's balance, coordination,
ability to retain and follow directions, and ability to perform tasks
requiring divided attention, and the presence or absence of other
skills necessary for the safe operation of a motor vehicle.'® We
see no reason why an officer’s observations of a defendant's
behavior on being asked to walk a straight line or to stand on one
foot should be excluded because the scientific community’s un-
derstanding of precisely how this correlates with marijuana use is
still evolving. We are not persuaded, however, that the FSTs can
be treated as scientific tests establishing impairment as a result of
marijuana consumption. The scientific community has not
reached a consensus whether a defendant’s performance on any
combination of FSTs, or on any individual FST, is correlated with
marijuana use or impairment.

The unsettled state of the scientific research suggests that FST
evidence should be neither treated as a definitive test of impair-
ment nor excluded entirely from consideration by the finder of
fact. Cf. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 476 Mass. 451, 464 (2017)
(where there is no consensus that simultaneous display of pho-
tographs is inferior to sequential display, “the decision . . . is best
left to law enforcement, and the choice will continue to bear on
the weight of the identification, but not on its admissibility”).

“The HGN stands on a different footing from the FSTs that are directed to
balance and coordination. We previously have held that, in a prosecution for
operating while under the influence of alcohol, “the HGN test relies on an
underlying scientific proposition and therefore expert testimony is required.”
See Sands, 424 Mass. at 188. In addition, “there must be a determination as to
the qualification of the individual administering the HGN test and the appro-
priate procedure to be followed if the HGN test results are to be admitted at
trial.” Id. We reached this result because the correlation between alcohol
intoxication and nystagmus is not within the common experience of jurors. Id.
In the context of marijuana, any correlation between nystagmus and intoxication
is even further beyond jurors’ common knowledge and experience.

784 477 Mass. 775 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

Moreover, that marijuana can cause impairment of skills neces-
sary to driving, such as coordination, concentration, and the
ability to divide one’s attention among multiple tasks, is within
the common experience and knowledge of jurors. A police officer
testifying to a defendant’s performance on these FSTs therefore
need not be qualified as an expert, and such evidence may be
admitted without satisfying the Daubert-Lanigan requirements.
A police officer may not suggest, however, on direct examination
that an individual’s performance on an FST established that the
individual was under the influence of marijuana.'® Likewise, an
officer may not testify that a defendant “passed” or “failed” any
FST, as this language improperly implies that the FST is a
definitive test of marijuana use or impairment.?°

Indeed, the word “test” itself inadvertently may lend “an aura
of scientific validity.” See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d
530, 559 (D. Md. 2002). We recognize, nonetheless, that it is not
practicable to eliminate the concept of testing entirely from trial
testimony. The FSTs are used as means to evaluate a defendant’s
ability to perform discrete tasks that are correlated to skills
required to safely drive a vehicle. See Webster’s New Universal
Unabridged Dictionary 1951 (2003) (defining “test” as, inter alia,
“a set of questions, problems, or the like, used as a means of
evaluating the abilities, aptitudes, skills, or performance of an
individual or group; examination,” and “a set of standardized
questions, problems, or tasks designed to elicit responses for use
in measuring the traits, capacities, or achievements of an indi-
vidual’). An officer administering the WAT, for example, assesses
a defendant’s ability to take nine steps, walk heel-to-toe on a
straight line, turn around, and return in the same manner. In some
sense, the officer thereby “tests” (measures, examines, evaluates,
assesses, or, at a minimum, observes) the driver’s physical bal-
ance and coordination, as well as his or her mental ability to

1Here, for example, a trooper testified at the motion hearing that “the results
of the [WAT and OLS] indicated that Gerhardt was impaired.” This testimony
would not be admissible at trial.

20On cross-examination, defense counsel may challenge a police officer’s
testimony concerning a defendant’ s performance of an FST or any portion of an
FST. See S.L. Jones, Drunk Driving Defense §§ 3.33-3.48 (2016-2017 ed.). See
also id, at §§ 3.49-3.54, We do not bar defense counsel from eliciting from the
officer his or her subjective evaluation of the defendant’s performance, but we
stress that defense counsel makes this strategic decision at his or her own peril
and opens the door to redirect examination by the Commonwealth on the same
topic.

477 Mass. 775 (2017) 785

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

understand and follow directions and to perform divided-atten-
tion tasks, albeit not in the same way that a chemist in a labora-
tory tests a sample for the presence of a particular substance. In
all circumstances, however, it must be made clear to the fact
finder that the WAT, the OLS, and the other FSTs do not directly
test marijuana impairment. The FSTs are a means of evaluating a
defendant's balance, coordination, and other skills specific to that
test. In addition, a witness testifying to the performance of FSTs
in the context of marijuana intoxication should refer to a driver’s
performance on “roadside assessments,” so as not to suggest that
they function as scientific validation of a defendant’s sobriety or
intoxication.

We emphasize as well another consequence of the lack of
consensus regarding the FSTs: the fact that the FSTs cannot be
treated as scientific “tests” of impairment means that evidence of
performance on FSTs, alone, is not sufficient to support a finding
that a defendant’s ability to drive safely was impaired due to the
consumption of marijuana, and the jury must be so instructed."

c. Lay testimony on the effects of marijuana. We also are asked
whether a police officer may testify, without being qualified as an
expert, to the effects of marijuana consumption and may offer an
opinion that a defendant was intoxicated by marijuana. We con-
clude that an officer may not do so.

“A lay opinion . . . is admissible only where it is ‘(a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness; (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.’ ” Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass.
535, 541 (2013), quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 701 (2013). In the
alcohol context, “a lay [officer] . . . may offer his opinion
regarding a defendant’s level of sobriety or intoxication but may
not opine whether a defendant operated a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or whether the defendant’s con-
sumption of alcohol diminished his ability to operate a motor
vehicle safely.” Canty, supra at 544, citing Commonwealth v.
Jones, 464 Mass. 16, 17 n.1 (2012). Such lay opinion testimony
is proper because it is not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge that would require expert testimony, but,
rather, lies within the realm of common experience. We long have

214 model jury instruction regarding FSTs, to be used in prosecutions for
operating while under the influence of marijuana, is set forth in the Appendix.

786 477 Mass. 775 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

observed that “[t]he ‘effects of liquor upon the minds and actions
of men are well known to everybody.’ ” Commonwealth v. Wall,
469 Mass. 652, 671 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor,
263 Mass. 356, 362 (1928). See Canty, supra at 542, quoting
Holton v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 303 Mass. 242, 246 (1939)
(* ‘the principal objective symptoms [of alcohol intoxication] are
so well known’ that we consider the lay opinion to have probative
value”).

No such general knowledge exists, however, as to the physical
or mental effects of marijuana consumption, which vary greatly
amongst individuals. On remand, the District Court judge re-
ported in his findings of fact, based on expert testimony presented
by both sides and numerous scientific studies, as well as existing
case law in Massachusetts, that “[n]o studies have concluded that
any specific characteristics are routinely found in people who
have used marijuana and were impaired. Manifestations of im-
pairment may differ between subjects who are under the influence
of liquor and those who are under the influence of marijuana,
depressants, or stimulant substances.” The judge found further
that some scientific studies had identified “four prevalent physical
characteristics common among those who were determined to be
cannabis-positive drivers . . .. These physical characteristics are
red and/or bloodshot eyes, a lack of convergence, eyelid tremors,
and drowsiness.” He determined, however, that no testimony
admitted at the Daubert-Lanigan hearing related these physical
characteristics “to an inference of impaired driving by reason of
marijuana use. Further, no scientific studies validating these spe-
cific physical characteristics as symptomatic of impaired driving
by reason of marijuana use were entered [in] evidence.” Our
review of the record confirms that the judge’s findings regarding
lay opinion evidence are supported by the documentary evidence
and in the studies submitted to us.

Where there is no scientific consensus on what, if any, physical
characteristics indicate marijuana intoxication, no lay opinion can
be admissible as common knowledge or understanding on that
subject. A lay witness may testify concerning a defendant’s
observable appearance, behavior, and demeanor, but may not
offer an opinion as to the defendant’s sobriety or intoxication.”
See State v. Schories, 827 N.W.2d 659, 666 (lowa 2013) (expert

22We caution the Commonwealth that “a prosecutor who elicits from a police
officer his or her special training or expertise in ascertaining whether a person
is intoxicated risks transforming the police officer from a lay witness to an

477 Mass. 775 (2017) 787

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

testimony preferred on cause of intoxication for substances other
than alcohol); State v. Noback, 309 Mont. 342, 346 (2002) (“we
are not persuaded that lay people are sufficiently knowledgeable
about common symptoms of drug consumption . . . to offer lay
opinion testimony”); State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 587 (2006)
(court declined “to place lay opinion testimony regarding mari-
juana intoxication on the same footing as lay opinion testimony
as to alcohol intoxication”). See also Commonwealth y. Sliech-
Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 330 & n.43 (2010) (lay witness may not
testify that individual suffers from mental illness, but may testify
to observed behavior).

With respect to the question of jurors’ use of their own common
sense, we recognize that jurors are the ultimate arbiters of the
facts. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 197 (1975).
As a general rule, trial judges routinely instruct jurors, and jurors
are urged by counsel, “not [to] leave their common sense outside
the jury room.” See Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810,
820 (1975). Jurors may use their common sense in evaluating
whether the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to
satisfy its burden of proof. See Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass.
30, 35-36 (1980) (in context of criminal responsibility, jurors may
rely on facts and circumstances surrounding crime to determine
whether Commonwealth established defendant’s sanity). We rely
on the judge’s limiting instructions to inform jurors about the
proper use of FST evidence. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 384
Mass. 572, 579 (1981).

Conclusion. We answer the reported questions as follows:

1. “No.” Police officers may not testify to the administra-
tion and results of FSTs as they do in operating while under
the influence of alcohol prosecutions. Police officers may
testify to the administration of “roadside assessments” in the
manner set forth in this opinion.

2. “No.” A lay witness may not offer an opinion that
another person is “high” on marijuana.

3. “Yes.” A police officer may testify to observed physical
characteristics of the driver such as blood shot eyes, drowsi-
ness, and lack of coordination. The officer is not permitted to

expert witness on this issue, and the admissibility of any opinion proffered on
this issue may then be subject to the different standard applied to expert
witnesses.” See Commonwealth v, Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541 n.5 (2013).

788 477 Mass. 775 (2017)

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

offer an opinion that these characteristics mean that the
driver is under the influence of marijuana.

4. “Yes.” Jurors are permitted to utilize their common
sense in assessing trial evidence.

The case is remanded to the District Court for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

477 Mass. 775 (2017) 789

Commonwealth ¥. Gerhardt.

APPENDIX.

Model Jury Instruction Regarding Roadside Assessments for Use in Pros-
ecutions for Operating While Under the Influence of Marijuana

You heard testimony in this case that the defendant, at the request of a police
officer, performed or attempted to perform various roadside assessments, such as
[Here outline the nature of the evidence, e.g., walking a straight line, balancing
on one foot]. These roadside assessments are not scientific tests of impairment
by marijuana use. A person may have difficulty performing these tasks for many
reasons unrelated to the consumption of marijuana.

It is for you to decide if the defendant’s performance on these roadside
assessments indicates that his [her] ability to operate a motor vehicle safely was
impaired. You may consider this evidence solely as it relates to the defendant's
balance, coordination, mental clarity, ability to retain and follow directions,
ability to perform tasks requiring divided attention, and other skills you may find
are relevant to the safe operation of a motor vehicle.

It is for you to determine how much, if any, weight to give the roadside
assessments. In making your determination, you may consider what the officer
asked the defendant to do, the circumstances under which they were given and
performed, and all of the other evidence in this case.

Finally, evidence of how a defendant performed in roadside assessments,
standing alone, is never enough to convict a defendant of operating while under
the influence of marijuana.

790 477 Mass. 790 (2017)

Commonwealth », Aldana.

Commonweatri vs. Marc ALDANa.

Worcester. March 7, 2017. - September 19, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Bupp, JJ."

Destructive or Incendiary Device or Substance.

At the trial of indictments charging the defendant with possession of the
ingredients to make an incendiary device or substance with the intent to do
so, the evidence was insufficient fo establish that the defendant lacked lawful
authority to possess or control the powders seized by police officers, either
individually or combined as thermite, where the fire safety regulations cited
at trial pertained to explosives and therefore did not apply to thermite, which
is an inflammable or incendiary substance; and where, even assuming that
termite fell within the definition of a “flammable solid” as set forth in a
regulation regarding inflammable materials, the evidence did not establish
that the amount of the substances that the defendant possessed would have
exceeded the limit permitted under the regulation, [797-803]

‘There was no merit to the Commonwealth’s claim that a criminal defendant
could have been found guilty under G. L. c. 148, § 12, which prohibits the
manufacture of fireworks in a building without a license, where the defend-
ant was not charged with a violation of that statute, [803]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on December 20, 2013.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Daniel M.
Wrenn, J., and the cases were heard by Richard T. Tucker, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred
the case from the Appeals Court.

Ethan C. Stiles for the defendant.

Joseph A. Simmons, Assistant District Attorney, for the Com-
monwealth.

Lenk, J. In the course of arresting the defendant at his apart-
ment on a default warrant, Worcester police officers saw in his
kitchen three bags containing unknown powders. One of the bags
was labeled “aluminum powder” and another “red iron oxide,” and
one bag was not labeled. An unidentified red-brown powder was

‘Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

477 Mass. 790 (2017) 791

Commonwealth », Aldana.

spilled on the counter and the kitchen window sill, and smudged
on the wall around the window. Concerned about the appearance
of the bags of powder, given the other circumstances in the
apartment, one of the officers undertook an Internet search for
information on the labeled substances. On the basis of informa-
tion derived from that search, a detective requested assistance
from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF), the State police, and the local fire department.
Representatives of these agencies arrived, seized the bags of
powder, and removed them from the apartment.

The defendant thereafter was indicted on two charges of pos-
session of the ingredients to make an incendiary device or substance
with the intent to do so, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (a), and
a single charge of possession of an incendiary device or substance,
in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (c).

After a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court, the defendant
was convicted of both charges under G. L. c. 266, § 102 (a), and
acquitted of the charge under G. L. c. 266, § 102 (c).? In this
appeal, the defendant argues that the ingredients seized and
observations made by police during the search of his apartment
should have been suppressed, and that the evidence at trial was in
any event insufficient to support his convictions. In the alterna-
tive, the defendant contends that his convictions are duplicative
and that one must be vacated.

To convict the defendant of a violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (a),
the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had in his possession or control, without
lawful authority to do so, a “substance . . . which, alone or in
combination, could be used to make a destructive or incendiary
device or substance” and that he intended to “make a destructive
or incendiary device or substance.” To prove that what the de-
fendant intended to make was a violation of the statute, the
Commonwealth was required to establish that the device or
substance was “designed or adapted to cause physical harm to
persons or property by means of fire, explosion, deflagration or
detonation and consisting of [a] substance capable of being
ignited, whether or not contrived to ignite or explode automati-
cally.” G. L. c. 266, § 101.

We conclude that the evidence introduced at trial was not
sufficient to establish that the defendant was without lawful

2The defendant was not charged under G. L.c. 148, § 12, which is applicable
to pyrotechnics, e.g., fireworks.

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authority to possess the powders themselves or the incendiary
substance, thermite, that the Commonwealth asserted he intended
to make. Since the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish at
least one critical element of the Commonwealth’s case, the de-
fendant’s convictions cannot stand. Accordingly, the matter must
be remanded to the Superior Court for entry of required findings
of not guilty.

1. Background. After a hearing on the defendant’s motion to
suppress, a Superior Court judge denied the motion in a written
decision containing comprehensive findings of fact. The defend-
ant thereafter was tried, jury-waived, by a different Superior
Court judge. All the individuals who had testified at the hearing
on the motion to suppress — officers involved in the arrest and
the building manager — testified to essentially the same facts at
trial. In addition, testimony was introduced from another member
of the Worcester police department, members of the State police
bomb squad, a chemist and a State police evidence technician,
two Worcester fire department lieutenants, and a defense expert in
chemistry. In announcing his verdicts, the trial judge issued
limited oral findings of fact and a brief explanation of his rea-
soning. We recite the facts the trial judge could have found,
reserving some facts for later discussion.

a. Evidence at trial. On October 15, 2013, officers of the
Worcester police department went to the defendant’s apartment to
arrest him on a default warrant for a charge of disorderly conduct.
Detective Sergeant Mark Richardson of the Worcester police
department, and other Worcester police officers, entered the
building and went to the door of the defendant’s apartment.
Richardson knocked on the door and announced the police pres-
ence several times without receiving a response. After the officers
heard movement inside the apartment and the sounds of breaking
glass, Richardson ordered one of them to force entry into the
apartment.*

The defendant was arrested almost immediately upon the po-
lice entry. Through the kitchen doorway, officers could see an

3In his motion to suppress, the defendant challenged, among other things, the
propriety of the police entry, as he does before us. Because of the result we
reach, we do not address the defendant’s claims concerning the forced entry, or
the other issues raised in his motion to suppress, including whether it was
immediately apparent that the powders were dangerous, such that their seizure
without a warrant fell within the plain view exception to the warrant require-
ment. We also do not reach the question whether the convictions were dupli-
cative.

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open kitchen cabinet and drawers standing open. The officers saw
two foil bags of powder, and one unlabeled plastic bag containing
a reddish-brown powder, on the counter and in the open kitchen
cabinet. One foil bag was labeled “aluminum powder” and the
other was labeled “red iron oxide.” The officers did not recognize
the names and were not familiar with the appearance of the
powders. One of the officers conducted an Internet search on his
cellular telephone and reported to Richardson that, when mixed
together, red iron oxide powder and aluminum powder produce
thermite, a substance Richardson believed posed a significant
public safety concern.

Thereafter, Richardson contacted ATF, the State police, and the
Worcester fire department; at some point, he conducted a “sweep”
of the apartment. State police Trooper Eric Gahagan, a bomb
squad technician, arrived and examined the three bags of pow-
ders. Based on the appearance of the substance, he suspected that
the unlabeled bag contained thermite. He took three samples from
each of the three bags of powder and placed them in glass vials.
Gahagan also performed a “sweep” of the apartment for signs of
other possibly dangerous materials, and any means for lighting
thermite, and found none. He then took the samples back to the
State police crime laboratory for testing. The remaining powders
were placed in a plastic bin and transported to a Department of
Public Works site to be destroyed by burning. Gahagan and an
ATF agent mixed the three bags of powder together, at the site,
and lit them remotely using a robot with an ignited road flare. The
mixture burned for approximately five minutes before it con-
sumed all the aluminum and burned itself out.

A State police chemist testified regarding the steps he took to
determine whether the powders seized from the defendant’s
apartment were, indeed, thermite. First, he examined samples of
each of the three powders under a microscope and confirmed that
they were aluminum, red iron oxide, and a mixture of aluminum
and red iron oxide. He then attempted to ignite the mixture with
a Bunsen burner and was not able to do so; he did not attempt to
ignite it with tools that burn at higher temperatures, such as a road
flare or a magnesium strip.

The technical evidence concerning the properties of the various
powders seized and their testing was essentially undisputed.
Experts for both the Commonwealth and the defendant testified
that thermite can be created by combining red iron oxide and
aluminum powder, and that specific ratios are necessary for it to

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burn. Neither iron oxide nor aluminum powder is ignitable indi-
vidually. The experts agreed that the only reason to combine red
iron oxide and aluminum powder is to create a thermite mixture
that can be ignited. When ignited, thermite burns at very high
temperatures, at approximately 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit.
Thermite is not explosive, will not ignite spontaneously, and,
because of the high temperature at which it burns, cannot be
ignited with an ordinary flame, such as a match or a Bunsen
burner. To reach the high temperatures necessary to ignite
thermite requires heat sources such as road flares, firework spar-
klers, or magnesium strips.‘

Thermite is used in military operations to dispose of old equip-
ment or to disable it in the field so that it does not fall into enemy
hands, and in civilian operations for metal salvage. Thermite also
is used for cutting metal, including steel; for welding or filling in
damaged portions of railroad tracks; for spot welding; for cutting
through locks to open doors and safes; and, because it is not
extinguished by water, in underwater welding.®

The sole evidence as to the licensing and permitting require-
ments applicable to thermite was introduced through Lieutenant
Robert Mansfield of the Worcester fire department. Mansfield
testified that he was responsible for fire hazard identification,
inspection, and suppression in Worcester. Through his testimony,
the Commonwealth introduced, and sought judicial notice of,
§§ 9, 12, and 13 of G. L. c. 148, the State fire prevention act, and
527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00 (2012), a regulation in effect at
the time of the defendant’s arrest,® governing storage, use, and
permitting of explosives, based on § 13 of the statute.” Mansfield

4Both Commonwealth and defense experts indicated that they believed
thermite is relatively safe, is difficult to light, and is stable when unlit. The
experts also stated that, in their many years of experience, investigations at the
State police crime laboratory involving thermite are quite rare.

Testimony at trial also indicated that red iron oxide (rust) and aluminum
powder, individually, have ordinary civilian uses. One use for red iron oxide is
as a pigment,

8Effective January 1, 2015, the version of 527 Code Mass. Regs. in effect at
the time of the defendant's arrest was repealed. The current State comprehensive
fire safety code is found in 527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1,00 (2016).

7Copies of the statutes and regulations Lieutenant Robert Mansfield discussed
were presented to the judge and marked for identification. The judge did not
state explicitly whether he took judicial notice of them. The parties dispute
whether the judge also implicitly took judicial notice of 527 Code Mass. Regs.
§§ 14.00, which then regulated the use and storage of certain inflammable

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explained that G. L. c. 148, § 9,8 authorizes the fire department to
require and issue permits to store and use certain explosive and
inflammable substances and that G. L. c. 148, § 12,° requires
licenses for the use and storage of, inter alia, fireworks and
firecrackers. General Laws c. 148, § 13,1° governs the storage,
manufacture, and sale of explosives. The regulations concerning
the manufacture, sale, and storage of explosives, implementing
the provisions of G. L. c. 148, § 13, were then contained in 527
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00.

Mansfield testified that the fire department’s authority to regu-
late the storage of thermite was derived from 527 Code Mass.
Regs. §§ 13.00.1 Although that regulation did not mention
thermite directly, he stated that thermite fell within its require-
ments because it explicitly incorporated 27 C.ER. § 55.23, a

solids, liquids, and gases. The transcript establishes that, at trial, the judge was
not presented with 527 Code Mass, Regs. §§ 14.00 nor asked to take notice of
it, See discussion, infra.

®The board shall make rules and regulations for the keeping, storage, use,
manufacture, sale, handling, transportation or other disposition of gunpowder,
dynamite, crude petroleum or any of its products, or explosive or inflammable
fluids or compounds, tablets, torpedoes or any explosives of a like nature, or any
other explosives, fireworks, firecrackers, or any substance having such proper-
ties that it may spontaneously, or acting under the influence of any contiguous
substance, or of any chemical or physical agency, ignite, or inflame or generate
inflammable or explosive vapors or gases to a dangerous extent... .” G. L.
c. 148, § 9.

®No building shall be used for the manufacturing of fireworks or firecrackers
without a license from the local licensing authority. No building or structure
shall be used for the manufacturing or storage of explosive materials without a
permit issued by the marshal.” G. L. ¢, 148, § 12.

10No building or other structure shall, except as provided in [§ 14], be used
for the keeping, storage, manufacture or sale of any of the articles named in [§ 9,
defining blasting requirements], unless the local licensing authority shall have
granted a license to use the land on which such building or other structure is or
is to be situated for the aforementioned uses, after a public hearing... .” G. L.
c. 148, § 13.

“Title 527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 13.00 applied to the use and storage of
“explosives” and “explosive materials,” and also provided that “[t]he term also
includes any material determined to be contained in the list of explosive
materials provided for in 27 [C.ER. §] 55.23.” 527 Code Mass, Regs. § 13.03.
“Explosive” was defined as “any chemical compound, mixture or device, the
primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion; ie., with
substantially instantaneous release of gas and heat.” Id. See notes 6, 8, supra.

796 477 Mass. 790 (2017)

Commonwealth », Aldana.

Federal regulation setting forth a list of explosive materials.‘? To
possess thermite in his apartment, the defendant would have been
required to have both a license from the State, after passing an
explosives handling course, and a permit from the city of Worces-
ter. Mansfield had examined the city’s records and found no
indication that the defendant had a permit to possess thermite; he
stated also that he would never issue such a permit to anyone
living in a multiunit residential building. He did not explain
which of the statutory or regulatory definitions pertaining to
“explosive,” see G. L. c. 266, § 101 (defining “[e]xplosive” as
“any element, compound or mixture that is manufactured, de-
signed or used to produce an explosion”), were applicable to
thermite.

Mansfield testified on cross-examination, without reference to
any applicable statute or regulation, that possession of aluminum
powder or red iron oxide would require a permit if it were above
“a certain amount” because they are an “inhalation hazard.” No
permit was required for possession of aluminum oxide. He also
agreed that, under G. L. c. 148, § 13, certain quantities of explo-
sives could be held without a permit or a license.

b. Trial proceedings. At the close of the Commonwealth’ s case,
the judge denied the defendant’s motion for required findings of
not guilty. At the close of all the evidence, the judge found the
defendant guilty of two counts of possession of the ingredients
necessary to make a destructive or incendiary device or substance
without lawful authority and with the intent to make such a
device or substance, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (a). The
defendant was acquitted of possession of an incendiary device or
substance in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (c).

The judge found that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that “the defendant was in possession of aluminum powder
and red iron oxide,” and also in possession of “a mixture of these
two substances.” The judge explained that the defendant’s com-

"Contrary to this testimony, the then-applicable Federal regulation listing
specific explosives did not in fact contain any mention of thermite. See 27 C.ER.
§ 55.23; 77 Fed. Reg. 58,410 (Sept. 20, 2012).

18Gahagan testified that red iron oxide and aluminum powder can be pur-
chased legally and stored lawfully in a residence. He also noted that the recipe
for mixing thermite from the compounds is readily available on the Internet; he
did not mention any requirement of a permit. The defense expert also testified
that these components are legally available, can be ordered over the Internet, and
are shipped by mail; he testified that the only restriction he was aware of was
that certain companies would not ship them to a college dormitory address.

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bination of the two substances, and the absence of evidence that
the defendant intended to use thermite for a legitimate purpose,
demonstrated his intent to make thermite. The judge did not make
findings or rulings or explain his reasoning as to whether the
defendant had lawful authority to possess thermite or its compo-
nents.

The judge also found that, while the evidence showed that the
mixture of the three bags combined by Gahagan and the ATF
agent burned in a manner consistent with thermite, the evidence
did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the mixture
found in the defendant’s kitchen would have been ignitable. He
noted that, before investigators disposed of the seized powders,
all three of them had been combined into a single mixture,* and
that the combination burned as thermite would burn. The judge
determined that, because the act of combining the three bags
might itself have created the proper ratio, this did not establish
that the seized mixed powder would have burned in the same
manner, if at all. He noted in this respect that the bags of powders
had not been weighed and the ratio of materials in the mixed bag
had not been determined.'®

The defendant appealed, and we transferred the matter from the
Appeals Court on our own motion.

2. Discussion. On appeal, the defendant argues that it was error
to deny his motion to suppress, the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions, and the convictions are duplicative. We
agree that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions
and therefore do not address the defendant’s other claims.

To convict a defendant of a violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (a),
the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) possessed
or controlled, (2) without lawful authority, (3) a “substance . . .
which, alone or in combination, could be used to make a destruc-

“4According to the ATF agent’s report, which was introduced in evidence and
about which Gahagan testified, “[t]he red iron oxide and aluminum powder were
spread in a line along the pavement with the suspected Thermite spread on top
of the previous two chemicals.”

‘The judge explained his decision to acquit the defendant of the charged
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102 (c), as follows:

“My reasons include among other things the lack of the weighing or
testing or burning of the mixture separately. I do not find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the mixture would have burned, even with a flare
igniter, if done without the presence of the remaining aluminum powder
and red iron oxide.”

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Commonwealth », Aldana.

tive or incendiary device or substance,” and (4) the defendant
intended to “make a destructive or incendiary device or sub-
stance.” To prove that the intended device or article fell within the
meaning of a “destructive or incendiary device or substance,” the
Commonwealth was required to prove that the device or sub-
stance was “designed or adapted to cause physical harm to
persons or property by means of fire, explosion, deflagration or
detonation and consisting of [a] substance capable of being
ignited, whether or not contrived to ignite or explode automati-
cally.” G. L. c. 266, § 101.

We conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to establish
that the defendant lacked lawful authority to possess or control
the powders seized, either individually or combined as thermite.'*
The Commonwealth offered evidence that thermite, operating as
it does through heat and not explosion, is an inflammable or
incendiary substance, rather than an explosive substance. The
Commonwealth did not offer evidence, through any witness or
otherwise, that the possession of thermite, or, as here, of its
component parts, is subject to regulation as an inflammable or
incendiary substance. Mansfield’s testimony did not bridge the
evidentiary gap.'7 Because the trial evidence established that
thermite is not an “explosive” but, rather, an “inflammable” or
“incendiary” substance, the regulation as to explosives has no

1645 noted, the Commonwealth was also required to prove that the defendant
intended to make a device or substance “designed or adapted to cause physical
harm to persons or property by means of fire, explosion, deflagration or
detonation” as defined in G. L. c. 266, § 101. The Commonwealth proceeded on
the theory that the possession of thermite, standing alone, would suffice to
establish such a device or substance. The issue not having been raised or briefed,
we do not address the question of the sufficiency of the evidence in this regard.
But see Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 456 Mass. 411, 431, vacated on other
grounds, 562 U.S. 956 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Mendes, 44 Mass. App.
Ct. 903, 904 (1997) (distinguishing object “designed for” given use and object
that “functions as” particular type of thing). “[A] device that explodes is not
covered by [a similar Federal] statute merely because it explodes.” United States
v. Hammond, 371 F.3d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 2004) (cardboard tube filled with
explosive powder was not designed as weapon and therefore was not destructive
device under Federal statute; to establish that explosive is weapon, and therefore
prohibited destructive device, requires “plus” factor). Compare United States v.
York, 600 K3d 347, 354-355 (Sth Cir. 2010) (concluding that, under similar
Federal statute, Molotov cocktail is designed as weapon and therefore is
destructive device).

17Mansfield did not indicate which of the statutory or regulatory definitions
pertaining to “explosives,” see G. L. c. 266, § 101, he believed were applicable
to thermite.

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Commonwealth », Aldana.

apparent application to thermite.

a. Sufficiency of the evidence of absence of lawful authority. In
arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support a convic-
tion under G L. c. 266, § 102 (a), insofar as the Commonwealth
failed to establish that he lacked lawful authority to possess
thermite, the defendant does not challenge the testimony that he
did not have a permit from the city of Worcester. Rather, he
argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish that such a
permit was necessary. He maintains that the fire safety regulations
of which the judge was asked to take judicial notice, discussed at
trial, concerned the storage of explosives and, therefore, were not
applicable to thermite, which is an inflammable.

The defendant argues further that, even had 527 Code Mass.
Regs. §§ 14.00 (2012), the regulation then governing the storage
of inflammables been introduced and considered, see note 7,
supra, the evidence did not show that thermite was a “flammable
solid,”'* which requires permits for use and storage if the weight
of the material is beyond the amount of a regulatory exemption.”
Because the weights of the bags were not introduced at trial, there
was no evidence that the powders in the defendant’s possession
exceeded the exempt amounts. Had the limited quantities noted
on the labeled bags been an accurate representation of the
weights, moreover, the amounts would have fallen within the
amount allowed by the exemption.

“Because the absence of lawful authority or justification is an
element of each of the crimes charged, the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] defendant acted
without lawful authority or justification.” Commonwealth v.
Cabral, 443 Mass. 171, 179 (2005).

18General Laws c. 148, § 9, authorizes the creation of regulations governing
“inflammable fluids or compounds.” Title 527 Code Mass. Regs. § 14.03 then
established differing storage and permitting requirements for flammable liquids,
gases, and solids. As thermite is a powder, and a compound, any regulation
applicable to it would have had to fall under the regulations on “flammable
solids,” and not under the sections pertaining to liquids and gases. See id.

1°The then fire safety regulations on explosives also contained such exemp-
tions. See 527 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.04(1) (in accordance with provisions of
G.L. c. 148, § 13, “the following quantities of explosive materials . . . shall be
exempt from License, Registration, and Permit and may be kept, or stored in a
building or other structure”); 527 Code Mass. Regs. § 13.04(1)(f) (exempting
“{s]pecial industrial explosive devices when in quantities of less than [fifty]
pounds net weight of explosives” and providing that materials falling under this
exemption “may be kept, or stored in a building or other structure”).

800 477 Mass. 790 (2017)

Commonwealth », Aldana.

i. Applicable regulation. All the regulations of which the judge
was asked to take notice, and all the testimony concerning the
required permits and licensing, were applicable to explosives.
The expert evidence at trial established that thermite is an “in-
flammable” or “incendiary” that operates through heat; it did not
establish that thermite is an “explosive” as defined in 527 Code
Mass. Regs. § 13.03.?° Mansfield, the fire department lieutenant
responsible for fire hazard identification, inspection, and suppres-
sion, testified that the fire department’s authority to regulate the
storage of thermite was derived from 527 Code Mass. Regs.
§§ 13.00, which then governed explosives. Neither he nor any
other Commonwealth witness explained which of the statutory or
regulatory definitions pertaining to “explosives” were applicable
to thermite, a substance that the expert evidence at trial estab-
lished is an “inflammable” or “incendiary” that operates through
heat.

The Commonwealth argues in its brief that the judge could also
have taken judicial notice, albeit implicitly, of the then regulation
for the use and storage of inflammables, 527 Code Mass. Regs.
§§ 14.00. That regulation was not mentioned at trial, and no copy
of it was introduced; nor was there any indication at trial or in the
judge’s reading of the verdicts that the judge had considered it?"
Moreover, we have not determined that a judge may, sua sponte,
take judicial notice of a regulation or implicitly rely on such a
regulation in reaching a verdict; when a judge takes judicial
notice at a jury trial, he or she must explain that determination to
the jury. See Commonwealth v. Finegan, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 921,
922 (1998); Mass. G. Evid. §§ 201, 202 (2017), citing Depart-
ment of Revenue v. C.M.J., 432 Mass. 69, 76 n.15 (2000) (in
criminal case, “party has right to notice of matters that court will
adjudicate”). In any event, because it was the Commonwealth’s
burden to establish that the defendant was without lawful au-
thority to possess thermite, it was required to prove that a specific
permit or license was necessary. See Commonwealth v. Ferola,

20Gahagan described ignited thermite as undergoing a chemical reaction that
creates a new chemical compound. The aluminum powder provides the fuel to
the iron oxide, and they burn at a much higher temperature as the reaction
occurs. The resulting reaction produces a “liquid molten metal,” which cools to
a slag left behind after the reaction has completed.

217n support of this argument, the Commonwealth notes that the regulation on
inflammables was mentioned in its opposition to a motion to dismiss. That
motion, however, was heard by a different judge, more than a year before trial.

477 Mass. 790 (2017) 801

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72 Mass. App. Ct. 170, 174 & n.4 (2008) (“Even if Klonopin
were a substance so designated in the United States Attorney
General’s regulations, see 21 C.ER. § 1308.14 [2006], no such
proof was adduced at trial”).

The judge, as fact finder, was entitled to credit Mansfield’s
testimony that the defendant did not have a permit from the city
of Worcester, a question of fact. That, however, does not answer
the more fundamental question whether a permit was required in
these circumstances. Such a determination is a question of law —
the applicable regulation and the meaning of its terms — that a
reviewing court considers de novo. See, e.g., Ivey v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 23 (2015). See also
Town Fair Tire Ctrs., Inc. vy. Commissioner of Revenue, 454
Mass. 601, 604-605 (2009).

ii. Whether a permit would have been required under 527 Code
Mass. Regs. §§ 14.00. The judge did not explain his determina-
tion that the defendant lacked authority to possess thermite. Had
527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 14.00 been proffered and considered,
however, the evidence was insufficient in any event to establish
the necessity of a permit. The evidence did not show that thermite
fell within the definition of those inflammable materials then
regulated under 527 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 14.00. Further, even
were we to assume that thermite did fall within the definition of
“flammable solid” in that regulation, the evidence did not estab-
lish that the amount of the substances the defendant possessed
would have exceeded the one hundred pound exemption from the
permit requirement set forth in the regulation.

A. Inflammable solid. As stated, had 527 Code Mass. Regs.
§§ 14.00, then regulating the storage and use of “flammable and
combustible liquids, flammable solids or flammable gases,” been
considered, the evidence was insufficient to establish that it would
have been applicable to thermite. There was neither expert testi-
mony nor other evidence introduced that thermite (a solid, not a

22+ “The interpretation of a regulation is a question of law which we review
de novo,’ Commonwealth v, Hourican, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 410 (2014),
applying ‘the traditional rules of statutory construction,” Young v. Patukonis, 24
Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1987). ‘This is so because a properly promulgated
regulation has the force of law . . . and must be accorded all the deference due
toa statute,’ Borden, Inc.[ v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 388 Mass. 707, 723,
cert. denied, 464 U.S, 936 (1983)].” Ivey v. Commissioner of Correction, 88
Mass. App. Ct. 18, 23 (2015).

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Commonwealth », Aldana.

liquid or a gas)** met the definition of “flammable solid” under
527 Code Mass. Regs. § 14.02. See Commonwealth v. Green, 408
Mass. 48, 50-51 (1990) (“The Commonwealth could have easily
met its burden of proof that codeine was a derivative of opium by
presenting expert testimony”). The evidence that was introduced
as to the properties of thermite, moreover, shows that it has none
of the qualities set forth in the regulatory definition of “flammable
solid” then applicable.

Pursuant to 527 Code Mass. Regs. § 14.02, a flammable solid
was “[a] solid substance, other than one classified as an explo-
sive, which is liable to cause fires through friction, through
absorption of moisture, through spontaneous chemical changes,
or as a result of retained heat from manufacturing or processing.”
Undisputed expert testimony at trial established that thermite
does none of these things. It can be soaked in or made to float on
water without any problem. It does not ignite through friction or
spontaneous chemical changes. The act of mixing iron oxide and
aluminum powder together does not generate or retain heat.
Indeed, expert testimony indicated that it is very difficult to ignite
thermite and that to do so requires a very particular type of high
intensity external source. Even if poured on top of each other, and
then lit, the particles of red iron oxide and aluminum powder that
make up the thermite compound may not be in close enough
contact with each other to burn.?4?°

B. Exemptions for limited amounts. Even if we were to assume
that thermite is an inflammable solid, nothing at trial suggested
that the weight of the powders in the defendant's kitchen ex-
ceeded the regulatory exemption for individuals possessing only
limited amounts of an inflammable solid.

As the fire safety regulations for using and storing both explo-
sives and inflammable materials then contained exemptions for
limited amounts of the explosives and inflammable materials that

22The experts testified that thermite is a combination of very fine powders.

4There was expert testimony that, when using thermite in the “field” to cut
or weld, a binding agent such as clay, plastic, or putty is generally used to hold
the particles closely together so that they do not separate; if the individual
particles of the two substances become separated, even in the same bag or pile,
the mixture will not burn.

25We recognize that, in the right circumstances, thermite could pose a sig-
nificant hazard once lit. The Legislature is of course free to modify the relevant
statutes to incorporate thermite should it deem such modification necessary.

26See 527 Code Mass Regs. § 14.03(2) (exempting, at time of trial, one
hundred pounds of flammable solids from any license or permit requirement).

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Commonwealth », Aldana.

they regulated, and provided that amounts that fell within these
exemptions may be used and stored without a license or permit,
the weight of the substances seized from the defendant’s kitchen
was essential to a determination whether a permit was required or
whether the lack of a permit established the absence of lawful
authority.

There was no evidence at trial concerning the weight of any of
the three bags, other than as to the labeled weights on two of the
bags. Even assuming that the open labeled bags contained the five
and two pounds of materials indicated on their labels, however,
and the entire contents of the three bags of powder were com-
bined, the resulting seven-pound mixture would appear to be far
below the exempted weight of one hundred pounds for an in-
flammable solid. The Commonwealth did not prove that the
powders, combined, exceeded the statutory exemption.

b. Pyrotechnics. Finally, as the Commonwealth notes, the ex-
perts at trial agreed that, in chemical terms, thermite is also
considered to be a “pyrotechnic compound” or “composition.”
Based on this, the Commonwealth argues that the defendant
could have been found guilty under G. L. c. 148, § 12, which
prohibits the manufacturing of fireworks in a building without a
license. There are two flaws in this argument. First, the defendant
was not charged with having violated that statute. Second, insofar
as the Commonwealth now argues that possession of a pyrotech-
nic without a license would separately subject the defendant to
criminal penalties under G. L. c. 266, § 102, we note that pyro-
technics are excluded from the definition of “explosives” appli-
cable to that statute. See G. L. c. 266, § 101 (“Explosive shall not
include a pyrotechnic . . .”).27

27For purposes of G. L. c. 266, § 101, and G. L. c. 148, § 12, a pyrotechnic
is “any commercially manufactured combustible or explosive composition or
manufactured article designed and prepared for the purpose of producing an
audible effect or a visible display and regulated by chapter 148 including, but
not limited to: (i) fireworks, firecrackers; (ji) flares, fuses and torpedoes, so-
called, and similar signaling devices.”

Both Commonwealth and defense experts testified that, while thermite is
defined in chemical terms as a “pyrotechnic compound” or “composition,” it is
not a pyrotechnic in the ordinary understanding of a firework or pyrotechnic. It
also does not meet the statutory definition under G. L. c. 266, § 101, or G. L.
c. 148, § 12. In those definitions, a pyrotechnic is designed to create a visible
and audible effect by explosive or combustive burning. Thermite does not do
either. Indeed, the Commonwealth’s expert testified that thermite is used by the
military to disable equipment precisely because it is silent and can be used

804 477 Mass. 790 (2017)

Commonwealth », Aldana.

3. Conclusion. Because the evidence at trial was not sufficient
to establish every element of the Commonwealth’s case, the
defendant’s convictions cannot stand. The defendant’s convic-
tions are vacated and set aside. The matter is remanded to the
Superior Court for entry of required findings of not guilty.

So ordered.

without disclosing one’s position.

We note also that the statutes regulating pyrotechnics contain another re-
quirement — that a pyrotechnic be commercially fabricated — which makes the
definition inapplicable to the apparently hand-mixed substance found in the
defendant's kitchen, See G. L. ¢. 266, § 101; G. L. ©, 148, § 12.

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 805

Commonwealth v, Brown.

CommonweattH vs. TimotHy Brown.

Middlesex. March 10, 2017. - September 20, 2017.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Bupp, & Cypuer, JI.

Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule, Home Invasion. Robbery. Firearms. Joint
Enterprise. Accessory and Principal. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, In-
structions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, Opening statement, Jury and
jurors, Voir dire, Presumptions and burden of proof. Evidence, Joint venturer,
Prior misconduct.

This court concluded that following the issuance of this opinion, a conviction of
felony-murder will require a finding of actual malice, not merely construc-
tive malice, and that as a result, felony-murder will no longer be an inde-
pendent theory of liability for murder but will be limited to its statutory role
under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of murder that permits a
jury to find a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree where the murder
was neither premeditated nor committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty but
was committed in the course of a felony punishable by life imprisonment.
[807-808] Gants, C.J., concurring, with whom Lek, Hives, and Bupp, JJ.,
joined. Gaziano, J., concurring, with whom Lowy and Cypier, JJ., joined.

At the trial of indictments charging the defendant with felony-murder as an
accomplice based on the predicate felonies of an attempted commission of
armed robbery, home invasion, unlawful possession of a firearm, and un-
lawful possession of ammunition, the evidence was sufficient to permit a
reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant know-
ingly participated in the predicate felonies, where the defendant was present
in his apartment when his accomplices developed a plan to rob the victims,
where the defendant gave his gun to one of the accomplices knowing that it
was going to be used in a robbery, and where the defendant gave hooded
sweatshirts to his accomplices to help them avoid detection, [811-814]

At the trial of indictments charging the defendant with felony-murder as an
accomplice based on the predicate felonies of an attempted commission of
armed robbery, home invasion, unlawful possession of a firearm, and un-
lawful possession of ammunition, the judge’s instruction to the jury on intent
and shared intent did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof, where the
instructions created permissive inferences [814-817]; further, the judge did
not err in instructing the jury on attempted armed robbery and home
invasion, where the judge properly and consistently instructed the jury that
the Commonwealth bore the burden to prove that the defendant knowingly

‘Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her
retirement.

806 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

participated in the predicate offense, with the requisite shared intent [817];
finally, the judge’s misstatement on one point was isolated and did not result
in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice [817-818].

Ata criminal trial, no prejudicial error or substantial likelihood of a miscarriage
of justice arose from the prosecutor’s use, in her opening statement and in her
closing argument, of a sports analogy to explain the Commonwealth’s theory
of the case [818-819]; further, an isolated misstatement of the evidence in the
prosecutor's closing argument was unlikely to have prejudiced the defendant
[819].

At the trial of indictments charging the defendant with felony-murder as an
accomplice based on the predicate felonies of an attempted commission of
armed robbery, home invasion, unlawful possession of a firearm, and un-
lawful possession of ammunition, the judge did not abuse her discretion in
allowing the introduction of evidence of a prior armed robbery, where such
evidence was probative of an accomplice’s intent to rob the victims of the
attempted armed robbery and the defendant's shared intent to participate in
that crime by supplying the guns and the means for potential disguise;
likewise, the judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting in evidence
photographs showing the defendant and an accomplice brandishing hand-
guns, where the photographs established the defendant's access to a weapon
that was used in the commission of the underlying felonies. [819-821]

During voir dire of the venire at a criminal trial, the judge had discretion to ask
the venire a question regarding their ability to follow her legal instructions,
and the defendant failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a miscar-
riage of justice arising from that question, [821-822]

‘This court concluded that the felony-murder rule does not violate art. 12 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, [822-823]

Although this court concluded that the verdicts against the defendant of felony-
murder in the first degree were neither contrary to this court’s jurisprudence
regarding joint venture felony-murder nor against the weight of the evidence,
this court exercised its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the
verdicts to murder in the second degree, where the defendant’s conduct, as
an individual who participated on the remote outer fringes of a joint venture,
made such verdicts more consonant with justice. [823-824]

Inpictwents found and returned in the Superior Court Depart-
ment on December 22, 2009.

The cases were tried before Sandra L. Hamiin, J.

David H. Mirsky for the defendant.

Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

Gaziano, J. We address, in this opinion, the scope of criminal
liability under the common-law felony-murder rule. The charges
stem from an attempted armed robbery and home invasion of a
Lowell townhouse shared by Hector and Tony Delgado. Two
armed gunmen fatally shot the brothers during the botched rob-
bery. The defendant was not present at the scene. The Common-

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 807

Commonwealth v, Brown.

wealth alleged that the defendant was liable as an accomplice to
felony-murder because he supplied one of the gunmen with a
pistol and provided hooded sweatshirts to the intruders to help
them conceal their identities. A Superior Court jury convicted the
defendant of two counts of felony-murder in the first degree based
on the predicate felonies of an attempted commission of armed
robbery, home invasion, unlawful possession of a firearm, and
unlawful possession of ammunition.

The defendant raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the
Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove
that he was a knowing participant in the felony-murders; (2) the
judge provided erroneous instructions on shared intent and ac-
complice liability; (3) portions of the prosecutor’s opening state-
ment and closing argument were improper; (4) the judge should
have excluded prejudicial evidence of prior misconduct; (5) the
judge asked improper voir dire questions of potential jurors; and
(6) we should abolish the felony-murder rule. The defendant also
asks us to order a new trial under our extraordinary authority
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

We conclude that the Commonwealth introduced sufficient
evidence to prove that the defendant knowingly participated in
the underlying felonies and, therefore, was an accomplice to
felony-murder. We conclude also that the defendant’s other chal-
lenges do not raise error warranting reversal or a new trial as to
any of the convictions. Nonetheless, in the circumstances of this
case, we are convinced that, pursuant to our authority under G. L.
c. 278, § 33E, the interests of justice require that the degree of
guilt be reduced to that of murder in the second degree.

As to whether we should abolish the common-law felony-
murder rule, a unanimous court concludes that the felony-murder
tule is constitutional. However, a majority of Justices, through the
concurrence of Chief Justice Gants, conclude that the scope of
felony-murder liability should be prospectively narrowed, and
hold that, in trials that commence after the date of the opinion in
this case, a defendant may not be convicted of murder without
proof of one of the three prongs of malice. As a result, in the
future, felony-murder is no longer an independent theory of
liability for murder. Rather, felony-murder is limited to its statu-
tory role under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of
murder, permitting a jury to find a defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree where the murder was committed in the course of
a felony punishable by life imprisonment even if it was not

808 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

committed with deliberate premeditation or with extreme atrocity
or cruelty. Because the majority holding as to common-law
felony-murder liability is prospective in effect, it does not affect
the judgment reached in this case. Because I disagree with that
holding, I write separately in a concurrence to explain my rea-
soning.

1. Background. Because the defendant challenges the suffi-
ciency of the evidence of the extent of his involvement in the
armed home invasion, and his shared intent to commit that crime,
we recite the facts the jury could have found in some detail.

a. Facts. On the evening of October 22, 2009, the defendant
was a passenger in a green Honda Civic automobile that was
being driven around the Pawtucketville section of Lowell. The
other occupants of the vehicle were his friends Ariel Hernandez,
Giovanni Hill, and Darien Doby. Hernandez was the driver. Hill
was in the front passenger seat, and the defendant and Doby
shared the rear passenger seat. Hernandez drove past two men
walking on the street and raised the possibility of robbing them.
The passengers convinced Hernandez not to do so.

A short time later, Hill and Hernandez noticed two women
walking down the street. Hernandez pulled into a side street and
parked. Hill and Hernandez got out of the vehicle and Hernandez
removed a firearm from the trunk. The two rounded the corner
and confronted the women while the defendant and Doby waited
in the vehicle. Hill stood and watched from a few feet away as
Hernandez, gun in hand, grabbed their purses. The two men
returned to the vehicle, and Hernandez drove away, with the
purses and the handgun in his lap. He stopped at a friend’s house
to exchange the green hooded sweatshirt he had been wearing for
a black sweatshirt without a hood.

The defendant, Doby, and Hill left the friend’s house, while
Hernandez stayed behind. The four men later met at the defend-
ant’s one-bedroom apartment. Hernandez stashed the handgun he
had used in the robbery (a nine millimeter pistol) in a kitchen
cabinet above the refrigerator. He rifled through the purses, pull-
ing out cash, driver’s licenses, and automated teller machine
(ATM) cards. Hernandez found what appeared to be a passcode
for one of the ATM cards written on a scrap of paper, and sent
Hill to a bank to attempt to withdraw money with the card. Before
he left, Hill borrowed the defendant’s black sweatshirt so he
could change out of the jacket he had worn during the robbery.
When he returned, Hill reported that he had been unsuccessful in
withdrawing any money.

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 809

Commonwealth v, Brown.

Later, at approximately 12:15 a.m., two cousins, Jamal and
Karon McDougal, visited the defendant’s apartment.? They were
joined by one of their friends, Joshua Silva. While gathered in the
kitchen with the defendant, Jamal asked Hernandez if he wanted
to participate in robbing someone who owed money to one of
Jamal’s friends. Karon predicted that the robbery would be
“pretty easy.” He warned the others, however, that they were
going to rob two “pretty big guys” who worked in bars.* Her-
nandez agreed to participate in the robbery. Silva joined them as
the getaway driver.

Once Silva agreed to participate, Hernandez urged, “If we’re
going to do it, let’s go do it now.” Hernandez retrieved his gun
from the kitchen cabinet, looked it over, and tucked it inside his
waistband. Still wearing the hoodless black sweatshirt he had
changed into after the earlier robbery, Hernandez asked the de-
fendant for a hooded sweatshirt so that he could “hide his face.”
The defendant provided Hernandez with a hooded sweatshirt with
a front zipper. Hernandez complained that the zipper was broken
and that some part of his shirt would be visible. The defendant
then gave Hernandez a black and red pullover-style hooded
sweatshirt with a white Red Sox “B” logo on the front. Jamal and
Karon also borrowed hooded sweatshirts from the defendant.

Before leaving, Jamal asked to borrow the defendant's
“burner” (gun). At first, the defendant hesitated, stating his con-
cern that something might happen to his gun. Hernandez and
Karon then urged the defendant to allow Jamal to borrow the gun,
promising that “nothing’s going to happen to it.” The defendant
eventually gave Jamal a .380 pistol that had been stored under-
neath his bed.

Jamal, Karon, Hernandez, and Silva left the defendant’s apart-
ment and drove in Silva’s Toyota Camry automobile to the
victims’ townhouse. Silva drove, and Jamal gave directions. After
Silva parked on a nearby side street, Jamal, Karon, and Hernan-
dez got out and approached the townhouse, while Silva waited in
the vehicle. Shortly after 1 a.m., the occupants of the townhouse
heard loud banging on the front door. From a fourth-floor win-

*Because they share a last name, we refer to Jamal and Karon McDougal by
their first names.

3In addition to his full-time job, Hector, one of the victims, worked part time
as a doorman at a local bar. Tony, the other victim, managed that bar and
supplemented his income by selling small “dime bag” quantities of marijuana
from the townhouse in Lowell where the brothers and their housemates lived.

810 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

dow, Tony called out, “Who’s there?” A voice that sounded
female responded “Nicole,” or “Nicki.” Tony went downstairs
and opened the front door. His housemates heard a scuffle at the
bottom of the stairs near the door, and then Jamal and Hernandez
chased Tony up the stairs into the second-floor living room.

A visitor had been sleeping on the living room couch. He saw
Jamal threaten Tony with a gun, demanding, “Where’s every-
thing?” Tony responded that “[alll [he] see[s] is dimes.” The
visitor was unable to identify Jamal, whose face was obscured by
a hooded sweatshirt. Hector and one of his roommates, Brian
Staples, headed downstairs from their third-floor bedrooms and
entered the living room. At that point, Jamal had Tony in a
headlock and was pointing the gun at his head.t Hernandez
rushed toward Staples, brandishing a gun, and ordered him up-
stairs. Staples and Hector ran upstairs to hide. Tony managed to
break free from Jamal and also ran up the stairs. Jamal and
Hernandez followed him.

From his hiding place, Staples heard Hector’s door being
kicked in, followed by an argument, and then gunshots. Once the
shooting stopped, Hector was found lying face up on his bed,
gasping for air. He had been shot three times and shortly there-
after died of multiple gunshot wounds. Tony, fatally shot in the
abdomen, managed to stagger to the fourth floor, where he was
treated at the scene before he died. Police recovered five nine
millimeter cartridge casings from Hector’s bedroom.

After the gunshots, Jamal and Hernandez ran outside, cheering
and exchanging “high fives.” They met up with Karon and Silva
and drove back to the defendant's apartment. En route to the
apartment, Jamal and Hernandez informed Karon that they had
been unable to steal anything. Jamal remarked that Hernandez
was a good shot, and Hernandez responded, “Yeah, once I seen
them jump on you, I just started shooting.” Jamal returned the
defendant’s gun to him. Hernandez asked the defendant if he
could leave his own gun at the defendant’s apartment. When the
defendant said no, Hernandez gave the gun to Hill and told him
to put it in the trunk of the Honda Civic. Jamal, Karon, and
Hernandez removed the borrowed sweatshirts and left them in the
defendant's living room.

4Jamal and Hernandez told Silva, the getaway driver, that Staples had been
unable to see the face of the person who grabbed Tony because the assailant
“had the hood on.” Staples, however, had been able to see a portion of the other
intruder’s face. He described the individual as dark skinned with a scruffy
goatee, and he later identified Hernandez from a photographic array.

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 811

Commonwealth v, Brown.

Within an hour of the shootings, Lowell police spotted Her-
nandez driving the green Honda Civic that had been used in the
earlier robbery. They stopped the vehicle, arrested Hernandez and
Hill, and found the gun Hernandez had used in the shooting
hidden in the trunk.

Detectives interviewed the defendant on October 24 and 25,
2009. He initially told police that he had purchased a .380
handgun “for protection,” which he kept under his mattress.
Eventually, the defendant admitted to having given this gun to
Hernandez and the other men on the evening of the shootings.
The defendant first said that he did not know what Hernandez and
the other men were going to do with the gun. Eventually he stated
that he believed they were going to rob someone, based on
conversations that he overheard inside his apartment and the fact
that Hernandez had robbed two women earlier that evening.

b. Prior proceedings. The defendant was indicted on two
counts charging murder in the first degree in the deaths of Hector
and Tony Delgado, home invasion, unlawful possession of a
firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The defendant
was tried before a Superior Court jury on the theory of felony-
murder with the underlying offenses of attempted armed robbery
and home invasion as the predicate felonies. The jury convicted
the defendant on all charges.

2. Discussion. The defendant’s primary argument on appeal is
that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to
prove that he participated in the underlying felonies, i.e., that he
shared the intent of the other participants to commit an armed
robbery. He also argues that the judge erroneously instructed the
jury on the issues of shared intent and accomplice liability;
portions of the prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argu-
ment were improper; the judge abused her discretion by allowing
the introduction of evidence of uncharged misconduct; and, dur-
ing voir dire, the judge asked potential jurors an impermissible
question. The defendant contends also that this court should
abolish the felony-murder rule. In addition, he asks us to exercise
our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reverse
the murder convictions as against the weight of evidence. We
address each argument in turn.

a. Sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing the denial of a
motion for a required finding of not guilty, we apply the familiar
Latimore standard. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass.
671, 677-678 (1979). “[The] question is whether, after viewing

812 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jd. at 677, quoting Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Under this standard of
review, we resolve issues of witness credibility in favor of the
Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Dilone, 385 Mass. 281, 286
(1982). In determining whether a reasonable jury could find each
element of the crime charged, we also do not weigh the support-
ing evidence against conflicting evidence. Commonwealth v. Lao,
443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005).

To convict the defendant of felony-murder on a theory of
accomplice liability, the Commonwealth was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly partici-
pated in the commission of one of the underlying felonies, alone
or with others, with the intent required for that offense.® Com-
monwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009). See Common-
wealth v. Silva, 471 Mass. 610, 621 (2015) (Commonwealth
required to prove defendant’s “knowing participation in some
manner in the commission of the offense” together with shared
intent); Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 253 (2013)
(court considers whether defendant actively participated in events
leading to victims’ deaths), Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463
Mass. 529, 536-537 (2012) (conduct that historically had been
described as accessory before fact “plainly falls under the rubric
of accomplice liability”). In this case, where the predicate felo-
nies were attempted armed robbery and armed home invasion, the
Commonwealth also was required to prove that the defendant
knew that one of his accomplices possessed a firearm. Common-
wealth vy. Garcia, 470 Mass. 24, 31 (2014).

Knowing participation in a criminal offense “may take any of
several forms” and includes providing “aid or assistance in com-

5,As for the substantive offenses, to support a finding of guilt of armed robbery
requires proof that the defendant (or an accomplice) while armed with a
dangerous weapon assaulted the victim and took money or property from the
victim with the intent (or shared intent) to steal it. Commonwealth v. Williams,
475 Mass. 705, 710 (2016). An attempt is defined as (1) an intent to commit the
underlying crime and (2) an overt act toward its commission. Commonwealth v.
LaBrie, 473 Mass. 754, 760-761 (2016). To prove armed home invasion, the
Commonwealth must establish that the defendant (or his accomplice) entered a
dwelling, while armed with a dangerous weapon, and “use[d] force or threat
enfed] the imminent use of force upon any person within such dwelling.”
Commonwealth v, Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 29 (2016), quoting G. L. ¢. 265, § 18C.

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 813

Commonwealth v, Brown.

mitting the crime.” Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 470 (Appendix). To
establish guilt on a theory of accomplice liability, the Common-
wealth is not required to prove that a defendant was physically
present at the scene of the offense. Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 424
Mass. 853, 858-859 (1997). A defendant may be convicted as a
coventurer when he or she is not present at the scene of a crime
“so long as the jury [find] [that the defendant] had actually
associated [himself or herself] with the criminal venture and
assisted in making it a success.” Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433
Mass. 678, 690 n.13 (2001), quoting Ortiz, supra. See Common-
wealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 310 (2013) (“[C]omplicity in
the underlying felony is sufficient to establish guilt of [felony-
murder] if the homicide followed naturally and probably from the
carrying out of the joint enterprise” [citation omitted]); Common-
wealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 690 n.6 (2013) (“a person need
not be physically present at the scene of the crime in order to
participate as a joint venturer”).

We do not agree with the defendant’s contention that the
evidence, at best, established that he was present inside an apart-
ment where others planned a robbery, and that his mere “acqui-
escence in a request to produce clothing or a firearm does not
confer joint venture liability.” There was sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in the predicate
felonies. He was present in his apartment when Jamal and Karon
openly solicited others to help rob “the pretty big” “Puerto Rican
guy.” Hernandez agreed to join the robbery, announced that he
would use his own gun, and retrieved it from its hiding place
inside the defendant’s kitchen cabinet. Jamal then asked to bor-
row the defendant’s gun. The defendant expressed concern over
the possibility that something would happen to it. Karon and
Hernandez urged the defendant to lend the gun to Jamal, assuring
him, “Nothing is going to happen to it.” The defendant agreed
and gave Jamal the gun.

In his statement to police, the defendant admitted that he gave
the gun to Hernandez and the other men knowing that it was
going to be used in a robbery. See Benitez, 464 Mass. at 690 (act
of providing accomplice with gun supports finding that defendant
knowingly and actively participated in armed robbery); Common-
wealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291, 301 (2002) (defendant’s par-
ticipation in joint venture supported by evidence that he supplied
firearm to shooter). See also Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass.

814 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

259, 261, 265 (1998) (defendant who remained in vehicle while
his accomplices entered apartment and robbed rival drug dealers
actively participated in felony-murder). The jury also reasonably
could have found that the defendant gave hooded sweatshirts to
his accomplices to help them avoid detection. Prior to the rob-
bery, Hernandez asked the defendant for a hooded sweatshirt so
that he could “hide his face.” The defendant provided Hernandez
with a hooded sweatshirt with a front zipper. When Hernandez
complained that the zipper was broken, and that some part of his
shirt would be visible, the defendant gave him a pullover-style
hooded sweatshirt. Jamal and Karon also borrowed hooded
sweatshirts from the defendant. After the robbery, Hernandez,
Karon, and Jamal drove directly to the defendant’s apartment and
returned the sweatshirts to him rather than wearing them in
public.

It also is reasonable to infer that the instruments supplied by the
defendant played an important role in the underlying crimes of
attempted armed robbery and home invasion. Jamal, armed with
the defendant’s pistol, forced his way into the Delgados’ town-
house. See Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 702-703
(2003) (circumstances may dictate that weapon is necessary to
overcome anticipated resistance from victims). Once inside,
Jamal used the gun to threaten Tony and demand money and
drugs. Further, the hooded sweatshirts provided by the defendant
hindered the ability of the other occupants of the townhouse to
identify the intruders.

We conclude, therefore, that the jury reasonably could have
found that the defendant was an active participant in the com-
mission of the underlying felonies.

b. Jury instructions. The defendant contends that three of the
judge’s instructions concerning shared intent and accomplice
liability were erroneous. First, he argues that the judge’s instruc-
tion on intent and shared intent shifted the burden of proof by
imposing a “mandatory rebuttable presumption,” which in-
structed the jury that the defendant’s conduct “necessarily indi-
cated [his] knowledge and support of every aspect of criminal
conduct that occurred.” Second, he argues that it was error for the
judge to refer to the theory of accomplice liability while instruct-
ing on the substantive felony charges. Third, he argues that the
judge misstated the burden of proof. Because there was no
objection to these instructions, we review these claims to deter-
mine whether there was error and, if so, whether it created a

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 815

Commonwealth v, Brown.

substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth
v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992).

We turn first to the defendant’s argument that the instruction on
intent impermissibly shifted the Commonwealth’s burden of
proof to him. The defendant characterizes the following jury
instructions as having created an impermissible “mandatory re-
buttable presumption”:

“[Y]ou may determine the defendant’s intent from any
statement or act committed or omitted and from all the other
circumstances that indicate a state of mind provided first you
find that any or all such circumstances occurred.

“Now, the jury may but not need necessarily infer from the
conduct of a person that he intended the natural and prob-
abl[e] consequences of his own acts.

“(T]he Commonwealth must also prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that at the time the defendant knowingly partici-
pated in the commission of the crime and, as I’ve indicated,
the felonies involved are attempted armed robbery and home
invasion, that he possessed or shared the intent required for
that crime. And when I define the essential elements, I’m
going to be telling you what the intent is. You’re permitted
but not required to infer the defendant’s mental state or
intent, from his knowledge of the circumstances and any
subsequent participation in the crime. The inferences you
draw must be reasonable and you may rely upon your expe-
rience and common sense in determining the defendant’s
knowledge or intent.”

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires the Commonwealth to prove
every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). “Instructions to the
jury that would lead them to believe otherwise are constitutional
error.” Commonwealth v. Cruz, 456 Mass. 741, 752 (2010), citing
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979). See Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985) (due process clause prohibits
use of evidentiary presumption that relieves government of its
burden). An instruction that the jury reasonably could have in-
terpreted as a mandatory presumption violates due process and

816 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

cannot stand. See DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 246,
252 (1980). By contrast, there is no constitutional infirmity where
a jury instruction creates only a permissive inference. Id. at 253.
See Commonwealth v. Ely, 388 Mass. 69, 76 (1983) (permissive
inference that allows jury to infer elemental fact from proof by
prosecutor of another fact does not shift burden of proof).

As the United States Supreme Court noted in Francis, 471 U.S.
at 313, the analysis is relatively straightforward — a reviewing
court must determine whether the challenged portion of an in-
struction created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption or
merely a permissive inference. In this case, we conclude that the
instructions on intent created permissive inferences. The judge
did not instruct the jury that they were to presume that certain
facts were proved, or that they were required to reach a particular
conclusion. Compare id. at 316 (instruction that person of sound
mind and discretion is presumed to intend natural and probable
consequences of his or her actions is mandatory presumption
“cast in the language of command”); Commonwealth v. Nolin,
448 Mass. 207, 217-218 (2007) (instruction that person is pre-
sumed to intend natural and probable consequences of his or her
acts improperly shifts burden of proof to defendant).

To the contrary, here, rather than being “cast in the language of
command,” the challenged instructions were permissive. The
judge instructed that intent and knowledge ordinarily cannot be
proved by direct evidence, and then added, “[Y]ou may determine
the defendant’s intent from any statement or act committed or
omitted and from all the other circumstances that indicate a state
of mind provided first you find that any or all such circumstances
occurred” (emphasis supplied). She then continued, “[T]he jury
may but not need necessarily infer from the conduct of a person
that he intended the natural and probabl[e] consequences of his
own acts” (emphasis supplied). The judge instructed as follows
on shared intent: “You’re permitted but not required to infer the
defendant's mental state or intent, from his knowledge of the
circumstances and any subsequent participation in the crime”
(emphasis supplied). See Hill v. Maloney, 927 F.2d 646, 651 (Ist
Cir. 1990) (words “you may infer” clearly indicated that infer-
ences of malice and intent were permissive).

Such permissive intent instructions do not run up against a
defendant’s right to due process. See Commonwealth v. Van
Winkle, 443 Mass. 230, 239 (2005) (no error in instruction that
“jury may infer, though it is not required to do so, that a person

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 817

Commonwealth v, Brown.

intends the natural and probable consequences of an act that is
knowingly done”); Ely, 388 Mass. at 76 (instruction that permits,
but does not require, jury to infer intent does not violate due
process). Indeed, the inferences on permissive intent also are
included in the model jury instructions on homicide, explaining
shared intent: “You are permitted, but not required, to infer the
defendant’s mental state or intent from his [or her] knowledge of
the circumstances or any subsequent participation in the crime.”
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 15 (2013). A similar in-
struction is included in the instruction concerning the intentional
use of a dangerous weapon: “As a general rule, you are permitted
(but not required) to infer that a person who intentionally uses a
dangerous weapon on another person intends to kill that per-
son... .” Id. at 92.

The defendant argues that the judge’s instructions on attempted
armed robbery and home invasion were erroneous because she
improperly linked the phrase “aider and abettor” with the defini-
tion of the elements of the underlying offenses. The defendant
contends that “[t]hese instructions were confusing and implied
that the jury should presume that the defendant was an aider and
abettor, with the requisite knowledge and intent pertaining to
home invasion and attempted armed robbery.” There was no
error.

Before defining the elements of each underlying offense, the
judge explained, “[W]henever I say the defendant, I always mean
as an aider or abettor or a joint venturer.”* In Zanetti, 454 Mass.
at 468 n.22, we recommended that judges incorporate the concept
of accessory liability within their instructions on substantive
offenses. Here, the judge properly and consistently instructed the
jury that the Commonwealth bore the burden to prove that the
defendant knowingly participated in the predicate offense, with
the requisite shared intent.

In his third claim of error in the instructions, the defendant
argues that the judge made a misstatement at the end of her
instructions on the predicate offenses, when she said, “If after

For example, at the beginning of her instructions on home invasion, the
judge explained:

“To prove the defendant guilty of the crime of home invasion, the
Commonwealth must convince you the jury of four elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, That the defendant as an aider and abettor unlawfully
entered the dwelling house of another. In other words, he doesn’t have to
physically go there himself if he aided/abetted the entry.”

818 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

your consideration of all the evidence you find the Common-
wealth has not proven any one of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt you must find the defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree.” This misstatement was a clear slip of the tongue
that went unnoticed by the judge and by the attorneys. Through-
out her comprehensive charge, the judge properly instructed the
jury on the presumption of innocence and the Commonwealth’s
burden of proving each essential element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, the misstatement was isolated and did
not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 844-845 (2006).

c. Prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument. The
defendant maintains that the prosecutor misstated the evidence,
both in her opening statement and in her closing argument. For
instance, the defendant points to the prosecutor’s asserted im-
proper argument that the defendant “planned and executed” the
attempted armed robbery and the home invasion. The defendant
contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by arguing
that “but for” the defendant’s participation, the crimes would not
have occurred.

We begin with the prosecutor’s opening statement. Because
defense counsel timely objected, we review for prejudicial error.
See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 (1997).

The purpose of an opening statement is to “outline in a general
way the nature of the case which the counsel expects to be able
to prove or support by evidence” (citation omitted). Common-
wealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 454 (1978). Here, the prosecu-
tor’s opening statement did not exceed the bounds of propriety.
She used a sports analogy to explain the Commonwealth’ s theory
of the case, stating that the defendant had been part of a team that
planned and executed a botched home invasion. She emphasized
that each team member played a particular role, and that the
defendant contributed to the team effort by supplying a firearm
and some clothing needed for disguise. The prosecutor also
argued that the team effort ultimately resulted in the deaths of the
Delgado brothers. The prosecutor’s characterization of the de-
fendant’s role in the shootings as the person who allegedly
provided “that .380 gun and hoodies to the team’ did not misstate
the evidence.

The defendant raises a similar argument with respect to the
prosecutor’s closing, which carried on the sports analogy. Be-
cause trial counsel did not object, we consider whether any of the

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 819

Commonwealth v, Brown.

challenged statements was improper and, if so, whether it created
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See Common-
wealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 626-627 (2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 1656 (2016).

In closing, the prosecutor urged the jury to draw an inference,
based on the evidence, that the defendant knew about the in-
tended robbery and was an active participant in it. She pointed out
that the defendant was aware that Hernandez had robbed two
women earlier in the evening, the defendant was present when the
men discussed robbing the two victims, and he knew that Her-
nandez would be bringing his gun to the robbery. The prosecutor
described the defendant’s role as providing “the tools to the rest
of the team to effectuate this armed robbery and home invasion.”
This was not beyond the bounds of permissible advocacy.

The defendant contends also that a portion of the prosecutor’s
closing argument misstated the evidence. While discussing Her-
nandez’s attempt to hide his gun in the defendant’s apartment
after the attempted robbery, the prosecutor said the defendant
“knew that that gun was just used in a crime. The crime that he
helped plan.” The defendant maintains that this statement “reit-
erated the false theme that [he] was a planner whose role was
critical.” In the context of the closing argument as a whole,
however, see Commonwealth v. Foxworth, 473 Mass. 149, 161
(2015), this isolated statement was unlikely to have prejudiced
the defendant. Throughout the trial, the prosecutor clearly pro-
ceeded on the theory that the defendant was liable because he had
supplied necessary instruments that facilitated the commission of
the underlying felonies, just as she presented his role on the
“team” in her opening statement.”

d. Evidence of uncharged prior misconduct. The defendant
maintains that the judge abused her discretion in allowing the
introduction of evidence of the prior armed robbery, as well as
photographs showing the defendant and an accomplice brandish-
ing handguns. The defendant argues that this evidence “over-

7The defendant also argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by
arguing that Jamal entered the townhouse because he was armed with the
defendant’s pistol; Hernandez participated in the robbery because he wore a
hoodie supplied by the defendant; and nobody would have entered the town-
house unless the defendant had supplied a firearm and disguises. There was no
error, The Commonwealth was entitled to analyze the evidence and suggest
reasonable inferences that the jury could draw from that evidence. Common-
wealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 333 (2015).

820 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

whelmed” the case with unfair prejudice. This argument is un-
availing.

Evidence of a defendant’s prior or subsequent bad acts is not
admissible to show “bad character or criminal propensity.” Com-
monwealth vy. Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 712 (2016). It may be
admissible, however, where it is relevant for another purpose,
such as to establish a “common scheme, pattern of operation,
absence of accident or mistake, identity, intent, or motive.” Com-
monwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224-225 (1986). We re-
view questions of admissibility, probative value, and unfair pre-
judice for abuse of discretion, id. at 229, and do not disturb a trial
judge’s decision absent a clear error of judgment in weighing the
relevant factors, see L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185
n.27 (2014). In deciding whether to allow the admission of such
evidence, a judge must decide whether the probative value of the
evidence is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249
(2014).

In the circumstances here, the judge did not abuse her discre-
tion in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the
armed robbery earlier in the afternoon on the day of the killing,
while the defendant waited in the vehicle; such evidence was
probative of Hernandez’s intent to rob the Delgado brothers, and
the defendant’s shared intent to participate in that crime by
supplying the guns and the means for potential disguise. Indeed,
in his statement to police, the defendant admitted that, as a result
of the earlier robbery, he believed Hernandez and the others
intended to commit another armed robbery at the time he handed
them his gun.

We also discern no error in the introduction of the photographs
showing the defendant brandishing his gun. The photographs
were introduced to establish his access to a weapon that was used
in the commission of the underlying felonies — the armed home
invasion and the attempted armed robbery. See Commonwealth v.
Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 450 (2015) (judge has discretion to admit
evidence that defendant previously possessed weapon that could
have been used to commit crime); Commonwealth v. Tassinari,
466 Mass. 340, 353 (2013) (information about defendant’s pos-
session of firearms admissible where connected to commission of
crime). The photographs, which were taken a few weeks before
the shootings, showed the defendant and Hernandez displaying
their respective weapons. Because both guns were introduced in

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 821

Commonwealth v, Brown.

evidence, the prejudicial impact of the photographs was minimal.

e. Jury voir dire. During a pretrial hearing, the judge informed
counsel that she intended to ask the venire a question concerning
joint venture liability. Defense counsel responded, “Yes, I think
that would be fine, Judge.” At trial, the judge asked potential
jurors, “Is there anything about the concept of aiding and abetting
that would prohibit your ability to listen and apply the law as I
will explain it to you at the conclusion of the trial and be a fair
and impartial juror?” The defendant did not object.

On appeal, the defendant contends that this question reduced
the Commonwealth’s burden of proof and “ensur[ed] a jury pre-
disposed to find [him] guilty.” Because the issue is unpreserved,
we review to determine whether asking the question was errone-
ous and, if so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice. Wright, 411 Mass. at 681.

During jury selection, a judge is required to “examine jurors
fully regarding possible bias or prejudice where ‘it appears that
there is a substantial risk that jurors may be influenced by factors
extraneous to the evidence presented to them.’ ” Commonwealth
v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 688 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v.
Garuti, 454 Mass. 48, 52 (2009). The judge may ask questions
designed to “determine whether jurors [can] set aside their own
opinions, weigh the evidence . . . , and follow the instructions of
the judge.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 501 (2006),
quoting Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 495 (2005).
The scope of jury voir dire is committed to the judge’s sound
discretion, and we will uphold the judge’s questioning “absent a
clear showing of abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Gray,
465 Mass. 330, 338 (2013), quoting Perez, supra at 689, and
cases cited.

We do not share the defendant’s view that the disputed question
predisposed the jury to convict the defendant. A question may not
be introduced if it “commit[ted] the jury to a verdict in advance”
or “[had] the effect of identifying and selecting jurors who were
predisposed to convicting the defendant based on evidence the
Commonwealth would present.” Gray, 465 Mass. at 339, quoting
Perez, 460 Mass. at 691. Here, the judge sought to identify jurors
who were unwilling or unable to follow her instructions regarding
accomplice liability. Indeed, one potential juror reported, “I have
more qualms about aiding and abetting being charged as a murder
case.” That juror was excused without objection.

At the beginning of jury selection, the judge provided the
members of the venire with a preliminary instruction that the

822 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

Commonwealth was required to prove each essential element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the judge
instructed that it was the Commonwealth’s burden to prove joint
venture liability by establishing that the defendant knowingly
participated in the commission of the crime with the requisite
intent to commit that crime. After jury selection, the judge
properly instructed the seated jury a number of times that, in
order for them to find the defendant guilty of felony-murder, the
Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant aided
and abetted at least one of the underlying felonies. See Common-
wealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. at 341 (court considers issues raised by
question to venire in context with judge’s conduct of entire
empanelment and judge’s legal instructions on topic). We con-
clude that the judge had discretion to ask the venire a question
regarding their ability to follow her legal instructions, and that the
defendant has failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice.

f. Abolition of the felony-murder rule. The felony-murder rule
“imposes criminal liability for homicide on all participants in a
certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the
course of that enterprise.” Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307, quoting
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 (1982). The
defendant invites the court to abolish the felony-murder rule,
arguing that it is arbitrary and unjust, and in violation of art. 12
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. According to the
defendant, the imposition of felony-murder liability is contrary to
the fundamental notion that an individual is culpable for his or
her own misconduct.

Felony-murder is a common-law crime.* See Matchett, 386
Mass. at 502. The felony-murder rule imposes criminal liability
“on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if a
death occurred in the course of that enterprise.” Commonwealth
v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978). “ ‘The effect of the fel-

*Felony-murder also falls within the province of G. L. ¢, 265, § 1, which
establishes two degrees of murder, That statute provides: “Murder committed
with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or
cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable
with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree, Murder which
does not appear to be in the first degree is murder in the second degree.” General
Laws c. 265, § 1, was enacted to “mitigate the harshness of the common law rule
imposing a mandatory death penalty on all murderers.” Commonwealth v.
Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 8 (2002), discussing Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372
Mass. 783, 803-805 (1977) (Quirico, J., concurring).

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 823

Commonwealth v, Brown.

ony-murder rule,’ both for principals and accomplices, ‘is to
substitute the intent to commit the underlying felony for the
malice aforethought required for murder.’ ” Hanright, 466 Mass.
at 307, quoting Matchett, supra.

We consistently have rejected the argument that the felony-
murder rule is unconstitutional, see Commonwealth vy. Moran,
387 Mass. 644, 649-650 (1982), and Watkins, 375 Mass. at
486-487, or that it relieves the Commonwealth of its obligation to
prove a defendant’s own moral culpability, see Hanright, 466
Mass. at 307-310; Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299,
307 (1973) (“A broad conception of complicity is indeed at work
in the special field of so called felony-murder . . .”).

More recently, in Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269,
277 (2015), we considered the continued viability of the com-
mon-law felony-murder rule but did not reach the issue. Discuss-
ing the scope of vicarious liability, we noted that felony-murder
is an exception to the general rule that “[o]ne is punished for his
own blameworthy conduct, not that of others” (citation omitted).
Id. at 276. Under the felony-murder rule, “a person who know-
ingly participates in one crime as part of a joint venture is ‘ipso
facto also guilty’ of [murder] committed by an accomplice in
furtherance of the joint venture.” Jd. We discern no reason to
deviate from our decisions in Moran and Watkins, and to accept
the defendant’s invitation that we abolish the felony-murder rule.

g. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The defendant asks also
that we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant
him a new trial because the felony-murder verdicts, “as indicated
by the prosecutor’s reliance on innuendo and misrepresentation,”
were against the weight of the evidence. We have carefully
reviewed the entire record pursuant to our duty under G. L.
c. 278, § 33E, and conclude that the verdicts of felony-murder
were neither contrary to our joint venture felony-murder juris-
prudence nor against the weight of the evidence.

Our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, however, also requires
us to consider whether the convictions of murder in the first
degree are consonant with justice. Commonwealth v. Gould, 380
Mass. 672, 680 (1980). “If upon our examination of the facts, we
should, in our discretion, be of [the] opinion that there was a
miscarriage of justice in convicting the defendant of murder in the
first degree, and that a verdict of guilty of murder in the second
degree or of manslaughter would have been more consonant with
justice, it is now our power and duty so to declare.” Common-

824 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

wealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109 (1963). The authority
granted us under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, includes the discretion to
reduce a conviction of felony-murder in the first degree in cir-
cumstances where the jury do not have that option. Common-
wealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 10 (2002) (it is left to court’s
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and is not within jury’s role
in reaching verdict, to reduce felony-murder in first degree to
felony-murder in second degree).

We are cognizant that the court’s authority under G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, should be used sparingly and with restraint. See Common-
wealth v. Lannon, 364 Mass. 480, 486 (1974). The court does not
serve as a second jury. Commonwealth vy. Prendergast, 385 Mass.
625, 638 (1982). Moreover, the doctrines of felony-murder and
joint venture liability “are well established and should not be
undermined on an ad hoc basis.” Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375
Mass. 284, 298 (1978).

Nonetheless, we have recognized that “the doctrines of felony-
murder and joint venture may, on some hypothetical fact patterns,
produce a conviction of murder in the first degree that would
appear out of proportion to a defendant’s culpability.” Common-
wealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 824 (2003). Here, the defendant
was involved in the “remote outer fringes” of the attempted
armed robbery and armed home invasion. See id. As discussed,
the defendant should be held liable for felony-murder as a sup-
plier of a firearm and clothing utilized by his cohorts in the
commission of the underlying felonies. Having carefully re-
viewed the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that
the defendant’s conduct, as an individual who participated on the
“remote outer fringes” of the joint venture, makes verdicts of
murder in the second degree more consonant with justice.

4. Conclusion. The verdicts of murder in the first degree and the
sentences imposed are vacated and set aside. The matter is
remanded to the Superior Court where verdicts of guilty of
murder in the second degree are to be entered, and the defendant
is to be sentenced accordingly. The defendant’s remaining con-
victions are affirmed.

So ordered.

Gants, C.J. (concurring, with whom Lenk, Hines, and Budd,
JJ., join). I agree with the court that, where the defendant's only

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 825

Commonwealth v, Brown.

participation in the crimes was to provide a firearm and hooded
sweatshirts to his friends, knowing they intended to use them in
the commission of an armed robbery, convictions of murder in the
first degree on the theory of felony-murder are not consonant with
justice. I write separately to explore how our common law of
felony-murder led to convictions of murder in the first degree that
are not consonant with justice, and to explain why it is time for
us to narrow the scope of liability for that common-law crime. I
believe that, in the future, a defendant should not be convicted of
murder without proof of one of the three prongs of malice: that he
or she intended to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm, or
intended to do an act which, in the circumstances known to the
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain
and strong likelihood that death would result. I also believe that
we should abandon the fiction of constructive malice — that
where a killing occurs in the commission of a felony, the intent to
commit the felony is sufficient alone to establish malice.

As noted in the opinion of the court, following the issuance of
this concurring opinion, which is joined by three other Justices, a
conviction of felony-murder will require a finding of actual
malice, not merely constructive malice. As a result, felony-
murder will no longer be an independent theory of liability for
murder. Rather, felony-murder will be limited to its statutory role
under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of murder,
permitting a jury to find a defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree where the murder was neither premeditated nor committed
with extreme atrocity or cruelty but was committed in the course
of a felony punishable by life imprisonment.

The court correctly concludes that, under our existing common
law, the defendant committed felony-murder in the first degree:
he knowingly aided and abetted the commission of a life felony
(attempted armed robbery and home invasion), in which his
accomplices killed two victims. Under our existing common law
of felony-murder, it is legally irrelevant that the defendant was
not present at the scene of the attempted armed robbery; he is
criminally responsible for every act resulting in death committed
by his accomplices during the attempted commission of the
armed robbery. See Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269,
272 (2015). It is also legally irrelevant that he did not share his
accomplices’ intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm
during the attempt; his intent to commit the armed robbery
substitutes for the malice aforethought generally required for

826 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

murder. Id. Because the underlying crimes were both felonies
punishable by life in prison, the jury properly were not instructed
on felony-murder in the second degree, because the evidence did
not permit such a verdict. See Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438
Mass. 1, 10 (2002). In short, under our existing common law of
felony-murder, the jury reached the correct verdicts. Indeed,
guilty verdicts of murder in the first degree on the theory of
felony-murder are the only verdicts they reasonably could have
reached on this evidence. It is not the fault of the jury that the
verdicts they reached are not consonant with justice; it is the fault
of our common law of felony-murder.*

We have long recognized that “[t]he common law felony-
murder rule is of questionable origin.” Commonwealth v.
Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12 (1982). A look at the early
English law reveals that there was no precedent in English cases
for what we now refer to as “felony-murder.” Professor Guyora
Binder, in an exhaustive analysis of the origins of American

‘Tt should not escape notice that this is the first time we have exercised our
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce a conviction of murder in the first
degree on the theory of felony-murder to murder in the second degree where the
evidence more than sufficed to support the verdict. See Commonwealth v. Rolon,
438 Mass. 808, 824 n.19 (2003) (“This court has reduced convictions of murder
in the first degree predicated on felony-murder only where the evidence sug-
gested that the felony intended by the defendant would not suffice for felony-
murder in the first degree”). Until now, “[t]his court’s power under G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, has never been exercised to relieve a defendant of the consequences of
participation in a felony that does qualify as the predicate for felony-murder in
the first degree.” Id. In Rolon, we declared:

“We recognize that the doctrines of felony-murder and joint venture may,
on some hypothetical fact patterns, produce a conviction of murder in the
first degree that would appear out of proportion to a defendant’s culpa-
bility. It may in some circumstances seem harsh to convict a defendant of
murd

in the first degree if the defendant was on the remote outer fringes
int venture to commit some felony that satisfied the felony-murder
rule in only some hypertechnical way.”

Id. at 824. But in Rolon we simply assumed, “without deciding, that reduction
of a verdict in such circumstances could be appropriate under [Mass. R. Crim.
P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995)].” Id. We did not need to
decide that issue because we determined that the case did “not present such
circumstances.” Id. Here, it is not accurate to say that the defendant’s conduct
constituted felony-murder “in only some hypertechnical way.” However, the
court correctly recognizes that a conviction of murder in the first degree, with its
mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, is not
consonant with justice where the defendant’s role was limited to providing a
firearm and hooded sweatshirts to his accomplices for the commission of an
armed robbery.

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 827

Commonwealth v, Brown.

felony-murder rules, concluded:

“By the time of the American Revolution, the rule that an
accidental death in the course of any felony was murder had
become a standard theme in scholarly writing about the
common law of homicide . . . . Yet no English court had ever
actually applied such a rule. . . . By the end of the eighteenth
century, some judges thought cofelons were automatically
implicated in any murder committed in attempt of a felony,
but most judges required participation in or encouragement
of the act causing death.”

Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 Stan.
L. Rev. 59, 98 (2004). An analysis of early American cases leads
to a similar conclusion — in most instances murder liability was
imposed only where there was independent proof of malice. See
id, at 193-194,

The absence of any clear preexisting concept of “felony-mur-
der” also becomes evident when examining the provenance of the
Massachusetts murder statute. In 1784, Massachusetts enacted a
statute providing “[t]hat whosoever shall commit wilful murder,
of malice aforethought, . . . shall suffer the pains of death.” St.
1784, c. 44. It was only in 1858 that the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture established two degrees of murder, and provided that the
degree of murder is to be found by the jury. St. 1858, c. 154, §§ 1,
2. “The legislative documents that precede the enactment of St.
1858, c. 154, suggest that murder was divided into degrees
largely to mitigate the harshness of the common law rule impos-
ing a mandatory death penalty on all murderers.” Commonwealth
vy. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 803 (1977) (Quirico, J., concur-
ring). Murder in the first degree, punishable by death, was defined
as “[m]urder, committed with deliberately premeditated malice
aforethought, or in the commission of an attempt to commit any
crime punishable with imprisonment for life, or committed with
extreme atrocity or cruelty.” St. 1858, c. 154, § 1. This statute is
described by Professor Binder as a “felony aggravator statute,” in
that it provided that where a defendant committed “murder” and
where that murder was committed in the attempt to commit a life
felony, the murder was murder in the first degree regardless of
whether it was premeditated or committed with extreme atrocity
or cruelty. See Binder, supra at 120. The statute did not define
“murder” and did not declare that a person is guilty of murder

828 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

whenever a death occurs during the commission of a felony; the
elements of murder liability continued to rest in the domain of the
common law. See People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 721 (1980)
(“[t]he use of the term ‘murder’ in the first-degree statute requires
that a murder must first be established before the statute is applied
to elevate the degree”).

It is not surprising that the first Massachusetts statute that refers
to murder in the commission of a felony treated it simply as an
aggravating element that made the murder worthy of the death
penalty. In the vast majority of the cases where a victim was
killed during the commission of a felony, the defendant had killed
the victim in furtherance of the crime or to facilitate his or her
escape, and intended to kill or to commit grievous bodily harm,
so there was no need for a distinct theory of felony-murder that
substituted the intent to commit the underlying felony for the
malice necessary for a murder conviction. In these cases, the
killing already met the definition of murder. See Binder, supra at
65-66. Nor is it surprising that this statute included only “an
attempt to commit any crime punishable with imprisonment for
life,” rather than the commission of a completed crime.? The law
of attempt during this time period was still evolving, and felony-
murder was a means to ensure that the attempt was appropriately
punished where it resulted in death. Id. at 92.

The first Supreme Judicial Court case that specifically ad-
dressed the issue of liability for a death occurring during the
commission of a felony (felony-murder liability)? was issued in
1863, five years after the enactment of the statute. See Common-
wealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen 541 (1863). In Campbell, a man was
killed by a gun shot during a draft riot but it was not clear whether
the shot was fired by a rioter or by a soldier who was defending
the armory from the rioters. /d. at 541, 543. The court considered
the prosecutor's request for a jury instruction declaring that, if the
defendant was a participant in the riot, and if the homicide
occurred during the attack on the armory, the defendant “is in law

2The statute was revised in 1860 to include “[m]urder committed . . . in the
commission of, or attempt to commit, any crime.” St. 1860, c. 160, § 1.

'In this opinion “felony-murder liability” refers to liability for murder absent
independent proof of malice. This is distinguishable from felony-murder as a
statutory aggravator that merely elevates what would otherwise be murder in the
second degree, based on proof of actual malice, to murder in the first degree
where the killing occurred during the commission of a life felony — the concept
codified in G, L. c. 265, § 1.

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 829

Commonwealth v, Brown.

guilty of manslaughter” even if the evidence fails to show
whether the shot was fired by a rioter or a soldier. Jd. at 543. The
court held that the jury should be instructed that the defendant is
entitled to an acquittal unless the jury finds “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the deceased was killed by means of a gun or other
deadly weapon in the hands of the prisoner, or of one of the
rioters with whom he was associated and acting.” Id. at 547-548.
The court reasoned that its conclusion flowed from the general
tule of law “that a person engaged in the commission of an
unlawful act is legally responsible for all the consequences which
may naturally or necessarily flow from it, and that, if he combines
and confederates with others to accomplish an illegal purpose, he
is liable [criminally] for the acts of each and all who participate
with him in the execution of the unlawful design.” Jd. at 543-544.
But he is not criminally liable for acts that are not “committed by
his own hand or by some one acting in concert with him or in
furtherance of a common object or purpose.” Jd. at 544.

The Campbell opinion identifies two principles of law on
which our common law of felony-murder liability rests that we
reject elsewhere in our criminal jurisprudence: vicarious substan-
tive criminal liability for every act committed by a joint venturer,
and the conclusive presumption of malice from the intent to
commit an inherently dangerous felony. See Tejeda, 473 Mass. at
276 (“the common law of felony-murder is an exception to two
basic principles of our criminal jurisprudence”). I discuss each in
turn.

The first of these principles is the rule of law that a person
engaged in a criminal joint venture is criminally liable for all the
acts of his or her accomplices committed in furtherance of the
joint venture. This rule was adopted by the United States Su-
preme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-648
(1946), which held that a defendant may be found guilty of
substantive offenses committed by his coconspirator in further-
ance of the conspiracy, even if he did not participate directly in
the commission of those substantive offenses.

We no longer adhere to this Pinkerton theory of accomplice
liability. See Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 47-49
(1965) (“To be liable for the substantive offence, a coconspirator
must participate or aid in the commission of it”). We declared in
Stasiun, supra at 48:

“While it has been said that a conspiracy is a ‘partnership
in crime’ (United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310

830 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

USS. 150, 253 [(1940)]), that metaphor should not be pressed
too far. It does not follow that such a partnership is governed
by the same principles of vicarious liability as would apply
in civil cases. Our criminal law is founded on the principle
that guilt, for the more serious offences, is personal, not
vicarious. One is punished for his own blameworthy conduct,
not that of others. Perkins on Criminal Law, 550 [(1957)].
Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 689 [(1930)] .. . . To ignore the distinction
between the crime of conspiracy and the substantive offence
would enable ‘the government through the use of the con-
spiracy dragnet to convict a conspirator of every substantive
offense committed by any other member of the group even
though he had no part in it or even knowledge of it.’ United
States v. Sall, 116 R2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. [1940]).”

Under our common law of joint venture liability, a defendant is
criminally responsible for a crime committed by an accomplice
only where the defendant knowingly participates in the crime
with the intent required to commit it. See Commonwealth v.
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009). But until now, we have
retained one exception: under our common law of felony-murder,
a defendant was still vicariously responsible for all the acts of his
or her accomplices that resulted in death committed during the
course of the felony. Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 275-276. The conse-
quence of this exception was that, if an accomplice shot and
killed a victim during the commission of an armed robbery, the
defendant was guilty of felony-murder even if he or she sat
outside in the getaway vehicle and had implored the accomplices
to hurt no one in committing the crime. However, if the accom-
plice committed the same shooting but the victim survived, the
defendant sitting in that getaway vehicle would have been guilty
only of the underlying armed robbery, not of the shooting. “Only
where a dangerous felony result[ed] in death [did] we adopt a
principle that we otherwise [had] ‘firmly rejected’ — that a
person who knowingly participates in one crime as part of a joint
venture is ‘ipso facto also guilty’ of all other crimes committed
by an accomplice in furtherance of the joint venture.” Jd. at 276,
quoting Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 306 (1973).
See Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 307-310 (2013),
quoting 2 W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.3 (b), at
362-363 (2d ed. 2003) (“we remain committed to the view

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 831

Commonwealth v, Brown.

that . . . A’s guilt as an accomplice to one crime should not per
se be a basis for holding A accountable for a related crime merely
because the latter offense was carried out by A’s principal”).

The second principle set forth in Campbell, 7 Allen at 543 —
“that a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is
legally responsible for all the consequences which may naturally
or necessarily flow from it” — has evolved in our common law
of felony-murder into a rule that, where a defendant commits an
inherently dangerous felony, such as armed robbery, he or she is
criminally responsible for the consequences of every act by a
joint venturer during the commission of the felony where the
consequence is death. See Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307-310, citing
Matchett, 386 Mass. at 502. As a result of this rule, a defendant
who participates in an armed robbery is guilty of felony-murder
in the first degree if the defendant or an accomplice commits any
act that results in death, even if the act is accidental and unin-
tended. As a result, although in every other circumstance a killing
constitutes murder only where it is committed with actual malice,
where the killing occurs in the commission of an inherently
dangerous felony, proof of actual malice is not required; a felony-
murder conviction may rest on proof of constructive malice,
which is defined simply as the intent to commit the underlying
felony.

We have noted that, in this regard, our common law of felony-
murder is an exception to our general rule that “we require proof
of a defendant’s intent to commit the crime charged, and do not
conclusively presume such intent from the intent to commit
another crime.” Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 276. In fact, we have said,
“A felony-murder rule that punishes all homicides committed in
the perpetration of a felony whether the death is intentional,
unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the
relation of the perpetrator’s state of mind to the homicide, vio-
lates the most fundamental principle of the criminal law —
‘criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in
the absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that
result.’ ” Matchett, 386 Mass. at 506-507, quoting Aaron, 409
Mich. at 708.

The consequence of this exception to “the most fundamental
principle of the criminal law” is that, if a defendant drops his or
her firearm and accidentally shoots someone during the commis-
sion of a felony, the defendant is guilty of both the underlying
felony and felony-murder if the shooting proves fatal. But if the

832 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

victim survives, the defendant is guilty only of the underlying
felony, and is not criminally responsible for the shooting. The
defendant's liability for the shooting rests not on the defendant’s
conduct, but on whether the victim lives or dies. See, e.g.,
Hanright, 466 Mass. at 308-309 (“The intent to commit armed
robbery, although sufficient to support liability for felony-murder
ona theory of joint venture, is insufficient to support liability for”
additional offenses against other, surviving police officers who
attempted to apprehend accomplice); Richards, 363 Mass. at 302,
307-308 (defendant who was waiting near getaway vehicle in
armed robbery may be found guilty of assault with intent to
murder police officer committed by accomplice only if defendant
had specific intent to kill police officer).

We have recognized that the application of the felony-murder
tule erodes “the relation between criminal liability and moral
culpability.” Matchett, 386 Mass. at 507, quoting People v. Wash-
ington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783 (1965). It is time for us to eliminate
the last vestige of these two abandoned principles and end their
application in our common law of felony-murder. Doing so
means that criminal liability for murder in the first or second
degree will be predicated on proof that the defendant acted with
malice or shared the intent of a joint venturer who acted with
malice. The sole remaining function of felony-murder will be to
elevate what would otherwise be murder in the second degree to
murder in the first degree where the killing occurs during the
commission of a life felony.*

Thus, a defendant who commits an armed robbery as a joint
venturer will be found guilty of murder where a killing was
committed in the course of that robbery if he or she knowingly
participated in the killing with the intent required to commit it —
that is, with the intent either to kill, to cause grievous bodily
harm, or to do an act which, in the circumstances known to the
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain
and strong likelihood that death would result. Model Jury Instruc-
tions on Homicide 57 & n.131 (2013), citing Commonwealth v.
Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 346-347 & n.9, 350 (2010), and Common-
wealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 470 n.1, 472 n.4 (1987). Where
a defendant participates in an armed robbery but does not have
the requisite intent for murder, the defendant will be found guilty

“This will entirely eliminate the concept of “felony-murder in the second
degree.” See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 58-63 (2013).

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 833

Commonwealth v, Brown.

of involuntary manslaughter if he or she acted wantonly or
recklessly. Where a defendant does not participate in the killing
or otherwise lacked the intent required to prove murder or man-
slaughter, the defendant will not go free because he or she can
still be convicted of the underlying armed robbery he or she
committed, and a judge in setting the sentence on that underlying
felony can take into account the aggravating factor that the felony
resulted in a victim’s death. Where the defendant is found guilty
of murder and the murder is committed “in the commission or
attempted commission of a crime punishable with . . . imprison-
ment for life,” the defendant will be guilty of murder in the first
degree, regardless of whether the murder was premeditated or
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. G. L. c. 265, § 1.
We are not the first to do this. Great Britain has abolished
felony-murder liability by statute, providing that “[w]here a per-
son kills another in the course or furtherance of some other
offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with
the same malice aforethought . . . as is required for a killing to
amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of
another offence.” Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2,c. 11, § 1.
See Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 277 n.9. Michigan has abolished felony-
murder liability under its common law, id., citing Aaron, 409
Mich. at 727-729, and Hawaii and Kentucky have abolished
felony-murder liability by statute, Tejeda, supra, citing 7A Ha-
waii Rev. Stat. § 707-701 commentary, and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 507.020, 1974 commentary. Other States have not abolished the
doctrine but have significantly departed from the traditional for-
mulation. See Tejeda, supra, citing State v. Doucette, 143 Vt.
573, 582 (1983) (holding that felony-murder requires proof of
malice, but that malice can be inferred “from evidence presented
that the defendant intentionally set in motion a chain of events
likely to cause death or great bodily injury, or acted with extreme
indifference to the value of human life’), Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
§§ 635, 636 (2007) (requiring defendant to act with recklessness,
for murder in the first degree, or criminal negligence, for murder
in the second degree), and N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.25(3), 125.27
(McKinney 2009) (setting forth affirmative defense where joint
venturer rather than defendant commits act causing death). The
Model Penal Code also has abandoned the traditional doctrine of
felony-murder, requiring the homicide to be purposeful, knowing,
or reckless in order to constitute murder, but providing for a
rebuttable presumption of recklessness where the homicide oc-

834 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

curred during the commission of certain felonies. Model Penal
Code §§ 1.12(5), 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Com-
ments 1985). See Matchett, 386 Mass. at 503 n.12.

Without felony-murder liability, our common law of murder
will be spared much of the confusion that has arisen from apply-
ing legal principles we have otherwise abandoned. General Laws
c. 265, § 1, provides that “[t]he degree of murder shall be found
by the jury,” but we have held that this statutory directive cannot
be met when a defendant is charged with felony-murder and the
only underlying felony is a life felony, because in such a case “no
reasonable view of the evidence supports a conviction of murder
in the second degree.” See Paulding, 438 Mass. at 3. As a result,
when a defendant fatally shoots a victim but does not do so
during the commission of a felony, the jury must be given the
option of finding the defendant guilty of murder in the second
degree. But when a defendant, as in this case, provides a weapon
and hooded sweatshirts to friends to help them commit what turns
out to be a botched armed robbery, the jury is denied that option.

The abolition of felony-murder liability from our common law
of murder is prospective, applying only to cases where trial
begins after our adoption of the change. It will have no effect on
felony-murder cases already tried, including this case (which is
why this is a concurrence rather than a dissent). I recognize that
a felony-murder case might have been tried very differently if the
prosecutor had known that liability for murder would need to rest
on proof of actual malice. For instance, a prosecutor might have
asked for an involuntary manslaughter instruction if he or she had
known that the jury could not rest a finding of murder on
felony-murder liability.

Justice Gaziano’s concurrence identifies various factual sce-
narios, some of which come from Massachusetts criminal cases,
where a victim was killed during the commission of a felony. See
Post at 836, 838-840. Through these examples, that concurrence
seeks to show, first, that a verdict of murder in the first degree
would not be possible on these facts without felony-murder
liability and, second, that any lesser conviction would not be
consonant with justice. See id. In fact, the examples show that,
without felony-murder liability, each of these cases could yield
convictions that are entirely consonant with justice.

Without felony-murder liability, the rapist who smothers the
child rape victim could be found guilty of murder with actual
malice if a jury found, either from the violence of the rape or the

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 835

Commonwealth v, Brown.

smothering of the child, that the defendant had an intent to
commit grievous bodily harm or intended to do an act that, in the
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person
would have known created a plain and strong likelihood that
death would result. See post at 836. Had the jury been so
instructed, Robert Wade, too, could have been found guilty of
murder without felony-murder liability based on his rape of an
eighty-three year old woman, his dragging her along a dirt road,
and his violent assault on her body, which would more than
suffice to support a finding of those two prongs of malice. See id.
at 838; Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 148-149, 153
(1998) (jury instructed only on felony-murder in first and second
degree and manslaughter). Had the jury found actual malice, each
would have been convicted of murder in the first degree under
G. L. c. 265, § 1, because the murder was committed in the
commission of a life felony.

The armed robbers who accidently discharged a fatal shot
while vaulting over the counter or when struck by the victim’s
baseball bat likely could not be found guilty of murder in the first
degree because their intent with respect to the killing probably
did not satisfy any of the three prongs of malice. See post at 836,
839-840; Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 397
(1998). But they might be found guilty of involuntary manslaugh-
ter if the jury found that the death arose from their wanton or
reckless conduct that created a high degree of likelihood that
substantial harm will result to another person. See Model Jury
Instructions on Homicide 73 & n.158 (2013), citing Common-
wealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 347 (2010); Commonwealth v.
Sneed, 413 Mass. 387, 393-394 (1992). And, even if the jury
found that the death did not arise from their wanton or reckless
conduct, they could still be sentenced to life in prison on the
armed robbery conviction. See G. L. c. 265, § 17. Convictions of
both armed robbery and involuntary manslaughter, or of armed
robbery alone, with a possible sentence of life in prison, should
not be perceived as “getting off easy” for an accidental killing
during an armed robbery.®

Justice Gaziano’s concurrence correctly notes that this concurring opinion is
in conflict with the reasoning in the court’s unanimous opinion in Common-
wealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303 (2013), where we reversed the judge’s
dismissal of indictments charging crimes related to an accomplice’s attempted
escape following an armed robbery and shooting and so much of an indictment
charging murder in the first degree as included theories other than felony-

836 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

Felony-murder liability is a creation of our common law, and
this court is responsible for the content of that common law.
When our experience with the common law of felony-murder
liability demonstrates that it can yield a verdict of murder in the
first degree that is not consonant with justice, and where we
recognize that it was derived from legal principles we no longer
accept and contravenes two fundamental principles of our crimi-
nal jurisprudence, we must revise that common law so that it
accords with those fundamental principles and yields verdicts that
are just and fair in light of the defendant’s criminal conduct. “And
if not now, when?” C. Taylor, Sayings of the Jewish Fathers 23
(2d ed. 1897) (quoting Hillel the Elder).

Gaziano, J. (concurring, with whom Lowy and Cypher, JJ.,
join). A rapist smothers a distraught child victim to silence her
sobbing. To his surprise, the child dies. An armed robber enters a
convenience store and threatens the store clerk with a handgun.
The store clerk, frozen in fear, fails to comply with his demands.
The frustrated armed robber vaults over the counter to empty the
cash register, and in the process accidently discharges a fatal shot.
See Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 965, 966 (2008) (Binder I). Neither of these offenders would
be convicted of murder under Chief Justice Gants’s abrogated

murder. Where that opinion discussed the distinction between joint venture
liability for the escape-related crimes and the joint venture principles in the
common law of felony-murder, I agree that the reasoning differs, but that
reasoning was premised on principles that this concurring opinion changes. The
reference to that case is apt, however, because its facts illustrate the need for this,
change in our jurisprudence if our law of homicide is to be more consonant with
justice. Under our current law of felony-murder, Scott Hanright, who was
nineteen years old at the time, could have been convicted of murder in the first
degree, with a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole, if he
were found to have served as an unarmed lookout or getaway driver during a
department store robbery committed by his accomplice, who was his grand-
mother’s boyfriend, /d. at 305-306, The accomplice killed a police officer who
responded to the robbery; Hanright never entered the department store and,
when he saw police officers pursuing his accomplice before the shooting,
walked away from the scene of the crime, [d. at 306. The prosecutor ultimately
did not seek a conviction of murder in the first degree; Hanright pleaded guilty
to murder in the second degree. Man, 23, Guilty in Slaying of Officer, Boston
Globe, May 28, 2015, at B1. A conviction of murder in the second degree would
not have been legally possible except through our review under G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, if Hanright had been found guilty of felony-murder in the first degree
with armed robbery as the predicate felony.

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 837

Commonwealth v, Brown.

version of felony-murder. In this view, charging the rapist and the
armed robber with murder would be unfair and unjust because
each’s criminal liability is disconnected from moral culpability
for the respective crimes. This approach, which is predicated on
an extremely narrow view of moral culpability (or blameworthi-
ness), diminishes the seriousness of violent felonies that result in
the deaths of innocent victims.'

Although an offender’s mental state is an important component
of assessing blameworthiness, it is not “the only legitimate de-
terminant of the grade of a homicide resulting from a felony.”
Crump & Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 359, 366 (1985) (Crump). See Binder I,
supra at 1059 (accurate assessment of culpability requires con-
sideration of fatal result). It is a fundamental tenet of criminal law
that blameworthiness is premised on two factors, not just the
offender’s state of mind. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass.
722, 725 (2001), citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
250 (1952). A criminal defendant’s blameworthiness depends on
“a showing that the prohibited conduct (actus reus) was commit-
ted with the concomitant mental state (mens rea) prescribed for
the offense.” Lopez, supra, citing Morissette, supra. See Crump,
supra at 362 (“Differences in result must be taken into account as
part of actus reus if classification and grading are to be rational”).
The actus reus component of a criminal offense refers to all the
physical elements of the crime, including the individual’s offense
conduct and the consequences of the act. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 399 Mass. 60, 64-65 (1987). See also Black’s Law
Dictionary 44 (10th ed. 2014) (actus reus includes attendant
circumstances and societal harm caused by criminal act, all of
which make up physical components of offense).

The criminal law, in general, considers the harm caused by an
individual in evaluating the severity of an offense. Binder, Mak-

"The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Gants relies on Commonwealth v.
Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 507 (1982), in support of the proposition that appli-
cation of the felony-murder rule erodes “the relation between criminal liability
and moral culpability.” Ante at 832. Prior to the decision in that case, “a
defendant could be found guilty of murder on a theory of felony-murder if he or
she committed a homicide while engaged in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony punishable by life in prison.” Commonwealth v. Prater,
431 Mass. 86, 95 (2000). In Matchett, supra, we addressed those concems by
narrowing the scope of the felony-murder rule to require that the Common-
wealth prove that the underlying felony is either inherently dangerous to human
life or was committed with a conscious disregard of the risk to human life.

838 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

ing the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 403, 427 (2011)
(Binder II) (“the evaluation of ends pervades American criminal
law”). Chief Justice Gants’s exclusive focus on the mens rea
component of the crime ignores the human costs of an offender’s
actions, and overlooks numerous examples in the criminal law to
the contrary. For example, it is a misdemeanor to drive a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. See G. L. c. 90, § 24.
If one intoxicated driver strikes and kills a pedestrian, whereas
another manages to avoid any accident, the former offense is
elevated to the serious felony of motor vehicle homicide. See
G.L.c. 90, § 24G (a). A defendant who shoots and kills his or her
intended target, and an individual who attempts to shoot some-
one but misses, may share the same intent to kill, yet it is clear
that they are not equally blameworthy. See Commonwealth v.
LaBrie, 473 Mass. 754, 760 (2016) (discussing mens rea of
attempted murder).

To provide needed context, I address several instances where
blameworthy defendants, who did not kill intentionally or reck-
lessly, were convicted of felony-murder in the first degree. Each
of these defendants would not be convicted of murder under
Chief Justice Gants’s reformulation of the felony-murder rule.

In October, 1993, a farmhand named Robert Wade abducted the
farm owner’s eighty-three year old mother from her house. Wade
dragged the victim, who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease,
along a dirt road to the shack where he lived. Commonwealth v.
Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 147-149 (1998). In the process, the vic-
tim’s shoulders, knees, and buttocks were badly scraped, and
gravel was embedded in the torn tissue of her back. Jd. at 149.
Wade brutally raped her. /d. at 148. “The victim’s clothing [was]
torn and was covered with human blood. She . . . suffered bruises
to her eyes and to her neck. . . , her left wrist was fractured and
there was evidence that she . . . suffered a blow to the head.” Id.
at 148-149. The farmer found his mother lying naked on the
defendant’s bed. /d. at 148. Her hip had been fractured during the
sexual assault. Jd. at 149. She had hip replacement surgery but
contracted pneumonia and died three weeks after the rape. Jd. The
court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of felony-murder in the
first degree with aggravated rape as the predicate felony. Jd. at
147-148. The court also determined that there was no basis on
which to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for this “brutal

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 839

Commonwealth v, Brown.

attack on a vulnerable, older woman.” Jd. at 155.28

On March 28, 1980, William Griffith spent the evening smok-
ing marijuana, ingesting cocaine, and drinking alcohol. Common-
wealth v. Griffith, 404 Mass. 256, 258 (1989). Thereafter, he
announced that he was going to rob a convenience store located
about a block away. /d. Griffith waited for the store to empty of
customers and entered armed with a revolver. Id. He demanded
money from the victim at gunpoint. Jd. The victim managed to
slip away during a chaotic moment when his wife confronted
Griffith. Jd. The victim then emerged from a back room armed
with a baseball bat and struck Griffith on the shoulder, head, and
arm. Jd. During this confrontation, Griffith accidently shot the
victim in the head. /d. The defendant was convicted of felony-
murder, and the court concluded that his claim that the shooting
was an accident did not absolve him of liability. Jd. 257, 260-261.
“A defendant who kills a victim in the commission or attempted
commission of a robbery, while the defendant is armed with a
gun, is guilty of murder by application of the felony-murder
tule. .. . The fact that, according to the defendant, the gun was
discharged accidently is of no consequence.” /d. at 261, quoting

2The court’s decision in Commonwealth v, Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 147-149
(1998), supports the position that a rapist whose actions result in death, regard-
less of whether the death is intended, is sufficiently blameworthy for the
imposition of felony-murder liability due to the depraved nature of this crime.

“To compel another by force to acquiesce in the violation of an impor-
tant right is to express contempt for a victim’s autonomy and status by
asserting mastery over him or her. The death of a victim under the
offender’s dominion and as a result of the offender’s coercion, typifies the
wrongfulness of assuming power over another’s fate in order to wrong her.
Felony murder rules appropriately impose liability for negligently causing
death for a very depraved motive, as long as the predicate felony involves
coercion or destruction, and a felonious purpose independent of the fatal
injury. In evaluating the offender's motives, felony murder rules are
compatible with other rules of American criminal law... .”

Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 965,
1059-1060 (2008) (Binder 1).

According to Chief Justice Gants’s concurrence, the factual scenarios dis-
cussed above, in which the victim was killed in the course of a sexual assault,
would result in a conviction of murder. This is a misreading of the fact patterns.
The rapist described in the hypothetical is intent on one “selfish aim[ J.” and
does not recognize the obvious risks that his conduct imposes on the victim.
Binder I, supra at 966, Similarly, Robert Wade's intent was to abduct and rape
the elderly victim; he dragged her out of the farmhouse and beat her to
accomplish this purpose. She died weeks later due to medical complications.
Wade, 428 Mass. at 147-149.

840 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

Commonwealth vy. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151-152 (1983). See
Commonwealth v. Neves, 474 Mass. 355, 371 (2016) (defendant
convicted of felony-murder in death of taxicab driver notwith-
standing defendant’s claim that gun discharged accidently when
victim accelerated and grabbed his hand).

The second issue raised in Chief Justice Gants’s concurrence
involves the imposition of vicarious criminal liability for every
act committed by an accomplice, in furtherance of the felony, that
results in death. See Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269,
276 (2015). Under this reformulation of felony-murder, an ac-
complice would be liable for a death resulting from the commis-
sion of a felony only if the Commonwealth were able to prove
that he or she shared the intent of a joint venturer who acted with
malice.

Chief Justice Gants’s concurrence repudiates the court’s recent
decision in Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 310
(2013). In that case, the nineteen year old defendant participated
in a masked armed robbery of a department store by an acquain-
tance, Domenic Cinelli. Jd. at 304-305. The defendant, who was
unarmed, walked to the store with Cinelli and waited outside
while Cinelli entered. /d. at 306. He told the police that he did not
act as a lookout. Jd. He claimed that he merely went along
because he was afraid of Cinelli, and because he hoped to share
in some of the proceeds from the robbery. /d. Responding to a
report of a robbery in progress, police observed the defendant
standing outside, but focused on Cinelli, who left the store
carrying a duffle bag. Jd. Cinelli pointed a gun at the first
responding officer, a chase ensued, and Cinelli fatally shot one of
the officers. Jd. The defendant had walked away from the store
during the pursuit and was not involved in the subsequent con-
frontation. Jd.

Addressing joint venture liability for escape-related crimes, the
court stated, “To establish liability for felony-murder on a theory
of joint venture the Commonwealth must prove ‘that a homicide
occurred in the commission or attempted commission of that
felony[.] [C]omplicity in the underlying felony is sufficient to
establish guilt of murder in the first or second degree if the
homicide . . . followed naturally and probably from the carrying
out of the joint enterprise’ ” (emphasis in original; citation omit-
ted). Jd. at 307. Recognizing that “the felony-murder rule oper-
ates according to a unique set of principles,” the court concluded
that the felony-murder doctrine allowed a jury to find the defend-

477 Mass. 805 (2017) 841

Commonwealth v, Brown.

ant liable for the police officer’s death by virtue of his complicity
in the underlying armed robbery. /d. at 308-309. Thus, the jury
were not required to find that the defendant specifically intended
to harm the officer. Jd. See Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 256
Mass. 387, 392 (1926) (“it is no defence for the associates
engaged with others in the commission of a robbery, that they did
not intend to take life in its perpetration, or that they forbade their
companions to kill”).

The conclusion reached by Chief Justice Gants is that revision
of the common-law felony-murder rule is necessary to vanquish
the “fiction of constructive malice” and yield “verdicts that are
just and fair in light of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” See
ante at 825, 836. Yet, under this narrowed version of felony-
murder, the defendant in this case likely would be convicted of
murder in the first degree on the basis of his joint participation in
an act of third prong malice.

Chief Justice Gants describes joint venture felony-murder li-
ability as follows: “a defendant who commits an armed robbery
as a joint venturer will be found guilty of murder where a killing
was committed in the course of that robbery if he or she know-
ingly participated in the killing with the intent required to commit
it — that is, with the intent either to kill, to cause grievous bodily
harm, or to do an act which, in the circumstances known to the
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain
and strong likelihood that death would result.” Ante at 832.

Here, the Commonwealth established that the defendant know-
ingly participated in the killing by supplying an accomplice with
a loaded .380 handgun and other accomplices with hooded sweat-
shirts to be used to conceal their identities. See Commonwealth v.
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 470 (2009) (Appendix) (knowing par-
ticipation includes aid or assistance in committing the crime). The
evidence also would support a reasonable inference that the
defendant had or shared the intent to carry out the crime of armed
home invasion or armed robbery. The defendant supplied the
handgun and disguises knowing that his accomplices were plan-
ning to enter an occupied residence at night to rob two large men,
both drug dealers, at gunpoint. In Commonwealth v. Selby, 426
Mass. 168, 172 (1997), the court concluded that a jury could infer
third-prong malice from evidence that an individual entered an
occupied house, carrying a loaded firearm, with the intent to
commit a robbery. See Commonwealth v. Childs, 445 Mass. 529,
533 (2005) (act of cocking and pointing loaded gun at three

842 477 Mass. 805 (2017)

Commonwealth v, Brown.

people creates plain and strong likelihood of death to one of
them).

In Commonwealth vy. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 824 (2003), the
court noted that “the doctrines of felony-murder and joint venture
may, on some hypothetical fact patterns, produce a conviction of
murder in the first degree that would appear out of proportion to
a defendant’s culpability.” The reasonable and far simpler remedy
to the problem of a disproportionate conviction of murder in the
first degree is to exercise the court’s statutory authority under
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict in those extraordinary
cases not consonant with justice. See Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 466
(“All of this . . . might be tolerable if there were no reasonable
alternative, but there is a reasonable, and far simpler, alterna-
tive . . .”). As Chief Justice Gants’s concurrence points out, this
is the first time that the court has exercised its authority under
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce a conviction of felony-murder in
the first degree in similar circumstances. See ante at 826 n.1.

Thus, rather than abolish common-law felony-murder, Chief
Justice Gants’s concurrence offers a muddled version of the same
crime. In the future, felony-murder liability will hinge on fine
gradations between third-prong malice, wanton and reckless in-
voluntary manslaughter, negligence, and accident — with pre-
dictably unpredictable results. See Crump, supra at 372 (discuss-
ing disparity in verdicts created by ambiguous felony-murder
tule). To be sure, there will be instances where morally culpable
individuals will not be held responsible for the death of a rape
victim, gasoline station attendant, or convenience store clerk.
Rather than create such confusion, I would, instead, rely on the
existing mechanism under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to remedy those
rare cases, such as the one presented here, where a verdict is not
consonant with the interests of justice. In my view, the abrogation
of common-law felony-murder to address the perceived unfair-
ness of this conviction, at the expense of innocent victims of
violent crime, is not necessary.

NOTE.

‘The next page is purposely numbered 1001. The page numbers
are the same as they will be in the bound volume, thus making
official citations available upon publication of this preliminary
print.

477 Mass. 1001

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RESCRIPT OPINIONS.

Kaven L. Arrasiasi vs, Commonweatta. May 3, 2017. Supreme Judicial
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

‘The petitioner, Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, is the defendant in a criminal case in the
Cambridge Division of the District Court Department in which he is charged
with criminal harassment in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a). In response to
certain actions and rulings in the trial court he filed two separate petitions in the
county court pursuant to G, L. c. 211, § 3. In the first petition, he asked the court
“to order the removal” of the presiding trial court judge as well as the assistant
district attorney representing the Commonwealth. In the second, he asked the
court to reverse several trial court rulings denying his motions for discovery.
The same single justice denied both petitions without a hearing, and Afrasiabi
appeals."

The two G. L. c. 211, § 3, petitions at issue here are the fourth and fifth such
petitions that Afrasiabi has filed in the county court seeking extraordinary relief
from interlocutory trial court rulings or otherwise related to ongoing trial court
proceedings. See Afrasiabi v. Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2015);
Afrasiabi v. Commonwealth, 466 Mass. 1007, 1007 (2013); Afrasiabi v, Rooney,
432 Mass. 1006, 1007 (2000). In each of the previous cases, his petition was
denied; he appealed to the full court; the appeal was subject to S.J.C. Rule 2:21,
as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001); and Afrasiabi failed to comply with the
rule? So too here. As Afrasiabi is well aware, the rule requires that an appellant
file “a memorandum of not more than ten pages . . . in which the appellant must
set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be
obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other
available means.” $.J.C, Rule 2:21 (2). Although he has filed a document in this
case entitled “memorandum,” the document appears in all respects to be a brief.
Moreover, it utterly fails to address the single issue that is the focus of rule 2:21:
why review of the trial court rulings at issue here cannot adequately be obtained
on appeal from a final adverse judgment.

Afrasiabi’s failure to address the adequate alternative remedy issue is basis
alone for us to “decline to disturb the single justice’s judgment.” Afrasiabi v.
Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2015), citing Rasten v. Northeastern

‘Although the petitioner filed two separate G. L. ¢. 211, § 3, petitions in the county
court resulting in two separate judgments by the single justice, the papers that he has filed
in this court address the judgments together. We do the same.

Moreover, one of the previous G. L. ¢. 211, § 3, petitions involved the same under-
lying criminal case from which the current appeals stem. See Afrasiabi v. Commonwealth,
473 Mass. 1016, 1016 (2015).

1002 477 Mass.

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Univ., 432 Mass, 1003, 1003 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1168 (2001), He
fares no better on the merits in any event. As to the denial of his motions for
discovery, there is no reason why those rulings cannot be adequately addressed
in an appeal from any adverse judgment. See, e.g., Madison v. Commonwealth,
466 Mass. 1033, 1033 (2013), and cases cited. Additionally, as far as his request
for an order removing the presiding judge and the prosecutor, it is unclear from
the record whether Afrasiabi has taken any action in the trial court related to
these issues, such as filing a motion for the judge to recuse herself. Even if he
had, and even if such motion were denied, there is, again, no reason why the
denial of any such motion could not be adequately addressed in a direct appeal
from any adverse judgment. See Bloise y. Bloise, 437 Mass. 1010, 1010 (2002),
citing Doten v. Plymouth Div. of the Probate & Family Court Dep’t, 395 Mass.
1001 (1985).

Given Afrasiabi’s repeated petitions seeking relief in circumstances where he
plainly has an adequate alternative remedy, as well as his repeated failure to
comply with rule 2:21, we now place Afrasiabi on notice that any subsequent
attempt to seek relief from this court pursuant to G. L. ¢, 211, § 3, that suffers
from like deficiencies may result in action by the court, including restriction of
future filings. See Watson v. Walker, 455 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2009).

Judgments affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.
Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, pro se.

WARREN L. Pare vs. HARMONY House, Inc. May 3, 2017. Supreme Judicial
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

The petitioner, Warren L. Pare, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of
this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

The record before us is scant, but as best we can tell, the respondent,
Harmony House, Inc., purchased Pare’s former home at auction and then
commenced a summary process action in the Housing Court to secure posses-
sion of the home. After a judgment in Harmony House’s favor, Pare filed a
motion to waive the appeal bond, pursuant to G. L. c. 239, § 5, which was
allowed. Harmony House appealed from that decision to a single justice of the
Appeals Court. After a hearing, the Appeals Court single justice remanded the
matter to the Housing Court for a determination of the amount of use and
occupancy instalment payments that Pare should make to Harmony House while
his appeal from the summary process judgment was pending. When Pare
subsequently sought to appeal from the single justice’ s decision to a panel of the
Appeals Court, a different single justice struck the notice on the basis that there
is no right of appeal to a panel in the circumstances here presented.? Pare then
filed, in the county court, a document entitled “Application for Direct Appellate

1We express no view as to the correctness of the order striking the notice of appeal to
a panel of the Appeals Court. Unless it is clearly established that no right exists to appeal
from a judgment of a single justice, see, e.g., MeMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178,
189 (2008), the better practice is to enter the appeal and allow the panel to determine the
issue. Cf. Mass. R. A. P. 15 (c), 365 Mass. 859 (1974).

477 Mass. 1003

Reseript Opinions.

Review,” which the single justice treated as a G. L, ¢. 211, § 3, petition, and
denied.

In his appeal to this court, Pare argues that Harmony House had no right to
appeal from the waiver of the appeal bond and that the Appeals Court single
justice therefore had no jurisdiction to hold a hearing on the matter or to issue
any kind of order to the lower court. The record that Pare has supplied to us is,
as we have said, scant, and the record before the single justice was even more
so. It was Pare’s burden, as the petitioner, “to create a record — not merely to
allege but to demonstrate, i.e., to provide copies of the lower court docket
entries and any relevant pleadings, motions, orders, recordings, transcripts, or
other parts of the lower court record necessary to substantiate [his] allegations
— showing both a substantial claim of violation of a substantive right and that
the violation could not have been remedied in the normal course of a trial and
appeal or by other available means.” Gorod y. Tabachnick, 428 Mass. 1001,
1001, cert, denied sub nom, Davis v. Tabachnick, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998), and
cases cited, He did not do this, and it is difficult, if not impossible, based on what
is before us, to ascertain the details of the underlying proceedings in the trial
court and what exactly he seeks by way of relief. What is not difficult to
ascertain is that the single justice acted well within her discretion in declining
to employ this court’s extraordinary power of general superintendence in these
circumstances and on this record, Furthermore, as far as we can tell, Pare did not
raise the same claim before the single justice as he now raises before the full
court, and we therefore need not consider it. See Carvalho v. Commonwealth,
460 Mass. 1014, 1014 (2011), and cases cited.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.
Warren L. Pare, pro se.

Curtis Howe vs. Brockton Division of THe District Court Derar™Ment.
May 3, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

Curtis Howell appeals from a judgment of the county court in which the
single justice declined to grant his petition for relief under G. L.c. 211, § 3. His
petition and other papers, which are disorganized and difficult to decipher,
apparently relate to proceedings to evaluate his competency to stand trial on
criminal charges in the District Court. We affirm.

The case is before us on Howell’s memorandum and appendix pursuant to
S.L.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a party
challenging an interlocutory ruling of the trial court to “set forth the reasons why
review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from
any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.”
Howell has not carried his burden under the rule. In his memorandum, rather
than demonstrating that the District Court judge has made a ruling that cannot
be remedied in the ordinary appellate process or by other means, he presses an
unsubstantiated claim that he has been subjected to unlawful surveillance since
childhood by means of an implanted device. In particular, he does not offer any
reason why G. L. ¢, 123, § 17, which permits any person found incompetent to

1004 477 Mass.

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stand trial to petition the court at any time for a competency hearing, does not
afford adequate review of a determination of incompetency. Moreover, we have
thoroughly reviewed the papers submitted to the single justice and find no basis
to disturb her determination that Howell is not entitled to relief.

Judgment affirmed.

‘The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.
Curtis Howell, pro se.

Paut Cucinetui vs, Commonweatti. May 3, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court,
Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Appellate Division,
Sentence.

Paul Cucinelli appeals from a judgment of the county court dismissing his
petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from a decision of the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court increasing his sentence for armed robbery.! He
has filed a memorandum pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass.
1301 (2001), which requires a party challenging an interlocutory ruling of the
trial court to “set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot
adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial
court or by other available means,”® Rule 2:21 does not apply here, as the
decision of the Appellate Division was not an interlocutory ruling, See Jones v.
Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 1005, 1005 (2012). Nonetheless, it is evident on the
record before us that relief was properly denied. Cucinelli argues that he has no
right to appeal directly to the appellate courts from the Appellate Division’s
decision. That is correct. G. L. ¢. 278, § 28B (decision of Appellate Division
“shall be final”). That, however, does not mean that he is entitled to review
under G. L. c. 211, § 3. “Rarely should we employ our superintendence power
to review rulings in matters in which the Legislature has expressly stated that the
decision of another court or judge ‘shall be final.” ” Commonwealth v. Barros,
460 Mass, 1015, 1015 (2011), quoting Hurley v. Superior Court Dep’t of the
Trial Court, 424 Mass. 1008, 1009 (1997). The single justice neither erred nor
abused her discretion by denying relief.

Judgment affirmed.

‘There is some suggestion that Howell may have been represented by counsel in the
District Court, He proceeded pro se in the county court. “Absent extraordinary circum-
stances, a party represented by counsel in pending criminal proceedings is not entitled to
challenge interlocutory rulings pro se.” Azubuko v. Commonwealth, 464 Mass. 1014, 1014
(2013), citing Commonwealth v Molino, 411 Mass. 149, 152 (1991).

‘The petition was the second one filed by Cucinelli to challenge the same decision. In
his first G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, Cucinelli argued that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel before the Appellate Division. A different single justice of this court
denied relief, and Cucinelli did not appeal from that judgment.

2Cucinelli has not filed an appendix as required by the rule, despite being granted an
extension of time in which to do so. This presents a further reason not to disturb the
decision of the single justice.

3To the extent that Cucinelli may be claiming that the new sentence ordered by the
Appellate Division is illegal, he would have an adequate alternative means of obtaining
review of his sentence. Under Mass. R. Crim, P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501

477 Mass. 1005

Reseript Opinions.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.

Paul Cucinelli, pro se.

Davio Scuumacuer vs. Commonweatt. May 3, 2017. Supreme Judicial
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Sex Offender. Practice, Civil, Sex
offender, Civil commitment.

David Schumacher appeals from a judgment of the county court denying,
without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, $3. In 2013,
Schumacher was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a term in the
State prison, The Commonwealth filed a petition in the Superior Court for
Schumacher’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to
G. L.c. 123A, alleging that he had been convicted of sex offenses in Florida, On
the Commonwealth's motion, a judge in the Superior Court issued an order
temporarily committing Schumacher to the Massachusetts ‘Treatment Center
(treatment center) pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (e), pending a probable cause
determination. Schumacher moved for reconsideration and for relief from tem-
porary commitment, and that motion was denied. Schumacher’s G. L. c. 211,
§ 3, petition, seeking interlocutory relief from the order for temporary commit-
ment, followed. The single justice denied relief without reaching the merits of
Schumacher’s claims on the ground that he has an adequate remedy in the
ordinary appellate process. We affirm.

The case is before us pursuant to S.J.C, Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass.
1301 (2001), which requires Schumacher to “set forth the reasons why review
of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any
final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” He has not
done so, Schumacher argues that, due to his temporary commitment to the
treatment center, he is being deprived of a liberty interest in a way that cannot
be remedied in the ordinary appellate process. He relies on Gangi v. Common-
wealth, 462 Mass. 158 (2012), and Coffin v. Superintendent, Mass. Treatment
Ctr., 458 Mass. 186 (2010), in each of which we permitted interlocutory review
under G. L. c. 211, §3, from the denial of a motion to dismiss ac. 123A
petition." That reliance is misplaced. Schumacher did not move to dismiss the
Commonwealth's c. 123A petition, but only challenged the order of temporary

(2001), Cucinelli “may at any time, as of right, file a written motion requesting the trial
judge to release him . . . or to correct the sentence then being served upon the ground that
the confinement or restraint was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” If such a motion is denied,
Cucinelli will have the right to appeal to the Appeals Court from the denial. Cucinelli
offers no reason why this would not be an adequate alternative remedy.

1Schumacher also relies on an unreported recent decision of a single justice of this
court granting relief on a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in an unrelated case. The fact that a
single justice exercised her discretion and granted relief in a different case does not
obligate other single justices to do likewise and, in any event, is not binding on the full
court. See Esteves v. Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 1003, 1004 (2001) (“The fact that the
single justice chose to do so in that instance does not compel us to decide that the single
justice should have done so in this case, or must do so in every instance”).

1006 477 Mass.

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commitment.”

More importantly, not every interlocutory order in a sexually dangerous
person case — not even every motion to dismiss — is subject to immediate
review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, merely because the party challenging the order
is temporarily committed to the treatment center. See Flood v. Commonwealth,
465 Mass. 1015, 1015-1017 (2013) (extraordinary relief from denial of motion
to dismiss c. 123A petition properly denied, despite claim of liberty interest at
stake; nature of claim, unlike in Gangi, was such that it could adequately be
remedied if necessary on appeal). “Nothing that we said in [the Coffin] case was
intended to mean that G. L. ¢. 211, § 3, is an available avenue for all petitioners
seeking relief from the denial, in the trial court, of a motion to dismiss a petition
for civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person,” Flood, supra at 1017 n.4,
or from the denial of any other type of interlocutory motion in a sexually
dangerous person case. All of Schumacher’s arguments as to the merits —
namely, that the district attorney for the Plymouth district lacked authority to file
the G. L. c, 123A petition in the circumstances of this case, that Schumacher
was not convicted of any sex offense within the meaning of G. L. c. 123A, § 1,
and that the residual clause in the statutory definition of “[s]exual offense” is
vague and overbroad? — can be raised on appeal from an adverse final judgment
in this matter, and the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in
concluding that the ordinary appellate process provides an adequate remedy.

Judgment affirmed.

‘The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.
Joseph M. Kenneally for the petitioner.

Derrick Wastincton vs, Marvio Gacuiant. May 12, 2017. Supreme Judicial
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Medical Malpractice, Tribunal, Bond.
Appeals Court, Jurisdiction. Superior Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Superior
Court.

The petitioner, Derrick Washington, appeals from a judgment of a single
justice of the county court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We
affirm.

In 2011, Washington commenced a medical malpractice action in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the respondent,
Maryjo Gagliani, and several other individuals. Gagliani requested review by a
medical malpractice tribunal pursuant to G. L. ¢. 231, § 60B, and the case was
referred to the Superior Court in Suffolk County for that purpose. See Feinstein
vy. Massachusetts Gen, Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 888 (Ist Cir. 1981).1 In its report
issued in September, 2014, the tribunal determined that Washington’s claim was

?Schumacher’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition before the single justice included a request
that the underlying c. 123A petition be dismissed, but he does not appear to have sought
that relief in the Superior Court.

3We express no view on the merits of these claims.

1Maryjo Gagliani was the only defendant in the Federal court action to request a
medical malpractice tribunal and is thus the only respondent here.

477 Mass. 1007

Reseript Opinions.

not sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial
inquiry, and therefore found for Gagliani.

Washington then filed a motion in the Superior Court to reduce the amount of
the bond that would be required for him to pursue his claim in the face of the
adverse tribunal ruling, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 60B, sixth par. A judge in the
Superior Court denied that motion. Washington next filed in the Superior Court
a notice of appeal that was dated October 19, 2014, and docketed on October 27,
2014. He sought to appeal to the Appeals Court from the tribunal’s ruling. The
notice of appeal was never processed, however, i.e., no record was assembled in
the Superior Court. Gagliani, for her part, filed a motion in the Superior Court
to dismiss Washington’s complaint for failure to post the bond. A judge in the
Superior Court purported to allow Gagliani’s motion on December 24, 2014,
and a judgment of dismissal to that effect was entered on June 25, 2015. But see
Clarke v, Heisey, 16 Mass, App. Ct. 976, 976 (1979) (similar procedural history;
holding that Superior Court “of course, could not dismiss an action brought in
the Federal court”), The matter was then transferred back to the Federal court.

Before the tribunal’s report was officially sent back to the Federal court, the
Federal action had already moved forward. After the tribunal issued its decision,
Washington filed a motion in the Federal action in October, 2014, to stay the
Federal proceedings pending his appeal in the State court. Gagliani, in turn, filed
a motion in the Federal action in December, 2014, to dismiss the complaint
against her on account of Washington’ failure to post a bond. In March, 2015,
Washington’s motion to stay was denied and Gagliani’s motion to dismiss was
allowed. Washington nonetheless continued to take steps to pursue his appeal
from the tribunal ruling to the Appeals Court. When he learned from the
Appeals Court, in August 2015, that it had no record of his appeal, and that his
case had been sent by the Superior Court back to the Federal court, he filed a
petition for relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking to
have his case reinstated in the Superior Court and to be permitted to proceed
with his appeal to the Appeals Court from the adverse tribunal ruling. A single
justice denied the petition.

Specifically, in his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, Washington sought relief from
the Superior Court's “failure to docket and recognize his appeal of” the tribu-
nal’s ruling. At that point, however, the State courts no longer had jurisdiction
over Washington’s case. The Federal court had sent the case to the Superior
Court for the sole purpose of convening the medical malpractice tribunal
requested by Gagliani, See Feinstein, 643 F.2d at 885-887. After the tribunal
issued its ruling, the proper place for Washington to proceed was in the Federal
courts, See Clarke, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 977. In the Clarke case, which involves
a similar procedural history, after the tribunal had ruled in favor of the defend-
ant, the plaintiffs did not file a bond and instead sought to appeal to the Appeals
Court from the tribunal’s ruling, /d, at 976, The Appeals Court dismissed the

2Where a medical malpractice action originates in the Superior Court and a tribunal
finds against the plaintiff, the plaintiff has the option of declining to post the statutorily
required bond, suffering the dismissal of the action, and then appealing to the Appeals
Court to challenge the tribunal’s ruling. See McMahon v. Glixman, 379 Mass. 60, 62-64
(1979).

It is not entirely clear from the record before us, but it appears that Washington may
not have realized that the matter had already been returned to the Federal court.

1008 477 Mass.

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appeal, noting that once the tribunal had rendered its decision, “any further
proceedings belonged in the Federal court.” Id.

So too here. The Superior Court and the Appeals Court had no jurisdiction
after the tribunal’s ruling to act further with respect to that ruling. At most, the
Superior Court might have had the authority to rule on Washington’s motion to
reduce the amount of the bond, but even that is questionable. See Pallazola v.
Rucker, 602 F.Supp. 459, 460 (D. Mass. 1984) (Superior Court judge who
presided over tribunal denied plaintiffs motion to waive bond; plaintiff then
moved in Federal court for reconsideration of tribunal ruling as well as for
reconsideration of action on motion to reduce bond), The place for Washington
to pursue his claims and to challenge the tribunal’s ruling, if he wished to do so,
was in the Federal courts. Indeed, as we have noted, the Federal court proceed-
ings continued even as Washington was attempting to pursue his appeal to the
Appeals Court.

Washington can receive the review to which he is entitled in the Federal
courts, When the judgment in the Federal action becomes final,* he will have an
opportunity to appeal from it and challenge the dismissal of his claim against
Gagliani, just as he would have been entitled to do if the action had originated
in the State court. In short, he has not been prejudiced by any of the events in
the State courts that ensued after the tribunal issued its decision.

For these reasons, there was no error in the single justice’s denial of
Washington’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.

Judgment affirmed.

Derrick Washington, pro se.
Tory A. Weigand for the defendant.

CommoNWEALta ys. Paut Rosinsoy. May 25, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court,
Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Capital case.

Along with a codefendant, Paul Robinson was convicted of two counts of
murder in the first degree and two counts of assault with intent to rob in 1969.
After plenary review, this court affirmed the convictions. Commonwealth v.
McGrath, 358 Mass. 314 (1970), S.C., 408 Mass. 245 (1990) and 437 Mass.
1002, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 980 (2002). Robinson has since filed several
motions for a new trial, all of which have been denied. After the denial of his
most recent (seventh) such motion, Robinson sought leave to appeal pursuant to
the gatekeeper provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E. A single justice of this court
concluded that the motion failed to present a “new and subsiantial question” and
therefore denied such leave. Robinson filed a notice of appeal to the full court
from the single justice’s ruling, and the Commonwealth moved to dismiss.
Robinson asserted in opposition that his appeal ought to be permitted to proceed
despite the longstanding rule that the decision of the gatekeeper is “final and
unreviewable.” E.g., Commonwealth v, Vinnie, 475 Mass. 1011, 1011 (2016),
and cases cited. We gave Robinson an opportunity to explain the basis for his
position in a preliminary statement of no more than five pages. Robinson has

It does not appear that any separate final judgment has entered as to Gagliani. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Federal action remains pending as to the other named defendants.

477 Mass. 1009

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responded with an eleven-page statement of issues, in which he argues essen-
tially that the gatekeeper process leads to arbitrary results and, more particularly,
that his appeal was not allowed to proceed whereas other defendants’ appeals
were.! This is merely a recasting of the equal protection challenge we rejected
in Napolitano y. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 240, 241-242 (2000). We reject it
again here, Robinson received plenary review of his convictions under § 33E on
direct appeal, and he has offered no reason to suppose that his seventh motion
for a new trial raised any new and substantial issue that was not or could not
have been presented in any of the previous six. There is no hint of arbitrariness
in this case, He also has not offered any reason to believe that the “single justice
erred by denying [his] gatekeeper petition on procedural grounds.” Common-
wealth v. Nassar, 454 Mass. 1008, 1009 n.2 (2009). Finally, we reject Robin-
son’s argument that § 33E does not bar an appeal from the decision of the
gatekeeper. “The special function of the single justice mandated by the statute
would be futile and meaningless if his or her rulings were subject to appeal
before the full court.” Commonwealth v. Companiono, 472 Mass. 1004, 1005
(2015), quoting Leaster v, Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 548 (1982). We see
ho reason to depart from our longstanding and well-established rule. See
Companiono, supra, and cases cited.

Appeal dismissed.

The case was submitted on briefs.
David J. Nathanson for the defendant.
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Commonweauta vs. Grorce McGrath. May 25, 2017. Supreme Judicial
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Capital case.
George McGrath purports to appeal from the decision of a single justice of
this court, pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, denying
leave to appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial on charges of
murder in the first degree and assault with intent to rob.! “A defendant who is
denied leave to appeal from a single justice acting as a gatekeeper .. . has no
right to appeal from the single justice’s ruling denying leave. The single
justice’s ruling is ‘final and unreviewable.’” Commonwealth v. Companiono,
472 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2015), quoting Commonwealth y. Gunter, 456 Mass.

‘Ut appears that Robinson intended the memorandum to apply to both his own appeal
and that of his codefendant, who similarly purports to appeal from a decision of the
gatekeeper. See Commonwealth v, McGrath, 477 Mass. 1009 (2017). He incorrectly
asserts that we issued identical orders to him and to his codefendant, affording each of
them five pages. In fact, we issued one order, to Robinson alone.

2Robinson’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Grassie, 416 Mass. 202, 213-218 (2017), is
misplaced, That case involved a direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the second
degree and from an order denying a motion to reduce the verdict, not a final and
unreviewable decision of the gatekeeper pursuant to G. L. c. 278, §33.

'McGrath’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after plenary review. Common-
wealth v. McGrath, 358 Mass. 314 (1970). In addition, we reversed the allowance of
McGrath's previous motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 437 Mass. 46,
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 980 (2002).

1010 477 Mass.

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1017, 1017 (2010), S.C., 459 Mass, 480, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011). We
see no reason to depart from this longstanding rule, See Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 477 Mass. 1008 (2017).

Appeal dismissed.

The case was submitted on briefs.
Kathleen M. McCarthy for the defendant.
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

IN THR Marrer oF AN APPLICATION FOR A CRIMINAL CompLatnt. May 25, 2017.
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal,
Complaint, Standing. Police Officer.

‘The petitioner appeals from a judgment of the county court denying her
petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm the judgment.

‘The petitioner, who was a Boston police officer, filed an application for a
criminal complaint in the West Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court
(BMC), alleging that the respondent, her supervisor, committed an assault and
battery against her. The respondent was the commander of the police station
falling within that court’s jurisdiction, After a hearing, a clerk-magistrate denied
the application for lack of probable cause. G. L. c. 218, § 35A. The petitioner
moved for reconsideration and change of venue. The application was transferred
to the Charlestown Division of the BMC for rehearing by a clerk-magistrate,
although it appears that the application was not docketed until almost one year
later. The petitioner requested that the matter be transferred out of Suffolk
County to Bristol County. That request was denied. The respondent also re-
quested a new hearing and change of venue on the ground that he had a business
relationship with all the divisions of the BMC. As a result, the application was
transferred to the Dedham Division of the District Court Department, nearly
three years after the application was transferred to the Charlestown Division of
the BMC." A clerk-magistrate of that court denied the application, finding no
probable cause. The petitioner then filed her G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, seeking
both a rehearing on her application and a broader ruling requiring that applica-
tions for criminal complaints made against police officers be automatically
transferred to a judge outside the police officer’s jurisdiction, rather than being
heard by a clerk-magistrate in the first instance. The single justice denied relief
without a hearing.

We review the single justice’s denial of relief only to determine whether there
was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Marides v. Rossi, 446 Mass. 1007,
1007 (2006), citing Restucci v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 1031, 1032 (2004).
The petitioner has not demonstrated any error or abuse of discretion as to either
of her claims.

"The nearly three-year delay in the Charlestown Division of the Boston Municipal
Court Department is unacceptable. There is no excuse for this period of delay in any case
scheduled for a clerk-magistrate’s hearing. See G. L. c. 218, § 35A. The delay in this case
is particularly troubling. The parties and the community are not just entitled to a fair and
just adjudication of this matter. The perception of justice must also be scrupulously
protected. Here, it was not. As a result, no matter how just the result in this case may be,
to the petitioner and perhaps others, justice is tainted by the delay.

477 Mass. 1011

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First, the single justice properly denied the petitioner’ s request for a rehearing
of her application for a criminal complaint. It is well established that “a private
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution
of another.” 460 Mass. 1020, 1020-1021 (2011), quoting Hagen y. Common-
wealth, 437 Mass. 374, 380 (2002). For this reason, “we have consistently
declined to review, under the authority given to us by G. L. c. 211, § 3, refusals
to issue complaints.” Bradford v. Knights, 427 Mass. 748, 752 (1998), citing
Tarabolski v. Williams, 419 Mass. 1001, 1002 (1994). See Victory Distribs., Inc.
v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 435 Mass. 136, 141 (2001) (“A private
party’s rights with respect to the criminal complaint process are limited to the
filing of an application and court action on that application”), Where a clerk-
magistrate denies a private party’s application for a criminal complaint, the
applicant’s recourse is to request rehearing by a judge in the same court. See
Bradford, supra at 752-753 (judges of BMC have inherent authority to rehear
denial of application for criminal complaint). See also Commonwealth y. DiBennadetto,
436 Mass. 310, 313 (2002) (“by implication,” judges of District Court have same
authority). Here, the petitioner filed her application, and the BMC, and then the
District Court, acted on it. She has no standing to obtain extraordinary relief in
this matter.”

Second, the single justice did not abuse her discretion by denying the
petitioner’s request for an absolute rule requiring any complaint against a police
officer to be heard by a judge outside the officer’ s jurisdiction. The petitioner has
not demonstrated that the existing criminal complaint procedure raises an issue
of systemic concern requiring the exercise of general superintendence powers.
Cf. Bridgeman vy. District Att’y for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 474-475
(2015), 5.C., 476 Mass. 298 (2017) (misconduct of widespread magnitude at
drug laboratory required exercise of superintendent powers for protection of
defendants convicted of drug offenses). The petitioner argues that, because
police officers frequently appear before clerk-magistrates to apply for search
warrants, arrest warrants, and criminal complaints, and otherwise interact fre-
quently with clerk-magistrates, there is a close working relationship between
them. This relationship, she argues, necessarily gives rise to a conflict of interest
when the clerk-magistrate must decide whether to issue a criminal complaint
‘inst a police officer. The petitioner has not substantiated her claim of

systemic bias in favor of police officers. Moreover, existing procedural safe-
guards, including rehearing by a judge, are adequate to ensure fair consideration
where the accused is a police officer.* In these circumstances, the petitioner was

21t does not appear that the petitioner requested rehearing by a judge in the Dedham
Division of the District Court Department before filing her G. L. ¢. 211, § 3, petition. The
respondent suggests that she could still do so. Nothing we say today is intended to deprive
her of the opportunity to request rehearing by a District Court judge.

°The District Court has written standards urging clerk-magistrates to give “strong
consideration . . . to asking the Regional Administrative Justice either to transfer the
matter to another division or to assign a magistrate from another division” where an
application is filed against a police officer employed in the same jurisdiction. Standard
3:02 of the District Court Standards of Judicial Practice: The Complaint Procedure (2008).
To our knowledge, the BMC does not have analogous standards. The public might be
better served if the BMC would formalize its practice in written standards.

1012 477 Mass.

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not entitled to extraordinary relief.

Judgment affirmed.

Brooks A. Ames for the petitioner.
Douglas I. Louison for the respondent.

Iy Tar Marrer or 4 Granp Jury Investicarion. May 25, 2017. Supreme
Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Moot Question.

The petitioner, R.C., appealed from a judgment of the county court denying
his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, §3. R.C. has been indicted for
possessing and distributing child pornography. In his petition, he sought relief
from an order of a Superior Court judge authorizing computers and digital
storage devices (digital material) seized from his home to be searched for child
pornography, R.C., who is an attorney, argued that the digital material may
contain privileged data provided to him by his clients and that the Superior
Court judge’s order did not adequately protect any such privileged data because
it does not conform to the protocol set forth in Preventive Med. Assocs. v.
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 810 (2013). After the single justice denied relief,
RC, moved to stay the Superior Court order pending this appeal. We denied that
motion, thereby allowing the search to proceed. The Commonwealth has moved
to dismiss this appeal as moot. It represents that the search has taken place
pursuant to the protocol set forth in the Superior Court order, that files allegedly
containing child pornography were transmitted to R.C.’s counsel, and that R.C.
does not claim that any of those files are protected by the attorney-client
privilege. R.C. has not disputed these representations or filed any response to the
motion within the time set forth in Mass. R. A. P. 15 (a), 365 Mass. 859 (1974).
R.C.’s challenge to the Superior Court order has become moot, as that order has
been fully carried out, See Lenardis v. Commonwealth, 452 Mass. 1001, 1001
(2008), No effective relief can be provided. Moreover, we see no reason to
believe that the issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review, and R.C. has
offered none.

Appeal dismissed.

‘The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.

Andrew W. Piltser Cowan for the petitioner.

Varsha Kukafka & Anne S. Yas, Assistant District Attorneys, for the Com-
monwealth.

BHARANIDHARAN PADMANABHAN vs, KiMpeRLEY Your. May 26, 2017. Supreme
Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

‘The petitioner, Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, appeals from a judgment of a
single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. ¢. 211, § 3. We
affirm.

In 2013, the respondent, Kimberley Yout, commenced a product liability
action in the Superior Court against Biogen Inc, and Elan Pharmaceuticals,
LLC, related to a medication used to treat multiple sclerosis. She subsequently
amended her complaint to include Padmanabhan, a medical doctor, and his

477 Mass. 1013

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company, Scleroplex, Inc., claiming medical malpractice stemming from
Padmanabhan’s treatment of her multiple sclerosis with that medication.
Padmanabhan moved to dismiss the claims against both him and, purportedly,
Scleroplex, on several bases: that venue was improper, that service was im-
proper and ineffective, and that the claims were barred by the applicable statute
of limitations.! The motion was denied. Padmanabhan then filed his G. L.
c. 211, § 3, petition, which the single justice denied without a hearing.

There is no reason why review of the denial of Padmanabhan’s motion to
dismiss cannot adgequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse
judgment in the trial court, and Padmanabhan has made no argument to the
contrary, This court’s extraordinary power of general superintendence under
G. L.c. 211, § 3, is not a shortcut for the normal process of trial and appeal. See
Foley v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 398 Mass. 800, 802 (1986)
(“Where a petitioner can raise his claim in the normal course of trial and appeal,
relief will be denied”). All of the claims Padmanabhan raised in his petition in
this case are remediable in the normal course. The single justice therefore did
not err or abuse his discretion in denying the petition.

Judgment affirmed.

‘The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.

Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, pro se.

Kimberly A. Dougherty for the respondent.

CommonweaLTa vs. Davin Lypon. May 26, 2017. Imprisonment, Credit for
time served. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Judicial discretion.

TAs the trial court judge properly noted, although Padmanabhan, who is not a lawyer,
is free to represent himself, he may not represent another person or entity, including
Scletoplex. See Varney Enters., Inc. v. WME, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 79 (1988) (“[A]
corporation may not be represented in judicial proceedings by a corporate officer who is
not an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth”).

1014 477 Mass.

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The defendant, David Lydon, appeals from an order denying his motion for
credit for time being served in a house of correction for one set of offenses,
while he was awaiting trial and sentencing in the Superior Court on a second,
unrelated set of offenses. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the motion
in a unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28, see
Commonwealth y. Lydon, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2017), and this court granted
further appellate review. Although the defendant is not entitled as of right to the
credit he seeks, we recognize that in appropriate circumstances a judge has
discretion to impose a concurrent State prison sentence nunc pro tune to the
commencement of a house of correction sentence then being served. Because
the judge did not consider whether to exercise his discretion in that regard, we
vacate the order, and remand for further consideration.

Discussion. While the defendant was on probation for various drug offenses
(Roxbury charges), he was arrested and arraigned in the District Court for three
new robbery offenses, for which he later was indicted and arraigned in the
Superior Court (Dorchester charges), About five weeks after his arrest on the
Dorchester charges, the defendant stipulated to violation of the conditions of his
probation, was sentenced on the Roxbury charges, and began serving a six-
month committed sentence in the house of correction. One hundred and thirty-
two days later (while he was serving the Roxbury sentence), he pleaded guilty
to the Dorchester charges and was given a committed sentence to State prison
“forthwith and notwithstanding” the Roxbury sentence. The sentencing judge
credited against the Dorchester sentence the thirty-six days the defendant had
been held before sentencing on the Roxbury charges, but denied the defendant’s
motion for additional credit for the 132 days he already had served on the
existing Roxbury sentence.

The defendant does not argue that he was entitled as of right to a 132-day jail
credit on the Dorchester sentence. Instead, his claim is that a judge has
discretion to authorize such credit in these circumstances for two reasons: first,
under Commonwealth y. Ridge, 470 Mass. 1024, 1025 (2015), a judge has
discretion to award jail credit directly; and, second, a judge has discretion to
effectively authorize a credit by imposing a concurrent sentence in a separate
case nunc pro tune to the commencement of the prior sentence. See Common-
wealth y. Barton, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 914 (2009). We reject the first
contention but agree with the second point.

1, Direct jail credit. Ridge, supra, does not support the defendant's claim that
a direct award of jail credit is discretionary in these circumstances. In Ridge, the
defendant was held in lieu of bail on two sets of unrelated charges: one set in
Plymouth County, and the other set in Norfolk County. He was sentenced first
in Norfolk County and was given credit on that sentence for the period of
pretrial detainment, When he was sentenced a year later in Plymouth County to
time concurrent with the Norfolk sentence, he failed to seek jail credit for the
same period of pretrial detention, In that circumstance, the court held that “had
the defendant requested credit for his pretrial detention at the time of the
Plymouth County sentencing, the sentencing judge plainly would have had the
power to accede to or to deny the request.” Ridge, 470 Mass. at 1025. Ridge did
not involve credit “against [one sentence] for the time [a defendant] was
incarcerated on an unrelated . . . sentence,” Ledbetter v. Commonwealth, 456
Mass. 1007, 1009 (2010), and the motion judge properly ruled that the defendant
was not entitled to jail credit on that basis.

477 Mass. 1015

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2. Concurrent sentences. The judge ordered the defendant's State prison
sentence on the Dorchester charges to take effect “forthwith and notwithstand-
ing” the house of correction sentence then being served on the Roxbury charges.
See Dale v. Commissioner of Correction, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 247, 249 (1983).
Pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 27, the effect of such a sentence is that “the sentence
then being served in the jail or house of correction is terminated and the prisoner
is ‘discharged at the expiration of his [State prison] sentence.’ ” Dale, supra,
quoting Kinney, petitioner, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 457, 461 n.3 (1977), We agree with
the defendant that the judge also had discretion to consider whether the circum-
stances warranted imposition of the concurrent State prison sentence nune pro
tunc to the commencement of the house of correction sentence. See Barton, 74
Mass. App. Ct. at 914 (considering possibility of “multiple concurrent sentences
for several different offenses that arise from several different criminal episodes,
pethaps in different counties, but with circumstances being viewed by the later
sentencing judge as warranting an order for the later-imposed sentences to begin
on the same date as the first, nunc pro tunc”). There is a difference between
“whether the judge knew he had discretion and exercised it, or believed that his
decision was compelled.” See Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 400 Mass. 214, 215-216
(1987), In this case, the judge did not recognize his discretionary authority.

Conclusion, The Superior Court judge has not considered whether, in the
exercise of his discretion, the circumstances warrant ordering the defendant’s
concurrent State prison sentence to commence nunc pro tune to commencement
of the house of correction sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the judge’s order
denying the motion for jail credit and remand for reconsideration of the motion
consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Jeffrey A. Garland, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defend-
ant.
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Iy THe Marrer or Davio M. Hass. May 31, 2017. Attorney at Law, Disci-
plinary proceeding, Suspension.

The respondent attomey, David M. Hass, appeals from the order of a single
justice of this court suspending him from the practice of law for two months.!
We affirm.

Background. In early 2013, the respondent settled a client’s personal injury
claim against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) for
$6,600. Understanding that the settlement would not be paid until approximately
July, 2013, the client signed a release of her claim, and the respondent delivered
the release to the MBTA. In late February, 2013, the client informed the
respondent that she wanted to obtain an advance on the settlement, and she
authorized the respondent to provide information about her claim to suppliers of

‘This bar discipline appeal is subject to this court’s rule governing such appeals. See
S.1.C. Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 (2015). We have reviewed the materials filed. Pursuant
to our rule, we dispense with oral argument.

1016 477 Mass.

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such services.* From his work with other clients, the respondent was familiar
with the process. He sent a facsimile transmission to an entity, inquiring about
potential suppliers for the client. Eventually, the client obtained three advances
from two suppliers, and the respondent received related documentation, as
described below:

1, In late February, 2013, the respondent received a “cash advance agree-
ment” and other documents from Global Financial Credit, LLC (Global), indi-
cating that, in consideration of a “cash advance of $1,025.00,” the client assigned
a security interest in the proceeds of the MBTA settlement to Global. The
respondent signed and returned documents acknowledging that he would pay
Global that amount, together with other fees described in the agreement, from
the client’s portion of the MBTA settlement. On March 4, 2013, the respondent
received a formal “notice of assignment” from Global.

2. On or about March 14, 2013, the respondent received documents from
Excel Legal Funding (ELF), Ata meeting at the respondent's office, the client
executed an “irrevocable letter of instruction,” and the respondent signed an
“attorney acknowledgment.” Pursuant to the acknowledgment, the respondent
agreed that the settlement funds would not be disbursed to the client until ELF
was paid in full; acknowledged receipt of the client’ letter of instruction; agreed
to place the documents in his file; and represented that “to my knowledge the
plaintiff has not received any prior cash advances against his/her claim/s.” ELF
thereafter gave notice to the respondent that the client had granted it a “security
interest and lien” in the amount of $920 from the proceeds of her MBTA claim.
The respondent's file has an ELF lien notice sticker affixed to it.

3. On or about April 12, 2013, the respondent received a second letter of
instruction from Global, signed by the client, as well as a cash advance agreement
for $725. The respondent signed and returned to Global an accompanying
acknowledgment representing “that [the client] has NOT previously received a
cash advance against his/her legal claim similar to the attached agreement.”

‘The MBTA paid the $6,600 settlement in late Jume, 2013, and the respondent
deposited the settlement funds into his client trust account. A settlement state-
ment was prepared reflecting the $1,998.00 payoff amount for Global’s two cash
advances to the client and accompanying fees; the respondent's legal fees and
costs of $2,569.30; and the balance, $2,032.70, due to the client. There was no
payoff amount indicated for ELE. The respondent disbursed the amounts indi-
cated on July 2 and 3, 2013.

‘The respondent did not notify ELF of receipt of the MBTA settlement funds.
As of July 2, 2013, under the terms of the client’s agreement with ELF,
approximately $1,265 would have been due, When ELF inquired about the

2The parties refer to this arrangement as “lawsuit funding” or “litigation funding.”
Others have described similar or related arrangements as “alternative litigation finance”
(ALF). See American Bar Association, Commission on Ethics 20/20, Informational
Report to the House of Delegates, at 5 (Feb. 2012). “Defined most generally, ALF refers
to mechanisms that give a third party (other than the lawyer in the case) a financial stake
in the outcome of the case in exchange for money paid to a party in the case.” Id. The
report indicates that “[clonsumer ALF suppliers are distinguishable from settlement
factoring companies; the former take a partial assignment in a claim that has not yet been
settled or reduced to judgment, while the latter purchases a claim that has been reduced
to judgment, typically as a result of a judicially approved settlement.” /d, at 6. We express
no view about the propriety of these arrangements.

477 Mass. 1017

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MBTA settlement and learned that the respondent already had disbursed the
settlement proceeds to the client, it demanded payment from the respondent.
The respondent refused. It was ELF’s request that bar counsel investigate that
gave rise to these proceedings.”

After a hearing, at which the respondent and a witness from ELF testified, a
majority of the hearing panel found that the respondent made intentionally false
statements to Global and ELF concerning the absence of prior cash advances, in
violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.1 (a), 426 Mass. 1401 (1998), and Mass. R. Prof.
C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998). The hearing panel unanimously found that
the respondent failed to comply with the client’s ELF letter of instructions by
failing to contact ELF to determine what the client owed to ELF, in violation of
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426
Mass. 1313 (1998), It also found that the respondent failed to notify ELF that the
settlement proceeds had been received, and failed to promptly deliver funds to
ELE in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (c), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1338
(1998). A majority of the panel recommended a three-month term suspension.
Both the respondent and bar counsel appealed.

‘The board adopted the hearing committee’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law, but recommended that the respondent receive a public reprimand. At bar
counsel’s request, the board filed an information in the county court. See Rules
of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.57(a) (2011). The single justice concluded
that the hearing committee’s findings, adopted by the board, were supported by
the record. He concluded that a two-month term suspension was warranted. The
respondent appeals.

Discussion. We begin with the immutable principle that “[t]he most funda-
mental duty which a lawyer owes the public is the duty to maintain the standards
of personal integrity upon which the community relies. The public expects the
lawyer to be honest and to abide by the law.” Matter of Barrett, 447 Mass. 453,
464 (2006), quoting American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions § 5.0 Introduction (1991). See Matter of Hilson, 448 Mass. 603, 619
(2007). The respondent’s principal argument is that the client’s agreements with
Global and ELF were either void or voidable, pursuant to G. L. c. 271, § 49, and
G. L. c. 140, § 96, and that his own failure to comply with his client’s letter of
instruction and his separate agreements with ELF and Global, as well as the
evident misrepresentations conceming the absence of prior advances contained
therein, therefore should be excused.* We reject that proposition.

The single justice correctly observed that the respondent's ethical obligations
in these circumstances are independent of the validity, legality, or enforceability
of his client’s agreements with the suppliers. See, e.g., Matter of Powers, 26
Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 518 (2010) (suspension of one year and one day
based on false affirmations concerning insurance coverage and falsified insur-
ance declarations, with aggravating factors); Matter of Lippman, 17 Mass. Att’y
Discipline Rep. 381 (2001) (eighteen-month suspension based on failure to
disclose existence of prior unrecorded mortgage, and falsified documents and

®During the disciplinary investigation, the respondent and ELF agreed to settle ELF’s
claim for $700.

40n the view we take of the case, we do not address the respondent’s arguments
concerning the validity of the cash advance arrangements between the respondent's clients
and the suppliers.

1018 477 Mass.

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false statements concerning mortgage, with mitigating and aggravating factors).
‘The respondent falsely represented to two suppliers that, to his knowledge, the
client had not received any prior cash advances against her MBTA settlement,
and the suppliers relied on those representations in deciding to advance funds to
the client.® Irrespective of the validity of the transactions between the client and
the suppliers, the respondent violated his ethical obligation not to “engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or mistepresentation.” Mass. R.
Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998). See Matter of Barrett, 447 Mass. at 464
(“engaging in conduct that is dishonest or deceitful, or that adversely reflects on
an attorney’s fitness to practice, will suffice” to constitute violation of rules of
professional conduct).

The same is true of the respondent’s failure to comply with his client’s
written instructions conceming the MBTA settlement proceeds, and his own
obligations to ELF once the proceeds were received. The hearing committee con-
cluded that the respondent’s failure to notify ELF was the result of “extreme{ |
careless{ness] to the point of gross negligence,” and was not “a conscious
decision.” That conduct is proscribed by the disciplinary rules. The respondent's
post-disbursement rationalization concerning the validity of the underlying ELF
transaction with the client does not excuse his own prior misconduct, Indeed, if
there had been any dispute about the proper disbursement of the settlement funds,
both the rules of professional conduct and the agreement with ELF would have
precluded disbursement to the client until the dispute was resolved.

Taming to the question of sanction, we consider whether the two-month
suspension imposed by the single justice “is markedly disparate from those
ordinarily entered by the various single justices in similar cases.” Matter of
Gustafson, 464 Mass, 1021, 1023 (2013), quoting Matter of Alter, 389 Mass.
153, 156 (1983). “[W]e give ‘no special deference’ to the determination of the
single justice [as to disciplinary sanction] but both we and the single justice give
‘substantial deference’ to the board’s recommendation.” Matter of Sharif, 459
Mass. 558, 563 (2011), quoting Matter of Doyle, 429 Mass. 1013, 1013 (1999).

We agree with the single justice’s observation that the respondent’s miscon-
duct was more serious than a failure promptly to notify a third party and deliver
funds to satisfy a lien, and that more than a public reprimand is required. See
Matter of Kelleher, 26 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 281 (2010) (stipulation to
public reprimand for failing to notify third party and deliver funds to satisfy lien,
where mitigating circumstances, including restitution, present); Matter of
Hughes, 25 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 277 (2009) (same). We also agree that
the respondent’s misconduct is less egregious than that in Matter of Phillips, 24
Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 547 (2008). In that case, the attorney was sus-
pended for three months based on an intentional breach of fiduciary duty and
violation of a court order to create a trust (with the proceeds of a settlement) for
the benefit of a client’s child, by facilitating the client’s access to the child’s
funds. It is also less egregious than that in Matter of Rafferty, 21 Mass. Att’y
Discipline Rep. 550 (2005), where the single justice accepted a stipulation to a
three-month suspension for an attorney who violated a court order to preserve
settlement funds for the benefit of a minor by paying one-half of the funds to the

®We presume that the respondent was not of the view, at the time the misrepresentations
were made, that the proposed transactions were “illegal.” Otherwise, the petition for
discipline might well have charged additional misconduct.

477 Mass. 1019

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minor or to her landlord for household expenses, and later lost track of the funds.
Although restitution of the full settlement amount was made in both Phillips and
Rafferty, unlike in those cases, in this case, no violation of a court order was
involved.

The hearing committee, as the sole judge of credibility, declined to credit the
respondent's explanations for his misconduct, and found no factors to weigh in
mitigation of sanction. Its findings were adopted by the board and the single
justice. With respect to factors in aggravation, the board and the single justice
adopted the hearing committee’ findings concerning the respondent’s substan-
tial experience in personal injury law and practice in general, and his experience
with litigation funding suppliers in particular. See Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass.
308, 311-312 (1993). The same was true of his apparent lack of insight with
respect to the ethical obligations imposed by the rules of professional conduct,
see Matter of Clooney, 403 Mass. 654, 657 (1998), lack of remorse, and lack of
candor in the disciplinary proceedings, see Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass.
448, 457, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 919 (1998). Considering all of these factors, we
are satisfied that a two-month suspension is not markedly disparate from the
sanctions imposed in comparable cases.

Finally, we note that the respondent filed a motion to dismiss in the county
court. He contends that the motion should have been allowed, because bar
counsel did not address in the county court the points he raised regarding the
board’s findings. Although bar counsel did not respond expressly to the respon-
dent’s motion, she did not concede that there was error, The single justice
independently reviewed the record and concluded that the board’s findings were
supported by substantial evidence. See Matter of Barrett, 447 Mass. at 459-460;
Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 364 (1999). Although a party risks much by
failing to respond to an argument raised by an opponent, that failure does not
equate necessarily with victory for the opponent.

Conclusion. The order of the single justice, imposing a two-month term
suspension, is affirmed.

So ordered.

‘The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.
David M. Hass, pro se.

Iy tHe Marrer or Barry D, Greene. May 31, 2017. Attorney at Law,
Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension.

‘The respondent attorney, Barry D. Greene, appeals from the order of a single
justice of this court suspending him from the practice of law for two years.! We
affirm.

We acknowledge that, after the disciplinary proceedings commenced, the respondent
reached a settlement with ELF.

"This bar discipline appeal is subject to J.C. Rule 2:23 (b), 471 Mass. 1303 (2015).
Pursuant to the rule, we dispense with oral argument and decide the case on the basis of
the materials filed by the respondent.

1020 477 Mass.

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Background. Bar counsel filed a petition for discipline, which was twice
amended, with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) against the respondent
arising out of his participation in seven residential mortgage foreclosure “rescue
transactions” during 2005 and 2006. At the time, the respondent worked with his
son, attorney Evan A. Greene, at a law firm specializing in real estate transac-
tions.” See Matter of Greene, 416 Mass. 1006 (2016). We previously described
those transactions, and do not repeat that discussion here.* /d.

After a hearing, a hearing committee of the board concluded that the respon-
dent made misrepresentations on mortgage applications in three matters, and
falsely certified the accuracy of incomplete and misleading HUD-1 closing
statements in four matters, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) and (b), 426
Mass. 1314 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998). In
addition, the hearing committee concluded that by inducing an associate attor-
ney to falsely certify the accuracy of HUD-I closing statements, the respondent
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (a), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998); and he directly or
indirectly caused false documents to be delivered to his lender clients and failed
to notify the lenders of the leases and option agreements, in violation of Mass.
R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) and (b), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (a) and (c). The hearing
committee also concluded that, by placing his own interests ahead of his lender
clients’ interests, and by assigning associate attorneys to close transactions
affected by his own or his son’s conflicts of interest, the respondent violated
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (b), as amended, 430 Mass. 1301 (1999), and Mass. R.
Prof. C. 8.4 (a). In addition, the hearing committee concluded that the respon-
dent’s withholding of relevant information from one client and his failure to
follow the client’s closing instructions violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 426 Mass.
1308 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); and Mass. R.
Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998). The hearing committee also determined
that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) by “exploit{ing], through
dishonest and deceitful means, vulnerable and uninformed individuals who were
desperate to save their homes.” Finally, the hearing committee found that, by
commingling personal and trust funds, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.
1.15 (b), as appearing in 40 Mass. 1338 (2004).

‘The hearing committee declined to weigh in mitigation of sanction payments
made in settlement of threatened litigation, the absence of prior discipline over
a substantial legal career, and the absence of harm to his own lender clients. It
weighed in aggravation its finding that the respondent’s conduct was motivated
by pecuniary gain at the expense of vulnerable and unsophisticated individuals,
and the breadth and scope of the transactions. It recommended that the respon-

2Bvan A. Greene was the subject of separate bar disciplinary proceedings. See Matter
of Greene, 476 Mass. 1006 (2016). We concluded in that case that an indefinite suspension
was appropriate, based in part on twelve criminal convictions that are not here at issue.

®We acknowledge the respondent's argument concerning the fact that the same assistant
board counsel assisted the board's hearing committee at the disciplinary hearings con-
ducted for him and the separate disciplinary proceedings involving his son. The board
found that the respondent waived any objection by failing to raise it before the hearing
committee. Moreover, the respondent has not identified any evidence suggesting that
assistant board counsel's presence influenced the hearing committee or prejudiced the
respondent in any way, and he does not contend that the hearing committee’s findings,
which were adopted by the board, are not supported by substantial evidence. We do not
address this argument further.

477 Mass. 1021

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dent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. The board adopted the
hearing committee’s report and recommendation, and filed a corresponding
information in the county court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §8 (6), as
appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 (2009). The single justice ordered that the
respondent be suspended for two years. The respondent appeals to the full court,
arguing that the sanction is too harsh.4

Discussion. Because the respondent does not contest the misconduct, the only
issue before us is whether the sanction imposed by the single justice “is
markedly disparate from those ordinarily entered by the various single justices
in similar cases.” Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 156 (1983). Where, as here,
an attorney’s misconduct spans multiple false HUD-1 closing statements, the
sanctions imposed generally have ranged between eighteen months and two
years. See Matter of Alberino, 27 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 1 (2011) (stipu-
lation to eighteen-month suspension for conduct involving three false HUD-1
documents, with aggravating and mitigating factors); Matter of Foley, 26 Mass.
Att’y Discipline Rep. 199, 201-202 (2010) (eighteen-month suspension for false
HUD-1 documents in twenty-four closings that were part of one large transac-
tion in single day); Matter of Coppo, 26 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 113 (2010)
(stipulation to eighteen-month suspension, for preparation of three false HUD-1
documents and conflict of interest); Matter of Marks, 23 Mass. Att’y Discipline
Rep. 438 442 (2007) (stipulation to two-year suspension for misconduct in four
transactions). In this case, the respondent's misconduct additionally involved
multiple conflicts of interest motivated by self-interest or selfish motive. See,
e.g., Matter of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 745 (1990) (six-month suspension for
attorney who had “direct financial interest” in transaction, with resulting pre-
judice to client); Matter of Tobin, 7 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 290, 294-295
(1991) (one-year suspension for “glaring” conflict of interest involving assisting
client to perpetuate fraud and take advantage of unsophisticated homeowner).
We consider the misconduct in this case to be more egregious than in Matter of
Foley, supra, because multiple transactions were involved over a substantial
period of time, the transactions gave rise to conflicts of interest motivated by
pecuniary self-interest, the respondent “was an investor in the transactions|.]
and . . . the misrepresentations were made to his firm’s clients.” Matter of
Greene, 476 Mass. at 1009 (“Had the HUD-1 violations been the only basis for
discipline, we would be satisfied that a two-year suspension is not markedly
disparate from the sanctions imposed in comparable cases”). In addition, the
board found that he commingled personal funds with client trust funds. In the
circumstances, the single justice’s determination that a two-year suspension is
appropriate is not markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed in comparable
cases.

Like the single justice, the board, and the hearing committee, we have
considered the factors proposed in mitigation or aggravation of sanction. We
agree that the respondent’s age and the absence of prior discipline are “typical”
mitigating circumstances that do not weigh in mitigation of sanction. See Matter
of Alter, 389 Mass. at 157. Likewise, although the respondent may have
obtained favorable results for the one homeowner who exercised the repurchase

4 Although the respondent appeared and argued at a hearing before the single justice, he
did not file a brief, We do not consider on appeal issues or arguments that were not raised
before the single justice.

1022 477 Mass.

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option, that is, as the single justice concluded, an “ordinary result expected of a
reasonably competent attorney,” not a factor to be considered in mitigation.
Finally, making payments in settlement of threatened litigation after the com-
mencement of these disciplinary proceedings neither evidences remorse nor, in
these circumstances, factors into determining the appropriate sanction. See
Matter of LiBassi, 449 Mass. 1014, 1017 (2007) (“Recovery obtained through
court action ‘is not “restitution” for purposes of choosing an appropriate
sanction’ ” [citation omitted]).

Conclusion, The primary factor in attorney discipline is “the effect upon, and
perception of, the public and the bar.” Matter of Kerlinsky, 428 Mass. 656, 664,
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160 (1999), quoting Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821,
829 (1994). In this case, the respondent used his considerable experience in the
practice of law to implement a series of transactions designed to take advantage
of vulnerable homeowners in precarious financial positions, concealed the
nature of the transactions from his lender clients out of a self-interested motive,
and engaged in multiple conflicts of interest. Giving “substantial deference to
the board’s recommendation,” Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 333 (2003), we
conclude that a two-year suspension from the practice of law is warranted. The
order of the single justice is therefore affirmed.

So ordered.

‘The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.
Barry D. Greene, pro se.

Joanne M. Popp vs. Rosext L. Pore. May 31, 2017. Divorce and Separation,
Alimony, Modification of judgment.

Joanne M. Popp argues that the application of the durational limits of the
Alimony Reform Act of 2011 (act), St. 2011, c. 124, to the alimony agreement
between her and her former husband, Robert L. Popp, is unconstitutionally
retroactive, For reasons set forth in our decision issued today in Van Arsdale v.
Van Arsdale, 477 Mass. 218 (2017), we conclude that the act’s durational limits
are constitutional. We address here Joanne’s claim that the Probate and Family
Court judge abused her discretion in declining to award Joanne alimony beyond
the act’s durational limits.

Background. Joanne and Robert were married in 1988 and divorced in 1994,
‘They remarried in 1996 and divorced again in 2011. The parties’ separation
agreement provided for Robert to pay Joanne $12,000 per month in alimony.
The relevant alimony provisions of the agreement merged with the divorce
judgment.

In 2014, Robert sought to modify his alimony obligation, claiming a material
change of circumstances, G. L. c. 208, § 49 (e), because his income had
decreased by fifty-five per cent. The judge agreed with Robert that his decreased
income was a material change of circumstances warranting modification, and
reduced the monthly alimony payments to $8,575. The judge also applied the
act’s durational limits, G. L. c, 208, § 49, to the agreement, and ordered that
based on the length of the parties’ second marriage, Robert’s alimony obligation
would terminate in August, 2020.

477 Mass. 1023

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Discussion. Aside from the constitutional claim, see Van Arsdale, supra,
Joanne claims that the judge abused her discretion by ordering alimony to
terminate in 2020, the presumptive termination date provided for in the act. See
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass, 653, 661 (2014) (alimony modification judgments
reviewed for abuse of discretion). Specifically, Joanne claims that the judge did
not consider two of the factors set forth in G. L, c. 208, § 53 (a) (ability to
maintain marital lifestyle and lost economic opportunity as a result of the
marriage) that the judge is obligated to consider. See Duff-Kareores v. Kareores,
474 Mass, 528, 535-536 (2016). After examining the judge’s detailed written
findings, we are satisfied that all the relevant factors were considered. In regard
to the two allegedly missing factors, the judge made detailed findings about
Joanne’s employment and earnings history throughout the parties’ relationship,
as well as Joanne’s current financial situation; these findings support the result
she reached. In sum, the judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that
Joanne failed to prove that deviation beyond the act’s durational limits was
required in the interests of justice at the time of the hearing on the complaint for
modification2® G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b). See George v. George, 416 Mass. 65, 70
(2016).

Judgment affirmed.

Richard M. Novitch (Elaine M. Epstein also present) for the wife.
Patricia A, DeJuneas for the husband.

Mictaet L. Lancan vs. Boar of RecisTaation iw Mepicine. June 13, 2017.
Board of Registration in Medicine. Doctor, License to practice medicine.
Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari.

Michael L, Langan appeals from a judgment of the county court denying his
petition for relief in the nature of certiorari from a decision of the Board of
Registration in Medicine (board). We affirm.

Background. Langan is a board-certified physician in geriatrics and internal
medicine. In 2008, after he had tested positive for various controlled substances,

‘Joanne Popp also appears to argue that the judge erred by not including the length of
the parties’ first marriage in her calculation of the length of the marriage for purposes of
determining the presumptive termination date of alimony under the Alimony Reform Act
of 2011 (act), G. L. c. 208, § 49 (6). She makes this argument in one footnote and in
passing references in the text without citation to legal authority. This argument is therefore
waived. Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).

2Prior to the presumptive termination of alimony in 2020, Joanne is free to file a motion
arguing that deviation beyond the durational limits is required in the interests of justice,
G.L. ©. 208, § 49 (b). If she chooses to do so, the circumstances of the parties should be
examined as they exist at the time such motion is filed. See George v. George, 476 Mass.
65, 70 (2016).

Robert Popp requests attorney's fees and costs associated with this appeal on the basis
that it was frivolous. See G. L. c. 211A, § 15. “An appeal is frivolous ‘[w]hen the law is
well settled, when there can be no reasonable expectation of a reversal.’ ” Avery v. Steele,
414 Mass. 450, 455 (1993), quoting Allen v. Batchelder, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 453, 458
(1984), Prior to this appeal (and the appeal in Van Arsdale v, Van Arsdale, 477 Mass. 218
[2017], also decided today), this court had not confronted the constitutionality of the act's
durational limits. Accordingly, this area of law was not well settled and the appeal was not
frivolous. Robert's request is denied.

1024 477 Mass.

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he and the board entered into a letter of agreement, under which he agreed to
certain conditions in order to continue practicing medicine, including refraining
from the use of alcohol and controlled substances without a prescription and
submitting to substance use monitoring by Massachusetts Physician Health
Services (PHS). The letter of agreement provided that violating its terms would
“constitute sufficient grounds for the immediate suspension of [Langan’s] li-
cense,” and that Langan had a right to an adjudicatory hearing as to any
violation found by the board.

After Langan entered into the letter of agreement, PHS reported three positive
tests, at low levels, for ethyl glucuronide (EtG) and ethyl sulfate (EtS), two
alcohol biomarkers. The board took no action at that time. In June and July,
2011, however, Langan tested positive for the same biomarkers, at higher
levels." As a result of these positive tests, PHS requested that Langan undergo
an inpatient evaluation, and the board asked him to enter into a voluntary
agreement not to practice pending completion of such an evaluation, Langan
refused at first, causing the board to find him in violation of the letter of
agreement, Langan then underwent the inpatient evaluation in September, 2011.

On February 1, 2012, Langan, represented by counsel, signed an addendum
to his letter of agreement requiring, in particular, that he “participate in a
minimum of three (3) 12-step meetings per week” and “submit proof of said
participation to PHS.” In October, 2012, PHS reported that Langan had mis-
represented attending meetings. In November, 2012, Langan again tested posi-
tive for EtS and EtG. Langan entered into a voluntary agreement not to practice
and was asked to produce documentation that he had attended all required
meetings. He did not do so, and in February, 2013, the board determined, based
on all the documentation before it, that Langan was in violation of his letter of
agreement for the second time. The board therefore suspended his license. The
2013 order of suspension provided that any stay of the suspension would be
contingent on an independent psychiatric examination, a worksite monitoring
plan, and a substance abuse monitoring plan. Langan did not exercise his right
to obtain review of the 2013 order.

In 2014, Langan petitioned the board for a stay of his suspension. By that
time, he had undergone a psychiatric examination by a board-approved evalu-
ator, who provided a favorable evaluation. However, he failed to submit the
necessary worksite and substance use monitoring plans. The board denied
Langan’s petition, reaffirmed his suspension, and stated that he could file a new
petition “upon submission of proof of abstinence from alcohol and controlled
substances for twelve consecutive months.” Langan filed a petition in the county
court seeking relief in the nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 42 See
Hoffer v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 458 (2012) G. L.
c. 249, § 4, provides avenue of relief from board decision not to reinstate
license). That petition was dismissed as untimely, having been filed more than

1n addition, in July, 2011, a test for a different biomarker, phosphatidylethanol, came
back positive. This test, however, was tainted by a chain of custody issue and played no
part in the board’s decisions.

2 angan also requested relief under G. L. ¢. 211, § 3. Such relief was denied on the
ground that Langan had an adequate remedy under G. L. . 249, § 4. In addition, our
superintendence power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, extends only to the lower courts of the
Commonwealth, and not to executive branch bodies such as the board.

477 Mass. 1025

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sixty days after the board’s decision. Langan did not appeal from the judgment
of dismissal.

Finally, on January 15, 2015, Langan again petitioned the board for a stay of
his suspension. He did not include any records, such as test results, demonstrat-
ing that he had abstained from alcohol and controlled substances. He also did
not include worksite and substance use monitoring plans, as required by the
2013 order as a condition of reinstatement. The board again denied Langan’s
petition and reaffirmed the suspension of his medical license. Langan timely
filed his petition for relief under G. L. c. 249, § 4, which was denied by a single
justice of this court.? Langan now appeals from that judgment.

Discussion. The board’s decision denying Langan’s reinstatement to his
chosen profession is reviewable under G. L. c. 249, § 4, the certiorari statute.
Hoffer, 461 Mass. at 458. Certiorari is a “limited procedure reserved for
correction of substantial errors of law apparent on the record created before a
judicial or quasi judicial tribunal.” Indeck v. Clients’ Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379,
385 (2008), quoting School Comm. of Hudson v. Board of Educ., 448 Mass. 565,
575-576 (2007). “[T]he proper standard of review under the certiorari statute is
flexible and case specific, but. . . as with review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, the
disposition must ultimately turn on whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary
and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise an error of
law.” Hoffer, supra at 458 n.9. Moreover, “[t]he board has broad authority to
regulate the conduct of the medical profession, . . . which authority includes its
ability to sanction physicians for conduct which undermines public confidence
in the integrity of the medical profession.” Sugarman v. Board of Registration
in Med., 422 Mass. 338, 342 (1996), citing Kvitka v. Board of Registration in
Med., 407 Mass. 140, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990). In reviewing the
board’s decision, we defer to its expertise. Sugarman, supra at 347.

‘As Langan made no timely challenge to the 2013 order suspending his license
or to the 2014 order denying a stay of the suspension, the sole issue before the
single justice was the propriety of the board’s 2015 order. In that order, the board
found that Langan failed to fulfil the conditions of reinstatement expressly set
forth in the 2013 and 2014 orders: submission of a worksite monitoring plan,
submission of a substance use monitoring plan, and proof of abstinence from
alcohol and controlled substances for twelve consecutive months. As a result,
the board concluded that Langan had not demonstrated his sobriety and fitness
to practice medicine. The board’s findings are amply supported by the evidence,
and its 2015 order denying a stay and reaffirming the suspension is well within
its broad discretion to regulate the conduct of the medical profession.

Langan’s arguments on appeal are unavailing. Langan alleges that the chain
of custody error in a July, 2011, phosphatidylethanol (PEth) test was the result
of deliberate fraud.4 See note 1, supra. That is a serious and disturbing charge,
but one that is not substantiated in the record. Moreover, the PEth test results

In connection with the proceedings before her, the single justice encouraged the parties
to settle on terms of reinstatement and gave them a sixty-day period to attempt to do so.
Contrary to Langan's suggestion, the single justice did not and could not “order” the
parties to settle. When the parties were unable to reach an agreement, she quite properly
proceeded to rule on Langan’s petition,

40On a related point, Langan argues that the board violated G. L. c. 112, § 5, by failing
to investigate his charges of fraud at PHS. He did not raise this issue before the single
justice, and in any event, the board’s action or inaction on any other complaint provides
him with no defense.

1026 477 Mass.

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formed no part of the basis for any of the board’s decisions in this matter.
Langan was suspended for misrepresenting his attendance at twelve-step sup-
port group meetings, not for failing the PEth or any other test, and he was denied
reinstatement for failing to fulfil the conditions thereof.

Langan also argues that his rights under the establishment clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated by the requirement
that he attend twelve-step support group meetings. Even assuming that such
support groups are religiously based, his argument fails for several reasons.
Langan voluntarily agreed to attend meetings when he signed the 2012 adden-
dum to the letter of agreement; the requirement was not unilaterally imposed by
the board, Langan did not timely challenge the suspension. Moreover, the
board’s 2015 decision makes it clear that Langan would have been permitted to
attend a secular support group if he had so requested. Finally, and most
importantly, the 2015 decision, which is the only one properly before us, was not
based on Langan’s failure to attend meetings, but on his failure to fulfil the
conditions of reinstatement.

Because the board committed no error in denying Langan’s petition to stay
his suspension, the single justice properly denied relief in the nature of certio-
rari

Judgment affirmed.

Michael L. Langan, pro se.
Bryan F. Bertram, Assistant Attorney General, for Board of Registration in
Medicine.

BHARANIDHARAN PADMANABHAN vs, Boarp of REGISTRATION IN MeDiciNE &
another! June 27, 2017. Board of Registration in Medicine. Administrative
Law, Decision.

The petitioner, Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, appeals from a judgment of a
single justice of the county court dismissing his petition for relief in the nature
of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4. On May 18, 2017, we issued an order
affirming the single justice’s judgment and indicated that this opinion would

In 2010, Padmanabhan, a medical doctor, was terminated from his position at
Cambridge Health Alliance, a termination that he alleges was based on false
claims that he harmed patients and in retaliation for certain actions that he took,
including reporting purported insurance fraud. Subsequent to his termination,
the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) commenced disciplinary proceed-
ings against him, and referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Law
Appeals (DALA). Following an evidentiary hearing that spanned eight days,
the DALA magistrate issued his recommended decision in August, 2015. The

5We recommend that the board provide Langan with model worksite and substance use
monitoring plans if it has not already done so.

‘Division of Administrative Law Appeals.

The parties do not specifically state, and the record before us does not appear to
indicate, when exactly the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) began its investi-
gation of Padmanabhan. It issued its statement of allegations against him in July, 2014.

477 Mass. 1027

Reseript Opinions.

board subsequently remanded the case to the magistrate, in January, 2016,
asking the magistrate to elaborate on certain parts of his decision and, among
other things, to include credibility determinations and clarify certain inconsis-
tencies in the decision. In March, 2016, the magistrate issued an order indicating
that he was preparing a revised recommended decision for the board in response
to the remand order.

Shortly thereafter, Padmanabhan filed a “Renewed Complaint in the Nature
of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” in the county court. In the petition he
argued that his due process rights had been violated in various ways during the
course of the board proceedings. He also argued that the recommended decision
issued by the magistrate in August, 2015, became final in February, 2016,
pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(3) (1998), and that his petition
thus did not stem from, or seek relief from, an interlocutory ruling but rather
what was, in effect, a final decision of the board. The board moved to dismiss
the petition on the basis that the proceedings before it had not yet concluded and
that it had not yet issued a final decision. The single justice dismissed the
petition without a hearing.*

In his appeal, Padmanabhan continues to argue that the magistrate’s recom-
mended decision became the board’s final decision pursuant to 801 Code Mass.
Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(3), and that his appeal is thus not interlocutory. The regu-
lation provides that if an agency such as the board “fails to issue a final decision
within 180 days of the filing or re-filing of [a] tentative decision, the initial
decision shall become the final decision of the [algency, not subject to further
[algency review.” In Padmanabhan’s view, the magistrate’s recommended de-
cision, issued in August, 2015, became the board’s final decision in February,
2016, 180 days after it was issued. After the board received the recommended
decision, however, it remanded the case to the magistrate for additional findings
and clarification, pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(2), and it did
so within 180 days of having received the recommended decision. In other
words, the remand was timely. In that circumstance, according to the board,
when it recommits a tentative decision to the presiding officer — in this case the
DALA magistrate — the 180-day period referred to in 801 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 1.01(11)(c)(3) will begin to run anew when a revised decision is refiled. See
801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(2) (“[t]he same procedural provisions
applicable to the initial filing of the tentative decision shall apply to any re-filed
tentative decision after recommital”).

We agree in the circumstances presented here that the board’s decision was
not yet final when Padmanabhan filed his petition in the county court, and that
his attempt to have review at that juncture was premature.* We note as well that
when the board issues a final decision, the appropriate avenue to seek review is

Padmanabhan previously filed a similar petition for relief in the county court in 2014,
In that petition, he sought review of the DALA magistrate’s denial of his motion to
dismiss the disciplinary proceedings. A single justice allowed DALA’s motion to dismiss
the petition on the basis that the magistrate’s decision was interlocutory, not subject to
judicial review at that time, and that Padmanabhan would be entitled to seek review
pursuant to G. L. ¢. 112, § 64, at the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings before the
board. Padmanabhan did not appeal from the dismissal of this earlier petition.

‘The circumstances here differ from those presented in McGuiness v. Department of
Correction, 465 Mass. 660 (2013), where we also considered 801 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 1.01(11)(c)(3). In that ease, a Civil Service Commission (commission) vote on whether
to adopt a DALA magistrate’s findings of fact and recommended decision resulted in a

1028 477 Mass.

Reseript Opinions.

by a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 64, not via a petition for relief in the
nature of certiorari, as Padmanabhan filed here. See, e.g., Picciotto v. Appeals
Court (No. 2), 457 Mass. 1002, 1002, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1044 (2010), and
cases cited (“certiorari relief designed to correct errors not otherwise reviewable
by motion or by appeal” [quotation and citation omitted]). The single justice, in
short, did not err or otherwise abuse his discretion in dismissing the petition.

Although Padmanabhan’s argument regarding finality is ultimately unavail-
ing, we are not unsympathetic to his situation. The board issued its statement of
allegations against him in July, 2014, almost three years ago, and Padmanabhan
claims that his medical career has essentially been in limbo ever since. We do
not condone the lengthy disciplinary process to which Padmanabhan has been
subjected. Indeed, we have serious concerns about the potential for repeated
recommitals and, in turn, repeated resettings of the 180-day clock pursuant to
801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(2), and to the elongated process that could
result, In this case, as it turns out, the DALA magistrate issued his amended
recommended decision in August, 2016, while this appeal has been pending, and
the board has since adopted that decision and suspended Padmanabhan’s li-
cense.* For Padmanabhan, therefore, it appears that the end of the administrative
process is imminent, He now has the opportunity to pursue judicial review of the
final decision of the board, which he may do pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 64. In
that appeal, he will be free to raise issues related to the procedural aspects of the
disciplinary process and the length of time that process took in his case.

For these reasons, we affirmed the judgment of the single justice.

Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, pro se.
Samuel M. Furgang, Assistant Attorney General, for Board of Registration in
Medicine & another.

Richarp ZacRaNski vs. Commonweacma. June 27, 2017. Supreme Judicial
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Capital case.
The petitioner, Richard Zagranski, was convicted of murder in the first degree
in 1989, We affirmed the conviction, See Commonwealth v. Zagranski, 408
Mass. 278 (1990). In 2012, Zagranski filed a motion for postconviction relief,
claiming that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and
seeking, among other things, an order granting him a new trial, an order vacating

two-to-two tie. See id. at 662. We concluded that the tie vote amounted to a “failure to
make a final decision” and, pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(3), resulted
in the magistrate’s decision becoming the final decision of the commission by default. See
id, at 666. In doing so we noted that the commission “did not fail to act for want of effort;
it did not act because it could not, given the voting deadlock.” /d. Here, however, the board
did act.

5In January, 2017, while this appeal was pending, Padmanabhan filed an “Emergency
Injunction” in this court asking for a stay of any further proceedings before the board. The
board opposed the attempt to prohibit it from issuing a final decision. A single justice
denied the motion.

In addition to the concerns expressed above, we also are troubled by the fact that
counsel for the board was unsure of the practical consequences of Padmanabhan’s
situation (¢.g., whether he can effectively practice medicine, and get paid to do so, pending
the board’s decision). It behooves the board to understand its own disciplinary process and
the effect of that process on those subject to it.

477 Mass. 1029

Reseript Opinions.

his conviction, or an order reducing the degree of the offense. He set forth
several bases for the ineffective assistance claim including, as is relevant here,
that his counsel had a conflict of interest that impaired counsel’s ability to
provide effective representation.! The postconviction motion was denied.
Zagranski then filed, in the county court, a petition for leave to appeal pursuant
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in which he continued to press the conflict of interest
argument. A single justice denied the petition, in August, 2013, as well as
Zagranski’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.2

In February, 2016, Zagranski filed a “Petition for Extraordinary Relief
Pursuant to [G. L. c.] 211, § 3,” in the county court in which he claimed that the
transcript of the hearing at which the trial judge considered the conflict of
interest issue was not a part of the record that was before this court when it
considered his direct appeal. In Zagranski’s view, the court was thus not able to
fulfil its duty pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to review “the whole case”
because the court did not have a complete record of the trial court proceedings.
A single justice denied the petition on the bases that Zagranski has an adequate
alternative remedy — to seek postconviction relief in the trial court — and that
his petition did not, in any event, raise a “new and substantial” issue that would
entitle him to review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Zagranski has appealed
from the single justice’s denial of his petition; the Commonwealth has moved to
dismiss the appeal.

A decision of a single justice denying leave to appeal under G. L. ¢. 278,
§ 33K, is final and unreviewable, and Zagranski cannot circumvent that by
seeking relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 451
Mass. 1008, 1009 (2008), citing Leaster v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 549
(1982). See also Napolitano v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 240, 241 (2000)
(gatekeeper decision pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, cannot be appealed to full
court or collaterally attacked on merits through other means). Zagranski none-
theless argues that seeking postconviction relief in the trial court is illogical,
because what he is asking for is not a new trial or other action in the trial court;
rather, he seeks a new appeal on the ground that, in his view, his direct appeal
did not get the “whole case” review to which he is entitled. At its core, however,
Zagranski’s argument remains one of ineffective assistance of counsel. That
issue should generally first be raised in a motion for postconviction relief in the
trial court, so that an adequate record can be developed. Commonwealth v.
Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 810-812 (2006), and cases cited. We do not discount the
possibility that he may be entitled to relief, but he should proceed in the first
instance in the trial court, not in this court.

"The conflict of interest issue was considered by the trial judge at the time of trial, but
the fact that Zagranski did not raise it in his direct appeal did not preclude his raising it
in his motion for a new trial where the same counsel represented him both at trial and in
the direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Edgardo, 426 Mass. 48, 49-50 (1997), and cases
cited.

?Zagranski’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was
also denied.

3We think it worth noting that Zagranski has previously raised the conflict of interest
issue in his earlier motion for postconviction relief. It will be incumbent on him to show
that his current argument regarding the record is not simply an attempt to make an end run
around the denial of his earlier motion and denial of leave to appeal pursuant to G. L.
©. 278, §33E.

1030 477 Mass.

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The single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief under
GL. ¢. 211, 83.

Judgment affirmed.

‘The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum
of law.

Richard Zagranski, pro se.

Eva M. Badway, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

NOTE.

‘The next page is purposely numbered 1401. The page numbers
are the same as they will be in the bound volume, thus making
official citations available upon publication of this preliminary
print.

477 Mass. 1401

Rules of Civil Procedure.

MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

On April 26, 2017, it was ordered by the Justices that the
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure adopted by order dated
July 13, 1973, as amended, to take effect on July 1, 1974, are
hereby amended as follows:

Rule 55 (b) (4): By deleting the citation “50 U.S.C. App.
§§ 501” and inserting in lieu thereof the
following citation: 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901

It was further ordered by the Justices that the amendment
accomplished by this order shall take effect on May 1, 2017.