State: Oklahoma
Volume: 208
Term: 1953-1953
Jurisdiction(s): Oklahoma
Source: https://static.case.law/okla/208.pdf

IRVINE et ux. v. HANIOTIS et ux.
No. 34389. Oct. 28, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1953.
252 P. 2d 470.

A. L. Beckett, Oklahoma City, and
Cc. D. Lewis, Okmulgee, for plaintiffs
in error.

Steele & Boatman, Okmulgee, for de-
fendants in error.

PER CURIAM. The parties will be
referred to as they appeared in the
court below. Plaintiffs below, Francis
S. Irvine and Hazel Irvine, took this
appeal from an order of the trial court
sustaining the separate demurrers of
the defendants, George Haniotis and
Grace Haniotis, to the amended peti-
tion filed by plaintiffs.

The amended petition to which the
demurrers of the defendants were di-
rected alleged in substance that the
plaintiffs are copartners and were at
all times mentioned in the petition
operating a cafe in the city of Still-
water, Oklahoma, and that in the trans-
actions referred to in said amended
petition the defendants, George Haniotis .
and Grace Haniotis, acted and dealt as
copartners. That on the 23rd day of
April, 1949, plaintiffs entered into a
certain agreement with the defendants
in which plaintiffs agreed to sell and
defendants agreed to buy a certain cafe
for the sum of $12,000: $6,000 of which
was to be paid upon execution of the
contract which was to be reduced to
typewritten form and was to be exe-
cuted on the 25th day of April, 1949;
and the remainder of the purchase price
to be paid in monthly installments of
$500 each, the deferred payments to
bear interest at the rate of four per
cent per annum. That the defendants
at the time of entering into said con-
tract made, executed and delivered to
the plaintiffs a check for $500 drawn
on the Citizens National Bank of Ok-
mulgee, payable to plaintiffs and signed
by the defendant Mrs. Grace Haniotis.
and being given to “bind the agree-
ment as of this date.” It was further
alleged that the $500 was “part pay-
ment of the purchase price as afore-
said.” A copy of the check was at-
tached to the amended petition, identi-
fied as “Exhibit A”. That on the 26th
day of April, 1949, plaintiffs received
a telegram from the defendant Grace
Haniotis, which telegram reads as fol-
lows: “Our buyer here backed out.
We cannot raise the money. $12,000.00
too much for us”. That on the 28th day
of Apri], 1949, plaintiffs received a let-
ter from Mrs. George Haniotis which

2. a

advised plaintiffs of the reason why
defendants were unable to go forward
with the proposed contract. That plain-
tiffs deposited the check in the First
National Bank of Stillwater, Oklahoma,
to their credit, and that thereafter the
bank was directed by defendants to
stop payment upon it. That the check
was given for a good and valuable con-
sideration and that defendants are in-
debted to the plaintiffs for the amount
of the check, to wit $500. Plaintiffs then
prayed for judgment in the sum of
$500 and the costs of the action.

“Exhibit B” set out in the record and
attached to the amended petition is an
unexecuted writing which was pre-
pared in pencil and denominated “con-
tract of purchase and sale”. It is a
rather carefully prepared and complete
instrument providing for the sale of
certain described restaurant or cafe
equipment and it is provided therein
that the sellers, the plaintiffs here,
were to deliver possession of personal
property therein described to the buy-
ers, the defendants, on the 20th day of
May, 1949, and it further provided that
the title to all of the property described
therein should remain in the sellers un-
til the purchase price was fully paid.

The defendants each filed separate
general demurrers to said amended
petition, which demurrers were sus-
tained by the trial court and plaintiffs’
cause of action was dismissed. It is
from this order that the plaintiffs ap-
peal.

It was the position of defendants be-
Jow and it is their position here that
the amended petition did not state a
cause of action against them for the
reason that it is shown upon the face
of said amended petition that plaintiffs
are barred from prosecuting this action
by force of the provisions of Title 15,
§136, O.S. 1941, which among other
things provides:

“The following contracts are invalid,
unless the same, or some note or mem-
orandum thereof, be in writing and sub-
scribed by the party to be charged, or
by his agent: * * *

“4, An agreement for the sale of
goods, chattels, or things in action, at
a price not less than fifty dollars, un-
less the buyer accept or receive part
of such goods and chattels, or the evi-
dences or some of them, of such things
in action, or pay at the same time
some part of the purchase money;***”

It is further the position of the de-
fendants that no part of the purchase
money, was paid by the defendants at
the time of the discussion of the parties
concerning the contract as provided by
the statute above quoted; that the de-
fendant George Haniotis did not sign
the check referred to above and there-
fore could not under any theory be
bound by the contractual arrangement
described in the amended petition.

Plaintiffs urge that the amended peti-
tion did state a cause of action since
the check described above constituted
a payment of part of the purchase
money, and further that the various
memoranda executed by the defendant
Mrs. George Haniotis are sufficient un-
der Title 15, §136, supra, to establish
a contract of sale.

We have said that the penciled in-
strument denominated “Contract of
purchase and sale,” which is attached
to the amended petition, was unsigned.
The defendant Mrs. George Haniotis,
on April 23, 1949, executed and deliver-
ed to the plaintiff F. S. Irvine her check
in the sum of $500, which check bore
the legend, “to bind agreement as of
this date”. As has been pointed out, the
defendant Mrs. George Haniotis di-
rected a letter to the plaintiffs dated
April 26, 1949, which was as follows:

“Dear Mr. and Mrs. Irvine: I hope
you weren’t too disappointed. But
things just moved too fast. I couldn’t
separate the things I wanted to do from
what I knew I might be unable to do.

“J hadn’t made up my mind fully.
(Guess I needed a legal adviser). But
twelve-thousand dollars is so much
money. When we have so little. We
were plain scared after we had time
to think it over. If the papers had been
drawn up, however roughly, and given

[| 3

us to study we would have realized
the weak points, as applied to us.

“If one of us should have become ill
or unable to work, especially George,
we stood to lose twelve thousand dol-
lars and 12 months’ work. I couldn’t
bear the thought. We had no assurance
of a place to live, and such a short time
to find one. We were taking too many
chances. And I became very nervous.
I can’t work under a nervous strain,
things have to at least appear favor-
able. The deal was too one-sided. Noth-
ing in our favor. You had nothing to
lose. No cause to worry. All the chances
taken and strain that accompanies it
were on our side. The place secured
you.

“Our daughter was too eager. She
had no authority to act for us, but she
is inexperienced and talked too fast,
however Betty is young and very sensi-
tive. She feels this upset her desires
very keenly. Please don’t hurt her feel-
ings. But I’m sure you won’t. You were
lovely. Both of you. And the parents
were grand people to know.

“Tf you keep it and, or but, want a
rest we'd consider leasing it for 3 or 6
months with an option to buy. We'd
feel we had a more firm footing. We
wouldn’t go in scared that if we didn’t
make a required amount we'd lose all
our life’s hard-earned savings. We are
reputable business people. We’ve been
in business here for 30 years. The
Chamber of Commerce and Retail Mer-
chants will give us their endorsements.

“Very sincerely yours, Mrs. George
Haniotis, 210 W. Main, Okmulgee, Okla-
homa.

“TI sent you the telegram this morn-
ing telling you our buyer here backed
out. Mrs. H.”

For convenience we again set out
the telegram referred to in the letter,
which is as follows: “Our buyer here
backed out. We cannot raise the money.
$12,000.00 too much for us.”

These are the instruments which the
plaintiffs contend constituted sufficient
written memoranda to comply with the
provisions of Title 15, §136, O.S. 1951.

It is undoubtedly true that a complete
contract binding under the statute of
frauds may be entered into by letters,

telegrams and other writings between
the parties relative to the subject mat-
ter of the contract if they are so con-
nected with each other that they may
be fairly said to constitute one paper
relating to the contract. In order, how-
ever, to be sufficient the writings re-
lied upon must by reference to each
other disclose every material part of a
valid contract and must be signed by
the parties sought to be charged. The
memoranda must plainly set out the
parties to the contract, the subject mat-
ter, the price, the description of the
property and all of the terms and con-
ditions of the contract, and must leave
nothing to rest in parol. Jennings v.
New York Petroleum Royalty Corp.,
169 Okla. 528, 43 P. 2d 762; Mason Mo-
tors Spirit Distributing Co. v. Cosden,
105 Okla. 244, 231 P. 890; Davis v.
Holman, 163 Okla. 59, 20 P. 2d 575. We
think it is obvious that the memoranda
relied upon within themselves do not
meet the requirements of a complete
contract. Had the plaintiffs been per-
mitted to proceed under their amended
petition they would have been required
to introduce parol evidence concerning
the subject matter of the contract and
its other terms and conditions and
therefore the memoranda under the
rule announced above was insufficient
to remove the case from the operation
of subdivision 4 of Title 15, §136, supra.

We next come to the plaintiffs’ con-
tention that the execution and delivery
of the $500 check by the defendant Mrs.
Haniotis, to the plaintiff Francis S. Ir-
vine, constituted such a payment of
“some part of the purchase money” as
to exempt the alleged contract from the
operation of the above-quoted portion
of the statute of frauds, Whether the
delivery of such check operates as such
a payment is a question upon which
this court has not heretofore passed.
As appears from the annotation en-
titled “Check as Payment Within Con-
templation of Statute of Frauds” in 8
A.L.R. 2d 251, the authorities are di-
vided on this question.

In any event, that question is not
one which we need here to decide for

4 [|

the statutory exemption presupposes
the existence of “an agreement for the
sale of goods, chattels or things in ac-
tion”. On the basis of the allegations
of plaintiffs’ petition it does not appear
that the alleged agreement had been
consummated by the parties, although
they may have been in accord as to
the terms and provisions of an agree-
ment which they were contemplating
but which was not to be effective until
reduced to typewritten form and exe-
cuted by the parties.

The contemplated agreement as set
forth in the alleged penciled draft, at-
tached as “Exhibit B” to the petition,
among other things, provides:

“In consideration of the above buyers
(defendants) agree to pay to sellers
(plaintiffs) the sum of $12.000.00 as fol-
lows: $6,000.00 cash in hand upon exe-
eution of this contract, receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged; * * *”

Thus is appears from the draft of the
contemplated contract and from the
allegations of the petition that two con-
ditions precedent were to be met be-
fore there was to be any binding agree-
ment: (1) the execution of the contract
after it had been reduced to writing in
final typewritten form, and (2) the pay-
ment of $6,000 to be made by defend-
ants simultaneously with the execu-
tion of the formal contract.

Surely plaintiffs would not contend
that the delivery of the $500 check
would be sufficient to evidence and
establish as fact a contract in which
plaintiffs acknowledged their receipt
of $6,000 as recited in the draft of the
contemplated agreement.

As stated by this court in Western
Roofing Tile Co. v. Jones, 26 Okla. 209,
109 P. 225, 227:

“The rule in reference to the ques-
tion here presented is that, where par-
ties desire to make the reduction of
any agreement into which they have
entered to writing and its signature a
condition precedent to its completion,
it will not be a contract until this is
done, and this is true although all of

the terms of the contract have been
agreed upon.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The $500 check could not constitute
the payment of “some part of the pur-
chase money” and thus exempt a con-
tract from the operation of the statute
of frauds unless there was an agree-
ment between the parties which was or
would become binding on them upon
such payment. But, under the allega-
tions of the petition, even had there
been an agreement, such agreement
had been rescinded by the telegram
and letter sent to plaintiffs by the de-
fendant Grace Haniotis on April 26,
1949, and plaintiffs apparently have
acquiesced in and approved of such
rescission for they do not allege that
they have ever reduced the contract
to final typewritten form or submitted
it in such form to the defendants for
execution, nor do they allege that they
have tendered any performance of the
contract on their part or that they are
now ready, able and willing to perform
thereunder. By this action, plaintiffs
do not seek to enforce any performance
under the contract, nor do they seek
damages for any breach thereof. They
merely seek recovery of the $500
amount payable under said check.

In other words, they seek recovery
on the check, but by their allegations
showing either want of, or failure of,
consideration therefor, are precluded
from any recovery thereon.

As pointed out above, plaintiffs
brought this action to recover on the
$500 check, alleging that said sum con-
stituted part payment of the purchase
price of $12,000. It is nowhere alleged in
the amended petition that there has
been an actual delivery of the personal
property involved to the defendants or
any offer to deliver it in accordance
with the terms of the penciled memo-
randum relied upon. Nor is there any
allegation to the effect the defendants
refused to accept said property and
there is no allegation setting forth any
valid excuse or inability to make such
offer to deliver. We are unable to tell
from the amended petition whether the

Cee

an

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plaintiffs still hold title to the property
in question and are in a position to de-
liver it to the defendants,

In the early case of Haynes v. Brown,
18 Okla. 389, 89 P. 1124, this court stated
in the syllabus:

“Where there has not been an actual
delivery of personal property, the sell-
er, in order to maintain an action for
the purchase price, must both aver and
prove an offer to deliver and refusal to
accept; and also that he is able, willing,
and ready to deliver said property at
all times, or allege some valid excuse
for inability to keep good his offer to
deliver.”

And in the case of American Soda
Fountain Co. v.. Gerrer’s Bakery, 14
Okla. 258, 78 P. 115, we said:

“* * * But the right of the vendor to
recover the purchase price is dependent
upon the performance by him in good
faith of substantially all the require-
ments on his part. He is not entitled to
treat the property as belonging to the
purchaser, and recover the contract
price, except in case he has delivered
the property, or in good faith tendered
it according to the terms of the sale.
If there is some condition to be by him
performed which must be done before
the possession or title can vest in the
purchaser, then he cannot treat the
property as that of the purchaser, and
a failure on his part to perform such
condition will defeat his right of re-
covery.”

As we construe the amended petition
the plaintiffs seek to recover a part of
the purchase price resulting from the
alleged sale of the personal property
involved and seek at the same time to
retain the possession of the same, which
may not be done. Since the court has
concluded that the amended petition
for the reasons above stated fails to
allege facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendants,
or either of them, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.

This court acknowledges the services”
of Attorneys R. D. Hudson, Lawrence
Elder, and Hawley C. Kerr, who as

Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Judi~-
cial Council, and appointed by the
court.

HALLEY, V.C.J. and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, JOHNSON, O’NEAL,
and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.

MOST WORSHIPFUL PRINCE HALL
GRAND LODGE, etc., et al.
v. DRAPER et al.

No. 34218. Dec. 2, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second
Petition for Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1953.

252 P. 2d 434.

8 a

Cc. R. Nixon, Amos T. Hall, L. J.
Bicking, and Primus C. Wade, Tulsa,
Chas. P. Gotwals and Cecil E. F. Rob-
ertson, Muskogee, and J. J. Bruce,
Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.

Disney, Houston, Klein & Melone, by
Gerald B. Klein, Tulsa, and O. J. Rob-
erts, Oklahoma City, for defendants
in error.

CORN, J. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin
defendants from using any secret work,
formulae, badges, regalia, or anything
resembling same, and to restrain them
from conducting a lodge or association
in Tulsa, Oklahoma, designated as
“Bree and Accepted Ancient York Ma-
sons,” “Free and Accepted Masons,”
“Masonic Lodge,” “Mason,” or other
words of colorable imitation thereof. AN
lodges herein involved are negro Ma~
sonic lodges. The individual defendants
allegedly associated themselves togeth-
er as colored Masonic lodges without
authority or consent of the plaintiff

” Grand Lodge.

The original defendants filed answer
and cross-petition wherein they sought
the same injunctive relief against plain~
tiffs. Leave was granted The Most Wor-
shipful National Grand Lodge of Free
and Accepted Ancient York Masons of
the United States of North America
(colored) to intervene. Such party is
included in the term “defendants”
herein, since their interests were and
are identical.

After an extensive hearing the trial
court denied relief to either side, but
assessed costs to plaintifis, who filed
motion for new trial and appealed from
the judgment entered.

Shortly after the trial one of the re-
porter’s stenographic notes, covering
the oral testimony of all plaintiff’s wit-
nesses and one defense witness, were
discovered to be missing. A lengthy
hearing to investigate the matter re-
vealed only that such notes had been
misplaced, lost or stolen. The record
on appeal contains depositions of cer-
tain of plaintiffs’ witnesses and all ex-

hibits offered by the parties. Subse-
quent to this hearing plaintiffs filed
motion for new trial upon the ground
of impossibility of’ making case-made
without fault of plaintiffs.

At later hearings the trial court urged.
the parties to prepare narrative state-
ments of the missing testimony. Defend-
ants complied with such request and
the trial court was of the opinion such
narrative statements substantially set
forth the missing testimony. The de-
fendants’ narrative statement of the
missing testimony appears in the rec-
ord before this court. Plaintiffs made
no attempt to comply with the trial
court’s request, but at all times in-
sisted that no narrative statement
could accurately present the missing
testimony. The motion for new trial
was overruled and plaintiffs have ap-
pealed upon the single proposition that
the trial court erred in denying their
motion for new trial based- upon the
ground of impossibility of securing a
case-made. The entire argument of
both parties is directed at this propo-
sition, thus waiving the remaining as-
signments of error.

The testimony of several of plain-
tiffs’ witnesses was presented by depo-
sition. These depositions, which dealt
at length with the composition, history
and jurisdiction of the colored Masonic
Lodges, together with numerous exhib-
its introduced at the trial, appear in the
ease-made, Comparison of the recitals
in defendants’ narrative statement re-
flects that much of the testimony con-
tained in the missing stenographic
notes was merely corroborative of mat-
ters contained in the depositions and
exhibits.

Defendants willingly co-operated in
reducing to narrative form a recital
of the missing testimony, and filed
their conception of such narrative in
compliance with the court’s request.

Plaintiffs at all times contended it was

impossible to supply a proper narra-
tive statement, and urged that defend-
ants would not agree to any narrative

ee 7

they supplied, Neither did they see fit
to offer amendments or corrections to
the statement offered by defendants.
The trial court heard all of the wit-
nesses, including those whose testimony
was not transcribed, and thereafter re-
viewed the narrative recital of the
missing evidence and rendered the
present judgment.

Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred
in overruling their motion for new
trial in view of 12 O.S. 1951 §651, subd.
9, which provides for the granting of a
new trial for a cause affecting ma-
terially substantial rights of an ag-
grieved party:

“Ninth: When, without fault of com-
plaining party, it becomes impossible
to make case-made.”

Supporting such contention plaintiffs
rely upon Cherry v. Brown, 79 Okla.
215, 192 P. 227, 13 A.L.R. 92; Okla.
Union Ry. Co. v. Dascus, 133 Okla. 83,
271 P. 242; Harris v. First Nat. Bank of
Pryor Creek, 140 Okla. 269, 282 P. 1097;
Gibson v. City of Chickasha, 171 Okla.
284, 43 P. 2d 95; City of Duncan v.
Abrams, Adm’x, 171 Okla. 619, 43 P.
2d 720; Baumgart v. Bryant, 184 Okla.
531, 88 P. 2d 635; J. H. Taylor Trust
v. Driggs, 193 Okla. 346, 143 P. 2d 806,
and other cases wherein new trials have
been granted upon the ground of the
impossibility to make case-made,

Defendants rely upon other decisions
from this court to the effect that it is
unnecessary for a case-made to con-
tain a transcript of the stenographic
notes of the evidence, since this may
be supplied in narrative form, and mo-
tion for new trial based solely upon im-
possibility to make case-made is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. See Jones v. Duncan, 168
Okla. 598, 35 P. 2d 451; Godfrey v. F.
D. Bearley Lbr. Co., 171 Okla. 425, 43 P.
2d 478; Seran v. Parker, 177 Okla. 219,
58 P. 2d 581; Smoot v. Mullins, 181
Okla. 505, 75 P. 2d 179.

Without herein attempting to analyze
and distinguish the cases relied upon
by the respective parties, it is sufficient

to observe that (1) mere inability to se-
cure a transcript does not confer a
right of new trial; (2) every case con-
sidered by the court on the ground of
impossibility to make case-made rests
upon the facts of the particular case;
(3) a proper decision in such cases
rests with the sound discretion of the
trial court.

The trial court heard all the wit-
nesses, including those who gave the
missing testimony, listened to exten-
sive arguments by numerous counsel,
and carefully reviewed the narrative
recital of those witnesses whose testi-
mony could not be transcribed. Under
the circumstances it is clear the trial
court conscientiously endeavored to
exercise his discretion when overruling
plaintiffs’ motion for new trial.

However, we are faced herein by
somewhat unusual circumstances. The
stenographic notes covering the oral
testimony given by each of plaintiffs’
witnesses was lost. While true that
mauch of the deposition testimony of-
fered by plaintiffs undoubtedly was cor-
roborative of some of the oral testi-~
mony, the fact remains that we are
called upon to review a judgment
based entirely upon the trial court’s
own recollection of such testimony,
considered in connection with the nar-
rative recital of the defendants’ attor-
neys as they, too, recollected the na-
ture and import of the testimony.

Should this court approve the trial
court’s action as respects denial of
plaintiffs’ petition for new trial, we
then would be called on to attempt to
pass upon merits of a controversy with-
out having before us a record which
presented first hand the testimony
upon which plaintiffs based their right
to the relief sought. No matter how
conscientious the trial court may have
been in his efforts to present a rec-
ord and avoid another lengthy trial,
we are of the opinion the trial court
acted beyond his discretion under the
particular facts revealed herein, and
that his action affected materially sub-
stantial rights of the aggrieved par-

8 Le

ties. The language in the body of the
opinion in City of Duncan v. Abrams,
supra, is peculiarly applicable to the
present situation.

“The question is: Is the record com-
plete enough to show the evidence and
the rulings that were made in connec-
tion with its introduction. Whether the
decisions on questions of law made dur-
ing the trial were right or wrong the
defendant city was entitled to a review
of those rulings by this court. If the
city was unable, through no fault of its
own, to make a record which would
present the questions, a new trial
should have been granted.”

The judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded, with directions to
grant a new trial.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and WELCH,
GIBSON, DAVISON, JOHNSON, and
O'NEAL, JJ., concur, BINGAMAN, J.,
dissents.

In re BARRY’S ESTATE.
No. 35154. Dec. 2, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second
Petition for Rehearing Denied
Jan. 27, 1958.

252 P. 2d 437.

W. E. Green, J. C. Farmer, Robert
J. Woolsey, Otho Flippo, and J. B.
Bailey, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Thurman S. Hurst and Edwin S.
Hurst, Tulsa, for defendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. In this case it appears
that Mary Louise Barry prior to her
death was the owner of a Chrysler
automobile. She had executed a will
bequeathing the automobile to Sadye
Risley. On the evening of June 3, 1948,
testatrix, while driving the automobile
on the highway, lost control thereof,
which caused it to overturn causing
considerable damage to the automo-
bile and severe injuries to her person,
and as a result thereof she died about
eight hours thereafter. Some time prior
to her death she obtained an accident
insurance policy indemnifying her for
personal injury damage and damage
to the car resulting from accident. The
policy covered among other things dam-
age caused by upset.

The policy contained certain options
among which was the option of the in-
surance company to settle any damage
that might be caused to the automobile
by either repairing the same or taking
possession of the automobile and pay-
ing to insured the appraised or agreed
value thereof at the time of the acci-
dent. Insurer exercised the option to
take possession of the automobile and
to pay the value at the time of the

| 9

accident which the record shows was
the sum of $2,600. The insurer there-
after sold the automobile for the sum
of $350 which the parties agreed was
the reasonable salvage value thereot.
The policy was in full force and effect
at the time of the death of testatrix.

It is stipulated by the parties that
the facts above detailed are the facts in
the case. No other evidence was intro-
duced except documentary evidence. It
appears from this evidence that the
legatee to whom the automobile was
bequeathed is a stranger to the inheri-
tance and that specific bequests and
devises were made to others. The will
does not .appear in the record, and it
cannot therefore be ascertained from
the record whether the will contains
a residuary clause. Counsel, however,
seem to concede in the briefs that it
does contain such clause.

It is also stipulated that after the
death of testatrix, William Green was
appointed executor of her estate. He
proceeded to administer upon the es-
tate and when it was ready for distri-
bution Sadye Risley, legatee herein,
filed an application in the county court
requesting that the insurance money
received by the executor under the
terms of the insurance policy in the
sum of $2,600 be distributed to her in
lieu of the automobile. The county
court denied the contention of the leg-
atee and held that she was only en-
titled to have distributed to her the
automobile in its damaged condition,
and that the executor had converted
the automobile to the use and benefit
of the estate; that the then value of
the car was $350 and ordered that in
lieu of the automobile there be distri-
buted to her the sum of $350.

The legatee appealed to the district
court. The district court reversed the
judgment of the county court and en-
tered judgment ordering the executor
to distribute to the legatee in lieu of
the automobile the amount of insur-
ance received for the damage thereto,
or the sum of $2,600.

The executor appeals to this court
and relies for reversal on the ground
that the judgment is contrary to the
stipulated facts and contrary to law.
It is argued by the executor that the
insurance policy constituted a con-
tract between the insurance company
and the insured; that the policy in-
demnified insured against damage to
the automobile caused by accident;
that such contractual right consisted
of no more than a chose in action be-
longing to deceased at the time of her
death, 60 O. S. 1951 §312; that the
proceeds derived from the insurance
should therefore have been distributed
to her heirs at law, or general legatees,
rather than to Sadye Risley, to whom
a specific bequest of the automobile
was made, citing State ex rel. Reirdon
v. Marshall County Court, 183 Okla.
274, 81 P. 2d 488.

It is conceded by both parties that
the exact question here involved has
not been directly passed upon by this
court, and that no decision of a court
of last resort has been found from any
other jurisdiction passing thereon.

Counsel for executor, however, refer
to the case of In re Hilpert’s Estate,
300 N.Y.S. 886, as a case in point. In
that case it appears that the property
bequeathed consisted of certain li-
brary books. Bequest was made to a
certain person as to a portion of the
books and the balance thereof to an-
other. The testator had obtained a fire
insurance policy upon the books. Fire
occurred causing damage to the li-
brary. A portion of the books were
completely destroyed. Others were only
damaged. The executor compromised
the loss with insurer. An application
was then filed by the executor for an

“ approval of the compromise and for

construction of the will. The court ap-
proved the compromise and held that
as to the books which were completely
destroyed by fire there was an ademp-
tion of the bequest, but as to the dam-
aged books they passed to the legatee
in the condition they were immediately
after the fire. The court there said:

10 |

“* # # In so far, therefore as the
specifically given articles were destroy-
ed by fire, there was an ademption of
the gifts. Those which were not destroy-
ed but merely damaged, are deliverable
in the state in which they presently
exist.

“The insurance policy was a totally
different asset of the decedent and was
merely a simple contract whereby the
insurer in return for a stated considera-
tion agreed, upon the happening of a
specified event to pay the insured a
fixed and ascertainable sum of money.
Matter of O’Neill’s Estate, 143 Misc.
69, 72, 255 N.Y.S. 767. It was, therefore,
merely a chose in action belonging to
the deceased as the designated payee
* * * which like any other chose in ac-
tion belonging to him, passed to his
personal representative. * * *”

We think the rule announced in the
above case sound and should be ap-
plied to the facts in the present case.

Testatrix did not under her will be-
queath to Sadye Risley the insurance
policy or any interest in the proceeds
collected. She made a specific bequest
under her will of an automobile and
upon the death of testatrix Sadye Ris-
ley took, under the will, the automobile
and nothing more, and she took the
same in the condition in which it was
immediately after the wreck. There is
nothing contained in the will which
would justify the court in distributing
to her the insurance collected in lieu
of the automobile.

The evidence, however, shows that
the insurance company and the execu-
tor adjusted the loss by the insurance
company taking over the automobile
and paying to the executor the full
value thereof or $2,600 as it existed
immediately prior to the wreck. As
above pointed out, the legatee, Sadye
Risley, was entitled to take the auto-
mobile in the condition it was imme-
diately after the wreck. It is agreed by
the parties that its value then was
$350. This amount is included in the
insurance money paid the executor. He
therefore has in his possession for use
and benefit of the estate of deceased
the value of the car as it existed im-

mediately after the wreck, which under
the will passed to Sadye Risley. The
executor and insurance company by
this adjustment made it impossible
for the executor to deliver to the lega-
tee, Sadye Risley, the automobile in
kind as it existed immediately after
the wreck. We therefore think she had
a right, under the will, to have dis-
tributed to her in lieu of the automobile
the value thereof immediately after the
wreck, or the sum of $350. The county
court so held and entered an order of
distribution accordingly.

Counsel for the executor agree that
the county court reached the correct
conclusion and expressed the law as
applicable to the facts in the present
case and assert that the district court
erred in reversing that judgment. They,
however, further argue in their brief
that if this court should not sustain its
contention in this respect it should then
consider the further question of ademp-
tion discussed by them in their brief.

However, under the view taken and
admissions made by counsel for the
executor, we deem it unnecessary to
discuss that question.

Reversed, with directions to affirm
the judgment of the county court.

HALLEY, V.C.J.,. and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, JOHNSON, and
BINGAMAN, JJ., concur. GIBSON, J.,

dissents.

BEAM et al. v. GREEN,
No. 34668. Nov. 12, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied Jan, 27, 1953.

252 P. 2d S44.

[| “a

Washington & Thompson, Oklahoma
City, for plaintiffs in error.

George Miller, Jr., Oklahoma City,
for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. D. M. Green com-
menced this action in the court of com-
mon pleas of Oklahoma county against
O. Thomas Beam and Lewis Culbert,
d/b/a Beam & Culbert, to recover $140,
and as a second cause of action he
sought the cancellation of a note for
$240 secured by chattel mortgage. The
sum of $140 was alleged to have been
the amount paid by plaintiff on the
purchase price of a used car purchased
by him from defendants, and the note
and mortgage were given by plaintiff
to defendants for the balance due upon
the purchase price, including carrying
charges, interest, and the premium

upon a fire and theft insurance policy
on the car, which plaintiff alleged was
fo have been secured and paid for by
the defendants.

Plaintiff alleged that on January 10,
1949, he purchased from defendants a
1929 Model A Ford for an agreed
price of $300, and that he was given
credit of $100 as the agreed trade-in
value of his old car, which he delivered
to defendants, executing a note for the
balance payable to defendants and se-
cured by a chattel mortgage on the
car. The note was payable in twelve
monthly installments of $20 each and
was for $240, being $200 balance on the
purchase price, $20.20 for carrying
charges or interest, and $19.80 to cover
the premium on a policy of fire and
theft insurance which defendants had
agreed to secure and pay for. The note
was assigned with recourse by defend-
ants to the City National Bank & Trust
Company, and after the fire this note
was reassigned to defendants. Defend-
ants paid the bank the installments due
February 10, and March 10, 1949.

On March 29, 1949, plaintiff's garage
and car were destroyed by fire. Plain-
tiff reported his loss to the bank and
inquired about what insurance defend-
ants had placed upon the car, and was
told that the car had not been insured.
Plaintiff then went to defendants and
told Mr, Beam that his car had burned,
and was again told that there was no
insurance on the car.

Plaintiff alleged that the agreement
of the defendants to insure the car
was partly in writing and partly oral.
In the application for credit to the bank,
signed by both parties, under the head-
ing “Statement of Transaction”, there
appears an item: “Finance charges,
including insurance, $40.00.” This ap-
pears to be the only written memoran-
dum showing such agreement. How-
ever, there is ample testimony to sup-
port a finding that defendants agreed
to secure such insurance and had been
paid the premium thereon by plaintiff’s
note. Such insurance was not secured,
and loss of the car while uninsured is
the basis of this action.

| |

12 Le

The court sustained a demurrer to
the second cause of action of plaintiff
wherein he sought the cancellation of
his note and mortgage. This left only
his first cause of action for $140.

Defendants answered by general de~
nial, but admitted the sale of the car
to plaintiff and the terms of the sale.
Defendants cross-petitioned for judg-
ment against plaintiff for the balance
due on his note for part of the pur-
chase price and for attorney’s fees as
provided in the note. The jury found
for the plaintiff for $140 and against
the defendants on their cross-petition.
Defendants have appealed, and sub-
mit seven propositions, which may be
grouped around three principal issues.
We shall refer to the parties as they
appeared in the trial court.

It is urged that the court erred in re-
fusing to direct a verdict for defend-
ants because the evidence was insuf-
ficient to warrant a finding for plain-
tiff. This argument is based largely
upon the failure of plaintiff to prove
with certainty the value of the car be-
fore it burned and its value after the
fire.

Defendants contend that the action is
one for rescission rather than for dam-
ages for breach of contract, and that
plaintiff cannot recover because the
promise to insure the car was only in-
cidental to the principal agreement of
sale and purchase, and plaintiff made
no tender to restore to defendants all of
the benefits he had received.

It is also urged that the court erred
in not sustaining defendants’ motion
to require plaintiff to elect his remedy
and state whether he was proceeding
under the equitable remedy of rescis-
sion or for damages for breach of con-
tract. In the defendants’ brief they
make the following statement:

“For the purpose of this proposition
and to give the defendant every benefit
of doubt as to whether there was or
was not an oral part of the contract
for plaintiffs in error to furnish in-
surance on the automobile, we will ad-
mit that Beam & Culbert did agree to

purchase insurance and that they failed
to do so and the car burned.”

We shall consider the foregoing ques-
tions in the inverse order in which they
are stated.

A careful examination of plaintiff's
amended petition leads us to the con-
clusion that it states a cause of action
for damages for breach of contract to
insure his car. In his prayer under the
first cause of action, he prays for judg-
ment for $140 “with interest thereon at
6% per annum from date of the breach
of said contract, March 29, 1949 * * *.”
He does not mention damages; neither
does he mention “rescission”. He sim-
ply pleads the contract to insure, its
breach, and the resultant loss to him-
self as a result of the breach.

In his second cause of action, plain-
tiff did pray for a cancellation of his
note and mortgage, but a demurrer
was sustained to that cause of action
after defendants had cross-petitioned
for judgment for the balance due upon
the note. It is immaterial whether or
not the second cause of action made
plaintiffs action one for rescission, be-
cause the court sustained a demurrer
thereto, leaving only plaintiffs first
cause of action for the exact amount he
had paid on the car. Since it was not in
fact an action for rescission, it was not
necessary for plaintiff to offer to return
to defendants the benefits received by
him.

Since we have decided that plaintiff's
action was one for damages suffered
by defendants’ breach of contract, we
find no merit in the contention that the
breach of the agreement to insure was
only incidental to the main purpose of
their contract, which was one of sale
and purchase. We need not consider
further the contention relative to plain-
tiff’s failure to tender all benefits re-
ceived. The rule is well established that
there must be a breach of the main
purpose of the contract to entitle one to
rescind. The sale and purchase of the
car are not in controversy in this ac-
tion. Such transaction is admitted by
defendants. The agreed price of plain-

be 13

tiff’s trade-in car was $100, and there
is no dispute that he made two pay-
ments of $20 each on his note. The exact
amount he had paid, $140, is all he
asked and all that the jury awarded
him.

When a demurrer was sustained to
plaintiff's second cause of action, it
left only his action to recover the actual
amount in which he had been damaged
by defendants’ breach of their contract
to insure his car.

The contention of defendants that the
plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to
sustain the judgment in his favor is
based upon the failure of the plaintiff
to produce direct evidence as to the
value of the car immediately before
and immediately after the fire. Plain-
tiff says that since the parties had
agreed that the car was worth $300 less
than three months before it burned, and
since the car was then over 20 years
old, it should be assumed that it had
already depreciated to a point where
depreciation within such a short period
of time would be negligible.

Plaintiff alleged that the car was
completely destroyed by the fire. He
testified, “My car was in the garage,
and all burned up, so I immediately
called the bank * * * told them my
garage burned and my car was in it”;
that he told Mr. Beam that “my
garage and car burned up.” The latter
statement was confirmed by Mr. Beam.
We note that defendants made no ef-
fort to establish that the car had. any
salvage value after the fire, and made
no effort to offset plaintiff's claim by
establishing a value after the fire.
Plaintiff offered on rebuttal to intro-
duce evidence on its value immedi-
ately before and immediately after the
fire, but defendants objected, and the
court sustained their objection. Plain-
tiff again offered such evidence before
the case was submitted to the jury, but
defendants’ objections were again sus-
tained.

In Chicago, R. I & P. Ry. Co. v.
Morton, 57 Okla. 711, 157 P. 917, and in

Jenkins v. Davis, 111 Okla. 191, 239 P.
135, it was held:

“Where counsel for plaintiff in error
has invited the action of the court up-
on which he predicates error, he will
not be heard to complain thereof.”

We conclude that the finding of the
jury is supported by competent evi-
dence to the effect that the car was
worthless after the fire; and that the
agreed sale value of $300 less than three
months before the fire was sufficient
to warrant the jury in awarding to the
plaintiff the sum of $140, in which
amount he had been damaged by the
failure of defendants to insure his car.

We agree with defendants that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover only
such sum as he would have been en-
titled to recover under a policy of in-
surance at the time the car was de-
stroyed. When we consider the age of
the car, it is hardly conceivable that
had the car been insured plaintiff would
not have been entitled to recover as
much as $140 as its value at the time it
was destroyed.

We think that instruction No. 5, given
by the court, was harmless error. It
instructed the jury that if it found for
the plaintiff it should award him $140.
There was no dispute over the fact that
he had paid that amount on the car be-
fore it was destroyed. He was defi-
nitely entitled to recover that amount
or nothing. Plaintiff had had the use of
the car for 78 days, but defendants
made no effort to prove the value of
such use. The old car traded in by
plaintiff at an agreed value of $100 had
been in the possession of defendants
for the same period of time, or at
least under their control, but plaintiff
elected to treat his loss of that car at
its agreed value of $100.

We conclude that such minor errors
as appear in the record were harmless.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys John P. Fullerton, W. W.
Godlove, and Ralph H. Cline, who as

14 a

Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and CORN, JOHN-
SON, O'NEAL, and BINGAMAN, JJ.,
concur.

a

BRENO v, WEAVER.

No. 84381. Nov. 12, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1953.

252 P. 2a 487.

Pierce, Rucker, Mock, Tabor & Dun-
can, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Poe & Murdock, Tulsa, and Bassman
& Bassman, Claremore, for defendant
in error.

WELCH, J. Harley Weaver com-
menced action against Robert M. Rog-
ers, Ethel L. Rogers and Earl Breno
for damages, charging negligence of

the defendants with resulting personal
injuries to the plaintiff.

On trial it was shown that the plain-
tiff sustained certain injuries to his
person when an automobile in which he
was a passenger crashed into the rear
end of a gasoline transport truck owned
and operated by the defendants Rog-
ers. According to testimony, the auto-
mobile was proceeding in a southerly
direction in a right hand traffic lane
along U. S. Highway 66, behind the
gasoline transport truck, when the truck
swerved toward the left traffic lane,
then back into the right lane and then
suddenly stopped. The automobile pro-
ceeded on, and with great violence
struck the rear end of the truck. The
driver of the truck gave no signal of
intention to stop the truck. Ahead of the
truck at the time it was brought to a
stop and within a few feet of where the
truck stopped, the defendant Breno’s
automobile was parked in the right
hand traffic lane of the highway, and
Jess than three feet to the right of the
center of the road. At the time the
truck was brought to a stop an automo-
bile with a house trailer attached was
proceeding northerly in the traffic lane
to the left of the transport truck. U.S.
Highway 66, at the place here involved,
is a much traveled highway.

The deferidants Rogers filed no plead-
ings in the case and were not present at
the trial.

At the close of the evidence pre-
sented in behalf of the plaintiff, in sub-
stance as set out above, the defendant
Earl Breno submitted a demurrer to
the evidence. The court sustained the
demurrer. The plaintiff thereafter sub-
mitted a motion for new trial, which
was sustained. The defendant Earl
Breno appeals from the judgment grant-
ing a new trial.

The defendant asserts:

“The court erred in granting a new
trial because as a matter of law the
plaintiff failed to make out a cause of
action and there was no case to go to
the jury in the first instance, nor is the

be 15

plaintiff entitled to try to make out a
case again a second time.”

The defendant contends the court
properly sustained his demurrer to the
evidence for the reason that contribu-
tory negligence was admitted by the
plaintiff, and that this contributory neg-
ligence had a causal, contributing con-
nection with the accident.

Whatever the state of facts presented
by the evidence, the trial court was
precluded by constitutional provision
from holding the plaintiff guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law.
Wilson & Co. v. Campbell, 195 Okla.
323, 157 P. 2d 465; Elam v. Loyd, 201
Okla, 222, 204 P. 2d 280; Hugill v. Doty,
202 Okla. 391, 214 P, 2d 257.

Art. 23, §6, of the Constitution pro-
vides:

“The defense of contributory negli-
gence or of assumption of risk shall,
in all cases whatsoever, be a question
of fact, and shall at all times, be left
to the jury.”

In the Hugill case, supra, we said:

“The defense of contributory negli-
gence is at all times a question of fact
for the jury, under section 6, article 23
of the Oklahoma Constitution, and it is
error for the court to instruct the jury
that a certain state of facts or circum-
stances constitute contributory negli-
gence.”

Accordingly, we hold that in the trial
court’s consideration of the defendant’s
demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence

_ herein, it was immaterial that in plain-
tiff's own testimony and admission of
certain facts it was made to appear
that the plaintiff was or was not guilty
of negligence which was or might have
been a contributing cause of the acci-
dent. The sole question presented by
the defendant’s demurrer was whether
there was or was not evidence in rea-
sonable inference tending to show that
the defendant was guilty of negligence,
a proximate cause of the accident and
injuries to the plaintiff. If there was
evidence of defendant’s negligence suf-
ficient to go to the jury, it was error

for the court to sustain the defend-
ant’s demurrer.

The defendant contends the court
properly sustained his demurrer to the
plaintiff's evidence for the reason there
was no showing of primary,negligence
on the part of the defendant.

In Union Transportation Co. v. Lamb,
190 Okla. 327, 123 P, 2d 660, this court
said and held:

“Negligence comprehends a failure to
exercise due care as required by the
circumstances of the case; a failure to
do what a person of ordinary prudence
would have done under the circum-
stances or the doing of what such a
person would not have done under the
circumstances.”

“When the driver of a motor vehicle,
of such a size that it obstructs the view
of drivers of vehicles in his rear, of the
road ahead, brings his vehicle to a
sudden stop in the traffic lane of one of
the principal highways of the state, be-
hind a slower moving vehicle, and in
front of an automobile traveling behind
him, without any signal of his inten-
tion to stop, under circumstances from
which the jury could reasonably infer
that he knew of the presence of such
automobile behind him and that he had
ample opportunity to slow down grad-
ually to avoid colliding with the vehicle
in front, this court cannot hold as a
matter of law that such driver exercised
due care and that there was an ab-
sence of proof sufficient to establish
primary negligence,

“Where, although concert is lacking,
the separate and independent acts or
negligence of several combine to pro-
duce directly a single injury, each is
responsible for the entire result, even
though his act or neglect alone might
not have caused it.”

As concerns the alleged negligent op-
eration of the gasoline transport truck
in this case, the evidence shows close
similarity to the facts and circum-
stances mentioned in the second para-
graph above quoted from the Union
Transportation case. Herein there is
evidence to support a finding that the
truck driver did not use due care in

16 |

bringing the truck to a sudden stop,
with his failure to give warning, in the
circumstance of the size of his vehicle
and on a busy highway where traffic
ahead and behind was reasonably to be
expected.

It was shown that the said parked
automobile, being operated by the de-
fendant Breno, was parked in the said
traffic lane on the highway less than
three feet to the right of the center of
the road. This in violation of a state
statute, 69 O.S. 1941 §583, rule 10, now
repealed, but in force at the time of the
accident. It is well settled that the fail-
ure to perform a statutory duty im-
posed by a valid statute, under the
police power of the state for protection
of the public, is negligence per se or
negligence as a matter of law. Mag-
nolia Pet. Co. v. Witcher, 141 Okla. 175,
284 P, 297. If the illegally parked auto-
mobile, or the defendant Breno’s act in
so parking the automobile, standing
alone, or in combination with acts of
others, was a proximate or contribut-
ing cause of injury to plaintiff, an es-
sential element of actionable negligence
against Breno was presented.

In a consideration of all the evidence,
and given its strongest inferences fav-
orable to the plaintiff, there is reason
to believe that the acts of the defend-
ant Breno and the truck driver and the
driver of the automobile in which the
plaintiff was a passenger all combined
to produce injury to the plaintiff. In
the circumstance that the acts of the
parties combined to produce injury to
the plaintiff, then each of the parties
guilty of negligence was responsible
for the result produced. Union Trans-
portation Co. v. Lamb, supra. Ac-
cordingly, we find that a cause of ac-
tion against the defendants was shown
in the evidence.

We have refrained from a discussion
of the evidence as reflecting negligence,
if any, of the driver of the plaintifi’s
car and from any discussion of the doc-
trine of imputed negligence as might
apply to the plaintiff, for the reason

that contributory negligence, if any, of
the plaintiff, is not an issue of proper
consideration by the court in the de-
termination of the defendant’s demur-
rer.

For reasons above set forth, we hold
it was error for the trial court to sus-
tain the defendant’s demurrer to the
plaintiff’s evidence. Apparently, the
trial court came to the same conclu-
sion as we have reached, and such was
the basis for the judgment sustaining
the plaintiff's motion for new trial.

The judgment granting new trial is
affirmed.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and CORN, JOHN-
SON, O'NEAL, and BINGAMAN, JJ.,
concur.

CHOCTAW COUNTY et al. v.
BATEMAN et al.

No. 34533. Nov. 5, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1953.
252 P. 2d 465.

Le 17

Mont R. Powell and Anthony R. Kane,
Oklahoma City, for petitioners.

Jenner & Bradley, Hugo, and Mac Q.
Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

JOHNSON, J. Steve E. Bateman,
hereinafter called claimant, filed his
notice of injury and claim for compen-
sation stating that while employed as
a laborer for Choctaw county he sus-
tained an accidental injury on June
23, 1949. The proceeding to determine
the nature and extent of the disability
was heard at Idabel, Oklahoma, be-
fore Commissioner Thomas D. Lyons.
The claimant was not represented by
counsel at that hearing which was the
only hearing conducted and the exam-
ination of the claimant was by the
trial commissioner. No evidence was
offered by the petitioners.

Claimant stated that he received the
injury as detailed in his Form 3 Claim.
The record then states:

“The Court: And did they pay you
some temporary? <A. No, sir, I haven’t
ever got anything. I wrote the insur-
ance company, I couldn’t get a reply.

“The Court: I see. Well, how did you
get hurt? A. Well, I was shoveling
ground, building bridges, anything that
come up—I was shoveling gravel right
then—

“The Court: What happened when
you were shoveling gravel? A. Strained
my back, right back in there (indicat-
ing)” ~

Following this it is shown that he re-
ported the accident and was sent by his
employer to Dr. Crotty. Gus Kite, a
fellow employee, supported the testi-
mony of claimant.

A report was filed by Dr. W. V.
Crotty which is as follows: .

“Mr. S. E. Bateman, Age 73, white,
of Fort Towson, Okla., has been treated

by me for injuries received on June 23,
1949,

“Mr. Bateman was first examined
and treated at my office on June 24,
1949. History of accident as follows.
Patient was working for Choctaw Coun-
ty with Road Construction. While shov-
eling gravel struck by severe low back
pain and was so injured that he had
to stop work.

“Physical Examination revealed an
acute lumbar myositis, sub-luxation of
right sacro~iliac articulation, 42” short-
ening of lower extremity. A moderate
scoliosis of spinal column.

“Office treatments — medical and
manipulative taping were given on 6/24,
25, 27, 28, 7/1, 2, 5, 18, 20, 22. Pa-
tient dismissed on 7/22/49.

“Present physical finding: Chronic
lumbar myositis, moderate  scolisis,
lumbar strain. Chronic sub-laxation of
right sacro-ilias articulation and short-
ening of right lower extremity. It is
my opinion that this condition will re-
main in chronic form, and patient will
be unable to carry on any type of
heavy manual labor without a recur-
rent attacks of low back trouble.”

The trial commissioner ordered a
medical examination of claimant where-
upon Dr. Pat Fite filed a written report
stating that he examined claimant for
an injury received June 23, 1949, and
further stated that claimant, a man
63 years old, was in poor physical con-
dition; that some of his disability was
due to chronic conditions. The doctor
also stated:

“The disability is more in the nature
of an aggravation.”

At the conclusion of the hearing the
State Industrial Commission entered
an award for three weeks temporary
total disability and 25 per cent per-
manent partial disability. This proceed-
ing is brought to review the award.

Petitioner presents two propositions.
In the first proposition it is argued
that the State Industrial Commission
erred in finding from the evidence that
the same constituted a basis upon

18 , —

which an award can be made; and that
the evidence clearly discloses there was
no accidental injury. It is further ar-
gued that since there was no unto-
ward incident and no unusual happen-
ing there can be no accidental injury
within the meaning and definition of
the Workmen’s Compensation Law, 85
O.S. 1951 §1 et seq.

In Stasmas v. State Industrial Com-
mission, 80 Okla. 221, 195 P. 762, and
other subsequent cases, we approved
the definition of the term “accident”
as:

“ ‘Accident’ in legal signification is
difficult to define. It is not a technical
Jegal term with a clearly defined mean-
ing and is used in more senses than
one. The word denotes an event which
proceeds from an unknown cause or
is the unusual effect of a known cause
and therefore unexpected. Chance, cas-
ualty, an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening through
human agency, an event which un-
der the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected to the person to whom it
happens. An event which under the
circumstances is unusual and unex-
pected by the person to whom it hap-
pens.”

In Andrews Mining & Milling Co. v.
Atkinson, 192 Okla. 322, 185 P. 2d 960,
we stated:

“We are committed to the rule that
the term ‘accidental injury’ is not to be
given a narrow or restricted meaning,
but is to receive a broad and liberal
construction, with a view of compen-
sating injured employees where disa-
bilities result from compensable person-
al injuries. Terminal Oil Mill Co. v.
Younger, 188 Okla. 316, 108 P. 2d 542;
National Biscuit Co. v. Lout, 179 Okla.
259, 65 P. 2d 497.

“An ‘accident? is an event happen-
ing without any human agency, or
if happening through human agency,
an event which, under the circum-
stances, is unusual and not expected to
the person to whom it happens. In the
term ‘accidental injuries’, the substan-
tive ‘injuries’ expresses the notion of
a thing or event, that is, the wrong
or damage done to the person, while

‘accidental’ qualifies and describes the
noun by ascribing to ‘injuries’ a qual-
ity or condition of happening, or com-
ing by chance or without design, tak-
ing place unexpectedly or unintention-
ally.” (Citing cases.)

In Terminal Oil Mill Co. v. Younger,
supra, it is stated:

“This court on several different oc-
casions has held that a disabivity re-
sulting from strain is compensable,
even though there were no surrounding
circumstances to increase the injury.
This was the holding in the following
cases; Junior & Sooner Oil & Gas Co.
v. Pfalzgraf, 164 Okla. 59, 22 P. 2d
911; Beck Mining Co. v. State Indus-
trial Commission, 88 Okla. 34, 211 P.
69, 28 A.L.R. 197; Evans-Wallower Lead
Co, v. Dry, 178 Okla. 48, 61 P. 2d 561;
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co.
v. Pound, 156 Okla. 101, 9 P. 2d 417;
Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co.
v. Linthicum, 168 Okla. 631, 35 P. 2d
450; and Berger v. Reynolds, 139 Okla.
163, 282 P. 143.” (Emphasis ours.)

In the Younger case, supra, we, in
effect, applied the definition of “acci-"
dent” as found in Stasmas v. State In-
dustrial Commission, supra. and we
there concluded that it was the appli-
cation of the rule which was difficult
and confusing. And, so it is, if the term
“accidental injury” is not given a broad
and liberal construction; however, “ac-
cidental injury” as the term is used
under our Workmen’s Compensation
Law, must never be construed so as to
invoke the doctrine of “assumed risk”.

In answering an argument similar, if
not identical, to petitioners’ first prop-
osition herein, the court, in the Younger
case, stated:

“The petitioners contend that since
there was no blow, no fall or slipping,
and no unusual strain, and since re-
spondent had done nothing different
from what he ordinarily did in the per-
formance of his duties, the so-called
jury could not have arisen out of and
in the course of his employment. Pe-
titioners cite and rely upon the lan-
guage in, and comment on the fact sit-
uations in the following cases of some-
what analogous nature; National Bis-

a 19

cuit Co. v. Lout, 179 Okla. 259, 65 P. 2d
497; Turner v. Ford, 183 Okla. 567, 83
P. 2d 844; Oklahoma Leader Co. v.
Wells, 147 Okla. 294, 296 P. 751; and
other cases, mostly from other states.

“We have analyzed these cases and
find that they are distinguishable from
the present case. In National Biscuit
Co. v. Lout, supra, the employee was in
the act of stooping to pick up a sack
when he received his injury. In Okla-
homa Leader Co. v. Wells, supra, the
employee was stricken while leaning
over to pick up a pair of pliers. In
Turner v. Ford, supra, the employee
was pushing a ‘wheelbarrow up an in-
cline when he became temporarily dis-
abled. The reading of this latter case
further discloses that there was no
competent evidence showing that the
alleged accidental injury caused the re-
sulting disability. In each of these
cases it was held that the injury of
the employee did not arise out of and in
the course of his employment. We find
it unnecessary to discuss the correct-
ness of the holdings in these cases due
to the fact that in the case at bar the
respondent was injured while in the
process of lifting the loaded scoop
shovel. This injury was no doubt the
result of a strain.”

In Clarksburg Paper Co. v. Roper,
196 Okla. 504, 166 P. 2d 425, the court
stated:

“In Terminal Oil Co. v. Younger, 188
Okla. 316, 108 P. 2d 542, Younger,
while shoveling cottonseed with a scoop
shovel in the Terminal Company’s gin
was seized with a sudden sharp pain in
his back. He was performing his usual
and customary work, the loaded shovel
which he was using weighing from 25
to 35 pounds. It was there contended
that there was no unusual strain and
that Younger had done nothing different
from what he ordinarily did in the per-
formance of his duties. In that case an
award by the Commission, holding that
he had received an accidental injury
was sustained.

A number of cases are cited from
other states analyzing fact situations
and defining accidental injuries.

In Gulf Oil Co. v. Rouse, 202 Okla.
395, 214 P. 2d 251, it is stated:

“In the reply brief petitioner argues
that the claimant has failed to note
the cases from foreign jurisdictions
brought to the attention of this court.
We have carefully examined these cases
and find that if they fail to conform
to the above rule announced by this
court they are contrary to the rule in
this state defining an accidental in-
jury. In this connection we have taken
note of the rulings made in Frank v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 49 S. D.
312, 207 N. W. 89; * * * In at least
one of these cases the rule was an-
nounced in sustaining an award which
had been set aside by an intermediate
tribunal. In Martin v. State Compen-
sation Commission, supra, the Supreme
Court of West Virginia in affirming an
order denying an award quite frankly
stated that it might have reached a
different conclusion but felt itself bound
by the holding of the Industrial Board.”

In Knotts Bakery v. Freudenthaler,
188 Okla. 321, 108 P. 2d 540, claimant
was injured while lifting a bucket.

In Evans-Wallower Lead Co. v. Dry,
supra, this court sustained an award
wherein the employee testified that he
lifted a lever in adjusting a pulley belt
and sprained his back. Other awards
sustained are: Indian Territory Ilum-
inating Oil Co. v. Pound, supra, where
the employee was rolling or lifting cas-
ing and sprained his back; Junior &
Sooner Oil & Gas Co. v. Pfalzgraf, su-
pra, where the employee sprained his
right shoulder while pulling a burning
car from in front of a gas meter;
Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. v.
Linthicum, supra, where the employee
sprained his back while lifting a loaded
ore can in a mine; and Berger v. Rey-
nolds, supra, wherein the employee was
setting a telegraph pole and in raising
the pole wrenched his back.

The language used in all of these
cases indicates that it is the strain
which constitutes the accidental injury.
If there is any unusual incident or con-
dition it is mentioned as evidence to
support the finding as to the strain.

In Hart Const. Co. v. Weaver, 201
Okla. 424, 206 P, 2d 724, this court again

20 Le

recognized and applied the doctrine an-
nounced in the foregoing cases.

The State Industrial Commission did
not err in holding that claimant sus-
tained an accidental injury.

The second contention is that the evi-
dence wholly fails to sustain the finding
that claimant has any disability re-
sulting from an accidental injury. The
disability for which claimant was seek-
ing compensation was of such charac-
ter to require determination of its na-
ture, cause and extent to be made by
skilled and professional persons and of
necessity had to be proved by the testi-
mony of such persons. Nu-Way Laun-
dry & Cleaners v. State Industrial Com-
mission, 194 Okla. 101, 147 P. 2d 795;
Andrews Mining & Milling Co. v. At-
kinson, supra; Eagle-Picher Lead Co.
v. Black, 164 Okla. 67, 22 P. 2d 907; J. J.
Harrison Construction Co. v. Mitchell,
170 Okla. 364, 40 P. 2d 643; Skelly Oil
Co. v. Rose, 176 Okla. 313, 55 P. 2d
1019; Atlantic Refining Co. v. Allen,
185 Okla. 194, 90 P. 2d 659.

We have heretofore shown that the
evidence of medical men was pre-
sented. Said evidence was competent
and sufficient to sustain the finding of
causal connection between the accident-
al injury and the disability sustained
by claimant. The two medical reports
reasonably informed the Commission
that in the opinion of the two experts
filing the reports the disability was due
to the strain caused by the accidental
injury of June 23, 1949.

As stated in Skelly Oil Co. v. Collins,
181 Okla. 428, 74 P. 2d 619, while the
testimony could have been more direct,
it did not necessarily have to be so giv-
en. Where the evidence is sufficiently
plain and explicit so as to justify the
conclusion reached therefrom, a find-
ing based thereon will not be disturbed
by this court. City of Kingfisher v. Jen-
kins, 168 Okla. 624, 33 P. 2d 1094,

The petitioners did not offer any med-
ical evidence to contradict the physi-
cians who filed reports for claimant.
There is no other expert evidence in

the record suggesting any other acci-
dent that claimant sustained. In such
case based upon the testimony the
State Industrial Commission may find
that the disability is a result of an ac-
cidental injury. Swift & Co. v. Brown,
202 Okla. 572, 216 P. 2d 294.

We have noticed the cases from other
jurisdictions treating of the evidence
required to sustain a finding as to the
disability. Among them are: Woods v.
W. E. Joyce Co., 239 N.Y.S. 110, in
which the loss of an eye was attempted
to be declared a result of a fall; and
Falco’s Case, 260 Mass. 74, 156 N. E.
691, in which it was sought to attribute
cancer to copper poisoning and the
medical evidence was declared uncer-
tain and insufficient. The fact that a
back strain frequently results from
shoveling, lifting and pulling is not
open to dispute and we think the cases
offered by petitioner are not in point.
Where no other cause of disability is
shown it has been held the evidence of
the accident and resulting disability
thereafter, supported by any compe-
tent medical testimony, is sufficient.
Swift & Co. v. Brown, supra. In Fed-
eral Mining & Smelting Co. v. Mont-
gomery, 148 Okla, 145, 297 P. 240, the
evidence to sustain a finding that her-
nia resulted from strain was in ques-
tion. Therein the court stated:

“Tt is our view that the testimony
of the injured workman sufficiently es-
tablished the cause of the hernia.”

See, also, in this connection, Nu-Way
Laundry & Cleaners v. State Indus-
trial Commission, supra; Eagle-Picher
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Linthicum,
supra, and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Anguish, 201 Okla. 691, 209 P. 2d 689.

We are of the opinion and hold that
the evidence was sufficient to support.
the finding that the disability was the
result of the accidental injury of June
23, 1949.

Award sustained.

WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, and O’-
NEAL, JJ., concur, HALLEY, V.C.J.,
dissents.

SAFEWAY STORES, Inc., v. DUVALL,
No. 34391. Jan. 27, 1953.
252 P. 2d 1022.

| 21

A. M. Covington, Tulsa, for plaintiff
in error.

Paul Edwards, Tulsa, for defendant
in error.

PER CURIAM. This is an action
brought by Bessie Duvall, as plaintiff,
to recover from Safeway Stores, Inc.,
as defendant, damages for personal in-
jury received when plaintiff became
entangled or hobbled in a metal hoop
causing her to fall while walking along
the sidewalk adjacent to defendant’s
store on West Second street in the city
of Sand Springs, Oklahoma, on or about
the 15th day of February, 1946. The
parties will be referred to as they ap-
peared in the trial court.

Plaintiff, a woman 41 years of age,
resided with her family in Sand Springs,
Oklahoma. The defendant owned and
operated a retail grocery store on the
corner of Main and Second in Sand
Springs. The store of the defendant
fronted both Second street and Main.
There was a front corner entrance to
the store and other openings along Sec-
ond street. The east five windows and
door of defendant’s store on Second
street opened into the sales room and
the sixth opening, a door, at or near
the west end of the store on Second
Street, opened into the stock room of
defendant’s store. This door ordinarily
was kept locked during the hours that
the store was open for business. The
store had no alley or back entrance. The
north and west-most door opening on
Second street was used by defendant
for receiving deliveries of merchandise
and removing waste from the store,
The defendant thus made a special use
of the sidewalk on Second street in
front of and adjacent to the side door
to the storage room for the purposes
stated.

The sidewalk at the point in question
was a normal public sidewalk without
any defects and without any labeling

22 Le

thereof as a loading zone. On the date
of the plaintiff's accident there was
some ice and snow on the sidewalk.

On the morning of February 15, 1946,
plaintiff, with her two sons, went into
a grocery store about one-half block
west of defendant’s store in Sand
Springs. After some period of time
plaintiff, accompanied by her two sons,
left the grocery store where they had
been shopping and walked up Second
street along the north side of defend-
ant’s store, but when she reached a
point in front of the north side of de-~
fendant’s store that was used for load-
ing and unloading purposes she became
hobbled in a metal hoop causing her to
fall on her knees, resulting in the in-
jury which is the basis of her com-
plaint. The metal hoop which caused
plaintiff to fall was the type of hoop
commonly used to bind boxes contain-
ing groceries and meat. There is no di-
rect evidence of contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff.

The evidence as to who placed the of-
fending metal hoop at the location of
the accident is in conflict. No direct
proof was introduced as to who placed
it there or how it came to be there.
The plaintiff's evidence and the cir-
cumstances proven by the plaintiff to-
gether with the reasonable deductions
or permissive inferences to be drawn
therefrom tend to prove that the hoop
was left there by the defendant or was
there as an incident to defendant’s use
of the sidewalk for its business pur-
poses, The evidence of the defendant
tended to prove that defendant did not
place it or cause it to be there, nor that
it was at said place by reason of the
defendant’s use of the sidewalk or the
abutting premises. Otherwise, there is
very little dispute as to the facts in the
case. In view of the decision of this
case on other grounds, we deem it not
necessary to pass on this disputed is-
sue of fact.

The questions to be decided that are
decisive are questions of law. The most
serious grounds urged by defendant on

appeal for reversal relate to the in-
structions given by the trial court.
These instructions define the duty
owed by an occupant or owner of
property abutting on a public sidewalk
to maintain the sidewalk in a condition
safe for pedestrians, when the side-
walk is used extensively by the abut-
ting user. In instruction No. 10 the
court instructed the jury that the de-
fendant was negligent if it:

“« * * * or its employees placed the
metal hoop on the sidewalk or had ac-
tual knowledge of its being there or
that it had been there for such a length
of time that the defendant should have
knowledge of its presence and the
length of time required for it to have
remained there in order to find that
the defendant should have known of its
presence is a question of fact for you
jurors to find, bearing in mind that
defendants are only required under the
law to use reasonable care in keeping
the sidewalk immediately adjacent to
their loading door or other premises

lean.”

Instruction No. 13 embodied a part
of the matters contained in instruction
No. 10 stating that it was the duty of the
city to keep the sidewalk in a reason-
ably safe condition for the public’s use,
but that this does not relieve the abut-
ting property owner from the duty of
using ordinary care to keep it clean of
objects dangerous to pedestrians, which
may come to be there as a natural re-
sult of the operation of the business:

* * providing you also find that
the abutting property owner either put
such things or debris on the sidewalk
or some of his employees did so, or that
it was there such a length of time that
the abutting property owner or store
operator should have known its pres-
ence.”

Instruction No. 15 embodies most of
the matters included in instructions No.
10 and No. 13, including the following:

“ * * * or if the hoop introduced as
evidence in this case was left there by
someone other than the defendant, or
its agents and servants, and had been
there for such a length of time that the

| 23

defendant knew or should have known

of its presence by using ordinary care.
ee

And continuing with other matters not
germane to the controverted questions:
of law. Defendant properly reserved ob-
jections to these instructions.

By these instructions we see that the
jury was instructed that the defendant
was not only negligent and liable to the
plaintiff in damages if it or its agents
had placed the hoop on the sidewalk,
or if it was there by reason of defend-
ant’s use of the sidewalk, but that if
someone else caused it to be there,
then defendant was liable if the object
had been there for such a length of time
that defendant should have known of its
presence. The latter part of instruction
No. 10 tells the jury that defendant is

required to use reasonable care in keep-.

ing the sidewalk immediately adjacent
to their loading door or other premises
clean. The principle of law announced
in the quoted portions of these three in-
structions was erroneous. We are un-
able to agree with plaintiff that it was
harmless error. To so hold would be to
say that the jury was not influenced or
misled thereby.

The sidewalks of a municipality are
maintained for the use of the general
public. It is the general rule in this
state that it is the duty of the munici-
pality to keep them in a safe condition.
City of Hugo v. Nance, 39 Okla. 640,
185 P. 346. The exception to this gen-
eral rule is that the occupant of the
premises abutting on the sidewalk owes
the duty to the public to keep the side-
walk clear of injurious objects or de-
bris which might be placed there by its
agents, or be there as a result of the
use of the walk or the premises by the
abutting occupant, or which might be
upon the walk by reason of customers
coming upon the premises or use of the
sidewalk by reason of the business done
by the occupant. Cities Service Oil Co.
v. Kindt, 200 Okla. 64, 190 P. 2d 1007.

The Cities Service case just cited is
discussed by both parties to this ap-

peal, with differing construction and ap-
plication, As we understand this de-
cision, the object causing plaintiff’s in-
jury was a small spot of oil left on the
sidewalk in front of the defendant’s
service station as an incident to de-
fendant’s use of the premises and the
business conducted by him, probably
by some automobile driven into the
service station or deposited there in
connection with the service of an auto-
mobile. It is significant that the parties
in the reported case made no distinc-
tion as to whether the oil was on the
sidewalk or on the property of the abut:
ting user. In the opinion the court said:

“The nature of defendant’s business
was such that he should expect motor
oil to accumulate on the station prem-
ises proper as well as on the sidewalk
in front of the station.”

There appeared to be little dispute
between the parties in that case as to
the fact that the oil was left on the walk
as an incident to defendant’s use of the
walk and abutting property. Such is not
the facts in the case at bar.

Defendant in error cites Corpus Juris
Secundum, vol. 63, pp. 225-226, under
the topical head, “Special Use for Pri-
vate Benefit.” The broad, general lan-
guage used in this text would seem to
support plaintiff’s position here, but a
careful analysis of the facts in the
cases cited in support of this proposi-
tion reveals that the statement of law
is based upon and refers to factual sit-
uations in which the user places the ob-
jects on the sidewalk, or where the ob-
jects came to be there as a reasonable
consequence of the use to which the
walk or premises were put by such
users. From the same volume 63 of Cor-
pus Juris Secundum, p. 223, we find the
announcement that:

“An abutting owner or occupant has
no right to do any affirmative act im-
pairing the safety of the sidewalk in
front of his premises, and he owes
pedestrians the negative duty not to
use the sidewalk negligently in such a
manner as to cause injuries to which
the pedestrian did not materially con-

24 a

tribute. He will be liable for injuries
where, by his affirmative act, he creates
a dangerous condition, as where he
wrongfully or negligently obstructs the
sidewalk or, according to the decisions
on the question, a person employed by
him does so, or where he creates or
maintains a nuisance. However, an
abutting owner not responsible for the
creation, and having no actual knowl-
edge, of a nuisance is not liable therefor
merely because he could have abated
the nuisance.”

Also, at page 219 of the same text,
we find further authority as follows:

“The owner or occupant of property
abutting a sidewalk is not an insurer
of the safety of pedestrians using the
sidewalk, and, as a general rule, in
the absence of statute, he owes no
duty to the public to keep the sidewalk
in repair or in a safe condition for
travel, and is not liable for injuries
to a traveler from defects or obstruc-
tions which he did not create.”

‘The case of Daly v. Mathews, 49 Cal.
App. 2d 545, 122 P. 2d 81, a California
case, deals in some degree with éur
problem at hand. In the reported case
a driveway had been constructed across
a sidewalk at a lower level than the
sidewalk proper. The plaintiff in using
the sidewalk and not observing the de-
pression in the walk caused by the
driveway stumbled and fell, causing her
injuries. The court held there was no
liability on the abutting owner for con-
structing the driveway in the manner
that he did, holding, as stated in the
head-note, that:

“The abutting landowner is not bound
to keep the sidewalk in front of his
premises in repair or in a safe con-
dition for public travel, in the absence
of statute or ordinance imposing such
a duty on him.”

Unquestionably, in this case the drive-
way was for the special use and bene-
fit of the abutting owner or occupant.

For further discussion of the general
rules involved in such cases, see Amer.
Juris. vol. 25, §§364 and 365, under the
subject of “Highways.”

The case of James v. Burchett, 15
Wash. 2d 119, 129 P. 2d 790, by the
Supreme Court of Washington, quoted
by the defendant in her brief, does not
support the rule contended for by her by
reason of the different factual situa-
tion. The facts in the Washington case
were that the abutting owner operated
a used car lot on which lot gravel or
stones were deposited, and in the course
of the use of the used car lot stones
were frequently worked out on to the
sidewalk. The plaintiff, a pedestrian,
stepped on one of the stones on the
walk causing her to fall, resulting in
the injuries sued upon. In its opinion
the court said:

“Where a sidewalk is used by one in
control of abutting property, as a
driveway for vehicles, the special use,
though lawful, carries with it the duty
to use reasonable care that the use
does not create conditions rendering
it unsafe for the passing thereon of pe-
destrians.”

The court affirmed a judgment in
favor of plaintiff in this reported case,
but for the apparent reason that the
offending object was on the sidewalk
by reason of defendant’s use of the
premises abutting thereon. The distinc-
tion between the principle of law in this
case by the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington and the rule announced by the
trial court in the case at bar in its in-
structions Nos. 10, 13 and 15 is readily
apparent. The lower court did not stop
when it instructed the jury that it
was the defendant’s duty to keep the
sidewalk clear of objects of its own or
placed there by its agents or as an in-
cident to its use, but instructed the jury
that defendant must keep the area in
question clean of objects that had been
there for such a length of time that de-
fendant knew or should have known of
their presence, leaving it to the jury to.
determine what length of time would
impose liability on the abutting user.

In the light of the authorities herein
cited, we find and hold that it was error
for the court to give instruction No. 10,
particularly that portion beginning with

the wording, “* * * or had actual knowl-
edge of its being there * * *” and con-
cluding with, “* * * the defendants are
only required under the law to use rea-
sonable care in keeping the sidewalk
immediately adjacent to their loading
door or other premises clean.” Also,
it was error to give the last two lines
of instruction No, 13, and that part of
instruction No. 15 that announced the
same principle of law with reference to
liability of defendant if some one other
than defendant or its agents left the
hoop on the sidewalk.

The judgment is therefore reversed,
and the cause remanded to the trial
court, with instructions to take such
further proceedings as are not incon-
sistent with the views herein expressed.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys A. C. Kidd, Dudley H.
Culp, and A. S. Wells, who as. Special
Masters aided in the preparation of this
opinion. These attorneys were recom-
mended by the Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion, approved by the Judicial Council,
and appointed by the court. ~

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, ARNOLD, O’NEAL,
‘WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., con-

- cur. HALLEY, C.J., concurs in conclu-
sion.

NORMAN et al. v. LEACH.
No. 35300. Jan, 27, 1953.
262 P. 2d 1020.

25

——E
Dyer & Powers, Tulsa, for plaintiff
in error.

Cleo Wilson and O, O. Leach, Tulsa,
for defendant in error.

CORN, J. Plaintiff sued defendant al-
leging an oral contract of employment
for performance of legal services; that
upon conclusion of such services the
parties agreed upon a fee of $750 there-
for and defendant drew her check pay-
able to plaintiff; subsequently, defend-
ant stopped payment upon the check
and as a result plaintiffs fee was un-
paid and he thereby was entitled to

~judgment for this amount.

After other proceedings not neces-
sary to consideration of this appeal,
defendant filed an amended answer.
Therein defendant admitted plaintiff's
performance of certain services for
which plaintiff rendered his statement
for $25, which amount defendant of-
fered to pay and tendered into court.
Defendant denied plaintiff’s services
were worth the amount claimed, and al-
leged the circumstances surrounding
execution of the check amounted to un-
due influence and plaintiff had been
guilty of overreaching and duress, and
that the check was wholly without con-
sideration, the sum sought as attorney
fees being excessive and unreason-
able.

After ‘argument and upon considera-
tion of the matter the trial court sus-
tained plaintiff's motion for judgment
upon the pleadings and awarded plain-
tiff judgment for the amount claimed.

In appealing from the judgment ren-
dered there is presented the single ques-
tion of whether the trial court erred in
sustaining plaintiff's motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings.

The general rule as announced in 71
C.I.S., Pleading, §429, is:

“Where a material issue is tendered
by the pleadings, judgment on the
pleadings is improper. The motion will

26 De

pe denied if an issue of fact, or a direct
issue joined on any single material prop-
osition, is made requiring the intro-
duction of testimony by the moving
party to sustain such issue. OR RD

“Judgment on the pleadings will not
pe rendered for plaintiff where his al-
legations are sufficiently controverted
or where the answer sets up a good de-
fense. * * *”

The general rule is recognized and ap-
plied in this jurisdiction, Mooney v.
Phillips Pet. Co., 201 Okla. 426, 206
P. 2d 977; Butterick Co., Inc., v.. Molen,
198 Okla. 92, 175 P. 2d 311; Peoples

Finance & Thrift Co. v. Fuller, 196 Okla.’

32, 162 P. 2d 189; Gilchrist v. Sutton,
191 Okla. 117, 127 P. 2d 163.

Although recognizing the rules appli-
cable to the present situation, plaintiff
urges that since defendant admitted
plaintiff’s performance of service, she
could not plead failure of consideration
without further alleging such services
were incomplete; that the allegations
of overreaching and duress were insuf-
ficient to raise an issue of fact, being
only conclusions of the pleader.

It is universally recognized that
where fraud, duress or undue influence
are relied upon, the pleader should set
forth material facts constituting the al-
leged fraudulent or oppressive conduct.
24 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit, §244;
17 Am. Jur. Duress and Undue Influ-
ence, §26; Burke v. King, 176 Okla. 625,
56 P. 2d 1185. However, motions for
judgment on the pleadings are not fa-
vored, and pleadings which are alleged
to state no cause of action, or defense,
are to be construed liberally in favor
of the pleader. Hendrix v. Redfern, 204
Okla. 613, 232 P. 2d 926. Neither should
the motion be sustained merely because
the pleadings are indefinite, incomplete,
or state conclusions of law. First Bank
of Texola v. Terrell, 44 Okla. 719, 145
P. 1140.

Upon numerous occasions we have
pointed out that a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings is of the nature
of both a motion and a demurrer, ad-

mitting matters of defense that are well
plead. Kinsey v. Townsend, 180 Okla.
466, 70 P. 2d 92. Among other matters
relied upon, defendant alleged plain-
tiffs purported claim arose from cir-
cumstances amounting to overreaching
and duress. Although the failure to
plead such circumstances with particu-
larity opened the way for attack upon
the pleading on grounds of indefinite-
ness, the defensive matters asserted
were sufficient to controvert plaintiff's
rights to recover upon the claim set out
in his petition. Thus the answer was
sufficient to raise a material issue of
fact requiring the introduction of testi-
mony. In such cases the motion for judg-
ment upon the pleadings cannot be sus-
tained. Hendrix et al. v. Redfern, supra.

_ We conclude that the trial court erred
in sustaining plaintiffs motion and ren-
dering judgment in his behalf.

Reversed and remanded for new
trial.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
DAVISON, ARNOLD, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

W. L. HULETT LBR. CO. v. VIKING
FREIGHT Co.
No, 34950. Jan. 27, 1953.

252 P. 2a 1017.

for

Arthur G. Croninger,
plaintiff in error.

Miami,

A. C, Wallace, John R. Wallace, and
Ben T. Owens, Miami, for defendant in
error.

DAVISON, J. This is an action
wherein Viking Freight Company, a
corporation, as plaintiff, sought to re-
cover from the defendants, W. L. Hu-
lett Lumber Company, a corporation,
and Mrs. Lue Dema Shewmake, the
sum $2,350, as damages for the almost
complete destruction of a motor trac~
tor trailer, resulting from a highway
collision caused directly and proxi-
mately by the alleged negligence of the
defendants. The case of W. L. Hulett
Lumber Co. v. Bartlett-Collins Co.,
206 Okla. 93, 241 P. 2d 378, grew out
of the same occurrence and was an ac-
tion for damage done thereby to the
eargo being transported in plaintiff's
tractor trailer. The parties here will
be referred to as they appeared in the
trial court.

At about 4:80 o’clock on the afternoon
of October 31, 1947, one W. B. Grissette
was driving a motor tractor trailer be-
longing to the plaintiff, Viking Freight
Company, loaded with a cargo of glass
products belonging to the Bartlett-
Collins Company of Sapulpa, Okla-

27

homa. He was driving along highway
No. U.S. 66 in a northeasterly direction
between Quapaw, Oklahoma, and Bax-
ter Springs, Kansas, at a point some
two miles northeast of Quapaw. Ap-
proaching him from the north was a
one and one-half ton International
truck, owned by the defendant Hulett
Lumber Company, and being driven by
one Noah Piercefield, with whom a
helper, Charles Ferris, was riding. Im~
mediately behind defendant’s truck, the
defendant Mrs. Lue Dema Shewmake
was driving a passenger car in the same

direction. She started around the Hu-

lett truck at a, time when it was only
a few hundred feet from the plaintiff's
vehicle. The right rear part of her car
struck the left front part of the Hulett
truck, which immediately went off into
the ditch on the right side of the high-
way, traveled in the ditch about one
hundred feet, came back up out of the
ditch, crossed the highway and collided
with plaintiff’s trailer. The impact
knocked the gas tank off the trailer
and punctured it, spilling the gasoline
over the highway under the trailer. The
gasoline was ignited and the ensuing
fire burned the trailer, its cargo and
much of the motor tractor. The defend-
ant Shewmake, after striking the Hulett
truck and slightly damaging the fender
of her car thereby, did not stop but con-
tinued on down the highway about a
half a quarter of a mile when she no-
ticed the fire and turned around and
went back to the scene of the collision.

A jury trial of the issues resulted in a
verdict for $2,350 for plaintiff as against
the defendant Hulett Lumber Company
only. From a judgment based thereon,
said defendant had perfected this ap-
peal.

The most serious contention of plain-
tiff in error is that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error in admitting,
over the objection of the defendant
Lumber Company, the testimony of
the defendant Shewmake, that the
driver of the lumber company truck
turned to the left across the center line
of the highway immediately before, and
causing the collision of the truck and

28 |

the Shewmake car. This testimony was
offered and admitted as evidence in
chief by the plaintiff. It is contended
that such proof was at variance with
the issues and in contradiction of the al-
legation of facts constituting negli-
gence, as contained in plaintiff’s peti-
tion.

The petition contains the following
allegations relative to negligence:

“2. Plaintiff alleges that said colli-
sion was caused by the negligence and
want of care of the defendants, W. L.
Hulett Lumber Company, and Mrs.
Lue Dema Shewmake, in any or all of
the following particulars, to-wit:

“(a) That the defendant, W. L. Hu-
lett Lumber Company, was guilty of
negligence in not keeping a proper look-
out in the situation and under the con-
ditions then existing in that had de-
fendant’s agent and employee, Noah
Piercefield, kept a proper lookout he
would have observed the trailer and
tractor of the plaintiff approaching
from the south on its own right hand
side of the highway and would have
observed the car driven by Mrs. Lue
Dema Shewmake attempting to pass
him all in time to have been able to
have reduced the speed and altered
the direction of his truck by turning to
the right in such a manner as to have
avoided a collision with the car driven
by Mrs. Lue Dema Shewmake and to
have thereby avoided crossing the cen-
ter of the road and striking the plain-
tiff’s trailer and tractor while plain-
tiff’s trailer and tractor were on the
right or east side of the road.

“(b) That the defendant, W. L. Hulett
Lumber Company, was guilty of neg-
ligence in that the defendant’s agent
and employee, Noah Piercefield, was
driving the truck owned by the defend-
ant without maintaining proper control
thereof, in that had the driver of said
truck been driving with ordinary and
reasonable care under the circum-
stances and the situation then existing
he would have been able to have kept
his truck on the right side of the center
of the road and thereby would have
been able to have avoided striking the
truck owned by the plaintiff even
though his truck had previously been
struck on the left front by the car own-

ed and operated by Mrs. Lue Dema
Shewmake,

“(c) That the defendant, W. L. Hu-
lett Lumber Company, was guilty of
negligence in that said defendant vio-
lated Rule of the Road Number 1, 69
Okla. St. Ann. 583, in that said de-
fendant’s truck agent and employee,
Noah Piercefield, permitted said truck
to cross from the right or west side
across the center of said road into the
lane of oncoming traffic and strike the
plaintiff's trailer and tractor with great
force and violence.

“(d) That the defendant, Mrs. Lue
Dema Shewmake, was guilty of negli-
gence in driving said automobile at a
reckless and excessive rate of speed
under the conditions then and there
existing, to-wit, a speed of approxi-
mately 45 miles per hour.

“(e) That the defendant, Mrs. Lue
Dema Shewmake was guilty of negli-
gence in that she violated Rule of the
Road Number 2, 69 Okla. St. Ann. 583,
in that in passing the truck of the de-
fendant, W. L. Hulett Lumber Com-
pany, she failed to keep to the left of
the center of the road until clear of
said truck but on the contrary negli-
gently pulled over to the right before
clearing said truck thus striking said
truck owned by the defendant, W. L.
Hulett Lumber Company, and that said
collision contributed to the fact that
the operator of the truck owned by the
defendant, W. L. Hulett Lumber Com-
pany, lost control of said truck thereby
permitting it to strike the trailer and
tractor owned by the plaintiff.

“(f) That the combination of negli-
gent acts on the part of the defend-
ants as above described were the di-
rect and proximate cause of the truck
belonging to the W. L. Hulett Lumber
Company crossing to the wrong side of
the road and running into the trailer
and tractor owned by plaintiff while
said trailer and tractor on the right
and proper side of the road, without
which acts of negligence on the part of
the defendants said accident would not
have occurred and the trailer and trac-
tor of plaintiff would not have been
damaged.”

Section 311 of Title 12 O.S. 1941 pro-
vides:

ee 29

“No variance between the allega-
tions in a pleading and the proof, is
to be deemed material, unless it has
actually misled the adverse party, to
his prejudice, in maintaining his action
or defense upon the merits. Whenever
it is alleged that a party has been so
misled, that fact must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court, and it must
also be shown in what respect he has
been misled, and thereupon the court
may order the pleading to be amended,
upon such terms as may be just.”

The testimony objected to was in ref-
erence to a part of a rapidly occurring
series of facts culminating in the col-
lision with, and injury to, plaintiff's
truck. It was about a fact already de-
tailed by plaintiff’s driver, although not
in harmony therewith. The testimony
was held admissible in the Bartlett-
Collins case, supra, when offered on
behalf of the defendant Shewmake.
Here, as there:

“The undisputed physical facts in the
case show that when the International
truck and the Chevrolet tudor collided
only a dent three or four inches deep
and approximately a foot long was
made in the Chevrolet; that the truck
went off into a bar-ditch, traveled about
100 feet, came up from the bar-ditch,
traveled 30 or 40 feet, crossed the pave-
ment, and struck the Viking truck with
such force as to puncture and knock off
its gasoline tank, break in two the
motor of the Hulett truck and damage
its whole front ‘almost to the cab’.”

“The negligent acts charged by plain- .

tiff against the Hulett Company are
failure to keep a proper lookout, driv-
ing its truck without maintaining con-
trol thereof, and violating the Rule of
the Road by permitting its truck to
cross the road and collide with the Vik-
ing truck. Whether the collision be-
tween the Hulett truck and the Shew-
make car was sufficient, from the phy-
sical facts shown, to cause the damage
alleged to have been done to the Hu-
lett truck, and whether the lack of con-
trol of the truck was due solely to the
collision with the Shewmake car, were
facts on which reasonable minds might
differ. Not alone the human testimony,
but the physical facts as well, were
properly ccnsidered by the jury in ar-
riving at its verdict. Oklahoma Ry. Co.

v. Ivery, 201 Okla. 245, 204 P. 2d 978.
And certainly the testimony of the de-
fendant Shewmake as to the cause of
the collision should be considered along
with the other evidence and given such
weight as the jury might think it de-
served.”

Even though plaintiffs position be
taken as true that, technically, there
was a variance between the allegations
in the petition and the questioned testi-
mony, that in itself does not constitute
reversible error. In construing the
above-quoted statutory provision, this
court, in the case of Franks v. Reeder,
101 Okla. 18, 223 P. 126, used the fol-
lowing language which is here appli-
cable:

“There is a well-defined, although
often disregarded, distinction between
variance and failure of proof. The one
is frequently used to include the other.
In this case the evidence supports the
cause of action pleaded and therefore
there is no failure of proof. The fact is
immaterial that it also establishes an-
other right, which the plaintiff did not
plead, and upon which he did not seek
or obtain relief. Incidental proof of an-
other cause of action upon which plain-
tiff neither seeks nor obtains relief is
not necessarily such a material variance
as will invalidate the judgment ren-
dered, provided the proof does support
the cause of action pleaded, and upon
which recovery is had, and the evi-
dence at variance does not otherwise
prejudice the court or judge. Under
the circumstances of this case such
evidence is nothing more than proof
of a harmless addition to the cause of
action the plaintiff sought to enforce—
merely proof of a right he had effec-
tively waived.”

Although the facts are not at all anal-
ogus, the same rule of law was re-
affirmed in the case of Howard v. Stew-
art, 195 Okla. 491, 159 P. 2d 527. In the
ease under consideration, any variance
was, at most, a harmless error. As was
further said in the case of Franks v.
Reeder, supra:

“Tt does not appear that defendant
has been misled to his prejudice by
the alleged variance, if any there be.
The plaintiff proved just what in his

PO

30 —

petition he undertook to prove. He
proved more, but relied on nothing
more. Under this statute defendant has
no just complaint. See Guinan v. Read-
dy, 79 Okla. 111, 191 P. 602.”

The other questions presented are not
substantially different from those dis-
cussed and determined in the Bartlett-
Collins case above cited and quoted,
the last paragraph of which is also ap-
plicable here. It is:

“Plaintiff in error’s remaining propo-
sitions go to the sufficiency of plain-
tiff’s evidence to show negligence on
the part of the driver of the Hulett
truck. We hold that there was compe-
tent evidence from which the jury
might reasonably conclude that both
defendants were guilty of negligence,
and that such negligence was the prox-
imate cause of the damages suffered
by plaintiff.”

The judgment is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, AR-
NOLD, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur. O'NEAL, J., dissents.

HOLT v. JONES et al.
No. 35299. Oct. 28, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1953.

252 P. 2d 460.

Byrne A. Bowman, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiff in error.

Wallace & Dollarhide, Oklahoma City,
for defendants in error.

DAVISON, J. This is a suit in the na-
ture of a creditors’ bill brought by Rob-
ert A. Holt, as plaintiff, against Bar-
bara Jan Jones and the subsequently
joined Sarah M. Jones, Creekmore Wal-
lace, and C. Lewis Dollarhide, all de-
fendants, to vacate various conveyances
of real estate as being in fraud of cred-
itors. The parties, appearing here in
the same order, will be referred to as
they appeared in the trial court.

Plaintiff has appealed from a judg-
ment rendered against him when he
elected to stand upon his amended pe-
tition after the trial court sustained the
several motions to dismiss filed by the
defendants and considered by the court
as demurrers. The petition and amend-
ment thereto are as follows:

“1. Barbara Jan Jones appears of
record to be the owner of the following
described property situate in Oklahoma
County, Oklahoma:

[| 31

‘Lots One (1) to Six (6) inclusive,
and Lots Nineteen (19) to Twenty-
Three inclusive, and the minerals
under, Lot Twenty-Four (24), in
Block (1), and the minerals under
Lot One (1), in Block Two (2), all
in Donly Heights Addition to Okla-
homa City, according to the re-
corded plat thereof.

“Her mother, Sarah M. Jones, be~
came the owner of said lots as de-
scribed, upon the death of Sarah M.
Jones’ father, John William Johnston,
October 16, 1947, and under the decree
of distribution in his estate rendered
in Case No. 24,984, County Court of
Oklahoma County, April 14, 1949. Sarah
M. Jones was bequeathed and devised
a two-thirds interest in said estate, and
said lots were set aside to her interest
and ownership under said decree, one-
third of her interest (which is two-
ninths of the estate) being distributed
to Liberty National Bank of Oklahoma
City, and one-third of her ‘interest
(which is two-ninths of the estate) be-
ing distributed to Gus Rinehart, her at-
torney, each of whom held assignments
or quit claim deeds, or both, from her,
or from her through Harry S. Carlin or
Charles B. Jones, as securities for in-
debtedness. When the indebtednesses
were satisfied they conveyed said lots
at her direction, or for her purposes,
at the direction of unknown persons, to
Barbara Jan Jones.

“2, Said conveyances were made
when Sarah M. Jones was indebted to

plaintiff and others, and was insolvent.°

They were made, insofar as Sarah M.
Jones, her agents, Barbara Jan Jones,
and the plaintiff were concerned, in bad
faith, without fair and valuable consid-
eration for the purpose and with the in-
tent of hindering, delaying, and de-
frauding plaintiff and other creditors;
such fraud obstructs the enforcement
of the legal right of plaintiff and other
creditors to take the property; and
are void as against plaintiff and other
creditors.

“3. Sarah M. Jones’ indebtedness to
plaintiff was, and is, as follows:

“a. Contract dated March 27, 1948,
which she abandoned about one year
later, under which plaintiff had ad-
vanced and loaned $3,035.94, which was
due him at time of abandonment.

“b. Promissory note for $3,600.00
dated March 21, 1949, payable on de-
mand.

“ce. Promissory note for $2,065.00,
dated August 18, 1949, payable $400.00
on September 18, 1949, $155.00 on Oc-
tober 18, 1949, and $1,510.00 on Novem-
ber 18, 1949.”

Her indebtedness to others, so far as
known to plaintiff, was, and is, as fol-
lows:

“d. Judgment held by Pacific Em-
ployers Insurance Company for $14,-
304.39, $943.05 interest, and $1,430.00
attorney fee, rendered April 15, 1949,
on promissory note dated April 28, 1948,
suit filed March 16, 1949, Case No.
120027, District Court of Oklahoma
County, Oklahoma. (This judgment has
been released to Lot 1, in Block 2, and
as to Lot 24, in Block 1.)

“e, Judgment held by First National
Bank of Bethany, Oklahoma, for $1,-
972,51, an attorney fee of $370.00, and
costs, rendered December 22, 1948, in
Case No. 118,900, District Court, Okla-
homa County, Oklahoma.

“f, Promissory note for $1,600.00
payable to First National Bank & Trust
Company, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
dated May 31, 1949, due August 23, 1949,
and extended by payment of interest to
October 22, 1949.

“4. First Cause of Action, Lots 1 to 6
and 23 and 24, Block 1. Plaintiff adopts
all of the foregoing paragraphs of gen-
eral allegations. The following deeds
are fraudulent and void as against
plaintiff and he claims an equitable
lien, prior to all creditors, against said
property (the earlier deeds are trans-
fers of Sarah M. Jones’ interest in trust;
the final deeds are from the trustees
to Barbara Jan Jones):

“a, ‘Sale and Assignment’ of a 4/18
interest in the said estate, from Sarah
M. Jones to Harry S. Carlin, dated
March 5, 1948, filed February 5, 1949,
recorded in Book 1158 at Page 453, rec-
ords in office of county clerk of said
county.

“b, Quitclaim deed from Liberty Na-
tional Bank et al. to Sarah M. Jones,
dated April 14, 1949, filed April 14,
1949, recorded in Book 1178, Page 200.

32 a

“c, Quitclaim deed from Sarah M.
Jones to Charles B. Jones, dated April
15, 1949, filed April 28, 1949, recorded
in Book 1182, Page 343.

“d. Quitclaim deed from Harry S.
Carlin to Charles B. Jones, dated No-
vember 15, 1949, filed December 21,
1949, recorded in Book 1276, Page 359.

“e. Quitclaim deed from Charles B.
Jones to Barbara Jan Jones, dated Oc-
tober 24, 1950, filed October 25, 1950,
recorded in Book 1410, Page 530 (cov-
ering Lot 23 and the minerals under
Lot 24).

“5. Second Cause of Action, Lots 19
and 20, Block 1. Plaintiff adopts all of
the foregoing paragraphs of general al-
legations. The following deeds are
fraudulent and void as against plaintiff
and he claims an equitable lien, prior to
all creditors, against said property (the
earlier deeds are transfers of Sarah
M. Jones’ interest in trust; the final
deeds are from the trustees to Barbara
Jan Jones):

“a, ‘Sale and Assignment’ of a 4/18
interest in the said estate, from Sarah
M. Jones to Harry S. Carlin, dated
March 5, 1948, filed February 5, 1949,
recorded in Book 1158 at Page 543, rec-
ords in office of County Clerk of said
county.

“b, Quitclaim deed from Liberty Na-
tional Bank et al. to Gus Rinehart,
dated April 14, 1949, filed April 14, 1949,
recorded in Book 1178 at Page 197.

“ce. Quitclaim deed from Harry S.
Carlin and wife to Gus Rinehart, dated
November 15, 1949, filed December 21,
1949, recorded in Book 1276 at Page
357.

“d. Quitclaim deed from Gus Rine-
hart to Barbara Jan Jones, dated Oc-
tober 9, 1950, filed October 25, 1950,
recorded in Book 1410, Page 527.

“6 Third Cause of Action. Lots 21
and 22, Block 1. Plaintiff adopts all of
the foregoing paragraphs of general
allegations. The following deeds are
fraudulent and void as against plain-
tiff and he claims an equitable lien,
prior to all creditors, against said prop-
erty (the earlier deeds are transfers of
Sarah M. Jones’ interest in trust; the

final deeds are from the trustees to
Barbara Jan Jones):

“a, Sale and Assignment’ of a 4/18
interest in the said estate, from Sarah
M. Jones to Harry S. Carlin, dated
March 5, 1948, filed February 5, 1949,
recorded in Book 1158 at Page 453, rec-
ords in office of county clerk of said
county.

“b, Quitclaim deed from Sarah M.
Jones and others to Liberty National
Bank, dated April 14, 1949, filed April
14, 1949, recorded in Book 1178, Page
199.

“ce, Quitclaim deed from Liberty Na-
tional Bank et al. to Sarah M. Jones,
dated April 14, 1949, filed April 14,
1949, recorded in Book 1178, Page 200.

“d. Quitclaim deed from Sarah M.
Jones to Liberty National Bank, dated
May 16, 1949, filed August 30, 1949,
Book 1226, Page 219.

“e, Quitclaim deed from Liberty Na-
tional Bank to Gus Rinehart, dated
May 17, 1949, filed August 30, 1949,
Book 1226, Page 220.

“f, Quitclaim deed from Harry S.
Carlin and wife to Gus Rinehart, dated
November 15, 1949, filed December 21,
1949, récorded in Book 1276 at Page
357.

“g. Quitclaim deed from Gus Rine-
hart to Barbara Jan Jones, dated Oc-
tober 9, 1950 filed October 25, 1950, re-
corded in Book 1410, Page 527.

“7 Fourth Cause of Action. Lot 1,
Block 2. Plaintiff adopts all of the fore-
going paragraphs of general allega-
tions. The following deeds are fraud-
ulent and void as against plaintiff and
he claims an equitable lien, prior to
all creditors, against said property (the
earlier deeds are transfers of Sarah M.
Jones’ interest in trust; the final deeds
are from the trustees to Barbara Jan
Jones):

“a. Sale and Assignment’ of a 4/18
‘interest in the said estate from Sarah
M. Jones to Harry S. Carlin, dated
March 5, 1948, filed Februaty 5, 1949,
recorded in Book 1158 at Page 543. rec-
ords in office of county clerk of said
county.

“b. Quitclaim deed from Sarah Jones
and others to Lilah Bennett, dated

Le 33

about April 14, 1949, filed April 20,
1949, recorded in Book 1180, Page 1.

“ce. Quitclaim deed of Sarah M.
Jones to Lilah Bennett of surface only,
dated about August 26, 1948, filed Au-
gust 26, 1948, recorded in Book 1102,
Page 349.

“d. Quitclaim deed from Liberty Na-
tional Bank to Lilah Bennett, dated
April 29, 1949, filed May 10, 1949, re-
corded in Book 1186, Page 357.

“e. Quitclaim deed from Harry S.
Carlin to Lilah Bennett, dated Novem~
ber 15, 1949, filed December 21, 1949,
recorded in Book 1276, Page 358.

“f, Mineral deed from Lilah Bennett
to Charles B. Jones, dated November
15, 1949, filed December 21, 1949, Book
1276, Page 360.

“g. Quitclaim deed from Sarah M.
Jones and others to Charles B. Jones,
dated February 6, 1950, filed April 24,
1950, Book 1329, Page 53.

“h. Quitclaim deed from Charles B.
Jones to Barbara Jan Jones, dated Oc-
tober 24, 1950, filed October 25, 1950,
recorded in Book 1410, Page 530.

“Wherefore, plaintiff prays that all of
said deeds be decreed fraudulent and
void as to plaintiff, that said property
be impressed with an equitable lien in
the aggregate sum of $12,000 of Sarah
M. Jones’ indebtedness to him, a rea-
sonable attorney fee, and costs.”

“Second Amendment to Petition

“1. Sarah M. Jones, the debtor, is
being sued by the plaintiff in this court
on the indebtedness referred to in Para-
graph 3 of plaintiff's petition in the
following cases, such cases being pend-
ing at this time:

“a, Contract of March 27, 1948: Case
No, 126,153.

“b. Promissory Note of $3,600: Case
No. 126,168.

“c, Promissory note of $1,620.03: Case
No. 126, 154.”

Plaintiff is entitled to have the deeds
referred to in plaintiff's petition set
aside as to Sarah M. Jones.

“2, On September 12, 1951, the de-
fendant, Barbara Jan Jones (who has
married since the filing of this suit, and
whose name is now Barbara Jan Jones
Lea), made, executed, and delivered
unto Creekmore Wallace and C. Lewis
Dollarhide a mortgage purporting to
cover all the lots described in plain-
tiff’s petition, purporting to secure a
promissory note of said date, filed in
the office of the County Clerk of Okla-
homa County on September 14, 1951,
and recorded in Book 1517 of said
Clerk’s records at Page 336. This was
after the filing of this suit. Creekmore
Wallace and C. Lewis Dollarhide have
acquired no lien, right, title, or interest

. in or to said property as against the

rights of plaintiff, and if they have
any rights they are inferior to the rights
of plaintifg.

“Wherefore, plaintiff renews plain-
tiffs prayer for judgment and prays
that Creekmore Wallace and C. Lewis
Dollarhide be decreed to have no lien,
right, title or interest in or to said
property, or, if they have any, that it
be decreed inferior to that of plaintiff.”

The only question presented by this
appeal is whether or not the petition as
amended states a cause of action. It
is worded in such a manner and con-
tains so many statements of mere con-
clusions of law that it is somewhat dif-
ficult to analyze what cause of action,
if any, has been stated therein. But, in
line with the general rule which this
court has always followed, the petition
will be liberally construed and for the
purpose of determining the merit of
the demurrer ali the allegations will be
taken as true. Holt v. Board of County
Com’rs of Oklahoma County, 205 Okla.
178, 236 P. 2d 476; Allison v. Caruthers,
205 Okla. 582, 239 P. 2d 759.

But where, upon giving full import
and consideration to all the inferences
that may be legally drawn therefrom,
a petition, taken as a whole, fails to
state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, a demurrer
thereto should be sustained. Davis v.
City of Okmulgee, 174 Okla. 429, 50 P.
2d 315; Alfe v. New York Life Ins. Co.,

34 |

180 Okla. 87, 67 P. 2d 947; Raley v.
Thompson, 203 Okla. 633, 225 P. 2d 171.

In the case at bar, plaintiff has at-
tempted to state a cause of action un-
der the provisions of 24 O.S. 1941 §§5
and 10. The only conclusion which can
be reached from the allegations con-
tained in the petition, and the state-
ments in the briefs of both parties sus-
tain it, is that as to the property de-
scribed in all causes of action Sarah
M. Jones parted with her title by the
execution of the instrument designated
“Sale and Assignment,” which was
dated March 5, 1948. Every item of in~
debtedness due to plaintiff or to anyone
else as disclosed by the petition, was
incurred subsequent to that date. There
is no allegation in the petition that any
conveyance was made with the fraudu-
lent intent to incur the debts or any
of them. Nor did plaintiff extend credit
on the faith of the grantor’s ownership
of the particular property conveyed.

This brings the case squarely within
the rule discussed and applied by this
court in the early case of Van Arsdale
v. Findley, 37 Okla. 425, 132 P. 185.
Therein, it was said:

“Section 1213, Comp. L. 1909, (24 O.S.
1941, sec. 10), in effect limits the credi-
tors who may attack voluntary con-
veyances to those whose debts were in

existence at the time the conveyances °

were made. * * * While the statute and
decisions constantly speak of fraudu-
lent conveyances as being void, it is
clear that they are not void but merely
voidable. They are good as between
the parties, and can only be set aside
upon the suit of creditors. A subse-
quent creditor, who has not extended
credit on the faith of the ownership of
the property, is not wronged in any
way. = ##

Measured by the standards outlined
in the last-cited and quoted case, plain-
tiff’s petition does not state facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action and
the trial court was correct in so holding.
The fact that the conveyance com-
plained of was made prior to the incep-
tion of plaintiff’s debt distinguishes the
case at bar from those cases cited and

relied upon by plaintiff in his brief filed
herein.

Im the trial court and before issues
joined, the plaintiff attempted to take
the depositions of Barbara Jan Jones,
Cliff M. Jones and Sarah M. Jones,
but said witnesses refused to testify
upon the ground that plaintiff’s petition
did not state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action. In the final judg-
ment, the court further adjudged that
plaintiff was not entitled to take their
depositions nor to an order requiring
them to testify.

As hereinabove explained plaintiffs
petition did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, nor did it
state facts sufficient to entitle plaintiff
to maintain the action. Sections 383 and
434 of Title 12 O.S. 1941 are those stat-.
utes which plaintiff contends give him
the right to take the depositions. What-
ever rights are conferred by these sec-
tions are conferred upon “the parties”
to an action and it logically follows
that if there is no cause of action there
can be no parties to it. Therefore, plain-
tiff has not brought himself within that
class for whose benefit the statutes were
enacted. The trial court’s order on this
phase of case was proper.

The judgment is affirmed.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, GIBSON, O’NEAL, and BING-
AMAN, JJ., concur.

a
CASKER v. DENNIS et al.
Nov. 18, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1953.

252 P. 2d 1027,

No. 84708.

Lt 35

Curtis & Blanton, Pauls Valley, and
Twyford, Smith & Crowe, Oklahoma
City, for plaintiff in error.

Owen F. Renegar, Oklahoma City,
for defendants in error.

JOHNSON, J. This is an action to
quiet title to a 40-acre tract of land
located in Garvin county, Oklahoma,
in which the plaintiff in error, Mar-
garet T. Casker, is the plaintiff. The
defendants are James M. Dennis and
Mrs. James M. Dennis (husband and
wife), and Henry Marcum, if all of said
defendants are living and if any of
them be dead then the respective un-

known heirs, executors, administrators,
devisees, trustees and assignees of such
deceased persons, Ernest Wall, as county
treasurer of Garvin county, State of
Oklahoma, and the board of county
commissioners of Garvin county, State
of Oklahoma.

The petition was filed February 1,
1945, Personal service of summons was
had on defendant Henry Marcum on
February 3, 1945. The defendants coun-
ty treasurer, Wall and the board of
county commissioners were personally
served and duly filed an answer. Serv-
ice by publication was duly obtained on
the other defendants, .An attorney for
the defendants was appointed and he
duly filed an answer, which was deemed
necessary under the terms of the Sol-
diers and Sailors Relief Act. The de-
fendant, Henry Marcum, defaulted. The
county treasurer and board of county
commissioners appeared by the county
attorney. The other defendants made
no appearance except by the attorney
appointed by the court under the Sol-
diers and Sailors Relief Act.

Judgment quieting title against all
defendants was rendered on April 21,
1945. On March 18, 1948, Marguerite
Dennis, widow of James M. Dennis,
Maytie Mitchell and R. N. Dennis,
claiming to be the only heirs of James
M. Dennis, deceased, filed their mo-
tion to vacate the judgment of April 21,
1945. With this motion they filed an
answer. On June 10, 1948, an order
was entered opening the judgment. The
amended answer and cross-petition of
the Dennis heirs, which was filed on
June 29, 1948, alieges that they are the
sole and only heirs of J. M. Dennis,
deceased, who, they contend, owned
the lands in controversy at the time of
his death; they further contend that
the plaintiff deraigned her title to said
lands from a commissioner’s .deed,
which was based on a resale tax deed;
that the resale tax deed was void be-
cause the publication for the notice of

~ resale included the last quarter of 1939

taxes; that said last quarter of 1939
taxes was not delinquent at the com-

36 [|

mencement of the said notice of re-
sale; that the notice of resale published
prior to the second Monday in May,
1940, in which the said land was ad-
vertised for sale for taxes included
among other taxes the assessments for
the years 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939;
the said assessments included certain
illegal assessments by reason of which
said resale tax deed was void.

The defendants tendered into court
the amount of taxes, penalties, etc., and
asked that the plaintiff take nothing
and that the tax deed be declared null
and void.

Defendants (Dennis heirs) in their
cross-petition allege that one of the
codefendants, Henry Marcum, has as-
serted claim on their property in that
on the 21st day of October, 1936, Henry
Marcum made a loan to J. M. Dennis,
otherwise known as James M. Dennis,
now deceased, in the sum of $150 with
interest at 8 per cent payable annually;
that as security for the loan J. .
Dennis, on October 21, 1936, made, exe-
cuted and delivered to Henry Marcum
a general warranty deed, a copy of
which was attached to their answer
and cross-petition and made a part
thereof; that though the deed is in the
usual form of conveyance, making Hen-
ry Marcum the record owner of the
land, yet his deed was security for the
$150 loan and they pray that the deed
from their ancestor, J. M. Dennis, to
the codefendant, Henry Marcum, be
declared to be a mortgage, and that
their title be quieted as against Henry
Marcum.

The record discloses that Henry Mar-
cum, without permission of the court
and after judgment against him had
been final for more than three years,
filed an answer on July 8, 1948; which
answer was prepared by the attorneys
for the Dennis heirs, Marcum ad-
mitted in this answer that the deed
to him was a mortgage and asked that
it be foreclosed.

The plaintiff filed a motion to strike
the answer of Henry Marcum. The

plaintiff in her amended reply to the
answer and cross-petition of the Dennis
heirs moved that their cause of action
against the codefendant, Henry Mar-
cum, be stricken because not germane
to plaintiff’s cause of action. Both mo-
tions were overruled and exceptions
saved,

In the interim the Texas Oil Company
intervened and claimed title to an oil
and gas lease. The judgment of the
court involving the Texas Company is
not presented in this appeal.

When the trial was concluded, the
trial court made findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and rendered judg-
ment based thereon in favor of the Den-
nis heirs against plaintiff. It also ren-
dered judgment against Henry Mar-
cum in favor of the Dennis heirs. The
oil and gas lease of the Texas Com-
pany, based upon the judgment of
April 15, 1945, was upheld. This judg-
ment was conditioned on the payment
to Marcum by the Dennis heirs the
amount of the alleged loan ($150) with
interest, which was to be deposited
with the court clerk within 30 days.
This was never so paid. But, there-
after, on April 6, 1950, a receipt and
release signed by Henry Marcum was
filed with the court clerk. On the 27th
of April, 1950, the Dennis heirs offered
in evidence the receipt from Marcum.
Thereupon final judgment was rendered
in favor of the Dennis heirs. Motion
for a new trial was filed within three
days after the conditional judgment
and another within three days after the
final judgment; both were overruled
with exceptions, resulting in this ap-
peal.

Numerous assignments of error are
made which are presented under three
propositions, to wit:

“Proposition One: The Court erred in
hearing the issues between the defend-
ant Henry Marcum and his co-defend-
ant, the defendants in error here, and in
rendering judgment on such issues, for
the reason that they are not germane
to the issues presented by the ‘petition.

[| 37

“Proposition Two: The final judg-
ment against Henry Marcum in favor
of plaintiff extinguished all title of de-
fendants, the heirs of Dennis.

“Proposition Three: The evidence was
insufficient to justify the court in find-
ing that the deed of October 21st, 1936,
was intended to be a mortgage, and in
holding it to be a mortgage.”

A determination of the second prop-
osition favorable to plaintiff will, we
think, eliminate the necessity of con-
sidering propositions one and three.

The record discloses through the
court’s findings of fact and the amend-
ed answer of the Dennis heirs that on
October 21, 1936, J. M. Dennis was
the owner of the lands involved in this
action; that on that date he executed
and delivered a warranty deed con-
veying the premises to Henry Marcum,
which was filed for record on Febru-
ary 11, 1937; that no deed of reconvey-
ance was ever executed by Henry Mar-
cum; that the plaintiff herein entered
into possession of the lands on August
16, 1940 under her resale tax deed
which is not void on its face; that she
hhas remained in possession of the same
since then, paying the taxes as owner,
without any notice actual or construc-
tive of the claims of the Dennis heirs.
The record conclusively shows that the
recorded adverse claimant to the land
in controversy was Henry Marcum;
that his title had been placed in him
by the deed to him from J. M. Den-
nis; no cause of defeasance was incor-
porated in the deed; nor was any sep-
arate instrument of defeasance execut-
ed and recorded. Marcum was a prop-
er party to the action and the court
had jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter at the time the
default judgment quieting title in plain-
tiff against Marcum was rendered on
the 2ist day of April, 1945; that he
mever appealed from such judgment
or made application to vacate same,
thus allowing the judgment to become
final. Therefore, we are confronted
with the legal question as to the effect

of a final judgment quieting title
against the record owner.

We think the final judgment against
Henry Marcum, the record owner, in
favor of the plaintiff, extinguished all
titles or unrecorded claims of defend-
ants, the heirs of J. M. Dennis.

The statute controlling, under the
facts in the case at bar, is sec. 11 O.S.A.
1951 Title 46, and provides:

“When a grant of real property pur-
ports to be an absolute conveyance, but
is intended to be defeasible on the per-
formance of certain conditions, such
grant is not defeated or affected as
against any person other than the
grantee or his heirs or devisees or per-
sons having actual notice, unless an
instrument of defeasance, duly executed
and acknowledged, shall have been
recorded in the office of the (register
of) deeds of the county where the prop-
erty is situated.”

In Ware v. Tyer, 199 Okla. 96, 182 P.
2d 519, applying the above statute and
following the rule announced in Star-
ritt v. Longcor, 179 Okla. 219, 65 P. 2d
979, it was said:

“Where the owner of land gives an-
other an absolute deed to the land sub-
ject to an unrecorded agreement be-
tween themselves qualifying the title
ostensibly conveyed, and the grantee
conveys the land to others, a subse-
quent purchaser who purchases in re-
liance on the record title and has no
actual notice of the former owner’s
claim is protected under 46 O.S. 1941
g11.”

The principal defendant and record
owner of the land, Henry Marcum, aft-
er service of summons on him, ig-
nored the pendency of the action and
permitted final judgment to be taken
against him and after the lapse of
more than three years, ignores that
judgment by filing, without permission
or without any attempt to set aside
the former judgment, an answer in the
cause. Such procedure is not based

upon legal principle, rule or precedent.

Under the record and contentions of
the defendants in this case, we think

38 [|

the language used in Lind v. Goble,
117 Okla. 195, 246 P, 472 (at page 475)
is apropos herein. There it was said:

“The judgment erroneously determin-
ing the tax deed valid was not itself
void, but merely voidable on direct at-
tack. The court had jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject-matter and ju-
dicial power to determine the validity
of the tax deed. Its judicial action was
invoked in each case by sufficient aver-
ments in the petitions, and in the in-
stant case, at least, by a sufficient tra-
verse of those averments in the answer.
It determined an issue joined by the
parties and its judgment, whether cor-
rect or erroneous, became final.”

With reference to the contentions of
the defendants as to the invalidity of
the tax deed, it is noted that in the Lind
v. Goble case, supra, we quoted with
approval the rule announced in Priest
v. Robinson, 64 Kan, 416, 67 P. 850,
as follows:

“We attach but little importance to
the title acquired by the tax deed.
Standing alone, plaintiff would have but
little trouble avoiding it. But the decree
against plaintiff, quieting title to the
property in Randall, holding under this
deed, is a matter of more consequence.
In this action of ejectment the attack
made upon this decree is purely col-
lateral, and unless absolutely void, as
distinguished from voidable, the decree
must stand in this case,—a perpetual
barrier between plaintiff and a re-
covery.”

In Lind v. Goble, supra, paragraph
two of the syllabus, it was said:

“Where the holder of a resale tax
deed recovers judgment on the merits
in an action of ejectment against the
record owner of the land who is also in
possession and such judgment becomes
final, in a subsequent action of eject-
ment by the holder of a deed to the
same land which was unrecorded when
the prior action was commenced and
when judgment was rendered, brought
against the plaintiff in the prior action,
said second action being based upon
the invalidity of the resale tax deed
adjudicated in the first action, the

judgment establishing the validity of
the resale tax deed, even though errone-

ous as a matter of law, and even though
the resale tax deed be absolutely void,
is res adjudicata and operates as an
estoppel against the assertion of any
rights under the unrecorded deed.”

See, also, Patterson v. Ralph, 180
Okla. 150, 68 P. 2d 499 (and cases cited
therein). Therein it was held that the
recording of an assignment of a mort-
gage covering realty is necessary to
protect assignee from divestiture of
title, lien or interest by judgment in a
suit to quiet title by a person without
notice of the assignment.

For the reasons announced in Lind v.
Goble, supra, and followed in subse-
quent cases and other cases noted
herein, we conclude that the judgment
rendered on April 21, 1945, in Casker
v. Marcum, is res adjudicata of the
rights claimed by the defendants herein
and operates as an estoppel against their
subsequent assertion of such rights.

The judgment is therefore reversed
and remanded, with directions to va-
cate the judgment and reinstate the
judgment rendered on April 21, 1945.

ARNOLD, C.J., HALLEY, V.C.J., and
CORN, and O'NEAL, JJ., concur.
WELCH and DAVISON, JJ., dissent.

DAVISON, J. (dissenting). I cannot
concur in the majority opinion in this
case for the reason that I do not think
the rules of law stated in the syllabus
are applicable to the facts herein. In
addition, I cannot see the consistency
between the allegation in the petition
that Mr. and Mrs, Dennis were claim-
ing and asserting a claim and title
to the realty adverse to plaintiff’s title
and the argument that the judgment
quieting title is final because plaintiff
had no knowledge that Mr. and Mrs.

‘Dennis were claiming and asserting a

claim and title to the realty adverse to
plaintiff's title. As to the first para-
graph thereof, I cannot understand how
the recording laws of this state, which
are the foundation of constructive no-
tice of those conveyances properly re-
corded, could have any bearing on the
rights of a purchaser at tax resale or

county commissioners’ sale based on
tax resale. If the tax sale statutes are
complied with, the claims and title of
all persons are canceled and terminated.
whether such claims are known or un-
known or are apparent from the record
or not. The case cited, Ware v. Tyer, to
support the proposition, deals with
ordinary purchasers of the property and
has no application to tax sales.

As to the second paragraph of the
syllabus, it seems to be overlooked that
the application to vacate judgment
herein was filed by one original de-
fendant and the heirs of another origi-
nal defendant who were served by pub-
lication and, as against whom, judg-
ment was by default. Under the pro-
visions of 12 O.S. 1941 §176, they had
the right to have the judgment vacated
and be let in to defend at any time
within three years from the date of ren-
dition of judgment. The statute gives
this right of vacating the judgment
and defending the action, irrespective
of the validity of the judgment. The
only requirements are that the defend-
ants were ignorant of the pendency of
the action; that the judgment was tak-
en by default after service by publi-
cation; and that defendants have a good
defense to the action. There could be
no better defense to this character of
action than that the tax deed, upon
which it was founded, was absolutely
void. This does not constitute a collat-
eral attack on the judgment but is di-
rect and is authorized by statute. The
cases cited to sustain the application
of the principle stated to the facts
herein deal only with situations where
the attack is made in a collateral pro-
ceeding by one not a party to the ori-
ginal judgment, or by an original de-
fendant as to whom the judgment has
become final.

To me, the conclusion reached by
the majority of the court has the effect
of sustaining a void tax deed on tech-
nical ground not applicable to thie facts.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

39

SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND v.
DICKINSON et al.

No. 35282. Feb. 3, 1953.
253 P. 2d 161.

40 es

Mont R. Powell, William R. Saied,
and Sam Hill, Oklahoma City, for pe-
titioner.

Rollie D. Thedford, Oklahoma City,
and Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen.,
for respondents.

BLACKBIRD, J. This proceeding
grew out of two claims against the same
employer. A. L. Dickinson, claimant,
filed his first notice of injury and claim
for compensation stating that while em-
ployed by the Steelman Construction
Company he sustained an accidental
injury on December 13, 1950, when he
injured his right knee. Thereafter, on
April 15, 1951, he filed his first notice
of injury stating that on March 7, 1951,
he sustained an accidental injury when
he injured his left knee. These two
claims were heard together and the
State Industrial Commission denied any
award for the alleged injury of Decem-
ber 13, 1950. The State Industrial
Commission made a finding under the
provisions of 85 O. S. 1951 §172, de-
termining that claimant was a physi-
cally impaired person and entered an
award in favor of claimant and against
the Steelman Construction Company
for the disability resulting from the
injury of March 7, 1951, and found that
claimant sustained a degree of dis-
ability materially greater than the dis-
ability caused by the latter injury
alone, by reason of the combination of
disability to the right knee and the
disability resulting from the accidental
injury of March 7, 1951, and entered an
award against Special Indemnity Fund.

This proceeding is brought by Special
Indemnity Fund to review said award
and it raises two propositions. It is
first argued that there is no evidence
to sustain the finding of the State
Industrial Commission that claimant
was a physically impaired person.

Claimant testified that he was clear-
ing brush and burning it when on the

13th day of December, 1950, he injured
his right knee; that as a result of this
he has a permanent disability. There
is expert medical testimony to sup-
port a degree of permanent disability.
Claimant’s brother, E. M. Dickinson,
testified as a lay witness. He stated
that he knew his brother had a dis-
ability to his right knee because he
saw him constantly limping. It is seri-
ously argued that this evidence is in-
sufficient to sustain the finding under
the statute. In Special Indemnity Fund
v. Keel, 196 Okla. 315, 164 P. 2d 996,
it is stated:

“Whether a claimant is a ‘physically
impaired person’ as defined in 85 O.S.
Supp. 1943 §171, is a question of fact
to be determined by the State Indus-
trial Commission from all the evidence
before it. In cases involving ‘loss of use’
of a specific member ‘such as is ob-
vious and apparent from observation or
examination by an ordinary layman,
that is, a person who is not skilled in
the medical profession,’ by reason of a
prior injury to the body, the determina-
tion of such fact by the Commission
must be supported by competent evi-
dence of witnesses. The fact that such
injury is ‘obvious and apparent’ may be
proved by ordinary laymen, as defined
therein, or by other competent per-
sons, and in the absence of such evi-
dence, an award based on said statute
will be vacated.”

See, also, Special Indemnity Fund v.
Hobbs, 196 Okla. 318, 164 P. 2d 980.

So far as we have been able to find,
this court has never stated definitely
what degree of physical disability must
be apparent to a layman or lay witness
described by the statute as “ordinary
layman.” In all of the cases involved
up to this time there has been some
objective evidence of a physical defect
of the anatomy of the person involved
other than the action resulting from a
not otherwise manifest disability. How-
ever, we see no reason why an injury
does not become “obvious and appar-
ent” when according to the common
parlance of a lay witness it is obvious
that the person involved is constantly

Le 41

conducting himself as a physically im-
paired person. We therefore hold that
the evidence in the instant case is suf-
ficient to sustain the finding of the
State Industrial Commission.

The second argument must be sus-
tained. The State Industrial Commis-
sion in fixing the degree of disability
found that claimant by reason of the
combination of the prior physical im-
pairment and the disability resulting
from the injury of March 7, 1951, sus-
tained a 7% per cent disability to the
body as a whole in the performance
of ordinary manual labor over and
above all deductions allowed by law.
This method of calculating an award
was specifically disapproved in Special
Indemnity Fund v. Woodrow, 206 Okla.
580, 245 P. 2d 445, and Miller v. Har-
mon Construction Co., 205 Okla. 280,
237 P, 2d 439, The claimant has con-
fessed error in this respect and argues
that this court may correct such error.
With this contention we cannot agree.
Under the foregoing opinions it is the
duty of the State Industrial Commission
to make the calculations pursuant to
85 O.S. 1951 §172.

In Special Indemnity Fund v. Wood-

row, supra, we held with reference to
an award made against the Special
Indemnity Fund for permanent partial
disability that it is the duty of the
State Industrial Commission to caleu-
late and allow the deductions provided
for therein, and where there has been
a failure substantially to comply with
statutory direction in this respect, the
award against the Special Indemnity
Fund will be vacated.

In Miller v. Harmon Construction Co.,
supra, we stated:

“In order to arrive at a proper award
to be entered against Special Indem-
nity Fund on a claim for compensation
filed by a physically impaired person
under the Special Indemnity Fund Act,
85 O.S. 1945 Supp., §172, the State In-
dustrial Commission should first find
the disability sustained by the em-
ployee as a result of his individual in-

. juries and further find the disability

sustained by him as a result of his
combined injuries and compensation re-
coverable for such disability, and if the
disability resulting from his combined
injuries be found to be less than per-
manent total, subtract therefrom com-
pensation recoverable for each indi-
vidual injury and the balance will con-
stitute the proper amount to be awarded
as against the Fund.”

The award is therefore vacated and
the cause remanded to the State In-
dustrial Commission for specific find-
ing as to the percent of disability which
the claimant was suffering from the
right leg prior to subsequent injury.
The Commission should then calculate
the award in accordance with the above
rule stated.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, O’NEAL, and WILLIAMS,
JJ., concur.

RUSSELL v. RUSSELL.
No. 35808. Feb. 3, 1953.
253 P. 2d 186.

42 a

Claude V. Thompson, Ada, for plain-
tiff in error.

W. V. Stanfield, Ada, for defendant
in error.

CORN, J. This is an appeal by Pau-
line Russell, now Peters, from an order
of the trial court denying a motion to
modify a decree awarding the custody
of her two sons, Charles and Jack, ages
eight and ten, to her former husband’s
father and mother.

She and her former husband were
married in September, 1940. On the
9th day of August, 1943, she was
granted a divorce from her husband.

We find incorporated in the divorce
decree the following, to wit:

“The court further finds that by
agreement of the parties, that the care
and custody of said minor children,
Charles Russell and Jack Russell, is
hereby awarded to the plaintifi’s moth-
er and father, Mr. and Mrs. C. A. Rus-
sell, until the further order of this
court, and that said children are not to
be taken out of the jurisdiction of this
court and that neither the plaintiff or
the defendant are to change said cus-
tody without order of this court and
without a hearing and opportunity to be
heard by both parties and a right to
present their side of the case to the
court.”

On the 11th day of May, 1951, Pau-
line Russell, now Peters, filed a motion
to change custody of the children, in
part, to wit:

« # * * The defendant is informed
and believes that said children are
now separated and no longer reside
with Mr. and Mrs. C. A. Russell; that
this Court has made no order author-
izing such change; that she has remar-
ried and has a fine home; that she and
hher present husband are capable and
willing to provide a suitable home for
said children, and that it is manifestly

for the interest of said children that
they be kept together; that the father
of said children does not have their
custody, seldom sees them and gives
no supervision whatever; and that it is
manifestly to the best interest for said
children who are both boys, now of the
ages of 8 and 10 years respectively,
that defendant have their care and
custody * * *”,

The answer of C. A. Russell, Jr., to
the said motion, in part, is as follows:

“* # * This respondent would further
show to the court that the movant here-
in, when the youngest child was only
six months of age, abandoned said child
without proper food and clothing and
that the sister of Mrs. C. A. Russell
took said child and has had the physi-
cal custody of said child since that date,
and did so have at the time of the de-
eree of divorce was granted which the
defendant herein well knew and has at
all times since the entering of said de-
cree knew. That the parents of the
plaintiff, while they have had the legal
custody of said child, being interested
in the welfare of said child, have con-
tinued to permit the aunt of this plain-
tiff to keep said child at her home,
all of which was known to the court at
all times as well as to the plaintiff
and defendant herein and that said
child has been furnished with ample
provisions, schooled, and attends Sun-
day School regularly and is perfectly
contented. That he and his brother at-
tend school at Allen, Oklahoma, to-
gether and are together regularly,
living in the close proximity of each
other, both children being in farm
homes and are not upon the streets of
some town at all times of the day or
night * * #”

«“* * * that neither of the children
have known any other parents other
than those with which they are now
residing and it will be for the best
interest of the said children that they
remain in the only homes they have
ever known. That said children have
repeatedly stated that they do not want
to go with either of their natural par-
ents and if taken away will run away
from them * * *”,

The record reflects that after the
hearing the court had a private talk

[| 43

with the children in his chambers and
returned to the courtroom and made
the following order:

“By the Court: I think the best in-
terests of the children would be to
leave them where they are. They have
made friends out there and they are
old enough to know what they want
to do. They have associations already
formed and I think that it is for the
best interests of the children that this
motion to modify be denied, and that
is the order of the Court.”

It is shown by the evidence in this
ease that Pauline, their mother, has
been married to Mr. Peters about three
years; that she and her husband are
both of good moral character, and are
able and willing to support and educate
the children and bring them up under
proper supervision. However, the evi-
dence further discloses that after they
were married about a year she filed
an action against him for a divorce
because he did not want her to have
custody of the children for the reason
he was not financially able to provide
for them, and later the action was dis-
missed.

The record also reflects that at the
time of the divorce and agreement by
the parties as to the custody of their
minor children being placed in the fa-
ther and mother of C. A. Russell, Jr.,
that, Pauline Russell knew that their
son Jack was in the physical custody of
Mrs. C. A.: Russell’s sister and hus-
band, B. A. Teeters, and had been ever
since he was six months old, and was
still in their custody at the time of the
hearing on the motion.

The evidence of the respondent shows
that the children have been properly
taken care of, living in good homes on
farms about one and one-half miles
apart, and attending the same school.

It would serve no useful purpose to
engage in a further discussion of the
evidence.

The movant proceeds upon the theory
that, under the law, a parent who is

morally fit is entitled to the custody of
her children and the court should not
take into consideration what is the best
interest of the children or the feelings
of the grandparents who have cared
for them from their infancy until they
are old enough to know where they
would rather stay. In Bishop v. Benear,
132 Okla. 116, 270 P. 569, we held:

“When resolving the question what
will best subserve the interest and hap-
piness of a child, its own wishes and
choice may be consulted and given
weight if it be of an age and capacity
to form a rational judgment. The
wishes of children of sufficient capacity
should be given especial consideration
when their parents have for a long
time voluntarily allowed them to live in
the family of another.

“Where a parent permits his minor
children to live in the family of an-
other, their grandparents, for many
years until the children have formed
other ties and a different direction has
been given to their course of life, the
courts may properly give weight to
the condition of the children’s present
surroundings and all advantages which
a continuance in those surroundings
may reasonably be expected to give.

“ Tn such cases three rights of in-
terest are to be regarded: First, that of
the parent; second, that of those who
have for years discharged all the obli-
gations of parents; and third and chief-
ly, that of the child,”

In Gilerease v. Gilcrease, 176 Okla.
237, 54 P. 2d 1056, we held:

“In the determination of the custody
of a minor child the best interests of
the child should be the paramount con-
sideration of the court and where it
does not appear that the trial court
has abused its discretion, this court will
not reverse the order of the trial court.”

In Hamann v. Miesner et ux., 148
Okla. 50, 297 P. 252, we held:

“Parents are the natural guardians
and are entitled to the custody of their
minor children as well as chargeable
with the obligation of their support.
Where a father has given his infant
child to her grandparents, who for two

44 a

years have given said child loving
care and’who are financially able and
are of such moral character to give
the child proper care and training, upon
application to repossess himself of the
child, the best interest of the child is
the paramount question before the court,
and this court will not disturb the judg-
ment and decree of the trial court un-
less it is clearly against the weight of
the evidence.”

Under all the facts and circumstances
of this case, we hold that the trial court
did not err in denying the motion and
leaving the custody of the children with
Mr. and Mrs. C. A. Russell where the
movant agreed for them to be placed
back in 1943 when she was granted
a divorce from the children’s father.

Judgment affirmed.

DAVISON, ARNOLD, O’NEAL, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. HALLEY, C.
J., JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., dissent.

JACKSON et al. v. GENERAL
FINANCE CORPORATION,
No. 34841. Feb. 3, 1953.

253 P. 2d 166.

Melton, McElroy & Vaughn, Chick-
asha, for plaintiffs in error.

Hatcher & Bond, Chickasha, for de-
fendant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This is an appeal
from the district court of Grady county,
Oklahoma, wherein the General Fi-
nance Corporation as plaintiff brought
an action in replevin for the recovery of
a Studebaker pickup, sold on time pay-
ments, which payments, it was alleged,
had not been made by the purchaser
and which motor vehicle, in the course
of the various transfers of title, was
at the time of the action in the posses-
sion of J. W. Jackson, who obtained it
from C. C. Jinks, who, in turn, had ob-
tained it from John L. Rawson, Jr., the
original purchaser from the plaintiff.
All pleadings in the cause, both by
plaintiff and defendants, were properly
joined. Defendants’ answer contained a
verified general denial under which de-
fendants were entitled to controvert any
issues of fact tendered by plaintiff’s pe-
tition, and the issues formed by the
pleadings were sufficient to withstand
a demurrer or motion for judgment on
the pleadings and was, therefore,
ready to be submitted for trial and judg-
ment upon the issues so formed.

In advance of the trial the court
denied the defendants’ request for a
trial by jury and the case was tried by
the court and judgment rendered for
plaintiff.

Defendants urge this, inter alia, as
error,

This is an action in replevin for the
recovery of specific personal property,
and the defendants were entitled to a
jury trial upon the issues of fact made
by the pleadings. 12 O.S. 1951 §556; art.
2, §19, Okla. Constitution. Sec. 556,
supra, provides:

es 45

“Issues of law must be tried by the
court, unless referred. Issues of fact
arising in actions for the recovery of
money, or of specific real or personal
property, shall be tried by a pry, un-
less a jury trial is waived.

Under the issues joined by the plead-
ings herein and the above statute, de-
fendants were entitled to have the is-
sues of fact tried by a jury. The right
to jury trial is determined by the char-
acter of the pleadings, Estes v. Okla-
homa City, 175 Okla. 278, 52 P. 2d 873;
and where defendants were entitled to
a jury trial and demanded it, the court
erred in refusing them this statutory
right. Thomas v. Westheimer & Daube,
87 Okla. 130, 209 P. 327; Williams v.
Bumpers, 206 Okla. 143, 241 P. 2d 945.
However, it is urged that the evidence
adduced in the trial by the court, aft-
er it had refused defendants a jury,
showed that defendants had no legal
defense, and that by reason thereof the
court’s action in refusing a jury was
harmless.

We have held that denial of a jury
trial in an action properly triable to a
jury is harmless, where, under the evi-
dence, defendants had no legal defense.
Oxley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 159
Okla. 287, 15 P. 2d 43; Wilson v. Fed-
eral Tax Co., 176 Okla. 90, 54 P. 2d
363; Board of Trustees of Firemen’s Re-
lief and Pension Fund v. Brooks, 179
Okla. 600, 67 P. 2d 4.

No attempt has ever been made to
distinguish the two rules or to justify
or harmonize, if possible, the rule of
harmless error announced in the last-
named cases with the rule announced in
Estes v. Oklahoma City, Thomas vy.
Westheimer, and Williams vy. Bumpers,
supra, and other cases of similar im-
port which hold that when issues of fact
are formed by the pleadings under §556,
Title 12 O.S. 1951, supra, and a trial
by jury is requested but refused by
the trial judge, it is error because such
action would deprive the litigant of the
legal right to a trial by jury. This
seems to us to be the true rule for the
reason that if the right of trial by jury

shall be and remain inviolate, art. 2,
§19, Okla. Const., upon issues of fact
arising in actions for recovery of spe-
cific personal property, unless a jury
trial is waived, $556, supra, then such
denial of trial by jury would, we think,
constitute erroneous unwarranted ju-
dicial action, notwithstanding the harm-
less error doctrine which is based upon
the failure of a litigant’s evidence to
sustain his alleged defense. Courts have
a duty to enforce strict observance of
the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions designed to preserve inviolate,
right to, and purity of jury trial. An
eloquent justification of our jury sys-
tem is found in the many text-books
and cases bearing on the subject which
may be paraphrased by stating that we
are cognizant of the fact that a jury
trial is not an infallible mode of ascer-
taining truth, and like all human insti-
tutions it has its imperfections; still it
remains the best protection for the citi-
zen in his property rights as well as
his liberty. It has stood the test of ex-
perience better than any other legal
institution that ever existed among
men, and it has met universal approba-
tion among those who lived under it,
and by the greatest thinkers who have
investigated it impartially; and it is
the imperative duty of the courts to
jealously guard any unauthorized en-
croachment upon the right of trial by
jury as guaranteed to the citizens by
the Constitution and statutes.

The effect of the rule that “Error
in denying a jury trial in an action
properly triable by jury is rendered
harmless where the evidence presents
no legal defense,” is to disregard the
plain intent and context of our statute
and give trial judges the right to deny
a litigant a jury trial in violation of
rights conferred upon litigants by stat-
ute, §556, supra, and as guaranteed
under art. 2, §19 of the Oklahoma Con-
stitution.

Obviously, in this case, there was no
waiver of the right to a jury trial. The
statute provides the manner in which
irial by jury may be waived. 12 O.S.

46 PC

1951 §591. Waiver of this right must
be strictly construed, and trial by jury
may only be waived in one of the
statutory methods. This has been held
in both civil and criminal cases. See
Pancoast v. Eldridge, 157 Okla. 195,
11 P. 2d 918; Ex parte Wilkins, 7 Okla.
Cr. 422, 115 P. 1118; State ex rel. Atty.
Gen. v. LeVan, 182 Okla. 371, 77 P.
2d 748.

This court, in State ex rel. Atty. Gen.
v. LeVan, supra, held that after a de-
mand for a jury trial has been errone-
ously refused, there is no waiver by
going forward and introducing evidence.
This rule, we think, is sound. To hold
otherwise would place the burden upon
a defendant to first prove that he was
entitled to a jury trial, and then, if
the trial judge saw fit, try his case to
a jury. Such is not the law. A jury
trial would not in any way affect the
rights of a plaintiff because if during
the course of the trial the defendant
fails to make a proper defense, or pre-
sent an issue of fact on the evidence
presented to the jury, then the court
may, in proper cases, withdraw the
case from the jury and direct a verdict
for the plaintiff.

Our former cases, Oxley v. Southland
Life Ins. Co., supra; Wilson v. Fed-
eral Tax Co.; Board of Trustees of
Firemen’s Relief and Pension Fund
v. Brooks, supra, holding that the error
in denying a jury trial in an action
properly triable by a jury is rendered
harmless where the evidence presents
no legal defense, are hereby expressly
overruled in so far as they conflict with
the holding in the instant case.

Other questions presented herein will
not be considered because a new trial
must be granted and such other errors
as may have occurred in the trial of
the cause may not reoccur.

The cause is reversed, with direc-
tions to grant defendants a new trial
in accord with the views herein ex-
pressed.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and

BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. ARNOLD,
J., concurs in conclusion,
bl

BALCH v. NEWBERRY.
No. 34228. Feb. 8, 1953.
258 P. @d 158.

Hurst & Hurst, Tulsa, for plaintiff in
error.

Es al

Manatt, Knight & Knight, Tulsa, for
defendant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This is an appeal
from a judgment entered in the court
of common pleas of Tulsa county. Plain-
tiff in error, Balch, designated the ac-
tion for rescission. Defendant in error,
Newberry, designated the action as one
to recover damages for breach of war-
ranty.

The action was commenced by de-
fendant in error, Brainard Newberry,
herein referred to as plaintiff. In his
petition as filed plaintiff alleged, in sub-
stance, that for several years prior to
March 24, 1947, defendant was engaged
in the business of breeding and selling
thoroughbred pointer bird dogs at
Tulsa, Oklahoma, ahd that plaintiff had
for many years been engaged in the
business of operating kennels at Ar-
kansas City, Kansas, which facts are
well known to both parties; that on or
about March 27, 1947, defendant, in con-
sideration of the payment of $800 cash,
sold and delivered to plaintiff one cer-
tain pointer dog known as “Joker” or
“Tornado”, whose name was later
changed to “Titano”; that plaintiff in-
formed defendant that he desired the
aforesaid male dog for breeding pur-
poses, and that he contemplated the
use thereof in his aforesaid business
and that defendant sold said dog to
plaintiff to be used by plaintiff for
breeding purposes only; that defendant
stated to plaintiff the pedigree of said
dog and represented that said dog was
in good physical condition, without
blemish, and would produce pups of
unmatchable strain and quality if
mated with bitches of good strain and
pedigree.

Plaintiff further alleged that he re-
lied upon the aforesaid representations
made by defendant, and believed the
same to be true, and that he paid the
aforesaid consideration by reason
thereof and took said dog to his ken-
nels at Arkansas City, Kansas.

Plaintiff further alleged that he re-
lied upon the implied warranty in said
sale that said dog was fit for plaintiffs

intended uses and purposes and that
from about March 30, 1947, to about
August 29, 1949, plaintiff caused said
dog to be mated with some six bitches
of good strain and pedigree, all owned
by plaintiff; that further relying upon
said representation plaintiff expended
$307 in advertising said dog for breed-
ing purposes in the American Field
magazine, a magazine of national cir-
culation among owners and breeders of
pointer dogs; that as a result of said
advertisement the breeding of bitches
was accepted by some eleven named
persons at a fee of $100 each.

Plaintiff further alleged that after the
lapse of a reasonable time after the
breeding of said bitches, it developed
that none of said bitches became preg-
nant as a result of mating same with
said dog “Joker” or “Titano,” and
that said male dog was sterile and
wholly unable to produce pups; that
thereupon plaintiff notified defendant
that said dog was sterile and unable to
beget pups, and offered and tendered
the return of said dog to defendant and
demanded the return of the consider-
ation paid by plaintiff to defendant for
said dog, and that said defendant re-
fused to accept said dog and refused
to return the consideration paid by
plaintiff for the purchase of said dog.

Plaintiff further alleged:

“That said dog was unfit as a sire
for breeding purposes, and unfit for the
purpose and use intended by the plain-
tiff in the purchase of said dog, all of
which said facts were well known to
the defendant, or in the exercise of due
diligence, the defendant should have
known of such facts. That said dog prior
to the foresaid sale by the defendant
to plaintiff had suffered a severe ill-
ness, accompanied by a high fever and
other complications well known to the
defendant but unknown to the plaintiff,
which rendered said dog unfit for
breeding purposes; but, notwithstanding
said knowledge, the defendant sold said
dog to the plaintiff as a sire or stud dog
for breeding purposes only.”

Plaintiff renewed the tender of said
dog to defendant in his petition and

48

demanded the return of the purchase
price, and further alleged that plaintiff
kept said dog for a period of about
fourteen months after March 27, 1947,
and the reasonable cost of $15 per
month or a total of $210 (this was later
raised to a period of seventeen months) ;
that plaintiff had expended the sum of
$307 in advertising said dog as above
stated; that he had expended the sum
of $22 for veterinary services and had
lost the $100 fee on each of the eleven
bitches bred or contracted to be bred
to said dog by other persons, and had
Jost a like sum for each of the six
bitches owned by plaintiff, which were
bred to said dog. In all plaintiff claimed
$2,839.50 damages, including the $800
purchase price. The total amount claim-
ed was later raised to $3,129.50.

The first pleading filed by defendant
was a “motion to elect” as follows:

“Comes now the defendant and
moves the court to require plaintiff to
elect whether he seeks to rescind or
affirm the sale.”

The motion to elect came on for con-
sideration by the court on August 23,
1948, and the record shows:

“Motion to Elect sustained and plain-
tiff announces that he elects to rescind
the contract sale. Defendant given 10
to plead or 15 to answer.”

Thereafter, on September 1, 1948, de-
fendant filed a motion to strike from the
petition all allegations, and the prayer
with reference to damages other than
for the return of the consideration of
$800.

On October 2, 1948, the motion to
strike was presented to the court and
was taken under advisement until Oc-
tober 5, 1948. On October 5, 1948, the
motion to strike was overruled by the
court, Exception was allowed and de-
dendant was given five days to plead
or ten days to answer. On October 7,
1948, time for defendant to plead or
answer was extended to ten and twenty
days. October 25, 1948, defendant filed
his answer denying generally all the
allegations contained in the petition

excepting only that a pointer dog known
as “Joker” was purchased by plaintiff
from defendant and.in the latter part of
March, 1947, for the sum of $800, which
is specifically admitted.

The answer further specifically denies
that defendant is engaged in the busi-
ness of breeding and selling pointer
dogs and states that, on the contrary,
field trial dogs have been his hobby for
years. The answer specifically denies
that any fraud was perpetrated upon
the plaintiff in connection with the sale
of said dog, or that any misrepresen-
tation of fact was made, and denies
that the dog was sterile at the time of
the sale, and finally alleges:

“And for further answer defendant
states that the said dog ‘Joker’ at the
time of the sale, was being trained
solely as a field trial dog, had consid-
erable value as such and had never
been bred, which fact was well known
to plaintiff. That as a result of lack of
training for a considerable period of
time said dog now has little or no
value for field trial purposes.”

October 28, 1948, plaintiff filed his
reply consisting of a general denial of
every. material allegation in the an-
swer except as such are admitted or
qualified in his petition.

The cause was, by agreement, tried
to the court without a jury.

The trial court made findings of fact
substantially in accord with the alle-
gations of plaintiff’s petition, including
the various elements of alleged dam-
ages other than the $800 purchase price.

The conclusions of law by the court
were to the effect that the evidence
supported the allegations contained in
plaintiffs petition, as amended, and
that plaintiff was entitled to recover
judgment against defendant in accord-
ance therewith, and that the represen-
tations made by defendant to the plain-
tiff were positive assurances of fact as
to the fitness of the dog for breeding
purposes and constitute warranties and
were designed by defendant to induce
plaintiff to purchase said dog, and that

Le 49

the evidence shows that there was a
breach of warranty of the fitness of said
dog for breeding purposes, and that
plaintiff is entitled to recover from de-
fendant fair compensation for the loss
sustained by plaintiff from his effort in
good faith to use the dog for breeding
purposes, and:

“That defendant expressly warranted
the dog as fit for stud purposes and
under the ordinary circumstances such
express warranty would exclude any
implied warranty in such transaction,
but by reason of the unusual and pe-
cular (sic) nature of the transaction
and the custom of permitting the pur-
chaser to try out said dog for the in-~
tended purposes, and the defects and
sterile condition of said dog not being
obvious and apparent, the usual rule
does not apply of excluding the implied
warranty and the Court finds that there
was an implied warranty of fitness of
said dog for the intended purpose of
using same as a stud dog.

Judgment was rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant in the
sum of $2,929.50, and defendant, after
unsuccessful motion for new trial, ap-
peals.

The evidence sustains the finding of
the trial court that there was an im-
plied warranty by the seller that the
dog had the pedigreed qualities of a
“stud” which plaintiff had a right to
rely upon.

It is undisputed that the dog proved
to be sterile and was therefore of no
value to the purchaser for such pur-
pose. The dog being of a defective qual-
ity, plaintiff was entitled to rescind
the contract of sale after his election to
so do. Thus, invoking the rule that
where a sale of personal property is
rescinded for defective quality, the pur-
chaser can recover what he paid under
the contract and expenses necessarily
incident thereto, but cannot, in addi-
tion, recover damages for the breach
of the implied warranty of quality.
Black on Rescission and Cancellation,
vol. 8 (2d Ed.) §695; Frickenschmidt v.
Garner, 174 Okla. 559, 51 P. 2d 537. In
this case, in the opinion, we said:

“Awards of money to the rescinding

. party may be made by the court when

asked for and when made for proper
elements. These are usually referred
to as damages, when oftentimes as a
matter of fact they partake more of the
* * * allowances of compensation for
care of the property, or improvements
made, etc. * * *”

Under the evidence and circum-
stances in the case at bar, it was the
duty of the court to render judgment
only for the amount of the purchase
price of the dog of $800 and 17 months
at $15 per month, a total of $255, as
actual and necessary expense for caring
for the dog. .

However, the defendant contends that
there was no implied warranty that the
dog was fertile so as to be used as a
stud, because both the seller and buyer
were without knowledge as to the ca-
pacity of the dog for that purpose; that
plaintiff (buyer) was advised by de-
fendant (seller) prior to the sale that
the dog had never been bred.

To sustain this contention, defendant
cites and relies upon 2 Am. Jur., Ani-
mals, §38, p. 723, which reads:

“As a general rule, it may be stated
that there is no implied warranty of
competency or fitness for breeding pur-
poses in the sale of an animal, although
a full price is paid and the sellers
know that it is bought for breeding
purposes, where there is no fraud or
misrepresentation and both parties are
alike destitute of knowledge or the
means of forming an intelligent judg-
ment as to the fitness or capacity of
the animal for that purpose. In such a
sale, it seems that custom, policy, and
the law unite in applying the maxim
caveat emptor, and that the purchaser
takes the animal upon his own judg-
ment, risking both the quality and the
value of it.”

But under foot note 18 of the above-
quoted section, reference is made to
vol. 24, R.C.L., Sales, §474, p. 202, where
an apparent exception to the rule an-
nounced in section 38, supra, is stated
as follows:

50 |

«% # % Tf however, the buyer trusts
the judgment of the seller, who is en-
gaged in the business of raising, im-
porting and selling stock to be used for
breeding purposes, to select one fit for
such purpose, it seems that there is an
implied warranty of its fitness. * * *”

In section 393, 46 Am. Jur., Sales,
page 568, the general rule as stated in
2 Am. Jur., Animals, section 38, supra,
is recognized but is qualified by the
words:

“However, the purchase of an animal
with the knowledge of the seller that it
is being bought for a particular pur-
pose gives rise to a warranty of fitness
for such particular purpose where the
buyer relies upon the seller’s skill or
judgment that the animal is fit for
such purpose. This rule applies to the
purchase of animals with the knowl-
edge of the seller that they are being
pought * * * for breeding purposes.”

See, also, Eden v. Vloedman, 202
Okla. 462, 214 P. 2d 930.

The evidence unquestionably estab-
lished the fact that defendant (seller)
was engaged in breeding and raising
pedigreed dogs and had sold plaintiff
other highly bred dogs for breeding
purposes, including a “stud”. The evi-
dence also discloses that the defendant
(seller) knew that the dog in the case
at bar was bought to be used exclu-
sively for breeding purposes and that
plaintiff (buyer) relied upon defend-
ant’s (seller’s) judgment that the dog
was of high breeding and fit for such
purpose.

Error in the elements of damage al-
lowed by the trial court has already
been noted, but where it appears from
the pleadings and the record that items,
which are separable, have been erron-
eously included in the judgment, the
cause will not be remanded but the
judgment will be modified, and as mod-
ified will be affirmed. Hutson v. Illi-
nois Bankers Life Assurance Co., 185
Okla. 573, 95 P. 2d 238. Therefore, the
judgment is modified to allow plaintiff
to recover the amount paid for the dog,
$800, and $255 for actual necessary ex-

pense in caring for the dog, and as so
modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Under the rule announced in Rein-
auer v. Davis, 191 Okla. 366, 180 P. 2d
91, and following the statute, 12 O.S.
1951, §978, the costs of this appeal shall
be equally divided between the plain-
tiff and defendant.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, ARNOLD, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. O'NEAL, J.,
dissents.

JOY v. GIGLIO.
No. 34331.

Feb, 8, 1953.
254 P. 2d 351.

| 51

Carmon C. Harris, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiff in error.

Goodson & White, Oklahoma City,
for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. For convenience the
parties will be given their trial court
designations.

The defendant, G. C. Joy, purchased
a 1948 Ford automobile from one Dick
Dolph, a used car dealer at Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, in March, 1949. Dolph
had previously purchased it from one
Robert C. King. It bore an Oklahoma
license tag, and the supposed owner,
Robert C. King, had in his possession
a certificate of title issued by the State
of Oklahoma to Robert C. King and
‘Thadeis King. However, the facts show
that plaintiff, who was engaged in the
automobile rental business at Tampa,
Florida, rented said automobile to King
in January, 1948, and King absconded
with it. In October, 1948, plaintiff dis-
covered this automobile in the posses-
sion of the defendant at Oklahoma City
and made a demand for its delivery.
The defendant refused to surrender pos-
session and, as a result, plaintiff sued
for the return of the automobile, or its
alleged value of $2,350 in lieu thereof,
and for damages in the sum of $500
for the loss of its usable value because
of the wrongful detention, and the cost
of the action, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.

Upon the trial of the issues, a jury
having been waived, the court found
in favor of the plaintiff and assessed
damages in the sum of $1,800, the value
of the automobile as of October, 1948,
and $500 in addition thereto, for the
loss of use of said automobile during
the time it was wrongfully withheld by
defendant.

At the request of the defendant, the
court itemized the damages making up
the sum of $500 as $350 for the loss of
the use of the automobile from October,
1948, until the 8th day of March, 1949,
and $150 for attorney’s fees expended
by the plaintiff.

For modification of the judgment the
defendant urges first that the court
erred in allowing damages for the
wrongful detention of the automobile
based upon loss of profits to the plain-
tiff. He argues that the loss of profits
the plaintiff would have received in
operating the automobile in his busi-
ness is not the proper measure of dam-
age, and in support of this contention
cites the case of M. & D. Finance Co.
v. Methvin, 186 Okla. 294, 97 P. 2d 572.
In that case the defendant, who was
wrongfully detained from the use of
his automobile, was using it as a
means of personal transportation in his
business. Therefore, the measure of
damages was rightly held to be the
amount it would have cost him to rent
another automobile for this use.

The case under consideration does
not present the same factual situation,
and it is our opinion, considering the
business in which plaintiff was engaged,
that the usable value of this automobile
would naturally be the profits that
would be realized by its rental. By its
very use it could have no other usable
value to plaintiff.

In support of this rule, we cite Mc-
Iver v. Katsiolis, 93 Okla. 49, 217 P. 422,
in which case this court held that house-
hold furniture used in a rooming house
or hotel had a distinct usable value and.
when such property was wrongfully de-
tained by another, the owner “has the
right to recover as damages the rea-
sonable value of the use of such prop-
erty during the period of its wrongful
detention.”

Plaintiff testified that he would nor-
mally expect to earn $40 a week on this
or a similar automobile in his business
at Tampa, Florida. In fixing the dam-
age it is to be noted the court only al-

52 [|

lowed him approximately $20 per week
during the period subsequent to the
time plaintiff's righful demand for the
surrender of his property was refused
by the defendant. Under the evidence
the damages assessed were reasonable.

Other cases not squarely in point on
the facts but which recognize the dis-
tinct usable value rule are: Francis v.
Guaranty State Bank of Texola, 44 Okla.
446, 145 P. 324, Hunt v. Cohen, 74
Okla. 248, 179 P. 1; Weleetka Light &
Water Co. v. Castleberry, 42 Okla. 745,
142 P. 1006. Also, 23 O.S. 1951 §61 pro-
vides:

“For the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, the measure
of damages, except where otherwise
expressly provided by this chapter, is
the amount which will compensate for
all detriment proximately caused there-
by, whether it could have been antici-
pated or not.”

Defendant further argues that the us-
able value of a chattel should be evalu-
ated at the place the defendant ac-
quired possession. This court has held
that the value is to be assessed “at
the place of taking.” Security State
Bank of Comanche v. Hubbard, 170
Okla. 502, 38 P. 2d 16, and Francis v.
Guaranty State Bank, supra. In these
eases the chattel was originally taken
from the plaintiff by the defendant and
the place of taking was the place where
the chattel was being used by the plain-
tiff and was of value to him.

In this case, the place where the
defendant took possession of the auto-
mobile was in Oklahoma City, Okla-
homa, rather than Tampa, Florida,
where the plaintiff had last been in
possession and the chattel had been of
value to him.

Therefore, if the “place of taking”
rule is as defendant urges, the plaintiff
could not recover damages for the loss
of use of his automobile, although he
had actually been damaged by its
wrongful detention, because he was not
engaged in the automobile rental busi-
ness in Oklahoma. Thus, it would ap-

pear that by adopting defendant’s con-
struction of the prior decisions of this
court, we would destroy the very pur-
pose of the statute whereby one may
be compensated for the damages in-
curred by another’s wrongful detention
of his chattel. Therefore, it must be
held that the place of taking relates to
the place where the chattel was orig-
inally taken from the possession of its
rightful owner and had a usable value,
and not the place where the person in
wrongful possession acquired it.

The defendant next urges that the
court erred in awarding attorney’s fees
against the defendant. Title 12 O.S.A.
§1580 specifically sets out the damages
which are recoverable in a replevin ac-
tion. The statute is as follows:

“In an action. to recover the posses-
sion of personal property, judgment for
the plaintiff may be for the possession,
or for the recovery of possession, or the
value thereof in case a delivery can-
not be had. and of damages for the
detention. If the property has been
delivered to the plaintiff, and the de-
fendant claim a return thereof, judg-
ment for the defendant may be for a
return of the property, or the value
thereof in case a return cannot be had,
and damages for taking and withhold-
ing the same.”

It will be noted that there is no pro-
vision in the foregoing statute making
attorney’s fees an element of damage
in a replevin action. Attorney’s fees are
not recoverable in any action, unless
they are specifically provided for by
contract or by statute. On this question
plaintiff cites the case of Orr v. Mallon,
190 Okla. 598, 126 P. 2d 83. In that case
there was a replevin action coupled
with an action to foreclose a lien. The
court held that attorney’s fees were a
proper element of damages in that
case, but based the recovery on the
fact that attorney’s fees are specific-
ally provided for by statute in an ac-
tion for foreclosure of a lien. There-
fore, it is the opinion of this court that
there is no basis for the recovery of at-
torney’s fees in an action based solely
on replevin. Thus the sum of $150

granted by the trial court based on this
element of damage was in error.

Finally, the defendant insists, “The
evidence upon which the judgment for
damages was based is improper and
should have been excluded.” Since un-
der the facts peculiar to this case the
court has held that loss of profits was
the proper measure of damages for us-
able value and Tampa, Florida, was to
be considered as the “place of taking,”
it, therefore, follows that the evidence
introduced was competent to support
the judgment of the court.

It is, therefore, ordered that the judg-
ment of the trial court awarding plain-
tiff the sum of $150 attorney’s fees, as
an element of damage, be reversed.

It is further ordered that the judg-
ment that Joseph B. Giglio is the owner
of said automobile, and assessing its
value at $1,800, and further finding that
plaintiff has been damaged in the sum
of $350 by reason of the loss of the use
of said automobile, is affirmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys George H. Jennings, Don
Vickers and Lawrence Jones, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
Court.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, O’-
NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur. ARNOLD, J., dissents.

be
WILLIAMS v. GARRETT et ux.
No. 35367. Feb. 3, 1953.
254 P. 2d 369.

De 5

oO

Bruce & Rowan, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

Edward J. Fauss, Oklahoma City,
(Priest, Belisle & Fauss, Oklahoma
City, of counsel), for defendants in er-
ror,

CORN, J. This is an action by Ada
v. Williams to collect on a promis-
sary note and to foreclose a real estate
mortgage, securing the payment of the
note, given by the defendants, Sims
Garrett and Priscilla Garrett, husband
and wife.

The defendants in their answer deny
all the allegations in plaintiff's peti-
tion, except such as are specifically ad-
mitted to be true. Defendants admit
the execution of the note and mort-
gage as alleged in plaintifi’s petition,
but plead that on January 10, 1951,
they paid to plaintiff on said note and
mortgage $100, and asked that they be
given credit on said note and mort-
gage for that amount.

As for further answer and cross-pe-
tition the defendants allege and state:

“That they adopt each and all alle-
gations contained in their answer in this
their cross-petition by reference the

54 Le

same as though the matters and things
therein set forth were recapitulated
herein.

“That on or about the 11th day of
April, 1950, in the City of Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, the defendants entered
into a written contract with the plain-
tiff, a copy of which contract is at-
tached to plaintiff’s petition, marked
Exhibit ‘A’, whereby the said plaintiff
for the corrupt purpose of receiving
and taking a greater sum for the loan
of her money than at the rate of ten
per cent per annum, as provided by
law, agreed to lend the defendants for a
period of eight months the sum of One
Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($150.00)
and in addition to pay the charges in-
curred in having the abstract covering
the property described in plaintiffs pe-
tition brought to date and examined on
the condition that the defendants would
pay to said plaintiff for the loan of said
money and for having said abstract
brought to date and examined, the sum
of Four Hundred and Five Dollars
($405.00) by January 1, 1951; that the
abstract consisted of one hundred and
two entries (102), for which a reason-
able charge would have not been more
than Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) and
the charges for bringing said abstract
to date were Seventy-five Dollars
($75.00 for inserting seventy-five (75)
entries; that, therefore, the plaintiff
reserved and charged in the note and
mortgage attached to plaintiff's peti-
tion, the sum of One Hundred and Fifty-
Five Dollars ($155.00) interest for the
loan of Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars
($250.00) for a period of eight months,
when the highest rate of interest that
could legally be charged on said sum
for said period was Eighteen Dollars
and Seventy-two Cents ($18.72).

“Defendants further state that the
transaction hereinabove described was
negotiated by Dr. E. J. Williams, the
husband of the plaintiff, and that the
said Dr. E. J. Williams was in said
transaction the duly authorized agent of
the plaintiff'and acting for the plaintiff
in said transaction, and that if the said
Dr. E. J. Williams was not plaintift’s
agent the plaintiff ratified his acts
and is estopped to deny them.

“That by reason of the premises
aforesaid the plaintiff has become liable

to the defendants for double the amount
of interest charged amounting to Three
Hundred and Ten Dollars ($310.00), to-
gether with Two Hundred ($200.00) at-
torney’s fees and all the costs herein,
and cancellation of mortgage shown by
petition of Plaintiff.”

The reply of the plaintiff to the an-
swer and cross-petition of the defend-
ant filed herein alleges and states:

“(1) That she denies each and every
material allegation contained in the an-
swer and cross-petition of the defend-
ants filed herein, except such as are
hereinafter specifically admitted.

“(2) Plaintiff admits that the de-
fendants did pay $100.00 on said note
and mortgage, and for which they are
entitled to credit on said note and mort-
gage.

“(3) Plaintiff denies that there was
any usury charged, contracted withheld
or attempted to be collected. That she
paid out the money as per contract and
defendants received the benefit of the
same.

“(4) Plaintiff further states that said
contract was made fair and reasonable
with the defendants, and was free and
voluntary, and for a good and valuable
consideration, as set out in said con-
tract.

“(5) That in the negotiations of said
loan between the plaintiff and the de-
fendants, Dr. E. J. Williams was acting
as the agent of the defendants, and not
the agent of the plaintiff.

“(6) Plaintiff further states that the
charge of usury made by the defend-
ants is a mere scheme and trick to
avoid paying their just and honest debt
and obligation.”

A jury was waived, and after a trial
io the court the following judgment,
in part, was rendered:

“That there is an unpaid balance on
the note sued on in the sum of $305.00
that said note was given for loan of
money, and that the plaintiff reserved
and collected interest in excess of 10%
per annum, and that the transaction
between plaintiff and defendants was
in violation of the usury laws of the
state of Oklahoma; that defendants

Le 55

were charged the sum of $155.00 as in-
terest and are entitled to have and re-
cover against the plaintiff double such
amount so charged as interest, or the
total sum of $310.00, of which said sum
of $305.00 should be credited in full set-
tlement and satisfaction of the said bal-
ance of the note sued on, and that de-
fendants should have and recover from
the plaintiff the sum of $5.00 and attor-
neys’ fees of $200.00, and that the mort-
gage described in the petition of the
plaintiff should be fully satisfied and
should be discharged and released of
record.”

The evidence reflects that the de-
fendants bought the property, which is
located in Oklahoma City, in February
of 1950, for $750, while they were living
in Headrick, Oklahoma; that defendant
Sims Garrett had an uncle in Okla-
homa City whom they went to visit,
and while there was called on by the
plaintiffs husband, Dr. E. J. Williams,
who had heard that they wanted to bor-
row $150 on the property. They had
never seen either Dr. E. J. Williams
or plaintiff prior to this time, nor had
they communicated with either of them
in any manner. Dr. E. J. Williams told
them that he would loan the money to
them himself, and gave them his card
which they introduced in evidence.
Plaintiffs name was not mentioned by
him at that time, or at any subsequent
time. He advised them that in return
for the $150 they would have to pay
him $405, of which $150 was to go for
preparation of the abstract, $25 for ex-
amination of the title, $75 interest, and
$5 additional interest for letting them
hhave $50 on the day the note and mort-
gage were signed, but prior to the ab-
stract being examined.

Then he took them to J. J. Bruce’s
office and dictated the contract.

The original contract introduced in
evidence was signed by the plaintiff,
but the copy given to the defendants,
and introduced in evidence, was signed
by Dr. E. J. Williams as the contracting
party, which fact is admitted by him.

After the defendants signed the note
and mortgage, he gave them $50 and

about two weeks later he sent $100 to
them at their home at Headrick. This
is all the money defendants ever re-
ceived and all that they were supposed
to receive by the terms of the contract.

The evidence also shows that the ab-
stract cost $75. Dr. E. J. Williams
testified that he paid plaintiff’s attor-
ney, J. J. Bruce, $100 for examination
of the title, but introduced no evidence
to support this statement.

The note and mortgage became due
on January 1, 1951, at which time, at
the request of the defendant Sims Gar-
rett, they were given an additional ten
days; whereupon, Sims Garrett bor-
rowed $100 from his father and paid this
to Dr. E. J. Williams on the 10th day of
January, 1951. When he accepted the
money he told Sims Garrett he was
giving him credit for only $50 of the
$100 paid and that the balance was for
waiting the extra ten days. He then
gave Sims Garrett a receipt for $100
showing a balance of $355, or a credit
of only $50, which receipt was intro-
duced in evidence by the defendants.

The plaintiff in her brief admitted
that only $75 was paid for the abstract.
The contract which plaintiff signed pro-
vided that the defendants were to get
only $150 and the trial court found that
this was all the defendants ever re-
ceived. The trial court further found
that a reasonable fee for the exami-
nation of the abstract would not exceed
$25, which leaves a balance of $155
charged as interest. It is possible that
if the plaintiff had put on any testimony
or evidence to the effect that Dr. E. J.
Williams had actually paid $100 for ex-
amination of the abstract, the court
would not have charged the excess of
$75 as interest. The only evidence to
this effect was that of the witness who
admitted that he had been convicted
of a felony, and the fact that he at-
tempted to penalize the defendants $50
for making payment ten days late, to-
gether with testimony of the defend-
ant Priscilla Garrett that he told them
there would be only a charge of $25

56 De

for examination of the abstract, formed
a reasonable basis for the court to con-
clude that only $25 in fact was paid
for the examination of the abstract.

It would have been a simple matter
for the plaintiff’s attorney, J. J. Bruce,
to introduce his records showing such
payment, or at least take the stand
and so testify, but he did not see fit to
do so. Therefore, the court was justi-
fied in concluding that in fact such
amount was never paid. Then the only
possible alternative would be for the
court to decide what would have been
a reasonable fee for such examination.

In Barnhart et ux. v. Richardson, 134
Okla. 19, 272 P. 418, we held:

“The courts will not permit an act
forbidden or penalized by statute to be
done either directly or indirectly, nor
acquiesce in the employment of any
shift or device by which the lender may
receive more than ten per cent per
annum for the use * * * of money.”

In the body of the opinion, we said:

“Money paid for services of the agent
of the lender in procuring a loan is
money paid the lender or for his bene-
fit.”

In Bean v. Rumrill, 69 Okla. 300, 172
P. 452, Syllabus 1, we held:

“Where a money lender engages an
agent to make loans of money, and
such agent procures a contract with
the borrower by which the borrower
agrees to pay 10 per cent per annum
interest from the time the money is
lent, and in addition thereto, as a part
of the transaction, the agent requires
the borrower to contract for or pay an
additional sum for the use of the money
under the guise of a socalled commis~
sion, the entire contract is construed
together and is usurious.”

We further quote from the body of
the opinion as follows:

“While some of the courts have up-
held reasonable charges for actual serv-
ices performed by the agent of the
lender, none, so far as we are advised,
have gone to the extent of permitting
charges unreasonable and unfair, though

under the guise of ‘commission’ to
stand, but in all such cases have con-
strued the entire negotiations as one
contract, and held the same to be usur-
ious when their effect was the contract-
ing to pay more than the highest law-
ful rate of interest. We think that each
business should bear its own expenses,
and that money paid for services of the
agent of the lender, in procuring a loan,
is money paid to the lender or for his
benefit, and if, in paying for such serv~
ices, the borrower contracts to pay a
sum or sums in excess of the highest
lawful rate of interest, the contract is
usurious.”

In 21 A. L. R. 799, appears an anno-
tation on this subject. Paragraph (d)
at page 813 reads as follows:

“In the same way transactions by
which one member of a family receives
commissions for alleged services in ne-
gotiating loans from another member
of the family have been held usurious,
where they appeared to be merely de-
vices by which an excessive compe!
sation was received for the loan.” (Cit-
ing many cases.)

At page 815 of 21 A. L. R., the second
paragraph of §4 reads:

“Excessive interest cannot be hidden
under pretended charges for expense
of drawing papers, examining security,
and the like.” (Citing many cases.)

At page 873 of 21 A. L. R., paragraph
(b) reads as follows:

“The actual and reasonable expense
of preparing abstracts and of investi-
gating and passing upon the title of
the borrower to property which is to be
mortgaged to secure the loan cannot or-
dinarily be made the basis of a charge
of taking usury. As to unreasonable
charges of this character, see supra
II d, and as to such charges, as de-
vices to conceal usury see supra, II
f, 4”

Paragraph (d), page 802 of 21 A. L.
R., reads:

“The reasonableness as to amount, of
charges against the borrower, seems to
be given considerable weight in deter-
mining their character as usurious or
otherwise. Thus, many cases refer to

the unreasonableness of such: charges
as a ground for considering them illegal
in this respect.” (Citing many cases.)

At page 803 of 21 A. L. R.:

“While in Mayfield v. British & A.
Mortgage Co, (1916), 103 S.C. 152, 88
S.E. 370, it was held that, although a
borrower could be prepared to pay a
reasonable attorney’s fee for prepar-
ing the abstract of title of the property

to be mortgaged as security for the *

loan, yet if the charge was unreason-
able, and such unreasonable portion
carried the interest over the maximum
legal rate, it would be usury.”

We hold that there is sufficient evi-
dence reasonably tending to support
the judgment of the trial court.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, DAVI-
SON, O'NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

INSURORS INDEMNITY & INS. CO. v.
ARCHER,

No. 34236. Feb. 10, 1953.
254 P. 2d 842.

Pierce, Rucker, Mock, Tabor & Dun-
can, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Wheeler & Wheeler, Tulsa, for de-
fendant in error.

O’NEAL, J. On the evening of No-
vember 9, 1947, Miss Archer suffered
physical injuries as the result of an
automobile accident growing out of a
collision of two automobiles upon a
state highway east of the city of Still-
water, Oklahoma. At the time of the
accident Miss Archer was a guest pas-
senger of the defendant, Bernie Lewis
Spence, the operator of the automobile
involved in the collision with an auto-
mobile driven by R. L. Lee. Miss Arch-
er brought an action in the district
court against both Spence and Lee for
damages alleging concurrent negli-
gence in the operation of the two auto-
mobiles, resulting in the accident and
plaintiff's injuries. On October 8, 1948,
plaintiff recovered a judgment against
Spence in the sum of $3,264.35. The
judgment was not appealed and be-
came a final judgment. Plaintiff pro-
cured the issuance of an execution up-
on said judgment which was returned
“No property found.” Thereafter,
plaintiff filed an affidavit for garnish-

58 Le

ment on execution which recited the
obtaining of the judgment and that the
Insurors Indemnity & Insurance Com-
pany had monies and properties in its
possession and control belonging toa
Spence, in which plaintiff sought to be
applied in the collection of the judg-
ment.

The record discloses that on Novem-
ber 6, 1947, Spence rented an automo-
bile from Jack W. Trimble Company,
d/b/a Rent-A-Car Company of Tulsa,
Oklahoma. The Rent-A-Car Company
carried a general policy of indemnity
insurance with the Insurors Indemnity
& Insurance Company, the garnishee
in the present action, which policy of
insurance was extended to cover the
car rented by the defendant, Bernie
Lewis Spence. This policy of insur-
ance thus extended to Spence provid-
ed, among other things, as follows:

“1, Report every accident immedi-
ately, and in no event not less than 24
hours;

“2. Cooperate fully with the insur-
ance company in all matters in connec-
tion with the investigation and defense
of any claims or suits, also neither
this insured, nor the driver shall aid
or abet any claimant against the in-
surance company;

“3, This insurance shall be void and
no coverage is provided by said policy
if the automobile is operated:—Reck-

lessly as to speed or otherwise.”

Spence did not notify the Rent-A-Car
Company of the accident, but some
days thereafter a proprietor of a garage
at Stillwater, Oklahoma, notified the
Rent-A-Car Company that it had in its
possession the Spence automobile in-
volved in the accident, The Rent-A-Car
Company and the insurance company
attempted to contact Spence, but were
unable to locate him, and they later
learned that he had left the city im-
mediately after the accident. The rec-

ord discloses that shortly after the ac-
cident Spence advised the officers at
Stillwater, Oklahoma, that he lived in-
‘Tulsa, Oklahoma, giving the address
of his parents as the place of his resi-

dence. The trial court found that serv-
ice of summons left with one of the
parents of Spence at the Tulsa address
was a valid service giving the court
jurisdiction of the person of the de-
fendant, Spence, in the present action.

The insurance company in an attempt
to contact Spence learned that he was
employed by a pipeline construction
company, and that his duties required
him to move from place to place as
the construction work progressed. It
was advised that Spence was employed
at points in Kentucky, Pennsylvania
and California. The insurance com-
pany wrote Spence six letters in care
of his employers advising him of the
institution of the suit against him and
that it would appear for him in said
suit but with the express reservation
of its rights to contest the policy. The
letters further advised Spence of his
right to employ individual counsel and
defend the suit if he so desired. Copies
of each of these letters were also ad-
dressed to Spence at the residence of
his parents in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The
insurance company did not receive re-
plies to any of these letters. Plaintiff
contends that there is a failure of proof
that Spence received the letters ad-
dressed to him, and, furthermore, that
Spence did not give the insurance com-
pany a nonwaiver agreement; that the
insurance company having defended
the suit without receiving the non-.
waiver agreement is now estopped to
deny any liability under its policy of
insurance. Plaintiff goes one step fur-
ther and contends that even if Spence
received the letters which advised him
that the insurance company would ap-
pear for him in the suit with express
reservation of rights to contest the
policy, that nonetheless the insurance
company cannot rely on any defense
under the policy because it did not
procure from Spence a valid written
nonwaiver agreement.

Answering these contentions the in-
surance company asserts that it was
not necessary for it to obtain a written
nonwaiver agreement signed by Spence,

ee 59

and that they performed their full legal
duty by mailing him the letters as
disclosed by the record that it would
defend the suit against him on a reser-
vation of its rights under the policy.

Plaintiff relied upon the rule an-
nounced in 45 C.J.S., Insurance, §714, at
page 684, which states:

“Broadly speaking an insurance com-
pany which undertakes or continues the
defense of an action against insured

with knowledge or means of knowledge -

of grounds for avoiding its liability to
insured, and without due notice to in-
sured of its disclaimer of liability, will
on principles of waiver and estoppel
be precluded from thereafter avoiding
liability under the policy on such
grounds, ***,”

A similar rule is announced in 29 Am.
Jur., Insurance, §878, at page 672, as
follows:

“The general rule supported by the
great weight of authority is that if a
liability insurer, with knowledge of a
ground of forfeiture or noncoverage un-
der the policy, assumes and conducts
the defense of an action brought against
the insured, without disclaiming lia-
bility and giving notice of its reserva-
tion of rights, it is thereafter precluded
in an action upon the policy from setting
up such ground of forfeiture or non-
coverage.”

It will be observed that the general
rule thus stated assumes that the in-
surer has taken over the defense of an
action brought against the insured with-
out disclaiming liability and without
giving notice of its reservation of
rights. The rule is based upon the
theory of waiver or estoppel.

Plaintiff relies upon our decision in
Tri-State Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDuff, 192
Okla. 105, 134 P. 2d 342. In this case
we cited with approval the general

. rule announced in 29 Am. Jur., supra.
The case, however, does not involve
the question of notice to the insured.
The opiriion discloses that the insurer
and insured jointly defended the action.

After judgment the insured sought
to recover from the insurer the amount

its nonliability’ under

of the judgment rendered against the
insured upon the claim that the attor-
neys for the insurer had dominated the
defense to the prejudice of the rights
of the insured. Upon this point we
said:

“The evidence as to whether defend-
ant undertook the defense of the action
without reservation as to liability, and
whether it exercised full control of the
defense thereof, was conflicting.”

And upon the conflict of evidence we
affirmed the finding of the trial court.

We are unable to agree with plain-
tiffs contention that there is a fail-
ure of proof that the defendant Spence
was advised of the suit against him and
that he was given an opportunity to
defend the action.

In United States Fire Ins. Co. v. L. G.
Adam Merc. Co., 117 Okla. 73, 245 P.
885, we held:

“When a letter is sent by post or
mail, properly addressed, the presump-
tion of its receipt by the party to whom
it is addressed arises, and this prima
facie presumption of delivery remains
until overcome by contradictory evi-
dence.”

Plaintiff made no effort to overcome
this presumption by contradictory evi-
dence,

Upon the record here presented we
think the insurance company ‘was
clearly within its rights to defend the
action in an effort to protect itself and
comply with its agreement.

In 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, §879, at
page 673, the author states:

“No estoppel arises against a liability
insurer where, although defending a
suit against the insured, it insists on
the policy, and
its defense of the suit is merely to pro-
tect itself and comply with its agree-
ment.”

We think the application of the rule
is especially applicable here where, as
we have seen, the insurer in good faith
has used every reasonable effort to

60 De

contact the insured and advise him of
the pendency of the suit prior to taking
over its defense,

In the footnote in the case of Miller
Mfg. Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150
Va. 495, 143 S. E. 747, 59 A.L.R. §14,
p. 295, we find the following statement:

“An insurer which denies its liability
under the provision of its policy under
consideration, before judgment, and
while the insured has sufficient time to
protect its interest at the trial of the
cause by providing its own counsel, or
otherwise; is not estopped, in an action
against it on the policy, to plead this
provision as a defense in an action upon
the policy, although it may have as-
sumed the defense of an action against
the employer by an employee or at-
tempted to compromise the claim.”

The judgment is reversed.

HALLEY, C. J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, DAVISON, WILLIAMS,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. CORN,
J., dissents.

BRISCOE et al. v. WORLEY.
No. 35125. Oct. 28, 1952.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1953.
253 P. 2d 145.

Pierce, Rucker, Mock, Tabor & Dun-
can, Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in
error.

Busby, Harrell & Trice, Ada, and
John B. Ogden, Oklahoma City, for de-
fendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. This action for damages
for alleged wrongful death was brought
by Willis C. Worley, administrator of

| 61

the estate of Ella Lucille Worley, de-
ceased, -against the Standard Paving
Company, a corporation, and Jack Bris-
coe and Frank Briscoe, a copartner-
ship, doing business under the firm
name and style of Jack Briscoe, Con-
tractor. The parties herein will be re-
ferred to as plaintiff and defendants. as
they appeared in the trial court, or in
the alternative as Mrs. Worley, Stand-
ard and Briscoe. .

The petition substantially alleges that
Standard, under its contract with the
State of Oklahoma, constructed a bridge
over Briar Creek on U.S. Highway 75,
at a point between the towns of Lehigh
and Coalgate; and that Briscoe, under
his contract with the state, constructed
approximately eight miles of concrete
road between said named towns.

This work covered a period of ap-
proximately a year, and during the con-
struction work the highway between
said towns was open to local traffic,
school buses and the U.S. mail; that
U.S, Highway 75 was the only existing
highway between said towns upon
which local residents could travel to
and from their homes. That Standard
erected a temporary bridge across Briar
creek and constructed a by-pass around
the main highway bridge then under
construction, which ‘temporary bridge
and by-pass was used by the local resi-
dents, as well as by Standard Briscoe
under their respective construction
work. The Briscoe contract required
him to hard surface the highway on
each side of the main bridge, as well
as the bridge itself, when completed,
and it was necessary to maintain a
temporary bridge at a by-pass for the
proper performance of their contract
with the State of Oklahoma. ~

On the completion of Standard’s
work, it placed wooden guards on each
end of the detour by-pass thus bar-
ricading travel therefrom. The travel-
ing public then crossed over the new
bridge for approximately a month
thereafter, and prior to the accident
hereinafter referred to.

Plaintiff pleads certain standard spe-
cifications for highway construction
adopted by the State Highway Com-
mission of the State of Oklahoma which
specifications were published prior to
the time the contracts were entered
into by Standard and Briscoe, and
which specifications are claimed to be
a part and parcel of the contracts of
Standard and Briscoe. These specifi-
cations required the contractor to plan
and perform work so that local traffic
and the U. S. mail would be hindered as
little as possible in the use of the high-
way, and to this end the contractor was
required to provide and maintain a
traffic way along the work and cross-
ings. That wherever a contractor is re~
quired to construct a temporary cross-
ing over a stream his responsibility for
accidents shall include the roadway
approaches, as well as the structures of
such crossings. Other specifications need
not be further noted.

It is alleged that Mrs. Worley, on the
evening of March 11, 1950, was driving
her automobile on U. S. Highway 75
in a northerly direction and as she ap-
proached the new bridge she found it
barricaded, and she was compelled to
use the by-pass and the temporary
bridge provided by the defendants. It
is alleged that defendants failed and
neglected to maintain the by-pass in a
safe condition, free from hazardous ob-
structions, in that they allowed a stump
to remain on the edge of the roadway
of the by-pass. This stump was too
high to be passed over by an auto-
mobile and was covered with coal dust
or pulverized cinders, which had been
used in the construction of the by-pass;
that there was no barricade, warning
sign or light near the stump; that as
Mrs. Worley was driving her car along
the by-pass it collided with the stump

and the accident resulted in her instant

death; that the death of Mrs. Worley
was directly and proximately caused
by the careless and negligent acts of
the defendants in failing to furnish a

“suitable by-pass around the bridge and

maintain it in a proper condition, free
from hazardous obstructions.

62 es

The separate answer of Briscoe, after
pleading a general denial, alleged that
the plaintiff's decedent, Mrs. Worley,
was herself negligent, which contri-
buted to the accident and her resulting
death; that Mrs. Worley failed to exer-
cise that degree of care which a rea-
sonably prudent person should have
exercised under the circumstances;
that she drove her car at a speed
greater than would permit her to bring
it to a stop within the assured clear
distance ahead; and drove her car off
of the traveled portion of the highway,
and off of the highway designated for
travel. Furthermore, that the accident
was an unavoidable casualty.

After the introduction of plaintiff's
evidence in chief, the defendant, Stand-
ard, demurred thereto on the ground
that plaintiff failed to sustain the alle-
gations of her petition. The demurrer
was sustained by the trial court on
the ground that plaintiff’s evidence dis-
closed that Standard completed its
work under its contract; that the bridge
had been accepted by the State High-
way Department, and that Standard’s
liability to maintain the by-pass in a
reasonably safe condition for traffic
had ceased long prior to Mrs. Wor-
ley’s accident and injury.

At the close of plaintiff’s case, Bris-
coe also demurred to the evidence on
the ground that plaintiff did not estab-
lish facts upon which plaintiff was en-
titled to affirmative relief as against
the defendant, Briscoe. This demurrer
was overruled. At the-close of all the
evidence Briscoe moved for a directed
verdict, which motion was denied. Up-
on the verdict of the jury a judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, Briscoe.

No issue is presented as to the rea-
sonableness of the verdict and judg-
ment rendered thereon, but it is urged
in Briscoe’s motion for a new trial and
by assignments of error that the trial
court erred in the following particu-
lars:

L

Actionable negligence on the part of
plaintiffs in error, proximately causing
the accident was not shown by the
evidence in this case.

I.

The accident was not a foreseeable
consequence of any negligence on the
part of the defendants.

qm.

The court erred in admitting for the
consideration of the jury, Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit “6”, over the objection of de-
fendants, and in making the statement
in the presence of the jury that the
plaintiff had the right to rely on the
contractual liability thus assumed.

Iv.

The court erred in giving to the jury
its Instruction No. 12 over the objec-
tion and exception of the defendants.

v.

The court erred in refusing to sub-
mit to the jury the Defendants’ Re-
quested Instructions, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
and 7.

The facts as shown by the record
disclose that Standard, under its con-
tract with the State covering the con-
struction of the main bridge over Briar
creek, found it necessary to construct
the by-pass running from one end of
the bridge to the other. This by-pass
was approximately 275 feet long. Dirt
fills 12 feet high were erected on each
end of the by-pass. The fills created
ramps leading from the main highway
onto the by-pass. The temporary bridge
crossing was about 140 feet north of
the south ramp. This by-pass running
along the creek was constructed over
a rough terrain. Slack from the coal
mines was used as a filling or ballast
over the main part of the traveled by-
pass. Along the edge of this by-pass
road Standard had cut down a tree
approximately 10” in diameter, leaving
a stump 18” high. This stump was
usually covered with a heavy thick-

[| 63

ness of coal dust, and the stump during
dry seasons could not be readily seen
by passing motorist. A number of wit-
nesses who traveled over the by-pass
had observed the stump and others had
not noticed it prior to the accident in
question. All witnesses stated that the
coal dust during dry spells made their
vision difficult if an automobile pre-
ceded them. On the evening of March
11, 1950, a coal miner by the name of
Lanoy was driving his car toward
Coalgate, and as he was about to enter
the by-pass on the south end, he ob-
served the headlights of the car some
distance behind him. When his car
reached the temporary bridge on the
by-pass he observed the Worley car
coming down the ramp behind him,
and shortly afterwards heard a crash.
He brought his car to a stop, got out
and went back to the Worley car. He
observed that the car had run into the
tree stump. The car was badly dam-
aged and Mrs. Worley was dead. Mr.
Lanoy stated that when he went down
the ramp he put his car in second
gear and when he approached the tem-
porary bridge he shifted his car into
low gear. That this witness was driving
slowly and that the Worley car was
also driving slowly behind him, is dis-
closed by the following questions and
answers:

“Q. Now, isn’t it a fact that this
ear which was following you, gained
on you very substantially, in other
words ate up the distance between it
and you, as you came to the top of the
ramp? .A. No, it couldn’t have come to
the top of the ramp.

“Q. Did it crowd you going down
the ramp? A. No.”

The sheriff of Coal county on the
night of the accident was traveling
south toward Lehigh. He stopped his
car on the north end of the by-pass
as he had observed two cars entering
the by-pass from the south. As these
cars’did not come out of the by-pass
he walked down and found the wrecked
Worley car and saw the witness, Lanoy,
at the scene of the accident. He stated

that he had traveled over the by-pass
on numerous occasions for over a year
while the bridge was being constructed,
but had never observed the tree stump.
He further stated that on the night in
question there was a strong north wind,
and visibility, on account of the coal
dust, was very poor.

The evidence is without substantial
dispute that during the construction of
the main bridge and the hard surfacing
of the highway there were times when
the barricades at the bridge were re-
moved, and then the local traffic was
permitted to cross the bridge. At other
times the barricades were placed at
each end of the bridge and then traffic
passed over the by-pass.

Standard, having completed its con-
struction work upon the bridge, in the
latter part of January or early in Feb-
ruary, 1951, placed barriers across
each end of the by-pass and it was
then closed to traffic. Briscoe had not
completed the road work, especially
with reference to resurfacing the floor
of the bridge and approaches to the
bridge. Briscoe testified that if they
could not use the by-pass they would
have to travel a dirt road seventeen
miles in length to get from one end of
the bridge to the other to complete
their paving operations. Briscoe sug-
gested to Standard that Standard leave
the ramps in place and at the con-
clusion of the construction work he
would rebuild the shoulders of the
ramps and recondition the by-pass as
Standard was obligated to do under its
agreement with the state. Standard
agreed to Briscoe’s request and there-
after, under date of January 21, 1950,
Briscoe addressed a letter to the State
Highway Department, as follows:

“This is to advise that it is satisfac-
tory with us for Standard Paving Com-
pany to leave the ramps off the grade
on each side of the two bridges on
project F-254 (2) and that we will re-
pair them to the satisfaction of the en-
gineer on our project without cost to
the state.”

64 Ee

The letter agreement referred to was
approved by the State Highway De-
partment and the balance due under
Standard’s contract was paid in full.
Briscoe then removed the barricades
from the ramp and barricaded the
bridge from traffic. He caused the
ramps to be regraded, as well as the
road over the by-pass. It is disclosed
by the evidence and shown by photo-
graphs introduced in the record, that
the grader approached very near the
tree stump at the edge of the by-pass
road. Agents of the State Highway De-
partment testified that U. S. Highway
75 at the main bridge was 130 feet
wide; therefore, the distance from the
center of the highway to the stump was
64 feet, placing the stump within one
foot of the outer edge of the highway.

Neither plaintiff nor defendants in-
troduced the contracts in evidence under
which they were performing their
work. An engineer of the State High-
way Department was called by plain-
tiff who testified that he was familiar
with the specifications of the State
Highway Department as applied to con-
struction work, and that section 104.06
—Maintenance of Detours, reads:

“The Contractor shall plan and pros-
ecute his work so that local traffic
and the U.S. Mail will be hindered as
little as possible in the use of the road.
To this end the Contractor shall pro-
vide and maintain a traffic way along
the work and crossings over or around
the culverts. Maintaining traffic at
bridges will not be required unless
specifically provided for on the plans
or in the proposals. Unless otherwise
stated in the plans or special provi-
sions, through traffic over State or U.S.
Highways will be detoured away from
the work, under way and marked de-
tour on temporary roads to be main-
tained by the Commission.”

The witness stated that this was a
standard specification in force and ap-
plicable to all work covering the con-
struction of public roads.

Plaintiff to sustain the verdict and
judgment rendered in their favor states:

“There is only one question involved
on this appeal, to wit: Is there sufti-
cient evidence to present a jury ques-
tion?”

Plaintiff asserts that if the local pub-
lic were permitted to use the by-pass
during the joint construction of the
bridge and road work, that the plain-
tiff was not a trespasser, or licensee,
but on the contrary was an invitee,
and as such it became the duty of the
defendants to use reasonable care in
the maintenance of the by-pass by
keeping it reasonably safe for travel.

Plaintiff calls to our attention cases
distinguishing the applicable rule of
care as applied to trespasser, licensee
and invitee. As we view the present
action, the general specifications of the
State Highway Department referred to
as 104.06—Maintenance of Detours, ap-
plies only to the contractural relation
between Briscoe and the state, and these
general specifications do not increase
or diminish the statutory or common-
law liability or duty of the defendant
as applied to the facts here involved.

In the course of the trial, defend-
ant, Briscoe, objected to the introduc-
tion of the Highway Department’s spe-
cifications. The trial judge referring
to plaintiff's petition stated:

“They allege the contractural liability
and the statutory and the common-
law liability. They have different
causes of action. They can rely upon
either one or both.”

As the trial progressed and as the
issues were developed, the court, by its
instruction No, 12, submitted the case
to the jury solely under the defendants’
common-law liability. This instruction
reads:

“You are instructed in this case that
if you shall find and believe from the
evidence and by a fair preponderance
thereof that the Standard Paving Com-
pany, one of the original defendants in
this cause, after completion of the
bridge over Briar Creek referred to in
the evidence and pleadings herein erect-
ed barriers across each end of the
detour commonly known as the ‘shoo

Le 65

fly’ and opened up the main highway
for traffic and should you further find
by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that thereafter the defendants herein,
Jack’ Briscoe and Frank Briscoe, re-
moved said barriers across each end of
the ‘shoo fly’ or detour and caused bar-
riers to be placed across the main
highway thereby causing or permitting
the local traffic to use said detour or
‘shoo fly’, you are then instructed that
it was the duty of the defendants, Jack
Briscoe and Frank Briscoe, to keep in
good order the temporary way of pas-
sage for travelers around the obstruc-
tion caused by the construction of the
bridge and to use that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent person
would have exercised in the same or
similar circumstances to render the
by-pass or ‘shoo fly’ reasonably safe
for use by persons traveling over it;
and you are further instructed that if
you shall find from a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defend-
ants, Jack Briscoe and Frank Briscoe,
their servants and employees, after re-
opening said detour or ‘shoo fly’, failed
and neglected to keep said detour or
‘shoo fly’, in good order so as to be
reasonably safe for use by persons
traveling over it, and that such failure
on the part of the defendants, their
servants and employees amounted to a
want of care which an ordinarily pru-
dent person would have exercised in the
same or similar circumstances, and if
you shall further find that such lack of
care was the proximate cause of the
death of Ella Lucille Worley, plaintifi’s
decedent, then your verdict must be
for the plaintiff and against the defend-
ants, Jack Briscoe and Frank Briscoe,
and you will fix his recovery at a sum
not to exceed $101,000.00 in accordance
with the instructions of measure of
damages hereafter given you.”

We think this instruction fairly sub-
mitted to the jury the issue of negli-

gence as applied to the facts in the
instant case.

This court has often held that to con-
stitute actionable negligence, where the
wrong was not willful or intentional,
three essential elements are necessary:

(1) The existence of a duty on the

part of the defendant to protect the

plaintiff from injury.

(2) Failure of the defendant to per-
form that duty.

(3) Injury to the plaintiff proximately
resulting from such negligence to per-
form that duty.

The trial court properly overruled de-
fendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s evi-
dence as plaintiff's evidence estab-
lished primary negligence of the de-
fendant.

In the case of Standard Theatres
Corp. v. Hughes, 185 Okla. 377, 91 P.
2d 1058, we said:

“The decisions from this court upon
this point are consistent in holding the
question of negligence or lack of negli-
gence is for the jury to decide, and it
is only when the facts are such that
reasonable men could draw only one
conclusion that the trial court is justi-
fied in taking the case from the jury.”

The same rule was applied in Mid-
Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Price, 203
Okla. 626, 225 P. 2d 176, and Casualty
Reciprocal Exchange et al. v. Sutfin,
196 Okla. 567, 166 P. 2d 434.

Briscoe lays great stress upon the
fact that the road was a “closed road.”
He states this fact was undisputed and
undenied. Closed road signs were
erected both at Lehigh and Coalgate.
The fact remains, however, that the
road, as well as the bridge and the
by-pass, was open to local traffic and
was generally used by the public for
a period of more than a year prior to
the date of the accident. In Toler v.
Hawkins, 188 Okla. 58, 105 P. 2d 1041,
this court said that a highway con-
tractor in the performance of road
work must exercise reasonable care in
protecting persons using the way. The
liability arises out of a legal duty not
to make the highway dangerous for
ordinary use under the circumstances,
and such liability is founded on tort,
and not on contract.

Defendants seek to avoid the legal
effect of Toler v. Hawkins, supra, by
the assertion that the work performed

- under the supervision of the State High-

66 —

way Department did not necessitate the
closing of the road to traffic. The State
Highway Department’s engineer, assign-
ed to the work, at no time made a sug-
gestion that local traffic be discontinued.

In Toler v. Hawkins, supra, the con-
tractor contended that as his contract
with the Highway Department did not
impose upon him a duty to maintain
the detour, and as the Highway De-
partment permitted the road to remain
open to travel, that he was under no
legal duty to maintain the road in a
safe condition. This contention was not
sustained by our decision in the Toler
ease. The facts in the Toler case in
their essential elements are quite sim-
ilar to the instant case. The principles
of law there announced are to the
effect that the liability of the contractor
is not based upon the contract, but
upon tort. This is the theory upon which
the court properly submitted the case
to the jury under instruction No. 12,
supra.

The evidence of Lanoy, referred to
above, discloses that Mrs. Worley was
driving her car at a reasonable and
cautious rate of speed, and that the
accident would not have happened but
for the unusual and hazardous condi-
tion which Briscoe negligently per-
mitted to exist. If it be assumed, as
defendants contend, that the court
erred in admitting in evidence plain-
tiffs Exhibit “6,” which are the gen-
eral specifications of the Highway De-
partment, heretofore referred to, the
error was harmless, as instruction No.
12 submitted the case solely on the
question of tort, and not upon con-
tract.

Complaint is made in the court’s re-
fusal to submit to the jury defendants’
requested instructions Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 and 7. We have examined the re-
quested instructions and find no error
in the court’s refusal to give them to
the jury, for the reason that the in-
structions are tantamount to an in-
structed verdict for the defendants.

The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed,

ARNOLD, C. J., and WELCH, CORN,
and DAVISON, JJ., concur. HALLEY,
V. C. J., and JOHNSON, J., dissent.

HALLEY, V. C. J. (dissenting). I
think the majority opinion is wrong,
for the reason that the defendant co-
partnership owed no duty to the de-
ceased, the wife of the plaintiff; and
further, because there was no negli-
gence on the part of the defendant.

The facts in the case are simple.
Standard Paving Company had a con-
tract with the state to construct a
bridge over Briar creek, and to assist
it in the construction of that bridge
had made what is referred to in the
record as a “by-pass”, “shoo-fly”, or
“detour” around the bridge and across
Briar creek, on the east side of the
highway between Coalgate and Lehigh.
Standard Paving Company had com-
pleted its contract for constructing the
bridge and had fenced off at each end
the “detour” it had constructed. The
defendant had a contract with the state
to lay the approaches to the bridge,
and wrote a letter to James George,
resident engineer for the State High-
way Department, stating that it was
satisfactory for Standard Paving Com-
pany to leave the ramps off the grade
on each side of the bridge over Briar
creek (and also at another bridge
which was included in the project) and
that defendant would repair them to
the satisfaction of the engineer on the
project without cost to the state. The
purpose of this was that the defendant
wanted to use the “detour” (which was
in actuality a service road) in its con-
struction work in laying the approaches
to the bridge. Defendant repaired this
service road in order to make use of
it for its own purposes.

The traveled portion of the service
road was eighteen feet wide, and the
stump into which the deceased drove
her car was six feet from the edge of

the traveled portion of the road and
was within one foot of the east edge
of the 130-foot right of way which the
state had at this point. There was
nothing in the contract of the defend-
ant with the state requiring it to con-
struct a detour on Briar creek. Section
104.06 of the Standard Specifications
provides that maintaining traffic at
bridges will not be required of the
contractor unless specifically provided
in the plans or proposals, and there
is no evidence that any such require-
ment was made of the contractor in
this case; as a matter of fact, it was
testified that there was no requirement
upon the contractor to maintain traffic
at the bridge over Briar creek. The
defendant made no effort to prevent
the local traffic from using this service
road, but the unquestioned testimony
shows that it was built for the con-
venience of the contractor and not for
use by the public. The highway was
closed at Lehigh and at Coalgate, with
detour signs directing traffic to an al-
ternate route. The use by the public
of the service road constructed for the
convenience of the contractor was at
its own peril. No duty rested upon the
defendant to furnish a highway around
the construction work. The only duty
that defendant owed plaintiff’s de;
ceased wife was not to willfully and
wantonly injure her, and there is no
evidence of any such act here, There
was no duty on the state, and none on
the defendant, to maintain this service
road for public travel. In Seelye v.
State, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 205, it was held
that where claimant for damages from
alleged defective condition of gravel
shoulder alongside state’s right of way
did not show the existence of a duty
on the state to maintain and repair
the shoulder, claimant was not entitled
to recover.

Even if it had been the duty of de-
fendant to maintain this service road
for public use, there is no negligence
shown in the manner in which it was
maintained. It was not required to
have a smooth road for the complete
width of the right of way; this was

Le 67,

a construction job in which defendant
was building a paved highway, and
naturally a service road around such
work, for the use of its construction
equipment, was only temporary; and
from photographs reproduced in the
record and shown in the briefs it is
evident that this road was sufficient
for the purpose for which it was con-
structed,

The stump into which the deceased
drove her car was six feet from the
traveled portion of the service road.
The question of whether or not an ob-
struction near the traveled portion of
an improved road can be an actionable
defect has not been passed upon in this
state, but respectable authority from
other states holds that it is not an
actionable defect, even though it is on
the shoulder or within the right of way.
Gilbert v. State, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 232;
Clinkenbeard v. City of St. Joseph, 321
Mo. 71, 10 S.W. 2d 54; McChesney v.
Dane Company, 171 Wis. 234, 177 N.W.
12; City of Knoxville v. Baker, 25
Tenn. App. 36, 150 S.W. 2d 224.

The majority opinion relies upon
Standard Theaters v. Hughes, 185 Okla.
377, 91 P. 2d 1058. That case is not in
point here, because there was evidence
there of the maintenance of a danger-
ous condition, ie., a step or ledge be-
tween the seats and the aisle of a
theater, and the theater was maintained
without sufficient lights, while here
there was no negligence, for the reason
that the alleged obstruction was beyond
the limits of the traveled portion of
the road.

The majority opinion also states that
the facts in Toler v. Hawkins, 188 Okla.
58, 105 P. 2d 1041, and those in the
case at bar are similar, but in the Toler
case the defect created by the con-
tractor was in the traveled portion
of the highway. They had torn up a

concrete road and were allowing the
public to travel over the torn-up por-
tion of the highway, and permitted a
large hole to be worn in the highway,
resulting in an injury to an occupant

68 a

of an automobile. The duties and re-
sponsibilities of the contractors in that
case and in the case at bar are en-
tirely different, in that this service
road was not a part of the main high-
way and there has been shown no duty
on the part of the defendant to main-
tain it for public use,

The defendant has raised a number
of propositions which would require
reversal of this case if well founded,
and I think they are. The record of
this case is honeycombed with errors
too serious to be dismissed with a wave
of the hand, as has been done by the
majority opinion.

The majority opinion says that in-
struction No. 12 given by the trial court
was correct. That instruction tells the
jury that when defendant removed the
barriers across each end of the “detour”,
and caused barriers to be placed upon
the main highway, thereby causing or
permitting local traffic to use said “de-
tour”, it was the duty of defendant to
keep in good order the “temporary way
of passage for travelers around the ob-
struction caused by the construction of
the bridge.” I submit that this in-
struction was erroneous in that no such
duty rested upon the defendant either
by contract, by statute, or by common
Jaw.

As previously stated, I think that
where a motorist uses a road which
has been closed to the public and with-
drawn from travel, he does so at his
own peril. See Blashfield’s Cyclopedia
of Automobile Laws and Practice,
§3269; Shawano Co. v. Froemming, 86
Wis. 491, 202 N.W. 186.

There has been a miscarriage of jus-
tice in this case. I respectfully dissent.

GILLETTE MOTOR TRANSPORT, Inc.,
v. .

No. 34838. Nov. 18, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1953.
253 P. 2d 189.

|

69

Banker & Bonds, Muskogee, for plain-
tiff in error.

Wilkerson & Wilkerson, Pryor, for
defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. The petition alleged
that the plaintiff was the administra-
trix of the estate of the deceased hus-
band who was killed in a collision be-
tween a Chevrolet truck being operated
by him on the night of August 8, 1947,
at about 10:30 p.m., approximately 1.6
miles north of Adair, Oklahoma, on U.
S. Highway 69; that the deceased was
26 years of age and earning from $240
to $300 per month and was then en-
gaged in driving his Chevrolet truck at
such place from a trip delivering wa-
termelons to some place in Kansas and
was returning home, his residence be-
ing in Texas, where his family was re-
siding. At the point of collision a truck
owned by the defendant, Gillette Motor
Transport, Inc., was being driven in a
northerly direction on the highway by
an employee of the defendant, Charles
Leslie Marshall, who was driving such
Gillette truck having a trailer thereon,
loaded and going in a northerly direc-
tion when the two trucks, the Cheyrolet
operated by the deceased, Carroll O.
Kirby, and the Gillette truck, operated
by said Marshall, collided or came to-
gether on said highway north of Adair,
Oklahoma. The evidence indicates that
the highway was concrete, 20 feet in
width, and had a black center line or
marker running up and down the high-
way. That it was a clear night and the
pavement was dry; that U. S. Highway
69 runs north and south in a straight
line and there were no curves at or
near the point of collision. The only
witness available who saw or testified
to seeing the collision was the driver
of the defendant’s truck, Marshall, who
was produced by the defendant. The
witnesses for the plaintiff were the
wife of the deceased, Vestal Kirby,
residing in Texas; a brother-in-law,
Darris Lyons, residing in Texas; A. D.

Kirby, a brother of the deceased, re-
siding in Texas; and C. G. Talfarrieo,
a brother-in-law of deceased, residing
in Texas, all of whom came to the scene

. of the collision the day following; al-

so, a photographer, Mrs. E. J. Burnett,
who was at the scene the day follow-
ing; also, Howard Hill, the highway
patrolmen who responded to the call
of the collision on the night it occurred,
and as such investigated the collision;
also, J. S. Lane, who lived about 4%
miles from the scene of collision and
who was on the scene the day after
the Chevrolet truck had been moved.

Also, plaintiff produced H. D. Lyons,
a brother of the brother-in-law, Darris
Lyons, in rebuttal, covering a conversa-
tion with C. L. Marshall about the 12th
of August, 1947.

The defendant produced as their wit-
nesses Howard Hill, the highway pa-

- trolman who appeared on the scene

at 11:15 p.m., August 8, 1947; Howard
Davison, a dispatcher and claim agent
of the defendant, and C. L. Marshall,
the only living person who could testify
as to what transpired from his own
ebservation or knowledge prior to and
at the time of the collision.

The plaintiff’s pleadings and position
on the trial were the necessity of prov-
ing actual or primary negligence by
sufficient legal evidence to permit a
reasonable man or men to determine if
the collision was primarily caused by
the negligence or want of care of the
defendant. The defendant pleaded a
denial of negligence and contributory
negligence and want of care on behalf
of the deceased and that the deceased
was at the time of the collision on the
“wrong side’ or “east side’ or the
“Gillette side” of the highway. A
determination of this issue if properly
arrived at would largely control the
correctness or incorrectness of the ver-
dict and judgment.

The plaintiff was permitted, over ob-
jections, to testify and to produce a
certain card, referred to as plaintiff's
Exhibit 1, by reading into the evidence
that deceased had been employed by

70 Le

the Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Company prior to this collision result-
ing in death and that the card was
read to the jury:

“Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Company awards this certificate of ap-
preciation to Carroll Otto Kirby, who
drove a company vehicle without
chargeable accident one year, from
Feb. 21, 1946 through Feb, 21, 1947.
Award given Feb. 21, 1947, with cur-
rent safety program.”

‘The trial court, in our opinion, com-
mitted error in permitting testimony
by the wife, Vestal Kirby, that her
husband was a careful driver and in
permitting, over objection, introduction
in evidence of the certificate awarded
from a previous employer that the de-
ceased was given such award for hav-
ing been theretofore a careful driver.
The court also committed error, in our
opinion, in permitting the witness Tal-
ferreio, the brother-in-law of the de-
ceased, to testify that the deceased was
a careful, painstaking driver and was
a very good driver and always wanted
to drive ever since he was a child. The
tule of law is: .

“If there was an eyewitness to a
fatal accident, evidence of the de-
ceased’s careful habits is not admis-
sible in a death action, ***.” Blash-
field, Cyc. of Automobile Law, vol. 9,
p. 640, §6193.

See, also, Scally v. Flannery, 292
Ill. App. 349, 11 N. E. 24 123; Moore v.
Bloomington D. & C. R. Co., 295 Ill. 63,
128 N. E. 721; Starr v. Los Angeles Ry.
Corp., 187 Cal. 270, 201 P. 599; Gorman
v. County of Sacramento, 92 Cal. App.
656, 268 P. 1083; also:

“Testimony of general habits of care-
fulness is too remote to raise the pre-
sumption that they have been exer-
cised in any given case.” City of Junc-
tion City v. Blades, 1 Kan. App. 85, 41
P. 677.

Generally, the courts hold that evi-
dence of careful habits of one injured
by another’s negligence is not admis-
sible to show care at the time of the in-
jury. 15 A.L.R. 127, citing numerous
cases,

The wife also testified that her hus-
band was earning from $240 to $300 per
month. The wife further testified that
the shoes her deceased husband had
on when she last saw him were “kind
of a blunt toed slipper and listed slight-
ly. The springs were all broken up in
them, and one shoe had an awful scar
across the toe of it.”

Darris Lyons, a brother-in-law of de-
ceased, testified that he had known the
deceased for eight years; that he mar-
vied deceased’s sister and deceased was
hauling watermelons for him, and over
objections testified the deceased was a
careful, painstaking driver, and that
he was a perfect driver. He also testi-
fied that the west-hand side of the road
was higher than the east side of the
road and he also testified that he saw
a set of marks on the “east side running
northeast.”

A. D. Kirby, brother of the deceased,
testified that he saw track marks made
by the Gillette truck on the east side
of the road the next day.

C. G. Talfarrieo, a brother-in-law of
deceased, testified that he knew de-
ceased for fourteen years and testi-
fied, over objections of defendant, that
deceased was a careful, painstaking
driver and was a very good driver from
seeing him drive and he always wanted
to drive ever since he was a child.

Howard Hill, highway patrolman,
testified that he arrived at the scene
of the accident at 11:15 p.m., and that
the Chevrolet truck was found by him
35 feet from the point of impact, which
point of impact was 42 inches to the
left or east side‘ of the road. Mr. Hill
also testified that he measured this
distance himself.

It was stipulated that the funeral
bill incurred was $700.

J. S. Lane was called for plaintiff.
He said he lived 4% miles from High-
way 69 and that he saw some clay on
the west side of the center line of the
highway.

ee 1

Plaintiff rested and defendant de-
murred to the evidence.

The court observed, “Under the rule
of inferable evidence, the jury might
infer negligence. I will overrule the
demurrer.” The court then stated: “It
is awful close.” The court further ob-
served:

“You have this situation here: The
man that would know about it he is
gone, he has passed out and the only
thing here is the circumstance of the
accident, and it may be fairly stated
that the only rule of evidence there
on behalf of the plaintiff, is the fact
that there was an accident; the trucks
came together under such circumstan-
ces it might have been the fault of
one and might have been the fault of
the other, or might even be the fault
of both, or where the jury might never
believe this evidence, and for the pur-
pose of the demurrer, it is taken as
true that the truck did pull over to
the left of the highway according to
the physical facts, so under that slight
authority there, I will overrule -the
demurrer to the evidence.”

‘Thereupon, the defendant called How-
ard Hill, the highway patrolman, as
its witness, and he testified that he
arrived at the scene at 11:15 p.m.; that
the weather was fair; that it was a
conerete highway, 20 feet wide; that
the bumper and axle of the Chevrolet
made a mark on the pavement and
the mark started where the wheel was
broken down and it was 42 inches to
the east of the black line where the
impact was; that from the cut place
in the highway, you could tell what
caused it; that there was a bumper
mark and that the cut place was def-
initely 42 inches east of the black line.
The highway patrol man further testi-
fied that the decedent’s shoes were part
off; that the throttle on the dash board
was pulled out; that there was a foot
feed on the truck; that he swept the
glass and other debris off himself that
night; that he showed the relatives the
next day the point where the accident
happened and the point of impact; that
he has no interest in the case.

Howard Davison testified that he was
a dispatcher and claim agent for de-
fendant, and that Marshall, the truck
driver, had been with the company for
18 years and worked out of Muskogee
and that his record showed that Mar-
shall left Muskogee the night of August
8, 1947, at 8:30 p.m.

C. L. Marshall testified that he lives
in Muskogee; that he was driving for
Gillette and had been driving for them
11 years; that he had gotten into Mus-
kogee the previous morning at 4:30
a.m. and rested all day at home; that
he was driving an International tractor
with a Fruehauf trailer; that he was
driving in a northerly direction, about
1.6 miles north of Adair on the night
of August 8, 1947; that there was a rise
on the highway; that the deceased was
about straddling the black line and
swerved back over and the next thing
he cut around; that Marshall was on
the east side of the black line; that
Marshall was about 1% feet over the
black line on the east side of the high-
way when the impact started; that
to be exact, at the time of the impact
hhe was 42 inches to the east side of
the black line in the center of the high-
way upon which he was traveling; that
when deceased hit Marshall’s truck,
deceased’s truck bounced across the
highway about 135 feet before it came
to a stop; that Marshall’s equipment
stopped about 90 feet from the point of
impact; that he had left Muskogee
about two hours before, almost to a
minute; that the distance covered was
54 miles in two hours, or an average of
about 27 miles an hour; that he just
had his motor overhauled and he never
rushed an overhauled job; that when
the Chevrolet turned in his direction
it was 15 or 20 feet from Marshall; that
he, Marshall, turned sharply to the
right to avoid the accident; that the
right front wheel of the Gillette trac-
tor was already off of the pavement
when they first touched; that the Gil-

-lette truck was loaded that night with

around 14,000 or 16,000 pounds; that be-
fore the Chevrolet turned towards Mar-
shall it was on the west side of the
line going south to the lefthand side.

72 Le

That the witness does not remember
how deceased was dressed except that
he was in his sock feet and that the
Chevrolet truck had a gas throttle feed.

Darris Lyons, on rebuttal, testified
he talked to Marshall about four or
five days later and that Marshall said
he first saw the Chevrolet truck about
half a mile coming and he thought it
was astraddle of the mark and he got
about 150 yards and he saw it over on
his side of the road, and when he got
within 15 feet, he, Marshall, saw that
his truck was headed towards the other
truck and jerked it to the right and fell
over to the side.

Defendant rested, the evidence closed.
Defendant demurred to the evidence as
insufficient. The court observed, “It
is a pretty close question, but I will
overrule it.” After instructions and
argument the jury retired and brought
in a nine-man verdict for $6,500. Upon
the verdict being presented, defendant
requested judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The court thereupon again
observed, “Unless a general demurrer
would be sustained, you can’t render
a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, but I still have some serious
doubts as to whether or not there is
any primary negligence.”

A motion for new trial was duly
filed containing six usual assignments
of error, and on April 29, 1949, same
was overruled and the customary no-
tice and requirements of appeal were
taken.

Taken as a whole, after completely
appraising all of the evidence and the
proceedings on the trial, we are forced
to the conclusion:

(1) That there was an eyewitness to
the collision, C. L. Marshall, and al-
though he was an employee of the de-
fendant, < nevertheless, this did not
thereby remove him as an eyewitness.

(2) That since there was an eyewit-
ness to the fatal accident, evidence of
the deceased’s careful habits is not ad-
missible in a death action. Blashfield,
Cye. A.L. vol. 9, §6193.

(3) That testimony of the general
habits of carefulness is too remote to
raise a presumption that they have
been exercised in any given case. City
of Junction City v. Blades, supra.

(4) That the reading into the record
of a certificate of award of carefulness
by a former employer for a prior period
was detrimental, inadmissible and er-
roneous.

(5) That the general over-all com-
plexion of the case shows, as the trial
judge himself had so well observed,
besides the fact of an accident or col-
lision at this point, if you remove the
entire evidence of the only living wit-
ness to the collision, Marshall, there
would be no resulting direct evidence,
except through inferences upon infer-
ences. The plaintiff, at most, merely
proved there was a collision by certain
black marks and gray marks and de-
bris and proved that the highway of-
ficer swept off the highway shortly
after the collision; that the highway of-
ficer testified that there were certain
indentations, scratch marks, ete, in
the pavement, not merely black or
gray marks, but actual cuts or inden-
tations made from the axle or drum of
the front left portion of the Chevrolet,
and that such point of contact of the
two trucks was 42 inches east of the
center mark on the highway, and that
he showed these marks or indentations
the next day to the relatives of the de-
ceased. That it is undisputed by the
wife’s testimony, by the highway pa-
trolman, and by Marshall, that the de-
ceased had some broken shoes, and the
latter two testified that the deceased
had been driving the Chevrolet truck
im his sock feet. It is also undisputed
that the Chevrolet immediately after
the collision showed it was being driven
by the dashboard gas throttle instead
of by the foot feed. All of the testi-
mony, therefore, even if you remove
from the record the testimony of the
eyewitness Marshall, still leaves infer-
ences upon inferences that would be
necessary to attenuate before one could
come to a definite conclusion that the
deceased was not at fault. The burden

Le 73

of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove
negligence on the defendant’s side, as
well as nonnegligence on the plaintiff’s
side, before reasonable men could draw
the conclusion that the collision was
caused primarily and by any fault of
the defendant,

(6) As stated in Highway Constr. Co.
v. Shue, 173 Okla. 456, 49 P. 2d 203, and
as quoted in Buxton v. Hicks, 191 Okla.
573, 131 P. 2d 1015:

“Is there evidence to sustain the con-
clusion of greater probability that the
injury came in whole or in part from
the defendant’s negligence than from
any other cause?”

In fact, the rule in the case of High-
way Constr. Co. v. Shue, supra, goes
one step further and says:

“There must be evidence to sustain
a conclusion that there is a greater
probability that injury came in whole
or in part from such negligence than
from any other cause.”

Tn the case of Prest-O-Lite Co. v.
Howery, 169 Okla. 408, 37 P. 2d 303, it
is said:

“A verdict must be said to be based
on speculation and conjecture when,
after considering all the evidence favor-
able to plaintiff, together with all in-
ferences to be reasonably drawn there-
from, and excluding all evidence fa-
vorable to defendant, all unprejudiced
minds must agree, from the facts and
circumstances in evidence, that any
one of several conclusions consistent
with nonliability of defendant may as
reasonably be drawn therefrom as is
the conclusion of liability under plain-
tiff’s theory of the case.”

(7) Applying the over-all principles
of law and an affirmative effort to do
justice to all parties, one can readily
see why the record in this case shows
that the court made not less than four
definite observations from the begin-
ning to the end of the case that the
court was in a definite state of uncer-
tainty, and we believe justly so, to the
extent of inferences upon inferences be-
fore any verdict could have been given
for the plaintiff. It is difficult to rec-

oncile the verdict being rendered in the
sum of $6,500, for the life of a young
man, 26 years of age, having an expec-
tancy of 38 years, and with a $700 fun-
eral bill and a $300 per month earning
capacity by a nine-man verdict, if suf-
ficient primary evidence was presented
for plaintiff to justify a verdict in favor
of plaintiff.

For the reasons above stated, we do
believe that the court committed ma-
terial error and that the order and
judgment should be reversed, and a
new irial granted.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys George H. Bowen, Hess
Crossland and Samuel A. Boorstin, who
as Special Masters aided in the prepa-
ration of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

WELCH, CORN, GIBSON, O’NEAL,
and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.

STRICKLAND et al. v. HOWARD.
No. 84601. Sept. 30, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1953.
258 P. 2d 158.

fT

4 |

O. J. Roberts, Oklahoma City, W.
Custer Service, Edmond, and Judson H.
Pierce, Perry, for plaintiffs in error.

Henry S. Johnston, Perry, and Joe
W. Howard, Muskogee, for defendant
in error.

BINGAMAN, J. This action was
brought by plaintiff, Lena Howard,
against H. A. Johnson and others, on
a written contract wherein Johnson
agreed to pay her the sum of $10,000 for
services performed by her in nursing
and caring for him at her home from
and after the year 1940. The contract
was dated December 7, 1946. Johnson
died in March, 1947, and the cause was
revived in the name of his administra-
tor, L. E. Plumer. Plaintiff filed a
claim with the administrator on the
written contract which was rejected
and an amended petition was filed in
the case by plaintiff, in which she
sought to establish the rejected claim.
The trial court submitted the matter
to a jury which returned a verdict for
defendants and thereafter the trial court
sustained plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial. Defendants appeal.

From the record it appears that John-
son was severely injured in an auto-
mobile accident in 1940, and was
brought to the home of plaintiff; that
he made arrangements for his room
and board, paying therefor the sum of
$30 per month, and that he remained
there until stricken with a cerebral
hemorrhage in November, 1946, while
he was in the home of a relative in
Edmond,’ Oklahoma. When he was
first brought to the home of plaintiff
he was bedridden for a considerable
length of time and plaintiff nursed him,
ministered to his needs, both by day
and by night, and assisted him in the
handling of his business affairs. It ap-
pears that Johnson was at that time
nearly 80 years of age and that in the
period of time from 1940, until his last
illness in 1946, he received injuries in
three other automobile accidents, each
of which incapacitated him for a cer-
tain length of time, during which peri-
ods plaintiff nursed him and cared for
him, at times having to feed him with a
spoon because of injuries to his mouth
and teeth. After he was stricken with
his last illness his relatives in Edmond
came to the city of Perry, where plain-
-tiff resided, and took from Johnson’s
safe in her residence a sum of money,
$4,000 of which they paid to plaintiff.
After Johnson was stricken with his
last illness plaintiff had the contract
involved in this action prepared by her
lawyer and executed by Johnson, in
which Johnson recited that she had
never been paid for the nursing and at-
tendance on him due to his injuries, and
that because of such services she was
entitled to and should receive from
his estate the sum of $10,000. Plain-
tiff’s witnesses testified at length to the
nature and extent of the services she
rendered to Johnson, and several also
testified that they were present when
Johnson signed the contract, and that
he was mentally competent at that
time. Testimony of his physician and of
a half-brother who was also a physician
and who visited him during his last
illness, was that he was generally un-
der the influence of opiates and was not
mentally competent.

After the various witnesses had tes-
tified as above set forth, plaintiffs at-
torney placed plaintiff on the stand and
after certain preliminary questions
had been asked, counsel for defendants
objected to the competency of plaintiff
to testify “to any transaction or com-
munication with H. A. Johnson” by rea-
son of the prohibition of the statute,
12 O.S. 1951 § 384. Plaintiff’s attorney
made no offer of proof, and asked the
witness no further questions except that
he asked her to state her age, to Which
the court sustained an objection that
the question was incompetent, irrele-
vant and immaterial.

After the verdict of the jury and the
judgment of the court thereon, plaintiff
in due time filed a motion for new
trial, which was sustained by the trial
court. The sole reason given by the
court for the sustaining of such motion
reads as follows:

“The Court: The new trial is granted
on the ground and for the reason the
Court is of the opinion that he erred
in not permitting the witness, (plain-
tiff), to testify as a witness in her
behalf to the services performed by
her and as to the probable value of
them.”

Defendants urge that the sustaining
of the motion for new trial, for the
reason given by the trial court, was
a pure unmixed error of law, and that
in such case this court will reverse the
ruling of the trial court where the rec-
ord clearly shows that the error was
purely one of law. Plaintiff contends
that the action of the trial court was
not error of law, but that where other
witnesses had testified to the services
rendered by plaintiff, she was not with-
in the prohibition of the statute, but
could testify to the services rendered
and the value thereof. In support of
this contention they call attention to
Ward v. Ward, 189 Okla. 609, 119 P. 2d
64; Robitaille v. Mumaugh, 167 Okla.
339, 29 P. 2d 602, Chandler v. Chapman,
189 Okla. 108, 114 P. 2d 471, and Ball v.
Fleshman, 183 Okla. 634, 83 P. 2d 870.

Examination of the cases cited by
defendants discloses that the question

ee] i)

presented in the instant case was not
involved in those cases. Thus in Ward
v. Ward, we held that the widow of the
deceased, who was a defendant in the
action, could testify as to the amount of
her individual money which went into
the purchase price of lands standing in
her name and her husband’s name
jointly. In Barry v. Hubbard, 195 Okla.
112, 155 P. 2d 512, we held that where
the plaintiff attempted to prove that
an assignment of insurance policies
made by her husband was given to
secure the sum of only $400 the de-
fendant could testify in rebuttal as
to the amount of money which she
claimed the policies were given to se-
cure. In Chandler v. Chapman, we held
that the plaintiff could testify that he
had not been paid for necessaries fur-~
nished by him to deceased where the
furnishing of such necessaries had
been established by the testimony of
other witnesses. In Robitaille v. Mum-
augh, the opinion states that the testi-
mony of plaintiff was limited strictly to
a recital of the services performed and
the reasonable value thereof and that
no testimony was offered relating to a
transaction or communications had with
the deceased.

These authorities, in our judgment,
have no bearing upon the question pre-
sented in the instant case.

In Pancoast v. Eldridge, 157 Okla.
195, 11 P. 2d 918, we held that the
statute prohibited the plaintiff from
testifying as to labor and services per-
formed by him for the deceased, and
expressly overruled the case of Sin-
clair v. Stringer, 80 Okla. 218, 195 P.
771, which held to the contrary. While
the statement in Robitaille v. Mum-
augh, supra, appears to the contrary
to the decision in Pancoast v. Eldridge,
no authority is cited in support of
the statement, and it was in effect
overruled by Hartsell v. Davis, 175 Okla.
446, 53 P, 2d 261, and Mitchell v. Koch,
193 Okla. 342, 143 P. 2d 811. In each of
those cases we held that the plaintiff
could not testify as to the services per-
formed by him for defendant and the
value thereof for the reason that it

FT

76 : Le

was an attempt to establish indirectly
a transaction with the deceased so as
to bind the deceased to an implied
contract to pay. While the claim of the
plaintiff here is based upon a written
contract, we are unable to see where
that fact would render her competent
to testify.

The case of Pancoast v. Eldridge,
supra, has been consistently followed
by this court, the last opinion on the
subject being Oklahoma Transportation
Co. v. Owens, 204 Okla. 77, 226 P. 2d
946, in which the rule announced in
Hartsell v. Davis and Pancoast v. Eld-
ridge was expressly approved.

In the instant case the objection to
the competency of plaintiff went only
as to transactions or communications
with the deceased. Since her attorney
made no offer of proof and made no
effort to further examine her, it is
apparent that her testimony would have
involved communications and transac-
tions with the deceased. At least, there
is nothing to the contrary in the rec-
ord.

Jt is an established rule in this court
that an order sustaining a motion for
new trial will be reversed where the
record shows that the order was
based solely upon an error in respect to
a pure, simple and unmixed question of
law. McGlone v. Landreth, 200 Okla.
425, 195 P. 2d 268; City of Holdenville
v. Deer, 191 Okla. 691, 132 P. 2d 928.

It follows that the trial court erred
as a matter of law in sustaining the
motion for a new trial for the reason
given by it.

Reversed, with directions to overrule
the motion.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and WELCH, DAV-
ISON, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. AR-
NOLD, C.J., and CORN, GIBSON, and
O'NEAL, JJ., dissent.

EVANS et al. v. WILCOX.
No. 35545. Feb. 10, 1953.
253 P. 2a 566.

Bell & Tucker, McAlester, for plain-
tiffs in error.

Dudley, Duvall & Dudley, Oklahoma
City for defendants in error.

HALLEY, C.J. This is an appeal from
a judgment in favor of defendant in an
action for personal injuries. The appeal
is by case-made. An order allowing time
in which to make and serve case-made
was entered on February 6, 1952, at
the time the motion for new trial was
overruled. The 60 days given in which
to make and serve case-made expired
on April 6, 1952. No further order ex-
tending the time in which to make and
serve the case-made was entered. The
case-made was served on April 23, 1952.

A motion to dismiss has been filed
for the reason that the case-made was
not served within the time given by the
trial court or any valid order extending
such time. The motion must be sus-

Lt 17

tained. In Wheeler v. Exchange Nat.
Bank of Tulsa, 196 Okla. 405, 165 P. 2d
614, it is stated:

“Where a case-made is not served
within 15 days from the date of the
rendition of the judgment appealed
from or some legal extension thereof,
this court acquires no jurisdiction to re-
view the errors complained of arising
upon such case-made.”

Plaintiffs in error contend that the
order of the trial court extending the
time to appeal, under the provisions of
12 O.S. 1951 §972, extended the time in
which to make and serve case-made.
This contention cannot be sustained.
Adams v. Hobbs, 204 Okla. 85, 226 P.
2d 913. Although not directly in point
this case is authority for the rule that
orders extending the time for appeal
and orders with relation to the making
and serving of the case-made are sep-
arate and distinct. There is nothing in
the order extending the time to appeal
that indicates an intent to extend the
time to make and serve the case-made.

Appeal dismissed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, AR-
NOLD, O’NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
concur. DAVISON, J., concurs in result.
WELCH and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent.

GUYTON et al. v. IRWIN.
No. 34667. Feb. 10, 1953.
* 253 P. 2a 556.

S. J. Montgomery, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiffs in error.

Jarman & Jarman, Oklahoma City,
for defendant in error.

CORN, J. This is an action by Geral-
dine Irwin against Euna Guyton, alias
Mrs. Kirby, and Bob Kirby to recover
damages because of an alleged assault
and battery committed by defendants
on, her person.

Plaintiff in her petition alleges and
the evidence in her behalf establishes
that at the time the alleged altercation
occurred she was the manager of a ho-
tel known as Saxon Inn located in Okla-
homa City. Some time prior to June 14,
1949, defendants came to her hotel to
rent a room. She rented them room
No. 9. The parties registered as Mr.
and Mrs. Bob Kirby. She afterwards
ascertained that Mrs. Kirby’s real name
was Euna Guyton. The parties were
not married. Plaintiff was occupying
room No. 4 in the hotel. About 1:30 a.m.
plaintiff heard a noise and disturbance
down the hall. She ascertained that the
disturbance came from room No. 9 oc-
cupied by defendants, Euna Guyton and
Bob Kirby. She rapped on the door and
requested them to remain quiet. Later
she returned and the defendants were
still raising a disturbance. They were
quarreling and the quarrel finally re-
sulted in a fight. She again rapped at
the door and asked defendant to leave
the hotel. Mr. Kirby then opened the
door, came out in the hall and struck
her in the face several times. The blow

78 —

knocked her to the floor. She had sev-
eral cuts on the left side of her nose
and across the bridge of her nose.

Plaintiff then called to her son who
was temporarily staying at the hotel.
In the meantime, defendant Mr. Kirby
had left the hotel, plaintiff's son fol-
lowed him in an attempt to stop him,
but was unable to do so. He then at-
tempted to call the police but got no
answer.

Plaintiff then entered a booth located
in the hall and put in a call for the
police. When she left the booth defend-
ant Euna Guyton passed her in the
hall and struck her and knocked her to
the floor.

She was taken to a hospital for treat-
ment. One of the doctors who assisted
in treating her stated she had two cuts
on the left side of the nose and that
two stitches were placed on this side
of the nose and that she had also suf-
fered an injury across the bridge of
the nose and four stitches were placed
in the nose at that point. The physician
further testified that a small bone in
the nose had been fractured and that in
his opinion the nose would be per-
manently disfigured.

Plaintiff offered in evidence a photo-
graph taken sometime before the alter-
cation occurred in order to show the
then condition of her nose.

Defendants denied that either of
them ever struck plaintiff. Mr. Kirby
testified that when they were asked to
leave the hotel he opened the door and
a corner of the door struck her in the
face.

The trial was to a jury resulting in a
verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum
of $1,500.

Defendants filed separate motions for
new trial which were overruled. There-
after, defendants employed S. J. Mont-
gomery, another attorney in the case,
who thereafter took charge of the case
and filed joint petition for new trial
on behalf of defendants.. The petition
for new trial was filed after the term

at which the judgment was entered and
was set for hearing on the motion
docket and was heard and overruled
on the 17th day of March, 1950.

Defendants appeal and in their pe-
tition in error assign several errors
among which is error in overruling their
petition for new trial. Defendants, how-
ever, in their brief discuss only the al-
leged error of the court in overruling
said petition. We shall therefore treat
the other errors assigned as having
been abandoned.

It is first contended by defendants
that the court erred in setting the pe-
tition for new trial for hearing on the
motion docket and treating the same

-as an ordinary or supplemental motion

for new trial. It is argued that the pe-
tition for new trial was filed pursuant
to 12 O.S, 1951 §655; that.the procedure
should have been under this section
rather than the procedure followed by
the court. This section provides:

“Where the grounds for a new trial
could not with reasonable diligence
have been discovered before, but are
discovered after the term at which the
verdict or decision was rendered or
made or report of the referee approved,
or where the impossibility of making
a_case-made, without fault of the com~
plaining party, arose after said term,
the application may be made by pe-
tition filed in the original case, as in
other cases, not later than the second
term after such discovery or occur-
rence; on which a summons shall issue,
be returnable and served, or publica-
tion made, as in the beginning of civil
actions, or such service may be made
on the attorney of record in the origi-
nal case. The facts stated in the peti-
tion shall be considered as denied with-
out answer, and if the service shall be
complete in vacation, the case shall be
heard and summarily decided at the
ensuing term, and if in term, it shall
be heard and decided after the expira-
tion of twenty days from such service.
The case shall be placed on the trial
docket, and the witnesses shall be ex-
amined in open court, or their deposi-
tions taken as in other cases; but no
such petition shall be filed more than

Le 79

one year after the final judgment was
rendered.”

Defendants, however, did not comply
with this section. They did not serve
summons upon counsel for the opposite
party. It is urged by defendants that
the petition for new trial was prema-
turely heard; that instead of placing
the petition for new trial on the motion
docket it should have been set upon the
trial docket and heard not earlier than
20 days after the time the petition was
filed. It will be observed the statute
provides that in cases of this kind serv-
ice of summons shall be served, as in
other cases, or upon counsel for the
opposite party; that it shall be heard
and decided after the expiration of 20
days from such service; that the case
shall be placed on the trial docket and
that witnesses shall be examined in
open court. In this connection defend-
ants argue that they were not given suf-
ficient time in which to prepare their
petition for new trial and were there-
fore denied the privilege of examining
witnesses in open court as provided by
statute.

Defendants, however, voluntarily ap-
peared at the hearing of the petition for
new trial without raising any objection
as to the procedure. No request was
made by them that the petition be
transferred to the trial docket and that
they be given further time to prepare
petition for new trial and to pro-
duce evidence in support of their
petition. No objection of any kind was
made by defendants as to the proce-
dure followed by the court, but on the
contrary defendants voluntarily partici-
pated im that procedure. The question
now raised was in no manner pre-
sented to the trial court by defend-
ants. They may not therefore raise this
question for the first time in this court.
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Jam-

ison, Adm’r, 197 Okla. 387, 171 P. 24

976.

The petition for new trial is based
upon newly discovered evidence. The
alleged newly discovered evidence con-
sisted of evidence of Dr. James B. Par-
ker and Dr. George H. Kimball. It is

alleged in the petition that Dr. Parker
was the doctor who received and first
treated plaintiff at the hospital and that
Dr. Kimball later examined her and
observed her condition and that both of
these doctors would testify that plain-
tiff’s nose was not fractured. It is fur-
ther alleged that S. J. Montgomery,
counsel who had been employed in the
ease after the trial, obtained a tran-
script of the evidence. It disclosed that
Dr. Bradley had testified on behalf of
plaintiff that her nose had been frac-
tured; that he thereafter made an in-
vestigation and discovered for the first
time that the doctors above referred to
would testify to the contrary, and it is
further alleged in the petition that this
evidence could not have been produced
at the original trial by the exercise of
due diligence. No facts, however, are
pleaded tending to show the diligence
exercised. The allegations of the peti-
tion are insufficient to justify the
granting of the petition.

It is well established that in order to
obtain a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence which could
not with reasonable diligence have been
discovered before trial, it is not suffi-
cient for the movant to merely allege
due diligence, he must allege and prove
facts evidencing such diligence. Inter-
City Finance Corporation v. McGowan,
174 Okla. 22, 49 P. 2d 698; Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. McDonald, 168 Okla.
255, 32 P. 2d 909.

Since the facts constituting dili-
gence have not been alleged and
proved, the trial court ruled correctly
in denying the petition for new trial.
Moreover, in our opinion, it is not prob-
able if the alleged newly discovered evi-
dence had been introduced at the orig-
inal trial that a different result would
have been reached.

Judgment affirmed.

Plaintiff requests judgment on the
supersedeas bond. A copy of said bond
appears in the record. The bond is
signed by Euna Guyton as principal
and Paul Ellis and Minnie Ellis as sure-
ties. It is therefore ordered and ad-

80 Le

judged that plaintiff have and recover
against Euna Guyton, principal, and
Paul and Minnie Ellis, as sureties, on
the supersedeas bond, the sum of $1,500
and costs.

HALLEY, C.J.. JOHNSON, V.CJ.,
and O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., concur. DAVISON, J., con-
curs in conclusion. WELCH and AR-
NOLD, JJ., dissent.

Inre RICHARDSON’S GUARDIANSHIP,
No. 35636. Feb. 10, 1953.
258 P. 2d 565.

William T. Powells, Walters, for pe-
titioners.

Walter Hubbell and Luther Eubanks,
Walters, for respondents.

WILLIAMS, J. I. A. Richardson and
Ethel Pults filed a petition in the county
court of Cotton county, alleging the in-
competency of their half-brother, G. B.
Richardson, and asking that a guard-

ian be appointed for him. Hearing was
had as provided by law, at the conclu-
sion of which the county judge found
him to be incompetent and appointed
a guardian. Appeal was taken to the
district court by the said G. B. Rich-
ardson, where trial was had de novo.
At the conclusion of petitioners’ evi-
dence, respondent, G. B. Richardson,
demurred thereto; the demurrer was
sustained; judgment was entered for
respondent; petitioners thereupon gave
notice in open court of intentions to ap-
peal to the Supreme Court.

Petition in error presents three alle-
gations of error: that the court erred
in sustaining the demurrer; that the
court erred in not rendering judgment
for petitioners; that the court erred in
his statement of fact (summarizing the
evidence). It is evident that a deter-
mination of any one of these three alle-
gations of error would require a review
of the evidence by this court.

A motion to dismiss appeal has been
filed in this court by respondent, G. B.
Richardson, for the reason that no mo-
tion for new trial was filed and ruled
upon, and that therefore this court is
without jurisdiction to review the rul-
ing of the trial court. This point is well
taken. In Gilliam v. Juccion, 203 Okla.
69, 218 P. 2d 380, we held:

“The ruling on a demurrer to the
evidence is a ‘decision occurring on the
trial” and in order to enable the Su-
preme Court to review such ruling, it
is necessary that a motion for new trial
be filed within the time prescribed by
law.”

See Ardmore Oil & Milling Co. v.
Doggett Grain Co., 32 Okla. 280, 122
P. 241, for an identical ruling. See
also, O’Balliet v. Lillard, 205 Okla. 467,
238 P. 2d 798; and In re Duncan, 129
Okla. 125, 263 P. 1083.

Appeal dismissed.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, 0’-
NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

Le 81

ROMNEY v. DAVIS.
No. 35487. Feb. 10, 1953.
258 P. 2d 546.

Allen & Allen, Tulsa, for plaintiff in
error.

Rosenstein, Fist & Shidler, by Gor-
don lL. Patten, Tulsa, for defendant in
error.

CORN, J. Plaintiff brought this ac-
tion in the justice of the peace court
to recover damages to personal prop-
erty alleged to have resulted from de-
fendant’s negligence in failing to prop-
erly maintain his premises.

The bill of particulars alleged plain-
tiff's entry into defendant’s store as a

business invitee and defendant’s duty
to maintain his premises in a safe con-
dition; that defendant maintained a gas
heater which had no door, thus expos-
ing the public to the open flame; while
standing near the heater the exposed
flame burned and damaged her coat.
Plaintiff alleged the flame was not ob-
vious to a reasonable person and that
no warning notice was posted; that by
failing to properly maintain the prem-
ises defendant was guilty of maintain-
ing a nuisance, and as a result of such
condition, nuisance and negligence on
defendant’s part, such negligence was
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury
and damage.

Defendant answered by general and
specific denial of plaintiff's allegations,
and further alleged that any damage
sustained by plaintiff resulted solely
from her own carelessness and negli-
gence in standing near the heater until
her coat was scorched and damaged.

Trial in the justice of the peace court
resulted in judgment for plaintiff for
the amount claimed. Defendant ap-
pealed to the court of common pleas,
where the matter was tried to the court
without a jury, and judgment again
was rendered for plaintiff.

Plaintiffs evidence was that she en-
tered defendant’s store to purchase
groceries. It was a cold day and she
walked to a heater, centrally located
in the store, to warm herself. A little
time elapsed when she smelled some-
thing burning and thereupon discovered
that the right flap of her fur coat was
scorched to such an extent as to re-
quire repair at a cost of $86.50, Plain-
tiffs evidence also was that the stove
had no door, thus permitting the flames
to extend outside the stove. There was
further evidence that certain employees
had burned their aprons while standing
near the stove.

Defendant’s evidence concerned the
condition of the stove. and that plain-
tiff stood too near the stove while
warming, although it was admitted that
an employee had burned an apron, De-
fendant’s evidence did not establish ex-

82 Le

istence of the door upon the heater, or
that there was any guard to protect
people from the front of the stove.

Defendant relies upon three propo-
sitions to reverse the judgment. It is
urged that the bill of particulars
failed to state a cause of action and
defendant’s demurrer thereto should
have been sustained. The rule is that
when pleading states facts upon which
the pleader is entitled to any relief,
a general demurrer thereto should be
overruled. Stevens.v. Colby, 182 Okla.
213, 77 P. 2d 67.

This was an action to recover dam-
ages allegedly resulting from defend-
ant’s negligence in failing to maintain
his premises in proper condition. The
plaintiff alleged defendant’s acts and
omissions and that the same constituted
negligence, which was the proximate
cause of the injury and damage. Such
pleading set out facts sufficient to pro-
vide grounds for granting plaintiff re-
lief, when tested by the rule that the
demurrer admitted the truth of all facts
well pleaded and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom, and was to be lib-
erally construed in favor of the pleader.
Kasner v. Ashburn, 200 Okla. 256, 192
P. 2d 649. Defendant’s demurrer to the
petition was properly overruled.

The second contention is that the
plaintiff's evidence was wholly insuffi-
cient to support the trial court’s judg-
ment. It is asserted that plaintiff’s evi-
dence failed to show primary negli-
gence on part of the defendant. And,
further, it is urged that no liability for
injury can be based upon dangers
which are obvious, reasonably appar-
ent, or as well known to the party in-
jured as to the owner. See Hejduk v.
Snyder, 76 Okla. 74, 183 P. 923; City of
Tulsa v. Harman, 148 Okla. 117, 299
P. 462; E. S. Billington Lumber Co. v.
Cheatham, 181 Okla. 402, 74 P. 2d 120,
and cases therein cited.

The principle upon which defendant’s
argument is based, as reflected in the
cited cases, is stated in 65 C.J.S., Neg-
ligence, $50, as follows:

«“# * ® However, the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk as applicable in the
law of master and servant, discussed
in Master and Servant, sec. 357, does
not apply between inviter and invitee.

“The basis of the inviter’s liability
for injuries sustained by the invitee on
the premises rests on the owner’s su-
perior knowledge of the danger, and as
a general rule he is not liable for an
injury-to an invitee resulting from a
danger which was obvious or should
have been observed by the invitee in
the exercise of reasonable care, or from
a condition which was as well known
or as obvious to the invitee as to the in-
viter, or which the inviter had no rea-
son to believe would not be discovered
by the invitee. * * *”

That such is a correct statement is
unquestioned. However, it was pleaded,
and the evidence tended to show, that
the stove was in a defective condition
and constituted a danger to invitees
upon the premises; that defendant,
through his agents and employees ©
knew, or should have known of this
condition; that it was not a danger that
was apparent or obvious, nor was there
evidence showing plaintiff could have
observed such danger by use of ordi-
nary care. In such cases the rule con-
tended for by defendant has no appli-
cation. In S. H. Kress & Co. v. Maddox,
201 Okla. 190, 203 P. 2d 706, we
pointed out that knowledge and ap-
preciation of the danger is an essential
element of the doctrine of assumption
of risk; that such doctrine does not ap-
ply unless the party alleged to have as-
sumed such risk is found to have known
of, or can be charged with, knowledge
of the risk. Also, see 38 Am, Jur., Neg-
ligence, §173. Where the facts are such
that the minds of reasonable men might
differ, the existence of negligence and
question of proximate cause are for the
trier of the facts. See Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Gray, 204 Okla. 362, 230 P.
2d 256. The trial court was correct in
overruling defendant’s demurrer to
plaintiff's evidence.

The third contention is that the trial
court erred in refusing to dismiss plain-
tiff’s action upon defendant’s motion,
based upon the contention plaintiff was

ee 83

not the real party in interest, having
no interest in the judgment rendered
in her favor.

At the trial defendant interrogated
plaintiff concerning repair of the fur
coat and payment for such repairs, and
then asked plaintiff directly whether
she had any interest in the judgment.
The trial court sustained plaintiff's ob-
jection to such questioning, made upon
the grounds this issue had not been
raised by the pleadings. Defendant then
made an offer of proof to the effect
that, although suit had been brought
in plaintiff’s name, she had been reim-
bursed for the expense of the repairs
and had no interest therein, Plaintiff's
attorney then offered to prove plaintiff
was the real party in interest, stating
that she had a loan receipt frem her
insurance company. Both parties sub-
mit argument in behalf of their re-
spective positions. Defendant insists
plaintiff was not the real party in in-
terest under the provisions of 12 O.S.
1951 §221, requiring that every action
must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. Plaintiff's argu-
ment is directed toward upholding the
validity of the “loan receipt” from her
insurer as being a legal arrangement
whereby she received payment for the
repairs to her coat as a “loan” only
and not as a settlement of her claim for
damages.

This issue was not raised by the
pleadings. Upon defendant’s offer the
trial court sustained plaintiff's objec-
tion that the motion should have been
made upon a motion directed at the
pleadings and that such offer came too
late. In view of the record, we are of
the opinion the trial court ruled cor-
rectly upon plaintiff's objection to de-
fendant’s offer of proof and motion to
dismiss. Although both parties attempt
to present the issue here, it seems plain
that this is such an issue as was not
presented under the record and is not
to be considered or determined upon
appeal. Munger v. Elliott et al, 187
Okla. 19, 100 P. 2d 876.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and DAVISON, O’-
NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
concur. JOHNSON, V.C.J., and
WELCH, J., dissent, .

SEBA et al. v. INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DIST. NO. 3, OF

DEWEY COUNTY.
No. 34869. Feb. 10, 1953.
258 P. 2d 559.

84 [|

Wise & Ivester, Sayre, and Ruble &
Ruble, Taloga, for plaintiffs in error.

E. F, Collier, Taloga, for defendant in.
error.

HALLEY, C.J. The parties occupy
reverse positions on appeal from their
positions in the trial court and will be
referred to as they appeared there.

The plaintiff had voted bonds in the
amount of $60,000 with which to pay for
the construction of a gymnasium build~
ing in the school district. The school
was located on block 29 in the town of
Leedey, and the defendants owned all
of block 28, which was immediately
north of block 29. The school district
owned other tracts of land in the town,
but the property of defendants was on
the main residential thoroughfare and
directly across the street from the
school building, and offered advantages
for a location for the gymnasium in the
way of easy access by automobiles and
pedestrians. The school board attempt-
ed to purchase from the defendants a
portion of block 28, but the defendants
refused to sell, and the school board
thereupon commenced this action for
condemnation.

Appraisers were duly appointed and
the proper procedure had for the con-
demnation of a certain tract of land in
the south half of block 28. The ap-
praisers made the appraisement, fixing
the value of the property at $2,750,
and this amount was paid into court
and the property was taken over by the
school district and a gymnasium con-
structed. The defendants filed no appli-
cation for a jury trial, but they did file
objections to taking the property, charg-
ing that the property was being taken
for arbitrary and spiteful reasons and

that the school board did not have the
funds with which to purchase the prop-
erty but had to borrow it on the mem-
bers’ own personal note from the First
National Bank of Leedey, and that the
plaintiff had other property on which
the gymnasium could have been
erected.

A trial was had on the objections
filed by defendants. The defendants as-
sumed the burden of proof—whether by
order of the court or by their own voli-
tion does not appear in the record. How-
ever, it was said in the journal entry
of judgment that the burden of proof
was placed upon the defendants by the
trial court. In view of the facts in this
case, we do not consider that it was
error for the trial court, if it did, to re~
quire defendants to assume the burden.
The school board was acquiring a site
for a gymnasium which would be an im-
portant part of the school program and.
which would be close to the main school
building. This was a place where bas-
ketball games and public meetings
would be held, and for that reason its
accessibility, both to the public and to
the students, was a major considera-
tion. In their objection to the taking of
the property the defendants questioned
the right of the plaintiffs to exercise
eminent domain. The school board
thought the property condemned was
needed for school purposes and no evi-
dence was offered to the effect that
their judgment on this question was
not sound. See 29 C.J.S. Eminent Do-
main, sec. 269.

We held in Fischer v. Oklahoma City,
198 Okla. 22, 174 P. 2d 244, that when
a city undertakes to take a fee-simple
title to real estate by eminent domain
the owner may offer legal objections
thereto with respect to the need for the
taking and the nature of the estate
taken, but if the owner did not offer
these objections he waives them. No
showing was made in the case at bar
that the school board did not need this
property or that it did not have the
right to take it by eminent domain.

In Wilkerson v. Grand River Dam Au~
thority, 195 Okla. 678, 161 P. 2d 745, we

Ee

held that where defendant landowner
assumed the burden of proof in the
trial court, he could not complain of
the court’s instruction that the burden
was upon him to make out his case by a
fair preponderance of the evidence. The

record in the case at bar shows no pro- *

test on the part of defendants to the
requirement that they assume the bur-
den of proof. We have held that im-
properly placing the burden of proof on
one party, in a case tried to the court,
did not constitute reversible error. Met-
ropolitan Casualty Co. v. Dolese Bros.
Co., 163 Okla. 36, 20 P. 2d 569; Austin,
Adm’r, v. Evans et al. 132 Okla. 238,
270 P. 26. See, also, 12 O.S. 1951 §78.

The defendants complain also that
there was no evidence offered by plain-
tiff to show the necessity for taking any
property of the defendants, or of ren-
dering the judgment approving the tak-
ing of all the land. The land that was
taken for the site of the gymnasium
appears from the record to be as fol-
lows:

Beginning at the Southwest corner of
Block 28 of the Town of Leedey, Okla-
homa; thence north a distance of 125
feet, thence east a distance of 130 feet,
thence south a distance of 25 feet,
thence in an easterly direction to the
east side of said block, thence south
100 feet, thence west to place of begin-
ning, according to the recorded plat of
the town of Leedey, Oklahoma.

From the description of the land
taken for the gymnasium, this was not
too- much ground for such a building
when modern conditions and the popu-
larity of athletics among high school
students are considered. The ordinary
rule in condemnation cases is that while
the particular property sought to be
condemned must be necessary for the
proposed project, the condemnor’s de~
cision as to the necessity for taking
particular property will not be dis-
turbed in the absence of fraud, bad
faith, or abuse of discretion. 29 C.J.S.
Eminent Domain, §90. Under certain
circumstances, we have held that this
was to be a judicial question where land
is being condemned in excess of that

actually needed to accomplish the pur-
pose for which condemned. This was
true in Grand River Dam Authority v.
‘Thompson, 189 Okla. 89, 113 P. 2d 818.
Tn that case, the Grand River Dam Au-
thority was attempting to take land that
was above the high-water mark re-
quired for the purposes of the project,
and we held that under those circum-
stances it became a judicial question as
to whether or not the land could be
taken, The evidence of defendants
failed to show any spite, prejudice, or
improper conduct on the part of the
school board in its efforts to acquire
the tract in question for the site of the
gymnasium. .

The defendants did not argue their
proposition that the condemnation was
illegal because the school board had no
funds with which to pay for the prop-
erty. However, we have held in several
instances that the landowner cannot in-
quire into the source of the money to
pay for the land, and all that is re-
quired is that just compensation be
made. Bilby v. District Court of Ninth
Judicial District, 159 Okla. 268, “15 P.
2d 38.

The evidence of the defendants whol-
ly failed to show any reason why the
condemnation was improper, and the
judgment of the trial court in sustain-
ing the demurrer to the evidence was
correct.

Judgment affirmed.

SOUTHWESTERN GAS & ELEC. CO.
v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION.
No. 34143. Feb. 10, 1953,

253 P. 2d 549,

86 [|

Richard L. Arnold and Arnold & Ar-

nold, Texarkana, Ark., and Lee B.
Thompson and McInnis, Thompson &
Sullivan, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff
in error.

R. F. Barry, W. F. Speakman, and
E. J. Armstrong, Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. The Southwestern
Gas & Electric Company, hereinafter
referred to as “protestant”, appealed
from an order of the Oklahoma Tax
Commission, hereinafter referred to as
“Commission”, assessing income taxes
against protestant for the years 1944 to
1947, inclusive, in the amounts set forth
in the body of this opinion.

The written stipulation of the parties
sets out the facts involved as follows:

The protestant is a Delaware corpora-
tion with its principal office in Shreve-
port, Louisiana, and is domesticated un-
der the laws of Oklahoma and au-
thorized to do business therein.

In 1941 and 1942 protestant built an
electric transmission line from Ash-
down, Arkansas, to Weleetka, Okla-

hhoma, 164 miles in length, of which 137
miles thereof is in Oklahoma and which
the protestant operates and maintains.
Maintenance and replacement work
on the line for the most part is done by
independent contractors, but on occa-
sions and in times of emergency pro-
testant sends ‘its employees into this
state to make repairs or patrol the
line.

The protestant operated and main-
tained an inter-connected system of
power generating plants, transmission
lines and distributing systems for the
generation and transmission of electric
current which was sold at wholesale
and retail outside of Oklahoma. It pur-
chased from the Public Service Com-
pany of Oklahoma at Weleetka, Okla-
homa, electric current which was trans-
mitted over its transmission line for
sale at wholesale and retail in Ar-
kansas, Louisiana and Texas. All cur-
rent transmitted over the Oklahoma
line was purchased from said Public
Service Company. From the sale of cur-
rent in said states the defendant re-
ceived during the period in controversy
net income in excess of $15,000,000. It
generated no electricity and made no
sales of current in Oklahoma and di-
rectly captured no income in said state.

Protestant filed an income tax re-
turn for each of the years involved
herein with the Commission and therein
showed a net loss for each year in ex-
cess of $50,000. The Commission de-
clined to accept the returns as filed and
proposed the assessment of income
taxes for each year, which assessments
were based upon net income as allo-
cated to the property and operations
of protestant in Oklahoma pursuant to
formula set out in §878, Title 68 O.S.
1951 (Oklahoma Income Tax Laws
1935), which formula was the average
ratio of three separate factors con-
sisting of property, expense and sales
in Oklahoma to property, expense and
sales everywhere. The pertinent figures
involved in the assessments made by
order of the Commission and appealed
from herein are these:

8

“Year Loss shown Net Income Allocated to Okla. Tax on
in return shown in Okla. by allocated net
return Comm. income
“1944 $55,961.79 ° $3,963,930.65 $29,769.84 $ 758.26
1945 52,422.63 3,747,270.08 32,550.55 858.59
1946 53,200.69 3,593,027.88 45,709.36 1,676.62
1947 54,047.02 3,989,097.72 22,826.96 563.84”

The only property that protestant
owned in Oklahoma was the 137 miles
of transmission line and the current
transmitted over same. It had no em-
ployees, officials or directors residing
in Oklahoma, and did no banking busi-
ness in Oklahoma.

Protestant paid general ad valorem
taxes on its transmission line and cor-
porate license taxes imposed on the
value of its capital that was here
used, invested and employed for years
in question.

Monthly bills for current purchases
of electric current from the Public Serv-
ice Company of Oklahoma were mailed
to protestant’s office in Shreveport,
Louisiana, and checks in payment
thereof were mailed from that city to
the Tulsa, Oklahoma, office of the Pub-
lic Service Company of Oklahoma.

Tt was stipulated that if protestant
owed income taxes that it was in the
amount assessed as above set out.

The above assessments were pro-
tested by protestant on the theory that
its business in Oklahoma was wholly
interstate in character; that it, did no
intrastate business and captured no
gross income in Oklahoma and for such
reason the imposition of net income
taxes would violate the Commerce
Clause and the Due Process Clause of
the Federal Constitution.

The business conducted by protest-
ant is obviously unitary in character,
which fact is not questioned by pro-
testant. See definition of unitary busi-
ness, 43 W. & P. Perm. 256, Fleming
v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, (C.C.A.
Okla.) 157 F. 2d 888, Cert. denied, 329
US. 812, 91 L. Ed. 693, 67 S.C. 634. In
view of the character of the business
and the fact that net income accrued

to the business as a whole, the right
of Oklahoma as a state of the situs of
a unit of the business, to allocate and
assign to itself that portion of protest-
ant’s net income which is reasonably
attributable to protestant’s property
owned in this state and “process con~
ducted” within its borders would or-
dinarily be conceded as being free from
doubt. Underwood Tpyewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113.

The pertinent portion of the levying,
§876 (a), Title 68 O.S. 1951, reads as
follows:

“(a) A tax is hereby levied upon
every person as defined in Section 874,
which tax shall be collected and paid,
for each taxable year, upon, and with
respect to, the entire net income of
such person, which is derived from all
property owned and/or business trans-
acted within this State. And a like tax
is hereby levied upon every person as
defined in Section 874 (b) which tax
shall be collected and paid, for each
taxable year, upon, and with respect to,
the entire net income of such person
which is derived from all property
owned partly within and partly without
this state and/or business done partly
within and partly without this State
(commonly known as interstate busi-
ness) such income derived from prop-
erty owned partly within and partly
without this State and/or business
transacted partly within and partly
without this State, upon which said tax
is hereby levied, to be determined or
allocated under the formula or formulae
as provided in Section 878”. (Emphasis.
ours.)

The statute treating with allocating
income, §878 (g), Title 68 O.S. 1951,
which is referred to in the above quota-
tion, authorizes the use of such a for-
mula as was here used. The protestant
in effect concedes such is true for, as
has been indicated, it is stipulated that

88 a

if it owes any tax it was that produced
through an application of the formula.

Section 874 (0), Title 68 O.S. 1951,
reads as follows:

“The terms ‘transacting business’
and ‘business transacted’ are used here-
in in their broadest sense. Such terms
are hereby declared to include the per-
formance of any act or the carrying on
of any activity, either by the principal,
agents or any representatives resulting
in income to the person, as defined in
subsection (b) of this Section, perform-
ing such act or carrying on such ac-
tivity (whether such act or carrying on
of any activity results in income direct-
ly or in conjunction with ‘other acts or
activities in part within and in part
without Oklahoma). The: performance
of such an act or the carrying on of
such an activity shall, within itself, be
sufficient to constitute ‘transacting
business’ or ‘business transacted’.”

In view of the principles of law laid
down in the above~-cited decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and the
wording of the quoted and cited stat-
utes, supra, protestant’s position can
only be said to have merit if it is
based solely on protestant’s contention
to the effect that the absence of local
or intrastate business (other than its
domestication owning, operating and
maintaining its electrical transmission
line in this state) and the absence of
the direct capturing of income within
this state serves to distinguish this case
from those which we have cited.

The protestant, during the years in
controversy, was qualified to do busi-
ness in Oklahoma entitling it to the
protection and benefits conferred un-
der its laws as a domesticated foreign
corporate unitary business and it car-
ried on in this state a substantial part
of its ordinary business of owning trans-
mission lines and transmitting electric
current for sale at wholesale and retail.
The value of that portion of its line in
Oklahoma was approximately $800,000,
and while the value of the electric cur-
rent transmitted in Oklahoma is not
shown, it must be assumed that the
value thereof was fairly substantial.

In view of the facts, the protestant
must be held to have been doing busi-
ness here. In 20 C.J.S, Corporations,
§1829, p. 46, the following rule is
stated: ‘

“The general rule is that, when a
foreign corporation trahsacts some sub-
stantial part of its ordinary business in
a state, continuous in character, it is
doing, transacting, carrying on, or en-
gaging in business therein, within the
meaning of the statutes under consid-
eration,”

If one is engaged exclusively in inter-
state commerce he is still doing busi-
ness. Fletcher on Corporations, vol. 18
(Perm. Ed.) §8804, p. 691, reads as fol-
lows:

“« * * But a corporation cannot be
engaged in the state in interstate com-
merce, it seems, without also ‘doing
business’ in the state * * *”

See, also, 23 Am. Jur., Foreign Cor-
porations, §377, p. 371.

The United States Supreme Court has
not predicated a state’s right to allo-
cate and tax the net income of a uni-
tary business on the doing of local or
intrastate business within the taxing
state. In Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315
U.S. 501, the court quotes from Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
254 U.S. 113, as follows:

“* * * that a State in attempting to
place upon a business extending into
several States ‘its fair share of the bur-
den of taxation’ is ‘faced with the im-
possibility of allocating specifically the
profits earned by the processes con-
ducted within its borders.” (315 U.S.
p. 507.)

In International Harvester Co. v. Wis-
consin Department of Taxation, 322 U.
S. 435, 441, the court said:

“* * * A state may tax such part of
the income of a non-resident as is fairly
attributable either to property located
in the state or to events or transactions
which occurring there are within
the protection of the state, and entitled
to the numerous other benefits which it
confers. Compare Schaffer v. Carter, su-
pra, and Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.

| 89

Co., 252 U.S. 60, 40 S. Ct, 228, 64 L. Ed.
460, and People of State of New York
ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308,
57 S. Ct. 466, 81 L. Ed. 666, 108 A.L.R.
721, And the privilege of receiving
dividends derived from corporate activ-
ities within the state can have no great-
er immunity than the privilege of re-
ceiving any other income from sources
located there.” (Emphasis ours.)

In‘sec. 874 (0), supra, it is provided
that “the performing of any act or the
earrying on of any activity” and
“whether such act or * * * activity re-
sults in income directly or in conjunc-
tion with other acts or activities in
part within and in part without Okla-
homa,” constitutes “transacting busi-
ness”, Under this broad and compre-
hensive language, protestant was trans-
acting business within the purview of
that statute, and, as has been indicated,
the Commerce Clause is not held to
prohibit the imposition of a net income
tax on net income accruing therefrom.
This court recognized that sueh was the
law in Rock Island Refining Co. v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission, 194 Okla.
349, 147 P. 2d 1000, where we said:

“Net income derived from local sales
of products to be transported to the
purchasers. in interstate commerce
constitutes net income derived from
business transacted within this state,
within the meaning of the Oklahoma
Income Tax Law of 1935, art. 6, ch. 66,
S.L. 1935, 68 O.S. 1941, sec. 871 et seq.,
and is subject to taxation thereunder.”

The protestant insists, however, that
the taxing of net income accruing
wholly from interstate commerce is pro-
hibited by the Commerce Clause and
the Due Process Clause of the Consti-
tution of the United States. In this con-
nection, the protestant contends that it
was engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce and asserts that Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S.
165, sustains its contention. In that case
it was held that the transmission of
electric current from Idaho where gen-
erated to another state constituted in-
terstate commerce, but the court also
held that the matter of generating the
current so transmitted was a local in-

cident that sustained the license tax
levied by Idaho that was there involved.
On the other hand, the Commission
contends that just as the generating of
current in Idaho was held to be a local
incident, the systematic and continuous
purchase of electric current and the
taking locally thereof followed by
transmission over the line that pro-
testant built, operates and maintains in
Oklahoma for such purposes is likewise
a local incident. As sustaining its argu-
ment the Commission cites the anno-
tated notes beginning at page 1447 of
12 A.L.R. (2); Memphis National Gas
Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80; Nippert v.
City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 426, and
other cases. The Commission contends
that cases determining what consti-
tutes “doing business” for jurisdictional
purposes apply to tax cases, citing 23
Am. Jur., Foreign Corporations, §362.
p. 339.

In our opinion, it is unnecessary to
decide whether the protestant was en-
gaged in both intrastate and interstate
business because the transaction of in-
trastate business is not by the author-
ities considered to be a condition pre-
cedent to the imposition of a net in-
come tax. We do wish, however, to em-
phasize and point out that the United
States Supreme Court is at present
committed to the proposition that those
engaged in interstate commerce should
assume “their just share of state tax
burdens”, McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co.. 309 U.S. 33,
at page 46.

In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Co., supra, the court said:

_ “* * * A tax may be levied on net
income wholly derived from interstate
commerce * * *,”

In Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Bee-
ler, 315 U.S. 649, 656, it was said:

“In any case even if taxpayer’s busi-
ness were wholly interstate commerce,
a nondiscriminatory tax by Tennessee
upon the net income of a foreign cor-
poration having a commercial domi-
cile there (citing cases), is not pro-
hibited by the commerce clause on

90 |

which alone taxpayer relies. United
States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S.
321, * * *.” (Emphasis ours.)

In West Publishing Co. v. McColgan,
27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P, 2d 861, 864, the
court had this to say:

«# # * ‘But it was not the purpose of
the commerce clause to relieve those
engaged in interstate commerce of
their just share of state tax burdens,
merely because an incidental or conse-
quential effect of the taxis an increase
in the cost of doing business. * * * A
tax may be levied on net income wholly
derived from interstate commerce,’
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46, 60 S. Ct.
388, 392, 84 L. Ed. 565, 128 A.L.R. 876.

“State power to impose a tax on net
income wholly derived from interstate
commerce was recently reaffirmed in
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler,
315 U.S. 649, 656, 62 S. Ct. 857, 86 L. Ed.
1090; see, also, International Harvester
Co. v, Wisconsin, 322 U.S. 435, 442, 64
S. Ct. 1060, 88 L. Ed. 1373. Such power
is so well recognized that appeals ques-
tioning it are dismissed by the United
States Supreme Court for want of a sub-
stantial federal question. Memphis Nat-
ural Gas Co. v. State Tax Comm., 323
US. 682, 65 S. Ct. 440; Id., Miss., 19
So. 2d 477; Parke Davis & Co. v. Cook,
323 U.S. 681, 65 S. Ct. 436; Id., 198 Ga.
457, 31 S.E, 2d 728, 156 A.L.R. 1360
(Emphasis ours.)

West Publishing Company perfected
an appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and the opinion of
that court, which is reported in 328 U.S.
823, reads as follows:

“June 10, 1946. Per Curiam. The
motion to affirm is granted and the
judgment is affirmed. United States
Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247
U.S. 321, 38 S. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135,
Ann. Cas. 1918E, 748; Interstate Busses
Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245,
48 S. Ct. 230, 72 L. Ed. 551; Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler. 315 U.S.
649, 656, 62 S. Ct. 857, 862, 86 L. Ed.
1090; International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154.”
(Emphasis ours.)

See, also, State Tax Commission v.
Memphis Natural Gas Co., 197 Miss.

583, 19 So. 2d 477, Per Curiam opinion
on appeal, 323 U.S. 682.

The fact that protestant captured no
gross income within this state is with-
out significance under the authorities.
The income taxed in the instant case
is held to be that which was in fact
earned here because reasonably attrib-
utable to protestant’s Oklahoma prop-
erty and its unitary business processes
conducted within this state. In Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
supra, 254 U.S, 113, 121, the court said:

«% * * Tt, therefore, adopted a meth-
od of apportionment, which for all that
appears in this record, reached, and
was meant to reach, only the profits
earned within the state * * *.”

The substance of the above-quoted
rule is found in Butler Bros. v. Mc-
Colgan, 315 U.S. 501, 506, where it is
said:

“We take a different view. We read
the statute as calling for a method of
allocation which is ‘fairly calculated’
to assign to California that portion of
the net income ‘reasonably attributable’
to the business done there. * * *.”

The annotator’s introduction to his
annotated notes appearing at pp. 1375
to 1377 of 156 A.L.R. reads:

“A state may impose on foreign cor-
poration doing business therein an in-
come tax on earnings derived from or
attributable to their activities, business,
or property within the state” (Em-
phasis ours.)

In Humble Pipe Line Co. v. State,
45 NLM. 29, 109 P. 2d 247, 250, the Su-
preme Court of New Mexico rejected
the contention that protestant makes
here and the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia did likewise in State Revenue Com-
mission v. Edgar Bros. Co. 185 Ga.
216, 194 S.E. 505, appeal dismissed, 303
USS, 626,

As pointed out in Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266
U.S. 271, and Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 151 Kan. 159,
98 P. 2d 143, the situs of a sale does not

ee

necessarily fix and determine the
source from which net income is de-
rived.

In view of the above authorities, and
as already indicated, the transaction
of local or intrastate business or the
capturing of gross income within this
state was not a condition precedent
to imposing a tax on protestant’s net
income.

Protestant now complains of the for-
mula used, which complaint appears to
be that the factors of the formula are
such that under certain assumed con-
ditions its Oklahoma net income could
be distorted but it makes no charge
that such is true of the years in con-
troversy. The protestant stipulated that
if it owes any income tax to the State
of Oklahoma for the years in contro-
versy, its income tax liability is in the
amount assessed, and in so stipulating
it must be held to have agreed that
the formula used did not allocate and
apportion to this state a disproportion-
ate part of its net income. It did not,
however, in so stipulating, agree that
it was, in fact, subject to an income
tax. But, if protestant was of the opin-
ion that the formula used distorted its
allocable net income, it should have
submitied a formula to the Commis-
sion that it believed would fairly do so.
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, supra; Flem-
ing v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
supra. .

In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Okla-
homa Tax Commission, 190 Okla. 172,
175, 121 P. 2d’ 1008, the right of a state
to allocate to itself a portion of the net
income of a unitary business is recog-
nized:

“By a system of indirect allocation
the income of a corporation operating
as a unit in interstate commerce may
be apportioned for tax purposes among
the states contributing to the facilities
and transactions from which the income
arose. Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 65 L. Ed.
165. This may be done by a percentage
or ratio method as defined in our stat-
ute * * #9

which right is at present well estab-
lished. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, su-
pra, and 27 Am. Jur., Foreign Corpora-
tions, §193, p. 416; Fleming v. Okla~
homa Tax Commission, supra.

The cases relied upon by protestant
are readily distinguishable from the in-
stant case. For instance, Curlee Cloth-
ing Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
180 Okla. 116, 68 P. 2d 834, was a case
involving income taxes. Curlee was a
foreign corporation that was not quali-
fied to do business in Oklahoma (it as-
serted that, for such reason, under the
facts there presented, Oklahoma did
not have jurisdiction of its person)
and owned no property within the state,
and, therefore, there was no reason for
it to share the state’s tax burden. Its
activities in Oklahoma were limited to
soliciting orders for the merchandise
that it sold, which orders were ac-
cepted outside this state and upon the
order being accepted, the merchandise
was shipped from outside this state.
The facts presented in Ozark Pipe Line
Co. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, and the
other cases involving a license tax are
not comparable to those of the instant
case, and as pointed out in West Pub-
lishing Co. v. McColgan, supra, the
United States Supreme Court distin-
guishes “between a tax which is levied
for the privilege of engaging in inter-
state commerce and a tax which is lev-
ied upon the net income from such
commerce,” and holds that net income
tax does not conflict with the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution of the
United States.

Protestant’s contention that the ac-
tion of the State of Oklahoma in levy-
ing an income tax on the net income
violates the Due Process Clause is with-
out merit. There is nothing in the rec-
ord upon which protestant may base
its argument that its property rights
have been taken away without due
process of law. The taxing power exert-
ed by the State of Oklahoma bears fiscal
relation to the protection, opportunities
and benefits given protestant by the
state. Obviously, the substantial privi-
lege of carrying on a substantial por-

92 Le

tion of its unitary business in Okla-
hhoma clearly supports the tax. State
of Wisconsin, v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
U.S. 435. The language used therein
is apropos in the case at bar and we
quote:

“The constitution is not a formulary.
It does not demand of states strict
observance of rigid categories nor pre-
cision of technical phrasing in their ex-
ercise of the most basic power of gov-
ernment, that of taxation. For constitu-
tional purposes the decisive issue turns
on the operating incidence of a chal-
lenged tax. A state is free to pursue
its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed
by the Constitution, if by the practical
operation of a tax the state has exerted
its power in relation to opportunities
which it has given, to protection which
it has afforded, to benefits which it has
conferred by the fact of being an or-
derly, civilized society.

“Constitutional provisions are often
so glossed over with commentary that
imperceptibly we tend to construe the
commentary rather than the text. We
cannot, however, be too often reminded
that the limits on the otherwise auton-
omous powers of the states are those
in the Constitution and not verbal weap-
ons imported into it. ‘Taxable event’,
‘jurisdiction to tax’, ‘business situs’,
‘extraterritoriality’, are all compendi-
ous ways of implying the impotence of
state power because state power has
nothing on which ‘to operate. These
tags are not instruments of adjudica-
tion but statements of result in apply-
ing the sole constitutional test for a
case like the present one. That test is
whether property was taken without
due process of law, or, if paraphrase
we must, whether the taxing power
exerted by the state bears fiscal rela-
tion to protection, opportunities and
benefits given by the state. The simple
but controlling question is whether the
state has given anything for which it
can ask return. The substantial privi-
lege of carrying on business in Wis-
consin, which has here been given,
clearly supports the tax, and the state
has not given the less merely because
it has conditioned the demand of the
exaction upon happenings outside its
own borders. The fact that a tax is con-
tingent upon events brought to pass

without a state does not destroy the
nexus between such a tax and transac-
tions within a state for which the tax
is an exaction.”

For the reasons stated, we are of the
opinion that the order of the Tax Com-
mission was correct. Therefore, the or-
der is sustained.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., con-
cur. DAVISON, ARNOLD, and O’NEAL,
JJ., dissent.

CLANTON v. OKLAHOMA TAX
COMMISSION.

No. 35208. 27, 1953.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 17,
253 P. 2d 562.

Jan.
1953.

Bledsoe, Nicklas & Chrisman, Law-
ton, for plaintiff in error.

R. F. Barry, W. F. Speakman, and
E. J. Armstrong, Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error.

| 93

HALLEY, C. J. This is an appeal
by E. B. Clanton from an order of the
Oklahoma Tax Commission assessing
additional income taxes against him for
the year 1946.

E. B. Clanton and Irene Clanton were
married in 1912 and have since resided
in Oklahoma as husband and wife. In
1920, E. B. Clanton and others began
to operate a truck transportation busi-
ness. In 1938 the business was incor-
porated as “Southwestern Motor Car-
riers Company.” An undisclosed num-
ber of shares of stock were issued to
E. B. Clanton as his share of the for-
mer partnership. He acquired other
shares and on July 26, 1945, he owned
183% shares which had cost him $18,375,

On February 15, 1946, he sold all of
his stock for $150,000. This was a cap-
ital gain of $131,625. This gain was re-
ported as community income on his
and Irene Clanton’s 1946 income tax re-
return in equal shares.

The Commission treated this increase
in the value of the stock as separate
income of E. B. Clanton and levied an
additional tax of $270.02, after giving
E. B. Clanton credit for the tax paid
by his wife on one-half of his income
from the sale of stock.

E. B. Clanton and wife did not elect
to come under the 1939 Community
Property Act. The 1945 Community
Property Act became effective July 26,
1945. It required no election and E. B.
Clanton held his stock some seven
months after the 1945 Act became ef-
fective. Sec. 1 of the 1945 Act is as
follows:

“All property of the husband, both
real and personal, owned or claimed
by him before marriage, or before the
effective date of this Act, whichever
is later, and that acquired afterwards
by gift, devise, or descent, or received
as compensation for personal injuries,
shall be his separate property.”

Sec, 3 provides that:

“All property acquired by either the
husband or wife during marriage and
after the effective date of this Act, ex-

cept thal which is the separate prop-
erty of either as hereinbefore defined,
shall be deemed the community or com-
mon property of the husband and wife
and each shall be vested with an un-
divided one-half interest therein * * *.”

The stock involved here was acquired
by E. B. Clanton and paid for during
the time when Irene Clanton was his
wife. It is admitted that she did cer-
tain work and operated a boarding
house at some time during their mar-
riage. There is no showing that Irene
Clanton contributed any of her earn-
ings to the purchase or increase in the
value of the stock. It appears to have
stood in his name at all times and it
must have been “owned or claimed” by
him on the effective date of the 1945
Act.

There is no showing as to when or
why the stock increased in value. It
may or may not have increased in
value between July 26, 1945, when the
1945 Act became effective and the date
of sale, February 15, 1946. It is shown
that it was all purchased more than
two years prior to the date of sale.

E. B. Clanton contends that (1) capi-
tal gain is income; (2) that income is
property, and (3) that increase or capi- |
tal gain acquired from the sale or ex-
change of separate property is common
or community property.

The Commission admits that capital
gain is income and that income is prop-
erty. The sole question remaining is
whether or not capital gain acquired
from the sale or exchange of separate
property is community property or sep-
arate property.

In 1941, while the 1939 Community
Property Act was in effect, this court
decided the case of Harmon y. Okla-
homa Tax Commission, 189 Okla. 475,
118 P. 2d 205. Harmon and wife had
elected to come under that Act and the
increase in value, or capital gain, on
a nonproducing oil and gas lease ac-
quired by Harmon with separate funds
was held to be his separate property

94 es

for income tax purposes. In the second
syllabus, it was said:

“Where a profit is realized from the
sale of a nonproducing oil and gas lease
made subsequent to the effective date
of election to come under the terms
of Community Property Act, supra,
which lease, prior to said date, was
the separate property of the husband,
said profit is properly taxed as sep-
arate income of the husband.”

The 1939 Community Property Act
provided that “all property, both real
and personal, of the husband owned or
claimed by him before the effective
date of the election to come under the
terms of the Act***, also, the increase
of all lands thus owned or acquired,
shall be his separate properties.” It
makes a similar provision for the wife
and states that property which is not
the separate property of either shall be
deemed community or common prop-
erty of the husband and wife.

In Schwartz v. McDaniel, 202 Okla,
324, 213 P. 2d 568, this court had under
consideration the 1945 Act and stated
in the fourth syllabus, as follows:

“Under the Community Property Act,
Title 32, chap. 1, sections 1 and 2, S.L.
1945, the property of either husband
or wife owned or claimed by them
prior to the effective date of the Act
remained, upon the adoption of the
Act, their separate property although
acquired after marriage.”

In Scofield v. Weiss, 5 Cir., 131 Fed.
2d 631, the taxpayer claimed that
under the laws of Texas a gain re-
ceived from the sale of corporate stock
was community property. It was there
said:

“*#*Tt seems to be conceded, but if
not, it is well settled that an original
issue of corporate stock, which was
separate property when issued to the
husband, retains its separate character,
no matter how much it increases in
value as a result of surplus accumu-
lated out of the earnings of the cor-
poration, Commissioner v. Skaggs, 5
Cir., 122 F. 2d 721; O'Conner v. Com-
missioner, 5 Cir., 110 F. 2d 652. And

this is so, though the increased value
is largely due to the efforts and ac-
tivities of the husband is managing
officer of the corporation, Beals v. Fon-
tenot, 5 Cir., 111 F. 2d 956***.”

In Beals v. Fontenot, supra, the com-
munity property laws of Louisiana were
under consideration and it was held
that the community was not entitled to
share in the increase in the value of
corporate stock which was the separate
property of the husband because such
increase was due to the efforts of the
corporation and not to the joint ef-
forts of the husband and wife.

In 11 Am. Jur. sec, 26, p. 190, the
general rule is stated as follows:

«#**Generally in this country, prop-
erty of a husband or wife need not, in
order to maintain its character as such,
be preserved in specie or in kind; sep-
arate property remains such through all
its mutations and changes so long as
it can be clearly and indisputably traced
and identified***.”

Again, on page 187, sec. 20 of 11 Am.
Jur. it is said:

“The status of property, as separate
or community property, is fixed as of
the time when it is acquired. The word
‘acquired’ contemplates the inception
of title***.”

E. B. Clanton contends that the capi-
tal gain sought to be held community
property was all “acquired” during the
time the 1945 Act was in effect. We do
not agree with this contention. It is true
that the capital gain came into his
possession during that time, but the
word “acquired” has been held to mean
the inception of title, as above stated.

In Wrightsman v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 111 Fed. 2d 227, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the 5th
Circuit construed the word “acquired”
as used in the Texas Community Prop-
erty Law. It seems that Wrightsman
was voted a salary of $50,000 for 1936
for managing the Wrightsman Oil Com-
pany. He had been in Texas only
eight days at the time. The court held:

es 95

“Petitioner and his wife keep their
books, and their tax returns are made
on the cash receipts and disbursements
basis. In the separate income tax re-
turns each filed for 1936, a salary of
$50,000.00 for that year voted to pe-
titioner as president of the Wrightsman
Oil Company, on December 30, 1936,
was treated as community property,
each reporting % of it as his income.
The question for decision here is when,
under the laws of Texas, where pe-
titioner and his wife were on Decem-
ber 30th, residing, the salary was ‘ac-
quired... Was it ‘acquired’ on the day
it was voted to him and therefore, as
claimed by them, community property,
or was it, as found by the Commis-
sioner and the Board, earlier ‘acquired’
while petitioner was still resident in
Oklahoma and therefore all of it his
separate property, except 8/365, that
part of it earned in the eight days after
the Wrightsman moved to Texas?”

“(1,2) It is settled law in Texas that
as used in the statute (Vernon’s Ann.
Civ. St., art. 4619), ‘acquired’ refers to
the origin or inception of the right or
title, rather than the completion or
ripening of it. Speer, Law of Marital
Rights in Texas, 3rd Ed. Page 524,
Sec. 438***.”

And further said, at page 229:

“***Particularly *** may it not be
doubted that under Texas law, he ‘ac-
quired’ it, not when it was voted to him
on December 30th, but as and when,
pursuant to the understanding, he went
about performing the duties and ren-
dering the services he had agreed to
perform and render.”

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Skaggs (5th Cir.) 122 Fed. 2d 721,
the court had under conideration these
facts: L. L. Skaggs married in 1929
and had since resided in Texas. In 1926
he acquired stock in Safeway Stores,
Inc., in lieu of an interest in that busi-
ness prior to incorporation. In 1934 he
sold the stock at a profit and reported
the gain as community income. From
1926 to 1929 Skaggs had served as presi-
dent or director of the corporation. In
the first syllabus, it is said:

“Where taxpayer who was domiciled
in Texas, after his marriage in 1929

disposed of stock of Texas Corporation
in 1934, which he had procured in 1926,
gain realized on sale of stock was tax-
able as taxpayer’s separate income and
not as community income.”

There is no doubt but that the cor-
porate stock involved here was ac~
quired during coverture, but there is
no evidence that the wife of E. B.
Clanton contributed any of her funds
or efforts to its acquisition or performed
any services that contributed directly
to its acquisition or enhancement in
value. E. B. Clanton owned or claimed
the stock when the 1945 Community
Property Act became effective. The in-
crease in the value of the stock is not
shown to have been the result of ef-
forts of the community. It seems more
likely that its increase in value was
the result of improved economic con-
ditions and the efforts of the corporate
entity.

The order of the Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission is supported by competent evi-
dence and is, therefore, affirmed.

JOHNSON, V. C. J., and WELCH,
CORN, ARNOLD, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

PUBLIC SERVICE CO, v. SONA-
GERRA.

No, 84962. Dec. 23, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1953.
258 P. 2a 169.

2
a

Doerner, Rinehart & Stewart, Harry
D. Moreland and Jack E. Campbell;
Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.

David J. Morrison, Oklahoma City,
and C. B. Perdue, Wilburton, for de-
fendant in error.

PER CURIAM. This action was
brought by Maggie Sonagerra, as plain-
tiff, against Public Service Company,
a corporation, as defendant, for dam-
ages for injuries received by the plain-
tiff when she walked into the service
lines of the defendant at night in her
back yard. The parties will be referred
to as they appear in the trial court.

The undisputed evidence discloses
that several years before the injury
complained of, the defendant ran two
service lines from a post in the alley
near the southeast corner of plaintiff’s
lot at an angle across the back part of
plaintiffs lot to the Cuzalinas, who
lived in the house just west of plaintiff's
house. Plaintiff had a clothesline in her
back yard. Defendant’s service lines
ran diagonally across the back part of
plaintiff's lot to the Cuzalina house.
They had a clearance of over ten
feet and crossed above plaintiff's
clothesline at about a 45° angle. As
a result of an unprecedented ice and
sleet storm in the area the weight of the
ice on defendant’s service lines which
ran to the Cuzalina house caused the
lines to sag until they rested on plain-
tiff’s clothesline. These service lines
at the spot where they were resting
on plaintiff’s clothesline were about
chin high. There was also a telephone
Tine across plaintiff's back yard run-
ning from the same post in the alley to
the Cuzalina house. This line had a
lower clearance than defendant’s serv-
ice lines. As a result of the storm this
telephone line had sagged until it was
flat on the ground.

Defendant’s evidence does not dis-
close just when it restored these par-
ticular service lines to their former
condition. Its evidence is that the ice
and sleet storm paralyzed its electric
system in the whole area and that it
was able to repair and restore its lines
and service within the area in from
ten to twelve days after the storm.

Plaintiff testified that these service
lines were not repaired for twelve to
fourteen days after the storm. That it

De | . 97

had been her common practice for more
than 30 years to go to. the back of her
property from five to nine times a day;
that there was a barn on the back of the
lot; that she kept her table scraps for
her son who had a pig and every day
she went out to the barn to take the
scraps to the pig. There was a path
from her house to this barn where the
pig was. That she had walked two or
three times a day from her house to
the barn after the ice storm until the
night of the accident which is the basis
of this action. That she was careful in
going out to the back of her property.
That when she took the garbage to the
pig the night she was injured, the lines
were sagging and were lodged on her
clothesline and that she had to stoop
down to go under these wires in or-
der to take the garbage to the pig.
That at night she used the telephone
wire which was on the ground as a
guide to tell her where the service lines
of defendant were. That on this par-
ticular night, with her hands full of gar-
bage, she lost her way by failing to lo-
cate the telephone line on the ground
which she used as a guide and walked
into the service lines of defendant and
fell and was injured. That she was in-
jured the night of February 5th, but
said nothing about it to the defendant
until the latter part of June.

This ice storm commenced on Janu-
ary 24th and lasted several days. Plain-
tiff complained to defendant about the
service lines being down in her back
yard four or five days before night of
the injury.

The defendant contends (1) that the
evidence does not disclose any negli-
gence on its part in the construction
and maintenance of these service lines
before the storm; (2) that the evidence
does not disclose any negligence on its
part in the repair of these service lines
after the storm; (3) that an unprece-
dented ice and sleet storm, which
amounted to an act of God, was the
sole cause of the sag in defendant’s
service lines and thus the sole cause
of the injury to plaintiff.

The evidence shows that defendant’s
service lines which crossed plaintiff's
lot and served the Cuzalina house were
194 feet in length; that there was no
support for these service lines between
the post in the alley back of plaintiff’s
jot and the Cuzalina house.

We have made a careful examina-
tion of all of the evidence in the record.

This evidence shows that defendant
complied with the provisions of the Na-
tional Electrical Code and the orders
of the Corporation Commission in run-
ning these service lines to the Cuzalina
house. That there is no order or rule
of any kind providing that service lines
shall be of any certain length. That
the safety factor involved in the length
of a service line depends on the nature
of the connections. That if a service
line is run from a post of the de-
fendant company to a substantial build-
ing where it can be securely fastened,
it may run as far as 250 feet in length.
In fact, service lines are all the way
from 50 feet to 250 feet in length. The
service lines to the Cuzalina house,
which passed over plaintiff's lot, were
194 feet long. It is natural that a serv-
ice line 194 feet long will sag more than
one 100 feet long. But these particular
service lines had a clearance in- ex~
cess of ten feet.

There is no evidence in the record
supporting the contention of plaintiff
that extending these service lines for
a distance of 194 feet made them un-
safe. One of the defendant’s employees
did testify that he did not like to run a
service line longer than 160 feet. How-
ever, he did not say that it was unwise
or dangerous to run such a line 194 feet
or that there was any rule of the de-
fendant or regulation of the National
Electrical Code or order of the Corpora-
tion Commission against running serv-
ice lines 194 feet. This testimony is
wholly insufficient to create a conflict
in the evidence with regard to the
safety with which these service lines to
the Cuzalina house were constructed.

The parties stipulated that the ice
and sleet storm was an unprecedented

98 a

storm. Whether an ice storm consti-
tutes an act of God is usually a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. However, in
this case, it was taken from the jury
as a result of this stipulation. This stip-
ulation constitutes this storm an act of
God as a matter of law. Then, too,
plaintiff testified that it was the most
severe ice and sleet ‘storm that had
occurred in Wilburton during the 49
years that she had lived there.

An act of God is such an unprece-
dented storm or flood as will excuse
from liability, provided it is the ap-
proximate cause of the injury as well
as the sole cause of the injury. How-
ever, the defendant is liable if the in-
jury is caused by an act of God, in
connection with which the negligence of
the defendant is a concurring cause, and
the injury would not have occurred ex-
cept for such negligence.

In City of Purcell v. Stubblefield,
41 Okla. 562, 139 P. 290, we said:

“Even if it were admitted that the
wind was unprecedented on that day,
and that there had never been such a
wind as that before, yet, if the accident
was not due entirely to this wind, but
the strong wind in connection with
the negligence of the defendant operated
as an efficient and contributory con-
current cause, then the defendant would
still be liable. The definition of an act
of God, as given by this court, is ‘an act
of God, such as an unprecedented rain-
fall and resulting flood which will ex-
cuse from liability, must not only be the
proximate cause of the loss, but it must
be the sole cause. If, however, the
injury is caused by an act of God, com-
mingled with the negligence of the
defendant, as an efficient and contribu-
tory concurrent cause, and .the injury
would not have occurred except for
such negligence, the defendant will be
liable’ M. K. & T. R. Co, v. Johnson,
34 Okla. 582, 126 P. 567. Applying this
definition to the facts of this case, in
order for this defense to avail the
defendant city, it must be found that
the wind that day was of extraordinary
and unprecedented velocity, and that
this wind was the sole cause of the sign
falling and the resulting injury.”

See, also, Gulf Oil Corporation v.
Lemmons, 198 Okla. 596, 181 P. 2d 568;
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McKone,
36 Okla. 41, 127 P. 488.

As the defendant was not negligent
in the construction and maintenance
of its service lines to the Cuzalina
house prior to the storm, the unprec-
edented ice and sleet storm was the
sole cause of the sagging of these serv-
ice lines. The defendant was not liable
for the sagging conditions of these serv-
ice lines.

Was the defendant negligent in re-
pairing these service lines after the
storm? The evidence discloses that
the storm began on the 24th day of Jan-
uary and lasted for several days. The
plaintiff was injured on the 5th day of
February. She notified defendant of the
sagging condition of these service lines
four or five days before she was in-
jured. When she notified defendant of
the condition of its service lines across
the back of her property she also told
the defendant that she was uneasy be-
cause she was afraid of these low sag-
ging lines. She asked the defendant to
repair them. The defendant received
similar calls or requests from hundreds
of other people in Wilburton and the
surrounding area. The lines continued
to carry electricity to the Cuzalina house
after the storm. They were insulated
and were no more hazardous because
they carried electricity than the lamp
cords in plaintiff’s house. Plaintiff says
that defendant did not advise her of
the harmless nature of these lines.

The only evidence in the record with
regard to the manner and method by
which these service lines were repaired
is that of defendant’s witnesses. All of
them testified that this unprecedented
ice and sleet storm was so severe that
it sagged and broke defendant’s cross
country transmission lines; its high-
voltage distribution lines; its low-volt-
age distribution lines; and its service
lines; that the storm covered an area
of about 85 miles by 115 miles; that one
of the defendant’s power stations in the

a 99

area was flattened by the storm; that
in restoring its electric system follow-
ing the storm defendant first restored
the high-voltage cross-county trans-
mission lines because of the extreme
hazard they created while down and
in order to restore power over the
stricken area so that the lines still
functioning could serve their facilities
and that those restored could begin
serving their facilities at once; that de-
fendant next restored its high-voltage
primary distribution lines because of
the hazard they created while down and
so that municipal waterworks, hospitals,
schools, etc. could have immediate
service; that defendant next restored
the secondary or low-voltage distribu-
tion lines and broken service lines so
that service could be restored to homes
and other users; and that defendant
then restored those service lines that
were sagging but still giving service,
among which were the lines to the Cu-
zalina house; that these restorations of
service were all in the nature of emer-
gencies which were the direct result of
the unprecedented ice and sleet storm
and not through the negligence of de-
fendant.

The evidence discloses that defend-
ant obtained every qualified repair
crew it could find, which crews worked
at the job long hours, sometimes as
much as twenty-four hours a day, in
order to get its wires and service re-
stored with the least possible delay.

It is plaintiff's contention that de-
fendant was negligent in that plaintiff
notified defendant of the condition of
its service lines across her back yard
and requested the defendant to repair
them four or five days before she was
injured as a result of walking into said
lines. Defendant’s witnesses, on cross-
examination, testified that defendant
could have restored these sagging serv-
ice lines across plaintiff's lot in a few
hours if it had worked on said lines
without taking into consideration its
larger and more important job of re-
storing its electric system in the area
and getting it back into operation in the

manner in which it did, and which was
the accepted method in the industry in
restoring electric service after such an
unprecedented storm.

Even though the defendant’s' method
of restoring its electric system in the
area after the storm was in accord
with the accepted method in the indus-
try and was the most humane ap-
proach to its problem from the stand-
point of the health and safety of all of
the people involved, ‘it resulted in the
failure to repair the service lines across
plaintiff's lot for some ten days after
the storm commenced and some four
or five days after plaintiff notified de-
fendant of the condition of its service
lines across plaintiff's property before
she was injured. Defendant does not
cite any case in its brief, and we have
found none in our search, holding that
an electric service company is not neg-
ligent as a matter of law regardless of
the situation confronting the electric
service company when four or five days
pass after notification of defect in
service lines before injury.

Defendant was required to use that
care, skill, and diligence that would
ordinarily be used by a careful and pru-
dent person in the transmission and dis-
tribution of electric energy in the con-
struction and maintenance of its lines,
poles and other equipment. Whether
or not defendant exercised such care,
skill and diligence in the repair and
restoration of its service lines to the
Cuzalina house, which this unprece-
dented storm caused to sag as they
crossed plaintiff’s property, is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. This ques-
tion is so well settled that citations
of authority are not necessary.

The verdict of the jury in this case
places a heavy burden on an electric
service company in face of such a se-
vere storm. However, regardless of how
we may feel with regard to, the dili-
gence of the defendant in restoring its
lines and service in the light of the sit-
uation with which it was confronted, we
cannot say as a matter of law that the

100

defendant used that care, skill and dili-
gence that would ordinarily be used by
a careful and prudent person in the
manner in which it restored its elec-
tric service lines across plaintiff's prop-
erty and which caused her injury.

The court, in instruction No. 11, fairly
presented this issue to the jury and
the jury found for the plaintiff.

Where there is competent evidence
reasonably tending to support the ver-
dict of a properly instructed jury, the
judgment based thereon will not be dis-
turbed on appeal.

In Missouri Motor Distributing Co.
v. Barker, 170 Okla. 183, 39 P. 2d 544,
we said:

“A reviewing court must assume,
where the verdict is for plaintiff, that
the jury believed the plaintiff's evi-
dence.”

In Elam v. Loyd, 201 Okla. 222, 204
P, 2d 280, we said:

“We have often said that questions
of negligence and of contributory neg-
ligence are questions of fact for the
jury and the court’s judgment thereon
will not be disturbed on appeal where
there is any competent evidence rea-
sonably tending to support the same.
Bunch v. Perkins, 198 Okla. 517, 180
P. 2d 664; Muzny v. Holland, 193 Okla.
695, 146 P. 2d 292.”

In Chapman v. Koenig, 205 Okla. 402,
238 P. 2d 357, we said:

«* * * This court has never deviated
from the rule that the verdict of a jury
will not be disturbed on appeal for in-
sufficiency of evidence if there is any
competent evidence reasonably tending
to support it.”

This rule of law is so well established
in this state that further authority in
support of it is unnecessary.

It is true, as defendant says in his
brief, plaintiff was aware of the condi-
tion of defendant’s service lines run-
ning across her property to the Cuza-
lina house. She notified defendant of
their condition. She afterwards used
the path passing by and under these
service lines both day and night for four
or five days prior to the night of her
injury. However, Art. 23, §6, of the
Oklahoma Constitution, provides that,
“The defense of contributory negligence
or of assumption of risk shall, in all
cases whatsoever, be a question of fact,
and shall at all times, be left to the
jury,” and the jury upon the evidence
brought in a verdict for plaintiff. This
settles in question of contributory negli-
fense and assumption of risk by the
plaintiff.

Defendant contends that the trial
court erred in refusing to give instruc-
tions requested by defendant and in
giving certain instructions. We have
given careful consideration to the in-
structions given by the court. These
instructions taken as a whole fairly
presented all of the issues in the case
to the jury and no error was committed
by the court, either in the instructions
given or in the instructions refused.

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys John Rogers, Horace Bal-
laine and Morris L. Bradford, who as
Special Masters aided in the preparation
of this opinion. These attorneys were
recommended by the Oklahoma Bar
Association, approved by the Judicial
Council, and appointed by the Court.

WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, JOHN-
SON, O'NEAL, and BINGAMAN, JJ.,
concur. HALLEY, V. C. J., and GIBSON,
J., dissent.

In re EVERHART’S ESTATE.
MARKS v. EVERHART et al.
"No. 35306. Jan. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1953.
253 P. 2d 174.

101

Ted R. Fisher and Allan Falkenstine,
Watonga, for plaintiff in error.

Robinson & Armstrong, Watonga, for
defendants in error.

HALLEY, V.C.J. J. B. Everhart died
December 20, 1946, leaving the follow-
ing will:

“I, J. B. Everhart, do hereby declare
the following to be my last will and
testament.

“J. I give, devise and bequeath all
my personal property, of every kind, to
my wife, Alva Everhart.

“2, All the real estate whicn I own,
I give, devise and bequeath to my wife,
Alva Everhart, to have and to hold
during her lifetime, or until her re-
marriage; and at the death or remar-
riage of my wife, unless I make fur-
ther provision hereafter, I give, devise
and bequeath all my real estate to my
heirs at law, except that William Mc-
Kinley Poole, Les Poole and Emma
May Pruiett are hereby excluded from
sharing in my estate in any manner.

“3. I hereby appoint my wife execu-
trix, without bond, of my estate.

“Signed by me this 4th day of De-
cember, 1946.

“(Signed) J. B. Everhart.”

The will was duly admitted to pro-
bate in the county court of Blaine coun-
ty, Oklahoma, and the surviving wife,
Alva Everhart (now Marks), appellant
herein, qualified as executrix. After all
claims had been paid she filed her final
report and petition for distribution, in
which she said in part:

“That said decedent died without
making any other or further provision
regarding the disposition of his real
estate, other than as set forth above;
that he died leaving no child, nor issue
of any deceased child, but leaving your
executrix, his surviving wife, and the
following named persons as his sole
and only heirs at law under the laws

102

of descent and distribution of the State
of Oklahoma, to-wit:” (naming all of
the heirs at law of the testator).

After alleging that J. B. Everhart
died without making any other or fur-
ther provision regarding the disposition
of his real estate and that she, as the
surviving wife of the decedent, had
elected to take under the will, she
prayed in part as follows:

“ * * * that the heirs at law of the
said J. B, Everhart, deceased, and the
beneficiaries under the terms of his
last will and testament, may be deter-
mmed; and that thereupon all of the
rest and residue of the property be-
longing to said estate, including the
money, personal property and real
estate above described, may be finally
assigned, conveyed and distributed to
the beneficiaries named in said will,
and in the manner as therein set forth.”

‘The final account was approved and
decree of distribution entered. The exe-
cutrix and the attorney she had se-
lected to represent her appeared and
were present when the above decree

was entered. The pertinent portions of -

the decree of distribution are as fol-
lows:

“It is further ordered, adjudged and
decreed by the court that the said J. B.
Everhart, deceased, died testate, and
that under the terms of his last will
and testament all of his personal prop-
erty is bequcathed to Alva Everhart,
surviving wife, and that under the
terms of said will all of the real estate
above described is bequeathed and de-
vised to the said Alva Everhart, to
have and to hold for and during her na-
tural lifetime, or until her remarriage,
and that the interest in remainder in
the said real estate is deviséd to the
following named persons, in the follow-
ing proportions, to-wit: * * *” (naming
all of the heirs except the surviving
wife).

The decree of distribution was en-
tered September 9, 1947. The present
action to set aside a portion of such
decree was filed in the county court
on March 19, 1951. In this petition she
alleged that the portion of the decree
of distribution set forth above, omitting

her name from the list of remainder-
men to whom the real estate was dis-
tributed subject to her life estate there-
in or her remarriage, was void, and al-
leged that she was entitled to a one-
half interest in the real property as
an heir at law of the testator.

Respondents filed objections and an-
swer to the application of Alva Marks
to vacate that portion of the decree
of distribution. It was stipulated that
there had been no changes in or addi-
tions to the heirs of decedent between
the date of his death and the remar-
riage of his surviving wife on Septem-
ber 10, 1950. The county court denied
the application to vacate that portion
of the decree, Alva Marks appealed to
the district court, where a hearing was
had, and that court denied her appli-
cation to vacate; and from that order
she has appealed to this court.

We shall refer to Alva Marks as “ap-
pellant” and to the other parties as
“respondents.”

Appellant presents as a single prop-
osition that the judgment of the trial
court is contrary to the law and to the
evidence. A number of subheadings are
used, but all of the issues presented
appear to revolve around two ques-
tions: (1) Did the testator intend to
exclude his surviving wife from any in-
terest in his real property upon her
remarriage? (2) Is the surviving wife
precluded, by the lapse of time or other-
wise, from attacking the order of dis-
tribution after her remarriage?

Our statutes provide in 84 O.S, 1951
§§151-152, that a will is to be con-
strued according to the intention of the
testator. In sec. 152 it is said that if un-
certainty arises upon the face of a will
as to the application of any of its pro-
visions, “ * * * the testator’s intention
is to be ascertained from the words of
the will, taking into view the circum-
stances under which it was made, ex-
clusive of his oral declarations.”

In Porter v. Porter, 97 Okla. 231, 222
P. 971, it was said:

“In the interpretation of a formal
will, the intention of the testator must
be determined from a consideration of
the whole instrument, and, where the
language used clearly shows that the
testator had in mind certain statutory
provisions in the preparation of his will,
his intention as expressed in his will
must be deduced from the language
used, aided by a consideration and ap-
plication of such statutory provisions.”

We think the will reveals that it was
the intention of the testator to exclude
his wife from the further use and en-
joyment of his real property upon her
remarriage. He gave her all of his
personal property without condition.
He then gave her all of his real prop-
erty, consisting of 560 acres of land,
as long as she lived and did not re-
marry. She would clearly have enjoyed
all of his estate as long as she lived
had she not remarried. The bequests
to her were in paragraph (1) and the
opening sentences of paragraph (2)
of the will. In the latter part of the
second paragraph, the testator said:
“I give, devise and bequeath all of my
real estate to my heirs at law * * *”,
excepting the three heirs expressly ex-
cluded from sharing in the estate in
any manner. Had J. B. Everhart in-
tended to give his wife an interest in
the remainder of his real property, we
think he would have indicated such in-
tention in some manner, after giving
her the use and enjoyment of his entire
estate during her lifetime or until she
remarried. It is not an unnatural be-
quest for a man to make full and ample
provision for his surviving wife during
her lifetime or until she remarries.
When she remarries it becomes the
moral and legal obligation of her new
husband to support her and provide for
her needs.

Had Alva Everhart elected to take
under the law of succession (84 O.S.
1951 §213), she would have received
one-half of the real property without
condition; but she elected to take un-
der the will. It is admitted that a sur-
viving wife is a “heir at law”, as the
term is used in our statutes of succes-

- cedent’s estate on a hearing as

103

sion, but we do not believe the testator
intended to include her in that class in
his will, when the other parts of the
will are considered.

Respondents contend that the pres-
ent action is a collateral attack upon
the decree of distribution, since no ap-
peal was taken and no effort made to
modify or vacate until the present ac-
tion was filed. That portion of the de-
cree sought to be vacated because void
upon its face is quoted above.

It is not disputed that the county
court had jurisdiction of the parties
and of the subject matter in entering
the decree of distribution.

In Porter v. Hansen, 190 Okla. 429,
124 P, 2d 391, it is said in the sixth
syllabus:

“The county court, in the perform-
ance of the statutory mandate that, in
settling the estate of a decedent, it
‘must name the persons and the propor-
tions or parts to which each is entitled’
(see. 1359, O.S. 1931, 58 Okla. St. Ann.
632), must determine who the bene-
ficiaries are and the extent and nature
of their interest, and in doing so it has
jurisdiction to construe a will under
which the property is disposed of,”

In Hetherington v. Falk, 173 Okla.
437, 49 P. 2d 756, the rule is stated in
the second syllabus as follows:

“A county court having acquired
jurisdiction in probate to decree dis-
tribution of a decedent’s estate and a
determination of heirs entitled thereto
in the manner provided by sections
1358-1361, O.S. 1931, and a decree of
distribution having been rendered, the
presumption arises that the court had
before it sufficient evidence to au-
thorize it to award such judgment.”

The third syllabus is as follows:

“A decree of distribution made by
the county court in probate, having
jurisdiction of the settlement of a de-
pro-
vided in sections 1345, 1350, 1351, 1358
and 1359, O.S. 1931, distributing to the
heirs their respective shares of the
estate of the deceased, is conclusive,
in the absence of a showing of fraud

104

or collusion, as to the rights of the
parties interested in the estate unless
reversed or modified on appeal, and
such a decree is not subject to collateral
attack. (Citing National Exploration
Co. et al. v. Robins, 140 Okla. 260, 283
P. 236.)”

In Porter v. Hansen, supra, the rule
is announced in the first, third, and
eighth paragraphs of the syllabus as
follows:

-“A will which gives to a forced heir
less than the heir would receive by in-
heritance is not void, but is merely
voidable as to such forced heir at his or
her election. Secs. 1539 and 1617, O.S.
1931, 84 Okla. St. Ann. 44 and 213.”

“A collateral attack on a judicial
proceeding is an attempt to avoid, de-
feat, or evade it, or deny its force and
effect, in some incidental proceeding
not provided by law for the express
purpose of attacking it.”

“The final decree of the county court,
valid on its face, making distribution
of a decedent’s estate, is binding and
conclusive on the heirs, devisees and
legatees, and, in the absence of fraud,
mistake, or collusion, the proceeding
may not be reopened so as to permit
an election by one devisee which will
deprive others of property vested in
them by such final decree.”

In the body of that opinion it was
said:

“While there are expressions in some
of our decisions that a will made in
contravention of the proviso in the
second subdivision is ‘void’ and _‘in-
‘valid’ as to the widow (see Bk. of Com.
v. Trigg, 138 Okla. 216, 280 P._ 563;
Ward vy. Cook, 152 Okla. 234, 3 P. 2d
728), yet the words are there used
loosely as is so frequently the case
(67 C. J. 265) when the word ‘voidable’
was intended. The true rule is that a
will which gives to a forced heir less
than the cited statutes give him or her
is voidable as to such forced heir at
his or her election.”

In Okfuskey v. Corbin, 170 Okla. 449,
40 P. 2d 1064, it was said:

“Tt will thus be seen that at that
time, upon the petition of Johnnie Ok-

fuskey, in his presence and in the pres-
ence of Cindy Okfuskey, the mother of
Billie Okfuskey, proof was made that
Billie Okfuskey was the son and heir
of Weatie Okfuskey, and a finding was
made to that effect, and decree of dis-
tribution was made. * * *

“The decree thus made appears to
have stood without question until about
September 30, 1924, some three years
and six months, when Johnnie Okfuskey
filed his petition in the county court
to set aside such finding of heirship
and decree of distribution.

« * * * we are of the opinion that the
county court was without jurisdiction
to set aside the finding of heirship and
decree of distribution.”

And in the same case, syllabus 2 is
as follows:

“Where a finding of heirship and final
decree of distribution, made in a pro-
bate proceeding in the county court, is
not appealed from and becomes final,
a further order of the county court
made more than three years thereafter
purporting to set aside the same and
making a different disposition of a por-
tion of the entire estate is void.”

In the absence of any claim of fraud,
mistake, or collusion, and in view of the
fact that the county court in probate
matters is a court of general jurisdic-
tion and its judgments entitled to the
same weight as those of other courts of
record, when the decree of distribution
was not appealed from or otherwise
questioned for more than three years
after its entry, it became immune to
collateral attack. This proceeding con-
stitutes such an attack. Hetherington
v. Falk, supra; Gassin v. McJunkin,
173 Okla. 210, 48 P. 2d 320; Porter v.
Hansen, supra.

The contention that the decree of dis-
tribution is void upon its face is an-
swered in the negative in Porter v.
Hansen, supra.

There is no claim that appellant did
not have notice of the decree of distri-
bution. The record shows that she and
her attorney were present at the hear-
ing at which such decree was entered,

Le 105

and that she testified at such hearing.
She accepted the terms of the decree,
omitting her name as an heir at law
taking a share of the real property.
She entered into full possession of the
real estate under such decree and made
no protest against any of its terms un-
til some of the remaindermen com-
menced an action in partition.

If there is any error in the decree of
distribution, it is an error of law and
does not render such decree subject
to collateral attack.

We conclude that the county and dis-
trict courts correctly construed the will
of J, B. Everhart in holding that it was
his intention that upon the remarriage
of his wife her interest in his real
property should cease, and that it be
distributed to the heirs named in the
decree of distribution.

We also conclude that the present
action constitutes a collateral attack
upon the judgment, and that the same
cannot be prosecuted more than three
years after the entry of the decree of
distribution, which was not appealed
trom.

The judgment of the trial court is
therefore affirmed.

CORN, JOHNSON, O’NEAL, and
BINGAMAN, JJ., concur. WELCH,
GIBSON, and DAVISON, JJ., dissent.

STAPLETON v. RATHBUN.
No. 35078. Nov. 18, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1953.
253 P. 2d 164.

John L. Ward, Jr., and F. J. Lucas,
Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Geo. W. Reed, Jr., and Geo. P. Strip-
lin, Tulsa, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal

from the district court of Tulsa county,”

where the parties appear as they did
in the trial court, in sustaining a de-
murrer to the evidence at the close of
her case; and from a judgment of the
trial court on defendant’s cross-peti-
tion, wherein judgment was rendered
on a note secured by a mortgage and
the mortgage ordered foreclosed to
satisfy the debt.

It appears that the plaintiff and de-
fendant are sisters; that for many
years prior to 1945, the father of the
two parties, C. M. Howrey, owned lots
12 and 13 in Homes Garden addition to
the city of Tulsa, and being desirous
of making improvements, the plaintiff
herein and another sister, in conjunc-

106

tion with the father and mother, but
without the aid or co-operation of the
defendant, borrowed $1,500 on this
property, for the purpose of improving
the same for the convenience of their
father and mother. This indebtedness
was reduced by plaintiff's payments to
$500. The same parties then renewed
and increased this loan to $1,500. In
renewing and increasing the loan, not
only was the property belonging to the
father and mother made the basis of se~
curity, but the plaintiff included her
property in the mortgage, to secure
this loan. The plaintiff continued pay-
ments on the new loan until it was re~
duced to about $1,300. In the mean-
time, the mother had died and the fa~
ther had taken up residence with the
defendant. It appears that the defend~
ant took a deed from the father, with~
out the knowledge or consent of the
plaintiff or the other sister, but agreed,
in consideration for a deed to the
property, to discharge the then out-
standing indebtedness, which it ap-
pears she did. It is not clear as to how
this transaction was handled, but it is
certain from the evidence that the de~
fendant acquired title to the property
with the definite agreement to pay
the debt and release the mortgage.
The property covered by the deed
which was the primary security was
duly released; but the mortgage on
the plaintiff's property was not dis-
charged. About two years after the de-
fendant had discharged this indebted-
ness and released the mortgage on the
property for which she received a con-
veyance, the plaintiff discovered that
the mortgage on her property had not
been released. It appears that plaintiff
was advised that no release had been
filed on her property, at a time when
she was bound in another trade, by
which she was using this property in
exchange for other real estate. The
plaintiff then requested the defend-
ant to file a release of the mortgage
on her property. This she declined to
do, unless plaintiff executed to her a
note and mortgage on certain other
property, in reimbursement of the in-
debtedness which she had discharged

covering lot 12, to which she had ac-
quired title on condition that she pay the
debt. Under the strained circumstances
which plaintiff claimed to have been
placed, she executed the note and
mortgage in question. This action was
commenced to cancel such note and
mortgage and to quiet title to her
property.

We think the trial court was in error
in sustaining a-demurrer to plaintiff's
evidence. There is a general rule that
where there is any competent evidence
reasonably tending to support plain-
tiff’s theory of the case and such evi-
dence standing alone would sustain a
judgment, it is error for the trial court
to sustain a demurrer thereto. People’s
Finance & Thrift-Co. v. Ferrier, 191
Okla. 364, 129 P. 2d 1015, and the cases
therein cited. The rule is so general
that further citation of authority is un-
necessary.

It clearly appears from the evidence
that the defendant solicited and ac-
quired the property from her father, in
consideration of the full discharge of
the then outstanding indebtedness
against the same, which necessarily in-
cluded releasing the mortgage on plain-
tiff’s property. It is quite apparent that
there was no consideration for the note
and mortgage which the plaintiff gave
the defendant, in view of the fact that
defendant became legally bound to
discharge the obligation and release the
mortgage. It seems to be a well settled
principle of law that, as between the
immediate parties, an adequate con-
sideration is indispensable to the exist-
ence of a binding obligation. The view
we take of the evidence is that the
transaction here involved was one
wholly without consideration and being
such, the defendant should have re-
leased the real estate mortgage on
plaintiff’s property. The well recog-
nized general rule is expressed in 10
C.J.S. 599, §143, to the effect:

“It is well settled that as between
the immediate parties to a bill-or note,
a sufficient and adequate consideration
is essential to the existence of a valid

and binding undertaking. In other
words, a promise which is purely
gratuitous and without consideration is
unenforceable, *** although it is in the
form of a bill or note.”

This court has adhered to the same
rule in numerous decisions, among
which are Roberts v. Boydston, 186
Okla. 336, 97 P. 2d 898; Harvey v.
Thomas, 150 Okla. 106, 300 P. 772; Red-
wine v. Cummins, 108 Okla. 39, 233 P.
418.

Since there was no consideration for
the note and mortgage which the de-
fendant exacted from the plaintiff, she
may not now be heard to say or claim
that a note and mortgage secured un-
der such circumstances may be en-
forced.

Mention is made in the briefs that
duress or some form of over-reaching
must be shown before relief could be

granted. With this contention we are.

unable to agree. The view we take is
that the transaction was one wholly
without consideration; and that it was
the plain, legal duty of the defendant to
have released the real estate mortgage
on plaintiffs property. This being
true, she may not now be heard to say
or claim that a note and mortgage se-
cured under such circumstances may
be enforced. It is elementary that:

“A right cannot arise to anyone out
of his own wrong.” 30 C.J. S. 94; Har-
ton v. Little, 188 Ala. 640, 65 So. 951.

The evidence does not indicate that
this was a renewal note or obligation,
neither does it appear that it was nec-
essary to either plead or prove duress
or misconduct, in order that the plain-
tiff might secure relief; but if it were,
the refusal of defendant to perform
her plain legal duty was sufficient. 21
C.J, 183. These issues, though raised,
are not important, since the matter
was disposed of under the above~-men-
tioned decisions.

Under the evidence, therefore, it
seems clear to us that the trial court
was in error in sustaining a demurrer
to the evidence. The judgment is re-

107

versed and the cause remanded to the
trial court, with directions to grant a
new trial and dispose of the case in
conformity with the views herein ex-
pressed.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Allen G. Nichols, B. F.
Davis, and R. S. Roberts, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

WELCH, CORN, GIBSON, DAVISON,
JOHNSON, O’NEAL, and BINGAMAN,
JJ., concur.

Application of CHOCTAW
EXPRESS CO.

DAY v. CHOCTAW EXPRESS CO.
No. 34383. Feb. 17, 1953.
253 P. 2d 822,

108

W. T. Brunson, Oklahoma City, for
protestant.

Cornish & Baumert, McAlester, for
respondent.

James G. Welch,.Oklahoma City, for
Corporation Commission.

O’NEAL, J. Upon the application of
Choctaw Express Company, a corpora~
tion, for a Certificate of Public Con-
venience and Necessity, the Corpora-
tion Commission of the State of Okla-
homa entered its report of the Com-
mission and its order authorizing Choc-
taw Express Company to operate Class
“A” motor carrier freight service as
follows:

“Between Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
and McAlester, Oklahoma, via State
Highway No. 3 from Oklahoma City
to intersection of said State Highway
No. 3 and U.S. Highway No. 270 (said
intersection being located approximate-
ly 4 miles west of McLoud) thence
via U. S. Highway No. 270 to McAlester,
serving all points on route in either di-
rection. Conditioned, however, that on
east bound movement applicant shall
operate with closed doors upon leav-
ing Oklahoma City and until reaching
McAlester.” *

The Commission’s order was based
upon its finding that public convenience
and necessity require the granting of
the application, and that upon said
finding that a Certificate should issue
in accordance with the application.

A protest to the granting of the Cer-
tificate to applicant was filed by H. A.
Day Truck Lines, in which protestant
pleaded that it had purchased a Cer-
tificate of Public Convenience and Nec-
essity, formerly issued by the Corpora-
tion Commission to the Berger Freight
Lines Company; that an application
to transfer said Certificate from the
Berger Freight Lines Company to pro-
testant is on file with the Corporation
Commission; that the said Certificate,
last referred to, authorizes common
carrier motor operations between Okla-
homa City and McAlester, Oklahoma,
via U.S. Highway No. 270. It is further
alleged that operations are presently

being conducted over said route in in-
terstate and intrastate commerce by
the Rock Island Motor Transit Com-
pany. Upon grounds that there is not a
sufficient volume of freight moving be-
tween or over said route, protestant
asks that the application of Choctaw
Express Company be denied.

Although the Rock Island Motor
Transit Company, as well as the Yel-
low Transit Company, made general ap-
pearances in the cause before the Com-
mission, they did not file formal pro-
test to the granting of Choctaw Express
Company’s application. The report of
the referee found, among other facts,
that the Rock Island Motor Transit
Company was operating eleven round
trips a week between Oklahoma City
and McAlester, and eleven round trips
a week between Oklahoma City and
Shawnee, Oklahoma, and six round
trips between Oklahoma City and Sem-
inole, Oklahoma. Upon these findings
the referee recommended that the ap-
plication of Choctaw Express Company
be denied.

Upon exceptions being taken to the
report and upon a final hearing before
the Commission, the order, supra, was
entered as of September 22, 1947, grant-
ing the Choctaw Express Company’s
application as prayed for.

The protestant, H. A. Day, d/b/a H.
A. Day Truck Lines, appeal (a) chal-
lenging the order as not sustained by
substantial evidence; and (b) that in
any event the court’s finding that Choc-
taw Express Company had knowingly
violated certain statutory requirements,
as well as the Rules and Regulations
of the Commission, in that it com-
menced doing business prior to the
issuance to it of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity, is a bar to
the issuing of the permit in question.
Choctaw Express Company will here-
after be designated as Applicant; H. A.
Day, d/b/a H. A. Day Truck Lines, as
Protestant; Rock Island Motor Transit
Company as Rock Island; Berger
Freight Lines as Berger, and the Cor-
poration Commission of the State of
Oklahoma as the Commission.

The record discloses that prior to
June, 1949, the route in question was
served by the Rock Island and by Ber-
ger, the latter company having become
insolvent had discontinued its opera-
tion as a common carrier between Mc-
Alester and Oklahoma City, and inter-
vening points. The Certificate of Berger
was sold by the trustee in bankruptcy
to protestant, which sale was approved
by the Commission. Applicant filed its
application with the Commission short-
ly after the Berger bankruptcy proceed-
ing was filed, and after Berger had
discontinued its operations under its
Certificate issued by the Commission.
Pending a hearing upon the applica-
tion of applicant, it furnished service
between McAlester and Oklahoma City
and return, and it posted the required
liability and fidelity bonds with the
Commission. The applicant’s Certifi-
eate of Public Convenience and Nec-
essity and the protestant’s application
for approval of its purchase of the
Berger certificate were each approved
by the Commission as of September
22, 1949.

Protestant seeks to vacate the order
of the Commission upon the assertion
that:

“There is a total lack of evidence to
sustain the finding that present and fu-
ture public convenience and necessity
requires applicant’s proposed opera-
tions and the lack of substantial evi-
dence in support of the application re-
quires that the application be denied.”

As provided by the Constitution of
the State of Oklahoma, article 9, sec.
20, as amended by Senate Bill 61, S. L.
1941, in considering protestant’s chal-
lenge that the order was erroneously
entered, we limit our consideration to
the question whether the order is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Pannell
et al. v. Farmers Union Co-Op. Gin
Ass’n et al., 192 Okla. 652, 138 P. 2d
817; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Vo-
gel, 195 Okla. 194, 156 P. 2d 620; Yellow
Transit Co. v. State, 198 Okla. 229, 178
P. 2d 83. In these cases we defined
“substantial evidence’ as something
more than a “scintilla of evidence”

109

and said it means evidence that pos-
sesses something of substance and of
relevant consequence and such that
carries with it fitness to induce con-
viction. Other courts have said the prin-
ciple which applies in determining
whether the evidence will support a
jury verdict, applies to findings of the
Commission. We think that every or-
der of the Commission must be sus-
tained by competent and material evi-
dence, and that an order is not justi-
fied without a basis in evidence hav-
ing rational probative force. This case,
therefore, calls for an answer to the
question, whether there ‘is substantial
evidence to support the order of the
Commission.

_ As has been noted, the Berger Lines
had gone into bankruptcy and had
abandoned their operation between
points of McAlester and Oklahoma City,
prior to the filing of applicant’s appli-
cation for a permit to operate its lines
between said points.

Protestant’s president, Ezra Hester,
testified that Rock Island left McAles-
ter at 11 o’clock in the morning and
returned during the night; that they
proposed to give a better service by
loading out at the end of the day’s busi-
ness, both at McAlester and Oklahoma
City, and thereby provide an overnight
service in both directions. Protestant’s
objection was largely based upon the
ground that there was not a sufficient
volume of freight moving between the
proposed cities and proposed route to
justify a third carrier.

The traffic manager of McKesson-
Robbins Drug Company, doing busi-
ness at McAlester, testified that its
business required an overnight truck
service at all points between McAles-
ter and Oklahoma City; that the pres-
ent service, furnished by Rock Island,
did not meet his company’s require-
ments as frequently Rock Island did
not pick up the freight for several days
after being placed upon the platform
for shipment.

The owner of Maytag Company of
McAlester, Oklahoma, testified that he

110

shipped his refrigeration equipment to
points between McAlester and Okla-
homa City; he stated that after Berger
ceased operations he shipped by Rock
Island, but the latter service was fre-
quently 24 hours behind its schedule.

The manager of the B. F. Goodrich
Company of McAlester, Oklahoma, tes-
tified that their company discontinued
using Berger. service cight months
prior to the present hearing because
of its inefficient service.

The owner of the Central Motor Sup-
ply Company at McAlester, Oklahoma,
testified that his company handled au-
tomobile and equipment supplies; that
he was compelled to abandon ship-
ments between McAlester and Okla-
homa City, because of inadequate serv-
ice furnished by Rock Island and Ber-
ger; that for the past year his com-
pany had been compelled to use truck-
ing service to deliver its equipment
out of Ft. Worth and Dallas, Texas.

There is additional evidence of mer-
chants doing business in McAlester, to
the effect that their businesses require
a regular and permanent overnight
service between McAlester and Okla-
homa City. These witnesses testified
that they either had or would avail
themselves of the shipping facilities
of applicant if it received a permit.

Protestant’s second proposition urges
that in any event the Commission
should not have granted applicant’s
permit on the ground that applicant’s
knowing and admitted violation of con-
stitutional and statutory requirements
and the Rules and Regulations of the
Corporation Commission and appli-
cant’s unstable financial condition, ren-
der it unfit to conduct operations as a
common motor carrier, and the find-
ing by the Commission that applicant
is fit, willing and able to operate a
common motor carrier service is not
sustained by the evidence and is such
an abuse of the discretion of the Com-
mission that this court should grant
relief.

Protestant does not support this prop-
osition by argument or citations of au-

thority, and we deem it unnecessary
to examine the question further than
to ‘observe that the question of the
financial condition of applicant, and its
ability to operate the common carrier,
are matters solely within the province
of the Commission to resolve, and- no
contention is here advanced that the
Commission’s general findings in this
respect are not supported by substari-
tial evidence. - .

The order of the Commission is .af-
firmed..

ROGERS v. GOODWIN.
No. 34438. Feb. 17, 1953.

253, P. 2d 84h.

Hudson, Hudson & Wheaton, Tulsa,
for plaintiff in error.

McNeill & McNeill, Tulsa, for de-
fendant in error.

ARNOLD, J. J. H. Goodwin sued
Charles B. Rogers for a money judg-
ment alleging that Rogers prepared and
delivered to him a power of attorney
for the signatures of Thelma Bruner
and Essie Bruner living in California,
who had an interest in a judgment pro-
cured by Rogers in the Lete Kolvin
case, No. 19179 in the district court of
Creek county, and directed him to go
to California to procure the signatures
of said persons to said written power
of attorney; that Rogers in writing
agreed to pay him his expenses not to
exceed $500 and $3,000 for the pro~
curement of the authorizations if same
were delivered to him on or before the
succeeding January 10th; that as con-
templated by the parties he went to
California for the sole purpose of pro-
curing said signatures; that his ex-
penses solely due to said trip were in
excess of $750; that while there and
conferring with Lucy Johnson, Thelma
Bruner, and others interested in the
case, and being informed by them that

111

they would not sign the authorization
along with Essie Bruner, he called Ro-
gers long distance and advised him of
developments up to the time of said
conversation; that Rogers told him that
Essie Bruner was not an heir and
was not a party to the judgment in the
Kolvin case; that he should disregard
her but get the signatures of Lucy
Johnson, Thelma Bruner, and the other
named heirs and judgment creditors
and immediately forward them to him;
that Rogers asked Goodwin to let him
talk to Lucy Johnson; that he did talk
to Lucy; that he again talked to Rogers
before the conversation was concluded
and Rogers told him that he had told
Lucy that if she and the others, with
the exception of Essie Bruner, would
go ahead and sign the instrument he
would waive his attorney fees against
their portion of the judgment; that the
signatures of those required were pro-
cured as directed by Rogers and air
mailed to him, he receiving the same on
the 9th day of the succeeding Janu-
ary; that before this suit was brought
Rogers paid him $380 which he credit-
ed on the expense account leaving a to-
tal balance due of $3,120 for which he
prayed judgment. Goodwin’s testimony
supported the foregoing allegations in
detail.

Rogers filed an answer in which he
admitted the preparation of the un-
signed powers of attorney; that the
terms of the employment were cor- .
rectly alleged by Goodwin but he de-
nied performance by Goodwin. His tes-
timony is to the effect that the $380
which Goodwin alleged was paid on the
expense account was a loan; he also
admitted the telephone conversation al-
leged and supported by Goodwin’s tes-
timony and the waiver of the attorney
fees on the judgment in favor of the
above-named persons which he testi-
fied amounted to about $1,400; he spe-
cifically denied that he told Goodwin
to procure the signatures designated by
Goodwin or that he waived the pro-
curement of the signature of Essie Bru-
ner and testified that he told Goodwin
the deal between them was off.

112 a

The cause was tried to a jury which
returned a verdict for $1,450 principal
and $500.25 interest, on which judgment
was rendered.

Rogers contends that both plaintiff's
amended petition and the evidence ad-
mit plaintiffs failure to perform the
written contract of employment sued
upon and seeks to modify the contract
by parol evidence in violation of Title
15 O.S. 1951 §237.

Plaintiff’s amended petition alleged
part performance of the contract and
defendant’s waiver of performance of

+ the balance and his proof supported
this allegation.

“The conduct of a party to a con-
tract, which prevents or dispenses with
performance by the adverse party, is
equivalent to a waiver of the right to re-
quire performance.” Voegel v. Fisher,
203 Okla. 657, 225 P. 2d 346; Quinette
v. Mitschrich, 109 Okla. 281, 235 P.
530.

Demurrer to the petition was prop-
erly overruled. Anderson & Kerr Drill-
ing Co. v. Bracht, 177 Okla. 394, 60
P. 2d 758. The parol evidence rule has
no application. Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum
Corporation v. Krow, 40 F. 2d 488;
Walker Valley Oil & Gas Co. v. Parks
& Palmer, 128 Okla. 286, 262 P. 672.
See, also, Oklahoma Improved Seed Co.
v. Smith, 175 Okla. 64, 51 P. 2d 563;
Campbell v. Frye, 145 Okla. 213, 292
P. 7. Demurrer to the evidence and
motion for directed verdict were prop-
erly overruled.

Rogers also complains of instructions
Nos. 5 and 6 given by the court. These
instructions both deal with the matter
of estoppel by waiver and are both
based on Walker Valley Oil & Gas Co.
v. Parks & Palmer, supra. There is no
error in the instructions.

Rogers also contends that the jury’s
verdict cannot be sustained because
Goodwin was entitled to recover the
entire amount sued for or nothing. We
agree. Under plaintiff’s theory of the
case he was entitled to recover $3,000
for services and $500 for expenses, less
the $380 theretofore paid. The jury evi-

dently in general believed Goodwin’s
story and should therefore have re-
turned a verdict for the sum of $3,120.
The verdict erroneously gives Rogers
credit for the attorney fees which he
waived, and he will not be heard to
complain if Goodwin chooses to accept
a lesser sum than he was entitled to
under the jury’s determination of the
facts. Rogers does not contend that
at the time he instructed Goodwin to
disregard the written contract of em-
ployment providing for the necessity
of getting the signature of Essie Bruner
a different rate of compensation was
agreed upon.

Lastly, Rogers asserts that plaintiff
did not plead or prove the assessment
or payment of intangible taxes upon
his alleged liquidated claim as required
by 68 O.S. 1951 §1515.

Nobody claims that upon perform-
ance plaintiff was entitled to any lesser
amount than $3,000. The contract shows
that upon its face. This is a liquidated
claim. Not so with the item for ex-
penses. That was to be an amount not
to exceed $500 and proof of the actual
expenses incurred had to be intro-
duced to establish the amount due.
Plaintiff sued partly upon a liquidated
claim and partly upon an unliquidated
claim. He had to allege and prove
payment of the intangible tax upon the
fixed amount for the services to be
performed. This he did not do. The
judgment is vacated and the cause re-
manded with directions to the trial
court after hearing upon proper notice
to determine such jurisdictional matter
and if plaintiff establishes compliance
with the Intangible Tax Law, then judg-
ment to be rendered for plaintiff; or
upon failure of plaintiff to establish
compliance with the Intangible Tax
Law, the plaintiff's action to be dis-
missed as specifically provided by that
act. See Mead v. Hellams, 200 Okla.
381, 194 P. 2d 603, and cases therein
cited.

Since the judgment appealed from is
reversed, the cost of this appeal must
be taxed against plaintiff.

Reversed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
WELCH, J., concurs in result.

GARR et al. v. COLLINS et al.
No. 35408. Feb. 17, 1953.
2538 P. 2d 888.

Cheek, Cheek & Cheek and Ray
Teague, Oklahoma City, for petitioners.

Wallace Hatcher, Pauls Valley, and
Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., for re-
spondents,

WELCH, J. Respondent in his claim
for compensation states that on Sep-
tember 23, 1951, while in the employ of
petitioner J. W. Garr, he sustained an
injury to his right hand consisting of
the loss of his first and second fingers,
and injury to a third finger of the hand;
that the injury occurred while he was
engaged in starting an air compressor
for the purpose of putting air in the
tire of a tractor belonging to the peti-
tioner J, W. Garr; that he was at that
time employed as a ranch and farm
laborer.

The trial commissioner, in substance,
found that on Sunday September 23,
1951, respondent, while in the employ of
petitioner, sustained an accidental per-
sonal injury to his right hand when he
caught the first and second fingers of
the right hand in the V-belt of an air
compressor, and that as a result of
said accidental injury he suffered the
amputation of the distal phalanx of the
first and second fingers of the hand,
and as a result of such injury he was
temporarily totally disabled for a pe-
riod of six weeks and four days and
would be entitled to compensation for
such disability in the sum of $166.68 if
any compensation were due, and in ad-
dition thereto he sustained a 20 per
cent permanent partial disability to the
right hand which would entitle him to
compensation for such disability in the
sum of $1,000, if any compensation were

114

due. He also further found that at the
time claimant sustained his accidental
injury he was in the act: of starting an
air compressor to put air in the tire of
his personal automobile and was there-
fore not acting within the scope of his
employment for his master’s interest,
and was not entitled to compensation.
He also found that petitioner carried
Workmen’s Compensation insurance for
his employees, having a combined lia-
bility and Workmen’s Compensation
policy which policy covered respondent,
Lee Collins, and that petitioner and his
insurance carrier are therefore es-
topped*to deny that the occupation in
which claimant was engaged was haz-
ardous within the meaning of the Work-
men’s Compensation Law, and upon such
findings entered an award denying com-
pensation. The commission sitting as a
whole on appeal modified the award
and by such modified award made its
own independent findings of fact and
conclusions of law. It found that on the
23rd day of September, 1951, respond-
ent, while in the employ of petitioner,
sustained an accidental personal injury
consisting of the amputation of the dis-
tal phalanx of the first and second fin-
gers of his right hand, and as a result
of such injury he was temporarily to-
tally disabled for a period of six weeks
and four days for which he was en-
titled to compensation in the sum of
$166.68; that in addition thereto he sus-
tained a 35 per cent permanent partial
disability to his right hand for which he
was entitled to compensation in the
sum of $1,750, and further found that at
the time respondent sustained his acci-
dental personal injury he was acting
within the scope of his employment for
petitioner J. W. Garr and entered an
award awarding respondent compensa-
tion accordingly. In all other respects
the findings of the trial commissioner
were sustained.

Petitioners bring the case here for re-
view and seek to vacate the award
on the ground that the respondent was
not engaged in a hazardous employ-
ment at the time he sustained his in-
jury, and in the alternative that the in-

jury sustained by him did not arise out
of and in the course of his employment.

The evidence shows that prior to and
at the time he sustained his injury re-
spondent was employed by petitioner
J. W. Garr as a ranch and farm laborer.
It is conceded by respondent that such
employment is not an employment de-
fined as hazardous by the Workmen’s
Compensation Law. It is stipulated that
petitioner carried compensation insur-
ance for his employees and that the
policy covered respondent and was in
force at the time he sustained his in-
jury, and that his salary was used in
tixing and collecting the premium paid
on the policy. Respondent refers to 85
O.S, 1951 §§65.2 and 65.3, and asserts
that under sec. 65.2, by reason of the
fact that the petitioner had obtained
compensation insurance for his em-
ployees under conditions stated in the
stipulation, he is now estopped to deny
that respondent was engaged in a haz-
ardous employment at the time he sus-
tained his injury. It is contended by pe-
titioners that said section of the stat-
ute is unconstitutional. This contention
cannot be sustained. We have many
times held to the contrary. National
Bank of Tulsa Bldg. et al. v. Goldsmith,
204 Okla. 45, 226 P. 2d 916; Veazey
Drug Co. et al. v. Collins, 204 Okla. 238,
228 P. 2d 1015; Garr v. Cameron, 207
Okla. 553, 251 P. 2d 181, and several
other cases. It is not disputed by pe-
titioners that respondent sustained an
accidental injury at the time and in the
manner as claimed by him in his claim
for compensation, nor is it disputed
that as a result thereof he suffered the
disability as found by the commission.
They, however, contend that the in-
jury sustained by him did not arise out
of and in the course of his employment.
This contention requires a review of
the evidence.

Respondent, in substance, testified:
On Sunday morning of September 23,
1951, he sustained an injury as stated
in his claim for compensation. He was
not required to work on Sunday except
when directed to do so by petitioner

es 115

Garr’s foreman. On the Sunday morn-
ing he sustained his injury he was di-
rected by the foreman to help him
start a truck which was being used on
the ranch. The foreman intended to use
the truck that day to take employees
of petitioner Garr to town to get gro-

ceries. It was the custom of said pe-"

titioner so to do every Sunday. It was
necessary to use a tractor to pull the
truck to get it started. Respondent
mounted the tractor to start it when he
discovered that one of the tires on the
tractor was down. The foreman then got
the hose and attempted to place air in
the tire. It was then discovered that
there was not sufficient air in the air
compressor to completely air up the
tire. The foreman stated that there was
enough air in the tire to pull the truck
in order to get it started. Respondent
then started the truck by pulling it with
the tractor and at that time told the
foreman that he would drive the tractor
back to the garage and finish airing the
tire to which the foreman made no re-
ply or objection. He then drove the
tractor into the garage and next to the
air compressor. He then noticed one of
the tires of his own car was low. He
moved his car close to the compressor.
He testified it was his intention after
he finished airing up the tire on the
tractor to also place air in the tire of
his own car. When he started the com-
pressor he reached over to get the hose
which was lying on the compressor;
when he did so his right hand was
caught causing the first and second fin-
gers to be amputated back of the dis-
tal joint, and also causing an injury to
the third finger of the hand.

The foreman, in substance, testified
that it was his custom each Sunday
morning to take the employees of the
ranch to town to get groceries, and on
that morning he was having difficulty
in starting the truck. He does not re-
member whether he asked respondent
to help him start the truck or not. Re-
spondent did, however, help him start
the truck and helped him put air in the
tire. After they had started the truck
he drove the truck away and inquired

of respondent what he intended to do.
He replied he intended to move the
tractor back into the garage and place
some air in the tire of his own car. He
also testified that respondent was a
good employee. He did not check on his
work, whatever there was to do he just
went ahead and did it. He further testi-
fied that respondent was instructed by
him as well as by his employer Garr
that any time he discovered the tires
on the truck or the tractor were low to
air them up.

We think the evidence taken as a
whole is sufficient to sustain the find-
ing of the commission that the injury
sustained by respondent arose out of
and in the course of his employment.

Petitioners, however, urge that re~
spondent sustained his injury on Sun-
day; that he was not required to do
general farm or ranch work on Sunday.
He was only required to do such work
as he was ordered to do on such days;
that on the Sunday morning respond-
ent sustained his injury he was di-
rected only to assist the foreman in
starting the truck; that when the
truck was started his work for that
day ceased; that respondent was not
directed by him to thereafter finish
airing up the tire of the tractor and
in doing so he was not acting within
the scope of his employment and is
therefore not entitled to recover com-
pensation.

We think, however, the commission
was justified in making its finding and
award on the evidence of respondent
alone. He testified that after the truck
was started he told the foreman he in-
tended to move the tractor back in the
garage and finish airing up the tire.
The foreman made no objection thereto,
but remained silent and we think that
by such silence he in effect acquiesced
and consented to respondent placing ad-
ditional air in the tire of the tractor
and that such act and conduct was in
itself sufficient to confer authority upon
him so to do,

The relation of employer and em-
ployee under the Workmen’s Compen-

116

sation Law may arise by implied con-
tract, such as by knowledge and acqui-
escence of the employer in the service
performed by the employee. Barnsdall
Ref. Co. v. State Industrial Commis-
sion, 163 Okla. 154, 21 P. 2d 749; Camp-
bell Oil Co, v. Elledge, 177 Okla. 601,
61 P. 2d 223. The commission, how-
ever, was not confined to this evidence
alone in making its findings. It had be-
fore it in addition to such evidence the
evidence of the foreman relative to the
general instructions given by him and
Mr. Garr to the effect that at any time
he discovered the air in the tires of the
tractor to be low to air them up. Re-
spondent was directed by the foreman
to drive the tractor on the Sunday
morning he sustained his injury. He at
that time discovered that the air in the
tire of the tractor was low. He was
therefore authorized under the general
instructions given him to put sufficient
air in the tire. He did not cease to be
acting within the scope of his employ-
ment when he attempted to place addi-
tional air in the tire of the tractor be-
longing to his employer simply because
he intended after having completed that
task to use the air compressor to place
air in the tire of his own private car.

The evidence is sufficient to support
the conclusion that the injury sustained
by respondent arose out of and in the
course of his employment.

Award sustained.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, J., concur. O’NEAL, J.,
dissents.

DAKE et ux. v. FINANCE CORPORA-
TION et al.

No, 35201. Feb, 17, 1953.
258 P. 2d 842.

Geo. W. Reed, Jr., and Geo. P. Strip-
lin, Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.

John J. Southwick and W. Leslie
Webb, Tulsa, for defendants in error.

WELCH, J. Plaintiffs, seeking money
judgment, alleged that defendants be-

| 117

came indebted to the plaintiffs in the
sum of $450, growing out of a trans-
action between the parties involving a
sale of the plaintiffs’ property. The de-
fendants each made denial of any in-
debtedness to plaintiffs.

At trial, before a jury, and at the
close of the introduction of the evi-
dence, motions for directed verdict in
favor of each of the defendants were
sustained by the court. Judgment in
accord therewith was for the defend-
ants.

The plaintiffs contend the court erred
in directing verdict for the defendants.

According to testimony of the plain-
tiff R. C. Dake, he employed the de-
fendant Herrington to procure a buyer
for certain property at a purchase price
of $9,000, and orally agreed to pay said
defendant a commission of $200 on suc-
cessful conclusion of the employment.
The defendant furnished a prospective
buyer who offered to purchase if he
could qualify and obtain a government
insured loan on the property in the
amount of the purchase price. The de-
fendant Finance Corporation offered to
make such loan for the buyer, and the
plaintiffs executed a deed to the prop-
erty in favor of the buyer and placed
the deed in escrow with the defendant
corporation with agreement that it be
delivered to the buyer upon completion
of the loan transaction and payment
to plaintiff of the loan proceeds of $9,-
000, less deductions made for the pay-
ment of existing liens, encumbrances
and claims against the property and the
fees and costs incident to the loan trans-
action. Thereafter, the said plaintiff
went to the office of the defendant cor-
poration where the defendant Herring-
ton and an agent of the corporation
were present. The plaintiff was there
presented a written statement and
loan closing agreement showing a list of
bills and charges paid out for the loan
proceeds of $9,000, including an item of
$450 to the defendant Herrington, as a
real estate broker’s fee. A check from
the defendant corporation in the amount
of the balance shown by said statement

was handed the said plaintiff and a
check from the said defendant corpora-
tion for $450 made payable to the de-
fendant Herrington was presented to
the said defendant. The plaintiff there
stated in the presence of the defendant
Herrington and the agent of the defend-
ant corporation that Herrington didn’t
have the check coming to him out of the
proceeds of the loan, and stated that he,
the plaintiff, would have to get an at-
torney to see what he could do about it.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff signed the
closing agreement with the statement
showing a deduction of $450 from the
loan proceeds and the payment thereof
to Herrington. The plaintiffs accepted
the check from the defendant corpora-
tion in the amount of the balance as
was shown in said closing statement
and agreement, and on the same day
the plaintiffs cashed said check and
used the proceeds thereof for their pri-
vate purposes.

In Eckroat v. Landrum, 205 Okla. 119,
235 P. 2d 705, it was held:

“In passing on a motion for a di-
rected verdict, the court must concede
to be true the evidence supporting the
view of the party against whom the
motion is made, giving him the benefit
of ail legitimate inferences.

“Where there is any evidence in the
record reasonably tending to support
the allegations of the petition which
would justify a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, it is error for the court to di-
rect a verdict for the defendant.”

The instant action being an action at
law triable to a jury, it was the duty
of the trial court, when ruling on the
motions for a directed verdict, to dis-
regard all the evidence unfavorable to
the plaintiffs and give them the bene-
fit of all legitimate inferences.

By the testimony of the plaintiff R.
C. Dake, it was made to appear that
the defendant Herrington received loan
proceeds from the defendant corpora-
tion rightfully belonging to the plain-
tiffs and to which the defendant Her-
rington was not entitled. With said tes-
timony accepted and viewed in a light

118

most favorable to the plaintiffs, it ap-
pears there is some evidence in the
record raising an issue of fact, and rea-
sonably tending to support the allega~
tions of the plaintiffs’ petition and to
possibly justify a verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendant
Herrington. Accordingly, we find it was
error for the court to direct a verdict
for the defendant Herrington.

According to the testimony of the
plaintiff R. C. Dake, in so far as the
defendant corporation was involved in
the transaction in the disposition of the
loan proceeds, the plaintiffs acceded to
its payment of loan proceeds to the de-
fendant Herrington. In the entire rec-
ord we have found no evidence as
would support a recovery by the plain-
tiffs against the defendant Finance
Corporation.

The judgment in favor of the defend-
ant Finance Corporation is affirmed.

The judgment in favor of the de-
fendant Herrington is reversed and the
cause is remanded for a new trial be-
tween plaintiffs and the defendant Her-
rington.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, DA-
VISON, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur. O'NEAL, J., dissents.

CHAPMAN v. WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAPH CO.

No. 35714. Feb. 17, 1953.
258 P. 2d 825.

W. S. Myers, Tulsa, for plaintiff in
error.

Martin, Logan, Finney. Stanton &
Moyers, Tulsa, for defendant in error.

WILLIAMS, J. The parties are des-
ignated herein as in the trial court.

This case was tried to the court be-
low, upon an agreed and stipulated
statement of the facts, a jury having
first been duly drawn, empaneled and
sworn to try the cause, and then, all
the evidence having been agreed and
stipulated to, jury trial waived by the
parties and the jury by the court dis-
charged. Judgment was rendered A-
pril 3, 1952. No notice of intentions to
appeal was given in open court at the
time or within ten days thereafter.
Instead, plaintiff filed a motion for new
trial which was by the trial court con-
sidered and overruled more than ten
days after the pronouncement of the
original judgment for defendant, to the
order overruling which motion for ne
trial plaintiff excepted and from which
order he first gave notice of intention
to appeal, and from which he has ap-
pealed to this court.

Motion to dismiss has been filed for
the reason that no notice of intention to
appeal was given in time. The mo-
tion to dismiss must be sustained. 1°
O.S. 1951 §954 specifically provides

that the party desiring to appeal shall
give notice in open court either at the
time judgment is rendered or within
ten days thereafter. In Tulsa Masonic
Bldg. Ass’n v. County Treasurer, 205
Okla. 169, 236 P. 2d 487, we held:

“Where all the ultimate facts of a
case are stipulated and the case is so
treated and presented to the trial court,
no motion for new trial is necessary or
proper, and the filing of such motion
does not extend the time within which
appeals may be perfected in the Su-
preme Court.

“The notice of intention to appeal as
provided by 12 O.S. 1941, sec. 954, must
be given within 10 days from the date
of the judgment or order from which
the appeal is taken; and where no
showing is made that the notice of ap-
peal was given within said time, this
court is without jurisdiction to review
the order and the proceeding based
thereon will be dismissed.”

Plaintiff argues that defendant in-
troduced a telegram involved in the
case and that therefore evidence was
presented and that the case does not
come within the rule of Tulsa Masonic
Ass’n v. County Treasurer, supra. A
similar argument was presented and
disapproved in the case of Durham v.
Dalton, 205 Okla. 243, 237 P. 2d 142.
Therein we quoted with approval from
Landers v. Bank of Commerce, 106
Okla. 59, 233 P. 200, wherein it is
stated:

“Where a cause is tried upon an
agreed statement of all the ultimate
facts, leaving for the court the sole
question of the application of the law
to such ultimate facts, a motion for
new trial is unnecessary and unau-
thorized by statute, and does not ex-
tend the time within which an appeal
must be perfected in the Supreme
Court, and the time for perfecting such
appeal runs from the date judgment is
rendered, and not from the date of the
overruling of such unnecessary and un-
authorized motion.”

Appeal dismissed.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, 0’-
NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

119
ALLIED PAINT MFG. CO. v.
BANES et al.

35523. Feb. 17, 1953.

258 P. 2d 826.

No.

E. D. Brewer and George E. Brewer,
Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Gable, Gotwals & Hays, Edwin S.
Hurst, and Joseph A. Moran, Tulsa,
for defendants in error.

CORN, J. This is a consolidated ac-
tion, consisting of four cases by plain-

120

tiff, Allied Paint Manufacturing Com-
pany, each of such cases being based
on a materialman’s lien filed by the
plaintiff against four separate parcels
or real estate owned, one each, by four
separate man-and-wife joint tenancy
defendants.

Each of these four properties con-
sisted of residences which had been
constructed by Alred Construction Com-
pany and H. M. Alred, the then owners,
and after construction one of them had
been sold to each of the four defendant
joint tenancy owners. .

The plaintiff furnished the paint and
wallpaper to Alred for the construction
of these improvements, and on March
26, 1951, filed materialman’s liens for
the said paint and wallpaper bill on the
four properties.

On April 7, 1951, the plaintiff released
all four of the properties from.the liens.

Later, on August 20, 1951, plaintiff
filed the four separate actions herein
consolidated, alleging that its lien re-
leases filed on April 7, 1951, had been
procured without consideration. Plain-
tiff prayed that the lien releases be set
aside for lack of consideration, and that
the liens be reinstated and that they be
foreclosed.

In these four separate actions, plain-
tiff made Alred a party, and asked for
personal judgment against him, as own-
er and builder, and made the four sep-
arate joint-owner groups parties, be-
cause, in the meantime, they had pur-
chased the properties. Plaintiff made
the Deming Investment Company a

- party, because prior to plaintiff’s re-
‘leases of liens Deming Investment Com-
pany had taken a mortgage on each of
the four properties.

Deming Investment Company, by its
attorneys, filed identical answers in
each of the four cases, setting up its
mortgagees, not asking foreclosure, but
alleging priority over plaintiff. The de-
fendants, William A. Brown and Viola
Brown, by their attorney filed a sepa-
rate answer, and the defendants, James
S. Banes and Marien Banes, Mayes

Odell Brown and Orlene Brown, and
Marcus A. Wells, Jr., and Celestine
Wells, by their attorney, filed identi-
cal answers and each asked in the
prayer for title to be quieted.

The court, by agreement of the par-
ties consolidated all four of the cases.

Before the time of trial the plaintiff
dismissed all four of its petitions in the
four separate cases and released and
quitclaimed all four of the properties
involved in the four separate actions.

When the case came on for trial,
plaintiff moved the court to dismiss the
actions as to all parties.

The defendants, Deming Investment
Company and the four joint-owner
groups, objected to dismissal as to their
separate answers and demanded that
they be permitted to go to trial for af-
firmative relief on the issues raised by
their answers.

The court overruled the motion of the
plaintiff to dismiss as to all parties and,
thereafter, the four joint-owner defend-
ants and the Deming Investment Com-
pany filed motions for judgments on
the pleadings.

The consolidated cases came on for
trial on February 18, 1952, and the court
sustained said motions over the objec-
tions of the plaintiff; then, without the
introduction of any evidence, rendered
judgments in favor of the four joint-
owner defendants and the mortgage
company against the plaintiff, quieting
title in them against the plaintiff, and
adjudging that by plaintiff’s dismissal
and releases of lien the plaintiff had
confessed judgment and that the de-
fendants were entitled to have their ti-
tles quieted against the plaintiff and to
have attorneys’ fees against the plain-
tiff, under the mechanic’s and material-
man’s lien statute, and rendered $75 at-
torney fee in each case.

The plaintiff contends there is no af-
firmative issue raised by the, answers
of any of the defendants amounting to a
cross-petition upon which to base a
judgment quieting title in them. In each

of the cases the defendants rely upon
the prayer of their answer as consti-
tuting a cross-petition upon which they
can be given affirmative relief, to wit:

“Wherefore, premises considered, de-
fendant prays that the plaintiff take
nothing by this action; that the court
establish the mortgage of this defend-
ant, set up and herein described to be a
first, valid, and subsisting lien upon
the real estate prior and superior to the
lien and claim of the plaintiff; that
it recover its costs herein expended and
the sum of $150.00 as attorneys’ fees in-
curred by defendant in the defense of
this action; and that this defendant
have such other, further, and equitable
relief as it may be entitled to, prem-
ises considerd.”

In the answer of William A. Brown:

“Wherefore, having fully answered,
defendants ask that plaintiff take noth-
ing by its petition and that the court
quiet the title of the defendants herein
as to the said plaintiff, or as to any
one claiming under or through it, and
that the defendants recover their costs
herein expended.”

The prayer in the answer of the rest
of the defendants is identical to the fol-
lowing, to wit:

“Wherefore, defendants James S.
Banes and Marien Banes, pray that
the plaintiff be denied relief in so far
as it seeks to have the alleged lien
reinstated and foreclosed as to the in-
terest of these defendants; that these
defendants’ title and interest in and to
said above described property be
quieted as against the claims of said
plaintiff; and that said defendants be
allowed their costs herein expended to-
gether with a reasonable attorney fee
and such other relief as may be just
and proper.”

The right of the plaintiff to dismiss
is defined in 12 O.
and 685:

“An action may be dismissed without
prejudice to a future action *** by the
plaintiff before *** final submission
*** to the jury or to the court, where
the trial is by the court.”

“«* * * A plaintiff may at any time be-
fore trial is commenced, on payment

S. 1951 §§683, 684.-

121

of the costs and without any order of
the court, dismiss his action, after the
filing of a petition in intervention or
answer praying for affirmative relief,
but such dismissal shall not prejudice
the right of the intervenor or defendant
to proceed in the action * * *”,

“Tn any place where set-off or count-
erclaim has been presented, the de-
fendant shall have the right of proceed-
ing to the trial of his claim, although the
plaintiff may have dismissed his ac-
tion or failed to appear.”

The plaintiff in its brief cites Haley
v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.) 70 S.W. 2d
348, from which we quote:

“The right of a plaintiff to take a non-
suit (dismiss without prejudice) upon
his own cause of action was considered
of sufficient importance by the Legis-
lature to be given express recognition.

“Owing to unexpected contingencies
that may occur during a trial, it is a
privilege which it may become neces~
sary for the most careful and diligent
litigant to exercise, and it is important
that the substance, and not the shadow
alone, of the right shall be preserved.
eee

“Tt is only when the defendant, by
a counterclaim, seeks some ‘affirmative
relief? that the right of the plaintiff to
discontinue the entire cause is forbid-
den. Obviously the defendant only seeks
such affirmative relief when, by his
own pleadings, he prays for some spe-
cific recovery that cannot be given to
him under pleadings that are strictly
‘defensive, and that serve only to compel
the plaintiff to prove his own cause of
action. The defendant must .not only
pray for affirmative relief, but he must
state facts showing that he has a cause
of action. If the defendant is doing no
more than resisting the plaintiff’s re-
covery, the statutes recognize the right
‘of the plaintiff for his own protection,
to dismiss the suit.”

The plaintiff also contends that the
counterclaim or cross-petition which
can suryive dismissal of the plaintiff’s
petition must pray for relief, distinctive
and separate from the mere defeat of
the plaintiffs cause.

“The various pleas and answers all
are to the effect that the land belongs

122

to the defendant and not to the plain-
tiff. Simply stating the causes why the
plaintiff does not own the land and why
the defendant does, is no more a plea
in reconvention than a plea of not
guilty, in an action of trespass to try
title.” Peck v. McKellar, 33 Tex. 234.

The Supreme Court of California, in
the case of Simpson v. Superior Court,
68 Cal. App. 2d 821, 158 P. 2d 46, held:

“The answers to the three actions, in
addition to the denials in the usual
form alleged from eight to fifteen sep-
arate defenses in substance that, the
complaints do not state a cause of ac-
tion; that the declaration of restrictions
was void and in violation of the Con-
stitutions of the State of California and
of the United States; that said restric-
tions were against public policy; that
said declaration of restrictions was not
duly signed and lacked adequate con-
sideration; that necessary parties are
not included; that said restrictions con-
stitute an ‘illegal restraint upon aliena-
tion’; that the period of time provided
for is indefinite; that the enforcement of
said restrictions would be inequitable;
that the defendants acquired the prop-
erty in question without notice; and that
the character of the community has
changed. * * *

“It is at once evident from the fore-
going that the only issues raised by the
pleadings were whether the contract in
question was valid and enforceable and
whether its enforcement would be equit-
able. * * *

“In other words, the relief sought, if

granted, operates not as a defense but,
affirmatively and positively to defeat
plaintiff’s cause of action. The privilege
of dismissing an action as provided by
Section 581 is designed to afford to
the plaintiff a certain freedom of ac-
tion within the limits prescribed that
cannot be circumscribed indirectly.
Any attempt to wrest such control in
any manner except as provided and
clearly intended by its provisions, is
ineffective for all purposes.”

In the case of Mathews v. Sniggs,
75 Okla. 108, 182 P. 703, we held:

“A counterclaim or cross-petition
must be pleaded as fully and distinctly,

and with the same substantial requi-
sites, as on original cause of action; it
must be sufficient within itself without
recourse to other parts of the pleading,
or other pleadings, unless by express
reference. It should be separately
stated, and must show with certainty
the character of the claim, how it ac-
erued, and the facts making it a proper
subject of counterclaim or cross-peti-
tion.”

After an examination of the various
answers of the defendants, we hold
that none of the defendants pleaded a
cross-petition or a counterclaim.

The plaintiff also asserts that the trial
court could not render a judgment
quieting title in the absence of an al-
legation and proof that the pleader is
the owner and in possession of real
estate involved and that opposing party
is claiming some right, title or interest
therein, and cites: Clewell v. Cottle, 99
Okla, 84, 225 P. 946, Martin v. Rogers,
151 Okla. 51, 1 P. 2d 696; and Robert-
son, Trustee, v. Knighten, Trustee, 192
Okla. 678, 139 P. 2d 601, all of which
support his contention.

We now come to the question of
whether the defendants are entitled to
an attorney fee, 42 O.S. 1951 §176 pro-
vides:

“In an action brought to enforce any
lien the party for whom judgment is
rendered shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney’s fee, to be fixed
by the court, which shall be taxed as
costs in the action.”

Clearly, under the facts in this: case,
the defendants are not entitled to an at-
torney fee.

The judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded, with direction to the
trial court to set aside and hold for
naught the judgment rendered herein
and sustain the motion of the plaintiff
to dismiss.

DAVISON, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. WELCH, J.,
dissents.

YORK et al. v. GARRISON, Co. Supt.,
et al.

No. 34858. Feb. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1953.
258 P. 2d 835.

W. B. Garrett, Mangum, and Tolbert
& Gillespie, Hobart, for plaintiffs in
error.

Hollis Arnett, Mangum, Jack Sas-
seen, Co. Atty., Greer County, Man-
gum, for defendants in error.

DAVISON, J. This proceeding was
instituted in the district court of Greer
county, Oklahoma, by R. S. York and
some seventeen other individuals, as
plaintiffs, against Ray Garrison, county
superintendent of said county, and the
boards of trustees of two consolidated
school districts and the individual mem-
bers of said boards, as defendants, seek-
ing, upon review on certiorari, the vaca-
tion of an order of said county super-
intendent, consolidating and uniting the
two said school districts pursuant
to, and as a result of, a school district
election held for that purpose. The trial
court denied plaintiffs the relief sought
and they have brought the matter here
by appeal.

One of the principal grounds of de-
fense relied upon by the defendants in
the trial court, and again insisted upon

- here, was that certiorari did not lie to
review the proceedings and the order
of the county superintendent com-
plained of. In this connection two facts
stand out significantly. First, the or-
der of the county superintendent, car-
rying out the directive of the people
as expressed at the election, was for
the union of two consolidated school
districts. Second, the present action on
certiorari was instituted in the district
court and brought here by appeal. The
entire controversy is determinable by
an interpretation of the controlling stat-
ute (70 O.S. 1941 §251) as it existed,

with amendments, revisions and par-

124

tial repeal, on April 19, 1949, the date
of the county superintendent’s order
which is here under attack. Said sec-
tion 251 was enacted in 1913 (1913 S.L.
534) and was subsequently amended in
1917 and 1919 (1917 S.L. 473; 1919 S.L.
260). It consisted of two parts, name-
ly, the statute proper dealing with the
formation of consolidated school dis-
tricts, and the proviso thereto, deal-
ing with attachment to a consolidated
school district of all or a part of an ad-
jacent district.

The first part of the statute, dealing
with the formation of the district, pro-
vided for an election to accomplish the
result. The duties of the county super-
intendent, after the election, in issu-
ing an order “declaring school districts
disorganized and a consolidated dis-
trict composed thereof organized, in-
volve the exercise of no discretion on
the part of such superintendent, but
are purely ministerial in their charac-
ter.” State ex rel. Freeling, Atty. Gen.,
v. Ross, Co. Supt. 76 Okla.. i1, 183
P. 918; followed in the cases of King,
Co. Supt., v. State ex rel. Gossett, Co.
Atty., 126 Okla. 130, 258 P. 755, and In
re Consolidation of School Dists. Nos.
14 and 20, 180 Okla. 271, 69 P. 2d 365.
And when his acts are purely minis-
terial, no appeal therefrom is author-
ized. Id. However, the order of the
county superintendent calling the elec-
tion for consolidation was a quasi ju-
dicial act from which an appeal would
lie under the general statutes. King v.
State ex rel. O'Reilly, Co. Atty., 83

Okla. 297, 201 P. 641; Board of County -

Com’rs of Carter County v. Woodford
Consolidated School Dist. No, 36, 165
Okla. 227, 25 P. 2d 1057.

The latter part of the statute, deal-
ing with annexation of territory to a
previously formed district, provided for
the accomplishment of the result with-
out an election, but by order of the
county superintendent upon petition by
the required number of electors. There
was an appeal from that order of the
county superintendent under the gen-
eral statutes because it, too, was a qua-
si judicial act.

“The sections of the common school
statutes which provide for appeals are
applied to the action of the county su-
perintendent where he acts in a judi-
cial or quasi judicial capacity.” King,
Co. Supt., v. State ex rel. Gossett, su-
pra, and In re Consolidation of School
Dists. Nos. 14 and 20, supra.

By the acts of 1941 and 1943 (1941 S.
L, 410; 1943 S. L. 208), the proviso or
second part of the statute under con-
sideration (O.S, 1941 §251) was repeal-
ed and a new method of annexation pro-
vided for, wherein the result was ac-
complished by an election in much the
same method that consolidation had
theretofore been accomplished under
the provisions of the first part of the
original statute. The 1941 act appears
in O.S. 1941, under Title 70, §890.1 et
seq.; the 1943 act appears in O.S. 1943
Supp., under Title 70, §891.1 et seq.
That these 1941 and 1943 sections re-
pealed and supplanted the proviso of
70 O.S. 1941 §251, was the holding of
this court in the case of State ex rel.
Graham et al. v. Monsey, Co. Supt.,
198 Okla. 183, 176 P. 2d 1021.

By 70 O.S, 1943 Supp. $891.9 (which
is the same as 70 O.S. 1941 §890.7), it
was provided that “no school district
or part of school district shall hereaft-
er be annexed to or united with any
other district or part of district except
in the manner provided in his Act.”
Such provision makes the 1943 Act ap-
plicable to all situations where, as here,
the organization of a new consolidated
district is accomplished by the union of
one consolidated district with another.
The above-quoted part of the statute
was applied to a slightly different fact
situation and was discussed at length
in the case of School Board of Cons.
School Dist. No. 47 v. Monsey, Co.
Supt., 198 Okla. 41, 175 P. 2d 76.

Section 891.5 of the 1943 Act further
provides, in situations where such act
applies, for an appeal from the order
of the county superintendent, announc-
ing the result of the election and de-

* claring the consolidation, That appeal is

to the district court where, as was held

in the case of Huebert et al. v. Keen,
190 Okla. 655, 127 P. 2d 180:

“On appeal to district court from an
order of the county superintendent of
public instruction sustaining or deny-
ing a petition for the annexation of ter-
ritory to a school district, *** the func-
tions of the court are to review the
whole record and to consider any prop-
er evidence offered by the parties,
and to make judicial determination of
the question whether the Act was sub-
stantially complied with, and to affirm
or vacate the order as the circum-
stances may require, or to render such
order as the superintendent should have
made in the first instance.”

The practical effect of the 1943 Act is
readily apparent. By one proceeding
in the district court all steps in the for-
mation of the new district could be re-
viewed. Under the earlier procedure,
applicable in the case of In re Con-
solidation of School Dists. Nos. 14 and
20, supra, the proceedings up to the
calling of the election were review-
able under the general appeal statute
and the final order, being ministerial,
could not be reviewed. Further, under
the 1943 Act, any proper person feeling

* aggrieved by the judgment of the dis-
trict court had the right to appeal
therefrom to this court. Alma Joint
Cons. School Dist. No. 16 v. Fox Cons.
School District No, 74, 195 Okla. 202,
156 P. 2d 607.

From this discussion it is clearly ap-
parent that when, on April 19, 1949, the
order of the county superintendent was
made in the instant case, the same was
subject to review on appeal to the dis-
trict court from whose judgment an ap-
peal lay to this court. Since, therefore,
there was an adequate remedy by ap-
peal, certiorari was not proper. In the
case of Consolidated School Dist. No. 8
v. Wilder, Co. Supt., 148 Okla. 91, 297
P. 280, it was said:

125

“Certiorari is not a writ of right, but
is to be granted or not in the discre-
tion of the court, and the writ will issue
only where no appeal or proceeding in
error lies, and ordinarily where the er-
ror cannot otherwise be corrected.”

To support their position that certior-
ari was proper, the plaintiffs rely,
among others, upon the following
eases: Huebert v. Keen, supra; Con-
solidated School Dist. No. C-41 v. Keen,
191 Okla. 188, 127 P. 2d 184; McCoy v.
Hall, 191 Okla. 311, 131 P. 2d 60; Peti-
tioners of School Dist. No. 9 v. Jones,
193 Okla. 9, 140 P. 2d 922. The general
holding in those cases was that certi-
orari from this court was the proper
method of reviewing the judgment of
the district court after appeal from the
order of the county superintendent.
However, those cases arose prior to
the 1943 Act and were controlled by the
1941 Act, which, by section 890.2, al-
though providing for appeal from the
county superintendent’s order to the
district court, also provided that the
judgment of the district court was final.
Such was not thé case after 1943.
Hence, the cited cases do not here ap-
ply.

Having reached the conclusion that
appeal was proper and that the lower
court did not have jurisdiction to re-
view, upon certiorari, the order of the
county superintendent, announcing the
union of the two school districts into
one, and, since the judgment of that
court accomplished the proper result
by denying plaintiff any relief, we need
not determine the other questions pre-
sented and will affirm the judgment
appealed from.

Judgment is affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, AR-
NOLD, O’NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
concur. WILLIAMS, J., dissents.

126

OKLAHOMA COCA-COLA BOTTLING
CO. v. DILLARD.

No. 35252. Jan, 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1953.
2538 P. 2d 847.

Rittenhouse, Hanson & Evans, Okla-
homa City, for plaintiff in error.

Howard K. Berry and James W. (Bill)
Berry, Oklahoma City, for defendant in
error.

HALLEY, V.C.J. Jessie Dillard sued
Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany and Safeway Stores, Inc., for
damages for mental and physical pain
and suffering alleged to have been the
result of drinking a bottle of Coca-Cola
which contained a dead Oriental cock-
roach, which insect in turn contained
certain poisonous insecticides which
contaminated the contents of the bottle,
made her acutely ill, and resulted in a
major abdominal operation.

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant
bottling company processed, bottled,
and securely capped the bottle of Coca-
Cola which she dfank and advertised
it as a refreshing and wholesome bev-
erage for human consumption, and
wholesaled it to Safeway Stores, Inc.,
in Oklahoma City, from whom she pur-
chased the bottle mentioned.

‘This action is based upon the implied
warranty rule to the effect that where
the processor of foods or beverages
seals or caps its product in such man-
ner that it reaches the consumer in the .
same condition as when it left the proc-
essor, there is an implied warranty
that such product is wholesome and fit
for human consumption.

Plaintiff alleges that on the afternoon
of August 15, 1949, she took a bottle
of Coca-Cola from the refrigerator in
her home, having previously purchased
it from Safeway Stores, Inc., which
had obtained it at wholesale from de-
fendant bottling company; that she re-
moved the cap with a can opener and
drank the contents of the bottle. That
the liquid had a queer taste, and upon
finishing the bottle she discovered that
it contained a dead cockroach. Her hus-
band replaced the cap on the bottle
and it remained in its then condition
until a chemist made an analysis of
the roach and found that it contained
traces of arsenic, fluoride, and copper.

It is further alleged that on the same
evening she attended a buffet dinner

where she ate a number of foods such
as slaw, potato salad, baked beans and
weiners, and that upon returning to her
home that night she became violently
ill, vomited and suffered severe abdom-
inal pains. She called her physician,
who gave her a sedative about mid-
night; and upon returning next morn-
ing and finding her condition worse,
he had her admitted to a hospital,
where she underwent a major abdom-
inal operation four days later; and that
her injuries were permanent and pro-
gressive.

Defendant answered by general denial
and pleaded negligence on the part of
the plaintiff in drinking the Coca-Cola
without first observing what was in
the bottle.

The jury found for the plaintiff and
awarded her damages in the sum of
$7,500. It found for Safeway Stores, Inc.,
and that defendant is not involved in
this appeal. We shall refer to the par-
ties as they appeared in the trial court.

The principal contention of defendant
is that the verdict in favor of plaintiff
is not supported by sufficient competent
evidence. The rule is well established
in this state that where an injury is of
such character as to require expert
medical testimony to determine the
cause and extent thereof, it can be de-
termined only by those skilled in med-
ical science and not by the testimony
of laymen. Cohenour v. Smart, 205
Okla. 668, 240 P. 2d 91; and the more
recent case of Cushing Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. Francis, 206 Okla. 553, 245
P. 2d 84. The facts before us present
such a case. Expert testimony is re-
quired to establish the causal connec-
tion between the ingestion by plaintiff
of a poisonous beverage and her subse-
quent illness and operation. The plain-
tiff introduced the testimony of Dr.
Kelso, a qualified medical expert, and
that of Mr. McCarroll, a qualified
chemist, who made an analysis of the
contents of the roach some eighteen
months after plaintiff discovered it in
the Coca-Cola bottle from which she had
just imbibed the contents. Mr. McCar-

127

roll testified that he found traces of ar-
senic, flouride, and copper, elements
often used in insecticides. The first
two elements named are classed as ir-
ritants, though copper is not.

Dr. Kelso testified that his diagnosis
of plaintiff’s illness, before the opera-
tion, was “an intestinal obstruction
from a mechanical cause, either from
an adhesion or what we call inosecep-
tion (sie; intussusception)—telescoping
of the bowel * * *”; that after the opera-
tion he decided that she was suffering
from “a chemical peritonitis”, and that
it was his opinion “that her illness was
due to the contents—some of this ma-
terial that had been ingested—the con-
tents of the bottle of Coca-Cola.”

Defendant claims that Dr. Kelso’s
testimony is not sufficient to warrant
submission to the jury of the question of
the cause of plaintiff's injury. It asserts
that his testimony, and all reasonable
inferences therefrom, force the jury
to speculate as to what really caused
plaintiff’s illness and resultant suffer-
ing. We deem it necessary to quote the
pertinent portions of Dr. Kelso’s testi-
mony as to the causal connection be-
tween plaintiff's drinking the Coca-
Cola and her illness which followed.

Dr. Kelso said that plaintiff’s health
had been excellent; that after he was
called to attend her on the night of
August 15, 1949, she vomited and suf-
fered abdominal pains until he deemed
an operation necessary; that upon open-
ing’ the abdominal cavity he found one
and one-half pints of straw-colored
fluid, and that her small intestine was
red and inflamed. No chemical analysis
was made of the vomitus, the urine, or
the fluid found in the abdominal cavity,
nor was any analysis made of the tis-
sues or organs. He was asked for his
opinion in regard to plaintiff's illness,
and said:

“I was of the opinion that, this pa~
tient being well and then followed by
the illness, and with the history ob-
tained, there was no other conclusion
to draw than that the contents of what
she had ingested had to be taken into

128

consideration as the cause of her ill-
ness,””

He further testified:

“Q. What was your opinion, Doctor?
A. I was of the opinion that her illness
was due to the contents—some of the
material that had been ingested.

“Q, And what was that material? A.
The contents of the bottle of Coca~
Cola.

“Q. You testified yesterday that you
did not know what compound or con-
dition would be created by putting this
roach into six ounces of bottled Coca-
Cola? A. That’s right.

“Q. You cannot say whether or not
that caused her condition? A. I can’t.

“Q. And, not knowing how much of
any substance was in that bottle and
not making any tests to determine what,
if any, arsenic, fluoride or copper was
in these secretions, the vomitus, the
urine, you cannot state whether or not
she ingested any substance in that
which would cause this condition, is
that right? A. Not positively: no sir.”

Further:

“Q. In all your practice, have you
ever seen a condition of this kind
caused by a trace of fluoride? A. No,
sir.

“Q. This is the first one? A. I am
sure that I have never seen one.

“Q. Have you ever seen one caused
by a trace of copper? A. No, sir.

“Q. And have never seen one caused
by a trace of arsenic? A. That’s right;
I never have.

“Q. And you don’t know whether
there were any of those substances in
this lady? A. No,

“Q. Do you know what they found in
the bottle? A. Just those three sub-
stances, I don’t know whether they
tested it for other things or not.

“Q. Do you know whether those three,
separately or individually, traces of
them, ever caused such a condition
as you found here? A. Not a trace, * * *

“Q. And you say that this lady’s con-
dition could not have been caused from

a trace of the substances I mentioned,
is that right? A. Not from a trace; no,
sir.”

He further testified that the condi-
tion of the plaintiff could have been
caused by other factors than the
drinking of the Coca-Cola, but his opin-
ion was that her suffering was caused
by the contents of the bottle of Coca-
Cola. While the testimony shows that
the roach contained only a trace of the
poisons mentioned, it was analyzed
more than a year after it had been left
in the bottle, which contained only a
small, dried trace of fluid. There is no
showing that only a trace of the poison
had been dissolved in the contents of the
bottle before it was consumed by the
plaintiff.

There is no direct evidence to indi-
cate that the roach was not in the bottle
when it left the control of the defendant
bottling company. It is possible, but
highly improbable, that the bottle had
been opened and the roach permitted
to enter it after it was delivered to the
retailer. The rule of implied warranty
announced in Ada Coca-Cola Bottling
Co, v. Asbury, 206 Okla. 269, 242 P, 2d
417, is applicable here; and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, as announced in
Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Newton, 205 Okla. 360, 237 P. 2d 627,
is also applicable. The presence of a
dead insect in a sealed bottle of bever-
age which is offered for human con-
sumption speaks for itself and makes a
prima facie case of negligence on the
part of the bottler, in the absence of any
proof that the bottle probably was not
in the same condition when it reached
the ultimate consumer as when it left
the bottler.

Defendant alleges error in the refu-
sal of the court to give its requested in-
struction No. 14. The substance of that
instruction was that if the jury found
that plaintiff drank a bottle of Coca-
Cola containing a foreign substance, it
must not presumé that the injury re-
sulted therefrom, and that the burden
remained upon the plaintiff to prove
that she was in fact injured by drinking
a deleterious and harmful substance

PO

contained in the bottle. We find that in-
struction No. 21, given to the jury, in-
structs it that:

«* * * Even if you should find from
the evidence that the bottle of Coca-
Cola contained a roach and a trace of
copper and arsenic and sodium fluoride,
before you can find for plaintiff you
must find that such substances in the
Bottle of Coca-Cola, or mixed with the
Coca-Cola, was the proximate cause of
plaintiffs illmess, and unless you so
find, your verdict must be for the de-
fendant.”

While the instruction given omits the
requirement of expert testimony to es-
tablish the causal connection between
the injury and alleged wrongful acts of
the defendant, it clearly tells the jury
that unless it finds that plaintiff’s in-
juries were caused by drinking the pol-
luted Coca-Cola it must find for the de-
fendant. We think the instruction given
fairly states the law of causal connec-
tion, and that the omission mentioned
did not result in misleading the jury
and constituted, at most, only harmless
error.

The rule is well established in this
state that where instructions, when
taken as a whole, fairly state the law,
they will be held sufficient, despite the
fact that one or more of them, stand-
ing alone, might be incomplete. Shay-
ler v. West, 199 Okla. 386, 185 P. 2d
957,

As to the permanency of plaintiff's
injuries, the defendant complains of in-
struction No. 18, which instructs the
jury that it may take into considera-
tion, in connection with the amount of
damages awarded, “the question of
whether the injuries are permanent or
temporary.” Defendant contends that
the testimony is not sufficient to war-
rant the consideration of whether plain-
tiff’s injuries are permanent. Dr. Kelso
testified that the scar made in the ab-
dominal operation was permanent, and
that plaintiff “has been very slow in
her recovery.” He further testified that
plaintiff had considerable pain in her
right arm shortly before the trial, but

129

that it was due to “the degeneration
of the structure between two of her
cervical vertebrae. She had no doubt
had that for a good many years. After
a prolonged illness, and she begins to
have pain from it, one would certainly
give some thought that the illness would
contribute somewhat to the onset of this
condition, which we believe she had
had for many years.”

The plaintiff, after testifying that she
was not able to do any work for some
time after she left the hospital on Sep-
tember 3, 1949, then testified:

“Q. Have you noticed any particular
difference in your physical strength
since this operation? A. I don’t have
the strength that I did.

“Q. What do you notice about the
condition of your stomach—that is, with
reference to your ability to digest food?
A. Well, there are some foods that I
don’t digest at all.

“Q. What, if any, difference is there
in the function of your nervous system,
so far as you can tell? A. I think that
I am more nervous than I was.”

We think that the foregoing testimony
is sufficient to warrant the instruc-
tion given. At least, it is certain that
the scar from a six- or seven-inch
abdominal incision is permanent, and
that future adhesions may occur. The
plaintiff was entitled to have the ques-
tion of permanency submitted to the
jury if there was any competent testi-
mony indicating that her injuries were
permanent, however slight and unim-
portant such permanent injuries might
be. A year and a half had elapsed
from the date of her operation up to the
date of the trial. The general rule is
stated in Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v.
Armour, 172 Okla. 442, 45 P. 2d 754, as
follows:

“Where the very nature of plain-
tiff’s injuries and the condition of plain-
tiff at the time of the trial are such-
that the jury may reasonably infer that
plaintiff will suffer some future pain,
it is not error to instruct the jury that
such pain and suffering as appears rea-
sonably certain that plaintiff will suf~

130° Le

fer in the future, as a result of his in-
juries, may be considered in determin-
ing the amount of recovery in an action
for damages for personal injuries.”

Defendant’s expert testimony is very
elaborate and complete. We have con-
sidered it carefully, especially that
pased upon the hospital chart and the
opinions of experts to the effect that
they found nothing to indicate that
plaintiff’s illness was caused by drink-
ing the bottle of Coca-Cola. The evi-
dence of defendant showed that it used
the utmost care in the manufacture
and bottling of the Coca-Cola. It ap-
parently uses every known modern de-
vice and scientific equipment to avoid
the inclusion in its bottled beverage of
any unwholesome element. However,
the jury found for the plaintiff.

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed.

CORN, JOHNSON, O’NEAL, and
BINGAMAN, JJ., concur. WELCH,
GIBSON, and DAVISON, JJ., concur in
conclusion.

McCOWEN v. THE SISTERS OF MOST
PRECIOUS BLOOD OF ENID et al.
No. 34854, Feb. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1953.

258 P. 2d 880.

Leon J. York, Brown Moore, and
Preston Moore, Stillwater, for plaintiff
in error.

A. R. Swank, A. R. Swank, Jr., and
E. C. Swank, Stillwater, for defendants
in error,

JOHNSON, V.C.J. The parties appear
in the same order as in the trial court
and will be referred to herein as they
there appeared,

This is an action by Mrs. George B.
McCowen against the Sisters Adorers of
the Most Precious Blood of Enid, a cor-
poration, and Sister M. Walburga. The
record discloses that the defendant Sis-
ters Adorers of the Most Precious Blood
was the lessee and operator of the
Stillwater Municipal Hospital. The other
defendant, Sister M. Walburga, was em-
ployed as one of the nurses.

Plaintiff's evidence was that on May
30, 1947, plaintiff was admitted to de-
fendant’s hospital for the purpose of
surgery by her personal physician, Dr.
Howard L. Puckett. She was prepared
and taken to the operating room by
nurses employed by the defendant cor-
poration and placed upon an operating
table where she was given a “spinal
block” by her physician. After admin-
istering the anesthetic, he left plain-
tiff in charge of the nurses and went
mto an adjoining room to scrub his
hands in preparation for the operation.
During his absence, and without any
instructions from him but in line of
duty, the nurse, Sister Walburga, pro-
ceeded to place plaintiff’s legs in de-
vices commonly referred to as stirrups.

‘of the table.

131

These instruments were attached on
each side of the foot or lower end of
the operating table and were held in
place by a set of screws and could be
removed from the table, or raised or
lowered to accommodate the size of the
patient. They were designed in such a
way that plaintifi’s legs, from her hips
to her knees, were held in a vertical
position while the calves of her legs
were permitted to rest in the trough-
like devices and extend in a horizontal
position. When plaintiff’s legs were
placed in the stirrups, the lower end of
the table was let down by means of a
screw type crank which permitted the
lower part of her back to extend over
the end of the table. When the drop leaf
of the table was let down, the entire
weight of the lower part of the plain-
tiff’s body was supported by the stir-
rups. While plaintiff was in this posi-
tion, Mrs. Hanson, the surgical nurse,
observed that the stirrups were im-
properly attached, or were in reverse
order, and suggested that Sister Wal-
burga change them so that they would
be more comfortable and would not in-
terfere with the patient’s circulatory
system. Without raising the drop leaf
end of the table, Sister Walburga pro-
ceeded to change the stirrups and, in
doing so, permitted Mrs. McCowen’s
legs to fall to the floor which caused
her body to slide forward over the end
The fall allegedly caused
severe bodily injuries, or injuries to
plaintiff's back.

After the adduction of all the evi-
dence of the parties, the trial court
sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's evi-
dence against the hospital and directed
a verdict for the defendant hospital on
the ground that Sister Walburga was
not an agent of the hospital, but was
the agent of Dr. Puckett, the operating
surgeon, at the time of the accident,
but submitted the question of Sister
Walburga’s negligence to the jury. A
verdict of $8,000 was returned against
her. Motions for a new trial were filed
by each of the parties. Plaintiff’s mo-
tion was overruled but a new trial was
granted Sister Walburga on the theory

132 -

that plaintiff's counsel had made a
prejudicial remark to the jury during
his closing argument. It is from this ac~
tion of the trial court that plaintiff
appeals.

Plaintiff seeks reversal on two prop-
ositions. First, that the trial court erred
in sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff’s
evidence against the defendant hospital
and in directing a verdict in its favor,
and, second, error of the court in grant~
ing Sister Walburga a new trial and
vacating the judgment rendered against
her.

Defendant hospital contends that the
codefendant, Sister Walburga, was a
general employee of the hospital and
was temporarily loaned to Dr. Puckett
and at the time of the accident was
working under his directions and con-
trol, by reason of which the Doctor and
the nurse, whose negligence caused the
injury, were responsible but not the hos-
pital. It was further contended that Dr.
Puckett was present in the operating
room and discovered the stirrups were
placed in reverse position and directed
Sister Walburga to change them. On the
other hand, plaintiff contends that Dr.
Puckett had no right to select the
nurses to help him; that if their serv-
ices were unsatisfactory he could not
discharge them, but had to accept the
ones that were assigned to him by the
hospital, and that he could either use
them or walk out and take his patients
elsewhere. In this connection, it was
shown by the evidence that the nurses
were trained to place the patients on
the operating table and to adjust the
stirrups and that it was part of their
routine duties as nurses.

The crux of plaintiff’s first proposi-
tion is that an issue of fact on the
question of agency was raised by the
pleadings and evidence and that the
court erred in not submitting the ques-
tion to the jury under proper instruc-
tions; that is, as to whether at the time
of the accident, Sister Walburga was an
agent and employee of Dr. Puckett and
under his control, or was she an agent
and servant of the hospital?

Plaintiff and Dr. Puckett testified
that Dr. Puckett, after administering
the spinal block, left the operating
room and went into an adjoining room
to “scrub up” preparatory to perform-
ing an. operation upon plaintiff; that
at the time of the accident Dr. Puckett
was not actually directing or supervis-
ing the work of Sister Walburga, but
that when the accident occurred she
was performing her routine duties as a
nurse for the hospital in preparing the
patient for the operation. Dr. Puckett
testified further that he had no choice
regarding the selection of nurses to as-
sist him in performing surgical opera-
tions in this hospital; that he had to ac-
cept them as they were assigned or
walk out. The defendants’ evidence
was in conflict with that of the plain-
tiff’s and Dr. Puckett’s, The codefend-
ant, Sister Walburga, and Mrs. Hanson,
the surgical nurse, testified that Dr.
Puckett was present and directed Sis-
ter Walburga to change the stirrups.
Other witnesses for the defendant testi-
fied that Dr. Puckett had the right to
select the nurses who were to assist
him and the right to discharge them in
the event they were unsatisfactory and
that such nurses were under his control.

Obviously, there is a conflict in the
testimony on the issue of agency which
is a question of fact. It is a fundamen-
tal principle of our system of jurispru-
dence in trials by jury that all ques-
tions of law must be decided by the
court, and all questions of fact, and
those depending upon disputed testi-
mony, by the jury; and, when the
facts pertaining to the existence or non-
existence of an agency are conflicting,
or conflicting inferences may be drawn
from the evidence the question pre-
sented is one of fact for the jury, or
for the court as the trier of fact if the
ease is tried without a jury. And even
though the evidence is not full or satis-
factory, it is the better practice to
submit the question to the triers of
fact. 2 Am. Jur., Agency, §454, p. 359.
(See Oklahoma cases cited in foot-
notes.) Applying this rule to the case
at bar, it was error for the trial court

to refuse to submit the issue of the
existence or nonexistence of agency to
the jury under proper instructions and
sustain the demurrer to plaintiff's evi-
dence and direct a verdict for the hos-
pital.

However, defendant hospital argues
and quotes at length from the evidence
to show that Dr. Puckett was in full
charge of the operation at all times,
from the time the patient was taken
into the operating room until she was
removed therefrom, and asserts that if
she sustained any injury as a result
of her legs falling after the spinal
block, it was the responsibility of the
operating surgeon who was directly in
charge; that the undisputed evidence
shows that Dr. Puckett was the plain-
tiffs family physician; that she em-
ployed him to perform a corrective op-
eration; that he was a member of the
hospital staff and made arrangements
for the operation the day before with
the hospital authorities; that the plain-
tiff went to the hospital the evening be-
fore the operation; that the following
morning she was taken to the operat-
ing room and Mrs. Hanson and Sister
‘Walburga were made available to the
surgeon as his assistants in the per-
formance of the operation; that the
plaintiff patient was prepared for the
operation under the doctor’s direction;
that he administered the spinal injec-
tion which immobilized the lower part
of her body and made her helpless and
immune to pain; that Dr. Puckett ad-
mitted that these nurses were assigned
to him and that he accepted their serv-
ices; that he then turned his back and
went into the scrub room, which was
not more than five to ten feet from
the operating table, with the door
open; that while the incident of chang-
ing the stirrups occurred, the doctor
was standing over the patient, but that
whether he was or not, the same rule
would apply; that Dr. Puckett had
started the operation; that he was in
charge at all times; that the hospital
authorities had no supervisory or con-
trolling power over the patient from
the time she was taken into the operat-

133

ing room until she was wheeled out;
that under the facts Sister Walburga
was, in the performance of this opera-
tion, the agent of the doctor, and not
the hospital; that Dr. Puckett was the
overmaster and was responsible. The
eases relied on to sustain this argu-
ment are: Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla.
203, 221 P. 752, 60 A.L.R. 137; Denton v.
Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 52 US. 141;
Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Okla. 270,
280 P. 820; Flower Hospital v. Hart,
178 Okla. 447, 62 P. 2d 1248; Hull v.
Enid General Hospital Foundation, 194
Okla. 446, 152 P. 2d 693; Letcher v.
Skiver, 99 Okla. 269, 226 P. 1029; Ran-
dolph v. Oklahoma City General*Hos-
pital, 180 Okla. 513, 71 P. 2d 607, and
Tulsa Hospital Association v. Juby, 73
Okla. 243, 175 P. 519,

The rule deduced from the above
cases is that where a hospital nurse,
although not in the regular employ of
the operating surgeon, is under his spe-
cial supervision and control during the
operation, the relationship of master
and servant exists and the surgeon is
liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Aderhold v. Bishop, supra.
This rule is subject to certain excep-
tions as in Flower Hospital v. Hart,
supra, wherein we said:

“For defendant (the Hospital) to avail
the plea of over-mastership, or subjec-
tion to the surgeon, which is settled law,
it must meet the requirements that the
surgeon ‘actually exercised supervision
and control over the servants’ of the
hospital. (Thomas v. Great Western
Mining Co., 150 Okla. 212, 1 P. 2d 165),
at the time of the negligence, or lack
of care, to ‘protect its patients in such
manner as their condition may render
necessary” ” (Emphasis ours.)

and in Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App.
2d 656, 62 P. 2d 1075, citing Aderhold v.
Bishop, supra, it was held that a sur-
geon could not be held responsible for
the negligence of a hospital nurse in
performing her duties in the operating
room unless the surgeon exercising or-
dinary care could or should have been
able to prevent injuries caused by the

134

nurse’s negligence. In the body of the

opinion, it was said:

“But it has been held that where a
hospital nurse although not in the reg-
ular employ of an operating surgeon,
is under his special supervision and
control during the operation the rela-
tion of master and servant exists, and
that the surgeon is liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior for the
nurse’s negligence.’ Aderhold v. Bishop,
94 Okla. 203, 221 P. 752. We think it
plain from the evidence that the acts of
preparation, performed by Miss Mc-
Kinnon were not done under the special
supervision and control of Dr. Prindle;
on the contrary, as we have seen, they
were performed by her in his absence.
That they were done at his request or
direction has no significance, since she
was merely attending to duties devolv-
ing upon her as an employee of the
hospital; and whether performed by
her at the direction of an officer of the
hospital made in pursuance of a pre-
vious notification by the doctor (as they
well could have been), or upon the
request of the doctor made directly to
her, cannot affect the legal situation.
(Emphasis ours.)

It is a matter of common knowledge
that the preparation of a patient for
surgery in the hospital operating room
is usually done by the hospital’s nursing
staff and the charges therefor are a
part of the hospital fees and not the
surgeon’s fee. If the evidence of the
plaintiff and her doctor, under proper
instructions, had been submitted to
the jury and the jury believed it, then
the negligence of the nurse which caused
the injury occurred during the absence
of the doctor and during the prepara-
tion of the hospitals patient for sur-
gery by her physician and certainly the
above emphasized rules would be ap-
plicable in the case at bar.

Plaintiff's second proposition that the
court erred in granting defendant Sis-
ter Walburga a new trial and vacating
the judgment rendered against her is
without merit.

The record discloses that the motion
for a new trial was sustained because

plaintiffs counsel in his argument to
the jury said:

“Although the hospital was out of it,
that if they awarded plaintiff a judg-
ment they should award her a substan-
tial one, that they could collect it with-
out taking money off of anybody.”

The jury may have been prejudicial-
ly influenced against the defendant
Nurse Walburga by this irrelevant re-
mark of counsel which clearly was cal-
culated to convey to the jury the knowl-
edge that the nurse was protected
against loss. It was therefore not error
to grant such defendant a new trial.
See Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Gold-
man, 175 Okla. 300, 52 P. 2d 1033; Han-
kins v. Hall, 176 Okla. 79, 54 P. 2d
609 and Berry v. Park, 185 Okla. 118, 90
P. 2d 425, and authorities cited therein.

‘The cause is reversed and remanded,
with directions to vacate the order di-
recting a verdict for the defendant hos-
pital and reinstate the cause, overrule
the demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence and
grant plaintiff a new trial. The action
of the trial court granting Sister Wal-
burga a new trial is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,

O'NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., concur.
be

BAKER et al. v. FINNELL et al.
No. 35114. Feb. 24, 1953.
253 P. 2d 1064.

F. E. Riddle and A. C. Elliott, Tulsa,
for plaintiffs in error.

Bassman & Gordon, Claremore, and
John R. Woodard, Tulsa, for defend-
ants in error.

WILLIAMS, J. For convenience, the
parties to this appeal are referred to
as in the trial court.

In 1928, Bertie Weaver, a widow, pur-
chased 160 acres of land in Rogers
county, which, together with certain
real estate in the city of Tulsa, is the
property involved in this action. She
immediately thereafter moved onto the
160 acres with Charles Finnell, and
they lived there the rest of their lives.
There is some controversy as to wheth-
er they became common-law husband
and wife, but a determination of that
question is not necessary in this case.
They were married in a ceremonial
marriage in 1941. Bertie Finnell (for-
merly Weaver) died intestate in 1948,
and Charles Finnell was appointed ad-
ministrator of her estate, in the county
court of Rogers county.

Bertie Finnell’s heirs were her hus-
band, three brothers, one sister, and a
niece and nephew. All of the heirs men-
tioned, except one brother, and her hus-
band, were plaintiffs in the action in the
lower court and prosecute this appeal.

135

In July, 1948, plaintiffs herein hired
attorney Jack E. Gordon to represent
them in protecting whatever interests
they might have in the estate of Ber-
tie Finnell. Mr. G. Raymond Bassman
was attorney for Charles Finnell, ad-
ministrator. Mr. Gordon and Mr. Bass-
man are both defendants in the case at
bar.

After a thorough and diligent investi-
gation, Mr. Gordon concluded that his
clients collectively should inherit a one-
half interest in the property above
mentioned, plus a small amount of rent
on the Tulsa property. He discussed the
claim with Mr. Bassman, and after ne-
gotiations extending over 8 or 9 months
Mr. Finnell recognized the claim
of Mr. Gordon’s clients, and agreed
to and did purchase their one-half
interest in the property since they de-
sired an immediate cash settlement.
Tn the meantime, Mr. Gordon has suc~
ceeded in getting Mr. Finnell and Mr.
Bassman to agree to add 12% per
cent to the appraised value of the 160
acres in computing the cash value of
the interest of his clients; parties also
considered various claims against the
estate, mortgages outstanding, court
costs, attorney fees, funeral expenses,
etc., all of which appear to be reason-
able and bona fide charges against
the estate of Bertie Finnell, deceased.
Mr. Gordon also testified that he con-
sidered the fact that the 160 acres was
the homestead of Charles Finnell, and
that Mr. Finnell could retain posses-
sion for the rest of his life, if he shou-d
so elect.

Pursuant to the agreement, all of Mr.
Gordons’ clients conveyed to Mr. Fin-
nell by assignments and deeds, all of
their interests in the estate of Bertie
Finnell, deceased, and were paid there- -
for.

In March, 1949, Charles Finnell died.
Immediately thereafter, his brother, R.
B. Finnell, was appointed successor-ad-
ministrator of the estate of Bertie Fin-
nell, deceased, and also executor of the
estate of Charles Finnell, deceased. In

136 Le

August, 1949, the Order Approving Fi-
nal Account, Decreeing Heirship, De-
creeing Distribution, and Discharging
Administrator was filed in the county
court of Rogers county in the case of
the estate of Bertie Finnell, deceased.
Said order has become final. It decreed
that the property concerned in the case
at bar descended one-half to Mr. Charles
Finnell and the other half to the collat-
eral kindred of Bertie Finnell above
mentioned. In October, 1949, plaintiffs
instituted the action from the judgment
in which this appeal is taken, in the
district court of Tulsa county. Defend-
ants herein are attorneys Gordon and
Bassman; the heirs of Charles Finnell;
the executor of the estate of Charles
Finnell, deceased; and other named de-
fendants not identified in the record.

Defendants filed a motion to make
more definite and certain, asking that
plaintiffs be required to attach to
their petition copies of all instruments
they wanted canceled. Pursuant to
the order sustaining said motion, to
which no exception was made, plain-
tiffs filed copies of the assignments and
deeds above mentioned. As grounds for
cancellation of said instruments, plain-
tiffs alleged that attorneys Gordon and
Bassman, acting in concert, practiced
fraud and deceit in the procurement of
the assignments and deeds, and that
Charles Finnell, as administrator of his
deceased wife’s estate, was precluded
by 58 O.S, 1951 §496 from purchasing
the interests of the other heirs. The pe-
tition also contained a prayer for dam-
ages, but since there is no evidence
of any kind in the record touching this
issue, it is assumed that plaintiffs aban-
doned such claim,

‘The trial court denied plaintiffs the
relief prayed for; motion for new trial
was considered and overruled, and
plaintiffs have appealed to this court as
provided by law.

The two questions for our determina-
tion are:

(1) Were defendants Gordon and
Bassman guilty of fraud in the pro-

curement of such assignments and

deeds?

(2) Was Charles Finnell, administra-
tor of the estate of Bertie Finnell, pre-
cluded by the terms of 58 O.S. 1951 §496
from purchasing the interests of the
other heirs of Bertie Finnell?

With reference to such first question,
the findings of the trial court include
the following:

“That plaintiffs employed Jack Gor-
don, an attorney, to represent them, and
that he made an investigation. That
thereafter at armslength dealings, in

_ which no fraud nor concealment was

practiced, nor unfair advantage taken,
plaintiffs contracted to sell their share
of Bertie Weaver Finnell’s estate to
Charles F. Finnell, for a price of ....
which price I find under all the circum-
stances to be fair and thereafter plain-
tiffs executed deeds and bills of sale
for same. Gordon was not Bassman’s
partner at the time and the dealing be-
tween Gordon and Bassman was car-

-ried on at armslength, each acting with

fidelity for the interests of his own
clients.”

The charges against attorneys Gordon
and Bassman were grave indeed, and
we have given these charges careful
consideration. A detailed examination
of the record herein reveals that there
was no misrepresentation by either at-
torney; that there was no concealment
of material facts; that the price paid
was fair and adequate, although the evi-
dence was in dispute on this point; that
no undue influence was exerted; and
that they were not even considering be-
coming partners at the time complained
of by plaintiffs. We conclude, there-
fore, that attorneys Gordon and Bass-
man acted with the highest fidelity to-
ward their clients, and that there was
no fraud in connection with the pro-
curement of the assignments and deeds
from plaintiffs herein; and that not only
were the findings of the trial court not
shown to be against the clear weight
of the evidence, but that the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence sustains the
findings of the trial court in that re-

gard. See Kliewer v. Bodenheimer, 199
Okla. 107, 184 P. 2d 456, wherein this
court said:

“In an action of equitable cognizance
the findings of the trial court should
be sustained, unless it appears that its
findings are clearly against the weight
of the evidence.”

See, also, Wahby v. Renegar, 199
Okla. 191, 185 P. 2d 184, and cases cited
in Note 566 to 12 O.S.A. $952.

As to the second question, 58 O.S.
1951 §496 reads as follows:

“No executor or administrator must
directly or indirectly purchase any
property of the estate he represents, nor
must he be interested in any sale.”

Plaintiffs cite the cases mentioned
below, among others, in support of
their contention that the administrator,
Charles Finnell, was precluded by the
quoted section of the statute from pur-
chasing the interests of the other heirs.
However, they are all distinguishable
from the case at bar for the reasons
indicated: Burton v. Compton, 50 Okla.
365, 150 P. 1080, concerned ward’s lands
sold to the guardian’s wife; Chastain v.
Pender, 52 Okla. 133, 152 P. 833, con-
cerned lands sold by an administrator
to his wife at a private judicial sale;
Frazier v. Jeakins, 64 Kan. 616, 68 P.
24, concerned ward’s land sold to the
guardian’s husband; Crume v. Rivers,
178 Okla. 363, 61 P. 2d 862, concerned
transfer of a ward’s promissory note
and mortgage to the guardian’s wife.

Plaintiffs are apparently proceeding
under the general rule that a trustee
cannot acquire an interest in the prop-
erties of his cestui que trust. We are of
the opinion, however, that the control-
ling rule in this case is that announced
in 21 Am. Jur., Executors and Admin-
istrators, §632, which says in part:

“As a general rule, the purchase by
an executor or administrator of an in-
terest of a legatee, devisee, or distribu-
tee in an estate who is sui juris and la-
boring under no disability will be up-
held where all the circumstances of
the transaction are fair and open and

137

no advantage is taken of the legatee,
devisee, or distributee by concealment,
misrepresentation, or omission to state
any important fact, or by the exercise
of undue influence, and he understands
the nature of the transaction.”

In Wiggins v. Wiggins, 176 Okla. 221,
55 P. 2d 119, this court said (Syllabus 2):

“A person acting as administrator
may purchase the interest of an heir
in such estate when the heir is sui juris
and laboring under no disability and
where no undue influence is exerted and
all circumstances of the transaction
are fair and open and no advantage is
taken of such heir by concealment, mis-
representation, or omission to state any
important fact. In such cases, however,
the court looks upon such transactions
with a jealous eye, and will not uphold
them unless it appears that such trans-
actions are fair and there is no fraud
or concealment. Dees v. Dees, 169 Okla.
598, 38 P. 2d, 508.”

Dees v. Dees, cited above, contains an
identical syllabus by the court. In John-
son v. Johnson, 85 Okla. 274, 206 P. 205,
the court said (Syllabus 2):

“Transactions between administrator
and heir are not void or even voidable
for that reason, and, while they will be
closely scrutinized by the court, yet
where they are fair and equitable they
will be upheld.”

The leading Oklahoma case on this
question is Kelly v. Blackwell, 63 Okla.
231, 164 P. 103. It contains an exhaus-
tive treatment of this subject, including
quotations from many other jurisdic-
tions. Therein this court quoted from
Haight v. Pearson, 11 Utah 51, 39 P.
479, as follows:

“But a contract to purchase the in-
terest of an heir in an estate by an exec-
utor does not come within the letter or
spirit of either the statute or this equit-
able rule. The executor has no author-
ity, as such, to sell the interest of an
heir in the estate. Such interest is not
in any sense property of the estate; it
is the property of the heir, and he alone
can sell it. Owing to the advantage
that might be taken of heirs by ex-
ecutors or administrators, if we were
called upon to pass upon such a sale

138

where the heir was claiming that he
had been overreached or wronged, we
should scrutinize the matter, and, if un-
fair in its terms, would not hesitate to
set such contract aside, but not because
it was in violation of the statute cited.
In other words, these sales by an heir
to an executor are not within the stat-
ute at all. If they are fair in them-
selves, they should be upheld the same
as other contracts.”

The Utah statute referred to is almost
identical to the quoted section of the
Oklahoma statute.

We hold that Charles Finnell, admin-
istrator of the estate of Bertie Finnell,
deceased, was not precluded by statute
from purchasing the interests of the
other heirs of said deceased in her es-
tate. Since there was no fraud or deceit
in the transactions surrounding the sale,
the decision of the trial court was cor-
rect.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, O’-
NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

TULSA MACHINERY CO. v. OKLA-
HOMA TAX COMMISSION.

No. 35393. Feb. 24, 1953.
258 P. 2d 1067.

F. C. Swindell and A. D. Mason, Tulsa,
for plaintiff in error.

R. F. Barry, W. F. Speakman, and
E. J. Armstrong, Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error.

ARNOLD, J. There is presented here
an appeal taken by Tulsa Machinery
Company, hereinafter referred to as ap-
pellant, from an order of the Oklahoma
Tax Commission, hereinafter referred
to as the Commission, assessing a sales
tax against it including interest and
penalty in the sum of $1,623.01. Appel-
lant paid the tax under protest and
filed a claim for refund of the amount
paid. The Commission denied the claim
for refund.

The tax was assessed by the Commis-
sion against the gross proceeds derived
from the sale of machinery and equip-
ment to the Anchor Stone & Material
Company and Chandler Materials Com-
pany.

The evidence shows that Anchor Stone
& Material Company and Chandler Ma-
terials Company owned separate tracts
of land near the city of Tulsa beneath
the surface of which lay a stratum of
limestone rock. The first step in the
process of the business conducted by
these companies was to remove the
overburden of surface soil of said
rock. This is done by use of bulldozers
and shovels powered by motor equip-
ment. After the removal of the over-
burdened, the next step required the
drilling of holes in the rock of sufficient
size and depth as to emplant therein
nitroglycerin or other explosives. The
explosion would crack the rock into
chunks, then by means of motor-pow-
ered shovels and conveyors the rocks
were loaded on a dump truck and trans-
ported to rock crushers located on the
properties of these companies. The rock

would then be placed in and would
pass through a series of crushers. The
crushers would reduce it into small
sizes for commercial use. The processed
material was then sold and used for
building roads, sidewalks and other pur-
poses.

It is the contention of appellant that
all the machinery and equipment sold
by it to Anchor Stone & Material Com-
pany and Chandler Materials Company
was sold for use in manufacturing and
the proceeds derived from the sale of
such machinery and equipment were
therefore exempt from taxation under
68 O.S. 1951 §1251d, subd (q) which ex-
empts:

“Sale of machinery and equipment
purchased and used by persons estab-
lishing new manufacturing or process-
ing plants in Oklahoma, and machinery
and equipment purchased and used by
persons in the operation of manufac-
turing plants already established in
Oklahoma; provided, this exemption
shall not apply unless such machinery
and equipment is incorporated into, and
is directly used in, the process of manu-
facturing property subject to taxation
under the Sales Tax Act. * * *”

The items upon which the taxes were
assessed consisted of the sale to An-
chor Stone & Material Company of a
K360 Diesel shovel, the purchase price
of which was $28,687.02 and also parts
for a pneumatic drill and repair parts
for the Diesel shovel upon which com-
bined items there was assessed a sales
tax in the sum of $645.72 plus interest
and penalty in the sum of $173.89; sales
to Chandler Materials Company con-
sisting of welding equipment in the sum
of $389.36 and repair parts for Diesel
shovel similar to the shovel sold by ap-
pellant to the Anchor Stone & Material
Company upon which items sales tax
was assessed in the sum of $680 plus
penalty and interest in the sum of
$123.40.

Counsel for the Commission contend
that the sales here involved and upon
which the taxes were assessed do not
come within the exemption claimed by

139

appellants for the following reasons: (1)
the Anchor Stone & Chandler Material
Companies to whom the machinery and
equipment were sold were not engaged
in the business of manufacturing; (2)
assuming that they were so engaged the
machinery and equipment purchased
and used by them was not incorporated
into and directly used in the process of
manufacturing and therefore not ex-
empt from the sales tax under the sec-
tion of the statute relied upon by ap-
pellants.

The authorities are in conflict as to
whether the activities in which the
above companies were engaged con-
stitute manufacturing. We think, how-
ever, this question is put to rest in this
state by our decision in Cain’s Coffee
Co. v. City of Muskogee, 171 Okla. 635,
44 P. 2d 50. In that case it appears
that the City of Muskogee passed an
ordinance authorizing the city council
to levy and collect a license tax on
merchants of all kinds including gro-
cers. The city attempted to collect the
license tax from Cain’s Coffee Com-
pany. It is contended that it was not a
merchant.or grocer but was a manufac-
turer and brought an action to enjoin
the collection of the tax.

The evidence in that case shows that
Cain’s Coffee Company had acquired
raw materials, such as green and un-
prepared coffee, teas, spices and other
materials which were unfit for human
consumption in the condition at time
procured and could be used only after
the same had been treated, milled,
worked upon and processed by human
skill and ingenuity and mechanical de-
vices and appliances used by the Cain’s
Coffee Company; that such processes
could be accomplished only by specially
constructed scientific machinery and
skilled manipulation; that all of said
materials were purchased in bulk; that
none were sold or disposed of by the
plaintiff in the natural form as acquired;
that no part of plaintiff's profit was
made or acquired through the sale of
such commodities in original state; that
it was only after the same had passed

140

through the factory of Cain’s Coffee
Company that they became fit for
human consumption. This court after
referring to cases from other states and
federal courts reached the conclusion
that Cain’s Coffee Company was a man-
ufacturer and not a merchant or grocer.

If the activities in which the Cain’s
Coffee Company in that case was en-
gaged constitute manufacturing, then
the activities in which the above men-
tioned companies were engaged in
changing the form of rocks by placing
them through various crushers, pulver-
izing and processing the rocks for com-
mercial use, likewise constitute manu-
facturing. The fact, however, that the
above mentioned companies were en-
gaged in manufacturing and that the
materials sold to them by appellant
were used in connection with that busi-
ness does not of itself entitle appellant
to the exemption claimed. Before the
exemption may be claimed it must be
shown that the machinery and equip-
ment sold by it to these companies was
by them “incorporated into and direct-
ly used in the manufacturing of prop-

erty subject to taxation” under the .

Sales Tax Act. Although the above com-
panies were engaged in manufacturing,
process of manufacturing did not take
place or commence until the rock was
conveyed to and placed in the first
erusher. The Diesel shovel and the re-
pair parts were not incorporated into
the crusher and were not used directly
in crushing or changing the form of the
rocks, and therefore not directly used
in manufacturing property subject to
sales tax and for this reason the gross
proceeds derived from the sale thereof
are not exempt from the sales tax. In
Tri-State Asphalt Corporation v. Glan-
der, Tax Com’r, 152 Ohio St. 497, 90
N.E. 2d 366, the Supreme Court of Ohio
held:

“Boom and bucket cranes the sole
function of which is the conveying of

ingredients to a place of processing,
and which have no part in the actual
processing itself, are not used or con-
sumed directly in the production of
tangible personal property for sale by
processing and under Section 5546-1,
General Code, their sales are not ex-
cepted from taxation.”

In that case the court in reversing
the order of the Board to Tax Appeals
said:

“The basis of the decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals was the fact that
in order to produce appellee’s product
it was essential to transport the ingre-
dients to bins located in the portable
mixer, Such a line of reasoning would
except from taxation the sales of prac-
tically all instrumentalities for trans-
portation used by manufacturers or
processors of products.”

See, also, W. E. Anderson & Sons
Co. v. Glander, Tax Com’r, 154 Ohio
St. 561, 97 N.E. 2d 29.

The Commission found that the ma-
chinery, repair parts and equipment
upon and in connection with which the
sales tax, including interest and pen-
alty in the amount of $1,623.01 was im-
posed, was not incorporated into and
directly used in the manufacturing of
property and for such reason the sales
were not exempt from the tax and de-
nied appellant’s claim for refund, ex-
cept as to the sum of $56.28, which
amount had been paid twice by appel-
lant. Under the evidence and above au-
thorities the Commission ruled cor-
rectly in so finding and holding. This
conclusion is not contrary to the defini-
tions by the Legislature and included in
the act, but, on the contrary, is, we
think, in accord therewith.

Order affirmed.
JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,

CORN, O'NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

Guardianship of MADDOX.
COON v. MADDOX.
No. 34546, Feb. 24, 1958.
258 P. 2d 1075.

John Allen Phillips, II, Durant, for
plaintiff in error.

Porter Newman, Durant, for defend-
ant in error.

BLACKBIRD, J. The plaintiff in er-
ror has appealed from a judgment en-
tered against him in the trial court and
on the 15th day of April, 1950, he filed
his brief. The authorities in the brief
reasonably sustain the allegations of er-
ror, The defendant in error has filed no
brief and has offered no excuse for
such failure. Under such circumstances,
as stated in Gooldy v. Hines, 186 Okla.
583, 99 P. 2d 498, it is not the duty of
this court to search the record for some
theory upon which to sustain the action
of the trial court, but the cause may be
reversed and remanded with directions.

The cause is reversed and remanded,
with directions to vacate the judgment

141

entered for the defendant in error and
grant a new trial.

HALLEY, C.J.. JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, ARNOLD, O’-
NEAL, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO. v. HALE.
No. 34589. Feb. 24, 1953.
254 P. 2a 338.

Gibson & Benefield, by
Wayne B. Snow, Oklahoma City, and

Savage,
Roberson & Roberson, El Reno, for
plaintiff in error.

Fogg, Fogg & Fogg, El Reno, for de-
fendant in error.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal
from a judgment of the district court
of Canadian county, Oklahoma, in
which Leonard E. Hale, as plaintiff,

142

recovered a money judgment against
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
road Company, a corporation, as de-
fendant, for damages to alfalfa crop.
The parties here will be referred to as
plaintiff and defendant, as they ap-
peared in trial court.

The plaintiff, Leonard E. Hale, in
May of 1949, and for several years prior
thereto, had been farming a tract of
land belonging to and as the tenant of
Charles H. Krumm on which alfalfa
was raised. This tract of land is lo-
cated north and east and immediately
adjacent to main line and railroad yards
of the defendant, Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Railroad Company in the
northwest part of El Reno, Oklahoma.
The plaintiff in this action contends
that he had 15.5 acres of the land in
alfalfa and ready for harvest and in
the process of being harvested on or
about May 18, 1949, when the growing
crop was destroyed by surface water
standing thereon that had accumulated
as a result of a heavy 4.64 inch rain
on the 17th and 18th of May. The
plaintiff contends that the alfalfa was
flooded and destroyed as a result of
the defendant changing the natural
flow of the surface waters by construc-
tion of its yards and tracks in an area
near the alfalfa field, and by permit-
ting a culvert under its tracks near the
southwest corner of the property being
farmed by the plaintiff to become
clogged up, creating a body of water
five acres in area on the south side of
defendant’s tracks, and as a result
thereof, the culvert having been opened
by a third person, the water flowed up-
on said alfalfa land, destroying such
crop, thus resulting in his damages.
The defendant contended in the trial
of the case that if the culvert was
clogged, stopping up the flow of the
water, that the clearing of the same
so the water did flow through was by
the act of a third person for which
it would not be responsible. Defendant
further contended that a spur-line was
build to the city water works of El
Reno, Oklahoma, and that under an
agreement with the city, it owned only

380 feet of this spur-line while the bal-
ance of the spur was owned by the
city, and that defendant was only to
maintain that part of the spur owned
by the city and had no responsibility
for keeping any culverts under the spur
track open. The defendant further
contended that any change in the nat-
ural drainage of the land or area in-
volved was prior to 1907 and that the
major expansion of tracks in defend-
ant’s yard, the last of which took place
in 1929, did not vary or change the
flow of surface waters and that the
defendant had a prescriptive easement
which would prevent plaintiff's re-
covery.

The evidence in the case established
beyond doubt that an unusually heavy
rain did accumulate surface waters on
the south of defendant’s tracks to the
east and west thereof, and that the cul-
vert that carried the waters under the
tracks of defendant northeasterly had
become clogged and that the obstruc-
tion thereto was removed by a third
person on the morning of May 18th,
thus permitting the accumulated water
to flow through the culvert and exten-
sively upon the lands being farmed by
the plaintiff, which resulted in the de-
struction of his alfalfa crop. The evi-
dence further showed that in 1929 the
defendant constructed four additional
tracks some 60 feet in width on the
south side of its right of way and over
and beyond the culvert which carried
drainage water from the south of the
tracks under them; and that in the
construction of these additional tracks
a fill was required to be built some
four or five feet in height. That in the
building of such additional tracks a
drainage ditch which had formerly car-
vied the surface waters eastward was
filled up and no longer served its pur-
pose. The evidence seems to be in con-
flict whether or not the natural drain-
age of the area was to be eastward
prior to the construction of the railroad
yards and tracks thereon. The case was
submitted to a jury resulting in a ver-
dict for plaintiff for about one-half of
the amount sued for, on which verdict

judgment was rendered, the defendant
filed timely motion for new trial which
was overruled, and this appeal was
taken.

The defendant assigns as error four
principal points on which it relies and
which are argued in its brief. The de-
fendant contends that the court com-
mitted error in permitting the plaintiff
to recover damages for all of the grow-
ing crop.

It is the law of Oklahoma that
where a tenant cultivates and ma-
tures a crop under a rental contract
providing that he shall pay a portion
of the crop as rent, he has the right to
the possession of the entire crop until
same is cut and divided and he can
maintain an action for damages for the
destruction or injury thereto. Yeldell
v. Hines, 73 Okla. i, 174 P. 229, and
Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Denning, 128
Okla. 145, 261 P. 929. It is contended
that the plaintiff did not clearly estab-
lish by the evidence the relationship of
landlord and tenant. Although the evi-
dence on this issue was not extensive,
we think that the plaintiff met the bur-
den of proof. The plaintiff testified that
he was is the farming business, that
he had been farming all his life, that
he was farming the land in question
and that the land was in alfalfa and
had been for five or six years, that he
was the tenant of the owner of the
land and that one-half of the hay was
paid in rent, that he had cut the al-
falfa and part of it was raked and
part of it was being baled when the
rain causing the damage occurred. The
landlord, Mr. Krumm, testified that he
owned the land in question and that
Leonard E. Hale, plaintiff, was his ten-
ant and that under his contract with
Hale that he received 50 per cent of the
crops. The plaintiff, therefore, met the
burden of proof enabling him to bring
action for recovery of the damages to
the entire alfalfa crop.

The defendant also contends that the
court committed error by failure to cor-
rectly instruct the jury as to its re-
sponsibility concerning surface waters.

143

The court, in the trial of the case,,
gave instructions 9 and 12 to which ex-
ceptions were taken. These instructions
should be considered with instruction
No. 7 which the court gave. We quote
the instructions:

“No. 7.

“You are further instructed that the
defendant railway company had a right
to construct its roadbed and trackage
facilities at the place it did in further-
ance of its business, even though such
construction may have interfered with
the natural drainage of surface water
and caused an unnatural diversion of
such waters. However, in the construc-
tion of that part of its spur tracks, em-
bankments, fills and culverts owned and
located upon its right-of-way, it was the
duty of the defendant to use ordinary
eare, to so construct and maintain the
same in such a manner as not to cause
the adjoining landowners any more
damage from waters due to surface
drainage, than would have naturally oc-
curred if the tracks, fills, embankments
and culverts had not been constructed.
A failure to exercise such ordinary
care either in the construction thereof
or in the maintenance or upkeep of the
facilities provided for the flow of sur-
face waters, would constitute negli-
gence.”

“No, 9.

“The plaintiffs contend that by filling
in and constructing railroad beds for
tracks on its right of way, both on its
mainlines and on that part of the spur
track leading to the City Water Plant,
which is located upon its right of way,
the defendant has formed an obstruc-
tion to the natural flow of surface
drainage water, and that by its failure
to provide sufficient drainage, and by
its failure to properly maintain the cul-
vert under its main tracks, that said
culvert became clogged up and pre-
vented the flow of water, which resulted
in a large accumulation of water on the
south side of the tracks, which when
released flooded over into and upon the
plaintiff's land. In this connection, you
are instructed that if you find a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in this case
that the defendant railroad company,
in building its grade, embankments,
fills and openings near the land of the

144

plaintiffs, failed to use ordinary care
and ordinary foresight in determining
the nature, width and scope of the
openings under its tracks to take care
of such surface waters, as with the ex-
ercise of ordinary diligence and skill
could be reasonably anticipated might
flow within the vicinity of such con-
struction, considering the topography of
the land, the natural drainage and all
surrounding circumstances; or, failed
to use and exercise ordinary care and
foresight in maintaining and inspecting
such openings or culverts as it may
have provided, to prevent the same
from becoming clogged or stopped up;
and was guilty of negligence; and you
further find that such negligence, if
any, was the proximate cause of dam-
age or injury to the plaintiffs then it
would be your duty to return a verdict
in favor of the plaintiffs. If you fail to so
find, it would be your duty to return
a verdict for the defendant.”

“No. 12.

“You are further instructed, if you
find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence in this case, that in constructing
its tracks, fills, embankments and cul-
verts for the passage of water, or in
inspecting or maintaining the same,
the defendant was guilty of any of the
acts of negligence as set out in plain-
tiff’s petition, and you further find that
such negligence if any, was the prox-
imate cause, or operated as a proxi-
mate contributing cause of flooding the
plaintiffs land, and that plaintiffs suf-
fered damages thereby, it will be your
duty to return a verdict in this case for
the plaintiffs.”

Railroads have played an important
part in the development of this country
and for many years they have been car-
rying a large part of its commerce.
They have enjoyed the right of eminent
domain and may build where they
choose. At the same time it has been
the law of the land that in the building
and operation of their tracks, yards
and grades they must compensate oth-
ers for damages suffered by reason of
the diversion of surface waters from
natural drainage.

The right to divert surface waters
by a railroad company is a necessary

one, but the right must be exercised
reasonably, for proper purposes and
in good faith and with due regard to in-
flict injury only when necessary.

In the case of Chicago, R.I.&P. Ry.
Co. v. Groves (1908) 20 Okla. 101, 93
P. 755, this court held:

“Surface water flowing naturally or
falling upon the soil may be diverted
in its course, and even thrown back
upon the dominant estate whence it
came, but with certain qualifications.
‘The doctrine that the right may not be
exercised wantonly, unnecessarily, or
carelessly is a common law doctrine,
resting upon the common law, as well
as upon the civil law.”

This court has many times held that
if a railroad company so constructs
its roadbed and ditches as to divert
surface waters from its usual and or-
dinary course and by its embankments,
ditches or artificial channels cause such
water to be conveyed to a particular
place, and thereby to overflow the land
of another proprietor, which before the
construction of such road, ditches, or
channels, did not overflow, the com-
pany will be liable to such proprietor
for the injury. See Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 25 Okla. 760, 107
P. 662, 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 879; Chicago,
R. IL & P. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 26 Okla.
434, 109 P. 214; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co.
v. Dale, 36 Okla. 114, 128 P. 137.

The defendant insists that the fore-
going instructions were erroneous in
that they embraced the element of or-
dinary care and foresight coupled with
what might be reasonably anticipated
in the construction of its roadbed, fills
and culverts. We concede that we have
found no reported case in a damage
suit such as this where these elements
were included in the court’s instruc-
tions. We are of the opinion that the
part of- the instructions of which
defendant complains would place a
greater burden on the plaintiff, and
that the same are not prejudicial to
the defendant, and that no error was
committed in giving of such instruc-
tions, when they are considered as a
whole.

The defendant next contends that
the verdict of the jury is not sustained
by the evidence and that it is contrary
to and in disregard of the court’s in-
structions.

The jury heard the evidence and had
the opportunity of weighing the same
and having explained a rather compli-
cated map of the area that was of-
fered in evidence, and were properly
instructed. The verdict was not con-
trary to the court’s instructions and
there was ample evidence to sustain it.

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Wade H. Loofburrow, F.
Hiner Dale and C. E. Bailey, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

JOHNSON, V.CJ., and WELCH,
CORN, ARNOLD, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. HAL-
LEY, C.J., dissents.

CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO. v. KRUMM.
No, 34590. Feb. 24, 1953.
254 P. 2d 342.

Savage, Gibson & Benefield,
Wayne B. Snow, Oklahoma City,
Roberson & Roberson, El Reno,
plaintiff in error.

Fogg, Fogg & Fogg, El Reno,
defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. This case was consol-
idated for trial in the district court of
Canadian county with the case of Chi-
cago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hale, 208 Okla.
141, 254 P. 2d 338, No. 34589, and the
points involved in this appeal are iden-
tical with the points raised in case No.
34589, the only difference being that
the defendant in error in this appeal
was the owner of the land on which the
alfalfa was grown. In case No. 34589,
Leonard E. Hale, defendant in error,
was the lessee under an agricultural
lease of the same land. The opinion
promulgated in the latter case is appli-
cable to this appeal, and the opinion
in that case is hereby adopted as the
opinion in this appeal.

and
for

for

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys E. E. Bailey, F. Hiner
Dale and Wade H. Loofburrow, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, ARNOLD, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., con-
eur. HALLEY, C.J., dissents.

146

BAILESS, Co. Treas., v. PAUKUNE.
No. 84547. Feb. 24, 1953.
254 P. 2d 349.

Frank Limerick, Co. Atty., Caddo
County, and Brewster McFadyen, Ana-
darko, and R. F. Barry, Atty., for Okla-

homa Tax Commission, for plaintiffs in
error.

Hatcher & Bond and J. F. Hatcher,
Chickasha, for defendant in error.

WELCH, J. This is an action by Juana
Paukune to enjoin the county assessor
of Caddo county, Oklahoma, from list-
ing and assessing real estate located in
Caddo county for ad valorem taxes, and
to permanently enjoin the county treas-
urer of Caddo county from selling the
land for delinquent taxes, and to strike
said land from the tax rolls and to en-
join the board of county commissioners
of Caddo county from claiming any
right, title or interest in the lands by
reason of the levy and assessment of
ad valorem taxes against same. The
trial court granted the injunction, and
the defendants appealed.

In a former opinion this court af-
firmed, upon construction of the gen-
eral Allotment Act of February 8, 1887,
24 Stat. 389, and, particularly, sec. 5 of
that Act. Bailess v. Paukune, 206 Okla.
527, 244 P. 2d 1137. In that decision we
quoted the statute and stated the facts.

On appeal from our decision the Su-
preme Court of the United States re-
versed on the theory that the purpose of
such statutes is to furnish protection of
Indians, not to furnish protection of
nonIndians, and that since Juana is not
an Indian the statute furnishes her land
or her interest in the land no such pro-
tection from tax liability. Bailess v.
Paukune, 344 U. S. 171, 73 S. Ct. 198,
97 L. Ed. 130.

The decision of that court is binding
upon every one on this Federal ques-

tion. See Texas Co. v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, 207 Okla. 363, 249 P. 2d
982, and authorities therein cited.

Therefore, our former decision herein
of April 29, 1952, Bailess v. Paukune,
206 Okla. 527, 244 P. 2d 1137, is over-
ruled. The judgment of the trial court
originally appealed from herein is re-
versed, and the trial court is directed
to vacate its judgment for plaintiff and
to dismiss plaintiff’s action.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, ARNOLD, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. DAVISON
and O’NEAL, JJ., dissent.

O'NEAL, J. (dissenting). It is my
opinion, where the Supreme Court of
the United States reverses a state
court, that upon receipt of its mandate
it becomes the duty of the state court
to issue its mandate to the trial court,
to which should be attached a copy of
the high court’s opinion, and directing
the trial court to proceed in conformity
with the said opinion.

I fully agree that on questions of Fed-
eral law, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States are binding
upon this court; but I do not agree that
the reversal of a state court’s decision,
such as is involved in this case, requires
it to promulgate another opinion in the
case. It is true there may be cases
where another opinion of the state court
would be necessary and proper, but
this is not that type of case. The opinion
of the high court speaks for itself and
does not require an opinion by this court
to vitalize or give it force of law in
this state.

I am authorized to say that Mr. Jus-
tice DAVISON concurs with the above
views.

147
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO.
v, KITTRELL.
No. 35173. Feb. 10, 1953.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1953.
258 P. 2d 1076.

148

Satterfield, Franklin & Harmon, Okla-
homa City, and W. L. Steger, Durant,
for plaintiff in error.

Paul & McPheron, Durant, for de-
fendant in error.

HALLEY, C. J. This action was
brought by T. J. Kittrell as plaintiff
to recover damages for injuries to cer-
tain machinery in an action against St.
Louis-San Francisco Railway Company,
a corporation, defendant. The parties
will be referred to as they appeared in
the trial court.

Plaintiff shipped five crates and one
pasteboard carton of machinery from
New York City to Durant, Oklahoma.
The machinery arrived on a truck op-
erated by defendant railway company,
having been transferred from train to
truck at St. Louis, Missouri, and was
unloaded at the station at Durant. It
was completely dismantled and disas-
sembled. The machinery was repaired
by a machine shop in Durant, Okla-
homa. Plaintiff testified that the ma-
chinery was of a particular type lim-
ited to use for constructing hat blocks;
that there were very few machines
of this type made; that the machinery
was second-hand, having been used by
aman in New York; that he bought it
from the widow of this man; that after
the machinery was repaired it would
not perform the functions for which it
was intended; that although he was
able to make hat blocks the machinery

was so damaged that it never did op-
erate and function as intended. The

. principal reason for the damage to the

machinery after the repair was the
welding that had to be done thereon;
that the permanent damage was due to
the limited precision of the machinery.
He further testified that all of the
knives of the machinery were com-
pletely destroyed and had to be re-
placed; that the cost of the replace-
ment of the knives was $300. The repair
bill submitted by the machine shop and
paid by him was $258.46.

Plaintiff in his petition sought $1,500
for permanent damages to the ma-
chines, $300 for the destruction of the
knives which had to be replaced, $258.46
for repairs paid to the machine shop,
and $891.54 damages for loss of busi-
ness during the delay due to repair. The
total amount sued for was $2,950. He
testified that he was delayed three
months in installing his machines for
work and that he made approximately
$200 per week in the ordinary course of
business.

The cause was tried to a jury, which
returned a verdict for $2,100. Defend-
ant appeals from the judgment en-
tered thereon.

It is first argued that it was error
to allow evidence of permanent dam-
ages to the machinery. Plaintiff did not
attempt to establish the reasonable
market value of the machinery, but re-
lied upon the peculiar value to him be-
cause the machinery could not be dupli-
cated and because of the use to which it
was put. The reasonable market value
was not the issue. Plaintiff was not
seeking to recover any part of the
reasonable market value. The proof of-
fered by plaintiff was of the permanent
damage because the machinery could
not be made to perform the duties for
which it was originally intended. The
evidence supports the finding that there
was permanent damage to the ma-
chinery to the extent of $1,500. St. Louis
& San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Dunham, 36
Okla. 724, 129 P. 862; Joe Hodges Trans-

PO

ee
fer & Storage Co. v. Keeffe, 189 Okla.

142, 115 P. 2d 251. In Oklahoma Trans-
portation Co. v. Seminole Lodge No. 430,
LO.O.F., 202 Okla. 622, 217 P. 2d 164,
it is stated:

“The measure of damages in an ac-
tion for damages for loss or destruction
of used articles of personal property
having no fixed market value is the
value of the goods to the owner; not any
fanciful value which the owner might
place upon them, but such reasonable
value as they had to owner, considering
the nature and condition of the goods
and purposes for which they were
adapted.”

It is next argued that there was error
in refusing to allow the defendant to
prove the price plaintiff paid for the
machines. Defendant offered in evi-
dence the testimony by deposition of
Mrs, Lee Cohan. The offer was refused.
Defendant cites Thaw v. Town of Fair-
field, 132 Conn. 173, 43 A. 2d 65, 160
A.L.R. 679, and Gouge v. Hoge, 203
Okla. 149, 218 P. 2d 1036. These cases
are applicable in certain instances.
They are not applicable in the case un-
der consideration. The evidence dis-
‘closes that by the nature of plaintiff's
business the machinery had a peculiar
value to him; that after it was repaired

as stated above the value to him was’

the damage to the machinery caused
by failure to place the machinery in the
condition prior to the damage by ship-
ment. There was no error in excluding
this testimony.

It is next argued that it was error to
submit the issue of damages due to de-
lay in repairing the machinery for the
reason that the defendant had no no-
tice of the use to which the property
was to be placed. The rule is stated as
follows in St. Louis & S. F. Railway
Co. v. Farmers’ Union Gin Co., 34
Okla. 270, 125 P. 894:

“On the question of damage for delay
in transportation of articles intended for
special use in business, Hutchinson on
Carriers (3rd Ed.) vol. 3, sec. 1369,
says: ‘If an article is intended for use
in business at destination, and the car-
rier unreasonably delays its transpor-

149

tation, the owner cannot recover for
the loss of its use during the delay,
or the profits which he would thereby
have made if it had been seasonably
delivered, unless he alleges and proves
that the carrier, at the time the con-
tract for its transportation was made,
was informed of the special use to
which it was to be put. And proof that
the carrier had knowledge of the gen-
eral use to which the article was to be
put will not be sufficient to charge him
with liability for loss of its use or the
profits which would thereby have been
made. The special circumstances of
the case requiring care or expedition
must have been brought to his atten-
tion in such a way that his acceptance
of the article under the circumstances
could fairly be said to amount to an as-
sumption of the risks which naturally
and proximately would flow from his
default. * * * 7”

See, also, Alton Railroad Co. v. Okla-
homa Furniture Mfg. Co., 190 Okla. 216,
122 P, 2d 152. The difficulty in applying
the rule is to determine what evidence
is sufficient to disclose notice. The fact
situation in the case under discussion
is more similar to that in St. Louis
& SF. Ry. Co. v. Farmers’ Union Gin
Co., supra, and we are of the opinion
and hold that the evidence justified the
submitting of this issue to the jury.

Certain objections are made to the
amount allowed as payment for the
knives which were totally destroyed.
Defendant suggests that these knives
were secondhand. Plaintiff testified,
and it was undisputed, that the value of
the knives was $300. Defendant also sin-
gles out certain items in the expense
account submitted by the owner of the
machine shop in the total of $258.46.
There were no special interrogatories
submitted to the jury and there is no
way of determining whether all of the
items presented in this account were
allowed by the jury or some of them
discounted.

This was purely a question of fact.

We find no error in the trial requiring
a reversal.

Judgment affirmed.

150

CORN, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. JOHNSON,
V.C.J.. and WELCH and DAVISON,
JJ., dissent.

STATE ex rel. COM’RS OF LAND OF-
FICE v. SPARKS et ux.

No. 84781. Feb. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 3, 1953.
258 P. 2d 1070.

R. H. Dunn and Sam Hill, Oklahoma
City, for plaintiff in error.

Earl Q. Gray and John M. Poindex-
ter, Ardmore, for defendants in error.

O'NEAL, J. On December 3, 1925, O.
A. Sparks and wife, Hortense Sparks,
executed their note to the Commission-
ers of the Land Office of the State of
Oklahoma in the sum of $7,500, to be-
come due on the 15th day of Decem-
ber, 1930. On the same day they exe-
cuted a mortgage as security for the
note, covering 235 acres of land sit-
uated in Carter county, Oklahoma. On
February 6, 1931, the Commissioners of
the Land Office filed a suit in the dis-
trict court of Carter county, Oklahoma,
to recover judgment upon the note and
for a foreclosure of the mortgage. On
April 23, 1931, defendants filed an an-
swer in the case. Thereafter the case
remained upon the court’s docket and
at issue until September 1, 1943, on
which date the case was dismissed upon
the motion of the Commissioners of the
Land Office. On the same date, the
Commissioners refiled the case in the
same court. On March 15, 1944, O. A.
Sparks and wife, Hortense Sparks, filed
their answer in the present case.

We shall hereafter refer to the State
of Oklahoma on relation of the Com-
missioners of the Land Office of said
state, as Commissioners, and O. A.
Sparks and Hortense Sparks, as de-
fendants.

The record discloses two journal en-
tries of judgment. The case was first
tried on January 6, 1948, and the first
journal entry of judgment disclosed

judgment was rendered on January
7, 1949. This journal entry of judg-
ment recites the appearance of the
defendants. The court found that de-
fendants executed the note and mort-
gage, and that defendants were indebt-
ed to the Commissioners in the sum of
$16,532.96, with interest thereon at the
rate of 10 per cent per annum from
the Ist day of September, 1943, until
paid, including certain expenses and at-
torney’s fee, and entered a decree of
foreclosure of the mortgage lien. That
journal entry of judgment specifically
provides, as follows:

“It is further ordered, adjudged and
decreed by the Court that the question
of personal liability of O. A. Sparks and
Hortense Sparks shall be continued for
a further order of this Court, and that
neither this judgment nor any finding,
or conclusion herein shall in any way
affect the quéstion of personal liability
of said defendants or create any pre-
sumption of the liability of said de-
fendants, but all issues as to the lia-
bility of said defendants shall remain
open.”

The second journal entry of judgment
was entered on the 7th day of Feb-
ruary, 1950, That decree recites that
the matter came on for hearing on the
Commissioners’ application for the en-
try of a deficiency judgment against
defendants. It recites the filing of the
original case in February, 1931, its dis-
missal, and refiling on the Ist day of
September, 1943, and the rendition of
judgment as of January 7, 1949, That,
thereafter, the court issued an order of
sale, and that the land was sold for the
sum of $11,500, being $4,000 more than
“the face of the original note. The de-
cree further recites that after the filing
of the original suit and at the demand
of the Commissioners, the defendants
surrendered possession of the land to
the Commissioners who have been in
exclusive possession thereof since the
year 1932. The decree further finds that
the defendants have sustained the alle-
gations of defense contained in their an-
swer, in that the Commissioners per-
mitted the land and improvements
thereon to become greatly deteriorated

|

151

in value; they neglected to use reason-
able care as a mortgagee in possession
to cultivate the land; they ‘permitted
terraces upon the land to wash out,
resulting in the erosion of the top soil;
they permitted inside fences to be re-
moved and buildings upon the land to
become useless for occupancy and per-
mitted pecan trees upon one hundred
acres of the land to die for the want of
reasonable care. The court found that
these damages resulted by the failure
of the Commissioners to use ordinary
and reasonable care of the property
as a mortgagee in possession as re-
quired by law, and that the damages
resulting to the land and improvements
were as great or equal to the amount
of the deficiency judgment demanded
by the Commissioners. The motion of
the Commissioners for a deficiency
judgment in the sum of $13,500 was
thereupon denied.

The Commissioners seek a reversal
of the judgment upon the following
grounds: (1) That the Commissioners
are entitled to a personal judgment
against defendants as a matter of law;
(2) that the state, acting through the
Commissioners, is acting in a sovereign
capacity in the collection of the in-
debtedness and cannot be charged with
negligence, and that the debt cannot
be extinguished, in whole or in part,
under art. 5, §53 of the Constitution of
Oklahoma.

Under the first proposition the Com-
missioners argue that the court’s judg-
ment of January 7, 1949, found that de-
fendants were indebted to the Commis-
sioners in the sum of $16,532.96, and,
therefore, it became the mandatory
duty of the court to render a money
deficiency against the defendants for
said sum in its judgment entered on
February 7, 1950. As we have indicated,
the judgment of January 7, 1949, re-
served the question of granting or re-
fusing to grant a deficiency judgment.
In other words, the court made a
mathematical calculation of the sum
due on the note, but reserved for fu-
ture disposition the personal liability
of the defendants. This liability was

152

denied upon proof that the Commis-
sioners, as mortgagees in possession,
had negligently operated the land for
a period of approximately 20 years,
which negligence resulted in the depre-
ciation of the value of the land, to-
gether with its improvements, in a sum
equal to the deficiency judgment prayed
for. The Commissioners contend that
the state, in its sovereign capacity, is
not subject to suit and is not liable for
the wrongful acts or torts of its officers,
agents or employees.

The Commissioners also assert that
they are entitled to a personal judg-
ment upon the obligation incurred by
the defendants under the express provi-
sion of 64 O.S. 1951 §§51 and 52. Sec-
tion 51 authorizes the Commissioners
to invest the permanent school funds
and other educational funds, and sec-
tion 52 authorizes them to invest such
funds in farm mortgages under the
rules and regulations defined in that
section; however, the method to enforce
such an obligation is governed by 12 O.
S. 1951 §686, and that section specifi-
cally provides that the mortgagee’s ap-
plication for a deficiency judgment
may be reserved for the future order of
the court.

The general rule as stated in 49 Am.
Jur. 83, under the title of “States, Terri-
tories, and Dependencies” is to the ef-
fect that:

“In the absence of any special stat-
utory -provision to the contrary, the
state, when bringing suit for the vindi-
cation of its rights, is subject to the gen-
eral rules of practice and pleading
which govern private litigants.”

The Commissioners contend that the
judgment entered as of January 7, 1949,
establish the amount of the debt due,
and that under the proviso in 12 O.S.
1951 §686, and constitutional provision,
art. 5, §53, the debt cannot be limited
or reduced. Conceding the contention
made, it has no application here for,
as we have pointed out, no deficiency
judgment was ever rendered against
the defendants in either of the judg-
ments, supra. Moreover, the proviso

contained in section 686 only limits the
court in reducing a deficiency judg-
ment when and if a deficiency judgment
has been entered in favor of the state.
The legislative purpose in the enact-
ment of the proviso was to prohibit
compromises and settlements of any
debts, obligations or taxes due the state
after the rendition of the judgment in
its favor.

The Commissioners contend that un-
der art. 5, §53 of the Constitution, the
court was not authorized to enter the
judgment of February 7, 1950. That
section reads:

“The Legislature shall have no power
to release or extinguish, or to authorize
the releasing or extinguishing, in whole
or in part, the indebtedness, liabilities,
or obligations of any corporation, or in-
dividual, to this State, or any county
or other municipal corporation thereof.”

This provision only restrains the leg-
islative branch of the government to
pass acts releasing or extinguishing
debts due the state, and has no appli-
cation here.

Under the Commissioners’ second
proposition it is contended that the
Commissioners are acting in a sover-
eign capacity in the collection of the
debt and, therefore, cannot be charged
with negligence.

In the case of State ex rel. Commis-
sioners of Land Office v. Hall, 191 Okla.
257, 128 P. 2d 838, the court said:

“The state is performing a govern-
mental function and engaged in a public
enterprise when ‘loaning the school
fund on real estate mortgages” * * * It
follows that when foreclosing a mort-
gage securing a loan made from school
land funds it is seeking to enforce a
public as distinguished from a private
right.”

We find no case, however, decided
by this court holding that where the
state enters its courts for the enforce-
ment of a debt that the defendant is
barred from asserting any right or de-
fense which might be asserted if the
action was brought by a private citi-
zen.

When the state voluntarily enters its
courts for the purpose of enforcing the
collection of a debt due it, it becomes a
litigant and stands in no more favorite
position than its citizens,

In 49 Am. Jur. §84, under the title
of “States, Territories, and Depend-
-encies,” the rule is announced as fol-
lows:

“Generally speaking, when a state
voluntarily places itself in the position
of a suitor, whether in its own courts or
in those of a sister state, it will be
held to have laid aside its sovereignty
and to have taken on the garb of an or-
dinary suitor, so far as concerns all
proper matters of adjudication grow-
ing out of the cause sued on, and the
defendant will be entitled to plead and
prove any and all matters properly de-
fensive. Hence, a state by bringing
an equitable action opens the door to
any defense or cross complaint ger-
mane to the matter in controversy.”

Neither can it be successfully con-
tended that to permit the defense here
pleaded is in effect permitting a suit
against the state without its consent,
for the reason’ that defendants do not
ask any affirmative relief or a money
judgment against the state, but base
their defense solely upon the ground of
nonindebtedness. The general rule,
which is a principle of equity, has often
been expressed that a mortgagee in pos-
session is held to the exercise of such
care and diligence as a prudent owner in
charge of the premises would exercise.
Conaway v. Thomas, 101 Okla. 227, 224
P. 965, and Brown et al. v. Leslie, Rec.,
192 Okla. 43, 133 P. 2d 551. This equit-
able principle is aptly expressed in
49 Am. Jur. §83, under the title of
“States, Territories, and Dependencies”
wherein it is said:

“As a general rule, the state, when
equitable relief is sought, must, like
private individuals, bring itself within
the known and fixed rules of equitable
interference before the court will grant
its petition.”

In 59 C.J., States, §474, it is stated:

“In actions brought by a state de-
fendant may, as a general rule, set up

153

any defense directly touching the mer-
its of the state’s claim which he could
have urged against a private suitor;
and an equitable action by the state
opens the door to any matter which may
properly affect the relief demanded.”

The rule thus announced is supported
by the weight of authority.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in
State v. Bucholz, 169 Minn. 226, 210
N.W, 1006, held:

“In an action by the state to recover
on a seed grain note, the defendant is
not prevented from asserting that the
sale was induced by the fraudulent rep-
resentations of the state’s represen-
tative, and he may recoup any .dam-
ages suffered as a result of the mis-
representations.

“When the state sues to recover mon-
ey—‘the defendant may in defense as-
sert any claims which are connected
with and arise out of the same trans-
action; that is, in such an action the de-
fendant is “entitled to plead and prove
any and all matters propérly defensive,
including credits and set-offs, so far
as the latter are dependent on, con-
nected with or grow out of the trans-
action which constituted the subject-
matter of the suit.”’”

The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in
State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 69 Atl.
1028, 129 Am. St. Rep. 205, held:

“A state by bringing an equitable
action opens the door to any defense
or cross-complaint germane to the mat-
ter in controversy. A sovereign who
asks for equity must do equity.

“This action being an equitable one,
the state, by bringing it, opened the
door ito any defense or cross-complaint
germane to the matter in controversy,
that the city might see fit to inter-
pose. A sovereign who asks for equity
must do equity.”

In State v. Portsmouth Savings Bank,
106 Ind. 435, 7 N.E. 379, the court held:

“Although the general rule is that the
state cannot be sued, yet when it goes
into court of its own accord it must be
treated as any other suitor, and a cross-
complaint may be filed against it.

154

“= * ® Although the state cannot be
sued yet when it goes into the courts
to recover property, it goes as any other
suitor, and must accord to the de-
fendant the right to file a cross-com~
plaint, and have the title litigated, set-
tled and quieted. State v. Board of
Com’rs, 101 Ind. 69, 74. From the view
we are constrained to take of the case,
it is not very material whether the plea
be treated as an answer or as a cross~
complaint; although, looking to all of
its averments, and the prayer for af-
firmative relief, we think that it is in its
essential features a cross-complaint.”

The trial court found that the dam-
ages to the land and improvements, re-
sulting during the 20 years occu-
pancy by the Commissioners as mort-
gagees in possession, exceeded and was
equal to the amount claimed as a de-
ficiency judgment. No attempt was
made in the trial of the cause to con-
tradict the evidence upon which this
finding is based.

We confine our adjudication here to
the right of the defendants to fully de-
fend against the. action of the state.
That is all that is involved and we sus-
tain that right. However, we deem it
proper to say that as to the above de-
cisions from other states which might
there sustain a money judgment over
against the state for damages, we do
not imply by citing them that the rule
to that extent would be applicable in
our state.

‘We have examined the entire record,
and finding no error therein, we af-
firm.

WELCH, DAVISON, ARNOLD, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, J., dissent.

De
CALHOUN v. HICKS.
No. 35222. March 10, 1953.
255 P. 2d 279.

O. B. Martin, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

Chas. L. Orr, Oklahoma City, for de-
fendant in error.

DAVISON, J. The only question pre-
sented by this appeal is as to the appli-
cability of the Intangible Personal Prop-
erty Tax Law, 68 O, S. 1941 § 1501 et
seq. The case comes here by transcript
and bill of exceptions.

By way of an amended petition, the
plaintiff, J. F. Hicks, sought to recover
from the defendant, Fred Calhoun, the
sum of $990.87. It was alleged that the
defendant was employed to manage
and operate a drugstore belonging to

the plaintiff, located in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma; that defendant did operate
the store from that time, September of
1946 to January 9, 1947, when plaintiff
sold the same; that during said time
the defendant was “guilty of fraud,
mismanagement, misrepresentation, and
misappropriation of *** goods, wares,
merchandise and funds * * *.” An item-
ized statement of the amounts claimed

to be due was attached to the petition.”

Defendant’s amended answer and
cross-petition was a general denial
coupled with affirmative allegations
that about June 1, 1946, defendant gave
up other employment to accept the po-
sition as manager and operator of plain-
tiff’s drugstore at a salary of $50 per
week; that by various checks described
in the cross-petition, he had been paid
$1,203.81, leaving a net balance due
him of $229.94. The defendant also al-
leged that the said amount was unliqui-
dated and, therefore, not subject to in-
tangible personal property tax.

A trial of the issues to the court,
without the intervention of a jury, re-
sulted in a judgment for plaintiff in
the amount of $724.79, from which de-
fendant has perfected this appeal. The
only question presented by the defend-
ant is that, because plaintiff neither al-
leged nor proved compliance with,
or exception from, the provisions of

the Intangible Personal Property Tax
Laws, 68 O.S. 1941 §1510 et seq., the
court had no jurisdiction to render
judgment in his favor.

This action is one purely in tort to
recover money and property belonging
to the principal, which the agent, by
“fraud, mismanagement, misrepresen-
tation and misappropriation,” took for
his own use. Being such, it is within
the rule stated in the case of Hall v.
Deal, 205 Okla. 46, 234 P. 2d 384,
wherein it was held that:

“Before being reduced to judgment,
a claim for money due in an action
grounded in tort is not subject to tax
under the Intangible Tax Law of Okla-
homa, 68 O.S. 1941 §§1501-1515.”

155

In addition, the claim was unliqui-
dated as is shown by the amount of the
judgment which, in effect, struck a bal-
ance between the claims of both par-
ties. Had plaintiff waived the tort and
founded the action upon an implied
contract, the fact that the amount was
unliquidated would also have exempt-
ed it from the operation of the tax law.
It was said in the case of Dunlap v.
Spencer, 191 Okla. 557, 131 P. 2d 994,
that:

“An undetermined and unliquidated
claim for money or for credit, arising
out of the mutual dealings and recipro-
cal demands of the parties to a busi-
ness arrangement, conducted under a
system of mutual account, does not con-
stitute an account receivable within the
meaning of the Intangible Personal
Property Tax Law. 68 O.S. 1941 §§
1501-1520.”

For these reasons, the provisions of
the Intangible Personal Property Tax
Law, 68 O.S. 1941 §§ 1501-1515, are not
here applicable and the trial court was
correct in so holding.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

|

LOCAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASS’N v. DAVIDSON & CASE
LBR. CO. et al.

No. 35083. Dec. 16, 1952.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1953.
255 P. 2d 248.

156

Everest, McKenzie, Gibbens & Craw-
ford, Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in
error.

Russell L. Morgan, Oklahoma City,
for defendants in error and cross-pe-
titioners in error, Roy Wallace, George
Whatoff, Tom W. Valentine, and L.
Hollis Grimmett.

Hemry & Hemry, Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error Della G. York.

Halley, Everest, Halley & Spradling,
Oklahoma City, for defendant and
cross-petitioner in error, Davidson &
Case Lumber Company.

O'NEAL, J. The question presented
by the appeal is whether the mort-
gage, the materialmen’s liens or the
judgment lien is entitled to priority of
payment in certain funds in the pos-
session of the court’s receiver.

The parties will be referred to as
follows: Roy Wallace, who filed the
suit, and the defendants, L. Hollis
Grimmett and George Whatoff, and the
interveners, Tom Valentine and Glenn
Geiser, as lien claimants, or named
individually as occasion demands, the

defendant, Davidson & Case Lumber
Company, a corporation, as the Lum-
ber Company, and the defendants Ruel
B. Thomas and Della G. Thomas, now
York, as the Thomases, or as Mr. or
Mrs. Thomas, Hemry & Hemry, as
judgment creditor, and the Local Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association as the
Local.

The Thomases owned jointly lot one
(1) in block thirteen (13), Nichols Hill,
Oklahoma county, State of Oklahoma.
They made an application to Local for
a loan on said property. On July 23,
1948, Local wrote a letter to Mr. Thom-
as that it approved the loan for $12,500
to be secured by a mortgage on the
property and would disburse funds, as
follows:

“1, When roof is on—outside sheet-
ing on studs — windows, casing and
sash set—plumbing and wiring roughed
mane of Conventional Loan or $12,-
500.00.

“2, When plumbing fixtures are set,
plastered through-out. Trim on—Brick
Veneer on — Cabinets built — top floor
down—40% additional.

“3. 20% to add to F.H.A. proceeds to
complete job.

“Tt is also understood and agreed at
the time each disbursement of funds is
made, proper evidence including paid
bills and lien waivers will be submitted
showing all materials and labor paid
up to and including date of disburse-
ment except those bills actually paid
out of funds disbursed by this Asso-
ciation. Before date of first disburse-
ment, we will require that Ruel B.
Thomas and Stella Thomas execute
FHA papers in the amount of $15,200.00
covering this property.”

On July 31, 1948, Mr. Thomas made a
contract with Tom W. Valentine, as
superintendent of construction, for
the building of a residence on the de-
scribed lot, Valentine to be paid $100
a week for his services. On August 3,
1948, the Thomases executed their note
to Local in the sum of $12,500 and a
real estate mortgage to secure payment
thereof. The mortgage was recorded
August 5, 1948. Construction, or work,

157

‘was commenced on the residence build-
ing August 9, 1948.

The Lumber Company’s lien state-
ment disclosed it furnished building
material which went into the construc-
tion of the house on the lot, commenc-
ing August 9, 1948, to March 30, 1949,
and filed a lien on April 6, 1949.

Tom Valentine, the superintendent
of construction, entered into a verbal
contract with Thomas to supervise the
work, and filed a lien on May 23, 1949.

George Whatoff, a bricklayer, by
contract under February 4, 1949, com-
menced work on said date and filed
lien on April 12, 1949.

L. Hollis Grimmett, by oral contract,
in December, 1948, built cabinets for
residence and filed lien April 5, 1949.

Roy Wallace, by written contract of
December 21, 1948, furnished the nec-
essary plastering; the work was com-
menced December 29, 1948, and lien
filed April 13, 1949.

Glenn Geiser, by oral contract, un-
der date of October 4, 1948, furnished
material and labor, and filed lien April
5, 1949.

Hemry & Hemry, as a judgment cred-
itor, claims a judgment lien against the
property under date of the judgment,
May 24, 1949.

The above mechanics and labor
liens as to the amounts due each claim-
ant were duly established, as well as
the date of filing lien statements, and
that the material was used and labor
performed in the construction upon the
property.

On November 1, 1949, judgments
were entered as against Mr. Thomas,
as follows:

For the plaintiff, Roy Wallace, the
sum of $584.00, with interest and attor-
ney fees;

For the defendant, L. Hollis Grim~
mett, the sum of $643.52, with interest
and attorney fees;

158

For the defendant, George Whatoff,
the sum of $634.00 with interest and at-
torney fees;

For the defendant, Davidson & Case
Lumber Co., the sum of $12,753.30, with
interest and attorneys fees;

For the intervener, Glenn Geiser, the
sum of $216.12, with interest and attor-
neys fees;

For the intervener, Tom W. Valen-
tine, the sum of $204.00, with interest
and attorneys fees.

and for a decree foreclosing their me-
chanics and labor liens.

For the intervener, Hemry & Hemry,
the sum of $800.00, with interest, and
for a decree of foreclosure as a judg-
ment creditor as against Mr. Thomas;

For the defendant, Local Federal
Savings and Loan Association, the sum
of $10,203.28, with interest and attor-
neys fees, and for a decree foreclos-
ing the mortgage.

The trial court during the progress
of the proceeding appointed a receiver
to take over the properties and com-
plete the construction of the residence.
The questions of priorities of the vari-
ous claimants were reserved, as well
as the personal liability of Mrs. Thom-
as.

On March 16, 1950, the court entered
its judgment in favor of the mechanic
and labor lien claimants, as against
Mrs. Thomas, for the identical amounts
with interest and attorneys’ fees, as
theretofore rendered on November ist,
against Mr. Thomas.

Mrs. Thomas, now Della G. York,
was granted a judgment against Mr.
Thomas for any sum of money which
she may be compelled to pay out by
reason of the judgment herein ren-
dered. No appeal is taken by Mr. Thom-
as from the judgment.

Thereafter, and on October 9, 1950,
the court’s receiver completed the con-
struction of the house, and under the
court’s order sold the property, free of
all claims of the respective parties, for
the sum of $26,500. This fund, less cer-

tain receiver’s certificates and approv-
ed costs, is the subject of the pres-
ent litigation.

The last journal entry of judgment
bears date of December 20, 1950, which
granted priority liens in the following
manner:

The court granted the Lumber Co. a
first lien in the sum of $9,524.62, with
interest and attorneys fees, less the
sum of $28.70 advanced by Local in
making the loan;

Local, a 3rd lien in the sum of $5,-
000.00, together with interest and at-
torneys fees;

L. Hollis Grimmett a 4th lien in the
sum of $643.52, and Roy Wallace a lien
of $584.00 as co-equal liens, together
with interest and attorneys fees;

The Local a 5th lien in the sum of
$5,174.58, this lien being inferior to the
liens of the Lumber Co., L. Hollis Grim-
mett and Roy Wallace;

The Lumber Company a 6th lien in
the sum of $3,228.68, together with in-
terest and attorneys fees;

George Whatoff, Glenn Geiser and
Tom W. Valentine a 7th lien, inferior
only to the liens of Local, Lumber Co.,
L. Hollis Grimmett and Roy Wallace,
together with interest and attorneys
fees;

Hemry & Hemry an 8th lien, infer-
ior to all other liens.

The court held that the lien of the
United States of America was inferior
to all other liens and was extinguished
by the sale of the real estate and prem-
ises had by the receiver. All of the
foregoing liens carried accrued interest
and attorneys fees, and the receiver
was directed to disburse the funds in
compliance with the judgment and de-
cree.

Thereafter, and on January 29, 1951,
upon motions, the court entered de-
ficiency judgment against Ruel B.
Thomas and Della G. Thomas, now
York, as follows:

Lumber Company in the sum of
$3,228.68, with interest and attorneys
fees;

Local in the sum of $7,984.77, with in-
terest and attorneys fees;

L. Hollis Grimmett in the sum of
$584.00, with interest and attorneys
fees;

George Whatoff in the sum of $634.00,
with interest and attorneys fees;

Tom W. Valentine in the sum of
$204.00, with interest and attorneys
fees;

Roy Wallace in the sum of $584.00,
with interest and attorneys fees.

The defendant, Della G. Thomas, now
York, appeals from the personal judg-
ment rendered against her.

We will give first consideration to the

mortgage lien of the Local, and the

. Lumber Company’s lien, and determine
which is entitled to priority.

The Thomases, joint owners of the
lot, borrowed $12,500 from the Local,
giving their joint note and mortgage
as security. Local was obligated to pay
out to the Thomases, 40% when the roof
was on, outside sheeting on studs, win-
dows, casing and sash set, and plumb-
ing and wiring roughed in. On Novem-
ber 26, 1948, Mr. Thomas furnished
his affidavit to Local, that as of that
date there were no unpaid bills or
claims for improvements made or con-
tracted for upon the property. The affi-
davit was supported by an itemized
statement showing expenditures of the
sum of $3,000 for labor upon the build-
ing operations. Upon this proof the Lo-
cal advanced Mr. Thomas the sum of
$5,000 on said date. On January 7,
1948, Mr. Thomas furnished an addi-
tional affidavit that as of that date
there were then no unpaid bills or
claims for improvements made or con-
tracted for, and upon that showing ob-
tained an additional $5,000 from the
Local.

We find no evidence in the record
that the affidavits did not truthfully
state the facts as they then existed;
neither is it controverted that Mr.
Thomas had disbursed $18,752.91 upon
construction bills when the second

159

$5,000 was paid to the Thomases on the
property.

Local contends that the material and
labor liens were attached subsequent to
the mortgage loan to the Thomases, and
that lien claimants had actual and con-
structive notice of Local’s mortgage
lien. .

That under Tit. 42 O.S, 1951 §141, as
construed by our decisions, the Local’s
mortgage lien is entitled to preference
in the distribution of the funds in the
receiver’s hands. The statute, so far
as applicable, reads:

“Any person who shall, under oral
or written contract with the owner of
any tract or piece of land, perform la-
bor, or furnish material for the erec-
tion, alteration or repair of any build-
ing, improvement or structure thereon
* * * shall have a lien upon the whole
of said tract or piece of land, the build-
ings and appurtenances. * * * Such
liens shall be preferred to all other
liens or encumbrances which may at-
tach to or upon such land, buildings or
improvements or either of them sub-
sequent to the commencement of such
building, * * * and such lien shall fol-
low said property and each and every
part thereof, and be enforceable
against the said property wherever the
same may be found, and compliance
with the provisions of this Article shall
constitute constructive notice of the
claimant’s lien to all purchasers and
encumbrances of said property or any
part thereof, subsequent to the date of
the furnishing of the first item of ma-
terial or the date of the performance
of the first labor.”

The Lumber Company introduced no
evidence as to the terms of any con-
tract they had with Mr. Thomas for
the furnishing of the building material.
Their petition states that it furnished
lumber and materials going into the
construction job, commencing August
9, 1948, to March 10, 1949; that it filed
the mechanics’ lien April 6, 1949. The
manager testified he wrote a letter un-
der date of October 4, 1948, to the Local
as follows:

“160 Le

“Tt is our understanding that you
are making Mr. Thomas a first mort-
gage loan on that above property.

“This is to advise that we are fur-
nishing the material on this job.”

The Lumber Company contends that
at the time Local advanced the last
$5,000 to Thomas on January 7, 1949,
its bill for lumber furnished aggregated
the sum of $9,524.62, which money at
the time was unpaid and due and owing
to the Lumber Company. The conten-
tion is not supported by the Lumber
Company’s evidence, or otherwise by
the record. Although its manager testi-
fied with reference to the letter of Oc-
tober 4, 1948, supra, he did not testify
to the terms of its contract, or the pay-
ments due. Nothing was said in the
letter as to when the materials were to
be paid for during the building opera-
tion, or any request that the Lumber
Company be advised as to advances to
be made by Local to the Thomases
under the mortgage. Furthermore, the
evidence does not show that the Lumber
Company, after writing its letter of Oc-
tober 4, 1948, again contacted the Loan
Company or advised it of the status
of its account with the Thomases. As
we have noted, the advances to be made
by the Local to the Thomases were
definitely fixed under the Local’s letter
of July 23, 1948. Clearly, the transac-
tion created no obligation upon Local
to disburse the proceeds of the loan
only to pay off any existing obligations
of the Thomases incurred in the con-
struction of the building.

In Basham et al. v. Goodholm &
Sparrow Inv. Co., 52 Okla. 536, 152 P.
416, the court held:

“The mere knowledge of a party who
holds a recorded mortgage against cer-
tain land that the owner of the land
intends to improve same, or the knowl-
edge that the owner is improving said
Jand, will not warrant the subordina-
tion of the said mortgage to a material-
man’s lien filed upon said premises for
material furnished in making said im-
provements.”

The holding of the Basham case is
followed in the case of Pittsburg Mort-

gage Inv. Co. v. Standard Lumber Co.,
148 Okla. 297, 298 P. 885, and Shefts
Supply, Inc., v. Brady, 170 Okla. 590.
41 P. 2d 820. The Basham case was
cited with approval in Antrim Lbr. Co.
v. Claremore Federal Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 204 Okla. 387, 230 P. 2d 274.

Under Tit. 42 O.S. 1951 §92, a person
who performs work and labor under a
contract with another is given a lien on
the product of his labor, for such
work and labor, and under Tit. 42 O.S.
1951 §96, such laborer is given a lien
over all other liens created prior or
subsequent to the laborer’s lien.

In the last-cited case the court, con-
struing the above mentioned statutes,
said that these statutes were only appli-
cable where the lien claimant has per-
formed manual labor with his own
hands in the construction of the im-
provements upon the real estate, and
the lien is only upon the improvements
so constructed by him, which lien is
superior to a prior mortgage lien. As
we shall hereafter point out, the me-
chanic liens of the defendants and in-
terveners were not such labor liens.

The Lumber Company, to support the
judgment of priority, states:

“Advances made pursuant to a mort-
gage to secure future advances which
the mortgagee was not obligated to
make are subordinate to incumbrances
intervening between the giving of the
mortgage and the making of the ad-
vances if the advances were made with
notice or knowledge of the intervening
incumbrances.”

Antrim Lbr. Co. v. Claremore Fed-
eral Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 204 Okla. 387,
230 P. 2d 274, is relied upon to support
the foregoing assignment. It was there
contended that the fee owner procured
a construction loan from the Loan Com-
pany and that the latter was required
to hold the proceeds of the loan until
satisfied that all labor and material
liens had been paid in full. Disposing
of this contention, we held the mort-
gage superior to the mechanic’s lien
because there was no evidence that the

mortgagee had the right to withhold
the proceeds of the loan and pay it
out as it desired and as the building
progressed.

In the Antrim Lbr. Co. case, as in

the instant case, the Lumber Compan-’

ies did not advise the Loan Companies
of any indebtedness due them prior
to the advances made by the Loan Com-
pany to the owner. The Antrim Lum-
ber Company’s decision distinguishes
our decision in Home Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Sullivan, 140 Okla. 300, 284
P. 30, by pointing out that if the mort-
gagee and owner had an agreement
that the building should be completed
before the money was paid out, and
the mortgagee had the right to refuse
payment until the building was com-
pleted, that materialmen who furnished
material, after the recording of the
mortgage, but before the money is
paid, have a prior lien to that of the
mortgagee.

In Garey v. Rufus Lillard Co. et al.,
196 Okla. 421, 165 P. 2d 344, this dis-
tinction was again pointed out. We held
there that where mortgage provided
for subsequent advances optional with
the mortgagee, such advances made
and secured by second and third mort-
gages would be treated as junior in-
cumbrances inferior to the intervening
liens attaching to property.

In 57 C.J.S. §205 (b), p. 773, the rule
is announced as follows:

“In a majority of jurisdictions, a
mortgage given to secure future ad-
vances has priority over mechanics’
liens subsequently arising to the extent
of the full amount advanced, including
what is advanced after, as well as be-
fore, the accrual of the mechanics’
liens, at least where the mortgage was
recorded prior to the performance of
services or the furnishing of the ma-
terials, and the making of the ad-
vances was obligatory on the mort-
gagee under the terms of his contract
with the mortgagor * * *.”

Under the rule thus announced, sup-
ported by our decisions, we are of the
view that the court erred in giving the

161

Lumber Company first priority in the
proceeds, less the item of $28.70 to Lo-
cak.

Our disposition of the controversy be-
tween Local and the Lumber Company:
obviates the necessity of a further dis-
cussion of the decree allowing Local a
lien of $5,000 junior to the lien of the
Lumber Company in the sum of $3,-
947.95, which was paid to Local by the
receiver. As we have heretofore noted,
the decree granted the Lumber Com-
pany a lien superior both to Local and
the lien claimants. As we view the rec-
ord, the Lumber Company and the other
lien claimants are co-equal.

The plaintiff’s, defendants’ and inter-
veners’ claims, other than the Lumber
Company, for priority payment, were
disposed of by the decree as follows:
Roy Wallace, plaintiff, and L. Hollis
Grimmett were decreed to have co-
equal liens, which were declared to
be superior to the lien claimants
Whatoff, Valentine and Geiser. The
Wallace claim is based upon doing a
plastering job in December, 1948; the
Grimmett claim is based upon the con-
struction of bookcases off of the prem-
ises and delivered in January or Feb-
ruary, 1949. The lien claimant, Whatoff,
did the brick work in February, 1949,
and Geiser did the painting, papering
and decorating, but the record does not
disclose when the work was com-
menced. Valentine was given a me-
chanics lien, and the question as to
whether or not he was entitled to such
lien was never raised in the trial pro-
ceedings or in the motions for a new
trial or in this court on appeal. Since
the question was not raised, it will not
be consideréd by this court. Von Stilli
v. Young, 203 Okla. 86, 219 P. 2d 224.

The decree granted the plaintiff, Wal-
lace, and the defendant, Grimmett, co-
equal rights, superior to all other lien
claimants. The order is erroneous. No
evidence in the records warrant giving
them a preferential position. Other lien
claimants furnished material and la-
bor and also filed lien claims prior to
the Wallace and Grimmett claims. The

162 a

lien claimants have adopted and here
rely upon the brief of the Lumber Com-
pany in support of their claims. They
assert that since the Local had notice
that the Lumber Company was furnish-
ing material on the job, that fact was
notice that the other lien claimants
were furnishing labor and material on
the job. What we have heretofore said
with reference to the Lumber Com-
pany’s claim of priority over the Local,
mortgagee, applies with equal force
here.

As we view the record, the claims
of the Lumber Company and other
lien claimants, stand co-equal, and that
the funds in the hands of the receiver
shouldbe so distributed, subject only
to the superior mortgage lien of the
Local. This view is supported by our
decisions in Republic Supply Co. v.
Powell et al., 71 Okla. 105, 175 P. 519,
and Braden Co. v. Robinson et al., 171
Okla. 278, 43 P. 2d 437,

If the funds in the hands of the re-
ceiver are insufficient to pay the lien
claimants in full, then claims should
be paid co-equal upon a pro rata basis.

Mrs. Thomas, now Della G. York,
by cross-petition in error challenges the
judgment rendered below based upon
a personal liability in the form of a
deficiency judgment rendered against
her. The record disclosed her joint
ownership of the real estate, and that
she and Mr. Thomas executed the note
and mortgage to the Local to procure
the loan of $12,500. There is evidence
establishing her participation in the
construction of the residence which was
intended to be occupied as the home.
She made payment of certain bills in-
curred by subcontractors for labor.
She joined Mr. Thomas in borrowing
money and executing a mortgage upon
other city property owned by her, the
funds being applied to the building
project. These and other facts and cir-
cumstances, as shown by the record,
support the judgment against her as a
deficiency judgment.

To defeat the deficiency judgments it
is argued that Glenn Geiser, a lien

claimant, did not comply with Tit. 12
O.S. 1951 §686, by filing a motion within
90 days from the date of the sale by
the receiver. This is a correct state-
ment of the record.

The record further discloses that the_

claimants, Wallace, Whatoff and Valen-
tine, filed motions for deficiency judg-
ments against Mrs. Thomas, now York,
but did not serve notices thereof upon
her or her counsel within a 90-day pe-
riod, and it is claimed that under said
section 686, the failure to serve notice
bars claimant’s right for a deficiency
judgment. These contentions cannot be
sustained. We have heretofore held that
12 O.S. 1951 §686 has no application in
the collection of a deficiency judgment
subsequent to a lien foreclosure sale.

In Price v. Shell Oil Co., 199 Okla.
193, 185 P. 2d 211, we held that §686,
as amended, is not ambiguous, and the
proviso added by the 1941 amendment
applies only to mortgaged foreclosure
proceedings.

We hold that the Local Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Ass’n should be granted a
prior and superior lien in the funds in
the hands of the receiver, to the extent
of the money advanced by the Local to
Thomases, under the mortgage. That
the Davidson & Case Lumber Company,
Roy Wallace, George Whatoff, L. Hollis
Grimmett, and Glenn Geiser be granted
liens upon said fund on a co-equal and
pro rata basis, subject to prior lien of
the Local and Tom Valentine,

That if the funds in the hands of the
receiver are insufficient to pay in full
the judgment of the Local, Lumber
Company and lien claimants, as herein
designated, that judgment be render-
ed for the deficiency found by the trial
court to be due the mortgagee and the
lien claimants against Ruel B. Thomas
and Della G. Thomas, now Della G.
York.

The case is reversed, with directions
to enter personal judgments and decrees
in conformity with the views herein
expressed.

EE 163

HALLEY, V.C.J., and CORN, GIB-
SON, DAVISON, JOHNSON, and
BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.
Le
DIEFFENBACH v. McINTYRE.
No. 34585. Dee. 16, 1952.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1958,
254 P. 2a 846.

McNeill & McNeill and R. P. Colley,
Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Lamoin Oldham and Wheeler &
Wheeler, Tulsa, for defendant in error.

BINGAMAN, J. This action was
brought by plaintiff, Mildred E. Mc-
Intyre, against the defendant, Nevin J.
Dieffenbach, seeking to recover rental
paid, damages for repairs made upon
a building leased by her from the de-
fendant, and anticipated profits lost by
her because of her removal from the
building. The trial court submitted the
cause to the jury as to the rental paid
and cost of repairs, but refused to per-
mit the introduction of evidence as to
loss of anticipated profits. Defendant
appeals from the judgment against him
rendered on a verdict by the jury in
favor of plaintiff, and plaintiff cross-
appeals from the refusal of the court
to permit her to introduce evidence
as to loss of anticipated profits.

Undisputed facts are that plaintiff,
prior to the time she leased the building
from defendant, was operating a beauty
parlor in one of the downtown buildings
in Tulsa; that she was required to va-
cate the rooms used by her in said build-
ing on or before May 1, 1946, and that

164

during the month of April she sought
to find another place in which to con-
duct her beauty parlor. She got in
touch with defendant, who was attor-
ney in fact for his mother-in-law, who
owned a building farther removed from
the business section of Tulsa, and
sought to lease a portion thereof from
him for a term of years. The transac-
tion finally resulted in her leasing the
entire building, which consisted of four
units of several rooms each, two up-
stairs and two downstairs. She installed
her beauty parlor in one of the down-
stairs units, but upon failure to obtain
the possession of the entire building re-
moved therefrom to other quarters on
or about the Ist of August, 1946.

Plaintiff testified that at or prior to
the time she signed the lease on the
building, which lease ran for a term
of three years at a rental of $500 per
month, she was assured by defendant
that he had raised the rent on the
other three units in the building from
$50 to $150 per month, and had given
30 day notices requiring them to re-
move, and that they could not possibly
remain there and pay the rental which
he had fixed as the new rate on the
property. Thereafter, she testified, he
informed her that he could not give her
possession until the Ist of June, and she
made arrangements to stay in her old
quarters for another month. On the Ist
of June, when she was ready to move
in, two of the units in the building
were still occupied, and she hesitated
to move in, but upon assurance from
defendant to her attorney that he would
obtain possession of the two occupied
units on or before June 7th, she moved
into the unit which she proposed to use
as a beauty parlor. When the lease
was signed she paid defendant one
month’s rent of $500, and she expended
additional sums in fixing up the unit

occupied by her. She testified that de--

fendant failed to oust the tenants from
the two units occupied by them, al-
though one of them subsequently left,
and that the occupant of the other unit
offered her the regular $50 per month
rental, but she refused to accept. the

same, telling them that arrangements
for payments should be made with de-
fendant. This unit was still occupied
when she, left the building and the
tenants testified that they thereafter
paid defendant the regular rental of
$50 per month and were still occupying
the unit and paying such rental at the
time of the trial.

Plaintiff's attorney testified that
when he found out the defendant could
not deliver possession on the Ist of
June, he talked to him with a view of
revising the lease to include only a por-
tion of the building, but that defendant
assured him that he would have all of
the tenants out by June 7th and that it
would be all right for plaintiff to move
in.

The defendant denied all these state-
ments. Therefore, the evidence being
conflicting the question was properly
submitted to the jury by the trial court
and their verdict in favor of plaintiff
was supported by competent evidence.

When plaintiff sought to introduce
testimony as to the profits she made
in her former location and the profits
she made while in defendant’s building,
and the drop in her profits when she
removed to another building, the trial
court sustained defendant’s objection
thereto, and did not permit that testi-
mony to go to the jury.

Defendant in his brief asserts that the
major and paramount question for deci-
sion is whether, as a matter of law, the
defendant, when he executed the lease
of April 30th, transferred to the plaintiff
the legal right to possession, and was
under no further obligation, or whether
he was obligated to go further and
place the plaintiff in actual possession
of the property on June Ist. In arguing
this question he asserts that the lease
transferred the legal right to posses-
sion to the plaintiff, which was all he
was required to do; that the occupants
holding over after the term of their
rental periods had expired by reason
of his notices to them were trespassers,
or tenants at sufferance of plaintiff,
and that he was not required to place

the plaintiff in possession as against
them. In support of this contention,
which is argued in several subheads, he
cites Brown v. International Land Co.,
29 Okla. 341, 116 P. 799; Holden v. Tid-
well, 37 Okla. 553, 133 P. 54, and other
similar cases. We do not agree with
this contention. An examination of the
cases cited in support thereof discloses
that they are not applicable to the fact
situation herein involved. In none of
them was the question of the failure of
the lessor to place the lessee in actual
possession at the beginning of the term
involved, but rather they involved tres-
passing committed upon the property
subsequent to the taking of possession
thereof by the lessee.

Defendant calls attention to the fact
that the so-called American rule as to
the placing of a lessee in possession re-
quired only that he be placed in legal
possession, while the other, or English
rule, holds that there is an implied
covenant to place the lessee in actual
possession (see Hannan v. Dusch, 154
Va. 356, 70 A.L.R. 141), and asserts that
the American rule is generally preva-
lent in the United States. This state,
among numerous others, has followed
the other, or so-called English rule,
and holds that the lessor is required to
place the lessee in actual possession
of the property. King v. Coombs, 36
Okla. 396, 122 P. 181; Flannagan v.
Dickerson, 103 Okla. 206, 229 P. 552. In
these cases we recognized and adhered
to the rule holding that the lease con-
tained an implied obligation to place
the lessee in actual possession. In Han-
nan v. Dusch, supra, the court cited
and discussed numerous cases which
adhered to either one rule or the other,
and in the note to that case a number
of these cases are analyzed. The states
listed in the opinion, on page 142 of 70
A. L. R. show that a large majority of
the states follow the so-called English
rule adopted and followed by this court
in the cases above cited, and in Stewart
v. Murphy, 95 Kan. 421, 148 P. 609, it
is stated that by the great weight of
authority the covenant to put the leesee
in possession at the beginning of the
term is implied, citing numerous cases.

165

It follows that in the instant case
the lessee was entitled to be put in pos-
session of the entire building by the
lessor on or before June 1, 1946, and
the failure of the defendant to so place
her in possession, or at least to place
her in possession June 7th, at which
time he assured her attorney she would
receive possession of the entire build-
ing, was a breach of the lease.

Defendant contends that the breach
was only a partial breach since it did
not interfere with the operation of the
beauty parlor by plaintiff, but we think
it was a complete breach, since it
forced the plaintiff either to bring
ouster proceedings against the tenants
holding over, or to continue to pay
$500 a month rent for a portion of the
premises only.

Defendant further claims that the
trial court erred in giving to the jury
instructions Nos. 3 and 4. By instruec-
tion No. 3, the jury was told that if
they found by a preponderance of the
evidence that plaintiff entered into pos-
session of two units of the leased prem-
ises on June ist, with the promise and
agreement on the part of defendant that
if she would take possession of said
units on that date he would place her
in possession of the remaining units
on June 7th or 8th, and he failed to do
so, the defendant committed an action-
able breach of the contract and their
verdict should be for plaintiff. By in-
struction No. 4, they were told that if
they found for the plaintiff, her dam-
ages should be for the sum of $500, the
first month’s rental. admittedly paid
by her to the defendant on April 30th,
and also such additional damages as
would compensate her for moving into
the building and remodeling the part
which she used for the beauty par-
lor, not to exceed the sum of $574.95,
claimed by plaintiff for such expenses.
Plaintiff contends that the true measure
of damages due a tenant on failure of
the landlord to deliver possession is the
difference between the rental agreed
upon and the actual rental value of the
property, together with special dam-
ages incurred by the lessee or tenant in

166 .

preparing to occupy the premises, citing
Anderson v. Hodges, 187 Okla. 43, 100 P.
2d 853; Dills v. Calloway, 175 Okla. 395,
52 P. 2d 707, and other similar cases.
However, in these cases the tenants
had paid no rental and had not moved
into the property in reliance upon any
representation of defendant that the
defendant would place them in the un-
disturbed possession thereof. Defendant
also asserts that the trial court erred
in refusing to give the jury several
requested instructions upon his theory
of the case as heretofore outlined in
this opinion. We have examined the
instructions given and the requested in-
structions refused and hold that the
trial court properly instructed the jury,
and that it did not err in refusing to
give the instructions requested by de-
fendant.

Plaintiff in her cross-appeal contends
that the court erred in refusing to per-
mit her to present to the jury for its
consideration the profits made by her
while operating in her previous loca-
tion, the profits made by her while lo-
cated in defendant’s building, and the
loss of profits occasioned by her re-
moval therefrom. We are unable to
agree with this contention.

While it is true that we have in num-
erous cases held that the loss of profits
in an established business is a proper
element of damages, the business of
plaintiff in her former uptown loca-
tion could not be used, we think, to
measure the damages sustained by her,
because of her removal from the build-
ing of defendant. She occupied the
building of defendant only two months,
and that in our opinion was not a suf-
ficient length of time to constitute her
business there an established business.
In 25 C.J.S. p. 518, §42b, it is stated
that in cases where the loss of antici-
pated profits is claimed as an element
of damages, the business claimed to
have been interrupted must be an es-
tablished one, and it must be shown
that it has been successfully conducted
for such a length of time and has
such a trade established that the profits
therefrom are reasonably ascertainable.

In our judgment, the business of defend-
ant, after her removal from her up-
town location to defendant’s building,
had not been conducted for such length
of time as to render it an established
business, and the trial court properly
refused to permit evidence of her
claimed losses to go to the jury.

It follows that the judgment for
plaintiff as rendered by the lower court
must be and hereby is affirmed.

In her brief plaintiff calls attention
to the fact that a supersedeas bond
has been filed by defendant and asks
for judgment on the  supersedeas
bond. Judgment is therefore rendered
against Julia LeBus and Kay L. Dief-
fenbach, sureties on the supersedeas
bond, for $1,152.92, with interest at the
rate of 6 percentum from October 26,
1949, and for costs.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, GIBSON, DAVISON, JOHN-
SON, and O’NEAL, JJ., concur. .

TULSA FRUIT CO. et al. v. LUCAS.
No. 35520. March 10, 1953.
254 P. 2d 788.

Pierce. Rucker, Mock, Tabor & Dun-
can, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

E. D. Brewer, Tulsa, for defendant in
error.

CORN, J. Plaintiff sued to recover
damages for personal injuries, and for
damages to his automobile, received in
a collision between his automobile and
defendant’s truck, and alleged to have
resulted from negligence of the truck
driver and codefendant Brown.

The petition alleged plaintiff was
driving his car east on Sand Springs
Road in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and defend-

167

ant’s truck, driven by the defendant
Brown, an employee, was parked on
the south or left-hand side of the street;
as plaintiff approached, defendant’s
driver negligently and unlawfully drove
the truck away from the south curb and
diagonally across the highway in a
northwesterly direction, colliding with
plaintiff and causing serious injuries.
Negligence was charged in defendant’s
truck unlawfully being parked on the
left-hand side (wrong side) of the high-
way facing west; in driving the truck
from the wrong side of the highway
into and across the eastbound lanes of
traffic without yielding the right of
way to plaintiff; unlawfully and reck-
lessly driving the truck across east-
bound traffic lanes so as to block high-
way and collide with plaintiff's car,
which defendant could have avoided by
use of ordinary care; violation of ap-
plicable ordinances of the city of Tulsa
providing as follows.

“Any person driving a vehicle away
from a parked position along a curb,
edge of street, or a double parked
position shall yield the right of way to
all vehicles moving in the line of traf-
fic being entered by such driver.

“No person shall stand or park a ve-
hicle in a roadway other than parallel
with the right edge of the roadway,
headed in the direction of traffic, and
with the right curb-side wheels of the
vehicle within eight (8) inches of the
edge of the roadway or the curbing
thereof, except where diagonal parking
or parking at a 45 degree angle or by
regulation of the Chief of Police in a -
cordance with the authority granted to
him by this ordinance.

“Tt shall be unlawful for any person,
firm or corporation to allow, permit
or suffer any vehicle registered in his,
her or its name to stand or park in any
street, highway, parkway or alley un-
der the control of the city in violation of
the provisions of this ordinance.”

Plaintiff further alleged that as a
result of defendants’ negligence he re-
ceived severe and permanent injuries
to his skull, forehead, eye, foot and
leg, and had lost his sense of taste

168

and smell, as well as damage to his
automobile in the amount of $850.

Defendants filed general denial, plea
of unavoidable accident, and further
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence, in: (1) failing to keep prop-
er lookout for other vehicles properly
upon the street; (2) failing to have
proper brakes, or failure to stop in the
assured, clear distance ahead; (3)
driving in excess of the speed permit-
ted under applicable city ordinance;
(4) violation of certain sections of city
traffic code requiring, upon streets of
sufficient width, that all drivers keep
upon the right half of the roadway and
requiring all vehicles meeting one
another to keep to the right of the cen-
ter of the highway. By cross-petition
defendants sought judgment against
plaintiff for damages to the truck and
loss of use thereof during time required
for repair, alleged to have resulted
from plaintiff’s negligence.

Plaintiff replied hy general denial of
the answer and all matters relied upon
for relief under the cross-petition.

At the trial evidence disclosed the
following physical facts as respects the
general locale, and conditions existing
immediately following the collision:
Sand Spring Road, in the city of Tulsa,
runs east and west in the vicinity of
the 4900 block where this accident oc-
curred. The roadway measures 35
feet in width, thus making a four lane
street. A traffic light is located at the
east end of this block, and the testi-
mony showed the point of collision to
have been 117 feet west of such light.
No parking is permitted on the north
side of Sand Springs Road, although
it is permissible to park along the
south curb line. When vehicles are
so parked only three traffic lanes re-
main open for travel. The accident oc-
curred about 10:30 a.m., on a cold day
in January, 1951.

To establish the facts of the accident
plaintiff relied upon his own testimony
and that of one other witness, Plain-
tiff testified he was traveling east at
approximately 25 miles per hour, and

was decelerating his own car in an ef-
fort to give the traffic light time to
change to green; a car parked along
the south curb caused him to drive out
in the center lane; first observed de-
fendant’s truck-when it started to pull
out from the curb across the highway
in an angling northwesterly direction
while plaintiff was approximately 100
feet away. The angle at which the
truck pulled across the street was
shown by the testimony to have been
from 30 to 45 degrees. Believing the
truck was pulling out in order to ob-
serve oncoming traffic plaintiff pulled
his car to the left about to the center
line of the street, but the truck pulled
on out across the street in his path.
Being unable to pass behind the truck
because of a parked car, plaintiff ap-
plied his brakes when a very short dis-
tance away, but the brakes did not
hold, and swung his car hard to the
left, but was unable to avoid colliding
with the truck, which he struck at the
left front corner of the bed. Plaintiff's
car jammed under the corner of the
truck and as a result of the collision
hhe was rendered unconscious and re-
ceived serious and permanent injuries.
Plaintiff's automobile was so badly
damaged it was sold for salvage. The
serious and permanent nature of plain-
tiff’s injuries was established by un-
controverted medical testimony, and
no issue is presented on appeal rela-
tive to the propriety of the judgment
in this respect.

Plaintiff's other witness (Lovely) was
standing inside a tavern looking out a
plate glass window toward the street
and observed defendant’s westbound
truck swerve across the street and park
on the wrong side. Two men got out
of the truck and carried some produce
into a nearby store. A few minutes
later they returned, jumped into the
truck and suddenly pulled out across
the street at an angle in a northwester-
ly direction. Witness observed plaintiff
when approximately 60 feet from the
truck and at the time he was traveling
20-25 miles per hour. Plaintiff could
not turn to the right because of cars
parked along the south curb. As the

two vehicles neared one another plain-
tiff swung to the left in an effort to
miss the truck, but they collided and
plaintiffs car was wedged in under
the front of the truck body. The de-
mutrer to plaintiff's evidence was over-
ruled.

Defendant’s driver and codefendant
(Brown) testified he stopped the truck
to make a delivery and then pulled
across the street to the right side and
stopped to let his coworker (Sheet)
into the truck; he then started the truck
and proceeded down the street at about
10 miles per hour when he observed
plaintiff's car approaching about a
block away but gradually pulling over
in a northeasterly direction into de-
fendant’s traffic lane without slowing
down.

The other employee (Sheet) was a
passenger in the ‘truck. He testified
defendant drove across the street into
his proper traffic lane and then stopped
to wait for witness to cross the street
and enter the truck, whereupon they
proceeded west in the proper lane; they
observed plaintiff's car and as it ap-
proached plaintiff veered across the
center onto the wrong side of the street
and struck the truck.

Police officers who investigated the
accident testified as defendant’s wit-
nesses, One officer testified the street
was 35 feet wide where this accident
occurred. Following the collision both
vehicles were on the north side of the
street in the truck’s lane of traffic;
there were no skid marks and appar-
ently plaintiff’s car came into the traf-
fic lane and struck the truck. The
photographic exhibits admitted in evi-
dence showed the position of the ve-
hicles following the collision and dis-
closed that the truck was struck by
plaintiff's car over the center line.
Another officer corroborated the above
testimony, and also testified that after
the wreck the truck’s right wheels were
about 7 feet from the north curb. The
third officer gave substantially the
same testimony.

169

In rebuttal plaintiff recalled the wit-
ness, who positively contradicted testi-
mony given by defendant’s witness to
the effect that Sheet went into the street
to look for approaching traffic and as-
sist in guiding the truck across the
street from its position at the south
curb. Witness further testified the
truck did not back up before pulling
away from the curb and across the
highway, and that it did not stop from
the time it pulled out from the curb
until it reached the point of impact.

Defendants’ motion for directed ver-
dict at the close of the evidence was
overruled, and after consideration of
the case under the trial court’s in-
structions the jury returned a verdict
for plaintiff for $14,892, upon which
verdict the judgment appealed from
was rendered.

Defendants rely upon two propositions
in seeking to reverse this judgment,
the first of which is the contention the
trial court erred in overruling defend-
ants’ demurrer to the evidence and the
motion for directed verdict. The sup-
porting argument is presented under
two subdivisions: (a) what defendants
refer to as the physical facts rule; (b)
there was no evidence of negligence.

Under subdivision (a) defendants
recognize that a question as to existence
of negligence is for the jury, but urge
that an exception to such rule is that
a jury cannot find the existence of neg-
ligence where the established physical
facts show an absence of negligence,
even though plaintiff’s evidence may
conflict with the physical facts and in-
dicate existence thereof. Defendants
contend the testimony, coupled with the
physical facts shown in the photo-
graphic evidence, precluded the jury
from finding defendants guilty of neg-
ligence.

The evidence introduced by means
of the photographs made immediately
after the collision showed: the truck
was in its proper lane of traffic; plain-
tiff’s car struck the truck and nearly
all of the car was across the center

170

line on defendants’ side of the road;
there were no skid marks from the
point of impact. Under defendants’
theory such physical facts must be ac-
cepted as showing lack of negligence
of defendants, and likewise precluded
the jury from finding negligence al-
though plaintiff’s evidence was in con-
flict therewith. Numerous cases are
cited as authority for the rule contend-
ed for. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
v. True (10 Cir.) 165 F. 2d 38; Wise v.
Wise, 175 Okla. 310, 52 P. 2d 715; McIn-
tire v. Burns, 172 Okla. 152, 42 P. 2d
143; and cases from other jurisdictions.

However, to accept defendants’ the-
ory of proper application of the rule
upon which they rely would require this
court to disregard entirely anything
other than the physical facts concern-
ing the actual collision and conditions
apparent thereafter. In other words,
to follow defendants’ theory and reason-
ing, we would be compelled to an-
nounce a rule to the effect that where
there are physical facts which show,
or tend to establish, certain conditions
and thus reflect that an accident could
have happened in a certain manner, a
court or jury cannot consider any oth-
er evidence of negligence of a party
prior to the happening of an event. This
we decline to do.

The negligence relied upon herein
was the manner in which the truck
was parked, and the course employed
by the driver in moving the parked
truck from an illegal parking place
across moving traffic lanes and into
the proper traffic lane. Plaintiff relied
upon defendants’ negligence in hand-
ling of the truck, as being the proxi-
mate cause of his being involved in a
collision. The physical facts relative
to the place the collision occurred are
not disputed. The question presented
for the jury’s consideration was wheth-
er the evidence showed that the acci-
dent resulted primarily from the man-
ner in which the truck was operated
up to the point of the collision.

In passing upon defendants’ demur-
rer to the evidence and motion for di-

rected verdict all the evidence favor-
able to plaintiff, and reasonable infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom, were to
be taken as true, while everything fav-
orable to movant was to be disregard-
ed. Defendants’ demurrer and motion
properly were overruled. Oklahoma
Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 204 Okla. 90, 227 P.
2d 392; Shamblin v. Shamblin, 206 Okla.
133, 241 P. 2d 941.

Defendants also contend there was
no evidence of negligence. They urge
plaintiff relied upon the illegal parking
of the truck and defendants’ failure to
yield right of way to plaintiff when
crossing the eastbound traffic lanes.
Thus, since the accident occurred after
the illegal parking, such fact was too
remote from the accident to have the
necessary proximate causal connection.
Defendants then conclude that under
our decision, before violation of an or-
dinance could provide a basis for re-
covery in a negligence action, such vio-
lation must appear to be the proximate
cause of injury. We have consistently
adhered to this rule. Harbour-Long-
mire Bldg. Co. v. Carson, 201 Okla. 580,
208 P. 2d 173. However, this rule like-
wise includes the principle that wheth-
er violation of an ordinance or statute
was the proximate or contributing
cause of injury is a question of fact
for the jury. See syllabus 2 of the
Carson case, supra.

Plaintiff did not rely solely upon de-
fendants’ violation of the city ordinance
as showing negligence. He pleaded and
offered evidence showing defendants’
entire course of conduct in operation
of the truck from the time of the illegal
parking until they sought to re-enter
the proper lane of traffic. The ques-
tion was whether defendants’ manner
of operation of the truck was the proxi-
mate cause of the collision. This was
a matter peculiarly for the jury. The
standard of liability was negligence.
The question was whether a reasonably
prudent person would have so operat-
ed the truck under the circumstances.
The evidence was such that reasonable
men might have drawn different con-
clusions therefrom. Whether negli-

gence existed and, if so, whether such
negligence was the probable cause of
injury, was for the triers of fact. Ok-
Jahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Gray, 204
Okla. 362, 230 P. 2d 256. These issues
were resolved in plaintiff's favor. The
verdict is amply sustained by compe-
tent evidence, and will not be disturbed
on appeal. United States F. & G. Co.
v. Dowdy, Adm’x, 203 Okla. 207, 219
P, 2d 215.

The second contention is that the
trial court erred in overruling the mo-
tion for new trial. The first ground
of argument is that the court erred in
giving instruction No. 9, wherein the
substance of various city ordinances
was stated. The complaint is that the
jury was told defendants were guilty
of negligence per se under one of the
city ordinances if the truck was parked
in violation of such ordinance. This
argument is without merit. In the fol-
lowing instruction (No. 10) the court
further advised the jury that while vi-
olation of the ordinance would be neg-
ligence, such negligence provided no
basis for judgment unless the violation
was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. The jury properly was advised
that violation of the city ordinance con-
stituted negligence per se. The court
further advised the jury it was nec-
essary to determine from the evidence
whether such violation was the proxi-
mate cause of injury. The instructions
given properly defined these issues.
Harbour-Longmire Bldg. Co. v. Carson,
supra.

The final argument is that the court
erred in admitting prejudicial evidence.
While plaintiff was testifying he took
a bone fragment from his pocket and
testified same had been removed from
his skull after the accident, although
plaintiff admittedly was unconscious at
the time the operation was performed.
Defendants objected and asked that the
jury be admonished not to consider
this. The trial court reserved his rul-
ing upon this motion. The specimen
thereafter was shown to plaintiff’s doc-
tor while he was on the witness stand,
although he stated he could not identify

171

same. The trial court again reserved
his ruling upon defendants’ objection
to the testimony and request that it
be stricken and the jury admonished
not to consider any such testimony. The
bone fragments were not introduced in
evidence.

The record does not disclose that
defendants at any time before judg-
ment renewed their objections, or re-
quested the trial court to enter a final
ruling upon defendants’ objections aft-
er having reserved his ruling thereon.
In such instances the rule is that a
party who permits a case to proceed to
judgment without having the court en-
ter a final ruling upon his motion will
be deemed to have waived his right to
such ruling; and in absence of a rul-
ing thereon there is no question of
error to be reviewed. United Trans-
ports, Inc., v. Jett, 193 Okla. 399, 144
P. 2d 110; Cushing Gasoline Co. v.
Hutchins, 93 Okla. 13, 219 P. 408; Black-
burn v. Morrison, 29 Okla. 510, 118 P.
402, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 523.

Judgment affirmed.

Plaintiff having prayed for judgment
upon the supersedeas bond executed
herein, judgment accordingly is ren-
dered thereon.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, DAVISON, O’NEAL,
WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
concur.

OKLAHOMA TURNPIKE AUTHORITY
v. BETREMIEUX et ux.

No. 35555. March 10, 1953.
254 P. ad 771.

172

Leon Shipp and C. E. Barnes, Okla-~
homa City, for plaintiff in error.

P. D. Erwin, Chandler, for defendants
in error.

ARNOLD, J. This is an appeal by
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority from a
judgment of the district court of Lin-
coln county awarding damages to de-
fendants, A. J. Betremieux and Maude
Betremieux. The plaintiff in its petition
seeks to condemn the fee-simple title
to surface rights on certain described

. property located in Lincoln county, upon
which defendants hold a preference
lease issued by the Commissioners of
the Land Office of the State of Okla-
homa. In the petition it is sought to
condemn approximately 12.28 acres
across defendants’ lease for the pur-
pose of constructing a turnpike and also
seek to condemn a temporary grant of
14.16 acres for the purpose of opening
and cleaning stream channels,

The Commissioners in condemnation
appointed by the court fixed defend-
ants’ damage in the sum of $650. De-
fendants filed exceptions to the Com-

missioners’ report which were over-
ruled; they thereafter filed a demand
for jury trial.

The cause was tried to a jury result-
ing in a verdict in favor of defendants,
assessing damages against plaintiff in
the sum of $2,500.

Plaintiff in due time filed a motion
for new trial on the grounds that the
jury by its verdict awarded the defend-
ants excessive damages and that the
evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict. On the hearing of this motion
the court indicated that unless defend-
ants filed a remittitur within five days
in the sum of $500 the motion for new
trial would be sustained. The remittitur
suggested was filed by defendants and
the motion for new trial was overruled
and judgment was rendered by the
court in favor of defendants in the sum
of $2,000.

Plaintiff appeals and asserts that the
verdict of the jury even after having
been reduced by the remittitur is exces-
sive and contrary to the weight of the
evidence and the court erred in over-
ruling its motion for new trial.

The evidence as to the damages sus-
tained by defendants is in conflict. It
shows that defendants are the owners
of a preference lease consisting of 160
acres located in Lincoln county and
plaintiff has obtained a right of way
over this land for the purpose of con-
structing a turnpike. The evidence
shows that the turnpike is being con-
structed diagonally across defendants’
lease; that it enters upon his lease a
short distance south of the northeast
corner thereof and transverses the lease
in a southwesterly direction to the west
boundary line thereof. The turnpike
will cause defendants’ lease to be di-
vided into two tracts, one to the north
and one to the south of the turnpike.
Defendant A. J. Betremieux. in sub-
stance, testified that the tract on the
north side of the turnpike consists of
timber and pasture land on which he
pastures his stock consisting of milk
cows, a number of calves and his work
horses. In the center of his lease and on

the south side of the turnpike is located
a never-failing spring from which he
obtains water for his stock. The im-
provements are constructed on the
south side of the turnpike and all of
his cultivated land is on the same side;
it will be necessary that the Turnpike
Authority fences both sides of the pike.
Defendants will have no ready access
from the south tract of their land to the
north tract. The construction of an un-
derpass is not contemplated by plaintiff
and defendant’s stock upon the comple-
tion of the highway will be completely
eut off from water. The only way he
may pass from one tract of the land to
the other is by traveling east to the east
boundary line of his land and across a
bridge constructed on the section line
and it will be necessary for him to
move his stock in this manner in order
to obtain water. Defendant A. J. Be-
tremieux testified that the value of the
lease immediately before the taking
was approximately $6,000 and that it
was worth $2,500 less after the taking.
Other witnesses testifying in behalf of
defendants fixed the damages at $1,500
to $2,000. Plaintiff’s witnesses estimated
defendants’ damages at various figures
from $800 to $1,250. All of these wit-
nesses based their estimate of damages
on the difference between the value of
defendants’ lease immediately before
and after the taking.

Counsel for plaintiff asserts that a
verdict under the evidence in excess of
$1,800 would not be reasonably sup-
ported by the evidence. This assertion
is based on the evidence of the witness
Fred Cobb, testifying for defendants,
who fixed defendants’ damages based
on the difference between the value of
their lease immediately before and aft-
er the taking, at from $1,800 to $2,000.
It is further asserted that the estimate
made by witness Cobb of the dam-
ages sustained is higher than that of
any other witness in the case except
the evidence of A. J. Betremieux, and
that his evidence did not justify an
award in excess of $1,800; that a verdict
based on the evidence of defendant Be-

173

tremieux alone could not be said to be
reasonably supported by the evidence
and that the judgment entered based
on the remittitur is therefore not rea-
sonably supported by competent evi-
dence.

This contention cannot be sustained.
We think there is sufficient competent
evidence to sustain the verdict returned,
and as stated by the Turnpike Author-
ity, if the amount awarded is reason-
ably supported by the testimony, the
verdict of the jury, and the judgment
based thereon, will not be disturbed on
appeal. Bush v. Oklahoma City, 194
Okla. 504, 154 P. 2d 960; Grand River
Dam Authority v. Rose, 195 Okla. 698,
161 P. 2d 766; Denney v. State ex rel.
King, 179 Okla. 35, 64 P. 2d 298; Nichols
v. Oklahoma City, 195 Okla. 305, 157
P. 2d 174.

It is further contended by plaintiff
that since the court indicated in pass-
ing on the motion for new trial that it
could not approve the verdict for the
reason that damages awarded were ex-
cessive, it was its duty to set aside
the verdict and grant plaintiff a new
trial; that it had no authority upon the
filing of remittitur to approve the ver-
dict and overrule the motion. We do not
agree. If the court could not conscien-
tiously approve the verdict for the rea-
son that it deemed the damages award-
ed defendants excessive, it had the
right to require a remittitur in such an
amount as would make it acceptable or
conscionable. Petite v. Davis, 203 Okla.
547, 223 P. 2d 1082. If the defendants
did not, under such circumstances, file
a remittitur the court could and would
be obliged to grant a new trial. De-
fendants did consent thereto as is evi-
denced by the filing of the remittitur.

The trial court committed no error
in overruling plaintiff’s motion for new
trial.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, DAVI-
SON, O’NEAL, and WILLIAMS, JJ.,
concur,

174 a

In re LAYMAN’S ESTATE.
LAYMAN v. LAYMAN et al.
No. 35883. March 10, 1958.
254 P. 2a 784.

White & Parris, Eufaula, for plaintiff
in error.

Brown, Brown & Brown, McAlester,
for defendants in error.

WILLIAMS, J. In December, 1949, J.
H. Layman died while owning certain
lands in McIntosh county, Oklahoma.

On January 15, 1950, an instrument
purporting to be his last will and testa-
ment dated April 15, 1938, was ad-
mitted to probate in the county court of
that county.

On October 16, 1950, certain heirs of
J. H. Layman filed a “Contest of Will
After Proof of Will” and presented a
purported holographic will dated Au-

gust 20, 1949. After due hearing, the
county judge entered judgment on No-
vember 20, 1950, admitting to probate
the said holographic will and canceling
the previous order admitting the will
of April 15, 1938, to probate.

On July 2, 1951, two heirs, hereinaft-
er called contestants, filed a petition
for contest of will after probate.

On July 21, 1951, an heir, hereinafter
called respondent, filed a special ap-
pearance and plea to the jurisdiction in
said contest proceeding.

A supplemental petition to contest
will after probate was filed by contest-
ants on August 10, 1951, and on August
31, 1951, the county court sustained the
plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed
the contest.

Contestants thereafter appealed to the
district court where, after hearing was
had as provided by law, the order of
the county court was reversed, and the
cause was remanded to the county
court for further proceedings therein.

From the last-mentioned judgment of
the district court, respondent has ap-
pealed to this court.

In support of his contention that the
plea to the jurisdiction should be sus-
tained, respondent (plaintiff in error)
in his brief argues the allegations of
error under three propositions which we
will consider in the order presented.

The first contention is that the peti-
tion for contest of will shows on its face
that it is insufficient to confer juris-
diction upon the court, because it does
not comply with the requirements of 58
O.S. 1951 §61, which sets out the condi-
tions under which a contest of will after
probate may be filed.

The pertinent parts of said section
are as follows:

“When a will has been admitted to
probate, any person interested therein
may at any time within one year after
such probate, contest the same or the
validity of the will. For that purpose he
must file in the court in which the will
was proved, a sworn petition in writing

containing his allegations, that evi-
dence discovered since the probate of
the will, the material facts of which
must be set forth, shows:

“1. That a will of a later date than
the one proved by the decedent, revok-
ing or changing the former will, has
been discovered, and is offered, or,

«ge ee

ge eH

“4, That the former will was not duly
executed or attested.”

This contention cannot be sustained,
since a reference to said petition reveals
that the contestants alleged therein the
discovery of new evidence since the
probate of the holographic will; that the
material facts of such evidence were
set forth therein; and that such alle-
gations of evidence state that a codicil
to the holographic will canceling it and
republishing the will of April 15, 1938,
had been found, and that said petition
further alleges that the holographic will
was not duly executed and attested as
provided by law. The requirements of
the cited section of the statute were
therefore satisfied.

The next contention is that contest-
ants are estopped from attacking the
validity of the holographic will because
they accepted benefits thereunder. How-~
ever, respondent did not plead the de-
fense of estoppel in the court below,
and this court has held many times es-
toppel must be pleaded to be available
as a part of a cause of action or de-
tense. See Holt v. Holt, 23 Okla. 639, 102
P. 187; Blakemore v. Johnson, 24 Okla.
544, 103 P. 554; Blakeney v. Home Own-
ers’ Loan Corporation, 192 Okla. 158,
135 P. 2d 339; Kirk v. Kirk, 205 Okla.
482, 238 P. 2d 808.

The third contention of respondent is
that under the terms of 58 O.S. 1951
§67, the proceedings were filed too late
and the county court was without juris-
diction to hear and determine the mat-
ter. It does not appear that this court
has ever had occasion to pass upon this
specific question.

175

In passing, we take note of the fact
that there apparently is a conflict be-
tween sections 61 and 67 of Title 58
O.S. 1951. Section 61 provides for a pe-
riod of one year within which to file a
contest of will after probate. Section
67 formerly provided the same time
limitation, but in 1951 it was amended
to shorten the period to only six months.
In such cases, the rule is that the last
expression of the Legislature will gov-
ern, as shown in the following quotation
from Creek County v. Robinson, 114
Okla. 163, 245 P. 584:

“Where two statutes cover the same
subject and the statute last adopted is
repugnant to and irreconcilable with
the provisions covering the same sub-
ject in the first statute, the latest ex-
pression of the Legislature will govern.”

For an identical syllabus by the court,
see City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil
& Gas Co., 64 Okla, 214, 166 P. 1058.

This section (67) was apparently
adopted by our Legislature from the
compiled laws of Dakota, 1887. It ap-
peared in the Revised Laws of Okla-
hhoma, 1910, as follows:

“Tf no person, within one year after
the probate of a will, contests the same
or the validity thereof, the probate of
the will is conclusive, saving to infants
and persons of unsound mind, a like
period of one year after their respec-
tive disabilities are removed.”

The 1951 Legislature of this state
amended this section of the statute,
changing it to read as follows:

“Tf no person, within six (6) months
after the probate of a will, contests the
same or the validity thereof, the pro-
bate of the will is conclusive, saving
to infants and persons of unsound mind,
a period of one (1) year after their re-
spective disabilities are removed.”

In the case at bar, the holographic
will was admitted to probate on No-
vember 20, 1950. At that time, the law
provided that contests after probate
must be filed within one year. On May
26, 1951, the law was changed so as to
allow only six months for a contest
after probate. As stated hereinabove,

176

the petition for contest of will after
probate was filed on July 2, 1951. As is
readily seen, the amended statute, if
retrospective in effect, and if retroac-
tive to November 20, 1950, date of ad-
mission of will to probate, took away
contestants’ right to contest the will
as soon as it became effective (May 26,
1951). The question, then. is whether
the amended section of the statute is
retrospective or merely prospective, as
applied to the case at bar.

Respondent bases his argument on
this question on the general rule of law
stated in the following quotation:

“No person has a vested right in any
particular mode of procedure, and if,
before the trial of the cause, a new law
of procedure goes into effect, it gov-
erns, unless the statute itself provides
otherwise.” Independent Cotton Oil Co.
v. Beacham, 31 Okla. 384, 120 P. 969.

Brief of contestants (defendants in
error) suggests that an answer to said
argument may be found in Clark v.
Kansas City, St. L. & C. Ry. Co., 219
Mo. 524, 118 S. W. 40. The following
language from that decision is quoted
with approval by the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in Shelby-Downard Asphalt
Co. v. Enyart, 67 Okla. 237, 170 P. 708:

“Tn this country, the general rule
seems to be, in accordance with the
English, that statutes pertaining to the
remedy, ie. such as relate to the
course and form of proceedings for the
enforcement of a right, but do not af-
fect the substance of the judgment pro-
nounced, nor either directly nor indi-
rectly destroy all remedy whatever for
the enforcement of the right, are ret-
rospective, so as to apply to causes of
action subsisting at the date of their
passage.” ***” (Emphasis supplied.)

By inference from the above, it would
seem that statutes should not be con-
strued so as to have retroactive or ret-
rospective effect where such a con-
struction would destroy a right of ac-
tion entirely, as in the case at bar. How-
ever, further portions of this opinion
obviate the necessity of our passing
directly herein upon either that ques-
tion; or the question of whether the

statute in question deals altogether
with procedural law or whether the
granting of time to file a contest be-~
stows a substantive right; or whether
the contentions made by contestants, if
successful, would amount to a depriva-
tion of rights without due process of
Jaw.

We hold that the general rule that
statutes are presumed to be prospec-
tive only, unless a contrary intent ap-
pears, is applicable in the case at bar.
Such seems to be the majority view as
reflected by decisions from other juris-
dictions.

In the California case of In re Ven-
ners’ Estate, 119 Cal. App. 417, 6 P. 2d
544, involving a practically identical
set of facts, the court said:

“Right to contest probate of will is not
barred until six months have elapsed
after effective date of statutory amend-
ment reducing time to institute con-
test, * * *?

In that case the “petition to revoke
probate of will” was filed a little over
eight months after the probate of the
will, but less than four months after
the statute had been amended to short-
en, from one year to six months, the
period within which to commence pro-
ceedings to “revoke” the probate of a
will.

See, also, In re Whiting’s Estate, 110
Cal. App. 399, 294 P. 502, which quoted
with approval the following language
from Swampland District v. Glide, 112
Cal. 85, 44 P. 451:

“But a man has no vested right
in the running of the statute of limita-
tions until it has completely run and
barred the action; and when a change in
the statute is made during the time of
its running, that time is not a credit
to the defendant, under the new law.
The whole period contemplated by the
new law must elapse to bar the action.

a

**
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 169 Va. 77,
192 S. E. 774, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia said:
“A suit, filed within two years after
probate of will, to contest it was not

barred by subsequent amendatory act
changing limitation period from two
years to one year.”

On the question of the general rule
as to the interpretation of statutes, see
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, §478, wherein it
is stated:

“The question whether a statute op-
erates retrospectively, or prospective-
ly only, is one of legislative intent. In
determining such intent, the courts
have evolved a_ strict construction
against a retrospective operation, and
indulge in the presumption that the
Legislature intended statutes, or amend-
ments thereof, enacted by it to operate
prospectively only, and not retroactive-
ly.”

On this same question, we find the
following language used in 59 C. J.
Statutes, §694:

“Statutes are presumed to be prospec-
tive only in their operation, rather than
retrospective, or retroactive, unless the
contrary clearly appears. * * *”

We hold that 58 O.S. 1951 §67, as
amended, is prospective only, and that
the time within which contestant might
contest the holographic will in question
after probate had not expired when his
contest was filed.

The judgment of the district court
overruling the plea to the jurisdiction
is affirmed, and this cause is remanded
to such court for further proceedings
not inconsistent herewith.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J., and
WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

HAYES et al. v. MOORE et al.
No 38984. March 10, 1953.
254 P. 24 773.

177

Fred W. Whetsel and Bell & Tucker,
McAlester, for plaintiffs in error.

Tom G. Haile, McAlester, for defend-
ants in error.

ARNOLD, J. This is an appeal from
a judgment of the district court of
Pittsburg county establishing a trust in
certain real estate and quieting title
thereto in the heirs of Lizzie Moore, de-
ceased.

Lizzie Moore was enrolled as a full-
blood member of the Choctaw Tribe.
At some time prior to December, 1925,
she was declared incompetent by the
county court of Pittsburg county and
one Kent V. Gay was appointed her
guardian. She had first been married to
one Sampson Moore, by whom she had
two children and from whom she ob-
tained a divorce. She then had one il-
legitimate child, then in 1924 married
one Roy Moore, by whom she had four
children, She died intestate in 1937 leav-
ing surviving her her husband, Roy
Moore, and her seven children.

In 1926 her guardian petitioned the
Department of Interior for authority to
invest $4,800 of the restricted funds of

178

Lizzie Moore held by it in 160 acres of
land adjoining land owned by her so as
to increase the number of tillable acres
for her use. He also made application
to the county court for authority to so
invest said funds belonging to the in-
competent. On January 7, 1926, the
county judge entered his order finding
that such investment was to the best
interests of the ward, authorizing the
purchase, and ordering that the guard-
ian “take title in the name of the
children of said Lizzie Moore.” At the
time of this order Lizzie Moore had
four children, three legitimate and one
illegitimate.

By successive steps thereafter taken
through various Federal agencies hav-
ing jurisdiction of the affairs of the Five
Civilized Tribes, authority was pro-
cured for the withdrawal of $4,800 from
her accumulated restricted funds to pay
for this land. The deed executed and de-
livered in closing this transaction con-
veyed the fee title to the three legiti-
mate children of Lizzie Moore, specifi-
cally naming them, instead of “in the
name of the children of said Lizzie
Moore”, and reserve a life estate to said
incompetent ward. After her death in
1937 administration proceedings were
had upon her estate. This land was not
administered as a part of her estate. Her
heirs were determined to be her seven
children and her surviving husband.

This action was commenced June 13,
1939, by her surviving husband, Roy
Moore, and four of her children against
Micey Hayes, nee Moore, Lillie Wallis,
nee Moore, and A. B. Moore, a minor,
grantees in the deed above mentioned,
and Sam Brence, mortgagee of the in-
terest of Micey Hayes in the land here
involved, to establish a resulting trust
in said land in favor of plaintiffs and to
quiet the title of plaintiffs to an undi-
vided one-eighth interest each therein.
Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants ap-
peal.

The essential question to be de-
termined is whether either the county
court or the Department of Interior had
authority to take title to the land in

question in the name of three of Lizzie
Moore’s children instead of in the name
of Lizzie Moore. Plaintiffs below, de-
fendants in error here, contend that said
transaction created a resulting trust;
that the consideration for the purchase
was paid from the restricted funds of
said Lizzie Moore; that she was the le-
gal owner of said land at her death and
title thereto passed to her husband and
children under the laws of descent and
distribution, each taking a one-eighth
interest subject to the homestead rights
of the husband and minor children, The
defendants below, plaintiffs in error
here, contend that this transaction con-
stituted a gift from the Secretary of In-
terior out of the funds of Lizzie Moore
to the grantees named in the deed, that
Lizzie Moore consented to the gift and
was competent to give her consent.

The order of the county court speci-
fically found “that the purchase of said
lands for said ward by said guardian
is for the best interests of said ward,”
and directed that title thereto be taken
“in the name of the children of said
Lizzie Moore”, This was not done. No
evidence of any kind was presented
showing that Lizzie Moore made any
request in any form that her restricted
funds be used to make a gift of land to
three of her four minor children. In
the absence of a request that such a
gift be made, the gift in question stood
as if made by the Secretary of the In-
terior on his own volition. This was be-
yond his authority.

Plaintiffs in error urge, however, that
Lizzie Moore consented to such gift.
They base this contention on the testi-
mony of their witness John L. Fuller,
a lawyer, who testified that the transac-
tion was closed in his office and that he
acted as notary in taking the acknowl-
edgments of the grantors in the deed.
He testified from memory to the details
of this transaction which occurred in his
presence more than 20 years prior to his
becoming a witness. The material por-
tion of his testimony was to the effect
that Lizzie Moore understood and spoke
English; that the purpose and effect of
the deed were explained to her by Mr.

Wilkinson, field clerk for.the Superin-
tendent at Muskogee; that Mr. Wilkin-
son brought the purchase money check
with him and delivered it to the seller
and took the deed and left with it; that
orily the sellers of the land, Mr. Wilkin-
son, Lizzie Moore, and her guardian
were present.

This testimony is in contradiction of
the facts stated in the stipulation en-
tered into by the parties as to who han-
dled the details of closing the deal on
behalf of the Department, who delivered
the check in payment, and who took
charge of the deed, and whom the de-
partment designated as its agent for
these purposes.

Where a transfer of real property is
made to one person and the consid-
eration therefor is paid by or for an-
other, a trust is presumed to result in
favor of the person by or for whom
such payment is made, 60 O.S. 1951
§137. This presumption may be over-
come by evidence, but we find no such
evidence in this record. Lizzie Moore
was the legal owner of the land and at
her death title thereto vested in her
heirs.

Plaintiffs in error also urge error of
the trial court in overruling the motion
of Sam Brence, cross-petitioner, to dis-
miss plaintiff's petition because of the
joint laches in filing and prosecution of
the case on the part of plaintiffs and
the other defendants than himself. This
joint assignment of error is not com-
mon to nor does it similarly affect all
parties to the petition in error and is not
therefore available to all parties. Pha-
roah v. Buegler, 172 Okla. 633, 45 P.
2d 1098; State Finance Service v. Mul-
lins, 193 Okla. 688, 147 P. 2d 159.

The last question raised is that of
the right of Roy Moore, surviving hus-
band, and the minor children to occupy
this land as a homestead. The probate
homestead right is a creature of law
and not of judicial action. No decree
of court is necessary to give validity to
the homestead claim of a surviving
spouse and minor children to continue
in the possession and occupancy of the

179

family home. See Hembree v. Magno~
lia Petroleum Co., 176 Okla. 524, 56 P.
“2d 851.

Affirmed.

HALLEY, CJ. JOHNSON, V.CJ,
and CORN, O'NEAL, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur. WELCH, DAVISON, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent,

Ee
CITIES SERVICE OIL. CO. v. GEOLO-

GRAPH CO,, Ine.

No. 35084. March 10, 1953.
254 P. 2d 775.

180

L. L. Corn, Gentry Lee, F. H. Bacon,
and R. O. Mason, Bartlesville, for
plaintiff in error.

Monnet, Hayes & Bullis and Mart
Brown, Oklahoma City, for defendant
in error.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff in error was
plaintiff in the trial court and defend-
ant in error was defendant. They will
be referred to as they appeared in the
court below.

Plaintiff sought recovery from de-
fendant on a written contract, claiming
there was due and owing by reason of
same, a substantial sum as “overrid-
ing royalty” payments based on annual
“gross rentals” received by defendant
for the year ending June 30, 1949, on a
certain patented device, known by its
registered trade-mark as a “Geolo-
graph”, and used for recording drilling
operations.

Defendant joined issue by answer ad-
mitting the execution of said contract,
but denying that there is any indebted-
ness due plaintiff for the period in ques-
tion. By cross-petition defendant set up
a counterclaim for overpayments alleg-
edly made to plaintiff due to what de-
fendant contends was a mistake in cal-
culating and paying royalty for past
years.

It appears that on or about November
6, 1942, plaintiff sold to P. B. Nichols,
the share which it had owned jointly
with him in the letters patent and the
registered trade-mark on the ‘“Geolo-
graph,” and in addition Nichols ac-
quired plaintiff's interest in the busi-
ness of manufacturing and renting the
“Geolographs”. The terms of sale and
property sold were all set out in a writ-
ten contract, and that contract, as
amended and supplemented at different
times, is looked to by each of the par-
ties to this action as controlling.

Nichols acquired plaintiffs interest
in the letters patent; the registered
trade-mark “Geolograph”; a certain li-
cense and option agreement which had
been taken as protection against possi-

ple claims of infringement by reason of
outstanding letters patent running in
the name of one George P. Mizell; cer-
tain geolograph machines then in exist-
ence; the amounts due and owing or to
become due and owing to a certain
joint account covering business oper-
ations after the close of business on
September 30, 1942; and all other prop~
erty of a personal nature used or kept
for use in connection with the conduct
of the joint adverture.

As full consideration plaintiff received
primary payment and, in addition
thereto, was to receive certain royalty
pursuant to paragraph 7 (b) of the
agreement which originally provided:

“Royaltys Company shall receive and
be paid by Nichols during the life of
said Patent an overriding royalty based
on gross rentals received on said Geolo-
graphs. All calculations of gross rentals
to be less any sales tax charged and
collected. The overriding royalty pay-
able hereunder shall be computed and
paid according to the following sched-
ule:

“Gross Rentals Annually:
“$0 to $6,000.00, no royalty.

“$6,000.00 to $10,000.00 5% royalty,
on excess over $6,000.00.

“$10,000.00 to $15,000.00, 744% on ex-
cess over $10,000.00.

“For all gross rentals in excess of
$15,000.00, 10%.”

Provision was furthe: made by the
contract that in event of the sale of
machines covered by the agreement,
or should Nichols engage in the busi-
ness of manufacturing and selling Geo-
lographs, then during the life of the pa-
tent plaintiff was to receive as royalty
on any machines sold 10% of the sales
price, said price to be not less than

$750.

It was further agreed that the going
business was to be carried on by
Nichols in a good and workmanlike
manner and he was to use his best en-
deavors to make the business profitable
and successful.

181

Subsequently, and on the 8th day of
July, 1943, the contracting parties modi-
fied the schedule of royalty payments
provided by subparagraph (b) of para-
graph 7 of the original agreement as
follows:

“Gross Rentals Annually:
“$0 to $6,000.00, no royalty.

“$6,000.00 to $50,000.00 5% royalty
on excess over $6,000.00.

“For all gross rentals in excess of
$50,000.00, 10%.”

On September 15, 1947, the contract
was further amended by changing the
accounting date for royalties due and,
in addition, to provide that plaintiff
was to receive a royalty of 30% on rent-
als paid by its contractors for use of
the “Geolograph” on wells drilled for
plaintiff as operators of the property
but the same not to be included when
computing “gross rentals” under sub-
division (b) of paragraph 7.

In 1947, the business was incorpo-
rated under defendant’s name, Nichols
continuing as one of the principal own-
ers of the business and serving the cor-
poration as its president. The corpora-
tion assumed the contract and ‘the roy~
alty payments were continued as in the
past until this controversy arose in
connection with the royalty for the year
ending June 30, 1949, All that is here
in dispute concerns royalty payments
to be made under subdivision (b) of
paragraph 7.

Plaintiff contends that it was the in-
tention of the parties by their contract
that plaintiff should be paid royalty,
to be computed on the gross rentals
received in excess of the first $6,000
without any deductions, except the
sales tax. It further contends that the
phrase “Gross rentals received on said
Geolographs” meant not only the rent-
als from the Geolographs in exis-
tence and sold pursuant to the contract,
but included gross rentals received on
Geolographs manufactured in the fu-
ture during the life of said patent.

182

* Defendant’s position is-that royalties
are payable only on gross rentals re-
ceived from users-of the “Geolographs”
in existence when the contract was
made and sold by plaintiff to Nichols;
that gross rentals on which royalties
were payable included all sums paid for
the use of the Geolographs, but do not
include sums paid for services rendered
by defendant in connection with servic-
ing and installing the Geolographs.

The cause was tried to the court
which found for the defendant and held
that the royalty was to be paid on the
Geolographs in existence at the time
of contracting and that said royalty is
to be computed on rentals less installa-
tion and servicing expenses. The trial
court found and held that 50% of the
money received by defendant should
have been charged to rentals and 50%
to expenses.

The proper interpretation to be put
upon the words “overriding royalty”,
“gross rentals”, and “Geolographs” is
controlling. If those words are to be
interpreted as plaintiff contends and
as they have operated in the past the
payments made were proper and the
amount which plaintiff seeks to recover
by its petition is due it. If, as the trial
court ruled, defendant’s interpretation
is correct, then plaintiff has money
which it has received from defendant
as the result of mistake and has no
right to retain it, defendant having
made due and proper demand for its
return.

Although counsel for the respective
parties are on record by their opening
statements as stipulating and agreeing
that the contract is not ambiguous, de-
pending upon which of their viewpoints
is found acceptable to the court, there
is a wide difference of opinion between
them as to what the contracting parties
intended the terms “overriding royal-
ty”, “gross rentals” and “Geolographs”
to mean. This presents a justiciable
controversy involving interpretation of
a written instrument. What the parties
ask, is that the court give effect to their
language. .

The law requires that a contract must
be so interpreted as to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties, as it
existed at the time of contracting, so
far as the same is ascertainable and-
lawful. 15 O.S. 1941 §152; Texas Co.
v. Adelman, 186 Okla. 663, 99 P. 2d 874,
127 A.L.R, 945.

It is an inveterate rule in the inter-
pretation of a written contract that the
parties’ intentions and purposes, in ab-
sence of allegations of fraud, accident,
or mistake in making the contract, must
be determined from the contract lan-
guage, subject matter, and relation of
the parties. 15 O.S.A. §§152, 163, 164;
Cherokee Oil & Gas Co. v. Lucky Leaf
Oil & Gas Co., 116 Okla. 121, 242 P.
214; Spring v. Major, 126 Okla. 150,
259 P. 125.

To determine the intention of the par-
ties in making a contract, the court
should place itself as far as possible
in the position of the parties when the
contract was made. Washoma Petro-
leum Company v. Eason Oil Co., 173
Okla. 430, 49 P. 2d 709.

So, as in every judicial controversy
involving a written contract, the inter-
pretation consists of ascertaining the
meaning of the words used. Therefore,
we must consider the choice of words
which the parties employ to express
their intent together with all else which
appears to be clear and explicit from
the contract itself.

If the language is clearly explicit and
does not involve uncertainty, the words
used are to be understood in their or-
dinary and popular sense. 15 O.S.A.
§154; Romans v. Shannon, 80 Okla. 199,
195 P. 298; Delk v. City Nat. Bank of
Duncan, 85 Okla. 238, 205 P. 753.

Where words appear in a contract
according to their particular signifi-
cance as applied to a business or trade
under consideration, the special mean-
ing given them by usage must be fol-
lowed. 15 O.S.A. §§160, 161. Webb v.
Woods, 176 Okla. 306, 55 P. 2d 959; Dan-
iel v. Pappas, 93 Okla. 165, 220 P. 355;
Broswood: Oil Co. v. Sand Springs
Home, 178 Okla. 550, 62 P’ 2d 1004.

‘That which we seek is the thought
the words express in keeping with a
usage with which the parties to the in-
stant contract are most familiar, along
with what the parties reasonably
could expect to give or receive in ac-
cordance with the terms used, That is
to say, we first shall invoke here the
viewpoint which will go to show what
parties must have intended “overrid-
ing royalty” to mean in terms of opera-
tive usages of a business in which they
were all engaged in one capacity or an-
other.

The record reflects that all persons
who handled negotiations and in draw-
ing the contract, including Nichols,
were in plaintiff's employment at the
time. They were all familiar with the
oil and gas business and when using a
term of peculiar significance and of
common usage with the oil fraternity,
such as “overriding royalty”, in con-
nection with the controverted words
“gross rentals”, they must have intend-
ed it to express the usage in that in-
dustry and to mean something more
than a share of the net profit from rent-
als received on the Geolographs. As so
used it must have been the purpose of
the parties that rental payments to
plaintiff should be free and clear of all
cost and expenses unless a contrary in-
tent is clearly expressed that more
should be deducted than sales tax.

As defined in 30 Words and Phrases
(Perm. Ed.) citing Thornburg v. Cole
201 Okla. 609, 207 P. 2d 1096, 1098:

“An ‘overriding royalty’ is a certain
percentage of the working interest
which as between lessee and assignee
of mineral lease is not charged with
the cost of development or production.”

In Cherokee Oil & Gas Co. v. Lucky
Leaf Oil & Gas Co., supra, this court
observes that use of the word “royalty”
in instruments relating to the oil and
gas industry shows an intent that the
interest conveyed should be free of the
usual costs and expenses of develop-
ment.

When the term “rentals” is used in
connection with “gross,” as the basis

183

for computing an “overriding royalty,”
we fail to see on what basis it can be
said there exists a clearly expressed in-
tent to authorize deductions other than
that specified by the parties which, in
this case, was the 2% sales tax.

There can be no doubt that “gross”
in its popular sense means whole, en-
tire, total, whether used in connection
with rentals, profits, proceeds, sales,
receipts, etc.

“Gross sales” as used in a contract
providing for the payment of royal-
ties of a certain per cent of the amount
of gross sales, was held in 7 Souther-
land Sisters v. McInnerney, 53 N. Y.
Supp. 771, 24 Misc. Rep. 720, to mean
actual sales without deducting ex-
penses.

In a lease providing that the “gross
earning and receipts” of the railroad
leased shall be the basis of computing
the rent, the phrase was held to mean
the same thing as the receipts of the
entire railroad and the property. Cin-
cinnati, S. & C. R. Ry. Co. v. Indiana
B. & W. Ry. Company, 44 Ohio St. 287,
315, 7 N.E. 139.

The trial court, in the instant case,
placed a restricted meaning on the term
“gross rentals” and held that it could
not be construed to mean “gross re-
ceipts” so as to include rentals, in ad-
dition to expenses in connection with
the installation, repair and adjustments
of “Geolographs” and travel expenses
to and from the place of installation.

We think the term must be given a
broad rather than a restricted meaning
when taken in context, or the use of
other words with which it is employed
are rendered meaningless. Further-
more, to do as the trial court has done
is to give to the term a retrospective
rather than a prospective meaning, us-
ing the operating experiences and ex-
penses of defendant to supply something
which the contract does not show was
necessarily within the contemplation of
the parties when the contracting. Such is
not favored if we are to remain con-
scious of the court’s duty to place it-

184

self as far as possible in the position of
the parties when the contract was
made. We think it most important that
we endeavor to do so here for as said
by the court in Long-Bell Lumber Co.
v. National Bank of Commerce, 35
Wash. 2d 522, 214 P. 2d 183, 187, “when
money disputes have arisen the per-
spective is apt to be clouded by the
unexpected chance of gain or self-in-
terest”.

Back at the time the parties were
contracting, the business was in its
infancy. Present earnings were not
necessarily foreseen. Annual gross rent-
als up to $6,000 were and are to be
royalty free, and we must assume that
this was to allow for expenses in part
and possibly some profit to the pur-
chaser before accounting to the seller.
The first year’s operating experience,
on the basis of plaintiff's contention,
earned for it only $538. Compare this
with plaintiff's claimed earnings of
$22,858.35 in the sixth year, and one can
readily see how the present “perspec-
tive is apt to be clouded by the unex-
pected chance of gain or self-interest”.

It is worthy to note also that when
Nichols found the contract operating in
a way which was not satisfactory to
him, there was no reckoning of operat-
ing expenses, but the way found to en-
hance defendant’s profit was to adjust
downward the royalty on gross rentals
by reflecting a substantial reduction in
the percentage provided by the original
schedule, thereby reducing plaintiff's
share in defendant’s income.

We find it inconceivable that the par-
ties would have exercised and employed
the minute care and detail in writing
and thereafter modifying and amend-
ing their contract, as the record re-
flects was done, and yet have left open
for a court to determine what one
was to pay and the other was to re-
ceive as royalty rents, on proof as un-
satisfactory as that which appears in
this record. Had the parties intended
deductions other than the sales tax to
to have been made there are enough
words in the English language for them

to have made that intent clear by de-
tailing all that was to be deducted in
computing plaintiff's royalty. But they
said nothing about deductions over and
above the sales tax, and this court can-
not supply material stipulations or read
into the contract words or terms it
does not contain. Phoenix Oil Co. v.
Mid-Continent Petroleum Co., 177 Okla.
530, 60 P. 2d 1054.

We are impressed with plaintiff's
argument, and so hold, that the trial
court has made a new contract for the
parties when it enlarged upon their
language and authorized deductions
for installation, repair, and travel ex-
penses. Of course, the court was with-
out power or authority to do this. Phoe-
nix Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corporation, supra; Phillips v. Hender-
son Gasoline Co., 101 Okla. 277, 225
P. 668.

The law will not make a better con-
tract than the parties themselves have
seen fit to enter into, or alter it for the
benefit of one party to the detriment
of another. Anthis v. Sullivan Oil &
Gas Co., 83 Okla. 86, 203 P. 187.

Much of defendant’s argument in its
brief concerning the point now under
discussion goes to the proposition that
to give the words the meaning to which
we subscribe would make it impossi-
ble for the defendant to operate prof-
itably under the contract and, in ef-
fect, defendant made a bad contract.

While we do not agree that the con-
tract as presently written is an onerous
one, we think the short answer is that
the folly or wisdom of a contract is not
for the court to pass on. Even though
the contract may seem harsh, it is not
the province of a court to change its
terms. 17 C.J.S. 742; Gvozdanovie v.
McCracken, 172 Okla. 111, 44 P. 2d 1.

Having concluded that the contractual
schedule for computing the overriding
royalty based on gross rentals received
on “Geolographs” should be without
any deductions, except the sales tax
as provided therein, we next consider
whether said royalty is to be com-

puted on gross rentals received on
“Geolographs” manufactured following
the date of the contract or only on the
“Geolographs” in existence and sold to
Nichols on that date.

At the outset, it is manifest that the
controversy over what “Geolographs”
were to enter into the computation of
royalty rents could have been averted
by sufficient amplification of what was
intended by the expression “said Geo-
lographs”. This could have been made
clear by expressly stating what ma-
chines the parties had in mind, or the
given number of machines if royalty
payments were to be limited to any
precise number.

In connection with the foregoing, we
are not unmindful of the rule for which
defendant contends when it holds the
contract is to be construed most strong-
ly against the one who writes it. 15
O.S.A. §170, Kondos v. Stauffer, 180
Okla. 185, 69 P. 2d 338; Smith v. First
Nat. Bank, 167 Okla. 408, 29 P. 2d 971;
Continental Oil Co. v. Fisher Oil Co.
(C.C.A, 10) 55 F, 2d 14.

That rule, however, can apply only
where there exists ambiguity. The par-
ties to this action contend that the con-
tract is unambiguous and tried the
cause and argued it on that theory in
the trial court. While we do not nec-
essarily agree that the language is
clear and explicit, it is our purpose to
give to the contract such construction
as will make it certain and not to
change its terms.

It is to be remembered, also, that
the rule that a written contract will be
interpréted against the person respon-
sible for ambiguity is subservient to the
rule requiring references to surround-
ing circumstances to determine mean-
ing and purpose of the language used
by contracting parties. 15 O.S.A. §170.
Replogle v. Indian Territory Tluminat-
ing Oil Co., 193 Okla. 361, 143 P. 2d
1002.

Keeping in mind the general rules al-
ready enunciated herein and others
hereinafter cited, we are of the opinion

185

we have before us once again a matter
of giving effect to the language of the
parties rather than one of construing
an ambiguous contract.

According to our understanding of
defendant’s contention the term, “said
Geolographs”, in paragraph 7 (b), re-
lates back to the preceding paragraph
where obviously the parties have in
mind only those machines in existence
on November 6, 1942.

Plaintiff's theory is that, since the
transaction involves the sale of going
business, the letters patent and the
trade-mark, as well as property in exis-
tence on the date of the sale, gross
rentals are to be paid on all “Geolo-
graphs” manufactured during the life
of the patent.

These divergent views start us again
on a search to determine upon what
sense, or meaning of the terms used,
the minds of the parties actually met.

And the intention of the parties to a
contract is to be gathered from the
whole instrument and not from de-
tached portions. 15 O.S.A. §157; Tri-
State Cas. Insurance Co. v. Stekoll, 201
Okla. 548, 208 P. 24 545; Hud Oil & Re-
fining Co. v. Smith, 179 Okla. 412, 65
P. 2d 1011; Levin v. Cook, 84 Okla. 55,
202 P. 299; Lamont Gas & Oil Co. v.
Doop & Frater, 39 Okla. 427, 135 P.
392.

The intent of the parties to a con-
tract is to be deduced from the entire
contract, and hence where the contract
has several provisions, the intent is not
expressed by any single clause, but by
the several provisions, all of which
must be considered together and be so
construed as to be consistent with each
other. Oklahoma Southern Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Mantz, 191 Okla. 515, 131 P.
2d 70.

The meaning of the word “Geolo-
graphs” in connection with its use in
other parts of the contract is a signifi-
cant aid in determining the meaning
of the same word in connection with its
occurrence in the disputed clause of the
written instrument.

186

Words used in one sense in one part
of a contract are deemed to have been
used in the same sense in another part
of the same instrument, where context
does not indicate otherwise. 17 C.J.S.
§303, p. 721; Jensen-Salesbery Labora-
tories, Inc, v. O. M. Franklin Black
Leg Serum Co., 74 F. 2d 501; Lyon v.
Gray (Tex. Civ. App.) 288 S.W. 545;
Chicago Homes for Girls v. Carr, 300
Ill. 478, 133 N.E. 344; American Book
Co. v. State, 216 Ala. 367, 113 So. 592.

It is of some significance that ““Geolo-
graph” is the trade-mark name of the
device subject to letters patent, both of
which were included in the sale. It
is plain from the contract that the
term “Geolograph” when used in oth-
er parts of the written instrument re-
ferred to the patented device, and
not to any particular machine or ma~
chines then in existence. To keep the
meaning clear, the scrivener, with min-
ute care, when referring to the mach-
ines in existence which were the sub-
ject of sale, used the expression “ma-
chines” and in certain instances speci-
fied the same by number. With like
care, when describing said machines,
they were referred to only parenthet-
ically as “Geolographs”, and not as
Geolograph machines, or Geolographs.

Pursuant to agreement for payment
of a primary purchase price which is
not here in controversy, title to the ma-
chines in existence passed immediately
to the purchaser. As collateral, and to
secure the promissory note given as
evidence of the debt which was due as
the primary payment, the purchaser
gave the seller a mortgage on the ma-
chines in existence on the date of the
sale. This gave rise to the contract
language to which defendant would tie
in the term “said Geolographs”. That
the expression had no relation thereto
is plain from the writing which appears
in the preceding paragraph as “ma-~
chines (Geolographs)”. The same writ-
ing does not appear in paragraph 7 (b),
but instead the language reverts to the
term “Geolographs”, and the expres-
sion “said machines (Geolographs)” is
not employed. 7

It is well to remember, also, that the
contract has to do with the future as
well as the past relations of the par-
ties. In effect, the seller, after giving up
title to the letters patent and the trade-
mark, reserved a royalty interest in the
promotion and use of the patented de-
vice. Such arrangements, either by
grant or license, are not unusual
where letters patent and trade-marks
are involved. Thus, it does not stand
to reason that the seller would have
parted with the patent, and thereupon
specified by contract that the royal-
ty was to be paid during the life of
said patent, when it was intended only
that said royalty was to be paid on an
expendable machine or machines. The
contract in the separate parts which
involve royalty payments or rentals ex-
pressly specifies as the term of pay-
ment “the life of said patent”.

It is also persuasive that the testi-
mony of record shows that if the par-
ties were contracting for royalty on
gross rentals of existing machines only,
they had done an idle and futile thing
by specifying what the royalty would
be on rentals of $50,000 or more when
it does not admit of dispute that such
earnings could not have been in con-
templation of the parties, when they
contracted, if limited to the machines
then in existence. .

In effect, what defendant is asking
the court to do in this lawsuit is to give
the contract a strained and unnatural
construction in order to import a con-
sideration more favorable to defendant
than that which is expressed in the
contract. We are not impressed, and
conclude that defendant is estopped.
See Curtis v. Yale Oil Refining Co.,
91 Okla. 93, 216 P. 433; Golden v. Gol-
den, 155 Okla. 10, 8 P. 2d 42.

Reversed, with directions to enter
judgment for plaintiff.

This court acknowledges the serv-
ices of Attorneys A. Langley Coffey,
Varley H. Taylor, and Henry L. Fist,
who as Special Masters aided- in. the
preparation of this opinion. Thesé at-

torneys were recommended by the
Oklahoma Bar Association, approved
by the Judicial Council, and appointed
by the court.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

CHEEVES v. CITY OF DUNCAN et al.
No, 35357. March 10, 1953.
254 P. 2d 765.

187

Owen F. Renegar, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

Jerome Sullivan, Duncan, for defend-
ants in error.

O'NEAL, J. In this proceeding, Floyd
Cheeves, a resident and qualified elec-
tor of the city of Duncan, Oklahoma,
seeks to establish title to the office of
city commissioner from Ward 4 in
the city of Duncan, a city of the first
class having a charter form of govern-
ment. The judgment rendered in the
trial court denied him the relief prayed
for, and from the order denying a new
trial, plaintiff appeals.

Mr. Cheeves’ contention in the trial
court and urged here is that under the
charter of the city of Duncan, a candi-
date for the office of city commissioner
must be nominated by wards and elect-
ed by wards. He further contends
that in no event was the defendant,
A. N. Bunch, eligible, either under the
terms of the city charter, or under 11
O.S. 1951 §48, to file as a candidate
for the office of city commissioner, or
to hold said office.

The defendant A. N. Bunch contends
that the city charter provides that the
candidates for the office of city com-
missioner are nominated by wards and
elected at large.

In a primary election held in the city
of Duncan, in March, 1951, Mr. Cheeves
was a Democratic candidate for city
commissioner of Ward 4. In the pri-
mary election held, he received 221
votes cast in Ward 4 for said office.
Mr. Bunch, in the primary election, was
a candidate for city commissioner of
Ward 4. He filed as an independent
candidate and in said primary election

188

he received 191 votes cast in said Ward
4, In the general election held in
April, 1951, there were 1,235 votes cast
at large, out of which Cheeves received
430 and Bunch, 805, for the office of
city commissioner of Ward 4.

The city of Duncan, in 1910, being a
city of first class, adopted a charter
form of government. This charter was
amended in 1920, Under Art. III of §1,
of the amended charter, the city is di-
vided into four wards. The boundaries
of each ward are defined by the char-
ter. Each ward is constituted as an in-
dependent voting precinct until other-
wise provided by ordinance. Section 2
of Art. III, provides:

“For the purpose of election of the
Board of Commissioners of the City of
Dunean, one (1) member shall be nom-
inated from each of the four (4) ‘wards
and-one (1) member from the city at
large and the members so nominated
shall be voted on at large in the gen-
eral election. * * *”

Section 4 of said article provides:

“Independent candidates may have
their names printed on the ballots as the
candidates for an office to be filled at
any City election, provided that they file
with the County Election Board a notice
as is required of the candidates for a
political party nomination, and notices
presenting the names of independent
candidates shall be filed with the Coun-
ty Election Board during the period pro-
vided by law, during which candidates
are required to file notice of their can-
-didacy in primary elections.”

To defeat the mandate of the char-
ter, plaintiff contends that the charter
is in conflict with express provisions
of statutory law and, therefore, the stat-
utory law must control governing elec-
tions held in cities of the first class as
the City of Duncan is conceded to be.

The statute relied upon, 11 O.S. 1951
§23b, provides that general elections
in cities of the first class shall be held
on the first Tuesday in April, 1943, and
each two years thereafter. The section
further provides that there shall also
be elected from each ward in cities

and towns one councilman from each
ward who shall serve for a period of
two years. The proviso of said section
reads:

“«* ® * provided, further, that the pro-
visions of this section shall not apply
to any city operating or hereafter op-
erating under a charter form of gov-
ernment.”

Plaintiff further contends that Mr.
Bunch, being a registered Democrat,
could not file as an independent can-
didate of city commissioner of Ward
4. In support of this proposition he
relies on our opinion in Darst v. County
Election Board of Craig County, 194
Okla. 469, 152 P, 2d 912. The Darst case
construed 26 O.S. 1951 §162. The ques-
tion posed was whether Darst, a regis-
tered Democratic elector, could file as
a candidate upon the Republican pri-
mary ballot for the office of county
attorney. We there observed that our
election laws were based on our party
system of government and that, there-
fore, only members of a party have the
right to nominate its candidates and its
candidate must be chosen from the
members of the party. That section,
however, has no application with ref-
erence to primary and general elec-
tions in cities and towns, or in cities
operating under a charter form of gov-
ernment.

In the instant case plaintiff seeks re-
lief invoking the provisions of 11 O.S.
1951 §23b, which govern primary and
general elections in cities and towns,
but, as we have pointed out, the lat-
ter act specifically exempts from its
provisions cities having a charter form
of government.

Construing the election laws as ap-
plied to cities of the first class, in the
case of Adair v. Cable, 207 Okla. 123,
248 P. 2d 599, we said:

“Under 11 O.S. 1951 §48, any elector
may become a candidate before any
political party for its nomination for any
office specified in any city primary elec-
tion, and he may file for the office in a
political party to which he does not be-

long.”

ee 12)

The defendant having complied with
the law governing the holding of pri-
mary and general elections under the
charter form of government of the city
of Duncan, and having received the
highest number of votes at large as an
independent candidate for the office of
city commissioner from Ward 4, he
is entitled to the possession of said of-
fice, .

The judgment of the trial court is af-

firmed.

CHANDLER MATERIALS CO. v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COM’RS
OF TULSA COUNTY.

No. 35052. March 10, 1953.

254 P. 2a 67.

Elton B, Hunt, W. L. Eagleton, and
A. C. Saunders, Tulsa, for plaintiff in
error.

Lewis J. Bicking, Co. Atty., and Hugh
Webster, Asst. Co. Atty., Tulsa, for de-
fendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. Freeholders residing in

“Tulsa county, Oklahoma, petitioned the

board of county commissioners of said
county to establish, open and lay out a
public road 100 feet in width, located in
sections 7, 8 and 18, township 19 north,
range 12 east, Tulsa county, Okla-
homa. The proposed highway was de-
lineated by metes and bounds as shown
by plans prepared by the county engi-
neer of said county and approved by the
board of county commissioners. Two of
the petitioning freeholders entered into
an undertaking to pay the cost of the
proceeding pending before the board if
said petition was disallowed.

The petition of the freeholders to es-
tablish, open and lay out the public
road, in conformity with their applica-
tion, was filed with the board on Au-
gust 7, 1950. The board thereupon
adopted a resolution assigning said pe-
tition for hearing on August 30, 1950,

190

and notice of the hearing was given by
publication and personal service was
made upon the Chandler Materials
Company. At the hearing before the
commission on August 30, 1950, state-
ments were made by freeholders in
favor of and against the establishing
of the highway. On the same day the
board adopted a resolution reciting that
the petition was sponsored by 12 or
more freeholders residing in the vici-
nity of the proposed road, and that a
public necessity exists for the designa-
tion, opening, laying out and construc-
tion of a public road and highway along
and over said proposed route; said
highway or road to be 100 feet wide
across the land described in the free-
holders’ petition.

The Chandler Materials Company
filed its notice of appeal with the board
of county commissioners, and the board
prepared a transcript of its proceedings
which was filed in the district court of
Tulsa county, Oklahoma. The notice of
appeal sets forth nineteen grounds why
the road should not be established. It
also filed an appeal bond conditioned
that it would prosecute its appeal with-
out delay and pay all costs assessed
against it.

On the 18th day of December, 1950,
the appeal of the Chandler Materials
Company from the board of county
commissioners came on for hearing in
the trial court. Thereupon, the county
attorney representing the board read
into the record a motion to dismiss the
appeal, which motion is in words and
figures as follows, to wit:

“Comes now the appellee, Board of
County Commissioners of Tulsa County,
Oklahoma, and moves the court for
judgment in favor of the said appellee,
on the ground that title 69, section 44,
Oklahoma Statutes 1941, and other per-
tinent statutory provisions, provides
that the Board of County Commission-
ers has exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter of designation of roads; that
their jurisdiction in the matter of des-
ignation of roads is of the same stand-
ing as that of the Department of High-

ways and the State Commission of High-
ways, over state-roads, and that the
decisions of the Board of County Com-
missioners with respect to designation
of roads is final, and that for that rea-
son the order of the Board of County
Commissioners and the resolution of the
Board of County Commissioners is fi-
nal and is not subject to review by the
court; for the furthér-reason that this
is not an appealable matter, as con-
templated -by the statutes, and that the
court is without jurisdiction to review
the order and judgment and resolution
of the Board of County Commissioners;
and for the further reason that the rec-
ord and transcript is filed in the office
of the Court Clerk in this matter and
cause shows upon its face that the ap-
pellee, Board of County Commissioners,
is entitled to judgment in its behalf.”

The trial court sustained said motion
and entered its judgment in favor of
the board of county commissioners upon
the ground recited in said motion. The
journal entry of judgment, entered in
the cause, recites that the attempted ap-
peal be denied on the ground that the
board of county commissioner’s deci-
sion is not appealable. The Chandler
Materials Company brings the case here
for review.

This case calls for an answer to the
question of whether the decision of the
board of county commissioners of Tul-
sa county, Oklahoma, in locating the
county road, involves the exercise of an
administrative function or a judicial or
quasi judicial function; and whether,
under the statutory law, the order of
the commission is an appealable order
vesting the district court with power
and authority to hear and determine
the matter de novo. The Act upon which
the Chandler Materials Company pos-
ited its contention for a hearing in the
trial court is 69 O.S. 1941 §363. The
board of county commissioners contend
that under 69 O.S. 1941 §44, its decision
upon the necessity for the construction
of a county highway is exclusive and
final and a fortiori that sec. 363, supra,
has no application; therefore, the judg-
ment of the trial court should be af-
firmed.

EE

:- The board stated in its brief and in
oral argument that.its action was taken
pursuant to 69 O.S. 1941 §44, subsection
(c). That section, insofar as here appli-
cable, provides that:

« * * ® Tt shall be the duty of the
County Commissioners in each County
to designate, construct and maintain
as’ County Highways, those roads which
best serve the most people of said coun-
ty, * * * Provided, further, that the
County Commissioners of the various
counties, shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the designation, construc-

‘tion and maintenance and repair of all

said County Highways and bridges
thereon. That the decision of the County
Commissioners in all matters pertain-
ing to the County Highways shall be
final. * * # /

As we have seen, the board’s motion
to dismiss the appeal specifically in-
voked the application of 69 O.S. 1941
§44. The motion, however, also invokes
application of “other pertinent statu-
tory provisions.” The record here dis-
closes that these proceedings were not
originated by the board of county com-
missioners, but were presented upon
an application of freeholders under the
applicable provisions of 69 O.S. 1941
§363.

Section 363, supra, empowers the
board to locate a public road upon the
petition of at least twelve freeholders
residing in the vicinity of the road af-
fected. This section further provides
that if the board concludes that the
public road applied for is unnecessary
and impractical, then no further pro-
ceeding shall be had, and that there-
upon the freeholders signing the bond
required under said section shall be lia-
ble for any costs accrued.

The final provision of said section
363, supra, reads:

“* % * Any person aggrieved by the
foregoing proceedings shall have the
right of appeal to the district court for
final review and adjudication.”

The trial court based its judgment
upon the ground that the locating of
the road here involved was an admin-

istrative matter and not.of a judicial
or quasi judicial nature. The board con-
tends that Groenewold v. Board of
Com’rs of Kingfisher County, 195 Okla.
526, 159 P. 2d 258, is decisive of the
question here presented. We held in
that case as follows:

“A decision of the board of county
commissioners by resolution to remove
a bridge across a river which has been
previously used as a part of a public
highway, but which has been partly
washed out and not repaired, and could
not be presently repaired because of
inability to secure material, and to use
the material in the repair of other coun-
ty bridges, is administrative in nature
and is not appealable under 19 O.S.
1941 §431 which, as construed, au-
thorizes appeals only from decisions
involving matters of a judicial nature.”

Title 19 O.S. 1941 §431, there con-
sidered, may be found under the title
of “Counties and County Officers”
(county commissioners) under which
section the right of appeal is granted
to any taxpayer who may be aggrieved
by a decision of the board of commis-
sioners. The sole question in the Groen-
ewold case was whether the decision of.
the board was appealable. The resolu-
tion of the board discloses that the high
water had washed out eight spans of
the bridge; that due to war condi-
tions, materials for repair could not
be obtained; that the remaining spans
of the bridge might be lost by further
high water; that the portion of the
bridge remaining should be removed
and the salvaged material used in the
repair of another bridge in that coun-
ty. Upon these findings of the board we
held the decision appealed from in-
volved an administrative matter rest-
ing solely in the discretion of the board
of county commissioners, and was,
therefore, not appealable, and the dis-
trict court correctly so held. In our
opinion we said:

“We have consistently construed this
section to authorize appeals only from
decisions of a judicial nature and that
decisions of an administrative, legisla-~
tive or political nature are not appeal-
able on the theory that, under the Con-

192

stitution, the courts cannot exercise
purely administrative or legislative
powers. Board of Com’rs v. Trippet,

187 Okla. 242, 101 P. 2d 1058. It is not
always easy to determine whether a
certain act of the board of county
commissioners -is judicial or adminis-
trative in its nature.”

The Chandler Materials Company
contends that our opinion in Stuart v.
King, 203 Okla. 23, 217 P. 2d 540, is
decisive of the question here presented.
In this case we held:

“Persons possessing qualifications
sufficient to authorize them to petition
the board of county commissioners for
action, under authority of Tit. 69 O.S.
1941 §363, are authorized by law to pro-
test against such action by the board
when same is petitioned by others.

“A decision of the board of county
commissioners made in altering a high-
way whereby a segment thereof is va-
cated and another route established as
a highway in lieu thereof, under au-
thority of Tit. 69 O.S. 1941 §363, is a de-
cision from which appeal lies. And a
party to the proceeding either as peti-
tioner or protestant is entitled to appeal
from an adverse decision.”

The proceeding in that case was orig-
inated by freeholders acting under 69
O.S. 1941 §363, by filing an application
with the board of county commission-
ers asking that a portion of a public
highway be vacated and another rout-
ing of a highway be substituted. Other
freeholders filed protests to the relief
prayed for. The board sustained the pe-
tition as prayed for and the protesting
freeholders appealed from the board’s
order to the district court. The peti-
tioning freeholders in the district court
contended that the decision of the board
vacating the road was not an appealable
order and was therefore final. In sup-
port of that contention they relied upon
the authority of Groenewold v. Board
of Com’rs of Kingfisher County, supra.
We pointed out in the opinion that the
facts of the two cases are not compar-
able; that in the Groenewold case the
decision of the board to salvage the
lumber in a destroyed bridge and to

use it in repairing another bridge did
not involve the exercise of judgment or
discretion, and that therefore the
board’s order was not appealable, but
in the Stuart v. King case, supra, the
board’s order vacated a segment of a
road and rerouting the road would in-
volve the exercise of judgment and dis-
cretion and was therefore appealable.

In Re Courthouse of Okmulgee Coun-
ty, 58 Okla. 683, 161 P. 200, and other
former decisions of the court, we have
consistently held that an appeal lies
from an order of the board of county
commissioners to the district court
whenever their orders or decisions are
of a judicial or quasi judicial nature.

The judgment of the trial court dis-
missing the Chandler Materials Com-
pany’s appeal is hereby vacated and
the cause remanded to the district
court with directions to reinstate the
appeal and proceed with the trial de
novo.

Reversed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

De

BOETTCHER OIL & GAS CO. et al.
v. LAMB et al.

No. 35567. March 17, 1953.

255 P. 2d 277.

Mont R. Powell, Sam Hill, and Wil-
liam R. Saied, Oklahoma City, for pe-
titioners.

Kerr, Lambert, Conn & Roberts, Ada,
and Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., for
respondents.

WELCH, J. In this case it appears
that on the 20th day of September, 1951,
John David Lamb, deceased, was em-
ployed by the Boettcher Oil & Gas Com-
pany as a welder and mechanic; that
on said day he suffered a heart injury
from which he died.

On November 9, 1951, Lois L. Lamb,
wife of deceased, filed a claim for com-
pensation before the State Industrial
Commission on her behalf, and on be-
half of two minor dependent children
of deceased against Boettcher Oil &
Gas Company, employer of deceased,
and the State Insurance Fund. Com-
pensation is claimed under the provi-
sions of Title 85, chap. 2, S. L. 1951, pp.
267 to 270, inclusive, commonly called
the Death Benefit Act.

The trial commissioner, in substance,
found: That on the 20th day of Sep-
tember, 1951, John David Lamb, de~
ceased, while in the employ of Boett-
cher Oil & Gas Company sustained
an accidental personal injury consist-
ing of an injury to his heart; that de-
cedent left surviving him Lois L.
Lamb, his widow, David Harold Lamb,
a son age 16 years, and Linda Kay
Lamb, a daughter age 8 years, all of
whom were dependent upon deceased
for their support, and that said persons
are entitled to receive compensation in
the sum of $13,500 to be divided propor-
tionately between them, each to receive
$4,500. An award was entered accord-
ingly which was sustained on appeal
to the commission en banc.

Boettcher Oil & Gas Company and
State Insurance Fund, hereinafter re-

193

ferred to as petitioners, bring the case
here to review this award and rely
solely to vacate the award on the ground
that deceased sustained no accidental
injury while in the employ of Boettcher
Oil & Gas Company; that his death was
not caused by an accidental injury, but
was due to other causes.

This assignment requires a review of
the evidence. The evidence shows that
deceased, on the 20th day of Septem-
ber, 1951, while in the employ as above
stated, sustained an injury to his heart
caused while cranking a motor. ia

A fellow employee testified in behalf
of respondent, in substance, as fol-
lows: On the morning of the day Mr.
Lamb sustained his injury he and Mr.
Lamb were engaged in overhauling a
motor; that they completed that task
about noon of that day; that at about
1:30 pm. Mr. Lamb attempted to
start the motor for the purpose of
placing it on a pump. It was necessary
to crank the motor by the use of a
hand crank. The motor was hard to
crank, it required very heavy lifting to
turn the motor over. After he had suc-
ceeded in turning the motor over about
five times he stepped back and shrug-
ged and twisted his shoulders and stated
that he was suffering severe pain in his
chest. The witness then started to crank
the motor, but was unable to get it
started, and he and Mr. Lamb event-
ually succeeded in starting the motor.
About 20 minutes after the motor was
started Mr. Lamb, this witness, and
two other employees started over to an-
other lease owned by the Boettcher Oil
& Gas Company. The lease was about
three quarters of a mile from the place
where the motor was cranked. In ar-
riving at that lease Mr. Lamb cranked
another and smaller motor. This task
he completed about 3:30 p. m. Mr.
Lamb, the witness, and two other em-
ployees then started to play dominoes.
Just as the game started Mr. Lamb
arose, walked to the door and stated
that he could not get his breath, and
that he was still suffering great pain
in his chest. He was then taken to a
hospital at Ada, Oklahoma, for treat-

194

ment and examination. An intern met
him at the hospital and obtained a his-
tory of the case from him, reduced it
to writing and delivered it to the doc-
tor. The intern testified at the hearing
as to the history obtained which is sub-
stantially the same as above detailed.

The doctor testified that he first saw
John David Lamb at the Valley View
Hospital at Ada, Oklahoma, at about
4 o’clock in the afternoon of September
20, 1951. He was then in a dying condi-
tion. He was pulseless, but had a slight
heartbeat. He was given oxygen and
other stimulants in an effort to revive
him, but without success and that Mr.
Lamb died; that he was furnished a
history of the case by the intern, and
from such history, his examination
and experience as a physician, express-
ed the opinion that Mr. Lamb’s
death was caused by overexertion,
that it produced a coronary occlusion
which means that one or more of the
arteries was blocked by an embolus.
The doctor further testified:

“Q. What, in your opinion, Doctor,
was the thing that produced his death?
A. Well, the coronary occlusion pro-
duced the death, but when you go to
classifying them, you have a little bit
of difficulty, because everything de-
pends on what a person means by ac-
cident or injury. If you mean by a blow
or something like that, then it — he
didn’t receive a blow or anything of that
nature. The overexertion produced a
marked increase in the heart beat, an
exertion of the heart, which tore an
embolus loose. If it lodges in the coro-
nary arteries, then you may have sud-
den death. If it lodges away in the
stomach or in the chest muscles or in
the legs, then you may have a little pain
for a day or two, and you are over it.
But your heart, you have a different
matter.

“Q, Then, Doctor, if I understand your
explanation, it was the strain and stress
under which he was working that pro-
duced the injury to that artery? A.
That’s right.”

No other physician testified in the
case. Other employees of petitioner
Boettcher Oil & Gas Company, how-
ever, testified that they did not hear
respondent complain of any pain in his
chest until they started playing domi-
noes. The evidence further shows that
deceased had worked for petitioner
Boettcher Oil & Gas Company doing
the same kind of work for about three
years prior to September 20, 1951, and
that he had never complained of any
pain in his chest or any kind of heart
trouble. We think the evidence above
detailed is sufficient to sustain the
finding of the commission that the in-
jury sustained by deceased constituted
an accidental injury within the mean-
ing of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.

We have heretofore held that an in~
jury sustained by a workman to his
heart caused by overexertion and strain
constitutes an accidental injury within
the meaning of the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act. Carden Mining & Milling
Co. v. Yost, 193 Okla. 423, 144 P. 2d
969; Clarksburg Paper Co. v. Roper,
196 Okla. 504, 166 P. 2d 425; Gulf Oil
Corporation v. Rouse, 202 Okla. 395,
214 P. 2d 251. In Producers Drilling
Co. v. Percival, 207 Okla. 17, 246 P. 2d
374, we held:

“An injury sustained by an employee
consisting of a strain to his back while
engaged in cranking a motor consti-
tutes an accidental injury within the
meaning of the Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Act, 85 O.S. 1951, §3, subd. 7.”

We think the evidence also sufficient
to sustain the finding of the commis-
sion that Mr. Lamb’s death occurred
from a heart injury sustained by him
on the 20th day of September, 1951,
while in the employ of petitioner Boett-
cher Oil & Gas Company.

Award sustained.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON. V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

In re PAULL’S ESTATE.
No. 33448. Jan. 17, 1950.
Rehearing Denied March 17, 1953.
254 P. 2d 857.

* Person E. Woodall, Norman, for plain-
tiffs in error.

Mike Foster and Clay M. Roper, Okla-
homa City, and Joe A. Smalley, Nor-
man, for defendants in error.

195

HALLEY, J. The district court of
Cleveland county denied an application
to probate a purported holographic will
of Alice M. Paull, deceased. It had
been offered for probate by W. H. Bur-
gess, the named executor under the
purported will, and Lorna M. Bur-
gess, his wife and the chief beneficiary
thereunder. The instrument had been
denied probate in the county court,
and they had appealed to the district
court, and from the district court’s ac-
tion the Burgesses have appealed here.
Claude R. Paull and other heirs of
Alice M. Paull, deceased, had contest-
ed the application to probate, and will
be referred to as protestants, and the
plaintiffs in error will be referred to
as proponents.

Alice M. Paull died in Cleveland
county, Okla., on April 24, 1942, leav-
ing real estate in Cleveland and Okla-
hhoma counties and some personal prop-
erty. She was an elderly single woman
and had made her home for many years
with her sister, Ida B. Earlywine. Her
niece, Lorna M. Burgess, and husband,

-W. H. Burgess, lived nearby and on

the farm owned jointly by Alice M.
Paull and Ida B. Earlywine.

After the death of Alice M. Paull in
1942, proponents sought to probate an
alleged lost will executed in 1912, but
were unsuccessful. Ida B. Earlywine
undertook by suit in the district
court to enforce alleged mutual wills
of Alice M. Paull and her brother,
Charles E. Paull, whereby the prop-
erty involved in the present action
would go to Ida B. Earlywine. Pro-
testants intervened and sought to estab-
lish title to the property upon promises
of Alice M. Paull that it would be theirs
at her death. This petition in interven-
tion was later dismissed. These mat-
ters are facts and circumstances to
be considered in connection with the
present claim of proponents in regard
to the instrument now offered for pro-
bate as the last will of Alice M. Paull,
deceased, The instrument now offered
for probate as a holographic will was
in the possession of proponents dur-
ing the time they were attempting to

196

establish title to the land in question
on other grounds.

The present action was commenced
by W. H. Burgess on July 9, 1945. It
is alleged that Alice M. Paull left a
holographic will dated February 1, 1934.
The protestants alleged that she died
intestate, and prayed for letters of ad-
ministration.

The instrument offered for probate
consists of two pieces or sheets of pa-
per, the first being a complete sheet
on which appears at the top center
of the page the word “WILL”, in the
handwriting of the decedent. There ap-
pears the ordinary first paragraph of
a will, followed by four numbered para-
graphs in the usual form. The first
paragraph appoints W. H. Burgess
executor; the second directs the pay-~
ment of debts and funeral expenses;
the third gives to Lorna M. Burgess
the land in Cleveland county; and the
fourth gives two lots in Oklahoma City
to Ida B. Earlywine. This first sheet
is not dated or signed, and the written
portion covers about two-thirds of the
page, the lower one-third being left
blank. It is written in ink and the evi-
dence shows that it is all in the hand-
writing of the decedent. The top center
bears the imprint of a rusty, round-like
paper clip, but no stain appears on the
back of the page. The second sheet of
paper consists of what appears to be
the lower one-third or one-fourth of a
sheet, the sides and lower edge being
smooth, but the top being ragged as if
torn from a complete sheet. It is a
different quality of paper than the first
page, and is written with a lead pencil.
It is in the handwriting of Alice M.
Paull, but appears to differ slightly
from the writing on the first page. It
bears no imprint of a paper clip. It
makes no bequests, but in three lines
states that her remaining interests are
held pending settlement of the estate
of her brother, J. W. Paull. Preceding
her signature is the word “Signed”.
Neither page is numbered, and neither
makes any reference to the other. At
the lower left corner of the first page
and at the top left corner of the second

are some pin holes, indicating that the
second page had been pinned to the
first. Lorna M. Burgess, the only liv-
ing person who saw these papers when
they were found, testified that they
were pinned together after they were
found in the effects of the deceased.

The above described two pieces of
paper were found by Ida B. Earlywine
in the desk used by Alice M. Paull,
in the room occupied by her up to the
time of her death. Lorna M. Burgess
was with Mrs. Earlywine when the pa-
pers were found, shortly after Alice
M. Paull was buried. The two pieces
of paper were found folded in a manu-
script cover for legal documents, bear-
ing the name and address of Ben F.
Williams, Jr., Norman, Oklahoma, on
the outside. This cover shows clearly
that it had been used for another sheet
of paper, which had been torn out, leav-
ing two small fragments around the
brads at the top to fasten the paper
inside the cover. “Alice M, Paull—Will”
was written on the outside of the
cover, but not in the handwriting of
Miss Paull. The cover and contents
were enclosed in a white envelope bear-
ing the single word “Will”, and the
sealing flap bore a Boulder Dam post-
age stamp, shown to have been dis-
tributed first in 1935. This white en-
velope was enclosed in a manila en-
velope which was not sealed, bearing
the name “Alice M. Paull”, but not
in her handwriting. It was admitted
that the manuscript cover inside of
which the two pieces of paper offered
as a will were folded was probably
that used- by the attorney who pre-
pared a will for the deceased in 1912.

One witness, who was 79 years of
age, testified that about 1937 she visit-
ed Alice M. Paull, who told her that
she had her will made just as she
wanted it, and had given her farm to
Lorna M. Burgess, pointing toward an
upstairs room then used by her, as if
to indicate that the will was in her
room. The daughter and son-in-law of
Lorna M. Burgess testified that they
took Alice M. Paull on a trip to Texas,
and that she stated that proponents

would get her farm—that Lorna and
“Dutch” (W. H. Burgess) had been
good to her.

A diary in the handwriting of the
deceased and the testimony of some
witnesses indicate that Alice M. Paull
was probably visiting in Texas on Feb-
ruary 1, 1934, when the last sheet of
the instrument offered is dated and
signed. The testimony on this point is
not definite. There is no definite evi-
dence as to when the first page was
written. The trial court denied pro-
bate, and proponents have submitted
two propositions, as follows:

“(1) The instrument offered for pro-
bate was the valid holographic will of
Alice M. Paull, deceased.

“(2) That there is not any evidence
upon which the court could base his
findings of fact and conclusions of law,
as appear in his order denying said
will to probate.”

The right to dispose of one’s prop-
erty by will being purely statutory,
the courts generally have adhered
strictly to the statutory provisions rel-
ative to the execution, interpretation,
and probate of wills. This is especial-
ly true with respect to holographic
wills. Section 54 of Title 84, O.S. 1941,
provides the three essentials of a valid
holographic will: It must be written,
dated, and signed entirely in the hand-
writing of the testator. It has been held
that the omission of either one of
these essential elements renders the
will invalid. The evidence before us
shows that the two pages offered by
proponents as a holographic will would
meet these three requirements if they
may be properly classed as a single
instrument, and were intended to be
so classed by the deceased. It is pro-
vided by section 154, Title 84, O.S. 1941,
that “several testamentary instru-
ments executed by the same testator
are to be taken and construed together
as one instrument.” This section, how-
ever, deals with the interpretation of
wills. While the two sheets offered for
probate as a single instrument are
clearly in the handwriting of the de-

197

ceased, it is equally clear that they
must have been written at different
times, and that something preceded the
three lines on the second sheet, which
is mutilated by being torn. The second
sheet standing alone is not testamen-
tary in character, as it devises nothing
and merely suggests that deceased’s
remaining interests are held pending
settlement of her brother’s estate. The
first sheet makes certain definite be-
quests, but is neither dated nor signed.
In Craig et al. v. McVey, 200 Okla.
434, 195 P. 2d 753, this court quoted
with approval certain rules set out in
the annotation in 54, A.L.R. 917-939,
in sec. 922 of which it is said:

“Tf the alleged testamentary state-
ment refers to something which de-
ceased intended to do in the future, as
opposed to something then being done
by him, the statement is not a testa-
mentary disposition.”

The statement of deceased on the
second page offered is more consistent
with the thought of a future intention
than a present intention as to disposing
of her property by will. It carries with
it the thought that when her brother’s
estate is settled, she will make some
disposition of it, but that for the present
it is being held. Section 101, Title 84,
O.S. 1941, provides that a will may be
revoked by being torn, burnt, cancelled,
obliterated or destroyed with intent and
for the purpose of revoking it. The
second sheet offered is torn from some-
thing which preceded it, but there is
no evidence as to who tore it or what
the intention of the deceased was, if
she had herself torn it from the full
page. There is plenty of room on the
first sheet for everything that appears
on the second. While a holographic
will may cover more than one sheet
of paper and need not be written at
the same time or mechanically fastened
together, if the pages are written at
different times and neither standing
alone meets the essential requirements
of a holographic will, it must be ap-
parent either by certain reference of
one to the other, or by evidence, that
the deceased intended that the several

198

. Sheets of paper should constitute one
single instrument and that it be effec-
tive as his last will and testament.

Alice M. Paull had served as execu-
trix of the will of one brother, and as
administratrix in the estate of another
brother. It is certain that she had an
attorney prepare a will for her in 1912.
She must have had some knowledge of
wills.

In Elrod v. Purdin, 196 Okla. 120,
163 P. 2d 209, this court denied the
probate of four separate sheets of pa-
per as a holographic will. The first
sheet was mutilated in that it had been
torn across the bottom and appeared
to be incomplete. The instruments were
written at different times, but were in
the handwriting of the deceased, and
at least one sheet bore a date and her
signature. The rule is announced in
the syllabus of the court as follows:

“Where an instrument is tendered
for probate as a holographic will, it
must be plainly apparent that it was
the intention of the deceased that the
paper should stand for her last will
and testament, and an _ instrument
should be denied probate unless such
intention is plainly apparent.”

The second sheet of the instrument
here offered is torn across the top and
appears to be incomplete. The manu-
script cover in which both sheets were
found is clearly shown to have had a
sheet torn out of it, and the writing
on the cover is not that of the de-
ceased. The two sheets are on different
brands or kinds of paper, and are writ-
ten with different instruments. The first
appears to be the beginning of a will,
but it is incomplete in that it is neith-
er dated nor signed, and makes no
disposition of anything other than the
land. There is not the slightest ref-
erence in either page to the other, and
they are not numbered. California has
a statute similar to that of Oklahoma
with respect to the essentials of holo-
graphic wills, and in the matter of In
re Anthony’s Estate, 21 Cal. A. 157,
181 P. 96, it is stated in the second
syllabus:

“Where a decedent, just prior to his
death, wrote a letter relative to the
disposition of his property, which was
not dated and hence was not sufficient
as an holographic will, it and another
letter properly dated could not be taken
together as constituting decedent’s will
unless the second letter was testamen-
tary in character and so referred to
the first letter as to incorporate it
therein.”

In the third syllabus it is announced,
relative to the rule of law that favors
testacy as against intestacy, as fol-
lows:

“The rule of law that favors testacy
as against intestacy only applies where
the existence of the testamentary in-
tent is ascertained and the subject mat-
ter of the doubt is one of construction,
and when there is a doubt as to the
existence of the testamentary intent the
rule does not apply.”

In Craig v. McVey, supra, the rule
is announced in the first syllabus as
follows:

“Where an instrument is tendered
for probate as an holographic will, it
must be plainly apparent that it was
the intention of the deceased that the
paper should stand for her last will
and testament, and an instrument
should be denied probate unless such
intention is plainly apparent.”

See In re Young’s Estate, 95 Okla.
205, 219 P. 100.

In determining whether or not an
instrument offered for probaté consti-
tutes a holographic will, the court will
consider all of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding its execution in or-
der to arrive at the true intent of the
testator. In Day v. Williams et al.,
184 Okla. 117, 85 P. 2d 306, it was stated
in the first syllabus that:

“The identity of a holographic will
and the provisions thereof must be de-
termined from the instrument itself.”

, The first sheet offered is testamen-
tary in character. When the deceased
wrote it, she clearly intended to write
her will. For some unknown reason she
failed to complete it with the date and

her signature. This left it lacking in
two essential elements of a holographic
will. The second sheet contains these
essential elements, but is not testa-
mentary in character and is clearly
torn from a different sheet of paper
from that on which the bequests were
made.

The proponents insist that the find-
ings and judgment of the trial court
are not supported by the evidence. We
have considered all of the evidence and
are unable to agree with this conten-
tion. The fact that proponents of the
purported holographic will had it
in their possession from April of 1942,
until July of 1945, without making any
effort to have it established as a holo-
graphic will, and in the meantime had
undertaken to probate other wills and
to obtain title to the land involved upon
other grounds, indicates that they must
have doubted its validity, and casts a
cloud upon their present claims. This
court announced in Re Creger’s Estate,
135 Okla. 77, 274 P. 30, that:

“Proceedings to admit a will to pro-
bate are in the nature of an equitable
action, and on appeal this court will
weigh the evidence.” Youngblood v.
Rector etal, 126 Okla. 210, 259 P.
579.

In Lewis et al. v. Wolfe et al. (In re
Lewis’ Estate), 200 Okla. 352, 194 P.
2d 174, the rule is stated in the first
syllabus as follows:

“This court will not, on an appeal
from the district court in a trial de
novo from the county court in a pro-
bate matter, disturb the findings and
judgment of the trial court on review,
unless such findings and judgment are
clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence.”

The findings and judgment of the
trial court are not against the clear
weight of the evidence, and are hereby
affirmed.

DAVISON, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
GIBSON, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.

199
BATES et al. v. WINKLE.
No, 35219. Feb. 17, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 17, 1953.
254 P. 2d 361.

Hudson, Hudson & Wheaton, Tulsa,
and Cecil Robertson and C. A. Ambris-
ter, Muskogee, for plaintiffs in error.

J. B. Underwood and Hughey Baker,
Tulsa, for defendant in error.

CORN, J. Plaintiff. recovered judg-
ment based upon a jury verdict for
$20,680.34, as damages for personal in-
juries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent alleged. to have resulted from ©
negligence of the individual defendants
in operation of their respective motor
vehicles.

Based upon the various acts of negli-
gence alleged, plaintiff sought judgment
upon three separate causes of action:
(1) permanent injuries to her head,

200

neck, spine and back, and shock to her
nervous system resulting in physical
incapacity to continue her usual occu-
pation as a paper hanger and interior
decorator; as well as pain and anguish
therefor; (2) punitive damages for de-
fendants’ gross negligence under the
circumstances; (3) damages for in-
jury to and loss of use of her automo-
bile.

The issues were made by defendants
filing separate answers making general
denial of the matters alleged in the pe-
tition, except that defendant Perryman
admitted driving his automobile upon
the highway the night of the accident.

In his opening statement at the trial
his attorney confessed negligence on the
part of defendant Bates. Defendant
Perryman at all times contended there
was no evidence of negligence upon his
part of sufficient probative value to re-
quire submission to the jury.

Plaintiff's evidence was directed to
showing the acts of negligence relied
upon for recovery, medical testimony to
establish the nature and extent of her
injuries, her inability to follow her us-
ual occupation of paper hanging, for
which she received $25-$30 per day, and
the permanent physical incapacity re-
sulting from her injuries. There was
testimony that within about a week aft-
er the accident she began suffering and
thereafter required continuous medical
attention and treatment. There was fur-
ther testimony, corroborative in nature,
from individuals who observed her
physical condition following the ac-
cident, or for whom she had previously
done decorating work, to establish her
physical incapacity and inability to ac-
cept proffered employment following
the accident.

After judgment had been entered the
defendants filed separate motions for
new trial, wherein both relied upon the
ground of newly discovered evidence
as grounds for the granting of a new
trial. To his motion for new trial the
defendant Bates attached the affidavits
of a man and wife in compliance with
the requirements of 12 O.S. 1951 §651.

These affidavits, in substance, set
forth that in response to plaintiff's
mewspaper advertisement seeking em-
ployment as a paper hanger they em-
‘ployed plaintiff to do certain work,
which she commenced on September 30,
1950. During the course of the work
plaintiff stated that she had been in an
automobile accident wherein her car
had been damaged but she was unin-
jured; she further told of having com-
pleted another decorating job the previ-
ous day. Plaintiff papered both walls
and ceilings in affiants’ home, completed
the work by herself, and gave no ap-
pearance of suffering from any physical
disability while working. In March,
1951, these parties read a newspaper
account of plaintiff's recovery of a
large judgment against the defendants,
and knowing plaintiff had received no
injuries, they advised defendants’ at-
torney of the matters covered by the
affidavits.

The requirements for granting of a
motion for new trial upon the grounds
of newly discovered evidence (12 O.S.
1951 §651, subd. 7) are that such evi-
dence:

(1) Must have been discovered since
the trial (Douthit v. Scott, 195 Okla.
70, 155 P. 2d 538.)

(2) Could not have been discovered
before the trial by exercise of due
diligence (Green v. Blancett, 179 Okla.
483, 66 P. 2d 911).

(3) Must be material to the issue
(Patteson v. Myers et ux., 183 Okla.
601, 83 P. 2d 846).

(4) Must not be merely cumulative
to the former evidence (Foster v. Hig-
ginbotham, 186 Okla. 276, 97 P. 2d 63).

(5) Must not be merely to impeach
or contradict the former evidence
(Miles v. Pressley, 198 Okla. 124, 176
P. 2d 473).

(6) Must be such as will probably
change the result in the event a new
trial is granted (Chew v. Fouts, 191
Okla. 665, 132 P. 2d 949).

Also, see City of Sapulpa v. Deason,
81 Okla. 51, 196 P. 544. See, generally,

39 Am. Jur., New Trial, §158 et seq. In
the same text, §156, it is said:

«* * * The rule to be deduced from
the cases is that where newly dis-
covered evidence is of such conclusive
nature, or of such decisive or prepon-
derating character, that it would with
reasonable certainty have changed the
verdict or materially reduced the re-
covery, a new trial should be granted
if it is satisfactorily shown why the
evidence was not discovered and pro~
duced at the time of the trial.”

And section 165 further states:

“The application for new trial
should be granted where it appears that
the additional evidence, if it had been
introduced at the trial, would have
caused the jury to reach a different
conclusion, or where its effect would
have been to reduce the recovery ma-
terially. A new trial is to be granted
when the newly discovered evidence is
of a conclusive nature or of such a de-
cisive preponderating character as
would, with reasonable certainty have
changed the verdict or materially
reduced or increased the recovery.***”

The rule obtains in this jurisdiction,
Salyer Oil Co. v. Miller, 181 Okla. 171,
73 P. 2d 147; Chew v. Fouts, 191 Okla.
665, 132 P. 2d 949; Kennedy v. Chad-
well, 193 Okla. 304, 142 P. 2d 979.

Plaintiff sought damages for personal
injuries which were claimed to be of a
permanent nature. The evidence was
conflicting in this respect. Her evidence
was that she commenced to suffer from
such injuries shortly after the accident,
was unable to work and was wholly
incapacitated to perform even house-
hold duties. The newly discovered evi-
dence offered by defendants was not
cumulative, but was of a direct and
positive nature, tending to present de-
fendants’ theory of the case, to the ef-
fect that plaintiffs disability was from
a pre-existing condition and was not
the result of the accident; and that any
injuries were not sufficiently serious to
warrant so large a verdict based upon
permanent, physical disability. Had a
new trial been granted and this evi-
dence presented to the jury, it most

201

probably would have caused the jury
to reach a different conclusion or, in
any event, would have materially re-
duced the recovery.

The granting or denial of a motion
for new trial is addressed to the sound
legal discretion of the trial court, and
the trial court’s action will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless it clearly ap-
pears the court erred in some pure,
simple and unmixed question of law,
or acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
Williams v. Long Bell Lbr. Co., 203
Okla. 250, 219 P. 2d 992. Moreover, we
often have pointed out that the “dis-
cretion of the trial court” means a
legal discretion which is to be exer-
cised in discovering the course pre-
scribed by recognized principles of law.
Petite v. Davis, 203 Okla. 547, 223 P.
2d 1082. We necessarily conclude that
the denial of defendants’ motions for
new trial upon the ground of newly
discovered evidence was an abuse of
judicial discretion. Reversed and re-
manded for new trial.

Le
CLEMENTS v. MEE et al.
No. 35802. Feb. 3, 1953.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1953.

254 P. 2d $54.

202

Neva Martin, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

John W. Mee, Oklahoma City, for
defendants in error.

CORN, J. Plaintiff sued Catherine
Clements, and other defendants who
are not concerned herein, to quiet title
to real property. Plaintiff alleged ac-
quisition of a prescriptive title based
upon a sheriff’s deed and subsequent
conveyances, and that any interest or
title claimed by defendant was barred
by applicable statutes of limitation and
by virtue of the sheriff's deed having
been recorded more than five years.

Defendant’s amended answer and
cross-petition alleged ownership and
homestead character of the property on
the date of the sheriff’s deed and at all
times thereafter, subject to a first mort-
gage, in favor of plaintiff's husband,
Robert W. Mee, who induced the pur-
chaser, H. S. Morris, to buy the prop-
erty at the sheriff's sale and convey
the same to his wife, Clara Mee, in
trust for his benefit. Further, in 1934
the Mees induced defendant to give
them possession of the property upon
representation this was necessary for
them to collect the rents upon the prop~
erty and apply same upon the arrear~
ages of indebtedness, thus making the
Mees mortgagees in possession at all
times up to the date of the action. De~
fendant tendered any balance owing
upon the mortgage, sought accounting
of the rents and profits and asked that
her title be quieted.

In answer to defendant’s cross-peti~
tion plaintiff denied defendant’s home~
stead interest and plead estoppel based
upon the finality of the proceedings
which culminated in execution of the
sheriff's deed; that defendant’s cause
of action was barred by applicable
statutes of limitation; claimed title in

plaintiffs own right and denied any
right or title in her husband except
a mortgage interest, since in all trans-
actions plaintiff and her husband acted
separately and apart. This answer in-
corporated the proceedings which pro-
vided the basis for the sheriff's deed
under which plaintiff asserted title. De-
fendant replied by general denial of all
matters inconsistent with her answers
and cross-petition.

At the trial it was stipulated that de-
fendant purchased this property in 1924,
and mortgaged same to Robert W. Mee
in 1930, and that this mortgage had
never been released of record. Plain-
tiff introduced the evidence of Robert

.W. Mee, who testified that he held a

mortgage on the property which was
delinquent, and with unpaid taxes and
insurance in 1934; defendant was in fi-
nancial distress and about to lose
the property because of the judgment
being placed against her, and came to
his office seeking further help, which
he refused; one Morris bought the prop-
erty at sheriff's sale and then sold this
equity to plaintiff; that the mortgage
was settled and adjusted between de-
fendant and himself, although not re-
leased of record, and that he had no
agreement with defendant that he
should take possession under his mort-
gage; that the property belonged to
plaintiff, who had been in possession
since 1934 or 1935, and witness had no
interest therein; plaintiff had owned
the property since 1934, and it had been
rented to a tenant who took possession
in December, 1934, and paid rent on
the premises.

Mee’s loan accounts and rent records
showed defendant delinquent on the in-
debtedness, but she had paid the in-
terest to November, 1934; the accounts
also reflected a $99 credit to her in
December, 1934. Defendant insisted this
was a credit on the mortgage, but Mee
testified this was merely an adjustment
made in writing off defendant’s obli-
gation which was not carried on the
books as a debt thereafter.

Plaintiff's tenant (Mrs. Clouette) tes-
tified to having rented the property

from Mee in 1934, and that she moved
into the property when it was vacant;
she had tried to rent the property from
defendant who, while declining the of-
fer, told the witness she was going to
lose the property. The rent records dis-
closed that this tenant made her first
rent payment December 3, 1934.

Defendant predicated her defense
upon the theory that since she sur-
rendered possession to Mee, he became
a mortgagee in possession, and under
the conveyance plaintiff could only hold
the property in trust for Mee’s benefit.
She testified the property was mort-
gaged to Mee and that she was de-
linquent in the payments; upon at-
tempting to refinance Mee refused fur-
ther assistance, telling her he would
send a tenant to take possession of the
premises so rent could be collected and
payments made on the mortgage; for
this reason defendant surrendered pos~
session to the tenant; no accounting was
made although she inquired two dif-
ferent times concerning the matter. She
dealt with both Mee and plaintiff on
different occasions, had made payments
to both, and was told that the mortgage
belonged to plaintiff and her husband.

There was other evidence which de-
fendant insists must be construed as
supporting her position. It was brought
out that the Mees conducted their busi-
ness through a single bank account and
worked together in their affairs; the
purchaser of the sheriff's deed made
no mortgage payments, but immedi-
ately deeded his equity to plaintiff for
a consideration of only $1; the mort-
gage was never paid, nor released of
record. Apparently the original deed
to plaintiff was lost, and in 1938 plain-
tiff secured and recorded a new deed,
which recited that the interest convey-
ed was subject to Mee’s mortgage.

The trial court rendered a general
judgment quieting plaintiff's title and
confirming her possession in the prop-
erty, denying defendant any relief
sought under her cross-petition, and
barring and enjoining any of the named
defendants from asserting any title or
interest in the real estate involved.

203

Defendant relies upon five propo-
sitions in seeking to reverse the judg-
ment rendered. Proper disposition of
this appeal requires consideration of
the single question whether Robert Mee
was a mortgagee in possession.

The evidence introduced upon this
question is pointed out above, as is the
fact that the testimony relative to such
issue was in direct conflict. Defendant
construes the evidence as showing Mee
took possession with defendant’s con-
sent and thus was estopped to deny
her title, and purchase of an adverse
interest therein had to be for the bene-
fit of, and held in trust for the mort-
gagor. Further, that the evidence pre-
sumptively established that Mee con-
tinued to recognize defendant’s title so
that he was precluded from asserting
that title was in plaintiff by virtue of
the conveyance from the purchaser at
the sheriff's sale. Supporting this argu-
ment defendant relies upon rules an-
nounced in texts, as well as numerous
decisions which, as a general prop-
osition, support the defendant’s argu-
ment. See 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages,
§263. However, it must be noted that
application of the rule urged is limited
to instances where it is clearly estab-
lished that the mortgagee’s possession
resulted from same agreement, express
or implied, with the mortgagor in re-
spect thereto.

The trial court rendered a general
judgment for plaintiff granting the re-
lief sought. In such instances the rule
is that such finding is a finding of every
special thing necessary to be found to
uphold the general finding, and is con-
clusive upon this court as to all doubt-
ful or disputed questions of fact.
Gillespie v. Dougherty, 179 Okla. 330,
65 P. 2d 486.

In equity cases the presumption fa-
vors the correctness of the trial court’s
findings. and it will not be set aside
unless against the clear weight of the
evidence. Powell v. Moore, 204 Okla.
505, 231 P. 2d 695; Williams v. Downing,
185 Okla. 633, 95 P. 2d 612.

204

In view of the foregoing it is unnec-
essary to consider other errors urged
by plaintiff.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and DAVISON, 0O’-
NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur.

SPENCER et al. v. WOODS et al.
No. 34945, March 17, 1953.
254 P. 2d 97h.

A. T. Tom Biggers, Ponca City, and
Tom C. Greer, Wewoka, for plaintiffs
in error.

W. M. Haulsee, Hugh Roff, and Rich-
ard S. Roberts, Wewoka, for defendants
in error.

CORN, J. Plaintiffs commenced this
action to quiet title to a one-half inter-
est in real property in Seminole coun-
ty. The defendants filed an answer al~
leging that they were the wife and mi-
nor child of Jack Woods, deceased, who
inherited the one-half interest in said
property from his father, David, an en-
rolled fullblood Seminole Roll No. 1335,
hereinafter referred to as David, who
left surviving him his wife Ludie Woods
and a son, Jack Woods.

Plaintiffs filed a reply alleging that
in probate cause No. 3635, in Seminole

county, the court found that defendants
were not the wife and child of said
Jack Woods. The trial court in the case
under consideration found that the de-
fendants were not bound by the find-
ing made in the probate proceeding
and entered judgment for the defend-
ants and the plaintiffs have brought this
proceeding to review said judgment.

At the outset plaintiffs have simpli-
fied the issue by conceding that the evi-
dence is sufficient to sustain the find-
ings of the trial court in the case un-
der consideration that defendants are
the wife and child of Jack Woods. They
present the case on appeal on the sin-
gle issue that the question is res judi-
cata and that defendants are estopped
by the judgment by the court in the
probate proceeding.

The evidence discloses that David
died intestate and left Ludie, his wife,
and Jack Woods, a son. There was no
probate of the estate of David. Jack
Woods died December 16, 1944, Ludie
Woods died January 8, 1946, leaving a
will. The defendants did not inherit un-
der the will. In the probate of the will
the defendants filed a contest in which
they asserted that the will was void for
the reason that it was executed under
duress. The court denied the contest
and found that defendants were not the
wife and child of Jack Woods.

We must assume, therefore, in ap-
proaching this single issue, that Jack
Woods died leaving a wife and child;
that Ludie Woods’ estate was duly pro-
bated; that thereafter this action was
commenced to determine the heirs of
Jack Woods, deceased. In fact, it is al-
leged that there has been no probate
of the estate of Jack Woods, deceased,
and that this action is brought to deter-
mine the heirs of Jack Woods, deceased.
Plaintiffs are bound by these allega-
tions. .

The order made by the probate court
after the contest filed by the defendants
is as follows:

“This matter coming on for hearing

this 9th day of August, 1948, after being
regularly continued from the 5th day

of May, 1948, upon the contest of Will
and petition as an heir of Cora Lena
or Woods and Mary Len Lena or Woods,
a minor, and the executor, Charlie
Grounds appearing in person and by
his attorney, M. W. Janes, Lina Spencer
now Fixico, Willie Spencer, Porter Bear
now Noon, appearing in person and by
their attorneys, Tom C. Greer and Tom
Biggers, and Cora Lena or Wood and
Mary Len Lena or Woods, a minor, ap-
pearing in person and by their attor-
ney, J. A. Patterson, and both parties
having put on testimony and rested,
and the Court, after argument in said
Cause, and being fully advised in the
premises, finds: That Jack Woods, Sem-
inole NE, died on or about the 6th day
of December, 1944, which date was be-
fore the death of the testator herein,
Ludie King now Wood.

“The Court further finds that Jack
Woods departed this life while a resi-
dent in good faith of Seminole County,
intestate, unmarried, and without issue.
The Court further finds that the said
Cora Lena or Woods was not the legal
and lawful wife of the said Jack Woods
at the time of his death, and that the
said minor, Mary Len Lena or Wood,
—— was not the lawful and surviving
child or issue of the said Jack Woods.
The Court further finds that the said
Cora Lena or Wood—and the said Mi-
nor, Mary Len Lena, or Wood—, are not
the legal heirs of the said Jack Wood—
and are not entitled to inherit into his
estate by representation or otherwise.

“The Court further finds that the said
Ludie King now Woods at the time of
executing the Will offered for probate
herein was of sound mind and memory
and possessed the testamentary capa-
city to make said Will; That there was
no fraud, duress, or undue influence
used upon the said Ludie King now
Woods and that said Will was executed
according to law and was regular and
valid under the laws of this State.

“It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged
and Decreed by the Court that the con-
test of the Will of Ludie King now
Woods, testator herein, on the part of
Cora Lena or Woods and Mary Len
Lena or Woods, a minor, be denied and
that the distribution be made accord-
ing to the terms of said Will.

205

“It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged
and Decreed by the Court that the said
Cora Lena or Woods is not the legal
and surviving wife or the said Jack
Woods at the time of his death and is
not entitled to inherit herein as an heir
of the said Jack Woods.

“It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged
and Decreed that Mary Len Lena or
Wood, minor child of Cora Lena or
Woods, is not the legal child or Jack
Woods, deceased. and is not entitled to
inherit as an heir of Jack Woods.”

In Re Assessment of First National
Bank of Chickasha, 93 Okla. 233, 220
P. 909, it is stated:

“The conclusiveness of a judgment
extends only to the question directly in
issue, and not to any incidental or col-
lateral matter, though it may have
arisen and been passed upon.”

In Dusbabek v. Boland, 199 Okla. 614,
189 P. 2d 173, we find the following:

« * * * Tf a judgment necessarily
determines a particular fact, that de-
termination is conclusive between the
same parties and their privies. Yet be-
fore the doctrine of estoppel by judg-
ment may be applied to a particular
issue that issue must be the same in
both cases, 50 C.J.S., Judgments, §719.”

In Ford v. Dania Lbr. & Supply Co.,
150 Fla. 435, 7 So. 2d 594, it is stated that
an essential element of estoppel by
judgment is identity of parties suing in
the same capacity; and in Paine & Wil-
liams Co. v. Baldwin Rubber Co., 113
F. 2d 840, that court states that the
facts conclusively determined by a
judgment includes not only the ultimate
facts but the material facts necessary
in arriving at the conclusion, but such
facts must be properly in issue for
them to give rise to the doctrine of es-
toppel by judgment.

The ultimate fact in the probate pro-
ceeding was that the will was valid.
The finding as to whether the mother
and daughter were the heirs of Jack
Woods was neither necessary nor ma-
terial. The probate of the estate of Jack
Woods is the only probate proceeding -
that would give jurisdiction to deter~
mine his heirs. The statement is made

206

and not denied that the property in-
volved was the original allotment of Da-
vid and restricted lands. If so, only the
probate court having jurisdiction of the
property of Jack Woods could deter-
mine the heirs of Jack Woods. Kenny v.
Miles, 250 U. S. 58, 63 L. Ed. 841; Wolfe
vy. Gills, 96 Okla. 6, 219 P. 350; Cowoko-
chee v. Chapman, 90 Okla. 121, 215 P.
‘759.

The probate court of Seminole county
was not probating the estate of Jack
Woods, neither was it seeking to de-
termine his heirs. Under the allegations
in the petition filed by plaintiffs in the
case at bar there has been no pro-
bate of the estate of Jack Woods and
for this reason they seek to determine
his heirs. The petition to quiet title
and determine the heirs would not
state a cause of action unless it alleged
that the heirs of Jack Woods had not
been determined by a proceeding in pro-
bate. Since the heirs of Jack Woods
can only be determined by a probate,
or this action in substitution thereof,
which must allege that there has been
no probate of the estate of Jack Woods,
defendants had a right to set up their
heirship.

In fact, we think the pleadings must
be construed as stating that nowhere
has the fact been established that Jack
Woods did or did not have a living
wife and child. Ludie Woods did not
have to will any property to the wife
or child of Jack Woods. Neither Jack
Woods’ wife nor his child made any
claim to be an heir of Ludie Woods.
There was nothing in the petition to
contest filed by the defendants in the
probate court which sought to establish
that either the wife or child was the
heir of Ludie Woods. They did not
claim to inherit from her but claimed
their inheritance from Jack Woods.
They had a right to assert that claim of
inheritance at the first place it was
proper to claim it, to wit, the action
filed by plaintiffs to quiet title and de-
termine the heirs of Jack Woods.

The action in the probate proceeding
was neither res judicata nor estoppel
by judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and DAVISON, O’-
NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur.

a
WILLIAMS et al. v. RIPPEE et al.
No. 35678. March 17, 1953.

255 P. 2d 998.

Felix Duvall and James A. MeNeese,
Ponca City, for petitioners.

Looney, Watts, Ross, Looney &
Smith and Claud Briggs, Oklahoma
City, Leonard Geb and George Moriar-
ty, Ponca City, and Mac Q. Williamson,
Atty. Gen., for respondents.

O'NEAL, J. This is a proceeding by
Orsina W. Williams and his insurance

carrier, Central Surety & Insurance
Corporation, to review an award of the
State Industrial Commission awarding
compensation to respondent Troy Rip-
pee.

Troy Rippee and Leonard Hand, part~
ners, and their insurance carrier, Tri-
State Insurance Company, are also
named as parties respondent in the pe-
tition.

Respondent Troy Rippee filed three
separate claims for compensation, one
in which he stated his employer was
Orsina W. Williams, and another in
which he stated his employer was Troy
Rippee and Leonard Hand, partners,
and another in which he stated he was
employed by both. In each of these
claims he states that on the 19th day of
November, 1951, he suffered an acci-
dental personal injury arising out of
and in the course of his employment
consisting of a coronary occlusion and a
severe injury to his chest and as a re-~
sult thereof he is premanently disabled;
that the injury occurred while he was
engaged in loading a steel chute on a
truck.

The case was assigned to a trial com-
missioner for hearing who, at the con-
clusion of the evidence, in substance,
found: Respondent Troy Rippee, on
November 19, 1951, while engaged in the
employ of petitioner Williams, sustained
an accidental personal injury arising
out of and in the course of his employ-
ment while engaged in lifting a chute
resulting in an injury to his chest in the
nature of a ruptured blood vessel. At
the time of his injury respondent’s
wages were sufficient to fix his rate of
compensation at $25 per week; that re-
spondent was then temporarily totally
disabled and entitled to compensation
for temporary total disability at the
rate of $25 per week, and upon such
finding entered an order requiring pe-
titioners to pay respondent compensa-
tion at the rate of $25 per week until
further order of the commission, not to
exceed 300 weeks, and discharged re-
spondents Rippee and Hand, partners,
and Tri-State Insurance Company.

207

Petitioners bring the case here to re-
view this award and rely for its vaca~
tion solely upon the ground that there
is a total lack of evidence tending to
sustain the finding that the injury sus-
tained by respondent Rippee arose out
of and in the course of his employment
with petitioner Williams.

The evidence is undisputed and con-
sists of testimony of respondent Troy
Rippee and a report filed by the exam-
ining physician of respondent as to the
cause, nature and extent of his injury.

Respondent Rippee testified that pe-
titioner Williams is engaged in the busi-
ness of a general contractor and that
he and his partner Leonard Hand were
engaged in the cement and cement fin-
ishing business; they frequently did ce-
ment finishing work under contract
with others. Mr. Williams was the own-
er of several steel chutes. He (Rippee)
and his partner frequently borrowed
one of these chutes m connection with
work they had contracted to do for
others. A few days prior to the 19th day
of November, 1951, the date on which
he sustained his injury, he borrowed
one of these chutes from Mr. Williams.
The chute was located some distance
from where he resided. On November
18th, the day before he sustained his
injury, Mr. Williams called him over
the phone and engaged him to work for
him the next day. He was to report for
work at 8 o’clock in the morning. A
few minutes before 8 o’clock in the
morning he started to work in a pickup ~
truck owned by the partnership. When
he arrived at the place where the chute
was located he started to load it on the
truck and while so doing he suffered
a strain which caused severe pains in
his chest. He rested a few minutes and
then succeeded in loading the chute on
the truck and conveyed it to the place
where he intended to go to work. When
he arrived he completely collapsed and
was taken to a hospital by one of the
other employees of Williams. He further
testified that Mr. Williams did not di-
rect him to return the borrowed chute;
that he returned it because he had bor-
rowed it and because he felt it was his °

208

duty to do so, and because he thought
Mr. Williams might want to use the
chute in connection with the work he
was then doing. This, in substance con~
stitutes the evidence upon which the
trial commissioner based his findings
and award.

We agree with the contention of pe-
titioners that there is a total lack of
evidence tending to show that the in-
jury sustained by respondent arose out
of and in the course of his employment
with Williams. An injury is received
in the course of employment within
the meaning of the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act when it is incurred while
the workman is performing -the duties
which he is employed to perform. It
arises out of his employment when it
results from a risk reasonably incident
to the employment. Consolidated Pipe
Line Co. v. Mahon, 152 Okla. 72, 3 P.
2d 844; Swift & Co. v. Forbus, 201 Okla.
516, 207 P. 2d 251. Respondent Rippee
was performing no work for Mr. Wil-
liams while engaged in loading the bor-
rowed chute. He was at that time per-
forming work for and in his own behalf
or in behalf of the partnership. His
injury did not result from any risk rea-
sonably incident to his employment
with petitioner Williams. It did not
therefore arise out of and in the course
of his employment.

Award vacated as to petitioners, with
directions to dismiss the claim as to
them.

HALLEY, C.J., and DAVISON, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
CORN, J., dissents.

DUTTON vy. CITY OF OKLAHOMA
CITY et al.

No, 35805. March 17, 1953.
254 P. 2d 995.

Harlan Deupree and W. A. Blackburn,
Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

A. L. Jeffrey, Municipal Counselor,
Edward H. Moler, Asst. Municipal
Counselor, and Robinson, Shipp, Robert-
son & Barnes, Oklahoma City, for de-
fendants in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. W. A. Dutton com-
menced an action for injunction against
the city of Oklahoma City and another
to prohibit the city of Oklahoma City
from leasing certain property to Leo
Portman.

The plaintiff alleged that he repre-
sents himself and those similarly situ-
ated; that defendant city of Oklahoma
City was about to enter into an illegal
lease contract and sought to enjoin the
execution of the lease,

A temporary injunction was issued
and thereafter a hearing was held at
the conclusion of which the court en-
tered a judgment for the defendants.
Plaintiff has appealed.

A motion to dismiss has been filed
for the reason the judgment of the trial
court was not superseded and the court
having held that in the absence of an
order superseding the judgment the de-
fendant city of Oklahoma City had a
right to lease the property; that said
lease has been executed and the ques-
tion on appeal has been rendered moot.
The appeal must be dismissed. In Har-
den v. Morris, 198 Okla. 398, 179 P. 2d
144, we said:

“When the question presented by an

appeal has become moot, the appeal
will be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.
HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,

DAVISON, O'NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

Es 209

FRENSLEY et al. v. WHITE et al.
No. 35410. March 17, 1953.

254 P. 2a 980. L. A. Winans and Wm. 0. Leach,
Duncan, and Harry Hammerly, Chick-
asha, for plaintiffs in error.

Ted Foster, Leonard C. Bowen, and
Ted D. Foster, Jr., Oklahoma City, for
defendants in error.

DAVISON, J. This is a suit of equit-
able cognizance brought by J. R. White,
Sam L. Files and J. D. Maddox, Trus-
tees of the Assembly of God Church of
Velma, Stephens county, Oklahoma, to
quiet title to a one-acre tract of land in
said county, as against the heirs, suc-
cessors and executrix of the estate of
their immediate grantor, J. R. Fren-
sley, deceased. The Skelly Oil Com-
pany, a corporation, the lessee in a cer-
tain oil and gas lease covering the
premises, executed by the other de-
fendants, was made a party defendant
also. The parties will be referred to as
they appeared in the trial court, being
inversely to their appearance here.

The only question for determination
in this lawsuit is the meaning and ef-
fect of a certain warranty deed, dated
January 30, 1935, executed by J. R.
Frensley and wife, Georgya L. Fren-
sley, to the plaintiffs herein, conveying
the title to the one-acre tract here in-
volved, subject to the provisions con-
tained in the habendum clause as fol-
lows:

“To Have and To Hold said above
described premises unto the said Trus-
tees and their successors in office, as
aforesaid, in trust, so long as said prem-
ises shall be held, kept and used by
said church or any branch thereof, or
any successor thereto for a place of di-
vine worship, for the use of the ministry
and membership of said church, sub-
ject to the usages, discipline and minis-
terial appointments of said church as
from time to time authorized and de-
clared by the General Council of the
Assemblies of God Church and by the
Annual Council within whose bounds
said premises are, or may hereafter
be situated.”

210

At the trial of the case, C. V. Butler,
Cc. L. Bass and O. W. Fulsom were
substituted as parties plaintiff, they be-
ing the then trustees of said church.
Plaintiffs offered the testimony of two
witnesses to the effect that a church
was being, and at all times since about
the date of the deed, had been con-
tinuously maintained on the premises.
Plaintiffs then rested and the defend-
ants, after demurring to the evidence,
produced two witnesses in an attempt
to prove the conversations and intent
of the parties at the time of the execu-
tion and delivery of the above de-
scribed deed. The trial court admitted
a part of such evidence over the strenu-
ous objection and exception of plain-
tiffs. It was to the effect that the par-
ties intended by the deed, to convey
only a site for a church to the plaintiffs,
but that the use should be only of the
surface, not of the minerals. Judgment
was for plaintiffs adjudging them to be
the owners of the entire fee in said
realty with the right to use the same
for-any purpose “so long as the prem-
ises shall be held, kept and used by
them or their successors * * * for a
place of divine worship.” From the
judgment, defendants have appealed.

The only question presented for de-
termination is whether or not the pro-
visions of the habendum clause in the
deed to plaintiffs, as above quoted, lim-
ited the use of the premises exclusively
to that of a place for divine worship.
In support of their position that such
was the effect of the provision, defend-
ants rely most strongly upon the opin-
ions in the cases of Board of Chosen
Freeholders of Cumberland County v.
Buck, 79 N.J.E. 472, 82 Atl. 418; Jor-
dan v. Goldman, 1 Okla. 406, 34 P.
871; and Union Missionary Baptist
Church v. Fyke, 179 Okla. 102, 64 P. 2d
1203. Each of these cases, however,
deals with a conveyance wherein the
provisions are materially different from
those in the case at bar.

Much unnecessary confusion seems
to have crept into the opinions dealing
with the subject because of the rather
extended discussions devoted to the

type of estates created by the various
deeds. However, note of them should
probably be here taken. There is, first,
the determinable fee upon conditional
limitation, which is a fee simple except
that it is immediately terminated by
the happening of some possible event,
subsequently. The estate remaining in
the grantor after the conveyance of such
an estate is a possibility of reverter
which he may convey, it being consid-
ered an interest in the land. If it is
conveyed, it is denominated as a lim-_
itation over to the third pecson. Next,
there is the fee estate upon condition
subsequent which is a fee simple ex-
cept that it may be terminated by the
grantor by re-entry upon the happen-
ing of some possible event, subsequent-
ly. What remains to the grantor after
the conveyance of such an estate is a
power (sometimes loosely designated a
possibility of reverter) which is not an
interest in the land and is not suffi-
ciently in esse to be subject to convey-
ance. Then, there exists the fee-simple
estate which is conveyed by a deed
poll, by the terms of which the grantee,
upon acceptance of the conveyance, im-
pliedly covenants to limit its use to
that specified in the deed. Although we
have used the word “fee” in these def-
initions, the same limitation of dura-
tion is often a provision in a convey-
ance of an estate of less quality than a
fee but the effect is the same.

It is, thus, readily apparent that the
opinion in the case Oklahoma City v.
Local Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n,
192 Okla. 188, 134 P. 2d 565, also cited
by defendants, has no application here-
in for the reason that the reported case
was dealing only with what property re-
mained in the grantor after the con-
veyance of the determinable fee and
whether or not such right or property
was capable of being conveyed by him.
It is noteworthy that in that opinion it
was pointed out that the use of the
words “so long as” (identical to those
in the case at bar) create an estate
upon conditional limitation rather than
upon condition subsequent. A situation,
in many respects, similar to the Okla-

homa City case, supra, was involved
in the case of Oklahoma City v.. Wain-
wright, 199 Okla. 470, 187 P. 2d 226.

This rather scanty explanation of the
terms eliminates the necessity of dis-
cussing the numerous and intricate
phases of the cases cited in defendants’
brief, wherein it is argued that the
words, used in the conveyance here in-
volved, created a conditional limitation
rather than a condition subsequent or
a covenant. But the important ques-
tion is, not what category the words
fall into, but whether or not there has
been a violation of the provisions of the
deed. It makes no difference whether
the estate conveyed to plaintiffs was
upon a conditional limitation or condi-
tion subsequent or with a covenant
against the occurrence of the condi-
tion, unless the condition arose. No
rights expired and no other rights ac-
erued until the occurrence. We, there-
fore, come to the crux of the contro-
versy: Did the provision in the deed,
“so long as said premises shall be held,
kept and used by said church or any
branch thereof, or any successor thereto
for a place of divine worship, for the use
of the ministry and membership of said
church, * * *” preclude the simultane-
ous use of the premises for additional
purposes, particularly, the production
of oil and gas? We think not.

The facts in the case at bar distin-
guish it from the hereinabove cited
cases relied upon by defendants. In the
case of Board of Chosen Freeholders
of Cumberland County v. Buck, supra,
“The use of the property for the pur-
pose named has now been permanently
abandoned.” The Jordan v. Goldman
ease, supra, had to do with treaties be-
tween the United States and the Chero-
kee Tribe of Indians in respect to the
jJand known as the Cherokee Outlet,
to which said tribe did not have a fee
title, but merely “an easement which
did not include the soil.” In the case
of Union Missionary Baptist Church v.
Fyke, supra, the deed being considered
provided that the premises should “be
used exclusively for a site for the
erection and maintenance of a church

ail

building.” Such provision is far from
analogous to the one here under con-
sideration.

The most nearly similar fact situa-
tion is found in the case of Priddy v.
School Dist. No. 78, 92 Okla. 254, 219
P. 141. There, the habendum clause
in deed under consideration provided
that the premises were granted, to be
held “as long as used for a school-
house site.’ That provision, in the light
of the discussion above, probably cre-
ated a conditional limitation although
in the opinion it is determined to be a
condition subsequent. Such distinction
is of no importance for its effect is
the same. “The fee passed by the deed
* * * in the same manner and to the
same extent as if the condition did not
exist, subject to the contingency of be-
ing defeated as provided by the condi-
tion.” The only practical difference is
as to the interest or possibility of re-
verter remaining in the grantor and its
transferability and not as to the estate
conveyed. This, notwithstanding the
opinion of some authors that technic-
ally “in the case of the ‘conditional lim-
itation’ an interest somewhat less in
concept has passed from the grantor,
which interest contains within itself the
basis for its expiration.” 19 Am. Jr.
531.

In the Priddy case, above quoted
from, it was not necessary to deter-
mine whether or not “the additional
use of the property for the production
of oil constitutes a wrong.” However,
the words there used were much more
restrictive than those in the deed in-
volved in the instant case. Herein, it is
doubtful that any additional use of the
premises would be wrongful, unless it
was in violation of the “usages, disci-
pline and ministerial appointments of
such church * * *.” Certainly, the addi-
tional use of the land for production
of oil and gas did not violate any of
the provisions of the deed.

There is no need to discuss at length
the parol evidence offered by the de-
fendants as to the intent of the parties
at the time of the execution and de-

212

livery of the deed. No ambiguity exists
in the instrument. The evidence was
not admissible.

“Rules of construction and interpre-
tation are available to remove uncer-
tainty concerning the meaning of a con-
tract when ambiguity exists in the writ~
ten instrument. However, if the lan-
guage is clear and explicit it governs
in determining the intent of the par-
ties in the absence of fraud, accident,
mistake or absurdity.” Johnson v. But-
ler, 206 Okla. 632, 245 P. 2d 720.

The title of plaintiffs, being one in
fee, subject to, and qualified by, only
the provisions of the habendum clause
in the deed, as fully set out above, was
sufficiently broad to entitle them to
the relief sought and the trial court
was correct in so holding.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, O’NEAL,
WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., con-
cur.

LOYD v. CAMPBELL et al.
No. 35479, March 17, 1953.
254 P. 2d 986.

Charles E. Grounds and E. Keith
Cooper, Seminole, for plaintiff in error.

Pierce, Mock & Duncan, Oklahoma
City, for defendant in error Roscoe T.
Campbell.

Draper Grigsby and Hal McPher-
son, Oklahoma City, for defendant in
error Elbert Marion Fenton, Jr.

WILLIAMS, J. Parties are referred
to herein as in the trial court.

On August 15, 1950, an automobile
driven by defendant Elbert Marion Fen-
ton Jr., was involved in an accident
with a truck driven by defendant Ros-
coe T. Campbell, near Shawnee, Okla-
homa.

On September 1, 1950, plaintiff, Net-
tie Loyd, who was a passenger in the
automobile driven by Fenton, filed a
suit for damages against defendants,
Fenton and Campbell, alleging that
both of them were guilty of negligence
which resulted in the accident, setting
out her injuries, and asking for dam-
ages. . .

Each defendant filed an answer con-
sisting of a general denial, an allega-
tion of negligence on the part of the
other defendant, and further allegation

of contributary negligence by the plain-
tiff.

After the trial to a jury, a verdict
was returned finding for defendants,
and judgment was pronounced thereon.
Plaintiff duly filed her motion for new
trial, which was overruled, and now
appeals to this court.

Plaintiff here argues the single prop-
osition “that there is a complete lack
of evidence tending to prove the essen-
tial facts which the jury had to find
before returning a verdict for both de-
fendants.”

However, we have examined the rec-
ord closely, and we find that the evi-
dence is conflicting, and that there is a
“hypothesis presented by the evi-
dence” upon which the verdict may be
justified.

Plaintiff, Nettie Loyd, testified that
she was the grandmother of defendant
Fenton; that she and Fenton were re-
turning from a trip to California at the
time of the accident; that the accident
occurred when Fenton tried to pass the
truck driven by defendant Campbell,
which was going in the same direction.

Fenton testified that he was driving
50 or 55 miles per hour at the time of
the accident; that he sounded his horn
before he started to cross into the left-
hand lane to pass Campbell’s vehicle;
that as he was passing, Campbell stuck
out his arm briefly, then turned left
into Fenton’s right front fender; that
Fenton’s car went off the road and ran
into a telephone pole.

Such testimony on the part of Fenton,
if believed, would reasonably tend to
support the jury’s verdict in his favor.

Campbell testified that he first saw
Fenton’s car about 100 yards behind
him; that he had his arm out in a left-
turn signal for about 120 feet before
he started to turn; that he was going
about 15 miles per hour; that Fenton
was going about 60 miles per hour; that
Fenton didn’t sound his horn till he
had pulled out and was beside his

213

(Campbell’s) truck, and then only
‘very briefly immediately before the
crash.

Such testimony on the part of Camp-
bell, if believed, would reasonably tend
to support the jury’s verdict in his fa-
vor.

Other witnesses generally tended to
substantiate the testimony of the respec-
tive parties for whom they were testi-
fying.

It is obvious that the jury could not
have believed all of the testimony of
both defendants, since there are direct
conflicts therein. However, it is elemen-
tary that the jury is at liberty to accept
or reject any or all of the testimony of
any witness. In that connection, it
might be suggested that the jury mere-
ly decided that the plaintiff had not es-
tablished the allegations of her petition
by a preponderance of the evidence, as
the court instructed them that she must.

There was also presented certain tes-
timony from which the jury might have
been justified in finding the plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence. Such
evidence was as follows: That plaintiff
Loyd and defendant Fenton had driven
for long hours during their trip back
from California (5:15 p.m. Sunday to
midnight; daylight to 10 p.m. Monday;
daylight to 11:30 am. Tuesday when
the accident happened; Sunday and
Monday nights they slept in the car);
that plaintiff, Loyd, never complained
to Fenton about his driving. With re-
gard to the truck ahead, it was shown
that Mrs. Loyd had said in a deposi-
tion: “I wondered what the fellow was
going to do. In my own mind I thought,
is he going on, or going to turn.” That
she didn’t say anything to Fenton about
it. .

In this connection, see Stillwater

Milling Co. v. Templin, 182 Okla. 309,
77 P. 2d 732, wherein the court said:

“The negligence of a driver of a car
is not imputed to his wife who is a mere
passenger in the automobile he is driv-

214 a

ing, and she may to a large extent rely
on his skill and experience; but she is,
like any other passenger, within the
rule which requires a guest to use or-
dinary care for his own safety. What
conduct makes a guest guilty of con-
tributory negligence ordinarily is a
question of fact to be decided by the
jury under appropriate instructions.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, the trial court
properly instructed the jury on the is-
sue of contributory negligence.

In Straughan v. Cooper, 41 Okla. 515,
139 P. 265, the court said:

“The sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a judgment will be determined
in the light of the evidence tending to
support same, together with every rea-
sonable inference deducible therefrom,
rejecting all evidence adduced by the
adverse party which conflicts there-
with.”

By virtue of its general finding for
defendants, and in view of the rule of
law above quoted, the jury is pre-
sumed to have found either that de-
fendants were not negligent, or that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, or both. Of course, either of
such findings alone would have been
sufficient to sustain the verdict. This
court has held that where there is any
competent evidence reasonably tending
to sustain the verdict of the jury, the
same will not be disturbed on appeal,
as stated in Burden v. Stephens, 174
Okla. 312, 49 P. 2d 1098:

“Where there is any competent evi-
dence reasonably tending to sustain a
verdict, in a law action, though the evi-
dence be conflicting, and the cause is
submitted to the jury upon instruc-
tions fairly stating the applicable law,
this court will not review the evidence
for the purpose of determining the
weight thereof, and substitute this
court’s judgment for the judgment ren-
dered on the verdict, and the verdict
will not be disturbed on appeal.”

In the case at bar, there is no com-
plaint that the instructions to the jury
do not fairly state the applicable law.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

Protest of GREEN-PHILLIPS

CHEVROLET CO.
No. 35376. March 17, 1953.
254 P. 2d 97%.

)_ eee
Bill Logan, Lawton, for plaintiff in

error.

R. F. Barry, W. F. Speakman, and
E. J. Armstrong, Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error.

CORN, J. The Green-Phillips Chevro-
let Company, hereinafter referred to as

the Company, on September 17, 1951, «

made application for a certificate of ti-
tle and registration of a new 1951 Model
Chevrolet Automobile, by filing a veri-
fied application, to wit:

“The vehicle for which application
for certificate of title is made is a new
automobile. It is owned by a dealer
in new automobiles, Green-Phillips
Chevorolet Company new vehicle deal-
er License No. 1471. It is being regis-
tered in the name of° Green-Phillips
Chevrolet Company for the purpose of
placing it on the Company Used Car
Lot in the City of Lawton, Oklahoma,
pursuant to the Company’s used vehicle
license No. 21504, for the purpose of
offering it for sale as a used automo-

ile,

The Tax Commission refused to reg-
ister and issue a certificate of title
to said automobile without the pay-
ment of the excise tax. The Company
paid the excise tax under protest and
sought a refund for the amount of the
excise tax paid which was denied by
the Tax Commission.

‘The facts are that the Company is the
holder of a new dealers’ license to sell
new Chevrolet automobiles and also
holder of a used car dealers’ license
to sell used cars. The Company con-
tends that it is entitled to have the car
registered and certificate of title is-
sued therefor without the payment of
the excise tax, and for its authority
refers to 47 O.S. 1951 §52d, which pro-
vides:

“An original or a transfer certificate
of title shall be issued without the pay-
ment of the excise tax levied by this
Act for:

215

“(e) Any vehicle legally owned by a
person licensed as a dealer in used
cars or parts, under the provisions of
the Vehicle License’ and Registration
Act, and offered for sale by such per-
son; * * #,

It will be necessary to examine the
“provisions of the vehicle license and
registration Act” in order to ascertain
if the Company can get the relief
sought. See 47 O.S. 1951 §22:

“Motor Vehicle License and Regis-
tration Act—This Act shall be known
and cited as the ‘Motor Vehicle License
and Registration Act.’ ”

Section 22.1:

“* * * Owner, Any person owning or
possessing any vehicle as herein defined.

nee :

“Dealer. Any person, as herein de-
fined, who is engaged in the business of
buying, selling or exchanging, new ve-
hicles in this State and who is the
holder of a valid selling agreement,
franchise, or contract with the manu-
facturer of the type of new vehicle he
offers for sale.

“Used Car Dealer. Every person
whose principal business is that of buy-
ing, selling or exchanging used vehicles,
or parts thereof, in this State.

nee

“Used Vehicles. A vehicle which has
been sold, bargained, exchanged or giv-
en away, or used to the extent that it
hhas become what is commonly known,
and generally recognized as a ‘second
hand’ vehicle. This shall also include
any vehicle, regardless of age, owned
by any person who is not the holder of
@ Y yalid selling agreement, franchise, or
contract with the manufacturer of the
type of vehicle so owned or possessed.

“New Vehicle. A vehicle which is in
the possession of the manufacturer, or
has been sold only by the manufac-
turer to the holder of a valid selling
agreement, franchise, or contract, grant-
ed by the manufacturer to sell said
make of new vehicle. This shall not
include any vehicle owned or possessed
by any person who is not the holder of

216

a valid selling agreement, franchise, or
contract with the vehicle manufac-
turer.”

Section 22.1: “Foreign Vehicle. Every
vehicle brought into this State and not
legally registered in this State.”

Section 22.5: “The license fees pro-
vided in this Act must be paid each
year whether or not the vehicle is op-
erated on the public highway.”

Section 22.13: “In the event a new
vehicle is not registered on the date
purchased, and in case a used vehicle is
brought into Oklahoma by a resident
of this State and is not registered im-
mediately, a penalty of ten cents (10c)
per day will be charged from the date
of purchase or the date of entry to the
date of registration, such penalty to
accrue for thirty (30) days, upon failure
to register, at the end of which time,
the penalty will be equal to the license
fee due. * * *”

Section 22.18: “No person shall own
or have in his possession within this
“State after the 31st day of January
each year any vehicle, unless such ve-
hicle shall have the current distinctive
identification and number plates as-
signed to it by the Commission, dis-
played on the front and rear of such
vehicle, securely fastened as shall be
prescribed by the Commission. It shall
be unlawful for any person to buy, sell
or dispose of, or have in his possession
at any time for saie, use or storage,
any second hand or used vehicle on
which the Oklahoma registration or li-
cense fee has not been paid for each
year, as required by law and on which
vehicle said person neglects, fails or re-
fuses to display, at all times, the cur-
rent identification and number plates
assigned to it.”

Section 22.23: “Miscellaneous Of-
fenses Enumerated. It shall be unlawful
for any person to commit any of the fol-
lowing acts: * * * (c) For any resi-
dent of this State to procure from an-
other state or country, or display upon
any vehicle owned or possessed by him
within this State, except as otherwise
provided in this Act, any license plate
issued by any state or country other
than the State of Oklahoma, unless
there shall be displayed upon such
yehicle at all times the current license

plate assigned to it by the Commis-
sion. * * *

“(f) To buy, sell or dispose of, or
have in his possession for sale, use or
storage, any secondhand or used ve-
hicle on which the registration or li-
cense fee has not been paid, as re-
quired by law, and on which vehicle
said person neglects, fails or refuses to
display at all times the current identi-
fication and number plates assigned to
inte ®

“(h) To purchase identification or
number plates on an assigned Certifi-
cate of Title. This particular subsec-
tion shall be applicable to all persons
except bona fide registered dealers in
used cars who are holders of current
and valid used car dealers’ licenses.”

Section 23.6 also provides:

“Sale or transfer of motor vehicle—
Assignment of certificate. * * * The
dealer shall execute and deliver to the
purchaser, bills of sale on forms pre-
scribed by the Commission for all new
vehicles sold by him. On presentation of
a bill of sale executed on forms pre-
scribed by the Commission, by a manu-
facturer or dealer for a new vehicle
sold in this State, accompanied by re-
mittance in the sum of one dollar
($1.00), together with any Motor Ve-
hicle Excise Tax or license fee that may
be due, a certificate of title shall be
issued in accordance with the provisions
of this Act. .

“Provided that every person licensed
as a dealer in used vehicles or parts
may register and obtain number plates
for any vehicle legally owned and of-
fered for sale by such person upon pres-
entation of a certificate of title for
such vehicle property assigned to such
dealer.”

It is plain the only way a dealer in
used cars can register and obtain a
number plate is to comply with the
above Act, to wit: “for any vehicle
legally owned and offered for sale by
such person upon presentation of a
certificate of title for such vehicle prop-
erly assigned to such dealer,’ which
means he is required to register and
pay the excise tax on any automobile
that he owns that has not been regis-

tered in Oklahoma, and if this construc-
tion is followed, it means that Oklahoma
will receive an excise tax on the first
registration of every vehicle in this
state which would be in accordance
with the language of sec. 52b to the ef-
fect that the excise tax is due “at the
time of the transfer of legal ownership,
or first registration in this State of such
vehicle, and shall be collected by the
‘Tax Commission at the time of the issu-
ance of a certificate of title for any
such vehicle.”

A person who is a new car dealer
seeking to register and obtain a certif-
icate of title to a new car must com-
ply with 47 O.S. 1951 §23.6.

After an examination of the entire
Act, we hold it was not the intent of
the Legislature in enacting §52d (e)
to permit the holder of a license to sell
new cars, who is also the holder of a
license to sell used cars, to register and
obtain a certificate of title to a new
car without payment of the excise tax
by filing an affidavit with said Tax
Commission that the new car was going
to be sold on the used car lot, as a used
car.

Affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and ARNOLD, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
JOHNSON, V.C.J., and DAVISON, J.,
dissent.

Pe
GRIMES v. CITY OF HENRYETTA etal.
. No, 35458. March 17, 1953.

254 P. 2d 980.

Farmer & Kerr, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

F. C. Helm, Henryetta, for defendants
in error.

WILLIAMS, J. Parties are referred
to herein as in the trial court.

On June 13, 1951, plaintiff, Lucille
Grimes, was arrested in the city of Hen-
ryetta, Oklahoma, and taken to the city
jail, where she was later allegedly
charged in the police court of said city
with driving an automobile while in-
toxicated and resisting arrest. She was in
jail until about 5:30 p.m. June 14, 1951,
at which time she was released.

On August 11, 1951, she filed suit
against the city of Henryetta and three
police officers of said city, alleging
brutal treatment in the arrest by the
officers, and further alleging that said

218

officers took charge of her automobile
and personal belongings, including $400
in cash, and that when her property
was returned to her at her release, a
large part of the cash was not returned.

Defendant city of Henryetta demur-
red to the petition; the demurrer was
sustained; plaintiff elected to stand on
her’ petition and has appealed to this
court from the order sustaining the de-
murrer, and dismissing the cause as
to defendant city.

In City of Lawton v. Harkins, 34
Okla. 545, 126 P. 727, this court said:

“The police regulations of a city are
not made and enforced in the interest of
the city in its corporate capacity, but
in the interest of the public. A city
is therefore not liable for the acts of
its officers in attempting to enforce
such regulations, and further because
police officers can in no sense be re-
garded as servants or agents of the
city. Their duties are of a public na-
ture. Their appointment is devolved
upon cities and towns by the Legisla-
ture as a convenient mode of exercising
a function of government; but this does
not render the cities and towns liable
for their assaults, trespasses, or negli-
gent acts.”

To the same effect are the holdings
of this court in Cummings v. Lobsitz,
42 Okla. 704, 142 P. 993, and Silva v.
City Council of City of McAlester, 46
Okla. 150, 148 P. 150.

The question of the liability of a mu-
nicipal corporation for the wrongful
acts of its police officers is fully dis-
cussed in Savage v. City of Tulsa, 174
Okla. 416, 50 P. 2d 712. Therein the
court said (Syllabus 1):

“A city has two classes of powers:
The one legislative, public, governmen-
tal, in the exercise of which it is a sov-
ereignty and governs its people; the
other proprietary, quasi private, cou-
ferred upon it, not for the purpose of
governing its people, but for the pri-
vate advantage of the inhabitants of the
city and of the city itself as a legal per-
sonality. In this state and in most oth-
ers, distinction is made between the lia-
bility of a municipal corporation for the

Fo

acts of its officers in the exercise of
powers of a governmental nature, which
it possesses for public purposes, which
it holds in the exercise of its sovereign-
ty and governs its people, and those acts
of its officers in the exercise of pow-
ers, proprietary in their nature, and
which are exercised not for the purpose
of governing its people but for the pri-
vate advantage of the municipality and
its inhabitants, of the former the city
is not liable, of the latter it is liable.”

Plaintiff herein has pointed out no
case in which the above holdings of this
court have been overruled or reversed,
and we are unable to find such.

Plaintiff further argues that in this
case, if the police officers. are unable
to respond in damages, an inequity will
result. If such is the case, plaintiff's
remedy lies with the Legislature, not
the judiciary.

The order sustaining the demurrer
and judgment dismissing cause as to
city of Henryetta is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
v. HORNE et al.

No. 84204. March 17, 1953.
254 P. 2d 988.

Mont R. Powell and Anthony R. Kane,
Oklahoma City, for petitioner.

Paul Pugh, Owen Townsend, and
Claud Briggs, Oklahoma City, and Mac
Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respon~
dents.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This is an original
proceeding in this court by Special In-
demnity Fund to review an award of
the State Industrial Commission award-
ing compensation to William Floyd
Horne.

Hereinafter, the respondent Horne
will be referred to as claimant and the
petitioner, Special Indemnity Fund, as
the Fund.

The record discloses that claimant,
while working for the Sapulpa Tank
Company on September 16, 1947, sus-
tained serious permanent injuries to
his feet; that he had previously sus-
tained a prior injury resulting in the
pre-existing total loss of his right eye.

Joint petition settlement with the
Tank Company was duly consummated

219

with all rights reserved as to the action
against the Fund, from which no appeal
was taken, and the Tank Company is,
therefore, not concerned in the present
proceeding.

The trial commissioner upon hearing
made findings of fact, and an order
in accordance therewith. The pertinent
part thereof, paragraphs 3 and 4, reads
as follows:

“That as a further result of said in-
jury, claimant has sustained a 50% per-
manent partial disability to the body
as a whole, for which disability he is
entitled to 250 weeks at $21.00 per week,
or a total sum of $5250.00; that there
is now due claimant the sum of $168.00,
same being accrued compensation for
8 weeks at $21.00 per week, computed
from June 3, 1948 to and including July
29, 1948.

“That the weight of the evidence does
not prove additional disability to do
manual labor by reason of the combi-
nation of injuries and the award as to
the Special Indemnity be and the same
is hereby denied.”

Upon appeal to the commission en
banc the trial commissioner’s findings
and order was affirmed except as to
paragraph 4, which was vacated and in
lieu thereof the following paragraph
was substituted and reads:

“That prior to claimant’s injury to
his feet, claimant had sustained an ac-
cidental personal injury to his right
eye, and at the time of said injury of
Sept. 16th, 1947, claimant was a Phys-
ically Impaired person, within the
meaning of Sec. 173, Title 85 O.S. and
the Commission further finds from the
evidence in this cause that by reason
of the combination of claimant’s injur-
ies, when he was 17 years of age and on
September 16th, 1947, claimant’s per-
manent disability to the body as a
whole has been materially increased in
the amount of 90 per cent permanent
partial disability to and loss of use of
his body as a whole, less the deduc-
tions as provided for by the Workmen’s
Compensation Law, to-wit: 50% to the
body as a whole by reason of the in-
jury to the right and left foot, and less
20% by reason of the pre-existing loss

220

of the right eye, for which claimant is
entitled to 100 weeks at $21.00 per week
or the total sum of $2100.00”.

It is from this order that the Fund
appeals. The Fund contends that the
award of the commission against it is
contrary to the law and evidence and
based upon speculation and conjecture.

We have held that a foot injury could
be combined with a previous injury
causing total blindness of an eye in
making an award against the Special
Indemnity Fund. Special Indemnity
Fund v. McMillin, 198 Okla. 412, 179 P.
2a 475. But it is argued herein that
there was no competent evidence rea-
sonably tending to support the finding
of the State Industrial Commission that
by reason of a combination of the loss
of an eye (by previous accident) and
the disability to the feet, claimant has
a disability materially greater in de-
gree then caused by the latter injury
(to the feet) alone; and this argument
poses the material question for our de-
termination as all jurisdictional mat-
ters are unquestioned.

A combination of a prior injury
causing total loss of claimant’s right
eye, and the subsequent injury to claim-
ant’s feet is permissible, if by such
combination claimant has a disability
materially greater in degree than
caused by the injury to his feet alone,
and recovery may be had under Title 85
O.S. 1951, §171 et seq. McMillin case,
supra, and cases cited therein.

The Fund having questioned the com-
petency and sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the commission’s finding that
claimant’s combined injuries resulted
in a disability materially greater in de-
gree than that caused by claimant’s
last injury alone, it therefore becomes
necessary for us to ascertain whether
the evidence was competent and suffi-
cient to sustain the award. We are cog-
nizant of the rule that the commission
was at liberty to give credence to so
much and such part of the evidence
as it deemed proper and to make such
award as might be justified under the

evidence,

See Kingfisher v. Jenkins,
168 Okla. 624, 33 P, 2d 1094, and other
cases of similar import. Also, that the
commission has the power to weigh the
evidence and draw its own conclusions,
and such commission like a court or
jury may draw reasonable inferences
from the facts and circumstances in
evidence, and where it draws such in-
ferences from facts and circumstances
which in their nature are such that rea-
sonable men might draw either the
same or opposite inferences, this court
will not say that the facts found as a
result of such inferences are not sus-
tained by sufficient evidence. Burch v.
Slick, 167 Okla. 639, 31 P. 2d 110.

The claimant first filed a Form 3, No-
tice of Injury and Claim for Compen-
sation, on September 22, 1947, alleging
that he was injured when he fell from a
scaffold, and asserted the nature and
extent of his injuries as fractured bones
in both feet and one ankle. The attend-
ing physician’s report Form 4 states
the nature and extent of his injuries
as “contusion posterior left chest. Frac-
tured left foot (calcaneus). Fracture
of right foot (talus) with perhaps frag-
ment displaced laterally”. Employee’s
Form 2, Notice of injury, states “Ankles
broken’.

Thereafter, on December 23, 1947, an
amended Form 3 was filed wherein
claimant alleged injuries to both feet,
back and chest.

Claimant was paid temporary total
compensation by his employer, Sapulpa
Tank Company, from September 16,
1947, to and including June 3, 1948.

Upon trial of the cause it was ad-
mitted that claimant had in a previous
accident lost the sight of his right eye,
and by reason thereof was a previously
impaired person.

As suggested by the Fund, the com-
mission’s findings are not conclusive
unless sustained by competent evidence.
McKeever Drilling Co. v. Egbert, 167
Okla. 149, 28 P. 2d 579, and where dis-
ability requires medical experts to de-

termine the cause and extent thereof,
such question must be proved by such
experts. Texas Co. v. State Industrial
Commission, 183 Okla. 461, 83 P. 2d
369, and if an award is not so sustained
it will be vacated. Id., and conversely
an award will be sustained.

The record discloses that two ad-
mittedly qualified physician’s testified
for claimant, Drs. Lloyd Boatright and
Phil White.

The Fund complains only about the
medical testimony concerning the pos-
sibility of a combination of the in-
juries. It is argued that since these
doctors testified that in their opinions
the last injury, standing alone, con-
stituted the claimant a permanently and
totally disabled person, such evidence
would not support an award against
the Fund.

An examination of the medical testi-
mony shows that Dr. White testified as
to the history, nature and extent of
claimant’s injuries and his findings con-
cerning the combination of claimant’s
previously injured eye with his subse-
quent injuries to his feet, which consti-
tuted the combinable injuries sustained
by claimant. The pertinent part there-
of reads:

“Q. Doctor, what do you say to the
respective disabilities to his right and
left foot? A. In my opinion, I think he
has, I would say, Fifty percent to the
right foot and Forty percent to the left.

“Q. Now, if you were considering his
disability to his feet in connection with
the loss of the eye, what would be your
opinion as to the body disability, that
is, independent of his back? A. Inde-
pendent of his back as a combination
of the injuries to both feet and pre-
existing disability or loss of vision of
the right eye, it would be my opinion
he would be practically totally and per-
manently disabled for the purpose of
ordiriary manual labor as a result of
the condition of the injuries to his feet
and pre-existing disability to his right
eye.”

Dr, White also testified that a com-
bination of claimant’s injured feet with

221

his back constituted him a totally and
permanently disabled person. However,
in this connection, Dr. C. R. Rountree,
who treated claimant for the respon-
dent, and filed a report, which was ad-
mitted in evidence and in which he dis-
closed his findings and opinion relative
to claimant’s injuries, and the degree of
the permanent disability sustained by
claimant by reason of his last injuries,
said that, in his opinion, claimant sus-
tained little, if any, permanent injury
to his back; that in his judgment claim-
ant would have a permanent partial
disability of 30% to the body as a whole
as a result of the last injuries to his
feet. He was of the opinion that no in-
creased disability resulted from the
combination of the injuries to claim-
ant’s feet with the old eye injury.

This constitutes the medical testi-
mony before the commission on the is-
sue of whether or not there was an in-
creased disability resulting from the
combination of claimant’s old and new
injuries, and was the basis of its finding
and judgment heretofore quoted.

The Fund points to the fact that Dr.
White, in testifying for claimant, com-

‘pined the disability to claimant’s feet

with the pre-existing eye disability, and
was of the opinion the combination
would constitute a permanent and total
disability; that in arriving at this esti-
mate he disregarded the disability re-
sulting from injury to the back which,
standing alone, Dr. White estimated had
resulted in 50% permanent partial dis-
ability to the body. It is argued that the
commission was not justified in disre-
garding Dr. White’s findings as to the
back injury and adopting his finding
and opinion of total disability to the
body by a combination of claimant’s
old eye injury with the new injuries
to his feet. And, but for Dr. Rountree’s
opinion that there was “little, if any,
permanent injury to claimant’s back,”
we would be inclined to agree. We
will not, however, under the appellate
rules governing us in reviewing evi-
dence adduced before the commission,

222

differentiate or separate the believable
evidence from the unbelievable; we are
only concerned with the competency
and sufficiency of same. The function
of the commission is to consider and
give credence to so much and such part
of the evidence as it deemed proper and
to make such award as the evidence,
in its judgment, justified. Kingfisher
v. Jenkins, supra. Evidently, the com-
mission disregarded Dr. White’s testi-
mony as to claimant’s back injury but
gave credence to and considered his
statement that increased disability re-
sulted from the combination of the new
injury to the feet and the old eye
injury which caused the claimant to
sustain total and permanent disability.
It is also evident that the commission
considered Dr. Rountree’s statement
that there was no permanent injury
to claimant’s back, but disregarded his
evidence in other matters, all of which
was proper for it to do. Burch v. Slick,
supra.

From all the facts and circumstances
in the instant case, including the fact
that the commission approved a joint
petition foreclosing all claims arising
out of the new injuries, we hold that
the commission necessarily found that
claimant sustained no injury to his
back.

From a careful examination of the
entire record we find that the award
of the commission is not based upon
speculation and conjecture, even though
evidence on which based might have
justified a different finding, Rialto Min-
ing Co. v. Yokum, 153 Okla. 297, 5 P.
2d 1065; and there being competent
expert medical opinion testimony to the
effect that the combination of new in-
juries to claimant’s feet with an old
injury to his right eye resulting in total
loss of vision, materially increased the
injured claimant’s disability, the award
against the Fund is sustained.

The Fund’s further contention that
the $200 bonus paid by employer’s in-
surance carrier on joint petition settle-
ment should be deducted from the
award against the Fund is without
merit. The commission’s finding and
order that by reason of claimant’s last,
or new injury, he had sustained a 50
per cent permanent partial disability
to the body as a whole, for which disa~
bility he was entitled to 250 weeks at
$21 per week, or a total of $5,250, had
become final, and the subsequent joint
settlement for a $200 bonus over the
disability fixed by the commission is
not deductible from the award against
the Fund. See Title 85 O.S. 1951 §172.
In this connection the Fund cites and
relies upon Special Indemnity Fund v.
Dimpél, 201 Okla. 556, 207 P. 2d 776, as
authority to sustain its contention. The
Dimpel case is readily distinguishable
from the instant case. There we held
that where a physically impaired per-
son filed claim for additional injury,
amount of money which he had received
from joint settlement of claim for in-
jury that made him a physically im-
paired person was deductible from
award made for the combined disa~
bility.

The commission, in the Dimpel case,
made no finding as to the claimant's
permanent partial disability before the
joint settlement agreement, but found
that the temporary total disability had
ceased, and that the matter of his
permanent partial disability was still
to be determined, so that the joint
settlement was necessarily made with
a view of adjusting claimant’s claim
for permanent disability, and we there
held that such order of the commission
made on such joint settlement would be
considered as a final award.

WELCH, DAVISON, ARNOLD, O’-
NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
HALLEY, C.J., and CORN and WIL-
LIAMS, JJ., dissent.

Le 223

HUMPHREYS v. DAY.
No. 35263. Jan. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 24, 1953.
254 P. 2d 996.

Martin L. Frerichs, Okemah, and
Leon C, Phillips, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

Clyde F. Ross, Okemah, for defend-
ant in error.

BINGAMAN, J. This action was
brought by C. R. Humphreys against
J. H. Day to compel the specific per-
formance of a contract to sell and con-
vey 400 acres of land, possession of
which had been delivered to the plain-
tiff. By cross-petition defendant sought
to recover possession of the property
and damages. From the judgment for
the defendant, plaintiff appeals.

By written escrow agreement the de-
fendant agreed to sell the land in ques-
tion to the plaintiff for a consideration
of $14,000. $500 of the purchase price
was deposited in escrow with the deed
conveying the property. The escrow
contract provided for delivery and ex-
amination of abstracts of title and on
approval of title provided plaintiff
should pay to the escrow bank the fur-

ther sum of $6,500 in cash and deliver
to the “escrow holder a real estate
mortgage covering the herein described
real estate and promissory note for
$7,000, which note shall bear interest
at 6 per cent per annum from date
thereof, and shall be secured by a real
estate mortgage, according to the
terms and conditions thereof.” The
written escrow agreement appears to
be full and complete in every respect
except it contains no provision fixing
the due date of the $7,000 promissory
note. The trial court permitted the
plaintiff to offer parol evidence as to
the due date of this note. Plaintiff's
evidence consisted of his own testimony
that the $7,000 was to mature in annual
installments of $1,000 on October Ist of
each year, beginning on October Ist,
after the execution of such note and
mortgage. The defendant’s testimony
directly contradicted the testimony of
the plaintiff in that he testified there
was no agreement as to the due date
of the mortgage.

The plaintiff tendered performance
of the agreement in accordance with
his version of the maturity date of the
mortgage which tender was refused by
the defendant.

To entitle the plaintiff to specific
performance he must establish that the
agreement was definite and certain as
to the maturity date or dates of the
note in question. Bordner v. Gordon,
94 Okla. 165, 221 P._50.

The evidence of the parties being
sharply in conflict it was for the trial
court to determine the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight and value
to be given their testimony. McAfee v.
Harden, 180 Okla. 546, 71 P. 2d 463.

The judgment of the trial court is
not clearly against the weight of the
evidence and should not be disturbed
on appeal. Payne v. Wade, 190 Okla.
222, 122 P. ad 144.

Affirmed,

HALLEY, V.C.J., and CORN, JOHN-
SON, and O’NEAL, JJ., concur. WELCH
and DAVISON, JJ., dissent.

224 —

ABBOTT et vir v. McCOY.
No. 35260. March 3, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 24, 1953.
254 P. 2d 997.

Walter Mathews, Cushing, for plain-
tiffs in error.

D. O. Cubbage, Cushing, and Guy L.
Horton, Stillwater, for defendant in er-
ror.

DAVISON, J. By this action, Blanche
Abbott and her husband, Fred Abbott,
as plaintiffs, sought to recover from
the defendant, N. C. McCoy, damages to
their cafe business, allegedly resulting
from the shutting off of light, air, and
free access to their place of business by
barricades and stacks of brick, lumber,
and other building material placed
around the cafe building by the defend-
ant. The parties appear here in the
same relative order as in the trial court
and will be so referred to.

For several years, the plaintiffs had
operated a cafe or restaurant in Cush-
ing, Oklahoma, in what was known as
the Harmon Building, when defendant
bought the building in December, 1949.
Plaintiffs’ lease expired with the cal-
endar year. They reached an agree~
ment with defendant to continue to oc-
cupy the premises under a month to
month tenancy. Shortly before July 1,
1950, the defendant gave the plaintiffs
a thirty-day notice to terminate the
tenancy. Immediately after August 1,
1950, defendant had plaintiffs served
with a notice to quit and then filed a
forcible entry and detainer action
against them. During those first days of
August, preparatory to rebuilding and
remodeling, the defendant stacked
brick, lumber, and building material
in front of and at the side of the cafe.
Late in the day, on August 8, 1950, while
the plaintiffs were visiting in a nearby
town, the defendant erected barricades
around and over the building materials

which shut off all light and ventilation
at the front of the building. Entrance
to the building could be made only
through a covered tunnel-like opening
some four to five feet wide and sixteen
feet long, extending from the front
door of the cafe almost to the street.

On August 19, 1950, plaintiffs filed
this action, seeking injunctive relief
against further interference with their
possession of the premises. Subse-
quently, an amended petition was filed,
wherein, in addition to injunctive re-
lief, plaintiffs sought to recover dam-
ages, both actual and punitive. Defend-
ant’s answer was coupled with a cross-
petition, seeking damages resulting
from plaintiffs holding over unlawfully
after the termination of their tenancy.
A trial of the issues to a jury resulted
in a verdict and judgment for defend-
ant upon the cross-petition in the sum
of $700, from which plaintiffs have per-
fected this appeal.

The argument of plaintiffs, as pre-
sented by the briefs, is not subdivided
and argued under separate propositions,
but the situation involved presents sev-
eral questions for determination.

The first question is that of plain-
tiffs’ right to recover. Plaintiffs’ case
was tried and has been briefed on the
sole theory that the defendant effected
a constructive eviction of plaintiffs,
causing them the alleged damages. But
their right to recover is dependent upon
the fact which is not here present.
There can be no constructive eviction
if the tenant remains in possession.
Plaintiffs cannot recover for construc-
tive eviction and at the same time
seek to enforce their right to occupy
the premises. In the case of Baptist
General Convention, ete, et al. v.
Wright et al., 136 Okla. 150, 276 P. 777,
this court held that:

“Any disturbance of the tenant’s pos-
session by the landlord or by some one
under his authority whereby the prem-
ises are rendered unfit for occupancy
for the purpose for which they were de-
mised, or the tenant is deprived of the
beneficial enjoyment of the premises

225

amounts to a constructive eviction, if.
the tenant abandons the premises within
a reasonable time.

“There can be no constructive evic-
tion without a surrender of possession
by the tenant; a tenant who continues
to occupy the premises for an unrea-
sonable length of time after the acts or
omissions that constitute a constructive
eviction waives the eviction and cannot
thereafter abandon the premises and
assert it.”

The next proposition, or defendant’s
right to recover, involves the determi-
nation of several questions. Plaintiffs
insist that defendant should not be per-
mitted to litigate in this action the mat-
ters set up in the cross-petition. The
governing statute is that part of 12 O.S.
1941 §273, as follows:

“The counterclaim *** must be one
existing in favor of a defendant and
against a plaintiff, *** arising out of
the contract or transaction set forth in
the petition as the foundation of the
plaintiffs claim or connected with the
subject of the action ***,”

This action as originally filed sought
to prevent the defendant from inter-
fering with plaintiffs’ alleged lawful
possession of the premises. The cross-
action sought damages resulting from
that possession, allegedly unlawful.
‘Thus, plaintiffs’ possession and the de-
termination of its lawfulness was the
foundation of the complaint and the
cross-complaint. They both, therefore,
arose out of the same transaction. In
the case of Ft. Worth Lead & Zinc Co.
v. Robinson et al., 89 Okla. 221, 215 P.
205, it was said,

“While the courts have not arrived at
a wholly satisfactory definition of the
term ‘transaction’ as used in the Code
provisions relating to counterclaim, it
is quite generally agreed that it is
broader in meaning than the word ‘con-
tract’ and includes torts; otherwise, it
would not have been employed. It is
clear that it was the intention of the
framers of the Code that the court in
one action might settle all matters in
controversy between the parties relat-
ing to the contract or transaction,

226

which is the foundation of the action.

“Therefore any cause of action, what-
ever its nature, arising out of the cause
of action alleged in the petition or con-
nected therewith, in favor of the de-
fendant and against plaintiff, is a
proper counterclaim.”

Plaintiffs further contend that the
counterclaim cannot be the basis of liti-
gation while a forcible detainer action
is pending. There seems to be no merit
in this contention in view of the former
decisions of this court to the effect that
the only issue, in a forcible entry and
detainer action, is the right of posses-
sion. However, we need not determine
the question because the record con-
tains no competent evidence that such
an action was pending or had been
tried. Nothing is included in the case-
made with regard thereto other than a
copy of a summons which was served
on the plaintiffs. Any statements in the
briefs about the forcible entry and de-
tainer action, except its mention by the
witnesses, is outside the record.

The remaining question goes to the
measure of defendant’s damage. The
trial court submitted to the jury only
two of the several items set out in de-
fendant’s cross-petition. Those were
the loss of rent from other tenants
whose tenancies were terminated by
the landlord relying upon the expecta-
tion that plaintiffs would surrender pos-
session when their tenancy terminated,
and the increase in the cost of remodel-
ing occasioned by delay in commencing
work as a result of plaintiffs holding
over. One witness, a builder, testified
that the removal of the stone around
the building would cost some $3,500,
which price had increased about ten
per cent, and, further, that there was
no market for the used stone. Defend-
ant had contracted with one Pounds
to do that work in return for the used
rock. Mr. Pounds died while plain-
tiffs were still in possession of the
premises some four months after the
expiration of their tenancy, and, thus,
defendant was deprived of the benefit
of that contract because of plaintiffs’
refusal to deliver possession.

In addi- ~

tion to that detriment, the defendant
was also damaged by a rise in labor
costs of some ten per cent. The testi-
mony on those points was sufficient to
sustain the verdict of the jury for $700
recovery. That such items were proper
elements in measuring the damages to
a landlord was the holding of the Cali-
fornia court in the case of Gwinn v.
Goldman, 57 Cal. A. 2d 393, 134 P. 2d
915, wherein a similar situation was
involved. In that jurisdiction, damages
could be recovered in the same action
wherein possession was sought. It was
there said:

“The court did not err in allowing
plaintiff special damages in the sum of
$200 as increased cost of remodeling
her building under contract with Henry

‘Brown, incurred on account of the fail-

ure of the defendant to surrender pos-
session of the property at the termina-
tion of his lease.”

There, the amount of increased cost
resulting from delay in beginning the
work was fixed by the remodeling con-
tract. Here, it was determined by the
jury from the testimony of the wit-
nesses. We see nothing unreasonable
in the amount allowed, in view of the
evidence of rise in cost of making re- |
pairs.

The judgment is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

HOUGH v. FOSTER et al.
No, 35255. Dec. 28, 1952.
Rehearirg Denied March 3, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second
Petition for Rehearing Denied
March 24, 1953.

254 P. 24 864.

Green, Farmer & Woolsey,
for plaintiff in error.

Tulsa,

Gilmer & Kennon and Dorothy
Young, Tulsa, for defendant in error,
Harold Foster.

BINGAMAN, J. This action was
brought by Claude Hough, guardian of

227

Claude Foster, an incompetent, against
Harold Foster and certain other de-
fendants, seeking to cancel certain con-
veyances from the mother of plaintiff
and defendant to the defendant Harold
Foster, on the ground that the mother,
at the time of the conveyances, was
mentally incompetent and the victim
of undue influence on the part of said
defendant, and seeking further to es-
tablish a trust in the property to the
extent of one-half thereof in favor of
plaintiff. The defendant in his answer
admits the conveyances of the prop-
erty to him by his mother but denies
that she was infirm and.incompetent
or acting under the influence of fraud,
undue influence or false representa-
tions. The trial court heard the evi-
dence of the parties and rendered judg-
ment denying the relief sought by
plaintiff, but held that from all the
evidence it concluded that the mother
intended that the plaintiff should be
taken care of out of the property, and
awarded plaintiff the sum of $1,800 to
pay for back expenses, including hos-
pital bills while in Tulsa, and the sum
of $90 per month from the date of the
judgment. Plaintiff appeals.

The record is voluminous, consisting
of one large volume of pleadings and
testimony and two large volumes of ex-
hibits, and it is impossible to set out
the evidence in detail. Undisputed facts
are as follows:

Plaintiff and defendant were the sons
of Willard and Minnie Foster, plaintiff
being the older of the two sons, Willard
Foster died, testate, in 1931, leaving
his entire property, which consisted of
a family residence in Tulsa and a con-

* siderable number of royalty interests

in various tracts of land in Oklahoma
and Texas, to his wife, Minnie Foster,
with a proviso in the will that should
she remarry each of his sons was to re-
ceive an undivided one-third interest in
the property; that both plaintiff and
defendant, at the suggestion of the at-
torney who probated the will, and act-
ing upon the belief that their mother,
who was then past 60 years of age,

228

would never remarry, signed a relin-
quishment of the provision in the will
giving them a one-third interest in the
property in the event she did remarry.
This was done at the suggestion of the
attorney in order that the handling of
the estate might be more easy and ex-
peditious. Plaintiff, ever since his early
youth, had been afflicted with a disa-
bility in his hip due to tuberculosis of
the joint, which disability necessitated
his having his hip operated upon and
drained at intervals. In 1927 he mar~
ried his second wife who divorced him
in the fall of 1932. By this wife he had
a son and by a family agreement ali-
mony of $75 a month was paid to the di-
vorced wife and $30 per month paid for
the support and maintenance of the
child. The divorced wife married again
in 1940 and thereupon the mother of
plaintiff discontinued payments of ali-
mony, but continued for a while to as-
sist in providing for the son. Later
these payments were also discontinued.

Plaintiff was addicted to the exces-
sive use of alcoholics, and for a time
was kept on a ranch in Arizona under
the supervision of the party operating
the ranch, apparently in order to pre-
vent his continued indulgence in alco-
holie liquors. Sometime in -1934 he
left the ranch and went to California,
where in 1935, he began living with
another woman in a common-law mar-
riage. Later, in 1948, he married this
woman by a legal ceremony. Early in
1942, on account of his mental condi-
tion, his common-law wife placed him
in a sanitarium, but later, when the
defendant refused to pay the expenses
of keeping him there, had him trans-
ferred to a state hospital for mental
cases. She testified that his condition
at that time was due to a nervous
breakdown caused by his worrying over
finances. It appears, however, both
from her letters and from statements
of the physicians at the state hospital,
that the plaintiffs condition at that
time was due to overindulgence in al-
eoholics, which had softened his brain
and made him the subject of various

hallucinations. He was in this hospital
in this condition at the time, in July,
1942, when his mother deeded the prop-
erty of the estate to defendant. In 1947
the hospital physicians advised defend-
ant that, in their judgment, his condi-
tion was permanent and incurable.

While plaintiff was in Arizona and
California and other places, the de-
fendant stayed at home assisting his
mother in the management of the es-
tate and looking after her. For a time
he worked, but later abandoned his
work and spent his entire time assist-
ing his mother in the management of
the estate and in looking after her. At
the time the estate of the deceased Wil-
lard Foster was probated and shortly
after the time when plaintiff and de-
fendant signed their renunciations of
their contingent interest in the will of
their father, she made a will giving
each of them an undivided one-half in-
terest in the property. At that time
both resided in the home. Later, in
1939, she made another will leaving
the plaintiff and defendant each one-
half of the property, and appointing de-
fendant and a minister, a long standing
friend of the family, as trustees for
plaintiff to administer his one-half of
the estate. At about the time she con-
veyed the property to defendant she
made a third will devising all the prop-
erty to defendant. In 1944, plaintiff was
paroled from the state hospital to the
custody of his wife in order that he
might go to Arizona to receive treat-
ment by a physician who had treated
him while he was on the ranch. In-
stead, he came to Tulsa, where the
mother signed a petition to have him
declared insane and he was found men-
tally incompetent and returned to Cali-
fornia to a state hospital. Up to that
time apparently his brother had con-
tributed every month or almost every
month to his wife to provide for plain-
tiffs comfort in addition to the provi-
sion made by the hospital, but after
that time he sent his contributions to
the hospital. Plaintiff was again pa-
roled at some time after the death of

his mother and come to Tulsa and in-
stituted this action by his guardian.

During all this time defendant had
remained in Tulsa looking after the es-
tate and caring for his mother. The
mother transferred her account in the
bank to defendant and her jointly and
thereafter transferred it entirely to de-
fendant, who from that time apparent-
ly assumed complete charge of all her
affairs and business of every kind. At
the time of her death the mother was
past 80 years of age.

Plaintiff to reverse the judgment of
the lower court makes five contentions.
The first is that where the lawyer pro-
bating the estate persuaded the two
sons to renounce their contingent in-
terest in the estate by telling them that
the widow would leave the property in
equal shares to them, and subsequent-
ly a will was made by the widow which
divided the property equally between
the sons, the later conveyance to one
son of all the property was a violation
of the agreement, and the property
should be impressed with a trust for
the beneficial interest of plaintiff to
the extent of one-half thereof. In sup-
port of this contention plaintiff cites
Bunte v. Hasley, 122 Okla. 81, 251 P.
591; Stricker v. Billingsley, 169 Okla.
145, 36 P. 2d 474; Perry v. Shaver, 101
Okla. 248, 225 P. 359, and many deci-
sions from other jurisdictions. Exami-
nation of these cases, however, dis-
closes either a contract between the
parties, or an understanding between
them, by which the parties claiming
the existence of the trust were assured
that their interest in the property would
be protected and vested in them at a
later date. The evidence in the in-
stant case wholly fails to establish any-
thing of this sort. While the attorney
testified that he represented to both
sons that it was extremely improbable
the mother would remarry, in which
they agreed with him, and that they
would share equally in the estate at
her death, he testified that he had no
authority from the mother to make
such statement, but that same was

229

merely his conclusion from his knowl-
edge of the mother’s affection for both
of the sons, and that at that time she
did not inform him of her intention to
make the will which she shortly there-
after made. Thus it is seen that the
statements of the attorney, according
to his own testimony, were not to be
attributed to any agreement with the
mother, but were based solely upon
his own judgment. It further appears
that the contingent interest of the sons
was so remote and the occurrence of
the contingency so extremely improb-
able in their judgment that they in re-
ality relinquished nothing of value, and
realized they were not at the time of
signing the renunciations. We find in
the record no evidence of any agree-
ment between the mother and the sons
or between the defendant and plaintiff
which supports the contention of plain-
tiff.

The second contention is that where
a voluntary conveyance or gift from an
elderly parent to one son is not a just
or reasonable disposition of the prop-
erty when the value of the estate, and
the age and physical condition of the
parent, and the circumstances sur-
rounding the gift, suggest fraud and un-
due influence, fraud and undue influ-
ence will be presumed and the burden
is on the donee to overcome the pre-
sumption of fraud and undue influence.
This contention is likewise untenable,
since there is no evidence in the record
of any circumstances suggesting fraud
or undue influence exercised by the
defendant over his mother. The great
weight of the testimony is, that at the
time of the conveyances the mother
was mentally competent in every re-
spect and in full possession of her fac-
ulties; that the defendant had for many
years looked after her and assisted in
the transacting of the family business;
that their relations were close and af-
fectionate, and that she knew at the
time the situation of plaintiff and be-
lieved that the defendant would take
care of the plaintiff in so far as he
was able to do so. She did not make
this a condition in the transfer of the

230

estate to him, but left that entirely to
his own judgment. The evidence all
shows that after the conveyance of the
properties to him the mother continued
to live in the family residence and the
son looked after her welfare, handled
her business affairs and in every way
he was able shielded her from further
knowledge of the condition of plaintiff
which would cause her unrest or grief.
This care of his mother and his con-
cern over her welfare continued unre-
mittingly as long as she lived. Defend-
ant testified that he was unable to send
plaintiff or plaintiff's wife the amounts
they requested because the
from the estate was insufficient after
providing for his mother’s and his own
needs, and he was assured by the hos-
pital authorities in California that good
care was being taken of the plaintiff in
the institution, and that only a small
amount to buy him cigarettes was ne-
cessary to be contributed. He testified
that his refusal to pay the hospital bill
incurred by plaintiff in Tulsa was due
to the fact that plaintiff had filed this
action, and that he refused to pay un-
der compulsion, but that he fully in-
tended to provide for his brother’s liv-
ing expenses subsequent to the deter-
mination of the action if the action
were decided in defendant’s favor. We
find nothing to substantiate the charge
of fraud or undue influence or of the
presumption thereof.

The third contention is that where
a donor conveys her property to one
son to the exclusion of another, but, in
a separate affidavit made to assist the
son to whom the property was given
to avoid being drafted for military serv-
ice, states that she had transferred her
property to him so that he might read-
ily handle all of her affairs and take
care of his invalid brother, an express
trust is created. From the evidence it
appears that defendant, who was a vet-
eran of World War 1, was called by
the draft board in World War 2, and that
in support of his attempt to avoid being
drafted his mother made an affidavit
that defendant handled all her business

income -

affairs, and looked after her son Claude,
who was an invalid and needed con-
stant supervision; that he was the only
person she had to attend to her affairs
and the only relative capable of looking
after her invalid son, and that at pres-
ent she was transferring all of her
property to the defendant in order to
enable him as head of the family to
more readily handle all affairs. In that
connection defendant stated in his ques-
tionnaire that he had an invalid brother
whom he had taken care of since 1930,
and that he had numerous tasks to do
for his brother’s son who was then
some thirteen years of age; that while
plaintiff had been necessarily confined
in an institution his improved condition
and the financial responsibility neces-
sitated defendant’s returning this bro-
ther to his home, and that his mother
could not live in the same house with
plaintiff unless defendant was in Tulsa
where he could have charge of the
situation. We see nothing in these state-
ments which in our judgment was suffi-
cient to create an express trust, but the
statements of the mother evidence her
reliance upon the defendant and her
feeling that he would care for his in-
valid brother, which, as pointed out in
a preceding portion of this opinion, the
evidence shows he had done to the best
of his ability and continued to do down
to the filing of this action.

The fourth contention is that where
the conveyance made by the widow of
all her estate to one of her sons, but the
facts and circumstances and a family
arrangement show that the two sons
were to share equally in the estate of
the mother, and the son who received
the property declines to share with the
other, the court will create a trust in
equity by operation of law; in other
words, a constructive or resulting trust.
Plaintiff cites Wright v. Logan, 179
Okla. 350, 65 P. 2d 1217; Tolon v. John-
son, 104 Okla. 201, 230 P, 865; Reigel
v. Wood, 110 Okla. 279, 229 P. 556, and
other similar cases in support of this
contention. We are unable to agree,
and do not consider these cases appli-

Po

cable to the instant case. While it is
true that the widow remained in the
home, and that for a time after the
transfers to defendant moneys received
from the properties went into a joint
account in the bank along with some
annuity insurance payments which she
received, it is evident that this was
done to enable her to write checks for
her living expenses and such other ex-
penses as she incurred, in which the de-
fendant apparently gave her free hand.
We find nothing in that arrangement
evincing an intention on the part of the
mother that the plaintiff should share
equally in the property so transferred.
In our judgment, the situation simply
reflects the trust and confidence which
the mother had in the defendant, and
which, as pointed out above, was whol-
ly justified.

The last contention is that the judg-
ment of the court that defendant should
only pay his brother the sum of $80
per month, and its finding that it was
the intention of the donor of the prop-
erty that the plaintiff should at least
have enough money to keep him from
want is contrary to the weight of the
evidence. The trial court based its judg-
ment on the fact that that sum of mon-
ey would sustain the life of an ordi-
nary citizen, and that it was sufficient
to pay the ordinary living expenses of
plaintiff, and that when she transferred
the property, the mother did so believ-
ing that the defendant would take care
of the plaintiff at least to that extent,
but left the amount of money to be
given plaintiff and the extent of the
care to be taken of him by the de-
fendant solely to the judgment of the
defendant.

The finding by the trial court that
the mother left the amount of money
to be given plaintiff and the extent of
care to be taken of him by the defendant
solely to the judgment of the defendant
is, we think, supported by the great
weight of the evidence. Whether the
amount fixed by the court as a monthly
payment was sufficient is, in our judg-
ment, doubtful, and we think that the

231

sum should be increased to at least
$100 per month. Whether the trial court
was justified in rendering this judg~
ment against the defendant is a matter
which we need not determine, since de-
fendant has not cross-appealed.

Careful study of the record convinces
us that the judgment of the trial court,
in all save as to the amount above set
forth, is not clearly against the weight
of the evidence, but is in accord with
the great weight thereof.

The judgment is modified to require
defendant to pay plaintiff or his guard-
ian out of the income from the estate
of his deceased mother the sum of $100
per month, and, as modified, is af-
firmed.

HALLEY, V. C. J., and WELCH,
CORN, and DAVISON, JJ., concur.
GIBSON, JOHNSON, and O’NEAL, JJ.,
dissent.

SNIDER et al. v. SNIDER.

No. 33916. March 24, 1953.

255 P. 2d 278.

232

Carder & Carder, Hobart, for plain-
tiffs in error.

R. Place Montgomery, Hobart, and
Emmett Sasseen, Cordell, for defendant
in error.

ARNOLD, J. This is a suit to quiet
title as against a stipulation for the
payment of royalty entered into by
owners of undivided mineral interests
and directed to the oil lessee dividing
royalty payments on a different basis
than that of ownership. The undisput-
ed facts are:

At the time of his death, and at the
time of the execution of the stipulation,
Elias F. Snider owned an undivided
one-fourth of the surface and an un-
divided one-fourth of 80 acres of the
minerals under the southwest quarter
of section 10, township 7 north, range
17 west, Kiowa county, and his son,
Louis Fort Snider, owned the remain-
ing undivided three-fourths of the sur-
face and three-fourths of the 80 acres
of minerals under said land. One-half
or 80 acres of the minerals had been
sold by father and son prior to the
father’s death. Said land was devel-
oped for oil which was being purchased
by the defendant Johnson Oil Refining
Company, a corporation. The father
and son made a stipulation as to pay-
ment of royalty accruing to them, as
follows:

“Whereas, the Undersigned, Elias F.
Snider and Louis Fort Snider, are own-
ers of the surface right and an un-
divided mineral right, interest and title
in and to the following described real
estate, to wit:

“The Southwest Quarter of Section 10
in Township 7 North, Range 17 West
of the Indian Meridian, Kiowa County,
Oklahoma, and whereas it is desired to
provide for the payment of royalty from
actual production of oil, gas, or any
other mineral thereon.

+ “Now, Therefore, it is agreed be-
tween the parties that without regard
to the actual ownership of said land
and right in said undivided mineral in-
terest that all royalty shall be paid and
divided among the parties as follows:

“That there shall be paid to the said
Elias F. Snider three-fifths of all such
royalty payments and to the said Louis
Fort Snider two-fifths of all such
royalty payments. The wives of the
respective parties being Nellie R. Snider
the wife of Elias F. Snider and Clara
Snider the wife of Louis Fort Snider
have joined in the execution of this
stipulation and agreement to avoid any
question arising as to homestead, com-
munity or any other arising questions
as to rights in said real estate.

“In Witness Whereof, the parties have
hereunto set their hands this 2ist day
of January, 1946.”

The Sniders abided by this agree-
ment and accepted payment of royalties
according to the terms of the foregoing
stipulation until the date of the death
of Elias. Shortly after the death of
his father Louis wrote a letter to John-
son Oil Refining Company notifying it
that he was canceling the division or-
der or stipulation theretofore executed
by him and his father and directing it
thereafter to pay royalties accruing in
accordance with the ownership of the
land. Thereafter, the oil company im-
pounded the three-fifths of the royal-
ties which had theretofore been paid to
Elias, the father. Louis, the son, then
brought this suit against his step-
mother, Nellie Snider, surviving widow
of Elias, and Thomas M. Sparks, admin-
istrator of Elias’s estate, and the oil
company above mentioned, seeking to
cancel the stipulation above quoted, al-
leging that it was void for three rea-
sons.

(1) It was made and entered into
without consideration.

(2) It has no specific period of dura-
tion and is terminable at the pleasure
of either party.

(3) It terminated upon the death of
Elias Snider.

Cancellation of the instrument was
prayed in conjunction with a prayer to
quiet the title of plaintiff to the three-
fourths of the minerals owned by him
and a prayer that the oil company ac~

count for all royalties impounded by it
and that same be paid according to
the ownership of the minerals.

Johnson Oil Refining Company an-
swered admitting that it was the pur-
chaser of the oil produced on the land;
and referring to the stipulation as a
division order it alleged that it had
been signed by Elias F. Snider as to
three-fifths of the royalty interest
owned by the Sniders and by Louis
Fort Snider as to two-fifths of said roy-
alty interest, and that it was impound-
ing the royalties accruing to the in-
terest of Elias under said division or-
der until the controversy as to owner-
ship thereof should be settled, that its
only interest was that of purchaser of
the oil from said premises. The other
defendants, Nellie Snider and Thomas
M. Sparks, filed no answer.

At the trial of the cause the stipula-
tion was introduced in evidence and
Louis, the plaintiff, testified generally
to the state of facts above set forth
and further testified that his father
paid him no consideration for the exe-
cution of the above-quoted stipulation.
Defendants Nellie Snider and Thomas
M. Sparks, administrator, objected to
this testimony by him that there was
no consideration paid for the execution
of the stipulation on the ground that
Louis was an incompetent witness un-
der 12 O.S. 1951 §384, commonly known
as the “Dead Man” statute.

Nellie Snider in an effort to show con-
sideration for the execution of the stip-
ulation testified very indefinitely. Her
attorney finally and apparently in lieu
of her testimony designed to prove con-
sideration made an offer of proof as
follows:

“Come now the defendants and offer
to prove, if permitted, that as a matter
of fact they offer to show that Elias
F, Snider purchased with his own funds
the north 80 acres of land herein in-
volved and made it a gift to his son,
and that they jointly inherited the
south eighty by reason of which Elias
F, Snider acquired forty acres which
he owned at the time of his death,

233

and plaintiff owned eighty acres by
gift and forty acres by inheritance, and
that in addition thereto that he also
gave him the amount of $800 over and
above one-half of the royalty sold.”

The offer was objected to, the objec-
tion was sustained, and exceptions to
the ruling taken by Nellie Snider. If
the testimony had been received to sup-
port the offer made it would have prov-
en only that Elias had at some time in
the past given Louis 80 acres of land
and $800 in cash. Such proof alone
would not constitute proof of considera-
tion for the execution of the stipulation.
This is the only theory on which it is
claimed that the proof would have
been competent. No other evidence was
introduced by either side.

The court entered judgment cancel-
ing the stipulation as to payment of
royalty as of the date of the death of
Elias F. Snider and fixed the mineral
interests owned by Louis Fort Snider
and his father’s estate according to
their undisputed ownership at the time
of the execution of the stipulation.
Johnson Oil Refining Company was or-
dered to pay all royalty theretofore
impounded and thereafter to accrue to”
the court clerk to be disbursed on the
further order of the court. From order
overruling motion for new trial, de-
fendants Nellie R. Snider and Thomas
M. Sparks, administrator, bring this
appeal. The oil company complied with
the order of the court and for this
reason was not made a party to this
appeal.

Plaintiffs in error, defendants below,
here contend that the purported con-
tract or stipulation constitutes a gift
inter vivos; that said purported con-
tract or stipulation constitutes a con-
veyance of mineral interest or assign-
ment of royalties in perpetuity and is
not subject to cancellation or revoca-
tion; that Louis Fort Snider was an in-
competent witness under the “Dead
Man” statute, supra, to testify that he
received nothing of value for the exe-
cution of the stipulation here in ques-
tion; in this connection, they argue that

234

the evidence of Louis that there was
no consideration for the execution of
the stipulation should have been strick~
en as was sought by defendants Nellie
Snider and Thomas M. Sparks, admin-
istrator, leaving proof of consideration
presumptively by 15 O.S. 1951 §114,
Though error of the court in rejecting
the offer of proof above quoted is set
forth in the motion for new trial and
its rejection is set forth among the as-
signments of error here, no argument
is made that the rejection of the offered
testimony constitutes reversible error.

Defendants did not plead below that
this stipulation was a gift inter vivos
and offered no testimony of any kind
to support any such contention. On
the contrary, an offer of proof was
made by Nellie Snider designed to show
consideration for the execution of the
stipulation as hereinbefore indicated.
Defendants cannot for the first time
present this defense on appeal. Staner
v. McGrath, 174 Okla. 454, 51 P.2d 795.

It is certain that this stipulation is
not a conveyance of mineral interest.
Nowhere does there appear a granting
clause of any kind in the stipulation.
Nor is it an assignment of royalties in
perpetuity. There is no word of as-
signment in the instrument, no duration
stated, no clause making the contract
binding upon the heirs, personal rep-
resentatives, or assigns of the parties.

The purpose of the instrument and
the intention of the parties with refer-
ence thereto is easily seen within the
four corners of the instrument itself.
It was a stipulation between father and
son designed to authorize the payment
by the oil company of accruing royal-
ties on a different basis than that of
ownership by the parties. In practical
effect, it is a division order and as
such subject to termination by either
party. Whether there was or was not
consideration for the execution of the
stipulation would not affect the right
to terminate upon notice where no spec-
ified duration is set forth in the division
order and no proof is made as to dura-

tion. For analogous reading see Mar-
larnee v. Pauline Oil & Gas Co., 133
Okla. 192, 271 P. 937; Welch v. Pauline
Oil & Gas Co., 133 Okla. 122, 271 P.
651. It is not necessary to pass upon
the question of whether it was error to
permit Louis to testify that his father
paid him no consideration because the
judgment on its face shows it was based
upon the court’s determination that the
death of Elias canceled the stipulation.
The presumption of consideration for
the written instrument given by the
statute, supra, if applicable here, would
have no effect upon the right to ter-
minate where no duration is stated or
proven.

At the death of the father the division
order theretofore executed by him ter-
minated. At the time of his death title
to the minerals in that land owned by
him immediately vested in his heirs.
Accruing royalties thereafter could not
be paid to any other person than the
heirs or their representative. A stip-
ulation to pay royalties on a different
basis than ownership would not be bind-
ing on the new owners, where no pe~
riod of duration was made in the in-
strument which might be binding upon
them. It is evident that the trial court
took this view of the instrument in its
judgment terminating the stipulation
as of the date of the death of the father.

Affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

a
PEARSON et ux. v. LOGAN.
No. 34529. March 24, 1953.
255 P. 2d 255.

Le 235

Elam & Crowley, Enid, for plaintiffs
in error.

J. E. Falkenberg, Enid, and D. W.
Falkenberg, Medford, for defendant in
error.

PER CURIAM. On November 3, 1945,
Melba I. Logan, the defendant in er-
ror herein, filed suit in the district
court of Garfield county, Oklahoma,
against Lewis E. Logan, seeking a
divorce, the petition alleging residence;
cruel treatment; that the property
jointly owned by the parties was home-
stead, and asking for a divorce, cus-
tody of a minor child, and that she be
awarded the real estate as alimony
and support and maintenance of the
child. Service was obtained by publi-
cation and thereafter Lewis E. Logan
came into court and moved to dismiss

for want of jurisdiction, and thereafter
filed an answer still objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court and deny-
ing the requisite resident in the State
of Oklahoma to entitle the plaintiff to
sue for a divorce,

Thereafter, and on May 28, 1946, the
matter was tried by the district court,
which denied plaintiff a divorce for the
reason that the plaintiff in the divorce
action had not been a resident of Okla~
homa for more than one year prior to
the time she filed her petition, but in
the journal entry of judgment the court
held that it had continuing jurisdiction
to make orders in the case and required
the defendant to pay plaintiffs attor-
neys, awarded custody of the minor
child to the plaintiff, visitation rights
to the defendant husband, and ordered
defendant husband to pay child support
payments to the plaintiff for the bene-
fit of the minor child.

On July 12, 1946, the husband of the
defendant in error, who was the de-
fendant in the divorce case above men-
tioned, made, executed and delivered to
Clarence W. Pearson, the plaintiff in
error herein, a warranty deed to the
east forty-two feet (42’) of lot five (5),
block five (5), City View Second addi-
tion to the city of Enid, Garfield county,
Oklahoma, which was duly filed of rec-
ord on the 19th day of July, 1946, and
it is this property that is the subject
matter of this appeal.

Thereafter, and on the 22nd day of
July, 1946, the defendant in error Mel-
ba I. Logan, filed a motion for a new
trial in the divorce case and a copy
thereof was served upon the attorney
of record for the defendant Lewis E.
Logan, by delivering a copy thereof to
the attorney, and this was apparently
in an attempt to comply with the re~
quirements of Title 12, O.S.A. §655.
Thereafter, and on the 24th day of July,
1946, an order was entered setting the
motion for hearing on August 19, 1946.
On the latter date the court entered an
order granting a new trial, and there-
after and on October 26, 1946, the court

236

granted plaintiff leave to file a supple-
mental petition and same was filed
November 2, 1946. On the 8th day of
November, 1946, judgment was entered
awarding the property involved to the
plaintiff in the divorce action, Melba
I. Logan, as well as granting her other
relief. Thereafter the defendant Lewis
E. Logan, on the 22nd day of Novem-
ber, 1946, filed a special appearance
and motion to quash the judgment and
said motion was sustained on February
19, 1947, because of insufficient notice
to the defendant of the setting. There-
after defendant filed his answer to the
supplemental petition, and on March 19,
1947, the court entered judgment in said
cause, again awarding the above de-
scribed property to the plaintiff in the
divorce case, Melba I. Logan, as well
as other relief.

On July 31, 1947, Melba I. Logan, de~
fendant in error herein, filed suit in
the district court of Garfield county,
Oklahoma, same being case No. 23252
against Clarence W. Pearson and Au~
drey M. Pearson, husband and wife, the
grantees in the deed above referred to
from Lewis E. Logan, seeking by her
petition to quiet title to the above de~
scribed property, alleging that the de~
fendants claim some right, title or in-
terest therein adverse to the plaintiff
which constitutes a cloud upon the title
of the plaintiff and seeks removal of
said cloud. The defendants answered
that Lewis E. Logan was the owner of
the property at the time of making the
conveyance and that the decree of di-
vorce awarding the property to Melba
I. Logan was null and void.

The case was tried on September 6,
1949, resulting in a judgment in favor
of the defendant in error herein, Mel-
ba I. Logan, decreeing her to be the
legal owner of the real estate and quiet-
ing her title as against the claim of the
defendants.

Plaintiff in error contends that the
only title held by Melba I. Logan was
by virtue of the purported decree of di-
vorce dated March 19, 1947, and that
such purported decree is void on the

judgment roll for want of jurisdiction.
Attorneys for the plaintiff in error ar-
gue at length in their brief that the
defendant in error was not a resident
of Garfield county, Oklahoma, on the
day she filed her petition and that in
such a case, where a divorce is denied
for want of jurisdiction, that the trial
court did not have authority to subse-
quently adjudicate the property rights
of the parties. The trial court held, and
we believe it to be established from the
evidence, that the defendant in error
and plaintiff in the divorce case was a
resident of Garfield county, Oklahoma,
on the date of filing her petition and the
divorce was: denied, not because she
was not a resident of the State of Okla~
homa, but because she had not been a
resident one year preceding the date of
the filing of her petition, and the court
did not err in holding that it had au-
thority to deny a divorce, but continu-
ing jurisdiction over the case for the
purpose of awarding child support pay-
ments, custody, visitation rights, etc.
In the journal entry in the divorce case,
the judge said:

“The court considers and holds that
he has jurisdiction to make orders in
this cause. * * *”

This court has held in Turlington v.
Turlington, 189 Okla. 352, 117 P. 2d
527, that in a divorce action, even if the
divorce is refused, the court may re-
tain jurisdiction to grant alimony or
specific property. In this case, the
court, in discussing the two Oklahoma
eases of Reed v. Reed, 119 Okla. 5,
246 P. 413, and Privett v. Privett, 93
Okla. 171, 220 P. 348, where a divorce
had been denied and the court later
granted a divorce and divided the
property, said:

“In these cases a prior proceed-
ing had been commenced by the par-
ties in the same court and a divorce
had been denied, after which, in a sub-
sequent proceeding, a divorce decree
was granted. It was pointed out in both
cases that the court granting the di-
vorce had the right to adjudicate the
property rights at that time. The fact

that there had been a prior adjudica-
tion of the property rights under the
provisions of section 669, Okla. Statutes
1931, 12 Okla. Statutes Anno. section
1275, when the divorce was denied, did
not prevent a subsequent adjudication
of all of the property rights. . .”

See, also, in this connection the case
of Jones v. Jones, 63 Okla. 208, 164 P.
463. The statute authorizing the court
to divide property where a divorce is
refused grants the district court the
right to divide property of parties to a
divorce suit in any case wherein a di-
vorce is not granted for any reason,
and the word “refused” being used in
a broad sense. Woodroof v. Barrington,
199 Okla. 125, 184 P. 2d 771.

And in the case of Bruce v. Bruce,
141 Okla. 160, 285 P. 30, our court has
held that an order of the trial court,
with respect to the custody or mainte-
nance of the minor children, is never
final in the sense that it is unchange-
able and it is final only in the sense that
it is appealable and the trial court re-
tains control over the case for the sup-
port of the children.

Since the court exercised its author-
ity to continue jurisdiction over the di-
vorce case upon the divorce being de-
nied, and the statement in the divorce
decree to the effect that it was contin-
uing jurisdiction over the parties, such
was notice to the whole world of the
status of the divorce case, and under
such circumstances the doctrine of lis
pendens attaches and the plaintiff in
error herein does not become an in-
nocent purchaser for value without
notice.

In Buffalo v. Letson, 33 Okla. 261,
124 P. 968, the court held that where
a husband against whom there is pend-
ing a suit for divorce transferred real
estate to a party who takes the same
with full knowledge of the rights of the
wife, such a transfer is void.

It is well settled in this state, and a
fundamental rule of real estate law,
that the grantee of real property ac-
quires no greater title of property than

237

that of his grantor, and a purchaser of
real estate which is involved in divorce
litigation acquires no title to real es-
tate if on the final disposition thereof
the property is not awarded to his
grantor.

Plaintiffs in error argue at length
that the petition for a new trial was
not served in accordance with the
statutory requirements for such service,
but we find it unnecessary to pass upon
this question as subsequent to the serv-
ice of the petition for a new trial upon
the attorney of record for the defend-
ant in the divorce case, the defendant
came into court and moved to set aside
the judgment rendered upon the sup-
plemental petition, and after the judg-
ment was set aside, filed an answer in
the case. In addition, the title of this
defendant in error in the real estate in-
volved, which is derived from the di-’
vorce decree dated March 19, 1947, is
strengthened by virtue of the fact that
the property herein involved was home-
stead and it is well settled law that
any attempted conveyance of home-
stead property by a husband, whether a
divorce case is pending or not, is inef-
fective against his nonconsenting wife,
and any attempt on the part of the
husband to convey the homestead with-
out the consent of the wife renders the
conveyance void. All of the cases de-
cided in Oklahoma regarding home~
stead and the inability of one spouse
to convey without the consent of the
other is based primarily on the Con-
stitution of Oklahoma, art. 12, §2, which
provides in part as follows:

“Nor shall the owner, if married, sell
the homestead without the consent of
his or her spouse.”

The record of the trial below con~
tains sufficient evidence to justify the
trial court in holding the property in-
volved was homestead and his decision
on this point will not be disturbed by
this court.

Plaintiffs in error herein seriously
urge in their brief that the defendant in
error, Melba I. Logan, must rely upon

238

the strength of her title and not upon
the weakness of that of her adversary,
and therefore the question of the home-
stead characteristics and doctrine of
lis pendens cannot be urged in an at-
tempt to defeat the deed from Lewis E.
Logan to the plaintiff in error. It is not
necessary for this court to pass upon
this proposition since we have held that
the divorce decree awarding the prop-
erty to Melba I. Logan was regular and
valid in all respects, but it should be
pointed out here that the défendant in
error, Melba I. Logan, in her action to
quiet title, has alleged and satisfactor-
ily proved that she is the owner of the
legal title thereto and the only require-
ment in this regard made by the de-
cisions of this court is that the plaintiff,
suing to quiet title or remove a cloud
upon the title, need not have title para-
mount to all others, but must at least
have some interest in title; that interest
must be paramount to the claim of its
adversary. Robertson v. Knighten, 192
Okla. 678, 139 P, 2d 601.

When this property was purchased by
the defendant in error and her husband,
Lewis E. Logan, and they treated same
as their homestead, the property took
on all of the features and attributes of
homestead property and color of title
immediately attached to the defendant
in error, and our courts have repeat-
edly held that in such cases there is a
strong presumption that the homestead
feature remains attached until clear
and convincing proof to the contrary
is shown. Lane v. Amis Brothers, 171
Okla. 593, 43 P. 2d 73.

Thereupon, upon the attaching of the
homestead characteristics to this prop-
erty, the defendant in error acquired
color of title and she thereby became
at least an equitable owner of the
property and she may bring suit to
quiet title on the equitable interest
owned by her, Bridwell v. Goeske, 200
Okla. 244, 192 P. 2d 656, and the claim
of the homestead rights by her is not a
reliance upon the weakness of her ad~
versary’s title, but is merely a strength-
ening of the title acquired by her in

the divorce decree dated March 19,
1947, and the same is true regarding
her attempt to invoke the doctrine of lis
pendens, and the setting up of the home-
stead characteristics on the property
and a showing that the deed from her
husband Lewis E. Logan to the plaintiff
in error was tainted with lis pendens is
not a reliance upon the weakness of
the adversary’s title, but was merely
a carrying forward of the burden of
proof by the defendant in error in es~
tablishing her title in and to the prop-
erty.

The record is silent as to whether
the plaintiff in error made an investi-
gation prior to obtaining the convey-
ance from Lewis E. Logan as to the
status of the divorce case between Lew-
is E. Logan and defendant in error
herein; whether an investigation was
made as to the rights of persons in
possession; whether or not the prop-
erty was or had been claimed as home-
stead property of the parties (although
the deed from Lewis E. Logan to the
plaintiff in error would indicate that
they were conscious of the homestead
rights of the sellers of the property
since the deed from Logan to plaintiff
in error was a warranty deed with re-
lease of homestead and recited that
the grantor released and waived his
right of homestead), and common pru-
dence would have dictated that the
purchasers should investigate the pos-
sibility of a claim of homestead by the
other spouse and the hazards of ob-
taining a conveyance by one spouse
only where a divorce case was pend-
ing and where in the divorce case the
court held that it had continuing juris-
diction to make orders in the cause.

For these reasons, we hold that the
plaintiff in error did not become inno-
cent purchasers for value without no~
tice, and title to the property in question
should be quieted in the defendant in
error, Melba I. Logan, and the judg-
ment of the district court should be af-
firmed. It is so ordered.

This Court acknowledges the serv-
ices of Attorneys Harry L. Dyer, El-

don J. Dick, and James B. Diggs, who
as Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
Court.

HALLEY, C.J.. JOHNSON, V.
and CORN, ARNOLD, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., concur, DAVISON, O’NEAL,
and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur in results.

MORRISON et al. v. FRY et al.
No. 35334. March 24, 1953.
255 P. 2d 270.

Wilson & Leach and Cleo Wilson,
Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.

Lewis J. Bicking, Co. Atty., and
Hugh Webster, Asst. Co. Atty., Tulsa,
for defendants in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. The plaintiffs in
error and defendants in error occupy

239

the same relative positions here as in
the trial court and hereafter they will
be referred to as they there appeared.

There is no dispute as to the facts,
as the parties herein submitted the
cause to the court upon an agreed
statement as to the facts involved,
which are substantially that the plain-
tiffs are the court reporters in the court
of common pleas of Tulsa county, Okla-
hhoma; that they instituted this action
in mandamus to compel the court
clerk, the board of county commission-
ers and excise board of Tulsa county,
Oklahoma, to pay the full amount of
the salaries they contend is due them
as such court reporters under the pro-
visions of H. B. No. 222 of the 23rd Ses-
sion of the Oklahoma Legislature, as-
serting that under the terms thereof
they are entited to be paid $3,900 per
year, payable monthly; that $250 each
per month is to be paid from the county
general fund and $75 each per month
shall be paid from the county court
fund of Tulsa county, Oklahoma. H.B.
No. 222, Session Laws 1951, p. 335, Title
19, §180.42f, 0.8. 1951 provides:

“The salary of each, of the official
court reporters of the County Courts
and Courts of Common Pleas in all
counties of the State of Oklahoma hav-
ing a population in excess of one hun-
dred and ninety thousand (190,000)
people, according to the last decennial
census, shall be Three Thousand Nine
Hundred Dollars ($3,900.00) per annum.
Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) of
which shall be payable monthly from
the general fund of the county under
the provisions of the statutes of this
State, and Nine Hundred Dollars
($900.00) of which shall be payable
monthly from the court funds of the
county in which said court is located.”

It is agreed that Tulsa county has a
population in excess of 250,000.

The plaintiffs each filed separate
claims for salaries each month after
the Ist of May, 1951, when the above
act became effective. Each was paid
$250 a month from the general fund,
but the claims against the court funds

240

for $75 were denied and payment there-
of refused though there were funds
available to pay such claims.

The trial court refused to issue a
writ of mandamus because the above-
quoted act was deemed invalid and in
violation of §§46 and 59 of art. 5 of the
‘Constitution of Oklahoma.

From this action of the trial court,
plaintiffs appeal.

The constitutional provisions referred
to in the court’s order denying plain-
tiffs relief are § 46, art. 5, which pro-
hibits the passage of a local or special
law regulating the affairs of the county
and §59, art. 5, which requires the uni-
form operation of general laws and
prohibits a special law where a general
one can be made applicable.

The paramount question to be de-
termined is: Was H.B. No. 222, supra,
invalid because of §§46 and 59 of art. 5
of the Oklahoma Constitution? We
think not.

These objections were raised in
Simpson v. Butts, 99 Okla. 168, 226 P.
332, and therein this court cited, quoted
and approved the rule announced in
Levine v. Allen, 96 Okla. 252, 221 P,
771. There we said:

“Defendant first complains that the
court erred in overruling his demurrer
to the plaintiff’s petition, the grounds
of said demurrer being that the court of
common pleas had no jurisdiction to
proceed with the action for the reason
that the act creating the said court of
common pleas of Tulsa county is re-
pugnant to the Constitution of the State
of Oklahoma and wholly void. This
court has recently had occasion to pass
upon the constitutionality of chapter
51, Session Laws 1923, which is the
act creating the court of common pleas
of Tulsa county, and has upheld the
validity of the act with the exception
of section 2 thereof. In Levine et al. v.
Alien et al. 96 Okla. 252, 221 P. 771,
it is said:

“ Section 1, of chapter 51, Sess, Laws
1923, creating a court of common pleas
in all counties of the state having a
city therein of over seventy-two thou-

sand and not more than ninety thou-
sand population, according to the last
preceding Federal census, defining its
jurisdiction and prescribing the number
and qualification of its judges does not
violate sec. 59, art. 5, Williams’ Consti-
tution.’ ”

In Lowden v. Oklahoma County Ex-
cise Board, 186 Okla. 706, 100 P. 2d 448,
we held that the statutes creating of-
fices of public defender and probation
officers and providing that the statutes
shall apply only to counties having a
population of 200,000 or more and con-
taining a city of 175,000 population or
more, do not violate the section of the
Constitution providing that laws of a
general nature shall have uniform op-
eration throughout the state, and that
where a general law can be made ap-
plicable no special law shall be enacted,
notwithstanding that the statutes were
in fact applicable to only one county.

In Bell v. Crum, 188 Okla. 67, 106 P.
2d 518, we held that the statute author-
izing additional salary for district
judges in districts having population in
excess of 200,000 and containing a city
with population exceeding 100,000 did
not violate constitutional provision re-
quiring laws of general nature to have
a uniform operation and prohibiting en-
actment of special laws where a gen-
eral law can be made applicable, not-
withstanding that statute might result
in higher salaries for judges in such
certain other districts. Therein we al-
so held that the Legislature possessed
power to provide for a fund out of
which salaries, or a part of the salaries,
of district judges, shall be paid, and
that such salaries or parts thereof be
paid out of a court fund comprised of
fees, fines and forfeitures belonging to
the respective counties.

In Bell v. Crum, supra, referring to
the constitutionality of payment of ad-
ditional salary of the district judges
from court funds of certain counties,
we said:

“A more serious question is sug-
gested in connection with the second
proposition which we now consider.

“The proposition in substance is that
the Legislature was without power to
require the appropriation and expend-
iture of county funds for a state pur-
pose, namely, payment of salaries of
state officers.

“A similar question was involved in
Herndon v. Anderson et al., supra, 165
Okla. 104, 25 P. 2d 326. Therein the
entire salary of the judge of the su-
perior court created by the Act there
involved was required to be paid by the
counties for which such courts were
created.

“This court did not specifically hold
that judges of such courts were state
officers. It did point out, however, that
the superior courts created by said Act
unquestionably exercised both state and
county functions. So, then, do district
courts. Many of the functions and
much of the work of the district courts
have to do with purely county matters.

“In the Herndon case, supra, it is’

held that under our system of govern-
ment a county is but an involuntary,
subordinate political subdivision of the
state created to aid in the administra-
tion of governmental affairs of the
state, and though possessed of a por-
tion of the sovereignty, it has no in-
herent powers. All the powers en-
trusted to it are the powers of the sov-
ereignty which created it. It cannot of
itself impose taxes. Its powers so to do
are derived from the state. A county
is without power to create or establish
a court fund. The authority, therefore,
and the method of raising the fund must
come from the state acting through the
Legislature. The power to create the
fund being in the Legislature it follows
that the control of the fund is a legis-
lative function in the absence of con-
stitutional inhibitions, The Herndon
case, supra, cites Steiner v. Sullivan,
74 Minn. 498, 77 N.W. 286, 287, as au-
thority supporting the power of the
Legislature to require the county to pay
the salary of a superior court Judge.
That case is more directly in point in
this case than in the Herndon case, The
identical question is involved except
that it does not appear that the addi-

241

tional salary of the district judge of
Ramsey county was to be paid out of a
court fund such as we have in this
state. There a special tax was imposed,
and the Act was upheld. Therein it is
said: ‘The fact that the judges of the
district court of the county of Ramsey
belong to the judicial department is no
reason why the Legislature might not
make the payment of a part of their
salaries a charge on the county.’

“In Herndon v. Anderson et al., su-
pra, substantially the same authorities
were relied upon to strike down the
Act there involved as in the instant
case. Plaintiff refers to Steiner v. Sulli-
van, supra, as an ancient case, and re-
lies largely upon Shelby County v. Six
Judges, 3 Tenn. Cas. 508, as followed
in Colbert v. Bond, 110 Tenn. 370, 75
S.W. 1061, and Cotham v. Coffman, 111
Ark. 108, 163 S. W. 1183. But this court
in Herndon v. Anderson, supra, distin-
guished those cases and declined by the
vote of a divided court to follow those
decisions now presented a second time.

“It does not appear that the provi-
sions of the Act here involved contra-
vene any of the provisions of the Con-
stitution.” (Emphasis ours.)

The natural sequence of the appli-
cation of the rules herein discussed is
that the Legislature was properly ex-
ercising its legislative prerogatives
when by the Act in question it created
the offices of common pleas court re-
porter and provided for the payment
of a part of their salaries from the
county general fund and the balance
from the court fund and without furth-
er discussion of the rules governing the
subject matter of this action, we hold
that H.B. No. 222, supra, is not invalid
for the reasons assigned by the trial
court and that it was error not to grant
the relief sought. The judgment is re-
versed, with directions to vacate same
and issue the writ as prayed for by
plaintiffs,

HALLEY, C. J., and CORN, WIL-

LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
DAVISON and O’NEAL, JJ., dissent.

242 a

BERBOHN v. PINKERTON et al.
No. 35228. Jan. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 31, 1953.
255 P. 2d 260.

Ted R. Fisher, Watonga, for plaintiff
in error. -

Draper Grigsby, Oklahoma City, for
defendants in error.

O’NEAL, J. The amended petition
substantially alleges that Lena Mae
Porter, on February 6, 1941, was riding
as a guest in an automobile driven by
her husband, which automobile was
traveling in an easterly direction on U.

S. Highway 270, at a point approxi- -

mately one-half mile west of the city of
Watonga, Oklahoma, when the accident
occurred resulting in her death.

The defendant Carl Pinkerton was
the owner of a truck, with trailer at-

tached, which truck was being oper-
ated at the time by the defendant Theo-
dore Gannon. The said truck made a
U-turn on said highway, the front end
of the truck extending in a south-
easterly direction upon the south edge
of the paved highway and the rear end
of the truck, or trailer, extending in a
northwesterly direction near the north
edge of the paved highway; that the
truck with trailer body extended a dis-
tance of 44 feet, completely blocking
the highway from travel by other ve-
hicles; that the automobile in which
Lena Mae Porter was riding ran into
the west side of the body of said trailer
and from the resulting collision, Mrs.
Porter received injuries resulting in her
immediate death.

The petition specifically alleges that
the said defendant Theodore Gannon
knew, or should have known, that the
paving slab on said highway at said
point was only 21 feet wide, and that
each of the shoulders of said highway
on each side of said paving slab were
only 11 feet wide, and in making a left
turn, or in making a U-turn, with said
truck at said time and place, such
truck would completely block said high-
way to all other vehicles traveling upon
the highway, for the period of time
necessary to move said truck into the
regular traffic lanes on the paving of
said highway.

Each of the defendants filed answers
denying generally all of the allegations
of plaintiff’s petition, and further plead-
ed that plaintiff's deceased was guilty
of contributory negligence and by rea-
son thereof should not recover herein.

At the close of plaintiff’s case, de-
fendants interposed a demurrer to plain-
tiff’s evidence upon the ground that
plaintiff’s evidence did not make out a
case to establish prima facie negli-
gence. The trial court sustained the de-
murrer and entered judgment for de-
fendants. From the order and judgment
rendered, plaintiff appeals.

The sole question here presented is
whether the facts established in the

trial of the cause prove primary negli-
gence on the part of the driver of the
truck. The evidence shows that Theo-
dore Gannon, the driver of the truck,
parked the truck in front of the Grove
residence a short time before the acci-
dent here involved. Desiring to return
to Watonga, one-half mile east of the
Grove residence, he drove his truck on
the paved highway and made a U-turn
to the left. The front of the truck at the
time of the accident was facing in a
southeasterly direction, the motor ex-
tending upon the shoulder on the south
side of the paved highway, and the
rear end of the body trailer extended
to the northwest near the north edge of
the blacktop of the highway. In this
position, the entire highway was block-
ed from traffic. The automobile oc-
cupied by Mrs. Porter and operated
by her husband, ran into the truck ap-
proximately nine feet from the rear
end thereof. The impact pushed the
truck some twelve feet sideways in an
easterly direction.

Defendants assert that the driver of
the truck had a lawful right to operate
the truck upon the highway, and that
turning across the highway violated no
statutory provision or rule of the road.
The statement is an over simplification
of the duty required under the circum-
stances of the case. Under the undis-
puted facts there were two spaces off
of the highway; on immediately north
of the blacktop and the Grove house,
and one east of the Grove house, where
the 44-foot length vehicle could have
made a U-turn. Gannon, however,
chose the other method. The case can-
not be resolved by admitting his right
to the use of the highway, but must be
decided on whether the use was a rea-
sonable one under the circumstances
disclosed.

The physical condition of the paved
highway, its abutment, and the condi-
tion of the land lying between the north
edge of the highway and the Grove resi-
dence where the defendant’s truck had
been parked prior to making the U-
turn, is disclosed by the evidence of

243

Rev. Tom E. Carter, who visited the
scene of the accident the morning of
February 7, 1941. He testified that
there was a clear tract of land from
the north edge of the paved highway, a
distance of 70 feet to a fence near the
Grove residence. The record discloses
the following interrogatives and an-
swers:

“Q. Now, Tom, another question—
‘You observed the condition there on
that ground with reference to the tracks
running in there, and the area there
immediately north of the blacktop, and
right at the Grove house? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Pll ask you if that distance of
70 feet in there is wide enough for a
truck to have made a complete U-turn
back to the highway? A. Yes, it is, be-
cause it has been used that way since I
have been out there. The cars have
been coming up in there and heading

-back to the highway after a U-turn is

made.

“Q. When you first went out there to
the scene of this wreck on the morning
of February 7th, 1941, was there any
such drive leading over to that fence
where they make their turns? A. No,
the drive then went on the shoulder,
and this one goes clear up to the fence.

“Q, But there has been no change in
the lay-out of the land itself since this
accident happened? A. No, sir. As far

vas I can see there hasn’t.”

The witness, Arthur Berbohn, admin-
istrator of the estate of the deceased,
visited the scene of the accident on
the morning of February 7, 1941, and
he testified that there was a clear tract
of land extending from the north edge
of the blacktop, a distance of 70 feet,
to the Grove residence, and that there
were no obstructions which might in-
terfere with cars turning on the tract
of land north of the highway. He also
testified that there was a level tract
of land right east of the Grove resi-
dence of approximately 90 feet in width.

Merrill Baskins, a deputy sheriff, tes-
tified that he arrived at the scene of
the accident shortly after the collision
of the car and the truck, and that the

244

driver of the truck, Theodore Gannon,
told him that he had parked the truck
facing west in front of the Grove house
and had been visiting Mr. Hicks, his
father-in-law, at the Grove residence;
that he decided to return to Watonga
and had driven the truck upon the paved
highway and had made a U-turn toward
the east when the collision occurred.
Baskins stated that the front end of
his truck rested upon the dirt shoulder
south of the blacktop, and the rear end
of the trailer rested on the north edge
of the blacktop at the time of the acci-
dent; that his truck and trailer was 44
feet long and that in its then position
had blocked the entire highway.

In our view of the case the facts
pleaded and established upon the trial
prove a prima facie case of negligence
to be submitted to the jury, and that
the court erred in sustaining the de-
murrer of the defendants to plaintiff's
evidence.

A demurrer to the evidence admits
every fact which the evidence, in the
slightest degree, tends to prove, and
all inferences and conclusions which
can be reasonably and logically drawn
therefrom; and if there is e conflict in
the evidence, that which is unfavorable
to the party against whom the demur-
rer is directed is to be considered with-
drawn. Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla.
489, 83 P. 2d 389; Wallace v. First
National Bank, 167 Okla. 563, 31 P. 2d
135; Brown v. Wrightsman, 175 Okla.
189, 51 P. 2d 761.

In Caesar v. Phillips Pet. Co., 187
Okla. 559, 104 P. 2d 429, we said:

“The driver of a vehicle desiring to
make a left turn across the highway
between intersections should exercise
extra precaution before attempting it,
as such turns are less frequent than at
intersections, and therefore not antici-
pated to the same extent by other
travelers.”

In Union Transportation Co. v. Lamb,
190 Okla. 327, 123 P. 2d 660, we said:

“A determination of the requirements
of due care as the same should be exer-

cised by an ordinarily prudent person
rests in the first instance with the jury,
and it is only where reasonable men
would not differ or where the law defi-
nitely prescribes the standard of duty
‘that the court may properly interfere
with or ignore the determination of
that fact-finding group.”

We conclude that the jury in the in-
stant case should decide the question
of fact whether the defendant Gannon,
having the means of choice, in the op-
eration of the truck, in the circum-
stances here disclosed, exercised that
degree of care which a prudent person
should have exercised under the exist-
ing circumstances.

We think the evidence is such as rea-
sonable men might differ on the ques-
tion of negligence or nonnegligence,
and therefore the demurrer to plain-
tiffs evidence was erroneously sus-
tained.

The case is reversed for a new trial.

ARNOLD, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, and BINGAMAN, JJ., con-
eur. HALLEY, V.C.J., and GIBSON,
and JOHNSON, JJ., dissent.

WELCH, J. (concurring specially). 1
concur because I think the decision in
Carter, Adm’r, v. Pinkerton, 194 Okla.
84, 146 P. 2d 842, is controlling and is
binding on the court in this case. See,
also, Pinkerton v. Carter, 197 Okla. 95,
169 P. 2d 192.

HIGHWAY INSURANCE UNDER-
WRITERS et al. v. NICHOLS.

No. 35279. Feb. 10, 1953.

Rehearing Denied March 31, 1953.
255 P. 2d 268.

Draper Grigsby, Oklahoma City, and
Anglin, Stevenson & Huser, Holden-
ville, for plaintiffs in error.

Bishop & Driscoll, Seminole, and
Hugh M. Sandlin, Holdenville, for de-
fendant in error.

BLACKBIRD, J. This is an action
brought by Allen G. Nichols, adminis-
trator of the estate of Claud Hester, de~
ceased, against Marion W. Middleton,
doing business as Middleton Transfer,
and the Highway Insurance Underwrit-
ers to recover damages for the alleged
wrongful death of the deceased, Claud
Hester.

245

It is alleged in plaintiff's petition that
deceased was instantly killed when a
pickup truck, which he was driving,
collided with a transport truck loaded
with hay and driven by Leslie L. Van-
dergriff.

The collision occurred on the eve-
ning of April 7, 1943, at a curve on
Highway 68 about four and one-half
miles from Holdenville, Oklahoma.

It is alleged that the transport truck
was owned by Leo Middleton, son of
defendant Middleton, and that it was
used by defendant Middleton in his bus-
iness, and that Vandergriff was em-
ployed by him on the date of the acci-
dent to operate the truck.

It is further alleged that sometime
prior to the death of Claud Hester, de-
fendant Marion W. Middleton made ap-
plication and obtained from the Cor-
poration Commission a certificate of
convenience and necessity and a per-
mit to use and did use the highways of
the state as a common carrier of
freight; that in order to obtain such
certificate and permit he was required
to, and did file, with the Motor Car-
riers Division of the Corporation Com-
mission, a public liability insurance pol-
icy executed by defendant Highway In-
surance Underwriters to protect the
traveling public from injuries sustained
by all persons who might suffer injuries
or death by reason of the negligent op-
eration of the motor carrier. Plaintiff,
in his petition, alleges the following
acts of negligence:

“(a) Violation of the statute requir-
ing a driver to drive at a careful and
reasonable speed, with due regard to
the traffic and other road conditions,
and requiring the driver to drive at a
speed that will enable him to stop with-
in the assured clear distance ahead.

“(b) Failure to keep a lookout for ap-
proaching vehicles.

“(c) Violation of the statute in op-
erating a truck on the highway, the bed
of which was more than 72 inches wide,
without clearance lights upon the pro-
jecting bed of the truck, which projec-

246

tion extended across the center of the
paved highway.”

It is further alleged by reason of hav-
ing executed its liability insurance pol-
icy, defendant Highway Insurance Un-
derwriters became obligated and bound
to pay all damages sustained to the ex-
tent of $5,000 because of injury to or
death of any person caused by the neg-
ligent operation of the truck owned by
Leo Middleton, while in the service of
and operated by Marion W. Middleton
as a common carrier of freight. A copy
of the policy is attached to the petition
as an exhibit and made a part thereof.
It covers any motor vehicle used by
Marion W. Middleton in the operation
of his business as a common carrier of
freight whether such motor vehicle is
owned by him or not. Under the terms
of the policy liability for injury or
death to any one person is limited to
$5,000.

As to damages sustained, plaintiff's
petition stated that the estate was ob-
ligated to pay funeral expenses of de-
ceased in the sum of $267.75. It is fur-
ther alleged that deceased’s earning
capacity prior to his death was about
$1,000 per year. It is stipulated that the
life expectancy of deceased under the
American Table fo Mortality Rate
would be 24 years. Plaintiff prayed
judgment against both defendants in
the sum of $20,000.

Defendants filed separate answers to
plaintiff's petition. In his answer, Mar-
ion W. Middleton specifically denied
that Vandergriff, driver of the trans-
port truck, was in any manner guilty
of negligence, and affirmatively alleged
that the collision occurred solely be-
cause of primary negligence of de-
ceased. It is alleged that the collision
occurred at the foot of a hill on a
curve; that said Claud Hester drove a
1940 Chevrolet pickup truck down the
hill going in a southeasterly direction
at a high, excessive and dangerous rate
of speed, and drove his automobile over
across the center of the highway on the
wrong side preparatory to cutting.a
curve at the foot of the hill, and as a

result thereof ran into and against the
truck driven in a northwest direction
by Lester Vandergriff and was killed.
He further alleged that the relation of
employer and employee did not exist
between defendant Marion W. Middle-
ton and Vandergriff at the time the
accident occurred. He further alleged
that at the time of the collision de~
ceased was operating and driving the
truck while under the influence of in~
toxicating liquor. He further pleads
unavoidable accident and contributory
negligence on the part of deceased.
Defendant Highway Insurance Under-
writers, in its separate answer, admits
that it wrote the insurance policy relied
upon by plaintiff and that such policy
was on file with the Corporation Com-
mission of Oklahoma, but denied that
such policy covered any equipment in-
volved in the accident described in
plaintiff's petition or that it incurred
any liability arising out of such acci-
dent. For further answer, it adopted
Middleton’s answer,

The case was tried to a jury and at
the conclusion of the evidence both de-
fendants requested the court to direct
a verdict in their favor. These requests
were denied. The jury returned a gen-
eral verdict in favor of plaintiff aud
against the defendants in the sum of
$10,000, Judgment was entered in the
sum of $5,000, plus interest, against the
defendants jointly and in an additional
sum of $5,000, plus interest, against the
defendant Middleton, separately.

Only the Highway Insurance Under-
writers has filed a brief in this appeal,
but the defendant Middleton has been
allowed, by stipulation, to adopt it as
his own. Defendants rely for reversal
on the allegation that the court erred
in denying their request for a directed
verdict. This assignment necessitates a
review of the evidence.

The evidence establishes that on the
7th day of April, 1943, between 8:30 and
9 o’clock p.m., a collision occurred be-
tween a pickup truck driven by Claud
Hester and a transport truck loaded

with hay and driven by Leslie Vander-
griff. The collision occurred on High-
way 68 on a curve about four and one-
half miles from Holdenville, Oklahoma.
As a result of this collision, Claud Hes~
ter, driver of the pickup truck, was in-
stantly killed. At the time of the acci-
dent he was driving the pickup truck
in a southeasterly direction. The trans-
port truck loaded with hay was travel-
ing in a northwesterly direction toward
Holdenville.

Mollie Hester, mother of Claud Hes-
ter, testified, in substance: On the day
of the collision, about 3 o’clock in the
afternoon, Claud Hester came to Trous-
dale, Oklahoma, in Pottawatomie coun-
ty, to pick her up and take her to her
home in Hughes county; that they left
Trousdale about 5 o’clock in the after-
noon; they arrived in Holdenville about
dark at which point they stopped for
supper; they left Holdenville about one
hour thereafter and traveled in a south-
easterly direction toward her home;
they met the transport truck traveling
in the opposite direction. It had two
headlights burning but had no side
clearance lights burning on the bed of
the truck. Claud Hester was driving the
pickup truck and she was riding on the
outside. There was a collision between
the pickup truck and the other ap-
proaching truck. Something on the back
of the approaching truck struck the
pickup truck. Claud Hester was driving
on the right side of the road at the time
of the accident. She was blacked out by
the impact and was afterwards picked
up and taken to a hospital. This wit~
ness also testified that Claud Hester
was not intoxicated while driving the
pickup truck and was not drinking any
that day.

Lola Hester, wife of deceased, testi-
fied to substantially the same facts as
did Mollie Hester.

The driver of the transport truck tes-
tified to the contrary. He testified that
at the time of the collision the clear-
ance lights on each side of the bed of
the truck he was driving were burning.
He also testified that as he approached

247

the pickup truck he dimmed his lights
but that Claud Hester, driver of the
pickup truck, neglected to dim his
lights.

Defendants concede that the evidence
offered by plaintiff was sufficient to
take the case to the jury on the ques-
tion as to whether the clearance lights
on the transport truck driven by Van-
dergriff were burning, and it is also
conceded that if the jury found that the
clearance lights were not burning, the
driver of the truck, under the statutes,
47 O.S. 1951 §148, subd. (g), paragraph
2, was guilty of negligence per se. It
is further contended, however, that not-
withstanding the driver of the truck
might have been guilty of negligence
while driving the truck without the
clearance lights burning, there is a to-
tal lack of evidence to establish that
such negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury and that the trial
court should therefore have directed a
verdict in their favor.

In this connection, Vandergriff, driver
of the transport truck, testified that at
the time of the impact the deceased
was driving the pickup truck to the left
of the center of the highway; that he
turned his truck to the right in order to
avoid a collision and the front wheels
of his truck were on the shoulder on
his right hand side of the road at the
time the impact occurred, He further
testified that the pickup truck struck
the fender of his truck and that the
pickup truck kept traveling south-
east and hit the bed of the truck he
was driving and came to rest on the
shoulder of the left side of the highway
immediately behind his truck. Defend-
ant offered the evidence of a highway
patrolman who appeared at the scene
of the accident shortly after it occurred
and, after examining the wreck and the
marks on the pavement and debris on
the highway, expressed the opinion that
the impact occurred to the left of the
center of the pickup truck’s side of the
road. The body of deceased was found
partly in the truck and partly out of
the truck and immediately alongside of

248

the body and at the rear end of the
pickup truck a half pint bottle, with
about two inches of whisky left in it,
was found lying close to the body of de-
ceased,

It is asserted by defendants that the
evidence conclusively establishes that
the impact occurred to the left of the
center of the pickup truck’s side of the
road and conclusively establishes that
deceased was driving to the left of the
center of the road at the time of the
accident, and that therefore the fact
that the clearance lights on the truck
might not have been burning could not
have been the proximate cause of the
accident. We do not agree. The evidence
is in conflict as to the exact point of the
impact.. In making this contention de-
fendants overlook the fact that the bed
of the transport truck was ninety-four
inches in width. The statute, supra,
provides:

“Every bus or truck seventy (70”)
inches or more in overall width and

less than thirty (30’) feet in overall
length shall have the following:

“(a) On the front, two (2) head
lamps, one (1) at each side.

“(b) On the front two (2) Clearance
lamps, one (1) at each side.***”

They also overlook the fact that both
Mollie and Lola Hester, occupants of
the pickup truck at the time of the ac-
cident, testified that immediately prior
to the impact, deceased was driving the
pickup truck on his right side of the
road and something on the rear end of
the transport truck driven by Vander-
griff struck the pickup truck and they
were knocked out.

We think the jury had a right to con-
clude from this evidence that the bed
of the transport truck extended across
the center of the highway and because
of the absence of burning clearance
lights, one on each side of the truck, in
violation of the statute, deceased was
prevented from discovering that the
bed extended across the highway so as
to avoid the accident, and that there-

fore the absence of such burning clear-
ance lights was the proximate cause of
the accident. ,

Ordinarily the question of proximate
cause presents a question for the deter-
mination of the jury. Sheridan Oil Co.
v. Wall, 187 Okla. 398, 103 P. 2d 507;
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Court-
ney, 182 Okla. 582, 79 P. 2d 235,

The question of proximate cause only
becomes a question of law for the court
where the evidence together with all
inferences properly deducible therefrom
is insufficient to show a causal connec-
tion between the alleged negligent act
and the injury. Leslie v. Hammer, 194
Okla. 535, 153 P. 2d 101. There is a
conflict in the evidence as to the cause
of the injury; therefore, under the
above authorities, the question of the
cause thereof presented an issue for de-
termination by the jury.

Defendant further contends that there
is a total lack of evidence tending to
show that Vandergriff was an em-
ployee of the defendant Middleton,
while driving the truck in question at
the time of the accident.

In this respect defendant Middleton
testified: Leo Middleton was the owner
of the truck involved in the wreck; that
he, defendant Middleton, was the owner
of but one truck, an International,
which was the only truck listed in the
liability insurance policy issued by the
defendant Highway Insurance Under-
writers. He, however, admitted that
should he use any other truck in con-
nection with his business as a common
carrier of freight, the policy would
cover such truck whether owned by
him or not. He stated, however, that
he had never used Leo’s truck in con-
nection with his business; that Leo was
working for himself and for Couch
‘Transfer of Ada, Oklahoma; that he and
Leo officed together; that there were
two telephones in the office, one under
the name of Middleton Transfer, which
was the name under which he was op-
erating, and the other in the name of
Couch Transfer. The number of his

telephone was 1136 and the number of
the Couch Transfer’s telephone was
248. He further testified that on the
morning of the day of the accident
Duncan McArthur came to the office
and asked him to haul some hay, and
let him have a truck for that purpose.
He told McArthur the truck belonged
to Leo and Leo was not then present.
Thereafter, McArthur again returned in
order to see Leo about hauling the hay
but Leo was still absent. Vandergriff
then stated he would take the truck
and haul the hay; that it would be all
right with Leo for him to do so. Defend-
ant Middleton also testified that he did
not authorize Vandergriff to haul the
hay; that he had no control over the
truck used in hauling it; that he had
never used the truck in his business;
and that Leo had no permit from the
Corporation Commission to use the
highways of the state for the purpose
of hauling freight.

Leo Middleton testified to substan-
tially the same state of facts. He ad-
mitted that he had no permit to use
the highways of the state to haul
freight but said he was working for
Couch Transfer of Ada; that Couch car-
ried liability insurance which covered
his trucks; and that McArthur paid
him for hauling the hay and he paid
Vandergriff. Incidentally, there is no
evidence that Couch Transfer had any
connection with the transaction.

Vandergriff testified that he was
working for Leo Middleton on the day
of the accident and was hauling the
hay for him; that Leo paid him for his
services and so far as he knew McAr-
thur did not pay Couch Transfer any-
thing for the use of the truck on that
day. The hay was loaded near Stuart,
Oklahoma, in the southeastern part of
Hughes county and was to be delivered
to Duncan McArthur at Holdenville,
Oklahoma. No one specifically directed
him to go after the hay but defendant
Middleton told him he wanted the hay
hauled and he went and got it; that he
used Leo Middleton’s truck. After the
wreck he drove the truck loaded with

249

the hay to Duncan McArthur’s barn at
Holdenville, but it was not unloaded
until the next morning.

Plaintiff concedes and so pleads in
his petition that Leo Middleton was the
owner of the Chevrolet truck involved
in the accident. It is contended, how-
ever, that defendant Middleton used the
truck in his business and that Vander-
griff was in fact employed by him in
his business and that. Vandergriff was
in fact employed by him on that day to
haul the hay. In this connection Stan-
ford Irvin testified that he was work-
ing for defendant Middleton on the day
of the accident and had been working
for him for about three and one-half
years prior thereto. Defendant Middle-
ton used two trucks in operating his
business, an International and the Chev-
rolet truck involved in this accident;
that he did not know who owned the
Chevrolet truck but that defendant
Middleton kept it in his name; He
further testified that the truck had in-
scribed on it “Middleton Transfer”,
which the evidence shows is the name
under which defendant Middleton was
operating. Other evidence shows that
it had inscribed on it “Phone No. 1136”,
which is the number of defendant Mid-
dleton’s office telephone; that defend-
ant Middleton directed Vandergriff to
haul the hay; that he offered to go
with him and help him load the hay
and defendant Middleton told him that
Duncan McArthur had employed an-
other person to help Vandergriff load
the hay; that both he and Vandergriff
had been working for defendant Mid-
dleton for several years immediately
prior to the date of the accident and
that Middleton paid them both for their
services.

Ernest Martin testified that he was
employed by defendant Middleton the
next morning after the accident to help
unload the hay from the Chevrolet
truck involved in the accident; that he
did unload the hay; and that defendant
Middleton paid him for his work.

The evidence also shows that all So-
cial Security taxes on Vandergriff were

250

paid by defendant Middleton. This de-
fendant testified, however, that Leo
thereafter reimbursed him for all taxes
paid.

We think this evidence, despite evi-
dence to the contrary, was sufficient to
take the case to the jury on the question
as to whether the relation of employer
and employee existed between defend-
ant Middleton and Vandergriff on the
date the accident occurred, and that
it was also sufficient to authorize the
jury to find that such relation did at
that time exist.

It is not essential that direct evidence
be offered in order to establish the rela-
tion of employer and employee. Proof
of the existence of such relation may
be made as fairly and fully by circum-
stantial evidence as by evidence which
is direct. 35 Am. Jur. 451. See, also,
Crum v. Walker, 241 Iowa 1173, 44 N.
W. 2d 701.

Defendants assert that the court erred
in admitting in evidence, over their ob-
jection, the evidence of Ernest Martin
to the effect that he was employed by
Middleton to unload the hay the next
morning after the accident occurred.
Under the facts and circumstances, as
stated above, we think this evidence
was properly admitted. The court com-
mitted no error in this respect.

It is further contended that Stand-
ford Irvin testified that Vandergriff
was employed by Marion W. Middleton
at the time he was driving the truck in
question; that this evidence was in-
competent and should have been ex-
cluded on their objection for the reason
that it amounted to nothing more than
a conclusion or opinion of the witness
without any substantial facts or cir-
cumstances upon which to base such
conclusion. We do not understand that
Mr. Irvin testified or intended to testify
that Vandergriff was in fact employed
by defendant Middleton to drive the
truck in question. He simply testified
that he and Vandergriff had been work-
ing for defendant Middleton some time
immediately before the day of the ac-

cident and that Middleton paid them
both for their services and that defend-
ant Middleton told Vandergriff to haul
the hay. No prejudicial error was com-
mitted by admitting this evidence.

Under separate assignment it is con-
tended that the court erred in instruct-
ing the jury that if they found for the
plaintiff, the defendants would be joint~
ly liable for all damages sustained and
made no attempt to limit the liability of
the defendant Highway Insurance Un-
derwriters to the maximum specified in
the policy. Counsel do not charge that
the general verdict in one sum against
both defendants, or the judgment di-
viding the jury’s award or assessment
of damages into two parts is void.
Their only argument seems to be that
if the jury had been specifically in-
structed that the insurer’s liability was
limited by the terms of the policy to
$5,000 for injury to or death of one
person, then the verdict might have
been less than it was. As hereinbefore
noted the judgment entered by the
court specifically limited plaintiff's re-
covery against the insurer, Highway
Insurance Underwriters, to the $5,000
specified in the policy, plus interest
from the date of the verdict—a fact
not mentioned in the argument. If the
trial court’s failure or omission to
give the instruction referred to was er-
ror as to that defendant, it appears to
have been cured by the judgment, and
no argument is presented to the con-
trary. As to the defendant Middleton,
there is no basis in the record for sup-
posing that the jury intended to limit
his liability to his insurance indemnity,
or that, if the court’s instructions had
included specific direction limiting re-
covery against his codefendant, the
verdict would have been less than it
was. As hereinbefore noted, plaintiff's
petition described the insurance, in-
cluding its specific amount, and a copy
of the policy itself was attached. This
pleading made it clear that no liability
beyond the limit named in the policy
was sought to be enforced against the
insurance company. The jury was spe-

cifically referred to the pleadings in the
court’s introductory instructions. We
have no right to assume that the jury
disregarded or overlooked these things
in its deliberations. The fact that it re-
turned a general verdict in one lump
sum against both defendants, rather
than apportioning its award or return-
ing separate verdicts, is an insufficient
basis, in itself, for such an assump-
tion. The record does not show that
the form of the verdict was ever dis-
cussed. Neither party now claims that
it was. Nor is there any evidence in
this case, as in some, that the jury ever
intended or attempted to assess dam-
ages against the insured in a lesser
amount than against the insurer. In
this connection, see, for instance, West
et al. v. Abney, 203 Okla. 227, 219 P.
2d 624. It is axiomatic that to con-
stitute cause for reversal, an alleged
error must be prejudicial to the rights
of the party complaining thereof. In
this case, the verdict in itself does not
show such prejudice and counsel’s argu-
ment that it might have been different
had the alleged erroneous instruction
been different is no more than mere
speculation. We cannot order the judg-
ment set aside and vacated on such a
basis. In keeping with the presump-
tions accorded a verdict on appeal, it
must clearly appear that the alleged
error complained of in the court’s in-
struction of the jury has caused a mis-
carriage of justice. Labenne v. Kauf-
man, 184 Okla. 565, 89 P. 2d 281.
There is no such appearance of in-
justice herein. The judgment is af-
firmed.

OWENS v. AUTOMOTIVE ENGI-
NEERS, Inc.

No. 85151. Feb. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 31, 1953.
255 P. 2d 240.

251

252

Harlan Deupree, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

Richardson, Shartel & Cochran, By
R. C. Jopling, Jr., Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. Automotive Engineers,
Inc., as plaintiff, recovered a judgment
against Frank C. Owens, in the sum of
$15,301.09, upon an alleged breach of
a written and oral agreement entered
into on August 16, 1947, arid October 25,
1947, respectively. From the order de-
nying defendant a new trial, he appeals.

The Automotive Engineers, Inc. a
corporation, will hereafter be referred
to as plaintiff, and Frank C. Owens,
as defendant, as they appeared in the
trial court. The Western Tire & Equip-
ment Company, the predecessor to the
plaintiff, will be referred to as West-
ern.

In some respects the petition with its
various amendments is not a model of
impeccable pleading. Although the
code sanctions amendments both be-
fore and during trial, the present case
illustrates the confusion and error
which have arisen in the trial of the
case due to first pleading a written
contract, then an oral modification
thereof, and lastly, when the trial had
progressed for several days, again
amending to plead a new and additional
cause of action based upon an alleged
tort.

Admittedly, the agreement of August
16, 1947, does not accurately or com-
pletely delineate the facts as known to

the plaintiff. It is represented that
the present authorized capital of plain-
tiff corporation is $45,000. In fact, it
was only $35,000. It recites that where-
as defendant is desirous of purchasing
$12,500 of the authorized capital stock
of the proposed corporation, it then
further states that defendant has paid
said $12,500 to the plaintiff. Whereas,
in fact, defendant at the time had paid
only $1,000 covering the $2,000 proposed
purchase of the stock.

For an understanding of the issues
as cast, it will be necessary to refer
at some length to plaintiff's petition
and its amendments and to the defend-
ant’s answer.

On January 6, 1948, plaintiff filed its
original petition alleging it and defend-
ant entered into a written contract, un-
der date of August 16, 1947, wherein
plaintiff agreed to sell and defendant
agreed to purchase certain shares of
stock in plaintiff's corporation; that
defendant paid plaintiff $2,000 cash and
now owes the sum of $10,500, the bal-
ance of the agreed purchase price of
the stock. A copy of the contract is
attached to plaintiff's petition.

On March 25, 1948, plaintiff filed an
amended petition wherein plaintiff re-
pleaded the execution of the contract
of August 16, 1947, and then alleged
that all of the parties to the contract
agreed that plaintiff could perform that
portion of the contract in which it
agreed to increase the authorized cap-
ital stock of plaintiff corporation by in-
creasing the same to an authorized
capital of $75,000 in lieu of $150,000 as
provided for in the contract. It is then
alleged that defendant has refused to
pay the balance due for the stock pur-
chased in the sum of $10,500, and that
by reason of defendant’s breach to per-
form the terms of the contract, plain-
tiff has been further damaged in the
sum of $23,984.75. The item of $23,-
984.75 is alleged to cover the difference
between the present free market value
of Automotive Engineers, Inc., after
plaintiff performed its obligations un-

der the contract and the free market
value of said corporation prior to the
execution of the contract. The prayer
is for a recovery of $34,484.75.

On May 12, 1948, plaintiff filed an
amendment to its petition wherein it
adopts the allegations of its first amend-
ed petition, and then further states that
on October 25, 1947, at the Baker Hotel
in Dallas, Texas, the signers of the con-
tract of August 16, 1947, orally agreed
to increase the authorized capital stock
of plaintiff corporation to $75,000 in
lieu of the $150,000 specified in the pre-
vious written agreement. With refer-
ence to the damages sought for the al-
leged breach of both the written and
oral agreements, plaintiff states that
the $23,984.75 item is composed of $4,-
780 expended by plaintiff in the per-
formance of the contract, which would
not have been expended had not de-
fendant entered into the contract re-
lied upon, and that the sum of $19,204.-
35 represents the difference between the
present free market value of plaintiff
corporation and the free market value
of said corporation prior to the execu-
tion of the contract of August 16, 1947.

On March 22, 1950, and during the
trial of the case upon its merits, plain-
tiff filed its second amendment to its
petition, and after adopting the allega-
tions of its first amended petition,
pleaded that defendant. requested and
encouraged plaintiff to fully perform
its obligations under the written agree-
ment of August 16, 1947, advising plain-
tiff that defendant intended to comply
with his obligations under the contract.
Plaintiff states that these representa-
tions were false and that plaintiff re-
lied upon them to its detriment. Plain-
tiff further alleges that within a month
after the execution of the August 16th
contract, defendant ratified and con-
firmed the contract by making an ad-
ditional payment of $1,000 covering the
purchase price of the stock. Finally,
plaintiff states:

“Plaintiff further alleges and states

that defendant attempted to procure
and did procure the breach of said con-

253

tract by T. G. Whitener; that on or
about January 5, 1948, defendant, in the
presence of T. G. Whitener and K. R.
Rone, president of plaintiff’s corpora-
tion, stated ‘Whitener does not have to
comply with the contract.’

While in the amended petition plain-
tiff sought a recovery in the sum of
$34,484.75, the present demand is re-
duced to the sum of $29,704.35.

On December 10, 1948, defendant
filed his answer to all of the above
pleadings, in which, after a general
denial, defendant admits his signature
to the written contract, dated August
16, 1947, attached to plaintif?’s petition,
but he denies that the written agree-
ment is or purports to be an agreement
between plaintiff and defendant for the
subscription of stock in plaintiff's cor-
poration. It is then alleged that short-
ly prior to the signing of the August
16, 1947, agreement, defendant entered
into an oral agreement with plaintiff
that defendant would purchase 250
shares of the plaintiff corporation and
pay therefor the sum of $12,500 pro-
vided that plaintiff corporation per-
formed the following conditions, to wit:

(a) That plaintiff corporation then
named Western Tire and Equipment
Company, with an authorized capital
stock of $35,000.00 would amend its ar-
ticles of incorporation by changing its
name to Automotive Engineers, Incor-
porated, and would increase its then
capital stock of $35,000.00 to $150,000.00,
of which $75,000.00 would be initially
subscribed by the stockholders of Wes-
tern and by this defendant and one T.
G. Whitener.

(b) That plaintiff corporation would
be expanded and improved, and that it
would secure.a new and better loca-
tion in which to carry on its business.

(c) That the $75,000.00 of par value
stock was to be immediately issued
as follows: The assets of Western Tire
and Equipment Company were to be
inventoried and the fair market value
thereof determined and approved by
defendant and Whitener; and that the
then stockholders of Western would sub-
scribe for additional stock at a par

254

value of $15,000.00 and would pay
therefor in cash a sum equal to the
difference between the actual cash value
of the assets so determined and ap-
proved by defendant and Whitener, and
the sum of $50,000.00 which would
represent the par value of their hold-
ings in the reorganized corporation, and
that when this was done defendant and
Whitener would each purchase at par
value shares of stock in the amount of
$12,500.00; the remaining $75,000.00 of
stock was to be issued only as dividend
stock.

(d) That plaintiff was required under
the agreement to secure the services
of T. G. Whitener as general manager
of the new corporation and place him
in complete charge of the business.

(e) That subsequent to the agreement
as above set forth, plaintiff procured
defendant to sign the August 16th con-
tract upon the representation that the
contract was for the sole purpose of
procuring Whitener as the corporation’s
general manager, and it was not in-
tended to change or vary the previous
agreements entered into between plain-
tiff and defendant.

(f) That defendant relying upon
plaintiff's representations paid plain-
tiff $2,000.00 to be applied upon the
$12,500.00 stock to be issued to him.

(g) Defendant alleges plaintiff did
not comply with the agreements in that:

1st. Plaintiff did not secure the in-
crease of the authorized capitalization
of the corporation.

2nd. Plaintiff failed and refused to
issue the stock in the manner repre-
sented to defendant and Whitener, and
for the consideration to be received
therefor by plaintiff corporation.

8rd. That plaintiff failed and refused
to comply with its agreement and plain-
tiff was unable to procure the services
of Whitener, and that Whitener did not
purchase the stock referred to in the
contract.

In the alternative, defendant plead-
ed that if the contract of August 16th
should be held to be an effective agree-
ment between plaintiff and defendant
that by mutual mistake the agreement
failed to contain a material element of

their agreement, in that it did not con-
tain the reorganization plan of the cor-
poration, or for the issuance of stock
to the existing stockholders of Western,
or the provision that the $75,000 of the
par value of the stock was only to be
issued as dividend stock.

Finally, defendant states that plain-
tiff’s amendment, filed during the trial,
attempted to plead an action sounding
in tort which was barred by the statute
of limitations.

The contract of August 16, 1947, is
unusual and unique in that the Western
Tire & Equipment Company and Frank
C. Owens are named parties of the
first part, and T. G. Whitener is named

party of the second part. Omitting the
“Whereas” recitals the Agreement
reads:

“(1) That the Western Tire & Equip-
ment Company, of Oklahoma City, im-
mediately after the execution of this
contract, will file its amendment to its
Articles of Incorporation as has been
duly approved and adopted by the di-
rectors and stockholders of said com-
pany and that the amendment to said
Articles of Incorporation changes the
name of said corporation from The Wes-
tern Tire & Equipment Company to
Automotive Engineers, Inc., and the au-
thorized capital stock from $45,000.00,
divided into 900 shares at $50.00 each,
par value, to an authorized capital of
$150,000.00, which is divided into 3000
shares at $50.00 each, par value.

“(2) That The Western Tire & Equip-
ment Company will issue 250 shares of
the authorized capital stock of Automo-
tive Engineers, Inc., to Frank Owens,
Oklahoma City, as soon as the amend-
ment to the Articles of Incorporation of
the Western Tire & Equipment Com-
pany have been duly filed with the
Secretary of State of the State of Okla-
hhoma.

“(3) That the Western Tire & Equip-
ment Company will undertake an ex~
pansion and enlargement of its opera-
tions immediately after the filing of the
amendment to its Articles of Incorpora-
tion and that a new, larger, more im-
proved store will be obtained by it and
an enlarged and improved stock of goods

will be obtained by it prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1948, and in accordance with
the suggestions and recommendations
of party of the second part; that it will
employ the party of the second part ‘as
general manager of this new and ex-
panded enterprise at such times as the
party of the second part may designate,
but not later than January 1, 1948.

“(4) That the party of the second part
on or before January 1, 1948, will pur-
chase $12,500.00 of the capital stock
of Automotive Engineers, Inc., paying
cash therefor in the amount of the par
value of the said stock and that the
same shall be issued by Automotive En-
gineers, Inc., to the party of the second
part fully paid and non-assessable. °

“(5) That on or before January 1,
1948, party of the second part agrees
to come to Oklahoma City and assume
the management of Automotive Engi-
neers, Inc.”

The defendant filed both general and
special demurrers to the various
amendments to plaintiff’s petition and
objected to the filing of the amendment
during the trial as barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, and that the various
amendments did not state a cause of
action entitling plaintiff the relief

_ prayed for. Defendant also moved at
the close of the trial for a directed ver-
dict. Each of said demurrers and mo-
tions were overruled.

A resume of the facts necessary for
consideration discloses that Western
had an authorized capital of $35,000.
The contract of August 16th, upon which
plaintiff relies in part, represented the
corporation had an authorized capital
stock of $45,000. As disclosed by this
contract, Western agreed to change its
name to Automotive Engineers, Inc.,
and increase its capital stock from $45,
000 to $150,000. Plaintiff corporation
thereafter increased its capital stock to
$75,000 under its contention that de-
fendant and Whitener orally agreed to
this reduction in capital.

" Mr. Rone, president of plaintiff cor-
poration, testified that at the time the
contract of August 16th was signed by
defendant, it was agreed by the parties

255

that the stock of the new corporation
would be issued to the then stockhold-
ers of Western when Western stock-
holders made up the difference between
the approved inventory value of the
merchandise and the $50,000 stock the
stockholders were to receive from the
new corporation. He was asked:

“Q. But your agreement with him
was that the stock should be issued
against the inventory and the balance
in cash, wasn’t it? A. That was in an
outside agreement; yes, sir. It wasn’t
in the contract.”

Under the reorganization of the cor-
poration with an authorized capital
stock of $75,000, defendant and White-
ner were to receive $12,500 par value
of the stock and the balance thereof,
$50,000, as testified to by plaintiffs
president, was to be issued to the pres-
ent stockholders of Western, but, as we
have seen, the written contract does
not contain such a provision. An in-
ventory was prepared by plaintiff as
of September 30, 1947, and was sub-
mitted to Whitener and the defendant.
Plaintiffs president was positive in his
declaration that there was no agree-
ment by the corporation with defendant
or Whitener to scale down and take
out worthless or objectionable items
reflected in the inventory, This posi-
tion of plaintiff is greatly weakened
by Mr. Rone’s subsequent statement
that Whitener objected to various items
as duplicates and to other items as
slow moving stock, and that defendant
did request that the slow moving stock
should be taken out of the inventory
and that the inventory as a whole
should be valued at its fair market
value. Plaintiff corporation agreed to
meet these suggested amendments, but
its testimony discloses that it and the
defendant did not come to an under-
standing or agreement as to the value
to be placed upon the inventory which
was to go into the new corporation. The
comparative balance sheet of Western
of September 30, 1947, shows an in-
ventory of $42,551.31 and as of Decem-
ber 31, 1947, an inventory value of $42,-
264.21. So, under plaintiff’s admissions

256 De

and defendant’s contention, the old
stockholders were obligated to pay into
the new corporation the difference be-
tween the amount of the inventory, the
sum of $7,448.69, as of September 30,
1947, or the sum of $7,735.29, as of De-
cember 31, 1947.

Mr. Rone, president of the plaintiff
corporation, stated that the $35,000 in
stock and the $10,000 surplus, and the
increase in the value of the inventory
was well in excess of $50,000 and justi-
fied the issuance of the $50,000 reissu-
ance of stock to the former stockhold-
ers of Western. As we have seen, the
contract does not so provide. More-
over, plaintiff corporation could not
thus dispose of its inventory and sur-
plus as that belonged to a corporation,
not to a privileged group of stockhold-
ers.

Mr. Nolan F. Young, employed by
plaintiff corporation from June until
December 30, 1947, was asked the fol-
lowing question:

“Q. Was the entire $50,000.00 to be
paid by Western Tire & Equipment
Company to be paid in cash?”

He answered:

“A. The stock (inventory) of the Wes-
tern Tire & Equipment Company, and
additional cash to make up the $50,-
000.00, was to constitute the shares of
the Western Tire & Equipment Com-
pany (meaning its stockholders).”

Plaintifi’s evidence conclusively shows
that the conditions of the agreement
were not performed.

Upon the last amendment to plain-
tiff’s petition it sought and obtained a
judgment upon an allegation sounding
in tort, in that defendant attempted to
procure and did procure the breach of
said contract with T. G. Whitener, in
that on January 5, 1948, defendant
stated to Mr. Rone, president of plain-
tiff corporation, in the presence of
Whitener, the following: ‘“Whitener
does not have to comply with the con-
tract.”

Upon the trial Mr. Rone testified as
follows:

“Mr. Owens said he was not going
through with the contract for the fact
that his company wouldn’t permit hira
to do so, and that Tony Whitener didn’t
have to do so unless he wished to.”

Mr. Rone’s statement enlarges the
allegation relied upon in plaintiff's
amended petition. No other evidence
was introduced to sustain the cause of
action based upon tort. It is neither
charged nor established by proof that
defendant was actuated by malice or
improper motives; nor is it even sug-
gested that the contractual obligations
of the parties were thereby affected.

In support of defendant’s answer, Mr.
Owens testified that the written agree-
ment of August 16th was prepared by
Mr. Rone, president of plaintiff corpo-
ration, and was presented to him with
the assurance that it was prepared for
the sole purpose of employing Whitener
as the general manager of the proposed
reorganized corporation; that prior to
defendant signing the agreement he and
Whitener had entered into an oral
agreement with plaintiff, that if West-
ern changed its name and capitalized
at $150,000, and if the old stockholders
of Western subscribed for $50,000 of the
capital stock based upon the market
value of the merchandise as shown by
an inventory to be approved by defend-
ant and Whitener, and make up the
difference in cash, that defendant and
Whitener would each take $12,500 of
the stock of the new corporation, with
the further condition that Whitener be-
come the manager thereof; that plain-
tiff furnished defendant and Whitener
an inventory showing a valuation of
approximately $32,000. This valuation
of the merchandise was not approved
by defendant or Whitener; they marked
the articles which were to be deleted
from the inventory with red pencil and
presented it to the corporation; they
were advised by its president that the
challenged and unapproved items of
the inventory would be deleted. Rely-
ing upon this representation, defendant

made a payment of $1,000 to be applied

upon the stock purchase. Defendant
testified that neither he nor Whitener
agreed that the new corporation might
be capitalized at $75,000; instead of
$150,000, Defendant further testified
that plaintiff and he agreed that under
the oral contract only the value of the
merchandise as shown by the inventory
as approved by Whitener and defendant
wes to go into the value of the stock
to be issued to stockholders of Western.
Defendant declined to go further with
the deal until this agreement was com-
plied with, and he refused to make fur-
ther payments for the stock. Plaintiff
then insisted that defendant would have
to take over all of the assets of Western
which would represent the value of the
$50,006 stock to be issued to Western
stockholders. These assets included the
following items: An auto truck valued
at $2,411.01; an item of bills receivable
$9,708.84; an item of $4,000 was listed
as an investment in a joint venture
which Mr. Rone, president of plaintiff
corporation, was individually interested
in covering a stock of merchandise in
another city; and an item of $5,100 as
good will. These items were reflected
in a financial statement which plain-~
tiffs president presented to defendant,
with the remark, “This is what you are
buying.” Defendant replied, “No.”
Plaintiff never denied this transaction.

When Whitener refused to pay for
his stock or report to take over the
management of the corporation, plain~
tiff suggested that defendant act as its
manager, to which suggestion defend-
ant advised plaintiff that his present
employment would not permit his de-
voting part time to the management of
the business, The record discloses that
thereafter plaintiff corporation disposed
of its stock of merchandise and ceased
to operate as a going concern.

As Disraeli has said: “It is much
easier to be critical than it is to be cor-
rect.”

Our review of the record, however,
leads to the inevitable conclusion that

257

the result of the verdict was not based
upon the proven facts, but was largely
influenced by the failure of the court
to clearly delineate the issues that were
supported by the proof. The pleadings
as heretofore noted were voluminous
in character and were copied verbatim
in the court’s instructions to the jury.

In Rhodes v. Lamar, 145 Okla. 223,
292 P. 335, we suggested it was not good
practice for the court to formulate the
issues by reading the pleadings of the
parties to the jury in the instructions.
Defendant has challenged several in-
structions as not being within the is-
sues and.proof. The challenged in-
structions are subject to serious criti-
cism and we think they unquestionably
resulted in the erroneous verdict ren-
dered.

As we view the record, the contract
between the plaintiff corporation and
the defendant was, in part, written,
and, in part, oral. Plaintiff was re-
quired to perform three conditions:
namely, (a) create a new corporation
with a capital of $150,000; issue to the
stockholders of Western $50,000 of the
stock and to the defendant and White-
ner each $12,500 of the stock in the new
corporation; (b) take out of the in-
ventory of Western all items of mer-
chandise not approved and accepted by
defendant and Whitener; that to the
value of the approved inventory the
stockholders of Western were to pay
into the corporation, cash so that the
combined value of the inventory and
the cash would represent the value of
the stock in the sum of $50,000 to be
issued to Western’s stockholders; and
(c) that the corporation was to acquire
the services of Mr. Whitener, as of
January 1, 1948, to manage and operate
the business.

Under plaintiff's evidence it did not
perform the conditions of its agree-
ment. It was either unable or unwilling
to perform and therefore it cannot re-
quire performance by the defendant.
The remark by defendant that Whitener
did not have to perform his agreement,

258

without further allegation or proof, is
insufficient to warrant the judgment
upon tort action. Where plaintiff as in
the instant case pleaded full perform-
ance of the agreements and which al-
legations were denied by defendant,
plaintiff to recover must bear the bur-
den of proof of performance. This it
failed to do. Camp v. Black Gold Petro-
leum Co., 195 Okla. 30, 154 P. 2d 769;
Roudebush v. Snell, Jr., 103 Okla. 291,
229 P. 1067; Anderson & Kerr Drilling
Co. v. Bracht, 177 Okla. 394, 60 P. 2d
758; Miller v. Young, 197 Okla. 503, 172
P, 2d 994; Messick v. Johnson, 167 Okla.
463, 30 P. 2d 176.

In Vogel v. Fisher, 203 Okla. 657,
225 P. 2d 346, we said:

“The conduct of a party to a contract,
which prevents or dispenses with per-
formance by the adverse party, is equi-
valent to a waiver of the right to re-
quire performance.”

Neither do we think that plaintiff
stated a cause of action in the amend-
ment of March 22, 1948, wherein plain-
tiff pleaded that defendant in the pres-
ence of T. G. Whitener and K. R. Rone,
president of plaintiff corporation, stated:
“Whitener does not have to comply
with the contract,” and the verdict and
judgment upon this cause of action can-
not be sustained.

In McCracken v. Cline, 55 Okla. 37,
154 P. 1174, we announced the follow-
ing rule:

“A petition which alleges that de-
fendant made false representations to
plaintiff, but fails to allege that plain-
tiff believed such representations and
relied and acted thereon to his damage,
does not state a cause of action for de-
ceit.”

The amendment did not allege or
was there proof in support thereof, that
defendant was actuated by malice, or
that the statement caused Whitener to
abandon his obligations under the
agreement. The statement was made
after plaintiff's president stated to the

defendant that defendant would have to
take all of the assets of the old corpora-
tion into the new corporation and after
plaintiff had devalued the stock by at-
tempting to issue $15,000 in stock to its
old shareholders without consideration
therefor, and in direct violation of the
parties’ agreements. No law prevents
one from speaking out to protect his
own interest, and to express his opinion
to his associate that he too need not
comply when the opposite party is not
complying with their mutual agree-
ments. This principle of law is an-
nounced in Schonwald v. Ragains, 32
Okla. 223, 122 P, 203; National Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 162 Okla.
174, 21 P. 2d 492, and Chicago, R. L &
P. Ry. Co. v. Armstrong, 30 Okla. 134,
120 P. 952,

Justice Brewer in Angle v. Chicago,
St. P. M.& O. R. Co., 151 U.S. 1, 14 S.
Ct. 240, 38 L. Ed. 55, announced the
rule that to sustain an action for inter-
fering with contractual rights between
two parties, it must be stated and
proven that the interference was ma-
licious.

Under the record here presented, it
is shown that defendant had made two
payments of $1,000 each to apply upon
his stock purchase, and that he stood
ready and willing to complete the fur-
ther payments thereon upon plaintiff's
compliance with the terms of their
mutual agreement. Upon plaintifi’s
breach of the contract, defendant was
entitled to recover the $2,000 which he
had paid the corporation. The court
erred in refusing to direct a verdict for
the defendant for this sum.

The judgment in favor of the plaintiff
is reversed, with directions to enter
judgment in favor of the defendant
against the plaintiff in the sum of
$2,000, with interest thereon from the
date each payment was made.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ,, concur. DAVISON, J., dissents.

ROCK ISLAND OIL & REFINING CO.,
Inc., et al. v. HUTCHINSON et ux.

No. 34881. Feb. 24, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 31, 1953.
255 P. 2d 234.

259

C. D. Cund, Duncan, Edward Howell,
Oklahoma City, and J. D. DeBois, Dun-
ean, for plaintiffs in error.

H. B. Lockett and Hegel Branch, Dun-
can, for defendants in error.

O'NEAL, J. This is an action at law
to recover damages for loss of live-
stock alleged to have resulted by drink-
ing polluted water out of Cow Creek.
Plaintiffs, the owners of the stock,
contend that the injury and resulting
damages arose out of defendants’ op-
eration of oil refineries located sev-
eral miles south of Duncan, Oklahoma.
For convenience we will refer to L. S.
Hutchinson and Temple L. Hutchinson
as plaintiffs, and the defendants, Rock
Island Oil & Refining Company, Inc.,
a corporation, and Sunray Oil Cor-
poration, a corporation, as defendants.

Plaintiffs occupied a tract of land in
Jefferson county, some distance south
of the refineries. Cow Creek runs from
a point north of Duncan, adjacent to
the refinery properties in a southerly
direction to plaintiffs’ land. Plaintiffs’
eause of action is based upon the al-
leged tort of the defendants in permit-
ting crude oil and other deleterious sub-
stances to escape from the refineries,
and which drained into Cow Creek, poi-

260

soning the waters thereof and causing
the death of one cow, one heifer, and
loss of time and expense in furnishing
an alternative water supply for their
stock. Plaintiffs recovered a judgment
for actual damages in the sum of $659,
and the sum of $1,500 as exemplary
damages, and from the overruling of
defendants’ motion for a new trial, the
appeal is taken.

The sole question presented on appeal
is whether plaintiffs’ evidence is suffi-
cient to support the verdict and the
judgment rendered thereon.

Complaint having been lodged with
the State Game and Fish Department
of the state, a state game ranger, in
July, 1948, visited the refineries and
exemined various pits and ponds upon
the refinery grounds. He testified that
he found that pipes from the refineries
carried refinery waste into these pits,
or ponds, which thereafter, by gravity,
was conveyed into wells; that when the
wells were filled up with fluid they were
emptied into open drains or ditches
which drained into Cow Creek, He tes-
tified as to the condition of Cow Creek
between Duncan and the refineries, and
stated that he found live fish in the
stream, but that below the refineries,
as the stream flowed in a southerly di-
rection, he found many dead fish in the
stream and found much evidence of
refinery waste therein.

Another Game and Fish Department
employee testified he had examined
Cow Creek from its head north of Dun-
can down to Red River, during the
years 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949; that
in March, 1949, he found live fish in
Cow Creek north of the refineries and
many dead fish south of the refineries;
that he found refinery pollution drain-
ing into Cow Creek during the years
1946 to 1949, inclusive.

Another witness testified that he had
lived in Comanche approximately 46
years during which time he had fre-
quently observed the condition of the
waters of Cow Creek; that in the middle
of October, 1948, he was employed in

the repair of a bridge crossing Cow
Creek at a point two miles south of the
refineries; that on the first day of his
employment at this point he observed
that the water in the stream looked
milky, and that a few days thereafter,
it turned black and had a very bad
odor.

Another witness owning a farm near
Waurika testified that Cow Creek emp-
tied into Beaver Creek, which latter
ereek ran through his farm; that in
the middle of October, 1948, the stream
was badly polluted, killing a large
number of catfish, frogs and turtles,
and that he found rabbits and squir-
rels lying dead along the bank of the
stream. He further stated that he
accompanied the game ranger to the
refinery grounds and inspected their
method of disposing of their effluent
waters; that upon the refinery grounds
he saw oil, boiler drainings, sludge and
muck being emptied into runways
which drained into Cow Creek; he iden-
tified the sludge pits on each of the re-
finery grounds and stated that they
would overflow during heavy rains and
that an unusual amount of pollution
came down the stream in October, 1948;
that the character of the pollution he
observed at the refinery looked like the
pollution he observed in Cow Creek.

Another witness who had a tract of
land near Waurika testified that Cow
Creek was badly polluted with oil
waste; that he observed many dead
fish in the stream; that on one occasion
he accompanied Mr. Sparks, the game
ranger, to each of the refineries and
found evidence of oil escaping from the
Rock Island properties which he stated
smelled like creosote dip.

Another witness testified that in
October, 1948, Cow Creek, at a point
between Addington and Terral, con-
tained pollution of a grayish color which
had a very bad odor. This witness also
accompanied the game ranger to the
defendants’ refineries and found that
the sludge pits had broken due to a pre-
vious heavy rain, and that the contents
of the pits had drained into the creek.

Demurrers were interposed by the
defendants to plaintiffs’ evidence based
upon the assertion that the facts proven
were insufficient to make out a case
in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants. The demurrers were
overruled with exceptions.

Defendants then introduced the depo-
sition of V. G. Heller, Professor of
Biological Chemistry at the Oklahoma
A & M College. He testified that H.
M. Marney mailed him two samples of
water, one taken from Cow Creek and
the other from the well on the Mize
farm’ on February 3, 1949, and from
these samples he found and so ad-
vised Mr. Marney as follows:

“I seriously doubt if it would be ad-
vantageous to make a quantitative de-
termination of the exact amount of inor-
ganic materials present as long as’ we
know the total amount would not be in-
jurious. I think the only chemical analy-
sis that is going to help you is to find
when there are sulfides or similar com-
pounds present that are truly toxic. We
can certify to the bad physical appear-
ance, bad odor, and to the unsavory
flavor, but we have to admit that there
is none of the usual oil field brines,
acids, or alkalies present in toxic quan-
tities. * * * In your waters we are
dealing with a different type of ma-
terial. The total amount of dissolved
materials present would definitely not
be toxic to either man or animal. The
amount of salts present are in the form
of sodium chloride, calcium chloride, or
magnesium chloride, so often found in
oil well brines and which are poisonous
in large quantities either to plants or
animals, is not present in your water.
Neither do we find the presence of al-
kalies as are sometimes found about
refineries or do we find any free acid,
so from the standpoint of all these nor-
mally discussed materials in waters, I
think you would have no case for dam-
ages.”

Officials of the cities of Duncan and
Comanche testified that these cities
emptied their sewage disposal into Cow
Creek. A witness living north of the
refineries testified that the waters of
Cow Creek in 1947 and 1948 were badly
polluted by sewage from Duncan, and

261

that he lost two cows in 1947 that had
drunk water from the creek.

A chemist who was employed by
Sunray Oil Corporation testified that he
took samples of water from Sunray’s
sewer outlet into Cow Creek on Octo-
ber 27, 1948, and from the analysis
made found the water contained no
element harmful to cattle. He arrived
at the same conclusion from samples of
water taken on October 27, 1948, at a
point seven miles south of Comanche,
and also from samples of water taken
in November, 1948, at Sunray’s sewer
outlet to Cow Creek. In November
and December, 1948, he took samples
of water from the creek south of the
refineries and arrived at the same con-
clusion, He further testified that the
effluent watér which Sunray permitted
to flow into Cow Creek during the
periods complained of would not be
injurious to animals or livestock.

The city chemist of Oklahoma City
testified that he visited the refineries
sometime after the institution of the
present suit, and from his examination
determined that their operations did
not add bacteria to the waters of Cow
Creek. He further stated that he ex-
amined the analysis made by Sunray’s
chemist and concurred in the conclu-
sion that the analysis did not disclose
that the water from the refineries
would be harmful to livestock.

Defendants’ evidence sustains the
conclusion that they have invested large
sums in the installation of equipment
to run off their effluent water, free
from oil and refinery contamination,
and that the method they employed in
disposing of their effluent water was
the best known to the industry.

Although defendants’ evidence sus-
tains their contention that they did not
deliberately permit oil or refinery
waste to escape from their pits or
ponds, it does disclose that they had
lost some oil refinery waste on several
occasions due to breaks of the ponds.
It is obvious that the pits, or ponds,
were constructed for the purpose of im-

262

pounding any crude oil or refinery
waste which might escape during re-
finery operations. The escaped oil or
waste was recaptured and re-run to
stills for refining. The excess residue
of oil waste in the ponds was disposed
of either by evaporation or by burning
the same. The evidence also supports
defendants’ contention that the cities
of Duncan and Comanche empty their
sewage into Cow Creek causing organic
pollution, and that some salt water
from the Empire Field and also the
Grookla and Pace leases or properties
drained into Cow Creek.

Plaintiffs assert by written and oral
argument that the evidence as a whole
establishes that refinery oil and waste
escaped from the defendants’ refineries
and drained into Cow Creek destroy-
ing the water thereof for stock purposes,
and which resulted in the damages
proven, and that the verdict of the jury
being supported by competent and sub-
stantial evidence, the judgment ren-
dered thereon cannot be set aside upon
appeal. Plaintiffs cite numerous cases
in support of the rule thus asserted.

Plaintiffs’ evidence, however, does
not sustain the full amount of the judg-
ment rendered for actual damages. The
damages established are sustained solely
upon the plaintiffs’ evidence of value
as follows: One cow $242; one heifer
$207; one aborted calf $60, and the
value of services in hauling water to
stock $90, or a total of $599. The ver~
dict for actual damages is therefore
affirmed in the sum of $599.

We are of the view and so hold that
the evidence sustains a causal connec~
tion with the negligence averred and
the injuries received, and that defend~
ants’ assertion that the verdict and the
judgment thereon is only supported by
an inference upon an inference or pre~
sumption upon presumption, is without
merit. Defendants rely upon Prest-O-
Lite Co., Inc., v. Howery, 169 Okla. 408,
37 P. 2d 303; Shell Petroleum Corpora-
tion v. Worley, 185 Okla. 265, 91 P. 2d
679; Shell Oil Co. v. Blubaugh, 199 Okla.

353, 185 P. 2d 959, and Mul-Berry Oil
Co. v. Penny, 195 Okla. 574, 159 P. 2d
243, as supporting their assertion of a
want of proof to sustain the verdict and
judgment.

The Prest-O-Lite case, supra, is dis-
tinguishable from the facts in the in-~
stant case. In that case plaintiff testi-
fied he did not know why his fowls and
hogs died. A veterinarian testified that
the cow was suffering from enteritis,
and that he assumed that drinking the
water from the creek was the cause of
the trouble. Furthermore, the evidence
did not show damage to the vegetation
along the stream, or fish in the stream.
It was therefore held that the damages
could not be sustained upon the hypo-
thesis that the stream was polluted with
deleterious substances, or that the fowls
and animals died as a result of drink-
ing the water.

In the Worley case, supra, plaintiff
sought damages to 100 small pecan
trees planted some months prior to the
overflow of a creek running through
plaintiff's land. The water spread over
an area of one and one-half miles wide,
and at places upon the land it was ten
feet deep. One witness stated the water
tasted salty. The evidence further dis-
closed that the damage to the young
trees might have been occasioned from
three other causes. We therefore held
the evidence failed to show a causal
connection between the alleged wrong-
ful act and the injury. It is stated
in the opinion of the case, as follows:

“In this case not a single witness
ventured an opinion that the pecan
trees on plaintiff’s land died because of
salt contained in the water which over-
flowed his land in the flood of June,
1935.”

The Blubaugh case, supra, turned
upon plaintiff's failure of proof to es-
tablish that one of the wells contained
contamination from oil wells alleged to
have been improperly plugged. The
proof disclosed that some oil got into
the well. When defendant was so in-
formed, it had the oil pumped out and

the well thereafter produced good wa-
ter. We there held that the proof failed
to show a causal connection with the
claim that the oil came from improp-
erly plugged wells, and the resulting
damage was not established.

The Mul-Berry case, supra, is based
upon facts comparable to the Worl2y
case in that plaintiff failed to establish
by proof whether the injury to plain-
tiff’s cattle was occasioned by salt wa-
ter from defendant’s properties, or
“burned up” pasture, or due to the
fact that the cows had suckling calves
during the period, as any or all of these
conditions might have been the cause
of injury, if any, although several wit-
nesses expressed the opinion that plain-
tiff’s calves were only worth $12 to $15
per head during April, May and June,
and to the middle of July, the period
covering the alleged pollution and in-
jury. The proof shows that the calves
were sold in August for $31.76 per head
which was the top prevailing market
price. We therefore held that there was
a failure of proof to sustain the verdict.

Isolated statements relied upon in the
cited cases may seem to give weight to
defendants’ contention of the want of
sufficient proof in the case at bar to
sustain the judgment, but as we read
the cases relied upon we find them dis-
tinguishable in point of fact. In each
case there was a definite failure to
prove the cause of injury and that dam-
ages resulted therefrom. In the instant
case there had been no rains imme-
diately prior to the middle of October,
1948, which would have increased the
flow of the water in Cow Creek, but
then on the 13th day of October, a large
volume of water, impregnated with oil
and refinery waste, came down the
stream. One angler who had caught
some 40 pounds of fish a few days
before October 13th testified that after
the deluge of the water had passed
down the stream, the banks of the
creek were lined with dead fish,
turtles, squirrels and cottontails, and,
as stated by another witness, the pollu-
tion looked and smelled like the sludge

263

and pollution he had observed in de-
fendants’ refinery pits. Furthermore,
plaintiff's stock had access to the
waters of Cow Creek for years prior to
said date without injury, but after its
use for several days following the flow,
two of his cattle died. These facts re-
moved from the realm of speculation or
conjecture the cause and effect of the
matters here complained of.

The remaining question is whether
the facts proven warrant the judgment
for exemplary damages rendered
against the defendants. The evidence
is without contradiction that no effluent
water carrying refinery waste was de-
liberately or knowingly permitted to
empty into Cow Creek. It was shown
that the embankments of the pits, or
ponds, were broken on two occasions
by reason of very heavy rains, which
caused their contents to drain into Cow
Creek. Furthermore, it is shown that
when the game ranger and others vis-
ited the refineries to ascertain the
cause of the pollution of Cow Creek, the
officials of the plants stated that they
were glad to work with landowners
upon the creek to prevent pollution, and
that they would investigate any claim
of pollution or run down the source
thereof and see if it could be avoided.
On another occasion, Mr. Coleman, a
member of the House of Representa-
tives, accompanied several landowners
upon an inspection trip of the refineries
to ascertain the cause of pollution, and
in a conversation with a representative
of Sunray they were advised that the
break of a dike caused the stuff to get
away; they were also advised by the
same representative of Sunray that the
company had procured additional land
for larger vats or ponds for the im-
pounding of refinery water.

In our view of the case the record
does not disclose such gross negligence
in the operation of the defendants’ re-
fineries and such disregard of plaintiffs’
rights as to amount to an evil intent or
gross negligence to sustain exemplary
damages. The record must establish
fraud, malice, oppression or gross neg-

264

ligence. No competent evidence was ad-
duced to show that defendants com-
mitted any overt act to come within the
announced rule. Pure Oil Co. et al. v.
Quarles, 183 Okla. 418, 82 P. 2d 970, and
Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Stewart, 172
Okla. 143, 45 P. 2d 121.

The judgment as modified in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of $599 is af-
firmed. The judgment for exemplary
damage in the sum of $1,500 is re-
versed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. HALLEY,
C.J., and ARNOLD, JJ., dissent.

ROCK ISLAND OIL & REFINING CO.,
Inc., et al. v. MARNEY et ux.

No. 84845. Feb. 24, 1953.
Rehearing Denied March 31, 1958.

255 P. 2d 289.

Cc. D. Cund, Duncan, Edward How-
ell, Oklahoma City, and J. D. DeBois,
Duncan, for plaintiffs in error.

H. B. Lockett and Hegel Branch, Dun-
can, for defendants in error.

O'NEAL, J. In this case there was
evidence to sustain the finding of the
jury that in the operation of defend-
ants’ refineries during the year 1948,
crude oil and refinery waste escaped
from defendants’ plants and drained
into Cow Creek. Cow Creek heads north
and meanders in a southerly direction
as it passes the defendants’ refineries.
In the operation of these refineries, es-
pecially in the year 1948, substantial
quantities of effluent water, impregnat-
ed with oil and refinery waste, escaped
from their plants and drained into
Cow Creek, which flowed over plain-
tiffs farm.

-Two witnesses, employees of the
State Game and Fish Department, testi-
fied that after they received a com-
plaint with reference to refinery waste
in Cow Creek, they went to the refin-
eries and found that oil and refinery
waste had escaped from certain ponds,
as well as in the general operation
of defendants’ plants, which refinery
waste drained into Cow Creek. From
their investigation of Cow Creek, above
defendants’ plants, they found the creek
water free from oil field or refinery
waste. That upon an examination of
the water, after it had flown past the
refineries, they found it contained re-
finery pollution. Several farmers
living along Cow Creek testified that
they found live fish, turtles and frogs
in the creek above the refineries, but
that in the fall of 1948, they found no
aquatic life in the stream below the
refineries; although they found dead
fish in large quantities along the bank
of said stream. A witness, owning a farm
near the stream, testified that in the fall
of 1948, he followed the stream from the
refineries down to and below Ryan,
and near Terral, where he observed

many dead fish along the banks of the
stream.

Without dispute it was shown that on
several occasions a dike or pond upon
the premises of one of the refineries was
washed out as a result of heavy rains,
causing large quantities of water to
flow into Cow Creek. One of these
breaks occurred about the middle of
October, 1948. Plaintiff testified that
his cattle, after drinking water from
Cow Creek in October, 1948, became
ill. Seven head of his cattle died and
twenty-one of his heifers aborted. Some
of his milch cows became ill and ceased
to produce milk. There is substantial
evidence in the record as to the injury
inflicted on his herd of cattle.

We have, today, affirmed the com-
panion case of Rock Island Oil & Refin-
ing Co., Inc., v. Hutchinson, 208 Okla.
259, 255 P. 2d 234. Practically the same
witnesses were used in that and the in-
stant case to establish that refinery
waste drained into Cow Creek, destroy-
ing the waters for livestock purposes.
With the exception of the question of
punitive damages, which was in the
Hutchinson case but not in this case,
the same propositions of law and the
same authorities are urged and relied
on in this case as were urged and relied
on in the Hutchinson case; and since
said propositions were discussed and
authorities analyzed in the companion
case, it is deemed unnecessary to re-
peat them herein.

The judgment in the sum of $2,900.50
in favor of the plaintiffs and against
said defendants is affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. HALLEY,
C.J., dissents.

265
FORD v. NELLIE B. MINING CO.
et al.
No. 35596. March 17, 1953.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1953.
255 P. 2a 504.

A. L. Commons and H.G.E. Beau-
champ, Miami, for petitioner.

J. A. Tillotson, Tulsa, Fenton & Fen-
ton, Oklahoma City, and Mac Q. Wil-
liamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

WILLIAMS, J. This is a proceeding
brought by James E. Ford to review
an order of the State Industrial Com-
mission denying him compensation on
a claim filed against Nellie B. Mining
Company, his employer, and its insur-
ance carrier.

266 —

Petitioner in his claim states that on
the 6th day of September, 1949, while
in the employ of Nellie B. Mining Com-
pany, he sustained an accidental in-
jury consisting of inhaling fumes from
a chemical known as xanthate and as
a result thereof he lost his sense of taste
and smell,

The trial commissioner to whom the
case was referred for hearing, in sub-
stance, found: Petitioner in his claim
alleges that he incurred a loss of the
sense of smell and partial loss of taste
by reason of inhaling xanthate fumes
while in the course of his employment
with Nellie B. Mining Company. He
further found petitioner suffered no ac-
cidental personal injury within the
meaning of the Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Act nor did he suffer any loss of
wage-earning capacity and entered an
order denying compensation which or-
der was sustained on appeal to the com-
mission en banc.

Petitioner in this proceeding contends
that the order of the State Industrial
Commission is not sustained by the
evidence and is contrary to law. The
evidence shows that respondent Mining
Company was the owner of a lead and
zine mine at Miami, Oklahoma, and in
connection therewith it operated a flo-
tation plant through which the products
taken from the mine were processed.
Different chemicals were used by re-
spondent Mining Company in process-
ing the material, among which was
xanthate. This substance consists of a
dry powder until it is mixed with wa-
ter; when so mixed, it is used in con-
nection with the processing of the ma-
terial taken from the mine. The mix-
ture, at the time petitioner sustained
his accident, was made in a 50 gallon
parrel with the top open and the sub-
stance was taken from the barrels in
water buckets and placed in a feeder
used in processing. Petitioner, while en-
gaged in this work, inhaled fumes which
came from the xanthate, resulting in
the loss of his sense of smell and partial
loss of his sense of taste. The evidence
is undisputed that he did inhale the

fumes as contended and that it did re-
sult in such loss.

It is contended by respondents that
an injury caused by inhaling fumes
from xanthate does not constitute an
accidental injury within the meaning of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
This contention cannot be sustained.
We have heretofore held that injury
caused by inhaling gas or dust may
constitute an accidental injury within
the meaning of the Act. Ross v. Ross,
184 Okla. 626, 89 P. 2d 338; C. K.
Howard & Co. v. McKay, 189 Okla.
453, 117 P. 2d 525.

It is further contended by respondents
that, although the inhaling of the fumes
resulting in the loss of taste and smell
constitutes an accidental injury, such
injury is not compensable under our
statute. While we have no statute def-
initely fixing compensation for loss of
taste and smell resulting from acci-
dent, such injury is compensable un-
der the “other cases” provision of our
statute, 85 O.S. 1951 §22, par. 3. Under
this section compensation is recover-
able for all classes of injury resulting
frem hazardous employment other than
such injuries for which specific com-
pensation is provided. H. F. Wilcox Oil
& Gas Co. v. Lewis, 173 Okla. 640, 49
P. 2d 782. Speaking on this question
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in the
case of Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co.,
134 Neb, 211, 278 N.W. 254, 116 A.L.R.
702, held:

“Disfigurement resulting from severe
third-degree burns to the face is to be
considered in the light of the general
statutory purpose to provide compen-
sation for personal injuries, and is with-
in the meaning of the language con-
tained in section 48-121 Comp Stat.
1929, viz., ‘in cases not covered by the
schedule.’ ”

The State of Nebraska had no stat-
ute specifically providing compensation
for disfigurement but had a statute
similar to the “other cases” provision
of our statute. The court held that an
injured workman could recover com-

pensation for disfigurement under such
statute.

Counsel for petitioner requested the
commission to make a finding on the
issue as to whether petitioner sustained
any disability as a result of his injury.
The commission made no such finding.
It did, however, find that the petitioner
had lost no wage-earning capacity by
reason of his loss of taste and smell.
We do not think this finding equivalent
to a finding that he sustained no disa-
bility as a result thereof. It was not
necessary for petitioner, in order to
obtain compensation under the “other
cases” provision of the statute, as
amended by 85 O.S. 1951 §22, par. 3,
to prove that he had sustained a loss of
wage-earning capacity. This section so
far as here material provides:

“Other cases: In all other classes of
disabilities, excluding only those here-
tofore referred to in subdivision three,
which disabilites result in loss of use
of any portion of an employee’s body,
and which disabilities are permanent
in quality but partial in character, the
compensation ordered paid shall be six-
ty-six and two-thirds per centum of the
average weekly wage during that por-
tion of the number of weeks which the
partial disability of the employee bears
to the total permanent disability.”

This section has the effect of arbi-
trarily fixing an employee’s loss of
earning capacity measured by his phys-
ical disability or by the degree of dis-
ability sustained. Mudge Oil Co. v.
Wagnon, 193 Okla. 466, 145 P. 2d 185.

In E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
Inc., v. Spencer, 195 Okla. 300, 157 P.
2d 186, in the second paragraph of the
syllabus we held:

“Under the ‘other cases’ provision of
85 O.S. 1951, §22, it is not necessary
to establish loss of wage-earning capa-
city, and the State Industrial Commis-
sion is authorized to award percentage
of total disability disclosed by the medi-
cal testimony.”

There has been medical evidence of-
fered in this case tending to show that
petitioner, as a result of his injury, has

267

sustained a 10 per cent permanent par-
tial disability to his body as a whole.
The commission should have made a
finding as to this issue.

Order vacated for further proceedings
in accordance with the views herein
expressed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, O’-
NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

EDWARDS et al. v. GANN et al.
No. 35510, March 31, 1953.

255 P. 2d 499.

268 [|

J. P. Speer, Duncan, for plaintiffs in
error.

Chas. E. Jackson, Pauls Valley, for
defendants in error.

DAVISON, J. This is a suit to quiet
title founded upon a resale tax deed.
It was brought by the plaintiff, W. J.
Gann, the grantee of the original tax
sale purchaser, with whom, his oil and
gas lessee, Charles E. Jackson, was
joined as an additional party plaintiff.
The defendants, Kate Edwards and
some 22 others, were the former record
owners of undivided oil and gas min-
eral interests in the property. The par-
ties will be referred to as they ap-
peared in the trial court.

W. A. Gann, the father of plaintiff,
was the owner of a large ranch in
Stephens county, Oklahoma, Imown
as the Gann Ranch, covering the ma-
jor part of some four or five sections
of land. About the year 1920, he pur-
chased from one Roy Huffman an ad-
joining 130-acre tract, the grantor re-
serving from the conveyance a one-
half or 65-acre interest in the oil and
gas thereunder. An undivided 15-acre
interest out of that which was reserved
is the res here involved. The former
record owners of varying proportions
of said 15-acre interest are the defend-
ants herein.

The plaintiff and his wife lived with
his parents on the family homestead
located on a plot just west of the Huff-
man 130 acres, and after the death of
the mother, they continued to live with

W. A. Gann, the father. Subsequently,
plaintiffs wife died and then in 1948 his
father died. During all this time, plain-
tiff continued to live in the family
home.

The record in the case at bar is far
from clear as to the different busi-
ness transactions through the years.
It seems, however, that in about 1930,
the principal part of the ranch, exclu-
sive of the Huffman farm, was deeded
by the elder Gann to the Travelers
Insurance Company in satisfaction of a
mortgage indebtedness. After that time,
W. J. Gann leased it and paid rent to
the former mortgagee. In 1939, the
Huffman tract was sold at resale for
delinquent taxes and was bought in by
one J. G. Welch. It, too, was covered
by a mortgage which was foreclosed. In
1943, the plaintiff W. J. Gann pur-
chased the Huffman tract through an
attorney representing both the mortga-
gee and the tax sale purchaser. Upon
payment of the purchase price to the
attorney, Gann received a deed from
each of them. The deed from the hold-
er of the tax title, the said J. G. Welch,
is the basis of the title plaintiff here
relies upon as paramount to the claims
of defendants to the mineral interests.
It was so adjudged by the trial court
who made findings of fact and .conclu-
sions of law. From that judgment, de-
fendants have appealed.

Defendants do not attack the regular-
ity of the tax sale procedure, nor the
validity of the tax deed itself. They
rely, rather, upon the holding of this
court in the case of Bereman v. Grant,
195 Okla. 330, 157 P. 2d 743, to the
effect that:

“A son, living with his aged father
upon and in charge of the property
mortgaged by the father, will not be
permitted, by securing a tax deed there-
to, to defeat the lien of a mortgage, in
the presence of facts indicating and
showing a moral obligation upon the
son to see that the taxes are paid.”

and contend that owners of mineral in-
terests stand in the same position as
mortgagees. Many other cases are cited

wherein the fact situation varies from
that in the Bereman case, supra, to that
in the case of Burnett v. Cole, 193 Okla.
25, 140 P. 2d 1012, wherein it was held
that the owner of the surface of lands,
in whose name the property is assessed
for taxation, could not obtain title from
tax sale purchaser and defeat the owner
of the coal rights of his interest.

It will be noted, however, that in all
cases where the tax deed is stricken
down. one of two situations exists. Ei-
ther the purchaser of the tax title was
under moral obligation to pay the taxes
in the first instance, or such purchaser
was guilty of fraud in some degree
in acquiring the same. In the case at
bar, the record does not disclose that
either situation obtained.

The property involved was not as-
sessed on the tax rolls in the name of
either W. A. Gann or W. J. Gann, the
plaintiff. For some nine or ten years
prior to the tax sale of the Huffman
lands to Welch, W. J. Gann had been
renting the ranch from the mortgagee
owner and furnishing his father a place
to live rather than having his father fur-
nish him a place to live as was con-
tended by defendants. There was no
obligation of any kind on W. J. Gann
to pay the taxes and his father had no
money or property from which they
could be paid. No fraud is attributed
to him. He purchased the Huffman
place through an attorney who fur-
nished him with a deed from the tax
title holder and a deed based on the
mortgage foreclosure. He may have
incidentally used the Huffman place
while his father held title, but the
testimony is in conflict about that.

The plaintiff here stands on much
firmer ground than did the tax title
purchaser in the case of Patterson v.
Wilson, 203 Okla. 527, 223 P. 2d 770,
wherein one cotenant in the minerals

269

purchased the resale tax title to the
exclusion of his former cotenant. The
following sound statement of the prin-
ciple is found in the body of the opin-
ion:

“Tn such case, where no fraud, collu-
sion, or inequitable conduct is involved,
and where there is no moral or legal
obligation upon a cotenant to pay the
taxes, we see no reason why such co-
tenant may not, if the land has been
sold to the county or a third party
and the title of the former owner and
the cotenant has been thereby termi-
nated, acquire the property from the
purchaser at the tax sale. No good
reason can be suggested for holding
that in such case a cotenant, by virtue
of his former cotenancy, is forever
precluded from obtaining title to the
property free from the claim of other
cotenants.”

In the case at bar, there was no
fraud, collusion or inequitable conduct
nor was there a moral or legal obli-
gation to pay the taxes on the part of
the plaintiff, W. J. Gann. His tax title,
being otherwise sufficient, was para-
mount to the claims of the defendants.
In the case of State ex rel, Commis-
sioners of Land Office v. Southland
Royalty Co., 204 Okla. 284, 230 P. 2d
471, we held that:

“A resale tax deed vests in the gran-
tee a full and complete title to the land
conveyed, including all mineral inter-
ests, whether severed or not, where
there is no actual production of oil or
gas during the years for which taxes
were levied.”

The judgment of the trial court is in
harmony with these decisions.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, ARNOLD, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. WELCH and
O'NEAL, JJ., concur in result.

270
JONES et al. v. BAYLESS et al.
No. 35663. March 31, 1953.
255 P. 2d 506.

A. M. Widdows, Edmund Lashley,
and William M. Fleetwood, Jr., Tulsa,
for plaintiffs in error.

Thurman S. Hurst, Saul A. Yager,
and Edwin S. Hurst, Tulsa, for de-
fendants in error.

BLACKBIRD, J. Defendants-in error,
Tulsa city policemen with ranks and
grades varying from sergeants to cap-
tains, commenced this action as plain-
tiffs to restrain and enjoin plaintiffs in
error, as defendants, from demoting
them to other policemen’s positions of
inferior rank with attendant reductions
in salary, responsibility and dignity.

The threatened demotions were to be
made without regard to said plain-
tiffs’ “good behavior”, without notice
and hearing, not for economic or fi-
nancial reasons, not for the purpose of
reducing the number of policemen in
the department, nor to reduce the num-
ber of positions within any one rank or
grade, but in order to promote police-
men of lesser rank to the positions now
held by plaintiffs. Upon the filing of
plaintiffs’ verified petition alleging,
among others, substantially the above
facts, the trial eourt issued a tempo-
rary restraining order forbidding the
threatened demotions.

Upon joinder of the issues and stipu-
lation of such facts, and the introduc-
tion of evidence not now necessary to
mention, the cause was tried without
a jury. By judgment entered June 3,
1952, the court found the issues in favor
of the plaintiffs and issued a perma-
nent injunction against defendants.
Thereafter defendants filed their mo-
tion for a new trial. It was heard and
overruled on June 6, 1952. At said
hearing the defendants gave notice
of appeal and requested the court to
fix a bond to be given by plaintiffs

to indemnify them against any dam-
ages they might sustain, including
reasonable attorney fees, in the event
it was finally determined that the
permanent injunction ought not to have
been granted. The court acceded to this
request and included in its order over-
ruling defendants’ motion for a new
trial a further order requiring plaintiffs
to file such a bond in the amount of
$10,000, within fifteen days, during
which period the temporary restraining
order granted before the trial was to
continue in force and effect. The next
day, plaintiffs filed an application to
change said order insofar as it required
the plaintiffs to give a bond, and upon
a subsequent hearing held on this appli-
cation thirteen days later, or on June
20, 1952, defense counsel called the po-
lice and fire commissioner to testify
* as to the amount of money the threat-
ened demotions would have saved the
city of Tulsa during each month that
they were restrained and enjoined. The
court, upon objection by the plaintiffs,
refused to admit this testimony and en-
tered an order vacating that part of its
previous order on the motion for a new
trial pertaining to the making and fil-
ing of the hereinbefore mentioned bond.

Defendants’ appeal to this court is
by petition in error and case-made. Our
continued reference to the parties will
be by their trial court designations.

Defendants’ first proposition is that
the trial court erred in holding for
plaintiffs and determining, in effect,
that the threatened demotions of plain-
tiffs constituted removals or discharges
without a hearing, forbidden by sec-
tion 5 of article XIV of the Tulsa city
charter. The pertinent parts of this ar-
ticle are as follows:

“Section 1. Amendment, amending
paragraph 30, Article 11, of the Charter
of the City of Tulsa, by repealing the
same, and adopting in lieu thereof the
following amendment relating to the
qualification, appointment and tenure of
policemen and members of the police
department of the City of Tulsa, except
the Chief of Police of said City, whose

271

qualification, appointment and tenure
is not included in this amendment, nor
affected thereby.

“Section 2. * * * No person shall be
eligible to appointment, or to be ap-
pointed, or serve as a policeman or
member of the police department of
the City of Tulsa who shall have been
convicted of any offense, the punish-
ment of which may be confinement in
the State Penitentiary; nor shall any
person be appointed who is not shown
to be of good character, or who can
not read and write the English lan-
guage, or who does not possess ordi-
mary physical strength and courage.
All policemen or members of the police
department, of the City of Tulsa shall
hold their positions during good be-
havior, and shall not be removed from
the same except for such cause as in
the opinion of the Board of Commis-
sioners render them unfit to remain in
the service of the City, and after writ-
ten notice, giving the grounds for such
discharge or removal and an oppor-
tunity to be heard on such charges or
reasons.

“Section 4. Finger print and Identi-
fication Members, Bertillonists, Me-
chanics, Ballistic Experts and Radio
Operators, being a special class of
skilled members of the Police Depart-
ment, in case of reduction of their
number, by abolishing any of their
offices or positions therein, shall, when
the number of such members are in-
creased, be reinstated to their respec-
tive positions or offices in the same
manner and procedure provided for re-
instating other members in said de-
partment. And a decrease or increase
in the number of policemen or members
not belonging to the above class, shall,
in no way affect the decrease or in-
crease in the number of the above
class of skilled members, nor their
right of reinstatement to their respec-
tive positions.

“Section 5. Provided, however, that
any policeman, or member so removed
shall within thirty (30) days from the
date of such removal, make written ap-
plication or request to the police com-
missioner of the City of Tulsa for re-
instatement. The person making such
application or request shall retain a
copy of same, upon which shall be

272

endorsed the date of the service of the
original notice upon the police com-
missioner of said City, and said Police
Commissioner shall sign his name
thereto. The original notice shall be im-
mediately filed with the City Auditor
of said City, who shall endorse thereon
the date of such filing. Said original
notice, or a copy thereof, so endorsed
and signed, shall be evidence of the
fact of the service of said notice.

“Section 6. Provided, further that
such policeman, or member, must re-
main a resident of the City of Tulsa,
and must be able to comply with all
of the provisions of this Amendment,
with reference to eligibility for the

original appointment in said Police De-
partment.
“Section 7. The term, ‘member of

the police department,’ as used herein,
means: All persons other than police-
men appointed in said department
whese ditties eve to assist in the opera-
tion ané functioning cf the police de-
partment of said City of Tulsa.” (Em~
phasis ours.)

Plaintiffs contend and trial court
was evidently of the view that sec-
tion 2, above quoted, gives them the
right to their respective positions un-
less “removed” from them for cause
rendering them, in the opinion of the
board of commissioners, unfit to re-
main in the particular grade or rank
in which they respectively are serving
and they cite many cases in an attempt
to show that a “demotion” is a “re~
moval” within the terms of the quoted
article. At the trial, some of the offi-
cers’ commissions were introduced in
evidence to show that they were is-~
sued for the duration of “good behav-
ior’, while defendants, on the other
hand, introduced various exhibits re-
ferred to in their argument to show
the history of Tulsa’s municipal legis-
lation on this subject and related ones
and to demonstrate that it is not article
XIV’s purpose to forbid demotions or
promotions within the class of police
department employees referred to in
said article as “policemen”.

If, as we view this article, its word-
ing was not plain and unambiguous,

then considerable reliance might need
to be placed upon such evidence to
arrive at the true meaning and inter-
pretation of the article. But, as we view
it, that is not the situation, and it is
neither necessary nor appropriate to go
outside of its provisions to determine
its true meaning. 37 Am. Jur. p. 828,
par. 187, and cases cited in Notes 17
and 18 thereto. In the cited text it is
very aptly said: “A court in construing .
an ordinance or charter must take its
evident meaning as it reads * * *,” If its
wording is plain, clear and unambigu-
ous, it needs no aid from parol or oth-
er evidence, for its proper construc-
tion, 37 Am. Jur. p, 828, Note 19;
Sylvania v. Hilton, 123 Ga. 754, 51 S.E.
744, 2 LRA. (N.S.) 483, 107 Am. St.
Rep. 162. If, at the same time, its
meaning is reasonable and practical in
application and in view of the purposes
the legislation was intended to serve
and the objects sought to be accom-
plished, then the courts have no justi-
fiable reason for, and no power to, go
beycend said wording or to fabricate a
meaning that can only be arrived at by
the insertion of additional or different
wording therein. That would be legis-
lating, which is not a function nor with-
in the prerogatives of the courts,

We think it clear, from the fact that
section 2 of the article deals with “po-
licemen and members of the police de-
partment” collectively (prescribing the
conditions for their eligibility, appoint-
ment and service, as such, to the city
of Tulsa), that the word “positions”
therein refers to employment in the po-
lice department as a’whole or gen-
erally. It will be further noted that this
plural or collective subject in that part
of section 2 pertaining to removals, is
used again preceding the word “same”,
which unmistakably relates back to it.
The section reads: “All policemen or
members of the police department shall
hold their positions * * * and not be re-
moved from the same * * *”, rather
than: “Each policeman or member of
the police department * * * shall hold
his position * * * and shall not be re-~
moved from it except for such cause

* * *” Manifestly, the provisions with
reference to removal refer to “police-
men” collectively rather than to the
position or rank of any separate or in-
dividual one. The interpretation con-
tended for by plaintiffs would make
it necessary to insert the word “re-
spective” between the words “their”
and “positions” or in some other man-
ner, narrow, restrict or qualify the
broad reference evident in the words:
“their” and “same”. To us, it is ob-
vious that this was not the meaning
intended by said section. In this con-
nection, it is noted that the expression
“their respective positions” is used
in section 4, dealing with the reduction
of the number of “finger print and iden-
tification members, Bertillonists, me-
chanics * * *” ete., in said department.
It is only reasonable to conclude that
if the framers of the article had in-
tended section 2 to be interpreted as
plaintiffs contend for, they would and
could readily have inserted the word
“respective” in the same relative po-
sition between the words “their”? and
“positions” in that section, as they
did in section 4.

In view of this fact, it can only be as-
sumed that the inclusion of the word
“respective” in section 4 indicates an
intent to exclude it from section 2, and
that its exclusion from this section was
deliberate—that it was not contem-
plated that each individual policeman
or member of the police department
should remain “in the same capacity”
in the service of the city, “in which
he was then serving” unless removed
for cause and after written notice, as
plaintiffs contend. In this connection
see Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 543,
192 N.E. 145, 95 ALR. 1286, and 50
Am. Jur., 258, pars. 267 and 269. Such
a meaning would drastically hamper
and restrict, if not completely curtail,
all reapportionment or redistribution of
policemen within the department; thus
hindering and tying the hands of those
charged with the responsibility of its
operation and efficiency. Defendants
point this out and suggest that such a
narrow and restrictive construction of

273

the section would not only prevent de-
motions without a hearing, but by the
same token would seem also to prohibit
promotions, and other changes, trans-
fers of re-assignments, detrimental not
alone or the department as a whole, but
also to the individual policemen, them-
selves, Detailed elucidation is not nec-
essary to demonstrate that with refer-
ence to a law enforcement agency, the
leaving of “square pegs” in “round
holes” could result not only in loss of
efficiency, waste of money and dire
consequences for the public generally,
but it could very conceivably result in
loss of life by policemen themselves.

We think our interpretation of the
article is rendered even more eminently
correct by sections 5 and 6 thereof deal-
ing in more detail with the prelimi-
naries for removal of a policeman. It
will be noted that section 6 apparently
contemplates that such a policeman
(after removal) may move out of the
city of Tulsa, and it prescribes as a con-
dition for reinstatement that he “must
remain a resident of the City of Tulsa”
and keep himself eligible as for an
original appointment. Manifestly, such
a move or departure would not be an-
ticipated as incident to a demotion, or
promotion in rank, or transfer or re-
assignment within the department, in
all of which instances the policeman,
remaining an employee of the depart-
ment, would presumably also remain
a resident of the city of Tulsa, with
no break in or lapse of his original
eligibility. Also, this interpretation con-
forms with a previous one by this court
of similar wording in the superseded
section 30 of the Tulsa charter’s art.
XI, in the case of City of Tulsa v.
Johnson, 193 Okla. 501, 145 P. 2d 198.
There it was argued that each officer
had a right to the special position to
which he was appointed, until removed
through similar procedure prescribed
in that article, and we said:

“The charter provision which plain-
tiff invokes for his protection runs to
all policemen as a general group. It
does not apply separately to any par-

274

ticular assignment or subdivision with-
in the group. No inhibition exists in
the charter preventing a transfer of
policemen from one assignment to the
other as the welfare of the department
may require. The different assignments
within the police department cannot
be accurately compared with indepen-
dent departments or officers of the
city government such as the city trea-
surer of the city auditor.”

The views above expressed have been
followed repeatedly in a group of cases
involving the same section of the Tulsa
charter, among the more recent being
City of Tulsa v. Jacobs, 194 Okla. 189,
148 P. 2d 172.

We fail to see how reference to the
charter’s art. XIII, pertaining to the
city’s fire department, which was en-
acted several years before the one in-
volved here, in any way bolsters plain-
tiffs’ argument. On the contrary, it
would seem to support the view we have ~
taken, because section 4 thereof con-
tains the specific word “respective”
between the words “their” and “po-
sitions”, which was left out, but plain-
tiffs have tried to read into, the phrase
or expression involved here. Also, the
fire department article has many other
differences, the most decisive of which,
for the purpose of this inquiry, are pro-
visions dealing specifically and in de-
tail with demotions and promotions
upon the specific basis of “merit, ef-
ficiency and fitness,” Then, too, if it
were not already established to the
point of certainty that like expressions
and provisions were not intended to be
incorporated in the article before us,
casual reference to some of the history ,
of such legislation in Tulsa would seem
to point to the same conclusion. In this
connection, it is found that the essen-~
tial difference between removal of an
officer, on the one hand, and his pro-
motion, demotion,-or transfer, on the
other, was recognized in sections 3 and
11 of Ordinance 5280, enacted May 27,
1947, and specifically repealed by Or-
dinance No. 5485 almost a year later.
Section 3 of this superseded ordinance
specifically allowed the police commis-

sioner to transfer any policeman or
employee (except the chief of police)
“in his sole discretion,” but protected
seniority rights in case of such transfer,
etc. Section 11 specifically protected
the ranks of individual policemen re-
gardless of changes in the city admin-
istration and specifically prescribed
the procedure for notice and a hearing
on “demotions.” The now effective re-
pealing Ordinance No. 5485 specifically
retains for the police commissioner his
discretionary right to effect transfers,
but repeals and abandons the provi-
sions of the previous ordinance protect-
ing or “freezing” (as defendants call it)
policemen’s ranks after changes of ad-
ministration, as well as the former pro-
visions requiring notice and hearing in
cases of demotions.

In support of their construction of art.
XIV, plaintiffs cite cases construing
Teacher Tenure statutes, Civil Service
statutes and Home Rule Acts, of other
states, providing various merit plans
for personnel administration. Some of
the reasoning by these courts, such,
for instance, as the demonstration that
an employee may quite as effectively
be “removed” (from some practical
standpoints) by demotion, as by actual
discharge, are persuasive, but not con-
trolling. In this connection, see 62 C.
JS. 1510, 1511, pars. 737 and 738. As
hereinbefore indicated, the matter be-
fore us is controlled by the city charter
in question and not by general laws or
by the special enactments of other
municipalities, governmental units or
jurisdictions. Goodwin v. Oklahoma
City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P. 2d 762; City of
Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okla. 630, 46
P. 2d 334; Hinz v. Hubbard, 95 Okla.
164, 216 P. 440; Walton v. Donnelly,
83 Okla. 233, 201 P. 367; Larson
Civil Service Comm. of City of Ev-
erett, 175 Wash. 687, 28 P. 2d 289; 62
C.J.S, 371, 372, par. 198, p. 1424, par.
702, p. 1436, Note 55, p. 1457, Note 24,
p. 1471, par. 725.

Generally, the power to demote, or
promote, or remove an employee is an
implied part of the power to appoint

him and where the controlling charter,
ordinances or statutes contain no pro-
vision to the contrary, such power is
within the discretion of the appointing
authority, although there are laws and
authorities to the effect that the power
of appointment and removal cannot al-
ways be exercised arbitrarily or ca-
priciously. See Title 11, O.S. 1941 §334;
City of Wewoka v. Rodman, supra;
Horvath v. Mayor of City of Anaconda,
112 Mont. 266, 116 P. 2d 874; Morris v.
Parks, 145 Ore. 481, 28 P. 2d 215; Sheriff
of Salt Lake County v. Board of Com’rs,
71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783; 43 Am. Jur. pp.
31, 32, 33, pars. 183, and 184, pp. 52 and
53, par. 213; 37 Am. Jur. 865, par. 236,
p. 867, par. 239, p. 869, par. 240, Note 7,
p. 873, par. 244; 62 C.J.S. 1431, 1432, sec.
708, Note 90, p. 1471, sec. 725, Notes 38,
89 and 40, pp. 1508 and 1509, sec. 734,
Note 40, and sec. 735. See references to
some of these matters in cases cited in
the annotations at 99 A.L.R. 336. Such
power should be guarded carefully for
many sound reasons, some of which
have already been mentioned; and for
an employee to be held within the pro-
tection of any specific legislative re-
striction of such power, he must def-
initely show that his position comes
within the specific terms of such re-
striction. See Goodwin v. Oklahoma
City, supra; City of Wewoka v. Rod-
man, supra. The practical reasons for
such restrictive safeguards are conson-
ant with sound public policy and are
both numerous and obvious. If a munic-
ipal official board or commission is
to be charged with the responsibility of
the operation of a department, he or it
should certainly have the power to se-
lect, retain or promote those among the
group of eligibles who can be trusted to
carry out its policies and programs, per-
taining to such subjects as more effi-
cient operation and less waste, better
law enforcement, more courtesy to the
public, etc, and by the same token,
such authorities should have the power
to relegate to lesser rank, where they
will not prove obstacles to the carrying
out of such policies, employees who,

although generally qualified, are, by

275

training, experience, temperament or
for other reasons, less fit for the more
important or key positions calling for
greater or different skills, training,
talent, and/or responsibility in the de-
partment. Thus it will be seen that our
interpretation is not only dictated by
the wording of the charter itself, but
it accords with reason and practical
considerations. In this connection, see
City of Wewoka v. Rodman, supra,
where some of such considerations
were mentioned.

The fact that beginning in May, 1946,
some commissions may have been is-
sued to Tulsa policemen, naming or
promoting them to a certain rank
“during good behavior” does not mili-
tate against our conclusion. It is not ar-
gued that such commissions constitute
contracts of employment or assured
the officers upon whom they were be-
stowed, of being able to keep such
ranks during “good behavior.” (In
this connection see City of Tulsa v.
Melton, 175 Okla. 581, 54 P. 2d 159; 62
C.J.S. 1424, secs. 702, 707, pp. 1424.
1431.) It is merely said that they indi-
cate administrative interpretation of the
character. We think, however, that in
the present case any probative value the
wording of such commissions may have
on the question is overshadowed and
negated by the other matters we have
considered, and that such wording in
those issued after the repeal on May 7,
1948, of sections 3 and 11 of Ordi-
nance 5280, may as well be attributed
to official negligence, clerical habit of
following previous practice, or to any
one or combination of other factors, as
to so-called “administrative interpreta-
tion.”

In their second and third propositions,
defendants assert that the trial court
erred in vacating the part of the order
overruling their motion for a new trial
that required plaintiffs to give the in-
junction bond, and in refusing to ad-
mit testimony they offered at the June
20th hearing as to the amount such in-
junction was costing the city of Tulsa.
Incidentally, it is noted that the tenor

276

of this testimony is inconsistent with
one of the agreed factual premises upon
which this appeal was submitted. Of

more controlling importance, however, _

is the fact that this appeal proceeds
from the previous order or judgment
and that such errors, if any, were not
called to the trial judge’s attention by
any motion for a new trial, thus depriv-
ing him of the opportunity of consider-
ing them. It has long been an establish-
ed rule of appellate review in this juris-
diction in cases requiring, for the per-
fection of an appeal, the filing of and
ruling upon a motion for a new trial,
that this court will review only the er-
rors specified in said motion, and no
new or other assignments of error will
be considered. Bunch v. Humphreys,
174 Okla. 206, 50 P. 2d 337; White
v. Madison, 16 Okla, 212, 83 P. 798;
Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping
Co. v. Farnham, 1 Okla. 375, 33 P. 867.

As hereinbefore indicated the burden
was upon plaintiffs to prove that they
were given their “ranks”, as distin-
guished from their “positions”, on a
permanent or “good behavior” basis,
and that their threatened demotions
came within the provisions of art. XIV,
regarding “removal”, and warranted
the injunctive relief they sought, Cham-
plin Refining Co. v. Corporation Com-
mission of State of Oklahoma, 286 U.S.
210 52 S. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. 1062; 62
C.J.S. p. 1528, sec. 742. Such relief
is like mandamus in that he who seeks
it must show that he has a clear legal
right to it. See, in this connection,
State ex rel. Thomas v. Brenner, 171
Okla. 320, 42 P. 2d 823. In our opinion,
they failed to discharge this burden.
The judgment of the trial court to the
contrary was erroneous, and is hereby
reversed.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,

and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

JONES v. HOME INSURANCE CO.
. OF NEW YORK.

March 81, 1953.
255 P. 2d 489.

No. 35140.

Percy Hughes, Hobart, for plaintiff
in error.

Satterfield, Franklin & Harmon,
Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

DAVISON, J. By this action, Dolly
Jones, plaintiff, sought to recover from
the Home Insurance Company of New
York, a corporation, defendant, for the
total loss by fire of an automobile, al-
legedly covered by the terms of a
policy of fire insurance. The parties
will be referred to as they appeared in
the trial court.

Plaintiff purchased the automobile
here involved, a 1947 Frazer Manhat-

tan, in December, 1947, insuring the
same with defendant against loss by
fire. It was totally destroyed by fire
on May 5, 1948, while being driven by
her husband, Leroy Jones, in the State
of Texas. Plaintiff alleged in her peti-
tion, as amended, that any possession
of the car by the said Leroy Jones was
without her knowledge or consent and
that she did not know the mission or
business of the said Leroy Jones at
the time the car was burned.

The defendant, by answer, denied
generally the allegations in the peti-
tion and specifically alleged that at the
time of loss and in violation of the
terms of the insurance policy the ve-
hicle was being used in an illicit trade
and transportation, which relieved the
defendant from liabilty thereunder. A
trial of the case to a jury resulted in
a verdict and judgment for defendant,
from which plaintiff has perfected this
appeal.

Two questions are presented for de-
termination: namely, the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the verdict and
judgment, and the competency of the
documents by which defendant sought
to prove that Leroy Jones was illegally
transporting intoxicating liquor at the
time of the burning of the automobile.
These will be discussed inversely to
the order in which they are presented.

Over the objection and exception of
plaintiff, the trial court permitted de-
fendant to introduce in evidence a copy
of the information filed in the Texas
court, charging Leroy Jones with the
unlawful transportation of whisky in a
dry county, also a copy of the judgment
and sentence entered upon said Leroy
Jones’ plea of guilty. The objection to
the documents was not as to their au-
thenticity, but that they could not be
introduced in evidence in the ab-
sence of a pleading setting out the
Texas statute which was allegedly vio-
lated. In support of the argument, the
ease of Hinds v. Atlas Acceptance
Corp., 178 Okla. 474, 63 P. 2d 29; State
v. Wright, 193 Okla. 383, 143 P. 2d 801,
are cited and quoted. Those cases, how-

277

ever, differ materially from the one
at bar. There, the proffered evidence
was that of the contents of a foreign
statute. Here, the evidence was a
copy of a judgment wherein a viola-
tion of a foreign statute was adjudi-
cated. It makes little difference what
the statutory provisions were in the
light of a judgment where no question
is raised as to its authenticity or as to
the jurisdiction of the court rendering
it.

“Section 1 of art. 4 of the Federal
Constitution requires that we give full
faith and credit to the judgment of a
sister state unless it is absolutely void.
* * * Tt cannot be collaterally attacked
in other states. * * * The judgment is
conclusive in Oklahoma and re-exam-
ination of any of the issues therein is
prohibited.”

Moody et al. v. Branson et al., 192
Okla. 327, 136 P. 2d 925.

The trial court was correct in over-
ruling the objection to the admission
of the evidence,

As to the sufficiency of the evidence,
it must be borne in mind that this
case was tried to a jury and that the
judgment is based upon the verdict.
We are thus limited in review by the
universally adopted rule that:

“Tf there is any testimony reasonably
tending to support the verdict of the
jury, and said verdict has been ap-
proved by the trial court, the judgment
will not be disturbed on appeal.”

This rule quoted from the case of
Newsom v. Medis, 205 Okla. 574, 239
P. 2d 784, is only a restatement from
numerous earlier decisions.

Plaintiff testified that the said Leroy
Jones took the automobile without her
knowledge or consent and that she im-
mediately notified the officers of the oc-
currence. Her testimony, as a whole,
was very unsatisfactory, being filled
with evidences of an exceptionally
convenient memory (or lack of it). The
record contains the testimony of other
witnesses to the effect that plaintiff
and Leroy Jones had been married

278

some 27 years; that they had several
cars in addition to the one here in-
volved; that the said Leroy Jones was
seen driving this car on numerous oc-
casions, but they had never seen plain-
tiff driving it. Measured by the above-
quoted rule the verdict of the jury is
binding on this court.

The judgment is affirmed.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.CJ.,
and CORN, O'NEAL, WILLIAMS,
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

LARSON v. BUNCH.
No. 35605. March 31, 1953.
255 P. 2d 486.

Jerome Sullivan, Duncan, for plain-
tiff in error.

S. N. Bunch, Oklahoma City, for de-
fendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. The sole question posed
in this case is whether the action of
the mayor and the board of city com-
missioners of the city of Duncan, Okla-
homa, in declaring that A. N. Bunch,
defendant in error, had forfeited his
right to the office as a councilman or
city commissioner of ward four, and
declaring said office vacant, comports
to the principles of due process of law.

The facts are these: A. N. Bunch
and Floyd Cheeves were nominees for
the office of city commissioner from
ward four in an election held for said
office in the city of Duncan, Oklahoma,
in the month of April, 1951. Mr. Bunch,
receiving the highest number of votes
cast, received the certificate of elec-
tion and qualified by filing bond and
taking the oath of office. He attended
three commissioners’ meetings in May,
1951. On the 22nd day of May, Mr.
Bunch submitted his resignation as city
commissioner of ward four. The fol-
lowing day, and prior to any action
taken upon said resignation by the city
commissioners, he withdrew said resig-
nation from the office of the city clerk.
The record discloses that Mr. Bunch
was of the opinion that there should
be a change in the personnel of the
office of city attorney. His associates,

on the board, were of an opposite view,
and being in the majority they reap-
pointed the then acting city attorney.
Mr. Bunch thereafter stated to the city
clerk, and other persons, that it would
be useless for him to attend any fur-
ther meetings of the commission as he,
apparently, could not get along with
two members of the board. In a con~
versation with the mayor of the city,
he stated that he might resign from the
commission and expressed an opinion
that certain named residents of ward
four were good citizens and could de-
vote their time to the duties of the
office.

Mr. Bunch spent part of the sum-
mer months visiting his daughters in
Wyoming, returning on two occasions
in the month of August to his home at
Duncan, and he was also present in
September at the trial of the cause in
the district court of Cheeves v. Bunch.

On September 17, 1951, the city com-
missioners caused the following journal
to be entered upon its minutes:

“Mayor Sharp talked to the Board
about declaring the office of Commis-
sioner in Ward Four, vacant. After
some discussion, Thomas A. Gray made
a motion as follows: ‘I move that
we declare the office of City Commis-
sioner in Ward 4 to be vacant for the
reason that A. N. Bunch at one time
filed his resignation with the City Clerk,
then withdrew it; that he has announced
privately and publicly that he did not
intend to attend any more meetings;
that he has not attended any more
meetings; that he has either moved
from Ward 4 or has been gone for suffi-
cient time from his home, with no ex-
planation, that we can assume that he
does not intend to live in that Ward or
take part in the affairs of the City;
that the people of Ward 4 is entitled
to representation on this Council and
that A. N. Bunch apparently does not
intend to represent them. For these rea-
sons I so move.’ Second by Leroy Tuc~
ker. Vote aye all. Nay none. Mayor
Sharp declared the motion carried and
the office of Commissioner for Ward 4
vacant. Thomas A. Gray made a mo-
tion that K. P. Larson be appointed as

279

Commissioner of Ward 4. Second Leroy
Tucker. Vote aye all. Nay none.”

Prior to this action of the board, and
in August, 1951, Mr. Bunch, in a con-
versation with Mr. Smith, the city
clerk, advised Smith that he intended
to serve out his term as city commis-
sioner from ward four if the then pend-
ing case of Cheeves against himself
was decided in his favor. It appears
that there was then pending in the
district court of Stephens county, and
not disposed of, an action in which
Floyd Cheeves was contesting the right
of Mr. Bunch to hold the office of
city commissioner of ward four. The
Cheeves v. City of Duncan case was af~
firmed by this court March 10, 1953, and
appears in 208 Okla. 187, 254 P. 2d 765.

After the action of the commissioners
vacating the office of commissioner of
ward four, the board appointed K. P.
Larson, plaintiff in error, to fill out
Mr. Bunch’s unexpired term of office,
which term expires in May, 1953. In
the trial court the issues were found
generally in favor of Mr. Bunch, and
from the order denying a new trial,
K. P. Larson appeals.

Mr. Larson contends that the board’s
action must be sustained under the
terms of the charter of the city of Dun-
can, as well as under certain statutes
to which we will advert. Under his
assignment that the trial court’s judg-
ment is contrary to law, he calls our
attention to the provisions of art. 3,
§124, of the charter of the city of Dun-
can, which provides in part as follows:

“Tn the event of the death, resigna-
tion or removal of either of the five
(5) Commissioners, the other four (4)
Commissioners shall elect a Commis-
sioner to serve the unexpired term.”

He also relies upon section 82, of the
amended charter of the city of Duncan
which provides that:

“Sec. 82. In addition to the powers
conferred by the Constitution of the
State of Oklahoma, and subject to the
limitations and restrictions imposed
thereby and by the laws of said State

280

not rendered inoperative by the adop-
tion of this Charter, said City shall
have such legislative, executive and ju-
dicial powers, and exercise the same in
such manner as may be necessary, in-
cident or proper to the conduct of its
business and affairs, and to the pro-
motion of the interests and securing of
the rights of inhabitants as fully as if
specifically and in detail enumerated
herein. The enumeration, hereinafter,
of any particular shall in no wise limit
the plenary powers vested by this Sec-
tion.” .

Lastly, he refers us to Title 11 O. S.
1951 §572, which provides:

“The Council may, by a vote of ma-
jority of all the members to be en-
tered upon the journal, remove for
cause any officer except the mayor.”

It is urged by defendant’s counsel
that, under sec. 124 of the charter, the
plaintiff, Bunch, has forfeited the of-
fice, for the reason he moved from the
ward after his election.

We are of the view that the word
“removal” as employed in sec. 124 in
the city charter, supra, must be con-
strued in the sense in which the word
“removal” is employed in 11 O. S.
1951 §571. Under the latter section, a
councilman must be an actual resident
of the ward from which he is elected,
and his removal from the ward shall
cause a vacancy in his office.

The Cheeves case was tried in the
district court of Stephens county on
September 6, 1951; taken under advise-
ment until September 14th, and upon
the latter date, it was decided in favor
of Mr. Bunch. After the decision in the
Cheeves case, Mr. Bunch wrote the city
clerk that he would attend the October
meetings of the board. The record dis-
closes that Mr. Bunch testified as fol-
lows:

“Did you write any communication
from Wyoming to anybody stating that
you would cccupy the position when
you got back? A. I did. Q. Who was
it written to? A. Mr. Smith, the City
Clerk. Q. What was the nature of that
communication? A. I wrote him that I

noticed in the paper the Cheeves suit
was settled in my favor and I would
be home for the October commission-
er’s meetings. Q. What did you learn
when you got back? A. I learned in the
next paper I got that they had vacated
my office and put Mr. Larson in. Q.
Did you have any intention of staying
outside the State of Oklahoma? A. I
didn’t. Q. Was it your purpose to con-
tinue to serve as commissioner from
Ward 4 on your return? A. That’s
right.”

The removal order was entered three
days after the judgment in the Cheeves
case. The removal order was entered
without knowledge or notice to Mr.
Bunch.

In passing we observe that the record
discloses the utmost good faith upon
the part of the commissioners in enter-
ing the order of removal. Due process
demands that a removal for “cause”
be based upon notice and an opportunity
to be heard. The principle is announced
in 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers, §212,
which reads:

“While the circumstances that an
officer holds for a fixed term does not
prevent his removal without notice or
hearing where an unconditional power
of removal is conferred, according to
the weight of authority, an officer is
entitled to notice and a hearing in or-
der that he may have an opportunity
to defend, the statute not providing oth-
erwise, where he holds for a definite
term, whether he holds for a term of
years, for life, or during good behavior,
or, whether or not he holds for a defi-
nite term, where, under the law, he
may not be dismissed except for cause
or for specified causes.”

Although Title 11 O. S. 1951 §572 does
not in terms authorize an appeal from
an order of the council declaring an
office vacant for cause, the weight of
authority sustains the defendant in er-
ror’s contention that such an order with-
out notice or opportunity for a hearing
is void. The principle was first an-
nounced by this court in 1904, in the
case of Christy v. City of Kingfisher,
13 Okla. 585, 76 P. 135, and thereafter

announced in the case of Akin, County
Supt., v. Harris, 138 Okla. 30, 280 P. 291.

The board was of the view that
“cause” existed for Bunch’s removal
from office; that “cause” is recited in
the order; that at one time Bunch
filed his resignation with the city clerk
and then withdrew it; that he has an-
nounced privately and publicly that he
did not intend to attend any more meet-
ings, and that he has not done so; that
he has either moved from ward four,
or has been gone for sufficient time
from his home with no explanation;
that the board can assume that he does
not intend to live in the ward.

The board’s assumption that Bunch
moved from the ward is as the board
says, “an assumption.’ The evidence
in the record, however, discloses that
he owned a residence which he oc-
cupied at the time he was elected, and
which he occupied immediately prior
to his visit to Wyoming, and also oc-
cupied on several occasions during the
month of August, when he returned to
Duncan, and also occupied at the time
of the trial of the Cheeves case. More-
over, the record discloses that a few
days before he was removed from of-
fice he had advised the city clerk, in
writing, of his intention to attend board
meetings in October.

Although, as a general rule, the
board of commissioners has the au-
thority to remove an appointed officer,
with or without cause, such authority
does not extend to an elective officer
with a definite term of office, and as
here where the elected officer was not
given notice and an opportunity to be
heard in opposition to the proposed
removal order.

The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

281

POWELL v. STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION et al.

No. 35690. March 31, 1953.
255 P. 2d 493.

Robert B. Harbison, Altus, for peti-
tioner.

A. R. Daugherty and Fenton & Fen-
ton, Oklahoma City, and Mac Q. Wil-
liamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

DAVISON, J. Tom Powell, claimant,
filed his first notice of injury and claim
for compensation, stating that on Octo-
ber 23, 1948, while operating a tie
press, commonly called a dinkey and
hereinafter called a press, the press
exploded and he sustained an acciden-

282

tal injury when a board struck his
toes, The trial commissioner after sev-
eral hearings entered an award for
permanent disability to the body as a
whole. On appeal to the commission en
banc the award was vacated and an or-
der entered denying an award. This
proceeding is brought to review the
final order of the State Industrial
Commission.

Claimant testified that he was on the
east side of the press. This press is
used to break the bands or ties on
pales of cotton so that they can be
compressed, The press operates by
steam; the steam cylinder used in the
operation exploded and his hand was
caught in the tie of a bale of cotton.
A fellow employee and the foreman,
Hogan, cut his hand loose from the
pale of cotton. Claimant testified that
when the press exploded it threw a
board approximately two feet longer
that the press across and over his
feet striking the toes of both feet. An
employee, William Fields, also testi-
fied that when he reached claimant,
the board was on claimant’s feet, and
that he, Fields, removed the board
from his feet.

Willie Lee Harris, an employee at
the press at the time it exploded, tes-
tified that claimant’s hand was caught
in the bale of cotton when he arrived
on the side of the press where claimant
was working. Harris did not testify
that any board or other object struck
claimant’s feet. The only other witness
at the scene of the accident was Percy
Thomas. He was on the west side of
the press loading the press. He was
going toward the press when the ac-
cident happened. When he saw claim-
ant, claimant was in the press and a tie
or band on the bale of cotton was hold-
ing his arm and his body was lying
“kind of” against the bale of cotton.
The board, referring to the board
claimant said struck his feet, had
blown around and claimant was stand-
ing “kind of” on the board. This board
was placed over a depression under-
neath the press.

William W. Hogan, foreman of Trad-
ers Compress Company, testified that
he was attracted by the noise made by
the explosion and hurried over to the
scene of the accident. Claimant’s arm
was caught in the band on the bale of
cotton at the wrist. When Hogan
reached the scene of the accident the
bale of cotton was still in the press.
Field was there when Hogan arrived.
At the direction of Hogan, Field got the
cutters and cut the bale thus freeing
claimant’s hand from the tie. Hogan
took Willie Lee Harris and claimant
to the superintendent, Voorhies, who
took both Harris and claimant to the
office of Dr. Reed, the company phy-
sician.

Claimant testified that Dr. Reed
treated his hand for a slight injury and
that claimant requested that he look at
his feet, but that Voorhies, the super-
intendent, stated there was nothing
wrong with claimant’s feet and that
they returned almost immediately to
the compress where claimant resumed
his work. He also testified that his
feet became so infected that he was
foreed to quit work on December 8,
1948. Thereafter, he was operated by
Dr. Ensey.

There was no attempt to establish at
the trial any injury to the hand, It
completely healed after the treatment
by Dr. Reed. All the controversy arises
as to the disability to the feet.

Dr. Ensey testified for claimant. He
first saw claimant May 26, 1949, and
treated him thereafter until he operated
him on October: 12, 1949, and his ulti-
mate release thereafter. He explained
in detail his reasons for believing the
disability resulted from an injury
which infected his toes. The left foot
was taken off by an operation referred
to as “lesflank”. According to the tes-
timony of Dr. Ensey claimant has a
permanent disability resulting from this
injury.

Dr. Becker was the anesthetist at the
operation performed by Dr. Ensey and
supported the theory that the acciden-
tal injury occasioned the disability.

Dr. Raymond H. Fox, physician and
surgeon of Altus, Oklahoma, testified
that he first saw Thomas Powell De-
cember 11, 1948. Thomas Powell had
quit work on December 8, 1948, and tes-
tified that he quit work because his
toes became so infected he was un-
able to stand on his feet. Dr. Fox
treated him from December 11, 1948,
until February 3, 1949. He stated that
claimant had a circulatory disturb-
ance and was not getting enough blood
in his feet, that the tissue was rotting
out; that he diagnosed the disease as

" Buerger’s disease. He testified that he
cleaned out the infection in the toes and
the feet would heal and then break
down; that the condition of claimant
was chronic and witness was also of
the opinion that it was of long standing;
that claimant at first gave no history
of trauma but after a month or so he
began talking about an accident he
has sustained at the compress. Before
this claimant had given no history of
any injury to his toes or his feet; that
witness found no condition in his treat-
ment of claimant which would indi-
cate that any of his difficulty was due
to trauma; that he found no fracture
of the toes; that in his opinion claim-
ant was suffering from Buerger’s dis-
ease alone and concluded that claim-
ant’s disability was not due to the ac-
cidental injury of October 28, 1948.

Dr. John R. Reed testified that he
treated claimant on October 23, 1948,
and October 24th thereafter, for a
bruised and injured arm, the history
being that a press blew up or a spring
gave way and caught claimant’s arm;
that at the time claimant made no com-
plaint about his feet and made no claim
that he had injured his feet. He fur-
ther testified he had examined claim-
ant a week before his testimony and
found the condition described by Dr.
Ensey in his testimony after the op-
eration on the feet; that he diagnosed
the condition as Buerger’s disease. He
gave it as his conclusion that the disa~
bility of claimant was not due to the
accidental injury of October 23, 1948,

283

or to any other injury, but was due to
the diseased condition of his feet.

It is first contended that the order
denying the award is not sustained by
any competent evidence. Claimant
cites Protho v. Nette, 173 Okla. 114, 46
P. 2d 942, and related cases. These
cases are authority for the rule that
where there is no competent evidence
to sustain an order either making or
denying an award this court will vacate
the order or award for that reason,

This court has repeatedly held that
whether a disability results from an
accidental injury or disease or other
causes is a question of fact, and if
there is any competent evidence rea-
sonably tending to support the order
made by the State Industrial Commis-
sion thereon, it will not be disturbed
on review. Johnson v. Ben Franklin
Ref. Co., 194 Okla. 347, 151 P. 2d 428;
Banning v. Peru-Laclede Syn., 179 Okla.
382, 65 P. 2d 976; Hollis v. Mid-Conti-
nent Pet. Corp., 174 Okla. 544, 51 P. 2d
498; Souder v. Mid-Continent Pet. Corp.,
187 Okla. 698, 105 P. 2d 750. See, also,
Nelson v. Carter Oil Co., 195 Okla. 317,
157 P. 2d 163. In Hollis v. Mid-Conti-
nent Pet. Corp., supra, we said:

“Tt therefore appears that from the
testimony, the nature of which has been
many times approved by this court,
submitted to the commission by com-
petent physicians, they choose to adopt
as their finding of fact those in support
of the respondent. Under the above au-
thorities, it is neither the province nor
the duty of this court to interfere
with the order of the commission based.
thereon.”

By a review of the above testimony,
it may be seen that it is in irreconcil-
able conflict. There is competent evi-
dence sustaining the finding of the
State Industrial Commission that the
disability was not due to the acciden-
tal injury of October 23, 1948.

In a fina] proposition it is argued
that the order is indefinite, uncertain
and should be sent back to the Indus-
trial Commission for further findings

284

under the doctrine announced in Cor-
zine v. Traders Compress, 196 Okla.
259, 164 P. 2d 625; Adams v. City of
Anadarko, 198 Okla. 484, 180 P. 159,
and related cases. We do not agree. The
finding is as follows:

“That on or about the 23rd day of
October, 1948, claimant was in the em-
ploy of respondent herein, engaged in a
hazardous occupation, subject to and
covered by the provisions of the Work-
men’s Compensation Law, and on said
date claimant sustained an accidental
personal injury, arising out of and in the
course of his employment with respond-
ent, consisting of an injury to his right
arm.

“That at the time of said injury,
claimant’s compensation rate, based on
his average earnings, was $24.00 per
week. That claimant lost no compen-
sable time from work by reason of his
right arm injury.

“That claimant sustained no perma-
nent disability to his right arm by rea-
son of his injury of October 23, 1948;
and therefore, claimant’s claim for com-
pensation herein should be denied.

“That claimant did not sustain an ac-
cidental personal injury to his feet on
October 23, 1948; and the permanent
disability that claimant now has to his
feet existing at this time is as a result
of the Burger’s (sic) disease and not
as a result of an accidental personal
injury; and therefore, claimant’s claim
for compensation herein should be de-
nied.”

The above-quoted portion of the order
reflects that it was the intention to
find that the disability did not result
from any’ accidental injury sustained
by claimant but was the result of
Buerger’s disease alone.

In Banning v. Peru-Laclede Syndi-
cate, Inc., supra, p. 384, 179 Okla. Re-
ports, at page 979, 65 P. 2d, we said:

«“« * * While the commission could
have more properly said that upon re-
view of all of the evidence they had
found that claimant had failed to prove
any disability resulting from his acci-
dent of May, 1934, we are of the opin-
ion that the meaning and intent of the

finding and order clearly results in a
determination of the issue of fact from
a consideration of all the evidence, al-
though the phraseology indicates the
sustaining of a demurrer. We conclude
that the commission intended to and did
say that the claimant had wholly failed
in his proof to establish his claim of
disability; that they chose to believe
the evidence before them which tended
to establish the fact that claimant had
never sustained any permanent injury
as a result of the accident of May 17,
1934, and therefore he was not entitled
to an award of compensation. * * *”

Order denying the award is sustained.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

ROWLEY v. FOSTER.
No, 34879. March 81, 1953.
255 P. 2d 501.

G. C. Spillers, and G. C. Spillers, Jr.,
Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Pierce, Rucker, Mock, Tabor & Dun-
ean, Tulsa, for defendant in error.

CORN, J. This action was brought
by Raden D. Rowley to recover for per-
sonal injuries. Raden D. Rowley died
pending the action and the cause was
revived in the name of A. D. Rowley,
administrator of her estate. The case
was tried to a jury which returned

a verdict for the defendant, and from
the judgment entered thereon plaintiff
appeals.

On October 15, 1948, at approximately
4:30 in the afternoon, Raden D. Row-
ley was a passenger in an automobile
when it collided with a bulldozer on
Harvard avenue in Tulsa county, Okla-
homa. At the time of the collision the
automobile was being driven by Mrs.
John McCoy. Mrs. McCoy testified, in
substance, that the day was clear and
there was no obstruction of her vision
as she approached Harvard avenue and
started traveling north; that she was
one-fourth mile from a tractor with a
blade in front, commonly referred to as
a bulldozer, and a ditch-digging ma-
chine, and that she could see for ap-
proximately one mile down Harvard
avenue; that she collided with the ma-
chine as she approached it going ap-
proximately ten miles per hour; that
she thought she had cleared the ma-
chine but it was suddenly and unex-
pectedly driven in her path, the blade
of the bulldozer striking her right
front wheel.

The testimony is in irreconcilable
conflict. Other witnesses testified that
a ditch was being dug on the east side
of Harvard avenue for the purpose of
laying water pipe; that the dirt from
the ditch was piled to the center line of
the paved road; that the bulldozer
which the automobile struck was fac-
ing south with both treads on the east
side of the center line of the paving;
that the blade of the bulldozer was
from twelve to fourteen inches over
west of the center line before the col-
lision; that there was sufficient room
for cars to pass to the left of the dirt
pile and the bulldozer; that no one was
operating the bulldozer but that it was
stationed straddling the dirt pile; that
the workmen were preparing to close
up for the night and were waiting to
place the last length of pipe in the
ditch preparatory to filling the ditch
with the use of the bulldozer so that
the project would not be a hazard to
traffic. A highway patrolman testified
that in his opinion the automobile was

285

traveling at approximately 35 miles
per hour when it struck the bulldozer,
that it struck the blade of the bull-
dozer; that all of the automobile was on
the pavement; that the impact turned
the bulldozer a few inches west; that
the driver had been drinking; other
witnesses testified that the driver had
been drinking. Several witnesses for
defendant testified that there was a
barrier approximately 140 feet south of
the tractor and dirt-digging machine.
Mrs. McCoy testified there was no bar-
rier. The highway patrolman testified
that there was such barrier when he
arrived; that he received his report of
the accident at 4:50 p. m. and arrived
on the scene at 5:05 p. m.

This is in substance the testimony.
The sole issue presented is that the
court erred as a matter of law in sub-
mitting instructions of contributory neg-
ligence, relying upon the rule an-
nounced in Miller v. Price, 168 Okla.
452, 33 P. 2d 624, to the effect that it
is error to submit an instruction on
contributory negligence where there is
no evidence thereof. Therein Miller,
a passenger, sued Price, the owner
and driver of the automobile and judg-
ment was entered for defendant and
Miller appealed. The driver of the ve-
hicle had been proceeding in a reason-
able manner but suddenly cut out of
the line of traffic into the path of a
vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction. Miller argued it was error
for the trial court to instruct on contrib-
utory negligence. There the driver
was confronted with a sudden emer-
gency.

No such fact situation is presented in
the case now under consideration.

Plaintiff also cites Thrasher v. St.
Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 86 Okla. 88, 206
P, 212. Therein plaintiff was riding as
a passenger with a companion when
struck by defendant’s train. In that
case it is stated:

“In an action for damages for the al-
leged negligent killing of plaintiff's de-
cedent at a public railway crossing,
where the defendant railway company

286

pleaded the contributory negligence of
the deceased, and that such contribu-
tory negligence consisted of certain
acts of the deceased, it was the duty of
the trial court to submit the issue of
contributory negligence to the jury, as
raised by the pleadings and the evi-
dence, and the instructions to the jury
ought to have reference to the circum-
stances of the case and be so given as
to secure a fair consideration and judg-
ment of the jury on the points in issue
as raised by the pleadings and the evi-
dence.”

In Haynie v. Olson Drilling Co., 189
Okla. 527, 118 P. 2d 230, plaintiff was
riding in an automobile as a passenger
when it collided at an intersection with
a truck. Therein the court said:

“As a second proposition for reversal,
plaintiff urges that the trial court erred
in giving an instruction upon contribu-
tory negligence. In the case of Miller
v. Price, 168 Okla. 452, 33 P. 2d 624,
we held that where a review of the evi-
dence in the case and all inferences
which way reasonably be drawn there-
from permits but one conclusion, which
is that no contributory ngligence has
been shown, it is error for the trial
court to submit an instruction upon con-
tributory negligence notwithstanding
the provisions of section 6, article 23,
of the Constitution. Okla., St. Ann. @
the case of Stillwater Milling Co.
Templin, 182 Okla. 309, 77 P.:2d 732,
this court pointed out that a passenger
or guest in an automobile must use or-
dinary care for his own safety, and
when the exercise of such care requires
that he call the attention of the driver
to approaching danger, he must do so
or be open to the charge of contributory
negligence. See 5 Am. Jur,. Automo-
biles, sec. 475 et seq., and authorities
therein cited.

“In the instant case it is shown that
plaintiff was familiar with the highway
over which the automobile was travel~
ing immediately prior to the collision;
that plaintiff knew of the intersection.
We have heretofore pointed out that
the evidence was conflicting as to the
speed of the automobile as it approach-
ed the intersection, and that it was
agreed that the pavement was slippery
on account of rain. Under all the cir-
cumstances presented in the instant

case there is presented a question of
fact as to whether or not the driver of
the automobile in which plaintiff was
riding was exercising due care in ap-
proaching the intersection; therefore,
is was incumbent upon the jury to de-
termine whether or not the plaintiff was
chargeable with the duty of calling
the attention of the driver to the ap-
proaching danger. We conclude that
the trial court did not err in submitting
an instruction to the jury upon contrib-
utory negligence.”

Where there is any evidence at all
of contributory negligence, the issue
or the defense is thus presented, and by
section 6 of art. 23 of the Oklahoma
Constitution, the finding of the jury on
that issue is final. Midland Valley R.
Co. v. Townes, 179 Okla. 136, 64 P. 2d
712, discussing Miller v. Price, supra;
Dickinson v. Cole, 74 Okla. 79, 177 P.
570, affirmed by Supreme Court of the
United States, in Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co. v. Cole, Adm’r, 251 U. S. 54, 40S. Ct.
68, 64 L. Ed. 133; Fay v. Brewer et al.,
181 Okla. 554, 75 P. 2d 425.

In Blossom Heath Operating Co. v.
Pipkin, 178 Okla. 617, 63 P. 2d 982,
plaintiff was injured by being knocked
down on the floor of a dancing hall.
The trial court refused to submit the
issue of contributory negligence. In
reversing the case this court held that
the evidence warranted the submission
of this issue.

We believe the case nearest in point
is Stillwater Milling Co. v. Templin,
182 Okla. 309, 77 P. 2d 732, wherein
this court reversed a judgment for
plaintiff for failure to instruct on con-
tributory negligence. Plaintiff recov-
ered a judgment for personal injuries
which resulted when an automobile
driven by her husband with whom she
was riding struck two cars and a
truck of the defendant Milling Com-
pany. Therein this court said:

“The negligence of the driver of a
car is not imputed to his wife who is a
mere passenger in the automobile he
is driving, and she may to a large ex-
tent rely on his skill and experience;
but she is, like any other passenger,

within the rule which requires a guest
to use ordinary care for his own safety.
What conduct makes a guest guilty of
contributory negligence ordinarily is a
question of fact to be decided by the
jury under appropriate instructions.

“Where contributory negligence is
made an issue, and there is any com-
petent evidence introduced on the is-
sue, the issue always must be sub-
mitted to the jury.”

The jury would have been justified
in finding Raden D. Rowley and Mrs.
McCoy, the driver, were both residents
of Tulsa and familiar with the road
involved in the accident; that Mrs. Mc-
Coy passed the barrier at not less- than
35 miles per hour and while driving
at approximately such speed and at-
tempting to pass the bulldozer while
it was standing still struck the blade
thereof causing the injury to plaintiff.

As to whether or not from all of the
facts and circumstances Raden D. Row-
ley was guilty of contributory negligence
was a question for the jury. The court
did not err in the instruction given.

Judgment affirmed.

P|
SHIRES et ux. v. REYNOLDS et ux.
March 31, 1953.

255 P, 2d 491.

No. 35563.

287

T. Austin Gavin, Tulsa, for plaintiffs
in error.

Cc. R. Thurlwell, Tulsa, for defend-
ants in error.

ARNOLD, J. Oren T. Shires and his
wife, Laura M. Shires, plaintiffs in er-
ror, filed a suit in Tulsa county against
defendants in error, W. L. Reynolds
and Fern Reynolds, for breach of war-
ranty alleging failure to pay taxes as-
sessed against property conveyed by
Reynolds to plaintiffs, which taxes had
been paid by plaintiffs to meet the re-
quirements made by a building and loan
company on application for loan. A
predecessor in title of Reynolds pro-
cured a correction order by the county
commissioners of Tulsa county purport-
ing to cancel the taxes in question.

This is the second time this case has
been appealed, Shires v. Reynolds, 203
Okla. 573, 224 P. 2d 580, The affidavit
now assertedly filed before the issuance
of the correction order was not in the
former record, nor was the certificate
of error or the correction order.

In our former opinion we held:

“Orders of an administrative board
in the performance of quasi-judicial
functions will be declared invalid un-
less its jurisdiction affirmatively ap-
pears.”

The taxes collected accrued and were
assessed for the years 1929, 1930, 1931
and 1932. As disclosed by our former
opinion a 1937 Act of the Legislature
dealing with the same subject matter,
to wil: the issuance of correction or-
ders by the county commissioners, was
held unconstitutional before the original
trial of this cause, and as further dis-
closed by our former opinion, the 1916
act which was the only authority avail-
able requires that “good cause” be
shown for not appearing before the
board of equalization as a prerequisite

288

to the issuance of a correction order.
The record before us at that time did
not show the jurisdiction of the board of
county commissioners nor was the evi-
dence on the point sufficient to dis-
close “good cause”. The cause was “re-
veised”. After the mandate was spread
of record the trial judge permitted Rey-
nolds to file an amended answer, set
the cause for trial, and tried it over
the objections of plaintiffs who sought
judgment in accordance with our opin-
ion.

On retrial an affidavit purportedly
filed by the applicant for the correc-
tion order was introduced in evidence.
This affidavit is as follows:

“State of Oklahoma, County of Tulsa,
SS:

“Application for Correction of Erron-
eous Assessment.

“To; The Honorable Board of County’

Commissioners of Tulsa County, State
of Oklahoma.

“Comes now C. L. Penn, the under-
signed, who first being duly sworn says
that he is a non-resident of the State of
Oklahoma and that the described prem-
ises, attached hereto, were erroneously
and excessively assessed in excess of
their fair taxable value for said years.

“That the undersigned did not ap-
pear before the Board of Equalization
for said years, for the reason that he
is a non-resident of the State.

“Tt is therefore, asked that the Board
of County Commissioners strike said
assessment for said years and re-assess
said property as set out in the attached
Exhibit by deducting the amounts as
therein shown.

“C. L. Penn

“Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 27th day of March, 1937.

“O, E. Clift, Notary Public
“Ellis County, Texas

“My commission expires May 31,
1937.”

Also, the alleged minutes of the com-
missioner’s meeting at the time of the

presentation of the application for cor-
rection order were introduced and are
as follows:

“Thursday, April 1, 1937.

“A special meeting of the Board of
County Commissioners was called by
the Chairman, John H. Miller, at the
hour of 9:00 A.M., and the following
members were present: John H. Miller,
Chairman; J. B. Gray and Harry L.
Hopkins, members.

eae

“Motion by Commissioner Hopkins,
seconded by Commissioner Gray, that
the application for correction of erron-
eous assessment filed by C. L. Penn,
covering real estate in Tulsa County,
Oklahoma, for the years 1929, 1930, 1931,
and J932, be and the same is hereby
granted and the County Clerk is hereby
instructed to issue a certificate of error
covering same. All members voting in
the affirmative, motion was by the
Chairman declared carried.”

Oral testimony was adduced by a
witness who was a county commis-
sioner at the time the correction order
was entered and who had testified at the
former trial that he had no independent
recollection of the presentation of the
application herein questioned. On cross-
examination he again admitted that he
had no independent recollection of the
showing of “good cause”. J. B. Gray,
another county commissioner at the
time of the entry of the order, also
testified but said that he had no inde-
pendent recollection of the matter what-
ever. One Tune testified that Penn, the
owner when the taxes were assessed
and who procured the issuance of the
correction order, was a resident of the
State of Texas, but now deceased.

The principle of law determined by
this court in the former appeal consti-
tuics the law of this case. The correc-
tion order referred 10 as a judgment
by Reynolds does not show jurisdiction
of the commissioners to enter it and
the testimony hereinbefore detailed is
wholly insufficient to show “good
cause”. A showing of nonresidency
alone is not sufficient to show the

“good cause” required by the 1916 act
and the other testimony has no proba-
tive value.

The order of correction was and is
invalid and the trial judge is ordered
to vacate the judgment heretofore en-
tered and enter judgment for the plain-
tiff for the amount sued for together
with proper interest.

Reversed.

HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, O’NEAL,
WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
concur.

S. W. ANTHONY ESTATE et al. v.
YOUNG et al.

No. 35569. March 31, 1953.
255 P. 2d 496.

289

Covington & Donovan, Tulsa, for pe-
titioners.

Streeter Speakman, Jr., Sapulpa, and
Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., for re-
spondents.

DAVISON, J. On the 28th day of
May, 1951, Oat Young, hereinafter
called claimant, filed his first notice of
injury and claim for compensation, stat-
ing that on March 17, 1950, while
employed as an oil field roustabout, he
sustained an accidental injury arising
out of and in the course of his em-
ployment with S. W. Anthony Estate,
employer, when he was struck on the
head by a falling piece of machinery. At
the conclusion of a hearing conducted to
determine the cause and extent of dis-
ability, claimant was given 15 per cent
permanent disability. Petitioners con-
cede that there is sufficient medical tes-
timony to sustain the finding of acciden-
tal injury and resulting disability, but
raise two questions to review this re-
ward.

It is first contended that the claim
is barred by 85 O.S. 1951 §43, for the
reason that it was not filed within one
year after the accidental injury or com-
pensation paid in lieu thereof.

85 O.S. 1951 §43 provides, in part,
as follows:

“The right to claim compensation
under this Act shall be forever barred
unless within one (1) year after the in-
jury or death a claim for compensation
thereunder shall be filed with the Com-
mission. Provided, however, claims
may be filed at any time within one (1)
year from the date of last payment of
any compensation or remuneration
paid in lieu of compensation.”

We have held under this section that
claims are barred when not filed within
the provisions thereof. Vaughan v. Shell
Pipe Line Corp., 204 Okla. 175, 228
P. 2d 180; Denver Producing & Refin-
ing Co. v. Holding, 199 Okla. 418, 186
P. 2d 815. On the other hand, we have
held that the statute is tolled by the
furnishing of medical attention. Wilcox
Oil Co. v. Fugua et al., 203 Okla. 391,
224 P. 2d 255; Domestic Laundry & Dry

290

Cleaning Co. v. Weston, 200 Okla. 13,
190 P. 2d 460.

Claimant contends that a claim was
filed within one year after the date
upon which medical attention was last
furnished by his employer and that the
claim was timely filed.

The question is, then, do the facts
and circumstances sustain the conten-
tion that there was sufficient timely
medical attention given claimant to
toll the statute. We think they do.
Claimant testified that on the 17th day
of March, 1950, he was pulling tubing
to be used on a well and went into the
doghouse to get a drink of water and
that a heavy valve on a shelf dropped
on his head. This valve weighed ap-
proximately six pounds. He worked the
following day which was Saturday. He
was off for a few days, and on the 21st
day of March, 1950, he was sent by his
employer to Dr. Curry. He was seen
thereafter by Dr. Curry on March 27,
1950, April 18, 19, 1950, and on May 6,
11, 20, and 25, 1950. Claimant continued
to work for his employer. The evldence
is in dispute as to when Dr. Curry
first released respondent from further
treatment. Dr. Curry testified that he
released claimant on May 25, 1950,
while respondent testified that the date
of release was May 28, 1950. However,
under the law governing this opinion,
this discrepancy in fact is immaterial.

Claimant testified that in the early
part of 1951 his “head kept getting
worse, got to hurting at night.” That
his head hurt him when “I got out of
bed, or hurt when I got in bed.” That
on April 14,.1951, and again on April 28,
1951, he (claimant) went to Dr. Curry
for further treatment. That Dr. Curry
took some X-ray pictures and recom-
mended that claimant have a spinal
test for a blood test. Claimant did not
want to take the spinal block for the
reason other doctors had stated that his
blood was pure.

Dr. Curry made a report to the pe-
titioner insurance company based on
these later visits and determined from

the X-rays that the claimant had no
disability. This report constitutes a
portion of petitioners’ evidence in the
present record. Petitioners contend that
these later examinations, treatments,
recommendations and report of Dr.
Curry were insufficient to toll the stat-
ute because claimant failed to prove
that the April, 1951, consultations were
with the approval of the petitioners.

We find that the continued medical
treatment received by claimant in Ap-
ril, 1951, was sufficient to toll the stat-
ute.

It is finally contended that since the
petitioners raised the issue before the
State Industrial Commission of the
bar of the statute of limitations under
the above section set out and quoted,
it was the mandatory duty of the State
Industrial Commission to make a spe-
cific finding that it had jurisidiction
and that the claim was not barred be-
fore proceeding to enter an award. We
do not agree. Petitioners have cited a
number of cases, among them, Nuway
Laundry Co. v. Trice, 182 Okla. 518,
78 P. 2d 706; Southland Cotton Oil Co.
v. Pritchett, 157 Okla. 264, 11 P. 2d
486, and related cases. These cases in-
volve the failure to give the statutory
written notice provided by 85 O. S, 1951
§24, and the failure of the State Indus-
trial Commission to make a finding ex-
cusing the giving of such written no-
tice. They are not in point in the case
under consideration. We have found no
case in point which has considered the
failure of the State Industrial Com-
mission to make a specific finding on
the jurisdictional question of whether
or not a claim has been barred by the
one year statute. This is a jurisdiction-
al question and as such will be reviewed
by this court. Roe v. Jones & Spicer,
Inc., 196 Okla. 582, 167 P. 2d 70. Where
the State Industrial Commission makes
or denies an award and on appeal the
issue is presented to this court, it is
necessary for this court to make an
independent finding on this issue. The
statute does not require the State In-
dustrial Commission to make a specific

iy
oS
x

finding thereon. We, therefore, hold
that it is not necessary for the State
Industrial Commission to make a spe-
citic finding as to whether the claim
was barred. .

Award sustained.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

WILSON et al. v. GREGG.
No. 34653. Dec, 23, 1952.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1953.
255 P. 2d S17.

Rainey, Flynn, Green & Anderson.
Oklahoma City, and Biddison & Rheam,
Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.

Mosteller, McElroy & Fellers, by
James D. Fellers, Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs filed a
petition in which they allege that on the
ist day of April, 1946, they entered
into a written partnership agreement
with the defendant under the firm name
of Gregg-Wilson Fire Protection Com-
pany. They attached to their petition
as Exhibit “A” a contract of partner-
ship in which they agreed to operate
a business located in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for the purpose of selling,
installing and maintaining automatic
sprinkler systems and other fire protec-
tion and extinguishing equipment. They
agreed to do all such things as may be
necessary and advisable in connection
therewith; and in establishing, conduct-
ing and maintaining said business to
make and execute contracts and agree-
ments, * * * and to acquire, purchase,
hold, lease, sublease, sell and convey
such real or personal property as may
be necessary or required with any or
all of the aforesaid business. The con-
tract is quite lengthy and it is not
necessary to recite all of its provisions.
Paragraph 15 thereof provides that if
any dispute, difference or question shall
arise between the partners, or their
representatives, in regard to the man-
ner in which the business is being

292

transacted, or between the partners
with respect to their accounts, or in
connection with the dissolution or the
winding up of said business, or the con-
struction, meaning or effect of this spe-
cial partnership agreement, or anything
therein contained, or the rights of lia-~
bilities of the partners, or their repre-
sentatives under these presents, or
otherwise in the premises, then every
such dispute, difference or question
shall be referred to arbitration of three
disinterested persons. This paragraph
further provides for the manner of the
selection of the arbitrators, the manner
of notice to interested parties and the
effect of the award of the arbitrators.
The petition also alleges that a dispute
arose between the parties and that
plaintiffs proceeded under the terms of
the partnership agreement to have the
dispute arbitrated; that they selected
an arbitrator and the arbitrator so se-
lected by them gave notice to the de-
fendant that he had been selected as
an arbitrator and that he would pro-
ceed to determine all issues of fact
and law under the terms of the special
partnership agreement at a certain
time and place.

The petition further alleges that de-
fendant, through his attorney, declined
to appoint an arbitrator and he gave
as reasons for so declining that the
partnership agreement expired ‘by its
terms in April, 1948, and further that
the partnership agreement provided, in
effect, that either of the general part-
ners might withdraw from the spe-
cial partnership and sell his interest to
the other general partner and that this
was done under a partnership agree-
ment dated January 31, 1948, and that
there was no binding agreement be-
tween, the partners which provides
for the appointment of arbitrators.
That the defendant did not appoint
an arbitrator, declined to participate in
arbitration and did not appear or take
part in any hearing before the arbitra-
tor appointed by the plaintiffs. That the
arbitrator made a finding that the de-
fendant was liable to plaintiffs in the
sum of $4,586.05. The petition prays for

a judgment against the defendant for
the amount found due by the arbitrator.
The petition pleads that all the steps
were taken on the part of plaintiffs to
consummate the arbitration. By amend-
ment to the petition the plaintiffs plead
that defendant is estopped to deny the
validity of the arbitration agreement
for the reason that defendant permitted
plaintiffs to incur attorneys’ fees and
arbitrator’s expenses.

The defendant demurred on the
ground that the petition did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendant.

Upon argument of the demurrer it
was stipulated in open court that the
first cause of action pleaded in the pe-
tition is the alleged arbitration award
and that the second or alternative cause
of action is for an accounting and that
the defendant might demur separately
to them even though they are not set
forth or numbered in the petition. The
court sustained the demurrer to the
first cause of action which pleaded the
arbitration award to which the plain-
tiffs excepted. The court overruled the
demurrer to the second cause of action
for an accounting to which the defend-
ant excepted. The case is here to test
the ruling of the trial court in sustain-
ing the demurrer to the first cause of
action. Attorneys for plaintiffs present-
ed their case for reversal on four prop-
ositions:

1. Where the only unsettled issue be-
tween the parties was that of the
amount due, if any, by the partners to
the partnership, the determination by
an arbitrator was but a condition pre-
cedent to the right of either to recover
as upon an accounting.

2. The power given by defendant and
the right to an arbitrator under para-
graph 15 of the partnership agreement
was supported by a valuable consider-
tion, and was not revocable, either un-
der the statute governing powers, or
under principles of the common law.

3. The defendant’s acts in relation to
the proposed arbitration in declining

to appoint an arbitrator or to partici-
pate therein did not constitute a revo-
cation of the power of right of arbitra-
tion.

4, Even if the defendant had the right
of revocation and his action would oth-
erwise constitute a revocation, he is es-
topped to assert the revocation for the
reason set out in the plea of estoppel.

We cannot agree that any of the rea-
sons given are valid under the record
before us. The contract in question is
quite broad. It provided for the sub-
mission to arbitration of any future con-
troversies between the parties as to
any and all matters which might or
could arise. By the contract, if we hold
that it is legal, the parties bound them-
selves on all types of questions both of
fact and law to abide the findings and
conclusions of arbitrators without re-
sort to the courts. Arbitration agree-
ments have been sustained in a number
of cases by this court, but we find no
ease, and none is cited, in which an
arbitration agreement providing for
the submission of all future contro-
versies to arbitration has been upheld.
Generally arbitration agreements to
submit controversies arising in the fu-
ture have been held unenforceable be-
cause they deprive the courts of juris-
diction and are contrary to public pol-
icy. The decisions of some courts hold
that such agreements are void. Other
courts hold that such agreements are
voidable and still others hold that such
agreements are not enforceable. There
is a line of decisions which hold that
even though the agreement is not en-
forceable it is binding if acted upon by
both parties thereto and an award
made. Some authorities have held that
an agreement to submit minor elements
of a future controversy to arbitration
is binding. There is authority both in
the decisions of the courts and in text~
writers sustaining arbitration provided
for by constitutions, by-laws, rules and
regulations of lodges and other volun-
tary associations on the theory that such
associations make their own rules and
jaws and the courts will not interfere
with such association’s enforcement of

293

such rules. But the great weight of au-
thority is to the effect that an agree-
ment such as is involved in this case is
not enforceable and that an action will
not lie based upon the findings and con-
clusions of the arbitrators. There are de-
cisions to the effect that agreements to
arbitrate are a condition precedent to
an action on the original cause. We are
not dealing in this case with any of the
exceptions or distinctions above men-
tioned. In Oklahoma the common law
of arbitration prevails.

38 Am. Jur., Arbitration and Award,
par. 27, announces the rule:

“Although in any specific case per-
sons may make a judicial tribunal for
themselves by a submission to arbitra-
tion, at common law their power to do
so is hedged about by the most cau-
tious rules. It is said that there is an
obvious distinction between cases where
an agreement that the decision of des-
ignated persons shall be conclusive is
made after a dispute has actually aris-
en, and cases where it is made before
any controversy exists. After a right
has accrued or an obligation has been
incurred, one may waive or decline to
enforce his rights, or by contract, bind
himself to submit the matter to arbitra-
tion, but he cannot bind himself by con-
tract in advance to renounce his right
to appeal to the courts to redress his
wrongs, for this right is one which in
its nature is inalienable.”

The rule is stated in 3 Am. Jur., Ar-
bitration and Award, par. 31, in the
following language:

“So long as agreements to arbitrate,
made in advance of the controversy,
remain executory, different rules pre-
vail than in the case of executed
agreements. It is settled at common
law that a general agreement, in or
collateral to a contract, to submit to
final determination by arbitrators the
rights and liabilities of the parties
with respect to any and all disputes
that may thereafter arise under the
contract is voidable at will by either
party at any time before a valid award
is made, and will not be enforced by the
courts, because of the rule that private
persons cannot, by a contract to arbi-

294

trate, oust the jurisdiction of the legally
constituted courts.”

A power as the term is used in 60 O.S.
1951 $183, is an authority to do some
act in relation to real property, or to
the creation or revocation of an estate
therein, or a charge thereon, which the
owner granting or reserving such power
might himself perform for any purpose.
Sec. 181 also provides that powers in re-
lation to real property are those which
are specified by the statute. Sec. 194
of the same statute provides that pow-
ers may be created only: First, by a
suitable clause contained in a grant of
some estate in the real property to
which the power relates, or in an agree-
ment to execute such grant; or second,
by a devise contained in a will.

Arbitration is defined by 3 Am. Jur.,
Arbitration and Award, par. 2:

“Arbitration is a mode of settling dif-
ferences through the investigation and
determination, by one or more unoffi-~
cial persons selected as a domestic tri-
bual for the purpose, of some disputed
matter submitted to them by the con-
tending parties for decision and award,
in licu of a proceeding for a judgment in
an established tribunal of justice. Its
object is speedily to determine dis-
putes and controversies by quasi judi-
cial means, thus avoiding the formal-
ities, the delay, the expense, and the
vexation of ordinary litigation.”

The nature of arbitration and award
is set out in 3 Am. Jur., Arbitration and
Award, par. 4:

“Although an agreement for arbitra-
tion may create substantive rights be-
tween the parties as is the case with
any other contract, arbitration itself is
a form of procedure whereby differ-
ences may be settled. It is not a defini-
tion of the rights and wrongs out of
which differences grow. The law of ar-
bitration is, in the United States at
least, a part of the law of remedies, ra-
ther than of the substantive law. Arbi-
tration, in theory, is a substitute
for a proceeding in court, athough in
formal respects it may differ there-
from. Unlike procedure in the estab-
lished courts, an arbitration depends,
for its existence and for jurisdiction

over parties and subject-matter, upon
the voluntary agreement of the par-
ties, known as the submission, subject
to limitation only by express provisions
of law. A reference to arbitration oc-
curs only where there is a difference
or matter in dispute between two or
more persons which requires a decision
of a judicial, rather than a ministerial,
nature.”

That a power is not arbitration and
that arbitration is not a power and that
the two terms are governed by different
rules and are intended as entirely dif-
ferent and distinct remedies is appar-
ent from an examination of the same.
Counsel say that they find no decisions
holding that the term “power” as used
in the Oklahoma statutes modifies or
affects the law of arbitration. Power
is created by one or more parties. Ar-
bitration is always created by two or
more parties. Power is a lien on real
property in its embrace from the time
the instrument creating it takes effect;
a stipulation to arbitrate creates no
lien. Power can create authority to
deed, mortgage, rent and otherwise deal
with real property; arbitrators have no
authority except to make an award.
The exercise of a power is ministerial;
the act of making an award by arbi-
trators is quasi judicial. Powers are
created by provisions in a grant of real
property or in instruments to execute
such grants or by a devise contained in
a will. Agreements to submit to arbi-
tration and submission to arbitration
are by stipulation of two or more par-
ties. Authority may be given by one
to execute a power after death of tes-
tator and the beneficiary named to en-
joy the benefits or to execute the trust.
It would be a rare case indeed if a
testator should provide in his will for
arbitration and appointment of arbitra-
tors. In the view that we take it is im-
material in this case whether power, as
defined by 60 O.S. 1951 §183, applies
only as to real property or to both real
and personal property. Power is defined
by the Oklahoma Legislature and arbi-
tration in Oklahoma is as it exists at
common law and listed above are a few
of the differences between the laws of

power and the laws of arbitration. We
find nothing to indicate that the Legis-
jJature had in mind in the enactment of
powers to modify the common law on
arbitration. This court, in the case of
Kuhara Trading Co., Ltd., v. Russell
Jobbers Mills, 103 Okla. 298, 230 P. 242,
in the body of the opinion said:

“We have no statute on arbitration
in this state and only the common law
to govern arbitration. In states that
have statutes on arbitration, they are
governed by the statute and the au-
thorities from those states are based
on the statute, while in states that have
no statute they are governed by the
common law.”

Ce Re

“But unless there is an arbitration
and findings, it is not binding on the
parties, and some of the cases hold
that either party may withdraw from
the arbitration at any time before the
trial award. This being a common law
state on the question of arbitration, we
do not think that the clause in the con-
tract relating to arbitration precludes
the defendant from recovering on its
cross-petition.”

One of the contentions urged in this
case is that the agreement to arbitrate
was not revoked as provided by the law.
Under the common law unmodified by
statutes the agreement in this case is
unenforceable and may be revoked at
any time before award. The case of
Sartwell v. Sowles, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Vermont and reported in
72 Vt. 270, 48 Atl. 11, 82 Am. St. Rep.
943, says:

“A submission to arbitration may be
revoked by either party, at any time
before an award is made and published,
notwithstanding an agreement not to
revoke, and when the submission is re-
voked it is no bar to a subsequent
action.”

The case of People ex rel. Union In-
surance Co., of Philadelphia v. Nash,
reported in 111 N. Y. 310, 7 Am. St. Rep.
747, in deciding the question of revo-
cation, uses the following language:

“Submissions to arbitration are rev-
ocable in their nature, and the par-

295

ties cannot make that irrevocable which
is of its own nature revocable,”

The same question was decided by
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in
Home Fire Insurance Co., of Omaha,
v. Kennedy, reported in 47 Neb. 138, 66
N.W. 278, 53 Am. St. Rep. 521, where
the court said:

“A stipulation for arbitration, which
does not provide for submitting the mat-
ters in dispute to a particular person,
or to a particular tribunal, but to one
or more persons to be mutually cho-
sen, is revocable by either party, and
will not oust the jurisdiction of the
court having cognizance of the sub-
ject matter of the controversy.”

In the case of Pepin v. Societe St.
Jean Baptiste, 23 R. I. 81, 49 Atl. 387,
91 Am. St. Rep. 620, in the body of the
opinion, on page 623, the court used the
following language:

“The finality of such an agreement is
objectionable for several reasons. The
reason generally given is that it ousts
courts of jurisdiction, and so deprives
a party of his rights under the law.
While he may waive those rights in a
given case, when he knows the cireum-
stances and the effect of his act, it is
held to be contrary to public policy for
one to bar himself in advance from a
resort to the courts for some future con-
troversy of which he can have no knowl-
edge at the time of the original agree-
ment. At first sight this may seem to
interfere with the obligation of a con-
tract, but it is not so. All the elements
of the contract affecting liability re-
main, the agreement to arbitrate relat-
ing only to remedy. It is to be pre-
sumed that a just decision will be
reached in either case, and hence nei-
ther party suffers injury. A resort to
the courts may be very necessary to a
claimant because he cannot compel the
attendance of witnesses before a vol-
untary tribunal; or the matter may
be of so great interest to the members
as to preclude impartial arbitrators.”

In the notes to the case of Williams v.
Branning Manufacturing Co., 153 N. C.
7, 68 S. E. 902, beginning at page 637
of 138 Am. St. Rep. Freeman, in his
comments upon the law of revocation,
at page 641, states as follows:

296 |

“The authorities are numerous which
recognize the rule that an agreement
or stipulation to submit matters in con-
troversy to arbitration may be revoked
by either party thereto at any time be-
fore the award is made, except when
the matters are referred to arbitrators
by a rule of court, or the statute pro-
hibits a revocation.”

The case of Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road Co., v. Stankard, reported in 56
Ohio St. 224, 46 N. E. 577, 60 Am. St.
Rep. 745, holds that an agreement to ar-
bitrate future controversies is not en-
forceable. In the body of the opinion, at
page 747, the court states the rule in the
following language:

“Courts are created by virtue of the
constitution, and inhere in our body pol-
itic as a necessary part of our system
of government, and it is not compe-
tent for anyone, by contract or other-
wise, to deprive himself of their pro-
tection. The right to appeal to the
courts for the redress of wrongs is one
of those rights which is in its nature
under our constitution inalienable, and
cannot be thrown off, or bargained
away.”

The Supreme Court of Utah, in John-
son v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P.
2d 1132, states the law in the following
terms:

“Statute providing for arbitration of
disputes existing at time of, making of
arbitration agreements held not to ap-
ply to agreements to arbitrate future
disputes.”

The common law of arbitration has
been changed by statutes in some
states and Congress has enacted spe-
cial statutes governing arbitration in
maritime controversies. In building con-
tracts, sales of goods and lands, and, in
other transactions, provisions for ap-
praisement have been sustained. The
law governing arbitration and the law
governing contracts for appraisal is a
very different thing.

It is urged by plaintiffs that they in-
curred an expense to their attorney and
to the arbitrator and that by reason of
same the defendant is estopped to deny

the validity of the award. As above
pointed out, a stipulation to arbitrate fu-
ture controversies may be revoked at
any time before the making of the
award. In this case the defendant,
through his attorney, on two occasions,
declined to take part in the arbitration
proceedings. He took the position that
there was nothing to arbitrate and de-
clined to appoint an arbitrator and did
not appear or participate in the hear-
ing.

The defendant is not estopped to deny
the effect of the award.

Affirmed.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Roscoe C. Arrington, Leon-
ard Carey, and Joe H. Reily, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and CORN, DAVI-
SON, JOHNSON, and BINGAMAN, JJ.,
concur. WELCH, GIBSON, and 0’
NEAL, JJ., dissent.

NABOB OIL CO. v. BAY STATE OIL
& GAS CO.

No, 34779. Feb. 24, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1953.
255 P. 2d 513,

Hudson, Hudson & Wheaton and O. C.
Essman, Tulsa, and Ted Foster, Okla-
homa City, for plaintiff in error.

Embry, Johnson, Crowe, Tolbert &
Shelton, V. P. Crowe, and John A. Phil-
lips, Oklahoma City, for defendant in
error.

WILLLIAMS, J. Parties will be re-
ferred to as in the trial court.

Plaintiff and defendant herein own
certain oil properties as partners. Be-
ginning in October, 1944, they carried
on negotiations orally and by letter de-
signed to bring about a dissolution of
the partnership and a division or sale
of the properties involved. Due to vari-
ous disagreements, they were unable to
come to an understanding, and in Au-
gust, 1945, plaintiff filed its petition ask-
ing for an accounting and a partition or
sale of the properties. While the suit
was pending, plaintiff filed a supple-
mental petition alleging a change in
circumstances in that since suit had
been commenced, defendant had made
a written offer to sell its interests to
plaintiff; that plaintiff accepted the of-
fer orally; that defendant now refuses
to execute its alleged contract; and
asking, as an additional cause of action,

297

that the contract be specifically en-
forced. Attached to said supplemental
petition were twenty-two exhibits, con-
sisting of letters between the parties in-
volved.

Defendant demurred to said cause of
action; the demurrer was sustained;
plaintiff elected to stand on such cause
of action as stated, and from judgment
sustaining demurrer thereto, appeals to
this court. All the errors complained of
in petition in error go to the proposition
that the trial court erred in sustaining
the demurrer, and in rendering such
judgment, and may be considered to-
gether under that general heading.

An examination of the record herein
reveals that the alleged offer to sell was
made by letter dated November 14, 1946,
and that it provided for a time limit of
five days thereafter in which plaintiff
must accept or reject. Plaintiff alleges
oral acceptance on January 5, 1947.
However, an examination of plaintiff’s
exhibit 14 shows that plaintiff rejected
the offer by letter in unqualified terms
on November 27, 1946. The first para-
graph of the letter of November 27, 1946,
from president of plaintiff corporation
to president of defendant corporation
reads:

“Your letter of the 14th instant, with
enclosures, received. In reply you are
advised that in my opinion your propo-
sals are not sufficiently complete for
acceptance.”

Said letter then goes on to detail vari-
ous objections to the offer, at great
length, and nowhere indicates even a
qualified acceptance of the offer. On the
contrary, some new proposals are
made, the making of which in itself con-
stitutes a rejection of the original of-
fer.

12 Am. Jr., Contracts, §36, reads as
follows:

“An offer is terminated by rejection
and cannot thereafter be accepted so
as to create a contract. A request for a
change or modification of a proposed
contract, made before an acceptance
thereof, amounts to a rejection of it.”

298

To the same effect is the following
holding of this court in Hartzell v.
Choctaw Lumber Co., 163 Okla. 240, 22
P. 2d 387:

“In order that an offer and accept-
ance may result in a binding contract,
the acceptance must be absolute, un-
conditional, and identical with the terms
of the offer, and must in every respect
meet and correspond with the offer;
and any qualification of or departure
from those terms invalidates the offer.”

We hold, therefore, that the offer ex-
pired by its own terms five days after
it was made, and further that it was
rejected in writing by plaintiff in his
letter of November 27, 1946. It is ele-
mentary that plaintiff could not revive
the offer by orally accepting it on Janu-
ary 5, 1947, after its rejection on Novem-
ber 27, 1946, and the petition does not
allege that it was revived or renewed by
defendant between those dates.

But plaintiff alleges that said offer
was renewed by defendant by letter
dated April 30, 1947, and that plaintiff
accepted such renewed offer orally on
June 10, 1947.

The letter of April 30, 1947, was at-
tached to plaintiff’s petition as Ex-
hibit 15, and reads in part as follows:

“#7 have felt that you should have
another opportunity to take over our
interests in either or both of the prop-
erties on the basis of the offers which
we made to you last fall***

“We are willing to repeat to you the
buy or sell proposition which we made
to you last fall or, if you want the
Thlocco interest, we will exchange our
half of the working interest in that
property for your half interest in the
Olive block properties, contingent on
the reinspection of the Olive equipment.
You realize, I am sure, that we would
have in mind selling those properties
immediately and not operate them since
the operation cannot be profitable for
us.”

Even if this could be construed as a
renewal of the offer hereinabove refer-
red to (which is doubtful, since a read-
ing of other exhibits attached to plain-

tiff’s petition shows that several offers
were made “last fall”) plaintiff still
cannot sustain its cause of action, be-
cause of a letter written by its employee
on June 10, 1947. Said letter is attached
as an exhibit to plaintiff's petition, and
plaintiff is bound by its own pleadings.
The letter quoting president of plaintiff
corporation, reads in part:

“He also stated that you people were
to blame in the first instance for these
arrangements for gas and were also to
blame for the matter having dragged
as long as it has for you have sought
to avoid a trial of the suit.***

*T am taking the authority to make
the above statements and basing them
upon Mr. Owens attitude as expressed
to me about three weeks ago when he
was in the office for a brief period.
At that time I called to his attention
your letter of April 30th about Thlocco
and Nabob buying your interest in the
jointly owned leases. He stated he
would try to work out a deal with you
in order to get the matter behind him
and instructed me to work up a state-
ment, to June Ist of the accounts be-
tween your company and Thlocco and
Nabob so that everything would be set-
tled and closed at one meeting and in-
dicated he would try to get to the mat-
ter on or before June Ist. ** *

“Under the circumstances, it will be
July ist, or later before he can act on
your proposal. ***

“P.S. Just as I was about to mail this
letter Mr. Owens arrived at the office
for a brief interval on an emergency
trip from the field. I explained what I
had written. He stated my position was
exactly correct. ***

“He also stated that if you attempt
to withhold as you suggest he will make
no move towards working out the settle-
ment with you as he has recently been
inclined to do but will have the suit re-
vived and tried in an effort to get the
matter cleaned up at the earliest possi-
ble date. In short he was decidedly dis-
pleased with your proposal and feels
that you alone are to blame for the
delay in the suit not being tried dur-
ing which delay the gas account has
arisen.”

It is evident from a reading of the
letters attached as exhibits to plaintiff's
petition, and particularly from those
portions above quoted, that there is a
decided variance between the allega-
tions of the petition and the import of
the exhibits attached thereto, and a part
thereof. In such cases, this court has
held many times that the language of
the exhibits must control over the
averments of the pleader. In Devine v.
Pyanhunkah, 170 Okla. 178, 39 P. 2d
132, this court said:

“Tt has been decided many times by
this court that where there is a con-
flict in the allegations set forth in the
pleadings and the exhibits thereto at-
tached, upon which the cause of action
is based, the language of the exhibit
is controlling.”

See Deere v. Gypsy Oil Co., 160 Okla.
237, 15 P. 2d 1086, wherein the court
said (Syllabus 1):

“Where there is a variance between
the allegations of the petition and ex-
hibits attached thereto as a basis of
suit, the contents of the exhibits control
and prevail over the allegations of the
petition.”

See, also, Billingslea v. Billingslea,
194 Okla. 400, 152 P. 2d 276; Mason v.
Slonecker, 92 Okla. 227, 219 P. 357;
Home Insurance Co. of New York v.
Whitchurch, 139 Okla. 1, 281 P. 234.

Bowker v. Linton, 69 Okla. 280, 172
“P. 442, is a case remarkably similar
to the case at bar. Therein, plaintiffs
alleged a contract for the sale of real
estate, as evidenced by letters attached
as exhibits to the petition. Defendant
demurred to the petition; the demurrer
was sustained; plaintiff stood on his pe-
tition and appealed. This court affirmed
the order of the trial court sustaining
the demurrer, upon the grounds that
the letters attached to plaintiff’s peti-
tion did not show an enforceable con-
tract. Therein it was stated by the court
(Syllabus 2):

“The letters which are attached to
the petition in the case as exhibits,
showing the contract sought to be en-

299

forced, must control when in conflict
with the averment of the petition, in
determining whether or not an enforce-
able contract has been entered into.”

From the above, it is evident that
the trial court’s decision to sustain the
demurrer was based, not upon any sup~
posed violation of the statute of frauds,
but upon a proper conclusion that plain-
tiff’s exhibits directly-controverted the
averments of its petition and con-
trolled, and affirmatively demonstrated
that no acceptance of an offer was ever
in fact made. It will therefore not be
necessary to consider plaintiff’s argu-
ment that the statute of frauds was not
violated.

The judgment sustaining the demur-
rer is affirmed, and the case is remand-
ed to the trial court for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with the views ex-

- pressed. herein,

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, AR-
NOLD, O’NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
concur. HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH,
J., dissent.

JAMES v. PENNINGTON-WINTERS
CONST. CO, et al.

No. 35450. March 3, 1953.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1953.
256 P. 2d 156.

300

Schwoerke & Schwoerke, Oklahoma
City, for petitioner.

Looney, Watts, Ross, Looney & Smith,
Oklahoma City, and Mac Q. Williamson,
Atty. Gen., for respondents.

CORN, J. On the 29th day of August,
1951, Jimmie James, hereinafter called
claimant, filed his first notice of injury
and claim for compensation stating that
on May 17, 1951, he sustained an acci-
dental injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment while em~
ployed as a pipeliner with Pennington-
Winters Construction Company, re-
spondent.

Thereafter, on the 9th day of October,
1951, an order was entered granting
temporary total disability from the date
of the accident covering a certain period
and all payments under this order have
been made. Thereafter, on motion of
the claimant, the matter was set for
hearing on the 10th day of December,
1951. The State Industrial Commission
found that all liability for the temporary
disability resulting from the acciden-
ta] injury had been paid and that there
was no permanent disability resulting
from the accidental injury.

Claimant has perfected this proceed-
ing on appeal from said order and
raises the single issue that the State
Industrial Commission erred as a mat-
ter of law in failing to enter an award
for permanent disability.

At the hearing immediately prior to
the order of December 10, 1951, there
was no further testimony by the claim-
ant as to the cause and extent of the
accident. He had formerly testified that
while employed in constructing a pipe
line he was pulling brace boards out of
an eight inch, foot cut ditch when he
became overbalanced and was thrown
into the ditch catching his right leg

under him and severly straining his
back.

Dr. C. A. Gallagher called as a wit-
ness for claimant at the second hearing
testified that as a result of the acci-
dental injury claimant had a severe
pain in his back; that there was a disa-
bility resulting therefrom and that in
his opinion this degree of disability was
permanent. On cross-examination he
admitted that this assumption was
based upon the fact that claimant
needed a corrective operation.

Dr. A. C, Lisle and Dr. Thornton Kell
both filed reports and the purport of
their testimony is that claimant had a
temporary disability resulting from the
accidental injury and that there is no
permanent disability resulting there-
from.

Claimant’s first contention is that the
finding of the State Industrial Commis-
sion made in its first order and the
finding made in its final order are in-
consistent. In the final order it is
stated:

“That claimant’s period of temporary
total disability ended as of October 22,
1951; and claimant has heretofore been
paid compensation at $25.00 per week
from the date of injury, less the five
day waiting period, to October 22, 1951,
pursuant to the Order of October 9,
1951, entered herein. That claimant has
failed and refused to take the opera-
tion provided for in the Order of Octo-
ber 9, 1951.

“That from the medical testimony in-
troduced herein, the Trial Commis-
sioner finds that claimant sustained no
permanent disability.”

In the first order the State Industrial
Commission found that claimant sus-
tained an accidental injury on the 17th
day of May, 1951, consisting of an in-
jury to his back and then made the
following finding:

“That claimant should submit to an
explanatory operation at the hands of
Dr. D. H. O’Donoghue, and such repair
work as is necessary to be done at
that time, Doctor O’Donoghue to con-

sult with Doctor A. C. Lisle, and Doc-
tor Lisle to be present at the time of the
operation. That O’Donoghue should
have consultation with Doctor Lisle
during claimant’s convalescence after
the operation and Doctor Lisle to ex-
amine claimant as he sees necessary
and proper during claimant’s convales-
cence, All this to be at the expense of
respondent and/or insurance carrier.”

Claimant relies upon Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co. v, Phillips, 162 Okla. 149,
19 P, 2d 576, wherein the court stated:

“Where the State Industrial Commis-
sion makes inconsistent findings of
fact on the material issues in the case,
upon petition to review in this court,
the award of the Industrial Commission
will be vacated and the cause remanded
with instructions to the commission to
make consistent findings of fact and
refuse or award compensation accord~
ingly.”

This case is not in point. Rather the
case is to be determined by the rule
announced in Hollis v. Mid-Continent
Pet. Corp., 174 Okla. 544, 51 P. 2d 498,
and Souder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corp. et al., 187 Okla. 698, 105 P. 2d
750, wherein this court held that where
the evidence is in conflict and would
be sufficient either to sustain or deny
an award and there is no other matter
of law involved, the question as to
whether there is any disability is one of
fact to be determined by the State In-
dustrial Commission. In Hollis v. Mid-
Continent Petroleum Corp., supra, we
said:

“It therefore appears that from the
testimony, the nature of which has
been many times approved by this
court, submitted to the commission by
competent physcians, they choose to
adopt as their finding of fact those in
support of respondent. Under the above
authorities, it is neither the province
nor the duty of this court to interfere
with the order of the commission based
thereon.”

The order denying the award is sus-
tained.

HALLEY, C.J. JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACK~
BIRD, JJ., concur.

301

WOODRUFF et al. v. GUNKEL et ux.
No. 35094. April 7, 1953.
255 P. 2d 941.

C. D. Lewis, Okmulgee, for plaintiffs
in error.

LL. Cowley,
fendants in error.

PER CURIAM. This is a suit upon an
appeal bond given by the defendants,
U. S. Wocdruff and Mrs. U. S. Wood-
ruff, as principals, and Harold Key
and Dallas Marlbrough, as sureties,
in a justice of peace court action for
unlawful entry and detainer decided
January 28, 1949.

Okmulgee, for de-

302

The superior court on the appeal also
rendered judgment against the defend-
ants who then filed a supersedeas bond
and appealed to the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma.

Upon motion of the defendant in er-
ror, the appeal was dismissed as frivo-
lous in Woodruff v. Gunkel, 202 Okla.
408, 214 P. 2d 709. Thereafter, George
Gunkel and Maudy Gunkel brought suit
in the superior court off Okmulgeb
county upon the appeal bond given in
the original action in the justice of
peace court, and recovered judgment
for $400, being double the rental value,
together with costs of $14.45 and costs
of the original forcible entry suit in
the amount of $22.

From this decision and judgment, the
defendants appeal to this court.

The petition in error in this case
specifies nine assignments of error re-
lied upon for reversal of the judgment
of the superior court, but the brief of
counsel fails to state upon which speci-
fications of error plaintiffs in error
rely.

This court will not examine the rec-
ord in search of prejudicial errors not
pointed out in the briefs. Specifications
of error not asserted or urged in the
brief will be considered as waived by
this court, Supreme Court Rules 1 and
15, L. S. Cogswell Lumber Co. v. Man-
ahan, 135 Okla. 174, 274 P. 871; Penny
v. Fellner, 6 Okla. 386, 50 P. 123.

It is apparent from reading the briefs
filed herein that the principal issues
raised which this court will consider
are: (1) Whether upon successive ap-
peals the bonds are cumulative in ef-
fect? (2) Whether in an action upon
an appeal bond the principals on the
bond are necessary parties? These
questions have heretofore been passed
upon by this court.

In First Nat. Bank Bldg. Co. v. Rid-

dle, 77 Okla. 143, 187 P. 479, syllabus
No. 1 by this court states:

“Bonds given upon successive ap-
peals are cumulative in effect, and the
giving of the second does not discharge
the first. The obligee may proceed -
upon either or both until he has ob-
tained satisfaction of his judgment.
They are separate contracts given to
secure fulfillment of the same ob-
ligation.”

Therefore, this court must and does
hold that the bonds are cumulative in
effect and that the defendants in error
had a right to maintain this action.

This court has held that a separate
action may be had against the sureties.
In Buckholts v. Wright, 186 Okla. 230,
97 P. 2d 44, syllabus No. 7 by this
court states:

“Surety on appeal bond in unlawful
detainer action may be sued separately
in an action on the bond, unless there
is evidence establishing, or some pro-
vision in the bond expressly making,
the liability of the surety joint as dis-
tinguished from joint and several.”

Unless the bond provides that the
liability is joint, the principals are not
necessary parties. The bond here pro-
vides that the principals and sureties
“undertake and bind ourselves, our
heirs and assigns, jointly and severally
to said Plaintiffs * * *.” Since the lia-
bility under the bond is “joint and sev-
eral” the principals are not necessary
parties, -

A careful examination of the cases
cited by the plaintiffs in error shows
that they are not applicable here and
are not in conflict with this opinion.

Judgment affirmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Robert M. Rainey, John
F. Eberle, and Charles L. Orr, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
Court.

be
MARTIN et al. v. HARPER et al.

No. 35518. April 7, 1953.
255 P. 2d 948.

R. B. Holtzendorff, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiffs in error.

Robinson, Shipp, Robertson & Barnes
and T. Murray Robinson, Oklahoma
City, for defendants in error.

WILLIAMS, J. Parties are referred
to as in the trial court.

Plaintiffs sued defendants for money
allegedly due under the terms of a cer-
tain contract. Said contract provided
for the payment of “location dam-
ages” in the amount of $4,000 for each
oil well drilled on the described 160
acres of land. There is no dispute as to
meaning of the actual terms in the con-
tract, as will be seen below, and it is
therefore unnecessary to set it out here.

Certain obligors on the contract paid
their share of the “location damages”;
others refused to pay, and this suit
was filed. Plaintiffs recovered judg-
ment in the lower court, and defend-
ants have duly appealed.

The sole question for our determi-
nation is the validity of the one assign-
ment of error in defendants’ brief,
which is as follows:

“A valid order of the corporation
commission limiting the drilling of one

303

well to each 40 acres of a quarter sec-
tion of land being in effect at the
time the contract sued upon was en-
tered into between the parties, became
a part of said contract to the same ex-
tent as though such order was written .
into its terms, and the court erred in
rendering judgment against defendants
under said contract for wells number
5 and 6, inasmuch as the same was not
contemplated by the parties at the
time the contract was entered into and
was contrary to the intention of the
parties,”

In this case, all obligors paid their
shares of the “location damages” on
the first four wells; but defendants
herein refused to pay their share on the
last two wells. The first four wells were
drilled to the Hunton Lime; the last
two were to the Bartlesville sand.

It is admitted that at the time the
contract was entered into, there was
in effect a valid order of the Corpora-
tion Commission providing for 40-acre
spacing. Though said order is not in
the record, it is also admitted that it
applied only to wells drilled to the Hun-
ton Lime, as is shown by the follow-
ing:

“Mr. Holtzendorff: We have stipu-
lated, have we not, that there was an
order of the Corporation Commission in
existence at the time of the execution of
this agreement zoning and spacing the
wells out there in 40-acre spacing? I
have got it, it is Corporation Commis-
sion order No. 16510.

“Mr. Robinson: What date?

“Mr. Holtzendorff: Dated July 19,
1943: 40-acre spacing to the Hunton
Lime.”

We find it unnecessary to rule on de-
fendant’s assignment of error herein,
for the reason that even if it were “a
part of said contract”, plaintiffs would
still be entitled to collect $4,600 for
each well drilled, provided only four
wells were drilled to the Hunton Lime,
there being in existence at that time
no Corporation Commission order pro-
hibiting or regulating the drilling of
wells to other sources of supply at this
particular place.

304 a

In passing, we take note of the fact
that the actual “location damages” per
well was considerably less than $4,000.
In this connection, plaintiffs in the court
below contend that thet contract was
actually a sort of “contingent lease bo-
nus” and that no payment was made
for the lease other than the payments
called for in the contract sued on.

With regard to the interpretation or
construction of contracts, see Delk v.
City National Bank of Duncan, 85 Okla.
238, 205 P. 753, wherein this court said:

“<“The language used in a contract is
to govern its interpretation, and, if
such language is clearly explicit and
does not involve uncertainty, the
words used are to be understood in their
ordinary and proper sense, and, when
the language is plain and unambiguous,
extrinsic evidence as to its meaning
is not admissible. ”

The language of the contract here
sued upon is clear, explicit, and in-
volves no uncertainty, and is plain and
unambiguous; indeed, it is not urged
otherwise. It was not by its terms re-
stricted to the Hunton Lime or any
other source of supply, but applied to all
wells drilled on the described 160 acres
of land.

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed.

MAGER MORTGAGE CO. v.
FERGUSON et al.

No. 85890, April 7, 1953.

P. 24 938.
|

Kavanaugh Bush, Tulsa, for plaintiff
in error.

Charles Dunn, Tulsa, for defendants
in error.

DAVISON, J. This is a suit to fore-
close various mechanics’ and material-
men’s liens, brought by the assignee
thereof, Mager Mortgage Company, as
plaintiff, against Jess F. Rose. Rose
Construction Company, Inc., James O.
Ferguson, Ruby S. Ferguson and In-
dustrial Tile Company, a corporation,
as defendants. The parties will be re-
ferred to as they appeared in the trial
court.

The defendant Jess F. Rose was a
builder and contractor for the construc-
tion of residences. In the early part of
1950, he contracted to buy, for $800
each, a number of vacant lots in a resi-
dential addition to the city of Tulsa,
Oklahoma. With two other individuals,
he organized the Rose Construction
Company, Inc., for the purpose of
building houses on the said lots. Be-
cause of the necessity of financial
assistance, he contacted the Mager
Mortgage Company, a corporation. The
principal stockholders in the corpora-
tion were partners in the Mager
Realty Company whose office was the
same as that of the mortgage company.
Rose executed to the mortgage com-
pany a mortgage in the principal
amount of $7,000 upon the lot here in-
volved and the house subsequently built

thereon. The amount of the mortgage
was to be advanced to Rose as the
construction progressed. By about the
Ist of October, 1950, some $4,300 had
been advanced and the house was
near completion. The major part of
what remained to be done was paint-
ing, floor sanding, some masonry
and hardware installation, sewer con-
struction and landscaping.

At the time of making the mortgage,
Rose gave the realty company an ex-
clusive contract for the sale of the
house. A Mr. Park was assistant secre-
tary-treasurer of the mortgage com-
pany and, for all practical purposes,
was office manager for both companies.
About the Ist of October, 1950, when
construction of the house had reached
the stage above outlined, Rose had be-
come financially unable to continue
with its construction. This information
was given to the painter, Mr. Card,
who was at that time the only work-
man on the job. The painter contacted
Mr. Park and told him what Rose had
said. His testimony as to what subse-
quently transpired was as follows:

“Q. What did Mr. Rose tell you in
regard to that? A. Well, he just told
me he was out of money, which I had
one check that I told him had been re-
turned, and he said he had gone as
far as he could go, and I said ‘I am
through too.’

“Q. Now, did_you do any work after
that time? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. And by whose authority did you
do that? A. Mr, Park.

“Q. Did you do that personally? A.
I called him on the phone and told him
what Mr. Rose had told me, and he
told me to go ahead and not to leave
he said he did not have anybody else
to go down there; and he said that he
would see to it that I got my money.

“Q. Mr. Card, did he give you in-
structions with regard to ordering ma-

terial for him? A. He told me to get,

what I needed to finish the job.

“Q. Did he tell you to charge it to
the Rose Construction Company? A. I
do not

remember who he said to

305

charge it to or just what Rose contract
was, whether he said to charge it to the
Rose Construction Company, but every-
thing else was charged that way, so I
suppose so, the entire job was so far as
I know.

“Q. Did Jess Rose authorize you to
charge anything to the Rose Construc-
tion Company after October ist? A.
No, sir.

“Q. After Mr. Rose discharged you,
then you were in the employ of Mr.
Parks and the Mager Mortgage Com-
pany, after that time? A. Yes, sir.”

On October 9th following, the defend-
ants James O. Ferguson and Ruby S.
Ferguson purchased the property for a
consideration of $11,750. They went to
the office of the Mager Mortgage Com-
pany and worked out all the details
with Mr. Park. A sales contract was
drawn and executed. The sale was
consummated on October 23rd by pay-
ment of the down payment and execu-
tion of mortgage. The deed was from
the Rose Construction Company to
whom title had been conveyed. Mr.
Ferguson testified that at the time of
closing the deal he was told that a title
examination had been made, that the
title was clear, and that the’ house
would be completed in good shape and
all bills would be paid; that the repre-
sentations were made by Mr. Park;
that had he known there were any out-
standing bills, he would not have pur-
chased the property. Mr. Park’s testi-
mony was in conflict with that of Mr.
Ferguson on a number of points.

Ferguson did not know that there
were outstanding unpaid bills on the
construction of the house until some-
time in November, when he went by
the Mager Mortgage Company office to
pick up some papers. He was then told
cf the bills and was asked to pay them,
which he refused to do. The bills had
been paid by, and the lien claims as-
signed to, the Mager Mortgage Com-
pany. This suit was brought for the
purpose of foreclosing these liens. The
total amount was approximately $1,000.
The trial court found that W. J. Park,
“as an officer of the Mager Mortgage

306 a

Company, and as agent of the Mager
Realty Company, knew that Rose was
insolvent and had defaulted in the con-
struction of the house and that as a
broker for the Mager Realty Company
undertook, and did finish the construc-
tion of the house and sold it as to the
defendant, Ferguson,” Judgment was
rendered for the defendants Ferguson,
from which Mager Mortgage Company
has appealed.

For reversal, plaintiff argues that all
of the essentials of an estoppel are not
here present and, for that reason, the
judgment for defendants cannot stand.
Those essentials are enumerated as
follows:

“(1) There must exist a false repre-
sentation or concealment of material
facts;

“(2) It must have been made with
knowledge, actual or constructive, of
the facts;

“(3) The party to whom it was made
must have been without knowledge of
the facts;

“(4) It must have been made with the
intention that it should be acted upon;

“(5) The party to whom it was made
must have relied on, or acted upon it,
to his prejudice.”

Cited are cases, wherein: this court
has said that those are necessary ele-
ments of estoppel, from the early case
of Bragdon v. McShea, 26 Okla. 35,
107 P. 916, to the more recent case of
Fite v. Van Antwerp, 201 Okla. 26, 200
P. 2d 439, Those cases are all well
founded upon sound principles of law,
but in none of them are the facts simi-
lar to the case at bar.

The most nearly analogous fact situa-
tion is that in the recent case of G. A.
Nichols, Inc., v. Stoddard, 206 Okla.
240, 242 P. 2d 742. Therein, the Nichols
Company, in order to sell certain resi-
dential lots owned by it, represented to
some prospective purchasers that an
adequate sanitary sewer would be con~
structed to service the lots; to later
prospective purchasers the representa-

tion was made that said sewer had been
constructed upon other acreages owned
by Nichols. Some ten or twelve years
later Nichols joined with several other
large property owners and built a sew-
age line to connect with the municipal
system. The land upon which the septic
tank system had been located was
platted into lots and blocks and the
task of leveling and grading was be-
gun. When this work broke into and
seriously impaired the septic tank op-
eration, the original purchasers of
lots, having refused to pay the $113.38
charge for connecting to the new sew-
age line, filed an injunction suit to pre-
vent the destruction of the earlier sys-
tem. The injunction was granted and,
in affirming the judgment, this court
held:

‘ * * Tn the instant case, the prop-
erty having been bought by the plain-
tiffs and other residents of the affected
blocks upon the express representation
that the sewer would serve their prop-
erties, defendants are estopped to as-
sert that by virtue of the reservation
in the dedication they could deprive the
plaintiffs of the right to use the sewer,
or destroy or damage it to the injury
or detriment of the plaintiffs.”

The same conclusion is reached upon
the same line of reasoning in the
case at bar. The property having been
bought by the defendants upon the
express representation that the house
would be completed and all bills paid
by plaintiff, said plaintiff is estopped
to assert that, by paying the construc-
tion bills and taking assignments of
the liens, it could force the defendants
to repay those bills or suffer the fore-
closure of the liens against their prop-
erty. The record discloses that all of
the essentials of an estoppel are here
present.

(1) Park, as agent for the plaintiff,
made a false representation that the
bills were or would be paid.

(2) He had actual knowledge that
’some of said bills were unpaid.

(3) The Fergusons were without
knowledge or means of knowledge of
the true facts.

(4) Such representations were made
with the intention that the Fergusons
act on them.

(5) The Fergusons did act upon them
by purchasing the house which they
would not have purchased had the true
facts been known.

These conclusions are founded upon
the findings of the trial court which
are supported by the clear weight of
the evidence, although conflicting upon
some points.

Judgment affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.CJ., and WELCH,
CORN, ARNOLD, O'NEAL, WILLIAMS,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

FIARPER et al. v. OKLAHOMA
CITY et al.

No. 35358. April 7, 1953.
255 P. 2d 933.

Washington & Thompson, Oklahoma
City, for plaintiffs in error.

A. L. Jeffrey, Municipal Counselor,
Keith McMillin, Asst. Municipal Coun-
selor, and Twyford, Smith & Crowe,
Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. This action was
brought by plaintiffs against defendants
to enjoin the assessment of plaintiffs’
property for benefits resulting from
paving a portion of North Chicago ave-
nue lying within street improvement
district No. 1133 created by the de-
fendant city. Being of equitable cogni-
zance, the case was tried to the court
without a jury. Judgment was ren-
dered for defendants, and plaintiffs ap-
peal.

By stipulation of the parties, there
was received in evidence court's Ex-
hibit A, consisting of certain ordi-
nances of the defendant city and the
several resolutions adopted in connec-
tion with the creation of street im-
provement district No, 1133. Defendants
introduced the judgment roll in No.
124815, district court of Oklahoma
county, being a suit wherein the par-
ties were the same as here, except that
the mayor and councilmen were not
joined. There also appears in the rec-
ord the judgment of said district court;
Oklahoma county in No. 123065, being
a proceeding brought by these plain-
tiffs for the vacation of a portion of
the plat of Roger Givens Subdivision of

308

Richland Acres, an addition to the de-
fendant city. These exhibits comprise
the entire evidence in the case. It is
necessacy to set forth in some detail
the facts involved as they appear in
the record.

Plaintiffs are the owners of certain
lands described in their complaint by
metes and bounds, but which consti-
tuted lots 1 and 2 of block “I” of Roger
Givens Subdivision above mentioned.
These lots lie on the west side of and
abut upon North Chicago avenue.

On November 16, 1948, the city coun-
cil adopted Ordinance No. 6113 vacating
that portion of North Chicago Avenue
between the north line of Northwest
Thirty-sixth Street and the northeast
boundary extended in a northwesterly
direction of Block One (1), Roger Gi-
vens Subdivision as to “Lots One (1)
and Two (2) of Block ‘’ and Lots Four
(4) and Five (5) of Block ‘H’ and the
streets running across and between
said blocks.”

Thereafter, the city council, by ap-
propriate resolutions, created street im-
provement district No. 1133 for the
paving and improvement of certain
streets, including “North Chicago Ave-
nue from the existing pavement on
Northwest Thirty-sixth Street to a
point 300’ north of the north line of
Northwest Thirty-sixth Street,” the
first of such resolutions being adopted
on August 22, 1950, and the final reso-
lution, approving and accepting the
work, being adopted on May 29, 1951.
Ordinance No. 6621 spreading the as-
sessment on the property involved was
adopted May 15, 1951.

On February 25, 1951, plaintiffs
brought suit against the defendants
city and Metropolitan Paving Company,
being cause No, 124915 in the district

. court of Oklahoma county. Without go-
ing into detail, suffice it to say that
plaintiffs in their petition alleged that
by Ordinance No. 6113, adopted on No-
vember 16, 1948, the city vacated that
portion of North Chicago avenue there-
in described and by virtue of the appli-

cable statute. plaintiffs thereupon be-
came the owners of the vacated portion
thereof upon which their property
fronted; that defendants, on February
21, 1951, entered upon plaintiff's prop-
erty in violation of plaintiffs’ rights
for the purpose of making a street
out of the west portion thereof and pav-
ing the same, all to plaintiffs’ dam-
age; that plaintiffs have no adequate
remedy at law. Plaintiffs prayed for an
injunction, A temporary restraining or-
der was issued. The defendants filed
separate answers and the defendant
city filed motion to dissolve. In this
motion the city alleged the passage of
Ordinance No. 6577 on February 27,
1951, re-opening North Chicago avenue.
After hearing, judgment was entered
finding that plaintiffs had an adequate
remedy at law “by reverse condemna-
tion for damages”, and that the plain-
tiffs could not enjoin a public improve-
ment. Injunction was granted as to
“the property located on the northern
part of the plaintiffs’ premises” and
was denied “as to the property lying
on the western part of their premises.”

No appeal was taken from this judg-
ment.

In this court plaintiffs make two con-
tentions:

1. That the portion of the paving for
which the property of plaintiffs is as-
sessed was in fact constructed, not
upon a public street, but upon plain~
tiffs’ property;

2, That Ordinance No. 6621 (the or-
dinance assessing the cost of paving)
erroneously described plaintiffs’ prop-
erty and, therefore, the attempted as-
sessment thereof is void.

For reasons which will presently ap-
pear, plaintiffs’ contentions cannot be
sustained.

In support of their first contention
plaintiffs assert that the portion of
North Chicago avenue described in Or-
dinance No. 6113, adopted November
16, 1948, was, by that ordinance, va-
cated and never thereafter re-opened;

that plaintiffs’ lands, then described
as lots 1 and 2 of block “I” of such
subdivision, abutted on said vacated
portion, and that by the provisions of
11 O.S. 1951 8659, plaintiffs became the
owners of the land in front of their
property to the extent prescribed by
such statute; that the paving for which
the assessment in question was made
was laid upon plaintiffs’ property and
that such property has: never been
condemned for such use.

It may well be doubted whether Or-
dinance No. 6113 was effective for any
purpose. It will be noted that in its title

- and in the ordinance itself, the portion
of the street declared to be vacated
was described as that portion of North
Chicago avenue between the north line
of Northwest Thirty-sixth street and
the northeast boundary extended in a
northwesterly direction of Block One
(1), Roger Givens Subdivision of Rich-
land Acres. It is clear from the record
that there was no block one (1) in the
area in question. There the blocks are
lettered alphabetically and not num-
bered. Probably the block which was
intended to be described was block “T’
and the letter “I” on the plat was read
as figure “1”; but the fact remains
that the ordinance describes a block
which did not exist in the plat of the
subdivision. However, in the court be-
low and in this court, all parties have
treated and considered Ordinance No.
6113 as a valid ordinance to the extent
that it effected a vacation of the portion
of North Chicago avenue here in-
volved, and, for the purposes of this
ease, we shall do likewise.

In Oklahoma the title to streets and
alleys in any municipality or addition
thereto is held by such municipality in
trust for the public, 11 O.S. 1951, 8515;
Town of Chouteau v. Blankenship, 194
Okla. 401, 152 P. 24 379. 11 O.S. 1951
§659 provides as follows:

“The council, or other governing
body, shall have the power to annul,
vacate or discontinue, or grant to any
public use any street, alley or lane,
within any legally platted city or addi-

309

tion thereto, whenever deemed neces-
sary or expedient; Provided, that all
damages sustained by the citizens of
the city or the owners of property there-
in, shall first be ascertained as pro-
vided by law for the condemnation of
the property for railroad purposes;
Provided, that whenever any street,
avenue, alley or Jane shall be vacated,
the same shall revert to the owners of
real estate thereto adjacent, on each
side, in proportion to the frontage of
said real estate, except in cases where
such street, avenue, alley or lane shall
have been taken and appropriated to
public use in a different proportion,
in which case it shall revert to adja-
cent lots or real estate in proportion
as it was taken from them; Provided,
that it shall be the duty of the council,
or other governing body, to re-open said
street, avenue, alley or lane thereto-
fore vacated or discontinued except
where the same has been acquired or
vacated for railway purposes, upon pe-
tition of the property owners owning
more than one-half of the property
abutting upon said street within one
block in either direction from said va-
cated portion, without expense to the
city. Provided further that any owner,
or owners, of any real estate to which
any street, avenue, alley or lane, or
any part thereof has heretofore or may
hereafter revert by annulment, vaca-
tion or discontinuance within the cor-
porate limits of any city, may com-
mence an action in the District Court of
the county in which said real estate is
situated, upon petition showing non-
user by the public for five years, and
after the passage of an Ordinance or
Resolution annulling, vacating or dis-
continuing such street, avenue, alley
or lane, asking for the determination of
the necessity for re-opening any said
street, avenue, alley or lane, and said
court shall hear and determine the
same; and, if a re-opening shall be de-
termined by said court not to be neces-
sary for public convenience or neces-
sity, judgment may be granted, adjudi-
cating to said owner, or owners. a com-
plete fee simple title in and to the va-
cated part or portion thereof which re-
verted-to his real estate; and, said ac-
tion shall be commenced and prose-
cuted as a civil action against said city
and owners of real estate in any block

310

or blocks abutting or adjoining said va-
cated street, avenue, alley or Jane shall
pe made parties thereto, or inter-
plead.”

In the light of this statute it is clear
that when the city council, by the adop-
tion of Ordinance No. 6113, vacated the
portion of the street upon which plain-
tiffs’ property abutted, plaintiffs ac-
quired title thereto to the extent pro-
vided by such statute. Askins v. Brit-
ish-American Oil Producing Co., 201
Okla. 209, 203 P. 2d 877.

But the title thus acquired was not
a fee-simple title; rather, it was a
conditional fee title, subject to divesture
by the re-opening of the street by the
city council upon the prescribed peti-
tion of property owners. The only way
in which plaintiffs’ title could be con-
verted to one in fee simple was by an
action in the district court of Oklahoma
county commenced and prosecuted to
judgment as in section 659 provided.
The record in this case shows no such
proceeding.

On February 27, 1951, the city council
adopted Ordinance No. 6577 re-opening
North Chicago avenue. The ordinance
correctly described the premises in-
volved and recited that a petition to re-
open “signed by the owners of more
than fifty per cent (50%) of the prop-
erty abutting upon said street within
one block in either direction from said
vacated portion, was duly filed with the
City Clerk on February 26, 1951.”

Plaintiffs attack the validity of this
ordinance upon the ground that the pe-
tition for its adoption was not signed
by a sufficient number of qualified
property owners; that, with one excep-
tion, those whose signatures appear
were not the owners of property abut-
ting upon the vacated portion of the
street. Much of the briefs in this court
is devoted to argument of this conten-
tion.

The defendant city insists that plain-
tiffs are estopped from attacking the
ordinance by the judgment in cause
No, 124915 heretofore referred to; that

although in that case the court did not
specifically declare the ordinance to be
valid, its validity was necessarily in-
volved and upheld. We do not pass upon
this question, preferring to rest our de-
cision upon a different ground.

The petition for re-opening the street
was not introduced in evidence and
there is nothing in the record from
which its sufficiency can be deter-
mined. The ordinance recites that
the requisite petition was filed and the
record contains no evidence to the con-
trary.

In 37 Am. Jur.’pp. 812-813, the rule
is stated as follows:

“Where the validity of an ordinance
depends upon the existence of one or
more facts at the time of the enact-
ment thereof, the existence, and not the
non-existence, of the facts necessary to
sustain the validity of the ordinance
should be presumed, in the absence
of evidence to be contrary.

“An ordinance will be presumed to
be in conformity with a statute from
which it derives its vitality, unless the
contrary is made expressly to appear.”

That is the same rule announced by
this court. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Wright, 124 Okla. 55, 254 P. 41; Baxley
v. City of Frederick, 133 Okla. 84, 271
P. 257.

On the record before us, plaintiffs’
first contention cannot be sustained.

Plaintiffs’ second contention is that
the assessment against their property
is void because of erroneous descrip-
tion in Ordinance No. 6621. Therein the
property is described as lots 1 and 2
of block “I”, Roger Givens Subdivision.
As before stated, plaintiffs, on May
31, 1950, obtained a judgment vacating
the plat of this subdivision as to these
and other lots. Plaintiffs argue that
thereby such lots became unplatted ter-
ritory and,no longer existed as lots;
that thereafter any description of the
property must be by metes and bounds
as set forth in plaintiffs’ petition here-
in.

There is no merit in this contention
Plaintiffs themselves brought about the
vacation of the plat as to their lots
and well knew that the premises ap-
pearing thereon as lots 1 and 2 of block
“T? were, in fact, identical with those
described by metes and bounds in the
judgment rendered in the vacation pro-
ceedings.

Furthermore, and assuming that the
description in the assessing ordinance
was erroneous, that fact would not en-
title plaintiffs to have the assessment
against their property declared void.
At most, their right under Oklahoma
statute would be limited to a reassess-
ment of their property, 11 O.S. 1951
§108; Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Severns Pav-
ing Co., 67 Okla. 206, 170 P. 216; Miss-
ouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. et al. v. City of Eu-
faula et al., 83 Okla. 263, 201 P. 808;
Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Mackey, 256
U.S. 531, 41 S. Ct, 582, 65 L. Ed. 1076.

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Donald Campbell, Brad-
ford J. Williams, and Wilbur J. Holle-
man, who as Special Masters aided in
the preparation of this opinion. These
attorneys were recommended by the
Oklahoma Bar Association, approved
by the Judicial Council, and appointed
by the Court.

De
EWING et al. v. TRAWICK.
No. 35620, April 14, 1958.
256 P. 2d 182.

311

Arney & Barker, Clinton, for plain-
tiffs in error.

Donald T. Royse, Elk City, and Mea-
cham, Meacham, Meacham & Mea-
cham, Clinton, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs in error
were defendants below, and defendant
in error was plaintiff below. They will
hereinafter be referred to as they ap-
peared in the trial court.

‘The plaintiff brought suit on Septem-
ber 6, 1951, to quiet title, alleging that
lhe was the owner in fee simple of a
tract of land in Custer county, Okla-
homa, from which had been reserved
to the defendant Ewing 1/8th royalty

312

on oil, gas, coal or minerals. That the
defendants J. P. Bills and D. N. Bills
were claiming some right, title, lien
or interest in or to said real estate,
but in fact had none; that plaintiff and
his grantors had been in open, visible,
continuous and exclusive possession of
said real property for more than fif-
teen years under claim of ownership
and title and that the same was held
by plaintiff, not under the permission
of anyone, but adversely. Plaintiff
prayed for judgment quieting title to all
of said real estate, except an undivided
1/8th interest in the oil, gas, coal and
other minerals in and under said real
estate, and asked that the title thereto
be quieted in R. L. Ewing and Ada
Ewing.

Defendants in their answer alleged
that D. N. Bills died intestate and left
as his sole and only heirs at law his
widow and adult children, and that the
heirs of said D. N. Bills had not been
determined; that said defendants said
it was the intention of the said J. P.
Bills and D. N. Bills, to reserve a 1/8th.
of said minerals and that the scrive-
ner, by inadvertence, referred to the
same as 1/8th royalty. Defendants de-
nied all of the material allegations of
plaintiff's petition, except they admitted
that plaintiff acquired title to the prop-
erty by warranty deed from the Dallas
Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas, Tex-
as. Defendants prayed that the heirs
of D. N. Bills be determined under the
laws of Oklahoma and that title to said
1/8th undivided interest in and to the
minerals in and under the premises
described be quieted and confirmed in
them and that their warranty deed be
reformed to reflect that said answer-
ing defendants owned 1/8th of the min-
erals.

Plaintiff in his reply denies the alle-
gations of the answer and alleged that
if the deed of conveyance from said
Bills was executed as alleged, said
defendants would have no rights in said
land for the reason that the convey-
ance from Bills was a warranty deed
in which title to the surface and an un-
divided 7/8ths interest in the minerals

was warranted by the predecessors in
title to the grantors Bills, and the said
Bills’ warranty deed conveyed all the
surface and 7/8ths interest in the min-
erals; that it was the intention of the
parties to except a 1/8th interest only
in said minerals, which had been re-
served by the said Ewings.

Upon order of the court, the defend-
ant Max Ewing was made party de-
fendant and R. L. Ewing and Ada
Ewing filed disclaimers, stating they
had conveyed said land to their son,
Max H. Ewing.

The defendant Max Ewing filed an
answer and cross-petition alleging that
he owned 1/8th interest in all minerals
in said land and asked the court to
quiet his title thereto.

Jury was waived and the parties
stipulated that the affidavit of J. P.
Bills might be admitted in evidence
and considered as testimony of that af-
fiant. After trial to the court, judg-
ment was rendered for plaintiff, quiet-
ing his title to said land, except an un-
divided 1/8th interest in the minerals,
which was quieted in Max Ewing.
Only the defendants J. P, Bills and the
heirs of D. N. Bills are appealing.

Defendants presented two proposi-
tions in their brief: First, error of the
court in refusing to sustain a demurrer
to the petition, and to the evidence of
plaintiff; and, second,’that the court ad-
mitted and considered incompetent, ir-
relevant and prejudicial testimony in
arriving at its decision.

Plaintiff testified that he had lived
on this land since 1938 and purchased
it from the Dallas Joint Stock Land
Bank of Dallas, Texas. The land in-
volved is described as S.% of N.E.%
and S.% of N.W.% and N.W.% of S.W.%
and N.E.% of S.E.% of section 28, town-
ship 13 north, range 30 west, Custer
County, Oklahoma.

The warranty deed was introduced
in evidence and is dated December
27, 1938, and recorded January 13, 1939,
whereby the Dallas Joint Stock Land
Bank of Dallas conveyed the above-

described property, with other land, to
H. L. Trawick, less certain royalties for
a period of ten years from date, or so
much longer as oil and gas may be
produced from said land; that no oil
or gas had been produced from said
land nor any well drilled thereon; that
he had been in the actual open, peace-
able possession since he bought the
land, farming it, and no one else had
asserted any claim thereto until this
lawsuit was filed, and that prior to the
time he bought it, the Dallas Joint Stock
Land Bank of Dallas was in posses-
sion since 1935. Plaintiff introduced
sheriff’s deed to the Dallas Joint Stock
Land Bank of Dallas, dated January
9, 1935, and recorded January 16, 1935,
conveying all the interest May Belle
Gholson and S. R. Gholson had on
February 15, 1927, in the land in con-
troversy and other lands; that plaintiff
never heard of the Bills until the
oil play came up and he thought he
had all the minerals until the Mid-Con-
tinent attorney called it to his atten-
tion in June, 1951. Plaintiff then of-
fered in evidence the following deeds,
which were objected to, admitted and
exception saved:

Exhibit 1: Warranty Deed from R.
L. Ewing and Ada Ewing to B, C. Hud-
son and Girtha Hudson, his wife, dated
October 28, 1916, which contained the
following clause: “Parties of the first
part reserves one eighth Royalty on
Oil, Gas, Coal or minerals their heirs
or assigns.”

Exhibit 2: Warranty Deed from B. C.
Hudson and Girtha Hudson, husband
and wife, to J. P. Bills and D. N. Bills,
dated September 1, 1917, which con-
tained the following clause: “Parties
of the first part reserves one eighth
royalty on oil, gas, coal or minerals,
their heirs or assigns.”

Exhibit 3: Warranty Deed from J. P.
Bills, a single man, and D. N. Bills
and Mattie Bills, husband and wife, to
E. D. Barnes and James W. Young,
dated December 15, 1919, which con-
tained the following clause: “Parties
of the first part reserve one eighth
royalty on oil, gas, coal or minerals,
their heirs or assigns.” This follows

313

the description of the land. At the end
of the warranty, this further clause
appears: “And the said J. P. Bills
and D. N. Bills and Mattie Bills hereby
relinquish all their right title and in-
terest in and to the above described
premises.”

Exhibit 4: Warranty Deed from E, D.
Barnes and Beulah Barnes, husband
and wife, and James W. Young and
Lula Young, husband and wife, to C.
H. Cantrell, dated September 21, 1920.
Just preceding the Warranty is this
clause: “Parties of the first part re-
serve one-eighth (1/8) royalty on oil,
gas, coal or minerals.”

Exhibit 5: Warranty Deed from C.
H. Cantrell and Dona Lee Cantrell,
husband and wife, to W. L. Hutcheson,
dated August 8, 1922, with no reserva-
tion or exception of minerals,

Exhibit 6: Warranty Deed from W.
L. Hutcheson and Mary Blanche Hut-
cheson, wife, to May Belle Gholson,
dated May 20, 1925. Following the de-
scription appears the following clause:
“The party of the first part reserves
one eighth royalty on all gas, oil or
other minerals on land described in
section 28.”

Plaintiffs witness W. A. Lewter, who
had been in the banking business in
Hammon for 40 years, testified that
he knew the plaintiff and the land he
purchased from the Dallas Joint Stock
Land Bank of Dallas, J. P. Bills and
D. N. Bills; that plaintiff and J. P.
Bills had been customers of the bank;
that he drew the deed from Bills to
Barnes and Young and took the ac- .
knowledgment of J. P. Bills; that he
remembered putting the reservation
clause in the deed, because it was in
the former deed, to protect Bills
against some royalty already disposed
of and that he copied the reservation
from another deed, and that in order
to protect the Bills’ interest as best
lhe could he added the clause, “and
the said J. P. Bills, D. N. Bills and
Mattie Bills hereby relinquish all
their right, title and interest in and to
the above described premises;” that
said clause was put in there because

314

it was agreed between the parties, and
that that should be in there; that he is
not a lawyer. On cross-examination, he
testified he remembered this deed be-
cause of this royalty question and de-
nied he told Mrs. Allison that he did
not remember it, and that he remem-
bered about that deed and that excep-
tion; that J. P. Bills did not want to
reserve 1/8th for himself; that he re-
membered because the only deal was
the royalty owned and he was trying to
write it against what was already gone
and that at no time in the deal did he
know about additional royalty until Mrs.
Allison called him; that it was dis-
cussed that a portion had already been
conveyed and Mr. Barnes knew that
at the time.

Under the stipulation, the affidavit
of J. P. Bills was admitted as what
he would testify to if present. It stated
that on December 15, 1919, either Ed
Barnes or James W. Young, or both of
them, approached J. P. Bills and D. N.
Bills to buy this land; that the deal was
finally made; that Barnes or Young
took D. N. Bills and J. P. Bills to Ham-
mon, and asked Lewter to do the work;
that Lewter was doing the work for
Barnes and Young; that at that time
the two Bills and the purchasers dis-
cussed the fact that there was 1/4th
of the minerals already gone, and that
the two Bills wanted to reserve an-
other 1/8th, and that all of the parties
orally agreed to it before Lewter.

Next appears the affidavit of Au-
brey Bills, stating that D. N. Bills is
deceased, died intestate more than four
years prior to April 2, 1952; that no
court had determined the particular
persons entitled to participate in the
distribution of his estate; that at the
time of his death he owned 1/16th un-
divided interest in the minerals under
said land and left as his sole and only
heirs at law his wife and certain oth-
ers.

Defendants’ witness, Iona Allison, tes-
tified that she is the daughter of J. P.
Bills, who lives in California; that after
the oil deal came out, she called Mr.

Lewter and asked if he remembered
the deed and he said “No,” and two
weeks later she went to the bank and
asked if he remembered drawing the
papers in which her dad reserved 1/8th,
and that he said he didn’t know, he
just fixed the papers “like your dad
wanted me to.” When she heard Trawick
had leased the land, she asked about
her dad’s interest and he said it was
too late, that it was already published
in the papers. She said she did not
know the suit was filed until after he
published it in the paper. That con-
cluded the evidence.

If we are to adopt the defendants’
construction of their deed, then giving
the same force to the other deeds,
there would be 5/8ths of all the min-
erals reserved to various grantors. Oth-
er than defendants, no grantor has
claimed interest in the minerals, ex-
cept the original reservation of 1/8th
to the Ewings. The reservation or ex-
ception in each deed is practically iden-
tical. In addition, the Bills when con-
veying the land added the final clause
which is significant of their intention
at that time, stating: “And the said J.
P. Bills, D. N. Bills and Mattie Bills
hereby relinquishes all their right, title
and interest in and to the above de-
scribed premises.” The evidence of the
parties was conflicting. .

In an action of purely equitable cog-
nizance, it is for the trial court to de-
termine the credibility of the witnesses,
and the weight and value to be given
their testimony. McAfee v. Harden, 180
Okla. 546, 71 P. 2d 463.

A cardinal rule in construing a deed
is ascertaining the true intent of the
makers, as that intent may be dis-
cerned from the instrument itself, tak-
ing it all together, considering every
part of it and viewing it in the light of
the circumstances surrounding the
makers at the time of its execution;
and their later acts in connection there-
with may be considered in arriving at
their intention. Case v. Case, 207 Okla.
681, 252 P. 2d 432.

The terms “reserving” and “except-
ing” are used interchangeably in deeds,
and their technical meaning will give
way to the manifest intent, even
though the technical term to the con-
trary is used. Burns v. Bastien, 174
Okla. 40, 50 P. 2d 377.

Giving effect to the above rules of
law construing the Bills deed and tak-
ing into consideration all of the evi-
dence, we hold that the trial court did
not commit prejudicial error on admit-
ting and considering the other deeds
hereinabove referred to.

This court has so repeatedly laid
down the following rule that it is un-
necessary to cite authorities:

“In a case of equitable cognizance
the appellate court will examine and
weigh the evidence but the judgment of
the trial court will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it appears that such judg-
ment is clearly against the weight of
the evidence.”

Having considered the entire record
in this case, together with the briefs,
we are of the opinion that the judg-
ment of the trial court is not clearly
against the weight of the evidence and
should not be disturbed on appeal.

Affirmed.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Frank T. McCoy, Wm. S.
Hamilton, and John T. Craig, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara~
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommendéd by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

JOHNSON, V.C. and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

315
BOVAIRD SUPPLY CO. v. WOFFORD
et al.
No. 34980. Oct. 28, 1952.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second
Petition for Rehearing Denied
April 14, 1958.

255 P. 2d 528.

Bradford J. Williams, Fenelon Boe~-
sche, R. B. McDermott, T. Hillas Esk-
ridge, and James C. Gibbens, Tulsa,
for plaintiff in error.

Marvin T. Johnson, Tulsa, for de-
fendant in error.

316

JOHNSON, J. This action was com-
menced by B. H. Wofford, John A.
Nicholson and Harold G. Rose, who
were partners d/b/a Nicholson and
Rose Drilling Company. They were en-
gaged in drilling oil and gas wells for
hire upon leageholds. Their action
arose out of a contract to furnish labor
and materials and services to drill a
well on an oil and gas lease for which
they had not been paid. A mechanics’
and materialmen’s lien had been per-
fected to secure the claim, and fore-
closure of this lien was sought.

The original defendants were the
owners of the leasehold, but later
others were made parties defendant,
to wit: W. P. Smith, Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Company, a corpora-
tion, the Bovaird Supply Company, a
corporation, G. E. Ferguson and
Leonard T. Thomas, all of whom inter-
vened and pleaded perfected con-
tractors’ mechanics’ and material-
men’s lien claims for materials and
labor furnished, except Leonard T.
Thomas whose claim was for labor per-
sonally performed upon the leasehold,
and which claim is not herein con-
tested, and Bovaird Supply Company
who only furnished supplies or mate-
rials. It appears that claimant Thomas
was the only lien claimant who per~
sonally performed any labor upon the
leasehold, and Bovaird Supply Com-
pany was the only claimant that fur-
nished only materials. The other claim-
ants furnished both materials and la-
bor under their contracts. The trial
court in entering judgment separated
into different items the amount of each
contractor’s lien claim for material
furnished and the amount for labor fur~
nished and held that the amounts for
labor furnished constituted a laborer’s
lien and was prior and superior to the
amounts for materials furnished, and
should be first paid pro rata from the
proceeds of the lien foreclosure sale.
Bovaird Supply Company has appealed
from this judgment and complains that
the order so holding should be reversed
and remanded with instructions to va-
cate the judgment and place its claim
on a par with those contractors who

furnished both labor and materials, but
who did not perform any labor.

Bovaird Supply Company contends
that contractors who furnished mate-
tials and labor, but performed no la-
bor, were not “laborers” as defined by
42 O.S.A. §92, and were not entitled to
priority of a laborer’s lien under- the
provisions of 42 O.S.A. §96. The record
supports plaintiff in error’s contention.
One who furnishes labor and materials
is not a “laborer” under the provisions of
sec. 92, supra. Priority of a laborer’s
lien under §96, supra, extends only to
workmen who actually perform work
and labor and not to contractors who
have furnished and paid for labor un-
der a general contract to furnish both
labor and materials. Morley v. Mc-
Caskey, 134 Okla. 50, 270 P. 1107. Such
contractors are not entitled to a lien
as “laborer” but only to a mechanic’s
and materialmen’s lien under 42 O.S.A.
§141 et seq. Shefts Supply, Inc, v.
Brady, 170 Okla, 590, 41 P. 2d 820.

The defendants in error, plaintiffs
below, contend that the judgment of
the trial court should be sustained be-
cause the court’s judgrnent was based
upon undisputed stipulated facts that
each claimant’s lien claim was for two
separate amounts—one for labor fur-
nished and one for materials furnished,
and that there is no evidence to sustain
plaintiff in error’s contention.

The record discloses what purports
to be a stipulation of the facts, but.
which, in reality, is only a statement of
defendants in error’s attorney, which
appears never to have been completed
either in substance or by agreement in
open court, or by signature of opposing
counsel. The portion thereof relied upon
by defendants in error as being of evi-
dentiary value sufficient to sustain their
contention reads as follows:

“That the lien claim of the plaintiffs
is correct in the total sum of $12,329.48,
of which labor and services is in the
sum of $10,603.28, and material and
supplies are in the sum of $1,726.20;
that the lien claim of defendant and
cross petitioner W. P. Smith is correct

in the total sum of $1,295.18, of which
$1191.68 is for labor and services and
$103.05 is for materials and supplies;
that defendant and cross petitioner Leo-
nard T. Thomas has a labor claim
which is correct in the total sum of
$34.00; that the defendant and cross pe-
titioner Halliburton Oil Well Cement-
ing Company has a correct claim in
the total sum of $377.28, of which
$260.00 is for labor and services and
$117.28 is for material and supplies;
that the defendant and cross petitioner
Bovaird Supply Company has a correct
claim in the sum of $3,460.17, all of
which is for materials and supplies;
that all of the items of material and
supplies, and that all of the labor and
services which are covered by this stip-
ulation were furnished and used in and
upon the leasehold estate described as
the northeast quarter of the southeast
quarter of section 24, township 7 north,
range 3 east in Pottawatomie County,
Oklahoma, being the leasehold estate
which is the subject of this litigation;
and that all of these claims are past
due and unpaid in the amounts stated in
the stipulation.”

The lien statements filed by the claim-
ants were attached to their pleadings
and contained a total sum for labor
and materials furnished. The judgment
of the court separated the purported
amounts for labor and materials fur-
nished in accord with the above stipu-
lation. The stipulation states that de-
fendants in error furnished labor, but
does not indicate that they labored. The
record reveals nothing more upon
which the court could base its judg-
ment. There was no evidence offered
by either party. This, in our opinion,
was insufficient to sustain the court’s
finding that the claimants’ claims for
labor furnished had priority over claims
for materials furnished except as to
claimant Thomas whose status as a la-
borer is unquestioned.

Following Morley v. McCaskey, su-
pra, we conclude that the claimants
who furnished both labor and mate-
rials under contracts for the develop-
ment of the leasehold, but who did not
actually labor, were not laborers as
defined by 42 O.S.A. §92, and were not

317

entitled to priority of laborer’s liens
under 42 O.S.A. §96, and that the trial
court erred in separating their claims
and establishing the priority of a por-
tion thereof as labor.

Reversed and remanded with direc-
tions to vacate the judgment and enter
its judgment in conformance with the
views herein expressed.

HALLEY, V.CJ., and WELCH,
CORN, GIBSON, DAVISON, O’NEAL,
and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.

OKLAHOMA FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INS. CO., Inc.,
v. BROWN.

No. 34965. Dec. 16, 1952.
Rehearing Denied April 14, 1953.
255 P. 2d 919.

318

Pierce, Rucker, Mock, Tabor & Dun-
can, Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in
error.

Bohanon & Adams and Bert B. Bare-
foot, Jr., Oklahoma City, for defendant
in error.

PER CURIAM. This is an action to
recover upon two fire insurance poli-
cies. The sole question for our deter-
mination is whether the policies were in
force on July 27, 1949, the date of the
loss.

The facts, which are not in dispute,
are as follows: On January 24, 1949,
plaintiff, Howard Brown, made applica-
tion to defendant, Oklahoma Farm Bu-
reau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc.,
for policies covering his truck and semi-
trailer.

Each application, after detailing var-
ious items of information requested,
stated that the “Date Written” was
January 24, 1949, and that the “Date
Effective” was also January 24, 1949.
The applications were signed by both
plaintiff and the agent of the company.

The policies, when written, provided
that the Company .

“subject to the limitations, excep-
tions exclusions, special provisions,
general conditions and form of cover-
age elected * * * does hereby insure
(plaintiff), commencing at 12:01 A.M.
Standard Time, on the date herein spe~

cified and expiring at 12:01 A.M. six (6)
months from effective date unless re-
newed * * #”

Each policy then stated that “The ef-
fective date of this policy is January 24,
1949.”

And each policy concluded as follows:

“In Witness Whereof, the Oklahoma
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, Ine., has caused this policy to be
signed by its President and Secretary,
but the same shall not be binding upon
the company unless countersigned by a
duly authorized officer or representa-
tive of the company.”

This language, in each case, was fol-
lowed by the printed signature of the
president and secretary. One policy was
countersigned by an authorized repre-
sentative of the company on the 2nd
day of February, 1949, and the other
on March 29, 1949.

The record contains copies of first
and second notices to plaintiff stating
that the policies would lapse on July 24,
1949, unless renewed, but the dates
when such notices were given do not
appear.

On July 27, 1949, the truck and trailer
covered by the policies burned. It will
thus be seen that the loss occurred
more than six months after the stated
effective dates of the policies, but less
than six months after such policies
were countersigned.

A jury was waived and the case
submitted to the court on the agreed
facts. The trial court entered judgment
for plaintiff on each policy and, from
the orders overruling its motion for
new trial, defendant appeals.

Defendant argues that the court erred
in rendering judgment for the plain-
tiff since under the undisputed facts
the loss occurred more than six months
after the stated effective date of the
policies and at a time when the policies,
by their own terms, were no longer in
effect.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues
that he was entitled to six months cov~.

erage and that his coverage did not
begin until the policies were counter-
signed, for, he says, if a loss had oc-
curred prior to that time the company
could have avoided liability by refus-
ing to countersign. Consequently, he
argues, the policies must be extended
for six months from the dates of the
countersignatures. Or, he asserts, that
if this does not follow as a matter of
law, at least, the policies are ambigu-
cus and can be construed to mean that
they were to continue in effect for six
months after the date of the counter-
signatures.

We are of the opinion that defendant
must prevail.

Although the question seems to be
one of first impression in this state,
it has been raised under almost identi-
cal circumstances in several other
states, and recovery has been uniform-
ly denied.

In the case of Dillon v. General Ex-
change Ins. Corporation (Tex. Civ.
App.) 60 S. W. 2d 331, the policy pro-
vided on its face that the effective date
was March 19, 1931, and the expiration
date March 19, 1932. It also provided:

“This policy shall not be valid unless
countersigned by the duly authorized
agent of the Company at San Antonio,
Texas. Countersigned this 31 day of
March, 1931, V. Hoover, Agent.”

The insured automobile burned on
March 20, 1932, and the plaintiff
made the same contention that plaintiff
makes here. In denying such conten-
tion, the court said:

“Appellant’s contention is that re-
gardless of the fact that the policy
contained the expressed stipulation that
it expired at noon March 19, 1932, it was
nevertheless in effect on the night of
March 20, 1932, because the policy also
contained the stipulation that it was not
valid unless countersigned by the duly
authorized agent of the company at
San Antonio, Tex., and that the policy
was actually countersigned on March
31, 1931, that appellant had paid for one
year’s insurance, that he was therefore

319

entitled to one full year’s insurance,
and that the policy not having been
countersigned until March 31, 1931,
should not have expired until March 31,
1932. .

“We do not agree with this conten-
tion. The insurance company had a
lawful right to make this policy effec-
tive from a prior date, regardless of
the provision that same was not valid
unless countersigned by the agent des-
ignated. This stipulation had to do with
the authenticity of the policy rather
than the time from which it should be-
come effective. The policy did not pro-
vide that it was not valid until coun-
tersigned, but unless countersigned. Un-
til might be construed as referring to
time, but unless does not refer to time.
Bankers Lloyds v. Montgomery (Tex.
Civ. App.) 42 S.W. 2d 285; Schwartz v.
Northern Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A.) 25 F.
2d 555; Anderson v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 164 Cal. 712, 130 P. 726, Ann. Cas,
1914B, 903.

“Appellant did not allege that this
policy did not contain the true agree-
ment of the parties. In the absence of
an allegation of accident, mistake, or
fraud, the court could not disregard
the plain and unambiguous statement
in the policy that the expiration date
theerof was at noon March 19, 1932.”

To the same effect are Union Ma-
rine & General Ins. Co., Limited, v.
Holmes, 249 Ala. 294, 31 So. 2d 303, and
McKee v. Continental Ins. Co., 191 Tenn.
413, 234 S.W. 2d 830.

A case’ closely in point from this
jurisdiction, although it relates to life
rather than fire insurance, is the case
of Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Harper,
90 Okla. 116, 214 P. 924, wherein plain-
tiff contended that the annual prem-
iums on a life insurance policy did not
become due each year on the anni-
versary date of the policy, as provided
in the contract, but on the anniversary
dates of its delivery, and that conse-
quently the policy was still in force
at the death of the insured. In denying
this contention, we said: -

“In order to bridge over this period
of time, counsel for defendant in error’s

320

first contention is that the policy did
not take effect and become operative
until July 25, 1912, the date of the de-
livery of the same, and that each prem.

ium became due each 12 months there- *

after, with 30 days’ grace; and not on
June 28th, the date of the policy and on
which date the annual premium be-
came due, by the terms of the policy.
With this contention we cannot agree,
because, as hereinbefore stated, the
policy by its terms provided otherwise.
And the authorities do not support coun-
sel’s contention. The rule is stated in
25 Cyc. 751, as follows:

“ In General—Premiums are pay-
able on the dates fixed by the con-
tract and the fact that the policy does
not go into effect on a date corres-
ponding to the date fixed for payment
of subsequent premiums does not
change the provisions of the contract
as to when such subsequent premiums
become payable.’ ”

The policy in the instant case plainly
stated that unless renewed the policy
would expire “at 12:01 A.M. 6 months
from effective date,” and the next sen-
tence thereafter stated, “The effective
date of this policy is January 24, 1949.”

Plaintiff contends, as did plaintiff in
McKee y. Continental Ins. Co., supra,
that if he had suffered a loss prior to
the time the policies were counter-
signed, the defendant could have avoid-
ed liability by refusing to countersign,
and that consequently his coverage dur-
ing such period was subject to the con-
tingency cf the company’s later coun-
tersigning. This may be true, but, at
least, he had partial protection during
such period in that he could have re-
covered had the company later counter-
signed and thus retroactively vali-
dated the policy. In any event, such fact
does not permit the court to rewrite
the plain terms of the contract be-
tween the parties.

Plaintiff cites Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York v. Walton, 24 Okla. 671,
104 P. 909, in support of the view that
there would have been no coverage
even if the company had countersigned
the policy after the loss occurred. In

that case, the agent countersigned the
policy not knowing that the insured had
already died. We held that a contract
cannot be made between parties, one
of whom is dead, for there can be no
meeting of minds. That case, we think,
is not authority for the proposition that
a countersignature on a fire insur-
ance policy cannot have retroactive ef-
fect and give rise to liability for a
loss already incurred at the time the
policy is countersigned. We think the
better reasoned cases, as stated in Dil-
lon v. General Exchange Ins. Corpora-
tion, supra, hold that if the policy is
countersigned, the company is liable
for losses occurring after the effective
date of the policy but prior to the time
of countersigning. See the authorities
therein cited and also 44 C.J.S. 1269.

The trial court thought the provision
that the policies were not binding on
the company unless countersigned made
the policies ambiguous as to the pe-
riod of coverage. We are unable to
agree with this view. Each policy plain-
ly stated that it would expire six
months from the effective date unless
renewed. There is nothing in the lan-
guage of the policies which intimates
that the period of coverage will be ex~
tended by a delayed countersigning,
and under an almost identical fact sit-
uation, the Supreme Court of Alabama
held that such provision did not make
the contract ambiguous as to the period
of coverage. Union Marine & General
Ins. Co. v. Holmes, supra. As was
poimted out in McKee v. Continental
Ins. Co. v. Holmes, supra, the parties
had the right to provide that the poli-
cies should become effective from a
prior date upon a later authentication.

Defendant urges that insurance was
in full force from the signing of the ap-
plications which constituted binders,
and that plaintiff therefore had full cov-
erage for six months. This may be
true, if the agent had authority to bind
the company and if the parties so in-
tended. See Prudential Fire Insurance
Company v. Stanley, 191 Okla. 506, 131
P. 2d 88, and cases there cited. Un-
fortunately, in this case no parol evi-

dence was offered and the applications
themselves are the only evidence upon
the issue of whether contracts for im-
mediate insurance were effected.

Since what we have said above makes
it unnecessary to determine whether
a contract of immediate insurance was
effected and since the evidence on such
issue is so limited, we prefer to leave
the question undecided.

Reversed, with directions to enter
judgment for the defendant.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Horace D. Ballaine, John
Rogers and Morris L. Bradford, who
as Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court,

HALLEY, V.C. J., and WELCH,

CORN, GIBSON, DAVISON, JOHNSON,
O’NEAL, and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.

On Rehearing.

PER CURIAM. Since the promulga-
tion of the opinion herein on Decem-
ber 16, 1952, the defendant in error has
strenuously urged on rehearing that the
rules of construction discussed in said
opinion are not here applicable be-
cause of various statutory provisions,
particularly 36 O.S. 1941 §§ 422, 425
and 428. In this connection, an exami-
nation of the statutes discloses that
mutual insurance corporations and mu-
tual insurance associations do not come
within the satne category nor are they
regulated by the same laws. Sections
421 10 432 deal with associations, not
corporations. The latter are regulated
by sections 321 to 391 of said Title 36.

The primary distinction between the
two, of importance herein, is in the re-
quirement that an applicant for mem-
bership and insurance in an association
must be approved by the governing
board before being accepted for either;

_ whereas, an applicant for insurance in
a mutual corporation is not issued such
a policy unless he is qualified by

321

(among other things) being a member
of a farm bureau. In the former, the
accepted applicants become members;
in the latter, they become stockhold-
ers. Therefore, as to mutual insurance
corporations, the statutes, as regard~
ing stock companies, are generally ap-
plicable, except as specifically pro-
vided, one provision being that insur-
ance policies shall only be issued to a
particular class (farm bureau mem-
bers).

In the case at bar, the defendant
below was a mutual corporation, not an
association. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that the applicant,
plaintiff below, was not qualified to
be insured when the application was
made. The only direct evidence on the
point is a copy of the report of the
agent to the home office stating that
plaintiff was a member of the Garvin
County Farm Bureau.

The statutes relied upon’ by defend-
ant as above cited are not here appli-
cable and the petition for rehearing is
denied.

SIMS et ux. v. BENNETT.
No, 34937, April 14, 1953.
255 P. 2d 916.

322

Frank Wilton, Jones, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiffs in error.

B. H. Mears, Jones, for defendant
in error.

PER CURIAM. This action was in-
stituted in the trial court by the de-
fendant in error, plaintiff below, against
the plaintiffs in error, defendants be-
low, to recover damages to grassland
and fence caused by fire. The parties
will hereafter be referred to as they
appeared in the trial court. The peti-
tion of plaintiff, filed March 31, 1950,
alleged damages to his property in the
amount of $491 as a result of fire com-
municated to his premises through the
negligence of the defendants, and on
same date summons issued which was
thereafter returned by the sheriff in due
time showing personal service on each
of the defendants The answer date on
such summons was April 30, 1950, and
the record does not disclose any ap-
pearance by defendants prior to judg-
ment.

On May 3, 1950, the cause came on
for trial at which time it appears the
plaintiff was represented by counsel
and that the defendants were not
present, either in person or by attorney,
whereupon the matter was heard by
the court and default judgment was
entered in favor of plaintiff and against
the defendants in the sum of $466.

Thereafter, and on May 6, 1950, de-
fendants filed their motion to vacate
judgment wherein the defendants al-
leged, among other things, that a mo-
tion to quash service of summons had
been filed in said cause on April 28,
1950, prior to the answer date in such
summons, but that for some reason
such motion was not filed by the clerk
of the court nor shown on the docket
of said cause; that due to illness of a
serious nature in the immediate family
of counsel for defendants, said counsel

was prevented from and unable to fol-
low up the filing of said motion to
quash summons in said cause. The re-
maining allegations contained in de-
fendants’ motion to vacate judgment
were in the nature of a general denial
of the negligence of the defendants and
the damage of plaintiff. On May 29,
1950, defendants’ motion to vacate judg-
ment was heard and denied by the
court, and the defendants have appealed
by transcript from the order of the trial
court overruling such motion,

On appeal the defendants assign five
specifications of error contending that
the trial court erred in overruling the
motion to vacate judgment in general
specifications, and specifically for the
reasons presented and discussed under
the following propositions:

1. It is error to render judgment by
default upon a petition claiming dam-
ages, without hearing evidence upon
which to assess the damages.

2, It is error to deny defendants’ mo-
tion to vacate default judgment and
not permit defendants to defend where
plaintiff recovers judgment based on
damages without proof of damages.

The propositions thus presented to
this court resolve themselves into the
question as to whether the motion to
vacate judgment should have been up-
held by the trial court for the reason
that no proof of damages was made by
Plaintiff on the trial of the case. The
argument presented by defendants un-
der the propositions urged is that due
to the silence of the court records as
to the proof offered there was nothing
upon which the trial court could assess
the damages for the fire injury, and
defendants cite numerous cases from
this jurisdiction in support of their con-
tention that it was, therefore, error for
the trial court to enter judgment by
default assessing the amount of dam-
ages, and that defendants’ motion to
vacate should have been upheld.

(1) The contentions by defendants
that the trial court rendered default

judgment without hearing evidence up-
on which to assess the damages present
and inject a new issue into the case
on appeal from the issues presented
by defendants and considered and de-
termined by the trial court at the hear-
ing on the motion to vacate the default
judgment. The record discloses that the
issues presented by such motion were
whether defendants had filed a motion
to quash summons in the cause prior
te such judgment, which motion for
some reason was not filed by the clerk
of the court nor shown on the docket
in said cause, and whether defendant
was thereafter prevented from taking
some proper action in the cause prior
to judgment by reason of illness. The
record does not disclose any allegation
by defendants that damages were as-
sessed by the court without competent
evidence upon which the court might
assess such damages. It has long been
the rule followed by this court that
parties will not be permitted to argue
in this court for the first time questions
not raised in the trial court. Gibbins
v. Wade, 202 Okla. 138, 210 P. 2d 955;
Dryden v. Burkhart, 198 Okla. 239, 177
P. 2d 121; Butterick Co. v. Molen, 192
Okla. 602, 138 P. 2d 89.

(2) The specifications of error urged
by defendants contain charges of a gen-
eral nature that the trial court erred
in overruling defendants’ motion to va-
cate judgment. The record discloses
that both plaintiff and defendants were
represented by counsel at the hearing
upon such motion before the trial court,
and defendants acknowledge in their
argument the general rule that the va-
cation of default judgment during term
is discretionary with the trial court.
This court has said before that if any
presumptions are to be indulged, they
will be in favor of the validity of judg-
ments of courts of general jurisdiction,
and that when any such court has
rendered judgment in relation to any
subject matter within its jurisdiction,
the presumption arises that the court
had before it sufficient evidence to au-
thorize the award of such judgment.

323

Town of Watonga v. Crane Co., 189
Okla. 184, 114 P. 2d 941.

The order of the trial court overruling
the motion to vacate judgment is af-
firmed.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Keith Drum, Orlando
Sweet and M. A. Holcomb, who, as
Special Masters, aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the
Judicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, DAVI-
SON, O’NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
concur. JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH
and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent.

SMITH v. WILLIAMSON.
No. 34982. April 14, 1953.
256 P. 2d 174.

324

|

Carter Smith, Tulsa, Douglas Gleason,
Ottawa, Kan., and Thurman S. Hurst
and Edwin S. Hurst, Tulsa, for plaintiff
in error.

Maurice F. Ellison, Tulsa, for de-
fendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. Nina Pearl Ansley Wil-
liamson, defendant in error, plaintiff
below, on the 7th day of November,
1947, filed an application to terminate
a trust estate theretofore created on
November 14, 1929, in a certain di-
vorce action, wherein Willie Ansley was
plaintiff and Henry Ray Ansley and
Nina Pearl Ansley Williamson were
defendants. Carter Smith, administrator
of the estate of Henry Ray Ansley, de~
ceased, defendant below, filed a re-
sponse to the application to terminate
the trust. The trial court, upon a hear-
ing, entered an order terminating the
trust and entered its judgment for the
distribution of the trust funds, and for
a division of certain land. From the
judgment rendered, the administrator
appeals.

In this opinion, Carter Smith, ad~
ministrator of the estate of Henry Ray
Ansley, deceased, plaintiff in error, will
hereafter be referred to as “adminis-
trator.” Nina Pearl Ansley Williamson,
defendant in error, will be referred to
as “Nina”. Henry Ray Ansley will
be referred to as “Ray”. Willie Ansley,
Ray’s second wife, will be referred to
as ‘Willie’. Margaret Godfrey, Ray’s
first wife, will be referred to as “Mar-
garet”’. Margaret Regina Ansley,
daughter of Ray and Margaret, will be
referred to as “Regina. Dona May
Ansley, Ray’s mother, will be referred
to as “Dona”. Billie Ansley, son of Ray
and Willie, will be referred to as “Bil-
lie”.

A chronological statement of facts is
essential to a proper understanding of
the question involved. During Ray’s
minority he lived with his mother,
Dona, and his sister, Nina. A substan-

tial part of their livelihood was provided
by royalty oil payments derived from
a ten-acre tract of land located in
Carter county, Oklahoma. Ray, as a
member of the Choctaw Tribe, or Na-
tion, acquired the ten-acre tract of land
as an allotment as a member of said
tribe. Ray attained his majority in
1923.

In the year 1925, Ray was involved
in an automobile accident while riding
as a passenger in a car operated by an-
other. The accident was not of a ser-
ious nature, but Ray, his mother,
Dona, and his sister, Nina, were fear-
ful that Ray might be sued for dam-
ages, and that if a judgment was ob-
tained against him, that the royalty
payments from oil produced from said
ten-acre tract might be subject to the
payment of such judgment. To avoid
this eventuality, Dona, Nina and Ray
went to the office of Dona’s attorney,
and upon the advice of the attorney,
Ray executed a deed to the land to
Nina. Thereafter, and up to the events
hereinafter detailed, the royalty pay-
ments were made to Nina, who turned
them over to Dona, and the proceeds
thereof, as formerly, were applied to
their joint living expenses.

Sometime thereafter, an action for
damages in the sum of $15,000 was filed
against Ray and his codefendant to re-
cover a money judgment growing out
of the automobile accident referred to.
This action was dismissed thereafter in
consideration of the payment in the sum
of $250 by Ray to the plaintiff in said
action.

Ray married Willie in November,
1927. Thereafter, in 1929, Willie brought
an action for divorce against Ray, in
which she joined Nina as a party
defendant. She alleged that Ray was
the legal and equitable owner of said
land, but that the legal title was held
in the name of Ray’s codefendant,
Nina. She further alleged that the land
had been previously conveyed by Ray
to Nina to cover up and avoid the pay-
ment of certain debts, or contemplated

325

debts, of Ray, and that said convey-
ance was made without consideration
and for the purpose of avoiding the pay-
ment of said debts, including Willie’s
claim for alimony and for child sup-
port. Ray filed an answer in the form
of a general denial to the petition of di-
voree. Nina filed an answer in which
she pleaded that Ray, then a single
man, by good and sufficient deed, con-
veyed the ten-acre tract to her in the
year 1925, and that she is the legal and
equitable owner thereof. A copy of the
deed is attached to her answer.

In November, 1929, a decree in the
divorce proceeding was entered, the
legal effect of which is determinative of
the principal issue posed in the present
proceeding. The decree granted Willie
a divorce and the custody of their mi-
nor son, Billie. The decree recites:

“The court further finds that the de-
ffendant, Henry Ray Ansley, insofar as
this plaintiff is concerned and insofar
as the issues in this case are involved,
is the legal and equitable and the actual
and beneficial owner of the above de-
scribed property and premises, not-
withstanding the record title to said
premises is in said co-defendant, Nina
Pearl Ansley Williamson; ***” ”

The decree states that the ten-acre
tract located in Carter county, Okla-
homa, should be divided equally be-
tween Willie and Ray as a part of the
reasonable alimony of Willie, subject to
a trust provision. The decree recites
that the deed from Ray to Nina cover-
ing said ten-acre tract was executed
without consideration, and for the pur-
pose of defeating Ray’s creditors, and
that, therefore, Nina holds the legal
title to said land in trust for Ray. The
decree makes a provision for a month-
ly payment for the support of the minor
son and other allowances in the form
of alimony, and a monthly payment to
Ray in the sum of $10. To enforce the
decree, Ray and Nina were required to
execute and deliver to the First Na-
tional Bank & Trust Company, a cor-
poration, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, as trus-
tee, a deed to said land to be held by
the bank in trust during Billie’s mi-

326

nority. The bank was authorized to
make a disposition of the proceeds of
the oil royalties derived from said land
in conformity with the decree. Nina and
Ray executed a deed to the bank as the
decree ordered. Finally, the decree or-
dered that upon the said minor reach-
ing his majority, or in the event of his
death prior thereto, that the trust should
terminate, and in that event, the funds
remaining in the hands of the trustee
bank, after paying cost of administra-
tion, were to be paid to Nina, and that
the bank should convey to her an undi-
vided one-half interest in the ten-acre
tract of the Carter county land, the
other one-half undivided interest to be
conveyed by the bank to Willie.

Thereafter, in May, 1931, Ray and
Nina tiled their verified motion to mod-
ify the terms of the divorce decree.
This motion stated that the decree in-
advertently provided that when the
trust terminated the remaining funds
were to be paid to Nina, and also a
one-half undivided interest in the ten-
acre tract was to be conveyed to her;
whereas, the divorce decree specific-
ally found that both the legal and equit-
able title to said ten-acre tract of land
was owned by Ray, and not by Nina.
They prayed that the decree be cor-
rected so that the residue of the funds
and the undivided one-half interest in
the tract of land at the termination of
the trust be conveyed to Ray.

The court heard the motion in June,
1931, and disposed of it by authorizing
the trustee to pay to Ray the sum of
$500 upon the condition, and with the
understanding, that said trust decree
be quieted and relieved from any claim
of the defendant, Ray, whatsoever, ex-
cept as provided in the said original di-
vorce decree of November 14, 1929.

Ray died in 1941, but an administra-
tor of his estate was not appointed until
‘about the middle of 1948. Thereafter, in
1947, Nina filed an application in the
original divorce case to terminate the
trust. The application recited that Bil-
lie would reach his majority in 1950,
and that the funds in the hands of the

-of Ray;

trustee were more than sufficient to pay
the alimony and child support money
provided by said decree, and she there-
fore requested that the residue of the
funds be turned over to her, and that
the trustee execute a deed conveying to
her an undivided one-half interest in
the ten-acre tract cf land as provided
for in said divorce decree.

The trustee was ordered to file its
response. The trustee, in its response,
claimed that there was an uncertainty
as to whether Nina was entitled to the
relief set forth in her application, or
whether the heirs of Ray, Regina and
Billie were the legal beneficiaries un-
der the trust.

The administrator of the estate of
Henry Ray Ansley, deceased, also, by
eross-petition, claimed that the residue
of the funds and the undivided one-
half interest in the ten-acre tract should
be assigned and conveyed to the ad-
ministrator for the benefit of Ray’s
heirs.

Upon the issues thus joined the trial
court entered its judgment in favor of
Nina, and against the administrator,
and ordered the trustee to distribute
the residue of the funds to Nina, and to
convey to her a one-half interest in said
ten-acre tract. From the judgment so
rendered the present appeal is taken
by the administrator, and to reverse
the judgment he asserts that: (1) The
divorce decree in 1929 is not res ju-
dicata because the defendants, Ray and
Nina, were not adversary parties in
that proceeding; (2) the statute of limi-
tations does not bar the enforcement of
the rights of the administrator and heirs
(3) the conveyance from
Ray to Nina in 1925 was not a fraud-
ulent conveyance since the record does
not establish that it was made to de-
feat an actual creditor; (4) that the
doctrine of unclean hands has no ap-
plication to the present action because
(a) that Ray purged himself of fraud-
ulent conduct, if any, by the settle-
ment of the damage suit; and (b) that
the doctrine does not preclude the en-
forcement of the trust established by

Nina’s verified motion to modify, and
(ce) that the doctrine has no applica-
tion for the reason that the adminis-
trator was not the moving party in
this action; and (d) that the adminis-
trator is entitled to equitable relief un-
der the pari delicto exception to the
doctrine of unclean hands.

We have no doubt that under the
terms of the decree upon the death or
majority of Billie, one-half interest in
the ten-acre tract of land would vest in
Willie. The divorce decree did not adju-
dicate the rights as between Ray and
Nina to the residue of the funds, or the
other one-half interest in the land;
therefore, the court was without juris-
diction or power to decree that the ac-
cumulated residue funds in the bank
and the remaining one-half interest in
the land should be conveyed to Nina.

In 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, §223, p.
966, the general rule is stated as fol-
lows:

“The general rule is that parties to a
judgment are not bound by it in subse-
quent controversies between each
other, where they are not adversaries
in the action in which the judgment
is rendered. This is true whether the
judgment is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, or determmes the issues in
favor of the defendants. The rule ap-
plies to a fact which might have been,
put was not, litigated in the original
action. The theory of the many deci-
sions supporting the general rule is that
the judgment merely adjudicates the
rights of the plaintiff as against each
defendant, and leaves unadjudicated
the rights of the defendants as among
themselves.”

In Noble v. Johnson, 145 Okla. 46,
291 P. 26, we said: .

“As a general rule, a judgment set-
tles nothing between codefendants who
are not adversary parties among them-
selves, and unless their conflicting or
hostile claims were brought in issue
‘by proper pleadings or otherwise, and
were actually litigated and adjudicated
in the action.”

327

In the case of De Watteville v. Sims,
44 Okla. 708, 146 P. 224, the rule is
stated as follows:

“As a general rule, a judgment set-
tles nothing between coplaintiffs or co-
defendants unless their conflicting or
hostile claims were brought into issue,
as by cross-petition or by separate and
adverse answer or otherwise, and were
thereupon actually litigated and adju-
dicated.”

This rule is also stated in Smith v.
Braley, 76 Okla. 220, 184 P. 586.

The earliest expression of the rule is
stated in M. B. Keagy v. Wellington
National Bank, 12 Okla. 33, 69 P. 811,
where the Territorial Supreme Court
said:

“Where two persons are sued as co-
defendants and answer separately, and
not by way of cross-petition, or make
default, the judgment of the court adju-
dicating the rights of the plaintiff as
against such defendants, will not be
res judicata as to any of the merely
relative rights as between the defend-
ants themselves.”

We are of the view, and so hold,
that the court was without power or ju-
risdiction, under the record as here pre-
sented, to adjudicate the adverse in-
terest in the residue funds or the land
as between Ray and Nina. We are for-
tified in this conclusion by the very
words of the decree, which recites that
insofar as the plaintiff, Willie, was con-
cerned, Ray was the legal and equit-
able owner of the land.

Nina contends that if the original
decree was not res judicata as of the
time of its entry it became res judi-
cata by judgment of the court upon
the motion of Ray and Nina to modify
the decree filed as of May 29, 1931.

In support of this contention Nina
cites the case of Wilson-Harris, Adm’x,
v. Southwest Telephone Co., 193 Okla.
194,141 P. 2d 986, wherein we held:

“A judgment of a court denying a
motion to vacate a judgment concludes
the parties and their privies, not only
as to the grounds contained in such mo-

328 a

tion, but as to all grounds for the vaca-
tion of the judgment which might prop-
erly have been contained therein.”

However, as we have noted, the veri-
fied motion to modify the decree filed
by Ray and Nina admitted that Nina
had no interest in the land, and re-
quested that it be reconveyed to Ray.
In that proceeding there was no issue
presented to the court as between Ray
and Nina as to the ownership of the
land in question; neither were they ad-
verse parties upon the motion, and
therefore the principle announced in the
cited cases, supra, are equally appli-
cable here.

Nina cites cases holding that res ju-
dicata applies, even though the deter-
mination was reached upon an erron-
eous view or application of law. We
agree that the rule is correctly stated,
but it is only applied where the par-
ties stand in an adverse position to each
other.

Nina here invokes the five-year stat-
ute of limitations as a bar to the ad-
ministrator’s response. The following
cases, among others, are relied upon.
Cassidy v. Gould, 86 Okla. 217, 208
P. 780; Royer v. Dobbins, 111 Okla.
156, 239 P, 157; Leedy v. Ellis County
Fair Ass’n, 188 Okla. 348, 110 P. 2d
1099; Dillon v. Helm, 196 Okla. 140, 163
P. 539; Martin v. Goodman, 126 Okla.
34, 258 P. 871.

We think the statute of limitations did
not begin to run against Ray during his
lifetime, for the reason that as a re-
mainderman he was not entitled to the
possession of the land; that right was
postponed until the period, for which
the bank trust was established, expired.
The precedent estate under the decree
was in the trustee to so remain until
Billie died, or reached his majority.
The subsequent estate came into being
only at Billie’s death, or at his ma-
jority, at which time it vested in’ the
remainderman. Willie’s enjoyment of
the one-half interest in the land was
postponed under the terms of the trust
during her son’s minority, and until the
trust was terminated. There being no

issue before the court as to whether Ray
or Nina was entitled to the remaining
on-half interest in the land, the de-
cree, insofar as it attempted to ad-
judicate their rights was void. The
court had jurisdiction to determine
whether the interest in the land be-
tween Ray and Nina was a precedent
or a subsequent interest. Finding it was
a subsequent interest, the right of pos~
session incident to it did not come into
being until the precedent right under
the trust terminated. This rule is stated
in 83 Am. Jur., Life Estates, Remain-
ders, etc., §187, p. 659, wherein it is
said:

“The universal rule of law is that a
statute of limitations does not begin to
run against a right of action until that
right exists. The party who has the
right of action has the full period of
the statute in which to enforce it. Since
the remainderman hag no right of pos-
session until the particular estate is
terminated, the general rule is that
laches, estoppel, or the statute of limi-
tations will not run against a remain-
derman prior to the termination of the
life tenancy, or, as some writers say,
till the life estate falls in. * * *”

Nina did not hold the legal title to
the land as a gift. She held the bare
legal title under the circumstances
heretofore related, and as we have no-
ticed, under her verified motion to mod-
ify the decree, she pleaded that
the land belonged to Ray, and that
she had no interest in it. Before the
statute of limitations could be relied
upon, it was incumbent upon her to re-
nounce and repudiate the trust and
claim the equitable and the beneficial
ownership of the land. This she did not
do.

We held in Leedy v. Ellis County Fair
Ass’n, 188 Okla. 248, 110 P. 2d 1099,
and in Dillon v. Helm, 196 Okla. 140,
163 P. 539, that limitation does not be-
gin to run in favor of the trustee of a
resulting trust until a clear repudiation
of his trust is brought to the knowl-
edge of the cestui que trust.

The remaining question presented is
whether the administrator should be de-

nied any relief by reason of certain al-
leged fraudulent conduct in the con-
veyance of the land to Nina. Nina con-
tends that the present action cannot be
sustained under the equity maxim of
unclean hands. In view of the record
that Nina, with full knowledge that
Ray might be sued in the automobile
accident case, willingly became a trus-
tee of a dry trust and her subsequent
effort to have the land reconveyed to
Ray, places her in an anomalous posi-
tion in charging that Ray’s administra-
tor fails to show clean hands.

“Where both are equally in the wrong,
defendant holds the stronger ground.”
Camp v. Camp, 196 Okla. 199, 163 P.
2d 970.

In Noble v. Johnson, 145 Okla. 46,
291 P. 26, we held that he who asserts
that a transfer is fraudulent as to credi-
tors, must assume the burden of prov-
ing that the conveyance was fraud-
ulently made, as it will not be im-
plied from circumstances which only
awaken suspicion. There were no credi-
tors to defraud unless it be conceded
that the plaintiff in the automobile acci-
dent case was a creditor when the deed
was executed.

In Smith v. Felkel, 91 Okla. 184, 217
P. 196, we held that where one person
conveyed land to another for the pur-
pose of placing it beyond the reach
of an alleged creditor, and where there-
after the claim was settled and was not
a bona fide claim, equity would permit
the grantor to recover the land.

In Hoff v. Hoff, 106 Kan, 542, 189 P.
613, the Kansas court states the rule as
follows:

“Where there are no actual creditors
to be defrauded, and there is only a
mental purpose to hinder imaginary
creditors, equity will relieve against
- transfers of property without consider-
ation.”

In Hickey et al. v. Ross, 197 Okla.
543, 172 P. 2d 771, we held that an
actual creditor must, in ‘fact, exist
to be a fraudulent conveyance.

329

The general rule is announced in 15
CJ.S., Compromise and Settlement,
§22, p. 737.

“The compromise and settlement of a
claim or cause of action is not an ad-
mission that the claim is valid, but
merely admits that there is a dispute,
and that an amount is paid to be rid
of the -controversy; nor is a compro-
mise with one person an admission of
any liability to someone else.”

Nina contends that there was an
existing creditor when the conveyance
was made. She cites the case of Evans
v. Cooper, Sheriff, 176 Okla. 41, 54 P.
2d 368. That case is based upon the
proposition that where a party has an
action pending against another, which
is afterwards reduced to judgment, he
is a creditor of such party before the
actual rendition of the judgment. But,
as we have seen, no judgment was ren-
dered in the automobile accident suit,
but the case was dismissed upon the
payment by Ray of the nominal sum
of $250.

This appeal is based upon the court’s
judgment entered December 27, 1950,
upon Nina’s application and motion to
terminate the trust created on Novem-
ber 14, 1929, in the original divorce
proceedings.

The trial court found the issues gen-
erally in favor of Nina, and against the
administrator, and decreed that Nina
be the owner of an undivided one-half
interest in the ten-acre tract of land,
‘ree from any interest of the adminis-
trator and free from Ray’s heirs; also,
that the residue funds be awarded to
Nina.

The record here discloses that Willie
alleged the title to the land was held
in trust for Ray. Nina, in her verified
motion and application to modify the
decree, alleged that she held the land in
trust for Ray, and that she had no in-
terest therein.

The court found that the land in truth
and in fact belonged to Ray, and that
Nina had no legal or equitable title
therein. Notwithstanding all this, the

330

court orders that an undivided one-half
interest be conveyed by the bank to
Nina. If the order was complied with,
the reconveyance of title could not in-
vest Nina with a full, legal and equit-
able title, for the reason that the court
had previously found Nina did not own
the land, had no interest therein, and
ordered her to convey the naked title
held by her to the bank as trustee.

Upon these findings, the court could
not divest Ray of the true ownership
of an undivided one-half interest in the

land, and invest Nina with the legal and °

equitable ownership therein.

We have examined the entire record
and are of the view, and so hold, that
this being a proceeding wherein Nina
is asking a court of equity to grant her
affirmative relief, that the equities in
favor of the administrator and the bod-
ily heirs of Ray predominate, and that
the judgment should be and is reversed,
and the bank is directed to convey an
undivided one-half interest in and to
the S.E.% of the S.E.% of the SE.%
of section 31, township 3 south, range
3 west, containing ten acres, more or
less, Carter county, Oklahoma, to the
administrator, plaintiff in error, togeth-
er with such residue of funds not im-
pressed with priorities under the court’s
decree of December 27, 1950.

The judgment is reversed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, DAVI-
SON, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur. WELCH, J., concurs in
result.

|
YOST et al. v. CASSEL et al.
No. 35542. April 14, 1953.
255 P. 2d 914.

Murphy & Firestone, Kingfisher, for
plaintiffs in error.

J. L. Pazoureck, El Reno, for de-
fendants in error.

DAVISON, J. This is an action in
partition wherein all of the parties,
both plaintiff and defendant, are the
children and heirs, or their grantees, of
John C. Moore, and/or his wife, Lin~
nie Moore, both deceased, the original
awners of the real estate involved
which they occupied as a homestead
until their respective deaths. It was
brought by the only two children who
were stiJl minors, by one of their sis-
ters as next friend, who, with two of
the adult brothers, joined, individual-

ly, as party plaintiff. Upon motions of
the guardian of their estates and the
guardian of their persons, the two
minors were substituted as parties de-
fendant instead of plaintiff. The other
children of the original owners were
also defendants. The plaintiffs sought
a decree quieting title to, and an order
for partition of, the property involved,
consisting of some 80 acres in Cana-
dian county, Oklahoma. The trial court
granted the quiet title decree, fixing
the proportion or part of the realty
owned by each of the parties, but de-
nied the order for partition. From such
denial the plaintiffs have appealed.

The sole question for determination
is the extent of jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court to order partition of lands
occupied by their deceased parents as
a homestead at the time of their deaths,
during the minority of some of the chil-
dren who survived them.

The tract of land here involved was
owned by John C. Moore when he died
testate, leaving said property to the
two minor plaintiffs, Benjamin Thomas
Moore and Kenneth Earl Neal Moore,
subject to life estate bequeathed to
his wife, Linnie Moore. She elected to
take under the statutes of intestate
succession and an undivided one-third
interest was distributed to her. She
died seized of that estate which de-
scended in equal shares to her ten
children, Marjorie Ruth Moore, Odus
Ray Moore, Lois Lucille Moore, Law-
rence Everett Moore, Della Hazel Fos-
ter, Raymon Lee Moore, Harold Dean
Moore, Esther Marie Moore, Benjamin
Thomas Moore, and Kenneth Earl
Moore. Thus the above-named minors
became the owners of an 11/30ths un-
divided interest each and the other
eight children became the owners of a
1/30th undivided interest each in said
land, which was the family homestead
at the time of the deaths of Mr. and
Mrs. Moore. In 1940, at the time of the
death of Mrs. Moore, the plaintiff, Es-
ther Marie Yost, and the two minor
plaintiffs and two other of the children
were living there. Immediately there-

331

after, said minors were sent to Califor-
nia to live with a half-sister and, some
four or five years later, they were
moved to Louisiana to live with an-
other half-sister, the defendant Maggie
Cassel. They were still living with the
said Maggie Cassel at the time of the
trial of this case, and were then sixteen
and nineteen years of age, respec-
tively. The defendant Barney McCabe
was the guardian in succession of
their estates. He was collecting the
rental of about $500 yearly, and after
paying taxes and expenses, the remain-
ing amount thereof was used for the
support of said minors.

That part of section 311 of Title 58,
O.S. 1941, controlling in situations of
this kind, provides:

“* * ® upon the death of both husband
and wife, the children may continue
to possess and occupy the whole home-
stead until the youngest child becomes
of age.”

That statute was adopted from the
Jaws of the Dakotas, coming by way of
its adoption by California. At an early
date in the case of Hoppe v. Hoppe,
104 Cal. 94, 37 P. 894, the California
court, in discussing the import of the
provisions in connection with an action
for partition, made the following pro-
nouncement:

«* * * The. homestead is a place of
abode for the family, and no act of
any member of the family can in any
way prejudice the rights of the others
to occupy it. It must remain intact until
the youngest child has reached its ma-
jority. Hence, it is not competent for
either of the other cotenants to have
a partition until that period has been
reached, * * *”

It is a sound rule that:

“An action for the partition of a
homestead set apart for the ‘use of the
surviving wife and minor children’ will
not lie until the children have reached
their majority.” Hoppe v. Hoppe, su-
pra.

The fact that the minors had not oc-
cupied the property after their mother’s

332

‘death has no effect on the proposi-
tion. In the case of Rockwood v. St.
John’s Estate, 10 Okla. 476, 62 P. 277,
the Territorial Court held that where,
immediately after the death of the sur-
viving parent, the minor children were
removed from the homestead owned
and occupied by the parents, “and a
guardian was appointed for the minor
children, who in that capacity has been
leasing the land and collecting the rents
therefrom, but has not occupied the
same, nor have any of said minor chil-~
dren occupied said land as a residence
since the death of their father; held,
that such removal of the minor heirs
from the land does not constitute a
waiver or abandonment of the home-
stead; and further held that personal
‘possession and occupancy’ of the land
by either the minor heirs or their
guardian was not necessary, * * * to
preserve the homestead character of
the land for the minor heirs.”

"In the body of the opinion in the St.
John’s case, supra, it was said:

«« * * The right to the homestead by
the minor children is not dependent
upon the actual ‘possession and occu-
pancy’ of the land by them. They can
neither waive nor abandon their right
to the homestead. Their right depends
upon their minority, which cannot be
forfeited or taken away * * *.”

That expression of the law was quot-
ed and affirmed by this court in the
case of Hembree v. Magnolia Petro-
Jeum Co., 176 Okla. 524, 56 P. 2d 851.

Where a spouse survives, his or her
rights to possess the homestead is
founded upon the same statute and are
protected to the same extent as the
rights of minors. The only material
difference is that the surviving spouse,
being an adult, may abandon or for-
feit the rights much more easily. But
unless there is an abandonment, the
courts grant the same protection under
the statute. As to partition of a home-
stead occupied by a surviving spouse,
this court in the case of Holmes v.
Holmes, 27 Okla. 140, 111 P. 220, held:

“Where a wife occupies as a home the
homestead set apart by order of the
probate court from the estate of her de~
ceased husband for the use of herself
as a home, the same is not liable to par-
tition at a suit of the heirs of the de-
ceased husband.”

and in the case of Pennington v. Wood-
ner-McGaugh, 54 Okla. 110, 153 P. 875,
it was held that:

«* * * and we find nothing in the
record to estop the defendant in error
from her statutory right to continue
to possess and occupy the homestead.
This being the case the rule is well set~
tled that the same cannot be partitioned
at the suit of any of the heirs.”

When the trial court substituted the
minors, by the guardians of their per-
sons and estates, as parties defendant
instead of plaintiff, this action became
one prosecuted by three of the adult
heirs of Mrs. Moore against the minors
and others as defendants. Since under
the rule in the Rockwood v. St. John’s
case, supra, there was no abandonment
of the lands as a homestead by the
minors, the same was not subject to
partition upon application by other
heirs. The trial court was correct in re-
fusing to order a partition.

The judgment is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. WELCH, J.,
concurs in result.

Le
THOMPSON v. UPDEGRAFF.
No. 35293. March 31, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 21, 1953.
255 P. 2d 912.

E. G. Nahler, St. Louis, Mo., and Sat-
terfield, Franklin & Harmon, Oklahoma
City, for plaintiff in error.

Anglin, Stevenson & Huser, Holden-
ville, for plaintiff in error.

ARNOLD, J. This is a suit for dam-
ages to personal property.

The uncontradicted testimony of
plaintiff reasonably tended to show the
following state of facts:

Urie Updegraff was the owner of a
truck and trailer designed for the trans-
portation of livestock and engaged in
the business of transporting livestock
for hire. The driver of the truck, his
employee, was in company with one
Marvin S. Olivo, the owner of 43 head
of cattle being transported from Ada
to the stockyards at Tulsa. The truck
was going eastward and approaching
the intersection of Highway 33 running

333

in the general course of north and south
near Sand Springs. The driver intended
to turn southward on Highway 33. There
was a considerable down grade for a
quarter of a mile or more in the road
traveled by the truck and approaching
said intersection. About halfway down
said grade the driver put his foot on
the brake pedal and found that the
brakes of the truck were not operat-
ing. The air brakes from the truck to
the trailer were not hooked up. His
speed was so great upon arrival at the
intersection that he decided he could
not make the turn and went straight
across Highway 33, through a tourist
court, taking the center garage of a
series of three and the automobile lo-
cated in said garage with him, along
an old abandoned road and upon the
railroad tracks of defendant railway
company where the truck and trailer
were stalled. All lights, both headlights
and clearance lights, on the truck and
trailer were burning. A train whistled
in the distance to the west. To the west
of the place on the tracks where the
truck stalled was a slight curve in the
railread tracks, then a straightaway for
more than half a mile. The owner of
the cattle took a couple of flares and an
old quilt and ran up the railroad tracks
in the direction of the approaching train
for the purpose of apprising the de-
fendant’s trainmen of the position and
peril of the truck-trailer. He placed one
of the flares at the end of the slight
curve in the tracks and where it would
be visible from the half mile or more
of the straightaway upon which the
train was approaching, then ran 283
yards down the track toward the ap-
proaching train and as it came in sight
began waving the other flare and the
quilt. The engineer whistled at him to
get off the track which he did. The
train proceeded without slackening its
speed until it crashed with the truck
and trailer. The train traveled 400 feet
after hitting the truck before it came to
a stop. The speed of the train was
approximately 45 miles per hour. The
train was 783 yards, or almost half a
mile, from the stalled truck when Olivo
first signaled it. Upon inquiry by Olivo

334

of the engineer immediately after the
collision the engineer admitted that he
saw the distress or warning signals
given by the owner of the cattle. That
the value of the truck and trailer be-
fore the collision was $2,000; that they
for use as such were destroyed; that he
sold them as junk for $100.

A demurrer to the evidence was in-
terposed and the trial court requested
to direct a verdict in favor of the de-
fendants. To the court’s adverse rul-
ing the defendant excepted and put on
no evidence. The jury was instructed; it
deiiberated and returned a verdict for
$1,000.

Motion for new trial was overruled
and judgment was entered on the ver-
dict, provoking this appeal.

By instruction No. 15 the court told
the jury that the plaintiff’s theory of re-
covery was based on “last clear

chance”. To this instruction the defend-
ant excepted and saved his record. By
instruction No. 16 the court told the
jury that the defendant contended that
there could be no recovery except on
the theory of “last clear chance,” and in
this connection insisted that actual
knowledge of the position of peril of
plaintiff’s truck and trailer on the part
of the employees of the defendant in
time to avoid the collision if ordinary
care were exercised was necessary in
order to permit recovery by plaintiff.
Contrary to the theory of plaintiff that
in “last clear chance” cases, under
such facts as here a “last clear chance”
instruction should be to the effect that
the defendant knew or in the exercise
of ordinary care should have known of
the presence and position of peril of the
truck-trailer, the court instructed the
jury four times that knowledge of the
presence and location of the trailer was
an absolute prerequisite to the right of
recovery on the part of plaintiff. These
four instructions were given at the re-
quest of defendant.

He argues that the evidence is not
sufficient to sustain the necessary find-
ing of the jury that the employees of

the railroad company, to wit: the en-
gineer and fireman, knew of the posi~
tion of peril of plaintiff's truck and
trailer in time, in the exercise of or-
dinary care, to have avoided the acci-
dent. Though, there was no direct proof
of knowledge of the position of the
truck and trailer, the foregoing circum-
stances are sufficient to reasonably
show that the employees of the railroad
company, to wit: the engineer and fire-
man, or one of them, knew of the pres-
ence of the truck and trailer in time,
in the exercise of ordinary care, to
avoid the collision. The failure to exer-
cise ordinary care and the proximate
relationship thereof to ensuing dam-
ages may be proven by circumstances.
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. vy. Gor-
don, 186 Okla. 424, 98 P. 2d 39.

Affirmed.
|

SWARTZ et al. v. DENNIS et al.
No. 34450. Dec. 9, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1958.

Application for Leave to File Second
Petition for Rehearing Denied
April 21, 1958.

255 P. 2d 923.

335

Haskell Paul, Pauls Valley, and
Chas. L. Orr, Oklahoma City, for plain-
tiff in error.

Otey, Johnson & Evans, Ardmore, for
defendant in error R. A. Lathrop.

Gilliland, Ogden, Withington, Shirk &
Vaught, Oklahoma City, for remaining
defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. Action brought by
widow of J. M. Dennis to quiet title
to real estate in Garvin county, alleged
to have been taken in name of Joe Lath-
rop, now deceased, for the benefit of
partnership composed of Joe Lathrop,
J. M. Dennis and R, A. Lathrop. R. A.
Lathrop is still living. Defendants, in-
cluding R. A. Lathrop, were heirs of
Joe Lathrop. R. A. Lathrop filed cross-
petition, also alleging the partnership
and claiming an undivided 1/3 interest
in partnership lands in addition to his
1/5 interest as heir of Joe Lathrop. Par-
ties agreed to fully determine and dis-
tribute alleged partnership assets, ex-
cept for one tract in litigation else-
where.

The court made findings of fact as
follows:

Partnership was formed in February,
1922, to deal in mineral interests and
the oil and gas business. Joe Lathrop
was single, and, for convenience, much
property was taken in his name but was
purchased with partnership funds and
held in trust for remaining partners.
Joe Lathrop died in 1934 and had, in
his name, varying interests in 18 tracts
in various counties. R. A. Lathrop was
appointed administrator of the estate
of Joe Lathrop, and listed some of these
tracts in the inventory of the estate,
without reference to the claimed part-
nership. The partnership had financial
reverses about 1928 and J. M. Dennis
and R. A. Lathrop ceased to devote

336

their time to its operations. The firm’s
office was closed in 1929.

In 1940, J. M. Dennis filed an affidavit
in Kay county asserting ownership of
certain property, which resulted in R. A.
Lathrop filing criminal charges against
Dennis as well as a suit to determine
ownership of the Kay county property.
These disputes were the objects of con-
versations between attorneys for the
various parties at different times. The
court found that the estate of J. M.
Dennis owes the estate of Joe Lathrop
$940.31 after taking into account the
various claims and counterclaims be-
tween the parties. Neither R. A. Lath-
rop nor J. M. Dennis filed any claim in
administration proceedings of the estate
of Joe Lathrop, deceased. Joe Lath-
rop’s sole heir was his mother, Jennie
Lathrop, who died in 1945, leaving as
her sole heirs the defendants. Jennie
Lathrop took possession of the estate
and it has remained since her death in
the possession of her heirs. R. A. Lath-
rop, in 1940, quitclaimed the property
listed in the inventory as part of the
Joe Lathrop’s estate to his mother, Mrs.
Jennie Lathrop, the consideration be-
ing a deed to R. A. Lathrop conveying
the Joe Lathrop home in Ardmore. R. A.
Lathrop contends that the quitclaim
deed was executed on his part by mis-
take and fraud.

This action was tried more than 18
years after the partnership closed its
office and more than 14 years after the
death of Joe Lathrop. The court found
that the interests of Joe Lathrop in 8
numbered tracts belonged to the part-
nership and should be divided 1/3 to
R. A. Lathrop, 1/3 to the heirs of J. M.
Dennis and 1/3 to the heirs of Joe Lath-
rop.

The parties will be referred to in this
ovinion by their respective designations
in the original action. When defendant
R. A. Lathrop is referred to, such ref-
erence will be by name. Remaining de-
fendants will be referred to as “defend-
ants.”

Defendants’ first proposition is that
plaintiff, as an heir and assignee of

. the

other heirs, could not maintain the ac-
tion.

The estate of J. M. Dennis was not
administered and defendants claim that
only a personal representative can
bring an action against a decedent’s
partners for an accounting.

“A thing in action, arising out of the
violation of a right of property, or out
of an obligation, may be transferred by
the owner. Upon the death of the owner,
it passes to his personal representa-
tives, * * *” 60 Okla. St. Ann. 313.

“Every action must be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest
* * *™ 12 Okla. St. Ann. 221.

“Ordinarily, the widow and legatees
of a deceased partner cannot act di-
rectly against the surviving partners,
but must compel the executor or ad-
ministratcr lo act for them.” 40 Am.
Jr. 342.

in Somerville v. Somerville, 118 Okla.
259, 247 P. 389, defendant partner set-
tled. a claim of a deceased partner by
giving a note to the latter’s widow.
When sued upon the note the surviving
partner defended on ground that only
the deceased partner’s personal repre-
sentative could enter into settlement of
decedent’s partnership affairs.
This view was sustained by this court.

In Lyons v. Lyons, 182 Okla. 113, 76
P. 2d 892, the court considered an iden-
tical question, and after citing the per-
tinent statutes and the case of Somer-
ville v. Somerville, supra, this court
stated:

“We are of the opinion that this ac-
tion for an accounting and to establish
a trust in the business and the personal
properties described in the petition
must be prosecuted by the administra-
tor of Sadie Lyons’ estate.”

Plaintiffs cite the case of Stallings v.
White, 194 Okla. 649, 153 P. 2d 813, but
the question of the capacity of plain-
tiffs to sue does not appear to have
been raised therein.

This being an action for accounting,
the proof might have sustained a find-

ing against J. M. Dennis that he was
indebted to the partnership, but judg-
ment could not be rendered against his
heirs. Judgment could only have been
rendered against his personal represen-
tative.

We must conclude that plaintiff was
not the proper party to bring the action.

Defendants’ propositions 2 and 3
should be stated and considered to-
gether.

“The death of Joe Lathrop dissolved
and terminated the alleged partnership
and it was the duty of the survivors
to promptly inventory, liquidate and
settle the firm’s affairs. The surviving
partners by failing, refusing and neg-
lecting to settle the partnership affairs
waived and abandoned the right.”

Under these propositions, defendants
argue that R. A. Lathrop’s inclusion of
items of property, here in controversy,
in his inventory as administrator of
Joe Lathrop’s estate constitutes an es-
toppel by R. A. Lathrop so as to pre-
clude his present claim that they were
partnership property. Defendants also
argue that R. A. Lathrop and plain-
tiffs decedent were estopped by sit-
ting idly by while these properties were
administered and distributed, J. M.
Dennis being then alive and along with
R, A. Lathrop residing in Carter county
where the estate was administered.

Defendants and R. A. Lathrop con-
tended that the partnership was a trust
and that the probate court had no juris-
diction over this property, and that its
decree had no effect on their rights.
They cite Harrison v. Eaves, 191 Okla.
453, 130 P. 2d 841, to show that the pro-
bate court’s decree was not conclusive
of their rights. The court there held
that a probate decree of distribution did
not preclude beneficiaries from later
establishing a trust in their favor by
action in equity. The court’s holding
was well summarized in syllabus 3:

“Where decedent held real property
in trust, probate court had no jurisdic-
tion over trust or trust property which

337

were within equity jurisdiction of dis-
trict court.”

However, we cannot agree that the
case last above-cited is determinative
herein. Joe Lathrop held title in his
own name without qualifications. The
partnership’s name did not appear in
the conveyance nor was Joe Lathrop
referred to therein as trustee. The de-
eedent in Harrison v. Eaves, supra,
held under a trust instrument and the
probate court sought to distribute prop-
erty to which decedent did not hold
title in his own right and name.

Defendants cite Holmes v. Patterson,
91 Okla, 163, 215 P. 1071, in which this
court held that a creditor could not wait
until the deceased’s administrator had
notified creditors and closed and dis-
tributed the estate, and then have a
new administrator appointed against
whom the claim could be established.
The court said:

“* # * a final decree * * * is also
conclusive of all those matters that
the claimant ought to have presented
for administration in the exercise of
the usual care shown by the ordinarily
prudent business man for the preserva-
tion of his property rights.” Young v.
Byrd, 124 Mo. 490, 28 S. W. 83; Shelby
v. Creighton, 65 Neb. 485, 91 N. W. 369.”

The case last cited is not determina-
tive for the reason that a purely equit-
able cause of action in which equitable
relief is sought does not constitute a
claim which must be presented to per-
sonal representatives. Brooks v. Yar-~
brough (10 Cir.) 37 F. 2d 527. How-
ever, the language of the Oklahoma
court last cited is pursuasive when we
consider defendants’ claim that plain-
tiff and R. A. Lathrop were estopped.

Even more persuasive is this court’s
opinion in Hutson v. McConnéll, 139
Okla. 240, 281 P. 760. There the dece~
dent died intestate leaving his grand-
daughter, Hutson and his wife, Morri-
son. Morrison was executrix and filed
petition to distribute estate to herself
and Hutson in equal shares, subject
to certain conveyance from Hutson to

338

her, Morrison. Hutson later filed action
to set aside these conveyances, where-
upon Morrison alleged in her answer
that the property did not belong to de-
ceased at all, but that deceased held
as trustee for defendant Morrison. This
court held that Morrison was estopped
by questioning her deceased husband’s
ownership by her allegations in the pro-
bate court inconsistent with her latter
claim.

In United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co. v. Clutter, 74 Okla. 254, 179 P.
754, this court held that an administra-
tor was estopped to deny that he came
into possession of property as belong-
ing to the estate, when such property
had been listed in the inventory of the
estate.

In Jeffress v. Hicks, 156 Okla. 291, 10
P, 2d 419, this court held:

“1, Where the husband dies and his
estate is probated in the county court,
and where the wife files instruments in
said probate matter admitting that all
the property in controversy was proper-
ty accumulated by their joint industry,
but makes no claim that said property
was partnership property, the county
court in probate acquires jurisdiction
to decree distribution of all of said
property.

“2. Under the circumstances as enu~-
merated in paragraph 1 of this sylla-
bus, the wife would be estopped to
later file a suit in the district court
claiming that the property held in the
mame of her husband was partnership
property, when the county court in pro-
bate had jurisdiction of said property
under the pleadings of the interested
parties.”

In McCleary v. Brown, 190 Okla. 19,
119 P. 2d 830, this court held:

“2. Surviving partner by his conduct
may waive right to question validity of
sale of his part of partnership prop-
erty by personal representative of de-
ceased partner and estop himself to re-
cover in action for accounting more
than his proportion of sale price.”

In the McCleary case the court’s hold-
ing only applied to alleged loss through
improper sale, but the court pointed
out our statutes for closing partner-
ship on death of partner and said:

“By permitting defendant to take pos-
session of and sell the partnership prop-
erty, without asserting his rights as sur-
viving partner, he waived his rights as
surviving partner. or estopped himself
from asserting such rights.”

The authority of Hutson v. McCon-
nell, supra, United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Clutter, supra; Jef-
tress v. Hicks, supra; Hutson v. Mc-
Connell, supra, impel us to hold in the
instant case that R. A. Lathrop is es-
topped from asserting title in 1946 to
property which he listed in 1934 as be-
ing owned by Joe Lathrop, and which
he joined other heirs in quitclaiming
to his mother in 1940. While J. M. Den-
nis by sitting by and permitting the
property to go through the procedures
involved in the estate of Joe Lathrop
indicated abandonment and estoppel on
his part, it is not necessary to so hold
in view of our holdings that the plaintiff
was not proper party to this action.

R. A. Lathrop and plaintiff seek to
avoid this holding by their claim that
R. A. Lathrop did in fact make claim
for the partnership of the tracts in-
volved herein. But this testimony, if
true, only shows that they made state-
ments to that effect and took no legal
action.

This property was in the name of the
partner who died first. His heir was an
aged woman who could not be pre-
sumed to know about the complex af-
fairs of an active trader in oil and gas
interest. ‘Had the situation been re-
versed and the partner in whose name
the property did not stand died first and
had the surviving partners kept the
property, then the heirs of the deceased
partner would not have known of the
ownership and would hardly have been
estopped to assert title.

Under this proposition 4, defendants
next contend that the lapse of time, the

death of parties and witnesses, and the
loss of evidence rendered it next to im-
possible for the court to do justice, and
precluded relief.

By this proposition defendants raise
the issue that plaintiff and R. A. Lath-
rop were guilty of laches. The latter
parties answer that laches does not ap-
ply unless the failure to assert rights
results in disadvantage to the oppos-
ing party and point out that defend-
ants were not innocent purchasers and
took only what interest their ancestor
had in the property and therefore would
not be damaged should plaintiff and
R. A. Lathrop prevail. Plaintiff and
Lathrop also argue that defendants and
their mother were responsible for the
delay in commencing litigation.

The latter arguments are hardly plau-
sible. Defendants had legal title which
was not contested of record, except in
Kay county, and then only by an affida-
vit from one not in the chain of title,
and they were not under any compul-
sion, and we cannot see that they were
under any duty to commence legal pro-
ceedings to determine these matters.

The partnership closed its office and
ceased business in 1928 with these prop-
erties in the name of Joe Lathrop. Joe
died in 1934. Dennis died in 1942. This
action was not brought until 1946 when
two of the partners were dead. Many of
the records were missing. The exhibits
at the trial, while voluminous, were
fragmentary.. Banks patronized by the
partnership had gone out of business.
Lawyers involved in the firm’s transac-
tions and in the estates of the dece-
dents had died.

It is well settled that “equity aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their
rights.”

“Nothing can call equity into activity
but conscience, good faith and dili-
gence.” Luschen v, Stanton, 192 Okla.
454, 137 P, 2d 567.

There is a sound reason for the rule
that equity will deny stale claims. In
30 C.J.S. at page 521, the reason is
stated:

339

“A stale demand or claim in its prop-
er sense is one that has for a long time
remained unasserted; one that is first
asserted after an unexplained delay of
such great length as to'render it diffi-
cult or impossible for the Court to as~
certain the truth of the matters in con-
troversy and do justice between the par-
ties, or as to create a presumption
against the existence or validity of the
claim, or a presumption that it has been
abandoned or satisfied.”

And at page 524:

“The doctrine of laches has existed
since the beginning of equity jurisdic-
tion. Its existence is independent of
statutes of limitation. The doctrine of
laches is based on the injustice that
might result from the enforcement of
long neglected rights, the difficulty, if
not the impossibilty, of ascertaining
the truth of the matters in controversy
and doing justice between the parties
and on grounds of public policy, its aim
being the discouragement for the
peace and repose of society, of stale
and antiquated demands.”

In Dardenne v. Daniels, 176 Okla.
557, 56 P. 2d 793, this court held:

“2. Where, from delay, the original
transactions have become so obscured
by lapse of time, loss of evidence, and
death of parties or witnesses, as to
render it difficult to do justice, the
doctrine of laches is applicable, and
the plaintiff may by his lapse be pre-
cluded from relief even though he may
have been entitled thereto in the be-
ginning.”

The trial court’s finding of fact No.
14, upon which the judgment was based,
is as follows:

“From the evidence and the books
and records produced, it is difficult for
the court to ascertain just what prop-
erty is now owned by the partnership
and the status thereof.”

In the trial court’s finding of fact
Nos. 26 and 27, the judge found that
parties were dead and some of the cor-
respondence had been destroyed mak-
ing determination of the issues difficult,
but says that he has been able to ferret
out all the essential facts and that

340

- these difficulties have not resulted in
prejudice to the parties. The trial judge
did display great patience and dili-
gence, but we do not see how he could
tell whether prejudice had resulted by
the loss of papers and correspondence
and absence of witnesses through death,
or how he could ferret out matters from
these missing papers or from absent
witnesses, Plaintiff and R. A. Lathrop
could have brought this action before
Joe Lathrop died, and the former par-
ties had the papers after his death and
before the correspondence was lost.

We think the inability to prove perti-
nent facts due to plaintiff's waiting
many years is as real detriment as
shown in order to bring laches into
operation.

Laches has been sustained where only
one and a half years intervened, Davis
v. Godwin-Barelay Co., 120 Okla. 274,
251 P. 1042, and where two years
elapsed, Brown v. Privett, 109 Okla. 1,
234 P. 577, The fluctuating character of
oil and gas properties particularly re-
quire that people claiming interests
therein assert them promptly and take
their part of the risk, rather than decide
to come in if and when the property has
become valuable; Twin Lick Oil Co., v.
Marbury, 91 U.S. 592, 23 L. Ed. 328;
Washington v. Morton, 90 Okla. 142, 216
P. 457; Nickel v. Janda, 115 Okla. 207,
242 P. 264, and Parker v. Ryan, 143
Okla. 187, 287 P. 1006.

We hold that plaintiff and R. A. Lath-
rop are barred by laches from prose-
cution of the instant action.

Defendants’ Proposition 5 is the claim
that it was impossible from the incom-
plete and inaccurate records to settle
the accounts of the parties.

This proposition is discussed and set-
tled in our disposition of the claim of
laches, as is Proposition 6, which al-
leges insufficiency of evidence to es-
tablish the property acquired by the
partnership and the status thereof,
with which conclusion we must agree.

Defendants’ Proposition 7 and 8 have
to do with the competence of a land

book introduced by plaintiff and ad-
mitted and considered by the court as
a book of account, and certain other
evidence at the trial. In view of other
holdings herein it is not necessary to
discuss this proposition.

Defendants’ Proposition 9 is entitled
to full discussion. It is “The action was
barred by limitations.” If the partner-
ship was not dissolved by mutual con-
sent of the parties when they cease
to do business together, it was certain-
ly dissolved by the death of Joe Lath-
rop twelve years before this action was
brought. Defendants claim a three-
year limitation period applicable. Plain-
tiff and R. A. Lathrop say their claim
is only subject to the fifteen-year stat-
ute covering interest in lands. Defend-
ants pleaded limitations in their answer.

Plaintiff's decedent or R. A. Lathrop
could have brought their action upon
the death of Joe Lathrop. At that time
the cause of action accrued, and the
applicable statute commenced to run.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 49 Okla. 398, 153
P. 195; Broadwell v. Board of Com-
missioners, 88 Okla. 147, 211 P. 1040;
Skelly Oil Co., v. Harrell, 192 Okla.
101, 134 P. 2d 136.

Plaintiff and R. A. Lathrop claim
that one partner is the trustee for the
others and that this is therefore an ac-
tion to enforce a trust and establish
an interest in land and is governed by
the fifteen-year provision in subd. 4 of
12 Okla. St. Ann. §93, while defendants
claim that 12 Okla. St. Ann. §95 gov-
erns, as this is primarily an action in
accounting.

This case was, by agreement of all
parties, tried as an accounting action.
Only upon this theory could the district
court of Garvin county obtain jurisdic-
tion as to real property outside that
county.

It is necessary to determine the na-
ture of this action. We believe this
question to be governed by the follow-
ing pronouncements of this court:

“A bill in equity filed by one mem-
ber of an alleged partnership against
another member thereof for a declara-
tion of the partnership and for an ac-
counting, in which it is charged that
certain property was and is partner-
ship property, is a transitory action
and the venue thereof is governed by
Sec. 207, C.O.S. 1921, and this is true
even if an estate in real property is by
the bill drawn in question, the plaintiff
pleading that the estate in real prop-
erty belongs to the partnership as such.
Such allegations if traversed by the
defendant in a court of competent juris-
diction, would form an issue for trial
as an incident to the primary relief
prayed in the bill, to wit, the declara-
tion of the partnership, the determina-
tion of its assets, and the accounting as
between the members thereof.” Myers
v. Garland, 122 Okla. 71, 251 P. 34.

“* * * The fact that some of the as-
sets of the partnership in joint venture
is real estate located in other counties
than the one where the action is brought
does not alter the rule, the relief as
between the partners as to the real es~
tate being incidental to the equitable
relief relating to the determination of
the partnership issues.” Wolley v.
Shaw, 192 Okla. 107, 136 P. 2d 398.

In Replogle v. Neff, 176 Okla. 333,
55 P. 2d 436, we find the same holding.

In Wolfe v. North, 182 Okla. 520, 78
P. 2d 674, this court said:

“Tn 33 C.J. 867, it is stated that the
statute of limitations for recovery of
the profits derived from a joint adven-
ture begins to run from the date of its
termination. The situation is analogous
to one where a partnership business is
closed out, and in such case a cause
of action to establish the partnership
and for an accounting and settlement
accrues between the partners when the
partnership is terminated, under an im-
plied contract mutually and equally to
share the profits and bear the burdens
of the partnership, and the three year
statute of limitations is applicable.”

341

Brooks v. Campbell (1916 Kan.) 155 P.
41.

Plaintiff and R. A. Lathrop rely on
the case of Stallings v. White, 194 Okla.
649, 153 P. 2d 813. In that case Susan
A. Stallings died intestate in 1909 leav-
ing her husband and numerous chil-
dren. The husband died in 1910. One
son died in 1911, leaving the other chil-
dren as his heirs, Other heirs died in
1912, 1921 and 1939. During all these
years, the properties owned by the first
decedent were managed and added to
under what this court called a loosely
constructed but not unusual family ar-
rangement. The trial court and this
court determined certain heirs of some
of the early decedents to have an in-
terest in the properties. This court only
considered three questions on appeal,
none of which had to do with limita-
tions of actions. That opinion is not
determinative of any of the issues
herein.

We hold the claims of plaintiff and
R. A, Lathrop barred by the three-year
statute of limitations.

The trial court’s judgment was not
sustained by sufficient evidence and is
contrary to principles of law and equi-
ty previously enunciated and expressed
herein by this court. The judgment of
the trial court is reversed and re-
manded, with instructions to render
judgment denying plaintiff any relief
and denying R. A. Lathrop relief, ex-
cept for his interest as an heir of Jennie
Lathrop. ~

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Joe Stamper and David
A. Stovall, who as Special Masters aid-
ed in the preparation of this opinion.
These attorneys were recommended by

the Oklahoma Bar Association, ap-
proved by the Judicial Council, and
appointed by the court.

HALLEY, V. C. J., and CORN,

GIBSON, DAVISON, JOHNSON, and
O'NEAL, JJ., concur.

342

STATE ex rel. COM’RS OF LAND
OFFICE v. MOBLEY et al.

No. 83211. Jan. 8, 1949.
Rehearing Denied March 8, 1949.

Application for Leave to File Second
Petition for Rehearing Denied
April 21, 1953.

255 P. 2d 945.

Lonnie L. Corn, T. J. Lee, Roy F.
Lewis, Richard A. Jackson, and Floyd
Wheeler, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff
in error.

Jobn R, J. Keahey, A. E. Pearson, and
Rex Belisle, Oklahoma City, for defend-
ants in error.

WELCH, J. In 1940, the State of
Oklahoma, on relation of the Commis-
sioners of the Land Office, commenced
action against B. A. Mobley and others
upon a promissory note secured by real
estate mortgage. M. L. Reid, who was
not a party to the note and mortgage,
but who subsequent to the execution
thereof acquired a mineral interest in
the land described in the mortgage,
was named a party defendant to the
action. On January 23, 1942, judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against certain named defendants
for the sum due upon the note and for
foreclosure of the mortgage against all
the defendants. Sale was had as pro-
vided by the judgment. The land was
sold to the plaintiff for an amount less
than the amount of the judgment on
the note. The sale was confirmed and
sheriff's deed issued to the state.

Thereafter, on May 5, 1944, the de-
fendant M. L. Reid filed a petition in
the case alleging that the judgment in
foreclosure was void as to her, in that
the court had not acquired jurisdic-

tion of her person. It was stated that
no summons was ever served on her
and that she had no knowledge of the
foreclosure action until about four
months prior to May 1, 1944. It was
alleged that she has a valid defense
in that she offers and agrees to pay
to the plaintiff all sums justly due and
owing on the mortgage. The prayer of
the petition is that the court vacate the
judgment and grant her the right to
pay off the indebtedness on the prop-
erty and be subrogated to the rights
of the plaintiff.

Accompanying the petition as an ex-
hibit thereto the defendant Reid ten-
dered an answer to the petition of the
plaintiff. In the answer so tendered the
defendant admits the allegation in
plaintiff's petition of her ownership of
an interest in the lands and plaintiffs
ownership of the mortgage, and that
defendant’s interest is subject thereto
and that the loan and interest on the
loan secured by said mortgage was in
arrears at the time of the filing of the
suit. The answer further states, “de-
fendant hereby offers, tenders and a-
grees to pay to the said plaintiff all
sums due to the said plaintiff on said
loan.” The prayer of the answer is
“that upon a finding of the court as
to the amount that is justly due and
payable to the said plaintiff, that the
court decree that this defendant, upon
payment of said sums, be decreed the
right of subrogation to the right, title
and interest of said plaintiff, in the
aforesaid real estate.”

Plaintiff interposed a demurrer to the
defendant’s petition to vacate. The trial
court sustained the demurrer and dis-
missed the petition. The defendant M.
L. Reid appealed to this court.

This court reversed that judgment
and remanded the cause with direc-
tions to the trial court to overrule the
demurrer to the petition to vacate and
proceed in accordance with the views
expressed in the opinion and mandate.
Mobley et al. v. State ex rel. Commis-
sioners of the Land Office, 198 Okla.
250, 177 P. 2d 503.

343

The mandate of this court was en-
tered on the journal of the district
court of March 17, 1947. On March 26,
1947, the plaintiff filed a motion to dis-
miss the action as to the defendant M.
L. Reid. On April 7th thereafter, by
interlineation, the words “with preju-
dice” were added to the motion to dis-

In May 1947, ajournal entry of judg-
ment was filed which recites that on
May 5, 1947, the cause came on for
hearing on plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
the foreclosure action as to the defend-
ant, M. L. Reid. The trial court made
findings that on April 7, 1947, the de-
murrer of the plaintiff to the de-
fendants’ petition to vacate the judg-
ment had been overruled, and on the
same date the judgment in foreclosure
as to the defendant M. L. Reid had
been vacated. The defendant Reid was
granted permission to file, instanter,
hher answer in the foreclosure action,
which answer had been attached to the
petition to vacate. The defendants in
open court made an offer to pay the
amount of money found due the plain-
tiff in the foreclosure action. The plain-
tiff refused the offer and requested an
order of dismissal of the action as to
the defendant Reid and stated that
plaintiff was filing in the case a writ-
ten dismissal with prejudice as to said
defendant. The court overruled plain-
tiffs motion to dismiss and sustained

. an objection by defendant to plaintiff's

filing of dismissal. The court made a
finding that plaintiff made no denial
that the defendant owned an interest in
the property and that such interest had
not been foreclosed. An order and judg-
ment was entered that if within a pre-
scribed time the defendant should pay
to plaintiff or pay into court an amount
equal to the judgment rendered on Jan-
uary 23, 1942, with interest thereon cal-
culated to May 5, 1944, the date when
petition to vacate the judgment was
filed, the plaintiff should have no fur-
ther interest in the premises described
in the foreclosure proceeding and that
the defendant Reid be subrogated to
all of the right, title and interest of

344

the plaintiff acquired by its mortgage
and foreclosure action.

In this appeal the plaintiff asserts:

“The court erred in denying plaintiff
its right to dismiss its cause of action
against the defendant M. L. Reid; the
court erred in its finding and judgment
that the defendant, M. L. Reid, be al-
lowed, upon voluntary payment of
said judgment, to become subrogated
to the rights of the plaintiff.”

Plaintiff cites 12 O.S. 1941 §684, which
reads in part as follows:

“A plaintiff may, on payment of costs
and without an order of court, dismiss
any civil action brought by him at any
time before a petition of intervention
or answer praying for affirmative re-
lief against him is filed in‘ the action.
A plaintiff may, at any time before the
trial is commenced, on payment of the
costs and without any order of court,
dismiss his action after the filing of
a petition of intervention or answer
praying for affirmative relief, but such
dismissal shall not prejudice the right
of the intervener or defendant to pro-
ceed with the action.”

Plaintiff asserts an absolute right un-
der the above statute to dismiss its ac-
tion as to the defendant Reid, in that
the defendant filed no answer praying
for affirmative relief.

The defendant cites Mobley et al. v.
State ex rel. Commissioners of the Land
Office, supra, wherein 42 O. S. 1941
§§18 and 19 are quoted as follows:

“818. Every person having an in-
terest in property subject to a lien, has
a right to redeem it from the lien, at
any time after the claim is due, and
before his right of redemption is fore-
closed.

“819. One who has a lien, inferior
to another upon the same property, has
a right:

“1. To redeem the property in the
same manner as its owner might, from
the superior lien; and,

“2, To be subrogated to all the bene-
fits of the superior lien when necessary
for the protection of his interests, upon
satisfying the claim secured thereby.”

And wherein in the body of the opin-
ion it is said:

“Under the demurrer it is to be ac~
cepted for the purpose of this review
that the movant was the owner of the
interest in the land and neither ap-
peared nor was served with process in
the cause. Under the law the judgment
rendered was void as to her and hence
her estate and rights incident thereto
were not impaired thereby. (Pettis v.
Johnston, supra; First Nat. Bank of
Newton v. Wm. B. Grimes Dry Goods
Co., 45 Kan. 510, 26 P. 56.) By reason
of the statutes hereinabove quoted the
movant as an incident to her owner-
ship had by law the rights of redemp-
tion and subrogation there provided
and upon such vacation her right to
seek the remedies provided could no
longer be in question.”

The defendant asserts that plaintiff
having filed its motion to dismiss any
right it may have had to summarily
dismiss was waived, citing Spellacy v.
Superior Court in and for Los Angeles
County, 23 Cal. App. 2d 142, 72 P.
2d 262, and 27 C.J.S., Dismissal and
Nonsuit, §12, wherein it js stated:

“A plaintiff's right to summarily dis-
miss is waived by his filing a motion
to dismiss and thereby invoking the
court’s jurisdiction to make an order
on the motion.”

If it be said that under 42 O. S. 1941
§18, supra, a person having an interest
in property subject to a lien might at
any time after the claim is due main-
tain an independent action against
such claimant to enforce his right to
redeem the property from the lien, then
it would appear to follow that when a
lien claimant has commenced action to °
foreclose and a person having an in-
terest in the property answers by of-
fering to pay the costs and redeem the
property from the lien, the lien claim-
ant may not dismiss the action and
leave the lien claim as a subject of
future action in foreclosure. Inasmuch
as such answering defendant might
have maintairied an independent action
to enforce his right to redemption from
lien, it would appear that an answer

offering to redeem might well be treat-
ed as a prayer for affirmative relief as
contemplated in 12 O.S,. 1941 §684. If
the lien claimant after commencing ac-
tion to foreclose acts to dismiss the ac-
tion with prejudice to a future action
an entirely different effect is wrought
as between the parties. The lien claim-
ant acting to dismiss his action on the
lien with prejudice and acting to for-
ever bar any claim of lien against
the property, resort to section 18, supra,
would not be required. Clearly. when
a person owns an interest in property
subject to a past due lien claim and
such lien has been effectively dis-
charged or barred, then section 18 could
have no application.

The question of whether or not plain-
tiffs right to summarily dismiss the
action could be or was waived requires
no direct answer in the determina-
tion of this appeal. Under the circum-
stances herein plaintiff's motion to dis-
miss with prejudice and the written
dismissal with prejudice are of the
same effect.

Herein, the action being one to
establish and foreclose a lien against de-
fendants’ property, the filing of a writ-
ten dismissal with prejudice by the
plaintiff clearly and effectually re-
leased the property from such lien
claim, and forever. As noted above,
defendant’s answer to plaintiff's peti-
tion was an offer to pay the amount
asserted as a lien against the prop~-
erty in which she owned an interest.
The prayer of the answer was that upon
such payment she be subrogated to all
benefits of the lien. After the filing of
dismissal by plaintiff or after plaintiff
had acted to effectively release the lien
as against defendant’s property, no
right to subrogation existed as prayed
for in defendant’s answer. Likewise, up-
on the filing of a motion by plaintiff
to dismiss with prejudice such motion
being an offer of effectual release of
the lien, no right to subrogation, which
in all cases is a protective right, would
exist. The trial court in the proper
exercise of its jurisdiction should have
dismissed the action with prejudice.

345

The doctrine of subrogation is gov-
erned and controlled in its operation
by principles of equity, rather than by
strict legal rules, and one of the condi-
tions of subrogation in all cases, in
the absence of specific contract, is that
the subrogee discharge the obligation
of another for the protection of his own
rights. Such is the condition stated in
42 O.S. 1941 §19 in the situation there
applicable. The rule is mentioned in
50 Am. Jur., Subrogation, 10, as fol-
lows:

“There are... certain elements or
conditions which must be present in
every case in which legal subrogation
is sought. In the first place, there must
be a debt or obligation for which par-
ties other than the subrogee are pri-
marily liable, and which he as surety,
guarantor, or in some other capacity
discharges for the Protection of his own
rights or interests,

In Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okla. 308,
168 P. 1031, in the second paragraph
of the syllabus, with reference to doc-
trine of subrogation, it was said:

“The doctrine requires (first) that a
third person seeking its benefit must
have paid a debt due to a third party
before he can be substituted to that
party’s right, and (second) that in do-
ing this he must not act as a mere
volunteer, but on compulsion, to save
himself from Joss by reason of a su-
perior lien or claim on the part of the
person to whom he pays the debt, as
in cases of sureties, prior mortgages,
etc. The right is never accorded in
equity to one who is a mere volunteer
in paying a debt of one person to an-
other.”

Herein, plaintiff having acted to ex-
tinguish the lien insofar as defend-
ant’s property was affected, no condi-
tions under which subrogation might be
decreed existed.

It is contended by defendant that the
plaintiff by virtue of 64 O.S. 1941 §52
could not effectuate a release of defend-
ant’s property until the loan made to
defendant’s predecessor in title had
been paid in full. The case of State ex

346

rel. Com’rs. of Land Office v. Schnei-
der, 197 Okla. 57, 168 P. 2d 288, is cited.

The statute cited reads in part as fol-
lows:

“No settlement shall be made by the
Commissioners of the Land Office or
any employee with any borrower for
less than the amount due upon his ob-
ligation, ... .”

It was held in State v. Schneider,
supra, that the statute prohibited settle-
ment with a borrower for less than the
amount due upon his obligations. Here-
in, the release of defendant’s property
from the mortgage given to secure the
loan does not lessen the amount due
upon the obligation of the borrower and
does not in anywise constitute a settle-
ment with the borrower and the ruling
in the cited case has no application.
The statute does not affect the plaintiff
in the management of its mortgage se-
curity except in its dealings with the
borrower,

It might be that under the peculiar
circumstances in this case the plaintiff
has gained valuable rights by virtue
of its ownership of the mortgage, which
rights can be best protected by release
of defendant’s property from the lien
of the mortgage. A dismissal of the
action by plaintiff with prejudice hav-
ing the effect of releasing or extinguish-
ing the lien as to defendant’s property
under the answer filed as hereinbefore
noted, does not prejudice any rights
of the defendant to which she in law or
in equity is entitled. Under such circum-
stances it was error to refuse dismis-
sal,

The judgment appealed from is re-
versed and the: cause is remanded to
the trial court, with directions to dis-
miss the action as to this defendant,
with prejudice to any future action.

HURST, C.J., DAVISON, V.C.J., and
BAYLESS and CORN, JJ., concur.
RILEY, GIBSON, and LUTTRELL, JJ.,
dissent.

HICKS et al. v. FAIRBANKS’ HEIRS,
ete., et al.

No. 35298. March 24, 1953.

Rehearing Denied April 21, 1953.
256 P. 2d 169.

Granville Tomerlin and Jack High,
Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.

Joe Young, Chandler, for defendants
in error.

WILLIAMS, J. Parties are designated
as in the trial court.

Orin Fairbanks died in 1917 while
owning the lands involved in this action,

and left a will reading in part as fol-
lows:

“Second, I give, devise and bequeath
unto my beloved wife, Ada Fairbanks
all of my estate real and personal and
mixed to have and to hold to her and
her heirs forever.

“Third, should any of my estate re-
main at the death of my said wife
Ada Fairbanks undisposed of then in
that event I give and bequeath such

remainder to my nephew Charles H..

Fairbanks to him and his heirs for-
ever. This provision is not intended to
restrain or hamper my said ..... in
any manner . . she is to have my en-
tire estate as above provided—and this
provision is only to take effect in case
any of my estate remains undisposed
of at the death of my said wife Ada
Fairbanks.”

This will was admitted to probate
and in 1919 the county court entered
its final decree distributing a fee-sim-
ple title to Ada Fairbanks, and making
no mention of a remainder to Charles
H, Fairbanks. No petition for decree of
distribution was filed before said final
decree was entered.

In 1949 Ada Fairbanks died, having
previously devised the lands involved
in this action to Thelma Hicks and
Mary Shiels, her nieces, plaintiffs in
the case at bar. In 1951 said plaintiffs
filed a quiet title action, alleging them-
selves to be in possession of said lands.
All defendants defaulted except Cosette
Johnson (daughter of Charles H. Fair-
banks) who, as administratrix of the
estate of Charles H. Fairbanks, and
individually, filed a cross-petition for
possession of, and to quiet title to, such
lands. At the conclusion of the trial, the
trial court rendered judgment for de-
fendant, Cosette Johnson, individually
and as such administratrix, according-
ly. Plaintiffs have appealed to this
court from such judgment and an or-
der overruling their motion for new
trial.

For reversal of the judgment ren-
dered below, plaintiffs make the con-

tention, among others, that the will of
Orin Fairbanks, properly construed,

347

vested in his wife, Ada Fairbanks,
through whom they claim a fee-simple
title.

As we are convinced from a consid-
eration of such contention, that the
trial court’s judgment should be re-
versed, we find it unneccessary to con-
sider plaintiffs’ other contentions here-
in made,

It is to be noticed that the second
paragraph of the will, above quoted,
devised the lands involved herein to
Ada Fairbanks “to her and her heirs
forever.”

A fee-simple estate is defined by 60
O.S. 1951 §23 as follows:

“Every estate of inheritance is a fee,
and every such estate, when not defea-
sible or conditional, is a fee-simple or
an absolute fee.”

See Words and Phrases, vol. 19,
“Heirs”, beginning at page 250, from
which the following paragraphs are
taken:

“Ordinarily, the words ‘heirs’ and
‘heirs of the body’ are words of limi-
tation, and by their own force convey
the idea of a fee-simple estate, Brum-
ley v. Brumley (Ky.) 89 S. W. 182,
183.

“Where testator gave to a son and
his heirs after him all his real estate,
the son took an estate in fee simple;
the word ‘heirs’ not being used in the
sense of ‘children’. Nesbit v. Skelding,
213 Pa. 487, 62 A. 1062 ***.

“At common law the word ‘heirs’ was
necessary to convey a fee-simple es-
tate, no matter how plainly the inten-
tion so to do be expressed in other
words of perpetuity. Hall v. Hall, 106
Me. 389, 76 A. 705, 706.

“A devise to one and his heirs car-
ries the fee to the first taker. Allen v.
Craft. 109 Ind. 476, 9 N.E. 919 ***,

“A conveyance to one and his heirs
always creates an estate in fee simple,
and it has been settled that no words
are so apt and appropriate for this pur-
pose as ‘heirs’. Robinson v. Payne, 58
Miss. 690. ***”

348

See, also, 16 O.S. 1951 §29, which
reads:

“Every estate in land which shall be
granted, conveyed or demised by deed
or will shall be deemed an estate in fee
simple and of inheritance, unless lim-
ited by express words.”

In Re Friss’ Will, 45 Okla. 399, 149
P. 1176, this court said (Syllabus 1):

“In construing wills, it is a well set-
tled rule that, where an absolute estate
or a certain specific interest is given
in one or more provisions in reasonably
clear and unambiguous language, this
interest or estate will not be cut down,
affected, impaired, or qualified in an-
other provision by inference or an in-
accurate recital of, or reference to, its
contents in other parts; and such gifts
will be impaired or cut down only when
such language tending to affect same is
clear and certain as the language creat-
ing the gift.”

In the body of the opinion, after quot-
ing the above language, the court said:

“That this rule is sound and in ac-
cord with reason and the great weight
of authority will be seen by exami-
nation of the text-books and adjudicated
cases, ***”

The principles stated in the above
quotations from the Friss case are ap-
plicable in the case at bar.

84 O.S, 1951 §141 reads as follows:

“Every devise of land in any will con-
veys all the estate of the devisor there-
in, which he could lawfully devise, un-
less it clearly appears by the will that
he intended to convey a less estate.”

See, also 84 O.S. 1951 §156, which
reads: -

“A clear and distinct devise or be-
quest cannot be affected by any reasons
assigned therefor, or by any other
words not equally clear and distinct,
or by inference or argument from oth-
er parts of the will, or by an in-

accurate recital of or reference to its
contents in another part of the will.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Gormly v. Edwards,
195 Okla. 123, 155 P. 2d 985, we held
(Syllabus 2):

“A devise of real estate by will, with-
out limitation or condition, conveys an
absolute estate in fee simple which is
incompatible with a lesser power over
it than that of complete right to its
possession, enjoyment and disposition.”

It is apparent, then, that but for the
question of a limitation over, the testa-
tor in the case at bar has satisfied
all the requirements of the common
law in connection with the devise of a
fee-simple estate, and in so doing has
actually gone beyond the requirements
of the statutes of this state, which make
express words of inheritance unnec-
essary. It obviously would have been
difficult for testator to have selected
expressions which, taken alone, would
show a more positive intention than the
provisions of paragraph two of the will,
supra, to devise an estate in fee sim-
ple.

Defendant contends that the will
clearly shows that the devise to Ada
Fairbanks was expressly limited with
a remainder over Charles H. Fair-
banks, of all property remaining un-
disposed of at the death of Ada Fair-
banks. We think Mr. Fairbanks did so
intend to create a “limitation over,”
but that the same is not permitted by
the law of this state, unless the words
creating the alleged limitation over are
as clear and distinct as the words
creating the fee-simple devise. See 84
O.S. 1951 §156, infra,

Further contention is made by plain-
tiffs that if there be a doubt from the
language he employed, whether testa-
tor intended a devise in fee simple or a
life estate, the granting of absolute
powers of disposition resolves the ques-
tion in favor of the former.

For reasons which we will set out be-
Jow, we think that the answer to this
question (whether or not Orin Fair-
banks granted to his wife absolute pow-
er to dispose of the land) will be the
determining factor in this case.

In this connection defendant argues
the will clearly shows that the testator
intended for Ada Fairbanks to have
the lands with power to sell and con-
vey during her lifetime, but that if any
remained undisposed of at her death,
then it was to go to Charles H. Fair-
banks. She says that a “will is a dis-
position of property to take effect on or
after the death of the owner”; that
nothing passed during the lifetime of
Ada Fairbanks, and that the property
remained undisposed of at her death.

This argument is self-contradictory.
It first seeks to show that “a will is a
disposition of property” and thereafter
(though Ada Fairbanks admittedly de-
vised the lands in her will) says that
the property was “undisposed of”.

84 O.S. 1951 §158 reads as follows:

“The words of a will are to be taken
in their ordinary and grammatical sense
unless a clear intention to use them in
another sense can be collected, and that
other can be ascertained.”

For convenience, at this point, we
again recite the language of paragraph
three of such will:

“Third, should any of my estate re-

main at the death of my said wife Ada.

Fairbanks undisposed of then in that
event I give and bequeath such re-
mainder to my nephew Charles H. Fair-
banks to him and his heirs forever.
This provision is not intended to re-
strain or hamper my said ...... in any
manner—she is to have my entire es-
tate as above provided—and this pro-
vision is only to take effect in case any
of my estate remains undisposed of
at the death of my said wife Ada Fair-
banks.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The following definition of the phrase
“dispose of? is found in Black’s Law
Dictionary, Third Edition:

“Dispose of. To alienate or direct the
ownership of property, as disposition
by will.” (Emphasis supplied.)

A quick examination of a few of our
statutes dealing with wills shows re-
peated use of the term “dispose of”.

349

See the following sections of Title 84,
O.S. 1951:

“41, Every person *** may by last
will dispose of * * *”

“42. A married woman may dispose
of *** by will ***”

“44, Every estate in property may be
disposed of by will. ***”

“45,A testamentary disposition may
be made to any person capable by law
of taking the property so disposed of.

eH?

“109. An agreement made by a testa-
tor, for the sale or transfer of property
disposed of by will. ***”

“111. A conveyance, settlement, or
other act of a testator, by which his
interest in a thing previously disposed
of by *** will, #***

“112, *** previously disposed of by
will. ***” (Emphasis supplied in all of
the above quotations.)

It is evident from a reading of the
above that the meaning of the phrase
“dispose of” includes “disposition by
will’.

Although defendant argues to the con-
trary, we believe the situation in the
ease at bar analogous to that present-
ed in a consideration of our statute pro-
viding, with reference to intestate suc-
cession,

“that in all cases where the property
is acquired by the joint industry of
husband and wife during coverture, and
there is no issue, the whole estate shall
go to the survivor, at whose death, if
any of the property remain, one-half
of such property shall go to the heirs
of the husband and one-half to the heirs
of the wife, according to the right of
representation.” (Emphasis supplied.)
84 O.S. 1951 §213(2).

In construing the above section of the
statutes, this court has consistently
held that a survivor who inherits land
thereunder may dispose of the same by
will. In re Laug’s Estate, 189 Okla.
516, 118 P. 228, concerned a situa-
tion where the wife was the survivor

350 [|

and later devised the land inherited
under the quoted section of the stat-
ute. In that case, the court said:

“The whole estate vested in her. It
was hers to dispose of *** by will.”

We hold that, under the terms of the
will of Orin Fairbanks, Ada Fairbanks
had absolute power to dispose of the
lands involved herein.

33 Am. Jr., Life Estates, Remainders,
etc., $36, reads:

“Tt is a well-settled rule, firmly sup-
ported by a great numerical prepon-
derance of the authorities, that where
there is a devise or bequest to one in
general terms only, expressing neither
fee nor life estate, and there is a sub-
sequent limitation over of what re-
mains at the first taker’s death, if there
is also given to the first taker an un-
limited and unrestricted power of ab-
solute disposal, express or implied, the
devise or bequest to the first taker is
construed to pass a fee. . .”

Substantially the same quotation may
be found in an annotation beginning at
75 ALR. p. 71.

To the same effect is the following
language of the court in Roth v. Raus-
chenbusch, 173 Mo. 582, 73 S. W. 664:

“A distinction must be made between
those cases where there is a devise
generally or indefinitely with a power
of disposition, and those cases where
there is a devise for life with a power
of disposition. In the former, the de-
visee takes the property in fee.”

See, also, Galligan v. McDonald, 200
Mass. 299, 86 N.E. 304, wherein the
court said:

“Testator devised his real estate to
his son, to hold ‘the same to him and
his heirs forever’, and provided that if
he died leaving no issue surviving, or if
such issue should die during minority,
the ‘estate remaining’ at the death of
the son should go to designated per-
sons. Held, that the words ‘estate re-
maining’ did not mean a remainder in
a technical sense, but meant what the
son should not dispose of during life,
and by necessary implication the son

had power to dispose of any or all of
the estate, and the limitation over, be-
ing inconsistent with the power of dis-
posal, could not take effect as an exec-
utory devise.

“The limitation over did not cut down
the son’s estate to a simple life estate,
or to a life estate with power of dis-
posal.”

We have previously shown that Orin
Fairbanks granted to his wife the abso-
lute power to dispose of the land. Un-
der the principles of law above stated,
it makes no difference whether he in-
tended to devise an estate in fee sim~
ple, or a lesser estate. In either case,
plaintiff herein should prevail, because
if Ada Fairbanks took a fee-simple
estate from her husband, the heirs
to whom she devised it are certainly
now entitled to it; and if her husband
devised to her less than a fee-simple
estate, coupled with absolute powers of
disposition, then by operation of law
she took a fee-simple title which she
could in turn devise as she wished.

The judgment of the trial court is re~
versed, with directions to enter judg-
ment for plaintiffs as prayed for in
their petition.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.
and WELCH and DAVISON, JJ., con-
cur. CORN, O'NEAL, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., dissent.

CORN. J. (dissenting). The facts, as
well as a copy of the will, are set
forth in the majority opinion. The fol-
lowing definitions will aid in a better
understanding of my dissenting opinion.

A will is the disposition of one’s prop-
erty to take effect after death.

A will is the legal declaration of a
man’s intentions, which he wills to be
performed after his death as to the
disposition of his property.

There can be no contention by any-
one that property passes or is disposed
of by a will before the testator dies.
Therefore, this property belonged to
Ada Fairbanks up to the time of her
death.

84 O. S. 1951 §151 provides:

“A will is to be construed according
to the intention of the testator. Where
his intention cannot have effect to its
full extent, it must have effect as far
as possible.”

Section 152 provides:

“Ascertaining intention. In case of
uncertainty, arising upon the face of a
will, as to the application of any of its
provisions, the testator’s intention is
to be ascertained from the words of the
will, taking into view the circumstances
under which it was made, exclusive of
his oral declarations.”

Section 155 also provides:

“Trreconcilable Parts. All the parts
of a will are to be construed in rela-
tion. to each other, and so as to form
one consistent whole, if possible but
where several parts are absolutely ir-
reconcible, the latter as to position
must prevail.”

In Cobb v. Newman, 201 Okla. 318,
205 P. 2d 858, we held:

“The object and prime purpose in
the construction of any will is to ar-
rive at and give effect to the intention
of the testator. And in ascertaining such
intention the will is to be considered
as a whole and the several provisions
thereof in their relation to each other.

“Where in one paragraph of a will
there is a specific devise of land in fee
simple, and in another paragraph deal-
ing expressly with such devise there is
prescribed a condition to the effect that
the title so devised is to be defeated in
part upon a contingency if same oc-
curs during the ownership of the devi-
see, held, the condition is consistent
with the title devised and valid.”

Under the third paragraph of the will
it is plain to my mind that the testator
intended for his wife to have the prop-
erty in fee simple to sell, barter or
give away, if she so desired, during
her lifetime, but in case any of the
property remained undisposed of at her
death it go to Charles H. Fairbanks or
his legal heirs.

The majority opinion cites 84 O.S.
1951 §213, and cases construing said
section, as authority. These cases hold

351

that a survivor who inherits land there-
under may dispose of the same by will.
I find no fault with the construction
given to said section. Said section deals
with the disposition of property that a
person acquires by joint industry,
without any restrictions, where he dies
intestate. Section 213, and cases con-
struing the same, are not applicable
to the facts in this case and have no
application whatever where a person
dies leaving a will. There is no limi-
tation in said section preventing a per-
son who inherits property acquired by
joint industry from disposing of the
property by will if he desires to do
so. In other words, property inherited
which was acquired by joint industry
ean be disposed of by the survivor,
in the same manner that he can dispose
of property that he has acquired the
title to by purchase or otherwise.

16 O.S. 1951 §29 provides:

“Every estate in land which shall be
granted, conveyed or devised by deed
or will, shall be deemed an estate in
fee simple and of inheritance, unless
limited by express words.”

So it appears to me that the language
in the third paragraph of the will exe-
cuted by Orin Fairbanks is clear and
certain as to what effect it was to
have on paragraph two of the will, and
was not inconsistent therewith.

It is thoroughly demonstrated in this
ease that paragraph three of the will
is not inconsistent with paragraph two
thereof. Ada Fairbanks owned this
property and held the unlimited use of
it and exclusive right to sell, barter
or give away the property for a pe-
riod of more than 30 years. I think
the majority opinion places a limitation
on the manner of how a person can dis-
pose of his property by a will which is
contrary to our statutes and all the
decisions of this court in construing a
will, ie, let the intent of the testator
prevail unless it violates some law,
statutory or otherwise, or is against
public policy.

I respectfully dissent.

352
WATKINS v. McCOMBER.
No. 34487. Nov. 18, 1952.
Rehearing Denied April 21, 1953,
256 P. 2d 158.

Keaton, Wells, Johnston & Lytle and
Richardson, Shartel & Cochran, Okla-
homa City, for plaintiff in error.

Albert-L. McRill, Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. George Raymond Mc-
Comber, plaintiff below, will be re-
ferred to as plaintiff and Earl A. Wat-
kins, defendant below, as defendant.
Other named defendants in the trial
court did not join in the defendant’s
appeal.

Succinctly stated, the petition al-
leges that Flora Alberta Cloonan, here-
after referred to as Mrs. Cloonan, was
the grandmother of plaintiff, and that
the defendant, Earl A. Watkins, was
her son, and that certain named indi-
vidual defendants were her grandchil-
dren. Mrs. Cloonan died in March, 1947,
testate. Her will designated defendant
as executor. Planitiff’s mother, a

daughter of Mrs. Cloonan, died, leav-
ing plaintiff, then five years old, in
the custody of the grandmother for his
care and education during his mi-
nority. The petition states that after the
death of plaintiff's mothér, plaintiff's
father and Mrs. Cloonan entered into
a verbal agreement to the effect that
in consideration of plaintiff remaining
with his grandmother during his mi-
nority that she would leave him by
will upon her death property from her
estate of the value of $10,000.

That after plaintiff reached his ma-
jority and in June, 1944, Mrs. Cloonan
placed building and loan stock in the
named associations, and of the value of
$10,000 or more, in her and plaintiff’s
mame as joint tenants, with right of
survivorship. :

That in August, 1944, without plain-
tiff’s knowledge or consent, Mrs. Cloo-
nan placed the identical stock in the
associations in her and the defendant’s
name, in which names it stood at the
time of her death; that defendant as-
sisted Mrs. Cloonan in placing said
stock in their names as joint tenants
with full knowledge that it then stood
in the names of Mrs. Cloonan and
plaintiff as joint tenants with right of
survivorship; that thereafter, in May,
1946, Mrs. Cloonan executed the will
under which she bequeathed plaintiff
and each of her other grandchildren
named, the sum of $1,000, and be-
queathed the residue of her estate, val-
ued at $25,000 to the defendant. The
prayer seeks equitable relief and for
specific performance against the de-
fendant, Earl A. Watkins, as executor
of the estate of Mrs. Cloonan, and also
against him individually as follows:
First, that the contract between Mrs.
Cloonan and plaintiff be fully complied
with, and, second, that the stock in
the building and loan associations
which are standing in the name of Mrs.
Cloonan and the defendant, be im-
pressed with a trust to the extent of
the value thereof. Other equitable re-
lief is sought which need not be specif-
ically referred to.

353

Certain admissions are contained in
defendant’s answer, as follows:

(1) Defendant admits that the build-
ing and loan associations have issued
certificates of stock which now stand
in the name of Mrs. Cloonan and the
defendant.

(2) Defendant’ admits that Blanch
Ella McComber, Mrs. Cloonan’s daugh-
ter and plaintiff's mother, died in 1925,
leaving plaintiff, her only child, in the
care and custody of Mrs. Cloonan.

(3) Defendant admits that Mrs. Cloo-
nan placed in her and plaintiff’s joint
names, in the two named building and
loan associations, the funds evidenced
by the certificates of stock referred to
in plaintiff’s petition.

(4) Defendant denies that Mrs. Cloo-
nan made any agreement with plain-
tiff’s father of the character alleged
in plaintiffs petition, and denies that
plaintiff rendered any services to his
grandmother, or acted for her as her
agent in the management of her busi-
ness, and finally, defendant alleges that
Mrs. Cloonan did not intend to give
plaintiff the building and loan stock,
or give him any interest therein, but
that she at all times remained the
owner thereof, and that the disposition
of the stock is expressed in her last
will and testament. All other allega-
tions of the petition are specifically
denied.

By reply plaintiff states that the de-
fendant procured Mrs. Cloonan, his
mother, by threats, duress and undue
influence to have the stock in the as-
sociation reissued in defendant and her
joint names, and thereby committed
a fraud upon her and this plaintiff.

A review of the testimony establishes
that plaintiff’s father, in various con-
versations had with Mrs. Cloonan,
shortly after his wife’s death in 1925,
agreed to leave his minor son, then
five years of age, with the grandmoth-
er until he reached his majority, and
in consideration. Mrs. Cloonan agreed

354

that she would leave plaintiff an estate
valued at approximately $10,000; that
in a subsequent conversation, after
plaintiff married, Mrs. Cloonan advised
plaintiff's father that she had invested
certain funds in the building and loan
associations for the benefit of the plain-
tiff.

A neighbor of Mrs. Cloonan testified
that on numerous occasions Mrs. Cloo-
nan stated that she had great affec-
tion for her grandson and intended
leaving him a substantial portion of her
estate; that in 1941, Mrs. Cloonan ex-
hibited two pass books and stated that
she was leaving approximately $10,000
of funds in the associations to the plain-
tiff. Another witness testified that sub-
sequent to 1923, she visited at the home
of Mrs. Cloonan, frequently, and that
either in 1925 or 1926, Mrs. Cloonan
stated that she had on deposit certain
monies in the building and loan asso-
ciations for George, and that on sev-
eral occasions she accompanied Mrs.
Cloonan to the offices of the building
and loan associations where deposits
were made to the credit of Mrs. Cloo-
nan’s accounts; and that Mrs. Cloonan
stated that the money upon her death
would belong to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff testified that in June, 1944,
he accompanied his grandmother to the
office of the Security Federal Building
& Loan Association where Mrs. Cloo-
nan and he executed an application for
membership and a share account in
the association in their joint names as
joint tenants, with right of survivor-
ship, and not as tenants in common;
that on the same day they visited the
office of the Local Federal Savings &
Loan Association where a like trans-
action was had.

At the close of plaintiff's evidence
defendant interposed a demurrer there-
to which was overruled with exceptions
saved. Defendant introduced no evi~
dence in support of the affirmative al-
legations contained in his answer.

The court found generally in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defend-

ant, Earl A. Watkins, individually, and
further found that the plaintiff should
take nothing as against the defendant,
Earl A. Watkins, as executor of the
estate of Flora Alberta Cloonan, de-
ceased, nor ‘against the individual de-
fendants legatees under the will.

The court further found that the
plaintiff should recover judgment
against the defendant, Earl A. Watkins,
individually, and adjudged plaintiff the
sole owner of the certificates and ac-
counts in both of said named associa-
tions, and ordered the associations to
reinstate the certificates with all rights
incident thereto in plaintiff’s name, and
ordered the defendant, Ear] A. Watkins,
to surrender the certificates held by him
for cancellation, together with the costs
incurred.

For reversal of the judgment de-
fendant contends that the judgment was
not only erroneous but void, because
rendered upon a cause of action not
sued upon.

Defendant correctly states the rule
that a petition, declaration or com-
plaint should inform the defendant of
the nature, character and purpose of
the suit in order that he may intelli-
gently make his defense to it.

The petition in the instant case
pleaded an oral contract entered into
between Mrs. Cloonan and her son-in-
law, that if the plaintiff was permitted
to remain with her until he reached
his majority she would leave him a
substantial portion of her property. The
petition also alleged that Mrs. Cloo-
nan, in her lifetime, conveyed the two
certificates of stock in the associations
by assigning them to herself and plain-
tiff, and that thereafter, without plain-
tiff’s knowledge or consent, Mrs. Cloo-
nan wrongfully transferred the certifi-
cates to the defendant, and the petition
prayed that the defendant be restrained
from disposing of the certificates, and
for a final judgment against him in-
dividually, and that the certificates be
held in trust for plaintiff's benefit.

Defendant did not move to separately
state the causes of action commingled
in the petition, neither did he move for
a more definite statement, but filed an
answer denying certain allegations of
the petition, and admitting others.

The defendant specifically denied
that the plaintiff had any interest, right
* or ownership in the certificates of stock,
and pleaded his ownership thereof. The
answer specifically admits that at one
time the certificates were placed in
the joint names of Mrs. Cloonan and
plaintiff, but states that Mrs. Cloonan’s
purpose of doing so was not to. give the
certificates to plaintiff, or to give him
any interest therein, and that Mrs.
Cloonan at all times remained the own-
er thereof. The issue was thus sharply
delineated whether plaintiff owned the
certificates and the proceeds of the
funds, or whether by reason of the sub-
sequent transaction referred to in de-
fendant’s answer, he was the owner
thereof.

Furthermore the record discloses
plaintiffs counsel upon trial advised
the court that the crux of the law-
suit and the question of decision was,
whether the deceased, Mrs. Cloonan,
the plaintiff and the associations en-
tered into an irrevocable joint tenancy
agreement, with right of survivorship.
In response defendant’s counsel stated:

“Now, we quite frankly admit that,
at one time, there was in the name of
the plaintiff and the grandmother, some
Building and Loan association stock
* * * and that she changed it back.”

In Welch v. Ruby, 200 Okla. 586, 198
‘P. 2d 432; Vinson v. Oklahoma City,
179 Okla. 590, 66 P. 2d 933, and in
Jackson v. Jackson, 196 Okla. 580, 167
P. 2d 51, we held that a court of equity
which obtained jurisdiction of the con-
troversy on any ground or for any pur-
pose will retain such jurisdiction for
the purpose of administering complete
relief and doing entire justice with re-
spect to the subject matter, and to
avoid multiplicity of suit.

355

As we have indicated, the petition,
as well as the statements of counsel,
clearly presented for judicial determi-
nation the ownership of the certificates
of stock in the association. If arguendo
it be conceded that the pleading
is not as specific as desired, the
court will treat the pleading as
amended upon an issue which has been
fully tried, where it is clearly shown
that no substantial prejudice results
to either party to the action. Anderson
v. Miller, 172 Okla. 480, 45 P. 2d 499.

In our view, the pleadings of the re-
spective parties were adequate to
frame the issue for trial, and to prop-
erly forecast and present for adjudica-
tion the claims of the respective par-
ties. We, therefore, hold that the judg-
ment is neither erroneous nor void
upon the assignment stated.

The defendant next contends that the
facts pleaded and proven did not show
that plaintiff had become the owner of
the stock and, therefore, he was not en-
titled to a judgment in his favor. The
argument advanced is that if the plain-
tiff became the owner of the stock, it
could only be by gift, and that the
plaintiff failed (a) to plead or prove a
valid gift; (b) failed to plead and prove
a donative intent on Mrs. Cloonan’s
part, delivery to him, relinquishment of
dominion and control by Mrs. Cloonan,
or acceptance by plaintiff; and (c) that
there was no joint tenancy, but if there
was, plaintiff was only entitled to one-
half of the stock, whereas he was
awarded all of it.

We first give consideration to the
transaction disclosed between Mrs.
Cloonan and the associations, and then
the transactions between Mrs. Cloonan
the plaintiff, and the associations.

Mrs. M. M. Brown, who was in
charge of the installment records of
the Local Federal Savings & Loan As-
sociation, testified that on June 16, 1944,
Mrs. Cloonan transferred a certificate,
then in her name, to herself and plain-
tiff; that at the same time Mrs. Cloo-

356

nan and plaintiff executed an applica-
tion for membership and for a savings
share account in the association in Mrs.
Cloonan’s and plaintiff's name as joint
tenants, with right of survivorship; that
the account was originally opened in
the association by Mrs. Cloonan in 1938,
and deposits were made therein period-
ically to January, 1945.

Mr. H. C. Irvin, secretary-treasurer
of Security Federal Savings & Loan As-
sociation, identified the account of Mrs.
Cloonan opened in January, 1939; iden-
tified the transfer of the account by
Mrs. Cloonan to herself and plaintiff,
and identified the application for mem-
bership in their joint names with right
of survivorship. He testified that this
transaction occurred on June 16, 1944.
The officers of the named associations
testified that Mrs. Cloonan and the de-
fendant, Earl A. Watkins on August
18th and 22nd, respectively, 1944, had
the accounts changed to place them in
the name of Mrs. Cloonan and the de-
fendant.

The transfer of the share account
and membership and the application
card and agreement executed by Mrs.
Cloonan and plaintiff requesting mem-
bership and transfer of the accounts of
the two associations are identical, ex-
cept the name of the associations. A fac-
simile of the instrument follows:

. “Account No. 236

“(1) F. A. Cloonan, or George R.
McComber

“(2) Joint Tenants, and i in case of the
Death of Either, the Survivor to be the
Sole Owner

“
(3)
“The undersigned hereby apply for
a membership and for a Savings share
account in the

“Local Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Oklahoma City
and for the issuance of evidence of
membership in the approved form in
the joint names of the undersigned as
joint tenants with the right of survivor-
ship and not as tenants in common. Re-

ceipt is hereby acknowledged of a copy
of the charter and by-laws of said as-
sociation. Specimens of the signatures
of the undersigned are shown below
and the association is hereby authorized
to act without further inquiry in accord-
ance with writings bearing any such
signature; it being understood and
agreed that any one of the undersigned
who shall first act shall have power
to act in all matters related to the
membership and any share account
in said association held by the un-

. dersigned whether the other person or

persons named in the certificate be liv-
ing or not. The repurchase or redemp-
tion value of any such share account or
other rights relating thereto may be
paid or delivered in whole or in part
to any one of the undersigned, who
shall first act, and such payment or
delivery or a receipt or acquittance
signed by any one of the undersigned
shall be a valid and sufficient release
and discharge of said association.

“(1) Signature F. A. Cloonan
George R. McComber

City and State City and State ©
“Dated 6-16-44 Introduced by

“This certificate issued pursuant to
this application for membership of joint
holders must be filled out by inserting
in the first blank space the names of
the joint holders; for example, ‘John
Doe and Richard Roe, immediately
followed by the words: ‘as joint ten-
ants with the right of survivorship and
not as tenants in common.’ Joint tenants
with the right of survivorship consti-
tute one member as a partnership con-
stitutes one member.

“(b) Membership of joint holders
(with right of survivorship) of a share
account”

The defendant argues that joint ten-
ancy with right of survivorship is not
regarded with favor in Oklahoma. Cit-
ing Clinton v. Clinton, 187 Okla. 144,
101 P. 2d 609, Kilgore v. Parrott, 197
Okla. 77, 168 P. 2d 886. However, the

cited cases expressly state that the
rule has no application where it is
clearly shown upon the face of the in-
strument that a joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship was intended.

The defendant also contends that Ti-
tle 60 O.S. 1951 §74 (Laws 1945, p: 213),
which expressly authorizes the execu-
tion of an instrument creating a joint
tenancy, has no application, as the
Act was enacted subsequent to the
transaction here involved. The Act,
however, provides:

“The provisions of this act shall ap-
ply to all estates in joint tenancy or
tenancy by entirety in either real or
personal property heretofore or here-
after created.”

We need not here decide whether the
1945 Act, supra, may be applied retro-
actively, for we have uniformly held
that joint tenancies, with right of sur-
vivorship, are enforceable in Okla-
homa; neither is the legal effect of a
joint tenancy as defined in the statu-
tory enactment, supra, modified by the
absence of the term “or the survivor
of them.”

In the case of Draughon et ux. v.
Wright, Adm’x, 200 Okla. 198, 191 P. 2d
921, we held:

“We cannot agree that 60 O.S. 1945
Supp. § 74 creates a statutory joint
tenancy without survivorship because
survivorship is not mentioned in that
statute. The term ‘joint tenancy’ had
a well defined meaning at common
Jaw, and, since the Legislature did not
define the term or use language indi-
eating a contrary intention, we must
presume that it used the term in its
technical common law sense.”

The foregoing decision was based
upon the common law meaning of a
joint tenancy with survivorship. The
common law, as modified by constitu-
tional and statutory law, judicial de-
cisions and the condition and wants of
the people, shall remain in force in aid
of the general Statutes of Oklahoma.
Title 12 O.S. 1951 §2.

357

Blackstone’s Commentaries upon
common law as applied to joint ten-
ancies makes the following observa-
tions. The creation of an estate in joint
tenancy depends upon the wording of
the deed or devise, by which the ten-
ants claim title, and can only arise by
the act of the parties; for joint ten-

sants have one and the same interest.

He further says that the interest of the
two joint tenants is not only equal or
similar, but also is one and the same,
and that each of the two joint tenants
has a concurrent interest in the whole;
and therefore, on the death of his com-
panion, the sole interest in the whole
estate remains to the survivior.

‘When Mrs. Cloonan made the trans-
fer of her accounts in the associations
to herself and plaintiff in the form and
manner shown by the record, the joint
tenancy came into being. The joint
tenants then applied for “a member-
ship and a savings share account” in
the associations. The applications re-
quested that:

“Evidence of membership in the ap-
proved form in the joint names of the
undersigned as joint tenants with the
right of survivorship and not as tenants
in common.”

A reading of the application card and
agreement executed by F, A. Cloonan
and George R. McComber, as joint ten-
ants, supra, conforms to the pattern of
Tit. 18, sec. 212b (Session Laws of 1937,
p. 319, §3). The legislative act in effect
was designed to protect the associations
by giving them a statutory acquittance
upon the payment of the funds in the
joint tenancy account, either to the joint
tenant who first acts or in case of no
action during the lifetime of a joint
tenant that payment to the survivor
shall give the association a full acquit-
tance. Although the account stands in
the joint names of two persons such a
joint account creates a single member-
ship in the association which is subject
to disposal by either joint tenant during
their lifetime as between the joint ten-
ants and the association.

The statute does not modify in any
degree the right, title or interest in the

358

joint account, or the proceeds thereof, as
petween one joint tenant and the other
joint tenant as the law of joint tenancy
establishes their rights.

The statute, supra, reads:

“Every building and loan association
and every Federal Savings and Loan
Association may issue shares or mem-
bership certificates in the joint names
of two or more persons or their sur-
vivor, in which event any of such per-
sons who shall first act, shall have pow-
er to act in all matters relating to the
shares or the membership, whether
the other person or persons named in
such shares or membership certificates
be living or not. Such a joint account
shall create a single membership in an
association. The repurchase or redemp-
tion value of an account issued in joint
mames and dividends thereon, or other
rights relating thereto, may be paid or
delivered, in whole or in part, to any of
such persons who shall first act, whether
the other person or persons be living or
not. The payment or delivery to any
such person or a receipt or acquittance
signed by any such person to whom any
such payment or any such delivery of
rights is made, shall be a valid and
sufficient release and discharge of an
association for the payment or delivery
so made.”

Under the quoted statute and the ap-
plication for the transfer of the share
account, Mrs. Cloonan had the right
to withdraw or transfer the funds as
she did so far as the associations were
concerned. This transfer had it been to
an innocent third person for value
would have been effective so far as
plaintiff is concerned. However, the
defendant having full knowledge of the
circumstances connected with the cre-
ation of the joint tenancy originally, and
not being an innocent third party pur-
chaser for value, took his interest in the
second joint tenancy subject to plain-
tiff’s vested right, which right may now
be invoked and enforced as against the
funds to the credit of the defendant,
Watkins, in possession of both associ-
ations.

Defendant further contends that the
gift of funds by Mrs. Cloonan to the

plaintiff was not effective for the reason
that she had the right to the use of the
funds during her lifetime. She had this
independent right both under the “ap-
plication agreement” and as a joint
tenant, as defined by the Act, supra.
The record, however, discloses that Mrs.
Cloonan at no time withdrew any of
the funds from the associations after
their transfer to herself and the plaintiff.

As between Mrs Cloonan and the
plaintiff, as joint tenants, the attempted
transfer of the funds in the associations
to herself and the defendant, Watkins,
as joint tenants, was ineffectual and sub-
ject to the vested rights of the plaintiff
to recover such funds upon tracing
them into the hands or under control
of the defendant as herein outlined.

We find no merit in defendant’s
contention that the assessment of cost
against him was erroneously entered.

. Both parties to the present action
have submitted elaborate briefs con-
taining citation of authorities from sister
states, and analysis and minute con-
sideration of which will unduly lengthen
the opinion. Moreover, we are of the
view that the statute and decisions here
referred to are decisive of the question
presented.

The judgment of the trial court is,
therefore, affirmed.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
GIBSON, and DAVISON, JJ., concur.

Le
SCAGGS v. BARKER.
No. 35664, Feb. 3, 1953.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1953.
256 P. 2d 528.

2
a
o

Wm. H. McClarin, Tulsa, for plaintiff
in error.

Norman Barker, Tulsa, pro se.

WELCH, J. This is an appeal from a
judgment on a supersedeas bond grow-
ing out of the case of DeBose v. Barker,
204 Okla. 607, 232 P. 2d 925.

A motion to dismiss has been filed
for the reason that the appeal is with-
out merit and taken for delay only. The
motion must be sustained. There was
no meritorious defense presented in the
trial court and no meritorious defense
is suggested in the response to the mo-
tion to dismiss. In DeBose v. Barker,
207 Okla. 508, 250 P. 2d 852, we stated:

“Where, from a cursory examination
of the record, the allegations made in
the motion to dismiss and the response
thereto it appears that the appeal is
without merit, a motion to dismiss will
be sustained.

Appeal dismissed.

CORN, DAVISON, O'NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

CITY OF CUSHING v. GILLESPIE
et al.

No, 35325, April 21, 1953:
256 P. 2d 418.

Sterling N. Grubbs, Cushing, and
Guy L. Horton, Stillwater, for plaintiff
in error.

A. R. Swank, A. R. Swank Jr., and
E. C. Swank, Stillwater, for defendants
in error, Francis G. Gillespie, Guy
James and Martin Wunderlich.

Everett E. Berry Jr., Joe E. John-
son, and M. C. Kratz, Stillwater, for
other defendants in error.

WILLIAMS, J. In 1924, the city of
Cushing, hereinafter referred to as
city, condemned certain lands involved
in this action for the purpose of enlarg--
ing a water reservoir. The lands at that
time belonged to George T. Gillespie
and his wife. In 1931, George Gillespie

360

executed an oil and gas lease cover-
ing the lands herein involved; he also
sold mineral rights to various people.
On May 15, 1951, the city issued a drill-
ing permit covering the land herein
involved; it was shown that neither at
that time, nor at any other time prior
to the filing of the instant action, did
the city claim to own the mineral rights
to the land condemned.

On June 14, 1951, certain heirs and
successors of Gillespie, to whom we
shall refer hereafter as plaintiffs, filed
an action to quiet their title to the
mineral rights under the lands con-
demned in 1924 by the city. The city
filed an answer and cross-petition in
which it set up a claim to the mineral
rights and asked that its title thereto
be quieted. Plaintiffs recovered judg-
ment in the trial court and defendant,
city, has duly appealed.

The sole question for our determina-
tion here is whether, by virtue of the
1924 condemnation proceedings, the
city acquired title to the minerals un-
der its reservoir.

Prior to and during the condemnation
proceedings, Gillespie and the city were
unable to agree on a price for his
land; both Gillespie and the city ex-
cepted to the report of the commis-
sioners appointed to appraise the land
and demanded a jury trial, which was
had.

The city argues first that the appli-
cable law authorized it to acquire a
fee-simple title; second, that the pro-
ceedings instituted pursuant to the ap-
plicable legislative act show a fee-sim-
ple title was acquired; and third, that
the proceedings subsequent to the com-
missioners’ report did not limit the title
to less than a fee-simple title.

The truth of the first argument is
conceded by plaintiffs, and, as is
shown below, a determination of the
second argument is controlling in this
case.

Defendant (plaintiff in error) city
cites Jones v. Oklahoma City, 192 Okla.

470, 187 P. 2d 233, in support of its
contention that a fee-simple title was
taken. In that case, certain lands had
been condemned by a railroad com~
pany in 1900, and the successors of the
orignal owners had brought an action
in ejectment against Oklahoma City,
which was the successor in interest of
the railroad company. . The railroad
company had proceeded under a stat-
ute of the Oklahoma Territory which
had been adopted from Dakota Terri-
tory. Such statute provided for the con-
demnation of land by railroad com-
panies, and specifically gave to the rail-
road company the right to sell the land
when it was no longer required for rail-
road purposes. Since the Oklahoma
statute had not been judicially inter-
preted at that time, this court, in
Jones v. Oklahoma City, adopted the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of
South Dakota, to the effect that the ex-
press power to sell, conferred upon the
railroad company by the statute, was
inconsistent with the passing of less
than a fee-simple title in the condem-
nation proceedings.

The city of Cushing, in its 1924 con-
demnation proceedings, acted under the
terms of Title 11, O.S. 1951 §293, which
permits (but does not require) the ac-
quisition of a fee-simple title in the
condemnation of land for water reser-
voir purposes. Said statute does not
confer upon the city the power to sell
the land when it is no longer needed
by the condemnor, and in this partic-
ular it is distinguishable from the
statute construed in Jones v. Oklahoma
City. For that reason, the holdings in
that case are not applicable here.

Defendant also cites Harn v. State
ex rel. Williamson, Atty. Gen. 184
Okla, 306, 87 P. 2d 127, to the effect
that when the words “appropriate” or
“appropriation” are used in condemna-
tion proceedings, the passing of a fee-
simple title is indicated. It is true that
these words were used in the pro-
ceedings in the instant case, but it is
also true that other words were also
used which indicated the passing of
less than a fee-simple title.

An examination of the pleadings, ex-
hibits, etc., in the condemnation pro-
ceedings, which are before us as ex-
hibits in the instant case, reveals the
following: that nowhere in said record
are there any words indicating directly
and positively an intent to take a fee-
simple title; that the city requested an
instruction to the jury not to consider
the possibility of the existence of oil
and gas under the land; that the court
instructed the jury that “the city takes
an easement on said land covered by
water for waterworks purposes, mere-
ly”. Evidence in the instant case
showed that the city had made no claim
of ownership of the mineral rights for
approximately 25 years, during which
time the plaintiffs’ predecessors sold
an oil and gas lease and mineral in-
terest to various people. Evidence also
showed that subsequent to the 1924 pro-
ceedings, the city condemned, for wa-
terworks purposes, a parcel of land
adjacent to the land herein involved,
and, in that connection, stipulated to
the effect that the mineral rights were
reserved to the original owners.

All of the above is highly indicative
of the fact that the city did not actually
intend to take the mineral rights in
the condemnation proceedings.

In the Harn case, supra, this court
said at page 309, of 184 Okla. Reports,
page 129 of 87 P. 2d:

“In deciding the question here pre-
sented, the extent of the estate con-
demned, we must look to the Act au-
thorizing the condemnation * * * and to
the proceedings instituted pursuant
thereto, including the commissioners’
report aforesaid. If, from that inspec-
tion, it appears that the Legislature
by its enactment intended to appro-
priate the fee-simple title, and that
such title was reasonably requisite
to the designated use, and_ suitable
proceedings were prosecuted to that
end, we must hold that the fee-simple
title passed to the city.” (Emphasis
supplied.)

See, also, 30 CJ.S., Eminent Do-
main, §449, which reads in part:

361

“The nature and extent of the title
or right taken in the exercise of emi-
nent domain depends on the statute
conferring the power. The statute will
be strictly construed; where the estate
or interest is not definitely set forth,
only such estate or interest may be
taken as is reasonably necessary to
answer the public purpose in view. ***”

“A condemnor is not required to go
to the full extent permitted by law,
but may voluntarily restrict itself to
so much of the landowner’s interest as
the public need actually requires; ***”

No evidence was presented in the
instant case, and no contention is made
on appeal, to the effect that the public
need required that the city of Cushing
take title to the mineral interests here~
in involved in order to provide prop-
erly for the water reservoir. To the
contrary, there was affirmative evi-
dence that the mineral rights were not
needed by the city; the oil well drilled
or started under authority of the drill-
ing permit mentioned in the first para-
graph of this opinion was “direction-
ally drilled” or “whipstocked”; this
was done with the express permission
of the city.

Since the condemnation proceedings
do not show a clear intent to take a
fee-simple title; and since the appli-
cable statute does not require the tak-
ing of a fee-simple title; and since it
was not shown that the public need
required the taking of a fee-simple ti-
tle; and since the court in effect told
the jury that the minerals did not
pass under the proceedings in ques-
tion, and it must be presumed that the
jury had such instruction in mind at
the time of assessing defendant Gilles-
pie’s damages in that case, we hold
that title to the mineral interests here-
in involved did not pass to the city of
Cushing by virtue of the 1924 condem-
nation proceedings.

The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON,
O’NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

362 .
MILLER v. BOURNE.
No. 34936. April 21, 1953.
256 P. 2d 481.

Tolbert & Gillespie and J. Percy
Hughes, Hobart, for plaintiff in error.

Carder & Carder, Hobart, for defend-
ant in error.

DAVISON, J. This action was brought
by Loyd W. Bourne, hereinafter called
plaintiff, to recover in damages for
malicious prosecution against the de-
fendants, Cager A. Miller and Mrs.
Cager A. Miller. The action was dis-
missed as to Mrs. Miller and the cause
tried to a jury. A verdict was returned
against Cager A. Miller for $500. Judg-
ment was rendered thereon, and de-
fendant appeals.

Plaintiff was a tenant on farm prop-
erty owned by defendant under a three
year lease commencing January 1, 1946,
and terminating December 31, 1948.
The defendant reserved an extra
house on the premises where he stayed
when in the community. Most of his
time was spent in Illinois and other
places while employed on various jobs.
In July, 1948, a crop of alfalfa was
cut on the premises and 264 bales har-
vested. One-third of this under the lease
belonged to defendant. Defendant was
absent at the time of the cutting and
returned from Illinois on August 12,
1948. Defendant testified that between
August 12, 1948, and September 6, 1948,
he went to see Richard Henson who cut
the hay for plaintiff, and was told by
him that he had cut 340 bales for
plaintiff; that defendant was told by
Sam Roberts that Roberts bought 100
bales from plaintiff and that plaintiff
told Roberts the hay was rent hay.
On the 6th day of September, 1948, de-
fendant went to the premises where
plaintiff resided. Plaintiff and Thur-
man McCullar were working on plain-
tiff’s car. Defendant testified that he
asked plaintiff where the rent hay was,
and when told by plaintiff that he had
sold the same, asked plaintiff for his
rent. Plaintiff denies this, and said de-
fendant asked him where his hay was
and plaintiff told the defendant he had
sold it. Plaintiff sold the remaining hay
on the 6th day of September, 1948, the
same day, to Thurman McCullar, and
on the 7th day of September, 1948, de-
posited the defendant’s share in a bank
at Snyder, Oklahoma. On’ the morning

of September 7, 1948, defendant went
to the law office of Percy Hughes at
Hobart, Oklahoma, and Percy Hughes
and defendant went to the office of the
county attorney, where, after talking
with the assistant county attorney, a
warrant was obtained for embezzle-
ment of 113-1/3 bales of hay.

On the last above-mentioned date de-
fendant served notice on plaintiff to
quit the premises for failure to pay
rent and other reasons assigned. This
notice was served on plaintiff by Ed
Killingsworth. At the time Killings-
worth served this notice, plaintiff stat-
ed to him that he had placed the rent
money in the bank at Snyder, Okla-
homa. Plaintiff was thereafter, on the
same day, arrested and released on
bond.

When the embezzlement case was
tried, Richard Henson testified that he
baled 264 bales of hay for plaintiff.
This was explained by Henson at the
present trial by stating that he also
baled 76 bales of hay for plaintiff on
another place. It was also brought out
on cross-examination in the present
case that at the time he conveyed the
information to the defendant, Henson
may have forgotton that the 76 bales of
hay were baled on another place. The
criminal action was dismissed when
Henson concluded his testimony.

Defendant filed a forcible entry and
detainer action against plaintiff. Plain-
tiff did not appear in the justice of the
peace court and judgment was taken
against him. He appealed the case to
the district court and it was pending
at the time of the trial of the case un-
der consideration.

Defendant testified that he made a
complete, full and honest statement of
all of the facts with relation to the
case, both to Percy Hughes, his at-
torney, and Fred Cunningham, as-
sistant county attorney. Percy Hughes
testified that he advised defendant he
could put plaintiff off the place and that
plaintiff was also guilty of embezzle-
ment. Plaintiff denied that defendant
ever asked him for the rent. The evi-

363

dence does not show that plaintiff ever
paid any rent to defendant during the
term of the lease. So far as the record
shows, he either paid rent to a lawyer
in Snyder, Oklahoma, or to the son-in-
law of defendant. During 1947 a contro-
versy arose as to the rentals due from
plaintiff to the defendant for wheat.
This was occasioned by a dispute over
the terms of an agreement between
plaintiff and defendant that plaintiff be
allowed the wheat on the premises in
consideration of having the place ter-
raced. It ended after a long discus-
sion in a payment by defendant to the
plaintiff of $17.20 over and above the
wheat raised and harvested on the
place that year. This caused ill will,
especially on the part of defendant.
Defendant testified that he read and re-
read his contract for the purpose of
finding a way to get plaintiff off the
place and then went to see his attorney.

This is substantially the testimony
submitted at the trial. Other facts and
circumstances will be mentioned in the
discussion of the issues presented on
appeal,

It is first argued that the court erred
as a matter of law in submitting the is-
sues to the jury because the evidence
disclosed beyond dispute that the de-
fendant acted on probable cause. In
Allison v. Bryan, 50 Okla. 677, 151 P.
610, it is stated:

“* % * What constitutes probable
cause is a mixed question of law and
fact. Johnson v. Miller, 63 Iowa 529,
17 N. W. 34, 50 Am. Rep. 758. If there
is no controversy over the facts, or
if the facts are conceded, then it be- .
comes a pure question of law for the
court to determine whether there was
probable cause or not. It therefore be-
comes a duty of the court, when evi-
dence has been given to prove or dis-
prove the existence of probable cause,
to submit to the jury its credibility,
and what fact it proves, with instruc-
tions that the facts found amount to
proof of probable cause, or that they do
not. Johnson v. Miller, supra.”

See, also, 34 Am. Jur., page 797,
Malicious Prosecution, §163.

364

Defendant testified that he talked to
plaintiff about the hay but the one
time. He says he asked him for the
rent. Plaintiff denies this. Within 24
hours after he had learned that the
hay had been sold, and as early as 9
o’clock the following day according to
the testimony of his attorney, Percy
Hughes, he was in Hobart for the pur-
pose he says of getting plaintiff off
the place. He had réad and re-read his
contract for that purpose. It is obvious
that this reading of the contract was
done prior to the time he learned that
the hay had been sold. Plaintiff stated
that when the defendant asked him
where the hay was, and he told him it
had been sold, he turned and walked
away. It is reasonable to believe some
question would have been asked of
the plaintiff as to whether he had paid
his son-in-law, as to how much hay
had been harvested, and to whom the
hay had been sold. The jury had a
right to believe that the defendant did
not care whether the rent had been
paid, but sought some reason to charge
that it had not been paid in order to
get the plaintiff off the place.

We are of the opinion and hold that
there was evidence to submit the case
to the jury and that the court did not
err in refusing to direct a verdict on
the ground that the evidence showed
that the defendant had probable cause.

In the second proposition defendant
argues that he made a full, fair and
honest disclosure of all of the known
facts to his counsel and the assistant
county attorney and that he is there-
fore absolved from any responsibility
for subsequent action. He cites Roby
v. Smith, 40 Okla. 280, 138 P. 141,
which approves an instruction that if
the defendant made in good faith a
full, correct and honest disclosure of
all of the material facts bearing upon
the case of which he had knowl-
edge and acted in good faith on advice
of counsel in procuring the warrant to
be issued, then the verdict should be
for the defendant. We need not discuss
this rule and whether it has been modi-
fied in subsequent opinions. See Em-

pire Oil and Refining Co. v. Cambron,
172 Okla. 202, 44 P. 2d 972; Williams
v. Frey, 182 Okla. 556, 78 P. 2d 1052.
The evidence as to whether he made
a fair, full and true disclosure is in
serious conflict. Defendant says he
told the county attorney that the plain-
tiff had refused to pay the rent. He
also testified that he advised Henson
that he was checking up on the rent due
him from plaintiff. Plaintiff says de-
fendant never asked for the rent. Hen-
son denied that defendant ever told
him that he was checking up on the
rent. There is likewise a conflict in the
testimony as to what was said by Sam
Roberts who bought the 100 bales of
hay from plaintiff as to whether it was
rent hay. In Drakos v. Jones, 189 Okla.
593, 118 P. 2d 388, it is stated:

«% * * Ordinarily, one who institutes
legal proceedings against another in
good faith and upon the advice of a
licensed attorney after a full and truth-
ful disclosure of the material facts,
within his knowledge or reasonably ob-
tainable, concerning the controversy in-
volved, may be said to have probable
cause for so acting. Williams v. Frey,
182 Okla. 556, 78 P. 2d 1052: Empire
Oil & Refining Co. v. Cambron, 172
Okla. 202, 44 P. 2d 972; Bryan v. Lee,
123 Okla. 22, 252 P. 2; Mayer v. Good-
man, 94 Okla. 12, 220 P. 656; El Reno
Gas & Electric Co. v. Spurgeon, 30
Okla. 88, 118 P. 397. It is well settled,
however, that if in his statements to
the attorney said informer misrepre-
sents or conceals such facts the doc-
trine does not apply and he cannot
rely upon the attorney’s advice to es-
tablish probable cause for his action.
See Williams v. Frey, supra; General
Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Da-
vis, 151 Okla. 225, 7 P. 2d 157; Em-
pire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Wainscott, 91
Okla. 66, 216 P. 141; Nelson v. Peter-
man, 119 Okla. 125, 249 P. 333; Allison
v. Bryan, 50 Okla. 677, 151 P. 610.

* e

Bearing in mind that the objection in
the present case is not to the instruc-
tion given but to the submission of the
issue to the jury, we find no error in
failing to direct a verdict for the de-
fendant. The issue as to whether he

Le
Dudley, Duvall & Dudley, Oklahoma

had made a full, true and honest disclo-
sure to his attorney and to the assist-
ant county attorney was properly sub-
mitted to the jury.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

as
OVERSTREET v. BUSH.
No. 35250. April 21, 1953,
256 P. 2d 416.

365

City, and Carder & Carder,
for plaintiff in error.

R. Place Montgomery, Hobart, and
John Allen Phillips, II, Durant, for de-
fendant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This cause stems
from an action for damages for wrong-
ful death in which the jury rendered a
verdict in favor of the defendant. The
court sustained plaintiff’s motion for a
new trial upon the ground that certain
instructions to the jury were erroneous
resulting in this appeal. The pertinent
part of the three assignments of error
interposed by defendant are as fol-
Jows:

Hobart,

“(1) The court erred in failing, neg-
lecting and refusing to render judg-
ment upon and in accordance with the
verdict of the jury, to which exceptions
were duly preserved.

“(2) The court erred in sustaining
the motion for a new trial, to which de-
fendant duly preserved exceptions,

“(3) The court erred in granting to
plaintiff a new trial, to which defendant
duly preserved exceptions.”

It is conceded by defendant that gen-
erally the trial judge has power and au-
thority to grant a new trial if he is not
satisfied with the judgment as ren-
dered, but it is urged that the court
expressed no dissatisfaction or disap-
proval of the the action of the jury. That
upon timely request by defendant, and
after argument of counsel, he stated
that he would sustain the second ob-
jection in the motion for new trial,
and so ordered. The second objection
in the motion for a new trial provided:

“Second: Error of the court in hav-
ing given instructions Nos. 5, 10, 11
and 12 to the jury, to which exceptions
were taken by the plaintiff and al-
lowed by the court at the time of the
trial.”

We will confine our review to the
reason assigned by the trial court for
granting plaintiff a new trial. McGlone
v. Landreth, 200 Okla. 425, 195 P. 2d
268.

366

Defendant argues that the instructions
as given by the court were correct, cit-
ing Browne v. Bassett, 191 Okla. 22,
126 P. 2d 705, wherein the court gave
an instruction on unavoidable acci-
dent and thereafter granted a new
trial to plaintiff on the stated theory
that the instruction was erroneous, and
we reversed the order granting a new
trial and remanded the case with in-
structions to enter judgment in favor
of the defendant, holding that where it
appears that an instruction is correct
and properly given, the action of the
court in granting a new trial presents
error as a pure and unmixed question
of law.

It is elementary that instructions
must be confined to the issues raised
in the pleadings, and supported by evi-
dence; if otherwise, any instruction so
given is erroneous, and constitutes er-
ror, and granting a new trial by trial
judge under such circumstances is not
error.

‘The instructions as given, and consid-
ered as erroneous by the trial court,
instructed the jury as to contributory
negligence of deceased, lack of evi-
dence of excessive speed of defendant’s
vehicle, defenses of sudden emergency
and unavoidable accident.

While instruction No. 2 instructed the
jury that there was no proof to show
acts of negligence on the part of the
deceased contributing to the accident,
yet instruction No. 5, instructing the
jury that when a person is injured
and the injury is the direct and proxi-
mate result of the negligence of an-
other, the person whose negligence
caused the injury will be liable in dam-
ages for such injury, unless the in-
jured person is guilty of contributory
negligence, is, if not erroneous, at
least confusing. But a more serious
error was committed when instruction
No. 12 was given instructing the jury:

“that the driver of a motor vehicle
confronted with a sudden peril or

emergency, not arising from any fault
of his own is not required to exercise
the same judgment and care as is re-
quired of one acting under normal con-
ditions. The test to be applied in that
situation is whether or not the person
in such a position of great mental
stress or sudden emergency did or at-
tempted to do what a reasonably pru-
dent person would have done under
the same or similar circumstances. If,
therefore, you find from the evidence
in this case that the defendant, without
fault of his own, was placed in a posi-
tion of great mental stress or sudden
emergency, and while in such position
he did or attempted to do what any
reasonably prudent person would have
done under the same or similar cir-
cumstances, then the defendant was
not negligent.”

The submission of this instruction
was error and justified the trial court
in granting a new trial because the
defense of sudden emergency was nei-
ther pleaded nor proven. In Yellow Taxi
& Baggage Co. v. Alsup, 175 Okla. 332,
52 P. 2d 724, in the second paragraph
of the syllabus, we said:

“The defense that the driver of a
vehicle acted according) to his best
judgment in a sudden emergency and is
not liable although he did not act in
the most judicious manner is not avail-
able unless affirmatively pleaded.”

The holding in Safe-Way Cab Serv-
ice Co. v. Gadberry, 180 Okla. 51, 67 P.
2d 434, is to the same effect.

Other errors suggested by plaintiff in
error and defendant in error will not be
considered as a new trial must be
granted and such other errors as may
have occurred may not reoccur on re-
trial of the cause.

The order of the trial court granting
a new trial is sustained.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

PEPPERS REFINING CO. et al. v.
BARKETT et al.

No. 35498, April 21 1953.
256 P. 2d 448.

367

A. E, Pearson, Warren H. Edwards,
Milton R. Moon, Woodrow Butler; Hal-
ley, Everest, Halley & Spradling; Em-
bry, Johnson, Crowe, Tolbert & Box-

ley; Claude Briggs, Arthur L. Ells-
worth, Charles Nesbitt; Twyford, Smith
& Crowe; and Robinson, Shipp, Ro-
bertson & Barnes, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiffs in error.*

Cargill & Cargill and Chas. Hill
Johns, Oklahoma City, for defendants
in error.

DAVISON, J. This is a suit wherein
the grantees in a “Sale of Oil and
Gas Royalty” seek to quiet title, as
against the successors in interest to
their grantors, to an undivided one-half
interest in the minerals underlying an
80-acre tract of land in Oklahoma
county, Oklahoma. The parties will be
referred to as plaintiffs and defend-
ants, as they appeared in the trial
court.

By an instrument entitled “Sale of
Oil and Gas Royalty,” dated Septem-
ber 8, 1925, George W. Carrico and
Hattie B. Carrico conveyed to the plain-
tiffs, F. H. Barkett and George Carum,

“An undivided % interest in all of
the oil, gas, coal and the other min-
erals now, or at any time hereafter,
lying in or under the following de-
seribed tract of land (or any part
thereof,) situated in the County of Okla-
homa County, State of Oklahoma, de-
scribed as follows, to-wit: The West
Half of the Northwest quarter of Sec-
tion Eight, Township Twelve North,

368

Range Two West,
Oklahoma.”

the habendum clause in the same pro-
viding that:

“To Have and to Hold, All the afore-
granted estate, property and ease-
ments, together with all and singular
the rights, privileges and heredita-
ments thereunder belonging or apper-
taining unto the said F. H. Barkett
and George Carum, their heirs, suc-
cessors, and assigns, for a term and
period of 25 years from the date hereof
at which time the estate, right and
interest of the second parties in the
minerals, lands and premises aforesaid
shall cease.”

Oklahoma County,

and the last paragraph providing that:

“And it is hereby expressly declared
that it is the true intent and purpose
of this conveyance to pass to and vest
in the said F. H. Barkett and George
Carum an undivided % interest in
all the mineral and mineral rights in
the land first described herein, or that
at any time may be found therein or
thereunder, and all grantor’s rights to
operate for said minerals, and deal and
contract with regard thereto, for the
full term and period of 25 years and
no longer from the date hereof includ-
ing the leasing thereof, as fully to all
intents and purposes as if the said
grantees were the joint owners of the
entire title and estate in said lands.”

That part of the instrument which is
italicized was written therein with a
typewriter; the remainder was part of
the printed form.

The grantees in the above instrument,
together with the wife of one, filed this
suit on September 2, 1950. The defend-
ants were the then owners of the in-
terest and estate formerly owned by
the grantors in said instrument. The
Peppers Refining Company, a corpora-
tion, although made a party defendant,
was the oil and gas lessee of all the
parties and occupied the position of a
stakeholder, impounding the _lessors’
portion of the oil runs until final ad-
judication of their respective interests.
The oil and gas lease to Peppers Refin-
ing Company was executed by the

plaintiffs, Barkett and Carum, on Oc-
tober 13, 1947, for a primary term of
five years and as long thereafter as oil
or gas is produced. The property was
drilled and at all times since June 28,
1949, has been producing oil.

It is plaintiffs’ contention that be-
cause the lease was executed within 25
years from the date of the “Sale of
Oil and Gas Royalty,” they are entitled
to receive the royalty provided for in
said conveyance until the termination
of the lease by cessation of production.
Defendants, on the other hand, contend
that plaintiffs’ interest in the minerals
and the royalty expired on Septem-
ber 8, 1950, 25 years from the date of
the conveyance, by reason of its ex-
press provisions. The trial court ren-
dered judgment for plaintiffs and de-
fendants appealed. The facts are not in
dispute. The sole question is one of
law. It is the determination of the ex-
piration date of plaintiffs’ interest in
the property under the provisions of the
royalty conveyance.

In the interpretation of written in-
struments, the rules of law controlling
are simple and well established in this
jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in their
application to each particular fact situ-
ation. In the case of First National
Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa v. Price,
204 Okla. 243, 228 P. 2d 623, it was
held that:

“The intention of the parties to a
deed must be ascertained, if possible,
from its language, not as presented in
particular sentences, clauses, or para-
graphs, but to its effect when viewed
as an entirety.

“Where the intention of the parties
is clearly expressed by an explanatory
clause incorporated in the habendum
clause, or in a separate clause, the
latter may control over the granting
clause of the deed.”

and in the more recent case of Meeks
v. Harmon, 207 Okla. 459, 250 P. 2d
203, we said:

«“* * * that every case must be ap-
proached for a concrete solution upon
its individual facts. Absence of fraud

369

or mutual mistake and no claim of
ambiguity made, we must look to the
four corners of the instrument and
from it alone weigh the quantity and
quality of the conveyance.”

Also:

“Under the provisions of section
5054 C.O.S. 1921 (15 O.S, 1941 §167)
the written portions of a contract gov-
ern over the printed portions, in case
of conflict.” American Inv. Co. v. Da-
venport, 151 Okla. 184, 3 P. 2d 434;
Witt v. Westheimer, 182 Okla. 645, 79
P. 2d 250.

The “Sale of Oil and Gas Royalty,”
hereinabove described in detail, when
taken as a whole, is a conveyance of a
one-half undivided mineral interest lim-
ited only as to duration by the written-
in provisions. There is no ambiguity
in the conveyance. The mineral in-
terest was conveyed “for a term and
period of 25 years (Sept. 8, 1925) the
date hereof at which time the estate,
right and interest of the second parties
in the minerals, lands and premises
aforesaid shall cease.” It was clearly
the intent of the parties that the gran-
tees should be the owner of said min-
eral interest with the right to operate,
deal and contract with regard thereto,
“for the full term and period of 25
years and no longer from the date here-
of.”

Only one conclusion can be reached
in interpreting this language. The min-
eral interest was conveyed to plaintiffs
for the term of 25 years only, but any
leases executed within that period did
not expire at the same time. They con-
tinued in force subject only to the re-
version of the royalty or mineral in-
terest to the defendants herein. It is no
different from the situation which would
have obtained had defendants conveyed
the minerals outright to plaintiffs with
the provision that they would, at the
end of 25 years, be reconveyed, sub-
ject to the rights of lessees, under the
terms of existing leases. As to plain-
‘tiffs, at the end of said period, their
interest and estates in the lands and
their rights under the leases ceased.
The rights of lessors to the benefits

flowing from an oil and gas lease are
not personal but inure to the owner of
the minerals or of the royalty interest
in those minerals if such royalty in-
terest has been carved out of, and
alienated from, the mineral estate. In
the instant case that had not been done.
The minerals had been conveyed. Twen-
ty-five years later, they reverted bur-
dened only by the outstanding lease-
hold estate.

“Oil and gas in place are minerals
and so long as they remain unsevered
from the soil they are a part of the
realty.” White v. McVey, 168 Okla.
19, 31 P. 2d 850, 94 A.L.R. 656; Local-
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Eck-
roat, 186 Okla. 660, 100 P. 2d 261.

So, too, the royalty interest (strictly
speaking) is a part of the mineral in-
terest, and when the 25-year estate
granted to plaintiffs in the minerals
expired or ceased, any interest in the
royalties did likewise. All title and es-
tate in the plaintiffs in the property
came to an end on September 8, 1950.

The judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded, with directions to en-
ter judgment for defendants.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

a
PRIDDY et ux. v. MASSEY et al.
No, 35871. April 21, 1968.

256 P. 2d 425.

370

Jack Bradley and Hal Welch, Hugo,
for plaintiffs in error.

Lloyd Story, Valliant, Geo. T. Arnett,

Idabel, and O. A. Brewer, Hugo, for
defendants in error.

BLACKBIRD, J. This is an appeal
by E. S. Priddy and his wife Elsie
Priddy, plaintiffs in the court below,
from said court’s judgment dismissing
their action upon sustaining defendants’

demurrer to their petition. The sole
question involved is whether said plain-
tiffs’ petition alleged facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action in their
favor as against the defendants. We
will continue to refer to the parties as
they appeared in the lower court.

The property involved in’ this action
was 120 acres of land originally owned
by defendants and later sold at a tax
resale in 1943 for delinquent ad valorem
taxes for the years 1931 and 1942, in-
clusive. In their petition plaintiffs show
that they deraigned their title by
mesne conveyances through the pur-
chaser at resale. At the time they ob-
tained their deed they already owned an
adjoining 40-acre tract, which, together
with the 120 acres thereby acquired,
their petition alleges they occupied as a
unit constituting their homestead of 160
acres. They also alleged that for the
years 1949, 1950 and 1951, the entire
160 acres had been so designated by
their annual applications for homestead
exemption, the first of which was filed
on January 11, 1949. Plaintiffs’ petition,
filed in July, 1951, contains, among
others, further allegations whose sub-
stance is that defendants had, slightly
more than two months previously, pro-
cured a judgment in cause No. 12959, of
said court, purporting to quiet their ti-
tle against the plaintiff E. S. Priddy,
in the 120 acres referred to, but that
said judgment is wholly void and of
no effect, because the plaintiff Elsie
Priddy, plaintiff E. S. Priddy’s wife, at
the commencement of said action and
at all times thereafter, was not a party
thereto or to the judgment rendered
therein. Plaintiffs’ petition prayed,
among other relief sought, for the court
to set aside said judgment and hold
it for naught as a cloud upon their
title.

Paragraph 1, of defendants’ demur-
rer to the above-described petition,
contains the general allegation that
same does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. Though
plaintiffs’ petition nowhere therein spe-
cifically made the previous judgment
therein attacked a part thereof, defend-

ant’s demurrer had attached to it a
purported copy of said judgment, to-
gether with the findings of fact and
conclusions of law it was alleged to
have been based upon, and paragraphs
2 and 3 of the demurrer set forth the
following allegations:

“(2) That the petition filed herein
shows on its face and by reference to
the findings of fact and decree of the
court in cause number 12959, District
Court of Choctaw County, have already
been adjudicated by this court, and
that this action is an attempted collat-
eral attack on the judgment and decree
of this court, made and entered in said
cause No. 12959, and which finding of
fact, judgment and decree are made a
part of plaintiffs petition by reference
thereto. For the convenience of the
court a copy of said finding and facts
and conclusions of law and decree of
the court are hereto attached, marked
Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’.

“(3) That the petition filed herein
sets forth no facts other than that a
judgment and decree was rendered in
said cause No. 12959, but sets forth
conclusions of law as to the invalidity
of said judgment.”

For reversal, plaintiffs rely upon de-
cisions of this court in Van Meter v.
Field, 195 Okla. 555, 159 P. 2d 546; Mer-
cer v. McKeel, 188 Okla. 280, 108 P. 2d
138; and Sixkiller v. Weete, 175 Okla.
204, 51 P. 2d 807. In the two earlier of
these cases, we held:

“When a husband and wife are liv-
ing upon property the title to which is
claimed by the husband and both have
a homestead claim thereon, an action
against the husband alone for the pur-
pose of trying the issue of whether he
ever acquired title to said property, the
wife not being made a party to said
action for the purpose of litigating and
determining the homestead interest in
the property, is erroneous for a lack
of proper parties, the wife being an
indispensable party to such action, and
any judgment rendered therein against
the husband alone does not conclude
the wife, and same may be attacked
and vacated by the wife at any time.”

In the Van Meter case, supra, we
cited the Sixkiller case and held void

371

as to both husband and wife a judg-
ment against the husband foreclosing a
mortgage on their homestead, whose
title was in him.

Defendants say that the facts of the
above cases distinguish them from the
present one, but we find no such dis-
tinction sufficient to preclude applica-
tion to the present case of the rule pro-
mulgated and followed therein.

Defendants also rely heavily upon the
veracity and correctness of the judg-
ment in cause No. 12959, and the find-
ings and conclusions upon which it
was based, which they say is reflected
in the exhibits attached to their de-
murrer. They argue that these exhib-
its show that the tax sale through
which plaintiffs’ title is deraigned, as
well as the deed constituting their pur-
ported color of title, is void and of no
effect. They say that these purported
judicial pronouncements (which, being
incorporated in the record merely as
exhibits attached to their demurrer,
cannot be considered as evidence) show
that Mr. Priddy has no right, title or-
estate, either legal or equitable, to the
Jands in question, and that therefore
his wife, who has no more nor better
title and whose only claim to the land
is through the same void deed, could
not have been a necessary or proper
party to cause No. 12959. They cite
Wilcox v. Westerheide, 199 Okla. 312,
185 P. 2d 452; Morton v. Van Orsdol,
203 Okla. 394, 222 P. 2d 520, and other
authorities as supporting their argu-
ment. In the earlier of these cases, we
held:

“The holder of a void tax deed who
takes possession of the property cov-
ered by such deed is not rightfully in
possession of such property, * * *.”

In the later case, where a county pur-
chased property by a void resale deed,
we said no presumption followed such
purported purchase that the county
took possession of the property, and
we referred to the rule stated in 2 C.J.
53, that:

“The constructive possession of land
is always in the holder of the best title

372 —

unless he has renounced it, and this
constructive possession can never be
ousted by anything less than an actual
possession maintained for the neces-
sary period.”

In the present case, as in all cases
involving only the sufficiency of a pe-
tition to withstand a demurrer, the al-
legations thereof must be taken as
true, for the purpose of ruling on said
demurrer. Plaintiffs’ petition specifi-
cally alleges that the quarter-section of
Jand involved “now does and has at
all times herein complained of, con-
stituted the family homestead of these
plaintiffs, and has been during all such
times so complained of herein and is
now occupied by them as a unit as
their homestead.” This petition goes on
to attack the previous judgment hold-
ing the plaintiff Priddy’s deed void as
being void, itself, and prays that it be
set aside. It is thus obvious that the
question before us is not governed by
the Wilcox and Morton cases, supra, in
which it was judicially determined,
upon the basis of proof, that the tax
deeds involved were void. Here, the va-
lidity of the tax deed constituting plain-
tiffs’ muniment of title, and the alle-
gations made pro and con on that sub-
ject, are yet to be determined by a
trial on the merits of this case. There-
fore,.in accord with the above rule
governing court decisions on demur-
rers to petitions and the rule promul-
gated and followed in the Sixkiller,
Mercer and Van Meter cases, supra,
the trial court should have overruled
defendants’ demurrer despite the un-
authenticated papers attached to it.
Its judgment and order to the contrary
is hereby reversed, with directions to
said court to set it aside and proceed
in a manner not inconsistent with the
views expressed herein.

CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

STATON et al. v. MOODY et al.
MOODY v. STATON et al.
Nos. 34584, 84527. Dec, 16, 1952.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.
. 256 P. 2d 409.

W. H. Brown, Paul G. Darrough, and
Virgil R. Ball, Oklahoma City, for Lor-
eta Staton and others.

Rex H. Holden, W. T. Brunson, and
Charles E, Dierker, Oklahoma City, for
Bernice Opal Moody and others.

JOHNSON, J. These two causes, No.
34534 and No. 34527, stem from a dis-
pute as to the legal and proper dispo-
sition of the estate of Elizabeth Decker,
deceased. No. 34527 was brought in the
district court of Oklahoma county by
Bernice Opal Moody, administratrix,
with the will annexed, of the estate of
Elizabeth Decker et al. against Loreta
Staton, as administratrix of the estate
of Anna Maude White, also known as
Maude White et al.

Plaintiffs alleged that Loreta Staton
was the administratrix of the estate of
Anna Maude White and that the other
defendants, Loreta Staton, Edwina Mc-
Curtain, W. E. White, Juanita Goldsby,
Nedra Hudson, J. W. White and Neil
White were the sole and surviving heirs
at law of the deceased, Anna Maude
White; that plaintiff Bernice Opal
Moody was the duly appointed admin-
istratrix with the will annexed of the
estate of Elizabeth Decker, deceased;
that Bernice Opal Moody and Grace
Elizabeth McGarvie were the sole resid-
uary legatees under the last will and
testament of Elizabeth Dedker, de-
ceased; that same was duly admitted to
probate in the county court of Okla-
homa county, Oklahoma, without a con-
test; that by reason thereof the prop-
erty hereinafter described passed to the
residuary legatees; that Anna Maude
White died on or about the 6th day of
March, 1946, and Elizabeth Decker died
on the 5th day of September, 1947; that
Anna Maude White was Mrs. Decker’s
niece; that Mrs. Decker had consider-
able means; that Mrs. White was with-
out means or income and lived with
Mrs. Decker, who furnished all living
expenses and funds for both; that Mrs.
White had access to Mrs. Decker’s prop-
erty and money, with the right to check
on her bank accounts; that on the 21st
day of May, 1945, Mrs. White purchased

373

with Mrs. Decker’s money, a duplex
located on lot 17, block 15, Terrace ad-
dition to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
taking the legal title in Mrs. White’s
name; that no part of the purchase
price was paid by Mrs. White; that
by reason thereof plaintiffs are the le-
gal and equitable owners of said prop-
erty and entitled to the possession
thereof and to have title quieted in
them. That immediately after Mrs.
White’s death, the defendants evicted
Mrs. Decker from the duplex (prop-
erty); that defendants have ever since
occupied and retained possession of
said property.

Plaintiffs prayed for an accounting of
the rents and profits, or, in the alter-
native, the reasonable usable value of
the property.

A demurrer to this petition as amend-
ed was overruled with exception. De-
fendants then filed their joint answer,
admitting the death of their mother,
Mrs. White, and Mrs. Decker, as al-
Jeged, and that they were the sole heirs
of Mrs. White.

Answering further they stated that
Elizabeth Decker, for many years, re-
sided in Juneau, Alaska, and owned
considerable property there; that she
had no relatives or close friends living
near her and for many years she con-
stantly sought to get Maude White, her
niece, to come to Alaska and live with
her and help take care of her and her
property; that Mrs. Decker was prac-
tically incapacitated from attending to
her housework and her business af-
fairs and being so handicapped she
insisted continually that Mrs. White
come to her; that if she would do so
she would leave her all of her estate
except a few minor bequests; that Mrs.
White was finally persuaded to leave
her family and kindred in Oklahoma
and went to live with Mrs. Decker; that
for many years thereafter she was in al-
most constant attendance upon her,
looking after her personal wants and
assisting her in taking care of her prop-
erty with the exception of an interval
when she returned to Oklahoma for a

374

short time; that to confirm the under-
standing and agreement had with Mrs.
White, Mrs. Decker duly executed her
last will and testament leaving prac-
tically all af her estate to Mrs. White
with the exception of small bequests to
other relatives aggregating approxi-
mately $6,000; that a copy of said will
was given to Mrs. White as evidence
of the agreement between them; ‘that
the physical condition of Mrs. Decker
grew worse as the years went by re-
quiring more personal attention; that
after several years, Mrs. Decker dis-
posed of her tangible property in Alas-
ka, and thinking that it might improve
her health they came to Oklahoma in
1944; that Mrs. White fully and com-
pletely performed and carried out all
the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment with Mrs. Decker; that Mrs.
Decker, in recognition thereof, upon re-
turning to Oklahoma, arranged for the
purchase of the real estate involved
herein and the payment of a part of the
purchase price thereof, having title
thereto taken in the name of Mrs.
White; that the same was done as a
partial performance of their prior agree-
ment; that Mrs. Decker had full knowl-
edge of all the facts concerning the
acquisition of this property and ac-
quiesced and consented thereto. They
prayed that plaintiffs take nothing.

Plaintiffs, in cause No, 34534 were
the defendants in cause No. 34527, and
defendants in No. 34534 were plaintiffs
in No. 34527.

The allegations in plaintiffs’ petition
in cause No. 34534, are, in effect and
substance, the same as their answer in
cause No. 34527 except that they claim
the enitre estate of Mrs. Decker less
the minor bequests provided for in her
last will and testament in favor of
Mrs. White, which they contend was
made in accordance with the contract
between Mrs. Decker and Mrs. White
referred to in their answer in No. 34527,
a copy of which was attached to their
petition. They prayed for judgment
against the defendants and each of
them for the sum of $96,685.61, this be-
ing the alleged aggregate value of Mrs.

Decker’s estate, together with interest
at 6 per cent per annum until paid and
all costs or, in the alternative, that
plaintiff recover judgment for a similar
amount against defendants upon the
claim for services rendered Mrs. Deck-
er by Mrs. White and filed against the
estate of Mrs. Decker, deceased, but
which was disallowed and for such oth-
er relief as they may be entitled.

The defendants’ answer was in ef-
fect a denial of the material allega-
tions of plaintiffs’ petition.

The causes were consolidated and
tried by the court.

Cause No. 34527 was an action by
plaintiffs, wherein they sought to im-
pose a trust in their favor on the du-
plex that was occupied by Mrs. Decker
and Mrs. White as their home, which
was purchased in the name of Maude
White about a year before Mrs. White’s
death. The sum of $5,000 was paid on
the property from funds which were on
deposit to the credit of Mrs, White in
the Liberty National Bank of Oklahoma
City, but which allegedly and in fact
belonged to Mrs. Decker.

The plaintiffs relied upon parol evi-
dence to establish a resulting trust in
their favor.

A resulting trust may be established
by parol evidence but the proof nec-
essary to establish it should be of the
most satisfactory kind, and the burden
of establishing such trust rests upon
him who seeks its enforcement, and
before a court of equity will be war-
ranted in making a decree therefor, the
evidence must be clear, unequivocal
and decisive. See Ward v. Ward, 197
Okla. 551, 172 P. 2d 978, and cases
cited therein.

It is undisputed that the $5,000 paid
allegedly from money belonging to
Mrs. Decker was only a partial pay-
ment on the duplex and that Mrs.
White alone gave a mortgage on it to a
local loan company and obtained money
to pay the balance of the purchase price
to the seller, and also, that the part
payment, if made from the money of

Mrs. Decker, was not shown to have
been made for any distinct part or in-
terest in the property.

We think the judgment of the trial
court refusing to impose a trust upon
the property (duplex) was justified un-
der the rule that where property is con-
veyed to one person on a part consid-
eration furnished by another and the
purchaser alone gives a mortgage on
the property purchased to obtain the
balance of the purchase money which
is paid to the seller, there is no result-
ing trust, and this is true even though
the court based judgment upon other
reasons. 54 Am. Jur. Trusts, §217, p.
167, Anno. 42 A.L.R. 52. Also, the trial
court’s judgment was proper for the
further reason that a resulting trust
does not exist in favor of one who pays
part of the price of land conveyed to
another unless such payment has been
made for some distinct part or interest
therein. McGowan v. McGowan, 14
Gray 119 (Mass.), 74 Am. Dec. 668, fol-
lowed in Dudley v. Dudley, 176 Mass.
34, 56 N.E, 1010, See, also, Olcott v.
Bynum, 17 Wall. 44, 21 L. Ed. 570.

In cause No. 34534, the plaintiffs al-
leged the existence of a contract be-
tween Mrs. Decker and Mrs. White,
the substance of which was that Mrs.
Decker agreed to make a will and
leave all of her estate to Mrs, White
except certain minor bequests if Mrs.
White would come to Alaska and take
care of her and her property which
plaintiffs contend Mrs. White did.

Upon trial of the cause the court
found inter alia that there was no con-
tract entered into between Mrs. Decker,
deceased, and Mrs. White, deceased,
and that Mrs. Decker, during her life-
time, fully compensated Mrs. White for
all services rendered to her by sub-
stantial gifts of money and property.
From an order overruling plaintiffs’
motion for a new trial, they appeal.

Plaintiffs, for reversal, present their
contentions under three propositions, to
wit: (1) There was a definite contract

entered inte between Mrs. Decker and
Anna Maude White

whereby Mrs.

375

White was induced to go to Alaska and
take care of Mrs. Decker; (2) that the
contract was fully performed; (3) that
specific performance of the contract
should have been granted; (4a) errors
of law occurring at the trial, and (4b)
error of the court in holding that plain-
tiffs were not entitled to maintain this
action; (5) alternative remedies sug-
gested by plaintiffs.

It is evident from what has been
said that this cause is to be deter-
mined by the application of equitable
principles; therefore, we will examine
and weigh the evidence, but unless the
judgment of the trial court is against
the clear weight thereof or contrary
to law, it will be affirmed.

The material question is, Was the
evidence sufficient to constitute a con-
tract between Mrs. Decker and Mrs.
White whereby Mrs. White was to be
willed Mrs. Decker’s estate as compen-
sation for her services in caring for
Mrs. Decker and her property during
her lifetime? If so, then Mrs: White
admittedly did not fully perform her
contract owing to the fact that she died
before Mrs. Decker. But, if she faith-
fully performed her part of such a con-
tract until death prevented its full per-
formance, we think that Mrs. White’s
administratrix first proving the con-
tract, may recover the value of the
service so performed up to date of her
death, not by action upon the contract
but upon a quantum meruit for serv-
ices performed. Leahy v. Cheney, 90
Conn. 611, 98 A. 132; Torgerson v.
Hauge, 34 N.D. 646, 159 N.W. 6,3 ALR.
164; 57 Am. Jur., Wills, $175, p. 155;
69 A.L.R. Anno. p. 52 et seq.

It is argued and the trial court so
held that the making of the contract al-
leged, and its terms, were not suffi-
ciently established. We do not agree.
Numerous disinterested, uncontradict-
ed witnesses gave testimony sufficient
to establish that there was an expressed
intent and agreement by Mrs. Decker
to give all of her property to Mrs.
White as compensation for caring for
her and looking after her property dur-

376

ing her lifetime. It is undisputed that
Mrs. White, at Mrs. Decker’s persis~
tent requests, left her home and family
in Oklahoma and went to live in Alas-
ka with Mrs. Decker, a widow of many
years, without issue, and so lived there
for about four years; that during that
time Mrs. Decker was an invalid and
required Mrs. White’s constant atien-
tion; that Mrs. Decker did, on Febru-
ary 3, 1941, make a will which was
duly executed in the presence of wit-
nesses and she délivered a copy to
Mrs. White, in which will, after making
some directions as to burial, etc., and
several explicit minor bequests, she
said:

“(h) I give, devise and bequeath all
the remainder of my property, real,
personal and mixed, of every nature
and description and wheresoever situa-
ted, including the Decker Apartment
Building, my home at Juneau, Alaska,
and all furnishings and other property
of every description, to my niece, Mrs.
Anna Maude White Rogers, of Okla-
homa City, Oklahoma.”

It is undisputed that all of the prop-
erty in Alaska was converted into cash
and that Mrs. Decker and Mrs. White
left Alaska and came to Oklahoma
City and that Mrs. White continued her
constant attention to the aged Mrs.
Decker, whose health grew gradually
worse; that during all the time Mrs.
White waited upon and cared for Mrs.
Decker she was in constant attendance
through 24 hours each day for seven
day a week. No complaint is now
made by defendants, or was any com-
plaint ever made by Mrs. Decker, as to
the services rendered by Mrs. White to
Mrs. Decker. The evidence discloses
that for more than five years Mrs.
White rendered services satisfactory to
Mrs. Decker as alleged until she died,
which was admittedly on March 6, 1946;
that Mrs. Decker immediately there-
after went to live with her sister, Mrs.
Johanna Margaret Moody, and her
niece, Bernice Opal Moody, and so
lived until her death on September 6,
1947; that on March 22, 1946, Mrs. Deck-
er, while living with her sister and

niece, and 16 days after the death of
Mrs. White, executed a new will be-
queathing and devising all of her es-
tate to the defendants, the value of
which was admittedly approximately
$100,000; but left nothing to the estate
of Mrs. White, or to her heirs or next
of kin.

There was no daily, weekly, monthly
or yearly amount of compensation to
be paid Mrs. White by Mrs. Decker, but
obviously Mrs. White, had she lived
would have been entitled to the whole
of Mrs. Decker’s estate, but since her
death stopped further performance on
her part, her heirs may recover on a
quantum meruit basis, her death excus-
fing further performance on her part.
The oral contract to leave all her prop-
erty as compensation to Mrs. White was
conclusively established by oral testi-
mony and written exhibits consisting of
numerous letters and the will in favor
of Mrs. White. The delivery of the copy
of the will to Mrs. White is an important
factor, but not necessarily essential in
establishing the contractual feature of
the transaction between Mrs. White
and Mrs. Decker. There was a valu-
able consideration as a consequence
of Mrs. White’s services resulting in
an enforceable contract, so that the
testator cannot, by making a later will,
escape the obligation confirmed by the
first one. See Nelson v. Schoonover, 89
Kan, 388, 131 P. 147.

Under the facts, this contract under
which said will was executed and de-
livered was substantially performed
and to such an extent that equity will
grant relief appropriate to the estab-
lished equitable principles.

The rule applicable to the facts and
circumstances herein has been well
stated in Torgerson v. Hauge, supra,
wherein it was held that a will executed
under such an agreement is both con-
tractual and testamentary.

Its contractual features cannot be
later revoked by the testator without
the consent of the beneficiaries, where
executed, and where equity should en-
force its provisions. There in the sylla-

bus by the court, paragraphs one, two
and three, it was said:

“1, The parents of Andrew Torgerson
entered into an oral understanding with
him in 1899, whereby he should reside
with and care for them during their
lives, and should receive their property.
They executed and delivered to him
their joint written will, constituting him
sole devisee of all their property. An-
drew purchased an adjoining quarter,
sold his own homestead in another
county, and for 15 years lived with his
parents. Andrew died in June, 1914; the
father in October following, at the age
of 74 years. The mother was 74 years
old at the time of the trial. Andrew
leaves a widow and four minor children.
Surviving him are these defendants,
his four brothers and sisters and his
mother. Six weeks after the death of
Andrew his brothers and sisters pro-
cured the aged and enfeebled father
and mother to make another will, re-
voking the former one and dividing all
their property between themselves and
the heirs of Andrew, one-fifth to each.
The parents then leave and reside with
the defendants. Andrew’s widow pro-
tests, and offers to continue to support
and care for them. The children of
Andrew herein seek to enjoin the pro-
bate of the second will and maintain
the status quo during the lifetime of the
mother; and to define the estate of the
minors in the real property and declare
their interest therein a trust upon the
fee thereof to be subsequently perfected
by the probate of the first will or pro-
ceedings in equity; and to annul any
pretended interest of the defendants
under the purported second will, and to
make suitable provisions meanwhile for
the maintenance and care of the mother
out of said homestead premises, title
to which was acquired by final proof
years ago, but subsequent to the de-
livery of the first will. Held, a will exe-
cuted under such an agreement is both
contractual and testamentary. Its con~
tractual features cannot be later re-
voked by the testators without the con-
sent of the beneficiaries where exe-
cuted, and where equity should enforce
its provisions.

“2, Under the facts this contract un-
der which said will was executed and
delivered was substantially performed,
and to such an extent that equity will

377

grant relief equivalent to specific per-
formance and fasten a trust upon the
property for the benefit of the heirs of
the beneficiary under the contract as
against any transferee or devisee.

“3, A will so executed will be recog-
nized in equity as a part performance
of the contract, and becomes itself in
its contractual features an enforceable
contract.”

In the opinion, it was said, in effect,
that Andrew Torgerson in his lifetime,
under his contract with his parents and
his partial performance thereof, ac-
quired, and had at the time of his
death, an equitable estate in the land in
question, which would pass upon his
death to his heirs or devisees, and
which passed to his heirs, the plain-
tiffs.

These considerations lead us to the
conclusion that the plaintiffs were en-
titled to relief, but not necessarily to
the full amount claimed, nor to the full
extent or amount of the estate, by the
enforcement of the first will in favor
of Mrs. White. Mrs. Decker by making
such will did not necessarily incapaci-
tate herself from making a later will
which should be valid except so far as
it should impinge upon her prior obliga-
tions.

The record discloses that Mrs. Moody
and her daughter took Mrs. Decker
into their home and kept her from the
date of Mrs. White’s death on March 6,
1946, until Mrs. Decker’s death on
September 6, 1947, evidently under the
same conditions and circumstances as
did Mrs. White. That is, they were to
care for her the rest of her life, which
they did, and but for Mrs. Deckeyr’s
prior obligations to Mrs. White they
would be entitled, under the second
will, to the full amount of Mrs. Decker’s
estate, less certain minor bequests, as
that was evidently the agreed amount
of compensation.

The record further discloses that
when Mrs. White agreed with Mrs.
Decker to go to Alaska and take care
of her, Mrs. Decker was 76 years old;

378

that under the American mortality ta-
ble she had a life expectancy of 5.88
years; that Mrs. White left Oklahoma
City for Alaska on September 25, 1940;
that she performed services for Mrs.
Decker until her death on March 6,
1946; that the Moodys performed the
same services for Mrs. Decker under
the same circumstances from the date
of Mrs. White’s death until the death of
Mrs. Decker. Under this state of facts
we think plaintiffs should recover on
a quantum meruit basis for the serv-
ices rendered by Mrs. White and that
we should reverse the judgment ren-
dered and remand the cause, with di-
rections for such determination.

Under the arrangements, or agree-
ments, that the devisees, under each
will, had with Mrs. Decker to receive
the entire amount of her estate in case
they cared for her until her death,
each, we think. is entitled to compen-
sation for services rendered.

See Masterson v. Masterson, 100 Kan.
108, 163 P. 617, and cases cited therein.
In that case the court said:

“The contract was substantially that
the nephew should live with and care
for his uncle until his death, and should
receive the farm in return for so doing.
He did live with him and care for him
for a year and three or four months.
‘Then the contract was abandoned for
reasons not chargeable to one party
more than to the other. We think the
nephew should receive something in re-
turn for the services he rendered while
the contract was in force, and that a na-
tural way of fixing the amount is to
compare what he actually did with what
he would have been required to do to
earn the reward promised for the full
performance of the agreement. If he
had cared for his uncle until his death,
he would have received land worth be-
tween $2,700 and $3,100 over the in-
eumbrance. He cared for him for a
year and three or four months. At the
time the contract was abandoned the
uncle was about 73 years old and his
expectancy of life was about 7 years.
The nephew had therefore presumably
accomplished from one-sixth to one-
seventh of his allotted task. We think

that $450 is a fair estimate of what he
ought to receive.”

After a careful examination of the
voluminous record herein and the in-
exhaustive briefs of -the parties, we
have carefully weighed the evidence
and find the judgment of the trial court
to be against the clear weight thereof
and contrary to law. Therefore, cause
No. 34534 is reversed and remanded,
with directions for further proceedings
in accord with the views herein ex-
pressed.

There are other questions raised by
the parties herein, but from what we
have said, we deem it unnecessary to
discuss them.

ARNOLD, C.J., HALLEY, V.C.J., and
WELCH, CORN, GIBSON, O’NEAL,
and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur. DAVI-
SON, J., dissents.

DAVISON, J. (dissenting). I am of
the opinion that the judgment of the
trial court in cause No. 34534 is not
against the clear weight of the evi-
dence and that said judgment should
be affirmed. I, therefore, respectfully
dissent.

as
ADAMS et al. v. ADAMS et al.
No. 35049. June 24, 1952.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.
256 P. 2d 458.

Oris L. Barney, Anadarko, for plain-
tiffs in error.

Sparks & Boatman, Woodward, for
defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. For convenience, the
parties will be referred to as they ap-
pear in the trial court. This is an action
by the plaintiffs against the defendants
whereby the plaintiffs attempt to im-
press a trust upon a tract of land in
Dewey county, Oklahoma. The facts
disclosed by the findings of the dis-
trict court show that in 1916 and 1917
Jacob E. Adams became the owner
of the land involved by patents from
the United States. In 1925 Jacob E.
Adams and wife executed and delivered
to the Federal Land Bank their note se~

379

cured by mortgage on the land for the
sum of $2,300; in 1936 the Federal

Land Bank instituted foreclosure of ~

the mortgage and judgment was ren-
dered on June 1, 1936, finding that Ja-
cob E, Adams and wife were indebted
to the Federal Land Bank on said note
and mortgage in the sum of $3,025.67
and order of sale was issued out of said
court on December 14, 1936. The prop-
erty was advertised to be sold on Jan-
uary 19, 1937. Jacob E. Adams made
several unsuccessful attempts to pro-
cure money with which to pay this
obligation. Jacob E. Adams and his
wife were about 70 years of age and in
very necessitous circumstances. While
the land was being advertised for sale
a deed was executed by Jacob E.
Adams and wife, conveying the land
to the Federal Land Bank. Thereafter
the sale was withdrawn, the mortgage
held by the Land Bank and the judg-
ment obtained thereon were released.
On January 27, 1937, the Federal Land
Bank entered into a contract for the
sale of this land to T. M. Adams, of
Cullison, Kansas, a brother of Jacob E.
Adams, for a consideration of $3,143.07
which was to be paid as follows: $643.07
cash, and 10 annual installments of $250
each, the first payment being due and
payable August 1, 1937. The contract
further specified, “Time is the essence
of this agreement”. Jacob E. Adams
and his wife continued to reside on the
land. An oral agreement existed be-
tween T. M. Adams and his brother
Jacob E. Adams to the effect that if
Jacob E, Adams would pay the sum
specified in the agreement between
T. M. Adams and the Federal Land
Bank, according to the terms thereof,
plus the sum of $435 previously loaned
to him by T. M. Adams, upon comple-
tion of the payments by Jacob E.
Adams, T. M. Adams would convey the
land to Jacob E. Adams. The record dis-
closed that Jacob E. Adams doubtless
paid the installments due August 1, 1938,
in the sum of $306.25 and installment
due August 1, 1939, in the sum of $300.
A further payment of $37.50 is indicated
on January 18, 1941. However, he did
not repay the old loan nor the initial

380

cash payment to T. M. Adams. The rec~
ord indicates that the remainder of the
payments including taxes were paid by
T. M. Adams, The final payment was
made on March 21, 1944. Thereafter,
deed was executed by the Federal Land
Bank conveying said real estate to T. M.
Adams. On August 21, 1940, the Federal
Land Bank wrote T. M. Adams concern-
ing delinquent items and stated, “as the
contract is now subject to cancellation,
this should be attended to at once.” T. M.
Adams promptly remitted the amount
due and inquired of the bank about a
long term loan. Thereafter T, M. Adams
visited the home of Jacob E. Adams and
conversation was had as to the failure of
Jacob E. Adams to make the payments
as provided in the contract with the
Federal Land Bank. T. M. Adams
threatened to rent the cultivated por-
tions of the farm to other parties, but
after much insistence by Jacob E.
Adams, T. M. Adams finally agreed
to give him one more year. In 1941
T. M. Adams informed J. E. Adams
that he “carried this as long as he
could”; that he had given him several
years to pay off the interest, taxes, and
installments on principal and T. M.
Adams thereupon rented the tillable
land to another brother, Ben Adams,
and the son of Ben Adams, Clifford
Adams, in the fall of 1941. They oper-
ated this portion of the land, paying the
rent to T. M. Adams. J. E, Adams and
wife continued to live in the house and
use the pasture until Jacob’s death in
1946, at which time the widow moved
away from the farm to another sec-
tion of the state. She commenced this
action in 1948 on behalf of herself and
as guardian of her son, Ernest Felix
Adams, an incompetent person, against
T. M. Adams, who subsequently de-
parted this life and the case was re-
vived against his widow and children.

The record reveals that the testimony
of the witnesses who heard conversa-
tions between T. M. Adams and Jacob
E. Adams just prior ‘to, at the time
of, and after the making of the arrange-
ment between them, is not in sharp
conflict. There is testimony more than

sufficient to sustain the trial court’s
finding that the agreement in its final-
ity, “was that if Jacob E. Adams would
pay the sum specified in the agreement
between the Federal Land Bank and T.
M. Adams, according to the terms of
the agreement between the Federal
Land Bank and T. M. Adams, that if
Jacob E. Adams would perform those
terms, make those payments accord-
ing to the terms of their agreement,
that upon completion of those payments
by Jacob E, Adams, upon completion
thereof, T. M. Adams would convey
that land to Jacob E, Adams. Now it
ought to be observed in this case and
in this matter Jacob E. Adams had
never assumed any of the contractual

obligations which would be enforceable
are

The record contains several letters
written by T. M. Adams after the orig-
imal arrangement was made. Some of
these letters are susceptible of more
than one construction and the letters
are not wholly consistent in themselves.
These letters were considered by the
trial court along with the oral testi-
mony, and in view of the entire record
we cannot say that the findings of the
trial court are contrary to the weight
of the evidence.

The decisions uniformly hold that to
impress a property with a constructive
or resulting trust there must be fraud,
violation of confidence, or of fiduciary
relation, or acquisition of title in some
other unconscionable manner. A de-
tailed search of the record fails to show
any such elements in this case.

An early case Hayden v. Dannenberg,
42 Okla. 776, 143 P. 859, Ann. Cas.
1916D, 1191, holds:

“A constructive trust may be estab-
lished by parol evidence, but the law
for the safety of titles requires that
the proof should be of the most satis-
factory and trustworthy kind.”

This is repeated in a large number
of cases involving constructive trusts,
including Parsons v. Crawford, 193
Okla. 537, 145 P. 2d 932, in which the

principal must be made on the due date
and time is the essence of the contract.

above syllabus is quoted and there is
added:

“The evidence must be clear,
equivocal, and decisive.”

un-

With respect to a resulting trust it
was held by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Ducie v. Ford, 138 U.
S. 587, 11 S. Ct. 417, 34 L. Ed. 1091, as
follows:

“While there is no doubt of the gen-
eral proposition that a trust results to
him who pays the consideration for an
estate, where the title is taken in the
name of another; that such trust, is
not within the statute, and that parol
evidence is admissible to show whose
money is actually paid for the proper-
ty,—it is equally clear that the trust
must have arisen at the time the pur-
chase was made, and that the whole
constderation must have been paid or
secured at the time of or prior to such
purchase.”

This case also holds in the syllabus:

“In order to make surrender of pos-
session to the defendant a sufficient
performance to take a case out of the
statute of frauds such surrender must
be made in pursuance of the contract,
and be referrable to it; it must be a
new possession under the contract, and
not merely the continuance of a former
possession claimed under a different
right or title. * * *”

This court has likewise held with re-
spect to resulting trusts in the case
of Birdwell v. Estes, 189 Okla. 379, 116
P. 2d 969.

The plaintiffs have wholly failed to
show by clear and decisive proof which
the law demands, that the considera-
tion for this land was paid by Jacob
E. Adams. There is no question that
the deed to the Federal Land Bank
was executed by Jacob E. Adams and
wife after a thorough and clear under-
standing between them and T. M.
Adams, and that it was a valid convey-
ance. The contract between the Fed-
eral Land Bank and T. M. Adams was
also free from any ambiguity, fraud,
and uncertainty and provided that all
payments due for taxes, interest and

381

The oral assignment or option, as
the finding of the trial court described
the arrangement, falls squarely within
the decision of Abraham v. McSoud,
188 Okla. 409, 109 P. 2d 822:

“An express trust” oral in form, “to
hold and to convey real property, is un-
enforceable as being in violation of the
statute of frauds and the statute of
uses and trust...”

Another case involving a similar sit-
uation is Oliphant v. Rogers, 186 Okla.
70, 95 P. 2d 887.

The plaintiffs in error argue for a
constructive trust on the basis of un-
just enrichment, but could there be
unjust enrichment in this case? The
evidence shows loans from T. M. Adams
prior to the inception of this transaction
of $435 purchase of seed wheat in 1936
amounting to $115, cash payment for
the purchase of the Jand sale contract,
$643.07, and payment of funeral ex-
penses of Jacob E, Adams. Jacob E.
Adams occupied the premises from 1937
to the date of his death without the pay-
ment of any other sums as rental or
otherwise for the use of said premises,
and from 1941 to the date of his death
he had the use of the house and pasture
without making any payments of any
nature. From this it would appear that
T. M. Adams had dealt generously with
his brother.

This is a case of equitable cogni-
zance and is governed by equitable
principles. In Renegar v. Bruning, 190
Okla. 340, 123 P. 2d 686, it was said:

“In cases of equitable cognizance the
judgment of the appellate court should
not lightly displace the judgment of the
trial court, which had the advantage of
observing the witnesses on the stand.”

In the recent case of Hill v. Hill,
202 Okla. 483, 215 P. 2d 553, this court
said:

“In an action of equitable cognizance
where the evidence is conflicting the
findings thereon of the trial court will
not be disturbed unless clearly against
the weight thereof.

382

We have reviewed the entire record
and considered all of the evidence in
the light of the interpretations put
thereon by the parties and the trial
court, and also the briefs of the parties,
and it is difficult to understand how
the trial court could have reached a
different conclusion.

The judgment of the trial court is
therefore affirmed.

This Court acknowledges the serv-
ices of Attorneys A. J. Kriete, Philip
R. Rimbish, and Marvin T. Johnson,
who as Special Masters aided in the
preparation of this opinion. These attor-
neys were recommended by the Okla-
homa Bar Association, approved by the
Judicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and CORN, JOHN-
SON, O’NEAL, and BINGAMAN, JJ.,
concur. WELCH and DAVISON JJ.,
concur in results. ARNOLD, C.J., dis-

sents.
ALLEN v. ALLEN.
No, 34449. Feb. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1958.
256 P. 2d 449.

Tom W. Garrett, Oklahoma City (Tom
W. Garrett, Jr., and Garrett & Garrett,
Oklahoma City, of counsel), for plain-
tiff in error.

Robert E. Shelton, Oklahoma City,
for defendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. The present action is
based upon a written contract dated
August 4, 1939, executed during cover-
ture of M. Lucille Allen and Walter E.
Allen and which was entered into in
contemplation of the severance of their
marital relationship. On the 10th day of
August, 1939, a decree of divorce was
granted to Walter E. Allen against M.
Lucille Allen in the district court of the
Second Judicial District of the State
of Nevada. The contract provides that
Mr. Allen will pay Mrs. Allen the sum
of $1,680 each year at the rate of $140
monthly, commencing on August 1, 1939,
for the remainder of Mrs. Allen’s life,
or until she remarries. Payments were
made by Mr. Allen, either voluntarily
or in compliance with former judg-
ments, up to and including the month of
August, 1946. The present suit is based
on delinquent payments as of Septem-
ber 1, 1946, to date of trial and for cer-
tain expenses incurred in the litigation

383

and attorney fees, as provided for in
the contract.

The trial court, on the 8th day of
September, 1949, denied Mrs. Allen the
relief prayed for, assigning grounds for
the decision that the decree of the Ne-
vada court of August 10; 1939, as modi-
fied by an order of nunc pro tune under
date of April 29, 1946, merged the con-
tract of August 4, 1939, into the decree
and that Mrs, Allen could not recover
under the contract. Parties stand in
the same relative position as in the
trial court, and will be generally re-
ferred to as plaintiff and defendant.

Succinctly stated, the defendant’s an-
swer admits the execution of the con-
tract referred to by plaintiff and admits
that on April 29, 1946, on defendant’s
application, and without notice to plain-
tiff, the district court of Nevada en-
tered its order nune pro tune incor-
porating the contract of August 4, 1939,
by copying it verbatim into the divorce
decree. Defendant pleads certain de-
cisions of the Nevada Supreme Court
sustaining the validity of the order nunc
pro tune and pleads that the contract
referred to was thereby extinguished.
Moreover, that the contract is unfair,
unconscionable, void and unenforceable
in Oklahoma, as being contrary to the
public policy of the state.

Plaintiffs reply and defendant’s an-
swer thereto plead certain decisions of
this court in the case of Allen v. Allen,
196 Okla. 36, 162 P. 2d 193, and Allen
v. Allen, 201 Okla. 442, 209 P, 2d 172,
and certain decisions of the Nevada
Supreme Court as to the authority and
power to enter the nunc pro tunc order
of April 29, 1946. No issues of fact are
raised by the pleadings, and only ques-
tions of law are presented upon the ap-
peal.

A stipulation of the parties was filed
in the trial court; certain material pro-
visions thereof will be noted:

(a) That on July 12, 1949, the de-
fendant’s second application for an or-
der nunc pro tune to incorporate the
contract in the decree was denied by the

384

Nevada court, and that the time of ap-
peal has not elapsed.

(b) That plaintiff’s attorney in the
Nevada court did not make an appli-
eation for the allowance of attorney
fees in the nunc pro tunc proceedings,
but that plaintiff at all times objected
to the jurisdiction of the court on the
matter presented.

(c) A stipulation that certain enum-
erated cases of the Nevada court sup-
port plaintiff’s or defendant’s respective
contentions as to the validity or invalid-
ity of the order nunc pro tunc.

(d) That, in the event this Court
should determine that plaintiff is en-
titled to recover, she would be en-
titled to recover the sum of $5,180.00
for installments accruing under the con-
tract from September 1, 1946 to and
including September 1, 1949.

(e) In the event the issues are de-
termined in favor of the plaintiff, she
should receive an additional allowance
as attorney fees and expenses incurred
in the litigation, as provided for in the
stipulation.

The decree of divorce was entered
on August 10, 1939, and it was not chal-
lenged by the defendant prior to April
29, 1946. On the latter date he applied
for an order nunc pro tunc to incorpor-
ate the contract in the decree. The or-
der was obtained on an ex parte appli-
cation without notice or knowledge of
the defendant. The decree of divorce
provides:

“Tt is further ordered that the agree-
ment between the parties hereto, dated
August 4, 1939, be, and it is hereby ap-
proved, adopted and confirmed by this
Court, and the parties hereto directed
to comply therewith and to execute the
terms thereof”.

The Nevada court had the power to
do either one of the following acts:

(a) The Nevada court had the au-
thority and power to disapprove the con-
tract of the parties and by its decree
make such property disposition or ali-

mony allowance as it deemed proper.
This the Nevada court did not do.

(b) The court could have approved
the contract and incorporated its terms
in its decree. This the Nevada court did
not do.

(c) It could have approved the con-
tract, but not set forth the terms there-
of in its decree. This the Nevada court
did by stating that the contract is ap-
proved, adopted and confirmed and the
parties: hereto directed to comply there-
with and execute the terms thereof.
One of the terms of the contract pro-
vided for the payment of the sum of
$140 monthly to plaintiff. Another pro-
vision thereof provided that Mr. Allen
carry a policy of insurance on the life
of Mr. Allen, in which Mrs. Allen was
to be named as the first sole bene-
ficiary. See Allen v. Allen, 201 Okla. 1,
201 P. 2d 786.

That plaintiff may maintain the pres-
ent action on the contract and that the
contract was not merged in the divorce
decree is sustained by our decision in
Allen v. Allen, 196 Okla. 36, 162 P. 2d
193, wherein this court said:

“Where a husband and wife, resi-
dents of another state, enter into a con-
tract in that state to settle their prop-
erty rights in contemplation of di-
vorce, and thereafter the husband sues
for a divorce in another state and in
his petition for relief alleges the exis-
tence of the contract, without setting
out its terms, and asks the court to rat-
ify, approve, and adopt said contract,
and where the wife answers and ad-
mits generally the husband’s allega-
tions in this respect, and the court
grants the husband a divorce and in the
decree provides ‘ * * * that the agree-
ment entered into between the parties
hereto, dated August 4, 1939, should be
approved, adopted and confirmed by
this court, and the parties should be di-
rected to comply therewith and to ex-
ecute the terms thereof,’ and orders
« * * * that the agreement between the
parties hereto, dated August 4, 1939, be,
and it is hereby approved, adopted and
confirmed by this court, and the par-
ties hereto directed to comply there-
with and to execute the terms thereof,’

held, when an action is brought in Okla-
hhoma to recover for breaches of the con-
tract, the contract was not merged in
the judgment so as to put an end to it
and require suit on the judgment.”

The plaintiff here contends that the
Nevada court had the authority and
the power to approve the contract of
the parties as for an alimony allowance
without merging the contract in the de-
cree, so that the plaintiff might sue
on the contract and cites in support
thereof the case of Doig v. Palmer
(1939) 97 Utah 150, 91 P. 2d 443, where
the court stated:

“Where wife was granted divorce in
California, and a property settlement
was entered into by parties and ap-
proved by court, but its terms were not
set forth in decree, rights of parties
thereunder under California law, rested
upon contract and not decree.”

In the case of. Price v. Price (1948)
85 Cal. App. 2d 732, 194 P. 2d 101, the
court stated:

“Where property settlement is copied
into and made a part of divorce decree,
it is merged therein and no action on
the agreement as such may be main-
tained, but where the agreement is
merely referred to with approval, an
action thereon may be maintained.”

“ In Coxe v. Coxe (1935) 20 Del. Ch.
384, 178 A. 104, the court held:

“Separation agreement between hus-
band and wife held specifically enforce-
able notwithstanding divorce decree,
subsequently secured by wife from
court of another state confirmed, adopt-
ed, and directed parties to comply with
agreement, since agreement was not
merged in divorce decree so as to make
suit one for specific enforcement of a
foreign court decree.”

The Supreme Court of Nevada in Fin-
ley v. Finley, 65 Nev. 113, 189 P. 2d
334, held:

“Where court entered divorce decree
approving a property settlement there-
tofore made by the parties which had
been admitted in evidence, but did not
adopt provisions of the agreement as
part of the decree, court had no power

385

subsequently to enter a nunc pro tunc
decree adopting as part of the decree
the provisions of the agreement, though
parties consented, since amended de-
cree, by adopting the provisions of the
agreement, gave wife, in addition to her
contractual rights then existing, right
to invoke contempt proceedings and
rights of a judgment creditor.”

In Fuller v. Helvering, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, (1939) 105 F. 2d
903, that court stated:

“Under Nevada law, a settlement
agreement made in contemplation of
divorce does not conclude the divorce
court as respects the wife’s allowance,
but the allowance once made is final,
unless the decree reserves power to the
court to modify it.”

Citing in support thereof Sweeney v.
Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431, 179 P. 638.

After the first decision of this court
in Allen v. Allen, supra (1945), in which
we held that the contract was not
merged in the decree of divorce, the
defendant, on April 29, 1946, applied
to the Nevada court for an order nunc
pro tunc to correct the judgment en-
tered in the divorce proceedings. The
decree, as has been indicated, simply
approved the agreement and directed
the parties to comply therewith and
execute the terms thereof. The terms
of the agreement were not incorporated
into the decree. The application for the
order was presented to the Nevada
court without notice to the defendant.
The Nevada court purported to correct,
or change, the decree by incorporating
therein the contract verbatim and fur-
ther decreed that “and said contract is
legally extinguished and merged in this
decree in lieu of said contract”.

In April, 1946, Mrs. Allen filed her
second action to recover unpaid install-
ments under the contract of August 4,
1939. Mr. Allen defended, claiming the
order nunc pro tune of April 29, 1946,
merged the contract into the decree and
that she could not base a cause of ac-
tion upon the contract. The parties in
this second action, Allen v. Allen, stipu-
lated that the order nunc pro tunc was

386

obtained without notice to defendant
and that the laws of Nevada were the
same as the laws of Oklahoma “as
to the authority of the trial court to ap-
prove or disapprove contracts entered
into between the parties offered in a
divorce proceeding”. Mr. Allen claimed
that the judgment, as amended by the
order nunc pro tune, is a Nevada judg-
ment and that the Oklahoma courts
must give it-full faith and credit unless
the judgment is void on its face. Upon
appeal this court held that, as the laws
of Nevada were not pleaded or proven,
that by stipulation it was agreed they
were the same, that under Oklahoma
law the order nunc pro tune without no-
tice to defendant was invalid and un-
enforceable. We therefore held:

“Where husband procured amend-~
ment of Nevada divorce judgment by
order nunc pro tune on ex parte hear-
ing without notice to wife, husband
when relying upon amended judgment
in Oklahoma courts was required to
prove that under law of Nevada such
notice was not required and that amend-
ment of judgment without notice was
valid under laws of Nevada.”

We further held in that case that
where the parties, having stipulated
that the laws of Nevada and Oklahoma
are not different on the necessity of
giving notice of an application to
amend the decree, after the time pro-
vided for under the respective laws,
that the attempt to merge the contract
into the decree was ineffective and
that the attempted merger did not
extinguish the contract.

The present case is the third one in-
volving the decree of the Nevada trial
court lodged in this court, and which
is referred to in counsel’s brief as Al-
len v. Alien. #3, was filed on the 6th
day of October, 1948. By previous ref-
erence, we have outlined the issues as
disclosed in the pleadings. After the fil-
ing of this action, Mr. Allen filed a sec-
ond application with the Nevada court
for an order nunc pro tunc, based on
the identical grounds in his previous
application. In this proceeding he
served notice on Mrs. Allen, and there-

after, on July 12, 1949, a hearing was
had in the Nevada court on this second
application. The Nevada court refused
to grant the order nunc pro tune.

The journal entry of judgment of the
trial court in the instant case entered.
on Spetember 12, 1949, after reciting
the execution of the contract of the 4th
of August, 1939, and the rendition of the
divorce decree on August 10, 1939, states
that Mr. Allen filed in the Nevada court,
on April 29, 1946, an application for an
order nunc pro tune to incorporate the
contract in the divorce decree, and
finds that the Nevada court had juris-
diction to enter the nunc pro tune order
without notice under Nevada law, and
that after said order was entered the
contract was merged in the decree and
was thereby extinguished and is not en-
forceable in Oklahoma. The decree
of lower court is in conformity with
findings.

As we view the present case, the low-
er court’s judgment denies the vali-
dity of our former adjudication in Allen
y. Allen (1948) 201 Okla. 442, 209 P. 2d
172, writ of certiorari denied, 336 U. S.
956, 69 S. Ct. 891, and, furthermore,
the decision is in direct conflict with
the well-settled law of Nevada.

Sec. 1 of art. 4, of the Federal Consti-
tution requires that we give full faith
and credit to the public acts, records
and judicial proceedings of every other
state.

But we are only required so to do if
the foreign court had jurisdiction both
of the subject matter and the parties
to the litigation. As was said in Wil-
liams v. State of North Carolina, 325
USS. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577:

“The full faith and credit clause op-
erates only with respect to judgments
rendered by a court whose jurisdiction,
either as to the subject matter or per-
son, is not impeached.”

“The full faith and credit clause does
not make a sister-state judgment a
judgment in another state, but to give
it that effect, it must be made a judg-
ment there, which can be done only
of the court purporting to render the

original judgment had power to pass on
the merits.”

Defendant here asserts that our for-
mer decisions in Allen v. Allen, 196
Okla. 36, 162 P. 2d 193, and Allen v. Al-
len, 201 Okla. 442, 209 P. 2d 172, are not
controlling because (a) the validity of
the Nevada judgment under Nevada
Jaw, and (b) whether a valid judg-
ment of the State of Nevada is entitled
to full faith and credit in the courts of
Oklahoma, were questions not drawn in
issue in either of said cases.

It is obvious this court of necessity
had to construe the legal effect of the
divorce decree. The trial court had
held that the contract of August 4, 1939,
was incorporated into the decree and
was thereby legally extinguished. We
reversed, holding the decree did not
extinguish plaintiff's right under the
contract.

Defendant does not contend, as in-
deed he may not, that the second Allen
v. Allen case, 201 Okla. 442, 209 P. 2d
172, did not involve the validity of the
Nevada decree, as amended by the
Nevada court’s order nunc pro tunc of
April 29, 1946, for he prayed in that
case as a defense that the nunc pro
tune order legally extinguished plain-
tiff’s contract; and in that case it was
stipulated that the laws of Nevada were
the same as the laws of Oklahoma as
to the authority of the trial court to
approve or disapprove contracts en-
tered into between the parties offered
in a divorce proceeding.

Defendant also prayed that the de-
cree, as amended, is a Nevada judg-
ment which must be given full faith
and credit by the Oklahoma court.
Plaintiff in response contended that, in
the absence of proof to the contrary,
the Nevada law is presumed to be the
same as Oklahoma law and that, in
the absence of notice to her, the order
mune pro tunc was void. In that case,
we again held that the contract was
not merged in the decree.

The defendant argues that the nunc
pro tune order of April 29, 1946, does
not modify or change the decree of

387

August 10, 1939, but rather, that it re~
cords the actual judgment entered by
the court in the divorce proceedings.
The defendant did not so contend on
his former appeal in the second Allen
v. Allen case, for by reference to the
court’s opinion in that case it is stated:

“In the instant case it is not only con-
ceded but urged by the defendant that
the judgment as corrected did change
the rights of plaintiff under the judg-
ment as originally entered, in that un-
der the amended journal entry the
amount payable to plaintiff might be
changed on account of the financial con-
dition of defendant. which it could not
be under the contract, and that under
the contract payments imposed upon de-
fendant might be impressed upon his
estate, whereas, if the contract was
merged in the decree, the payments
would end upon the death of either hus-
band or wife.”

It is our opinion that the modifica-
tion of the judgment undoubtedly would
affect a very substantial right of the
plaintiff.

We held in McRoberts v. McRoberts,
177 Okla. 156, 57 P. 2d 1175, Finley v.
Finley, 174 Okla. 457, 50 P. 2d 643, and
Murphy v. McElroy, 185 Okla. 388, 92
P. 2d 369, that a judgment for alimony
for an indefinite sum is void. Further-
more, a change in the husband’s cir-
cumstances creating hardship or in-
ability to perform is not a valid de-
fense to wife’s suit for installments due
under a contract which was entered
into by the parties in contemplation
of an immediate separation and di-
vorce, Stark v. Stark, 185 Okla. 348, 91
P. 2d 1064.

As we have noted in the second Allen
v. Allen case, the defendant asserted
that the validity of the judgment must
be judged by the laws of the State of
Nevada, where the judgment was ren-
dered, and not by the laws of the forum.
The parties in that case assumed that
the laws of the two states were the
same on the pivotal question as to
whether the order nunc pro tune with-
out notice to defendant was valid. On
appeal, this court held that the order

388

could not be sustained for the reason
that under Oklahoma law notice to the
opposite party was necessary to give
the court jurisdiction.

Upon a fuller examination of the Ne-
vada authorities, we are led to the in-
evitable conclusion that the laws of
the two states on the question of the
necessity of giving notice on the appli-
cation of the order nune pro tune run
parallel.

Rule 45 of the Second Judicial District
of Nevada becomes important in the
consideration of this case. It is as fol-
lows:

“No judgment, order, or other judi-
cial act or proceeding, shall be va-
cated, amended, modified or corrected
by the court or judge rendering, mak-
ing, or ordering the same unless the
party desiring such vacation, amend-
ment, modification or correction shall
give notice to the adverse party of a
motion therefor, within six months af-
ter such judgment was rendered, or-
dered, or action or proceedings taken.
As amended, October 25, 1911.”

The Supreme Court of Nevada has
frequently construed the application of
court Rule 45. In the case of Finley
v. Finley (1948) 189 P. 2d 334, the Ne-
vada court held:

“The power to order entry of judg-
ment nunc pro tune cannot be used to
correct judicial errors or omissions,
nor to change judgment actually ren-
dered to one which the court neither
rendered nor intended to render.”

“A court may amend its order to cor-
rect mere clerical errors or omis-
sions at any time and has inherent
power to do so by a nunc pro tunc or-
der, but such order cannot be used to
enlarge the judgment as originally ren-
dered.”

“A judgment varying the rights of
the parties as fixed by original decision
is void, though the court has informed
counsel of his decision to do so, and no
objection is made. ***

“Where court entered divorce decree
approving a property settlement there-
tofore made by the parties which had

been admitted in evidence, but did not
adopt provisions of the agreement as
part of the decree, court had no power
subsequently to enter a nunc pro tune
decree adopting as part of the decree
the provisions of the agreement, though
parties consented, since amended de-
cree, by adopting the provisions of the
agreement, gave wife, in addition to
her contractual rights then existing,
right to invoke contempt proceedings
and rights of a judgment creditor.”

In Lindsay v. Lindsay (1929) 52 Nev.
26, 280 P. 95, the Nevada court held:

“Where order of court altered decree
for divorce in substantial way by re-
ducing amount which defendant hus-
band was required to pay wife for sup-
port and maintenance of minor chil-
dren, changes were unauthorized under
Rule 45 of District Court, requiring no-
tice to adverse party within six months,
where motion for construction of decree
and order were not made within six
months after judgment was rendered.”

In Lauer v. Eighth Judicial District
Court (1943) 62 Nev. 78, 140 P. 2d 953,
that court in its syllabus stated:

“The district court rule fixing a pe-
riod of six months within which a judg-
ment, order, or other judicial act might
be modified or vacated was adopted
to take place of former rule requiring
motions to vacate judgments to be no-
ticed during terms at which they were
rendered. District Court Rules, rule 45.”

“By virtue of district court rule, judg-
ments, which formerly could not be set
aside by a district court after expira-
tion of terms at which they were ren-
dered, cannot now be set aside by mo-
tion noticed more than six months af-
ter they are rendered. District Court
Rules, rule 45. * * *

“An application cannot be made in
district court to vacate a judgment upon
ground that it was procured by extrin-
sic fraud by motion in the original
cause noticed more than six months
from rendition of the decree. District
Court Rules, rule 45.”

The cases pressed upon us by the
defendant do not serve him.

In Silva v. Second Judicial District
Court (1937) 57 Nev. 468, 66 P. 2d 422,

the record discloses that the parties,
husband and wife, entered into a con-
tract with reference to the custody
of their minor children. A decree of
divorce was thereafter granted the
wife. As shown by the court reporter’s
transcript of the trial, the court stated
(referring to their agreement): “I will
approve it, but I will retain jurisdiction.
* * * The court reserves the right to
make whatever orders may be deemed
necessary concerning the custody of
the minor children hereafter.” On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of that state
held:

“It thus clearly appears that the de-
cree rendered included a reservation
of jurisdiction as to the custody and
support of the minor children and that
it was omitted from the decree which
was entered. Petitioner contends that
this omission is a clerical error, and
as it appears from the record, the trial
court may at any time, and it is its duty
to amend the decree accordingly. We
are of this opinion. It was held by this
court at an early period, Sparrow &
French v. Strong, 2 Nev. 362, that the
court will at all times correct a mere
clerical error, which can be. corrected
from the record itself.”

And the court stated: “There can
be no question as to the omission of
the reservation in this case being cler-
ical and not the result of judicial er-
ror.” It is important in reading the
Silva case to keep in mind that the cus-
tody of minor children was a para-
mount issue involved, for the court
stated: “The fact that the record dis-
closes that the parties by agreement
had effected a settlement as to the
custody and support of the minor child-
ren, which was approved and con-
firmed by the court, will not relieve
it from the performance of such a duty”.
And the opinion affirmatively discloses,
“No modification is sought”.

In Gottwals v. Rencher, 60 Nev. 35,
98 P. 2d 481, the Supreme Court of Ne-
vada construed Rule 45, supra. In that
case the court stated:

“It is contended that the court al-
tered its decision in a substantial way.

389

We think, however, that the court
merely corrected the record so as to
make it speak the truth as to what was
actually decided. The court had the in-
herent power to do this and it was its
duty to do it. * * * (citing cases)”

That case discloses that no formal de-
eree had been entered, and no question
of notice was involved in that proceed-
ing, as all parties were present by
counsel. In that case the court stated:

“Action of trial court in amending
minute entry of oral decision of trial
court, to show what court actually de-
cided, was proper as a correction of
record so as to make it speak the truth,
as against contention that the court al-
tered its decision in a substantial way.”

In Smart v. Valencia (1926) 49 Nev.
411, 248 P. 46, the sole question before
the Nevada court was whether the
plaintiff's complaint could be amended
after judgment and pending appeal.
The court, answering that question,
stated:

“Trial court can order amendment of
complaint to correct clerical misprision
after judgment so as to make judgment
speak truth, in view of Rev. Laws, §
5484.”

“Trial court can correct clerical mis-
takes appearing on face of record after
appeal, since it has not lost jurisdic-
tion of its records.”

“In action to recover overpayment on
certain sheep, error in complaint in
calculating amount paid held clerical
rather than judicial, and therefore
amendable.”

In Schneider v. Second Judicial Dis-
trict Court (1947) 64 Nev. 26, 176 P. 2d
797, that court held:

“The statute giving district court con-
tinuing jurisdiction to modify or change
a divorce decree with reference to cus-
tody of minor children does not author-
ize the modification of decree with
respect to support of minor children or
alimony for wife. Comp Laws, §9462.”

In the argument at the bar it was
suggested that the court’s minutes con-
clusively show the character of the
judgment that was actually rendered.

390

In other words, that the oral pronounce-
ment of the trial judge as indicated by
the clerk’s minutes is of controlling
force in determining the true judgment
rendered.

We held in Wilkerson et al. v. Was-
son, 110 Okla. 66, 235 P. 206, that re-
marks made by the court are not prop-
erly a part of the record in the case and
are certainly no part of the judgment.

The same rule is answered by the
Utah court in Frost et al. v. District
Court of First Judicial District (1938)
96 Utah 106, 83 P. 2d 737, wherein the
court said:

“The judgment and findings signed
by the judge of the court constitute the
only findings and judgment that may
be considered. What a judge says in
orally indicating what his decision will
be, may be of aid to counsel in prep-
aration of the findings and judgment;
but the findings and judgment actually
signed may not be disturbed by a show-
ing as to what may have been in the
judge’s mind before. The signed find-
ings and judgment in so far as dis-
closed by the record indicate what was
in the judge’s mind when he signed
them. Between the time of making an
oral statement as to matters pertaining
to the cause, the findings, or judgment,
the court may have changed its mind.
Oe RN

And as was aptly said by the Su-
preme Court of Washington in Gould
v. Austin (1909) 52 Wash. 457, 100 P.
1029:

« ¢# * * We think it a safe rule to
hold that, when the court signs a writ-
ten order, it shall be considered the
evidence of its real and final act touch-
ing the subject immediately under con-
sideration’ ”.

In the present case we hold that the
law of Nevada as construed by its Su-
preme Court holds that the Nevada
District Court did not have the author-
ity and power to merge and incorpo-
rate the contract in the divorce decree
and thereby extinguish the same.

The judgment of the trial court is,
therefore, vacated and set aside, with

directions to enter judgment in favor
of plaintiff for the unpaid monthly
sums, as covered by the stipulation
referred to herein, and that the trial
court upon remand determine and ren-
der judgment for plaintiff for expenses
and attorney fees, as provided for in
the stipulation.

Judgment reversed.

CORN, DAVISON, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur HALLEY,
CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH
and ARNOLD, JJ., dissent.

STATE ex rel. BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.
NO. 19, WAGONER COUNTY,
et al. v. STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION et al.

No. 35317. March 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.
256 P. 2d 446.

Mastin Geschwind, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiffs in error.

Mac. Q. Williamson, Atty Gen. and
J. H. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for de-
fendants in error.

WELCH, J. Plaintiffs sought per-
emptory writ of mandamus to compel
the defendants to make a reapportion-
ment and a further disbursement of
State Aid funds to the respective school
districts for ‘the certain fiscal year in-
volved.

There is no dispute as to the facts.
The pleadings and evidence direct at-
tention to certain legislative enact-
ments which are mentioned below.

Citations of Oklahoma statutes will
be made from O. S. Supp. 1949, since
all of the statutory provisions involved
in this case do not appear in O. S. 1951.

Section 7 of the Flood Control Act
of Congress, approved August 18, 1941,
33 U.S.C.A. Cum. Supp. §701c-3, as
amended, provides:

“75 per centum of all moneys re-
ceived and deposited in the Treasury
of the United States during any fiscal
year on account of the leasing of lands
acquired by the United States for flood-
control purposes shall be paid at the
end of such year by the Secretary of
the Treasury to the State in which such
property is situated, to be expended as
the State Legislature may prescribe for
the benefit of public schools and pub-
lic roads of the county, or counties, in
which such property is situated. * * *”

62 O. S. Supp. 1949 §204 provides.

“The State Treasurer of Oklahoma is
hereby authorized and required to dis-
tribute moneys now in his hands, or
hereafter received by him under_the
provisions of Section 7 of the Flood Con-
trol Act of Congress, approved August
18, 1941, in the following manner:

391

“Such moneys shall be distributed by
the State Treasurer at the end of each
fiscal year to counties wherein is lo-
cated a Federal flood control project,
and one-half (%) of such moneys shall
be distributed by the State Treasurer
to the County Treasurer of such county
to be by the County Treasurer appor-
tioned to the public schools of the
county, upon an enumeration basis;

In 70 O. S. Supp. 1949 art. 18 §18.1 et
seq., there is set forth a method and
manner of apportionment and disburse-
ment of funds from appropriations
made by the Legislature for the pur-
pose of extending “State Aid” to the
operation of the public schools. It is
provided that the State Board of Educa-
tion shall apportion and disburse said
funds to the several school districts as
each school district may be qualified
under the provisions of the Article.

70 O. S. Supp. 1949 §18.4 provides that
the amount of money for which a school
district may qualify, under said art. 18,
shall be determined by subtracting the
amount of its “Minimum Program In-
come” from the costs of its “Minimum
Program.” In subdivisions 1 and 2 of
§18.4, the terms “Minimum Program”
and “Minimum Program Income” are
defined. In definition of “Minimum
Program Income” the statute mentions
specific items of income of a school
district, and provides:

“4, And all other revenue which can
legally be estimated by the County Ex-
cise Board, as now provided by law or
which shall hereafter be provided by
law, except surplus cash and taxes in
process of collection, tuition fees from
pupils or their parents or guardians,
State assistance and reimbursements
for special programs, Federal grants
of aid and reimbursements.”

On hearing it was shown that the
plaintiffs school districts are so situ-
ated as to qualify for and have hereto-
fore received funds in source from the
Federal Government under provisions
of the Act of Congress, and §204, supra.
For convenience such revenues of a
school district will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as “Flood Control Rentals.”

392

It was shown that the said school dis-
tricts each, for the fiscal year here in-
volved, were apportioned “State Aid”
in an amount, respectively, as was de-
termined by the subtraction of its
“Minimum Program Income” from the
cost of its “Minimum Program” with
its respective estimated revenues from
“Flood Control Rentals” included in
the computation as an item of its min-
imum program income. The said plain-
tiff districts, each within the fiscal
year, made written demand on the de-
fendant State Board of Education, and
the defendant Director of Finance of
said Board, for an additional or further
apportionment of State Aid, on the bas-
is of a determination under the afore-
said computation with its estimated
revenue from “Flood Control Rental”
not included as a part of its “Minimum
Program Income.” The demands were
refused and on the day before the close
of the fiscal year the plaintiffs filed the
instant action to compel such reappor-
tionment and disbursement.

On the day set for hearing the de-
fendants filed response and answer to
the plaintiffs’ pleadings and to the al-
ternative writ of mandamus which had
been issued on the plaintiffs’ motion
and affidavit. The defendants in their
said pleading, in substance, stated that
the defendant Board and its Finance
Director had computed State Aid due
each plaintiff for the fiscal year, with
the amounts such district received dur-
ing the preceding fiscal year from
“Flood Control Rentals” considered as
an item of “Minimum Program In-
come;” that such was in accord with
applicable statutory provisions, and the
construction placed upon the involved
statutes by the said officials in years
past, and that said plaintiff school dis-
tricts have in years past acquiesced in
said administrative construction and
are guilty of laches in waiting until the
time when this action was filed to as-
sert a contrary construction; that judg-
ment for the plaintiff would result in
serious public consequences.

The principal issue in trial, and in
this appeal, is determined by whether

or not an item of estimated revenue
from “Flood Control Rentals” may
properly be considered as an item of
“Minimum Program Income” in the
calculation of a school district’s ap-
portionment of State Aid.

The statute, 70 O. S. Supp. 1949 §18.4,
supra, which defines “Minimum Pro-
gram Income” of a school district spe-
cifically excepts “Federal grants of aid
and reimbursements.”

When a statute is unambiguous and
couched in plain language, the words
will be interpreted in their ordinary
sense and as they are usually under-
stood. First Nat. Bank v. Mills, 134
Okla. 186, 272 P. 840.

The phrase “Federal grants of aid
and reimbursements” as used in the
statute in a reference to the income of
a school district clearly means all fed-
eral grants of money provided by law
as income to a school district and
whether the purpose of such grants is
to extend aid or help or to serve as a
reimbursement in the sense of a refund-
ing or restoration. Accordingly, reve-
nues from “Flood Control Rentals” re-
ceived or to be received by a school
district pursuant to the Act of Congress
and §204, supra, which provides for a
transfer of federal funds to the benefit
of public schools, and ultimately to a
school district, are under the statute,
§18.4, excepted from the definition of
“Minimum Program Income” and un-
der said §18.4 such revenues are not
to be considered in the calculation of
State Aid.

Within the purview of the statutes,
supra, and the undisputed evidence,
the plaintiffs school districts are en-
titled each, to an apportionment of ad-
ditional State Aid. There is no ques-
tion that in the enforcement of such
right mandamus is an appropriate rem-
edy.

Laches, in legal significance, is not
merely delay, but delay that works a
disadvantage to another. O’Neal v.
Vose, 193 Okla. 451, 145 P. 2d 411. Here-
in, the facts that the plaintiffs in prior

years made no claims for additional
apportionments of State Aid on a basis
of the then improper apportionments,
and that plaintiffs commenced this ac-
tion late in the fiscal year, afford no
basis for refusal of the remedy of man-
damus on the ground of laches. We
do not find sufficient basis for the de-
fendants’ contention that judgment for
the plaintiffs will result in serious pub-
lic consequences.

The judgment in favor of defendants,
and for discharge of the alternative
writ of mandamus herein, is reversed,
with directions that judgment be en-
tered for the plaintiffs in accord with
the views herein expressed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, AR-
NOLD, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

Le
BREDOUW v. WILSON.
No. 35466. April 7, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.
256 P. 2d 421.

393

Charles Dunn, Tulsa, for plaintiff in
error.

Milton W. Hardy, Tulsa, for defend-
ant in error.

PER CURIAM. The parties will be
referred to herein by their trial court
designations.

The plaintiff, A. R. Wilson, sued the
defendant, Chester R. Bredouw, for
damages sustained because of the re-
fusal of the defendant to permit plain-
tiff to continue in the operation of a
restaurant in Tulsa, Oklahoma, known
as Petroleum Inn. The suit was filed
on February 11, 1949, and judgment en-
tered November 2, 1951, on the verdict
of the jury in the amount of $2,482.50.

394

On January 1, 1947, plaintiff and de-
fendant executed articles of copart-
nership which provided, among other
things, that the term should be for a
period of five years from date, and that
the partnership might be terminated by
thirty days’ written notice by either
party. A copy of the agreement is at-
tached to plaintiff's petition.

Defendant answered by an unverified
general denial and by affirmative de-
fense alleging that the plaintiff and de-
fendant mutually agreed by oral agree-
ment to a termination of the partner-
ship on or about the 3rd day of Feb-
ruary, 1949.

Briefly, plaintiff’s testimony con-
cerning the disputed.issue of termina-
tion of the partnership is that in Janu-
ary, 1949, he was ill; that he, accom-
panied by the defendant, went to a doc-
tor’s office and that defendant, told the
doctor that plaintiff “is kind of in a
bad shape and that he had better get
away for two or three weeks and take
a rest,” that he and defendant went
home and discussed the matter and de~
cided that plaintiff should go to Florida
for three or four weeks, and that de-
fendant made arrangements for procur-
ing the railroad tickets for plaintiff;
that plaintiff did not at any time quit
the partnership and that defendant
did not serve notice in writing termin-
ating the partnership. Plaintiff further
testified that he remained in Florida
about six weeks, and that when he left
for Florida he packed his personal ef-
fects in his trunk and stored them;
that on his return from Florida he at-
tempted to call defendant to see if he
could talk to him; that defendant was
not there, but a Mr. Murphy answered;
that he came back from Florida expect-
ing to go ahead with the operation of
the business.

The defendant, called as a witness for
plaintiff, identified himself in a pic-
ture reproduced in an advertising mag-
azine, the “Downtowner.” The “Down-
towner” is incorporated in the case-
made, and accompanying the picture
of defendant, with a lady and another

man, the following advertising matter
is shown:

“Pix 1—Well, well, look who’s doin’
the big chores and greetin’ out at the
Petroleum Inn. Ole Fran Shuler Mur-
phy, the smilin’ agent on the right.
He’s takin’ over with owner Chet Bred-
ouw in the place of genial Al Wilson
who's in Florida on an extended vaca-
tion for his health, (thanks for the card
last week, Al) center is Mrs. M. (Min-
nie) whom you'll also be seein’ around
and maybe addin’ a little fem touch
to the salads and the place in general.
Chet is in person on the left and smil-
in’? most whole heartedly on linin’ up the
ms. ‘course Chet will be around most
of the time as usual except the times
he slips away on one of his famous
trips. Congrats Shuler and Minnie. We'll
be seein’ you around as we know will
your many friends.”

Testifying further as plaintiff's wit-
ness, defendant stated that Murphy be-
came associated with him in the busi-
ness in February or March, 1949.

Defendant, testifying in his own be-
half, stated that in the latter part of
January or the first part of February,
1949, plaintiff's condition was such that
he could not do the work at the res-
taurant, had blots in his eyes and could
not make change; that he went with
plaintiff to the doctor’s office and dis-
cussed the condition of both plaintiff
and defendant, and that later plaintiff
stated he was feeling bad, that he
thought he had a stroke and was going
to have to leave; that he and plaintiff
had some argument over a $100 check
that plaintiff had cashed and over the
wrecking of defendant’s car by plain-
tiff, and that plaintiff stated to him
that he did not want any trouble, “All
I want to do is to get away.” That af-
ter this conversation plaintiff imme-
diately called a cab and took all of his
belongings and that defendant did not
see him again until this suit was filed.

Defendant testified on cross-examina-
tion that he did not serve a notice in
writing to terminate the copartnership,
but that he and plaintiff definitely
agreed orally to end the partnership.
He stated that there was a settlement

made of 1948 business, but that no set-
tlement was made at the. time the
partnership ended, as there was noth-
ing to settle.

Clarence Eady, a cook employed at
Petroleum Inn, testified that plaintiff
told him just before leaving that he
could not make change and could not
remember, and told Eady that he,
plaintiff, was crazy. That plaintiff told
him “Good-bye,” said he was leaving,
that he could not take care of the busi-
ness and had to get away from it.
but did not say whether he was com-
ing back.

Plaintiff denied having made the
statements testified to by Eady, and
denied that he ever stated to Eady or
anyone else that he was through with
the partnership.

Defendant bases his appeal upon two
propositions:

(1) That the court erred in overruling
defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff's evi-
dence.

(2) That the verdict was totally un-
supported by the weight of the evidence
and was contrary to the law and the
evidence.

Defendant urges, in support of his
first proposition, the basic rule of law
that a copartnership may be dis-
solved by expressed agreement, or by
the acts of the partners themselves.
This is undoubtedly the correct rule of
Jaw. But in this case it is admitted
that a partnership ‘was created, and
plaintiff testified positively that there
‘was no mutual agreement to terminate
it; that he went to Florida because of
the condition of his health and intended
to return and resume operation of the
business, and that on his return from
Florida, he discovered (and defendant
admitted) that a Mr. Murphy had taken
over operation of the restaurant. This
was certainly competent evidence to
be submitted to the jury on the issue of
termination of the partnership and to
determine that the plaintiff had been
excluded from the partnership.

395

The rule that where there is any
competent evidence which would rea-
sonably support a verdict in favor of a
party against whom a demurrer to the
evidence is leveled, the demurrer
should be overruled, has been so often
reiterated by this court, that it has
become axiomatic. There was no error
in the overruling of the demurrer to
plaintiffs evidence.

In his second proposition, the de-
fendant contends that the verdict is
totally unsupported by the weight of
the evidence and was contrary to the
law and the evidence.

Basically, the essential fact in con-
troversy here was whether the part-
nership contract was terminated by a
mutual oral agreement entered into
between the parties on or about the
8rd day of February, 1949, The execu-
tion of the articles of partnership and
the existence of the partnership were
admitted by the pleadings, the answer
and cross-petition being unverified. De-
fendant admits that he associated
Murphy with him in the business some-
time in February or the first of March,
1949. There is no dispute concerning
the amount of the damages 4s reflected
by the verdict.

It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
a contract in writing may be rescinded
or modified by a subsequent oral agree-
ment fully performed, but the evidence
must be positive, clear and convincing
(Black v. Silver, 135 Okla. 198, 274 P.
886). Having pleaded, as an affirm-
ative defense, the termination of the
written agreement, the burden of prov-
ing such termination was properly upon
the defendant, although the trial court
in its instructions did not impose this
burden upon defendant.

The testimony concerning the oral
agreement to terminate the partner-
ship on or about February 3, 1949, is in
direct conflict. The circumstances at-
tending plaintiff's departure and his
sojourn in Florida are such as might
well create different inferences as to
whether the departure to Florida was
intended and understood by the parties

396

as being the end of the partnership or
was intended as a vacation trip only,
prompted by the condition of plaintiff's
health. Some of the circumstances sup-
port plaintiff's theory of the case and
others support defendant’s theory.

Under the law of this state the trial
court could not have justifiably directed
a verdict for the defendant in this case.
It was the duty and function of the
jury, and not of the court, to weigh the
conflicting evidence, and determine
wherein the greater weight lay.

In Kelley v. McKay, 120 Okla. 215,
251 P. 82, this court announced the well
established rule:

“Where the evidence is conflicting,
the Supreme Court will not review the
evidence for the purpose of determining
the weight thereof; but where there is
any competent testimony reasonably
tending to support the verdict of the
jury, and the case is submitted under
proper instructions from the court, the
verdict will not be disturbed on appeal.”

Alleged misconduct of the jury is dis-
cussed in the briefs of the parties. This
was not assigned as error, and is there-
fore not an-issue before this court.

Judgment affirmed.

The application for judgment on the
supersedeas bond is granted and judg-
ment is hereby rendered accordingly
against Chester R. Bredouw, the prin-
cipal, and Mrs, R. B. (Maude M.) But-
ler and Jack Bredouw, the sureties.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys J. T. Bailey, Lockwood
Jones, and Lloyd Clearman, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
Court.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, ARNOLD, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

OKLAHOMA TURNPIKE AUTHORITY
+ v. DYE et ux.

No. 35407. April 7, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.
256 P. 2d 438.

Leon Shipp and C. E. Barnes, Okla-
homa City, for plaintiff in error.

P. D. Erwin, Chandler, for defend-
ants in error.

O'NEAL, J. In this case it appears
that on June 22, 1951, plaintiff, Okla-
homa Turnpike Authority, brought an
action in condemnation in the district
court of Lincoln county, against Wil-
liam B. Dye and Lillian B. Dye to ac-
quire a fee-simple title to surface rights
to a tract of land consisting of 0.27
acres out of a two-acre tract owned
by defendants located in the southeast
corner of the N.W.% of the S.W.%
of sec. 27, township 4 north, range 5
east, for use in connection with the con-
struction of its turnpike, and also a
temporary grant of approximately .12
acres of land located in the N.% of
the N.E.% of the N.W.% of sec. 34,
for the purpose of use as a detour road.

The commissioners in condemnation
were duly appointed, and on the 25th
day of July, 1951, returned their report
into court fixing defendants’ damages
in the sum of $10,000. Plaintiff made no
demand for jury trial and filed no ob-
jection to the report of the commis-
sioners, but on the 17th day of August,
1951, and within the 30 days period in
which either party might have demand-
ed a jury trial, attempted to dismiss
the proceeding by filing a dismissal in
the office of the court clerk of Lincoln
county, and by paying costs.

On November 5, 1951, and after the
expiration of the time granted by 66
O.S. 1951 §55, in which either party
might have filed exceptions to the re-
port of the commissioners, defendants
filed a motion to set aside the pre-
tended order of dismissal and request-
ed an order directing plaintiff to pay
the amount of damages awarded by
the commissioners into the office of the
clerk of the court. The motion is based
on the ground that the instrument filed
by the plaintiff in the office of the
court clerk did not constitute a dis-
missal or discontinuance of the proceed-
ings; that the award of the commis-
sioners was then final; that plaintiff
had not abandoned its turnpike proj-
ect or road but is now constructing
such turnpike upon the location indi-
cated in the original plat attached to
the petition; that the award made by

397

the commissioners covered not only
defendants’ tract of land described
in the petition but covered also conse-
quential and other damages sustained
by defendants to their land; that by
reason of said facts they were entitled
to an order vacating the pretended dis-
missal and to an order directing and
ordering plaintiff to pay the amount
of the award for compensation and
damages into court. On the hearing of
that motion plaintiffs engineer and oth-
er witnesses testified that shortly af-
ter the commissioners filed their re-
port fixing the amount of damages to
be awarded against plaintiff, it changed
its plans for the construction of the
turnpike and completely abandoned
its right of way across defendants’ land
and upon completion of the turnpike
no portion of defendants’ land will be
used or appropriated in the construc-
tion thereof, but that the turnpike will
cross section 27 immediately south of
defendants’ land and across land not
owned by defendants; that the detour
road originally located in sec. 34 has
been moved up on section 27 and on
land not owned by defendants and upon
which plaintiff had acquired the right
of way by purchase. The evidence of-
fered by these witnesses is undisputed.

Defendant William B. Dye testified
that he is the owner of two acres of
land in the southeast corner of section
27 above described and is also the
owner of 80 acres of land in section 34
above mentioned. The south line of
section 27 is the north line of section
34. This 80-acre tract of defendants con-
sists of Dry Creek bottom. Dry Creek
flows in a southeasterly direction across
the S.W.% of the S.W.%4 of sec. 27
and across the northeast corner of the
West 40 acres of defendants’ 80-acre
farm; that plaintiffs turnpike is being
constructed about 250 yards north of
his 80-acre farm; that he has a pecan
orchard on that farm and at the time
of the hearing the turnpike was being
constructed. The embankment was
about 12 feet high and 250 feet wide. It
did not have sufficient outlets to per-
mit accumulated water to flow through

398 a

Dry Creek, but the embankment would
back the water up over defendants’
land and destroy their pecan crop and
that the commissioners took such
damage into consideration in fixing its
award. He further testified that plain-
tiff had taken possession of his two-
acre tract. It entered upon the tract,
digging ditches for the purpose of re~
moving a pipeline preparatory to using
the tract in connection with the con-
struction of its turnpike. The witness,
however, further testified that the ditch
was being dug by employees of the
Texas Oil Company; that the Texas Oil
Company had oil and gas leases on his
as well as other adjoining premises;
that someone appeared upon the tract
and stopped the digging of the ditch
and requested the employees to refill
it which was accordingly done. The wit-
ness further testified that plaintiff used
water from a water hole in Dry Creek
located on his 80-acre tract for the pur-
pose of mixing concrete to be used in
connection with the construction of the
turnpike.

Plaintiff offered witnesses who testi-
fied employees of the Texas Company
dug the ditch upon defendants’ two-
acre tract without direction from it or
without its knowledge; that after ac-
quiring knowledge that it was engaged
in this work it stopped the work and re-
quested the employees to fill the ditch
which they accordingly did. It had in-
structed the Texas Company to lower
and re-locate its line under the turn-
pike property; that it was not neces-
sary for them to enter upon defend-
ants’ property to accomplish this pur-
pose. It directed the company to make
the connection at a point which did not
touch any of the land of defendants and
to remain on property belonging to it
which it had acquired by purchase.
Contact was then made at a point east
of defendants’ land and connection and
hookup was made south of their line.

The trial court sustained defendants’
motion and directed plaintiff to pay
into court the amount of damages fixed
by the award of the commissioners.

Plaintiff appeals and asserts that the
judgment rendered is not sustained by
the evidence and is contrary to law.

Plaintiff contends that the dismissal
filed by it with the court clerk operated
as a discontinuance and abandonment
of the proceedings so far as defend-
ants’ property is concerned and the
trial court was therefore without juris-
diction to further proceed in the matter.
The dismissal was filed under the pro-
visions of 12 O.S. 1951 §684.

Defendants contend that said section
applies only to a civil action; that a
condemnation proceeding is not such
an action but is a special proceeding
and that said section is not applicable
to such proceeding. The case of Epper-
son v. Johnson, District Judge, 190
Okla. 1, 119 P. 2d 818, would appear to
lend support to this contention.

The mere fact, however, that the dis-
missal filed by counsel may not have
constituted a legal dismissal of the pro-
ceeding would not preclude plaintiff
from pleading abandonment and insist-
ing upon its right to discontinue the pro-
ceeding in defense of the motion filed
by defendants. Defendants by their
motion placed in issue the question of
abandonment and their right to receive
compensation awarded them by the
commissioners. The issue of plaintiff's
right to discontinue and abandon the
proceeding was thus placed before the
court to the same extent as though
plaintiff had then filed its motion to
discontinue and abandon the proceed-
ing.

Plaintiff had the right to discontinue
and abandon the proceeding at any
time prior to the time it took posses-
sion of the land sought to be con-
demned or paid the award. In 30 C.J.S.
Eminent Domain, §335 b. the author
states:

“In the absence of statutes other-
wise prescribing, the general rule is
that a condemnor may voluntarily dis-
continue or abandon the proceedings
until there has been a taking, or until
there has been a vesting of title or other
rights, such as the right to compensa-
tion, |

In 121 ALR. 16, the author states
that a condemnation proceeding may
be discontinued at any time before the
rights of the parties have become re-
ciprocally vested. Sec. 24, art. 2, of the
State Constituiton, so far as here ma-
terial provides:

“«* * * Until the compensation shall
be paid to the owner, or into court for
the owner, the property shall not be
disturbed, or the proprietary rights of
the owner divested. When possession is
taken of property condemned for any
public use, the owner shall be entitled
to the immediate receipt of the com-
pensation awarded, without prejudice
to the right of either party to prose-
cute further proceedings for the judi-
cial determination of the sufficiency or

insufficiency of such compensation.
Par)

66 O.S. 1951 §54 provides:

“When possession is taken of prop-
erty condemned, as provided herein,
the owner shall be entitled to the im-
mediate receipt of the compensation
awarded, without prejudice to the right
of either party to prosecute further pro-
ceedings for the judicial determination
of the sufficiency or insufficiency of
said compensation.”

It is clear under said action of the
Constitution and statute that the owner
of the land may not be divested of his
title until compensation awarded by the
commissioners has been paid and that
the landowner is not entitled to receive
compensation until condemnor takes
possession of the property sought to be
condemned. This being true the right
of the landowner to the compensation
award does not become vested and
fixed in him prior to the time posses-
sion of the property is taken by the
condemnor; therefore, condemnor may
abandon the proceeding at any time
prior to that time. In Board of Com’rs
of Pontotoc County v. Rayburn, Adm’r,
192 Okla. 624, 138 P. 2d 820, this court
held:

“Where a county, exercising powers
of eminent domain, instituted condem-
nation proceedings and commissioners
appointed to appraise lands made re-
ports showing landowner’s damages to

399

accrue, but landowner’s possessory
rights are not disturbed, condemnor is
entitled to abandon the proceedings and
decline to pay the assessed value of
the land sought to be condemned.”

Defendants refer to 66 O.S. 1951 §53,
in support of their position. This section
provides that commissioners shall be
appointed to appraise and assess the
landowner’s damage, and file their re-
port with the court clerk.

The Act further provides that:

« * * and a certified copy thereof
may be transmitted to the register of
deeds of the county where the land
lies, to be by him filed and recorded
(without further acknowledgment or
proof) in the same manner and with like
force and effect as is provided for the
record of deeds. And if said corpora-
tion shall, at any time before it en-
ters upon said real property for the
purpose of constructing said road, pay
to said clerk for the use of said owner
the sum so assessed and reported to
him as aforesaid, it shall thereby be
authorized to construct and maintain
its road over and across said prem~-
ises.”

Defendants argue that under this sec-
tion of the statute title to the property
sought to be condemned passes to the
condemnor immediately upon the trans-
mission by the court clerk of a certi-
fied copy of the commissioners’ report
to the county clerk. It will be noted
that the statutes provide that the court
clerk may transmit a certified copy of
the commissioners’ report to the regis-
ter of deeds (county clerk). There is
no evidence tending to show that such
report was in fact transmitted: to the
county clerk. Assuming, however, that
it was transmitted and filed and re-
corded by him, such transmission, fil-
ing and recording would not in itself
operate to convey title to the condem-
nor. Title under the specific provision
of such section would not vest in the
condemnor until compensation awarded
by the commissioners was paid to the
landowner. It is conceded that plaintiff
has not paid the compensation awarded.
This section does not sustain defend-
ants’ contention.

400

Defendants further contend that there
was no good faith abandonment of the
proceeding; that there has been no
change in the location of the turnpike
at the point adjoining their 80-acre
tract, and that upon completion of the
turnpike they will suffer the same dam-
ages as found and awarded them by the
commissioners. This contention is not
sustained by the evidence. The undis-
puted evidence shows that when plain-
tiff abandoned its right of way over
defendants’ land, it also abandoned its
original plan in the construction of its
roadbed close to defendants’ land. It
changed its plans of construction. It
provided for more and larger outlets
for the purpose of draining away accu-
mulating water which plaintiff's engi-
neer testified will be sufficient for that
purpose and the water will continue in
its natural course through Dry Creek
bed as it did prior to the construction
of its roadbed, and will prevent it from
backing up on defendants’ 80-acre tract.
If, however, after the completion of the
turnpike it should develop that defend-
ants will suffer the expected and antic-
ipated damages to their 80-acre tract
as the result of the construction of the
turnpike, they may then maintain an
action against plaintiff to recover dam-
ages sustained by reason of its con-
struction. Chicago, RI. & P. R. Co. v.
Jennings, 175 Okla. 524, 53 P. 2d 691;
City of Blackwell v. Murduck, 206 Okla.
466, 244 P. 2d 817.

Defendants further contend that
plaintiff could only abandon its right
of way over their land by resolution to
that effect adopted by its governing
board and that abandonment could only
be proved by it by the production of
such resolution and that it has pro-
duced no such resolution. Authorities
are cited tending to sustain such con-
tention. These authorities, however, are
based on statutes specifically so pro-
viding. Defendants concede that we
have no such statute. They, however,
assert that we should apply such rule
independent of statute. This we may not
do. The general rule is, in the absence
of a statute otherwise providing aban-

donment of a condemnation proceed-
ing may be proved by oral evidence to
the same extent as any other fact may
be proved. 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain,
§336.

The evidence is undisputed that no
portion of defendants’ land will be used
or appropriated by plaintiff in the con-
struction of its turnpike. Defendants,
however, contend that prior to the hear-
ing on their motion plaintiff had taken
possession of their property for use in
connection with the construction there-
of, The evidence does not sustain such
contention. The evidence as to this is-
sue is as above set forth. It is clear
that the unauthorized entry of the em-
ployees of the Texas Company upon
defendants’ land and the digging of the
ditch thereon, which was later stopped
by plaintiff’s agent in charge and re-
filled by the employees, did not con-
stitute the taking of possession of de-
fendants’ premises by plaintiff. Nor
do we think the taking of the water
from the waterhole in bottom of Dry
Creek on defendants’ 80-acre tract con-
stituted such possession as would pre-
clude the right of abandonment. It was
at the most a mere technical or tem-
porary trespass and was not such pos-
session as would give defendants a vest~
ed right to compensation. Board of
Com’rs of Pontotoc County v. Rayburn,
Adm’r, supra.

Defendants also argue that the appeal
should be dismissed for the reason
that plaintiff could not appeal without
depositing the amount of compensation
awarded by commissioners into court.
This question has heretofore been pre-
sented to this court on motion to dis-
miss the appeal. The motion was denied
and we see no reason for changing that
order.

Under the undisputed evidence and
authorities cited, the trial court should
have found that plaintiff abandoned its
right of way over defendant’s property
and should have denied defendants’ mo-
tion to require plaintiff to deposit the
compensation awarded by the com-
missioners into court.

Reversed, with directions to enter
judgment in accordance with the views
herein expressed.

HALLEY, C. J, JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

|
WILLIAMS v. TERBUSH et al.
No. 85176. March 8, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.
256 P. 2d 484.

Bryan Billings, Woodward, for plain-
tiff in error.

Sparks, Boatman & Wybrant, Wood-
ward, for defendants in error.

BLACKBIRD, J. This is an action
originally brought by Lee H. Williams
against Tom Terbush and Harold Wells
to recover damages alleged to have
been sustained as a result of a car
collision between a Chevrolet passen-
ger car owned by William Laird and
driven by him and a Studebaker dump
truck owned by Tom Terbush and driv-
en by Wells.

Mr. Williams was riding as a guest
in the Chevrolet car at the time the

401

collision occurred. It is stipulated that
Lee Williams died on July 24, 1950, and
that Ethel Williams was appointed ad-
ministratrix of his estate and the ac-
tion was thereafter revived in her name
as administratrix. It is further stipu-
lated that Lee Williams’ death was not
caused by injuries received as a result

. of the collision but that he died of nat-

ural causes.

It is agreed that the collision occurred
at about 5:30 in the morning of the 17th
of April, 1950. The evidence shows that
on that morning Lee Williams, Donald
Williams, Fay Shoat, and William Laird
left Woodward, Oklahoma, for Bucklin,
Kansas, where all three were em-
ployed by a construction company. It
was still dark at the time they left and
misty and foggy. Visibility was from
zero to about twenty feet. They were
traveling west and when they reached
a pceint of about three and one-half
miles east of the town of Supply they
overtook a bread truck traveling in the
same direction. They followed the
truck for about three-fourths of a mile
At that point the highway was grad-
ually sloping upward. Mr. Laird, driver
of the Chevrolet car, testified that when
he reached a point at the top of this
slope he turned to the left in order to
pass the bread truck; as he did so he
saw three yellow or red lights. He as-
sumed they were lights on some car
traveling in the same direction he was
traveling. He paid no attention to the
lights but proceeded in his attempt to
pass the bread truck. When his car
reached a point alongside the cab of the
bread truck he observed a truck ap-
proaching him from the west traveling
east. He immediately applied his
brakes in an attempt to stop but his
car skidded into the truck. He further
testified that at the time the truck was
located off the pavement on the south
side of the highway and the left wheels
resting on the shoulder. He was travel-
ing about fifty miles per hour in at-
tempting to pass the bread truck and
when he applied the brakes. Donald
Williams testified that as Mr. Laird
turned to the left to pass the bread

402

truck he saw two lights which appeared
to him to be lights on each side of the
cab of some motor vehicle. Fay Shoat
testified that when Mr. Laird started to
turn to the left to pass the bread truck
he observed two dim lights that ap-
peared to be on ahead (evidently mean-
ing on the front of some approaching

vehicle). He then shouted, “Look out, .

Bill.” Laird immediately applied his
brakes and his car skidded into the
truck. These witnesses all testifed that
the headlights on the approaching truck
were not burning.

Defendant Wells
about 4:45 on the morning the collision
occurred he and Gene Minor left La-
verne, Oklahoma, in a Studebaker dump
truck; they intended to go to Woodward,
Oklahoma, for the purpose of haul-
ing gravel. He agreed in his testimony
that the weather conditions were as
testified to by plaintiff. He testified
that the headlights on his truck were
burning all the way and the truck was
also lighted with clearance lights, one
on each side of the cab; that they were
traveling east; the truck was owned
by defendant Terbush and he was em-

. ployed by Terbush to drive the truck
for him. When he reached a point close
to where the collision occurred he dim-
med his lights and as he did so he saw
the Chevrolet car attempting to pass
the bread truck. He immediately swung
his truck to the right off the pavement
and stopped the truck on the shoulder.
Immediately after the collision occurred
he turned off the lights. The clearance
lights at the sides of the cab and the
headlights on the front were on the same
switch and neither could be turned off
or on without at the the same time turn-
ing off or on all of the lights. Gene
Minor testified in substance to the same
state of facts as did Mr. Wells.

A patrolman who arrived at the scene
shortly after the collision occurred tes-
tified that the pavement was still wet
and he saw skid marks leading from
the point where the brakes of the Chev-
rolet car were applied along and across
the left side of the highway where it
skidded into the truck. He inspected

testified that at.

the lights on defendant’s truck and they
were all working in proper order both
on light and dim beam; that the clear-
ance lights and headlights were on the
same switch.

The only act of negligence attempted
to be established by plaintiff was the
negligence of the driver of the truck
in driving without displaying burning
headlights as provided by statute, 47
O.S. 1951 §148, subsections b and g.

The trial was to a jury resulting in a
verdict in favor of defendants. Judg-
ment was rendered accordingly.

Plaintiff appeals and relies for re-
versal on error of the court in instruc-
tions given and in refusing to give cer-
tain requested instructions.

Plaintiff requested the court to give,
among others, the following instruction:

“You are further instructed that the
negligence, if any, of the driver of the
automobile in which Lee H. Williams
was riding, is not imputable to the said
Lee H. Williams, and in this connection
you are instructed if you believe from
a preponderance of the evidence that
William Franklin Laird, driver of the
Chevrolet car in which Lee H. Williams
was riding, was guilty of negligence at
the time of the collision in question, and
you further believe from a prepond-
erance’ of the evidence that the said
defendant, Harold Wells, was also
guilty of negligence as heretofore de-
fined to you, and such negligence on
the part of William Franklin Laird, if
any, and such negligence on the part of
Harold Wells, if any, concurred to di-
rectly and proximately cause Lee H.
Williams’ injuries, and damages, if any,
then your verdict should be for the
plaintiff.”

There is evidence from which the
jury might have found that both the
driver of the Chevrolet car and the
driver of the Studebaker truck were
guilty of negligence, that the separate
negligence of either was not the sole
proximate cause of the injuries and
resulting damages sustained by Lee H.
Williams, but that the concurrent or
combined negligence of both was the

direct and proximate cause thereof.
Conceding arguendo that an instruction
as to such concurring negligence would
have been proper ‘in this case, yet the
question remains, was it reversible er-
ror under the circumstances here pre-
sented? One of the instructions re-
quested by the plaintiff and given by
the court was No. 15, which reads as
follows:

“You are further instructed that al-
though the negligence, if any, of the
driver of the Chevrolet car in which
Lee H, Williams was riding, towit, Wil-
liam Franklin Laird, was not imputable
to the plaintiff's decedent, Lee H. Wil-
liams, yet if you find from the evidence
that the injuries of Lee H. Williams
were caused wholly and solely by the
negligence of the said William Franklin
Laird, the driver of the car in which
Lee H. Williams was riding, and that
the driver of the Studebaker truck,
Harold Wells, was without fault, it
would be your duty to return a verdict
in favor of the defendants.”

The plain and unmistakable inference
from the above instruction was that, in
order to hold for the defendants, the
jury must find that the defendant Har-
old Wells was without fault whatso-
ever— that is, without fault singly or in
concert or concurrence with the fault
or negligence of any other. Under this
instruction, if the jury found Well’s
negligence combined with that of Lee
Williams, the driver of the decedent’s
ear, to cause the accident, then its ver-
dict could not have been for the de-
fendants. Accordingly, we think that in-
struction No. 15 was less liberal, if any-
thing, than the other one of the plain-
tiff’s requested instructions above
quoted. Therefore, the court’s error,
if any, in refusing this instruction was
harmless, rather than prejudicial, under
the circumstances.

Plaintiff rather incidentally complains
that in none of the court’s instructions
did it tell the jury under what circum-
stances a verdict might be returned
for the plaintiff. In support of this argu-
ment, counsel points to the fact that
five (out of the 19) instructions given by
the court, end with wording to the ef-

403

fect that under the conditions stated in
the instructions “your verdict should
be for the defendants.” This argument
ignores the fact that sometimes it is
easier to state a premise by explaining
under what conditions it does not hold
true, than by attempting to explain more
volubly the conditions under which it
will hold true, or, in other words, to
demonstrate it by using the process of
elimination. As applied to instructions,
this principle may be stated thusly:
In some cases the jury may more easily,
briefly, and effectively be told upon
what findings it may return a verdict for
plaintiff, by describing the findings or
conditions upon which they must hold
against him or for his adversary, than by
attempting to set forth all of the various
findings or combinations of them, under
which they may hold for him. Of course,
most cases lend themselves to the use of
a combination of both methods and that
is the system usually employed, with the
result that some of the instructions end

- in expressions to the effect that “Your

verdict shall be for the plaintiff,” and
others with the words: “Your verdict
shall be for the defendants.” However,
to say, as an abstract proposition, that
the use of either method, to the ex-
clusion of the other, is unfair, in our
opinion, is an attempt to draw a dis-
tinction without establishing an essen~
tial difference. Some of the instruc-
tions ending, as now complained of by
plaintiff's counsel, were given by the
court verbatim as he requested them.
If counsel deemed this wording objec-
tionable perhaps he should have changed
it before submitting such instructions
to the court. However, be that as it may,
we have examined all of the instructions
and fail to see; when they are considered
all together and as a whole, wherein
they in any way negate, preclude, or dis-
courage the jury in returning a verdict
for the plaintiff upon its finding of facts
justifying such a verdict. When so con-
sidered and in view of the ample justifi-
cation found in the evidence for the
verdict returned in this case, we find
no. substantial ground for concluding
that plaintiff was prejudiced by the
wording complained of.

404

As we have found no cause for rever-
sal in any of the errors complained of,
the judgment of the trial court is here-
by affirmed.

WELCH. CORN, DAVISON, and
O'NEAL, JJ., concur. HALLEY, C.J.,
JOHNSON, V.C.J. and WILLIAMS, J.,

dissent.

De
LUNCEFORD et al. v. LUNCEFORD.
No. 35495. March 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied April 14, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.

255 P. 2d 909.

Harlan S. Trower, Jack J. Ferguson,
and Jack I. Gaither, Tulsa, for plain-
tiffs in error.

Luther P, Lane and Kriete & Kriete,
Tulsa, for defendant in error.

CORN, J. This is an appeal from a
judgment of the district court of Tulsa
county, affirming a decree of distribu-
tion of the county court.

After a full and complete hearing, the
district court made findings of fact
which are set forth in the journal entry
of judgment, to wit:

“The defendants then introduced
their evidence and rested and the Court

after hearing all of the testimony of
witnesses, and examining all of the
documentary evidence introduced and
hearing the argument of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises
finds that Sabra C. Lunceford was mar-
ried to Emmett L. Lunceford on the
29th day of January, 1947; that no is-
sue was born of said marriage and that
Emmett L. Lunceford departed this
life on the 28th day of January, 1948,
and left surviving him his widow Sabra
C. Lunceford, a sister Lula Wilkerson,
a sister Fay A. Lunceford Whitcomb,
a brother James Lunceford, and a
nephew Lester Lunceford, son and only
survivor of a deceased brother; that
the said Emmett L. Lunceford left no
children; that at the time he married
Sabra C, Lunceford plaintiff he had
been in ill health for some time and
that he had no assets or property of
any consequence; that his equipment
was old and run down and had encum-
brances thereon in excess of the value
of such equipment; that the real estate
consisting of the homestead was like-
wise encumbered with liens that were
in default and subject to foreclosure
and the equity therein was of doubtful
value if any existed. That after the
marriage of plaintiff to Emmett L.
Lunceford she not only maintained the
home but assisted in the operation of
the business and practically managed
it. That shortly thereafter some of the
old equipment was exchanged for more
modern equipment and some new
equipment was purchased and the in-
debtedness materially reduced; that
the liens on the homestead were placed
in good standing by payment of delin-
quent installments; that through the
efforts of his widow, Sabra C. Lunce-
ford, his business had been revived and
improved; that some assets had been
acquired at the time of his death; that
his widow used the proceeds of his
life insurance which was payable to
her in payment of claims against his
estate; the court therefore finds gen-
erally for the plaintiff Sabra C. Lunce-
ford, and against the defendants; that
the property owned by Emmett L.
Lunceford, deceased, at the time of his
death was acquired by joint industry
of Sabra C. Lunceford and Emmett L.
Lunceford, husband and wife, during
coverture and that the surviving widow
Sabra C. Lunceford is entitled to all of

the property of Emmett L. Lunceford,
deceased, and all increment if any to
said property.”

The assets and liabilities of Emmett
L. Lunceford at the time he married
in 1947, as testified to, are as follows:

“Assets.

One 1937 Ford Truck,
value approx. ... . $300.0!
Less indebtedness . . 300.00 No value

One 1936 Ford Truck
appraised at... . $1000.00
at time of death, but
actually worth

One 1941 Dodge %-ton
pick-up appraised at $500.00
but actually sold for

One 1941 Ford %4-ton
pick-up, value

Office equipment, dol-
lies, ete... 2... 6.

Real estate, worth ap-
prox. at the time of
marriage

$200.00

$150.00
++ + $100.00

$3000.00
$3500.00

Total Assets

“Liabilities.

Amount owed Ameri-
can Exchange Bank

Amount owed Opal
Meeker

Amount due Home
Owner’s Loan Corpo-
ration, Approx... ..

Total Amount Owed $3263.00
Total Net Worth $ 237.00

The inventory of the property filed
by Sabra C. Lunceford, in county court
in February, 1948, gave the appraised
value of the property to be $6,874 with-
out any deductions for indebtedness
against the property. The property in
Tulsa, which was set aside to her as
her homestead, was appraised at $4,-
200, and the property in Spavinaw at
$250, which was sold later for $100. We
have already shown, which is borne
out by the record, that the appraised
value of the property, which was made
in February, 1948, was far in excess of
the actual value.

$563.00
$1000.00

+ + + $1700.00

The plaintiffs in error contend:

“« # * * By way of explanation, it
should be stated that a sister of the

405

decedent, Lula Wilkerson, assigned her
interest in the estate to Sabra Lunce-
ford for a consideration of $1000.00.
Therefore, plaintiffs in error are en-
titled to only an undivided three-eights
interest in the estate. These facts do
not appear in the District Court record,
but they were brought out in the County
Court hearing.”

In answer to this the defendant says:

“Plaintiffs in error in their conclu-
sion infer that Lula Wilkerson, a sister
of deceased, assigned any interest she
might have in the estate to Sabra C.
Lunceford and received in payment
therefor the sum of $1000.00. There is
not one scintilla of evidence in the rec-
ord to justify this statement and inas-
much as it is injected in the brief, we
feel the Court should permit us the
liberty of replying thereto. No such
evidence was before the County Court.
We have the transcript of the evidence
touching upon this,matier and we quote
verbatim the questions propounded by
Mr, Trower, one of the attorneys for
plaintiffs in error, to Mrs. Wilkerson
and her answers:

“Q. Mrs. Wilkerson, you made an
assignment of an interest in this estate
to Mrs. Lunceford, did you? A. Maybe
I don’t know what you mean. Q. Did
you make an assignment of your in-
terest in this estate to Mrs. Sabra
Lunceford? A. I had no interest in it.
Q. Did you make an assignment? * * *
Q. Did you sign a quitclaim deed, also
to the real estate involved in this estate?
A. I signed it. I had no interest in it.
Yes sir, I did if that is what you mean.
Q. You signed a quitclaim deed to the
real estate, didn’t you, to Mrs. Lunce-
ford? A. Would it be a quitclaim deed,
maybe so. Q. And you received a con-
sideration for that, didn’t you? A.I did
not. Q. Didn’t you take a promissory
note for a thousand dollars, or any
other amount? A. I did not. Q. You
say you took some cash? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that one time, or more than one
time? A. One time. Q. And that was
in connection with the assignment and
quitclaim deed to this estate? A. Had
nothing to do with that at all.”

The plaintiffs, in their brief, also
state, “all the evidence shows that
none of the property owned by Emmett

406

L. Lunceford at the date of his death
was acquired during his marriage to
Sabra C. Lunceford.” We find that
statement to be substantially correct.

The district court, in effect, held that
she could under the second subdivision.
of 84 O.S. 1951 §213, which provides:

oe HOF Provided, that in all cases
where the property is acquired by the
joint industry of husband and wife dur-
ing coverture, and there is no issue,
the whole estate shall go to the sur-
vivor, at whose death, if any of the
said property remain, one-half of such
property shall go to the heirs of the
husband and one-half to the heirs of
the wife, according to the right of rep-
resentation.”

The trial court found that while the
property was acquired before mar-
riage, it had an indebtedness against it
at the time of their marriage equal to
or more than the value of the property,
that the said wife maintained the home,
assisted in the operation of the busi-
ness and through her management of
the business reduced the indebtedness,
got the lien on the homestead in good
standing by paying the back install-
ments, and that in doing this she had
used some of the money that belonged
to her individually. In Detrick v. Det-
rick, 182 Okla. 429, 78 P. 2d 303, we held
in the 8rd syllabus:

“Where a single man makes settle-
ment and homestead entry of land un-
der federal laws providing for the dis-
position of public land, and thereafter
marries and his wife lives with him on
the land and assists in the usual way
with all the work, etc., necessary to the
maintenence of residence requisite to
make final proof and complete the
title, such property may properly be
held to be acquired by the joint indus-
try of the husband and wife, so as to
subject it to the proviso in subdivision
2 of section 1617, O.S. 1931. The proviso
in subdivision 2 of section 1617, O.S.
1931, does not constitute a rule of prop-
erty in this state, but is purely a rule
of descent and distribution.”

In Re Lewis Estate, 200 Okla. 352,
194 P, 2d 174, we held:

“This court will not, on an appeal
from the district court in a trial, de
novo from the county court in a probate
matter, disturb the findings and judg-
ment of’ the trial court on review un-
less such findings and judgment are
clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence.”

See, also, Thompson v. Thompson,
177 Okla. 437, 60 P. 2d 615; Barnes,
Adm’r, v. Logston, 184 Okla. 464, 88
P. 2d 361; In re Smith’s Estate, 197
Okla. 405, 172 P. 2d 328, and cases cited
therein.

From all the facts and circumstances
in this case, we cannot say that the
judgment of the trial court is clearly
against the weight of the evidence.

Affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON. V.C.J.,
and WELCH, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

De
POE et al. v. POE.
No. 35116. May 27, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 5, 1952.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.

256 P. 2d 158.

Hulsey & Hulsey,
plaintiffs in error.

Bell & Tucker, McAlester, for defen-
dant in error.

GIBSON J. Plaintiff in the trial court
(defendant in error here) is the son
of defendant M. M. Poe and the brother
of defendant Colbert Poe. In his peti-
tion plaintiff alleged that he was the
equitable owner and in possession of
certain described real estate in Pitts-
burg county, subject to specified en-
cumbrances; that the record fee-simple
title to the land was vested in defend-
ants by virtue of deed dated April 24,
1950, but in truth and in fact the
said defendants merely held the rec-
ord title in trust for plaintiff. It is fur-
ther alleged that on said date plaintiff
was to purchase the land from the for-
mer owners and his mother agreed to
loan plaintiff the money to make the
initial payment for the land and that
defendants were to take the deed to

McAlester, for

407

the property as security for the loan to
plaintiff to be paid on or about Novem-
ber 15, 1950, at which time plaintiff was
to assume the purchase price mort-
gage on the property in the sum of
$1,300, and defendants were to convey
to the plaintiff; that relying upon rep-
resentations of defendants, who were
in confidential relationship with plain-
tiff, the plaintiff took possession of the
property and made valuable, perman-
ent improvements thereon. Plaintiff
further pleads a timely tender of the
sum due and offered to assume the
existing mortgage, to which arrange-
ment mortgagee had consented, but
that defendants wrongfully fail and re-
fuse to carry out said trust agreement.
Plaintiff prayed judgment declaring
him to be the owner and directing that
defendants convey to plaintiff by war-
ranty deed, subject to the encumbran-
ces, and in event of failure of defend-
ants to comply with said judgment
that a sheriff's deed be ordered.

Defendants’ answer contains general
and specific denials, also allegations
that they were the owners, as joint
tenants, of the fee title, under a war-
ranty deed, a copy of which was at-
tached to the answer.

C. D, Hall, a resident of Arizona, was
former owner of the involved farm
lands. Through his authorized agent at
McAlester the land was leased to plain-
tiff for the year 1950, at a cash rental
of $200, which plaintiff paid. It was or-
ally agreed that if plaintiff should elect
to purchase the land prior to July 1,
1950, the purchase price was to be
$2,500, but plaintiff would be given cre-
dit for his rental payment. Later, Hall
withdrew the property from his agent’s
listing and notified plaintiff that he him-
self would handle the transaction,
Plaintiff advised that he desired to pur-
chase and Hall wrote to plaintiff stat-
ing his price and terms. The offer was
accepted by plaintiff in a reply letter,
and on April 24, 1950, Hall and his wife
went to McAlester. There they met
plaintiff and his mother, M. M. Poe, in
the office of Hall’s attorney.

408

The evidence is in conflict as to the
representations and understandings of
the parties on that occasion, but as a
result of the conference Hall and wife
executed a warranty deed to defen-
dants as joint tenants. Defendant M. M.
Poe paid Hall the sum of $1,000, and la-
ter defendants executed a note and
mortgage on the property for $1,300,
the balance of the agreed purchase
price.

The trial court rendered judgment
for plaintiff, finding him to be the equi-
table owner and in possession of the
property, subject to specified encum-
brances, and further found that defend-
ants held the legal title in trust for
plaintiff, conditioned on plaintiffs pay-
ment to defendants of $1,000, with in-
terest and taxes theretofore advanced
by defendants, Defendants were order-
ed to execute and deliver to plaintiff
their warranty deed to the premises
subject to encumbrances set forth in the
judgment.

Defendants contend that the evidence
upon which plaintiff relies for crea-
tion of a trust is not clear, strong and
unequivocal citing the rule stated in
Hayden v. Dannenberg, 42 Okla. 776,
148 P. 859, as follows:

“A constructive trust may be estab-
lished by parol evidence, but the law
for the safety of titles requires that
the proof should be of the most satis-
factory and trustworthy kind. The onus
of establishing a constructive trust
rests upon him who seeks its enforce-
ment, and before a court of equity will
be warranted in making a decree there-
for, the evidence must be clear, unequi-
vocal and decisive.”

In the main, conflict in the evidence
arises as to the representations and
agreements of the parties in the con-
ference had on April 24, 1950, when the
instruments involving the title were
drawn and executed. Defendant
Colbert Poe was not present at the
conference. Plaintiff's testimony was

flatly disputed by defendant M. M. Poe.
But plaintiff was corroborated by the
attorney who drew the deed, and his

two office employees, and in part at
Jeast by the grantor, Hall. The trial
court observed all of the witnesses on
the witness stand and was in position
to judge their credibility. A mere con-
flict in the testimony of witnesses will
not render the evidence unclear or in-
decisive. We have reviewed the record
and we cannot say that the evidence,
considered in its entirety, was violative
of the rule requiring that evidence to
establish a trust must be clear, unequi-
vocal and decisive.

There is evidence that M. M. Poe
stated that she was buying the property
for plaintiff. She denied making the
statement.

“Although a simple avowal of acqui-
sition for the use of another, whether
made contemporaneously with or sub-
sequent to the fact, will not of itself
support an allegation of trust, yet it
is equally well settled that if one can
be induced to confide in the promise of
another that he will hold in trust, or
that he will so purchase for one or both,
and is thus led to do what otherwise he
would have forborne or to forbear what”
he contemplated to do in the acquisition
of an estate whereby the promisor be-
comes the holder of the legal title, an
attempted denial of the confidence is
such a fraud as will operate to convert
the purchaser into a trustee ex male-
ficio.” Raper v. Thorn, 202 Okla. 235,
211 P. 2d 1007.

Under the testimony it is clear that
owner Hall went to McAlester to sell
the property to plaintiff, who had ac-
cepted his offer of sale. Hall testified
that at no time had he received any
correspondence from defendants re~-
garding the purchase of the farm. The
testimony reveals that plaintiff could
have financed the purchase by a sacri-
ficial sale of his livestock, which were
not then ready for market.

Plaintiff and his mother conferred
with Hall in the attorney’s office. All
witnesses, except the mother, under-
stood that she was to advance the sum
of $1,000 as a loan to plaintiff, the same
to draw interest to be repaid in the
fall of 1950. All understood that the

rental payment theretofore made by
plaintiff was to be applied on the pur-
chase price. At the suggestion of M.
M. Poe the deed was made to herself
and son Colbert as joint tenants to
avoid any possible difficulty with plain-
tiff's wife in event of his death, but
the witnesses understood that defend-
ants were to convey to plaintiff when
the loan was paid, and that the deed
was taken as security.

Relying upon their agreement plain-
tiff made permanent improvements up-
on the property, which he would not
have made as a tenant. He made a
timely tender of payment of the loan
and that tender was refused. Plaintiff
testified that defendants Colbert Poe
told him that defendants had received
an offer of about double the purchase
price paid. Colbert denied that state-
ment. Regardless of the true reason,
the attitude of defendants had under-
gone a change from that shown when
the deal was closed, and defendants
now intended to keep the property as
their own. Relying upon his mother’s
promises plaintiff had changed his posi-
tion to his detriment. He had forborne
his opportunity to acquire his title di-
rectly from the seller with whom he
had negotiated for purchase of the
farm. A court of equity will come to his
aid. Powell v. Adler, 69 Okla. 291, 172
P. 55; McCaleb v. McKinley, 80 Okla.
38, 194 P. 105.

A finding and decree by the trial
court of existence of a trust, al-
though based on oral evidence, will not
be disturbed, on appeal, where the evi-
dence with reference thereto is clear,
convincing and decisive. Johnson v.
Johnson, 201 Okla. 268, 205 P. 2d 314.
We hold the evidence in this case to be
of that type and character.

Affirmed.

HALLEY, V. C. J., and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, JOHNSON, O’NEAL
and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.

409
BILLINGS v. BILLINGS.
No, 84617. Jan. 8, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied April 28, 1953.

256 P. 2d 165.

Hardy & Hardy, Summers Hardy, and
Milton W. Hardy, Tulsa, and Wayne
Bayless, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff
in error.

Pierce, Rucker, Mock, Tabor & Dun-
can, Truman B. Rucker, and Irvine
E. Ungerman, Tulsa, for defendant in
error.

PER CURIAM. This appeal is from
the district court of Tulsa county and
the parties appear and will be referred
to herein as in the trial court. The ac-
tion was one for divorce and for such
other order concerning custody of chil-

410

dren, alimony, support and main-
tenance as might be proper. For her
answer defendant denied that plaintiff
was entitled to a divorce, and alleged
that plaintiff had become infatuated
with a young girl and thereafter com-
menced a course of abuse and mis-
treatment toward defendant. In her
cross-péetition she prayed for separate
maintenance for herself and four minor
children. At the conclusion of the trial
the court announced that plaintiff was
not entitled to a divorce, but that the
case would be taken under advisement
in the hope of reconciliation; that if it
developed that reconciliation were im-
possible, it would be set for further
disposition. Subsequently, upon appro-
priate pleadings the court granted a
decree of divorce to defendant, to-
gether with custody of the children,
child support, alimony and a division
of property. Plaintiff appealed from the
judgment, but has now dismissed the
appeal insofar as it grants the divorce,
and presents the appeal solely upon the
proposition that the award for alimony
and child support is excessive. Defend~
ant has filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal for the reason that it is with-
out merit and maintained merely for
the purpose of delay. We are of the
opinion that the motion should be de-
nied and the appeal determined on its
merits.

Plaintiff argues, first, that the final
order for alimony and child support
is excessive, and was made without due
regard to the value of the real and
personal estate at the time of the di-
vorce; and, second, that the court ap-
parently refused to consider the faults
of the wife in awarding alimony. As
to the latter contention, we think it is
sufficient to say that the court found
defendant to be without fault, and fur-
ther found that the sole cause of the
breaking up of this family was plain-
tiffs infatuation for a young girl who
had been employed as a baby sitter in
this home. The evidence amply supports
this finding.

In order to determine the contention
that the award for alimony and child

support is excessive, it will be neces-
sary to review the evidence. It ap-
pears that the parties had been mar-
ried 21 years; that at the time of their
marriage plaintiff was 20 and defend-
ant 18 years of age; that plaintiff was
unemployed and that they started life
together without property. At the time
of the divorce decree they had four
minor children ranging in age from five
to sixteen years. One of the children
had been injured by a truck and had,
since that time, required special and
unusual attention and care. The par-
ties had acquired a home estimated
by plaintiff to be worth from $12,000
to $16,000 with an indebtedness of $3,-
800 against it, household and kitchen
furniture of the estimated value of $2,-
000 to $4,000 with an indebtedness of
$275 against it, a 1946 Chevrolet car,
an airplane of the estimated value of
$500, an air conditioner of the esti-
mated value of $300, cash in the amount
of $1,500, and bonds of the value of
$450. Plaintiff was gainfully employed
and testified that in 1945 his gross
earnings were $8,000 or $9,000, in 1946,
$10,000, in 1947, $10,000 or $10,500, and
in 1948, $17,000. His net earnings in
1948, he testified, were $11,000 to $12,-
000. No testimony was offered as to
the 1949 earnings; however, there is
shown in the record an exhibit disclos-
ing that for the first 714 months of
that year plaintiff's gross earnings
were $5,386.69, or an average monthly
income of $718.22 before payment of
taxes or $538.67 after payment of taxes.
By the terms of the judgment defend-
ant was awarded the home and furni-
ture, subject to the indebtedness there-
on, the automobile, and alimony of
$260 per month for ten years. She was
also awarded the care and custody of
the four minor children and $60 per
month per child for their support dur-
ing their respective minorities. Plain-
tiff was awarded the airplane and the
air conditioner. No mention was made
in the judgment of the $1,500 cash and
the $450 worth of bonds in possession of
the plaintiff. It is apparent, therefore,
that substantially all of the tangible
property was awarded defendant.

When a divorce is granted the wife
by reason of the fault of the husband,
the allowance of permanent alimony
rests in the sound judicial discretion of
the trial court, and is to be exercised
with reference to establishd principles
and on a view of all the circumstances,
such as the husband’s estate and ability
at the time the divorce is granted, the
wife’s condition and means, and the
conduct of the parties. McCarty v. Mc-
Carty, 193 Okla. 18, 141 P. 2d 103. Plain-
tiff recognizes that 12 O. S. 1941 §1278
authorizes the court to award alimony
out of the husband’s real and personal
property as the court shall think reason-
able, and that the statute has been con-
strued to authorize the award of perma-
nent alimony upon consideration of the
future prospects as to the earning capa-
city of the husband. This seems to be a
fair statement of the law. Mathews v.
Mathews, 186 Okla. 245, 96 P. 2d 1054;
Hughes v. Hughes, 177 Okla. 614, 61
P. 2d 556. In the practical administra-
tion of the law, it appears that ali-
mony awarded has exceeded the net
value of the husband’s estate. Moseley
v. Moseley, 171 Okla. 150, 42 P. 2d 237;
Hughes v. Hughes, supra.

In making a property settlement, and
awarding alimony, it was proper for
the court to consider that when these
parties were married they had no prop-
erty, and that everything they pos-
sessed at the time of the divorce, in-
cluding plaintiff’s earning capacity, had
been acquired during their 21 years of
marriage; that the parties had four
minor children, one of whom because
of an injury required special and un-
usual attention and consideration; that
defendant was then 40 years of age
and because of her marriage at an early
age and the rearing of four children,
she had developed no earning capacity;
that plaintiff's earning capacity was
steadily increasing as is evidenced
by an increase from $8,000 in 1945 to
$17,000 in 1948; the conduct of plaintiff
in relationship with the young girl
whom the evidence discloses he pro-
posed to marry, as well as his respon-
ibility to his wife of 21 years and his

4ll

four children. From the alimony award
defendant must pay an indebtedness of
$3,800 against the home, at the rate of
$55 per month, and an indebtedness of
$275 against the furniture. She would
also be required to pay the taxes on the
property. Viewed in the light of all
these circumstances and conditions, we
are not able to say that the award for
alimony is excessive, or that it is against
the clear weight of the evidence and,
unless it is against the clear weight
of the evidence, it must be affirmed.
Smyth v. Smyth, 198 Okla. 478, 179 P.

2d 920; Biggs v. Biggs, 199 Okla. 326,
185 P. 2d 447,

It is earnestly contended that the
award for alimony and child support
leaves plaintiff nothing for his own
maintenance and support, and it is also
said that plaintiff had an indebtedness
of $1,600 as well as a payment of $1,-
500 on income tax that must be paid
from his earnings. The testimony rela-
tive to the indebtedness of $1,600, and
$1,500 due as income tax, is very mea-
ger and, in fact, consists only of the
statement of plaintiff that he owed
these amounts. In view of the fact that
substantial withholdings were made
from plaintiff's earnings for the pur-
pose of paying income tax, it is diffi-
cult to understand why he would owe
an additional $1,500, unless he had earn-
ings which were not subject to with-
holding tax. It is noted that plaintiff
has estimated a tax payment of $1,-
346.62 on earnings of $5,386, although
he has six exemptions. We do not be-
lieve such an estimate is warranted. It
is also noted, from inspection of the
exhibit detailing his 1949 income for
the first 7% months, he has credited
himself with $350 per month while mak-
ing payments to his family. The record
discloses that on August 17, 1949, plain-
tiff, through his attorneys, suggested to
the trial court that the alimony award
be fixed at $150 per month for ten years,
and the award for child support be $60
per month per child. Evidently he then
believed his earnings were sufficient
to justify such an award, but there does
appear to be some merit in the conten-

412

tion that the total award for alimony
and child support is in excess of plain-
tiffs ability to pay. However, we do
not believe it is more than reasonably
necessary to maintain his family. If we
were satisfied from the evidence that
plaintiff’s earnings were consistently
$17,000 or $18,000 per year, as contended.
by defendant, we would not hesitate to
affirm the judgment as entered, but the
record does not justify such conclusion.
The 1948 income was $17,000 but in no
other year is it shown to exceed $10,500,
and we are not warranted in concluding
that plaintiff's earnings are greatly in
excess of $10,000 per year. We believe
that, in the interest of justice, the award
for alimony should be affirmed, but that
the award for child support should be
reduced to $40 per month per child; that
after payment of these amounts plain-
tiff will still have sufficient from his
income to appropriately maintain him-
self, even after payment of taxes. The
matter of child support is in the con-
tinuing jurisdiction of the trial court
and may be changed as circumstances
warrant. Upon satisfactory proof that
plaintiffs earnings are substantially in
excess of what the record here dis-
closes, the trial court would, no doubt,
be justified in increasing the award
for that purpose.

The judgment is affirmed as to the
award for alimony, and is modified as
to the award for child support to pro-
vide for payment of $40 per month per
child and, as so modified, is affirmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Marvin Shilling, Ezra
Dyer and Earl Q. Gray, who as Special
Masters aided in the preparation of this
opinion. These attorneys were recom-
mended by the Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion, approved by the Judicial Council,
and appointed by the Court.

HALLEY, V.C.J., and CORN, GIB-
SON, DAVISON, JOHNSON, O’NEAL,
and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.

CUTRIGHT et al. v. RICHEY et al.

No, 35287. May 6, 1952.

257 P. 2d 285.

Ralph D. Smith, Cordell, for plaintiffs
in error.

Jones & Wesner, Cordell, for defend-
ants in error and cross-appellants.

WELCH, J. This action was com-
menced by W. S. Richey and Eunice
Richey, husband and wife, to quiet title
to a mineral interest in 30 acres of
land in Washita county. The court after
a trial without a jury entered its order
and judgment finding various interests
in the property and from this judg-
ment Ruhl K. Cutright and Martha
Cutright appealed and filed their peti-
tion in error with case-made attached
on October 9, 1951.

W. S. Richey and Eunice Richey
filed a cross-petition in error in this
court November 3, 1951. A motion to

dismiss has been filed for the reason
that the cross-petition in error was
not filed within three months from the
date the order overruling the motion
for new trial was filed, to wit, August
2, 1951. The motion must be sustained.

Where cross-petition in error is not
filed in this court until after the expira-
tion of the time fixed for appeal, this
court has no jurisdiction over the sub-
ject-matter and the appeal will be dis-
missed. Bilby v. Bilby, 127 Okla. 9,
251 P. 611; Haygood v. Pinkey, 112
Okla. 30, 239 P. 456, and Wolfe v.
Graham, 181 Okla. 379, 74 P. 2d 119.
In Wolfe v. Graham, supra, it is stated:

“ ‘Where a cross-petition in error is
not filed in this court until after the
expiration of six months from the date
of the final judgment or order com-
plained of, this court has no jurisdic-
tion over the subject-matter and the
cross-appeal will be dismissed” Bilby
v. Bilby, 127 Okla. 9, 251 P. 611.”

12 O. S. 1951 §972 provides that the
appeal must be taken within three
months from the date of the ‘rendition
of the judgment or final order com-
plained of unless within said three
months time is extended in which to
perfect the appeal.

It is admitted that the petition in
error on cross-appeal was not filed un-
til the 3rd day of November, 1951, but
in the response to the motion to dismiss
it is stated that the cross-petitioners
placed in the post office at Cordell,
Oklahoma, on November 1, 1951, said
cross-petition in error addressed prop-
erly and that in the due course of mail
the cross-petition should have reached
the office of the Clerk of the Supreme
Court within time.

In Home Savings & Loan Ass’n v.
Rounds-Porter Lumber Co., 80 Okla.
201, 195 P. 479, it is stated:

“Inclosing a petition in error in an
envelope addressed to the clerk of this
court, with postage prepaid, and de-
positing the same in the United States
mail within time to reach the office of
the clerk of this court, is not a compli-
ance with the statute.”

413

Appeal dismissed.

HALLEY, V. C. J., and CORN, GIB-
SON, DAVISON, JOHNSON, O’NEAL,
and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.

CUTRIGHT et ux. v. RICHEY et ux.
No. 35287. April 21, 1953.
257 P. 2d 286.

Ralph D. Smith, Cordell, for plain-
tiffs in error.

414

Jones & Wesner, Cordell, and Wise
& Ivester, Sayre, for defendants in error.

WELCH J. This is an action brought
by W. S. Richey and Eunice Richey
against Ruhl K. Cutright and Martha
Cutright, and numerous other parties,
to quiet title to an undivided 70/160
mineral interest in and to 160 acres
of land located in Washita county, Okla-
homa.

It appears that on the 8th day of July,
1938,. plaintiffs, who were then the
owners and holders of a fee-simple title
to the land in question, executed a
mineral deed to C. R. Walbert whereby
they conveyed to him an undivided
one-half mineral interest in and to said
premises; that Walbert thereafter con-
veyed fractional mineral] interests to
the land in question to others, among
whom was Wm. T. Payne, and to him
he conveyed a 30/160 undivided mineral
interest in and to the premises.

On the 29th day of December, 1941,
Wm. T. Payne, by quitclaim deed, con-
veyed all his right, title and interest
in the premises to the “Record Title
Holder.” On the 29th day of November,
1948, Mr. Payne executed a second
quitclaim deed whereby he conveyed
all his right, title and interest in and
to said premises to plaintiff herein, W.
S. Richey. The deed recites that it is
executed in order to correct a prior
quitclaim deed executed to the “Record
Title Holder” on the 29th day of Decem-
ber, 1941.

On the 7th day of December, 1946,
plaintiffs, by warranty deed, conveyed
the above-mentioned premises to de-
fendants Ruhl K. Cutright and Martha
Cutright. The evidence, however, shows
that neither of the parties to this deed
had any knowledge of the execution
of the “Record Title Holder” quitclaim
deed by Mr. Payne at the time the deed
was executed, and did not obtain knowl-
edge thereof until February, 1949, at
which time the abstract to the prem-
ises was examined. Mr. Payne, the party
who executed the “Record Title Holder”
deed, testified that he did not notify

any of the parties to this proceeding
of the execution of such deed; that he
executed the deed for the reason that
he desired to dispose of his interest in
the property conveyed; that he recorded
the deed and paid for the recording and
that he received no consideration for the
deed, This quitclaim deed, however,
was of record at the time plaintiff
executed his warranty deed to defend-
ants Cutright, and they therefore had
constructive notice of the existence of
such deed.

The main controversy here arises
over the construction which should be
given to the “Record Title Holder”
quitclaim deed. It is the contention of
plaintiffs and defendants Cutright that
the deed is indefinite and uncertain as
to the grantee intended by the grantor
by his designation as “Record Title
Holder” and that parol evidence was
therefore admissible in order to estab-
lish his identity. Mr. Payne, the grantor
in that deed, was permitted to testify
over the objection of defendants other
than defendants Cutright, that by
his designation of grantee as the “Rec-
ord Title Holder” he meant the holder
of the fee-simple title and he intended
to convey his interest to the holder of
such title; that he did not intend to
convey his interest to the various holders
of mineral interests in and to the land.

The trial court at the conclusion of
the evidence on motion of defendants,
other than defendants Cutright, struck
all of this evidence and also excluded
the correcting quitclaim deed executed
by Wm T. Payne, and in its findings
and conclusions refused to consider
such evidence. In this respect, the
court found:

« * * * This instrument should be
interpreted by the Court without the
necessity of parol testimony relative
thereto, and the Court has heretofore
sustained the motion to strike parol
testimony by which the party seeks to
show the intention of the grantor. The
Court is of the opinion that this instru-
ment conveys the interest of William
T. Payne to the thirty acres of

erals which he held to the remaining

holders of the minerals as they ex-
isted at the time of this conveyance, to-
wit: December 29, 1941, in proportion
to their respective interest in the min-
erals at this time. William T. Payne’s
interest in the real estate involved here-
in was limited to a thirty acre in-
terest in the minerals, and his convey-
ance was therefore limited to a min-
eral interest. In this Court’s opinion
a mineral deed to the ‘Record Title
Holder’ would have the legal effect of
conveying the interest of the grantor to
the remaining holder or holders of the
minerals’ proportionate to his or their
interest at. the time of the convey-
ance,”

Judgment was entered on the above
finding quieting title to the 30/160 un-
divided mineral interest herein in-
volved in the various holders of min-
eral deeds in accordance with their
respective interests.

Defendants Cutright appeal and con-
tend that the court erred in exclud-
ing the above evidence, and erred in
rendering judgment in favor of the

various holders of mineral interests.’

Plaintiffs cross-appealed making the
same contention. Their appeal, how-
ever, was dismissed by this court for
the reason that it was not filed in time.

We think the court should have con-
sidered the excluded evidence in arriv-
ing at its findings and conclusions.
Under the record in this case there is
more than one person who might come
within the description “Record Title
Holder.” The owner of the fee-simpie
title who has his deed of record cer-
tainly would come within that descrip-
tion and the holders of mineral deeds
in and to the land in question who had
placed their mineral deeds of record
might also come within that descrip-
tion.

It cannot be definitely ascertained
from the deed itself as to the grantee
intended by Mr. Payne by the designa-
tion or description “Record Title Hold-
er.” The deed in this respect is am-
biguous and extrinsic or parol evidence
was therefore admissible in order to
identify the grantee.

415

Where a grantor in a deed describes
his grantee in such manner as to make
his identity uncertain, parol evidence
is admissible in order to establish his
identity. 26 C.J.S. Deeds, §24b; York
v. Stone, 178 Wash. 280, 34 P. 2d 911;
Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Con-
sol, 104 Mont. 328, 67 P. 2d 811.

We have many times held where the
intent of the parties to a deed is plain,
parol evidence is not admissible to prove
an intent different from the terms of the
deed, but where a deed possesses an
element of uncertainty parol evidence
is admissible in order to ascertain its
true meaning. Purcell v. Thaxton, 202
Okla. 612, 216 P. 2d 574; First Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bohanon’s Heirs,
etc., 199 Okla. 665, 189 P. 2d 612.

The trial court should have con-
sidered the excluded evidence and
should have found that Wm. T. Payne,
by his “Record title Holder” quitclaim
deed, intended to and did convey to W.
S. Richey all his right, title and in-
terest in and to the 160 acres of land
here involved.

The question remains: Did the 30/160
undivided interest in the minerals con-
veyed by Payne to plaintiff Richey
pass to defendants Cutright under their
warranty deed executed and delivered
by plaintiffs to them? We think this
question must be answered in the af-
firmative.

A warranty deed made and executed
in substantial compliance with the stat-
utes conveys to the grantee, his heirs
and assigns, the whole interest in the
premises described except as other-
wise limited by the deed. 16 O.S. 1951
§19; Kimbley v. Luckey, 72 Okla. 217,
179 P. 928; Crookum v. Ketchum, 174
Okla, 468, 50 P. 2d 710. 16 OS. 1951
$17 provides:

“All rights of a mortgagor or grant-
or in and to the premises described in
the instrument and existing at the
time or subsequently accruing, shall
accrue to the benefit of the mortgagee
or grantee, and be covered by his
mortgage or conveyed by his deed, as
the case may be.”

A16

In Skelly Oil Co. v. Butner, 201 Okla.
372, 205 P. 2d 1153, we held:

- “A deed of general warranty pur-
porting to convey to the grantee the
fee title of described lands without ex-
ception or qualification transfers to
such grantee every existing right of
the grantor pertaining to the premises
described.” (Emphasis ours.)

Under the above authorities we con-
clude that the title to the 30/160 undi-
vided interest in and to the minerals
in the land here involved passed to de-
fendants Cutright under the warranty
deed executed by plaintiffs.

The warranty deed executed by plain-
tiffs to defendants Cutright conveys to
them the entire interest of plaintiffs to
the premises therein described except
a one-fourth undivided interest in the
minerals in and under the land hereby
reserved and retained by W. S. Richey.
Immediately following this reservation
appears the following clause:

«* * * Tt being understood that min-
erals hereby retained is in addition to
undivided one-half interest in and to
minerals under said lands heretofore
conveyed.”

Plaintiffs contend that the above
clause should be construed as mean-
ing and expressing an intent on the
part of plaintiffs to convey to de-
fendants Cutright one-fourth of the sur-
face rights plus one-fourth of the min-
eral interest in and under the prem-
ises described and reserving unto them
all remaining mineral interest. The
language used does not justify such
construction. The clause referred to
performs no other function than to ex-
cept the prior mineral grant from the
conveyance and from the covenant of
warranty. It does not in any manner
enlarge upon the reservation con-
tained in the deed or convert the one-
fourth or 40/160 undivided mineral in-
terest reserved into a 70/160 undivided
interest as contended by plaintiffs and
as alleged in their petition.

A grantor in his deed is presumed
to have made all the reservations he

intended to make and he is not per-
mitted to derogate from his grant by
showing that some reservation was in-
tended, but not expressed. 16 Am. Jr.
Deeds, §406; Charlie Tong v. Jacob
Feldman, 152 Md. 398, 136 Atl. 822, 51
ALR, 1291.

The trial court should have found
in favor of defendants Cutright, and
should have quieted title in them to
the 30/160 mineral interest involved in
this action.

Reversed, with directions to enter
judgment in accordance with the views
herein expressed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. et al.
v. SHEEL.

No. 35585. April 28, 1953.

256 P. 2d 815.

Covington & Donovan, Tulsa, Hamil-
ton & Kane, Pawhuska, and Rayburn
L. Foster, Harry D. Turner, and D. E.
Hodges, Bartlesville, for plaintiffs in
error.

Frank T. McCoy, John T. Craig, and
Robert P. Kelley, Pawhuska, for defend-
ant in error.

DAVISON, J. George Sheel, as plain-
tiff, brought this action against the de-
fendants, Phillips Petroleum Company,
a corporation, and V. W. Edmondson,
seeking recovery for the loss of cattle
resulting from defendants allowing salt
water to escape from their oil well op-
eration and run over the surface of the
land in violation of 52 O. S. 1941 §296.
The parties will be referred to as they
appeared in the trial court, being in-
versely to their appearance here.

The plaintiff owned the surface of a
quarter section of land in Osage county,
Oklahoma, on which he pastured cattle.
The corporate defendant held an oil
and gas lease thereon from the Osage
Indian Tribe, and was pumping oil
from a well on the premises. The in-
dividual defendant was employed as
pumper. The oil well was near the east-
ern border of the tract about 125 yards
north of the southern border. A short

417

distance west of the oil well, there was
a salt water disposal well where salt
water was pumped back into the ground.
From the salt water well toward the
south there was a slight down grade and
an old road, which also was a draw or
drain, ran from it to a water hole near
the southeast corner of the pasture.
Plaintiff testified that the water hole
varied from 10 to 30 feet in length and
was some 10 feet wide at the widest
part. There was shade in that part of
pasture and the cattle would stand
around in the locality and drink from
the water hole. During the summer of
1950, the plaintiff had a herd of some
75 to 100 head of Durham and Hereford
eattle on the pasture. In the latter part
of July, some six head of the cattle
stopped gaining weight and started
looking like something was wrong with
them. Plaintiff testified that he sold
them at a loss of some $435. About
the first part of October of the same
year, other cattle were in bad condition
and he started investigating the cause of
their decline. He had noticed the cattle
drinking from the little pond so he tasted
the water and it was salty. He made an
investigation and found that the pump
at the salt water well was leaking badly
and that the ground was muddy around
it for about ten feet. There was no vege-
tation from the water hole on up to the
pump and the ground was white with
the salt which had dried out.

He called a veterinarian, having no-
ticed the cattel drinking from the pond
during the summer. On October 17th
the-doctor came out and made an in-
spection and examination of the lo-
cality and of the cattle. From that ex-
amination and the laboratory tests he
subsequently made, it was his opinion
that the bad condition of the cattle
was the result of drinking salt water.
Many of plaintiff’s cattle had suffered
from this salt water. and it became
necessary for him to move them to
another pasture, losing the use of the
pasture where the salt was.

On February 23, 1951, this action was
filed, wherein plaintiff sought to recover
for the loss sustained. Trial was had to

418

a jury who returned a verdict for $1,500.
Judgment was rendered for plaintiff
upon the verdict, and defendants have
appealed to this court.

The first proposition urged is that
the petition and proof were fatally de-
fective because of failure to allege or
prove negligence on the part of de-
fendants. As to the defendant Edmond-
son, there was no allegation or proof
of a duty on his part to keep the salt
water pump in repair. The testimony
was uncontradicted that Edmondson
was employed as pumper in charge
of the oil well pump; that he had no
duties or responsibilities and per-
formed no services with regard to the
salt water pump from which the salt
water escaped; that there was no duty
on his part to keep said salt water
pump in repair. The rule applicable
to such a situation was restated in the
case of Sanders v. McMichael, 200 Okla.
501, 197 P. 2d 280, wherein it was said:

“= * * When there is an entire failure
of the evidence tending to establish
this fact (primary negligence), it is er-
ror to submit the issue to the jury and
the trial court should sustain a demur-
rer thereto and instruct a verdict for
defendant, * * * ”

The trial court should have sustained
Edmondson’s demurrer to the evidence
and directed a verdict in his favor.

It is strenuously argued that the
instant case presents the same ques-
tions and is determined by the re-
cent cases of Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corp v. Rhodes, 205 Okla. 651, 240
P. 2d 95, and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Sheel, 206 Okla. 330, 243 P. 2d 726. In
the Rhodes case, “there was no evi-
dence that defendants allowed salt wa-
tr to ‘escape’ from a confinement and
beyond the drilling site and ‘to flow
over the surface of the land’ as would
constitute a violation of 52 O.S. 1941
§296.” In the Sheel case, damage by
salt water was in nowise involved nor
did the case have any connection with
the provisions of the above statute.
Negligence, in its generally accepted
meaning, was the foundation upon

which both of the reported cases rested.
Being so, it is elemental that it had to
be alleged and proved. The gist of the
case at bar was the violation of the
penal statute.

“52 O.S. 1941 §296 is a penal statute
and a violation thereof resulting in an
injury to another constitutes action-
able negligence.” Texas Co. v. Belvin,
207 Okla. 549, 251 P. 2d 804.

In the case of Leslie v. Hammer, 194
Okla. 535, 153 P. 2d 101, it was said:

«% # * The gravamen of plaintiffs’
action was recovery for injury done by
salt water which the defendants had
failed to keep safely impounded upon
their premises as they were required to
do. 52 O.S. 1941 §296. As said in the
case of Texas Co. v. Mosshammer, 175
Okla. 202, 51 P. 2d 757, 758: ‘Since the
adoption of the Revised Laws of 1910,
this statute has been treated as a penal
statute and also as a remedy for the
benefit of all persons who may suffer
injury by violation of its terms. Since
the law positively requires that all
waste oil and refuse from tanks or
wells shall be drained into proper re-
ceptacles and be immediately burned or
transported from the premises and in
no case shall the same or salt water
be permitted to flow over the land, it
has been repeatedly held that a failure
to perform the duty thus enjoined upon
the operator of an oil well is negligence
per se, and no other negligence need
be pleaded or proved.* * *’”

We see no reason to depart from that
well established rule.

The next contention is that the evi-
dence was too speculative to support
the verdict and judgment. With this we
do not agree. The testimony is in con-
flict on many points, but several con-
clusions are inevitable. They are: That
salt water had escaped from defendants’
salt water pump in sufficient quantity
to make the ground very muddy for a
distance of ten feet all around; that
there was dried brine on the ground
following the little drain down from
the salt water pump to the water hole;
that cattle had drunk from that pond;
that the water in it was salty; that

there was a saline deposit around the
bodily orifices of the cattle; that the
cattle had depreciated materially in
value and that such deterioration in the
cattle was the ordinary result of drink~
ing salt water. The case here presented
is in many respects similar to that of
Maley v. Henly, 195 Okla. 51, 154 P. 24
970, wherein it was held that’ with such
evidence the matter resolved itself into
a fact question for determination by the
jury. The same reasoning applies here.

The last proposition is that the jury
should have been instructed on the ex-
tent of defendants’ duty to plaintifi’s
cattle as trespassers when within a
reasonable distance of defendants’ op-
erations. The argument is founded upon
the same false premise as was the
first contention, i. e.: that the action is
one for damages resulting from negli-
gence generally, rather than from the
violation of a positive statutory provi-
sion. It has been disposed of by the
discussion hereinabove,

As to the defendant Edmondson, the
judgment is reversed; as to the de-
fendant Phillips Petroleum Company,
it is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,

O'NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., concur.

GRIGG v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INS. CORP.

No. 35047. May 5, 1953.
257 P. 2d 290.

Fred W. Martin and G. F. Waggoner,
Wagoner, for plaintiff in error.

Allen E, Barrow and T. Austin Gavin,
Tulsa, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM, In the trial court the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
as assignee of the American National
Bank of Pryor, was plaintiff and E. B.
Grigg was defendant. Reference will be
made to the parties as they appeared
in the trial court.

The American National Bank of Pryor
became financially embarrassed by rea-
son of embezzlement by one of its ex-
ecutives. For the protection of the de-
positors the assets of the bank were
assigned to and taken over by the plain-
tiff. The $5,000 note and chattel mort-
gage here involved were among the as-
sets so assigned to the plaintiff. Being
unsuccessful in its efforts to collect the
$5,000 plaintiff instituted replevin suit
herein for possession of the livestock
and various other items of personal
property described in the mortgage, or
for the value thereof in the amount of
$5,000 with interest as provided by the
terms of the note and mortgage.

Defendant first contended that the
$5,000 note and mortgage were forgeries
and denied his knowingly having exe-
cuted either instrument and asserted
that if the instruments contained his
genuine signature that such signatures

420

were obtained without consideration. A
hand-writing expert testified that the
$5,000 note and mortgage, as well as a
number of earlier notes, contained the
genuine signature of the defendant.
Trial by jury having been waived, the
case was tried to the court and resulted
in judgment in favor of the plaintiff as
prayed in its petition.

On appeal to this court, the defend-
ant complains of the failure of the trial
court to have made certain specific re-
quested findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law, and further complains that
the evidence was insufficient to support
the judgment.

In the trial it was developed that the
defendant had negotiated numerous
banking transactions with the American
National Bank of Pryor over a period
of years. During the period from 1941 to
April 10, 1946, the defendant had exe-
cuted a number of notes to the bank.
Several of the notes involved renewals
of previous notes. According to the
bank’s records the $5,000 note here in-
volved was executed to take up or re-
new previous notes to the bank.

Defendant filed written request for
some twenty (20) separately numbered
findings of fact and conclusions of law,
including a requested finding as to
whether the defendant executed’ the
$5,000 note and mortgage and, if so,
whether defendant received considera-
tion therefor. Most of the remaining
requests for special findings of facts
and conclusions of law concerned the
execution and consideration of previous
notes not here involved. The trial court
made written findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. Among the sixteen
separately numbered findings of fact
filed, the court found, among other
things, that the $5,000 note and mort-
gage was duly executed by the defend-
ant to merge and consolidate the un-
paid balance of earlier notes and that
the $5,000 note had been recognized by
the defendant by his having paid in-
terest thereon for more than two years
without objection. The court made no
findings in connection with certain of
the earlier notes.

The trial court concluded that the
defendant was indebted to the plaintiff
in the sum of $5,000 with interest as
provided by the note and that the in-
debtedness was secured by the chattel
mortgage.

Defendant contended that he had paid
a number of the earlier notes which
made up a part of the $5,000 note.
Apparently, in an effort to support this
contention, defendant caused the tak-
ing of depositions of the defaulting bank
executive who, on behalf of the bank,
participated in all of the note transac-
tions between the bank and the defend-
ant. In the main, his testimony sub-
stantiates the position of plaintiff.

The contention of the defendant that
the court should have made specific
findings as to certain transactions which
occurred between the defendant and the
bank several years prior to the execu-
tion of the note and mortgage here in-
volved is without merit. As hereinbe-
fore noted, the court made numerous
specific findings of facts including a
finding that the note and mortgage here
involved was genuine, executed for val-
uable consideration and was unpaid.
The earlier transactions about which
the defendant requested specific find-
ings were immaterial to the issues in-
volved.

It has been held many times by this
court that a refusal to make special
findings of facts and conclusions of
law on nonessential issues is not error.
See Curtin v. Moroney, 117 Okla. 276,
246 P, 232. We held in the case of Brad-
ford v. Mayes Mercantile Co., 89 Okla.
31, 213 P. 743, that the trial court is
merely required to state its findings on
the material and controlling facts sep-
arately from the conclusions of law. In
the case of Reed v. Richards & Cono-
ver Hardware Co., 188 Okla. 452, 110
P. 2d 603, this court said:

“The court is not bound to make sep-
arate findings concerning immaterial
facts, nor is the court bound to find the
material facts in any greater detail
than is really necessary for the correct

decision, by a higher court, of ques-
tions of law involved in the case.”

The defendant’s complaint as to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support
the judgment is untenable. Where a
jury is waived in a law action and the
‘cause is tried to the court, the judg-
ment will be given the same effect as
the verdict of a properly instructed jury
if reasonably supported by any compe-
tent evidence and will not be disturbed
on appeal. See Gross v. Alexander, 187
Okla. 492, 103 P. 2d 929, and American
Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Ble-
vins, 203 Okla. 405, 223 P. 2d 347.

Defendant states further that the trial
court erred by excluding competent,
relevant and material evidence offered
by the defendant and in the findings of
various facts, Based on the evidence the
trial court found that the defendant exe-
cuted the $5,000 note and mortgage, that
no alterations or additions were made
thereto, and the principal thereof was
unpaid. For a period of two years im-
mediately preceding the closing of the
bank, the defendant, without protest,
paid interest on the $5,000 note here in-
volved. The depositors of the bank as
well as the Bank Examiner and all
other interested parties were put on no-
tice that the defendant acknowledged
that he owed the bank for this $5,000
note. It would have been inequitable
for the trial court to have allowed the
defendant to show any facts other than
those that would be material to a deter-
mination of the questions here involved.

Where a case is tried on conflicting
evidence, this court will not on appeal
weigh evidence or determine credi-
bility of witnesses, that question being
one for the trial court. Graff v. Holli-
day, 172 Okla. 503, 45 P. 2d 1065. It
is well settled that on appeal evidence
tending to support the judgment and
every reasonable inference to be drawn
therefrom will be indulged and contrary
evidence rejected. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Railroad Co. v. Floyd. 146 Okla.
42, 293 P. 250, and 77 ALR. 1431.

The judgment of the trial court is suf-
ficiently supported by the evidence and
is not contrary to law.

421
Affirmed.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Carland Smith, Charles B.
Steele and Q. D. Gibbs, who as Special
Masters aided in the preparation of this
opinion. These attorneys were recom-
mended by the Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion, approved by the Judicial Council,
and appointed by the court.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FIRE-
MEN’S RELIEF & PENSION
FUND v. COTTON.

No. 35489, April 7, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1953.
256 P. 2a 802.

for

Turner & Turner, Holdenville,
plaintiff in error.

Wells & Wells, Seminole, for defend-
ant in error.

CORN, J. Plaintiff and R. L. Cotton
were married in 1907. In 1910 they es-
tablished their home in Holdenville,
Oklahoma, where R. L. Cotton served
more than 20 years as a member of the

422

city fire department. Upon retirement
in May, 1942, his years of service en-
titled him to a pension of $87.50 per
month, which amount he continued to
drew until his death in December, 1949.

September 13, 1951, plaintiff sought
a writ of mandamus requiring defend-
ant to pay her, as surviving widow,
there being no minor children, the sum
of $58.33 per month from and after
December i, 1949. The petition alleged
the facts of R, L. Cotton’s pensioned
retirement, death and her surviving
widowhood; that defendant was the
custodian of funds beloriging to those
entitled to receive same; following her
husband’s death she made claim to de-
fendant for this pension which was re-
fused; the filing of a further claim
therefor (July 31, 1951), which defend-
ant rejected and refused to pay to her
as the surviving widow as required by
applicable laws of this state.

September 20, 1951, the trial court
entered an alternative writ of manda-
mus directing defendant to pay plain-
tiff all amounts due and to continue
monthly payments in the amount
claimed, or to appear and show cause
for defendant’s refusal to comply with
such writ.

September 27, 1951, defendant filed
answer admitting deceased’s retirement
and payment of pension until time of
his death and that if plaintiff was the
surviving widow that she would be en-
titled to receive 66 2/3% of deceased’s
pension. In defense defendant pleaded
that for plaintiff to be eligible to re-
ceive such pension it was required that
she and deceased had lived together
as man and wife continuously for the
five year period immediately preceding
R. L. Cotton’s retirement; that on Oc-
tober 10, 1940, R. L. Cotton secured a
decree of divorce from plaintiff in
Hughes county, Oklahoma, and under
applicable statutes this made her ineli-
gible to receive any portion of such
pension. Further, that plaintiff had pre-
sented a claim therefor which was re-
jected after due consideration by the
board on January 2, 1950; having failed

to exercise her statutory right of appeal
from the board’s action, same became
final and not having availed herself
of an adequate remedy provided by
law, mandamus would not lie.

At the trial the records of the 1940 di-
vorce proceedings were introduced, as
was the testimony of the attorney who
represented R. L. Cotton in such pro-
ceeding. A divorce was granted R. L.
Cotton upon the ground of extreme
cruelty, following the wife’s (plaintiff’s)
entry of appearance and waiver of
service of summons. Hearing upon
plaintiff's action for mandamus further
developed that in May, 1951, she filed
petition to vacate the divorce upon the
ground same had been procured through
fraud and misrepresentation practiced
upon the trial court. By amendment
the board was made a party defendant
to such petition, for the reason the
money due from deceased’s pension
constituted a part of the property rights
involved in the property settlement
entered into between the parties, and
approved by the trial court, upon grant-
ing of the decree of divorce. Defendant
did not appear at the hearing on the
petition to vacate the divorce decree.
The trial court found that false allega-
tions and recitations in such proceeding
constituted fraud upon the trial court
and the defendant (plaintiff herein);
having been procured fraudulently such
decree was void and an order was en-
tered (July 30, 1951) setting same aside.

Upon trial of the present case de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss the action
for mandamus was overruled, as was
the motion to set aside the judgment
vacating the divorce decree.

The evidence established the parties’
marriage in 1907, and that they made
their home in Holdenville from 1919
until deceased’s retirement in 1942, and
that they lived together as husband
and wife during this period. In 1940
deceased had secured the above men-
tioned divorce. However, plaintiff testi-
fied that deceased returned home the
day after the divorce was granted; the
following day, they took a short trip

Le

together outside the state, and at all
times thereafter lived as husband and
wife. There was further testimony by
witnesses who lived as neighbors to
plaintiff and her husband, or who had
occasion to visit in their home with
some regularity. These witnesses testi-
fied that they knew nothing of the di-
vorce in 1940, and that deceased was at
the home and the parties lived together
at all times as man and wife, and noth-
ing of a contrary nature ever was ap-
parent to those who knew plaintiff and
her husband. Following deceased’s re-
tirement in 1942 the parties moved from
Holdenville to Henryetta, Oklahoma,
where they purchased a home which
they occupied until 1949. There was con-
siderable evidence of marital discord
during the period they resided in Hen-
ryetta.

Respecting plaintiff's making claim
for the pension, it appears that after
the husband’s death, plaintiff verbally
requested the mayor to investigate and
see if the council would agree to allow
payment thereof. Nothing came of this
and plaintiff later directed inquiry to
the city clerk (John Kirk), and also
secretary of the pension board, and in
this manner learned that the board did
not intend to allow her claim.

The trial court found that plaintiff's
pension claim was arbitrarily denied
by the board without a claim having
been filed, and without any transcript
or record of any evidence being taken,
and without notice to plaintiff that the
board was to meet; that although the
minutes of the board reflected unani-
mous rejection of her claim, such ac-
tion was not binding upon plaintiff. The
court further found that plaintiff filed
claim for pension with the clerk of the
pension board for all sums due and to
become due, but the clerk refused to
file such claim and have the board pass
thereon, and failed to notify plaintiff
that her claim was being ignored. It is
sufficient to point out that such findings
are entirely sustained by the evidence.

The trial court further found plaintiff
and deceased were living together as

husband and wife at the time of de-
ceased’s retirement, and had been liv-
ing together continuously for more than
5 years immediately preceding his re-
tirement, and not having remarried,
plaintiff was and remained his widow.
Based upon such findings the court en-
tered a peremptory writ of mandamus
requiring defendants to pay plaintiff
$58.33 per month for every month
since deceased’s death, such payment
to continue so long as plaintiff remained
the unmarried widow of R. L. Cotton.

In seeking to reverse the judgment
entered defendant presents an extended
argument based upon three proposi-
tions. The gist of such argument is to
the effect that the trial court attempted
to accomplish by mandamus a result
not otherwise possible, and therefore
was without jurisdiction of the subject
matter; that being a quasi-judicial body
the board had the right to exercise its
judicial discretion in determining plain-
tiff’s eligibility for a pension and such
determination was final except for being
subject to review by the district court
on appeal in the manner provided by
statute; plaintiff failed to establish that
she came within the statutory provi-
sions entitling her to a widow’s pen-
sion.

We are of the opinion that this ap-
peal involves consideration of only two
questions, which sufficiently dispose of
the contentions urged on appeal. Nat-
urally, the paramount question relates
to the jurisdiction of the trial court to
grant a writ of mandamus. It is urged
by defendant that it is a quasi-judicial
body, created by statute (11 O.S. 1951
§361, et seq.) and vested with discre-
ticnary powers. And that mandamus
will not lie to control such judicial dis-
cretion, or issue. where there is an ade-
quate remedy at law. 12 O.S. 1951 §§
1451-1452. The argument is that plain-
tiff was bound by the statutes re-
garding presentment of her claim and
appeal from the board’s decision to the
extent that her failure to proceed ac-
cording to statute prevented the dis-
trict court from having jurisdiction in
mandamus, although the board itself

424

was not bound to the extent that it
was necessary to notify plaintiff her
oral claim was to be heard, to take
evidence of the proceedings, or to make
a transcript of the proceedings upon
which a proper appeal could be based.
Defendant relies upon decisions of this
court to the effect that upon appeal to
the district court there is no right to trial
de novo and the court’s jurisdiction goes
only to a review of the transcript of the
proceedings and the evidence in order
to ascertain whether there were errors
of law, and whether the findings are
supported by the evidence. See In re
Gruber 89 Okla. 148, 214 P. 690; Fire-
men’s Relief and Pension Board, of City
of Holdenville, v. Lucas, 189 Okla. 328,
117 P. 2d 112. Under the circumstances
outlined such decisions are inapplicable,
although it is recognized that they are
in accord with the general rule.

In 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus, §42, this
rule is announced:

“Invented, as it was, for the purpose
of supplying defects in justice, manda-
mus does not supersede legal remedies.
To warrant the court in issuing the
writ, it must appear that the complain-

ing party has a clear legal right to the’

+ performance of the particular duty
sought to be enforced and that he has
no other plain, adequate, and com-
plete method of redressing the wrong
or of obtaining the relief to which he is
entitled, so that without the aid of the
writ, there would be a failure of jus-
tice,* * #?

And in section 126, the following rule
is announced:

“* * *Before appealing to the courts
for mandamus, it may be necessary
to seek a hearing before the board or
commission against which the writ is
sought, unless it is apparent from the
facts and circumstances that any re-
course to such board or commission
would be unavailing.***”

This rule has been applied in our
prior decisions, wherein we have recog-
nized that a writ of mandamus may be
issued 10 correct an abuse of discre-
tion, or to compel some action where
there has been an erroneous refusal to

act, or where the action taken is er-
roneous or arbitrary. Consideration of
the granting of this relief is subject
to the trial court’s legal and equitable
discretion. See State ex rel. H. F. Wil-
cox Oil & Gas Co. v. Walker, 168
Okla. 543, 35 P. 2d 269; Board of County
Comrs of Carter County v. Dorough,
177 Okla. 346, 59 P. 2d 273; Marland,
Gov., v. Hoffman, 184 Okla. 591, 89 P.
2d 287.

The trial court found defendant’s ac-
tions as respected plaintiff’s pension
claim constituted an arbitrary and er-
roneous abuse of discretion. We are
of the opinion that upon the showing
made the trial court had jurisdiction
to entertain plaintiff's application for
writ of mandamus.

The second point of inquiry concerns
defendant’s contention plaintiff failed
to come within the provisions of the
statute upon which the pension claim
was based. A surviving widow’s right
to receive a part (66 2/3%) of a de-
ceased husband’s pension is fixed by 11
O.S. 1951 §368a. The final proviso of
this statute is as follows:

“# ® *Provided, further, that in order
for a widow to qualify for said pension
she must have been married to and
living with the pensioner as his wife at
the time of his retirement and at least
five (5) continuous years prior thereto.”

Defendant points out that these par-
ties were divorced within the five-
year period mentioned in the statute,
the decree having remained in effect
until set aside in 1951, upon plaintiffs
petition. Further, deceased left his
home and supposedly married another
woman in 1943, but divorced this party
and returned home; whereupon plain-

‘tiff and deceased underwent another

ceremonial marriage in 1944, and were
subsequently divorced, but again con-
tinued living together as husband and
wife up to the time of deceased’s death.
Defendant urges that these facts con-
clusively establish plaintiff’s ineligibil-
ity to a pension under the above stat-
utory provisions, and further show
plaintiff was not a surviving widow.

a

This record reveals a series of mari-
tal transgressions by deceased of vary-
ing duration. Each episode culmi-
nated in reconciliation with plaintiff
and a return to the family home, which
plaintiff apparently kept open as a
haven where deceased always returned
when his wanderings ended. A history
of their marital status discloses a di-
vorce on October 10, 1940, and de-
ceased’s return home the following
day. Following his retirement in 1942
the parties established a home in
Henryetta. In the latter part of 1943
deceased “took up” with a woman in
a neighboring city, but in January,
1944, he returned home, advising plain-
tiff he had been divorced. Nothing in
the record establishes a marriage dur-
ing the three months he consorted with
this woman, nor is there evidence of a
divorce, other than deceased’s advice
to plaintiff that he had been divorced.
At plaintiffs instigation, being dissatis-
fied with the appearance of deceased
leaving and then being able to return
at will to the family home as a hus-
band, the parties underwent another
marriage ceremony in June, 1944, at
Durant, Oklahoma. In October, 1944,
he besought plaintiff to give him a di-
vorce because another woman was
“threatening to ruin him.” However,
during pendency of this proceeding the
other woman relented in her claim to
his affections and disappeared without
further ado. During all this time these
parties lived together as husband and
wife, the relation continuing uninter-
ruptedly until deceased’s death in 1949.

It is unnecessary to consider whether
the divorce decree (1940) so broke
the chain of marriage relationship as
to destroy plaintiff’s pension eligibility
under the statute, supra, even though
the parties in truth and fact continued
the marriage relationship. The trial
court vacated such decree upon the
grounds of fraud in the procurement
thereof, which materiajly prejudiced
plaintiffs property right.

The rule applicable in such situations
is found in 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and
Separation, §462, which states:

“According to the generally -prevail-
ing view, a judgment or decree of di-
vorce does not affect property rights.
Proceedings to vacate it will not lie af-
ter the death of one of the parties.
The only object which could be at-
tained would be sentimental in its na-
ture, for the death of the parties effec-
tually severs the marriage relation and
the practical result of the judgment or
decree would not be affected. On the
other hand, where the judgment or de-
cree affects property rights, the death
of one party or both parties does not
affect the right of the unsuccessful
party or his or her representatives to
institute vacation proceedings. This is
permitted, not for the purpose of con-
tinuing the controversy touching the
right to a divorce itself, but for the
ascertainment of whether the property
has been rightly diverted from its ap-
propriate channel of devolution. This
rule has been held to apply where the
divorce was procured at the instance of
a husband and except for it, the wife
would be entitled to a Federal pension
from the time of his death. The action
is deemed to involve only property
rights, and the state is no longer in-
terested, ***”

The rule in this jurisdiction is that
courts of equity have the inherent pow-
er to relieve against judgments which
are procured by fraud. See Kauffman
v. McLaughlin, 189 Okla. 194, 114 P. 2d
929. Such relief may be had by direct
suit in equity. Red Eagle v. Cannon,
198 Okla. 330, 177 P. 2d 841. The exact
application of the rule permitting vaca-
tion of a divorce decree which de-
prived the wife of a pension following
the husband’s death may be observed
in Lawrence v, Nelson, 113 Iowa 277, 85
N.W. 84, 57 L.R.A. 583. Also see Scheih-
ing v. Baltimore & O. Ry. Co. 180
Mad. 168, 23 A. 2d 381, limiting the right
of attack by the surviving spouse to
property rights alone. Bussey v. Bus-
sey. 94 N.H. 328, 52 A. 2d 856, to the
same effect; Rimbow v. Rimbow (Tex.
Civ. App.) 191 S.W. 2d 89, presenting an
extensive review of authorities. In this
case the Texas court applied the rule
permitting vacation of a divorce decree
procured by fraud by the first wife,
where property rights were involved, as

426

against a second wife. Recognition of
this principle by our own court may be
observed in the early cases of Rodgers
v. Nichols, 15 Okla. 579, 83 P, 923; Clay
v. Robertson, 30 Okla. 758, 120 P. 1102;
LeClair v. Calls Him, 106 Okla. 247, 233
P. 1087. We are of the opinion the trial
court properly vacated the divorce de-
cree entered in 1940. With this in mind
there is no merit to the contention that
such decree severed the parties’ mar-
ital relation so as to destroy plain-
tiffs eligibility to receive the statutory
pension provided under section 386a,
supra.

As concerns defendant’s remaining
argument. the record sufficiently sup-
ports the trial court’s finding that plain-
tiff was the surviving widow of R. L.
Cotton. This evidence is overwhelming-
ly to the effect that the parties main-
tained their marital relationship over
the years. In the absence of better evi-
dence, deceased’s conflicting declara-
tions at various times concerning his
marital status cannot overcome the
fact of these parties’ marriage and con-
tinuous maintenance of the relationship
of husband and wife. The trial court
correctly concluded that plaintiff was
the surviving widow of R. L. Cotton,
and as such was entitled to the statu-
tory allowance from the defendant’s
pension funds. -

Judgment affirmed.

BARKER et al. v. BRITISH AMERI-
CAN OIL PRODUCING CO. et al.

No. 34711, Feb. 3, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1953.
256 P. 2d 807.

James R. Eagleton, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiffs in error.

Robinson, Shipp, Robertson & Barnes,
Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.

DAVISON, J. The defendants in.error
herein, the British American Oil Pro-
ducing Company, a corporation, F. E.
Harper and Roy J. Turner, as plain-
tiffs, brought this suit in equity against
the defendants, H. R. Barker, C. A.
Davis and Clara Davis, plaintiffs in
error here, to quiet their title to an oil
and gas leasehold estate in certain
lands in Oklahoma county, Oklahoma,
the acreage in controversy being about
two and one-half acres. The parties will
be referred to as they appeared in the
trial court.

On March 25, 1941, the said C. A. Da-
vis and Clara Davis, his wife, while
the owners of a number of blocks in
the Gee and Jones Subdivision of the

west half of the southwest quarter of
sec. 4, twp. 12 north, range 2 west, in
said Oklahoma county, executed a con-
tract of sale and warranty deed to Au-
guste D. Bellegarde and Ida Rowland
Bellegarde, as grantees; on a five-
acre block in said subdivision, desig-
nated number 13, reserving, however,
to the grantors an undivided one-half
interest in the oil and gas underlying
the premises. The contract and deed,
without being recorded, were placed
in escrow with one Frank Trosper, for
delivery to the grantees when the total
purchase price of $600 had been paid in
accordance with the terms of the con-
tract. The sale of this block and of sev-
eral other blocks in said subdivision
were negotiated and handled by the
said Trosper. The Bellegardes did not
take actual possession of the property
which was rough unoccupied land, nor
did they pay taxes or any of the pur-
chase price other than the original
small down payment.

On April 16, 1947, C. A. Davis and
Clara Davis executed and delivered to
the plaintiffs, F. E, Harper and Roy
J. Turner, an oil and gas lease cover-
ing said block 13 and eight other blocks
in the subdivision. The lease was for a
primary term of five years, contained
a general warranty of title and was re-
corded April 17, 1947. At the time of
filing this suit, the lease was owned
jointly by all the plaintiffs, insofar as
block 13 was concerned. In June, 1949,
the defendants, Davis, employed one
Hal Folmar to clear up the title to said
block 13 and, as compensation, agreed
to give him an oil and gas lease on said
block and a mineral interest in some
other land. Folmar located the Belle-
gardes and on June 10, 1949, for $1
consideration, secured a quitclaim deed
from them to him. On June 13, 1949,
Folmar executed an oil and gas lease on
block 18 to the defendant, H. R. Barker,
and on June 20, 1949, he executed a
quitclaim deed thereon to Davis. The
warranty deed from Davis to Belle-
garde, the quitclaim deed from Belle-
garde to Folmar, the oil and gas lease
from Folmar to Barker and the quit-

427

claim deed from Folmar to Davis were
all recorded on June 21, 1949.

Although the facts are rather detailed,
the issues between the parties are sim-
ple. Plaintiffs contend that their lease
covers said block 13 in its entirety, and
that at the time of its execution the les-
sees had no notice, either actual or con-
structive, of any claim or interest of the
Bellegardes to the premises; that the
deed from Davis to Bellegarde was
never delivered nor was the purchase
price ever paid; that the quitclaim
deeds from Bellegarde to Folmar and
from Folmar to Davis were elements
of a fraudulent attempt to defeat the
warranty of title in the lease from Da-
vis to Harper and Turner and that Fol-
mar and the defendants, Davis and
Barker, were estopped from asserting
any interest adverse to plaintiffs.

Defendants, on the other hand, assert
that the oil and gas lease from Davis
to Harper and Turner covered only the
right, title and interest of the lessors
in the premises at the time of the con-
veyance; that plaintiffs’ lease covered
only an undivided one-half interest in
the minerals under said block 13, be-
cause that was all that was owned by
Davis at that time; that Bellegarde
owned a one-half interest in the min-
erals until foreclosure or voluntary con-
veyance and that the defendant Bar-
ker obtained a leasehold estate which
was never reconveyed to Davis and,
therefore, could not have passed to
plaintiffs as an after-acquired title un-
der the warranty of title in plaintiffs’
lease.

A trial of the case to the court re-
sulted in a judgment for plaintiffs, from
which defendants have perfected this
appeal.

The lease to Harper and Turner from
Davis conveyed: .

«“* * * the following described land
in Oklahoma County, State of Okla-
homa, to-wit:

“ ‘All of Blocks Seven (7), Eight (8),
Nine (9), Ten (10), Eleven (11), Twelve
(12), Thirteen (13), Fourteen (14), and

428

Sixteen (16), of the Gee and Jones
Sub-Division to Oklahoma City, Okla-
homa, according to the recorded plats
thereof, being a part of the West Half
of the Southwest Quarter (W% SW%4)
of Section Four (4), Township Twelve
(12) North, Range Two (2) West, Okla-
homa City. Oklahoma.’ ”

The check for $450, payable to C. A.
Davis and Clara Davis, given in pay-
ment of the bonus for said lease, bore
the following notation:

“Full cash bonus consideration for
new 5 yr. term oil & gas lease cover-
ing all their interest in W% SW%
sec. 4 Tp. 12 R. 2W.”

The above-quoted notation on the
check forms the basis for defendants’
argument that the lease was intended
to cover only the interest actually
owned by Davis at that time and did
not include the one~half mineral interest
in block 13, covered by the Bellegarde
contract of sale. To support this posi-
tion, defendants cite the cases of Pauly
_v. Patily, 198 Okla. 156, 176 P. 2d 491,
and Reed v. Whitney, 197 Okla. 199,
169 P. 2d 187. Neither cited case is
analogous to the one now before us.
The Pauly case deals with the en-
forcement of an oral contract, later
reduced to writing, made contempor-
aneous with, and as part consideration
for, a deed. The Reed case deals with
a conveyance wherein the phrase “all
their right, title and interest in and to”
preceded the description in a deed.

All of blocks 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14 and 16 of the subdivision, described
in the lease from Davis to Harper and
Turner, constituted only a part of the
W.% of the S.W.%4 of the described
section. Therefore, the above-quoted
notation on the check in no way con-
flicts with or limits the description con-
tained in the lease. The Bellegarde con-
tract and deed were not recorded un-
til long after plaintiffs’ lease was exe-
cuted, delivered and recorded. The land
was rough and unoccupied, and Belle-
garde did not in any way take actual
possession of it. The testimony of the
witnesses as to actual notice being given
to the agent who procured the lease for

the plaintiffs was conflicting. Under
such circumstances, the rules of law
discussed in the recent case of Metzger
v. Mueller, 205 Okla. 490, 238 P. 2d
802, are applicable and controlling.
Therein, it was said:

“The rule is well established that in
the absence of actual or constructive
notice of a previous conveyance, or of
matters which would put a purchaser
on inquiry, a bona fide purchaser for
value will take a good title to the prop-
erty. Luschen y. Stanton, 192 Okla. 454,
137 P. 2d 567; Davis v. Lewis, 187
Okla. 91, 100 P. 2d 994; Gungoll v.
Elsberry, 177 Okla. 301, 58 P. 2d 852.

“* * * The trial court heard and
passed upon the evidence which was
conflicting on this point. The judgment.
is not clearly against the weight of the
evidence, and should not be disturbed
on appeal. Kliewer v. Bodenheimer, 199
Okla. 107, 184 P. 2d 456; Wahby v. |
Renegar, 199 Okla. 191, 185 P. 2d 184,
and cases cited in Note 566 to 12 O.S.A.
$952.”

These rules are in harmony with thé
applicable portions of the opinions in
the cases of Davis v. Lewis, 187 Okla.
91, 100 P. 2d 994, and Luschen v. Stan-
ton, 192 Okla. 454, 137 P. 2d 567.

Having reached this conclusion, it is
not necessary to discuss allegations in
plaintiffs’ reply to the effect that the
several transfers culminating in the
lease to the defendant Barker were
parts of a fraudulent scheme aimed to-
ward defeating plaintiffs’ title. Never-
theless, it should be noted that the
record discloses that, after Davis em~
ployed Folmar to get a release of the
Bellegarde contract, Folmar and Bar-
ker worked together in locating the
Bellegardes and in getting the quit-
claim deed from them; that Barker took
the acknowledgment thereon and that
both were to share in the profits made
from the transaction.

However, the judgment should be sus-
tained for the reasons above discussed.
Judgment affirmed.

WELCH, CORN, ARNOLD, O’NEAL,
WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., con-
cur. HALLEY, C. J., dissents,

PARKHILL TRUCKING CO. et al.
v. HOPPER.

No. 35345. March 31, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1953.
256 P. 2d 810.

Welcome D. Pierson, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiffs in error.

Hal Whitten and Whitten & Whitten,
Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. This is an action by Ann
Hopper, administratrix of the estate of
Bobby Lee Hopper, deceased, against
the Parkhill Trucking Company, a Dela-
ware corporation, and James Clyde
Harrison, its employee, to recover dam-
ages for the alleged wrongful death of
Bobby Lee Hopper. Upon the verdict
in favor of the administratrix in the
sum of $12,500 on plaintiff’s first cause
of action, and the sum of $975.70 on her
second cause of action, as against the
defendants, Parkhill Trucking Com-
pany, a corporation, and James Clyde
Harrison, defendants appeal.

On November 4, 1949, Bobby Lee
Hopper,

whom we will refer to as
was a guest passenger in an
automobile being driven in a westerly
direction on State Highway 33, at a
point approximately five miles east of
Coyle, Oklahoma. The defendant’s em-
ployee, James Clyde Harrison, was op-
erating the truck with a trailer attached
in an easterly direction, and as the
truck approached the automobile going
west, a coupling pin connecting the
trailer with the truck became disen-
gaged from the truck, causing the
trailer to veer to the left and across
the center line of the highway and

430

come in contact with the approaching
automobile in which Bobby was a pas-
senger. The accident resulted in the in-
stant death of Bobby.

The
leged,

specific act of negligence al-
which was sustained by the
proof, was that there were no safety
chains connecting the trailer with the
truck, or other safety device to control
the trailer in the event the coupling pin
became disengaged. Although the de-
fendants by motion for a new trial
and by petition in error set forth num-
erous grounds upon which the verdict
and judgment thereon should be set
aside, we find that the sole question
presented in their brief is that:

“The verdict of the jury is contrary
to the instructions of the court, is ex-
cessive, is not sustained by the evi-
.dence and is contrary to law.”

The foregoing proposition is raised

under defendants’ assignments of error.

1, 75, 76, 77, 79 and 80 set out in their
petition in error. Defendants’ argument
is lodged most forcibly in support of
assignment in error 79, that the verdict
of the jury in the court below is ex-
cessive and is the result of bias and
prejudice against these plaintiffs in
error, defendants below.

Upon the trial the court gave its in-
struction No. 16, to which defendants
objected and saved exception. That in-
struction reads:

“You are further instructed that if
you find your verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, it will then become your duty
to fix the amount of plaintiff's recov-
ery. Such recovery should be in a sum
which would reasonably compensate
plaintiff, as the parent and adminis-
tratrix of the estate of the deceased, for
the actual pecuniary loss which plain-
tiff has sustained by reason of the
death of the said Bobby Lee Hopper.
You are not at liberty to allow damages
for grief, sorrow or anguish of mind re-
sulting from his death. In determining
such an amount as you may allow,
if any, you may take into consideration
the age of the deceased, his normal
life expectancy, which under the evi-
dence was 41.53 years, his condition

fn

of physical and mental health, his ha-
bits, talents and aptitudes, if any,
which might have influenced his earn-
ings or affected the value of his serv-~
ices to the plaintiff -in the future, either
before or after the attainment of his le-
gal majority, and the liklihood (sic)
of ‘voluntary contributions which might
have been made by him after reaching
such legal majority. You may also con-
sider the age of the plaintiff, which
under the evidence was 44 years, her
condition of health, her station in life,
and the sireumstances (sic) surround-
ing the relationship between the de-
ceased and the plaintiff prior to the
death of the deceased. Your verdict, if
any, should be reasonable and should
not be oppressive or unconscionable,
and in no event shall you allow plain-
tiff to recover more than the sum of
$40,000.00 on her first cause of action
and the sum of $1075.70 on her second
cause of action, and your verdict in no
event should exceed the total sum of
$41,075.70.

“If you find for the defendants, that
is all you need say in your verdict.”

Defendants contend that the instruc-
tion is exceedingly broad in its lan-
guage and in some respects is objec-
tionable, and that in any event the ver-
dict of the jury is contrary to the in-
struction and therefore contrary to law.
Whether the instruction is erroneous
upon the challenge lodged against it, re-
quires a resume of the record to de-
termine if the facts upon which it is
predicated presented a submissible is-
sue for the jury’s determination. The
jury, under the instruction, was called
upon to fix the value of the pecuniary
loss to Ann Hopper, mother of Bobby,
who lost his life by reason. of the negli-
gent act of the defendants. By their
verdict they determined the pecuniary
loss and damages at $12,500. The pres-
ent appeal does not challenge the ver-
dict on plaintiff's second cause of ac-
tion in the sum of $975.70 covering fun-
eral expenses of the deceased.

The statutory law which is here ap-
plicable is stated under 23 O.S. 1951
§§ 61 and 97. Sec, 61 of the Act pro-
vides:

“For the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, the measure of
damages, except where otherwise ex-
pressly provided by this chapter, is
the amount which will compensate for
all detriment proximately caused there-
by, whether it could have been antici-
pated or not.”

Sec. 97 of the Act provides:

“Damages must, in all cases, be
reasonable, and where an cbligation of
any kind appears to create a right to
unconscionable and grossly oppressive
damages, contrary to substantial jus-
tice, no more than reasonable dam-
ages can be recovered.”

Equally fair-minded jurors might
find it difficult to determine in any
given case the amount of damages that
would compensate a parent for the pe-
cuniary loss suffered by the death of a
child, Equally fair-minded and ex-
perienced judges, after a perusal of the
record upon appeal, and after a full
debate, might find it difficult to evalu-
ate the facts upon which the ultimate
conclusion must be based. We know
that a decision involving the reason-
ableness of compensatory damages is
one of the most elusive problems to be
resolved in any given case. There is no
yardstick or norm to guide us and we
must consider each case in the concrete
for a determination of the ultimate
conclusion as to whether the judgment
is equitable and just.

From the record we find proof that
Bobby was past 20 years of age at the
time of his death, and had a life expec-
tancy of 41.53 years, and Ann Hopper,
his mother, was 44 years of age and
had a life expectancy of 25.27 years as
of the time of Bobby’s death on No-
vember 4, 1949. Five years prior to said
date, Bobby’s father divorced his mo-
ther. She was decreed the custody
of the minor children and granted the
sum of $60 per month as child support.
No child support payments were ever
made by the father. The mother worked
as a waitress and supplemented her
income by keeping roomers and board-
ers. She had not remarried and she
had no other means of support, save

431

and except the financial help she re-
ceived from Bobby.

After Bobby completed grade school
he attended high school. In his junior
year he made the Honor society. He
was an outstanding football player
and swimmer. In 1945, he joined the
Merchant Marines, and later was as-
signed to the United States Army Air
Force, in which he served for three
years. He was honorably discharged
with the rank of sergeant at the age of
20 years. He re-entered high school
and completed his senior year studies,
and then entered the University of
Oklahoma in June, 1949, for the summer
term. During his school years he worked
at any available jobs he could find to
make a few dollars. He worked in
grocery stores, drugstores, and as a pin
setter in a bowling alley. During vaca-
tion periods he worked asa rough-
neck in the oil fields and was also em-
ployed as a construction worker, for
which he received: 99c per hour. While
at the University he received a gov-
ernment allowance of $75 monthly, and
earned various sums from jobs procur-
able. A few days before his death he
left the University because he could not
meet his living expenses after sending
his mother $40 a month out of his gov-
ernmental allowance. He had a fixed
determination to re-enter the University
and complete his college work. On
numerous occasions he expressed his
determination to acquire a home for
his mother. It is suggested that state-
ments made by deceased that he in-
tended to provide a home for his mother
should not be given any probative val-
ue. We think the evidence was com-
petent to show the intentions of the
deceased, and also competent as show-
ing the mother’s reasonable expecta-
tions based upon the intentions of the
deceased. Lusk v. Phelps, 71 Okla. 150,
175 P. 756.

The proof discloses that he contrib-
uted various amounts of money to his
mother, depending upon his current
earnings. On one occasion, after work-
ing in the oil fields during a school va-
cation period, he gave his mother $100.

432 De

While in the Air Corps he sent his mo-
ther $20 to $30 monthly. The evidence
discloses that Bobby was a boy of ex-
ceptionally good habits, intelligent and
very industrious. There was evidence
upon which a jury might reasonably
conclude that Bobby would continue
aiding his mother after his majority.

An examination of instruction No. 16
discloses that the jury was told that
plaintiffs recovery was (a) limited to
her pecuniary loss; (b) that no re-
covery could be allowed for grief, sor-
rew or anguish of mind, because of her
son’s death; (c) that they should take
into consideration the age of the de-
ceased, his life expectancy, his physi-
eal and mental health, his habits, tal-
ents and aptitudes, which might af-
fect his earnings during his minority,
as well as after he attained his ma-
jority, had he lived, and also the likeli-
hood of his making any contributions to
his mother after his majority; (d) also
the age of his mother, her condition of
health, station in life and necessities;
and (e) that the amounts so determined
should be reasonable and should not
be oppressive or unconscionable.

In Fike v. Peters (1935) 175 Okla.
334, 52 P. 2d 700, we sustained a judg-
ment in the sum of $10,000 where the
evidence disclosed that the parents
were in a dependent condition and that
the disposition of said child in its rela-
tion to said parents was such that
there would be a reasonable expectation
that said child would have contributed
to the support of said parents after ar-
rival at her majority.

We have held that the recovery of
pecuniary damages is not limited to the
sum of money the deceased would have
probably contributed to the parent, ex-
cept for his death, but that the jury
might also take into consideration the
pecuniary value of any services or aid
which the deceased might have contrib-
uted to the parent for his support and
maintenance. Kaw Boiler Works v.
Frymyer, 100 Okla. 81, 227 P. 453.

Instruction No. 16, here complained
of, permitted the jury to consider any

voluntary contributions which the de-
ceased might make to his mother af-
ter reaching his majority, but, as we
have seen, under the Kaw Boiler Works
case, this court approved an instruc-
tion which permitted the jury to also
consider the value of any services or
aid which the deceased might have con-
tributed to the parent for his sup-
port and maintenance.

The defendants here urge that the
case of Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v.
Pickeral, 204 Okla, 37, 226 P. 2d 397,
supports their contention that under the
rule there announced the verdict in the
instant case should be vacated and set
aside as being excessive. That case
does not support them. That action
was brought by the mother for the re-
covery of compensatory damages for
the death of her son. The deceased
would have reached his majority within
a month from the date of his death.
The instruction there told the jury
that the mother’s recovery was limited
to a sum that would compensate her
for the son’s death up to the time of
his majority. No objection was taken
by either party to this instruction and
as no other or further instruction was
given covering her claim for either
funeral expenses or for conscious pain
or suffering, we held that the verdict
for $5,636, under the one instruction
and proof, could not be sustained. It
is quite clear that the instruction could
not be sustained on the theory that the
services of the deceased to his mother
were worth the sum of $5,636 covering
the one month prior to his majority.
The verdict there was clearly contrary
to the court’s instruction and on that
ground was there vacated.

Furthermore, the defendants’ inter-
pretation of the Capitol Steel & Iron
Co. case, that no compensatory dam-
ages may be allowed beyond the ma-
jority of the deceased, is in direct con-
flict with our decisions.

We agree with the defendants’ con-
tention that the cases of National Tank
Co. v. Scott, 191 Okla. 613, 130 P. 2d
316, and New et al., Receivers, v. Mc-

Millan, Adm’x, 79 Okla. 70, 191 P. 160,
lay down the rule that the recovery
by a parent for the wrongful death of a
child is limited to the pecuniary loss
sustained by the parent.

A reading of instruction No. 16 dis-
closes that the court specifically lim-
ited the plaintiff’s recovery on the ba-
sis of pecuniary loss, and further ad-
vised them that they could not allow
any damages for grief, sorrow or an-
guish of mind resulting from her son’s
death.

In Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Jami-
son (1950) 204 Okla. 93, 227 P. 2d 404,
we sustained a verdict in the sum of
$10,000 as a pecuniary loss to a parent
for the loss of a child eight years of
age. In Kurn et al. v. Youngblood (1943)
193 Okla. 299, 142 P. 2d 983, we sus-
tained a verdict and judgment in the
sum of $10,000 for the pecuniary loss
of a boy fifteen years of age living with
his mother. These cases are illustra-
tive of the wide range of discretion
vested in a jury in determining facts
involving a recovery for pecuniary loss.

We are of the view, and so hold, that
the plaintiff’s recovery in the sum of
$12,500 as a pecuniary loss and damage,
and the sum of $975.70 damages for fun-
eral expenses, are fully sustained by
the proof in the record.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, DAVISON,
ARNOLD, WILLIAMS, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., concur. JOHNSON, J., dis-

sents.

TILLEY v. ALLIED MATERIALS
CORPORATION.

No. 35056. March 17, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 12, 1953.
256 P. 2d 1110.

433

434

Wayne W. Bayless and Charles L.
Orr, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in er-
ror.

Richardson, Shartel & Cochran, F. M.
Dudley, and J. G. Rucks, Oklahoma
City, for defendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. The question here pre~
sented is whether Orville Tilley is en-
titled to 1/4 of 7/8 of the first oil pro-
duced from two oil and gas leases un-
der a recorded drilling contract asserted
to be superior to the rights of a sub-
sequent mortgagee and the purchasers
of the leases under the foreclosure sale.

The plaintiff below will be referred to
as “Tilley” and the defendant, Allied
Materials Corporation, as “Allied.”

On April 17, 1939, Allied was the
owner of an oil and gas lease known as.
the “Louis Tipken” lease covering 80
acres in Lincoln county, Oklahoma. Al-
lied was also the owner of an oil and
gas lease, known as the “Henry Tip-
ken” lease covering 80 acres in said
county and state. On said date, Allied
entered into a written contract with A.
A. Thornton to drill one well on a 40-
acre tract on each of said separate
leases; and for the drilling of said wells
Allied agreed to assign to Thornton 40
acres out of each of said 80-acre tracts,
subject to a 1/8 overriding interest in
the gas produced from each lease, and
subject to a reservation of 15,000 barrels
of oil out of 1/4 of 7/8 of the oil pro-
duced from each of said leases. Thorn-
ton was required to sell Allied the oil
so produced for a minimum period of
two and one-half years at 50 cents per
barrel.

On May 2, 1939, Thornton employed
Tilley, a well driller, to drill one well
on each of said 40-acre leases for a cash
consideration and an oil payment of
$30,000 “to be paid out of the first oil
produced from an undivided 1/4 of 7/8
working interest of the two 40-acre oil
and gas leases.” The contract was re-
corded on August 8, 1939.

Tilley completed a well on the Louis
Tipken lease in July, 1939, producing
oil in very substantial quantities. There-
after, in September, 1939, he complied
with his contract by drilling a well on
thé Henry Tipken lease, which well pro-
duced gas only.

On June 22, 1939, Allied, in compli-
ance with its contractural obligations,
thereupon assigned 40 acres out of the
Louis Tipken lease to Thornton, reserv-
ing the overrides of 1/8 of the gas,
15,000 barrels of oil and the right to
purchase the oil as provided in Allied’s
contract with Thornton.

From and after the time the Louis
Tipken well became a producer of oil,

Allied received its reserved 15,000 bar-
rels of crude and ran the oil from the
lease. As the purchaser of the crude
it paid royalties to the owners, over-
riding interest and the oil payments in
conformity with the provisions of the
various contracts of record, save and
except as hereinafter referred to.

On June 29, 1939, Thornton assigned
to Yorkan Production Corporation his
interest in the Louis-Tipken lease, sub-
ject to his contract of April 17, 1939,
with Allied and subject to an overrid-
ing royalty of 1/8 of gas and casing-
head gas produced in favor of Allied
and subject to the oil payment to Tilley,
out of 1/4 of 7/8 of the first oil pro-
duced from the Louis-Tipken lease.

In September, 1939, after Tilley had
drilled the gas well on the Henry Tip-
ken lease, as he was required to do un-
der his contract of May 2, 1939, with
Thornton, Allied assigned the Henry
Tipken lease to Yorkan Production Cor-
poration, Thornton’s nominee, with cer-
tain reservations not here involved.

On July 25, 1939, Tilley executed a
division order which authorized Allied
to credit Tilley “oil payment of $15,000.-
00 in favor of Orville Tilley, out of
1/4 of 7/8 working interest from the
Louis Tipken lease.”

On August 22, 1939, Yorkan Produc-
tion Corporation executed certain mort-
gages covering both leases to secure
loans and advancements made by Eu-
gene L. Garey, which mortgages were
subject to a payment of $15,000 out of
1/4 of 7/8 of oil produced from the
Louis-Tipken lease, and the obligations
of Yorkan to pay drilling costs of well
on the Henry Tipken lease, all mort-
gages being subject to the terms of the
April 17, 1939, contract between Allied
and Thornton. The gas well was there-
after completed in September, 1939.

On March 9, 1940, Yorkan Production
Corporation and Tilley advised Allied,
by letter, that the division order of July
25, 1939, covering productions of oil
from the Louis Tipken well was erron-
eously executed and claimed it should

435

have included and covered the pro-
duction of gas and casinghead gasoline,
in addition to the oil.

On the same date the Yorkan Pro-
duction Corporation executed certain
assignments to Tilley, authorizing the
payment to him out of 1/4 of 7/8 work-
ing interest of both oil and gas from the
Henry Tipken lease until Tilley shall
have received the sum of $8,250 in lieu
of his right to an oil payment of $15,000.

On the same date Yorkan Production
Corporation executed an assignment to
Tilley authorizing the payment to him
out of 1/4 of 7/8 of the working interest
from both oil and gas out of the Louis
Tipkin lease until Tilley shall have re-
ceived the full sum of $15,000.

The evidence of Paul Brown, secre-
tary and attorney of Yorkan Produc-
tion Corporation, and also attorney for
Thornton, clearly establishes that the
two instruments referred to under date
of March 9, 1940, were prepared by
him in an effort to compromise and
settle the claim of Tilley that he should
receive payments from gas, as well as
from oil, from the respective leases.
The attempted compromise and settle-
ment to include payments out of gas, as
well as oil, were not approved or recog-
nized by Allied, the purchaser of the
production of oil from the Louis Tip-
ken lease, or thereafter when Allied
became the owner of the leases under
the foreclosure sale.

To sustain the judgment rendered be-
low, Allied contends that (1) the drilling
contract under which Tilley contends
that he is entitled to payment of $30,000
out of 1/4 of 7/8 of the first oil pro-
duced from the Louis Tipken lease is
ambiguous and was given a practical
construction by the parties upon which
they acted and relied and the court was
justified in giving such construction
controlling effect in construing or in-
terpreting the contract; (2) in the fore-
closure action cause No. 18194 in the
district court of Pottawatomie county,
the court decided plaintiffs claim ad-
versely to him; hence, under the prin-
ciple of res judicata, the same can-

436

not be opened, considered or retried in
the instant action.

The answer under Allied’s first con-
tention depends upon the force and ef-
fect of the drilling contract between
Thornton and Tilley. Thornton, having
acquired the “farmed-out” contract
from Allied, entered into a contract
with Tilley, under date of May 2, 1948.
This contract obligated Tilley to drill
two wells; one on the Louis Tipken lease
and one on the Henry Tipken lease, for
a cash consideration and a $30,000 oil
payment to be paid out of 1/4 of the
7/8 of the first oil produced from said
leases. Tilley contends that as the Louis
Tipken lease produced oil, that this
lease was obligated to pay the full
$30,000 oil payment out of the 1/4 of 7/8
of the first oil produced therefrom after
he had completed his contract by drill-
ing both wells. To fortify his conten-
tion he calls attention to the following
sentences in the contract of May 2, 1939.
The first sentence fixing the amount of
the oil payment of $30,000 and provid-
ing that it be paid from the first oil
produced from the leases reads as fol-
lows:

“Tn addition to said sums of money
the second party shall be paid the sum
of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00)
out of the first oil produced from an un-
divided one-fourth of the seven eighths
working interest out of the two forty-
acre oil and gas leases above referred
to” (Louis Tipken lease and Henry
Tipken lease).

The second sentence contains a pro-
vision which reduced the oil payment
under the contingencies therein recited.
The sentence reads as follows:

“Tt being understood, however, that
if for any reason the Second Party does
not drill the second well, (Henry Tip-
ken lease) that then the oil payment he
is entitled to receive shall be reduced to
Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00)
out of the first oil produced from an
undivided one-fourth interest in the for-
ty-acre tract on which the first well is
drilled.” (Louis Tipken lease.)

The third sentence of the contract pro-
vides that Thornton might change the

location of the second well if the first
well should not prove to be a commer-
cial producer. That sentence reads as
follows:

“Tt being further understood that if
for any reason the first well that is
drilled does not prove to be a commer-
cial producer in the judgment of First
Party, he may elect to move the loca-
tion of the second well to some other
location on the forty-acre tract or on
some other lease in the vicinity of said
well and if said second well is thus
moved to some other location, the oil
payment herein provided shall come out
of the two wells so drilled, regardless
of their location.”

The fourth sentence of the contract
provides for the execution and delivery
of oil payments as the wells were com-
pleted, but did not change either the
amount or source of the $30,000 oil pay-
ment for the drilling of the wells. That
sentence reads as follows:

“Said oil payments are to be executed
and delivered to the Second Party upon
the completion of each well; that is the
first oil payment to be executed and de-
livered to Second Party when the first
well is completed and the second oil
payment to be executed and delivered
to the Second Party when the second
well is completed.”

(Tilley is the second party referred to
in the quoted paragraphs of the con~
tract.) .

As we construe this contract, Tilley,
after drilling the two wells, was en-
titled to receive the $30,000 oil payment
from 1/4 of 7/8 of the first oil produced
from the wells drilled; that if the sec-
ond well drilled by him on the Henry
Tipken lease did not produce oil, but
produced gas, he had a call upon the oil
produced from the Louis Tipken lease
for the full amount specified in his drill-
ing contract.

We do not agree with Allied’s con-
tention that the division order executed
by Tilley setting up his oil payment of
$15,000 out of 1/4 of 7/8 of the working
interest out of the Louis Tipken lease
evidenced any intention by Tilley to

abandon his rights established under
his drilling contract with Thornton.
When this division order was executed
the second well had not been drilled.
Moreover, it is unreasonable to assume
that after drilling the first well as an
oil producer, he would abandon the
benefits of his contract in failing to
drill the second well, and thereby de-
prive himself of the full oil payment of
$30,000. The fact that the first well
when completed came in as a good pro-
ducer would be a sufficient incentive to
drill the second well, in the reasonable
expectation of accelerating the liquida-
tion of his $30,000 oil payment.

Neither can we subscribe to Allied’s
contention that Tilley’s oil payment was
to be limited to a $15,000 oil payment
out of one well if the second well failed
to become a producer. This theory as-
sumes Tilley should be burdened with
the cost and expenses of drilling a dry
hole. The contracting parties specific-
ally foreclosed such a conclusion by
providing that if the first well does not
prove to be a commercial producer,
Thornton could call on Tilley to drill
a second well, and if the second well
became a producer “the oil payment
herein provided shall come out of the
two wells so drilled, regardless of their
location.” It follows that if the second
well failed to become a producer, the
first well was obligated to pay the full
oil payment. The contract provides for
an oil payment, not for oil payments.
We find no ambiguity in the contract
with reference to the amount or the
conditions under which the oil payment
became due and payable.

Allied did not plead that the Thorn-
ton-Tilley drilling contract was ambig-
uous, nor did it offer proof in support
of an alleged ambiguity, but limited its
defense under an assertion that Tilley
was only entitled to receive $15,000 out
of 1/4 of 7/8 working interest from the
first well drilled and having paid said
$15,000 out of the production from the
first well, its liability under the con-
tract ceased. The trial court found the
drilling contract to be free from am-
biguity and stated:

437

“The law of Oklahoma certainly
makes this contract clear.”

The court’s finding of facts in this re-
spect was correct, but the court’s con-
clusion of law, we think, was erroneous.

We held in Coston v. Adams, 203 Okla.
605, 224 P. 2d 955, as follows:

“A contract must be so interpreted
as to give effect to the mutual intention
of the parties as it existed at the time
of contracting so far as the same is
ascertainable and lawful.”

In Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v.
Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 159 Okla. 35,
15 P. 2d 1028, we said:

“The intention of the parties to a con-
tract must be deduced from the entire
agreement and not from any part or
parts of it, and where a contract has
several provisions, the intention of the
contracting parties is not expressed by
any single clause or provision, but by
every part and provision of it.”

In Popplewell v. Jones, 202 Okla. 185,
211 P. 2d 283, we held:

“The cardinal rule in the interpreta-
tion of contracts is to ascertain the in-
tention of the parties thereto as ex-
pressed therein, and give effect to the
same, if it can be done consistently with

legal principles. In arriving at the in-
tention of the parties to a contract, the
language used therein, if it is clear and
explicit, and does not involve an absur-
dity, governs in the interpretation.”

Allied asserts that Tilley concurred
in the construction which Allied says
should be given the Thornton-Tilley
contract, that is, that Tilley was only
entitled to one payment of $15,000 out of
1/4 of 7/8 working interest of oil pro-
duced from the Louis Tipken lease. That
contention is not supported by any evi-
dence that we are able to discover in the
record. Tilley at all times contended
that the oil payment was to come out of
both wells, if and when both wells were
drilled. When he signed the division
order on July 25, 1939, covering the first
well, the second well had not been
drilled. The gas well was not completed
until September, 1939, and, therefore,

438

neither of the contracting parties
gave any consideration to whether the
oil payment was to come out of one
well or two wells, or whether the pay-
ment was to come out of both oil and
gas from said wells. When the gas well
came in on the Henry Tipken lease Til-
ley discovered for the first time that the
drilling contract gave him a call for an
oil payment, but not from gas. Tilley
brought an action to reform the con-
tract to include payment out of gas
production. In an effort to compromise
that suit, two instruments were exe-
cuted providing for a reduced oil and
gas payment from the Henry Tipken
lease and an oil and gas payment of
$15,000 out of the Louis Tipken lease.
These instruments were to become ef-
fective only if Eugene L. Garey would
subordinate his mortgage upon the
leases to include the gas payment. This
Garey refused to do.

Allied contends that Tilley in his
pleadings in the Pottawatomie county
suit limited his oil payment to $15,000
to the Louis Tipken well. The record
does not bear out Allied’s contention.
Copies of the pleadings filed by Tilley
in the Pottawatomie case disclose that
the only question raised by him was
that his contract with Thornton of May
2, 1939, by mutual mistake, failed to
include gas, as well as oil, out of the
$30,000 oil payment to be paid. The
journal entry of judgment in that case
discloses that the court specifically ap-
proved the report of the Referee to
the effect that the oil payment should
come out of gas as well as oil from
the production of both leases, subject
only to the right of Eugene L. Garey
under his mortgage from Yorkan. That
judgment in no manner foreclosed
Tilley’s rights to the oil payment un-
der his recorded contract with Thorn-
ton. The priority of Garey’s mort-
gage upon appeal was affirmed by this
court in Garey v. Rufus Lillard Co.,
196 Okla. 421, 165 P. 2d 344. The judg-
ment in the Pottawatomie case, upon
which Allied relies, foreclosed all the
right, title and interest of Yorkan Pro-
duction Corporation in the leases. Yor-

kan’s interest was inferior to Tilley’s
interest, as Yorkan acquired its interest
in the leases subject to Tilley’s recorded
contract.

We said in McNeal v. Baker,
Okla. 159, 274 P. 655, as follows:

“In construing the judgment of a
court, effect should be given to every

135

* word and part thereof, including such

effects and consequences that follow the
necessary legal implications of its
terms, although not expressed.”

This rule was approved in Russell v.
Freeman, 202 Okla. 417, 214 P. 2d 439.

As we view the pleadings, the report
of the Referee and the judgment of the
court in the Pottawatomie suit, the
judgment did not assume to foreclose
Tilley’s rights to the oil payment, and,
furthermore, no exceptional circum-
stances were alleged or established in
that proceeding authorizing the court to
render the judgment claimed to have
been rendered by Allied.

We held in State ex rel. Com’rs of
Land Office v. Reynolds, 201 Okla. 400,
206 P. 2d 184; Hester v. Watts, 203
Okla. 97, 218 P. 2d 641, and in Noble v.
Kahn, 206 Okla. 13, 240 P. 2d 757, as
follows:

“Tn an action to foreclose a real es-
tate mortgage, if plaintiff desires to
bring within the jurisdiction of the court
and litigate an outstanding title or in-
terest which on the face of the record is
a valid paramount title, the plaintiff
should allege the facts upon which he
seeks to have his mortgage decreed
to be a lien on such apparent para-
mount title.”

Allied’s counsel admits in his brief
that the Pottawatomie judgment fore-
closing Tilley’s oil payment might have
been erroneously entered, but asserts
that if it is erroneous, the judgment
binds Tilley, and, therefore, the judg-
ment is res judicata, and in support of
that contention relies upon Talley v.
Harris, Ex’r, 199 Okla. 47, 182 P. 2d
765. In that case this court held that
while the judgment rendered was er-
roneous, it was not void. The court had

jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of the action. It had jur-
isdiction to pass upon the question
there presented. It had power and au-
thority to render the particular judg-
ment in question.

A careful reading of the case dis-
closes that the court had jurisdiction
of the subject of the action. The sub-
ject matter of the action there involved
was whether an antenuptial contract en-
tered into between a man and woman
in contemplation of their marriage will
be enforced and thereby deprive the
widow of a widow’s allowance out of
her deceased husband’s estate. It is ap-
parent that the force and effect of the
antenuptial contract was specifically
pleaded and relied upon to defeat the
widow’s claim to participate in her de-
ceased husband’s estate.

In the Pottawatomie case which Al-
lied relies upon as res judicata, the
pleadings did not draw in question
whether Tilley was entitled to the
$30,000 oil payment out of the Tipken
well or out of both wells, or whether
the Louis Tipken well was solely lia-
ble to an oil payment of $15,000. Nor
was the jurisdiction of the court invoked
to construe the legal effect of the Til-
ley-Thornton contract, but its jurisdic-
tion was only invoked to decide whether
by reason of the mutual mistake of the
parties they had failed to include gas as
a source from which the Tilley pay-

“ments should be made. On this issue
the court found in favor of Tilley. The
journal entry of judgment states:

“Tt is Further Ordered, Adjudged and
Decreed by the Court that the contract
of Orville Tilley (Claim #61 of the Re-
vised Report of the Referee) for the
drilling of wells upon the Louis Tip-
ken and Henry Tipken leases, and pay-
ment therefor, should be and the same
is hereby reformed to provide for the
payment of said Orville Tilley, under
said contract, of the sum of Fifteen
Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) to be
paid out of an undivided one-fourth of
the production of the gas as well as the
oil accruing to the Henry and Louis
‘Tipken leases herein described, but that

439

such reformation shall not be made to
be effective prior to the first, second
and third mortgage liens of Eugene L.
Garey.”

Jurisdiction of a court is of three
kinds: (1) jurisdiction of the parties;
(2) jurisdiction of the general subject
matter; and (3) jurisdiction of the par-
ticular matter which the judgment pro-
ifesses to decide.

We held in Standard Savings & Loan
Ass’n v. Anthony Wholesale Grocery
Co., 62 Okla. 242, 162 P. 451, as fol-
lows:

“A judgment, which is entirely out-
side of the issues in the case and upon
a matter not submitted to the court for
its determination, is a nullity, and may
be vacated and set aside at any time on
motion of a party, or any person af-
fected thereby. And any collateral or
subsequent proceeding dependent upon
the validity of such judgment may, in
like manner, be vacated upon proper
motion by any person affected there-

ry.

This court in its opinion refers to its
earlier decisions in Anglea v. McMas-
ter, 17 Okla. 501, 87 P. 660, wherein the
territorial court announced a similar
rule.

In our recent decision in Bishop v.
Franks, 188 Okla. 196, 107 P. 2d 358, we
held:

“A judgment, or any portion thereof,
which is entirely outside the issues and
upon a matter not submitted to the
court for determination, is erroneous.”

In Hester v. Watts, supra, and in
State ex rel. Com’r of Land Office v.
Reynolds, supra, we held that in a pro-
ceeding to foreclose a mortgage where-
in the mortgagee alleges that certain
named defendants claim some interest
or title to the property, but which is
inferior to the mortgagee’s title, does
not plead facts justifying a judgment
canceling a prior recorded title in the
land. Moreover, the Garey mortgage
and the suit of foreclosure thereon re-
cited that the mortgage was subject to
the contracts between Allied and Thorn-
ton, the reservations of Allied and the

440

“unpaid balance of the oil payment to
Orville Tilley out of the Louis Tipken
lease and the obligations of Yorkan
to pay the drilling contractor for drill-
ing the well on the Henry Tipken lease.”

When Allied purchased the leases un-
der the foreclosure sale, it acquired only
the title of Yorkan. As we have seen,
Yorkan’s title was subject to the oil
payment of Tilley.

Allied continued making the oil pay-
ment to Tilley out of the production of
the Louis Tipken well from June, 1939,
to July 1946, in the sum of $15,000.
When Allied discontinued further pay-
ment Tilley contacted the president of
Allied and demanded that the oil pay-
ment be continued as per his drilling
contract. The only reply he received was
that the matter would have to be turned
over to Allied’s lawyers.

The judgment is reversed, with in-
structions to enter judgment for Tilley
for the balance due under his drilling
contract to be paid out of 1/4 of 7/8
working interest of oil produced from
the Louis Tipken well, the judgment to
carry interest at 6% from the date such
payment became due and payable.

HALLEY, C. J., JOHNSON, V.C. J.,
and WILLIAMS and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
concur. CORN and DAVISON, JJ.,

dissent.

RICE v. STATE BOARD OF '
MEDICAL EXAMINERS.

No, 85622. May 12, 1953.
257 P. 2d 292.

Don Welch, Don E. Welch, and Thom-
as E. Shaw, Madill, for plaintiff in error.

B. E. Harkey, Oklahoma City, for de-
fendant in error.

CORN, J. Plaintiff brought this ac-
tion (April 22, 1951) seeking to enjoin
defendant from unlawfully practicing
medicine without a license. The first
cause of action alleged that our stat-
utes (59 O. S, 1951 §§491-492) make it
unlawful for any person not holding a
valid, unrevoked certificate authoriz-
ing him to practice in this state to en-
gage in, offer to engage in, or to hold
himself out as qualified to practice
medicine; that for at least four years
prior to filing the petition defendant
had been holding himself out as a quali-
fied medical doctor and engaging in the
practice of medicine in violation of the
statutes and to the injury of the public.

The second cause of action alleged
that chapter 16A, Title 59, page 357,
S. L, 1947 (59 O. S. 1951 §§731.1-731.6),
effective May 22, 1947, make it unlaw-
ful for any person not holding a valid,
unrevoked license issued under the
laws of this state to engage in, offer to
engage in, or to hold himself out as
qualified to make diagnosis and treat-
ment of any human ill defined in such
act. Further, that defendant was not
then, or at any time hereafter men-
tioned, the holder of a legal, unrevoked
license authorizing him to practice any
branch of the healing arts; that from
May 22, 1947, to the date of filing the

petition, defendant had willfully,
wrongfuly and unlawfully engaged in,
and had held himself out as qualified in,
the diagnosis and treatment of human
ills, and had appended the word “doc-
tor” in front of his name, in violation
of such act, and would so continue to do,
to the irreparable damages of the public,
unless perpetually restrained and en-
joined therefrom, and that plaintiff
had no adequate remedy at law.

Subpoena duces tecum was issued and
served upon defendant commanding
him to produce his records disclosing
the names of the patients he had treated
and the treatment administered.

Defendant moved to quash such sub-
poena on the grounds production of his
records would be violative of the con-
fidential doctor and patient relation-
ship and would be a disclosure of privi-
leged matter; and, if forced to comply
therewith, the information contained
in such records would tend to prove the
guilt of a criminal offense for which he
might be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion. The motion to quash was overruled,
but enforcement of the subpoena was
stayed during pendency of this appeal.

It is urged on appeal that enforcement
of the subpoena duces tecum is viola-
tive of art. 2, §21, of our Constitution,
which provides:

“No person shall be compelled to
give evidence which will tend to in-
criminate him, except as in this Con-
stitution specifically provided; * * *”

We agree with this contention. It can-
not be questioned but that the provi-
sions of 59 O.S. 1951 §§491, 500 and 731.4
are penal in nature. The general rule
against self-incrimination is stated in
58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, §36, in the fol-
lowing manner:

“No principle of the common law is
more firmly established than that which
affords to a witness the privilege of
refusing to answer any question that
will criminate himself. As the common
law had it, ‘nemo tenetur seipsum ac-
cusare.’ * * *”

441

And section 69 of the same text fur-
ther states:

“The seizure or compulsory produc-
tion of a man’s private books or papers
to be used in evidence against him is
not substantially different from com-
pelling him to be a witness against
himself. Accordingly, the privilege of
an. accused not to be compelled to give
evidence against himself in a criminal
proceeding protects him from the com-
pulsory production of personal books
or papers that contain evidence which
would tend to incriminate him or ex-
pose him to a penalty or forfeiture.
Such seizure or compulsory production
is within the spirit of constitutional pro-
visions providing that no person shall
be compelled to testify against himself
in a criminal cause. * * *”

One of the earliest applications of
such principle in this jurisdiction may
be observed in our early decision in
Gillespie v. State (1911) 5 Okla. Cr. 546,
115 P. 620, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171, Ann.
Cas. 1912D, 259, wherein it was pointed
out that the constitutional provision
above quoted is not merely a formal,
technica] rule to be enforced or dis-
pensed with at the court’s discretion.
Rather, it is a mandatory constitutional
provision which secures to every indi-
vidual a valuable and substantial right.

Mindful as we are of the so-called
“modern tendancy” to abrogate indi-
vidual rights on the ground that the
exigencies of the moment require it,
and that by so doing the courts are
able to “get at the truth of the matter,”
we think the language (quoted in the
Gillespie case, supra) in Boyd v. U.S.,
116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746,
@ 752, particularly apropos.

The court’s opinion quoted from Mc-
Knight v. U.S., 115 F. 972, as follows:

“«* * * A perusal of the decisions of
the Supreme Court shows that no con-
stitutional right has been the subject
of more jealous care than that which
protects one accused of crime from be-
ing compelled to give testimony against
himself. The right to such protection
existed at the common law, and was
carried into the Constitution that the

442 —

citizen might be forever protected from
inquisitorial proceedings compelling
him to bear testimony against himself
of acts which might subject him to
punishment. * * *

« « # * Tt may be it is the obnoxious
thing in its: least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional prac-
tices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of proce-
dure. This can only be obviated by ad-
hering to the rule that constitutional
provisions for the security of person
and property should be legally con-
strued. A close and literal construc-
tion deprived them of half their effi-
cacy, and leads to gradual depreciation
of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty
of the court to be watchful of the con-
situtional right of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. Their motto should be, “Obsta
principiis” 7 *#*”

It is unnecessary to prolong this dis-
cussion by citation and comparison of
innumerable authorities upon this ques-
tion, or to trace the development and
the underlying basis for the reasoning
upon which the rule is founded. It is
enough to note that the deprivation of
human rights and destruction of consti-
tutional guarantees is not accomplished
by a complete denial of any constitu-
tional right, but is accomplished by a
gradual wearing away of the whole by
means of “silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of proce-
dure.” Such an “approach” may be ob-
served in the argument urged herein,
that no prosecution pends against de-
fendant for any violation of the penal
code. This argument is unpersuasive.
The duty of the court is to be watchful
of the constitutional rights of every
citizen. We are of the opinion and hold
that the trial court erred in refusing to
sustain defendant’s motion to quash
the subpoena duces tecum which issued
herein, for the reason that the subpoena
was nothing more than an attempt to
work a compulsory production of the de-
fendant’s records into court in order
that they might be used in evidence
against his interests. This is such a sit-

uation as the quoted constitutional in-
hibition was adopted to defeat. It is
unnecessary to consider other questions
herein presented.

The judgment is reversed, with di-

rections to sustain defendant’s motion
to quash.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,

and WELCH, DAVISON, ARNOLD,
WILLIAMS,
concur, O’NEAL, J., dissents.

and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,

P|
REIN et al. v. PATTON.
No. 85527, April 14, 1953.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1953.
257 P. 2d 280.

Butler, Rinehart & Morrison, Okla-
homa City, for plaintiffs in error.

Ames, Daugherty, Bynum & Black,
Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. The parties will be
referred to herein as they appeared
in the trial court.

The plaintiff alleged in his petition
that the defendant E. A. Hassman was
the owner of an apartment hotel in
Oklahoma City, and that he had in his
employ the defendant Mrs. Lavon
Rein, as general manager and opera-
tor of the hotel; that on December
30, 1949, the defendant Mrs. Rein, while
acting as agent and pursuant to her
duties, was attempting to replace a
light bulb above the front door of the
hotel; that the plaintiff, a tenant in the
building, at the request of Mrs. Rein,
climbed a ladder to replace the bulb;
that while the plaintiff was so engaged,
Mrs. Rein was holding the ladder on
the front steps of the building; that
without warning to the plaintiff she
released her grip on the ladder and
walked away; that the ladder then
slipped and the plaintiff fell on the
ground causing a fracture and double
dislocation of his right ankle; that his
injuries were directly and proximately
caused by the negligence and careless-
ness of the defendant in permitting the
ladder to slip; that the injuries were
sustained without fault on his part and
could not have been foreseen by him.
He outlined the extent of his injuries,
his expenditures for medical and hos-
pital bills and his earning capacity.
He asked judgment against the defend-
ants in a substantial amount.

The defendants in their answer de-
nied all of the material allegations of
the petition except they admitted he
sustained an injury on the date alleged;

443

they denied that the injury sustained
was due to any fault or negligence on
their part, but was due entirely to vol-
untary acts on the part of the plaintiff
in that he volunteered to climb the
ladder and change the light bulb, and
due to his own acts he fell or jumped
from the ladder and sustained the in-
jury of which he complained. Defend-
ants further plead contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff and
prayed that he take nothing.

On trial before jury plaintiff testi-
fied that he was a tenant in the apart-
ment hotel; that there were 45 apart-
ments in the building; that the defend-
ant Mrs. Rein was the manager of the
apartment hotel; that at about 4:30
or 5:00 p.m., on December 30, 1949, the
defendant Mrs. Rein came to his apart-
ment and requested him to help her
with the light; that she got a ladder and
he helped her to take it to the front
of the building; that after going down
the steps she placed the ladder and
held it and he ascended it to the top
step; that he cautioned her to “be sure
to hold the ladder’; that when he at-
tempted to remove the bulb his hand
came in contact with the metal part of
the light and he got an electric shock;
that he told Mrs. Rein the electricity
was on; that she said it was not;
that she went to examine it and came
back and told him the electricity was
off; that he then took out the burned-
out bulb and descended far enough on
the ladder to hand it to her; that she
tock it and handed him a new bulb;
that he went back up the ladder and
again cautioned her “to be sure and
hold this ladder”; that he reached over
to insert the new bulb in the socket and
then he felt the ladder slipping and giv-
ing away and looked and saw Mrs.
Rein away from the ladder, and for
self-preservation he jumped, landing on
the solid ground; that he received the
injury to his foot when he hit on the
side of his right leg and on one hand;
he said the ladder was slipping back-
ward and had slipped a foot and a half
when he jumped from it. He testified
to the nature and extent of his injury

444

and expenditures for his medical and
hospital bills, his earning capacity and
loss of time from his work. He testi-
fied that when he told Mrs. Rein about
the electricity being on, he told her
that he had a friend visiting him the
night before and his friend almost fell
down the steps.

This friend testified that he had vis-
ited the plaintiff the night before and
that as he went out the front door
of the apartment building that it was
very dark and that he stumbled as
he went down the steps.

The defendant E. A. Hassman, as a
witness for the plaintiff, testified that
he was the owner of the building; that
at the time of the accident the defend-
ant Mrs, Rein was employed by him.
When asked whether Mrs. Rein’s du-
ties included the replacing of burned-
out light bulbs, he answered. “Yes, sir,
I think so because she was looking af-
ter the building.”

The defendant Mrs. Rein, as de-
fendants’ witness, testified that her
duties as an employee of the defend-
ant Hassman were to “collect the rent,
take care of the laundry and replace
the light bulbs and to in general see
that things are run correctly.” She
testified that before the date in ques-
tion, on one or two occasions, she had
helped in changing the light bulb, and
on other occasions did it by herself.
She said it was misting rain on the
night in question and it was getting
colder and she was afraid that if it
froze or was sleeting a person might
slip on the slick place. She wanted to
turn on the light so people could get
up the steps. It was then she found
the light was not burning. It was be-
tween 4:30 and 5:00 p.m. She went to
the back of the building to get the lad-
der; that plaintiff saw her and asked
if she wanted help and that she told
him that it was not necessary; that he
insisted on helping; then she told him
if he would hold the ladder, she would
get her slacks and then she went to
get the light bulb and put on her
slacks; that plaintiff said, “let’s get

this thing over with,” and took the lad-
der outdoors. She said she did not
ask him to help her. She said plaintiff
climbed the ladder and removed the old
bulb and handed it to her; that she
threw it on the ground and handed him
the new bulb; that he proceeded to
climb up the ladder with the new bulb;
that she was standing below plaintiff
with her hand on the ladder; that when
the plaintiff felt the electric shock he
jumped and jerked and jiggled the lad-
der but that she steadied it; that she
went in to ascertain whether the cur-
rent was on and came back and told
him the current was off; that it had not
been turned on; that presumably
plaintiff got another shock and when he
did he jerked and jiggled the ladder
and she guessed he lost his balance
and for fear of falling, he jumped. She
said the ladder was not slipping or fall-
ing until plaintiff started to jump. On
cross-examination she testified that af-
ter plaintiff offered to go up the ladder,
she let him do so and did not tell him
not to do so.

Each defendant demurred to plain-
tiff’s evidence and the demurrers were
overruled. They excepted. At the close
of all the evidence each defendant mov-
ed for directed verdict. These mo-
tions were overruled and they excepted.

The jury returned verdict for the
defendants. In due time plaintiff filed
motion for new trial charging, among
other things, error of law occurring at
the trial. Motion for new trial was
taken under advisement and the parties
were given time to file briefs. Later,
the motion for new trial was sustained.

In Jetter to the attorneys, which was
made part of the record, the court
said:

“I beg to advise that after consid-
ering the briefs filed on motion for
new trial in above case and reviewing
some of the authorities cited, I must
confess that I am still somewhat in
doubt as to some questions raised, and
I feel, therefore, the only thing left
for me to do under ail the circum-
stances is to sustain plaintiffs motion
and grant a new trial.

“In doing so, I am not basing it
upon any specific thing, but considering
all the circumstances, including the in-
structions of the court, I cannot feel
that the plaintiff in this case had the
fair trial that the law contemplates. I
am, therefore, directing the clerk to
enter a minute today sustaining the mo-
tion for new trial and allowing the de-
fendant an exception.”

From the order sustaining the motion
for a new trial the defendants have ap-
pealed to this court. In their joint pe-
tition in error they charge error in
sustaining the motion for new trial
and the overruling of each defendant’s
demurrer to the evidence and of each
defendant’s motion for directed verdict.
In their brief they contend there was
no evidence on which a judgment for
plaintiff could have been sustained;
therefore, they assert it was error for
the court to set aside the judgment.

They say there was no evidence that
Mrs. Rein had authority to employ any
persons to assist her in her work; that

the plaintiff was not an employee but
was merely a volunteer. They say there
was no evidence of negligence on the
part of Mrs. Rein.

Plaintiff's evidence is to the effect
that Mrs. Rein was employed by Mr.
Hassman; that she was to see that
things were run correctly; that it was
a part of her duties to replace light
bulbs; that at previous times she had
had help in changing bulbs; that she
was looking after the building; that
she was the manager of the apart-
ment building.

The plaintiff, as a witness, testified
that Mrs. Rein requested him to help
her and that he cautioned her to hold
the ladder to keep it from falling; the
evidence shows that on December 30,
1949, it was dark, or approaching dark,
when the light bulb was being changed;
that it was misting and was probably
freezing on the steps. Mrs. Rein owed
plaintiff the duty to hold the ladder on
the frozen or freezing steps, especially
so, when she was cautioned by plaintiff
to do so. According to plaintiff’s testi-

445

mony she failed to continue to hold the
ladder and her failure to do so resulted
in his receiving the injury. Under this
testimony she was guilty of negligence,

Mrs. Rein, as the manager of the
building, evidently had authority to pro-
cure the plaintiff or any other person
to help her. In the case Caldwell v.
Crozier, 100 Okla. 175, 228 P. 974, on
which defendants rely, the person who
requested Crozier to assist in moving
the scaffold was an employee working
by the hour and was not a superintend-
ent or manager. The case of St. Louis
& S.F. R. Co. v. Bagwell, 33 Okla. 189,
124 P. 320, 40 LRA. (N.S.) 1180, is
more in point. In that case a conduc-
tor of a train requested help. We
held that the one requested by the con-
ductor became a servant of the com-
pany. Furthermore, Patton as a tenant
was interested in having the light over
the entrance to the building burning
to prevent injury to himself or to his
guest coming into the building or de-
parting therefrom after dark. This in-
terest would in any event remove him
from being classified as a volunteer.
Hughes v. Shanafelt, 203 Okla. 80, 218
P. 2d 350.

Defendants’ contention that the de-
murrers and motions for directed ver-
dict should have been sustained, is not
well taken. Special emphasis is placed
on the argument that it was error to
overrule the demurrer and motion for
directed verdict as to the defendant
Hassman. He is not in position to pre-
sent error: as. to him alone. The peti-
tion in error is joint and unless good
as to both, it is unavailable as to both.
Pepis v. Rector, 196 Okla. 489, 166 P.
2d 94.

The fact that the plaintiff was not
promised compensation for his services
does not prevent him from being a serv-
ant of the defendant. 35 Am. Jur. 591,
§163; W. H. Neill Co. v. Rumpf, 148
Ky. 810, 147 S.W. 910, L.R.A. 1917C,
1199.

Defendants say that plaintiff raised
no objection to the instructions given.
In his motion for a new trial he did not

446 Le

specifically complain of error in the
giving of instructions. In sustaining the
motion for a new trial, the trial court
said he was not basing it upon any
specific thing, but considering all the
circumstances, including the instruc-
tions of the court, he did not feel that
the plaintiff in the case had the fair
trial the law contemplates. It is not
necessary to make much comment of the
instructions, but we do note that one
instruction mentioned assumption of
risk. This was not pleaded. Contrib-
utory negligence was specially plead-
ed, but there is a clear distinction be-
tween these two defenses. Chicago,
RI. -& P. Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 60 Okla.
249, 159 P. 1132; St. Louis & S.F. Ry.
Co. v. Sears, 173 Okla. 483, 49 P. 2d
489. To be available as a defense, as-
sumption of risk must be expressly
pleaded. Shunkamolah v. Potter Delco,
131 Okla. 272, 268 P. 270.

The trial court was not limited by
the grounds mentioned in the motion
for new trial. In Reyes v. Goss, 205
Okla. 140, 235 P. 2d 950, we said:

“When a motion for new trial is sus-
tained the trial court is not limited

.to the grounds stated in the motion,

but has a broad latitude or discretion
which will not be disturbed by this
court, unless it is shown that the court
has acted arbitrarily or abused_ its
discretion, or has manifestly erred in
some pure, simple, and unmixed ques-
tion of law. * * *”

The granting of the new, trial does
not end the litigation. The trial court
feared the plaintiff had not had the
fair trial the law: contemplates; there-
fore, he vacated the judgment to put
the parties in the position they were
before the case was tried. In Harper
v. Pratt; 193 Okla. 86, 141 P. 2d 562, in
the syllabus, we said:

“The granting of a new trial being

so much within the discretion of the
trial court, this court will not reverse

an order of such court granting a new
trial, unless error is clearly established
in respect to some pure, simple and
unmixed question of law.

“The judge who presides at the trial
of a case, hears the testimony of the
witnesses, observes their demeanor, and
has a full knowledge of the proceedings
had and done during the process of the
trial, is in a better position to know
whether or not substantial justice has
been done than any other person. Where
such judge sustains a motion for a new
trial, it will require a clear showing of
manifest error and an abuse of discretion
before the appellate court will be justi-
fied in reversing such ruling of the
trial court.

“As the granting of a new trial only
places the parties in a position to have
the issues between them again sub-
mitted to a jury or court, the show-
ing for reversal should be much strong-
er where the error assigned is the
granting of a new trial than where it
is the refusal.”

Under the rules announced in the
foregoing cases, and in many other
cases cited in West Oklahoma Digest
under the heading of Appeal and Error,
Key No. 977 (3) and New Trial, Key
No. 6, we hold that the trial court did
not commit error in granting a new
trial.

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed and the cause remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.

This court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Wm S. Hamilton, Frank
T. McCoy, and John T. Craig, who as
Special Masters aidéd in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
court.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
HALLEY, C.J., dissents.

NASALROAD et ux. v. GAYHART et al.
No. 35536. May 12, 1953,
257 P. 2d 299.

A. R. Swank, A. R. Swank, Jr., and
Chilton Swank, Stillwater, for plaintiffs
in error,

447

Schwoerke & Schwoerke, Oklahoma
City, and Guy L. Horton, Stillwater,
for defendants in error.

DAVISON, J. This is a proceeding in
habeas corpus brought by Ervin L. Na-
salroad and Rebecca Nasalroad against
Carnie C. Gayhart and Opal V. Gayhart
to obtain the custody of a minor male
child of the age of seven years.

Petitioner Rebecca Nasalroad is the
mother of the child and Ervin Nasal-
road is her husband. Respondent Opal
Gayhart is a half-sister of Ervin Nasal-
road.

The trial court denied the writ and
rendered judgment in favor of respond~
ents.

Petitioners appeal and assert that the
judgment is not sustained by the evi-
dence and is contrary to law.

The evidence shows that petitioners
were married December 20, 1940. Er-
vin Nasalroad was at that time in the
United States Army and was stationed
at Ft. Sam Houston, Texas. He was
sent overseas in June of 1942. Mrs. Na-
salroad lived at Stillwater, Oklahoma,
during his absence. He returned home
in April, 1945. Upon his return he dis-
covered that his wife was pregnant.
She gave birth to the child, the subject
of this controversy, on July 16, 1945.
About a week after its birth custody
was given to the respondents herein
who have had its custody ever since.

There is a conflict in the evidence as
to the circumstances under which cus-
tody of the child was obtained by re-
spondents. The weight of the evidence,
however, shows that Mrs. Nasalroad
solicited and frequently requested re-
spondents to take custody of and rear
the child; that after some hesitation
they agreed to do so. Several letters
written by petitioners to respondents
strongly tend to support the above state
of facts.

The child was born in a hospital at
Cushing, Oklahoma. Mrs. Nasalroad
left the hospital July 23, 1945, and
went to Tulsa. On the day she left the

448

hospital she and her husband signed a
written agreement whereby they agreed
that custody of the child should be giv-
en to respondents and the child should
be adopted by them. Petitioners both
testify that they did not read the docu-
ment and did not know its contents at
the time they signed it; that it was
represented to them that the document
was an application to obtain a ration
book for the child. They, however, both
testified that it-was the understanding
and agreement that respondents were
to have temporary custody of the child
for a period of about six weeks and
that it would then be determined as
to whether they should adopt the child.
After the agreement was signed, re-
spondents took custody of the child and
named it Dwayne Gayhart. This agree-
ment was signed July 23, 1945. On the
27th day of December, 1945, Mrs. Nasal-
road wrote a letter to the respondents,
in which among other things she said:

«# * * T do think a lot of you for you’re
the mother & father of Dwayne & I do
know that you all think the world of
Dwayne. He is a wonderful baby and I
do love him so very much. We will all
be happy beings you told me what you
would do. It is so hard to write on
paper. I just want both of you not to
worry.

“Please come whenever you can.
Don’t be afraid I do want you & Carnie
to have Dwayne. * * *”

We think this letter shows quite
conclusively that petitioners knew when
they signed the agreement that it was
an adoption agreement and they were
willing at that time for respondent to
have custody of and adopt the child.
However, thereafter, for reasons shown
by the record not necessary here to dis-
cuss, they changed their minds, and on
March 25, 1953, brought this action to
obtain custody of the child.

The record discloses that the unfor-
tunate circumstances above disclosed
did not cause a separation between Mr.
and Mrs. Nasalroad, but that they con-
tinued to live together as man and
wife and that thereafter two children

were born to them, one of which was
six years of age at “the time of the
trial and the other four years of age.
Mr. Nasalroad testified that he is will-
ing to take the child in his home and
care for it and treat it the same as if
it were his own. We do not doubt that
he would make a conscientious effort
to do so but we doubt the possibility of
his doing so. The presence of this child
would undoubtedly constitute a constant
reminder to him of the unfortunate cir-
cumstance which occurred in his mar-
ried life and it is very probable that
he would not have the same love and af-
fection for the child as he would have
for the two children of which he is the
father. This is a circumstance which
the trial court had a right to take into
consideration in arriving at its con-
clusion.

It is contended by petitioners that
Mrs. Nasalroad, being the mother of the
child, has a prior right to its custody
and that she may not be deprived of
that right in the absence of a showing
that she is not a fit and proper person
to have its custody, or that the best in-
terests of the child require that its
custody be placed elsewhere. This is a
correct statement of law. We have many
times so held. Potter v. Potter, 203
Okla. 236, 219 P. 2d 1011; Ex parte Wal-
lace, 206 Okla. 66, 241 P. 2d 192; Ex
parte Harley, 207 Okla. 71, 247 P. 2d
508. The trial court, however, found
that the best interests of the child re-
quired that it remain with respondents.

It is further contended by petitioners,
assuming that the adoption agreement
was freely and voluntarily entered
into between the parties, it is neverthe-
less of no force and effect for the rea-
son that children are not chattels and
not subject to barter or sale. This is
undoubtedly true but the fact that a
parent has relinquished the custody of
his child should be given due consid-
eration in determining whether it
should be returned to the parent. Ha-
mann v. Miesner, 148 Okla. 50, 297 P.
252; Osburn v. Roberts, 197 Okla. 206,
169 P. 2d 293; Potter v. Potter, supra.

The evidence shows that respondents
are fit and proper persons to have the
eare and custody of the child; that they
are deeply devoted to the child and
have no children of their own and that
the child is being well treated and
eared for by them.

The trial court after considering all
the facts and circumstances in evidence
found that the best interests of the child
require that its custody remain in re-
spondents and entered judgment ac-
cordingly.

We cannot say that the judgment ren-
dered is clearly against the weight of
the evidence. It will, therefore, not be
disturbed on appeal. Ex parte Thom-
as, 205 Okla. 451, 238 P. 2d 806; Morri-
son v. Morrison, 197 Okla. 620, 173 P. 2d
919.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C. J.. JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, ARNOLD, O’NEAL, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. WELCH and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., dissent.

BRASHEARS v. EDWARDS.
No. 35482. May 12, 1953.
257 P. 2d 295.

449

King & Wadlington, Ada, for plaintiff
in error.

McArthur & Orton, Ada, for defend-
ant in error.

ARNOLD, J. On October 7, 1949, var-
ious plaintiffs as holders of promissory
notes executed by the defendant, Okla-
homa Silica Sand Company, Inc. filed
this action to foreclose the mortgage
given on the personal property of said
defendant as security for said promis-
sory notes. Blanche Brashears, plaintiff
in error here, was made a party de-
fendant because it was alleged that
she claimed some right, title, or in-
terest in the mortgaged property. She
was the owner of certain real estate
situated in Murray county, containing
approximately 66 acres, upon which
the mortgaged personal property was
located. Oklahoma Silica Sand Com-
pany, Inc., held a mining lease for the
mining of silica sand upon this 66-
acre tract, and also held a separate
lease on the surface of a tract of 2.2
acres located in a corner of this 66-acre
tract.

At the time plaintiffs brought the suit
to foreclose the mortgage Oklahoma
Silica Sand Company was in receiver-
ship in the district court of Pontotoc
county and plaintiffs obtained permis-
sion from that court to file their cause
of action in the district court of Mur-
ray county against the receiver for said
company.

On November 30, 1949, Blanche Bra-
shears filed her answer disclaiming any
interest in the personal property which
was the subject of the foreclosure ac-

450

tion and situated on her real estate and
her cross-petition against the plaintiffs
and all her codefendants except the re-
ceiver of Oklahoma Silica Sand Com-
pany, Inc., seeking to cancel the above-
mentioned surface lease covering 2.2
acres which she had given to Oklahoma
Silica Sand Company, Inc., and to quiet
title to her real estate. As grounds for
such cancellation she alleged failure
of consideration; that the principal
consideration for the execution of
the surface lease was the development
of the whole 66-acre tract under the
mining lease; that the land had not been
developed; that the mining lease pro-
vided for payment of semi-annual rents
to keep it in force and effect; that be-
cause of failure to pay the delay rentals
the mining lease was canceled by decree
of the district court of Murray county on
November 9, 1948, in cause No. 7489.

Plaintiffs thereafter dismissed their
foreclosure action without prejudice.
Blanche Brashears did not dismiss her
eross-petition to quiet title. After the
filing of her cross-petition, and on May
3, 1950, she obtained permission from
the district court of Pontotoc county to
sue the receiver of Oklahoma Silica
Sand Company, Inc., on the cause of
action set up by her in her cross-peti-
tion. On March 20, 1951, she filed an ap-
plication to make the new receiver and
certain named assignees of the assets
of Oklahoma Silica Sand Company, Inc.,
additional parties defendant, which
was granted. All additional defendants,
except David J. Edwards, filed their
disclaimers; David J. Edwards filed
answer denying generally all allegations
of Brashears except those specifically
admitted and alleging that he and the
other named defendants, now dis-
claimers, purchased all the assets of
the Oklahoma Silica Sand Company,
Inc., at receiver’s sale, which was con-
firmed; that thereafter said named dis-
claiming defendants sold their interests
to him; and thereafter an assignment
was made by the new receiver specif-
ically assigning him all right, title, and
interest of Oklahoma Silica Sand Com-
pany, Inc., to the surface lease in ques-

tion; that said assignment was ap-
proved by the district court of Pontotoc
county. He attached copies of order
confirming receiver’s sale, bills of sale
of the other named defendants to him,
and order confirming the above-men-
tioned assignment of the surface lease
to his answer.

Blanche Brashears filed a reply to
the answer of David J. Edwards alleg-
ing that the district court of Pontotoc
county with knowledge of her ciaam had
confirmed the receiver’s sale and as-
signment by the receiver to defendant
Edwards of the surface lease subject
and without prejudice to her claim.

The case went to trial on the issues
made up between cross-petitioner Bra-
shears and defendant Edwards.

In support of the allegations of her
cress-pétition the evidence of Brashears
shows that in December, 1942, she was
approached by one Gould for a mining
lease on the 66-acre tract for the pur-
pose of mining silica sand; that she
gave him said mining lease; that she
later learned that she did not have com-
plete fee title to the land, which she and
her brothers and sisters had inherited
from her mother and that it would be
necessary for her brothers and sisters
to join her in executing the lease; that
she obtained quitclaim deeds from her
brothers and sisters to the surface of
the land, but that they retained their
respective mineral interests therein;
that on July 1, 1943, she signed a new
mining lease for the mining of silica
sand in favor of C. W. Gould, and said
lease was then sent to her various
brothers and sisters for their signa-
tures, the last signature being obtained
on July 9, 1943; that said lease pro-
vided, among other things, that it should
remain in force and effect for a term of
10 years or as long thereafter as sand
was found in paying quantities, that
lessee should begin operations within
six months from the date of the lease,
or, in the alternative, should pay delay
rentals of $200 for the privilege of de~
ferring commencement of operations
for a further six-months period, and that
a like deferment might be had for

the same number of months succes-
sively upon the payment of like sum;
that on July 10, 1948, she gave a sur-
face lease on 2.2 acres out of this 66-
acre tract to Oklahoma Silica Sand
Company, Inc., which recited that it
was given subject to the terms and
conditions of the mineral lease thereto-
fore given to C. W. Gould covering this
and other lands; that said surface lease
provided as consideration for the leas-
ing of said premises the payment of
$102 rental per year, payable at the
rate of $8.50 per month, and further pro-
vided:

“It is further agreed by and between
the parties that said lessee shall have
the right to carry on any lawful busi-
ness or operation upon said land and
shall have the right to construct, erect,
and complete at its own cost and ex-
pense, at any time during the term
of said lease, any buildings, improve-
ments, switches, pipe lines, phone and
power lines, and any other structures
that may be necessary or convenient
in the operation of any lawful business
carried on by lessee on said property;

that the primary term of said lease was
25 years from the date of the execution
thereof with the option to renew the
lease for an additional 25 years under
the same terms, conditions and rent-
als provided for in the lease; that the
mining lease was delivered to C. W.
Gould at the same time that the sur-
face lease in question was executed
and delivered; that C. W. Gould was
the secretary of Oklahoma Silica Sand
Company, Inc., at this time; that there
was no development under the mining
lease had on the land; that C. W.
Gould and his assigns paid the delay
rentals provided for in the mining lease
for a time and then ceased paying such
rentals; that she brought suit in the
district court of Murray county, cause
No, 7489, styled Blanche Brashears et
al. v. C. W. Gould et al., to cancel the
mining lease on the grounds of failure
to pay delay rentals; a copy of the
journal entry was introduced in evidence
which showed that said mining lease
was canceled on November 9, 1948, be-

451

cause of failure to pay delay rentals and
all defendants in that case, including
Oklahoma Silica Sand Company, Inc.,
and its receiver, were perpetually en-
joined from asserting any interest in
said 66-acre tract under said sand min-
ing lease; copies of the mining lease and
the surface lease were introduced and
received in evidence; that Oklahoma
Silica Sand Company, Inc., had erected
various buildings and had placed various
other personal property upon the 2.2
acres covered by the surface lease and
had conducted a business of processing
silica sand from other properties but
had started no mining operations on the
tract of land; that Gould had told her
that he would need a surface lease for a
place to put the processing plant as
well as the mining lease to mine the
land.

Judging from the wholly unsatisfac-
tory proof of Brashears and statements
of her counsel to the court she wanted
to prove that a part of the considera-
tion for the surface lease on the small
acreage mentioned was the develop-
ment of the 66-acre tract. The court
stopped the counsel of plaintiff from
pursuing the inquiry on the theory that
testimony to this effect would be in-
competent because in violation of the
parol evidence rule in that it would con-
stitute an effort to change the terms of a
written instrument by parol. Brashears
excepted to the rulings of the court but
made no offer of proof which showed
evidence of any such state of facts.

The court did allow her to testify that
she gave the surface lease so that
silica sand could be mined from the
66-acre tract; that if she had known
Gould would not mine the sand she
would not have given the surface lease;
that it was her understanding that he
would develop the whole tract; that the
rental payments on the surface lease
were not regularly made; that upon ad-
vice of her attorney she refused to ac-
cept any rentals due under the surface
lease after April, 1947, although she ad-
mitted that the rentals had been ten-
dered to her. She offered in evidence a
statement prepared by her showing un-

452

paid rentals due under the surface lease
to November, 1948, in the amount of
$331.50, but on cross-examination iden-
tified canceled checks made payable to
and endorsed by her showing receipt of
rentals through April, 1947, after which
date she refused to accept any more
rentals on the ground that the surface
lease was void because of failure to
mine the land.

At the close of cross-petitioner Bra-
shear’s testimony, defendant David J.
Edwards interposed a demurrer to the
evidence which was sustained over the
objections of Brashears. The court
found that defendant Edwards had ten-
dered all rentals due under the surface
lease and that Edwards by proper as-
signments was the owner of all right,
title and interest in said lease and that
said surface lease was in full force and
effect; that Edwards was entitled to the
use and occupation of the land covered
by the surface lease and to all rights
under the terms thereof; that the rent-
als due Blanche Brashears on said land
to and including October, 1951, amount-
ed to $459, and entered judgment in
accordance with said findings; defend-
ant Edwards was ordered to pay the
sum of $459 into court for the use and
benefit of cross-petitioner Brashears,
which was done. The court quieted title
in Brashears in the surface and an un-
divided one-third interest in the min-
eral rights in said 2.2 acres, her share
as an heir, against the plaintiffs and all
other defendants subject to the right
and title of defendant Edwards under
said surface lease.

From order overruling motion for
new trial cross-petitioner Brashears
brings this appeal.

Plaintiff in error contends that the
court erred in refusing and ruling out
evidence which would prove that the
surface lease was subject to and de-
pendent upon good faith performance
by the lessee of the mining lease and
that the surface lease should be can-
celed because of failure of considera-
tion in that there was no development
under the mining lease. In this connec-

tion she argues that parol evidence
may be introduced either to show a
separate parol agreement constituting
a condition precedent to the taking ef-
fect of a written contract or that there
is a collateral agreement which consti-
tutes a part of the consideration of the
written agreement or operates as an
inducement for entering into it and it
appears that the writing was executed
on the faith of the oral agreement.

Neither the mining lease nor the sur-
face lease is in any way ambiguous.
Under the mining lease the company
could keep its lease in full force and ef-
fect by the payment of delay rentals.
To impose the duty to mine would ef-
fectively cut off the privilege thereof
to continue the validity of the lease
without development by the payment
of delay rentals. Testimony of the
character sought to be proven would be
contrary to and in variation of the priv-
ileges conferred and duties imposed
under the mining lease.

Under the surface lease according to
the terms therein expressed the lessee
had the right to conduct “any lawful
business” thereon and therefore could
process thereon sand mined from any-
where, including the tract covered by
the mining lease. There is a definite
and stated consideration in the lease,
to wit: payment of annual rental in
the amount of $102. Testimony of the
character offered and excluded by the
court would supply an additional and
different consideration than that specif-
ically set forth in the lease. Where the
contract states the amount, and the
manner and means by which, and
the time when the consideration is to
be paid, parol evidence is inadmissible
to show a different consideration from
that expresssed in the contract. See
Warren v. Pulley, 193 Okla. 88, 141 P.
2d 288; Thompson v. E. W. Jones, Inc.,
189 Okla. 480, 118 P. 2d 196; Reed v.
Moore, 54 Okla. 354, 154 P. 348; Halsey
v. Minnesota-South Carolina Land &
Timber Co., 174 S.C. 97, 177 S.E. 29,
100 A.L.R. 1.

Plaintiff in error urges that the court
erred in sustaining the demurrer of de-

fendant to her evidence because she
states there was some evidence which
might indicate failure of consideration,
and that a demurrer admits every fact
which the evidence in the slightest de-
gree tends to prove together with all
inferences and conclusions which may
be reasonably drawn therefrom. With-
out the character of evidence which the
trial court rightfully excluded as being
in violation of the parol evidence rule,
there was no evidence to show that
there was a failure of consideration as
to the surface lease or failure to pay
rentals entitling her to cancellation. De-
murrer to the evidence was properly
sustained.

Plaintiff in error further contends that
the court did not correctly determine
the amount of rentals past due under
the terms of the surface lease. The evi-
dence clearly sustains the finding of the
court on this point.

Affirmed.

ATCHLEY v. BOARD OF BARBER
EXAMINERS OF STATE et al.

No. 35475. May 12, 1953.

257 P. 2d 302.

453

* C. W. Schwoerke, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

George Miskovsky, and Leon S. Hirsh,
Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, a bar-
ber and the operator of a barber shop,
sought injunction to prevent the defend-
ants, the Board of Barber Examiners
and its secretary, from proceeding
against the plaintiff by criminal com-
plaint, or in civil action for the viola-
tion of rules promulgated by the Board.

‘The case was presented on a stipula-
tion of facts which reflects that the

454 Ee

Board, under the direction of the State
Commissioner of Health, prescribed cer-
tain rules and regulations known as
“Sanitary Requirements for Barber
Shops.” The secretary of said board
made complaint against the defendant
which resulted in a criminal action
charging the plaintiff with violation of
one of the certain rules, prescribed as
aforesaid. The plaintiff had committed
the act charged in the criminal com-
plaint as being a violation of said cer-
tain rules. The secretary of said board
has told the plaintiff that he will con-
tinue to seek the filing of criminal
charges against all known offenders of
said rules, and also will attempt other
legal steps to enforce compliance with
said rules, including the filing of an
injunction action to close the barber
shop of any persistent offender. The
plaintiff has suffered pecuniary loss by
the action of defendants and will con-
tinue to suffer pecuniary loss there-
from.

In argument for reversal of the judg-
ment denying the application for an in-
junction, the plaintiff contends that the
Board of Barber Examiners has no
statutory authority to prescribe sani-
tary requirements for barber shops and
barbers working therein.

Notice is taken of 59 O.S. 1941 877,
59 O.S. 1951 §77, which provides:

“The Board of Barber Examiners
shall have authority to, and shall, un-
der the direction of the State Commis-
sioner of Health, prescribe sanitary
requirements for barber shops, and
barbers and apprentice barbers work-
ing therein. Any person operating a
barber shop who knowingly permits
said sanitary requirements to be vio-
lated, and any person, whether or not a
registered barber or apprentice bar-
ber, violating said sanitary require-
ments shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction be punished by a
fine of not more than One Hundred
($100.00) Dollars. * * * ”

The provisions of section 77, supra,
were first embodied in an Act of the
Legislature in 1933, Laws 1933, ch. 60,
p. 110, §6. In 1937 the Legislature

passed an act of declared purpose to
regulate and contro] the barber indus-
try. Laws 1936-1937, ch. 24, art. 2, p.
48. In September, 1937, in the case of
State v. Pyle, 62 Okla. Cr. 411, 71 P. 24
997, it was held that with the passage
of the said 1937 Act, the said 1933 Act
was repealed. In 1941 the Legislature
authorized a compilation of the statutes
of the state then in force. Laws 1941, p.
458, 75 O.S. 1941 §101 et seq. The pro-
visions of section 77, supra, with title
and section numbers as noted, were em-
bodied in the compilation. In an Act of
the Legislature of 1943, Laws 1943, p.
252, Title 75, ch. 4. §1, the said compila-
‘tion was declared to be “adopted and
made of force as the Code and Revised
Statutes of the State of Oklahoma to be
known as ‘Oklahoma Statutes 1941,’

Perera

The plaintiff contends the 1943 Act,
supra, did not effect a valid enactment,
or re-enactment of section 77, supra,
in view of the Pyle decision, supra, and
the history of said section, and the lim-
ited authority of the compilers of the
statutes under the 1941 Act.

The plaintiff cites Thomas v. State,
83 Okla. Cr. 25, 172 P. 2d 651; Ex parte
Olden, 88 Okla. Cr. 56, 199 P. 2d 228,
and Harrigill v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. 347,
214 P. 2d 263, of syllabus expression,
as follows:

“Where one was authorized to codify
existing laws but the authority was ex-
pressly withheld to include any statute
which had been ‘repealed’ ‘or held un-
constitutional by the highest courts’ and
such a statute was inadvertently in-
cluded, adoption of statutes did not
have effect of validating the statute in-
advertently included.”

It appears from examination of the
Thomas case, supra, that the issues
therein were determined on considera-
tion of a statutory provision which was
included in the 1941 compilation, and
which statute in its substantive provi-
sions had theretofore been held violative
of the Constitution. Said the court:

«“ * * * There was no reason for the
codifiers to include this section in the

statutes of 1941, as it could not be effec-
tive if placed therein. * * *”

In the Olden and Harrigill cases, su-
pra, the issues were determined with
consideration to the intent of the Legis-
lature as affecting the construction to
be given certain enactments relating to
the same subject.

In these cases cited by the plaintiff
we are without benefit of a direct deci-
sion on the precise point that is herein
presented. Here we are concerned about
a statute held repealed and thereafter
included in a compilation, which com-
pilation was adopted by Act of the
Legislature as the “Code and Revised
Statutes of the State.” The question pre-
sented is whether or not the statute was
thereby re-enacted and made operative.

In the Thomas case, supra, it was
said by the court:

“We have examined the case of At-
las Life Insurance Co. v. Rose, 196
Okla. 592, 166 P. 2d 1011, * * *, and
think there is a distinction to be drawn
between that case and this one, inas-
much as the statute there referred to
had been declared unconstitutional by
reason of a defective title only, and not
the law itself.”

In Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Rose, supra,
reference is made to an Act of the Leg-
islature which had been held unconsti-
tutional because of defective title, and
which Act in its substantive provision
was included in the 1941 compilation
of statutes; and said the court:

«# ®# * The provision, however, was
re~enacted by the Legislature in 1943
when it adopted the Statutes of Okla-
homa, 1941, as the law of the state and
such provision is now in full force and
effect. * * *”

In the Thomas case, supra, by the
reference to the Rose case, supra, there
appears to be a recognition of the pos-
sibility of a new enactment resulting
from the adoption of a compilation con-
taining a section theretofore not in force
and effect. In this view it becomes ap-
parent that the syllabus expression,
of the Thomas case, and as

supra,

455

adopted in the Olden and Harrigill
cases, was intended as an expression of
limited application, and of applica-
tion in the determination of the intent
of the Legislature when the subject mat-
ter of a statute is such as to present
a question of inadvertence or the lack
of intent of enactment.

In Ex parte Haley, 202 Okla. 101, 210
P. 2d 653, there was an adherence to the
expression of the Rose case, supra. In
the Haley case it was held that upon
passage of the 1943 Act adopting the
1941 Code, such Code, and all the sec~
tions therein contained, thereafter be-
came the law of the state, including
a certain numbered section, though
such section may not have been in
force and effect prior thereto. Said the
court:

«“* * * The general rule is that where
by legislative enactment a Code Com-
mission is created and such commis-
sion is authorized and empowered to
compile and codify statutes of the state
then in force, and the Legislature
thereafter adopts the Code so com-
piled and prepared by the commission
as the law of the state, such Code and
all laws therein contained thereafter be-
come the law of the state, although
the commission may have inserted
therein sections containing new matter,
or sections theretofore repealed, con-
trary to the provisions of the act creating
the commission and authorizing the
compilation, * * * ”

We adhere to the above pronounce-
ment and, with application herein, hold
that section 77, supra, though once re-
pealed, was legally re-enacted and be-
came operative when the Legislature
by Act of 1943 adopted the 1941 statutes.

The plaintiff contends the statute,
section 77, supra, is void in that it vio-
lates the Constitution which vests the
law-making power in the Legislature
and inhibits a delegation of the leg-
‘islative power to an administrative
board.

“In order that a court may be justi-
fied in holding a statute unconstitu-
tional as a delegation of legislative
power, it must appear that the power
involved is purely legislative in nature,

456

pertaining exclusively to the legislative
department, and not one merely inci-
dental to some of the administrative
powers for the exercise of which a
board or commission was created.” 42
ven Jur. Public Administrative’ Law,
43.

In 59 O.S, 1941 §61 et seq. (59 O.S.
1951 §61 et seq.), there is provision for
the creation of a State Board of Bar-
ber Examiners with power to conduct
examination and issue certificates of
registration to those desiring to prac-
tice the trade of barber, upon consid-
eration that the applicant has shown a
prescribed physical fitness and in oral
and physical demonstration has shown
himself possessed of skill in the trade of
barbering, “including a knowledge of
an ability to use asceptic and anti-
septic preparation and tools ordinarily
used in practicing of said trade, and is
possessed of a sufficient knowledge con-
cerning the common diseases of the face,
head and skin to avoid the aggravation
or spreading thereof in the practice of
said trade.’ The practice of barbering
is defined. It is provided that no person
shall practice the trade of barber with-
out such certificate of registration, and
that such certificate be renewed annual-
ly; that the Board may refuse renewal or
suspend or revoke a certificate for gross
malpractice or gross incompetency, etc.;
that members of the Board or appointees
of the Board may inspect any barber-
shop during business hours to ascer-
tain whether there is compliance with
this Act and with the sanitary require-
ments prescribed by the Board.

It is thus apparent that the Legisla-
ture has declared a policy of regulat-
ing the practice of barbering or the
parber trade in the interest of the pub-
lic health, and with purpose of avoid-
ing the aggravation or spreading of
the diseases of the face, head, and skin,
in the practice of said trade, and that
the Board of Barber Examiners was
created to carry out such purpose and
policy. .

In 42 Am, Jur., Public Administrative
Law, §§49, 50, it is aptly stated:

“The Legislature, having declared its
policy and purpose and provided stand-
ards for the exercise of the power, may
confer upon administrative authorities
the power to enact rules and regulations
to promote the purpose and spirit of the
legislation and carry it into effect, and,
even though such rules and regulations
are given the force and effect of law,
there is no violation of the constitutional
inhibition against delegation of the leg-
islative function. The authority to make
rules to carry out a policy declared by
the lawmaker is administrative and not
legislative, even though the lawmaker
has provided that a violation of such
rules shall be punished as a public of-
fense. Such power is not the power to
make law, but the power to carry into
effect the will of the lawmaker as ex-
pressed by the statute, and its use by
administrative officers is essential to
the complete exercise of the powers of
all the departments. * * *

“§ 50. * * * the Legislature may
validly provide a criminal or penal sanc-
tion for the violation of the rules and
regulations which it may empower
administrative authorities to enact.”

In Associated Industries of Oklahoma
v. Industrial Welfare Comm., 185 Okla.
177, 90 P. 2d 899, it is said:

“Power to determine the policy of the
law is primarily legislative, and can-
not be delegated, whereas the power to
make rules of a subordinate character
in order to carry out that policy and
apply it to varying conditions, although
partaking of a legislative character, is
in its dominant aspect administrative
and can be delegated.”

The authority to make rules of sani-
tary practice for barbers and barber
shops provided by section 77, supra,
clearly contemplates a making of rules
to promote the purpose and spirit of
the legislation, 59 O.S. 1941 §61 et seq.,
supra; that is, the regulation of bar-
bering practices so as to avoid the
spread of diseases. Sanitation practices
to avoid the spread of diseases is the
standard prescribed for the exercise of
the rule-making power.

Inasmuch as a policy is laid down by
the Legislature and a standard is es-

tablished by statute, there is no uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative
power in leaving to the barber Board
the making of rules within such pre-
scribed limits, and the determination
of the facts to which the policy as de-
clared by the Legislature is to apply.
The authority to make rules to carry
out the policy declared by the Legis-
lature is administrative and not legis-
lative. Accordingly, upon consideration
of the provisions of 59 O.S. 1941 §61 et
seq., and including section 77, the terms
of section 77, supra, do not reflect a
violation of the constitutional inhibition
against delegation of the legislative
function.

Herein there is no evidence or charge
that the rules prescribed by the de-
fendant Board are unreasonable, ar-
bitrary or discriminatory, and there is
no charge of oppression in the acts of
the defendants other than that their
acts as officials, and affecting the plain-
tiff, were without statutory authority
or sanction. No basis for injunction
was shown.

The judgment for the defendants, and
denying the plaintiff's application for
injunction, is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, AR-
NOLD, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur.

De
GREESON v. GREESON.
No. 34634. April 7, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 12, 1953.
257 P. 2d 276.

457

for

George H. Jennings,
plaintiff in error.

Sapulpa,

Streeter Speakman, Jr., Sapulpa, for
defendant in error,

PER CURIAM. There is virtually no
dispute about the facts in this contro-
versy. On May 18, 1940, the plaintiff
in error, hereinafter referred to as
plaintiff, was granted a divorce from
the defendant in error, hereinafter re-
ferred to as defendant. She was given
the custody of the three then minor
sons of the parties and the defendant

458

was ordered to pay plaintiff $15 per
week for child support.

On February 15, 1941, the plaintiff
remarried and she, her husband and
the three minor childrén moved to
California where they resided at the
time of this trial. On September 17,
1942, the defendant enlisted in the U.S.
Navy where he served until his dis-
charge on September 18, 1945.

The defendant made no payments to
the plaintiff for the support of the chil-
dren which the divorce decree ordered
him to make. However, by virtue of
and during his service in the Navy the
plaintiff received from the United States
Government 10 monthly allotments of
$43.70 each and 10 monthly allotments
of $70 each.

During 1946 the oldest boy became
self-supporting and the parties com-
menced negotiations with reference to
the amount the defendant should pay
the plaintiff for the support of the two
younger boys. The plaintiff demanded
$50 and the defendant offered $30 per
month. The plaintiff consulted her attor-
ney in Richmond, California, and the
defendant consulted his attorney in
Sapulpa, Oklahoma. In an exchange of
letters between the attorneys it was
agreed that the defendant should pay
$40 per month, and to make the agree~
ment binding on both parties, the de-
fendant’s attorney suggested that the
matter be handled through an agreed
court order modifying the original de-
cree. He prepared and forwarded to
plaintiffs attorney a proposed order for
his and plaintiff's approval and for
plaintiff’s signature. After consulting
with and upon advice of her attorney
the plaintiff signed the proposed order
and it was returned to the defendant’s
attorney for presentation to the court.
On December 21, 1946, the court signed
the order so approved in writing by
the plaintiff and the defendant, which
is as follows:

“This matter coming on to be heard
on application of defendant, Ray Gree-
son, to modify divorce decree entered
in the above entitled cause on the 18th

day of May, 1940, in so far as it af-
fects the order for support for the chil-
dren of said marriage.

“And it appearing to the court that
the eldest child, to-wit, Charles Ray
Greeson, is now in the military service
of the United States and is self-sup-
porting and that the decree providing
for the payment of $60.00 a month
should be modified.

“It is therefore ordered, adjudged
and decreed by the court that said de-
cree be and the same is hereby modi-
fied awarding plaintiff the sum of $40.00
per month in lieu of all other sums
and in lieu of the $15.00 per week pro-
vided for therein, the first payment of
$40.00 to be paid on January 1, 1947,
and on the first day of each month
thereafter until further order of the
court.

“Done in open court this 21st day of
December, 1946.

“C, C. Beaver, District Judge.
“O.Kd
“Opal Greeson
“Ray T. Greeson”

Following the entry of the above
agreed order and commencing Janu-
ary 1, 1947, to and including Septem-
ber 3, 1949, the defendant paid the
plaintiff $40 each month, except three
payments which the plaintiff said she
did not receive.

On August 20, 1949, the second son of
the parties was married and became
self-supporting, and on September 23,
1949, the defendant filed a motion to
modify the agreed order of December
21, 1946, by reducing the payments
from $40 to $25 per month in view of
the change in condition. The plaintiff
filed a response to this motion and
also filed an application for an order
determining the amount of unpaid in-
stallments which matured between May
18, 1940, the date of the divorce decree,
and January 1, 1947, as well as the
amount unpaid under the agreed order
of December 21, 1946, and prayed for
judgment against the defendant for the
amount so found to be due.

After introduction of evidence estab-
lishing the above facts, the trial court
rendered judgment modifying the or-
der of December 21, 1946, by reducing
the amount of child support from $40
to $30 per month, and also rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for
$120, being the amount of 3 install-
ments under the order of December 21,
1946, which the court found to have
been unpaid. No complaint is made
about this part of the judgment. The
trial court further found “that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover any
further sum” and refused to render
judgment for any of the unpaid install-
ments which accrued prior to Decem-
ber 21, 1946, the date of the agreed
order. It is from this part of the judg-
ment that plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff contends that the order of
December 21, 1946, insofar as it oper-
ates retroactively to relieve the de-
fendant of liability for the unpaid in-
stallments accrued prior to the entry of
the order, is void because the court
was without authority to make such an
order.

With this contention we agree. Under
12 O.S. 1941 §1277, the court has au-
thority to modify an order for child
support prospectively. The court does
not have authority to make the modi-
fying order operate retroactively
Sango v. Sango, 121 Okla. 283, 249 P.
925; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 192 Okla.
564, 137 P. 2d 914. Therefore, if the
order of December 21, 1946, had been
entered by the court upon the merits
after a trial of the issues, it would
have been void insofar as it had the
effect of relieving the defendant of lia-
bility for unpaid installments accrued
up to the time of the entry of the order.

However, it is agreed that the order
of December 21, 1946, was a consent or-
der entered by the court upon the
agreement and consent of the parties.
While in its retroactive aspect it is
void as a court order, yet being a con-
sent order, it is in the nature of a con-
tract, and in the absence of fraud or
mistake, is a binding obligation be-

459

tween the parties thereto. In Cobb v.
Killingsworth, 77 Okla. 186, 187 P. 477,
this court said:

“Tt is true that without her consent
this part of the judgment would prob-
ably have been void, and subject to
collateral attack. But a judgment by
consent is regarded in the nature of a
contract, ***”

and in the same case, the court, quot-
ing from Freeman on Judgments, said:

“ *& judgment by consent is regarded
as in the nature of a contract and bind-
ing obligation between the parties there-
to, which neither, in the absence of
fraud or mistake, has the right to set
aside and disregard, and which as
against each is a waiver of errors and
irregularities, and when such consent
judgment embraces matters or extends
to relief not involved within nor re-
sponsive to the issues in the case, it,
with respect to such matters and relief,
no doubt partakes more of the character
of a voluntary agreement between the
parties than of a judgment of the court
determining a controversy between
real litigants.’ ”

In Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va.
458, 197 S.E. 426, the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals said:

“Hence, as a judgment settling prop-
erty rights in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing, the order, to the extent indicated,
is void, but, having been entered by
consent, it is evidence of binding con-
tractual obligations.”

Plaintiff contends that the order of
December 21, 1946, regarded as a con-
tract between the parties, is not sus-
ceptible to a construction which would
eliminate defendant’s liability for un-
paid installments accrued prior to the
entry of the order. An agreed judgment
is in the nature of a contract and is to
be construed as other contracts. Gray-
son v. Pure Oil Co., 189 Okla. 550, 118
P. 2d 644; Insurance Service Co., v.
Finegan, 196 Okla. 441, 165 P. 2d 620.
The intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from the writing alone, if
possible. 15 O.S. 1941 §155. The plaintiff
testified that when she signed the order
of December 21, 1946, it was not her

460

intention to relieve the defendant of
the payments he owed under the di-
voree decree. The defendant testified
to a contrary intention. This was the
only disputed fact between the parties.
However, in Hicks v. Mid-Kansas Oil
& Gas Co., 182 Okla. 61, 76 P. 2d 269,
this court held:

“A contract is to be interpreted to
give effect to the mutual intention of
the parties at the time of contracting,
and in so doing the language used gov-
erns if it is clear and does not involve
an absurdity. The meaning of a con-
tract is to be ascertained from the writ-
ing alone, if possible, the duty of the
court being to declare the meaning of
what is written in the instrument, not
what was intended to be written.”

It is also the rule that the whole of a
contract is to be taken together so as to
give effect to every part if reasonably
practical, each clause helping to inter-
pret the other. 15 O.S. 1941 §157; Ed~
mundson v. State ex rel. Johnson, 181
Okla. 150, 73 P. 2d 150.

Viewing the order of December 21,
1946, in the nature of a contract, and
construing it in the light of the forego-
ing by ascertaining the intent of the
parties from the writing alone and giv-
ing effect to every part thereof, the
provision in the order that the divorce
decree is modified by awarding the
plaintiff $40 per month “in lieu of all
other sums and in lieu of the $15 per
week provided for therein” can have
no other meaning than that it was the
intention of the parties to relieve the
defendant from any liability for unpaid
installments accrued prior to the date
of the order. The order recites that it
is in lieu of all “other sums”. What
“other sums?” No other sums could
have been intended than those that had
been unpaid at the time of the ap-
proval of the order. No other sums
were due. Nor could it be said that the
provision for $40 per month was in-
tended to be only in lieu of the $15
per week provided for in the divorce
decree, because the agreed order speci-
fically states that it is in lieu of both
“all other sums” and “in lieu of the

$15 per week.” By adopting the con-
struction urged upon us by the plain-
tiff, the court would not be giving ef-
fect to every part of the agreed order,
but would actually be required to dis-
regard an express provision thereof.

It is not contended that the plaintiff
did not understand the import of the
consent order or that her consent there-
to was obtained by fraud or mistake.
She signed the order after consulta-
tion with and upon advice of her attor-
ney. Thereafter, for a period of almost
three years, she received $40 per month
pursuant to that order and at no time
during that entire period did she even
intimate that the defendant owed her
for installments accrued prior to the
consent order. The inference is justi-
fied that plaintiff construed the consent
order as relieving the defendant of lia-
bility for unpaid installments accrued
prior to the order. It is said in 31 Am.
Jur., p. 107, §462:

“The application to judgments of the
rule of practical construction, that a
construction adopted by the interested
parties, especially if acquiesced in for
a long time, will not be departed from
by the court except for strong rea-
sons, has peculiar force where a judg-
ment by consent is involved.”

The entire record discloses sufficient
evidence that the consent order of De~
cember 21, 1946, was intended to and
did relieve the defendant of liability
for unpaid installments accrued prior
to the order. The trial court so found
and the record sustains the finding.
Judgment afffirmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Philip N. Landa, Joseph
L. Hull, Jr., and Jack N. Hays, who as
Special Masters aided in the preparation
of this opinion. These attorneys were
recommended by the Oklahoma Bar
Association, approved by the Judicial
Council, and appointed by the Court.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. WELCH, J.,
dissents.

WELCH, J. (dissenting). I do not
think the language of the journal entry
can properly be construed as constitut-
ing or expressing an agreement by
plaintiff to remit or cancel past install-
ments unpaid. I believe plaintiff en-
titled to collect back payments within
the applicable statute of limitations.

CARPENTER ELECTRIC CO. et al.
v. DRENNAN et al.

No. 35564, May 19, 1953.
257 P. 2a 510.

Pierce, Mock & Duncan, Oklahoma
City, for petitioners.

Lewis M. Watson, Ada, and Mac. Q.
Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. Sherman Drennan,
hereinafter called claimant, filed his
first notice of injury and claim for
compensation stating that he sustained
an accidental injury while employed by
Carpenter Electric Company. An award
was made against the employer and its
insurance carrier and this proceeding is
brought to review that award.

Claimant, Sherman Drennan, testi-
fied that he is employed as an electri-
cian’s helper for the Carpenter Elec-
trie Company; that on September 23,

461

1950, he was sent by his employer to a
farm to load some sacks of wheat and
while loading the wheat sustained his
injury. There is no contention that his
work at the time of the injury had any
direct connection with his duties as an
employee of the Electric Company.

Edward Carpenter testified that he is
the owner of the Carpenter Electric
Company; that he is also engaged in
farming; that claimant was employed
as an electrician’s helper and engaged
in farming; that claimant was em-
ployed as an electrician’s helper and
engaged generally with his duties
in connection with the Carpenter
Electric Company; that on September
23, 1950, Carpenter sent claimant to a
farm operated by Carpenter’s father to
load some wheat; that in addition to
the duties of claimant as an employee
of his Electric Company claimant also
works on the farm when directed and
requested by Carpenter. Carpenter fur-"
ther testified that he furnished a payroll
to insurer covering all of his employees;
that he intended to purchase a contract
from insurer covering all of his em-
ployees in whatever work they per-
formed and so advised insurer; that he
paid claimant $1.10 per hour as wages.

The cause and extent of the disability
in the case under consideration are not
in issue.

In two separate propositions the in-
surer argues, first, that the contract is
limited to the employees of the Carpen-
ter Electric Company and does not cov-
er employments other than~ therein
listed; second, that there is no ground
for estoppel in this case as the contract
of insurance is limited to the particular
employment of claimant. We shall dis-
cuss these two propositions together.
It is conceded that Maryland Casualty
Company issued a policy to the em-
ployer which was in force at the time
of the accident and upon which claim-
ant’s wages were used in computing
the premiums collected. Petitioners re-
sist the award solely upon the ground
that when claimant was injured he was
not engaged in any act incident to and

462

connected with his duties as an em-
ployee of the Electric Company.

Claimant argues that the evidence
discloses that Edward Carpenter con-
tracted for full coverage of all of his
employees regardless of the nature of
the work performed, and also argues
that under National Bank of Tulsa
Building v. Goldsmith, 204 Okla. 45,
226 P. 2d 916, the insurer is estopped
to claim that claimant is not covered
by the contract in question regardless
of the nature of the duties performed
at the time of the injury. We think the
first proposition argued by- claimant is
controlling. Edward Carpenter stated
that he bought the contract through
Fred Fox, agent of insurer; that he
explained fully to Fred Fox that Car-
penter was engaged in other business
than the Electric Company and he
wanted all of his employees covered;
that he wanted the farm employees cov-
ered while they were working on the
farm or otherwise; that Fred Fox agreed
to this and thereafter the contract of
insurance was delivered. He stated that
he never read the contract. He further
stated that pursuant to this agreement
he gave the complete figures of his
entire payroll. This submission of the
payroll, in a single sheet, was introduced
in evidence. It was the only schedule of
wages and employees obtained or re-
quired by the insurer.

The insurance agreement as set out
in the testimony of Edward Carpenter
is not denied. In a number of cases we
have held that the agent of the insur-
ance company is such agent for the
purpose of binding said company to
an agreement as to the risk incident
to the contract. Great Northern Life
Ins. Co. v. Cole. 207 Okla. 171, 248 P.
2d 608; Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v.
Iven, 206 Okla. 377, 243 P. 2d 983; Atlas
Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 172 Okla. 595,
52 P. 2d 28. In Atlas Life Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, supra, it is stated:

“* * *The soliciting agent was the
agent of the company and not the agent
of the applicant. It necessarily follows
that the knowledge of the soliciting

agent in the absence of fraud or collu-
sion between the soliciting agent and
the applicant becomes the knowledge of
the company, and it is bound thereby.
= 8 RD

Under the facts and circumstances of
this case, we hold that it was the agree-
ment of the insurer and Edward Car-
penter that the claimant be covered in
his employment both while engaged in
his duties at the Electric Company and
while employed by Carpenter on the
farm.

Award sustained.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, WILLIAMS, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., concur. O’NEAL, J., dissents.

HOWZE et al. v. STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION et al.

No. 35713. May 19, 1953.
257 P. 2a 502.

Kerr, Lambert, Conn & Roberts, Ada,
for petitioners.

Frank Seay, Seminole, and Mac Q.
Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

BLACKBIRD, J. This is a proceeding
brought by the employers and insur-
ance carrier, hereinafter called peti-
tioners, to review an award made on
claims filed by claimant, Ray Lawhorn,
in which he stated that he sustained
an accidental injury arising out of and
in the course of his employment with
the employers while using a cleaning
chemical. An award was made by the
State Industrial Commission for tem-
porary total disability and the petition-
ers have brought this proceeding to re-
view the same.

The evidence discloses that claimant
was employed in the cleaning estab-
lishment of employers at Seminole,
Oklahoma, from November, 1949, until
he quit work on September 23, 1950.
Neither he nor his employers were ex-
perienced in the cleaning of furs. He
was instructed on just one occasion in
the presence of one of his employers
by a salesman for the cleaner as to
the method of cleaning furs. This chem-
ical was the one used by claimant. The
furs accumulated in the establishment
beginning in the months of April and
May of each year. They were stored un-
til August and then the furs were
cleaned separately and apart from the
other cleaning. This work was done on
Sundays so that it would not interfere
with the other cleaning done in the
plant. On Sunday, August 6, and Sun-
day, August 27, 1950, claimant, alone
in the plant, cleaned a large number of
furs. In the process he used carbon
tetrachloride as the principal cleaning
chemical. The furs were placed in a
drum or tumbler for cleaning. This
drum was an ordinary cleaning drum
and not specially designed for cleaning
furs. It was not airtight. Claimant tes-

463

tified that in the process of cleaning he
was forced to open the tumbler and
place his face slightly inside thereof
close to the garments in the process of
cleaning and drying the same; that on
August 6, 1950, he became sick and
the next morning reported to his em-
ployers who sent him to physicians
chosen by them; that the physicians ad-
vised him to go home and go to bed;
that he was in bed for a period of one
week. On the 27th day of August, there-
after, he again became ill because of
contact with the chemical and was
again sent to the same physicians and
was off work for one day. Finally he
quit work and is now temporarily to-
tally disabled and is being hospitalized
in Will Rogers Veterans Hospital.

Dr. G. W. Winkelman testifying for
claimant stated that he first saw claim-
ant in June, 1951, and that claimant has
been under his care since June 29, 1951;
that according to the history of the case
claimant is temporarily totally disabled
by reason of the contact with the car-
pon tetrachloride. On cross-examination
Dr. Winkelman was asked if this con-
dition was due to a gradual subjection
to said chemical and he replied that he
pased his opinion on a mass contact
on the two dates given by claimant.

It is first argued that the evidence is
not sufficient to sustain the finding
that the claimant sustained an acci-
dental injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment. An accident
as contemplated by the Workmen’s
Compensation Law, 85 O.S. 1951 §1 et
seq., is distinguished from an occupa-
tional disease in that it arises by some
definite event the date of which can be
fixed with certainty, but which cannot
be so fixed in case of an occupational
disease. Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Guth-
rie, 167 Okla, 83, 27 P. 2d 814; Tri-
State Contractors v. Althouse, 166 Okla.
296, 27 P. 2d 1041; Ross v. Ross, 184
Okla. 626, 89 P. 2d 338; C. K. Howard
& Co. v. McKay, 189 Okla. 453, 117
P. 2d 525; Eagle-Picher Mining &
Smelting Co. v. Loyd, 192 Okla. 554, 138
P. 2d 536; Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Sni-

464

der, 196 Okla. 433, 165 P. 2d 634. In
Tri-State Contractors v. Althouse, su-
pra, after discussing a number of cases
of this and other courts, it is stated:

“We do not deem it necessary to un-
dertake to add to these discussions. The
question now before us in this case
seems to be adversely settled to the
contention of the petitioners in the case
of Quality Milk Products et al. v. Linde
et al, 159 Okla. 256, 15 P. 2d 58, and
in the more recent case of Johnson Oil
Refining Co, v. Guthrie et al., 167 Okla.
83, 27 P. 2d 814. In the last case an in-
jury was declared to be accidental in
character which resulted from inhaling
gas fumes and coke dust over a period
of time ultimately resulting, on a date
that could be ascertained, in a disa-
bility to a claimant, * * *”

We are of the opinion and hold that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the finding of the State Industrial Com-
mission that there was an accidental in-
jury arising out of and in the course of
the employment.

It is next argued that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the finding of the
State Industrial Commission that the
disability is caused by the accidental
injury. Reference is again made to the
testimony of Dr. Winkelman above. Dr.
Gallaher filed a report which substan-
tiates the conclusion that the disability
is the result of the accidental injury
although the report does not contain all
of the facts supplied by the direct testi-
mony of Dr. Winkelman.

In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Snider, su-
pra, we said:

«ce * * We have held that in a pro-
ceeding before the Industrial Commis-
sion, where the disability alleged to
exist is of such a character as to re-
quire skilled and professional men to
determine the cause and extent thereof,
the question is one of science and must
necessarily be proved by the testimony
of skilled professional persons (City of
Kingfisher v. Jenkins, 168 Okla. 624,
33 P. 2d 1094); and that the cause and
extent of a disability resulting from an
accidental injury are questions of fact,
and if there is any competent evidence

reasonably tending to support the find-
ing of the Industrial Commission, an
award based thereon will not be dis-
turbed on review, * * *”

See, also, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.
v. White, 187 Okla. 627, 105 P. 2d 225;
Superior Oil Co. v. Swimmer, 177 Okla.
396, 60 P. 2d 734; Southern Ice & Utili-
ties Co. v. Barra, 178 Okla. 291, 62 P. 2d
988; Klein Iron & Foundry Co. v. State
Industrial Commission, 185 Okla, 424,
93 P, 2d 751.

There is competent evidence reason-
ably tending to sustain the finding that
the disability is the result of the acci-
dental injury.

Award sustained.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
O’NEAL, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

KINGKADE HOTEL CO. v. KEGGIN.
‘No. 35356. May 19, 1953.
257 P. 2d 504.

Suits & Weiss, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff in error.

Sam J. Montgomery, Oklahoma City,
for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. The parties on this
appeal will be referred to as they ap-
pear in the trial court, T. E. Keggin,
plaintiff and Kingkade Hotel, defendant.
The plaintiff in his petition asserted two
causes of action against the defendant;
one cause of action for wrongful eject-
ment from a hotel room and the other
cause of action for conversion of his
baggage. The defendant denied both
the alleged ejectment and the alleged
conversion. The case was submitted
to a jury and the verdict was in favor
of the plaintiff. Judgment was entered
for the plaintiff, and defendant ap-
peals.

The testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses
and defendant’s witnesses as to vari-
ous conversations which took place at
the Kingkade Hotel is conflicting, but,
as the jury found for the plaintiff, we
will assume the correctness of the testi-
mony on his behalf as to these conversa-
tions.

The plaintiff testified that he regis-
tered as a guest of the Kingkade Hotel
on the 23rd day of April, 1951. At the
time he registered the hotel clerk stated
to him that they might have to move
him during the week. He was assigned
a room which he proceeded to occupy.
A day or so after he registered at the
hotel he was informed by a clerk that
he would have to give up his room be-
cause there was a big convention in
Oklahoma City, and. that the hotel

465

would have to give its rooms to the peo-
ple attending the convention. The plain-
tiff could not find another room and did
not give up his room in the hotel. On the
evening of the 26th of April, when he
returned to his room, he found that all
of his baggage had been moved out of
the room by-the hotel employees. He
and a friend of his then went to the
clerk at the desk of the hotel and he
tendered the clerk a week’s room rent
which the clerk refused to take. At that
time he owed the hotel for the three
days he had occupied the room, at the
rate of $2.50 per day or $7.50, and he
also owed a laundry bill of $1.22. He did
not attempt to pay these items except
in his tender of the room rent for one
week. The night of the 26th, he stayed
at the home of a friend. On May 9, 1951,
he instituted this suit for wrongful eject-
ment from the hotel room and for the
value of his baggage which he alleged
the defendant had converted. He, him-
self, made no demand for the baggage
from the 26th day of April, 1951, until
July 28, 1951. In the early part of June,
a friend of the plaintiff went to the hotel
to get the plaintiff's baggage. Accord-
ing to him he was informed that the
man who had the key to the room in
which the baggage was stored was
not there. He waited about 30 or 40 min-
utes and then left the hotel. Some ten
days later another friend of the plaintiff
went to the hotel to demand the bag-
gage. According to him hé was in-
formed by Mr. Kingkade that the hotel
would not release the baggage until he
procured written authority from the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, and
that Mr. Kingkade informed him that
the plaintiff would have to give a re-
lease from all lawsuits in order to get
the baggage. Thereafter, on July 28,
1951, the plaintiff did go to the hotel,
paid his bill of $8.72, and all the bag-
gage which the hotel had held was
turned over to him.

The plaintiff stated that he had stayed
at the hotel, prior to the occasion of
his registering on the 23rd, for about a
month during part of March and April,
1951. He stated that he had been ren-

466 |

dered bills during that period of time at
the end of each week and had paid
such bills.

Over objection of the defendant the
plaintiff testified that he had bought
clothes of the approximate value of
$35 or $40 during the time the hotel held
his baggage and clothing. He also testi-
fied the baggage which the hotel held
was worth $1,310.

No testimony was offered by the
plaintiff as to any specific damage sus-
tained by him by reason of the eject-
ment from the hotel room and no testi-
mony was offered other than that just
mentioned as to the damage sustained
by reason of the retention of the bag-
gage.

No evidence was offered by the
plaintiff that the Hotel Kingkade was
operated by the defendant, Kingkade
Hotel Company.

The defendant’s witnesses testified
that the room was rented to the plain-
tiff on a day to day basis only, at a
charge of so much per day, and that
the plaintiff had been notified when he
registered on the 23rd day of April,
1951, that he could only have the room
from day to day. They also testified
that the hotel held plaintiff’s baggage
for the payment of the $8.72 due to it
and that they refused to deliver the
baggage to plaintiff’s friends for the
reason that they had no written author-
ity from the plaintiff or his attorney and
that they were at all times ready to
turn the baggage over to plaintiff upon
demand by him and upon payment of
the bill owed to the hotel.

Martin Kingkade testified for the de-
fendant that there were two separate
corporations: Kingkade Hotel Company
and Hotel Kingkade, a corporation. He
further testified that the corporation,
Kingkade Hotel Company, was the
owner of the hotel building and of the
furniture in it, and that the corporation,
Hotel Kingkade, was the corporation
which operated the hotel. He testified
that he was the president of the cor~

poration, Kingkade Hotel Company, and
he was manager of Hotel Kingkade, a
corporation. He also testified that he
owned stock in both corporations. He
stated that the Kingkade Hotel Com-
pany, the defendant in this suit, had
nothing to do with the operation of the
hotel. The testimony that there were
two separate corporations, one of which
owned the building, and the other
operated the hotel, and that this de-
fendant had nothing to do with the op-
eration of the hotel, was uncontradicted.
The defendant offered, in evidence, the
separate annual corporation license for
each of the corporations but the trial
court sustained an objection to the in-
troduction of these instruments.

At the conclusion of the testimony
the defendant moved that the action be
dismissed for the reason that the evi-
dence showed that the defendant cor-
poration was not at any time operating
the hotel. This motion was overruled.

The defendant offered an instruction,
defendant’s instruction No. 2, to ihe ef-
fect that if the jury found from the evi-
dence that the defendant, Kingkade
Hotel Company, a corporation, was not
operating the Kingkade Hotel, then, and
in that event, the plaintiff could not re-
cover from the defendant. This instruc-
tion was refused by the court and ex-
ception allowed.

The jury brought in a verdict for the
plaintiff of $400. It was a general ver-
dict and did not show the amount
awarded by the jury on each cause of
action. The defendant, before the jury
was discharged, objected to the form
of the verdict for the reason that it did
not disclose on its face upon which
cause of action the amount allowed was
applicable. This objection was over-
ruled.

The defendant at the trial and here
contends that the plaintiff sued the
wrong party. In our opinion defendant’s
contention is sound. The plaintiff alleged
in his petition that the defendant, King-
kade Hotel Company, a corporation, was
operating the hotel. The burden was on

the plaintiff to prove this. The un-
contradicted evidence was that the
Kingkade Hotel Company, a corporation,
did not operate the hotel but that the
hotel was operated by Hotel Kingkade,
a corporation. The latter corporation
was not made a party to the suit. Al-
though the names of the corporations
were similar and the president of one
was the manager of the other, never-
theless, they were separate legal entities.
There was no proof that one was re-
sponsible for the acts of the other.

This court has passed upon this
question in the case of Hilliard v. St.
Louis & S.F, R. Co., 98 Okla. 22, 223 P.
877. In that case the plaintiff sued St.
Louis & San Francisco Railroad Com-
pany et al. for personal injuries. In the
trial of the case it developed that the
defendant, St. Louis & San Francisco
Railroad Company, prior to the acts
complained of by the plaintiff in that
action, had transferred all of its assets
to St. Louis-San Francisco Railway
Company, a separate and distinct cor-
porate entity. It was this latter corpor-
ation which was operating the property
at the time of plaintiff's injury. At the
trial the plaintiff moved to substitute
the name of St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway Company for the old company.
The motion was denied and the trial
court sustained a demurrer to the plain-
tiff’s evidence and rendered judgment
for the defendant. The court, in affirm-
ing the case, made the following state-
ment:

« * * * Tt is shown in the record that
on the 30th day of August, 1916, the spe-
cial master in a federal court receiver-
ship case, under orders of the court,
deeded the property of the St. Louis
& San Francisco Railroad Company
to the St. Louis-San Francisco Rail-
way Company, so that it was apparent
at the time of plaintiff's injury and at
the time of the trial, the owner and
operator of the Frisco properties was
the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway
Company, and that it was at the times
referred to, a separate and distinct cor-
porate entity from the St. Louis & San
Francisco Railroad Company.***

467

“We think the learned trial judge was
correct in refusing to substitute the
‘St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Com-
pany’ for the St. Louis & San Francisco
Railroad Company.”

A similar question was presented to
the Supreme Court of Colorado in the
case of Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Love~
land, 16 Colo. A 146, 64 P. 381. It was
held in that case as follows:

“I, Where there were two corpora-
tions, the D. & R.G. Railway Co. and
the D. & R.G. Railroad Co., and on the
trial of an action against the former it
developed that the acts complained of
were committed by the latter, it was er-
ror to allow an amendment of the com-
plaint making the latter corporation de-
fendant, on the ground that such amend-
ment was the correction of a misnomer.”

In our opinion, these cases are deci-
sive on this issue.

The judgment appealed from is re-
versed and the case remanded to the
trial court, with directions to enter

judgment for the defendant at the cost

of the plaintiff.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Bradford J. Williams, Wil-
bur J. Holleman, and Donald Camp-
bell, who as Special Masters aided in
the preparation of this opinion. These
attorneys were recommended by the
Oklahoma Bar Association, approved
by the Judicial Council, and appointed
by the Court.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

De
FLETCHER v. ROYSE, Sheriff.
No. 85665. May 19, 1953.
257 P. 2a 507.

468

Vincent Harper, El Reno, for plaintiff
in error.

Porta & Weaver and Rinehart & Rine-
hart, El Reno, for defendant in error.

CORN, J. In September, 1951, plain-
tiff recovered judgment against one
Pettigrew for $2,530 and costs of $8.15,
in a suit on a note. Pursuant to plain-
tiff’s praecipe the court clerk issued
execution on January 18, 1952, direct-
ing the county sheriff, respondent here-
in, to levy upon the judgment debtor’s
goods and chattels, and for lack thereof
upon certain real property. The exe-
cution, returnable in 60 days, together
with a typewritten memorandum of
property to be levied upon, was de-
Tivered to respondent’s office the same
day. February 5, 1952, respondent’s dep-
uty called upon plaintiff to furnish an
indemnity bond to protect respondent
from any damages that might arise out
of his levying the execution. Plaintiff
purchased such bond ($5,000) which was
approved by the county attorney, and
delivered same to respondent’s deputy.

Respondent had knowledge of the exe-
cution, approval and delivery of the
indemnity bond.

Respondent made no return of the
execution to the court clerk, and March
21, 1952, plaintiff filed motion to amerce
respondent under the provisions of 12 O.
S. 1951 §811. Such motion set forth the
above facts and that respondent had
failed, refused and neglected to return
the execution within 60 days, and asked
that he be amerced in sum of $2,603.80,
plus the additional 10% provided by
statute.

The motion was set for hearing, but
the matter was continued and plaintiff
filed an amendment to her motion, set-
ting out that she had been required to
expend $50 for an indemnity bond and
asking that respondent be amerced such
additional amount, plus 10%, together
with a reasonable attorney fee, as dam-
ages.

The matter was heard April 12, 1952,
respondent having filed no pleadings.
Respondent testified he had received
the execution but had made no levy
upon any of the judgment debtor’s prop-
erty, and did not make a return of the
execution within 60 days. He testified
plaintiff's attorney advised him that
he particularly desired the levy to be
made upon certain trucks owned by the
debtor (Pettigrew) and that he at-
tempted to do this and regularly sought
to find these trucks, but was unable
to locate them. He advised the attorney
of such circumstances, and the attor-
ney told him to wait until it was possi-
ble to catch the trucks and levy upon
them. It was plaintiffs’ theory and tes-
timony that respondent’s deputy had
been asked to expedite the levy and
make same as soon as possible; and
that respondent had not been requested
not to levy the execution.

After hearing all the testimony the
trial court denied the motion to amerce.
Motion for new trial was heard and
overruled, and plaintiff has appealed
from the trial court’s order.

The two propositions are urged as
grounds for reversal. However, both
are based upon the argument that the
respondent rendered himself liable in
amercement for failing and refusing
to levy the execution, and in failing to
return the execution with his action
endorsed thereon within 60 days follow-
ing issuance and receipt of the writ.

Plaintiff relies upon the provisions of
12 O.S. 1951 §751 and §811. The for-
mer section provides, in substance, that
upon receiving a writ of execution the
officer shall immediately levy upon the
debtor’s goods. If no goods are found
such fact is to be endorsed upon the
writ and the officer then shall levy upon
any real property which may be liable
to satisfy the judgment. If such prop-
erty is encumbered by mortgage, or
other lien, the property may be levied
upon and sold subject thereto.

The latter section provides that for
neglect or refusal of a sheriff to exe-
cute any writ of execution directed to
hin, or to return such writ to the proper
court on or before the return day there-
of, he may be amerced in the amount
of the debt, damages and costs thereon
for the use of the plaintiff or defend-
ant as the case may be.

Plaintiff urges that since respond-
ent failed, refused and neglected to levy
on any of the judgment debtor’s prop-
erty pursuant to the writ, and because
he failed, neglected and refused to re-
turn the execution within 60 days from
the date thereof, the rule announced in
our early decision of Henderson-Sturges
Piano Co. v. Smith, Sheriff, 33 Okla.
335, 125 P. 454, should be applied. In
that opinion it was pointed out that our
statute was adopted from the State of
Kansas; and, in an early case from that
.court construing this statute, the court
stated that the language of the statute
expressly requires that an officer be
amerced for failure to perform the ex-
press duty laid upon him by statute.
The statute implies no discretion, but is
peremptory, and the amercement is a
penalty for neglect of duty. Such states

469

the general rule, it being recognized
that amercement is a money penalty
imposed by statute for misconduct or
neglect of duty, the object being to in-
sure promptness and fidelity on the part
of officers. 47 Am. Jur., Sheriffs, Police
and Constables, §187; Stein v. Scanlan,
34 Okla. 801, 127 P. 483, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.)
895.

The remedy fixed by statute requires
that an officer be amerced, without dis-
cretion on the part of the trial court,
whether his failure to act results from
willful wrong or mere neglect, and re-
gardless of whether such conduct has
resulted in actual injury. Henderson-
Sturges Piano Co. v. Smith, supra.
However, it is recognized generally that
such statutes are penal in nature, and
are to be strictly construed and applied
only to instances where the default
clearly is within the terms thereof.
Stein v. Scanlan, supra; Bank of Lov-
ell v. Graybeal, 169 Okla. 543, 37 P. 2d
912; Redwine v. Alexander, 206 Okla.
106, 241 P. 2d 376.

47 Am. Jur., Sheriffs, etc., §209, con-
cerning failure to levy execution, states:

«* * ® The inability of a sheriff to
levy will not excuse him from liability,
if the inability is a result of his own
voluntary act or conduct. * * *”

And, the same text, section 212, states
the rule:

“The officer may avoid liability by
proving a reasonable excuse for failure
to make a return. He may show that
the delay or failure to return the exe-
cution was due to his obedience of in-
structions given him by the execution
creditor or by such creditor’s attorney
of record; or he may prove that the
plaintiff had sustained no injury.***”

Respondent’s defense to the motion
for amercement herein was predicated
upon evidence tending to show that his
failure to levy the execution and make
return thereof was not the result of his
own voluntary act, but resulted from
his obedience to instructions given by
plaintiff’s attorney. While we have not

470 Es

VINCENT v. VINCENT.

No. 35500. May 19, 1953.
257 P. 2d 512.

been called upon to consider such cir-
cumstances heretofore, we are con-
vinced that the trial court was cor-
rect in denying plaintiff's motion to
amerce. The evidence was sufficient to
justify the trial court in finding that
respondent’s failure to act, or to make
return of the writ as directed, resulted
from the instructions given him to with-
hold levying upon the debtor’s property
until there was an opportunity to levy
upon the trucks.

In Stein, Sheriff, v. Scanlan, supra,
the opinion quotes from Duncan v.
Drakely, 10 Ohio 46, as follows:

“In proceeding under the statute au-
thorizing the amercement of an officer,
great strictness is required, and he who
would avail himself of the remedy
therein provided must bring himself
both within the letter and the spirit of
the law. It is right, that it should be so,
because the remedy is summary, and in
its consequences highly penal. There is
no trial by jury, and but little, if any,
discretion left to the court.”

In W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Hester, 190
Miss. 329, 200 So. 250, that court, in con-
sidering an amercement proceedings,
said:

« * * * Wherever, indeed, statutes of
this character are found they are re-
garded as of a character so highly penal
that very slight circumstances are held
to exempt officers from their opera-
tion.”

Other matters are presented by the
parties to this appeal. In view of the
conclusion reached herein, it is unnec-
essary 10 pass upon such questions.

Judgment affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

H. Tom Kight, Jr., and Ralph B.
Brainard, Claremore, for plaintiff in
error.

G. Raymond Bassmann and Jack E.
Gordon, Claremore, for defendant in
error.

BLACKBIRD, J. Defendant in error
commenced this action as plaintiff
against plaintiff in error, as defendant,
to obtain a divorce on the ground of ex-
treme cruelty. In answering her hus-
band’s said charges, defendant, in sub-
stance, denied she had been guilty of
any conduct constituting grounds for
divorce, and prayed that his petition
be denied and that she be discharged
with her costs of defending the action,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

The evidence adduced at the trial re-
veals that both parties were of mature
years when they married in 1935, and
no children have been born of the mar-
riage, though defendant has a daughter
by a previous one. Both parties have
college educations, the defendant being
a public school teacher by profession.
When they were first married they
lived at Claremore and defendant has
continued her teaching, going to Tulsa
about the year 1937, and purchasing a
home with her school-teacher sister.

At the time of the marriage, plaintiff
who had attended agricultural college,

47

was then on a Rogers county farm
which was lost by foreclosure shortly
thereafter; and after an unsuccessful
attempt at professional boxing in
Florida, he returned to Rogers county
and obtained intermittent employment
with the Federal Government. In 1937
plaintiff's employment with the Farm-
er Home Administration took him to
Delaware county, Until sometime there-
after, plaintiff's employment had not
been permanent. During two, three or
four of the years plaintiff was employed
there, the defendant spent summers
with him at or near Jay, Oklahoma.
Since about 1942, plaintiff has been sta-
tioned at the Claremore office of the
Administration and, until a short time
before this action was filed, spent the
weekends with defendant in her Tulsa
home, where her aforementioned sister
also resides.

The conduct principally relied upon
to support plaintiff's charges of defend-
ant’s “extreme cruelty” toward him
were things she did and said about
his association with two women who
at different times worked with plaintiff
for the aforementioned government
agency. The youngest of them had
commenced her said employment in
plaintiffs office at Jay, while the other
was employed with that agency at
Claremore. Plaintiff testified that de-
fendant “falsely” accused him of infi-
delity to her in his relations with these
two younger women and it is undisputed
that she went to the State Director of
the Farmers Home Administration and
complained to him about this, charging
that plaintiff was not sufficiently con-
tributing to her support and had refused
to assist her in paying a dental bill
amounting to approximately $1,000. It
appears that on one occasion when the
younger of these women came to Tulsa,
plaintiff visted her in her hotel room
and defendant later learned he was
there when she telephoned the room.
Plaintiff testified that when defendant
accused him of having improper re-
lations with this woman, he admitted
it, but further testified that such
admission was untrue and denied any

472

romantic interest in the woman. The
woman, herself, testified that after be-
coming employed in plaintiff's office at
Jay in 1938, she commenced an asso-
ciation with him that included rides on
horseback and in his automobile and
developed into a “romantic situation.”
She further testified that this “associa-
tion” progressed to the point where she
and plaintiff had a tacit understanding
that he would divorce defendant and
marry her.

With reference to the other woman—
the one employed in plaintiff's office
at Claremore—plaintiff’s testimony was
to the effect that he had suffered indig-
nity and embarrassment from defend-
ant’s contacting his State Director and
attempting to get her transferred away
from the Claremore office on the basis
of the defendant’s “false” accusations
concerning his association with her, re-
sulting in his being called to the Direc-
tor’s office, confronted with such char-
ges, and told by the Director to get the
situation “straightened out.” He also
testified that he understood or thought
defendant had also telephoned the girl’s
parents and brother about the “affair.”
Defendant admitted that she telephoned
the girl’s father concerning the matter,
but testified that she called him only
after he had first phoned her at a time
when she didn’t want to discuss the
matter on account of the presence of an-
other person in her home. Defendant
admitted that she watched, and after it
became apparent that plaintiff was go-
ing to try to divorce her, hired an inves-
tigator to watch, this woman’s apart-
ment in Claremore and that she kept a
record of some 60 visits by the plaintiff
to said apartment, at least one of which
did not terminate until the early morn-
ing hours.

In testifying to other circumstances
that had brought about dissatisfaction
or friction between the parties, plain-
tiff testified, in substance, that he liked
country life and liked to handle live~
stock and wear cowboy clothes, while
defendant liked a more “cultural” life
and ridiculed his wearing of cowboy
boots. He further testified that defend-

ant and her sister complained about
his using bar bells to exercise with
when in the Tulsa home. He further tes-
tified that defendant had repeatedly and
continuously talked about -and drawn
comparisons between her family and
his and talked about how “sorry” his
was; that the defendant got to condemn~
ing the National administration and
those that worked for it and this had
been the subject of some arguments be-
tween her and her sister on one side
and him on the other. Plaintiff further
testified that after defendant and her
sister purchased the home in Tulsa
they told him they wouldn’t ever want
to live in a small town and “I have
never felt like I wanted to take her to
a small town, and I don’t feel she
would be satisfied.” Plaintiff admitted
that defendant’s continuing to work in
Tulsa was a matter of mutual agree~
ment between him and defendant on
the theory that two salaries were bet~
ter than one, and it is indicated that de~
fendant’s salary in Tulsa was larger
than she could have obtained in a sim-
ilar position in smaller cities or towns.
Plaintiff admitted that at one time he
could have gotten his employer to trans-
fer him to Tulsa, but he didn’t do this
because his duties there would have
consisted mostly of collecting delinquent
loans, taking him out of contact with
the kind of farmers he liked, and he
didn’t believe he could have afforded to
keep a riding horse there. Plaintiff ad-
mitted that defendant didn’t like it be-
cause he didn’t take the offered trans-
fer to Tulsa.

It was shown that the parties had dis-
cussed the subject of acquiring a home
together outside of Tulsa and that the
defendant had offered to help plaintiff
finance a business enterprise in Rogers
county, but they had been unable to
find a suitable one. Plaintiff admitted
that defendant had offered to come to
Claremore and live with him, but he had
offered her little encouragement, think-
ing that she wouldn’t want to live like
he lived. At one place in his cross-
examination plaintiff admitted that the
reasons he wants a divorce from the de-

fendant all condense into the true and
ultimate one that he just doesn’t want
to live with her. He said he had asked
defendant to divorce him many times,
but she had refused, finally saying “she
didn’t believe in divorce. * * *”

In rendering judgment for the plain-
tiff, the trial judge named no specific
conduct on the part of the defendant
which he regarded as extreme cruelty,
but based his decision on that general
ground, after indicating that, in his
opinion, plaintiff and defendant couldn’t
get along and live together as husband
and wife and would derive no possible
benefit from a continuance of the mar-
riage. In its decree, the court directed
a specific division of property among
the parties and denied defendant re-
covery of an attorney’s fee.

In prosecuting this appeal, defendant
contends that said judgment is clearly
against the weight of the evidence, that
it constitutes an abuse of discretion, and
is contrary to law.

Our continued reference to the par-
ties will be by their trial court designa-
tions.

We have not attempted, and it is un-
necessary, to describe all of the various
details in which the testimony on be-
half of the defendant contradicts that of
plaintiff, or how her conduct that plain-
tiff complains of was explained, ex-
cused or mitigated by circumstances
she testified to. Suffice it to say that
defendant’s evidence tends to mini-
mize the effect of the parties’ differ-
ences and to indicate that their argu-
ments have been infrequent or inter-
mittent rather than continuous, and that
no irreconcilable differences exist be-
tween them. Also, defendant evidenced
a desire to “patch up” the marriage
and a hope that they would be given
that opportunity. “Extreme cruelty”
as defined in Robertson v. Robertson,
73 Okla. 299, 176 P. 387, and applied in a
long line of cases, including Peterson v.
Peterson, 206 Okla. 68, 240 P. 2d 1075,
is conduct on the part of either spouse
which so grievously wounds the men-

473

tal feelings of the other, or so utterly
destroys the peace of mind of the other
as to seriously impair the bodily
health, or such as utterly destroys the
legitimate ends of matrimony, On the
basis of the record we think there is
no doubt that defendant’s conduct ful-
filled neither of the above-noted re-
quirements. At most, the proof estab-
lishes no more than the parties’ incom-~
patibility in some respects. That is not
a ground for divorce in this jurisdic-
tion. In so holding, this court, in Hor-
nor v. Hornor, 151 Okla. 292, 3 P. 2d
670, quoted in part from Barker v. Bar-
ker, 25 Okla. 48, 105 P. 347, 26 LRA.
(N.S.) 909, as follows,

“©« * # #® To entitle a party to the
remedy of divorcement on the ground
of extreme cruelty, it is not enough that
the grounds be the result of incompati-
bility of tastes or temperament or es-
trangement produced by differences of
opinion and conduct growing out of the
administration of household affairs, as
these must be endured along with the
other minor misfortunes of life, They
are the things which under the law
parties who marry take into considera-
tion on entering matrimony, and di-
vorce will not be granted on their ac-
count.’ ”

Defendant asserts that the wrongdo-
ing established by the evidence was on
the part of the plaintiff, that no fault
or wrongdoing was proved against her,
and that the court went beyond its
statutory prerogative in giving the di-
vorce to said wrongdoer. While in this
jurisdiction a divorce may be granted
in the court’s discretion where the
parties are in equal wrong (12 O.S.A.
§1275; Panther v. Panther, 147 Okla.
131, 295 P. 219), that is not the situation
here. There is no proof of any wrong
committed by defendant sufficient to
constitute a ground of divorce. It was
clearly established that she had cause,
justification and reasonable provocation
for accusing plaintiff of infidelity and
we do not think she went any further
in trying to prevent her marriage from
being broken up than was natural or
justifiable. It appears that her efforts
were successful in terminating one of

474

plaintiff's extra-marital “affairs” and
nowhere does it appear that they had
any other or ulterior motive, or that
she deliberately sought to humiliate
and insult plaintiff. In the fourth para-
graph of the opinion in Beach v. Beach,
4 Okla. 359, 46 P. 514, this court gave
full expression to its views and to the
principles of law applying to this phase
of the case and it is unnecessary to
repeat them here.

In Morris v. Morris, 133 Okla. 176,
270 P. 833, this court referred to the
following oft-repeated truisms which
may appropriately be repeated here:

« * * * The remedy of absolute di-
vorce is an extraordinary remedy for
evils which are unavoidable and unen-
durable, and which cannot be relieved
by any proper and reasonable exertion
of the party seeking the aid of the
courts. * * *

“Tt is not right to relieve a husband
of his solemn duty to support his wife
and children, to cherish his wife in sick-
ness and in health, and permit him to
east her off at any time he becomes
dissatisfied or wishes to transfer his
affections to others, .. .”

“ ‘Marriage is a contract, and a re-
lation which if possible should endure,
and public policy requires that there
be no straining of law or facts to end
the contract and sever the relation.
Time will heal many estrangements,
and bring together those whom tem-
porary feeling has alienated. And courts
having ever in view the public good
may often wisely use their discretion
to give time and opportunity for recon-
ciliation.’ ”

Of course, the law does not, nor can
the courts, compel a husband and wife
to live together. However, it is sound
public policy to give the marriage con-
tract all inducements to endurance,
preservation and success. It is not the
purpose of our state’s divorce laws,
and it should not be of our courts, to
render the breaking of such a contract
and its dissolution so easy that the par-
ties thereto will not have the strongest
of inducements or incentives, and all
possible opportunities, for resolving

their differences and preserving their
marriage.

In recognition of the foregoing prin-
ciples, the trial court should have de-
nied plaintiff a divorce, and his refusal
to do so, as prayed for by defendant,
was not merely an abuse of discretion,
but was contrary to law and to the evi-
dence in this case.

With defendant’s contention that
plaintiff should pay the attorney’s fee
for which she has become obligated in
defending this unwarranted action, we
agree. Plaintiff points to the provisions
for a property settlement contained in
the decree appealed from, and espe~
cially to the fact that he has previously
paid defendant the sum of $200 in tem-
porary alimony and given her govern-
ment bonds of a value of approximately
$900, as an equitable adjustment of the
parties’ property rights sufficient to re-
lieve him of any further obligations
in the matter. We are not impressed
by this argument. It can reasonably
be inferred from the evidence that the
defendant has been largely self-sup-
porting the entire period of her mar-
riage to plaintiff and without such fi-
nancial assistance in discharging a
husband’s customary duties to his wife,
plaintiff may never have accumulated
the money and property he now has.
The record of his liquid assets shows
that he is financially able to pay this
attorneys’ fee without undue hardship,
and we think that, under the circum-
stances, he should do so. In this con-
nection, it should be kept in mind that
since we have determined that the
judgment should be reversed on the
merits of the case, the property settle-
ment contained in the decree will like-
wise be dissolved or set aside, and, ex-
cept as to the financial detriment aris-
ing from the bringing of this action, the
parties will. in all respects be left as
they were before it was commenced.

Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court is hereby reversed, with di-
rections to said court to set it aside
and enter a judgment in conformity
with the views expressed herein.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, and WIL-
LIAMS, JJ., concur.

|
In re PORTER'S ESTATE,
FISHER et al. v. PORTER et al.
No. 35526. May 19, 1953.
257 P. 2a 517.

475

k=
Allan Falkenstine and H. G. Tolbert,
Watonga, for plaintiffs in error.

Harry Glasser, Enid, and R. H. Mor-
gan, Watonga, for defendants in error.

WILLIAMS, J. S. P. Porter died on

* June 16, 1951, leaving a will in which

he devised the bulk of his estate to the
children of the daughter of his twin
sister. Petition for probate of the will
was filed in the county court, and cer-
tain heirs at law contested the probate
on the ground that testator was incom-
petent when he executed the will. No
medical testimony was introduced in
the county court, and the will was ad-
mitted to probate. On trial de novo in
district court, where medical testimony
was introduced, the probate was denied.
From this order and judgment, the ex-
ecutor and devisees (proponents) un-
der the will have duly appealed.

Parties will be referred to herein as
proponents and contestants.

Proponents present two assignments
of error in their brief, one of which was
error of the court in the admission of
certain alleged privileged and hearsay
evidence Since the judgment must be
reversed for that error, we will not con-
sider herein the other assignment made.

The evidence which is alleged to be
privileged and hearsay was the hos-
pital records concerning a visit by the
deceased to a hospital in Oklahoma
City. These records contained a narra-
tive discussion of the ailment of de-
ceased and a diagnosis of his condi-
tion. The physicians who wrote the nar-
rative were not witnesses and therefore
were not available for cross-examina-
tion.

The contention of proponents that the
evidence concerned was privileged as
being a confidential communication be-
tween physician and patient is not well
taken, for the reason that such privilege
can be waived, as to a decedent, by
his heirs at law. See 58 Am. Jur. Wit-
nesses, section 440, which reads in part:

476 |

“Under the majority rule stated
above, heirs may waive the privilege in
a contest with strangers or with other
heirs. Thus, when the dispute is be-
tween the devisee and heirs at law of a
testator, all claiming under the de-
ceased, either the devisee or heirs may
call the testators attending physician
as a witness. This rule applies in ac-
tions to set aside a will and in pro-
ceedings to contest the probate of a
will, because, as has been declared, the
proceedings are not adverse to the es-
tate, * * #7

The contest in the instant case is be-
tween the executor and devisees (pro-
ponents) and heirs at law (contestants)
of the deceased. We hold that the privi-
lege, if such existed, was waived by the
heirs at law when they offered the hos-
pital reports in evidence,

We have given the voluminous rec-
ord in this case careful consideration.
It indicates that the decision was based
largely on the medical evidence ob-
jected to. At one point the trial court
said with reference to the alleged hear-
say evidence:

“***Now this diagnosis is a very re-
vealing—I think the only way the Court
can decide it—for as I say, the evi-
dence of Proponents and Contestants
(meaning testimony of lay witnesses)
probably off-set themselves***”,

In his findings of fact, the. trial court
said in part:

“That the report of Doctors Hermann
and Wilkins, made as of October 12,
1940, concerning such tests and exami-
nation is the best evidence of what it
purports to show. ***

“That the terms ‘general paresis’,
and ‘menigo-gascular disease’, are both
used in such report as technical terms,
identifying types of organic, but not
readily distinguishable brain disease re-
sulting from syphilis.”

Doctors Hermann and Wilkins were
the authors of the narrative report and
diagnosis written into the hospital rec-
ords which were objected to as hearsay.
Formal identification of the hospital
records was waived, but the objection

of “incompetent, irrelevant, immate-
rial and privileged” was saved.

Contestants do not deny that the rec-
ords were hearsay, but contend that
the hearsay objection was not properly
saved in the trial court, for the reason
that the only objection going to the
question of hearsay was the objection
above quoted.

With this contention we cannot agree.
Title 12, O.S. 1951, §424, which pro-
vides in substance that the objection of
“incompetent, irrelevant and immate-
rial” shall be deemed to “cover all mat- ~
ters ordinarily embraced within such
objections,” unless a more specific
statement of the objection is requested
by the trial court or opposing counsel,
is not applicable here because it con-
cerns only a situation “where any party
desires to object to any question put to a
witness”. See Skinner v. Bowlan, 181
Okla. 544, 75 P. 2d 181. We must there-
fore determine what is the correct rule
in the absence of statute. The question
of what objections are saved by the
general objection of “incompetent, ir-
relevant and immaterial” was answered
in the Skinner case, supra, as follows:

“As a basis, or a starting point, it is
well to remember that the objection to
the effect that offered evidence is
‘incompetent, irrelevant and immate-
ria’, is merely the equivalent of T
object’, and in the absence of statute
is no objection at all. ***”

The exception to this general rule was
aptly stated in the earlier case of Mc-
Donald v. Strawn, 78 Okla. 271, 190 P.
558, wherein the court said:

“But there is this exception to the
general rule: If the objection cannot be
obviated or if the evidence is clearly
inadmissible for any purpose, a general
objection is sufficient. ***”

Hearsay evidence is defined as fol-
lows in 31 C.J.S, Evidence, 8192, p. 919:

“Evidence is hearsay when its pro-
bative force depends on the compe-
tency and credibility of some person
other than the witness.”

31 C. J. S. Evidence, §194, p. 930,
reads in part as follows:

“A statement otherwise objectionable
as hearsay does not become competent
because it has been reduced to writ-
ing. #**”

In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brad-
bury, 179 Okla, 253, 65 P. 2d 433, this
court said, concerning the admissibility
in evidence of the unsworn written
statement of a physician who did not
testify at the trial:

“A fact in dispute between litigants
cannot be proven by written statement
prepared and signed by disinterested
parties prior to trial; the admission of
such hearsay evidence over proper ob-
jections, may constitute reversible er-
ror,”

In the body of the opinion, the court
said:

“The plaintiff suggests that the error
in admitting these documents should
be held to be harmless, but in view of
the fact that this evidence touched a
controlling primary issue in the case,
*** we would not be justified at all in
saying that this evidence did not prej-
udice the rights of the defendant.”

In the case at bar, the fact that the
offered evidence was hearsay was ap-
parent on its face; the written state-
ments of the physicians concerned the
existence of a certain disease which in
its advanced stages can render one
mentally incompetent. The statement of
the trial court above quoted, and his
findings of facts, both reflect the fact
that he gave great weight to the hear-
say evidence noted in rendering his de-
cision. Under those circumstances, it
cannot be said that the error in admis-
sion of hearsay evidence was not prej-
udicial to the rights of proponents.

We hold that, pursuant to the rule
set out in McDonald v. Strawn, above
quoted, the objection “incompetent, ir-
relevant and immaterial” in the case
at bar did raise the question of hear-
say, and that the court committed er-
ror prejudicial to the rights of propo-
nents in admitting the evidence object-
ed to.

4TT

The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed and this cause is remanded, with
directions to grant proponents a new
trial.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. .

Ce
ANDERSON et al. v. DAVIS.
No. 34063. April 29, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1953,

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied May 19, 1953.

256 P. 2d 1099.

478

Wayne W. Bayless, Oklahoma City,
and G. C. Spillers and G. C. Spillers,
Jr., Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.

Tom L, Irby, C. L. Armstrong, and
Felix Duvall, Ponca City, for defend-
ont in error.

PER CURIAM. The question pre-
sented by this appeal is whether the
will of Arne N. Anderson should be
admitted to probate, or whether probate

‘should be denied on the presented con-

test on the ground of undue influence.
In such contest the cause is one of
purely equitable cognizance and it is
the duty of this court to examine the
entire record and weigh the evidence,
See In re Chubbee’s Will, 133 Okla.
156, 271 P. 681, where it was held in
paragraph one of the syllabus:

“Will contest cases are of purely
equitable cognizance, and upon appeal,
in such cases, from the district court
to the Supreme Court it is the duty of
the Supreme Court to examine the
whole record and weigh the evidence
and render, or cause to be rendered,
such judgment as should have been
rendered in the district court.”

We have examined the entire record
and we here set out the facts, circum-
stances and conclusions which in our
view guide and direct the determina-
tion of the cause.

Arne N, Anderson was born in Nor-
way where he received about a grade
school education. He came to America
in young manhood and lived with a
brother and sister-in-law who taught
him the English language. He was fru-
gal in his habits and careful in his
investments and accumulated an estate
of the value of about $100,000 to
$150,000. He had no immediate family
of his own, but was on good terms
with his brothers who predeceased him,
and he remained on good terms with
his several nieces and nephews. He died
in May, 1948, when 86 years of age.

On the last day of 1944, or the first
day of 1945, then aged about 83, An-
derson sustained a broken leg in an
accidental injury and was confined in a
hospital more than a year. He was in
declining health and vigor from the
first of 1945 until his death three years
and four months later, during which

time he was back in the hospital a

time or two, and ill at times in his
hotel room. It is clearly shown that
during that period of about three years
and a half he suffered substantial de-
cline in physical health and strength
and in mental competency, and in the
initiative and aggressiveness which had
marked his life in previous years.

During that three year period Mr.
Johnson, principal beneficiary of the
will, had charge of the business affairs,
funds and property of Anderson and
they were together much of that time
and until Mr, Anderson died. Specifical-
ly the will named Mr. Johnson and his
wife as principal beneficiaries.

It is that asseciation between Mr.
Anderson and Mr. Johnson, and the
details of the transactions in reference
to the property and in reference to the
making of the will, that give rise to
the claim of undue influence.

Mr, Johnson was cashier of the bank
in which Mr. Anderson was a stock-
holder. Mr, Johnson had the will drawn
which left $2,500 each to five nieces,
and all other property, real and per-

A479

sonal, to Mr. Johnson and his wife.
The will was executed in the bank in
Mr. Johnson’s presence on March 1,
1947. While Mr, Anderson was in the
hospital on September 3, 1946, he ex-
ecuted, without consideration, a re~
lease of a mortgage on Mr. Johnson’s
home which represented a loan made
some years before. On the day Mr.
Anderson died, or the next day, Mr.
Johnson presented various assignments
to himself of a bond of $10,000, and
of Anderson’s bank stock and stock in
two Building and Loan Associations,
and on May 22, 1948, he recorded a
deed by which Anderson conveyed to
him a city lot and farm lands of high
value. The assignments were dated
Sept. 19th and 23rd, 1947, and the deed
was dated October 16, 1946. It was
Mr. Johnson’s position that the assign-
ments and the deed were delivered to
him when executed, and that he held
them in secret or in confidence until
Mr. Anderson died, because Mr. An-
derson specifically requested it. He did
not claim that any consideration was
paid in any such transactions, but
claimed that each such conveyance
was a voluntary gift to him for friend-
ly service.

Mr. Johnson admits having complete
charge of the property and affairs of
Mr. Anderson during the three and one-
third years, during which time he made
many collections and bank deposits, and
wrote many check for Mr. Anderson,
with a great many visits and confer-
ences, sometimes several in a day, but
he claims all this was at the request
of Anderson and was but the perform-
ing of friendly services. He admits that
he had the will drawn, but states that
also was at the request of Mr. Anderson
and that the will was drawn as he
had requested it. It is his position that
throughout ali the transactions his mo-
tives were altogether wholesome. On
the contrary, it is the position of his ad-
versaries that Mr. Johnson was pro-
ceeding on a plan and design to obtain
the Anderson property, and that pre-
sents the issue between the parties.

480

It is noted that throughout his life
Mr. Anderson continued to pose and
act as the owner of all his lands and
corporate stocks and claimed to con-
tinue in that ownership although the
conveyances to Mr. Johnson were dated
as above set out long before Mr. Ander-
son’s death. There are several obnox-
ious contradictions in the testimony of
Mr. Johnson. There can be no doubt
that during all the above period a re-
lationship existed between Mr. Ander-
son and Mr. Johnson which was highly
confidential, and that relationship
places on Mr. Johnson certain burdens
in this litigation.

Of course, no man can say, to a
certainty, whether Mr. Johnson’s mo-
tives were wholesome and pure, or
whether designed to take advantage of
this elderly man. It is our duty to weigh
the evidence and observe the overall
picture which is drawn by the acts,
transactions and statements of the par-
ties, In such a case it will not do for
this court to merely scan the testimony
in a perfunctory manner and approve
the finding before us. When a citizen
has passed away and his property is
before the court to be passed to his
heirs by law, or to an unrelated person
by a will which it is charged he in-
fluenced for his private gain, this
court must really weigh the evidence,
in the highest and most conscientious
sense of that term, with firm resolution
to do justice in the instant case, within
guidance of former precedent, and
thereby laying down further precedent
for future guidance of men and courts,

Mr. Johnson points to the long fam~
ily friendship and to the friendship ex-
isting for many years between his fath-
er, now deceased, and Mr. Anderson,
who were about the same age, and evi-
dence is offered to show that the father
gave valuable aid to Mr. Anderson
by investment advice and counsel, and
Mr. Johnson offers in explanation of
the mortgage release that Mr. Anderson
expressed the desire that Mr. Johnson
and his wife have a home, free of all
encumbrances. We consider those cir-

cumstances, but we note that the tes-
timony of Mr. Johnson shows serious
contradiction as to the execution of
this mortgage release. We also note
that Mr. Anderson rendered some aid
to Mr. Johnson’s father as evidenced
by the loan of several thousand dollars
on his unsecured notes, which notes re-
mained unpaid at Mr. Anderson’s death,
and, also, we note the evidence that
Mr. Johnson is a man of some sub-
stantial worth in his own right, aside
from the Anderson properties.

Mr. Johnson points to the fact that
the will was found in Mr. Anderson’s
bank box after he died as indicating
that Mr. Anderson had exclusive pos-
session and control of the will from
its execution until his death. That is
a circumstance to be considered, but
in that connection we note that, since
Mr. Johnson was in control of all other
items as aforesaid, he may have had
access to the bank box. We cannot say
he did because there is no direct evi-
dence to that effect. We do observe,
however, that the unpaid promissory
notes above mentioned were not in the
Anderson box, but were held elsewhere
in the bank.

There is evidence that Mr. Anderson
had executed a former will by which he
gave Mr. Johnson his bank stock in the
sum of $10,000 and divided the balance
of his estate among his relatives. It is
not shown just when that will was ex-
ecuted, but apparently it was several
years before he died, and that ap-
parently remained as his last will until
late in 1946, when, in a conference with
Mr. Johnson, Mr. Anderson for the first
time discussed changing his will.

A controlling point in this case, or a
strong point, is the fact that there is
no showing that Mr. Anderson had any
independent advice in connection with
this will which gives the principal part
of his estate to a person with whom he
had this highly confidential relation-
ship. In Hunter v. Battiest, 792 Okla.
248, 192 P. 575, this court said:

“When the legal presumption of un-
due influence has arisen by showing

confidential relations, whether in dis-
positions of property inter vivos or by
will, the burden of proof is upon the
party seeking to take the benefit of such
disposition to rebut the presumption
attaching thereto by showing either a
severance of the confidential relations,
or that the party making the disposition
had competent and independent advice
in regard thereto. Gidney v. Chappel,
supra; McQueen v. Wilson, 131 Ala. 606,
31 South 94.”

In the case of In re Kuhn’s Will,
120 Kan. 18, 241 P. 1087, it was held:

“When a will is prepared by the sole
or principal beneficiary, who was the
confidential agent, or who occupied a
position of confidence or trust, to the
testator, the instrument will not be held
valid as a will unless it be affirmatively
shown (a) that the testator read or
knew its contents, and (b) had in-
dependent advice with reference there-
to.”

In that case and in other cases in
that court the term “independent ad-
vice” was held to mean:

“That the donor had the preliminary
benefit of conferring fully and privately
upon the subject of his intended gift
with a person who was not only com-
petent to inform him correctly as to its
legal effect, but who was, furthermore,
so disassociated from the interests of
the donee as to be in a position to advise
with the donor impartially and con-
fidentially as to the consequences to
himself of his proposed benefaction.”

In the case of In re Conroy’s Estate,
29 Wyo. 62, 211 P. 96, where the dece-
dent was aged, and for a short period
of years the principal beneficiary in the
will managed the decedent’s property
in and by reason of a confidential re-
lationship, probate was denied and the
court took occasion to enumerate the
following elements of undue influence
which should be considered by the court
on the question of undue influence:

“(1.) The suspicion excited by the
fact that the beneficiary drew the will
gained strength when it appears that he
was a stranger to the blood of the tes-
tatrix.

481

: “(2) That by the will he takes a
large or unreasonable proportion of the
estate.

“(3) That he was the trusted or con-
fidential agent or adviser of the de-
ceased,

“(4) That he was present and active
in the execution of the will.

“(5) That the testatrix was of ad-
vanced age, impaired faculties, and
feeble of mind and body.

“(6) That she had no independent
and disinterested advice with reference
to making the will.”

All of the elements there stated are
present in the case at bar, and also in
that case, as in the case at bar, there
had been some outside statements of in-
tention to will or to leave the property
to the principal beneficiary on account
of friendship or acts of kindness.

In the case at bar there is no proof
whatever that the testator Anderson
had any independent advice concern-
ing this devising of his property, The
proponent points out that he had oppor-
tunity for such independent advice, but
in that connection we note the forceful
demonstration of high secrecy as to all
the property transactions between tes-
tator and Mr. Johnson. The notary ac-
knowledgments were taken by a notary
public who was a permanent employee
in Mr. Johnson’s bank. All the circum~-
stances would imply or indicate that
the testator did not have independent
advice.

In Fairbank v. Fairbank, 92 Kan. 45,
139 P. 1011, the facts disclose that on
March 31, 1906, the testatrix, a widow,
deeded a large tract of land to her
son. On February 14, 1907, she executed
a will giving him almost all of her
property and naming him as executor.
On August 2, 1908, she died. The bene-
ficiary offered the will for probate and
his sister and the testatrix’ grandchil-
dren contested the probate of the will.
The will was denied probate on the
ground of undue influence of the chief
beneficiary. The court in discussing the

482

question of undue influence gave great
weight to the following circumstances:

“(1) The deed was not recorded until
after the death of the grantor, and the
other members of the family did not
know of its execution.

“(2) The testatrix died at the age of
79 years,

“(3) For about 25 years before her
death, her son Rudolph who is unmar-
ried, managed her property and busi-
ness, living with her for the last few
years.

“(4) She was feeble and in ill health.

“(5) She had learned to read after
she was 60 years of age.

“(6) She was to a certain extent en-
feebled mentally by dropsy, heart dis-
ease and Bright’s disease (the latter
being a kidney disease.) She was not
as clear mentally as she had been.

“(7) She was not previously ac~
quainted with the lawyer who drew her
will and had never before employed
him, while the beneficiary consulted
with him as his attorney about that
time.

“(8) Some 10 years before she died,
Elizabeth Fairbank expressed an inten-
tion that her daughter, Mrs. Carter
(one of the contestants) should have
an equal share of her property, and
she repeated this a year and half before
her death.”

All those circumstances were present
in the case at bar by direct proof or
fair analogy, noting, however, that
there are slight differences. While the
confidential relationship as applied to
complete property management in that
ease extended over a longer period
than here, we have in this case a tes-
tator who was several years older.

In the case of In re Mullen’s Estate,
8 Cal. App. 2d 684, 47 P. 2d 746, the
California court said:

“The testimony of appellant and his
wife, besides being impeached as above
shown, must also be weighed against
the presumption of undue influence,
which arises from proof of the exist-

ence of a confidential relation between
a testator and a beneficiary, coupled
with activity of latter in the preparation
ofa will. In re Estate of Baird, 176 Cal.
381, 168 P. 561; In re Estate of Nutt,
181 Cal. 522, 185 P, 393. In the instant
case decedent requested appellant to
prepare a will, and the latter had his
own wife pen it at his direction.

ee Re

“A previously executed testamentary
writing, conflicting with the propounded
instrument, executed voluntarily and
while decedent had recognized mental
capacity, is an evidentiary fact from
which undue influence or unsoundness
of mind at the time of the later writing
might be inferred, there being no ex-
planatory facts.”

In the case of In re Hampton’s Estate,
39 C. A. 2d 488, 103 P. 2d 611, the
California court held:

“If the provisions of the propounded
instrument vary radically from testa-
mentary intentions which the decedent
entertained previously. to the execution
of the writing, this fact, when unex-
plained, is one of the recognized indicia
of imposition or undue influence.”

We have heretofore noted in this
opinion the sharp differences between
the former will of Anderson and the
present will which was executed about
a year after Mr. Johnson took over
the detail management of the property,
funds, collections and expenditures of
the deceased.

In the case of In re Lance’s Estate,
216 Cal. 397, 14 P. 2d 768, a will was
denied probate which named as the sole
beneficiary a friend of 20 years stand-
ing, who was not related to testator by
blood or marriage, but a confidential
relationship existed between the two.
The court there noted three important
elements held to give rise to a pre-
sumption of undue influence, and held
to place the burden on the proponent
to show that he had not been guilty of
undue influence as follows:

“(1) That confidential relations ex-
isted between the proponent and the
decedent;

“(2) That the proponent sunduly, prof.
ited by the terms of the will *
to the prejudice of the heirs of the
decedent.’

_ “(8) That the proponent actively par~
ticipated in the execution of the will.”

All of these elements are present in
the case at bar.

In the case of In re Rupert’s Estate,
152 Ore, 649, 54 P, 2d 274, the decedent
had a former will naming his nephew
as beneficiary. He later made a will
naming his physician as principal bene-
ficiary. The relationship there was a
confidential one and the beneficiary
denied that he had ever influenced
the deceased in regard to his will. In
the course of the opinion there and in
reference to the situation, the Supreme
Court of Oregon said:

“But denials alone will not suffice.
He participated in the will making and
owed a duty to give an explanation
of occurrences which only he could
explain. * * * Possessed of the influ-
ence which he held over the decedent,
the latter’s mention of an intention to
make a will, and includé a devise in it
for appellant, should have caused the
latter promptly to retire from the scene.
If he wanted to participate, he should
have surrounded the decedent with
those of his old-time friends who
would have given him disinterested ad-
vice.”

In the case of In re Lobb’s Will,
2 Appeals 173 Ore. 414, 145 P. 2d 808,
and 177 Ore. 162, 160 P. 2d 295, there is
this:

“Where a principal beneficiary under
a_ will sustains a confidential or fidu-
ciary relationship toward the testator,
and actively participates in the prep-
aration of the will, he must assume,
when the will is attacked upon the
ground of undue influence, the burden
of proving that he did not exert such
influence. In re Rupert’s Estate, 152
Ore. 649, 54 P. 2d 274; In re Knutson’s
Will, 149 Ore. 467, 41 P. 24 793, * * *”

In that case the principal beneficiary
was an attorney at law and was the
testator’s attorney, but the court there
shows no disposition to limit the legal

483

principle to be appliable only as be-
tween attorney and client. Ail know
that relationship between men may be
just as a confidential in fact when neith-
er is a lawyer. In this case the record
is such that all must agree that the
relationship between Mr. Anderson and
Mr. Johnson was such a confidential
relationship of the highest degree.

We will cite no more decisions. We
have selected these citations because
we regard them as forceful statements,
to be applied here. A multitude of au-
thorities could be cited along the same
line, but we deem it not necessary. We
do not understand that proponent ques-
tions these rules of law. He does insist
with vigor either that they do not
apply here, or that their application
does not guide to a reversal. However,
that is a decision for this court to make
in all sound judicial discretion. It is
our duty to weigh the evidence and
apply the law in full justice as we
conscientiously view it.

Our duty here is a solemn duty be-
cause the case involves probably a for-
tune in amount, which will go by in-
heritance to the blood relatives of Mr.
Anderson if we decide it one way, or
which will go as a gift to his friendly
banker if we decide it the other way.

We see no need to further detail the
evidence. We have carefully considered
the entire record. The contest to the
will must be sustained on the ground
of undue influence, on account of the
showing made in that regard, and on
account of the failure of Mr. Johnson
to discharge the burden cast on him by
the legal rules above referred to, and
by the relationship shown by the facts
and circumstances.

For the reasons stated the judgment
is reversed, and the cause remanded,
with directions to render judgment sus-
taining the contest and denying probate
of the proposed will.

ARNOLD, C. J., and WELCH, CORN,
O'NEAL, and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur.
HALLEY, V. C. J., and GIBSON and
DAVISON, JJ., dissent.

484

HALLEY, V. C. J. (dissenting). I
dissent from the majority opinion in
this case. I do not believe that the
decision reached is sustained by the
record, but it is predicated on a factual
situation shown by overwhelming evi-
dence not to exist.

The last will of Arne N. Anderson
was admitted to probate after a hearing
in the county court of Kay county. In
that court Charles E. Anderson filed
a formal contest, but did not introduce
evidence or urge the contest in any
manner. He was not represented by
counsel until later. On appeal the dis-
trict court, after an extended hearing,
with many witnesses testifying, con-
firmed the county court’s order and
dismissed the appeal of those who con-
tested the will. The district judge saw
all witnesses upon the stand, observed
their demeanor, considered their inter-
est or lack of interest, and decided the
issues in favor of the proponents of the
will.

“A will contest is a case of purely
equitable cognizance, and on appeal this
court will examine the entire record
and weigh the evidence, but the findings
and judgment of the trial court will
not be disturbed unless clearly against
the weight of the evidence.” Runnels v.
Burton, 202 Okla. 406, 214 P. 2d 709.

See, also, In re DeVine’s Estate, 188
Okla. 423, 109 P. 2d 1078.

In the trial court and in this court
contestants attack the validity of the
will on two grounds: (1) that Arne N.
Anderson was not mentally competent
to make a will on March 1, 1947, and
(2) that the will was procured by undue
influence and fraud by the principal
beneficiary, Wilfrid B. Johnson.

Of necessity, and for clarity, this dis-
sent will be extended by recital of cer-
tain facts not appearing in the majority
opinion. That opinion does not squarely
meet the presented issue as to mental
competency of testator, but in my opin-
ion the extended testimony offered on
mental competency has a substantial
bearing on the correct decision of the

issue of undue influence, and the tes-
timony of more than a dozen witnesses
cannot be ignored or dismissed with a
casual observation.

For contestants, three persons not re-
lated to deceased and five of the
nieces and nephews testified concern-
ing his mental competency. A majority
of them testified that after his leg was
broken December 31, 1945, Mr. Ander-
son’s memory was poor, or that he was
forgetful or that he did not recognize
people including relatives. Several, but

_ not all, expressed an opinion that he

was mentally incompetent to make a
will on March 1, 1947. One contestant,
Tora Rock, a niece, who did not see
Arne Anderson in the year 1947, tes-
tified:

“A. From 1945 on there I don’t think
he would be able to make a will at his _
age.

“Cross-examination by Mr. Duvall:

“Q. That was largely because of for-
getfulness? A. Yes, his forgetfulness,
he didn’t recognize people, at times he
didn’t.

“Q. Well, it was largely because of
his forgetfulness? A, Yes, and absent
mindedness.

“Q. Now, you are only 60? A. Yes.

“Q. And you know you are compe-
tent to make a will? A. No, I don’t

think so.”

The quoted testimony is typical. Ob-
viously, to the trial judge, who knew
the testator, it was incredible.

We have held that mere advanced
age or physical infirmity does not ren-
der one incapable of making a will or
entering into a contract. Dunkin v. Rice,
197 Okla. 150, 169 P. 2d 210.

With the exception of one nephew
these heirs had all moved away from
Ponca City and did not reside in Okla-~
homa during the last years of Mr. An-
derson’s life, and they saw him only
on occasional visits.

On the contrary, more than a dozen
disinterested witnesses, including busi-
ness and professional men, public offi-
cers and doctors, testified that he was
mentally competent at the time the will
was made. All had been residents of
Kay county for years and had frequent
and some of them almost daily contact
and opportunity for observation of him.
Included in these witnesses were the
night clerk of the hotel where he lived;
the policeman who walked the beat be-
tween the hotel and the bank where
Anderson spent much of his time, the
vice president of the First National
Bank of which Arne Anderson was a
stockholder, director and depositor;
president of a trust company; officer of
a Savings and Loan Association; a
former city councilman, who had served
on the council with Anderson; a retired
dentist, and the physician who, so far
as this record reveals, had attended
Arne Anderson in his every illness.
Each of these witnesses testified that
deceased was mentally competent to
make a will and dispose of his property
at the time his will was made. Both the
county judge and the district judge
found Arne Anderson to be competent,
and I am of the opinion that such find-
ings are sustained by a great prepon-
derance of the evidence. I cannot lightly
regard the opinions of such witnesses as
testified that Arne Anderson was men-
tally competent. Nor can I substitute
a judgment contrary to that of the coun-
ty judge and district judge who knew the
testator and heard and observed the
witnesses as they testified.

But it is said the will was obtained
by undue influence and fraud of the
principal beneficiary, who stood in a
confidential relationship with testator.

The rule applicable here was stated
by this court in Re Jones’ Estate, 190
Okla. 123, 121 P. 2d 574:

“Undue influence, such as will in-
validate a will, must be something
which destroys the free agency of the
testator at the time the instrument is
made and which, in effect, substitutes
the will of another for that of the tes-

485

tator. It is not sufficient that the tes-
tator was influenced in the ordinary
affairs of life or that he was surrounded
by relatives and friends in confidential
relationship with him at the time of its
execution. Suspicion, conjecture, pos-
sibility, or guess that undue influence
or fraud has induced a will, is not
alone sufficient to defeat the probate
of a will, Power, motive, and oppor-
tunity to exercise undue influence do
not alone authorize the inference that
such influence has in fact been ex-
ercised.”

The evidence shows that Anderson
watched with interest and probably ad-
miration as Johnson developed from
a young man into a successful business
man. Through the years Johnson did
him many favors. He called for John-
son when he was ill. Johnson and his
wife visited him frequently while An-
derson was confined in a hospital for
more than a year. Anderson was close
fisted. Through the years Johnson filled
out papers for Anderson in his leasing
of property and loans of private funds
for which no charge was suggested by
Johnson for his services. Many bankers
do these things for customers or friends.

Contestants now say that these acts
were performed by Johnson designed-
ly and to the end that he might later
exercise an undue influence when An-
derson came to making his will, The
record dees not sustain that contention.
Friendship might exert an influence
over a person, but such acts of friend-
ship even when confidential relations
exist do not necessarily mean that it
is what is known at law as an “undue
influence”. Whether or not the influence
of one person upon another is an “undue
influence” is a question of fact for the
court to decide, in consideration of all
the evidence in the cause.

The same rule was announced in Re
DeVine’s Estate, supra. In that case,
just as in the case before us, the con-
testant was a nephew and the principal
beneficiaries were not related to the
testator.

In Canfield v. Canfield, 167 Okla.
590, 31 P. 2d 152, we discussed at

486

length the subject of undue influence
and influence gained by acts of kind-
ness. We approved the following quota-
tions from various courts:

“Influence secured through acts of
kindness is not wrongful, and therefore
not undue.” Chrisman v. Quick, 174
Ky. 845, 193 S. W. 13.

“Influence over testator gained by
affection and friendly attention is not
‘undue influence’ which will invalidate
a will.” Biggerstaff v. Wicks, 348 Ill.
129, 180 N. BE. 840.

“The word ‘undue’ when used to
qualify ‘influence’, has the legal mean-
ing of ‘wrongful’, so that ‘undue in-
fluence’ means a wrongful influence,
but influence acquired through affection
is not wrongful.” Hurd v. Reed, 260
Til. 154, 102 N. E. 1048.

This record does not reveal that Wil-
frid Johnson exercised influence over
Arne Anderson to persuade him to
make the will in question, to say noth-
ing of employing such influence as
would destroy the free agency of the
testator or substitute his will for that
of the testator at the time the will
was made.

Various witnesses have described the
traits of character of Anderson as fol-
lows: “good business man”; “positive”;
“he wouldn’t spend much”; “he was
tight”; “most conservative man I ever
knew”; “stubborn old man’; “deter-
mined”; “alert”; “he was just as keen
as I ever saw him up to his last illness.”
It is difficult for me to understand how
aman possessed of these qualities could
be easily influenced or that he would
permit another person’s will to be sub-
stituted for his own.

Conceding that confidential relation-
ship may give rise to a presumption of
undue influence, the overwhelming evi-
dence shows that the testator was not
influenced by Johnson or any one else
in making his will, Furthermore, the
majority opinion assumes, contrary to
the evidence, that Johnson prepared the
will in question. The undisputed evi-
dence is that Anderson directed how

his will should be drawn; that it was
drawn by a reputable member of the
bar of this state, and that the subse-
quent changes in the will were directed
by the testator and were typewritten
only by Johnson. Under the record here
there was no occasion for the rule relat-
ing to “independent advice” to ever
apply.

A person possessed of mental capa-
city has the legal right to dispose of
his property as he wishes.

“The right to make a will includes
the right to make it according to tes-
tator’s own desires, subject only to the
statutory restrictions.” In re Cook’s
Estate, 71 Okla. 94, 175 P. 507,

In addition to the cases above cited,
this court has held that acts of kind-
ness do not constitute undue influence
such as would defeat the probate of a
will, and we have consistently followed
the rule of In re Jones’ Estate, supra;
McClure, Ex’r, v. Kerchner, 107 Okla.
28, 229 P. 589; Kindt v. Parmenter, 83
Okla. 116, 200 P. 706; Nelson v. York,
87 Okla. 210, 209 P. 425; In re Cook’s
Estate, supra; Myers v. Myers, 130
Okla. 184, 266 P. 452.

It is true that confidential relations
existed between Anderson and John-
son. But those relations were mutual.
They were the usual confidences inci-
dent to an association in business. This
record does not reveal that Johnson
ever dominated or controlled Anderson.
In fact, it would indicate that Ander-
son was the more dominant. Johnson
came at his every beck and call. John-
son responded when Anderson was ill
and called for aid. Anderson loaned his
money, rented his farms and town
property; made his own deals, and
then, at his request, Johnson prepared
the instruments incident to the business.
This record does not reveal, in the years
of their acquaintance, where Johnson
ever clashed with Anderson’s views on
any matter or imposed his will over
Anderson’s will.

When it came to the preparation of
the will in question the testator told

Johnson of his desired distribution of
the estate, named the five nieces who
were to be given bequests, and directed
that he have an attorney draw the will.
This was done and the will given to
Anderson, who kept it several weeks.
He returned, stating that he desired
two changes, and Johnson redrafted the
will to reflect the changes as directed
by Anderson. Again Anderson retained
possession of the will for several weeks.
On the day that he decided to execute
the will Anderson approached a friend
whom he wanted as a witness. On their
way to the bank this lonely old bachelor
told his friend that he was leaving his
property to Johnson and his wife; that
they had treated him better than any-
body. The will was executed. Anderson
placed it in his safety deposit box,
where it remained until his death nearly
fourteen months later. It is intimated in
the majority opinion that Johnson, too,
had access to the will, but there is no
proof or evidence which will justify the
insinuation.

I do not agree with the majority opin-
ion that Johnson had complete charge
of Anderson’s property and affairs for
three and one-half years prior to his
death. The hospital record of Anderson’s
illnesses following his confinement with
a broken leg, which confinement ter-
minated February 4, 1946, shows that he
was confined again for one week Sep-
tember 1, 1946, to September 8, 1946,

,and from January 3, 1948, to January
6, 1948. He was again confined from
March 12, 1948, to his death on May
20, 1948, He was not ill from September
8, 1946, through the entire year 1947.
The will was executed March 1, 1947.
The bank’s records reveal that from
that date to his last hospitalization Arne
Anderson made 32 visits to his safety
deposit box, in which the will was kept,
and signed the authorization card upon
each such occasion. During that time he
negotiated and executed a lease on his
farm, consulted his farm tenant fre-
quently as to crops and improvements,
and collected monthly rentals from his
property in town.

487

This record is replete with evidence
showing that Arne Anderson had a very
great affection for Wilfrid Johnson and
his wife Marie. To various people he
referred to them as his children and
to Wilfrid as his son.

A quarter of a century before this
will was made Arne Anderson ex-
pressed a determination to handle his
affairs as he saw fit and indicated
feelings of partiality and favoritism
even concerning his nieces and nephews.
At a family picnic in 1920 he told a
nephew that he was going to see that
his relatives were taken care of “in the
proper manner”, and said “there are
some I will favor a little more than the
others, that I think a little more of.”
It is evident that he believed that he
was the one to determine what would
be the “proper manner.”

In 1945 when certain relatives were
visiting him in the hospital he told a
friend that his folks had his property
divided up and figured out how they
were going to spend it, and added “but
Tm going to fool them.” When the will
was made he knew how he wanted to
distribute his property.

In its opinion this court cites two
Oregon cases: In re Brown’s Estate,
165 Ore. 575, 108 P. 2d 775, and In re
Lobb’s Will, 177 Ore. 162, 160 P. 2d
295, I have no quarrel with the rules
announced therein. This court has
made similar announcements, which
could have been cited. But I do not
agree that the factual situations of those
cases, one dealing with the will of an
illiterate Indian, naming his attorney
as chief beneficiary, and the other with
the will of an old lady who was infat-
uated with her attorney and named him
as beneficiary, are comparable with the
situation of the instant case. Arne
Anderson was a competent and shrewd
business man who had accumulated his
fortune by the exercise of a sound busi-
ness judgment and frugality. He was
a positive character who knew what
he wanted done with his estate. The
majority opinion defeats the wishes

486 es

of the testator as expressed in his will.
The evidence is overwhelming that he
knew what he was doing when he willed
the bulk of his estate to a stranger
to his blood who had been good to him
in his lifetime rather than to his blood
relatives who, after his death, swarmed.
from far and near to prove that the
testator was non compos mentis when
he executed the will, and before and
after. The picture is familiar. But sel-
dom in such circumstances are the ex-
pressed wished of the testator dis-
regarded.

The majority opinion substitutes the
judgment of this court for that of the
county éourt and of the district court,
both of which heard the overwhelming
testimony of the testator’s intimates
and associates to the effect that the
testator, though old in years, was sound
in mind.

The facts of this case are similar to
those in Re Wheeling’s Estate, 198 Okla.
81, 175 P. 2d 317, but much stronger
in support of sustaining the will, for
there the testator was under guardian-
ship. In that case we said:

“Tt appears that the will in the pres-
ent case was duly executed and in ac-
cordance with the exact wishes and re-
quest of the testator, and upon his sole
volition. The judgment of the trial court
on the issue of testamentary capacity
and in admitting the will to probate is
not against the clear weight of the
evidence and therefore cannot be dis-
turbed. In re Shipman’s Estate, supra,
(184 Okla. 56, 85 P. 2d 317); In re
Will of Son-se-gra, 78 Okla, 213, 189
P. 865.”

Even if the judgment is to be re-
versed I think the case should be re-
manded for a new trial rather’ than for
this court to render judgment.

GIBSON ‘and DAVISON, JJ., concur
in this dissent.

MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO. et al.
v. SUTTON.

No. 35224, April 21, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 19, 1953.
257 P. 2d 307.

Earl A, Brown, Dallas, Tex. and

Robert W. Richards, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiffs in error.

Gomer Smith and Gomer Smith, Jr.,
Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

BLACKBIRD, J. In this action, de-
fendant in error, as plaintiff, obtained
a verdict and judgment against plain~
tiffs in error, as defendants, in the’ sum
of $70,000 for the alleged wrongful
death of her husband, Buster Sutton, in
an explosion on an oil and gas lease.

The lease belonged to one of the
plaintiffs in error, Magnolia Petroleum
Company, and Sutton was the em--
ployee of Monarch Construction Com-
pany, which was engaged under con-
tract with said oil company, to install
a battery of four oil field storage
tanks on the lease. The tanks were
erected in a single file or straight row.

The explosion killed Sutton instant-
ly. Its cause was unknown and how it
occurred remained the principal issue
throughout the trial. There were vari-
ous theories, testified to by expert as
well as nonexpert witnesses, as to what
might have caused it.

It appears that on Saturday, October
16, 1948, or two days before the fatal
accident, Sutton, and Monarch’s fore~
man, Charles Leffler, did some work on
the tanks, but did not connect the two
north tanks referred to herein as tanks
Nos. 1 and 2 with the two south tanks
referred to as tanks Nos. 3 and 4.
While they were there that day, Hoenig
Tank Trucks, another independent con-
tractor, hauled in several hundred
barrels of crude oil for Magnolia and

490 |

pumped the oil into tanks 1 and 2. After
that, apparently all workmen left the
the tank battery until the following
Monday, when the Monarch workmen,
including the deceased, and his fore-
man, Leffler, returned to complete their
part of the tank battery installation.
Their arrival preceded that of a crew
employed by Magnolia Pipe Line Com-
pany, whose job was to connect each
tank in the battery with said company’s
pipe line. The latter crew and the
Monarch workmen had labored two
hours or more there together on their
separate assignments in connection with
readying the tank -battery for operation
when the explosion occurred.

At the time of the explosion, the pipe
line which was to conduct the future
crude oil contents from the tanks for
marketing, or other uses, was already
laying in a shallow open ditch along-
side the tank battery and a welder of
the pipe line company’s crew was en-
gaged in cutting or shortening with
an acetylene torch a “riser” pipe, com-
ing up out of this line to connect it with
what we will call a “spigot”, near the
base of tank No, 3. The deceased had
been sent to the topside of the tank
battery to lubricate the stops or valves
on the equalizer or “overflow” pipe or
line, which extended between the tanks
near their tops, and was for the purpose
of permitting oil to flow over from one
tank into the next one when the ad-
joining one was filled to capacity. He
was lubricating the “stop” valve on the
overflow line between tanks 3 and 4.

The explosion blew down only tank
4, but the impact also unseated tank 3.
The other two tanks were apparently
not affected The testimony is not in
agreement as to whether tanks 3 and 4
were affected simultaneously or succes-
sively; and, if successively, which tank
—No. 3 or No. 4—felt the impact first.

When this action by Sutton’s widow
came on for trial before a jury, not
only the Magnolia Petroleum Company
and the Magnolia Pipe Line Company
but also Monarch Construction Com-
pany, its foreman, Charles Leffler, and

Hoenig Tank Trucks were parties de-
fendant.

After plaintiff had moved for a dis~
missal of the action as to Hoenig Tank
Trucks, the verdict was against only
the two defendants, Magnolia Petro~
leum Company and Magnolia Pipe Line
Company, the jury exonerating the other
two.

The Magnolia Companies have ap~
pealed from the trial court’s order
overruling their separate motions for
a new trial, filed on the ground, among
others, that the trial judge erred in
overruling the separate requests they
made during the closing arguments that
a mistrial be declared. Plaintiff and
these defendants will hereinafter be
referred to by their trial court designa-
tions, except when clarity requires use
of their proper names. Other defendants
will be designated by name,

At the trial, one of the theories ad~
vanced as to the cause of the explosion
was that gas or combustible fumes
from the oil in tanks 1 and 2 were ig~
nited by the acetylene torch the pipe
line company’s welder was using. De-~
fendants’ principal theory was that such
fumes were set off or ignited by the
negligence of the decedent or one of
Monarch’s other employees near or on
top of tanks 3 and 4. Their counsel
now points to such physical facts as the
blowing down of tank 4, while tank 3
remained standing, testimony that Mon-
arch workmen were seen smoking with-
in three or four minutes of the explo-
sion, that deceased was a cigarette
smoker and bits of cigarettes and match~
es were observed lying near his body
after the explosion, and conclusions of
experts, as showing that the ignition
of the gases must logically have come
from some source closer to tank 4 than
the welder working at the base of tank 3.

The defendants’ separate requests of
the trial judge to declare a mistrial
were directed, not at the conduct of
Mr. Gomer Smith, plaintiff’s attorney,
but at the conduct of Mr. Paul who
represented their codefendant, the

Monarch foreman, Charles Leffler, and
was also one of the attorneys for the
Monarch Company, which had an addi-
tional attorney, Mr. Brown. The ap-
pealing defendants, Magnolia Petro-
leum and Magnolia Pipe Line, were
represented by Mr. Richards and Mr.
Garvin. Mr. Paul’s conduct is indi-
cated by the following excerpt from
his closing argument to the jury:

«* # * The Court has instructed you
as a matter of law and as a matter of
fact that oil, crude oil is a dangerous
thing. We are going to decide just ex-
actly the cause of that explosion out
there. I am not going to set a fire here
or hurt anyone, you don’t have to worry
about that. First, tell me if that is gas-
oline, (handing to the jury a can); I
want you and each of you to examine
it and tell me if it is gasoline, I am
sure each of you say that it is gaso-
line. I just went down to the filling
station and bought one quart of good
gasoline, will someone give me a cig-
arette?”

Following the above remarks, Mr.
Richards immediately interposed an
objection and made motions on behalf
of both of his clients that the court de-
clare a mistrial. The court then excused
the jury for the purpose of hearing
argument on these motions, and, as
the jurors filed out of the courtroom,
one of them remarked: “If an explosion
takes place who is responsible?” Af-
ter the jury’s departure, Mr. Paul ex-
plained to the court that with the can
of Ethyl gasoline he had brought out of
his brief case during his quoted re-
marks, he had intended to demonstrate
to the jury that an open flame is re-
quired to ignite gasoline—that a ciga-
rette will not do it; that he had been
about to drop a burning cigarette in
the gasoline to show them it would be
extinguished rather than igniting the
gasoline. He further explained that he
had then intended to drop a lighted
match in the gasoline showing the jury
that the match’s flame would ignite it.
Mr. Paul’s evident intention, as indi-
cated, had been to graphically demon-
strate to the jury that the explosion
was caused by the flame on the acety-

491

lene torch of Magnolia pipe line’s
welder, rather than by any burning or
smoking cigarettes of the deceased or
other Monarch employees. At the con-
clusion of the attorney’s argument,
out of the hearing of the jury, the
court overruled them, and admonished
Mr. Paul to refrain from proceed-
ing with his proposed demonstration
to the jury; and when the jurors re-
turned to the courtroom, the judge in-
structed them to disregard what they
may have seen or heard during Mr.
Paul’s above-quoted opening remarks
and told them specifically: “* * * It
has nothing to do with this case.”
Then before resuming his closing argu-
ment, Mr. Paul made the following ad-
ditional remark (whether addressed as
a question to the court or a statement
to the jury does not definitely appear):
“Then I cannot make the demonstra-
tion that I desired to make.” Mr. Rich-
ards then renewed his clients’ motions
for a mistrial and the court again ruled
against him, but instructed the jury
to disregard Mr. Paul’s last-quoted re-
mark.

Counsel for the Magnolia Companies
states that in this case, the defend-
ants Monarch Construction Company
and its foreman, Leffler, in reality,
were just as much adverse parties to
his clients as was the plaintiff, in that
if it was successfully demonstrated to
the jury that his clients were entirely
responsible for the death of the de-
ceased, then they could reasonably ex-
pect a verdict relieving them from all
liability. The argument is to the ef-
fect that the trial judge should have

‘stopped Mr. Paul before he had gone so

far with his allegedly wrongful attempt
to demonstrate to the jury that the
pipe line company’s acetylene torch
flame, instead of the deceased’s or
some other Monarch worker’s lighted
cigarette, caused the explosion; that
the jury should have been ushered out
of the courtroom before the controversy
between lawyers about the demon-
stration began; and that the court’s fail-
ure to do either of these things resulted
in the jury receiving an unfair, biased

492

and prejudiced impression of the evi-
dence, and, of the correct conclusion
to be drawn therefrom, as to the real
cause of the accident. It is argued
that the harmful and damaging effect
as to the Magnolia Companies, of the
unwarranted conduct of Mr. Paul, ap-
parently endorsed by Monarch’s other
attorney, Mr. Brown, was not wiped
out, obliterated, or removed from the
minds of the jurors by the court’s
“mild” admonition, as is indicated by
the parting remark of one of the jurors
we have quoted. Counsel say they rec-
ognize the general rule that the trial
court’s admonition will usually rectify
the harm done by improper remarks
by litigants’ counsel before a jury, but
they say there is a recognized excep-
tion to this rule which applies where
counsel have gone beyond the record
in his argument. They cite the case of
City of Shawnee v. Sparks, 26 Okla. 665,
110 P. 884, with excerpts from Bullard
v. Boston & M. R. R, 64 N.H. 27, 5
Atl. 838, quoted therein, excerpts from
Labbe Mfg. Co. v. Samples, 89 Colo.
333, 2 P. 2d 1086, and Waldron v. Wal-
dron, 156 U.S. 361, 39 L. Ed. 453, as au-
thority for their position. We think all
of these cases may be distinguished
from the one at bar. The decision on
the matter referred to in the Shawnee
case is reflected in paragraph 1 of the
syllabus therein, as follows:

“Where counsel in argument makes
statement of a material fact not in evi-
dence against the objection of the other
party, he violates the right of a fair
trial, and where the trial judge fails
to pass squarely on the objection, and,
if sustained, fails to admonish the jury
to disregard such statement as not in
evidence, we must reverse, unless this
court can ascertain from the record
that no harm resulted.”

In all of the above-cited cases, the
attorney’s statements complained of
unequivocally and definitely represent-
ed material facts to the jury that were
not in evidence, or they persisted in
their statements after being admon-
ished not to make them. As shown in
the present case, Mr. Paul made no

such representation nor did he persist
in attempting to make his planned dem-
onstration. The trial court speci-
fically sustained Magnolia Company’s
objection to his going any further with
it and specifically instructed the jury
that what they may have seen or heard
during the first part of Mr. Paul’s argu-
ment had “nothing to do with this case.”
Of course, there was no evidence in
this case that the explosion was caused
from the ignition of gasoline—the facts
indicated it was the result of the igni-
tion of natural gas or gaseous fumes
from crude oil,—but we do not think
that, under the circumstances Mr.
Paul’s interrupted attempt to make the
demonstration he had planned was the
same or tantamount to the statement
of a material fact not in evidence. And,
even so, the fact that a flame and not
a cigarette ember would ignite gasoline
was a matter with which most, if not
all, members of the jury, from their own
personal experience, reading or observa-
tion, were probably already familiar. As
noted, the explosive agent in evidence
was gas rather than gasoline, but as
plaintiffs counsel points out, a demon-
stration that such explosive agent was
ignited by a flame, rather than the live
ember of a smoking cigarette, though
not entirely irrelevant, could not, in it-
self, have been decisive. Here, there
was ample evidence that it was the
welder’s flame which furnished the
ignition for the explosion. We do not
think it appropriate here to act upon
speculation as to whether Mr. Paul’s re-
marks influenced the jurors in arriving
at their verdict. Defendant’s counsel
point to nothing indicating that they
were, except the amount of the recovery.
Their efforts would obviously be more
germane to the issue and more compe-
tently show harmful effect from Mr.
Paul’s conduct, if they pointed out an
absence of evidentiary basis for cul-
pability on the part of their clients, rath-
er than referring only to the amount the
jury determined they should pay for
such culpability. We do not think the
circumstances justify the application of
the extreme measure of holding Mr.
Paul’s conduct reversible error “unless

this court can ascertain from the rec-
ord that no harm resulted.” Ordinar-
ily, the remarks of counsel in their
argument before a jury are not con-
sidered reversible error, if ordered
stricken by the court or are definitely
withdrawn from the jury’s considera-
tion, and it does not appear that the
jury was influenced thereby. Wagner
v. McKernan, 198 Okla. 425, 177 P. 2d
511; Grand River Dam Authority v.
Audrain, 193 Okla. 55, 141 P. 2d 97;
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Crane, 175
Okla. 198, 51 P. 2d 711; McDonald v.
Cobb, 52 Okla. 581, 153 P. 138. The
whole case, with the particular cir-
cumstances thereof, may be taken into
consideration in determining the effect-
iveness of attempted corrections by
the court, of the error in the improper
argument or conduct. Wagner v. Mc-
Kernan, supra; 3 Am. Jur. 612, §1070.
We recognize that in a case where, by
highly improper or prejudicial re-
marks, attorneys have insisted on going
beyond their legally permissible lati-
tude in such matters (See Grand River
Dam Authority v. Audrian, supra),
and the appellate court cannot definitely
determine on a concrete and tangible
basis whether or not the error has ac-
tually resulted in prejudice to the
complaining party, it may conclude that
the ends of justice would be served
only by affording a new trial (See, in
this connection and in addition to de-
fendants’ cited cases, the discussion in
Berry v. Park, 185 Okla. 118, 90 P. 2d
425, and the rule stated in Texas In-
demnity Insurance Co. v. McCurry
(Tex. Com. App.) 41 S. W. 2d 215, 78
ALR. 760). Here, however, we do not
believe that such a situation exists and,
while attorney Paul’s conduct was not
proper and is not to be condoned, we
do not think his attempted demonstra-
tion had progressed so far beyond an
attorney’s license in such matters (be-
fore its interruption and the taking of
corrective measures by the court),
that we can say, with any degree of
certainty, and on the basis of the rec-
ord, that the jury’s verdict would have
been different had it not occurred. For
this reason, we think the harmless er-

493

ror doctrine rather than the rule urged
by defendants applies; and the verdict
will not be set aside because of the
trial court’s alleged error in refusing to
declare a mistrial.

Another proposition presented by de-
fendant Magnolia Petroleum Company
is that the trial court erred in over-
ruling its separate demurrer to plain-
tiff’s evidence. Under this proposition,
it is argued that since the deceased
was said oi! company’s invitee and it
owed him no greater degree of care
than keeping the premises reasonably
safe from defects or conditions in the
nature of hidden or concealed dangers
or pitfalls, the question presented by
said demurrer was whether said com-
pany had created such a danger by
having crude oil in tanks 1 and 2, and
then, having the Monarch crew, of
which deceased was a member, con-
nect up the vent, flow and equalizer
lines from these tanks to tanks 3 and 4.
In support of this argument, they point
to the testimony of various witnesses
showing a more or less common knowl-
edge among the workmen on the lease,
including some of those employed di-
rectly by the Monarch Company, that
tanks 1 and 2 did contain the crude
oil, and they say it is inconceivable that
the deceased did not also know of the
existence of said oil in those tanks.
Plaintiff's counsel find no particular
fault with this premise, but they point
out that the deceased’s knowledge that
tanks 1 and 2 contained oil was not
the same or tantamount to knowledge
that the valve on the vent line be-
tween these tanks and tanks 3 and 4 had
been opened allowing gas to escape
from the former into the latter ones
that contained no oil and would reason-
ably be assumed to be free of oil fumes
or gas. We think this sufficiently an-
swers Magnolia Petroleum Company’s
contention. Here, we find no proof that
the deceased knew or should have
known that such gases had been allowed
to escape into tanks 3 and 4, and at most,
this question, under the circumstances,
was a part of or related to the one of de-
ceased’s contributory negligence, and

494

was a matter for determination by the
jury.

Under the above proposition, the Pe-
troleum Company also argues that, as-
suming its conduct constituted negli-
gence, such negligence merely created
a condition rendering the fatal injury
possible by the action of “intervening”
conduct on the part of the Monarch
Company, its foreman, Leffler, the de-
ceased, and Magnolia Pipe Line Com-
pany. In this connection, it is said that
the Petroleum Company should have
been freed from liability because it
was these intervening acts of other de-
fendants that combined to cause, and
were the proximate cause of the dece-
dent’s death; and any negligence on the
Petroleum Company’s part was too re-
mote from the explosion to be deemed
its cause, under the rule promulgated
and followed in Fox v. Superior Oil
Cc., 188 Okla. 165, 107 P. 2d 185; St.
Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gilbert, 185
Okla. 591, 95 P. 2d 123; and Munroe v.
Schoenfeld & Hunter Drilling Co., 178
Okla. 149, 61 P. 2d 1045. We cannot
agree. As pointed out in plaintiff's
brief, the above cases were distinguish-
ed from and shown in Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Barnes, 198 Okla. 406, 179
P. 2d 132, not to be decisive in a case
like the present one. In the latter case,
this court demonstrated that where
there is evidence from which it may
reasonably be concluded that a defend-
ant was negligent and the alleged
“intervening cause” is not sufficient
in itself to produce the injury, defend~
ant’s negligence may still be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury; that ‘the
“intervening” acts must be the “effi-
cient” cause and such as to sever the
connection between defendant’s origi-
nal negligence and the injury, in order
to relieve him from the consequences
of such negligence. The applicable rule
is more fully explained in the follow-
ing excerpt from City of Altus v. Wise,
193 Okla. 228, 143 P. 2d 128:

“ .. . in order to relieve the one
guilty of the first act of negligence
of reponsibility, the intervening cause
must entirely supersede the original

negligence. In other words, it must be
independent of the original act and ade-
quate of itself to bring about the in-
jurious result. (Citing authorities.) * * *
Consequently, where an act of negli-
gence is not superseded by a second
cause, but continues to operate, so that
the injury is the result of both causes
acting ‘in concert, each act may be

regarded as the proximate cause there-
oft *

In this case, Magnolia Petroleum
Company’s negligence and responsibil~
ity for the dangerous gas condition
existing at the time of the explosion
was not superseded by the act of the
Pipe Line Company’s welder, or of
any one or more of the Monarch Com-
pany’s employees, in setting it off or
igniting it. Obviously, such flame or
spark was harmless and wholly inade-
quate, in itself, to bring about the ex-
plosion. Both the gas and the ignition
had to be present. A concurrence of
both was necessary to cause the ex-
plosion. Therefore, we are not im-
pressed by said company’s attempt to
relieve itself of liability for its negli-
gence, by showing that another’s neg-
ligence also contributed to or helped
cause the explosion. From a consider-
ation of the evidence as a whole (which
must be done since said Petroleum
Company did not stand on its de-
murrer and appeal directly from the
ruling thereon) we do not think the
trial court erred in overruling said
Petroleum Company’s demurrer.

The next proposition in defendants’
brief is that the trial court erred in
overruling Magnolia Pipe Line Com-
pany’s demurrer to the evidence, and,
in this connection, it is contended that
there is no basis in the evidence for
any liability on the part of this defend-
ant. It is argued on the basis of testi-
mony to the effect that tank 4 ex-
ploded before tank 3, and from the
fact that said company’s welder was
working in front of tank 3 instead of
tank 4, that the explosion could not
have been ignited by the welder’s torch.
Counsel says that if such had been the
ease, tank 3 would undoubtedly have

been the first of the two tanks to ex-
plode. Defendants’ witness, Dr. Hunt-
ington, testified to the effect that if
tank 4 had been the first of the two
tanks to explode, then undoubtedly it
was the gas in that tank rather than
the gas in tank 3 that was ignited first.
As hereinbefore revealed, there was
a conflict in the evidence elicited to
show which of these tanks exploded
first. Consequently, the jury was at
liberty to draw its own conclusions as
to this, along with the inferences or
conclusions to be drawn from all of the
other evidence, under proper court in-
structions. In the absence of any clear
or unequivocal showing of error in the
jury’s verdict that the Pipe Line Com-
pany was at least partially responsible
for the explosion, we cannot see that
such conclusion is an incorrect one
from such conflicting evidence. The
rule is that verdicts in such cases must
be accorded every presumption of cor-
rectness on appeal and defendants
point to no fact unequivocally estab-
lished by the evidence, sufficient to
overcome such presumption in this
case.

In its propositions V and VI, defend-
ants contend that the trial court erred.
in giving its instructions Nos. 13, 22,
23, 24, and 42. The pertinent parts of
these instructions are as hereinafter
briefly described and delineated. By
the first one, the court described the
different degrees of care in law as:
slight, ordinary and great; and there-
imafter told the jury that it was for
them to decide which of such degrees
governed defendants’ obligations in this
case. In the second, they were told
that Magnolia Petroleum and Magnolia
Pipe Line owed plaintiff's decedent
only ordinary care to protect him
“against injury and death.” In the
third, they were told that because of
the dangerous character of gas, the
law imposes upon those handling it a
high degree of care to prevent dam-
age, commensurate with the danger it
is their duty to avoid. The court’s in-
struction No. 24 was as follows:

495

“You are instructed that the de-
ceased, as well as the other employees
of the defendant, Monarch Construc-
tion Company, were invitees upon the
premises where they were connecting
and installing the tank battery for said
Magnolia Petroleum Company. Said
Magnolia Petroleum Company owed the
deceased the duty to keep the premises
reasonably safe, but the duty to keep
the premises reasonably safe applies
only to defects or conditions which are
in the nature of hidden dangers, traps,
snares, pit-falls and the like, in that
they are not known to the invitee and
would not be observed by him in the
exercise of ordinary care. In this con-
nection, if you find from the evidence
herein that the death of the deceased,
Buster Sutton, was the proximate re-
sult of a defect or condition which was
known to him, or which should have
been observed by him in the exercise of
ordinary care, then your verdict shall
be for the defendant, Magnolia Petro-
leum Company.”

Counsel says that the above instruc-
tions were conflicting and confusing
as to the degree of care defendants
owed the deceased in that the jury
was first told it should determine such
degree, then told that Magnolia Pe-
troleum Company must have used or-
dinary care to protect him against
“apparently any danger”, then that a
high degree of care was required, and,
finally, that Magnolia Petroleum Com-
pany’s duty was to keep the prem-
ises safe only as to unknown or hidden
defects and conditions. We think coun-
sel exaggerates the import and effect
of the instructions referred to, When
they are considered together, they can
readily be correlated into a fair state-
ment of the law. In this case, the dif-
ferent defendants bore various rela-
tionships to the decedent, such as em-
ployer, invitor, and licenser; and their
duties toward deceased varied with
their relationships to him, as well as
with the instrumentalities they were
handling or dealing with in their work
on the lease. It would have been ex~
ceedingly difficult, if not impossible,
to incorporate into any one paragraph

496 Le

of instructions, a comprehensive and
readily understandable statement of the
Jaw as to all of the various factors
the jury was to take into consideration;
and it was not necessary that the court’s
directions to that body be set forth in
that manner. It is sufficient if the
various paragraphs or numbered in-
structions when considered together and,
as a whole, fairly present the law
applicable to the issues. Johnson v.
Short, 204 Okla. 656, 232 P. 2d 944.

The court’s instruction No. 42 was as
follows:

“You are further instructed that if
you find from all the evidence, by a
fair preponderance thereof, that the
sole proximate cause of the explosion
and death of plaintiff's decedent, Bus-
ter Sutton, was the act of negligence
of defendant, Magnolia Pipe Line Com-
pany, if any, through any of its em-
ployees, then the defendants, Monarch
Construction Company and Charles
Leffler would not be liable in this case,
and your verdict should be in their
favor.”

Counsel charges that the above in-
struction was erroneous in so far as
Magnolia Petroleum Company was
concerned, because it did not include
said company with the other two de-
fendants in whose favor a_ verdict
should be returned, if decedent’s death
was found to have been caused solely
by the negligence of the Pipe Line Com-
pany. The record reveals that the court
had already told the jury, by instruc-
tion No. 26, that the Petroleum Com-
pany and the Pipe Line Company were
two separate and distinct legal enti-
ties, and in instruction No. 40 had also
told the jury that before plaintiff was
entitled to recover against the Petro-
leum Company, she must establish that
it was negligent and that such negli-
gence was either the direct and proxi-
mate cause of the deceased’s death in
itself, or combined with the negligence
of another defendant, to cause it. When
this instruction is considered with, and
as qualifying or supplementing the one
complained of, it will be seen that the
detrimental interpretation and effect

attributed by counsel to instruction 42,
standing alone, is precluded or obviated.
We think these two instructions, when
considered together, and the entire list
of instructions, when considered as a
whole, contain a fair statement of the
law as it applies to the issues of this
case. It thus follows, under the above-
cited rule, that the deficiencies alleged
in the individual instructions constitute
no ground for reversal.

Defendants’ remaining proposition 1s
that the jury’s verdict of $70,000 was
excessive. Their counsel recognizes that
damages held to be excessive in one
case may not be so adjudged in another,
but they cite the elemental principles
that damages in a death case are com-
pensatory only and must bear a reason-
able relation to the demonstrated earn-
ing capacity of the deceased (citing City
of Sapulpa v. Deason, 81 Okla. 51, 196
P. 544). As hereinbefore indicated, the
deceased was killed instantly. He was
42 years of age, but it was stipulated by
the litigants that a life expectancy of
23.81 years for the plaintiff's widow
would be considered, rather than the
life expectancy of the deceased. Defense
counsel points out that at the time of his
death the deceased had held the job he
then had with Monarch Construction
Company only 22 months, that the
record shows his total net earnings in
this capacity for the first “10 months”
of the year preceding his death, was
$2,007.85. Counsel contends that this
must have been his peak earnings,
or else plaintiffs counsel would have
introduced evidence of any higher
wages he had made. They say this is
an average of approximately $200 per
month, which could not be relied upon
to last during the deceased’s elder or
declining years, if he had lived. Coun-
sel add that this amount would be giv-
ing plaintiff more than she would ever
have personally benefited from her
husband’s earnings if he had lived, be-
cause it does not take into considera-
tion the amount thereof that he would
necessarily have had to spend for his
own personal needs and upkeep.

497

The only element of plaintiff’s dam-
ages or loss of which there was evi-
dence as to actual monetary value
was the deceased’s earnings. The fig-
ure proven for his gross earnings (after
withholding taxes) was $2,028.90 (in-
cluding $21.05 deducted for old age re-
tirement benefits) for a 9-month period
immediately preceding his death. This
was an average of $225.43 1/3 per
months. For 23.81 years, at this rate, de-
ceased would have had total earnings
of $64,410.81, which with the funeral bill
of $957.50 added, would make a total
of $65,368.31, which, as will be seen, is
considerably less than the amount
awarded plaintiff by the verdict. In the
course of necessary living and natural
events, Mr. Sutton would have to spend
some of this for his personal needs, so
it cannot be said that this full amount
would ever have been contributed by
him to the plaintiff for her needs and/or
wants. And the true measure of her
loss on the basis of his wages coud be
no more than such contribution would
have been. English v. Southern Pac.
Co., 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47; Pitman,

Adm’r, v. Merriman, 80 N.H. 295, 117 -

Atl. 18, 26 A.L.R. 589, and annotations
following; 25 C.J.S. 1299, Note 10; Mc-
Cormick on Damages (1935 Ed.) pp. 341
and 342. In this connection, see also
discussions in M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v.
West, 38 Okla. 581, 134 P. 655, and St.
Louis-S. F. R. Co. v. Floyd, 146 Okla.
42, 293 P. 250, 77 ALR. 1431. Plaintiff
should have introduced evidence of this
important element of her measure of
damages, but didn’t. In their brief, de-
fendants’ counsel make an arbitrary es-
timate of $60 per month for Mr. Sut-
ton’s own necessary personal and in-
cidental expenses, and when such a
deduction is made, plaintiff's dam-
ages are no more than $48,225.11, or
$21,774.89 less than the verdict. Sixty
dollars per month seems to us a modest
deduction for this item in view of pres-
ent living costs. If Buster Sutton’s per-
sonal expenses were less than this,
plaintiff should have introduced evi-
dence tending to show what they were
in dollars and cents (25 C.J.S. 788),

and then the court could have been re-
quested to instruct the jury as to the
proper measure of plaintifi’s damages.
See St. Louis-S. F. R. Co. v. Floyd,
supra, and authorities therein cited.
However, as she made no attempt in
this direction, and we think that the
jury’s excessive verdict was due to its
consequent failure to take into consid-
eration that element in her measure
of damages, we feel that she should
remit $21,774.89 of the jury’s award, or
participate in a new trial, where she
can properly prove her damages. She
would then have further opportunity
to establish the monetary value of any
proper losses suffered by reason of her
husband’s death in addition to his con-
tributions to her from wages. As to the
effect of jury’s ignorance of proper
rule or measure of damages, see 2nd
paragraph of syllabus in Public Serv-
ice Co. v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149
P. 2d 783. Therefore, in conformity with
the precedent followed in Coker v.
Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P. 2d 504, and
other cases, the judgment is affirmed,
on condition that plaintiff file within
ten days a remittitur of the judgment
in the amount of $21,774.89, the excess
over $48,225.11. Otherwise, the judg-
ment of the trial court will be re-
versed and remanded for a new trial.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH and DAVISON, JJ., con-
cur. CORN and O’NEAL, JJ., concur
in affirmance, but dissent as to remit-
titur.

KANSAS, OKLAHOMA & GULF RY.
CO. v. McANALLY.

No. 34870. Dec. 9, 1952.
Rehearing Denied May 19, 1953.
257 P. 2d 271.

498

Chas. P. Gotwals and James D. Gib-
son, Muskogee, and Anglin, Stevenson &
Huser, Holdenville, for plaintiff in error.

Lawrence H. Green, Ada, and Roy
Paul, Durant, for defendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. This was an action
brought by Charles D. McAnally against
the Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf Railway
Company to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries growing out of and in the
course of his employment as a section

hand on defendant’s railway right of
way.

The parties will be referred to as
plaintiff and defendant as they ap-
peared in the trial court.

Upon the return of the verdict in
plaintiff’s favor and from an order over-
ruling defendant’s motion for a new
trial, judgment was entered, from which
this appeal is taken. The questions
posed by the appeal are (1) was there
any proof of primary negligence under
the various charges of negligence con-
tained in plaintiff’s petition and, if so,
did one or more of them result in the
accident and the injury complained of?
(2) whether the appeal presents sub-
stantial error in the court’s refusal to
give adequate instructions under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and
whether the instructions given ade-
quately submitted the issues in the case.

The allegations of the petition may
be summarized as charging that the de-
fendant was negligent in (a) failing to
exercise reasonable and ordinary care
in furnishing plaintiff a safe place in
which to work; (b) in failing to provide
a sufficient number of fellow employees
to perform the work at the time and
place of the accident resulting in plain-
tiffs injury; (c) in failing to properly
supervise the work and in doing the
work in a dangerous manner; and (d)
in doing the work at a time when
the ground was covered with snow and
sleet.

From an examination of the entire
record, we find that the following facts
are established by competent evidence:

Plaintiff was employed by defendant
in 1945 as a section hand to perform
work on its railway track and right of
way. On the morning of February 13,
1948, defendant’s section foreman in-
structed plaintiff, and two additional
employees of defendant, to load cer-
tain repair tools and equipment on a
motor car then located at Allen, Okla-
homa. The foreman, after receiving ad-
vice from the railway depot agent as

to the location of trains that might be
operated over the track where his du-
ties might require him to go, rejoined
the three employees and ran the motor
ear from Allen to Boggy Curve set-
off, a distance of approximately six
miles south of Allen. When they arrived
at Boggy Curve, plaintiff, and another
employee, lifted the light end of the
motor car across the main rails to the
set-off rails, and the foreman and an
employee pushed the other end of the
car around, This method of removing
the motor car from the main line track
onto the set-off rails was the usual and
normal way employed, which practice,
as well as the physical conditions of
the set-off at Boggy Curve, is not in
dispute. As the motor car was lifted
off of the main rails and in the process
of setting it down, plaintiff's foot slipped
and he fell, causing an injury to the
back of his head. There was snow and
frozen sleet covering the Boggy Curve
set-off, as well as the area in general,
and it is claimed the accident resulted,
in part, by this condition and in con-
junction with the other specific acts of
negligence heretofore referred to.

Considerable stress is laid upon the
circumstances that the foreman told the
men at Allen to hurry in loading the
working tools upon the motor car as
he wanted to reach Boggy Curve, where
there was a set-off for the removal of
the motor car, before the arrival of a
train proceeding north reached that
point; that when they reached Boggy
Curve, the foreman again urged his
crew of three men to hurry and get the
motor car off of the main track as a
train probably would arrive at any
time. One of the employees stated that
their foreman was always urging them
to hurry.

Plaintiff further suggests as an ele-
ment of negligence that the foreman
having a discretion as to the time and
place where work was to be performed
by his men should not have gone on the
inspection trip on the morning of the
day the accident occurred, as it was
then apparent that snow and sleet was

499

upon the ground generally in that terri-
tory.

After the lapse of a period of time
two trains passed; whereupon, the crew
replaced the motor push-car upon the
main track and proceeded on an in-
spection trip to a point approximately
six miles south of Boggy Curve. They
returned to Allen at noon and plaintiff
reported to a doctor who dressed his
head injury. Plaintiff returned to his
usual work within a few days ‘and
worked continuously up until July 19,
1948. During the month of July, 1948,
the roadmaster of the defendant com-
pany observed plaintiff at a time when
he was attacked by a spasm, or fit,
and the roadmaster directed plaintiff
to report to defendant’s physician at
Muskogee for a physical examination.
Defendant’s physician was of the opin-
ion that plaintiff was subject to epilep-
tic seizures and that the malady was
evidenced by fits and by coma at peri-
odical times. The defendant’s physi-
cian advised the railway company that
plaintiff should not be permitted to re-
sume his railroad work until his physi-
cal condition showed improvement.
Thereafter, plaintiff submitted himself
to two physicians of his own selection
who furnished him statements certify-
ing that they were of the opinion that
plaintiff was able to resume his former
employment. Plaintiff, accompanied by
a representative of his labor union,
made a request upon the defendant that
they reinstate him in his former posi-
tion. Plaintiff furnished defendant with
the physicians’ certificates, and also
advised the defendant that he felt as
able to work as he had previous to the
accident, except during such periods of
time when he was “knocked out” by
what he called “fits.” Defendant de-
clined to reinstate him, whereupon
plaintiff did construction work in the
building of an Armory in the town of
Allen, and was engaged in other labor
employment. The evidence in reference
to whether plaintiff had fainting spells,
or fits, prior to the accident complained
of, was in sharp conflict. Several wit-
nesses testified that they had not ob-

500

served that plaintiff had such “spells”
prior to the date of the accident. The
greater weight of the evidence is to the
contrary, as his fellow employees testi-
fied that plaintiff had spells both prior
and subsequent to his accident, and that
the spells were not more progressive
subsequent to the injury complained of.
The evidence of the three physicians as
to whether plaintiff was physically able
to resume work was also in sharp con-
flict. From a careful review of the
entire evidence, we are constrained to
hold that the evidence does not sustain
the allegations of negligence relied
upon, and that the evidence and all
proper deductions therefrom are in-
sufficient to show a causal connection
between the alleged wrong and the in-
jury.

In Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v.
Sutfin, 196 Okla. 567, 166 P. 2d 434, we
held:

“Where there is competent evidence
on the question of negligence intro-
duced from which reasonable men
might draw different conclusions, it is
one for the jury, and under like cir-
cumstances the question of proximate
cause is one for the jury.”

In Leslie v. Hammer et ux., 194 Okla.
535, 153 P. 2d 101, we said:

“As a general rule the proximate
cause of an injury is a question of fact
and only becomes a question of law
where the evidence together with all
inferences which may be properly de-
duced therefrom is insufficient to show
a causal connection between the al-
leged wrong and the injury.”

In the case of Earl, Adm’x, v. Okla-
homa City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. 187
Okla. 100, 101 P. 2d 249, we held:

“Tt is well settled that where there is
no evidence reasonably tending to show
that the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence, it is error for the trial court to
submit that issue to the jury.”

In Sanders et ux. v. McMichael, 200
Okla. 501, 197 P. 2d 280, this court
stated:

“The question of negligence or no
negligence is one of law for the court
where but one inference can reason-
ably be drawn from the evidence; and,
where the plaintiff fails to show pri-
mary negligence or breach of a duty”
on the part of defendant, then judg-
ment must be for defendant.” City of
Tulsa v. Harman, 148 Okla. 117, 299 P.
462; Hanson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Co., 184 Okla. 480, 88 P. 2d 348; Stano-
lind Oil & Gas Co, v. Klaus, 193 Okla.
409, 144 P. 2d 955.

The plaintiff’s allegation that defend-
ant failed to furnish a safe place within
which to work is not supported by proof.
It was not shown in what respect the
set-off rails were improperly con-
structed, or were in an unsafe state of
repair, nor can plaintiff's allegation be
sustained that defendant negligently
failed to furnish sufficient fellow em-
ployees to remove the motor car from
the main line onto the set-off rails. His
own testimony disclosed that only four
men could be used in this work, and
that the work was performed in the us-
ual and customary manner.

Much stress is placed upon plaintiff's
statement that the crew was ordered to
hurry in getting the motor car loaded
at Allen, and off of the tracks at Boggy
Curve. The proof discloses that the
crew removed the motor car in the us-
ual manner, and that it usually re-
quired fifteen seconds to move the mo-
tor car off of the main tracks upon the
set-off rails. An extended argument is
presented that as it was a cold day
with snow and sleet upon the ground,
the defendant’s foreman should not
have required the crew to do work at
the time and manner disclosed by the
record.

The general rule as stated in 39 C.J.
391, is as follows:

“The general rule is that a railroad
company is not liable to its employees
for injuries resulting from climatic con-
ditions, such as snow and ice, but
within its yard limits where workmen
in considerable numbers are constant-
ly engaged, it must exercise a degree
of care commensurate with the risk to

prevent the accumulation of snow or ice
in such quantity, form, and location as
to be a menace to the safety of its em-
ployees working therein.”

The rule is supported by the follow-
ing cases: Cincinnati N. O. & T. P.
Ry. Co. v. Delaney, 204 Ky. 295, 264
S. W. 735; Wichita Falls & S. Ry. Co. v.
Burton (Tex. Civ. App.) 35 S. W. 2d
476, 477, and Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Aeby, 275 U. S. 426, 429-30, 72
L, Ed 351, 354.

We next briefly consider defendant’s
objections and exceptions to the in-
structions given by the trial court. The
petition alleges the defendant and its
employee McAnally, was engaged in
interstate commerce, and that the ac-
tion is covered by the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §51
et seq.

Section 53 of said Act reads as fol-
lows:

“In all actions hereafter brought
against any such common carrier by
railroad under or by virtue of any of
the provisions of this chapter to re-
cover damages for personal injuries to
an employee, or where such injuries
have resulted in his death, the fact that
the employee may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar
a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable
to such employees.”

The trial court wholly failed to give
an instruction advising the jury that
if they found the issues in favor of the
plaintiff, and also found that the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence, the damages should be dimin-
ished by the jury in proportion to the
amount of the negligence attributable
to plaintiff.

In Kansas City, M. & O. Ry. Co. et al.
v. Costa, 69 Okla. 132, 170 P. 892, this
court held:

“The requirement of Federal Employ-
ers’ Liability Act April 22, 1908, c. 149,
35 Stat. 65 (U.S. Comp. St. 1916 secs.
8657-8665), that diminution of damages

501

by the jury in case of an employe’s con-
tributory negligence shall be in propor-
tion to the amount of negligence attrib-
utable to such employe, means that
where the causal negligence is attribut-
able partly to the carrier and partly
to the employe, recovery cannot be had
for full damages, ‘but only for a di-
minished sum bearing the same rela-
tion to the full damages that the negli-
gence attributable to the carrier bears
to the negligence attributable to both;
the purpose being to exclude from re-
covery a proportional part of the dam-
ages corresponding to the employe’s
contribution to the total negligence.’ ”

Defendant saved exceptions to the
court’s instructions Nos. 11, 12, 13 and
14. They were challenged principally
upon the assertion that they were un-
duly long, involved and repetitious in
character by setting forth plaintiff's al-
legations of negligence as enumerated
in the petition.

*

As we view the case, their principal
vice was that in no instance did the
court advise the jury the applicable
diminution of damages under the Fed-
eral Employers’ Liability Act. It is the
duty of the court in every case to
give instructions applicable to the is-
sues as found by the pleadings and sup-
ported by the evidence.

The judgment is reversed.

WELCH, CORN, GIBSON, and DAVI-
SON, JJ., concur. HALLEY, V.C.J., dis-
sents.

HALLEY, V.C.J. (dissenting). The
majority opinion misconstrues the facts
in this case and does not properly ap-
ply the law to the facts as they ac-
tually existed. The evidence clearly

* shows that the set-off at Boggy Curve

was a makeshift affair and was not
the regular and normal set-off used by
railroads. The location of the set-off was
on a slant, which made it easy for the
section hands to fall when taking a mo-
tor car from the tracks. In addition, the
evidence showed that the track and
ground around the set-off were covered
with snow and ice at the time the
plaintiff was injured; and the further

502

fact was brought out that the foreman
caused the men to hurry to get the car
off the main line, when there was in
fact no urgency about the matter at
the time, and he knew it.

The photograph filed in the case-made
as the defendants’ exhibit shows that
the set-off was not safe under normal
conditions, and especially would it be a
precarious place for the section hands
to work when snow and ice were on the
ground.

I think the law is settled that in an
action for injuries to servants of a
railroad the question of whether the in-
juries proximately resulted from negli-
gence of the railroad company regard-
ing its tracks and roadbeds is for the
jury where there is sufficient evidence.
McClain v. Charleston & W. O. Ry.
Co, 191 S.C. 332, 4 S.E. 2d 280; 57
C.J.S. $533 (e) (2). I say that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to
determine whether the working condi-
tions provided by the defendant were
safe under the circumstances in the
case at bar. It was clearly a case
about which reasonable men could dif-
fer. There is no question but that the
foreman was hurrying the men at the
time the plaintiff was injured, and the
evidence shows that the approach of the
train was not so imminent as to ne-
cessitate any hurry. In my opinion, it
was a question of fact for the jury to
pass on as to whether or not the fore-
man was guilty of negligence in giving
the hurry-up orders he did under the
conditions which then existed. See 56
C.J.C., Master and Servant, §280; Wil-
liams v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n of
St. Louis (Mo. App.) 20 S.W. 2d 584;

Mitchell v. Wabash Railway Co., 334”

Mo. 926, 69 S.W. 2d 286.

The majority opinion states that the
trial court committed error in failing
to advise the jury the applicable pro-
vision for the diminution of damages
under the Federal Employers Liability
Act. The trial court did not give such
an instruction, but did give an instruc-
tion that was more favorable to the de-

fendant railroad than the rule provided
for under the Federal Employers Lia-
bility Act. The instruction given told the
jury that if the plaintiff's negligence
contributed in any way to his injuries
he could not recover, while the instruc-
tion that the defendant sought would
have permitted the jury to allow re-
covery for the plaintiff if it found that
his negligence contributed to his in-
juries. Under the instruction given, the
jury had to find that there was no con-
tributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in order for him to recover
anything, and by the verdict of the jury
there was contributory negligence. The
record was devoid of any evidence of
contributory negligence. The defendant
cannot complain about the failure of the
court to give a requested instruction if
the instruction given was more favor-
able to the defendant than the one re-
quested. Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okla. 273,
276, 292 P. 356; Anderson v. Rucker
Bros., 107 Wash. 595, 183 P. 70, 8 A.L.R.
544.

There was testimony by a duly li-
censed physician that the injury the
plaintiff received caused traumatic ep-
ilepsy, and there was medical testimony
to the contrary. It was clearly the
jury’s function to determine which doc-
tor it believed.

I respectfully dissent.
be

JAMES v. UNKNOWN TRUSTEES,
SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS OF
THREE-IN-ONE OIL &
GAS. CO. et al.

No, 35335. May 5, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 26, 1953.
257 P. 2d 520.

Owen F. Renegar, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiff in error.

Hill & Godfrey, Oklahoma City, for
defendant in error George Woodward,
Jr.

Keaton, Wells, Johnston & Lytle,
Oklahoma City, for defendants in error
C. E. McCaughey, and Helen McCaug-
hey, R. D. Jones and Kathleen Jones,
Walter K. Jones and Erlo O. Jones, John
E. Laughlin and Beradine C. Laughlin.

Bulla & Bynum, Oklahoma City, for
defendants in error Dickson Oil Com-
pany, Willard L. Miller, S. L. Routledge
and Helen Routledge, Harold D. Hern-
don and Saltmount Oil Company.

Bohanon & Adams, Oklahoma City,
for defendants in error L. S. Young-
blood, J. Lee Youngblood, Kenneth Eili-
son, Bessie M. Ellison, A. L. Lawson
and First National Bank & Trust Com-
pany.

Forrest M. Darrough, Walter Davi-
son, and Richard P. Ryan, Tulsa, and
Curtis & Blanton, Pauls Valley, for de~
fendant in error Carter Oil Company.

Hall & Cotton, Oklahoma City, for
defendants in error Romeo L. Perrault,
Miss Solange Beauchim, Garfield S.
Birnie and Frederick B. Locker, Inc.

Brown, Cund & Brown, Duncan, for
defendants in error J. S. McCasland
and T. H. McCasland, sole and surviv-
ing trustees of Three-In-One Oil & Gas
Company.

George & George, Ardmore, for de-
fendants in error Ward S. Merrick and
Jinks Ikard Merrick.

C. H. Bowie, Pauls Valley, for de-
fendants in error L. R. Bradshaw,
Helen E. Bradshaw, W. C. Bonney and
Wilma G. Bonney.

- want of prosecution,

503

Garvin & Shumate, Pauls Valley, for
defendants in error Treasury Island
Royalties and Glenn O. Young.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This is an appeal
from a judgment on the pleadings in
favor of the defendants establishing
their rights to certain mineral interest
claimed by plaintiff in an action brought
by him in 1949. The trial court sus-
tained a demurrer to the petition. On
appeal to this court the order of the
trial court was reversed and a new
trial was directed. James V. Unknown
Trustees, etc., of Three in One Oil &
Gas Co., 203 Okla. 312, 220 P. 2d 831, 20
ALR. 2d 1077. Upon the retrial of the
case as directed by the mandate, the
defendants filed their answer and cross-
petition. Plaintiff demurred thereto,
which demurrer was overruled. De-
fendants filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings which was sustained
by the trial court, resulting in this ap-
peal.

A motion to dismiss has been filed
because the appeal is without merit and
for the further reason that the record
discloses that there is no issue between
the plaintiff and defendants that has
not heretofore been determined. We are
of the opinion that this contention is
correct and that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.

In reply to the motion to dismiss,
plaintiff argues that his rights were
not adjudicated in Three-In-One Oil &
Gas Co. v. Bradshaw, 192 Okla. 309, 135
P. 2d 992. With this contention we
agree. That in effect was the holding in
James v. Unknown Trustees, etc., su-
pra, but after the mandate of the last-
named case was spread of record, de-
fendants then, as above stated, filed an
answer setting up the pleadings and
judgment in cause No, 8234 in the dis-
trict court of Garvin county, which, on
appeal to this court, was docketed as
No. 20862, and thereafter dismissed for
In the latter case
it was determined that plaintiff had no
right in the mineral interest in the real
property involved.

504

This adjudication was final as to any
rights plaintiff may have had in the
property and the record now discloses
that plaintiff's rights asserted in the
appeal have heretofore been deter-
mined.

The order of the trial court sustaining
the motion for judgment on the plead-
ings is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, O’NEAL,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

BOARD OF EDUCATION, OF INDE-
PENDENT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 20,
OSAGE COUNTY, et al. v.
STATE ex rel, HADDEN et al.

No, 85837. April 21, 1953.
257 P. 2a 1080. ~

Chas. R. Gray and W. N. Palmer,
Pawhuska, for plaintiffs in error.

Hamilton & Kane, Pawhuska, for de-
fendants in error.

ARNOLD, J. This action was begun
January 19, 1951, by 19 taxpayers and
electors of Independent School District
No. 20, Osage county, against three
members of the board of education of
that district and L. R. Stegall to re-
cover twice the amount alleged to have
been paid to Stegall by the board
during the school year 1949-1950. The
action runs in the name of the state
on the relation of said taxpayers and
electors. It is alleged that the pay-
ments in the course of the year, $5,620,
were illegally made to defendant Ste-
gall inasmuch as Stegall did not have
an administrative certificate but acted
as superintendent of the school dis-
trict. George Wilhelm, a member of
the board throughout said years, is a
relator plaintiff, The action also runs
against the board of education of the
district during said year, the named
defendants.

The defendant members of the school
board and Stegall filed a motion ask-
ing that Wilhelm be made a party de-
fendant alleging that he was a mem-
ber of the board at the time of the oc-
currence complained of and as such
participated therein. The board of ed-
ucation named as a defendant filed
a similar motion. All of these motions
were overruled; exceptions were saved.

The defendant board members and
Stegall thereafter filed a general and
special demurrer to the petition alleg-
ing, among other things, defect in
parties defendant because, they said,
Wilhelm was a necessary party de-
fendant, the action being joint and he
having been a member of the board at
the time and having participated in
the action complained of. The board
filed a similar demurrer. The demur-

rers were overruled and exceptions
saved. The defendant board members
and Stegall filed an answer in which
they denied all the allegations of plain-
tiff, denied that Stegall was hired to
act or acted as superintendent, and al-
leged that Wilhelm was a member of
the school board and participated in
the action of the board during the
year of which complaint was made and
prayed that Wilhelm be held liable if
liability was fixed on them. The board
of education filed a similar answer
but in addition thereto alleged its op-
eration of the school district in good
faith. The plaintiff filed a motion to
strike all that part of those answers
which made reference to George Wil-
helm. The motion to strike was sus-
tained. The defendants within the time
allowed filed separate amended an-
swers. This time they left out of their
answers any reference to George Wil-
helm. To their amended answers they
attached cross-petitions against the
plaintiff George Wilhelm alleging Wil-
helm’s membership on the board and
his participation in the actions com-
plained of. Plaintiff filed a motion to
strike the cross-petition from the an-
swer of Ray, Thompson, Wells, mem-
bers of the board, and Stegall, and a
motion to strike the entire answer and
cross-petition of the board of education.
All the motions io strike were sustained
by the trial court and exceptions were
saved, provoking this appeal from that
order.

The defendants as plaintiffs in error
here have filed separate petitions in
error.

Though the plaintiffs in error argue
nine propositions, they concede that if
the liability is joint and several, the
taxpayers or electors who brought the
action in the name of the state had the
authority to bring the action and de-
termine which joint tort-feasors would
be proceeded against. The defendant in
error on the relation of the named
taxpayers or electors asserts that the
determination of the question of wheth-
er the liability under its allegations is

505

joint and several is determinative of
the entire issue.

This suit was brought under the pro-
visions of the Oklahoma School Code
passed by the 1949 Legislature, 70 O.S.
1951, articles 1-20, inclusive, which be-
came effective July 1, 1949. Article 6,
§6, of the School Code, supra, pro-
vides that it shall be unlawful for a
member of the board of education of a
school district to employ, approve, or
vote for any person to perform serv-
ices for such district unless the person
employed holds a valid certificate of
qualification issued in accordance with
the rules and regulations of the State
Board of Education to perform the
services he is employed to perform.
Article 6, §7, provides that it shall be
unlawful for any person to serve, or to
contract or agree to serve, as super-
intendent, principal, etc., unless such
person holds a valid certificate of qual-
ification issued by the State Board of
Education to perform the services he
performs or contracts or agrees to per-
form. Both of these sections are new
and appear for the first time in the
Oklahoma Statutes, Supp. 1949.

Article 1, §18, defines “superinten-
dent” as follows:

“a. Teacher: Any person who is em-
ployed to serve as district superintend-
ent, county superintendent, principal,
supervisor, librarian, school nurse or
classroom teacher, or in any other
instructional, supervisory, or admin-
istrative capacity, is defined as a
teacher. Such person shall not be
deemed qualified unless he or she holds
a valid certificate, issued by and in
accordance with the rules and_regu-
lations of the State Board of Educa-
tion, to perform the particular services
for which he or she is employed.

“b. Superintendent: A district super-
intendent of schools shall be the execu-
tive officer of the board of education
and the administrative head of the
school system of a district maintain-
ing an accredited high school, provided
he holds an administrator’s certificate
recognized by the State Board of Edu-
cation.”

506

Article 4, §30, under which this ac-
tion is brought, provides:

“Every member of the board of ed-
ucation or board of county commis-
sioners who shall hereafter vote for the
payment of any money or transfer of
any property belonging to the school
district in settlement of any claim
known to such member to be fraudu-
lent or void or in pursuance of any un-
authorized, unlawful or fraudulent con-
tract or agreement made or attempted
to be made, for any school district, by
any officer or officers thereof, and ev-
ery person having notice of the facts
with whom such unauthorized, unlaw-
ful or fraudulent contract shall have
been made, or to whom, or for whose
benefit such money shall hereafter be
paid, or such transfer of property shall
be made, shall be liable in damage to
all innocent persons in any manner in-
jured thereby and shall be liable to
the school district affected for double
the amount of all sums of money so
paid, and double the value of property
so transferred, as a penalty to be re-
covered at the suit of the board of edu-
cation of such school district, or of
any school district elector thereof, as
hereinafter provided. Such illegal pay-
ment of money shall include salaries
or. any compensation paid to any per-
son for teaching or performing other
services for said district when such
person does not have a written con-
tract required by law or does not hold
a valid certificate as required by the
Oklahoma School Code or rules and
regulation of the State Board of Edu-
cation, for the subjects taught or serv-
ices performed and valid for the entire
time for which such person has been
paid, and any person receiving such
illegal payment shall also be guilty of
a misdemeanor.” (Emphasis ours.)

Section 31 of this same article pro-
vides that upon refusal, failure or neg-
lect of the board of education after
written demand made upon them by
ten schoo] district electors to institute
suit to recover money unlawfully paid
out, any school district elector may,
in the name of the State of Oklahoma
as plaintiff, institute such suit for the
benefit of the district.

Article 6, §1, of the Oklahoma School
Code, provides in part:

«“* * * No board of education shall
have authority to enter into any writ-
ten contract with a teacher who does
not hold a valid certificate issued_or
recognized by the State Board of Ed-
ucation authorizing said teacher to
teach the grades or subject matter for
which the teacher is employed. Any
board of education paying or authoriz-
ing the payment of the salary of any
teacher not holding a certificate, as re-
quired herein, shall be adjudged to be
guilty of a fraudulent expenditure of
public funds and members voting for
such payment shall be held jointly re-
sponsible for the return of the amount
of any public money thus expended,
upon suit brought by the county attor-
ney or by any interested citizen in the
district where such funds have been
expended. * * *”

Nobody contends that an adminis-
trator’s certificate is not required or
provided for.

The relators urge that this action
sounds in tort and they can bring the
action against those tort-feasors whom
they choose. The real party in interest
is the school district. This is not pri-
vate litigation for remuneration for a
private wrong. Relators cannot make
such a choice for the district. The rule
usually applicable in tort-feasor cases
has no application here. A tort is an
action inherently wrong. Until July 1,
1949, there was no statute against hir-
ing a superintendent who did not pos-
sess an administrator’s certificate nor
was it ever a wrong at common law.
The liability and penalty prescribed
inures to the benefit of the public,
the school district, and was designed
to insure the enforcement of the public
policy of the state enunciated for the
first time by the statute. The evident
intent of the Legislature was to make
all guilty board members jointly liable
and it evidently did not intend to leave
this liability to the discretion of indi-
viduals. We have not heretofore con-
strued the statute in this respect, and

no case in point is cited from any other
jurisdiction,

The statutes above quoted deter-
mine the public policy of this state,
which is that boards of education may
not knowingly hire and pay uncerti-
fied teachers or superintendents or oth-
er employees, and if such is done, the
members of such board shall be jointly
liable for the return of the amount of
public money thus expended. The ac-
tion is for the benefit of the school
district, not the individual taxpayers
or electors who bring the suit as mere
relators, and to allow such relators to
determine to bring such suit against
three members of the school board
only, in the face of allegations by such
members that another member of the
board, one of the relators, also partici-
pated in the actions complained of and
is liable if they are, would not be to
the best interest of the school district,
the real party in interest, and would be
violative of public policy. The school
district is entitled to have the action
prosecuted against all board members
who knowingly participated in the al-
leged wrongful action, and, conversely,
the liability being joint, the board
members are entitled to have made
party defendants all those members
who participated in such action. A
guilty member of such a board can-
not escape liability by becoming a rela-
tor and thus putting himself in the po-
sition of a nominal plaintiff and bring-
ing suit against his fellow board mem-
bers. Nor should the other relators,
electors-taxpayers, be interested in as-
sisting such guilty member to escape
liability. For interesting supporting
philosophy, see: 52 Am. Jur. p. 24-25;
Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Eppler,
182 Okla. 391, 77 P. 2d 1158; In re
Seagraves, 4 Okla. 422, 48 P. 272; 52
Am. Jur. p. 7.

Wilhelm should be brought in as
party defendant and allowed to make
such defense to the action as he can.

The cause is reversed, with instruc-
tions to proceed not inconsistent with
this opinion.

507

HALLEY, C.J, JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, O’NEAL, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur. WELCH, DAVISON, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent:

THRASHER v. GREENLEASE-
LEDTERMAN, Inc.

No, 34984. May 12, 1953.
257 P. 2d 795.

508

S. J. Clendinning, Tulsa, for plaintiff
in error.

Rittenhouse, Hanson, Evans & Tur-
ner, Oklahoma City, for defendant in
error.

O’NEAL, J. The parties here assume
the same position as in the trial court
and will be referred to as plaintiff and
defendant.

The question here is whether the trial
court correctly instructed the jury to re-
turn a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant. Plaintiff filed a petition in which
he alleged that on the 14th day of May,
1946, he delivered to defendant a Cad-
illac automobile for repairs and safe-
keeping; that on the 16th day of May,

1946, said automobile was stolen from,

defendant’s garage, and that the theft
and the damage to plaintiff resulted
from defendant’s negligence to exercise
ordinary care while the automobile was
in defendant’s possession. It was fur-
ther alleged that some years prior to
May, 1946, a former employee of the
defendant company had broken into de-
fendant’s garage and stolen one of the
automobiles; that this employee was
charged with iheft, was convicted, and
served a term in the State Peniten-
tiary; that this employee had recently
returned to Tulsa; that the defendant
was negligent in placing plaintiff’s car
near an exit door of its garage, and
negligent in not removing the car keys
therefrom, thereby facilitating the thief
in stealing plaintiff's car.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended
petition upon which issue was joined
and the trial had. The amended peti-
tion alleged that the defendant was
engaged in the business of operating an
automobile repair shop where automo-
biles were stored for safe-keeping dur-
ing repairs thereon as a bailee for hire;
that on the 14th day of May, 1946, plain-
tiff delivered to defendant a Cadillac
automobile for safe-keeping until de-
fendant could repair the same; that de-
fendant accepted such bailment and
plaintiff paid the customary charges
therefor; that on the 16th day of May,
1946, plaintiff demanded the return of
his automobile, but defendant failed
and refused to return the same to plain-
tiff. That thereafter, and on June 3,
1946, defendant returned plaintiff’s
automobile in a badly damaged condi-
tion, necessitating the expenditure of
$774.31 to repair it; that the loss of the
use of said car, together with the de-
preciated value thereof, damaged plain-
tiff in the total sum of $1,454.31.

Defendant’s answer contained a gen-
eral denial and an affirmative defense
that its garage was broken into on the
night of May 16th, and that plaintiff's
automobile was stolen; that defendant
was without fault, having exercised or-
dinary and reasonable care in the prem-
ises.

Defendant interposed a demurrer to
plaintiff's evidence, which demurrer
was overruled. At the close of the case
defendant moved for a directed verdict,
which motion was sustained, and there-
upon judgment was entered by the trial
court in favor of the defendant for its
costs, and from the order denying plain-
tiff’s motion for a new trial, he appeals.

Plaintiff urges reversal of the case
upon the ground that the trial court
erred in refusing to submit the case
to the jury. Plaintiff’s testimony is to
the following effect: On May 14, 1946,
he owned a Cadillac automobile which
he delivered to defendant’s garage in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the installation of
minor parts and repairs consisting of

straightening both front fenders, repair
to right front fender skirt, spot paint
front fenders and touch up chipped
places on doors. The car was to be
delivered to plaintiff on the following
evening at approximately 5 o’clock. On
May 16, 1946, plaintiff went to the
defendant’s place of business to in-
quire about his car and was advised
by defendant’s service manager that
the car was not there, “that somebody
got it”’ Thereafter, plaintiff paid the
service charges to defendant in the
amount of $15.72. Some days later
plaintiff was advised by the Tulsa
Police Department that his car was
found in the State of Ohio. The car
had been in a wreck and was badly
damaged. Plaintiff testified as to the
costs and expenses incurred in return-
ing the car to Tulsa, and the casts of
repairs and its depreciated value after
the repairs were made.

Defendant’s demurrer to the forego-
ing evidence of the plaintiff was over-
ruled, and thereupon defendant submit-
ted proof tending to establish the fol-
lowing facts: Plaintiff delivered his au-
tomobile to defendant’s garage at 11:00
on May 14, 1946, and requested that
certain repairs be made as ordered by
the plaintiff. Defendant’s service man-
ager testified that the repairs were
completed on May 15, 1946, with the
exception of the paint job. The car
had been removed from an upper floor
to the ground floor where the painting
work was customarily done. At the rear
end of the garage building there was
an overhead electrically controlled door
which was only used as an exit for
cars. At the closing hour on May 15th,
the service manager barred and locked
this door from the inside. When this
door was locked it could not be opened
from the outside. This was the condi-
tion of the garage when the service
manager left for his home on the
evening of May 15th. On the following
morning he found that the electrically
controlled door was unlocked and plain~
tiff’s car had been stolen. The proof
is without contradiction that on the

509

night of the 15th, a rear window of
the garage had been broken out, and
someone had entered the garage and
stolen plaintiffs automobile. It was
subsequently ascertained that defend-
ant’s former employee, who had pre-
viously served two terms in the peniten-
tiary for theft, had broken into the gar-
rage, stolen plaintiff’s car, and had
transported it to Ohio.

To sustain plaintiff's proposition that
the court erred in refusing to submit
the case to the jury, he relies upon the
rule announced in Smith v. Maher, 84
Okla. 49, 202 P. 321. This case announces
the rule that where the owner of cattle
left them in the possession of another
to pasture and the bailee failed to re-
turn a number of the cattle to the own-
er upon demand, in such a situation it
is incumbent upon the bailee to satisfy
the jury by the evidence that the loss of
the cattle was consistent with the ab-
sence of fault on his part.

The-crux of the decision is that where
property is left with another under a
specific contract for safe-keeping, the
owner or bailor makes out a case of
prima facie evidence upon which he is
entitled to recover, unless the bailee
overcomes the prima facie case by evi-
dence that the loss was consistent with
the absence of fault on his part. In this
case there was neither allegation nor
proof that the cattle had been lost be-
yond the bailee’s control. The bailee
presented no proof to justify his failure
to return several head of the cattle to
plaintiff. His defense was limited “to his
assertion that he exercised ordinary
care in looking after the cattle during
the period of bailment. This case is dis-
tinguishable under its facts from the
case here presented for it is disclosed
by plaintiff's own testimony that the
Cadillac car was not delivered to de-
fendant under a specific agreement for
“safe-keeping” but, on the contrary,
was delivered for the express purpose
of making repairs thereon. Therefore,
after defendaht made proof of the cir-
cumstances of the theft of the car, it

510

was incumbent upon the plaintiff to
show, if he could, that the theft was
occasioned by some act of negligence
or want of due care of the defendant,
which was the proximate cause of the
theft.

A statement of plaintiff's case, as
cast in his original petition, discloses
that he based his cause of action on
tort, that is, the negligence of the de-
fendant to exercise reasonable and or-
dinary care in the premises. In the
amended petition he abandoned his for-
mer cause of action and thereafter
based his cause of action on the “safe-
keeping” or contract theory. The pay-
ment made by plaintiff to the defendant
in the sum of approximately $15 was
not a payment for safe-keeping nor as
a storage payment, but was, under the
undisputed evidence, a payment for re-
pairs on the automobile.

We think that, under the law, as ap-
plied to the relationship of bailor and
bailee, where the bailor contends, as
did plaintiff in his original petition,
that the damage resulted from the neg-
ligence of the bailee, plaintiff could not
make out a prima facie case by proof
that he delivered his car to defendant
for repairs and that it was not returned
upon his demand. In other words, if
plaintiff alleges negligence he does not
have a “presumption” in his favor, but
he must prove the case upon the tort
alleged. Proceeding then to the case
as here presented upon the amended
petition, plaintiff pleaded a specific con-
tract of bailment for safe-keeping, but,
as we have seen, his testimony did
not sustain that allegation. We, thefe-
fore, cannot agree with plaintiff’s con-
tention that by means of a “presump-
tion” he has established a prima facie
case of negligence.

These distinctions are pointed out in
Traders Compress Co. v. Precure, 107
Okla, 191, 231 P. 516, wherein we said:

“Where the owner of stored goods
elects to found his cause of action upon
the negligence of the warehouseman,
instead of upon the contract of bail-

ment, he must recover, if at all, upon
proof of the negligence alleged.”

This case was reversed for a new
trial and upon its return to this court in
Traders Compress Co. v. Precure, 140
Okla, 40, 282 P. 165, referring to the
rule announced in the former opinion,
we said:

“We interpret the above language to
mean just what it says, that is, if the
bailor sues the warehouseman in tort
and alleges the warehouseman was
negligent or at fault in the loss and de-
struction of the goods, the bailor must
sustain his case throughout by the bur-
den of proof. :

- “On the other hand, if the bailor sues
on contract, alleging the delivery of the
goods to the warehouseman, thereafter
makes a lawful demand for the return
of the goods, and the warehouseman re-
fuses or fails to return the said goods,
the warehouseman must then, in order
to legally excuse himself, show that the
said goods were lost or destroyed with-
out his fault or negligence.”

In Metropolitan Electric Service Co.
v. Walker, 102 Okla. 102, 226 P. 1042,
we held that where a bailor sued a
bailee to recover the value of property
left with the bailee for safe-keeping,
proof of demand and refusal or failure
to return, are ordinarily sufficient to
make a prima facie case. However,
where the bailor went one step further
and also pleaded that the bailee’s prop-
erty was lost or stolen by the negligence
of the bailee, then the bailor must prove
negligence as alleged.

After defendant’s demurrer to plain-
tiffs evidence was overruled, defend-
ant, of necessity, assumed the burden of
establishing the affirmative matter
pleaded in its answer; that proof es-
tablished that the theft of the car was
not occasioned by the negligence of the
defendant. To destroy the effect of de-
fendant’s affirmative defense, plaintiff,
by cross-examination of defendant’s
witnesses, attempted to refute defend-
ant’s contention that it was free from
negligence. Failing to establish this bur~

den of proof, the defendant was entitled
to the instructed verdict.

Affirmed.

CORN, DAVISON, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. HALLEY,
C.J., and WELCH, J., dissent.

De

STATE ex rel. MOORE v. CURRY,
Judge.

No, 35913. May 26, 1953.
257 P. 2d 799.

511

Charles Besly, Pawnee, for plaintiff.

P. D. Erwin, Chandler, for defend-
ant.

WILLIAMS, J. This is an original
proceeding in this court for a writ of
prohibition. The pertinent facts giving
rise to this action are as follows:

Mike Moore filed a suit in the district
court of Pawnee county against several
defendants, including E. L. Irwin, al-
leging, among other things, that they
were members of a _ copartnership.
Irwin was originally designated in the
petition by the name of “Irvin Cotton”;
later, with permission of the court, the
name “Irvin Cotton” was changed to
read “E, L. Irvin’, The statement by
plaintiff that Irwin was commonly
known as “Cotton Irwin” is not denied
by respondent. A summons was issued
to be served on “Irvin Cotton”; the re-
turn of service shows that it was served
on “E, L. Irvin”. Plaintiff Moore later
recovered judgment in this suit. ~

Eight months later, Irvin, whose true
name is E. L. Irwin, filed suit in the
district court of Lincoln county against
Mike Moore and the sheriff of Lincoln
county, asking that the sheriff be re-
strained and enjoined from making a
levy upon an execution issued out of
the district court of Pawnee county
pursuant to the judgment recovered in
the above mentioned suit. No service
was had on Moore, but the sheriff was
served with summons, and the district
court of Lincoln county granted the re-
straining order, and later, a perma-
nent injunction.

Six weeks later, Mike Moore, appear-
ing specially, filed in the Lincoln county
case a motion to vacate judgment,
which motion was overruled. Moore
(hereinafter referred to as petitioner)
now seeks a writ of prohibition com-
manding the district court of Lincoln

512

county and the judge thereof (here-
inafter referred to as respondent)
to refrain from further proceedings in
the Lincoln county case mentioned
above; and to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction over the sheriff of Lincoln
county in the exercise of, his legal duty
in levying upon property of Irwin under
the execution from the district court of
Pawnee county; and that he be ordered
to vacate, set aside, and hold for naught
all purported orders, judgments and
decrees rendered in the Lincoln county
case mentioned. As grounds for the is-
suance of such writ, petitioner Moore
recites the facts as above set out and
argues that a district court of one dis-
trict in Oklahoma has no superior au-
thority nor superintending control over
a district court of another district.

Since we deem this proposition to be
controlling in the instant case, we will
not consider the other contentions ad-
vanced herein by petitioner.

In Harris v. Hudson, 122 Okla. 171,
250 P, 532, which was a proceeding for
a writ of prohibition, this court said:

“A district court of one judicial dis-
trict of this state has no superior au-
thority nor superintending control over
a district court of another judicial dis-
trict, nor any authority to enjoin or in-
terfere with a judge of another judicial
district in the enforcement of his own
judgments.”

“Where a disirict court of one judicial
district assumes to exercise a superin-
tending control over the judge of anoth-
er district by issuing a restraining or-
der, purporting to restrain the judge of
such other district from enforcing a
judgment of his own court, a writ of
prohibition will issue to the judge thus
exceeding his jurisdiction and powers.”

In the instant case, though the re-~
straining order and injunction were
issued against the sheriff of Lincoln
county, they had the effect of prevent-
ing the judge of the district court of
Pawnee county from enforcing the judg-
ment of his own court.

It is apparent from the brief that the
gist of respondent’s argument is to the

effect that the judgment in the Pawnee
county suit was void on its face as to
E. L. Irwin for the reason that E. L.
Irwin was not properly served with
summons, and that the above rule of
law does not apply.

With this we cannot agree. In Stock-
er v. Dobyns-Lantz Hardware Co., 101
Okla. 134, 224 P. 303, this court con-
sidered a situation wherein the wrong
initials were used in the name of a de-
fendant served with summons. The
court said in the body of the opinion:

“An individual who has been served
with a summons in which he is desig-
nated by the wrong name is entitled to
plead a misnomer, but the service of
summons designating the defendant by
the wrong name, where it is personally
served upon the right defendant, is suf-
ficient to give the court jurisdiction of
the defendant, and such defect becomes
immaterial, unless the defendant ap-
pears and pleads the misnomer.” (Em-
phasis supplied.)

See, also, 42 Am. Jur. Process, §18,
which reads in part:

“As a general rule, an objection that
the defendant was sued by the wrong
name is matter of abatement only, and
will not avoid a judgment against him
if he has been actually served. It is
true there are some cases which hold
that one sued and served by a wrong
name may disregard the summons, but
the better view is that one summoned
by a wrong name, being thus informed
that he is sued, although not correctly
described by his true name, who does
not avail himself of his opportunity to
object, whereby the true name would
be inserted in the proceedings, is pre-
cluded from afterward doing so. * * *

“***The test in such cases appears
to be whether the defendant could have
been misled by the error in his name.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, it is not denied
that the summons was actually served
upon the right party. Though the last
name was misspelled, and the names
were reversed, we believe, pursuant to
the principles of law above set out, that
said summons was sufficient to ap-

prise E. L. Irwin of the fact that he had
been sued, and to give the district
court of Pawnee county jurisdiction over
him. Since the sheriff who served the
summons had no difficulty in determin-
ing the identity of the person actually
intended, we do not believe that the
person himself could have been mis-
Jed.

Respondent presents five arguments
against the issuance of the writ prayed
for.

The first one is based upon the follow-
ing rule of law, which respondent quot-
ed:

“Tt is a rule generally observed by
the courts that an application for writ
of prohibition, restraining an inferior
court from proceeding in a cause, will
not be entertained until lack of jurisdic-
tion of the cause is called to the at-
tention of the lower court in some man-
ner.” Adams v. District Court of Mus-
kogee County, 166 Okla. 263, 27 P. 2d

11.

The record before us shows that pe-
titioner Moore, in his motion to vacate
judgment, filed in the Lincoln county
action, specifically mentioned the Paw-
nee county judgment; it also shows
that the original petition in the Lincoln
county action substantially set out the
facts concerning the Pawnee county
judgment. The above rule is therefore
not applicable, since its requirements
have been complied with.

Respondent’s second argument is that
petitioner Moore had “An adequate
remedy by appeal”. Granting for pur-
poses of argument only that Moore
could have appealed (he was not served
with summons in the Lincoln county
action, and no judgment was rendered
against him), this contention is not ap-
plicable here. By the positive terms of
the rule expressed in the Harris case,
above quoted, petitioner Moore is en-
titled to a writ of prohibition under the
facts herein existing for the very reason
that E. L. Irwin himself did not pursue
his “adequate remedy by appeal” in the
Pawnee county action, but chose to ig-
nore the summons, allow the Pawnee

513

county case to go to judgment, and then
file a separate action in Lincoln county.
If respondent’s argument herein were
sustained, an absurdity would result
in that, so long as either party could
keep getting injunctions from different
courts, neither party would be entitled
to a writ of prohibition, and endless con-
fusion would result. See Harris Foun-
dation v. District Court of Pottawato-
mie County, 196 Okla. 222, 163 P. 2d 976,
wherein this court said:

“Prohibition is the proper remedy
where an inferior tribunal assumes to
exercise judicial power not granted by
law, or is attempting to make an un-
authorized application of judicial force,
and the writ will not be withheld be-
cause other concurrent remedies exist;
it not appearing that such remedies are
equally adequate and convenient.”

It appears from the record before us
that the Pawnee county judgment has
become final. Under respondent’s rea-
soning that petitioner has an “adequate
remedy by appeal”, Moore would be
forced to prosecute an ordinary appeal
to the Supreme Court in order to enforce
the valid and regular judgment which he
won in the lower court, in which he
now has a vested property right, and
which he is entitled to have enforced
now. Under such circumstances, it can
hardly be said that an appeal is “equal-
ly adequate and convenient.”

Respondent presented three other
propositions in his brief, but since they
are all based on the assumption that
the judgment from the district court of
Pawnee county was void, which as-
sumption we have shown to be false, we
will not consider them.

We hold that, in the absence of the
pleading of a misnomer in the Pawnee
county case, the service of summons
upon E. L, Irwin was valid; that the
judgment therein rendered was a valid
judgment; and that the district court of
Lincoln county exceeded its jurisdiction
in issuing a restraining order and in-
junction which amounted to an assertion
of “superior authority” or “superintend-
ing contro] over a district court of an-
other judicial district.”

514

Writ granted.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

DOBBS v. BOARD OF COUNTY
COMRS OF OKLAHOMA
COUNTY et al.

No. 35947. May 26, 1953.
257 P. 2d 802.

F. M. Bookstore, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiff.

Everett E. Cotter, Frank Miskovsky,
V. P. Crowe, Wayne Bayless, and Gran-
ville Scanland, by Nathan S. Sherman,
Oklahoma City, for defendants.

HALLEY, CJ. Betty O. Dobbs, a
resident taxpayer of Oklahoma county,
attacks the constitutionality of H. B.
No. 646 of the 1953 Legislature, which
became effective March 24, 1953, and
prays that we prohibit the board of
county commissioners of Oklahoma
county from appointing a second county
judge.

The above law amends sec. 131(a),
Title 19, O.S. 1951, and provides addi-

tional county judges in all counties in
Oklahoma having a population of
300,000 or more, as shown by the last
Federal Decennial Census, and which
further provides that any resident tax-
payer of a county having that popula-
tion may contest the constitutionality of
the Act by original action in this court.

It is admitted that Oklahoma county
has the required population to justify
the appointment of an additional coun-
ty judge, if H.B. No. 646 is held valid.
An amended petition was filed showing
that the board of county commissioners
of Oklahoma county did, on March 24,
1953, appoint William A. Berry as an
additional county judge for Oklahoma
county and he is joined herein as a
party defendant with the county com-
missioners who made the appointment.

The petition alleges that H. B. No. 646
is ineffective because it violates sec. 11,
article VII of the State Constitution.

The pertinent portion of H.B. No. 646
is sec. 1, which is as follows:

“(A) At the general election to be
held in November, 1948, and each two
(2) years thereafter, there shall be
elected in each county of the State of
Oklahoma, a County Judge, provided
however in each County having a popu-
lation in excess of Three Hundred Thou-
sand (300,000) as shown by the last pre-
ceding regular Federal Decennial Cen-
sus, there shall be elected an additional
County Judge, and in all counties of
the State of Oklahoma, a County At-
torney, a Court Clerk and a County
Sheriff, who shall hold office for a term
of two (2) years beginning, except that
of the County Judge, as provided in
Section 11, Article VII, Constitution of
Oklahoma, on the first Monday in Janu-
ary following their election, and until
their successors are elected and quali-
fied.”

Section 11 of article VII of our Con-
stitution provides:

“There is hereby established in each
county in this State a County Court,
which shall be a court of record; and,
at the election to ratify this Constitu-
tion, there shall be elected in each
county a County Judge, who shall hold

515

his office until the close of the day next
preceding the second Monday in Janu-
ary, nineteen hundred and eleven; and
thereafter the term of office of the
County Judge shall be two years, and
he shall be elected at each biennial gen-
eral election. The county judge shall
be a qualified voter and a resident of
the county at the time of his election,
and a lawyer licensed to practice in
any court of record of the State. The
county judge shall be judge of the
county court.”

Section 2 of article XVII provides:

“There are hereby created, subject
to change by the Legislature, in and
for each organized county of this State,
the offices of Judge of the County Court,
County Attorney, Clerk of the District
Court, County Clerk, Sheriff, County
Treasurer, Register of Deeds, County
Surveyor, Superintendent of Public In-
struction, three County Commissioners,
and such municipal township officers as
are now provided for under the laws
of the Territory of Oklahoma, except as
in this Constitution otherwise provided.”

Petitioner points out that in Nichols v.
Levy, 151 Okla. 245, I P. 2d 766, this
court had before it a similar law, being
HLB. No. 131, effective March 5, 1931,
providing for two county judges in a
county having a population of 220, 000,
and held the same unconstitutional and
void.

The principal objective of the Act
here attacked is the same as that of
the 1931 Act. We have examined care-
fully the opinion in the Nichols v.
Levy case, decided by this court in 1931,
and also the two dissenting opinions,
and agree that if H.B. No. 646 is up-
held it will be necessary to overrule
the decision in Nichols v. Levy. In that
case it was agreed that the real issue
was: “Does our Constitution prohibit
the Legislature from providing for more
than one judge for the county
court regardless of the size of the
county or the amount of court work?”
Such is clearly the real issue before us.

The defendants contend that the opin-
ion in the Nichols v. Levy is erroneous
in the following particulars:

516 .

(a) The failure to sustain the constitu-
tionality of an Act of the Legislature
in the absence of clear prohibition and
the limitation in the Constitution of the
power of the Legislature to enact the
law in question.

(b) The decision failed to consider
certain pertinent provisions of the Con-
stitution.

(c) It failed to consider the Bill of
Rights expressed in sec. 6, Article II, of
our Constitution, and,

(d) Their reasoning in the opinion is
fallacious.

The above contentions are treated
together in the brief of the defendants,
and since Nichols v. Levy is the only
case relied upon by plaintiff, we have
considered them together, with ref-
erence to the decision which must be
overruled if H.B. No, 646 is to be sus-
tained, That decision is based prin-
cipally upon the provisions of sec. 11,
art. VII, supra, which provides for
the establishment in each county of
“a county court,” and that there shall
be elected in each county “a county
judge” who shall hold “his” office until
a time fixed, and that thereafter the
term of office of “the county judge”
shall be two years, and that “he” shall
be elected each biennial election. The
qualifications of “the county judge” are
prescribed and he is required to be “a
lawyer”.

The original jurisdiction of the county
court is fixed by sec, 12, art. VII, “until
otherwise provided by law’; that sec.
10 of the same Article, a district court,
“or any judge thereof” shall have power
to issue writs, while sec. 12 provides
that the county court, “or judge there-
of,” shall also have such power.

It was pointed out that while article
VII provides for changes of certain sec-
tions of law, there is no such provision
relative to changing the number of
county judges. The provision fixing the
jurisdiction of the county court contains
a clause that the same may be changed

by the Legislature, as has been done
many times,

It was also pointed out that district
judges might be sent into other coun-
ties outside their district to try cases,
but no such provision was made as to
county judges.

The opinion in Nichols v. Levy is
very well summarized in the body of the
opinion, on page 248, 151 Okla. Reports,
wherein the court expressed disagree-
ment with a decision handed down by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in the
following language:

“We cannot follow the reasoning of
the Supreme Court of Arkansas in
State v. Martin, 60 Ark 343, 30 S.W. 421,
28 L.R.A. 153, to the effect that the
articles used in a constitutional pro-
vision are too indefinite to define or
limit the number of judges which may
be provided by legislation. We cannot
hold that ‘a county judge’, ‘the county
judge’, ‘his election’, and ‘a lawyer’ re-
fer to two or more judges. As well
might it be said that the provision in
the Constitution for ‘a Governor’ would
authorize a legislative enactment for
two Governors. The illustration used by
the plaintiff is that an agent authorized
to buy ‘a horse’ would not thereby be
authorized to buy two horses.”

Before discussing certain phases of
the Nichols v. Levy decision, we shall
call attention to certain other well es-
tablished rules governing constitutional
interpretation. It is pointed out by de-
fendants that a state Constitution is an
instrument of limitations in the powers
of the state government, while the Fed-
eral Constitution is a limited grant of
power. Our Legislature is supreme, ex-
cept as limited by the express provi-
sions of our state Constitution. If there
is any doubt as to the validity of an
act of the Legislature, the doubt must
be resolved in favor of the constitution-
ality of the Act of the Legislature. The
rule is aptly expressed in Finerty v.
Williams, 81 Okla 10, 196 P. 709, where-
in it is stated:

“All powers not specifically granted
to the Congress of the United States or

arising by implication therefrom are re-
served to the states or the people there-
of; hence the Legislature does not get
its power from the Constitution of this
state. The people of the state have,
through its Constitution-makers, the
right to limit the power of the state
Legislature, and any limitation on the
power of the Legislature should arise
only upon specific declarations and
should be strictly construed against im-
plied limitations and any doubt arising
should be resolved in favor of the power
of the Legislature. See Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162; Gol-
den v. Prince, 3 Wash. C.C.P. 313, Fed.
Cas. No, 5,509; Alabama & Florida Ry.
Co. v. Burkett, 42 Ala. 86-87.”

In Herndon, Judge, v. Anderson, 165
Okla. 104, 25 P, 2d 326, in adopting the
language of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, it was said:

“When the validity of a statute is
drawn in question, the court approaches
the subject as one involving the gravest
responsibility, and to be considered
with the greatest caution. The Gen-
eral Assembly is presumed to have been
as careful to observe the requirements
of the constitution in enacting the stat-
ute as the court in applying it. Every
presumption is to be indulged in favor
of the validity of the act, and_that
presumption is to continue until if8
invalidity is made to appear beyond a
doubt.” (State ex rel. v. Aloe, 152 Mo.
477, 54 S.W. 496.)

It we follow the foregoing rule of con-
struction we shall consider other perti-
nent provisions of our Constitution in
addition to those relied upon by the
plaintiff.

Sec. 6, art. II, provides that:

“The courts of justice * * * shall be
open to every person, and speedy and
certain remedy afforded for every
wrong ***; and right and justice shall
be administered without sale, denial,
delay or prejudice.”

In order to meet the foregoing man-
date of our Constitution our Legislature
has provided this court with a Supreme
Court Commission, and Referees. It
has created superior courts; and courts
of common pleas in some of our cities,

517

and additional district courts, and in-
creased the number of district judges
from the 22 -originally provided for to
42.

Section 36, art. V, expressly gives the
legislative branch of our government
wide authority in the following lan-
guage:

“The authority of the Legislature
shall extend to all rightful subjects of
legislation, and any specific grant of
authority in this Constitution, upon any
subject whatsoever, shall not work a
restriction, limitation, or exclusion of
such authority upon the same or any
other subject or subjects whatsoever.”

While new conditions, such as the in-
crease of population, have increased the
work of our courts, it does not justify
an illogical or unlawful interpretation
of our Constitution. We think such
matters may properly be considered
in arriving at the intention of the fram-
ers of our Constitution and those who
voted for its adoption. It is true that
the constitutional convention did not
adopt the Constitution, but we should
remember that they not only prepared
it but were an influential part of the
mass of people to whom it was sub-
mitted and by whom it was adopted as
the supreme law of the state.

The right of the Legislature to estab-
lish courts, judicial offices and other
appropriate agencies of the state gov-
ernment by general law has been-upheld
by this court (Lowden v. Oklahoma
County Excise Board, 186 Okla. 706, 100
P, 2d 448; Crawford v. Smith, 162 Okla.
165, 19 P. 2d 964; Roberts v. Ledger-_
wood, 134 Okla. 152, 272 P. 448) and
the limitations placed upon the Legis-
lature by sec. 46, article V, with re-
spect to the local and special laws, does
not prohibit the Legislature from reg-
ulating by general law “affairs of
counties”, “changing of county seats”,
or “creating offices * * * in counties”.

In sec. 1, art. VII, creating the judi-
cial powers of the state, we find no
distinction made between the district
court, justices of the peace, and munic-

518 Le

ipal courts, and no distinction is made
as to the number of judges who might
serve as district judges, county court
judges or judges of other courts ‘thereby
created. The only limitation being that
such courts be inferior to the Supreme
Court.

In Burks v. Walker, 25 Okla. 353, 109
P. 544, Mr. Justice Hayes, after quot-
ing sec. 2, art. VII, said:

«“# # * Two different judicial systems
hhad_theretofore prevailed within the
territory now constituting the state. The
dockets of all the courts were badly
crowded, and it was impossible to fore-
tell just what division of jurisdiction
between the various courts would en-
able the courts of the state to dispose
of the business already accumulated
upon the dockets and that might reason-
ably be expected to arise.”

If we accept the view of the plaintiff
and the decision in Nichols v. Levy, it
might be said that the Legislature was
granted full authority to carry out the
mandate of sec. 6, art. II, supra, which
provides for speedy justice without de-
lay to all of our citizens, with the sole
exception of those whose controversies
and affairs fell within the jurisdiction
of county courts. The administration
of estates of decedents is vested exclu-
sively in county courts. Such cases are
as certain as death itself and those in-
terests are surely entitled to be heard
promptly in accordance with the provi-
sions for an orderly administration and
settlement of estates.

Sec. 7, art. V, is as follows:

“The reservation of the powers of the
initiative and referendum in this ar-
ticle shall not deprive the Legislature of
the right to repeal any law, propose or
pass any measure, which may be con-
sistent with the Constitution of the State
and the Constitution of the United
States.”

Is there in the Constitution any ex-
press provision limiting the number
of county judges, or prohibiting the
Legislatute from providing by general
Jaw for the creation of an additional
county judge where it is found neces-

sary in order that the county court may:
grant speedy justice without delay? We
find no such provision. Sec. 46 pro-
hibits special laws on certain subjects.
One is “creating offices or prescribing
the powers and duties of officers in
counties, cities,’ etc. But this section
does not prohibit, but, in fact, grants,
full authority and power to enact such
laws upon the very subjects mentioned
by general acts. Sec. 1, art. VII, is as
follows:

“The judicial power of this State shall
be vested in the Senate, sitting as a
court of impeachment, a Supreme
Court, District Courts, County Courts,
Courts of Justices of the Peace, Munic-
ipal Courts, and such other courts,
commissions or boards, inferior to the
Supreme Court, as may be established
by law.”

At statehood the population of Okla-
homa county was 55,849, In 1950 it was
325,352. The number of probate cases
filed in the year ending January 1,
1908, was 127. In the year ending Janu-
ary 1, 1950, there were 1,546 cases, an
increase of 1,500%. Sanity hearings
have increased almost as much, and ju-
venile hearings, beer licenses and other
duties have increased tremendously.

The county judge must now make ap-
plication for medical care for crippled
children, issue certificates to ex-service-
men to permit peddling without a li-

‘ cense, supervise the marriage license
bureau, issue beer, pool and billiard
hall licenses, authorize cashing checks
for disabled pensioners and of deceased
pensioners by proper persons.

In Nichols v. Levy it was held that:

“We cannot hold that ‘a county judge’,
‘the county judge’, ‘his election’, and
‘a lawyer’ refer to two or more judges.”

Despite the ruling on the meaning of
“sec. 11, art. VII, we find that sec. 9 of
article VII, relative to judicial districts
for district judges, provides in sub-
stance that: the state shall be divided
into 21 judicial districts and the voters
in each district shall elect “a judge of
the district court” except in the 13th

district two judges shall be elected and
that the district judge shall be a citi-
zen of the United States and a resi-
dent of the territory for two years and
of his district at least one year prior
to his election. The term of office of the
district judge shall be four years, and
at the time of his election he shall
have reached the age of 25 years. If
the judge elected in any district is ill
or unable to preside, the Chief Justice
may designate any district judge in
the state to serve in lieu of the judge
elected from the district. It was fur-
ther provided that if public business
shall require it, the Chief Justice may
appoint a district judge to hold court
in any district and that two or more
district judges may sit in any district
at the same time,

Sec. 12, art. VII, fixes the jurisdiction
of county courts and among other things
provides that in the absence of the dis-
trict judge from his county, or his dis-
qualification, the county court, or judge
thereof, shall have power to issue writs
of injunction in matters about to be
brought or pending in the district court
and to issue writs of injunction, man-
damus, and all writs necessary to en-
“force the jurisdiction of county courts.
It is further provided that when a
county judge is disqualified in any case
pending in the county court, a judge
pro tempore may be selected in the
same manner provided for the election
of judges pro tempore in the district
court.

It is nowhere provided in the last sec-
tion mentioned that the Chief Justice
may assign a county judge from the
county for which he was elected to any
other county in the state. The reason
for this is doubtless because district
judges are paid by the state while coun-
ty judges are county officers and are
paid by the county they serve.

The majority opinion in Nichols v.
Levy refused to follow the holdings of
the Supreme Court of Arkansas. In
State v. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 S.W.
421, 28 L.R.A. 153, which is more nearly

519

in point than any other decision exist-
ing at the time it was rejected by this
court. The syllabus expresses the hold-
ings in that case as follows:

“Act Feb. 8, 1895, providing for an ad-
ditional judge for the Sixth judicial
circuit, and for the division of that
circuit, does not violate Const. art. 7,
§13, providing for the division of the
state into judicial circuits, and for the
election of ‘a judge’ for each circuit;
nor section 1, which vests the judicial
power of the state in one supreme
court, in circuit courts, etc, by estab-
lishing a new office, in which judicial
power is vested.”

The Arkansas Constitution provided
that the state should be divided into
circuits and for each circuit “a judge”
should be elected. It was contended, as
here, that use of the word or letter
“g” before the word “judge” prohibits
the Legislature from providing more
than one judge for each circuit. The
Legislature has passed an act providing
for two circuit judges for the Sixth
Circuit. In the body of the opinion it
was said, at page 425, 30 S.W.:

«* * * But we are of the opinion that
this grammatical particle ‘a’ whose of-
fice is frequently only to preserve eu-
phony in the use of words and structure
of sentences, and whose force often
depends upon the mere accident of ac-
centuation, was not used, nor was it
ever intended to be used, by the fram-
ers of our organic law, so as to ob-
struct and partially defeat the exalted
purpose for which the circuit cou
the ‘great residuum of all jurisdiction’,
were created, namely, the speedy ad-
ministration of public justice. ***”

The decision in State v. Martin, su-
pra, was approved by the Supreme
Court of Iowa in the First Trust Joint
Stock Land Bank of Chicago v. Arm-
strong, 222 Iowa 425, 269 N.W. 502, in
which the court stated in the syllabus:

« * * * word ‘an’ meaning any one
of a great number * *

In Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 506,
56 N.E. 2d 832, the Supreme Court of

520

Illinois cites the Martin case, supra,
with approval on page 838 and stated:

«# * * The article ‘a’ is generally not
used in a singular sense unless such
an intention is clear from the language
of the statute (1 CJ.S. Ap. 1; * * *
We agree with plaintiffs that the article
‘a’ refers not to quantity but, instead,
to quality or nature. * * *”

It would have been normal and rea-
sonable to have provided for “one
county judge” for each county court
had the framers of the Constitution
desired and intended to limit the num-
ber of county judges to one for each
county.

In sec. 9, art. V, the words “one” and
“two” are used in describing the mem-
bership and term of offices of the state
senators,

In sec. 10(d), art. V, the words “one”
and “two” are freely used relative to
representatives. We find that in sections
12, 18, 14, 15, and 16, of article V, the
words “one” and “two” and “three”,
in providing for legislative districts and
the number of representatives to be
elected, are used numerous times.
These sections of the Constitution indi-
cated clearly that when the constitu-
tional convention wanted to expressly
limit the number of officers it used
the words meaning the exact number
it intended.

We think the opinion in Nichols v.
Levy overlooked certain cardinal rules
of construction. In Capitol Steel & Iron
Co. v. Fuller, 206 Okla. 638, 245 P, 2d
1134, it is stated in the first syllabus:

“A constitutional amendment should
be construed in the light of its purpose
and given-a practical interpretation so
that the plainly manifest purpose of
those who adopted it may be carried
out.”

In Re Flynn’s Estate, 205 Okla. 311,
237 P, 2d 903, it is said:

“The authority of the Legislature ex-
tends to all rightful subjects of legisla-
tion not withdrawn by the Constitutién
or in conflict therewith.”

“In 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law,
sec. 51, it is said in regard to the flex-
ibility of a Constitution:

“A Constitution usually announces
certain basic principles to serve as the
perpetual foundation of the state. It is
not intended to be a limitation on its
healthful development nor an obstruc-
tion to its progress. And accordingly, the
courts are not inclined to adopt such a
technical or strained construction as
will unduly impair the efficiency of the
Legislature to meet responsibilities oc-
easioned by changing conditions of so-
ciety. * *

It is suggested that, in the interest of
stability and permanence in govern-
ment, an interpretation of the Consti-
tution by this court that has stood for
more than 20 years should not be over-
ruled where the facts are similar. There
is some merit in this contention in view
of the fact that different interpretations
may result in confusion and possibly in-
justice to those who have relied upon a
seemingly well established rule.

However, if we are convinced that
the court has placed an erroneous inter-
pretation upon some phrase of our ba-
sic law, it must be admitted that it is
our duty to correct such error. We have
done it before as well as other state
courts and the Supreme Court of the
United States. The passage of time
should not be allowed to serve as a bar~
rier to a correct interpretation.

The question of the right of our Leg-
islature to enact a general law provid-
ing for more than one county judge in
counties having more than 300,000 pop-
ulation has come before this court
again, largely because of the increase
of population in some of our coun-
ties, but also because our county courts
have been burdened with additional jur-
isdiction until it is obviously impossible
for a single county judge in our more
populous counties to administer speedy
justice without delay.

Our Constitution, sec. 12, art. VII,
provides that where county judges have
disqualified a county judge pro tempore

may be selected in the same manner
as a district judge under similar cir-
cumstances. It is well known to the at-
torneys in our most populous counties
that a temporary county judge is se-
lected to serve for as much as two
weeks each year while the overbur-
dened regular county judge is given a
brief rest or vacation. As we construe
the opinion in Nichols v. Levy, supra,
such action would be a violation of the
Constitution in that there would be two
county judges for that county during
that period. We cannot believe that the
framers of our Constitution intended to
impede justice by limiting each county
to one county judge, or that the people
who voted for its adoption ever thought
that the Legislature was not given au-
thority to increase the number of county
judges to meet the urgent needs, aris-
ing from an increase in population and
the additional burdens placed upon the
county judges by increased jurisdiction
due to the complexities of modern so-
ciety. They were not so short-sighted
as to think that at no time would the
probate business of the court become
so great as to be impossible for one
man to handle.

We find no express limitations in
our Constitution upon the power of the
Legislature to enact a general law au-
thorizing the appointment and election
of two county judges in counties having
a population in excess of 300,000. The
decision in Nichols v. Levy is hereby
overruled and H.B. No. 646 is held to be
constitutional and the acts of the de-
fendants, county commissioners of Okla-
homa county, in electing a second
county judge is approved. The writ of
prohibition prayed for by the plaintiff
is denied.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
DAVISON, ARNOLD, and WILLIAMS,
JJ., concur. CORN, O’NEAL, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., dissent.

DAVISON, J. (specially concurring).
In my opinion the dissenting views of
Mr. Justice Hefner, in the case of Nich-
ols et al. v. Levy, 151 Okla. 245, 1 P.

521,

2d 766, should have been adopted in that
case. The logic and reasoning in the
Hefner dissent is, to me, unanswerable.
Since the above mentioned dissent was
written, several states, including Iowa
and Illinois, have followed the general
thought contained therein. The majority
opinion in the Levy case, supra, has
never been followed.

While I have always been of the opin-
ion that we should apply the rule of
stare decisis wherever possible, yet,
when we find that an earlier opinion
has been proven to be unsound and we
are thoroughly convinced of its un-
soundness, we should correct the error
at the earliest possible date.

Iam authorized to state that Mr. Jus-
tice WELCH concurs in the foregoing
views.

ARNOLD, J. (specially concurring).
The effective block placed in the
highway of the administration of
justice ‘by Nichols v. Levy (1931)
151 Okla. 245, 1 P. 2d 766, has been
removed. The widows, the orphans,
the insane, the halt and the blind
—in fact, all residents of this state
whose problems fall within the exclu-
sive original jurisdiction of the county
court of Oklahoma county may have,
as intended, justice without delay.

Our fundamental rights to justice,
equality, freedom and the pursuit of
happiness did not come from the Con-
gress, the Legislature, or the judiciary.
We are endowed with these absolutely
inalienable rights—they came from the
Creator of us all, God. This is plainly
recognized by our Constitutions.

All legislative power must come from
the people—sovereign because endowed
with those fundamental rights. The ul-
timate purpose of all government is to
vouchsafe and keep secure the exercise
of these rights.

Recognizing the importance of these
sovereign rights, as did Patrick Henry
and the President of the United States
lately when he so earnestly approved

522

the immortal statement, “Give me
Liberty or give me Death”, the people
vested in the Legislature power to
legislate on all rightful subjects not
specifically withheld. Article 5, §36
of our state Constitution provides:

“The authority of the Legislature

shall extend to all rightful subjects of.

legislation, and any specific grant of au-
thority in this Constitution, upon any
subject whatsoever, shall not work a
restriction, limitation, or exclusion of
such authority upon the same or any
other subject ** * whatsoever.”

Though this is true of most state Con~
stitutions, the reverse is true of the
Constitution of the United States. The
Congress is restricted in its legislative
powers to those specifically granted.
Article 1, section 1, of the Constitution
of the United States provides:

“All legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives.”

Here you have the reason for the uni-
versal rule that restriction of the legis-
lative power of our State Legislature
must be directly and plainly spoken in
the Constitution and the universal rule
that any such restriction may never be
manufactured by implication.

The courts belong to all the people.
The people of Tupelo, Mississippi, have
the same rights before the county court
of Oklahoma as do the people of Tupelo,
Oklahoma, the residents of Oklahoma
county, and all other residents of this
state. Everybody is entitled to justice
and for this reason our Constitution pro-
vides the power in these unmistakable
words:

“The judicial power of this State shall
be vested in the Senate, sitting as a
court of impeachment, a Supreme
Court, District Courts, County Courts,
Courts of Justices of the Peace, Munic-
ipal Courts, and such other courts,
commissions or boards, inferior to the
Supreme Court, as may be established
by law.” Article 7, §1;

and then the adopters told the Legisla-
ture and the judges:

“The courts of justice of the State
shall be open to every person, and
speedy and certain remedy afforded for
every wrong and for every injury to
person, property, or reputation; and
right and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, delay, or preju-
dice.” Article 2, §6.

How can this plain mandate of the
Constitution be carried out if this court
by implication, contrary to all judicial
precedent, restrict the Legislature?

Under the plainly expressed purpose
and mandate of the Constitution above
noted, nothing should be allowed to
stand in the way of the Legislature in
the proper exercise of its power and
duty to provide adequate courts to ad-
minister justice to all people promptly.
We have heretofore held that where a
mandate of the Constitution comes in
conflict with a specific restriction the
mandate overrides the restriction and
must be carried out. (Smartt, Sheriff,
v. Board of County Commissioners,
Craig Co., 67 Okla. 141, 169 P. 1101,
L.R.A. 1918C, 313; School Dist. No. 62,
Craig Co. v. School Dist. No. 17, Craig
Co., 143 Okla. 136, 287 P. 1035.) There
there was a specific restriction. Here
there is none.

It is conceded there is no specific
limitation on the Legislature to create
county courts. The Levy case, supra,
is based entirely on faulty interpretation
and implication and overlooks some per-
tinent and significant provisions of our
Constitution. When adopted, as now,
there was no reason or judicial prece-
dent to support it. It is wrong, always
has been wrong, but has effectively
prevented the prompt administration of
justice in this state. The Legislature de-
termined in 1931 the need for another
county judge in Oklahoma county and
has now again determined the need of
it. This is its exclusive duty and its de-
termination will not be disturbed by
appellate courts. Here the need is con-
ceded,

In view of all the circumstances it is
the positive duty of this court to over~

rule Nichols v. Levy, supra. Otherwise,
prompt justice commanded by the Con-
stitution will continue to be denied only
on the flimsy excuse that consistency
should be maintained. Consistency
would be of no help here, but the ad-
ministration of justice would.

Judges, lawyers, preachers of the
gospel, and teachers unashamed of their
organizational affiliations are agreed
that there is little doubt that we are
now facing a threat to our democratic
way of life, greater, perhaps, than any
we have experienced in our national
history. This common danger has
aroused a united will to defend our
institutions. Something more, however,
than a mere enthusiasm for democracy
must animate its defenders or they will
fail. The ultimate survival of our ideal
will depend primarily on the strength
of its basic institutions and the confi-
fence of its citizens in them.

“Jesus said to him, ‘No one who puts
his hand to the plough, and then looks
back, is fitted for the Kingdom of
God. ”

—Luke 9:62

O’NEAL, J. (dissenting). For the rea-
sons stated in the majority opinion in
Nichols v. Levy, 151 Okla. 245, 1 P. 24
766, I respectfully dissent.

BLACKBIRD, J. (dissenting). I re-
spectfully dissent to the opinion of the
majority of my associates, and my
most compelling reasons for so doing
are fully considered and set forth in
Nichols v. Levy, 151 Okla. 245, 1 P. 2d
7166, which has stood the test of time as
a precedent in this jurisdiction for ap-
proximately 22 years.

In the 5th paragraph of the majority
opinion’s syllabus, it is recognized that
such a precedent should stand unless
erroneous, but in the body of the opin-
ion it is not established, on the basis
of any sound or valid principle, that the
Nichols decision is erroneous.

The controlling reason for enlarging
the plain wording of the Constitution
to authorize the Legislature to create

523

more than one county judge in a single
county, as is done in the majority opin-
ion, seems to be that of necessity. Re-
peated reference is made to the Legis-
lature’s continued additions to the orig-
inal duties of a county judge with the
inference that, in the more populous
counties, like Oklahoma county, it has
become almost humanly impossible for
one man to discharge them. To me, this
is no valid reason for countenancing, au-
thorizing or approving a direct violation
of the Constitution. In my opinion, to
construe the Constitution contrary to
its plain wording, in any case, sets a
very dangerous precedent and creates
an “opening wedge” which may quite
conceivably enable the breaking down
of any number of its most important
provisions, including those pertaining to
individual liberties and human rights
heretofore regarded as inviolate and
guaranteed in plain English words
commonly understood by ordinary lay-
men, untrained in the variously applied
and sometimes unwarrantedly used
rules of legal documentary construction,
to have only one simple and commonly
accepted meaning.

The majority opinion recognizes that
sec. 11, art. 7, of the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion, uses the singular words “a”, “the”,
and “he”, in referring to the county
judgeship and court thereby created,
and I am unable to see how the use of
such plain wording does not restrict
our counties to a single such judgeship.
One of the strictest and most elemental
principles governing judicial interpre-
tation of constitutional or statutory
provisions is that their evident mean~
ing must be accepted. See authorities
cited in Jones v- Bayless, 208 Okla. 270,
255 P, 2d 506. If the wording thereof is
plain, clear and unambiguous, there is
no reason or justification for the use of
interpretive devices to fabricate a dif-
ferent meaning. The words must stand
as they are, until changed by appropri-
ate repealing or amending processes.
In this connection, I think it well to
remember and emphasize a part of the
opinion of this court in Dixon v. Shaw,
122 Okla. 211, 253 P. 500, 504, 50 A.L.R.

524

1232, quoted in the Nichols case, supra,
as follows:

«* * * the language employed by the
makers of the basic law of the state
should not be given a strained or subtle
meaning, but such meaning as the av-
erage citizen would conclude the lan-
guage imports. This for the reason that
the electorate, in ratifying the docu~
ment and thereby breathing life into
the same, considered the provisions as
the language used fairly imports.” (Em-
phasis ours.)

‘When the matter is properly analyzed,
it will be seen that the real con-
stitutional question presented herein,
is not merely whether a county having
a population of 300,000, or more, and
obviously needing an additional official
to aid its one county judge in discharg-
ing his official duties, may, under our
Constitution, have more than one such
judge, but rather: Whether the Consti-
tution authorizes a or any county (irre-
spective of need) to have more than
one county judge. If the Constitution
does not mean what it obviously says,
then it provides no limit to the number
of county judges a county may have,
and the Legislature may give it two
or more such offices, regardless of
need. The majority opinion has failed
to point out any respect in which the
Constitution is ambiguous on this sub-
ject, or to show wherein the plain word-
ing of sec. 11, art. 7 thereof, is in con-
flict with any other constitutional pro-
vision. Accordingly, the matter, in my
opinion, remains settled by that plain
wording, as made crystal clear in
Nichols v. Levy, supra.

I am authorized to announce that
Mr, Justice CORN concurs in the views
herein expressed.

STATE INSURANCE FUND v.
TRIESCHMANN.

No. 35696. May 26, 1953.
257 P. 2d 823.

Mont R. Powell and William R. Saied,
Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Hal Welch and James Bounds, Hugo,
for defendant in error,

CORN, J. Plaintiff brought suit for
the principal sum of $10,000 and in ac~
cordance with the statute, 12 O.S. 1951
§264, plaintiff claimed and sought judg-
ment for interest on the principal sum
from February 6, 1948, until paid. Upon
trial there was judgment for plaintiff
for $10,000, with interest thereon from
February 6, 1948, and the defendant ap-
pealed therefrom. That appeal was dis-
missed by our opinion in State Insur-
ance Fund v. Trieschmann, 206 Okla.
533, 244 P. 2d 1128. When the mandate
reached the trial court, the defendant
paid the judgment in the sum of
$10,000, but declined to pay the in-
terest and presented a motion to strike
from the judgment the item of in-
terest, or to correct the judgment to
that extent. This appeal is presented
from the order denying such motion.

Defendant, on appeal, makes but one
contention only, and that is that the
judgment was void as to the item of in-
terest.

Defendant cites no authority to the
effect that the judgment is void because
it included the item of interest as sued
for. Defendant does cite decisions in
which, upon a proper attack, claims for
interest under various circumstances
were allowed, or it was held that the
party claiming the same was not en-
titled to recover judgment for interest,
or cases in which a judgment for the
recovery of interest was held to be er-
roneous. Those decisions are not in
point here. This judgment is not here
attacked as being erroneous as to any
part or as to all the interest for which
judgment was rendered. This judg-
ment is attacked as being void.

Since an issue was here tendered
upon plaintiff’s specific claim and suit
for interest, surely the trial court had
authority and jurisdiction to determine
that issue, and surely if that determina-
tion was erroneous in whole, or in any
part, that would not render the judg-
ment void. No authority to the contrary
is cited.

Defendant contends, in effect, that
interest on the principal sum should

525

not run thereon from February 6, 1948,
but instead should begin to run on and
from a subsequent date, thus reducing
the amount of interest defendant should
pay up to the final payment date. That
is equivalent to a contention that the
trial court erred in its determination,
on plaintiff's specific claim and petition,
in fixing the date as stated.

But if a part of the interest defendant
must pay could be said to be based upon
an erroneous judgment that would not
render the judgment void. Any such
error, if any error existed, could be
questioned on a proper appeal, but af-
ter an attempted appeal had been dis-
missed, and after the judgment became
final, it could not be successfully at-
tacked as being void on account of any
such error.

In the concluding language of sec.
592, 50 C.J.S., p. 11, where the state-
ment and grounds of the doctrine of res
judicata are set forth, we find the fol-
lowing:

“* #* * The doctrine applies and
treats the final determination of the ac-
tion as speaking the infallible truth as
to the rights of the parties as to the en-
tire subject of the controversy, and such
controversy and every part of it must
stand irrevocably closed by such deter-
mination, The sum and substance of
the whole doctrine is that a matter -
once judically decided is finally de-
cided.”

In the case of Ickes, Secretary of In-
terior, v. Ledbetter, 135 F. 2d 658, in-
volving a judgment of a state court of
Oklahoma, it was said:

“Where, on January 16, 1928, State
Court in Oklahoma rendered judgment
for money with interest against Indian
and for 40 per cent of all royalties ac-
eruing in future, and on September 19,
1938, Federal District Court in Okla-
homa ordered Secretary of Interior to
pay judgment with interest and 40
per cent of accrued royalties, amount-
ing to $1,849.84, the principle of ‘res
judicata’ precluded reliance of Federal
statute adopted in January, 1933, re-
stricting all funds in hands of Secretary
belonging to Indian heirs, for purpose of

526

avoiding payment of the principal sum
of Federal District Court judgment with
interest and the adjudicated amount of
accrued royalty.”

Therefore, we conclude that after this
judgment became final, and long after
the time allowed for any motion to mod-
ify it, the trial court did not err in de-
nying defendant’s motion which was
presented by defendant on the theory
that the judgment was in part void.

Affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
DAVISON, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

PLUMER et al. v. PEARCE et al.
No. 35889. May 26, 1958.
257 P. 24 818.

O. J. Roberts, Oklahoma City, and
Judson H. Pierce, Perry, for plaintiffs
in error. :

J. T. Dickerson and Forrest Powell,
Edmond, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. The parties occupy
the same positions in this court as they
occupied in the trial court, and will be
referred to herein as plaintiffs and de-
fendants.

We deem is unnecessary to dwell at
length on the issues made by the plead-
ings. Briefly stated, plaintiffs’ petition
alleged that H. A. Johnson was the
owner of the full equitable and bene-
ficial title in and to, and in full and ab-
solute peaceable possession of, two
tracts of land of 160 acres each situated
in Oklahoma county, Oklahoma, and of
a tract of 80 acres situated in Seminole
county, Oklahoma; that all of said
land had been conveyed, without consid-
eration, by H. A. Johnson to Ruth J.
Pearce; that at all times from the date
of the deeds until his death H. A. John-

.son was in full possession and enjoy-

ment of all of the beneficial rights in
said land, renting, managing and con-
trolling the same, paying the taxes
thereon and receiving the rents and
profits therefrom; that the defendant

.Ruth J. Pearce well knew that no bene-

ficial title in said land was conveyed or
intended to be conveyed to her, but that
she was holding the legal title to said
land for H. A. Johnson, his heirs and
assigns; that at the time of executing
and recording the deeds H. A. Johnson
exacted a promise and agreement from
Ruth J. Pearce that she would, on de-
mand, reconvey the property to H. A.
Jobnson, or in the event of his death
convey the same to his estate. The pe-~

tition was in four counts. In the first
count, plaintiffs sought to recover pos-
session of the land, in the second, they
prayed judgment decreeing Ruth J.
Pearce to hold all of the property in
trust, in the third, they prayed for an
accounting of the rents and profits, and
in the fourth they asked for the appoint-
ment of a receiver.

The answer of the defendants, in ad-
dition to containing a general denial
and certain other allegations not neces-
sary to be discussed, pleaded the con-
veyance of the land in Oklahoma
county by H. A. Johnson to Ruth J.
Pearce for a consideration of $14,00
that to secure the payment of the con-
sideration Ruth J. Pearce executed to
H. A. Johnson a mortgage on the prop-
erty, together with a promissory note
for $14,000; that Ruth J. Pearce paid
H. A. Johnson the full amount of the
indebtedness, and that said mortgage
was released of record by H. A. John-
son on July 9, 1937.

Plaintiffs’ reply denied defendants’
quiet and peaceable possession of the
property in controversy, denied that
either of the defendants purchased the
property, alleged that the note and
mortgage were without consideration,
that Ruth J. Pearce never paid any
amount on the mortgage, and that the
mortgage was released by H. A. John-
son without consideration; that at all
times, both prior to and subsequent to
the release of the mortgage and up until
the date of his death, H. A. Johnson was
in full, peaceable, open and notorious
possession of all the property involved
in the action, renting and receiving the
rents, revenues and profits from the
land and enjoying all the benefits there-
from the same as though the deeds had
never been executed.

On the issues thus joined the case
was tried and resulted in a judgment in
favor of the defendants as to all of the
lands described in plaintiffs’ amended
petition. We have carefully reviewed the
record and conclude that because of
certain undisputed evidence in the case
and of certain well-established rules

527

governing cases of this nature, the judg-
ment of the trial court must be af-
firmed.

The record shows without dispute that
the land in Oklahoma county was con-
veyed by H. A. Johnson to Ruth J.
Pearce by warranty deed dated De-
cember 19, 1930, and there is no evi-
dence to support the allegation of plain-
tiffs’ amended petition that at the time
of execution of the deed Ruth J. Pearce
promised or agreed that she would, on
demand, reconvey the property to H. A.
Johnson, or to his estate in the event of
his death. The evidence also showed
that on the same date the deed was
made Ruth J. Pearce executed to H. A.
Johnson a note and mortgage for
$14,000 covering the property conveyed.
It further showed without dispute that
on July 9, 1937, H. A. Johnson executed
a release of the mortgage, wherein he
acknowledged satisfaction and payment
in full of the indebtedness secured.

The record further shows the undis-
puted fact that on August 19, 1936, H.
A. Johnson, acting as attorney for Ruth
J. Pearce, filed in the district court of
Oklahoma county a petition to quiet title
to one of the tracts of land in Oklahoma
county, wherein he alleged Ruth J.
Pearce to be the owner of the land and
in which case he obtained a decree
quieting the title in Ruth J. Pearce.

It further appears without dispute
that on December 9, 1938, in connection
with a bond given in a murder case
pending in the district court of Dela-
ware county, Oklahoma, H. A. Johnson
filed an affidavit in which he swore that
R. J. Pearce was the owner of the land.
An affidavit made and filed by R. J.
Pearce in the same proceeding describes
the Oklahoma county land that is in-
volved in this case and alleges it to be
the property of affiant; hence, it is clear
that the R. J. Pearce mentioned in both
affidavits is the Ruth J. Pearce who is
defendant herein.

A deed to the Seminole county land
from H. A. Johnson to Ruth J. Pearce,
dated December 19, 1930, and mort-
gage on the same land executed on the

528

same date from Ruth J. Pearce to H. A
Johnson to secure the payment of the
sum of $15,000, were introduced in evi-
dence without objection,

Plaintiffs rely upon a statement con-
tained in a purported will of H. A. John-
son, which was denied probate on the
ground that it was not a valid will, the
statement being shown to be in the
handwriting of H. A. Johnson and being
as follows:

“To my beloved cousins, Zoe Vermil-
lion and Ruth J. Pearce, I give, devise
and bequeath all property I may own
in Edmond, Okla., including all notes
and mortgages which’ said Ruth J.
Pearce may owe to my estate at my
death, but this is on the condition that
she deed to my estate or executor of this
will all real estate outside of Edmond
which I have heretofore deeded to her
for business reasons.”

Clearly this statement could not be
binding upon Ruth J. Pearce, Further-
more, it was made almost nine years
prior to the death of H. A. Johnson, does
not describe the property in contro-
versy, and leaves entirely open the
question of what property H. A. Johnson
had previously deeded to Ruth J.
Pearce “for business reasons.” We are
unable to attach to this statement the
importance contended for by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs objected to certain testi-
mony given by Ruth J. Pearce on the
ground that she was an incompetent
witness. However, that point is not
urged in this court and must be treated
as waived. It is apparent that the trial
court concluded that her incompetency
had been waived by plaintiffs by the
introduction by them of certain other
evidence. Furthermore, under the rule
announced by this court in Berry v.
Janeway, 206 Okla. 555, 245 P. 2d 71,
Title 12 O.S. 1951 §384, commonly re-
ferred to as “The Dead Man’s Statute,”
is not applicable to the facts in this case.

Ruth J. Pearce testified that the
mortgages on the Oklahoma county and’
the Seminole county land were paid;
that the rents from the land were ap-
plied in payment of part of the purchase

price, that a piece of property in Ed-
mond was conveyed to H. A. Johnson as
a part of the consideration, and that
payments in cash were made from time
to time. It is true that the evidence as to
the cash payments was not altogether
satisfactory, but some consideration
must be given to the fact that the wit-
ness was testifying about matters that
occurred long prior to the time of trial.

Considerable evidence was introduced
on behalf of plaintiffs of instances in
which on other occasions Ruth J.
Pearce had made inconsistent and con-
flicting statements regarding the own-
ership of the lands in controversy, but
her testimony upon the trial of this
case was positive, and as to whether she
was telling the truth at the trial we
are bound by the rule that the credibil-
ity of witnesses and the effect and
weight to be given to conflicting or in-
consistent testimony are questions of
fact to be determined by the trier of the
facts. whether court or jury, and are
not questions of law for this court on
appeal. Strahm v. Murry, 200 Okla.
640, 199 P. 2d 603.

The first proposition urged in the
brief of plaintiffs relates to the rule
that a resulting trust arises where the
legal estate is conveyed, but the intent
appears or is inferred from the terms of
the disposition, or from the accom-
panying facts and circumstances, that
the beneficial interest is not to go or be
enjoyed with the legal title. Such is un-
questionably the rule, but obviously its
application must depend upon the facts
of each particular case.

‘The second and only other proposition
urged in the brief of plaintiffs is with
reference to the rule that in cases of
equitable cognizance a judgment off
the trial court which is against the clear
weight of the evidence will be reversed
on appeal. This, also, is unquestion-
ably the rule followed by this court in
proper cases, but the converse of the
rule is equally true and is of frequent
application. In the case of Payne v.
Wade, 190 Okla, 222, 122 P. 2d 144, the
converse of the rule contended for was
expressed as follows:

. “In cases of equitable cognizance the
appellate court will examine and weigh
the evidence but the findings and judg-
ment of the trial court will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless it appears that
such findings and judgments are clearly
against the weight of the evidence.”

There is another rule which applies to
resulting trusts and the proof required
to establish the same, which, under the
record in this case, requires an affirm~
ance of the judgment of the trial court.
This rule is stated in Ward v. Ward, 197
Okla. 551, 172 P. 2d 978, in the follow-
ing language:

“A resulting trust may be established
by parol evidence, but the law re-
quires that the proof necessary to es-
tablish it should be of the most satis-
factory kind. The onus of establishing
a resulting trust rests upon him who
seeks its enforcement, and before a
court of equity will be warranted in
making a decree therefor, the evidence
must be clear, unequivocal and deci-
sive.”

After a careful review of the evidence
in this case we are not able to say
that a resulting trust was established by
evidence that was clear, unequivocal
and decisive, nor can we say that the
judgment of the trial court is clearly
against the weight of the evidence. On
the other hand, we conclude that the
judgment is supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.

The judgment of the trial court is,
therefore, affirmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys John T. Craig, Wm. S.
Hamilton and Frank T. McCoy, who as
Special Masters aided in the prepara-
tion of this opinion. These attorneys
were recommended by the Oklahoma
Bar Association, approved by the Ju-
dicial Council, and appointed by the
Court.

JOHNSON, V.CJ., and WELCH,
CORN, ARNOLD, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ. concur.

529

MORAL INSURANCE CO. v. STEVES.
No. 35451. May 26, 1953.
257 P. 2d 836.

530

Foster, Wilson & Bowen, Oklahoma
City, and J. G. Follens, Tulsa, for plain-
tiff in error.

Butler, Rinehart & Morrison, Okla-
homa City, for defendant in error.

BLACKBIRD, J. On November 28,
1950, Herbert B. Steves recovered judg-
ment in the court of common pleas, in
the sum of $1,426.88 and costs, against
Val Bryon Wells. Said judgment debt-
or’s liability apparently arose out of an
automobile accident which occurred Au~
gust 6, 1950. After an execution had
been issued to satisfy said judgment and
the same was returned: “No property
found,” garnishment proceedings were
instituted in said cause against Moral
Insurance Company, as garnishee. Af-
ter obtaining issuance of a garnishment
order upon filing one affidavit, another
affidavit for garnishment after judg-
ment was filed on behalf of the judg-
ment creditor, Steves, in which it was
alleged that the affiant verily believed
that said insurance corporation is in-
debted to the judgment debtor or has
in its possession or under its control
property belonging to said debtor which
is not exempt from seizure or sale
upon execution. Attached to this affida-
vit were interrogatories which were
served upon said garnishee and which,
after being so directed by court order,
the garnishee answered. The pleading
it filed in so answering contained no
more than the interrogatories and its
answers thereto, in words and figures
as follows:

“1, Did you, prior to the 6th day of
August, 1950, issue to Val Bryon Wells
a policy of public liability and prop-
erty damage insurance wherein the said
Val Bryon Wells was the named in-
sured.

“Answer: Yes.

“2. If your answer to Interrogatory
number 1 is in the affirmative, state

the limits of liability shown in said pol-
icy.

“Answer: 5000/10000 B1 5000

PD

“3. Was said policy of liability and
property damage insurance in force and
effect on the 6th day of August, 1950?

No.

“4, If your answer to Interrogatory 3
is in the negative, please give the ex-
piration date or cancellation date of
said policy.

“Answer:

“Answer:

July 20, 1950.

“5, If said policy of insurance re-
ferred to in the above interrogatories
was cancelled by written notice, attach
hereto photostatie copy of such notice,
and describe the manner and method
of serving such notice on the said Val
Bryon Wells.

“Answer: Notice sent to Val B. Wells
by United States mail.

“6, If the policy of insurance referred
to above has heretofore been cancelled,
please give reason for cancellation.

“Answer: Prior accidents.

“1, Tf the policy of insurance referred
to above was issued, attach photostatic
copy of original policy or copy thereof.

“Answer: Attached.”

After the filing of the above instru-
ment Steves, the judgment creditor,
served notice upon said garnishee that
he took issue with its answers to inter-
rogatories 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and, without
any further pleadings, a trial was had
without a jury. At the close of the
trial, the court entered judgment in fa-
vor of Steves, finding that the insur-
ance policy issued to Wells by the garn-
ishee as disclosed in its answers to the
1st, 2nd and 7th interrogatories, was in
force and effect on the date of the acci-
dent (contrary to the said garnishee’s
answers to the 8rd, 4th, 5th and 6th in-
terrogatories), and entered a money
judgment for Steves and against said
garnishee in the same amount as the
judgment he had previously obtained in
the same court against Wells.

Wells, the insured, was not a party
to the garnishment proceedings and ap-
peared therein only as a witness for
Steves.

The garnishee, Moral Insurance Com-
pany, will hereinafter be referred to
merely as “The Company” or the
“Garnishee.” In its appeal from said
judgment, the Company takes the posi-
tion that the trial court erred in its
attempt, by said judgment, to compel
enforcement of the policy. It is urged
that said judgment, which found that
Well’s policy had not been canceled pre-
vious to the date of the accident, as rep-
resented in said company’s answers to
the 8rd, 4th, 5th and 6th interroga-
tories, is contrary to the evidence. We
do not agree. In support of said com-
pany’s contention, it points to evidence
showing that as early as July 15, 1950,
United Underwriters, its general agent,
wrote a Mr. Hoffman of the Motor Se-
curities, Inc., its local agent, to return
Well’s policy “for immediate cancella-
tion and to notify the assured of such
action,” and that if the policy was not
received by said writer within five days
of the date of said letter, it would be-
come “necessary for direct cancellation
notice to be sent to the assured”; that
thereafter, on July 20, 1950, Motor Se-
curities, Inc., wrote Mr. Wells of their
receipt of the letter “advising us that
they are cancelling this insurance cov-
erage, as of this date,” and inviting him
to stop in their office “* * * so that we
can have a talk with you in regard to
it. * * *” On the basis of this and Wells’
admission that he went to see Hoffman
about it, the company argues that Wells
had actual notice of the cancellation of
the policy several days before the acci-
dent. In their argument, counsel for the
Company also infers that Wells must
have surrendered the original policy be-
cause it appeared that he had in his pos-
session only a copy of it and the evi-
dence did not clearly show what dispo-
sition was made of the original, or of
the refund of the unearned portion of
the last premium Wells paid on the pol-
icy, which is customarily returned to
the insured upon surrender or cancella-

531

tion of the policy. Wells’ testimony was
not only to the effect that a copy of the
policy was all he ever received and that
no part of the unearned premium was
returned to him, but that he went to see
a Mr. Cotton, the insurance company’s
branch manager, before going to see
Hoffman in June; that Cotton told him
his policy was not canceled and that
when he related this to Hoffman, the
latter said no more about its being can-
celed. In our opinion, the trial court’s
finding that Wells’ policy was in effect
on the date of his accident with Steves
is sufficiently supported by this evi-
dence and the undisputed fact that the
five days notice prescribed both in the
policy itself and our statute (36 O.S.
1941 §14), was not mailed by the com-
pany until August 7, 1950, or one day
after the accident.

The Company also contends that the
trial court lacked power or jurisdiction
to render a money judgment against it
pecause the only issue joined by the
Company’s “Answer” or answers to
Steves’ interrogatories and his notice
that he took issue therewith, was:
Whether or not the policy that the
company had issued to Wells was in
force and effect on the date of the au-
tomobile accident? It is said that in go-
ing further than determining that the
policy was in force, and purporting to
determine, in addition thereto, the gar-
nishee’s liability under the policy, the
court went beyond the issue joined by
the only “pleadings” that had been filed
and the only evidence presented, con-
trary to the plain wording of the pro-
vision of Title 12 O.S. 1941 §1177, stat-
ing that the judgment in such cases
“shall be no bar beyond the facts stated
in “the (garnishee’s) answer”; and its
judgment was invalid and erroneous to
that extent; that in so doing, the court
determined liability on an insurance
contract in which the insurer’s obliga-
tion to pay such a judgment for its in-
sured was not fixed or unconditional,
but was dependent upon the existence of
various conditions and the insurer’s
compliance with a number of contrac-
tual provisions set forth in the policy;

532

that by rendering the judgment it did,
the court deprived the Company of the
opportunity of pleading or proving that
such conditions precedent to its enforce-
ment prescribed in the policy itself had
not been met or occurred, and which
would have precluded any attempted
enforcement of the policy by the in~
sured. In support of its position, the
Company cites Security Bldg. & Loan
Ass’n of Oklahoma City v. Ward, 174
Okla. 238, 50 P. 2d 651; Maxey & Co. v.
Crowl, 171 Okla. 337, 41 P. 2d 254;
Tucker v. Ware, 169 Okla. 401, 37 P. 2d
623; Jacobs v. Colcord, 136 Okla. 158,
275 P. 649; Bell-Wayland Co. v. Nixon,
57 Okla. 138, 156 P. 1195; House v. Scan-
lan, 34 Okla. 796, 127 P. 481; Davis v.
Lilly, 17 Okla. 579, 87 P. 302, and Lon-
don & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of
America v. Courtney (C.C.A, Okla.) 106
Fed. 2d 277, These cases are cited as
authority for the propositions that
Steves, the judgment creditor, could ac-
quire no greater rights against the
garnishee insurance company than the
insured and judgment debtor, Wells,
possessed, or could enforce against it;
that the liability of the garnishee to
the debtor is never presumed but must
be proved; and that a judgment, out-
side or beyond the issues of the case and
upon a matter not submitted for de-
termination, is a nullity. We find no
fault with the rules laid down in these
cases, but in none of them, nor in any
other cases that have come to our atten-
tion, has the precise question involved
here been decided. It is true, as recog-
nized in the Security Bldg. & Loan
Ass’n of Oklahoma City case, supra,
that the liability of an insurance com-
pany to its imsured can neither be
created nor enlarged by the institution
of garnishment proceedings. It is also
true that the necessity of proof of the
insurer’s liability to the insured under
the terms of the policy cannot be dis-
pensed with by reason of the garnish-
ment proceedings. However, in this
case it is observed from the record that
the insurance policy was introduced in
evidence; and that in section 1 of the
“Insuring Agreements” contained there-
in, the Company agrees “To pay on be-

half of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages * * * sustained by
any person, caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, mainte-
mance or use of the automobile.” We
think that if the Company had had any
defense or defenses against enforcement
of the policy and its above-quoted con-
tractual obligation thereunder, it should
and would have attempted to prove it
or them at the trial, and in the absence
of such defense, the trial court’s judg-
ment was warranted. The last clause of
section 1177, Title 12 O.S, 1941, supra,
does not apply to the situation here. The
garnishee’s answer referred to in that
section is the statutory affidavit of in-
debtedness denial formulated and set
forth in section 1176, immediately pre-
ceding it. Section 1177, supra, states
that such garnishee’s affidavit shall be
deemed the answer to the plaintiff's,
or judgment creditor’s affidavit, and
that plaintiff may in all cases move
the court, upon such answer of the
garnishee, * * * for such judgment,
as he shall be entitled to thereon,
but any such judgment shall be no
bar beyond the facts stated in such
answer. ‘ The “Answer” filed by the
garnishee here was the one contem-
plated in section 864 of Title 12, supra.
While the judgment in the present case
did go “beyond the facts stated” in the
garnishee’s answers to the judgment
creditor’s interrogatories, regarding the
question of whether or not its policy
was in force and effect on the date of
the insured’s or judgment debtor’s acci-
dent, still, the garnishee’s liability un-
der the terms of the policy was put in
issue by the judgment creditor’s allega-
tions in its affidavit for garnishment, as
to said Company’s indebtedness to the
insured, and even though the Company
did not join this issue by specifically
denying such indebtedness or liability,
in addition to answering the interroga-
tories, it was free to do so. Instead, how-
ever, it went to trial upon its denial
that the policy was in force and effect,
and the record reveals no attempt on
its part to amend or supplement its
answers to the interrogatories with any

broader or additional denial. We think,
by such failure, the Company waived
any right it may otherwise have had to
now complain that the judgment went
further than determining the single is-
sue of whether or not the policy was in
force and effect on the date of the in-
sured’s accident. When instituted in
aid of execution as in this case, after
an execution’s return: “No property
found”, garnishment proceedings are in
the nature of an action in equity, and
equitable principles apply. Brooks v.
Fields, 25 Okla. 432, 106 P. 828, 83
London & Lancashire Ind. Co. of Amer.
ica v. Courtney supra. One such prin-
ciple is that having obtained jurisdic-
tion, the court may consider the plead-
ings amended to conform to the proof
and may do all things necessary to the
settlement of all issues between the par-
ties with respect to the subject matter
of the action, thus obviating a multi-
plicity of hearings or trials in the same
action or of relitigation in other ac-
tions. Vinson v. Oklahoma City, 179
Okla. 590, 66 P. 2d 933; Newbern v.
Farris, 149 Okla. 74, 299 P. 192. It goes
without saying that such a result is al-
ways desirable when possible and this
was recognized in Woods v. Amulco
Products, Inc., 205 Okla. 34, 235 P. 2d
273. There, against the garnishee’s con-
tention that his indebtedness to the
judgment debtor was not in issue at the
trial, said debtor having filed no plead-
ings, we upheld a judgment giving
effect to such indebtedness as the debt-
or proved after appearing in person
and by his attorney at the trial. Of
course, the facts in that case were rath-
er different from those here, but we
think some of the same principles ap-
ply, and that a judgment creditor should
not be put to the unreasonable, unneces-
sary and onerous burden of relitigating
the question of the garnishee’s indebt-
edness to him, when such indebtedness
was specifically asserted in his affida-
vit for garnishment and the garnishee
was free to and should have refuted,
or defended against, such allegation,
if, in fact, it had any such defense. Nor
does the decision in London & Lanca-
shire Indemnity Co. of America v.

533

Courtney, supra, militate against or al-
ter this conclusion. In that case the
judgment creditor failed to take issue
with the garnishee’s negative answers
to his interrogatories and on the day the
case was set for trial, moved to dis-
miss with prejudice. The trial court
sustained his said motion, and, against
the garnishee’s contention that instead
of such a dismissal, a general judg-
ment should have been rendered for it
on its answer, the appellate court held
that a dismissal with prejudice to the
creditor on the issues covered in the
garnishee’s answer and determined by
it and the judgment creditor’s failure to
take issue therewith, would have been
proper; but as to all other matters, the
judgment could be no bar to said credi-
tor’s action, and, therefore, as to them,
a dismissal without prejudice was prop-
er, thus giving effect to the last clause
in section 1177, supra.

The judgment of the trial court is
hereby affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.CJ., and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, ARNOLD, O’NEAL,
and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

MID-CONTINENT COACHES, Inc., v.
_GUTHRIE.

No. 85626. May 26, 1953.

257 P. 2d 829.

534

Dudley, Duvall & Dudley, Oklahoma
City, for plaintiff in error.

Schwoerke & Schwoerke and James
E. Grigsby, Oklahoma City, for defend-
ant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. Fannie Hope Guth-
rie, defendant in error, hereinafter re-
ferred to as plaintiff, while in a bus sta-
tion in Woodward, Oklahoma, operated
by W. A. Toler, fell, breaking her leg.
She brought this action against W. A.
Toler, the operator of the bus station
as the agent of Mid-Continent Coaches,
Ine., and Mid-Continent Coaches, Inc.,
plaintiff in error, hereafter referred
to as defendant.

A demurrer to the evidence was sus-
tained as to Toler. A jury verdict was
rendered for plaintiff in the amount of
$15,000 against the defendant, and a
judgment accordingly, from which de-
fendant appeals.

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant
operates a bus station in Woodward,
Oklahoma, which Toler was operating
at the time of the accident as the
agent, servant and employee of the de-
fendant; that in the rear of the bus sta-
tion is a ladies’ rest room, and in front
of the door thereto is a floor drain two
and one-half to three inches lower than
the remainder of the floor, the floor
and the slope to the drain being cov-
ered with inlaid linoleum; that the
building is poorly lighted and this area
was shadowed. That on November 8,
1950, plaintiff entered the bus station
about 9:00 p.m., for the purpose of
meeting her niece, who was to arrive on
defendant’s bus; that when she walked
toward the rest room, she stepped into
the depression for the floor drain,
and was thrown off balance and fell.
She alleged that defendant was negli-
gent in (a) not providing sufficient
light; (b) allowing a dangerous depres-
sion to exist in a pathway used by the
public; (c) failing to provide warning

of the dangerous condition of the path-
way; (d) maintaining a trap. That
plaintiffs fall caused a severe fracture
of her right femur just above the knee;
that her medical expenses incurred and
reasonably expected to occur amounted
to $4,960, that employment of household
help would cost plaintiff $19,125, and
that her pain and suffering entitled her
to $15,000. .

The defendant answered, denying,
generally, the allegations of the petition,
the agency of Toler, and alleged con-
tributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff and that the accident was un-
avoidable.

Toler filed a general denial. Plaintiff
replied to the separate answer of Mid-
Continent Coaches, Inc, and denied
specifically each and every allegation
contained in the separate answer of the
defendant except those which were ad-
mitted. The plaintiff alleged further
that the Corporation Commission of the
State of Oklahoma, by 47 O.S. 1951
$162, is vested with power and authority
to supervise and regulate the business
of defendant as a motor carrier and to
prescribe rules and regulations there-
for; that rule 18 (b) of General Order
No. 15679 of the Corporation Commis-
sion provides that motor carriers of
passengers shall establish and maintain
adequate and suitable station facilities
at points served by them. That when
the defendant obtained a permit as a
common carrier of passengers from the
Corporation Commission, the duty was
east upon it to establish and maintain
an adequate and suitable station at
points served by it, including Wood-
ward, Oklahoma, and that it cannot
by contract with the defendant, W. A.
Toler, for the operation of the Wood-
ward, Oklahoma, station, relieve itself
from liability for the negligence of W. A.
Toler in the operation of said station,
and plaintiff further prayed for judg-
ment as set forth in her petition.

Defendant argues its assignments of
error under six propositions.
proposition is:

The first

535

“As a matter of law, defendant, a non-
passenger, was not liable for plaintiff's
injuries because of the absence of proof
that defendant owned, operated or was
responsible for the condition of the bus
station.”

It was stipulated that defendant is a
common carrier under authority from
the Corporation Commission, certificate
No. A-531, and that it has a bus stop at
Woodward, Oklahoma, and uses the
facilities of the bus station where the
accident occurred, including the ladies
rest room.

It is undisputed that plaintiff was not
an intended passenger of the defend-
ant, but had gone to the bus station to
meet her niece, who was due to arrive
within a short time as a passenger on
defendant’s bus.

In Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Cogs-
well, 23 Okla. 181, 99 P. 923, we held
that a common carrier is bound to ex-
ercise ordinary care for the safety of a
person who is upon its premises for the
purpose of meeting an incoming passen-
ger, and is liable to such person for
injuries sustained on account of the
carrier’s failure to exercise such care.
To the same effect is our holding in St.
Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Stacy, 77 Okla.
165, 171 P. 870.

While it is true that the bus station
was rented from the owner of the build-
ing by the defendant’s agent, and a
portion of the space was sub-rented for a
cafe, yet it admittedly used the rest
room facilities. The general rule gov-
erning this situation is stated in 10 Am.
Jur., Carriers, p. 190, §1288, “Stations
not owned or controlled by carrier”,
and reads as follows:

“With respect to the liability of a
common carrier of passengers for in-
juries caused by defective premises not
owned or controlled by the carrier, the
general principle has often been applied
that one who, although not strictly in
control of a defective agency or dan-
gerous place, uses it for his own bene-
dit or for his own purposes and invites
another to make use of the same may.

536

be held liable to the latter for an injury
caused by the defect or danger. * * *”

This rule was recognized in Herrman
v. Great Northern Railway Co., 27
Wash. 472, 68 P. 82, and applied in
Missouri, Kansas & Oklahoma Coach
Lines, Inc., v. Burton, 181 Okla. 45,
72 P. 2d 385. In the Burton case, supra,
we held that it was a bus company’s
duty to provide safe conditions for its
passengers at hotel used as a bus station
under arrangements with hotel owner;
and that in action against a bus com-
pany for injuries sustained by a pas-
senger from a fall at the curb while
walking to the bus from the bus station
located in the hotel, evidence that the
curb was 18 inches above the street level
with only one intervening step which
was 6 inches wide and 12 inches high
constituted sufficient showing of negli-
gence in providing safe conditions at
the bus station to justify granting a
new trial after judgment for the bus
company.

Therefore, defendant’s first proposi-
tion is untenable.

Defendant’s second proposition, that
“The court erred in holding that de-
fendant owed any duty toward plaintiff
other than not to wilfully injure her”,
is likewise untenable. The defendant
bus company did not owe plaintiff,

when she entered the bus station for.

the purpose of meeting her niece, an
incoming passenger, the highest degree
of care that it owes a passenger in
transit, but only ordinary care to keep
its premises and station in a reasonably
safe condition. See Burton and Cogs-
well cases, supra, and Wheeler v. South-
eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Ky.)
238 S.W. 2d 145.

Defendant’s third proposition is that
“the court erred in admitting in evi-
dence Rule 18(b) of General Order No.
15639 of the Corporation Commission,”
which required motor carriers of pas-
sengers to establish and maintain ade-
quate and suitable station facilities at
points served by it; and that schedules
shall be so arranged as to accommodate

passengers in the use of sanitary com-
fort stations at points along the route.
Error is urged on the ground that this
rule was not properly identified or
shown to be in force and effect at the
time of the accident. This contention is
without merit.

The liability of bus company for un-
safe conditions at bus stations is a ques-
tion of law, and introduction of a Cor-
poration Commission’s rule without
identification was not error where the
rule required no more of the bus com-
pany than was already required of it
under the law.

In Missouri, Kansas & Oklahoma
Coach Lines, Inc., v. Burton, supra, we
said that the question of liability of a
bus company for unsafe conditions at
bus stations is a question of law, and
that such carriers are required to pro-
vide for passengers all such accommo-
dations as are usual and reasonable;
that compliance with such requirements
in bus travel necessitates rest periods
at reasonable intervals and safe condi-
tions at the bus station. In this con-
nection, however, defendant asserts
that its liability extends only to pas-
sengers and since plaintiff was not a
passenger it owed her no duty. This
last contention was disposed of under
defendant’s propositions one and two.

We next consider the defendant’s
fourth proposition, that “there was no
evidence of negligence on the part of
defendant”.

The negligence alleged is that a com-
bination of conditions caused the plain-
tiff’s accidental injury, that is, a depres-
sion in the floor at the drain which was
near and directly in front of the ladies’
rest room door, and failure of defendant
to provide sufficient light, causing dark-
ness in the vicinity of the depression
which included the pathway traveled
by the public. The existence of the de-
pression and the fact that plaintiff fell
and was injured is admitted, but the
evidence is conflicting as to the suffi-
ciency of the lights in the vicinity of the

depression. Photographs were admitted
which show that the drain was directly
in front of and near the door to the
rest room and had a short slope or in-
cline of about two and one-half inches
from the top of the incline to the bottom
of the drain, which is covered with lino-
leum and that it was about 30 inches in
diameter, being similar to drains used
in garages and rest rooms. The evi-
dence disclosed that the drain had been
in the ladies rest room until the rest
room had been moved and one unac-
quainted (as was the plaintiff) with the
location of the drain would not ordinar-
ily expect to find one so located. No
useful purpose was shown justifying the
location of the drain in the pathway
leading to the ladies rest room, thus
tending to negate the fact that the floor
was in a reasonably safe condition.
65 C.J.S., Negligence, §§45 and 274.

In defense of this fact situation de-
fendant contends that this linoleum cov-
ered gentle slope or slight incline in the
floor of the bus station did not consti-
tute negligence. Citing in support of
this contention, City of Bristow v.
Pinkley, 158 Okla. 104, 12 P. 2d 229;
City of Tulsa v. Frye, 165 Okla. 302,
25 P. 2d 1080; Oklahoma City v. Cant-
rell, 181 Okla. 56, 72 P. 2d 381; Sanders
v. McMichael, 200 Okla. 501, 197 P. 2d
280; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson
(10 Cir.) 91 F. 2d 332.

Generally, a slight slope or incline in
floor or walkway in a store, office or
public building, does not of itself consti-
tute negligence; Oklahoma Natural Gas
Co. v. Glazier, 192 Okla. 516, 137 P. 2d
584. In that case numerous cases from
other jurisdictions are cited with a
brief resume of the facts and court’s
holding which we think, together with
our holding therein, sustains the trial
court in the case at bar. In the syllabus
of the Glazier case, it is stated:

“Where the evidence showed an in-
cline upon the floor of defendant’s of-
fice and a waxed condition of the floor
covering, rendering it ‘very slick’, and
the evidence reasonably tends to show
that plaintiff, a customer of defendant,

537

slipped on the inclined waxed part of
the floor and fell, receiving the injuries
sued for, it was not error to overrule a
anotion of defendant for a directed ver-
dict in its favor.”

and in the body of the opinion we said:

“Tt is first asserted that there is no
negligence under. ordinary circum-
stances in the use of a smoothly waxed

loor.

eee

“Tt is contended that the slope or in-
‘cline in the floor, such as is shown by
the evidence in this case, is too slight
to constitute negligence. A number of

-eases involving slopes or inclines in

sidewalks, walkways, floors, ete. are
cited in support of this, among which
are Oklahoma City v. Cantrell, 181 Okla.
‘56, 72 P. 2d 381; City of Tulsa v.
Frye, 165 Okla. 302, 25 P. 2d 1080, and
similar cases. Only a few of the cases
cited are applicable, since they involve
the question of liability of cities for de-
fects in the plans, specification, etc., in
the construction of public ways. As a
general rule, the maintenance of waxed
or oiled floors in stores, offices, etc.,
is not of itself negligence. Likewise, a
slight slope or incline in the floor or
walkway does not of itself constitute
negligence. We are here dealing with
a combination of two conditions. Under
such conditions it may be said a ques-
tion of fact is presented for a jury’s
decision.” (Emphasis ours)

Defendant’s fifth proposition is that
there is no evidence that the negligence
complained of was the proximate cause
of the injury to plaintiff.

The evidence of the plaintiff discloses
that she, with her husband, went to the
Union Bus Station at Woodward a short
time before the scheduled time for the
arrival of the bus on which she was ex-
pecting her niece; that she and her
husband went to the front of the bus
station and sat down for a while and
then decided to go uptown. Before doing
that she asked the lady at the counter
where the rest room was and she said
“Right back there”, indicating the back
of the room. She went back that way,
and it was very dark.

538 |

“There was a light over the desk
when I went back there, and I just
looked back, I didn’t get down to look
along the floor, and the door was paint-
ed white and the walls were very dark,
and I walked back that way not know-
ing there was a floor drain, so I stepped
in the floor drain and fell down and
broke my leg.”

She further testified that the door to
the rest room was not open and that
the drain was right in front of the rest
room door, She was asked if she was
in the habit of falling down or stumbling
and her answer was “I am not”. She
was asked “What happened then”, and
after several intervening questions she
was asked again “Alright, now what
happened?” “How did you fall; I mean,
which way did you fall; backward, side-
ways, frontward, or how?” and she an-
swered:

“Those are just things you hardly
thoroughly remember until you get
down; but I seen I was going to fall,
and I do recollect that I put out my left
hand. I realized also there was nothing
to touch, and, of course, I just went
down. It threw me kind of in a twist.”

She was then asked “When you found
yourself on the floor, just the best you
can, tell the jury which way you were
lying?” to which she answered:

“Well there was a wall on the right-
hand side of me as I went towards the
rest room door, and when those that
came to me, which was, one of them
was my husband, and I remember one
being Mr. Toler, and a young man
which I didn’t know and had never
seen, and one lady, and I don’t know
who the lady was, but anyway, when
they got me straightened around, I put
my hand—my head was towards the
wall that was to the right of me, and
kind of a little to the east, and I had
my arm, after I had been straightened
around, right in that drain, and I said,
‘My, my, what a trap here on the
floor’.”

Defendant contends that this evidence
is insufficient in that it fails to show
that plaintiff slipped, or that she could
not have seen the depression on the
floor had she looked; that she was look-

ing at the door of the toilet to see which
way it opened; that she wasn’t watch-
ing where her feet were going; that no
other witness testified to anything other
than she fell.

It is argued that this evidence leaves
to conjecture the cause of plaintiff's
fall. Citing Tweed v. First National
Bank Bldg. Corp., 203 Okla. 31, 218 P.
2d 356, and other cases of similar im-
port. Such cases are based upon the
proposition that in the absence of evi-
dence showing an unsafe condition of
the premises, the mere fact that a plain-
tiff slipped and fell at the time and place
raises no presumption of negligence on
the part of the owner or lessee of the
premises. This rule is not applicable
to the facts in the instant case as it is
shown by the evidence outlined above
and under propositions one and two
hereinbefore considered that the prem-
ises were in an unsafe condition.

‘The rule of causal connection or prox-
imate cause is well stated in Thompson
v. Walsh, 203 Okla, 453, 223 P. 2d 357.
There we said:

“In a civil case all that the plaintiff
is required to prove in order to establish
causal connection between defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's injury is to
make it appear more probable that
the injury came in whole or in part
from the defendant’s negligence than
from any other cause, and this fact may
be established by circumstantial evi-

lence.”

and in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.
Gray, 204 Okla. 362, 230 P. 2d 256, the
rule is stated as follows:

«* * * The rule is settled that, where
different conclusions may be drawn
from the evidence, the existence of neg-
ligence and the question of proximate
eause of an injury are questions to be
determined by the trier of facts. * * *”

Defendant’s sixth and last proposi-
tion is:

“The court erred in admitting X-rays
in evidence without proper identifica-
tion and in permitting plaintiff's attor-
ney to display them to the jury.”

Defendant cites in support of this
proposition Bartlesville Zine Co. v.
Fisher, 60 Okla. 139, 159 P. 476; Call v.
City of Burley, 57 Idaho 58, 62 P. 2d
101; Ligon v. Allen, 157 Ky. 101, 162 S.
W. 536, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 842; National
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Robertson,
169 Okla. 136, 36 P. 2d 479, and South-
western Cotton Oil Co. v. State Ind.
Com., 167 Okla. 294, 29 P. 2d 122, but
principally relies upon the Fisher case.
These cases are based upon the theory
that admission of X-rays without proper
indentification and expert explanation
constitutes reversible error because no
identification of the injuries is possible
or that no connection is shown between
the injured and the injuries shown
thereby; or, if there is, such pictures or
negatives must be read and explained
by experts. But the rule is not appli-
eable where other and competent evi-
dence tends to prove the same facts.
O. C. Cab Service Co. v. Askew, 183
Okla. 6, 79 P. 2d 811.

The record herein discloses that there
were 17 X-rays introduced, thirteen of
which were merely shown to the jury
through an electric view box without
the identification or explanatory inter-
pretations of an expert. It is contended
that the introduction of these X-rays
without medical or professional in-
terpretation was error; and if this
were the only evidence to establish the
extent of plaintiff's injuries, such con-
tention would prevail, but four of the
X-rays introduced were identified as

_ pictures of plaintiff's bodily injuries
by Dr. C. R. Rountree who treated her
immediately after her injury and dur-
ing her recuperation. He was an ortho-
pedic specialist qualified to read K-rays
and he presented these X-rays to the
jury and explained them and testified
as to the extent and degree of plaintiff’s
injuries. Defendant offered no extenu-
atory medical evidence as to the degree
or extent of plaintiff's injuries or
amount of resulting damages.

- No complaint is made that the amount
of the judgment is excessive. The only
purpose of the introduction of X-rays

539

and medical testimony was to establish
the extent and degree of plaintiff’s in-
juries and amount of resulting dam-
ages, and since this was done by other
competent medical testimony and other
X-rays which were identified and read
by a qualified physician, the error, if
any, was harmless. O. C. Cab Service
Co. v. Askew, supra. There in the sec-
ond paragraph of the syllabus we said:

“Admission of incompetent evidence
is not necessarily harmful where other
and competent evidence tends to prove
the same facts, or where from the whole
case it reasonably appears that the
facts to which such evidence is relevant
are not in reality in dispute.”

In the body of the opinion it is stated:

“The complaint that the X-ray pic-
tures were not properly identified rests
largely on the fact that the person who
took the pictures did not testify as to
their accuracy. X-ray pictures do not
prove themselves, and it is true, as
a general rule, that the person who took

the pictures is the proper person to
identify them and to show that they
were taken by the ordinary or custom-

ary X-ray process. The physician who
interpreted the X-ray pictures under
consideration here did not take them.
He testified that they were taken under
his direction and that they were pic-
tures of the arm, shoulder and skull of
the girl. The injuries were broken and
fractured bones in the arm and at the
shoulder, and a fractured skull. In an-
swer to a question by the court, the
doctor, after examining the pictures,
declared that they were pictures of the
girl’s arm, shoulder, and skull.

“Although objection was made to the
introduction of the photographs, the
doctor was allowed to testify as to the
breaks and fractures shown by the pi
tures. He also was permitted to testify
that a bone specialist was called in to
fix the fractures. Furthermore, without
the use of X-ray pictures he testified
concerning other injuries the child had.
He further testified as to pain and suf-
fering she underwent, and also as to the
probable effect on her future condition,
all without objection. Another physi-
cian, without objection, testified about
injuries to her eyes and ear caused by

540

the accident. The fact that the bones
were broken seems to have been evi-
dent. A police detective testified, with-

- out objection, that the girl was uncon-
scious and had some broken bones. The
testimony is to the effect that the bones
mended rapidly and well. We find
nothing to refute the claim that bones
were in fact broken and fractured.
There is no claim that the nature of her
injuries would throw any light on the
other question raised, negligence or
lack of negligence. Moreover, no argu-
yment is made as to excessiveness of
the verdict; it is unquestioned that the
girl was knocked unconscious and pain-
fully injured.”

Under all the circumstances, we are
of the opinion that the cause should be
affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL,
WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., con-

eur,

TULSA EXPOSITION & FAIR CORP.
v. JOYNER.

No, 35599. June 2, 1953,
257 P. 2d 1077.

Hugh Ownby and Clarence A. War-
ren (Ownby & Warren), Tulsa, for
plaintiff in error.

George E. Brewer, Joe B. Houston,
Gerald B. Klein, James P. Melone, R. L.
Davidson, Jr., and E. Lee Grigg, Tulsa,
for defendant in error.

O'NEAL, J. The parties will be re-
ferred to in the same order as they ap-
peared in the trial court.

On the 18th day of September, 1950,
the plaintiff paid an admission fee to
the fairgrounds where defendant con-
ducted the Tulsa County Fair. The pe-
tition, in detail, discloses the location
of the buildings upon the grounds and
their position with reference to road-
ways and walkways maintained for the
use of the public in entering and leav-
ing said buildings; that the terrain on
the north side of said buildings is from
five to eight feet higher than the level
of the roadways and walkways leading
to and from said buildings; that de-
fendant constructed and maintained a
ditch which ran parallel to said road-
ways and pathway referred to in which
ditch defendant allowed water to accu~
mulate; that the banks of said ditch
were wet and slippery and dangerous
for pedestrian traffic; that defendant
failed and neglected to provide safe
means in the form of steps, culverts
or other artificial walkways to pro-
tect the public in the use of said path-
ways; that plaintiff in walking down the
incline to enter said pathway or road-
way slipped upon a muddy and slip-
pery portion of the pathway causing
him to fall and receive injuries to his

right arm and back resulting in severe
pain, loss of time from his usual em-
ployment and the expenditure of money
for medical services, all to his damage
in the sum of $4,700.

Defendant in answering said petition
denied all of the allegations therein,
and pleaded that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence, and that his
injuries were due solely to his own neg-
ligence, and without which negligence
the accident would not have occurred.
From the verdict rendered for the plain-
tiff in the sum of $1,500 and the judg-
ment rendered thereon, the defendant
appeals.

For reversal the defendant contends
that the court’s instructions Nos. 8 and
9 were erroneous resulting in error war-
ranting the reversal of the case. In-
struction No. 8 reads as follows:

“You are instructed that the owner or
proprietor of a place of amusement,
such as the Fair, being conducted by
the defendant in this case, and to which
the public is admitted upon payment of
an admission fee, owes to the public
the duty to use a high degree of care
to place, keep and maintain the prem-
ises in a reasonably safe condition and
if you find from the evidence that the
plaintiff exercised due care for his own
safety, and was injured by reason of
defendant’s failure to exercise such high
degree of care and such failure prox-
imately caused his injuries, then you
should find for the plaintiff.”

The defendant contends the instruc-
tion placed too high a degree of care
required of it in maintaining the prem-
ises in a reasonably safe condition. In
other words, that the rule as applied to
the character of defendant’s operation
of the fairgrounds only required it to
use ordinary care to protect its patrons
from injuries. In support of the rule
contended, defendant cites the follow-
ing cases: Maryland State Fair, Inc.,
v. Henderson, 164 Md. 587, 165 Atl. 698,
Syllabus 2; Burke et ux. v. State Fair of
Texas (Tex. Civ. App.) 93 S.W. 2d 765,
Syllabus 3; Blue Grass Fair Associa-
tion v. Bunnell, 206 Ky. 462, 267 S. W.
237, Syllabus 4; Clark v. Monroe Coun-

541

ty Fair Association, 203 Iowa 1107, 212
N.W. 163, Syllabus 7; Welsh v. Jeffer-
son County Agricultural Society, 121
Neb. 166, 236 N.W. 331, Syllabus 1, and
Virginia State Fair Association v. Bur-
ton, 182 Va. 365, 28 S.E. 2d 716, Syl-
labus 2.

These cases and many others that
might be cited support the rule that de-
fendant’s duty under comparable situ-
ations as here presented is limited to
the exercise of reasonable care. Our
previous decisions do not follow what
seems to be the prevailing rule in other
states, for we have consistently held
that one engaged in operating public
places of amusement is held to stricter
accountability for injuries to patrons
than owners of private premises gener-
ally.

In Standard Theaters Corporation v.
Hughes, 185 Okla. 377, 91 P. 2d 1058,
we said: .

“The proprietor of a theater who
charges an admission price to anyone
desiring to receive entertainment owes
his patrons the duty to exercise a high
degree of care in their behalf to prevent
injury to them; and instructions which
charge the jury to this effect are
proper.”

In this case we approved an instruc-
tion as follows:

“Instruction No. 12 charged the jury
the owner of a theater owed paying
patrons the duty to use a high degree of
care to keep the premises in a safe con-
dition, and if by failure to do so a pa-
tron was injured, the owner was liable.
Further, it was the defendant’s duty to
exercise a high degree of care in main-
taining its premises in a reasonably safe
condition for the use of its patrons and
the same high degree of care in keeping
proper lights to make the premises rea-
sonably safe, and, if while exercising
reascnable care for her own safety the
plaintiff was injured by reason of de~
fendant’s negligence in either or both of
the particulars referred to, it was the
duty of the jury to find for plaintiff.”

In an earlier case, Tulsa Entertain-
ment Co. v. Greenlees, 85 Okla. 113, 205
P. 179, the rule was applied in the oper-

542
ation of a baseball park. In that case,
we held:

“The owner of a baseball park to
which the public is admitted, upon pay-
ment of an admission fee, for the pur-
pose of witnessing baseball games or
other athletic contests, owes a duty to
the public to use a high degree of care
to keep each part of such park in a safe
condition for the use to which the sev-
eral parts are put, and, if on account
of such owner’s failure so to do, any of
the patrons of such park ,are injured,
the owner is liable in damages for such
injury.”

Defendant suggests that the rule ap-
plied in the Standard Theaters case,
supra, should be limited to cases where
an injury occurs in an indoor public
place of amusement but should not be
extended to entertainments at a public
fair. We do not agree. The duty to exer-
cise a high degree of care is based upon
a public policy to protect the general
public where large bodies of the public
congregate for entertainment. Sand
Springs Park v. Schrader, 82 Okla. 244,
198 P. 983, where we lay down the
rule the degree of care required in-
creases as the peril increases.

Instruction No, 9 complained of by
the defendant reads as follows:

“You are instructed that any person
who suffers detriment from the unlaw-
ful acts of omission of another, may re-
cover from the person in fault a com-
pensation therefor in money, which is
called damages. Detriment is the loss
or harm suffered in person or property.

“Damages must in all cases be rea-
sonable.

“Tf your verdict be for the plaintiff
you should determine the reasonable
sum which will fairly compensate him
for the pain and suffering, which he has
endured up to now, and may reason-
ably be expected to suffer, as the direct
and proximate result of the injury re-
ceived, plus the reasonable sum he has
expended for necessary medical and
hospital bills, plus reasonable compen-
sation for such disability, if any, which
has prevented or may reasonably be
expected to prevent the plaintiff from

engaging in any lucrative ‘occupations,
all not to be more than $4,700.00, the
amount sued for by the plaintiff.”

In view of the testimony which dis-
closed that plaintiff expended the sum
of $575 for medical expenses and the
medical testimony that plaintiff’s in-
jury to his wrist and arm was per-
manent, and that plaintiff had and in
all reasonable probability would suffer
future pain as a result of the injury,
fully justified the form and substance
of the instruction.

‘We held in Midland Valley R. Co. v.
Hilliard, 46 Okla. 391, 148 P. 1001, as
follows:

“The damages recoverable for bodily
pain and suffering are not limited to
that which is past, if the proof renders
it reasonably certain that the party
must suffer in the future. In estimating
the pecuniary loss in such cases, all the
consequences of the injury, future as
well as past, are to be taken into con-
sideration, including bodily pain which
is shown by the proof to be reasonably
certain will necessarily result from the
injury.”

The measure of damages for a tort is
such an amount that will compensate
for all detriment proximately caused
thereby. 23 O.S. 1951 §61. Deep Rock
Oil Corporation v. Griffeth, 177 Okla.
208, 58 P. 2d 323; Denco Bus Lines, Inc.,
v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 229 P. 2d 560.

The judgment not being otherwise
challenged, we affirm.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. NO.
65, WAGONER COUNTY, et al.
v. STAFFORD.

No. 35399. June 2, 1953.
257 P. 2d 1092.

Fred W. Martin, Wagoner, for plain-
tiff in error.

Miller & Herrin, Sapulpa, and Harry
G. Fender, Wagoner, for defendant in
error.

CORN, J. Plaintiff brought this action
to recover damages for breach of a
written contract of employment as a
school teacher. The petition alleged her

543

qualifications and execution of a writ-
ten contract with dependent school dis-
trict No. 56, July 11, 1950, whereby she
was employed to teach a ten months
term at $250 per month during 1950-
1951 school year. The contract was
properly approved by the county super-
intendent. District No. 56 qualified to
receive state aid, and for sufficient
funds to provide a full term and pay
salaries. However, in July, 1950, the
district held an election and voted in
favor of annexation to this defendant,
although annexation was not approved
by the State Board of Education until
August 29, 1950. The board of district
No. 56 ordered plaintiff to begin teach-
ing July 17, 1950, and she taught until
August 11, 1950, when the pupils were
transferred to defendant district. Plain-
tiff reported to a school in district No.
65 but was not allowed to teach, and on
September 6, 1950, the board of educa-
tion of defendant district advised plain-
tiff her contract was void for reason no
money was on hand to pay her when
contract was signed and none had been
appropriated. Plaintiff also alleged mat-
ters showing the board of district No.
56 had approved a budget sufficient to
meet all needs, and the inclusion of
sufficient funds in the budget of dis-
trict No. 65 approved by the county ex-
cise board, and that all valuation and
revenues of district No, 56 had been
transferred to defendant by order of the
excise board; that the salary account
later was supplemented by appropriate
order. Plaintiff made demand upon de-
fendant to be allowed to teach, but was
refused and her salary claims rejected,
although defendant had assumed the
obligations of district No. 56, and her
contract and salary were current obli-
gations of district No. 65. Plaintiff
asked judgment against defendant for
unpaid salary ($2,500) interest and
costs,

Defendant, successor to district No.
56, answered by general denial and plea
that plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action. Further, that plaintiffs contract
was void because no funds were avail-
able to contract against on date same

544

was made and the excise board had
neither made nor approved appropria-
tions, so that the contract was in excess
of available funds of such district.

Plaintiff replied by alleging in detail
the valuations, taxes, assessments and
apportionments, and specifically alleg-
ing the contract was made after be-
ginning of the fiscal year when there
were funds on hand to meet require-
ments; that legal and proper esti-
mates had been made and approved by
the excise board, including appropria-
tions for teachers’ salaries in both dis-
tricts, so that plaintiff’s contract was
valid and not in excess of the school
district funds, and by reason of breach
thereof plaintiff was entitled to judg-
ment. Prior to trial plaintiff amended
her petition to show employment else-
where during period of the contract,
and accordingly reduced the claim for
damages to $1,912.50. The petition was
amended further the day of trial to
show compliance with the Intangible
Tax Law.

Upon trial to a jury plaintiff intro-
duced evidence supporting the allega-
tions of her petition and rested. Cross-
examination of plaintiff disclosed she
had filed nothing with the school board
other than her contract and salary
claims, which were filed June 1, 1951.

Defendant demurred to plaintiff's evi-
dence in the following manner:

“Comes now the defendant and de-
murs to the evidence on behalf of the
plaintiff for the reason that the same is
wholly insufficient to constitute a cause
of action in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, and for the fur-
ther reason the evidence wholly fails
to show that the teacher filed a teach-
er’s oath as required by the statute and
for the further reason the evidence af-
firmatively shows that the plaintiff did
not file what is designated as loyalty
oath and, under both statutes, both the
loyalty oath statute and the teacher’s
oath statute it would be illegal to pay
her any money, and a misdemeanor to
pay her.”

This demurrer was overruled and
defendant elected to stand thereon.

Plaintiff's motion for directed verdict
was overruled and the case was sub-
mitted to the jury under written in-
structions, No. 9 of which was:

“Tf you find and believe from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover, then in that event, you will fix
the amount of her recovery in any
amount not to exceed the sum of
$1912.50, and interest thereon since
June 1, 1951.”

During the jury’s deliberations plain-
tiff took both the loyalty oath and teach~
er’s oath in the court’s presence. The
jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in
amount of $1,912.50, and when judg-
ment had been pronounced plaintiff at-
tempted to file the loyalty oath in com-
pliance with statute, but defendant’s ob-
jections were sustained, although the
trial court overruled defendant’s motion
to strike all matters pertaining to filing
of the oath from the record. The court
then found plaintiff had asked interest
upon her claim but the jury had failed
to allow this item, although plaintiff
was entitled thereto, and accordingly
entered judgment for interest at 6 per
cent from June 1, 1951, to date of judg-
ment, as well as the principal amount.

Defendant presents two contentions
on appeal, the first of which is as fol-
lows:

“Failure of the plaintiff to conform
with the requirements of the Loyalty
Oath, (enrolled House Bill No. 8, 23rd.
Legislature, (Laws 1951; 51 O.S. 1941
(Supp.) 37.1-37.8) is fatal to her cause
of action.”

The argument is that since plaintiff
was a teacher, suing to recover her sal-
‘ary, but without showing compliance
with the loyalty oath statute, supra,
the case falls within the rule announced
in Board of Regents, etc, v. Upde-
graff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131. How-
ever, since- the matter herein consid-
ered became at issue in this court, the
Updegraff case, supra, has been re-
versed by the Supreme Court of the
United States. See Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97
L, Ed. —...

We deem it unnecessary to consider
either the reasons urged for applica-
bility of the loyalty oath statute, or the
extensive arguments offered concerning
the nonapplicability thereof.

Plaintiff's cause of action was based
upon defendant’s breach of a written
contract, executed July 8, 1950, ap-
proved by the county superintendent,
and allegedly breached on September 6,
1950. The loyalty oath statute (51 O.
S. 1941 Supp. §§ 37.1-37.8) did not be-
come effective until April 9, 1951. It
has never been considered, nor urged in
any instance, that the “Loyalty Oath”
statute was contemplated or intended
to operate other than prospectively.
Thus it is obvious that the require-
ments of the statute were not applic-
able to plaintiff upon the date she exe-
cuted her contract, nor were they ap-
plicable on the date of the alleged
breach thereof.

Plaintiffs petition simply declared
upon a cause of action arising out of
defendant’s breach of contract. Our
statute (12 O.S. 1951 §4) gave plaintiff
a right of action to protect her con-
tractual rights, by seeking redress for
defendant’s wrongful breach thereof.
Stone v. Case, 34 Okla. 5, 124 P. 960,
43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1168. When defendant
breached plaintiff's contract her cause
of action arose. In such cases the rule
is that the employee has a cause of ac-
tion for wages past due, and the right to
claim damages for the injury sustained
by virtue of the wrongful breach there-
of And, in such instances, the proper
measure of damages is the amount stip-
ulated by contract to be paid for serv-
ices, such amount to be mitigated to
the extent of any sum obtained from
employment of a like nature. Sharp-
less Separator Co. v. Gray, 62 Okla. 73,
161 P. 1074; Farmers’ Co-Op. Ass’n v.
Shaw, 171 Okla. 358, 42 P. 2d 887; Ray
v. Board of Education of Pond Creek,
194 Okla. 472, 153 P. 2d 233. Plaintiff
pleaded that she had mitigated her
damages and made no claim for the
amount received from her other em-
ployment.

545

Briefly, then, this situation may be
summed up in the following manner:
Plaintiff introduced evidence support-
ing the allegations of her petition. At
the close of this evidence defendant
demurred thereto on the grounds such
evidence failed to establish a cause of
action in plaintiff's favor. The effect of
defendant's demurrer was to admit ev-
ery fact which plaintiff’s evidence tend-
ed in the slightest degree to prove, to-
gether with all logical and reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Car-
penter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.
2d 761. Upon this basis it was estab-
lished that plaintiff had entered into a
valid and approved contract, that there
were funds available to contract against
at the time same was approved, and
that this contract was breached by de-
fendant without justification, thus en-
titling plaintiff to a judgment for dam-
ages in the amount of the contract for
such breach. Under these circumstances,
the rule is that a demurrer to the evi-
dence should be overruled, the evidence
and inferences deducible therefrom be-
ing sufficient to support the verdict.
Or, stated otherwise, it is error to sus-
tain a demurrer to the evidence where
the evidence reasonably tends to estab-
lish a right of action in plaintiff's favor
and against defendant. Acme Glass
Co. v. Owens, 204 Okla. *601, 232 P.
2d 624.

Neither do we consider as persuasive
defendant’s argument suggesting de-
fendant would not have stood upon the
demurrer, had there been reason for
anticipating the eventuality that the
loyalty oath statute might be declared
unconstitutional, and asking that de-
fendant now be granted a new trial in
order to proceed with its defense. Means
are provided by our statute whereby
defendant could have preserved such
question and presented the defense
properly raised by the pleadings. Hav-
ing misconceived its defense by relying
upon the applicability of a statute
which, upon its face, did not apply to
the situation presented by plaintiff, can-
not now serve to provide the basis for
granting of a new trial to defendant.

546

Defendant’s second contention is that
the trial court erred in entering judg-
ment in plaintiff's favor for interest, af-
ter the jury failed to allow plaintiff in-
terest. To sustain its position defend-
ant relies upon the rule announced in
Blackwell, Enid & Southwestern Rail-
way Co. v. Bebout, 19 Okla. 63, 91 P.
877, syllabus 5 of which states:

“The judgment of the court must fol-
low the verdict, and where the verdict
is general and for a sum in gross and
the question of interest was not re-
served by the court, and there is noth-
ing in the record to indicate that the
jury omitted interest, it will be pre-
sumed that it is embraced in the amount
of their finding, and the court cannot
add interest to the amount found by
the verdict of the jury.”

Without attempting to discuss and
distinguish the cases relied upon by de-
fendant, we are of the opinion that the
trial court properly added the interest
to the jury verdict. 23 O.S. 1951 §6
provides as follows:

“Any person who is entitled to recover
damages certain, or capable of being
made certain by calculation, and the
right to recover which is vested in
him upon a particular day, is entitled
also to recover interest thereon from
that day, except during such time as
the debtor is prevented by law, or by
the act of the creditor from paying the
debt.”

We have construed this section of the
statute numerous times, and consistent-
ly have held that interest is recoverable
where the right to recover vests at a
particular time, and the amount sued
for is capable of being made certain.
And such has been our holding even
where the petition did not ask for al-
lowance of interest, but the amount
sued for was capable of being ascer-
tained. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Mid-
Continent Petroleum Corp., 182 Okla.
588, 79 P. 2d 227. We also hold that
an alimony award is a money judgment
upon which interest may be allowed
without any specific provision therefor.
Harden v. Harden, Ex’r, 191 Okla. 698,
180 P. 2d 311. Our decisions are ex-
pressive of the general rule announced

in 15 Am. Jur., Damages, §57, and 25

C.J.S., Damages, §52. The nature of
plaintiff's cause of action, and the cer-
tainty with which the extent of her
damages were capable of calulation,
justified the trial court in adding in-
terest upon the recovery allowed her by
the jury.

Judgment affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and DAVISON,’
O'NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACK~
BIRD, JJ., concur.

WILCOX OIL CO. v. BRADBERRY.
No. 34992. June 2, 1953.
257 P. 2d 1096.

|

Horace B, Clay, Tulsa, for plaintiff in
error,

James F, Haning, Wewoka, for de-
fendant in error.

PER CURIAM. This is an action
wherein Alton Bradberry, as plaintiff,
sought to recover from Wilcox Oil Com-
pany, a corporation, damages for the
destruction of a tractor and plow by a
fire. The fire had been set out by
plaintiff and had gotten out of control.
Plaintiff left the field wherein he was
plowing, drove his tractor and plow to
the pasture where the fire was then
burning, and started to plow furrows
or a fire guard ahead of the fire in order
to stop the fire. While engaged in this
plowing to stop or head off the fire, the
plow struck the pipe line, stalled the
tractor and broke the pipe line from
which oil sprayed out around and on the
tractor. Before plaintiff could get the
tractor started again the fire overtook
the tractor and the tractor and plow
were destroyed.

It was stipulated by the parties in the
trial of the case that the easement for
the pipe line, among other things, pro-
Vided that said pipe line “shall be bur-
ied to such a depth as not to inter-
fere with the ordinary cultivation of
said land”.

The plaintiff as a lessee of the prem-
ises had been living on said leased
premises for five or six years. The
point where the pipe line was struck
was in the pasture and was not in culti-
vation, or at least was not in cultiva-
tion in the sense that it was being
plowed annually.

It appears from the evidence that the
pipe line where it crossed the land
which was in cultivation, that is, plowed
from year to year, was buried to a
depth not to interfere with ordinary
cultivation of the land. Where the pipe

547

line crossed the pasture it had not been
placed beneath the ground. In some
places it was not covered, in sonie
places it was partly covered, and in
other places completely covered by
weeds and grass.

A jury trial of the issues resulted in
a verdict of $600 in favor of plaintiff as
against the Wilcox Oil Company, a cor-
poration, From a judgment based there-
on, the defendant has perfected this ap-
peal.

It is conceded by plaintiff in error
that a violation of the provision to bury
the pipe line to a depth not to interfere
with ordinary cultivation would be pri-
mary negligence, but in this connection
contends that the provision does not ap-
ply to pasture land. We do not agree.
The provision makes no such exception.
It was the duty of defendant to bury
its pipe line to the required depth with-
out regard to whether the land was cul-
tivated or pasture land.

In substance, pldintiff in error ar-
gues that its failure to bury the pipe
line to a depth that would not interfere
with ordinary cultivation of the land on
a hillside in the pasture where the land
had never been cultivated or plowed
only served to furnish the opportunity
for injury and was not the proximate
cause; that the injury could not have
occurred except for the independent act
or acts of defendant in error in setting
out a fire to burn off some high weeds
and grass on a part of the farm land
on a windy day which got out of con-
trol and which defendant in error was
trying to stop by plowing a fire guard
on the hillside pasture land; that the
act of the defendant in error in setting
the fire to burn off some high weeds and
grass so that the land could be plowed,
the fire getting into the pasture, and the
plowing of a fire guard in front of the
fire to head it off, amounted to an inde-
pendent, intervening, unrelated, extra-
ordinary and unexpected act and super-
seded the primary negligence.

It cannot be said that setting a fire
on one’s own premises to burn off high

548

grass and weeds in order to cultivate
the land better is wrongful; neither can
it be said that when a fire gets into the
pasture land that the owner or tenant
does not have the right to plow a fire
guard ahead of the fire in order to
stop it, though to do either under certain
circumstances might constitute negli-
gence. In the face of primary negligence
proximately related to the injury on the
part of plaintiff in error such negligence
would present only a question of contri-
butory negligence.

In the case of the City of Altus v.
Wise, 193 Okla. 288, 143 P. 2d 128, it
was said:

“However, in order to relieve the one
guilty of the first act of negligence of
responsibility, the intervening cause
must entirely supersede the original
negligence. In other words, it must be
independent of the original act and ade-
quate of itself to bring about the in-
jJurious result. * * *

«* * * Tt is enough if it could have
been reasonably expected that a cause
would intervene in a way likely to pro-
duce an injury similar to that actually
suffered.”

In St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gilbert,
185 Okla, 591, 95 P. 2d 123, it was said:

«“* * * In other words, an intervening
cause will not relieve from liability
where the prior negligence was the
efficient cause of the injury. The test
is not to be found in the number of in-
tervening events or agencies, but in
their character and in the natural con-
nection between the wrong done and
the injurious consequences, and if the
injury is the natural and probable con-
sequence of the original negligent act
or omission, and is such as might rea-
sonably have been foreseen as prob-
able, * * * liability attaches.”

Plaintiff in error in its brief cites the
case of Norman v. Scrivner-Stevens
Co,, 201 Okla. 218, 204 P. 2d 277, and
quotes extensively from the body of
the opinion. It is pointed out in this
case that:

“Another consideration always to be
given to the question of whether negli-

gence is the proximate cause of an in-
jury is whether such negligence as the
efficient cause was connected with an-
other cause to produce the injury, or
whether the injury resulted from the
intervention of some new and independ-
ent cause, which was neither antici-
pated nor reasonably foreseeable, and
which operated independently of the
original negligence and without which
the injury would not have occurred.”

In Norman v. Scrivner-Stevens Co.
the original or primary negligence was
not connected with the cause which re~
sulted in the injury.

In this case the original or primary
negligence is directly connected with
the acts resulting in the injury.

It seems to us that any injury result-
ing from the collision with the pipe
line at a point where it was not buried
to a depth that would not interfere with
the ordinary cultivation of the premises
in any ordinary or necessary work on
the premises was contemplated by the
parties, else it would not have been
provided in the lease that the pipe
should be buried to a depth not to in-
terfere with ordinary cultivation of the
land.

We have considered the instructions
as a whole and believe they sufficiently
instruct the jury as to the law upon the
issues involved.

The testimony as to the reasonable
market value of the tractor and plow
at the time of their admitted destruc-
tion shows somewhat vaguely their con-
dition at the time of the fire and the
value of such equipment in the condi-
tion described, and reasonably supports
the verdict and judgment based thereon
which is less than any estimated value.

Affirmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys Richard L. Wheatley and
Riley Q. Hunt, who as Special Masters
aided in the preparation of this opinion.
These attorneys were recommended by
the Oklahoma Bar Association, ap-

| 549

proved by the Judicial Council, and
appointed by the Court.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.CJ.,
and CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

be
MILLER v. ROBERTS.
No. 34768. Feb. 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1953.
257 P. 24 1068.

R. A. Howard, Ardmore, and Twy-
ford, Smith & Crowe, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiff in error.

Sigler & Jackson, Ardmore, for de-
fendant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This case origi-
nated in the district court of Carter
county, Oklahoma on the 3rd day of
July, 1948. The parties appeared there-
in as W. L. Roberts, plaintiff, v. J. M.
Miller, defendant, and hereinafter will
be referred to as they there appeared.
Therein the plaintiff alleged that on
May 27, 1935, in a certain case then

550

pending in said court, styled W. L.
Roberts, plaintiff, v. J. M. Miller, de-
fendant, the plaintiff recovered ‘judg-
ment against the defendant for $3,080,
together with 6% interest thereon from
said date until paid; the sum of $42.40
cost, and the court adjudged said judg-
ment to be a lien upon an undivided
one-fourth interest in certain land de-
scribed in the plaintiff’s petition.

An execution was issued on said judg-
ment on February 29, 1940, and re-
turned unpaid; and another on March
19, 1945, was issued on said judgment
and returned not collected. A copy of
said judgment was attached to the pe-
tition as “Exhibit A” and made a part
thereof. Plaintiff alleged that there was
due upon said judgment the sum of
$5,460.12 up to the 25th day of October,
1947. That on said date, the defendant
paid the sum of $1,000, leaving a bal-
ance due on said judgment of $4,460.12
for which plaintiff prayed judgment.

On August 7, 1948, a demurrer was
filed raising the question that the exe-
cutions issued on the judgment were
general executions instead of special
executions and that therefore the judg-
ment was dormant.

Plaintiff then amended his petition
and alleged that at the time the note
was executed by J. M. Miller to W. L.
Roberts (which note was the basis of
the judgment in case No. 21095) Miller
was not the record owner of the land
upon which the court adjudged and de-
creed plaintiff a vendor’s lien and fore-
closure thereof; that prior to the exe-
cution of said note on September 21,
1925, Miller had conveyed said land to
his wife, Carrie Miller, and on the 5th
day of March, 1930, five days before
said note was executed, Carrie Miller
conveyed said property to Mira J.
Witherow, who was at all times there-
after and prior to the 19th day of No-
vember, 1947, the record owner of the
property and that plaintiff could not
have sold said property under his judg-
ment; that Miller conveyed said prop-
erty and all other property which he

owned to his wife and she in turn con-
veyed the same to Mira J. Witherow for
the purpose of preventing the plaintiff
from levying upon said property and
for the purpose of defrauding his cred-
itors and this plaintiff; that for this
reason said defendant, Miller, is now
estopped to plead that plaintiff should
have levied upon said land by special
execution and sold the same prior to
issuing a general execution.

Plaintiff further alleged that by rea-
son of Miller’s conveying said property
away that he was led to believe that
Miller was insolvent and accepted the
sum of $1,000 on said judgment by rea-
son of the fact that he believed that
because of Miller’s insolvency he could
not collect the judgment, but he now
alleges that the sale by Miller was a
sham sale and that Miller owned the
property at that time; that immedi-
ately upon securing a release of said
judgment he had the property recon-
veyed to him; that prior thereto the
property had been of little value; but
that it suddenly became valuable for
oil, and in order to be able to lease said
land Miller paid him the $1,000 and
secured a release of the judgment; that
said release was obtained by fraud;
that if he had known that Miller owned
the land and that said sale was a mere
sham; he would never have released
said judgment; that for the reasons al-
leged the release of said judgment was
and is void.

The defendant answered pleading sev-
eral defenses, among which was that
plaintiff's cause of action was barred
by the five year statute of limitations;
that no valid execution was ever issued
on said judgment within five years af-
ter the date of the judgment; that said
judgment was dormant and dead; that
the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was by
special execution and order of sale of
the property as provided for in the judg-
ment.

Plaintiff's reply to this answer was a
general denial. Thereafter, on the ist
day of September, 1949, the cause was

set for pre-trial conference for the pur-
pose of determining whether or not
the judgment was dormant.

Plaintiff offered in evidence a deed
from J. M. Miller to Carrie Miller,
which deed was dated the 21st day of
September, 1925, and also a deed from
Carrie Miller to Mira J, Witherow,
dated the 5th day of March, 1930. It
was then agreed that on the 10th day of
March, 1930, J. M. Miller executed to
W. L. Roberts a note for $2,000, which
note was introduced in evidence. There-
upon the court clerk of Carter county,
Oklahoma, was called as a witness to
identify the record in case No. 21095.
He stated that the style of the case was
W. L. Roberts, plaintiff, v. J. M. Mil-
ler, defendant; that under date of June
18, 1935, a journal entry of judgment
was filed; that on January 25, 1945, a
second praecipe for execution was filed
and another general execution issued.
Each writ of execution was returned
marked “no property found’. It was
then shown that on the 19th day of No-
vember, 1947, Mira J. Witherow deeded
this land back to J. M. Miller, which
deed was offered in evidence; that on
the 5th day of October 1949, the court
made and entered the following order
after hearing the pre-trial conference,
which reads:

“Now on this the 5th day of October,
1949, this matter came on for hearing
upon pre-trial upon the question of
whether or not the execution issued on
the 24th day of January, 1945, in the
case of W. L. Roberts versus J. M. Mil-
ler, No. 21095 on the docket of this court
were sufficient to keep said judgment
from becoming dormant, and the court
having considered said matter and be-
ing fully, advised in the premises is of
the opinion that said executions were
sufficient to keep the judgment from
becoming dormant, to all of which the
defendant duly excepts.”

Thereafter, on the 21st day of Febru-
ary, 1950, the cause was tried to a
jury, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff,
Roberts, in the sum of $4,360.12. This
verdict was approved by the trial court
and judgment rendered accordingly.

BBL
Upon motion for new trial being over-
ruled, the defendant, Miller, appeals.

For reversal the defendant pleads
numerous assignments of error, which
he presents and argues under three
propositions.

He first contends that a general exe-
cution could not issue until the plaintiff
had exhausted his remedy by causing
a special execution and order of sale
to issue and sell the land upon which
the lien was impressed in accordance
with the judgment of foreclosure.

‘We do not agree. As a general rule
this is true. Riddle v. Gamble, 99 Okla.
161, 226 P. 106, but herein it is undis-
puted that the record owner of the prop-
erty was not a party to the action
wherein the trial court decreed plain-
tiff, W. L. Roberts, entitled to a ven-
dor’s lien on a one-fourth (14) undi-
vided interest therein and for foreclo-
sure thereof. It, therefore, was impossi-
ble for the plaintiff to have foreclosed a
lien upon the property under these
circumstances. Since the trial court did
not have jurisdiction of the record own-
er of the property, the judgment de-
claring a lien and providing for its
foreclosure was void. This being so, it
‘was unnecessary to issue a special exe-
cution before a general execution was
issued on the general judgment cover-
ing the indebtedness created by the
note. The general executions were
timely issued to keep the judgment
alive and prevent it from becoming
dormant.

Defendant’s second proposition is that
the judgment rendered on May 27, 1935,
was dormant and dead because the at-
tempted general execution of February
24, 1940, was issued without authority of
law, and was utterly void because not
signed by the court clerk and was not
under the seal of the district court as
required by Title 12, §51 O.S. 1951.

Under defendant’s first proposition
we found that the issuance of a general
execution under the facts herein was
permissible.

552

As to the invalidity of the execution
because not signed by the court clerk,
under the seal of the district court, it
is noted that a demurrer of defendant
to plaintiff’s petition was confessed and
thereupon plaintiff filed an amended
petition. Defendant then, on Septem-
ber 2, 1948, filed a motion to strike the
amended petition from the files. There-
in he alleged:

“That said amendment is a departure,
and pleads fraud in said amendment,
the original petition declaring upon a
local judgment that had been released
without consideration.

“That defendant’s demurrer sustained
by the court, and confessed by the
plaintiff, was that plaintiff's cause of
action was barred by the statute of
limitations, and said amended petition
sets up nothing new to take his cause of
action out of the statute of limitations;
and said petition on its face with ex-
hibits thereto attached and made a part
thereof show that plaintiff's cause of
action is and was barred by the stat-
utes of limitations, in that said judg-
ment sued on became dormant on the
27th day of May, 1940, and could not be
revived after May 27th, 1941, and was
dead long before plaintiff filed his suit.”

A pre-trial conference was had and
the order, heretofore quoted, was made
on October 5, 1949, finding that the exe-
cutions as issued were sufficient to
prevent the judgment from becoming
dormant, and thereafter, on October
14, 1949, the court, after taking under
advisement the motion to strike plain-
tiffs amended petition from the files,
overruled the motion. The defendant's
exceptions to both orders were allowed.

The record discloses that plaintiff
filed a praecipe for execution. The
praecipe was signed by the plaintiff,
W. L. Roberts, and directed the court
clerk to issue an execution. Thereafter,
the clerk issued the execution in due
form, but failed to sign same other
than by his typewritten name and did
not affix the seal of the court on it.
The execution fully described the judg-
ment. It shows that it was delivered to
the sheriff and that the sheriff treated

it as a valid writ of execution and re-
turned the same “No property found”.
‘The execution shows that it was placed
upon the execution docket; that it was
filed in the cause (No. 21095) styled W.
L. Roberts v. J. M. Miller, all of which
was offered in evidence on the trial
of the merits of the cause without ob-
jection by the defendant. It is admitted
by plaintiff that the execution was not
signed by the clerk and did not bear
the seal of the court, but he contends
that it was a valid execution because
it was issued by the clerk and was oth-
erwise subject to amendment and that
the proceedings were sufficient to pre-
vent the judgment from becoming dor-
mant. We agree with this contention.

We have no constitutional provision
requiring a seal to be on civil process
nor requiring the personal signature of
the clerk. Title 12, O.S. 1951, §51, pro-
vides:

“The style of all process shall be
‘The State of Oklahoma’. It shall be un-
der the seal of the court from whence
the same shall issue, shall be signed
by the clerk, and dated the day it is
issued.”

The general rule is that where a Con-
stitution requires a seal to be on proc-
ess, that process without the seal is
void, but where the Constitution does
not so require a seal, but is required
only by statute, the lack of a seal does
not render an execution void. Houston
Oil Co. of Texas v. R. J. Randolph (Tex.
Com. App.) 251 S.W. 794, 28 A.L.R. 926.
Texas Title Guaranty Co. v. Mardis,
186 Okla. 433, 98 P, 2d 593. In the Texas
Title Guaranty Co. case we said that
the statute authorizing amendment of
process is to be liberally construed,
and held that a summons not bearing
the signature of the clerk and seal of
the court was not void but amendable.
In Johnson v. Noble, 179 Okla. 256, 65
P. 2d 502, we held that although an
execution was issued without the clerk
signing it, it may be amended after
the sale, by order of the court upon the
clerk to sign it if necessary to validate
proceedings under it.

Courts as a rule will refuse to set
aside an execution sale for mere irreg-
ularities, as shown by the record, in
the execution or levy where the pro-
ceedings were not fraudulent or void,
and the court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties. 33 C.J.S.,
Executions, §231.

The writ of execution herein being
amendable, it will be accorded the
same effect with reference to acts done
in execution of it as if it had been
amended. 33 C.J.S., Executions, §82,
p. 222. The recorded facts on the public
docket of the court in the case at bar
show a bona fide public effort to col-
lect the debt (judgment) 33 C.J.S., §231,
supra. This being so, the process was
sufficient to prevent the judgment from
becoming dormant. 49 C.J.S., Judg-
ments, $532.

Defendants third and last proposi-
tion is that there was sufficient consid-
eration, as an accord and satisfaction,
for the release and satisfaction of the
judgment prior to the action on the
judgment.

Elements constituting “accord and
satisfaction” are liability of defendant,
agreement of the amount to be paid,
and acceptance of such agreement in
settlement of the original claim or dis-
pute, and defendant setting up accord
and satisfaction must plead and prove
such elements. Swift & Co. v. Colvert,
127 Okla. 80, 259 P, 844.

In this connection defendant asserts
that the plaintiff executed a release of
the judgment, which, omitting the cap-
tion, reads:

“For and in consideration of the pay-
ment to me of an amount that is satis-
factory to me, receipt of which is here-
by acknowledged, I, W. L. Roberts, the
plaintiff above named, does hereby re-
lease and discharge a certain judgment
rendered in the above entitled action
on the 27th day of May, 1935, in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defend-
ant in the District Court of Carter
County, and I hereby authorize and

553

empower the Court Clerk to release the
record of said judgment.

“Witness my hand this 25th day of
October, 1947.
“W. L. Roberts
“Plaintiff.
“O. K.
“Champion & Fisch
“Attorneys for Plaintiff,
“Endorsed:
“Filed in District Court
“October 27, 1947
“Joe Maddox, Court Clerk
“Carter County, Oklahoma”

That this release of the judgment was
made in consideration of the payment
of $1,000 to plaintiff and $100 to plain-
tiffs attorney is admitted. Defendant
contends that since the existence and
validity of the judgment was disputed,
there was sufficient consideration for
the acceptance of a lesser amount than
the face of the judgment.

This payment was given in settlement
of a disputed claim, which might, and
did, become the subject of further liti-
gation and if fairly made, in good faith,
without mistake, undue influence, mis-
representation or fraud, constituted suf-
ficient consideration and was valid.
First National Bank of Tecumseh v.
Harkey, 63 Okla. 163, 163 P. 273.

But in the instant case the plaintiff
interposed the issue of fraud and the
cause was tried to a jury. The defend-
ant demurred to plaintiff's evidence
which was overruled. He then ad-
duced his evidence, at the close of
which both parties rested without filing
a motion for an instructed verdict, or
exception to the instructions of the
court, and the jury decided the issues
in favor of the plaintiff. There being no
fundamental errors which would justify
a reversal, we must adhere to the rule
applied in Bolon v. Smith, 170 Okla.
407, 40 P. 2d 677, wherein we said:

“If a defendant, after its demurrer
to the evidence of the plaintiff has
been overruled, does not stand upon the
demurrer but puts in its evidence, it
waives the demurrer, and if it does not

554

move for a directed verdict after the
parties have finally rested, it cannot
urge against an adverse verdict that
the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish a cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff.”

For the reasons stated herein, the
judgment is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
WELCH, DAVISON, and O’NEAL, JJ.,
dissent.

G. I, CONSTRUCTION CO, et al. v.
OSBORN et al.

No. 35592. June 2, 1953.
257 P. 2d 1056.

Looney, Watts, Ross, Looney & Smith,
Oklahoma City, for petitioners:

E. S. Collier, Taloga, and Mac Q.
Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. In this case it ap-
pears that on and prior to the 11th day
of August, 1951, George Ival Osborn
was employed by the G. I. Construction
Company, and on that day while em-
ployed by it and engaged in a hazard~
ous employment he sustained an acci-
dental injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment causing his
death. .

On the 25th day of August, 1951, Lela
Osborn, his mother, claiming to be a
dependent of the deceased, filed a claim
against the construction company, here-
inafter referred to as petitioner, and
its insurance carrier, hereinafter re-
ferred to as carrier, before the State In~
dustrial Commission for compensation
under the death benefit provision of
the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

The claim was set for hearing before
a trial commissioner who after hearing
the evidence, in substance, found: On
the 11th day of August, 1951, George
Ival Osborn, while in the employ of
petitioner and engaged in a hazardous
employment sustained an accidental
personal injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment causing his
death; he left surviving him Lela Os-
born, his mother, as his sole and only
dependent and as such dependent is en~
titled to recover compensation in the
sum of $13,500 and entered an award in
her favor accordingly. The award was
sustained on appeal to the commission
en bane,

Petitioner and its insurance carrier
bring the case to this court to review
this award and rely for vacation of the
award on the sole ground that the evi-
dence offered by claimant is insuffi-
cient to sustain the finding of the com-
mission that she was a dependent of de~
ceased.

The only evidence offered in the case
consists of evidence of claimant. She
testified that deceased met his death at
the time and in the manner stated in

her claim. She is a widow and mother
of deceased. Her husband died several
years ago. George was 18 years of age
at the time of his death and was single
and had never been married. He was at
that time attending school and had part
time work while in school; during the
summer he was continuously employed.
He used his money to buy clothes and
other necessaries of life and the balance
of his earnings he deposited in a joint
account in the bank in his and his
mother’s name. He had intended to use
the money in the bank to complete his
education. Claimant had drawn no
money from this account until after the
death of her son. Since that time she
has drawn from the account part of
the money. She checked on the account
as needed for her support. Up to the
time of her son’s death she was able to
take care of herself. She was the owner
of a‘laundry and workshop located in
Camargo, Oklahoma, and also has some
rental property and some farm land
located close to Camargo. Her son,
during his lifetime, contributed no
money to her support but helped her by
working for her in the laundry and
workshop.

We think this evidence sufficient to
establish dependency. The work per-
formed by deceased in connection with
the laundry and workshop owned by
claimant, the income of which she used
for her support, and the fact that he
used his earnings to provide the nec-
essaries of life and to acquire an ed-
ucation, we think, constituted contribu-
tions toward the support of his mother;
and the fact that he placed his savings
in a joint account in his and his mother’s
name and upon which the mother might
check at will indicates an intent on his
part to provide future support for his
mother.

The death benefit provision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Law should
be broadly and liberally construed in
determining the question of dependency.
58 Am. Jur. Workmen’s Compensation,
§163; Dominik Weisgerber, Sr., v. Work-

555

men’s Compensation Bureau, 70 N.D.
165, 292 N.W. 627, 128 ALR. 1482.

The rule above announced follows
the rule frequently announced by this
court in construing other provisions of
the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

The fact that claimant up to the time
of the death of her son was able to
take care of herself does not necessarily
preclude her from being classified as a
dependent of her deceased son. In Sec.
162, Am. Jur., supra, it is said:

“The purpose of the statute is to pro-
vide the workman’s dependent in future
with something in substitution for what
has been lost by the workman’s death,
and, consequently, to establish depend-
ency the applicant for compensation
must show that he or she had reason-
able grounds to anticipate future sup-
port from the decedent. This reasonable
expectation of continuing of future sup-
port and maintenance seems to be the
true criterion as to who are depend-
ents.”

See, also, Ross v. Industrial Accident
Board, 106 Mont. 486, 80 P. 2d 362. Nor
does the fact that she was the owner of
the property above mentioned preclude
her from being so classified. 58 Am.
Jur., Workmen’s Compensation, §163;
Fennimore v. Pittsburg-Scammon Coal
Co., 100 Kan. 372, 164 P. 265.

We think the evidence in this case
sufficient to show a reasonable expec-
tation on the part of claimant to re-
ceive present and future support from
the earnings of her deceased son and
therefore sufficient to sustain the find-°
ing of the commission that she was a
dependent of her deceased son.

The question of dependency under the
death benefit provision of the Work-
men’s Compensation Law is a question
of fact for the determination of the
State Industrial Commission and its
finding on such issue will not be dis-
turbed on review where reasonably
supported by competent evidence. Anno.
30 A.L.R. 1277.

Award sustained.

556

HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, DAVI-
SON, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur.

KOCH et al. v. OKLAHOMA TURN-
PIKE AUTHORITY.

No. 35634. May 12, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1953.
257 P. 2d 790.

Hie

Young, Young & Young, Sapulpa, for
plaintiffs in error.

Leon Shipp and C. E. Barnes, Okla-
homa City, for defendants in error.

O'NEAL, J. On the 30th day of July,
1951, the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority
filed its petition in the district court of
Creek county, whereby it sought to
condemn the fee-simple title to surface
rights of 8.74 acres of land situated in
Creek county for its use and benefit

in the construction of its turnpike and
also a temporary easement of 1.47 acres
for the purpose of opening a stream
channel,

Notice of the filing of the petition
and application for the appointment of
commissioners in condemnation was is-
sued and served on all defendants. The
record shows that defendant, Linda Kay
Koch, is a minor six years of age and
that upon application of both plaintiff
and defendant Lydia Koch, mother of
the minor defendant, a guardian ad
litem was appointed for the purpose of
representing the minor defendant in the
proceeding.

The guardian ad litem contends that
no proper service of notice was had on
the minor, Linda Kay Koch. We shall
later discuss this question.

Commissioners in condemnation were
appointed by the judge of the court on
August 27, 1951, to appraise and assess
the damages which defendants might
sustain by reason of the taking of their
land and the commissioners appraised
the damages in the sum of $750.

On December 17, 1951, Linda Kay
Koch, a minor, by her guardian ad
litem, joined by the other defendants,
filed a motion to vacate and set aside
the award of the commissioners. Their
motion is based on numerous grounds
which they contend renders the appoint-
ment of the commissioners and the ap-
praisement made by them void. The
trial court denied the motion.

‘Defendants appeal and rely for re-
versal on four separate and distinct
propositions: (a) notice of the applica-
tion for the appointment of the commis-
sioners was not properly served on the
minor defendant, Linda Kay Koch; (b)
the commissioners appointed to ap-
praise and assess damages did not take
the oath required by statute until after
the appraisement was made; (c) no
bona fide effort was made by plaintiff
to acquire the property by purchase
prior to the institution of condemnation
proceedings; and (d) plaintiff was with-

557

out authority to condemn a temporary
easement.

‘We shall consider these propositions
in the order made. With reference to the
first proposition the sheriffs return
shows that he served notice of the ap-
plication for the appointment of com-
missioners on the minor defendant,
Linda Kay Koch, by serving Mrs.
George Koch, mother of the defendant,
by delivering a true copy of the fore-
going notice to her to which was at-
tached a copy of the petition filed in
said cause. The trial court at the hear-
ing of the motion permitted the sheriff
to amend his return and show service
upon Linda Kay Koch, a minor six
years of age, by leaving a copy of the
notice at her usual place of residence
with a member of her family, her
mother, a person over fifteen years of
age. The amendment of the return was
allowed by the court upon the testi-
mony of the deputy sheriff as to the
manner in which the notice was served.
The deputy sheriff, however, testified
that he served but one copy of the
notice; that he did not serve a copy
thereof personally upon the minor de-
fendant, Linda Kay Koch.

It is not seriously contended by de-
fendants that the court was without
authority to allow the sheriff’s return
to be amended. It is their contention
that the service on the minor defend-
ant is void because she was not per-
sonally served with notice. It is argued
that two notices should have been
served by the sheriff, one personally
upon the minor defendant and another
upon her mother. In support of this
contention they rely upon 12 0.5. 1951
§169, and authorities construing this
section. It is the contention of plain-
tiff that this section is not applicable
to the service of notice in condemna-
tion proceedings; that 66 O.S. 1951 §53
is the applicable statute. This section
provides in substance that notice of the
application for the appointment of con-
demnation commissioners shall be
served on the adverse party either by

558

personal service or by leaving a copy
thereof at the usual place of residence
with some member of his family over
fifteen years of age.

It is argued by plaintiff that the sec-
tion relied upon by defendants relates to
the service of summons in a civil ac-
tion; that a proceeding in condemnation
is not a civil action but is a special
proceeding; that the notice of appoint-
ment of commissioners in such pro-
ceeding is not governed by the section of
the statute relied upon by the defend-
ants but is governed by 66 O.S. 1951
§53, which is a special statute applicable
to condemnation proceedings; that such
special statute therefore must prevail
over the general statute; that the serv-
ice of the notice upon the minor de-
fendant, Linda Kay Koch, was made in
accordance with the provisions of §53,
supra, and is therefore a valid service.
We think this contention correct.

In State ex rel. Department of High-
ways v. Zabloudil, 206 Okla. 286, 242 P.
2d 710, we held:

“Where there are two provisions of
the statutes, one of which is special and
particular and clearly includes the mat-
ter in controversy, and where the spe-
cial statute covering the subject pre-
seribes different rules and procedure
from those in the general statute, it will
be held that the special statute applies
to the subject-matter, and that the gen-
eral statute does not apply.

“Where, upon application for condem-
nation of land for highway purposes,
the district judge makes an order, as
provided by 66 O.S. 1941, §53, requiring
service of notice of said proceedings
to be had upon the defendants by pub-
lication in three consecutive weekly is-
sues of a designated newspaper, such
notice is not unreasonable and compli-
ance therewith gives the court juris-
diction in the condemnation proceed-
ings.”

In that case it appears that the State
Department of Highways sought to
condemn certain land for use in the
construction of a highway. Some of the
defendants were nonresidents. The trial

court ordered that service by publica-
tion be made as provided by 66 O.S.
1951 §53. No proper affidavit was
filed in order to obtain service by pub-
lication. It was there contended that
the service for this reason was void.
In passing on this contention the court
said:

« * * * There is no provision of the
statute which requires an affidavit or
any other form of proof of the facts be-
fore the district judge fixes the length
and manner of publication of the no-
tice. * * * The failure to file an affi-
davit for service by publication did not
invalidate notice nor the order of con-
demnation and appointment of commis-
sioners made in pursuance theréof.”

It is, of course, true as contended by
defendants that service of notice or oth-
er process on a minor must be made in
the manner provided by statute. How-
ever, where the applicable statute does
not specifically provide the manner in
which process shall be served upon a
minor, service may be had upon him in”
the same manner as a service upon an
adult. 43 C.J.S., Infants, §115b. In
Baumgartner v. Guessfeld, 38 Mo. 36,
the court said:

“All the points made by the plain-
tiffs in error may be best considered
under two heads: Ist, that the service
was illegal as to the infant defendants;
and 2d, that the decree was for the
plaintiff, when it should have been for
the defendants.

“I, With regard to the first-the in-
fants were served by leaving copies of
the writ at their usual place of abode
with a white member of their family
over the age of fifteen years. We see
no distinction in the statute between the
service upon an infant and upon an
adult; nor do we see any reason for a
distinction, The service is admfited to
be such as would be good against any-
body but an infant, and no authority
is pointed out, nor is any good reason
given, why it should not be good against
the infant. ***”"

In Leidy v. Edwards, 24 NJ. Misc.
116, 46 Atl, 2d 723, the New Jersey
court held that since the statute there

involved made no special provision as
to the manner in which process should
be served on a minor, service upon him
by leaving a copy thereof with his step~
mother at his usual place of residence
constituted a valid service on the minor.
The contention of defendants that the
notice of the proceedings and the ap~
pointment of commissioners was not
properly served on the minor defend-
ant, Linda Kay Koch, cannot be sus-
tained.

Defendants in their second proposi-
tion contend that the order appointing
the appraisers and the award made by
them is void for the reason that the
commissioners did not take the oath re-
quired by statute until after the ap-
praisement was made. There is some
confusion in the record as to the exact
day upon which the commissioners took
the oath. It appears that the oath was
verified and filed by the court clerk
on the 10th day of September, 1951, The
report of the commissioners shows that
the appraisement was made and the re-
port signed on the 5th day of Septem-
ber, 1951. One of the commissioners,
however, testified that the commission-
ers were appointed on the 27th day of
August, 1951, and on the same day the
three commissioners took and signed
the oath of office; that he took all the
papers in the case with him; that the
appraisement was made and the report
signed by all three commissioners on
the 5th day of September, but he did
not return the papers until the 10th day
of September; that neither of the other
commissioners was with him at that
time. The files in the court clerk’s of-
fice show that the order appointing the
commissioners and oath of office and
their report were returned and all filed
on the 10th day of September, 1951, at
approximately the same time. The re-
port of the commissioners recites that
they took the oath on the 27th day of
August, 1951, and the report is signed
by all of the commissioners.

The deputy court clerk testified he did
not remember as to whether the com-
missioners subscribed to the oath on the

559

date it was verified and filed by him
and he did not remember as to whether
all of the commissioners were present
on the day he filed the oath and that he
did not see them sign it. He did, how-
ever, testify that the oath had not been
administered in his presence prior to
that date.

The trial court under this evidence
found that the commissioners did take
the oath required by statute prior to the

+ date they made their appraisement. We
think the evidence sufficient to sustain
this finding. It will not, therefore, be
disturbed on appeal.

Defendants at the hearing of the mo-
tion sought to prove by evidence of de-
fendant, Lydia Koch, that no effort had
been made by plaintiff to acquire from
her the tract of land in question by pur-
chase prior to the institution of the con-
demnation proceeding. The evidence
was excluded by the court and this rul-
ing is assigned as error.

It is contended by defendants that un-
der our statutes, 66 O.S, 1951 §53 and
69 O.S. 1951 §658, it is necessary for a
condemnor in a condemnation proceed-
ing to allege and prove that he made a
bona fide effort to acquire the property
sought to be condemned by purchase
before instituting condemnation pro-
ceeding and that such requirement is
jurisdictional. We think this contention,
as a general rule, under a statute like
our own, is correct. The authorities so
hold. 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain,
§319; Watkins v. Board of County
Com’rs of Stephens County, 70 Okla.
305, 174 P. 523; State ex rel. Bremerton
Bridge Co. v. Superior Court for Kitsap
County, 194 Wash. 7, 76 P. 2d 990, and
authorities therein cited. This rule,
however, has its exceptions. In 18 Am.
Jur., Eminent Domain, §319, it is said:

«“« * * Where an offer to one joint
owner, as to his undivided interest,
fails there is no necessity for further
negotiation.

“No attempt need be shown to agree
upon a sale with one who cannot con-

560

vey his title. So an offer need not be
made to an infant. When attempt to
agree upon value would be futile, no
attempt need be made.* * *”

In Davis v. Northwestern El. Ry. Co.,
170 Ill. 595, 48 N. E. 1058, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held:

“It was contended that the court had
no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
unless there was proof of the failure on
the part of the petitioner to be able
to agree with the lot owner as to the
amount of compensation. The pleadings
show that the defendants were nonres-
idents, and that certain of them were
minors. In such case it is not neces-
sary to show by proof that the com-
pensation and damage could not be
agreed upon. The minors could not
make an agreement.”

See, also, Stillwater & M. St. Ry. Co.
v. Slade, 55 N.Y.S. 966; Hanika v. Lin-
coln Traction Co., 98 Neb. 583, 153 N.W.
568; City of Dallas v. Crawford (Tex.
Civ. App.) 222 S.W. 305.

69 O.S. 1951 $658 of the act creating
the Turnpike Authority provides in
part:

“Whenever a reasonable price can-
not be agreed upon, or whenever the
owner is legally incapacitated, or is ab-
sent, unknown, or unable to convey
valid title, the Authority is hereby au-
thorized and empowered to acquire, by
the exercise of the power of condem-
nation in accordance with and sub-
ject to the provisions of any and all
existing laws and statutes applicable
to the exercise of the power of condem-
nation of property for public use, any
land, property, rights, rights-of-way,
franchises, easements, or other prop-
erty deemed necessary or convenient
for the construction or the efficient op-
eration of any turnpike project or nec-
essary in the restoration of public or
private property damaged or destroyed.

As above pointed out, the record
shows that Linda Kay Koch is a minor
six years of age and that no legal guard-
ian had been appointed for her estate
and that by reason of her minority she
was unable to convey her interest in the

land. The record shows that the plain-
tiff sought to condemn the full fee-
simple title to the surface rights to the
Jand and since it was not able to ob-
tain the interest of the minor by pur-
chase, it was not essential that it make
an effort to acquire by purchase the
interest of the adult owner, Lydia Koch,
since the acquiring of her interest by
purchase would not have prevented
condemnation proceedings.

Defendants’ final contention is that
plaintiff was without authority to con-
demn a temporary easement over their
land. No authority is cited to sustain
this contention. We think such proceed-
ing is authorized by 69 O.S. 1951 §658.
The court ruled correctly in overruling
defendants’ motion to vacate the award.

Judgment affirmed,

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, WILLIAMS, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., concur.

HOBART v. PATRICK et al.
No, 35581. March 31, 1953.

Rehearing Denied June 2, 1953.
257 P. 2d 825.

Moseley & Raynolds and Robert W.
Raynolds, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Cc. J. Davenport and T. L. Blake-
more, Sapulpa, for defendants in error.

ARNOLD, J. This is an action by
Fred L. Patrick and L. W. McEwen
against Ethel F. Brock and P. M. Ho-
bart et al. to quiet title to 5/64ths of
the mineral interests in each of plain-
tiffs in and under the southeast quarter
of section 8, township 17 north, range
10 east, in Creek county.

Mrs, P. M. Hobart was the owner
of the fee-simple title to said quarter
section. On May 15, 1940, she gave a
deed to 3/8ths of the mineral interest
therein to her husband, P. M. Hobart.
He in turn deeded 5/32nds interest in
the minerals to W. C. Brock, on May
16, 1940. On January 31, 1946, Ethel
F. Brock deeded said 5/32nds mineral
interest to L. W. McEwen, reciting in
the deed that she was the “widow of
W. C. Brock, deceased, and sole bene-
ficiary of his estate.” In April, 1947,
McEwen conveyed the interest to R. H.
Lovett. On December 2, 1949, Lovett
conveyed the interest’to F. L. Patrick,
who, on January 18, 1950, reconveyed to
McEwen one-half of the 5/32nds interest
(it never being intended that Patrick
should have more than one-half of the
interest of McEwen).

Hobart admits that Ethel Brock is
the widow of his grantee, W. C. Brock,
but pleads and contends that his deed
to Brock in 1940 was not intended as an
outright conveyance but was made as
a part of a written transaction be-
tween him and Brock under the pro-
visions of which Brock assigned the
working interest of a certain lease in
Illinois (which he never did) and gave
a bill of sale to the equipment on said
lease to Hobart, and Hobart assigned
to Brock a half interest in the lease on
the northwest quarter of the southeast

561

quarter of section 8, township 17 north,
range 10 east, Creek county (the record
does not disclose whether this was done
or not), and conveyed the 5/32nds min-
eral interest here in question to Brock
“as additional security”, with the fur-
ther provision that Hobart was to drill
a well on the northwest quarter of the
southwest quarter of said section, and
if said well were not a commercial well
he would return to Brock $4,100 in cash
and if the well were a commercial
well Brock would reassign the 5/32nds
mineral interest here in question to
Hobart.

As to Patrick, Hobart contends that
Patrick knew or should have known of
his claim of title.

The court refused introduction of tes-
timony offered by Hobart consisting of
the written contract and correspond-
ence between Brock and Mrs. Hobart
concerning the transaction, ds well as
various assignments showing that the
Illinois lease referred to in the written
contract had been transferred to an-
other party. The letter from Brock to
Mrs. Hobart told her that he would
send Hobart the assignment of the min-
eral interest if Hobart would return to
him what he had received in further-
ance of the provisions of the contract.
The court refused this evidence upon
the objection of Mrs. Brock upon the
theory that Hobart was an incompetent
witness under 12 O.S. 1951 §384, com-
monly known as the “Dead Man” stat-
ute,

The court fund that Patrick was an
innocent purchaser, and entered judg-
ment quieting title in 5/64ths of the
minerals under said land in him and
found that McEwen, was not an inno-
cent purchaser and quieted title in
5/64ths of the minerals in defendant
and cross-petitioner Mrs. Ethel Brock.

McEwen did not appeal from the
judgment against him quieting title in
Mrs. Brock in the 5/64ths interest
claimed by him. Mrs. Brock did not
cross-appeal from the judgment quiet-
ing title in 5/64ths of the mineral in-

562

terest in Patrick. Hobart appeals com-
plaining only of the judgment in favor
of Mrs. Brock and F. L. Patrick. As to
the judgment in favor of Patrick he
complains that the evidence is not suf-
ficient to sustain the holding of the
court that Patrick was an innocent pur-
chaser. As to Brock he claims preju-
dicial error in excluding his proffered
testimony as to the written contract or
transaction between him and Brock.

The testimony on behalf of Patrick
generally is that McEwen offered to sell
him one-half of the 5/32nds mineral in-
terest in the tract of land involved;
that he checked the title and the land;
that he found the deeds on record as
hereinbefore set forth; that he looked
at the land which was located between
two farms which he owned and observed
a small stripper well in operation
thereon; that he checked with the op-
erator of the well and learned it was
making only two barrels, but that the
operator contemplated drilling another
well within the near future; that upon
the return of McEwen they agreed upon
a price and McEwen procured a deed
from Lovett to Patrick, as instructed,
which he delivered to Patrick and re-
ceived therefor the balance of the pur-
chase price agreed upon, and Patrick
filed the deed of record; that very
shortly ‘thereafter Patrick gave back
to McEwen a deed to the 5/64ths of the
mineral interest to correct the inadver-
tent mistake made by McEwen in giv-
ing him a deed for the full 5/32nds in-
terest; that he never heard of any
claim asserted by Hobart or Mrs. Brock
until after his deal with McEwen was
entirely closed; that he knew of
Brock’s deed and knew there was no
transfer from him to Mrs. Brock of rec-
ord, but that he knew from the recita-
tion in the deed from Mrs. Brock to
McEwen that she claimed to be the
widow and sole beneficiary of W. C.
Brock, deceased.

Hobart offered no evidence of any
kind which would show that Patrick
had any knowledge of Hobart’s claim,
nor did he offer any evidence which

would show that Patrick knew of the
written contract between him and
Brock. However, he argues that be-
cause (1) there was no conveyance of
record from W. C. Brock to Ethel Brock,
which was an obvious defect in title,
(2) there was a special clause in the
quitclaim deed from Ethel Brock to
McEwen purporting to convey only such
interest as vested in her as beneficiary
of the estate of W. C. Brock, deceased,
(3) there was a producing well on the
property, and (4) that when Patrick
checked the record he found that both
Hobart and Mrs. Brock executed a
lease to Skelly, he knew or should have
known that somebody other than Mrs.
Brock claimed an interest and all of
these facts were sufficient to put a
reasonably prudent person on notice
that there was an adverse claim to the
mineral interest. Incidentally, he ar-
gues that Patrick failed to check pos-
sible suspended royalties and the lease
to Gulf which he says if followed up
would have disclosed the claim of Ho-
bart.

In answer, Patrick says he is a prac-
ticing attorney and, of course, knew
that he would have to quiet title to the
mineral interest because of the lack
of record of probate proceedings which
would vest the record title of W. C.
Brock in Mrs. Brock, but that made no
difference to him because he knew that
Mrs. Brock, as widow of W. C. Brock,
was at least a forced heir under Okla~
homa law and had sufficient title, with
or without probate proceedings, which
she could convey and upon which he
could base quiet title proceedings; that
he did not buy the mineral interest be-
cause of the small stripper well, for
that was not producing in commercial
quantities and was practically worth-
less, but the prospect of future wells to
be drilled did make it of value as an
investment; that he made no inquiry as
to whether the runs were being paid or
to whom they were being paid because
he knew he would get only the runs
from the date of his deed, anyway,
and therefore he had no interest in the
runs up to the date of his deed; that if

the oil company would pay the runs
without a quiet title action that would
be well and good, but if they refused
because of the lack of probate proceed-
ings he could easily quiet the title, and
he knew Brock had been dead long
enough that he could bring such action
in district court and have Brock’s heirs
determined there without the necessity
of having ancillary probate proceed-
ings. He testified he had no knowledge
of any claim being asserted by Hobart
or Brock until after he closed the deal
with McEwen, when he asked Gulf Oil
Corporation, the company buying the
oil from the property, to prepare a divi-
sion order for him to sign; that when
he learned there were other claims he
brought this action to quiet title, mak-
ing party defendant thereto everyone
that he could find out was asserting
any claim of any nature.

The holding of the court that Patrick
was an innocent purchaser is not clear-
ly against the weight of the evidence.

Further, as to Brock, Hobart’s oral
testimony was that the deal between
him and Brock was never carried out;
that Brock transferred the Illinois lease
to another person; the offered contract
between him and Brock is as follows:

“This Agreement entered into this
18th day of May, 1940, by and between
W. C. Brock, party of the first part,
and P. M. Hobart, party of the second
part.

“Witnesseth: The party of the first
part hereby agrees to deliver by as-
signment the 13/16 working interest in
and to a certain oil and gas lease dated
5/16/38—11/22/38 by and between C.
M. Peiffer & E. L. Martin and also to
furnish the bill of sale to the party of
the second part for the entire equip-
ment on the said lease;

“For and in consideration of the
above mentioned the second party
agrees to deliver to the party of the first
part an undivided half interest in and to
a certain oil and gas lease executed the
15th day of May, 1940, by Virginia Ho-
bart to P. M. Hobart on the NW 4 of
the SE4 of Section 8, Township 17

563

North, Range 10 East, containing 40
acres more or less, and also agrees to
convey by deed the 5/32 of the royalty
under the SE4 of Section 8, Township
17 North, Range 10 East, Creek County,
Oklahoma, as additional security, and
further agrees that in the event that a
well which is to be drilled on the NW4
of the SW4 by the party of the second
part is not a commercial well to return
to the party of the first part the sum
of $4100 Dollars ($4100.00) in cash; the
same sum to be paid after it has been
determined whether or not the said
well will make a commercial well at a
depth of thirty-one hundred feet (3100)
or the Wilcox sand, he at his option
can take a well at whatever depth he
may find a commercial producer above
the depth of thirty-one hundred feet
3100).

“In the event that a commercial well
is made upon this above mentioned
forty (40) acres, it is agreed by the
party of the first part that he will as-
sign back to the party of the second
part the 5/32 royalty under the SE4 of
Section 8, Township 17 North, Range
10 East.

“In Witness Whereof, said parties
have hereunto set their hands the day
and date first above written.

“W. C. Brock, Party of the
First Part

“P. M. Hobart, Party of the
Second Part.”

On the basis of the foregoing prof-
fered testimony, he contends that if the
contract between him and Brock had
been admitted in evidence his evidence
would therefore have conclusively es-
tablished that the title to the 5/32nds
mineral interest was in Brock as trustee.
Apparently, in this connection, how-
ever, he forgets that Brock at the in-
ception of the deal between him and
Hobart had given Hobart a bill of sale
to all the personal property on the
Illinois lease. Nobody contends that the
terms of the written agreement be-
tween Brock and Hobart were com-
plied with fully by either side and re-
scission has been sought by neither
Brock nor Hobart. If the contract be-
tween Brock and Hobart had been re-

564

ceived in evidence, Hobart in order to
require the return of the 5/32nds min-
eral interest would have to rescind,
returning under the statute everything
of value which he received from Brock.
15 O.S. 1951 §235: See, also, Davis v.
Godwin-Barclay Co., 120 Okla. 274, 251
P. 1042. This did not occur, so even in
the face of the uncompleted contract
between Brock and Hobart, Mrs. Brock
would be entitled to have the title
to the 5/64ths mineral interest quieted
in her, it being established that she
was the sole beneficiary of her de-
ceased husband. The error of the court
in excluding the offered written trans-
action between Brock and Hobart, if it
‘were error, was harmless.

Having come to this conclusion, it is
unnecessary to discuss the other con-
tentions made by Mrs. Brock that Ho-
bart was barred by laches, that the
mineral interest conveyed was not given
as security, and that the proffered tes-
timony of Hobart was correctly ex-
cluded under 12 O.S. 1951 §384.

Affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, DAV-
ISON, O'NEAL, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

CARTER OIL CO. v. JOHNSTON.
No. 34394, April 14, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1953.
257 P. 2d 817.

Anglin, Stevenson & Huser, Holden-
ville, and Forrest M. Darrough, Rich-
ard P. Ryan, and Walter Davison,

Tulsa, and George T. Montgomery, Ok-
lahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Clem H. Stephenson, Wewoka, and
Homer H. Bishop, Seminole, for de-
fendant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. The parties here-
in occupied reverse relative positions
in the trial court and they will be
hereinafter designated as they appear-
ed in the trial court.

This is an appeal by defendant from
a judgment rendered against it for
$1,500 in plaintiff’s action for damages
for personal injuries allegedly result-
ing from tripping upon and falling over
a pipe line owned by defendant on
premises it occupied under an oil and
gas lease.

Plaintiff alleged, in substance, that
during the year 1946 she had a sur-
face lease on the northwest quarter of
section 23, township 10 north, range 6
east, upon which she and her husband
kept their milch cows; that the defend-
ant owned and operated an oil and gas
lease on said land; that a well defined
and constantly used footpath led from
her home south and passed on the east
side of defendant’s tanks; and that the
defendant maintained a salt water line
from its said tanks that ran across
the surface of the ground to the east
line of said premises and which line
crossed the said footpath at said point
passing through grass and vegetation
on July 4, 1946, which grass and vege-
tation were approximately 15 inches in
height and concealed the pipe line from
view; that the pipe line was approxi-
mately the same color as the vegeta-
tion and was located about four inches
above the surface of the ground and
constituted a dangerous and hazardous

565

obstruction which was liable to trip up
and cause people using said path to
fall.

That on July 4, 1946, plaintiff hurried
down said path to keep their stock from
being injured or poisoned from drink-
ing the salt water from a pool where
it had collected as it flowed across
the ground; that she did not know the
pipe line blocked the path; that in go-
ing down the path she was exercising
the ordinary care of a reasonably pru-
dent person but caught her toe under
said pipe line and was tripped by the
same and fell to the ground with great
force and sustained serious personal
injuries; that such injuries were caused
by the negligence of the defendant in
constructing and maintaining the pipe
line across a well-defined footpath above
the surface of the ground so as to con-
stitute a barrier and hazard to people
using said path; failure to warn travel-
ers on said path of the existence of
the dangerous hidden barrier across
said path; and failure of the defend-
ant to bury its pipe line across said
footpath. That said negligence was
the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injuries herein.

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays judg-
ment against the defendant for the sum
of $2,999,

Defendant’s answer denied each al-
legation contained in plaintiff's petition
except that it admitted that it was the
owner and operator of the leasehold
and premises in question. Defendant
alleged that if the plaintiff was in-
jured as alleged, the same was the re-
sult of her own negligence and want
of reasonable care for her own safety
and that her acts and conduct contrib-
uted to and caused such injuries, if
such were sustained.

The defendant further alleged that
the alleged footpath in question was
not a footpath, but was a part of a
road crossing the land and that said
road was traveled by automobiles and
trucks daily by persons engaged in the
operation of said oil and gas lease.

566

That by reason of such constant use
of said road, and the area surrounding
it, it was at all times mentioned in
plaintiff's petition free of any substan-
tial amount of vegetation with none at
all growing in the path. That defend~
ant’s salt water line crosses said road.
at a point south of the plaintiff's house
where it is practically barreri of vege-
tation and said line is approximately
two-thirds buried and offers no obstruc-
tion whatsoever to people using said
road; that it has been in place across
said road for many years and its ex-
istence and location was well known
to the plaintiff and was plainly visible
and that if the plaintiff did trip and
fall and sustain injuries as alleged, that
it was by reason of her failure to keep
proper lookout; that she could have
avoided the same had she exercised the
degree of care that an ordinarily pru-
dent person would have exercised un~
der the circumstances, That said ac-
cident and injuries, if any were sus-
tained, were not due to or caused by
any condition existing as a result of
any prior act of the defendant.

The defendant prayed that plaintiff
take nothing and that it have its costs
expended.

Upon the issues thus formed the
cause was tried to a jury. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of plain-
tiff, which verdict was approved by the
trial court and judgment rendered
thereon. Defendant’s motion for a new
trial was overruled and the defendant
appeals and presents five assignments
of error, or contentions.

It is first contended that plaintiffs
evidence was insufficient to show that
the pipe line on which she tripped and
fell was a hidden dangerous and haz-
ardous obstruction to those using the
path, and that the court erred in over-
ruling its demurrer to plaintiffs evi-
dence.

In reviewing trial court’s action on
demurrer, we are constrained to apply
the following rules: First, that on de-
murrer to evidence, that of the party

against whom demurrer is sought
should be given full credence and con-
sidered in the most favorable light,
Oklahoma Hospital v. Brown, 87 Okla.
46, 208 P. 785, and second, before a
demurrer to evidence can be sustained,
the court must be able to say that, ad-
mitting every fact favorable to plain-
tiff and every inference therefrom, still
plaintiff has failed to make out a prima
facie case, Sartain v. Walker, 60 Okla.
258, 159 P. 1096. In other words, this
court, in reviewing a ruling on a de-
murrer to the evidence, must treat
plaintiff's evidence as true. Annear v.
Swartz, 46 Okla. 98, 148 P. 706, L.R.A.
1915E, 267, and when so considered, if
reasonable minds may differ as to
plaintiffs right to recover, an order
overruling a demurrer to the evidence
will be sustained. Anthony v. Bliss,
39 Okla. 237, 134 P. 1122.

Defendant asserts that the accident
occurred at 3 o'clock in the afternoon
when there was adequate light to en-
able any person using ordinary care
to have seen the pipe line across the
path and avoid tripping over it and in-
juring themselves.

The substance of the testimony of
the plaintiff, Vivian Johnston, germane
to this contention, is that she and her
husband had purchased an agricultural
leasehold from another lessee and had
taken charge of the farm about a month
before the accident. A small part of
the acreage was farmed and the rest
was pasture. A path led from the
farmhouse to the pasture which was
south of the house. This path passed on
the east side of oil tanks belonging to
the defendant and admittedly located
on its oil and gas lease. The defend-
ant had two salt water pipe lines across
this path. Plaintiff started down this
path to drive the family milch cows
away from the salt water and tripped
and fell on the pipe line that defendant
had raised about 6 inches above the
ground at the place where it crossed
the path by placing a box under the
end of the pipe to keep it full of water
to prevent corrosion in the pipe; that she

sustained serious personal bodily in-
juries from the fall; that she did not
know the pipes crossed the path; that
the pipes were concealed from her view
by grass and rag weeds; that the weeds,
grass, ground and pipes were almost
the same color and invisible; that this
was the first time she had traveled this
path; that she did not know the pipe
was across the path; that she had seen
the pipe since the accident when the
box was removed and that the pipe
was flush down on the ground.

The evidence of Sherman Johnston,
her husband, and Jim Andrews, her
father, was substantially the same as
plaintiff's as to the condition of the
pipes, the invisibility thereof and its
dangerous condition.

The defendant, by oral and pictorial
evidence, sought to contradict plain-
tiff’s evidence and to show that there
was no hidden dangerous condition ex-
isting on its premises and to sustain its
contention relies upon the law as found
in 45 C.J. 837, Negligence, §244 (6);
City of Tulsa v. Harman, 148 Okla.
117, 299 P. 462; City of Drumright v.
Moore, 197 Okla. 306, 170 P. 2d 230,
and Hull v. O. C. Baseball Co., 196
Okla. 40, 163 P. 24982. These citations
are authority for the rule that in the
absence of a hidden dangerous ob-
struction there is no liability for per-
sonal injuries to an invitee, as the dan-
ger, if any, is of such nature as must
or should have been observed in the
exercise of ordinary care. Under the
issue of fact herein, upon which the evi-
dence is in conflict, we are concerned
about the rule that the owner or occu-
pant of property must exercise reason-
able care to protect persons rightfully
upen his (its) premises from traps,
pitfalls, or hidden danger. 65 C.J.S.,
Negligence, §83, p. 591.

Whether there was a hidden danger-
ous condition existing on defendant’s
premises was a question of fact, upon
which the evidence was in conflict,
and was, therefore, a question of fact
for the jury to decide. Southern Kan-

567

sas Greyhound Lines, Inc., v. Hicks,
184 Okla. 581, 89 P. 2d 278, and cases
cited therein. Likewise, whether there
is negligence is always a jury question,
if reasonable men may differ as to
facts or inferences to be drawn there-
from. Id. Applying these rules to the
facts herein, we conclude that the rec-
ord does not sustain defendant’s first
contention.

Defendant next contends that plain-
tiff’s evidence was insufficient to show
that it was defendant’s legal duty to
maintain its pipe line across the path
in such manner so as to make the same
a safe place for plaintiff, a concurrent
possessor of the premises, to walk.

The evidence showed that the plain-
tiff and defendant were in concurrent
possession of the premises and that
defendant occupied the premises where
the accident allegedly occurred by vir-
tue of its oil and gas leases, which were
introduced in evidence. The leases con-
tained the usual provisions that the
lessee was not required to bury its
pipe lines unless requested and admit-
tedly no such request was made.

Defendant showed that it was the
usual custom and practice of oil com-
panies in that area not to bury salt
water pipe lines running over pasture
land, and that the method in which it
handled the salt water on these prem-
ises was the usual and customary man-
ner used by oil companies in the Sem-
inole area.

To sustain this’ contention it cites
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co.
v. Dunivant, 183 Okla. 233, 80 P. 2d
225, and Giller v. Hollyfield, 176 Ark.
861, 4S. W. 2d 526.

These cases define the rights of each
concurrent possessor as to the use of
the premises for the development or
attainment of their separate objectives.
We find nothing in them which would
constitute a rule of law justifying one
concurrent possessor as against another
concurrent possessor in erecting and
maintaining a. hidden dangerous ob-

568

struction across a pathway or roadway
on the premises which such other pos-
sessor could rightfully use. We think
that defendant in the conduct of its oil
field or mining operations should con-
form to the duties imposed upon it by
law, one of which was to exercise rea-
sonable care to protect persons right-
fully upon its premises from traps, pit-
falls, or hidden dangers. 65 C.J.S. 591,
§83, supra; 36 Am. Jur., Mines and
Minerals, §176, p. 401. The evidence
was sufficient, if believed by the jury,
to justify their finding that defendant
did erect and maintain the hidden dan-
gerous condition across the pathway.

Defendant’s third contention is that
the court’s instructions to the jury set
forth what purported to be the sub-
_stance of plaintiff’s petition and defend-
ant’s answer, but which, in fact, con-
sisted mostly of quotations from the
pleading; that virtually all of the peti-
tion and answer was set forth in the
exact language or language very simi-
lar to that used by plaintiff and de-
fendant; that there was no substantial
difference between this part of the in-
structions and the pleadings; that de-
fendant objected to this manner of in-
structing the jury, which objection was
overruled with exceptions.

An examination of the outline of the
issues involved in the action preceding
the numbered general instructions dis-
closes language very similar to the
language used by the plaintiff in her
petition and the defendant in its an-
swer, but there were no quotes. We
think the pleadings were merely sum-
marized by the instructions and the
court’s instructions on the issues, to-
gether with the other instructions given,
sufficiently applied the law to the par-
ticular issues of fact which the jury
was required to decide and, therefore,
no prejudice resulted.

The court’s action was justified un-
der the rule as stated in Klein v. Muhl-
hausen, 83 Okla. 21, 200 P. 436. There-

in, under a very similar fact situation, as
to a summary of the pleadings, it was

held that a summary of the pleadings
was permissible. In the first paragraph
of the syllabus, we said:

“It is the correct practice generally to
state the issues of the case as made by
the pleadings to the jury; and it is not
error to properly summarize in the in-
structions the allegations contained in
the pleadings.”

Defendant next contends that the
numbered instructions were mere ab-
stract rules of law and did not define
the issues in the case; that the in-
structions were misleading, and that
the court erroneously refused to give
its requested instructions Nos. 1 and
7, which it contends correctly set forth
the rights and duties of an oil and gas
lessee; and its requested instructions
Nos. 4 and 6, which correctly defined
negligence as applied to the defendant.

The only objections of defendant to
the instructions were to the statement
of the issues, which question we have
already negatively concluded, and in-
structions Nos. 11 and 12. These in-
structions provided:

“11. You are instructed that the de-
fendant, as the owner and operator of
oil wells on said leasehold has the right
to lay and maintain pipelines thereon
for the purpose of disposing of salt wa-
ter and other waste products and in
doing so it is the duty of such owner
and operator to use ordinary care in
laying and maintaining said pipelines
so as to avoid injuries to others using
and occupying said premises; and in
this connection, you are instructed that
if you find and believe from the evi-
dence that the defendant did use ordi-
nary care in laying and maintaining
said pipelines in question and was not
guilty of negligence which proximately
caused the injuries, if any, alleged by
the plaintiff, then and in that event you
should find for the defendant and so
say by your verdict.

“12. Now, bearing in mind the above
and foregoing definitions and instruc-
tions and carefully applying them to
the evidence in this case, if you find
and believe from a fair preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant was

negligent in installing and maintaining
the pipe lines as alleged in the plain-
tiffs’ petition and that the plaintiff while
proceeding down said path tripped and
fell over and upon said pipelines sus-
taining injuries, as alleged in her peti-
tion, and that such negligence, if any,
on the part of the defendant was the
direct and proximate cause of the in-
juries sustained by the plaintiff, then
and in that event, you should find for
the plaintiff and fix the amount of her
recovery in such amount as in your
good judgment will reasonably compen-
sate her for such injuries as you may
find that she received, not to exceed,
however, the sum of $2,999.00, the
amount sued for.

“And, in this connection, you are in-
structed that you shall take into con-
sideration the nature and extent of her
injuries and whether they be temporary
or permanent, and the pain and suffer-
ing which you may find that she has
endured by reason of such injuries and
disability, if any, caused by said in-
juries together with all the other evi-
dence in the case.

“If you do not so find and believe
from a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence then it will be your duty to
return a verdict for the defendant.”

Instructions 11 and 12, when con-
sidered in connection with all the other
instructions given by the court, fairly
stated the issues and the law involved
in the cause, and this being so, the
court’s action in overruling defendant’s
objections thereto was not error.

The refusal to give defendant’s re-
quested instruction was not error. In
Landree v. City of Mangum, 196 Okla.
281, 164 P. 2d 630, we said:

“Where a court instructs the jury
clearly, fairly, fully and correctly upon
the issue of a case, it is not error to
refuse to give a requested instructiorf
covering the same issue.”

Defendant, however, discusses at
length the court’s instructions 1 to 10
and 13 to 15, but since no objections
or exceptions were made to these in-
structions, we must, in the absence of
fundamental error, apply the rule that

569

either party to a suit must save proper
exceptions to each instruction of the
court to which he objects, or the ob-
jection is waived. Watson v. Doss, 151
Okla. 132, 3 P. 2d 159. Finding no
fundamental errors, the judgment is
affirmed.

WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, ARNOLD,
O'NEAL, WILLIAMS, and BLACK~
BIRD, JJ., concur. HALLEY, C.J., dis-
sents.

HALLEY, C.J. (dissenting). The de-
fendant, as the owner and operator of
the oil and gas lease, had the right to
use ordinary methods for producing oil
from the property. No effort was made
to show that methods used were not
reasonable and proper. This lease had
been producing for more than twelve
years at the time of plaintiff’s alleged
injury. She had been on the premises
about a month, .

The evidence here wholly fails to
show a trap or pitfall and defendant
was under no duty to warn of hidden
perils. Dunn v. Bomberger, 213 N.C.
172, 195 S. E. 364; 65 C.J.S. Negligence,
§38. The existence and maintenance of
a pipe line to drain off salt water is
normal procedure in the production of
oil and gas and warnings of its exist-
ence do not have to be given to a li-
censee.

The exact type of lease that her
husband had on the land is not clearly
revealed, but it was undoubtedly an
oral lease for the surface and was
subject to the rights of the defendant
under its oil and gas lease.

The plaintiff was nothing more than a
licensee in so far as defendant is con-
cerned and she took the premises as
she found them when she entered there-
on. 65 C.J.S. Negligence, §35.

In the case of Platt v. Bender (La.
App.) 178 So. 678, it was held that oil
and gas lessees were not liable for the
death of a part owner of surface rights
sustained in an explosion occurring
while such owner was watching the

570

operation of a potential oil well. Where
the part owner of the surface was pres-
ent as a licensee on the leased prem-
ises, such owner took the premises
as he found them and the lessees owed
him no duty of care other than not to
wantonly or intentionally injure him.
There was no allegation or proof of
wanton or intentional wrong in the
case here. The defendant would not be
liable to the surface owner under the
facts in this case and by the same
token it is not liable to the wife of the
surface lessee. The demurrer to the
evidence should have been sustained.
I dissent.

GRIM et ux. v. CHEATWOOD et al.
No. 85178. April 21, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 9, 1953.

257 P. 2d 1049.

J. Scott Vincent, Cheyenne, and Dud-
ley, Duvall & Dudley, Oklahoma City,
for plaintiffs in error.

A. K. Little and L, D. Hoyt, Okla-
homa City, for defendants in error.

HALLEY, C. J. Plaintiffs in their
amended petition allege that on and
prior to August 14, 1945, the plaintiffs
were cotenants and joint owners equal-
ly in an undivided one-half interest in
all of the mineral rights in and under
a tract of land referred to as tract No.
1, located in the NW/4 of section 32,
township 13 north, range 23 west, in
Roger Mills county, Oklahoma; that
plaintiff Orval Grim was the individual
owner of mineral rights in a certain
tract of land referred to as tract No. 2,
located and situated in the NW/4 of
section 23, township 15 north, range 21
west, in Roger Mills county, Oklahoma.

That on or about the 12th day of Au-
gust, 1945, defendant Vernie Cheatwood
connived, enticed and induced plain-
tiff Orval Grim to become engaged in a
poker game and with the collusion and
collaboration of two of his cohorts, with
the use of marked cards, defrauded
said plaintiff out of checks totaling the
sum of $1,000. That plaintiff Orval
Grim, believing that the poker game
was honest and on the square, exe-
cuted and delivered to defendant Ver-
nie Cheatwood certain mineral deeds
in return for such checks.

Plaintiff Gladys Grim did not sign
either deed. On or about the Ist day
of November, 1949, plaintiff Orval Grim
discovered that the poker game re-
ferred to was instituted through conni-
vance, collusion, and a fraudulent plan
of defendant Vernie Cheatwood and
his cohorts for the purpose of defraud-
ing him out of his money.

Upon discovery of the fraud plain-
tiffs brought this action to set aside
and cancel the mineral deeds, and pray
that such deeds be set aside and can-
celed and title quieted in them in and
to the minerals.

Defendants Cheatwood demurred to
the amended petition on the ground
that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The trial
court sustained the demurrer as to
plaintiff Orval Grim but overruled it as
to plaintiff Gladys Grim. Plaintiffs ap-
peal and assert that the court erred as
a matter of law in sustaining the de-
murrer to the petition as against plain-
tiff Orval Grim.

It is the contention of defendants that
plaintiffs’ cause of action is based on
a gambling transaction, a transaction
forbidden by law and made a crime
by statute, and that in such case nei-
ther a court of law nor one of equity
will grant relief to either party to en-
force any rights growing out of such
transaction, but will leave the parties
where it found them, and that the trial
court therefore ruled correctly in sus-
taining their demurrer to the petition
as against plaintiff Orval Grim.

This, as a general rule, is a correct
statement of the law. Freeman v.
Wright, 204 Okla. 497, 231 P. 2d 675;
Smithson v. Love, 132 Okla. 214, 270
P. 23; Brinley v. Williams, 189 Okla.
183, 114 P. 2d 463.

Plaintiffs concede the general rule to
be as contended by defendants. It is
their contention, however, that there is
a well-established exception to the rule
to the effect that where fraud is prac-
ticed by the winner in order to obtain

571

his winnings (as is pleaded by them in
their petition), equity will not permit
such a party to benefit by his fraud and
will grant relief to the one less guilty.

We think there is merit to this con-
tention. In 24 Am. Jur., Gaming, §80,
p. 456, it is said:

“Some courts, while denying that
money fairly lost at play at a for-
bidden game cannot be recovered back
in an aciton, hold that money won by
cheating at any kind of game, whether
allowed or forbidden, and paid by the
loser without a knowledge of the fraud
may be recovered, the view being taken
that a wager won by such undue means
is not won in the eyes of the law, and
therefore, the money is paid without
consideration and by mistake.”

In Lockman v. Cobb, 77 Ark. 279, 91
S.W. 546, the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas said:

“Where plaintiff was induced to put
up large sums of money as a bet on
a foot race, it being represented to
him that one of the racers was certain
to win, but in fact there was no bora
fide race, but in a pretended race the
other party won, the plaintiff was en- -
titled to recovery the amount lost.”

In that case the court said:

“In what wrong or crime were the
plaintiff and the defendants in pari de-
licto? If any, it was a conspiracy by
the defendants to defraud the plain-
tiff and to steal his money; to obtain
by deceit and falsehood the money of
plaintiff by inducing him to believe
that a foot race was to be run and
that they were actually wagering their
money, one against the other, upon it;
and to induce him to believe he was
betting upon a foot race. *** But the
race was never run. Two men ran, but
according to a previous understand-
ing the one upon whom he staked his
money fell down, and the other passed
out ahead and was declared the
winner. *** By fraud and deceit they
caused him to make a pretended wa-
ger and robbed him of his money, pre-
tending that he had lost it *** and he
was not in pari delicto with the de-
fendants.”

572

‘The same conclusion has been reached
under a similar state of facts in Hobbs
v. Boatwright, 195 Mo. 693, 93 S.W. 934,
and by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
8th Circuit, in Stewart v. Wright, 147
F. 321. In Webb. v. Fulchire, 25 N.C.
485, 40 Am. Dec. 419, the court held:

“Money won by cheating at any kind
of game, whether allowed or forbid-
den, or by means of jugglery, and paid
by the loser without knowledge of the
fraud, may be recovered back.”

The case of Falkenberg v. Allen, 18
Okla. 210, 90 P. 415, cited by defend-
ants, does not sustain their position
because there the man that was being
duped demanded his money back be-
fore the foot race and it was refused
and the opinion held that he was en-
titled to recover the money. That case
quoted with approval a statement con-
tained in Hobbs v. Boatwright, supra,
which is applicable here, and is as fol-
lows:

“The doctrine that courts will not
aid a plaintiff who is in pari delicto
with the defendant is not a rule of uni-
versal application; it is based on the
principle that to give the plaintiff re-
lief in such case would contravene pub-
lic morals and impair the good of so~
ciety. Therefore the rule should not be
applied in a case in which to withhold
the relief would, to a greater extent, of-
fend public morals. To promote the
good of the public is the highest aim
of the court in the application of this
doctrine.”

Plaintiff Orval Grim, under the alle-
gations in plaintiffs’ petition did not
voluntarily enter into a real and honest
poker game with defendant Vernie
Cheatwood and his confederates and
lose his money in such a game. He
was induced to enter into a fixed and
pretended poker game for the purpose
of cheating and robbing him of his
money by the use of marked cards.
Plaintiff had no knowledge of said con-
spiracy and fraud at the time he en-
tered the game. Upon discovery of the
fraud plaintiffs brought this action to
set aside the deeds. Under such state

of facts he was not in pari delicto with
defendant Vernie Cheatwood and his
confederates. Lockman v. Cobb, supra.

Plaintiffs’ action is not an action to
recover losses sustained in a gambling
game. Their action is one in equity
to cancel and set aside mineral deeds
because of fraud in their procurement
and lack of consideration for their
execution, and since under the plead-
ings the parties were not in pari delic-
to, plaintiffs may maintain this action
although it will be necessary for them
to plead and prove the gambling trans-
action in order to establish fraud and
Jack of consideration.

Where the parties are not in pari
delicto, equity will intervene in the pro-
tection of one less guilty, notwithstand-
ing his unclean hands. Coleman v.
Coleman, 48 Ariz. 337, 61 P. 2d 441;
Vol. 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jur. 738, §942.

While there are some authorities to
the contrary, we think the better rule
and weight of authority support the
conclusion reached.

Plaintiffs’ petition stated:a cause of
action, and the trial court erred in
sustaining the demurrer thereto as
against plaintiff Orval Grim.

Plaintiffs’ right to recovery will, of
course, depend upon the evidence.

Reversed, with directions to overrule
the demurrer and for further proceed-
ings in accordance with the views here-
in expressed.

WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, and WIL-
LIAMS, JJ., concur. JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and DAVISON and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
dissent.

DAVISON, J. (dissenting). I am un-
able to agree with the majority opin-
ion. There can be no question that the
plaintiff in error voluntarily entered
the card game for the purpose of win-
ning money from his opponents.

Where the parties voluntarily engage
in a gambling game, which is prohib-

ited by law, neither courts of law nor
of equity, in the absence of a statute
authorizing a recovery of gambling
losses, should aid or assist either party
to enforce rights growing out of the
illegal transaction. Courts should not
become the arbiters of incidental acts
of participants in gambling games
which are prohibited by law. Public pol-
icy prompts the courts to decline to
distinguish between degrees of turpi-
tude of parties who engage in outlawed
transactions, since otherwise courts
might be compelled to decide which
party cheated the most.

In the case at bar, plaintiff actually
went through with the gambling game
and lost his money for which he exe-
cuted checks. Then, in exchange for
the checks, he executed the convey-
ances. The most nearly analogous case
in the reports is that of Wallace v.
Opinham, 73 Cal. A. 2d 25, 165 P. 2d
709, wherein,

«# * * The plaintiff and defendant
voluntarily engaged in that unlawful
game, in the course of which plaintiff
lost the money he now seeks to recover
by this suit. The second count of the
complaint is necessarily founded on
plaintiff’s participation in that unlaw-
ful and prohibited game. He could not
prove the alleged fraud and deceit, by
means of which he lost his bets, with-
out evidence showing that the fraud
was exercised incident to his partici-
pation in that game of cards which is
prohibited by statute. * * *.

The court, in that case, used the fol-
lowing language, particularly applica-
ble here:

«# * * Where a party acts illegally,
he is to suffer the loss of his money
as the consequence, if the money is
sought to be recovered, except where
he may have a remedy under the par-
ticular provisions of some statute. Here
is a@ case of gaming accompanied with
cheating. Clearly if the gaming had
been fair, the law would give no rem-
edy. The only question then is, whether
the fraud will alter the case. We think
it will not. If a man thus voluntarily
puts himself in a condition to be cheat-

573

ed, through his illegal act he cheats
the government, and the other person
cheats him, and they must be left to
settle the affair’ between themselves.

Faery)

In my opinion, public morals and
the good of society would be best served
by following the rule in the above-cited
case. The trial court felt that the
courts should not decide issues regard-
ing payment of gambling debts, since
none of the participants of the unlaw-
ful and illegal gambling game could
come into court with clean hands. I
am, therefore, of the opinion that the
trial court should have been upheld
in sustaining defendants’ demurrer to
the petition.

I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that Mr. Jus-
tice BLACKBIRD concurs, in the fore-
going views.

HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO. v. WADE.
No. 35608. May 19, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 9, 1953.

257 P. 2d 1064.

574

Rittenhouse, Hanson & Evans, Okla-
homa City, for plaintiff in error.

Robert J. Bell and Charles B. Tucker,
McAlester, for defendant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This is an appeal
from the district court of Haskell coun-
ty, Oklahoma, by Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Company, from a judgment against
it for $1,812.52, with interest at 6% per
annum from November 7, 1949, for loss
by fire of insured’s stock of merchandise
in Keota, Oklahoma.

Plaintiff, J. T. Wade, alleged that
his property at the time it was de-
stroyed by fire was insured by an in-
surance policy which had been issued
to Paul Finch while he was the sole
owner thereof; that subsequent to the
issuance of the policy and

« * * * on September 5, 1949, the said
Paul Finch, for a good and valuable
consideration, transferred, assigned and
sold to this plaintiff a one-half (1%)
undivided interest in the properties
above described, known as the Finch
Grocery, consisting of stock of mer-
chandise, fixtures, oleo license, cigar-
ette license and unearned insurance
with defendant company, whereby the
plaintiff became the owner of a one-
half (%) undivided interest therein;
that the said defendant, through its
duly authorized agent, servant and em-
ployee, to-wit: A. L. Price, was duly
notified of said transfer of interest as
evidenced by bill of sale, a true and
correct copy of which is attached here-
to as Exhibit B and made a part hereof,
the said A. L. Price then and there wit-

nessing said bill of sale; that the plain-
tiff relied upon the knowledge of said
defendant through its agent (the knowl-
edge of said agent being imputable to
the defendant, and relied upon the de-
fendant to reform said insurance policy,
if necessary (as was its duty to plain-
tiff) so as to protect and cover the in-
terest of this plaintiff; that by virtue of
the silence of said defendant, and the
knowledge of said defendant, as afore-
said, of said transaction, the said plain-
tiff was induced to refrain from doing
what he otherwise probably would have
done, to-wit: procuring a rider on said
policy of insurance showing his interest;
by virtue of which, in conjunction with
the other facts hereinafter pleaded, de-
fendant is estopped from claiming that
thereby said insurance policy was for-
feited in whole or in part.”

Exhibit B reads:
“Exhibit B.
“Keota, Okla.

“Bill of sale
“To whom it may concern

“This is to certify that I have this
5th day of September, 1949, sold to J. 'T.
Wade (14) one half interest in the Finch
grocery, consisting of stock of mer~
chandise $4252.80, fixtures, 3,132.05,
Oleo license $5.50, Cigarette license
$7.47 unearned insurance $74.76, mak-
ing a total of $7,472.58,

“The above is to be clear of debt
in every respect.

“/s/ Paul Finch

“Witness to signature

“/s/ A. L. Price
“/s/ Claude Cason”

that the insurance company represented.
to plaintiff after the fire that the com-
pany was only liable for the amount
that Paul Finch owned in the stock
of merchandise at the time of the fire,
or a one-half undivided interest; that
the plaintiff would not be recognized as
a part owner of the property and was
not covered by the policy; that the
company settled with Paul Finch and
refused and failed to settle with plain-
tiff, Plaintiff prayed judgment for his

loss of one-half interest in the stock of
merchandise and fixtures in the sum of
$1,812.52 with interest at 6%.

Defendant answered admitting all the
allegations of plaintiff except that the
transaction in which the plaintiff ac-
quired a half interest in the stock of
merchandise and fixtures was within
the knowledge of the defendant, Hart-
ford Insurance Company.

Upon the issues joined, the cause was
submitted to the jury. The jury returned
a verdict for plaintiff, and the trial
court rendered judgment thereon,

For reversal, defendant interposes
five assignments of error, the substance
of which are: That the court erred in
(1) overruling defendant’s demurrer to
the petition, (2) overruling defendant’s
demurrer to the evidence, (3) overrul-
ing defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict, (4) admitting incompetent, ir-
relevant and immaterial evidence over
the objections and exceptions of the de-
fendant, (5) giving instructions Nos. 2
and 3 over the objections and excep-
tions of defendant.

Plaintiff's evidence relied upon to es-
tablish his cause is outlined in his
brief as follows:

“Only two witnesses testified, to-wit,
plaintiff, Wade, and Claude Cason. De-
fendant has specifically admitted the
residence of plaintiff, the domestica-
tion of defendant, the fact that plaintiff
was the owner of a one-half interest in
the stock and fixtures known as Finch
Grocery; the payment of the premium
to agent, Price, the delivery of the
insurance to Paul Finch, the amount of
the insurance, and that the fire oc-
curred and the loss was adjusted and
paid as alleged. Therefore, the plain-
tiff, Wade, in addition to the pleaded
and admitted facts, testified that he
bought a one-half interest for cash on
invoice price; that the store was lo-
cated on the main street of the little
town of Keota, Oklahoma; that plain-
tiff had known defendant’s agent, Price,
since 1927 and Price had talked with
him about buying insurance on other
property. That on the morning, being

575

Sunday, when the inventory was being
made by six people, Mr. Price came
into the store a time or two and that
this was a town of about five hundred
people; that the following day the bill
of sale was written and witnessed by
agent Price; that plaintiff paid Finch
for a one-half of the unearned insur-
ance of $74.76. Plaintiff thereafter
worked in the store on Saturdays and
two or three times per week an hour
or two before closing time and that he
had never worked there before; that he
did not talk with Mr. Price about in-
surance as Paul Finch’s name was in
there and the store was run by Finch
and that he relied on Mr. Price. Plain-
tiff testified that the store burned; that
the insurance company did not recog~
nize his interest in the policy and that
he acted as Finch’s attorney in fact in
cashing the draft as Mr. Finch had left
the country. He just settled Finch’s
Joss.

“The other witness was Claude Ca~
son whose store was adjacent to Finch’s
Grocery being separated only by a wire
fence and the door between them was
never closed. Agent Price’s insurance
office was just across the street. Six
people made the inventory on Sunday
and agent Price was there at the time.
After the inventory was complete and
reduced to writing, and on the following
evening the bill of sale was executed.
Agent Price was there. At the time of
the execution of the bill of sale Mr.
Price was talking with Mr. Wade. That
witness Cason asked agent Price to act
as additional witness to the ‘bill of sale’.
He further testified, without objection,
that Keota is a town of four or five
hundred people and that it was a mat-
ter of general knowledge about Mr.
Wade having bought in. That Wade
had never worked there before but he
did afterwards. After the fire loss,
the question of the bill of sale came up
and Mr. Staton, the adjuster, was
there. When Mr. Staton heard about the
bill of sale he said that it would pro-
bably ‘complicate matters’. He said that
he would have to send it to the com-
pany.

“At the bottom part of page 8 of the
brief, in quoting testimony of Mr.
Finch, the quotations are actually from
depositions. We do not find where the
depositions were introduced in evidence

576

but do not think this is material. How-
ever, this testimony of Wade omits the
questions and answers shown at pages
35 to 37 of the case-made, which point
out that Wade, in participating in the
settlement, did so under the power of
attorney from Mr. Finch. In the same
capacity he endorsed the draft. It should
be noted that the draft is made to
Paul Finch and endorsed by Paul Finch
through Claude Cason and Terrill
Wade; attorneys in fact.”

Assuming without deciding that plain-
tiff’s petition was sufficient to with-
stand a demurrer, we are then con-
fronted with the action of the court in
overruling defendant’s demurrer to the
evidence.

The evidence wholly fails to establish
an implied contract, or right to refor-
mation of the insurance contract with
Finch so as to cover property owned by
Wade. The admitted fact that Price sub-
scribed his name as one of the witnesses
on a bill of sale which, if he had read,
would have disclosed that Wade had
purchased a half interest in a business
upon which the company he represented
as an agent had written an insurance
contract with the seller, Finch, prior
to the sale, was insufficient in law to
constitute a basis for the jury to con-
clude that Price, the agent, read and
understood the bill of sale, or that
Wade, the purchaser, was at that mo-
ment making an offer to purchase in-
surance, or that Wade, in the absence
of express rejection of the offer, would
deem the offer accepted and expect the
issuance of an insurance policy pay-
able to him. It was not shown from the
evidence that agent Price read or un-
derstood the contents of the bill of
sale, or that the purchaser, Wade, was
then making an offer to purchase in-
surance, or that Wade, in the absence
of express rejection of the offer, would
deem the offer accepted and would
expect the issuance of an insurance
policy payable to him.

The record discloses that more than
two months after agent Price signed
the bill of sale as a witness to the sig-

nature of the seller which transferred a
half interest in Finch’s grocery to Wade,
the store was destroyed by fire; that
the value of the store at the time of
the fire was $11,374.96; that defendant
paid Finch one-half that sum as his
insured interest in the property, which
left $1,812.52, the balance of the amount
of Finch’s policy; that neither Wade
nor Finch ever mentioned anything
about insurance on Wade’s interest in
the store to Price, the agent, either at
the time of the sale or after the sale
and transfer of the half interest in the
store to Wade, though his office was
just across the street (of the small
town) from the store.

The words and conduct of Wade and
Price cannot be construed either as an
oral agreement, or implied contract to
insure Wade’s interest in the property.

Nothing is disclosed in the record
of oral statements or conduct of Price,
the agent of defendant, to sustain plain-
tiffs contention of the existence of an
oral or implied application for insur-
ance, or the existence ofa contract for
insurance, either oral or implied. Title
15 O.S. 1951 §1 et seq. In discussing
what constitutes a contract of insur-
ance in Dorman v. Connecticut Fire
Ins. Co., 41 Okla. 509, 135 P. 262, we
said:

“A contract of insurance consists of
an agreement between the insured and
the insurer, including the following ele-
ments: (1) The subject-matter; (2)
the risk insured against; (3) the amount;
(4) the period of risk; and (5) the
premium; and there is no contract until
the minds of the parties meet in these
respects. 1 Briefs on the Law of Ins.,
by Cooley, 368, 392, 411, 513; 1 Law
of Ins. by Charles Beach, Jr., 507; 1
May on Ins. §§43-65; 1 Joyce on Ins.
§845-50; Kerr on Ins. §40, pp. 73-77;
Id. §53 p. 113; Shawnee Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. McClure, 39 Okla. 535, 135 P.
1150, and cases there cited.

«* * * An application for insurance is
not itself a contract, but is a mere
proposal, which requires acceptance by
the insurer through some one actually
or apparently authorized to accept the

same to give it effect as a contract.
1 Briefs on the Law of Ins., by Cooley,
413; 1 Joyce on Ins. §54; 1 May on Ins.
(8rd Ed.) §43H; Elliot on Ins. §106;
Kerr on Ins. §51-52; Richards on Ins.
(8rd Ed.) §282; Van Arsdale-Osborne
v. Young, 21 Okla. 151, 95 P. 778; Shaw-
nee Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McClure,
supra.”

Since obviously there is no oral con-
tract, the question of whether a con-
tract is to be implied from the above
admitted existing facts becomes a mat-
ter of law. 17 C.J.S. Contracts, §611, p.
1274; Mead Bros., Inc., v. State Indus-
trial Commission, 144 Okla. 279, 291 P.
571.

The parties each cite many gases
to sustain their contentions, but from
an examination of these cases, and our
independent search, we have been un-
able to find any insurance case which
does not involve in some manner a
written application for insurance, and
to that extent, this case, under the
facts, presents to this court a question
of first impression. However, other jur-
isdictions, K. C. Working Chemical Co.
v. Eureka, Sec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
82 C.A. 2d 120, 185 P. 2d 832; Boswell
v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 269, 29
S. E. 2d 71; Celina Mutual Cas. Co. v.
Baldridge, 213 Ind. 198, 10 N.E. 2d 904,
12 NE. 2d 258; American Casualty
Co. v. Ricas, 179 Md. 627, 22 A. 2d
484; Neuner v. Gove (Mo. App.) 138 S.
W. 2d 689; Bekken v. Equitable Life As-
sur. Soc. of U.S., 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W.
200, have applied the principles which
we think sustain our conclusions herein.
‘These cases emphasize the fact that be-
fore there can be an oral or implied
application for insurance, there must
have been an actual application or of-
fer to purchase insurance, an actual
acceptance of the offer and a complete
meeting of the minds of the insured and
the insurer. Proof of these essential
elements being absent in the instant
case, the court erred in overruling de-
fendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s
evidence. The cause is therefore re-
versed, with directions to vacate the
judgment, sustain the demurrer to

577

plaintiff's evidence, and dismiss the
action.

In view of what we have said, we
deem it unnecessary to discuss the other
alleged errors.

HALLEY, C.J., and CORN, O'NEAL,
WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., con-
cur. WELCH, J., dissents.

OKLAHOMA TURNPIKE AUTHORITY
v. WILLIAMS et ux.

No. 35556, May 26, 1953,”
Rehearing Denied June 9, 1953.

257 P. 2d 1052.

578

|

Leon Shipp and C. E. Barnes, Okla-
homa City, for plaintiffs in error.

P. D. Erwin. Chandler, for defendants
in error.

O'NEAL, J. The Oklahoma Turnpike
Authority under permissible statutes
started a condemnation proceeding in
the district court of Lincoln county,
Oklahoma, to appropriate 19.55 acres of
land out of an 80-acre tract owned by
Kirby O. and Margaret N. Williams.
Upon notice to defendants the judge of
the district court appointed appraiser to
view the land and assess the damages to
defendants for the land taken and con-
sequential damages to the remainder
of the defendants’ land. The commis-
sioners awarded defendants the sum of
$5,000 damages which plaintiff paid into
court for defendants’ benefit. Plaintiff,
feeling aggrieved as to the amount of
the award, appealed to the district court
for a jury trial. The jury awarded the
defendants damages in the sum of
$5,500, and from the denial of plaintiff's
motion for a new trial, the appeal is
taken. No contention is made by plain-
tiff that the verdict of the jury and the
judgment rendered thereon is excessive
nor sustained by competent evidence.

The first ground argued for a reversal
of the case is based upon plaintiffs
contention that one of the commis-
sioners appointed by the court to ap-
praise the value of the land appro-
priated was called as a witness by the
defendants and was permitted to testify
as to the amount of damages to the land

as disclosed by the commissioner’s re-
port. The record discloses that the wit-
ness, J. A. Patterson, as one of the ap-
praisers, had joined with his co-ap-
praisers in assessing defendants’ dam-
age at $5,000. When called by the de-
fendants as a witness he testified to
defendants’ damage in the sum of
$10,000. Defendants’ counsel in his direct
examination of the witness did not di-
rectly or obliquely refer to the fact that
the witness was one of the commis-
sioners, or to the return made by said
commissioners. Upon cross-examination
plaintiffs counsel then asked the wit-
ness: “I will ask you if in a former ap-
praisement that you made to this Court
you didn’t appraise the damage at
$5,000.00.” To which the witness replied
that he joined with the other commis-
sioners in making such a return. There-
upon counsel for plaintiff moved the
court for a mistrial on the ground that
defendants’ counsel on redirect exami-
nation asked the witness if he was work-
ing with the other appraisers that were
appointed as commissioners in this
case. We think the trial court properly
overruled plaintiff's motion for a mis-
trial.

In City of Tulsa v. Creekmore, 167
Okla. 298, 29 P. 2d 101, we sustained
the judgment, notwithstanding two of
the three commissioners who had ap-
praised the damages were permitted
to testify as to the value of the land
before and after the taking.

In Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. State ex rel.
Department of Highways, 205 Okla.
325, 237 P. 2d 878, we held that where
one invites or participates in the in-
jection of incompetent evidence, he will
not be heard to complain of such error.

Moreover, it cannot be successfully
contended that the testimony of J. A.
Patterson materially affected the re-
sult of the verdict. Seven witnesses
testified that the damages to the de-
fendants ranged from $2,400 to $12,000,
or a mean average of approximately
$5,500, which was the amount of the
verdict in the instant case,

Plaintiff also contends that the court
erred in excluding competent evidence.
The alleged error is based upon the
court’s refusal to permit defendants to
state the price they paid for the 80-acre
tract over which the highway was con-
structed. The authorities uniformly hold
that the extent of the range of inquiry
to be permitted regarding the value of
property taken or damaged in eminent
domain proceedings is largely in the
discretion of the: trial court: City of
Tulsa v. Horwitz, 131 Okla. 63, 267
P. 852.

As applied to the case before us, we
think that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding the evidence
as to the purchase price of the 80 acres
over which the Turnpike condemned the
right of way. The defendants also owned
a contiguous 80-acre school land lease
upon which defendants had their home
and farm improvements. These two
80-acre tracts were used as a stock

* farm, and the evidence submitted tend-
ed to prove that the defendants’ use of
the entire tract of land would be sub-
stantially impaired by a division of the
land by the Turnpike Highway. Grand
River Dam Authority v. Gray, 192 Okla.
547. 138 P. 2d 100.

As a general rule, the fair cash mar-
ket value of the land taken under emi-
nent domain is the value at the time of
the taking together with such depre-
ciation in the market value of the land
not taken as may be reasonably antic-
ipated to result from the taking. State
ex rel. City of Ardmore v. Winters et
ux., 195 Okla. 243, 156 P. 2d 798; Okla-
homa Natural Gas Co. v. Coppedge, 110
Okla. 261, 237 P. 592.

Lastly, plaintiff contends that the
trial court erred in requiring plaintiff
to pay into court the amount of the de-
ficiency judgment in the sum of $500,
with interest from December 12, 1951.
Cited in support of this contention is our
opinion in Oklahoma Turnpike Author-
ity v. Byrum, Dist. Judge, 206 Okla. 541,
244 P. 2d 1145.

579

We think plaintiff gives the Oklahoma
Turnpike Authority v. Byrum, supra, an
unwarranted application. The pivotal
point of the decision was whether the
Authority’s possession should continue,
or whether it was interrupted, extin-
guished or vacated by virtue of the
jury trial. In that case, after the origi-
nal condemnation money was paid into
court, the Authority went into posses-
sion of the land. An appeal was taken to
the district court and upon trial an ad-
ditional sum of money was awarded the
owner by the jury’s verdict. The Author-
ity desiring to appeal the jury’s verdict
and the judgment rendered thereon to
the Supreme Court requested that it be
permitted to file a supersedeas bond.
Bond was denied and an order was en-
tered requiring the Authority to pay the
excess damages awarded by the jury and
the judgment rendered thereon, or to
vacate the land which it had heretofore
appropriated under its condemnation
proceedings. Under this state of the
record, we held that either party might
appeal from the jury verdict, and that
there is no requirement that con-
demnor make second deposit or addi-
tional payment of the jury verdict
excess as a condition precedent to pres-
ervation of possession.

Finding no substantial error in the
proceedings below, the judgment is af-
firmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, DAV-
ISON, ARNOLD, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur, HALLEY,
C.J., and WELCH, J., dissent.

HALLEY, C.J. (dissenting). On No-
vember 21, 1951, J. A. Patterson, one of
the commissioners in’ this condemnation
proceeding, fixed the value of the sur-
face on the south 19.55 acres of the
west half of the southeast.quarter of
9-14-3E of Lincoln county together with
a temporary construction easement on
0.11 acres at $5,000. This amount was
outrageously high due to the fact that
the land taken was badly eroded black-
jack timber upland. It could only be
used as pasture land and was a very

580

poor quality for that. The Turnpike Au-
thority was not satisfied with the report
and demanded a jury and quite properly
so. The landowner offered J. A. Patter-
son as a witness as to the value of the
land at the jury trial on the 18th of
March, 1952. At this trial, he fixed the
value of the land at $10,000, Counsel for
the plaintiff Authority of necessity
cross-examined him as to the discre-
pency between his testimony at the
trial and the appraisement he made less
than five months before. He was care-
ful, however, not to bring out that Mr.
Patterson was one of the commission-
ers in this case. On re-direct exami-
nation counsel for defendant asked Pat-
terson the point blank question if he
was not one of the commissioners in
this case and received an affirmative
answer. This was error and reversible
error. St. Louis, El Reno & Western
Railroad v. Oliver, 17 Okla. 589, 87 P.
423, 10 Ann. Cas. 1048, and Wichita
Falls & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Munsell, 38
Okla. 253, 132 P. 906, lay down the rule
that on appeal from the award of the
commissioners to the district court in a
condemnation proceeding, the award
made by the commission is not compe-
tent evidence to go to the jury and
was prejudicial and a new trial should
be granted when such is done.

The majority opinion says that plain-
tiff’s counsel injected this incompetent
evidence in this case. With this I cannot
agree and submit that defendant’s cout-
sel would not have asked the question
on re-direct examination if he had
thought the jury was definitely informed
that Patterson was a commissioner and
that the commissioners’ award was
$5,000. Defendant put Patterson on the
stand and plaintiff's counsel had to
cross-examine him. To say the plain-
tiff had to cross-examine Patterson at
the risk of having it brought out that
he was a commissioner and what the
commissioners’ award was is unfair.
This is especially true where everyone
who knows anything about the value of
this eroded black-jack upland in Lin-
coln county would not fix a value of
$280 an acre on the surface only. There

are thousands of acres of better pasture
land selling in Oklahoma from $25 to
$50 an acre.

The role of condemnor is ordinarily
difficult but is entitled to a fair trial. If
it had been intended by our lawmakers
that condemnors pay a premium on the
land they take by condemnation pro-
ceedings they certainly would have said
sO.

This case should have been reversed
for a new trial. I dissent.

MANN v. WELCH.
No. 35320. April 14, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 19, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied June 17, 1953.

257 P. 2d 1074.

|

Francis S. Irvine, Jr., and Ram Mor-
rison, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in
error.

Raymond Thomison and Ozmun &
Fullerton, by John P. Fullerton, Law-
ton, for defendant in error.

WELCH, J. The plaintiff sued the de-
fendant for a sum certain, allegedly
due for supplies and services furnished
by the plaintiff under an oral contract
with the defendant.

The defendant entered an oral plea
in general denial of the allegations of
the plaintiff's pleading and stated that
his agreement with the plaintiff was
void under the statute of frauds.

At trial a witness called by the plain-
tiff gave testimony of effect to show
the followmg state of facts:

The defendant and a Mr. Gray came
to the plaintiff’s place of business and
the defendant told the plaintiff they
were going to drill a well and wanted
to buy supplies if the plaintiff could ex-
tend the defendant credit. Thereafter
the plaintiff furnished oil and gas and
services for those engaged with the de-
fendant in a well drilling operation, the
well being known as the Mannson Pro-
duction Trust Company well. The plain-
tiff cashed a check drawn by Mr. Gray
on the account of the Mannson Pro-
duction Trust Company. The check in
due course of business was returned
to the plaintiff with a notation thereon,
“insufficient funds.” Thereafter the

581

plaintiff made demand on the defendant
for payment for the supplies and serv-
ices he had furnished in connection with
the drilling operation. The defendant
paid the account in full, whereupon the
plaintiff told the defendant he couldn’t
extend further credit in the circum-
stances of the check from Gray and
the reports he had concerning Mannson.
The defendant then told the plaintiff
that he had to have oil and gas to
drill the well and that if the plaintiff
would sell him the oil and gas and ex-
tend him credit, that he, the defendant,
would be personally responsible for the
bills. The plaintiff told the defendant
he would sell to him on that condition
and the defendant said all right. There-
after products were delivered to the
defendant and to various persons known
by the plaintiff and defendant to be
employed in connection with the drill-
ing of the well that had been referred
to by the defendant, and which was
known as the Mannson Production °
Trust Company well. In these instances
charges were entered on the books of
the plaintiff against the defendant for
the products or services, although sales
slips for the items were sometimes
made out in the name of the defendant
and sometimes in the name of Mann-
son, and sometimes in the name of
the person who took delivery. After the
said account had grown to a consider-
able amount, the defendant paid to the
plaintiff $100, and since said payment
the plaintiff has received nothing on the
account.

To the plaintiff's petition there is at-
tached a statement of account against
the defendant, which statement is item-
ized and reflects a balance due of
$437.26. The prayer of the pleading is
that plaintiff have judgment against
defendant for $437.26, with interest
thereon.

At the close of the aforesaid testi-
mony the plaintiff rested his case. The
defendant demurred to the evidence.
The demurrer was overruled and the
defendant rested. Judgment was for the
plaintiff in the amount as prayed for.

582 —

The defendant contends the court er-
red in rendering judgment for the plain-
tiff in that there was no sufficient evi-
dence to show liability on the part of
the defendant for merchandise and
services furnished by the plaintiff to
Mannson; that the evidence as tends
to show an oral agreement by the de-
fendants to pay such charges reflects
a special promise by the defendant to
answer for the debt of Mannson, and
that said oral agreement is void under
the statute of frauds.

The defendant cites 15 O.S. 1951 §136,
which provides, in substance, that a
special promise to answer for the debt
of another is invalid unless the same,
or some memorandum thereof, be in
writing and subscribed by the party
or his agent. Cases are cited which con-
strue the statute.

The matter of the meaning and effect

. of the statute is well settled. The stat-

ute does not apply where a party orally
promises to pay for goods or services
furnished another, if the parol agree-
ment creates an original liability on the
part of the promisor, and credit is ex-
tended solely to him, but if the inten-
tion of the parties was that the prom-
isor should be collaterally liable and
pay only in case of default of the party
to whom goods and services were fur-
nished and to whom credit was ex-
tended, then such parol contract would
fall within said statute and be invalid.
Snodgrass v. Lamunyon, 94 Okla. 151,
221 P. 46; Proctor v. Sisler, 182 Okla.
603, 78 P. 2d 802; Whitlatch v. Maupin,
202 Okla, 137, 210 P. 2d 782.

In Whitlatch v. Maupin, supra, it is
said:

“Whether an oral promise to pay for
merchandise to be furnished to a third
person on open account is an original
or a collateral obligation of the promi-
sor is to be determined from the intent
of the parties as disclosed by the facts
and circumstances in evidence and the
determination of this question is solely
for the jury under proper instructions.
The judgment of the trial court based
on the verdict of a jury determining

such issue will not be disturbed if there
is any evidence reasonably supporting
the same.”

Herein, trial by jury was waived and
trial was to the court. In the consid-
eration of the evidence herein it is not
our province to weigh the evidence as
between any conflicting inferences that
might be drawn therefrom. Findings
of the trial court essential in the judg-
ment rendered will not be disturbed
where thene is evidence reasonably
supporting the same.

In argument the defendant directs
attention to certain statements con-
tained in the plaintiff’s pleadings, and
to certain statements of plaintiff’s coun-
sel, and to certain testimony, all, as-
sertedly, evidencing an intendment of
the ‘parties hereto that the defendant
was to be held as collateral obligor
only for supplies and services furnished
by the plaintiff for use in connection
with the drilling operation.

In the testimony heretofore set out,
in substance, it is reasonably made to
appear that the plaintiff furnished sup-
plies for the drilling operation on credit
extended solely to the defendant and
under his promise to be exclusively
responsible therefor. Under this testi-
mony the promise does not fall within
the statute of frauds, supra, and the
defendant became liable for such sup-
plies as were delivered in accord with
the defendant's promise to pay for the
same.

The defendant contends the court
erred in rendering judgment for the
plaintiff for the reason there was no
testimony as to specific items or as to
the amount of an account against the
defendant upon which a recovery for a
specific sum could be based.

The record reflects a discussion of
the plaintiff’s pleadings at an appear-
ance of the parties before the trial
court shortly before the hearing of tes-
timony on the issues between the par-
ties, and whereat, the defendant ad-
mitted the correctness of the plaintiff's

claim for supplies and services fur-
nished in connection with the drilling
operation known as the Mannson Pro-
duction Trust Company well. There-
after, and following a statement by the
plaintiff of the claims of his plead-
ings, the defendant orally made a gen-
eral denial of the allegations of the
plaintiff’s pleadings and in further oral
pleadings stated that his attempt to
guarantee payment for things fur-
nished to Mannson is void under the
statute of frauds. At the close of all the
testimony in the case the defendant
raised no question of any insufficiency
of the evidence other than in demurrer
he urged an application of the statute
of frauds to the oral contract as was
shown by the testimony. In trial, in
motion for new trial, and in hearing of
the motion for new trial, no question
was raised about a failure of proof of
the items and amount of the account.

In Union Pet. Co. v. Oklahoma, N.M.
& P. Ry. Co, 114 Okla. 21, 242 P.
1027, it was held:

“Where evidence of a fact which is
capable of proof was not produced in
the trial of a cause, in which such fact
was a material element to the right of
the plaintiff to the recovery obtained,
because the same was tacitly conceded,
and the cause tried on the theory that
if plaintiff established facts warranting
a recovery, the amount of the recovery
should be the amount prayed, the de-
fendant cannot raise the failure to pro-
duce such proof as ground for rever-
sal for the first time in this court.”

The rule and ethic as above stated is
here applicable and is here applied.

The judgment is affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, DAV-
ISON, O'NEAL, and WILLIAMS, JJ.,~
concur. HALLEY, C. J., and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., dissent.

583
JENKINS v. FREDERICK.

No. 35860. Dec. 16, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied June 17, 1953.

257 P. 2d 1058.

584 |

Wesley E. Disney, Joe B. Houston,
Gerald B. Klein, James P. Melone, and
Garland Keeling, Tulsa, for defendant
in error.

GIBSON, J. The parties will be given
their trial court designations. Plaintiff
in error was plaintiff, and the defend-
ant in error was one of several defend-
ants. Plaintiff filed his petition naming
as defendants Dan A. Rowe, county
treasurer of Tulsa county, the board of
county commissioners and several oth-
er defendants, including Etta J. Fred-
erick, alleging that the defendants
claimed some right, title or interest in
a described quarter section of land in
Tulsa county. He alleged that he was
the owner of the legal title in fee simple
and in possession of the real estate, and
had acquired his title by deed from
one R. F, Henshaw, who in turn had ac-
quired the title by a county treasurer’s
resale tax deed dated May 17, 1940, and
duly recorded, and that the defendants
had no title:to the lands; that any
rights claimed by them were lost and
voided by said tax resale, but the
claims of defendants constituted a cloud
on the title of plaintiff. He prayed that
his title be quieted.

Defendant filed an answer alleging
that she was the owner of an undivided
one-half interest in and to the oil, gas
and other minerals under said prop-
erty in so far as they may be pro-
duced from any sand below that gen-
erally described as the Glen Sand, and
further that the purported tax sale, its
proceedings and deed described in
plaintiff's petition were wholly ineffec-
tive as to defendant’s mineral interests
and that said deed did not convey the
_mineral rights of defendant for the rea~
son that oil had been discovered upon
said land and the gross production tax
was paid thereon during each year for
which said land was purportedly sold
for taxes. It was further alleged that
the tax sale and deed were void for
the reason that it was made for taxes

Joy G. Clayton, Tulsa, for plaintiff unlawfully assessed and for taxes not
jn error. yet due or delinquent.

The cause was tried and submitted
on a stipulation of facts in which the
agreed facts pertinent to the issues
here presented were as follows:

On November 18, 1929, J. P. Flana-
gan, former owner, by mineral deed
conveyed an undivided one-half the
minerals in the involved land, produced
below the Glen Sand, to William J.
Frederick who died in 1938. The defend-
ant is his widow, and she acquired his
interest by mesne conveyances from
the Frederick heirs. Oil was produced
on the property, from the Glen Sand,
and gross production taxes were paid
thereon for the years 1929 to 1932, both
inclusive, but there has been no pro-
duction of oil since March, 1932. On
November 3, 1930, the property was
sold to Tulsa county for delinquent
taxes for the year 1929. At the annual
1940 tax resale held on May 3, 1940, the
property was sold by the county treas-
urer for taxes, including 1929 ad valo-
rem taxes and all ad valorem taxes
for the years 1931 to 1939, both inclu-
sive. It is stipulated that the sale was
made for and included the entire levy
for the year 1939, and the notice of sale
was first published April 11, 1940.

The purchaser was R. F. Henshaw
and his resale tax deed, executed by
the county treasurer, was issued May
17, 1940, and recorded May 20, 1940.
Henshaw conveyed to plaintiff by quit-
claim deed on June 4, 1940, and plaintiff
has been in possession of the surface of
said property at all times since said
date,

Judgment was rendered for the plain-
tiff quieting his title as against all de-
fendants except Etta J. Frederick.
Judgment was in her favor on June 30,
1951, quieting her title to an undivided
one-half interest in and to all oil, gas
and other minerals in and under the
real property that may be produced in
any sand below the Glen Sand. Plain-
tiff appeals.

Plaintiff here urges that the judg-
ment is contrary to and not supported

585

by the evidence and that the judgment
is contrary to law.

The resale tax deed under which
plaintiff asserted his title was void.
The factual situation, even to the year
of the resale, is parallel to the case of
Williamson v. Hart, 199 Okla. 328, 186
P. 2d 71, wherein we said:

“One of the irregularities in the tax
resale procedure relied on by plaintiff
was the fact that the property was sold
in May, 1940, pursuant to advertisement
beginning April 11th. Included in the
amount for which the property was ad-
vertised and sold was the entire levy for
the year 1939. The last quarter of these
taxes did not become delinquent until
May ist, under the provisions of 68 O.S.
1941 §351. This court has held that,
where the amount for which the prop-
erty is advertised and sold includes an
item of tax which does not become de-
linquent until after the first publication
of notice of resale, the procedure is in-
effective to give the county treasurer
authority to sell the same and renders
the resale tax deed based thereon void.
House v. Mainka et al., 196 Okla. 174,
163 P, 2d 225; Sarkeys v. Evans, 197
Okla. 304, 170 P. 2d 229; Carman v.
McMahan et al., 198 Okla. 367, 178 P.
2d 626.”

Plaintiff says that defendant is barred
from asserting such defense by the
statute of limitations, Tit. 12 O.S. 1951
§93:

“Actions for the recovery of real prop-
erty, or for the determination of any
adverse right or interest therein, can
only be brought within the periods
hereinafter prescribed, after the cause
of action shall have accrued, and at
no other time thereafter:

ey eee

“ge ee
“3, An action for the recovery of real
property sold for taxes, within five (5)

years after the date of the recording
of the tax deed.

ge eR
“Bee

“6, Numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and
3 shall be fully operative regardless of

586

whether the deed or judgment or the
precedent action or proceeding upon
which such deed or judgment is based
is void or voidable in whole or in part,
for any reason, jurisdictional or other-
wise; provided that this paragraph
shall not be applied so as to bar causes
of action which have heretofore ac-
crued, until the expiration of one (1)
year from and after its effective date.”

Paragraph 6 did not appear in our
statute until the amendment of S. L.
1949, c. 3, §1, p. 95.

The Legislature had some purpose-
ful intent in enactment of this strict
amendment. Prior to the amendment
this court had upheld the short term
statute as a bar to actions for the re-
covery of land sold at judicial sale even
where the sale was void and not merely
voidable, and we had held that such
deed was sufficient to set the statute in
operation. Dodson v. Middleton, 38 Okla.
763, 135 P. 368 (guardian’s deed); Sand-
lin v. Barker, 95 Okla. 113, 218 P. 519
(administrator’s deed); Green v. Wahl,
117 Okla. 292, 246 P. 419 (sheriff's
deed); Goslen v. Waddell Inv. Co., 145
Okla. 269, 292 P. 362 (foreclosure sale).

But we had consistently held that
the short term statutes of limitation did
not apply in tax sale cases, where the
deed relied upon was void. Lind v.
Stubblefield, 138 Okla. 280, 282 P. 365;
Farmers Nat. Bank, etc., v. Gillis, 155
Okla. 290, 9 P. 2d 47; Cunningham v.
Webber, 171 Okla. 211, 42 P. 2d 244;
Westerheide v. Wilcox, 190 Okla. 382,
124 P, 2d 409.

We do not find subsec. 6, supra, to be
ambiguous.
“Where the language of a statute is

plain and unambiguous, and its mean-
ing clear and unmistakable, there is no

room for construction, and the courts _

are not permitted to search for its
meaning beyond the statute itself.” In
re Martin’s Estate, 183 Okla. 177, 80
P. 2d 561.

The Legislature plainly says in sub-
par. 6 that paragraph 1 (relating to
judicial sales); paragraph 2 (relating

to sales by executors, administrators
and guardians,) and paragraph 3 (re-
lating to tax sales), shall all be fully
operative as statutes of limitation
against actions for the determination of
adverse interests in real property, whe-
ther the deed relied upon is void or
voidable, for any reason, jurisdictional
or otherwise.

Defendant places great reliance upon
Morton v. Van Orsdol, 203 Okla. 394,
222 P. 2d 520, where the fifteen-year
statute of adverse possession was relied
upon, and we found that such period
had not run. But in that case we said:

“An action or defense against a void
resale deed or a county commissioner’s
deed based on a void resale is not
barred by any lapse of time alone or
until there has been a lapse of time ac~
companied with actual occupancy of the
land for the period prescribed by stat-
ute as sufficient to bar an action for
recovery of the property.”

The barring statute is subpar. 3, §93,
Tit. 12, supra, under which the period
of limitation for recovery of real prop-
erty, or determination of an adverse in-
terest therein, is five years. It is stipu-
lated that plaintiff had been in physical
possession of the surface of the prop-
erty, collecting rents and paying taxes
thereon since June 4, 1940. The resale
tax deed was recorded May 20, 1940.
The answer of defendant, attacking
plaintiff's title under the tax deed, for
the first time, was filed September 5,
1950, and the five year period of limita~
tion had expired.

Defendant says that an adverse pos~
session statute of limitations is not
available to plaintiff for the reason that
plaintiff has never been in possession
of defendant’s mineral interest and no
statute of limitations operates in favor
of one not in possession, and cites De~
ruy v. Noah, 199 Okla. 230, 185 P. 2d
189, and Noble v. Kahn, 206 Okla. 13,
240 P, 2d 757, wherein we held that
where there has been a severance of
the minerals from the ownership of the
land adverse possession of the sur-

face is not adverse possession of the
mineral estate. Both cases involved a
title acquired by proceedings in the
foreclosure of real estate mortgages.

In Secrest v. Williams, 185 Okla. 449,
94 P. 2d 252, we had a case similar in
issues and status of the parties to the
one now under consideration. Therein
we said:

“The defendant in support of this con-
tention cites a number of cases holding
in substance that a conveyance of min-
eral rights creates a separate estate in
the land, but the cases cited have no
particular bearing upon the question
herein involved, as none of them deal
with the subject of taxation of mineral
rights in nonproducing lands, * * *

“It necessarily follows that the sale
of land for taxes passes title to the land,
including the mineral rights therein,
whether severed or not, to the pur-
chaser, and therefore extinguishes the
rights of the owner or owners of the
land and of the mineral rights of any
interest or estate therein.”

We followed the same rule in cases
dealing with resale tax titles in Hales
v. Lee, 199 Okla. 110, 184 P. 2d 451;
State ex rel., etc., v. Southland Royalty
Co., 204 Okla. 284, 230 P. 2d 471. And in
Sears v. Randolph,'195 Okla, 200, 156
P. 2d 595, we said:

“Where real estate was purchased by
the county at an original annual tax
sale for taxes levied and assessed for
years during which the mineral rights
therein were not subject to said sale,
due to production of oil and the pay-
ment of gross production tax thereon,
but subsequent to said time, and prior
to resale and issuance of said resale
deed, production of oil and the payment
of the gross production tax ceased, and
ad valorem taxes were assessed and
became delinquent. Held: That the re-
sale tax deed vests in the grantee an
absolute and perfect title in fee simple
to said real estate as against the own-
ers of the mineral rights.”

It is true that in Secrest v. Williams,
supra, we were considering a valid
tax deed, while in the instant case we
are holding that the resale tax dted was

587

void. This returns us to a considera-
tion of the statute. Clearly the Legisla-
ture of 1949 intended that there shall
be a limit of time within which deeds
of the three classes mentioned in sub-
sec. 6 can be attacked and that unless
such actions were commenced within
the designated period the right of each
attack is lost. The statute was designed
to force one who is not in possession to
begin his action for recovery of bis in-
terest in the real property or to de~
termine an interest adverse within the
specified time or lose his right to at-
tack the deed in question, As we have
heretofore observed, this court had up-
held statutes of limitation as being ap-
plicable to deeds issued in judicial
sales and by executors and adminis-
trators, even though the deeds were is-
sued pursuant to defective proceedings,
but we held in Westerheide v. Wil-
cox and other cases, supra, that the
short term statutes of limitation did
not apply to void tax sales. When the
Legislature in its 1949 amendment
lengthened the period of limitation to
five years and specifically provided that
the periods of limitation in paragraphs
1, 2 and 3 should be fully operative re-
gardless of whether the deed or judg-
ment were based on proceedings that
were void or voidable, for any reason,
it is clear that it was intended to es-
tablish a uniformity of application of the
prescribed limitations in all of the three
designated classes of actions.

Cases are cited by the parties which
apparently conflict one with the other.
A review of the same with the idea
of drawing distinctions would unduly
lengthen this opinion. We observe that
all such cited opinions were written
before the amendment in 1949 and be-
fore subpar. 6 was enacted. No case
has been called to our attention constru-
ing that amendment.

We must keep in mind that, in the
instant case, plaintiff was in posses-
sion of the property at all times after
his deed was recorded and for more
than five years before defendant at-

588

tempted to attack the validity of his
deed. Defendant was attempting more
than an attack on validity of the deed.
She was attacking the validity of a re-
sale tax deed coupled with actual pos-
session by the purchaser for the limita-
tion period. We have seen that plain-
tiff’s possession under his resale tax
deed is possession of the entire prop-
erty including the nonproducing min-
erals. Hales v. Lee and other cited
cases, supra. Having lost her title to her
mineral interests under the resale,
when defendant pleads here that she
has title and that plaintiff has no title
to said minerals and seeks to have her
title quieted, she is bringing an action
for the recovery of real property from
one who was in possession beyond the
period limiting the time within which
she could bring such action. This she
could not do in face of the above statute.

Defendant suggests that if she is to
be deprived of her rights in the min-
erals the statute is unconstitutional.
We do not agree. In Cornelius v. Jack-
son, 201 Okla. 667, 209 P. 2d 166, the
plaintiff claimed title based on a re~-
sale tax deed and the appellant was
the owner of mineral interests. Therein
we said:

“Where a statute authorizes a lien for
ad valorem taxes to be foreclosed by
advertisement and sale by the county
treasurer, the proceedings thereunder
relate to the land itself, rather than the
owner thereof, and where the statute
provides for notice and gives the right
to any person owning the land, or any
interest therein, to redeem the land
from such taxes at any time before a
tax deed is issued by the county treas-
urer, the statute affords due process of
law, and the owner of the nonproduc-
ing oil, gas, and other mineral rights,
whose interest in the land, in the name
of the owner of the surface, is assessed,
advertised, and sold for delinquent ad
valorem taxes, is given equal protec-
tion of the law and is not deprived of
property without due process of law.”

Appeal to the United States Supreme
Court was dismissed 335 U.S. 906, 69 S.
Ct. 412, 93 L, Ed. 440.

Judgment of the trial court is re-
versed, with directions to enter judg-
ment for the plaintiff quieting his title
to the involved real property.

ARNOLD, C. J., HALLEY, V. C. J.,
and DAVISON and JOHNSON, JJ., con-
cur. WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, and
BINGAMAN, JJ., dissent.

OKLAHOMA RY. CO, v. BENSON.
No. 34844, March 81, 1958.
Rehearing Denied May 12, 1953.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied June 17, 1953.

257 P. 2d 1084.

Richardson, Shartel & Cochran, F.
M. Dudiey, and Wayne W. Bayless,
Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Monnet, Haynes & Bullis and Mart
Brown, Oklahoma City, for defendant
in error.

O'NEAL, J. Plaintiff's petition alleges
that on the 19th day of May, 1948, at
7:10 a.m., plaintiff was walking across
Main street in Oklahoma City, Okla~
homa, in a northerly direction on the
west side of Broadway, where said
Main street and Broadway intersect,
and within the painted markings desig-
nated in which pedestrians are to walk;
that when plaintiff had advanced ap-
proximately 33 feet north of the south
curb of Main street, he was struck by
a bus owned by the defendant and
operated by defendant’s employee, Wil-
iam Henry Collins; that said bus had
been traveling in a northerly direction
along Broadway, and at the time it
struck plaintiff was making a left turn
onto Main street.

The acts of negligence are primarily
based upon alleged violations of cer-
tain ordinances of the city of Okla-
hhoma City, as follows:

(1) Title 10, §64 (5), of the ordinance
pleaded need not be considered as it
applies only to a vehicle making a
right turn at intersecting streets. But

it is alleged that defendant was negli-
gent in making an improper left turn
at the intersecting streets in that de-
fendant cut the corner of the intersec-
tion in violation of Title 9, §55 (2), of

589

the traffic ordinances of Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma. That said ordinance
provides:

“The approach for a left turn shall
be made in that portion of the right
half of the roadway nearest the cen-
ter line thereof, and after entering the
roadway intersection the left turn shall
be made so as to leave the roadway in-
tersection to the right of the center line
of the roadway being entered.”

(2) That defendant failed to sound a
horn or give any warning to the plain-
tiff in violation of Title 10, §64 (6),
of the traffic ordinances of the city of
Oklahoma City.

That subsection (6) provides that:

“Nothing within this section shall be
construed to relieve every driver of
any vehicle of the duty to exercise due
care to avoid colliding with any pe-
destrian upon any street or roadway
nor to give warning by sounding the
horn when necessary, and to exercise
proper precaution upon observing any
child or any confused or incapacitated
person upon the street or roadway.”

(3) In addition plaintiff pleads de-
fendant failed to keep a proper lookout
for pedestrians crossing the street, and
especially this plaintiff.

The answer of the defendant con-
tains a general denial and also a plea
of contributory negligence. Upon the
trial of the case defendant demurred
to plaintiffs evidence upon the ground
that the allegations of the petition and
the proof submitted did not establish
primary negligence of the defendant.
At the close of the case defendant's
demurrer was renewed and it also in-
terposed a motion for a directed ver-
dict. The demurrer and motion were
overruled. From the verdict and judg-
ment rendered thereon in favor of plain-
tiff, the defendant appeals, alleging that
the verdict and judgment are not sup-
ported by the evidence, and that the
same are contrary to law. Specifically,
defendant contends: (a) that there is a
total failure of proof to establish the
acts of negligence charged; and (b)

590 Le

that the trial court erred in giving
its instruction No. 14 as not applicable
to the evidence, in that it assumes
the existence of a material fact; and
(c) that instruction No. 10 was erron-
eously given as the ordinance therein
referred to was neither pleaded nor
proven by either party; and (d) that it
was error to give instruction No. 16,
as it submitted to the jury a material
issue not raised in the pleadings; and
(e) that the verdict is excessive and re-
turned under the influence of passion
and prejudice.

Whether defendant’s contention that
the trial court erred in refusing to sus-
tain defendant’s demurrer and motion
for a directed verdict depends upon
whether, under the allegations of the
petition and the proof, plaintiff estab-
lished negligence of the defendant as
charged. That question can only be re-
solved by epitomizing the evidence.

Officers Rankin and Connell, of the
Oklahoma City police department, re-
ceived a call by radio advising them of
the accident at the intersection of Main
and Broadway streets; they arrived
shortly after the accident; they found
J. R. Benson, the plaintiff, sitting on
the curb on the north side of Main
street near the Tradesmen’s National
Bank Building; they observed several
spots of blood in the center of Main
street, 33 feet north of the south curb of
said street. At a point on the south
side of the bus involved in the accident,
and approximately 10 to 12 feet from
the front end of the bus, and near
where the cowling curves under the
bus, they found a patch of human skin
and hair and an indication of fresh
blood. From measurements they placed
the front end of the bus 18 inches from
the north curb of Main street, and the
rear of the bus extending in a south-
easterly direction, some 6 to 10 feet.
The bus was 36 feet long.

E. F. Collins, an attorney of Taloga,
Oklahoma, was standing on the north-
west corner of Main and Broadway
streets and observed the plaintiff walk-

ing north on the green light to a point
some 33 feet north of the south curb of
Main street. He observed the bus as it
proceeded north on Broadway, and as
it turned west on Main street. After
the bus entered Broadway, he could
not see plaintiff, who was then south
of the bus. He stated, however, that
the front of the bus did not hit the
plaintiff. When Officers Rankin and
Connell came to the scene of the acci-
dent, the witness walked out to the
intersection of Main street and pointed
out to the officers where plaintiff had
been lying prior to his removal to the
north curb of Main street. At the point
indicated he observed spots of blood on
the pavement.

The witness, R. W. Thomas, county
surveyor of Oklahoma county, made a
survey of the Main and Broadway in-
tersecting streets, and had prepared a
plat indicating distances with refer-
ence to the intersections of the streets
and the point of the accident. This plat
was used throughout the trial by coun-
sel for plaintiff and defendant; but in
view of counsel uniformly referring to
points as “here” and “there” in the
examination of witnesses, we are fre-
quently left in doubt as to the exact
locations referred to.

Immediately prior to the accident a
bus operated by J. S. Jackson, de-
fendant’s employee, had stopped on a
red signal light on the southwest cor-
ner of Main and Broadway ‘streets.
Harry Copeland, a draftsman, residing
in Dallas, Texas, was sitting on the
north or left side of that bus imme-
diately back of the bus driver. He ob-
served plaintiff passing in front of the
bus in which witness was then sitting,
and walk in a northerly direction. The
witness testified:

“A. Well, Mr. Benson had just passed.
in front of the bus I was on; and this
other bus turned the corner and was
coming at an angle and turning, of
course, when it hit Mr. Benson; and
knocked him down with his head point-
ed in a southwesterly direction and his
Jegs right up about this high; and his

pack down on the pavement; and I
thought a wheel ran over it.

“Q. Now I will ask you this way. Did,
or did it not cut the corner? A. It cut
the corner.”

The witness stated the side of the
bus hit plaintiff, knocking him to the
‘pavement, and that the driver of the
bus upon which Copeland was sitting,
“hollered,” “hey” and “you will run
over him.”

Lee Andrew Glover was a passenger
on the bus involved in the accident.
He stated he sat on the left side to-
ward the rear with a view to the
south as the bus entered Main street.
Referring to the Thomas plat the wit-
ness traced the movement of the bus
from its stop on the red signal at the
southeast corner of the intersecting
streets as it proceeded north and then
west, referring to points on the plat as
“here” and “there”. He observed plain-
tiff walking across Main street going
north on Broadway, and as plaintiff
crossed the intersection he stopped, and
started to step back, but the bus hit him
and the last time he saw plaintiff he
was going over backwards. He said
he felt a bump at the same moment
and the bus ran over to the curb and
stopped “catacorner” by the curb. He
jumped out of the bus and ran around
the back of it to see what had happened
and found plaintiff lying a little south
of the center of Main street.

J. R. Benson, the plaintiff, testified in
his own behalf that he was a salesman
for the Belmont Radio Corporation,
with general headquarters at Dallas,
Texas; that on the morning of the ac-
cident he had left his hotel and pro-
ceeded to the southwest corner of Main
and Broadway streets; that when the
green signal light went on he started
across Main street, intending to go to
Bishop’s cafe. He stated he glanced
both to the right and left to observe
the traffic, especially the traffic com-
ing down Broadway and turning west
into Main street; that as he got near
the tracks on Main street, he observed

591

the bus about a foot and a half away;
and he stopped and immediately at-
temped to step backwards when he
was hit and knocked to the pavement
and the rear wheel of the bus ran over
his leg.

In addition to the foregoing resume
of the evidence submitted by plaintiff
in chief, he introduced evidence of the
nature and extent of the physical in-
juries inflicted; his loss of earnings,
his medical and hospital expenses, and
the pain and suffering he endured and
his life expectancy.

Defendant, at this juncture of the
proceedings, interposed a demurrer to
the evidence contending that the proof
did not establish any prima facie neg-
ligence, and that the proof submitted
failed to establish that the asserted neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of the
accident and the resulting injury to the
plaintiff.

We have uniformly held that in de-
termining the sufficiency of plaintiff's
testimony to withstand a demurrer all
reasonable inferences and deductions
must be indulged in his favor and any
testimony unfavorable to him should be
excluded. Davis v. Curry, 192 Okla. 32,
133 P, 2d 186. Furthermore, the rule is
well established in this state that where
the evidence is such that reasonable
men may fairly differ as to whether
the facts constitute negligence, the
question is one for the jury to decide.
Carter, Adm’r, v. Pinkerton, 194 Okla.
34, 146 P. 2d 842,

The defendant was charged with a
violation of Title-10, §64 (6), of the
traffic ordinances of Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, in that defendant failed to
exercise due care to avoid colliding
with a pedestrian upon the street, and
in failing to take proper precaution
upon observing plaintiff, an incapaci-
tated person, as he attempted to cross
the street, and in failing to give a warn-
ing by sounding the horn of the bus.

As we have seen, the evidence tends
to establish the following facts: (a) no

592 Ee

horn was sounded; (b) the witnesses,
E. F. Collins, Harry O. Copeland and
Lee Andrew Glover, observed plaintiff
walking north across the street with
the use of a cane and that he had
approximately reached the center of
Main street when the accident occurred;
(c) that the witnesses, Collins and
Glover, testified that the defendant’s
bus “cut the corner” as it entered into
the intersection of the streets, contrary
to traffic ordinance Title 9, §55 (2).

Defendant severely criticizes Glover’s
evidence, claiming he was thoroughly
discredited in view of previous state-
ments asserted to be inconsistent with
his present testimony. The weight of
his testimony, and also his credibility,
are not subject to our review. Such
questions, of necessity, must be and
were resolved by the jury in the ren-
dition of the verdict. As we view the
record the court properly overruled de-
fendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s evi-
dence in chief.

We now summarize defendant’s evi-
dence, William Boggs, an employee of
the street department of Oklahoma City,
was standing on the northwest corner
of the intersection of Main and Broad-
way. He observed plaintiff crossing
Main street going north on Broadway;
he stated that plaintiff walked in a
semi-crouched position. He did not
know whether plaintiff checked his for-
ward movement as he approached the
bus. He expressed an opinion that the
bus “made a good long corner,” but
he was unable to state whether the
bus went south or west of the center
point of the intersecting streets. He left
before Officers Rankin and Connell
came to the scene of the accident, When
he read an account of the accident in a
newspaper, he thought that the acci-
dent was improperly detailed so he
contacted an employee of the defendant
company and furnished him with his
version of the accident.

Nelson Milton, employed as an engi-
neer by the city of Oklahoma City,
was a passenger on the bus. He placed

the bus 10 to 12 feet north of the center
of Main street when the accident oc-
curred. He observed plaintiff some 5 or
6 feet south of the bus walking north
in a stooped position. He could not re-
member whether plaintiff stopped or
looked up before the accident, or
whether the bus turned clear around the
intersection of the streets, but thought
it had not straightened out when the
rear south end of the bus came in con-
tact with the plaintiff. He heard some-
one on the bus “holler,” “you hit a
man”.

R. H. Spencer, a passenger, was sit-
ting on the left side of the bus imme-
diately prior to the accident. He stated
that as the bus started to make its left
turn, he observed plaintiff standing 4 or
5 feet from the south curb on Main
street; that plaintiff started to walk
north and came in contact with the bus
just as it was making the turn. The
bus did not sound its horn, neither did
he observe that plaintiff was walking
with the use of a cane.

W. H. Collins, the driver of the bus
involved in the accident, testified that
he stopped the bus on the red light
signal on the southeast corner of Main
and Broadway; and that when the green
light went on he entered the intersection
of Main and Broadway and turned west
on Main. He observed plaintiff going
north on the pedestrian walk with his
face “kinda looking down”. He was not
sure whether plaintiff walked with the
use of a cane but he noticed that plain-
tiff walked with a limp. He stated
that the first time he looked to the
south was when his bus was within 5
or 6 feet from the pedestrian walk, and
at that time plaintiff was approximately
10 to 15 feet south of the bus, walking
in a northerly direction. He stated that
his supervisor was standing on the
northwest corner of the intersecting
streets and that the supervisor “hol-
lered” at him and he immediately
brought his bus to a stop. He stated
that he did not sound the horn of the
bus at any time as he made the turn

from Broadway to Main street, and that
after he passed the pedestrian walk he
was looking toward the north curb im-
mediately prior to bringing the bus
to a stop.

Charles Roach testified that he was
approaching the corner of Main and
Broadway, immediately prior to the
accident. He observed the bus as it
made the turn and as it approached
the pedestrian walk. He observed plain-
tiff as he approached the bus some two
or three steps to the south thereof, in
which position his view of the plaintiff
was then obscured and he did not see
the contact of plaintiff with the bus.

J. S. Jackson, a bus driver, employed
by the Oklahoma Railway Company,
had stopped his bus on the southwest
corner of Main and Broadway, waiting
for the green signal light to go on. He
observed the bus involved in the acci-
dent as it made its turn from Broad-
way, and as it approached the east line
of the pedestrian walk at which time
he observed plaintiff some 6 or 8 feet
south of the left front corner of the
bus, walking slowly, with a noticeable
limp, and with the use of a cane. He
stated that plaintiff kept going forward
until he bolted into the side of the bus;
that when the plaintiff fell his body was
lying near the street car rails. He
stated the accident occurred as the bus
was making the turn, and that the
rear of the bus was somewhat at a
southeast angle—the front end of the
bus in a northwesterly direction. The
witness did not remember that he
“hollered” at W. H. Collins, the driver
of the bus involved in the accident
(his passenger, Harry C. Copeland had
testified he “hollered”, “hey” and “you
will run over him.”) nor did the witness
remember whether the driver of the bus
involved in the accident sounded his
horn (the driver, however, testified that
he did not sound his horn).

Under our view of the entire evi-
dence we hold that the trial court prop-
erly overruled defendant’s motion for-a
directed verdict. The evidence with all

593

permissible inferences sustains findings
that plaintiff was apparently an inca-
pacitated person, walking in a semi-
crouched position, with the use of a
cane, Plaintiff, in addition to other sec-
tions of city ordinances, pleaded the
provisions of city ordinance, Title 10,
§64 (6), which requires drivers of ve-
hicles to exercise due care to avoid
colliding with a pedestrian upon the
street by giving warning by sounding
the horn when necessary and to exer-
cise proper precaution upon observing
an incapacitated person upon the street,

The defendant’s driver, by his own
admission, did not sound his horn.
Moreover, he stated he observed the
plaintiff coming toward the bus “kinda
looking down” walking with a limp, at
a distance of some 10 feet south of the
bus. Furthermore, he stated that he did
not look south from which direction
plaintiff was approaching until the front
of the bus was within 5 or 6 feet of the
pedestrian walk. The evidence also dis-
closes that defendant’s supervisor and
also the driver of another of defend-
ant’s busses “hollered” warnings to the
bus driver, as heretofore indicated.
There is also evidence of the witnesses,
Glover and E. F. Collins, that the bus
involved in the accident cut the corner
at the intersection of said streets.

The evidence is without dispute that
the bus was 36 feet in length and that,
as it entered Main street, the back or
rear end of the bus tracked some feet
to the south of its front wheels.

Evidence of negligence or nonnegli-
gence cannot be established with math-
ematical certitude in any case. We
think reasonable men might well differ
on the question of negligence or the
want of due care under the circum-
stances as disclosed by this record,
and, therefore, the verdict thereon, as
approved by the trial court, can only
be vacated upon errors of law preju-
dicial to the substantial rights of the
defendant. Citations of decisions in
eases under fact situations dissimilar
to the case at-bar do not afford us much

594 a . :

light as we find that every case is
unique and requires a creative decision.
Defendant urges that errors in the
trial court require a reversal of the
case. It challenges instruction No. 14,
as assuming the existence of a ma-
terial fact. That instruction reads:

“You are instructed that motorists
who are making turns at intersections
have the duty to bear in mind that a
pedestrian in crossing the street at an
intersection must give more attention
to traffic which is in his path or ap-
proaching him from the right or left
than to that which may be approaching
diagonally from the rear.”

In view of the evidence that the bus
proceeded north on Broadway, and
then west on Main, coupled with the
evidence that the plaintiff had reached
the center of Main street, when com-
ing in contact with the bus, sufficiently
warranted the giving of this instruction.
There was no controversy as to the po-
sition of the bus as it entered the inter-
secting streets, other than whether it
swung around the exact intersection or
cut its corners. Plaintiff's witnesses
stated it made a short turn and the
finding of the jury established that
fact. In either event, it was not at the
time of the accident in a direct east
and west path of the pedestrian plain-
tiff.

When we consider the court’s instruc-
tion No. 4, that the burden is upon the
plaintiff to establish all the material al-
legations of the petition by a prepond-
erance of the evidence, and instruction
No. 6, that mere proof of the accident
and injury does not establish negli-
gence, and instruction No. 8, that both
parties must exercise ordinary care for
their and others’ safety, and instruction
No. 13, which requires plaintiff to take
into consideration the fact of traffic
at the intersecting streets and keep a
sharp lookout for such traffic, we can-
not assume that instruction No. 14,
supra, was prejudicial’ to defendant’s
rights.

Defendant urges that instruction No.
14 conflicts with instruction No. 13, and,

therefore, tended to confuse the jury.
We find no such conflict. Instruction
No. 13 does no more than advise the
jury that it was the plaintiff's duty in
attempting to cross the intersecting
streets to take into consideration that
vehicles were constantly passing and
turning, and, therefore, he should keep
a sharp lookout for such vehicles to
ascertain the movements they were
making or about to make. The instruc-
tion thus placed the burden on plaintiff
to exercise care for his own safety.

Defendant contends that the court’s
instruction No. 16 was erroneous, in
that it gives undue emphasis to a spe-
cific fact or circumstance and ignores
the importance of others. That instruc-
tion reads:

“You are instructed that, due to the
length and size of the bus involved in
the accident, in making turns at inter-
sections the rear of the bus does not
track the front end, but in this par-
ticular case the left side of said bus as
it extended toward the rear came far-
ther to the left or south than did the
front end, and in this connection you
are charged that the bus driver owed
the duty to the plaintiff to take this
fact into consideration in determining
the method and manner in which he
should operate said bus.”

Defendant cites the following cases
to support its contention of error: Dill
v. Johnston, 121 Okla. 62, 247 P. 349;
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Priest,
178 Okla. 91, 62 P. 2d 55; Prest-O-Lite
Co., Inc., v. Howery, 169 Okla. 408, 37
P. 2d 303. These cases hold that, under
the facts there involved, it was error
to instruct the jury upon a material
issue which was not raised by the plead-
ings, but, as we have heretofore noted,
plaintiff pleaded a violation of Title 9,
§55 (2), of the traffic ordinances, which
provides that the vehicle shall enter
the roadway after making a left turn
so that when leaving the roadway in-
tersection the vehicle is to the right of
the center line of the roadway being
entered. It was not incumbent upon
plaintiff to plead the evidentiary fact

that the rear end of the bus trailed to
the left or in a southwesterly direction,
5 or 6 feet, as it made the left turn.
The fact that it did so is not contro-
verted. All that instruction No. 16 did
was to advise the jury that the driver
owed a duty to plaintiff to take that
fact into consideration in determining
the method and manner in which he
should operate the bus under the cir-
cumstances,

Defendant also complains of instruc-
tion No. 10 on the ground that the or-
dinance referred to, being §4, Title 2,
Ordinance 5791, of the ordinances of
Oklahoma City, was not pleaded. That
ordinance reads:

“Vehicles facing such signal shall
proceed straight through or turn right
or left, unless an official sign at such
place prohibits such turn, but the right-
of-way shall be yielded to any vehicle,
railroad train, street car or pedestrian
lawfully within the intersection when
signal changes to green. Pedestrian
facing such signal may proceed across
the roadway unless a ‘walk’ signal
indication is operating.”

The ordinance was not pleaded or
proven and the instruction was inad-
vertently given. Although erroneously
given it does not warrant a reversal
unless it appears to have prejudiced
defendant’s substantial rights. The ra-
tionale of the instruction is that if plain-
tiff started to cross Main street before
the green light came on and therefore
was not lawfully at the intersection,
the bus in that situation had the right
of way. If the jury had so found it
would logically follow that plaintiff was
himself negligent contributing to his
injury. The instruction was not harm-
ful and in fact it was beneficial to the
defendant. In any event, we cannot say
it confused or misled the jury. An er-
roneous instruction standing alone with-
out more does not constitute reversible
error. Pact Gas Co. v. Baker et ux.,
203 Okla. 124, 218 P. 2d 912, and Bow-
ring v. Denco Bus Lines, 196 Okla. 1,
162 P. 2d 525.

595

Lastly, defendant contends that plain-
tiff was awarded excessive damages
appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
The verdict returned was for the sum
of $29,458. In the accident plaintiff suf-
fered a fractured left shoulder and
also a compound fracture of his right
leg. The injury was inflicted on May
19, 1948, and at the date of trial, in
February, 1949, his leg was still in a
east or brace running from the thigh
to the knee. He had incurred medical
and hospital bills in the sum of $1,354.
He remained in the hospital from the
date of injury, in May, until the month
of September, following. He suffered
severe pain.

In the year 1946, he had an income
of $13,000 and in the year of 1947, an
income of $18,000. He had been unable
to return to his employment from the
date of the accident to the date of the
trial. There was evidence to the ef-
fect that his future earning capacity
would be permanently reduced to the
extent of at least one-half of his former
earning capacity. He had a life ex-
pectancy of approximately 18 years, and
had been continuously employed by the
same company for a period of 16 years
prior to the accident in question,

Under this record, we cannot agree
with defendant’s contention that the
verdict is excessive.

Affirmed.

HANCOCK et al. v. THIGPEN et al.
No. 85566. Jan. 16, 1953.
256 P. 24 428.

596

D. F. Rainey and John Barksdale,
Okmulgee, for plaintiffs in error.

Harland A. Carter, Okmulgee, for de-
fendants in error.

O’NEAL, J. In this action plaintiffs,
Vera Hancock and John Walden Han-
cock, sought to recover a money judg-
ment against the defendants, Mary
Thigpen and Jim Thigpen, upon the
alleged ground that plaintiffs’ son,
John Walden Hancock III, came to his
death through the negligent acts of the
defendants. The case was submitted to
a jury which returned a verdict in favor
of the defendants upon which judgment

- was entered. From the order of the
court overruling plaintiffs’ motion for
a new trial, plaintiffs appeal, alleging
error of the court in the giving of var-
ious instructions to the jury, which are
subsequently referred to,

Plaintiffs’ minor son, John Walden
Hancock IT, lost his life on the eve-
ning of December 16, 1950; the child on
that day was three years and eleven
months of age. The accident complained
of occurred at the intersection of 6th
Street and Liberty street, in the city of

Okmulgee, Oklahoma. The defendant
Jim Thigpen, at said time and place,
was operating a truck on 6th street
proceeding in a westerly direction, and
as he approached the intersection of
Liberty street, his truck ran over John
Walden resulting in his death.

It will be unnecessary to delineate
the numerous grounds of alleged neg-
ligence pleaded in plaintiffs’ petition.
Upon disputed questions of negligence
and proximate cause, the jury absolved
defendants of fault.

Plaintiffs below, plaintiffs in error
here, assert that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error on questions
of law arising in the trial of the case
in that the court in its instructions to
the jury submitted the question of the
contributory negligence of the deceased
child, although the defendants did not
plead or offer evidence in support of
contributory negligence as an affirma-
tive defense.

Our disposition of this proposition will
dispose of the pivotal question in this
case.

An examination of the defendants’
answer discloses that defendants did
not plead that the deceased child was
guilty of contributory negligence, but
it discloses that defendants did plead
that the father and mother of the
child were careless and negligent in
permitting the child to go upon the
street unaccompanied by anyone, and
that the parents’ negligence was the
proximate cause of the alleged injury
and resulting death of the child.

The plaintiffs, as parents of the minor
child, filed their reply in which they
specifically denied that their conduct
and action contributed to the accident
and resulting death of their minor
child.

Plaintiffs here contend that the trial
court committed reversible error in its
instructions Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, as they
appear in the record.

“(5) The jury are instructed that by
the term ‘contributory negligence’, as
used in these instructions, is meant
the want of ordinary care on the part
of the person injured. That is to say,
the want of such care as an ordinarily
prudent person would have exercised
under the same or similar circumstances,
which taken either by itself, or in
connection with the negligence of the
defendant, if any, proximately caused
the injury.

“You are further instructed that the
law places upon all persons the duty of
exercising ordinary care for their safe-
ty, and even though you should believe
from the evidence that the defendant
was riegligent, if the evidence also
shows that the plaintiff’s intestate was
hegligent, and that such negligence
caused or materially contributed to
his injuries, your verdict should be for
the defendant.

“The burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiffs’ intestate, rests upon the defend-
ant (unless the same appears from the
evidence of the plaintiff.)

“(6) You are instructed that while
the burden of proving contributory neg-
ligence by a preponderance of the evi-
dence is upon the defendants, still such
contributory negligence may appear
from the evidence offered in behalf of
the plaintiffs, and, if from the evidence
offered in behalf of the plaintiffs, gr
from the evidence offered in behalf of
the defendants, the jury find that the
plaintiffs’ intestate, the child of the
plaintiffs, was guilty of contributory
negligence, the plaintiffs cannot recov-
er, and your verdict should be in favor
of the defendants.

“However, in this connection, con-
sidering the question as to whether or
not plaintiffs’ intestate was guilty of
contributory negligence at the time
and place of the accident, the jury will
take into consideration the age of the
plaintiffs’ intestate, the surrounding cir-
cumstances, the capacity and under-
standing of the plaintiffs’ intestate, to-
gether with his experience in human
affairs, if any, and his actions at the
time of the accident.

597

“(7) Whether a child may be guilty
of contributory negligence, is deter-
mined by factors of age, intelligence,
experience, discretion, previous train-
ing, maturity, alertness, and nature of
danger encountered.

“(8) Whether the child in this case
had sufficient capacity to understand
the danger involved in running out into
the street, so as to charge him with
contributory negligence, is a question
for the jury to determine; and it is
also a question for the jury to deter-
mine, under all the facts whether the
child exercised such care and discre-
tion as might reasonably be expected
of one of his age, capacity, and ex-
perience situated as he then was.”

The errors inherent in each of these
instructions are that the issue of con-
tributory negligence of the child was
not pleaded by the defendants and
therefore was not an issue properly
submitted to the jury. We have hereto-
fore held that contributory negligence
is an affirmative defense which must
be pleaded and proven.

Shunkamolah v. Potter Delco, 131
Okla. 272, 268 P. 270. In that opinion,
we said:

“This court has repeatedly held that
neither the defense of contributory
negligence nor that of assumption of
risk is available to a defendant who
fails to plead these defenses. Cosden
Pipe Line Co. v. Berry, 87 Okla. 237,
210 P. 141; Colonial Refining Co. v.
Lathrop, 64 Okla. 47, 166 P. 747; Arm-
strong v. Greene, 113 Okla. 254, 241 P.
789; Town of Depew v. Kilgore, 117
Okla. 263, 246 P. 606.”

This rule was restated in the more
recent case of G. A, Nichols Co. v.
Lockhart, 191 Okla. 296, 129 P. 2d 599,

Plaintiffs further contend that the
court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury that, in no event, could the plain-
tiffs’ minor son be charged with contrib-
utory negligence, due to his age at
the time of the accident. In support of

this contention they cite the text in 45
C.J., Negligence, 1002. Also, 65 C.J.S.,
Negligence, §145, p. 785.

598

Under sec. 6, art. 23, of the Con-
stitution of Oklahoma, the defense of
contributory negligence, in all cases
whatsoever, must be submitted to the
jury as a question of fact. We so held
in Witt v. Houston, 207 Okla. 25, 246
P, 2d 753. In that case the contributory
negligence of a child five years of age
was submitted to the jury.

It is unnecessary here to pass upon
the question of whether the constitu-
tional provision must be applied in a
situation when a child is so young as
to be wholly unable to apprehend ap-
parent danger, and to avoid exposure to
it.

The case is reversed upon the ground
that the instructions noted were not
within the issues joined. The cause is
remanded for a new trial.

HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,
DAVISON, and WILLIAMS, JJ., con-
cur.

SHELL OIL CO. v. HOWELL et al.
No. 35232. April 21, 1953.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1953.

258 P. 2d 661.

George W. Cunningham, Robert Hart,
Gordon Watts, and Jesse M. Davis,
Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Shilling & Shilling, Ardmore, for de-
fendants in error.

BLACKBIRD, J. Defendants in error,
owners of a 120-acre tract in what is

- referred to as the “Wildcat Jim” area

of Carter county, Oklahoma, com-
menced this action as plaintiffs against
the defendant, plaintiff in error herein,
who is the assignee of an oil and gas
lease on said tract, to cancel a ma-
jor portion of said lease for breach of
the implied covenant to further de-
velop it. The parties will hereinafter
be referred to as they appeared in the
trial court. Defendants’ appeal is from
the trial court’s judgment in the form of
an alternative or conditional decree can-
celing the lease, except as to 10 acres
immediately surrounding two herein-
after described shallow producing wells
on the tract, unless, within 20 days, it
agreed to, and thereafter did, drill on
the undeveloped portions of the lease,
specifically as follows: (1) a shallow
well to be commenced within 60 days,
and (2) a deeper well to be commenced.
within six months,

The facts are undisputed and the per-
tinent ones are as hereinafter set forth.
Plaintiffs’ ownership and defendant’s
lease cover the S.% N.E.% and N.W.%
N.E.% of section 18, township 2 south,
range 2 west. The lease was orig-
inally executed and delivered by
plaintiffs’ predecessors in title to
Wirt Franklin on November 21, 1925.
Previous to the time defendant ac-
quired the lease in 1949, two small wells
had been drilled on it. The first one
drilled in 1926, in the southeast corner
of this L-shaped tract was located’ on

the 10 acres described as the S.E.%
S.E.% N.E.% and produced oil in
meager quantities for a short time.
The second well, which was drilled on
the 10 acres immediately north of the
first, was completed in 1936, as a small
producer and at the time of the trial
was producing only 2 barrels of oil
per day. Previous to its acquisition of
the lease defendant had conducted a
preliminary geophysical survey of said
area which was completed about the
time -it acquired the lease. It appears
that the purpose of this survey and its
subsequent work and study of the area
was to determine the existence of an
oil-bearing sand or formation at lower
levels than any theretofore explored.
Accordingly, the first well it drilled was
to a depth of approximately 4,000 feet
—some 1,400 feet below any known pro-
ducing formation in that area. This -well
was located in the northeast corner
of the L shaped tract on a 10 acres spe-
cifically described as the N.E.¥%4 N.W.%
N.E.% of section 18. It was drilled
to the lower horizons and plugged back
and completed as a small producer at
the 2,600 foot level, approximately the
same depth from which the older well
was producing. No further wells were
drilled on the lease, but according to
the evidence, the defendant continued
its study of the area, and finally, about
the time this suit was filed, arrived at
the conclusion that the deeper produc-
tion, if any, lay under a strata or
geophysical “high”, the center and
highest part of which was southwest of
the lease in question. From its infor-
mation, defendant concluded that the
southwestern portion of the lease might
extend over the northeastern edge of
this structure, but that the initial ex-
ploratory well should be drilled higher
or nearer the dome of the “high” or
top of the structure, at a location
southwest of this lease. It estimated
that a well to test this lower strata
would probably cost $100,000, and be-
cause of this and the fact that it owned
leases on less than 500 acres in the
area, it began to contact other holders
of leases over the “high” to seek their

599

aid and financial assistance in drilling
an exploratory well farther up on the
“high” than plaintiffs’ land extended.
There was testimony to the effect that
if this venture was successful in dis-
covering oil in paying quantities, de-
fendant entertained the idea of there-
after drilling a so-called “edge” well
on the southwestern part of plaintiffs’
tract.

On December 14, 1950, plaintiffs,
through their attorneys, addressed a
letter to the defendant company call-
ing its attention to the fact that there
were only two small wells on two 10-
acre tracts of the lease, asserting that
nothing had been done by way of de-
veloping the remaining 100 acres there-
of, demanding that said company pro-
ceed at once with further development,
and expressing a desire to be given a
definite answer within 30 days, as to
what the company proposed to do.
Without further correspondence be-
tween the parties, the company took
plaintiffs’ demand under consideration
and its division exploration engineer
at Oklahoma City, Mr. Eyler, upon a
review of the company’s subsurface in-
formation, decided and recommended
to its production manager, that an ef-
fort be made to contract with some
other operator to explore the shallow
depths on the undeveloped portion of
the lease. Such a transaction or proj-
ect is what, in the oil industry, is
commonly termed and will hereinafter
be referred to as a “farm out”. Mr.
Eyler testified that such a recommen-
dation is the customary procedure of
his department when he thinks the
profit derived from such exploration
will not be large. He also testified that
where it was found impossible to get a
satisfactory “farm out”, the customary
procedure was for him to re-examine
or reconsider the question and make
further recommendation as to whether
or not the company should itself do the
drilling, or relinquish the lease. In ac-
cord with Mr. Eyler’s recommendation,
Mr. Austin, of the defendant company’s
land department, contacted various per-
sons we shall call “independent” op-

600

erators, who had shown an interest
in the lease prior to the time Shell had
drilled its well. Finally, on January 19,
1951, defendant obtained a written pro~
posal from a Mr, Elmer Wahl to ac~
cept defendant’s “farm out” proposi-~
tion providing for the commencement of
a well on the undeveloped portion of
the lease within 60 days from the date
of the signing of a contract, to a depth
of 3,500 feet, to test the Des Moines
formation. Plaintiffs commenced this
action on the same day. During the
next week thereafter, and before de~
fendant filed its answer, it advised
plaintiffs it could and would contract
with Wahl for further development of
the lease as described in the “farm
out” proposal, and requested that they
dismiss this action so it could go ahead
and obtain such a contract with Wahl.
Plaintiffs refused to accede to said re-
quest of the defendant, who thereupon
filed a general denial for its answer
to plaintiffs’ petition.

One of the questions, and a decisive
one, presented in defendant’s appeal
from the trial court’s judgment of al-
ternative cancellation, is whether said
judgment is warranted on the basis of
the facts herein.

Plaintiffs admittedly sought the ap~
plication to this case of the rule in
Doss Oil Royalty Co, v. The Texas Co.,
192 Okla. 359, 137 P. 2d 934, where we
held that the evidence that an oil op-
erator had failed for an unreasonable
length of time to develop certain por-
tions of a lease was sufficient to with-
stand his demurrer to the lessor’s peti-
tion for cancellation of the undeveloped
portions of the lease. This was made
evident when they rested their case
as soon as they had established the
dates and the locations of the previous

* drilling on the lease, without showing
any established drilling pattern or spac-
ing, or other circumstance, to indicate
the need or advisability of drilling other
wells on the undeveloped portions of the
lease.‘ As noted in Skelly Oil Co. v.
Boles, 193 Okla. 308, 142 P. 2d 969, the
notable result of our decision in the

Doss case was to relieve the lessor
from having to prove- that further drill~
ing would be profitable or was re-
quired under the “prudent operator”
rule in a case where the lessee’s delay
in further development had been of
“anconscionable” duration. We also
said in the latter case:

“Just how long such delay can be
excused as conscionable depends in
each ease upon the circumstances rath~
er than upon the precise time which
has expired. In view of the disposition
of the lessee to investigate the possi-
bility of other deeper producing sands
in the area, the fact that such disposi-
tion was accompanied by actual inves-
tigations involving the expenditure of
money and by negotiations with other
operators for the purpose of sharing ex~
penses of deep drilling tests, and in
view of the fact that the lessee was
still producing a number of wells on
the leased premises, we are impelled
to hold that the delay in this case was
not unconscionable, which must ap-
pear in view of the absence of proof
that the drilling would probably be
profitable.”

In this case there is no evidence or
intimation that the drilling of other
shallow wells on the undeveloped por-
tions of this lease would be profitable
and we have abundant proof of the
lessee’s disposition to investigate for-
mations believed to exist at lower
depths, as in the above-quoted case.

In their argument, plaintiffs empha~
size the fact that the lease has been in
existence for more than 25 years with
only three wells drilled thereon, only
one of which the defendant has drilled.
However, it is important that this de-
fendant was not assigned this lease un-
til less than 15 months prior to the
commencement of this action and did
not complete its well until less than
6 months before this time. During
this last 6 months it was probing and
studying the possibility of obtaining
worthwhile production from the deeper
strata in that area. Incidentally, it is
indicated that these studies were not
completed until after this suit was

filed. The defendant’s reluctance to ex-
pend any more of its own money on
drilling to the shallow formation under
this lease can well be understood. In
some respects the facts here are sim-
ilar to those in Hay v. Shell Petro-
leum Corp., Dist. Ct. W. D. Okla., 30
Fed. Supp. 663, in which it was said:

“Tt is the contention of the plaintiffs
that the defendant Shell had no right
to refuse a release if it did not want
to drill. Under the terms of the lease,
it had the right to defer drilling until
the development could be made in an
ordinary and profitable manner and if
the investigation as to the probable
production of the proposed Hay No. 2
was proceeding with reasonable def-
initeness and the defendant was not sat-
isfied that it could drill the well and
secure production sufficient in amount
to meet the expenses of drilling, equip-
ping and operating the well and in ad-
dition thereto produce a reasonable prof-
it, then it was under no obligation
to do so. It could not, however, con-
tinue to hold the lease and refuse
to develop the land for an_ indefinite
period or for an unreasonable period
but since the suit was filed in less than
twelve months after the demand was
made, in view of the new processes
which were being resorted to in the
field to go to deeper sands, the court
is of the opinion that the defendant
Shell Petroleum Corporation did not
abuse a reasonable discretion in _re-
fusing a release of the premises.” (Em-
phasis ours.)

As to the above and related matters,
see, also, Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell
(C. C.) 100 Fed. 2d 945.

He who seeks equity must do equity;
and the fact that a lessor may have an
opportunity to re-lease his land for a
handsome new bonus is no more ground,
in itself, for canceling the existing
lease, than is the lessee’s desire to hold
the lease for speculative purposes, a
ground for refusing such relief. That

would be unfair to the lessee, who in
this case has invested much more money
in the lease than it apparently has any
hope or chance of getting out of it
without reasonable opportunity to ex-

601

plore deeper horizons in a prudent and
financial practicable manner. Here, it
would appear from plaintiffs’ haste in
filing this action and their arbitrary and
unexplained refusal to dismiss it, when
apprised of Mr. Wahl’s proposal, that
they may have had some other motive
for their conduct than the desire for
further drilling operations on their land.
As said in Ferguson v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
192 Okla. 355, 187 P. 2d 940:

«* * * Tt (the rule laid down in the
Doss case) should not be used to per-
mit a lessor to secure cancellation so
that he may sell a new lease on the
land at a speculative price made pos-
sible by large expenditures of a lessee
in drilling near-by tests. Neither should
it be used to penalize a lessee for the
exercise of caution in the conduct of
an expensive and hazardous enterprise,
which if successful will aid both lessor
and lessee.”

Upon consideration of the undisputed.
evidence in this case, we think the facts
here do not justify the inference that
the defendant had abandoned any part
of this lease, or established any cause for
cancellation of the lease, and the trial
court should have so concluded, wholly
and unconditionally denying plaintiffs
any such relief. Its judgment to the
contrary is erroneous. Because of the
growing tendency of litigants to rely on
the periods of undevelopment appearing
in reported cases like the Doss case,
supra, to relieve them of introducing
any evidence under the “prudent opera-
tor” rule, regardless of other circum-
stances, and despite the hereinbefore
quoted language of the Skelly Oil Com-
pany case, we want it clearly under-
stood that we do not intend nor purport
to hold that a lessor’s failure to drill
for the period in question here may be
permissible, or not ground for cancel-
lation, under different circumstances.
Obviously, a lessee may evidence n
intention to abandon a lease or be held
to have abandoned it, soon after his
last drilling thereon. We merely hold
that the failure of this lessee to drill
during the period and under the
circumstances shown here was not

602 EE

ground for cancellation of the lease at
the time of the trial, And we may add,
as we did in the Skelly Oil Company
case, supra, that our refusal to uphold
the trial court’s judgment does not mean
that such delay as was here shown
may not continue until it becomes un-
reasonable or unconscionable and thus
grow into valid ground for cancellation
of the lease at some time in the future.
As a corollary, it follows that our de-
cision herein should not be interpreted
as licensing the defendant to do nothing
in the near future toward further de-
velopment of the lease. Nor should it
be taken as a judicial declaration that
defendant may not, within a short pe-
riod, be responsible for conduct which,
in law, would amount to an abandon-
ment of the lease, or give just cause
for its cancellation. On the other hand,
we believe that said company should be
free to use what devices it may have or
be able to procure for the lease’s fur-
ther development, and not be shackled
with a court order or judgment which
nowhere therein provides, for the pur-
pose it presumably is calculated to ac-
complish, any means for extensions of
time for commencement of operations,
if the necessity therefor should arise;
and which, as is indicated by the evi-
dence in this case, tends to cast a legal
cloud or question of uncertainty as to
the duration of the lease and to “chill”
the inclinations of those who might
assist the company in such project, thus
limiting or restricting its opportunities
of accomplishing further development
in a competent and prudent manner.

The judgment of the trial court is
hereby reversed, with directions to said
court to set it aside and enter judgment
for the defendant.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, and WIL-
LIAMS, JJ., concur. O'NEAL, J., dis-
sents.

GROENDYKE TRANSPORT, Inc.,
et al. v. STATE,

No. 85142, May 26, 1958.
"968 P. 2a 670.

Bernard I. Parker, Tulsa, for plain-
tiffs in error.

Bill Logan, Lawton, for defendants
in error.

James G. Welch, Oklahoma City, for
Corporation Commission.

WILLIAMS, J. George Gutshall and
Rodney Varner applied to the Corpora-
tion Commission for a Class B motor
carrier’s permit. Notice was given and
hearing had as provided by law. Appli-
cants were not represented by counsel
in the proceedings before the Corpora-
tion Commission. Several trucking com-
panies appeared to protest and after
the hearing the commission granted the
permit. Protestants have duly appealed.

Rule 4 (c) of Order No, 15639 of the
Corporation Commission is not incor-
porated in the record in this cause, but
it is referred to therein and portions
thereof are set forth in the protestant’s
brief, and, since it is legislative in its
character, this court may properly take
judicial notice of its contents. See Oils
Inc. v. Corporation Commission of Okla-
homa, 165 Okla. 202, 25 P. 2d 703. Said
rule provides in substance that appli-
cants for a Class B intrastate common
carrier’s permit shall make a showing
of public convenience and necessity, and
that, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it will be presumed that ex-
isting carriers are rendering adequate
service in the area concerned.

Mr. Gutshall testified in part that the
reason for the application was that Mr.
Varner had bought a new transport
two years previously to haul gasoline,
etc, to their own station and to their
pulk customers; that one of their friends
told Mr. Varner “I could turn you
three or four loads of gas if you had an
O.T.C. permit***”; that he had not had
any request for service from service
station operators who did not own
transports of their own; that he did not
know all of the trucking concerns that
operate in the area covered by the ap-
plication, but knew two of them in Law-
ton; that he didn’t know whether or not
the present operators were giving satis-
factory service. Witness Mitchell, the
only shipper witness called, testified
that he was unable to get service in
1947; that Bacon Oil Company hauled
for him up to that year; that he had
not tendered them any business since

603

1947; that he had not tried to get any
trucking concern to handle his needs
since 1947. Mr. Varner testified that
they didn’t intend to try to build up a
big business; that if they went into the
transport business “full time”, he would
have to quit running the service station
or hire a full time driver, and that he
was not going to do either.

For the protestants, the manager of
Nichols Truck Line testified that his
company had 10 units of equipment, of
which 3 were idle at that time; that
his company solicits business and could
take care of additional business; he
named 16 trucking concerns which were
competing for business in the area cov-
ered by the application. A representa-
tive of Groendyke Transport, Inc., testi-
fied that his company had about 140
pieces of equipment, of which 30 are
used in Oklahoma; that not all of the
units were busy, and additional business
could be handled; that his company
solicited business in the area covered by
the application. The manager of Earl
Bray, Inc., testified that his company
operated 12 pieces of equipment in Ok-
lahoma; that his company had never
turned down any offered business. A
representative of T & J Transport testi-
fied that his company had 8 units op-
erating at about 50 or 60 percent of
capacity; that his company solicits busi-
ness in the area covered by the applica-
tion; that no business had been turned
down.

Applicants cite Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. State, 181 Okla. 246,
71 P. 2d 747, to the effect that, on ap-
peal, actions of the Corporation Com-
mission shall be deemed prima facie
just, reasonable and correct, and that
the burden of rebutting this presump-
tion lies with the complaining party.

A careful examination of the evi-
dence, of which the above summary is
the most pertinent part, convinces us
that applicants did not overturn the pre-
sumption created by Rule 4 (c) of Order
No. 15639 of the Commission; that they

604

did not prove public convenience and
necessity; and that protestants did re-
but the presumption noted in the South-
western Bell Telephone Co. case above
styled.

The Order of the Corporation Com-
mission is vacated.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and DAVISON,

ARNOLD, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., con-
cur. CORN, J., dissents.

CHASTAIN et al. v. OKLAHOMA CITY.
No. 35490. May 26, 1953.

258 P. 2d 685.

J. D. Chastain, Oklahoma City, for
plaintiffs in error.

A. L, Jeffrey, Municipal Counselor,
and Arthur Leach, Asst. Municipal
Counselor, Oklahoma City, for defend-
ant in error.

DAVISON, J. J. D. Chastain, as plain-
tiff, filed this suit seeking to enjoin the
city of Oklahoma City, as defendant,
from collecting a sewer service charge
as provided for by a city ordinance.
The partiés will be referred to as they
appeared in the trial court.

The defendant, through its proper of-
ficers, enacted a city ordinance on July
24, 1951, whereby it was provided that
a sewer service charge should be made
against, and collected from, those in-
habitants using the city sewers, Plain-
tiff, a resident taxpayer, owned his
home in the city. On October 11, 1951,
he paid $2 upon the allegedly “void
and illegal tax, under protest.” On the
same day, he filed his petition in the
district court praying that “said alleged
ordinance as applied to plaintiff, and
to all others similarly situated, be can-
celed, held for naught, and that this
plaintiff have and be by the court
awarded judgment herein, for the said

Le 605

$2.00 so expended under protest as
aforesaid, and that said defendant
mucipality be restrained and enjoined
from collected said sums, or any sum
under the said void ordinance, * * *”
Subsequently, he filed an amended
petition seeking the same general re-
lief. The defendant’s demurrer to the
amended petition was sustained and,
upon plaintiffs election to stand upon
his amended petition, the cause was dis-
missed and plaintiff has appealed.

Although plaintiff may not have
placed himself in such a position tech-
nically that his right to maintain this
action is unquestionable, the importance
of the principal issue, to the public gen-
erally, requires that it be determined.
Plaintiff alleged and argued that the
ordinance was unconstitutional in that:
the title thereof was insufficient; it
impaired the obligation of contract; and
it violated the provisions of art. 10, §27,
Oklahoma Constitution. These proposi-
tions will be discussed in the order out-
lined.

There is no material difference be-
tween the facts in the case at bar and
those in the case of Sharp v. Hall, 198
Okla. 678, 181 P. 2d 972, wherein we
held that such an ordinance did not de-
prive a user of the sewer of his prop-
erty without due process of law. Also,
it was there held that, since a sewer
system was a public utility, the munic-
ipality could lawfully make a charge
for its use “basing the amount thereof
on amount of water used and making
the person purchasing the water liable
therefor.” The reported case determines
most of the questions with regard to
such an ordinance.

As to the sufficiency of the title of the
ordinance, it clearly and fairly ex-
pressed the subject with a concise out-
line of the major provisions. Some of
the details were not specifically men-
tioned but they all related to the same
general subject and object of the act.
It clearly met the constitutional re-
quirement, as recently interpreted in
the case of Jackson v. Yochum, 206

Okla, 531, 244 P. 2d 1134, Therein it was
held:

“Section 57, art. 5, of the Constitution
of Oklahoma, providing every act of
the Legislature shall embrace but one
subject, which shall be clearly ex-
pressed in its title, is satisfied if the
act has but one general subject and
that is fairly indicated by the title. It
may have many details, but if they
all relate to the same general subject
or object, they are properly included
therein. The purpose of this provision
of the Constitution was to forbid the
Legislature from embracing in any one
act two or more unconnected sub-
jects.”

As to whether or not the provisions of
the ordinance impair the obligation of
contract, the plaintiff's petition con-
tains no allegation of a contract between
the plaintiff and the city. Plaintiff was
not obligated to purchase any amount
of water at any price nor was the city
obligated by contract to furnish any
amount of water at any price. The only

obligation on the part of the city was -

as to discrimination between users—
the same obligation that rests upon any
public utility corporation. Had the water
been furnished by a private corpora-
tion, power to fix the rates would have
been under the jurisdiction of the Cor-
poration Commission and an order by
it “establishing a higher rate for such
commodity”, would “not impair the ob-
ligation of such contract.” Southern Oil
Corp. v. Yale Nat. Gas Co., 89 Okla. 121,
214 P. 131. The Arkansas court, in the
case of Arkansas Light & Power Co. v.
Cooley, 138 Ark. 390, 211 S.W. 664, said
that: “An individual can acquire no
vested right as against the public in the
continued service of a public utility.”
The ordinance in that case, raising the
water rate, was held invalid only be-
cause it was not properly adopted.

Plaintiff devotes most of the argu-
ment in his brief to the contention that
the ordinance is in conflict with art.
10, §27, of the Oklahoma Constitution.
which provides that:

“Any incorporated city or town in this
State may, by a majority of the quali-

606

fied property tax-paying voters of
such city or town, voting at an election
to be held for that purpose, be allowed
to become indebted in a larger amount
than that specified in section twenty-
six, for the purpose of purchasing or
constructing public utilities, or for re-
pairing the same, to be owned exclu-
sively by such city: Provided, That
any such city or town incurring any
such indebtedness requiring the assent
of the voters as aforesaid, shall have
the power to provide for, and, before
or at the time of incurring such in-
debtedness, shall provide for the collec-
tion of an annual tax in addition to the
other taxes provided for by this Con-
stitution, sufficient to pay the interest
on such indebtedness as it falls due,
and also to constitute a sinking fund
for the payment of the principal thereof
within twenty-five years from the time
of contracting the same.”

It is his position that the reasoning
in the case of Burch v. City of Pauls
Valley, 201 Okla. 78, 201 P. 2d 247, ap-
plies here and that the reported case, in
effect, overruled the decision in the
case of Sharp v. Hall, supra. Such con-
clusion is erroneous. The two cases
have nothing in common other than
that they deal with municipal sewer
systems. The Sharp v. Hall case held
that a city ordinance, fixing and impos-
ing a sewer service charge, similar to
that in the case at bar, was constitu-
tional. The Burch case held that a city
ordinance, authorizing the creation of a
debt for extension and improvement of
a public water system and the issuance
of bonds to pay therefor, payable from
the revenues of the water department,
was unconstitutional, being violative of
art. 10, §27, of the Constitution. The de-
cision in the Burch case was founded
upon the constitutional limitation upon a
municipality to become indebted. The
Sharp case and the case at bar have
no connection with municipal indebt-
edness; the ordinance. in each pre-
scribed what rates were to be charged
for a municipally owned self-sustain-
ing utility and to what purpose the prof-
its derived therefrom were to be ap-
propriated. Neither the Constitution, nor
the statutes, specifically provide there-

for, St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Andrews,
137 Okla. 222, 278 P. 617; Sharp v. Hall,
supra.

The ordinance was not unconstitu-
tional and the petition of plaintiff, there-
fore, did not state a cause of action.
The trial court was correct in so hold-
ing.

Judgment affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, ARNOLD, WILLIAMS, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

SMITH v. BARRY et ux.
No. 34809. May 26, 1953,
258 P. 2d 165.

Hughey Baker, Tulsa, for plaintiff in
error.

David H. Sanders, Tulsa, for defend-
ant in error.

O’NEAL, J. The pivotal question pre-
sented for our consideration is whether
the trial court had jurisdiction of the
cause of action upon which plaintiffs
sought to recover a money judgment
against the defendant.

Charles B. Barry and Elizabeth Bar-
ry, husband and wife, were plaintiffs
below and John E. Smith was defend-
ant below, and they will be referred to
in the same position as they appeared
in the trial court.

The defendant was engaged in the
business of building and selling houses
in the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma. On Sep-
tember 13, 1947, defendant entered into
a contract with plaintiffs to sell them
certain designated lots and a house then
under construction. The building was
completed in January, 1948, and the
property was conveyed by defendant
to plaintiffs jointly. The contract of sale
and purchase, among other things, pro-
vided that the defendant would com-
plete the construction of a five-room
frame house on the described premises,
which construction was to meet the
minimum requirements of the Federal
Housing Administration. The agreement
further provided for the installation of a

607

septic tank with lateral connections
which were to be in conformity with the
rules and regulations of the Health De-
partment of the State of Oklahoma.

Shortly after plaintiffs moved into the
house they discovered that the sewer-
age disposal system, installed by the
defendant, was defectively constructed
and that sewage was escaping from the
lateral lines which created an unsani-
tary condition upon plaintiffs’ prem-
ises. It was further found that a portion
of the sewerage disposal system, by er-
ror, had been partially constructed upon
the adjoining premises to plaintiffs’
property. Upon complaint made by
plaintiffs to defendant, he rebuilt and
remodeled the septic tank but he de-
clined and refused to relay the lateral
lines connected with the tank. In the
present action plaintiffs sought to re-
cover damages upon the ground that
the sewerage disposal system as a
whole did not meet the minimum re-
quirements of the sale and purchase
contract, nor the requirements of the
Health Department of the State of Okla-
homa; and that the faulty construction
of the system resulted in damages as
outlined in plaintiffs’ petition.

The defendant contends here and in
the lower court that plaintiffs pleaded
four separate and distinct causes of ac-
tion in which plaintiffs sought to re-
cover the sum of $4,522.80 in each cause,
which aggregate sum exceeds the juris-
diction of the common pleas court of
Tulsa county, Oklahoma. Title 20 O.S.
1951 §651.

Defendant challenged the petition by
filing a motion to strike, demurrer, and
a motion to require plaintiffs to elect
upon which alleged cause of action they
sought relief. These respective motions
and the demurrer were overruled. Al-
though plaintiffs’ petition is not a model
of impeccable pleading, it is clear to us
that plaintiffs pleaded one single cause
of action within the jurisdiction of the
court of common pleas. Plaintiffs set
forth their cause of action in four sep-
arate paragraphs which they errone-

608

ously characterized as first, second,
third and fourth causes of action.

It will be noted that in their so-called,
“First Cause of Action,” they seek to
recover the sum of $452.80 as the sum
expended by them in the construction of
reconditioning the sewerage disposal
plant, and for the further sum of $4,000
which they claim as damages for the
humiliation, intimidation and embar-
rassment which they allege they suf~
fered by reason of the unsanitary con-
dition of their premises.

In plaintiffs’ designated, “Second
Cause of Action,” they pleaded a
breach of the express warranty of the
sale and purchase contract, and by ref-
erence allege all of the allegations con-
tained in their first cause of action,
and pray for damages in the sum of
$522.80 as costs and expense of recon-
ditioning the sewerage disposal plant,
and the sum of $4,000 for alleged humil-
iation, intimidation and embarrassment
as set forth in the previous count.

In plaintiffs’ designated, “Third
Cause of Action,” they reallege all of
the allegations contained in their first
and second causes of action and then
allege a breach of the implied warranty

of fitness of the sewerage disposal’

plant and pray for damages in the sum
of $452.80 as costs and expense in the
repairing thereof, and pleaded for dam-
ages in the sum of $4,000 for humilia-
tion, intimidation and embarrassment
as pleaded in their first and second
causes of action.

In plaintiffs’ designated, “Fourth
Cause of Action,” they reallege all of
the allegations stated in their first,
second and third causes of action, and
then allege that they expended the sum
of $522.80 in reconditioning and repair-
ing the sewerage disposal system and
further allege that defendant represent-
ed that the disposal plant would meet
the requirements of the State Board of
Health and would be approved by it,
which statements plaintiffs allege were
untrue; that the Health Department
subsequently required plaintiffs to re-

pair and recondition said disposal sys-
tem. In this count plaintiffs reduced
their claim to $3,000 for humiliation, in-
timidation and embarrassment as al-
leged in previous counts, but added a
claim for $1,000 as compensatory and
punitive damages.

Defendant, in answer to plaintiffs’
petition, denies that plaintiffs suffered
any damages and affirmatively pleads
that he performed all of his obligations
under his contract with plaintiffs.

As we construe plaintiffs’ petition
they stated one cause of action as dam-
ages resulting from the alleged improper
installation and construction by defend-
ant of the sewerage disposal system
upon plaintiffs’ premises. The four
separate so-called causes of action at-
tempted to state the four separate the-
ories of law upon which the plaintiffs
sought relief.

As a general rule, the allegations with
reference to the amount of recovery,
control over the allegations in the pray-
er of a petition, but it will be noted
here that but one recovery was sought
in a sum within the jurisdiction of the
court. The trial court so construed the
petition for in the court’s instructions it
told the jury that although plaintiffs
separated their said petition into four
separate causes of action alleging sub-
stantially the same facts, these facts
are not inconsistent with each other,
but ask only one judgment against the
defendant in the sum of $4,522.80.

This position is again supported by
the court’s instruction No. 3, which ad-
vised the jury as follows:

“Gentlemen of the Jury, you are in-
structed that as a matter of law that
all of the separately numbered causes
of action stated in plaintiffs petition
shall be construed as one cause of ac-
tion, and that in the event your verdict
is for the plaintiffs, there shall be only
one recovery, taking the four sepa-
rate causes of action concurrently and
together, and the one judgment, if for
the plaintiffs, will satisfy all the four
causes of action. And in no event shall
the verdict be for more than $4,522.00.”

*-Much confusion in pleadings may be
avoided by complying with the man-
date of the statutein Title 12 O.S. 1951
§264, which provides: .

“That the petition must contain *** a
statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise
language and without repetition.”

Defendant here asserts that the trial
court erred in refusing to strike all of
the allegations in plaintiffs’ petition in
its first, second, third and fourth des~
ignated causes of action, wherein plain-
tiffs alleged that they were subjected to
humiliation, intimidation and embar-
rassment, and a threat of being sued
for damages by others by reason of the
unsanitary condition of their premises,
occasioned by the defective disposal
system, and under which allegations
plaintiffs sought to recover damages in
the sum of $4,000. Defendant further
asserts that the court erred in refusing
to strike from plaintiffs’ fourth cause
of action their claim for _ exemplary
damages.

Further, defendazit asserts that the
court erred in not sustaining defendant’s
demurrer to plaintiffs’ petition. In our
view of the case the defendant’s motion
to strike, as well as his demurrer, were
properly overruled.

With reference to defendant's motion
to, strike the allegation of punitive and
exemplary: damages, as alleged in
plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action,: the
record shows that this allegation was
deleted upon plaintiffs’ motion. The re-
fusal of the court to strike the words,
“humiliation; intimidation. and embar-
tassmént” from each of said four des~
ignated counts or causes of action, even
if erroneous, was harmless’ error, for
the reason that the court entirely elimni-

_ hated all reference to said allegations
in its instructions to the jury covering
the ‘question of damages. Neither was
there error in overruling - defendant’s
demurrer to the plaintiffs’.petition for,
as. we have seen, the petition alleged
a cause of action upon, which. plaintiffs
were ‘entitled to some relief, -providing

- stallations,

609

that the proof supported the allegations
of the petition. The demurrer to the pe-
tition was also properly overruled for,
as we have pointed out, the total sum,
sued for did not exceed the jurisdiction
of the court of common pleas of Tulsa
county, Oklahoma.

The remaining error asserted is that
the court erred in overruling defend-
ant’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ evidence,
and erred in it sustaining defendant’s
motion for a directed verdict. We find
substantial evidence that the sewerage
disposal system did not comply with
the contract of purchase and sale of the
premises; nor with the standard of re-
quirements of the Oklahoma State
Health Department; that under the or-
der of the latter agency, the defendant
was required to and did make substan-
tial changes in the septic tank, but re-
fused to relay or relocate the lateral
lines which, by his error, had been
laid in part. upon an adjoining lot to
plaintiffs’ premises.’

There is evidence to the effect that
plaintiffs expended the sum of $522.80
in repairing and putting the system in
a workable condition. Moreover, the
evidence supports plaintiffs’ allega-
tions that sewage seeped from the in-
‘stood in sumps upon plain-
tiffs’ premises and became sufficiently
obnoxious to cause substantial appre-
hension of complaints from neighbors,
and probable suits by them to abate
the nuisance. The verdict for $750 was
well within the issues and proof to sup-
port the same and the amount of the
verdict is not here challenged.

We have many..tirnes said:

“If there is any testimony reason-
ably tending to support the verdict of
the jury, and said verdict has been ap-
proved -by.the trial:court, the judgment
will not be disturbed.on appeal. »” Newson
v. Medis,°205 Okla. 574, 239 P. 2d 784.

Lastly, defendant contends that the
court's uctions Nos. 3 to 27, inclu-
sive, wer erroneously given. It we uid,
unduly, tend this opinion, to, anal 1

610

to do in view of defendant’s position in
his brief which limits his criticism to in-
structions 6, 15, 16 and 22. It is asserted
that these instructions are inconsistent
with one another. We think they are
consistent with the various issues joined
and the evidence in support thereof.
Plaintiffs were entitled to instructions
upon each of their theories if supported
by substantial evidence. We find that
the instructions as a whole fairly sub-
mitted the issues to the jury.

We are committed to the rule that:

“Where the instructions, when con-
sidered as a whole, correctly state the
law and fairly submit the issues to the
jury arising upon the proof, there is
no reversible error.” Marathon Oil Co.
v. Sanders, 180 Okla. 642, 71 P. 2d 956.

In Duncan v. Flagler, 192 Okla. 18,
132 P. 2d 939, we held:

“Although one of a series of instruc-
tions given in a case may contain an im-
proper statement of the law as applied
to the facts in the case, nevertheless,
if it clearly appears from the instruct-
tions, taken as a whole, that no preju-
dice has in fact resulted therefrom,
the error will be considered harmless.”

Finding no substantial error in the
record, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, DAVISON, ARNOLD, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

Appeal of LEWIS.
No. 35682, May 26, 1953.
258 P. 2d 173,

Lynn W. Norman, Sulphur, and Lut-
trell & Luttrell, Norman, for appellant.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and
J. Walker Field, Asst. Atty. Gen., Okla-
homa City, for respondent.

O’NEAL, J. The appellant in these
proceedings is a physician and surgeon
engaged in the practice of medicine
and surgery in the city of Sulphur,
Oklahoma. Previous to the occurrences
disclosed by the record, the appellant
had practiced his profession at Granite,
Oklahoma.

On the afternoon of the 4th day of
November, 1951, appellant was driving
his automobile in a westerly direc-
tion on a state highway at a point ap-
proximately six miles east of the city of
Lawton, Oklahoma, at which point he
was arrested by a state highway patrol-
man and was taken to Lawton, charged
with the offense of driving an automo-
bile while under the influence of alco-
holic beverages and detained in the
county jail until the following day when
he was released upon bond. At a sub-
sequent date this charge was reduced
to a charge of reckless driving and, as
so modified, upon re-arraignment, ap-
pellant pleaded guilty and paid a fine
in the sum of $150 and costs.

A report of the arrest and charge
as modified, the plea of guilty thereun-
der, and the fine imposed in confor-
mity with 47 O.S. 1951 §296, was pre-
pared and filed by the arresting officer
with the Commissioner of Public Safety.

On March 19, 1952, the Commissioner
of Public Safety suspended the driver’s
license of the appellant for a period of
six months from the date of the order.
Appellant filed a petition in the county
court of Murray county, Oklahoma,
praying that the order of the Commis-
sioner of Public Safety be vacated and
set aside. Upon the hearing had in the
county court on May 27, 1952, the court
vacated and set aside the order of the
Commissioner of Public Safety suspend-
ing appellant’s driver’s license. The
Commissioner of Public Safety appealed

611

to the district court where, on July 29,
1952, the latter court entered a judg-
ment finding that the judgment and or-
der of the county court was arbitrary
and capricious, and, therefore, vacated
the same. From the judgment of the
district court, the appellant has per-
fected this appeal and for reversal as-
serts that the offense to which the ap-
pellant entered a plea of guilty was not
an offense under section 295 of 47 O.S.
1951, making it mandatory that the ap-
pellant’s driver’s license be revoked,
but is a case making the matter of the
revocation or suspension of a driver’s
license discretionary with the Commis-
sioner of Public Safety as provided in
section 296 of Title 47 O.S. 1951.

Appellant contends that under the
construction given to the Act in State
v. Moyers, 86 Okla. Cr. 101, 189 P. 2d
952, by the Criminal Court of Appeals
of this state, the district court is limited
to an examination of the testimony pro-
duced in the county court, and that the
judgment there rendered cannot be dis-
turbed except for manifest abuse of
discretion or errors of law. We con-
cur in the interpretation thus placed
upon the Act and this construction will
compel our review of the evidence as
shown by the transcript of the proceed-
ings.

The court in the Moyers case held
that under the discretionary powers
vested in the Commissioner of Public
Safety under 47 O.S. 1951 §§296 and
297 to suspend a driver’s license, that
the Commissioner acts in an executive
or administrative capacity as distin-
guished from a judicial capacity. Sec-
tion 296 of the Act provides that when-
ever any person pleads guilty to any of-
fense relative to the operation of a mo-
tor vehicle upon a public highway, the
court shall report the proceedings had
to the Commissioner of Public Safety.
The Commissioner of Public Safety
upon receipt of such report may, in his
discretion, suspend the driver’s license
of such person, not to exceed one year,
based upon the record of such convic-
tion together with the record and re-

612

ports on file in the office of the Com-
missioner of Public Safety. The appel-
Jant’s driver’s license was suspended
under the provisions of section 296 (the
discretionary suspending statute) and
not under section 295, which latter sec-
tion makes it the mandatory duty of
the Commissioner of Public Safety to
enter an order of revocation of license
upon the receipt of a report of convic-
tion. Under section 300, a person whose
driver’s license has been revoked by the
Commissioner of Public Safety, if the
revocation is under section 295, cannot
appeal the order of suspension to the
county court for a trial de novo. The

right to appeal is granted under sec--

tion 300 only in cases arising under
section 296; under the discretionary
provision of the statute. Gentry v. Blinn,
184 Okla. 9, 84 P. 2d 27; Ashcraft v.
State, 68 Okla. Cr. 308, 98 P, 2d 60.

The county court under section 300
has original jurisdiction to take testi-
mony in cases where the licensee pleads
guilty to an offense under section 296,
as well as in cases of conviction under
said section. If the county court finds
the Commissioner’s order is not justi-
fied he may vacate the same and order
the license restored. If he finds the or-
der justified but concludes the period
of suspension was too long, he can re-
duce the term of such suspension.

The licensee or Commissioner may
appeal from the final order of the coun-
‘ty court to the district court upon a
certified transcript of the proceedings.
Likewise, either party may appeal the
final order of the district court to the
Supreme Court by transcript in like
manner as an appeal is taken from the
county court to the district court. The
county court in the instant case set
aside the order of suspension. The dis~
‘trict court vacated the order of the
county court and reinstated the order of
the Commissioner of Public Safety.

We have. examined the testimony of
the witnesses disclosed in the transcript
‘and find. the judgment of the district
court is supported by substantial evi-

dence. This is a special proceeding as
distinguished from criminal, and the
county court cannot, upon trial de novo,
act arbitrarily with respect to the rein-
statement of a suspended driver’s li-
cense, but its order must, as in all ju-
dicial proceedings, be based upon a
justifiable and factual basis.

A resume of the evidence tends to es-
tablish these facts: Rufus Carothers
was driving east on a public highway
approximately six miles east of Lawton,
and as he approached a Ford car driven
by appellant he observed that appel-
lant’s car was not under control, and to
avoid an accident he drove off of the
paved highway. Mr. Carothers stated
that appellant was either drunk, dopey,
or crazy—that he was not normal.
Carothers reported the near accident
to‘the Highway Patrol and when the pa-
trolman arrived they found appellant
standing near his car which had gone
off of the highway and into a ditch
along the road. Appellant stated that
he was driving from Sulphur to Lawton,
and had stopped at Duncan, Oklahoma,
and drank a soft drink and one whisky.
He stated that he lost control of his
car due to a soft condition of the em-
bankment. He testified that he had
been ill for days prior to his arrest
with a chest infection and had been
taking aureomycin, terramycin and
phenatol compound tablets, and that
the effect of these tablets made him
groggy and drowsy.

Upon cross-examination appellant ad-
mitted that on November 21, 1951, he
was charged with the offense of being
drunk in a public place; that he pleaded
guilty to said charge and paid a fine
thereon. We do not think that this evi-
dence was competent for the reason
that under the Act here in review the
latter charge was not connected with
the operation of a motor vehicle upon
a public highway.

For reasons not disclosed in the rec-
ord, the Commissioner of Public Safety
did not revoke .or suspend appellant’s
driver’s license until five months after

his arrest and conviction upon the
charge of reckless driving. The evi-
dence produced in the county court
by the Commissioner consisted of a
report prepared and filed by the ar-
resting patrolman which, among other
things, disclosed that appellant was
charged, under date of November ‘4,
1951, with driving an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating
beverages; that appellant’s car ran an-
other car off of the paved highway;
that he was very drunk; that he placed
him in the county jail at Lawton, Okla-
homa, and that he found one pint bottle
of whisky about half full in the car.
This report is admissible in the pro-
ceedings had in the county court under
section 300 of Title 47, supra.

Lt. C. W. Adams, in charge of the
Highway Patrol at Lawton, went to
the place where the near accident oc-
curred and found that appellant’s car
had left the road and was in a ditch,
and that appellant was standing near
his car. He testified that appellant
smelled strongly of alcohol, and that he
walked with difficulty; that he had
trouble in getting him into his patrol
car; that he conveyed him to the county
jail at Lawton, and turned him over
to the deputy sheriff, M. T. McCracken,
who placed him in jail. The witness
stated that from his demeanor, the
smell of liquor upon his breath, his
thickness of speech and his inability to
walk, he concluded definitely that the
man was drunk.

We need not refer to the events in
more detail as we conclude the evi-
dence substantially supports the finding
of the district court. The state need not
establish the charge beyond a reason-
able doubt as it is required to do in a
criminal case. We think the charge of
reckless driving is sustained by sub-
stantial evidence.

We think that under the record in
this case the judgment of suspension
should be, and it is hereby reduced to
a period of ninety days, effective the
date mandate is spread of record in the

613

district court of Murray county, Okla-
homa, and the trial court is directed
to require appellant to surrender his
driver’s license to the trial court to
be forwarded to the Commissioner of
Public Safety, to be retained by him
during the period of suspension, and
then returned to appellant. -

The judgment of the trial court as
modified is affirmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and DAVISON and WILLIAMS, JJ.,
concur, CORN and BLACKBIRD, JJ.,
concur in affirmance and dissent as to
reduction.

WILLIAMS et al. v. WRIGHT.
No. 35658. June 2, 1953.
258 P. 2a 162.

614

Dick Hansen, Oklahoma City, for

plaintiffs in error.

Ted Foster and Leonard C. Bowen,
Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

O’NEAL, J. This action was instituted
by a partnership composed of three
lawyers engaged in the practice of law
at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to re-
cover a balance due under a contract of
employment entered into on the 29th
day of November, 1948, with Hasbrouck
S. Wright, administrator of the estate of
L. L. (Roy) Conner, deceased. From
the judgment in favor of plaintiffs for
an amount less than sued for, plaintiffs
appeal asserting that the trial court
erred in its construction of the contract
here involved.

After the empaneling of a jury in the
trial court that jury was dismissed by
agreement of the parties. The court
thereon construed the contract and en-
tered a judgment for the plaintiffs in
the sum of $492.82.

Plaintiffs’ sole contention is that un-
der the terms of the contract they
were entitled to recover a judgment in
the sum of $2,271.21. The contract in-
volved reads:

“This Contract and Agreement made
and entered into this 29th day of No-
vember, 1948, by and between Has-
brouck S. Wright, of Harrisburg, Penn-
sylvania, administrator of the Estate of
L. L. (Roy) Conner, deceased, first
party, and Williams, Ford & Crandall,
a firm of lawyers of Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, composed of Leo J. Wil-
liams, Roy F. Ford and Charles D.
Crandall, second parties,

“Witnesseth:

“That, whereas, first party has here-
tofore caused to be filed and there is
now pending in the District Court of
Tulsa County, Oklahoma, a cause of ac-
tion styled ‘Hasbrouck S. Wright, Ad-
ministrator of the estate of L. L. (Roy)
Conner, Dee’d., Plaintiff v. Public Serv-~
ice Company of Oklahoma, a corpora-
tion, W. R. Grimshaw Company, a co-
partnership composed of W. R. Grim-
shaw, Sr., W. R. Grimshaw, Jr., Harry
D. Grimshaw and Bertha Grimshaw,
as Individuals, Defendants, No. 76,893;
for $80,840.00 actual damages and
$50,000.00 punitive or exemplary dam-
ages for the wrongful death of L. L.
(Roy) Conner, deceased, and the attor-
neys who heretofore represented first
party as plaintiff, without the knowl-
edge, consent, approval or authority of
first party attempted to dismiss said
suit with prejudice as to one of said de-
fendants and attempted to settle said
suit with two of said defendants, and
first party has refused to accept, ap-
prove or be bound by such attempted
dismissal and settlement and desires to
employ second parties as his attorneys
to take the necessary steps to have all
proceedings relating to and resulting
in the aforesaid attempted dismissal
and settlement vacated and set aside
and to thereafter prosecute said suit to
final judgment in the District Court of

Tulsa County unless settlement thereof
satisfactory to all parties hereto can be
made prior to the trial of said cause,
the second parties are willing to accept
and undertake said employment under
the terms and conditions hereinafter
set out:

“Now, therefore, it is contracted and
agreed by and between the parties
hereto that second parties shall forth-
with commence and thereafter diligent-
ly continue their efforts to vacate all
proceedings relating to and resulting
in the aforesaid unauthorized attempted
dismissal and settlement of said cause
of action and to thereafter bring said
case to trial at the earliest possible date
and try the same in the District Court
of Tulsa County.

“Tt is agreed that second parties’ em-
ployment shall include their services in
prosecuting or defending appeals that
may be taken from the judgment or
order of the District Court of Tulsa
County refusing to vacate or vacating
all proceedings relating to and resulting
in a judgment rendered or that may be
rendered pursuant to the aforesaid un-
authorized dismissal and settlement,
and without compensation in addition
to that provided herein.

“Tt is agreed that upon execution by
all parties to this agreement, first party
shall pay to the second parties the sum
of six hundred twenty-five ($625.00)
dollars cash, receipt whereof is ac-
knowledged by second parties hereto,
and upon conclusion of the trial of said
cause of action in the district court of
Tulsa county (after appeal, if taken,
to the Supreme Court) or upon settle-
ment, approved in writing by first party
hereto, before trial of said cause in the
district court of Tulsa county, first party
shall pay to second parties an addi-
tional sum of Six Hundred Twenty-five
($625.00) dollars.

“In addition to the aforesaid sums of
$625.00 paid and to be paid, first party
agrees to pay to second parties fifty
(50%) percentum of all funds in excess
of Twenty-two Thousand Five Hundred
($22,500.00) dollars received by settle-
ment. Approved in writing by first
party, before or after trial of said
cause in the District Court of Tulsa
County, such additional percentage pay-
ment to be made at the time the funds

615

derived from such settlement are paid
to first party.

“It is expressly agreed that neither of
the parties hereto has authority to, nor
shall attempt to settle the aforesaid
causes of action with the defendants
or any of them, without the written
consent of the other party or without
such other party being personally pres-
ent at, participating in, and agreeing to
such settlement; that second parties
shall fully inform O. O. Owens, of Tulsa,
Oklahoma, first party’s local agent, of
all negotiations for a settlement of said
causes of action, that all proposals for
settlement shall be submitted to said
O. O. Owens for communication by him
to first party, and it is also expressly
agreed that all such proposals made
or received by second parties, looking
to a settlement of said causes of action,
must be approved and first party’s ac-
ceptance thereof recommended by said
O. O. Owens,

“In addition to the foregoing compen-
sation provided to be paid second par-
ties, it is agreed that second parties
shall defray their own personal and
traveling expenses incurred in the State
of Oklahoma; that all court costs, costs
of depositions, fees for stenographer’s
services, printing of briefs, transcripts
or casemades for appeal, etc., and other
expenses directly relating to the said
case or the prosecution thereof and also
the traveling expense of second parties
outside the state of Oklahoma shall be
paid by first party upon submission by
second parties of proper itemized state-"
ments and receipted bills therefor.

“This contract executed in duplicate,
each of which shall be an original, one to
be retained by either of the parties
hereto.

“Witness our hands the day and year
above set forth.
“/s/ Hasbrouck S. Wright

“Hasbrouck S. Wright, Admin-

_ istrator of the Estate of L. L.
(Roy) Conner, Deceased, par-
ty of the First Part

“Williams, Ford & Crandall
“By /s/ Roy F. Ford
“Parties of the Second Part.”

616

Counsel for plaintiffs and defendant
assert that the contract is not ambig-
uous; that it clearly expressed the in-
tent of the contracting parties, but they
part company upon the legal construc-
tion to be applied.

Our conclusion is that the contract
has not ambiguously, indefinitely,
equivocally or indistinctly expressed
the intent of the parties. Thus we look
to its language to determine the correct-
ness of the trial court’s judgment.

In the case of Terrill v. Laney, 200
Okla. 308, 193 P. 2d 296, we said:

“The language used in a contract is
to govern its interpretation, and, if such
language is clearly explicit and does
not involve uncertainty, the words used
are to be understood in their ordinary
and proper sense, and, when the lan-
guage is plain and unambiguous, extrin-
sic evidence as to its meaning is not
admissible.”

In the interpretation of the contract
we are governed by the mandate of our
statute which provides in 15 O.S. 1951
§§152, 154, 157 and 160, as follows:

“§ 152. A contract must be so inter-
preted as to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties, as it existed at
the time of contracting, so far as the
same is ascertainable and lawful.

“§ 154. The language of a contract
is to govern its intrepretation, if the
language is clear and explicit, and does
not involve an absurdity.

“§ 157. The whole of a contract is to
be taken together, so as to give effect
to every part, if reasonably practicable,
each clause helping to interpret the
others.

“§ 160. The words of a contract are
to be understood in their ordinary and
popular sense, rather than according to
their strict legal meaning, unless used
by the parties in a technical sense, or
unless a special meaning is given to
them by usage, in which case the latter
must be followed.”

Applying this norm and standard to
the writing here drawn in dispute, we
find from the pleadings and the state-

ments of counsel in the record, and
from the reading of the contract itself,
these facts: That Hasbrouck S. Wright,
administrator of the estate of L. L.
(Roy) Conner, deceased, prior to plain-
tiffs’ employment, had filed an action
in the district court of Tulsa county to
recover damages for the alleged wrong-
ful death of L. L. (Roy) Conner, de-
ceased, It appears that the adminis-
trator’s counsel compromised, settled
and caused that action to be dismissed
upon the payment to the administra-
tor’s counsel of the sum of $22,500. When
the administrator was advised of this
compromise settlement, and the dismis-
sal of the action, he contended that the
settlement was made without his
knowledge or consent and that the dis-
missal of this case was without au-
thority. He thereupon employed the
plaintiffs’ law firm to have said com-
promise settlement and the judgment
rendered thereon vacated. Under their
contract of employment, dated Novem-
ber 29, 1948, supra, the administrator
paid plaintiffs a cash fee of $625 for
legal services in moving to vacate that
judgment. This contract obligated the
administrator to pay plaintiffs an addi-
tional sum of $625 upon the vacating of
the judgment. Plaintiffs were success-
ful in vacating and having that judg-
ment set aside and as provided by the
contract received the additional pay-
ment of $625.

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed an action
in the district court of Tulsa county,
against the Public Service Company
of Oklahoma, and others, to recover
the sum of $80,840 actual damages and
$50,000 punitive or exemplary damages
for the wrongful death of L. L. (Roy)
Conner. In this suit the administrator
recovered a judgment in the sum of
$43,000 against said named defendants.
This case, upon appeal, National Valve
& Mtg. Co. v. Wright, Adm’r, 205 Okla.
565, 240 P. 2d 769, was affirmed. In
payment of the judgment the defend-
ants in that case caused to be issued to
plaintiffs, as counsel for the adminis-
trator, two checks in the aggregate sum
of $49,792.48. The excess of the judg-

ment over and above $43,000 represents
the accrued interest on the judgment.
Counsel for the administrator forwarded
these checks to the administrator at
Harrisburg, Pa., and at the same time
drew their draft upon him for the sum
of $14,271.21 representing the amount of
the fee claimed due them. The draft
was not paid as the administrator con-
tended it was in excess of the amount
due plaintiffs under their contract, su-
pra. By subsequent agreement of the
parties, the check was cashed and a
portion of the fund paid to the admin-
istrator and the sum of $11,500 was paid
upon plaintiffs’ fee. That payment rep-
resented 50% of one-half of the judg-
ment and interest in excess of the sum
of $22,500.

As we construe the contract we hold
that plaintiffs were not entitled to par-
ticipate whatsoever in the $22,500 which
had been previously procured through
the unauthorized compromise and set-
tlement in the original case.

As plaintiffs construe the contract
they claim that they are entitled to par-
ticipate in 50% of the accrued interest
on the $22,500 item, but in this assump-
tion we think they are in error as the
contract specifically provides that the
administrator agrees to pay his attor-
neys 50% of all sums in excess of $22,500
received by settlement provided in writ-
ing by the administrator. Plaintiffs,
having no interest in the item of
$22,500, were not entitled to recover
one-half of the accrued interest on said
item.

As we view the contract the construc-
tion placed upon it by the trial court
‘was correct.

Affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, DAVI-
SON, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur. HALLEY, C.J., dissents.

617
HUGH ‘BREEDING, Inc., v. GODWIN.
No. 34085. April 7, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 2,
258 P. 2d 157.

1953.

618

Rosenstein, Fist & Shidler, Tulsa, for
plaintiff in error.

Carter Smith and John L. Dunn, Tul-
sa, for defendant in error.

ARNOLD, J. This is an appeal from
a judgment of the district court of
Tulsa county. It is the last of a series
of three suits between the same par-
ties, all of which arose out of the same
transaction,

Suit No. 1, No. 73727, styled Clarence
Godwin v. Hugh Breeding, Inc., was
filed in the district court of Tulsa coun-
ty on September 10, 1945. This was a
suit for replevin of the title certificate
to a KS7 International truck which had
been sold to plaintiff by defendant and
for damages for the wrongful retention
thereof, basing the damages upon the
loss of use of the truck-tractor which
allegedly could not be operated upon
the highways without such title cer-
tificate.

Suit No. 2, No, 29555, styled Clar-
ence Godwin v. Hugh Breeding, Inc.,
was filed in the court of common pleas
of Tulsa county on September 19, 1945;
this was a suit founded on alleged
breach of contract in the failure of de-
fendant to furnish four new tires, two
recapped tires, and certain repairs to
the rear end of said KS7 International
truck tractor, and for certain deduc-
tions for social security, unemployment
insurance, and truck association dues
allegedly made by defendant from
plaintiff's earnings.

Suit No. 1, No. 73727, was tried in dis-
trict court on December 11, 1945, before
a jury. Evidence was introduced by
both parties both as to the right of pos-
session of the title certificate and as
to the damages allegedly sustained by

plaintiff. After both parties had rested
the trial judge stated that he would
submit to the jury the sole question of
whether or not the plaintiff was en-
titled to the possession of the title cer-
tificate to the truck tractor and all other
matters would be continued to some fu-
ture date, then to be disposed of by the
court. Plaintiff and defendant agreed
to this action of the court and entered
into the following written stipulation:

“It is stipulated that the court may
submit this case to the jury for their
consideration upon the sole question of
the right of the plaintiff to recover the
possession of certificate of title de-
seribed in plaintiff's petition, of the
tractor-truck, at the time of the com~
mencement of the action, reserving to
the court the right, in the event of a
verdict for the plaintiff in the possessory

* action to determine the question of dam-

ages at a later time and also reserving
to the court the right to adjust the
equities between the parties and to
render at a later time under this stipu-
lation of reservation any, all and such
judgment as the court may find to be
fitting and just in regard to the ques-
tion of damages and the equities of the
parties.”

Plaintiff's theory was as follows:
Plaintiff and defendant had an oral con-
tract of sale whereby plaintiff pur-
chased from defendant at a price of
$2,000 a used KS7 International truck-
tractor, paying $500 down and giving
his note for the balance of $1,500, to be
paid at the rate of $125 per month,
with interest on unmatured installments
and interest on the whole unpaid bal-
ance if not paid at maturity, with pro-
vision for a reasonable attorney’s fee
if placed in the hands of an attorney
for collection; as a part of this trans-
action, defendant agreed to furnish four
new tires and two recapped tires for
the truck-tractor, and make certain
repairs to its rear end; as a further
part of this contract, plaintiff agreed
to use said truck-tractor in defendant’s
business of hauling gasoline, attaching
thereto a trailer-tank provided by de-
fendant, and defendant was to collect
all revenue earned by said truck-tractor

and semi-trailer, paying 70% thereof to
plaintiff and retaining 30%, and deduct-
ing from plaintiff’s 70% the monthly
payments of $125 on the purchase note
above mentioned; defendant retained
the title certificate to the truck-tractor,
under the terms of this agreement, so
that the truck-tractor could be operated
in defendant’s business under its Class
“B” permit and be carried on its
fleet insurance policy, and the title cer-
tificate was to be delivered to plaintiff
if at any time he ceased to operate
the truck-tractor in defendant’s busi-
ness. Plaintiff and defendant operated
under this oral agreement from Feb-
ruary 6, 1945, the date of the pur-
chase of the truck, until August 20,
1945, at which time defendant refused
to allow plaintiff to operate it in de-
fendant’s business. Upon demand by
plaintiff, possession of the truck-trac-
tor was delivered to plaintiff, but de-
fendant refused to deliver possession
of the title certificate thereto unless
and until plaintiff either paid the bal-
ance due on the purchase note, $750,
in cash, or made and executed a chattel
mortgage on the truck to secure de-
fendant in the payment of the balance
due on said note. This plaintiff re-
fused to do and filed the suits above
mentioned.

In suit No, 1, No. 73727, above men-
tioned, the jury brought in a verdict in
favor of plaintiff for possession of the
title certificate to the truck-tractor.
Defendant filed motion for new trial.
While it does not appear in the record,
defendant alleges in its brief and plain-
tiff does not deny that the trial judge
indicated he would allow only nominal
damages for the detention of the cer-
tificate of title, whereupon plaintiff filed
a motion for permission to dismiss that
part of his cause of action asking for
damages. To this motion defendant
filed a response objecting thereto be-
cause a full trial had been had and
testimony introduced on the items
sought to be dismissed and it would
be unfair to require defendant to retry
the same matters in another action.
This motion and response came on for

619

hearing on January 3, 1946; after argu-
ment, and before the court ruled on
his motion, plaintiff withdrew it and
then moved for permission to withdraw
without prejudice all allegations of
damages from his petition, which the
court granted. Defendant saved excep-
tions to this action of the court. The
journal entry recites:

“It is further ordered, adjudged and
decreed, that the plaintiff’s request to
withdraw without prejudice from his
petition herein and from his cause of
action, all of the allegations as to dam-
ages both actual and punitive, be and
the same is hereby granted, to which
action of the court the defendant ex-
cepted and an exception allowed.”

Defendant did not appeal from the
judgment, but delivered the certificate
of title to plaintiff on January 7, 1946.

On January 7, 1946, suit No. 3, No.
74029, was filed in the district court of
Tulsa county, styled Clarence Godwin
v. Breeding, Inc., based upon alleged
breach of express contract to deliver
the certificate of title and the conse-
quent loss of use of the truck-tractor
for a period of 135 days, and in the
second cause of action, upon alleged
breach of implied contract under the
statutes to deliver such certificate of
title, but seeking but one recovery on
both causes of action.

On January 11, 1946, suit No. 2, the
common pleas action, was tried to a
jury, resulting in a verdict in favor
of plaintiff in the sum of $914.43; judg-
ment was rendered in accordance with
the verdict, motion for new trial was
overruled, and defendant gave notice
of appeal. This appeal was dismissed
by this court because of failure to pre-
pare and serve case-made within the
time allowed, Hugh Breeding, Inc., v.
Godwin, 197 Okla. 637, 173 P. 2d 917.
That judgment has been paid.

To the petition filed in suit No. 3, No.
74029, which is the case here on appeal,
defendant filed motion to make more
definite and certain, which was sus-
tained, then a general demurrer, which

620

was overruled, and then filed its an-
swer asserting for the first time spe-
cifically a splitting of the causes of
action and pleading in connection there-
with res adjudicata by reason of the
judgment in the first suit filed, No.
73727. Plaintiff then filed a second
amended petition alleging in greater
detail the alleged oral contract upon
which the suit was based and asking
for damages for the loss of use of the
truck-tractor for a period of 140 days
at $50 per day. To this defendant filed
a motion to require plaintiff to elect
as between his two causes of action,
the one on the alleged express contract
and the other on the alleged implied
contract which was overruled; it then
filed a combined motion to make more
definite and certain and to strike quot-
ed statutes, the motion to make more
definite and certain being overruled,
the motion to strike sustained; and
separate general demurrers to plain-
tiff’s first and second causes of action,
which were overruled. Defendant then
filed its answer, pleading the judgment
in cause No. 73727, suit No. 1, and the
judgment in suit No. 2, No. 29555, as be-
ing res adjudicata of the issues raised
in the instant suit. It also filed its cross~
petition setting up plaintiff's prom-
issory note and asking judgment for
the unpaid balance thereof, $750, with
interest and attorneys’ fee as provided
by the note. To this answer and cross-
petition plaintiff filed motion-to strike
all allegations as to suits Nos. 1 and 2,
above referred to, which was overruled;
defendant filed an amended answer and
plaintiff then filed his demurrer to the
answer which was overruled. Defend-
ant filed a second amendment to his
answer alleging the dismissal of the
appeal in suit No. 2, No. 29555, supra,
and that judgment had become final
in such suit.
defendant’s answers consisting of a gen-
eral denial, and allegation that the
stipulation entered into in suit No. 1,
No. 73727, supra, reserved the question
of damages and that said suit could not
be res adjudicata for that reason, al-
leged failure of consideration as a de-

Plaintiff filed his reply to”

fense to the note, and alleged that
defendant should have litigated the
note in suit No. 2, the common pleas
suit, supra, and as it did not is now
barred from seeking relief on the
note. Defendant filed motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, which was
overruled. On the issues as thus made
up the case came on for trial on Jan-
uary 21, 1948. The case was tried to
the court.

Plaintiff’s evidence tended to prove
the rental value of the truck-tractor to
be from $35 to $50 per day, although
all his witnesses admitted such sums
included charges for oil and gas and
wages of a driver; defendant’s evi-
dence tended to prove the reasonable
rental value of such a truck-tractor to
be $5 per day. At the conclusion of all
the evidence and after both parties had
rested, the trial judge after making
findings of fact rendered judgment for
plaintiff for $2,025 damages and for
the defendant for the balance of the
principal due on the note, together with
a reasonable attorney’s fee, refusing to
give defendant judgment for the in-
terest accrued and provided for in
the note and offset the defendant’s
judgment against the plaintiff's judg-
ment. From order overruling motion
for new trial, defendant brings this ap-
peal. Plaintiff, Godwin, did not cross-
appeal and does not argue either ques-
tion raised in his reply to the answer
of defendant concerning the note.

For reversal, defendant argues that
the defense of res adjudicata bars this
suit; that the three suits filed are be-
tween the same parties, upon the same
subject matter, with the same issues
relating to the same subject matter
and the capacity of the parties the
same as to the subject matter and the
issues, and therefore contain all the
elements of res adjudicata as held by
this court to be necessary in St. Louis
& San Francisco Railway Co. v. Stuck-
wish, Admr., 137 Okla. 251, 279 P.
683; In re Widener’s Estate, 112 Okla.
54, 240 P. 608; Penney v. Walters, 121
Okla. 281, 249 P. 736; that plaintiff could

and should have litigated all of his
claims in suit No. 1, No. 73727, supra,
or suit No. 2, No. 29555, supra. He
cites Akin v. Bonfils, 67 Okla. 123, 169
P. 899; Brown v. Chowning, 59 Okla.
278, 159 P. 323; and Hales Mullaly, Inc.,
v. Cannon, 189 Okla. 613, 119 P. 2d 46,
all of which state the rule that an en-
tire claim or demand cannot be split
so as to be made the subject of differ-
ent actions for different parts, and if
this is done and separate actions are
brought a judgment on the merits in
one will bar the others. In answer to
this proposition plaintiff concedes the
rule but contends that the rule against
splitting causes of action is for the
benefit of the defendant and a defend-
ant will be presumed to have waived
the rule’ unless timely objection is
made, citing Todd _v. Central Petroleum
Go., 155 Kan. 249, 124° P. 2d 704; Geor-
gie Ry. & Power Co. v. Endsley, 167
Ga, 439, 145 S.B. 851, 62 ALR. 256.
These cases are not in point with the
fact situation here, for in each of those
cases the plaintiff filed separate suits
on separate items of damage, the de-
fendant filed dilatory pleas in each
suit, and not until one suit was brought
to final judgment was the plea of res
adjudicata raised in the other suit. Here
plaintiff filed one suit in replevin and
for damages, and almost simultaneously
filed another suit for different damages
but growing out of the same transac-
tion; in neither, although the plea of
“another action pending” was avail-
able, did defendant make such plea
and both cases went to final judgment.
When the third suit was filed, as here-
inbefore pointed out, defendant filed a
motion to make more definite and cer-
tain and to strike; when these were
ruled upon he filed general demurrer.
The plea of res adjudicata based upon
splitting of causes of action is an affirm-
ative defense and can only be raised
by answer. 12 0.S. 1951 §267; Simpson
v. Highfill, 172 Okla. 141, 45 P. 2d 115;
Whitson v. City of Pauls Valley, 182
Okla. 306, 77 P. 2d 711; Bronson v.
Reid, 167 Okla. 447, 30 P. 2d 459. In
his answer he pleaded res adjudicata

621

on this basis.
timely.

His plea was therefore

But plaintiff further claims that the
stipulation entered into by the parties,
after both sides had rested and sub-
mitted the cause, in suit No. 1, No.
73727, supra, reserving to the court
the right at a later date, in the event
of a verdict for plaintiff in the pos-
sessory action, to determine the ques-
tion of damages and adjust the equities
between the parties, and the judg-
ment of the court above quoted per-
mitting plaintiff to withdraw without
prejudice all the allegations of dam-
ages from his petition, reserved to
plaintiff the right to split his cause of
action and bring a subsequent suit.
He cites Powell Brothers v. State, 177
Okla. 568, 61 P. 2d 231. The defendant

_concedes that a claim arising out of

the same transaction may be reserved
from the operation. of the judgment by
the court as was done in Billy v. Le-
Flore County Gas & Electric Co., 146
Okla. 227, 293 P. 1009, but states there
was no reservation in the judgment
here.

There can be no question what was
in the minds of the parties and the
court when the stipulation above
quoted was entered into: If the jury
brought in a verdict in favor of de-
fendant for possession of the title cer-
tificate, there would be no damages,
and if it brought in a verdict in favor of
plaintiff, the trial judge would then de-
termine the damages upon’ the basis
of the evidence already introduced. Af-
ter thé jury brought in a verdict for
plaintiff for possession of the title
certificate, plaintiff then sought to dis-
miss his cause of action for damages;
when defendant resisted plaintiff then
asked and got permission to withdraw
without prejudice all allegations of
damages’ from his petition. This was re-
cited in the journal entry and is quoted
above. This left the suit in the same
position as if originally filed asking for
replevin only without seeking dam-
cages. We hold there was no reserva~

622

tion in the judgment in suit No. 1,
No. 73727, supra.

Though the note shows on its face
that interest is provided for, and plain-
tiff concedes this to be true, the court
rendered judgment for defendant on
its cross-petition for the unpaid bal-
ance of the note, without interest, and
a reasonable attorney’s fee, and then
offset this judgment against the judg-
ment for damages entered in favor of
plaintiff. Since we have held that plain-
tiff was not entitled to any judgment
on his cause of action asserted, it is
obvious that defendant was entitled to
judgment for accrued interest.

Reversed, with directions to vacate
the judgment entered in favor of plain-
tiff, dismiss his cause of action, and
amplify the judgment in favor of de-
fendant, Hugh Breeding, Inc., by the
addition of accrued interest.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, DAV-
ISON, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., concur.

CIMARRON TELEPHONE CO. et al.
v. NANCE et al.

No. 35848, June 2, 1953,
255 P. 2d 981.

Looney, Watts, Ross, Looney & Smith,
Oklahoma City, for petitioners.

Elder & Francis, Tulsa, and Mac Q.
Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respond-
ents.

WELCH, J. On the 30th day of May,
1952, Ronald Ray Nance, deceased, was
employed by the Cimarron Telephone
Company and while engaged in a haz-
ardous employment he sustained an ac-
cidental injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment resulting in
his death by electrocution. Deceased’s
father, Russell Nance, was in due time
appointed administrator of his estate,
and on August 12, 1952, filed a claim
for compensation against Cimarron
Telephone Company and its insurance
carrier on behalf of himself and Rose
Hunt Nance, his wife, whom he desig-
nated as dependents of deceased. Com-
pensation is claimed under the provi-
sions of Title 85, c. 2, S.L. 1951, pp. 267
to 270, inclusive. The claim was set

for hearing before a trial commissioner
who, after hearing the evidence, found:

“That on May 30, 1952, Ronald Ray
Nance, deceased, was in the employ-
ment of the respondent herein, said re-
spondent being engaged in a hazardous
occupation, subject to and covered by
the provisions of the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Law, and that on May 30,
1952, Ronald Ray Nance received an ac-
cidental personal injury, arising out of
and in the course of his employment
with respondent herein when he was
electrocuted and died immediately on
May 30, 1952; that no compensation has
been paid as a result of said injury.

“That the deceased, Ronald Ray
Nance, was an unmarried man and
that he left no surviving wife, no chil-
dren or child of a deceased child, and
that the sole survivors and dependents
of the deceased were his mother and
father, Russell Nance and Rose Hunt
Nance.

“That Rose Hunt Nance and Russell
Nance are hereby determined to be the
dependents of Ronald Ray Nance, de-
ceased, within the meaning of the Death
Benefits Provision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act of the State of Okla-
homa and are entitled to receive the
proportionate share of the $13,500.00
award, * * * »

Upon such findings he awarded com-
pensation to claimants in the sum of
$13,500 to be divided equally between
them. The award was sustained on ap-
peal to the commission en banc.

It is first contended by petitioners on
appeal that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain the finding of the commis-
sion that claimants were dependents of
the deceased employee.

The evidence, in substance, shows
that the deceased was 19 years of age
at the time of his death. He was un-
married. He was employed by “Cim-
arron” on the 15th day of May, 1951,
and continued in its employment until
the date of his death. He was paid for
his work 75 cents per hour for a 40-hour
week and time-and-a-half for overtime.
The evidence shows that during the
period of time he worked for the com-

623

pany he received wages approximating
$1,000, 60 per cent of which he contrib-
uted to the support of his parents. He
made no cash contribution to them, but
every two weeks after receiving his pay
check he cashed it and paid 60 per cent
thereof on his father’s grocery bill.
Deceased’s father was in very poor
health and unable to obtain regular em-
ployment. He did, however, occasional-
ly work at odd jobs but his earnings
were not sufficient to support himself
and family. The above facts are estab-
lished by the testimony of claimants
and the grocer with whom the family
traded.

We think this evidence sufficient to
sustain the finding of the commission
that claimants were dependents of de-
ceased. It is true, as contended by pe-
titioners, that they were not wholly de-
pendent upon him for support, but it
was not essential under the Act, su-
pra, in order that they might be classi-
fied as dependents, to establish that
they were wholly dependent upon him
for support. It was sufficient for them
to show that they were partially de-
pendent upon him for support and that
during his lifetime the deceased em-
ployee had made substantial contribu-
tions to their support. In 58 Am. Jur.
p. 686, §163, it is said:

“A person may be a dependent of an
employee within the purview of the
statute although the dependence is only
partial. * * * While according to the
construction placed on the term ‘de-
pendent’ by some of the courts, the ap-
plicant, in order to be entitled to com-
pensation, must show that he or she was
dependent upon the deceased employee |
for the ‘ordinary necessaries of life,’ in
a majority of jurisdictions the view
seems to have been accepted that de-
pendency within the terms of the stat-
ute does not mean absolute dependency
for the necessities of life, but rather
that the applicant looked to and relied
on the contributions of the workman,
in whole or in part, as a means of sup-
port and maintenance in accordance
with his or her social position and ac-
customed mode of life. * * * ”

624

In Deemer Lumber Co. v. Hamilton,
211 Miss. 673, 52 So. 2d 634, the Su-
preme, Court of Mississippi held:

“In a proceeding under Workman’s
Compensation Act by father who sought
to recover compensation as dependent
of son who was killed in accident aris-
ing out of scope of employment, where-
in it appeared that father was able to
do but little work and that son had con-
tributed substantially to support of fam-
ily, evidence sustained finding of com-
mission that father had been dependent
of deceased son.”

In Tabor et ux. v. Industrial Acc.
Fund (Mont.) 247 P. 2d 472, it is said:

“Under Workmen’s Compensation
Act, a ‘dependent’ need not be abso-
lutely dependent upon the workman for
the necessities of life but need only
look to and rely on the contributions of
the workman, in whole or in part, as a
means of support and maintenance in
accordance with his social position and
accustomed mode of life,”

See, also, annotations 100 A.L.R. 1106.

It is further contended by petitioners
. that since the evidence shows that
claimants were only partially dependent
upon deceased employee for their sup-
port, the commission was without au-
thority to allow them the full compen-
sation provided by the Act. Authorities
from foreign jurisdictions are cited in
support of this contention. These au-
thorities are based upon statutes spe-
cifically distinguishing between total
and partial dependency and fix the
amount of compensation allowable based
upon percentage of dependency. Our
statutes contain no such provision. 85
O.S. 1951 §22, paragraph 7, provides:

“Tf the injury causes death within
two (2) years from the date of the acci-
dent or, if the injury causes continuous
disability and causes death within five
(5) years from the date of accident,
notice of which was given as provided
in this Act, compensation shall be pay-
able in the amount of Thirteen Thou-
sand Five Hundred Dollars ($13,500.00)
and to the dependents of the deceased
employee as defined herein.”

It will be noted that the statute arbi-
trarily fixes the amount of compensa-
tion allowable to dependents of a de-
ceased employee at $13,500. It makes no
provision for proportioning the amount
allowable based upon percentage of
dependency. We, therefore, hold that
claimants are entitled to recover full
compensation allowed by the statute.

In Hershkowitz et al. v. Arizona High-
way Department, 59 Ariz. 10, 121 P. 2d
879, the court said:

«* * ® Tf the dependency is total and
both parents survive, they are to re-
ceive forty per cent of the wages earned
by the deceased. If the dependency is
only partial, it makes no difference
whether this partial support is ten or
ninety per cent of the total support of
the parent, the award is but fifteen
per cent of the wages. It may be that
the statute should proportion the award
to the percentage of support, but it does
not do so, and we can only enforce the
law as it is written.”

What is there said applies here.
Award sustained.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, DAVI-
SON, WILLIAMS, and BLACKBIRD,
JJ., coneur,

MEALY-WOLFE DRILLING CO. et’ al.
v. LAMBERT.

No. 34864. May 5, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 9, 1953.
256 P. 2d 818.

Horsley, Epton & Culp, Wewoka, and
Monnett, Hayes, Brown & Bullis, Okla-
homa City, for plaintiffs in error.

Frank Seay, Seminole, for defendant
in error.

ARNOLD, J. Willie Mae Lambert, the
widow of William Fred Lambert, de-
ceased, commenced this action in the
superior court of Seminole county
against the Mealy-Wolfe Drilling Com-
pany, S. R. Mealy and W. W. Wolfe,
co-owners, and the First National Bank
& Trust Company of Tulsa, executor of
the estate of S. R. Mealy, deceased, to
recover damages for the wrongful death
of her said husband.

In substantial accord with the alle-
gations of her petition that defendants
failed to furnish deceased a reason-
ably safe place in which to work and
reasonably safe appliances with which
to do the work, and specific allegations
of negligence in this connection, plain-
tiff’s evidence reasonably tends to
show: that the deceased was employed

by Mealy-Wolfe Drilling Company as a’

tooldresser; that on January 23, 1948,
he was working southwest of Davenport
on a Cardwell drilling-in unit belonging
to defendants; that he was working on
the tour beginning at 11:30 p.m.; that
the night was cloudy and cold, and
spitting snow; that L. J. Goodman, the

625

driller, was the only other person work-
ing this tour; that the deceased and
Goodman were stringing up tubing
tools, in preparation for running tubing
in the morning; that it was necessary to
tie the tubing line to the drilling line in
order that one might trail behind the
other through one of the pulleys at the
top of the derrick and thus both lines
be wound on the drum; that the two
wire lines were tied together by means
of a “soft rope”, producing an irregu-
larity at this point in the line; that
when this point in the line reached
the pulley at the top of the derrick the
line jumped out of the pulley; making
it necessary to climb the derrick to
place the line back in the sheave; that
this was the work of the tooldresser but
Goodman, the driller, offered to make
the climb; that deceased refused the
offer and climbed the derrick himself;
that within five or six minutes after de-
ceased started up the derrick Goodman
heard a groan and turning his head
saw deceased falling practically even
with his face; that deceased fell on a
“sudding arm” of the rig crosswise;
that thereafter Lambert did not speak;
that he died as a result of the injuries
sustained in this fall; that deceased
was an experienced oil field worker;
that there was no illumination of the
mast although floodlights for this pur-
pose are used in the Mid-Continent area
and oilfields; that there was no lighting
provided on this rig except lights on the
rig floor itself, about 10 to 12 feet
above the ground; that, under such cir-
cumstances, one who is up in a derrick
at night and who looks down to the rig
floor will be blinded, but such condition
would not exist if the derrick were prop-
erly lighted; that there was a type of
guard rail or wicket which was adapted
for use on derricks such as this one
which, had it been on the ladder here,
would have prevented deceased’s fall;
that the derrick and the ladder which
deceased had to climb were covered
with congealed oil and were dirty, oily,
and greasy; that the derrick and ladder
had never been washed down on this
job; that to climb up the derrick de-

626

ceased had to climb the “A” frame
and then step on the ladder leading up
the derrick, which began about 16 feet
above the ground; that the ladder was
fastened to the mast by angle irons;
that some of the rungs were completely
gone, some of the ends were torn loose,
and at one point the main stringer of
the ladder itself was broken in two and
when it was stepped on at this point
it would flip; that the ladder was
crooked and bent and very greasy; that
there were other methods, in common
use in this area, by which deceased
could have been lifted to the top of
the derrick to replace the line in the
pulley and thus eliminate the necessity
of climbing the slick, oily broken lad-
der at night; that deceased could have
been lifted to the top of the derrick
with no chance of his falling either by
the cat-line or by a saddle on the drill
stem; that from the standpoint of safe-
ty the work should have been deferred
until daylight, as it was unsafe to string
up to do a tubing job at night with
moonlight as the only illumination.

Defendants’ evidence was in some
respects corroborative of plaintiff’s evi-
dence, but on many points was in di-
rect contradiction thereof.

Defendants’ demurrer to the evi-
dence and motion for directed verdict
were overruled. At the conclusion of all
the evidence the judge instructed the
jury and the jury brought in a verdict
in favor of plaintiff. Judgment was en-
tered on the verdict. Motion for new
trial was overruled, provoking this ap-
peal. .

Defendants contend that there was no
evidence tending to show the proxi-
mate relationship between the acts of
negligence alleged and the injuries com-
plained of. The evidence is circumstan-
tial. No one saw deceased fall, and no
one testified as to the exact cause of
the fall. Proximate cause, like any
other fact, may be established by cir-
cumstantial evidence. All plaintiff has

to do is to make it appear more prob-
able that the injury came in whole or in

part from defendants’ negligence than
from any other cause. St. Louis & S.F.R.
Co. v. Darnell, 42 Okla. 394, 141 P. 785.
There is evidence to show that de-
ceased had climbed up into the derrick,
that the lighting was insufficient, that
the ladder was broken and defective,
that it was slick and greasy, that at one
point it was broken in two, that there
was no safeguard to prevent a fall, and
the inference that any one or a combi-
nation of one or more of these factors
caused the fall is a reasonable one. The
exact point of the beginning of the
fall is not shown by the evidence but
the lapse of time would indicate that it
started from the ladder, which began
16 feet above the derrick floor.

The question of proximate cause is
one for the jury if there is any evi-
dence reasonably tending to show proxi-
mate relationship. When there is doubt
as to which of several probable causes
produced the injury the cause of the in-
jury is properly left to the jury. If
the evidence is reasonably sufficient to
show that the negligence alleged and
proven more probably caused the in-
jury, the question must be submitted to
the jury.- Petroleum Iron Works Co. v.
Wantland, 28 Okla. 481, 114 P. 717. In
this case the conclusion that one or
more of the acts of negligence of defend-
ant caused the injury is more consistent
with the facts than that something else
did. The inference of causal connection
springs reasonably and directly from
the facts in evidence. There is evidence
to sustain the conclusion of greater
probability that the injury came from
defendants’ negligence than from any
other cause. Especially is this true in
this case in view of the testimony on
insufficient lighting. We cannot say as
a matter of law that the evidence in
this case does not reasonably tend to
show that the place was not a safe
place to work and that some one or
more of the features constituting it an
unsafe place to work was not the more
probable cause of decedent’s fall and
injury. See Highway Construction Co.
v. Shue, 173 Okla. 456, 49 P. 2d 203.

Defendant also urges error in the fail-
ure of the court to give its requested
instruction No. 9 to the effect that if the
equipment was the same kind or nature
that was used by other reasonably care-
ful operators in the same business de-
fendants would not be guilty of negli-
gence. Instead, the court instructed the
jury that the exercise of reasonable
care in the furnishing of a safe place
to work was the test but in this connec-
tion instructed the jury that it must con-
sider the testimony introduced as to
customary appliances and methods used
in that area. Essentially the same in-
struction was attacked in Southern
Drilling Co. v. McKee, 171 Okla. 409,
42 P. 2d 265, and approved by us.

The court gave two instructions which
advised the jury that the driller was a
vice-principal for whose negligence the
defendant would be liable and defend-
ant points to these instructions as error.
While there is no evidence in the rec-
ord which would make the driller, Good-
man, a vice-principal under the defini-
tion given in Chap-tan Drilling Co. v.
Myers, 203 Okla. 642, 225 P. 2d 373,
whether he was or was not a vice-
principal is entirely irrelevant here. It
is obvious that the error, if any, would
militate against the plaintiff, not the

defendant, and the error is certainly |

harmless as to defendant.

The court gave instruction No. 15,
as follows:

“You are instructed that the deceased
was an employee of the defendants and
entitled to all the protection that the
law gives to an employee, and in this
connection you are instructed that the
relation of master and servant existed,
and that it was the duty of the master
or the defendant, in this case, to fur-
nish the deceased in this case a reason-
ably safe place to work, a reasonably
safe method and manner of doing the
work and to provide reasonable safe
guards, and you are further instructed
in this connection that if you find from
the evidence in this case by a prepon-
derance thereof, that the deceased was
injured while in the exercise of ordinary
care and prudence, and in obedience to

627

the orders of his superiors, and that
such injuries caused his death, was the
result of the negligence of his employer,
acting through its vice principal, in in-
structing him to perform duties in a
dangerous place, or if in obedience to
such orders or instructions from his
superiors he was placed in a position of
‘peril, then in the instance your verdict
should be for the plaintifi.”

Defendants object to the italicized
portion of this instruction on the ground
that there was no definition of the word
“peril”, that there was no requirement
that defendants be negligent, and that
the effect of the instruction was that
defendants would be liable if they were
negligent, or if the climbing by dece-
dent was perilous without regard to any
negligence of defendant.

After giving the above instruction,
the court gave the following instruc-
tion:

“Gentlemen of the Jury, as a fur-
ther instruction in this law suit, you
are instructed that in Instruction No.
15, you were instructed by the Court
‘that the deceased was an employee
of the defendants and entitled to all the
protection the law gives to an employee,
and that the relationship of master and
servant existed, and that it was the
duty of the master, or the defendant in
this case, to furnish the deceased a
reasonably safe place to work, a rea-
sonably safe method and manner of do-
ing the work, and to provide reasonable
safe guards.’

“You will notice that the word or
words ‘safe guards’ were spelled in In-
struction No. 15 as two separate words,
when in fact they should have been used
as one word ‘safeguards’. You are
now instructed that it was not the in-
tention of the Court to infer or to state
in Instruction No. 15 that it was the duty
of the defendants to furnish protec-
tion guards or guard rails upon the well
drilling unit used by the defendants and
the deceased at the time of the fatal
accident, it only being the duty of the
defendant to furnish the deceased with
a reasonably safe place to work, a rea-
sonably safe manner and method of
doing the work and to provide reason-
able safe tools and appliances with
which to perform the work.”

628

In giving this latter instruction the
court corrected any error inherent in
the first instruction. He feared the jury
might misinterpret the use of the word
“safe guards”, and after clearing that
point up went on to redefine the duty
of the master to the servant so there
could be no possible chance that the
jury might be misled. As shown by the
italicized part of the latter instruction
quoted above, he clearly limited the
duty of the master to the furnishing of
a safe place to work, safe tools and
methods of doing the work. Taking the
instructions as a whole, it cannot be
said that they did not correctly state
the law or that the jury was misled
thereby.

Affirmed.

JONES et al. v. HANGER.
No. 35619. June 9, 1953.
258 P. 2d 176,

Hatcher & Bond, Chickasha, and Wal-
ter Morris, Anadarko, for plaintiffs in
error.

Haskell B. Pugh, Anadarko, for de-
fendant in error.

ARNOLD, J. This is an action in
mandamus filed in the district court of
Caddo county by James F. Hanger
against the three members of the board
of county commissioners of said county
seeking te compel said board to ap-
prove, allow and pay his claim in the
amount of $187.11 for salary as assist-
ant county attorney for the month of
October, 1951. Upon trial of the case a
judgment was rendered directing the
board to allow and pay the claim; from
order overruling motion for new trial,
defendants bring this appeal.

The undisputed, conclusive and con-
trolling facts in this case are: R. L.
Lawrence, the duly qualified and act-
ing county attorney, filed his itemized
estimate of the needs of his office for
the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1951,
including therein request for his salary
at the rate of $279.86 per month and for
the salary of a first deputy at $204.82
per month. This request was approved
by the board and a lump sum was ap-
propriated sufficient to pay the salary of
the county attorney at the rate re-
quested by him and the salary of a first
deputy in the amount of $187.11 per
month. Assistant county attorney H.
Louis Allen filed salary claims in the
amount of $187.11 each for the months of
July, August, and September, 1951, and
these claims were approved and paid by
the board. On September 26, 1951, H.
Louis Allen resigned and the county at-
torney appointed plaintiff James F.
Hanger, who took the oath of office and
entered upon the duties of assistant
county attorney on October 1, 1951. The
county attorney sent written notice of
this appointment to the board on Sep-
tember 26th and the appointment was
disapproved by the board on October 4,
1951, the reason for disapproval not be-
ing shown. A claim for salary as as-
sistant county attorney for the month of

October, 1951, in the amount of $187.11,
dated and sworn to on October 31, 1951,
was filed by James F. Hanger with the
Board; this claim was approved by the
county attorney, though no date of ap-
proval was shown, and shows that it
was filed for entry on the calendar on
October 29, 1951, though the claim rec-
ord shows it was filed on October 31st.
This claim has been neither approved
nor denied by the Board. James F.
Hanger filed this action to compel pay-
ment of the claim on January 17, 1952,
alleging the above facts.

The board filed its answer to plain-
tiff’s petition, the substance of which is
that it had a discretion to approve or
disapprove of plaintiff personally and
exercised that discretion.

The trial court being of a contrary
view struck all the allegations from the
answer revelant to the issue. The board
of county commissioners having an-
swered setting forth only the one issue,
its failure to pay the claim must be
assumed to have been only on the
ground of its disapproval of the ap-
pointee.

The board took the position below as
here that it had a discretion in confirm-
ing or rejecting the person appointed
to be head deputy which it had exer-
cised and that its rejection of the ap-
pointment made the claim invalid and
illegal; that the county commissioners
must not only establish the position, set
up the salary, and make an estimate in
their budget therefor, but must give
their consent or approval to the person
appointed before he is legally an officer
who can draw salary as such.

The Uniform Salary Act of 1949, 19
O.S. 1951 §179, was in effect at all
times hereinbefore mentioned. It pro-
vides:

“for purposes of fixing salaries un-
der this Act County Officers shall be
grouped in the following classifications:

“A. Enforcement Officers or those
charged with enforcing the laws relat-
ing to public peace and safety: the
County Attorney * * *”—Section 179.4.

629

“The officers named in Groups ‘A’
and ‘B’ shall have such number of dep-
uties, assistants, aides, stenographers,
technicians, or other help whether on
whole or part-time basis, and at such
rates of salary or pay as the principal
officer may propose and establish the
need for and the county commissioners
will approve; provided however, that
the salary or rate of pay proposed and
approved for any subordinate position
under any such officer shall never ex-
ceed eighty per cent (80%) of the salary
provided _in this Act for the principal
officer. Provided, however, that under
such conditions as the Board of County
Commissioners will approve, the County
Attorney and Sheriff may each be al-
lowed not to exceed one (1) deputy or
assistant at not more than ninety per
cent (90%) of the rate of salary pro-
vided herein for the principal officer.
* * * Said number of subordinate posi-
tions and rates of pay as to each so
proposed and approved shall be rea-
sonably classified as to responsibility,
risks, skills, training, and experience
required for such position, with due
weight as to whether said position be
on whole or part-time basis: all of
which shall be determined without re-
gard to the individuals whom the prin-
cipal officer may thereafter select and
appoint to perform such services. And
provided further that, at the beginning
of each fiscal year, all previous agree-
ments and commitments of the prior fis-
cal year having lapsed, when the prin-
cipal officer shall include in his esti-
mate of needs prepared in full con-
formity to Section 286, of Title 68, Okla-
homa Statutes 1951, or any amend-
ments thereto, the said number of po-
sitions and rates of pay for the num-
ber and classes of deputies, aides, sten-
ographers, technicians, or other help,
and whether on whole or part-time ba~
sis, deemed necessary for such ensuing
fiscal year. Be it further provided that
whether approval be by proper entry in
their Journal of the action of the Board
of County Commissioners or by com-
mitment by approval and payment of
claims for such services, the number
of positions and rates of pay shall re-
main so fixed for such fiscal year and
shall not thereafter be changed or re-
duced except by and with the consent
of the principal officer; * * *” —Sec-
tion 179.7.

630

In 1951 an amendment to this act
was passed, 19 O.S. 1951 §156. It is
contended that this provision thereof
is pertinent here:

“Regardless of any law heretofore
enacted, from and after the approval of
this Act it is hereby provided that, in
all counties of this State, and as to
each office in any such county, except
the office of the County Superintendent
where the officer is authorized by agree-
ment with the Board of County Com-
missioners to have one or more dep-
uties, the deputy, or in the event there
be more than one then one of such
deputies, shall be denominated princi-
pal or head deputy and the person ap-
‘pointed to be such principal or head
deputy shall be paid, in equal monthly
installments, by and with the consent of
the Board of County Commissioners, an
annual salary in amount not to exceed
ninety percent (90%) of the salary or
compensation provided by law for such
officer. It is hereby provided, however,
that the provisions of this Act shall be
limited and restricted to those offices
where, by law, such head deputy is au-
thorized to perform any and all of the
duties of the officer who appoints him
to the position of head deputy.”

The salary of the county attorney of
Caddo county fixed by the Uniform
Salary Act, supra, is $279.86 per
month. The amount approved and ap-
propriated here for the assistant county
attorney is less than 80 per cent of that
amount. It is obvious, therefore, that
the foregoing provision has no applica-
tion.

Under the foregoing provisions here-
inabove quoted from section 179.7 of
the statute, the board of county com-
missioners has the duty of passing upon
the estimated needs of the county attor-
ney’s office and exercising its discre-
tion in the approval of the number of
deputies requested and the salary at
which such deputies shall be paid. This
discretion was exercised and appropria-
tion made therefor for an amount inclu-
sive of $187.11 per month for the as-
sistant county attorney. This approval
cannot be withdrawn during the fiscal
year. There is no provision of the stat-

FT

ute that specifically says that the board
of county commissioners shall not ap-
prove or disapprove the appointment of
a designated assistant county attorney;
likewise, there is no provision which
specifically grants the duty of approval
or disapproval. It is perfectly obvious
from the implications of the section
that it was not the intention of the
Legislature that said board should have
any right or duty to approve or disap-
prove an appointee of the county at-
torney. The board of county commis-
sioners has no discretion whatever in
the matter of who shall be the assistant
county attorney of said county. The
disapproval of the board in this instance
as shown by its pleadings and the proof
in this case was based entirely upon its
erroneous contention that it had the
right and duty to approve or disap-
prove the designated assistant county
attorney. It does not contend by plead-
ing, proof, or otherwise, that the disap-
proval was based on its determination
that the claim was illegal on any other
basis.

Herein it is conclusively shown that
after the estimated needs and request
for appropriations was filed and ap-
proved and the appropriation made, the
plaintiff was legally appointed assist-
ant county attorney, entered upon the
performance of his duties as such, per-
formed his duties for a month or more,
and filed a legal claim with the county
commissioners for payment of a
month’s salary which has not been
acted upon by the county commis-
sioners for the sole reason of the
claimed duty to exercise discretion in
the approval of his appointment. Under
the state of facts as hereinbefore dem-
onstrated, nothing remained to be done
except the ministerial duties of ap-
proval and payment of the claim.

Where an inferior tribunal or board
has exercised and exhausted its dis-
cretion and has thereby decided all
questions which come properly and
legally within its discretion, leaving
nothing to be done except a mere
ministerial duty, and has refused to

perform such ministerial duty for a
reason neither legally nor properly
within the scope of its discretion, it
may be compelled by mandamus to
perform such ministerial duty. 34 Am.
Jur. p. 863; Butterworth v. United
States, 112 U.S. 50, 28 L. Ed 656, 5 S, Ct.
25; Hopley, Treasurer, v. Benton, 38
Okla. 223, 132 P. 808; Ryan v. Hum-
phries, 50 Okla. 343, 150 P. 1106.

Affirmed.

HALLEY, CJ., JOHNSON, V.C.J.
and DAVISON, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. CORN,
J., dissents.

BISHOP’S RESTAURANT, Inc., et al.
v. McKIM et al.

No. 35765. June 9, 1953.
258 P. 2d 170.

H. R. Palmer and Fenton & Fenton,
Oklahoma City, for petitioners,

John G. Hervey and J. B. Beaird,
Oklahoma City, and Mac Q. William-
son, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

631

O'NEAL, J. On November 21, 1951,
Horrell McKim filed a claim for com-
pensation against his employer, Bish-
op’s Restaurant, Inc., and its insur-
ance carrier, United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company, wherein he claimed
compensation for an injury sustained on
June 23, 1951, to his head, hip and
legs.

Thereafter the parties entered into a
joint petition settlement agreement
whereby claimant agreed to settle his
claim for the sum of $2,000. On Janu-
ary 3, 1952, the commission after full
hearing approved the settlement and
awarded claimant compensation ac-
cordingly, which award has been fully
paid and satisfied.

On January 16, 1952, claimant, Hor-
rell McKim, died. On February 26, 1952,
Susie McKim, surviving wife and widow
of deceased, filed a claim for compen-
sation against the above-named par-
ties under the death benefit provision of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act in
which she claimed to be the sole de-
pendent of deceased and stated that she
wholly depended upon him for sup-
port; that deceased’s death was caused
by an assault inflicted upon him by a
third person seeking to enter Bishop’s
Restaurant; that the assault occurred
while deceased was in the employ of
Bishop’s Restaurant and arose out of
and in the course of his employment.

It is stipulated that Bishop’s Restau-
rant, Inc., carried compensation insur-
ance for its employees and that de-
ceased’s salary was computed with
other employees in arriving at the
premium paid on the policy.

The trial commissioner to whom the
case was assigned for hearing at the
conclusion of the evidence, in substance,
found: On June 23, 1951, Horrell Mc-
Kim, while in the employ of Bishop’s
Restaurant, Inc. and engaged in a
hazardous employment, sustained an
accidental injury arising out of and in
the course of his employment result-
ing in his death; that the employment

632

in which he was then engaged was not
hazardous in its nature, but that re-
spondents were estopped from denying
the employment was hazardous by rea-
son of the facts stated in the above
stipulation; that deceased left surviv-
ing him as his sole dependent his
widow, Susie McKim, claimant herein,
and that she was entitled to recover
compensation in the sum of $13,500 as
provided by statute, 85 O.S. 1951 §22,
par. 7; and further found that the joint
petition settlement entered into between
the parties and approved by the com-
mission did not bar claimant as a de-
pendent of deceased from prosecuting
her claim; and under the above findings
entered an award in favor of claimant
for the amount above stated. The
award was sustained on appeal to the
commission en banc.

Bishop’s Restaurant, Inc., and its
insurance carrier, hereinafter referred
to as petitioners, bring the case here for
review and seek to vacate the award
on the sole ground that there is a total
lack of medical evidence tending to
sustain the finding of the commission
that deceased’s death was caused by
the injury sustained on June 23, 1951.

Horrell McKim prior to his death tes-
tified at the hearing on joint petition
settkement. A transcript of his testi-
mony taken at that hearing was by
agreement admitted in evidence at the
present hearing. At the joint petition
settlement hearing deceased, in sub-
stance, testified: On June 23, 1951, while
in the employ of Bishop’s Restaurant,
he sustained an injury to his head, back,
hip and legs resulting in some disa~
bility, to his person. He was employed as
a checker between the main restaurant
and the tap room. It was his duty to
check employees and others as they
passed from the tap room into the res-
taurant.

On the night he sustained his injury
he encountered some trouble with an
intoxicated customer who sought to en-
ter the restaurant. He put the customer
out the back door and as he was stand-

ing in the door the customer pulled
him out into the alley, hit him over the
head with some hard instrument,
knocked him down and rendered him
temporarily unconscious. As a result of
his injury he was compelled to discon-
tinue work and has not since been able
to do any work; that he never had any
previous injury to his head; that the
only injury of any kind he had pre-
viously had was about three or four
years ago when he fell and sustained
a slight injury to his kneecap.

The medical evidence is in conflict
as to the cause of deceased’s death.
Several physicians testified that his
death was not caused by the injury
sustained on June 23, 1951, but was due
to other causes. One doctor, however,
testified he performed an autopsy on
the body of deceased on the 19th day
of January, 1952. The purpose of the
autopsy was to determine the cause of
his death; that his death was caused by
cerebral apoplexy which means a hard-
ening of the arteries of the brain. He
found in the brain evidence of a contu-
sion giving definite evidence of previous
trauma to the brain; that there were
definite indications that he had not com-
pletely recovered from the trauma
which he had and which finally caused
his death, and, after stating in detail
other conditions found to exist, in an~
swer to questions propounded by the
trial commissioner, the doctor stated:

“Q. Doctor, just state what you con-
cluded, what your diagnosis was that
caused the death of Mr. McKim? A.
Cerebral apoplexy.

“By the Court: And what do you
think brought that on or did you form
a conclusion as to that? A. The man had
a pre-existing advanced hardening of
his arteries, and he had definite evi-
dence of a contusion which had occurred
sometime and had not entirely healed
and terminally he had a so-called stroke
or apoplexy which was the cause of his
death.

“By the Court: Did you form a con-
clusion as to whether or not this con-
tusion that you found that happened had

anything to do with the cause of this
hardening of the arteries? A. It would
be my opinion that the contusion would
be a precipitating or aggravating cause.
He had pre-existing vessels which were
hard and inelastic and the type which
made it very hazardous for him, if we
may state it that way, to be subjected
to severe trauma which we know he
had.”

On cross-examination the doctor said
he did not know how long the condition
he found had existed. He had no history
of any date upon which deceased sus-
tained his accident. His testimony is
based entirely on what he found on au-
topsy and did not take into account any
period of time that may have elapsed
between any trauma deceased might
have sustained and his death, nor did
he intend to testify that any particular
incident or trauma played any part in
the condition he found to exist. This, in
substance, constitutes the medical evi-
dence relied upon by respondents to
sustain her claim.

It is contended by petitioners that
the evidence is wholly insufficient upon
which to base a finding that deceased’s
death was caused by the injury sus-
tained on June 23, 1951.

It is true as contended by petitioners
that the doctor did not directly and
specifically testify that the apoplexy
which he found to exist, and which was
caused by trauma to the brain, oc-
curred on the 23rd day of June, 1951.
We think, however, that his testimony
connected with the testimony of de-
ceased given at the joint petition hear-
ing, to the effect that he had no prior
injury to his head, is sufficient to sus-
tain the finding of the.commission. Tide-
water Associated Oil Co. v. Ale, 191
Okla. 414, 130 P. 24.991. In Swift & Co.
v. Brown, 202 Okla. 572, 216 P. 2d 294,
we said:

« * * * Although Dr. Henry was not
given a statement or history of the acci-
dental injury by claimant, the State
Industrial Commission had a complete
description of the injury by claimant
and of the sequence of events leading
up to the disability, and Dr. Henry

633

stated the disability was not due to
the usual cause, towit: stricture. But
the statement of Dr. Henry that injuries ~
such as claimant’s are due either to
accident or disease, and that claimant’s
disability is not due to disease, is evi-
dence of the fact that it was due to
accident. The evidence, although not
categorical, reasonably informs the State
Industrial Commission that there is a
disability due to an accidental injury
sustained by the employee during his
employment. That is sufficient. City of
Kingfisher v. Jenkins, 168 Okla. 624, 33
P, 2d 1094; Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Clow, 163 Okla. 302, 22 P. 2d 378;
Burch v. Slick, 167 Okla. 639, 31 P.
2d 110. * * *

Whether a disability is attributable
to an injury or other cause is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the
State Industrial Commission from the
competent evidence adduced. Its de-
termination of this fact will not be dis-
turbed where reasonably supported by
medical testimony. M. & W. Mining
Co. v. Lee, 199 Okla. 76, 182 P. 2d 759;
Henson v. Tulsa Sales & Service Co.,
205 Okla. 157, 236 P. 2d 249.

Award sustained.

HALLEY, C. J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, WIL-
LIAMS, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

INDEPENDENT - EASTERN TORPEDO
CO. v. PRICE.

No, 34522. March 10, 1953.
Rehearing Denied May 12, 1958.

Application for Leave to File Second Petition
for Rehearing Denied June 9, 1953.

258 P. 2d 189.

+
oo
3S

Draper Grigsby, Oklahoma City, and
G. C. Spillers and G. C. Spillers, Jr.,
Tulsa, for plaintiffs in error.

Clyde G. Pitman and George Defen-
baugh, Shawnee, for defendant in error.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This is an appeal
from the district court of Pottawatomie
county, Oklahoma, from a verdict of a
jury and judgment based thereon,
awarding defendant in error $65,000
for personal injuries allegedly sustain-
ed by him through the negligence of
the plaintiffs in error.

The parties herein occupied reverse
relative positions in the court below
and hereafter will be referred to as
they there appeared.

Plaintiff, inter alia, alleged in sub-
stance that he was a resident of Pot-
towatomie county, Oklahoma; that the
Independent Eastern Torpedo Company
was a foreign corporation authorized to

do business in Oklahoma; that Jim
Kamp was an employee of said corpo~
ration; that plaintiff was employed by
W. P. Smith as a tool dresser on an
oil and gas well located in said county,
and that by virtue of his employment
it was his duty to immediately resume
work after the defendants had dis-
charged a shot of 60 liquid quarts of
nitroglycerin; that on September 2,
1948, Jim Kamp, the expert shooter of
the Torpedo Company, prepared the
well for shooting, which shot was set
to go off at 11:02 a. m., September 3,

635

1948; that thereafter, at the time ap-
pointed, Kamp announced that said
shot had been discharged; that plain-
tiff relied upon such announcement and.
resumed work and was near the open-
ing of the well when the charge of ni-
troglycerin exploded and that as a re-
sult the plaintiff sustained serious
permanent injuries to his face and eyes
and that the injuries were caused by
the direct and proximate result of the
negligence of defendants; that the
shooting or blasting of an oil well with
a heavy charge of nitroglycerin is
known to be an inherently and ex-
tremely dangerous operation requiring
the highest degree of care on the part
of those who undertake such a danger-
ous performance; that such facts were,
at all times, well known and under-
stood by the defendants; that the de-
fendants agreed to shoot the well in the
usual and customary manner as afore-
said; that in doing so they held them-
selves out to plaintiff and other per-
sons interested or likely to be affected
by such operation as being fully com-
petent, capable and experienced in
shooting oil wells with the amount of
explosives as herein described; that
defendants held themselves out as able
to, and agreed that they would, per-
form the work of shooting the well with-
out danger or injury to the plaintiff,
or any other person who, at the time,
was rightfully on the premises during
the discharge of their expert services
in shooting the well. That as experts
it was defendants’ duty to know and
understand all of the dangers and haz-
ards attached to the use of such ex-
plosives; that it was their duty to care-
fully watch and actually determine ac-
curately when the charge of danger-
ous explosives had been fully dis-
charged and when the same had spent
its force and effect in the natural proc-
ess of explosion; that in addition there-
to, it was their duty to use the highest
degree of care and caution to determine
when said shot had been discharged
and thereafter to advise plaintiff and
others who might be rightfully on the
premises that such explosives had been

636

set, that said shot had been discharged,
and when it was safe for plaintiff and
others to resume work on the well; that
notwithstanding that it was the duty
of defendants to so advise and warn
plaintiff, they failed and neglected to do
so and were thereby guilty of negli-
gence resulting in plaintiffs injury;
that while the defendants knew, or by
the exercise of ordinary care should
have known, that the charge of nitro-
glycerin had not in fact exploded at
the time set by the defendants for its
discharge; that defendant Jim Kamp,
acting for and on behalf of himself and
his employer, stated to plaintiff and
others, in substance, that the charge
of nitroglycerin had in fact discharged
and exploded and that such charge had
fully spent its force; that such state-
ments and acts on the part of the de-
fendants were so made and done, know-
ing full well that these statements (and
conduct) would be and were in fact
relied on by plaintiff and that he would
resume work on the drilling floor near
the oil well immediately after the an-
nouncement.

It was further alleged that immedi-
ately after having announced that the
charge of nitroglycerin had been dis-
charged, or exploded, that defendant,
Jim Kamp, proceeded to make an in-
spection of the well by looking into
and around the well; that by means
of such inspection so made, the de-
fendant knew, or by the exercise of
ordinary care and caution, under the
circumstances, could have known and
should have known, that said charge
had not in fact exploded, but that, not-
withstanding this, he again announced
to plaintiff, and others rightfully on the
premises, that the shot of nitroglycerin
had exploded; that said charge had
been fully exhausted and that the
shooting of the well was completed;
that this conduct and these statements
were made, knowing that it was the
duty of plaintiff to rely thereon, and
that he would resume work in danger-
ous proximity to the well; that plain-
tiff did so rely on the statements, acts,
and conduct of the defendants and by

reason thereof believed that the charge
had exploded as represented; that in
the exercise of due care, and in reli-
ance upon such statements and con-
duct, he resumed his work near the
hole or opening of the well, and was
picking up and removing small tools
and equipment therefrom when ‘the
charge of nitroglycerin placed in the
well by defendants actually, and in
fact, exploded; that as a result of said
explosion there was forced out of the
hole a great volume of water, sand,
gravel, dirt and oil with a violent and
terrific force; which struck plaintiff
on the head and in the face and eyes
and a large portion of his body with
such great force that it knocked him
unconscious, threw him a considerable
distance and resulted in serious and
permanent injury to him; that his in-
juries were directly and proximately
caused by the negligence and want of
care by defendants; that by reason
thereof he is permanently disfigured
about the face and head and eyes; that
he is permanently and totally indus-
trially blind; that he has suffered and
will suffer great and excruciating pain
the rest of his life; that he is perman-
ently and totally disabled from work-
ing or following any gainful occupation.

It is further alleged that at the time
he sustained the injuries complained
of he was a strong, robust and able-
bodied man, in good health and work-
ing steadily and continuously as a tool
dresser and oilfield worker, and earn-
ing $500 per month ($6,000 per year);
that he had a life expectancy of 33
years and that he would have continued
to earn this amount during the re-
mainder of his life expectancy, except
for the negligence of defendants; that
through defendants’ negligence he has
peen damaged in the amount of $140,-
467 by loss of earning capacity; that
he has suffered damages of $25,000 for
pain and mental anguish, or a total
sum of $165,467, for which he prays
judgment.

Defendants answered denying gen-
erally all allegations not specifically ad-

mitted, and admitted its corporate ex-
istence, and that it placed and explod-
ed a charge of nitroglycerin in the well
in question.

Answering further defendants stated
that if plaintiff sustained any injuries,
as alleged in the petition which they
do not admit, then, and in that event,
defendants allege that the injuries, if
any, sustained by plaintiff were the
direct result and proximate result of
negligence and carelessness on his part,
and without which no such injuries
would have been sustained by the
plaintiff.

Plaintiff for his reply to the answer
of the defendants, other than the gen-
eral denial, denies that he was guilty
of contributory negligence and alleges
that he was wholly without fault, and
renewed the prayer for judgment in
his petition.

The essential facts, as disclosed by
the record, are that prior to September
1, 1948, J. F. Smith, who owned the
lease, or an interest therein, drilled an
oil and gas well near Shawnee, Okla~
homa. Finding no oil or gas in sub-
stantial quantity the well was plugged
back from a depth of 5,607 feet to a
depth of proximately 4,900 feet. This
well was what is known as a “tight
hole”, that is, there were no caves or
cavities in the earth at the bottom of
the hole. The owner, J. F. Smith, then
engaged the defendant Independent-
Eastern Torpedo Company to shoot the
well with 60 quarts of liquid nitrogly-
cerin. On the 2nd day of September,
1948, the defendant Company sent de-
fendant Jim Kamp, who was one of
its expert shooters, to the well, and
there, at the request of the owner,
placed’ on the bottom of this hole three
containers containing 60 liquid quarts
of nitroglycerin. The shooter used a
time bomb which was set to explode
and discharge the nitroglycerin shot at
11:02 a. m. on September 3, 1948.

Preparatory to placing the time bomb
and shooting the well, the hole was
plugged with a concrete fill of about

637

700 feet. The casing at the bottom was
encased in concrete from 5,607 feet up
to about 4,900 feet depth, and 7 inch
O.D. Casing was then set in the hole,
resting on this concrete. It was at the
bottom of this hole and inside the con-
erete reinforced casing that the shoot-
er placed the 60 quarts of explosives,
the zero hour time bomb, and the um-
brella bridge which was to protect the
shot from sand and water used to
“tamp” or fill the hole to within two
feet of the top of the casing, which ex-
tended above the derrick floor. After
the bomb was set, and all other prelim-
inaries performed, the W. P. Smith
Drilling Company, for whom plaintiff
worked as tool dresser, who had been
engaged by J. F. Smith to work on the
hole with cable tools, filled the hole,
when plaintiff was not present, by using
two yards of sand and then finished
filling with water. A hose was con-
nected so that a constant stream of
water ran into the hole and kept the
casing filled to within two feet of the
top of the casing where there was a
hole in the casing which allowed the
water to run out if it got above this
point. This was for the purpose of
keeping the well full of water. Further
work on the well was discontinued until
the shooting of the well.

Sometime before 11:02 a.m., on Sep-
tember 3, 1948, Jim Kamp, the expert
shooter, who represented Independent
Eastern Torpedo Company, returned to
the well for the purpose of determining
when the shot discharged. He had a
seismograph, sometimes referred to as
a G-phone or shot detector, which in-
cluded earphones, watch, ammeter and
diaphragm. The diaphragm of the in-
strument was buried about three inch-
es in the ground near the well. When
so arranged and when the earth vi-
brates, the hands of this instrument
are supposed to move and the phone
reveals a noise or sound. The shooter,
while using this instrument, listened
and watched the instrument and at
11:02 a. m., September 3, 1948, when
the shot was set to go off, announced
that the shot had discharged. After

638

making the announcement, the shoot-
er walked toward the well where he
met Walter Morris, superintendent for
the J. F. Smith Company, who said
“Yes, it went off right on the minute”.
They conferred and the shooter said,
“I wonder if the water went down in
the hole?” The shooter and Morris
then went on the derrick floor and
looked into the hole. Mr. Little, a
farmer also looked into the well. Mor-
ris and the shooter said the water ap-
peared to have gone down 15 or 20
feet. Mr. Little said the water was
about 2 feet below the top of the cas-
ing. The shooter and Morris then
walked off the derrick floor to a dis-
tance of about 15 or 20 feet from the
well hole where they conferred with
Mr. Louvier, the driller for W. P. Smith
& Company, under whose supervision
plaintiff worked. Morris and Louvier
both said the shot was off because they
felt the jar. Thereupon, Louvier, the
driller, apparently believing the shot
was off, resumed operations by at-
tempting to start the motors which had
been down for 24 hours. Plaintiff had
been in a utility building, known as
the “dog house” during this time
watching the shooter. Plaintiff did not
leave the dog house until the shooter
had said and indicated that the shot
had gone off and the shooter and Mor-
ris had gone up and looked into the
well. After these assurances, and
Louvier, the driller, had resumed work,
the plaintiff left his place of safety. He
followed Louvier, which appears to
have been his duty and helped start
the motors. (Morris and Louvier both
testified that it was his duty to follow
this driller and help him in this work
without being ordered to do so.) After
the motors had been started to resume
work, plaintiff walked across the der-
rick floor. He stopped to pick up some
small tools, at which time water and
sand came out of the hole (well) with
a terrific explosive force and went 75
to 100 feet high above the mouth of the
well. This force hit plaintiff in the
face, and on the head and body, in-

flicting upon him the alleged perma-
nent bodily injuries.

The theory of the plaintiff is that
the defendants negligently failed to use
the safe and best known means of de-
termining when a charge of nitrogly-
cerin was discharged, and that by do-
ing so, they, through the expert shoot-
er, Jim Kamp, negligently and erron-
eously announced that the 60 liquid
quarts charge of nitroglycerin had ex-
ploded and discharged when, in fact,
it had not, and that due to this negli-
gence and erroneous announcement,
and conduct of the shooter, plaintiff
was led to believe and did believe and
rely upon the announcement and con-
duct of the expert shooter and was
thereby injured; that this negligent
and erroneous announcement and con~
duct was the proximate cause of plain-
tiffs injury and damages sustained
thereby.

The cause was tried to a jury upon
this theory resulting in a verdict of
the jury in favor of plaintiff, which ver-
dict was approved by the trial court
and judgment rendered accordingly,
resulting in this appeal.

The defendants present their numer-
ous assignments of error under six
propositions. Their first proposition
is:

“There was no proof of any negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiffs in
error, or either of them, and the trial
court erred in overruling the demurrer
to the evidence of the defendant in er-
ror, and likewise erred in overruling
the request of the plaintiffs in error
for a directed verdict at the conclusion
of all the testimony, to which plaintiffs
in error excepted.”

In passing on alleged error in over-
ruling defendants’ demurrer to plain-
tiff’s evidence, and their request for a
directed verdict, the evidence will be
construed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff and where there is any evi-
dence or reasonable inferences from
the circumstances reasonably tending

to establish a cause of action, or to
sustain a jury’s verdict and the court’s
judgment based thereon, such judg-
ment will be sustained on appeal un-
less shown to be contrary to law.

Defendants, under this proposition,
assert that it was the position of plain-
tiff that the shooter said the shot was
off when, in fact, it was not, and they
argue that the proof showed that the
shot exploded as announced by the
shooter, and that any damage to plain-
tiff was due to his contributory negli-
gence in knowingly going upon the
premises when he knew from experience
that he might be injured from a de-
layed eruption after the explosion such
as, they claim, occurred in this in-
stance. They further contend that the
shooter used due care and diligence in
the use of standard instrumentalities
for determining whether the shot was,
in fact, off, and that of this fact there
is no dispute, and that since this is
true, even if the shooter had announced
to the superintendent that the shot was
off when in fact it was not, neither of
the defendants would have been guilty
of actionable negligence because to hold
them liable for damages to persons
(and property) when the shooting com-
pany, through its agent, places and ex-
plodes a charge of nitroglycerin in the
well, or attempts to do so, would re-
sult in making the company an insurer
against risk of damage to the well or
to any of the employees about the prem-
ises, which, they assert, is not the
rule, They assert that the measure of
duty is that the shooting company must
use standard equipment and such care
and diligence as an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise under the same
or similar circumstances, and having
done so the shooting company, its
agents, servants and employees, are
exempt from any claim for damages
which may result from the explosion
of a charge of nitroglycerin or any at-
tempt to explode.

The evidence shows that while the
shooter used a shot detector in an ef-
fort to determine when the charge of

639

nitroglycerin had exploded, there was
ample evidence from experienced per-
sons to the effect that a more prac-
tical and positive means of determin-
ing when a shot, such as this one, had
exploded, was available and well
known to this shooter. Witness Hash-
burger, a shooter of 31 years experi-
ence, testified in effect that the only
certain way to determine when a shot
had exploded, tamped as this one was,
was to watch and observe the top of
the hole; that when the shot actually
exploded there would always be a dem-
onstration at the top of the hole. He
testified:

“Q. Have you ever shot in casing
with a shot tamped with sand and
water to the top of the hole? A. Yes sir.

“Q. Do you have an opinion as to
what will happen at the top of the hole
when that shot goes off? A. My opin-
ion is that the water would come out
the top of the hole when the shot goes
off.

“Q. Now, I will ask you whether or
not, in your opinion, there is a positive
test to tell when that shot goes off?
A. Yes, sir,

“Q. What is that test? A. You watch
the top of your hole; something’s going
to come out there when that shot goes
off.”

Even the shooter testified that there
was another way, aside from the shot
detector, to determine when the shot
had exploded. He said that this was
“simply by watching”. The shooter
further stated:

“A. Simply by watching. If the hole
is filled with fluid, by watching the
top of the control head to see if any
fluid comes up or boils up, or if there
ig any movement on top of the fluid;
even a wave on top of the fluid indi-
cates that the shot is off. You don’t
always pick it up with the shot detect-
or. If the hole is not leaded with fluid,
you can stuff papers in the top of the
control head or put a piece of paper on
top of the control head to see if it blows
it out or if it falls off or if there is
any reaction from the gas or pressure
formed.”

640

J.P. King testified:

“A, Well, when the shot goes off in
the hole, loaded under those conditions
inside the pipe and all, it would natur-
ally, kick some of the water out the
top of the hole.

“Q. In your opinion, how high would
that water jump? A. Well, it would
vary some. Sometimes it would blow
it... well, it would depend upon the
size of the shot and the power it had. I
have seen it blow it 50 to 150 feet, and
I have seen it blow it as high as 150
feet above the derrick.

“Q. Is this movement of the water
instantaneous with the explosion? A.
It is. Well, at the time the shot goes
off, it would have to kick out at the
same time that it went off, ‘cause it
would be the line of least resistance,
coming up the hole, enclosed by your
casing; and, the formations would be
hard and solid and it would naturally
follow the line of least resistance, and
that would be out the top of the hole.

“Q. Do you know whether or not
this is a customary test to determine
when a shot goes off in that type of an
oil well? A. Yes.

“Q. Is that the most reliable means
of determining when a shot goes off
in a well that is loaded as this well
is loaded and that has the same con-
ditions as this well? A. In my exper-
iences of the shot going off in a hole
that’s loaded as this hole was, the most
definite way of telling when the shot
goes off is when that water kicks out
of the hole.

“Q. Have you observed these g-phones
being used? A. Yes, sir, I have.

“Q. Have you ever experienced a
jar, other than from the well, register-
ing on those g-phones? A. Yes, sir, I
know of occasions where they would
get a jar on a g-phone when the shot
hadn’t gone off.

“Q. What type of a jar will disturb
those g-phones? A. I seen a bird dog
jump out of a car and cause the shoot-
er to think the shot had gone off on
his g-phone.

“Q. What other types? A. Oh,
stomping on the ground or anybody

moving on the ground, any kind of a
jar on the ground.

“Q. Have you definitely experienced
a well being miscalled by g-phone?
A. Yes, sir.

“Q. In addition to those facts, as-
sume that a time bomb was set to
go off at 11:02 in the morning and that
at the time, 11:02, the shooter said
that the shot had gone off; and that
at the time nothing came from the top
of the hole; but, from five to ten min-
utes later, a sudden eruption from the
top of the hole; when, in your opinion
did the shot go off? A. At the instan-
taneous time that the shot goes off,
this eruption will happen at the top
of the hole there.

“Q, Mr. King, in your opinion, is it
safe to go around an oil well after it
hhas been shot? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. You say you have had a lot of
experience in connection with the
shooting of wells. Now, after the shot
goes off, what do you do? A. Well,
after the shot goes off, we usually get
ready to run our tools, which ever they
may be; and, we have to start up the
motors, always for they are down so
there won’t be any vibrations; and
what tools are on the floor, we gather
them up; and then we wait on orders
to go into the hole with whatever tools
we are going to run.

“Q. Is this immediately after the
shot goes off? A. Just as soon as the
shot goes off, why that’s what we start
doing there.

“Q. Mr. King, what percentage of
shots would you say would make a
demonstration at the top of a 5,000
foot hole? A. Any, shot, shot within
the pipe.

“Q. Any shot, shot within the pipe?
A. In my experience, they all kick out
when shot within the pipe; they all
kick out the top of the hole.”

This testimony, together with other
evidence in the record, though in con-
flict with defendants’ evidence on this
issue, clearly shows that the jury was
justified in finding the defendants neg-
ligent in not having used this practical,
positive, and certain means to deter-

mine when the shot had discharged.
Where there is a practical and appar-
ently certain means to determine a re-
sult, especially when dealing with a
dangerous substance, and it is not used,
and injury results from such conduct,
the person responsible for such failure
is liable. Certainly the person in charge
of the instrumentality who makes a
false determination about the explo-
sion of a shot, when relied upon by a
person who is rightfully present, and
is injured by reason of the failure to
use such means, is entitled to recover
because the shooter did not use that
degree of care commensurate with the
danger at hand. See Title 25 Okla. St.
Ann. §§3,4,5, and 6, and annotations.

The responsibility of a person using
a dangerous instrumentality such as
nitroglycerin places on him the duty
to exercise the degree of care com-
mensurate with the danger at hand, in-
cluding the employment of known
means to prevent injury to others. This
rule is set forth in the case of Lusk v.
Phelps, 71 Okla. 150, 175 P. 756, where
this court said:

“Tt was the duty of defendants when
using dynamite in the prosecution of
their business to exercise such reason-
able supervision over the management
and use thereof as would result in the
observance of the utmost care on the
part of defendant’s employees using
such instrumentality for the safety of
others, and having intrusted such dan-
gerous agency and instrumentality to
their servants they cannot shift this
responsibility with reference to the cus-
tody and use thereof to the servants,
and thus escape liability for no one has
a right to put in operation forces calcu~
lated to endanger human life and prop-
erty without placing them under the
control of ‘a competent and ever active
superintending intelligence, and wheth-
er he undertakes the use himself, or
delegates the use thereof to another,
the obligation abides with him to use
a degree of care commensurate with
the dangerous character of the agency
or instrumentality, and a failure to dis-
charge this duty in either case imposes
the corresponding liability. of making

641.

reparation for any injury that may en-
sue as a result thereof.”

As has been indicated in the author-
ity cited above, a higher degree of
care is required of a person using an
agency known to be dangerous. And’
an oil well shooter, in using a danger-
ous substance such as nitroglycerin,
is required to exercise that degree of
care and caution which is commensu-
rate with the danger involved. This
general rule is clearly set forth in the
case of American Glycerin Co. v. Eason
Oil Co., 98 F. 2d 479, and later approved
in Worcester v. Pure Torpedo Co., 127
F, 2d 945. To the same effect is the
statement in 35 C.J.S., Explosives, Sec.
Kn

To what has been said above, it may
be added what this and other courts
have said in similar situations. In the
case of Martin v. McLain, 184 Okla. 418,
87 P. 2d 1075, in the body of the opinion,
at page 420 Okla. Reports, p. 1077, Pac.
we held:

“However, in a case like the present,
where the only yardstick which the
law furnishes for measuring the duty
of the defendant is the care which a
reasonable and prudent person would
exercise under the circumstances and
there may be a difference of opinion
as to what conduct would constitute
such care, it is not only the function
of the jury to determine the facts as
to what the defendant actually did, but
it is also their exclusive prerogative
to determine whether or not that con-
duct constitutes negligence within the
legal definition thereof that is set forth
in the court’s instructions. As we held
in Prickett v. Sulzberger & Sons Co.,
supra, quoting the rule laid down in
Interstate Compress Co. v. Arthur,
supra, ‘It is only in cases where the
facts are such that all reasonable men
must draw the same conclusions from
them that the question of negligence
(or the want of negligence) becomes
one of law for the court, and then only
when no recovery can be had upon any,
view which can properly be taken of
the facts which the evidence tends to
establish’ (57 Okla. 567, 157 P. 365). In
the cited case, it was also said: ‘Neg-
ligence is so much a mixed question

642

of law and fact . .. that courts are
seldom justified in saying that all reas-
onable men will agree with them on
the question of whether a given state
of facts constitutes the exercise of or-
dinary care.’ ”

In the case of White’s Administrator
v. Kentucky Public Elevator Co., 186
Ky. 91, 216 S. W. 837, at page 839, it is
held:.

“The only basis for the claim that de-
fendant exercised ordinary care in or-
dering deceased to clean the tank with
the assurance it was about empty was
the test made with the sounding bucket,
but clearly this test was inaccurate, as
testified by Mr. Weiser, and wholly un-
dependable, or it was carelessly ap-
plied by Mr. Kelty, because the tank
was not nearly empty, as he might
easily have ascertained by comparing
the weights or asking Mr. Whitney. It
was his duty to have known the grain
was still being withdrawn from the
tank, and, knowing this, to have exer-
cised reasonable care to ascertain it
was so nearly empty as not to be dan-
gerous before ordering it cleaned; and
deceased, who was under no duty of
inspection, had the right to assume he
had, done so, and that the place was
reasonably safe. Olive Hill Fire Brick
Co..v. Stone, 153 Ky. 360, 155 S. W. 733;
Louisa Coal Co. v. Hammond’s Adm’x,
160 Ky. 260, 169 S. W. 709; Interstate
Coal Co. v. Garrard, 163 Ky. 235, 173
S. W. 767. (Emphasis ours.)

Then in Rankel v. Buckstaff-Edwards
Co., 138 Wis. 442, 120 N.W. 269, at page
270, the court states:

“Preparatory to the blasting of the
frozen earth, the workmen engaged in
breaking up the ground drove an iron
bar into the ground with a sledge ham-
mer. When the iron had been driven
into the ground to the desired depth,
the bar was withdrawn, and the work-
men retired and took no part in the
blasting operation. Spanbauer was the
only man at work on the grounds of the
defendant who had had any experience
with dynamite, and when the hole had
been made he charged it by placing the
dynamite in the hole, placing the ex-
ploding cap on it, making the necessary
electrical connections, filling the hole
with earth, and tamping it down, and

he then exploded the charge. Several
charges of dynamite were exploded
at the same time by having a series
of charged holes connected with the
one electrical instrument used to dis-
charge the exploding caps. Four charged
holes were connected for the last blast
made by Spanbauer. About one of the
holes of the earth was not thrown up as
about the other three, and Spanbauer
then again connected the wires from
this hole with his electrical apparatus
and ran a current through the wires.
No explosion followed, and Spanbauer
made an examination of the ground
in the vicinity of the hole and saw a
crack about 1% feet from the hole.
He attributed the crack to the supposed
explosion of the charge in the hole, and
told the men to proceed with the dig-
ging, that everything was all right. Sub-
sequently plaintiff, while working in
this vicinity struck the unexploded
charge of dynamite with a pick, and by
the ensuing explosion lost the sight of
both his eyes and suffered other injuries.
eee

“Neither the plaintiff nor the other
workmen took part in setting and pack-
ing in the charges or in connecting
them by fire with the battery or in dis-
charging them. All of this was under
the control of and was performed by
Spanbauer in the capacity of blaster.
From this it appears that the setting
and exploding of the blast was ex-
clusively intrusted to the expert, and
that plaintiff took no part in perform-
ing this service. It is obvious from the
dangerous character of this service that
it was treated as separate and distinct
from the service plaintiff and the other
workmen were performing in excavat-
ing the earth for the foundation of
the mill.” (Emphasis ours.)

This same general rule was applied
in the case of Valz v. Goodykoontz, 112
Va. 853, 72 S. E. 730. There it was held:

“Where a contractor who is blasting
an obstruction off a railroad track,
placed thereon in the prosecution of
his own work, has set a number of
blasts, an assurance to an employee of
the railroad company, present to see
that the obstruction is quickly removed,
that there is no danger, before all the
blasts have exploded, is negligence and
amounts to a failure to exercise the
ordinary care which such person is en-

titled to have exercised for his safety.”
(Emphasis ours.)

In the body of this opinion, the court
says:

“Thereupon along with Valz’s men
and a section foreman and his gang,
they retired to a place of safety, where
they remained until after four blasts
hhad exploded, when Harvey called out:
‘All over boys; come on back’ and set
out with his men to resume work. The
plaintiff in company with the freight
conductor and a civil engineer, followed
Harvey, and, addressing him by name,
inquired at what time they could clear
the track. About that time the plain-
tiff also directed Harvey’s attention to
smoke arising from behind a nearby
rock, and said: ‘Mr. Harvey, what is
that smoking?’ to which remark Har-
vey replied that it was ‘nothing’—
‘just some powder or a chunk burning
up;’ that there was ‘no danger.’ The
plaintiff repeated the inquiry about the
smoke, and asked if it was perfectly
safe, and was assured by Harvey that
it was safe, and that there was no
danger. Thus assured, he continued to
follow Harvey, who had passed the
danger point, when a delayed blast,
from which the smoke was issuing,
went off, and a fragment of rock struck
the plaintiff on the side of the head,
crushing in the skull and leaving a
hole large enough to admit the passage
of a large duck egg or goose egg, and
inflicting upon him injuries of a ser-
ious and permanent character.

“We are of the opinion that the fore-
going facts and just inferences which
a jury would have been warranted in
drawing from the evidence make out a
clear case for the recovery of damages.”

The Supreme Court of Kansas, in
the case of Taylor v. Atchison Gravel,
Sand & Rock Co. 90 Kan. 452, 135
P. 576, announced and applied this rule.
There it was said:

“Evidence tending to show the fol-
lowing facts is held to authorize a re-
covery: in the operation of a quarry
a small charge of powder was exploded
in a drilled hole, for the purpose of
enlarging it so that it would receive a
larger quantity. The custom was, in
such circumstances, for the superin-

643

tendent to test the hole to be sure that
no fire remained in it before it was
loaded for blasting. The plaintiff was
directed by the superintendent to load
this hole, and was told that it was
safe. He knew the custom, and believed
the test had been made. Relying on
this belief he attempted to load the
hole. The powder exploded, and he
received the injuries, on account of
which he sued.”

It was held in the case of Lynchburg
Traction & Light Co. v. Gordon, 123
Va. 198, 96 S. E, 195, at page 196:

“Tt was his duty to decide whether
the current should be cut off, and there-
fore primarily his duty to know wheth-
er it was on or off at a given time and
place. In this respect he was a vice
principal, and the plaintiff had the
right to rely upon his statement that
the current was off. This being true,
the question discussed to some extent
before us as to whether rubber gloves
or other instrumentalities for use in
cutting live wires were available ‘to
the plaintiff and should have been used
by him is immaterial. The wire would
have been harmless, and the plaintiff
could with perfect safety have done
exactly what he did do, if the foreman’s
alleged statements had been true.”

Therefore, the argument that the
plaintiff had no right to rely upon the
words of assurance given by the shoot-
er, that the shot had discharged, or the
conduct of the shooter and Morris, the
superintendent, which included going
and looking into the hole after the
shooter had negligently and erroneous-
ly, as found by the jury, announced the
shot off before the explosive eruption
which injured the plaintiff, is unten-
able. The conduct of the shooter and
the superintendent in doing so was a
most dangerous act, but it assured the
plaintiff that the shot had discharged.
It assured him that he was safe in re-
turning to work.

The argument that the plaintiff had
been present on many occasions when
wells had been “shot” and knew the
danger and relied on his own judgment
and not that of the shooter is, under
the circumstances herein, immaterial

644

and unavailable as a defense, The evi-
dence disclosed that the well would
have been harmless and plaintiff could,
with perfect safety, have done exactly
what he did do, in performing his duty,
if the shot had been discharged at the
time defendant’s words and conduct
indicated and as plaintiff evidently be-
lieved. Plaintiff took no part in the
“setting off” of the charge of the 60
quarts of nitroglycerin in the well. This
was intrusted to the expert shooter,
Kamp. Because of the dangerous char-
acter of this service it was treated as
separate and distinct from the service
plaintiff was performing. The shoot-
er, who knew the dangerous character
of this service which was treated as
separate and distinct from the service
plaintiff was performing, and who
knew the dangerous character of the
nitroglycerin, alone was responsible for
the proper detection of the “discharge”
of the explosives so that persons right-
fully there’ would not be injured in the
performance of their duties.

The shooter, as an expert, had under-
taken the duty to explode or discharge
the heavy charge of nitroglycerin in
the tamped casing, at the bottom of the
oil well, and he was bound to perform
that duty in such a manner that those
who were rightfully led to a course of
conduct or action on the faith that the
duty would be duly and properly per-
formed should not suffer loss or injury
by reason of negligent failure to per-
form it, and the nature and extent of
the duty assumed by him are factual
matters to be established by proof of
his actual conduct. 65 C. J. S., Negli-
gence, Sec. 4,

The plaintiff has, without question,
shown that by the act of the improper
detection of or the failure to detect
and announce when the discharge of
the explosives occurred, his injuries,
though unintentional, were within the
range of reasonable apprehension and
under circumstances from which vary-
ing inferences might have been pos-
sible and was a question for the jury.
Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248

N. Y. 339, 162 N: E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253.
Therein it was said:

“Tf the harm was not wilful, he must
show that the act as to him had pos-
sibilities of danger so many and appar-
ent as to entitle him to be protected
against the doing of it though the
harm was unintended.”

The plaintiff had a clear right to rely
upon both the words and conduct of
the shooter that the dangerous explo-
sives had discharged. Since this infor-
mation was erroneous and plaintiff re-
lied on it to his injury, the defendants
are liable. The right to recover was
not dependent upon the existence of
any privity of contract or legal rela-
tionship of any kind between the plain-
tiff and defendants. The applicable
rule is stated in 65 C.J.S., Negligence,
$4, and 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, §§21
and 22. See, also, Title 76 Okla. St.
Ann., Torts, §§1 and 5.

This court, however, has already de-
termined that a privity of contract or
legal relationship was not essential to
recovery in this character of action. In
Lisle v. Anderson, 61 Okla. 68, 159 P.
278, we held:

“Whenever the circumstances attend-
ing a situation are such that an ordi-
narily prudent person could reasonably
apprehend that, as the natural and
probable consequences of his act, anoth-
er person, rightfully there, will be in -
danger of receiving an injury, a duty
to exercise ordinary care to prevent
such injury arises; and, if such care
is not exercised by the party on whom
the duty rests and injury to another
person results therefrom, liability on
the part of the negligent party to the
person injured will generally exist, in
the absence of any other controlling
element or fact, and this, too, without
regard to the legal relationship of the
parties.”

We very definitely stated this rule
in the case of Southland Cotton Oil Co.
v. Renshaw, 148 Okla. 107, 299 P. 425,
where, in the Syllabus, it is held:

‘While a volunteer, or a substitute,
assisting or doing the work of a regular

employee in a cotton oil mill may not
recover on the basis of service, he is
entitled to the exercise of that degree of
care owing to persons rightfully upon
the employer’s premises and may base
a recovery on general principles of neg-
ligence, and notwithstanding the vol-
unteer or substitute places himself in
a position of danger, even negligently,
the employer is liable if the injury
could have been avoided by the exer-
cise of ordinary care on his part or
that of the employee.”

In the case of Bright v. Barnett &
Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60 N. W. 418,
in holding that privity of contract was
not essential to recovery, there, in the
body of the opinion, it was said that
the duty rests on the principle that the
law reposes the duty on anyone to
avoid acts in their nature dangerous to
the lives of others.

In 65 C. J. S., Negligence, §65, p. 556,
the rule is stated to be:

“The duty to exercise care to avoid
injury is not restricted to those in con-
tractual relationship with the alleged
wrongdoer, but extends to others law-
fully present, and employed, as for ex-
ample, to the servant of another who
is where he has a lawful right to be in
the performance of his ordinary du-
ties.”

In the more recent opinion of Hughes
v. Shanafelt, 203 Okla. 80, 218 P. 2d
350, we approved the rule in Lisle v.
Anderson, supra, by stating:

“In that case the court pointed out
the essential elements of actionable
negligence. It was then determined
that no relation of master and servant
existed, but this court held, after dis-
cussion of numerous authorities, as fol-
lows: ‘Thus it will be seen that the
rule deducible from the authorities,
supra, is that, whenever the circwm-
stances attending the situation are such
that an ordinarily prudent person could
reasonably apprehend that, as the nat-
ural and probable consequences of his
act, another person, rightfully there,
will be in danger of receiving an injury,
a duty to exercise ordinary care to pre-
vent such injury arises, and if such
care is not exercised by the party on

645

whom the duty rests and injury to
another person results therefrom, lia-
bility on the part of the negligent party
to the person injured will generally
exist, in the absence of any other con-
trolling element or fact, and this, too,
without regard to the legal relation-
ship of the parties’ ” (Emphasis ours.)

The defendants, however, largely
predicate their defense on what it is
claimed was held in the case of Inter-
national Products Co. v. Erie R. Co.,
244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662, and the
case of Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v.
Smith, Adm’x, 160 Okla. 287, 16 P. 2d
226, and other cases of similar import.
In the railroad case, supra, there was
no mention of the theory of any con-
tractual or legal relationship between
the parties. The case is based on a
total failure of the plaintiff to estab-
lish any fact of negligence. It was not
shown that any employee of the com-
pany was, through want of care, re-
sponsible for the conductor’s death. The
Jaw therein can have no bearing on the
issue here presented. The holdings in
the case of International Products Co.,
supra, does not relate to facts such as
are presented here. However, the
court in that case very definitely held
that words, negligently spoken, when
relied upon, may justify recovery
where a person relying thereon has
been injured. Therein, in the body of
the opinion, the court said:

“Obviously, however, the rule we
have adopted has its limits. Not every
casual response, not every idle word,
however damaging the result, gives rise
to a cause of action. Chancellor Kent
might not be held responsible for an
error in one of his ‘battery opinions.’
As he himself said, they cost nothing,
and bind no one. Liability in such cases
arises only where there is a duty, if
one speaks at all, to give the correct
information. And that involves many
considerations. There must be knowl-
edge, or its equivalent, that the infor-
mation is desired for a serious purpose;
that he to whom it is given intends to
rely and act upon it, that, if false or
erroneous, he will because of it be in-
jured in person or property. Finally,
the relationship of the parties, arising

646

out of contract or otherwise, must be
such that in morals and good con-
science the one has the right to rely
upon the other for information and the
other giving the information owes a
duty to give it with care.”

It is evident that in this case the rule
stated is one of general application.
The relationship required to sustain
recovery is that the plaintiff had a
right to be present at the time and to
rely upon the false words spoken or
erroneous information given. It does
not hold that there must be a privity
of contract before the offending party
may be held accountable. Its only
requisite is that the parties must be in
such relationship to each other that
one is dependent upon the other to
exercise due care and caution in what
he is doing and saying; a failure to
exercise such care, whether by being
misled through spoken words or rash
conduct, or otherwise, constitutes neg-
ligence. If the person is injured in
relying upon the assurance given or
the conduct performed, as in this case,
he is entitled to recovery.

In support of this statement, it has
generally been held, as in Lisle v. An-
derson and Hughes v. Shanafelt, supra,
that a privity of contract between the
parties is not a prerequisite to the
existence of a duty to exercise due
care, and that a liability exists for neg-
ligent conduct resulting in injury to
one rightfully present. The rules de-
ducible from the authorities are stated
in 119 ALR. 1002; 38 Am, Jur., Neg-
ligence, page 655 et seq. and cases cited
therein, and may be stated as follows:
First, this duty is not dependent upon
the existence of a contract relation be-
tween the person who controls the dan-
gerous instrumentality and one who is
injured thereby, but rests upon the
principle that it is the duty of every
man to use his own property so as not
to injure the person or property of
others, 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, §23 et
seq.; 60 N. W. 418, 26 L.R.A. 524, Sec-
ond, liability in negligence is not nec-
essarily dependent upon a pre-existing

privity in legal relationship between
the person injured and the person caus-
ing the injury. 123 A.L.R. 863; 38 Am.
Jur., Negligence, §14 et seq. The duty
of vigilance to prevent injury has its
source in the laws applicable to hu-
man relations rather than in a narrow
conception of privity. 34 P. 2d 481;
L.R.A. 1916F, 696; 111 N. E. 1050.

‘We are of the opinion that the fore-
going facts and reasonable inferences
which a jury would have been war-
ranted in drawing from the evidence
make out a clear case for recovery of
damages, and, that by reason thereof,
the errors complained of under de-
fendants’ first proposition are unten-
able. And, in this connection, we note
that defendants’ fifth proposition is
that:

“The defendant in error could pred-
icate no cause of action against plain-
tiffs in error on the announcement
made by the shooter, Jim Kamp, to
the superintendent of the lease that the
charge of nitroglycerin placed in the
well exploded at the appointed time.”

The argument under this proposition
is largely a repetition of the matters
presented under plaintiffs in error’s
first proposition, We think what has
been said as to the first proposition dis-
poses of the arguments presented un-
der the fifth proposition, and we there-
fore deem it unnecessary to further
discuss the merits of this issue.

Defendants’ proposition No. II is that:

“The trial court erred in giving in-
structions requested by the plaintiffs
in error numbered 2 and 3, to which
plaintiffs in error duly excepted. ”

And proposition No. II is:

“The trial court erred in giving in-
structions numbered 3, 5 and 6, to which
plaintiffs in error duly excepted.”

Requested instruction No. II, refused
by the court, advised the jury that if
the shooter used due care and diligence
in an effort to determine if the shot was
discharged or exploded before he an-
nounced that it had, it would make no

difference whether it had gone off or
not; that the announcement that it had
gone off when such was not the fact
would be immaterial. This is not the
law, or standard of conduct, as we have
shown heretofore under plaintiffs in
error’s first proposition.

Requested instruction No. III, which
was refused by the court, embraced
the theory that the work of shooting
the well by the expert shooter was com-
pleted and turned over to the owner
when plaintiff was injured. This con-
stituted an affirmative defense which
was neither pleaded nor proven.

An examination of the instructions
as a whole indicates that the court sub-
mitted the issues to the jury most fav-
orable to the defendants, and the in-
structions, when considered in their
entirety, fairly presented the issues to
the jury. There was no error in either
ithe rejection of requested instructions
under plaintiffs in error’s second prop-
osition, or in giving the instructions
complained of under the third propo-
sition.

It is next contended under plaintiffs
in error’s proposition IV that:

“The verdict of the jury is excessive
and appears to have been rendered. un
der influence of passion and prejudice.”

To sustain this proposition they cite
and rely upon the cases of St. Louis &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hart, 45 Okla. 659, 146
P. 436; St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hodge,
53 Okla. 427, 157 P. 60; St. Louis, I. M.
& S. Ry. Co. v. True, 71 Okla. 264, 176
P. 758 (Cert. denied 63 L. Ed. 801.)

These authorities or opinions were
written several years ago, and this
court will not consider them as a meas-
ure of damage in this time of the de-
valuated dollar, the higher individual
earning capacity, and the modern ten-
dency of allowing much larger verdicts
to stand than were permitted a few
years ago. John A. Brown Co. v.
Clause, 205 Okla. 122, 235 P. 2d 680. In
the second and third paragraphs of the

647

syllabus of the John A. Brown. case,
supra, we said:

“The general rule is that unless there
has been an abuse of discretion, the
trial court’s ruling on a motion ‘for a
new trial on the ground that the dam-
ages are excessive will not be dis-
turbed.

“In an action for damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained, the court will
not grant a new trial on the ground of
excessive damages, unless the amount
awarded clearly shows that the jury
was actuated by passion, partiality, or
prejudice.”

There is no evidence in the record
to indicate passion or prejudice toward
defendants on the part of the jury, and
we are unable to say that such existed
by the amount of the verdict alone.

The evidence sustained the allega-
tions of plaintiff's life expectancy, earn-
ing capacity and loss of earning capa-
city, pain and suffering and bodily dis-
figurement.

It is argued that the medical testi-
mony is insufficient to ascertain that
plaintiff was totally and permanently
industrially incapacitated. This was
established by Dr. G. W. Brown, who
testified in detail as to his physical dis-
abilities. Defendants did not question
the medica] testimony of the plaintiff.
They did not ask to have plaintiff ex-
amined by other medicos, nor offer
any testimony on this issue. An exam-
ination of the record convinces us that
the verdict and judgment for plaintiff
was not excessive.

The sixth and last proposition is that:

“The plaintiff in error, The Indepen-
dent-Eastern Torpedo Company, was
an independent contractor and its con-
tract had been completed and its work
accepted by the owner of the well prior
to any injury sustained by the defend
ant in error by reason of the explosion
of the said charge of nitroglycerin in
the well in question, and no liability
did or could attach to the plaintiffs in
error, or either of them.”

Under this proposition, it is urged
that Morris, the superintendent, and

648

Kamp, the shooter, testified that the
work of shooting the well had been
completed, and the work accepted by
the owner, and that defendants were
not liable for damages for an accident
that happened subsequent to the com-
pletion of the work. Citing Armstrong
v. City of Tulsa, 102 Okla. 49, 226 P.
560, which they contend is the leading
ease on the subject of completion and
acceptance.

This contention is without merit. It
is necessary to plead defenses which
assume or admit the original cause of
action alleged, but which are based
upon subsequent facts or transactions
which go to qualify or defeat it, and
defenses which are analogous to the
ancient facts in abatement—in other
words—new matter; and an entire fail-
ure to plead a defense is not cured by
the introduction without objection of
evidence in support of it, or by finding
in relation thereto. Bancroft’s Code
Pleading, vol. 1, §267. This is the rule
applied in Kurz v. Stafford, 135 Okla.
121, 274 P. 674, where, in the first syl-
labus, we said:

“Whenever a defendant intends to
rest his defense upon any fact which is
not included in the allegations neces-
sary to the support of plaintiff's case,
he must set it out. Any fact which
avoids the action and which the plain-
tiff is not bound to prove in the first
instance in support of it is new mat-
ter and must be specifically pleaded.”

The following cases are to the same
effect; Mercantile Insurance Co. v.
Murray, 171 Okla. 597, 43 P. 2d 451;
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weaver,
178 Okla. 156, 47 P. 2d 104; Venmex Oil
Co. v. Thomas, 189 Okla. 407, 117 P.
2d 540; Sanders v. Matthews, 157 Okla.
223, 12 P. 2d 873.

Judgment affirmed.

WELCH, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur, HALLEY,

CJ., and CORN, ARNOLD, and WIL-
LIAMS, JJ., dissent.

HALLEY, C. J., (dissenting). Plain-
tiff sued defendants to recover dam-

ages for injuries sustained to his per-
son as a result of being struck in the
face by matter flowing from the top
of an oil well following the shooting
thereof with nitroglycerine.

The accident occurred September 3,
1948, at a well drilled on a lease owned
by one J. F. Smith and located in Lin-
eoln county. The well was being drilled
by one Price Smith under contract with
the owner. The plaintiff was an em-
ployee of said Price Smith and as such
acted in the capacity of a tool dresser
for one Fred Louvier, who was em-
ployed by said Price Smith as a driller.
Defendant Torpedo Company, under
contract with the owner, shot the well
and defendant Kamp, acting as its
agent and employee, performed the
service. The well had been drilled to
a depth of 5,607 feet and plugged back
to the depth of 4,950 feet and casing
split in preparation for the shot. In
accordance with its contract with the
owner, the Torpedo Company, on Sep-
tember 2, 1948, placed in the hole three
containers of nitroglycerine, each con-
taining 20 quarts, attached thereto a
time bomb set to explode at 11:02 a. m.
on September 3, 1948, and placed there-
over what is termed an umbrella. Up-
on the completion thereof the drilling
contractor put in the hole 2 or 3 cubic
yards of sand and then filled the hole
with water and inserted a water hose
so as to maintain that volume of water
until the shot was exploded. Present
on the premises on the forenoon of
September 3rd were said driller and
plaintiff, who were on twelve hour tour,
which did not end until 12 noon of that
day; Kamp, one Walter W. Morris,
lease superintendent and representa-
tive of said J. F. Smith, and two others,
landowners in the vicinity who were
interested in knowing the potential of
the well. Kamp, who came by auto-
mobile, brought with him a seismo-
graphic instrument, known as a shot
detector, which he installed by placing
the diaphragm thereof in the ground
beside the car which was parked about
75 feet south of the well. The instru-

ment was provided with an ammeter
which reflected to the eye the force of
an explosion and ear phones which re-
flected the sound thereof. Shortly be-
fore 11:02 a. m. Kamp, seated upon
the running board of his car, placed
the seismograph phones in his ears
and held the ammeter in his hand in
anticipation of the explosion. At the
same time Morris and Louvier stood
about 25 or 30 feet from the well with
watches in hand in order to note the
time of the explosion. Practically on
the minute set Kamp waved his hand
to Morris and cried “its off”, or words
to such effect, meaning that the shot
had exploded. Morris, in response,
made a similar cry in recognition
of the truth of Kamp’s statement.
Thereupon Louvier went to start the
power in order that the motors, which
had been dead more than 24 hours,
might warm up. After giving said sig-
nal Kamp assembled his seismograph,
placed same in his car and came to
where Morris was standing and they
together went to the well to note wheth-
er the water which filled the well at
time of the explosion had settled. After
noting the fact that the water had set-
tled they left the platform of the well
and stood nearby, engaged in conver-
sation with Louvier who had returned
from starting the motors, They were
standing with their backs to the well
and while so standing and engaged
there was a terrific noise of an erup-
tion. On turning to look at the well
they observed the plaintiff lying on
his back upon the derrick floor with
water and oil which covered his face
and had filled his eyes and nose, all
of which resulted in injury. Reflecting
his conduct at the time of and imme-
diately preceding his injury, plaintiff
testified that he was in the lease utility
building known as “doghouse” talking
with one of said landowners at the
time set for the explosion, That from
the doorway thereof, he observed the
signal given by Kamp to Morris, and
though he did not distinctly hear the
words that Kamp spoke he was satis-
fied that they meant that the shot had

649

exploded. That he saw Louvier going
to start the motors and joined him in
order to assist. That after the motors
were started he concluded that the
large motor was running rather fast
and he went to the side thereof to idle
it down. After doing so he started
across the derrick floor en route to the
doghouse when he noted some lease
tools lying around and he concluded to
pick them up and thus leave the place
clean when going off tour at noon. Then
he was in the act of stooping to pick
up a tool near the mouth of the well
when the eruption occurred.

The uncontroverted facts in this case
show that Kamp, the shooter, gave the
warning that the shot had exploded and
from that moment on it was dangerous
to be around the mouth of the well.
This fact was known to the plaintiff and
the shooter had the right to rely on the
fact that employees on a drilling well
were experienced enough to know that
it was dangerous to get near the well
under such circumstances. This plain-
tiff had seen a hundred wells shot and
was cognizant of the danger. He had
been around drilling oil wells since he
was twelve or fourteen years of age.
The law is well settled that where rea-
sonable warning has been given, the
person in charge of a dangerous instru-
mentality on seeing another approach
a dangerous place may assume that the
latter will not place himself in obvious
peril. 65 C.J.S. Negligence, §67; Cho-
quette v. Key System Transit Co., 118
Cal. App. 646, 5 P. 2d 921. In 38 Am.
Jur. §89, this statement is made:

“Persons who own, operate, or main-
tain dangerous instrumentalities have
a right to rely upon others who may |
be imperiled thereby to take the usual
and customary measures to avoid in-
jury. They may assume, in the ab-
sence of information to the contrary,
that others are in possession of their
faculties and will exercise them in the
normal and usual manner.”

This statement is supported by the
following citations: Bresee v. Los An-
geles Traction Co., 149 Cal. 131, 85 P.

650

152, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1059; Herring v.
Wilmington & R.R.Co., 32 N.C. 402, 51
Am. Dec. 395; Derringer v. Tatley, 34
NLD. 43, 157 N.W. 811, L.R.A. 1917F,
187; Deans v. Wilmington & W. R. Co.,
107 N.C. 686, 12 S. E. 77, 22 Am. St.
Rep. 902.

What more could reasonably be ex-
pected of the shooter in this case? He
went on the premises at the request of
the owner. He knew that it was a
drilling well and that it was customary
to have experienced workers on the
well. He warned the workers. He
knew that he did not have to person-
ally tell all of them to stay away from
the mouth of the well. The plaintiff
was warned that the shot had exploded.
The shooter had no reason to think that
the plaintiff would get so close to the
mouth of the well that he would be
injured by the explosion. There was
nothing in the shooter’s conduct, or the
warning given, to make the plaintiff
think that there was no danger at the
well’s mouth. It is true the shooter
glanced at the well immediately after
he gave the warning that the explosion
had taken place, but he immediately
stationed himself a safe distance from
the mouth of the well. Sec. 480, vol. 2
in the Restatement of the Law of Torts
contains this statement:

“A plaintiff who, by the exercise of
reasonable vigilance could have ob-
served the danger created by the de-
fendant’s negligence in time to have
avoided harm therefrom, may recover
if, but only if, the defendant (a) knew
of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) re-
alized or had reason to realize that the
plaintiff was inattentive and therefore
unlikely to discover his peril in time to
avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is
negligent in failing to utilize with reas-
onable care and competence his then
existing ability to avoid harming the
plaintiff.”

In this case there was no negligence
on the shooter’s part, but even if there
were there was nothing to make him
realize that the plaintiff was inattentive
and therefore unlikely to discover his
peril in time to ‘avoid harm. What

person who was engaged in shooting
oil wells would think that any one who
was experienced enough to be a tool
dresser would get so near to the mouth
of the well containing such a shot of
nitroglycerin as to be injured before
the all-clear signal had been given?
Further on in sec. 480, this statement
is made:

“The defendant is entitled to assume
that the plaintiff is paying or will pay
reasonable attention to his surround-
ings; until he has reason to suspect the
contrary, he has no reason to believe
that the plaintiff is‘ in any danger.
Therefore, the defendant is liable only
if he realizes or has reason to realize
that the plaintiff is inattentive and con-
sequently in peril.”

In this case the shooter did every-
thing that a man of ordinary prudence
would do who was working with a high
explosive. The shot had been placed
23 hours before and there was no dan-
ger to any one as long as they kept
away from the mouth of the well. No
worker around the well was justified
in getting too near the well’s mouth
until he was told it was safe to do so.
In this instance, the plaintiff knew the
danger, but let his curiosity get the
better of him or forgot what he was
doing. There was nothing in his con-
duct to indicate to the shooter that he
should be given additional warning.

There was no evidence to sustain
plaintiff's contention that there was
negligence in the detection of the time
the shot went off. The best methods
were used and no living person can
say that the shot did not go off when
the shooter said it did. Surely that ex-
plosion at the mouth of the well could
not take place at the same time the
shot went off at the bottom of the well.
The oil and sand from the bottom of
the well that struck the plaintiff took
some time to get to the surface of the
earth. The doctor who first examined
the plaintiff testified:

“When I saw the man, both of his

eyes were filled with sand and mud;
you could see the mud and what looked

to be crude oil or black oil; and, his
nose was completely packed with it;
his mouth was full of it; his upper part
of his throat was; there was a number
of abrasions filled with sand and gravel
up each cheek in front of his ears be-
ginning at the chin; and under his up-
per lip a laceration was filled with mud
and gravel and oil; and his hair was
and even his throat was just packed
with it.”

These materials traveled 4,600 feet,
at least, through water before hitting
plaintifg.

But what difference would the time
the shot went off make in this case?
Plaintiff knew it was not safe to be at
the mouth of the well after the signal
was given. One hour was the shortest
time after the shot was supposed to
go off that the danger period was over.
Here the explosion reached the surface
from 15 to 30 minutes after the warning
was given.

Much is made of a Professor Cloud’s
testimony, but his testimony boiled
down is that he thought that water
would flow out of the top of the hole
when the shot went off. He did not:
say that the matter from the bottom of
the hole went out of the mouth of the
well immediately upon the discharge of
the shot. The evidence showed that
water settled to a lower level immedi-
ately after the shot went off.

Even though the defendants were li-
able in this case, the verdict is exces-
sive. This man was not blind after he
recovered from the injury. He drove
an automobile. He would not do that
unless he could see enough to drive to
his own satisfaction. If his employer
had set off this shot the most he would
have received would have been $10,500.
The plaintiff was engaged in a hazard-
ous employment covered by the Work-
men’s Compensation Laws of the State
of, Oklahoma. To place a judgment
against these defendants of $65,000,
when the shooter performed his duty
as any prudent person would have
done, is unreasonable. It is placing a
burden on one of the necessary opera-

651

tions in the production of oil that it is
not able to bear. It makes one in the
well shooting business an insurer of
all who come near a well that is being
shot by him. This court should not
countenance such a rule of law.

Under the facts in this case there
was no duty upon the shooter to warn
the plaintiff more than he did, and
there was no negligence shown on the
part of the shooter.

I dissent.

WEEKLEY v. WEEKLEY.
No. 35565. June 16, 1953.
“258 P. 2d 622.

652

Percy Hughes, Hobart, for plaintiff
in error.

Robert B. Harbinson and Stansell
Whiteside, Altus, for defendant in error.

WILLIAMS, J. Parties are referred
to herein as in the trial court.

Plaintiff, Robert Weekley, sued de-
fendant, Margaret Weekley, for di-
vorce; Mrs. Weekley filed a cross-pe-
tition in which she prayed for a divorce
and the division of jointly acquired
property. Judgment was rendered for
Mrs. Weekley on her cross-petition, and
she was awarded alimony in the
amount of $6,500, with the provision
that described property owned by the
plaintiff should be conveyed to her if
the alimony had not been paid by a
certain date.

Plaintiff has duly appealed, alleging
several errors in the court below; how-
ever, in his brief he abandons all such
allegations except error in the allow-
ance of the alimony. His argument in
this connection is that all of the prop-
erty accumulated during coverture was
plaintiff's separate property; also, that
since his liabilities exceeded his assets,
there was in reality no property to be
divided, and alimony, therefore, should
not have been allowed.

The evidence in this regard was to the
effect that plaintiff had purchased four
beer taverns during the marriage, an
automobile, and other personal prop-
erty, all of which he still owned, the
total purchase price being in the ap-
proximate amount of $26,000. Plaintiff
testified that all of the money for these
purchases had been borrowed by him
and had not been repaid. Most of the
money had been borrowed from his
father, or with his father as surety;
however, the mortgages securing such
debts were not placed of record till af-
ter the filing of this action, and defend-
ant charged -that they were not bona
fide mortgages. Plaintiff also testified
that his income at the time of trial was
about $500 per month; Mrs. Weekley
testified that the income from two of

the four beer taverns totaled about
$800 per month.

In Marcus v. Marcus, 202 Okla. 451,
214 P, 2d 899, this court said:

“Where a divorce is granted the wife
because of the fault of the husband, the
court in its discretion should make an
equitable distribution of jointly ac-
quired property, and may also, in its
discretion, allow the wife alimony out
of the property of the husband.” (Em-
phasis supplied.)

In Schatz v. Schatz, 202 Okla. 433,
214 P, 2d 943, the following rule is ex-
pressed:

“Where divorce is granted wife by
reason of the fault of the husband, the
allowance of permanent alimony rests
in the sound discretion of the *** court.”

In the body of the opinion, the court
said: .

“It is well established that where a
divorce is granted the wife by reason
of the fault of the husband the allow-
ance of permanent alimony rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court and
that the trial court’s conclusion in this
respect will not be disturbed on appeal
unless against the clear weight of the
evidence, or unless there has been some
abuse of discretion.”

And in Mathews v. Mathews, 186
Okla. 245, 96 P. 2d 1054, we find the
following:

“Although the statute, sec. 672, O.S.
1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. §1278 (12 O.S.
1951 sec. 1278), provides that the wife
shall be allowed alimony ‘out of the
husband’s real and personal property’,
where a divorce is granted by reason
of his fault, alimony may be allowed
in a proper case where the husband
has no estate.”

In the body of the opinion is the fol-
lowing:

“We have on various occasions stated
that the earning capacity of the husband
is a proper element to be taken into con- .
sideration in determining the amount
of alimony.”

Under the facts in this case and the
above-stated rules of law, it is im-
material whether, as plaintiff contends,
the property here concerned was his
separate property or whether same
was, in fact, jointly acquired. There
was evidence herein that the husband
had a substantial monthly income, and,
as is shown above, the earning capacity
of the husband is a proper element to
consider in determining the amount of
the alimony.

Considering the facts that all the
property was acquired during cover-
ture, although in part at least with pro-
ceeds of property of plaintiff owned by
him prior to the marriage; that the
mortgages were not placed of record
till after this suit was filed; and that
plaintiff had an income of between $500
and $800 per month, or more, we hold
that the discretion of the trial court was
not abused, and that the judgment is
not against the clear weight of the evi-
dence.

Motion of defendant to dismiss plain-
tiff’s appeal as frivolous, renewed in
her brief with permission of the court,
is denied.

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON, and
O'NEAL, JJ., concur,

CARR et al. v. VANNOY et al.
No. 35758. June 16, 1953.
258 P. ad 617.

653

Fenton & Fenton, Oklahoma City, for
petitioners.

Willis R. Stark, Oklahoma City, Lynn
W. Norman, Sulphur, and Mac Q. Wil-
liamson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

CORN, J. This proceeding was com-
menced by filing of first notice of in-
jury and claim for compensation by
claimant against R. M. Webb, employer,
and the American Casualty Company,
insurance carrier, by reason of an in-
jury to the back, eye and right wrist
of claimant. After the proceeding had
been commenced R. M. Webb filed a
motion to make Elmer Carr, doing busi-
ness as Sulphur Builders Supply, a par-
ty to the proceeding and after testi-
mony had been commenced the trial
commissioner entered an order direct-
ing that Elmer'Carr, doing business as
Sulphur Builders Supply, and his in-
surance carrier, Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Company, be made parties.
At the conclusion of the hearings an
award was entered in favor of claimant
against Elmer Carr, doing business as
Sulphur Builders Supply, and the Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Company,
his insurance carrier, and this pro-
ceeding is brought by the latter as pe-
titioners to review the award.

654

The cause and extent of the disability
is not disputed in this proceeding. The
single issue presented by petitioners is
that there is no evidence to sustain
the finding that claimant was the em-
ployee of the Sulphur Builders Supply,
or Elmer Carr, the owner.

Claimant testified that he lived at
Sulphur, Oklahoma, was 47 years of age
and a carpenter by trade; that on
Thursday, March 28, 1951, he was noti-
fied by Aubrey Howeth, an employee of
Sulphur Builders Supply, that R. M.
Webb wanted a carpenter; that on the
same afternoon he visited Webb at his
place of business and discussed the
building of a shed for a wash rack in a
filling station Webb had leased to an-
other person; that thereafter, on Fri-
day, he and Frank Mitchell started
building the shed and worked until
Monday, April 2, 1951, when claimant
fell from the top of the shed and sus-
tained serious injuries which are not
questioned in this proceeding. The testi-
mony further reveals that claimant quit
work because of his injuries and Frank
Mitchell obtained the services of Olen
Sartan and the shed was completed. It
is developed from the evidence and un-
disputed that it was the custom of car-
penters to stay at the premises of the
Sulphur Builders Supply, a lumber yard
owned and operated by Elmer Carr, and
wait for jobs of customers of the es-
tablishment and that this was the rea-
son claimant and Frank Mitchell were
at the premises on the day he was
called to the establishment of R. M.
Webb. Both Frank Mitchell and claim-
ant testified they were not employed
by Sulphur Builders Supply, Elmer
Carr was not present at the place
of business when Webb called for a
carpenter but was home sick, Elmer
Carr testified that claimant was not
employed by him and that it had
been over a year since claimant had
been in his employ. R. M. Webb testi-
fied that on a number of occasions over
a number of years he had called the
Sulphur Builders Supply for carpenters
and that on Thursday, March 28, 1951,

he called and asked for Carr and was
told that he was ill, and talked to his
daughter. Otherwise, there is no sub-
stantial conflict in the testimony of R.
M. Webb and the other witnesses re-
ferred to above.

Petitioners insist that the trial com-
missioner erred in holding that the re-
lationship of employer and employee
existed. We agree. The relationship of
employer and employee can only be
created by contract express and im-
plied. Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. Mur-
ray, 201 Okla. 650, 207 P. 2d 914; Hamil-
ton v. Randall, 136 Okla. 170, 276 P. 705;
Campbell Oil Co. v. Elledge, 177 Okla.
601, 61 P. 2d 223; Denton v. Young, 203
Okla. 688, 226 P. 2d 406; Roach v. J. S.
Bryan & Sons Corporation, 184 Okla.
211, 86 P. 2d 304; Snetcher & Pittman
v. Talley, 168 Okla. 280, 32 P. 2d 883.

These cases emphasize the principle
that the evidence must disclose the re-
lationship of employer and employee
between the claimant and the one he
seeks to hold. The only relationship
created by agreement implied or ex-
pressed between the claimant and any
other party was with R. M. Webb. The
testimony of Elmer Carr, claimant, and
Mitchell disclosed beyond dispute that
there was no relationship of employer
and employee between claimant and
Elmer Carr, owner and operator of
Sulphur Builders Supply. In Hamilton
v. Randall, supra, it is said:

“The relation of employer and em-
ployee is contractual. Like every other
contractual relation, it is a product of
the meeting of the minds of the con-
tracting parties. To create the relation
of employer and employee there must
be an express contract, or such acts as
will show unequivocally that the parties
recognize one another as master and
servant. Our Workmen’s Compensation
Law is remedial in its objects and op-
eration, and should receive a liberal
construction in favor of those entitled
to its benefits; but before one is en-
titled thereto, he should be held to strict
proof that he is in a class embraced
within the provisions of the law, and
nothing can be presumed or inferred in

this respect. (Moore & Gleason et al. v.
Taylor, 97 Okla. 193, 223 P. 611.)”

We are convinced that the State In-
dustrial Commission erred in holding
that the relationship of employer and
employee existed between the claimant
and Sulphur Builders Supply or its
owner.

Award vacated.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, DAVISON, O’NEAL, and
WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

BYRD v. MARLIN.
No. 84536, June 16, 1953,
258 P. 2a 649.

Malcolm E. Rosser, Muskogee, and
Malcolm E. Rosser, Jr., Duncan, for
plaintiff in error.

White & Parris, Eufaula, for defend-
ant in error.

WILLIAMS, J. Parties are referred
to herein as in the trial court.

On January 6, 1933, Yahdeka Byrd,
plaintiff herein, executed a deed of

656

trust in which he named B. A. Marlin,
defendant herein, as trustee of the
“Yahdeka Byrd Trust”. Marlin was
given the general powers of a trustee
with respect to all of Byrd’s property;
the trust was to expire five years from
the date of execution of the deed of
trust. Sometime thereafter, and while
the trust relationship existed, Byrd
made an outright conveyance to Marlin
of certain lands involved in this action.

On January 26, 1934, Byrd signed a
release of all claims of any kind against
Marlin. On March 14, 1934, Byrd was
declared incompetent in county court
proceedings. A guardian was appointed
for him and said guardian brought suit
(number 7087 in district court) against
Marlin for a settlement and accounting
and an order setting aside the deed of
trust. On February 25, 1935, a stipula-
tion was entered into between Marlin
and the guardian which set out the
terms upon which the suit brought by
the guardian should be settled. The stip-
ulation was approved by the county
judge, and on the same day (Feb. 25,
1935), a judgment was entered in the
district court suit according to the
terms of the stipulation.

On January 6, 1941, Byrd was restored
to competency.

On March 18, 1941, Byrd filed his pe-
tition in the case at bar, in which Mar~
lin is defendant. The petition alleged
fraud in the procurement of the judg-
ment in cause number 7087, and asked
that said judgment be set aside; it also
asked that the deeds executed by Byrd
to Marlin while they occupied the posi-
tion of trustee and cestui que trust, be
set aside, and for other relief.

Marlin’s answer was a general de-
nial and a plea that all of the issues set
out in the petition had previously been
litigated in cause number 7087.

For reasons which do not appear in
the record before us, trial was not had
until November 7, 1949. Before the pres-
entation of any evidence, defendant,
Marlin, renewed his plea of res judica-

ta, which was overruled; plaintiff then
presented his evidence, at the conclu-
sion of which the defendant again plead-
ed res judicata, and demurred on the
grounds that the evidence did not show
a cause of action as to him. The de-
murrer was sustained. The formal or~
der sustaining the demurrer indicates
that it was sustained because of the in-
sufficiency of evidence; however, the
language used by the trial court, as
shown in the case-made, indicates that
it was sustained on the grounds that all
issues had previously been litigated.
The questions for our determination,
then, are whether the evidence of plain-
tiff was sufficient to show a cause of ac-
tion against the defendant, and whether
the plea of res judicata was a valid de-
fense.

The elements essential to the invok-
ing of the doctrine of estoppel by former
recovery, or res judicata, are listed
as follows in 50 C.J.S. Judgments, sec-
tion 598: identity in the thing sued for,
identity in the cause of action, identity
of persons or parties to the action, and
identity of quality in the persons for or
against whom the claim is made. These
same essentials are listed in Re Wide-
ner’s Estate, 112 Okla. 54, 240 P. 608.

With regard to the plea of res judi-
cata, it is self-evident that all of the is-
sues of the instant case could not have
been litigated in cause number 7087,
for the reason that one of the issues in
the case at bar is whether or not
there was fraud or collusion in the pro-
curement of the very judgment entered
in cause number 7087, and whether it
therefore should be set aside. Fraud
extrinsic of the issue tried in the former
proceedings is a proper defense. See
Sutton v. State, etc, 86 Okla. 120 at
page 123, 206 P. 818. In Griffin v. Gal-
braith, 114 Okla. 208, 247 P. 339, a
judgment decreeing partition against
minor heirs rendered in a prior case
was attacked by cross-petition in a la-
ter suit to quiet title brought by gran-
tees of partition sale purchaser for the
reason, among others, that attorneys
appointed to represent certain minors

as guardians ad litem had made no at-
tempt to represent them properly, but
had compromised their claims. Therein
the court said:

“The action of the attorneys in this
cause as disclosed by the record in at-
tempting to compromise said suit was
a fraud upon said minors and of no
binding force or effect.

“The fact that the interest of the
minors was not properly protected by
this guardian ad litem, or next friend,
is patent, and the court, in permitting
a judgment to be entered against these
minors, violated likewise its duty to see
that the guardian ad litem, or next
.friend, properly represents the interest
of his ward.

“We, therefore, conclude that the sec-
ond action is not a bar to any of the
parties, and the authorities herein cited
are sufficient basis for the statement
that minors are not bound by a judg-
ment when their cause is not properly
presented for consideration and the
court does not protect the:

We hasten to say that no charge is
leveled at either the judges or attor-
neys involved in the case at bar, but be-
lieve the purported judgment rendered
in the former case involved here would
be no more binding upon the plaintiff
here, an incompetent at that time,
than was the former judgment in the
case referred to binding upon the mi-
nors involved there,

In fact, the following sections of Title
12, O.S. 1951:

“The district court shall have power
to vacate or modify its own judgments
or orders, at or after the term at which
such judgment or order was made:

oe ee

“Fourth. For fraud, practiced by the
successful party, in obtaining the judg-
ment or order.” (Section 1031, subdivi-
sion 4.)

“Proceedings to vacate or modify a
judgment or order, for the causes men-
tioned in subdivisions four, five and
seven, of Section 5267 (1031) must be
commenced within two years after the
judgment was rendered or order made,

657

unless the party entitled thereto be an
infant, or a person of unsound mind and
then within two years after removal of
such disability. * * * A void judgment
may be vacated at any time, on mo-
tion of a party, or any person affected
thereby.” (section 1038.)

leave no room for doubt in the instant
case if the filing of a separate suit to
vacate or cancel the judgment is a
proper method of attack.

It is to be noted that the Griffin case
was before this court on its merits,
while the appeal in the case at bar is
from an order sustaining a demurrer to
the evidence. It is elementary that a
party appealing from an order sustain-
ing a demurrer to the evidence is in a
more favorable position in this court,
with regard to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, than one appealing from a judg-
ment against him upon the merits of his
cause. See the quoted syllabus of the
court from Adams v. Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co. below.

We hold that the issue which is the
crux of plaintiffs cause of action—
whether there was extrinsic fraud in
the procurement of the judgment in
cause number 7087—has never been lit-
igated before, and the defense of res
judicata is therefore not valid. (It may
well be that plaintiff, upon retrial of the
ease, will desire to amend his petition
to allege extrinsic fraud to conform

to the proof.)

In the case of Lewis v. Couch, 194
Okla. 632, 154 P. 2d 51, this court said:

“A petition to vacate a judgment for
fraud practiced by the successful party
in obtaining the judgment is authorized
by 12 O.S. 1941 §1031, subd. 4, and is in
the nature of an independent action.”

This court, in Brown v. Trent, 36,
Okla. 239, 128 P. 895, said:

“Where a petition, in a suit to quiet
title to certain land, alleges that an or-
der of court directing a guardian to sell
land was procured by fraud, and prays
to have the order of sale and_subse-
quent orders approving the sale can-

658

celed, the suit is a ‘direct attack’ on the.
orders and not a ‘collateral attack’.”

“The fraud which will justify the can-
cellation, in an equitable suit, of a judg-
ment or order of a probate court, must
be extraneous to the issues, and such
as prevented the complaining party
from having a fair hearing.”

In the body of the opinion, the court
said, at page 247, of the Oklahoma Re-
ports:

“The jurisdiction of a court, in a suit
to quiet title, to cancel a judgment ob-
tained by fraud, has been exercised in
numerous cases.” (Citing 12 cases.)

In the case of McIntosh v. Holtgrave,
79 Okla. 63, at page 66, 191 P. 739, the
court classified the methods of attack
upon such judgments and quoted from
Brown v. Trent, supra, as follows:

“ ‘But an attack upon a judgment
for fraud in its procurement is a direct
attack, over which courts of equity take
jurisdiction, and no well considered case
can be found in which such jurisdiction
is denied.’ ”

In the McIntosh case the court fur-
ther said:

“A domestic judgment may be at-
tacked in three ways:

eee

“(c) By an equitable proceeding to
set aside said judgment for fraud prac-
ticed by the successful party, said fraud
inducing or entering into such order or
judgment, where such fraud is extrinsic
to the issues in the proceeding attacked,
and especially where the court has been
imposed upon by such fraud.”

The latter statement in McIntosh v.
Holtgrave, supra, was quoted and fol-
lowed in Cone v. Harris, 104 Okla. 114,
230 P.721. Therein the court said, quot-
ing 15 R.C.L. 760:

“ Praud is the arch enemy of equity,
and a court of equity will relieve against
a judgment obtained by imposition or
fraud. *** It matters little as to the
mode or manner in which fraud is ef-
fected. A court looks to the effect, and
asks if the result is a consequence of the

fraud. For any description of mala fides
practiced in obtaining a judgment equity
will grant relief. If by fraud and mis-
conduct one has gained an unfair advan-
tage in proceedings at law, whereby the
court has been made an instrument of
injustice, equity will interfere to pre-
vent him from reaping the benefit of the
advantage thus unfairly gained.”

and quoting 23 Cyc. 1025:

“ ¥raud practiced in the very matter
of obtaining the judgment is regarded
as perpetrated upon the court, as well
as upon the injured party, and will war-
rant a court of equity in enjoining the
judgment.’ ”

and quoting Pomeroy’s Equitable Rem-
edies, vol. 2, §§648, 650, and 651:

“ ‘Where fraud relates to the conduct
of the suit, as where it prevents a party
from asserting his rights, there is no
fair adversary proceedings, and equity
will interfere. The courts commonly
speak of the former class as intrinsic
and of the latter as extrinsic fraud,
etc. Thus, it is generally said that it is
extrinsic fraud, mistake, and the like
which are grounds for relief.’

“ Relief is very freely granted where
a judgment is taken in violation of
a stipulation or agreement as to the
conduct of the suit. It is apparent that
there is no fraud in the technical sense;
such conduct does not fall within the
definition of ‘actual’ fraud—misrepre-
sentation of existing facts. There is
merely a breach of a contract; but the
effects of such a breach are so mani-
festly against conscience that the courts
will relieve, and base their jurisdic-
tion on the ground of fraud.*** The
unconscionable conduct may assume
many forms.’ ”

See, also, Dennis, etc., v. Kelley, 81
Okla. 155 at page 158, 197 P. 442; Elrod
v. Adair, 54 Okla. 207, 153 P. 660; and
Pevehouse v. Adams, 52 Okla. 495, 153
P. 65.

In Sutton v. State, ete, supra, this
court said, quoting United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93:

“But there is an admitted exception
to this general rule, in cases where,
by reason of something done by the
successful party to a suit, there was,

in fact, no adversary trial or decision of
the issue in the case. Where the unsuc-
cessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his oppo-
nent, as by keeping him away from
court, a false promise of a compro-
mise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ig-
norance by the acts of plaintiif; or
where an attorney fraudulently or with-
out authority assumed to represent a
party and connives at his defeat; or
where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sells out his client’s interest
to the other side—these, and similar
cases which show that there has never
been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case, are reasons for
which a new suit may be sustained to
set aside and annul the former judg-
ment or decree, and open the ease for
a new and fair hearing.’

There was evidence in the case at
bar that about one week before the exe-
cution of the stipulation which was the
basis of the judgment entered in cause
number 17087, defendant Marlin met
plaintiff Byrd and offered to give him
“all of the land back and the money
back” in order to settle the lawsuit;
that the money amounted to about
$12,000 or $15,000; that news of this of-
fer was transmitted immediately to
Byrd’s guardian; that the guardian re-
fused the offer, but said he would settle
for $25,000 and title to the property;
that on the day of the trial in district
court, Byrd started into town to the
courthouse to attend the hearing, but
Marlin met him three miles out of town
and told him “not to be here, it was al-
ready settled”; that he later learned
that the guardian had signed the stipu-
lation which became the basis of the
judgment in district court. Under the
terms of the judgment, Marlin got one-
half of Byrd’s interest in about 160 acres
in section 4; all of Byrd’s interest in
about 80 acres in section 1; all of Byrd’s
interest in about 200 acres in section
30; all of Byrd’s interest in three city
lots in Eufaula; and one-half of Byrd’s
interest in his deceased wife’s estate.
Parts of this land were described in
the deed of trust, and other parts were

659

described in an outright conveyance
from Byrd to Marlin made while the
trust relationship existed. See 65 C.J.
Trusts, section 522, which reads in part
as follows:

“While contracts and dealings be-
tween the trustee and the cestui que
trust are not absolutely prohibited, gen-
erally a trustee cannot take beneficially
from the cestui que trust. Equity looks
on transactions between a trustee and
the cestui que trust with suspicion, and
will subject them to the severest scru-
tiny, and will permit them to stand
only when the trustee affirmatively
shows that the agreement was entirely
fair and advantageous to the benefi-
ciary and that there was no fraud,
concealment, undue influence, or un-
conscientious advantage. Contracts be-
tween a trustee and the cestui que
trust may be set aside on slight grounds,
and the burden of proof is on the trustee
to show that he acted in good faith,
that all was fair, open, and voluntary,
and that the contract was well under-
stood; * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)

See, also, Kernel v. Murrell, 122 Okla.
22, 250 P. 420, wherein this court said
at page 23 of Okla. Reports:

«# * * The law looks with suspicion
upon transactions between trustees and
beneficiaries, and, when the cestui que
trust sells trust property to the trustee,
the burden is placed upon the grantee
or trustee to whom such transfer is
made to show that the grantor or cestui
que trust was in possession of full in-
formation and acted upon her own vo-
lition or independent advice, and free
from all influence of the grantee or
trustee to whom such transfer is made.”

On the question of sufficiency of the
evidence, the following is the settled
law of this state with regard to de-
murrers to the evidence:

“A demurrer to the evidence admits
all the facts which the evidence rea-
sonably tends to prove, and all the in-
ferences and conclusions which may
reasonably and logically be drawn from
the evidence, and, upon demurrer to the
evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to
every inference which the evidence,
considered in the light most favorable to
him, reasonably tends to prove.” Adams

660

v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. et al., 187
Okla. 478, 103 P, 2d 526.

We hold that the above testimony,
together with documentary evidence
introduced as exhibits in this case, was
sufficient to withstand a demurrer.

The judgment is reversed and this
cause is remanded, with directions to
grant plaintiff a new trial.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and CORN, AR-
NOLD, and O’NEAL, JJ., concur.
BLACKBIRD, J., dissents.

GLOBE & RUTGERS FIRE INS. CO.
v. ROYSDEN.

No. 36062. June 16, 1953.
258 P. 24 644.

Rittenhouse, Henson, Evans & Tur-
ner, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in
error.

Melton, McElroy & Vaughn, Chicka-
sha, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. This is an action
brought by the plaintiff, T. R. Roysden,
against the defendant, Globe & Rut-
gers Fire Insurance Company, to re-
cover damages for loss by fire of house-
hold furniture and personal property.
The parties to this action will be re-
ferred to as they appeared in the lower
court, that is, the plaintiff in error as
the defendant and the defendant in error
as the plaintiff. The fire insurance pol-
icy was written by Claris Ricker, lo-
cal agent of the insurance company at
Chickasha, Oklahoma, and was issued

- on July 24, 1948, for a term of one year

and in the amount of $1,000. Said policy
covered household furniture and per~
sonal property located in a cement
building with composition roof, occu-
pied as a seasonal dwelling; said build-
ing being situated upon the S.E.%4 of
section 17, township 7 north, range 7
west, on Highway No. 81, north of
Chickasha, Oklahoma. On September 30,
1948, a cement block building, occupied
by plaintiff as his residence and situated
upon said premises, together with the
household furniture and personal prop-
erty located therein, was destroyed by
fire.

Plaintiff claims the loss of the house-
hold furniture and personal property so
destroyed is within the terms of the in-
surance policy issued by the defendant
and that, subsequent to the fire, proper
proof of loss was given to the defend-
ant as required by the policy or such
proof was waived by the defendant, and
that the value of the household furni-
ture and personal property destroyed
was $650 but the defendant refused to
pay for any part of said loss. The de-
fendant ,filed its answer denying gen-
erally the allegations of plaintiff’s pe-
tition and further denying plaintiff made

proof of loss as required by the policy
or that such proof of loss was waived
by the defendant, and further denying
plaintiff suffered any loss covered by
said policy. This cause was tried by a
jury which found the issues in favor of
the plaintiff and fixed the amount of his
recovery at $650. A motion for a new
trial was filed and overruled, and
from the judgment overruling the
motion for a new trial, the defendant
prosecutes this appeal.

The evidence discloses substantially
the following facts: The plaintiff and his
wife were living in a tourist cabin when
the policy sued upon was issued and
were also operating a cafe in a building
nearby, referred to as the cafe building.
The cabin and the cafe building were
each cement or cement block build-
ings with composition roofs, and located
upon the S.E.%4 of section 17. At the
time said policy was issued the house-
hold furniture of plaintiff was located in
three buildings, to wit, a tourist cabin,
a garage building and a cafe building.
Plaintiffs washing machine and refrig-
erator were located in the cafe build-
ing at said time and the remainder of
his household furniture was located in
the tourist cabin and garage.

Plaintiff's evidence was that upon
application for the insurance both plain-
tiff and his wife told Claris Ricker, de-
fendant’s agent, that the household fur-
niture was then located in the afore-
said three buildings, that they were
going to vacate the tourist cabin in the
immediate future and move all house-
hold furniture into the cafe building
which they would occupy as their resi-
dence; said agent, after viewing the
household furniture in all three loca-
tions, told plaintiff it would be all right
to move said household furniture into
the cafe building and he agreed to in-
sure said household furniture in the
amount of $1,000, and on the following
day issued the policy herein sued upon;
approximately three weeks prior to the
fire on September 30, 1948, plaintiff
moved the household furniture into the
cafe building and was occupying the

661

same as his residence on the date of the
fire, and all of the household furniture
therein contained was destroyed; plain-
tiff testified that the building destroyed
by the fire was the cement building de-
scribed in the policy; that within a few
days after the fire plaintiff orally re-
ported said loss to the defendant’s agent
and offered to file any necessary re-
ports concerning the same and said
agent advised plaintiff that he would
look after the matter and there was
nothing for plaintiff to sign, and by
reason thereof the plaintiff did not file
a written report of the loss of the furni-
ture within the time and in the manner
specified in the insurance contract.

Defendant’s evidence, by its agent,
Ricker, was that the building described
in the policy sued upon was the tourist
cabin then occupied by plaintiff as a
residence and the personal property of
plaintiff in the cafe building was cov-
ered by a policy of insurance with the
Alliance Insurance Company of Phil-
adelphia, issued to plaintiff through
Ricker at the same time he issued the
policy of defendant covering the house-
hold furniture; that he did not waive
the proof of loss which plaintiff was re-
quired to furnish under the terms of the
policy, and he denied he was told by
plaintiff and Mrs. Roysden prior to the
issuance of the policy sued upon that
the plaintiff intended to move his house-
hold furniture into the cafe building
and occupy the same as a dwelling;
and that it was after the fire occurred
he first learned the household furniture
had been removed from the tourist
cabin into the cafe building. By reason
of the removal of the furniture from the
tourist cabin to the cafe building, the
defendant took the position during the
trial that its liability was limited under
the terms of the policy to $100, that is,
10% of the full coverage of $1,000, to
cover property insured while elsewhere
than on the premises described in, the
policy, and the defendant invited judg-
ment against it in the amount of $100.

No written notice of loss having been
given by plaintiff to defendant within

662

the time and in the manner as required
by the terms of the policy, the waiver
or nonwaiver of such notice by tle de-
fendant was a question of fact submit-
ted to the jury under proper instruction
of the court and the finding by the
jury that such notice was waived by
the acts and conduct of the defendant’s
agent, Ricker, is supported by the
evidence and such finding is not an is-
sue on this appeal.

The defendant’s first proposition is
that the trial court committed revers-
ible error in limiting the admission in
evidence of defendant’s Exhibit No. 4,
being the policy of Alliance Insurance
Company, which exhibit was admitted
only for the purpose of establishing the
difference in the rate charged for cov-
erage of household furniture in a build-
ing occupied as a residence and the
rate charged for coverage of personal
property in a building occupied as a
cafe. The issue made by the pleadings
and the gist of this action is whether or
not the household furniture was covered
by the policy of the defendant and
the determination of said fact is not
dependent upon the existence of the
policy of the Alliance Insurance Com-
pany of Philadelphia covering the con~
tents of the cafe building. However, the
issuance of this latter policy simul-
taneously with the policy herein sued
upon was a fact testified to by defend-
ant’s agent, Ricker, and admitted by
the plaintiff, and said agent further
testified as to the difference in rates
charged for the respective coverages.
Under the aforesaid circumstances the
admission of the policy, Exhibit No. 4,
would not tend to make any proposition
in issue more or less probable and the
limited purpose for which said exhibit
was admitted in evidence was not error.
As stated in Price v. Rogers, 201 Okla.
678, 209 P. 2d 683, and Chaney v. Lack-
ey, 204 Okla. 398, 230 P. 2d 720, a fact
is relevant if it legally tends to prove
some matter in issue or to make a prop-
osition in issue more or less probable,

The defendant’s second proposition is
that under the clear terms of the insur-

ance policy and other facts in evidence,
judgment against the defendant in a
sum exceeding $100 is not warranted in
law. Defendant’s theory is that the pro-
visions of the policy sued upon, and ac-
cepted by the plaintiff, are clear, plain
and free of all ambiguity, and the
plaintiff is chargeable with knowledge
of its terms and conditions, and under
the language of said policy the plain-
tiff’s household goods were covered
only when located in the tourist cabin
and if located elsewhere the defend~
ant’s liability was limited to 10% of the
coverage, or the sum of $100. In support
thereof plaintiff cites Liverpool, London
& Globe Ins. Co. v. Richardson Lum~
ber Co., 11 Okla. 579, 69 P. 936, and
Brown v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 52 Okla.
392, 153 P. 173, wherein it is stated that
an applicant for insurance who accepts
a policy, the provisions of which are
plain, clear and free from all ambigu~
ity, is chargeable with knowledge of
its terms and legal effect. It is the
duty of the assured to read and know
the conditions of the policy before he
accepts it and where he fails and neg-
lects to do so he is estopped from deny~
ing knowledge of its terms and condi-
tions unless he alleges and proves that
he was induced not to read the policy
by some trick or fraud of the other
parties; and also the case of National
Aid Life Ass’n v. May, 201 Okla. 450,
207 P. 2d 292, wherein it is stated that
where the terms of the contract are
clear, consistent and unambiguous no
forced or strained construction should
be indulged to give effect to the policy.
Defendant contends that since the plain-
tiff neither pleads nor proves fraud or
mistake, all prior contemporaneous
oral agreements between the plaintiff
and the agent of the company were
merged in the written contract, and un-
der the rules announced in the above
cases the defendant’s liability for house-
hold furniture not located in the tourist
cabin, but located elsewhere, when de-
stroyed, is limited to 10% of $1,000.

Plaintiff contends that the above
cases are not controlling in the instant
case in that the evidence clearly estab-

lishes that the agent of the defendant,
prior to the issuance of the policy sued
upon, was fully advised that the cover-
age requested was for household turni-
ture then located in a tourist cabin,
a garage building and a cafe building,
all of which household furniture would
be removed into the cafe building, and
that said agent issued the policy with
full knowledge that the household furni-
ture when insured and as then located
was to be removed to the cafe build-
ing, thereby waiving the provisions of
the policy limiting the loss of the house-
hold furniture when located elsewhere
than in the tourist cabin. Plaintiff con-
tends that the household furniture at
the time of its destruction was lo-
cated on the premises and in the build-
ing as provided in the policy.

We are of the opinion that the.rule
announced in the case of North Ameri-
ean Acc. Ins. Co. v. Canady, 196 Okla.
105, 163 P. 2d 221, is applicable to the
facts in the instant case, wherein it was
held under our statute, 36 O.S. 1941
§197, the soliciting agent of an insurance
company is the agent of the insurer in
all matters relating to such application
and that the knowledge received and
acted upon by the soliciting agent in
connection with applications taken by
him are binding on the insurer in the
absence of fraud or collusion between
the agent and the applicant. See, also,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 141
Okla. 90, 284 P. 624, and North Carolina
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. White,
130 Okla. 118, 265 P. 642; 29 Am. Jur.,
p. 627, sec. 823. Wherein it is stated
any person, who solicits insurance and
procures an application thereof in all
matters relating to said application and
policy issued, is the agent of the com-
pany issuing the policy and not the
agent of the insured.

The court’s instruction No. 6 to the
jury is as follows:

“You are further instructed, gentle-
men, that the policy herein sued on
contained the provision that the insured
may apply up to ten per cent of the
amount specified to cover property

663

therein and insured thereby while else-
where on the described premises, and
in this connection you are instructed
that if the plaintiff fully advised the de-
fendant of his intention to remove the
property to the building which was
destroyed by fire, and the insurer had
actual knowledge that the property in-
tended to be insured was not at the lo-
cation when it was destroyed by the
fire, and that the said Company issued
its policy of insurance knowing the
property was not in the location when
it was destroyed by the fire, then this
provision of the policy would have been
waived by the defendant. And in this
connection you are further instructed
that should you find and believe from
the evidence that the Company was not
advised that the property was to be re-
moved to the building where it was
destroyed by fire, then the plaintiff
could only recover ten per cent of the
amount specified in the policy to cover
property destroyed by fire.”

There is competent evidence in the
record for the giving of the aforesaid
instruction. The burden of proof was
upon the plaintiff to show that the
agent of the defendant was advised and
had full knowledge that the household
furniture was to be removed to the
building destroyed by fire and with
that knowledge accepted the premium
and delivered the policy in order to es-
tablish a waiver of the provisions of the
policy limiting defendant’s Iiability to
10% of the amount of the full cover-
age. The jury on this issue of fact found
against the defendant, and we cannot
say that such finding is not supported
by the evidence. The judgment is af-
firmed.

This Court acknowledges the services
of Attorneys R. P. Colley, G. C. Spillers,
and Wm. H. Martin, who as Special
Masters aided in the preparation of this
opinion. These attorneys were recom-
mended by the Oklahoma Bar Asso-
ciation, approved by the Judicial Coun-
cil, and appointed by the Court.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.CJ., and
CORN, DAVISON, O’NEAL, WILLIAMS,
and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. AR-
NOLD, J., concurs in conclusion.

664

GILMORE, GARDNER & KIRK OIL
CO. et al. v. HARVEL et al.

No. 35789. June 16, 1953.
258 P. 2d 682.

|

Looney, Watts, Ross, Looney & Smith,
Oklahoma City, for petitioners.

Porta & Weaver, El Reno, and Mac
Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., for respond-
ents.

JOHNSON, V.C.J. This is an original
proceeding brought by Gilmore, Gard~
ner & Kirk Oil Company and Tri-State
Insurance Company, its insurance car-
rier, as petitioners, to review an award
made to Marguerite Harvel as the wife
of Leo Paul Harvel under the provisions
of the Death Benefit Statute, 85 O.S.
1951 §3.1, due to the death of Leo Paul
Harvel who was killed in a motor ve-
hicle accident at Okemah, Oklahoma,
February 23, 1952. There is no dispute
as to the cause of the death of said Leo
Paul Harvel, or that it arose out of
and in the course of the employment.

Claimant testified that she and Leo
Paul Harvel were husband and wife
and were married in May, 1945, and
had lived together as husband and wife
since that date until his death; that in
1945 they agreed to live together as
husband and wife and secured an apart-
ment at 618 South Harvey in Oklahoma
City; that they later moved to and lived
at an apartment on 609 South Walker,
Oklahoma City. Claimant identified nine
Christmas cards sent to her and her
husband. Two of these cards were sent
by relatives and members of the family
of L. P. Kirk, one of the partners in
the employer company. Claimant fur-
ther testified that at parties given for
the employees of the employer com-
pany L. P. Kirk introduced claimant
and her husband as husband and wife
and at another party given by said em-
ployer Gardner introduced herself and
her husband as husband and wife.

Juanita Duran testified that she knew
Mrs. Harvel; that Mrs. Harvel worked
at Hill’s Grocery Store and Mrs. Hill
called her Mrs. Harvel; that several
people witness knew called claimant
and her husband Mrs. and Mrs. Harvel.

Warren Price testified that he was a
truck driver for the employer for three
years and knew claimant and Leo Paul
Harvel as husband and wife; that Mrs.
Harvel would drive her husband home

from his work when he came in from
driving a truck; that Leo Paul Harvel
introduced claimant to witness as his
wife; that he attended the parties where
L. B. Kirk introduced claimant and Leo
Paul Harvel as husband and wife.

Petitioners offered controverting tes-
timony which we deem it unnecessary
to review.

Petitioners first argue that the testi-
mony of claimant as to the relationship
with Leo P. Harvel was incompetent
and should be excluded by reason of
what is generally known as the “Dead
Man’s Statute,” 12 O.S. 1951 §384. With
this contention we cannot agree. The
statute provides:

“No party to a civil action shall be al-
lowed to testify in his own behalf, in
respect to any transaction or communi-
cation had personally by such party
with a deceased person, when the ad-
verse party is the executor, adminis-
trator, heir at law, next of kin, surviving
partner or assignee of such deceased
person, where such party has acquired
title to the cause of action immediately
from such deceased person; * * *.”

In Ogle v. Oklahoma City Horse &
Mule Commission Co., 173 Okla. 34, 47
P. 2d 130, it is stated:

“The rule is that a witness is compe-
tent to testify in his own behalf as
against his adversary. His disqualifica-
tion to testify is the exception to the
rule. Section 271, St. 1931, disqualifies
a witness to testify in his own behalf as
to transactions had personally by the
witness with a deceased person only
when the conditions mentioned in said
statute exist. Said statute cannot be
extended by interpretation to render
the witness offered disqualified, except
where the opposite party is brought by
the express provisions of said statute
within one of the classes of persons
therein specifically named.”

See, also, Grosshart v. McNeal, 95
Okla. 102, 218 P. 329; Berry v. Janeway,
206 Okla, 555, 245 P, 2a 71.

There was no adverse party in the
case under consideration named in the
statute above referred to or included

665

therein by implication. The testimony of
claimant was competent.

It is next argued that the evidence is
insufficient to establish a common-law
marriage. We have carefully reviewed
all the testimony offered to support the
relationship of marriage and the con-
troverted testimony and are of the opin-
ion that the evidence is sufficient to sus-
tain the finding of the State Industrial
Commission. In re Giordano’s Estate,
Mueller v. Giordano, 197 Okla. 693, 174
P, 2d 236; In re Sanders’ Estate, San-
ders v. Sanders, 67 Okla. 3, 168 P. 197;
Fisher v. Fisher, 116 Okla. 129, 243 P.
730; Tiuna v. Willmott, 162 Okla. 42, 19
P. 2d 145. In Sanders v. Sanders, supra,
it is stated:

“A common-law marriage may exist
in this state, and when parties capable
of entering into the marital relation
agree to be and become husband and
wife, and in pursuance of such agree-
ment enter into and thereafter main-
tain the marriage relation a common-
law marriage exists,”

The fact situation in Re Giordano’s
Estate, Mueller v. Giordano, supra, is
somewhat similar to that in the case
under consideration. Therein certain
witnesses also testified that they did not
know the parties were married. Therein
it is stated:

“Where some testimony tends to show
that a man and woman are generally
reputed in a community to be husband.
and wife, and other testimony tends to
show they are not, the evidence does
not present a case of ‘divided’ or ‘singu-
lar’ reputation, but merely a conflict
of evidence as to the general reputa-
tion of the parties’ relationship in the
community.”

After a review of all the evidence,
we are of the opinion and hold that the
State Industrial Commission was au-
thorized to enter an award to Marguer-
ite Harvel as the wife of Leo Paul
Harvel.

Award sustained.
HALLEY, C.J., and WELCH, CORN,

DAVISON, O'NEAL, and WILLIAMS,
JJ., concur.

|

666

HARRILL v. STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION et al.

No, 35741. June 16, 1953.

258 P. 2d 624.

B. E. “Bill” Harkey, Oklahoma City,
for petitioner.

Monnet, Hayes & Bullis, Oklahoma
City, and Mac Q. Williamson, Atty.
Gen., for respondents.

DAVISON, J. Frank Wesley Harrill,
hereinafter called claimant, filed his
first notice of injury and claim for com-

pensation against E. B. Treadwell, em-
ployer, and Central Surety & Insurance
Corporation, insurance carrier, stating
that he sustained an accidental injury
arising out of and in the course of his
employment with E. B. Treadwell when
he slipped and fell, The trial commis-
sioner entered an award for claimant
but on appeal to the commission en
banc the award was vacated and the
claim was denied. This proceeding is
brought by the claimant to review an
order denying the award. The cause
and extent of the disability are not in
issue.

The claimant raises the single issue
that the State Industrial Commission
erred in finding that claimant was not
an employee of E. B. Treadwell. In
this connection he relies upon the rule
in Williams v. Branum, 192 Okla. 129,
134 P. 2d 352, which holds:

“This court in reviewing an award
of the State Industrial Commission will
not accept as conclusive the findings of
fact of the State Industrial Commission
concerning a jurisdictional question, but
on review will weigh the evidence re-
lating thereto and make its own inde-
pendent findings of fact.* * *”

We shall therefore review the evi-
dence and make an independent find-
ing-in accord with the above rule.

Claimant testified that he was hired
to do inside trim on dwellings being
erected by E. B. Treadwell; that this
consisted of putting on the base, the
base shoe and hanging the medicine
cabinets and phone booth; that this was
done on an oral agreement for $85 per
dwelling. He had completed a number
of houses for E, B. Treadwell, contrac-
tor, and was engaged in work on a
like job when he sustained his injury
due to the fall.

In Nichols v. State Industrial Com-
mission, 207 Okla. 167, 248 P. 2d 616,
we stated:

“The relation of employer and em-
ployee is a first prerequisite to any
award under. the Compensation Act, and
such relation is created either by con-

tract, express or implied, or by the un-
equivocal acts of the parties recogniz-
ing the relationship.

“Before one is entitled to a liberal
construction of the Workmen’s Compen-
sation Law, he must be held to strict
proof that he is in the class embraced
within the provisions of the law. He
must establish direct proof of relation-
ship of master and servant at the time
of the accidental personal injury.”

An independent contractor is one who,
exercising an independent employment,
contracts to do a piece of work accord-
ing to his own methods and without
being subject to the control of his em-
ployer, except as to the result of his
work. Producers Lumber Co. v. Butler,
87 Okla. 172, 209 P. 738. See, also, Keel-
ing v. Schuman Bros. Lbr. Co., 204
Okla. 277, 229 P. 2d 193; Thompson v.
Braselton Federal Insulating & Build-
ing Materials Co., 203 Okla. 510, 223
P. 2d 527.

In Southland Cotton Oil Co. v. Prit-

chett, 167 Okla. 6, 27 P. 2d 819, it is
stated:

“Tm determining whether the relation
between a principal contractor and an-
other engaged in work on the subject
matter of the contract is that of master
and servant or an independent contrac-
tor, the test is whether the principal
contractor reserves the power to con-
trol the latter.”

In Hobart Lumber Co. v. Fells, 190
Okla. 106, 122 P. 2d 390, this court
stated:

“In Getman ~ MacDonnell ~- Summers
Drug Co. v. Acosta, 162 Okla. 77, 19 P.
2d 149, the elements to be considered
in determining the status of a claimant
as an agent or an independent con-
tractor are stated, and it was also said
that the line of demarcation between
the two is not one clearly drawn by the
courts, and that the question must be
determined from the facts in each case.

667

See, also, W. H. Butcher Packing Co.
v. Hixon, 189 Okla. 700, 119 P. 2d 1019.
The controlling factor here is whether
the claimant was subject to the control
of the Lumber Company while engaged.
in doing the work.”

Tn order to show the control of claim-
ant’s work, claimant stated that if he
did not put in a full day’s work he
would no doubt have been discharged.
In order to show supervision of his
work, he stated that if any of his work
was not properly done he would have
to do it over. He also stated that on
one occasion his brother-in-law helped
him to complete two dwellings because
Mr. Treadwell was in a hurry for these
particular dwellings. The evidence dis-
closes that E. B. Treadwell did not de-
duct any amount from claimant’s wages
for social security or income tax. No
one kept any account of the number of
hours claimant worked. We find nothing
in the evidence that would support a
finding that claimant was an employee.
In Burnett v. Roberts, 57 Wyo. 511, 121
P. 2d 896, it is ‘stated that the con-
trolling or principal test as to whether
or not a person is an employee instead
of an independent contractor is‘whether
or not the employer retains the right to
control the details of the work. The evi-
dence discloses without substantial con-
flict that claimant was hired to do the
trim work in each of the houses in his
own manner and according to his own
best judgment and that E. B. Treadwell
desired only the completed job satis-
factory to him.

‘Under such circumstances, the State
Industrial Commission did not err in
denying the award.

Order denying award sustained.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, and WIL-
LIAMS, JJ., concur.

668 Le

BARNEY U. BROWN & SONS, Inc.
et al. v. SAVAGE et al.

No. 35544, April 21, 1953.

Rehearing Denied June 17, 1953.

258 P. 2d 183.

Mont R. Powell, William R. Saied,
and Sam Hill, Oklahoma City, for pe-
titioners.

Tom L. Irby, Ponca City, Claud
Briggs, and Brown & Verity, Okla-
homa City, and Mac Q. Williamson,
Atty. Gen., for respondents.

BLACKBIRD, J. This is a proceed-
ing brought by the State Insurance
Fund to review an award of the State
Industrial Commission in favor of the
claimant, Hubert Savage, against it and
his employer, Barney U. Brown & Sons,
Incorporated, as respondents. For con-
venience Barney U. Brown & Sons,
Incorporated, will be referred to herein
merely as “The Company” and the
State Insurance Fund as the “Fund”.
The Company had two different busi-
nesses; one was an oil and gasoline
business at Oklahoma City, and the
other was a feed and grain business at
Enid. Claimant was employed as a
salesman in the feed and grain business.

The Company’s Workmen’s Compen-
sation insurance policy with the Fund
specifically covered only its workers in
the oil and gasoline business, but in
the schedule of employees, upon the
basis of which the policy’s premiums
were computed and paid, claimant was
listed.

The only questions involved in deter-
mining whether or not the award to
claimant on the basis of this policy will
be upheld, concern the interpretation
and application of Sections 2 and 3
of House Bill No. 234, Act of the Leg-
islature 1947, §§65.2 and 65:3 of Title
85, O.S. Supp. 1947, and O.S, 1951. These
sections are as follows:

“Sec. 65.2. Every employer and every
insurance carrier who schedules any
employee as a person employed by the

employer for the purpose of paying or
collecting insurance premiums on a
Workmen’s Compensation insurance pol-
icy or who pays, receives or collects any
premiums upon any insurance policy
covering the liability of such employer
under the Workmen’s Compensation
Law by reason of or upon the basis of
the employment of any such employee
shall be estopped to’ deny that such
employee was employed by the em-
ployer in a hazardous employment sub-
ject to and covered by the Workmen’s
Compensation Law if such person re-
eeives an accidental personal injury
arising out of and in the course of his
employment, during the period for
which such premium was so received,
regardless of the type of business in
which the employer was engaged or the
type of employment in which the em-
ployee was engaged at the time of such
injury. Laws 1947, p. 626, Sec. 2.

“(See. 65.3). Every contract of in-
surance issued by an insurance car-
rier for the purpose of insuring an em-
ployer against liability under the Work-
men’s Compensation Law shall be con-
clusively presumed to be a contract for
the benefit of each and every person
upon whom insurance premiums are
paid, collected, or whose employment
is considered or used in determination
of the amount of premium collected
upon such policy for the payment of
benefits as provided by Workmen’s
Compensation Law regardless of the
type of business in which the employer
of such person is engaged or the type
of work being performed by the em-
ployee at the time of any injury re-
ceived by such employee arising out
of and in the course of his employment,
which contract may be enforced by
such employee as the beneficiary there-
of, before the State Industrial Commis-
sion as now provided by law. Laws
1947, p. 627, sec, 3.” (Emphasis ours.)

After a trial commissioner had de-
termined that claimant’s employment
‘was not covered by the policy and de-
nied him any recovery thereunder, said
order was appealed to the commission
en bane which, though it applied the
above-quoted presumption and estoppel
provisions of the cited statute against
the Fund and granted claimant an
award as a beneficiary under the pol-

669

icy, made, among others, the following
findings of fact:

“That the State Insurance Fund of
the State of Oklahoma carried a Pol-
icy of insurance for the period begin-
ning September 30, 1950, to October 1,
1951, upon the gasoline and oil business
and the clerical office employees as-
sociated with the gasoline and oil busi-
ness of Barney U. Brown & Sons, Inc.,
the respondent herein; that the said
policy of insurance did not cover the
seed and grain business carried on by
the respondent in Enid, Oklahoma;
that the provisions of Paragraph 6 .in
the Contract expressly states that no
other trade, business or profession is
conducted by the Employer at any lo-
cation in Oklahoma except those dis-
closed in Paragraph 4; that Paragraph
4 does not anywise disclose that the re-
spondent was engaged in the seed and
grain_business; that the State Insur-
ance Fund did not have actual or con-
structive knowledge that the respondent
was engaged in the feed and grain busi-
ness in Enid, Oklahoma, until an in-
vestigation was conducted following the
filing of the claimant’s claim herein.

“That the wages paid by the re-
spondent to the claimant were added to
the wages paid to the clerical workers
in the oil and gas business in Okla-
homa City in computing the premiums
paid under the said policy for clerical
workers; that said premiums were
accepted by the State Insurance Fund
under the mistaken belief that the
said premiums were based solely on
the wages paid to the oil and gas cleri-
eal workers employed in Oklahoma
City.”

In the Fund’s brief, in which the in-
sured and employer, Brown & Sons,
have refused to join, it is argued that
all of the above-quoted findings of the
commission except the introductory
one that Brown & Sons had a policy
with the Fund covering the oil and gas-
oline business, are inconsistent and
conflict with its order, which is con-
trary to both the law and the evidence.
In support of its position the Fund cites
such undisputed facts as those that
the rate of premiums charged by it is
higher for salesmen than the rate of

670 |

clerical workers and that only the rate
for clerical workers was paid and col-
lected on the policy in this case. It is
also argued that the commission has
no jurisdiction to determine contract
rights between an insured and its in-
surer, including the power to interpret
contracts they have made, but, at the
same time, it relies on an interpretation
of one of the commission’s findings in
this case as a finding that no contract
of insurance covering claimant’s “em-
ployment” existed between the Fund
and Brown & Sons, and argues that
under National Bank of Tulsa Bldg.
v. Goldsmith, 204 Okla. 45, 226 P, 2d
916, such a contract is necessary in
any case before the “estoppel” and
“presumption” provisions (sections
65.2 and 65.3 of Title 85, supra) are ap-
plicable to it. We think counsel misin-
terprets the legislative and judicial pro-
nouncements they rely on. Granted
that, under the statutes and the pre-
vious decisions of the court, the com-
mission is without the power of courts
of general jurisdiction to settle con-
tract rights in general, we do not think
that is what the commission did or pur-
ported to do in this case. Its finding that
the policy involved did not, by its spe-
cific terms, include the kind of employ-
ment in which claimant was engaged,
is the only conclusion that anyone read-
ing the policy would arrive at; and
it was a necessary one to application
of the above statutory sections. In this
connection, see Tri-State Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Bowen, 189 Okla. 97, 113 P. 2d
981, and Employer’s Casualty Co. v.
Carpenter Bros., 204 Okla. 312, 229 P.
2d 592, and compare with Spaulding
& Osborne v. Pacific Employers Co.,
192 Okla. 154, 134 P. 2d 581. Said sec-
tions are plainly contemplated to ap-
ply to situations where a worker's em-
ployment is not covered by the spe-
cific provisions of his employer’s in-
surance policy. Such coverage is ef-
fected under the Act through a con-
clusiive presumption in his favor,
where premiums on the policy in exist-
ence have been “paid, collected, or”
his employment “considered or used in

determination of the amount of prem-
jum collected upon such policy, * * *”
regardless of the employer’s type of
business or the employee’s type of
work, While in the National Bank of
Tulsa Bldg. case, supra, this court used
the expression: premiums paid and re-
ceived “on a basis of a particular em-
ployment”, it did not mean or :ntend
to hold, contrary to the wording of the
statute, that the premiums must have
been paid and received on a “partic-
ular (type or kind of) employment.”
All we were referring to in the quoted
part of the syllabus was thé particular
employee’s employment, rather than
the employee’s particular employment
or kind of work. The word “employ-
ment” as used in that particular clause
or phrase of our opinion and in the
statutory provisions in question refers
merely to the relationship of employer
and employee (or master and servant),
rather than to the particular capacity
in which the employee is serving his
employer. When this is understood,
there is no ground for controversy on
this point, and no question but that
the commission was correct in making
an award herein, Any other interpre-
tation of the wording of the portion of
the statute involved would be contrary
to its specific wording and meaning.
The interpretation urged by the Fund
would make it immaterial whether or
not a particular employee had been
included in the total premium paid on
the policy, as he undisputedly was here,
if a mistake had been made in doing
so, and his particular type of work was
not included in the specific terms of
the policy. This is just the sort of case
the statute was enacted to cover.
Whether the facts presented here be
called an employee’s “snare”, or “pit-
fall,” or merely an individual or mu-.
tual “mistake”, or “oversight” on the
part of the employer and/or his insur-
ance carrier, they are illustrative of a
situation in which the Legislature has
decided that an employee should not
find himself “trapped” or jarred
from recovery after suffering a com-
pensable injury. If it were not for these

statutory provisions, both the employ-
er and the employee might go along,
seeing premiums on the policy collected
and being lulled thereby into believing
that the latter’s job was covered by
the policy, then, when an accident oc-
curred and a claim was filed thereun-
der, suddenly find to their joint dis-
may, that they had no such protection.
We think the facts that the Fund
charges a higher rate of premium on
salesmen (than on clerical workers)
and that the Fund did not know claim-
ant was employed as such, are both
immaterial; and the commission’s find-
ings to that effect, of themselves, show

* no error in its award. The Fund had
the right to ascertain what type of work
claimant was engaged in, and there-
upon, under the specific provisions of
the policy, to increase the premiums
Brown & Sons were paying, if that
premium was less than the ene it
should have paid on the policy after
claimant was included in the list of em-
ployees scheduled. The employee should
not have to suffer for the combined
or individual mistake of his employer
and/or the insurance carrier in com-
puting, paying and/or collecting the
proper amount of premium on the pol-
icy—a mistake for which he was in no
way responsible and over which he had
no supervision or control.

Besides being the only one that
could be adopted under the specific
wording of the provisions involved here,
our interpretation accords with the
well established rule that the Work-
men’s Compensation Law should re-
ceive a liberal construction in favor of
those entitled to its benefits. See Rose
Hill Burial Park v. Garrison, 176 Okla.
355, 55 P. 2d 1045.

We find no error in the commission’s
order and its award is hereby sus-
tained.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and WELCH, CORN, DAVISON,
O’NEAL, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

671

OKLAHOMA NATURAL GAS CO.
v. PICKETT.

No. 35617. May 5, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1953.
258 P. 2d 186.

Pinson, Lupardus & Carlson, Tulsa,
for plaintiff in error.

. P. D. Erwin, Chandler, for defendant
in error.

WILLIAMS, J. Defendant, Oklahoma
Natural Gas Company, owned and

672

maintained certain pipe lines which
went through the farm of plaintiff,
Pickett. Plaintiff's petition alleged that
in connection with the construction and
maintenance of these lines, defendant
was negligent in leaving certain sub-
stances (spun glass, tar base, asphalt
paper, etc.) in the pasture of plaintiff;
that plaintiff’s cattle ate the substances
and as a result two died, and the others
were damaged; that the pasture was
damaged in the removal of one pipe line
and construction of another. Plaintiff
recovered judgment in the trial court
and defendant has duly appealed.

Parties are referred to herein as in
the trial court.

In its brief, defendant argues the fol-
lowing propositions: that the judgment
is based upon conjecture, speculation
and guesswork and cannot stand, and
that the judgment is contrary to the
law and the evidence.

With regard to the first proposition,
there was undisputed evidence to the
effect that defendant did own the pipe
lines in question and did perform the
construction work as alleged in plain-
tiff’s petition; that at the conclusion of
such work the harmful substances were
left in the pasture; that shortly there-
after the cattle of plaintiff lost weight
(some as much as two or three hundred
pounds) and their market value de-
creased; that spun glass is harmful to
the stomachs and intestinal tracts of
cattle; that two of the cattle died; that
one of the cattle that died was dissected

and found to have little “bags” through- -

out its stomach and intestinal tract;
there was also specific evidence from
which the jury could compute the total
damages to the cattle and to the pas-
ture. .

A chemist who had examined samples
of the substances left in the pasture by
defendant testified that they would
produce great mechancial injury to
the stomach and intestinal tract of the
cattle; that particles of the spun glass
would penetrate the walls of the

stomach and intestinal tract and pro-
duce injury.

Defendant’s principal argument under
this proposition goes to the fact that
no witness testified that he actually
saw the cattle eating the substances
in question. It is too well established
to require quotation from authority that
facts in issue may be proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence as well as direct
evidence. See Marland Refining Co. v.
Snider, 125 Okla. 260, 257 P. 797.

Defendant also argues in its brief that
cattle will not eat spun glass; however,
since no evidence was introduced on
this point in the trial court, it will not
be considered here.

Since there was direct or circumstan-
tial evidence to support all the mate-
rial allegations of plaintiff, defendant’s
argument that the judgment was based
on conjecture, speculation and guess-
work is not well taken.

Defendant’s argument under the sec-
ond proposition is that plaintiff did not
prove damages to his cattle by defend-
ant; that the amount of the verdict was
not justified by the evidence with re-
gard to the amount of damages to the
pasture; therefore, since the amount of
the verdict is not sustained by the evi-
dence, the judgment should be reversed
and a new trial granted on the amount
of damages to the pasture.

As is evident, this contention rests
on the assumption that damage to the
eattle was not proved, and the conten-
tion is therefore without merit. In addi-
tion, we note that defendant did not
point out this specific alleged error in
his motion for new trial. See Gassaway
v. Skiveers, 182 Okla. 9, 75 P. 2d 1149,
wherein this court said:

“Errors occurring during the trial of
a case cannot be considered in this
court unless a motion for new trial
founded upon and including such er-
rors has been made by the party com-
plaining and presented to the trial court
and by it denied.”

Defendant also points out that a vet-
erinarian testified that four of plain-
tiff’s cattle were afflicted with a disease
called hyperkeratosis; that the cause of
such disease is unknown. This is, of
course, in direct conflict with the evi-
dence of plaintiff as to the cause of the
damage to his cattle; in such circum-
stances, the following rules of law ap-
ply:

“Where there is doubt as to which of
several probable causes produced the
injuries, the cause of the injuries is
properly a question for the jury.” Kan-
sas O. & G. Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 191 Okla.
671, 135 P. 2d 498.

“Where a civil action at law is tried to
a jury, and there is competent evidence
reasonably tending to support the ver-
dict of the jury, this court will not dis-
turb the verdict upon appeal, on the
ground that the same is‘not sustained
by sufficient evidence.” Black v. Cole-
man et ux., 142 Okla. 195, 285 P. 983.

The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed.

HALLEY, C.J, JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN, DAVISON, ARNOLD, O’-
NEAL, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.

TEXAS CONSOLIDATED OILS et al.
v. VANN et al.

No. 35265. March 24, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1953.
258 P. 2d 679.

673

674

Jim Hatcher and Reford Bond, Jr.,
Chickasha, and C. J. Davenport, Sapul-
pa, for plaintiffs in error.

Clarence McElroy and Owen Vaughn,
Chickasha, for defendants in error.

O’NEAL, J. The question before us
arises in a proceeding by the owners of
an 80-acre tract of land in Caddo
county, to obtain a cancellation of an
oil and gas lease executed by them and
by assignment held by the operators,
upon plaintiffs’ contention that the op-
erators have abandoned the lease and

have failed to develop the same by
drilling additional wells, thereby
breaching the implied covenants there-
of, and have failed to protect the land
from oil and gas drainage from wells
drilled on adjacent lands. For the
reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that
the court’s decree and judgment re-
quiring the drilling of additional wells
in the manner and mode designated in
the decree, and declaring a forfeiture
of the oil and gas lease, cannot be sus-
tained.

Plaintiffs’ original petition filed Nov-
ember, 1948, alleges plaintiffs’ owner-
ship of the land and mineral rights in
and to the S% of the NW% of section
4, township 5 north, range 9 west, Cad-
do county, Oklahoma. That on June
27, 1941, plaintiffs, Wade H. Vann and
Mary B. Vann, executed an oil and gas
lease upon said land for a term of
four months and as long thereafter as
oil or gas was produced therefrom. By
assignments the oil and gas lease is
presently owned by the defendants,
Texas Consolidated Oils, successor to
Texmass Petroleum Company, and the
Caddo Oil Company, the operators, and
by certain other named defendants as-
serted to have an interest therein. That
the operators have made no effort to
develop said land under the lease, and
have abandoned its development, with
the exception of one well thereon.
Plaintiffs state that there is consider-
able production of oil and gas on adja-
cent land, which proves all of the above
described land is productive of oil and
gas from other and different horizons
and sands that warrants development
of the undeveloped portion of said lease,
which defendants have failed and re-
fused to do. That defendants have
failed to protect the land from drain-
age by offset wells. Written notice for
additional development is pleaded. The
prayer seeks a cancellation of all acre-
age under the lease, except the ten
acres upon which the well is presently
producing gas, for the reason that the
operators have neglected to comply
with the express and implied terms of

the lease, and have abandoned further
development thereof.

On the 17th day of August, 1949, the
plaintiffs filed their amended petition
in which additional parties are made
defendants, and who appear to claim
some interest in the property involved,
which rights are asserted to be inferior
to plaintiffs’ rights pleaded in their
original petition.

On the 30th day of August, 1950,
plaintiffs filed their amendment to their
original and amended petition in which
they allege that since the filing of
their original and amended petition,
there has been further development in
the vicinity of the leased premises, and
that the wells so drilled are direct off-
sets to said land and cause plaintiffs’
Jand to be drained of the oil and gas
therefrom. Upon this additional ground,
plaintiffs pray for cancellation of the
lease.

The Texas Consolidated Oils, by its
answer, states the defense of all named
defendants necessary for our considera-
tion. Defendant, Texas Consolidated
Oils, after its general denial, admits
its ownership of the oil and gas lease
upon the described land and asserts
that the notice for additional develop-
ment is insufficient to advise defend-
ants of planitiffs’ ground for cancella-
tion of the lease, and further that the
notice served on defendants is not
signed by the owners of the mineral
interest in said land. The answer fur-
ther states that at the time suit was
filed there was no producing oil or gas
well offsetting defendant Texas Con-
solidated Oils’ lease and, therefore,
there was no drainage of oil or gas
from the land and, consequently, no
cause of action for cancellation under
the implied covenants of the lease to
protect against drainage had accrued,
when the notice for additional develop-
ment was served on defendants.

Defendants pleaded that they have
made considerable research at consid-
erable expense to determine the poten-
tialities of the lease for further devel-

675

opment. That when said research is
completed, if favorable, defendants in-
tend to explore the deeper oil and gas
sands underlying the land. Defendants
specifically deny that they have or in-
tend to abandon the lease, but on the
contrary expect to develop it further
if its geological research justifies ad-
ditional development. Various defend-
ants have filed separate answers and
cross-petitions, but it will be unneces-
sary to refer to them for a proper dis-
position of the case.

The Texas Consolidated Oils and the
Caddo Oil Company demurred to the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence,
which demurrer was overruled, and at
the close of the trial demurred to the
evidence and requested a dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ action for failure to es-
tablish facts upon which plaintiffs were
entitled to any affirmative relief. The
demurrer was overruled and from an
order denying defendants a new trial,
they have perfected their appeal.

A proper consideration of the issues
involved require an examination of the
court’s decree and the judgment ren-
dered thereon. The journal entry of
judgment recites that there is a pro-
ducing gas well on the SW% of the
SW% of the NW% of section 4, and as
to said gas well and to its ten acres of
land the lease is confirmed and re-
mains in full force and effect. As to
the remaining 30 acres in the SW% of
the NW% of said section 4, the decree
provides that the NE% of the SW%4 of
the NW% and the NW% of the SW%
of the NW%4 and the SE% of the SW%
of the NW% of said section 4, that the
lease remain in full force and effect
providing that the operators commence
operations for the drilling of a well on
one of said ten acres of land within 30
days from May 11, 1951, and prosecute
such operations with due diligence un-
til the well has been completed, and
that within 30 days from the completion
of the first well, that said operators
commence drilling operations on the
second well on another ten acres of
said land and prosecute such operations

676

with due diligence until the well has
been completed, and within 30 days af-
ter the completion of the second well
that said operators commence drilling
operations on the remaining ten acres
of said 30 acres of land and prosecute
such operations with due diligence un-
til said last well has been completed;
that if operators fail to drill any one
of said wells within the time provided
for in the decree, then the oil and gas
leases on the said remaining. ten acres
of land will be canceled. As to that
portion of the land described as the
SE% of the NW% of said section 4, the
decree cancels the oil and gas lease as
to the defendants, Texas Consolidated
Oils and Caddo Oil Company, on the
ground that defendants have breached
the implied covenants of said lease, and
have abandoned said oil and gas lease,
except that certain named individual
defendants by reason of their reserved
reassignment rights under the lease,
which are established under the de-
cree, are required to drill one well on
each of the four ten-acre tracts in the
SE% of the NW% of said section 4,
within the same time and manner as
provided for in the drilling of wells
covering the SW% of the NW% of said
section 4, by the operators, provided,
however, that if the case is appealed
the individual defendants shall not be
compelled to perform on any portion
of the land which they are prevented
from performing by reason of said ap-
peal until 30 days after the effective
day of the final judgment. The decree
finally provides that if the operators
fail to drill any one or more of the
wells on the remaining 30-acre tract in
the SW% of the NW% of said section 4,
then said named individual defendants
shall have a period of 30 days, after
the performance date on the part of the
operators, to drill each ten-acre tract
within the time and manner as here~
tofore specified in the decree.

The court reserved jurisdiction for
the purpose of enforcing the provisions
of the decree. Plaintiffs in error, Texas
Consolidated Oils and Caddo Oil Com-

pany, being sole appellants, will here-
after be referred to as defendants, or
operators,

Defendants seek a reversal of the
decree and judgment on the following
grounds:

(a) That the plaintiffs’ petition, to-
gether with its amendments and the
proof in support thereof, did not entitle
plaintiffs to the relief prayed for.

(b) That the court erred in overruling
defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ evi-
dence, and erred in overruling defend-
ants’ demurrer and motion for judg-
ment at the conclusion of the trial.

(c) That the notice and demand
served on defendants by plantiffs did
not allow defendants sufficient time,
prior to the filing of the action, to con-
sider the demands made and reach an
intelligent conclusion thereon.

A summary of plaintiffs’ petition, to-
gether with its amendments, discloses
that plaintiffs’ claim for cancellation
of the lease is based on the assertion
that defendants have not complied with
the express or implied covenants of
the lease in fully developing the same
for oil and gas production; that the
defendants have failed to drill offset
wells to prevent drainage of oil or gas
from plaintiffs’ land, and that defend-
ants have wholly abandoned any in-
tention for further development of the
lease. On these grounds plaintiffs as-
sert they are entitled to a cancellation
of the entire lease, except a producing
gas well and a ten-acre tract surround-
ing the well.

In support of the foregoing allegations
plaintiffs produced proof that in June,
1941, plaintiffs executed the oil and gas
lease upon the 80-acre tract described
as the S% of the NW% of section 4,
township 5 north, range 9 west in Caddo
county, Oklahoma, and that the de-
fendants, Texas Consolidated Oils and
Caddo Oil Company, acquired the lease
by assignment and are the operators
thereof. That during the initial term

of the lease the then lessees drilled a
well to the total depth of 6,978 feet
upon the SW% of the SW% of the NW14
of said section 4, and that this well has
produced gas in paying quantities at
all times prior to the institution of the
present action. As we have indicated,
the trial court confirmed the lease in-
sofar as it affected the producing gas
well and the ten-acre location thereof.

Wade H. Vann, one of the plaintiff
lessors, testified that he had a con-
versation with a field superintendent
of the operators in which he requested
that the operators further develop the
properties by drilling additional wells.
The superintendent advised Mr. Vann
that the matter would have to be taken
up with headquarters, Plaintiff stated
that he did not further request addition-
al drilling prior to the filing of his
action, other than a written notice pre-
pared by his attorneys and served up-
on the operators and other defendants
in the action.

Harry Suffield, a petroleum geolo-
gist, testified that he prepared a map
which shows the location of wells indi-
cated by the letters “A to H” inclusive.
The well designated by the letter “D”
is the gas well on plaintiffs’ land. Wells
“BY, “CO, “R?, “P,Q” and “EP
were wells drilled on adjoining land
subsequent to the service of notice for
additional drilling, and subsequent to
the filing of the present action. Well
“A” van its first production of oil in
October, 1948, and the present suit was
filed on November 10, 1948. The gas
well in the southwest corner of the
land is being produced from the Culp-
Melton sand at a depth of 6,978 feet.
There are a number of sands above
the Culp-Melton, the first one encoun-
tered is the Fortuna sand zone around
2,100 to 2,500 feet in depth. Between
the Fortuna and the Culp-Melton is
found the Noble-Olsen sand at an ap-
proximate depth of 3,440 feet. That For-
tuna and Noble-Olsen sands are present
in Vann #1, which is a well located
on land adjacent to the lease here in-
volved. That the Fortuna and Noble-

677

Olsen sands extend over the entire 80-
acre tract of plaintiffs’ land. That,
in his opinion, if the Fortuna and
Noble-Olsen sands were penetrated on
any part of the 80-acre tract there
would be a very good chance of
obtaining production. Mr. Suffield
testified that the Stanolind Oil Com-
pany had drilled a well on an ad-
jacent tract to a depth of 7,490 feet,
but the well was thereafter completed
in the Fortuna sand, and from this in-
formation he gave it as his opinion that
there are deeper sands that have a
pretty good chance of production; that
these sands might be encountered in
the Hunton limestone at 10,000 feet and
in the Simpson series ranging from
12,000 to 14,000 feet estimated depth,
and that lower sands than these may
be present though no well has been
drilled lower than the Stanolind well
referred to. The witness states that, in
his opinion, the wells designated “A”,
“By, 0, “E, “EY, Gand “EH?
located on adjacent lands, all drain the
80-acre tract in question. The record
is not clear, but the inference is that
the witness limited his drainage to oil.
Referring to Well “C”, he stated that
this well drained plaintiffs’ land. Re-
ferring to Well “G”, he stated: “I
would say it possibly would drain plain-
tiffs’ land.” As to Well “A” the witness
stated: “It probably drains plaintiffs’
land. I think it probably does.”

As to the Stanolind-Thatcher well
designated as Well “F”, the witness
stated: “It will drain some oil and
gas.” As to Well “B” the witness
stated: “It could have some drainage
from the northwest portion of the plain-
tiffs’ land.” The witness did not state
his opinion as to whether or not Wells
“E or “H” would drain plaintiffs’ land.

John S. Graham, a drilling contrac-
tor, testified that a well completed
and equipped to the Noble-Olsen would
cost approximately $30,000, and to the
Fortuna approximately $20,000, and at
a cost of $35,000 to complete a well to
both sands; that the approximate cost
of operation of a well in the field was

678 |

$1,000 yearly; that as a drilling con-
tractor and as a producer of oil in com~
parable formations, he would require
four or five months time to observe a
well’s production record before deter~
mining whether or not additional drill~
ing operations would be warranted.

Upon the foregoing record, the court
overruled defendants’ demurrer to
plaintiffs’ evidence.

Defendants’ evidence substantially
discloses that the gas well, Well “D” on
plaintiffs’ land, was drilled at a cost
of $56,000, and that since defendants’
acquisition of the lease the well has
produced $21,897.78 in revenue over and
above operating costs; that the well
will successfully drain all gas from the
plaintiffs’ land, after which the well
could be completed in the Fortuna as an
oil well.

Defendants’ evidence corroborates
plaintiffs that an operator would re-
quire from five to seven months pro~
duction experience before a petroleum
engineer could give a sound opinion as
to the advisability of drilling offset wells
in the area.

At the trial in March, 1951, the op-
erating defendants made an offer to
drill a well as a diagonal offset to Well
“A” located on adjoining land, and
drill the same to the Fortuna or Noble-
Olsen formation, which offer was de-
clined by plaintiffs and was again re-
newed as shown by the testimony of
the operating defendants. As applied to
Well “A” the proof shows that the well
was not completed on September 9,
1948, the date upon which the notice
for additional drilling was served upon
the operators. The first production from
that well was obtained in October, 1948,
and its total production to December 31,
1950, was 10,113.47 barrels.

Mr. W. C. Bednar, a petroleum en-
gineer, called by the defendants, testi-
fied that the Cement field in which the
plaintiffs’ lease is situated, was dis~
covered in 1917, and that over 700 wells

have been drilled in the field. These
wells were drilled at depths of 2,000
feet to 10,776 feet. One well in the
North Cement field was drilled to a
depth of 13,046 feet. The Fortuna zone
sand at 2,300 feet is interbedded with
shales and thick individual sand mem-
bers ranging from very thin to at times
as much as 12 feet in thickness. The
sands in the Noble-Olsen zone at 3,400
feet are lenticular and interbedded with
shales. That in the Noble-Olsen zone
additional sand members can be ex-
pected to have a thickness up to as
much as 18 or 20 feet. Wells “A” and
“B” located north and northwest on ad-
jacent land will produce oil in pay-
ing quantities, and he so advised the
operators in February, 1949, following
the completion of Well “A” in October,
1948. The well was not drilled because
of the filing of the present action. That
the Fortuna under defendants’ gas well
has sufficient sand thickness to war-
rant completing an oil well in that

.zone when the gas well is abandoned.

That from his interpretation of the elec-
tric log he concludes that the Noble-Ol-
sen sand is not’ present under the en-
tire 80-acre tract, as indicated by the
witnesses’ isopachous map, showing the
absence of net pay sand in that sand
zone.

A summary of the testimony, both of
the plaintiffs and defendants, estab-
lishes that when the action was filed
only one well had been drilled on ad~
jacent land, to wit: Well “A”, and its
first production, was received in Octo-
ber, 1948, and the plaintiffs’ action was
filed in November, 1948, Well “B” lo-
cated on adjoining land made its first
runs in September, 1949, and the cu-
mulative runs from this well and a
companion well ran to the same bat-
teries as of January 1, 1951, was
34 barrels. Well “C” located on
ing land made its first runs in
March, 1949, and its cumulative pro-
duction as of January 1, 1951, was
11,318.28 barrels. Well “E” located in
section 5 on adjoining land had its first
pipe line run as of November, 1948, and

its cumulative production as of Janu-
ary 1, 1951, was 2,912.37 barrels.

That a well known as the McKenna
well, located south and east of plain-
tiff’s land, and which was drilled both
to the Fortuna and Noble-Olsen sands,
was a dry hole. Well “F” on the same
McKenna tract, and which was com-
pleted in October, 1948, in the Fortuna,
will not produce oil economically. Well
“G” located on land southeast of plain-
tiffs’ tract known as the Norman-Gra-
ham well, was completed in February,
1950, and as of January 1, 1951, had a
cumulative production of 4,813 barrels,
Well “H” located east of Well “G”,
referred to above, was completed in
November, 1948, and its ultimate re-
covery over a period of eight years will
not exceed 16,424 barrels. The testimony
of the officers of the operating com-
panies disclosed no intention to aban-
don the lease in whole or in part, and
as heretofore indicated, they offered to
drill a well offsetting Wells “A” and
“B” prior to and at the trial, and
there is no question as to their finan-
cial ability to assume the obligation of
further drilling development of the
lease.

Plaintiffs’ assertion in their brief that
adjoining wells in the area were drain-
ing the land is not sustaitied by the
record. In our view of the record, the
plaintiffs wholly failed to sustain the al-
legations of their petition by competent
evidence, and the defendants’ demur-
rer at the close of all of the evidence
should have been sustained. As we
have noted, plaintiffs’ allegations went
no further than a statement that defend-
ants made no effort to develop the
lease. No facts were alleged upon which
the allegations are predicated, neither
are any facts alleged or established
upon which plaintiffs could base their
contention of abandonment, nor is there
any proof sustaining plaintiffs’ allega-
tions that their land is being drained
by wells drilled on adjoining land.

After the service of notice for addi~
tional development was served by the

679

lessor, the obligation of the lessee to
develop further under said lease is
suspended until the settlement of the
controversy. Gibson & Jennings, Inc.,
v. Amos Drilling Co., 196 Okla. 143, 162
P, 2d 1002.

In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. St.
Louis-S. F.R.Co., 194 Okla. 435, 152
P, 2d 367, we held:

“The burden rests upon a_ plaintiff
seeking cancellation of the undeveloped
portion of an oil and gas lease on the
theory of breach of covenant to plead
and prove the facts establishing breach
of covenant.”

Plaintiffs’ proof in support of their
claim for cancellation of the lease went
no further than the statements of the
witness geologist that the Fortuna and
Noble-Olsen sands were present under
the entire 80-acre lease involved, and
would be productive wherever encoun-
tered on any portion of the lease, and
his further statement that wells drilled
on adjoining lands produced oil and,
in his judgment, probably drained plain-
tiffs’ land. Plaintiffs made no attempt to
establish that any well drilled on the
80-acre tract, or that the wells drilled
on adjoining land, would produce oil
and gas in paying quantities. There is
substantial evidence to the contrary.
‘The lease in question provides:

“That it shall remain in full force and
effect for four months, and as long
thereafter as oil and gas, or either of
them, is produced from said land by
the lessee.”

In Walden v. Potts, 194 Okla. 453, 152
P, 2d 923, we said:

“A clause in an oil and gas lease that
the lease shall continue for one year
‘and as long thereafter as oil or gas,
or either of them, is produced from said
land by the lessee in paying quantities’
means not only discovery but taking out
oil or gas in pursuance of the covenants
and purposes of the lease in such quan-
tities as will pay a profit to the lessee
over the operating expenses.”

In the present case it is without dis-
pute that Well “D”, the gas well, has

680

at all times produced gas sold from
the premises in paying quantities.

In Wilcox v. Ryndak, 174 Okla. 24,
49 P. 2d 733, we said:

“There is no implied obligation on
the part of an oil and gas lessee to drill
an offset well to a well on adjoining
premises, or to drill an additional well
on the leased premises after oil or gas
has been discovered thereon, save and
except where the drilling of such well
would probably, taking all of the exist-
ing facts and circumstances into con-
sideration, produce sufficient oil to re-
pay the cost of drilling, equipping and
operating such well, and also to produce
a reasonable profit on the entire out~
jay, and neither the lessee nor the les-
sor is the arbiter of whether an offset
well should be drilled or the leased
premises further developed, but both
are bound by what a reasonably pru-
dent operator would do under similar
circumstances, and under no circum~
stances will a lessee be required to
drill an offset or an additional well
when the.same would probably not re~
sult profitably to him.”

In Ramsey Petroleum Corporation v.
Davis et al. 184 Okla. 155, 85 P. 2d
427, we held:

“The test prevailing in this state for
determining a breach of the implied
covenants to drill additional wells and
to protect the lease premises from
drainage by wells on adjoining lands is
‘the ordinary prudent operator test’. It
requires the lessee to do whatever in
the circumstances would be reasonably
expected of operators of ordinary pru-
dence, having regard to the interest of
both lessor and lessee, but neither is the
arbiter of the extent to which, or the
diligence with which, the operations
shall proceed. The burden of proving the

breach of these implied covenants is

upon the plaintiff.”

Plaintiffs’ contention that defendants
abandoned the lease cannot be sus-
tained for we have held that nonde-
velopment of a portion of a lease, un-
accompanied by physical relinquish-
ment, is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment, Doss Oil Royalty Co. v.
Texas Company, 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.

2d 934, and Gibson & Jennings, Inc., v.
Amos Drilling Co., 196 Okla. 143, 162 P.
2d 1002. In the latter case, we said: !

“Nondevelopment of a portion of a
lease, unaccompanied by pliysical re~
linquishment, is not sufficient to con-
stitute abandonment.”

The same rule was announced by this
court in Ferguson et al. v. Gulf Oil
Corporation et al., 192 Okla. 355, 137
P, 2d 940, and Skelly Oil Co. v. Boles,
193 Okla. 308, 142 P. 2d 969.

In the instant case, it is shown that
only seven years intervened from the
drilling of the gas well prodicing in
paying quantities, and the filing of
the present suit for cancellation. More~
over, it is shown that defendants of-
fered to drill an offset well to Well
“A” located on adjoining land and were
also negotiating for a deep test well,
and it is without controversy that both
lessor and lessee are of the opinion that
a deep test, either to the Simpson, Wil-
cox or Ordovician, has distinct possi-
bilities of paying production.

This court has uniformly held that
neither the lessor nor lessee was the ar-
biter as to whether due diligence had
been exercised in operating and devel~
oping an oil and gas lease, and that
whether such due diligence had been
exercised depends upon the facts and
circumstances of the case. Strange et
al. v. Hicks et al., 78 Okla. 1, 188 P.
347; Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North,
78 Okla. 39, 188 P. 1069.

As to whether the court should in any
given case declare a forfeiture of the
undeveloped portion of a lease must be
determined by the facts established in
each individual case. Skelly Oil Co.
et al. v. Boles et al, 193 Okla. 308,
142 P. 2d 969.

The trial court was not advised by
plaintiffs’ evidence whether a well on
any portion of the lease would produce
oil and gas in paying quantities, save
and except all parties agreed that an
offset well to Well “A” would, in all
probability, produce oil in paying quan-

tities, both in the Fortuna and the No-
ble-Olsen. But as we have heretofore
stated, lessor refused to let lessee drill
the offset well. Neither was the court
advised by plaintiffs’ proof that addi-
tional wells as offsetting wells to Wells
«BY, «CO, “PE” and “G” would pro-
duce either oil or gas in paying quan-
tities. Plaintiffs’ geologist did not testi-
fy that either one of said wells would
produce oil in paying quantities, but
limited his statement to the effect that
they would produce some oil. Likewise,
he expressed the opinion that each of
these wells would drain some oil from
plaintiffs’ land. Neither did plaintiffs’
evidence establish facts as to the thick-
ness of the sand formations, or whether
they were porous and therefore permea-
ble to the flow of oil or otherwise.

Forfeitures to be sustained must be
supported by substantial facts as for-
feitures are only granted to effectuate
justice, Skelly Oil Co. v. Boles, supra.

We have reviewed the entire record
and are of the opinion that the plain-
tiffs have not sustained, either by alle-
gation or proof, that the lease was
abandoned, or that the defendants have
failed to comply with the implied cove-
nants of the lease in its further devel-
opment. Furthermore, that there is no
proof sustaining plaintiffs’ contention
that the lease should be forfeited, in
whole or in part, for failure to protect
it against drainage from wells drilled
on adjoining land.

Counsel for plaintiff relies strongly
upon Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas
Company, 192 Okla. 359, 137 P. 2d 934,
McKenna v. Nichlos, 193 Okla. 526, 145
P, 2d 957, and Colpitt v. Tull, 204 Okla.
289, 228 P. 2d 1000, in support of the
judgment rendered. As we ‘read the
cases they announce the rule that:

“A suit for cancellation of the un-
developed portion of a producing oil
and gas lease is of equitable cogni-
zance, and is governed by principles of
equity.”

It ig pointed out in each cited case
that:

681

“the granting of such relief depends
upon the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the particular case.”

Neither do the cases depart from
our oft-expressed pronouncements that
neither the lessor nor the lessee is the
arbiter of the extent to which, or the
diligence with which, the lessee shall
proceed, but such question is com-
mitted to the sound discretion of the
court to be determined from the facts
and circumstances of each case.

In the Doss case, we find the lessee
had failed to drill additional wells on a
large portion of the lease for a period
of fourteen years, and the question was
posed as to whether the court might
grant relief without requiring the les-
sor to prove that such additional wells
may be drilled with a reasonable ex-
pectation of profit as required by the
prudent operator rule, under the theory
of a breach of the implied covenants
of the lease.

This court held ‘that:

“In an action to cancel the unde-
veloped portions of producing oil and
gas leases after the expiration of the
primary term, evidence that the oper-
ator has failed for an unreasonable
length of time to develop substantial
portions thereof is sufficient to with-
stand defendant’s demurrer to the evi-
dence.”

We construe our holding not to abro-
gate the prudent operator rule for we,
in the opinion, stated:

“The prudent operator rule may be
considered as a measuring stick to
guide the court in determining the dili-
gence required of the lessee in order
to ascertain whether a breach of the
implied covenants has occurred.”

Like other rules of equity, the pru-
dent operator rule is not inflexible. That
this is a rationale of the case is dem-
onstrated by our decision in McKenna
v. Nichlos, supra. The same Justice pre-
pared both opinions of the court. In
that case the opinion states:

682

“But the duty to drill further wells,
after the lapse of an unreasonable
length of time, is not tested by the stan-
dard of the prudent operator alone. In
the recent case of Doss Oil Royalty Co.
v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P. 2d
934, we had occasion to treat this sub-
ject extensively, and the principles
there laid down govern the instant case.
In that case we pointed out that suits
for the cancellation of oil and gas leases
are governed by principles of equity,
and that the question of whether a les-
see has breached the implied covenant
for further development is committed
to the sound discretion of the courts, to
be determined from the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. We stated
that while, in determining such matter,
‘we would consider the question of the
likelihood of profit from further drilling,
we would also give weight to other con-
siderations, particularly the length of
time which the lessee had held the
lease without further development. In
other words, after the passage of a rea-
sonable length of time, the duty to drill
additional wells becomes progressively
greater, and the standard of the pru-
dent operator becomes progressively of
less importance in determining whether
such duty exists.”

In Colpitt v. Tull, supra, our decision
is based upon our holding in the Doss
and McKenna cases. Specifically, we
said:

“Therefore, when there is an unrea-
sonable delay in drilling additional
wells plaintiff is not required to prove
that additional wells would have been
profitable.”

The rationale of the cases leads us to
the following conclusion: (1) Where in
the Doss, McKenna, and Colpitt cases
the additional development is long de-
layed, a court of equity may, in a prop-
er case, declare that the implied cove-
nants of the lease for reasonable de-
velopment have been breached and
upon such finding cancel the undevel-
oped portion thereof. The decree is sus-
tained by proof of mere lapse of time
without more. (2) Where from all facts
and circumstances the delay in the ad~
ditional development is not long de-
layed, but additional development is

demanded by the lessor, the reason-
able operator rule will apply. Neither
the lessor nor lessee is the arbiter of its
application. The rule of law which this
and other courts have uniformly fol-
lowed is that the lessor must establish
the fact that additional development in
all reasonable probability will result in
profit to the lessee, over and above the
costs of the development.

This construction avoids an antinomy
between principles of equity and rules
of law, for our decisions disclose that
the principles of equity, and the rule of
Jaw, applicable to cancellation of oil
and gas leases, as to the undeveloped
portion thereof, are coexistent and run
parallel.

We cannot agree with defendants’
contention that such interpretation will
result in an inequitable disposition of
the case; nor will we indulge in the
presumption that the equitable power
of the trial court may be improperly
exercised. A court of equity does not
have unbridled authority under the
guise of justice and equity to substitute
its judgment in opposition to the law.
Equity follows the law.

In York v. Trigg, 87 Okla. 214, 209
P, 417, we said:

“No court is ever justified in invok-
ing the maxim of equity for the pur-
pose of destroying legal rights or of es-
tablishing rights that do not exist.”

Nor do we agree with a contention
made that this disposition of the case
permits the trial judge to decide for
himself what he thinks is just and equit-
able, uncontrolled and unrestricted by
any norm, standard or yardstick.

As we have attempted to point out,
the measuring rod is the rule of law
which guides the chancellor’ to a just
and equitable solution.

The decree commands lessee to com-
mence a well on a 10-acre tract and
within 30 days after its completion
commence a second well on a 10-acre
tract, and upon its completion, and

within 30 days, drill a well on the third
10-acre tract.

It then provides that if lessee does
not drill on the first tract, as com-
manded, the lease is canceled on the
entire 30 acres. If, however, he drills
the first tract, and fails to drill on
second tract, the remaining 20 acres
are canceled; if he drills on the second
tract and fails to drill on the third
tract the remaining 10 acres is can-
celed.

This decree is unreasonable, in-
equitable and unjust. It does not take
into consideration whether the drilling
of any one of such wells comes in as a
dry hole, or whether it will reasonably
produce oil or gas in paying quantities,
Under the reasonable operator rule a
lessee has never been required to drill
additional wells, in the absence of a
showing the well would be profitable to
both lessor and lessee.

The decree also canceled the remain-
ing 40 acres of the east half of the 80-
acre tract, as of the date of the judg-
ment.

‘The same vice is imbedded in the de-
cree as it affects certain individual de-
fendants, having reserved assignable
rights under the lease as it affects the
east 40-acre tract.

The judgment of the trial court is
reversed,

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and CORN and WILLIAMS, JJ., con-
cur. BLACKBIRD, J., dissents.

GESCHWIND v. BRORSEN.
No, 35288. June 23, 1953.
258 P. 2d 619.

683

Al. T. Singletary, Perry, for plaintiff
in error.

L, E, Roseboom, Enid, for defendant
in error.

WILLIAMS, J. Parties are referred to
herein as in the trial court.

In 1949, defendant received a notice
from the Collector of Internal Rev-
enue to bring his financial records and
books to the post office at Perry, Okla-
homa, for an examination as to the
source and extent of his income for
certain years. Shortly thereafter, de-
fendant hired plaintiff, who is a li-
censed attorney and certified public
accountant specializing in tax matters,
to represent him and assist in straight-
ening out his tax troubles. The contract
of employment was partly oral and
partly written, but its terms, including
a rate of payment based upon hours of
work performed, were definitely proved
at the trial, and were not denied by de-
fendant.

Before hiring plaintiff, defendant had
retained another attorney, who was not
a tax specialist. This attorney worked
on the case for some time; when it
became apparent to him that the fi-
nancial affairs of defendant were in
such condition that much accounting
work would be required, he withdrew
from the case and recommended the
employment of plaintiff. As a part of
plaintiff’s contract of employment, de-
fendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff
the fee due the first attorney hired, and
plaintiff agreed to pay such sum to the
attorney. As a result of his agree-

684

ment, plaintiff was to be allowed to use
the information already compiled by
the first attorney. This fee is included
in the amount here sued for.

Defendant represented to plaintiff
that his financial affairs were simple
and that not much work would be re-
quired. However, as plaintiff got into
the work, which extended over a pe-
riod of several months, he found that
such was not the case; for instance, de-
fendant had told him that he had made
16 interest bearing loans during the
period in question; plaintiff’s investiga-
tions showed that there were 93 such
loans. Plaintiff testified that as more
and more tax liability was uncovered,
defendant became less co-operative, and
plaintiff's work was thereby made more
difficult. In order for him to complete
his work, plaintiff had secured several
continuances from the Collector; fin-
ally, as a condition of granting another
continuance, the Collector demanded
that plaintiff file a power of attorney
showing that he was in fact represent-
ing defendant. It was shown that such
an instrument was required to be filed
by U. S. Treasury Department regula-
tions.

In an effort to comply with the Col-
lector’s demand, plaintiff prepared such
power of attorney and asked defendant
to sign it, which he refused to do. Such
refusal constituted a breach of the con-
tract by defendant, making it impossible
for plaintiff to represent defendant be-
fore the Collector and carry to a final
conclusion the purpose of his employ-
ment. Two days thereafter, plaintiff re-
turned defendant’s bank statements,
records, etc., to him, and demanded
payment for work performed. When
such payment was refused, he filed this
action in the district court, seeking pay-
ment at the rate set out in the contract
of employment. Defendant prevailed in
the lower court, and plaintiff has duly
appealed.

At the trial, plaintiff introduced 13
exhibits consisting, for the most part,
of data sheets and work sheets prepared

by him in the course of his employ-
ment and investigations into defend-
ant’s financial transactions. These ex-
hibits include about 110 large sheets of
paper of the type generally used for
accounting work. They reflect an enor-
mous amount of work done by plaintiff,
the performing of which is not denied
by defendant.

Only one witness testified for defend-
ant; he was a tax specialist, attorney,
and accountant who testified as an ex-
pert. It had previously been shown that
after defendant breached the contract,
he hired another attorney to represent
him before the Collector; that such at-
torney determined defendant’s income
by computing the excess of bank de-
posits over withdrawals, and adding to
this the amount of interest earned by
the 93 loans above referred to. Of
course, this method did not take into
account other items of income pre-
viously uncovered by plaintiff herein.
On the basis of such computations, the
Collector assessed an additional tax lia~
bility of $3,000 against the defendant,
which was paid. The tax specialist who
testified for defendant said the value _
of such services was between $250 and
$300. However, on cross-examination,
he testified in part as follows:

“Q. If you had no records and you
were trying to determine a man’s tax
liability for three years, would you try
to compile a record of all of the checks
that he had issued during those three
years so that you could determine what
he spent his money for? A. That’s the
only way you could do that.

“Q. That’s the only way you could
do it, isn’t it? And if he had no records
of his deposits over a three year period,
would you try to compile a record of
those deposits from the best source ob-
tainable, the bank? A. That’s the only
place you could.

“Q. And after you have got those de-
posit slips, and where you found that
those deposit slips didn’t show the
source of the money, in order to make
an accurate tax return would you try
to make an investigation to find out

where the money came from? A. That
would be the procedure.”

The methods outlined in the questions
above were substantially the same as
those used by the plaintiff herein. This
witness also admitted that the payment
of the $3,000 did not necessarily mean
that defendant had paid all the tax he
owed, or that he would not have to
make further payments later.

At the conclusion of defendant’s evi-
dence, plaintiff demurred to the evi-
dence, which demurrer was overruled.
At the conclusion of all the evidence,
plaintiff moved for a directed verdict
in his favor, which motion was over-
ruled. The jury thereafter returned
a verdict for defendant, and judgment
was pronounced thereon,

One of the assignments of error made
by plaintiff is error of the court in fail-
ing to sustain plaintiff's motion for a
directed verdict in his favor. Since we
deem this proposition controlling, we
will not discuss herein the other errors
alleged.

From the above summary, it is ap-
parent that there was no conflict in the
evidence. Plaintiff proved that the con-
tract of employment was entered into;
that he performed his duty under the
contract with defendant’s knowledge;
and that defendant, by his lack of co-
operation and refusal to execute the
power of attorney, made it impossible
for him to continue in the employment.
There was absolutely no evidence pro-
duced by the defendant in contradiction
or denial of these facts.

The principal argument advanced
by defendant that does not go generally
to the sufficiency of the evidence is to
the effect that plaintiff “rescinded with-
out restoration”. In support thereof, he
quotes 15 O.S. 1951 §235, which pro-
vides in substance that one who elects
to rescind a contract must restore to
the other party everything of value that
he has received from such other party
under the contract. As we have hereto-
fore shown, the contract was breached

685

by defendant, not rescinded by plain-
tiff, and the argument is therefore inap-
plicable. Further, the record shows that
plaintiff did restore to defendant all of
the bank statements, records, etc., that
defendant had given to him. Defendant
now contends that plaintiff should have
“restored” to defendant the data sheets,
work sheets, etc., which plaintiff pre-
pared in the course of his work for de-
fendant. It is obvious that plaintiff
could not have “restored” to defend-
ant something that the defendant never
had in the first place. The work sheets
were prepared by plaintiff and repre-
sented the result of many hours of
work. They were his personal proper-
ty. He was under no obligation to part
with them until he had been paid there-
for.

Defendant also argues that plaintiff
“stipulated himself out of a quantum
meruit recovery by requesting the
court to instruct the jury” that plain-
tiff was entitled to the entire amount
sued for or nothing. The stipulation
referred to is as follows:

“Tt is stipulated by counsel for plain-
tiff and defendant that the Court may
instruct the Jury that plaintiff is en-
titled to collect the entire amount sued
for, or nothing.”

As is evident, this stipulation, which
was entered into after denial of plain-
tiff’s motion for directed verdict, mere-
ly amounted to an agreement between
the parties as to what might be includ-
ed in an instruction to the jury. It
was not an agreement that plaintiff
should collect “all or nothing”. Since
the trial court was under the positive
duty to instruct the jury, if at all, as
to all of the law applicable to the case
at hand, it is elementary that such
stipulation was not binding upon him.

No complaint was made by either
party as to the measure of damages

embodied in the court’s instructions.

It is not alleged, and the record does
not show, that the evidence of plain-
tiff is unreasonable or improbable, or
is contrary to other facts in evidence

686

Under the circumstances shown to
exist in this case, the following rule
of law is applicable:

“Where the evidence introduced by
the plaintiffs makes out the plaintiffs’
ease, and the defendant introduces no
evidence to rebut it, the court should
instruct a verdict for plaintiffs.” Moore
¥ Deigh-Head & Co., 48 Okla. 228, 149

. 1129.

See, also, State v. Strange, 202 Okla.
11, 209 P. 2d 691, wherein this court
said, at page 17 of the Oklahoma Re-
ports:

“We have many times held that where
the evidence offered by a plaintiff to
sustain his case is undisputed, and is
not unreasonable or improbable, or
contrary to facts and circumstances
shown in the record, it is the duty of the
trial court to direct a verdict in his
favor.”

The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed, with directions to enter judg-
ment for plaintiff.

HALLEY, C. J., JOHNSON, V. C. J.,
and WELCH, CORN, O’NEAL, and
BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur. DAVISON,
J., dissents.

P|
BEATTY et al. v. BAXTER et al.
No. 35109. May 19, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1953.
258 P. 2d 626.

Peyton E. Brown, Blackwell, for

plaintiffs in error.

Bruce Potter, Blackwell, Felix Du-
vall, Ponca City, and Ross & Ross,
Newkirk, for defendants in error.

DAVISON, J. This is a suit of equit-
able cognizance, wherein the owners
of the reversionary interest, J. B. Beat-
ty and Zella E, Beatty, as plaintiffs,
seek, as against F. H. Baxter and some
ten others, as defendants, to have the
court adjudge that the determinable es-
tates in the minerals underlying an 80-
acre tract of land in Kay county, Okla-
homa, owned by the defendants, had
terminated and expired. The parties
will be referred to as they appeared in
the trial court, being the same as their
appearance here.

At the time of his death in 1925,
James S, Hubbard was the owner of a
quarter section of land (160 acres). The
parties here, both plaintiff and defend-
ant, are his children or their grantees.
The said Hubbard had, theretofore, and
in 1921, executed an oil and gas lease
on the premises for a primary term of
five years or as long as oil and gas

was produced, the same being owned
at the time this suit was filed by Con-
tinental Oil Company. Other convey-
ances relative to the minerals executed
by the said Hubbard have expired or
have been terminated and need not be
considered. At his death, he left a will,
by the terms of which he devised to one
of his sons, Charles S. Hubbard, the
south half or 80 acres of the quarter
section. To another son, Fred B. Hub-
bard, was devised the north half or 80
acres, being the lands involved herein.
Threatened contests of the validity of
the will developed.

In settlement thereof and to avoid any
contest, the said Fred B. Hubbard, in
February, 1925, conveyed to each of
his brothers and sisters an undivided
mineral estate in the 80 acres which
had been devised to him. The plaintiffs
~herein are the owners of the estate he
retained. The defendants are the own-
ers of the estates conveyed. Plaintiffs
contend that the conveyed estates have
terminated. Defendants contend that
they have not. The trial court made
written findings of fact and conclusions
of law and, founded thereon, rendered
judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs
have perfected this appeal.

Except for two, the conveyances by
Fred B. Hubbard, which constitute the
foundation of this lawsuit, were identi-
cal in that the habendum clause in
each provided as follows:

“To Have and to Hold, All the afore-
granted estate, property and ease-
ments, together with all and singular
the rights, privileges and hereditaments
thereunder belonging or appertaining,
unto the said heirs, successors and as-
signs, for a period of Twenty (20) years
and_as long thereafter as oil or gas is
produced from said premises.”

The other two conveyances had the
phrase “or development had thereon”
added.

From 1924 on, numerous wells were
drilled on both the north 80 acres and
on the south 80 acres. Most of them
produced oil for a number of years and

687

then were plugged and abandoned. By
December, 1945, only one well remained.
on the north 80 which was being
pumped and was producing oil. At that
time, December, 1945, the lessee
stopped pumping oil from that well,
known as No. 3. In 1947, another well,
known as No. 7, was drilled on the
north 80 acres. It was completed and
started producing oil in September of
that year. It was some 700 to 800 feet
deeper than was No. 3. A few months
later, and in the early part of 1948, well
No. 3 was deepened and again began
producing oil. The trial court found:

“that production was never aban-
doned as to the north half of said 160
acres, but that said lessee only tem-
porarily ceased production in order to
rehabilitate the well, but that said re-
habilitation of the well was delayed be-
cause of the war conditions then exist-
ing. That during said temporary cessa-
tion of production the plaintiff did not
assert any rights or claim to said prop-
erty or lease contrary to the defend-
ants’ interests. That his present claim
is being made after production had be-
gun after such cessation.”

The quoted finding of fact sustained
the contention of the defendants and
rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the
cessation of production from the 80
acres here involved terminated the es-
tates of the defendants, under the
above-quoted provisions of the haben-
dum clauses in the conveyances from
Fred B. Hubbard. During the approx-
imate 21 months that oil was not be-
ing taken from the north 80 acres, it
was being produced from the south 80
acres so that no question of the termi-
nation of the lease is here involved or
suggested. The district superintendent
of the lessee testified that the casing
was never removed from well No. 3;
that it was never abandoned; that if it
had been the casing would have been re-
moved. At the time of the trial, after
being deepened, it was producing 15
to 18 barrels of oil per day; that during
that time the war was in progress
and oil field equipment was very
scarce; that, under those circum-

688

stances, the fact that the casing was
left in the well indicated that there
was no intention of abandoning it.

Whether or not a contract, which is
effective “as long * * * as oil or gas
is produced,” has expired depends
upon the surrounding facts in each
case. Plaintiffs cite and rely upon a
number of decisions of this court deal-
ing with the interpretation of the quot-
ed phrase, .but all of them are those
wherein the phrase was a provision in
an oil and gas lease. No case has been
cited wherein the phrase was a provi-
sion in a mineral or royalty deed. Nor
do we find one upon independent in-
vestigation. The cited cases constitute
little authority which is applicable to
the case at bar. An oil and gas lease
is governed by different rules of con-
struction from those applicable to other
contracts, being construed most strong-
ly against the lessee and in favor of
the lessor. The reason therefor springs
from the danger of loss of oil and gas
by drainage. Superior Oil & Gas Co.
v. Mehlin, 25 Okla. 809, 108 P. 545;
Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas & Oil
Co., 29 Okla. 719, 119 P. 260; Gil-
lespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 260 Ill. 169, 102
N. E. 1043.

“Ordinarily oil and gas leases are
executed for the purpose of exploring
and operating for oil and gas, and
when its terms will permit it, under
the rules of law, such lease will be
construed so as to promote develop-
ment and prevent delay and unproduc-
tiveness.” New State Oil & Gas Co. v.
Dunn, 75 Okla. 141, 182 P. 514.

The defendants herein being grantees
of royalty interests stand in a mate-
rially different position from that: of
lessees. Not only is there no duty upon
them to effect production, but their
right to do so is doubtful. That duty
rests upon the lessee and upon the suc-
cess of the lessee’s action in obtaining

and maintaining production depends the
extent of the term of the defendants’
estates. But, under either rule of con-
struction, as was said in the case of
Prowant v. Sealy, 77 Okla. 244, 187 P.
235:

“The findings of the trial court in
an equitable action should be sustained
unless it appears that they are clearly
against the weight of the evidence. ***”

The trial court found that production
from the well on the land involved was
only temporarily halted for rehabilita-
tion of the well thereon and that such
rehabilitation was delayed because of
war conditions then existing. The tes-
timony, in addition to establishing the
facts hereinabove outlined, further
showed that at that time machinery
and materials were difficult to obtain
and many oil companies were tempo-
rarily ceasing small production and
trying to find bigger production to
satisfy the war effort. The testimony
further showed that casing was very
scarce and, if the stoppage of produc-
tion had not been only temporary, the
casing would have been pulled from the
well and used elsewhere. In addition,
the well had been rehabilitated and was
producing oil at the time of the trial.
Under such circumstances, the finding
and judgment of the trial court was not
against the clear weight of the evidence.
Being so, this court will not reverse it
on appeal.

Other propositions are presented but
due to the conclusion reached on the
point discussed it becomes unnecessary
to determine them.

The judgment is affirmed.

JOHNSON, V.C.J., and WELCH,
CORN, and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
HALLEY, C.J., and ARNOLD, O’NEAL,
and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent.

2
ey
oS

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE
RY. CO, v. HICKS.

No. 35628. June 23, 1953.
258 P. 2d 672.

Rainey, Flynn, Green & Anderson,
Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Rittenhouse, Hanson & Green, Okla-
homa City, for defendant in error.

O’NEAL, J. The parties will here
after be referred to as they appeared
in the lower court.

This action is founded upon the pro-
visions of the Federal Employers’ Lia~
bility Act, 45 U.S.C.A,, §51 et seq.

Upon the motion of the plaintiff be-
low, the trial court instructed the jury
that plaintiff had established liability
of the defendant, thus leaving solely
to’ the jury the question of whether the
proof submitted established defendant’s
plea of contributory negligence; and the
further question as to the amount of’
plaintiff’s recovery.

690

The jury returned its verdict in favor
of the plaintiff upon which judgment
was rendered. The appeal is from ‘the

court’s order denying defendant a new
trial.

Plaintiff's amended petition substan-
tially alleged that plaintiff, on Decem-
ber 22, 1950, was an employee of the
defendant, Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway Company, a corporation,
and was engaged in work in the further-
ance of interstate commerce. That on
said date plaintiff was riding in a
steam engine on defendant’s railway
track in Purcell, Oklahoma, when a
Diesel engine operated by the defend-
ant collided with the engine in which
plaintiff was riding, causing plaintiff to
be injured. Plaintiff pleaded the rules
of the defendant corporation with ref-
erence to movement of trains and en-
gines, which rules in part, provide:

“* * * trains or engines using other
than main track must proceed prepared
to stop short of train, obstruction or
switch not properly lined * * * In case
or doubt or uncertainty, the safe course
must be taken * * *.”

“Firemen must assist in keeping a
constant lookout and must instantly
give the engineman notice of any ob-
struction or signal they may perceive.”

That one Yost, engineman on the
Diesel engine, negligently violated the
rules, in that although he could not see
the steam engine occupied by plaintiff,
he failed to reduce the speed of the
Diesel engine, and failed to maintain
proper lookout for signals given him by
his fireman helper, one “Smilie”, and
thereby was unable to stop short of ob-
Structions on his course or to stop it
short of a switch which was not prop-
erly aligned for his passage. That one
Smilie, fireman on the Diesel engine
driven by Yost, negligently violated said
rules in failing to keep a lookout for
obstructions under the engine’s course;
and failed to give instant warning to
Yost of the proximity of plaintiff's
steam engine or of the alignment
and position of the switch point over

which the steam engine was about to
pass; that Yost negligently operated
the Diesel engine at the time and place
at a speed of 15 miles per hour; and
failed to keep a reasonable and proper
lookout so that signals, if any, given by
Smilie might be seen and understood
and so that right of way might have
been given to the plaintiff's steam en-
gine; that if Smilie gave Yost a signal
requiring reduction in speed of the Die-
sel engine, or stopping it, that Yost neg-
ligently failed to see or negligently fail-
ed to heed such signal; that the switch
point over which the steam engine
moved, when the Diesel engine collided
with it, was aligned for it and the col-
ored signal gave warning to Yost and
Smilie that plaintiff's steam engine had
pre-empted the tracks, but that said
Yost negligently failed to yield the
right of way to plaintiff's engine.

Plaintiff avers that the accident re-
sulted from the fault of the defendant
which directly and proximately resulted
from the accident and injuries com-
plained of.

To the amended petition defendant
filed its amended answer denying the
material allegations of the petition and
for affirmative defense it alleged that
the accident complained of was due
solely to the negligence on the part of
the plaintiff Hicks, as follows:

(a) That it was the duty of the plain-
tiff as fireman on the steam engine at
the time and place of the accident to
keep a lookout for other engines upon
the tracks and to warn his engineer
in time to allow him to stop and avoid
a collision; that plaintiff failed in these
duties and that his negligence to keep a
proper lookout and to warn his engi-
neer was the sole and proximate cause
of the accident.

(b) That the plaintiff knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have
known, that the plaintiff’s engineer
could not see the Diesel engine ap-
proaching and that plaintiff knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care

should have known, that plaintiff's en-
gineer depended upon plaintiff to keep
a lookout and warn him of the ap-
proaching Diesel engine in time to slow
down or come to a stop to avoid the
collision; that plaintiff failed to give
such warning, and that his negligence
in failing so to do was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident.

(ec) That although plaintiff had an
unobstructed view of the track for sev-
eral hundred feet upon which the Diesel
engine was approaching, he failed and
neglected to warn the engineer of the
steam engine upon which plaintiff was
riding of the approach of the Diesel en-
gine until it was too late for his en-
gineer to apply the brakes and to avoid
the collision; that his negligence in fail-
ing to warn his engineer until it was
too late to avoid the collision was the
sole and proximate cause of the acci-
dent.

(d) That the negligent acts of plain-
tiff and the negligent failure to perform
his duties as fireman, contributed to
the accident, and that such acts of neg-
ligence and contributory negligence re-
sulted in plaintiff’s injuries.

In determining whether there is suf-
ficient evidence of probative force to
establish a case under the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act, we measure it by
the common-law concept of negligence.
The substantive limitations upon the
common-law negligence actions, as for
instance those pertaining to assump-
tion of risk and negligent fellow serv-
ants, must be enforced by the state
court irrespective of the local law. The
Federal Act does not, however, relieve
the plaintiff from the burden of estab-
lishing that the defendant was negli-
gent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause in whole or in part of
the accident complained of. The defense
of contributory negligence, if estab-
lished, does not defeat the plaintiff's re-
covery, but the damages shall be di-
minished by the jury in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable
to the plaintiff. We are therefore con-

691

fronted with the duty of determining
whether the proof warrants a finding of
fault and casualty sufficient to sustain
the court’s peremptory instruction to
the jury that plaintiff established lia-
bility, or whether the evidence estab-
lished facts of probative force warrant-
ing their submission to the jury as ques-
tions of controversial facts.

The other question raised is whether
the instructions given adequately sub-
mitted the issues that were supported
by proof to the jury.

A summation of the facts are these:
Mr. Hicks had worked as a fireman for
the Rock Island Railroad Company in
1948. In September, 1950, he was em-
ployed as a fireman by the Santa Fe
Railway Company, working in the yards
at Purcell, Oklahoma. On December
22, 1950, a steam engine which was
headed north was backing south upon
a track leading to the roundhouse;
Hicks was sitting on the left side of the
cab on the fireman’s seat box facing,
when he turned his head, in the direc-
tion in which the engine was moving.
The engine as it neared the switch
was moving about five miles per hour.
At or near the switch point on the
west of the track a light indicated that
the switch was aligned for the steam
engine. Hicks first observed the Diesel
engine as it aproached the curve on
the west track indicated in the Exhibits
1 and 2 of the record. As the Diesel
engine came into Hicks’ view from be-
hind several gondola cars, the rear end
of the Diesel was 150 feet from the
switch point; and the rear end of the
steam engine was approximately even
with the switch points. In this situation
Hicks’ engineer asked him if the switch
was aligned for the steam engine and
Hicks advised his engineer that it was.
When Hicks determined that the Die-
sel was not going to stop he told his en-
gineer to “hold it.” To “hold it” meant
to stop it. At this moment he thought
the Diesel engine was 40 feet from his
track. Immediately before Hicks gave
the “hold it” command, he observed

692

Smilie, the helper on the Diesel engine,
drop off of the Diesel and give the Die-
sel engineer a stop signal. The signal
was not observed or was unheeded and
the Diesel hit the steam engine about
two feet back on the tank from the front
of the tender located directly behind
the cab of the engine. Hicks testified
that he had operated both Diesel and
steam engines and could form an opin-
ion of their speeds; that when he first
saw the Diesel 200 feet away, up to the
time it was within 40 feet of the steam
engine, the Diesel was traveling at the
rate of 15 miles per hour; that he first
formed an opinion that the Diesel
would not stop when it had reached a
point 40 feet away at which time he
told his engineer to “hold it.”

After the collision Hicks was taken
to a hospital in Purcell, by the fore-
man or superintendent of the switch
yards. He, apparently, had suffered
some facial cuts and a bump upon his
head. The company’s physician sewed
up the cuts and gave Mr. Hicks first aid
treatment. A week after the accident
Hicks returned to work at his former
job. He worked until January 31, 1951,
for the Santa Fe Railway Company,
then resigned his job and went to
work for the Rock Island Railway
Company during February and March,
in the capacity of a fireman. He then
quit working as he felt he could no
longer perform his duties because of
physical impairment occasioned by the
accident.

In support of his physical impairment
several physicians testified at length
with reference to Mr. Hicks’ injuries
and his physical condition, and the med-
ical treatment they prescribed for him.
On direct examination Mr. Hicks stated
that he did not know what happened
to his engine after the accident; that
he didn’t remember what happened to
him between the time of the collision
and the time he was taken to the hos-
pital because he was unconscious.

On cross- examination he stated that
Bill Pugh, the defendant’s foreman,

took him to the hospital and as he got
into Pugh’s truck he asked Pugh about
the cut on his lip. The proof supports
Mr. Hicks’ statement that his engineer
was sitting on the east side of the en-
gine cab, and that his engineer could not
see the west track or the Diesel en-
gine as it advanced, and, therefore,
that his engineer had to depend wholly
upon him to keep a proper lookout
for obstructions on the track. With ref-
erence to the gondola cars it appears
that they were stationed upon a track
east of the track upon which the Diesel
was approaching, and may have par-
tially obstructed Hicks’ view up to the
time the Diesel reached the curve on the
track indicated by plaintiff's Exhibits
1 and 2 in the record.

On December 28, 1950, a few days
after the accident, a claim adjuster
for the defendant company obtained a
statement from Mr. Hicks in which he
stated that when he first saw the Diesel
engine on the curve it was 50 to 100 feet
away; that the hostler helper on the
Diesel got off and gave a stop sign to
the hostler at a time when the Diesel
was far enough away to stop had the
hostler acted on the signal. An addition-
al portion of the written statement
reads:

“I did not say anything to my en-
gineer at the time as I did not want
him to stop right then as the other en-
gine would have hit in the engine right
at the cab where I was riding, but I
did holler and he grabbed the brake
valve. In the accident, I received a cut
upper lip requiring 12 stitches, bump on
forehead, bruised right collar bone and
right side bruised just above pelvic
bone. I was attended by Dr. Bill Mc-
Curdy at Purcell, Okla. and if he re-
leases me, I will return to work Satur-
day, Dec. 30, 1950.”

On January 18, 1951, Mr. Hicks pre-
pared and filed a written report of the
accident. That report discloses that he
was asked whether the accident re-
sulted from any defect in the track or
any carelessness on the part of the
company or anyone in the company’s

employ tending to cause the accident,
to which he responded:

“A. It lays between the Hostler and
Hostler Helper or both. I did see a stop
sign given which was good enough for
me as we work on signals and signals
only.”

With reference to his injuries, he
stated: “Cut on upper lip into nose,
bad bruise right side.”

This resume of plaintiff's evidence
presents the proof submitted save the
medical testimony.

Counsel for the plaintiff at the close
of the case dictated into the record the
following motion:

“The plaintiff rests and at this time
moves the Court to direct the jury to
return a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff on the issue of liability and to sub-
mit to the jury only the question of
damages. The motion is made upon the
grounds it appears conclusively from
the evidence that this accident and the
resulting injury to plaintiff was the re-
sult of negligence of the defendant.”

In commenting upon plaintiffs mo-
tion, the trial judge stated:

“TI don’t believe I can go that far
with you. I don’t think you have made
any proof-on this sole proximate cause
idea but I think you have here the ques-
tion of what contributed. He has two
defenses, one based on whether it was
the sole proximate cause of injury, and
that part of it, on the basis of the evi-
dence as its stands now, the Court will
sustain a demurrer to that part of his
answer, whatever it amounts to, be-
cause that is an affirmative defense
there, but as far as the contributory
negligence is concerned, on the basis
of his own testimony, I feel that will
have to be left to the jury because that
was brought in on the basis of his own
testimony.”

An analysis of the statement discloses
that the trial judge did not think the
motion should be sustained because
plaintiff failed to establish proximate
cause. In the last portion of that state-
ment the judge stated that insofar as
the defense of contributory negligence

693

is concerned, it must be submitted to
the jury, because plaintiff’s own testi-
mony established his contributory negli-
gence. A reasonable interpretation of
the judge’s statement indicates he held
to the opinion that plaintiff’s proof did
not make out a case of fault and causa-
tion, and, therefore, plaintiff had not
sustained the burden of proof required
to make out liability. A further infer-
ence is that the judge was of the opin-
ion that plaintiffs own version of the
facts indicated plaintiff himself was
guilty of contributory negligence. The
court, however, in instruction No. 4,
told the jury that as to the question of
liability, their verdict must be for the
plaintiff. We find it dififcult to under-
stand these incongruous views of the
case,

To sustain the directed verdict on the
question of liability, plaintiff here as-
serts that the trial court may direct a
verdict for or against either party. It
is not necessary to belabor the point,
as under the Act this court and the
Supreme Court of the United States,
in its last analysis of a case under
the Act, is the sole arbiter as to whether
the plaintiff has or has not made out a
submissible case as to negligence and
as to causation.

This court has frequently held that
where from the facts shown by the
evidence, although undisputed, reason-
able men might draw different conclu-
sions respecting the question of negli-
gence, such question is properly for the
jury. Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla.
147, 198 P. 851.

The converse of this principle of law
comes into play where disputed facts
fail to establish primary negligence.
The court then may either sustain a de-
murrer to plaintiff's evidence, or, in the
alternative, grant a peremptory instruc-
tion, Hanson, Ex’x, v. Atchison, T. & S
F. Ry. Co., 184 Okla. 480, 88 P. 24
348.

Plaintiff cites numerous cases which
hold that where the evidence is undis-
puted an instructed verdict may be

694

given. An examination of the cases
discloses they are not applicable in a
situation where there is conflicting evi-
dence, upon the pivotal question of fault
and whether the casualty is established;
neither do we think plaintiff's sugges-
tion tenable that the case of Bailey,
Administratrix, v. Central Vermont
Railway, Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 87 L. Ed.
1444, is an authority in support of the
directed verdict in the instant case. The
Bailey case simply holds that to deprive
a railroad worker of the benefit of a
jury trial in close or doubtful cases is to
take away a goodly portion of the relief
which Congress has afforded them. The
teaching of that decision as we see it is
to leave to the jury for its consideration
cases where the facts, although of a
doubtful character, might warrant the
approval by the court of the verdict ren-
dered. Neither can we subscribe to the
suggestion that in all reasonable prob-
ability another jury might find that
plaintiff made out a case of negligence
and proximate cause. Disposing of a
like contention, the court in Henwood
v. Coburn, 165 F. 2d 418, said:

“That may be so, but the fact is of no
relevance here. It is not the function
of an appellate court to dispose of er-
rors in trial process on the basis of
what it thinks a jury will do on an-
other trial.”

As the standard of liability is negli-
gence, the question is what a reason-
able and prudent person would have
done under the circumstances. Wil-
kerson v. McCarthy, Trustees, 336 U.S.
53, 61.

Where there is a debatable issue on
which fair-minded men might differ, it
becomes a question for the jury. Bailey
v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc., 319
U.S. 350, 353.

We find in the proof sufficient facts
and circumstances raising debatable
questions on, whether primary negli-
gence was established. We cannot say
that the proof was such that all rea-
sonable men might not come to oppo-
site conclusions.

As the narrative statement shows,
plaintiff made a written report of the
accident under date of January 28, 1950,
in which he stated that he “saw this
engine coming as it was on curve some
50 to 100 feet before it got to us.” In
direct examination he stated that when
he first saw the Diesel it was approach-
ing the curve on the west track. He then
stated that when the Diesel came
from behind the gondola cars the rear
end was approximately 150 feet from
the switch points or where the two
tracks intersect. He did not, however,
at that time give his engineer any
warning. He stated:

“I did not say anything to my en-
gineer at the time as I did not want
him to stop right then as the other en-
gine would have hit in the engine right
at the cab where I was riding.”

As we have shown, supra, both by
the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s plead-
ings, as well as the proof submitted,
it was the plaintiff’s duty to keep a con-
stant lookout and instantly give his en-
gineer notice of any obstruction or sig-
nal he might perceive.

In Henwood vy. Coburn, supra, the
court said:

“* * * the domain of the jury in cir-
cumstantial cases under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act may not be
narrowly bounded, and the settling of
any question of negligence or proximate
cause, where more than one rational
possibility is involved on the eviden-
tiary facts, is exclusively within its
field.”

The teaching of the decisions of the
Supreme Court are to the effect that
the Act does not make the employer
the insurer of the safety of his em-
ployees while they are on duty. The
basis of the employer’s liability is his
negligence—not the fact that injuries
occur. The choice of conflicting ver-
sions of the way the accident happened,
the decision as to which witness was
telling the truth, the inferences to be
drawn from uncontroverted as well as
controverted facts, are questions for the

jury. Ellis v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co., 329 U.S. 649.

That in order to recover under the
Act, it was incumbent upon the plain-
tiff to prove that defendant was negli-
gent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause in whole or in part of
the accident, Tennant v. Peoria & P. U.
Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29; Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67.

However, the court is not free to re-
weigh the evidence and set aside the
jury verdict merely because the jury
could have drawn different inferences
or conclusions, or because the court
regards another result as more reason-
able. Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry.
Co., supra.

If the appellate court entertains the
view that the trial court erred in hold-
ing that there was not sufficient proof
to support the charge that defendant’s
negligence was the proximate cause of
the accident and injury, it may reverse
the case, The fact that fair-minded men
might likewise reach different conclu-
sions on the question of negligence em-
phasizes the appropriateness of leav-
ing the question to the jury. Ellis v. Un-
ion Pacific R. Co., 329 U.S. 649; Coray
Ancillary Administrator v. Southern
Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520, 523; Carter v.
Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railway Co.,
338 U.S, 430, 433.

‘We need not elaborately consider de-
fendant’s contention that the court’s in-
struction No. 2 was erroneous. That in-
struction reads:

«* * ® For further defense, defendant
alleges that because of the negligent
acts and failure as above set forth,
plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, and that except for such acts
of negligence and contributory negli-
gence upon the part of plaintiff, the ac-
cident and resulting injuries, if any, to
plaintiff would not have occurred.”

There were no acts of contributory
negligence previously set forth as the
preceding instruction No. 1 simply out-
lined the various grounds contained in
plaintiff's amended petition upon which

695

he based his cause of action. The de-
fendant’s amended answer to which we
have referred, supra, alleged the spe-
cifie grounds upon which defendant re-
lies upon its plea of contributory neg~
ligence. Clearly, defendant was not re-
lying upon plaintiff’s petition to sup-
port its plea and defense of contribu~
tory negligence. It is the duty of the
trial court to correctly instruct the jury
on contributory negligence as those
facts are pleaded and as supported by
reasonable proof. Roadway Express,
Inc., v. Baty, 189 Okla. 180, 114 P. 2d
935; Van Antwerp v. Tuller, 202 Okla.
366, 214 P. 2d 237.

We are of the view, and so hold, that
the trial court erred in refusing to sub-
mit the controverted issues of negli-
gence and proximate cause to the jury.
We find substantial error in the court’s
instruction No, 2; therefore, the case
is reversed, with instructions to grant
defendant a new trial.

HALLEY, C.J., JOHNSON, V.C.J.,
and DAVISON and WILLIAMS, JJ.,
concur. WELCH, CORN, and BLACK-
BIRD, JJ., dissent.

Application of LITTLE NICK OIL CO.
Nos. 35392, 35437. June 23, 1953.
258 P. 2d 1184.

696

L. A. Thompson and W. W. Heard,
Tulsa, and Norton Standeven and Barth
P. Walker, Oklahoma City, for appel-
lant Stanolind Oil & Gas Company.

Floyd Green, Conservation Atty., and
Ferrill H. Rogers, Asst. Conservation
Atty., for appellee Corporation Com-
mission.

BLACKBIRD, J. On September 26,
1946, one John Cleary obtained a five-
year oil and gas lease from Lewis O.
Tendall, the landowner, covering an
undeveloped 40 acres of land described

as the southwest quarter of the north-
west quarter of section 22, township 5
north, range 8 west, located in the area
commonly known as the Chickasha Gas
Field, of Grady county, Oklahoma. The
lease is in the ordinary ‘“Producer’s
88” form, except that it contains a pro-
vision allowing the lessee to “pool or
combine” the leased premises, or any
portion thereof, with contiguous land
when in “lessee’s judgment it is nec-
essary or advisable to do so in order
to properly develop and operate said
lease(d) premises so as to promote the
conservation of oil, gas or other min-
erals in and under and that may be
produced from said premises...” This
provision also provided that in the event
the lessee desired to exercise this op-
tion to “pool or combine” the lease
with such other leaseholds, he should
make it known by recording “an in-
strument” in the county’s conveyance
records identifying and describing the
pooled acreage. It also provided:

“If production is found on the pooled
acreage it shall be treated as if pro-
duction is had from this lease, whether
the well or wells be located on the
premises covered by this lease, or not.”
(Emphasis ours.)

Thereafter, on October 7, 1946, Mr.
Cleary assigned the lease to Stanolind
Oil & Gas Company, hereinafter re-
ferred to merely as “Stanolind.” The
tract covered thereby is contiguous to
a leasehold that is combined with oth-
er leases in what is known as the “Tide
Water Unit.” Gas production from
this unit comes out of two wells, one
of which is called the “Tide Water
Associated Oil Company Tendall No. 2
Well” or merely “Tendall No. 2 Well.”
The gas production in the field comes
from three sands or zones at different
depths known as the “Glover,” “the
“Pooler-Mona”, or just Pooler, and
the ‘“‘Charlson” or “Lower Charlson.”
The production from the wells in the
field drilled to its common pools, res-
ervoirs, or sources of supply in these
sands, has for some time in the past
been regulated by orders of the State

Corporation Commission, usually here-
inafter referred to merely as the “Com-
mission.”

The size and shape of these pools or
the surface area overlying them has
been variously defined, and marked
out or outlined on surface maps from
time to time on the basis of drilling
and geological data obtained as explo-
rations in the field have spread and
progressed. Such information and data
has been introduced as evidence in ap-
propriate hearings held before the Cor-
poration Commission. When new dis-
coveries have proved the underground
boundaries or limits and physical char-
acteristics of these pools to be different
than earlier indicated, the Commission
has revised, adjusted or superseded its
previous orders to conform to such
proof, and its production-regulatory
orders have been amended according~
ly, with the announced purpose of con-
serving the gas in, and protecting the
correlative rights of, all parties own-
ing such mineral interests in land over-
lying the pools. In accord with this
general plan or purpose and its said
orders, the Commission, through its
Conservation Director, has each month
assigned maximum allowable produc-
tion quctas to the different wells in the
field. The Tendall No, 2 well, like the
other wells, has had a definite maxi-
mum allowable each month. An im-
portant factor taken into consideration
in computing these so-called production
“allowables” has, of course, been the
market demand for the gas from the
field.

There has never been a producing
well drilled to either of the above-
named gas sands on the 40-acre tract
covered by Stanolind’s lease, which we
will hereinafter usually refer to merely
as the Tendall lease or acreage. To-
ward the end of said lease’s term,
Stanolind decided to exercise the above-
described option contained in its said
lease, to combine said leasehold with
some other leaseholds and thus make
it a part of a unit. For this purpose,

697

said company contacted the lessees in
the adjoining Tide Water Unit, and af-
ter negotiations extending over a con-
siderable period, succeeding in obtain-
ing their execution of a contract called
“Operating Agreement,” in which said
lessees gave their consent to the in-
clusion of the Tendali tract in said
Unit and agreed with Stanolind to var-
ious provisions, therein set forth, re-
garding said leasehold’s participation
in said Unit. This contract was based
upon a stipulation and agreement
among the parties, themselves, as to
how many acres of the 40 overlay the
three different gas producing zones.
It was estimated and agreed that said
40 acres probably contained the follow~
ing respective acreages overlying and
potentially productive from the three
zones, as follows: Glover, 27.5 acres;
Lower Charlson, 31 acres; and Pooler,
20 acres, On this basis, agreement was
also reached as to the proportion of
the proceeds of production and operat-
ing expenses of the Unit, as a whole,
that Stanolind would participate in.
This agreement was not finally reduced
to writing until August 31, 1951 (only
26 days before Stanolind’s lease was to
expire); and the Tide Water Unit’s op-
erator, Oklahoma Natural Gas Com-
pany, before it would sign the agree-
ment, required Stanolind to supplement
said agreement, with a letter in which
it agreed to indemnify the lessees of
the Unit against loss, expense or dam-
ages in the event that it should be de-
termined by a subsequent court action
that such agreement was illegal or im-
proper.

Thereafter, before filing in the con-
veyance records of Grady county, any
instrument evidencing this “pooling”
arrangement, as provided in its lease,
Stanolind set out to make it officially
effective by getting the Corporation
Commission to increase the Tendall No.
2 Well’s allowable on the basis of the
additional so-called “productive acre-
age” that, in its above-described agree-
ment with said well’s operators, had
been settled upon as being within said

698

well’s sphere of drainage from the three
zones.

At that time, the drainage areas of
wells in the field, or the productive
acreage attributed to them, out of the
three gas sands or zones, were fixed
by certain previous orders of the Cor-
poration Commission, and subsequent
amendments thereto. The particular
order in effect on August 31, 1951, was
Order No. 20536, entered by the Com-
mission at a regular hearing in its
cause CD 1463, on October 30, 1947.
When said order was entered, and pur-
suant to its direction, the following
“productive acreages” in the three
sands or zones were attributed to the
Tendaill No. 2 Well, to wit: Lower Charl-
son—120 acres, Glover—131 acres,
Pooler—140 acres. Under said order,
the monthly allowables of the wells in
the field were computed by using a
formula prescribed therein. “Produc-
tive acreage” was one of the important
elements or factors in the formula, and
under its operation, a well’s allowable
would increase or decrease in direct
relation to an increase or decrease in
the “productive acreage” attributed to
it.

. Stanolind was obviously cognizant of
the effect of an increase in a well’s
“productive acreage” upon its month-
ly allowable, when it addressed a let-
ter, dated September 10, 1951, to Mr.
Walker T. Pound, Director of Conser-
vation for the Commission, referring
to the agreement it had obtained from
lessees in the Tide Water Unit for
allowing its Tendall lease to be com-
bined with or incorporated in that Unit.
In the letter, Stanolind inclosed the affi-
davit of one of its production superin-
tendents in which the productive acre-
age then officially attributed to the
Tendall No. 2 Well under the Commis-
sion’s order No, 20536, supra, was re-
ferred to, among other facts, and it
was represented that the Tendall lease
possessed the productive acreages of
31, 27.5 and 20 in the field’s three re~
spective gas producing zones (as above
shown to have been agreed to, stipu-

lated and set up in the “operating
agreement”). In said affidavit, it was
further represented that “pursuant” to
said agreement “and the terms of”
Stanolind’s lease, it “has unitized and
attributed such oil and gas lease unto
the .. . Tendall Well for the purposes
specified in” the operating agreement
and lease. This letter to the Conserva-
tion Director represented said inclosed
affidavit as “setting forth the facts
which are essential to your increasing
the gas allowable to the Tide Water
Associated Oil Company No. 2 Well...
in accordance with Order No. 20536,
heretofore issued by the Corporation
Commission.” On the basis of this let-
ter and said inclosure, Director Pound
then “attributed” to the Tide Water
Unit’s Tendall No. 2 Well, the “pro-
ductive acreages” that the Tendall
lease was said, in Stanolind’s affidavit,
to have, and increased said well’s al-
lowable and adjusted other wells’ pro-
portionate shares of the field’s total
allowed production, accordingly, incor-
porating such revisions in the schedule
of allowables promulgated for said
field for the month of September, 1951.

On September 27, 1951, Little Nick Oil
Company, on the theory that Stanolind’s
lease had expired of its own terms,
purchased a new lease on the 40 acres
in question, from Mr, Tendall, who
thereafter filed suit in the district court
of Grady county, presumably to quiet
his title against Stanolind’s lease, on
the same theory. While this suit was
pending, the Little Nick Oil Company
filed its application in the Corporation
Commission requesting vacation of the
allowables order made by or through
its Conservation Director attributing
said lease’s productive acreage to the
Tide Water Unit’s Tendall Well No. 2,
as above described. In said applica-
tion, it was charged, among other
things, that no true or lawful unitiza-
tion, as contemplated in Stanolind’s
lease, was in fact effected or created
by the operating agreement hereinbe-
fore described. It was pointed out that
said agreement was not signed by the

land or royalty owner, Lewis O. Ten-
dall, and that the agreement was not
even fully executed or acknowledged
by Carter Oil Company, one of the les-
sors in the Tide Water Unit, until Oc-
tober, the next month after Stanolind’s
lease had expired, and was made for
the sole and underlying purpose of per-
petuating Stanolind’s lease. It was
further charged that the purported “at-
tribution” to the Tendall No. 2 Well
of the purported “productive acreage”
within said leasehold, was a nullity and
without authorization either by law or
by previous order of the Corpora-
tion Commission. It was specifically
charged that the September gas allow-
able order, with said unlawful attribu-
tion as a basis, “issued by the Direc-
tor of Conservation,” was beyond his
power and authority (ultra vires) and
made without notice to, or the permis-
sion or consent of, Mr. Tendall or the
applicant oil company. It was also
charged that not all of the questioned
lease’s acreage, represented to be “pro-
ductive acreage” by Stanolind for the
purpose of obtaining the increase in the
Tide Water Unit’s allowable, was in
fact productive; and it was asserted
that acreage which is not actually pro-
ducing cannot be attributed to a pro-
ducing well without a formal applica-
tion to the Commission, notice to all
interested parties, a hearing, and proof
of the legality of the unitization of the
unit or units for which gas allowables
are sought. It was further alleged that
the Conservation Director’s order at-
tributing a part of the lease’s acreage
to the Tide Water Unit would deprive
said company of its right to produce
gas from the Tendall lease and have
the effect of depriving it of property
without due process of law.

After a hearing on the matter, the
Corporation Commission entered its
order No. 25290, in which it found that
the ownership of the lease was involved
in the suit pending in Grady county’s
district court, already mentioned here-
in. In this order, it was further stated
that the Commission “is of the opinion

699

that it should not take any action in
this case that would jeopardize the
rights of either party” in the district
court action, “but should leave them
where they were prior to the time
that said 40-acre tract was attributed
to the Tendall No. 2 Well by the ac-
tion of the Director of Conservation.”
‘The Commission then went on to grant
Little Nick Oil Company’s application
and vacate the increased allowable
complained of, and directed the Con-
servation Director to take out or sub-
tract all acreage of the Tendall tract
from the “productive acreage” previ-
ously assigned or attributed to the Tide-
water Unit’s Tendall No. 2 Well. Stan-
olind then gave notice of appeal from
this order; and also reopened the pro-
ceedings (CD No. 3488) by filing there-
in its own application, referring to the
fact that in order No. 25290 (from which
its appeal was then pending), the Com-
mission had set aside the action of its
Director of Conservation in promulgat-
ing allowables for the Tendall No. 2
well, on the basis of the Tendall tract’s
unitization with or inclusion in the Tide
Water Unit, but had not made any find-
ing or determination in said vacation
order, as to whether or not said di-
rector’s action was in fact or in law
within the scope of his authority. In
the application, it was requested that
the Commission make such a finding
or determination and definitely rule on
the question of whether such action of
the Director was proper and valid.
After the hearing on this application
was held in January, 1952, the Commis-
sion entered its Order No. 25437, refus-
ing to make the requested determina-
tion and finding therein “that it could
not, at this time, say whether or not
the Director of Conservation was au-
thorized by Order No. 20536, to attribute
said additional acreage to the Tendall
Well No. 2, since this is a question in-
volved in the district court in Grady
county, Oklahoma, but that the parties
should be left in the same position that
they were prior to the time that the
Director of Conservation made such at-
tribution.”

700

In these appeals from Orders No.
25290 and No. 25437, for the purpose
of briefing and herein considered as
consolidated, Stanolind maintains that
by said orders, which it claims are
without statutory authorization, it has
been deprived of its “property rights”
without due process of law, contrary
to the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution and art. II, sec. 7
of the Oklahoma Constitution. It is
rather difficult to definitely determine
from its briefs just what “property
rights” it alludes to. At one place in
its brief (with apparent reference to
the possible effect of the Commission’s
order No. 25290, on the land title action
pending in Grady county district court)
it asks the question:

“By attempting to preserve such a
status quo, may the result not well be
that the Commission, not having the
power and authority to hear the evi-
dence in respect to the controversy of
title, jeodardized the rights of one or
both of the parties in respect to the title
controversy by issuing these Orders?”

In another place, however, Stanolind
asserts that the orders complained of
deny it its co-equal opportunity to pro-
duce its correlative share of the gas
in the three zones of the Chickasha
Field, all to the detriment of said Com-
pany “and its royalty owner.” The
royalty owner, Mr. Tendall, is not com-
plaining, however; and as these orders
do not have the effect of preventing the
drilling of a well on said leasehold to
obtain gas production, but merely foil
an attempt to participate in production
from a hole on another’s land, it is
difficult to see how any of the “correla-
tive rights” of either is violated. Here,
it is pertinent to inquire; In what man-
ner has the parties’ so-called “corre-
lative share” in the Glover, Pooler and
Charlson reservoir, been determined,
unless the “Operating Agreement” and
Director Pound’s action constitute a
“determination?” And what of the
rights of neighboring owners in the
same segment of these known sources
of supply? Here, Stanolind has not

punctured these gas reservoirs or pools
by drilling a well on its lease and by
the process of “capture” thus proved
that any part of its lease will produce
from the zones involved, or that it is
entitled to any “correlative share” in
said gas supplies. Then, by what proc-
ess has it been determined that it
has any fixed, definite or certain “cor-
relative share” in these sources of sup-
ply? While it is true that the outlines
of the Glover, Pooler and Charlson res-
ervoirs, as mapped on the Commis-
sions order No. 20536, appear to in-
clude varying portions of the Tendall
acreage, and a similar portrayal of
these reservoirs was introduced by
Stanolind into the evidence in these
proceedings, yet, it is obvious that the
Tendall lease and the Tide Water Unit’s
leases do not cover all of the land there-
by depicted to be within these reser-
voir’s boundaries, north and west of
the southeast corner of section 22’s
northwest quarter-section; and nowhere
in the record is the Commission, sit-
ting as a tribunal, shown to have made
any determination whatsoever, as to
the probable productivity or “produc-
tive acreage’ in these reservoirs, of
any part of the Stanolind lease or Ten-
dall tract. Stanolind cites no law, or
order of the Corporation Commission,
authorizing its Director of Conservation
to make such a determination, There
is reference in the briefs to paragraphs
16 and 21 of order No, 20536, but we
have examined these and find them in-
applicable. At least, one of these par-
agraphS seems to deal with a proce-
dure for ascertaining, and adjusting al-
lowables for, market demand for gas
from the field, and does not pertain to
the attribution of additional “produc-
tive acreage” for leases or units in the
field.

Obviously, such an ex una parte pro-
cedure as herein attempted, and which,
when called to its attention by Little
Nick Oil Company, was set aside or
nullified by the Commission, consti-
tutes no such “determination”, as we
have been discussing. The determina-

tion of a lease’s productive acreage in
a common pool, reservoir or source of
supply contemplated by our Conserva-
tion Act (Title 52, O. S. 1941 §81 et seq.)
is a judicial determination arrived at
only after a hearing, at which those
claiming correlative rights in the com-
mon reservoir have had the opportu-
nity of being heard, and at which com-
petent and substantial evidence has
been introduced to show how much of
each owner’s tract or acreage is likely
or potentially productive. This was
clearly and thoroughly demonstrated in
Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Corpo-
ration Commission, 205 Okla. 672, 241
P. 2d 363, wherein this court upheld
the same Commission order (No. 20536)
that fixed the Tendall Well No. 2’s pro-
ductive acreage, which Stanolind in
this case has, by private agreement,
and co-operation of Mr. Pound, sought
to increase. Therefore, and in view
of the fact that no authority has been
shown for such procedure, resulting in
said well’s September allowable being
unauthorizedly increased, as Little Nick
Oil Company complained of, we can

701

only conclude that same was illegal.
This being true, the Commission’s ac-
tion in nullifying it by its order No.
25290, could constitute no deprivation
of property without due process of law.
For a tribunal to deprive one of so-
called “property rights” he must first
have possessed, or been determined to
possess, them. Here, it has never been
established on any sound or legally
recognized basis that Stanolind is en-
titled to the “correlative share” it
claims, and tried, with the Tide Water
Unit’s operators and Mr. Pound’s co-
operation, to have bestowed upon it-
self in the producing zones involved.
This is the principal reason that the
legal propositions presented in its
briefs, though undisputedly sound and
correct as abstract propositions of law,
have no application to this case. Since
no error has been demonstrated in
either of the Corporation Commission’s
orders herein appealed from, they are
hereby affirmed.

JOHNSON, V. C. J., and CORN,
O’NEAL, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.