State: Indiana
Volume: 275
Term: 1980-1981
Jurisdiction(s): Indiana
Source: https://static.case.law/ind/275.pdf

MICHAEL SCOTT MCCOLLUM v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 127983840. Filed December 31, 1980.]

Barrie C. Tremper, Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Richard Albert Alford, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

2 Dn

GIVAN, C.J.—Michael Scott McCollum was found guilty by a judge of
two counts of second degree murder. The court sentenced appellant
to an indeterminate term of not less than fifteen (15) years nor more
than twenty-five (25) years on Counts I and II, the sentences to run
concurrently.

The evidence most favorable to the State reveals that on Friday after-
noon, February 4, 1977, appellant called a friend and told him that appel-
lant’s parents would be leaving town at midnight that evening. He told
his friend that he could “borrow” his parent’s car without their per-
mission. In fact the evidence showed that the parents had no intention
of leaving town that night.

At about midnight that night, appellant went into his parent’s
bedroom and shot and killed both of them with a .22 caliber rifle. Next
he took two shells from the rifle, inserted them into a hand gun which
he then placed in his father’s hand to make it appear that his father
had killed appellant’s mother and then committed suicide.

Appellant claims the judgment of the court below was contrary to
law in that the evidence introduced was of such character as to create
a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused was sane at the time
the crime was committed. We note that at the time appellant committed
the offense the State was required to carry the burden of proving the
accused was sane at the time of the alleged crime. Lynn v. State, (1979)
271 Ind. 297, 392 N.E.2d 449.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this
Court will consider only that evidence most favorable to the State,
together with all logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn

HB therefrom. Charlton v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 36, 408 N.E.2d
1248. This Court will not reweigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Such is the province of the jury. Hauger
v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 481, 405 N.E.2d 526, 528, Although, in the instant
ease, appellant was tried by a court and not a jury, the standard of
review is the same. Patterson v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 22, 262 N.E.2d 520.

Two psychiatrists testified for the defense. Both of these doctors

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testified that appellant was insane and could not conform his conduct
to the law; that he had no control over his actions.

However, a psychiatrist for the State testified that the defendant
was sane at the time of the murder. This witness personally interviewed
the appellant and had examined other medical and psychological data
pertaining to appellant’s mental condition both before and after the
time of the murder.

It is clear that the decision of the trial court required a resolution
of conflicting evidence concerning the sanity of the appellant. The trier
of fact may accept or reject the testimony of witnesses, includ-
Hsing that of expert witnesses. Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267
Ind. 224, 232, 368 N.E.2d 1359, 1364. This Court will not second-
guess the trier of fact and reweigh the evidence. Lock v. State, (1980)
278 Ind. 315, 403 N.E.2d 1360, Hauger v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 481, 405
N.E.2d 526. There is sufficient evidence in the record before us to sus-
tain the decision of the trial court.

The judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
All Justices concur.

Note—Reported at 413 N.E. 2d 912.

Pt
ROGER D. LAGENOUR v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 11798313. Filed December 31, 1980.]

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Larry A. Landis, Special
Assistant, Melanie C. Conowr, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.—This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for post-
conviction relief. The appellant was originally convicted of kidnapping
and assault and battery with intent to gratify sexual desires, in a trial
in 1976 in which evidence of prior sexual offenses was admitted as part
of the State’s substantive case. Before the trial, defense counsel had
made what was styled a motion in limine but what was in effect a
motion to suppress which was aimed at excluding entirely the prior
sexual offenses evidence. The motion was denied and the evidence,
testimony of two witnesses who purportedly were victims of appellant,
came in.

In the direct appeal, Lagenour v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 441, 876 N.H.2d
415, appellant raised for review, among other things, the admissibility
of this evidence, but a divided Court deemed the issue to have been
forfeited because of defense counsel's failure to renew his objection
when the State introduced the evidence during the course of the trial.
The conviction was affirmed.

Appellant then petitioned for post-conviction relief asserting two

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claims. First, he contended that he had been denied his constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel because of his trial counsel’s
failure to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of the
evidence of prior sexual offenses. Second, he contended that he had
been denied due process of law because of the retroactive application
by this Court in the direct appeal of a procedural waiver rule which
resulted in the forfeiture of the right to appellate review of the admis-
sibility claim.

Following denial of the petition for post-conviction relief, appellant
filed a motion to correct errors withthe trial judge, which was denied,
and this appeal followed.

Two issues are presented for review. The first is whether “trial
counsel's failure to preserve defendant’s right to a fair trial denied
{him] the effective representation of counsel to which he is entitled
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Art. I, § 18, of the Indiana Constitution.” The second raises for the
first time the question whether the prosecutor's testimony to the jury
regarding other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant is funda-
mental error requiring reversal.

In reviewing this appeal, we treat the first issue as a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the post-conviction trial
judge's conclusions that there was no denial of effective assistance of
counsel, and a challenge to the conclusion of law that there was no
denial of due process.

In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner has the
burden of establishing his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ind. R.P.C. 1, § 5. In order to prevail on appeal from a denial
HB of his petition, “appellant must satisfy the Court that the
evidence as a whole was such that it leads unerringly and
unmistakably to a decision in his favor; that is, one opposite to that
reached by the trial court.” Sotelo v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 694, 408 N.E.2d
1215.

L

The first claim has two aspects. One is that the inadequacy of counsel
manifested in the failure to object contemporaneously resulted in the

admission of irrelevant and prejudicial testimony. The other is that
the same inadequacy manifested in the same failure resulted in the
loss of a meritorious issue on appeal. Appellant also argues in his reply
brief the denial of due process of law in that this Court retroactively
applied the procedural waiver rule reaffirmed in Pointon v. State, (1978)
267 Ind. 624, 372 N.E.2d 1159, to his case, which was tried before
Pointon.

Reviewing these related claims in the light outlined above, we must
consider first whether the testimony adduced at the hearing on the
post-conviction petition leads unerringly to the conclusion that trial
counsel was ineffective.

At the post-conviction hearing appellant's former trial counsel

testified that he was relying upon this Court’s opinion in Lockridge

v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 678, 338 N.E.2d 275, in passing up the

Hs opportunity to make the in-trial objection. In that case, Judge
Arterburn, writing for the Court said:

“[Wle do not consider this issue waived because the Appellant
presented to the Court prior to trial a motion in limine which,
in part, asked that the Appellant’s pre-trial statements be
excluded. This part of the Appellant’s motion was overruled. Objec-
tion at trial would have been desirable, but the issue was so thor-
oughly argued and the Court's ruling was so specific that further
objection may be considered fruitless.” Id. at 278, 279.

The language in Lockridge logically supports trial counsel's decision
at trial to withhold objecting. He cannot now be faulted for permitting
his trial strategy to be guided by it, even though it ultimately turned
out in the course of later appellate litigation that this Court would not
be bound by it. To fault an attorney for relying on a holding of this
Court would be to distort our standard of adequate legal representa-
tion. See, e.g., Crisp v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 534, 394 N.H.2d 115, 118.

Trial counsel did move to suppress the prior crimes evidence. He
did attempt to persuade the trial judge of the correctness of his posi-
tion and did obtain a ruling by the judge upon due consideration. This
effort, in and of itself, served the defense interest in exclusion of the
evidence in large measure. This is not a case in which counsel sat idly
by and permitted the prosecution to introduce questionable evidence

[| 7
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without challenge.

In sum, the claim of ineffective representation by trial counsel does

not provide an avenue to post-conviction relief for appellant. Counsel

is presumed to have executed the defense in an effective man-

ster and his efforts are to be considered within the totality

of the circumstances surrounding his pre-trial preparation and

the actual conduct of the entire trial. Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind.

618, 335 N.E.2d 811. Assessed in this light counsel's efforts were not
shown ineffective in the constitutional sense.

There was no error in the finding of no denial of effective assistance
of counsel.

We next turn to the claim of denial of due process in the application
of the procedural waiver rule reaffirmed in Pointon, supra. Although
the post-conviction trial judge did not enlarge upon his conclusion that
there was no such denial, we do not find error.

In the direct appeal of this case, we applied the Pointon procedural
waiver rule and the issue is res judicata.

IL.

Appellant contends that fundamental error occurred when, at the
original trial, the prosecuting attorney testified, without any objec-
tion by the defense, about the evidence of prior sexual offenses.

According to appellant’s brief, the defense called the prosecuting
attorney in order to expose the inadequate investigation which was
done in this case, and to present evidence that both cases against the
defendant involving the two alleged victims of prior sexual offenses
were dismissed by the prosecutor. At the conclusion of the testimony,
the court inquired as to whether he would like to respond.

The Prosecutor then made the following statement:

“We do have a series of three cases here, ladies and gentlemen.
The first case of JEH, as you know, was tried two times. You heard
that from her testimony. And you saw her on the stand this morn-
ing and she replied as to why her case was dismissed. She could
not go through this case again. The case as to DW was dismissed

8 |

by DW’s request after a technical filing and refilings. For the
reason we were unable to convict Roger Lagenour on the first
JEH case, she felt her case was not as strong as the first one.
So she asked that it be dismissed. The difference between those
two cases and this case today is that in the interim I found a case
which allowed in order to establish motive, intent, a similar
scheme, that the other incidents be allowed to be introduced into
evidence. So, therefore ladies and gentlemen, the two hung juries
did not have benefit of knowing the two other offenses when they
made their decision.”

Even though this issue was not included in the motion to correct
errors or in the brief or direct appeal, or in the petition for post-
conviction relief, appellant invokes this Court’s inherent power to take
cognizance of errors that result in depriving a defendant of constitu-
tional rights.

Appellant argues specifically that in his testimony the prosecutor
improperly told the jury that they were not only trying the defendant
for the crimes charged, but also for those crimes which he allegedly
had committed but for which the prosecutor was unable to obtain a
conviction.

We cannot agree with appellant that the narrative quoted above

amounted to an evidentiary harpoon destroying appellant’s right to

a fair trial. Since the jury had already heard JEH and DW

| | testify about the alleged offenses, the prosecutor's narrative
only tended to have a cumulative effect.

Appellant further claims that the prosecutor's testimony implied that
the jury may consider “other crimes” testimony as evidence of the
defendant’s guilt of the crimes charged, and that such an inference
is improper. We decline this invitation to review the substantive issue
which we deemed forfeited on the direct appeal.

We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 414 N.E. 2d 295.

©

PHILLIP LYNN SCHUTZ v, STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 1279S337. Filed January 6, 1981. Rehearing denied March 11, 1981.]

Forrest B. Bowman, Jr., S. Sargent Visher, of Indianapolis, for
Appellant.

10 a

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Jeff'G. Fihn, Deputy Attorney
General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, Phillip Lynn Schutz, was convicted by a
jury of voluntary manslaughter, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.),
and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. His direct appeal raises
the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting defendant's confes-
sion into evidence; and

2. Whether the trial court erroneously refused to dismiss the
information against defendant and later erroneously refused to exclude
the testimony of one of the state’s witnesses after tape cassette record-
ings of her statements to police were destroyed.

A statement of the facts from the record most favorable to the state
shows that on February 9, 1979, defendant was living with Lori John-
ston and Lori's one-year old daughter, Stacy. On that evening, several
persons got together at their residence. During the course of the even-
ing, large amounts of hard drugs, marijuana, whiskey and beer were
consumed by all persons. Later, in the early morning hours, defendant
was awakened by Stacy’s crying. He got up, changed her diaper and
attempted to quiet her crying. When the child continued to cry, defend-
ant became angry, grabbed her by the neck, hit her with his fists and
threw her on the floor. Stacy subsequently died from a subarachnoid
hemorrhage in the brain.

Officers Halligan and Harless responded to a call for assistance for
an injured or sick child. Defendant admitted them to the house and
told them the baby was in the back room. The child was being held
by Lori on the bed and wasn’t breathing. The officers immediately
started administering first aid to the child. Officer Harless orally
advised defendant of his rights at that time. After the medic unit
arrived and took the child to the hospital, another officer read the com-
plete rights form to defendant. Defendant appeared nervous but stated
that he did understand his rights. Both he and Lori then agreed to
go to the police station for questioning.

At the police station, defendant was put in an interview room by

[| i
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himself. Police Officer Burgess entered several times to ask defendant
if he needed anything. Defendant inquired on at least two occasions
about the baby’s condition. The second time defendant inquired,
Burgess responded that the baby was gone. At this point defendant
started crying deeply. Officer Burgess then left defendant alone. About
one hour later, another officer told Burgess that he had looked into
the interview room and that defendant was “acting kind of funny, maybe
trying to do himself in.” Several officers went to the interview room
to check on defendant. When they entered the room, defendant was
standing there with his belt lying on the floor. He had a small cut on
his chin. He was weeping and said, “I didn’t mean to kill her.”

A short time later, defendant agreed to give a statement to the police.
Officer Burgess read a waiver of rights form to defendant and defendant
signed this form. Burgess orally advised defendant that he could stop
the questioning at any time. He testified that defendant had calmed
down some although he still appeared upset. Defendant then gave his
voluntary statement about the incident which was tape recorded by
the police. The record shows that this statement was given at 11:35
a.m., approximately four hours after defendant had been brought to
the police station.

1

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence his tape recorded statement. He contends that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily given and was the product of his unlawful
detention for investigation and interrogation.

The question of the admissibility of a statement or confession is con-
trolled by determining from the totality of circumstances whether or
not the confession was given voluntarily and not through

HH inducement, violence, threats or other improper influences
so as to overcome the free will of the accused. Arch v. State,

(1978) 269 Ind. 450, 381 N.E. 2d 465; Pawloski v. State, (1978) 269 Ind.
350, 380 N.E. 2d 1230; Works v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 250, 362 N.E. 2d
144. The question of voluntariness is one for the trial court. We review
the question on appeal as we do other sufficiency matters. We do not
weigh the evidence, but rather determine whether there was substan-

12 |

tial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's finding.
This is true even though conflicting evidence is presented to the trial
court on the issue of voluntariness. Arch v. State, supra; Riggs v. State,
(1976) 264 Ind. 263, 342 N.E. 2d 838.

In the instant case, we first note that there is no evidence of an illegal
detention. The police officers were admitted voluntarily to Lori John-
ston’s residence. They observed that the injured child wasn't breathing
and that the nature of her injuries indicated she had been abused.
Defendant and Lori Johnston, the child’s mother, were the only two
persons present with the child. Defendant was advised of his rights
two times and voluntarily went with police to the station for question-
ing.

We also must consider the other circumstances surrounding the giv-
ing of the statement. Defendant testified that he didn’t remember hav-
ing his rights read to him. He also testified that he was induced to
give his statement because a police officer told him it would go easier
on him if he gave a statement. However, the record clearly shows that
a waiver of rights form was signed by defendant at 11:30 a.m. He had
been advised of his rights two times before he was taken to the police
station. He also signed another form at the end of his typed statement.
which acknowledged that he had been given his rights before he gave
the voluntary statement.

In the instant case, there is no evidence of any prolonged interroga-

tion, any coercive treatment or any physical abuse. It has often been

held that vague statements by the police such as “seeing what

I they could do for him” or it would “be in his best interest

to tell the real story” are not sufficient inducements to render

a subsequent confession inadmissible. Turpin v. State, (1980) 272 Ind.

629, 400 N.E. 2d 1119; Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E. 2d

1188. Defendant was at the police station only a few hours before he

gave his statement. We find no circumstances here indicating any

unusual or coercive action by the police which logically would have

misled defendant or overborne his will in regard to his voluntary state-

ment. There was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s find-
ing of voluntariness.

a 18
PC

I.

The police took two tape recorded statements from Lori Johnston
on the morning of the incident. They took another statement from her
a month later, when an agreement was reached that charges against
her would be dismissed in exchange for her cooperation. They also con-
ducted tape recorded interviews with three other prospective wit-
nesses. The police testified that it had been department policy for
twelve years to erase tape recordings of witnesses after their state-
ments had been transcribed in order to reuse the tape cassettes. Tape
recordings of an accused’s statements were not erased. Defendant now
claims that the erasure of the tapes constituted a deliberate destruc-
tion of evidence which violated his due process rights. He contends
that the erased recordings were a more complete, more informative
record than the typed transcriptions. He alleges that after the erasures
there was no way to check on the accuracy of the transcripts to deter-
mine whether anything was omitted which might prove exculpatory
material for defendant. We find no merit to these contentions.

Defendant first moved for a dismissal of the information when he

found out about the erasures. He also objected to Lori Johnston’s

testimony when she was called to testify by the state. It is

I clear that the motion to dismiss the information was properly

denied. We have long held that an indictment or information

may not be questioned on the ground of insufficient evidence. The suf-

ficiency of the evidence is decided at trial. Hubbard v. State, (1974) 262

Ind. 176, 313 N.E. 2d 346; Stephenson v. State, (1932) 205 Ind. 141, 179
NE. 633.

It is also well settled that a prosecutor has discretion in determin-
ing whether particular nonmaterial evidence should be produced,
retained, or destroyed. It is the negligent destruction or with-

HH bolding of material evidence by the police or prosecutor which
may present grounds for reversal. Turpin v. State, supra;

Birkla v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 37, 323 N.E. 2d 645; Hale v. State, (1967)
248 Ind. 630, 230 N.E. 2d 432. There is no claim here of the intentional
destruction of any evidence. There is only speculation about a possible
loss because the actual tape cassettes were not retained. The possibility

14 De

of an omission of some exculpatory evidence in a particular witness’s
statement must always be considered by defense counsel. We do not
see that the retention of a typed transcript rather than the tape cassette
itself significantly affects the possibility of an omission. The defense
has ample opportunity to correct any such omission through indepen-
dent investigations, depositions and cross-examination. It is not the
duty of the prosecution to bear the burden of assembling the defense
counsel's evidence. State v. Wright, (1978) 267 Ind. 590, 372 N.E. 2d 453.

In the instant case, defendant had a complete transcript of the
witness's statement available for impeachment purposes. He was able
to depose the witness if he wished and she was available for cross-
examination. Under these circumstances, we find no prejudice to
defendant in the destruction of the tape cassettes and no violation of
his due process rights.

For all of the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 413 N.E. 2d 913.
|

RICHARD S. CHERRY v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 10798278. Filed January 7, 1981. Rehearing denied April 6, 1981]

16 |
{|__|

ee

P|

John D. Clouse, Michael C. Keating, of Evansville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, Richard S. Cherry, was charged with rape,
a class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), criminal
deviate conduct, a class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2 (Burns 1979
Repl.), and being an habitual offender, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979
Repl.). He was found guilty by a jury on Counts I and II as class B
felonies and guilty on Count III. He was sentenced to fifteen, fifteen,
and thirty years, respectively, the sentences to be served consecutively.
In his appeal he raises twelve issues, but due to our disposition of the
case under issue one, we need only consider the following seven issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to refile two
counts against defendant after once dismissing them;

2. Whether Indiana’s rape shield act is unconstitutional;

8. Whether members of the prosecutor’s staff may testify against
a defendant;

4, Whether certain former recorded testimony of a witness was
erroneously admitted;

5. Whether defendant was entitled to a discharge under Ind. R.
Crim. P. 4(B);

Le qT
po

6. Whether the court erred in giving certain instructions and refus-
ing to give others; and

7. Whether the court erred in considering certain aggravating cir-
cumstances in determining the sentence.

A summary of the facts from the record most favorable to the state
shows that on the evening of December 23, 1977, the victim and a
girlfriend walked to a tavern in Evansville, Indiana. They sat at a table
and had something to drink. The victim testified that defendant came
up to their table and asked her to dance. She stated that she danced
with him several times and may have had more drinks. Her friend left
the tavern sometime during the evening, but the victim stayed until
approximately 3:00 a.m. At this time, she asked defendant to drive
her home and he agreed.

The victim testified that defendant stopped the car about a block
from her home and told her to take her clothes off. She refused and
tried to get out of the car, but the door wouldn't open. Defendant then
pushed her down, threatened to kill her and choked her, causing
scratches on her neck. He forced her to have intercourse with him and
then forced her to have oral sex with him. After this, the victim asked
defendant to take her to the home of her former husband because she
was afraid her present husband wouldn't believe her. Defendant drop-
ped her off at her former husband’s home around 4:00 a.m. She then
ealled the police and the rape crisis line and went to the hospital.

L

Defendant first alleges that it was error for the state to refile two
counts against him after once dismissing them. Defendant was originally
charged early in 1978, with three counts arising from the instant
crime: Count I, rape, a class A felony; Count II, criminal deviate con-
duct, a class A felony; and Count III, habitual offender. In May, 1978,
defendant moved to sever the counts and this motion was granted.
The state indicated it would try defendant only on Counts II and III.
A jury trial in June, 1978, resulted in a guilty verdict on Count II and
a hung jury on Count III. The trial court found there were aggravating
circumstances and sentenced defendant to forty years’ imprisonment
on the criminal deviate conduct count. After the sentencing, the state

18 |

made a motion to dismiss Counts I and III and this motion was granted.

Defendant filed a motion to correct errors and later a supplemental
motion to correct errors. These motions were granted by the trial court
in November, 1978, on the basis of prejudicial testimony admitted dur-
ing the trial and defendant's poor physical condition which had not been
attended to for several months preceding and during the trial while
he was held in jail. After defendant had been granted a new trial on
December 11, 1978, the state refiled the other two counts against him
on January 9, 1979, and January 29, 1979. A second jury trial was held
in April, 1979, without the introduction of the improper and prejudicial
testimony. This trial resulted in guilty verdicts on all three counts.
However, the jury at this time found defendant guilty of both rape
and criminal deviate conduct as class B felonies rather than class A
felonies as charged. The trial court again found aggravating circum-
stances and sentenced defendant to serve fifteen, fifteen, and thirty
year terms consecutively. Defendant is now serving a sixty year term
of imprisonment rather than the forty year term he was given at his
first trial.

Defendant argues that allowing the state to refile the two counts
which they had dismissed after the sentencing at the original trial
violated his double jeopardy and due process rights. It is clear
Hsthat defendant’s double jeopardy argument must fail since
there had been no trial on the rape charge as of the time of
dismissal and the trial on the habitual offender count had ended in a
hung jury. In both those situations double jeopardy does not bar fur-
ther prosecution. Harlan v. State, (1921) 190 Ind. 322, 180 N.E. 418;
Crim v. State, (L973) 156 Ind.App. 66, 294 N.E.2d 822.

However, the timing of the state’s actions in this case does raise
a serious due process question. We must consider the issue of “‘pro-
secutorial vindictiveness” under the principles enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Blackledge v. Perry, (1974) 417 U.S. 21, 94
S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628, and North Carolina v. Pearce, (1969) 395
US. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656.

The Supreme Court first addressed the situation where a judge im-
posed an increased penalty on a criminal defendant at a second trial

19

after he had successfully appealed his first trial. The Court held that
due process prohibits actual vindictiveness in resentencing and said

that:

“... since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally
deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally
attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defend-
ant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on
the part of the sentencing judge.

“In order to assure the absence of such a motiviation, we have
concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence
upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so
must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon ob-
jective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part
of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentenc-
ing proceeding.” [Footnotes omitted.] North Carolina v. Pearce,
(1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725-726, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080-2081, 23 L.Ed.2d
656, 669-670.

The rationale of Pearce was extended to prosecutorial conduct in
Blackledge v. Perry, supra. In Blackledge the defendant was convicted
in state court on a misdemeanor assault charge. When he exer-

Hs cised a statutorily granted right to demand a trial de novo
on appeal, the prosecutor obtained a felony assault indictment

based upon the same conduct. Upon review before the Supreme Court
it was held that the prosecution's unexplained filing of an increased
charge violated the defendant's due process rights, even in the absence
of any evidence that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or maliciously.

The Court stated that:

“A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory
right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will
retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original
one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential
period of incarceration. [Citation omitted.]

“Due process of law requires that such a potential for vindic-
tiveness must not enter into North Carolina's two-tiered appellate
process.” 417 U.S. 21, 28, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2102-2108, 40 L.Ed.2d 628,
634-635.

Questions of prosecutorial vindictiveness are not easy to resolve
because two antithetical interests are brought into conflict. One is the

20 |
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due process right of the defendant to be free of apprehension that he
will be subjected to an increased punishment if he exercises his right
to attack his conviction and the other is the substantial discretion tradi-
tionally accorded the prosecutor in controlling the decision to prosecute.
Blackledge and its progeny show that there must be a balancing of the
defendant's interest against that of the state in order to protect both
these interests. Blackledge, supra; United States v. Andrews, (6th Cir.
1980) 612 F.2d 235; Miracle v. Estelle, (5th Cir. 1979) 592 F.2d 1269;
Jackson v. Walker, (5th Cir. 1978) 585 F.2d 189; United States v. Groves,
(9th Cir. 1978) 571 F.2d 450; United States v. Aluarado-Sandoval, (9th
Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 645; United States v. Jamison, (D.C. Cir. 1974) 505
F.2d 407.

In analyzing Blackledge and Pearce, we find it is clear that when the
prosecution has occasion to file more numerous or more severe charges
for the same basic criminal conduct against an accused after
Hs the accused has successfully exercised his statutory or con-
stitutional rights to an appeal, the prosecution bears a heavy
burden of proving that any increase in the number or severity of the
charges was not motivated by a vindictive purpose. There is no ques-
tion in the instant case of the increased harshness of the penalty for
defendant when the state refiled the two additional charges against
him. The defendant's interest here is a substantial one considering both
the increased sentence which he received and the addition of two felony
convictions to his record.

On the other hand, the state has offered no reason for refiling the
two additional charges. We find no unusual circumstances here which
could support the timing of the state’s actions such as the
I discovery of additional evidence, elements of the crime being
completed which were not complete at the time of the first
trial, or an honest mistake or oversight being made at the time of the
original decision to prosecute. In fact, the timing of the state’s actions
points solely to a vindictive motive. The state did not dismiss the
original rape and habitual offender counts until after defendant had
been sentenced to forty years on the original criminal deviate conduct
charge. Then the state did not refile those two counts until after defend-
ant had successfully appealed the criminal deviate conduct conviction
and had been granted a new trial on that count.

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We need not find that the prosecutor actually acted in bad faith or
that he maliciously sought the refiling of the two charges. The under-
lying concern of the Blackledge and Pearce decisions is that
Il__ it is the realistic apprehension of vindictiveness, rather than
vindictiveness in fact, which controls. The factual situation
of the crimes behind the charges is not dispositive on the question of
vindictiveness; rather, it is to be regarded as only one of the factors
bearing on the issue. United States v. Groves, supra; United States v.
DeMarco, (9th Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 1224; Midgett v. McClelland, (4th Cir.
1977) 547 F.2d 1194; Hayes v. Cowan, (6th Cir. 1976) 547 F.2d 42; United
States v. Johnson, (4th Cir. 1976) 587 F.2d 1170. Some jurisdictions have
attempted to limit Blackledge and Pearce strictly to fact situations in
which there has been only the substitution of a more serious charge
and not the addition of charges. This approach ignores Blackledge’s
underlying concern with the appearance of vindictiveness and its chill-
ing effect on defendants and gives too much deference to prosecutorial
discretion. Vindictiveness issues are only present after the state has
had ample opportunity to exercise its discretion. The circumstances
in this case show that the appearance of vindictiveness is very high
and there was no other apparent reason for the timing of the state’s
actions. Since this case involves only the prosecutor's right to reopen
a previously completed exercise of discretion involving the same basic
criminal acts, the state has not met its burden of proving that the tim-
ing of the refiling of the two charges was not motivated by vindictive-
ness.

Thus, the timing of events in this case, when considered with the
likelihood that the two dismissed charges would never have been refiled
if there had been no appeal or reversal of conviction, leads to the in-
escapable conclusion that the refiling of the two previously dismissed
charges had the effect of punishing the defendant for pursuing an ap-
peal of his conviction, a constitutional and statutory right he clearly
has. Therefore, the convictions on Counts I and III must be reversed.

I.

Defendant next contends that the Indiana rape shield statute Ind.
Code § 35-1-32.5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) violates the equal protection clause

22 es
T_T

of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates
HE against rape defendants. This issue has been decided
adversely to defendant in Finney v. State, (1979) 179 Ind.App.
816, 385 N.E.2d 477, where the Court held that since rape defendants
are not a suspect classification, the equal protection clause requires
only that there be a rational and reasonable basis for the classification
and that it bear a fair relationship to the purpose of the statute. In
light of the legitimate state policies which the statute is designed to
promote, it cannot be said that the disparate treatment of rape defend-
ants is without a reasonable basis. Roberts v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 127,
373 N.E.2d 1108.

I.

At the trial, defense counsel cross-examined the victim concerning
the description she gave police of her assailant as a thin man with either
brown or reddish-brown hair. This description did not fit the defend-
ant at the time of trial since he was not thin and had dark brown or
black hair.

The state then called two witnesses to rebut this misidentification
testimony. The witnesses, Robert Carithers and Scott Bowers, were
deputy prosecutors who had seen defendant at the time of his first
trial. They testified that the appearance of defendant had changed
substantially from his appearance at the first trial and that he had
gained a good deal of weight after hospital treatment for severe thyroid
and heart conditions. Bowers further testified that defendant formerly
had reddish hair.

Defendant argues that it was reversible error to allow the two deputy
prosecutors to testify about a material matter. It is clear that the dual
role of lawyer-witness should be avoided out of consideration

Hof several rules of professional responsibility, but a lawyer

in a case is not thereby rendered incompetent as a witness.

A prosecuting attorney is a sworn officer of the court and is entitled,
in the sound discretion of the trial judge, to be heard as a rebuttal
witness. Worthington v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 499, 405 N.E.2d 913; Hodge
v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 377, 344 N.E.2d 293; Butler v. State, (1951) 229
Ind. 241, 97 N.E.2d 492. In this case, the deputy prosecutors were

Le 23
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responding to a challenge to the integrity of a state’s witness and there
were apparently no other witnesses available to testify as to defend-
ant’s appearance at the time of the prior trial. Under these circum-
stances, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge
in permitting the testimony of the deputy prosecutors.

Iv.

The victim was examined after the incident at the hospital emergency
room by Dr. Carmen Haynes. Dr. Haynes testified at defendant's first
trial, but was working in Huntsville, Alabama, at the time of the sec-
ond trial. Her recorded testimony from the first trial was admitted
as evidence over defendant’s objection. He now contends that the ad-
mission of this evidence was erroneous because it was hearsay and
did not fall within the prior testimony exception. We disagree.

The admission or exclusion of prior testimony of an unavailable
witness is subject to the discretion of the trial court when certain
requirements are met. Pollard v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 599,
HE 388 N.E.2d 496. Here, it is clear that the objected to testimony
was given at a former judicial proceeding, was given under
oath, and was subject to cross-examination by the defendant. Defend-
ant argues that there was not sufficient evidence of the unavailability
of the witness since there was nothing to indicate the state had con-
tacted her to ask her if she would appear. There was testimony,
however, that Dr. Haynes was working at the time of the trial in Hunts-
ville, Alabama, and that Alabama had not enacted the Uniform Act
to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State. There-
fore, there was no reciprocal duty emanating from the law of Alabama
to insure the attendance of a witness working in that state. Under these
circumstances, we find that the unavailability of the witness was suffi-
ciently established and there was no abuse of discretion in allowing
the admission of the prior recorded testimony.

v.

Defendant, pro se, filed a motion for early trial on January 28, 1979.
Trial was commenced on April 9, 1979, at which time defendant filed

24 —
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a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(B), arguing

Hs that seventy-six days had elapsed since the filing of his pro

se motion. There is no merit to this argument since the trial

date of April 9, 1979, had been set before defendant's pro se motion

was filed and this April 9, 1979, date was reaffirmed on February 9,

1979. Defendant did not object to the trial date at that time and so

has waived any error. It is well settled that a defendant has an obliga-

tion to object at the earliest opportunity when his trial date is set

beyond the seventy-day limit set by Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(B), or he waives

his right to discharge under that rule. Heflin v. State, (1977) 267 Ind.

427, 870 N.E.2d 895; Cheeks v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 190, 361 N.E.2d
906. There was no error here.

VI.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to
give three of his tendered instructions. His tendered instruction No.
1 read: “You have no right to find the defendant guilty only
HH for the purpose of deterring others from committing crime.”
The substance of this instruction was adequately covered by
the court’s preliminary instructions No. 1 and No. 4 which instructed
the jury not to consider matters outside the evidence before them and
advised the jury of defendant's presumption of innocence and the state’s
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A trial court com-
mits no error when it refuses to give a tendered instruction which is
adequately covered by other instructions. Richmond v. State, (1979) 270
Ind. 554, 387 N.E.2d 1812; Toliver v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 575, 872 N.E.2d
452.

Also, defendant's tendered instruction No. 2 which was refused dealt
with the jury’s duty in resolving conflicting evidence. The substance
of this instruction was covered by defendant’s instruction No. 3 which
was given and also dealt with resolving conflicts in the evidence. There
was no error in refusing this instruction.

Defendant's tendered instruction No. 6, which was refused, instructed
the jury as to the elements of battery as a lesser included offense of
rape and criminal deviate conduct. The test for determining

Hs whether it was error to refuse instructions on lesser included
offenses is whether there was evidence adduced at trial to

be 25

which the included offense instruction was applicable. Rowley v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 584, 394 N.E.2d 928; Pruitt v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 559,
382 N.E.2d 150. Here, the testimony of the victim concerning the actual
criminal acts was uncontroverted since defendant did not take the stand.
There was no testimony which would support a lesser included offense,
and it was not error to refuse this instruction.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in giving the state’s
instruction No. 5 which instructed the jury that the evidence was to
be considered as a whole and that all incidental or subsidiary
HM facts did not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
This instruction has been approved in Ringham v. State, (1974)
261 Ind. 628, 308 N.E.2d 863. Furthermore, although defendant argues
this was an incomplete instruction, he does not allege that he tendered
a more complete instruction. He has therefore waived any error on
this issue. Miller v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 635, 372 N.E.2d 1168; Brown
v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 484, 346 N.E.2d 559; Woods v. State, (1979) 181
Ind.App. 352, 391 N.E.2d 858.

VIL.

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in considering
certain factors as aggravating circumstances in determining the
sentence. He first argues that it is unconstitutional for the trial court
to consider the same prior crimes that are the basis for the habitual
offender count as also part of the aggravating circumstances. This issue
is moot due to our reversal of the habitual offender conviction under
issue I, above.

Defendant further argues that it was erroneous for the trial court
to consider his previous convictions, an alleged unrelated sexual assault
by defendant, and his juvenile record. The trial judge stated that he
found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating cir-
cumstances and listed the aggravating circumstances in the following
words:

“This Court now states into the record that defendant's prior
record, juvenile record and the presentence report demonstrate
the likelihood that defendant will do further crimes of a like nature,
demonstrate a total lack on defendant's part and disregard for
the life and well being of other persons. This Court believes im-

26 |
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prisonment to be necessary, and defendant has demonstrated
obvious criminal sexual tendencies and he constitutes a danger
to society.”
It is clear that it was proper for the trial court to consider the defend-
ant’s presentence report, his past criminal history and the risk that
he would commit another crime in finding aggravating circum-
Hs stances. West’s Ann. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7 (1978); Williams
v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 408, 393 N.E.2d 149; MeNew v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 214, 391 N.E.2d 607. There is no evidence that the judge
improperly considered any prior charges which had resulted in an ac-
quittal. We find that the trial judge did consider proper factors and
did make an adequate statement of reasons to support the addition
of five years to the basic ten years for a class B felony on the criminal
deviate conduct count.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed as to the conviction on Count II and reversed as to the
convictions on Counts I and III.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
DeBruler and Prentice, JJ., concur.

Pivarnik, J., dissents with opinion in which Givan, C.J., concurs.

DISSENTING OPINION

PIVARNIK, J.—I dissent from the majority opinion on Issue I. The ma-
jority goes far beyond the Supreme Court cases it purports to rely
on, and establishes a new, absurd, illogical and unworkable “rule” con-
cerning the filing of charges where the defendant has successfully
appealed from a conviction on a separate, distinct charge.

The majority purports to rely on North Carolina v. Pearce, (1969)
395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, and Blackledge v. Perry,
(1974) 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628, and freely quotes ap-
parently supportive language from those cases. In North Carolina v.
Pearce, the defendant received what amounted to a greater sentence
after an appeal, reversal and retrial for the same charge he had been
convicted of in the first trial. The Court phrased the issue presented

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there in terms of “constitutional limitations upon the imposition of a
more severe punishment after conviction for the same offense upon
retrial.” 395 U.S. at 715-16, 89 S.Ct. at 2075, 23 L.Ed.2d at 664 (empha-
sis added). The Court held that a defendant’s exercise of his right to
appeal may not be deterred by the threat of “retaliatory motivation
on the part of the sentencing judge.” Id. at 725, 89 S.Ct. at 2080, 23
L.Ed.2d at 669. Thus, “whenever a judge imposes a more severe
sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reason for his doing
so must affirmatively appear.” Id. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081, 23 L.Ed.2d
at 670. Nowhere does the Court suggest or even imply that this rule
would also apply to separate, distinct charges of which the defendant
has neither been previously convicted nor sentenced.

In Blackledge v. Perry, supra, the United States Supreme Court ap-
plied the notions expressed in Pearce to prosecutors. In Perry, the
defendant was initially charged with assault, a misdemeanor under
North Carolina law. After being convicted in the misdemeanor court,
Perry filed notice of his intent to exercise his absolute statutory right
to a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. Thereafter, the
prosecutor obtained an indictment charging Perry with assault with
a deadly weapon with the intent to kill, a felony. Perry pleaded guilty
and received a substantially greater sentence than he had received
for the misdemeanor conviction. Following the logic of North Carolina
v. Pearce, the Supreme Court found this result denied Perry due pro-
cess. The Court specifically noted: “The indictment covered the same
conduct for which Perry had been tried and convicted in the District
Court.” 417 U.S. at 23, 94 S.Ct. at 2100, 40 L.Ed.2d at 631. The Court
in Blackledge v. Perry again focused on the “danger of vindictiveness.”
And, as it had done in Pearce, the Court in Perry specifically defined
the context in which such possible vindictiveness is relevant:

“A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his
statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the
State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the
original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased poten-
tial period of incarceration.”

Id. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102-03, 40 L.Ed.2d at 634-35 (emphasis added).
Thus, both Pearce and Perry specifically concerned only cases involv-

28 ee
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ing the same or substituted charges which pertained to exactly the
same conduct. Again, just as in Pearce, there is nothing in Blackledge
v. Perry which even remotely suggests that this rule applies to separate,
distinct crimes of which the defendant has not been previously con-
victed or sentenced.

Supreme Court cases subsequent to North Carolina v. Pearce also
recognized the limited context in which “vindictiveness” is relevant.
In Colten v, Kentucky, (1972) 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1958, 32 L.Ed.2d
584, the defendant argued that Pearce was applicable to Kentucky's
two-tier system of processing misdemeanors. The Court addressed Col-
ten’s contention and described Pearce in this fashion:

“[Plearce did not turn simply on the fact of conviction, appeal,
reversal, reconviction, and a greater sentence. The court was there
concerned with the two defendants who, after their convictions
had been set aside on appeal, were reconvicted for the same offenses
and sentenced to longer prison terms.”
407 US. at 116, 92 S.Ct. at 1960, 32 L.Hd.2d at 593 (emphasis added).
While the rule of North Carolina v. Pearce was not extended to the
situation presented in Colten v. Kentucky, that case also involved only
one offense. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, (1978) 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977,
36 L.Ed.2d 714. See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, (1978) 434 U.S. 357,
98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (discussed infra). Thus, the United States
Supreme Court is one of the courts which has, as the majority opinion
states, “attempted to limit Blackledge [v. Perry] and Pearce to fact situa-
tions in which there has been only the substitution of a more serious
charge and not the addition of charges.” Slip op. at 6.

The language of these cases plainly and consistently reveals the
United States Supreme Court’s concern with the treatment of the same
or substituted charges by courts and prosecutors. Just as plainly, these
cases in no way implicitly suggest or logically require the applicability
of the vindictiveness rule to cases involving separate, additional crimes.
Clearly, then, the majority here is not simply following the dictates
of Pearce and Perry, but is fashioning out of whole cloth a rule for situa-
tions to which Pearce and its progeny undoubtedly were never intended
to apply. The logic of the majority opinion would give rise to a sugges-
tion of vindictiveness whenever a prosecutor files any other, additional

[| 29
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charges against a defendant after that defendant has successfully ap-
pealed a conviction for a separate crime. I have very serious doubts
as to whether Pearce and Perry dictate such a result.

Further, the majority opinion by its terms, is not restricted in its
application only to refiled charges which arose out of the same general
incident, which happens to be true in this case. Thus, we must assume
the majority's sweeping language would apply to any charges which
the prosecutor has the misfortune to file after the defendant has ob-
tained a reversal of a conviction for some totally unrelated charge. In
fact, the thrust of the majority’s opinion indicates that this vindictive-
ness rule would apply to additional charges which have never before
been filed. The majority repeatedly emphasizes the timing of the refil-
ing, as evidence of the alleged vindictiveness. Of course, the initial fil-
ing of an unrelated charge could also occur shortly after the defendant
has successfully appealed some other, unrelated conviction. The tim-
ing of such a filing could be coincidental, or, obviously, it could be
justifiably prompted by the reversal the defendant has obtained. In
such a situation, the majority would apparently require the prosecutor
to justify the timing of the new filing of charges. I do not believe he
should be required to make such a justification, and, more importantly,
Ido not read Pearce and its progeny to require this justification. I do
not believe the Court in Pearce and its progeny intended to curtail
or limit the prosecutor’s otherwise broad discretion in the sweeping,
substantial fashion the majority has here. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
supra.

In an astoundingly summary manner, the majority equates the fil-
ing of a more severe charge with the refiling of an additional charge
or charges. The logic of such an equation is fatally flawed. In the former
situation, the more severe charge, by definition, covers the same con-
duct as the original charge; in the latter situation, as in the case before
us, the additional charge, by definition, covers altogether different,
independently culpable conduct. Thus, in the Pearce line of cases, the
defendant received a greater penalty upon conviction of the same or
substituted charges which arose out of the same conduct. In the case
now before us, Cherry received a greater total sentence for three
charges, one of which—at Cherry's request —was not tried in the first

trial, and two of which were later dismissed and then reinstated by
the prosecutor.

Saying, as the majority does, that the additional charges in this case
pertained to “the same basic criminal conduct” — which, emphatically,
they do not—does not bring the case before us under the principles
of Pearce and Perry. The fact that the rape occurred shortly before
or shortly after the criminal deviate conduct, does not mean that these
two charges are for “the same basic criminal conduct.” It would seem
even more obvious that the habitual criminal charge, which does not
really require any additional acts, does not involve “the same basic
criminal conduct” as either of the other two charges. This newly-coined
phrase only confuses the issue and attempts to blur the fundamental
distinction between refiling the same but greater charge, and refiling
separate charges, which concern completely separate acts. Further,
this “standard” of “the same basic criminal conduct” raises many more
questions than it answers. For example, may we now logically say that,
if the rape charge and the deviate conduct charge do involve “the same
basic criminal conduct” for purposes of this issue, are they not also
the “same” for double jeopardy purposes? See Elmore v. State, (1978)
259 Ind. 532, 382 N.E.2 893.

The critical distinction between the situation found in North Carolina
v. Pearce and its progeny and the situation presented here may be seen
in another way. In the Pearce line of cases, the application of the vin-
dictiveness rule occurred only when the sentencing authority or the
prosecutor attempted to “up the ante” and retaliate against the defend-
ant for having successfully pursued his appeal rights and, in effect,
punish him more severely for precisely the same conduct, i.e., for the
same or a substituted charge. In those cases, it was only because the
defendant had exercised his right to appeal that the prosecutor or
sentencing authority was even in a position where he could attempt
to “up the ante.” In other words, if the defendant had not fully exercised
his rights, the specter of vindictiveness would never have arisen in any
of the Pearce line of cases. The facts of Blackledge v. Perry, supra, il-
lustrate this proposition. In that case, if the defendant had not pur-
sued his right to a trial de novo, and the prosecutor had nonetheless
obtained the indictment for the felony charge, that charge undoubted-

[| 31
PC

ly would have been subject to dismissal as a violation of Perry's right
against double jeopardy. Thus, the guidelines of Pearce and its pro-
geny necessarily presuppose the defendant's successful exercise of his
appeal rights.

In the case before us, however, the initial filing and the refiling of
the rape and habitual criminal charges were never contingent upon
Cherry’s exercise of any of his rights. From their inception, these charges
stood independently from the criminal deviate conduct charge. As long as
initially, they remained valid regardless of the outcome, at trial or on
appeal, of the deviate conduct charge. Even if Cherry had lost on his
motion to correct error and lost on appeal, the prosecutor would have
been acting within his discretion in refiling the rape and habitual
criminal charges. The same would be true if Cherry had been acquitted
of the deviate conduct charge in the first trial. Likewise, the prosecutor
would have been acting within his discretion if he had never dismissed
the two charges. (In retrospect, he no doubt wishes he had not done
so.) Further, he could have dismissed and then refiled the charges after
sentencing but before the court's decision on the motion to correct error,
or even before that motion was filed. Thus, the prosecutor here was
in a position of dealing with the rape and habitual criminal charges
as he wished and when he wished, and his alternatives with respect
to those charges were in no way limited by the defendant's course of
action, or the result of that action, with respect to the deviate conduct.
charge. Therefore, because these charges retained validity regardless
of the outcome of Cherry’s motion to correct error concerning the
deviate conduct conviction, there could have been no possible fear on
Cherry’s part that the State would retaliate by filing a more severe
charge in liew of the deviate conduct charge. See Blackledge v. Perry,
supra, 417 U.S. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102, 40 L.Ed.2d at 634-35.

On the other hand, obviously, none of the alternatives discussed
above which were present in this case would have been available in
any fashion to the prosecutor in Blackledge v. Perry. The reason is equal-
ly obvious: his alternatives were wholly dependent upon the defend-
ant’s actions. This was the central point of the Pearce line of cases.
Plainly, then, it is in that context when the prosecutor's vindictiveness
becomes relevant. If, as in this case, his dispositional alternatives are

32 |
Es
not dependent on the defendant's exercise of his rights, the prosecutor’s

motivation in pursuing any of those alternatives is not relevant to deter-
mining the validtiy of the resulting convictions.

Finally, in my view, this case is closely analagous to Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, to which
the majority opinion fails to pay even the most cursory lip service.
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the defendant was charged with uttering
a forged instrument, an offense carrying a two-to-ten year prison term.
After arraignment, during subsequent plea negotiations, the prosecutor
informed Hayes that if he did not plead guilty to the indictment and
accept the prosecutor’s recommended five-year sentence, the prosecutor
would seek another indictment charging Hayes under Kentucky's
habitual criminal statute. Conviction under that statute carried with
it (at that time) a mandatory life sentence. Hayes refused to plead guilty
to the forgery charge, and the prosecutor then obtained the habitual
criminal indictment. Hayes was found guilty on both counts, and subse-
quently challenged the enhanced sentence as being violative of Black-
ledge v. Perry, supra.

The United States Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s action
in seeking the additional indictment did not violate due process. In
explaining this result, the Court emphasized the “give-and-take” pres-
ent in a plea-bargain situation, and also pointed out: “It is not disputed
that the recidivist charge was fully justified by the evidence, that the
prosecutor was in possession of this evidence at the time of the original
indictment, and that Hayes’ refusal to plead guilty to the original charge
was what led to his indictment under the habitual criminal statute.”
Id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 666, 54 L.Ed.2d at 608. The Court noted that,
so long as the defendant was free to accept or reject the prosecutor’s
offer —and thereby assert or waive his right to plead not guilty —there
is no element of prosecutorial punishment or retaliation.

Insofar as prosecutorial vindictiveness is concerned, the right to plead
not guilty is similar to the right to appeal. In the former situation,
the defendant may waive his right to plead not guilty because he wants
a “better deal” of some sort. That “deal” may include the prosecutor’s
dismissal of other valid, independently chargeable offenses. On the

[| 33
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other hand, he may exercise his right to plead not guilty. If he does
so, under Bordenkircher v. Hayes, he runs the risk that the prosecutor
will exercise his wide discretion to his detriment, by making the defend-
ant “fac[e] [additional] charges on which he was plainly subject to prose-
cution.” Id. at 365, 98 S.Ct. at 669, 54 L.Ed.2d at 612.

In the latter situation, the defendant in this case was faced with
parallel alternatives. Cherry chose to exercise his right to appeal, just
as the defendant Hayes exercised his right to a trial. Cherry could have
waived his right to appeal, just as Hayes could have accepted the prose-
cutor’s offer and waived his rights. Cherry knew, or should have known,
just as Hayes knew, that the added charges might be brought against
him. In fact, in Cherry’s case at least, the added charges could have
been maintained regardless of Cherry’s decision on whether to exer-
cise or waive his rights. Of course, the prosecutor probably would not
have refiled the rape and habitual criminal charges if Cherry had lost
his appeal from the deviate conduct conviction. However, “[djefendants
advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safe-
guards are presumptively capable of intelligent choices in response
to prosecutorial persuasion. .. .” Id. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 668, 54 L.Ed.2d
at 611. Thus, I would view this case as being analagous to Bordenkir-
cher v. Hayes, supra, and I would hold that the prosecutor was merely
presenting Cherry with charges the latter knew might be refiled (in
any event) and on which he was plainly subject to prosecution.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bordenkircher v. Hayes also effec-
tively challenges the majority’s assertion that “[t]he underlying con-
cern of the Blackledge [v. Perry] and Pearce decisions is that it is the
realistic apprehension of vindictiveness, rather than vindictiveness in
fact, which controls.” Slip op. at 6. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court
explained the problem in Pearce and Perry in this fashion:

“The Court has emphasized that the due process violation in cases
such as Pearce and Perry lay not in the possibility that a defendant
might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, see Colten
v. Kentucky, (1972) 407 U.S. 104, 92 8.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584;
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, (1978) 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d
714, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating
against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction.”

34 ee
Ld

434 U.S. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 667-68, 54 L.Ed.2d at 610. If the majority
here would equate the “realistic apprehension of vindictiveness” with
“the possibility that a defendant might be deterred,” then, according
to Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the majority's reading of Pearce and Perry
is flawed in this respect as well. Equally inaccurate, then, is the ma-
jority’s claim that the “underlying concern” of Blackledge v. Perry is
“with the appearance of vindictiveness and its chilling effect on defend-
ants.” Slip op. at 6.

In sum, I believe the majority has grossly misinterpreted Supreme
Court cases dealing with the issue of vindictiveness, and thereby
reached a result which the Supreme Court never contemplated and,
no doubt, never intended. I would affirm the convictions for rape and
habitual criminality.

Givan, C. J., concurs.
NotE—Reported at 414 N.E.2d 301.
Pe

KENNETH R. LAX v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 11798326. Filed January 7, 1981. Rehearing denied March 23, 1981.]

Frederick T. Work, of Gary, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.—In a trial by jury, Defendant (Appellant) was convicted
of Robbery, a Class A Felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979), and
sentenced to thirty (30) years imprisonment. His direct appeal presents
the following issues:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in not allowing a witness to relate
defendant’s religious activities;

(2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defend-
ant to call a certain witness;

(3) Whether the record demonstrates that prejudice of the trial
judge denied him a fair trial and if so, whether the errors flowing from
bias rose to the level of fundamental error;

(4) Whether the trial court erred in not permitting defense counsel
to read certain excerpts from law books during closing argument; and

(5) Whether the trial court erred in failing to reinstruct the jury
after deliberations had commenced.

ISSUE I

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in not allowing
a witness to relate the religious activities of the defendant. He asserts
that the evidence would have tended to establish his good character,
thus, bolstering his defense of mistaken identification and alibi. The

contention is without merit.

The defendant cites the decisions of Wagner v. State, (1886) 107 Ind.
71, 7 N.E. 896 and McQueen v. State, (1882) 82 Ind. 72 to substantiate
his position. However, these cases only support the proposi-
Hl tion that evidence of a defendant’s general character is admis-
sible; they do not speak to the admissibility of specific lauda-
tory acts. This is because such acts are generally not admissible to
demonstrate one’s reputation or character. See Pointon v. State, (1978)
267 Ind. 624, 372 N.E.2d 1159; Vaughn v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 142, 378
N.E.2d 859. See also McFarland v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 105, 390 N.E.2d
989; Woods v. State, (1954) 233 Ind. 320, 119 N.E.2d 558. The trial court
did not err in disallowing the defendant to present evidence of specific
acts of his good conduct.

ISSUE II

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing
to allow him to call a certain witness. The defendant's offer to prove
was that if the witness were allowed to testify, he would relate that
he was arrested on January 11, 1978 (the instant crime occurred on
January 9, 1978). Further, the witness would testify that he was then
told by a police officer that he fit the description of a suspect in the
instant crime; that he was “very near” a composite drawing of that
suspect; and that he was wearing the same clothing as the suspect.
We view the trial court’s ruling as being proper.

The record is not clear as to the reason that the court refused to
permit the defendant to call the witness who was, at that time, standing
trial in another courtroom. However, in view of the offer to

I prove, we need not consider the correctness of that ruling,
because the offer to prove discloses that the anticipated
testimony of the witness embodied inadmissible hearsay. “ ‘Hearsay
evidence is testimony in court * * * of a statement made out of court,
such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of mat-
ters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility
of the out-of-court asserter.’ ” Patterson v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 55, 56-57,
324 N.E.2d 482, 484 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Harvey v. State, (1971)
256 Ind. 473, 476, 269 N.E.2d 759, 760). The trial court did not err in

P| 37
Es

refusing to allow the defendant to call the witness.
ISSUE III

The defendant contends that the trial court was prejudiced against
him, thereby denying him the due process right to a fair trial. The
defendant complains of several instances of alleged judicial misconduct,
the most notable being a question, which if overheard by the jury would
have been depreciative of the testimony of two prior defense witnesses.
The other instances alleged were the badgering of defense counsel and
the prompting of objections by the State.

The instance first mentioned was a question addressed to counsel
who had appeared on behalf of a witness who had been called. The
question was an oblique comment upon the unlikelihood that the at-
torney, who is white, had ever been mistaken for the defendant, who
is black. It was obviously ill-considered and inappropriate humor and
was depreciative of the defense of mistaken identity. However, it oc-
curred in a conference at the bench and, in all probability, without the
hearing of the jury.

Finally, the defendant entered no objection to the judge’s comments

now complained of and made no motion for admonition with reference

to them. He is, therefore, now in no position to complain, see

HE Fought v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 158, 390 N.E.2d 1011, as the

conduct in no manner approached the level of fundamental

error. See Clark v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 161, 352 N.E.2d 762. See also
Nelson v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 218, 409 N.E.2d 637.

ISSUE IV

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in not permitting
his trial counsel, during closing argument, to quote from a United States
Supreme Court opinion and a legal article. In support thereof, the
defendant asserts that he has a right to read the “law” to the jury.
We do not agree.

Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution gives the jury the
right to determine the law, as well as the facts, in criminal cases.
Because of this constitutional provision, a trial court may not

38 ee
Le

Hi sunduly interfere with a defendant's presentation of legal argu-
ment. However, reading from cases and other legal authorities
does not equate with arguing the law. Lynch v. State, (1857) 9 Ind. 541.
As stated in Murphy v. State, (1855) 6 Ind. 490, 491: “The Court would
not be bound to sit and hear counsel read all the numerous treatises
on criminal law to the jury; and if not all, why any? Where would the
Court stop?” It therefore follows that, while the reading of “law” to
a jury is permissible, a trial court need not allow it in all instances.
Rather, it is a matter of sound discretion, the exercise of which we
will not overturn absent manifest abuse. Lynch, 9 Ind. at 541-42;
Sizemore v. State, (1979) 181 Ind.App. 409, 391 N.E.2d 1179; Kilgore
v. State, (1976) 170 Ind.App. 569, 354 N.E.2d 254. See Hubbard v. State,
(1974) 262 Ind. 176, 313 N.E.2d 346; Harvey v. State, (1872) 40 Ind. 516;
Murphy, 6 Ind. at 491. The defendant has not persuaded us that the
trial court abused its discretion.

The defendant's reliance upon the decision in Klepfer v. State, (1890)
121 Ind. 491, 23 N.E. 287 is misplaced. In Klepfer, this court held that
it was not prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to read from our
decisions and from “law books” during closing argument. Id. at 494,
23 N.E. at 288. Though we there stated that a prosecutor had a “right”
to so read, we now perceive the use of that word as being ill-advised.
We interpret Klepfer as standing for the proposition that it is not ipso
facto misconduct for counsel to read the “law” to the jury and not for
the proposition that the right may not be limited by the Court.

At first blush, our decision in Trainer v. State, (1926) 198 Ind. 502,
154 N.E. 273, also appears supportive of the defendant's assertion.
However, a close examination of that case reveals the holding to be
that it is reversible error to instruct a jury that it must not consider
our decisions in reaching its verdict. Id. at 508-09, 154 N.E. at 275. To
the extent that it may foster a belief in an absolute right to read “law”
to the jury, it is expressly disapproved.

We further note that the defendant neither prefaced his attempted
quotation with a statement that it was argument, Kilgore, 170 Ind.App.
at 569, 354 N.E.2d at 256, Sizemore, 391 N.E.2d at 1182; see

HE Harvey, 40 Ind. at 518-19, nor demonstrated how the so-called
“law” he wished to quote pertained to his case. Kilgore, 170

Lt 39
L

Ind.App. at 573, 354 N.E.2d at 256-57. It appears that what he was
proposing to read was a selected portion of an opinion which, taken
out of context, would indicate that, as a matter of law, eyewitness iden-
tifications are inherently unreliable. Such is not the law and is not the
holding of the case being quoted. Had counsel sought to read from the
materials with the announced purpose of demonstrating judicial
acknowledgment that eyewitness identifications are not infallible and
must be assessed for credibility by the trier of fact, as other evidence
is assessed, he would have been entitled to do so. The manner in which
he proposed to read the materials, however, was improper, because
it would have been misleading, and, under these circumstances, we
find no error in the court’s ruling.

ISSUE V

The defendant's final contention is that the trial court erred in fail-
ing to reinstruct the jury. He submits that during deliberation, the
jury foreman informed the bailiff that the jury was confused as to the
varying degree of felonies. However, there is nothing in the record
to substantiate the submission. Therefore, there is no error presented.
Grimes v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 378, 412 N.E.2d 75. Hill v. State, (1977)
267 Ind. 411, 370 N.E.2d 889.

We find no error. The judgment is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NoTE~Reported at 414 N.E.2d 555.

Le |

JOHN E. MOORE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

(No. 180817. Filed January 7, 1981.]

Christopher C. Zoeller, Peters, Carter & Zoeller, of Indianapolis, for
appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, John E. Moore, was convicted by a jury
of second-degree murder, Ind. Code § 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975) and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. His direct appeal raises the following
issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior
assault by defendant upon the victim;

2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the
victim into evidence;

3. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give two of defend-
ant’s tendered instructions on self-defense; and

4, Whether the verdict of the jury is sustained by sufficient
evidence.

A summary of the facts from the record most favorable to the state
shows that defendant was separated from his wife, Glenda Rice Moore.

Le 41

Mrs. Moore was living at the home of her mother, Odessa Rice. On
January 27, 1977, an Indianapolis police officer was directed to Mrs.
Rice’s address by a radio report of a man with a knife. The officer,
Terry Boyer, testified that he saw defendant holding a knife to his
estranged wife’s throat and then saw him beating her with his fists.
Boyer was finally able to stop defendant and handcuff him.

About two months later, on March 14, 1977, defendant came to Mrs.
Rice’s home. He attempted to talk to Glenda Moore when she came
out of the house and crossed the street to get into a car. Moore said
that there was nothing to talk about. Mrs. Rice was on the porch and
saw defendant pull a gun and fire at his wife. Moore put her hand up
to her face and exclaimed, “Oh, John. You shot me!” She threw down
her purse and keys and ran down an alley. Defendant ran after her
and fired more shots at her.

When police arrived, they found a group of people gathered in the
alley and defendant's wife lying on the ground dead. An autopsy dis-
closed that she had been hit by two gunshots. One wound was across
the bridge of the nose and right side of the face. A second shot, which
was the cause of death, had penetrated the left side of her body, going
entirely through the heart and right lung.

L

Defendant first contends that it was erroneous to admit into evidence
the testimony of Officer Boyer concerning the prior assault by defend-
ant on the victim. Defendant had filed a motion in limine concerning
this testimony prior to trial; however, the motion was denied. Defend-
ant renewed his objection when the testimony was introduced at trial.

It is clear that evidence of prior threats and acts of beating or assault
upon the same victim is admissible in a murder trial as proof of malice
and intent to kill. Martin v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 583, 372

HE N.E.2d 181; Greer v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 20, 245 N.H.2d 158;
Corbin v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 147, 234 N.E.2d 261. There

was no error in admitting the evidence of the prior assault for this
purpose. Defendant also argues that one part of the officer’s testimony
about the prior assault was inadmissible hearsay. The officer testified
that as he approached the building where he could observe defendant

42 |
Ld

attacking the victim, defendant shouted, “Don’t come in, pig.” We find
no error here since evidence about the entire prior assault including
defendant’s actions and remarks at that time, was admissible as proof
of malice and intent to kill.

0.

The defendant next contends that it was error to admit into evidence
a photograph of the upper part of the nude body of the victim. It is
well settled that photographs are admissible when testimony concern-
ing that which they depict would be proper. Autopsy photographs that
are illustrative of a witness’s testimony and tend to prove the cause
of death are admissible. Grooms v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 212, 379 N.E.2d
458; Tinsley v. State, (1977) 265 Ind. 642, 358 N.E.2d 743.

In the instant case, the pathologist testified about the path of the
bullet through decedent’s heart and lung, causing death. The witness
referred to the photograph which was illustrative of his testi-
Hs mony and was not unnecessarily gruesome. The photograph
was also identified by the mother of the victim as that of her
daughter, Glenda Rice Moore. Thus, since the photograph was not un-
necessarily gruesome, was relevant and material, and was illustrative
of a witness’s testimony, there was no error in its admission.

I.

Defendant argues that it was error for the trial court to refuse to
give two of his tendered instructions covering the issue of self-defense.
We find no merit to this contention since the court gave its own in-
struction covering this issue in the following words:

“A person is justified in using reasonable force against another
person to protect himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
However a person is justified in using deadly force only if he
reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious
bodily injury to himself or a third person or the commission of
a forcible felony.”

This instruction correctly covers all the essential elements of defend-
ant’s tendered instruction No. 1.

Defendant’s tendered instruction No. 2 again covered the elements

[| 43
Ld

of self-defense but also included a statement that the state had to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-
I defense. We find no error in the refusal of this instruction,
since there is no precedent in Indiana which requires such
an instruction. It is true that once self-defense is pleaded, the state
is required to prove the absence of self-defense, but this burden may
be satisfied by reliance upon the state’s evidence in chief. Johnson v.
State, (1980) 274 Ind. 198, 409 N.H.2d 621; Williams v. State, (1978) 269
Ind. 265, 379 N.E.2d 981; Harris v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 672, 382 N.B.2d
913. In this case, the jury was correctly instructed on the state’s burden
to prove all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. Another instruction dealing only with the burden of proof as
to self-defense was unnecessary. Montague v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 51,
360 N.E.2d 181; Woods v. State, (1974) 162 Ind.App. 316, 319 N.E.2d
688. We find no error in the refusal of defendant’s instructions.

Iv.

Defendant finally contends that the verdict is not supported by suf-
ficient evidence. He testified in his own defense that he was afraid
of his wife because she always carried a gun. He testified that he shot
at his wife in order to scare her and not to kill her. He further testified
that a third person was in the alley behind him and fired the fatal shot.
This testimony was contradicted by the victim’s mother who testified
that she did not see any gun in her daughter's hands. She testified
that her daughter:

“threw her pocketbook and her keys down and she started run-
nin’ and he started runnin’ behind her, still steady shootin’ at her.
And she said, ‘Oh don’t kill me. Don’t kill me, John! You've already
shot me, but please don’t kill me.’ And he just steady, steady

shootin’.

Another witness testified that he did see a third person in the alley
but did not see another gun.

It is well settled that the resolution of any conflict in the evidence
is for the jury. As a court of review, we will neither reweigh the
evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Rather,
we will look only to that evidence most favorable to the state
and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If there

44 ee
LC

is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion
of the trier of fact, the verdict will not be overturned. Wofford v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 518, 394 N.E.2d 100; Poindeater v. State, (1978) 268 Ind.
167, 874 N.E.2d 509. In this case, there was ample substantive evidence
to support the jury’s verdict that defendant intentionally shot and killed
his estranged wife.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

DEBRULER, J.—The accused testified that he shot his wife in self-
defense. A defense witness testified that the wife always carried a gun
in her purse and had twice pulled it on appellant. A second defense
witness testified that the victim’s mother had a gun at the scene. This
proof of self-defense was not without weakness, but nevertheless in
a homicide prosecution it was sufficient to raise the defense of self-
defense. The trial judge and the parties agree that the defense was
raised. When the defense of self-defense is raised the burden is on the
prosecution to negate it. Williams v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 265, 379
N.E.2d 981; White v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 32, 349 N.E.2d 156; Johnson
v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 579, 271 N.E.2d 123. This burden is added to
the existing burden of the prosecution to prove the elements of the
offense. It requires the prosecution to convince the trier of fact to a
certainty beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the accused pur-
posely or intentionally killed another human being, but in addition that
he was not justified in doing so. The very essence of a trial in which
self-defense is an issue, is the resolution of that issue by the trier of
fact. The accused has a right to that, and as an appellate judge I want
to know that he got it, and in a proper manner. A guilty verdict, because
of its generality, does not provide assurance that the issue was resolved.
Such assurance must come in jury situations from the jury instruc-

P| 45
a

tions. The instructions given by the court in this instance do not pro-
vide that assurance, and I would, therefore, not permit the verdict to
stand. Here, the jury was instructed that the State had the burden
of proving the defendant guilty and was given an instruction defining
the elements of self-defense. In the absence of an instruction fully and
fairly informing the jury that a guilty verdict is inappropriate unless
it is convinced that the defendant was not justified in killing, one can-
not infer that the verdict of guilty carried with it a determination of
the jury that the defendant was not justified in that act. If, as the ma-
jority concludes, there is no precedent requiring such an instruction,
I would create one in this case.

Note—Reported at 414 N.E.2d 558.
De

CHARLES M. SMITH, A/K/A CHARLES M. MURPHY v.
STATE OF INDIANA.

(No, 5808125. Filed January 7, 1981]

Bruce S. Cowen, of Fort Wayne, for appellant.

46 ee

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant), following a trial by jury, was con-
victed of Attempted Robbery, a Class A Felony, Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1
and 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979), and was sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of thirty (30) years. By this direct appeal, he charges that the
trial court erred in five separate instances when it sustained the State’s
objections to questions asked by defense counsel on cross-examination
of State’s witnesses. His ultimate contention is that the cumulative
effect of such limitations upon cross-examination denied him his con-
stitutional right to a fair trial.

Defendant's first assignment is that the trial court erred in refusing
the defendant the right to cross examine State’s witness, Rennee
Holmes, about what she had told an investigating police of-
I ficer with reference to the appearance of the perpetrator of
the crime. However, the briefing requirements of Ind. R. App.
P. 8.2(B)(5) and 8.3(A)(7) have not been minimally complied with, in that
we have not been referred to the page or pages of the transcript reflect-
ing the proposed questions and exclusionary rulings. Further, we have
not been advised as to how the issues and contentions relate to the
particular facts-of this case. In fact, we have not even been made privy
to the particular question or questions that were proposed and excluded.
We have nothing more than counsel’s assertion that the trial court
refused to permit cross-examination upon a particular subject and a
quotation from a recent opinion to the general effect that a witness
may be cross examined as to statements made that conflict with those
made upon direct examination. The issue has not been properly
presented and warrants no review or further comment.

Defendant’s other assignments relate to alleged refusals of the trial
court to permit cross-examination of State’s witnesses Rennee Holmes
and Kevin Kirk in reference to what each had said on prior

I occasions. By reference to the pages of the transcript of the
evidence cited by Defendant, we perceive that in each instance

counsel sought to impeach the witnesses by showing that they had made
prior inconsistent statements. However, such impeachment has cer-

[| 47

tain requisites. First, a proper foundation must be laid by directing
the witnesses’ attention to the prior statement by giving the substance
of the statement, and by stating the date, place and person to whom
it was made. Gradison v. State et al., (1973) 260 Ind. 688, 709, 300 N.E.2d
67, 81. The purpose of the foundation is to give warning to the witness
to enable him to prepare to deny the prior statement or to explain
it away, if he admits having made it. In general, the courts of this state
will accept, “as a proper foundation, any question framed in such a
manner as would adequately call the alleged utterance to the atten-
tion of the witness sufficiently to enable him to recollect the same,
if recallable.” Id. In the instances concerning which Defendant charges
that the court refused to permit cross-examination, counsel had made
no attempt to lay a proper foundation.

Two witnesses, Rennee Holmes and Kevin Kirk had observed the
robbery attempt, and both had identified the defendant on direct exam-
ination. Apparently counsel desired to challenge the consistency of such
testimony with prior statement of the witnesses with respect to
whether the robber’s facial hair was of sufficient quantity to be
classified as “sideburns.” It also appears that the witness, Holmes, had
been previously deposed, that counsel had the deposition in his hands
during cross-examination, and that the witness had just explained what
she had intended to convey by her prior statement upon the subject.
Thereupon counsel asked: “Are you saying that this deposition is in-
correct, then?” The court correctly sustained the objection, with the
comment that he was doing so because of the phrasing. There was
nothing about the witness’ prior testimony that indicated she disputed
the correctness of the content of the deposition. Further, the court
expressly advised counsel, on this occasion, that he could “pursue [his]
questioning.”

Counsel continued to cross examine the witness with respect to the
description of the robber she had given the investigating officer. Again,
counsel apparently wanted to attempt to impeach the witness by using
the statements from her deposition. The following colloquy ensued:
Question: “Allright, again, this is deposition of Rennee Holmes—
Mr. Sims: “Judge, I'm going to object to the form.

48 ee
Po
Court: “Objection sustained.

Question: ‘Would you read the front cover of this? (presumably

presenting the deposition)

Mr. Sims: “Judge, the same objection.

Court: “Sustained.”

With this, counsel continued to cross examine the witness but aban-
doned his attempt to impeach her by use of her deposition.

With respect to the witness, Kirk, Defendant asserts in his brief
that he was cross examining on the matter of the robber’s description,
both as given in direct testimony and as previously given to the police
and that the court “refused to allow reference to the police report about
the matter of facial hair.” The cited portion of the record reveals the

following:

“Q. Do you recall whether he had any facial hair or not?

“A. Yes, I thought he did.

“Q. You thought he did?

“A. Yes.

“Q. Would you say that the police report was inaccurate if it
indicated that you had said that there was no facial hair?
“MR. SIMS: To which, Judge, I’m going to object.
“COURT: Objection sustained.

“Q. If Officer—do you recall having a conversation with Officer
Manlove, who is sitting here next to the prosecutor?

“A. Yes, I do.

“Q. Ifhe were to get on the stand later on and say that you had
said that the person was clean-shaven, would you say that
he was lying?

“A. No, I would—

“MR. SIMS: To which I will object, Your Honor, again.
“COURT: Objection sustained.”

The questions were hypothetical and premised upon facts not in
evidence. They were argumentative and had a potential for misleading

[| 49

the jury, regardless of the answer that might have been forthcoming.

We see nothing unduly restrictive in the court’s management of the
cross-examination. If there were, in fact, bases for impeachment of the
witnesses, the inability to effect them appears to have stemmed from
counsel’s miscomprehension of the mechanics of such procedure, rather
than from any reluctance of the trial court to permit it.

Defendant further charges that the cumulative effect of the curtail-
ment of his cross-examination was to deny him a fair trial. However,
we have found no curtailment, hence it follows that this final conten-
tion is without merit.

We find no error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NoTE— Reported at 414 N.E.2d 299.

CARLTON HATCHER v. STATE OF INDIANA.

(No. 179821. Filed January 8, 1981]

James A, Neel, Davis, Neel & Headlee, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted in a trial by jury,
of two counts of armed robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for
two consecutive terms of ten (10) years each. We find it necessary to
reverse the judgment because of impermissibly suggestive identifica-
tion procedures employed by the State.

Two black males entered a restaurant during the early afternoon.
By use of guns and threats, they took money belonging to the business
entity from one employee, Miss Seybert, and personal funds from
another employee, Mr. Doyle. Both employees saw the bandits during
the episode.

P| 51
ee

Indianapolis Police Officer Gillespie conducted photographic displays
on several occasions for Seybert and Doyle. Following one such occa-
sion, Doyle selected a photograph of Defendant as portraying one of
the perpetrators of the robberies. The record reveals that this was
the only occasion on which Defendant's picture was displayed to the
victims. Approximately one week later, Seybert and Doyle each
selected the defendant and Johnny Jones in separate “lineups” arranged
by the police and identified them as the robbers. The defendant had
been charged with the crimes at the time he was displayed in the
“lineups.” He was not provided with counsel for the proceedings, and
the record does not disclose whether or not he had been previously
advised of his right to such counsel.

Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress identification testimony
from Doyle and Seybert upon the grounds that they had identified him
at police “lineup” proceedings conducted subsequent to his arrest for
the offense and in the absence of his counsel. The motion was overruled.
At trial, over timely objection, Doyle and Seybert were permitted to
identify the defendant as one of the persons who robbed them and also
to testify that they had previously so identified the defendant at the
aforementioned “lineups.”

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at or after the time
that adversary judicial proceedings had been initiated against the
accused. Kirby v. Illinois, (1972) 406 U.S. 682, 688, 92 S.Ct.

HB 1877, 1881, 32 L.Ed.2d 411, 417, (plurality opinion). In United
States v. Wade, (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d

1149, and Kirby ». Illinois, supra, the United States Supreme Court
held that the right to counsel encompasses the right to have an at-
torney present at a pre-trial “lineup” identification procedure conducted
at or after the initiation of such criminal proceedings. In this State,
the filing of an information or indictment begins the formal criminal
process. Winston v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 8, 11, 323 N.E.2d 228, 230.
Therefore an accused is entitled to have counsel present at any “lineup”
which is conducted subsequent to the filing of an information or indict-
ment. Kirby v. Illinois, supra; United States v. Wade, supra; Winston
v. State, supra. Thus, it is clear that Defendant had a Sixth Amend-
ment right to have counsel present at the “lineup” conducted in this

case.

52 ee
EE

Moreover, when police conduct an uncounseled “lineup” at a time
when the defendant is entitled to counsel, the sanctions are clear.
Evidence of a witness’ identification of the accused at the
HH “lineup” is per se inadmissible at trial. Gilbert v. California,
(1967) 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178. Defendant
specifically challenges only the admission of evidence of the “lineup”
identification. However, the conduct of an illegal “lineup” calls into ques-
tion the admissibility of the witness’ in-court identification. United
States v. Wade, supra. Thus, a witness’ in-court identification testimony
must also be suppressed, unless the prosecution can establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the in-court identification has an indepen-
dent origin and is not the product of the illegal “lineup.” Gilbert v.
California, supra; United States v. Wade, supra; Morgan v. State, (1980)
272 Ind. 504, 400 N.E.2d 111, 113; Love v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 577,
581, 365 N.E.2d 771, 773. We must first determine, then, whether the
facts of this case reveal a denial of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.

The State argues that Defendant waived his right to have an attorney
present. Officer Gillespie informed him, six days in advance, that he
would be placed in a “lineup.” Gillespie also told him, at that time, that
he had a right to have an attorney present. The defendant, however,
made no response to this information, and Gillespie did not discuss
Hatcher's rights with him any further. Gillespie did not know at that
time whether or not the defendant had counsel. Apparently, he did
have counsel in an unrelated City Court matter, but the record does
not disclose that an attorney had entered an appearance in this case.
Neither does it disclose that Defendant did, in fact, have counsel in
this case. The State argues, however, that Defendant’s knowledge of
the impending “lineup” and of his right to have an attorney present,
together with his failure to have an attorney present effected a waiver
of that right.

The Court in United States v. Wade, supra, did indicate that a defend-
ant may waive his right to have counsel present at the “lineup.” After
discussing the need for and the purpose of having counsel in attend-
ance, the Court said: “Thus both Wade and his counsel should have
been notified of the impending lineup, and counsel’s presence should

[| 53
—

have been a requisite to conduct of the lineup, absent an ‘intelligent
waiver.’ See Carnley v. Cochran, (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8
L.Ed.2d 70.” 388 U.S. at 287, 87 S.Ct. at 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1163.
However, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has
ever been required to determine the standards to be applied in resolv-
ing whether or not to invoke such a waiver.

Waiver of the right to counsel in other contexts has received exten-
sive examination. Such a waiver must be shown to have been know-
ingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. Johnson v. Zerbst, (1938) 304
USS. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357. This showing
must appear on the record. Id.; Russell v. State, (1978) 270 Ind. 55, 383
N.E.2d 309; Owen v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 513, 381 N.E.2d 1235. Further,
courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver.
Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. In addition, the right to counsel does not de-
pend on a request. Carnley v. Cochran, (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 513, 82 S.Ct.
884, 889, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, 76.

Cases decided subsequent to United States v. Wade and Johnson v.
Zerbst clearly establish that these strict standards also apply to invoca-
tion of a waiver of the right to have counsel present at certain
Hsopre-trial proceedings. In Brewer v. Williams, (1977) 480 U.S.
387, 97 S.Ct. 1282, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, the United States Supreme
Court discussed the question of waiver of the right to have counsel
present during an interrogation. The Court explained that “ * * * the
proper standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver
as a matter of federal constitutional law * * * (is whether) * * * the
State [ean] prove ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.’ ” 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d
at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, supra). The Court in Brewer v.
Williams then pointed out that “{t]his strict standard applies equally
to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a
critical stage of pre-trial proceedings. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, (1973)
412 U.S. 218, 238-40, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2053-54, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 869-70;
United States v. Wade, (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937,
18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1163.” Id., 97 S.Ct. at 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d at 440.

In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, the accused argued that a “con-
sent” to a search under the Fourth Amendment should be evaluated

54 ee
EE

by the same standards used to determine a “waiver” for Sixth

HE Amendment purposes, under the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst,

supra. In disposing of this argument, the Court explained that

the waiver standards of Johnson v. Zerbst, “ * * * were enunciated ...

in the context of a fair criminal trial.” 412 U.S. at 235, 93 S.Ct. at 2052,
36 L.Ed.2d at 867. The Court further stated:

“The requirement of a ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ waiver was
articulated in a case involving the validity of a defendant’s deci-
sion to forego a right constitutionally guaranteed to protect a fair
trial and the reliability of the truth-determining process.” Id. at
236, 92 S.Ct. at 2052, 36 L.Ed.2d at 868.

“Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and
intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to pre-
serve a fair trial.” Id. at 237, 92 S.Ct. at 2053, 36 L.Ed.2d at 868.

“The guarantees afforded a criminal defendant at trial also pro-
tect him at certain stages before the actual trial, and any alleged
waiver must meet the strict standard of an intentional relinquish-
ment of a ‘known’ right. But the ‘trial’ guarantees that have been
applied to the ‘pretrial’ stage of the criminal process are similarly
designed to protect the fairness of the trial itself.

“Hence, in United States v. Wade, (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct.
1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, and Gilbert v. California, (1967) 388 U.S.
268, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, the Court held ‘that a post-
indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to
identifying witnesses is a critical stage of the criminal prosecu-
tion; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and
in the absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth [and
Fourteenth] Amendment right to counsel . . .’ Id. at 272, 87 S.Ct.
at 1956, 18 L.Hd.2d at 1186. Accordingly, the Court indicated that
the standard of a knowing and intelligent waiver must be applied
to test the waiver of counsel at such a lineup. See United States
v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at 237, 87 S.Ct. at 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d at
1163.” Id. at 238-39, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d at 869.

See Shelton v. State, (1979) 181 Ind.App. 50, 390 N.E.2d 1048, 1051. Thus,
in light of United States Supreme Court pronouncements on the general
question of waiver, we must evaluate the case before us in terms of
whether or not the defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waived his right to have an attorney present at the lineup.

P| 55
Le

It is clear from the record that Defendant did not waive his right
to counsel. Although Officer Gillespie orally informed him that he was
entitled to have an attorney present, he made no response.
|| Gillespie did not ask whether he wanted to have an attorney
present, whether he had an attorney, or whether he wished
to contact an attorney. The State emphasizes that Defendant did not
ask to have counsel present. However, as we noted above, “where the
assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be fur-
nished counsel does not depend on a request.” Carnley v. Cochran, (1962)
369 U.S. 506, 518, 82 S.Ct. 884, 889, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, 76. See Brewer v.
Williams, (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1282, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424,
439. Likewise, a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver may not
be inferred from a silent record. Fitzgerald v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 39,
47, 257 N.E.2d 305, 311. See Carnley v. Cochran, supra. Therefore, we
hold that the defendant did not waive his Sixth Amendment right to
have an attorney present at the “lineup” proceedings.

It follows that the trial court erred when it admitted the testimony
disclosing the “lineup” identifications. Gilbert v. California, supra, held
that such evidence is per se inadmissible, saying:

“That testimony is the direct result of the illegal lineup ‘come at

by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.’ (Citations omitted) The

State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show that that

testimony had an independent source. Only a per se exclusionary

rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure
that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused’s con-
stitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical

lineup.” 388 U.S. at 272-73, 87 S.Ct. at 1956-57, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1186.

It has been urged that the error in admitting the evidence of the
“lineup” identification was harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt, in-
asmuch as the witnesses also identified the defendant, in court, as one
of the perpetrators of the crime and had sufficient bases for such identi-
fications independent of the “lineup” identifications. Acknowledging,
arguendo, that the in-court identifications were not tainted by the im-
propriety of the “lineup” procedures, the error cannot be regarded as
being harmless.

In Moore v. Illinois, (1977) 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424,

56 ee

a rape victim had been permitted to testify at the trial of the accused
that she had previously identified him at a preliminary hearing at which
he had not been represented by counsel, counsel not having been of-
fered. The trial judge permitted the testimony, notwithstanding the
illegality of the pre-trial identification, because there existed an “inde-
pendent source” for the identification at the uncounseled confrontation.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for
a determination of whether the admission of such evidence was harm-
less constitutional error under Chapman v. California, (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065. The court said:

“But Gilbert held that the prosecution cannot buttress its case-in-
chief by introducing evidence of a pretrial confrontation made in
violation of the accused’s Sixth Amendment rights even if it can
prove that the pretrial identification had an independent source.
‘That testimony is the direct result of the illegal lineup (come at
by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.) (citing Gilbert), and
the prosecution is ‘therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show

that the testimony had an independent source.’ ” 434 U.S. at 281,

98 S.Ct. at 466, 54 L.Ed.2d at 435-36.

We do not question that under given circumstances, such error might
be deemed harmless under the Chapman criteria. However, such cir-
cumstances do not appear from this record. The conviction hinged upon
the identification testimony of Doyle and Seybert. Although their in-
court identifications may have been permissible, notwithstanding their
exposure to the taint of the illegal “lineup” proceedings, it cannot be
said that the additional evidence of their having previously identified
the defendant at the “lineups” did not buttress their in-court identifica-
tions of him.

We have been liberal in the past in determining that in-court identi-
fications had bases independent of improper pre-trial identification pro-
cedures that had a potential to taint. However, to use the

HI “independent basis” test in an indiscriminate manner in every
case as a criteria for finding error’in admitting evidence of

illegal identifications to be harmless, would be to permit the “exploita-
tion of the primary illegality” and would obviate the requirement that
identification procedures be kept free of state induced suggestivity.
It simply cannot be said that the evidence of the “lineup” identifica-

bn 57
a

tions did not buttress the witnesses’ in-court identifications in this case.
Obviously, the evidence was offered for that very purpose. To say that
it did not impact upon the jury would be sheer speculation.

The State has also challenged the entitlement of a charged defend-
ant to have counsel, as a matter of right, at “lineup” proceedings and
argues that the proceedings were properly conducted, saying:

“What would be the function of counsel at a line-up? A defendant’s
right to counsel is not a mere academic right of companionship,
but such counsel is expected to perform a beneficial function. If
counsel had been present at the line-up, he could not have inter-
fered in the proceedings in any way. He could not have objected
to the display of Defendant by the police nor could he have advised
Defendant that he did not have to get in the line. The evidence
of the line-up shows that it was held properly and that Defendant
was identified without any suggestion or coercion by police.”
It is noted that counsel for the State has said that the “evidence,”
not the “record,” of the lineup shows no impropriety.

We do not find it reassuring that the record before us discloses no
impropriety in the “lineup” procedures. To give weight to this would
be to draw an inference from a silent record. The presence of counsel
at identification proceedings serves two vital purposes. First, as pointed
out in United States v. Wade, supra, if counsel is present he can serve
both his client’s interest and that of the prosecution by the prevention
of suggestiveness.

Secondly, if such impropriety occurs, notwithstanding his presence,

he can see that an appropriate record is made. We take no comfort

that the record before us discloses no suggestiveness when

that record is entirely dependent upon the correctness of the

memories of those who urge the acceptance of the evidence,

and there was no one present to record, remember or even to observe
matters that might detract from its credibility.

Because of our holding upon this issue, we do not meet the defend-
ant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of
his motion for a mistrial for an alleged failure of the State to disclose
all witnesses.

58 ee
Pd

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
DeBruler and Hunter, JJ., concur;

Pivarnik, J., dissents with opinion in which Givan, O.J., concurs.

DISSENTING OPINION

PIVARNIK, J.—I dissent from the majority's conclusion that the admis-
sion of evidence concerning the uncounseled lineup was not harmless
error. I agree that Hatcher was entitled to counsel at the lineup, that
he did not waive his right to counsel, and, therefore, that evidence
of that pretrial lineup identification should not have been admitted
at trial. The majority, however, soft-pedals the question of “indepen-
dent origin” and the relation of that issue to the question of harmless
error. Thus, the majority has failed to properly complete the necessary
analysis to be made in resolving this question, and, as a result, fails
to elucidate the guidelines which trial courts and this Court must follow
in future cases of this type. A full and proper analysis of the law and
the facts of this case leads me to conclude that the error was harmless
in nature.

After determining that evidence of the witnesses’ lineup identifica-
tion should not have been admitted, we must examine the nature of
the witnesses’ in-court identification. The purpose of conducting this
analysis is clear: the witnesses also should not have been allowed to
make an in-court identification of Hatcher unless those identifications
had origins independent of the illegal lineup. United States v. Wade,
(1967) 388 U.S. 226, 241-42, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1939-40, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149,
1165-66; Morgan v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 504, 400 N.E.2d 111, 113; Love
v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 577, 581, 865 N.E.2d 771, 773.

The factors to be considered in determining the existence of an in-
dependent basis may be divided into two sets: those dealing with the
witness’ opportunity to observe the offender, and those relating to the
reliability of his recollection of his original observation of the offender.
Morgan v. State, supra; Love v. State, supra. Specific factors in the first
group include: the duration for which the observer can observe the
perpetrator; the distance separating them; the lighting conditions; and

Le 59

circumstances affecting the amount of attention the witness can devote
to observing the guilty party. Parker v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 595, 599,
858 N.E.2d 110, 112. Factors in the second set include: the witness’
prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act; the existence
of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defend-
ant’s actual description; any pre-lineup identification of another per-
son; the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup;
failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and the lapse of
time between the alleged act and the lineup. Swope v. State, (1975) 263
Ind. 148, 157, 325 N.E.2d 193, 197, quoting United States v. Wade, supra,
888 U.S. at 241, 87 S.Ct. at 1940, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1165. “It is also relevant
to consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are dis-
closed concerning the conduct of the lineup.” Id. See Morgan v. State,
supra; Love v. State, supra.

Concerning witness Sherrie Seybert in the case before us, the record
reveals that she was unable to pick appellant’s picture from the
photographic display conducted prior to the lineup. However, the
description she gave shortly after the crime to Officer Gillespie closely
matched Hatcher’s actual description. At no time did she mis-identify
another person. Moreover, only about six weeks elapsed between the
commission of the crime and her identification of appellant in the lineup.

In addition, Seybert had a good opportunity to observe the perpe-
trators at the time this crime was committed. This robbery occurred
in the middle of the afternoon, and appellant and his cohort were in-
side the restaurant for approximately five minutes. Seybert testified
she had a clear view of appellant's face as he left the restaurant. Fur-
ther, she engaged in a brief conversation with the two men before they
pulled their guns and announced the robbery. Thus, in light of these
facts, I believe there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court
could determine that Seybert’s identification of appellant had a basis
independent of the illegal lineup. Therefore, in my view, the court did
not err in admitting her in-court identification.

Witness George Doyle also had independent grounds for making an
in-court identification of Hatcher. Like Seybert, Doyle was able to give
a description of the perpetrators which matched Hatcher's description.
Moreover, Doyle did identify Hatcher from the photographic display

60 ee
—

conducted prior to the lineup, and also he never failed to identify
Hatcher on a prior occasion. He testified that Hatcher approached him
in the back part of the restaurant and, at one point, their faces were
only about one foot apart. Thus, Doyle had an even greater opportunity
than Seybert to observe the perpetrator during the robbery. Therefore,
I think the trial court did not err in allowing Doyle to make an in-court
identification of Hatcher. See Johnson v. State, (1972) 257 Ind. 682, 278
N.E.2d 577.

The majority opinion apparently accepts in a limited sense the propo-
sition that the in-court identifications of Hatcher by Seybert and Doyle
had an independent origin and were not the product of the uncounseled
lineup. However, the majority then attempts to compare this case to
Moore v. Illinois, (1977) 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424. The
Moore case has no bearing on the issue of the independent basis of
the witnesses’ in-court identifications. The United States Supreme
Court stated in Moore:

“[TJhe prosecution cannot buttress its case-in-chief by introduc-
ing evidence of a pretrial confrontation made in violation of the
accused’s Sixth Amendment rights even if it can prove that the
pretrial identification had an independent source.”
Id. at 231, 98 S.Ct. at 466, 54 L.Ed.2d at 435-36, citing Gilbert v. Calt-
fornia, (1967) 888 U.S. 263, 278, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178,
1186 (emphasis added).

Thus, without question, the per se exclusionary rule of Gilbert v.
California, as applied by Moore v. Illinois, operates in this case to render
inadmissible evidence of the witnesses’ pretrial lineup identification.
However, at this stage of the analysis, we are past that point; accept-
ing that conclusion, we should be focusing on whether the in-cowrt iden-
tification had an independent origin, and, if so, whether the trial court’s
error in admitting evidence of the lineup identification was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Moore v. Illinois addresses an
entirely different issue, and should not be used to confuse or suspend
our analysis of the in-court identification evidence.

My assessment of the facts of this case, as set out above, leads me
to conclude—and the majority appears to agree —that the witnesses’

Lt 61
as

in-court identifications had origins independent of the uncounseled
lineup. Therefore, in my view, the trial court did not err in admitting
the victims’ in-court identification on testimony. We must next deter-
mine whether the admission of the improper evidence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly, the United States Supreme Court
has contemplated and even required the application of the harmless
error doctrine to cases of this exact type. Moore v. Illinois, (1977) 434
US. 220, 226, 98 S.Ct. 458, 463, 54 L.Ed.2d 424, 436; Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, (1967) 888 U.S. 263, 274, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178,
1187; United States v. Wade, (1967) 388 U.S. 226, 242, 87 S.Ct. 1926,
1940, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1166.

The majority seems to be ill at ease with the idea that the victims’
positive in-court identifications could help render the error in ques-
tion harmless. In my view, the strength of these identifications —and
the clearly independent bases for them—are crucial to a proper solu-
tion of the harmless error question. It is illogical and unfair to recognize
the admissibility of the witness’ in-court identifications and, hence, their
independent origins, but then to refuse to consider those identifica-
tions in deciding whether the error as to the lineup testimony was
harmless. The majority asserts that, to permit such an analysis “would
be to permit the ‘exploitation of the primary illegality’ and would ob-
viate the requirement that identification procedures be kept free of
state-induced suggestivity.” However, to refuse in all cases to consider
the in-court identification in applying the harmless error rule would,
for purposes of our review, completely undercut the finding that the
in-court identification was admissible. I do not believe the exclusionary
rule of Gilbert v. California and the harmless error rule logically or
legally require this approach. In fact, such an approach would, in many
cases, probably frustrate and twist the otherwise completely proper
application of the harmless error rule.

The two victims here, Doyle and Seybert, both unequivocally iden-
tified Hatcher at trial as one of the perpetrators of the rebbery. In
addition, Doyle picked Hatcher's picture from a photographic display
which was conducted before the illegal lineup. Evidence of Doyle’s selec-
tion was also presented to the jury. Also, as noted above, the circum-
stances surrounding the crime, including the witnesses’ close visual

62 |
LC

contact with Hatcher, unquestionably made their in-court identifica-
tions of him very convincing. Moreover, there was no evidence pre-
sented to the jury that either Seybert or Doyle ever misidentified
another person as the perpetrator, nor that Doyle ever failed to iden-
tify Hatcher on a prior occasion. In addition, both witnesses’ initial
description of one of the perpetrators closely matched Hatcher’s ac-
tual description. All of these facts, which were fully available for the
jury’s consideration, lead me to conclude that the admission of evidence
of the uncounseled lineup could not have affected the jury’s verdict.
The testimony regarding the victims’ pretrial identifications added little
to their positive identifications at trial. See United States ea rel. Moore
v. Illinois, (7th Cir. 1978) 577 F.2d 411 (on remand from 484 U.S. 220,
98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424), cert. denied, (1979) 440 U.S. 919, 99 S.Ct.
1242, 59 L.Ed.2d 471.

Finally, the majority has chosen to remand this case for a new trial.
At that new trial, evidence of the uncounseled lineup identification will
clearly not be admissible. The question remains, however, as to whether
the victims will be permitted to make an in-court identification. That
question, of course, turns on whether their identifications have indepen-
dent origins. The majority, at two points, asswmes for the sake of argu-
ment that such origins exist. However, the majority, in fact, never
directly applies the appropriate guidelines and decides this question.
I think this Court should give some guidance to the parties and the
trial court concerning this important question, because, judging from
the record before us, a finding that the in-court identifications were
also improper might, as a practical matter, determine for the prosecutor
whether he will pursue this case further. In addition, I also believe
the majority should address the issue of the State’s alleged failure to
disclose all witnesses. Whatever merit this issue has now, it will also
have upon retrial and on any subsequent appeal.

I would hold that the admission of evidence of the uncounseled lineup
was, in this case, harmless error, and would therefore proceed to con-
sider the other issues raised on this appeal.

Givan, C. J., concurs.

NoTE—Reported at 414 N.E.2d 561.

6:

ict)

DAVID HARDIN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 8798218. Filed January 8, 1981]

John F. Ittenbach, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted in a jury trial of
Robbery, a Class B Felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979), and Bat-
tery, a Class C Felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (Burns 1979). He was also
determined to be an Habitual Offender pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8

64 ee
Es

(Burns 1979). He raises the following issues in this direct, albeit belated,
appeal:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s mo-
tion to withdraw;

(2) Whether the trial court erred in allowing certain cross-
examination; and

(8) Whether the trial court erred in allowing a certain witness to
testify for the State.

ISSUE I

On April 18, 1979, with trial set for April 23, trial counsel moved
for leave of court to withdraw his representation of the defendant. The
trial court held a hearing upon the motion on April 20, at which time
it was taken under advisement with the admonishment that the defend-
ant could retain new counsel if he desired, but that there would be
no continuance granted and that if new counsel were retained, he would
have to proceed with trial on April 23. The defendant contends that
the ruling denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in that
trial counsel did not have the defendant's best interests at heart and
that it seemed “hard for [him] to try the case.” The contention is without
merit.

We initially note that the defendant had, on a prior occasion, changed
counsel, that he had previously been granted a continuance, with the
agreement of the State, which had occasioned a delay of approximately
three months, and that he had also been granted a further continuance
of approximately five weeks because the State, four days prior to the
date then set for trial, filed an amended information, changing a charge
of attempted murder to battery and adding a charge of habitual of-
fender. Moreover, at the pre-trial conference held one day prior to the
filing of the motion for leave to withdraw, counsel did not broach the
subject.

Essentially, the defendant’s claim is that a continuance, as well as
leave for counsel to withdraw, should have been granted. We do not
agree. The grant of a continuance lies largely within the discre-

| | tion of the trial court; and, although a defendant may be
granted wide latitude in matters related to the selection of

[| 65
Es

counsel, he has no right to utilize it as a vehicle for obtaining a delay
to which he is not entitled. German v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 67, 373
N.E.2d 880. See Mitchell v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 369, 398 N.E.2d 1254.
Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811. The facts of this
case do not support Defendant's contention that he was denied his right
to counsel.

ISSUE IT

Just prior to trial, a disturbance occurred in the hallway outside the
courtroom. Allegedly, the defendant’s wife told the father of the pro-
secuting witness, Jimmy Hart, that she would shoot him if he permitted
Jimmy to testify. The defendant made an oral motion in limine to
preclude the tender of evidence of such threat, and the court sustained
the motion “as to any substantive evidence, but, of course, subject to
a different ruling in the event that it comes in on impeachment or
cross-examination.”

The defendant's wife testified on behalf of her husband, and upon
cross-examination she was asked, “And isn’t it further a fact that out
in the hall of this very courtroom you threatened Jimmy Hart’s father,
to shoot him if he let his son testify today?” The defendant objected
on the grounds that it was in contravention of the in limine order and
designed to reveal irrelevant but prejudicial matters. He now acknowl-
edges that the in limine order was not a final ruling upon the ultimate
admissibility of evidence but continues to pursue the assignment of
irrelevancy and prejudice. The contention is without merit.

The credibility of a witness who has testified is always in issue, hence

evidence which fairly reflects thereon is relevant. The trial judge has

a recognized discretion to control such cross-examination in

I order to prevent the waste of time or the creation of undue

prejudice; but generally, liberal cross-examination is allowed

for the purpose of disclosing a witness’ bias. MeCormick’s Handbook
of the Law of Evidence § 29, at 58-59 (2d Ed. 1972).

We have stated in the past that evidence pertaining to bribery,
threats and other influences which reflect upon the credibility of a
witness should be given to the jury. E.g. Barnes v. State, (1978)

HE 269 Ind. 76, 378 N.E.2d 839; Adler v. State, (1967) 248 Ind. 193,
225 N.H.2d 171. Moreover, such evidence should not be viewed

66 |

as being collateral in nature. Clark v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 524, 348
N.E.2d 27; Hunter v. State, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 397, 360 N.E.2d 588;
McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 41, at 81 (2d Ed. 1972);
Underhill’s Criminal Evidence § 244, at 769 (6th Ed. 1973). The ques-
tion in this case was designed to demonstrate the witness’ feelings for
the defendant, her husband, and the extent to which she would pro-
tect him. It was relevant to her credibility and, therefore, proper.
Hunter, 172 Ind.App. at 417, 360 N.E.2d at 601.

ISSUE III

Immediately prior to trial, the State moved for leave to fingerprint
the defendant. The motion was granted over the defendant’s objec-
tion. At the hearing on the habitual offender charge (held on the same
day as the trial), the State proposed to call a fingerprint expert to testify
that the defendant’s fingerprints matched those contained in the records
of a prior felony conviction of one David Hardin. The trial court acced-
ed to the proposal over the defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony
of all witnesses whose names had not been previously disclosed to the
defendant in compliance with a discovery order. The defendant also
moved at that time, in the alternative, for a continuance. The trial court
denied the defendant's motions and the expert was allowed to testify
over objection. The defendant here assigns error to the denial of his
motion for a continuance in that he was “surprised” by the expert’s
testimony. Further, he asserts that the testimony was critical to the
State’s case against the defendant on the habitual charge.

The usual remedy for “surprise” such as that present in the case
at bar is a motion for a continuance. Lund v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 428,
345 N.E.2d 826. However, the trial court’s ruling on such a

Hs motion not based upon statutory grounds is discretionary and
will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse. E.g., Himes

v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 416, 403 N.E.2d 1877. In a case of this nature,
a defendant must demonstrate not only “surprise,” but also harm flow-
ing from the trial court’s denial of the continuance motion. See Himes,
403 N.E.2d at 1379-80; King v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 422, 296 N.E.2d
113. The defendant has not claimed that a continuance would have en-
abled him to refute or discredit the testimony of the “surprise” witness,

a 67

nor has he demonstrated any other manner in which additional time
would have benefited him. Under these circumstances, we can not say
the trial court abused its discretion.

We find no error. The judgment is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NotTE—Reported at 414 N.E.2d 570.

es

ROBERT LEE BENTLEY, JR. v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 8798287. Filed January 15, 1981.]

Perry H. Harrold, Wilson, Coleman & Roberts, of Indianapolis, for
appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Kathleen G. Lucas, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.—Defendant was convicted, following a trial by jury, of Con-

68 |
PF

spiracy to Commit Robbery, Ind. Code § 35-1-111-1 (Burns 1975); Com-
mission of a Felony while Armed, Ind. Code § 35-12-1-1 (Burns 1975);
and Murder in the Second Degree, Ind. Code § 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975),
as a lesser degree of the charged offense of Murder in the First Degree,
Ind. Code § 35-18-4-1 (Burns 1975). He was sentenced to concurrent
terms of imprisonment, the greatest term being for an indeterminate
term of not less than fifteen (15) years, nor more than twenty-five (25)
years on the murder conviction.

This direct appeal presents two issues:
(1) Whether or not the verdicts were sustained by the evidence.

(2) Whether or not the trial court judge erred in failing to disqualify
himself, sua sponte.

ISSUE I

The corpus delicti of the crimes of armed felony and murder were
proved by the testimony of one of the victims of the robbery, and it
is not disputed that three men, two of whom wore ski masks, entered
a gambling house, robbed two men, shot another to death and departed.
The corpus delicti of the conspiracy and the identity of those who con-
spired to and did commit the robbery and murder is entirely depend-
ent upon the testimony of David Craig, who had three prior felony
convictions and who testified for the State as part of a plea bargain.
Under the plea bargain, Craig entered a plea of guilty to one charge
stemming from the criminal incident and received a suspended sentence.
The other three charges that had been previously filed against Craig
were dismissed.

Craig testified that he participated, with the defendant and two
others, Williams and Edwards, in both the conspiracy and the result-
ant robbery and murder.

The four men were riding together and went to a house where ball
game tickets were sold. Williams went inside, bought some tickets and
returned with the report that there was a lot of money inside and the
suggestion that they take it. The plan was agreed upon, and Craig drove
the automobile around the nearest corner, and parked while the others
went inside and executed the robbery. Craig’s role was to be ready

| 69

with the get-away car. When the three returned to the car, they divided
the proceeds of the robbery equally among the four participants.

The defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence is a challenge to the
credibility of the witness, Craig, without whose testimony the defend-
ant could not be connected to the crimes. He contends that
Hl because of Craig’s prior convictions and that his testimony
was bargained for, it was unworthy of belief. The credibility
of witnesses, however, is to be judged by the trier of facts, not by courts
of review. Loyd v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 404, 398 N.H.2d 1260, 1264;
Dodson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 380, 384, 381 N.E.2d 90, 93. Although
we have, in a few instances determined that the evidence was insuffi-
cient because the only incriminating evidence was inherently unbeliev-
able, we do not find this to be such a case. The jury was aware of the
witness’ prior criminal record and of the benefits flowing to him in
exchange for his testimony. Unquestionably, those elements rendered
his veracity suspect, but they are in a better position than are we to
make the credibility determination. We cannot say that a reasonable
man could not believe the witness’ testimony to be true.

ISSUE II

The defendant contends that he suffered prejudice because the trial
judge had served as his parole officer in the past and asserts that he
did not discover the prior relationship until after sentencing. There
is nothing in the record to substantiate either the claim of the prior
relationship or the late discovery. Neither is there anything in the
record to support that such relationship was in any way prejudicial
to his defense. In his memorandum in support of the motion to correct
errors, the defendant states:

““* * * but we cannot and do not deny the Court’s integrity, and
during the trial the Court’s ruling was just as fair to the defend-
ant as it was to the State despite one ruling on a Motion for a
Mistrial, * * *”

Thus, the defendant does not indicate any instances of bias or pre-
judicial conduct by the trial court except one alleged error, which he
did not raise in his motion to correct errors and does not raise on this

appeal.

We note categorically that a bald assertion in the motion
to correct errors does not present a sufficient record for
review. See Pulliam v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 381, 391, 345 N.E.2d

229, 238.
We note further that, even if the trial judge were privy to informa-
tion about the defendant’s past, he was not required to disqualify
himself. See Grimes v. State, (1978) 266 Ind. 684, 688, 366 N.E.2d
HB 639, 642 (trial judge that represented appellant in the past
not required to disqualify himself from presiding over appel-
lant’s guilty plea hearing). We find no merit in the defendant’s conten-

tion.

We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 414 N.E.2d 573,

RICHARD EARL BATTLE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 180818, Filed January 19, 1981]

Nick J. Thiros, of Merrillville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, Richard Earl Battle, was convicted by a
jury of felony-murder, Ind. Code § 35-13-4-1 (Burns 1975), and conspiracy
to commit robbery, Ind. Code § 35-1-111-1 (Burns 1975). He was sen-
tenced to terms of fifteen to twenty-five years and two to fourteen
years to be served concurrently. His direct appeal raises the following
issues:

72 ee
Ld

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s pretrial
motions for discharge;

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's pretrial
motion to suppress and in admitting defendant’s confession into evi-
dence; and

8. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give one of the de-
fendant’s tendered instructions and giving instead one of the state’s
final instructions.

A summary of the facts most favorable to the state and necessary
for a consideration of the above issues shows that the victim, Alvin
Jackson, was shot and killed while leaving a liquor store in Gary, In-
diana, in the early morning hours of March 14, 1975. An employee of
the liquor store, Alberta Redmon, was abducted at this time in the
victim’s automobile, taken to another location and sexually assaulted.
Defendant was charged with three others with the murder and rob-
bery of Jackson and was positively identified by Redmon as one of
the participants.

L

Defendant first contends that he was entitled to discharge on both
counts under Ind. R. Crim, P. 4(A) and 4(C). He argues that he was
held in jail without a trial longer than the six-month period allowed
under subsection 4(A) and that he was not brought to trial within the
one-year period contemplated under subsection 4(C).

We will first deal with Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(A). As we have clearly

stated in the past, the language of this rule requires release after the

six-month period and not a discharge. The rule does not pre-

HH clude prosecution unless there is a violation of the one-year

limitation of Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C). Collins v. State, (1977) 266

Ind. 430, 364 N.E.2d 750; Lewis v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.B.2d

859. Since the period when defendant would have been entitled to be

released has expired, any alleged violation of subsection (A) raises no
question for review on this appeal.

Defendant also alleges a violation of the one-year limitation in subsec-
tion 4(C). The charges in this case were originally filed on March 19,

Le 73
ee

1975. However, defendant agrees that there was a period of three years
with several delays chargeable to him. During this time, motions of
incompetency were filed, a period of committment to the Indiana
Department of Mental Health was served, and finally a written plea
agreement was executed from which a petition for post-conviction relief
was filed. Both parties agree that the starting point for evaluating the
time period is February 16, 1978, the date on which the trial court
granted post-conviction relief and ordered a new trial. Defendant was
not brought to trial after this until April 6, 1979, and contends that
this period of almost fourteen months violates subsection 4(C).

We find no merit to this argument since defendant’s own actions
were the cause of considerable delay during this time. Defendant filed
a motion to suppress on June 12, 1978. He requested a continuance
on July 24, 1978, in order to further prepare for the evidentiary hear-
ing which had been scheduled on this motion. The continuance lasted
until August 15, 1978. At that time, there was an extensive eviden-
tiary hearing on the motion to suppress which could not be completed
in one day. Further hearings on this motion were held in September,
November, and December. The motion to suppress was overruled on
February 13, 1979, and the case was then set for trial.

The record shows that the interim continuances during the eviden-
tiary hearings on the motion to suppress were granted on the trial
court’s motions due to a congested court calendar or as a result
Hof defense counsel’s other trial committments. These delays
were clearly the result of defendant's actions in filing his mo-
tion to suppress and requesting full evidentiary hearings on it prior
to trial. As stated by the rule, the time limitations therein shall be
extended by the period of any delay caused by defendant’s acts. Ind.
R. Crim. P. 4(F). Bradberry v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 530, 364 N.E.2d
1183; Gross v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 46, 278 N.E.2d 583. Therefore, since
several months of the delay were attributable to defendant, there was
no violation of Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C), and the motions for discharge were
properly overruled.

Defendant further argues that count II had been pending since its
initial filing on March 19, 1975, in violation of both subsections 4(A)
and 4(C). There is no merit to this contention since any delays which

affect count I also effect this count, even though this count was dis-
missed as part of the plea bargain agreement accepted by the trial
court in April, 1977. The count was refiled when the new trial was
granted on February 16, 1978. The delays prior to the filing of the writ-
ten plea bargain agreement were attributable to defendant’s actions
in filing a motion of incompetency to stand trial. Delays after this period
were also attributable to defendant because of his actions in filing for
post-conviction relief and then in filing other pretrial motions as dis-
cussed above. We find no error here.

I.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress his confession and in subsequently admitting the
confession into evidence at trial. He argues that this confession was
the product of an illegal, warrantless arrest and an unlawful detention
and was not freely and voluntarily given.

We first turn to the question of the allegedly illegal arrest. It has
been clearly established in Indiana that a police officer may arrest an
individual without a warrant when the officer has reasonable and prob-
able cause to believe that the person has committed a felony. Smith
v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 328, 397 N.E.2d 959; Works v. State, (1977) 266
Ind. 250, 362 N.E.2d 144. Probable cause exists when at the time of
the arrest the officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances which
would warrant a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe
the defendant committed the criminal act in question. Gaddis v. State,
(1977) 267 Ind. 100, 368 N.E.2d 244.

In the instant case, the police knew that a homicide had been com-
mitted. An eyewitness, Alberta Redmon, gave police an oral account
of the incident and a general description of the perpetrators.

Is She later picked out defendant’s photograph from a group

of photographs shown to her by police and advised police that
defendant was definitely one of the assailants and had been in the liquor
store several times earlier on the evening of the crime. On the basis
of this information, three police officers went to defendant's home to
talk to him. They did not obtain a warrant at that time because they
felt the incident was still under investigation and they needed more

[| 15
EE

information regarding defendant and the other participants involved.
They were admitted voluntarily to defendant’s home and while they
were questioning him and other individuals present they saw a gun
and narcotic paraphernalia lying on a table. Defendant was then placed
under arrest for narcotics, weapons and homicide. Under these circum-
stances, the officers had probable cause to believe defendant had com-
mitted a felony and were justified in making an immediate arrest
without benefit of a warrant.

Defendant next argues that his confession was inadmissible because
it was the product of an illegal detention since he was not immediately
taken before a neutral magistrate. It is well settled in Indiana
Hl sthat a delay in bringing a defendant before a magistrate does
not make a confession inadmissible as a matter of law, but it
is one of the factors to be considered in determining the admissibility
of a confession. Carpenter v. State, (1978) 270 Ind. 96, 383 N.E.2d 815;
Murphy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 184, 369 N.E.2d 411. In the instant case,
defendant was arrested at approximately 3:15 p.m. on a Friday after-
noon and was booked about one hour and fifteen minutes later. He was
advised of his rights on several occasions. He gave his voluntary state-
ment to police at approximately 1:00 p.m. on Sunday afternoon when
he had been detained under forty-eight hours. Our statute allows for
a period of detention of forty-eight hours when a weekend is involved.
Ind. Code § 18-1-11-8 (Burns 1980 Suppl.). Therefore, no violation of the
statute had occurred when defendant gave his statement.

We next turn to the question of the admissibility of the confession.
This question is controlled by determining from the totality of cir-
cumstances whether or not the confession was given voluntarily and
not through inducement, violence, threats or other improper influences
so as to overcome the free will of the accused. Arch v. State, (1978) 269
Ind. 450, 381 N.E.2d 465; Pawloski v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 350, 380 N.B.2d
1230. The question of voluntariness is one for the trial court. We review
the question on appeal as we do other sufficiency matters. We do not
weigh the evidence, but rather determine whether there was substan-
tial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s finding. This
is true even though conflicting evidence is presented to the trial court
on the issue of voluntariness. Arch v. State, supra; Riggs v. State, (1976)

16 |

264 Ind. 268, 342 N.E.2d 838.

In the case at bar, the record shows that defendant was arrested with
probable cause and was advised of his rights on several occasions. He
was questioned on the day of his arrest and the following day, but he
gave no statements. Then on the second day following his arrest defen-
dant asked several times to talk to the officer in charge of the investiga-
tion of his case. He was taken to the detective bureau around 1:00 p.m.
He attempted to find out what information his accomplices had given
regarding the incident. Then he said he wanted to give a statement.
Officer Taylor responded that that wasn’t really necessary because he
already had enough information from the others. Defendant then said
he wanted to tell his side of the story.

The record shows that the police, at that time, again read defendant's
tights to him and he was given an opportunity to read them as well.
He stated that he had no questions about his rights and that
she was familiar with the waiver of rights form. He filled in
the necessary blanks on the form himself. He did not ask for
an attorney prior to or during the taking of the statement. After the
typing of the statement had begun, defendant volunteered to type the
narrative himself. When the narrative portion of the statement was com-
plete, defendant reviewed it and then signed it. Testimony revealed that
no physical force or intimidation was used, no threats or inducements
were made, no promises were given in exchange for the statement, and
defendant was not told what to put in the statement. We find that there
was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of
voluntariness.

Tt.

Defendant finally contends that the giving of final instruction No. 9
was prejudicial in that it emphasized the existence of the confession
and removed the question of voluntariness from the jury. The court’s
instruction was as follows:

“You are instructed that the court has determined as a matter of
Jaw that the confession of Richard Ear] Battle was voluntarily made
and therefore admissable [sic] as evidence against him. You, the
jury, may, upon hearing evidence as to the voluntariness of the

P| 17
Ee

confession give such weight to the confession as you, the jurors,
feel it deserves under all the circumstances.”
We agree that this instruction is confusing. Only the last sentence
is required to be given under our statute, Ind. Code § 35-5-5-1 (Burns
1979 Repl.). However, we do not find that defendant’s tendered
H__ instruction on this issue properly stated the law, either, and
it was therefore properly refused.

Our statute concerning the admissibility of confessions states in per-
tinent part, Ind. Code § 35-5-5-1, supra:

“If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily
made, it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall per-
mit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness
and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession
as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.”

A more appropriate instruction under this statute was approved in Jones

v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 349, 363 N.E.2d 959. In the instant case, however,

in view of the clear evidence of defendant's guilt, aside from

HB his own statements, we do not believe that he was prejudiced.

It is well settled that errors in the giving or refusing of in-

structions are harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the

evidence and the jury could not properly have found otherwise. Grey

v, State, (1980) 278 Ind. 489, 404 N.E.2d 1348; Carter v. State, (1977) 266

Ind. 196, 361 N.E.2d 1208; Pinkerton v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 610, 283
N.E.2d 376.

We do not find that the instruction given by the trial court emphasiz-
ed the existence of a confession to such an extent as to amount to an
argument of a particular phase of the case. Jones v. State, supra. The
jury heard testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the giv-
ing of the statement. Defendant was positively identified as one of the
perpetrators of the crime by an eyewitness. In light of this and the trial
court’s general instructions on weighing the evidence and judging
credibility, we believe that the defendant suffered no prejudice to his
substantial rights. We find no reversible error here.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no reversible error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

78

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NotEe—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 39.

DAVID M. LITTLE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 5808124. Filed January 21, 1981]

David W. Hopper, of Chesterfield, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, David M. Little, was convicted by a jury
of burglary, a class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.);
theft, a class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.) (amend-
ed 1979); and being an habitual offender, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns

[| 79
EE

1979 Repl.) (amended 1980). He was sentenced to ten years for the class
B felony, two years for the class D felony, and thirty years on the habitual
criminal charge, the sentences to run consecutively.

Two issues are presented for review in this direct appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for
discharge pursuant to Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C); and

2. Whether the trial court erred in giving certain instructions.

The evidence most favorable to the state reveals that in the early
morning hours of July 3, 1978, defendant forcibly entered the home of
Ralph and Opal Garner and took several items of property, including
jewelry, coins, and a gun.

Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C) provides:

“Defendant discharged. No person shall be held on recognizance
or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate
embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge
against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on
such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was
had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where
there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because
of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the
last-mentioned circumstances, the prosecuting attorney shall file
a timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this
rule. Any defendant so held shall, on motion, be discharged.”

On July 19, 1978, the information for burglary was filed. Defendant
was arrested on July 30, 1978. Under the rule, the one-year period on
the burglary charge would run from the later of these dates, July 30,
1978. Therefore, defendant should have been tried for burglary no later
than July 30, 1979.

On August 4, 1978, defendant was charged with theft and being an
habitual offender. Since this date is later than the date of his arrest,
the one year on these charges would commence on August 4, 1978.
Accordingly, defendant should have been tried here no later than August
4, 1979.

80 De
Ld

Because of delays attributable to both parties, two trial dates set for
February 9, 1979, and May 30, 1979, were canceled and trial was reset
for July 20, 1979. For reasons not disclosed by the record, there was
no trial on that date and defendant was not tried on all counts until
January 17 and 18, 1980, at which time he made his motion for discharge.

When there are delays caused by defendant's acts, the time limita-
tions specified in Ind. R. Crim. P. 4 are to be extended by the period
of such delays. Bradberry v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 530, 364

HE sON.E.2d 1183; Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(F). Here, upon defendant’s
motion, the trial court continued the cause for seven days from

August 22, 1978, to August 29, 1978. This delay is clearly chargeable
to defendant. Easton v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 204, 280 N.E.2d 807. On
August 29, 1978, defendant filed a motion to quash or dismiss the count
charging him with being an habitual offender. This motion was implicitly
denied when the state was allowed to file an amended habitual offender
charge on September 8, 1978. This delay of ten days is also clearly
chargeable to defendant. Hodge v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 377, 344 N.E.2d
298. On June 8, 1979, defendant’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion
to withdraw his appearance. It was granted, and on July 17, 1979, re-
tained counsel for defendant entered his appearance. This thirty-nine
day delay is chargeable to defendant as well. State ex rel. Shepphard
v. Circuit Court of Clark County, (1980) 274 Ind. 602, 413 N.E.2d 258.

The total period of delays attributable to defendant amount to fifty-
six days, thus extending the July 30, 1979 expiration date to September
24, 1979, and the August 4, 1979 expiration date to September 29, 1979.
On August 10, 1979, the trial court set a pretrial conference for October
8, 1979, which was beyond the time limits of Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C) as
extended. Obviously, the trial was to be scheduled for a date later than
that, and defendant should have objected. State ea rel. Wickliffe v.
Criminal Court of Marion County, (1975) 263 Ind. 219, 328 N.E.2d 420.
However, defendant made no objection whatsoever.

It is well settled that a defendant is not required to take affirmative
action to obtain a trial.date within the’period set by Ind. R. Crim. P.
A(C). State ex rel. Back v. Starke Circuit Court, (1979) 271 Ind.

HH 82, 390 N.E.2d 643. However, when, prior to the expiration of
the period set by the rule, the court sets a trial date which

bn 81
EE

is beyond that period and the defendant is or should be aware that the
setting is beyond that period, it is his obligation to object at the earliest
opportunity so that the court can reset the trial for a date within the
proper period. State ex rel. Wernke v. Superior Court of Hendricks
County, (1976) 264 Ind. 646, 348 N.E.2d 644; State ex rel. Wickliffe v.
Criminal Court of Marion County, supra; State v. Rehborg, (1979) Ind.
App., 396 N.E.2d 953. If the defendant sits idly by at a time when the
court could yet grant him a trial within the proper period and permits
the court, without objection, to set a date beyond that period, he will
be deemed to have acquiesced therein. Id. By failing to object at the
earliest opportunity, defendant waived his right to be discharged under
Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C).

Il.

Defendant next contends that final instructions numbers two and five
given in the habitual offender phase of the trial were erroneous. Instruc-
tion number two informed the jury of the state’s right to charge defen-
dant as an habitual criminal, but did not disclose the penalty to be
assessed in case the jury returned a guilty verdict. Instruction number
five told the jury:

“You are not to take into consideration any penalty that may attach
as aresult of your decision. You are only to determine if the defen-
dant is, or is not, an habitual offender.”
Defendant complains that not informing the jury of the potential punish-
ment denied him due process of law.

There was no error here. Since juries no longer fulfill any function
regarding sentencing, the amount of penalty prescribed by the
legislature would be irrelevant for their consideration. Com-
HB stock v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 259, 406 N.E.2d 1164; Debose v.
State, (1979) 270 Ind. 675, 389 N.E.2d 272.
For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NoteE—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 44.

82 ee
Es

FRANK J. LEAVER v. STATE OF INDIANA.

(No. 9738170. Filed January 23, 1981]

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Darrell F. Ellis, Deputy
Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, John P. Avery, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.* — Petitioner-appellant Frank Leaver was charged in the
Floyd Circuit Court with first degree murder under Ind. Code § 35-13-4-1
(Burns 1975). This charge arose out of the November 7, 1962 slaying
of Anita Christine Barmore. The cause was tried to a jury in April, 1966,
and Leaver was convicted as charged. On his direct appeal, the convic-
tion was affirmed. Leaver v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 528, 237 N.E.2d 368.
In 1972, Leaver filed a petition for post-conviction relief, challenging
the competency of his trial counsel. That petition was denied, and this
appeal followed.

*This case was assigned to this office for opinion on December 19, 1980.

[| 83
Ee

The sole issue presented here concerns whether the post-conviction
relief court erred in finding that Leaver did not carry his burden of proof
on the question of his trial counsel's incompetence. Petitioner claims
the record of the trial shows thirty-one instances of trial counsel's alleged
incompetence. We have categorized these alleged errors into five general
areas: (1) questions relating generally to the adequacy of the indictment;
(2) questions concerning an alleged unlawful search and seizure; (3) ques-
tions concerning jury instructions; (4) issues concerning the handling
of the jury; and (5) questions relating to counsel’s handling of discovery,
procedural and evidentiary matters, and his overall handling of Leaver’s
defense.

There is a strong presumption that an attorney has properly dis-
charged his duties to his client, and strong and convincing proof is re-
quired by the petitioner to overcome this presumption. To
HH prevail on this issue, appellant must show that what the at-
torney did or did not do made the proceedings a mockery of
justice shocking to the conscience of the court. Duncan v. State, (1980)
272 Ind. 614, 400 N.E.2d 1112, 1114; Willis v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 10,
401 N.E.2d 683, 685; Herman v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 680, 395 N.E.2d
249, 253; Ottman v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 262, 897 N.E.2d 278, 275. In
reviewing an issue of this type, we look to the totality of the facts and
circumstances to determine whether the accused received adequate
representation. Id.

I.

Appellant Leaver presents several related allegations of in-
competence which stem from the alleged inadequacy of the indictment.
The indictment alleged that Leaver

“did unlawfully, feloniously, purposely, and with premeditated
malice, strangle the said Anita Christine Barmore about the neck
and throat, thereby causing the death of the said Anita Christine
Barmore by strangulation, being then and there contrary to the
form of statutes in such cases made and provided and against the
peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

We find this language sufficient to allege the offense of first degree

84 ee
Ee

murder. See Heflin v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 427, 370 N.E.2d 895; Ind. Code
§ 35-13-4-1, supra. Therefore, trial counsel did not act incompetently
in failing to object to: the indictment; preliminary instruction number
one; final instruction number one; and the form of the verdict, nor in
failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment due to the indictment’s
alleged failure to state a public offense.

I.

Appellant also argues trial counsel incompetently failed to raise and/or
preserve several questions concerning evidence allegedly obtained
through an unlawful search and seizure. This argument contains nothing
more than petitioner's bald assertions. At a minimum, Leaver fails to
show that the evidence in question was, in fact, improperly obtained.
See Hollon v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 439, 398 N.E.2d 1273, 1278. The post-
conviction relief court did not err in refusing to conclude that this issue
revealed trial counsel’s inadequacy.

Tl.

Leaver next contends trial counsel's incompetence was shown by his
failure to tender any preliminary instructions, and by his failure to
tender any final instructions on lesser-included offenses. Once again,
this argument contains only bare assertions. There has been no show-
ing that the preliminary instructions which were given by the trial court
were improper or somehow inadequate. Further, appellant has not
shown what instructions should have been tendered by trial counsel
and how they would have helped his cause. Leaver also argues that trial
counsel should have tendered instructions on the lesser-included offenses
of assault and battery, and assault and battery with the intent to kill.
Such instructions clearly would have been properly refused in this case.
See Goodpaster v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 170, 402 N.E.2d 1239; Lawrence
v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330, 375 N.E.2d 208. Thus, we cannot say the
court erred in refusing to conclude that these omissions by trial counsel
were evidence of incompetence.

Iv.

Appellant Leaver next argues that trial counsel incompetently and
improperly handled certain matters concerning the jury. First, he argues

a 85

counsel should have objected to the trial court’s refusal to sequester
the jury. Second, he claims counsel incompetently failed to spend more
than one day in selecting the jury. This presents yet two more ques-
tions grounded wholly on speculations. He can show no harm—in the
way of exposure to prejudicial publicity, for example —in the trial court’s
refusal to sequester the jury. Likewise, Leaver has not shown that trial
counsel could have had a hand in the length of time used to select the
jury. See Lynn v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 297, 392 N.E.2d 449; Bradberry
v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 530, 364 N.E.2d 1183. Moreover, he does not ex-
plain how taking more time in selecting the jury would have produced
a different or more impartial jury; nor has he shown that the jury which
tried his case was improperly selected or was not impartial. In any event,
to draw conclusions to that effect would be to second-guess, based on
pure speculation, counsel’s handling of the jury selection. This we will
not do. Duncan v. State, supra; Willis v. State, supra.

Vv.

Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s failure to file certain motions

and to object to certain evidence and testimony shows that this case

was handled incompetently. Many of these instances do not

HH reveal either mistakes of law or improper strategy. However,

even if we were to employ the luxury of hindsight and agree

with petitioner that the instances he cites do reveal questionable

judgments, we are not prepared to say that petitioner’s trial counsel
was therefore incompetent. As we have stated many times:

“Tsolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness, or
inexperience do not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel
unless, taken as a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice.”

Hollon v. State, supra, 272 Ind. at 444, 398 N.E.2d at 1277. See Duncan
v. State, supra; Willis v. State, supra; Herman v. State, supra; Ottman
v. State, supra. Again, in reviewing a claim of inadequate counsel, we
will not second-guess the attorney’s decisions as to trial strategy and
tactics. Id. Petitioner here simply attacks trial counsel's failure to file
certain motions. Even a cursory review of the record shows that most
of these proposed manoeuvres were groundless and thus would have
been futilely made. Those suggested motions which might, in theory,

86 ee
Ee

have had some bases were tactical and strategical matters for trial
counsel to resolve. This principle applies with equal validity to peti-
tioner’s criticism of counsel’s handling of certain witnesses. See Hollon
v. State, supra; Ottman v. State, supra.

Leaver also challenges trial counsel’s handling of certain discovery
matters and his overall preparation of the defense. The use of discovery
tools is a matter of strategy. See Cook v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 403 N.E.2d
860, 867-68. There is very little credible evidence bearing on the issue
of counsel's preparation, and trial court was completely justified in
disbelieving petitioner’s testimony in this regard, Herman v. State,
supra, 271 Ind. at 686, 395 N.E.2d at 252.

The record in this case reveals that trial counsel filed a motion to
suppress and a motion to be let to bail, and apparently hearings were
held on those motions. The record also shows that counsel
Hs cross-examined each of the State’s witnesses. At the hearing
on the petition for post-conviction relief, the great bulk of the
evidence was made up of testimony from the attorney who represented
Leaver on his direct appeal. This testimony merely contains the at-
torney’s opinions — given the luxury of hindsight —as to the quality of
Leaver's trial counsel. We believe the post-conviction relief court cor-
rectly concluded that petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing
that his trial counsel was incompetent.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

All Justices concur.

NoTE—Reported at 414 N.E.2d 959.
EE

JESSE STEVEN COLLINS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 180812. Filed January 26, 1981.]

fod
oO

John D. Clouse, Michael C. Keating, of Evansville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, Jesse Steven Collins, was convicted by a
jury of attempted theft, a class D felony, Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1 and
35-43-4-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and being an habitual offender, Ind. Code
§ 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979 Repl.) (amended 1980). He was sentenced to two
years for the class D felony and thirty years on the habitual offender
charge. Defendant now raises six issues in this direct appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in overruling his motions to dismiss
both counts of the information;

2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting state’s exhibit number
five;

3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting state’s exhibits
numbers six, seven, and ten;

4. Whether the trial court erred in permitting a state’s witness
to testify about another state’s criminal law;

5. Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for judg-
ment on the evidence; and

6. Whether the trial court erred in giving state’s instruction number
six.

90 ee

The evidence most favorable to the state reveals that in the early
morning hours of July 11, 1978, Lloyd Gallion, assistant manager of
Maaco Auto Painting and Body Works in Evansville, Indiana, heard
a loud noise in the outer office of the business. He had been sleeping
in a back room. When he went to investigate, he saw the room air con-
ditioner disappearing out of the window. He proceeded out the front
door and saw the defendant and another man holding the air condi-
tioner. They immediately dropped it and ran. Gallion gave chase and
eventually the two culprits were intercepted and apprehended by police
a few minutes later. A latent fingerprint taken from the air conditioner
proved to be that of defendant.

I

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his mo-
tion to dismiss Count I of the information which was the theft charge.
He first asserts that Ind. Code § 35-50-1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.),
Hsowhich provides that the court shall fix the penalty and sen-
tence a convicted person, violates his right to a jury trial as
guaranteed by article I, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution and the sixth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This Court has previously held
that a defendant's right to trial by jury is not offended by a statutory
scheme which does not require the jury to fix the punishment. Bran-
don v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 92, 396 N.E.2d 365; Williams v. State, (1979)
271 Ind. 656, 395 N.E.2d 239. Defendant’s argument is without merit.

Defendant also contends that Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (Burns 1979 Repl.)
violates article I, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution and the fourteenth
amendments equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution because
it provides for as much as a two-year increase in the sentence for a
class D felony in case of aggravating circumstances but makes no pro-
visions for lessening the basic two-year sentence when there are
mitigating circumstances.

The determination of appropriate penalties for crimes committed
in this state is a function properly exercised by the legislature, and
the judiciary will disturb such a determination only upon a

Hs showing of clear constitutional infirmity. Neal v. State, (1977)
266 Ind. 665, 366 N.E.2d 650; Vacendak v. State, (1976) 264

Le 91
EE

Ind. 101, 340 N.H.2d 352, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 851, 97 S.Ct. 141, 50
L.Ed.2d 125. Defendant overlooks subsection (b) of Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7,
supra, which provides:
“(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, if a person has
committed a class D felony, the court may enter judgment of con-
viction of a class A misdemeanor and sentence accordingly. The
court shall enter in the record, in detail, the reason for its action
whenever it exercises the power granted in this subsection.”

Class A misdemeanors carry a maximum one-year term of imprison-
ment. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.). Defendant’s claim of
unconstitutionality is without merit.

Defendant next makes a broadside constitutional attack on Ind. Code
§ 35-4.1-4-7 (Burns 1979 Repl.). He appears to place primary emphasis
on the eighth amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, citing Furman v. Georgia, (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct.
2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346. First, he contends that Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7(d),
supra, unconstitutionally permits the trial judge to consider any fac-
tor he desires in determining the sentence in a given case. He main-
tains that such discretion could lead to the imposition of arbitrary
sentences.

Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7(b) and (¢), supra, provide a list of aggravating

and mitigating factors that a trial court may consider in pronouncing

sentence. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7(d), swpra, makes clear that

Hs these lists are non-exclusive. Implicit in subsection (d) is the

requirement that any other factor considered by the trial court

be relevant and supported by the evidence. See Harris v. State, (1979)

272 Ind. 210, 396 N.E.2d 674; McNew v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 214, 391
N.E.2d 607.

In Gardner v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 627, 388 N.E.2d 513, we noted
that the statutory flexibility inherent in the concept of distinguishable
aggravating and mitigating circumstances was directly related to the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and
the mandate that all penalties be proportioned to the nature of the
offense. We held there that when a judge increases or decreases the

basic sentence, suspends the sentence, or imposes consecutive terms

92 ee

of imprisonment, the record should disclose what factors were con-
sidered by the judge to be mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Therefore, if improper factors are utilized by the trial judge in im-

posing sentence, an appellate court would be in a position to review

that determination. The appellate courts of this state have

Ils the power to review and revise criminal sentences. Ind. Const.

Art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Ind. R. App. R. 8. 1, 2. Defendant does not

and cannot allege that the trial judge used an improper factor as an

aggravating circumstance in sentencing him. He received the basic two-
year term of imprisonment for committing the class D felony.

Second, defendant maintains that Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7, supra, is
unconstitutional because it does not specify an exact number of years
which are to be added whenever aggravating circumstances are found.
He points out that under the various sentencing provisions for felonies,
a trial judge may choose any number of years, within a specified range,
which are to be added. Defendant asserts that this alleged defect also
promotes arbitrariness.

In Murphy v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 116, 352 N.E.2d 479, the defend-
ant also cited Furman v. Georgia, supra, in support of his argument
that the statute prescribing a determinate sentence of between ten
and thirty years in prison was unconstitutional. In upholding the
statute, we held that while Furman does, to some extent, restrict the
degree of discretion in assessing sentences, it does not prohibit vir-
tually all discretion as urged by the defendant. Further, defendant’s
argument has been rejected by the Court of Appeals in Wells v. State,
(1979) Ind.App., 897 N.B.2d 1250, and in Boyd v. State, (1979) Ind.App.,
396 N.E.2d 920.

We do not believe that Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7, supra, is unconstitu-

tional. Rather, by allowing the trial judge to tailor the degree of punish-

ment according to a defendant's particular background and

HM characteristics, the statute is consistent with the eighth

amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 16 of the

Indiana Constitution. The trial court did not err in overruling the mo-
tion to dismiss Count I.

Next, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his

Le 98
—

motion to dismiss the habitual offender charge. He contends that Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-8, supra, is unconstitutional because it permits arbitrary
enforcement by the prosecutor. He complains that whether or not the
recidivist penalty is to be sought in any given case depends wholly
upon the prosecutor’s discretion, unrestrained by any statutory guide-
lines. We have very recently rejected the same argument in Haton
v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 78, 408 N.E.2d 1281. There was no error here.

Il.

State’s exhibit number five consisted of two enlarged photographs.
One was an enlargement of state’s exhibit number two, which was the
latent fingerprint taken from the air conditioner. The other was an
enlargement of a fingerprint taken from state’s exhibit number four,
which contained the rolled and flat impressions of defendant’s finger-
prints.

Defendant first contends that the exhibit was inadmissible because
he was not given a copy of it prior to trial as ordered by the court.
However, the order to which defendant refers merely required the state
to furnish defendant a copy of the ink fingerprints which were taken
of him and this was done. During trial, the state informed the court
that the first time it had seen the photographic enlargment was earlier
that same day. The state explained that it was, therefore, impossible
to have included the exhibit in its discovery answer but that it had
informed defense counsel prior to trial that it was going to use
enlargements. Defendant’s attorney did not dispute that. There was
no error here.

Next, defendant maintains that the exhibit was inadmissible because
the state failed to show a complete chain of custody proving that the
photographic enlargement contained the same prints as found
[_sinstate’s exhibits two and four. Nonfungible items do not re-
quire the high degree of scrutiny that must be applied to

fungible items. Proctor v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 357, 397 N.E.2d 980;
Wilson v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 469, 333 N.E.2d 755. Evidence of finger-
prints is capable of eyewitness identification. It is a sufficient founda-
tion for the introduction of such evidence that a witness identifies it
and it has relevance to the issues of the case. Proctor v. State, supra;

94 ee
Ee

Woodard v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 19, 366 N.E.2d 1160.

At trial, Carroll J. Shiflett testified that he worked for the FBI in
Washington as a fingerprint specialist. He identified state’s exhibits
two and four as having been received by him from the Evansville Police
Department for examination. He stated that under his direction, photos
were made of the fingerprints found in those exhibits by the FBI’s
photography department. He took the negatives from those photos,
made the necessary markings for comparison, and then had enlarge-
ments made from the negatives. Shiflett testified unequivocally that
exhibit five was an accurate reproduction of the prints found in exhi-
bits two and four. This testimony provided a sufficient foundation for
the introduction of exhibit five, and there was no error in its admission.

TL

State’s exhibit number ten consisted of an information filed in the
Vanderburgh Superior Court, cause number 75-CR-262, charging a Jesse
Steven Collins with unlawful dealing in a controlled narcotic substance,
a commitment order bearing the same cause number placing Collins
in the custody of the Department of Corrections, and certificates of
the Vanderburgh Superior Court clerk and judge who presided over
the case.

Defendant first argues that the exhibit was inadmissible because
it did not contain an order book entry evidencing his previous convic-
tion. We have found nothing in the trial rules, statutes, or case law
of this state requiring the state to introduce order book entries in order
to prove a defendant’s prior convictions in an habitual criminal pro-
ceeding. In Brown v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 399, 385 N.E.2d 1148, we
sustained the habitual criminal conviction as being supported by suffi-
cient evidence when the state utilized certified copies of prison records
showing the defendant’s previous convictions.

Defendant also complains that the exhibit should not have been ad-
mitted because it failed to show a judgment of conviction. However,
the commitment document specifically recites that the trial

Hs court found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled
substance and ordered and adjudged defendant to serve two

years in prison for commission of that offense. This evidence adequately

[| 95
—

discloses the prior conviction.

Defendant additionally contends that admission of the exhibit was
erroneous because the information charged him with dealing when he
was only found guilty of possession. He argues that it was
irrelevant and prejudicial to show that he was charged with
a crime of which he was not convicted. First, we note that
possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of deal-
ing in a controlled narcotic substance. Cf. Thompson v. State, (1972) 259
Ind. 587, 290 N.E.2d 724, cert. denied, (1973) 412 U.S. 948, 93 S.Ct. 2788,
87 L.Ed.2d 404; Smith v. State, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 71, 345 N.E.2d 851.
Thus, the charge in the information did include the crime of which
defendant was eventually convicted, and the relevancy of the exhibit
is established.

As for defendant’s claim of prejudice, the trial court specifically in-
structed the witness identifying the exhibit not to mention the fact
that defendant was charged with dealing in narcotics. The witness
followed this instruction. Furthermore, when the exhibit was examined
by the jury, the court informed them that defendant's conviction in
that case was for a lesser included offense and that they were not in
any way to consider the charge of dealing as part of their delibera-
tions. There was no error in admitting the exhibit.

State’s exhibit number six contained several documents from the
state of Arizona. It included an information, cause number 83628, charg-
ing a man with defendant's name with two counts of first-degree bur-
glary, a superior court “minute order” reciting the individual’s guilty
plea and the court’s entry of judgment on both counts, and a certifica-
tion by the clerk and presiding judge of the Maricopa County Superior
Court. Defendant first contends that the exhibit was inadmissible
because it did not contain an order book entry. We have already dis-
posed of this argument in our discussion of the Vanderburgh Superior
Court conviction.

Second, he asserts that the exhibit was not properly authenticated
as required by Ind. Code § 34-1-18-7 (Burns 1973). That statute provides:

“Proceedings of courts of record in other states.—The records and
judicial proceedings of the several courts of record, of or within

96 |
Ld

the United States or the territories thereof shall be admitted in
the courts within this state as evidence, by attestation or certifi-
cate of the clerk or prothonotary, and the seal [certificate] of the
court annexed, together with the seal of the chief justice or one
or more of the judges, or the presiding magistrate of any such
court, that the person who signed the attestation or certificate
was, at the time of subscribing it, the clerk or prothonotary of
the court, and that the attestation is in due form of law; and the
records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall
have full faith and credit given to them in any court within this
state, as by law or usage they have in the courts whence taken.”
Here, the clerk of the Maricopa Superior Court certified that the
documents contained in exhibit six were full, true, and correct copies
of the originals. The presiding judge certified that the clerk was the
duly elected, qualified, and acting clerk of the court. The judge further
certified that the attestation was in due form of law. The requisite
seals accompanied the signatures. The exhibit was authenticated in
compliance with the statute.

Defendant also argues that there was no certification by the judge

that the clerk was the custodian of the records, citing Ind. R. Tr. P.

44(A)(1). We have previously held that Ind. R. Tr. P. 44 is to

Ibe considered as an alternative to other methods of authenti-

cation authorized by law and that, in any event, while Ind.

R. Tr. P. 44(A)(1) permits proof that the attesting officer is the legal

custodian of the records, it does not require such proof. Eldridge v.

‘State, (1977) 266 Ind. 184, 361 N.E.2d 155, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928,

98 S.Ct. 412, 54 L.Ed.2d 287. There was no error in the admission of
exhibit six.

State’s exhibit number seven consisted of a copy of the Arizona
burglary statute in effect at the time the crimes were committed there
and a properly executed certification by the Arizona Secretary of State
attesting to the authenticity of the statute. Defendant maintains that
the exhibit was inadmissible because the state failed to give reasonable
notice that it intended to present evidence of a foreign law in violation
of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, specifically Ind.
Code § 34-3-2-4 (Burns 1973), which provides:

“Evidence as to laws of other jurisdictions.—Any party may also

[| 97

present to the trial court any admissible evidence of such laws,
but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in another juris-
diction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable
notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings
or otherwise.”
Defendant also maintains that the state failed to list this item as
a potential exhibit in its pretrial discovery answer. However, the state’s
supplemental discovery answer filed several weeks before
Hl trial did include as a potential exhibit the Arizona statutes
pertaining to Maricopa Superior Court cause number 83628.
In addition, the record discloses that several weeks before trial, the
defense was given a copy of exhibit six which contained the informa-
tion charging defendant with violating the Arizona burglary statute.
It should also be noted that the information in the present case charg-
ing defendant as an habitual criminal alleged defendant’s prior burglary
conviction in Arizona. Thus, there was more than enough forewarning
to constitute “reasonable notice” of the state’s intent to present
evidence of Arizona law. There was no error in admitting this exhibit.

Iv.

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in permit-
ting a state’s witness to testify that at the time defendant allegedly
committed the first-degree burglaries in Arizona, that crime

HM sowas a felony in that state. He asserts that another state’s law
may not be proven by parol evidence. It is not necessary to

address this argument. Whether or not the state of Arizona classified
first-degree burglary as a felony is not relevant for purposes of
establishing a prior felony conviction in determining habitual criminal
status in Indiana. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) provides:

“Definition.— As used in this chapter [35-50-2-1—35-50-2-9], ‘felony
conviction’ means a conviction, in any jurisdiction at any time,
with respect to which the convicted person might have been im-
prisoned for more than one [1] year; but it does not include a con-
viction with respect to which the person has been pardoned, or
a conviction of a class A misdemeanor under section 7(b)
{85-50-2-7(b)] of this chapter.”

The jury was instructed according to this statute. Exhibit seven

showed that first-degree burglary was punishable in Arizona by im-
prisonment for not less than one nor more than fifteen years. Thus,
one found guilty “might” be imprisoned for more than one year. With
this exhibit, the state proved that the Arizona conviction was a felony
conviction within the meaning of Ind. Code § 35-50-2-1, supra, and Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-8, supra.

The above testimony may have been objectionable on grounds of
relevancy but that was not the basis of defendant's objection at trial
or his argument on appeal. Any error in the admission of this testimony
is, therefore, waived. Washington v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 156, 402 N.E.2d
1244; Rowley v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 584, 394 N.E.2d 928. There is no
reversible error here.

v.

After the state presented its evidence on the habitual criminal
charge, the defendant made an oral motion for judgment on the evi-
dence. It was denied by the trial court, and defendant now assigns this
ruling as error.

First, he contends that there was insufficient proof of two prior
unrelated felony convictions. He asserts that proof of the Arizona con-
viction could not be considered because the state’s evidence
HH did not disclose that defendant had been informed of his con-
stitutional rights before making the guilty plea. We disagree.
It is defendant’s burden to produce evidence in support of a defense
that his prior convictions are invalid. Hall v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 507,
405 N.E.2d 530. Here, defendant made no claim whatsoever either at
trial or in his appellate brief that he had not been adequately informed
of his constitutional rights. His attack is strictly limited to the alleged
facial invalidity of the state’s proof. Defendant has not sustained his
burden. Defendant also argues that the prior convictions were not prop-
erly proven by order book entries, but we have already decided that
issue adversely to defendant and need not discuss it any further.

Besides proof that a man with defendant's name had been convicted
of two prior unrelated felonies, the state utilized the testimony of two
police officers in order to identify defendant as that same per-

son. One officer was present during the trial of cause number
75-CR-262 in the Vanderburgh Superior Court and made an

a 99

in-court identification of defendant. The other officer was also in court
during the proceedings in cause number 83628 in the Maricopa Superior
Court and made the arrest for the offense involved there. He, too, identi-
fied defendant. A motion for judgment on the evidence is proper only
where there is a total absence of evidence on an essential issue or where
the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one inference, that
being in favor of the accused. Norton v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 635, 408
N.E.2d 514. The evidence produced here was clearly enough to with-
stand the motion.

Second, the defendant maintains that application of the present
habitual criminal statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8, supra, had an ex post
facto effect in violation of article I, § 10, cl. 1 of the U.S. Con-

Hi stitution and article I, § 24 of the Indiana Constitution. He
points out that at the time of his prior felony convictions, the

earlier habitual criminal statute was in effect which required a defend-
ant not only to have been convicted, but imprisoned as well. Ind. Code
§ 35-8-8-1 (Burns 1975) (repealed 1976). Since the new statute does not
require proof of imprisonment, defendant argues that the quantity of
proof necessary to convict has been unconstitutionally decreased. In
order to properly preserve this issue for appeal, defendant should have
made a motion to dismiss the habitual offender charge prior to arraign-
ment and plea. Johnson v. State, (1977) 174 Ind. App. 263, 367 N.H.2d 25.

In any event, defendant overlooks the fact that the enhanced penalty
under the habitual criminal statute is imposed neither for the prior
crimes nor for the status of habitual offender, but for the

Hl ounderlying crime involved in the current proceeding. Wise

v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 498, 400 N.E.2d 114. The statute to

be applied, therefore, should be the one in effect at the time that
underlying crime was committed. See Parks v. State, (1979) 270 Ind.
689, 389 N.E.2d 286. Here, the attempted theft occurred after the new
habitual criminal statute had gone into effect, and thus there was no
ex post facto violation. An identical constitutional attack was presented
to this Court in Hall v. State, supra, and rejected for the same reasons.

Third, defendant contends that he could not be tried on the habitual
offender count because the trial court had not yet entered judgment
on the jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted theft. He cites Ind.

100 ee

Code § 35-50-2-8(c), supra, which provides in pertinent part, “If the per-
son was convicted of the felony in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene
for the sentencing hearing; . . .”

Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) provides in pertinent part,

“After a verdict, finding or plea of guilty, if a new trial is not granted,

the court shall enter a judgment of conviction.” We have con-

| | strued this statutory section and its predecessor as not re-

quiring reversal when a defendant was sentenced without the

trial court having first entered judgment. Schalkle v. State, (1979) 272

Ind. 134, 396 N.E.2d 384; McMinoway v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 241, 294

N.E.2d 803. The terms “judgment” and “sentence” were deemed to

be synonymous so that as long as defendant was properly sentenced,
the requirements of the statute were met. Id.

Statutes which relate to the same general subject matter are in pari

materia and should be construed with reference to each other so as

to harmonize and give effect to the provisions of each.

Hl Schrenker v. Clifford, (1979) 270 Ind. 525, 887 N.E.2d 59; In-

diana Waste Systems, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, (1979)

180 Ind.App. 385, 389 N.H.2d 52. We construe Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8

in the same manner as Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-1 and conclude that it is

not reversible error when the trial court fails to enter judgment for

the underlying felony prior to commencing the second phase of the
bifurcated proceeding.

Defendant, however, argues that an entry of judgment was peculiarly
necessary here because Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b), supra, gives the trial
court discretion to enter judgment and pronounce sentence for a class
A misdemeanor when the accused has been found guilty of a class D
felony. While this argument does appear to have merit, we do not
believe defendant was harmed. The trial court implicitly found no
mitigating circumstances justifying an entry of a misdemeanor convic-
tion when it entered judgment for a class D felony subsequent to the
habitual criminal proceeding.

However, a different result might obtain in a different case. It is
conceivable that after the recidivist hearing and after examining the

a 101

presentence investigation report, a trial court could decide
Hs to enter judgment for a class A misdemeanor, thereby unnec-
essarily subjecting the defendant to the habitual criminal
phase of the trial. Therefore, we believe that it would be the better
practice in the future, in the case of a guilty verdict on a class D felony,
for the court, prior to the trial on the status question and after con-
sidering the presentence investigation report and arguments of counsel,
to determine whether or not it will withhold judgment for a class D
felony and enter judgment for a class A misdemeanor instead. If the
court decides to enter judgment for a class D felony, it should do’ so
and reserve imposition of sentence for the felony until after the trial
on the habitual criminal charge. In the case of guilty verdicts for other
felonies, this same problem will not be encountered as the sentencing
provisions for class D felonies are unique.

VI.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in giving state’s
instruction number six which stated in the final sentence, “Acts con-
sidered apart from other evidence may appear innocent, but when con-
sidered with the other evidence may import guilt as well as innocence.”
He asserts that this instruction lacks mutuality and gives undue prom-
inence to the state’s case.

However, the court also instructed the jury that in their considera-
tion of defendant’s flight, they should keep in mind that there may
have been reasons for it which are fully consistent with inno-
HM cence, including unwillingness to confront the police, reluc-
tance to appear as a witness, etc. Further, the jury was told
that defendant was presumed innocent, that the burden rested with
the state to establish his guilt, and that defendant should be acquitted
unless his guilt was proven beyond every reasonable doubt to the ex-
clusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence.
Instructions are not to be considered as disjointed statements or prin-
ciples but are to be considered as a whole and are to be read together.
Lottie v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 529, 406 N.E.2d 632. There was no error
in giving state’s instruction six.

Defendant has made additional allegations of error concerning proof

102 |

of a third prior felony conviction in the habitual criminal phase of the

trial. We need not address these allegations inasmuch as there

Hl is sufficient evidence of two prior unrelated felony convictions.

Estep v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 525, 394 N.E.2d 111. Proof of

a third felony conviction is mere surplusage under the requirements

of the habitual criminal statute. Jessup v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 409,
269 N.E.2d 374.

For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 46.

DONALD RODGERS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 380863. Filed January 27, 1981]

a 1038

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, James G. Holland, Deputy
Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted after a bench trial
of Kidnapping and Robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of life
imprisonment and ten (10) to twenty-five (25) years. This belated ap-
peal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel.

(2) Whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and
understandingly waived his constitutional right to a jury trial.

(8) Whether the verdicts are supported by sufficient evidence.
ISSUE I

The defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel.

“We have frequently stated that an attorney is strongly presumed
to be competent. (citations omitted). Absent a glaring and critical
omission or succession of omissions evidencing in their totality
a mockery of justice, this Court will not attribute a criminal con-
viction or affirmation to ineffective representation.”

Kerns v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 39, 41, 349 N.E.2d 701, 703;
HE Merida v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 218, 383 N.E.2d 1043, 1045.
In an attempt to satisfy this standard the defendant asserts

four (4) errors of counsel.

The defendant contends that his counsel conducted no discovery.

Failure to conduct discovery is a tactical matter, Cook v. State, (1980)

Ind.App., 403 N.E.2d 860, 867, and the defendant has not

Is shown that he was thereby hampered in the preparation of
his case.

The defendant contends that his counsel failed to move to suppress
and failed to object to inculpatory statements that he had made.
However, he shows no basis for suppression or objection, and we find
none in the record. Hollon v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 439, 398 N.E.2d 1273,
1278.

The defendant contends that his counsel waived arraignment without
consulting him. The arraignment is the procedure of bringing the ac-
cused before the court, notifying him, usually by reading the informa-
tion or indictment, of the charges against him and asking for his plea.
Andrews v. State, (1925) 196 Ind. 12, 146 N.E. 817. In court room ver-
nacular, a waiver of the reading of the charge is often inaccurately
referred to as a “waiver of arraignment.”

The record of Defendant’s arraignment reflects that the defendant
appeared, without counsel and that the court appointed pauper counsel
to represent him. Counsel then stated to the court: “This
His Donald M. Rodgers, Your Honor, age twenty. Waives
arraignment and pleads not guilty and requests an early trial.”
It was the reading of the charge, however, that was dispensed with,
not the arraignment, and there was a plea. Andrews v. State, supra.
Defendant has made no attempt to show how he was harmed by this
customary procedure, and we perceive none. It is the burden of appel-
lants to show how they were harmed by the error complained of. Hester
v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 284, 315 N.E.2d 295 and cases there cited. In
this case, Defendant has shown neither error nor harm.

Lastly, the defendant contends that his counsel failed to object to
the admission of certain testimony. The record shows that counsel ob-
jected to the testimony in question as the witness’ drawing a conclu-
sion, and the trial court properly sustained the objection.

[| 105
EE

The record further discloses that trial counsel presented the defend-
ant’s case and vigorously cross examined the State’s witnesses. We
find that the defendant had effective assistance of counsel.

ISSUE II

The defendant contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently,
voluntarily, and understandingly waive his right to a jury trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and Article I, Section 18 of the Indiana Constitution.

Ind. Code § 35-1-34-1 (Burns 1975) provides:

“The defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the
court, may submit the trial to the court. All other trials must be
by jury.”

In construing this statute we have held that “ * * * the defendant's

assent must mean an assent by defendant personally, reflected in the

record before the trial begins either in writing or in open

HE court.” Good v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 29, 32, 366 N.E.2d 1169,
1171 (emphasis added).

The record shows that the defendant signed a waiver of trial by jury
on January 5, 1968, and the following exchange occurred just prior
to trial, on February 2, 1968:

“THE COURT: Does the Defendant want a trial by Court, rather
than by jury?

“MR. STEINHAUER: Yes, we agreed.

“THE COURT: Let the record show that the Defendant has filed
his written waiver of trial by jury in open Court.”
The defendant would have us grant him a new trial merely because
the record does not show that the trial court informed him of an abso-
lute right to a trial by jury under the United States and
H_sIndiana Constitutions. The trial court’s failure to so inform
the defendant and its failure to interrogate the defendant
personally as to his understanding of his right to trial by jury does
not vitiate the waiver. Kennedy v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 382, 393 N.E.2d
189, 142, cert. denied, (1980) 444 U.S. 1047, 100 S.Ct. 787, 62 L.Ed.2d

734. We perceive the trial court’s failure to inform the defendant of
his right to trial by jury under the United States Constitution to be
justified. The United States Supreme Court did not extend the Sixth
Amendment’s requirement of trial by jury to state criminal proceedings
until May 20, 1968. Duncan v. Louisiana, (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88
S.Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 496, and the holding therein is pro-
spective. only. DeStefano v. Woods, (1968) 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093,
20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (per curiam).

ISSUE III

The defendant’s final assignment is a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the convictions. It is his contention that
the evidence shows that he was the victim of a kidnapping and there-
fore, acted under duress during the entire time that the robbery and
kidnapping of an automobile service station attendant occurred.

The defendant acknowledges that we will consider only the evidence
most favorable to the State, together with all reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom in favor of the verdict. Loyd v. State, (1980)
272 Ind. 404, 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1264. We note the following:

On two separate occasions he had the opportunity to escape his
alleged kidnapper. On the first oceasion, he remained in the front seat
of an automobile holding a ripping knife for fifteen (15) to twenty (20)
minutes, while the service station attendant and another kidnapping
victim were in the back seat, and while his alleged kidnapper was in
an apartment. The defendant had been told by his “kidnapper” to watch
the victims with the knife and not to let them get away.

On the occasion of the second opportunity to escape, which occurred
following an accident with the automobile in which he, the “kidnapper”,
and the service station attendant were riding, the defendant

Isat his “kidnapper’s” request, again stood guard with a knife
over the service station attendant.

“Appellant * * * urges upon us the rule that mere presence at
the scene of the crime is not sufficient to allow an inference of
participation. (Citations omitted). While this is the general rule,
presence in connection with other circumstances is relevant. Com-
panionship with one engaged in a crime, and a course of conduct

[| 1
Ee

2

7

before and after the offense may be considered in determining

whether aiding or abetting may be inferred.” Simmons v. State,

(1974) 262 Ind. 300, 303, 315 N.E.2d 368, 369.

The facts in this case warrant an inference that the defendant aided
his alleged kidnapper in a robbery and kidnapping. Parker v. State,
(1976) 265 Ind. 595, 602, 358 N.E.2d 110, 118-14; Atherton v. State, (1967)
248 Ind. 354, 356, 229 N.E.2d 239, 241.

We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 57.

JEFFERSON GRIFFIN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 5808121. Filed January 27, 1981.]

Ss
I

109

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy
Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, George B. Huff, Jr., Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.—Defendant-appellant Jefferson Griffin was charged in Jay
Circuit Court with Class C burglary, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979
Repl.), and with being a habitual criminal under § 35-50-2-8. Griffin was
tried to a jury and convicted on the burglary charge. In a bifurcated
proceeding, he was found to be a habitual criminal. The trial court first
sentenced appellant to an eight-year term on the burglary count, and
then added the obligatory thirty years for the habitual criminal find-
ing. This appeal followed.

Appellant Griffin raises ten issues for our consideration, concern-
ing: (1) whether the trial court improperly assisted the State in prepar-
ing its case; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Griffin’s mo-
tion for a psychological evaluation; (2) whether the trial court erred
in admitting State’s exhibits three and four into evidence; (4) whether
the trial court erred in denying Griffin’s motion in limine and in over-
ruling his objections to testimony which related to the subject matter
of that motion; (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant
a mistrial due to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper final argument;
(6) whether the trial court erred in admitting State’s exhibits A through

D in the habitual criminal phase; (7) whether the trial court erred in
giving final instruction number seventeen in the habitual criminal pro-
ceeding, and in ordering counsel not to mention certain matters in
arguments to the jury; (8) whether the trial court erred in giving final
instructions 6A through 6C in the habitual criminal phase; (9) whether
the guilty verdict on the burglary count is supported by sufficient
evidence; and (10) whether the eight-year term for the burglary con-
viction violated appellant’s right against double jeopardy.

The record reveals that appellant Jefferson Griffin and his brother,
Frank Griffin, were apprehended at approximately 11:30 p.m. inside
the Redkey Community Church. Investigating officers had discovered
bootprints in the snow leading from a parked car to a door of the church.
The door had been pried open to gain entry. The Griffins’ footwear
matched the impressions in the snow. A screw-driver and flashlight
were discovered in Jefferson Griffin’s possession, and a crowbar and
a flashlight were discovered in Frank Griffin's possession. Police of-
ficers discovered several items strewn about the pulpit area, but the
minister of the church testified that nothing was taken.

L

Appellant first argues that the trial court improperly assisted the
prosecution in the preparation of its case. Griffin asserts that the trial
judge advised the prosecutor at the pretrial conference concerning cer-
tain questions of evidence. He contends such counselling constituted
a breach of the trial judge’s duty to remain impartial.

While we agree with appellant’s assertion that the trial judge must
refrain from acting with partiality, see Brandon ». State, (1979) 272 Ind.
92, 396 N.E.2d 365; Brannum v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 51, 366
I sN.E.2d 1180, the record here simply does not show improper
conduct on the part of the trial court. The only reference in

the record to this matter shows the following:

“Also brief discussion is had of the required certified record
referring to Trial Rule 44 and Indiana Code § 34-1-17-7, at which
point Mr. Ludy objects to the discussion of record keeping stan-
dards, indicating that the same amounts to assistance of the court
to the State, and the objection is overruled.”

[| 111

Record at 186. It is appellant’s obligation to provide us with an ade-
quate record which clearly shows the alleged error of which he com-
plains. See generally Flewallen v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 90, 368 N.E.2d
239. This record plainly does not show that the trial court acted in
a prejudicial or otherwise improper manner.

IL.

Appellant Griffin next alleges the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a psychological evaluation. The record reveals that Griffin
filed a motion for a determination of competence to stand trial, pur-
suant to Ind. Code § 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and a special plea
of insanity, under § 35-5-2-1. In response to the competency issue, the
trial court ordered an examination of Griffin by two psychiatrists, see
§ 35-5-3.1-1, and held an evidentiary hearing on the question of Grif-
fin’s ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the prepara-
tion of his defense. Part of the record of these proceedings are the
reports filed by the two examining psychiatrists. Both experts con-
cluded that Griffin understood the charges against him and is not
suffering from a mental disease or illness. They also concluded that
Griffin has an antisocial personality, but that he was competent to stand
trial. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Griffin had the ability to
understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense.

Thereafter, Griffin, by his new counsel, filed a “Motion for In-Depth
Psychological Evaluation” at a State mental health facility. The sole
basis for this motion was “the interests of justice.” On the following
day, the trial court held that the testimony and evaluation made by
the two psychiatrists consituted sufficient compliance with § 35-5-2-2,
and that Griffin had shown no justification for any further examina-
tion and evaluation. The court then denied Griffin’s motion. Appellant
now claims the court’s refusal to order further examination at state
expense hampered his preparation of his insanity defense.

Generally, the appointment of experts to assist in the preparation
of the defense is a matter committed to the trial court’s discretion.
To show reversible error, appellant must show that the trial

i | court’s decision on this question constituted an abuse of discre-
tion. Roberts v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 127, 373 N.E.2d 1103.

See Norris v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 568, 394 N.E.2d 144; Owen v. State,
(1979) 272 Ind. 122, 396 N.E.2d 376; Murphy v. State, (1976) 256 Ind.
116, 352 N.H.2d 479. In the case before us, the trial court appointed
two psychiatrists to examine Griffin to determine his competency to
stand trial and his sanity at the time of the commission of this offense.
Both concluded that he was legally sane. Appellant has not shown that
the psychiatrists’ evaluations were improper or inadequate, nor has
he shown how additional examinations by additional court-appointed
experts would have changed matters in any way. A boilerplate asser-
tion that the additional examinations were required “in the interests
of justice” is not sufficient to show an abuse of discretion by the trial
court in failing to order additional examinations at state expense.
Roberts v. State, supra. See Norton v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 635, 408
N.E.2d 514, 525; Bell v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 1, 6-7, 366 N.E.2d 1156,
1159. This issue is without merit.

It.

Griffin contends certain items of physical evidence were erroneously
admitted into evidence by the trial court. State’s exhibits three and
four, a flashlight and a pry bar, were admitted into evidence after
testimony established that these items were found in the possession
of appellant’s companion at the scene of the crime. Appellant now
asserts that, because these exhibits were not shown to have been in
his possession, they should not have been admitted as evidence against
him.

We hold the trial court did not err in admitting these exhibits. These

items were clearly relevant to show the commission of a burglary. See

Hill v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 549, 395 N.E.2d 132. Their posses-

Il sion by Griffin’s companion does not diminish their relevance

to prove his guilt. The acts of the defendant’s partner were

fully attributable to the defendant. H.g., Irons v. State, (1979) 272 Ind.

287, 397 N.E.2d 603; Proctor v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 357, 397 N.E.2d

980; Rogers v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 65, 396 N.E.2d 348; Barnes v. State,

(1978) 269 Ind. 76, 378 N.E.2d 839. Thus, the possession and use of the

pry bar and the flashlight by Griffin's cohort —and, hence, the items

themselves—were probative on the question of Griffin’s participation
in the burglary. These exhibits were properly admitted.

P| 118
Ld

Iv.

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine
and overruling his objections to questions asked of him on cross-
examination. Griffin requested in his motion in limine that the State
be ordered not to cross-examine him for impeachment purposes con-
cerning the prior convictions which were alleged in the habitual criminal
information. This motion was overruled. During the trial on the burglary
charge, Griffin took the witness stand on his own behalf. He testified
that he had no memory of the crime in question. On cross-examination,
the prosecutor asked Griffin if he had been convicted of burglary on
April 9, 1976, in Shelby County, Indiana. After defense counsel’s objec-
tion was overruled, Griffin answered affirmatively. The prosecutor then
asked Griffin if he had been convicted of possession of stolen property
on June 7, 1974, in Rush County, Indiana. Counsel's objection was again
overruled, and Griffin again answered affirmatively. In the bifurcated
habitual offender proceeding, documentary evidence of these convic-
tions was admitted to show that Griffin was a habitual criminal.

Appellant contends the State should not have been allowed to force
him to admit under oath that he had committed the crimes which were
alleged in the habitual criminal count. He asserts that permitting this
question placed him in the position of either not taking the witness stand
in his own defense, or taking the witness stand and, in effect, helping
the State prove the essential elements of the habitual criminal allega-
tion. Thus, he argues, his right to testify in his own behalf was chilled.

We disposed of the identical issue in Jameison v. State, (1978) 268 Ind.

599, 377 N.E.2d 404. In that case, the defendant filed a motion in limine

similar to the motion Griffin filed in this case. When the trial

HBB court denied the motion in limine, defendant Jameison decided

not to testify. This Court held that the trial court had not erred

in overruling the motion. We explained that, under Ashton v. Anderson,

(1972) 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210, the credibility of a witness may be

impeached by showing prior convictions for crimes involving dishonesty
or false statement. We further noted:

“The trial court complied in all respects with the bifurcated trial
requirements of Lawrence v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d
839. The jury heard direct evidence of the appellant’s prior crimes

114 |

in the habitual criminal proceeding and was bound to adjudicate
him solely on the basis of that evidence. We fail to see how any
undue prejudice could have arisen in the habitual criminal trial from
the use of evidence of prior crimes to impeach appellant at the prin-
cipal trial.”
268 Ind. at 603, 377 N.E.2d at 406-07. In the case now before us, the prior
convictions brought up on cross-examinations came within the rule of
Ashton v. Anderson, supra. Further, just as in Jameison v. State, the
jury here heard direct, independent evidence of Griffin’s prior convic-
tions in the habitual offender phase of the proceedings. We also note
that Griffin presented an insanity defense. Under our well established
rules, then, evidence of his prior convictions also would have been ad-
missible in the trial on the burglary charge on the question of sanity,
whether or not Griffin chose to testify in his own defense. See, ¢.g., Lock
v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 315, 403 N.E.2d 1360, 1366. Therefore, the exer-
cise of either choice would not have affected the presentation of this
evidence, for an alternative, limited purpose, to the jury. The trial court
did not err in overruling appellant’s motion in limine, nor in refusing
to limit the State’s cross-examination as to his prior convictions.
Jameison v. State, supra. See Shepler v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 331, 412
N.E.2d 62, 69.

Vv.

Appellant Griffin next alleges error in the trial court’s refusal to grant
his motion for mistrial made during final argument. The basis of the
defendant’s motion was the prosecutor’s reference in his argument to
the facts of analogous cases disposed of by this Court on appeal. The
cases which the prosecutor referred to concerned, in part, the sufficiency
of evidence. The prosecutor read a brief portion from each of two cases,
and noted the similarities of the cited cases to Griffin’s case. Counsel
then objected and moved for a mistrial.

The trial court properly overruled appellant’s motion for a mistrial.
We have held on several occasions that reading from decisions to the
jury is proper in final argument. E.g., Owen v. State, (1979) 272

Ind. 122, 396 N.E.2d 376, 380; Hubbard v. State, (1974) 262 Ind.

176, 182, 313 N.E.2d 346, 350; Klepfer v. State, (1889) 121 Ind.

491, 494, 23 N.E. 287, 288. See Bryant v. State, (1933) 205 Ind. 372, 380,

a 115
CL

186 N.E. 322, 325. Appellant urges us to reconsider our decisions in those
cases, contending that this technique causes confusion and misleads the
jury. We believe that, so long as it is clear, as it was in this case, that
the prosecutor is reading from or referring to a separate case, the jury
will not be misled or confused. We decline to overturn the rule of the
cases cited above, and we hold the trial court properly denied appellant’s
motion for a mistrial.

VI.

Appellant Griffin next challenges the trial court’s ruling on the ad-
missibility of State’s exhibits A, B, C, and D, which were introduced
during the habitual offender stage of the proceedings. These exhibits
were a series of documents which showed two of Griffin’s prior convic-
tions. Appellant argues that these documents were not properly authen-
ticated, and that the prosecutor did not establish their connection to
him. He did not specify to the trial court, nor does he'specify to us here,
the alleged deficiency of the authentication. Exhibit A was a probable
cause affidavit filed in the Rush Circuit Court under cause number CR
74-29. This item was sworn by one Marvin L. Hedrick, who, at that time,
was a Rush County Deputy Sheriff. Hedrick alleged in the probable cause
affidavit that Griffin was found in possession of an article which had
been stolen from an Indiana State Highway Department garage. Hedrick
testified during the habitual offender phase and identified appellant Grif-
fin as being the same individual referred to in the affidavit. Exhibit B
was an information filed under the same Rush County cause number,
charging Griffin with possession of stolen property under Ind. Code §
85-17-5-3(1)(f) (Burns 1975). Exhibit C was a copy of a criminal docket
sheet from Rush County, showing that Griffin pled guilty as charged
in the information, and that this plea was accepted by the trial court.
Each of these documents was certified by the Rush Circuit Court Clerk
as being true and complete copies of the records of the case. These
documents showed that Griffin had been convicted of theft in 1974. See
§ 35-17-5-3(1f), supra.

Exhibit D was a series of documents, including a probable cause af-
fidavit, an arrest warrant, an information charging “Jeff Griffin and John
Dixie” with first degree burglary, under Ind. Code § 35-13-4-4 (Burns
1975), and a criminal docket sheet from Shelby Superior Court. This

116 ee
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docket sheet shows that Jefferson Griffin pled guilty to entering to com-
mit a felony and was sentenced accordingly. See Ind. Code § 35-18-4-5
(Burns 1975). Norman Collins, the Shelby County Deputy Sheriff who
made the probable cause affidavit, identified Griffin in court as the same
“Jeff Griffin” named in his affidavit. This set of documents was certified
by the Shelby Superior Court Clerk as being true and complete copies
of the records of that case. These documents showed that Griffin had
been convicted of entering to commit a felony in 1976. See § 35-13-4-5,
supra.
We believe the trial court correctly found these exhibits to be pro-
perly authenticated under Ind. Code § 34-1-17-7 (Burns 1973) and Ind.
R. Tr. P. 44(A). See Eldridge v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 134, 361
Hi sN.£.2d 155. The trial court also properly found a sufficient con-
nection between these documents and appellant Griffin. There-
fore, the court did not err in admitting these exhibits into evidence.

vil.

Griffin next contends the trial court erred in giving final instruction
number seventeen in the habitual criminal proceeding. This instruction
provided:

“These instructions do not contain any information concerning
the penalties that could be imposed as a result of a finding against
defendant in this matter. The judge is solely responsible for assess-
ing the penalties in the manner prescribed by law. The law has
been so written so that you may make your decisions without be-
ing influenced by the apparent severity or leniency of the possible
penalties.”

Supp. Record at 134. The trial court also ordered that the jury not be
made aware of the habitual criminal penalty throughout the taking of
testimony, nor during final argument. Appellant claims this instruction
and order prevented the jury from fully discharging its duty to judge
the law and the facts under article one, section nineteen of the Indiana
Constitution.

We hold the trial court’s instruction and order were entirely proper.
We have disposed of identical or similar arguments in several recent

be WT
a

cases. E.g., Comstock v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 259, 406 N.E.2d

HE 1164; Craig. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 385, 398 N.E.2d 658; Debose

v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 675, 389 N.H.2d 272; Drake v. State, (1979)

272 Ind. 302, 397 N.E.2d 600. As we stated in Craig v. State, supra: “To

date no persuasive argument has been presented to this Court that the

accused in a criminal prosecution has a right to have the jury informed

as to potential penalties where the jury does not engage in the sentenc-

ing function.” 272 Ind. at 388, 898 N.E.2d at 660. This issue is without
merit.

VII.

Appellant argues the trial court erred in giving certain final instruc-
tions, numbers 6A, 6B and 6(C, during the habitual criminal phase. In-
struction 6A informed the jury that, in 1974, an Indiana statute pro-
vided that a person convicted of theft might receive a sentence of from
one to ten years, depending on the circumstances of the offense. Final
instruction 6B provided:

“You are further instructed that at all times relevant to this cause

of action, including on and prior to June 7, 1974, that a person con-

victed of theft was convicted of a felony since, regardless of the

sentence pronounced under Ind. Code § 35-17-5-12, theft is a felony

and cannot be a misdemeanor.”
Supp. Record at 122. Final instruction 6C informed the jury that, under
the law applicable in 1976, a person who committed the offense of enter-
ing to commit a felony was to receive a sentence of from one to ten years.
Instructions 6A and 6C clearly related to Griffin’s prior convictions for
theft and entering to commit a felony. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(d) (Burns
1979 Repl.) provides that the jury may find that the defendant is a
habitual criminal only if the state proves “beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person has accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions.”
Griffin contends the language of this statute required the State to prove
that his prior convictions were felonies; he also asserts that the ques-
tion of whether the offenses of which he was convicted were felonies
was for the jury to determine. Appellant argues, therefore, that these
instructions effectively relieved the State of part of its burden of proof.
We disagree.

118 |
Es

Whether an offense is a “felony” is purely a question of legislative

categorization; it is not a question of fact for the jury, but a matter of

law predetermined by the legislature and applied by the judi-

HEM ciary. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). See Collins v.

State, (1981) 275 Ind. 86, 415 N.H.2d 46. The pertinent ques-

tion of fact for the jury to determine in a habitual offender proceeding

is whether the accused has two prior convictions. The question of

whether those alleged convictions were for felonies is for the trial court

to determine, based on the relevant statutes, before evidence of the con-
victions is presented to the jury.

We view this issue as analogous to the question of whether the jury
should be informed of the habitual offender penalty. See Issue VII, supra.
In Drake v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 302, 397 N.E.2d 600, 601-02, we stated:

“{IJnasmuch as the jury is not ... charged with the responsibility
of assessing the penalty upon a verdict of guilty, it would be im-
proper for it to be instructed concerning potential sentences. ‘Such
an advisement can only invite the jurors to be influenced by their
independent judgment of the fairness of the statute—a matter
dehors their task —in making their determination.’ Garcia v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 510, 394 N.E.2d 106, 111.

In Beavers v. State, (1957) 236 Ind. 549, 141 N.E.2d 118, we held
that although our Constitution grants to juries the right to deter-
mine the law, it is to do so under the guidance of the trial judge.
Hence, the jury’s right to determine the law is not without
limitation.

We agree ... that the penalty provided by an offense is a part
of the law. Nevertheless, if the jury cannot alter the penalty pro-
vided, and clearly it cannot, no valid purpose could be served by
its disclosure. Whether or not the jury approves of the penalty pro-
vided has no bearing upon the defendant's guilt or innocence. ...”

Thus, we held in Drake v. State that the trial court properly refused
to apprise the jury of the habitual offender penalty.

Allowing the jury to determine the status of an offense —as a felony
or misdemeanor — would produce similar undesirable results. Permitting
the jury to determine whether Griffin’s prior convictions, for

Hl theft and entering to commit a felony, were for felonies, would
invite their independent judgment as to the fairness of the

[| 119
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categorization of those offenses as felonies by the legislature. Whether
the jury approves of the categorization of the offenses as felonies has
no bearing on whether the accused has been convicted of those offenses.
Thus, allowing the jury to make such a judgment would give that body
the opportunity to move far outside its realm and consider totally ir-
relevant factors in deciding the defendant’s status as a habitual offender.
In addition, permitting the jury to determine whether a given offense
is a felony would allow them to decide a pure question of law which has
previously been settled by the legislature; given such an opportunity,
the jury might possibly reach a different conclusion from that properly
drawn by the legislature.

The challenged instructions properly informed the jury of certain prin-
ciples of law promulgated by our legislature. These instructions did not
relieve the State of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that Griffin had accumulated two felony convictions. As explained above,
these instructions properly directed the jury's thought processes, and
thereby guarded against their consideration of inappropriate and irrele-
vant matters. The trial court did not err in giving these instructions.

Ix.

Griffin next argues there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction for burglary. Specifically, he challenges the adequacy of proof
as to the status or nature of the victim. The burglary statute, Ind. Code
§ 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), provides: “A person who breaks and enters
the building or structure of another person with intent to commit a felony
in it, commits burglary, a Class C felony.” § 35-41-1-2 further defines
“person” in the following fashion: “ ‘Person’ means a human being, cor-
poration, partnership, unincorporated association, or governmental en-
tity.” Appellant Griffin asserts there was no evidence from which the
jury could infer that the Redkey Community Church was a “person”
under these statutes. We do not agree.

The pastor of the Redkey Community Church, John Gibson, testified
as to the nature and location of the church property. He stated that he
was employed by the Church and was in charge of the church

|| building which was broken and entered into. His testimony
raised the inference that the Redkey Community Church, in

fact, owned the property and the buildings in question. The specific legal
status of the church was not disclosed. We think, however, the jury could
properly find the church to be an “unincorporated association” under
§ 35-41-1-2, supra. We believe the legislature without a doubt intended
that the term “unincorporated association” should encompass entities
or organizations such as this church. See generally Short v. State, (1954)
234 Ind. 17, 122 N.E.2d 82. Therefore, we hold there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding of guilt on the burglary charge.

xX.

Finally, appellant Griffin challenges the trial court's sentencing deci-
sion as to the burglary count. The jury convicted Griffin of Class C
burglary, and then found him to be a habitual criminal. The trial court
subsequently sentenced Griffin to eight years on the burglary charge;
the court then added thirty years to that sentence due to Griffin’s status
as a habitual offender.

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (Burns 1979 Repl.) establishes the sentencing
range for a Class C felony conviction:

“A person who commits a Class C felony shall be imprisoned for
a fixed term of five years, with not more than three years added
for aggravating circumstances or not more than three years sub-
tracted for mitigating circumstances; in addition, he may be fined
not more than ten thousand dollars.”

In addition, Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7 (Burns § 35-50-1A-7, 1979 Repl.)
provides:

“CRITERIA FOR SENTENCING.—(a) In determining what
sentence to impose for a crime, the court shall consider the risk
that the person will commit another crime, the nature and cir-
cumstances of the crime committed, and the prior criminal record,
character, and condition of the person.

(b) The court may consider these factors as mitigating cir-
cumstances or as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing
probation:

(1) The crime neither caused nor threatened serious harm to per-
sons or property, or the person did not contemplate that it would
do so.

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CF

(2) The crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
(8) The victim of the crime induced or facilitated the offense.

(4) There are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify
the crime, though failing to establish a defense.

(5) The person acted under strong provocation.

(6) The person has no history of delinquency or criminal activ-
ity, or he has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period before
commission of the crime.

(7) The person is likely to respond affirmatively to probation or
short-term imprisonment.

(8) The character and attitudes of the person indicate that he
is unlikely to commit another crime.

(9) The person has made or will make restitution to the victim
of his crime for the injury, damage, or loss sustained.

(10) Imprisonment of the person will result in undue hardship
to himself or his dependents.

(c) The court may consider these factors as aggravating cir-
cumstances or as favoring imposing consecutive terms of
imprisonment:

(1) The person has recently violated the conditions of any proba-
tion, parole, or pardon granted him.

(2) The person has a history of criminal activity.

(3) The person is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treat-
ment that can best be provided by his commitment to a penal
facility.

(4) Imposition of a reduced sentence or suspension of the sentence
and imposition of probation would depreciate the seriousness of
the crime.

(5) The victim of the crime was sixty-five [65] years of age or older.
(6) The victim of the crime was mentally or physically infirm.

(d) The criteria listed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section
do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determin-
ing the sentence.”

The habitual offender statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979 Repl.),

provides for the following sentencing result: “A person who is found
to be an habitual offender shall be imprisoned for an additional fixed
term of thirty years, to be added to the fixed term of imprisonment im-
posed under section 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 [§§ 35-50-2-3 — 35-50-2-7] of this chapter.”
Thus, by the terms of this statute, the trial court was required to add
thirty years to whatever sentence was initially imposed on the burglary
charge under § 35-50-2-6.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the
following pronouncement:

“Very well. Sentencing hearing held and concluded and the court.
finds defendant has a history of criminal and serious delinquency
offenses or activity; the defendant needs correctional or
rehabilitative treatment not available locally or best provided by
commitment to prison. Imposition of a reduced sentence or proba-
tion would be improper because of the seriousness of the crime.
The victim of the crime was a church. The crime is not suspendable
by law. There is a relatively high risk that defendant will commit
another crime. In fact it is certain to a high degree that he will.
Defendant is such a person that he should not be allowed to be out
on the streets again. He is a sociopath even though legally sane.
The nature and circumstances of the crime committed and the prior
criminal record, bad character and condition of defendant are fac-
tors favoring up to the maximum sentence of 8 plus 30 or 38 years
and/or consecutive sentencing.”

Record at 728-29. Appellant Griffin contends the “same exact factors”
were used to sentence him on both the burglary count and the habitual
criminal count. He asserts that the trial court should not have been
allowed to increase the initial sentence for burglary due to certain fac-
tors, and then add the mandatory thirty-year term for habitual criminal-
ity in response to those same factors. The factors appellant refers to,
of course, concern his past criminal record. Griffin asserts that the trial
court used his prior convictions for theft and entering to commit a
felony to raise the total sentence on two occasions: in finding and ap-
plying the aggravating circumstances under §§ 35-50-2-6 and 35-4.1-4-7,
and in assessing the additional thirty years under § 35-50-2-8. Appellant
argues that his right against double jeopardy will be violated if this Court
permits the trial court to “punish the defendant twice (aggravate his
sentence twice in the same proceeding) based on the same facts.”

a 128
CS

In Elmore v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 532, 382 N.E.2d 893, we explained
that the right against double jeopardy prohibits: (1) reprosecution for
the same offense after acquittal; (2) reprosecution for the same
HE offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishment for the
same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce, (1969) 395 U.S. 711,
89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656. In addition, we noted in Wise v. State,
(1980) 272 Ind. 498, 400 N.E.2d 114, 117, that a person found to be a
habitual criminal “is subjected to the greater sentence neither for the
prior crimes nor for the status of habitual offender, but rather the
enhanced sentence is imposed for the last crime committed.” The ap-
pellant in Wise v. State argued that allowing sentencing based on proof
of prior convictions violated his right against double jeopardy. We ex-
plained, however, concerning the second and third categories listed in
Elmore v. State, supra, that the sentencing for the immediate crime is
enhanced by “the fact of those convictions and is not based on the same
facts which established those prior crimes.” 272 Ind. at 502, 400 N.E.2d
at 117. Therefore, the habitual offender sentencing provision is “neither
a separate criminal charge nor an additional penalty for the earlier
crimes.” Thus, the use of prior convictions to enhance the sentence for
the immediate crime does not constitute a reprosecution for the same
offense after a conviction, nor does such use result in multiple punish-
ment for the same offense. Therefore, enhancing the sentence in this
fashion for the immediate crime does not violate double jeopardy. This
is true where those prior convictions are used as aggravating cir-
cumstances to increase the sentence, under § 35-4.1-4-7, supra, and where
they are used to support the finding that the defendant is a habitual
offender, under § 35-50-2-8, supra. Appellant Griffin can therefore show
no double jeopardy violation.

Moreover, appellant is incorrect in his assertion that the two prior
convictions for theft and entering to commit a felony were the sole basis
of the trial court’s finding of aggravating circumstances under §
35-4.1-4-7. The presentence report concerning Griffin lists frequent in-
stances where Griffin has run afoul of the law, and shows nearly a lifetime
of incorrigible behavior. When the trial court pronounced the sentence,
he noted that Griffin needs treatment which is not available locally or
which is best provided by commitment to an institution; that the victim

of the crime was a church; that he is “certain to a high degree” that
Griffin would commit more crimes; and that Griffin is a sociopath, even
though legally sane. The trial court was correct in considering each of
these factors, and it is clear that the court did not base its finding of
aggravating circumstances solely on the two prior convictions which
were used to find that Griffin was a habitual criminal.

Thus, Griffin has shown no error in the trial court’s performance of

its sentencing function. Further, we do not find the sentence imposed

here to be manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the

HHI ooffense and the character of this offender. As we explained

above, we find this sentence to be fully authorized by statute.

Therefore, we are not at liberty to revise the sentence. Ind. R. App.
Rev. Sent. 2.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

All Justices concur.
NotTE—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 60.
EE

HARRY FRED PALMER, III v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 8805353. Filed January 30, 1981. Rehearing denied March 3, 1981.]

a 125

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy
Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— Appellant Harry Fred Palmer attempts to appeal a case
which has already been decided by this Court. We decided this cause
on March 22, 1979. State v. Palmer, (1979) 270 Ind. 493, 386 N.E.2d 946.
The trial court received a certified copy of our opinion on June 8, 1979.

For purposes of disposing of this attempted appeal, we again set forth
the relevant procedural facts of this case. On September 12, 1977, ap-
pellant Palmer was charged with first degree burglarly under Ind. Code
§ 35-13-4-4 (Burns 1975). On January 16, 1978, he withdrew his plea of
not guilty and entered a plea of guilty as charged. On February 13, 1978,
Palmer was sentenced by regular Judge William Bontrager to serve
a sentence of not less than ten nor more than twenty years, as provided
by the statute. Our legislature had further provided, in § 35-7-1-1, that
first degree burglary was one of several enumerated crimes for which
the sentencing court was prohibited from suspending the sentence and
placing the defendant on probation. However, Judge Bontrager found
this provision to be unconstitutional, and decreed that Palmer should
serve a sentence of one year, the balance of the sentence to be suspended
and Palmer to be placed on probation for a period of five years.

The State appealed the trial court’s ruling. We held that the trial court
had no authority to enter an order suspending Palmer’s sentence, since
the trial court was limited to sentencing him under the provisions of
the applicable statutes. The cause was then remanded to the trial court
with the following holding and order:

“We accordingly hold that the trial court had no authority to
enter an order suspending Palmer’s sentence and was limited to
sentencing the defendant under the provisions of the old code which
were applicable at that time. The cause is accordingly remanded
to the trial court with instructions to modify its judgment consis-
tent with this opinion.”

State v. Palmer, supra, 270 Ind. at 498, 386 N.E.2d at 950. The entry

of our judgment, as set out above, completed this cause to a finality,
and left no issues to be decided by this Court or the trial court. The
trial judge’s only remaining duty on remand was to follow the instruc-
tions of this Court by striking the portion of his sentencing order which
placed Palmer on probation, and by committing him to the Department
of Corrections for a period of not less than ten nor more than twenty
years, pursuant to the clear and mandatory language of §§ 35-13-4-4 and
35-7-1-1.

The mandate of this Court to this date has not been carried out by
either Judge William Bontrager or Special Judge Richard Sproull. It
is apparent that Judge Bontrager chose not to sentence Palmer as the
law and our holding obliged him to do. Following the receipt of the cer-
tified opinion of this Court on June 8, 1979, Judge Bontrager set the
matter for “further proceedings” on June 18. Over the objections of the
State, Judge Bontrager thereafter held a series of hearings, the pur-
pose of which was apparently to determine whether Palmer should, in
fact, be sentenced for the statutory period. Palmer was permitted to
call witnesses to attempt to prove that he had been rehabilitated since
the time of his original sentencing, and that to force him now to serve
his time would be nothing more than vindictive justice. Judge Bontrager
continued the matter from time to time, and Palmer, through his counsel,
was granted permission to call witnesses and take depositions of many
individuals, including the Director of Corrections of Indiana.

On August 8, 1979, Judge Bontrager recused himself from the case
and Special Judge Sproull purported to assume jurisdiction. Special
Judge Sproull then began to pursue the same course of action Judge
Bontrager had taken, permitting Palmer to offer evidence for the pur-
pose of proving that he should not be made to serve his time, but should
be allowed to continue on probation. Finally, on September 7, 1979, Judge
Sproull did sentence Palmer. He stated in his order that he felt the
original sentencing of Palmer was erroneous, that Palmer had been
rehabilitated, and that it would be cruel and unusual punishment to have
him serve the statutory time. Special Judge Sproull concluded that since
this Court had ordered the sentence to be executed, he had no choice
but to carry out that order. He then sentenced Palmer to not less than
ten nor more than twenty years, and ordered that Palmer be given credit

Le 127
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for the 365 days he had served. Special Judge Sproull denied Palmer's
request for continued probation and ordered him to report to the In-
diana Reception and Diagnostic Center on October 1, 1979. Judge Sproull
then fixed an appeal bond in the sum of five thousand dollars, and in-
structed Palmer on the procedures to follow to appeal this judgment.
Palmer filed the five thousand dollar appeal bond on September 11 and
a motion to correct error on November 2. The motion to correct error
was overruled on January 31, 1980, and a motion for relief from the trial
court’s order was also denied on that date. This attempted appeal
followed.

Thus, we now have before us documents which purport to be an ap-
peal in a cause which has already been decided by this Court and in
which no appealable issues remain. There is a right to appeal an error
in the sentence imposed upon a guilty plea, but that right does not ob-
tain in this case. Weyls v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 301, 362 N.E.2d 481. Special
Judge Sproull made it appear that he was following the directives of
this Court by articulating the sentence required. However, he then per-
mitted Palmer to be released by posting an appeal bond where no ap-
peal was available. Because no appeal was available, Palmer had no right
to be released under such pretenses.

This record presents to us nothing short of legal gymnastics by the
regular judge and the special judge to avoid the clear duty facing them
under the statutes, the order of this Court, and the oaths of their office;
instead, they attempted to effect the result thought by them to be a
better idea. Obviously, that idea was to have Palmer remain free, as
indeed he has done to this day. If there is some persuasive reason or
convincing philosophy why Palmer should not have to serve his time,
those arguments should be directed to an application for executive
clemency or perhaps a petition for post-conviction relief. In the mean-
time, it is incumbent on the trial court and on this Court to follow the law.

The original appeal from the guilty plea and the sentencing thereon
presented only one issue; there, the State challenged the jurisdiction
of the trial court to put Palmer on probation when the statute prohibited
him from doing so. We found in that appeal that the trial court had no
authority to suspend Palmer’s sentence and put him on probation, and
we ordered that the trial judge sentence Palmer accordingly. A peti-

128 ee
Cd

tion for rehearing was denied, and a certified opinion was issued to the
trial judge. At that point, there was nothing for the trial judge to do
except follow our instructions by striking his suspension and probation
order and committing Palmer to the Department of Corrections. There
was nothing further for the trial court to hear or decide; therefore, there
is nothing to be presented now to this Court for decision on appeal. This
attempted appeal is a nullity, and any orders or findings by either trial
judge, other than those showing compliance with the orders of this Court,
are also null and void. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed, and this cause
is again remanded to the trial court with orders to immediately commit
Palmer to the Department of Corrections to serve the sentence imposed
on him under the statute.

We further find that Judge William Bontrager and Special Judge
Richard Sproull have directly violated a clear mandate of this Court
in a manner that appears to be contemptible of this Court. Accordingly,
an order shall issue forthwith directing both judges to personally ap-
pear before this Court and show cause why they should not be held in
indirect criminal contempt of this Court. Judgment accordingly.

All Justices concur.
NOoTE—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 707.
De

HARRY FRED PALMER III v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{[No. 8808358, Filed March 31, 1981.]

[| 129

a
a
The Honorable William D. Bontrager found guilty of Indirect Criminal

Contempt; Special Judge, Richard Sproull found not guilty.

Richard E. Steinbronn, Thornburg, McGill, Deahl, Harman, Carey &
Murray, of South Bend, William J. Nye, Myers & Nye, of Elkhart, for
respondents.

PIVARNIK, J.— This proceeding arises out of an order issued by this Court
on January 30, 1981, to the Honorable William D. Bontrager, Judge of
the Elkhart Superior Court Number Two, and the Honorable Richard
H. Sproull, Special Judge of that court, directing them to appear before
this Court and show cause why they should not be held in indirect
criminal contempt for failure to carry out an order of this Court. The
order in question directed the trial court to sentence Harry Fred Palmer
III as required by statute. We issued the show cause order concurrent
with findings which were published in an opinion handed down January
30, 1981. Palmer v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 124, 415 N.E.2d 707. This opin-
ion is issued pursuant to our written order of March 6, 1981, finding
Judge Bontrager guilty and Special Judge Sproull not guilty of indirect
criminal contempt.

All of the facts on which we based our appraisal of apparent contempt
were contained within the records filed with this Court. Defendant
Palmer entered a plea of guilty to a charge of first degree burglary,
under Ind. Code § 35-13-4-4 (Burns 1975), in Judge Bontrager’s court.
Under Ind. Code § 35-7-1-1 (Burns 1975), first degree burglary was one
of several enumerated crimes for which the sentencing court was pro-
hibited from suspending the sentence and placing the defendant on pro-
bation. On February 13, 1978, Judge Bontrager sentenced Palmer to

130 |
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not less than ten nor more than twenty years on his plea of guilty, as
the burglary statute provided. Judge Bontrager then found § 35-7-1-1
to be unconstitutional, and thereafter ordered Palmer to serve a sentence
of one year, the balance of the sentence to be suspended and Palmer
to be placed on probation for a period of five years. The State then pro-
secuted an appeal.

We decided the original appeal in this case on March 22, 1979. State
v. Palmer, (1979) 270 Ind. 498, 386 N.E.2d 946. We held that the applicable
statutes were constitutional, and that the trial court was therefore
limited to sentencing Palmer — by virtue of his guilty plea—to not less
than ten nor more than twenty years; we further held that Judge Bon-
trager had no authority to suspend Palmer’s sentence in any fashion.
We then remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to modify
its judgment accordingly.

This case then came back to us a second time, on Palmer's attempt
to present alleged additional issues. We disposed of that appeal by
dismissal in our January 30, 1981, opinion. The record showed that, after
Palmer’s petition for rehearing was denied by this Court following our
first opinion, a copy of that opinion was certified to Judge Bontrager’s
court on June 8, 1979. At this point, Judge Bontrager set the matter
for “further proceedings.” On June 18, 1979, over the State’s objection,
Judge Bontrager continued sentencing to August 20, and further
directed the parties to make omnibus-type disclosure by August 6 of
all witnesses and evidence to be introduced at the “further proceedings.”
Several motions were filed, relating to the scope of discovery, a change
in defendant's counsel, and a request for a delay in sentencing pending
an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Palmer also requested
a delay in sentencing pending resolution of a case then under considera-
tion by the Supreme Court. Judge Bontrager deferred all rulings.
Finally, on August 6, 1979, Judge Bontrager recused himself from the
cause without ever having sentenced Palmer pursuant to the statutes
and the order of this Court.

On August 8, 1979, Richard H. Sproull appeared and qualified as
Special Judge. He conducted a hearing on August 24, 1979, concerning
all pending matters. Special Judge Sproull granted the State’s motion
for a protective order, denied Palmer’s motion to delay sentencing, and

[| 181
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set the matter for sentencing on September 5, 1979. On September 7,
Special Judge Sproull entered written findings. He found the defendant
to be rehabilitated and suggested that it would be cruel to return him
to prison at that time. In spite of these findings, he acknowledged this
Court’s order and sentenced Palmer to the Department of Corrections
for a term of ten to twenty years, with credit for time already served.
Palmer was ordered to report to the diagnostic center on October 1,
1979. Special Judge Sproull then fixed an appeal bond in the amount
of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00). Palmer filed a five hundred dollar
($500.00) cash bond, and was released on September 11, 1979.

We held in our second opinion that all issues in the cause had already
been decided in our original opinion and, therefore, that no appealable
issues remained for our consideration. We noted that, after
H_sthe March 22, 1979 opinion was certified to the trial court, the
only thing left for the trial court to do was to follow the direc-
tives in that opinion by striking its order suspending Palmer’s sentence
and placing him on probation, and thereafter order him committed as
the statutes provided. The trial judge had no discretion to act in any
other way. There was, therefore, no appeal available to Palmer, and
no reason for him to be released on an appeal bond. If the defendant
felt at that time that he had remedies to pursue relative to the situation
in which he then found himself, he could have raised—and still could
raise —those issues in any subsequent actions he thought appropriate.
However, there was nothing further to be raised or decided on that at-
tempted second direct appeal. Palmer v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 124, 415
N.E.2d 707, 708-09.

Pursuant to our show cause order, Judges Bontrager and Sproull ap-
peared with counsel before us on February 25, 1981. The evidence ad-
duced at that hearing showed that the facts already in the record were
accurately presented in the two appeals we have considered involving
this defendant. The facts further showed that both judges understood
the orders of this Court and knew that, under those orders, it was man-
datory that Palmer be sentenced to a ten-to-twenty-year term and com-
mitted to the Department of Corrections.

Judge Bontrager did not deny any of the facts disclosed in the record,
but spoke only in mitigation, concerning his claimed lack of intent to

132 |
Le

the contemptuous of this Court. He testified of his concern for Palmer’s
position of being sentenced to a full term after having complied, to that
point, with the terms of Judge Bontrager’s original sentence, even
though this first sentence was found to be illegal. He said he had ex-
amined opinions from other jurisdictions that had spoken on this general
subject, and was aware that the United States Supreme Court was con-
sidering a case in which this general type of due process question was
at issue. Further, Judge Bontrager had made public statements con-
cerning Palmer’s case and the first opinion handed down by this Court,
which were much discussed in the Elkhart County media and among
the citizens of the community.

Nearly two months after this Court’s first opinion was certified to
Judge Bontrager’s court, the prosecuting attorney, Michael Cosentino,
called on Judge Bontrager in his chambers and suggested that he recuse
himself from the case, due to his emotional and personal involvement
in the affairs of this defendant. Judge Bontrager recognized the valid-
ity of Cosention’s assertions; he also recognized that his attitudes were
generally known and highly publicized in the community. For those
reasons, he recused himself and provided for the selection of a special
judge to continue the cause. Thus, Judge Bontrager had the orders of
this Court before him for a period of almost two months, orders which
he fully understood and yet totally failed to execute.

In a similar contempt proceeding, we had occasion to speak on the
conduct of a trial judge who unduly delayed responding to the orders
of this Court, where that delay was obviously caused by the
I trial judge's reluctance to follow those orders. In State ea rel.
Sedamv. Ripley Circuit Court, (1973) 262 Ind. 25, 27,302 N.E.2d

761, 762, we stated:

“It appears to this Court that this unseemly delay in executing
the orders of this Court was an intentional attempt to thwart the
effectiveness of the order which resulted in stirring up additional
litigation in Respondent’s court as well as in this Court. All of this
matter could have been disposed of on August 31, 1973, when
Respondent partially executed the orders of this Court. We have
concluded from the evidence before us that there has been an at-
tempt to trifle with the Court and to circumvent a compliance with
the orders of this Court, thus unnecessarily requiring our time and

Pi 133

attention and that of other public officials.”

After Judge Bontrager’s unseemly delay of almost two months, he placed
himself in a position where he could not execute our order, and recused
himself from the case without ever having done so.

At the February 25 hearing, we found Judge Bontrager guilty of in-
direct criminal contempt for failing to carry out the mandate of this
Court. We sentenced him to thirty days imprisonment at the State Farm
and fined him in the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00). The prison
term was suspended, and the fine was ordered paid on or before March
5, 1981. We further ordered that the matter of Judge Bontrager’s con-
duct would be referred to the Judicial Qualifications Commission for
investigation.

The evidence at the February 25 hearing showed that Special Judge
Sproull indicated to the parties from the beginning of his involvement
in the case that, in his opinion, the only option he had was to follow the
mandate of this Court, which would require him to sentence Palmer to
a ten-to-twenty-year term and commit him to the Department of Cor-
rections. Special Judge Sproull felt, however, that Palmer did have a
right to make a record and raise the due process issues he felt were
available to him; Sproull then permitted him to do so, to facilitate presen-
tation of those issues to this Court for review. Special Judge Sproull
stated that he did feel that Palmer had a right to raise these issues on
an appeal to this Court. It was apparent that the deputy prosecutor
handling the case agreed that Palmer did have appealable issues to pre-
sent. Thus, all concerned agreed that Palmer should be permitted to
make a record of those issues and thereafter should be permitted to
perfect an appeal to this Court. The deputy prosecutor also agreed to
the fixing of an appeal bond pending the purported appeal. As noted
earlier, we subsequently dismissed that appeal.

Even though we feel Special Judge Sproull was incorrect in his
analysis of the questions in this case and improperly allowed Palmer
to be free on bond after his commitment, we have a reasonable

Hs doubt whether his actions and intentions amounted to indirect
criminal contempt of this Court. Special Judge Sproull came

into this cause at a very late date, and was faced with a situation which

134 —
a

any special judge would find difficult. He followed a course of action
which he sincerely believed was in compliance with this Court’s order.
His actions in permitting Palmer to make a record and post an appeal
bond were encouraged by all of the parties, or at least were not objected
to. We therefore found that Special Judge Sproull was not guilty of in-
direct criminal contempt of this Court.

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, J., concur.

Hunter, J., dissents in part and concurs in part in separate opinion
in which Prentice, J., concurs.

DISSENTING IN PART, CONCURRING IN PART.

HUNTER, J.—I dissent from the majority’s opinion finding that Judge
Bontrager is guilty of indirect criminal contempt, but I concur in the
necessity of the referral of this matter of Judge Bontrager’s conduct
to the Judicial Qualifications Commission by reason of his reluctance
to follow the law and this Court’s order. He subscribed to the same oath
which each member of the judiciary subscribes to when he takes office —
that is, to uphold the Constitution of the United States of America and
the Constitution and laws of the State of Indiana to the best of his skill
and ability. I believe there is a grave question concerning Judge Bon-
trager’s judicial demeanor.

Talso concur in the finding that Special Judge Sproull was not guilty
of indirect criminal contempt of this Court.

Prentice, J., concurs.
NoTE—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 530.
P|

CHARLES GILMORE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 380878. Filed January 29, 1981.]

13!

a

Thomas J. Campbell, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.— The defendant, Charles Gilmore, was convicted by a jury

136 De

of burglary, a class C felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.)
and found to be an habitual offender, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979
Repl.) (amended 1980). He was sentenced to terms of five years and thirty
years respectively. His direct appeal raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant’s
motion to dismiss the habitual offender count;

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by not sus-
taining defendant’s objection when the prosecutor allegedly commented
upon defendant’s failure to testify;

8. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give two of defend-
ant’s final instructions; and

4, Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s ver-
dicts on both counts.

A summary of the facts most favorable to the state shows that a
school building in Indianapolis was broken into on the evening of
November 15, 1978. Etta Cox testified that she was employed as a custo-
dian at the school and that while she was in the teacher’s lounge be-
tween 7:30 and 8:00 p.m., she heard the sound of glass breaking in
another room. Cox left the lounge and called security, then returned
to the lounge and locked herself in the room. She stated that she saw
a shadow through the frosted window of the door of the teacher’s
lounge, but could not identify any specific individual.

Officer Riley responded to the school alarm and observed a person
wearing a dark cap and light jacket crawling out of a window at the
school. He then saw the person duck back into the building and heard
him running through the school. Riley advised other police in the area
that a person had been seen on the south side of the building. Another
policeman, Officer Briner, advised that he had a subject on the west
side of the building that fit the description. Briner testified that he
encountered defendant walking on the sidewalk next to the school and
that defendant had on a dark cap and light jacket. A person present
on the west side of the building would either have had to come out
of the building or have climbed the fence on the south side. If anyone
had climbed the fence on the south'side, Officer Riley would have seen
him.

[| 187
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After defendant was apprehended, a window was found open leading
into a hallway. A section of a window in the kindergarten room was
broken out and a pair of scissors belonging to the kindergarten teacher
was found on a desk in the clerk’s office. There were pry marks on
a drawer in the desk and a broken point from the scissors was found
jammed in the drawer.

Defendant claimed he had been at his girlfriend’s house and was just
cutting across the school grounds on his way home when he was ap-
prehended. He said he had climbed the fence and walked down the
sidewalk. After Officer Briner apprehended defendant, he immediately
went to defendant’s girlfriend’s home. She stated that defendant had
been there earlier, but had not been there in the past half hour.

I.

Defendant first alleges that the trial court erroneously denied his
motion to dismiss the habitual offender count. He was originally charged
with burglary, a class C felony, on November 16, 1978. The state filed
a motion to amend by adding Count II, the habitual offender count,
on June 22, 1979. This motion was granted and trial was held on Octo-
ber 4, 1979.

The right of the state to amend by adding an habitual offender count

has been specifically approved by this Court. Howard v. State, (1978)

268 Ind. 589, 377 N.E.2d 628. An information may be amended

Isat any time before, during or after trial so long as it does

not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. Since

the habitual criminal statute does not impose punishment for a separate

crime but provides a more severe penalty for the crime charged and

since defendant was given adequate time to prepare a defense, an

amendment to add the habitual criminal count did not prejudice the
substantial rights of the defendant. Howard v. State, supra.

Defendant further argues that his rights were prejudiced in this case
because the amendment adding the habitual offender charge affected
the availability of a defense. He argues that he was precluded

Hs irom testifying in his own behalf during the trial on the
burglary charge because of the risk that the state would use

his past criminal convictions for impeachment purposes and this evi-

dence would influence the jury in its deliberations on the habitual of-
fender count. We find there is no merit to this contention since the
trial court held a bifurcated trial in complete accordance with the re-
quirements of Lawrence v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830.
This bifurcated trial procedure was adopted to prevent unnecessary
prejudice to a defendant during a trial on a principal charge. There
will always be some inherent prejudice to any defendant who has prior
criminal convictions but a bifurcated procedure, such as that followed
in the instant case, will preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
We find no error here. See Jameison v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 599, 377
N.E.2d 404,

I.

During the trial, defendant called a witness, Santos Irizarry, in an
attempt to show that he had been working at a gas station on the even-
ing of the crime. During the direct examination the following exchange
occurred:

Q. [by defense counsel]: “What happened when it got dark?
Did Mr. Gilmore eventually leave the gas station?”

A. “Yes. When it got dark, he said—”

Mr. Commons [prosecutor]: “I would object what he said, Your
Honor, as being hearsay.”

Court: “Well, is that an exception to the Patterson rule or not?”

Mr. Commons: “Well Judge, I think the hearsay rule applies to
statements made by the defendant during the res gestae.
From what I understand of his testimony, it is res gestae
unless he wants to get up and testify himself.”

Court: Iam going to overrule your objection. There may be merit
to it but I am going to overrule it.”

Mr. Hollander [defense counsel]: “Judge, I would object to the
prosecutor’s reference also.”

Court: “I have overruled the objection. Proceed.”
Defendant now argues that the prosecutor's statements regarding

the application of the hearsay rule were impermissible comments on
his failure to testify and constitute reversible error. It is true that any

Le 139
EE

direct or indirect comment which is subject to interpretation by a jury
as a comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify is impermis-
sible. Bryant v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 268, 385 N.E.2d 415; Rowley v.
State, (1972) 259 Ind. 209, 285 N.E.2d 646; Ind. Code § 35-1-31-3 (Burns
1979 Repl.).

However, we are here concerned with a discussion between the pros-
ecutor and the judge about a technical hearsay question. The remarks
were not direct comments on defendant’s failure to testify
H__obut were part of a hypothetical example used to clarify the
hearsay issue. Furthermore, the remarks were directed to
the judge and not to the jury. While it would be better practice to
hold such a discussion outside the presence of the jury, this is not always
practicable. We find no error here.

OL

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing two
of his final instructions. Defendant's final instruction No. 1 covered
the issue of the presumption of innocence. The trial court refused that
instruction and instead gave its own preliminary instruction No. 3 which
stated as follows:

“Under the law of this State you are the sole judges of both the
Jaw and the evidence and you must presume that the defendant
is innocent. You must continue to believe that he is innocent
throughout the trial, unless the State proves that the defendant
is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of every essential element
of the offense charged. The burden of proof herein is on the State
alone and never shifts to the defendant.

“Since the defendant is presumed to be innocent, he is not required
to present any evidence to prove his innocence, nor to prove, do,
or explain anything. If, at the conclusion of the trial, there remains
in your mind a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s guilt,
you must find him not guilty.”
Defendant contends that this instruction did not adequately instruct
the jury that it was their duty to reconcile the evidence upon the theory
of defendant's innocence if they could reasonably do so. How-
sever, the court further instructed the jury in a separate in-
struction that all reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor

of the defendant. We find that the court’s instructions adequately
covered the theory of the presumption of innocence, although not in
the exact words that defendant requested. The refusal of a trial court
to give a tendered instruction is not reversible error if the substance
of the instruction is adequately covered by other instructions given
by the court. Richmond v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 554, 387 N.E.2d 1312;
Toliver v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 575, 372 N.E.2d 452; Vacendak v. State,
(1976) 264 Ind. 101, 340 N.E.2d 352.

Defendant tendered the following instruction No. 9 which was also
refused:

“The Defendant requests that you find that on the day in ques-
tion he had assisted his sister's boyfriend who was working at
a self-service gas station on East Washington Street from mid-
afternoon until late afternoon; that after leaving the gas station,
he went to his girlfriend’s house at 141 Highland Street, Indiana-
polis, Indiana, where he stayed for approximately one (1) hour,
before leaving, heading in the direction of the house where he
was staying at 1424 Marlowe Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, and
that when he left 141 Highland Street, he took a shortcut through
the alley, jumped the fence at the schoolgrounds of School Number
Fourteen (#14), where he was immediately arrested and charged
with the commission of this crime.

“Tf you find these statements to be true, then you must find the
Defendant not guilty of the commission of this crime.”
This instruction was properly refused because it invaded the pro-
vince of the jury by attaching weight to certain evidence. Blackburn
v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 189, 390 N.E.2d 653; Murphy v. State,
HB s(1977) 267 Ind. 184, 369 N.E.2d 411.

Iv.
Defendant finally contends that the verdicts were not supported by
sufficient evidence. He first argues that since the evidence connecting

him with the crime was largely circumstantial it was not enough to
identify him as the person who broke into the school building.

We have consistently held that this Court does not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses and will consider only

[| 141
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that evidence most favorable to the state and all reasonable
I_sinferences drawn therefrom. When there is substantial evi-
dence of probative value to support each element of the of-

fense, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed. Wofford v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 518, 394 N.E.2d 100; Poindeater v. State, (1978) 268 Ind.
167, 374 N.E.2d 509. On review, this Court does not have to find that
circumstantial evidence is adequate to overcome every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence but only that an inference may reasonably be
drawn therefrom which supports the finding of the jury. Hall v. State,
(1980) 273 Ind. 507, 405 N.E.2d 530; Parks v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 689,
389 N.E.2d 286; Jones v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 640, 377 N.B.2d 1349.

In this case, the evidence shows that Etta Cox was the only author-
ized person in the school building on the night of the crime. She heard
glass breaking and called security. Officer Riley arrived at the building
a few minutes later and saw someone wearing a dark cap and light
jacket starting to crawl out of a window. The person ducked back into
the building and Officer Riley advised other officers that a person had
been seen on the south side of the building. Officer Briner then appre-
hended defendant walking on a sidewalk on the west side of the building.
Defendant was wearing a dark cap and a light jacket. In order to be
on the west side, a person would either have had to come out of the
building or would have had to climb the fence on the south side of the
building in full view of Officer Riley. There was evidence that there
had been an attempt to pry open a desk drawer in the clerk’s office
in the building. This was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s ver-
dict of burglary.

Defendant further argues that his conviction on count II, the habitual
offender count, was not supported by sufficient evidence in that one
of the state’s exhibits relating to a prior conviction was erroneously
admitted. During the hearing on count II, the state called Anthony
Larocca as a witness. Larocca testified that he was a counselor
employed by the Indiana Reformatory and was not the custodian of
the records. Larocca was permitted to testify, over defendant's objec-

tion, regarding the documents marked as state’s exhibit No. 16. These
exhibits consisted of fingerprints, photographs, and a copy of a com-

142 ee
Cd

mitment to the Department of Corrections and were all properly cer-
tified by Sam Whiteman, the Director of Records at the Indiana
Reformatory.

We find no error here since our statute, Ind. Code § 34-1-17-7 (Burns

1973), provides for admission of copies of public records when they are

attested as true and complete by the keeper of the records

HI sunder the seal of his office. Eldridge v. State, (1977) 266 Ind.

184, 8361 N.H.2d 155. Since there was a proper certification

of the documents in the instant case we find that they were properly

admitted and there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict on
count II.

For all of the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 70.

ALICE MARIE PARKER v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 11798884, Filed January 30, 1981]

a 143
PE

Richard D. Gilroy, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, J. David Roellgen, Thomas
E. Kieper, Deputy Attorney Generals, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.—Appellant, Alice Parker, was convicted of robbery,
resulting in bodily injury, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1, by the Marion County
Criminal Court. She received a sentence of twenty years. On appeal
the following claims are made:

(1) The trial court erred in overruling an objection to the trial identi-
fication of appellant by the two chief prosecuting witnesses.

(2) The evidence was insufficient as a basis for this conviction.

The proof presented by the prosecution tending to identify appellant
as having committed the charged crimes came from two witnesses, the
victim Gene Goad, whose wallet and money were taken, and Raunell
Moralez who was present at the time those events occurred. Both
pointed out appellant at trial.

Due process requires suppression of such testimony if the witness
giving it also made a pre-trial identification of the accused, and the
procedure employed by the police utilized unnecessarily suggestive
means, and the suggestive means were such as to give rise to “a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Neil v. Biggers,
(1972) 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401.

The first element which must be established in achieving suppres-
sion of trial identification is that an unnecessarily suggestive extra-
judicial identification procedure occurred. Here, both witnesses viewed
photographs and selected one of appellant from them as portraying
the assailant. The record reflects that Goad was taken to the station
house two or three times after the robbery and that he went through
the files there and discovered a picture of appellant and recognized
her. It also shows that at one point he was shown “three or four dif-
ferent ones, different shots.” It also shows that Moralez was shown
a group of six photographs, one of appellant and the others of persons
of comparable weight, age, and complexion. Upon examination she

144 ee
EE

selected appellant's photograph from this group as depicting the
assailant.

In Emerson v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 399, 287 N.E.2d 867, we con-
demned the use of a single photograph in an identification procedure
as fraught with unnecessary dangers of suggestivity. In Sawyer v. State,
(1978) 260 Ind. 597, 298 N.E.2d 440, we viewed in the same manner
the practice of telling a witness during such a procedure that a person
arrested and charged with the crime is among those depicted in a small
group of photographs.

The procedures used by the police here do not indicate a needless

amount of suggestivity under the circumstances. Several photographs

were used in both instances, and there is no proof that the

Il police said anything or took any action which would have in-

ereased the dangers of suggestivity. There was no unneces-

sarily suggestive extrajudicial identification procedure employed by

the police here, and the in-court identification of appellant by both
witnesses was properly admitted.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the grounds
that

(1) both identification witnesses were under the influence of
drugs and alcohol and the time of the robbery;
(2) the recollection of the facts was weak by the two identifica-
tion witnesses; and
(8) the witness Goad attempted to get money from the girlfriend
of a co-defendant.
These issues were probed and developed at length in a forthright man-
ner before the trier of fact. Both witnesses readily admitted that the
robbery occurred during a get-together at Goad’s apartment
H_swhere both drugs and alcohol were available and in use. Goad
testified that he held appellant’s co-defendant responsible for
his loss in the robbery of some $700, and sought to get it from him
through a girlfriend. He also admitted having said that he would lose
interest in pressing the charges if he could recoup $400 of the loss.
One cannot accept the characterization of the testimony of the two
identification witnesses as weak. Their testimony was not equivocal.

Le 145
po

Moralez testified on cross-examination, for example, in response to ques-
tions probing her ability to recall the events and identify appellant
stated that she would swear to the accuracy of her recollections “on
her mother’s grave.” In the final analysis these factors went to the
credibility of the witnesses, their bias and prejudice, and their ability
to recall the events, matters exclusively reserved for consideration
by the trier of fact, and beyond the scope of that which an appellate
court can consider in determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence.
Miller v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 461, 364 N.H.2d 129.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NoTE—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 709.
Le
STEVEN T. Jupy v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 5808128. Filed January 30, 1981.]

a
ES
a

Kenneth M. Stroud, of Indianapolis, Stephen L. Harris, of Mooresville,
for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Michael Gene Worden, Assis-

tant Attorney General, Charles D. Rodgers, Deputy Attorney General,
for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— This cause is before us for review by virtue of appellant
Steven T. Judy’s “Verified Petition for Determination of the Status
of This Appeal,” filed by his court-appointed counsel. This petition
shows that, on February 25, 1980, appellant Judy was sentenced to
death upon conviction of four counts of murder. These charges arose
out of the April 28, 1979 slayings of Terry Chasteen and her three
children, Misty Zollers, Stephen Chasteen and Mark Chasteen. The
trial judge signed the death warrant and ordered the sentence to be
carried out. On the day he was sentenced, appellant Judy requested
that an appeal be filed, and Kenneth M. Stroud and Stephen L. Harris
were appointed appellate counsel. Judy’s attorneys timely filed a mo-
tion to correct error on April 16, and the trial court denied the motion
on May 6. On May 23, Judy’s attorneys filed a praecipe for the record
with the Clerk of the Morgan Superior Court, and, on August 4, counsel
filed the record of the proceedings with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
This Court then granted a petition for extension of time to file appel-
lant’s brief. At the time of the filing of the “Verified Petition for Deter-
mination of the Status of This Appeal” on October 14, the due date
for appellant’s brief was October 20.

On October 8, Judy notified his counsel and this Court that he desired
to terminate the appeal prior to the completion and filing of his brief;
he requested that counsel cease all efforts toward proceeding with his
appeal. Judy further indicated to counsel that he wished to waive his
right to appeal and to completely terminate the appeal proceedings.

Counsel asserted in their verified petition that conflicting duties,
created by the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by this
Court and the nature of the sentence imposed here, placed
Is them in an “intolerable dilemma.” One portion of the death
penalty statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(h) (Burns 1979 Repl.),
provides:
“(h) A death sentence is subject to automatic review by the

Supreme Court. The review, which shall be heard under rules
adopted by the Supreme Court, shall be given priority over all

Le : 149
{|__|

other cases. The death sentence may not be executed until the

Supreme Court has completed its review.”
Under this section, then, a sentence of death may not be carried out
in this State until there has been a review by this Court. Generally,
this provision would have imposed a duty on Stroud and Harris, as
Judy’s appointed counsel, to complete this appeal and thereby assist
in this Court’s review. Therefore, they would have violated that duty
if they had followed the directives of their client and ceased to prose-
cute this appeal.

On the other hand, attorneys generally have a duty to act on their
clients’ requests, and counsel here recognized that they should comply
with Judy’s request, if that request was knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently made. Thus, as counsel asserted in their verified petition:

“Appellant’s counsel cannot determine which duty to follow. If
the Statute is construed as mentioned and counsel drop the ap-
peal pursuant to Appellant’s request they have violated the
statutory duty. If the Statute is construed as allowing waiver of
appeal in death cases and counsel ignore Appellant’s request and
file the appeal they have violated their duty to their client.”

Therefore, to fully protect their interests and those of their client,
counsel requested that this Court dispose of this “insoluble professional
and ethical problem.”

After considering the issues presented in counsel’s petition, this
Court concluded that § 35-50-2-9(h) precludes waiver of a review of the
sentencing in a death penalty case. However, we further found
Tl that this statute does not preclude waiver of a review of a
murder conviction. Accordingly, this Court set a hearing for
October 27, for Judy to appear personally before us so that we might
determine whether he did, in fact, wish to waive his appeal of this con-
viction, and, if he did so waive, whether that waiver was voluntarily
and knowingly made. In this opinion, we shall: (1) determine the valid-
ity of Judy’s waiver of appellate review of his convictions; and (2) review
the death sentence imposed by the trial court.

I.

It is well established that an individual in the setting of a criminal

prosecution may waive his constitutional rights. Generally, this waiver
must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. E.g.,
HE Brewer v. Williams, (1976) 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51
L.Ed.2d 424; Gilmore v. Utah, (1976) 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S.Ct.
436, 50 L.Ed.2d 632; Faretta v. California, (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct.
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562; Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct.
1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; Johnson v. Zerbst, (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct.
1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461. See Baker v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 554, 400 N.E.2d
187; Holleman v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 534, 400 N.E.2d 123; Tyson v.
State, (1979) 270 Ind. 458, 386 N.E.2d 1185; State v. Brown, (1941) 219
Ind. 251, 37 N.E.2d 73. Gilmore v. Utah, supra, presented substantially
the same situation we face here. The defendant there, Gary Gilmore,
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Utah trial court.
He ordered his counsel to stop all appeals and to allow the death
sentence to stand unchallenged. The Utah Supreme Court held a hear-
ing and personally interviewed Gilmore to determine that he was know-
ingly, intelligently and willingly waiving his right to any further appeal.
That Court accepted Gilmore’s waiver.

Gilmore’s mother, claiming to act as next friend on behalf of her son,
then filed an application for a stay of execution of the death sentence
with the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted
a temporary stay of execution in order to secure a response from the
State of Utah. Gilmore, by and through his attorneys, challenged the
standing of his mother to initiate any proceedings on his behalf.

After reviewing the transcripts submitted by the State of Utah, the
United States Supreme Court found that Gilmore had made a knowing
and intelligent waiver of any rights he might have asserted after the
trial court’s sentence was imposed. The Court further specifically held
that the Utah Supreme Court’s determination of Gilmore’s competence,
and of his knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights, were firmly
grounded. The United States Supreme Court also found that Gilmore's
mother had no standing to initiate any proceedings on her son’s behalf;
therefore, the Court terminated the previously entered stay of execu-
tion. Our inquiry here, then, is to determine whether Steven Judy is
intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to appeal his
four convictions for murder.

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Judy’s response to the legal procedures in this case was much like
Gilmore's in Utah; in fact, one might surmise that Judy was aware
of Gilmore’s activity, as it was heavily publicized, and opted to bring
to bear the same results in this case. An examination of the transcripts
and record of the trial before the court and jury reveals that the pros-
ecution presented overwhelming evidence of Judy’s guilt.

Steven Judy was convicted of murdering Terry Chasteen and her
three children: Misty Zollers, age five years; Stephen Chasteen, age
four years; and Mark Chasteen, age two years. Hunters discovered
Terry Chasteen’s body at approximately 9:30 a.m. in White Lick Creek,
near State Road 67 and Mooresville in Morgan County. A police search
of the creek led to the discovery of the other three bodies. Terry Chas-
teen was found naked, with her hands and feet bound with strips of
material torn from her clothing, and her head covered with her slacks.
She had been gagged and strangled with other strips of cloth. The
evidence established that Terry Chasteen had been raped and that she
died of strangulation, while the children died of asphyxia due to
drowning.

Certain physical evidence tended to circumstantially connect Steven
Judy with this incident. Tests on a coat found at the scene of the crimes
revealed a semen stain. Analysis of this stain indicated that the makeup
of the substance was compatible with Judy’s blood type and the find-
ing of an “H endogen” in a sample of Judy’s blood. Testimony estab-
lished that, once the geographic location of the discovery of the
substance was known, only a very small percentage of the male popula-
tion was capable of producing semen with the identification qualities
mentioned. In addition, two threads of material found in Steven Judy’s
truck substantially matched the threads of one article of Terry Chas-
teen’s clothing.

The evidence further established that Terry Chasteen had left in
her automobile with the three children some time after 6:00 a.m. She
had planned to leave the children at a babysitter’s house and continue
on to her place of employment. When her probable driving route was
retraced, her automobile was found parked near the interchange of
Interstate 465 and 70 in southwest Marion County.

152 |
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Several witnesses related that they had seen various segments of
the incident. On the day of the killings and the preceding day, Steven
Judy had in his control a red and gray truck which several witnesses
placed at or near the location of Terry Chasteen’s car on Interstate
465. One of the witnesses testified that he saw a blond-haired man,
whom he later identified as Judy, standing near a car parked on the
interstate with the hood open. Another witness testified that he was
driving southwest on State Road 67 and saw a red and gray truck car-
rying a man, a woman, and some children, proceeding in the same direc-
tion. This witness stated that the truck was moving at a fast pace,
and in a sometimes erratic manner, and that the woman in the truck
waved to him when the two vehicles stopped at a traffic light.

Judy’s truck was also seen parked near the scene of the killings by
White Lick Creek around 7:00 to 7:30 a.m. One witness recognized the
truck from having seen it on several occasions at a construction site.
Another witness testified that he saw a man near the scene carrying
a child under one arm and carrying a bundle, which actually had the
shape and size of a child, under his other arm. A third child was walk-
ing in front of the man. The witness saw no other person at that time.
At approximate 7:30 a.m., a man was seen running away from the creek
toward the parked truck. Near that same time, another person saw
a man with blond hair backing his truck onto the travelled portion of
the highway from this same location. The person who witnessed this
occurrence testified that the driver of the truck was alone.

As noted earlier, Judy had possession of the truck in question on
the day preceding and the day of the murders. The evidence established
that Judy returned the truck to witness Robert Carr in Indianapolis
between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. on the day of the killings. Judy initially
denied any involvement in the incident, and asserted that he was with
his girlfriend at the time in question and could not remember what
had happened. Judy’s girlfriend first corroborated this story, but subse-
quently contradicted Judy’s alibi.

At trial, Judy presented an insanity defense and testified at length
concerning his commission of the rape and murders. Judy stated that
he was driving on Interstate 465 in Marion County when he passed
Terry Chasteen’s car. He testified that he motioned for her to pull over

[| 153
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to the shoulder of the road, indicating that something was wrong with
the rear of her car. The two vehicles pulled to the shoulder and stopped,
and Judy purported to assist the victims. In the process, he removed
the coil wire, thereby rendering Terry Chasteen’s car inoperable. When
her car would not start, Judy offered her and the children a ride, and
she accepted.

Judy then drove the victims to the location of the killings and pulled
his truck off the road. He testified that he directed them on foot toward
the creek, and that he sent the children down the path ahead of Terry
and him. Judy testified that he then raped Terry Chasteen and bound
her hands and feet and gagged her. When Terry cried out, the children
ran back up the path to them. Judy stated that the children stood around
him and yelled. At that point, he strangled Terry Chasteen and threw
her body into the creek. Judy testified that he then threw each of the
children as far as he could into the water. He stated that he remembered
seeing one of the children standing in the creek. Judy returned to his
truck after attempting to eradicate his footprints. He then drove away
from the scene, stopped and bought a soft drink, and threw the coil
wire away. Thereupon, he returned the truck to Robert Carr at Carr’s
residence. Although Judy’s version of the events presented some dis-
crepancies concerning minor details, his testimony very substantially
corroborated the evidence presented by the State.

The only defense presented at the trial was a plea of insanity at
the time of the commission of the offenses. Dr. Cathy Spath Widom,
a psychologist, testified for the defense that she believed Judy had
chronic emotional problems. She described Judy as having an anti-social
personality disorder, and was of the opinion that he was legally in-
sane. She referred in her testimony to extensive records on Judy’s
life and mental condition; these records covered a period of fourteen
years. During this time he had been examined and evaluated many
times as a result of committing offenses at school and in his neigh-
borhood. The evidence established that, when Judy was thirteen years
old, he perpetrated a rape, stabbed the victim eighteen times, and hit
her with a hatchet. As a result of his incident, he was admitted to Cen-
tral State Hospital in Indianapolis for evaluation. While he was involv-
ed in Central State’s treatment program, he became the foster child

154 ee
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of a family in Indianapolis. He was discharged from Central State
Hospital in 1972 at age sixteen, with a recommendation that he be
returned to the juvenile center for placement at the Indiana Boys
School. The hospital’s evaluation stated that Judy had appeared to
recover from his emotional problems and that further hospitalization
was not warranted.

Judy testified that he had been committing various offenses since
he was ten years old. He asserted that he had been involved in approx-
imately two hundred shoplifting incidents, a like number of burglaries,
twenty to fifty robberies, approximately twenty-four car thefts, and
from twelve to sixteen rapes. He also estimated that he had been ex-
amined by approximately thirty psychiatrists during those years. From
1975 to the time of these offenses, Judy had been out of jail for a total
time of approximately four months. During those periods, he testified,
he had lived with or had intercourse with fifteen women. Three women
with whom Judy had lived testified that he had never threatened or
physically harmed them. In fact, Judy was living with one of those
women during the week prior to the commission of these murders.

However, other women testified as to various attacks Ji udy had com-
mitted upon them. These incidents involved accosting the victims in
their cars and kidnapping, threatening and beating them. One witness
testified to being a victim of one of Judy’s armed robberies. These
witnesses all believed Judy was in control of himself during the in-
cidents and could have stopped doing what he was doing. However,
one witness stated at one point that Judy “acted crazy” when he was
beating her about the face. Previously conducted psychiatric evalua-
tions classified Judy as having a personality disorder and concluded
there was no indication of a mental illness. Two court-appointed
psychiatrists, Dr. John Kooiker and Dr. Larry Davis, testified that they
had examined Judy and that, in their opinions, he had an antisocial
personality disorder. Both concluded that he was legally sane at the
time of the commission of these crimes. In fact, the record reveals that
every psychiatrist who has ever examined Judy has been of the opin-
ion that he is of normal or above-average intelligence and that he is
legally sane. The jury rejected Judy's insanity defense and convicted
him on all charges.

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After the jury found Judy guilty on all four counts of murder, and
the bifurcated sentencing portion of the trial was commenced, Judy
ordered his attorneys not to present any evidence of mitigating cir-
cumstances to the jury in regard to the sentence they might select
and recommend. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c), (d) (Burns 1979 Repl.). Judy
stated to the jury in open court at the sentencing hearing that he would
advise them to give him the death sentence, because he had no doubt
that he would kill again if he had an opportunity, and some of the peo-
ple he might kill in the future might be members of the jury. He also
directed a similar comment to the trial judge. Then, during final argu-
ment in the sentencing hearing, Judy ordered his attorneys not to argue
against the death penalty. They complied with his request, except for
a suggestion to the trial judge that the constitutionality of the death
penalty statute ought to be considered before such a penalty is imposed.

On October 27, Judy appeared in this Court with his attorneys for
a hearing on his request that he be permitted to waive his appeal. At
that hearing, Judy very freely and openly discussed his situation with
the members of this Court. It was obvious to all members of this Court
that Judy well understood his situation and the results that could be
expected from an acceptance of his waiver. Judy stated that he under-
stood that he had a right to an appeal, that a review of the convictions
might result in an order for a new trial, that in that event he would
again be entitled to a jury trial, and that, at that new trial, he also
would be entitled to a change of judge and a change of venue from
the county. He further expressed an understanding that, if he were
granted a new trial, he would be entitled to the assistance of counsel
and to subpoena witnesses in his behalf. He also understood that he
might be found not guilty at a new trial. In addition, Judy stated he
was aware that our review of the sentence might result in the setting
aside of the death sentence and the imposition of a term of years.
Moreover, Judy acknowledged that he understood that a waiver at
that time of review of his convictions would be considered his final
decision, and would stand, even if this Court were to decide to set aside
the death sentence. Finally, he freely admitted that he is guilty of the
murders of which he was convicted. Waiver Hearing Transcript at 8-19.

Thus, in response to questions from various members of the Court,

156 De
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he indicated that he was fully aware of all that might happen if this
Court allowed him to waive his appeal. He discussed all of the alter-
natives with the Court and showed that he clearly and intelligently
understood them. He responded to one question in the following man-
ner: “I no longer wish any more representation by counsel, any counsel.
All right? You know, I feel that it’s my right that I can proceed with
the appeal.” Waiver Hearing Transcript at 15.

Judy further stated that he felt the attorneys in court with him,
Stroud and Harris, were “darned good attorneys.” He said he has no
complaint about them, and, in fact, they are the best lawyers he has
ever seen. Wavier Hearing Transcript at 12. Judy also wanted it to
be known that his actions did not detract in any way from his feeling
that they were representing him competently and were treating him
fairly in all respects. He made it clear to this Court, as he had done
at the sentencing hearing, that he did not want counsel to make
arguments for him regarding the death sentence.

In addition, Judy asserted that he personally did not intend to take
any further action on his appeal. In answer to another question from
the Court, Judy stated:

“What I understand that statute [§ 35-50-2-9] to mean is that
the Indiana Supreme Court has to review the case. It’s not saying
that a brief has to be filed on it or any motions filed or anything.
Alright, that’s final, there. The Indiana Supreme Court can review
the case, if they wish.”

Waiver Hearing Transcript at 18-19. At another point, Judy told the
Court that he understands his constitutional rights; in fact, he feels
he understands his rights more than other laymen understand them.
Waiver Hearing Transcript at 14. The Court explained to Judy that,
by waiving his appeal, his convictions would not be reviewed for legal
errors, and that the Court would accept that Judy is guilty of the crimes
in question. Judy’s overall attitude is best expressed by his response
to that warning:

“I understand all that. It’s, you know, the why, you know, of

not going on with this appeal, it’s within myself, you know. And
there’s really no—you know, I accepted what the court found. You

[| 187
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know, I thought I was treated fair, more than fair. I was provided
with good counsel and I lost. There’s no sense going on with this.”

Waiver Hearing Transcript at 10. Thus, Judy’s attitude, in short, was
that he would like to waive review of the sentence as well as review
of the convictions; however, if this Court felt it had to review the
sentence, he would accept that, but would take no action toward that
review, preferring that it be done as soon as possible.

Before the hearing terminated, Judy stated in open court that he
would like to formally fire attorneys Harris and Stroud, saying he no
longer wished for them to represent him. Judy further stated that he
had nothing against these two gentlemen; that they are the best at-
torneys he had ever seen, but that he wanted the sentence review to
proceed with no further efforts on his behalf. Attorneys Stroud and
Harris stated to the Court that they also understood that Judy did
not want them to act in any way on his behalf, including the filing of
any brief concerning the Court’s review of the death sentence. This
Court acknowledged Judy’s dismissal of Harris and Stroud, and advis-
ed them that they were released from any further obligation with
regard to the review process in his case.

We further find that Judy has made a knowing, voluntary, and in-

telligent waiver of his right to appeal his four murder convictions.

In addition to all we see in the record, much of which having

I__ been discussed above, we have observed Judy’s appearance

and demeanor in this Court, his responsiveness to our ques-

ions, and his ability to communicate with his lawyers. We find him to

be fully competent to make this waiver. See Gilmore v. Utah, supra.

Accordingly, this Court will not evaluate the murder convictions any

further; we shall, then, proceed to review the death sentence imposed
by the trial court.

I.

Although we feel Steven Judy can waive and has waived review
of any issue that might be raised with reference to his convictions,
we believe that the death sentence cannot be imposed on anyone in
this State until it has been reviewed by this Court and found to com-
port with the laws of this State and the principles of our state and

federal constitutions. In conducting this review, we have an extensively
charted course. In various ways, this issue has been reached in many
jurisdictions, as well as our own, in recent years. The efforts of various
legislatures and courts have culminated in a number of decisions by
the United States Supreme Court that have set the standards and
guidelines to be used in applying and reviewing a death sentence. Thus,
it is our province here to review and assess the validity of our statutes,
and their application in this case, under these controlling standards
and guidelines.

Appellant Steven Judy was charged, tried, and convicted and
sentenced to death under statutory provisions adopted by our
legislature in 1977. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) defines the
erime of murder:

“A person who:

(1) Knowingly or intentionally kills another human being; or

(2) Kills another human being while committing or attempting to

commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct,

kidnapping, rape, or robbery; commits murder, a felony.”
Judy was convicted for the murder of Terry Chasteen under subsec-
tion two of this statute, and for the murders of Misty Zollers, Stephen
Chasteen and Mark Chasteen under subsection one.

In addition, § 35-50-2-3 establishes the sentencing alternatives for
this crime:

“(a) A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a
fixed term of forty years, with not more than twenty years added
for aggravating circumstances or not more than ten years sub-
tracted for mitigating circumstances; in addition, he may be fined
not more than ten thousand dollars.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a person who
commits murder may be sentenced to death under section nine
[85-50-2-9] of this chapter.”

Thus, by the plain language of this statute, the death penalty
Hs may not be imposed in mandatory fashion, and may only be
imposed pursuant to established procedures set out elsewhere

in the sentencing provisions.

Finally, § 35-50-2-9 establishes the procedure for the state to follow

[| 159

in seeking the death penalty, and provides the substantive
HBB standards to be applied and the procedural steps to be taken
in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty ina

a given case. This section states:

“(a) The state may seek a death sentence for murder by alleg-
ing, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument,
the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances
listed in subsection (b) of this section. In the sentencing hearing
after a person is convicted of murder, the state must prove beyond
areasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating
cireumstances alleged.

(b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:

(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally kill-
ing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson,
burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping,
rape, or robbery.

(2) The defendant committed the murder by the unlawful
detonation of an explosive with intent to injury person or damage
property.

(8) The defendant committed the murder by lying in wait.

(4) The defendant who committed the murder was hired to kill.

(5) The defendant committed the murder by hiring another per-
son to kill.

(6) The victim of the murder was a corrections employee,
fireman, judge, or law-enforcement officer, and either (i) the vic-
tim was acting in the course of duty or (ii) the murder was
motivated by an act the victim performed while acting in the
course of duty. .

(7) The defendant has been convicted of another murder.

(8) The defendant has committed another murder, at any time,
regardless of whether he has been convicted of that other murder.

(9) The defendant was under sentence of life imprisonment at
the time of the murder.

(c) The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under
this section are as follows:

(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
conduct.

(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance when he committed the murder.

(8) The victim was a participant in, or consented to, the defen-
dant’s conduct.

(4) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed

160 —

by another person, and the defendant's participation was relatively
minor.

(5) The defendant acted under the substantial domination of
another person.

(6) The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or
of intoxication.

(7) Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.

(d) Ifthe defendant was convicted of murder in a jury trial, the
jury shall reconvene for the sentencing hearing; if the trial was
to the court, or the judgment was entered on a guilty plea, the
court alone shall conduct the sentencing hearing. The jury, or the
court, may consider all the evidence introduced at the trial stage
of the proceedings, together with new evidence presented at the
sentencing hearing. The defendant may present any additional
evidence relevant to:

(1) The aggravating circumstances alleged; or

(2) Any of the mitigating circumstances listed in subsection (c)
of this section.

(e) If the hearing is by jury, the jury shall recommend to the
court whether the death penalty should be imposed. The jury may
recommend the death penalty only if it finds:

(1) That the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
at least one of the aggravating circumstances exists; and

(2) That any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed
by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. The court shall
make the final determination of the sentence, after considering
the jury’s recommendation, and the sentence shall be based on
the same standards that the jury was required to consider. The
court is not bound by the jury’s recommendation.

(f) If a jury is unable to agree on a sentence recommendation
after reasonable deliberations, the court shall discharge the jury
and proceed as if the hearing had been to the court alone.

(g) If the hearing is to the court alone, the court shall sentence
the defendant to death only if it finds:

(1) That the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
at least one [1] of the aggravating circumstances exists; and

(2) That any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed
by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.

(h) A death sentence is subject to automatic review by the
Supreme Court. The review, which shall be heard under rules
adopted by the Supreme Court, shall be given priority over all
other cases. The death sentence may not be executed until the

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Supreme Court has completed its review.”

The statutory provisions were adopted by our legislature following
several pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court. Gregg
v. Georgia, (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859; Jurek
v. Texas, (1976) 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed. 2d 929; Proffitt
v. Florida, (1976) 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913; Roberts
v. Louisiana, (1976) 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974; Wood-
son v. North Carolina, (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d
944; Furman v. Georgia, (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d
346. In Furman, the Court found the imposition of the death penalty
in the cases before it to be unconstitutional, but did not delineate any
standards for determining when it might possibly be constitutional.
This Court, in Adams v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 164, 165, 284 N.E.2d 757,
758 (opinion on rehearing), found that the pronouncements of Furman
v. Georgia left the constitutionality of our statutes and procedures
uncertain; thus, it was necessary to set aside the death penalty in that
case. In fact, we quoted in Adams from Chief Justice Burger’s separate
opinion in Furman: “Since there is no majority of the Court on the
ultimate issue presented in these cases, the future of capital punish-
ment in this country has been left in an uncertain limbo.” Furman v.
Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 403, 92 S.Ct. at 2811, 33 L.Ed.2d at 444
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).

In 1978, Indiana adopted a new murder statute, Ind. Code § 35-13-4-1
(Burns 1975), that provided for mandatory death sentences for specified
types of murder. The validity of imposing the death sentence

Hi sunder this statute was presented to this Court in French v.
State, (1977) 266 Ind. 276, 362 N.E.2d 834. We found in French

that our statute was very similar to the statute struck down in Wood-
son v. North Carolina, (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d
944. The United States Supreme Court found the North Carolina statute
to be constitutionally deficient because it provided for a mandatory
death penalty. The Court held that the mandatory nature of the statute
departed markedly from contemporary standards with respect to the
imposition of the punishment of death, and was therefore contrary to
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ requirement that the states’
power to punish “be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”

162 Le
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428 U.S. at 301, 96 S.Ct. at 2989, 49 L.Ed.2d at 959 (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642
(plurality opinion)). Contrary to Furman, mandatory imposition of the
death penalty under the North Carolina statute failed to provide the
jury with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rational-
ly reviewable the process for imposing the death sentence. Id. at 302-03,
96 S.Ct. at 2990-91, 49 L.Ed.2d at 959-60. Finally, the North Carolina
statute failed “to allow the particularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before
the imposition upon him of the sentence of death,” contrary to the fun-
damental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment. Id.
at 303-04, 96 S.Ct. at 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d at 960-61. Therefore, in French,
we found the imposition of the death penalty to be unconstitutional.
We further stated:

“[W]e do not see how this Court or a trial court could review
and revise sentences of death in the absence of statutory pro-
cedures providing for the introduction of appropriate evidence on
which to base such review. Second, we do not see it as the role
of the judiciary to legislate the standards by which the death pen-
alty should be applied. The establishment of such standards and
the procedures by which evidence relevant to those standards and
the individual accused would be made a part of court record, are
tasks within the realm of the legislative branch.”

French v. State, supra, 266 Ind. at 282-83, 362 N.E.2d at 838.

Thus, following the decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina and
French v. State, we have set aside death sentences which were imposed
under the statute struck down in the French case. Bond v. State, (1980)
273 Ind. 233, 403 N.E.2d 812; Norton v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 635, 408
N.E.2d 514; Fair v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 380, 364 N.E.2d 1007; Gaddis
v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 100, 368 N.E.2d 244; Lamar v. State, (1977) 266
Ind. 689, 366 N.E.2d 652; Murphy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 184, 369 N.B.2d
411. Pursuant to the language of that statute and the result in French,
we ordered a life sentence imposed in those cases. Compare Ind. Code
§ 35-13-4-1 (Burns 1975) with Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.).

In Bond v. State, supra, which was tried under the statute at issue
in French, the trial court attempted to conform the procedures of the

[| 163
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trial to the standards provided for in Gregg v. Georgia, (1976)
HE 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, and Proffitt v.
Florida, (1976) 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed. 2d 918
(discussed infra). The court tried the case in a bifurcated manner as
to the guilt and sentencing phases, and also balanced the aggravating
and mitigating factors found in the evidence, even though the statute
in effect at the time the crime was committed, § 35-13-4-1, did not re-
quire these procedures. The State contended in Bond that since the
standards of Gregg and Proffitt were apparently followed, the un-
constitutional features of § 35-13-4-1 addressed in French v. State were
cured. Thus, the State argued, the imposition of the death sentence
in that case would be constitutional. We held, however, that

“[t]he death penalty may be imposed only where procedures are
followed which guarantee due process. In the instant case, the
statute under which the defendant was condemned to death con-
tained no such procedural safeguards. The provision for death
therefore was invalid and could not be rendered valid by judicial-
ly created innovation.”

Bond v. State, supra, 278 Ind. at 236, 408 N.E.2d at 816.

Here, then, for the first time, we review the imposition of the death
penalty imposed under our present statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9
(Burns 1979 Repl). At the outset, we may dispose of the ques-
Hl tion of whether the imposition of capital punishment is prohi-
bited by the Indiana Constitution. Article one, section eighteen

of our constituton provides: “The penal code shall be founded on the .
principles of reformation and not of vindictive justice.” As we stated
in French v. State, supra: “This provision has been consistently inter-
preted by this Court not to prohibit capital punishment for the crime
of first degree murder. Adams v. State, (1971) 259 Ind. 64, 271 N.E.2d
425, rev’d in part on reh., (1972) 259 Ind. 164, 284 N.E.2d 757 (death
sentence vacated); Hawkins v. State, (1941) 219 Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79;
McCutcheon v. State, (1927) 199 Ind. 247, 155 N.E. 544; Driskill v. State,
(1855) 7 Ind. 338.” 266 Ind. at 280, 362 N.E.2d at 837. Citing the most
recent pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court, we fur-
ther noted in F’rench that the death penalty is not unconstitutional per
se as cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amend-

164 ee
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ment to the United States Constitution and article one, section six-
teen of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 279-80, 362 N.E.2d at 837.

In Gregg v. Georgia, (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d
859, Jurek v. Texas, (1976) 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929,
and Proffitt v. Florida, (1976) 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d
918, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the death penalty
statutes of Georgia, Texas and Florida, and found them to be constitu-
tional. We note that our present statute is very similar to the statutes
under consideration in those cases, and, in fact, is nearly identical to
the Florida statute upheld in Proffitt. See Proffit v. Florida, supra, 428
USS. at 247-53, 96 S.Ct. at 2964-67, 49 L.Ed.2d at 920-23. Compare Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979 Repl.) with Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (Supp.
1976-77).

Clearly, imposition of the death sentence under our statute is based
on the nature and circumstances of the crime and the character of the
perpetrator being sentenced. The State’s request for consideration of
the imposition of the death penalty must be filed on a document separate
from the charging instrument. In that separate count, the State must
allege the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances
listed in the statute. The sentencing hearing is bifurcated from the
guilt-determination phase of the trial. § 35-50-2-9(a). Thus, the death
penalty issue is not presented to the jury until after they have found
the defendant guilty of the charged crime or crimes.

At the sentencing hearing, both parties may introduce evidence and
make argument to the jury regarding aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances. § 35-50-2-9(a)-(d). The statute permits the jury to consider
all the evidence introduced at the guilt determining phase of the pro-
ceeding, together with new evidence presented at the sentencing hear-
ing. § 35-50-2-9(d). The prosecution may stand on the evidence presented
at the trial phase, or may introduce further evidence to show the ag-
gravating circumstance alleged under § 35-50-2-9(b). The defendant may
present additional evidence relevant to the aggravating circumstances
or any mitigating circumstances listed in subsection (c) of the statute.
In addition, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court has held
that the sentencer must be allowed to consider, as a mitigating factor,
“any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the cir-

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cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for
a sentence less than death.” Lockett v. Ohio, (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604,
98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (foot-
notes omitted). See State v. McCormick, (1979) 272 Ind. 272, 397 N.E.2d
276.

The statutory aggravating circumstances are as follows:

“(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally kill-
ing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson,
burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping,
rape, or robbery.

(2) The defendant committed the murder by the unlawful
detonation of an explosive with intent to injure person or damage
property.

(3) The defendant committed the murder by lying in wait.

(4) The defendant who committed the murder was hired to kill.

(5) The defendant committed the murder by hiring another per-
son to kill.

(6) The victim of the murder was a corrections employee,
fireman, judge, or law-enforcement officer, and either (i) the vic-
tim was acting in the course of duty or (ii) the murder was
motivated by an act the victim performed while acting in the
course of duty.

(7) The defendant has been convicted of another murder.

(8) The defendant has committed another murder, at any time,
regardless of whether he has been convicted of that other murder.

(9) The defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment
at the time of the murder.”

§ 35-50-2-9(b). See State v. McCormick, supra. The statute also lists the
following mitigating circumstances:

“(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
conduct.

(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance when he committed the murder.

(8) The victim was a participant in, or consented to, the defen-
dant’s conduct.

(4) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by
another person, and the defendant’s participation was relatively
minor.

(5) The defendant acted under the substantial domination of
another person.

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(6) The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was

substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or

of intoxication.

(7) Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.”
§35-50-2-9(c). See Lockett v. Ohio, supra.

The jury may recommend the death penalty only if it unanimously
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating
circumstances exists, and that the mitigating circumstances,
HM if any, do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
§ 35-50-2-9(e). The jury’s verdict on this question is advisory
only; the trial court makes the final determination of the sentence to
be imposed. In deciding on the appropriate sentence, the court must
consider the jury’s recommendation, but must also base his decision
on the same standards that the jury was required to consider.
§ 35-50-2-9(e). Thus, the trial court must also find beyond a reasonable
doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance is present, and that
any existing mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating
circumstances. Finally, a sentence of death is subject to automatic, ex-
pedited review by this Court. § 35-50-2-9(h).

Thus, under our statute, just as under the Florida statute upheld
in Profitt, in order for a death sentence to be imposed, several proced-
ural standards and guidelines must be met and followed.
HE Where the case is tried to a jury, both statutes require: a
conviction for murder; a bifurcated sentencing hearing; a
finding that at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances
exists; a finding that any mitigating circumstances are outweighed by
the aggravating circumstances; a jury recommendation concerning the
imposition of the death penalty; a finding by the trial court that at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists, and that the aggra-
vating circumstance or circumstances outweigh the mitigating cireum-
stances; and automatic review by the state Supreme Court. In addition,
as noted above, our statute requires that the aggravating circumstance
or circumstances be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Several other constitutional and legislative pronouncements, plus
certain procedural rules promulgated by this Court, also provide direc-

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tion and guidance in the disposition of death penalty cases at
HMM the trial and appellate levels. Under our constitution, the
statutes enacted by our legislature, and the rules of this Court,
the trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding sentencing are re-
quired to be in writing and in the record for this Court’s review. Arti-
cle seven, section four of the Indiana Constitution provides this Court
with the following authority: “The Supreme Court shall have in all ap-
peals of criminal cases the power to review all questions of law and
to review and revise the sentence imposed.” In addition, this Court
adopted the following rules for the appellate review of sentences, ef-
fective January 1, 1978:

“1. Availability—Court.

(1) Appellate review of the sentence imposed on any criminal
defendant convicted after the effective date of this rule is available
as this rule provides.

(2) Appellate review of sentences under this rule may not be
initiated by the State.

(8) The Supreme Court will review sentences imposed upon con-
victions appealable to that Court; the Court of Appeals will review
sentences imposed upon convictions appealable to the Court of
Appeals.

2. Scope of Review.

(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized
by statute except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable
in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.

(2) A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no
reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to the par-
ticular offense and offender for which such sentence was imposed.”
Also in furtherance of our duties under the Indiana Constitution and

legislative enactments, this Court has adopted a rule which gives this
Court exclusive jurisdiction of criminal appeals from judg-

Hs ments or sentences imposing death, life imprisonment, or a
minimum sentence of greater than ten years. Ind. R. App.

P. 4(A){7). Moreover, Indiana’s general sentencing hearing statute re-
quires, in all cases where there are aggravating circumstances present,
that the sentencing judge include a statement of the reasons for select-
ing the sentence he imposes. This enactment, Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-3

168 ee
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(Burns § 35-50-1A-3, 1979 Repl.), reads as follows:

“Sentencing hearing in felony cases. —
Before sentencing a person for a felony the court must conduct
a hearing to consider the facts and circumstances relevant to
sentencing. The person is entitled to subpoena and call witnesses
and otherwise to present information in his own behalf. The court
shall make a record of the hearing, including:
(1) A transcript of the hearing;
(2) A copy of the presentence report; and
(3) If the court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating
circumstance, a statement of the court’s reasons for select-
ing the sentence that it imposes.”
Thus, the statute requires the sentencing authority —the trial court
in this state—to include his reasons in the record for the sentence im-
posed, and, of course, this must be done in writing. Clearly, this re-
quirement facilitates meaningful appellate review by this Court of the
trial court’s sentencing decision. Proffitt v. Florida, supra. See Page
v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 264, 410 N.E.2d 1304; Brandon v. State, (1976)
264 Ind. 177, 340 N.E.2d 756; Love v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 57, 272 N.E.2d
456.

Our review of these various constitutional and statutory require-
ments and our rules satisfies us that our sentencing scheme passes
constitutional muster. Under our procedure, the sentencing authority's
discretion, as exercised by the jury and the trial court, “is guided and
channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in
favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating
total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition.” Proffitt v.
Florida, supra, 428 U.S. at 258, 96 S.Ct. at 2969, 49 L.Ed.2d at 926.
Significantly, in cases tried to a jury, the trial court may not simply
rely solely on the jury’s advice; rather, he must conduct this analysis
independent of the evaluation and recommendation made by the jury.
In this fashion, the trial court, as the actual sentencing authority, pro-
vides an additional safeguard against a death penalty recommenda-
tion which may have been prompted by improper factors. Of course,
the trial court must analyze the case in the same independent manner
if it is tried only to him.

Further, our scheme provides for a procedure which enables this

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Court to review the imposition of the death penalty to further safeguard
against the influence of improper or prejudicial factors at the
Hi trial level, and to further determine that the elements of arbi-
trariness and capriciousness condemned by Furman v.
Georgia, supra, were not present in the sentencing decision. With the
above considerations and guidelines in mind, this Court can then mean-
ingfully and systematically review each case in which capital punish-
ment has been chosen, in light of other death penalty cases. Mandatory
review by this Court, in each case, of the articulated reasons for im-
posing the death penalty, and the evidence supporting those reasons,
assures “consistency, fairness, and rationality in the evenhanded opera-
tion” of the death penalty statute. Proffitt v. Florida, supra, 428 U.S.
at 259-60, 96 S.Ct. at 2970, 49 L.Ed.2d at 927. See Gregg v. Georgia,
(1976) 428 U.S. 153, 194-95, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2935, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 886-87.
Cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, supra; French v. State, supra. The
guidelines and procedures established by our constitution, statutes,
and rules thus permit an “informed, focused, guided and objective in-
quiry” by all concerned into the appropriateness of capital punishment
in a given case. Therefore, we find our death sentencing procedures
to be consistent and in full compliance with those required by the United
States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia and Proffitt v. Florida, and
thus not violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.

The procedure and guidelines of § 35-50-2-9 were properly followed
in the trial court in this case. As recited above, the jury heard exten-
sive and overwhelming evidence of Judy's guilt in the commission of
these four murders and the manner in which they were perpetrated.
Testimony from several expert psychiatric witnesses, when added to
the testimony concerning all the other circumstances presented by lay
witnesses, established that Judy was not insane at the time of the com-
mission of these crimes. The jury found Judy guilty of each of the four
murders charged in the information.

The trial court then instructed the jury as to their duties in deter-
mining whether to recommend the death penalty. As we indicated in
Issue I, the parties were given an opportunity in the sentencing hear-
ing to present any evidence they wished; however, neither the State

nor the defendant offered further evidence. In fact, Judy specifically
ordered his counsel to refrain from doing so. Judy was, however, given
an opportunity to speak in his own behalf, and he did address the court
and jury to the extent that he wished. Both sides were offered an op-
portunity to argue to the jury concerning the evidence heard at the
trial phase and the question of the appropriateness of imposing the
death penalty in this case.

By a unanimous verdict submitted to the court in writing, the jury
found beyond a reasonable doubt that two aggravating circumstances
existed. The jury further found that no mitigating circumstances ex-
isted to outweigh those aggravating circumstances. Thus, for each con-
viction, the jury recommended to the trial court that the death penalty
be imposed.

One of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury was that
Judy intentionally killed one of the victims, Terry Chasteen, while com-
mitting or attempting to commit rape. This circumstance is specifical-
ly provided for in § 35-50-2-9(b)(1), and, in fact, the jury’s finding was
cast in the language of the statute. This jury had just found Judy guilty,
in the trial phase, of murdering Terry Chasteen while in the perpetra-
tion of a rape, and that finding, of course, was made under the typical
reasonable doubt standards. The circumstances of this killing, therefore,
constituted a valid aggravating factor for the jury to consider in
deciding to recommend the death penalty.

The jury also found a second aggravating circumstance: that Judy
had “committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether
he has been convicted of that other murder.” This, of course, was also
a recitation of the statutory language of one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances, subsection (b)(8). This also was a valid aggravating cir-
cumstance for the jury to consider, because these four murders were
all committed at virtually the same time and in conjunction with each
other, and the jury had previously convicted Judy, as charged in the
informations, of all four murders.

The interrelationship of these killings, and the coinciding convictions
for each of those killings in the trial phase, clearly distinguish this case

be 171
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from the situation we considered in State v. McCormick, (1979)
W272 Ind. 272, 397 N.E.2d 276. We held in McCormick that it
would not be proper for the judge or jury to consider, as an
aggravating circumstance under subsection (b)(8), that the defendant
had committed another murder, where that other murder was not
related to the principal charge that had been tried, and the defendant
had not been convicted of that other murder. In this case, however,
the facts clearly show multiple murders committed as part of one series
of events, and the jury heard all of those facts and made its judgment.
of guilt of four charges of murder—based on those facts—in the guilt
determining phase of the trial. We stated in McCormick that our holding
there was “confined to those cases in which the murder alleged as an
aggravating circumstance is not related to the principal murder charge.”
Id. at 280, 397 N.E.2d at 281. As the jury here considered the sentence
to be imposed on Judy for each of the four murders, they had before
them their own finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the other
three murders involved in the entire incident. Therefore, they could
properly consider these convictions as aggravating circumstances in
deciding to recommend the death penalty. See § 35-50-2-9(d).

The defendant presented no evidence of mitigating circumstances
at the sentencing hearing; in fact, Judy personally advised the jury
that no such mitigating factors were available for their consideration.
As we noted above, the defendant was given every opportunity to in-
troduce relevant evidence and make argument on the question of miti-
gating circumstances. Thus, the jury was justified in finding that no
mitigating circumstances existed which would outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances they had found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.

After receiving the jury's sentencing recommendation, the trial court
ordered a presentence report to be prepared by the probation depart-
ment. This report was prepared and filed in writing with the court.
The prosecution and the defendant were given an opportunity to ex-
amine the presentence report, and both sides stated in open court at
the time of sentencing that they had seen the report and had no correc-
tions or objections to make as to its contents. The trial court discussed
the report's contents with the parties and gave them an opportunity
to offer evidence concerning the statements contained in the report.

172 ee
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Both parties declined. The presentence report showed Judy’s frequent

involvement in criminal activity for a long period of time. Much of that
activity involved extremely violent behavior.

The transcript of the sentencing hearing before the judge shows that
he considered and found to exist the same aggravating circumstances
the jury had found after hearing all the evidence. The court found that
Judy intentionally killed Terry Chasteen while committing or attempt-
ing to commit rape upon her, and that Judy intentionally killed Terry
Chasteen’s three children. The trial judge also considered possible
mitigating circumstances which might have balanced against or out-
weighed those aggravating circumstances. The court found that no
mitigating circumstances existed, and discussed this finding at length
with both parties. In reaching this conclusion, the judge specifically
found that the evidence showed that none of the six enumerated miti-
gating circumstances of subsection (c) were present, and further found
that there were no other mitigating circumstances which would in any
way balance against the aggravating circumstances of these crimes.

We also have before us the written findings and conclusions of the
trial judge, in which he makes all of these findings, pursuant to the
statute and pursuant to our rules. The trial court’s written findings
list the aggravating circumstances that the jury and the court had
previously found. His written findings also reveal close scrutiny of the
particular features of these murders and of Judy’s lengthy history of
criminal behavior. The court found that Judy fully intended to commit
the murders, that he was not provoked in any manner, that he “con-
templated his course of conduct and chose it consciously without im-
pairment, without excuse or justification,” and that his conduct and
attitude after the incident remained consistent with the intent shown
before and during the murders. In reviewing Judy’s past, the court
found that Judy has consistently refused to accept responsibility for
his various criminal acts, and has shifted the blame and responsibility
to others for acts which were solely his doing. The court also found
that Judy’s victims generally have been particularly defenseless, and
noted that three of the four victims in this case were very young
children. Thus, the trial court could find nothing in the circumstances
of these crimes or the characteristics of this defendant which mitigated

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against the strong aggravating circumstances of this case. From these
findings, the trial court concluded that the death penalty should be
imposed for each of these four murders.

We note here that the court’s written findings and conclusions did
not initially appear in the record. Due to the unusual manner in which
this case was presented to us, this fact was not discovered until after
this Court’s review process had begun. Upon discovering this, deletion,
we issued a writ of certiorari to the trial court, ordering him to furnish
us with his written findings and conclusions, if, in fact, he had made
them, and to enter them of record in writing if he had not yet done
so. The court was also ordered to furnish these written findings and
conclusions to us to facilitate our review of the case. Accordingly, the
trial court has taken all of these steps, and we conclude his findings
and conclusions comport with the pronouncements of Gregg v. Georgia,
supra, Proffitt v. Florida, supra, and Furman v. Georgia, supra.

We further find, as explained above, that the trial court in all respects
properly followed the required procedures in imposing the sentence
of death. There was more than ample evidence in the record
|| to justify the trial court’s determination beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating circumstances set out in his find-
ings were present. The facts in evidence before the court, together
with those presented in the presentence report, also completely
substantiate the court’s finding that no mitigating circumstances
existed which outweighed the aggravating circumstances. Both of these
conclusions, and the specific findings to support them, were clearly
enunciated in writing by the trial court. The facts evident in the record
of this case, which patently show the egregious and horrifying nature
of these offenses and the character of this offender, and the trial court’s
careful compliance with the proper procedures, inescapably lead us to
the conclusion that the sentence of death recommended by the jury
and imposed by the trial court was not arbitrarily or capriciously ar-
rived at, and, without any doubt, is reasonable and appropriate.

Therefore, we affirm the trial court in its imposition of the death
penalty here. This cause is remanded to the trial court for the purpose
of setting a date for the death sentence to be carried out.

174 a
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Givan, C.J., and Hunter, J., concur.

Prentice, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.

DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion.

CONCURRING IN RESULT.

PRENTICE, J.—I concur in the result, and I agree that the death sentence
is lawful and reasonable in this case.

Our statutes and rules appear to give reasonable assurance that the
death penalty cannot be arbitrarily and capriciously inflicted and thus
to comport to the requirements of those recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States cited in the majority opinion and upholding
the death penalty laws of several of our sister states. There are some
differences, however, between the provisions of our laws and those
there approved. It should be noted that the effect of those differences,
and hence the constitutionality of our procedures, has not been adver-
sarily tested. That testing had been waived in this case.

DISSENTING OPINION

DEBRULER, J.— The people address this Court from the past and in the
present by several means. They do so through statutes, such as those
making up the criminal code, including the death penalty statute before
us, recently enacted by elected representatives in the Legislature. They
also do so through the provisions of the Indiana Constitution which
was drafted long ago by a convention and ratified by popular vote.
The Constitution establishes the framework for the government and
its relationship to the citizenry, draws its force from the direct ratifica-
tion of it by popular vote, and takes precedence over statutes contrary
to it. Our Indiana Constitution in the Bill of Rights contains the follow-
ing provision:
“The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reforma-
tion and not of vindictive justice.” Article 1, § 18.

This Court has recently considered whether this provision is an obstacle
to the enactment of the death penalty and concluded that it was not.
Adams v. State, (1971) 259 Ind. 64, 271 N.E.2d 425. That position was

a 175

adopted by a three to two margin. In that case I argued in dissent
at length in support of a construction that would withhold the power
of the Legislature to provide for capital punishment. (See Appendix
-a-) The majority was terse in its contrary holding on this point. (See
Appendix - b -) It is the first principle of constitutional construction
and our sworn duty not to rewrite or amend the Constitution, but to
read it to effectuate the intent and purposes of the Framers. Bell v.
Maryland, (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 84 S.Ct. 1814. (Concurring opinion of
Goldberg, J.) In so doing provisions must be read not as “legislative
codes which are subject to continuous revisions with the changing
course of events, but as the revelation of the great purposes which
were intended to be achieved by the Constitution as a continuing in-
strument of government.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316,
61 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 85 L.Ed. 1368. In determining the meaning of the
Constitution we have held fast to the guiding propositions that “the
words used in the Constitution must be presumed to have been carefully
chosen so that each word would have a meaning”, and that “each word
must be thought of as having been deliberately selected and intention-
ally placed as though it had been hammered into the instrument.” Chad-
wick v. City of Crawfordsville, (1940) 216 Ind. 399, 24 N.E.2d 937.

Ordinarily I would consider myself to be bound through the prin-
ciple of stare decisis and would uphold this statute in an instance such
as this as consistent with Art. 1, § 18. But as Justice Frankfurter aptly
stated:

“stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula
of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and question-
able, when adherence involves collision with prior doctrine more
embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by ex-
perience.” Helvering v. Hallock, (1940) 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444,
451, 84 L.Ed. 605.
Since considering this question in the Adams case, substantial views
have surfaced which bear directly upon the proper understanding and
applications of Art. 1, § 18, in relation to the penalty of death. This
matter has given an added perspective to the penalty of death which
placed it again and anew upon a collision course with that state con-
stitutional provision and calls for reconsideration. I do not therefore
deem myself constricted by stare decisis.

116 SS

The new matter to which I refer has arisen as the United States
Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of the death
penalty. In Gregg v. Georgia, (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, Justice
Stewart on behalf of himself and Justices Powell and Stevens states:

“In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's
moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This fune-
tion may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an
ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes
rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.

‘The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man,
and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability
of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe
that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they “deserve”, then there
are sown the seeds of anarchy — of self-help, vigilante justice,
and lynch law.” Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S., at 308,
92 S.Ct., at 2761 (Stewart, J., concurring).

‘Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law,’ Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084,
93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), but neither is it a forbidden objective nor
one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men. Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 394-395, 92 S.Ct., at 2806-2807 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id., at 452-454, 92 S.Ct., at 2835-2836 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S., at 581, 535-536, 88 S.Ct.,
at 2153, 2155-2156 (plurality opinion). Indeed, the decision that
capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme
eases is an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes
are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only
adequate response may be the penalty of death.”
The view espoused here is that in addition to having a deterrent ob-
jective, the death penalty has another objective which at once is
separate, identifiable, and real. It is a retributive, vengeful, and thus
vindictive one. Justices White, Rehnquist and the Chief Justice go even
further. Concurring in the judgment in Gregg, they refer to reasons
appearing in dissent in Roberts v. Lowisiana, (1976) 428 U.S. 325, 96
S.Ct. 3001, which include the idea that life imprisonment may be in-
adequate “to satisfy the need for reprobation or retribution.” At 3015.
By adding the concept of reprobation in this context I take them to

L | 177
Po

mean that the death penalty is applied when a life can be declared
totally without worth. So viewed, the biological death of the wrongdoer
by law is the culmination of a process which has as one of its steps
the determination that an extant human life is totally valueless. Justice
Blackmun, concurring, refers to his joining in Justice Powell’s dissent
in Furman v. Georgia, (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, in which Justice
Powell notes that retribution is not impermissible. Both Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan in dissent in Gregg express the belief that one of
the principal purposes served by the death penalty is retribution. The
new matter then to which I have alluded is the published fact that
all nine justices of the highest court of the land believe that the death
penalty is in part vindictive. Seven Justices believe that this vindic-
tive principle is consistent with the respect for the dignity of man in
the Eighth Amendment, while the remaining two believe that it is not.

No Justice of this Court is bound to accept the characterization of
the purposes of the death penalty or the principles underlying it to
which the Justices of the United States Supreme Court ascribe. How-
ever, their unanimous view, arising as it does in cases involving a very
basic issue and calling out visceral individual responses, is entitled to
substantial weight. Adventitiously those responses support the views
I previously expressed in dissent in Adams, and as complementary to
those views leads me anew to the firm belief that Art. 1, § 18, must
be removed from the Constitution, if Indiana is to have the death
penalty. A form of constitutional amendment tracking a similar provi-
sion which was in the Montana Constitution from 1889 to 1972 would
suffice to accomplish this purpose. Article III, § 24 of the Montana Con-
stitution of 1889 reads as follows:

“Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the prin-

ciples of reformation and prevention, but this shall not affect the

power of the legislative assembly to provide for punishing offenses
by death.” (emphasis added)

One can agree that the vindictive, retributive and reprobative ob-
jective of the death penalty is not inconsistent with the respect for
the dignity of man encompassed within the prohibitions of our consti-
tutions against cruel or unusual punishments, however, one cannot ra-
tionally accept the proposition that this objective is consistent with

178 EE
pe

the mandate of Art. 1, § 18. In bringing forth the meaning of this provi-
sion of the Constitution the words of it are to be taken in their natural
and ordinary sense. Benton County Council v. State ex rel. Sparks, (1946)
224 Ind. 114, 65 N.E.2d 116. The language of this provision is straight-
forward. We need not stray far from it. Its plain meaning is that prin-
ciples of reformation must underpin the establishment of criminal
penalties to the exclusion of principles of vindictive justice. The death
penalty rests upon a foundation which is partially vindictive and is
the product of principles of vindictive justice. It is based upon the almost
universal and understandable human revulsion to particularly heinous
and atrocious crimes and the judgmental response which very often
follows closely that the perpetrators of such crimes deserve to be put
to death. It is based upon the judgment that there are persons who
have conducted themselves in such a dangerous and reprehensible man-
ner and are of such an ungovernable nature that their life is totally
worthless. The Indiana Constitution in Art. 1, § 18 bars the State of
Indiana from permitting this instinct of man for vengeance and retribu-
tion from manifesting itself in the establishment and formulation of
criminal penalties.

It was said in the majority opinion in Adams v. State, supra, and
in previous opinions of this Court as well responding to this issue that
the purpose of all punishment is the protection of society. This response
misses the mark. The core point of Article 1, § 18 is that society may
indeed protect itself through the enactment and enforcement of penal
sanctions, but that it nevertheless may not go so far in accomplishing
that important and necessary objective as to satisfy the longing and
need of the community for revenge and retribution against a wrongdoer.
This I believe to be the purpose of Article 1, § 18, and I deem myself
as a judge, bound to honor it. I would therefore remand this case with
instructions to impose the determinate sentences.

APPENDIX
-a-

Whatever may be the case in other jurisdictions, in Indiana the Con-
stitution explicitly sets out that at least one of the functions of punish-
ment must be to reforni the offender and that function is absolutely

P| 179
fF

incompatible with the death penalty.

In spite of the obvious, clear meaning of § 18, this Court has in the
past upheld the validity of the death penalty. Hawkins v. State (1941),
219 Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79; McCutcheon v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 247,
155 N.E.544; Rice v. State (1855), 7 Ind. 332; Driskill v. State (1855),
7 Ind. 338. The rationale of this position was set out in Driskill and
Rice, and subsequent cases have added nothing to the discussion.

In Driskill, this Court said:

“In connection with this point, it is insisted that the law authoriz-
ing the death penalty is in conflict with section eighteen of the
bill of rights, which requires the penal code to be founded on prin-
ciples of reformation, and not of vindictive justice. The punish-
ment of death for murder in the first degree, is not, in our opinion,
vindictive, but is evenhanded justice. There is, indeed, nothing vin-
dictive in our penal laws. The main object of all punishment is the
protection of society. With that end in view, the legislature have,
ina given case, left it within the discretion of the jury to say when
the death penalty shall be inflicted. It is true, one branch of that
discretion does not contemplate reform; still, it is the only instance
in the law in which the purpose of reformation is not prominent,
and it cannot, it seems to us, be allowed to give character to the
principles upon which the entire code is founded. The eighteenth
section of the bill of rights, when properly construed, requires
the penal laws to be so framed as to protect society, and at the
same time, as a system, to inculcate the principle of reform. In this
view, the present code is, no doubt, founded on the principles of
reformation, within the spirit and intent of the constitution. The
law which allows the death penalty to be inflicted, must, therefore,
be held valid.” (Emphasis added.) 7 Ind. at 342, 348.

In Rice, this Court said:

“Tt is also decided in Driskill v. State, infra, that the death
penalty is not in conflict with the 18th section of the first article
of our constitution. If any question can be raised before the judici-
ary upon the discretion of the legislature under that section, we
concur that it has not been abused in leaving the question of assess-
ing that penalty to the jury. There are cases beyond the hope of
reformation—criminals whose necks have become so hardened ‘that
they should suddenly be cut off, and that without remedy.’ ” (Em-
phasis added.) 7 Ind. at 338.

180 ee
PT

In the above quotations the Court made several attempts to justify
its conclusion that § 18 is no obstacle to the enactment of the death
penalty provision by the Legislature. I believe the arguments fail to
support that conclusion.

First, the Court stated baldly that the death penalty is not vindic-
tive in nature but is “even-handed justice”. This has no determinable
meaning. It might mean that the death penalty is an option which the
sentencing authority may choose in all first degree murder cases. As
such it is true but beside the point. It might mean that the death penalty
is not vindictive because it is the taking of the life of the offender who
has himself taken a life. This would be the same as claiming that the
“eye for an eye” philosophy is not vindictive, when in fact it is the
epitome of vindictiveness and revengefulness. The exclusive use of the
“eye for an eye” philosophy is precisely what is precluded by § 18.
Whatever it might have meant to the judge who wrote it, this state-
ment that the death penalty is even-handed justice is not an argument
at all, and does not succeed in establishing that the death penalty is
not vindictive.

Second, the Court said that the “main object of all punishment is
the protection of society”. Although this is not stated in the Constitu-
tion and the Court does not indicate any constitutional basis for the
claim, I assume it to be one of the basic objectives of the penal system.
However, the need to protect society does not require the death penalty,
and there is no reason to adopt this objective to the exclusion of the
principle embodied in § 18. If possible we must try to give effect to
both objectives of the criminal sanction. This is easily done because
there is nothing in § 18 that is incompatible with the objective of pro-
tecting society. Section 18 merely precludes a penalty which forecloses
all possibility of reformation of the offender. Life imprisonment as a
maximum penalty accomplishes both goals and there is no need to
choose between them; but the death penalty defeats one of them, the
only one specifically set out in the Constitution.

Third, the Court said the requirement that the “penal code” be
founded on the principles of reformation did not apply to each and every
criminal statute, but merely applies to the entire system, and one in-
stance, where admittedly the penalty does not contemplate reform,

[| 181
po

does not make the whole system vindictive in violation of § 18. I see
no reason to interpret § 18 in this way. The “penal code” is made up
of each and every legislative enactment which defines a crime and pro-
vides a penalty for a violation thereof; it is the class of all criminal
statutes and it is they which must be founded on principles of reforma-
tion. The language of § 18 does not indicate any exceptions and the
Court offers no valid reason to accept any. The fact recognized by the
Court in Driskill, that the death penalty “is the only instance in the
Jaw in which the purpose of reformation is not prominent” does not
support the argument that the death penalty is constitutional, but on
the contrary clearly demonstrates that it is a lone anomaly among the
penal laws and that it is at odds with the rest of the body of penal
laws and that it is unconstitutional.

Fourth, the Court seemed to rely on the fact that the sentencing
authority has the discretionary power in a first degree murder case
to impose a penalty of life imprisonment rather than death if it so
chooses. Presumably they thought that the existence of this power
renders the penalty provision nonvindictive and in conformance with
principles of reformation, and, therefore, not in violation of § 18. In
my view the power of the sentencing authority to select life imprison-
ment rather than death does not render the penalty provision constitu-
tional under § 18. The question is, when the death penalty is in fact
chosen, is § 18 satisfied? Section 18 means that the sentence actually
imposed must leave open the possibility of reformation of the offender.
This is not satisfied by the existence of a potential sentence of life
imprisonment.

Fifth, in the Rice case, the Court states its firm opinion that those
offenders who had been assessed the death penalty were beyond any
hope of reformation and, therefore, the principles of reformation did
not need to be considered in a death case. I believe this position is
erroneous for two reasons: (1) The concept of human nature implicit
in § 18 is one which says that every man, no matter how depraved,
has the possibility of redemption for his evil ways through a change
of heart. Who are we to say any man’s heart is hardened beyond any
hope of change? (2) There are no grounds for believing that those per-
sons who receive the death penalty are in fact beyond hope of reforma-

tion since the sentencing authority is not required to find that the
defendant is non-reformable before assessing the death penalty. The
Court is merely saying that the imposition of the death penalty is
justified because the offender is non-reformable, and we know he is
non-reformable because he has received the death penalty.

I would hold that the mandate of § 18 clearly prohibits the death
penalty and that no Indiana case has even begun to offer a good counter
argument to that position.

-b-

Likewise appellant’s contention that the death penalty as punish-
ment for the crime of first degree murder is a “vindictive justice” is
also without merit. In Driskill v. State (1855), 7 Ind. 338, 343, this court
stated:

“The punishment of death for murder in the first degree, is not,

in our opinion, vindictive, but is even-handed justice. There is,

indeed, nothing vindictive in our penal laws. The main object of
all punishment is the protection of society.”

For the reasons stated we are bound by legislative policy and
historical rationale, therefore, the appellant’s contention as to the death
penalty must fail.

NotEe—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 95.
|

MITCHELL L. WATERS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 18086. Filed February 4, 1981.]

183

J. A. Cummins, Public Defender of Delaware County, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.—On August 1, 1979, appellant Waters was found guilty
of murder by a jury in Delaware Superior Court. He was sentenced
to life imprisonment. He appeals.

The evidence at trial revealed that on February 1, 1977, Larry Brown
left his former wife’s home at approximately 7:24 p.m. to meet with
Mitchell Waters at a tire warehouse on Lilac Lane. The purpose of
the meeting was to collect some checks for tires that Waters had bought
on credit from Larry Brown’s employer. When Larry Brown did not
return in an hour as he had promised, Diane Brown looked for him
at his house and at his employer's store, White Flash Petroleum.
Brown’s truck was parked there and was locked. Mitchell Waters, the
appellant, told Diane Brown on the telephone that he hadn't seen Larry
Brown since Saturday. The next evening, February 2, she reported
Larry Brown as a missing person. Several persons, including relatives
of Brown were concerned about what had happened to him and went
down to the warehouse because of reports of a very bad odor emanating
from that area in the following months.

184 a

Over two years later, on March 19, 1979, Robert Poole was cleaning
out a warehouse on Lilac Lane where tires were stored. When he emp-
tied the old tires out of the end section, a body was found underneath
them which was later identified as the remains of Larry Brown. Mit-
chell Waters had rented and used that section of the warehouse before
Poole cleaned it out. When an autopsy was performed on the deceased,
a bullet was found in the skull.

Prior to March 20, 1979, Delaware County Sheriff Gary Carmichael
and his deputies responded to a call from the owners of a house which
appellant Waters had occupied as a tenant. They wanted Sheriff Car-
michael to accompany them as they looked inside the house to observe
its condition. On March 20, the Sheriff and deputies and the owners
entered the house. A set of keys, a coat, a copy of a stop payment order
and cancelled checks were seized.

The keys were identified as Larry Brown’s keys for his truck and
for White Flash Petroleum. Diane Brown had given Larry Brown the
key ring, which matched one she had. She had seen the key ring in
his possession on the last night she had seen him. The stop payment
orders were on checks issued to Larry Brown by Waters.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
in limine and in allowing State’s witness Dwayne Hendrickson to testify,
in overruling a motion to suppress and in admitting evidence seized
in a Search, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convic-
tion of murder.

I.

Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his mo-
tion in limine and in allowing Dwayne Hendrickson to testify.

Appellant had filed a Motion in Limine asking the court to rule that
certain proposed testimony of State’s witness Dwayne Hendrickson
be ruled irrelevant and immaterial and, therefore, inadmis-

| | sible at trial. The court overruled this motion. Dwayne Hen-
drickson testified as to a conversation he had overheard in

which Mitchell Waters had told his father, “You don’t have to worry
about the money. It’s all taken care of.” There was no objection made

Le 185
CO

to this testimony at the time it was given. Objection was made after
recess during a “clean up” motion. The court denominated it a continu-
ing motion and overruled it. In order to preserve error in the overrul-
ing of a pre-trial motion in limine the appealing party also must have
objected to the admission of the evidence at the time it was offered.
State v. Church of Nazarene of Logansport, (1978) 268 Ind. 523, 877 N.E.2d
607; Burrys v. Silhavy, (1978) 155 Ind.App. 558, 293 N.B.2d 794.

Appellant’s objection that the testimony was irrelevant and imma-
terial to the issues involved is without merit.

Appellant Waters had owed Larry Brown at least $15,000. He had
given Brown two checks, one in the amount of $17,000 and the other
in the amount of either $384 or $834. These checks were given
[sto Brown and then taken back from him supposedly for the
purpose of having Waters’ wife countersign them. The checks
were never countersigned. Even though Waters had written these
checks, he had never had more than about $1200 in his account. The
above testimony was offered in an attempt to establish a motive for
the killing. It also tended to be an admission that Waters had “taken
care” of the problem of this debt. The evidence could reasonably con-
tribute to the inference that Waters had killed Brown to avoid paying
a substantial debt. Evidence having even a slight tendency to prove
a material fact in issue is relevant. Jones v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 285,
385 N.E.2d 426. There was no error in the overruling of this motion
and the admission of this testimony.

I.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in overruling a mo-
tion to suppress and in admitting evidence seized in a search of defend-
ant’s former residence. Mitchell Waters had rented a residence on
Truitt Road, in Delaware County, from Mrs. Shroyer. He paid rent
there from February 1978 to February 1979: The last rent receipt was
dated January 24, 1979, and was for the rental period of January 24
to February 24. Mrs. Shroyer testified that the Waters had always
paid their rent on time. When they did not pay rent in February she
went to the house on March 2, to get the rent. No one was there and
she could see that everything had been moved out of the kitchen and

from another room that could be seen from the kitchen. On March 5,
she and her husband went to Fairmont to see if they could “run them
down.” The Shroyers had repeatedly asked Waters to remove a large
number of tires that were on the premises. Waters had promised to
move them and had not done so. When Shroyers found out that he
had left, they were quite concerned. They went to Fairmont and waited
for Mrs. Waters to come home. They finally saw her after midnight.
She said that they would pay rent until the tires were removed. On
March 9, the Shroyers wrote a letter asking that the tires be removed
a: 1told the Waters’ that since they had retained the keys the Shroyers
would hold them responsible for rent and any damages to the property.
On March 5, Mrs. Shroyer called the gas company and found out that
the gas had been shut off because Waters did not pay the bill. Shroyers
went in the house and plugged in an electric heater to prevent damage
to the plumbing. At that time they saw a disconnect notice from In-
diana Michigan Electric Company. They asked that the electricity be
put in Mr. Shroyer’s name on March 10 or 11. Although there was prop-
erty left in the house and tires left around the yard, Mrs. Waters said
that they had decided, about February 4, 1979, not to live there any
more. They had bought a house in Fairmont and had moved part of
their possessions. They had been sleeping at the Fairmont house since
February 10, and she considered that house to be her legal residence
after February 10.

Mrs. Shroyer had called the police asking about what she could do
about tenants who had vacated her rental property and left property
inside the house and used tires around the out buildings. She wanted
to go inside the house to check on the condition in which it had been
left by the Waters’ and wanted the police to accompany her. On March
20, the Sheriff accompanied the owners to the Truitt Road house and
entered the house with the owners’ key and their consent. At this time
a coat was seized which had keys in the pocket, and a copy of an order
to stop payment on checks was taken from a box on the floor. No search
warrant was issued prior to this search. At this time Waters was being
held in Delaware County Jail on preliminary charges of murder.

Appellant contends that because he did not give his consent to the
search, it was an illegal search and that all items seized should have

P| 187
a

been suppressed. Appellant claims he had u possessory interest in the
premises based on the facts that he had rented this property in the
past, had not returned the keys, and had left considerable property
on the premises which was not moved immediately after tueir buying
the house in Fairmont. He argues that the owner’s request and con-
sent did not validate the warrantless search of the Truitt Road house.
The State contends that appellant had no standing to challenge the
search since his failure to pay rent had terminated his leasehold and
that he had no basis for a legitimate expectation of privacy in that house.

In determining whether appellant’s rights were violated when the
sheriff accompanied the owners to the house and items were seized,
we must determine whether Waters had a legitimate expecta-
Hl tion of privacy in that house. Rakas v. Illinois, (1978) 439 U.S.
128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387; Pollard v. State, (1979) 270
Ind. 599, 388 N.E.2d 496. Appellant claims a kind of possessory interest
in this house. In considering his claim we note that Ind. Code § 32-7-1-7
(Burns 1980 Repl.) provides that a notice to quit is not required to ex-
press a tenant’s intention to terminate his leasehold when rent is
payable in advance and such rent is not paid. The failure of the tenant
to pay such rent constitutes a default of the lease. Lafayette Car Wash,
Inc. v. Boes, (1972) 258 Ind. 498, 282 N.H.2d 837. Here appellant had
not paid his rent, had moved and bought a house in another town. He
simply failed to remove all of his property from his house and yard
after changing his residence. He had never contacted the owners to
notify them he was moving from their house, instead they had had
to try to locate him. When Mrs. Waters was confronted she claimed
that they would pay rent until the tires were removed. However, it
is undisputed that no more rent was ever paid after the January pay-
ment. The trial court heard all of these facts and determined that the
lease had been terminated and that there was no violation of the ap-
pellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. We agree with this determina-
tion. There was no error in allowing these items into evidence.

Il.

Appellant finally contends that the evidence is insufficient to sus-
tain his conviction. He claims that some possible motive which was

inferred from the evidence is the only connection between him and
the offense.

The evidence most favorable to the State revealed that Larry Brown
left Diane Brown’s home on the evening of February 1, 1977. At that
time he had his keys with him. They were on a distinctive
sand unique key chain. He was going to meet appellant Waters
at a warehouse on Lilac Lane to collect some checks for tires.
Larry Brown was never seen alive again. Over two years later, his
body was found in a warehouse on Lilac Lane that had been rented
by Waters. His truck and business keys were found in a pocket of
Waters’ coat, and stop payments orders against the checks given by
Waters to Larry Brown were also found. Testimony was heard that
Waters had told his father that he did not have to worry about the
money, that he had taken care of it. It is clear that a conviction may
be sustained upon circumstantial evidence alone. Willard v. State, (1980)
272 Ind. 589, 400 N.E.2d 151, 160; Ruetz v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 42,
48-51, 373 N.E.2d 152, 156-57. The evidence here is sufficient to sup-
port the jury’s finding that appellant Waters was guilty of first degree
murder.

Judgment affirmed.

Givan, C. J., DeBruler, J., and Hunter, J., concur.

Prentice, J., concurs in result.

NoTE—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 711.
De

GEORGE ROGER DUVALL v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 12798360. Filed February 4, 1981,]

189

Walter E. Bravard, Jr., of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, John K. Silk, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

GIvAN, C. J.— Appellant was convicted of two counts of robbery, while
armed, a Class B Felony. He was sentenced to two ten-year terms of
imprisonment to run consecutively.

On May 8, 1978, the Hooks Pharmacy in Southport was robbed. Two
males entered the store and took money from the cashier and from
a customer. There was evidence that the appellant was one of these
men and that he carried a hand gun during the robbery.

Appellant claims that the in-court identifications by three witnesses

were tainted by improper and suggestive pretrial identification, thereby

denying him a fair and impartial trial. The record discloses

The failed to object during the trial to the identification

testimony given by any one of the three witnesses. Therefore,

appellant has not preserved the issue for review. Drake v. State, (1979)
272 Ind. 302, 397 N.E.2d 600.

Appellant next claims there is insufficient evidence on the issue of
identity. This argument was predicated on the fact that appellant
testified that he knew nothing about the robbery, although
| | the cashier, the pharmacist, and a customer made in-court
identifications. When there is a conflict in the testimony, the
jury is free to believe whomever they wish. Ward v. State, (1973) 260
Ind. 217, 294 N.E.2d 796. This Court will not weigh the evidence nor
judge the credibility of the witnesses. Brown v, State, (1977) 266 Ind.
82, 360 N.E.2d 830. The record contains ample evidence to support the
finding of the jury that appellant had been identified as a perpetrator
of the crime.

Appellant next claims there is insufficient evidence to support the
charge that he was armed with a deadly weapon. Although one witness
described the weapon as a revolver, and another as an auto-
| | matic, all three witnesses testified they saw a gun. Two
witnesses during cross-examination by appellant conceded
that the weapon could have been a replica. No weapon was introduced
in evidence by the State. In Brown v. State, supra, we held that it is
not necessary to introduce a weapon into evidence to prove use of a
deadly weapon. There is ample evidence in the record from which the
jury could reasonably find that appellant was armed with a deadly
weapon.

Appellant claims the State failed to prove that he took money from
the person or presence of the cashier as stated in the information.
However, the cashier testified that while appellant held a gun,
i | his comrade took money from the cash register. She further
testified she saw the appellant take money from the customer's
billfold. In Smith v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 148, 246 N.E.2d 765, we af-
firmed a conviction of robbery where the employees of the store were
taken to the back of the store room, forced to lie face down, and after
the appellant fled, found that $2200 and between 150 and 200 pieces
of jewelry were missing. In Smith, supra, 252 Ind. at 153, 246 N.E.2d
at 767, this Court stated:
“It is not necessary to sustain a conviction for robbery that the

property taken is from the actual person of another. It is suffi-
cient if the property taken is from the personal presence or per-

[| 191
pT

sonal protection of the victim. Mahoney v. State, (1932) 203 Ind.

421, 180 N.E. 580; Chizwm v. State, (1932) 203 Ind. 450, 180 N.E.

674.”

There is ample evidence in this record to support the finding that
appellant took money from the cashier and from a customer in the
establishment.

Appellant claims the trial court erred in consecutively sentencing
him to two ten-year terms for two counts of robbery. He argues that
the crimes occurred during one criminal undertaking and constitute
one unitary transaction, not two separate offenses.

Appellant correctly cites Williams v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 656, 395
N.E.2d 239 for the proposition that an unlawful taking from four tellers
in one bank, during one robbery constituted a single count
i | of robbery. However, the case at bar is distinguishable from
Williams, supra. In this case, appellant took money from the
pharmacy and from its customer. In McKinley v. State, (1980) 272 Ind.
689, 400 N.E.2d 1378, this Court held that robbing a pharmacy of its
receipts and the proprietor of the pharmacy of his personal belongings
did not constitute a unitary transaction, but constituted two separate
robberies. Applying the McKinley case to the case at bar, we find no
error in convicting appellant of two counts of robbery. The consecutive
sentences are permitted by I.C. 35-50-1-2.

The trial court is in all things affirmed.
All Justices concur.

Note—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 718.
Es

WILLIAM J. DUFFY v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 780S206. Filed February 4, 1981.]

192

William J. Dougherty, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frederick N. Kopec, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, William J. Duffy, was convicted in a bench
trial of rape, a class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.)
and criminal deviate conduct, a class B felony, Ind. Code § 85-42-4-2
(Burns 1979 Repl.). He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of fif-
teen years each. His direct appeal raises the following issues:

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions;
and

2. Whether the findings and decision of the trial court were con-
trary to law in that defendant was so intoxicated on the day of the
crime he was not able to form the necessary specific intent.

A summary of the facts most favorable to the state shows that on

Le 198
pF

the afternoon of June 27, 1979, the victim, a seventy-eight year old
widow, was watching television in her unlocked apartment. A man
entered the apartment suddenly and threatened her with a knife. The
man was described by the victim as a white male in his mid-forties
wearing a white tee-shirt, pants, and dark socks without shoes. He
pulled her to the floor, threatened several times to kill her and both
raped her and had oral sex with her. During the rape, the man dropped
the knife which police later recovered. After raping the victim, the
man grabbed some loose change from the top of the victim’s dresser
and ran down the hall. The victim went to her door and screamed for
help.

A woman visiting in another apartment near to the victim’s apart-
ment saw a man wearing dark socks without shoes, a white tee-shirt
and tan pants run down the hallway and get on the elevator shortly
after she heard the victim scream. She identified defendant in court
as the man she had seen entering the elevator. Another witness had
seen defendant with a kitchen knife sticking out of his pocket in the
elevator of the apartment building about an hour before the incident.

Defendant was arrested in the apartment building shortly after the
incident and was taken to the hospital where the victim was being
treated. The victim looked at the defendant from a distance of one to
two feet and positively identified him as her assailant. She said, “He
had put his shoes on . . . but he still got on those black socks.” However,
eight months later at the trial, the victim was unable to identify defend-
ant in the courtroom. When she was asked if she saw her assailant
there, she pointed to a spectator in the back of the room rather than
to defendant.

Defendant testified that he was drunk on the day of the offense and
that as an alcoholic he was prone to experiencing blackouts when drunk.
He testified that he remembered nothing of the alleged crimes and
had never to his knowledge raped anyone in his life. Court-appointed
psychiatrists testified that defendant was not suffering from a mental
disease or defect at the time of the offense and did not lack substantial
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.

L

Defendant first contends that there was not sufficient evidence as
to his identity to support his convictions. He argues that the identifica-
tion by the victim in the hospital was made under conditions which
were tainted by suggestive circumstances. He alleges that since the
victim was unable to identify him in court, and the pretrial identifica-
tion was made under suggestive circumstances there was insufficient
evidence of his identity to sustain his conviction. We do not agree.

It is clear that a one-on-one confrontation between suspect and vic-
tim is as a general proposition very suggestive, but it is not always
unnecessarily suggestive. Clark v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 316, 380 N.E.2d
550; Kelly v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 231, 379 N.E.2d 963; Zion v. State,
(1977) 266 Ind. 563, 365 N.E.2d 766. Depending upon the surrounding
circumstances, it may be found that the confrontation was not unnec-
essarily suggestive, and that there had been no denial of the defend-
ant’s due process rights. Neil v. Biggers, (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct.
375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401; Clark v. State, supra.

In the instant case, the show-up took place within a few hours of
the crime. The victim was being treated in the hospital for the effects
of the attack. Thus, the use of a lineup was impractical. The victim
gave an accurate description of her assailant to the police shortly after
the incident occurred. She was able to describe his race, his height,
his features, his approximate age and the clothing he wore. She was
wearing her eyeglasses when defendant entered her apartment on the
afternoon of the incident and was able to look closely at him. At the
hospital, the victim viewed defendant at a distance of one to two feet
and stated she was sure he was the same man she saw in her apart-
ment. She even noticed that he had put his shoes on but that “he still
got on those black socks.”

There is no evidence that the victim was pressured or forced at the
hospital to identify defendant as the perpetrator. She never varied
in her description of her assailant and never waivered in her

I certainty that the man she saw at the hospital was the same
man who had attacked her earlier in her apartment. Although

the show-up itself was not entirely free of suggestiveness, under the

Le 195

circumstances of this case, it was not impermissibly so and did not
warrant the exclusion of the evidence at trial.

The victim’s inability to identify defendant in court may well have

been due to her poor eyesight over a greater distance and to the eight-

month lapse in time between the incident and the trial. How-

sever, the fact that she failed to identify defendant in court

is relevant only to the weight to be accorded her earlier identi-

fication, not to its admissibility. Young v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 107,
409 N.E.2d 579.

In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, it is well settled that
as a court of review, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
the credibility of witnesses. Rather, we will look only to that evidence
most favorable to the state and all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to sup-
port the conclusion of the trier of fact, the judgment will not be over-
turned. Wofford v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 518, 394 N.E.2d 100; Poindea-
ter v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 167, 374 N.E.2d 509.

In this case, the victim’s unvarying description of her assailant
matched defendant’s appearance. She identified defendant a few hours
after the crime as being her assailant. Other independent evi-
I dence placed defendant running through the apartment
hallway on the floor of the victim’s apartment at the time of
the incident. Another witness identified defendant as a man she had
seen entering the apartment elevator earlier in the afternoon. She
observed a kitchen knife sticking out of his pocket resembling the knife
found in the victim’s apartment after the offense. The evidence of iden-
tification is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that defend-
ant was guilty as charged. There is no error on this issue.

Il.

Defendant also contends that the finding of the trial court was con-
trary to law since he was too intoxicated on the day of the crime to
have formed the necessary specific intent. He presented evidence at
trial which showed that he was an alcoholic and was prone to experi-
encing “blackouts” when drunk. He claimed that he remembered drink-
ing the day before the incident and on that morning. He then claims

he remembered nothing until he “woke up” in jail on the following day.

The law is well settled that voluntary intoxication is no defense in

criminal proceedings unless it can be shown that the accused was so

intoxicated as to be incapable of formulating the requisite

Hs intent. Bates v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 214, 409 N.E.2d 623;

Larkin v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 469, 393 N.E.2d 180. The burden

of proving the intoxication defense rests with the defendant. Dobrzy-

kowski v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 604, 382 N.E.2d 170. Whether defendant

possessed the requisite intent, despite his claim of intoxication is a

question for the trier of fact. Greider v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 281, 385
N.E.2d 424.

In this case, defendant offered testimony to the effect that alcoholics
generally experience “blackout” periods, after which they have no
recollection of such periods. However, medical experts offered testi-
mony that a “blackout” does not affect an individual’s behavior at the
time; it simply affects the memory of that behavior. The experts agreed
that the lack of memory has no effect on one’s ability to understand
or appreciate what one is doing during the time one is doing it. Only
one of defendant’s witnesses gave testimony contrary to that of the
medical experts. This witness stated that the assumption was that
alcoholics are not aware of their behavior during blackouts. This witness
claimed to be an expert on alcoholism but offered no evidence of train-
ing or education which would support her qualification as an expert.

The state presented ample expert medical testimony that defendant
was not suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the
crime. The state offered substantial lay testimony of police officers
who talked with defendant at the time of the incident and stated that
he did not slur his words when talking, did not stumble when he walked,
was able to respond to commands and did not appear to be drunk. There
was sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find that defend-
ant was able to form the intent necessary to commit the crimes as
charged.

For all of the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

197

Givan, C.J., Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
DeBruler, J., concurs in result.

NotE—Reported at 415 N.E.2d 715.

FREDERICK HEFLIN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

(No. 10798269. Filed February 5, 1981]

198 Le

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender of Indiana, Paul Jeffery ff.
Roberts, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.—This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for post-
conviction relief. The appellant was convicted in January, 1976, of three
counts of committing a felony while armed, Ind. Code § 35-12-1-1
(repealed effective October 1, 1977).

On direct appeal, Heflin v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 427, 370 N.E.2d 895,
appellant raised, among other issues, a claim that he was denied a
speedy trial under the provisions of Ind. R.Crim. P. 4(B). This Court,
assuming arguendo that Criminal Rule 4(B) was applicable, deemed the
right to a speedy trial to have been waived by appellant’s failure to
object to a trial date scheduled beyond the seventy-day limit set by
the rule. The issue, the Court held, was therefore forfeited on appeal.

In his petition for post-conviction relief, appellant raised the sole
claim that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. He alleged
in his petition that his attorney failed to object properly to the trial
date; that his attorney failed to object to the denial of his motion for
a lineup; that on appeal his attorney misstated the law and the facts
on the speedy trial issue, and failed to preserve the lineup issue in
the motion to correct errors; and that on the petition for rehearing
his attorney did not address “misstatements of facts in the record”
upon which the court based its waiver holding.

Following denial of the petition and denial of the motion to correct
errors, appellant brought this appeal, raising five issues. The first four
are as follows:

(1) Whether the court erred in law in finding that the appellant
was not entitled to the benefit of the speedy trial provisions of Indiana
Criminal Rule 4(B).

(2) Whether the court erred in finding that the Interstate Com-
pact on Detainers takes precedence over the application of Indiana
Criminal Rule 4(B).

L | 199
Tid

(3) Whether the court erred in finding that appellant’s constitu-
tional rights were adequately safeguarded by the application of the
principles enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct.
2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.

(4) Whether the court erred in finding that the appellant was not
in custody of the State of Indiana after return on October 20, 1975,
until trial on January 5, 1976.

These four issues underlie a fifth claim that the post-conviction court
erred in finding that the petitioner was not denied adequate legal
representation.

In order to review these claims we must first briefly examine the
relevant facts.

Appellant was charged by information with the underlying felony,
and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest on January 13, 1975.
The warrant was not served until October 20, 1975. Meanwhile, appel-
lant was arrested on May 2, 1975, on federal charges and held in St.
Joseph County jail from May 5, 1975, until July 18, 1975, when he was
transferred to federal prison in Michigan.

On July 27, 1975, Indiana authorities placed a detainer on appellant
while he was still in federal prison in Michigan. On September 9 or
11 appellant pro se filed what was styled a motion for speedy trial in
the St. Joseph Superior Court. The court ordered the prosecutor's of-
fice to procure appellant’s attendance in court for disposition of the
pending charge, and on October 20, 1975, he arrived at the St. Joseph
County jail from federal prison in Oklahoma. He was served with the
Indiana warrant on that day. On October 23, 1975, appellant appeared
in court and counsel was appointed for him; arraignment was continued
to October 27, 1975, and then to October 31, 1975, at his request. On
October 31, 1975, appellant appeared in court with counsel and orally
moved for a speedy trial and for dismissal of the charges based on
alleged defects in the information. The court denied the motion to
dismiss and ruled that the time for a speedy trial should run from Octo-
ber 31, 1975.

On December 2, 1975, the court set the case for trial on January

200 ee
Cd

5, 1976. On December 29, 1975, appellant was brought before the court
in connection with a pro se letter motion for discharge. His counsel
on that day filed a motion to dismiss the information based not on a
Criminal Rule 4(B) claim, but rather on constitutional claims of denial
of due process and denial of the right to a speedy trial. Counsel argued
that the State’s failure to serve the January 13, 1975, bench warrant
while appellant was in St. Joseph County jail in federal custody from
May 5 to July 18 worked a prejudice against his client in securing
witnesses and preparing the case. Counsel further argued that his client
was available to Indiana authorities during the whole time, even though
he was in federal custody, through the provisions of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (the Agreement), Ind. Code § 35-2.1-2-4, to
which the United States is also a signatory, 18 U.S.C. App., 84 Stat.
1897-1403.

Counsel's motion was denied. Appellant's pro se motion for discharge,
referred to in the court docket in the record of the original proceedings
only as “his letter on legal sized paper styled ‘Motion for Discharge’ ”,
was not ruled upon. There is no reference to it in appellant's brief on
direct appeal, but appellant testified that this letter motion was based
on a Criminal Rule 4(B) claim that the January 5, 1976, trial setting
was beyond the seventy-day limit established by the rule (calculated,
presumably, from the September 9 or 11 date of his request for a speedy
trial sent from federal prison).

In resolving the question of whether appellant’s counsel was inef-
fective, the post-conviction trial court adopted three alternative views
on the allegations of ineffectiveness as to the Criminal Rule 4(B) speedy
trial claims. First, the post-conviction trial court held that a claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel could not be based on failure to raise, preserve
for appeal, or argue properly, the issue of Criminal Rule 4(B) time limits.
This is because Criminal Rule 4(B) is not applicable in this case. Rather,
the court held, since appellant was imprisoned in another jurisdiction,
his September 9 or 11, 1975, request triggered the application of the
Agreement on Detainers. The time limits there are either one hun-
dred eighty days from the date of receipt of the request or one hun-
dred twenty days from his arrival in Indiana on October 20, 1975. The
January 5, 1976 trial setting was within either of these limits.

[| 201
EE

Second, the post-conviction court held that even if Criminal Rule
4(B) were applicable, its seventy-day time limit must be calculated from
October 31, 1975, since a Criminal Rule 4(B) motion could not have been
made until the prisoner was in Indiana and his first request under
Criminal Rule 4(B) in Indiana was made on October 31, 1975. Based
on this, the seventy-day deadline would have fallen on January 9, 1976,
and no objection could have been made to the January 5 setting.

Finally, the post-conviction court found, based on testimony at the
hearing, that the appellant had instructed his counsel not to object.
In this alternative, the failure to object was voluntarily waived as a
matter of trial strategy.

We adopt the holding of the trial court that the provisions of the
Agreement apply in this case. This Court has said that it is irrational
to extend the application of Criminal Rule 4(B) to a defendant
who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. Smith v. State,

(1977) 267 Ind. 167, 368 N.E.2d 1154.

In enacting the Agreement, the Indiana Legislature recog-

HI sonized the problem of speedy trial rights of out-of-state

prisoners subject to Indiana detainers based on untried
charges:

“The party states find that charges outstanding against a
prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations,
or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons
already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties
which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.
Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposi-
tion of such charges and determination of the proper status of
any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations
or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with
reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from
another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of
cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agree-
ment to provide such cooperative procedures.”

Because we hold that the time limits of the Agreement apply, we can
entertain no claim of ineffectiveness arising from counsel’s failure, if
any, to assert at trial, preserve on appeal, or address on rehearing,

claims flowing from Criminal Rule 4(B).

Appellant also claims that counsel was ineffective for having failed
to present a coherent theory of his client’s Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial. Appellant appears to challenge the trial court’s find-
ing that his constitutional rights were adequately safeguarded by the
tests set out in Barker v. Wingo, supra.

In Barker, the Court found no constitutional basis for holding that

the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specific number of days

or months. It identified instead “some of the factors which

Hs courts should assess in determining whether a particular

defendant has been deprived of his right.” Id. at 2192. Four

such factors which the Court identified are: “Length of delay, the

reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and pre-
judice to the defendant.” Id.

This Court held in the direct appeal that there was not “a sufficient
delay in this case to prejudice the appellant to the extent of constituting
reversible error.” The issue having no substantive merit, we cannot
say that counsel was ineffective for having failed to present the issue
properly.

The remaining claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is that counsel failed
to object to the denial of his motion for a lineup and failed to preserve
the issue on appeal. Appellant’s argument on this claim is scanty, con-
sisting only of an unsupported assertion that since there was an alibi
defense, the issue of identification was pivotal.

The trial court determined that a trial judge has discretion to order
such a lineup and reviewed the factors which ought to be considered.
It found that discretion was properly exercised in this case because
there was no substantial risk of misidentification, citing the following
evidence in the record of the original proceedings:

At least five of the victims, four of whom were witnesses, knew the
defendant before the robbery. They recognized him as soon as he
entered the room to commit the robbery because although he wore
a nylon stocking mask it rolled up to the top of his nose three or four
times, revealing his features. These same four separately, and under

Yi 203
CT

orders not to discuss whom they had seen with each other, picked
defendant's photograph out of police mug books containing sixty to
eighty photographs and did so either in the immediate aftermath of
the robbery or within three days after the robbery. The victims had
been in the room with the robber for fifteen minutes.

While the pre-trial motion is discretionary, it is favored. The positive
identifications through photographic arrays and at trial, however, may
well have justified counsel in his decision not to pursue the
Hs denial on appeal. The trial court did not err in determining
that this claim could not support a contention that counsel

was ineffective.

The opinion of the trial court is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NoTE—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 121.

STEVE TINNIN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 4808117. Filed February 5, 1981]

Le 205

James A. Neel, Neel & Wyndham, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, Steve Tinnin, was convicted by a jury of
possession of a narcotic drug, a class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6
(Burns 1979 Repl.) and being an habitual offender, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8
(Burns 1979 Repl.) (amended 1980). He was sentenced to two years for
the class D felony and thirty years on the habitual offender charge.
He now presents six issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions
for a mistrial;

2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s request
to take the deposition of a prosecution witness;

3. Whether the trial court erred in overruling defendant’s motion
to suppress;

4. Whether the trial court erred in excluding certain impeachment
evidence offered by defendant;

5. Whether the trial court erred in failing to give two instructions
tendered by defendant; and

6. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s ver-
dict on the narcotics charge.

The evidence most favorable to the state discloses that in the after-
noon of August 1, 1978, four Indianapolis police officers armed with
a search warrant proceeded to an apartment where they had reason
to believe defendant resided. Defendant was encountered outside the
apartment, and he let the officers inside with a key. Defendant informed
them that a quantity of heroin was located inside the hall closet. He
then pointed to a shoebox inside the closet which revealed the heroin.

IL

During the cross-examination of a defense witness, the state attemp-

206 ee
Cd

ted to impeach his veracity through the use of prior convictions. The
state inquired whether he and defendant had both been convicted of
second-degree burglary in January of 1966. The trial court immediate-
ly struck the question, saying that the witness could be questioned
as to his convictions but not those of defendant. Defendant moved for
a mistrial, but it was denied, and the jury was admonished.

Arguably, defendant's convictions were not relevant to the matter
of this witness’s general propensity for telling the truth. The granting
of a mistrial lies largely within the sound discretion of the
HEB trial court and is only proper where, under all the cireum-
stances, the defendant has been placed in a position of grave
peril to which he should not have been subjected. Schmanski v. State,
(1970) 270 Ind. 331, 385 N.E.2d 1122; White v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 64,
272 N.E.2d 312. Furthermore, if a jury is admonished by the trial judge
to disregard what has occurred at trial, or if other reasonable curative
measures are taken, no reversible error will normally be found. Smith
v. State, (1978) 270 Ind. 1, 882 N.E.2d 937; Ballard v. State, (1974) 262
Ind. 482, 318 N.E.2d 798. Here, the defense witness never answered
the question, and the jury was promptly admonished. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

Later, during cross-examination of the defendant, the state asked
if he had been convicted of second-degree burglary in 1966 and placed
on probation. The defendant asked if that was a juvenile conviction.
The state replied in the affirmative, and the defendant then admitted
the conviction. The prosecutor acknowledged the answer and defend-
ant further explained that the conviction had been for stealing some
dogs. Defense counsel then objected and moved for a mistrial, contend-
ing that references to juvenile convictions were improper. The motion
for mistrial was denied.

We hold that the objection here was not timely. A party must make
his objection to a question before the answer is given in order

[to preserve the issue for appeal. Dombkowski v. State, (1967)
249 Ind. 32, 230 N.E.2d 602; Beeler v. State, (1952) 230 Ind.

444, 104 N.E.2d 744. Any error that occurred has thus been waived.

Il.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing his

Pi 207
CL

request to depose Detective Thomas Schneider who was to be a pros-
ecution witness at trial. Defendant’s first attorney entered his ap-
pearance on August 4, 1978. Subsequently, there were at least four
pretrial conferences, two trial dates were canceled due to defense mo-
tions for a continuance, and defendant changed attorneys twice.

Finally, on September 5, 1979, the trial court set a trial date for
November 12, 1979, and ordered that all discovery motions be filed
by October 31, 1979. On November 2, 1979, ten days prior to trial, defen-
dant for the first time made a motion for an order authorizing the tak-
ing of Detective Schneider’s deposition at public expense. The trial
court denied the motion as being “untimely filed.”

We recognize that normally, absent a showing that the defendant
had no legitimate defense interest in support of his motion or that the
state had a paramount interest to protect, criminal defendants

HEBD have a right to discovery, including the taking of depositions
from those persons listed as state’s witnesses. Murphy v. State,

(1976) 265 Ind. 116, 352 N.H.2d 479; Howard v. State, (1969) 251 Ind.
584, 244 N.E.2d 127. The granting of the discovery motion is subject
to the limited discretion of the trial court. Amaro v. State, (1968) 251
Ind. 88, 239 N.B.2d 394; Owen v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 406 N.E.2d
1249. However, it is also true that the trial court has inherent power
to issue orders which are necessary to prevent the use of discovery
from unjustifiably delaying the proceedings. Antrobus v. State, (1970)
253 Ind. 420, 254 N.E.2d 873; Gutowski v. State, (1976) 170 Ind. App.
615, 354 N.E.2d 293 (Garrard, J., and Hoffman, J., concurring in result).

Defendant stresses the fact that a new attorney had just been ap-
pointed for him on August 1, 1979. However, Detective Schneider was
known from the outset to be the key prosecution witness, and there
was more than enough time for the defense to make its motion to depose
him prior to the trial court’s October 31, 1979 deadline. Under the cir-
cumstances of this case evidencing defendant’s lack of diligence, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to take
Detective Schneider’s deposition.

Il.

Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred in denying his mo-

208 |

tion to suppress the heroin seized in the course of executing the search
warrant. First, he attacks the probable cause affidavit, contending that
it failed to adequately establish the credibility of the confidential in-
formant who was the source of the affiant’s information. Ind. Code
§ 35-1-6-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.). The affiant was Detective Schneider.

The affidavit recited:

“Said informant is reliable in that information provided by said
informant in the past has led to at least two arrests where at least,
two seizures of controlled substances have been obtained.”
It is well established that a statement in an affidavit declaring that
the informant has previously supplied valid information is sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirement of facts as to the credi-
i | bility of the informant. Webster v. State, (1978) 270 Ind. 145,
883 N.E.2d 328; Hoskins v. State, (1977) 174 Ind. App. 475,
367 N.E.2d 1388. Defendant’s contention is, therefore, without merit.

Defendant also maintains that the information upon which the af-
fidavit was based was too “stale” to permit issuance of the warrant.
He cites Ashley v. State, (1968) 251 Ind. 359, 241 N.E.2d 264, which held
that information indicating that marijuana was present at a certain
residence would not support a finding of probable cause when that in-
formation was eight days old. This Court observed that a substance
like marijuana was easily concealed and moved about.

In the present case, the affidavit was dated August 1, 1978, and stated
in pertinent part:

“This affiant basis [sic] his belief on the following information that
within the past seventy-two hours of August 1, 1978 a confiden-
tial, credible and reliable informant came personally to this af-
fiant and stated that within the past seventy-two hours of August
1, 1978 said informant was personally inside the residence located
at 1925 N. Senate Ave., Indpls., marion [sic] County, Indiana and
personally observed in the possession of Steve Tinnin N/M a
substance said informant believed to be heroin, a derivative of

The search warrant was issued the same day. Thus, at the time the
determination of probable cause was made, the information was at most
three days old.

Le 209

In Ashley, this Court noted that there was no precise rule as to how
much time could intervene between the obtaining of the facts and
the issuance of the search warrant. As the United States
HA Supreme Court stated in speaking of a federal statute author-
izing the issurance of search warrants for illegal intoxicating

liquors:

“While the statute does not fix the time within which proof of
probable cause must be taken by the judge or commissioner, it
is manifest that the proof must be of facts so closely related to
the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of prob-
able cause at that time.” Sgro v. United States, (1932) 287 U.S. 206,
210, 53 S.Ct. 138, 140, 77 L.Ed. 260, 263.

The Arizona Supreme Court was faced with an identical situation
as the case at bar in State v. Camargo, (1975) 112 Ariz. 50, 587 P.2d
920. There, the court held:

“The fact that there was a delay of approximately 72 hours be-

tween the time the drugs were seen by the confidential informant

to be in Espinoza’s possession and the time that the warrant was
issued does not invalidate the warrant. The drugs were not on
the person of Espinoza but in his home, unlike State v. Hutton,

110 Ariz. 339, 519 P. 2d 38 (1974), and 72 hours is a period of time

for which it is reasonable to believe that the contraband would

still be present in the home.” Id. at 52, 587 P.2d at 922.

The same result has been reached in other cases involving drug of-
fenses and a three-day period of delay. State v. Jung, (1973) 19 Ariz.
App. 257, 506 P.2d 648; Commonwealth v. Mayfield, (1978) 262 Pa. Super.
96, 396 A.2d 662. We therefore hold that the search was not illegal,
and the seized evidence was properly admitted.

Iv.

During cross-examination of Detective Schneider by the defense, it
was brought out that in November of 1978, Schneider personally served
an unrelated battery warrant upon the defendant. Schneider denied
that defendant was injured as a result of being served with the war-
rant, conceding only that it was “very possible” defendant might have
received some minor scrapes and bruises. In addition, he expressed
no knowledge of a complaint filed against him by defendant with the

210 De |
Lo

Indianapolis Police Department.

When the defense presented its case, it attempted to introduce
hospital records and the testimony of a doctor who would have verified
defendant’s physical condition after the November, 1978 incident. Also,
defendant tried to introduce a copy of a citizen’s complaint filed against
Schneider by defendant with the Indianapolis Police Department and
verification of it by an Indianapolis police officer. The trial court ex-
cluded this evidence, and defendant made an offer to prove.

It is well settled that evidence is admissible which shows bias, pre-
judice, or antagonism on the part of a witness toward the defendant.
Powers v. State, (1933) 204 Ind. 472, 184 N.E. 549; Cook v. State,
HH (1907) 169 Ind. 430, 82 N.E. 1047; Pettit v. State, (1893) 135
Ind. 393, 34 N.E. 1118. In Clark v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 524,
348 N.E.2d 27, cert. denied, (1978) 439 U.S. 1050, 99 S.Ct. 731, 58 L.Ed.2d
711, this Court recognized that evidence of bias is not considered col-
Jateral and that courts are generally liberal in allowing it. Although
we believe that the evidence should have been admitted, we are con-
strained under the facts of this case to hold the error to have been
harmless. Webster v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 309, 302 N.E.2d 763.

In Key v. State, (1956) 235 Ind. 172, 182 N.E.2d 143, and in Guise v.
State, (1977) 171 Ind. App. 680, 359 N.E.2d 269, it was held reversible
error for the trial court to have excluded certain impeachment
Hs evidence offered by the defendant. However, in each of those
cases, the testimony of the prosecution witness sought to be
impeached was the only direct evidence of defendant’s guilt. See also
Johnson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 370, 380 N.E.2d 1236 (only evidence
contradicting defendant’s plea of insanity was testimony of witness
sought to be impeached).

In the case at bar, defendant’s guilt was also established by the
testimony of another police officer who was present at the scene on
August 1, 1978. In addition, Detective Schneider admitted on cross-
examination that defendant had filed a citizen’s complaint against him
with the FBI concerning the events of November, 1978. Furthermore,
defendant was permitted on direct examination to describe in great
detail how Schneider allegedly beat him when serving him with the

Le 211
—

battery warrant. There was no reversible error here.
Vv.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in not giving his

preliminary instruction number two which defined the penalty for a

class D felony. There was no error here. Since juries no longer

HM fulfill any function regarding sentencing, the amount of penal-

ty prescribed by the legislature would be irrelevant for their

consideration. Comstock v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 259, 406 N.E.2d 1164;
Debose v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 675, 889 N.E.2d 272.

Defendant also complains that the trial court erred in refusing to
give his preliminary instruction number one which discussed the pre-
sumption of innocence and the requirement that guilt be
|| proven beyond a reasonable doubt. These rules of law were
sufficiently conveyed to the jury in the court’s preliminary
instructions numbers three and four. A trial court commits no error
when it refuses to give a tendered instruction which is adequately
covered by other instructions. Richmond v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 554,
887 N.E.2d 1812; Vacendak v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 101, 340 N.E.2d 352,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 851, 97 S.Ct. 141, 50 L.Bd.2d 125.

VI.

Defendant’s last allegation of error is that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the jury’s verdict on the class D felony. Specifically,
he maintains that the evidence failed to show that he “knowingly or
intentionally” possessed the heroin. He asserts that the state did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the residence in which the heroin
was discovered belonged to him or was under his control.

The evidence revealed that the apartment in question was leased
to defendant’s girlfriend. However, Detective Schneider testified that
when the search warrant was executed, defendant used a key he took
from his pocket in order to gain entrance. Schneider also testified that
when defendant worked for him as a confidential informant a few weeks
earlier, defendant told him that he lived there and that he used to pick
up defendant at that residence. In addition, Schneider said that defend-
ant’s girlfriend informed him that defendant resided there.

Another police officer, Schneider's partner, testified that defendant
used a key to let the officers inside the apartment and that he discov-
ered some male clothing in one of the apartment’s closets. Both
Hl officers aiso testified that defendant directed them to the ex-
act location of the heroin once inside the apartment. In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will not weigh
the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses but will only
view the evidence most favorable to the state and the logical inferences
to be drawn therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative
value to establish every element of the crime, the verdict will not be
disturbed. Norris v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 568, 394 N.E.2d 144; Hill v.
State, (1979) 271 Ind. 549, 394 N.E.2d 132. The evidence here is suffi-
cient to establish a constructive possession. Thomas v. State, (1973) 260
Ind. 1, 291 N.E.2d 557; Mills v. State, (1978) 177 Ind. App. 432, 879 N.E.2d
1023.

For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NoTe—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 116.

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE; MUTUAL
HOSPITAL INSURANCE, INC.; MUTUAL MEDICAL
INSURANCE, INC. v. ROBERT L. RYNARD, DiB/A
RURAL NURSING HOME, RILEY NURSING Home,
DELAWARE NURSING HoME, CRESTVIEW NURSING HOME.

{No. 281828. Filed February 10, 1981.]

[| 2138

Ee
ee
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GRANTING APPELLANTS’ “PETITION FOR TRANSFER”
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

COMES NOW the Appellant, Indiana Department of Public Welfare,
and filed its “Petition for Transfer” raising the issue concerning the
appropriateness of granting ten-per-cent (10%) damages payable from
State funds which punitive damages were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its opinion of May 7, 1980, basing such Petition for Transfer
upon a later decision by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of
State of Indiana v. Denny, (1980) 273 Ind. 556, 406 N.E.2d 240; this Court
has carefully considered that contention by the Attorney General as
presented in its said “Petition for Transfer” and finds that, solely upon
such basis, said Petition for Transfer should be granted. This Court
notes that the Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case was rendered on
May 7, 1980, and that subsequent thereto on June 26, 1980 this Court
clearly stated in its opinion in the Denny case that an Appellant Rule
15(G) penalty cannot be imposed against the State holding:— State of
Indiana v. Denny, (1980) 278 Ind. 556, 406 N.E.2d 240, 241, held:

It is also noted that under the common law principles, such an
award would have been questionable and that the common law
in this area has been superseded by Indiana Code § 34-4-16.5-4,
which states in part: ‘A governmental entity is not liable for
punitive damages.”

[1,2] It may be contended that this provision is not applicable
to this case in that it is a part of the Indiana Tort Claims Act.
Nonetheless, the concept of the State not having a state of mind or
not being deterred by punitive damages should be the basis for the
prohibition of such punitive damages in all cases applicable to the
State. Such Act should be considered as a statement of public policy
by the legislature that the State is not to be considered as being liable
for pumitive damages in cases such as this. -(Emphasis Supplied).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

214 Ee
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upon the receipt of this case by the Court of Appeals from the GRANT-
ING of the State’s “Petition for Transfer” that said Court of Appeals
is hereby directed to expunge from its order that part thereof which
awarded ten-per-cent (10%) damages against the State of Indiana, but
that, in all other respects, the decision by the Court of Appeals dated
May 7, 1980 is hereby AFFIRMED after the expungement of the pen-
alty heretofore referred to.

DONE AT INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA this 9 day of February, 1981.

RICHARD M. GIVAN
Chief Justice of Indiana

All Justices concur, excepting only DeBruler, J.

IN THE MATTER OF M. DANIEL FRIEDLAND.

(No. 3879865. Filed February 10, 1981.)

Ye 215

M. Daniel Friedland, Pro Se, Wilcox, Ogden, and DuMond, of In-
dianapolis, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Richard L. Zweig, of Indi-
anapolis, for respondent.

David B. Hughes, of Indianapolis, for the Indiana Supreme Court
Disciplinary Commission.

PER CURIAM—This cause was initiated in a three-count verified com-
plaint filed by the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission
pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 12. During the
course of the preceeding, on motion of the Respondent, a grievance
filed by James W. Bradford was merged with the complaint as Count
IV. In accordance with the provisions of Admission and Discipline Rule
23, an appointed Hearing Officer has conducted a hearing of this mat-
ter and filed with this Court his Findings of Fact. On motion of the
Respondent, oral argument in this cause was heard on July 2, 1980.

The Respondent now petitions this Court for review, or in the alter-
native to reopen the hearing; in support of his Petition for Review,
the Respondent has submitted a brief and reply brief. The Disciplinary
Commission has filed its brief in response to the pleadings of the
Respondent and moved that Respondent's reply brief be stricken. The
Disciplinary Commission’s motion to strike is denied.

The Indiana Civil Liberties Union has moved for leave to file a brief
Amicus Curiae in this cause and tendered to this Court such brief. The
motion of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union is granted and the tendered
brief shall be shown as filed.

Counts I, I, and III of the Verified Complaint generally assert that

216 ee
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the Respondent attempted to intimidate or improperly influence the
Executive Secretary, staff and members of the Supreme Court Disci-
plinary Commission, and witnesses against the Respondent. Specifically,
under all three counts, the Respondent is charged with violating a
Disciplinary Rule, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice, and engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on his
fitness to practice law. Additionally, under Count III the Respondent
is charged with filing a suit when it is obvious that this action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.

The Bradford grievance, which was merged at hearing with the
above-noted three-count complaint, raises a question as to whether or
not the Respondent misrepresented the status of a pending lawsuit
in the course of arguing a motion to intervene in another cause. With
regard to this supplemental charge, this Court adopts the findings of
the appointed Hearing Officer to the effect that there was no misrep-
resentation. Therefore, we now find that the Bradford grievance is in-
sufficient to support a finding of professional misconduct and, accord-
ingly, is dismissed.

Upon examination of all matters which have been submitted under
this cause, consideration of the statements of counsel during oral argu-
ment, and review of this Court’s records we now find that the Respon-
dent was admitted to the Bar of this State on May 19, 1971. On June
16, 1978, the Respondent was suspended for a period of thirty days
beginning August 1, 1978, and on April 15, 1980, the Respondent was
suspended for the nonpayment of disciplinary fees. He was reinstated
on September 9, 1980.

Relative to the allegations of misconduct set out in the Verified Com-
plaint, this Court now adopts and accepts as its own the findings of
the appointed Hearing Officer. Under Count I of the Verified Complaint,
we find that since mid-1975 there have been one or more grievances
involving the Respondent pending before the Indiana Supreme Court
Disciplinary Commission. Referee David B. Caldwell filed a grievance
in mid-1975 which eventually culminated in the thirty day suspension
of the Respondent. James Bopp and Alfred Bennett filed a grievance
in December, 1975, which was subsequently dismissd by the Commis-
sion, as was the grievance filed on March 17, 1977, by Anthony E.

P| 247
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Thomas. The Bradford grievance, filed on August 4, 1977, has been
previously discussed. In mid-1978, the Disciplinary Commission, on its
own motion, initiated a grievance against the Respondent; this
grievance is the underlying basis of the charges now pending before
this Court.

On March 15, 1978, following receipt of a local bar association in-
vestigation report into this matter, Sheldon Breskow, Executive
Secretary of the Disciplinary Commission, notified the Respondent that
the Bradford grievance had been reclassified and docketed as a mat-
ter of “misconduct.” At the time of receipt, the findings of the Hearing
Officer relative to the Caldwell grievance were pending before this
Court.

On March 20, 1978, the Respondent, accompanied by three of his
clients, appeared without appointment at the offices of the Disciplinary
Commission. The Respondent and his clients were offered a conference
with Breskow and the Commission Investigator, Cecil L. Melvin. Dur-
ing this conference the Respondent inquired into the grievances against
him pending before the Commission. The Respondent became agitated,
uttered profanity, and at one point stated to Breskow, “You are a ly-
ing bastard and I’m going to get you.” The Respondent was informed
that the conference was concluded and escorted to the door by Melvin.
Respondent reentered the offices and continued to make accusations
in a loud and profane manner. He was pushed out of the office by Melvin.

Respondent appeared again at the Commission offices on April 5,
1978, and delivered a letter dated March 22, 1978. The salutation read
“Dear Fellow Attorney”; the letter generally recounted the history
of Respondent’s difficulties with the Commission, but also contained
several personal references to Breskow; for example, referring to him
as a “moral reprobate” and accusing him of personal and professional
misconduct in the manner in which he was administering the work of
the Commission. On the letter delivered by Respondent there was a
notation as follows:

“Shel,

This letter will be sent to 1,000 selected lawyers on Monday if
all grievances against me aren't dropped—Buchanan is next.”

218 |

Breskow was angered by the letter and viewed it in the nature of an
extortion attempt. He disqualified himself to act further in any mat-
ters involving the Respondent.

On April 11, 1978, the Respondent called the Commission and left
the message that Breskow had “an extra day.” Two days later, several
major Indianapolis law firms received a letter from the Respondent
virtually identical to the letter previously delivered to the Commis-
sion. This letter accused Breskow of “perverting the function of the
Commission”, pursuing “personal animosity”, using his office “for per-
sonal vendetta” and using his “power base to harass lawyers for per-
sonal reasons.”

The Respondent continued in his efforts to intimidate Breskow. A
few days before the hearing of this cause, Respondent, while riding
his bicycle past Breskow’s personal residence, shouted to Breskow that
he had better hope the Commission did not win this case. The Respon-
dent was aware, at such time, that Breskow was scheduled to appear
as a Commission witness.

The above-noted findings demonstrate to this Court an intent on the
part of the Respondent to discredit, embarrass, intimidate, and ridicule
Breskow. The purpose, likewise, appears to be clear; it was meant to
pressure the Commission into dismissing the grievances then pending
against the Respondent.

Our findings under Count II supplement those under Count I. We
now find that on March 22, 1978, the Respondent appeared without
an appointment in the offices of the Honorable Paul H. Buchanan, Jr.,
Judge, Indiana Court of Appeals. Judge Buchanan has been a member
of the Disciplinary Commission from its inception. When the Respon-
dent entered, he yelled, “Buchanan, Buchanan.” The Respondent in-
sisted, in a loud and angry tone of voice, that Judge Buchanan meet
with the Respondent. Judge Buchanan declined to do so and advised
the Respondent that a Court Bailiff would remove the Respondent from
the office, if necessary. Respondent replied in a loud and angry man-
ner, “Alright, you are on my list.”

On April 5, 1978, the Respondent delivered to the Commission the
letter noted under Count I with the notation that “Buchanan is next.”

[| 219
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On April 21, 1978, the Respondent delivered to the Disciplinary Com-
mission a draft complaint signed by the Respondent, as attorney for
Arthur D. Anderson, proposing to sue Judge Buchanan for damages
in the sum of $750,000. Anderson had been an unsuccessful litigant
represented by Respondent before the Court of Appeals. Handwrit-
ten on the face of the draft complaint was the notation:

“To be filed Monday, Shel—I know that Buchanan, not you, calls

the shots at the Disciplinary Commission.”

As under Count I, this Court must conclude that Respondent's
motivation was to bring personal pressure on the members and staff
of the Disciplinary Commission so as to affect their official judgment.

Under Count III of the Verified Complaint filed in this Cause, we
now find that on December 17, 1975, James Bopp, Jr. and Alfred R.
Bennett filed a grievance against the Respondent. It was asserted that
the Respondent engaged in professional misconduct during the course
of a hearing before the State Employees’ Appeals Commission involv-
ing the dismissal of Respondent's client, Arthur D. Anderson, from
employment at the Indiana Boys School. Bopp, a Deputy Attorney
General, represented the Department of Correction and Bennett was
Superintendent of the Boys School. The grievance was four and one-
half pages in length; it cited specific allegations of misconduct with
reference to pages in an accompanying transcript. It was apparently
filed in good faith.

Shortly after the grievance was filed, Respondent confronted Bopp
at a Bar Association Christmas party and indicated that a suit would
be filed against him. Respondent, at a later date, informed Bennett
that he would be sorry for joining in the grievence with Bopp and would
be sued for having done so. On March 12, 1976, the Respondent filed,
pro sé, a suit against Bopp and Bennett in the United States District
Court asserting that the defendants violated the Respondent’s civil
rights by filing a grievance for the purpose of maliciously chilling the
Respondent's first amendment rights to expose atrocities at the Boys
School. This cause was dismissed on November 380, 1976, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; an attempted appeal was dismissed because
Respondent failed to tender the fifty dollar filing fee.

220 —

During the time of the hearing of this disciplinary action, Respond-
ent, by chance, met Bopp at an Indianapolis restaurant. Respondent
told Bopp that another lawsuit was being planned and whether or not
Bopp would be named as a party defendant would depend on Bopp’s
testimony in this disciplinary proceeding.

Seth Lewis was the prosecutor on a drug charge filed against Arthur
D. Anderson, a client of Respondent’s. On the day Anderson surren-
dered on this charge, Respondent told Lewis that everyone in this case
would be sued in Federal Court and that Lewis was “going to pay for
this.” Before any verdict was known, Lewis, by written correspondence,
advised the Disciplinary Commission that he intended to file a com-
plaint against the Respondent for alleged misconduct in the course of
the trial of this drug charge. Anderson was acquitted on February 17,
1976. Lewis was named a party defendant along with Bopp and Ben-
nett in the suit filed on March 12, 1976. The allegation against Lewis
was terminated in the same manner as the charges against the other
defendants.

Respondent filed, pro se, in Federal District Court a class action suit
against the Attorney General of Indiana, the Supreme Court Disciplin-
ary Commission, and the members of the Commission on September
8, 1976. Respondent attempted to establish a conspiracy among the
defendants to violate the civil rights of the Respondent and other at-
torneys who represent clients in suits challenging government action.
This lawsuit was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdicition and
the dismissal was affirmed by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals.

As noted above, James W. Bradford filed a grievance against the
Respondent on August 4, 1977. The grievance clearly was filed in good
faith. On September 16, 1977, Respondent sued Bradford in the Marion
Circuit Court asserting malicious abuse of the disciplinary process and
libel. Respondent sought $75,000 in compensatory damages and
$1,000,000 in punitive damages. This complaint eventually was dis-
missed by the trial court and such decision is now final.

On April 5, 1979, the Respondent filed, on behalf of Arthur D. Ander-
son, a lawsuit against the Honorable Paul H. Buchanan, Jr., in the
United States District Court. The complaint in this disciplinary pro-

Le 221
Cd

ceeding was filed on March 12, 1979. The lawsuit purported to state
a claim against Judge Buchanan for participating in the per curiam
decision dismissing Anderson’s appeal of his Boys School employment.
termination. The suit against Judge Buchanan was dismissed on the
ground of judicial immunity.

Each and every one of the above described lawsuits was filed or pros-
ecuted by the Respondent against individuals who had either filed
grievances with the Commission against the Respondent, or who had
evidenced an intent to file a grievance, or who had participated (by
virtue of their office or appointed position) in the administrative handl-
ing of grievances filed against the Respondent. This evidence convinces
us that the above described lawsuits were designed, intended, filed
and prosecuted by the Respondent to harass, intimidate, impede, and
discourage the aforementioned parties from pursuing, administering
and processing grievances against the Respondent under the disciplin-
ary process provided by Rule A.D. 23. It appears that the Respondent
tends to view the threat of, and the filing of, a lawsuit as a club or
weapon with which to subdue those who would file or prosecute griev-
ances against him. The record in this disciplinary hearing is literally
replete with the Respondent’s threats that he yet intends to sue those
that have administered and prosecuted this proceeding in the event
the outcome of this cause is not to his liking.

Respondent and Amicus argue that the Respondent’s conduct found
in this cause involved the legitimate exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights. More specifically, Respondent and Amicus assert that
Respondent's involvement with the Disciplinary Commissioa’s members
and staff was constitutionally protected free speech under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the filing of lawsuits
by Respondent was the legitimate exercise of his right to petition the
government for the redress of grievances as protected under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
12 of the Indiana Constitution.

In the course of their presentations to this Court, Respondent and
Amicus argue that an individual does not relinquish his rights to peti-
tion the government to seek redress through the courts, or to oppose

222 ee
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the practices of governmental agencies when admitted to the Bar of
this State. This Court agrees with these propositions; however, we
also recognize that such statements are not absolute in nature, but
merely expressions of concerns which must be measured in the con-
text of competing social values. Our disagreement with Respondent
and Amicus begins when an attempt is made to mold these proposi-
tions into meaningful standards and apply them to the facts present
in this case.

This Court in the past has not addressed, specifically, the constitu-
tional tension between the First Amendment and the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. Upon reflection of this question, it is our belief
that a generalized test cannot be drawn. Each prohibition, circum-
scribed by the factual setting present in a particular cause, must be
examined in light of the affected State interest and measured against
the limitation placed on the freedom of expression.

This appears to be the approach which has been taken when weighing
First Amendment consideration against solicitation limitations. The
United States Supreme Court has held that a state cannot discipline
an attorney for solicitation when such conduct was part of the associa-
tional activities of the NAACP or ACLU. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963),
871 U.S. 415, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 83 S. Ct. 328; In re Primus (1978), 436
US. 412, 56 L.Ed.2d 417, 98 S. Ct. 1893. On the other hand, a lower
standard of judicial scrutiny has been applied to one-on-one solicita-
tion and prohibitions of this nature have been found not to be violative
of the First Amendment. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association (1978),
436 U.S. 447, 56 L.Hd.2d 444, 98 S. Ct. 1912. Similar analyses have been
employed relative to other attorney disciplinary rules competing with
the First Amendment. See, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977), 483
U.S. 350, 53 L.Ed.2d 810, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (Attorney Advertising);
Hirschkop v. The Virginia State Bar (1976, DC Va), 421 F. Supp. 1137
(Commenting on Litigation); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer (1975,
7th Cir.), 522 F.2d 242 (Commenting on Litigation).

In the present case, ironically, the Respondent asserts First Amend-
ment protection when the facts belie an understanding of the legal pro-
fession’s obligation to preserve rights of this nature through the orderly
processes of litigation. Respondent attempted to influence public of-

Le 223
PC

ficials by threatening and then introducing factors thought to produce
personal hardships on the part of these public officials. The record in
this case demonstrates that the Respondent threatened, made, and
published critical comments about the Disciplinary Commission, its per-
sonnel and its policy, for the purpose of obtaining the discharge of pro-
ceedings against him. In his correspondence the Respondent stated,
“You are a lying bastard and I am going to get you” and “This letter
(containing a derogatory personal attack on the Executive Secretary
of the Disciplinary Commission) will be sent to 1,000 selected lawyers
on Monday if all grievances against me aren’t dropped .... Buchanan
is next.” The Respondent called the Disciplinary Commission and indi-
cated that he was giving them “an extra day.” Unfortunately, the
specter of physical intimidation is present also in this case. Respond-
ent’s demeanor in his unscheduled visits to the offices of the Disciplin-
ary Commission and Judge Buchanan contains unseemly physical
undertones.

The evidence in this case also demonstrates that Respondent engaged
in a pattern of litigation directed toward intimidating and influencing
public officials and adverse witnesses. He attempted to use the lawsuit
as a weapon against those who administered and prosecuted grievances
against him. His motivation is evident from the fact that he directed
this litigation at the individuals involved in the grievance process, only
tangentially attacking the merits of the issues to be determined through
this process. The Respondent wanted to punish the persons who filed
grievances, and intimidate the persons who administered the process.

It is the Constitutional duty of this Court, on behalf of sovereign
interests, to preserve, manage, and safeguard the adjudicatory system
of this State. The adjudicatory process cannot function when its of-
ficers misconstrue the purpose of litigation. The Respondent attempted
to influence this process through the use of threats and intimidation
against the participants involved. This type of conduct must be enjoined
to preserve the integrity of the system. Additionally, the adjudicatory
process, including disciplinary proceedings, must permit the orderly
resolution of issues; Respondent's conduct impeded the order of this
process.

In view of the above considerations, this Court concludes that the

224 ee
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acts of Respondent, as found by this Court under the complaint filed
in this cause, are not protected speech or expression under
Hs the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
and that the imposition of a sanction under these circum-
stances will not constitute an impermissible infringement of Respond-
ent’s right to petition the government for redress under the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I,
Section 12 of the Constitution of Indiana. Accordingly, this Court now
finds under all three counts of the complaint filed in this cause, that
the Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice which adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law in viola-
tion of Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(1), (5), and (6) of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. This Court further finds, under Count III of the
complaint filed in this cause, that the Respondent took action on behalf
of clients when it was obvious that such action would serve merely
to harass or maliciously injure another in violation of Disciplinary Rule
T-LO2ANL).

This Court must now determine an appropriate sanction to be im-
posed. We note at the outset that Respondent has previously been dis-
ciplined. In re Friedland (1978), 268 Ind. 536, 376 N.E.2d 1126.

Hsin that prior action, we found that the Respondent engaged

in undignified and discourteous conduct degrading to a tri-

bunal. The misconduct found in the prior proceeding together with the
misconduct present in this cause establishes a pattern indicative of
a serious behavioral flaw. Respondent does not appear to understand
the responsibilities of attorneys admitted to practice in this State. There
are limits which have been drawn to guarantee the effective administra-
tion of justice. The acts of Respondent demonstrate that he fails to
acknowledge even the existence of ethical limitation. Under these cir-
cumstances this Court now finds that the strongest form of discipline
should be imposed to preserve the integrity of the legal profession and
to insure the effective administration of justice. It is therefore ordered
that by reason of the misconduct found in this cause the Respondent
be, and he hereby is, disbarred as an attorney in the State of Indiana.

Costs of these proceedings are assessed against the Respondent.

NotE—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 433.

225

In THE MATTER OF GEORGE A. PURVIS.

[No. 280845. Filed February 12, 1981.]

Respondent neither appeared pro se nor sought representation by
counsel.

Thomas Opsut, of Indianapolis, for the Indiana Supreme Court
Disciplinary Commission.

PER CuRIAM—In this disciplinary proceeding, the Respondent, George
A. Purvis, is charged with violating the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility by neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, by failing to
seek the lawful objectives of his client and by failing to carry out a
contract of employment entered into with his client. He is further
charged with prejudicing his client and misrepresenting the status of
her case.

Pursuant to the provisions of Admission and Discipline Rule 28, a
hearing was conducted and the Hearing Officer has submitted his find-
ings and conclusions to this Court. Neither party has petitioned for
review.

The record discloses that the Supreme Court Disciplinary Commis-
sion filed a verified complaint on March 7, 1980, and served Respondent.
Respondent was provided notice, by certified mailings, of a pre-hearing
conference and the hearing itself. The Respondent failed to appear
either in person or by attorney throughout the proceeding.

Having examined all matters submitted in this cause, this Court now
adopts and accepts as its own the Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law reported by the Hearing Officer. These findings establish that
the Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the State of Indiana on
December 4, 1952. In September, 1977, the Respondent was retained
by one Hollis Laverne Fitch for the purpose of filing a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy on her behalf. Fitch provided the Respondent with
all the information necessary to file the bankruptcy including a list
of her creditors. The Respondent quoted Fitch a total fee of $302.00
for filing the Bankruptcy, and Fitch paid the entire $302.00 fee in
September of 1977.

After retaining the Respondent, Fitch continued to receive calls from
her creditors seeking payment of certain debts. One such creditor was
Associates Financial Services. Fitch, thereafter, contacted the Respond-
ent concerning the calls from the creditors. The Respondent advised
Fitch that he had taken care of it, which Fitch believed meant that
he had filed her bankruptcy. In April of 1978, some seven (7) months
after Fitch had retained the Respondent, Associates Financial Services
sued Fitch in Marion County Municipal Court on a debt that should
have been scheduled in Fitch's bankruptcy. Fitch attempted without
success to contact the Respondent through his answering service and
his residence phone concerning the bankruptcy and the lawsuit filed
by Associates.

The Respondent never filed a bankruptcy for Fitch and performed
no services for the $302.00 fee he received.

In October of 1978, after discovering that the Respondent had not
filed her bankruptcy, and being unable to contact the Respondent, Fitch
retained another attorney to file a bankruptcy on her behalf to whom
she paid another fee of $300.00.

The Respondent has not returned any portion of the fee paid to him
by Fitch for filing the bankruptcy.

The foregoing findings clearly establish that Respondent’s actions
in this matter were violative of Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3), in that
he neglected his client’s legal matter entrusted to him. He violated
Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(1), in that he failed to seek the lawful objec-
tives of his client and violated Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(2) by failing
to carry out his contract of employment with Fitch. Respondent’s con-

L | 227
Cd

duct prejudiced and damaged his client in violation of Disciplinary Rule
7-101(A)(3) and involved misrepresentation, in violation of Disciplinary
Rule 1-102(A)(4). All such Disciplinary Rules are set forth in the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

This misconduct is a negative reflection not only on Respondent’s
professional status, but on the entire legal profession. Respondent
betrayed the essence of the attorney-client relationship, the trust which
a client places in his attorney.

Under the facts established in this case, and in light of the foregoing
considerations, we find that a period of suspension from the practice
of law is warranted. Accordingly, it is ordered, that the Respondent
be, and hereby is, suspended from the practice of law in the State of
Indiana for a period of not less than two years, beginning March 16,
1981.

It is further ordered that the costs of these proceedings be assessed
against the Respondent and that the payment of these costs are a con-
dition to reinstatement. Should Respondent seek reinstatement to the
practice of law in this State, restitution of unearned fees from Respond-

ent’s client, Hollis Laverne Fitch, shall also be a condition to such
reinstatement.

All Justices Concur.

Notge—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 439.

Roy MILTON BROWN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 10798288. Filed February 20, 1981,]

I<

28

Merle B. Rose, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.—This is a direct appeal from a conviction for confinement,
Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3, and criminal deviate conduct, Ind. Code § 35-4-4-2(b).
Trial resulted in conviction on both charges. Appellant was sentenced
to ten years’ imprisonment on the first charge, and thirty years’ im-
prisonment on the second charge, the sentences to be served concur-
rently.

Appellant seeks a reversal and a new trial based on four issues. The
evidence most favorable to the State reveals that late in the night of

P| 229
Es

August 29, 1978, appellant approached L.D., put a knife to her neck,
told her he would kill her if she screamed, and ordered her to get into
her car. Continuing to brandish the knife appellant ordered L.D. to
remove her clothes, committed sexual acts upon her and forced her
to commit oral sodomy on him. When another car approached his, appel-
lant began choking L.D., ordering her to stay down. When L.D. tried
to escape, appellant again pulled the knife and threatened to kill her.
They struggled over the knife, appellant bit L.D. on the leg, threw
her out of the car, and drove off.

L

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in two
respects.

First, he argues that there was no specific evidence proving the time
of the commission of the crime, citing the conflict between the date
set out in the information— August 29, 1978—and the date referred
to by the prosecutor during trial— August 30, 1978. Claiming that the
prosecutrix never pin-pointed the date of the crime, appellant argues
that the time of the crime should not be assumed to be that set out
in the information.

In failing to establish the date, the State has failed to sustain its
burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
appellant claims.

L.D. testified that she was abducted between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30
p.m. on August 29, 1978, and that she was thrown out of the car about
one hour later. Any conflict as to the date of the crime relates to its
having continued from August 29 to August 30.

Second, appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient on the
issue of identity because he has a severe stutter and L.D. noticed no
speech defect in her attacker. There was evidence by defense witnesses
that appellant could not utter a simple phrase without stuttering, and
the transcript of appellant’s trial testimony shows that he stuttered
constantly except when he was required to answer with a simple “yes”
or “no”.

230 |

The jury also heard witnesses who testified that appellant did not

stutter, or stuttered only under stress. There was evidence from-which

the jury could have concluded that the appellant did not

HB salways stutter. Taken with other evidence on the issue of iden-

tity, this evidence could have led the jury to conclude that
appellant committed the acts charged.

The evidence was not insufficient on either basis presented.
IL.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in excluding evidence
of a similar crime, committed while he was in jail, which tended to
prove that someone else had committed the crime charged.

Proof of separate and distinct crimes not charged are generally in-
admissible, but may become admissible if relevant to prove intent,
motive, purpose, identity, or common plan or scheme. Bruce v. State,
(1978) 268 Ind. 180, 375 N.E.2d 1042. Since identity was an issue here,
appellant argues that evidence of the other crime was admissible to
disprove the element of identity. The similar modus operandi of the
two crimes tended to prove, appellant also claims, that the unknown
perpetrator of the other crime committed the crime with which appel-
lant was charged. The State argues that the two crimes were so dis-
similar that the rule on admissibility did not apply.

The rule governing the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's
other crimes to prove the commission of a crime for which he is being
tried insures the relevance and the minimization of prejudice of such
evidence. Here the possibility of prejudice to the accused is not pres-
ent, and therefore reliance on this rule is misplaced. We are concerned
here only with the lega) relevance of evidence of crimes committed
by others, offered to disprove the element of identity in the crime
charged.

“Tt is generally held that the evidence to establish that someone
else, and not accused, is the guilty party must be such evidence
as is relevant on the trial of the accused person, and that the
evidence offered by accused as to the commission of the crime
by another person must be limited to such facts as are inconsis-
tent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable

[| 231

inference or presumption as to his own innocence.

The evidence, to be admissible, must be such proof as directly
connects the other person with the corpus delicti, and tends clearly
to point out someone besides accused as the guilty person. Discon-
nected and remote acts, outside the crime itself cannot be separ-
ately proved for such purpose; and evidence which can have no
other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise
a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by
another, is not admissible.” 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 622 (1961).
In Fortson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 161, 379 N.B.2d 147, a defendant

attempted to introduce evidence showing that two others may have

committed the crime of which he was accused based on their

i | previous joint criminal activity. This Court held that the trial

court properly refused to admit this evidence because it was
irrelevant. We said:

“A defendant may, of course, establish his innocence by show-

ing that some other person .. . committed the crime charged... .

But the mere possibility that some third person did the act is not

enough. Evidence tending to incriminate another must be compe-

tent and confined to substantive facts which create more than a

mere suspicion that such other person committed the particular

offense in question.” 269 Ind. at 171, 379 N.E.2d at 153.

In this case, the proffered evidence in no way directly connected
the unknown perpetrator with the corpus delicti of the offense charged.
It did no more than raise a bare suspicion that some other person may
have committed the crime of which appellant was accused. The evidence
was properly excludable as irrelevant.

Ul.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in refusing appellant’s
tendered instructions and in giving an instruction over appellant’s
objection.

The first claim is based on the following tendered instructions:

“Defendant’s Tendered Instruction No. 1

To this charge the defendant has entered a plea of NOT
GUILTY, and the burden is upon the State of Indiana to prove

to each juror beyond a reasonable doubt every material allega-
tion of the crime(s) charged, or of any offense which is included
within the crime(s) charged, before there may be a conviction. The
following may be included under the crime(s) charged: Count I—
Battery, Recklessness, Attempted Confinement.

The definitions and material elements of all crime(s) charged
and included will be stated in other instructions.

Defendant’s Tendered Instruction No. 2

To this charge the defendant has entered a plea of NOT
GUILTY, and the burden is upon the State of Indiana to prove
to each juror beyond a reasonable doubt every material allega-
tion of the crime(s) charged, or of any offense which is included
within the crime(s) charged, before there may be a conviction. The
following may be included under the crime(s) charged: Count
II— Attempted Criminal Deviate Conduct, Battery and Reckless-
ness.

The definitions and material elements of all crime(s) charged
and included will be stated in other instructions.

Defendant’s Tendered Instruction No. 8

A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs
an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
person commits criminal recklessness, a Class B Misdemeanor.
However, the offense is a Class A Misdemeanor if the conduct
includes the use of a vehicle or deadly weapon.

Defendant’s Tendered Instruction No. 4

A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another per-
son in arude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class
B Misdemeanor. However, the offense is:

(1) A Class A Misdemeanor if it results in bodily injury to any
other person, or if it is committed against a law enforcement of-
ficer or against a person summoned and directed by the officer
while the officer is engaged in the execution of his official duty;

(2) A Class D Felony if it results in bodily injury to such an
officer or person summoned and directed; and

(3) A Class C Felony if it results in serious bodily injury to
any other person or if it is committed by means of a deadly weapon.

Defendant’s Tendered Instruction No. 5

While the prosecution has examined each witness first, you
should give careful consideration to the cross-examination con-
ducted by the Defendant and such evidence adduced on cross-
examination is entitled to equal consideration to that testimony
and evidence of the prosecution upon direct examination.”
Appellant’s argument on this issue centers on a claim that the rule

in Minton v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 39, 378 N.E.2d 639, is in conflict with
Art. I, § 19, of the Indiana Constitution which provides that
Hs the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the
facts in criminal cases. In Minton, this Court held that instruc
tions regarding lesser included offenses need not be given in a case
in which the evidence showed that a rape and robbery had been com-
mitted and the defendant did not challenge the existence of the elements
of either crime but challenged identity only. This rule is applicable
here, since defendant did not challenge the existence of elements of
the crimes charged, offered no evidence that he committed such lesser
included offenses, and steadfastly maintained that he was in no way
involved in the attack. The rule did not prevent the jury from finding
whether the lesser offenses had been committed since there was no
evidence to support such a finding.

Concerning Instruction No. 5, we are presented with no argument
as to the impropriety of the trial court’s refusal to give this instruc-
tion. This part of the issue is not before us. Ind. R. App. P. 8.3(A).

The second part of this claim is based on the trial court’s giving of
the following instruction over appellant’s objection:

“INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7

You are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony. You should attempt to
believe a witness if it can reasonably be done. You should not
disbelieve a witness without due consideration and without just
cause.

If you find a conflict in the testimony of witnesses, then you
may decide which you do believe and which you do not believe.
In determining credibility you may take irito consideration the
following:

1. The bias or prejudice of any witness, or the interest that

234 |
Ee

any witness may have in the outcome of this trial.

2. The manner, memory and conduct of the witness upon
the witness stand.

Whether the testimony sounds probable or not probable.

Whether the witness has the ability to know the things
about which he or she has testified.

5. The relationship of the witness, if any, to the accused,

or to any other person who may have an interest in the
outcome of the trial.

You also may consider any other proper matter which may assist
you in arriving at the truthfulness of any witness who testifies.”
Appellant argues that such an instruction impermissibly tells the

jury to give less weight to the testimony of witnesses who are related

to the defendant, citing McNulty v. State, (1907) 40 Ind.App.

Hs 113, 81 N.E. 109. That case recognized that courts cannot in-

struct the jury as to what the evidence proves or tends to

prove, or as to the weight that should be given to evidence. The in-

struction challenged here does not tell the jury to give less weight

to testimony of witnesses related to the defendant, but merely instructs

the jury that it may, in determining credibility, consider the relation-
ship of witnesses to the accused.

We have said that “instructions as to credibility of witnesses should
be general in nature and apply equally to all witnesses both for the
State and the defense.” Evans v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 148,
300 N.E.2d 882, 886. Since the instruction does provide for
consideration of “bias or prejudice of any witness,” we can-
not say that the instruction was given in error. Moreover, we have
held that an instruction that the jury might consider the relationship
of witnesses to the defendant in determining the weight to be given
to their testimony is not erroneous. Keesier v. State, (1900) 154 Ind.
242, 56 N.E. 232; Morgan v. State, (1921) 190 Ind. 411, 180 N.E. 528.
There was no error in the refusing or giving of instructions.

Iv.

Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not granting

Le 235
po

his motion to strike an objection to the State’s notice of deposition,
and in granting the State’s motion for continuance.

The State filed a Notice of Deposition six days before the trial was
scheduled to begin. When the witnesses to be deposed failed to appear,
the State moved for, and was granted, a continuance to June 14, 1979.
Ultimately, the trial began without the depositions having been taken.

Appellant claims that the deposition request was a sham and that
the granting of a continuance based on such a sham requires reversal,
apparently because of the denial of a speedy trial. There is no support
for the assertion that the continuance was a sham, and indeed the record
discloses that the motion for continuance was necessitated in part by
defendant’s failure to supply the State with the information necessary
to find the witnesses.

The continuance was for about three weeks. Appellant has not shown
that any prejudice resulted from this delay. These rulings were not
erroneous. See Stewart v. State, (1976) 170 Ind.App. 696, 354

HE N£E2d 749.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NoTE—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 828.

RAY BEGLEY v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 7808196. Filed February 20, 1981.]

2:

o
rod

Walter E. Braward, Jr., of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Michael Gene Worden, Assis-
tant Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, Ray Begley, was convicted by a jury of
voluntary manslaughter, a class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (Burns
1979 Repl.), and was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. His direct
appeal raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court’s exclusion of certain testimony about
the victim’s reputation was reversible error;

2. Whether the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on self-

Le 237 .
po

defense was reversible error;

8. Whether the verdict was supported by substantial evidence; and

4, Whether defendant’s right to an impartial jury trial was denied
when he was tried by members of a regular jury panel who had already
sat on numerous cases.

A summary of the facts most favorable to the state shows that the
victim, Richard Terry, was killed with a shotgun in the afternoon of
October 28, 1979. Defendant and Terry had a fist fight earlier that after-
noon in the backyard of a friend’s home. After defendant had been
severely beaten and knocked to the ground, he said to Terry, “I’m going
to kill you.” Defendant returned with a gun in a short time and found
Terry and some friends sitting on the front porch. Terry jumped up
on the ledge of the porch when he saw defendant. Then defendant shot
Terry once in the abdomen.

Defendant testified that he was afraid of Terry and that he expected
Terry to run as soon as he saw the gun. He said he only intended to
scare Terry and did not remember firing the gun. Other witnesses
testified that Terry’s reputation for violence was “very bad.”

L

Defendant first contends that the exclusion of certain testimony about
the victim's reputation was reversible error. First, he argues that the
court erred by excluding testimony from witnesses concerning specific
acts of violence inflicted upon them by the victim. The.witnesses were
allowed to testify about the general reputation of the victim but not
about specific acts of misconduct. The trial court ruled that the defense
had not put on any evidence of self-defense and therefore such testimony
was irrelevant and inadmissible. Defendant now argues that there was
evidence of self-defense presented and that the testimony should not
have been excluded.

It is well settled in Indiana that as a general rule the character of
the deceased is not an issue in a trial for homicide, and evidence to
show his general reputation as a dangerous and violent man

Hl__ is inadmissible. An exception to the general rule is the exist-
ence of the issue of self-defense. Teague v. State, (1978) 269

Ind. 103, 879 N.E.2d 418; Madison v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 353, 269 N.E.2d

238 ee
PF
164, However, there should be appreciable evidence of the deceased's

aggression substantiating the self-defense issue before such testimony
is relevant and admissible. Teague v. State, supra.

In the instant case, the witnesses to the killing offered no evidence
in support of a self-defense theory. One witness testified that defend-
ant had threatened to kill the victim after the fist fight earlier in the
afternoon. Defendant himself testified that his intention was to “scare”
the victim. He testified that he thought the victim would run when
he saw the gun and that he planned to shoot up in the air over the
victim's head. He did not testify that he shot in self-defense, but rather
that he didn’t intend to kill anyone and didn’t remember pointing the
gun or pulling the trigger. Defendant said that he was afraid of the
victim because of his bad reputation for violence. He knew he would
have to do something or the fights would keep happening again.

Defendant now argues that the fact that the victim jumped up on
the ledge of the porch was evidence which would support his theory
of self-defense. However, there is no other evidence in the record to
support this theory. There is no evidence that the victim was armed
in any way. Defendant’s own testimony as well as the other evidence
supports the conclusion that defendant had the gun in order to scare
the victim, not to protect himself.

After defendant had testified, the trial court agreed to allow fur-
ther testimony as to the general character of the victim since the state
had not objected to defendant’s testimony about his character. How-
ever, the court would not allow testimony of specific acts of miscon-
duct of the victim, as there was no evidence of self-defense which would
support such testimony. We find no error in the trial court’s refusal
of this testimony as we agree that under the facts shown by the record
there was not sufficient evidence of self-defense presented to support
such testimony. Teague v. State, supra.

Defendant further alleges that the trial court erroneously refused
to permit a state’s witness to be cross-examined as to the victim’s
reputation for violence. We find no error here since this witness
testified before the defendant had testified about the victim’s character,
and as discussed above there was no basis for the admission of reputa-

Le 239
po

tion evidence at that time.

Defendant also alleges that it was error for the court to refuse to

allow this witness to testify about the reason a certain van was parked

at the rear of the property where the shooting occurred. The

Hs court found that this testimony would be irrelevant and

therefore denied it. Rulings of a trial court on the relevancy

of evidence are accorded wide latitude. Brames v. State, (1980) 278 Ind.

565, 406 N.E.2d 252; Williams v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 578, 387 N.E.2d

1817. Since there was no foundation establishing any connection of the

van with the instant crime, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in its ruling.

I.

Defendant next contends that it was reversible error for the trial
court to refuse to give the jury an instruction on self-defense. This
argument must fail for two reasons. First, defendant did not
H__stender any written instruction on self-defense. It is well settled
that failure to tender an instruction in writing waives the
error, if any, of not giving the requested instruction. Miller v. State,
(1978) 267 Ind. 635, 372 N.E.2d 1168; Short v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 459,
237 N.E.2d 258.

Furthermore, as discussed under Issue I, above, there was no
evidence in the record to support the theory of self-defense. It is error
for the trial court to instruct the jury upon principles of law
not applicable to the evidence and not involved in the case.
McDonald v. State, (1975) 264 Ind. 477, 346 N.E.2d 569. We

find no error here.

Ii.

Defendant next contends that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury’s verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. We have
consistently held that this Court does not reweigh the evidence or judge
the credibility of witnesses and will consider only that evidence most
favorable to the state and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.
When there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each
element of the offense, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed.

240 ee

Wofford v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 518, 394 N.B.2d 100; Poindexter v. State,
(1978) 268 Ind. 167, 374 N.E.2d 509.

In this case, the defendant was charged with murder. The evidence

shows that defendant threatened to kill the victim after defendant had

been beaten up in a fist fight. On this same afternoon, defend-

HB sant got a shotgun and returned to the house where the vic-

tim was sitting on the porch. Defendant fired the gun into

the victim’s chest from a distance of two or three feet. Although defend-

ant testified that he was afraid of the victim, there was no other

evidence to support a theory that defendant had to shoot the victim

in self-defense. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s ver-
dict that defendant killed the victim knowingly and intentionally.

Since both murder and voluntary manslaughter can be proved by

evidence of the knowing or intentional killing of another human being,

the rule is well established that the jury has the right to find

HM defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser in-

cluded offense. Hardin v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 459, 404 N.E.2d

1854. State of mind may be established by the circumstances surround-

ing the killing and the method of killing. Blood v. State, (1980) 272 Ind.

417, 398 N.E.2d 671. There was sufficient evidence in this case to sup-
port the conviction of voluntary manslaughter.

Iv.

Defendant finally contends that his right to an impartial jury trial
was denied when he was tried by members of a regular jury panel
who had already sat on numerous cases. He argues that an accused
would have a superior chance of acquittal with a “virgin” jury rather
than with jurors selected from the regular jury panel who had served
on other cases. However, defendant made no objection to the panel
of jurors at his trial and does not cite any authority in support of his
theory.

A similar argument was refused by this Court in Brown v. State,
(1977) 266 Ind. 82, 860 N.E.2d 830, where we said:

“When a juror is summoned to present himself for jury duty, it
is expected that he or she may serve on a jury in more than one
case during his or her term of service. ... The prior jury service

[| 241

of the jurors in this case would not, by itself, disqualify them from
service in this case.” Id. at 89.
Since defendant made no objection to the panel of jurors at the time
of his trial and now offers no evidence other than an unsupported opin-
ion that the panel was biased or prejudiced, we find no error
HH _shere. We do not find any “blatant” or fundamental error which
would deny defendant his due process rights and require us
to go against the well established rule that a matter cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. Webb v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 101, 284 N.E.2d
812.

For all of the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotTE—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 824.

TED SHANKS AND ROGER SHANKS, NATURAL GUARDIAN OF
TED SHANKS v, A.F.E. INDUSTRIES, INC.

{No. 281847. Filed February 28, 1981. Rehearing denied April 28, 1981.]

Thomas N. Mote, G. Terrence Coriden, Lawson, Pushor, Mote & Cor-
iden, of Columbus, for appellant.

William G. Moore, Steckbeck, Moore & Cohen, of Indianapolis, Sharp-
nack, Bigley, David & Rumple, of Columbus, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— This cause comes to us on appellee’s petition to transfer
from the First District Court of Appeals. At the close of plaintiff Shanks’
evidence at trial, the trial court entered judgment on the evidence for
defendant-appellees A.F.E. Industries, Inc. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered a new trial, finding that the ques-
tion of the feasibility of safety devices that would warn users or
bystanders that an elevator leg was about to be activated was of suffi-
cient probative value for the trier of fact to determine the ultimate
question of whether the product was defective and unreasonably
dangerous. Shanks v, A.F.E. Industries, Inc., (1980) Ind.App., 403 N.E.2d
849. We find that the trial court properly entered judgment on the

[| 243
—

evidence; accordingly we grant transfer and vacate the opinion of the
Court of Appeals.

The facts and circumstances of this cause were well enumerated in
the Court of Appeals opinion, and we adopt that portion of the opinion
and incorporate it herein as follows:

“Plaintiffappellant Ted Shanks appeals a judgment on the
evidence for defendant-appellee A.F.E. Industries, Inc. (A.F.E.),
entered at the close of the plaintiff's evidence by the Bartholomew
Circuit Court.

Two issues are raised for our review:

I. Whether the judgment is contrary to the law and the
evidence; and

Il. Whether the trial court erroneously excluded certain ex-
hibits and testimony.

In the fall of 1973, Ted Shanks was enrolled in a high school
agricultural cooperative program, a part of which consisted of
employment at Grammer Elevator, Inc. (Grammer), a commercial
feed mill and grain elevator. He was repairing an elevator leg
which was connected to an automatic grain dryer manufactured
by A.F.E. when the elevator leg began to move, severely and per-
manently injuring his left leg.

Plaintiff filed suit against A.F.E. for the personal injuries suf-
fered by him under the theories of breach of implied warranty
and strict liability in tort under § 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts (1965). The trial court granted A.F.E.’s motion for
judgment on the evidence at the close of the plaintiff's evidence
under Ind. Rule of Procedure, Trial Rule 50(A)(1) and entered judg-
ment for A.F.E. Although plaintiff raised allegations of error
relating to the theory of breach of implied warranty in his motion
to correct errors, he has not argued these allegations on appeal
and has waived them under Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate
Rule 8.3(A)(7).

The rule in Indiana with respect to a motion for judgment on
the evidence pursuant to T.R. 50 is that such motion may properly
be granted only if there is no substantial evidence or rea-

I sonable inferences derived therefrom supporting an essen-
tial element of the claim, a complete failure of proof, and

244 ee
—

that in considering such motion, the trial court must consider only
the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable
to the non-moving party. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman,
(1979) 180 Ind.App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541; Gregory v. White Truck
& Equipment Co., Inc., (1975) 163 Ind.App. 240, 323 N.E.2d 280.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A has been expressly
adopted as the law of Indiana, and is as follows:

‘() One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it was
sold.

(2) The rule stated in the Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
form or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.’

A prima facie case is established by evidence of 1) a purchase
2) from a seller engaged in the business of selling such a product
8) of a defective product 4) and the product reached the
Heuser or consumer without substantial change in its condi-
tion and 5) the product caused physical harm to the user
or consumer because of the defect. Ayr-Way Stores, Inc., v. Chit-
wood, (1973) 261 Ind. 86, 300 N.E.2d 335; Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., supra.
FACTS

A proper understanding of the case requires a lengthy recital
of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. We consider only that
evidence which was most favorable to the plaintiff. Grammer, a
firm engaged in the business of buying grain from farmers and
reselling it on the market, purchased the grain dryer in question
in 1967. Charles Whittington, part owner and manager of Gram-
mer, purchased the dryer from A.F.E. through a distributor in
Michigan. Whittington went to Zurich, Illinois, with his own truck,
and transported the dryer to Grammer. It was accompanied by

[| 245

an owner's manual. The dryer had a capability which was stated
in the manual to function manually or automatically in conjunc-
tion with other auxiliary equipment, which auxiliary equipment
could assume a variety of forms and functions, depending upon
the desires of the owner. The dryer was at first used manually
at an old elevator complex.

In 1969, Grammer, through the efforts of Whittington, built an
entirely new grain elevator complex. Whittington wanted an en-
tirely automatic grain drying system that ‘would run by itself as
much as possible.’ Whittington, a Purdue University agricultural
graduate experienced in grain handling and farm operations, ap-
proached four firms and asked them to submit plans and designs
for the desired complex. He selected the plans and design of Barnes
Construction Company (Barnes) and awarded it the contract.
Barnes built the complex, but did not design or install any elec-
trical wiring or electrical equipment. The complex, as built, con-
sisted of a pit into which grain was dumped from the farm trucks,
an elevator leg, several cylindrical metal storage bins, a central
shed, the necessary augers, electric motors, and machinery, and
the A.F.E. dryer which was moved from its prior location to the
new complex.

Grammer, through Whittington, employed the firm of Auto Elec-
tric to design the electrical functions and wire the entire complex.
The entire complex was operated electrically. Auto Electric
created the design, furnished all the electrical equipment in the
complex, and installed such equipment. The end result of the in-
stallation of the electrical fixtures, as relevant here, was the crea-
tion of a central control shed containing all switches, boxes, fuses,
breakers, and controls which operated every piece of machinery
and every electric motor in the complex, including the dryer,
augers, and elevator leg.

The planning and the construction of the complex and the design
and installation of the electrical fixtures were done only after close
consultation with and approval by Whittington. Auto Electric did
no wiring whatsoever internally within the dryer. It merely wired
the dryer into the system in compliance with the recommenda-
tions contained in the manual furnished by A.F.E. by attaching
its wires to terminals on the dryer.

Upon completion, the drying operation worked automatically
in four phases. In the first phase, an auger brought wet grain from
a wet grain storage bin to the top of the dryer and filled it. The
second phase was the drying of the grain. This was accomplished

246 ee
ee

by heat, generated by a fuel-fired heating device in the dryer,
forced by means of fans through and around the grain. The third
phase was the cooling phase during which the grain was cooled
with the aid of fans. The fourth phase was the unload phase. Here
the dried grain was removed from the dryer by means of an auger
in the bottom of the dryer and was, by means of yet another auger,
transported to the base of the elevator leg which was located close
to the dryer. The elevator leg than elevated the grain to a point
high over the complex of bins and dumped it into a pipe which
carried the grain to the selected bin for storage. The four-phase
cycle was then repeated.

The entire operation was automatic. The dryer, inherently and
as designed and manufactured by A.F.E., had a system of switches
and timers on it that would activate, time, and control the four-
phase drying cycle according to predetermined settings. The aux-
iliary equipment, consisting of the storage bins, augers to transport
the dried grain to the elevator leg, and the leg, was not manufac-
tured nor installed by A.F.E. However, the dryer was designed,
manufactured, advertised, and sold with the contemplation and
representation that it could be used in conjunction with such equip-
ment. Such was anticipated by A.F.E. in its owner’s manual. Fur-
ther, the controls installed in the dryer by A.F.E. activated and
governed all phases described above and controlled the auxiliary
equipment. The internal controls of the dryer were wired by means
of its terminals through the central control shed, and the dryer
could be turned off and on from the central control shed.

When the dryer switch in the central control shed was in an
‘off’ position or when the dryer was in a load, dry, or cool cycle,
the elevator leg could be operated independently by means of its
own switch. This was necessary because, in addition to drying,
the elevator leg was used in most functions in the complex where
grain was handled whether the grain was to be dried or not.
However, even when the elevator leg switch was in an ‘off’ posi-
tion and the dryer commenced its unload phase, the dryer, through
its internal automatic control devices which were wired through
our central control shed to the elevator leg, activated the elevator
leg. This was necessary for if the dryer began its unload phase
and the elevator leg did not commence to operate simultaneously,
there would accumulate a glut of grain at the base of the leg with
resulting spillage. The elevator leg consisted of a tall metal hous-
ing inside of which ran an endless revolving chain with buckets
attached to it. The buckets scooped up grain from a pit at the
base of the leg brought to that point by augers, carried the grain

[| 247
ee

to the top of the leg, and dumped it into pipes where it descended
to the selected bin for storage.

Whittington, being instrumental in the design and construction
of the complex, understood its operation thoroughly from the
beginning and, as relevant here, understood that when the elevator
leg switch was in an ‘off’ position, and the dryer was operating,
and the dryer commenced its unload phase, the dryer’s controls
activated the elevator leg automatically.

Plaintiff, a 17-year-old boy, was an employee of Grammer. Whit-
tington explained to him the general operation of the complex in-
cluding the control shed and the switches, but told him to leave
the dryer alone. Plaintiff did not know that the dryer’s operation
would activate the elevator leg automatically even if the elevator
leg switch was in an ‘off’ position.

On this particular day a bucket was loose from the chain in the
elevator leg and plaintiff volunteered to repair it. Whittington
approved with the admonition that plaintiff turn everything off.
It was necessary to rotate the defective bucket to an inspection
door in the housing on the leg by power in order to effect repairs.
This was accomplished by plaintiff's using the separate elevator
leg switch and watching the door, which was the customary way.
The defective bucket passed the inspection door slightly because
of the inertial lag after power was cut by turning off the independ-
ent leg switch, and after turning the switch off, plaintiff attempted
with his leg and the weight of his body to push the chain backward
to place the defective bucket in front of the inspection door, which
technique was also customary. At this point the dryer commenced
its unload phase, thereby automatically activating the elevator
leg, and plaintiff was severely injured.”

Plaintiff Shanks argues that the lack of warning to the user that
the elevator leg was to be automatically activiated during the “unload”
phase of the dryer rendered the dryer unreasonably dangerous within
the contemplation of § 402A. See Ind. Code § 34-4-20A-1 et seg. (Burns
Supp. 1980) (codifying § 402A). In other words, he asserts, there was
a defect in the operation of the dryer because it did not have a safety
device in the form of a bell or light which would indicate that the
elevator was about to activate, and thereby give a worker time to get
out of the way of the moving parts. On the other hand, A.F.E. con-
tends the dryer was not defective. A.F.E. argues that the overall com-
plex, including the elevator leg, was designed and built by other

248 a
ee

manufacturers. The dryer perfectly performed its intended and
designed functions. A.F.E. further asserts there was no hidden danger
because the buyer, Whittington, knew all about the automatic nature
and characteristics of the dryer and, in fact, had the complex built to
utilize this feature and make the operation as automatic as possible.

As the Court of Appeals explained, A.F.E. neither designed nor built
the complex. In addition, both parties acknowledge that the dryer
operated exactly as it was intended to operate by A.F.E. and Whit-
tington. No manufacturing flaw is involved, nor is there a design flaw
involved as to the dryer’s operating characteristics. The automatic
feature of the dryer was contemplated by both the seller and the buyer;
the very purpose of the automatic operation was to move the grain
through the transfer, drying and storage processes without the neces-
sity of an employee monitoring each phase, and thereby facilitate a
more efficient operation of the complex. The system functioned very
well in that regard. As the facts indicate, Shanks’ employer, Gram-
mer, through Whittington, had the complex designed in that manner
and with this feature in mind. Whittington selected the plan and design
of Barnes Construction Company, and awarded the contract to Barnes
to build the complex in the fashion Shanks found it when he was in-
jured. The firm of Auto Electric designed the overall electrical system
and wired the entire complex to suit Whittington’s desires. This in-
eluded wiring the dryer into the overall system. Whittington had ex-
tensive knowledge of these operations and therefore was aware of any
necessity for warning devices to be used at any stage of the operation.
Likewise, had he thought it advisable, he had the opportunity to have
such warning features incorporated into the design and operation of
the overall complex. Grammer, through Whittington, is also the party
responsible for hiring Shanks, instructing him on the operation of this
equipment, and dispatching him on the job he undertook which resulted
in his injuries.

There is no showing here that A.F.E. failed to give adequate warn-
ings of any dangers in the operation of this dryer that proximately

caused the injuries to Shanks. In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.

HE 2. Chapman, (1979) 180 Ind.App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541, the Court

of Appeals held that a defect can be found from a complete

[| 249
Pt

absence of warnings or from inadequate warnings, and that the test
of the adequacy of a warning is whether it was reasonable under the
circumstances. In Burton v. L. O. Smith Foundry Products Co., (7th
Cir. 1976) 529 F.2d 108, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a product may be defective because of manufacturing flaws, defective
design, or failure to supply complete information about the product’s
dangers. In that case, the Court was applying Indiana law in a diversity
jurisdiction case, and addressed itself to a situation similar to the one
we face here. The Court reasoned that the defendant manufacturer
had no control over the work space, the machine or the hiring, instrue-
tion or placement of personnel. Thus, the defendant’s duty to warn
and instruct the ultimate user was satisfied when the manufacturer
adequately warned or instructed those employees of the purchaser who
were responsible for receiving the product. It was the responsibility
of those persons to post warnings and take other precautions relative
to the deceased, who was the ultimate user.

In the case before us, it is apparent that Whittington was not ig-
norant of any of the facts concerning the operations and dangers in-
herent in the functions of the dryer. As the Court of Appeals stated
inits opinion: “He perfectly well knew the characteristics of the dryer,
wanted it that way, ordered it that way, and caused it to be installed
in the new complex to work automatically in conjunction with the leg.
No additional warning or literature that could be furnished to him by
AF-E. at the time of the sale could have improved upon his understand-
ing of the characteristics of the machine.” 403 N.E.2d at 857. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals properly found here that Shanks’ theory concern-
ing the adequacy of instruction and warnings is “untenable.” Id.

The Court of Appeals erred on the issue relating to A.F.E.’s duty
to equip the dryer with warning devices. Because the dryer could be
used as a component in a multifaceted complex such as the one created
here by Whittington, to allow a jury to examine, in retrospect, the
wisdom of A.F.E.’s incorporating some lights or bells into the dryer
is to permit nothing more than speculation. A complex operation such
as this one could have taken many forms, depending on the needs of
the owner and the imagination of the designer. Here, Grammer, through
Whittington, solicited four different plans before finally selecting the

250 ee
ee

one to be used. The need for any warning devices, and the circumstances
surrounding their use, would, of course, depend upon the operation
of the whole complex, based upon the features of its design. Thus,
because the dryer could be incorporated into a variety of grain handl-
ing systems, the desirability or need for such devices could be deter-
mined only after any given type of complex had been chosen and
created. Of course, A.F.E. here had no way of knowing exactly how
Whittington would employ its dryer and, hence, the specific context
in which such warning devices could or should be used relative to the
operation of an elevator leg. By contrast, Grammer, through Whit-
tington, had extensive knowledge of these factors, not only concern-
ing the dryer, but concerning the entire grain handling operation.

In addition, once the design for the entire system was completed
and a decision made by Grammer to incorporate warning devices, it
would further be necessary for any employee using the complex to be
instructed as to what the lights or bells meant. The employee would
have to be told that the flashing of lights or the ringing of bells signalled
the movement of some parts of the system, possibly including the
elevator leg. Fundamentally, that responsibility lay with Grammer,
as the creator of the complex and as Shanks’ employer. Burton v. L.O.
Smith Foundry Products Co., supra. Again, A.F.E. had no knowledge
of or control over these decisions and therefore the instructions or warn-
ings which possibly should have been given to Grammer’s employees.
Thus, further speculation arises as to what A.F.E. should have known
regarding how many lights or bells would be necessary, how large or
bright or loud they should be, and their location, given the several dif-
ferent ways A.F.E.'s dryer might have been put to use in the system.

Finally, this system included an electrical switch that deactivated
the entire complex, including the dryer. In spite of Whittington’s in-
structions to shut everything off, this particular switch was not turned
off; the dryer continued to function until the drying cycle was com-
pleted, and then, as it was supposed to do, automatically activated the
elevator leg on which Shanks was working.

Unquestionably, the facts and evidence supporting Shanks’ theory
reveal the development of a situation which was especially unforesee-

[| 251
ee

able to A.F.E. Cf. Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Corp., (1976)

Hi s171 Ind.App. 418, 357 N.E.2d 788. Since there was no probative

evidence at the close of the plaintiff's case that any defect

existing in A.F.E.’s dryer due to a lack of warning devices in that prod-

uct proximately caused or contributed to cause the injuries to Shanks,

the trial court properly granted A.F.E.’s motion for judgment on the

evidence. Appellee’s petition to transfer is granted, the opinion of the

Court of Appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Givan, C. J., Hunter, and Prentice, JJ., concur.

DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

DEBRULER, J.—The grain drying machine manufactured by defendant-
appellee was designed and constructed so as to operate in conjunction
with auxiliary loading and unloading equipment. In fact, the drying
machine is useless unless operated in tandem with such other equip-
ment, as without it, it would simply dump grain out onto the ground.
The machine is therefore equipped with an electrical control box which
is designed to govern the operation of auxiliary equipment. The machine
and its auxiliary equipment can be operated in either an automatic
or manual mode. The design of the circuitry in this control box is such
that when auxiliary unloading equipment such as the elevator which
came on without warning and cut off the plaintiff's leg is connected
to proscribed terminals on the box, and the drying machine is being
operated in the automatic mode, a signal is sent out to the auxiliary
equipment to start up without also sending out a signal that the machine
is in the automatic mode. Whether the absence of a warning device
of this sort rendered the drying machine defective as unreasonably
dangerous, and whether plaintiff who was operating an auxiliary ele-
vator when it suddenly and unexpectedly started up was within the
class of persons that the defendant manufacturer should have reason-
ably foreseen as being subject to the harm were questions which should
have been submitted to the jury.

I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

252 Dn
a

NotE—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 833.
Le

WILLIAM COWELL v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 6808166. Filed February 23, 1981.]

Harriette Bailey Conn, [Mrs.], Public Defender, Ihor N. Boyko, Deputy
Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

[| 258
a

HUNTER, J.—The petitioner is before this Court appealing from the
denial of his petition for relief under Post-conviction Relief, Rule 1.
He was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by this Court in a
unanimous opinion, Cowell v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 344, 331 N.E.2d 21.
His petition now raises this sole issue:

1. Whether the defendant was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel.

In post-conviction proceedings, the burden of proof rests with the

petitioner to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of

the evidence. Laird v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 328, 385 N.E.2d

HB 452; Davis v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 327, 330 N.E.2d 738. It is

the responsibility of the judge hearing the petition to weigh

the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, and his determina-

tion denying relief will be reversed only where the evidence is without

conflict and leads unerringly to a result other than that reached by

the trial court. Baker v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 304, 403 N.E.2d 1069;
Riner v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 578, 394 N.E.2d 140.

First, defendant contends that his representation was inadequate
due to a conflict of interest on the part of his trial attorney. The evidence
discloses that after defendant’s arrest, his wife contacted a local law
firm and secured counsel for defendant, paying the firm with her own
money. Several days after obtaining legal representation for defend-
ant, she approached this same firm and secured representation for
herself concerning some civil matters and an unrelated criminal charge
against her.

At the time of defendant’s trial, his attorney represented both the
defendant and his wife. The wife and her daughter (defendant's step-
daughter) were subpoenaed by the state and testified as witnesses for
the prosecution. It is undisputed that the firm was also retained by
defendant’s wife for the purpose of protecting her daughter whom the
wife feared might be culpable as an accessory after the fact for trans-
porting and harboring defendant following the murder.

Defendant postulates that there was some sort of a deal between
the state and these witnesses that they would testify in exchange for

254 |

nonprosecution of the respéctive criminal liabilities facing them. Defend-
ant does not expand upon this argument but we assume he means that
whether his trial attorney was actively involved in the alleged “deal”
or not, he was probably aware of it and was therefore restrained in
his cross-examination of these witnesses, not wanting to jeopardize
the chance of favorable treatment for them.

Even assuming that such a deal did exist, there are several problems
with defendant's argument. First, the wife’s testimony as a prosecu-
tion witness did not implicate the defendant in any way. Therefore,
there was nothing on which to cross-examine which might have placed
defendant’s attorney in a position of conflict. Second, and most import-
ant, while the daughter’s testimony did implicate defendant, defendant
at no time denied that he had committed the murder. Rather, having
made a confession to police and admitting his guilt on the stand, his
defense was that of insanity.

On cross-examination, defendant’s attorney elicited from the
daughter that at the time of the offense, she thought defendant was
“sick” and “disturbed.” In addition, although defendant's wife did later
give testimony implicating defendant, it occurred during her role as
a defense witness in which she described defendant's mental instability
consistent with the insanity defense.

We certainly do not dispute case precedent which holds that a defend-
ant is denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
when his trial attorney, without defendant’s knowledge and
Hs consent, concurrently represents a prosecution witness who
gives damaging testimony and whose interests are adverse
to those of a defendant. Stephens v. United States, (5th Cir. 1979) 595
F.2d 1066; Castillo v. Estelle, (5th Cir. 1974) 504 F.2d 1248; United States
ex rel. Williamson v. LaVallee, (E.D.N.Y. 1968) 282 F.Supp. 968; Scott
v. District of Columbia, (D.C. Mun.App. 1953) 99 A.2d 641, aff'd, (1954)
94 U.S. App.D.C. 227, 214 F.2d 860. However, as noted in United States
ex rel. Williamson v. LaVallee, supra:
“The mere fact of dual representation, standing alone, does not
create a Sixth Amendment violation. A conflict of interest must
first be established.” Id. at 974.

[| 255
Po

We agree with the judge presiding at the post-conviction hearing
that there was no conflict of interest under the facts of this case. Defend-
ant admitted at the post-conviction hearing that he had told
Hs his trial attorney he had done the killing and that he had never
proclaimed his innocence to him. Defendant asserted for the
first time at the post-conviction hearing that he did not commit the
murder. There having been no actual or possible conflict at the time
of trial, we are not inclined to view defendant’s previously unrevealed
claim of innocence as grounds for establishing a conflict of interest and
ineffective representation on the part of his attorney. See Martin v.
State, (1974) 262 Ind. 232, 314 N.E.2d 60, cert. denied, (1975) 420 U.S.
911, 95 S.Ct. 833, 42 L.Ed.2d 841.

Next, defendant maintains that his right to effective assistance of
counsel was violated because his trial attorney failed to obtain a
psychiatrist to examine him and present evidence in his favor in time
for trial. He also notes that due to his lawyer’s failure to comply with
statutory requirements, his motion for a continuance, in which more
time was sought in order to secure the services of a particular psychia-
trist, was denied. Cowell v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 344, 331 N.E.2d 21.

The record of the original trial proceedings reveals that defendant’s
trial attorney represented to the court several days before trial that
about a week prior to that, he first learned that several psychiatrists,
who had submitted reports earlier indicating that they thought defend-
ant was insane at the time of the crime, had reversed their opinion.
He stated that attempts had been made to locate other psychiatrists
who would be willing to examine defendant but that these attempts
had been fruitless. In the motion for a continuance, defense counsel
mentioned the name of a particular psychiatrist whom he thought would
agree to examine defendant, but he was currently out of town. The
motion was denied, and trial proceeded without any psychiatric
testimony being offered on behalf of defendant.

Even assuming that defense counsel could have been more diligent
in securing a psychiatric examination for defendant, we are not
prepared to hold that defendant’s representation was so inadequate
as to reduce the trial, taken as a whole, to a mockery of justice. Baker

256 |
a

v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 304, 403 N.E.2d 1069; Huggins v. State, (1980)
273 Ind. 264, 403 N.E.2d 332. This Court has consistently sought to
determine if and how a defense attorney's alleged inadequacies have
harmed defendant at trial. Huggins v. State, supra; Crisp v. State, (1979)
271 Ind. 534, 394 N.B.2d 115.

Here, defendant presented no proof at the post-conviction hearing
that the psychiatrist whose attendance was sought via the continuance,
or any other psychiatrist, would have testified in support of
I the insanity defense. Besides defendant himself, defense
counsel called two lay witnesses who testified as to defend-
ant’s mental instability. Also, on cross-examination, defense counsel
elicited from two lay witnesses for the state testimony very favorable
to the insanity defense. Furthermore, we note that defendant was ex-
amined by two court-appointed psychiatrists. They testified that defend-
ant was sane, but defendant’s attorney extensively cross-examined
them as well as the psychiatrist called by the state. We hold that defend-
ant’s contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel is
without merit.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NOTE— Reported at 416 N.E.2d 839.
|

ARBIE CLAY v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 12798864. Filed February 26, 1981.]

257

James A. Neel, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Kathleen G. Lucas, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of rob-
bery, a class A felony, for which appellant was sentenced to thirty years
imprisonment, and two counts of burglary, for which he was sentenced
to ten years on each count. The sentences run concurrently.

The appeal raises the issue of whether the thirty-year sentence for
the robbery count is excessive and should be modified.

The evidence favorable to the State reveals the following: Appellant
planned a burglary with two companions. They stole a car on September
26, 1978, to use to get to the area where they planned to commit the
burglary. On September 27, 1978, they drove to the area and broke
into and ransacked a house after determining that no one was at home.
Appellant found some guns there and loaded one of them. The three
also stole a stereo set, a microwave oven, knives, and other items, which
they placed in the stolen car. They then found another house where
no one was at home, kicked down the door, ransacked and vandalized
the house and stole guns, television sets, cameras, two bullet proof
vests, and a police radio.

258 |
pT

As they were leaving the second house in the car, a police car followed
them, a chase ensued, and they turned into a driveway of a third house
to elude the police car. The owner of the house was working in his
garage when the three men drove up. They entered the garage bran-
dishing guns and told the owner that they wanted to hide the car in
his garage. Appellant twice bound the owner’s hands so tightly that
he complained that the circulation was cut off, and appellant replied,
“T don’t care nothing about your circulation.” At one point appellant
hit the victim in the face with a gun and stomped on his glasses as
they fell from his face. He demanded to know if the owner had any
guns and when he replied that he had a rifle, appellant said that he
wanted handguns only. After opening a safe in the owner’s house and
taking a coin collection, appellant bound the owner’s legs, threw him
into a closet, and pushed furniture in front of the door, saying, “You
are going to suffocate in your own closet.”

IL

Appellant's first argument is that the injury he inflicted on the house
owner was not serious enough to warrant conviction of a class A felony.
Indiana Code § 35-42-5-1, reads:

“A person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from
another person or from the presence of another person:

(1) By using or threatening the use of force on any person; or
(2) By putting any person in fear;

commits robbery, a class C felony. However, the offense is a class

B felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon,

and a class A felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious

bodily injury to any other person.”

The robbery victim testified that he suffered a deep bruise to his
sinus, a nosebleed for three days, and a headache for three weeks, as
a result of the blow to his face.

Appellant correctly points out that the Legislature views a class A
felony as much more serious than a class B felony, since the former
calls for a fixed term of thirty years imprisonment and the latter calls
for a fixed term of ten years (with aggravating and mitigating cireum-
stances adding to or subtracting from the fixed terms). Appellant asks

[| 259
Es

rhetorically, “How much more serious was the Appellant’s crime than
...aclass B felony?” And he answers: Only to the extent of a bruised
nose. Appellant argues that such a minor “discomfort” cannot reason-
ably be said to be the type of injury contemplated.by the Legislature
when it established the penalty for class A felonies. This argument
is not persuasive.

The Legislature intended to make robbery a class A felony in two
situations: (1) when bodily injury resulted to the person being robbed,
and (2) when serious bodily injury resulted to any other per-

Hs son. Bodily injury to the robbery victim need not rise to the
“serious” level to impose class A felony liability on the rob-

ber. The trial court properly convicted appellant of the class A felony.

Il.

Appellant next urges that in imposing the sentence of thirty years
the court could not have considered, as it should have done, the fac-
tors set out in Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-7 (35-50-1A-7, Burns 1979 Repl.):

“(a) In determining what sentence to impose for a crime, the
court shall consider the risk that the person will commit another
crime, the nature and circumstances of the crime committed, and
the prior criminal record, character, and condition of the person.

(b) The court may consider these factors as mitigating cireum-
stances or as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing
probation:

(1) The crime neither caused nor threatened serious harm.
* OK

(8) The character and attitudes of the person indicate that
he is unlikely to commit another crime.”

Appellant concedes that it could be argued that the crime threatened
serious harm. He urges, however, that such a threat exists in any armed
robbery, and an armed robbery not resulting in bodily harm to the
victim is merely a class B felony. The court, he argues, should have
considered this as a mitigating circumstance. This is illogical. The crime
clearly involved a threat of serious harm. The sentencing court may
consider mitigation only in the absence of a threat of serious harm.

260 ee
pe

That such a threat necessarily accompanies the lesser B felony is ir-
relevant on the issue of mitigation.

The fact that there was no actual harm, appellant further argues,
also should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance. This
is also wrong. The court is permitted to consider as a miti-

Hs gating circumstance the fact that the crime neither caused
nor threatened serious harm. Both factors must be absent

from the crime. Since one factor was present there was no ground for
considering mitigation on the basis of the absence of the other factor.

Tl.

Finally, appellant argues that the sentencing court failed to consider
evidence set out in his pre-sentence memorandum showing that he was
only eighteen and had demonstrated remorse by writing a letter of
apology to his victims and the court.

He asks whether he could be expected to become a useful member
of society after having served, even with “good time” credit taken into
consideration, at least fifteen years for bruising a man’s nose.

The scope of appellate review of sentences is set out in Ind.
HB OR App. R.S. 2:

“(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized
by statute except where such is manifestly unreasonable in light
of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

(2) A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no
reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to the par-
ticular offense and offender for which such sentence was imposed.”

Since the sentence is clearly authorized by statute we need to deter-

mine only whether no reasonable person could find the sentence inap-
propriate to the particular offense and the character of the offender.

In deciding on the imposition of the presumptive thirty-
year sentence, the sentencing court is presumed to have taken
into account the mandatory provisions of § 35-50-1A-7:

“[TJhe risk that the person will commit another crime, the nature
and circumstance of the crime committed, and the prior criminal
record, character, and condition of the person.” Gardner v. State,

Ye 261
es

(1979) 270 Ind. 627, 388 N.E.2d 513, 517.

We will assume that the court considered, as it should have, the age
of the appellant and his remorse as mitigating circumstances. But in
light of the nature of this crime spree, and the prior criminal record
revealed by the pre-sentence report, which included an armed robbery,
class B felony conviction, the sentencing judge, we presume, did not
find that the mitigating circumstances warranted a reduced sentence.

We cannot say that the sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light
of these considerations.

The sentence of the trial court is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note— Reported at 416 N.E.2d 842.
|

WoopROW TALAS v. CORRECT PIPING COMPANY, INC.

[No. 381852, Filed March 2, 1981]
ee
ee

Michael R. Morow, of Munster, for appellant. Leonard M. Ring and
Associates, of Chicago, Illinois, Of Counsel.

Samuel J. Furlin, Spangler, Jennings, Spangler & Dougherty, P.C.,
of Merrillville, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.— This case is before this Court upon the petition to transfer
of plaintiff-appellant Woodrow Talas. Mr. Talas was injured in a work-
related accident resulting in traumatic quadriplegia. For approximately
four months, plaintiff received around-the-clock nursing care at his home
which was paid for by his employer's insurance carrier. The payments
then stopped, and the continuous care was soon terminated thereafter.
Plaintiff then filed an emergency petition with the Industrial Board
of Indiana, seeking to have his employer resume paying for the twenty-
four hour nursing care. He contended that without the exercise pro-
grams administered by the nurses, his joints stiffened, and he lost the
feeling in some areas of his body which he had regained through the
exercising.

A hearing was held before a single hearing officer who granted plain-
tiff’s petition, finding him to be “100% totally permanently disabled
and in need of further medical care in order to reduce his disability
or impairment.” The employer appealed to the full Board which, after
a second hearing, reversed the earlier ruling and ordered that plain-
tiff take nothing. The Court of Appeals, First District, affirmed in a
unanimous opinion. Talas v. Correct Piping Co., (1980) Ind.App., 409
N.E.2d 1223. Transfer is now granted, and the decision and opinion
of the Court of Appeals are hereby vacated.

One issue before the Court of Appeals was whether or not the find-
ings made by the full Board were adequate for purposes of judicial
review. The Court of Appeals held that even though the findings were
minimally adequate at best, they were still sufficient “due to the cir-
cumstances of the case, the record before this court, and the standard
of appellate review, ....” Id. at 1228. We must disagree.

The Board made no findings of fact. It simply stated:

“It is further found that the Full Industrial Board by the majority

of its members overrules the Single Hearing Member’s decision

on said Emergency Petition and said Petitioner shall take nothing.”
In Hawley -v. Department of Redevelopment, (1978) 270 Ind. 109, 383
N.E.2d 333, we recognized that administrative agencies must in all cases
set out written findings of fact in support of their decision so that an
appellate court may intelligently review the decision without specu-

P| 263
EE

lating as to the agency’s reasoning. Written findings of fact were said
to help maintain the integrity of the agency's decision by insuring that
review was strictly limited to those findings. See also Kunz v. Water-
man, (1972) 258 Ind. 578, 283 N.E.2d 371. The findings must be specific
and not general. Securities Commission of Indiana v. Holovachka, (1955)
234 Ind. 135, 124 N.E.2d 380; Public Service Commission v. Fort Wayne
Union Railway, (1953) 232 Ind. 82, 111 N.E.2d 719.

Here, the Board has clearly not satisfied this requirement. Nor can
the error be considered harmless. The original finder of fact found for
plaintiff, and we are without a record of the second hearing. We also
reject the employer’s suggestion that any defect can be cured by the
full Board's inclusion of the hearing officer’s order in its order. First,
we note that the Board included the hearing officer's order, not his
findings. Second, even if the hearing officer's findings were incorporated
into the Board’s order, we fail to see how this action could cure the
Board’s deficiency. The Board reversed the hearing officer's decision,
and therefore it was necessary for the Board to explain its reasons
for reversal. Here, the Board not only failed to make an ultimate find-
ing of fact, but it also failed to make specific, basic findings of fact
to support the ultimate finding.

Therefore, in order for a proper review of this case, the cause is
remanded to the Industrial Board with instructions to make specific
findings of fact. Plaintiff has made other allegations of error by the
Board, but we believe that consideration of them should be postponed
until the Board has taken further action consistent with this opinion.

Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NoTE—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 845.

JOYCE ANN DEVILLEZ v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 9798244. Filed March 2, 1981.]

iS
a

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Melanie C. Conour, Deputy
Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Cindy A. Ellis, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— This is an appeal from a denial of a post-conviction pro-
ceeding by which appellant DeVillez sought to withdraw a plea of guilty.
Following a hearing the petition was denied.

Le 265

On September 80, 1974, appellant was arrested upon a charge of ac-
cessory before the fact to first degree murder in the killing of her hus-
band, and retained attorney Lopp as her counsel. On May 21, 1975,
she entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder and received a
sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years. On May 17, 1978, appellant
filed her petition for post-conviction relief, the denial of which forms
the basis for this appeal.

The post-conviction petition alleged that the trial court at the guilty
plea proceeding had failed to advise her that the court was not a party
to the plea agreement which was tendered as required by Ind. Code
§ 35-4.1-1-3(e) (1971), and the nature of the charge or the elements
thereof, pursuant to the requirements of Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3(a) (1971),
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I,
§ 13, of the Indiana Constitution. The second part of the post-conviction
petition alleged that appellant had not been provided the level of
assistance by counsel required by the Sixth Amendment and Art. I,
§ 18, of the Indiana Constitution.

I,

Indiana Code § 35-4.1-1-3(e) requires the court receiving a guilty plea
to inform the accused that the court is not a party to the plea agree-
ment and is not bound by it. At the plea proceeding, appellant
Hsin person and by counsel tendered her plea of guilty to sec-
ond degree murder. In addressing her, the following exchange
took place:
“THE COURT: Do you have any reservation about entering the
plea?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do yourealize that by entering the plea of guilty
to Second Degree Murder you are admitting the

truth again under oath of the facts that are con-
tained in this memorandum?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Has any threat or force been used to induce you
to enter this plea?

266 De

DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Do you realize that on a plea of guilty to Second
Degree Murder that the Court has the power
to impose a sentence of either 15 to 25 years
or life imprisonment?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And that which sentence is imposed is disere-
tionary with the Court?

DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You do realize that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do yourealize that if you did not enter this plea
of guilty that you’d have the right to a jury
trial?”

The objective of subsection (e) is fairness to the accused. This objec-
tive is sought by portraying the role of the court as being independent
of the plea agreement and by insuring that the acceptance of the plea
and the sentence received are within the expectancies of the accused.
In the above colloquy the plea is considered tentative and ineffective
without further proceedings of the court, even though its terms have
been openly agreed to by the defense and the prosecution, and the
core of the plea agreement, namely, the sentence to be served, is to
be set by the court alone within the applicable maximum and minimum.
Appellant was given the advice required by this subsection of the
statute. The plea was not involuntary on this legal basis.

Il.

Indiana Code § 35-4.1-1-3(a) requires the judge to personally address

the accused at a plea hearing and “determine” that he understands

the nature of the charge to which he is pleading guilty. To

Hi determine in this context is to arrive at a conclusion based

upon the interchange with the accused at the time the plea

is taken. The judge in the post-conviction proceeding concluded that

this operation of the judicial mind had in fact taken place, and that
there was a sufficient record support for it.

Le 267

Appellant made a factual statement and admission in written form
which was tendered to the plea judge, subscribed and sworn to in open
court before him, accompanied by her verbal statement to
i | the judge that it was true and accurate and voluntarily made,
in which she described in detail how she hired Terry Wayne
Walker to kill her husband and how she assisted him in doing so. In
it she flatly, unmistakably and completely admits facts which permit
of only one appraisal, namely that it is an admission of each element
of first degree murder. It necessarily arises from this statement again
and again, that she is aware that guilt in her case is predicated, not
upon having physically unleashed the deadly force, but an involvement
in the use of that deadly force summed up in the hiring and assisting
element. Such a voluntary admission by the accused of each element
of an offense is sufficient as a basis for the plea judge’s determination
that the accused is aware of the true nature of the charge against her
and comports with due process. Henderson v. Morgan, (1976) 426 U.S.
687, 96 S.Ct. 2258, 49 L.Ed.2d 108. We hold that a voluntary admission
of this sort on the record of the plea proceeding may also satisfy the
implicit requirement of subsection (a) that there be a rational basis
for the judge’s determination that the accused understands the nature
of the charge. We rejected the position of appellant that such require-
ment can only be satisfied by an advisement by the court of the separate
elements of the offense. That, of course, remains one good way to make
the determination, and we encourage it.

Appellant argues that she was never informed either by way of a

separate indictment or otherwise of the nature of second degree

murder, and that there is nothing in the record upon which

Hl to conclude that she understood the nature of the charge of

second degree murder. At the plea stage second degree

murder is a necessarily included offense within a charge of first degree

murder. Cf. Barker v. State, (1958) 238 Ind. 271, 150 N.E.2d 680.

Therefore, her knowledge of the true nature of the greater offense

necessarily supplies sufficient knowledge of the true nature of the lesser
and included offense of second degree murder.

As an adjunct to appellant’s claim regarding compliance of the plea
judge with the plea statute, she asserts that evidence at the post con-

268 a
a

viction hearing showed her impaired mental and physical condition.
The medical testimony in the record on this point relates most pointedly
to the date of the offense in 1974 and not to the date of the plea pro-
ceeding in the following year. It was, therefore, highly speculative in
its tendency to show her mental state at the time of the plea, and when
considered in conjunction with the other factors bearing upon com-
pliance with the plea statute would not lead the trier of fact to a con-
trary result in favor of appellant.

The plea was not shown unknowing or involuntary on the basis of
non-compliance with the plea statute or the requirements of due process
as contended.

Ill.

Appellant next contends that she should be permitted to
I_swithdraw her plea of guilty because her counsel in the trial
court was constitutionally ineffective. Regarding this claim

we have said:

“Counsel is presumed to have prepared and executed his client’s
defense effectively. State v. Irvin (1973), 259 Ind. 610, 291 N.E.2d
70; Robbins v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 278, 274 N.E.2d 255. This
presumption is rationally grounded in the educational and other
requirements for admission to the practice of law, but is rebut-
table by strong and convincing proof. Robbins v. State, supra. In
resolving the issue, a court should consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding counsel’s pretrial preparation and the ac-
tual conduct of the trial. Lowe v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 610, 298
N.E.2d 421; Blackburn v. State (1978), 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686;
Sargeant v. State (1978), 157 Ind. App. 173, 299 N.E.2d 219. Per-
functory representation is not enough. Wilson v. State (1943), 222
Ind. 68, 51 N.E.2d 848; Castro v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 385, 147
N.E. 321. Counsel must have reasonable time for pre-trial prepara-
tion. Hartman v. State (1973), 155 Ind. App. 199, 292 N.H.2d 293.
Deliberate choices made by counsel for some contemplated tac-
tical or strategic reason which turn out to be detrimental to the
client’s cause do not establish ineffective representation. Henry
v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U.S. 448, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408;
Lowe v. State, supra.” Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 621,
835 N.E.2d 811, 814.

Le 269
PO

Appellant established at the post-conviction hearing that she had been
subjected to serious mistreatment at the hands of her husband and
suffered from a serious medical problem at the time of the offense;
that the deputy prosecutor was her lawyer’s nephew; that she was
not present during depositions of prosecution witnesses, and was not
advised clearly of clemency possibilities. Such showing was made to
support claims that counsel was remiss in failing to have her psychia-
trically examined for purposes of evaluating her ability to make a plea
or present a defense of insanity; in failing to advise her of the poten-
tial conflict of interest because of the family relationship with the pros-
ecutor; in failing to advise her of her right to be present during deposi-
tions and in failing to provide her with the accurate clemency data
upon which to decide whether to plead guilty.

There was competing evidence presented that defense counsel and
an associate spent considerable time with appellant during the six
months between arrest and the plea, and that the plea of insanity was
discussed as was the nature of the charge and lesser included offenses
and the sentencing alternatives with which they were confronted.
Defense counsel did depose the three key prosecution witnesses and
unsuccessfully prosecuted a motion to suppress a damaging tape re-
corded telephone conversation. Defense counsel testified that his rela-
tionship with the deputy prosecutor in no way affected his handling
of the case, and indeed defense counsel even deposed that deputy pros-
ecutor in connection with the motion to suppress. The residual of points
missed by defense counsel, when considered in light of the totality of
surrounding circumstances, clearly were not such as would have re-
quired the trier of fact to conclude that counsel was constitutionally
ineffective.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotE—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 846.

SHIRLEY A. SHIDELER AND BARNES, HICKAM, PANTZER & BOYD
v. MARY CATHERINE DWYER.

{No. 381855. Filed March 3, 1981.]

Alvin E. Meyer, Richard L. Gilliom, Stewart, Irwin, Gilliom, Fuller
& Meyer, of Indianapolis, Lineback & Lew , of Greenfield, for
appellants.

Jon R. Pactor, of Indianapolis, for appellee. :

272 De
fF

PRENTICE, J.— This cause is before us upon the petition of the Defend-
ants (Appellants), Shideler, et al. to transfer the cause from the Court
of Appeals, First District, that Court having affirmed the denial by
the trial court of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment by opin-
ion at 386 N.E.2d 1211.

Transfer is now granted under Appellate Rule 11(B)(2\(c), in that there

is a conflict between said decision and the decision of said Court in

Cordial v. Grimm, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 58, 346 N.E.2d 266, in

Hs that the Court of Appeals, Third District, in Cordial v. Grimm,

supra, held that the two year limitation statute Ind. Code

§ 34-4-19-1, was not limited to medical malpractice actions and is ap-

plicable to malpractice actions brought against members of the legal

profession; whereas said Court, in the cause before us, held that it was

not. We are in accord with the Court of Appeals, First District, upon

this issue in its holding that the doctrine of ejusdem generis limits

the application to the term “or others,” as used in said statute, to others

of the medical care community. Accordingly, Cordial v. Grimm, supra,
is expressly overruled.

Nevertheless, the decision of the Court of Appeals, First District,
herein is erroneous in that it held that, notwithstanding the occurrence
of injury and damages, i.e. the existence of the plaintiff's right to sue
the defendants, the statute limiting the time within which suit could
be filed thereon did not commence to run until the entry of a judicial
decree, in an action initiated by Plaintiff and to which the defendants
were not parties, confirming the plaintiff's loss.

At the outset, it should be noted that the motion for summary judg-
ment was addressed, in the main, to the issue of whether or not the
action was barred by the statute of limitations and not to the issue
of whether or not a named beneficiary under a will, who was disap-
pointed by the failure of the gift occasioned by reason of the lack of
professional competence of the lawyer who drafted the will, can main-
tain a malpractice action against the errant lawyer. Accordingly, that
substantive issue is not before us, and we intimate no opinion thereon.

In California, a state that has recognized the right of the beneficiary
to maintain such an action, it was held that the statute of limitations

be 273
PT

began to run at the death of the testator.

“Under the alleged facts of this case, we conclude that the limita-
tions period starts from the date that the cause of action accrues;
namely the incidence of the testatrix’ death when the negligent
failure to perfect the requested testamentary scheme becomes ir-
remedial and the impact of the injury occurs.” Heyer v. Flaig, (1969)
70 Cal. 2d 223, 225, 449 P. 2d 161, 162, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 226.
Formerly, statute of limitations were looked upon with disfavor in
that they are invariably in derogation of the common law. “Now,
however, the judicial attitude is in favor of statutes of limita-
I tions, rather than otherwise, since they are considered as
statutes of repose and as affording security against stale
claims. Consequently, except in the case of statutes of limitations
against the government, the courts are inclined to construe limitation
laws liberally, so as to effect the intention of the legislature.” 51 Am.
Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions § 50, (1970). Such statutes rest upon sound
public policy and tend to the peace and welfare of society and are
deemed wholesome. Horvath v. Davidson, (1970) 148 Ind.App. 203, 264
N.E.2d 328; Sherfey v. City of Brazil, (1938) 213 Ind. 493, 18 N.E.2d
568; High et al. v. Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, (1883) 92
Ind. 580, 589. They are enacted upon the presumption that one having
a well-founded claim will not delay enforcing it. In Re Hogan, (1921)
75 Ind.App. 53, 129 N.E. 633.

The trial judge certified and the Court of Appeals found, on Defend-
ants’ Petition for Leave to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, that the
order denying summary judgment involves a substantial question of
law, the early determination of which will promote a more orderly
disposition of the case. Accordingly, leave was granted by the Court
of Appeals for Plaintiff to appeal from the trial court order, pursuant
to Indiana Appellate Rule 4(B)(5)(b). We do not disturb that grant.

The statement of the case, the facts and issues are as stated by Judge
Lowdermilk, for the Court of Appeals and are as follows:
“STATEMENT OF THE CASE

“Defendants-appellants Shirley A. Shideler (Shideler) and Barnes,
Hickam, Pantzer & Boyd (Barnes, Hickam) bring this appeal after the

274 |
po

Hancock Circuit Court denied their motion for summary judgment.
They contend that the professional malpractice action brought by
plaintiff-appellee Mary Catherine Dwyer (Dwyer) is barred by statutes
of limitation set forth in IC 1971, 34-4-19-1 (Burns Code Ed.) and IC
1971, 34-1-2-2 (Burns Code Ed.).

“FACTS

“Shideler is-a partner in the law firm of Barnes, Hickam. In 1973
Shideler prepared a Will for Robert P. Moore. Moore, who executed
the Will on October 8, 1973, died on December 14, 1973. Moore’s Will,
which was admitted to probate on December 21, 1973, included the
following provision:

“ ‘Clause 7.1(c); Provision for Mary Catherine Dwyer. I specifically
direct Dominie L. Angelicchio to use his best efforts as long as
he owns any shares of stock of Moorfeed Corporation, to cause
the Corporation to continue the employment of Mary Catherine
Dwyer until her retirement or her other service termination date,
then from and after such date and until her death, or the death
of Dominie L. Angelicchio prior thereto, Dominie L. Angelicchio
shall cause the Corporation to pay Mary Catherine Dwyer as a
retirement benefit the sum of $500 per month.’ (Original emphasis)
“Dwyer decided to terminate her employment in the fall of 1974.
Her attorney discussed Clause 7.1(c) in Moore's Will with Shideler, who
was then serving as attorney for Moore's estate. The estate and
Angelicchio' took the position that Dwyer would have to meet the
qualifications set forth in the profit-sharing plan of Moorfeed Corpora-
tion before she would be eligible for any benefits provided by Clause
7.1(c) of Moore’s Will. Nevertheless, Dwyer submitted her resignation
effective October 31, 1974.

“When Dwyer did not receive a payment for November 1974, she
filed her petition on November 13, 1974, asking the Marion County
Probate Court to construe the Will of Robert P. Moore. The Probate

1. Shideler and Barnes, Hickam note in their brief at page 14: “‘Angelicchio in-
formed Dwyer prior to her resignation that it was the opinion of an attorney for the
personal representatives of Moore’s estate, whom Angelicchio had consulted, that Dwyer
would not be entitled to any payments under Clause 7.1(c) of the Will should she carry
out her intention to resign at that time.” (Our Emphasis)

bn 275

Court entered its decree on June 30, 1975, and held that Clause 7.1(c)
of Moore’s Will was ‘. . . null and void and of no effect because of its
impossibility of performance. The language of said Clause 7.1(c) is
merely precatory language. Such Clause 7.1(c) is directed to a corpora-
tion and a stockholder of such corporation cannot cause the corpora-
tion to perform the acts set out in said clause.’

“Dwyer filed her action against Shideler and Barnes, Hickam on June
29, 1977. She alleged, inter alia, that Robert P. Moore had intended
for Dwyer to receive $500 per month in addition to other retirement
benefits, and that Shideler and Barnes, Hickam, who prepared the Will
for Moore, knew or should have known that Clause 7.1(c) would be held
void.

“Shideler and Barnes, Hickam ultimately filed their motion for sum-
mary judgment, which the trial court denied.

“ISSUES

“The following issues have been certified to this court for considera-
tion, pursuant to Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 4(B)(5):

“1. Is Dwyer’s action barred by the statute of limitations set forth
in IC 34-4-19-1?
“2. Is Dwyer’s action barred by the statute of limitations set forth
in IC 34-1-2-2?
“3. Do genuine issues of material fact exist in the case at bar?”
ISSUE I

As previously stated herein, we have determined that IC 34-4-19-1
is not applicable. Because our decision herein is controlled by our deter-
mination of issues 2 and 8 favorable to Defendant’s position, further
treatment of Issue I is unnecessary.

ISSUES II & Ill

Again referring to California authority where the right of an intended
beneficiary to maintain an action against an attorney who mis-drafted
the Will has been established, it has been there determined that the
action is in tort. Heyer v. Flaig, supra.

216 De

“Applying the Biakanja criteria to the facts of Lucas, the court
found that attorneys incur a duty in favor of certain third per-
sons, namely, intended testamentary beneficiaries. In proceeding
to discuss the contractual remedy of such persons as the plain-
tiffs in Lucas, we concluded that ‘as a matter of policy * * * they
are entitled to recover as third-party beneficiaries.’ (56 Cal. 2d
at p. 590.) The presence of the Biakanja criteria in a contractual
setting led us to sustain not only the availability of a tort remedy
but of a third-party beneficiary contractual remedy as well. This
latter theory of recovery, however, is conceptually superfluous
since the crux of the action must lie in tort in any case; there can
be no recovery without negligence. This reading of Lucas is rein-
forced by the following language recited with approval in the case
of Eads v. Marks (1952) 39 Cal. 2d 807, 811 [249 P. 2d 257]: ‘Tt
has been well established in this state that if the cause of action
arises from a breach of a promise set forth in the contract, the
action is ex contractu, but if it arises from a breach of duty grow-
ing out of the contract it is ex delicto. * * *’”

Plaintiff's complaint, as amended, was in five counts or theoretical
paragraphs. After alleging the relevant facts, Plaintiff alleged conclu-
sions charging: (1) breach of contract, (2) negligence, (3) fraud, (4) con-
structive fraud and (5) breach of fiduciary duty. Such method of
pleading, however, will not control the limitations period.

Courts have consistently rejected efforts to make substantive limita-
tions analysis under modern procedures, such as the Trial Rules, turn
on formalistic pleading conceptions reminiscent of the Field

HB Code era. In Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., (S.D.
Ind. 1966) 257 F.Supp. 282 (Indiana law), aff'd per curiam (7th

Cir. 1967), 885 F.2d 414, Judge Dillin aptly summarized the current rule:

“The general rule is that, especially where forms of action have
been abolished, as in Indiana, it is the nature or substance of the
cause of action, rather than the form of the action, which determines
the applicability of the statute of limitations.” 257 F.Supp. at 292.
(Emphasis added)

In Cordial v. Grimm, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 58, 346 N.E.2d 266, the Court
of Appeals endorsed this language in responding at length to an effort
by the plaintiff to characterize his action as sounding in “contract” for
limitations purposes:

[| 277
je

“The [earlier] Indiana cases which directly deal with this ques-
tion were decided in the era of Field Code pleading.” (Citations
omitted). “At this time, each pleading paragraph of a complaint
was required to contain sufficient averments of fact within itself
to reveal the theoretical nature of the cause of action to the court.”
(Citations omitted). “In those cases, our courts determined the
question of the nature of an action such as the case at bar by
reference to the theory stated in the complaint.” (Citation omitted).

“However, under our present Indiana Rules of Procedure, a party
commencing a civil action is required to include in his complaint
only a demand for relief. Trial Rule 8(A), Ind. Rules of Procedure.
The complaint need not disclose the general legal theory upon which
the plaintiff will proceed, but rather only the operative facts in-
volved in the litigation.” State v. Rankin, (1973) 260 Ind. 288, 294
N.E.2d 604.

“In conformity with these principles, appellant alleged in his
original and amended complaints the facts constituting the alleged
malpractice by the appellees, and omitted any reference to his
legal theory of the action. In ruling on appellees’ motion for sum-
mary judgment, however, the trial court was required to determine
what statute of limitations was applicable to the cause of action
stated by appellant by determining the legal basis of the action.”
Id. at 62, 63, 346 N.E.2d at 269. (Emphasis added).

After quoting with approval Judge Dillin’s formulation in Koehring
Co. of the “general rule,” the court concluded in Cordial:

“Today a dominant trend in the law, as exemplified by our present

Indiana Rules of Procedure, is the recognition of substance and the

disregard of mere form. The general rule quoted hereinabove

serves this end. Furthermore, the older Indiana case law
authorities now under consideration are of dubious vitality, due
to the language of subsequent decisions.” (Citation omitted).
“Thus, it 1s both necessary and appropriate under the current
state of the law for the trial court to rule upon the legal nature or
substance of a cause of action when the applicability of a statute
of limitations to such cause of action is in issue.” (Emphasis added).

Id. at 63, 346 N.E.2d at 269-70.

In Lucurious Swimming Pools, Inc. v. Tepe, (1978) 177 Ind.App. 384,
379 N.E.2d 992, the Court of Appeals once more affirmed that legal
substance rather than pleading form is the governing principle of limita-
tions analysis. The plaintiff had sued and won a judgment against

278 ee

defendant contractor for improper construction of a swimming pool
in plaintiff's backyard. Defendant contended that, since plaintiff had
included in his complaint various breach-of-warranty theories arising
under the Uniform Commercial Code, a four-year limitations period
set forth in the Code governed and barred the action. This Court re-
jected defendant’s argument, because the substance of plaintiff's ac-
tion was for damages caused by deficiencies in making improvements
to real property, and was thus governed by the ten-year period of Ind.
Code § 34-4-20-2 (1976):
“‘# % %* (Tit is the existence of an injury to real property brought
about by the specified deficiencies, rather than the cause of action
under which a recovery for such action is sought, which governs
the applicability of [this] statute [of limitations].” (Emphasis added).
379 N.E.2d at 995 n. 2.

In short, though parties confronted with a limitations problem often
attempt, as Plaintiff has attempted here, to evade such difficulties by
reliance upon pleading technicalities, the courts have consistently
rebuffed these efforts in favor of substantive analysis. Particularly in
view of the heightened emphasis on substance and the disregard of
mere form which the Trial Rules demand, it is clear that such formalistie
pleading arguments no longer merit serious attention. With respect
to the Complaint herein, the number and variety of Plaintiff's technical
pleading labels and theories of recovery cannot disguise the obvious
fact — apparent even to a layman—that this is a malpractice case, and
hence is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to such
actions.

Our statutes of limitations, in-so-far as they conceivably could be
applicable, are:

“The following actions shall be commenced within the periods
herein prescribed after the cause of action has accrued, and not
afterwards.

“First. For injuries to person or character, for injuries to personal

property, and for a forfeiture of penalty given by statute, within
two (2) years: * * * .” LC. § 84-1-2-2.

“All actions not limited by any other statute shall be brought
within fifteen (15) years. In special cases, where a different limita-

Pi 279
Po

tion is prescribed by statute, the provisions of this act shall not
apply.” LC. § 34-1-2-3.
In applying this statute and its predecessors, Indiana Courts have
consistently viewed “personal property” in its broad and natural sense,
and have rebuffed arguments for a narrow and technical inter-
I pretation of the term. The decision in Rush v. Leiter, (1971)
149 Ind.App. 274, 271 N.E.2d 505, is illustrative. The issue
in Rush was whether a complaint for conversion of personal property
was governed by: (a) the first clause of § 34-1-2-2; (b) § 34-1-2-1, the
six-year statute for recovery of personal property; or (c) § 34-1-2-3, the
fifteen-year “catch all” statute.

Reversing a judgment for Plaintiff, the Court of Appeals held that
the trial court should have found the action barred by the statute for
injuries to personal property, and rejected Plaintiff's contention that
§ 34-1-2-2 should be narrowly interpreted:

“Plaintiff-appellee urges this court to adopt the narrow and
restrictive view of the contested phrase [injuries to personal prop-
erty’], thereby limiting its applicability to direct physical injury
to tangible chattel property as distinguished from violations to
rights in or to personal property or arising out of such injury.
With this construction we cannot agree.” 149 Ind.App. at 277-78,
271 N.E.2d at 507.

Although noting that some states had “limited the term so that it em-
braces only goods and chattels,” the Rush Court cited numerous
authorities establishing that Indiana has adopted the second,
I_sobroader definition of “personal property,” which “ * * * in-
cludes not only the thing itself but all the rights and interests
of the owner.” 149 Ind. App. at 278, 271 N.E.2d at 507. (Emphasis added).
Under this “broader definition,” it was clear that the first clause of
§ 34-1-2-2 “ * * * is not to be limited only to direct injuries to chattels,
but also incorporates violations to a person’s rights and interests in or
to such property.” 149 Ind.App. at 279, 271 N.E.2d at 508. (Emphasis
added). Accordingly, the Court concluded that “ * * * conversion of
personal property is a violation of the true owner's rights in the same
and the owner's action arising out of the conversion is a chose in action
and thus personal property, (citation omitted).” Id.

280 |
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Both the authority cited in Rush and decisions subsequent to it fully
support the conclusion that the first clause of § 34-1-2-2 governs all
actions involving claimed losses of “rights and interests in or to” per-
sonal property. Thus, in Graf v. City Transit Co., (1942) 220 Ind. 249,
252, 41 N.E.2d 941, 942, we held that an action for loss of services is
for injuries to property rather than as one for injuries to person. Mer-
ritt v. Economy Department Store, Inc., (1955) 125 Ind.App. 560, 564,
128 N.E.2d 279, 281, reached the same result, holding that a husband’s
action for loss of servies caused by injuries to his wife “ * * * was
a chose in action and thus personal property and would be governed
by the statute of limitations of two years from the date of the injury.”

In Cordial v. Grimm, supra, it was held that the principles expressed
in these decisions were fully applicable to an action for legal malprac-
tice. In addition to holding that the plaintiff's action was barred by
the malpractice statute of limitations, a ruling that we have herein
expressly rejected, the Cordial Court relied on the statute for injuries
to personal property as an alternative basis for affirming the trial
court’s entry of summary judgment for the defendant attorneys:

“In the case at bar, the substance of the factual allegations which
the appellant made in his complaint is that the appellees’ actions
or inactions rendered his valid workman’s compensation claims
worthless.

Such claim was a chose in action, and as such must be considered
to have been the personal property of appellant. (Citations omitted).

It is the alleged tortious damage to such personal property which
gave rise to appellant’s cause of action, and it is for such damage
that he sought compensation.

In light of the foregoing, the trial court could have properly
concluded that the provision of [Ind. Code § 34-1-2-2 (1976)} limiting
the commencement of actions for damage to personal property
was applicable to appellant's cause of action, because such aspect
of this case was the gravamen of the case. See, Rush v. Leiter, (1971)
149 Ind. App. 274, 271 N.E.2d 505.” (Emphasis added). Id. at 63-64,
346 N.E.2d at 270.

Under this clear and consistent line of Indiana authority, it is ap-
parent that Plaintiff's action is one for injuries to personal property

Le 281
Po

within the meaning of Ind. Code § 34-1-2-2. The damages

| | Dwyer seeks are based upon her claimed loss of a chose in

action whereby she was allegedly entitled to receive payments

of $500 a month beginning November 1, 1974 and continuing thereafter

until her death. Under any plausible analysis, a claim that one has lost

aright to receive a specified monthly sum of money is, in the language

of Rush, a claim for injuries to “rights or interests in or to” personal

property, and is thus governed by the applicable two-year limitations
period.

It having been determined that this case is controlled by Ind. Code
§ 34-1-2-2, a two year limitation upon actions for injuries, to personal
property, the date upon which the cause of action (if any) accrued, re-
mains to be determined.

It is Plaintiff's contention that the cause of action did not accrue
until June 30, 1975, the date upon which the probate court decreed
that the gift to her, ie. Clause 7.1(c) of Moore's will, was void. Until
then, she posits, she sustained no damage from the defendant’s acts
or omissions, because the court conceivably could have declared the
clause to be valid. In support of her position, she cites Price, Adm.
v, Holmes, (1967) 198 Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976, which did so indicate and
misled our Court of Appeals. The threshold issue in that case was
whether or not a cause of action against Holmes who negligently super-
vised the execution of Weber's will, would survive the death of the
disappointed beneficiary, Lillian Price. The issues were drawn by a
motion for summary judgment. Kansas procedure allowing for non-
repugnant alternative pleading, the complaint was sufficient if it stated
a cause in either contract or tort. It was Holmes’ contention that a
tort action was barred because it did not survive the death of the plain-
tiff's decedent, Lillian Holmes, and that a contract action was barred
by the statute of limitations, which commenced to run when the employ-
ment contract was breached by his negligent performance.

From that point, the court rationalized to a conclusion that would
permit the plaintiff to go forward. The tort concept of the case was
equated to an earlier case wherein a defective installation of plumbing
resulted in an explosion two years later. It was there held that no cause

282 |
fF

of action in tort accrued until the explosion occurred, the time the
tortious act occasioned damage, but that an action on contract accrued
when the faulty work was done. The court went on to say that the
explosion in the case before it occurred when it declared Weber’s will
void. “That was the date on which the ground fell from under Lillian
Price; prior to that time the will had been held valid by two courts,
and Lillian had suffered no damage at the hands of Mr. Holmes.” No
cause of action in tort survived, for the simple reason that Lillian had
died before that time; and a cause of action survives in favor of a per-
sonal representative, only if it accrued in favor of the decedent in his
lifetime.

The remainder of the Price opinion has no application to the case
before us as it proceeds upon a breach of contract hypothesis, whereas
we have determined that Plaintiff's claim for malpractice is in tort.

The fallacy in the Kansas opinion is the conclusion that there had
been no injury done until the Supreme Court said so. Our Court of
Appeals was led into the same trap but relegated the task
Hof effecting the “explosion” to the Marion County Probate
Court, overlooking the theoretical possibility that the injury
might have been averted by appellate proceedings. It is clear, to us,
that the Kansas Court and our Court of Appeals confused damage, as
a requisite element of any tort with damages, as a measure of compen-
sation. For a wrongful act to give rise to a cause of action and thus
to commence the running of the statute of limitations, it is not necessary
that the extent of the damage be known or ascertainable but only that
damage has occurred. Assuming that Defendants negligently set a
potentially dangerous force into motion, the “explosion” occurred
simultaneously with the death of Moore. That is the time when, but
for the negligence complained of, the plaintiff would have realized a
property interest.

The Kansas case of the plumbing explosion has an Indiana counter-
part in The Board of Commissioners of Wabash County v. Pearson, (1889)
120 Ind. 426, 22 N.E. 184. That case concerned a bridge constructed
in 1871 which collapsed and injured Pearson in 1884. It was there held
that the statute of limitations did not commence to run until the right
of action accrued and that that did not occur until Pearson was injured,

Le 283
PY

although the defendant’s negligence occurred thirteen years earlier.

It does not follow from that decision, however, that the cause of action
did not accrue until the extent of Pearson’s damages could be deter-
mined. In Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., et al,
HB (1963) 12 NY2d 212, 287 NYS2d 714, 188 N.E.2d 142, 4 ALR
83d 814, amended on other grounds 12 NY2d 1073, 239 NYS2d
896, 190 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, (1963) 374 U.S. 808, 83 S.Ct. 1697,
10 L.Ed.2d 1032, the New York Court of Appeals held that a medical
malpractice action accrued when the radioactive and carcinogenic
substance was inserted in the plaintiff's sinuses, not fifteen years later
when carcinoma allegedly produced thereby was first discovered. The
court followed its earlier decision in Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch
Transp. Co., (1936) 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824, 104 A.L.R. 450, where
it was held that the cause of action accrued when he inhaled the dust —
more than three years before the action was commenced —not at the
time when the dust so inhaled resulted in a disease of the lungs, which
date could only be determined by medical testimony.

“Though negligence may endanger the person or property of
another, no actionable wrong is committed if the danger is averted.
It is only the injury to person or property arising from negligence
which constitutes an invasion of a personal right, protected by
law, and, therefore, an actionable wrong. Cf. ‘The Duty to Take
Care,’ by W.W. Buckland, 51 Law Quarterly Review, p. 637; Pollock
on The Law of Torts (12th Ed.) p. 186. Through lack of care a per-
son may set in motion forces which touch the person or property
of another only after a long interval of time (Cf. Ehret v. Village
of Scarsdale, 269 N. Y. 198, 199 N.E. 56); and then only through
new, fortuitous conditions. There can be no doubt that a cause
of action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion
produce injury. Otherwise, in extreme cases, a cause of action
might be barred before liability arose.”

“That does not mean that the cause of action accrues only when
the injured person knows or should know that the injury has oc-
curred. The injury occurs when there is a wrongful invasion of
personal or property rights and then the cause of action accrues.
Except in cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides
otherwise, the statutory period of limitations begins to run from
the time when liability for wrong has arisen even though the in-
jured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or in-

284 |

jury. Consequential damages may flow later from an injury too
slight to be noticed at the time it is inflicted. No new cause of
action accrues when such consequential damages arise. So far as
such consequential damages may be reasonably anticipated, they
may be included in a recovery for the original injury, though even
at the time of the trial they may not yet exist. When substantial
damage may result from any wrong affecting the person or prop-
erty of another, a cause of action for such wrong immediately
accrues.” Conklin v. Draper, 229 App.Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529, af-
firmed 254 N.Y. 620, 178 N.E. 892; Wiener v. Ellrodt, 268 N.Y.
646, 198 N.E. 537; Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653.

“We must apply that rule here. The injury to the plaintiff was
complete when the alleged negligence of the defendant caused the
plaintiff to inhale the deleterious dust. For that injury, including
all resulting damages, the defendant was then liable. The disease
of the lungs was a consequence of that injury. Its results might
be delayed, or, perhaps, even by good fortune averted; neverthe-
less, the disease resulted naturally, if not inevitably, from a con-
dition created in the plaintiff's body through the defendant's
alleged wrong. It cannot be doubted that the plaintiff might have
begun an action against the defendant immediately after he in-
haled the dust which caused the disease. No successful challenge
could have been interposed on the ground that the action was
prematurely brought because at the time it was commenced no
serious damage to the plaintiff had yet developed. In that action
the plaintiff could recover all damages which he could show had
resulted or would result therefrom. In effect, the plaintiff is ask-
ing this court to hold that the statutory period of limitation begins
only from the time that the plaintiff had reasonable assurance that
serious damage had resulted or would result from past injury. The
statute provides in unambiguous language that the period of limita-
tion begins to run at the moment when right to begin an action
accrues. The same test must be applied to a challenge that the
action is stale as to challenge that the action has been brought
prematurely.” Jd. at 300-01, 200 N.E. 2d at 827.

The drafting of Moore’s Will and the resulting disappointment to
Plaintiff may be likened to the construction of the bridge and its subse-
quent collapse in the Pearson case (supra). In both, the wrong preceded
the damage by a considerable period of time. In neither, did the cause
of action accrue until damage resulted from the wrong. In the case
of the bridge, the damage occurred and the cause of action accrued

be 285
pe

when the bridge collapsed. That is when damage resulted to Pearson.

When did damage to Plaintiff result from Defendant's alleged
negligence? Not when the Will was drafted or executed, because it
had to await the death of Moore before it could have any dispositive
effect. But at his death, the instrument was operative; and, just as the
negligent construction of the bridge in Pearson became irremediable
with its collapse under Pearson’s weight, the wrong, if any, set in mo-
tion with the drafting of Moore’s Will became irremediable with his
death.

We agree with the following quoted holding of the Supreme Court
of California in Heyer, et al. v. Flaig, (1969) 70 Cal.2d 228, 449 P.2d
161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225. “The statute of limitations does not com-
HB omence to run until the testatrix’ death, at which time the defend-
ant’s negligence becomes irremediable and before which time
the plaintiff possesses no recognized legal interset in the testatrix’ estate.”
Id. at 230, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229. And we agree with
the following stated logic, also quoted from that opinion. “A second
basic reason that bars the running of the statute until the testatrix’
death lies in the fact that plaintiffs’ could not bring an action against
defendant before that time. A statute of limitations does not commence
to run until a cause of action accrues, and ‘a cause of action * * * in-
variably accrues when there is a remedy available.’ ” Id. at 230, 449
P.2d at 166, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 230. (Citation omitted).

We are not in agreement with the Supreme Court of Kansas in its
determination that the “ground fell from under Lillian Price” on the
date that it declared Weber's will void. According to that theory the
plaintiff's cause in the case before us still has not accrued, as we have
never been presented with the question of the validity of Moore’s will.

Under the Kansas theory, the accrual of the plaintiff's action had
to abate a determination of the validity of the will clause in a collateral
action, which at most would be enlightening upon the question of the
extent of her damages. Had the will clause been upheld, Plaintiff's
damages would have been slight but not non-existent. The issue in her
action here is not whether or not the will clause is valid but whether
or not it was inartfully conceived and drafted by the defendants, in

violation of a standard of care owing. The declaration of the probate
court was a factor that figured in the extent of Plaintiff's damages,
but it was not the explosion of the plumbing nor the collapse of the
bridge. The explosion occurred when Moore died leaving a testament-
ary provision in favor of the plaintiff of questionable validity.

To be sure, the ultimate effect upon the plaintiff of the defendant’s
alleged negligence was speculative at the time the cause of action ac-
crued, but it cannot be questioned that the impact occurred at the time
of Moore’s death. It is doubtful that the extent of Pearson’s damages
was known the instant that the bridge collapsed. It may never have
been fully determined, and there may have been conflicting medical
opinions as to whether he had sustained any. Nevertheless, -if he was
damaged, it occurred at the moment of the collapse; and if this plain-
tiff was damaged, it occurred at the moment of Moore’s death. Whether
or not the will was competently drawn was the issue to be tried in
the court below. Whether or not the clause was ultimately held to be
valid or invalid would weigh heavily upon that issue, but it would not
determine it.

In Craven v. Craven, (1918) 181 Ind. 553, 103 N.E. 333, we quoted
from an even earlier case, “ ‘Statutes of limitation are now generally
look upon as statutes of repose. They rest upon sound policy, and tend
to the peace and welfare of society, and they are to be deemed just
as essential to the general welfare and wholesome administration of
justice as statutes upon any other subject.’ * * * And while an injustice
may be done in some instances, it is better for the sake of the peace
and welfare of the State, that the rule should prevail, that adverse
possession for twenty years will ripen into a title in fee simple.” Jd.
at 559, 103 N.E. at 335.

“Considering the function of a Statute of Limitations as a device
for repose, a potential defendant’s equities are the same whether
the plaintiff knows of his condition or not. Repose is as beneficial
to society in the one case as in the other.” Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chem. Corp., (supra)

There is authority supporting the proposition that statutes of limita-
tion attach when there has been notice of an invasion of the legal right
of the plaintiff or he has been put on notice of his right to a cause of

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fT

action. City of Miami v. Brooks, (1954) Fla., 70 So.2d 306; Urie v. Thomp-
son, (1949) 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 11 A.L.R. 2d 252.
There may be special merit to that viewpoint where, as in Neel v.
Magana, et al., (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421, the
plaintiff was the client or the patient, but we do not have that problem.

We also note that in many cases where the discovery rule has been
applied or alluded to, the misconduct was of a continuing nature or
concealed, which also was the situation in Neel v. Magana, supra.

We see no unique relationship between a lawyer who drafts a will
and one who is merely the object of his client’s bounty that calls for
a special rule. Without more, there is no continuing obliga-

HH tion to the devisee.

In Jaramillo v. Hood, (1979) 93 N.M. 433, 601 P.2d 66, the court ap-
parently adopted the discovery rule in a case very similar to the one
before us. But the court held that the appellant was in a position to
ascertain or discover the harm when she changed attorneys. We infer
from this that the appellee had represented the appellant in her capacity
as devisee, and that the harm was discoverable when she ceased to
rely upon the appellee. This case can give no comfort to Plaintiff, as
the court rejected the appellant’s claim that the cause of action did
not accrue until the will was denied probate.

Plaintiff postulates, but without cogent argument, that the overrul-
ing of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was an implicit find-
ing of genuine issues of material fact. Under the circumstances of this
case, however, we do not perceive that to be correct.

On June 29, 1977, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Superior Court
of Marion County against Defendants. In essence, Plaintiff Dwyer
alleged that Moore intended that she be a beneficiary under his Will;
that Defendants, in rendering their legal services to Moore, failed to
carry out that intention; and that Plaintiff thereby lost the benefits
of the testamentary annuity which Moore intended to provide for her
benefit.

Following the allegations of fact, the Complaint proceeds on various
legal theories set forth in five counts, as aforesaid.

288 ee

Following change of venue to the Hancock Circuit Court, the par-
ties engaged in discovery proceedings. Plaintiff filed and defendants
responded to requests for admissions and two sets of interrogatories.
Defendants took Plaintiff's deposition, which was filed and ordered
published by the trial court. Plaintiff in turn took the deposition of
Defendant, Shideler, which was filed and ordered published, and the
deposition of J. Howard Williams (“Williams”), an executive at Moorfeed
and a co-executor of the will, which deposition was filed June 26, 1978
and ordered published.

On May 28, 1978, defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and supporting brief. Contemporaneously with filing the same,
Defendants submitted summary judgment exhibits documenting some
of the undisputed facts upon which the motion was based. These ex-
hibits included: (a) the Will, (b) Plaintiff's Petition for Construction
of Will Provision in the Probate Court of Marion County, (c) Plaintiff's
post-hearing brief filed in that court, (d) the brief filed in that same
proceeding by Domenic Angelicchio (“Angelicchio”), a Moorfeed exec-
utive and the residuary beneficiary of the Will, (e) an affidavit executed
by Angelicchio, and (f) an affidavit executed by Defendant Shideler.
The trial court then set Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
for hearing on August 4, 1978.

Prior to the hearing on Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff submitted to
the trial court the transcript of the March 5, 1975 hearing held by the
Probate Court of Marion County in her will construction suit. There-
after, Plaintiff filed her Memorandum Opposing Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment, attaching as exhibits thereto the petition for
and order of probate of the will and an affidavit executed by Myron
H. Budnick (“Budnick”), who had been her counsel in the proceedings
for construction of the will in the Probate Court of Marion County.

On August 4, 1978, the Hancock Circuit Court held a hearing on
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing, Defend-
ants moved to strike as irrelevant and inadmissible under Trial Rule
56 that portion of Budnick’s Affidavit which stated that, in his “opin-
ion,” Dwyer did not have a cause of action against Defendants until
a time, less than two years prior to commencement of the present ac-
tion. Defendants’ counsel then summarized for the trial court the

a 289

evidence in the record for summary judgment purposes, followed by
a similar summary presented by Dwyer’s counsel. Neither Defendants
nor Plaintiff, however, offered any testimony or additional evidence
at the hearing beyond that already in the record before the trial court
on Defendants’ Motion. Following the hearing, the trial court heard
argument of counsel and took the matter under advisement and over-
ruled the motion.

Defendants then petitioned the trial court, on September 11, 1978,
for certification for appeal of the order denying summary judgment,
pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(B)(5); and on September 15, 1978, the trial
court determined that it required additional research on the issues
presented by Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and on its
own motion vacated and set aside its previous order denying summary
judgment.

On September 22, 1978, the trial court held a hearing upon the peti-
tion for certification for appeal and took the matter under advisement.
Thereafter, on October 2, 1978, it entered the following interlocutory
order (omitting caption, title and formal parts), from which this appeal
was taken:

The Court now being fully advised overrules the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed herein by Defendants on May 23, 1978.
The Court now finds and adjudges that this ruling and order in-
volves a substantial question of law. The early determination of
which will promote a more orderly disposition of the case and that
an interlocutory appeal may be had from this order. [sic]

The Court further orders and adjudges that all further pro-
ceedings in this case shall be stayed until the termination of said
interlocutory appeal.

Defendants’ petition for certification for appeal addressed only mat-
ters relating to the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff's action was
barred by either statute of limitations hereinbefore con-

Hs sidered. We conclude from the trial court’s grant of that peti-
tion that the denial of summary judgment was not occasioned

by a finding of any genuine issue of fact material under any theory
of the complaint but, rather, was by reason of the court’s determina-
tion that, under the facts as established, the action was not so barred.

290 EE
a

We come to this conclusion because, otherwise, it could not be said
that an early determination of the issue presented by the order would
promote a more orderly disposition of the case. Were there material
issues of fact in existence on any theory of the complaint or any theory
in avoidance of the statute of limitations, the case could not have been
resolved without a trial, and the certification for the interlocutory ap-
peal would have been nothing more than a request for an advisory opin-
ion, which the appellate courts of this state do not render.

We have, therefore reviewed the exhibits that were before the trial
court upon the motion for summary judgment to determine whether
or not there existed any genuine issue of fact relevant to any theory
of the complaint. We have found no such issue upon any such theory.
Therefore, notwithstanding Plaintiff's contentions throughout her briefs
that the counts of her complaint alleging breach of contract, fraud, con-
structive fraud and breach of a fiduciary duty remain viable, regardless
of an adverse determination upon the issue of the statute of limita-
tions, we find that the Defendants are entitled to judgment, as a matter
of law, upon those counts, as the exhibits disclose no facts supportive
of any such theory.

If there were any basis for the charges under any of those theories,
Plaintiff failed to present it in response to Defendant’s motion. Trial
Rule 56(E) provides, and our Court of Appeals has repeatedly
Hs held, that when a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genwine issue for trial. See, e.g. Cunningham
v. Universal Battery Division—Yardney Electric Corp., (1976) 170
Ind.App. 166, 170, 352 N.E.2d 83, 86; Burcham v. Singer, (1972) 151
Ind.App. 1, 5, 277 N.E.2d 814, 816.

The party opposing summary judgment is obliged to disgorge suffi-
cient evidence to controvert the moving party’s assertion that there
exists no factual issue to be tried. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. Local Readers Service, Inc., (1969) 143 Ind.App. 370, 240 N.E.2d 552.

Although we hold that a disappointed beneficiary's action, if any,

Yi 291

the statute of limitations would then begin to run, we recog-
HH sonize that such statutes are subject to avoidance under cer-
tain recognized circumstances. Thus, the existence of a genu-
ine issue of fact which, if found, would avoid the consequence of the
statute would have precluded the grant of summary judgment. Accord-
ingly, our review of the summary judgment exhibits was also made
with a view to ascertaining the existence of any issue of fact relevant
to any theory of such avoidance. Again, none was found. Thus, although
arguably, the defendants’ may not be entitled to summary judgment,
as a matter of substantive law upon the negligence count of the com-
plaint, they are, nevertheless, entitled to judgment thereon, as a mat-
ter of law, because under the facts, as established, the applicable statute
of limitations was not tolled, and the complaint was not timely filed.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no dispute or conflict re-
garding a fact that is dispositive of the litigation. Letson v. Lowmaster,
(1976) 168 Ind.App. 159, 341 N.E.2d 785.

One final contention of Plaintiff should be disposed of. She argues,

without supporting authority, that the defendants were required to

raise the statute of limitations defense by a TR 12(B)(6) motion

Hor by an answer and, that by their failure to do so, they have

waived the defense. It has been logically held that such

defense may be properly raised by a motion for summary judgment.

Horvath v. Davidson, supra. In Von Clemm v. Smith, (S.D.N.Y. 1962)

204 F.Supp. 110, 113, it was said, “A defense of the statute of limita-
tions is peculiarly suitable as a basis for summary judgment.”

The decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals are ordered vacated.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. The cause is remanded,
and the trial court is directed to vacate its order denying Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and to grant the same as to all counts
of Plaintiff's complaint.

DeBruler and Hunter, JJ., concur;
Givan, C.J., dissents with opinion in which Pivarnik, J., concurs.
DISSENTING OPINION

GIVAN, C.J.—I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.

I do agree with the majority in their statement that the order deny-
ing summary judgment was appealable, pursuant to Indiana Appellate
Rule 4(B)(5)(b). I also accept the position of the majority in their find-
ing that the action in this cause is in tort and that the two year statute
of limitations is applicable.

I dissent from the majority opinion as to when the statute of limita-
tions began to run. In holding that the statute of limitations had not
yet run, the Court of Appeals cited the case of Price v. Holmes, (1967)
198 Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976. The majority opinion also cites the Kansas
case, but takes the position that it is in error. The majority states,
“The fallacy in the Kansas opinion is the conclusion that there has been
no injury done until the Supreme Court said so.” The majority takes
the position that the injury occurs when the will is probated and that
the named beneficiary in the will must within two years commence
an action against the drafters of the will concerning any malpractice
resulting in a detriment to the beneficiary.

The majority cites the case of Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp.
Co., (1936) 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824, 104 A.L.R. 450. In substance,
this case holds that a person inhaling dust which subsequently damages
his lungs, must bring his cause of action within two years of his first
inhaling the dust. The writers of the opinion observe that even though
the effects of breathing the dust may not be known to the plaintiff
for several years, he is nevertheless first impinged upon inhaling the
dust and must bring his cause of action within the statute of limita-
tions of that date.

I cannot accept this proposition of law, but in any event feel that
it is not in point with the issues presented in this case.

The majority also cites the case of The Board of Commissioners of
Wabash County v. Pearson, (1889) 120 Ind. 426, 22 N.E. 134. The case
concerns the construction of a bridge in 1871 which collapsed and in-
jured Pearson in 1884. The court held the statute of limitations did
not commence to run until the right of action accrued and that did not
oceur until Pearson was injured by the collapse of the bridge, not-
withstanding the fact that the negligence had occurred some thirteen
years earlier. The majority draws what I perceive to be an erroneous

Le 293
es

parallel between that case and the case at bar. The majority takes the
position that in the case at bar the impingement to the plaintiff first
occurred when the will was probated. Thus, likening that incident to
the incident of the collapse of the bridge. If we draw a parallel be-
tween the two cases, it would seem the negligence in constructing the
bridge parallels the negligence, if any, in constructing the will. The
probate of the will would parallel the opening of the bridge to traffic.
The collapse of the bridge parallels the decision of the Probate Court
in holding that the bequest to the plaintiff was void and of no force
and effect. To hold otherwise places the beneficiary under a will in
an impossible position. Upon probate of the will, he presumes he is
to benefit under the will, thus he bides his time waiting for the proper
authority to fulfill the bequest. Some time later, he learns that the
administrator of the estate has no intention of fulfilling the bequest.
He still takes the position the bequest is valid and institutes proceedings
in the Probate Court for enforcement of the bequest. At this time his
bridge is still standing, and he is taking the position that it is sturdy
enough to support him in his position. He, of course, would take the
position that the attorney who drafted the instrument drafted a per-
fectly valid instrument. It would be unthinkable for him at that time
to bring an action against the attorneys for drafting a bad instrument.
His bridge does not collapse until the Probate Court makes a decision
that the bequest in the will is unenforceable, and that he will take
nothing under the terms of the will. Only then is he in a position to
turn his attention to the drafters of the instrument which has failed him.

Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the impinge-
ment occurred when the will was probated, one must consider the “dis-
covery rule” as applied to this case.

The majority seeks to bolster its opinion by citing Heyer v. Flaig,
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 228, 449 P.2d 161. An analysis of Heyer and its pro-
geny lead one to conclude that if the California Supreme Court were
faced with the facts in the case at bar, it might well conclude that the
statute of limitations did not begin to run until the challenged provi-
sion of the will was declared void.

One reason for concluding that the statute began to run upon the
date of the death of the testatrix was because the plaintiff could not

294 |
PF

have brought an action before that time. “A statute of limitations does
not commence to run until a cause of action accrues, and ‘a cause of
action * * * invariably accrues when there is a remedy available’ ”.
Heyer v. Flaig, supra at 230, 449 P.2d at 166, quoting Irvine v. Bossen,
(1944) 25 Cal.2d 652, 658, 155 P.2d 9, 13. Unlike the instant case, the
negligence of Flaig was discoverable upon the death of the testatrix.
The Heyer sisters alleged that the testatrix retained Flaig to prepare
her will. She told defendant that she wanted her entire estate to pass
to her two daughters. She also informed Flaig that she planned to
remarry in a few weeks. The will purported to leave the entire estate
to the plaintiffs. However, the will did not mention the testatrix’ hus-
band to be, except that it named him as executor. Under a California
statute a spouse can be disinherited only if“... the spouse is provided
for in the will, or in such a way mentioned therein as to show an inten-
tion not to make such a provision; and no other evidence to rebut the
presumption of revocation can be received.” Cal. Probate Code §70
(West). Thus, in the Heyer case, once the will was admitted to probate
it was evident to the sisters that the will was drafted in such a way
as to reduce their share of their mother’s estate—a result which was
clearly contrary to her intentions.

In the instant case, plaintiff could not have known that the particular
clause in the will was ineffective until the court determined that it
was void. It would be strange indeed to require a potential beneficiary
under a will to file suit alleging that the portion of the will which ap-
parently benefitted him is void before the validity of the provision has
been determined by a court. Yet, this is what the majority seems to
require.

Aside from the factual dissimilarities between Heyer and the case
at bar, an examination of California cases decided since Heyer indicates
that the majority has erroneously relied on California law to support
the proposition that the statute of limitations in the instant case began
to run at the time of death of the testatrix.

In Heyer, the California Supreme Court began to depart from the
majority rule which sets the commencement of the statute of limita-
tions at the time of the negligent act. The Court began to acknowledge,
without fully accepting, the emerging “discovery rule”. According to

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PCT

the discovery theory, the statute of limitations in such cases runs from
the date the negligence was, or should have been, discovered.

The California Court did not mention the discovery rule in the text
of Heyer; rather, it alluded to it in a footnote. There the Court stated
that “[t}he judicial rule against postponed accrual of the statute of limita-
tions in legal malpractice actions is set upon a tenuous basis.” Heyer,
supra, at 223 FN 7, 449 P.2d at 168, FN 7.

The California Court did not fully embrace the discovery rule until
later. In Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart, & Gelfand, (1971) 98
Cal.Rptr. 837, 846, 491 P.2d 421, 430, Justice Tobriner concluded that
“in an action for professional malpractice against an attorney, the cause
of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or should know, all
material facts essential to show the elements of that cause of action.”
Neel, rather than Heyer, is the key California case with respect to the
statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions. See also Horne v.
Peckham, (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 404, 158 Cal.Rptr. 714.

In the case at bar, Dwyer had no way of knowing whether the chal-
lenged provision was unenforceable until the Probate Court rendered
its decision. The clause provided that Angelicchio, the testator’s
business partner, would continue to employ plaintiff until she retired.
This much, Angelicchio did. Not until she retired did she learn that
the portion of the clause requiring Angelicchio to pay her $500.00 a
month after she retired might be unenforceable. And until the provi-
sion was declared void, she had every reason to claim validity of the
clause.

Faced with a similar factual situation, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico applied the discovery doctrine. Jaramillo v. Hood, (1979) 93 N.M.
433, 601 P.2d 66. As in the case at bar and Heyer, Jaramillo involved
a suit by a disappointed beneficiary against the drafter of a will. The
will was prepared on April 28, 1967. The testator died on October 6,
1967. On November 22, 1967, the will was admitted to probate. Appel-
lant changed attorneys on January 22, 1968, March 26, 1969, and August
2, 1971. The order admitting the will to probate was set aside nunc
pro tunc on April 14, 1969. Appellant did not file her complaint until
May, 1977. As to the date when the statute of limitations began to

296 |
PF

run, the Court stated:

The harm or damage in this case arose at the time the testatrix
died. However, the cause of action did not accrue until the harm
or damage was ascertainable or discoverable. In this case appellant
was in a position to ascertain or discover the harm or damage
to her as a result of the alleged defect in the execution of the dece-
dent’s will each time she changed attorneys, and also at the time
the court set aside the order admitting the will to probate. Jara-
millo, supra, 601 P.2d 67.

While it appears that the majority of states adhere to the rule that
the statute of limitations on a legal malpractice claim begins to run
from the date the negligent act occurred, 18 A.L.R.3d 978 (1968), several
states, besides California and New Mexico, have recognized the dis-
eovery rule. Niedermeyer v. Dusenberry, (1976) 275 Or. 83, 549 P.2d
1111; Cameron v. Montgomery, (1975) Iowa, 225 N.W.2d 154; Succession
of Killingsworth, (1972) LaApp., 270 So.2d 196; Hendrickson v. Sears,
(1974) 865 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131; Kohler v. Woollen, Brown &
Hawkins, (1978) 14 Ill.App.3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677; Peters v. Simmons,
(1976) 87 Wash. 2d 400, 552 P.2d 1053; Edwards v. Ford, (1973) Fla.,
279 So.2d 851; Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, (1978) 94 Nev. 440, 581 P.2d
851; McKee v. Riordon, (1976) 116 N.H. 729, 366 A.2d 472; Mumford v.
Staton, Whaley and Price, (1969) 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has made perhaps
the most poignant statement by a court justifying the application of
the discovery rule:

We are inclined to agree with the defendant that it is the ma-
jority view in this country that as a general proposition the statute
of limitations begins to run from the date of the commission of
the act of professional malpractice rather than from the date of
discovery. However, we do not agree with the defendant's cavalier
dismissal from consideration the cases which subscribe to the so-
called minority view. We do not equate an “overwhelming number
of cases”, as expressed in the defendant's brief, with justice and
right. Family Savings & Loan, Ine. v. Ciccarello, (1974) 157 W.Va.
983, 207 S.E.2d 157.

Likewise, in the instant case, appellant blithely states that the holding
in Price v. Holmes, (1967) 198 Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976, which is but one

Le 297

case where the discovery rule was applied in a legal malpractice situa-
tion, “is an aberrational holding” and that “cases from other jurisdic-
tions ... reveal that Price v. Holmes is an abberational result.” I cannot
agree with this assertion. Whether the impingement occurred when
the Probate Court rendered its decision or was discovered at that time
is of little moment; in either event the statute of limitations in the
case at bar should not be deemed to commence until the date the clause
in the will was declared void. Accordingly, I dissent from the decision
of the majority insofar as it holds that the statute of limitations began
to run from the date of death of the testator.

Pivarnik, J., concurs.

NotE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 281.

STATE OF INDIANA EX REL. RICHARD DROST AND NAKED CITY, INC.
vy. NEWTON SUPERIOR COURT AND THE HONORABLE
DENNIS KRAMER, AS JUDGE OF SAID COURT.

[No. 11808427. Filed March 8, 1981]

Richard Kammen, McClure, McClure & Kammen, Franklin I. Miroff,
Ancel, Friedlander, Miroff and Ancel, of Indianapolis, for relators.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen Cuthbert, Deputy
Attorney General, R. Steven Ryan, Prosecuting Attorney, Newton
County, for respondent.

PIVARNIK, J.— Relators, Richard Drost and Naked City, Incorporated,
have petitioned this Court to issue a writ of mandate against the
Newton Superior Court and the Honorable Dennis Kramer, as judge
of that court. Essentially, relators challenge the adequacy of respond-
ent Judge Kramer’s compliance with the statutory procedures relating
to the seizure and preliminary judicial review of allegedly obscene
materials. After the oral argument on this matter on November 24,
1980, this Court unanimously denied relator’s request for a writ of man-
date. This opinion is in furtherance of that decision.

On August 12, 1980, respondent Judge Kramer issued a search war-
rant authorizing police officers to search for and seize

“video tapes, films and photographs exhibiting any obscene per-
formance and any photographs, films or video tapes presenting
or exhibiting any obscene performance depicting or describing sex-
ual conduct involving any person who is under sixteen (16) years
of age; and, any video tape machines, and projection systems,
screens, projectors, used to display, manage, produce, sponsor or
exhibit such obscene performance.”

The warrant recited that the search could cover “the lobby area and
the bedroom known to be occupied by Richard Drost in the Round Gold

[| 299
ee

Building located . . . at Naked City in Roselawn, Indiana.” Pursuant
to this warrant, Indiana State Police officers seized over one hundred
items from the described premises at Naked City. Most of these items
were films or video tapes of an allegedly obscene nature.

The search for and seizure of these materials were made pursuant
to Ind. Code § 35-30-10.1-1 et seq. (Burns 1979 Repl.). Section 35-30-10.1-5
states:

“Where the subject matter is offered for distribution to the
public as stock-in-trade of a lawful business or activity, or, as in
the case of films, is exhibited at a commercial theater showing
regularly scheduled performances to the general public, no per-
son shall be arrested for a violation of any of the provisions of
this chapter unless the arresting officer shall have obtained an
arrest warrant, and no property shall be seized as evidence unless
a search warrant shall have first been obtained pursuant to the
provisions of this title; Provided, however, that the quantity of
materials seized shall encompass no more than is reasonable and
necessary for the purpose of obtaining evidence.”

In addition, § 35-30-10.1-6 states:

“At any time after seizure, or the obtaining of evidence by pur-
chase, and prior to trial, the state, defendant, owner, or other party
in interest of any matter seized or purchased, may apply for and
obtain a prompt adversary hearing for the purpose of obtaining
apreliminary determination of probable obscenity. If evidence has
been obtained by purchase, the court shall direct the clerk of the
court to issue notice to the defendant informing him or her of the
availability of a prompt adversary hearing prior to the issuance
of an arrest warrant. If the court determines at said hearing that
there is probable cause to believe that the matter is obscene, the
matter shall be held as evidence, and an arrest warrant may be
issued for the arrest of the defendant. Provided, further, if the
defendant, owner or other party in interest of any matter seized
or purchased shall not apply for a prompt adversary hearing within
five (5) days after the seziure occurs or within seven (7) days after
notice is issued by the clerk, an arrest warrant may be issued
for the arrest of the defendant. In the case of films or motion
pictures, at any time after seizure and prior to trial or any adver-
sary hearing for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary determina-
tion of probable obscenity, the defendant or owner of any matter
seized may apply for and, upon a showing that other copies of the

300 ee
___ EEE

film or motion picture are not available to be exhibited, the court
shall order that the applicant be permitted to copy the film or
motion pictures, at his own expense, so that showing can be con-
tinued pending a judicial determination of probable obscenity in
an adversary hearing.”

Thus, under these statutes, if materials are seized pursuant to a search
warrant, the defendant, owner or other party in interest is entitled
to a prompt adversary hearing conducted for the purpose of
H_soobtaining a preliminary determination of probable obscenity.
See generally State ex rel. J.N.S., Inc., v. Marion Municipal

Court, (1979) 272 Ind. 86, 396 N.E.2d 361.

The record before us here reveals the following sequence of events.
On August 15, 1980, three days after the search warrant was executed,
relators petitioned for a prompt adversary hearing pursuant to
§ 35-30-10.1-6. The respondent court began these adversary hearings
on August 19; however, the court did not complete its review on that
day, and set the matter for continued hearing the next day. However,
relators then requested a continuance. The court granted this request
and reset the hearings for August 27 and August 28. Further hearings
were held on those days, and the court then continued the matter to
September 11 and September 12.

At some point before the resumption of the scheduled hearings,
relators learned that Judge Kramer was not planning to be present
at those hearings, but instead was planning to appoint a judge pro tem-
pore to conduct the hearings in his absence. Relators, joined by the
prosecutor, objected to this contemplated action; as a result, at relators’
request, the hearings were continued and were rescheduled for Octo-
ber 28, 29 and 30. On September 15, relators filed an “Application for
Return of Property and Renewed Request for Prompt Hearing.” This
pleading objected to the October 28-30 hearings dates and requested
that respondent Judge Kramer resume the probable obscenity hear-
ings immediately and continue to hold the hearings until the review
of the evidence was completed. In response to this petition, Judge
Kramer’s record entry states that he had a schedule conflict from
September 22 to October 10, and that he had rescheduled the hearings
for the earliest possible resumption.

Ye 301
_ Eee

On October 15, respondent Judge Kramer entered an order confirm-
ing the October 28 and October 29 hearing dates, but continuing the
October 30 hearing date because “the court has other matters that
have to be heard on October 30, 1980.” One week later, on October
22, the State requested a continuance of the October 29 hearing date
due to the unavailability of one of its witnesses. The court granted
this motion. The trial court’s record further reflects that the probable
obscenity hearings were resumed on October 28. At that hearing,
relators renewed their request for “a prompt hearing” and the return
of all confiscated items. Judge Kramer denied this motion and, at the
close of that day’s hearing, scheduled further hearings for November
26, December 2, December 3, and December 11. Thereafter, relators
filed the petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court.

Relators argue that the statutory procedure has not been adequately
followed by Judge Kramer, and that his method of disposing of this
matter effectively denies them their First Amendment rights. Relators
correctly assert that they are entitled to a prompt adversary hearing
for the purpose of determining the probable obscenity of the materials
seized pursuant to the warrant. They contend that, to adequately in-
sure protection of their First Amendment rights, the respondent trial
court must put aside all other matters, except criminal cases in which
the defendant is exercising his right to a speedy trial, and conduct these
adversary hearings in greatly expedited fashion. The respondent court,
here, of course, has not taken such action. Relators conclude that re-
spondent Judge Kramer lacks jurisdiction to conduct these adversary
hearings except in the fashion and with the speed they suggest. On
that basis, relators request that we issue a writ of mandamus against
respondents, and order Judge Kramer to advance this matter on his
calendar ahead of all other matters except criminal cases in which the
defendant is asserting his right to a speedy trial.

On the basis of the facts before us, we are not persuaded by relators’
argument. It is true, of course, that an action for a writ of mandamus
will lie to force an official to perform a clear legal duty or

Hs to grant an unquestioned right to relief. E.g., State ex rel.
Burns v. Clay Cirewit Court, (1979) 271 Ind. 344, 393 N.E.2d

127, 180; State ex rel. Sorrells v. Gibson, (1968) 251 Ind. 225, 229, 240

302 ee
Ee

N.E.2d 544, 546; State ex rel. Winkler v. Marion Superior Court, (1967)
248 Ind. 424, 428, 229 N.E.2d 648, 651. However, an action for mandate
cannot be employed to adjudicate and establish a right or to define
and impose a duty. E.g., State ex rel. Rainey v. Bd. of Trustees, Ind.
St. Teachers’ Retirement Fund, (1964) 245 Ind. 693, 699, 201 N.E.2d 564,
567; State ex rel. Socony Mobil Oil Co., v. Delaware Circuit Court, (1964)
245 Ind. 154, 159, 196 N.E.2d 752, 755. Relators’ petition here essen-
tially asks this Court to perform this latter task and define and impose
a duty on respondent Judge- Kramer.

We do not agree with relators’ contention that Judge Kramer has

a clear legal duty to conduct these hearings in the fashion they sug-
gest or that he has jurisdiction to handle this matter only with

I the speed they deem appropriate. The United States Supreme
Court’s pronouncements on related obscenity questions have

spoken of “prompt adversary hearings,” but have refused to define
or circumscribe this constitutional requisite with more specificity. See
Heller v. New York, (1973) 413 U.S. 483, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 37 L.Ed.2d 745;
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, (1971) 402 U.S. 363, 91 S.Ct.
1400, 28 L.Ed.2d 822. Likewise, the applicable statute, § 35-30-10.1-6,
speaks only in terms of a “prompt adversary hearing.” Our decision
here in no way detracts from a trial court’s duty to conduct these adver-
sary hearings on probable obscenity in prompt fashion. Respondent
Judge Kramer was and is under such a duty in this case. However,
vigilant adherence to this principle does not require the establishment
of specific time limits in which these hearings must be held. The
vagaries of trial court caseload and scheduling problems mitigate
against the establishment of a set of time limitations applicable to all
cases, and, in fact, strongly suggest that the “prompt adversary hear-
ing” principle can be meaningfully applied on only a case-by-case basis.

The circumstances of this case do not reveal the failure to perform
aclear legal duty. Respondent Judge Kramer scheduled the first hear-
ing for August 19, one week after the items were seized. The record
also indicates that Judge Kramer scheduled subsequent hearings for
the soonest, most convenient dates available on the court calendar,
and, in fact, has proceeded to conduct hearings on those dates whenever
possible. At the time relators filed their petition with this Court, four

L | 303

future dates had been selected and set aside for the purpose of holding
these hearings. Thus, this is not a case which presents unaccounted-
for delays, or in which the trial court has refused to conduct the
necessary hearings and thereby effectively censored the items from
community access without a judicial determination of probable obscen-
ity. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, (1965) 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13
L.Ed.2d 649.

It is true that certain hearing dates were set aside and rescheduled
for later times; however, two such continuances were brought about
on relators’ motion. This fact would seem to logically contradict relators’
demand for immediate disposition of this matter. In any event, such
delays clearly could not be charged to respondent Judge Kramer in
determining whether he has discharged his duty to conduct prompt
hearings. Heller v. New York, supra.

Finally, relators have not shown or even argued that this search
and seizure has “prevented continuing exhibition” of copies of the seized
materials. Heller v. New York, supra, 418 U.S. at 491, 93 S.Ct.
HB saat: 2794, 37 L.Ed.2d at 754. See Ind. Code § 35-30-10.1-6, supra.
While certainly not dispositive of the question of whether the
trial court is properly discharging his duty under First Amendment
principles and our statutory procedures, we believe this is a factor which
must be considered in analyzing relators’ argument that Judge
Kramers’ alleged lack of promptness has operated to deny them their
First Amendment rights. See Heller v. New York, supra; Freedman v.
Maryland, supra. Cf. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., (1980)
445 U.S. 308, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 63 L.Ed.2d 413.

Relators have implicitly suggested that the State and/or respondent
Kramer brought about this administrative dilemma by the seizure of
such a large quantity of exhibits. We might be inclined to agree, as
a general proposition, that it would have been better judgment to pur-
sue this matter in a different fashion. However, where no constitu-
tional or statutory violation has been shown, it is not our task to review
discretionary decisions of this type, especially in the context of the
reviewing of a petition for extraordinary relief.

We conclude that, so long as it is readily apparent that the trial court

304 |
CE

is not avoiding its constitutional and statutory duty and is conducting
the necessary hearings in “prompt” fashion, the court has dis-
I cretion to decide exactly when—and the frequency with
which—the hearings must occur. The record here does not
reveal a failure to discharge a clear legal duty; likewise, we decline
to establish a right of relators to have these hearings advanced on the
court’s calendar above all other matters, save criminal cases, and a
concomitant duty on respondent Judge Kramer to conduct these hear-
ings in this fashion or within a specified or predetermined amount of
time. See State ex rel. J.N.S., Inc., swpra. For these reasons, relators’
petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Hunter, and Prentice, JJ., concur.
Note—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 1247.
Le

AARON DEW v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 280837. Filed March 3, 1981. Rehearing denied May 14, 1981.]

P| 305
[Cid

Robert E. Stochel, of Griffith, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Gordon R. Medlicott, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.—This is a direct appeal from a conviction after a jury
trial of one count of criminal confinement, class B felony, Ind. Code
§ 35-42-3-3, one count of robbery, class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1,
and one count of burglary, class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. The
court sentenced appellant to concurrent twenty year terms of imprison-
ment on each count.

The evidence supporting the verdict shows that on February 18, 1979,
appellant was driving a car which struck a car being driven by Brenda
Evans. Mrs. Evans’ daughter was a passenger in the car. After the
two drivers emerged from their cars to discuss the incident, appellant
pointed a gun at Evans’ head, forced her into the front seat of her car
and ordered the daughter into the car he had been driving. He then
drove to the Evans home, his companion following in the other car.

While at the Evans’ house, appellant tied up Mrs. Evans, her
daughter, and her husband, and left the house about one hour later
in the Evans’ car, taking their television set, stereo equipment, and
other items.

The appeal raises the sole issue of whether it was reversible error
for the trial court to allow the State, over appellant's objection, to in-
troduce evidence in conflict with appellant’s notice of alibi when the
State had failed to answer the notice as it was required to do.

The appellant filed and served a timely notice of intention to offer
evidence of alibi, pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-5-1-1. He included, as pro-
vided by Ind. Code § 35-5-1-2, a request for a specific statement of the
date, time, and place the prosecution proposed to present at trial as
the date, time, and place the appellant was alleged to have committed
the crimes. The State never filed the specific statement.

Under the provisions of Ind. Code § 35-5-1-3, if the prosecution fails

to file the requested statement, the court, absent a showing by the pros-

ecution of good cause for the failure is required “to exclude

Hs evidence offered by the prosecuting attorney to show that the

defendant was at a place other than the place stated in the

defendant’s original notice and that the time was other than the time
stated in the original notice.”

Appellant argues that since the State showed no good cause for the
failure, the evidence was improperly admitted and the convictions should
be reversed, citing Pearman v. State, (1954) 233 Ind. 111, 117 N.E.2d
362, and Shelton v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 559, 290 N.E.2d 47. In Pearman
this Court reversed a conviction because the State failed to comply with
the then applicable statutory provisions on the defense of alibi, sections
9-1631 to 9-1633, Burns’ 1942 Repl., which are virtually identical with
our present statute. The Court said:

“The alibi statute, which is of material assistance in enabling
the State to detect and disprove a fraudulent ablibi, puts duties
upon the State as well as the defendant. The defense of alibi is a
legitimate defense, and if the accused takes the proper steps pur-
suant to the statute, the State must be required to discharge its
duties, unless good cause be shown for failure so to do.” 233 Ind.
at 119, 117 N.E.2d at 366.

Shelton, a case in which the alibi statute was not properly invoked by
the defendant, recites the Pearman language quoted above, and holds
that defendant's failure to comply strictly with the statute forclosed
his assertion of rights created there. Strict compliance was held to be
a condition precedent for such an assertion.

The State’s response to the Pearman decision is that it is old and that
since the time it was decided, the thinking of this Court has changed
“a bit,” citing Reed v. State, (1963) 243 Ind. 544, 188 N.E.2d 533; Owens
v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 487, 333 N.E.2d 745; and Hampton v. State, (1977)
172 Ind.App. 55, 359 N.E.2d 276. The State misstates the ruling in Reed.
In that case the appellant had properly served his notice of alibi under
the same statutory provisions as in Pearman, and requested the specific
statement as to exact time and place of the alleged offense. The pro-
secuting attorney did not file the requested statement within the
statutory eight-day period before trial but filed a motion on the sixth

be 307

day before trial for leave to file the statement. The court granted the
motion and the specific statement was served on the appellant on that
day. Error in Reed was based on the trial court’s overruling of appellant’s
motion to strike the State’s motion for leave to file the specific state-
ment out of time. This Court held that there had been no error because
another section of the alibi statute provided that in the event of the
failure of the prosecuting attorney to file the requested statement, the
court could in its discretion extend the time for filing.

Owens also involved a delayed filing of the specific statement re-
quested by the appellant in his alibi notice. This Court said that although
appellant’s objections to the late filing were well-grounded, the ap-
propriate remedy was a continuance.

Neither case reflects, as the State claims, a change in the Court’s think-
ing, since the alibi problems in those cases involved late filings while
Pearman and the present case involve a failure to file.

The State cites Hampton for the proposition that since only the date
is required to be disclosed by the State, the exact time may be obtained
by other discovery. The appellant refused to acknowledge other
discovery as a remedy for the failure to file, and “stood on his rights”,
the State argues. Reliance on Hampton is misplaced since in Bruce v.
State, (1978) 268 Ind. 180, 375 N.E.2d 1042, this Court expressly disagreed
with the Court of Appeals’ determination in Hampton of the specificity
required of the State in its specific statement, and held that if evidence
available to the State permits, the prosecutor must specify the time
of day as well as the date.

This Court has not changed its thinking since Pearman. A review
of cases since then reveals that we have consistently said that a defend-
ant’s right to exclusion of State’s evidence of time and place

I soof'a charged crime arises upon his strict compliance with his
duties under the statute, in the absence of a showing of good

cause for the State’s failure to file the requested specific statement.
Cases excusing the State’s failure to file involve defendants’ failure to
comply with their own duties. See, e.g., Bullock v. State, (1978) 178
Ind.App. 316, 382 N.E.2d 179, 183; Dockery v. State, (1974) 161 Ind.App.

308

|
ee
681, 317 N.E.2d 458, 459; Shelton, supra; Cockerham v. State, (1965) 246
Ind. 308, 204 N.E.2d 654, 656.

Other cases involved defendants’ claims of non-compliance because
the State’s responsive statements were not sufficiently specific. See
Bruce, supra; and Monserrate v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 153, 352 N.E.2d
‘721, 724,

Since appellant complied with the requirements under the alibi notice
statute, and the State failed to do so and demonstrated no good cause
for its failure, it was error for the trial court to permit the State to in-
troduce its evidence as to time and place. The conviction is reversed
and the case remanded for a new trial.

Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NotTEe—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 1245.

Dorotuy I. BRAND v. MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

[No. 381857. Filed March 4, 1981. Rehearing denied May 19, 1981.]

Chalmer Schlosser, Jr., William L. Schlosser, Schlosser, White &
Schlosser, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John R. Carr, III, Stephan R. Buschmann, Buschmann, Carr & Meyer,

of Indianapolis, for appellee. William M. Evans, Bose, McKinney & Evans,
of Indianapolis, Attorney for Amicus Curiae.

PIVARNIK, J.— This cause comes to us on a petition to transfer from the
Fourth District Court of Appeals. Appellant Dorothy Brand was plain-
tiff below. She was the wife of Bruce Brand, the insured, and brought
the action for the $10,000 (ten thousand dollar) proceeds of a life insurance
policy issued by appellee and defendant below, Monumental Life In-
surance Company. Brand received an adverse judgment after a trial
to the court and appealed that judgment, alleging that it was contrary
to law and the evidence. It was Brand’s contention that Monumental
should have been estopped from asserting a forfeiture of policy benefits
for non-payment of monthly premiums. This contention was based on
Monumental’s admitted practice of accepting premiums paid within sixty
days after the end of a thirty-one (81) day grace period provided the
insured was alive and apparently in good health. Brand tendered three
monthly payments totalling $48.87, within the sixty-day period, but after
the death of the insured, Bruce Brand. Monumental refused to accept
the tender of payments and contended its actions were justified in that
the condition for the extension, that the insured be alive and apparently
in good health, was not met because Bruce Brand was not alive at the
time of the tender.

On appeal, Brand was seeking to reverse a negative judgment claim-
ing it to be contrary to law and the evidence. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and found that Brand was entitled to

Hi judgment in the amount of $10,000 with interest. Brand v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co., (1979) Ind.App., 396 N.E.2d 417. The

Court of Appeals acknowledged in its opinion that the standard for deter-
mining when a negative judgment will be overturned is: “A finding,

310 ee

which is, in effect, a negative finding against the plaintiff, may be set
aside only if the evidence is uncontradicted and will support no
reasonable inference in favor of the finding.” Taxpayers Lobby of In-
diana, Ine. v. Orr, (1974) 262 Ind. 92, 311 N.E.2d 814, 819. In determin-
ing whether a judgment is contrary to law we do not weigh the facts
nor determine the credibility of the witnesses. This is the duty of the
trier of fact. Where there is a conflict in the evidence, the trier of fact
in the court below must resolve that conflict. Where the party having
the burden receives a negative judgment by the trier of fact, we will
not disturb that judgment if there is any evidence to support it or a
reasonable inference to be drawn from any evidence in favor of it. Um-
breit v. Chester B. Stem, Inc., (1978) 176 Ind.App. 53, 373 N.E.2d 1116.
We find that the Court of Appeals violated the above standard in revers-
ing the judgment of the trial court here, and further find that the Court
of Appeals improperly applied the law to the facts presented to the trial
court in making the finding that the judgment of the trial court was
contrary to law. We therefore grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the
Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the stipulations entered into
by both parties before trial. Those stipulations were as follows:

1. The premium payment book with attached receipt contains
a true record of the dates of collection of premiums on the in-
surance policy.

5. Defendant’s agents visited the home of Bruce Brand and
Dorothy Brand on or about July 9, 1975, for the purpose of
asking Bruce Brand and Dorothy Brand to pay the amount of
premiums then overdue.

6. The amount of overdue premiums was at that time $48.87, for
the months of May, June and July of 1975.

7. Defendant’s agents, after meeting with Bruce Brand and
Dorothy Brand, attempted to contact Bruce Brand’s mother,
Margaret Smith, for the purpose of asking her to pay the
amount of said overdue premiums on behalf of Bruce Brand
and Dorothy Brand.

8. Bruce Brand died on July 14, 1975.

Le 311
ee

9. Dorothy Brand tendered the amount of overdue premiums to
defendant’s agents on or about July 22, 1975.

10. Defendant’s agents refused said tender.

11. Defendant has a practice or procedure whereby premium
payments are accepted within 60 days of the expiration of the
applicable grace period, provided defendant’s agents receive

at least verbal assurance that the insured is alive and ap-
parently in good health.

12. Dorothy Brand had actual knowledge of defendant’s practice
or procedure set forth in stipulation No. 11.

18. The premium payment tendered by Dorothy Brand on or about
July 22, 1975, would have been accepted by defendant’s agents
on behalf of defendant, if Bruce Brand had been alive and ap-
parently well at that time.

There was other evidence before the trial court, in addition to these
stipulations, that is pertinent to our opinion here.

The policy of insurance issued by Monumental was a basic life policy
covering the deceased, Bruce L. Brand, and plaintiff-appellant, Dorothy
I. Brand. The policy provided for a premium of $16.09 per month, payable
in advance on the first day of its interval of premium payment, which
date for the first premium is the date of issue, March 1, 1974. Bruce
Brand was 21 years old at the date of issuance and died at the age of
22 years, on July 14, 1975. The policy further provided that any premium,
other than the first, not paid when due may be paid within the grace
period of thirty-one (31) days after its due date provided premiums have
been paid to that date. Under paragraph IV of the policy, Monumental
had the option of reinstating the policy after a lapse, after having
received evidence of insurability satisfactory to the Company plus pay-
ment of overdue premiums and interest. Paragraph XII of the policy
provides that the policy will lapse if a premium has not been paid when
the grace period of thirty-one days ends. If the policy has no surrender
value at the end of the grace period, the insurance will cease to be in
force. Paragraph XII also sets out the method of calculation of the ex-
tended term insurance available, if any, at the time of lapse.

The policy issued to Brand here, had no cash value when the premiums
were due and unpaid. This policy was issued on March 1, 1974, and the

312 ee
Ee

first payment was made on or about April 15, 1974. Thereafter, all
payments were made when due or before the expiration of the grace
period through January, 1975. The payment due February, 1975, was
paid March 10, 1975, and the March and April payments due March 1,
and April 1, respectively, were paid on April 16, 1975. Thereafter, no
further payments were made or tendered until July 22, 1975, after the
death of the insured. There was evidence that when the February 1975,
payment was made on March 10, 1975, after the thirty-one day grace
period had passed, that a representative of Monumental first inquired
by phone and determined that Bruce Brand was alive and apparently
in good health, before accepting said payment. There was evidence that
the March and April payments which were paid on April 16, 1975, were
not accepted by agents of Monumental until they had seen Bruce Brand
in person and had determined that he was in good health.

Stipulation 12 of the stipulations of the parties, supra, states that
Dorothy Brand had actual knowledge of Monumental’s practice of ac-
cepting late payments as set out in Stipulation 11, supra, providing
their agents received at least verbal assurance that the insured is alive
and apparently in good health. There was evidence that Bruce Brand
also had knowledge that he had no coverage and obtained that know-
ledge in the presence of his wife. There was testimony by witnesses
Millett and Kreutzer, representatives of Monumental, that they were
at the Brand home two days before the death of Bruce Brand, attemp-
ting to collect the premiums so that the policy might be reinstated.
Their testimony was that they told Bruce Brand that his policy had
lapsed and he no longer had coverage, but, if he paid the overdue
premiums, his policy could be in effect again and his coverage would
be continued. Their testimony was that Bruce Brand responded that
he did not want the insurance and did not intend to continue it. He
told them he intended to live forever and would not need insurance.
He further said he did not have the money to pay it and was not going
to pay it. There was a discussion about having Bruce’s parents pay
the premium, but Bruce told them he did not want them to bother his
parents as he did not want the policy. There was evidence that Bruce’s
mother or father had paid one of the payments in February, 1975. There
is conflict in this evidence. Dorothy Brand testified that although she

[| 318
ee

was not present during all of the conversation, she did hear one of
the agents for Monumental tell Bruce Brand that his policy was still
in effect but, if he did not pay the premium soon, it would be cancelled.
There was also evidence that after the thirty-one day grace period the
policy was carried as lapsed and lapse notices were sent to the parties.
Witnesses for Monumental testified that notices had been sent to the
Brands telling them that their policy had lapsed. Dorothy Brand
testified she never received any of these notices. The Company policy
also was that within a sixty-day period following the due date of a
premium payment, they would accept a late payment without interest
on verification from an agent that such agent had determined that the
insured was alive and apparently in good health. There was a special
form filed with the agent when he sent in the premium notice under
these circumstances in which he indicated he had made that determina-
tion. It was further provided in the policy that a lapsed policy could
be reinstated for up to five years, but after the sixty-day period, in-
surability would have to be verified by medical examination and all
premiums, plus interest, would have to be paid before reinstatement.

Our burden, and that of the Court of Appeals, in reviewing this case
on an appellate level, is to determine whether there was evidence before
the trial court to support his judgment that Monumental was justified
in asserting a forfeiture under the facts and circumstances here.

This Court addressed the question of forfeitures of insurance pro-
ceeds in the context of late payments and the waiver of their time-
liness in Oddfellows Mutual Aid Association of Indiana v.

HB Sweetser, (1889) 117 Ind. 97, 19 N.E. 722. In that case the in-
surance agreement provided that the premium payments

could be made within ten days after the due date, which fell on the
25th day of each month. In actual practice, payments were accepted
up to 60 (sixty) days after the due date. On November 24, the insurance
company accepted the September 25th payment from the insured. At
that time the insured was informed his October 25th payment was late
and his November payment would be due the next day. He died on
December 15, without having paid the October and November
payments. This Court found in Sweetser that the course of dealing had
induced the insured to believe that payment might be made within

314 ee

sixty days after the receipt of notice, even though the notice stated
otherwise. No formal action had been taken by Oddfellows to cancel
the certificates or to declare a forfeiture, nor was the insured informed
when the payment last made by him was received by the Company
that the previous extensions for time payment would no longer be con-
tinued. “It is abundantly settled that an insurance company will be
estopped to insist upon a forfeiture, if, by an agreement, either ex-
pressed or implied by the course of its conduct, it leads the insured
honestly to believe that the premiums of assessments will be received
after the appointed day. Id. at 100, 19 N.E. at 723. “It is not necessary
that there should have been an agreement, formally expressed in words,
to extend the time. If the officers of the association manifested by their
acts, declarations or conduct, their assent to an extension of time, and
their intention not to insist upon a forfeiture, and the insured honestly
and in good faith relied and acted upon their conduct or declarations,
the association is now estopped to say that there was no agreement.”
Id., at 104, 19 N.E. at 725. The court then found that whether or not
under all the circumstances the conduct of the association was such
as to put the insured off his guard and to raise an implied agreement
to continue in the same course of dealing was a question for the jury
after taking into consideration all of the circumstances including those
circumstances of the conduct of the association in accepting late
payments for two years, of seeing the assured at his office and not
advising him of the change of policy, and of receiving assessments that
were then nearly sixty days past due.

In Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Custer, (1891) 128 Ind. 25,
27 N.E. 124, the insurance company was estopped from asserting a
forfeiture for overdue premium payments because of its practice of
extending the time for the payment. Instead of demanding cash pay-
ment on Custer’s June 3, 1884 annual premium, the Company accepted
a note due January 3, 1885, and later extended the maturity date of
the note to June 3, 1885. On May 9, 1885, Custer died. The trial court
entered judgment for Custer and this Court affirmed the judgment,
stating: “According to the interpretation claimed by appellant the ar-
rangement to extend the time for payment of the note, so far as his
right (sic) under the policy were concerned, would have left him precise-
ly in the condition he would have been without an extension. It would

P| 315
ee

enable the company, under a show of leniency, to receive all the benefits
of the extension, and yet remain in a condition to repudiate all liability
during the same time. It would enable the company, whatever hap-
pened, to ‘reap the premium and escape the risk.’ Kentucky Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Jinks, 5 Ind. 96.” Id., at 30-31, 27 N.E. at 126. See also
West v. National Casualty Co., (1916) 61 Ind.App. 479, 112 N.E. 115.
In these cases there was a practice of the company accepting late
payments beyond the grace period without any conditions being put
on that acceptance and without any notice to the insured that certain
conditions must be met with reference to insurability before the in-
surance could be reinstated. In all of those cases it was determined
that by a practice of accepting late payments, the insured had been
led to believe that payments within a period after the regular grace
period were acceptable to the company, and the company was therefore
estopped to declare a forfeiture during that extended period. As a mat-
ter of fact, in Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Custer, supra,
the premiums had, in fact, been paid by a note even though the note
was unpaid. The company did have an action on the note and accepted
it as payment, thereby leading the insured into a determination that
he had coverage.

Tn the cause before us there was evidence before the trial court that
for a period of sixty days after the expiration of the thirty-one day
grace period, the company would accept overdue payments

Ito bring the policy to coverage again, if it were determined
that the insured was alive and in apparent good health at the

time of the tendering of the premium payment. There was evidence
before the trial court that the Brands knew of this practice. The par-
ties stipulated in Stipulation 11 that this was the practice of the com-
pany, and stipulated in Stipulation 12 that Dorothy Brand had actual
knowledge of this practice. In Stipulation 18 it was agreed that the
payments would have been accepted if Bruce Brand had, at that time,
been alive and apparently well. There was evidence before the trial
court that Bruce Brand also knew these facts. The trial court had all
of this evidence before it to weigh. It had the right and the duty to
resolve the conflicts in the evidence and to believe the testimony it
deemed the most credible. There was evidence from which the trial
court could reasonably find that Monumental was not estopped from

asserting a forfeiture here. There was evidence that supported the
determination that the practice of the company in accepting overdue
payments after the thirty-one day grace period and for an additional
period of sixty days was done only on condition that the insured was
in apparent good health and alive, and that these conditions were well
known to the insured, Brand. The judgment of the trial court was not
contrary to law since it was not inconsistent with Sweetser, supra,
Michigan Mutual Life, supra, or West v. National Casualty Co., supra.
There was ample evidence before the trial court to support its judg-
ment, and we will not disturb that judgment on appeal.

The trial court is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter and Prentice, JJ., concur.
DeBruler, J., dissents without opinion.

NoTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 297.

In THE MATTER OF THE MANDATE OF THE
SHELBY SUPERIOR CouRT OF May 15, 1980.

[No. 7808224. Filed March 5, 1981.]

Le 317

Frank E. Spencer, of Indianapolis, for petitioners.
Good and Murphy, of Shelbyville, for Shelby Superior Court.

PIVARNIK, J.— This is an expedited appeal, pursuant to Ind. R. Tr. P.
60.5, from a judgment of the Shelby Superior Court in its capacity as
the Shelby Juvenile Court. The Honorable Ronald Drury, Special Judge,
affirmed a mandate ordered by the regular judge of the Shelby Superior
Court, the Honorable George Tolen. Petitioners, the Shelby County
Council and the Auditor of Shelby County then requested that Special
Judge Drury certify this matter to this Court for review.

On May 15, 1980, Judge Tolen issued a writ of mandate to the Shelby
County Council, ordering salary increases for two assistant probation
officers, a court reporter and a court administrator. The increase to
the assistant probation officers, Emma Horner and Mary Bailey, would
be $2000, from $8,000 to $10,000 a year; to court reporter Pamela Hupp,
from $9,360 to $11,000, an increase of $1,140; and to court administrator
Victor Hirschauer, an increase of $760, from $11,000 to $11,760. The
issues presented in this appeal are: (1) whether the items mandated
are reasonably necessary for the operation of the Shelby Superior Court
in discharging its duties as the juvenile court; and (2) whether any
specific fiscal or other governmental interest is adversely affected by
the mandate orders to a degree that such orders should be set aside
or modified.

An additional issue is raised by the Shelby County Council and the
Auditor of Shelby County in their request for certification here that
concerns the posture to be taken by the regular judge who has been
removed from the mandate proceedings pursuant to the procedures
established in Trial Rule 60.5. The Council and the Auditor contend

318 EE
—

that Trial Rule 60.5 contemplates a summary proceeding that is not
adversary in nature and, therefore, that it is improper for the regular
judge to act in the nature of a party in a regular lawsuit and take part
in the proceeding, defending and promoting his position in requesting
the increases represented in the mandate order. In this case, Judge
Tolen employed counsel to represent him and the Shelby Superior
Court. Special Judge Drury affirmed the mandate order and also
ordered the Shelby County Council to pay the attorney representing
Judge Tolen and the Superior Court the sum of $3,000, plus an addi-
tional $1,000, should the matter be appealed to this Court.

We have previously considered Trial Rule 60.5 certifications and
established our guidelines for review of them. In Vigo County Council
v. Vigo Superior Court, (1979) 272 Ind. 344, 397 N.E.2d 969, 970,
IEEE we stated: “In a mandate action the issues for trial are whether
the items mandated are reasonably necessary for the opera-
ion of the court and whether any specific, fiscal or other governmental
interests are so severely and adversely affected [as] to require that
the mandate order be set aside.” It must also be shown that the regular
judge first met with the county council, showed his need for the funds,
and requested that they be furnished out of the county treasury. On
appeal, the question presented to this Court is whether there was
substantial evidence of probative value to sustain the decision of the
trial court that the mandate funds were reasonably necessary for the
operation of the court. Hale v. Smith, (1979) 271 Ind. 92, 890 N.E.2d
645; State ex rel. Lake County Council v. Lake County Court, (1977) 266
Ind. 318, 359 N.E.2d 918.

The evidence before Special Judge Drury showed that Judge Tolen
appeared before the Shelby County Council more than once for the
purpose of advising the Council concerning the salaries of these
employees. He discussed with the Council the effect the new juvenile
code would have on his employees’ work load. Judge Tolen told the
Council that the new code requires more steps to be taken in the handl-
ing of juvenile cases, and therefore requires additional work by all of
the court's staff. The actual impact of these added duties could not
be determined until there had been some experience working under
the new code. The county budget for 1980, including the salaries of

[| 319
EE

these employees, was approved prior to October 1, 1979, the effective
date of the new juvenile code. Judge Tolen appeared at a meeting of
the Shelby County Council on April 8, 1980, and discussed with the
members his reasons for requesting salary increases for his staff. He
presented to them comparative figures of payment for the same job
categories in other counties, and the experience and ability of the assis-
tant probation officers. Judge Tolen also reviewed with them the addi-
tional efforts required by the new juvenile code, including samples of
the forms used in processing juvenile cases. The County Council tabled
the matter for that meeting and ordered the Auditor to re-advertise
for the May meeting.

Judge Tolen again appeared at the meeting of the Shelby County
Council on May 18, 1980, and again requested the additional appropria-
tions that he presented at the April meeting. After a general discus-
sion, the County Council disallowed the request. On May 15, 1980, Judge
Tolen issued the mandate in question and, pursuant to Trial Rule 60.5,
the Council and the Auditor moved for a change of judge. Judge Ronald
E. Drury, regular judge of the Boone Circuit Court, was appointed as
special judge and tried the cause. The Auditor of Shelby County
testified at trial that Shelby County had paid out more money in the
last three years than it received in taxes so that the general fund
balance, from which additional appropriations can be paid, had been
reduced by approximately two-thirds. He testified that the present
balance for the county was less than one-half of the total budget for
the Shelby Superior Court for the calendar year 1980. The Auditor
further testified, however, that the funds requested by Judge Tolen
would not cause Shelby County to reduce or drop any services, nor
would the amount requested, if granted, have the effect of bankrupt-
ing the county.

There was evidence from which the trial court could find that assis-
tant probation officers in Shelby County were the lowest paid of any
such officers in counties surrounding Marion County. Additional testi-
mony and documentary evidence tended to show that the new juvenile
code required many additional forms and greater duties of the entire
court staff, including those employees named in the mandate order.
Further evidence showed that the workload in juvenile matters in

320 —
po

Shelby County exceeded that of any other court in counties surrounding
Marion County. There was also evidence which revealed the high
qualifications of the two assistant probation officers, including evidence
that they had achieved two of the highest scores ever reported on their
probation officer's qualifications test.

We conclude, therefore, that there was substantial evidence of pro-
bative value from which the special judge could find that the trial
judge did meet with the county council prior to issuing the
Hs mandate, that no specific fiscal or other governmental interest
would be so severely and adversely affected as to require the
mandate to be set aside, and that the items mandated were reasonably
necessary for the operation of the court. The special judge weighed
all the evidence and judged the credibility of the witnesses. We would
set aside his conclusions as to these facts only where the evidence is
without conflict and points unerringly to the opposite conclusion. Vigo
County Council v. Vigo Superior Court, supra; Carroll v. State, (1976)
265 Ind. 423, 355 N.E.2d 408; Hale v. Smith, supra.

The additional issue raised by the Council and the Auditor here ques-
tions whether the regular judge may retain counsel and take an active
part in the proceedings. We disposed of this question in

HE Hale v. Smith, supra. Justice DeBruler, speaking for a
unanimous Court, stated: “In the case at bar, Judge Smith

issued the mandate in his official capacity and not for his own pecuniary
reward, but for the purpose of meeting the operational needs of the
Sullivan County Court. The court reporter and bailiff are to receive
the salaries, and the Sullivan County judicial system will reap the
benefits thereby. In light of this, this court proceeding is properly to
be viewed for these purposes as a dispute between arms of the county
government and in court both are appropriately to be represented by
counsel and the fees of such counsel shall be paid for by the county.”
271 Ind. at 96, 390 N.E.2d at 648. The judge of a trial court is the of-
ficer commissioned to preside over and manage that office. He is the
one charged with the duty of seeing that the court is properly run,
and the one most knowledgeable of its needs and requirements. After
the change of judge motion was filed, Judge Tolen made entries on
the records of the Shelby Superior Court showing the change of judge,

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his appointment of counsel to represent himself and the Superior Court,
and only such other entries as were administrative in nature and
established a record of these transactions. In conjunction with his
counsel, Tolen then testified as a witness in the trial and caused briefs
to be filed in defense of his actions. The special judge treated Tolen
as an interested party in the “lawsuit,” in the same manner that the
County Council and the Auditor were treated. We find this to be pro-
per activity of the regular judge under Trial Rule 60.5; Judge Drury
properly recognized Judge Tolen in this posture and properly ordered
the payment of the attorneys fees.

Special Judge Drury found that the order of mandate to the Shelby
County Council and the Auditor of Shelby County was fair and rea-
sonable, that there is a need for the funds requested, that the items
mandated are reasonably necessary for the operation of the court, and
that there is no specific fiscal or other governmental interest so severely
and adversely affected as to require the mandate order to be set aside.
The order further required the necessary funds to be appropriated
for payment of said sums and ordered an appropriation of funds suffi-
cient to pay the attorneys fees for the representation of the regular
judge and the Shelby Superior Court. The findings and conclusions
of Special Judge Drury are approved and the judgment as written is
affirmed.

Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Hunter, and Prentice, JJ., concur.
NotTe—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 1260.
|

WILBUR CAREY v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 280829. Filed March 5, 1981.)

LAE

a 323
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| |

James A. Neel, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— Appellant Wilbur Carey was charged in Marion Criminal
Court, Division Two, with two counts of unlawful dealing in a control-
led substance, to-wit: heroin, under Ind. Code § 35-24.1-4.1-1 (Burns
1957), and with being a habitual criminal, under § 35-8-8-2. On the mo-
tion of the State, the habitual criminal count was dismissed prior to trial.
Carey was tried to a jury and convicted on the remaining two charges.
The trial court sentenced him to twenty years on each count, and fined
him in the amount of two thousand dollars on each count. Following the
denial of two belated motions to correct error, appellant initiated this
appeal.

The sole issue on this appeal concerns several alleged instances of
prosecutorial misconduct regarding the informant’s testimony and the
disclosure of information about the informant. Appellant contends the
prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence relating to the
credibility of the informant. He further asserts that the informant made
several statements during his testimony which the prosecutor knew
or should have known were of a perjurious nature. Therefore, he argues,
under United States v. Agurs, (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d
342, and Richard v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 607, 382 N.E.2d 899, the convic-
tions should be set aside as violative of the Due Process Clause of the

324 a
pT

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The charges against Carey arose out of two controlled buys executed
by an informant working for the Indianapolis Police Department and
the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.). While this in-
vestigation was conducted and completed primarily through the efforts
of the Indianapolis Police Department, a number of D.E.A. agents
assisted in the preparation of this case against Carey. On September
18, 1977, the informant, Stacy Shields, telephoned Carey at the latter’s
home in Indianapolis. Shields placed the call from a room in a hotel some
distance away. Two Indianapolis Police Officers, Schneider and King,
and a D.E£.A. Special Agent, McGivney, were present in the room when
Shields placed the call. With Shields’ permission, Officer Schneider
monitored and tape recorded the conversation. Appellant Carey agreed
to meet Shields in the parking lot of the Meadows Shopping Center and
sell him some heroin. At the same time, another Indianapolis Police of-
ficer was conducting visual surveillance on Carey’s home.

At the conclusion of the conversation between Shields and appellant
Carey, police officers prepared for Shields to make the heroin purchase
from Carey. Police officers searched Shields’ automobile and conducted
a strip-search of Shields. Shields was then given one hundred thirty
dollars to be used in buying the heroin from Carey. In addition, a “kel-
set” radio transmitting device was placed in Shields’ shirt pocket. Shields
then drove his car to the Meadows Shopping Center to meet Carey.
Police officers kept Shields in sight at all times. Meanwhile, Carey left
his home in his automobile shortly after talking with Shields. A police
officer followed Carey as he drove to the Meadows Shopping Center
parking lot.

Upon arriving at the parking lot, Shields parked in the prearranged
area. Two police officers parked a few hundred feet from Shields’ car
in a van. Shortly thereafter, Carey drove into the lot and parked next
to Shields’ car. Appellant Carey then exited from his car and joined
Shields in the front seat of the latter’s car. At that time, Carey gave
Shields two small balloons containing a brown powdery substance, and
Shields tendered the cash in the amount of the prearranged purchase
price. Appellant Carey then returned thirty dollars to Shields, indicating
he was willing to sell the heroin for only one hundred dollars. Carey

Le 325
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then returned to his own car and left the parking lot. Likewise, Shields
returned to the hotel. This sequence of events in the parking lot was
observed by the officers in the van and was recorded in a series of six
photographs, showing Carey walking to Shields’ car and sitting with
him in the car.

At the hotel, police officers recovered the balloons and the thirty
dollars from Shields. Once again, Shields’ car was searched and Shields
was subjected to a strip-search. No other narcotics or money was
recovered from Shields’ car or person.

The next day, September 14, this procedure was repeated with only
minor differences. Four telephone calls were required to finalize plans
for Shields to meet with Carey. Each call on the second day was also
placed from the hotel room; however, Indianapolis Police Officer
Schneider was the only law enforcement officer present. With the ex-
ception of these two facts, the second day’s controlled buy proceeded
along substantially the same lines as had the first day’s purchase. The
informant, Shields, was searched before and after the purchase, as was
his automobile. A series of photographs also corroborated the infor-
mant’s and the police officers’ testimony as to what had taken place with
appellant Carey.

The purchase on the second day also netted two small balloons con-
taining a brown powdery substance. On both days, police officers con-
ducted field tests on the substances, and the tests indicated the presence
of an opium derivative. In addition, expert testimony from two forensic
chemists established that the balloons obtained from appellant Carey
contained heroin.

This recitation of the facts reveals that Stacy Shields was the linchpin
in the narcotics investigation of Carey and was the key witness against
him. As noted above, appellant asserts that he was victimized at trial
by repeated acts of perjury allegedly committed by Shields and the pro-
secutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence concerning Shields
to defense counsel and to the jury. While one alleged perjurious state-
ment concerns one fact of the actual case against Carey, the significance
of the perjury and disclosure issues lies primarily in their bearing on
the important question of Shields’ credibility. We shall proceed to review

these alleged instances of perjury and the alleged failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence in the context of the entire trial.

Stacy Shields was the first witness called by the prosecution. He
testified in detail concerning the two purchases of heroin from appellant
Carey. Shields testified on direct and cross-examination that only Of-
ficer Schneider was present in the room when he telephoned Carey on
the first day to arrange the first controlled buy. He also testified on
direct examination that he had never been involved in the distribution
of heroin and that he had never sold heroin. Shields asserted that he
had volunteered to act as an informant in the investigation that resulted
in the prosecution of Carey. He also testified that there were no pend-
ing state or federal charges pending against him, and that no promises
or inducements had been given to him in exchange for his agreeing to
testify against Carey. Shields further testified that his only felony ar-
rest was in 1971 for a violation of the 1935 Firearms Act. At the conclu-
sion of Shields’ testimony, the court recessed for the day.

The next morning, before the jury was returned to the courtroom,
the deputy prosecutor in charge of this case addressed the court. She
stated that she had just been informed that federal surveillance reports
indicated that Stacy Shields had delivered narcotics to an undercover
federal agent. The prosecutor recognized that there was, to say the least,
“some disparity” between these reports and the testimony given by
Shields on the previous day. The prosecutor proposed to recall Shields
to the witness stand to clear up this matter. In the colloquy which
followed, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Counsel argued that the
prosecutor was charged with knowing of Shields’ relationship with
federal agents; he alleged that the Indianapolis Police detective in charge
of this case actually knew when he first met Shields that Shields had
delivered narcotics to federal agents. The deputy prosecutor asserted
that she had just learned for the first time of narcotics transactions be-
tween Shields and D.E.A. agents. She claimed that Shields never told
her that he had sold drugs to anyone.

At that point, outside the presence of the jury, an evidentiary hear-
ing was held, during which two law enforcement officers testified regard-
ing Stacy Shields. Indianapolis Police Officer Tom Schneider testified
that he directed the general investigation in which Stacy Shields was

[| 3827

used as an informant, including the activities which led to the arrest
of appellant Carey. Shields first became known to Schneider when he
learned that Shields was a “courier” for a heroin distribution organiza-
tion. In connection with the D.E.A., Indianapolis Police decided to have
an undercover federal agent purchase heroin from Shields; as a result
of the obvious bargaining leverage gained by police through such a trans-
action, Shields would be forced to work for them as an informant. This
plan was put into action, and Shields unwittingly made three deliveries
of heroin to Special Agent Howard Hayes of the D.E.A. These deliveries
were made in early 1977, approximately six months before appellant
Carey’s two sales to Shields. Officer Schneider testified that Shields
was never arrested for these deliveries, and that there were no pend-
ing state or federal criminal charges pending against Shields. He also
testified that the details of Shields’ deliveries to Agent Hayes were
recorded in surveillance reports prepared by Indianapolis Police Officers
and D.E.A. personnel. However, Schneider admitted that these reports,
and therefore, apparently, direct knowledge of Shields’ deliveries, were
never presented to the prosecutor nor to Carey’s trial counsel.

D.E.A. Special Agent James McGivney was the second witness called
by the prosecutor. McGivney essentially corroborated Officer
Schneider’s account of the initial contact with and use of informant
Stacy Shields. McGivney testified that Shields was picked up by federal
agents in May of 1977. At that time, they confronted him with the in-
formation concerning his deliveries of heroin to Agent Hayes, and, in
fact, presented Agent Hayes to Shields to reinforce the point. In
McGivney’s words:

“At that time we ... explained to Mr. Shields that we wanted
him to act as an informant for us, that if he did act as an inform-
ant we would advise the U.S. Attorney of everything that he did,
and that after he was finished with any assignments that we gave
him the U.S. Attorney would make a determination whether he
was going to be charged with any federal narcotics violations or
whether the case would be dismissed by plea bargain.”

Record at 332. McGivney supported Officer Schneider's testimony that
Shields was never arrested for any narcotics violations. He further
testified that, in his conversations with the deputy prosecutor about
this case, he does not recall whether he informed her of Shields’ sales

328 Le
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of heroin to D.E.A. Agent Hayes. This concluded the testimony
presented to the trial court outside the presence of the jury.

Before the jury was recalled, further motions and arguments were
heard. Defense counsel moved to strike the testimony of Stacy Shields
for the reason that the prosecutor had failed to inform the jury of the
agreement reached between Shields and law enforcement personnel,
and had likewise failed to inform defense counsel of these facts prior
to trial. The deputy prosecutor then again offered to recall Shields to
the witness stand and have him clear up the obviously inconsistent
statements which had surfaced. Defense counsel then moved for a
mistrial. After the court overruled this motion, defense counsel moved
for a thirty-day continuance to allow him to further investigate Shields
and his relationship with law enforcement officials. Counsel asserted
that he had only just learned that Shields had engaged in heroin trans-
actions with a federal agent named Hayes; counsel further requested
that Hayes be called to testify about this matter. This request was
denied. The court denied these requests, but ordered that the prose-
cutor provide defense counsel with a copy of Shields’ criminal record.
The jury was then returned to the courtroom, and the taking of evidence
resumed.

Stacy Shields was recalled as a witness by the prosecution. He
acknowledged that he had met D.E.A. Agent Hayes through a drug
transaction. Shields testified that he acted as a “middle man” in three
heroin purchases made by Hayes. Shields asserted that he received
the money from Hayes, but that he had someone else deliver the heroin
to Hayes.

On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to explore the ob-
vious inconsistencies presented in the record. Counsel attacked Shields’
testimony from the preceding day, in which he asserted that he had
never been involved in the distribution of heroin. Shields continued
to characterize himself as a “volunteer” informant, but acknowledged
that his decision to act as an informant was stimulated by his knowledge,
and that of the D.E.A., that he had unwittingly sold heroin to an under-
cover agent. Shields also testified that Indianapolis Police officers had
given him money for expenses and that he acted as an informant, in

Ye 329
[To

part, to show his “appreciation for what [Officers Schneider and King]
had did [sic] for me and my family.” Record at 370. Shields also main-
tained on cross-examination that, although he had taken part in heroin
transactions with D.E.A. Agent Hayes, he did not personally deliver
the heroin to Hayes.
In Richard v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 607, 382 N.E.2d 899, this Court
discussed the issue of evidence which must be disclosed by the prose-
cutor. Interpreting United States v. Agurs, (1976) 427 U.S. 97,
| | 96 S.Ct. 2391, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, we noted three types of cases
in which the prosecutorial duty of disclosure comes into ques-
tion: (1) cases in which undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the
prosecution’s case includes perjury; (2) cases in which the defense has
made a pretrial request for specific evidence; and (3) cases in which
evidence was not disclosed but where there was only a general request
for discovery by the defense or no request at all. Richard v. State, supra,
269 Ind. at 611-12, 382 N.E.2d at 903.

The type of case involved also determines the applicable test for
materiality to be applied on review. If the prosecution has knowingly
used perjury testimony, whether that perjury relates to the
HH defendant's guilt or to the credibility of a State’s witness, the
conviction “must be set aside if there is any reasonable like-
lihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury.” United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 103-4, 96 S.Ct.
at 2897, 49 L.Ed.2d at 349-50, quoted in Richard v. State, supra, 269
Ind. at 612, 382 N..2d at 903. If the defense has made a specific re-
quest before trial for certain evidence favorable to the accused and
that evidence is suppressed, the conviction will be reversed if the
evidence “might have affected the outcome of the trial.” United States
v. Agurs, supra, 427 US. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2398, 49 L.Ed.2d at 350.
Finally, when there has been no pretrial request for exculpatory
evidence, or when the request was only general in nature, the omitted
evidence, as evaluated in the context of the entire record, must create
a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist. Richard v. State,
supra, 369 Ind. at 614, 382 N.E.2d at 904, quoting United States v. Agurs,
supra, 427 U.S. at 112-18, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-2, 49 L.Ed.2d at 355.

In addition, the prosecutor’s duty to voluntarily disclose evidence

330 a
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to the jury exists when there has been a “deal” made with a State’s

witness, such as promises, a grant of immunity, or a reward

I soffered in return for testimony. E.g., Campbell v. State, (1980)

274 Ind. 88, 409. N.E.2d 568, 570; Turczi v. State, (1979) 271

Ind. 329, 392 N.E.2d 481, 483; Hoskins v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 290, 296,

375 N.E.2d 191, 194; Newman v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 569, 572-73, 334

N.E.2d 684, 686-87; Adler v. State, (1967) 248 Ind. 193, 197, 225 N.E.2d

171, 178. See Drollinger v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 5, 408 N.E.2d 1228,

1239. With these principles in mind, we shall proceed to discuss the
specific claims raised by appellant Carey.

L

The major potential problem concerning acts of perjury by Stacy
Shields was resolved by the prosecutor during Shields’ testimony and
with the testimony of another prosecution witness. This, of

HB course, related to Shields’ assertion in his initial appearance

as a witness that he had never been involved in the distribu-

tion of heroin. Subsequent testimony from Shields and Officer
Schneider, clearly established that Shields sold heroin to a federal agent
on three occasions; the agents’ bargaining leverage, gained as a result
of these transactions, was the principal reason why Shields became
an informant. Unquestionably, the prosecutor in charge of the case
against Carey should have known from the outset the circumstances
surrounding the use of Shields as an informant, considering how crucial
his testimony was in the State’s case against Carey. See Annunziato
v. Manson, (2d Cir. 1977) 566 F.2d 410. When law enforcement officials
are aware of, and, in fact, cause arrangements such as this to exist,
their failure to inform the prosecutor of such facts does not obviate
the State’s obligation, under the Adler line of cases, to make those facts
available to the jury. Freeman v. Georgia, (5th Cir. 1979) 599 F.2d 65,
cert. denied, (1980) 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 641. See
Giglio v. United States, (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d
104; Newman v. State, supra. In any event, Shields’ distribution of heroin
to a federal agent prior to becoming an informant appears, based on
the record before us, to have been adequately presented to the jury.
Evidence was also presented to the jury from which they could infer
that federal agents made general promises to Shields in exchange for

Le 331
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his agreeing to act as an informant. From this record, we conclude that
this incident did not involve the knowing use of perjured testimony
by the State. Cf Mooney v. Holohan, (1935) 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340,
79 L.Ed. 791.

Likewise, we conclude that the deputy prosecutor did not breach
her duty to present evidence to the jury of any promises made with
Shields in exchange for his activities as an informant. Shields
Hs generally admitted that he sold heroin to D.E.A. Agent Hayes,
and that federal agents asked him to become an informant
after confronting him with this fact. In addition, Shields acknowledged
that Indianapolis Police Officers Schneider and King had done “favors”
for him, and that he had received money for expenses from them.
Schneider's testimony corroborated the latter fact. Of course, the pros-
ecutor would have been well-advised to place before the jury the
evidence adduced from Agent McGivney outside the hearing of the
jury—namely, that federal agents told Shields they would advise the
United States Attorney that Shields had acted as an informant for them,
and that the United States Attorney would thereafter decide whether
to prosecute Shields for delivery of heroin. “It is, of course, better prac-
tice for the prosecutor to unequivocally state to the jury the entire
nature and extent, if any, of the State’s dealings with its witnesses.”
Gordy v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 379, 385 N.E.2d 1145, 1148. The prosecutor
did elicit testimony, however, which established that Shields had never
been arrested relative to the sales of heroin to Hayes. Thus, we believe
the prosecutor, albeit with little room to spare, presented sufficient
evidence under Adler and its progeny to allow the jury to fully assess
Shields’ credibility. Turczi v. State, supra. See Stephens v. State, (1973)
260 Ind. 326, 295 N.H.2d 622.

Finally, the evidence of Shields’ involvement in heroin traffic and
his distribution of narcotics to a federal agent raises a third, related
question. Appellant Carey argues that the prosecutor knew or should
have known that federal agents had offered a very favorable arrange-
ment to Shields in exchange for his agreeing to act as an informant.
Appellant asserts that trial counsel was not aware of these facts until
they were revealed in the mid-trial hearing, and that the prosecutor's
failure to inform him before trial of Shields’ situation amounted to the

332 ee

withholding of exculpatory evidence under United States v. Agurs,
supra.
While we agree that this evidence had some tendency to be exculpa-
tory in nature, and that the prosecutor should have disclosed Shields’
arrangement to defense counsel prior to trial, we do not
Il__ believe appellant was thereby denied a fair trial. The rule
of Agurs presupposes a situation where the omitted evidence
is neither disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial nor presented to
the jury during trial. See United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at
102, 96 S.Ct. at 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d at 349; Brady v. Maryland, (1963) 373
US. 88, 84, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1195, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 217; Sypniewski v. State,
(1980) 272 Ind. 657, 400 N.E.2d 1122, 1123-24. The evidence in question
here was, in fact, presented to the jury, and defense counsel had an
ample opportunity to cross-examine Shields and Officer Schneider on
this matter. Thus, we are not concerned here with evidence which was,
in the final analysis, “suppressed” or “omitted” from the jury’s con-
sideration by the State. While defense counsel did request a continuance
so that he might further investigate Shields, he does not argue on this
appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the continuance.
Based on the evidence received from the two police officers outside
the presence of the jury, and defense counsel’s subsequent opportunity
to take advantage of this evidence, we conclude that this evidence was
adequately presented to the jury, and that appellant was not denied
a fair trial due to the prosecutor's failure to disclose the evidence to
counsel prior to trial.

I.

A second allegation of the use of perjury is also based on testimony
given by Stacy Shields. Concerning Shields’ three sales of heroin to
Agent Hayes, Shields maintained, even when recalled as a witness by
the State, that he did not personally deliver the heroin to Hayes. In-
stead, he asserted, he received the purchase money from Hayes on
each occasion, but had another person make deliveries of the narcotic
to Hayes. However, testimony heard outside the presence of the jury
directly contradicted this account. Officer Schneider testified at that
hearing that he knew at the time Shields became an informant that
Shields delivered heroin to Agent Hayes. In fact, Officer Schneider

Le 333
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was present in a remote surveillance capacity when two of the deliveries
were made, although he did not personally observe the transactions.
Officer Schneider also stated that Agent Hayes informed him that
Shields had made the deliveries to Hayes. Schneider further acknowl-
edged that Shields admitted making the deliveries. Officer Schneider
testified before the jury that Shields had been involved in drug traffic,
but he did not state specifically that Shields had personally made
deliveries of heroin to Hayes. D.E.A. Agent McGivney also testified
outside the presence of the jury that he knew Shields made the deli-
veries to Hayes.

Thus, it is apparent that, even when recalled to testify by the State,
Stacy Shields did not reveal the full extent of his participation in the
heroin deliveries to Agent Hayes. The inconsistency between Shields’
version and the officers’ version was and is obvious, yet only Shields’
version was clearly presented to the jury. In fact, Shields insisted on
cross-examination that he only arranged for the deliveries to be made.
To this extent, it does appear that Shields committed an act of perjury
in explaining his heroin transactions with Hayes, and that this misstate-
ment was not fully corrected. Plainly, the prosecutor knew or should
have known that Shields was, as appellant claims, “candy-coating” his
relationship with Agent Hayes, and should have taken further steps
to bring the entire story to the jury’s attention. See Napue v. Illinois,
(1959) 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1178, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217.

This conclusion, however, does not require a reversal of Carey's con-
victions. The jury was informed, in part through Shields’ own testimony,
that he was involved in the distribution of heroin, and that

Hs this involvement ultimately led to his acting as an informant
for the D.E.A. and the Indianapolis Police. It appears, then,

that Shields’ credibility, which was of great importance in the case
against appellant Carey, was not hidden from the jury. For the pur-
pose of assessing Shields’ credibility, we do not see a meaningful dif-
ference between the two versions of previous involvement in the dis-
tribution of heroin. Thus, we do not believe “there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony [concerning whether Shields per-
sonally delivered heroin to a federal agent] could have affected the
judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 103-4,

334 EE
pe

96 S.Ct. at 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d at 349-50. See generally Richard v. State,
supra.

ql.

The third instance of alleged perjury on the part of the informant,
Shields, concerns one detail of one of the crimes in question here. As
explained above, the transactions between appellant Carey and Shields
were each arranged during telephone conversations between the two.
In relating the series of events to the jury, Shields, on direct examina-
tion, described the circumstances surrounding the telephone calls. He
testified that he placed the calls from a hotel room, and that he had
given permission to an Indianapolis Police officer to monitor and record
the conversations. Concerning the call placed on the first day, the
deputy prosecutor asked Shields who was present when the call was
made; Shields replied that Indianapolis Police Officer Tom Schneider
was present. On cross-examination, Shields was again asked who was
present when he telephone appellant Carey; he again answered that
Schneider was in the hotel room. Defense counsel then asked Shields
if anyone else was present and if any federal agent was present at
the time. Shields answered “No” to both questions. However, Officer
Tom Schneider testified for the prosecution that two other persons
were present during Shields’ call to Carey, and, further, that one of
those present was federal agent James McGivney.

Thus, once again, prosecution witnesses gave directly conflicting
testimony concerning a fact which was obviously within the knowledge
of both. Shields was evidently attempting to soft-pedal the

HM oextent of his involvement with the D.E.A., or any involve-
ment of the D.E.A. in this case. The reasons for such an at-

tempt are not readily apparent, for the fact of Shields’ connection (as
an informant) with the D.E.A., and the fact of the D.E.A.’s participa-
tion in this case, were made known to the jury through other prosecu-
tion witnesses. In any event, of critical importance during the first
telephone call were the actions of Shields, Schneider and, of course,
appellant Carey, not the presence or absence of additional law enforce-
ment officers. Shields and Schneider presented substantially consistent
testimony concerning the placing of the call, Shields’ permission for

Le 335
—

Schneider to monitor and record the conversation, and the subject mat-
ter of the conversation. For these reasons, we do not believe there
is any reasonable likelihood that Shields’ false statement concerning
who was present when the first telephone call was made could have
affected the judgment of the jury. Id.

While the record presented to us here is obviously not a model of
how a case of this type should be presented, we cannot conclude, based
on this record, that perjured testimony was used to obtain Carey’s
conviction, or that he was otherwise denied a fair trial. The judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.

Givan, C. J., Hunter, DeBruler, and Prentice, JJ., concur.

NoTe—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 1252.

TERRELL LEE WEEDMAN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 4808108. Filed March 6, 1981.]

336 Dn

James B. Hancock, of New Albany, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Michael Gene Worden,
Assistance Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of Kidnapping, Ind.
Code § 35-1-55-1 (Burns 1975), and sentenced to life imprisonment. This
direct appeal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit medical
records of the defendant into evidence.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict.

(3) Whether the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial due to
the State’s improper final argument.

On February 22, 1977 Deanna Neal was walking home from school.
The defendant, in his automobile stopped near Deanna and asked if
she needed a ride. When Deanna declined the offer, the defendant
pointed a gun at her and ordered her to get into the automobile. She
complied, and the defendant drove around New Albany, Indiana for
a few minutes and then ordered Deanna to give him directions.

While they were driving, the defendant asked Deanna to remove
her pants. Upon her refusal, the defendant pointed the gun at her head
and repeated his request. He then grabbed Deanna’s arm and belt and
tried to remove her pants. At this point the automobile was approaching
a service station. The defendant let Deanna go after telling her not
to tell anyone about what had happened. Deanna, however, screamed
for help. The service station attendant heard her and summoned the
police, who apprehended the defendant in Louisville, Kentucky after
a high speed chase.

ISSUE I

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to ad-
mit his medical records into evidence. The defendant interposed an
insanity defense. The medical record originated from a mental health

[| 337
Ee

center in Kentucky, where the defendant had received treatment. It
contained the conclusion of a person, who is not identified in the record,
that the defendant suffered from a schizoid personality.

The defendant asserts that he offered the medical record for the
purpose of cross examining the court apppointed psychiatrist; however,
the record does not bear him out. The defendant offered the
HB sexhibit during his presentation of evidence and after it had
been identified by the mental health center’s medical records
technician. The defendant made no attempt to re-offer the medical
record during the presentation of the court appointed expert witnesses.
As such, the defendant attempted to bring a medical record contain-
ing an observation about his sanity or insanity directly into evidence,
which we have stated should not be done. Smith v. State, (1972) 259
Ind. 187, 189, 285 N.E.2d 275, 55 A.L.R.3d 546, cert. denied, (1973) 409
U.S. 1129, 93 S.Ct. 951, 35 L.Ed.2d 261. There was no error in failing
to admit the medical record.

ISSUE II

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his mo-

tion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s evidence. He asserts

that the State failed to prove the specific intent required for

HB Kidnapping. However, he cites us to no place in the record

where he made a motion for a directed verdict, and we find

none. “An error alleged but not disclosed by the record is not a proper

subject for review.” Mendez v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 309, 311, 370 N.E.2d
828, 325.

We perceive the defendant’s contention to be a challenge to the suf-

ficiency of the evidence. The testimony of the defendant concerning

the incident is in complete accord with that of the victim. As

I related above, the evidence discloses he used force to compel

the victim to enter his automobile and continued that force

to compel her to remain there against her will. He then moved the

victim from one place to another. The evidence is sufficient to support

a jury finding that the defendant intended to kidnap the victim. Boat-
man v. State, (1956) 235 Ind. 623, 627-28, 187 N.E.2d 28, 30.

338 ee
Cd

ISSUE II

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s improper com-
ments during the State’s final argument. The objection was to the
following comment:

“Would it still be a reasonable doubt if it happened to a daughter,

or a friend, or a loved one—”

The record shows that defense counsel’s objection to the Prosecutor’s
remark was sustained, and the jury was told to disregard it. No mo-
tion for mistrial was made.

The trial court’s admonition to the jury is presumed to have cured

the error if any, in fact, occurred. Page v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 264,

410 NE.2d 1304, 1807. Had a motion for mistrial been made,

Hs the trial court would have been correct in denying it. Morse

v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 652, 413 N.E.2d 885; Warner v. State,

(1976) 265 Ind. 262, 265, 354 N.H.2d 178, 181; Williams v. State, (1980)
Ind. App., 408 N.E.2d 128, 124-25.

We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NotE—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 1268.
a

JAMES BREWER v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 6788119. Filed March 6, 1981. Rehearing denied August 19, 1981.]

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342 |

Ee
Dennis R. Kramer, of Crown Point, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Thomas D. Quigley, Palmer
K. Ward, Deputies Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted in a trial by jury
of Murder, in that he knowingly or intentionally killed Stephen Skir-
pan. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979). Following a sentencing hearing
thereafter held before the same jury, it was determined that said
murder was committed by Defendant while committing or attempting
to commit a robbery, and a sentence of death was recommended and
thereafter decreed by the court. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979).

This direct appeal challenges both the legality of the defendant’s
conviction and the legality of the sentence and presents the following
issues:

(1) Whether the verdict was sustained by sufficient evidence.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other
criminal activity by the defendant.

(3) Whether our death sentence statute violates consitutional pro-
scriptions in any of the following respects:

(A) Asa transgression of Article I, Section 18 of the Constitu-
tion of Indiana providing that the penal code shall be founded on
the principles of reformation and not vindictive justice.

(B) In failing to provide the parameters of the review of the
sentence required by this Court.

(C) As permitting the imposition of the death penalty against
one convicted under a theory of vicarious liability, hence allowing
punishment that is cruel and unusual, and not proportioned to the
crime.

(4) Whether the finding of an aggravating circumstance, prerequi-
site to the imposition of the death sentence, was sustained by suffi-
cient evidence.

[| 343
EE

(5) Whether the charging requirements of the death penalty statute
were complied with.

(6) Whether the court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for a
continuance of the sentencing hearing.

(7) Whether the defendant's rights against compulsory self-incrim-
ination were violated at the sentencing hearing.

(8) Whether the defendant was denied the effective assistance of
counsel at the sentencing hearing.

(9) Whether the defendant had been denied access to the report
of a psychologist who had examined the defendant, pursuant to a sua
sponte order of the court made following the return of the jury’s death
penalty recommendation.

(10) Whether the trial court erred in advising the jury, during
deliberations following the sentencing hearing, concerning parole
possibilities concomitant to a prison term.

(11) Whether Defendant’s death sentence is an unconstitutional ap-
plication of the death penalty statute, as excessive and irrational, hence
cruel and unusual, when compared with the sentence of sixty (60) years
imprisonment awarded to the accomplice, Brooks.

ISSUE I

In the late afternoon of December 4, 1977, the decedent Stephen Skir-
pan, a young man, was at home with his parents, Mr. and Mrs. John
Skirpan, and his cousin, Joyce Matthews. At approximately 5:00 p.m.,
the front door bell rang, and he responded. Mr. Skirpan was then sum-
moned by the decedent, who said that two detectives wanted to speak
with him. The callers were two well-dressed, youthful looking black
men, the defendant and Kenneth Brooks. They stood in the doorway
and displayed a badge and announced that they were investigating a
traffic accident in which one of the Skirpan automobiles had been in-
volved. Mr. Skirpan advised the callers that their automobiles were
parked in front of the house, had been there all day and that they could
look at them. One of the callers responded that they had a search war-
rant, and Mr. Skirpan asked to see it. With that, the defendant, who

344 |
ee

was standing behind Brooks began to move and exclaimed, “This is
a hold up!” Brooks pushed Mr. Skirpan aside and drew a handgun.
Simultaneously, a shot was fired, and Stephen fell to the floor. Brooks
then held Mr. Skirpan at bay with his gun, while the defendant, who
was also armed with a drawn handgun, stepped into the house. Both
Brooks and the defendant entered the house.

The defendant and Brooks held Mr. and Mrs. Skirpan and Joyce at
gunpoint and demanded money. Mrs. Skirpan said that the money was
in the bedroom, and the defendant went to look for it. Meanwhile,
Brooks took money from Mr. Skirpan and searched Mrs. Skirpan’s per-
son, herded her, Mr. Skirpan and Joyce into the bathroom, closed the
door and ordered them to remain there for ten minutes.

After approximately one minute inside the bathroom, the Skirpans
and Joyce emerged and found that their assailants had departed. The
entire episode had lasted seven to ten minutes. Mrs. Skirpan rushed
to a neighbor’s house for help, and as she did, she saw a dark blue
sedan depart from the area. Joyce summoned an ambulance, but when
it arrived, Stephen was dead.

The defendant’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence is addressed
to the absence of medical evidence of the cause of Stephen’s death,
the alleged absence of evidence placing him at the scene of the crime
and the absence of evidence identifying him as the one who shot
Stephen.

Circumstantial evidence alone may support a conviction, so long as

a reasonable man could find each element of the crime therefrom,
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. State, (1980) 273 Ind.

HE 49, 402 N.H.2d 947; Ruetz v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 42, 373 N.E.2d
152, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 897, 99 S.Ct. 261, 58 L.Ed.2d 245.

With respect to the evidence of the cause of decedent’s death, we
have heretofore held that medical testimony is not a prerequisite to
establishing the cause of death in a murder case. Hall v. State,

HE (1978) 269 Ind. 24, 378 N.B.2d 823; Hudson v. State, (1976) 265
Ind. 302, 354 N.E.2d 164. Stephen fell to the floor simultan-

eously with the firing of a handgun at close range. He was not moved
and was found to be dead when examined shortly thereafter. An
autopsy was performed and a bullet, which had entered the front left

[| 345
Ee

side of Stephen's abdomen and travelled downward, was removed from
a point just above his right hip. From such evidence, a reasonable per-
son could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stephen died of
a bullet wound.

With regard to Defendant’s contention that there was insufficient
evidence placing him at the scene of the crime, the evidence revealed
the following:

The decedent was shot and killed in his home by one of two men
during the commission of a robbery at approximately 5:00 p.m. One
of the assailants was identified as Kenneth Brooks by two eyewitnesses
who were also victims. Admittedly, the witnesses could not identify
the defendant as the other assailant, their testimony concerning the
height and the sound of the voice of the unidentified assailant did not
match such characteristics of the defendant, and defense witnesses
testified that the defendant was elsewhere at the time the crime was
committed. Nevertheless, there was also testimony that another armed
robbery had occurred at approximately 4:30 p.m. the same day, and,
at approximately 7:30 p.m. of the same day, a series of three robberies
by force had occurred at an apartment house. The defendant and Ken-
neth Brooks were identified by eyewitnesses as the ones who
perpetrated all four robberies, all of which occurred in Gary, which
was the scene of the Skirpan residence. Additionally, also in Gary, at
approximately 6:30 p.m. that day, the defendant and Kenneth Brooks
were seen together in a bailbond office.

Part of the money stolen in the robbery of the Skirpans was in
bicentennial commemorative coins, which they had been saving. When
arrested, later that evening, two silver dollars, two half dollars and two
quarters, all of the commemorative issue, were found on Defendant’s
person. Further, when the police attempted to arrest the defendant and
Brooks, they were travelling together, and the defendant shot at them.

Notwithstanding some discrepancies in the identification testimony,
which were matters for the jury to consider, the foregoing related cir-
cumstantial evidence was ample to permit a reasonable person
| | to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
was the assailant with Kenneth Brooks at the time of the rob-

bery and murder.

346 ee
Ee

The defendant's final submission with regard to the sufficiency of the
evidence is that there was no evidence that he actually shot Stephen
Skirpan. While conflicting inferences as to whether it was
Brooks or the defendant who shot Stephen can be drawn from
the evidence and although there may have been some conflicts
between Mr. Skirpan’s description of the assailant and the defendant’s
actual stature, we find the conflict to be immaterial. Under Ind. Code
§ 35-41-2-4 (Burns 1979), an offense is committed whenever one inten-
tionally or knowingly aids, induces or causes that offense to be commit-
ted. We have held in similar circumstances that concerted action or par-
ticipation in a crime is sufficient for this purpose. See, e.g., Webb v. State,
(1977) 266 Ind. 554, 364 N.H.2d 1016; Simmons v. State, (1974) 262 Ind.
300, 315 N.E.2d 368. The evidence in this case fully supports a deter-
mination that the defendant participated in the commission of the crime
at bar. (This issue treated further under Issue IV).

ISSUE II

Over the defendant's objections, the trial court permitted the introduc-
tion of evidence disclosing his participation in the aforementioned other
four robberies. Although not admissible to show a defendant’s
propensity to commit crimes in general, evidence of prior
crimes is admissible, if it is relevant to some issue in the case,

most commonly intent, motive, knowledge, plan, identity or credibility.
Lawrence v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830, and cases there
cited. Also see Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, § 205 at 595 (6th ed. 1978).

In the instant case, the evidence objected to was relevant, in that
it had a logical tendency to identify the defendant as the accomplice
with Brooks at the time of the Skirpan robbery and murder. He was
in the company of Brooks, both before and after the incident and in close
proximity thereto, both in time and distance. Additionally, there were
a number of similarities in the modus operandi by which all the rob-
beries, including the one of the Skirpans, were effected, thus evidenc-
ing that they were committed by the same persons.

ISSUE III

The defendant contends that our death penalty statute, Ind. Code
§ 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979), under which he has been sentenced to death,

bn 347
EE

is unconstitutional, per se, as being in derogation of the proscription
against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment” of the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Although no claim
has been made under the companion provision of Article I, Sec. 16 of
our state constitution, it is appropriate that we regard this assignment
as a challenge under both the Federal and the State Constitutions.

This Court has consistently held that the death penalty does not of-
fend Article I, Sec. 16. Adams v. State, (1971) 259 Ind. 64, 74, 271 N.E.2d
425, 430, (DeBruler, J. and Prentice, J. dissenting) and cases there cited.

With regard to Defendant’s claim under the Eighth Amendment, we
are governed by the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Although the Court, in Furman v. Georgia, (1972)
408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, found it unnecessary to determine the con-
stitutionality of death sentences per se, the separate opinions of the
Justices dealt at length with the issue and arrived at diametrically op-
posed conclusions. The majority, however, found no per se proscription,
leaving the unmistakable inference that it was possible, under the
amendment, for the states to enact and administer statutes authoriz-
ing the imposition of the death penalty.

In response to the Court's holding and opinions in Furman, a number
of the states, including Indiana, whose death penalty statutes had not
passed constitutional muster because they granted to juries
Hs the untrammeled discretion to impose or withhold the death
penalty in those cases where it was authorized by statute, en-
acted statutes to replace the deficient ones. Four years later, the Court
affirmed three death sentences imposed under such statutes, thus leav-
ing nothing to inference upon the issue. Gregg v. Georgia, (1976) 428 U.S.
158, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859; Proffitt v. Florida, (1976) 428 U.S.
242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913; Jurek v. Texas, (1976) 428 U.S. 262,
96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929.

ISSUE III (A)

Having determined that the death penalty is not unconstitutional per
se, as being in derogation of either the Eighth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States or Article I, Sec. 16 of the Constitution
of Indiana, we now turn to a consideration of the Indiana Statute, Ind.

348 De
Ed

Code § 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979),' in light of Pronouncements of the Supreme

1. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979) provides:

(a) The state may seek a death sentence for murder by alleging, on a page separate
from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least one [1] of the ag-
gravating cireumstances listed in subsection (b) of this section. In the sentencing
hearing after a person is convicted of murder, the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of at least one [1] of the aggravating circumstances
alleged.

(b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:

(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the vietim while
committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate
conduct, kidnapping, rape, or robbery.

(2) The defendant committed the murder by the unlawful detonation of an explosive
with intent to injure person or damage property.

(3) The defendant committed the murder by lying in wait.
(4) The defendant who committed the murder was hired to kill.
(6) The defendant committed the murder by hiring another person to kill.

(6) The victim of the murder was a corrections employee, fireman, judge, or law-
enforcement officer, and either (i) the victim was acting in the course of duty or (ii)
the murder was motivated by an act the victim performed while acting in the course
of duty.

(7) The defendant has been convicted of another murder.

(8) The defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless of
whether he has been convicted of that other murder.

(9) The defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment at the time of the
murder.

(c) The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are
as follows:

(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conduct.

(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance when he committed the murder.

(8) The victim was a participant in, or consented to, the defendant’s conduct.

(4) ‘The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person,
and the defendant's participation was relatively minor.

(5) The defendant acted under the substantial domination of another person.

(6) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to con-
form his conduet to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result
of mental disease or defect or of intoxication.

(7) Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.

P| 349
Le

Court of the United States emanating subsequent to Furman. Georgia,
supra.

We have very recently considered these matters in Judy v. State,
(1981) 275 Ind. 145, 416 N.B.2d 95. It was unfortunate that that case was
the first to arrive in this Court under the relevant statute,

Hl because the condemned man insisted upon waiving his appel-
late rights, thus depriving us of the benefits that flow from
adversary proceedings. It should be noted, however, that although we
recognized Judy’s right to waive his right to appeal his conviction, we
also recognized that we were under legislative mandate to review his

(@) If the defendant was convicted of murder ina jury trial, the jury shall reconvene
for the senteneing hearing; if the trial was to the court, or the judgment was entered
ona guilty plea, the court alone shall conduct the sentencing hearing. The jury, or
the court, may consider all the evidence introduced at the trial stage of the pro-
ceedings, together with new evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. The defen-
dant may present any additional evidence relevant to:

(1) The aggravating circumstances alleged; or
(2) Any of the mitigating circumstances listed in subsection (c) of this section.

(e) If the hearing is by jury, the jury shall recommend to the court whether the
death penalty should be imposed. The jury may recommend the death penalty only
if it finds;

(1) That the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one [1] of
the aggravating circumstances exists; and

(2) That any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances. The court shall make the final determination of the
sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation, and the sentence shall be
based on the same standards that the jury was required to consider. The court is
not bound by the jury’s recommendation.

(f Ifa jury is unable to agree on a sentence recommendation after reasonable
deliberations, the court shall discharge the jury and proceed as if the hearing had
been to the court alone.

(g) If the hearing is to the court alone, the court shall sentence the defendant to
death only if it finds:

(1) That the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one [1] of
the aggravating circumstances exists; and

(2) That any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances.

(h) A death sentence is subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. The
review, which shall be heard under rules adopted by the Supreme Court, shall be
given priority over all other cases. The death sentence may not be executed until
the Supreme Court has completed its review.

350 ee
a

sentence, regardless of his wishes in the matter.

“Although we feel Steven Judy can waive and has waived review

of any issue that might be raised with reference to his convictions,

we believe that the death sentence cannot be imposed on anyone
in this State until it has been reviewed by this Court and found
to comport with the laws of this State and the principles of our

State and Federal Constitutions.” Judy, supra.

To permit Judy to be put to death upon a finding that his sentence
was permissible under our statute, but without regard to the validity
of the statute, would have been an aberration beyond comprehension.
Accordingly we proceeded to a study not only of the propriety of his
sentence under our statute but also of the constitutionality of the statute,
in all of its aspects. From that study, diligently pursued, we concluded
that our statute and our procedures thereunder and under related
statutes and court rules are consistent with and are in full compliance
with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Proffitt v. Florida, supraand Jurek v. Texas,
supra.

We have now been subjected to a vigorous challenge and debate in
keeping with the tradition of English and American Jurisprudence. We
have reconsidered our conclusions in the light of Defendant's arguments
and authorities, but no cogent argument or authority has been here
presented that was not fully considered, albeit sua sponte, in the Judy
review, and we are convinced that our decision in that case was correct.

As stated in Judy, supra, “We note that our present statute is very
similar to the statutes under consideration in those cases, * * * (Gregg,
Jurek and Proffitt) * * * and, in fact, is nearly identical to the Florida
statute’ upheld in Proffitt.” Our task in determining whether our statute
meets the current standards is, therefore, minimal.

2. The statute upheld in Proffitt was Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (Supp. 1976-1977), which
provided:

(1) Separate proceedings on issue of penalty.—_Upon conviction or adjudication
of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentenc-
ing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment as authorized by s. 775.082. The proceeding shall be conducted
by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable. If, through impossibil-
ity or inability, the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of
penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused, the trial judge may summon

a special juror or jurors as provided in chapter 913 to determine the issue of the
imposition of the penalty. Ifthe trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded
guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for
that purpose, unless waived by the defendant. In the proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence the defendant
and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circum-
tances enumerated in subsections (6) and (6). Any such evidence which the court deems
to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity
to rebut any hearsay statements. However, this subsection shall not be construed
to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Florida. The state and
the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against
sentence of death.

(2) Advisory sentence by the jury.— After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall
deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following
matters:

(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsec-
tion (5);

() Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in subsection (6)
exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and

(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced
to life imprisonment or death.

(3) Findings in support of sentences of death.— Notwithstanding the recommen-
dation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but
if the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon
which the sentence of death is based as to the facts:

(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection
(5), and

(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in subsee-
tion (6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of
the court shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the
circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and upon the records of the trial and the
sentencing proceedings. If the court does not make the findings requiring the death
sentence, the court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment in accordance with
s. 775.082.

(4) Review of judgment and sentence.—The judgment of conviction and sentence
of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida
within sixty (60) days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record,
unless the time is extended for an additional period not to exceed thirty (80) days
by the Supreme Court for good cause shown. Such review by the Supreme Court
shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court.

352 —

A comparative analysis of the Florida statute and our own reveals
that under both, the determination is made by the judge and require
the following, as prerequisites to the imposition and execution

HE ofa sentence of death:

(1) A conviction of murder.

(2) A hearing for purposes of determining the sentence to be im-
posed, separate from the trial at which the issue of guilt was
determined.

(6) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to
the following:

(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.

(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.

(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.

(a) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was
an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after com-
mitting or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping,
or aireraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb.

(c) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.

(®) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.

(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.

(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(6) Mitigating circumstances.— Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.

(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.

(a) ‘The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor.

(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domina-
tion of another person.

(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.

(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.

[| 353
EE

(8) In jury trials, a finding, by the jury, of at least one (1) of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute.

(4) In jury trials, a finding, by the jury, that mitigating cir-
cumstances, if any, are outweighed by the aggravating
circumstances.

(5) In jury trials, a recommendation by the jury, as to whether
or not the death penalty should be imposed.

(6) A finding by the trial court of at least one (1) of the aggravating
circumstances enumerated in the statute.

(7) A finding by the trial court that mitigating circumstances, if
any, are outweighed by the aggravating circumstances.

(8) The completion, prior to carrying out the sentence, of an
automatic expedited review of the imposed sentence by the
Supreme Court of the State.

In holding that the death penalty is not per se unconstitu-
HH tional, the Court said in Gregg v. Georgia, supra:

“We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that
may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the of-
fense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless
of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it.”
428 U.S. at 187, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 883.
which is but another way of saying that the penalty may be extracted,
if the circumstances of the offense and the character of the offender
both warrant and if the procedures followed in making the determina-
tion are such as reasonably to assure that it was not done arbitrarily
or capriciously.

Inall three cases, Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek, the Court examined the
pertinent statutes with a view to determining if they met such criteria;
and in each case it found that they did, although by varying
HH someans. In the Florida case, the Court specifically noted the
presence of the eight attributes hereinbefore set forth as be-

ing common to both Florida and Indiana, and concluded:

“On their face these procedures, like those used in Georgia, ap-
pear to meet the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.
The sentencing authority in Florida, the trial judge, is directed to
weigh eight aggravating factors against seven mitigating factors
to determine whether the death penalty shall be imposed. This

354 |
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determination requires the trial judge to focus on the circumstances
of the crime and the character of the individual defendant. He must,
inter alia, consider whether the defendant has a prior criminal
record, whether the defendant acted under duress or under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, whether the
defendant's role in the crime was that of a minor accomplice, and
whether the defendant's youth argues in favor of a more lenient
sentence than might otherwise be imposed. The trial judge must
also determine whether the crime was committed in the course of
one of several enumerated felonies, whether it was committed for
pecuniary gain, whether it was committed to assist in an escape
from custody or to prevent a lawful arrest, and whether the crime
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. To answer these ques-

tions, which are not unlike [428 US 252] those considered by a

Georgia sentencing jury, see Gregg v. Georgia. at 197, 49 L.Ed.2d

859, 96 S.Ct. 2909, the sentencing judge must focus on the individual

cizcumstances of each homicide and each defendant.” 49 L.Ed.2d

“The Florida capital-sentencing procedures thus seek to [428 US

253] assure that the death penalty will not be imposed in an ar-

bitrary or capricious manner.” 49 L.Ed.2d 923.

Looking now to the variances in the Florida and Indiana statutes, we
find that in most respects, Indiana is more restrictive in the applicabil-
ity of death sentences than is Florida. Indiana requires that when the
guilt issue was tried by jury, the sentencing hearing must be before
the same jury, whereas Florida permits the impaneling of a special jury
for the sentencing, under certain circumstances. The finding of
enumerated aggravating circumstances must be beyond a reasonable
doubt in Indiana, while, in Florida, no standard of proof is specified.

Florida permits the recommendation of a death sentence by a mere
majority of the jury; while our statute requires unanimity in the recom-
mendation, if any. Nothwithstanding that the court may proceed without
a recommendation, if the jury is unable to agree and, notwithstanding
that it is not bound by the recommendation, if forthcoming, we are of
the opinion that the requirement of the Indiana statute cannot but have
a molifying effect.

The Indiana statute affirmatively provides that there be no limita-

tion upon the mitigating circumstances to be taken into account in deter-
mining the sentence, whereas the Florida Act, however, has been in-

[| 355
—

terpreted as being without limitation with respect to mitigating cir-
cumstances. See Lockett v. Ohio, (1978) 488 U.S. 586, 606, 98 S.Ct. 2954,
2965-66, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 991 (citing Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250 n. 8, 96 S.Ct.
at 2965-66 n. 8, 49 L.Ed.2d at 922 n. 8).

The Florida statute permits the relaxation of the rules of evidence
at the sentencing hearing, but, inasmuch as this could facilitate the
presentation of evidence by the State as well as by the defendant, we
do not regard the adherence to customary evidentiary rules as having
any impact adverse to fundamental fairness.

Neither do we perceive as significant the variance with respect to
the time limitation for review placed upon the Supreme Court of Florida
but not upon the Supreme Court of Indiana. In both Gregg,
Hl supra, and Proffitt, supra, the Court expressed a very favor-
able regard for the requirement of a review by the supreme
court of the concerned state. However, in neither did it comment upon
time limitations or even upon the requirement that such reviews be
expedited. The giving of priority to such matters is altogether appro-
priate. However, no matter can be permitted to dominate the court
to the exclusion of all others. The degree of priority given under such
a statutory mandate must, therefore, rest in the sound discretion of
the court. Any other view would be a denial of our judicial authority
and responsibility.

We found in Judy that our legislative and procedural scheme com-
ports with the standards and guidelines provided for in Gregg, and Pro-
JSfitt at the trial and appellate levels. In Gregg, the United States Supreme
Court wrote approvingly of the requirement for the sentencing authority
to specify the factors relied upon in reaching its decision referring to
it as “...a further safeguard of meaningful appellate review . . . to in-
sure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish
manner.” 428 U.S. 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935, 49 L.Ed.2d at 886-87. This is
also required under the Florida statute. As we pointed out in Judy, even
though this provision is not specifically in our death penalty statute,
it is required and followed in the sentencing of all of those convicted
of committing felonies in the State of Indiana.

Article 7, § 4 of our Indiana Constitution provides: “The Supreme
Court shall have in all appeals of criminal cases the power to review

356 |

all questions of law and to review and revise the sentence im-
spose.” And under our Indiana Constitution and rules adopted
by this Court, exclusive jurisdiction of criminal appeals from
judgments or sentences imposing death, life imprisonment or a minimum
sentence of greater than ten years, is reposed in this Court. Ind. R. App.

P. 4(A)(7).

Our rules for the appellate review of sentences, effective
Hl January 1, 1978, are as follows:

“1. Availability—Court.

(1) Appellate review of the sentence imposed on any criminal
defendant convicted after the effective date of this rule is available
as this rule provides.

(2) Appellate review of sentences under this rule may not
be initiated by the State.

(3) The Supreme Court will review sentences imposed upon
convictions appealable to that Court; the Court of Appeals will
review sentences imposed upon convictions appealable to the Court
of Appeals.

“2. Scope of Review.
(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence author-
ized by statute except where such sentence is manifestly

unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character
of the offender.

(2) A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no
reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to the par-
ticular offense and offender for which such sentence was imposed.”
Indiana’s general sentencing hearing statutes require in all cases
where there are aggravating circumstances present that the sentenc-
ing judge include a statement of the reasons for selecting the sentence
he imposes. This enactment, Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-8 (Burns § 35-50-1A-3,
(1979 Repl.)) provides as follows:

“Sentencing hearing in felony cases.— Before sentencing a person
for a felony the court must conduct a hearing to consider the facts
and circumstances relevant to sentencing. The person is entitled
to subpoena and call witnesses and otherwise to present informa-
tion in his own behalf. The court shall make a record of the hear-
ing, including:

Le 357
Ce

(1) A transcript of the hearing;
(2) A copy of the presentence report; and

(83) Ifthe court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating
circumstances, a statement of the court’s reasons for
selecting the sentence that it imposes.”

We found in Judy that the requirement that the sentencing authority
state his reasons in writing in the record facilitated meaningful appel-
late review by this Court of the trial court’s sentencing deci-
Hl sion. Judy v. State, supra; Proffitt v. Florida, supra; Page v.
State, (1980) 274 Ind. 264, 410 N.E.2d 1304; Brandon v. State,
(1976) 264 Ind. 177, 340 N.E.2d 756; Love v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 57, 272
N.E.2d 456. This statute was designed to restrict trial courts to the ra-
tional exercise of their diseretion to impose enhanced or diminished
sentences and to facilitate our review of such sentences. Death is an
enhanced penalty for murder committed under certain designated cir-
cumstances. Ind. Code § 35-50-1A-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.) and all of the other
statutory constitutional and judicial requirements set out above are ap-
plicable when a death sentence is to be imposed and were complied with
in the case before us.

As has been pointed out to us by the defendant, our statutory and
procedural scheme is not exactly like those in any of those states whose
death penalty procedures have been approved by the United

Hl States Supreme Court. However, as that Court stated in Gregg,
supra: “We do not intend to suggest that only the above
described procedures would be permissible under Furman or that any
sentencing system constructed along these general lines would in-
evitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system must
be examined on an individual basis.” 428 U.S. 195, 96 S.Ct. 2935, 49
L.Ed.2d 887. Thus, although there are some variances in the procedures
prescribed under our statute and the Florida statute, those variances
do not appear to be critical. The procedures required in Gregg, supra,
were also different from those required in Proffitt, supra, and those re-
quired in Jurek, swpra, were at a substantial variance from those ap-
plicable in either of the other two. We hold that our statutory and pro-
cedural scheme limits the imposition of death sentences in such man-
ner as to assure that they will not be inflicted in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, and upon that basis the provisions thereof for sentences of death

358 ee
—

violate neither the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States nor is counterpart in our State Constitution, Article I, Sec. 16.

Defendant has cited us to Article I, Sec. 18 of the Constitution of In-
diana in support of his position that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States. His claim is not supported by cogent
argument, and we fail to perceive any interplay between these constitu-
tional provisions. It should be here noted, however, that we have
previously held that Article I, Sec. 18 did not proscribe death penalties.
Adams ». State, (1971) 259 Ind. 64, 271 N.E.2d 425, (DeBruler, J. and Pren-
tice, J. dissenting); Judy, supra.

ISSUE III (B)

Defendant also contends that our statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (Burns
1979) is constitutionally infirm because: “{I]t does not provide a com-
plete review of the trial court’s decision by the Supreme

HE Court.” His argument is premised upon the omission from this
Statute of specifications to determine the parameters of our

review. We have previously noted the similarity of our statute and our
procedures to those of Florida approved in Proffitt v. Florida, supra.
We have also observed that Ind. Code § 35-50-1A-3 (Burns 1979) requires
the sentencing judge to make written findings. In Judy, supra, and in
this opinion, we have pointed out that our Constitution, our statutes,
and our court rules provide for a review of all penalties fixed by trial
courts, including the death penalty. A review of a death sentence under
our rule and pursuant to our Constitution and our aforementioned
statutes will meet the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of
the United States as expressed in Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Proffitt v.
Florida, supra; and Woodson v. North Carolina, (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 96
S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944. These cases made it clear that the function
of appellate review in the overall consideration of constitutionality is
to assure that the system, as applied in a particular case, precludes the
capricious and arbitrary infliction of the penalty, by assuring that the
legislative guidelines have not been cireumvented by the sentencing
authority. Our standard of review precluding the revision of sentences
authorized by statute except for manifest unreasonableness is, in
essence, no different from the recent dictates of the United States

a 359
PO

Supreme Court that capriciousness and arbitrariness in the infliction
of death penalties cannot be other than cruel and unusual.

Mandatory review by this Court, in each case, of the articulated
reasons for imposing the death penalty, together with a review of the
evidence supporting these reasons assures consistency, fair-
Hl sness and rationality in the operation of the death penalty
statute. Proffitt v. Florida, supra. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra.
Cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, supra; French v. State, (1977) 266 Ind.
276, 362 N.E.2d 834. The application of the guidelines and procedures
established by our Constitution, statutes and rules effect an informed,
focused, guided and objective inquiry, by all concerned into the ap-
propriateness, under the statute, of capital punishment in a given case.
Therefore, as in Judy, supra, we hold our death sentencing procedures
to be consistent with and in full compliance with those required by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Gregg v. Georgia, supra and Pro-
Sfitt v. Florida, swpra, and thus not violative of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

In reviewing the imposition of the death penalty in this case, it is ap-
parent that all of the statutory procedures were followed in the trial
of this defendant. As already set out in this opinion, the jury and the
trial judge found the homicide by the defendant here to have been com-
mitted in the perpetration of a felony. A separate sentencing hearing
was held following the guilt determination, and all mitigating cir-
cumstances were considered and weighed against the aggravating cir-
cumstance. The trial judge followed the same procedure and in addi-
tion, had in his possession and knowledge all the information in the
presentence report filed by the probation officer as well as all evidence
presented to him by both the parties in aggravation and mitigation at
the sentencing hearing. The trial judge made his findings’ in writing

3. The trial court’s “reasons for imposition of death penalty” are as follows:

The Court sets out the following reasons for accepting the jury recommendation
and imposing the death penalty in this case.

In the first stage of the trial, the defendant James Brewer was found guilty of
the intentional killing of one Steven J. Skirpan. At the sentencing hearing, the
burden was upon the State of Indiana to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the intentional murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery as set forth
in the addendum to the charging indictment. The State moved to incorporate by
reference, the testimony presented in the first stage of the trial, which motion

360 ee

was granted. The testimony showed that the defendant and his co-defendant an-
nounced to the Skirpan family that it was a “holdup”; that they drew guns and
demanded money and left the Skirpan home with something in excess of One Hun-
dred ($100) Dollars. The defendant, while contending that his co-defendant actually
shot the victim, testified that the victim was shot in the commission of a robbery.
Accordingly, the jury was justified in finding the existence of the aggravating cir-
cumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

In reviewing the seven possible mitigating circumstances considered by the jury,
the Court finds:

L

THE DEFENDANT HAS NO SIGNIFICANT HISTORY
OF PRIOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT

‘The defendant took the stand during the sentencing hearing and the State, on
cross-examination, established that he had been convicted in the Lake Criminal
Court in 1975 of Assault and Battery With Intent to Commit Robbery and also
with Entering to Commit the Felony of Theft. The jury was instructed that these
matters were admitted for impeachment only and not as aggravating circumstances.

In reviewing the pre-sentencing report which was not available to the jury, the
Court found that the defendant was committed to the Indiana State Farm for one
(1) year on each of the above counts under the terms of the Minor Sentencing Act
and that said terms were served concurrently. The defendant further testified that
he was convicted of Auto Theft and the pre-sentencing report indicated that con-
vietion was in Tippecanoe Superior Court and that the defendant was sentenced
to 92 days on the Indiana State Farm. The Court further found from the pre-
sentencing report that the defendant had a rather lengthy juvenile record including
several commitments to Indiana Boys’ School.

The report reflects that the defendant was first committed to Indiana Boys’ School
on the 6th day of March, 1968, for being incorrigible and that he was returned
to the institution as a parole violator on the 5th day of February, 1969, for truancy,
theft, and possession of a dangerous weapon and was again released after serving
154 days. Defendant was again returned to the institution as a parole violator on
the 8rd day of December, 1970, for aggravating assault and battery and again released
aiter serving 176 days. On the 20th day of January, 1972, the defendant was returned
to Indiana Boys’ School for the fourth time for aggravated assault and possession
ofa deadly weapon and served 189 days before his final release from the institution.

As hereinbefore indicated, this lengthy juvenile record was soon followed by
the auto theft convietion in Tippecanoe County and then the two felony convictions
here in Lake County. The felony records alone are sufficient to constitute a signifi-
cant history of pre-criminal conduct.

I.

THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER EXTREME MENTAL OR
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE WHEN HE COMMITTED THE MURDER

There was no evidence of any mental or emotional disturbance. The defendant
testified that he had been employed full-time at Harrison Metal Company for some
18 months as a burner and, in fact, intended to go to work the morning after the
killing. Further, the defendant testified that he and his co-defendant had decided
to commit the robberies on the day before.

[| 361

The Court had the defendant examined after the trial by one Dr. Manuel J. Vargas
for the purpose of determining his intelligence quotient. His full scale intelligence
quotient when tested with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) was 76.
Although this is within the dull normal to borderline range, it cannot be said to
constitute extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

pang

THE VICTIM WAS A PARTICIPANT IN/OR
CONSENTED TO THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT

The evidence was that the victim was unknown to the defendant. The robbery
of the Skirpan home was one of several random robberies committed by the defend-
ant on this day. The defendant and Kenneth Brooks posed as policemen to gain
entry to the home and when the victim asked to see a warrant, he was killed.

Iv

THE DEFENDANT WAS AN ACCOMPLICE IN A
MURDER COMMITTED BY ANOTHER PERSON AND THE
DEFENDANT'S PARTICIPATION WAS RELATIVELY MINOR

The defendant was charged jointly with one Kenneth Brooks. The father of the
victim was able to identify Kenneth Brooks as one of the two people who com-
mitted the robbery. He testified that Kenneth Brooks was not the one who shot
and killed his son but that it was the other man. The State, by strong eireumstan-
tial evidence, was able to show that the other man was defendant, James Brewer.
However, the father of the victim also testified that Brooks had a revolver and
Brewer an automatic. Expert testimony showed that the bullet removed from the
victim could not have been fired from an automatic. Further, when James Brewer
testified during the sentencing hearing, he said that Kenneth Brooks fired the shot
that killed the victim. The jury was instructed that when two or more people unite
in a commission of a crime, each is criminally responsible for the actions of the
other in the commission of that crime.

If we were to assume for the purpose of this provision, that the defendant, James
Brewer did not fire the fatal shot, the jury would still be justified in rejecting this
as a mitigating eircumstanee. The evidence was that this was only one of several
robberies committed by Brooks and Brewer on that date. James Brewer admitted
that he entered the Skirpan home with a loaded gun with the intention of commit-
ting robbery, that after the victim was shot he proceeded to ramsack the home
for money and that upon leaving, he and Brooks divided the money equally. Brewer
further testified that the pair continued to commit other robberies the same night
after the ineident and that later when the police were chasing them, he fired at
the police ear. In the robberies testified to during the trial, there were repeated
references of threats to kill made by Brewer. The Court, of course, has no way
of knowing whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant James
Brewer fired the fatal shot. But even if a jury had some doubt about that, certainly
there was no evidence that his participation was “relatively minor.”

Vv

THE DEFENDANT ACTED UNDER THE SUBSTANTIAL
DOMINATION OF ANOTHER PERSON

There was simply no evidence that the defendant, James Brewer, was under
substantial domination of another person.

362 |
CE

in the record stating therein his reasons for fixing the death penalty,
and we have reviewed those findings and reasons along with the evidence
in the cause. An examination of the entire record discloses that it clear-
ly supports the conclusion that the imposition of the death sentence was
determined by the nature of the offense and the character of the defen-
dant. Accordingly, there is no basis for saying that a reasonable person
could not find Defendant’s sentence to be appropriate to his offense and

VI

THE DEFENDANT'S CAPACITY TO APPRECIATE THE CRIMINALITY
OF HIS CONDUCT OR TO CONFORM HIS CONDUCT TO THE REQUIREMENT
OF THE LAW WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED AS A RESULT OF
MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT OR OF INTOXICATION

The defendant, JAMES BREWER, did not file a plea of insanity nor did he file
a plea alleging lack of comprehension. He did testify that he was high on drugs
on the night in question. However, he further testified that he knew what he was
doing and could have controlled himself if he had wanted to. He testified that he
and Brooks decided the night before to commit the robberies on that date and that
he entered the Skirpan home with a loaded gun for the purpose of committing a
robbery. As hereinbefore indicated, the defendant's intelligence quotient is within
the dull normal to borderline range. That this alone would not constitute a mental
disease or defect.

After the trial, the Court had the defendant examined by Dr. Manuel J. Vargas,
Ph. D.,a licensed psychologist, who said of the defendant, “He simply acts on feel-
ing and impulse. He appears to live pretty much on the moment without thinking
ahead nor looking much behind. Consequently, he tends not to learn from his ex-
periences.” A copy of this report is attached hereto.

VIL
ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES APPROPRIATE FOR CONSIDERATION

‘The only other circumstance that the jury might have possibly considered in
mitigation was the fact that the defendant is only 21 years of age and that his
mother died when he was 11 or 12 years old. In view of the entire record, this
was of minimal importance and certainly could not have been considered signifi-
cant enough to outweigh the aggravating circumstance. The fact that defendant
was of a minority race was of little or no significance in view of the fact that three
of the jurors including the foreman were of the same minority race as the defend-
ant. The affects of the limited intelligence of the defendant is well countered by
his “street wisdom” and certainly cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance.
His manipulation of the police and his alibi witnesses in the fabrication of his alibi
during the trial stage reflects a calculating mind that tends to negate the low in-
telligence quotient score.

IN CONCLUSION, the Court finds the aggravating circumstance ruled upon by
the State to have been proven beyond any doubt whatsoever and that there simply
was no evidence of any mitigating circumstances to affect it. Accordingly, the Court.
finds the jury recommendation to be proper and lawful and that the Court has
a duty to follow such recommendation.

Pi 363
Cd

character. Such sentence, therefore cannot be said to be based upon
capricious or arbitrary considerations or manifestly unreasonable.

Since 1972, we have vacated death sentences in eight (8) cases. In
Adams v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 164, 165, 284 N.E.2d 757, 758 (opinion
on rehearing) it was in response to the holding in Furman v. Georgia
which left the constitutionality of the statute under which he was con-
victed and sentenced uncertain. Six of the other cases,‘ came before us
following an amended statute and the decisions in Woodson v. North
Carolina, supra; Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Proffitt v. Florida, supra; Jurek
v. Texas, supra; and Roberts v. Louisiana, (1976) 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct.
8001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974, veh. denied, 429 U.S. 890, 97 S.Ct. 248, 50 L.Ed.2d
178.

In State v. McCormick, (1979) 272 Ind. 272, 397 N.E.2d 276, we allowed
an interlocutory appeal and held that to permit the State to seek the
death penalty, for a count of murder, by virtue of aggravat-
Hsing circumstances consisting of the defendant’s alleged murder
of another person in an unrelated incident, for which he was
under indictment but had not yet been tried, would be a denial of due
process. Under such circumstances, he would be prejudiced by being
tried on two separate, unrelated charges before the same jury. In each
of those cases following Adams, the sentence was ordered vacated
because the standards and guidelines were absent. They have since been
provided, however, as hereinbefore related, and we hold the statute and
procedures aforementioned and the sentence of death imposed
thereunder upon the defendant to be constitutional under the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States in those cases
last mentioned.

ISSUE III (C)

Defendant next asserts that the constitutional proscriptions against
cruel punishment preclude inflicting the death penalty upon one whose
role in the crime was that of accessory, as opposed to principal. In sup-

4, French v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 276, 362 N.E.2d 834; Bond v. State, (1980) 273 Ind.
233, 403 N.E.2d 812; Fair v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 380, 264 N.E.2d 1007; Gaddis v. State,
(1977) 267 Ind. 100, 368 N.H.2d 244; LaMar v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 689, 366 N.E.2d 652;
Murphy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 184, 369 N.E.2d 411; and Norton v. State, (1980) 273
Ind. 685, 408 N.E.2d 514.

364 ee -

port of this contention, he cites Lockett v. Ohio, (1978) 488 U.S. 586, 98
S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 978, and particularly the separate opinion of
Justice Marshall which was especially critical of a system that did not
distinguish “between a wilful and malicious murderer and an accomplice
to an armed robbery in which a killing unintentionally occurs. * * * and
turns on fortuitous events that do not distinguish the intention or moral
culpability of the defendants.” (Emphasis added).

The Lockett judgment, although it reversed the judgment of the lower
court to the extent that it had sustained the imposition of the death
penalty as to Sandra Lockett, did not hold that the Ohio statute

Hl was deficient because it permitted the death penalty for felony

murder to be inflicted upon others than those who dealt the
death blow. Rather, the statute was overturned because it made provi-
sion for consideration, at the sentence determination stage, of but a very
limited range of mitigating circumstances. Excluded were age and
relative culpability. In essence, the case holds only: “To meet constitu-
tional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude con-
sideration of relevant mitigating factors.” 438 U.S. 586, 608, 57 L.Ed.2d
978, 992. Our statute has numerous provisions that would militate
against the arbitrary imposition of a death sentence upon one convicted
under a theory of vicarious liability. We particularly note that felony
murder in and of itself is not a capital offense but becomes one only
if the murder was committed intentionally and that where a defendant
‘was an accomplice in a murder committed by another; it is expressly
provided that the degree of his culpability be considered. Other
mitigating factors are: the substantial domination by another, the
absence of a significant history of prior criminal conduct and, perhaps
the most important of all, “any other circumstances appropriate for con-
sideration.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(e).

That the Legislature contemplated the imposition of death sentences
under circumstances such as those present in this case cannot be ques-
tioned in view of the provision that the playing of a “relatively minor”
role by an accomplice is a mitigating circumstance.

Accessories are guilty of the same crimes as are their principals. We,
therefore, perceive of no reason why it should be ipso facto inappropriate
to subject them to the same penalties.

Le 365

Historically, we have imposed death sentences upon aiders and abet-
tors to both intentional murders and felony murders.

In Neal v. State, (1938) 214 Ind. 328, 14 N.E.2d 590, 15 N.E.2d 950, we
affirmed the convictions of Neal and Marshall for murder in the perpetra-
tion of a robbery, for which crime they were sentenced to death. The
facts in that case were that the defendants overtook the victim (William
Bright) while the latter was in his automobile. The defendants forced
Bright from the wheel and drove him out into the country. While there,
the defendants removed Bright from the automobile and searched him
for valuables. Defendant-Marshall then walked back to the car in order
to obtain a rope to secure Bright. En route, Marshall heard the firing
of four shots and when he returned, Bright was dead.

In Hamilton v. State, (1934) 207 Ind. 97, 190 N.E. 870, and Witt v. State,
(1933) 205 Ind. 499, 185 N.E. 645, we affirmed the convictions of Hamilton
and Witt for murder in the perpetration of a robbery. Again, both defen-
dants were sentenced to death. Here, the facts were that the defendants
entered the Standard Grocery Company headquarters in Indianapolis
and announced a stick-up. Confusion erupted and shots were fired. As
aresult, Lafayette Jackson was killed. The cause of his death was deter-
mined to be a gun shot wound, inflicted by a bullet from a handgun.
Defendant-Hamilton used a pistol during the robbery, while Defendant-
Witt used a shotgun.

And in Rice v. State, (1855) 7 Ind. 332, and Driskill v. State, (1855) 7
Ind. 338, we affirmed the convictions of Rice and Driskill for first degree
murder. We also upheld the imposition of a death sentence against each
Defendant. The facts here were that the defendants and one other
entered the Fahrenbaugh home near Lafayette at night. They attempted
to break into a bureau but were prevented from doing so by Cephas
Fahrenbaugh. After neutralizing the other occupants of the home, the
intruders drug Cephas outside and killed him. He had been shot twice
with the same pistol. The Fahrenbaughs could not determine who had
in fact shot Cephas.

The defendant’s argument that execution of an accessory who had
no intention to murder and, in fact, did not personally commit the murder

366 |

can have no deterrent effect as to such murders is unpersua-
Hl sive. If the commission of violent crimes can, in fact, be deter-

red by the rational infliction of the death penalty, reason
requires that the program be administered in such manner as will deter
all who have a penchant to participate in violent crimes. This, in turn,
dictates that those who participate, in a significant way, be eligible for
selection to serve as examples.

ISSUE IV

Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial was insuffi-
cient, in that it did not demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
he intentionally killed Stephen Skirpan. He makes this contention in
the belief that the constitutional provision under review proscribes the
imposition of death sentences upon defendants whose roles were ac-
cessorial only. We have determined under Issue III (C), that the con-
stitutions do permit the imposition of death penalty, notwithstanding
that the conviction is based upon a theory of vicarious liability. Hence
it would be unnecessary for us to consider this issue. It should be made
clear, however, that Defendant’s conviction can stand without resort
to the accessorial concept.

This claim of insufficiency is premised upon the inability of either
Mr. Skirpan or his niece, who were the sole eyewitnesses to the tragedy,
to identify him as one of the assailants, together with Mr. Skirpan’s
misstatement, as to his height, given to the investigating officers im-
mediately after the event. Additionally Mr. Skirpan testified that
Brooks, whom he did identify, was armed with a chrome revolver, and
the ballistics tests revealed that the fatal bullet had been fired from
a revolver, which is consistent with Defendant’s testimony that it was
Brooks, not he, who shot Stephen.

Defendant's argument, however, is misplaced in this Court. It is not
reconcilable with Mr. Skirpan’s testimony that when he went into the
room in response to Stephen's call, Brooks was in front of his compan-
ion and that it was the man “in back” who fired.

There were but two assailants present. One was Brooks. Strong cir-
cumstantial evidence presented at the guilt determination phase of the

L | 367
Cd

trial firmly supports a finding that the other was the defendant;
Hand at the sentencing phase, Defendant admitted that he was
the other one. It is inescapable that the defendant is the man
who stood “in back,” announced a hold up and fired the shot that killed
Stephen Skirpan, unless Mr. Skirpan’s testimony is determined to be
unworthy of belief. His credibility was a matter for the jury to deter-
mine and cannot be reassessed in this Court under the circumstances
of this case. Bentley v. State, (1982) 275 Ind. 67, 414 N.E.2d 573.

ISSUE V

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(a) (Burns 1979) provides “The state may seek
a death sentence for murder by alleging, on a page separate from the
rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least one (1) of the
aggravating circumstances listed in sub-section (b) of this section.” Id.
(Emphasis added). Defendant contends that the failure of the State to
follow this procedure was tantamount to a failure to apprise him that
the death penalty would be sought. He erroneously asserts that the
statute mandates the charging of the aggravating circumstances as
therein directed and misperceives the purpose of the directive.
The procedure urged by the statute is patterned after that provided
for charging habitual offenders, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8, which was adopted
in response to our holding in Lawrence v. State, (1972) 259 Ind.
HH (306, 286 N.E.2d 830. In that case, we held that the procedure
of reciting the prior offenses in the charging instrument and
giving evidence of them in the trial of the current offense was un-
necessarily contaminating and patently unfair. The bifurcated pro-
ceedings were not fashioned as a means of apprising the defendant of
his position, as defendant appears to believe. Rather, they were designed
to shield him from the hazard of having the knowledge of his prior
criminal record prematurely imparted to the jury. We do not have this
potential problem, however, with respect to the presentation of the death
penalty issue in all circumstances under which the death penalty is ap-
plicable, although it is present when the aggravating circumstance to
be charged is either a prior murder conviction, a prior murder unrelated
to the current offense, or a prior life sentence.

In this case, Defendant was charged, with Brooks, with murder and

368 Le

with intentional murder in the perpetration of a robbery, the latter be-
ing the first listed aggravated situation rendering the death penalty
applicable under the statute. The killing and the robbery were the same
res. They could not have been kept separate in the presentation of
evidence, and there was no such need. Consequently, there was no
benefit to flow to the defendant from segregating the charge of the ag-
gravating circumstance, a robbery, from the charge of the murder.

Defendant's claim that he was not properly apprised that the death
penalty would be sought simply belies the record. Arguably, the mere
citation of Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 endorsed at the top of the charging in-
strument may be regarded as inadequate. However, the record of the
arraignment is replete with notices of the penalty sought.

We hold that the procedure utilized in this respect by the State did
not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant and was not error,
in this case.

ISSUE VI

Following the return of the guilty verdict by the jury, the defendant
moved for a continuance of the sentencing hearing. The motion was
denied because it was not premised upon any grounds and because the
jury was sequestered.

The determination of whether to grant a continuance lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court, when the motion therefor is not based
upon statutory grounds. The denial of such a motion will be

Hi overturned only when an abuse of discretion is demonstrated.
Johnson v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 145, 390 N.E.2d 1005, cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 944, 100 S.Ct. 302, 62 L.Ed.2d 312; Works v. State, (1977)
266 Ind. 250, 362 N.E.2d 144. In this case, the defendant presented no
factual basis to the trial court which warranted a delay in the pro-
ceedings. He now contends that a continuance was required to permit
an investigation of the circumstances of his prior mental problems and
that the denial precluded the presentation of mitigating circumstances,
in violation of Lockett v. Ohio, supra, and deprived him of the right to
counsel. We find this contention to be without merit. The denial of a
motion grounded upon sheer speculation that some benefit might flow
from it cannot be said to be artibrary or abusive. Hardin v. State, (1981)

Yi 369

275 Ind. 68, 414 N.E.2d 570; Himes v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 416, 403
N.E.2d 1877.

ISSUE VIL

Defendant asserts that he was denied his constitutional rights against
compulsory self-incrimination at the sentencing hearing, in consequence
of his counsel's putting him upon the witness stand in reliance upon the
trial judge’s informal recommendation and assurance that he would not
permit extensive cross-examination. The record, however, does not con-
firm Defendant’s representations.

The sentencing hearing opened with a motion by the State that the
evidence introduced at the trial on the issue of guilt be incorporated,
by reference, as part of the record of the hearing. The motion was sus-
tained, and the State rested. Thereupon, the defendant, who had not
testified previously, took the stand. On direct examination, he repudiated
the alibi testimony and admitted to having voluntarily taken part in
the robbery-murder. He added, however, that he had been under the
influence of drugs at the time and that it was Brooks, not he, who killed
Stephen Skirpan. In consequence of such testimony, the State cross ex-
amined Defendant extensively.

We view the decision for the defendant to take the witness stand as
a tactical choice and one that we cannot fault, given the cireumstances
of the moment. The jury had rejected the alibi defense, and the defen-
dant stood convicted of a particularly heinous crime and was subject
to the death penalty. That neither the judge nor the jury reacted
favorably to the evidence offered in mitigation does not render its tender
bad judgment. There was simply no other way to submit mitigating
evidence.

The trial judge, by affidavit made pursuant to Ind. R. App. P.
7.2(A)(3\(c), has acknowledged that, in response to defense counsel's re-
quest for guidance, he stated that in view of the circumstances, he ap-
peared to have no alternative but to put his client upon the stand. This
claim of prejudicial error, in itself, attests to the impropriety of a judge’s
deviating from his assigned role of impartial referee. However, we ap-
preciate the frustrations of the moment, and we perceive no design by
either counsel or the judge to do other than advance the best interests

370 ee
PL

of the defendant. Neither do we believe that the defendant was thereby
harmed.

ISSUE VIII

Defendant's assignment that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel at the sentencing hearing is not substantiated by the record.
The indicators of incompetence relied upon by Defendant, in the main,
appear to have been either tactical decisions or matters over which
counsel had no control.

With regard to the claims that counsel spent insufficient time prepar-

ing for the sentencing hearing, subpoenaed no witnesses and failed to

investigate Defendant's history of mental problems, we are not

HB apprised of how Defendant was thereby harmed. The presump-

tion is that counsel was competent, and that presumption can

be overcome only by a clear showing that his actions or inactions resulted

in a mockery of justice such that our collective conscience is shocked.

Deadwiler v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 480, 405 N.E.2d 521; Robertson v. State,

(1974) 262 Ind. 562, 319 N.E.2d 838. Further, the presumption of com-
petence is reinforced by the record herein.

Defendant claims that counsel should have moved in limine to ex-
clude evidence of his prior criminal activity from the sentencing hear-
ing and objected to its admission when presented. But, such evidence
was relevant at that stage of the proceeding, and there was no basis
for its exclusion. Neither was there any basis for counsel to object to
the State’s motion that the evidence presented at the trial be made a
part of the record of the sentencing hearing. The statute expressly pro-
vides for the consideration of such evidence at that stage of the pro-
ceedings. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(d) (Burns 1979).

ISSUE IX

After the jury returned a recommendation of the death penalty, the
trial court, sua sponte ordered that the defendant be examined by Dr.
Vargas, a psychologist. The substance of Dr. Vargas’ report was that
the tests given to the defendant indicated that he was in the lowest
seven (7) percent of the population as to general intelligence, acts on
feelings and impulses, without intelligent reflection or analysis and
tended not to learn from experiences.

[| 371

The court considered the report, along with the evidence presented
at the trial and the sentencing hearing, in arriving at its decision to im-
pose the death penalty, and the defendant now contends that he did
not have access to such report and that it was therefore error for the
court to consider it. He cites Gardner v. Florida, (1977) 480 U.S. 349,
97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, but that case does not support his
argument.

In Gardner, supra, the court held that it was a denial of due process
to sentence one to death, when such sentence was based, in part, upon
information which the defendant had had no opportunity to deny or ex-
plain. Additionally, in that case, the record did not contain the undis-
closed information, thereby frustrating meaningful appellate review.

We first note that although the record does not indicate that a copy
of Dr. Vargas’ report was ever formally served upon the defendant or
his counsel, neither does it reflect or suggest that he was denied access
to it. Defendant and his counsel were aware that the examination had
been made, and when the sentence was pronounced, the court made
reference to the report, and no protest was made. The denial of such
access was not assigned in the first motion to correct error but was made
a point of contention in the belated motion to correct error. At the hear-
ing thereon, counsel acknowledged that the report was available to him
at the time of sentencing, although he did not recall when he had received
it; and in announcing its ruling upon the belated motion to correct er-
ror, the court stated that the report had been available to defense
counsel.

In Gardner, supra, the trial court disdained the jury’s recommenda-
tion and sentenced the defendant to death, but in the case before us,
the court followed the recommendation, for which there was
Hs ample basis. The reasons given by the trial court for imposing
the death sentence reflect that his purpose in ordering the
examination was to determine if there were circumstances that militated
against the recommendation. There was nothing about the report that
was prejudicial to Defendant’s interest.

ISSUE X

Following the sentencing hearing, the jury interrupted its delibera-

tions and inquired of the court as to when the defendant would be eligi-
ble for parole, if a life sentence were imposed. A conference was had
between counsel and the court and a response agreed to, and given by
the court to the jury. In effect, the reply advised that there was no longer
any provision in our statutes for a life sentence, that the range of
sentences for murder, if the death penalty was:not imposed, was a fixed
sentence of from thirty to sixty years and that one sentenced could earn
credit for good behavior to apply against the sentence, with a maximum
allowable credit of fifty percent of the sentence. The court further in-
structed that the sentence would be fixed by the court, and that the
determination of the jury would not be binding but would be a recom-
mendation only.

This assignment is not available for review under our appellate rules,
inasmuch as it was not presented at trial. Rennert v. State, (1975) 268
Ind. 274, 329 N.E.2d 595; Pinkerton v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 610,

HI 283 N.E.2d 876. Defendant’s position that he is, nevertheless,
entitled to review under our fundamental error exception to

the aforestated rule is incorrect. We have recently said “fundamental
error” transgressing our rules of appellate procedure “must be blatant,
and the potential for harm must be substantial and appear clearly and
prospectively.” Nelson v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 218, 409 N.E.2d 687, 639.

Weare, nevertheless, at liberty to review questions, notwithstanding
non-compliance with our rules, Lindsey v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 198, 341
N.E.2d 505; and we deem this an appropriate case for such action, in
view of the gravity of the matter and the need for guidance concerning
a newly established procedure.

Although we have condemned arguments and instructions that in-
vite or tempt the jury to consider the ultimate sentence likely to be
served, Feggins v. State, (1977) 265 Ind. 674, 359 N.E.2d 517; Inman v.
State, (1979) 271 Ind. 491, 393 N.E.2d 767, our concern has been with
cases where there was no need for the jury to have such information,
because, under the law, they were not concerned with sentencing. Im-
parting such knowledge, therefore, could not be beneficial, and the poten-
tial for polluting the guilt determination was present. We are not con-
fronted with that problem, however, in the case before us. Not only had
the guilt determination been made and thus could not be influenced,

P| 378
EE

but also there was a definite need for the jury to have such information.

Notwithstanding that the sentence determination by the jury is not
binding upon the judge, we do not regard it as a mere formality having
no substantive value. If we did, error if any, in such regard
Hs could not be other than harmless. On the contrary, the recom-
mendation of the jury is a very valuable contribution to the
process, in that it comes from a group representative of the defendant’s
peers, who are likely to reflect, collectively, the standards of the com-
munity. The ultimate determination cannot be made in a vacuum. Hence
recommendations, if they are to have relevance, must be arrived at in
the light of available alternatives. Given the task of the jury at this stage
of the hearing, it is altogether proper that they be fully aware of the
consequences of a prison sentence as well as of the consequences of a
death sentence.

ISSUE XI

Defendant asserts that his punishment is cruel and unusual, inasmuch
as it is excessive and irrational when compared with the sentence of
sixty years imprisonment awarded Brooks, his accomplice, who, accord-
ing to Defendant's testimony, was the “triggerman.”

We have hereinbefore held that there was evidence to support a find-
ing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the “trigger-
man,” in which event his argument upon this point is moot.

Assuming that the evidence leaves a reasonable doubt upon this issue,
there is, without question, substantial probative evidence that it was
he who fired the fatal shot. The only evidence that it was fired by Brooks
was the defendant’s testimony given at the sentencing hearing. This
testimony is subject to considerable scrutiny, considering not only the
defendant's position to benefit from it but also that at the trial upon
the issue of guilt, he had presented an alibi defense.

The defendant was sentenced on March ist and Brooks more than
nine months later, by a judge other than the one who sentenced Defen-
dant and apparently upon a guilty plea. We are not privy to evidence
that induced the sixty year sentence for Brooks, hence we have no basis
for concluding that the sentences were not properly proportioned. Con-

374 ee

ceivably, there may have been mitigating circumstances shown that
would have rendered the death sentence for Brooks unreasonable, even
assuming that he was the one who fired the shot.

CONCLUSION

We find no reversible error with respect to either the guilt deter-
mination or the sentence determination.

The findings and reasons of the trial court are a part of the record*
We have reviewed the evidence in detail. It would serve no purpose
to burden this opinion with a further recitation. That which has
hereinbefore been detailed discloses that there is a rational basis under
the provisions of Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979) for the sentence im-
posed. Said sentence, therefore, is not manifestly unreasonable in light
of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all things; and this cause
is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of fixing a date for the
sentence to be executed.

Givan, C.J., and Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur; DeBruler, J.,
dissents with opinion.

DISSENTING AND CONCURRING

DEBRULER, J.— Appellant was convicted pursuant to the provisions of
Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4(1) for the murder of Steven Skirpan. He thereupon
became subject to another trial upon allegations of aggravating cir-
cumstances for the purpose of determining whether he should be given
the death sentence. A burden was upon the prosecution to prove the
alleged aggravating circumstances to the jury, and ultimately to the
judge, beyond a reasonable doubt.

L

The indictment and the jury instructions informed the jury that ap-
pellant was charged with “knowingly or intentionally” killing Steven
Skirpan by “knowingly or intentionally shooting” him. The jury received
an instruction based upon Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2, defining both intentional

5. See note 3 supra.

a 375

and knowing conduct. The jury returned a verdict which stated
simply: We, the jury, find the defendant, James Brewer, guilty of
murder. As this general verdict is consistent with a conclusion of the
jury that appellant had the knowing mental state and with a conclusion
that appellant had the intentional mental state, it does not provide a
basis for choosing which of the states of mind the jury actually deter-
mined. Only the culpability of an intentional killing can justify the death
penalty pursuant to the aggravating circumstances alleged in this case,
a knowing one cannot.

In instructing the jury at the sentencing hearing, the judge informed
the jury that:

“In the first stage of this trial, you found the Defendant, JAMES
BREWER, guilty of the charge of Murder as alleged in the State’s
charging indictment.” (Emphasis added.)

And he informed the jury:

“In the second or sentencing stage of this trial the State is seeking
the death penalty by alleging that the Defendant, James Brewer
...did... knowingly or intentionally kill and murder ... Steven
Skirpan ... by ... knowingly or intentionally shooting . . . him.”
(Emphasis added.)

And he instructed the jury that the death penalty statute defined one
of the aggravating circumstances as follows:
“1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally kill-
ing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson,

burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping,
rape, or robbery.” (Emphasis added.)

The jury returned the following recommendation:
“The Defendant, JAMES BREWER, having been found guilty of

murder, we, the Jury, recommend to the Court that the death
penalty be imposed.”

The judge at sentencing relied upon that verdict in stating his reasons
for imposing the death penalty. He stated:
“In the first stage of the trial, the defendant, James Brewer, was found

guilty of the intentional killing of one Steven J. Skirpan. At the
sentencing hearing, the burden was upon the State of Indiana to

376 De

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the intentional murder was
committed in the perpetration of a robbery as set forth in the ad-
dendum to the charging indictment. The State moved to incorporate
by reference, the testimony presented in the first stage of the trial
which motion was granted. The testimony showed that the defen-
dant and his co-defendant announced to the Skirpan family that
it was a ‘holdup’; that they drew guns and demanded money and
left the Skirpan home with something in excess of One Hundred
($100) Dollars. The defendant, while contending that his co-
defendant actually shot the victim, testified that the victim was
shot in the commission of a robbery. Accordingly, the jury was
justified in finding the existence of the aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.)

The sentencing judge concluded his statement with the following:

“In conclusion, the Court finds the aggravating circumstance ruled
[sic] upon by the State to have been proved beyond any doubt what-
soever and that there simply was not evidence of any mitigating
circumstances to affect it. Accordingly, the court finds the jury
recommendation to be proper and lawful and that the Court has
a duty to follow such recommendation.” (Emphasis added.)

It is apparent from this record of proceedings that there has been to
date no determination by the judge or jury that appellant “committed
the murder by intentionally killing the victim” as required by subsec-
tions (b)(1), (e)(1) and (e)(2), of the death penalty statute. The judge made
no determination himself and relied upon the general verdict of guilty
to satisfy this requirement. That verdict does not contain a determina-
tion that the jury found appellant to have “intentionally” killed the vic-
tim. The judge’s conclusion that the State proved the aggravating cir-
cumstance beyond a reasonable doubt cannot stand.

ti.

This Court is called upon to construe and apply the aggravating cir-
cumstances alleged against appellant made pursuant to Ind. Code §
35-5-2-9(b)(1), which provides:

“The aggravating circumstances are as follows:

(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally kill-
ing the victim while committing or attempting to commit ar-
son, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kid-
napping, rape or robbery.”

The aggravating circumstances identified here is the coexistence of two
separate and distinct culpabilities with conduct constituting two
separate crimes, in and by the same person, i.e., the commission of two
offenses specified. The elements of this aggravating circumstance are
the following:

(1) The death of the victim as the result of inflicted injuries.

(2) The defendant had the conscious objective to inflict injury upon
the victim and cause his death. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (definition of
intentional)

(3) The defendant had the culpability required for the underly-
ing felony, i.e., in this case he had the conscious objective to take
property from the victim. Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (robbery statute)

(4) Conduct satisfying the remaining elements of intentional
murder and the underlying felony.

In arriving at his final conclusion that the aggravating circumstance
was proven, the sentencing judge found that the jury had found appellant
guilty of the intentional killing. At trial on the charge, however, the
jury was instructed as follows:

“It is a fundamental principal of law that where two or more per-
sons engage in the commission of an unlawful act, each person is
criminally responsible for the actions of each other committed in
the execution of the common design or plan even though not in-
tended as part of the original design or plan. It is not essential that
participation of any one person to each element of the crime be
established.”

Under this legal principal, the verdict of guilty may have been arrived
at without a determination that appellant personally held the conscious
objective in mind to kill the victim. I agree with the opinion of White,
J.in Lockett v. Ohio, (1978) 488 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 978, that

“death may not be inflicted for killings consistent with the Eighth
Amendment without a finding that the defendant engaged in con-
duct with the conscious purpose of producing death ....” 98 S.Ct.
at 2981.

I would add to this as well that the conduct of the defendant must be
immediately connected to the deliberate taking of the life of the victim.

Cf. separate opinion of Blackmun, J., in Lockett v. Ohio, supra. I find
the Indiana statute and the position taken by Justice White to be in

accord. Our statute states: “The defendant committed the murder by
intentionally killing the victim. .. .” The phraseology “by intentionally
killing” serves to stress this culpability and to exclude a “knowing kill-
ing”. The statute here is focusing upon the actual state of mind of the
defendant at its primary and personal level and not at a vicarious level.
I do not discount the support for the conclusion reached by the major-
ity that evidence simply establishing guilt of the two offenses is
necessarily and inevitably sufficient to establish the aggravating cir-
cumstance proscribed under subsection (b)(1) above. Both views of this
statute are supportable. However, in light of the irrevocable nature of
the penalty involved, the Legislature should make its purpose clear,
if it be that persons having no actual conscious purpose of producing
death are to be executed.

I vote to affirm the conviction, but to set aside the penalty of death.
Note—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 889.

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
v. KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION.

[No. 381867. Filed March 6, 1981.]

Le 379

££»
|
ee

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Anthony J. Metz, III, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellant.

Robert E. Johnson, Francis S. Connelly, Kreig, DeVault, Alecander
& Capehart, of Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— This cause is before us upon the petition of the Plaintiff
(Appellee), Kimberly-Clark Corporation, to transfer the cause from the
Court of Appeals, First District, that Court having reversed the trial
court’s judgment in the plaintiff's favor. The Court of Appeals’ opinion
is reported at 375 N.H.2d 1146.

Transfer is hereby granted pursuant to Ind. R. App. P. 11(B)(2)(b)
in that the Court of Appeals has erroneously decided a new question
of law, i.e. the interpretation to be placed upon the term “business
activities” as used in Public Law 86-272 (15 U.S.C.A. § 381). Specifi-
cally, the Court of Appeals decided that by reason of the very limited
activities conducted within Indiana by the plaintiff, which arguably
could be said were not, in and of themselves, “solicitations,” it was
not entitled to the exemption provided by the statute.

Public Law 86-272 (15 U.S.C.A. § 381), in pertinent part is as follows:

Oe RO

(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power
to impose, for any taxable year ending after September 14, 1959,
a net income tax on the income derived within such State by any
person from interstate commerce if the only business activities
within such State by or on behalf of such person during such tax-
able year are either, or both, of the following:

(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his repre-
sentative, in such State for sales of tangible personal prop-
erty, which orders are sent outside the State for approval
or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or
delivery from a point outside the State; and

380 |
Ee

(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his repre-
sentative, in such State in the name of or for the benefit of
a prospective customer of such person, if orders by such
customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders
resulting from such solicitation are orders described in para-
graph (1)—”

The statement of the case and the relevant facts were set forth by
Judge Lowdermilk of the Court of Appeals as follows:

“Defendant-appellant Indiana Department of Revenue (Depart-
ment of Revenue) appeals from the judgment of the Marion Cir-
cuit Court ordering the Department of Revenue to refund amounts
collected from plaintiff-appellee Kimberly-Clark Corporation
(Kimberly-Clark) as Indiana adjusted gross income tax for the
years 1969, 1970, and 1971.

FACTS

“Kimberly-Clark is a Delaware corporation with its chief exec-
utive offices located at Neenah, Wisconsin. It is engaged in the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of paper and related products.
During 1969, 1970, and 1971, Kimberly-Clark employed at least
sixteen salesmen, some of whom lived in Indiana, to represent
it in this state.

“Each salesman operating in Indiana reported to a district of-
fice located outside of Indiana. He made daily calls to the Wiscon-
sin office in order to receive instructions and messages. Kimberly-
Clark paid its salesmen salaries, and some could earn bonuses by
exceeding quotas. Each salesman worked from his home and had
no secretary or assistance provided by Kimberly-Clark. The cor-
poration had no listing in any Indiana telephone directory, and
each salesman had a personal telephone listing without reference
to his employer or his profession.

“Kimberly-Clark furnished each salesman a fleet or leased auto-
mobile and provided some salesmen with portable typewriters,
staple guns, case cutters, and selling cases. Kimberly-Clark also
furnished each salesman with brochures or pictures of its products
and samples of its new products, but the salesmen neither sold
nor gave away any of the sample merchandise. Kimberly-Clark
reimbursed its salesmen for automobile expenses, motel expenses,
and limited entertainment expenses.

“Salesmen called on two types of customers: direct customers,
who received their products from Kimberly-Clark; and indirect

381

_ EEE,

eustomers, such as retail stores and hotels and beauty shops, which
received the Kimberly-Clark products by purchasing them from
Kimberly-Clark’s direct customers.

“The salesmen would discuss with direct customers ways to in-
crease sales of the Kimberly-Clark products. Occasionally the
salesmen called on indirect customers and did what is known as
“missionary work,” in an effort to generate sales for direct
customers, which in turn would generate sales for Kimberly-Clark.
The missionary work including checking inventories, checking shelf
facings, and explaining products. When requested to do so, a
salesman would also price products and put them on shelves.
Display materials were available from the Wisconsin office, but
the salesmen also carried display materials. When asked to do
so, a salesman would set up a display at the retail store.

“Indirect customers ordered from Kimberly-Clark’s direct
customers. The direct customers placed their orders with
Kimberly-Clark’s Wisconsin office, or the salesman would forward
the order to Wisconsin. The salesman had no authority to approve
or disapprove any order; only persons located outside of Indiana
possessed such authority. When the office located outside of In-
diana received the order, it ran a credit check and also determined
the pricing, quantity, and availability of the product before noti-
fying the direct customer of acceptance of the order.

“The Wisconsin office set all product prices; salesmen had no
authority to negotiate prices. The Wisconsin office arranged for
all sales promotions and special price offers. The Wisconsin office
hired a Chicago agency to take care of all radio, newspaper, and
other media advertising in Indiana.

“All payments were made to the Wisconsin office. The Wiscon-
sin office had full responsibility for collections.

“The Wisconsin office handled all claims concerning merchan-
dise. When customers made complaints to salesmen, the salesmen
only forwarded the complaints to superiors located outside of In-
diana and did not attempt personally to resolve such matters.

“Kimberly-Clark had no inventory in the State of Indiana. It
maintained no bank accounts and no offices in the State of Indiana.
It rented no buildings or real estate in the State of Indiana.

“Kimberly-Clark paid Indiana adjusted gross income tax under
protest for the years 1969, 1970, and 1971 in the total amount of
$18,198.00 plus interest of $2,757.90. The trial court held that

382 |
—EEEEEEEEeeeee

Kimberly-Clark was not liable for such tax because its business

activities in the State of Indiana amounted to no more than solicita-

tion of orders and such activities were protected from state taxa-

tion by the provisions of Public Law 86-272 (15 U.S.C.A. § 381).

Following denial of its motion to correct errors, the Department

of Revenue brings this appeal from the judgment of the trial court

ordering the Department of Revenue to refund the amounts paid
by Kimberly-Clark as Indiana adjusted gross income tax for the

years 1969, 1970, and 1971.”

Courts of other jurisdictions have passed upon very similar ques-
tions arising under the same statute, but with opposite results.’ Two
ceases, in our viewpoint, are fairly representative of those cases. Miles
Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, (1976) 274 Or. 895, 546 P.2d
1081 and United States Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, (1978) 478 Pa.
125, 386 A.2d 471, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 217, 58 L.Ed.2d 193.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in United States Tobacco
Co. v. Commonwealth, supra, that a corporation is engaged in “solicita-
tion” alone when its only activities within a particular state consist
of informing customers of new products, assisting in the display of those
products and taking orders. The court stated that such activities are
“imextricably related to solicitation” and that it was the intent of Con-
gress, in enacting Pub. Law 86-272, to exempt such activities. Id. at
140, 142, 386 A.2d at 478-79. In reaching its decision, the Pennsylvania
court relied in part upon the decision in Gillette Co. v State Taw Com-
mission, (1977) 56 A.D.2d 475, 393 N.Y.S.2d 186, aff'd., (1978) 45 N.Y.2d
846, 382 N.E.2d 764, 410 N.Y.S.2d 65. In Gillette, it was held that the
purpose of Public Law 86-272 would be frustrated if a tax could be
imposed upon a corporation which neither owns property within a par-

1. Compare, e.g., Coors Porcelain Co. v. State, (1973) 183 Colo. 325, 517 P.2d 838,
cert. denied, (1974) 419 U.S. 874, 95 S.Ct. 186, 42 L.Ed.2d 113; Ciba Pharmaceutical Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, (1964) Mo., 382 S.W.2d 645; Gillette Co. v. State Tax
Commission, (1977) 56 A.D.2d 475, 393 N.Y.S.2d 186, aff'd., (1978) 45 N.Y.2d 846, 382
N.E.2d 764, 410 N.Y.S.2d 65; Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp., (1966) Okla., 420 P.2d 894; United States Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, (1978) 478
Pa, 125, 386 A.2d 471, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 217, 58 L.Ed.2d 193, with,
2.g., Hervey v. AMF Beaird, Inc., (1971) 250 Ark. 147, 464 S.W.2d 557; Jantzen, Inc. v.
District of Columbia, (1978) D.C., 395 A.2d 29; Chattanooga Glass Co. v. Strickland, (1979)
244 Ga. 603, 261 S.E.2d 599; Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, (1970) 109 N.J.Super. 22, 262 A.2d
213, aff'd., 57 N.J. 199, 270, A.2d 702, appeal dismissed, (1971) 402 U.S. 902, 91 S.Ct.
1877, 28 L.Ed.2d 643; Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, (1976) 274 Or.
895, 546 P.2d 1081.

P| 383
__ Eee

ticular state, nor makes repairs within that state after sale. Under such
circumstances, advising retailers on the art of displaying goods con-
stitutes “solicitation” alone. Id. at 482, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 191.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oregon held a corporation
to be taxable when its in-state representatives arrange advertising
displays and replace damaged goods after sale. Miles Laboratories v.
Department of Revenue, (1976) 274 Or. 395, 400, 546 P.2d 1081, 1083.
The court in Miles enumerated the following activities as being of a
“nonsolicitous” nature:

“giving ‘spot credit, accepting orders, collecting delinquent ac-

counts and picking up returned goods within the taxing state, col-

lecting deposits and advances on orders within the taxing state,
pooling and exchanging technical personnel in a complex mutual
endeavor, maintaining personal property (beer kegs) and
associated local business activity for purposes not related to
soliciting orders within the taxing state.”

Id. at 400, 546 P.2d at 1083 (citations omitted).

In the case at bar, the crucial activities of the petitioner are: 1) con-
veying information to customers concerning inventory conditions or
delays in shipments, 2) verifying destruction of damaged merchandise
and 8) coordinating the delivery of merchandise for special promotions.

It can be seen that the circumstances of the Oregon case differed
from those of the Pennsylvania case, and those of the case before us
are similar to both but not the same as either. The activities of Plain-
tiff within Indiana appear to be more closely identified with those
related in the Pennsylvania case than with the Oregon case, but we
decide the case as we do upon the rationale expressed in the former
and not because of a compelling similarity of facts.

We agree with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that it is not
possible to state a general rule demarcating solicitation from merchan-
dising. United States Tobacco Co., 478 Pa. at 135, 386 A.2d at

HE 476 (quoting Gillette Co., 56 A.D.2d at 482, 393 N.Y.S.2d at
191). Rather, each case must be judged upon its own merits,

with particular emphasis placed upon the totality of a corporation’s
activities within a state. United States Tobacco Co., 478 Pa. at 186-37,
386 A.2d at 477. No one or two corporate activities performed in a

casual or infrequent manner should operate to remove the exemption
provided by Public Law 86-272. Such activities are indicative of the
extent of a corporation’s activities within a state, but it is the entire
operation which must be examined.

We also believe that Congress perceived “solicitation” as embody-

ing “sundry activities so long as those activities [are] closely related

to the eventual sale of a product.” Id. at 189, 386 A.2d at 478.

Hs Finally, when a corporate representative performs an “act

of courtesy” in order to accommodate a customer, he has not
ventured beyond the realm of “solicitation.” Id.

The aforementioned activities of the petitioner in this case may be
properly categorized as “inextricably related to solicitation,” or as “acts
of courtesy.” As such, the exemption provided by Public Law
86-272 is applicable. Accordingly, the decision and opinion of
the Court of Appeals are ordered vacated and the judgment,
of the trial court is affirmed.
Givan, C.J. and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 416 N.E.2d 1264.

MILTON ABBOTT v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 880860. Filed March 9, 1981]

P| 385
Cd
eC“ Cs
ee

Gregory D. Ball, Wayne County Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— Appellant Abbott appeals here from a conviction follow-
ing a trial by jury of attempted murder, a class A felony under Ind.
Code § 85-45-1-1, and Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1), in the shooting and critical
wounding of one Billy Joe Daugherty. He received a sentence of thirty
years.

The claims made on appeal are:

(1) the trial court erred in giving Final Instruction No. 4 regard-

ing sudden heat and attempted voluntary manslaughter;

(2) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial because of
questioning by the prosecutor regarding a prior shooting; and

(8) whether the evidence was sufficient to negate self-defense.
I.

The court’s Instruction No. 4 read in pertinent part as follows:

386 ee

“Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter has the same elements as
Attempted Murder, or in other words, as charged in this case,
the ‘knowing’ or ‘intentional’ attempted killing of a human being,
except that in the case of Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter,
the ‘knowing’ or ‘intentional’ attempted killing is accomplished
in a sudden heat. The element of sudden heat, if the sudden heat
is established, therefore, reduces Attempted Murder to Attempted
Voluntary Manslaughter.”

The instruction also contains an explanation of sudden heat. Trial
counsel objected to the instruction on the basis that there is no such
crime as attempted voluntary manslaughter in Indiana.

An attempt is defined in Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1:

“(a) A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with
the culpability required for commission of the crime, he engages
in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission
of the crime. An attempt to commit a crime is a felony or misde-
meanor of the same class as the crime attempted. However, an
attempt to commit murder is a class A felony.”

Indiana Code § 35-42-1-3(a) defines voluntary manslaughter as follows:

“(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another
human being while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary
manslaughter, a class B felony.”

Pursuant to this definition and the common law since the days of

Blackstone, manslaughter like murder involves an intentional killing

of another human being. At common law the punishment for

HE somurder required a retaliatory letting of blood. But when the

murder occurred during a fight or other circumstance involv-

ing the heat of passion induced by a sufficient provocation the punish-

ment of banishment was deemed sufficient. In McDonald v. State, (1976)
264 Ind. 477, 346 N.E.2d 569, we held:

“[I]f sufficient evidence is presented to the jury by which it could
find murder in the first or second degree, the jury may also return
a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter, notwithstanding
the absence of proof of ‘sudden heat’.” 264 Ind. at 483.

This understanding of the nature of manslaughter is carried forward
in subsection (b) of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-8, wherein it is stated:

[| 387

“The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces
what otherwise would be murder ...to voluntary manslaughter.”
Thus since the intentional element is present in a voluntary
manslaughter as in the case of murder, although modified in nature

by the presence also of sudden heat, the attempt statute is

Hs applicable to voluntary manslaughter upon the same basis that

it is applicable to murder itself. There is therefore in Indiana

a crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the objection to the
instruction was not well-founded.

Appellant also contends that it was error to give this in-
I] struction because there was no evidence of sudden heat to
warrant it. In Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692, 284 N.E.2d

770, we stated:

“It is error to give an instruction upon an issue if there is no

evidence to support it.” 258 Ind. 698.
The evidence presented showed that appellant and Daugherty argued
and fought in a pool room, and that Daugherty wrestled a pool cue
from appellant’s grip and in the immediate aftermath of this appellant
shot Daugherty from a distance of ten to twelve feet as Daugherty
was in the process of returning the cue to the wall and retaking his
seat at a table. This was evidence warranting the inference that ap-
pellant was acting in anger and frustration as a result of his humilia-
tion before others in the pool room at the hands of Daugherty. There
was no error in giving the instruction.

I.

The deputy prosecutor at trial brought out on cross-examination of
appellant that he had shot a man in 1974. That shooting had not resulted
in any conviction. The challenged cross-examination proceeded as
follows:

“Q. Ever have to use that gun?

A. Yes sir.
Q. When?
A. I don’t know, four or five years ago.

388 a

Anybody see you shoot Ronnie Reed?
Yes sir.

Who saw you shoot him?

Q. Who did you use the gun on?

A. Ronnie Reed.

Q. You shoot him?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Shoot him in the back two times?
A. No sir.

Q. What did you do with the gun after you shot him?
A. Threw it away.

Q. Threw it away?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Was that in 1974?

A. Guess so.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Peggy —.”
In Hensley v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 258, 268 N.H.2d 90, we said:

“When the defendant takes the witness stand, the State may
cross-examine him concerning his credibility. However, in so doing
the State is not permitted to inquire into specific acts of miscon-
duct other than prior convictions.” 256 Ind. at 260-61.

This prohibition does not prevent the State from presenting compe-
tent and relevant evidence tending to prove or disprove a fact in issue
even though it may tend to show guilt of another crime, Mal-
HE donado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843, and the
subject matter in the above cross-examination falls in this lat-

ter category.

Appellant testified on direct examination that he had the pistol with
which he shot Daugherty on his person to “take care” of his business
which he operated in the same neighborhood. Further he stated that
Daugherty attacked him and struck him in the head with the pool cue,

P| 389
a

and that in a dazed, half drunken, and fearful state he turned around
towards the spot where Daugherty was standing and fired off several
shots, not knowing how many, in that general direction, never aiming
at Daugherty or intending to shoot and kill him, but only to defend
his life, which he deemed to be in great danger. This testimony tended
to portray appellant as a naive businessman having a good reason for
carrying a handgun and having a very limited ability to use it in a skilled
and calculated manner. By it he sought to have the jury infer that he
acted in panic in an uncontrollable fear or confusion rather than in a
deliberate, calculated and intentional manner in shooting Daugherty.
The testimony elicited on cross-examination tended to show that he
had fired the gun on a former occasion, striking another human being,
and was therefore experienced in the handling of the gun and in its
use against others, and that he was fully capable of using it against
Daugherty in a conscious and deliberate manner to hit and wound or
kill him. The subject was relevant on the issue of intent as it was being
litigated in this case, and was not improper.

TL.

Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
Hl negate the defense of self-defense. In White v. State, (1976)
265 Ind. 32, 349 N.E.2d 156, in considering the claim of self-

defense upon appeal we stated:

“When we review a self-defense claim, we determine if there is
any substantial evidence of probative value from which the jury
could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant
did not act in self-defense. Appellant must have acted without fault,
been in a place where he had a right to be, and been in real danger
of death or great bodily harm, or in such apparent danger as caused
him in good faith to fear death or great bodily harm. The State
has the burden of showing that appellant did not meet one of these
requirements.” 265 Ind. 34-35.

Customers present in the tavern and pool room where the shooting
took place presented testimony from which the jury could have con-
cluded beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time appellant drew his
gun and shot Daugherty he was not in real danger of death or great,
bodily harm or in apparent danger which would cause him in good faith

390 ee

to fear death or great bodily harm. Appellant asked Daugherty to pay
him back for a debt owed. Daugherty refused. Appellant threatened
Daugherty’s family. Daugherty seized the pool cue from appellant after
a brief struggle and a heated verbal exchange. Appellant was not struck
with the cue or injured in any fashion. Daugherty did not verbally
threaten to kill appellant. Daugherty returned the cue to the wall and
returned to his seat at a table. Appellant, at a distance of twelve feet,
while moving away from Daugherty and the point where they had
struggled, drew his gun, turned and shot five times at Daugherty,
severely wounding him. Daugherty was not armed. This testimony if
believed was sufficient to negate self-defense.

The judgment is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NoTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 278.

WAYDE M. MENEFEE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 280831. Filed March 9, 1981.]

391

John F. Surbeck, Jr., Allen County Deputy Public Defender, for
appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.—In this case Wayde M. Menefee appeals from a convic-

tion for burglary which resulted in a sentence of ten years which the

judge ordered served consecutively to a sentence of two to

Il five years meted out in another case. This appeal does not

satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of Ind. R.App. P. 4(A)(7)

in that there has been here no single sentence imposing a minimum

greater than ten years. However, we exercise our inherent judicial
authority and retain this case for disposition on the merits.

The gravamen of the offense was that appellant broke into the house
of Leon Mauricio in Allen County, Indiana and stole a number of guns
and a gold watch. He contends in this appeal that the evidence
was insufficient to support the jury verdict in that the cen-
tral part of it came from one who had participated in the
crime and the testimony of this person was given in return for a promise
by the prosecutor to recommend a suspended sentence for her on a
like charge arising out of the same incident, and such testimony was
fraught with inconsistencies. In determining this question we do not
weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility but look to the
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the ver-
dict. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction
will be affirmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative
value from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that appellant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover v. State, (1970) 253 Ind.
536, 255 N.E.2d 657.

According to the testimony of the accomplice Sarah Jennings, she
planned the burglary. She knew that Mauricio had a number of guns
in his house and she wanted one to pass to a boyfriend to aid him in
an attempt to escape from jail. She persuaded appellant to break into

392 |

the house and steal a gun for her. Jennings drove past the house in
her blue Maverick a couple of times to check it out, and then dropped
appellant off there and drove around the block, stopping once and lift-
ing the lid of her car trunk. Five to ten minutes later she drove back
to the house and appellant came out carrying a number of guns and
a gold watch. Together they left in the Maverick.

Two neighbors of Mauricio testified at trial that they had observed
Jennings and a man in and about a blue Maverick in their area at the
time established for the burglary. One testified that she observed Jen-
nings get out of the car and open the trunk lid and saw only one
person—a man—come running out of the house and get in the car.

Jennings made a full disclosure of the plea bargain she had made
with the State before the jury. She testified that she had entered a
plea of guilty to a charge of burglary at the Mauricio home and in ex-
change for a recommendation of a suspended sentence by the prosecu-
tion agreed to testify against appellant.

A police officer testified that upon his request Jennings procured
and turned over to him a weapon identified as one stolen from the
Mauricio residence.

In questioning the nature of the Jennings testimony appel-
HH lant relies upon Newman v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 569, 334
N.E.2d 684, wherein we stated:

“An accomplice who turns ‘state’s evidence’ and agrees to
‘cooperate’ with the State in consideration of leniency or the
dismissal of charges by the State, to be realistic, is being bribed,
regardless of the fact that public policy has approved such action
in the interest of effective law enforcement. It does not necessarily
follow that because of inducements offered to the accomplice his
testimony is false. It is, however, highly suspect. Because of the
pressure of such undue influence upon the witness in such cases
the jury should have the evidence relating thereto. Such type of
influence naturally impairs the credibility of such a witness.

“In this state a defendant may be found guilty solely on the
evidence of a confessed accomplice. Walker v. State, (1934) 206 Ind.
282, 189 N.E. 127; Payne v State, (1924) 194 Ind. 365, 142 N.E. 651.
Because human nature would tend to cause accomplices to ‘unload’
against their partners and desire to clear themselves as much as

Pe 393
Ld

possible of blame for a crime, such testimony should be highly
scrutinized by the jury or fact finder. Such fact finding body should
have before it all the relevant circumstances that caused or in-
duced such witness to testify, including the rewards for such
testimony.” 263 Ind. at 572, 334 N.E.2d at 686-87.
We continue to view accomplice testimony in this light. However, here,
a full disclosure of the role of the plea bargain in inducing Jennings
to testify for the prosecution was made to the trier of fact, and it was
in a position to evaluate her credibility in light of it. Moreover, her
story was supported in large measure by the independent evidence
of the two neighbors and testimony of the officer.

In further questioning the nature of the Jennings testimony appellant
points to testimony of the police officer that Jennings at one time before
trial said that she and appellant were accompanied by a third person,
one Jennifer Blakely; and had at one time refused to tell him what
had happened to the pistol she had acquired. It is the essence of the
function of the trier of fact to assess the weight and credit of the
testimony of trial witnesses in light of such inconsistencies and con-
tradictions. It is not the function of this Court. On review we are
relegated to determining whether evidence was presented which was
susceptible of belief and which if believed would convince a reasonable
trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of Jen-
nings while that of a confessed accomplice, and while not totally con-
sistent and unvarying, was nevertheless susceptible of belief and when
taken in conjunction with the balance of evidence of guilt was suffi-
cient to warrant this conviction.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NoTE~Reported at 417 N.E.2d 302.
—

TIMOTHY CoBBS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 580$160. Filed March 9, 1981.]

394 |

J. Michael Katz, of Merrillville, for appellant.

Linley E.. Pearson, Attorney General, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— Appellant Timothy Cobbs was charged in Lake Superior
Court with class B robbery, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.).
Cobbs was tried to a jury and convicted as charged. The trial court
sentenced Cobbs to a prison term of fourteen years. This appeal
followed.

The sole issue Cobbs presents to us concerns the sufficiency of the
evidence. He contends that the crime of robbery requires: (1) an
unlawful taking (2) by violent means or by placing someone in fear of
violence. Appellant asserts that the evidence is not sufficient to sus-
tain the verdict.

The evidence reveals that appellant Cobbs approached the victim,
Velves Thomas, at Olsen Cadillac, Thomas’ place of work, in late Octo-
ber, 1979. Cobbs told Thomas that Thomas owed Cobbs twenty-five
dollars. Cobbs then produced a .38 caliber revolver and repeated the
statement. Thomas then gave Cobbs approximately thirty dollars.
Thomas testified that he recognized Cobbs, but did not know him per-
sonally. He further testified that he did not report this incident to the
police.

Approximately six days later, on November 3, Cobbs and a female
companion approached Thomas in the hotel where Thomas boarded.

[| 395
EE

The three then went to Thomas’ room, where Cobbs again took some
money from Thomas, this time it was twenty-five dollars. Cobbs was
armed with a handgun during this incident. Cobbs told Thomas that
he would return later for more money, and Cobbs and his companion
then left Thomas’ room.

True to his word, Cobbs and his female companion returned to
Thomas’ room two days later. Thomas attempted to lock them out of
the room, and telephoned the police when Cobbs attempted to gain
entry by force. Cobbs left the scene without taking any money from
Thomas before police arrived. When Cobbs appeared at Olsen Cadillac
approximately one week later, the police were called and Cobbs was
apprehended. Cobbs was charged with robbery in connection with the
second occasion on which he took money from Thomas.

Cobbs’ defense at trial and here on appeal is that he had previously
loaned Thomas money. He asserts that, on the occasion in question,
he was merely collecting the money which Thomas allegedly owed to
him. In conjunction with this claim, he argues that robbery requires

n “unlawful taking.” Thus, he contends that, if he were merely col-
Jecting an unpaid debt, no “unlawful taking” occurred, and, therefore,
he is not guilty of robbery.

Appellant’s argument in effect asks us to reweigh the evidence
presented at trial. The robbery statute states in part:

“A person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from
another person or from the presence of another person:

(1) by using or threatening the use of foree on any person; or

(2) by putting any person in fear; commits robbery, a Class C
felony. However, the offense is a Class B felony if it is committed
while armed with a deadly weapon. .. .”

There is no question here that Cobbs relieved Thomas of the money,
nor that he did so at the point of a gun. Thomas denied owing Cobbs
any money. Thus, there was conflicting evidence on that point;
resolution of that conflict was a task for the jury. Moses v.
State, (1976) 170 Ind.App. 451, 456, 352 N.E.2d 851, 855. More
important, even if Thomas had undisputedly owed Cobbs this money,
Cobbs would not have been justified in taking the money by threaten-

396 Le

ing to use force or by placing Thomas in fear; Cobbs’ actions would
still have constituted a robbery. It was also the jury’s task to deter-
mine, from the surrounding cireumstances, Cobbs’ intent and the lawful
or unlawful nature of the taking. Johnson v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 427,
399 N.E.2d 360, 361-62; Perry v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 792,
794. See Williams v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 408, 393 N.E.2d 149. Two
such surrounding circumstances here, of course, were Cobbs’ repeated
“collection” of the “debt,” and his repeated brandishing of a handgun
in Thomas’ presence.

We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s find-
ing that Cobbs committed a class B robbery. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.

All Justices concur.
NotE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 310.
Le

GERALD E. WARFIELD v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 5808157. Filed March 9, 1981.]

Charles G. Read, of Jeffersonville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— Appellant Gerald Warfield was tried by jury in Clark
Circuit Court and found guilty of three counts of Robbery and four
counts of Criminal Confinement. He was sentenced to a determinate
period of ten (10) years on each count of Robbery with ten years added
to each for aggravating circumstances. These sentences for Robbery
are to be served concurrently. He was sentenced to a determinate
sentence of ten (10) years on each of the counts of Criminal Confine-
ment with ten (10) years added to each for aggravating circumstances.
Each of the sentences for criminal confinement is to be served concur-
rently; however, the sentences for criminal confinement are to be served
consecutively to the sentences for robbery. Warfield appeals.

The evidence reveals that Donna Mitchell, her husband and five-year-
old daughter were at their home at 2413 Bishop Road in Jeffersonville,
Indiana, on May 26, 1979. Donna Mitchell’s mother, Mrs. Pruitt, was
also at the residence. The Mitchells were leaving on vacation, and Mr.
Mitchell had started to pack the car around 4:30 a.m. The garage was

open, the car trunk was open and the car engine was running. A man
standing in the hallway with a gun ordered Mitchell to raise his hands.
Mrs. Mitchell was getting ready to leave when she saw the man with
the gun in the middle of the hallway. He told her to “hold it” and not
to move. This man directed the Mitchells to go into the living room.
Mr. Mitchell was told to lie down on the floor. Mrs. Mitchell was ordered
to remove his wallet and watch and to tie his hands behind his back
with a rope the man gave her. She was then ordered to tie his feet.
The gunman checked the bindings and ordered her to come through
the house and asked if she had any jewelry. He opened her makeup
case, found and took approximately four hundred dollars ($400). He
took the rings from her fingers and her earrings. During this entire
time he held a gun on her.

In the meantime, Mrs. Pruitt, who had been sleeping in the guest
room, heard a man say “hold it”. The bedroom door was slightly ajar.
She looked out and saw a big man wearing a stocking mask and holding
a gun. She crawled into the master bedroom where there was a
telephone and made a call. She reached the Clarksville Police who said
they would relay her call to the Clark County Police.

Mrs. Mitchell heard the sound of the phone being replaced on a
receiver. The robber heard the noise also and asked where it was com-
coming from. She said her mother was in the bedroom. He entered
the bedroom and told Mrs. Mitchell to tie her mother to the bedpost.
Mrs. Mitchell was then ordered to remove Mrs. Pruitt’s wallet from
her purse and to give him the money. She was next ordered to go into
her daughter’s room. The robber removed his gloves, laid down the
gun and tied Mrs. Mitchell to the bedpost of the daughter’s bed. He
asked for a telephone number of someone who could come and untie
them. Mrs. Mitchell gave him her father’s telephone number. The rob-
ber took some keys and then returned to the room to say goodbye.
She heard him remove telephones from the wall jacks. The telephones
were found later at the garage door. Mr. Mitchell crawled to the
daughter’s room and Mrs. Pruitt walked into the bedroom after hav-
ing untied herself.

Sergeant Ronald Ross of the Clark County Police Department
responded to a dispatch of an armed robbery at approximately 5:04

Pe 399
LC”

a.m. He arrived at 2413 Bishop Lane at 5:13 a.m. He parked his car
in front of the house. Officer Haas also responded to this dispatch. Both
officers approached the house. Officer Ross went through the garage
door to the rear door. As he approached the rear door, the appellant,
Warfield, was backing out of the kitchen and backed directly into Of-
ficer Ross. They struggled and Ross was disarmed and pushed against
the wall. Warfield pointed his gun at Ross’ head and said he was going
to shoot him. Officer Haas yelled at Warfield to drop his gun and
distracted him. The appellant was then disarmed and handcuffed. A
vehicle parked approximately 25 feet from the intersection of Scott
Road and Bishop Road was found. A license check identified it as being
registered to Mr. Warfield. This car was impounded and an inventory
search was conducted some time later.

Appellant claims that the jury’s verdict in this cause was not sup-
ported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law; that the court
committed error in allowing certain items into evidence, and that the
trial court erred in sentencing.

I.

Appellant claims that the jury’s verdict was contrary to law in that
it was not supported by sufficient evidence that he knowingly and in-
tentionally committed robbery or confinement.

Robbery is defined by Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) as
follows:

“A person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from
another person or from the presence of another person:

(1) By using or threatening the use of force on any person; or

(2) By putting any person in fear; commits robbery, a class C
felony. However, the offense is a class B felony if it is committed
while armed with a deadly weapon, and a class A felony if it results
in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any other person.”
The record is replete with evidence that the appellant intentionally

took items and cash from Donna Mitchell, Charles Mitchell and Dorothy
Pruitt. All of these witnesses testified that they were in fear
Hand that the appellant was armed with a deadly weapon.

Criminal Confinement is defined by Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3 (Burns 1979
Repl.) as follows:

“A person who knowingly or intentionally:
(1) Confines another person without his consent;

commits criminal confinement. . . .”

Confine is defined by Ind. Code, § 35-42-3-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) as
follows:

“As used in this chapter, ‘confine’ means to substantially interfere
with the liberty of a person.”
The evidence revealed that Charles Mitchell’s hands and feet were
bound on Warfield’s orders, Dorothy Pruitt was tied to a bedpost and
Warfield tied Donna Mitchell to a bedpost. Tammy Mitchell,
I age five, was confined by Warfield’s actions in tying and
holding her family in confinement at gunpoint. It is obvious
that the liberty of these four persons was substantially interfered with,
without their consent.

Appellant argues that there was no evidence presented to the jury
concerning his ability to form the intent to commit robbery or confine-
ment. He bases his claim on the fact that he presented an insanity
defense. Appellant is basically arguing that his defense should have
been believed.

Lay witnesses testified as to their observations concerning the ap-
pellant’s condition. It was observed by Officer Ross that the appellant
went into a “coma” at the jail and received three or four kinds of medica-
tion. Appellant testified that he had severe headaches, comatose states,
loss of memory and narcolepsy. Florence Weis had been living with
appellant, and she described changes in him over a period of years.
She described him as unpredictable, and she thought he couldn’t con-
trol himself. A trustee at the jail testified, along with other inmates,
that Warfield would sleep for days at a time at the jail and could not
be awakened.

Dr. Hassi Shina, Clark County Jail physician, testifed that Warfield
had psychosomatic illness and that he had prescribed medication for

Le 401
PC

Warfield and recommended psychiatric consultation for him. Dr. Shina
believed that appellant’s symptoms were caused by an anxiety state.
Dr. Teodora E. F. Bordador, a court-appointed physician, testified that
in his opinion appellant was sane. Dr. Navin P. Patel testified that,
in his opinion, appellant was sane. Dr. Patel did not believe appellant
had any kind of mental disease or defect.

The issue of insanity was fully presented to the jury and there was

substantial evidence to support their finding that the appellant was

sane at the time of the commission of these crimes and that

he did have the intent to commit these crimes. Cobb v. State,

(1980) 274 Ind. 342, 412 N.E.2d 728. In addition, there was

ample evidence that the appellant was prepared and armed. He took

money and items from three persons, tied them up, and removed tele-

phones from the wall jacks. These are not the actions of a person in-

capable of forming a specific intent. See Williams v. State, (1979) 271
Ind. 408, 393 N.E.2d 149.

IL.

Appellant also alleges that the statute requiring him to prove in-

sanity as a defense by a preponderance of the evidence is unconstitu-

tional because it shifts the burden of proof from the state to

Il the defendant. This issue has been thoroughly discussed and

decided in the recent case of Price v. State, (1980) 274 Ind.

479, 412 N.E.2d 783, which held that the statute being challenged, Ind.

Code § 35-41-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), which became effective April 1,

1978, placing the burden of proof of insanity on a defendant is per-

missible under the United States Constitution and under the Indiana
Constitution.

IIL.

Appellant objected to the admission of State’s Exhibits #14, #15, and
#16. He claims that their admission prejudiced him and inflamed the
jury.

Exhibit #14 was a bag containing jewelry, some of which had iden-
tification tags, and a stocking. Exhibit #15 was six strands of rope
similar to those ropes used to tie the victims in the present case. Ex-
hibit #16 was a pry bar which was taken from the Appellant at the

402 |

time of his arrest. It had been tucked into the waistband of his pants.

Appellant denied knowing anything about these items. He argues
that these items were improperly allowed as evidence of “other crimes”
and prejudiced the jury. We disagree. Exhibits #14 and #15 were taken
from appellant’s car during an inventory search. Exhibit #16 was
removed from him at the time of the arrest. Officer Gerald Crotchett
testified concerning the obtaining of these exhibits and their subse-
quent custody. Appellant's claim is based on the fact that during argu-
ment to the court regarding the admissibility of these exhibits the pros-
ecutor mentioned as one reason why these exhibits were admissible
was that the defendant had been asked if he had been involved in
criminal conduct before. There is no merit to appellant’s claim. This
discussion was had outside the presence of the jury. They heard none
of it and there is no way it could have prejudiced appellant.

Appellant was wearing a mask and took jewelry belonging to the
victims in the instant robberies and confinements. The rope was similar
to rope used to tie the victims. The pry bar was taken from
shim at the time of his apprehension. Any evidence that con-
nects the defendant with the crime is admissible. Hill v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 549, 394 N.E.2d 182; Wilson v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 112,
374 N.E.2d 45; Pullins v. State, (1970) 258 Ind. 644, 256 N.E.2d 553.
There was no error in the admission of these exhibits.

Iv.

Appellant next contends that the court abused its discretion in
sentencing. He claims the court ignored the factors set forth in Ind.
Code § 35-5.1-4-7 (Burns 1979 Repl.) which would have been considered
mitigating factors and improperly gave consideration to other factors
which were used by the court to increase the sentence. The criteria
for sentencing are as follows:

“Criteria for sentencing.—(a) In determining what sentence to
impose for a crime, the court shall consider the risk that the per-
son will commit another crime, the nature and circumstances of
the crime committed, and the prior criminal record, character, and
condition of the person.

(b) The court may consider these factors as mitigating circum-

403

stances or as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing pro-
bation:

(1) The crime neither caused aor threatened serious harm to
persons or property, or the person did not contemplate that it
would do so.

(2) The crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
(8) The victim of the crime induced or facilitated the offense.

(4) There are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify
the crime, though failing to establish a defense.

(5) The person acted under strong provocation.

(6) The person has no history of delinquency or criminal activity,
or he has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period before com-
mission of the crime.

(7) The person is likely to respond affirmatively to probation
or short-term imprisonment.

(8) The character and attitudes of the person indicate that he
is unlikely to commit another crime.

(9) The person has made or will make restitution to the victim
of his crime for the jury, damage or loss sustained.

(10) Imprisonment of the person will result in undue hardship
to himself or his dependents.

(c) The court may consider these factors as aggravating cireum-
stances or as favoring imposing consecutive terms of imprison-
ment:

(1) The person has recently violated the conditions of any pro-
bation, parole, or pardon granted him.

(2) The person has a history of criminal activity.

(3) The person is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treat-
ment that can best be provided by his commitment to a penal
facility.

(4) Imposition of a reduced sentence or suspension of the

sentence and imposition of probation would depreciate the seri- -

ousness of the crime.

(5) The victim of the crime was sixty-five [65] years of age or
older.

404 Le
a

(6) The victim of the crime was mentally or physically infirm.

(d) The criteria listed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section
do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determin-
ing the sentence. [IC 35-4.1-4-7, as added by Acts 1976, P.L. 148,

§ 15, p. 718; 1977, P.L. 340, § 189, p. 1533.]

Appellant claims that he did not contemplate the commission of a crime
that threatened serious harm to persons or property; that he had
medical, domestic and emotional problems which caused him to act
under strong provocation, and that he needed psychological counselling
rather than incarceration in a penal facility. He testified that he was
unlikely to commit another crime. Appellant contends that therefore
the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an aggravated sentence
on him.

The trial court found that appellant entered the Mitchell residence
wearing a mask and carrying a gun loaded with hollow-point bullets.
Three people were robbed and bound. Two were bound in the presence
of a five-year-old child. After encountering a police officer, appellant
refused to surrender, threatened to kill the officer and held his gun
to the police officer's head before he was finally disarmed by two police
officers. The judge found that the appellant had been convicted of
disorderly conduct and that there were seven outstanding warrants
for his arrest.

Subsection (d) of the above criteria clearly states that the court is
not limited in the matters that it may consider in determining the
sentence. The above findings clearly were relevant to the determina-
tion of the sentence, and the trial court was not required to accept
Appellant’s version of the events and his motives.

Appellant also claims that the judge should not have considered that
he used a deadly weapon as a factor in sentencing since the crime of
robbery, a Class B felony requires that the perpetrator be

Hs aarmed. He contends that allowing the court to use this fact

as an aggravating circumstance is a form of cruel and unusual
punishment. He also complains that it is error for the court to use these
factors in determining whether the sentences should run consecutively
or concurrently. Subsection (c) specifically provides that the court may
consider these factors as aggravating circumstances or as favoring im-

P| 405
Co

posing consecutive terms of imprisonment.

In Inman v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 491, 393 N.E.2d 767, 772, this Court
stated:

“The court may, upon consideration of relevant facts and infor-
mation, increase the standard penalties, impose consecutive
sentences or both. Furthermore, IC § 35-50-1-2 (Burns 1979), places
the determination of whether sentences are to be served concur-
rently or consecutively in the discretion of the trial court, except-
ing (b).”
Appellant’s other contentions regarding the fact that he was armed
being considered as a factor as well as being part of the definition of
his crimes have been answered before by this Court. We have
H_sheld that the trial judge may consider the nature and circum-
stances of the crime committed in determining what sentence
to impose and that this consideration may include the fact that he was
armed, and that he threatened human life. Williams v. State, (1979)
271 Ind. 656, 395 N.E.2d 239, 249; McNew v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 214,
391 N.E.2d 607. We do not find that appellant Warfield’s sentence is
“manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” Ind. R.App. Rev. Sen. 2(1).

Judgment affirmed.

Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Hunter, and Prentice, JJ., concur.

NoTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 304.
a

JERRY DEAN BUTLER v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 12798348. Filed March 10, 1981.]

406 ee

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Howard N. Bernstein,
Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— This is an appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief.
Appellant’s conviction of second degree murder was affirmed on direct
appeal to this Court in Butler v. State, (1967) 249 Ind. 484, 229 N.E.2d 471.

In appellant’s first and direct appeal he contended that the grand
jury which indicted him was selected from a panel which had been
selected by the jury commissioners in an arbitrary manner in that they
had adopted a system of selecting the names of married men and omit-
ting the names of married women, when two such names appeared
together on the tax rolls. The commissioners had, however, selected
names of women from the rolls when they appeared alone or together
with another not their spouse. This Court held that that selection
system was contrary to the Indiana law that women are qualified jurors,
but concluded that the system was not in bad faith or was not shown
to be probably harmful to substantial rights as required by the statute
governing the quashing of indictments for irregularities in the jury
selection process. Ind. Code § 33-15-22-2; ef. Phillips v. State, (1978) 268
Ind. 556, 376 N.E.2d 1143. The Court noted that the system would
satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment announced by
the Supreme Court in Hoyt v. State of Florida, (1961) 368 U.S. 57, 82
S.Ct. 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 118.

In 1975 in the case of Taylor v. Louisiana, (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 95
S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated by a state
jury selection system which inevitably resulted in very few women
being called for jury service. Appellant bases his claim for post-
conviction relief on this federal holding. He concedes that as a matter
of federal law, he is not entitled to retroactive application of the Taylor

[| 407

holding, Daniel v. Louisiana, (1975) 420 U.S. 31, 95 S.Ct. 704, 42 L.Ed.2d
790, but argues that this Court should nevertheless as a matter of state
law give retroactive application to that holding.

Appellant accurately points out that this Court has on occasion
adopted more stringent standards for the protection of federal consti-
tutional rights than those adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
In Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790, we required in
Indiana that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a confes-
sion is voluntary rather than merely by a preponderance of evidence
as required by federal courts. Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 335
N.E.2d 811. Clearly this Court has the constitutional authority to do
so. Lewis v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138. Our decision
to exercise that prerogative in safeguarding the privilege against self-
incrimination was based primarily upon our assessment that the judg-
ment upon the admissibility of a confession or admission of evidence
of guilt partakes of the nature of the judgment upon the whole of
evidence of guilt, constituting a prima facie case, in that both lead as
a practical matter in most cases to a finding or verdict of guilty. The
denial to the Taylor holding of retroactive application implicates no
similar grave concern. We find the reasoning and conclusion in Daniels
v. Louisiana, supra, the necessary, if not totally satisfying, result of
the proper application of appropriate standards.

The judgment is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 327.

KEITH E. ABERCROMBIE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 4808106. Filed March 10, 1981.]

408 es
SS —E—————= —ll
ee

Geoffrey A. Rivers, of Muncie, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney Generals, Janis
L. Summers, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Le 409
EE

Hunter, J.—The defendant, Keith E. Abercrombie, pleaded guilty to
rape, a class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.); rob-
bery, a class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.); burglary,
aclass A felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.); and theft,
a class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.). He was sen-
tenced to terms of twenty years, forty years and forty years on the
first three counts, these terms to run consecutively. He was sentenced
to a four-year term on the count of theft, this term to run concurrently.
He now appeals attacking the severity of the one hundred-year sentence
and alleging errors in the sentencing procedure.

A summary of the facts most favorable to the state shows that the
defendant, who was 27 years old at the time of this incident, had been
on parole for about two years for a Federal Fire Arms violation. He
was holding a steady job with a local foundry, was living with his
parents and had his own car. On the night of April 5, 1979, defendant
was at a tavern with a group of friends and then went to a party at
a house next door to the victim’s house. In the early morning hours
of April 6, 1979, defendant was very drunk and was thrown out of the
party. He does not remember any of the later events.

The victim, a 69-year-old widow, awoke around 7:00 a.m. that morn-
ing and found defendant standing, fully dressed, in her shower. He
told her to cooperate; then grabbed her and took her into the bedroom.
He raped her once at that time and ordered her to cook breakfast for
him. After that, he raped her a second time. Defendant ordered her
to dump the contents of her purse on a desk and took $20 and her car
keys. The victim awoke later, not knowing if she had fainted or been
struck, and found herself on the basement floor with her hands and
feet bound. She was subsequently hospitalized for four days for her
injuries which included bruises and a fractured sternum. Defendant
was arrested later that day for speeding while driving the victim’s car
in Kentucky. The victim identified defendant as the intruder who at-
tacked her.

Defendant originally entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insan-
ity to the charges. Two court-appointed psychiatrists examined him.
Defendant then entered a plea of guilty on October 24, 1979, at a hear-
ing where the trial court heard evidence from defendant, a police of-
ficer and the victim. Defendant was sentenced at a sentencing hearing

410 |
Cd

on November 27, 1979, where the trial court heard evidence from
defendant and his father. The court also considered a presentence
report in which the probation officer recommended a term of seventy
years but gave no specific reasons for this recommendation. Defense
counsel gave a lengthy statement at the hearing about the mitigating
and aggravating factors present in this case and argued that the recom-
mended seventy-year term was overly excessive and was not propor-
tional to the offenses.

The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one hundred years.
He gave no specific reasons for the sentence and did not list any specific
factors which he had considered as aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances other than the serious nature of the crime itself. His only
remarks were the following:

“Well it is the judgment of this Court after having reviewed the
evidence here and the pleadings. And the presentence report sub-
mitted by the probation officer, and having thought about this
case for a long time, which I have. And thought about the statute,
considered the statue [sic], the aggrevating [sic] and mitigating
circumstances here. The aggrevating [sic] cireumstances having
so far out weighted the mitigating circumstances. And the crime
having been so (inaudable) [sic] and discussing and (inaudable) [sic]
it is the judgment of this Court that on Count I, C2S 79/57, that
the aggrevating [sic] circumstances far out weigh the mitigating
circumstances and a 10 year increase be added to the standard
penalty of 10 years for a total of 20 years on Count I. On Count
II, it is the judgment of this Court that the aggrevating [sic] cir-
cumstances far out weigh the mitigating circumstances and that
this warrants an increase of 10 years, to the base penalty of 30
years for a total of 40 years, on Count II. And that Count II, be
served consecutively to Count I. Count III, it is the Court’s judg-
ment that the aggrevating [sic] circumstances far out weigh the
mitigating circumstances in this case. And that an additional 10
years be added to the standard term of imprisonment for burglary,
a Class A felony, and that be a period of 40 years. And that period
of time to be run consecutively with Count I and Count IL. It is
the judgment of this Court, that with respect to Count IV, that
the mitigating circumstances far out weighed by the aggrevating
{sic] circumstances, that the defendant be sentenced for a period
of 4 years on Count IV. That it run concurrently with Counts I,
II and III. That the defendant pay the costs in this case in the
amount of $47.00 on each Count and that the defendant be

P| 411

remanded to the Department of Correction for a period of 100

years. That is all.”

Defendant now argues that the one hundred-year sentence is cruel
and unusual punishment and is not proportional to the nature of the
offenses in violation of the Indiana Constitution, art. 1 § 16. He further
argues that the trial court violated Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-3 (35-50-1A-3,
Burns 1979 Repl.) because he did not sufficiently set out his reasons
for selecting the sentence he imposed and did not set out the specific
aggravating and mitigating circumstances which he had considered.
Defendant finally argues that the trial court erred in using the same
aggravating circumstances to increase the sentence three different
ways: to raise the classification of two counts from class B felonies
to class A felonies; to add an additional number of years to the basic
terms; and, finally, to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment.

Defendant's argument that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment and is not proportional to his crime must fail since it
is well settled that the length of the term of punishment is
Hs primarily a legislative concern. This Court has continually held
that the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment are a limitation upon the acts of the General Assembly
and not upon the discretion of a trial court acting within the framework
of a statute imposing penalties for the offense. Inman v. State, (1979)
271 Ind. 491, 393 N.E.2d 767; Gingerich v. State, (1948) 226 Ind. 678,
83 N.E.2d 47.

However, Indiana’s criminal code has recently been restructured by
the legislature and now sets out specific guidelines for the sentencing
procedure. First, the sentencing court must make a record of the state-
ment of the court’s reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes.
Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-3 (35-50-1A-3, Burns 1979 Repl.). The code further
provides certain criteria for sentencing which must be considered by
the trial judge as well as other factors which may be considered as
mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances. Ind. Code §
35-4.1-4-7 (85-50-1A4-7, Burns 1979 Repl.). This concept of distinguishable
aggravating and mitigating circumstances is relatively new to Indiana
law and is related directly to the constitutional mandate that “The penal
code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vin-
dictive justice.” Indiana Constitution, art. 1 § 18. In order to further

412 |

implement the constitutional mandate, the appellate courts are author-
ized to review sentences. The scope of our review is defined within
our Rules for the Appellate Review of Sentences, Rule 2 (1):

“The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized by
statute except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable
in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.”
Clearly, the purpose of these sentencing provisions in our criminal
code is to insure a basic fairness in the sentencing process and thereby
promote respect for the law. When the sentencing judge is
HI required to make a statement of the reasons for imposing a
particular sentence, two important goals are served. First,
the judge is confined to proper grounds for either increasing or decreas-
ing the presumptive sentence provided for the offense; and, second,
the appellate court is enabled to determine the reasonableness of the
sentence imposed, under the circumstances. Page v. State, (1980) 274
Ind. 264, 410 N.E.2d 1304.

But a statement of reasons for imposing a particular sentence serves
numerous other goals beyond the two primary goals. An attempt by
the sentencing judge to articulate his reasons for a sentence in each
case should in itself contribute significantly to the rationality and con-
sistency of sentences. A statement by the sentencing judge explaining
the reasons for commitment can help both the defendant and the public
understand why a particular sentence was imposed. An acceptance of
the sentence by the defendant without bitterness is an important in-
gredient in rehabilitation, and acceptance by the public will foster con-
fidence in the criminal justice system.

This Court has held that we will not require a lengthy state-
Hs ment of reasons or a list of specific aggravating and mitigating
factors considered when only the basic sentence is imposed.

We have said:

“When a court imposes the basic sentence embodied within a par-
ticular criminal statute, this Court will presume that the manda-
tory considerations were made by the judge, even if the record
lacks specificity in enumerating those considerations. See West's
Ann. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-3(3) (1978). However, when a judge in-
creases or decreases the basic sentence, suspends the sentence,

[| 413
Ee

or imposes consecutive terms of imprisonment, the record should
disclose what factors were considered by the judge to be mitigating
or aggravating circumstances.” Gardner v. State, (1979) 270 Ind.
627, 388 N.E.2d 518, 517.

In the instant case, however, much more than the basic sentence
was involved and there was not any statement of specific reasons given
by the court to support the imposition of the greatly enhanced sentence.
Determination of an appropriate sentence involves a balancing of many
factors and some articulation of this balancing process must be made
in the record by the sentencing judge. Here, the aggravating factors
were clear and easily stated. There was physical injury to the victim,
and this factor alone raised two of the class B felonies to class A felonies.
Other aggravating factors were that the defendant had a prior criminal
record and the victim was over 65 years old.

However, there were also many unique aspects to this crime and
many mitigating factors which should have been examined. Some of
the mitigating factors in this case were that there was no death, no
permanent physical impairment, no destruction of property, no weapons
involved and no evidence of deliberation. Beyond the actual facts of
the crime itself, the nature and background of the individual defend-
ant should also be considered. Here, defendant's prior criminal record
was not extensive and involved no crimes of violence. The defendant
showed remorse for the instant crime and agreed to plead guilty and
spare the victim the ordeal of a trial. Defendant was holding a steady
job and had the support of a good family in the community. The unique
and unplanned circumstances surrounding the incident tend to show
that the crime would not be likely to happen again. Several members
of defendant’s family wrote to the judge showing their concern for and
support of defendant. Defendant’s attorney at the sentencing hearing
cited other mitigating circumstances involved in this case, including
defendant’s age, which would support the likelihood of defendant’s
rehabilitation and therefore the imposition of a minimum term.

On the other hand, the presentence report which the trial judge
studied was brief, listed mainly the objective facts of the crime and
contained no explanation of why the state recommended an enhanced
sentence of seventy years. The sentencing record before us contains
no statement of reasons and does not set out specific aggravating and

414 ee
Cd

mitigating circumstances to support the imposition of the one hundred-
year sentence. There is no indication that the court even considered
the possibility of the rehabilitation of defendant. While we recognize
that the crimes of rape, robbery and burglary are very serious, the
legislature has provided a basic term of thirty years for these crimes
when they are class A felonies as in the instant case. The imposition
of a term more than three times the length of the basic term requires
a thorough statement of the reasons considered and the specific ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances which support the sentence.

Furthermore, although the trial court is bound to consider the
seriousness of the crime committed and the need to protect the com-
munity by sequestration of the offender, there are other
Hl objectives of a term of imprisonment which also must be con-
sidered. Under our constitution, the primary goal to be con-
sidered is the rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member
of society and any unique factors which support this goal must be
carefully considered. Other objectives are deterrence of the offender
himself as well as of other members of the community and community
condemnation of the individual offender for the purpose of maintain-
ing respect for societal norms of behavior. The record must show that
the sentence imposed is a reasoned application of these sentencing
objectives.

Since we find no statement of reasons or of specific aggravating and
mitigating circumstances which would support the imposition of a one
hundred-year sentence for the instant crimes, the cause must be
remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant defendant a new
sentencing hearing and enter sufficient findings to support the sentence
imposed. We are ordering a new sentencing hearing in this case because
the original trial judge is now deceased.

We must also address the last argument raised by defendant as it
may be involved at his new hearing. Defendant argues that the trial
court erred in using the same aggravating circumstances to

Il increase his sentence three different times; to raise the class-
ification of two counts from class B felonies to class A felonies;

to add an additional number of years to the basic terms; and to impose
consecutive terms of imprisonment. We have held that under our pres-
ent statutes the alternative ways of increasing a particular sentence

[| 415
Es

are not mutually exclusive. A court may, upon consideration of rele-
vant facts and information, increase the basic penalties, impose con-
secutive sentences or both. Mott v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 216, 402 N.E.2d
986; Inman v. State, supra.

However, it is clear, that in every case where increased sentences
are imposed the record must show that careful consideration commen-
surate with the denial of liberty involved has been given to
Il the defendant. Due care must be taken to demonstrate a
thorough and thoughtful sentencing decision supported by
specific and detailed reasons and an indication that the court has con-
sidered the goal of rehabilitation. The record must show that the deter-
mination of the inereased sentence was based upon a consideration of
the facts of-the specific crime, the aggravating and mitigating cireum-
stances involved and the relation of the sentence imposed to the cbjec-
tives which will be served by that sentence.

Since the record in the instant case is not adequate to support the
imposition of both increased terms and consecutive terms or a one
hundred-year sentence, the cause is remanded with instructions to grant
defendant a new sentencing hearing and enter sufficient findings to
support the sentence imposed.

The conviction of guilty on the pleas and the evidence is affirmed.
The cause is remanded with instructions to conduct a new sentencing
hearing.

Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NOTE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 316.

JOHN HAAK v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 7808204. Filed March 10, 1981.]

i
arg
a

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy
Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, George B. Huff, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.—Appellant John Haak was charged in LaPorte Circuit
Court with rape, Ind. Code § 35-42-41 (Burns 1979 Repl.). Haak was
tried to a jury and convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced
him to twenty years imprisonment. This appeal followed. Appellant
raises four issues for our consideration. One of these issues requires
a reversal of appellant’s conviction and a retrial of this cause. Therefore,
we shall deal in this opinion only with this issue and an additional ques-
tion which may arise in a subsequent retrial. The issues we shall dispose
of concern: (1) whether the trial court improperly restricted cross-

P| 4l7
—

examination of the victim; and (2) whether the trial court erred in refus-
ing to grant a mistrial due to information revealed during trial con-
cerning two of the jurors.

1

Appellant alleges the trial court improperly restricted his cross-
examination of the victim. The record reveals that the victim, L.M.,
and Haak were second cousins and were acquainted prior to this alleged
incident. L.M. testified that defendant's brother, Robert Haak, was her
former boyfriend, but that they had “broken up” four or five years
earlier. Appellant attempted to impeach L.M.’s credibility by introdue-
ing evidence that she harbored a dislike for appellant’s brother, and
would try to “get back at” appellant’s brother by lashing out in some
fashion at appellant. Apparently defense counsel wished the jury to
conclude, therefore, that she had fabricated this charge against appel-
lant Haak. The trial court did not permit this line of questioning.

We do not find that the trial court unduly or improperly restricted
appellant’s right of cross-examination. The scope of cross-examination
is, as a general matter, subject to the trial court’s discretion.
HE Ashbaugh v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 557, 400 N.E.2d 767, 772;
Gutierrez v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 639, 395 N.E.2d 218, 223.
The court here informed defense counsel that he would permit cross-
examination of the victim concerning possible prior animosity toward
appellant or any prior adverse relations she had had with him, but would
not permit evidence of the type appellant suggested. Clearly, the
testimony which appellant wished to adduce concerned a relationship
which had existed several years earlier and, in fact, did not directly
involve appellant John Haak. The remote character of this proposed
testimony far outweighed its limited relevance on the question of L.M.’s
credibility. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
limiting the cross-examination of L.M. in this fashion. See Chambers
v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 357, 392 N.H.2d 1156, 1160. This issue is without
merit.

I.
Appellant Haak argues the trial court erred in refusing to grant his

418 ee
Le

motion for a mistrial. This issue involves the discovery by counsel and
the court during trial that one of the jurors is married to an attorney
who had accepted a deputy prosecutor's position in the county where
the case was being tried. We agree that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in failing to declare a mistrial, and, accordingly, we reverse Haak’s
conviction and remand this cause for a new trial.

The facts pertinent to this issue are as follows. Jury selection for
Haak’s trial began on Monday, September 24, 1979, and was completed
in time to allow for the taking of some testimony on that day as well.
One of the persons selected for the panel was Marsha Pawloski. She
stated on voir dire that her husband, Thomas Pawloski, is an attorney
in LaPorte County, and that she is his legal secretary. In addition, she
stated that her husband did undertake some criminal defense work,
but was not a prosecutor. Mrs. Pawloski asserted that her ability to
act as an impartial juror would not be affected by the fact that her
husband is an attorney. Another person ultimately selected for the
jury in Haak’s trial was Roger Bixler. Voir dire examination of Mr.
Bixler established that his wife and Mrs. Pawloski are sisters. When
defense counsel saw, before voir dire began, that Marsha Pawloski was
one of the venire persons from whom the jury would be selected, he
challenged her for cause on the basis that her husband is an attorney.
The trial court denied this challenge. Defense counsel did not exhaust
his peremptory challenges, nor did he exercise a peremptory challenge
to remove Mrs. Pawloski or Mr. Bixler from the panel. Likewise,
defense counsel did not challenge either Mrs. Pawloski or Mr. Bixler
for cause after questioning them during voir dire.

At the beginning of the second day of the trial, defense counsel filed
a written motion for a mistrial. This pleading alleged that Marsha
Pawloski’s husband had been hired as a deputy prosecutor by the pros-
ecutor whose office was prosecuting this case and that Marsha Pawloski
was therefore incapable of acting as an impartial juror in this cause.
Defendant's motion repeated this allegation with respect to juror Roger
Bixler and also challenged his ability to act as an impartial juror. As
a result of these allegations, the trial court conducted a hearing out-
side the presence of the jury.

Thomas Pawloski, Marsha Pawloski’s husband, testified at that hear-

L | 419
CO

ing that he is an attorney in LaPorte County and that on the preceding
day, which was the day Haak’s trial began, he and his future partner,
Craig Braje, had been offered and had accepted positions as deputy
prosecutors in LaPorte County. This offer was made by Walter Chapala,
the elected prosecutor of LaPorte County. Chapala’s office was handl-
ing the prosecution of Haak in this case. Chapala offered the position
to Thomas Pawloski at approximately 2:00 p.m. on the preceding day,
which was after Marsha Pawloski had been selected as a juror in this
cause.

Chapala testified that, at the time the offer was made and accepted,
he and Thomas Pawloski both knew that Pawloski’s wife was serving
on Haak’s jury. For that reason, Chapala stated, they agreed that
Pawloski would not actually begin working for Chapala’s office until
Haak’s trial was concluded, and that they would not inform Marsha
Pawloski of this arrangement until after the conclusion of Haak’s trial.
Thomas Pawloski testified, however, that his wife knew at the time
she was selected as a juror that Thomas Pawloski and Braje were seek-
ing deputy prosecutor positions with Chapala’s office; she also knew
at the time she was selected as a juror that her husband was planning
to meet with Chapala on the day Haak’s trial began and discuss the
employment proposal which Pawloski and Braje had decided to make
to Chapala. Thomas Pawloski testified that he did not inform his wife
later that day that he had taken the position in Chapala’s office.
Pawloski further stated that Roger Bixler was not aware that he had
been seeking a deputy prosecutor position, nor that he had accepted
such a position.

The trial court then called Marsha Pawloski to the witness stand
and questioned her outside the presence of the rest of the jurors. Mar-
sha Pawloski testified that she knew her husband and Braje had been
discussing the idea of applying for positions in the prosecutor's office.
The trial court then informed Mrs. Pawloski that her husband had,
in fact, taken a deputy prosecutor’s position in Chapala’s office and
would begin working in that capacity when Haak’s trial was concluded.
Under questioning from the trial court, Marsha Pawloski stated that
she did not think this knowledge would make it difficult for her to
render an impartial verdict in this case.

420 |

In Block v. State, (1885) 100 Ind. 357, this Court faced a similar situa-
tion. Unbeknownst to either the defendant or his attorney at the time
of jury selection, one of the jurors in the Block case was a deputy pros-
ecutor in that county. In response to the defendant’s motion for a new
trial, the juror filed an affidavit, stating inter alia that his holding the
position of deputy prosecutor “had no influence whatever upon him
in making up the verdict which the jury returned.” Jd. at 358-59. At
the time of the Block case, there was a statute in effect, R.S. 1881 §
1793, which stated in part:

“The following, and no other, shall be good causes for challenge
to any person called as a juror in any criminal trial:

Eleventh. That he is biased, or prejudiced, either for or against
the defendant.”
We first held in Block that objections in the nature of chal-
HH lenges for cause, other than those listed in this statute, may
be made to the competency of a person called as a juror. We
then explained:

“The ‘bias’ which disqualifies a juror is of two kinds, ‘actual bias’
and ‘implied bias.’ Actual, where a real bias for or against one
of the parties exists. Implied, where the relations which the juror
sustains to one of the parties are such as to raise a presumption
in his favor.”

Id. at 362. See United States v. Wood, (1936) 299 U.S. 123, 134, 57 S.Ct.
177, 180, 81 L.Ed. 78, 82 (“The question here is as to implied bias, a
bias attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless of actual
partiality.”). While acknowledging that the relevant statute did not
list specific relationships which would constitute implied bias, we never-
theless recognized in Block that “the principles and definitions of the
common law on the subject of ‘implied bias’ . . . have always been ex-
pressly or inferentially recognized in this State.” Id. at 363-64.

We then concluded in Block v. State that a deputy prosecutor
Hi _smust be placed in the category of impliedly biased. In reaching
this conclusion, we explained:

“The prosecuting attorney stood, in this case, for and as the

[| 421
es

representative of the State, and was, by analogy and for all prac-
tical purposes, the plaintiff in the prosecution. Grayson [the juror],
by his appointment as deputy, had become and was the employee
and subordinate of the prosecuting attorney, as well as the at-
torney for the State within certain territorial limits. He was, there-
fore, impliedly biased against the appellant, and hence an improper
juror.”
Id. at 364, quoted in United States v. Wood, supra, 299 U.S. at 141, 57
S.Ct. at 182, 81 L.Ed. at 85 (emphasis added). Thus, we reversed Block’s
conviction and awarded him a new trial. Significantly, the Court
disregarded the juror’s assertion in his affidavit that his position did
not affect his performance as a juror. We noted in this regard: “It
may be that the objection to Grayson’s want of qualification to sit as
a juror in this case worked no actual injury to the appellant, but,
however that may have been, we can not afford to make the precedent
which would be established by our holding that Grayson was a compe-
tent juror.” Jd. at 364-65.

In Barnes v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 320, 330 N.E.2d 743, we were once
again faced with a situation very similar to the case now before us.
During the selection of the jury in the Barnes case, one of the jurors
was asked if he had any friends or relatives on the prosecutor's staff.
He replied that he did not. However, it was later discovered that the
juror was married to a second cousin of a member of the prosecutor’s
staff. At the time of the Barnes case, Ind. Code § 35-1-30-4 (Burns 1971)
provided:

“The following shall be good causes for challenge to any person
called as a juror in any criminal trial:

Eleventh. That he is biased or prejudiced for or against the
defendant.

Fourteenth. That he has a personal interest in the result of the
trial.”
Thus, this statute is very similar to the statute referred to in Block
v. State, supra. With slight changes, this statute remains in effect. Ind.
Code § 35-1-30-4 (Burns 1979 Repl.).

422, ee
Ld

Because the possibility of juror bias had been raised by appellant
Barnes’ allegation, and because there had been no opportunity to
discover this bias at the time the jury was selected, we remanded the
cause to the trial court. Pursuant to this remand, the trial court was
instructed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We explained that the
sole purpose of the evidentiary hearing was to determine two ques-
tions: (1) whether, during voir dire, the juror was “aware of his rela-
tionship to the member of the prosecutor's staff;” and (2) whether, at
any time prior to the verdict, the juror became aware of his relation-
ship to the member of the prosecutor's staff. We then stated: “If either
of these questions are found to require an affirmative answer, grounds
for challenge for cause will have been shown to have existed, and a
new trial must be ordered.” 263 Ind. at 326, 330 N.E.2d at 747.

Three points must be noticed in analyzing the Barnes case. First,
the result of the Barnes opinion and the result of the evidentiary hear-
ing to be conducted on remand did not turn on any finding by this Court
or the trial court that the juror in question knowingly gave an untruth-
ful answer on voir dire. We did state that, if the juror had lied, his
misconduct was ground for a new trial; however, our instructions to
the trial court regarding the evidentiary hearing clearly revealed that
the important questions concerned if and when the juror became aware
that he was related by marriage to a member of the prosecutor's staff.
We held that, if the juror became aware of this relationship before
the verdict was reached, appellant Barnes was entitled to a new trial,
even if the juror did not know of the relationship —and therefore did
not lie—during voir dire. Stated another way, the juror could have
given an innocently incorrect answer on voir dire, and yet could have
learned the truth prior to the verdict being reached. In that event,
his knowledge prior to the verdict of his relationship would have en-
titled the defendant to a new trial. Id. at 326, 330 N.E.2d at 747. Cf.
Barker v. Cole, (1979) Ind.App., 396 N.E.2d 964, 968.

Second, we were not concerned in Barnes with the extent of the
juror’s relative’s involvement in that case. We noted that the juror’s
wife’s second cousin was “involved to a slight degree in the trial of
this cause.” However, as explained above, the defendant’s right to a
new trial turned solely on the juror’s knowledge of his relationship

Pi 423

with the prosecutor’s office. If he became aware of that relationship
at any time prior to the return of the verdict, he was incompetent to
act as a juror, and the defendant was entitled to a new trial.

This result also raises the third crucial point of the Barnes case. Our
holding in Barnes gave the prosecution no opportunity at the subse-
quent evidentiary hearing to show that the juror was not actu-
HE oally biased as a result of any knowledge he obtained prior
to the verdict. Thus, just as we explained in Block v. State,
the problem created in Barnes by the juror’s relationship was that of
implied bias, “where the relations which the juror sustains to one of
the parties are such as to raise a presumption of bias in his favor.”
Block v. State, supra, 100 Ind. at 362. Therefore, as the results in Barnes
and Block indicate, when a relationship of this type is shown to exist,
and it is also shown that the juror knew of or became aware of this
relationship prior to the verdict, then the defendant will have estab-
lished the existence of grounds for a challenge for cause. If the jury
has not yet been selected, the defendant has the right to have the indi-
vidual removed for cause. If, as in Block and Barnes, the problem is
not discovered until after the trial is over, the defendant is entitled
to a new trial.

We believe that Barnes and Block clearly mandate a conclusion that,
the trial court in the case before us should have granted appellant
Haak’s motion for a mistrial. According to the testimony received at
the hearing conducted during trial and the transcript of the voir dire
of the jury, neither Marsha Pawloski nor defense counsel knew at the
time she was selected as a juror that her husband had, in fact, accepted
a job as a deputy prosecutor. However, it is abundantly clear that she
knew at that time that he and his partner-to-be were seeking positions
in the prosecutor's office. She did not reveal this information on voir
dire, even when asked if her husband was a prosecutor. Thus, the
defendant had no opportunity nor reason to challenge Mrs. Pawloski
during voir dire on the basis of the relationship which later came to
light. See Barnes v. State, supra, 263 Ind. at 326, 330 N.E.2d at 747.

According to the testimony heard outside the presence of the jury,
prosecutor Chapala did not actually offer the position to Thomas

424 ee

Pawloski until after Marsha Pawloski was selected as a juror.
Hs Appellant did not learn of Thomas Pawloski’s position with
the prosecutor’s office until after the trial had recessed for
the day; he filed his motion for a mistrial at the beginning of the court
session the following day. On two occasions during the subsequent hear-
ing, the trial court unequivocally stated to Mrs. Pawloski that her hus-
band was going to become a deputy prosecutor as soon as Haak’s trial
was concluded. Marsha Pawloski was, therefore, a juror attempting
to help return an “impartial” verdict in a case being prosecuted by
the same office in which her husband had, with her knowledge, agreed
to be employed. From the time of the hearing, if not from the inception
of these proceedings; she was a juror biased by “the relations [she]
sustains to one of the parties.” Block v. State, supra, 100 Ind. at 362.
This bias, as a matter of law, rendered her incapable of acting as a
truly impartial juror. Barnes v. State, supra. Cf. Stevens v. State, (1976)
265 Ind. 396, 354 N.E.2d 727.

“The end to be obtained is an impartial jury; to secure this end,
a man is prohibited from serving on it whose connection with a
party is such as to induce a suspicion of partiality. The relation-
ship may be remote; the person may never have seen the party;
he may declare that he feels no prejudice in the case; and yet the
law cautiously incapacitates him from serving on the jury because
it suspects prejudice, because in general persons in a similar situa-
tion would feel prejudice.”
United States v. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Case. 49, 50 (opinion of
Marshall, C.J.).

We perceive no meaningful distinction between this case, where the
juror is the spouse of the deputy prosecutor, and Block v. State, where
the juror was himself a deputy prosecutor. This difference

His merely one of slight degree, and is, realistically, not a dif-
ference in kind. Similarly, we find no meaningful distinction
between this case, where the juror’s husband was to begin working
as a deputy prosecutor as soon as the trial concluded, and Barnes v.
State, where the juror’s relative was already a member of the prose-
cutor’s staff. Again, this is only a slight difference in degree. The una-
voidable inclinations and motivations which rendered the juror incompe-
tent as a matter of law in Barnes were no less real and troublesome

P| 425
Es

here, where the relationship in question had only been verbalized at
the time of the trial, but, to a certainty and with the juror’s knowledge,
was going to exist in fact as soon as the trial concluded. Cf. Ross v.
State, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 484, 360 N.E.2d 1015.

Moreover, a much closer relationship existed between the juror and
one of the parties in this case than existed in Barnes v. State. In this
case, the juror’s husband was directly connected to one of the parties
by virtue of his acceptance of the offer of employment. In Barnes, the
juror’s spouse was a second cousin of a member of the prosecutorial
staff. Yet, we held in Barnes that the juror’s knowledge of this rela-
tionship, by itself, made him challengeable for cause. The same result
must obtain here.

We refuse to distinguish Barnes v. State on the basis of the amount
of involvement or the fact of involvement of the juror’s relative in the
case being tried. In Barnes, the second cousin of the juror’s wife “was
involved to a slight degree in the trial” of the case. 263 Ind. at 325,
330 N.E.2d at 746. However, as we explained above, that involvement
was not a factor in this Court’s determination that the juror—if he
knew about the relationship — would have been challengeable for cause.
The implied bias which must be avoided is created simply by the juror’s
relationship to one of the parties and his or her knowledge of that rela-
tionship, not by the fact that the juror’s relative was “involved” —to
whatever degree —in the particular case being tried. See Block v. State,
supra.

The juror’s bias here could not be avoided or dissolved by admoni-
tions from the court or by the juror’s assertion that she believed she
could judge this case impartially. To expect a juror in this situation
to act with an even hand toward both parties, when she knows her
spouse is soon to become an advocate for one of those parties, is to
ignore human nature. In spite of his or her most sincere efforts to
become or remain impartial, the juror in this situation would unques-
tionably be subjected to extraneous pressures; it is precisely these
pressures and the unreasonable risks of these pressures which must
be avoided in safeguarding the accused’s right to an impartial jury.
U.S. Const. amend VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 18. See People v. Branch,
(1979) 46 N.Y.2d 645, 651, 415 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469

(“[T]he risk of prejudice arising out of the close relationship between
the prospective juror and one of the key participants in the trial was
so great that recital of an oath of impartiality could not convincingly
dispel the taint.”). “It may be that the objection to [Marsha Pawloski’s]
want of qualification to sit as a juror in this case worked no actual
injury to the appellant, but, however that may have been, we can not
afford to make the precedent which would be established by our holding
that [she] was a competent juror.” Block v. State, swpra, 100 Ind. at
364-65. Without question, one improper juror destroys the integrity
of a verdict.

For these reasons, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to grant Haak’s motion for a mistrial. We dispose of this case
solely on the basis of Marsha Pawloski’s implied bias, and we therefore
express no opinion as to whether her sister’s husband, Roger Bixler,
was qualified to act as a juror in this case. The conviction is reversed,
and this cause is remanded with instructions to grant Haak a new trial.

Givan, C. J., DeBruler, Hunter, and Prentice, JJ., concur.

NotE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 321.

INDIANA REVENUE BOARD: OTIS R. BOWEN, AS A MEMBER OF THE
INDIANA REVENUE BOARD: JULIAN RIDLEN, TREASURER OF THE
STATE OF INDIANA AND AS A MEMBER OF THE INDIANA REVENUE
BOARD: CHARLES LOOS, AUDITOR OF THE STATE OF INDIANA AND AS
A MEMBER OF THE INDIANA REVENUE BOARD; THE STATE BOARD OF
TAX COMMISSIONERS: CARLETON L. PHILLIPPI; DURWOOD S.
STRANG; TAYLOR I. MORRIS, JR.; AS MEMBERS OF THE STATE BOARD
OF TAX COMMISSIONERS OF THE STATE OF INDIANA; WILLIAM
TRACY, AS INHERITANCE TAX ADMINISTRATOR; DONALD CLARK, AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVENUE
v. R. JEAN HANSBROUGH AND MAX J. HANSBROUGH, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS OF THE CITY OF
INDIANAPOLIS, COUNTY OF MARION, STATE OF INDIANA,
SIMILARLY SITUATED.

[| 427

(No. 381871. Filed March 10, 1981.]

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Alembert W. Brayton, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellants.

Robert D. Epstein, Michael J. Donahoe, Epstein & Frisch, of Indiana-
polis, Z. Alonzo Deckard, Lind, Deckard & O’Brien, of Danville, for
appellees.

PIVARNIK, J.—This cause comes to us on a Petition to Transfer from
an order of the First District Court of Appeals remanding this cause
to the trial court on July 16, 1980. Max J. Hansbrough and R. Jean
Hansbrough, his wife, brought this action in Marion Superior Court
Room 5, on behalf of themselves and all other taxpayers of the City
of Indianapolis, County of Marion, State of Indiana. The action was
venued to the Hendricks Circuit Court and judgment was entered by
Judge Boles there. This is the second purported class action brought
by Max J. Hansbrough, and in this case, his wife Jean, as alleged tax-
payers on behalf of themselves and all other taxpayers of the City of
Indianapolis, County of Marion, State of Indiana, similarly situated on
their amended complaint against the Governor, Treasurer and Auditor,
as members of the State Revenue Board and the State Board of Tax
Commissioners and the Commissioner of the Department of State
Revenue, claiming that they, as such taxpayers, are entitled to interest
on an alleged judgment rendered in State ex rel. Mass Transportation
Authority of Greater Indianapolis v. Indiana Revenue Board, et. al., (1968)
144 Ind.App. 68, 242 N.E.2d 642 in the Appellate Court of Indiana. They

428 |

claim that there was a shortage of an amount in excess of $800,000
in the amount that was actually paid to the Mass Transportation
Authority and the amount of judgment. They seek interest on that
amount from December 31, 1968 until March 4, 1970.

The Court of Appeals found that the records of the Clerk of the Court
of Appeals contained a release of plaintiffs in the action, releasing the
defendants in full and acknowledging receipt of the judgment amount
of $11,909,752.60. The release was never presented to the trial court
and appar;ently the attorneys handling the matter for the State of In-
diana and the trial court were unaware of its existence. On July 16,
1980, the Court of Appeals remanded the cause to the trial court for
it to determine the validity of the release and the effect of the release,
if valid, and the order upon the matters in issue in the cause. Since
we find that the Court of Appeals can, and should, resolve this matter
without remand to the trial court, we vacate the July 16, 1980 order
of the Third District Court of Appeals in the cause and grant transfer.

The original cause to which the action before us originates, was in-
itiated by Mass Transportation Authority as Plaintiff, filing a petition
in the Superior Court of Marion County Room 3, to mandate the defend-
ants to comply with House Enrolled Act No. 1818, passed by the General
Assembly during its 1967 Session. House Enrolled Act No. 1818 directed
the payment of 90% of inheritance taxes collected by the State paid
to the Mass Transportation Authority. In the proceedings, the trial
judge granted a temporary restraining order against the defendants
enjoining them from continuing to apply the taxes levied and collected
under the inheritance tax law of Indiana according to the acts of the
General Assembly of Indiana 1931, Ch. 75 § 36, as it existed prior to
its amendment by the 1967 Act. The trial judge granted a temporary
restraining order. The Attorney General, on behalf of the defendants,
prior to the hearing date set by the Superior Court of Marion County,
filed a petition to transfer the cause to the Court of Appeals (then Ap-
pellate Court) pursuant to Ch. 7 of the Acts of 1965 (Second Special
Session). After a hearing, the Appellate Court, sitting en banc, on the
petition to transfer, assumed jurisdiction and transferred the cause
to the Appellate Court and dissolved the existing restraining order.
After hearing the cause on the merits, acting as a trial court, the Ap-
pellate Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against

Le 429
po

the defendants. This judgment was entered on December 31, 1968. State
ex rel. Mass Transportation Authority of Greater Indianapolis v. Indi-
ana Revenue Board, et al., (1968) 144 Ind.App. 68, 242 N.E.2d 642.

On November 19, 1969, the Appellate Court, on its own Motion,
ordered and directed all of the defendants and each of them, the then
Indiana Revenue Board, Governor, Treasurer, Auditor, the Indiana
Department of State Revenue and the Commissioner thereof, the State
Board of Tax Commissioners and Inheritance Tax Administrator of
the State, to make a written computation of the exact amount of state
inheritance taxes imposed in Marion County, Indiana, by Ch. 75, § 36
Acts of 1931 as amended by House Enrolled Act 1818, 1967 General
Assembly, which were deposited in the Inheritance Tax Account of
the State Treasury between January 1, 1967, and to and including
December 31, 1968. All defendants were ordered to file a certified copy
of said written computation with the Clerk of the Supreme and Appel-
late Courts. On February 28, 1969, attorneys representing Mass Trans-
portation Authority filed a notice of intention to hold an attorneys lien
pursuant to an agreement entered into by said attorneys and the Mass
Transportation Authority on the 20th day of July, 1967. Said agree-
ment provided that said attorneys were to receive an amount equal
to ten percent of the first year’s Marion County inheritance tax revenue
received by the Authority as a result of counsel obtaining a court deter-
mination in favor of Mass Transportation Authority.

On December 16, 1969, the Appellate Court entered an order with
the following provisions: (1) a finding that, pursuant to the order of
the Appellate Court entered on November 19, 1969, James O. Mathis,
as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of State Revenue, and
Richard D. Green, as Inheritance Tax Administrator of the State of
Indiana, did, on the 20th day of November, 1969, file with the Clerk
of the Supreme and Appellate Courts, duplicate certificate computa-
tions of the amounts deposited by Marion County, Indiana, in the In-
diana Inheritance Tax Account of the General Fund of the State
treasury for the calendar years 1967 and 1968; (2) a finding that the
plaintiff State of Indiana on relation of the Mass Transportation
Authority of Greater Indianapolis filed an answer in response to the
order which accepted as true the certified computations as filed; (3)
an order that the Clerk of the Supreme and Appellate Courts transmit

430 |
a

instanter a copy of said certified computation to the Auditor of the
State of Indiana; (4) an order that said State Auditor draw and issue
a warrant on or before December 22, 1969, upon the general fund of
the treasury of the State of Indiana for a sum equal to 90% of the
amount so computed and certified and immediately present and deposit
said warrant with the Clerk of the Supreme and Appellate Courts;
(5) an order that the Treasurer of the State of Indiana honor said war-
rant when called upon to do so; (6) an order that the Clerk, upon receipt
of said warrant, disburse the same as follows: (a) disburse the amount
deposited to the Mass Transportation Authority of Greater Indianapolis
Jess the amount to be disbursed to the attorneys of record in satisfac-
tion of the attorney’s lien filed by them on February 28, 1969; (7) an
order that the Clerk disburse the 10% to the attorneys of.record in
satisfaction of their attorney’s lien. State ew rel. Mass Transportation
Authority of Greater Indianapolis v. Indiana Revenue Board, et al., (1969)
146 Ind.App. 334, 255 N.E.2d 833.

The record of the Appellate Court further shows that all of the above
orders were complied with. An amount of $12,787,338.98 was deposited
with the Clerk of this Court. The Clerk of this Court issued a check
in the amount of $11,909,752.60 to the Department of Transportation,
successor to Mass Transportation Authority, original Plaintiff, and the
Mass Transportation Authority filed an acknowledgment of receipt of
said amount and a release in full of all claims. The Clerk of the Supreme
Court, on the same date, also issued a check to the attorneys of record
in the amount of $827,586.37, in satisfaction of the attorneys’ lien and
the attorneys filed an acknowledgment of receipt of said amount and
a release in full payment of all claims. Simple mathematics will, of
course, show that the total of these two amounts is $12,737,338.97. Con-
tained in the records of the Court of Appeals are all of these acknowl-
edgments, releases, and the cancelled checks of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court. The Appellate Court, on March 5, 1970, showed, by
its order entered that day, that its judgment entered on December
81, 1968, had been fully satisfied.

Thus, the Court of Appeals, acting as a trial court and in full jurisdic-
tion of all the issues, completely and finally decided this case. Their
pronouncements became the law of the case and all of the matters con-
cerning this case and these parties are contained in their own records.

[| 431
—

Thereafter, on February 21, 1973, Max J. Hansbrough, the same Max
J. Hansbrough who is plaintiff in the case before us, filed his first class
action seeking collection of judicial interest on inheritance tax funds
previously ordered paid by the Appellate Court to the Mass Trans-
portation Authority. This cause was filed in the same court in which
he originally filed in the action presently before us, Marion County
Superior Court Room 3, before Judge Glenn W. Funk. It is apparent
that the $800,000 plus that Hansbrough is concerned about is the
amount paid in a separate check to the attorneys of record as set out
above. As we indicated, this amount was paid directly to the attorneys
pursuant to the Court order, and the amount paid to the Mass Trans-
portation Authority was minus the $827,586.37. There was then, of
course, no shortage in the payment. The full amount, as determined
by the computations filed by the defendants and ordered paid by the
Court, were paid and acknowledgment of this was made by the plain-
tiffs, the attorneys, and by the Appellate Court, in its order of March
5, 1970.

In Hansbrough’s case before Judge Funk in 1973, the trial court found
against Hansbrough. He first did so on July 5, 1973, by sustaining a
motion to dismiss and overruling a motion to make a class action by
Hansbrough. After a motion to correct errors was filed, the court made
the following findings and orders.

“1. The Appellate Court of Indiana, pursuant to Burns’ (1968
Repl.) §3-2121, took complete and orginal {sic] jurisdiction for all
purposes of the case of State ex rel. Mass Transportation Author-
ity v. Indiana Revenue Board (1968), 144 Ind.App. 63, 242 N.E.2d
642; ibid., 244 Ind.App. 63, 253 N.E.2d 725; ibid., 246 Ind.App. 334,
255 N.E.2d 833, by removing said case from the Superior Court
of Marion County, Room No. 3. Therefore, this Court cannot
rightfully assume jurisdiction of any ancillary proceedings of the
subject matter of said case.

2. Even if subject matter jurisdiction properly were vested
in this Court:

A. No interest was requested and none awarded in the deci-
sion of State ex rel. Mass Transportation Authority v. Indiana
Revenue Board, supra and no motion to correct errors was timely
filed.

432 |
Ee

B. Plaintiff herein is a stranger to the record of said case. No
motion to intervene in said case nor any other pleading was filed
therein on behalf of plaintiff Hansbrough.

C. Plaintiff herein did not attempt to intervene or take other
appropriate action in a timely fashion, but instead waited until
February 21, 1973, to file the instant action.

D. Any action to recover any interest which might accrue
would properly be against officials of the Metropolitan Transport-
ation Authority for failure to request said interest, not against
the State of Indiana.

E. Notwithstanding any other issues of this cause, judicial in-
terest will not lie on a writ of mandate. The decision of the Ap-
pellate Court of Indiana in State ex rel. Mass Transportation
Authority v. Indiana Revenue Board, supra, was clearly a writ
of mandate, not a judgment for money within the meaning of the
statutes of the State of Indiana. Plaintiff's complaint therefore
does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under any
set of facts.

It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that
plaintiff's motion to correct errors is hereby overruled this 25 day
of October, 1973.

/s| G. W. Funk, Judge, Superior Court of Mation [sic] County —
Room No. 3”

Hansbrough then appealed that judgment to the Court of Appeals
and on April 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals found that Hansbrough
had not filed a Motion to correct errors to the court’s final judgment
entered on October 25, 1973, and accordingly dismissed his appeal.
Hansbrough v. Indiana Revenue Board, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 56, 326
N.E.2d 599. Judge Funk’s orders then became a final judgment in that
cause.

Plaintiff Hansbrough, joined by his wife, then went to the same court
and filed this action. It is the same action he raised in 1978, and it asked
for the same relief. As we have indicated above, when the cause was
tried after a change of venue in Hendricks County, it is apparent that
those attorneys representing the State were unaware of the background
facts we have set out above and did not present these facts fully to
the trial judge. The Court of Appeals noted that the release filed by
the Mass Transportation Authority in the original action would be

be 433
po

dispositive of this case and should be considered by the trial judge.
It is true this release is very important to the resolution of this cause.
There are many other things in the record, however, that are just as
important and that establish that plaintiff Hansbrough has no cause
of action which entitles him to the judgment entered in the Hendricks
Circuit Court. Payment of these funds to plaintiffs Hansbrough would
be nothing short of piracy on the public treasury.

The Court of Appeals has within its own records the fact that this
case, including the issues raised by Hansbrough here, was fully decided
by them and the issues he raises herein were resolved by them in the
original cause. Those records show a finding by the Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, that the judgment was fully satisified by pay-
ment of the full amount ordered and acknowledged by and released
by the plaintiffs and attorneys involved. Furthermore, Judge Funk
found in the 1973 judgment of the Marion Superior Court 3 that all
of these issues resolve against plaintiff Hansbrough and this is con-
tained in the record of the Court of Appeals.

In 1905, this Court said in Westfall v. Wait, 165 Ind. 358, 359; 73 N.E.
1089, 1091. “This Court may look into the record for the purpose of
ascertaining what facts were before it on the former appeals and to
what extent the rule applies that the decision there made is the law
of the case.” Two cases by the Court of Appeals followed this princi-
ple. In 1918, the Court of Appeals found in Studabaker v. Faylor, 52
Ind.App. 171 at 173, 98 N.E. 318, 319. “Appellate courts may search
their own records on their own motions or the suggestion of counsel.”
In Bruggner, et al., v. Shaffer, (1965) 188 Ind.App. 183, 187, 210 N.B.2d
439, 441-42, the Appellate Court reversed on the basis of its judicial
notice of matters of record, even though not raised in appellant’s brief,
stating: “While the specific question of the stipulated facts was not
raised in appellant’s briefs, this court, while not required to search
the record for errors is not so restricted that it must close its eyes
to what is clearly before it.” The Supreme Court of the United States
has stated that the right of an appellate court to examine its own
records for matters properly affecting proceedings before it, is apparent
in DeBearn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., of Baltimore, (1914) 233 U.S.
24 at 32, 34 S.Ct. 584, 58 L.Ed. 833, as follows: “We take judicial notice
of our own records, and, if not res judicata we may, on the principle

i

34 ee
es

of stare decisis, rightfully examine and consider the decision in the
former case as affecting the consideration of this, and again, ... The
court has the right to examine its own records and take judicial notice
thereof in regard to proceedings formerly had therein by one of the
parties to the proceedings now before it.” See also Marconi Wireless
Telegraph Co., of America v. United States, (1943) 320 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct.
1393, 87 L.Ed. 1781; United States v. Pink, (1942) 315 U.S. 208, 62 S.Ct.
552, 86 L.Ed. 796.

This cause is ordered remanded to the Court of Appeals, First
District, with directions to enter judgment in favor of Appeliants-
Defendants and against the Plaintiffs-Appellees. Transfer granted.

DeBruler, Hunter, and Prentice, JJ., concur.
Givan, C. J., not participating.
NoTE— Reported at 417 N.E.2d 311.

JOHN D. WILLIAMS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 11798325. Filed March 11, 1981.]

435

Stuart T. Bench, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Thomas D. Quigley, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted in a jury trial of
Burglary, a Class B Felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979), Rob-
bery, also a Class B Felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979), and
Rape, a Class A Felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979). He was
sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment on the Burglary convic-
tion, ten (10) years imprisonment on the Robbery conviction and forty
(40) years imprisonment on the Rape conviction. The sentences for
Burglary and Rape were to run consecutively, while the sentence for
Robbery was to run concurrently.

This direct appeal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s mo-
tion for bond reduction;

(2) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s mo-
tion for additional discovery;

436 De
Pd

(3) Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion
for a protective order;

(4) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to order the divulgence

of an “informant’s” identity;

(5) Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion
in limine;

(6) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's
challenge to one of the jurors for cause;

(7) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defend-
ant’s other criminal activities;

(8) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s mo-
tion for judgment on the evidence; and

(9) Whether the sentences upon the Burglary and Rape convictions
were excessive and unreasonable.

ISSUE I

On February 2, 1979, an information was filed against the defendant
and bond was set at $110,000, in accordance with the Marion County
bond schedule. The defendant moved to reduce his bond on February
6 and a hearing was held upon that motion the next day. It was deter-
mined at the hearing to reduce the bond to $20,000, and the defendant
also entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, Defendant posted bond
and was released.

On March 7, the defendant's trial was set for June 4.

On March 22, Judge Daugherty ordered a hearing for March 30 for
reconsideration of the previous reduction in bond. The defendant op-
posed the order, and on March 29 moved for a change of judge. At
the March 30 hearing, Judge Daugherty, over the defendant's objec-
tion, premised on the Judge’s lack of jurisdiction, reset Defendant’s
bond at $110,000. But, on April 2, the change of judge motion was
granted, and the case was transferred to Judge Tranberg. Defendant,
thereafter, moved for a reduction in bond before Judge Tranberg, who
denied the motion.

Ye 487
Cd

Defendant contends that the bond was excessive and that, because
he was unable to meet it, his ability to aid the defense was diminished.
He also argues that Judge Daugherty was without jurisdiction to in-
crease the amount, inasmuch as a motion for a change of judge was
pending.

We need not consider the defendant's challenge to Judge Daugherty’s

jurisdiction. The defendant’s motion for a change of judge was ulti-

mately sustained and another bond reduction hearing was held

I before Judge Tranberg. Thus, the defendant had the amount

of his bond considered upon its merits and determined by a

judge, who, without question, possessed jurisdiction. The matter lay

within his sound discretion. See Hughes v. Sheriff, (1978) 268 Ind. 21,

373 N.E.2d 144. See also Vacendak v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 317, 302
N.E.2d 779.

ISSUES II & III

The defendant was originally charged with two rapes, which were
two of six recent incidents known as the “southside” rapes. The defend-
ant sought and received complete discovery as to the two rapes with
which he was charged. However, on March 26, 1979, he moved for ad-
ditional discovery with regard to the other four rapes. Specifically,
he sought all the reports made by the Indianapolis Police Department,
the Marion County Sheriff's Department, the Indiana State Police
Department and the Marion County Prosecutor's office with reference
to the other four rapes. The State opposed the motion and moved for
a protective order. The trial court held a hearing on the matter on
May 10, 1979 and denied the defendant’s motion.

The defendant now contends that the trial court erred in denying
the motion. He asserts that the information sought was material to
the defense, because if it could have been shown that the other four
rapes were committed by someone other than the defendant, then it
was less likely that he committed the two rapes with which he was
originally charged. The defendant also contends, for the same reason,
that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for a protec-
tive order.

438 ee
Ld

We have assiduously combed the record in an attempt to determine
whether the trial court granted the State a protective order. While
our attempt was futile, we perceive the trial court’s denial of the defend-
ant’s motion for additional discovery to be tantamount to a granting
of a protective order. Accordingly, the two issues have been merged.

The scope of criminal discovery generally lies within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. Vaughn v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 142, 378 N.E.2d
859. Discovery will normally be afforded when the defendant
I (1) sufficiently designates the items he seeks, and (2) demon-
strates the materiality of those items, unless the State estab-
lishes a paramount interest in non-disclosure. E.g., Brandon v. State,
(1978) 268 Ind. 150, 374 N.E.2d 504. In the instant case, we have not
been persuaded that there is any basis for a substantial belief that
the information would have been beneficial to the defense. Moreover,
the interest of the State in maintaining confidentiality with respect
to an on-going police investigation is self-evident. Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for addi-
tional discovery.

ISSUE IV

The defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to com-
pel the disclosure of an “informant’s” identity. The “informant” had
contacted the police and told them that the defendant may have been
involved in the “southside” rapes. The police responded by including
the defendant's photograph in a photographic array displayed to three
of the rape victims, two of whom selected the defendant’s picture as
depicting one of their assailants. Defendant contends that the “inform-
ant’s” identity was necessary for investigative purposes, with a view
toward a potential motion to suppress the identification. We do not

agree.

In this case, the only effect of the information was to prompt the
inclusion of Defendant’s photograph in an array. The identifications
did not in any way hinge upon the credibility of the informant
Hand Defendant could have gained nothing from knowing his
identity. McCulley v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 135, 272 N.E.2d 613.

P| 439

ISSUE V

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the State’s
motion in limine prohibiting disclosure to the jury of the results of
a polygraph examination which had been given to the defendant. The
defendant had earlier undergone another polygraph examination, under
an agreement that the results could be admitted into evidence. He sub-
mits that such stipulation “carried over” to the second polygraph ex-
amination, but we do not agree.

At the outset, we note that the record is devoid of a valid stipula-
tion to the admissibility of the results of the first polygraph examina-
tion. Although the record contains a writing which purports to be a
stipulation of admissibility, it does not bear the signature of a repre-
sentative of the State.

Assuming the validity of the purported stipulation, however, there
is no basis for concluding that it was intended to extend to the second
examination, which had been arranged by Defendant without prior ap-
proval of the State and administered without any participation on behalf
of the State, by a private examiner.

ISSUE VI

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying
his challenge for cause to one of the jurors. The challenge was based
upon the alleged bias or prejudice of the juror, see Ind. Code § 35-1-30-4(11)
(Burns 1979), in that she had admitted having once been the victim
of a burglary or robbery. The contention is without merit, as the juror
also swore that she would be able to give the defendant a fair trial.
There is no basis in the record for concluding that she violated her oath.

ISSUE VIL

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting
vidence of his other criminal activities. As stated hereinbefore, the
defendant was originally charged with two counts of rape. However,
pursuant to his motion, the two were separated for trial. One rape oc-
curred on December 27, 1978 and the other on January 4, 1979. The
case before us relates to the December 27 offense, and the defendant

440 Le

asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony that he com-
mitted the January 4th rape.

The evidence was admissible under the “common scheme or plan”
exception to the general rule excluding evidence of an accused’s other
crimes. “This exception requires much more than mere repeti-
Hl tion of similar crimes; ‘The device used must be so unusual
and distinctive as to be like a signature.’ ” Biggerstaff v. State,
(1977) 266 Ind. 148, 152, 361 N.E.2d 895, 897 (quoting Riddle v. State,
(1976) 264 Ind. 587, 597, 348 N.E.2d 635, 641; C. McCormick, Evidence
§ 190 at 449 (2d ed. 1972)). In the case at bar, this stringent standard
was satisfied. In both rapes, (1) two men were the assailants, (2) one
man wore a ski mask, while the other wore a red-hooded sweatshirt
tied around his face, (8) the attacks were preceded by middle-of-the-
night obscene phone calls, (4) the victims’ husbands normally worked
nights, (5) the attacks occurred in the middle of the night, (6) entry
was effectuated by prying open the back door, (7) the back door was
left open following the attack, (8) a butcher knife was used to intimidate
the victim, (9) the victims’ hands were tied, (10) the bedroom phone
wires were severed and (11) personal property of the victims was taken.
Because of the similarities in the two crimes, together with their prox-
imity in point of time, the evidence was relevant to the identification
of the perpetrator and admissible.

ISSUE VIII

The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his mo-
tion for judgment on the evidence at the close of the State’s case-in-
chief. In support thereof, he submits that the State did not prove that
it was the defendant who actually consummated the rape.

While the matter may be deemed waived because the defendant sub-
mitted evidence subsequent to the denial of his motion, ¢.g., Parker
v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 595, 358 N.E.2d 110, we, nevertheless,

Hs have considered the contention and find it to be without merit.
Under Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (Burns 1979), one who aids or in-

duces the commission of an offense, commits that offense. Thus, it is
of no moment whether the defendant actually perpetrated the rape,
so long as he participated in it. See, ¢.g., Webb v. State, (1977) 266 Ind.

P| 441
Ld

554, 364 N.E.2d 1016. The State’s evidence amply demonstrated the
defendant’s participation.

ISSUE IX

The defendant's final contention is that the sentences imposed upon
the Rape and Burglary convictions are excessive and unreasonable.
He submits that the trial court did not substantiate the enhanced
sentences for the Rape and Burglary convictions with a statement of
reasons. Further, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying him
a psychiatric evaluation and in failing to take into account his “no prior
felony” record.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the trial court did make a
statement of reasons in support of the enhanced sentences as required
by Ind. Code § 35-50-1A-3 (Burns 1979). See Page v. State, (1980)
274 Ind. 264, 410 N.E.2d 1304. The criteria enumerated by
the trial court were the nature of the offenses, the threat to

human life that the offenses engendered generally and the specific
threat made on the life of the victim's child. The sentences were within
the ambits of the sentencing provisions of the criminal code and can
not be viewed as manifestly unreasonable. See Ind. R. App. Rev. Sen. 2.

Although the defendant set forth the denial of his motion to have
an additional person with him at counsel table in his Statement of Issues,
he has presented no argument thereon. Ind. R. App. P. 8.3(A)(7).

We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NOTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 328.
|

ALAN E. BROWN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 5805142. Filed March 12, 1981.]

Yi 443

Edward A. Pease, Thomas, Thomas & Pease, Public Defender, for
appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney Generals, Thomas
D. Quigley, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, Alan E. Brown, was convicted of rape, a
class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and criminal
confinement, a class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.).
He was sentenced to fifty years and twenty years, the sentences to
run concurrently. His direct appeal raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
based upon a denial of his right to a speedy trial;

2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence
without a proper foundation;

3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony
of the prosecuting witness;

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to
strike certain testimony and his motion for mistrial when defendant
found out he had allegedly not been given a certain medical report;

5. Whether the trial court erred in admitting a certain map into
evidence which was not drawn to scale;

6. Whether the court erred in questioning a certain witness about
his conclusion regarding the location of the crime;

7. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for
mistrial after some jurors allegedly overheard a conversation between
a witness and another person;

8. Whether the trial court erred in denying admission of the deposi-
tion of a defense witness; and

444 —
CE

9. Whether the trial court erred in giving certain instructions and
refusing other instructions.

A summary of the facts most favorable to the state shows that on
May 8, 1979, the victim was waiting at a bus stop in Terre Haute, In-
diana. Defendant arrived at the bus stop about fifteen minutes later
and sat down next to the victim. The victim started to rise when she
saw her bus approach but was ordered to sit down again by defendant
who showed her a knife in his hand. Defendant told her to remain seated
for a few minutes and then forced her at knife point to get into an
automobile. The victim tried to escape from the car but found that
the passenger door was locked from the outside and there was no lock
button on the inside.

Defendant drove the victim on a succession of gravel roads through
Vigo County and into Clay County. There he forced her to get out of
the car and undress. He raped her twice but stopped his sexual assault
when he thought he heard someone approach. He then forced the vic-
tim to get back into the car and drove her back to Terre Haute. The
victim identified defendant from pictures prior to trial and also iden-
tified his automobile and key chain.

I

Defendant first contends that he was denied the right to a speedy
trial and that therefore the charges against him should have been
dismissed. He bases his argument on Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(B)(1) which
provides:

“Tf any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall
move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to
trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such mo-
tion, except where a continuance within said period is had on his
motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there
was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calen-
dar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.”

Defendant first appeared in court on May 10, 1979, and entered a
pro se plea of not guilty. Pauper counsel was appointed and apparently
defendant made a request at that time that a trial date be set. He was
given a date of June 14, 1979. A few days later defendant filed three

a 445
Le

motions concerning a reduction of bond, production of evidence and
a change of judge. He later filed a motion for change of venue from
the county and then, on June 1, 1979, a motion for psychiatric examina-
tion at court expense. When this latter motion was granted, the court
vacated the original trial date because of the time required for the
psychiatric tests. The trial date was later set for September 17, 1979;
then it was twice reset, and the trial was finally held on October 16,
1979.

It is not clear from the record before us whether or not defendant's

request that a trial date be set actually qualifies as a motion for a speedy

trial. In any event, defendant's argument must fail on other

Hs grounds. There are numerous cases construing Ind. R. Crim.

P. 4 which make clear that there is a duty upon the state to

bring a defendant to trial within the framework of the protections that

rule provides. However, it is also well settled that the time limitations

of the rule shall be extended by the period of any delay caused by defen-

dant’s acts. Battle v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 70, 415 N.E.2d 39; Bradberry

v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 530, 364 N.E.2d 1183; Gross v. State, (1972) 258

Ind. 46, 278 N.H.2d 583. Determination of what amount of delay is at-

tributable to defendant’s actions must be decided on a case by case
basis. Fortson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 161, 379 N.H.2d 147.

In the instant case, defendant moved for a psychiatric examination
on June 1, 1979, and it appears from the record that all the examina-
tion reports were not available until September 28, 1979. This period
of delay was properly chargeable to defendant and there was no error
here. Fortson v. State, supra.

IL.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence a key chain which was identified by the victim as the key
chain she observed in defendant’s possession during her confinement
and rape. He argues that there was not a proper foundation or a com-
plete chain of custody established prior to its admission. We do not
agree,

The victim had given a description to the police of a rather unusual
key chain which had been in her assailant’s possession. The police took

446 ee

a key chain matching this description from defendant when
I they arrested him the day after the crime and locked it in
the police property room until the trial. The victim positively
identified the key chain when it was introduced into evidence at the
trial as being the key chain which her assailant used. It is well settled
that it is a sufficient foundation for the introduction of non-fungible
items into evidence that a witness identify the items and they have
relevance to the issues of the case. Walker v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 197,
409 N.E.2d 626; Woodard v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 19, 366 N.E.2d 1160.
The admissibility of the key chain did not hinge upon a showing of
an exhaustive chain of custody. It was positively identified by the vic-
tim and was relevant to the issue of the identity of the victim’s assailant.
There was no error in its admission.

Ill.

Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred in admitting cer-
tain prejudicial testimony of the victim regarding sexual fantasies which
defendant described to her as he was driving her back to Terre
Haute. The record shows only a general objection to the ad-
mission of this testimony, so any alleged error on this issue
has been waived. Grounds for objection must be specific and any
grounds not raised in the trial court are not available on appeal.
Strickland v. State, (1977) 265 Ind. 664, 359 N.E.2d 244,

Furthermore, it is well established that happenings near in time and

place which complete the story of the crime are admissible under the

theory of res gestae. Maldonado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492,

HB 3855 N.E.2d 843; Tapp v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 406 N.B.2d 296.

The victim's testimony here supported her account that she

was in fear for her life and was trying to gain defendant's trust so

that he would release her. There was no error in the admission of this
testimony.

Iv.

Defendant next contends that he should have been granted a mistrial
when the testimony of Dr. Perez was allegedly contrary to the infor-
mation contained in his report that had been furnished to defendant.
Defendant alleges that this testimony showed that the state had failed

P| 447
ee

to comply with the court’s order for production of evidence and had
placed him in grave peril. We agree with the state that defendant’s
motion for mistrial made at this time was properly overruled.

Dr. Perez testified that his examination results showed that sperm
was found through a “vulva area pap smear.” Defendant contends that
Dr. Perez’s report which he received prior to trial only stated
Hs that no sperm had been found in the vaginal pap smear and
that he had planned to rely upon this report to reduce the
victim’s credibility. While it is possible that two different reports were
involved, it is also possible that defendant misread the report he was
given. Since defendant has not included a copy of the report he was
given, we have no way of knowing what was actually in that report.
It is well settled that it is the duty of a defendant to present a com-
plete record to this Court. Bare assertions of error not disclosed by
the record are not available for review by this Court. Daniels v. State,
(1980) 274 Ind. 29, 408 N.H.2d 1244. Defendant has waived any error
which may have occurred on this issue.

After defendant’s motion for mistrial was overruled, defendant

moved alternately to strike Dr. Perez's testimony. This motion was

also denied. We find no error here, since there has been no

Hs showing that this testimony was actually left out of the report

furnished to defendant. Furthermore, there is no showing that.

the prosecution deliberately thwarted or obstructed any attempts at

discovery of Dr. Perez’s testimony, and, in the absence of that show-

ing, the remedy of exclusion of testimony would not be appropriate.

Henson v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 233, 352 N.E.2d 746; Gregory v. State,
(1972) 259 Ind. 295, 286 N.H.2d 666.

v.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence a map of Clay County, Indiana, since there was no indication
on the map that it was drawn to scale. We find no error here

Il since it is clear this map was admitted into evidence as an
aid to the jury’s understanding of the route driven by defend-

ant during the criminal confinement. It had been prepared by one of
the investigating officers and was used to illustrate his testimony and

448 ee
Cd

that of the victim. It was not used to establish the location of the rape
since Trooper Polk stated he personally knew the location where the
rape occurred was in Clay County and this testimony was never con-
troverted. Unofficial maps and diagrams are admissible to represent
objects and places which cannot otherwise be as clearly shown or
described, and when such documents are offered in connection with
the testimony of a witness, they are admissible as legitimate aids to
the court or jury. Seaton v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 554, 319 N.E.2d 829;
Freeman v. King, (1967) 141 Ind.App. 655, 231 N.E.2d 161.

VI.

When defendant objected to the admission into evidence of the map
discussed above, the court then asked the testifying witness, Trooper
Polk, whether he had visited the site and whether he had per-
Hs sonal knowledge that it was within Clay County. The witness
answered that he had visited the site and did know that it
was within Clay County. Defendant now argues that the court’s ques-
tioning of a non-expert witness and eliciting from him a conclusion
regarding an ultimate issue of fact was erroneous and prejudicial. How-
ever, defendant made no objection when Polk answered these ques-
tions at trial, and we must therefore deem the issue waived. In order
for error to be preserved for review, a timely and adequate objection
must be raised at trial. Reynolds v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 221, 409 N.E.2d
639; Gee v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 28, 389 N.E.2d 303.

vil.

Defendant moved for a mistrial at one point during the proceedings
after alleging that the jurors had overheard a conversation between
Trooper Polk and another police officer about the actual location of
the rape. This alleged error occurred during a recess following the
testimony of Polk when the jury filed past the table at which the pros-
ecutor and the witness were seated. Another police officer approached
the table and started talking to Polk about the location of the crime
as the jurors were walking by. After the jury had left the courtroom,
defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis of improper commu-
nication with the jury. This motion was overruled.

When the jurors returned to the courtroom, the trial judge care-

Ye 449
CE

fully admonished them that the only evidence they could consider was
the evidence they heard from the witness stand and the exhi-

Ils bits which were properly admitted into evidence. They were
admonished to disregard any statements they heard from any

other source. In addition, the trial court included a similar admonish-
ment in the final instructions. Such admonishments are presumed to
cure error, unless the contrary is shown. Randolph v. State, (1978) 269
Ind. 81, 378 N.E.2d 828; Carmon v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 1, 349 N.E.2d
167. No such showing was made in this case. The trial judge has great
discretion in determining whether or not to grant a motion for a mistrial,
and reversal will result only from clear error in his ruling. Drollinger
v, State, (1980) 274 Ind. 5, 408 N.E.2d 1228; Carmon v. State, supra.

VIII.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erroneously denied the
admission into evidence of the deposition of one, Alonzo Hoffman. It
appears that defendant thought the victim would testify that she did
not know Hoffman. The state objected to the admission of this deposi-
tion since its only purpose was to show that Hoffman was acquainted
with the victim and had had sexual relations with her. The trial court
ruled that the testimony in the deposition was not relevant to any issue
of guilt or innocence in the instant case and therefore was collateral,
immaterial and irrelevant. The court sustained the state’s objection.

It is axiomatic that collateral matter cannot be made the basis for

impeachment. Bryant v. State, (1978) 261 Ind. 172, 301 N.E.2d 179; Miller

v. State, (1910) 174 Ind. 255, 91 N.E. 930. The test as to whether

|| a matter is collateral is whether the party seeking to introduce

it for purposes of contradiction would be entitled to prove

it as a part of his case. Bryant v. State, supra. It is clear that there

was no error here since the victim's alleged acquaintance with a par-

ticular third person, Hoffman, had no relevance to the questions at

issue in defendant’s case where the third party had no relationship
to defendant or to the instant crime.

Ix.

Defendant finally alleges errors in the trial court’s refusal to give

certain of his tendered preliminary and final instructions. He first
alleges as error the refusal of the trial court to give his proposed
preliminary instruction number one which included the language of
Indiana's rape shield statute, Ind. Code § 35-1-32.5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.).
He argues that the jurors were entitled to know that such a law ex-
ists. We do not agree. It is clear that the law in question concerns the
issue of admissibility and this issue is to be resolved by the court, not
the jury. See Pointon v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 44, 408 N.E.2d 1255. There
was no error in the refusal of this instruction.

Defendant agrees that any error concerning the refusal of other in-

structions is now waived since these instructions dealt with the

penalties attendant to the crimes with which he was charged.

HM This Court has clearly held that a defendant is not entitled

to have the jury informed as to potential penalties where the

jury does not engage in the sentencing function. Craig v. State, (1979)
272 Ind. 385, 398 N.E.2d 658.

For all of the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NotE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 333.

BILAL ABDUL RAHIM, A/K/A GEORGE P. HESTER v. STATE OF
INDIANA.

[No. 8808330. Filed March 18, 1981.]

[| 451

7
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Howard N. Bernstein,
Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney Generals, Carmen
L. Quintana, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The petitioner is before this Court appealing from the
denial of his petition for relief under Post-Conviction Relief, Rule 1.
He was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by a majority of this
Court in Hester v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 284, 315 N.E.2d 351. His peti-
tion now raises this sole issue:

1. Whether the defendant was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel.

In post-conviction proceedings, the burden of proof rests with the

petitioner to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of

the evidence. Laird v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 328, 385 N.E.2d

HE 452; Davis v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 327, 330 N.E.2d 788. It is

the responsibility of the judge hearing the petition to weigh

the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, and his determina-

tion denying relief will be reversed only where the evidence is without

conflict and leads unerringly to a result other than that reached by

the trial court. Baker v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 304, 403 N.E.2d 1069;
Riner v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 578, 394 N.E.2d 140.

After defendant’s arrest in February of 1971, he was incarcerated
at the Delaware County Jail and was eventually transferred to the
Indiana Reformatory. A psychiatrist examined defendant at the reform-
atory and found him to be “grossly psychotic.” In April of 1971, he

452 —
EE

was admitted to the Norman Beatty Memorial Hospital for ‘“safekeep-
ing and observation.” While there, he was administered the drug
Thorazine, an anti-anxiety, anti-psychotic medication.

Defendant was released from the hospital in December of 1971 and
returned to the Delaware County Jail. Sometime in the spring of 1972,
the cause was venued to Wayne County where defendant pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity. In October of 1972, defendant was found
competent to stand trial, and he was tried in November of 1972 during
which time he continued to receive Thorazine at the Wayne County
Safety Building where he was being held.

It is defendant’s contention that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel, and hence a fair trial, because his trial attorney failed to
“fully develop” the fact that he was taking medication during trial and
failed to tender an instruction to that effect. He maintains that his
in-court behavior was strongly conditioned by the medication and that
the jury should have been informed that the insanity defense was to
be applied to a basic behavior pattern which was not the one they were
observing.

There is a presumption that counsel has discharged his duty fully,

and it requires strong and convincing evidence to rebut this presump-
tion of adequacy. Riner v. State, supra; Crisp v. State, (1979)

i | 271 Ind. 534, 394 N.E.2d 115. In order to prevail, a defendant

must show that his representation was so inadequate as to

reduce the trial, taken as a whole, to a mockery of justice. Baker v.
State, supra; Huggins v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 264, 403 N.E.2d 332.

First, we note that defense counsel did elicit from witnesses the fact
that defendant was taking Thorazine three times a day which made
him feel more relaxed and that Thorazine was a fairly powerful anti-
anxiety and anti-psychotic agent. Second, and more important, defend-
ant presented no evidence at the post-conviction hearing explaining
why he was receiving Thorazine and what his behavior would have
been had he not been given the medication.

The only expert witness called by the defendant at the post-conviction
hearing was a psychiatrist who had never examined the defendant and
who testified that Thorazine was used for a variety of purposes and

bn 453

had multiple effects, one of which was to control aggressive behavior.
Defendant places primary emphasis on this latter property of Thorazine,
but there was absolutely no evidence that defendant was an aggressive
or violent individual who needed the medication in order to prevent
him from exhibiting that kind of conduct.

In fact, defendant’s expert testified that 400 to 800 milligrams of
Thorazine per day usually controls aggressive behavior, but the evi-
dence established that during the murder trial, defendant was receiv-
ing only 150 milligrams of Thorazine daily. In addition, defendant
himself testified that at the time of the murder, he had ingested a quan-
tity of aleohol and speed and that without those substances, he did
not normally act in a violent or aggressive manner.

The cases cited by defendant are readily distinguishable. In State
v. Hayes, (1978) 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire was presented with a certified question of whether
a trial court could force a defendant to take medication against his
will prior to and during trial where the evidence was uncontroverted
that he was mentally competent to stand trial only while under the
influence of that medication. The Supreme Court answered in the af-
firmative as long as the jury was instructed about the facts relating
to the defendant’s use of medication. In the case at bar, defendant makes
no contention that he was compelled to take drugs against his will in
order to render him competent for trial.

In In re Pray, (1975) 183 Vt. 253, 3836 A.2d 174, the defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder, despite his plea of insanity, and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Vermont re-
versed and ordered a new trial because the state failed to disclose to
the jury the fact that defendant had been administered a large dosage
of medication by a state hospital which made him quiet and tractable
during trial. The defendant and his counsel were relieved of this obliga-
tion because they were never fully informed of the extent or effect
of the drugs. Unlike the case at bar, the jury in Pray was completely
unaware of defendant's medication, and there was evidence in Pray
that defendant would have been difficult to control without the drugs.
We therefore hold that defendant’s contention that he was denied ef-
fective assistance of counsel and a fair trial is without merit.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NoTE—Reported at 417 N.B.2d 343.
Es

PAUL E. MILLER v. STATE OF INDIANA.

(No. 8798228. Filed March 13, 1981. Rehearing denied May 5, 1981.]

455

Joseph R. Kilmer, of Pendleton, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Thomas D. Quigley, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted in a trial by jury
of the theft of property of Danny Turner, Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (Burns
1979), and of being an habitual offender, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns
1979). This direct appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict upon the theft and the legality of his having been
sentenced as an habitual offender.

Defendant has assigned as error the court’s denial of his motion for
judgment at the conclusion of the State’s evidence in chief, but, error,
if any, with respect to that ruling was waived when he elected

I to present evidence in his defense. Love v. State, (1980) 272
Ind. 672, 400 N.E.2d 1371, 1874. However, the same issue is
presented upon his challenge to the sufficiency to sustain the verdict.
The evidence adduced at trial supportive of the verdict disclosed that
the premises of Danny Turner had been burglarized between 7:30 a.m.
and 7:45 p.m. on February 23, 1978 in Kokomo, Indiana. Officer Williams,
of the Anderson, Indiana Police Department, was investigating that
crime, and at 8:15 p.m. of that day he was at the Olympia Bar, in Ander-

son, where James Farthing, who was known to be a dealer in stolen
property, was employed as a bartender. While there, Williams observed
Farthing, the defendant and Gale Fields engaging in conversation; and
he observed either the defendant or Fields say that he did not want
to take “the stuff’ back to Kokomo and Farthing to say that he was
not interested in buying “the stuff.” The three then went to the park-
ing lot.

Williams summoned assistance by radio, and Officers Prizer and
Stanley responded. Upon or shortly after their arrival, they saw the
defendant, Fields and Farthing standing next to a blue Pontiac Tempest
automobile. The three peered into the vehicle, entered it and began
to talk.

After some brief period of time, Farthing got out of the vehicle and
re-entered the Bar, and the automobile, with Fields and the defendant
therein, was maneuvered around the parking lot to a point behind a
parked housetrailer. One of the two occupants of the vehicle exited,
removed a sewing machine and two stereo-speakers therefrom and re-
entered the automobile, abandoning the sewing machine and speakers.
The automobile was then driven to the public street. The observers
could not discern what the two were saying during the aforesaid ac-
tivity, but they overheard their voices, which were raised, as if in
argument.

When the automobile exited from the parking lot into the street,
the defendant got out but walked in the same direction as the car was
moving. Prizer and Stanley approached him and identified themselves
as policemen. Thereupon the defendant ran but was apprehended by
the officers. Fields, while continuing in the automobile was also appre-
hended by other police officers who had been summoned.

The automobile from which Defendant had just taken leave contained
a number of items of stolen property, including a television set and
the tape recorder identified at trial as having been taken in the afore-
mentioned Kokomo burglary. The vehicle also contained property which
belonged to the defendant, and the license plate displayed upon the
automobile had been issued to “Paul E. and/or J. L. Miller.”

The statute under which the defendant was charged and convicted

Le 457
Lo

provides that a person commits a theft if he knowingly or intentionally

exerts unauthorized control over the property of another per-

Hs son with intent to deprive the other person of any part of

its value or use; and it is the defendant’s sole contention upon

the sufficiency issue that there was no evidence that he exerted any
control over the Turner property, but we disagree.

“Upon a review for sufficient evidence this Court will look only
to the evidence most favorable to the State and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. If the existence of each ele-
ment of the crime charged may be found therefrom, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed.” (Citation omit-
ted). “In such a review, we will not weigh conflicting evidence nor
will we judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Loyd v. State, (1980)
272 Ind. 404, 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1264.

A reasonable inference could be drawn from the aforestated facts that
the defendant and Fields were acting in consort, that the property was
in their join possession and control and that they jointly offered to
barter it to Farthing.

The inference of guilt of the defendant is also strengthened by his
attempted escape when the police sought to apprehend him. Thomas
v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 561, 563, 261 N.E.2d 224, 225.

It is clear that there was presented to the jury substantial probative
evidence from which a reasonable man could find not only the requisite
possession by the defendant but the other requisite elements of the
crime as well, all beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant has assigned several issues with respect to the legality
of his having been sentenced as an habitual criminal, one of which com-
pels us to order the sentence vacated and to remand the cause for re-
trial upon the issue of habitual offender. See State v. McMillan, (1980)
274 Ind. 167, 409 N.E.2d 612, 618.

The information for theft was filed on February 24, 1978. Following
several continuances and an amendment to the information, the defend-
ant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty on April 18, 1978.
The information contained no allegations with respect to prior offenses.

On September 15, 1978, under the same cause number, the State

458 ee
Ld

filed what it denominated as “Count No. II Information for Habitual
Offender I.C. 35-50-2-8,” which alleged prior convictions for burglary
in 1956 and 1967.

On March 30, 1979, the trial commenced upon the theft charge and
was concluded on April 2, with a verdict of guilty. Immediately there-
after, the defendant was arraigned on the habitual offender count and
trial thereon was set for the following morning, April 3, 1979.

While the theft and habitual criminal charges were pending in the
Madison County Superior Court, the defendant also stood charged in
Howard County with a count of burglary and a count of rape. He had
been convicted upon those counts one week prior to the trial in the
case before us but had not yet been sentenced.

On April 3, 1979, immediately before proceeding with the habitual
offender proceedings, the State was allowed over the defendant’s ob-
jection to amend the habitual offender count to include the aforemen-
tioned convictions for rape and burglary. The defendant contends that
it was error for the trial court to permit that amendment to include
counts upon which he had not been sentenced, and we agree.

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979) in pertinent part:

“(a) The state may seek to have a person sentenced as an habitual
offender for any felony by alleging, on a page separate from the
rest of the charging instrument, that the person has accumulated
two (2) prior unrelated felony convictions. * * *

“(b) After he has been convicted and sentenced for a felony com-
mitted after sentencing for a prior unrelated felony conviction, a
person has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony convictions.”
(Emphasis added).

The State admits that the convictions for which the defendant had
not yet been sentenced could not properly be utilized under the habitual
offender statute; but it contends, nevertheless, that the inclusion of
them in the charge was mere surplusage and harmless error, because
the adjudication of the defendant as an habitual offender was supported
by the evidence of the 1956 and 1967 convictions. This position is not
tenable.

The jury found the defendant to be an habitual offender upon the

Yi 459
Ld

charge which alleged four prior convictions and upon evidence as to
all four. It is clear from the statute that to sustain a sentence
under it, the State must show that the defendant had been
previously twice convicted and twice sentenced for felonies, that
the commission of the second offense was subsequent to his having
been sentenced upon the first and that the commission of the principal
offense upon which the enhanced punishment is being sought was subse-
quent to his having been sentenced upon the second conviction. Under
previous law, it was also required that the defendant had been impris-
oned upon the first sentencing prior to commission of the second of-
fense and that he had been imprisoned upon the second sentencing
prior to the commission of the principal offense. Cooper v. State, (1972)
259 Ind. 107, 114, 284 N.E.2d 799, 803. The requirement of imprison-
ment is not included in the current statute, but the sequence of of-
fenses, convictions and sentencing was expressly retained.

Not only had the defendant not been sentenced for the third and
fourth offenses charged, he had not yet been convicted of them at the
time the principal offense was committed, and for all we know, they
may even have been committed subsequently to its commission.

“The purpose of our habitual criminal statute is to give offenders
due warning by conviction, sentencing and imprisonment of the conse-
quences of persistence in criminality * * * .” Cooper v. State, supra.

“The purpose of the statute is to more severely penalize those per-
sons whom prior sanctions have failed to deter from committing
felonies.” (Citation omitted). Hall v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 507,

HE 405 N.B.2d 530, 536.

“Its purpose is to prevent an offender who has been convicted of

several felonies from being sentenced as an habitual offender before

he has had an adequate chance to respond affirmatively to

Il the sentences for such convictions.” Criminal Code Study Com-
mission Comments to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (West 1978).

With respect to the State’s contention that the error was harmless,
we have previously held that it was not error to prove additional prior
felonies. Hall v. State, supra, and cases there cited. But in those cases,
the additional offenses qualified under the statute, and all prior con-
victions, ete. were proved. Even so, unless special findings are to be

submitted, the prosecutorial wisdom of charging prior offenses in ex-
cess of the statutorially required number is subject to question. But
here, the defendant was improperly charged, over his objections, and
evidence was submitted on those improper charges. Notwithstanding
that competent evidence was admitted to support a finding that the
defendant “had accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony convictions,”
under this state of the record, it eannot be discerned which of the four
alleged prior convictions provided the factual basis for the jury’s
determination.

A general verdict can not stand when the case was tried and sub-
mitted on two theories, one bona fide and the other not. Bachellar v.
Maryland, (1970) 397 U.S. 564, 569-71, 90 S.Ct. 1312, 1315-16,
(25 L.Ed.2d 570, 575-76; Williams v. North Carolina, (1942) 317
US. 287, 291-92, 63 S.Ct. 207, 210, 87 L.Ed. 279, 282, 143 A.L.R.

1278.

Defendant also asserts that he could not be sentenced as an habitual
offender on the basis of the 1956 and 1967 convictions, inasmuch as
those convictions had been utilized previously to support sentencing
of him as an habitual offender in the aforementioned ongoing pro-
ceedings in Howard County. This “double jeopardy” argument has been
resolved contrary to Defendant's position in Hall v. State, supra, and
cases there cited.

We have previously held that the issue of guilt and the issue of
habitual offender’s status are severable, when necessary to carry out
the statutory purpose and when severance is not violative
I of the defendant's due process rights. State v. McMillan, supra.
Here, the defendant knew from the amended information filed
well in advance of trial that the State would seek to have him sentenced
as an habitual offender on the basis of the 1956 and 1967 convictions.
Thus there can be no claim that the severance places him at a disad-
vantage. The cause is, therefore, remanded to the trial court with in-
structions to sustain Defendant's objections to the April 3, 1979 amend-
ment to the information and for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Le 461
Ld

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 339.
be

SHERMAN H. SKOLNICK v. STATE OF INDIANA AND SAUL I. RUMAN
AND RICHARD J. LESNIAK.

[No. 381875. Filed March 16, 1981.]

Sherman H. Skolnick, of Chicago, Illinois, Pro Se.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Alembert W. Brayton, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee State of Indiana; Saul I. Ruman, of Ham-
mond, for appellees Ruman and Lesniak.

GIVAN, C. J.—The Supreme Court receives this case on a petition to
transfer from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals October
25, 1979, and recorded in 397 N.E.2d 986.

On July 29, 1975, the appellant was convicted of three counts of direct
criminal contempt by the Porter Superior Court. The Court of Appeals
affirmed two convictions and reversed one. Both appellant and the
State, as appellee, petitioned this Court for transfer of the cause pur-

suant to Appellate Rule 11(B).

The relevant facts for our determination are as follows:

July 29, 1975:

July 30, 1975:
August 27, 1975:

September 26, 1975:

May 5, 1976:

July 12, 1976:

Order issued citing Skolnick for three
counts of contempt (the subject of this ap-
peal), and setting bond on each count at
$5,000 ($15,000 total).

Bench warrant issued for Skolnick’s arrest.

The trial court issued an order finding:
(1) That the Porter County Sheriff had in-
formed the court that Skolnick had fled the
court’s jurisdiction into Illinois in order to
avoid arrest. This was supported by
Skolnick’s attempt to file pleadings which
were mailed from Chicago, Illinois, and
Skolnick’s statement over a “telephone
hotline” that he was in Illinois to avoid the
jurisdiction of the Porter Superior Court.
(2) That the court would not entertain any
pleas from Skolnick until he submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
(3) That the Porter County clerk was not
to act on any pleadings attempted to be
filed by Skolnick until further ordered by
the Porter Superior Court.

Skolnick attempted to file his motion to
correct errors, but it was not filed pursuant
to the trial court’s order.

On Skolnick’s petition to the Court of Ap-
peals for an order of mandate against the
Porter Superior Court, a per curiam mem-
orandum decision was issued giving
Skolnick thirty days to submit himself to
jurisdiction of the Porter Superior Court,
and thereafter, sixty days to perfect his
appeal.

The trial judge certified to the Court of Ap-
peals that Skolnick had timely submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the Porter
Superior Court by posting bond.

bn 463

Pd
July 12, 1976: Skolnick’s motion to correct errors was
ordered filed.
July 29, 1976: Skolnick’s motion to correct errors was
overruled.
August 19, 1976: Skolnick’s amended praecipe was filed.

Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure 59(C) states that a motion to correct

errors shall be filed not later than sixty days after the entry of judg-

ment. Failure to file a timely motion to correct errors pre-

HE scludes appellate review. Lines v. Browning, (1978) 156 Ind.App.

185, 295 N.E.2d 853. An extension of time to file a motion

to correct errors cannot be granted. Lines, supra. Indiana Rules of Trial
Procedure 6(B) states:

(B) Enlargement. When an act is required or allowed to be done
at or within a specified time by these rules, the court may at any
time for cause shown:

ee Ok

(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period,
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect; but, the court may not extend the time for
taking any action . . . to correct errors under 59(C)....
However, the general rule in this state is that the voluntary and
unlawful absence of the defendant from the trial court’s jurisdiction
waives his right to a timely appeal. Irvin v. State, (1956) 236
HH Ind. 384, 189 N.E.2d 898; State ew rel. Ruetz v. LaGrange Cir-
cuit Court, (1972) 258 Ind. 354, 281 N.E.2d 106. In Irvin, we
stated:

“If a prisoner escapes he is not entitled during the period he is
a fugitive to any standing in court or to file any plea or ask any
consideration from such court.”

236 Ind. at 391, 139 N.E.2d at 901.

Based upon the information from the Porter County Sheriff that
Skolnick had fled the Porter Superior Court’s jurisdiction, the trial
court ordered the clerk to refuse pleadings from Skolnick. The trial
court was correct in making such an order. Skolnick’s attempt to file
his motion to correct errors on September 26, 1975, while absent from

464 ee
Po

the trial court’s jurisdiction, was correctly denied. By his continuing
absence during the time period designated by Indiana Rule Tr. P. 59(C),
Skolnick waived his right to file his motion to correct errors and con-
sequently perfect his appeal for appellate review. Therefore, the man-
date order issued by the Court of Appeals on May 5, 1976, granting
the appellant 30 days to submit himself to the Porter Superior Court’s
jurisdiction and 60 days thereafter to perfect his appeal is overruled.

We accept transfer of this cause, vacate the opinion of the Court
of Appeals, and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Givan, C.J., Hunter and Prentice, JJ., concur.
DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion.

Pivarnik, J., not participating.

DISSENTING OPINION

DEBRULER, J.—The majority opinion states that the test to be applied
in determining whether the right to appeal was waived is the general
rule that the voluntary and unlawful absence of the defendant from
the trial court’s jurisdiction waives his right to a timely appeal. The
formation and statement of this rule predates the grant in the Indiana
Constitution of the absolute right to one appeal in criminal cases. Art.
7, § 8. Under the new constitutional provision the appeal in criminal
eases has become a necessary part of the machinery of criminal justice,
a part, I dare say, as fundamental as the right to trial, and like the
right to trial is to be safeguarded with the greatest diligence. This
Court has said many times that constitutional rights, even the right
to trial, may be waived, but the waiver must be made freely and under-
standingly, and unless they are so waived there is error in the pro-
ceeding. State v. Lindsey, State v. Carroll, (1952) 231 Ind. 126, 106 N.E.2d
280. This is the standard to be applied in determining whether a per-
son convicted of a crime has waived the constitutional right to appeal,
and not the one announced in the majority opinion.

Under the record as I understand it, Skolnick voluntarily and inten-
tionally fled the jurisdiction of the Porter Superior Court. From his
place in hiding, he attempted to file a motion to correct errors comport-

L | 465
Cd

ing in time and substance with the requirements of Ind. R.Tr. P. 59.
While avoiding the jurisdiction of the Porter Superior Court, appellant
sought extensions of time to file the record of the proceedings in the
Court of Appeals. When the Court of Appeals issued its order that
appellant should surrender in thirty days or suffer forfeiture of his
right of appeal, appellant responded by surrendering himself to the
Porter Superior Court. Thereafter Judge Pivarnik denied the motion
to correct errors and the appeal was prosecuted in the normal fashion.

From the time of his conviction to the time of his surrender, appel-
lant’s conduct was contemptuous and disrespectful to the entire judicial
system. He mocked the courts. His conduct was scornful. I do not for
a minute wish to be understood as condoning it. However, as a judge,
guided by the waiver standard, I see this conduct as inconsistent with
a free and understanding relinquishment of the right of appeal. It is,
indeed, consistent with a continuous desire to have an appeal of his
conviction. There is nothing in the record of which I am aware that
would permit the inference that appellant knew during the sixty days
for filing a motion to correct errors that his appellate rights would
be forfeited because of his flight from the trial court’s jurisdiction. There
is, therefore, ample support in the record for the Court of Appeals
to have concluded that there had been no waiver of the right to appeal.

I, therefore, dissent to the dismissal of this appeal.
NotTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 1103.
a

MICHAEL EDWARD MILLAR v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 6808187. Filed March 17, 1981.]

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Carr L. Darden, Deputy
Public Defender, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General, Frederick N. Kopec, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— Appellant Millar appeals from a denial of his Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. On October 21, 1971, after trial by jury, appellant
Millar was found guilty of Second Degree Murder. On appeal, the In-
diana Supreme Court affirmed that conviction. Millar v. State, (1978)
260 Ind. 368, 295 N.E.2d 814. On December 14, 1976, Appellant filed
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief which was subsequently amended
on April 27, 1977, and again on October 20, 1978. The trial court con-
ducted a hearing on August 10, 1979. On January 24, 1980, the trial
court filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law denying relief. Ap-
pellant filed his Motion to Correct Errors on March 24, 1980, and the
trial court overruled that Motion on March 28, 1980. This appeal
followed.

Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment under Ind. Code
§ 35-1-54-1 (repealed 1976), which permitted the imposition of either
life imprisonment or the imposition of a fifteen to twenty-five year
prison term upon conviction of second degree murder. Appellant claims
that his life sentence is unconstitutional because the above statute pro-

P| 467
LC

vided for two widely divergent sentences, but set forth no specific
eriteria by which to determine which sentence should be imposed. He
claims that this provision allowed the life term to be arbitrarily imposed,
which is a denial of equal protection of law and renders the punish-
ment cruel and unusual in violation of the Highth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections
16 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution.

L

The defendant-appellant was charged with first-degree murder, found
guilty of second-degree murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Ind. Code § 35-1-54-1 (repealed 1976), the statute under which he was
convicted read as follows:

“Whoever, purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation,
kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree,
and, on conviction, shall be imprisoned in the state prison during
life, or shall be imprisoned in the state prison not less than fifteen
(15) nor more than twenty-five (25) years.”

The appellant relies heavily upon the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Furman v. Georgia, (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33
L.Ed.2d 346 in his argument that because there were no specific criteria
provided in the statute for determining which sentence to impose, he
was denied equal protection of law and suffered cruel and unusual
punishment. He acknowledges that Furman, supra, dealt with the death
penalty but argues that the principles set forth in Furman apply to
other penalties.

This Court has previously considered and decided this issue
Hand found that Furman did not apply. In Wilson v. State, (1978)
268 Ind. 112, 121, 374 N.E.2d 45, 50 our Court stated:

“Appellant further argues that the jury was not provided with
adequate guidelines to choose between a life sentence and a lesser
sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years in prison for the crime
of second-degree murder. He argues that the lack of guidelines
makes the jury’s choice of the greater sentence cruel and unusual
punishment under the concept of Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408
U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346. Appellant does not
demonstrate that Furman, which dealt with the death penalty,

468 a
Ee

applies to sentences of imprisonment for murder as are involved
in this case. Neither is it demonstrated that Furman stands for
any constitutional mandate of “guidelines” for use by the jury any
time the sentencing function is undertaken. We do not believe
that Furman so applies, and find this argument to be without
merit.”
Identical constitutional claims were also considered and rejected in
Jones v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 285, 385 N.E.2d 426 and in Bawm ». State,
(1978) 269 Ind. 176, 379 N.E.2d 437. We reaffirm our holdings in these
cases and find no error in the denial of defendant’s petition for post-
conviction relief on these grounds.

Il.

Appellant also alludes to a claim that the statute involved is uncon-

stitutionally vague. This argument is not supported by citation to rele-

vant authority nor developed to a point which would enable

Hs this Court to make a reasoned response thereto. There being

no discernible argument presented, we must deem this issue

waived. Ind. R. Ap. P. 8.3(A)(7); Guardiola v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 404,

875 N.E.2d 1105. In addition, this argument was considered and re-

jected by our Court in Jones v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 285, 385 N.E.2d
426. There is no error on this issue.

Il.

Appellant also contends that the life sentence imposed upon his con-
viction of second-degree murder is in violation of Article 1, Section
16 of the Indiana Constitution because a life sentence is also the penalty
imposed for a first-degree murder conviction. The appellant bases his
claim on language from Heathe v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 345, 274 N.E.2d
697 which read as follows:

“* * * The constitutional mandate that ‘all penalties shall be pro-
portioned to the nature of the offense’ requires that the maximum
for a lesser offense be less than the maximum for a higher offense.”

An argument identical to the appellant’s argument here was considered
in Brown v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 169, 301 N.E.2d 189. In Brown, supra,
the appellant had been convicted of second-degree murder and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. Brown cited the identical passage from
Heathe v. State, supra, appellant Millar cites here, and asked this Court

a 469
CO

to find that his life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Con-
stitution because his sentence was not proportioned to his offense.

In rejecting Brown’s argument the Court explained the above quoted
passage from Heathe, supra, as follows:

“However, such is not the rule of that case. Heathe had been con-
victed of the offense of entering to commit a felony, a lesser in-
cluded offense of second degree burglary. He had been sentenced
to imprisonment for a period of from one to ten years, the penalty
provided by statute for entering to commit a felony. We remanded
the case with instructions to modify the sentence by reducing the
maximum to five years, which is the same as, not less than, the
maximum provided the greater offense.”

261 Ind. at 171, 301 N.E.2d at 190.

The Brown Court went on to state and reaffirm their holding from
Dembowski v. State, (1968) 251 Ind. 250, 240 N.E.2d 815 that the
legislature may not provide a punishment for a lesser included offense
which is greater in years on the face of the statute than the punish-
ment for the greater offense.

This Court reaffirmed its Brown decision in Shackelford v.
HH State, (1976) 264 Ind. 698, 349 N.E.2d 150 and stated:

“We believe that opinion was a correct statement of the law. A
person who kills with purpose and malice, but without premedita-
tion, has still killed intentionally and without justification or ex-
cuse. While the state permits the trier to find that the offense
was substantially less reprehensible and the act less likely to be
repeated than other homicides, the statute also permits the trier
to find the act of such a quality and so likely to be repeated that
this defendant should be punished and confined during his life,
just as he would have been punished and confined if his act were
the result of premeditation. Neither the Constitution nor common
sense requires the penalty to be less.”

Brown, supra, was also reaffirmed in Hmery v. State, (1973) 261 Ind.
211, 301 N.E.2d 369 in which the identical issue and argument was
presented as is presented here by appellant Millar. The Supreme Court
upheld the denial of Emery’s post-conviction relief. In Rock v. State,
(1979) 270 Ind. 658, 388 N.E.2d 533 this Court was asked to reexamine
and overrule its decision in Brown v. State, supra, and declined to do

so. In Williams v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 656, 395 N.E.2d 239, 246 which
involved a robbery conviction, this Court reiterated its position that:

“Nevertheless, we have held that the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 1, § 16 of the Indiana Con-
stitution require only that the maximum sentence for a lesser in-
eluded offense not exceed the maximum sentence for the greater
offense.”

There is no error on this issue.
Judgment affirmed.
All Justices concur.

NotTe—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 1105.

RECIE J. GIBSON v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 12798349, Filed March 18, 1981]

Le 4m

James P. McCanna, of Auburn, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Cindy A. Ellis, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— Appellant Gibson was convicted following a trial by jury
of robbery, a class B Felony, and received a determinate sentence of
twenty years. On appeal appellant claims that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to convict, that the court abused its discretion in sentencing
him, and that his trial counsel did not furnish effective services during
the trial and at the time of sentencing.

The circumstances of this offense are that appellant and a compan-
ion entered the Newhall General Store in DeKalb County, Indiana, as
Nancy Harter the owner of the store was preparing to close. Appellant
held a knife in his hand, pointing it in her ribs, and ordered her to
put money into a bag. She did so and the two then left the store, and
departed in a car. Shortly thereafter appellant and several others were
stopped and arrested by Butler City Police and State Police, and money,
a check, and a receipt from the store were recovered from the car.

Appellant Gibson contends that the evidence of his culpability, that
is, his having “knowingly” or “intentionally” acted in robbing the store
and its owner, was insufficient to warrant conviction. In deter-
H__smining this question we do not weigh the evidence nor resolve
questions of credibility but look to the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom which support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970)
254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction will be affirmed if from
that viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from which a
reasonable trier of fact could infer that appellant was guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Glover v. State, (1970) 258 Ind. 536, 255 N.E.2d 657.

472 —

The store owner testified that she smelled alcohol on appellant at
the time of the robbery. Defense witnesses testified that appellant,
on the day of the robbery, consumed alcohol, smoked marijuana, and
was in possession of “T”, a form of phencyclidine. Appellant testified
that he took fifteen or twenty dollars worth of “T” before the robbery,
in addition to drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. Beer cans and
syringes were found in the get-away car. One of the defense witnesses
testified that the body keeps going but the mind sometimes blacks out
under the influence of alcohol and T. Appellant testified that he could
not remember the incidents at the Newhall General Store.

Arrayed against the evidence of drug and alcohol intoxication was
the testimony of Mrs. Harter that appellant spoke softly, but distinctly,
did not stagger, and did not display signs of being drunk. To her he
appeared normal and appeared to know exactly what he was doing.
His face was not flushed. Police officers who observed appellant at the
time the car in which he was riding was first stopped, and at the police
station to which he was taken, within one to two hours after the rob-
bery of the Newhall store, testified that appellant spoke in a normal
manner, and did not sway, stumble or fall in walking. In their opinions,
appellant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Applying the governing standard, the trial court concluded that the
evidence of intoxication, if believed, was such that it could have created
areasonable doubt in the mind of the jury that appellant enter-

Il tained the intent to wield the weapon and to steal. Williams

v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 105, 402 N.E.2d 954. He therefore gave

an instruction to the jury on intoxication. The jury was not bound,
however, to believe and credit the evidence of intoxication, and to con-
clude that the impairment of appellant’s mental capacity was so exten-
sive as to render him incapable of forming the requisite specific in-
tent. The evidence of intoxication was controverted in all respects by
the testimony of the victim and the arresting officers, and it is said
that under such circumstances whether a mental incapacity existed
is a question of fact for the trier of fact. Shackelford v. State, (1976)
264 Ind. 698, 349 N.H.2d 150. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses
was substantial and probative of the existence of the required mental
capacity. From it, the jury was warranted in concluding beyond a
reasonable doubt that in spite of his ingestion of aleohol and drugs,

P| 413
Cd

appellant knowingly and intentionally threatened the storekeeper with
a knife and took the money.

The trial court set appellant’s sentence at the maximum of twenty
years after adjusting it upward from the basic ten years upon considera-
tion of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Ind. Code
HH § 35-5-2-2 (class B felony sentence). Ind. Code § 35-50-1A-7
(criteria for sentencing). Juxtaposed against aggravating cir-
cumstances including multiple misdemeanor convictions including
among others, carrying a concealed weapon, assault and battery, mali-
cious trespass, disorderly conduct and resisting arrest for which he
had served time; the threat of serious harm to the victim and her child;
past violations of terms of probation; and others, was the lone mitigating
circumstance found by the trial court, namely, that appellant was under
a degree of intoxication which was less than the defense but which
helped facilitate the commission of the crime.

In addressing appellant and explaining the decision to give the twenty
year sentence the trial court at one point stated that “there is nowhere
in here a mitigating circumstance that you ever tried to do anything
about your problem with alcohol.” Appellate counsel attached his af-
fidavit to the motion to correct errors in which he swore that appellant
had stated to him during an interview that he was treated in January,
1978, for alcohol and drug problems at the Northeastern Center in Ken-
dallville, Indiana. In ruling upon the motion to correct errors, the trial
court stated: “On at least twenty to twenty-six other occasions he
failed to respond affirmatively to correct his problems of alcoholism,
at least before the commission of crimes.”

It is evident from the court’s explanation in ruling on the motion
to correct errors that he had not been able to find support for the con-
clusion that appellant had ever been self-motivated to seek out help
in aid of a personally felt desire to curb his use of alcohol and drugs
and thus reduce the likelihood that he would act in a manner dangerous
to others. Appellant's post-trial affidavit provides no such support
either. It goes no further than to evidence that appellant was seen
at a clinic in January, 1978. The circumstances of that attendance are
not disclosed. The duration and substance of that attendance is not
disclosed. Such information is within the knowledge of appellant. The

474 |
PO

affidavit is conjectural in content. Upon review of this record we find
that the sentencing court was not in error in failing to find and evaluate
a mitigating circumstance. The trial court’s evaluation of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances is not subject to the complaint made, and
therefore the sentence of twenty years could not be manifestly unrea-
sonable under Rule 2 of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Review of
Sentences on the basis posed.

Appellant's last claim is that he was denied constitutionally effec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial and sentencing. Appellant was faced
with overwhelming evidence of guilt. He did, through his counsel pros-
ecute a defense of intoxication; make request for discovery; move for
a mistrial and a directed verdict. Appellant contends that trial counsel
failed to call a witness from a mental health clinic attended by appellant
several months before the crime, for trial or sentencing, to object to
cross-examination of defense witnesses by the trial prosecutor concern-
ing prior criminal charges against them, and failed to strike a juror
“who was believed” to have been a tenant of the trial prosecutor.

The failure of trial counsel to call a defense witness was considered
in this context in Burns v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 512, 387 N.E.2d 442.
The implication of appellant’s claim is that there exists a “medical ex-
pert” at the clinic who could provide testimony relevant to whether
appellant had the requisite intent to commit the act and to show that
he had attempted to do something about his drinking problem. In Burns,
supra, the witness was identified by the accused by name and there
had been communication between the accused and counsel concerning
the precise testimony which the witness might give. Under those cir-
cumstances, counsel's representation was not deemed ineffective. Here,
the witness was not identified by name, and the content of the omitted
witness's testimony is not described. There is no record support for
the proposition that defense counsel even knew of such a witness or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of such a witness.
Indeed, when asked at sentencing whether defense counsel had failed
to do anything on his behalf, appellant replied, “no, sir.” The likelihood
of ineffectiveness of counsel is much less here than it was in Burns,
supra.

We find nothing in the record to support the contention that a juror

[| 475
pT

who was a tenant of the prosecutor may have sat on the jury. No claim
of ineffectiveness can be predicated upon this contention.

The trial court expressly found in ruling on the motion to correct
errors that defense counsel had chosen as a matter of trial strategy
to withhold making lengthy objections to the cross-examination of some
defense witnesses, in order not to give the jury the impression that
appellant did not want the evidence to be heard. We agree with this
assessment.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances we find that the
presumption that counsel has discharged his duties fully has not been
overcome by the presentation in this case. Magley v. State,

HH (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotE—Reported at 417 N.B.2d 1111.
|

KENNETH BRADY v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 180810. Filed March 18, 1981]

es

476 —

Robert Graves, of Marion, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Cindy A. Ellis, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— Appellant Brady was convicted in a trial by jury of the
offense of robbery while armed pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1, and
received a sentence of imprisonment of ten years. He was also con-
victed at the same time of the offense of resisting law enforcement
pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(1), and received a sentence of four
years such sentence to run consecutively with the robbery sentence.

Appellant contends in this appeal as follows:

(1) The evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for armed
robbery.

(2) The evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for
resisting law enforcement.

(8) The verdict of guilty of resisting law enforcement is incon-
sistent with the verdict of not guilty rendered on a charge of at-
tempted murder.

It is apparent on the face of this record that this appeal does not
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of Ind. R. App. P. 4(A)(7) in that
there has been no single sentence imposed here having a minimum
greater than ten years. Menefee v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 390, 417 N.E.2d
302. We do however exercise our inherent judicial authority and re-
tain this case for disposition on the merits in light of the passage of
time during which it had pended in this Court.

Appellant was charged with the perpetration of an armed robbery
of the Miller's Liquor Store on February 10, 1979, at 10:00 p.m., in Grant

a 477
Es

County, Indiana. He contends that the evidence serving to identify him
as the perpetrator of the offense was insufficient. In determining this
question we do not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibil-
ity, but look to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which
support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558.
The conviction will be affirmed, if from that viewpoint there is evidence
of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer
that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover v. State,
(1970) 258 Ind. 586, 255 N.E.2d 657.

The case for the prosecution came from civilian witnesses who
observed the robbery from within and without the liquor store and
police officers of the city of Marion and deputy sheriffs of Grant County
who pursued the robbers as they made their escape. Three men entered
the liquor store, each armed with a shotgun, and took about two hun-
dred dollars from the register and the presence of the clerk in attend-
ance. Two of the men wore ski masks. The third man wore no mask,
but was not appellant. The men were observed going into the store
carrying weapons and green trash bags by a customer who had just
left the store and had entered his car. This customer observed the rob-
bery take place and saw the men run out of the store and around the
side of the building. He then saw a car exit an alley at the rear of
the store. He described this car in an immediate report to the police
as a 1974 or 1975 Monte Carlo, fairly new, with a white top and red
bottom.

Within minutes a car described by police officers as a 1973 or 1974
Monte Carlo, red top and white bottom, was seen by a Marion city
police unit, and this unit began to follow the car which was proceeding
through the street within the speed limit at about thirty miles per hour.
The Monte Carlo then speeded up, and the unit, with siren and warn-
ing lights on, proceeded to chase the car for about nine blocks.

A unit of the Grant County Sheriff's department, driven by Lt. Nor-
ton was positioned at the end of an alley, although not blocking the
alley, down which the Monte Carlo was being pursued by the city police.
Norton got out of the car, armed with a rifle, and stood at the end
of the alley, as the car, about forty yards away, proceeded towards
him at a rate of about fifteen to twenty miles per hour. The intersec-
tion of this alley with the street on which the sheriff's car was stopped

478 |
pT

was illuminated by a bright city street light. Norton aimed his rifle
at the driver and yelled for the car to stop. As the car proceeded on
towards him, he stepped back and the car swerved over at him. At
this point Norton slipped and fell and at almost the same instant a
shotgun blast came from the car, but did not strike him. The car nar-
rowly missed hitting him, as did the following police car as it continued
the chase through the intersection. Norton and another deputy fired
at the car striking it and knocking a large hole in the rear window.

The pursuit continued, and one man in the car climbed out of the
rear window while it was moving and made his escape. The car came
to a stop shortly thereafter and two men exited the passenger side.
One man was shot in the hip and fell outside the car. The second man
successfully made his escape on foot. Beside the fallen man, who was
one Clifford Larry, there was a shotgun, a ski mask, a green trash bag
containing more than two hundred dollars and checks from the Miller
Liquor Store.

Norton testified that he aimed his rifle at the driver of the car as
he yelled, “halt”. He further testified in court that the driver of the
car was appellant Kenneth Brady, and that he was able to see him
and had no doubt about his recognition of Brady because his attention
was focused upon the driver, the area was illuminated by the street
light, and the car came very close to him.

Appellant argues that the discrepancy between the description of
the get away car with regard to its top and bottom colors given by
the civilian witnesses and the police officers, and the fact that the car
did not speed away from the liquor store area, coupled with the absence
of testimony of persons at the liquor store identifying appellant serves
to illustrate the insufficiency of evidence. These were weak elements
of the State’s proof, unfavorable to the verdict, and were for considera-
tion by the trier of fact. Their presence does not render the evidence
insufficient on appeal.

Appellant argues that there was no physical evidence admitted at
trial connecting him to the robbery. This assertion is true; however,
there was parol evidence describing the car, money, checks,

| | ski mask, and shotguns. The failure of the prosecution to pre-
sent the physical evidence which was described by the wit-

[| 479
Po

nesses weakened the State’s case, but did not render the verbal descrip-
tions insufficient to engender belief in their existence and use to a
certainty beyond a reasonable doubt. Pettit v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 409,
281 N.E.2d 807.

Appellant argues that a pre-trial statement given by a prosecution
witness, one Cox, which was used by the State to refresh his recollec-
tion or impeach him was either not substantive evidence, or if properly
considered substantive evidence was so contradictory as to be unworthy
of belief. In arriving at our assessment of the State’s proof of guilty
in this appeal, we find it unnecessary to include this statement within
the evidence favorable to the verdict reached, and therefore do not
give consideration to it.

Upon consideration of the evidence of guilt stated in the narration

above, we conclude that the jury was warranted in concluding from it

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was one of the men

Hs who entered the Miller Liquor Store and took money at gun

point. The jury could have so inferred from the perpetration

of the crime by three men, the presence of three men in the Monte

Carlo, the events comprising the robbery, the flight from the scene

and the recovery of the stolen items and guns from the ear, and the

testimony of Norton that he recognized appellant as the driver of the
Monte Carlo.

Appellant also contends that the evidence of guilt was insufficient
to warrant his conviction of resisting law enforcement. He was charged
with having drawn or used a deadly weapon in resisting
Hs‘ Deputy Norton. He contends that absent proof that he dis-
charged the shotgun from the car the evidence of guilt cannot
be sufficient. The jury was justified in believing that appellant was
the driver of the Monte Carlo and with the two other men intended
to make their escape through the use of means then available to them.
The window of the car was rolled down and the muzzle of the shotgun
was stuck out of it and one of the men fired as the car driven by ap-
pellant swerved over at Norton. This was sufficient evidence to show
that appellant Brady was guilty as an aider of the crime as committed
by another. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2. Cf. Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549,
356 N.E.2d 1188.

Appellant was also charged in a separate count with the attempted
murder of Deputy Norton. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty
on this count. Appellant contends that such verdict is inconsistent with
the verdict of guilty of resisting law enforcement, and therefore the
latter verdict should not be permitted to stand.

In Marsh v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 454, 393 N.E.2d 757,
HB _swith regard to the appellate claim of inconsistent verdicts this
Court concluded:

“[TJhis Court has looked and will continue to look at verdicts to
determine if they are inconsistent. While perfectly logical verdicts
should not be demanded, extremely contradictory and irrecon-
cilable verdicts warrant corrective action by this Court.” 393
N.E.2d at 761.
The Court will look for a line of reasoning grounded in the proof which
could have been adopted by the jury in reaching the two verdicts. The
testimony of Deputy Norton was that the shotgun was discharged out
the window, but that he was not hit. It would therefore be logical to
infer that the jury was not convinced to a certainty beyond a reasonable
doubt that appellant had the culpability required for the commission
of the crime of murder, but at the same time was so convinced that
he had the culpability required for the crime of resisting law enforce-
ment. It is conceivable that one can forcibly resist apprehension by
a police officer by drawing and using a weapon and at the same time
have no purpose in mind to knowingly or intentionally kill. There is
therefore no necessary inconsistency between these two verdicts which
warrants corrective action.

The convictions are affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NotE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 1108.

NORVILLE WHITE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 8808229. Filed March 19, 1981.]

be 481

Kevin B. Relphorde, of Gary, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General, William E. Daily, Chief
Counsel, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.~Defendant (Appellant) was charged with Attempted
Rape, a Class A Felony, and was convicted, following a trial by jury,
of Attempted Rape, a Class B Felony. This direct appeal presents the
sufficiency of the evidence as the sole issue.

The Class A Felony charged, Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1, § 35-42-4-1 (Burns
1979), was an attempt to rape the prosecutrix while armed with a knife.
The Class B Felony of which the defendant was convicted is a lesser
offense necessarily included in the offense charged, differing only in
that commission of the Class B offense does not require the element
of being armed.

The evidence most favorable to the State revealed that the defen-
dant attacked the prosecutrix and her male companion as they were
walking past a school building and drinking wine at about 10:30 a.m.
Her companion extricated himself, and enlisted aid from a policeman.
When the policeman arrived on the scene Defendant and Prosecutrix
were in a doorway or alcove of the building, an area approximately
three feet by eight feet. Both were standing, the defendant fully
dressed, and the prosecutrix nude from the waist down.

482 ee
{|

The prosecutrix testified that before the police arrived, Defendant
had had her in the alcove, on the ground and with a knife at her throat
and his penis exposed and tried to rape her. However, no knife was
found at the scene or on the defendant’s person.

The defendant testified that he was acquainted with the prosecutrix
and that a short time earlier he had given her five dollars to buy some
wine, beer and cigarettes and that she was to return. After six to ten
minutes she had not returned, and he went in search of her. He found
the prosecutrix who, by then had been joined by her companion, asked
why she had not returned, and they accosted him. He denied that he
had attempted to rape her.

It is the defendant’s argument that inasmuch as the jury returned
a verdict of guilty on the Class B offense, it rejected the prosecutrix’s
testimony that he had threatened her with a knife. From this
H__spoint, he argues that the verdict was entirely dependent upon
her credibility and that since the jury rejected her testimony
concerning the knife her credibility was so suspect as to be inadequate,
to support a finding of guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant
cites no authority to support his apparent contention that the finder
of fact may not accept part of a witness’ testimony and reject part,
and we reject such a thesis.

“Tt is for the trier of the action to reconcile, reject or accept part

of disputed or conflicting testimony, even when made by the same

witness and that witness is a party to the action.” Leader v. Bowley,

(1961) 182 Ind.App. 528, 543, 178 N.E.2d 445.

Defendant, however, is in error if he assumes, as he apparently does,
that the Class B conviction, of necessity precluded a finding by the
jury that he was armed.

In Widup v. State, (1967) 250 Ind. 1, 230 N.E.2d 767, Appellant had
been charged with forcible rape and convicted of the lesser included
offense of assault with intent to commit the felony of rape. There was
sufficient evidence presented to support a verdict of guilty of the crime
charged, and the court rejected the appellant’s. contention that the
refusal of the jury to find him guilty of rape necessarily determined
that there had been no threat of force, ete. which were necessary to
sustain the lesser included offense.

a 483
Co

In Acton v. State, (1930) 201 Ind. 686, 171 N.E. 197, we held that if

the evidence shows that the charged crime of rape was committed, a

verdict that the appellant was guilty of a lesser included

I offense was not contrary to law, saying “In considering

whether a verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, we can

consider only the evidence sustaining the verdict, and cannot give any

credence to the evidence which contradicts this evidence * * * .” 201 Ind.
at 690-91. (Authorities cited) (Emphasis ours).

In McCawley v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 137, 409 N.E.2d 594, the ap-
pellant complained that his conviction of a lesser included offense (Rape
Class B Felony) on a charge of Rape Class A Felony, “smacked” of a
compromise verdict; and we held that a conviction could not be con-
sidered a compromise where the evidence was sufficient to support
it. Also see Caudill v. State, (1946) 224 Ind. 531, 69 N.H.2d 549; Butler
v. State, (1978) 177 Ind.App. 622, 380 N.E.2d 611.

We find no error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and Hunter and Privarnik, JJ., concur; DeBruler, J., con-
curs in result.

NoTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 912.
a

STATE OF INDIANA, ON THE RELATION OF ROGER LEE SMITH
v, THE STARKE CIRCUIT COURT, AND THE HONORABLE
MARVIN D. MCLAUGHLIN, JUDGE OF THE
STARKE CIRCUIT COURT.

[No. 7808210. Filed March 23, 1981.]

ee)
+

[| 485

Frank E. Spencer, of Indianapolis, for relator.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Joseph N. Stevenson, William
E. Daily, Deputy Attorney Generals, for respondent.

PIVARNIK, J.— This cause is before us by virture of relator’s petition
for a writ of mandate and prohibition against respondents, the Starke
Circuit Court and the Honorable Marvin D. McLaughlin as judge of
that court. At the heart of this case is a question concerning the con-
stitutionality of Ind. Code §§ 33-4-1-74.3—33-4-1-74.9 (Burns Supp. 1980).
These statutes concern the appointment of a master commissioner by
the circuit court judge, and the commissioner's exercise of certain duties
authorized by the sections in question. On July 21, 1980, this Court
issued a temporary writ of mandate to the Starke Circuit Court and
Judge McLaughlin. This opinion is in furtherance of those proceedings,
and with this opinion we order that the writ of mandate shall be made
permanent. In addition, we grant the petitions for leave to appear as
amici curiae filed by the Vanderburgh and St. Joseph Circuit Court.
As we shall explain, we find certain statutory provisions to be violative
of established principles found in the Indiana Constitution concerning
the operation of the judiciary.

The procedural facts giving rise to this action may be summarized
as follows. On March 3, 1979, Roger Lee Smith, relator in this original
action, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against his wife,
Wanda Smith, in Starke Circuit Court. The previously appointed com-
missioner of the Starke Circuit Court, David P. Matsey, purported to
act as the judge in the Smith marriage dissolution case. It is not disputed
that Matsey performed the following acts pertaining to the resolution
of the Smith case: signed the entry of filings; ordered hearings; ruled
on motions; heard evidence and tried the cause as judge; entered judg-
ment in the form of a decree on November 7, 1979; entered an amended
judgment on January 31, 1980; and overruled the motion to correct
errors. It is also not disputed that Matsey, in performing these acts,
did not purport to act as a special judge or as judge pro tempore of
the Starke Circuit Court. Matsey purported to adjudicate this matter
solely in his capacity as Master Commissioner of the Starke Circuit
Court.

On April 23, 1980, after Matsey had ruled on the motion to correct
errors, Roger Smith’s counsel filed a “Motion to Strike Purported Entry
of Judgment, and Determination of Cause by Elected Judge.” This
pleading requested that respondent Judge McLaughlin strike Commis-
sioner Matsey’s purported entry of judgment and amendment of judg-
ment. The entry of this filing was made by Commissioner Matsey. On
May 22, 1980, Matsey entered an order purporting to overrule the
motion to strike.

On June 13, 1980, relator’s counsel filed a “Praecipe for Notice of
Withdrawal of Submission,” pursuant to Ind. R. Tr. P. 53.1(B), along
with a suggested “Notice of Withdrawal of Submission.” The theory
behind this filing, of course, was that the duly-elected judge of the
Starke Circuit Court, Marvin McLaughlin, had not ruled upon the
motion to strike within thirty days of its filing, as called for in Trial
Rule 53.1(A). Approximately one week later, relator’s counsel was in-
formed by the Starke Circuit Court Clerk's office that the Trial Rule
53.1 filings had been taken to the “judge” and had not been acted upon
by the clerk. See Ind. R. Tr. P. 53.1(B). A few days later, relator’s counsel
ordered certified copies of these filings from the Starke Circuit Court
Clerk. These certified copies were prepared, minus the tendered
“Notice of Withdrawal”; relator was informed that Commissioner
Matsey had these filings and that they had not been entered. On July
11, 1980, relator received the certified copies he had requested from
the Circuit Court Clerk, together with a copy of the docket sheet for
the Smith dissolution proceedings. The docket sheet shows the final
entry, dated July 10, 1980, as follows: “Nunc pro tune as of June 13,
1980. Petitioner tenders for filing his Praecipe for Notice of Withdrawal
of Submission. The Clerk finds that there are no motions not ruled
upon.” The basis for this response seems to have been respondent’s
belief that Commissioner Matsey was fully authorized by statute to
carry out all judicial duties concerning the Smith divorce proceedings,
and that he had done so in accordance with Trial Rule 53.1.

Thereafter, relator filed his “Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate
and Temporary Alternative Writ of Mandate.” Relator asserts that
the Smith marriage dissolution has not been tried and adjudicated by
the judge of the Starke Circuit Court; that the motion to strike the

Yi 487
Pd

purported entries of judgment and amended entry of judgment had
not been ruled upon by the judge of the Starke Circuit Court; and that
the Circuit Court Clerk had taken no action on his praecipe for notice
of withdrawal of submission, in spite of the fact that the praecipe was
filed more than thirty days after the filing of the motion to strike.
Relator argues that Commissioner Matsey had no jurisdiction or power
to purport to act as judge in the Smith marriage dissolution proceed-
ings, and that respondent Judge McLaughlin originally had a duty to
act as judge in that cause. Relator contends, therefore, that, by virtue
of Judge McLaughlin’s failure to rule on the motion to strike within
thirty days and the filing of the Trial Rule 53.1 praecipe, respondent
McLaughlin has lost the power to rule upon the motion to strike.

In his petition for a writ of mandate, relator prayed that the Court
appoint a special judge or order that a writ be issued to respondent
to show cause why a special judge should not be appointed to rule on
the motion to strike and vacate Matsey’s purported entries of judg-
ment. After oral argument on this petition, this Court issued the tem-
porary writ of mandate, and ordered the Clerk of this Court to issue
an order to respondent to show cause, on or before August 22, 1980,
why the Court should not appoint a special judge to rule on the motion
to strike and to vacate the Commissioner’s purported entries of
judgment.

As stated earlier, we are concerned here with the validity, under
the Indiana Constitution, of certain statutes which attempt to vest vir-
tually full judicial powers on master commissioners who are appointed
by, and serve at the pleasure of, circuit court judges. Respondent Judge
McLaughlin appointed David P. Matsey Master Commissioner of the
Starke Circuit Court pursuant to Ind. Code §§ 33-4-1-74.8 e¢ seq. (Burns
Supp. 1980). These statutes were passed by our legislature in 1977 and
amended in 1978. Acts 1977, P.L. 314, §§ 1-7, p. 1452; amended by Acts
1978, P.L. 138, § 1, p. 1292. Section 33-4-1-74.3 provides that the Starke
Circuit Court Judge may appoint a master commissioner. The commis-
sioner must be an attorney in good standing and a resident of the county
after his appointment. The appointment must be made in writing, and
the commissioner continues in office until the judge removes him. Fur-
ther, § 33-4-1-74.4 provides:

488 ee
— ee

“(a) A master commissioner of the Starke Circuit Court may
administer all oaths and affirmations required by law, take and
certify affidavits and depositions, and issue subpoenas for -
witnesses whose testimony is to be taken before him. The master
commissioner has the same power to compel the attendance of
witnesses and to punish contempts as the judge of the court has.
The master commissioner may conduct preliminary hearings in
criminal matters and issue search warrants and arrest warrants
and fix bond thereon.

(b) If empowered by the judge of the court, the master commis-
sioner may exercise full jurisdiction over any probate matters,
civil matters, or criminal matters, and he may enforce court rules.
However, only the judge may exercise jurisdiction over juvenile
matters.”

In addition, § 33-4-1-74.5 permits the commissioner to serve as judge
pro tempore of the court, but states that he shall receive no additional
salary for such services. The master commissioner must devote full
time to his duties, and may not otherwise engage in the practice of
law; he is to receive the same salary as a judge of a county court. §§
33-4-1-74.7; 33-4-1-74.8. See Ind. Code § 33-10.5-5-2 (Burns Supp. 1980).
The commissioner is also entitled to participate in the public employees’
retirement fund. § 33-4-1-74.9.

Further, § 38-4-1-74.6 provides:

“All inherent powers of judicial mandate in Starke County re-
main vested solely in the judge of the Starke Circuit Court.”

‘Thus, the clear thrust of these statutes is to give the appointed com-
missioners the full scope of powers held by the regular Starke Circuit
Court judge, except insofar as juvenile and mandate matters are
concerned.

It is not disputed that in the case now before us, Commissioner
Matsey’s acts came within the scope of powers granted by § 33-4-1-74.4.
The Smith dissolution proceeding has been handled from its inception
in all respects by Matsey. Prior to our issuance of the temporary writ
of mandate, Judge McLaughlin was not involved in the Smith
dissolution.

The legislature also has passed very similar statutes applicable to

[| 489

the circuit courts of Vanderburgh and St. Joseph Counties. In fact,
the Vanderburgh and St. Joseph Circuit Courts and their respective
judges have petitioned for leave to appear as amici curiae, and have
tendered briefs as amici in defense of the constitutionality of the
statutes applicable to their counties. Ind. Code §§ 33-4-1-82.1 et seq.
(Burns Supp. 1980) provides for the appointment of a master commis-
sioner for the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, and establishes his powers
and duties. These provisions are very similar in language, and iden-
tical in effect, to the statutes pertaining to Starke County. The key
Janguage for our purposes is found in §§ 33-4-1-82.1 and 33-4-1-82.2. These
sections state:

“Vanderburgh County—Master commissioner—Appointment—
Qualifications.— The judge of the Vanderburgh Circuit Court may
appoint a master commissioner, who must be a competent attorney
in good standing and a resident of the county after his appoint-
ment. The master commissioner's appointment must be in writing.
The master commissioner continues in office until removed by the
judge. § 33-4-1-82.2. Vanderburgh County—Powers and duties of
master commissioner.—(a) A master commissioner of the Vander-
burgh Circuit Court may administer all oaths and affirmations re-
quired by law, take and certify affidavits and depositions, and issue
subpoenas for witnesses whose testimony is to be taken before
him. The master commissioner has the same power to compel the
attendance of witnesses and to punish contempts as the judge of
the court has. The master commissioner may conduct preliminary
hearings in criminal matters and issue search warrants and ar-
rest warrants and fix bond thereon.

(b) If empowered by the judge of the court, the master commis-
sioner may exercise full jurisdiction over any probate matters,
civil matters, or criminal matters, and he may enforce court rules.
However, only the judge may exercise jurisdiction over juvenile
matters.”

In addition, § 33-4-1-82.4, like its Starke County counterpart, provides
that the power of judicial mandate shall remain in the regular judge
of the Vanderburgh Circuit Court. These provisions were passed by
our legislature in 1977, as part of the same enactment which created
the position of Starke Circuit Court Master Commissioner. Acts 1977,
P.L. 814, §§ 8-13, p. 1452.

Ind. Code § 33-4-1-75.1 concerns the appointment of a master com-

490 ee
PO

missioner for the St. Joseph Circuit Court, and lists his powers and
duties. Subsections (a), (b) and (ce) provides:

“St. Joseph County—Master Commissioner.—(a) Subject to
subsection (j), the judge of the St. Joseph circuit court may ap-
point a master commissioner, who must be a competent attorney
in good standing and a resident of the county after his appoint-
ment. The master commissioner’s appointment must be in writing.
The master commissioner continues in office until removed by the
judge.

(b) A master commissioner of the St. Joseph circuit court may
administer all oaths and affirmations required by law, take and
certify affidavits and depositions, and issue subpoenas for
witnesses whose testimony is to be taken before him. The master
commissioner has the same power to compel the attendance of
witnesses and to punish contempts as the judge of the court has.
The master commmissioner may conduct preliminary hearings in
criminal matters and issue search warrants and arrest warrants
and fix bond thereon.

(c) If empowered by the judge of the court, the master commis-
sioner may exercise full jurisdiction over any probate matters,
civil matters, or criminal matters, and he may enforce court rules.”

Notably, in contrast to the parallel provisions applying to Starke and
Vanderburgh Counties, there is nothing in subsection (b), supra, which
restricts the St. Joseph Circuit Court Commissioner’s powers to act
in juvenile matters.

A second distinction between the provisions applying to St. Joseph
County and those applying to Starke and Vanderburgh Counties is
found in §§ 33-4-1-75.1(d). This subsection provides:

“(d) The judge of the court may limit any of the rights or powers

of the commissioner specified in subsection (b), (c) or (e), and the

judge may specifically determine the duties of the commissioner,

within the limits estabished in subsections (b), (c) and (e).”
A practical construction of all of the statutes involved affecting these
three counties, however, indicates that the circuit court judges in each
of the counties could, under these statutes, restrict the powers of the
commissioner in the fashion stated in § 33-4-1-75.1(d).

Although not crucial for our purposes, a third difference between
the statute controlling St. Joseph Circuit Court Commissioner and those

P| 491

directing such operations in Starke and Vanderburgh Counties is found
in subsections (j) and (k). These subsections provide that no appoint-
ment of a commissioner shall occur after December 31, 1986, and that
the position of master commissioner shall expire on January 1, 1987.
No such limitations are found in the statutes referring to Starke and
Vanderburgh Counties. Finally, § 33-4-1-75.1(f) provides that the St.
Joseph Court Master Commissioner, like his counterparts in Starke
and Vanderburgh Counties, shall have no power of judicial mandate.

Thus, it is clear that the legislature has passed substantially similar
statutes providing for the appointment of master commissioners in
Starke, Vanderburgh and St. Joseph Counties. Relator here, of course,
challenges only the sections pertaining to Starke County. However,
due to the importance of this challenge and the obvious effect our result
will have on the statutes which apply to Vanderburgh and St. Joseph
Counties, we have granted the petitions for leave to appear amici curiae
and will pass on the constitutionality of their relevant statutes as well.

The language and effect of these statutes touch upon several con-
stitutional provisions which relate to the operation of the courts of
this State. Article seven, section one provides:

“The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, one Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts, and such other courts
as the General Assembly may establish.”

Article seven, section seven states:

“The State shall, from time to time, be divided into judicial cir-
cuits; and a Judge for each circuit shall be elected by the voters
thereof. He shall reside within the circuit and shall have been duly
admitted to practice law by the Supreme Court of Indiana; he shall
hold his office for a term of six years, if he so long behaves well.”

In addition, article seven, section eight provides that the circuit courts
“shall have such civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be prescribed
by law.” Further, article two, section fourteen establishes the date for
general elections to be held, with an additional provision that the
legislature may establish separate elections for judges. Finally, article
five, section eighteen states:

“When, during the recess of the General Assembly, a vacancy

492 a
ee

shall happen in any office, the appointment to which is vested in
the General Assembly; or when, at any time, a vacancy shall have
occurred in any other State office, or in the office of Judge of any
court; the Governor shall fill such vacancy, by appointment, which
shall expire, when a successor shall have been elected and
qualified.” [emphasis added]

When these various constitutional provisions are read together, a
number of important principles emerge which are relevant to the case
now before us. The State Constitution provides for the crea-

Hs tion of a Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Circuit Courts.
The power to create additional courts of general jurisdiction

lies in our legislature, and the legislature may establish such courts
as it deems appropriate. See Elkhart County Board Comm. v. Albright,
(1907) 168 Ind. 564, 81 N.E. 578; Shoultz v. McPheeters, (1881) 79 Ind.
878. The judges of such courts must be elected, or, if a vacancy occurs
in the office of such judge, that vacancy shall be filled by appointment
by the governor, until a successor is elected. See In re Petition for Ap-
pointment of Magistrates of Beech Grove, (1940) 216 Ind. 417, 24 N.E.2d
773; State ex rel Gleason v. Gerdink, (1909) 173 Ind. 245, 90 N.E. 70.

In Shoultz v. McPhetters, supra, we were presented with a situation
similar to the one we face here. Our legislature, in 1881, passed a series
of statutes pertaining to the appointment of master commissioners.
Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.) ch. 38 was entitled: “An act concerning pro-
ceedings in civil cases.” This enactment, of course, established the code
of civil procedure. Section 412 of chapter 38 required circuit court judges
to appoint at least one master commissioner, and empowered them to
appoint as many as they deemed necessary to assist them. Sections
415 and 418 established the limited powers that such a commissioner
would have:

“Sec. 415. Such master commissioners are empowered to ad-
minister oaths and affirmations which are required by law; to take
and certify affidavits and depositions; to issue subpoenas for
witnesses whose testimony is to be taken before them, and shall
have the same power to compel the attendance of witnesses and
punish contempts, as is given to Justices of the Peace.

. “Sec. 418. Such master commissioners shall have the powers and
discharge the duties herein mentioned, which have heretofore been

P| 493
—

performed by masters in chancery, so far as the same may be con-
sistent with existing laws.”

The statutes at issue in Shouliz v. McPheeters, however, was § 419 of
chapter 38. That section provided:

“Whenever the office of judge shall become vacant, or, in case
of the absence of all the judges competent to act, or whenever
such judge or judges, by reason of interest, is or are incompetent
to act, or unable by reason of sickness, such master commissioner
shall have all the power of any judge in vacation, to grant restrain-
ing orders, injunctions, writs of habeas corpus, and writs of exeat,
and to appoint receivers, and hear and determine all motions and
matter, and make all orders concerning the same.”

In the Shoultz case, the appellant had applied to a master commissioner
for a writ of habeas corpus. The statute quoted above clearly allowed
for such a petition to be made to the master commissioner. This sec-
tion was challenged as a delegation of judicial powers beyond the scope
permitted by the Indiana Constitution.

In answering this contention, this Court first noted the
Ho origin and independent nature of judicial power. Article seven,
section one of the Indiana Constitution, at the time of the

Shoultz case, provided:

“The judicial powers of the State shall be vested in a Supreme
Court, circuit courts, and such other courts as the General
Assembly may establish.”

We noted that our constitution’s use of the word “court” means “judicial
tribunals presided over by a judge or judges.” Shoultz v. McPheeters,
supra, 79 Ind. at 376. Thus, we concluded that “[t]hroughout all the
constitutional provisions runs the controlling idea that a court cannot
exist without a judge. The legislature may establish courts, but can-
not vest the judicial power in any other tribunal.” Id.

In light of this premise, it was necessary in Shoultz to
WBME further discern what acts and powers are, in fact, judicial in
nature. We stated:

“ ‘Judicial acts, within the meaning of the Constitution of In-
diana, are such as are performed in the exercise of judicial power.
But the judicial power of this State is vested in courts. A judicial

494 ee
—

act, then, must be an act performed by a court, touching the rights
of of parties, or property, brought before it by voluntary appearance.

Id. at 877, quoting Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, (1861) 17 Ind. 169,
173. We further described judicial acts, as distinguished from non-
judicial acts, in this fashion:

“The power to hear causes and report facts or conclusions to
the court for its judgment is not judicial within the meaning of
the Constitution.

‘It is the inherent authority not only to decide, but to make bind-
ing orders or judgments, which constitutes judicial power; and
the instrumentalities used to inform the tribunal, whether left to
its own choice or fixed by law, are merely auxiliary to that power,
and operate on persons or things only through its actions, and
by virtue of it.’”
Id. at 378, quoting Underwood v. McDuffee, (1867) 15 Mich. 361, 368.
Clearly, in light of these principles, a master commissioner can act as
an “instrumentality” to inform and assist the court by conducting hear-
ings and reporting facts or conclusions to the court, but only the court
has “the inherent authority not only to decide, but to make binding
orders or judgments. . . .” Id. See Ind. R. Tr. P. 53. Cf. Ind. Code
§ 34-1-25-1 et seq. (Burns 1973), repealed by Acts 1969, ch. 191, § 3, p. 546.

Yet, the statute at issue in Shouliz questionably purported to confer
authority on master commissioners to exercise powers which are strict-
ly judicial in quality. Section 419 clearly stated that a master commis-
sion was to have

“all the power of any judge in vacation, to grant restraining orders,
injunctions, writs of habeas corpus, and writs of ne exeat, and
to appoint receivers, and hear and detrmine all motions and mat-
ters, and make all orders concerning the same.”

This Court asserted:

“A master commissioner is not a court, and judicial duties which
courts only can exercise, can not be conferred upon him. This seems
so plain upon principle that the support of authority is not needed.”

Shoultz v. McPheeters, supra, T9 Ind. at 376. We concluded, in light
of the constitutional principles stated above, that “judicial powers can

Le 495
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not be vested in officers, such as master commissioners, appointed by
judges of the courts.” Id. at 375. Thus, section 419, quoted above, was
held to be unconstitutional in Shoultz.

In striking down § 419, we distinguished §§ 415 and 418, which con-
ferred to master commissioners only non-judicial powers. The perfor-
mance by a master commissioner of the types of acts found in §§ 415
and 418 does not amount to the exercise of judicial power by a body
other than a constitutional court created by our legislature.’

There are striking and compelling similarities between the Shouliz
case and the case now before us. The statutes in question here, per-
taining to Starke, Vanderburgh and St. Joseph Counties, attempt to
confer similarly broad powers on the master commissioners of the
respective circuit courts. The sections in question authorize the master
commissioner, if so empowered by the circuit court judge, to, inter alia,
“exercise full jurisdiction over any probate matters, civil matters, or
criminal matters.” Potentially, the only limitations on his power con-
cern juvenile matters and matters of judicial mandate. See, ¢.g.,
§§ 83-4-1-74.4; 33-4-1-74.6.

1. Notably, §§ 415 and 418 remained a part of our law until recently. Ind. Code
§§ 84-1-25-1— 34-1.25-3 (Burns 1973) represented, with certain amendments, the codified
version of §§ 412, 415, and 418 of Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.) ch. 38. With the adoption of
the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure in 1969, these sections, along with many other
provisions of the Civil Code of 1881, were repealed, effective January 1, 1970. Acts
1969, ch. 191, § 3, p. 546 (approved March 13, 1969). However, Acts 1969, ch. 483, §§
18, p. 1824 (approved March 15, 1969), specifically amend §§ 412, 415 and 418. Moreover,
§ 6 of chapter 433 states that “an emergency exists for the immediate taking effect
of this action,” and, therefore, that these sections shall be in full force and effect from
and after their passage. Thus, these amendments took effect on March 15, 1969; the
repealing act, by its terms, did not take effect until January 1, 1970. Clearly, then, §§
412, 415 and 418, codified as §§ 84-1-25-1-341.25-3, were in effect from Mareh 15, 1969
until January 1, 1970.

However, we believe the legislature intended to supercede §§ 84-1-25-1—34-1-258.
The Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure undertook to totally revise and update our pro-
cedural rules. Thus, many sections which had been part of the 1881 civil code were
repealed. See Acts 1969, ch. 191, § 3, p. 546. One of the rules adopted as part of the
Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure is Trial Rule 53, which covers the same general sub-
ject matter as §§ 34-125-1—34-1.253. The act which repealed the latter statutes was
approved before the amendments, but took effect after the amendments. Thus, the see-
tions were validly amended, because they were still in effect when amended. Never-
theless, they were specifically repealed by an act which took effect subsequent to the
amendments. Therefore, while we maintain our approval of the type of master commis-
sioner powers found in §§ 84-1-25-1—34-125-3, we recognize that those particular sec-
tions have been repealed. See Ind. R. Tr. P. 53. See generally State v. Bridenhager, (1972)
257 Ind. 699, 279 N.E. 24 794.

496 es
Pd

Further, these statutes provide vastly greater opportunities for the
master commissioner's exercise of such powers than did the statute
in question in Shoultz v. McPheeters, supra. In Shouliz, the statute per-
mitted the commissioner to exercise jurisdiction only when the regular
judge was absent, incompetent, or unable to act by reason of illness.
The statutes now before us, however, authorize the commissioner to
perform his duties on a full-time basis; he acts independently of the
regular judge, and does not depend on the regular judge’s absence or
inability to act for the statutorily-given authorization to perform various
judicial tasks.

Therefore, on the authority of Shoultz v. McPheeters, we conclude

that § 33-4-1-74.4(b), § 33-4-1-75.1(c), and § 38-4-1-82.2(b) are constitutionally

infirm because they attempt to authorize the performance of

I plainly judicial acts by the master commissioner. Such judicial

acts, by our well established principles, may be performed only

by judges. “[J]udicial powers cannot be vested in officers, such as master

commissioners, appointed by the judges of the courts.” Shoultz v.
McPheeters, supra, 79 Ind. at 375.

Also underlying our decision here are article five, section eighteen,
and article seven, section one, of our Constitution. The former provi-
sion clearly states that a vacancy in the office of judge of any court
is to be filled by appointment by the governor, such appointment to
expire “when a successor shall have been elected and qualified.” This
provision applies to courts of general jurisdiction. In re Petition for
Appointment of Magistrates of Beech Grove, (1940) 216 Ind. 417, 24N.E.2d
113; State ex rel. Gleason v. Gerdink, (1909) 173 Ind. 245, 90 N.E.70.
The statutes under consideration, by their effect, create offices with
virtually the same authority and powers as constitutional courts of
general jurisdiction. See Ind. Const. art. 7, § 1; art. 5, § 18. The master
commissioner of such a “court” is given virtually unlimited powers to
act in a clearly judicial capacity; the statutes extend his authority as
far as that of the circuit court judge, except concerning juvenile and
mandate matters. These two limitations on the commissioner's powers
do not cireumscribe and meaningfully limit his authority and jurisdic-
tion to the point where we could consider his office as less than
equivalent to a “constitutional court” having a “general and state
character.” In re Petition for Appointment of Magistrates of Beech Grove,

P| 497
ee

supra, 216 Ind. at 425, 24 N.E.2d at 776. Further, his actions in a given
case are subject to no direct control, oversight or review by the circuit
judge. In spite of this grant of broad powers, a master commissioner
under these statutes is neither elected by the voters nor appointed
by the governor; he is appointed by the circuit court judge and serves
at his pleasure.

Thus, we conclude these statutes are constitutionally deficient in
this respect: they establish an office having authority virtually equiv-
alent to that of a constitutional court of general jurisdiction.
[Insofar as they attempt to establish additional courts for the
respective counties, the statutes reflect a proper exercise of
legislative authority. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 1. See Elkhart County Bd.
Comm. v. Albright, (1907) 168 Ind. 564, 81 N.E. 578. See also Ind. Const.
art. 7, § 8. However, the judge of such a “court,” which, by virtue of
the powers given to them by the statutes, is what the master commis-
sioner would be, must be elected by the voters or, if a vacancy occurs
in that office, appointed by the governor. Our constitution clearly
reflects the intent to maintain as elected officers the judges of courts
having general jurisdiction. Ind. Const. art. 2, § 14; art. 5, § 18; art.
7, § 7; In re Petition for Appointment of Magistrates of Beech Grove,
supra; State ex rel. Gleason v. Gerdink, supra; Shoultz v. McPheeters,
supra.

Stated conversely, the appointment of a master commissioner by

a circuit court judge is not necessarily constitutionally improper.
However, a commissioner who is selected in this manner must

Hs have substantially fewer powers and duties than those
granted by the statutes in question. Under the constitutional
principles outlined above, an appointed officer of this type must have
significantly limited jurisdiction, or his authority must be confined to
the performance of non-judicial acts. In re Petition for Appointment
of Magistrates of Beech Grove, supra; State ex rel. Gleason v. Gerdink,
supra; Shoultz v. McPheeters, supra. See Ind. R. Tr. P. 53; Ind. Code
§ 84-1-25-1 et seg. (Burns 1973) cited with approval in Shoultz v.
McPheeiers, supra, repealed by Acts 1969, ch. 191, § 3, p. 546. The
statutes in question clearly attempt to grant judicial powers and
authority beyond such constitutional limitations. Therefore, we declare

498 |
Ped

the following sections unconstitutional: Ind. Code §§ 88-4-1-74.4(b);
38-4-1-82.2(b); and 38-4-1-75.1(c) (Burns Supp. 1980).
We realize our holding here will raise questions concerning
judgments already entered by the master commissioners in these
counties. In Gordy v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 275, 283, 315 N.E.2d
HB 362, 367, this Court disposed of a similar question with the
following language:

“The Commissioner did not merely usurp this authority and set
up a mock court. He heard the case in the Lake Criminal Court,
which clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as
over the person of defendant. The Commissioner was acting as
judge, a duty he clearly may assume under the statute if his ap-
pointment is procedurally correct. Both parties submitted to his
authority as a judge and neither questioned this authority until
this appeal was initiated. Thus, he was operating under color of
authority, and served as a judge de facto if not as a judge de jure.
His authority as a judge de facto may not be raised on appeal for
the first time. Hvans v. Rutherford (1921) 76 Ind. App. 366, 371,
181 N.E. 55; Perry v. Pernet, (1905) 165 Ind. 67, 70, 74 N.E. 690;
Lillie v. Trentman, (1891) 130 Ind. 16, 20-21, 29 N.E. 405; Crawford
vy. Lawrence, (1900) 154 Ind. 288, 290, 56 N.E. 673; Pattison v.
Hogston, (1927) 90 Ind.App. 59, 68, 157 N.E. 450, 158 N.E. 516;
Wallace v. Village of Manchester, (6th Cir. 1970) 434 F.2d 241, 242;
Norton v. County of Shelby, (1886) 118 U.S. 425, 441-42, 6 S.Ct. 1121,
1125, 30 L.Ed. 178.”

Just as in Gordy v. State, the commissioners here have acted as de
facto judges. Therefore, this holding shall have only prospective ap-
plication, and shall apply to or affect only cases which have not yet
reached final judgment or have not yet had a ruling on the motion to
correct error.

As a point of clarification, we emphasize that our holding and opin-
ion here do not affect the validity of or current practice under: Ind.
Code § 31-6-9-2 (Burns 1980 Repl.), concerning juvenile court

I referees; Ind. Code § 29-2-2-1 et seg. (Burns Supp. 1980), con-
cerning probate commissioners; Ind. R. Tr. P. 53, concerning

the appointment of masters in individual cases; or Ind. R. Sm. Cl. 14,
relating to the appointment of commissioners in small claims cases.
See In re Public Law No. 305 and Public Law No. 809, (1975) 263 Ind.
506, 334 N.E.2d 659. It is our opinion that those statutes and rules do

Pe 499
PL

not grant those officers greater powers than are constitutionally
permissible.

Finally, we must determine the appropriate disposition of the Starke
Circuit Court proceedings from which this original action arose. The
record before us reveals that petitioner Roger Lee Smith filed his
praecipe and notice under Trial Rule 53.1 more than thirty days after
the filing of his motion to strike. The record also shows that the mo-
tion to strike was not ruled upon by the judge within thirty days, as
required under that rule. Therefore, the Starke Circuit Court Clerk
shall withdraw the submission of the Smith case and proceed accord-
ingly under Trial Rule 53.1, whereupon this Court shall appoint a special
judge for these proceedings. In this case, petitioner Smith has the right
to have these dissolution proceedings adjudged by the special judge.
Writ of Mandate made permanent.

Judgment accordingly.
All Justices concur.

Note—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 1115.

JOHN FREDERICK THOMAS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 5778346, Filed March 24, 1981.]

500 |
Pd

David Keckley, of South Bend, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— Appellant Thomas was found guilty of robbery and kid-
napping in 1966. He appealed from this conviction and was granted
a new trial. Thomas v. State, (1969) 251 Ind. 546, 242 N.E.2d 919.

On March 27, 1969, after remand, the State filed additional charges.
Upon retrial Thomas was found guilty of accessory after the fact to
theft, and accessory after the fact to kidnapping. He was sentenced
to a one-to-ten year term of imprisonment on the charge of accessory
after the fact of theft, and life on accessory after the fact of kidnapp-
ing. The office of the Public Defender of Indiana filed a belated motion
to correct errors on behalf of Thomas and appealed. This Court affirmed
the conviction. Thomas v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 590, 321 N.E.2d 194.

Appellant filed a pro se petition for Post Conviction Relief on January
21, 1976. Counsel was appointed and after a hearing the trial court
denied this petition on October 29, 1976. This appeal followed.

Appellant states claims of error which relate to the fact that after
remand, at his second trial, the State filed additional accessory charges.
He claims that it is improper and a violation of due process of law and
common law to charge a person with being the principal in a crime
and also with being an accessory after the fact to the same crime. He

P| 501
a

claims that the “delay” of two years and seven months between the
offense and the filing of accessory charges was unreasonable and fun-
damentally unfair. He also claims that the jurisdiction of the trial court
was improper, and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
at trial and on appeal.

All of these matters set forth in the Post Conviction Relief Petition
were known to Thomas at trial and on direct appeal. However, he
couples his claims with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
which he asserts that all of the above claims he makes now should have
been asserted at the trial and appellate level. He acknowledges that
they were not made before but claims that he repeatedly asked his
counsel to do so and that this amounts to ineffective assistance of
counsel. The State Public Defender’s office stated to Thomas that they
would not advance these alleged errors on appeal because they were
without merit. We agree.

1

Thomas had been charged as a principal and granted a new trial.
Thomas v. State, (1969) 251 Ind. 546, 242 N.E.2d 919. Two months
after that opinion was handed down, the State filed the addi-
Hl tional accessory charges. These charges were filed before the
expiration of the five year period of limitations then in effect
for filing felony charges, Burns 9-304, IC 1971 § 35-1-3-4 (repealed 1976).
Petitioner claims that the delay in filing these charges caused substan-
tial prejudice to his right to a fair trial. However, he cites no facts
in support of this statement. It is also obvious that it was not
unreasonable for the State to delay filing any additional charges until
the decision granting a new trial was made. There is no error on this
issue.

I.

On remand the State filed two additional charges of accessory after
the fact of robbery and accessory after the fact of kidnapping. It was
not error to charge appellant as principal as well as an acces-

Hs sory. This claim and argument has been disposed of in Riggen-
bach v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 322, 397 N.E.2d 953. In Riggenbach,

supra, appellant claimed she was unduly burdened and prejudiced by

502 |
Pd

having to defend against “two inconsistent theories of prosecution”
when she was charged with first degree murder and with accessory
before the fact of murder in the first degree. Relying on Vaughn v.
State, (1978) 269 Ind. 142, 878 N.E.2d 859, which involved a defendant
charged with both premeditated murder and premeditated killing of
a police officer we held, “The question of whether the prosecution should
be compelled to elect between counts, when these counts grow out of
the same transaction, is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
Riggenbach, swpra, 397 N.E.2d 953, 955. In the present case, the two
additional charges of accessory were filed on or about March 27, 1969.
The trial was postponed until September 17, 1969. Thus, there could
have been no surprise involved in having to defend against both counts.
We fail to see how appellant was prejudiced by the allowing of these
two counts to be filed. Riggenbach v. State, supra; Moses v. State, (1978)
269 Ind. 698, 382 N.E.2d 934. There is no error on this issue.

In.

Thomas also alleges that venue was improper and complains because
his counsel did not argue this point. He bases his contention on language
that appeared in the opinion issued on his second appeal. He claims
that this language states that his act in replacing a license plate was
the positive physical act which allowed the jury to reach their verdict
of guilty. This act took place in the State of Michigan. Appellant claims
that therefore, venue in Indiana was improper and that his conviction
is unconstitutional because it violated Article I, § 13 of the Indiana
Constitution which states that the trial shall be in the county in which
the offense shall have been committed. Again, no objection was made
at trial or on appeal. Appellant claims that this further shows the inef-
fectiveness of his counsel. There is no merit to this claim. The exact
Janguage of the opinion related to a claim of insufficiency of the evidence
and reads as follows:

“The first issue is whether or not the evidence was sufficient
to allow the jury to find that Defendant harbored, concealed, or
assisted the principals with the intent that they escape from detec-
tion, capture, arrest or punishment. The evidence, from that point
of view most favorable to the State, is that Defendant and one
Jacobs and one Gardner were driving around trying to decide upon
an establishment to rob. They decided to rob the Bank City Oil

[| 508
Po

gas station. However, Defendant feared that he would be recog-
nized by an employee so he was dropped off at the Doghouse
Tavern two blocks from the gas station. Jacobs and Gardner took
money from the attendant and ordered ‘him into the back seat of
the car. Jacobs and Gardner then picked the Defendant up at the
tavern and drove down a country road where the attendant, after
having been required to strip, was let out. The three then drove
toa side road in Michigan and, while Gardner put the attendant’s
clothes in some bushes, Defendant put the license plate, which
Gardner had removed prior to the holdup, back on the car. They
then drove to the mobile home where they were staying and split
the money three ways. Defendant’s share was about $15.00. Defen-
dant’s course of conduct before and after the crimes indicates an
adoption and confirmation of the plan and execution of the crimes.
The positive physical act of replacing the removed license plate
is sufficient probative evidence to allow a jury to infer that he
intentionally assisted the principals in their attempt to escape
detection and apprehension. Walker v. State, (1964) 246 Ind. 386,
204 N.E.2d 850.”

262 Ind. 590 at 591-92, 321 N.E.2d 194 at 195.

Read in context, it is apparent that this language did not limit the

determination of the sufficiency of evidence of appellant’s participation

or conduct to the single act in Michigan. Rather, it is clear that

Hl his conduct before and after the crime and his act in Michigan

were all related to the robbery committed in St. Joseph

County, Indiana. The basis for venue in Indiana was sufficient. Pollard

v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 599, 388 N.E.2d 496; Conrad v. State, (1974) 262

Ind. 446, 317 N.E.2d 789. See also McCabe v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 196,
396 N.E.2d 895.

Iv.

Appellant also claims that because the issues raised now were not
raised as error by his trial and appellate counsels those attorneys were
ineffective. He claims that it was error for his trial counsel not to ob-
ject during cross-examination at his first trial and that there was error
in a cautionary instruction which was offered.

There is a strong presumption that an attorney has properly dis-
charged his duties to his client, and strong and convincing proof is

504 |
po

required to overcome this presumption. To prevail on this

Il issue, the appellant must show that what the attorney did

or did not do made the proceedings a mockery of justice shock-

ing to the conscience of the court. Willis v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 10,

401 N.E.2d 683, 685; Duncan v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 614, 400 N.E.2d

1112; Ottman v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 262, 397 N.E.2d 273; Herman v.
State, (1979) 271 Ind. 680, 395 N.H.2d 249.

The instances of ineffectiveness cited by the defendant here con-
stitute trial strategy, and we have consistently held that we will not
substitute our judgment for that of counsel. Willis v. State, supra,
McFarland v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 527, 381 N.E.2d 1061. The record
in this case does not support petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.

Judgment affirmed.
All Justices concur.
NotTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 1124.

DECTRICK RASPBERRY v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 5808149. Filed March 24, 1981.]

Pe 505

Charles H. Graddick, of Gary, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney Generals, Kathleen
G. Lucas, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Hunter, J.—The defendant, Dectrick Raspberry, was charged with
first-degree murder on June 30, 1976. He was found guilty by a jury
of second-degree murder, Ind. Code § 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975) and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. On September 10, 1980, he was granted
permission to file this belated appeal which raises the following issues.

1. Whether the trial court erred in giving its instruction number
9 on voluntary intoxication;

2. Whether the trial court erred in not determining the volun-
tariness of defendant's statement outside the presence of the jury;

8. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s ver-
dict; and

4, Whether the trial court erred in not directing a verdict on behalf
of the defendant.

A summary of the facts from the record most favorable to the state
shows that on the evening of May 21, 1976, defendant was riding around
Gary, Indiana, as a passenger in a car driven by Sam Taylor. Another
passenger was riding in the front seat and defendant was sitting in
the back seat and was holding a shotgun. Taylor pulled up to the curb
on Nineteenth Avenue where he saw a group of people standing and

talking. Several shots were fired from the car, then Taylor sped off.
The shots struck two men who were standing at the curb. One of the
men, Howard Bandy, subsequently died of the shotgun wounds.

L

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in giving its final
instruction number nine on voluntary intoxication. He contends that
the instruction was incomplete and erroneous. The instruction correctly
informed the jurors that voluntary intoxication is not normally a defense
in a criminal proceeding. However, the instruction did not further in-
form the jurors that voluntary intoxication may be a defense when
the crime charged involves specific intent, and the defendant has shown
that he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of entertaining the re-
quired specific intent.

We find defendant’s argument must fail for several reasons. The
record does not show that a specific objection to this instruction
was made in the trial court. Defendant did not tender any
H__instruction of his own stating the complete law concerning
the defense of voluntary intoxication and he did not set forth
the complained of instruction with specificity in his motion to correct
errors. All of these actions are necessary to preserve an alleged error
on appeal. Jacks v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 611, 394 N.E.2d 166; Mireles
v. State, (1978) 261 Ind. 64, 300 N.E.2d 350; Spivey v. State, (1971) 257
Ind. 257, 274 N.E.2d 227.

Furthermore, any alleged error in the omission of the complete in-
struction must be deemed harmless since the jury found defendant
guilty of murder in the second degree rather than murder
I_sin the first degree as charged. We have clearly held that
specific intent it not an element of second-degree murder.

Kriete v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 381, 332 N.E.2d 209.

Il.

Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred by admitting his
statement into evidence without first determining the voluntariness
of the statement outside the presence of the jury. Again, con-

Il sideration of this issue has been waived because it was not
raised with specificity in defendant’s motion to correct errors.

Le 507
PF

The alleged error is set forth as follows:

“2. That the Court permitted an error of law in the conduct of

the trial by allowing the admission of inadmissible evidence.”
This general assertion of error constitutes a waiver of defendant’s right
to challenge the admission of the evidence, since it lacks the specificity
necessary to preserve the question for appeal. Ind. R. Tr. P. 59(D);
Spivey v. State, supra; Moore v. State, (1979) 182 Ind.App. 552, 395 N.E.2d
1280.

Il.

Defendant next alleges that there was insufficient evidence to sus-
tain the jury’s verdict. Our disposition of this issue is governed by
a well-settled standard and scope of review. This Court does
Hs not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses
and will consider only that evidence most favorable to the
state and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When there is
substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the
offense, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed. Wofford v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 518, 394 N.E.2d 100; Poindeater v. State, (1978) 268 Ind.
167, 374 N.E.2d 509. On review, this Court does not have to find that
circumstantial evidence is adequate to overcome every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence but only that an inference may reasonably be
drawn therefrom which supports the finding of the jury. Hall v. State,
(1980) 273 Ind. 507, 405 N.E.2d 530.

In order to sustain a conviction for second-degree murder, there must

be proof that the killing was purposeful and malicious. Ind. Code

§ 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975); Faust v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 640,

I (366 N.E.2d 175. It is permissible for the jury to infer these

elements from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely

to cause death. Brown v. State, (1975) 264 Ind. 40, 338 N.E.2d 498; Chat-
man v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 581, 334 N.E.2d 673.

Here, the evidence shows that defendant was armed with a shotgun
and was riding in the back seat of an automobile with the gun pointed
out the window just as the car approached a group of people. At least
three witnesses claimed that “about four or five” shots came from the
car. Defendant claimed that the gun accidently discharged while he
was trying to reload it. However, a jury could properly infer that it

508 Le

would be unlikely for a 12 gauge pump shot gun to accidently discharge
several times in succession. Other testimony revealed that there had
been previous violence between a group of defendant’s friends and
members of another gang who were standing at the location of the
shooting. This was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that
defendant used a deadly weapon in a purposeful and malicious manner
likely to cause death and therefore was guilty of second-degree murder.

Defendant further argues that his state of intoxication was so great
that he was not capable of forming any specific intent or any purpose
to support his actions. As we have indicated above, specific intent is
not an element of second-degree murder. Kriete v. State, supra. Both
malice and purpose may be inferred by the jury from the cireumstances
of the crime or the nature of the attack upon the victim. Morris v. State,
(1979) 270 Ind. 245, 384 N.E.2d 1022. It is clear from the facts adduced
at trial that the nature of the attack was malicious and purposeful.
Furthermore, defendant's actions following the shooting, which included
inquiring about his hospitalized mother’s health, putting the gun in
the garage, and proceeding to his girlfriend’s house to spend the night,
showed that he was not too intoxicated to be capable of purposeful
and malicious action. Since there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s verdict, that verdict must not be disturbed.

Iv.

Defendant finally alleges that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for directed verdict made at the close of the state’s case in chief
on the basis of insufficient evidence. No further discussion of this issue
is necessary since we have found above that there was sufficient
evidence to support the verdict.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
DeBruler, J. concurs in result.

NotTE—Reported at 417 N.E.2d 913.

WENDELL W. DAVIS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 180814. Filed March 26, 1981.]

510 Ee

Barry L. Standley, of Evansville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney ( General, John Silk, Deputy Attorney
General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J—This is a direct appeal from a conviction for burglary,
class C felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1, and theft, class D felony, Ind. Code
§ 35-43-4-2. Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of eight years
and four years on the counts respectively.

Defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court
erred in denying a motion for a mistrial; and (2) whether the theft count
was supported by sufficient evidence.

We do not have jurisdiction of this case under Ind. R.App. P. 4(A)(7),
since no single sentence is greater than ten years. Menefee v. State, (1981)
275 Ind. 390, 417 N.E.2d 302. We do, however, exercise our
H_sinherent judicial authority and retain this case for disposi-
tion on the merits in light of the passage of time during which

it had pended in this Court.

The evidence favorable to the State shows that in the early morning
hours of April 10, 1979, appellant broke into a house on East Blackford
in Evansville while the owner of the house and her companion were
asleep in the bedroom, and stole the owner’s purse and seventeen
dollars in cash from the companion’s wallet.

L

Before the trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress, as irrelevant
and prejudicial, evidence that he was also a suspect in another break-
in one hour and twenty minutes later that morning on Henning, about
eight blocks away from the Blackford Avenue house. The court granted
the motion.

In the course of the trial, Officer Pointer, a crime scene technician
for the Evansville Police Department, was called as a witness for the
State. His testimony concerned his search, shortly after the break-in
oceurred, for physical evidence left by the intruder on East Blackford.

P| 511
Pd

He said that he had lifted partial fingerprints from the bedroom
doorknob but was unable to lift any fingerprints from the window the
intruder apparently used to enter the house, and the doorknob prints
were too poor in quality to be matched to defendant’s prints. During
this direct examination, the prosecution asked Officer Pointer why he
returned to the Blackford house a second time that morning. Pointer
replied:

A person had been apprehended at the address on Henning.

The general description of this person was close to the descrip-

tion that had been given by the lady on Blackford. We thought

it to be a good idea to take this person by to see if the two might
have been the same person on both offenses.

Appellant immediately moved for a mistrial because this testimony
introduced evidence that the trial court had ruled was inadmissible.
The trial court denied the motion but admonished the jury to disregard
the question and answer. Appellant urges us to reverse the conviction
because the admonition was insufficient to cure the prejudice created
in the minds of the jurors by evidence of his involvement in another
crime.

Appellant argues that his case is similar to White v. State, (1971)
257 Ind. 64, 272 N.E.2d 812, a case in which this Court reversed a theft
conviction because at trial a police officer testified, in answer to a ques-
tion regarding what the occasion was for his seeing the defendant,
“{t]hat’s when this man was brought into our department with reference
to an armed robbery case in our city.”

The appellant points to our holding in that case that the prejudice
engendered by the reference to another crime could not be cured by
an admonition, and to our discussion of the burden on the appellant
to show that he was harmed. We said:

The State apparently labors under the erroneous belief that
in such cases as these, the burden is upon the party claiming er-
ror to conclusively demonstrate that the error caused the verdict
to be what it was and that it would have been otherwise had the
error not occurred. True, the burden is upon him to show that
he was harmed; but this is done when it is made, by all the cireum-
stance, to appear that the error placed him in a position of grave
peril to which he should not have been subjected. 257 Ind. at 77-78,
272 N.E.2d at 319-20.

512 ee

In White it was apparent that the “sole purpose of calling the witness
was to wield the evidential harpoon, deliberately calculated

by counsel to prejudice the jury against the defendant and
his defense.” (Original emphasis.) 257 Ind. at 76.

We further said:

While this Court is generally reluctant to override the decision
of a trial judge in his determination that error was harmless, in
view of an admonition, we feel that where there are serious con-
flicts in the evidence entitling the jury to go either way upon the
issue of guilt or innocence, it is especially important that they
not be subjected to improper influences. In such a case, the defen-
dant should be given the benefit of reasonable doubts; and in a
case such as this, where the error was deliberately committed and
amounted to misconduct on the part of counsel, intervention
becomes more compelling. 257 Ind. at 76-77, 272 N.E.2d at 319.

In Hightower v. State, (1978) 260 Ind. 481, 296 N.E.2d 654, this Court
was confronted with a claim that admonitions to the jury were inade-
quate to cure prejudice and a motion for mistrial should have been
granted in a trial in which the prosecutor asked many leading ques-
tions and continually called for hearsay testimony. The defendant in
Hightower claimed that the very number of objections could taint the
fairness of the trial and mandate reversal irrespective of the fact that
the trial court had consistently ruled in defendant's favor and con-
sistently admonished the jury to disregard any improper evidence.

In that case we discussed different types of trial irregularities as
grounds for mistrial, distinguishing between those that concern
constitutional guarantees and highly prejudicial evidentiary

HEME harpoons on the one hand, and those that concern general
fairness in the trial proceedings on the other hand. We said:

When we are confronted with an appeal such as this... which
is grounded in general fairness and does not concern constitutional-
ly guaranteed rights or highly prejudicial evidentiary harpoons,
it would not be consistent with our function as an appellate court
if the mere existence of an arbitrary number of simple leading
questions or questions calling for hearsay answers would
automatically require us to search the record and insure that the
jury’s verdict corresponded to our general sense of fairness. We
cannot be called upon to substitute our sense of fairness for a jury's
sense of fairness on such elastic, arbitrary and general grounds.

[| 513
a

When irregularities such as this are the ground of the appeal there
should be a strong presumption that the jury was able to follow
the admonitions of the trial court to disregard any hastily given
evidence. In cases concerning an irregularity bearing on a con-
stitutionally secured right or concerning an evidentiary harpoon
we do undertake to assess the probable impact of the irregularity
on the final verdict of the jury and we do require a high level
of assurance that the irregularity did not affect the verdict before
we will affirm the judgment. However in cases involving simple
irregularities as here we may rely on a lower level of assurance
concerning the impact on the jury because the likelihood of their
effect on substantial rights is much less. If the appellant cannot
demonstrate to us that these irregularities have had a discerni-
ble and apparent effect on the verdict of the jury we will not under-
take to scrutinize the evidence at trial in relationship to the verdict
of the jury and subject it to a test of fairness. 260 Ind. at 488-89,
296 N.E.2d at 659.

Under this analysis, the testimony here involved more than “general

fairness” irregularities such as were present in Hightower.

At the same time, it is not the case here, as in White, that the witness
was called solely to wield the evidentiary harpoon. Officer Pointer gave
competent testimony concerning his search for physical evidence at
the Blackford house. The question that elicited the testimony at issue,
moreover, was not designed solely to bring in the inadmissible
testimony, but was apparently designed to establish that the return
trip to Blackford was to bring by a suspect for identification within
a short time after the crime had occurred.

In White we felt particularly compelled to override the trial court’s
determination that an admonition would suffice to cure any prejudice
because we found that the deliberate interjection of inadmissible
evidence of other crimes amounted to misconduct by the prosecution.
We did not, however, restrict our intervention to such blatant instances
of prosecutorial misconduct.

The gauge is not exclusively the way in which the testimony entered
the case but rather the probable impact of the irregularity on the
verdict. We require a high level of assurance that there was no

HB residuum of prejudice left after the jury was admonished. In
this case, the jury heard only a vague reference to “another
offense.” The defendant immediately asked to make a motion outside

Bid
Po

the presence of the jury. The jury was excused and a motion for mistrial
was made and argued. The trial court denied the motion and directed
the prosecutor to instruct his witnesses not to make any reference to
any specific address on Henning nor to make reference to any reason
for the apprehension of the defendant. When the jury returned to the
courtroom the trial judge addressed the jury as follows:

I sustained the objection to the last question that was asked
of Officer Pointer and am instructing you that you are to disregard
both the question, the answer, and any inference from it and you
are not to consider the question, the answer, and any inference
therefrom in your deliberations as to the innocence or guilt of the
defendant in this cause. .
He then polled the jurors individually, asking if there was anyone “who
thinks they could do that.” Each juror answered, “yes.” The trial .
proceeded.

As was the case in White, there was a serious confict of evidence.
Appellant presented an alibi witness who testified that appellant was
at his home at the time of the crime. The State presented one of the
burglary victims as an eyewitness who identified the appellant as the
intruder who stole her purse. She saw the appellant’s face in her lighted
bedroom when she was awakened by the intruder. Nevertheless, the
quality of the stricken testimony — the reference to “another offense” —
was not the same as that in White, where the reference was to the
defendant’s having been brought into a police station in reference to
an armed robbery case in the same city.

We do not believe, in light of the inadvertence of the remark, its
vagueness as to the defendant’s involvement in another crime,

Hand the admonition to and polling of the jurors, that the
testimony affected the verdict.

Il.

Appellant claims that the theft count is not supported by the evidence
and is contrary to law. He was charged with having committed theft
of lawful United States currency belonging to the house owner’s com-
panion. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will neither
weigh the evidence nor determine credibility, but we will examine the
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the ver-

Le 515
LC

dict. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction
will be affirmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence, direct or cir-
eumstantial, of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact
could infer that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover
v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 536, 255 N.E.2d 657.

Appellant argues that the evidence at trial failed to establish that
any lawful United States currency found in his possession when he
was arrested belonged to the companion. The evidence, he claims, raised
only a mere suspicion which could not warrant conviction. There was,
he says, no evidence presented that the intruder who fled was seen
in possession of or near the companion’s wallet.

The evidence included an unequivocal identification of the appellant
by the house owner as the man she saw at the foot of her bed. The
companion testified that he was sure he had a ten, a five and
Hone or two one dollar bills folded together in his wallet when
he went to sleep, and that this cash was missing when he
searched his wallet after the intruder awakened him. When the ap-
pellant was arrested two hours later, he was found to have a ten, a
five and two one dollar bills folded in his left front pocket. Ten dollars
in cash was found in his right pocket.
There was circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have
inferred that the appellant stole seventeen dollars from the companion.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NoTE—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 203.

MICHAEL BALES AND MELVIN HOLLEN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 678S100. Filed March 26, 1981.]

Timothy J. Burns, Lawrence O. Sells, of Indianapolis, for appellants.

Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General, Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— Michael Bales, Melvin W. Hollen and Ray D. Crawford
were charged by information in Marion Criminal Court with first degree
murder, Ind. Code § 35-13-4-1 (Burns 1975). Bales and Hollen were tried
toa jury in January and February of 1978. The charge against Crawford
was dismissed in exchange for his agreement to testify against Bales
and Hollen. The jury found Hollen guilty of involuntary manslaughter,
and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to an indeterminate
term of one to ten years. The jury found Bales guilty of second degree
murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term
of fifteen to twenty-five years. Bales’ and Hollen’s subsequent appeals
have been consolidated by this Court.

Appellant Bales presents two issues which, independently, require

P| 517
es

a reversal of the convictions of both Bales and Hollen. Therefore, we
shall dispose of those issues and three additional questions which may
arise on a subsequent retrial. Thus, the issues we shall consider on
this appeal concern: (1) whether the trial court erred in giving final
instruction number nineteen; (2) whether the trial court erred in giv-
ing final instruction number twenty-two; (3) whether the trial court
erroneously refused the defendants’ tendered final instruction number
three; (4) whether the trial court improperly permitted the jury to
separate after the case had been given to the jury for deliberation;
and (5) whether the trial court improperly communicated with the jury
outside the presence of the defendants or their counsel.

IL

Bales and Hollen, through their respective attorneys,
HB objected at trial to the giving? of final instruction number nine-
teen. This instruction concerns accessory liability, and reads

as follows:

“You are instructed that a statute of our State in full force and
effect reads as follows:

‘Every person who shall aid or abet in the commission of a
felony, or who shall counsel, encourage, hire, command, or
otherwise procure a felony to be committed may be charged
by indictment, or affidavit, tried and convicted in the same
manner as if he were a principal. .. .’
This statute covers all felonies in Indiana and therefore a defen-
dant can be held responsible if he either perpetrated the crime
or aided, abetted or encourgaged its commission. A defendant is
responsible for the acts of his confederates as well as his own.

The court instructs you, however, that the defendant can be
held responsible on the above theory only for acts before or dur-
ing the commission of the offense charged.”

1, Asa point of clarification, we note that none of the final instructions were ac-
tually read to the jury by the trial court. While all parties allegedly waived such a
reading, we have held that a failure or refusal to read the instructions to the jury is
clearly improper and, in iself, constitutes reversible error, even where the defendant
does not object to this procedure at trial. Foresta v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 658, 413 N.E.2d
889, 890; Drake v. Stade, (1979) 271 Ind. 400, 398 N.E.2d 148, 149; Williams v. State, (1978)
269 Ind. 430, 431, 381 N..2d 458; Purdy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 282, 289, 369 N.E.2d
688, 636. See Cameron v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 185, 383 N.E2d 1089, 1040, appeal after
remand, (1980) 274 Ind, 436, 412 N.E.2d 1194.

518 ee
EE

Record at 322.

This instruction correctly states the law. See Ind. Code § 35-1-29-1 (Burns

1975); Norton v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 635, 408 N.E.2d 514, 520-21.

Bales and Hollen objected on the ground that the evidence

Hs did not support this instruction. Without commenting in any

way on the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, we note that

there was adequate evidence on the question of whether Bales and/or

Hollen aided each other in the commission of the alleged acts, or coun-

selled, encouraged, hired, commanded or otherwise procured the other's

commission of the alleged acts, to justify the giving of an instruction
on accessory liability.

IL.

Appellant Bales contends the trial court erred in giving final instrue-
tion number twenty-two. This instruction provided:

“An individual who inflicts injury upon another may be found
guilty of homicide if the injury contributes to the death of that
other person.”

Record at 325. Bales argues the instruction should have stated:

“An individual who inflicts injury upon another is deemed by
law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately
or immediately to the death of that other person.”

Bales asserts, therefore, that the instruction given by the court
misstates the law. This assertion is incorrect. Bivins v. State, (1970)
254 Ind. 184, 188, 258 N.E.2d 644, 646. See Hicks v. State, (1937) 213
Ind. 277, 297, 11 N.E.2d 171, 179. Contrary to Bales’ contention, the
deletion of the words “mediately or immediately” from this principle
does not change the meaning of the instruction or render it an inac-
curate statement of law. Bivins v. State, supra; Hicks v. State, supra.

Tl.

Bales and Hollen next argue the trial court erred in refusing tendered
instruction number three regarding circumstantial evidence. This in-
struction provided:

“The Court further instructs you that the existence of any

material fact, or state of facts, may be established by cireumstan-
tial evidence as well as by direct evidence.

Ye 519
CL

It is the law of the State of Indiana that circumstantial evidence,
to be sufficient to warrant a conviction in a criminal case, must
be of a conclusive character.

The true test by which to determine the value of circumstan-
tial evidence in respect to its sufficiency to warrant a conviction
of a defendant in any case involving the alleged commission of
a crime, is not whether the proof, if any, establishes circumstances
which are consistent or which coincide, with the theory or
hypothesis of the defendant’s guilt, but whether the circumstances
satisfactorily established are of so conclusive a character, and point
so surely and unerringly to the guilt of the defendant, as to ex-
clude every reasonable hypothesis of his innocence.”

However, where, as in the case now before us, there is both direct
and circumstantial evidence of guilt, the trial court is not required
to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence. Faught v. State,
HB s(1979) 271 Ind. 153, 390 N.E.2d 1011, 1017; Sammons v. State,
(1979) Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 289, 293. The trial court did not err

in refusing tendered instruction number three.

Iv.

Finally, two issues are presented which require this Court’s rever-
sal of the convictions of both defendants. In fact, either of these errors
standing alone would require us to overturn the convictions
HI _sihere. First, it appears from the record that the trial court
permitted the jury during its deliberations to hear the
recorded testimony of two witnesses; the record further reveals that
neither the defendants nor their attorneys were present when this oc-
curred, nor were they made aware of this procedure before it occurred.
Such a procedure plainly violated the accuseds’ constitutional right
to be present at every stage of the proceedings which requires the
presence of the jury. U. 8. Const. amend VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 18;
Cape v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 609, 400 N.E.2d 161, 163. See Ind. Code
§ 34-1-21-6 (Burns 1978); Childers v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d
1284. This error requires a reversal of the convictions. Cape v. State,
supra.

v.

Second, the record reveals that the trial court permitted the jurors
to separate overnight for approximately ten and one-half hours, after

the case had been given to them for deliberation. In Walker
Hx. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 224, 410 N.E.2d 1190, the trial court
permitted the jurors to separate for four days after they had
begun their deliberations. We held that such action directly contravened
Ind. Code § 35-1-37-4 (Burns 1979 Repl.). In the Walker case, as in the
case now before us, there was no suggestion that the separation of
the jurors “was occasioned for any reason other than convenience.”
Id. at 227, 410 N.E.2d at 1192. Cf. Gibson v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 23,
29, 271 N.E.2d 706, 709; Jones v. State, (1899) 152 Ind. 318, 321, 53 N.E.2d
222, 228. Following Riley v. State, (1884) 95 Ind. 446, we held in Walker
v. State that the burden is on the prosecution to remove the suspicion
attending the jury’s misconduct. The State must show beyond a
reasonable doubt that among other things, the separation of the jurors
during deliberations did not influence them adversely to the defen-
dant or render them less capable of discharging their duty. See Walker
v. State, supra. This showing simply has not been made in the case
before us; hence, Bales and Hollen are entitled to a new trial for this
reason as well. We reiterate the clear thrust of Walker v. State: bar-
ring exigent circumstances, ¢.g., Gibson v. State, supra, the trial court
should not permit the jury to separate once their deliberations have
begun.

The convictions of Bales and Hollen are reversed, and this cause
is remanded with instructions to grant them a new trial.

All Justice concur.
NotE—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 215.

KATHY DAGUE, INDIVIDUALLY AND SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX,
ESTATE OF JOHN R. DAGUE, DECEASED v.
PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION.

[No. 181824. Filed March 26, 1981. Rehearing denied May 11, 1981]

eel
a
Lid

Frank E. Tolbert, Miller, Tolbert & Wildman, of Logansport, for
appellant.

Peter G. Tamulonis, Kightlinger, Young, Gray & DeTrude, of In-
dianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— This cause comes to us on an order for certification under
Ind. R. App. P. 15(O) from the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit. The case originated in federal district court for the Northern
District of Indiana, due to the diversity of citizenship of the parties.
Plaintiff is special administratrix of the estate of John R. Dague, her
deceased husband. She filed a four count complaint against defendant
Piper Aircraft Corporation, seeking damages for the wrongful death
of her husband.

The decedent died as a result of injuries sustained in the crash of
the Piper Pawnee aircraft he was piloting. The crash occurred on July
7, 1978, and decedent Dague succumbed on September 5, 1978. Plain-
tiff filed her complaint on October 1, 1979, alleging that John Dague’s
injuries and death were caused by a defective condition in the aircraft.
It is undisputed that defendant Piper Aircraft Corporation manufac-
tured the plane in 1965 and placed the aircraft in the stream of com-
merce on March 26, 1965.

bn 523
EE

The federal district court sustained Piper Aircraft’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the action is barred by section five
of the Indiana Product Liability Act, Ind. Code § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns
§ 34-4-20A-5 (1980 Supp.)). The district court further held that section
five does not contravene article one, section twelve, nor article four,
section nineteen of the Indiana Constitution. Plaintiff then prosecuted
an appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals determined that the substantive law of In-
diana controls the questions presented on the appeal, and that there
are no clear and controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of
Indiana from which a determination of all of the issues may be made.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has certified the following questions
to us and requested our instruction theron:

(1) Does the statute of limitations in the Product Liability Act
apply to bar this action, in view of the word “or” between the
two statutory periods of time?;

(2) Does this statute of limitation apply to bar this action, not-
withstanding plaintiff's contention that defendant’s alleged failure
to warn occurred within the statutory period of limitations?;

(8) Does this statute of limitation contravene article one, sec-
tion twelve of the Indiana Constitution?; and

(4) Does the Product Liability Act contravene article four, sec-
tion nineteen of the Indiana Constitution?

In 1965, Piper Aircraft manufactured a Piper Pawnee PA 25-235 air-
craft, bearing serial number 25-3263 and Federal Aviation Administa-
tion number N7317Z. As noted above, Piper Aircraft first sold this
plane and placed it in the stream of commerce on March 26, 1965. On
July 7, 1978, near Logansport, Indiana, the plane crashed and burned
while being flown by plaintiff's decedent, John Dague. As a result of
injuries sustained in that crash, John Dague died on September 5, 1978.

Piper Aircraft Corporation contends that this cause is barred by sec-
tion five of the 1978 Product Liability Act. Ind. Code § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns
§ 34-4-20A-5) provides:

“This section applies to all persons regardless of minority or
legal disability. Notwithstanding Ind. Code § 34-1-2-5, any product

524 |

liability action must be commenced within two years after the
cause of action accrues or within ten years after the delivery of
the product to the initial user or consumer; except that, if the
cause of action accrues more than eight years but not more than
ten years after the initial delivery, the action may be commenced
at any time within two years after the cause of action accrues.”

Under Piper Aircraft’s interpretation of this statute, our legislature
intended to place an outer limit of ten years on all product liability
actions, except where the cause of action accrues more than eight (but
less than ten) years after initial delivery of the product. On the other
hand, plaintiff argues the statute provides for two alternative periods
of limitation. In support of this contention, plaintiff points to the
legislature’s use of the disjunctive “or” in describing the time limita-
tions. Plaintiff also argues this section violates article one, section
twelve and article four, section nineteen of the Indiana Constitution.
We shall address these issues in the sequence in which they are
presented by the Court of Appeals’ certified questions order.

L

In construing an Indiana statute, our duty is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. In doing so, we must give meaning
to the language used, where that meaning is clear and unam-
I biguous. Where the meaning of the statute is ambiguous,
however, or where one or more constructions are apparently
possible, we must construe the statute so as to arrive at the apparent
intention of the legislature which is consistently revealed in all sec-
tions of the act, and consistent with all other statutes passed by the
legislature. See, ¢.g., Loza v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 124, 128-29, 325 N.E.2d
178, 1976; State ex rel. Bynum v. LaPorte Superior Court, (1978) 259
Ind. 647, 650, 291 N.E.2d 355, 356; Thompson v. Thompson, (1972) 259
Ind. 266, 273, 286 N.E.2d 657, 661; Allen County Dep’t of Public Welfare
v. Ball Memorial Hosp. Ass’n,, (1969) 253 Ind. 179, 184-85, 252 N.E.2d
424, 427; State v. Gilbert, (1966) 247 Ind. 544, 219 N.E.2d 892, 895.

The clear intention of the legislature in section five was to limit the
time within which product liability actions can be brought. However,
under plaintiff's interpretation, which emphasizes the legislature's use
of the disjunctive “or,” the three phrases of this section are not recon-
cilable with each other. In addition, such an interpretation would give

[| 525
———E—EEeeee

nothing more to or take nothing more from the plaintiff than she already
had under our general limitation statutes already in existence at the
time the act was passed. See Ind. Code § 34-1-2-1 et seq. (Burns 1979).
Plaintiff would have us interpret the statute to give a claimant the
right to bring an action within two years after it accrues, without any
reference to the length of time which has passed since the initial entry
of the product into commerce. If the legislature had intended such a
rule, they could simply have stated it in those terms. The obvious in-
tent of the statute, however, is that the action must be brought within
two years after it accrues, but in any event within ten years after the
product is first delivered to the initial user or consumer, unless the
action accrues more than eight but less than ten years after the prod-
uct’s introduction into the stream of commerce.

Our Court of Appeals recognized this proposition in Amermac, Inc.
v. Gordon, (1979) 182 Ind.App. 116, 394 N.E.2d 946, 948 n.4, with the
following observation:

“Although not deciding the issue, we note that Indiana’s recently
enacted Products Liability Act, Ind. Code (1978 Supp.) § 83-1-1.5-1
(Acts 1978, P.L. 141, Sec. 28), may shed light upon the Legislature’s
intentions as the applicable statute of limitations in these situa-
tions. First, although somewhat confusingly drafted, see J. Vargo
& J. Leibman, Survey of Recent Developments in Products Liability,
12 Ind. L. Rev. 227, 249 (1979), the legislature clearly intended
to place an absolute time limit on liability for a product’s defects,
including actions in negligence. Ind. Code (1978 Supp.) § 33-1-1.5-1.
This policy would be defeated by applying a tort limitation which
would not begin to run until after an injury, no matter when that
injury occurred. Second, the Legislature specifically differentiated
between actions in tort (negligence and strict liability) and war-
ranty actions. Ind. Code (1978 Supp.) § 33-1-1.5-1. This, too, would
seem to indicate that a contract statute of limitations would app-
ly in actions for personal injuries due to a breach of implied
warranty.”

Legal scholars have reached a similar conclusion:

“Reference to House Bill No. 1258 reveals language similar to
the enacted bill, with the exception that the two limitation provi-
sions are joined with the word ‘and’ rather than ‘or’. Although
the legislature in conference committee might have chosen a com-
pletely opposite course to that introduced in the House, such an

526

ee
pee

analysis would find the clause following, ‘initial user or consumer,’
to be mere surplusage. This clause states: ‘[E]xcept that, if the
cause of action accrues more than eight (8) years but not more
than ten (10) years after that initial delivery, the action may be
commenced at any time within two (2) years after the cause of
action accrues. Unless the ten-year period was intended to be an
outer cutoff, there would be no need to state again that the plaintiff
has two years in which to bring his action if his injury occurs dur-
‘ing the ninth or tenth year of the life of the product. The purpose
of this clause is clearly to insure that all plaintiffs injured within
ten years of delivery will, nevertheless, have a full two years to
file a claim.”

J. Vargo & J. Leibman, supra. 12 Ind. L. Rev. at 250 (emphasis added).

We find this argument to be persuasive. We are also persuaded by
Piper Aircraft’s contention that plaintiff's proposed interpretation not
only ignores the clear legislative intent, it also would produce
Hs the irrational result of granting persons injured by a new prod-
uct ten years to file suit, while granting only two years to
all others. Plaintiff correctly argues that the interpretation of the
statute we now adopt, in effect, changes the disjunctive term “or,”
which, of course, appears in the statute, to the conjunctive “and.” While
terms of this type should ordinarily be given their literal and normal
definition when it is apparent that the resulting meaning was intended,
this Court is not bound to blindly give effect to the word “or,” when
a disjunctive reading of the terms of the section would render mean-
ingless a portion of the statute. Likewise, the term “or” should not
be given its ordinary meaning when such an application flies in the
face of a clearly contrary legislative intent. State v. Myers, (1896) 146
Ind. 36, 38, 44 N.E. 801, 802; Armstrong v. State ea rel. Klaus, (1918)
72 Ind.App. 303, 317-18, 120 N.E. 717, 721. Moreover, we are at liberty
to make minor substitutions of words where necessary to give vitality
to the legislative intent. See generally Woerner v. City of Indianapolis,
(1961) 242 Ind. 253, 261-63, 177 N.E.2d 34, 37-38, cert. denied, (1962) 368
U.S. 989, 82 S.Ct. 605, 7 L.Ed.2d 526. Therefore, we hold that section
five of the Product Liability Act bars plaintiff's action in this cause,
inasmuch as the damages incurred by plaintiff occurred more than ten
years after the product was first place in commerce.

[| 527

I.

Plaintiff Dague next argues that, even if it should be found that sec-
tion five bars her claim relating to the defendant’s acts enumerated
in the statute, that portion of her complaint alleging a failure to warn
of the product’s dangerous nature would not be so barred. Dague con-
tends that Piper Aircraft had a continuing duty to warn users of those
dangerous features of its product of which it had knowledge, and that
this duty—and the defendant's negligent failure to perform it—
allegedly occurred within the statutory period. Thus, she claims, Piper
Aircraft’s alleged negligence began during the ten-year time limit and
was continuing, and the statute of limitations does not bar an action
grounded on this theory. We hold, however, that section five likewise
bars plaintiff's cause of action based on a negligent failure to warn
the user of the aircraft’s alleged defect.

Ind. Code § 38-1-1.5-1 (Burns § 34-4-20A-1 (1980 Supp.)) states:

“This chapter shall govern all product liability actions, including
those in which the theory of liability is negligence or strict liability
in tort; provided, however, that this chapter does not apply to
actions arising from or based upon any alleged breach of
warranty.”

Section two of the act (Burns’ Ed. § 34-4-20A-2) defines the key terms
used in the act. Thus, a “product liability action” includes: “all actions
brought for or on account of personal injury, disability,
I disease, death or property damage caused by or resulting
from, the manufacture, construction or design of any product.”
Plaintiff asserts that the duty to warn is a general one and is in no
way peculiar to the law of products liability. Therefore, her argument
runs, because the legislature did not specifically refer to claims resulting
from the alleged failure of a manufacturer or seller to warn a potential
customer or user of its product’s latently defective nature, then it must
be presumed that the legislature did not intend this act to apply to
such an action.

We are not persuaded by this argument. First, if the legislature had
intended to insert this exclusion in the act, it could easily have done
so. As a matter of fact, an exclusion of this type was placed in section

528 ee
po

one, where breach of warranty claims are specially excluded from the
chapter's application. Second, it seems clear the legislature intended
that the act govern all product liability actions, whether the theory
of liability is negligence or strict liability in tort. This is what the
legislature expressly said in section one.

It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that the manner in which a person
can be negligent concerning a duty to warn in the context of product
liability is not peculiar to that field of law. The same type
Hof negligence, of course, can and does appear in other fields
of tort law. However, an action for damages resulting from the
alleged failure of a manufacturer or seller to warn a user of its prod-
uct’s latently defective nature is certainly a product liability action
based on a theory of negligence, and, ultimately, is one in which the
claim is made that the damage was caused by or resulted from the
manufacture, construction or design of the product. See Ind. Code
§ 33-1-1.5-2, supra. The Product Liability Act expressly applies to all
product liability actions sounding in tort, including those based upon
the theory of negligence, and the legislature clearly intended that no
cause of action would exist on any such product liability theory after
ten years. It is not our office to question the wisdom of the legislature’s
enactments. As a reviewing court, we will not substitute our judgment.
or opinion on such matters for that of the legislature. Johnson v. St.
Vincent Hosp., Inc., (1980) 278 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 591; Short v.
Texaco, Inc., (1980) 278 Ind. 518, 406 N.E.2d 625, 632; Sidle v. Majors,
(1976) 264 Ind. 206, 209, 341 N.E.2d 763, 766; Blue v. Beach, (1900) 155
Ind. 121, 126, 56 N.E. 89, 91. Irrespective of the defendant’s continuing
duty to warn of any latent defects of which it had knowledge, and its
alleged continuing breach of that duty, see, e.g., Travis v. Rochester
Bridge Co., (1919) 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1, plaintiff's cause of action for
such negligence did not accrue until her decedent was harmed. This,
of course, occurred more than ten years after the plane was placed
in the stream of commerce. For this reason, sections one and five of
the act bar this cause of action.

IIL.

Plaintiff Dague next contends the Product Liability Act violates ar-
ticle one, section twelve of the Indiana Constitution. That provision

be 529
EE

states in part: “All court shall be open; and every man, for injury done
to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law.” Plaintiff argues that, since the act restricts or cuts
off her product liability claims based on strict liability or negligence
without providing an alternative remedy, it thereby deprives her of
aecess to open court, and is therefore violative of this constitutional
provision.

We observe at the outset that our legislature clearly has the power
to abrogate or modify common law rights and remedies. In Sidle v.
Majors, supra, we stated: “Both this Court and the United
HH States Supreme Court have upheld the right of states to
abolish or modify the common law.” 264 Ind. at 209, 341 N.E.2d
at 766. In that case, we quoted at length from Gallegher v. Davis, (Del.
Super. 1936) 183 A. 620, wherein the court noted that one of the
acknowledged functions of legislation is to change the common law to
reflect change of time and circumstances. Moreover, there is no vested
or property right in any rule of the common law, and the right to bring
a common law action is not a fundamental right. Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp., Inc., supra; Sidle v. Majors, supra; Southern Ry. Co. v. Hower-
ton, (1914) 182 Ind. 208, 220, 105 N.E. 1025, 1029. Plaintiff here is not
in the position of having had a vested right taken from her. Her cause
of action had not yet accrued at the time the no-cause provision became
effective under the act; at the time of her loss and damages, there was
no cause of action existing, by virtue of section five’s time limitations.
Thus, she had no vested right in a remedy.

Plaintiff further contends that if a common law right is to be taken
away, something must be given in return. This quid pro quo argument
posits that if the legislature eliminates or modifies a non-
BBE vested common law right or remedy, it must substitute some
other right or remedy to the person allegedly aggrieved by the
defendant’s act but foreclosed by legislation. We have previously re-
jected such an argument. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., supra;
Sidle v. Majors, supra. As the Court explained in Gallegher v. Davis,
supra.

“[N]Jo one has a vested interest in any rule of the common law.

530 De

____ eee
Rights of property which have been created by the common law
cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as
a rule of conduct, within constitutional limits, may be changed at
the will of the legislature. The great office of statutes is to remedy

defects in the common law as they develop, and to adapt to the
change of time and circumstance.

Negligence is merely the disregard of some duty imposed by law;
and the nature and extent of the duty may be modified by legisla-
tion, with a corresponding change in the test of negligence, ...
and as said by the [United States Supreme Court] with respect
to the Fourteenth Amendment, in Silver v. Silver, [(1927) 280 U.S.
117, 122, 50 S.Ct. 57, 58, 74 L.Ed. 221, 225] when that case was
before it, ‘We need not . . . elaborate the rule that the Constitu-
tion does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition
of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible
legislative object.’”

183 A. at 624, quoted in Sidle v. Majors, supra, 264 Ind. at 228, 341
N.E.2d at 774.

An act of the General Assembly is clothed with a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., supra;
Short v. Texaco, Inc., supra. All reasonable doubts must be
resolved in favor of constitutionality, and neither the parties
nor this Court can merely question the wisdom or desirability
of legislation. Id.; Sidle v. Majors, supra; Welsh v. Sells, (1963) 244 Ind.
423, 428, 192 N.E.2d 753, 757, appeal dismissed, (1964) 376 U.S. 649,
84 S.Ct. 983, 11 L.Ed.2d 979; First Federal Sav. & Loan of Ind. v. Fur-
nish, (1977) 174 Ind.App. 265, 367 N.E.2d 596, 600. We hold that the
Product Liability Act does not contravene article one, section twelve
of the Indiana Constitution.

Iv.

Finally, plaintiff Dague argues that the Product Liability Act con-
travenes article four, section nineteen of the Indiana Constitution. The
provision in question states: “An act, except an act for the codifica-
tion, revision or rearrangment of laws, shall be confined to one subject
and matters properly connected therewith.” The Product Liabilty Act
under consideration here was passed as section twenty-eight of Public
Law 141 of the Acts of 1978. Public Law 141 consists of twenty-eight

be 531
po

sections, and is entitled: “An Act to Amend I.C. 33 concerning courts
and court officers and product liability.” The first twenty-seven sections
generally concern the operation and jurisdiction of the various courts
of Indiana. All twenty-eight sections of the act revise various sections
of Title 33 of the Indiana Code.

One basic principle of our review is that, in considering the validity
of an act under this constitutional provision, a very liberal interpreta-
tion is to be applied, with all doubts resolved in favor of the legisla-
tion’s validity. See Orbison v. Welsh, (1962) 242 Ind. 385, 398, 179 N.E.2d
721, 731. In State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, (1932) 208 Ind. 457, 467-68,
180 N.E. 865, 868, we observed:

“[T]he only test which this Court can apply is the indefinite one
of ‘reasonableness,’ a standard and not a specific rule of law. Sec-
tion 19, art. 4 does not by restricting the contents of an ‘act’ to
one subject, contemplate a metaphysical singleness of idea or thing,
but rather that there must be some rational unity between the
matters embraced in the act, the unity being found in the general
purpose of the act and the practical problems of efficient ad-
ministration. It is hardly necessary to suggest that matters which
ordinarily would not be thought to have any common features or
characteristics might, for purposes of legislative treatment, be
grouped together and treated as one subject. For purposes of
legislation, ‘subjects’ are not absolute existences to be discovered
by some sort of a priori reasoning, but are the result of classifica-
tion for convenience of treatment and for greater effectiveness
in obtaining the general purpose of the particular legislative act.
And if, from the standpoint of legislative treatment, there is any
reasonable basis for the grouping together in one ‘act’ of various
matters, this court cannot say that such matters constitute more
than one subject.”

We further noted in Stith Petroleum Co. v. Ind. Dep’t of Audit and
Control, (1937) 211 Ind. 400, 409, 5 N.E.2d 517, 521:

“Authorities are numerous upon the general subject, covering a
wide variety of subjects, and hold that if there is any reasonable
basis for grouping together in one act various matters of the same
nature, and the public cannot be deceived reasonably thereby, the
act is valid. State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, (1982) 208 Ind. 457,
180 N.E. 865; Baldwin v. State, (1924) 194 Ind. 303, 141 N.E. 343;
Maule Coal Co. v. Partenheimer, (1900) 155 Ind. 100, 55 N.E. 751;

582 —
poe

Bright v. McCullough, (1866) 27 Ind. 223.”

Thus, this Court has traditionally given broad interpretation to the
one-subject requirement, and thereby allowed legislative combinations
of matters which, at first blush, might appear quite diverse.
EE See, ¢.g., Orbison v. Welsh, supra, (legislation providing powers
concerning eminent domain, administrative law and criminal
law combined in Indiana Port Commission Act); Ule v. Stone, (1985)
208 Ind. 255, 194 N.H. 140 (1925 Act concerning registration of motor
vehicles, regulation of motor vehicles on public highways, licensing of
chauffeurs, garagemen’s liens on motor vehicles, and hit-and-run
drivers); State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel, supra (one act combining pro-
visions relating to school attendance by minors and provision concern-
ing employment of minors); Wright v. McCullough, supra (1852 Act con-
cerning, inter alia, election of highway supervisors and assessment
of road tax).

It is clear in the case before us that the legislature was aware of
the contents of Public Law 141 when the act was passed. There is
no basis for finding that some trick was employed to attach the
HI Product Liability Act to the other provisions of the act, so
that the public would be deceived by its location. In fact,
the title of the act specifically mentions the subject matter of section
twenty-eight. Plaintiff does not claim that these evils are present in
Public Law 141 or, more particularly, in section twenty-eight of the
act. The broad subject in the act is the construction, operation and
jurisdiction of Indiana courts. Thus, it would not be clearly unreasonable
to conclude that the Product Liability Act should fall under that
heading. In view of these factors and the broad constructions we have
given in the application of this constitutional provision, we cannot say
that the grouping together of the subjects in this act was so unreason-
able as to be repugnant to the Indiana Constitution. We hold this act
does not contravene article four, section nineteen.

The Clerk of this Court is directed to certify copies of this opinion
to Chief Judge Thomas E. Fairchild, Judge Luther M. Swygert, and
Judge Robert A. Sprecher of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.

Le 533
Eee

Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Hunter, and Prentice, JJ., concur.
NotTE—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 207.

STATE OF INDIANA ON THE RELATION OF ROGER D. LONG
v, THE MARION-SUPERIOR CouRT, CIVIL Division, ROOM
NUMBER 5 AND THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. DUGAN,
AS JUDGE THEREOF AND THE HONORABLE JERALD L. MILLER,
AS JUDGE PRO TEMPORE THEREOF.

[No. 12808452. Filed March 27, 1981.]

Charles B. Huppert, Daniel B. Altman, Huppert & Altman, Scott Ging,
of Indianapolis, for relator.

Lante K. Earnest, Bruce A. Walker, Klineman, Rose & Wolf, of
Indianapolis, for respondent.

ORIGINAL ACTION

PRENTICE, J.—This matter is before us upon the return of the
Respondents, Marion Superior Court, Civil Division, Room Number
5, and The Honorable Michael T. Dugan, as Judge Thereof, to the alter-
native writ issued December 22, 1980, prohibiting the exercise of further
jurisdiction in that certain cause pending in Respondent Court entitled

534 ee]
i»

“In Re The Marriage of Betty J. Long and Roger D. Long,” being Cause
No. S 580 1418 in said Court and mandating said Court to strike cer-
tain orders therein or, alternatively, to show cause why said alternative
writ should not be made permanent.

The proceeding requires us to resolve a conflict of jurisdiction be-
tween the Respondent Court and the Hamilton Superior Court, a
dissolution of marriage action having been filed by the Relator in the
Hamilton Superior Court on November 10, 1980, and another by his
spouse, later on the same day, in the Respondent Court. The Relator
was served process from the Respondent Court, however, prior to the
time that service of process from the Hamilton Superior Court was
had upon his wife.

Our decision is determined by Ind. R. Tr. P. 8, which provides:

“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court
or such equivalent pleading or document as may be specified by
statute.”

While Indiana does not appear to have had a case in point decided
since the implementation of our trial rules adopted in 1969, the similar-
ity between our Rule above quoted and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 makes Federal law most compelling.

In adopting the rule, we effectively adopted the Federal Rule. Civil

Code Study Commission Comments, 1 Harvey, Indiana Practice, Rules

of Procedure Annotated 256 (1969); and in so doing, we adopted

Hs the construction which the Federal Courts have placed upon

the rule. See Clark v. The Jeffersonville, etc. Railroad Company,

(1878) 44 Ind. 248; Robertson v. Ford, (1905) 164 Ind. 538, 74 N.E. 1;

Eberhart v. Abshire, (Tth Cir. 1946) 158 F.2d 24; 1 Harvey, Indiana Prac-
tice, Rules of Procedure Annotated 256 (1969).

We hold that exclusive jurisdiction over the particular cause of ac-
tion vests when the complaint or other equivalent pleading or document
as provided by Ind. R. Tr. P. 8 is filed. See Barber-Greene

HE Company v. Blaw Knox Company, (6th Cir. 1956) 239 F.2d 774,
778 (cases cited therein) (construing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3). See also

Penn General Casualty Company v. Pennsylvania, (1935) 294 U.S. 189,
196, 55 S.Ct. 386, 389, 79 L.Ed. 850, 856 (Jurisdiction attaches in in

be 535
Es

rem proceeding on the filing of a bill of complaint).

Respondents point out that our holding contradicts language which
appears in numerous cases dealing with conflicts of juridiction. State
ex rel. Ferger v. Circuit Court of Marion County, et al., (1949) 227 Ind.
212, 215, 84 N.E. 2d 585, 587; State ex rel. Poindeater v. Reeves, Judge,
et al., (1952) 230 Ind. 645, 654, 104 N.E.2d 735, 739; State ex rel. American
Fletcher National Bank v. Daugherty, Judge, (1972) 258 Ind. 632, 634-35,
283 N.E.2d 526, 528. In those cases we did speak of jurisdiction becom-
ing exclusive when a court acquired jurisdiction of the person as well
as the subject matter. It must be noted, however, that two of those
cases pre-date the adoption of our current trial rules, and none operated
to deny jurisdiction to the court wherein the complaint had been first
filed.

When there are courts having concurrent subject matter jurisdic-
tion, it is inevitable that there will sometimes be “races to the court-
house” by would-be litigants. The Clerk’s Office is a logical “finish line,”
as termination at that point will, in many cases, avert useless pro-
ceedings. Indiana Rules Trial Procedure 3 accomplishes that end.’

The alternative writ is now made absolute and permanent.
Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NotTe—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 218.

WILLIAM HERMAN IVEs v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 5808118. Filed March 30, 1981. Rehearing denied June 4, 1981.]

1, “Additionally two actions may be commenced involving the same dispute. This
Rule would determine which of the two commenced first, regardless of when the sum-
mons is filed. For example, if A and B file suits against each other, which suits involve
the same claim, and A files his complaint one day before B files his complaint, A’s suit
will be the first suit to commence under Rule 3, even if B’s service is first effected
or is made before A’s service.” 1 Harvey, Indiana Practice, Rules of Procedure An-
notated 256 (1969).

[| 587

Merle B. Rose, Cronin & Rose, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted after trial by jury
of Rape, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979), and of being an Habitual
Offender, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979). He was sentenced to ten
(10) years imprisonment on the Rape charge and to an additional thirty
(80) years imprisonment as an Habitual Criminal, for a total of forty
(40) years. This direct appeal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the rape
conviction.

(2) Whether errors occurred concerning the defendant’s rights
relative to the discovery had and evidence admitted on the habitual
offender charge.

(8) Whether the trial court erred with respect to jury instructions
given and refused.

(4) Whether the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s pants
into evidence over the defendant's objection that the chain of custody
had not been adequately established.

(5) Whether the trial court erred in allowing the alternate juror
to sit in the jury room during deliberations.

ISSUE I

The defendant contends that the rape conviction is improper for want
of evidence of a forcible penetration. Dobrzykowski v. State, (1978) 269
Ind. 604, 382 N.E.2d 170.

The prosecutrix and two of her friends drove to Indianapolis to at-
tend the Indy 500 time trials. One of her friends had arranged for the
girls to stay at the home of her future employer and had also arranged
to meet one, Douglas White, and his friends, who would show the girls
around the city. The girls met White and two of his friends, including

588 ee]
Ld

the defendant, at the Holiday Inn on Shadeland Avenue as prearranged.
The group of six persons spent the night partying and dancing and
then went to a restaurant at about 2:00 a.m. for breakfast.

After leaving the restaurant, the prosecutrix rode in the defendant’s
automobile, with the understanding that he would take her back to
the Holiday Inn to pick up her own, after which they would go to the
house where the girls planned to stay. They followed White’s car until
it turned, after which he proceeded independently, stating that he had
to stop for gasoline but a few minutes later stating that he was going
directly to the house where the girls planned to stay.

They drove around for fifteen to twenty minutes, and she suggested
that they stop to make a telephone call to get directions, but the defend-
ant parked the vehicle off the road near Eagle Creek Park and pulled
her toward him and kissed her. She neither encouraged nor resisted,
but told him that they should find a telephone booth, make a call, and
leave.

The defendant suggested that she relax. He continued to kiss her
and she pulled away. She said that she thought that they should leave
to find the others, but he told her to relax, that he wasn’t going to
do anything.

The defendant then attempted to remove her pants. She told him
to stop and that she was menstruating, whereupon he grabbed her waist
and pulled her down. The victim’s testimony continues:

“Q. And then what happened?

“A. And then I was trying to get his hands away from me, and
he reached around behind me and grabbed a hold of my right
hand so that my left arm was pinned underneath me and
my — — he had a hold of my right hand, and he continued
to try to get my pants undone.”

This struggle continued until the defendant completed the rape. Dur-
ing the struggle the prosecutrix cried and screamed and tried to pull
her pants back up as the defendant was trying to pull them down.

“Upon a review for sufficient evidence, this Court will look only

bn 539
Es

to the evidence most favorable to the State and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. If the evidence of each element
of the crime charged may be found therefrom beyond a reasonable
doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. (Citation omitted). In such
areview, we will not weigh conflicting evidence nor will we judge
the credibility of the witnesses.” Loyd v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 404,
898 N.E.2d 1260, 1264.
The uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain
a rape conviction. Geisleman v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 241, 410 N.E.2d
1298, 1295. As related above, the record shows that the
I defendant used force to accomplish the penetration of the
victim.
ISSUE II

Defendant assigns an assortment of alleged errors related to the
habitual offender determination phase of the bifurcated trial, the totali-
ty of which, he contends, denied him representation by competent, in-
formed counsel and the right to confront his accusers.

‘The rape information was filed on June 12, 1979. On June 21st, Defen-
dant was arraigned, proper counsel was appointed and discovery
ordered completed within thirty days.

On September 11th, Defendant filed a speedy trial motion, and a
trial date of October 17th was set. We are not apprised as to why the
trial did not commence on that date, but on October 31st, an amended
information adding the habitual offender count was filed.

On November 5th, the defendant was again arraigned, the case was
set for trial for November 12th; and both sides were ordered to comply
with discovery orders within thirty days.

On November 9th, the State, pursuant to discovery orders, supplied
the defendant with documents to be offered into evidence supporting
the rape charge and others supporting the habitual offender charge.
Defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude introduction
of the documents, which motion was subsequently sustained as to the
evidence of rape but overruled as to the evidence of the habitual of-
fender status; and the latter was subsequently admitted into evidence,
over defendant’s timely objection.

540 ee

The case was called to trial and the jury impaneled and sworn. The
defendant then moved orally for a continuance, which was refused.

There is no merit to Defendant’s claim that he was harmed
I by the State’s tardy compliance with the original discovery
order. The evidence that was tardily disclosed was excluded.

Neither is there merit to the claim that the documentation of his
habitual offender status came late. It was furnished nine days follow-
ing the amendment which added his offender status as an issue, four
days following the order and three days prior to the commencement
of the trial. The evidence merely related to his identity; and there is
no indication that the defendant was surprised by the disclosure.
Neither is there any showing of how he would have benefited from
an earlier disclosure or by the grant of a continuance. There has been
no claim that the records introduced did not relate to him.

The later amendment and election by the State to try the defendant
as an habitual offender may well have entitled the defendant to reassess
his prior determination to seek an early trial. Abstractly,
Hs such a late change could well be valid grounds for a contin-
uance, in which case it would behoove a defendant to act
promptly. In the case before us, the defendant did not ask for a contin-
uance when he first became aware of the amended charges but awaited
the actual commencement of the trial. He revealed neither a need for
the continuance nor a justification for the delay in seeking it, and it
was properly denied. Hardin v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 63, 414 N.E.2d
570; White v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 302, 305, 380 N.E.2d 84, 86.

Defendant has alluded to having been placed in a position of elect-
ing between foregoing his speedy trial rights and proceeding to trial
uninformed, but we do not see that he was uninformed in any signifi-
cant manner.

We do not understand the defendant’s claim that the court did not
enforce its discovery orders. Evidence relative to the habitual offender
status was not relevant until the amended information was filed. Ac-
cording to his brief, the only other evidence that was supplied to the
defendant belatedly was excluded.

Le 541
Le

ISSUE III

The defendant raises three errors relating to the trial court's in-
structions to the jury.

The Record shows that the defendant, without stating his grounds
therefor, objected to Instructions Nos. 16 and 17:

INSTRUCTION NO. 16

“You are instructed that any sexual penetration, however slight,
is sufficient to complete the crime of rape, if the other elements
are proved. Proof of emission is not necessary.”

INSTRUCTION NO. 17

“Tt is not the law of this State that a woman assaulted with an
intent to commit rape upon her is required to resist by all violent
means within her power. The law requires only that the case be
one in which the woman did not consent. Her resistance must not
be mere pretense but in good faith. The law does not require that
the woman shall do more than her age, strength, and all atten-
dant cireumstances make it reasonable for her to do in order to
manifest her opposition. The question of resistance is a question
of fact for you to determine and find and not a question this court
can decide.”

The defendant's brief does not set out the verbatim ob-
HH jection to these instructions.

“Ind. R. Ap. P. 8.3 requires an appellant predicating error upon
the giving of an instruction, to set out in the argument section
of his brief the verbatim objection made thereto, as well as the
verbatim instruction. Defendant has failed to comply with this rule,
and the error, if any, is deemed waived. Notwithstanding Ind. R.
Ap. P. 8.3, we have searched the record and find that it discloses
a mere naked objection to the giving of such instruction without
stating the grounds therfor. Ind. R. Tr. P. 51(c) provides: ‘No party
may claim as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects
thereto * * *, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the grounds of his objection.’” Brandon v. State, (1978) 268 Ind.
150, 154, 374 N.E.2d 504, 506-07. (Emphasis in original).

Nevertheless we proceed to the defendant's contentions. He asserts
that Instruction No. 16 should have stated ‘“* * * if the other elements

52 es
LE

are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” We found a similar
HE contention without merit in Lottie v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 529,

406 N.E.2d 682, 636, and note that here, as in Lottie, the jury
was fully instructed on the State’s burden of proof. Additionally, this
Court has repeatedly approved Instruction No. 17. Lottie v. State, (1980)
273 Ind. 529, 406 N.E.2d 682, 636-37 (cases cited therein). There was
no error in giving these instructions.

The defendant next contends that the trial court should have given
the following instruction:

“You are instructed that voluntary intoxication is a defense to

a criminal act to the extent that it negates specific intent.”

The information charged that the defendant “did unlawfully and
knowingly have sexual intercourse with * * * by use or force or immi-
nent threat of force, * * * .”

“Knowingly” has been equated to intent, and the defense of intox-
ication has been held applicable, notwithstanding recent redefining of
criminal offenses. Williams v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 105, 402 N.B.2d
954, 956. In Williams, it was further determined that it was error to
refuse such an instruction “* * * where the evidence of intoxication,
if believed, is such that it could create a reasonable doubt in the mind
of a rational trier of fact that the accused entertained the requisite
specific intent.”

Although there was evidence that the defendant and others in the
group had drunk considerable amounts of alcoholic beverages during

the evening and early morning preceding the criminal event,
Hs there was no evidence from which the requisite mental state

of the defendant could be subjected to a reasonable doubt. The
defendant's claim was that he did not penetrate and that her resistance
was token only, until penetration was imminent, at which time she pro-
tested and he desisted. Not only was there no evidence giving rise
to a reasonable doubt upon the matter, the defendant's own testimony
made it clear that he was possessed of his mental faculties throughout
the episode. This is true, notwithstanding his testimony that “* * *
I guess I passed out.” which related to his conduct subsequent to his
abandonment of the misadventure. The instruction, therefore, was not

Le 543

appropriate under the evidence and was properly refused. Cf. Fleener
v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 478, 412 N.E.2d 778, 782. (No error to refuse
tendered instruction on lesser included offenses where the only issue
before the jury was the identity of the perpetrator.)

ISSUE IV

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
victim’s pants into evidence over objection that no chain of custody
had been established.

Our rule requiring that the chain of custody be established before
exhibits are admitted into evidence applies with diminishing strictness
as the exhibits concerned become decreasingly susceptible to altera-
tion, tampering or substitution. Coleman v. State, (1975) 264 Ind. 64,
69, 339 N.E.2d 51, 55.

At trial the pants were identified by their owner, the prosecutrix,
and by the police officer who received them from her. From the record
it appears that the defendant’s objection was premised upon the police
officer's failure to mark the pants. The pants had been placed in a sealed
and marked evidence bag and then taken to the police laboratory. It
is of no consequence that someone in the police laboratory had had
access to the garment, inasmuch as the officer recovered it in the same
condition as he had left it at the police laboratory.

There is no merit to the defendant’s contention. Our decisions do
not require a strict showing of the chain of custody, where as here, the
exhibit is nonfungible and witnesses identify it. Lucas v. State,
HH (1980) 274 Ind. 635, 413 N.E.2d 578, (cases cited therein). Ad-
ditionally, there has been no showing of how the defendant

could have been harmed by the introduction of such evidence.

ISSUE V

The defendant urges us to reconsider our holding in Johnson v. State,
(1977) 267 Ind. 256, 259-60, 369 N.E.2d 623, 625, cert. denied, (1978) 436
USS. 948, 98 S.Ct. 2855, 56 L.Ed.2d 791, which allows the alter-

Hl nate juror to retire with the regular jurors during delibera-
tions. In the instant case the trial court followed the dictates

544 Le

of Johnson by instructing the alternate juror not to communicate with
the members of the jury concerning the deliberations. We continue
to be unpersuaded that Johnson should be overruled. Wofford v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 518, 394 N.E.2d 100, 106; Minton v. State, (1978) 269 Ind.
39, 45, 378 N.E.2d 639, 642; Phillips v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 556, 561,
376 N.E.2d 1148, 1146; Poindexter v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 167, 175, 374
N.E.2d 509, 513.

Defendant has tendered two additional assignments of error by his
brief, one relating to the rejection of evidence offered by a defense
witness and one related to the denial of his motion for a mis-trial pre-
mised upon allegedly improper argument made by the trial prosecutor.
Neither of these assignments was presented in the motion to correct
errors, hence they are not available on appeal. Guardiola v. State, (1978)
268 Ind. 404, 405, 375 N.H.2d 1105, 1107.

We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur; DeBruler, J.,
dissents with opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

DEBRULER, J.— According to testimony at trial appellant drank con-
siderable amounts of aleohol during the several hours preceding the
alleged rape of the prosecutrix and after the alleged rape, passed out.
While the jury was not required to credit any of this proof, it was such
that it was susceptible of belief,-and if believed could have created
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury that a high probability ex-
isted that appellant was aware of what he was doing when he trans-
gressed that line between permissible touching and illegal force.
Williams v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 105, 402 N.E.2d 954. In my opinion,
there was sufficient evidence of intoxication presented to entitle ap-
pellant to the instruction on the defense of intoxication, that it was
error to refuse that instruction, and that this conviction should be
reversed and remanded for a new trial.

NotE—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 220.

STATE EX REL. STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, PROSECUTOR 01
MARION COUNTY, NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
v. THE MARION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, CRIMINAL
DIVISION No. 1, THE HONORABLE JAY B. HAGGERTY,
SPECIAL JUDGE.

[No. 11798316. Filed March 31, 1981.]

546

Stephen Goldsmith, Prosecuting Attorney for the Nineteenth Judicial
Circuit, Bobby Jay Small, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Theodore L.
Sendak, Attorney General, Michael G. Worden, Deputy Attorney
General, for relator.

David F. McNamar, Michael R. Franceschini, Steers, Sullivan,
McNamar & Rogers, of Indianapolis, for respondent.

CONTEMPT ACTION ARISING FROM AN ORIGINAL
ACTION IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

GIVAN, C.J.— This contempt action arose from a writ of mandamus issued
to the respondent judge on November 15, 1979. Respondent was ap-
pointed special judge in two criminal cases, State of Indiana v. William
J. Daugherty, Cause No. CR 70 116A and State of Indiana v. Ricky
Lee Harris, Cause No. CR 79 93A. Both defendants entered guilty pleas

Le 547
_ EEE

pursuant to plea bargain recommendations specifying executed
sentences. Respondent accepted the plea bargain recommendations.
However, he reduced each defendant's sentence. The writ of mandamus
of November 15, 1979, ordered respondent to resentence the defen-
dants according to the agreement or alternatively vacate the sentences
and probations and set the causes for trial. Respondent followed the
former course.

On December 6, 1979, and December 7, 1979, the defendants filed
their respective petitions for consideration for shock probation.
Respondent granted both defendants Harris and Daugherty’s petitions
on March 4, 1980. Thereafter, the relator filed an information and
amended information in this Court alleging a violation of this Court’s
mandate of November 15, 1979.

On May 14, 1980, this Court held an evidentiary hearing for indirect
criminal contempt. On May 22, 1980, this Court found respondent guilty
of contempt for failing to carry out the mandate of November 15, 1979.
Respondent was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment at the Indiana
State Farm and fined $250. The Court further ordered that the sentence
and fine be suspended if, before noon the following day, the respon-
dent complied with the mandate. Respondent recalled both defendants,
vacated their existing sentences and probations, set aside the judg-
ments of conviction, rejected the plea bargain agreements, and set each
cause for trial. Thereafter, respondent notified the Supreme Court of
his actions.

This opinion is written in order that the Bench and Bar may be fully
apprised of the circumstances surrounding this case.

Respondent first raises the question as to whether an appeal rather

than an original action is the proper procedure to limit a judge to

statutory sentencing provisions. He argues that once he com-

I plied with the writ of mandamus issued by this Court on

November 15, 1979, by sentencing the defendants to executed

terms, the case ended, and that the subsequent use of shock probation

did not constitute a violation of the mandate. Respondents in In re

Lemond, (1980) 274 Ind. 505, 413 N.E.2d 228, raised the same issue.
In that case, we stated at p. 243:

548 De
i ih

“Respondents argue that, when Judge Richardson granted the writ
of habeas corpus, these Court’s orders were thereby fully com-
plied with. A similar position was advanced in State ex rel. Purcell
v. Sullivan Circuit Court, (1950) 228 Ind. 410, 92 N.E.2d 843. In
that case, a circuit court judge entered an order which seemingly
complied with a writ of prohibition issued by the Supreme Court.
The facts behind the trial court’s order, however, demonstrated
that the order was merely a sham, designed to avoid the force
and effect of the writ. In finding the circuit court judge in con-
tempt the Supreme Court cautioned that {t]his Court... is not
blind,’ and proceeded to look past the trial court’s order to his
actual behavior. Id. at 425, 92 N.E.2d at 849.”
Respondent next claims it was improper for the Marion County Pros-
ecutor to raise this question in the Supreme Court by information, since
the rules concerning original actions contain no such provision.
Hs Notwithstanding the lack of procedural outline in the Rules
of Procedure for Original Actions specifying the propriety of
an information, this form has been utilized as a means of calling atten-
tion to the failure to comply with the orders of this Court. In re Le-
mond, supra; In re Perrello, (1978) 260 Ind. 26, 291 N.E.2d 698.

Respondent next asserts impropriety because the contempt citation
arose from utilization of I.C. 35-4.1-4-18, the Shock Probation Act, while
the basis for the writ of mandamus was I.C. 35-5-6-1, et seq.,
Is the Plea Bargain Act. In In re Lemond, an appeal was taken
from a trial decision regarding interstate child custody. The
Court of Appeals, interpreting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act, reversed the trial court. We denied respondent Lemond’s
petition to transfer the cause to this Court. The contempt citation was
founded on respondent's attempted circumvention of the Court of Ap-
peals’ and the Supreme Court’s orders by the filing and granting of
CHINS (Children in Need of Service) petition pursuant to I.C. 31-6-4-3,
et seq., (Burns Supp. 1979) after having seemingly complied with the
directives of this Court. Thus, notwithstanding the application of a
different statute, a citation for contempt will issue when this Court’s
order is violated.

Respondent argues procedural flaws mistakenly relying on LC.
84-4-7-1, et seq. However, I.C. 34-4-7-10 reads in relevant part:

“Section 10. The provisions of this act shall apply to all proceedings

bn 549
_-_ Eee,

for contempt in all courts of record in this state except the Supreme
Court thereof ....” (emphasis added.)
Thus, by terms, the above act delineating procedure is inapplicable
to the case at bar.

Respondent next claims that the Supreme Court erred in failing to
appoint a Commissioner to hear the cause in accordance with I.C.
84-4-8-2, which reads as follows:

“34-4-8-2 [3-912]. Indirect Supreme and Appellate Courts— Special
commissioners— Procedure. In all cases of indirect contempt of
the Supreme or Appellate Courts of this state, except those grow-
ing out of wilfully resisting, hindering, delaying or disobeying any
lawful process or order of court, the court against which the alleged
contempt has been committed shall... nominate three [3] compe-
tent and disinterested persons . . . to be submitted to the parties
in the action... . The court shall thereupon appoint such person
who shall remain unchallenged a special commissioner of such
court... .”
We hold that the respondent’s noncompliance with the mandate of
November 15, 1979, falls within the exception of “growing out of
wilfully resisting, hindering, delaying or disobeying any lawful
i | process or order of court.” Thus, there was no error in declin-
ing to appoint a Commissioner.

The applicable statute in this case is I.C. 33-2-1-4 which reads:

“38-2-1-4 [4-110]. Oaths—Fines for contempt.—Such court shall
have full power to impose and administer all necessary oaths; to
punish by fine and imprisonment for contempt of its authority and
process; and to compel the attendance of witnesses by attachment
and fine.”
We further point out that courts of superior jurisdiction have inherent
ability to punish contemptuous acts independent of statutory provisions.
Worthington v. State, (1979) 181 Ind. App. 365, 391 N.B.2d
1164. The proceedings against respondent Haggerty flow from
these powers.

Respondent claims that his intent to violate the Supreme Court man-
date was not established. Intent and good faith are questions of fact to
be decided by this Court after considering the evidence.

HE in re Lemond, supra; In re Perrello, supra. Where a violation

550 Le
pee

of a court order is clear on the record, “it is not sufficient
to merely deny any intention to defy the order.” In re Perrello, supra,
260 Ind. at p.30, 291 N.E.2d at pp.700-701. This Court issued a writ
of mandamus ordering respondent to sentence the defendants to ex-
ecuted terms of imprisonment or set the causes for trial. Subsequent-
ly, when the trial court granted shock probation, the order of this Court
was thereby violated.

Respondent challenges the nonunanimous finding of contempt by
drawing an analogy with the unanimity requirement in criminal jury
verdicts. With three justices sitting in this contempt hearing, two found
respondent guilty of contempt and one did not. I.C. 33-2.1-2-1 provides
that three justices shall constitute a quorum to conduct the business
of this Court. In State ea rel. Sedam v. Ripley Circuit Court, (1973) 262
Ind. 25, 302 N.E.2d 761, this Court in a nonunanimous opinion held a
respondent trial judge in contempt.

Respondent also complains of Justice Prentice’s participation in the
voting in this action. Justice Prentice did not attend the hearing,
but cast a fourth vote based on the briefs filed. Respondent
Hl has failed to establish any prejudice caused by Justice Pren-
tice’s participation. When votes on this Court are evenly split,
the Court declines to take any affirmative action. (See Rule of Appellate
Procedure 15 (F)) Thus, the participation of Justice Prentice as a fourth
judge could only aid the respondent. The vote of the majority was not
needed for affirmative action, where, on the other hand, had he cast
a negative vote, the Court would have been split on a two-two vote
which would have resulted in no action being taken. Thus, respondent
could have only been aided, not harmed, by the participation of Justice
Prentice.

Because the relator did not verify the information, respondent claims
he was not given sufficient notice by the order to appear and show cause
of May 14, 1980, to adequately warn him that he was being
cited for contempt. Although the information is not verified
by the relator, the information was attached to copies of all
pleading and trial court entries certified by the clerk of the respon-
dent court. In In re Perrello, supra, 260 Ind. at 31, 291 N.E.2d at 701,
we stated:

Yi 551
_ Eee

“Respondent also contends the action is defective because the in-
formation was not verified by the oath of the informant. See State
ex Rel. Indianapolis Bar Assn., supra; Denny, supra. However,
attached to the information is a transcript of the sworn testimony
which the informant made to Judge Boring of the Marion County
Municipal Court concerning this matter, along with the Certificate
of the Reporter and the Certificate of the Judge. This obtains
substantially the same result, and we hold it to be sufficient to
prevent nullifying the action.”

Therefore, we hold that the information is not so defective as to defeat
this action.

Respondent's claim of insufficient notice is likewise without merit.
Paragraph 6 of the Information reads as follows:

“6. That the trial court, by granting ‘shock’ probation, violated

the plea agreement entered into by the State and the Defendant,

and violated this Court’s order requiring the trial court to either

impose the five (5) year executed sentence as recommended by

the State in plea agreement or set the cause for trial.”

This Court’s Order to Appear and Show Cause reiterated the above
allegations and further stated:

“This Court hereby ORDERS the said Special Judge Jay B.
Haggerty to appear before this Court on the 22 day of May, 1980
at 1:30 P.M. to show justification for his granting of ‘shock’ proba-
tion, and whether granting of ‘shock’ probation is in compliance
with this Court’s mandate either to vacate the sentence imposed
and impose the sentence recommended in the plea agreement, or,
vacate the judgment and sentence and set the cause for trial, as
expressly provided in said ‘Writ of Mandamus.’”

A clear statement of the facts constituting the contemptuous action

was furnished to the respondent.

Respondent questions whether or not the statutes concerning plea
bargaining and the statutes concerning shock probation can be har-
monized to give effect to both provisions in the same case,

I specifically whether a judge can grant shock probation after
accepting a plea bargain. We believe not. We hold that the

shock probation provision is inapplicable when a plea bargain is ac-
cepted by the trial judge, unless the plea bargain would contain a

552 a
ee

specific reservation for the trial judge to invoke the shock probation
statute.

I.C. 35-5-6-2(b) dictates compliance with a written plea bargain recom-

mendation filed by the prosecutor pursuant to I.C. 35-5-6-1, et seq. if

the trial court accepts the recommendation. Should the court

HI reject the recommendation, the statute allows subsequent

recommendations to be filed. If the recommendation is re-

jected by the trial court, its only course then is to set the matter for
trial.

The concept of plea bargaining contemplates an explicit agreement

between the State and defendant which is binding upon both parties

when accepted by the trial court. To allow the trial court to

Hs cither increase or suspend the executed sentence, would deny

the parties the essential purpose of their agreement. It is

to the interest of both the defendant and the public to facilitate ex-

peditious disposition of criminal cases. Strict adherence to the agree-
ment is essential to this purpose.

If the tendered recommendation calls for an executed sentence, the
trial court may either accept or reject the recommendation. Moyer v.
State, (1978) 177 Ind. App. 461, 379 N.E.2d 1036. He may not, however,
alter the plea bargain for an executed sentence upon motion for con-
sideration for shock probation by the defendant or upon his own motion.
Of course, shock probation may be specifically provided for in the agree-
ment itself; and, as such, both parties acknowledge the potential of
a sentence reduction. Similarly, when the defendant pleads guilty to
a lesser offense and no term is specified in the plea bargain recommen-
dation, sentencing falls within the ambit of the trial court’s discretion
upon acceptance of the agreement.

The respondent argues that our decision in this case impinges on
an early release occasioned by parole for “good time” as provided by
LC. 35-50-6-1, et seg. We do not agree. The foreclosure
Hof judicial discretion in suspending an executed sentence pro-
vided for in an accepted plea bargain has no affect on the
statutory discretion which is within the purview of the Parole Board
or the Department of Corrections.

P| 553
EE,

Respondent likens the trial court’s discretion in revocation of pro-
bation to the discretionary grant of shock probation. We do not accept
the analogy. In the former case, the defendant, granted probation
through a plea bargain agreement, must understand that he is to abide
by the terms of probation or suffer revocation. On the other hand, a
plea bargain calling for an executed sentence forecloses any probation
by the court, including shock probation.

Fortunately, this Court is rarely required to resort to contempt pro-
ceedings; however, recent cases cited in this opinion lead us to caution
the Bench and Bar that violations of orders of the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals constitute criminal contempt. These courts are
not blind to subterfuge and manipulation intended to circumvent their
orders. The light penalties imposed in recent cases should not be taken
as precedent for the future.

We now reaffirm our finding of guilty of contempt heretofore issued
in this case.

Givan, C.J., Pivarnik and Prentice, JJ., concur.
DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion.

Hunter, J., concurs in dissent.

DISSENTING OPINION

DEBRULER, J.— Prior to the contempt hearing we construed the plea
agreement in which the prosecution recommended an executed sentence
of six years to preclude authority of the judge approving it to initially
suspend the sentence. At the contempt hearing this Court again con-
strued the plea agreement to preclude authority of the judge to sus-
pend the sentence pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-4.1-4-18, the Shock Pro-
bation Act, after having ordered the six year sentence executed. With
the first conclusion, I have agreed. With the latter, I do not.

An executed sentence is a sentence which a judge has not postpon-
ed by suspension, but has ordered execution. On November 30, 1979,
Judge Haggerty, in response to our writ ordered the six year sentences
executed. In consequence of the actual imposition of these sentences

554 Le

the defendants were delivered up to a state penal institution and com-
menced service of their six year sentences. Nothing could be clearer
than that at this point the plea agreement and our order were fully
obeyed and fulfilled. Three months after the defendants commenced
service of their sentences, Judge Haggerty granted them shock pro-
bation. There was nothing in the law, the plea agreement, or the order
of this Court which withdrew authority to take that step from Judge
Haggerty. According to the statement of the prosecuting attorney in
oral argument to us, that authority was not contemplated by the con-
tracting parties in making their agreement. That authority was also
not contemplated by this Court in making its order.

The case of In Re Lemond, (1980) 274 Ind. 505, 413 N.E.2d 228, is
different. In that case at the point in time when the appellate court
order was to be fulfilled by delivering the child into the physical custody
of its mother in the court room as previously arranged, the judge used
jurisdiction stemming from a separate statute to frustrate the final
act. But most importantly, as expressly addressed in this Court’s opin-
ion, that jurisdiction did not arise in the court because procedures re-
quired by the statute governing it had not been complied with. There
are no such factors present in the behavior of Judge Haggerty in this
case.

In sum, the prosecuting attorney, like any party, like the accused,
is bound by the express terms of his contracts. He is entitled to no
special deference from courts permitting him to amend or alter the
terms of his contracts to the State’s advantage after they have been
set and then approved by the trial court. The State bargained for and
got an executed sentence. This Court ordered and got an executed
sentence. Judge Haggerty enforced the agreement and complied fully
with this Court’s order, and he is therefore not guilty.

Hunter, J., concurs.
NoTE— Reported at 419 N.E.2d 109.

VIRGIL VAN BIBBER, THE VAN BIBBER LAKESIDE RETREAT, INC.,
AND AMERICAN FLETCHER NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY ¥.
WILLIAM C. Norris.

(No. 481891. Filed April 3, 1981.]

Pred
ir}

Terrill D. Albright, James M. Carr, of Indianapolis, for appellant-
American Fletcher National Bank and Trust Company; Glenn E. Davis,
Sr., of Beech Grove, for appellants-Van Bibber and Van Bibber Lakeside
Retreat.

Robert J. Hoffman, Hugh G. Baker, Jr., Steven D. Allen, of Indianapolis,
for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— This case is before us on a petition to transfer from the
Court of Appeals, Fourth District. The opinion of that court is reported
at 404 N.E.2d 1365; reh’g den’d 408 N.E.2d 1302. We grant transfer and
vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff-appellee Norris brought this action against defendants-
appellants Virgil Van Bibber, Van Bibber Lakeside Retreat, Inc., and
American Fletcher National Bank for damages for the wrongful
repossession of his mobile home and the loss of its contents. The trial
court awarded damages of $5,000 for the home and $10,000 for the con-
tents against all the defendants, giving the Van Bibber defendants a
setoff of $1,837.41 for their claims against Norris.

In addition, the trial court assessed punitive damages of $10,000
against American Fletcher National Bank (AFNB) and $30,000 in
punitive damages jointly and severally against Virgil Van Bibber and
Van Bibber Lakeside Retreat, Inc., (referred to collectively as Van Bib-
ber). The Court of Appeals affirmed.

AFNB and Van Bibber separately appealed the decision, but because
the issues raised by the separate appellants are interrelated we will
treat them together.

We adopt the Court of Appeals’ statement of the facts:

“Norris purchased a mobile home from VanBibber in 1965. The
total time balance of this purchase was $5,738.04. This amount in-
cluded the finance charge and insurance expenses. Norris agreed
to pay the balance in 84 monthly installments of $68.31. These fell
due on the thirtieth day of each month. The contract between Van

fo

558

Bibber and Norris was on a form prepared by the bank. It was en-
titled ‘retail installment sale security agreement.’ Van Bibber
assigned the contract to the bank on a full repurchase basis.

“The contract contained the following provision:

‘Upon the occurrence of any of the following events or con-
ditions, namely: (i) default in the payment or performance
of any of the obligations of the Buyer or of any covenant or
liability contained or referred to herein; (ii) any warranty,
representation or statement made or furnished to the Seller
by or on behalf of the Buyer in connection with this Agree-
ment proving to have been false in any material respect when
made or furnished; (iii) loss, theft, substantial damage, destruc-
tion, sale or encumbrance to or of any of the Goods, or the mak-
ing of any levy, seizure or attachment thereof or thereon; (iv)
death, dissolution, termination of existence, insolvency,
business failure, appointment of a receiver of any part of the
property of, assignment for the benefit of creditors by, or the
commencement of any proceeding under, any bankruptcy or
insolvency laws by or against the Buyer or any guarantor or
surety for the Buyer; or (v) the Seller, for any reason deeming
itself insecure, the Seller may at its option without notice or
demand declare all of the Buyer's obligations to be immediately
due and payable and shall then have the remedies of a secured
party under the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in In-
diana (regardless of whether the Code has been enacted in the
jurisdiction where rights or remedies are asserted), including
without limitation thereof, the right to take possession of the
Goods, and for that purpose the Seller may, so far as the Buyer
ean give authority therefor, enter upon any premises on which
the Goods or any part thereof may be situated and remove
the same therefrom. The Seller may require the Buyer to make
the goods available to the Seller at a place to be designated
by the Seller which is reasonably convenient to both parties.
Unless the Goods are perishable or threaten to decline speedily
in value or are of a type customarily sold on a recognized
market, the Seller shall give the Buyer at least ten (10) days’
prior written notice of the time and place of any public sale
thereof or of the time after which any private sale or any other
intended disposition thereof is to be made. Expenses of retak-
ing, holding, preparing for sale, selling or the like shall include
the Seller’s reasonable attorney’s fees and legal expenses.’

“The repurchase obligation of Van Bibber was contained in the

following language:

be 559

‘This assignment is made:

(4) on a FULL REPURCHASE basis whereby Dealer
agrees to purchase the Goods from the Bank for the unpaid
balance due under the terms of the Agreement if the Goods
are repossessed by the Bank and offered to the Dealer within
90 days after maturity of the earliest installment remaining
unpaid, or if the Bank is required by law or by the order of
any court or governmental agency to hold said Goods for any
reason, the Dealer will accept delivery of the Goods as soon
as they can be delivered, notwithstanding the fact that delivery
may be delayed for such reason beyond the 90- day period men-
tioned above, and the Dealer will so purchase the Goods
although the Bank has, prior thereto, and without Dealer's con-
sent waived default by the Buyer in the performance of the
Agreement or has granted an extension of time to the Buyer
in which to perform, or has taken possession of Goods.’

“Very often Norris was late with his monthly payments. The
bank’s employee, John Runk, testified that out of fifty-nine
payments Norris was past due (five days late) fifty-seven times.
Thirty-seven times the account was delinquent (over ten days late).
The bank would press him for the payments. Eventually Norris
would make them. Sometimes his mother made the payments for
him. The bank’s brief also informs us that on seventeen occasions
installments were more than thirty days overdue. The bank twice
extended the maturity date.

“Norris initially kept the mobile home at a trailer park operated
by Van Bibber. Animosity developed between Norris and Van Bib-
ber. Norris eventually removed his mobile home from Van Bibber’s
trailer park. By this time Norris was allegedly indebted to Van Bib-
ber for about $400.00. This debt was evidenced by a promissory
note.

“Upon leaving the Van Bibber trailer park Norris moved his
mobile home to a park operated by Imperial Estates. Norris became
indebted to Imperial Estates.

“An installment on the bank loan fell due October 30, 1970. Nor-
ris did not pay the installment by that date. According to Runk’s
testimony the bank would not consider a payment delinquent un-
til ‘over ten days past the payment date.’ The tenth day was
November 9.

“On November 6, 1970, Imperial Estates filed a ‘Complaint for

560 ee

Rent and Restraining Order’ against Norris. The purpose of this
was to recover delinquent rent and various penalties. Imperial
Estates also prayed the court to order Norris not to remove his
mobile home from the trailer park. The Montgomery Circuit Court
issued the order the same day.

“Norris tried to remove his mobile home secretly from Imperial
Estates on the night of November 7-8. His friend Ronnie Van Bib-
ber, the son of defendant Van Bibber, assisted him in this attempt.
Norris planned to tow the trailer with a truck belonging to defen-
dant Van Bibber. The removal attempt was thwarted when Norris
was served with the restraining order.

“November 8 was a Sunday. That evening law officers arrested
and incarcerated Norris and Ronnie Van Bibber in Indianapolis on
a drug charge. The elder Van Bibber was not immediately aware
of this.

“The next morning, November 9, Van Bibber called John Runk
of the bank. Van Bibber first asked whether the account of Norris
was current. Runk ‘advised him that it was at that time.’ (This was
consistent with his testimony that the bank would not consider the
account delinquent until ten days after October 30, and November
9 was the tenth day.) After receiving this response from Runk, Van
Bibber then told him about the weekend incident at Imperial
Estates.

“Following this conversation Runk discovered in a local
newspaper that Norris had been arrested the night before. Runk
conferred with his superior, James McAllister, about the matter.
They decided to repossess the trailer even though Norris was cur-
rent on his account.

“That same morning Runk called Van Bibber to tell him of the
bank's decision to repossess. During this conversation Runk in-
formed Van Bibber of the arrest of Norris. At the same time Runk
discovered that the newspaper article also recounted the arrest
of Ronnie Van Bibber. This was the first information that Van Bib-
per had received of his son’s arrest.

“On November 9 the bank requested Van Bibber to repossess
the mobile home. Van Bibber did this on November 20 after the
bank agreed to pay the claim of Imperial Estates against Norris.
Van Bibber removed the mobile home from Imperial Estates to Van
Bibber’s trailer park the same day.

“On November 25, 1970, the bank mailed to Norris written notice
of the repossession. The bank sent the notice to the former address

[| 561
ee

of Norris at Imperial Estates. The bank gave the notice pursuant.
to a provision of the bank’s insurance coverage.

“Norris, meanwhile, resided in the Marion County Jail from
November 9 through the 23rd. From November 24 through
December 11 he was in the Crawfordsville jail. It was not until
December 11 that Norris was able to obtain release on bail.

“Tom Madden, a relative of Norris, contacted the bank on
December 2. He asked how the trailer could be reacquired by Nor-
ris. Runk informed Madden that it would be necessary to pay the
full amount owing on the contract, the amount reimbursed to Im-
perial Estates, and the costs of the repossession. Madden pursued
nothing further along this line.

“On December 14 the bank received a check from Van Bibber
for the repurchase of the home.

“After his release from jail Norris contacted Van Bibber. Van
Bibber refused to return the mobile home or its contents unless
Norris first paid him $2,580.00. This amount apparently included
the balance due on the purchase price together with other claims
such as delinquent rent. Norris did not pay this amount. Therefore
Van Bibber retained the mobile home and contents.

“Van Bibber stored some of the trailer’s contents in a warehouse.
These were subsequently destroyed by a fire. Van Bibber removed
from the trailer and gave to his children a television and a stereo
belonging to Norris. Eventually Van Bibber sold the mobile home.
The specific circumstances of the sale are not in the record.”

Because of our disposition of this case we will discuss first the issue
of whether the repossession was wrongful and then the question of liabil-

ity for wrongful disposition of the repossessed collateral and loss of the
contents of the mobile home.

L

Did the Trial Court Err in Determining That the
Repossession was Wrongful?

AFNB argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in deter-
mining that the repossession was wrongful, and claims that there were
three separate bases for such respossession: Norris’ failure to make
a payment when due; insecurity as to the prospect of performance; and
the existence of an encumbrance on the collateral.

562 ee
Pd

It also argues, as a separate issue, that the trial court erroneously
imposed a duty upon it to give notice of the acceleration and repossession.

A.

We will first discuss the contention that the trial court erred in holding
that AFNB had by its conduct waived its right to unconditional enforce-
ment of the acceleration and repossession terms of the default section
of the agreement, and that notice was required before these terms could
be enforced.

The trial court found that AFNB had, by continual acceptance of late
payments, waived its right to unconditional enforcement of the accelera-
tion and repossession terms of the default section of the agreement,
based on failure to make payments on time.

The trial court also made findings of fact that defendants did not give
notice to Norris of the AFNB’s intention to accelerate the balance due
or of its intention to repossess the mobile home, or of the repurchase
by Van Bibber. These facts supported the conclusion of law that the
acceleration and repossession without notice were wrongful.

The trial court's conclusion that AFNB had waived default ignored
the following language in the agreement:

“No waiver by the seller of any default shall be effective unless
in writing, nor operate as a waiver of any other default nor of the
same default on a future occasion.”

We will refer to this clause as the “non-waiver” clause.

AFNB argues that the missed installment payment of October 30,
1970, was a default enumerated in the agreement that triggered its
rights to acceleration and repossession under the contract and
Hi sunder the Uniform Commercial Code, Ind. Code § 26-1-1-101,

et seq.:

“Secured party’s right to take possession after default.— Unless
otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party
may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without
breach of the peace. .. .” Ind. Code § 26-1-9-503.

Norris argues initially that regardless of whether AFNB had waived
its right to strict compliance with the terms of the contract, the trial

court’s determination that the repossession was wrongful was based
in part on the fact that he was not in default on the date of the reposses-
sion because AFNB’s own practice called for no action to be taken on
a past-due account until it was ten days late. Even if we were to con-
sider the grace period as binding and as superseding the express terms
of the contract, we cannot agree that Norris was not in default. While
AFNB made its decision to repossess on November 9, the tenth day
after payment was due, the actual repossession was on November 20,
beyond the grace period. Norris was in default on the October payment
at the time the mobile home was repossessed.

Since Norris was delinquent, we must now consider whether the
AFNB’s pattern of accepting late payments amounted to a waiver of
its rights to declare the default and proceed with remedies under the
contract.

General rules of waiver are applicable to secured transactions and
have been summarized as follows:

“{T]he secured party may not ordinarily establish a pattern of
accepting time payments which may be slightly late and then sud-
denly insist on strict compliance with time provisions and declare
a forfeiture; in such case, where the parties have treated the time
clause as waived with respect to some payments, the secured party,
in order to avail himself of the right of forfeiture for failure to make
subsequent payments on time, must give reasonable, definite and
specific notice of his changed intention.” 79 C.J.S. Supp. Secured
Transactions § 100 (1974).

This generality, however, does not contemplate the impact on the

secured party’s rights of the insertion of a non-waiver clause, which has

the specific purpose of avoiding the risk of waiver by notifying

I the debtor in a contract term that the secured party’s accep-

tance of late payments cannot be relied on as treating the time
provisions as modified or waived.

Some courts have considered it to be a jury question whether accep-
tance of late payments amounts to a waiver of the non-waiver clause.
Smith v. General Finance, (1979) 243 Ga. 500, 255 S.E.2d 14. We con-
sider this approach to be illogical, since the very conduct which the clause
is designed to permit — acceptance of late payment —is turned around
to constitute waiver of the clause permitting the conduct.

564 ee
Cd

We believe the correct approach is that

“[U]nder an installment . . . contract providing that waiver of any

default shall not be deemed a waiver of any other or subsequent

default, the acceptance of late payments . . . does not constitute

a waiver of the secured party’s right to demand that payments be

made according to contract provisions, or to declare a default and

repossess. ...” 79 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transactions § 100 (1974).
See, e.g. McAllister v. Langford Investigators, Inc., (Ala. App. 1980) 380
S0.2d 299; General Grocer Co. v. Bachar, (1977) 51 I.App.3d 907, 365
N.E.2d 1106; Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor Sales, Inc.,
(Ky. 1968), 424 S.W.2d 409.

The article on Secured Transactions contains the following provision:

“General validity of security agreement. — Except as otherwise
provided by this act [26-1-1-101 — 26-1-10-106] a security agreement
is effective according to its terms between the parties, against pur-
chasers of the collateral and against creditors.”
Norris, by signing the retail installment sale contract, agreed to the
terms of the non-waiver clause.

Ifthe security agreement is to be truly effective according to its terms,
we must conclude that AF NB did not waive its rights to demand strict
compliance and to pursue its contract and statutory remedies.

The question remains, however, whether, even though there was no
outright waiver of the rights to declare a default, accelerate, and
repossess, there was nevertheless a duty to notify Norris that the rights
would be enforced and that the AFNB intended to repossess.

Jurisdictions are split on this question. One approach is to hold that
although the non-waiver clause preserves the substantive rights of the
secured party to declare a default and repossess the collateral in spite
of continual acceptance of late payments, where the fact of such con-
tinual acceptance would lead a buyer to believe that his late payments
would be accepted and that he would be allowed to catch up in his ar-
rearages, notification of a change in this pattern should be given to the
buyer before acceleration and/or repossession. See, e.g. Cobb v. Midwest
Recovery Bureau Co., (1980) Minn., 295 N.W.2d 232, 28 UCC Rep. 941;
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, (Fla., 1973), 273 So.2d 96.

We note that the former case is not a sound decision, since it begs

Le 565
Co

the question of the validity of the non-waiver clause. The cases it cites
all stand for the general proposition that notice is a prerequisite to ex-
ercise of the right to repossess after continual acceptance of late
payments. None of the cases cited in Cobb involved a non-waiver clause.

In short, this line of cases properly considers that the secured party
has preserved strict compliance through the non-waiver clause, but im-
poses the duty of notice.

Another approach is to hold that since a security agreement is to be
enforced according to its terms, an agreement containing a non-waiver
and non-modification clause gives the secured party the right to take
possession of the collateral without notice upon default. See Hale v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., (Ala., 1979), 374 So.2d 849; Wade v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., (D.C.E.D. Mo., 1978), 455 F.Supp. 147.

We believe the latter approach better serves the purpose of Ind. Code

§ 26-1-9-503, and carries out the terms to which Norris agreed. If the

non-waiver clause preserves the secured party’s right to de-

Hs mand strict compliance, and the debtor's failure to comply with

the terms would otherwise give rise to the secured party’s

right to repossession without notice, then, we believe, the right to
repossess without notice is similarly preserved.

As this Court said in analyzing the general concept of waiver:

“(TJhe vendor may waive strict compliance with the provi-
sions of the contract by accepting overdue or irregular pay-

Hs ments, and having so done, equity requires the vendor give
specific notice of his intent that he will no longer be indulgent
and that he will insist on his right of forfeiture unless the
default is paid within a reasonable and specified time. (Cita-
tions omitted.)

“It follows that where the vendor has not waived strict compliance

by acceptance of late payments, no notice is required to enforce its

provisions.” (Emphasis added.) Skendzel v. Marshall, (1973) 261 Ind.
226, 230-31, 301 N.E.2d 641, 643-44.

Since the secured party here is in the same position, by virtue of the
non-waiver clause, as one who never accepted a late payment, we con-
clude that no notice was required before it could proceed with its con-
tract remedies.

YO

566 —
Cd

Norris appears to argue that the trial court’s conclusion that the
repossession was wrongful was based on its findings that strict enforce-
ment of the terms of the agreement would offend the code’s pervasive
requirement of good faith, and would be unconscionable.

1. Good faith

The code provides that “[e]very contract or duty within this act im-
poses an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.”
Ind. Code § 26-1-1-203. “Good faith” is defined as “honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction.” Ind. Code § 26-1-1-201(19).
This requirement applies to secured transactions through Ind.
Code § 26-1-9-105(4).

Norris reaches into the article governing sales for an additional obliga-
tion imposed on merchants: “Good faith in the case of merchants means
honesty in fact and observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing in the trade.” Ind. Code § 26-1-2-103(1)(b).
This provision would apply to the original sale between Van
Bibber and Norris, but since we are not confronted with any claim of
lack of good faith in that transaction, we do not see its relevance here.

AFNB is not a merchant:

“Definitions.—(1) ‘Merchant’ means a person who deals in goods
of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as hav-
ing knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved
in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be at-
tributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other in-
termediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.” Ind. Code § 26-1-2-104.

We note, however, that the absence of a similar burden of observing
“reasonable comercial standards” on a secured party reflects the code
drafters’ recognition that sales transactions are more amenable to
establishment of “reasonable commercial standards” than are the rela-
tions between secured parties and debtors.

In any event, Norris claims that good faith requires that notice should
have been given before repossession.

Since the security agreement here closely tracks the Uniform Com-
mercial Code’s provisions authorizing repossession upon default unless
the parties have otherwise agreed, and since those provisions are not

[| 567
ee

predicated on the giving of notice, we cannot say that there could be
lack of good faith based on the secured party’s doing that which the
code clearly authorizes it to do.

2. Unconscionability

Norris claims that the trial court’s determination that the reposses-
sion was wrongful could have been based on its determination that the
provision allowing acceleration and repossession without notice was
unconscionable.

The article on Sales provides:

“Unconscionable contract or clause.—(1)If the court as a matter
of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the ap-
plication of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result.” Ind. Code § 26-1-2-302.

And according to § 26-1-9-201, a security agreement is valid to

Il the extent it is not unconscionable, or in some other way of-
fensive to the code.

In support of his claim that the provision is unconscionable, Norris
cites three cases which he claims hold that similar provisions were un-
conscionable particularly where late payments had been accepted.

Reliance on Fountaine v. Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island,
(1978) 111 R.I. 6, 298 A.2d 521, is misplaced. The secured party in that
case had accepted late installment payments in August and September,
and had received timely payment in October, but then repossessed the
collateral before the November payment was past due based on the
August default. There was a non-waiver clause similar to the one in this
case. The Rhode Island Supreme Court said that enforcement of such
a clause so as to permit a secured party to declare a default retroac-
tively would be unconscionable. The debtor would be subject to the peril
of repossession for the duration of the security agreement, despite timely
subsequent payments, based on a past default. But the Fontaine court
was not faced with the question whether under the security agreement
before it a default in November would have given rise to the right to
repossess in November.

Kosches v. Nichols, (1971) 68 Mise.2d 795, 327 N.Y.Supp.2d 968, is not
on point. It dealt with the constitutionality of a pre-judgment attachment
statute, which the court held unconstitutional in light of

HE Sniadach v. Family Finance, (1969) 395 U.S. 387, 89 S.Ct. 1820,

23 L.Ed.2d 349. It is well-settled that self-help provisions
authorized by Ind. Code § 26-1-9-503, do not involve state action invok-
ing constitutional protection. See, e.g. Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071
(7th Cir., 1978); Adams v. So. Calif. First National Bank, 492 F.2d 324
(Qth Cir., 1978), cert. den’d, (1974) 419 U.S. 1006, 95 S.Ct. 325, 42 L.Ed. 282,

Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Barnes, (1972) 126 Ga.App. 444, 191 S.E.2d
121, did not involve the problem of acceptance of late payments, but
did involve the validity of an acceleration clause. The Georgia Court
of Appeals held that the language of the particular clause precluded
the secured party from exercising the option to declare the entire balance
due on default unless notice was communicated to the debtor. The court
did not decide whether by other language the acceleration provision
could have been made to be self-executing.

No cogent argument is presented in support of the claim that the trial
court determined that the clause permitting acceleration and repossess-
ion without notice was unconscionable. Indeed, no evidence
H_swas presented at the trial on this issue and the trial court made
no findings of fact or conclusions of law that any part of the
security agreement was unconscionable. In dealing with a claim that
an acceleration clause of a contract was unconscionable, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, after scrutinizing the factual record and finding nothing
that would justify it in declaring such a clause (which it noted is univer-
sally accepted in the business world) to be unconscionable on its face
or as applied in the particular facts, said:

. “In the absence of extraordinary circumstances demonstrating op-
pression or grossly unfair dealing or the like not here present, or
conflict with the public policy of the state ... the court should not
declare unconscionable the provisions . . . deliberately agreed to
in the contract between the parties in this case.” King v. South
Jersey National Bank, (1974) 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1.

We decline to hold the acceleration and repossession clause
unconscionable.

Ye 569

The trial court erred in holding that there was no basis for reposses-
sion based on the October 30 delinquency and in holding that notice was
required before the acceleration clause could be enforced.

B.

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the bank
was not “insecure” at the time of the repossession and could not in good
faith have deemed themselves insecure, and that Norris established by
a preponderance of the evidence that the bank acted in bad faith.

The bank argues that the trial court applied incorrect standards as
to what constitutes good faith insecurity.

The code provides:

“Option to accelerate at will.— A term providing that one party
or his successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance
or require collateral or additional collateral ‘at will’ or ‘when he
deems himself insecure’ or in words of similar import shall be con-
strued to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good
faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is im-
paired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party
against whom the power has been exercised.” Ind. Code § 26-1-1-208.

Insecurity may be found either as to the debt itself or as to the collateral.
Univ. CLT. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 516, 829 N.E.2d
620.

The basis for the trial court’s conclusion is summarized in the follow-
ing findings of fact:

“5. That defendant, American Fletcher National Bank & Trust
Company authorized the defendant, Virgil Van Bibber to accomplish
the repossession of the mobile home, as their agent. That at the
time the repossession was ordered the defendants knew or should
have known that:

“(1) The plaintiff was no more than 10 days overdue on the
October payment.

“(2) The plaintiff had paid approximately 70% of the contract
price.

“(3) The value of the collateral exceeded the balance due on
the contract.

570 Pe
PC

“(4) The defendant, American Fletcher National Bank & Trust
Company had a repurchase agreement with the Van Bib-
ber Lake Retreat, Inc. and would suffer no monetary loss.

“(5) That defendant, American Fletcher National Bank &
Trust Company had previously prevailed upon plaintiff's
mother to make up past due payments and could
reasonably expect to do so again.

“(6) That the plaintiff was presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty of any criminal charges pending against him.

“(7) That the plaintiff was entitled to release from jail pend-
ing trial upon the posting of bail in a reasonable amount.”

We agree that reliance on these facts is erroneous. The relevant facts
of this case lead unerringly to the conclusion that Norris did not establish
lack of good faith.

Norris’ claim of lack of good faith was based on his theory that Van
Bibber, motivated by personal animus, prevailed upon the bank to
repossess. We do not need to examine this claim, since the evidence
clearly supports the conclusion that the bank had valid reasons for deem-
ing itself insecure.

First, the bank had had a continuing problem of collecting from Nor-
ris, and he was delinquent on the current payment due. His arrest cer-
tainly impaired his prospects of making the current and sub-
Hs sequent payments. The bank did not have an obligation to await
the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him. In addi-
tion, insecurity existed as to the collateral. The arrest meant that the
mobile home would be unoccupied for an indefinite period, placing it
in jeopardy. Moreover, the action by Imperial Estates Mobile Homes
Park owners imperiled the collateral and was a valid basis for insecur-
ity. This last factor was in itself an independent basis for default which
we will discuss below.

Norris did not meet his burden of proving that the bank did not in
good faith deem itself insecure.

Cc.

The bank urges that the trial court erred in ignoring the existence
of another basis for acceleration and repossession, Imperial Estates’ lien.

Norris answers that trial court did not err because the temporary

a 571
PO

restraining order did not constitute a lien but was merely an order
restraining him from removing the trailer. Even if Imperial Estates had
alien for unpaid rent, Norris continues, such a lien could not reasonably
be the form of encumbrance referred to in the security agreement,
because this would allow unscrupulous creditors to repossess collateral
with impunity whenever the lot rental was overdue.

Norris’ concern is unnecessary since the provisions of Ind. Code §
26-1-9-504 regarding notice of resale and the obligation to account to
the debtor for any surplus effectively remove any incentive for arbitrary
repossessions.

The temporary restraining order did not, as Norris points out, declare

alien in favor of Imperial Estates. There was, however, an already exist-

ing statutory lien pursuant to Ind. Code § 13-1-7-33

HM (Burns 16-9-2B-33) (lien on property of guest). This lien is

perfected by mere possession, and has a priority over a per-

fected security interest under Ind. Code § 26-1-9-310. The temporary

restraining order, therefore, protected the mobile home park owner's
statutory lien. A lien is an encumbrance.

The trial court erred in ignoring the attachment of a superior lien
which was an independent basis for acceleration and repossession.

D.

Finally Norris argues that overshadowing the entire question of the
wrongfulness of appellant’s repossession and acceleration is the fact that
at all material times the bank was fully protected against loss by the
repurchase terms of the assignment. This argument supports his theory
that no genuine basis for repossession was present and that it was based
entirely on malice. This contention has no merit, since Van Bibber’s
obligation to repurchase was contingent upon the bank’s repossession
of the collateral.

We hold that the trial judge misapplied the law in this case. There
were three independent grounds justifying acceleration of payment and
repossession of the collateral without notice: 1) the delinquent October
30 payment; 2) insecurity in good faith; and 3) the existence of an
encumbrance.

We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court against AFNB

572 —
Po

and enter judgment for the bank on all claims. We vacate the judgment
of the trial court against the Van Bibber defendants to the extent that
it was based on the determination that the repossession was wrongful
and malicious.

Il.

Was the Secured Party Liable for Wrongful Disposition of
the Repossessed Collateral and for the Loss of the Contents
of the Mobile Home?

Regarding Norris’ claim against the Van Bibber defendants for con-
version of the mobile home and for loss of its contents, we remand the
case for a new trial. We cannot determine from the trial court’s findings
to what extent the damages assessed against the Van Bibber defendants
were based on the wrongful repossession as opposed to the claimed
wrongful disposition of the collateral.

As to the claim of wrongful disposition of the repossessed collateral
and of loss of the contents of the mobile home, the Van Bibber defen-
dants are in a different posture from AFNB.

The Van Bibber defendants argue on appeal that they have no liabil-
ity arising from the resale of the mobile home. They claim that they
are actually three separate entities: the Van Bibber partnership which
sold the trailer to Norris; the Corporation, which purchased the mobile
home from the bank after repossession; and the natural person, Virgil
Van Bibber.

According to this theory, if the repossession was wrongful, none of
the Van Bibber entities could be liable since whichever one was involved
was merely an agent of the bank. Since we hold that the repossession
was not wrongful, we need not consider this claim.

Under this theory, however, the Van Bibber corporation claims to
have been a stranger to the initial sale and to the repossession, and to
have entered the picture only as a purchaser in an outright sale by the
bank of the repossessed collateral. Van Bibber, Inc., argues that it was
never under any obligation to Norris, citing Ind. Code § 26-1-9-504(4):

“When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default,

the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's
rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is

a 573

made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The
purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though
the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this part
or of any judicial proceedings.

“(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge
of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with
the secured party, other bidders or the person conducting the sale;
or

“(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.”

Van Bibber, Inc., argues that the trial court’s finding of fact that defen-
dant Van Bibber did not dispose of the mobile home in a commercially
reasonable manner is based on error as to the nature of the transaction
between the bank and Van Bibber, Inc., and as to the status of Van Bib-
ber, Inc., in the transaction.

The Van Bibber defendants did not disclose this theory in their answer
or during the trial, but raised it for the first time in the motion to cor-
rect errors. Their answer and trial strategy focused solely on the pro-
priety of the repossession and the propriety of their possession of the
collateral.

They are barred from raising this claim this late in the proceedings.
Even if we were to entertain this claim, we find the evidence to be quite
clear that the same Van Bibber entity which sold the mobile
Ho bome initially, repurchased the collateral from the bank. Van
Bibber, Inc.'s position in its pleadings was that the repossession
was proper and that its possession of the mobile home was pursuant
to the bank’s right of full recourse against it under the “erms of the
assignment of the security agreement. In his trial testimony Virgil Van
Bibber repeatedly referred to the transaction between himself and the
bank as a repurchase pursuant to the terms of the assignment. The
amount paid by Van Bibber, Inc., for the mobile home was for the exact
amount of the balance due from Norris, and the check for the payment
contained the notation, “Payoff on Wm. C. Norris Repo.”

The transaction was a repurchase. Indiana Code § 26-1-9-504(5) pro-
vides that “a person who is liable to a secured party under a... repur-
chase agreement . . . and who receives a transfer of the collateral from
the secured party ... has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured
party.”

574 ee
Ee

Indiana Code § 26-1-9-504(3) provides that “{ujnless collateral is
perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type custom-
arily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of

Hl the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notifica-

tion of the time after which any private sale or other intended
disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor... .”

Since the parties in their stipulations agreed that the debtor had paid
60% of the cash price, an additional duty was on the secured party pur-
suant to Ind. Code § 26-1-9-505:

“{A] secured party who has taken possession of collateral [on which

the debtor has paid 60% of the cash price] must dispose of it under

section [26-1-] 9-504 and if he fails to do so within ninety [90] days
after he takes possession the debtor at his option may recover in
conversion or under section [26-1-] 9-507(1) or the secured party’s
liability.”

Indiana Code § 26-1-9-507, provides in pertinent part:

“Tf it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this part disposition may be ordered
or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposi-
tion has occurred the debtor .. . has a right to recover from the
secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the pro-
visions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor
has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the
credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of
the debt or the time-price differential plus ten per cent of the cash
price.”

We remand this cause for a new trial on the sole issue of whether
the Van Bibber defendants complied with the provisions of Ind. Code
§ 26-1-9-504 and § 26-1-9-505, and whether they are liable for the loss

of the contents, noting that the record reveals that the bank, prior to
the repurchase by Van Bibber, Inc., sent a notice of resale to Norris
by certified mail to his Imperial Estates address.

Reversed in part and remanded for new trial in accordance with this
opinion.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Nore—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 115.

DAVID GEORGE KIMMEL v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 8798213. Filed April 7, 1981. Rehearing denied June 17, 1981.]

576 |

John D. Clouse, Michael C. Keating, of Evansville, James Lowenthal,
Coleman, Lowenthal & Lofton, of Bloomington, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.—After a trial by jury the appellant was sentenced on
February 20, 1979, to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of not
Jess than ten (10) nor more than twenty (20) years for burglary, and to
imprisonment for fifteen (15) years for the offense of sodomy while armed
with a dangerous weapon. He appeals.

Appellant raises five issues for our review. These concern the admis-
sion of evidence, the overruling of his Motion to Permit the Production
of Evidence of Jury Impropriety, the denial of his Motion for Serology
Examination, the trial court’s refusal to admit polygraph test results,
and the sufficiency of the evidence.

On the evening of June 12, 1977, the victim and her roommate were
in their residence at the Ardmore Apartments in Bloomington, Indiana.
Both went upstairs to their bedrooms around 10:00 p.m. K.G. went to
her bedroom, closed the door, turned out the light and went to bed. The
victim, D.C., went to her room, read for a while, and then turned out
the light and went to sleep. She awoke around 2:00 a.m. on the morning
of June 18, 1977, with someone’s hand over her mouth and nose. She
struggled briefly. She was told repeatedly not to scream. She said that
she would not scream and the person took his hand away. He leaned
over her, said he was lonely and wanted to talk, and sat down on the
bed. He told her his name was John and that he had come from the train
yard. He told her that if she wouldn't scream he would take the knife
away from her neck. After taking the knife away, he continued to hold
it while he talked. D.C. described this knife as a Bowie knife about ten
inches long. The man smoked a cigarette and extinguished it in the waste

Lt 517
Po

basket. He began touching her and she asked him to stop. He put the
knife against her neck and told her to be quiet. He removed her gown
and asked her if she had any baby oil. She said she did not, but that
she had some lotion on the dresser. He put lotion on her, made her turn
over and get on her knees. He had anal intercourse with her, zipped
his pants, told her not to tell anyone, and left. She heard him stand out-
side her room for a while, and then heard him going down the stairs.
She heard the front door open and the chain catch. She heard him take
off the chain and open the door. She got up, locked the door and went
to her roommate's room. She told her roommate that she had been raped.
They checked the apartment and called the police. They went downstairs
and noticed that the kitchen window was open.

Three police officers arrived and searched the area. A gumball and
a Vantage regular cigarette butt were found on the sidewalk. Finger-
prints were lifted from the inside door knob of the living room door.
A Vantage regular cigarette butt was recovered from the wastebasket
in D.C.’s room.

The victim gave a description of her assailant to police and she was
taken to the Bloomington Hospital. Dr. Bill Adamson examined her and
determined that she had scratches or cuts on her face, neck, and rectal
area. It was his opinion that she had had anal intercourse.

The victim later gave a statement and helped to construct a composite
picture of her attacker. In August, 1977, she viewed a photographic
lineup of eight individuals and picked one out of that lineup. Two or
three weeks later she viewed a live lineup with this person in it and
failed to pick him out. This person was not the appellant. In January
of 1978, she viewed a second live lineup in which the individuals spoke
certain phrases. At that lineup she picked out the appellant. At trial
she testified that this person’s voice, hair and facial features were the
same as her attacker's although she admitted that she was not absolutely
positive about the identification.

L
Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
that he had committed another crime which was unrelated to the one

for which he was being tried. Christean Eznor was permitted to testify,
and she related that on December 23, 1977, a man rang the doorbell

578 |

of her apartment at approximately 2:00 a.m. He asked if Lisa Cunning-
ham lived there. She responded, “No” and the man said, “Well, she’s
supposed to live in Beau Trace Apartments.” Those apartments were
located on the other side of Bloomington. Eznor said she was sorry
but she did not know Lisa Cunningham and had never heard of Beau
Trace Apartments. She shut the door and locked it. She was frightened
and looked in the Bloomington directory and the I.U. student direc-
tory but could find no listing for a Lisa Cunningham. She went upstairs
and then returned downstairs to find the front door open as far as pos-
sible with the chain attached. She walked into the dining room and
Saw a man peering in her window. He ducked beneath the window.
She pounded on the window and he stood up. She then called the police.

Two officers arrived approximately five minutes later. Christean was
showing them the window where she had seen the man when officer
Pickell saw a person meeting her description walk across Kighth Street.
The officers stopped him and on frisking him found a steak knife in
his pocket. This knife was approximately seven or eight inches long.
This individual was the appellant, Kimmel. He told the officers that
he had used the knife to clean rabbits. Kimmel was charged with Public
Intoxication and Carrying a Concealed Weapon. He pleaded guilty to
Public Intoxication. The charges of Carrying a Concealed Weapon were
dismissed. Appellant argues that this incident was not sufficiently
similar to the incident of June 18, 1977, to warrant its admission.

The general rule in Indiana concerning the admission of evidence

of separate, independent crimes or acts committed by an accused is

that such evidence is inadmissible. There are exceptions to

Il this rule recognized by our courts. It is well established that

evidence of other crimes may be used to prove intent, pur-

pose, motive, identity or a common scheme or plan. Porter v. State,

(1979) 272 Ind. 267, 397 N.E.2d 269; Willis v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 269,

374 N.E.2d 520, 522; Pierce v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 240, 248, 369 N.E.2d
617, 621.

The incident which occurred on December 23, 1977, which was the
subject of Christean Eznor’s testimony occurred at 2:00 a.m. in Bloom-
ington. David Kimmel was arrested after he had gone to an apartment
and asked for a woman who did not live there. Ms. Eznor had gone
upstairs and returned to find the front door open as far as the chain

[| 579

would permit and noticed someone ducking beneath her window. When
apprehended, Kimmel was found to have a seven or eight inch knife
in his pocket and was intoxicated. He was smoking Vantage cigarettes.

The incident which is the basis for this appeal also occurred in Bloom-
ington at 2:00 a.m. The victim also lived in an apartment. The window
was broken in, and Kimmel’s fingerprint was found on the living room
door. This incident involved burglary, and sodomy while armed with
a dangerous weapon, a knife, by an individual who had been drinking.
Vantage cigarettes were found outside, and the attacker had exting-
uished one in the wastebasket.

The State argues that this case is so similar to that of Porter v. State,
(1979) 272 Ind. 267, 397 N.E.2d 269, that the evidence of the other crime
should be admitted. The argument is also made that here, as in Porter,
the only discrepancies are due to the fact that the defendant’s efforts
were effectively thwarted by the victim. In Porter, the victim was
awakened when she heard someone in her apartment. She observed
a black man in her room brandishing a knife and ordering her not to
move. He removed his trousers, removed the victim’s panties, pene-
trated her and then cut her with the knife several times and threw
a plant stand at her. She ran to a window, opened it and screamed
for help, whereupon her attacker left. The other incident in Porter,
testified to by a State’s witness which was allowed into evidence was
that of another victim, who knew the defendant personally and lived
near the defendant’s residence. This victim testified that she was
awakened by someone standing in her bedroom doorway. She jumped
out of bed and asked who was there. The defendant grabbed her and
told her to be quiet or she would get hurt. She screamed and fought
her assailant. He finally left, escaping the same way he had entered,
by putting a ladder to the window of her brother’s bedroom, next to
hers, and breaking a window.

In Porter, supra, it was apparent that no sex was involved because
of the interruption and that no knife was used. Both victims were at-
tacked in their upstairs bedrooms during the early morning hours. Both
were threatened to be quiet and to cooperate or they would be harmed.
The second attack occurred near the first, both geographically and in
time. These facts were considered to be sufficiently similar to support
an inference that the appellant was the perpetrator of both attacks

580 ee

and this Court found the testimony of sufficient probative value to make
it competent evidence.

Here, it is also apparent that Kimmel was interrupted by Christean
Eznor’s calling the police. These incidents both occurred around 2:00
a.m., in the city of Bloomington. Both women lived in apart-
Hs ment complexes. In the first incident, entry was made through
a window, and Kimmel’s fingerprint was found on the inside
door knob. In the second incident, the door was opened as far as possi-
ble until stopped by the chain and Kimmel was observed under the
window. Vantage cigarette butts were left at the scene of the first
incident and Appellant Kimmel was smoking Vantage cigarettes when
he was arrested in the second incident. The perpetrator of the first
attack threatened his victim with a knife and Kimmel was carrying
a knife when he was arrested. In both incidents, the man involved had
been drinking. These facts are sufficiently similar to support an infer-
ence that the appellant was the perpetrator of both attacks, and we
find this testimony to be of sufficient probative value to make it com-
petent evidence.

I.

The appellant also claims that the trial court erred in denying defend-
ant’s motion to permit defendant to produce evidence of jury impro-
priety.

During the trial of this cause, on January 24, 1979, an article ap-
peared in a local newspaper, the Indiana Daily Student, stating that
the victim testified that she had previously identified the defendant
in a line-up. The next day a correction appeared in the paper, stating
that Police Sgt. Barbara Webb had said that the victim had identified
the defendant in the line-up.

The jury returned its verdict on January 26, 1979. On February 8,
1979, defendant filed a “Verified Motion to Permit Defendant to Pro-
duce Evidence of Jury Improprieties.” This motion was denied on
February 18, 1979. In his motion to correct errors the defendant filed
additional affidavits in support of his Motion.

Affidavits by Kimmel’s sister, brother, girlfriend and another indi-
vidual asserted that they had seen copies of the newspaper in the jury

[| 581
De

room. Kimmel’s attorney, James Lowenthal, filed an affidavit that Hugh
Martin of the Indiana Daily Student contacted Lowenthal and stated
that he had spoken with three jurors who admitted that the Indiana
Daily Student and other newspapers were in the jury room on a daily
basis during the trial of this cause. Each of the jurors had denied that
they had read any articles in any newspaper.

The judge denied the motion and stated his reasons for doing so.
The reasons, in brief, were that no impropriety by any juror was al-
leged, only the possibility of a view of a headline; that there was no
allegation that such a headline was prejudicial to the defendant; that
the allegations were based on a volunteered hearsay statement; that
there was no allegation that the printed information was falsified or
contained any facts not presented to the jury at trial; that the jurors
contacted denied having read any article and stated that any paper
in the jury room was covered; and that it was the law that a jury’s
verdict could not be impeached by testimony of jurors. The court denied
defendant's request for a hearing.

Appellant relies heavily on Lindsey v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 851, 295
N.E.2d 819 in his argument that the trial court’s failure to interrogate
the jurors regarding the alleged impropriety was reversible error. In
Lindsey, supra, this court held that the trial court’s failure to inter-
rogate the jury regarding alleged improprieties was reversible, but
it was made clear that the risk of prejudice must be substantial. In
Lindsey, the publicity complained of contained erroneous and inadmis-
sible information. In Bruce v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 180, 375 N.E.2d 1042
the Lindsey procedure was analyzed further and two types of prejudicial
reports were discussed; (1) inflammatory matter which would not be
admissible at trial and (2) misstatements or distortions of the evidence
given at trial.

Here, the newspaper article involved simply stated on one day that
the victim testified that she had previously identified the defendant.
The next day, a correction appeared stating that Police Sgt.

Hs Barbara Webb had said that the victim had identified the
defendant in a line-up. This newspaper statement was cor-

rect except for the reporter's error as to who had made the statement.
In Lindsey, supra, and in Bruce, supra, this Court emphasized that

582 ee
Ee

if the risk of prejudice appears substantial, the court should interrogate

the jurors as follows:
“Upon a suggestion of improper and prejudicial publicity, the trial
court should make a determination as to the likelihood of resulting
prejudice both upon the basis of the content of the publication
and the likelihood of its having come to the attention of any juror.
If the risk of prejudice appears substantial, as opposed to im-
aginary or remote only, the court should interrogate the jury col-
lectively to determine who, if any, has been exposed.”

Bruce v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 180 at 218, 375 N.E.2d at 1063.

The situation in the present case is further distinguished from the
situation in Lindsey because this alleged prejudicial publicity was not
brought to the judge’s attention until after the verdict. In Hardiman
v. State, (1978) 176 Ind.App. 557, 377 N.E.2d 1384, the First District
of the Court of Appeals considered this precise issue and held that
the precautionary procedures set forth in Sacks v. State, (1977) 172
Ind.App. 185, 360 N.E.2d 21 [which were the Lindsey, supra, procedures]
do not apply when alleged jury misconduct was not brought to the
court’s attention until after the verdict had been rendered.

The trial court here considered the alleged jury impropriety as
presented in defendant's motion filed on February 8, 1979, and in
defendant's motion to correct errors. The court considered the matter
on the basis of its content and the likelihood of its having come to the
attention of any juror. It is clear that the trial judge determined that
there was no substantial risk of prejudice because of the newspapers
or articles. There is no error on this issue.

Til.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in denying his mo-
tion for serological examination. Appellant Kimmel had filed a Peti-
tion for Serological Examination of Semen on February 5, 1979, which
was granted on February 6, 1979. He filed another Motion for Sero-
logical Examination on April 18, 1979, which was directed to obtaining
the blood type and secretor status of the victim. This motion was denied
on the same day. The jury had returned their verdict on January 26,
1979, and Appellant was sentenced on February 20, 1979. Appellant
argues that the denial of the motion filed April 18, 1979, constitutes
error under Ind. R. Tr. P. 59(A)(5), uncorrected error of law occurring

Le 583

and properly raised subsequent to trial and under Ind. R. Tr. P. 59
(A)(6), newly discovered evidence. He claims that it was from the last
witness on Thursday, January 25, 1979, the day before the verdict,
that he learned that a valid test was available from which blood type
or group could be determined from semen samples taken from the vic-
tim. Kenneth Houck, a laboratory technician testified that such tests
could be conducted if semen samples had been taken and retained. At
trial, Dr. Anderson, the gynecologist who had examined the victim,
reiterated his opinion that such tests were unavailable. Appellant claims
that the possibility exists that if these tests were made, it is possible
that the results would be favorable to him. He also is basing his claim
on the fact that he learned about the possibility of making such a test
only when Kenneth Houck testified on the day before the verdict was
rendered. Kenneth Houck was a defense witness, and it appears that
with reasonable diligence the defense could have discovered that such
a test was possible before trial.

Trial Rule 59 (A)(6) provides for relief in the event of “newly
discovered material evidence which could not, with reasonable diligence
have been discovered and produced at the trial.” “Motions
Hl predicated upon newly discovered evidence are viewed with
disfavor. The grant or refusal thereof is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court, and upon review, we will reverse the trial
court’s denial of such motion only if it could not reasonably have reached
a conclusion that, upon re-trial, a different result would not be prob-
able. Williams v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 385, 304 N.E.2d 311; Beyer et
al. v. State, supra.” Helton v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 211, 402 N.E.2d 1263,
1267.

Defendant’s proper remedy, if he were surprised at trial by the

testimony of Kenneth Houck, would have been to seek a continuance.

Washington v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 179, 402 N.E.2d 1244; Min-

HH ion ». State, (1978) 269 Ind. 39, 378 N.E.2d 639. By failing to

move for a continuance, appellant has waived any alleged er-

ror. Siblisk v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 651, 336 N.E.2d 650. There is no
error on this issue.

Iv.

Appellant seeks to have this court reconsider and reverse its posi-
tion on the use of polygraph examinations. He admits that the trial

584 |
Po

court abused no discretion in refusing to admit polygraph results or
to allow reference to them. His argument is designed to plead for a
change in law. His argument is based on his contention that the poly-
graph is a valid and reliable instrument when in the control of a com-
petent operator. He additionally claims that the results of such an
examination, in the opinion of the operator, proved Kimmel was not
guilty of the offenses charged.

It is well settled in Indiana that the results of a polygraph examina-
tion of a witness or a party are inadmissible in a criminal prosecution
absent a waiver or stipulation by the parties. Pavone v. State,
HB (1980) 273 Ind. 162, 402 N.E.2d 976; Tope v. State, (1977) 266
Ind. 239, 362 N.E.2d 187, cert. denied 489 U.S. 869, 98 S.Ct.
209, 54 L.Ed.2d 146. This Court has specifically stated its concerns that
the test is not sufficiently accurate to mandate its admission. Vacen-
dak v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 101, 340 N.E.2d 352, cert. denied 429 U.S.
851, 97 S.Ct. 141, 50 L.Ed.2d 125. This Court has also expressed its
fear that the jury will give undue weight to a polygraph test's validity.
Williams v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 365, 375 N.E.2d 226 at 227. We reaf-
firm our holdings that polygraph examinations and results are inad-
missible in a criminal prosecution absent a waiver or stipulation by
the parties.

Vv.

Appellant finally claims that the evidence against him was insuffi-
cient to sustain his conviction. He does not argue that the State failed
to prove any element of the crimes. Rather, he claims that there was
insufficient evidence to identify him as the perpetrator.

When the issue of sufficiency of the.evidence is raised on appeal,
this Court will neither weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility
of witnesses. Rather, we will consider only the evidence which is most
favorable to the State, together with all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom, and if, from that evidence a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the convic-
tion should be affirmed. Willard v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 589, 400 N.E.2d
151.

The evidence as previously set out in this opinion revealed that a
fingerprint identified as that of the appellant Kimmel was found on

be 585
Ee

the inside door knob of the living room door. The victim picked

Hs Kimmel out of a live lineup in which each individual spoke

certain phrases, testifying that his voice was “the same voice

Theard that night.” She also stated that his hair color and facial features

were as she had described. Both the perpetrator of this crime and Kim-
mel smoked Vantage cigarettes.

Appellant contends that it is necessary to establish that the finger-
print could have been impressed only at the time the crime was com-
mitted and that this was not done. His argument is that he explained
that he attended a party a month prior to the incident in this apart-
ment and that that was when his fingerprint was made on the door
knob. He contends that this explanation should have been believed.

A fingerprint expert testified that if someone had touched the print
it would have been erased or smudged, or a double impression would
have been left. The victim and her roommate testified that during their
residence in the apartment a cable T.V. man had used the door and
that they used the door. A witness who was a resident of the apart-
ment at the time Kimmel alleged he attended a party there did not
recall seeing him at the party. The jury was not required to believe
the appellant’s explanation of his fingerprint on the door knob.

In Paschall v. State, (1972) 152 Ind.App. 408, 283 N.E.2d 801, the Court
of Appeals held that the presence of a fingerprint of the defendant
found on the inside door knob of a burglarized house was suf-
Il ficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the burglar.
The Court of Appeals quoted the following language from
Shuemak v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 117, 258 N.E.2d 159:
“Under the circumstances it is universally recognized a finger,

palm or bare footprint found in the place where a crime was com-
mitted may be sufficient proof of identity.”

152 Ind.App. at 412, 288 N.E.2d at 804.
Here the evidence was sufficient.
Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, and DeBruler, JJ., concur.
Prentice, J., dissents without opinion.
NotTE— Reported at 418 N.E.2d 1152.

586 |
Pd

VON CARLOS WILSON v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 280852. Filed April 7, 1981.]

Walter E. Bravard, Jr., of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Cindy A. Ellis, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— Appellant Wilson was convicted in a trial by jury of rob-
bery, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1, and attempted murder, Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1,
and Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. He received concurrent sentences of forty
years’ imprisonment. In this appeal two basic issues are presented,
namely:
(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the verdicts
of guilty; and
(2) Whether the testimony of the victim identifying appellant
was properly admitted.

I.
The gravamen of the offense was that appellant entered the house

of John Williams brandishing a handgun, tied Williams up, took his
money, shot him in the chest and hit him on the head. He contends

P| 587
CL

that the evidence serving to identify him as the perpetrator of these
offenses was wholly insufficient to support the jury verdict. In deter-
mining this question we do not weigh the evidence nor resolve ques-
tions of credibility, but look to the evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom which support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind.
401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction will be affirmed if from that view-
point there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier
of fact could infer that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Glover v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 536, 255 N.E.2d 657.

The evidence gleaned from the record tending to support the ver-
dict disclosed that the victim John Williams lived in his house in In-
dianapolis on October 24, 1978, that he was seventy-one years old, and
was a collector of numbers by occupation. He was watching television
in the early afternoon when a man knocked on the door. When he
answered it appellant Wilson was standing on the front porch pointing
a gun at him. Appellant entered the house and tied Mr. Williams up.
As he was being tied up Williams saw a second man enter the house
and heard this person rummaging through items in the house. Once
he had bound Williams, appellant searched through his pockets and
took money. He told his accomplice that Williams had been lying to
him, whereupon he then shot Williams in the chest and clubbed him
over the head.

Police, in the mobile crime lab, who were called to the scene were
able to lift latent fingerprints from several objects in the house in-
cluding a carving knife and a vase. These were later found to match
the fingerprints of appellant.

The evidence serving to prove that appellant was the man who bound
and shot Williams and took his money came from Williams and police
officers who lifted latent prints from objects located within the house.
Williams pointed out appellant in court during his testimony as his
assailant. The testimony from investigating officers in sum was that
the fingerprint lifted from the inside lip of a vase which was located
in the living room of the house, and which had been knocked over was
that of the left middle finger of appellant Von Wilson. They also testified
that the print lifted from the knife which was found on the television
in the living room of the house was that of the right index finger of

588 ee

appellant Von Wilson. Williams further testified that the knife was
kept in the kitchen, and that neither appellant nor his companion had
been in the house at any time before October 24, 1978.

This proof was clearly susceptible of belief by the trier of fact, and
if believed was sufficient to warrant the conclusion beyond a reasonable
doubt that appellant was the man who robbed Williams and

HE attempted to kill him.

I.

Appellant also contends that reversible error occurred when the trial
court refused to suppress the in-court identification of appellant by
Williams. Due process of law requires the suppression of in-court iden-
tification testimony which has been preceded by an out-of-court iden-
tification which itself was produced through utilization by the police
of procedures so unnecessarily and impermissibly suggestive of guilt
as to create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifica-
tion. Stovall v. Denno, (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d
1199; Neil v. Biggers, (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401;
Sawyer v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 597, 298 N.E.2d 440.

The proof tending most strongly to support the motion to suppress
was that Williams had very thick cataract glasses which were badly
damaged in the attack. While in the hospital he may have learned from
non-police, non-official sources the names of his assailants. The police
came to the hospital and showed him several photographs, and he
selected one of appellant from them as his assailant. None of the
photographs had names upon them, and there is no proof that the police
said anything suggestive on that occasion, or that he had given appel-
lant’s name to the police prior to that time.

This evidence is contradicted by the testimony of Williams in which
he testified that he was unable to identify appellant while in the hospital
and did not identify a photograph of appellant until he was

Hs home and was presented a group of ten to twelve photographs
from which he selected one of appellant. Even though we are

not required to credit the strongest version of conflicting evidence
under our standard governing review of the trial court’s denial of sup-
pression, were we to do so here, it would not warrant setting aside
the trial court’s ruling. The practice of exhibiting a number of

oO

Le 58

photographs to a crime victim by police for purposes of identification
is not as a general proposition unduly suggestive. It is only when such
a display is accompanied by graphic or verbal communications or in-
dications tending unfairly to single out one of the photographs as that
of a suspect that such procedures may be condemned as unnecessarily
and impermissibly suggestive of guilt. Parker v. State, (1981) 275 Ind.
142, 415 N.E.2d 709; Sawyer v. State, supra; Parker v. State, (1977) 265
Ind. 595, 358 N.E.2d 110. There is no proof here warranting the conclu-
sion that the extrajudicial identification procedure employed by the
police was unnecessarily suggestive. The trial court did not err in refus-
ing to suppress the in-court identification of appellant by the victim
Williams.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice, and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 1150.

ROBERT Doty v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 380861. Filed April 8, 1981.]

590 |

Gregory D. Ball, Wayne County Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— Appellant, Robert Doty, was convicted following a trial
by jury of the crime of murder pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
He received a sentence of forty years’ imprisonment. On appeal the
following issues are raised:

(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit a defense
witness to testify that five years before the offense alleged, ap-
pellant accidentally discharged a gun.

(3) Whether the trial court erred in permitting cross-examination

of appellant beyond the scope of his direct examination.

(4) Whether the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor

to first present proof of motive on rebuttal.

Appellant was charged with having “knowingly” killed Willie Eaton
by shooting him with a shotgun. He contends that the evidence serv-
ing to show that he had the requisite culpability at the time the gun
was discharged causing the mortal wounds to Mr. Eaton was insuffi-
cient. In determining this question we do not weigh the evidence nor
resolve questions of credibility, but look to the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom which support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970)
254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction will be affirmed if from
that viewpoint there is evidence, direct or circumstantial, of probative
value from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that appellant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover v. State, (1970) 253 Ind.
536, 255 N.E.2d 657.

Le 591
pT

An examination of the evidence presented at trial from this view-
point shows that on January 22, 1979, at about 2:00 p.m. appellant was
riding alone about the city of Richmond in his auto. His path crossed
that of the victim Eaton who was also driving about the city accom-
panied by his son, one Charles Patterson, and one other person. Eaton
was driving Patterson to a television supply house to get a tube. Ap-
pellant and Eaton exchanged pleasantries. Eaton invited appellant to
come to church where he was preacher. Appellant’s reply was not
understood by the other occupants of the Eaton car; however, it was
not made in an angry or threatening manner. As the cars continued
on appellant fell in behind the Eaton car and as it slowed to turn, ap-
pellant struck the rear end of it. Mr. Eaton continued driving until
he stopped in front of the television supply company and let Mr. Pat-
terson out, whereupon appellant again struck the car from behind.

According to the testimony of at least three persons present at that
point on the street at that time, including that of Teresa Stone, ap-
pellant emerged from his car carrying a shotgun. He pointed it at Teresa
Stone, a passerby on the sidewalk who was carrying her two year old
child and told her to stand still and not move. He then told Patterson
as he was entering the supply house not to call the police. He then
opened the driver's door of the Eaton car with his left hand and pointed
the shotgun at Mr. Eaton who was behind the wheel saying, “Get your
fat ass out of that car, you have fucked up.” He then asked Eaton
whether he was scared to which Eaton replied, “Yes”, whereupon ap-
pellant shot him at point blank range, inflicting a wound in the abdomen
from which he soon bled to death.

Appellant then walked back to his car, threw the gun in the front
seat, got in, and drove off.

Appellant then drove to a nearby lounge, where he induced his uncle
to get in the car, and held the shotgun on him while they drove off.
As appellant drove along he almost struck another car, and his uncle
yelled at him, and then in the excitement of the moment grabbed the
gun away from appellant. The gun was loaded with five shells. Appel-
lant then drove his uncle home. The gun belonged to the uncle who
had loaned it to appellant for hunting rabbits. Appellant said, “I blowed

two away and you're next.” When his uncle got out of the car, appellant
said, “Take the gun and go on and I hope you get caught with it.”

The uncle also testified that he had been hunting with appellant two
or three times and that appellant knew how to handle firearms in a
safe manner. When he recovered the gun from appellant in the car,
it had the safety on.

Appellant was charged with having the “knowing” state of mind,
which is defined by statute in the following manner:

“(b) A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he
engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he
is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2.

Appellant testified in his own defense that he intended to give Eaton
the shotgun so that he could return it to his uncle, and that in present-
ing Eaton with the gun, it accidently discharged causing the
Hs wortal wounds to Eaton. He also testified that he had unloaded
the gun and thought that it was still unloaded, although ad-
mitting that he had been reckless in failing to check that out before
giving it to Eaton. It is upon this testimony which appellant urges is
uncontradicted and corroborated that he rests his claim that the
evidence of culpability was insufficient. This was direct proof presented
under oath by appellant which along with corroborative matters could
have been accepted by the trier of fact at face value. However, it does
not stand uncontradicted, as it is directly opposed by the inference
arising from the proof presented by the State that appellant, knowing
the gun to be loaded, took it from his car for the purpose of using it
to kill Eaton. This opposing inference arises from the proof of his angry
threats against bystanders and Eaton and the manner in which he aimed
it at the person of Eaton and then discharged it. It was for the jury
to choose which of these two versions of appellant's state of mind at

the time of the shooting it would credit.

The question before this Court is not whether the jury could reason-
ably have accepted a construction of the evidence implying appellant's
innocence, but whether it could reasonably have accepted one

HB of his guilt. The proof presented was sufficient to warrant
the jury in believing that version of events presented by the

[| 593
pe

witnesses for the State and in concluding therefrom that appellant
knowingly killed Eaton.

The claim is made that the trial court erred in refusing to permit
a defense witness to testify that appellant had accidentally discharged
a gun and blew a hole in the trunk of his car.

According to the offer to prove, the witness would have testified
that she was sitting on her front porch and observed appellant work-
ing inside the trunk of his car. She heard a gun go off. She went to
the car and saw a long gun lying down inside the trunk and saw a hole
that had been blown in the trunk.

The event occurred five years prior to the incident resulting in this

charge. It was but a single instance. The substance of it with regard

to appellant’s state of mind at the time is doubtful. It was

Hs sought to be introduced by the defense to provide a basis for

the inference that appellant at the time of the shooting of

Eaton had a trait or had developed a behavioral pattern or propensity

to handle firearms in a careless manner. It would not render this desired

inference more probable and therefore did not meet the test of rele-

vance. Pirtle v. State, (1975) 268 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634. Cf. Tolbert
v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 269, 391 N.H.2d 823.

The claim is made that the trial court erred in permitting the prose-
cution to question appellant on cross-examination about an incident
occurring two months before the killing of Eaton, in which

Hs appellant taunted Eaton and slapped him, and Eaton struck
appellant in response. Generally the cross-examination of a

witness is to be limited to the subject matter of his examination in
chief. Rusher v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 520, 270 N.E.2d 748. During direct
examination appellant in testifying provided a basis for the inference
that there was no hard feeling or dispute between him and the victim.
He stated that he was acquainted with the victim, knew where he
worked, and what shift he worked. He stated that the exchange with
Eaton while in their cars had been friendly. He testified that he removed
the shotgun from his car in order to entrust it to Mr. Eaton, and that
it was within his expectations that Eaton would respond by doing him
the favor of delivering it to the uncle. Through this testimony appellant
sought to implant in the mind of the jury that his feelings toward Eaton

594 |
a

were friendly and not retributive or vengeful. His defense in essence
was that he had no motive. The challenged cross-examination by the
trial prosecutor was upon this same subject matter and was therefore
not outside the scope of permissible cross-examination as contended.

The claim is made that the trial court erroneously permitted the

prosecution to present proof on rebuttal of motive which appellant may

have had for killing Eaton. The victim’s widow and son de-

Hl scribed in detail the fight which appellant had with Eaton two

months prior to the shooting. Appellant correctly states that

motive is not a separate element or burden in a homicide case. He fur-

ther contends that proof therefore of motive is inadmissible as irrele-
vant. This contention is incorrect.

“The State is allowed, but not required, to prove that an accused
had some understandable reason for committing the crime charged,
because such evidence has probative value in determining whether’
he committed that crime.” Bruce v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 180, 256,
375 N.E.2d 1042.

“All circumstances relative to or tending to shed light on the in-

tent or motive of the defendant or tending fairly to explain his

actions are admissible even though they occurred prior to the

crime.” Hart v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 358, 359, 375 N.E.2d 221.
Here, appellant’s hostile acts towards the victim two months before
the shooting were relevant on the issue of culpability and to rebut ap-
pellant’s defense on the facts that he had no motive to shoot and kill
Eaton.

Appellant also argues that the evidence was prejudicial and this qual-
ity far outweighed its probative value and should therefore have been
excluded. The testimony given by the widow and her son who observed
and participated in the events did portray appellant to have a tendency
to be cruel. At the same time however, absent this testimony there
was no understandable reason for appellant’s alleged gross conduct.
The absence of such a reason would have seriously weakened the case
for the prosecution as it developed at trial. It was not therefore inad-
missible on this basis.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
Note—Reported at 422 N.E.2d 653.

595

THOMAS CALBERT v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 280856. Filed April 9, 1981.]

Timothy J. Burns, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Gordon R. Medlicott, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.—This is a direct appeal from convictions for rape, Ind.
Code § 35-42-4-1, and criminal deviate behavior, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2,
class A felonies. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for thirty
years on each count, the sentences to be served concurrently. Ten years’
imprisonment was suspended from each term. Appellant raises two
issues on appeal: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to establish
rape and criminal deviate conduct; and (2) whether there was suffi-
cient evident to establish the class A convictions.

The evidence most favorable to the State shows the following. Ap-
pellant had hired S.F. to work in his office, and on the day she reported
to start work, as she was about to leave in the afternoon after taking
down notes dictated by appellant, he grabbed her by the legs, ordered
her to lie on the floor and threatened to “punch her lights out.” When

596 |
Po

S.F. attempted to resist, appellant threatened to kill her. He knocked
S.F. to the floor, sat on her upper abdomen and slapped her repeatedly.
As S.F. continued to resist, appellant threatened her saying “I'll kill
you, I’ll kill you.” Appellant inserted his penis into S.F.’s mouth and
then bit her on the vulva. Continuing to threaten her life, appellant
then had sexual intercourse with S.F. After the assault, S.F. left the
office immediately, drove to her home, and called the state police. A
state trooper met her at a restaurant and took her directly to a hospital
for examination.

I

Appellant claims that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient
to support the convictions. After pointing out that the convictions were
based entirely upon the “essentially uncorroborated testimony
Hof [the victim, S.F.],” appellant concedes that Indiana law is
clear that such testimony can be sufficient to sustain a con-
viction, citing Beard v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 648, 323 N.E.2d 216; Lynch
v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 360, 316 N.H.2d 372; and Quassy v. State, (1975)
167 Ind.App. 205, 338 N.E.2d 283. His claim in essence is that S.F.’s
testimony is contradictory and not credible. He cites the facts that S.F.
testified that despite having an opportunity to leave during the assault
she did not do so; that she had indicated that appellant had had an
ejaculation during the rape, but hospital tests revealed no sperm pres-
ent in the vagina; that hospital tests revealed only a superficial abra-
sion on the vulva, and no indication of trauma to the head or abdomen;
and that she was quoted by the examining physician as having denied
having oral sex forced upon her.

We have said many times that in reviewing a sufficiency claim we

will neither weigh the evidence nor determine credibility, but we will

examine the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom

HB sowhich support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401,

260 N.E.2d 558. We will affirm the conviction if from that view-

point there is evidence of probative value, direct or circumstantial,

from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that appellant was

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 536,
255 N.E.2d 657.

Appellant asks this Court to make a determination of credibility.
This, the jury has already done, and it is not our province to redeter-

Yi 597
CL

mine the question. There was sufficient evidence before the jury on
all the elements of each of the crimes charged to support verdicts of
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

IL.

Appellant next argues that even if there was sufficient evidence to
support the verdicts of guilty of rape and criminal deviate behavior,
this evidence was insufficient to support the class A felony charges.

Both rape and criminal deviate conduct are class A felonies if com-
mitted by using or threatening the use of deadly force, or while armed
with a deadly weapon.

If the verdict was based on the use of deadly force, he first main-
tains, the evidence was insufficient. Appellant correctly recites the
definition of “deadly force” found in Ind. Code § 35-41-1-2, as
HE “that [which] creates a substantial risk of serious bodily in-
jury”, and the definition of serious bodily injury found in the
same section as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death
or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, unconscious-
ness, extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment
of a bodily member or organ.” He asserts that the testimony regard-
ing the element of force failed to prove serious bodily injury. The force
need not cause actual harm. Rather, it is enough, according to the
statute, if it created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. The
record reveals that S.F. was thrown to the floor, sat upon, bitten, and
repeatedly slapped. These actions clearly created a substantial risk
of serious injury to the victim.

If the verdict was based on the threat to use deadly force, he next
maintains, a substantial question of first impression is presented to
this Court: ‘Does slapping a person along with statements of ‘I'll kill
you,’ without more, meet the definition of threatening deadly force?”

Appellant urges this Court to adopt the view that the Legislature
in defining deadly force used the term “serious bodily injury” to indicate
its intent to require a showing of more than an idle and meaningless
threat. To permit this conviction to stand as a class A felony would,
he asserts, render the presumptive class B designation of these offenses
meaningless. To illustrate his point, he suggests first the hypothetical

598 |
— EE

case of a woman who submits to a forcible act of intercourse by a man
who does not utter one word. Were the victim to testify that she sub-
mitted because she was in fear of death or great bodily injury, appellant
asks if the offense could reach a class A proportions.

He next suggests the same case but with the man uttering the words,
“TIL kill you”, without any demonstrated capacity or inclination to carry
out the act. Again he asks whether the offense could reach class A
proportions.

We agree that the statute requires a showing of more than an idle
threat. We do not need to reach the questions posed by the hypotheticals
since they are not presented here, although in a recent case in which
a defendant threatened to pull a knife on his victim unless she perform-
ed oral sex on him, we held that such conduct did constitute a threat
to use deadly force within the meaning of the rape and criminal deviate
conduct statutes, even though no knife was actually seen. Zollatz v. State,
(1980) 274 Ind. 550, 412 N.E.2d 1200. The threats to kill here were ut-
tered in a context in which appellant was actually inflicting injury on
S.F. and we believe that these threats are within the contemplation of
the statute.

The evidence was sufficient to sustain the class A felony verdicts.
The convictions are affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ. concur.

NotTe—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 1158.

STATE OF INDIANA ON THE RELATION OF JOHN A. WORSTELL AND
DIANE WORSTELL v. THE PORTER SUPERIOR COURT AND RAYMOND
B. KICKBUSH, AS JUDGE OF SAID CouRT.

[No. 12808441. Filed April 15, 1981.)

599

Hoover Law Offices, of Valparaiso, for relators.

F. Joseph Jaskowiak, Hoeppner, Wagner & Evans, of Valparaiso, for
respondents.

PRENTICE, J.—Relators seek a writ of prohibition and mandate pro-
hibiting further action in furtherance of Respondents’ grant of a change
of venue and mandating Respondents to vacate the order granting such
change, all in that certain cause entitled Design Organization, et al. v.
John A. Worstell, et al., pending in Respondent Court under Cause No.
TT-PSC-1897.

Relators were the original defendants in said cause No. 77-PSC-1897.
On April 7, 1980, the cause was set for trial on March 3, 1981. Thereafter,
on July 8, 1980, Nostalgia, Inc. and Peter Scovill were added as party
defendants and ordered to file responsive pleadings within thirty days.
Notice of such action was not properly given, however, and on August
6, 1980, they appeared and requested and were granted an additional
thirty days to plead. On August 13, 1980, they filed a motion for a change
of venue, which the Respondent granted on September 25, 1980. It is
this grant which the Relators here seek to have set aside by issuance
ofa writ from this Court prohibiting Respondents from taking additional
action in furtherance of said change of venue and mandating said
Respondents to vacate the aforementioned grant of a change of venue
and to resume jurisdiction in said cause.

It is the Relators position that because Nostalgia and Scovill had ac-
tual knowledge of the trial setting and had not shown that they had
objected thereto and moved for the change as soon as they had learned
of the setting, they had waived their right to such change under the
provisions of Ind. R. Tr. P. 76(7), which provides:

“Provided further, a party shall be deemed to have waived a re-
quest for a change of judge or county if a cause is set for trial before
the expiration of the date within which a party may ask for a change,
evidenced by an order book entry and no objection is made thereto
by a party as soon as such party learns of the setting for trial. Such

600 ee
Pd

objection, however, must be made promptly and entered of record,
accompanied with a motion for a change from the judge or county
(as the case may be) and filed with the court.”

It is immaterial whether or not Nostalgia and Scovill acted promptly,
as they were not parties to the litigation on April 7, 1980, when the
trial date was set, Ind. R. Tr. P. 4(A). They are second generation
defendants.

In State ex rel. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Madison Superior Court,
(1976) 265 Ind. 287, 291, 354 N.E.2d 188, 191, and in State ex rel. Crane
Rentals, Inc. v. Madison Superior Court, (1977) 266 Ind. 612, 865 N.E.2d
1224, we held that second generation defendants were not limited under
Ind. R. Tr. P. 76(2) as to when they could file for a change by virtue
of the joining of issues before they became parties. To hold otherwise
would deprive them of an automatic change and defeat the purpose
of the rule. State ew rel. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Madison Superior
Court, supra, at p. 291. The same would be true if we were to apply
the waiver provisions of Ind. R. Tr. P. 76(7) to second generation defend-
ants with respect to a trial date setting that occurred prior to their
becoming a party to the law suit.

We hold, therefore, that for purposes of Ind. R. Tr. P. 76(1), a second
generation defendant is not bound by the setting of a trial date which
occurred prior to his joinder, and the writ is denied.

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
NotTeE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 127.

JAMES ODIS HENDRIX v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 7808195. Filed April 15, 1981]

Ye 601
Lt
PO —C“C;sSSSCés
_

Nile Stanton, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.—Petitioner (Appellant) was convicted of Murder in the
First Degree in a trial by jury. His direct appeal resulted in an affirm-
ance. Hendrix v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 309, 315 N.E.2d 701. This appeal
from the denial of post conviction relief presents the-competence of
his trial counsel as the sole issue for our consideration.

Specifically, the petitioner charges that counsel’s incompetence was
demonstrated by his trial in four respects.

Defendant had interposed a claim of self defense. He had, on a prior
occasion, successfully employed that defense and had also been charged,
as a juvenile in California, for assault with a deadly weapon. By direct
examination of his client, trial counsel disclosed these prior incidents.
Subsequently, in summation, the prosecutor commented upon them in
a manner depreciative of the defense.

The post conviction hearing judge found that counsel’s action in
disclosing his client’s past was a tactical decision. This finding is sup-
ported by counsel’s testimony.

The claim that counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s com-
menting upon such evidence was disposed of in petitioner’s direct
appeal.

602 |

“Yet, even as we choose to examine the merits of appellant’s claim,
his assertion still fails. The record discloses that the prosecutor
was referring to the direct testimony of appellant, who chose to
testify in his own behalf. Therefore, such comment was patently
proper.” 262 Ind. at 312, 315 N.E.2d at 703.

Petitioner’s contention that trial counsel suppressed his own client’s

exculpatory statement is puzzling. The statement was made shortly

after the shooting incident and was to the effect that he had

Il shot the decedent in self defense. The statement was inculpa-

tory as well as exculpatory. Viewed as an exculpatory state-

ment, it was not admissible. Petitioner’s claim that prior statements

seonsistent with a witness’ testimony are admissible to refute an at-

tack upon his version of the occurrence is incorrect and not supported

by the authorities which he cites. There had been no impeachment of
the defendant’s testimony.

Additionally, the statement would only have been cumulative of peti-
tioner’s trial testimony and the post conviction judge’s finding that
counsel’s decision could have been tactical is supported by the record.

Petitioner contends that trial counsel did not prepare adequately
for the trial, but the evidence brought forth at the post conviction hear-
ing does not compel this conclusion. Contrary to Petitioner's claim, the
record reflects that counsel interviewed witnesses, had numerous
discussions with Petitioner about his available options, and informed
him of his trial rights and plea bargaining possibilities.

Notwithstanding trial counsel’s candid testimony at the post convic-
tion hearing, acknowledging that he believed that he had made some
errors in judgment and would try the case differently, if given the op-
portunity, and notwithstanding the apparent willingness of the prose-
cutor at the hearing to confess error, the evidence does not compel
a finding that Petitioner’s trial counsel was incompetent.

We have frequently stated that an attorney is strongly presumed
to be competent. Absent a glaring and critical omission or succession
of omissions evidencing in their totality a mockery of justice,
; | this Court will not attribute a criminal conviction or affirma-
tion to ineffective assistance of counsel. Rodgers v. State, (1981)

275 Ind. 102, 415 N.E.2d 57.

[| 603
EE

“In post conviction proceedings, the burden is upon the peti-
tioner to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of
the evidence. Post Conviction Remedy Rule 1, § 5. The trial judge
is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses.’ ” (Citations omitted). “ ‘His decision will be set
aside only where the evidence is without conflict and leads unerr-
ingly to a result other than that reached by the trial court.’ ” Con-
rad v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 587, 406 N.E.2d 1167, 1169. (Quoted
case and other citations omitted.)

We find no error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotE—Reported at 418 N.E.2d 1161.

RODNEY WILLIAMS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 7808205. Filed April 16, 1981.]

604 —

Christopher C. Zoeller, Peters, Carter & Zoeller, of Indianapolis, for
appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frederick N. Kopec, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.—Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of robbery, Ind.
Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979), and sentenced to forty (40) years imprison-
ment. This direct appeal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in not suppressing the victim’s in-
court testimony concerning her identification of the defendant at a pre-
trial line-up.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in failing to give the defendant's
tendered instruction on lesser included offenses.

(3) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion
to dismiss an habitual offender count of the information.

In the early morning hours of February 21, 1978, the victim walked
from a supermarket to her automobile, which was parked near the en-
trance. She saw the defendant in the back seat. He explained that he
had mistakenly entered the wrong car and left by the passenger door.
She then entered her automobile and locked the passenger door, but
before she could lock the driver’s door, the defendant had forced his
way into the vehicle. He took money and the car keys from her at gun-
point and attempted to drive the automobile. The vehicle became stuck
on the ice and snow, however, and she and the defendant struggled,
as she attempted to escape. He struck her in the head twice with his
gun, and she suffered two concussions.

Another customer came out of the market, and, as he appeared, the

Le 605
CT

defendant ran to a 1970 model Ford Thunderbird automobile parked
nearby. He unsuccessfully attempted to enter it and then fled on foot.
The keys to the Thunderbird were found inside the victim’s car. When
the defendant was subsequently arrested, pursuant to warrant, five
days later, he was driving a 1970 model Ford Thunderbird.

ISSUE I

Over the defendant’s objection and suppression motion, the victim
was permitted to testify about a pre-trial line-up.

On the day of the robbery, the police showed the victim thirty (80)
photographs. She selected a picture of the defendant as depicting the
perpetrator and was then told by a police officer present that she had
selected Rodney Williams, and that he was the right person.

About two weeks later, the victim was shown an array of seven (7)
photographs, which consisted of six (6) photographs from the previous
array of thirty and a different photograph of the defendant. The vic-
tim again selected the defendant.

On March 20, 1978, the line-up was held in the presence of defense
counsel, and the victim again selected the defendant.

The defendant first contends that the police provided the victim with
knowledge that the defendant would be in the line-up prior thereto.
However, the record shows that the victim had only assumed that the
defendant would be in the line-up and that the purpose of the line-up
was to make a positive identification. United States v. Person, (1978)
155 U.S.App.D.C. 455, 457, 457 F.2d 659, 661.

The defendant next argues that the second array was overly sug-
gestive, because the front of the defendant’s photograph bore the name
“Williams.” Each of the seven photographs bore a name—“Williams”;
“White”; “Winters”; “Ronnie Williams”; “Woods”; “Williams”; and
“Williams, Jr.” We are inclined to believe that the victim’s knowledge
of the perpetrator’s name, Rodney Williams, would effectively reduce
the aforementioned array of photographs from seven (7) to three (3).?

1. If the vietim had viewed only three photographs as part of a second array, that
alone would not be a firm basis for a claim that the array was unnecessarily suggestive.
Porter v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 267, 397 N.E.2d 269, 271.

606 ee
Pd

However, the issue before us is whether or not this array tainted the
subsequent line-up. The record shows that the defendant made no ob-
jections at trial to the victim’s testimony about her identifications of
the defendant based upon either photographic array. Even if the trial
court had excluded the victim’s testimony about the line-up, the jury
heard her testimony about the two other pre-trial identifications in
which she positively identified the defendant as the perpetrator. It
also heard the testimony of the customer who had followed the defend-
ant after the incident. He testified that he had identified the defend-
ant from a photographic array of six (6) to eight (8) pictures.

Under these circumstances, the victim’s testimony about the pre-
trial line-up was merely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence
of probative value relating to the perpetrator’s identity,’ and
Is crror in its admission, if any was harmless. Cody v. State, (1973)
259 Ind. 570, 579-80, 290 N.E.2d 38, 44, cert. denied, (1974) 416

U.S. 960, 94 S.Ct. 1978, 40 L.Ed.2d 311.

ISSUE IL

The defendant was convicted of Robbery, a Class A Felony. He con-
tends that the trial court erred in not giving his tendered instruction

2. See egs., Walton v. State, (1980) 272 Ind, 898, 398 N.B.2d 667, 670 (Admission
of heroin over objection is harmless error where Defendant made no objection to
testimony of officer who recovered the heroin and chemist who identified the substance
recovered as heroin); Bobbitt v. Stade, (1977) 266 Ind. 164, 174, 361 N.E.2d 1193, 1199
(No error in admission of photographs of automobile where Defendant made no objec-
tion to testimony regarding the automobile); Jenkins v, State, (1975) 268 Ind. 589, 592-98,
335 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Admission of a drawing prepared in part on the basis of hearsay
is harmless error where testimony of the evidence depicted in the drawing is admitted
without objection); Chatman v. State, (1975) 268 Ind. 531, 547-48, 384 N.E.2d 673, 683
(Hearsay testimony of physician as to cause of death is not reversible error where it,
is merely cumulative of other competent and unrefuted evidence of the cause of death);
Koonce 0. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 5, 7, 823 N.E.2d 219, 220, (Defendant's claim that admis-
sions were obtained without advice of Miranda rights not considered where other
witnesses related the substance of the admissions); Seton v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 554,
559-60, 319 N.E.2d 829, 882 (Admission of Defendant's inculpatory statements is harmless
error, where evidence of the statements went to the jury without objection through
testimony of other witnesses); Boles v, State, (1973) 259 Ind. 661, 668-64, 291 N.E.2d 357,
360 (Admission of photocopy of lease over “best evidence” objection is harmless error
where other evidence indicating ownership and possession of property is admitted without
objection).

Pi 607
Ld

on the lesser included offenses of Robbery, as a Class B Felony; Rob-
bery as a Class C Felony; and Theft.

Defendant points out that the only evidence which indicates the use
of a gun and the infliction of bodily injury came from the victim, and
that it was not corroborated. The defendant offered no evidence at trial.

The uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain

arobbery conviction. Geisleman v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 241, 410 N.E.2d

1293, 1295. Since the defendant presented no evidence to con-

HH radict the victim, the only issue before the jury was the iden-

tity of the perpetrator, and it was not error to refuse an in-

struction on lesser included offenses. Fleener v. State, (1980) 274 Ind.
473, 412 N.E.2d 778, 782, (cases cited therein).

ISSUE III

The defendant was charged with being an habitual offender. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979), but that charge was dismissed on the
State’s motion, after the verdict on the robbery charge was returned.
It is his contention that his motion at trial to dismiss the habitual of-
fender charge should have been granted, because the sole purpose of
the charge was to discourage him from taking the stand. The defend-
ant has a long criminal record and would probably have been impeached
thereby, had he testified. He further argues that, had he been im-
peached, he would have provided the State with the evidence to con-
vict him on the habitual offender charge. Thus, he claims, he was faced
with the dilemma of acquitting himself upon the robbery charge and
convicting himself on the habitual offender charge.

Assuming that the prosecutor's motive was as the defendant charges,

we, nevertheless, perceive no error. The prosecutor's roll is adversative,

and we will not review his strategy except to prevent the

Hs denial of due process of law. The filing of habitual offender

charges to induce plea bargaining has been held to be a proper

exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, (1978) 434

U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604; Howard v. State, (1978) 268 Ind.

589, 591, 877 N.E.2d 628, 629-30, cert. denied, (1978) 489 U.S. 1049, 99
S.Ct. 727, 58 L.Ed.2d 708.

Any defendant with a prior criminal record, who elects to take the
stand in his own defense, runs the risk that his credibility will be
adversely affected by impeachment through use of his prior
HE convictions. Gilmore v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 184, 415 N.E.2d
70, 73; Jameison v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 599, 603, 377 N.H.2d

404, 406-07.

We have often stated that the status of habitual offender is not an

“offense” but rather a justification for an enhanced penalty on the

charge(s) for which the defendant has been tried and convicted.

| | Examined in this light, the dilemma of which the defendant

complains, is a phantom. If the defendant chooses to testify,

and the jury acquits him there is no habitual offender phase of the

proceedings. If he is convicted, the prosecutor bears the same burden

of proving the defendant’s habitual offender status as if the defendant

had not testified and had not been impeached by his criminal record.
There is no merit to the defendant’s contention.

We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur;
DeBruler, J., concurs in result.
Note—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 134,

STEVIE W. NoRRIS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 5808155. Filed April 16, 1981.]

2
3
oS

George K. Shields, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Frederick N. Kopec, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted after trial by jury
of attempted murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; § 35-41-5-1 (Burns 1979),
two counts of battery, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (Burns 1979), resisting ar-

610 |

rest, Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (Burns 1979), and possession of a controlled
substance, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7 (Burns 1979). He was sentenced to five
concurrent terms, the longest being twenty (20) years for attempted
murder. This direct appeal presents two main issues:

(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support any of the
verdicts.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to prove
his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.

This is a tragic incident concerning the defendant’s abuse of phen-
eyclidine (PCP).

On the evening of June 21, 1979, Rita Sanford and the defendant
went to bed. The defendant could not sleep. He got up and went into
the bedroom of Rita’s three year old son, Eric, and sat on the bed. Rita
found him there and asked what he was doing. He said he was just
sitting there.

Rita went next door to get herself and the defendant a drink. When
she returned, the defendant was no longer in Eric’s bedroom. She walked
down the hall, and as she passed the bathroom, the defendant, now
naked, opened the bathroom door and pulled her inside. He said very
quietly that someone was out there. Rita told him that no one was there
but followed his direction to be quiet so that they would not hear
anything.

Through an open window Rita heard the noise of children playing.
The defendant closed the curtains and again told her to be quiet because
they were out there and were going to get him and her. At this time,
Rita observed that the defendant was holding a piece of a wooden bed-
post in his hand. He told her that he was not going to let them hurt
her because he loved her, and he then hit her on the head with the
bedpost. Rita began to cry and told the defendant to stop; but the
defendant said, “I told you I’m not gonna let them hurt you.” Next,
he told her to face the wall and not to turn around and struck her
repeatedly with the bedpost. Rita fell on the floor bleeding and crying.

The commotion awakened Eric, who came down the hall, crying, and
the defendant said, “Here they come.” Rita responded, “It’s just Eric.”,
whereupon the defendant jerked open the bathroom door, looked

be 611
Ee

straight ahead and went to grab the child. Rita tried to stop him, but
the defendant knocked her into the bathtub. Defendant then threw
Eric onto the floor and hit his head twice with the bedpost, causing
multiple skull fractures. After the first blow to Eric’s head, Rita again
tried to stop the defendant. She succeeded by telling him that there
was someone out there and that the defendant should go and get them.
The defendant said, “I told you I’m not gonna let them hurt you. Because
I love you.” The defendant then left the bathroom and Rita screamed
out the window for help but was ignored. She gathered up Eric, went
to a neighbor’s and called the police.

Officer John Miller arrived at the scene to find Rita holding Eric,
who was bleeding. She told him about the beating, and he asked where
the defendant was. Rita indicated the upstairs apartment in the rear.
Miller went to the apartment and opened the door. He identified himself
and yelled in that he wanted the defendant to come out. Miller waited
thirty seconds and then started up the stairs. It was pitch dark in the
apartment and quiet. Miller again yelled for the defendant to come
down. He reached the top of the stairs and opened the door on his left,
took a step into the room, shined his flashlight, and caught a move-
ment out of the corner of his eye. As Miller turned on the light, the
defendant hit him on the forehead with the bedpost, knocking him out
of the room.

Miller called for assistance, and the defendant went out a window
onto the roof. The defendant jumped some three to four feet down onto
the roof of the building next door. He became wild and violent, swing-
ing his fists and kicking his feet. It took three police officers to appre-
hend him.

ISSUE I

The defendant first claims that the evidence shows that his conduct
was neither intentional nor knowing. At trial he interposed an insanity
defense. His argument is that the evidence shows that he “ * * * was
not even aware of what he was doing, and had no intention of commit-
ting any crime.”

The defendant’s argument does not recognize the statutory
Hs concept of criminal culpability as provided by Ind. Code
§ 35-41-2-2 (Burns 1979):

612 Dn
ee

“(a) A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he

engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.

“(b) A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages

in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.”
Knowing or intentional conduct is a requisite element of each of the
five offenses charged.

Rita Sanford and Officer Miller testified about the events of that
evening. It appears that the defendant’s conduct was both bizarre and
out of character, and there was evidence from which the jury could
have found that he was acting under a self-administered injection of
PCP. Jackson v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 49, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949. While
there is no direct evidence that the defendant used PCP prior to the
incident on the night in question, Rita testified that she had seen the
defendant use it on one of the two previous nights, and that he used
PCP two to three times a week. On that day she had hidden drug para-
phernalia and a quantity of PCP from the defendant, because she did
not want the defendant to use them. She testified further that in the
past, when the defendant had been under the influence of PCP, he had
acted dumb and childish, but had never reacted violently.

The evidence shows that the defendant’s paranoia and delusions had
begun about twenty-four to forty-eight hours before he became violent.
He had taken PCP and had awakened Rita as “he was scootin’ up in
the corner between the bed and the wall.” The defendant had told her
to be quiet and that he thought Officer Miller was in the house. The
defendant and Officer Miller had met on prior unrelated matters, and
the defendant had known Miller for quite awhile. On that occasion,
the defendant then pulled Rita close to him and said, “Now as soon
as you see him you jump on the floor, and I'll shoot him.” They then
got up and walked through the house so that Rita could show him that
no one was in the house. The defendant closed all the windows and
said that Officer Miller was outside and would shoot him through the
window. He then used pieces of a broken bed to jam the windows shut
and placed chairs under the doorknobs to jam the doors shut. He told
Rita to remain quiet and that he was afraid that Officer Miller would
put a ladder to one window and get him. The defendant was also shak-
ing from chills and complaining that he was hot. This behavior con-
tinued until dawn of the next day.

Le 613

On prior occasions the defendant had expressed fears to Rita that
Officer Miller would kill him.

The trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences based upon
examination of the surrounding circumstances to infer the existence
of knowing or intentional conduct. Farno v. State, (1974) 159

HI sInd.App. 627, 629, 308 N.E.2d 724, 725, (cases cited therein).

On this record we cannot say that the defendant was somehow
unaware of his possession of PCP or that it was not his conscious ob-
jective to possess it and to use it. The police found PCP and drug
paraphernalia in the defendant's apartment, and the defendant was
a regular user. The evidence is sufficient to support the possession
conviction.

While the defendant may have been suffering from delusional para-
noia and hallucinations, the jury could have found that when he struck
the blows against Rita Sanford and Officer Miller, he intended to harm
someone. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the convic-
tions for battery and resisting arrest.

The defendant further contends that there is no evidence to show

that Rita Sanford suffered “serious bodily injury” required to support

a conviction of battery, Class C Felony. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(8)

HE (Burns 1979). There is no merit to this contention. Barbee v.

State, (1977) 267 Ind. 299, 396 N.E.2d 1072. The record con-

tains photographs of Rita Sanford taken after she received treatment

for her injuries. They depict the numerous cuts and bruises that were

inflicted. One head wound required stitches, and she spent five days
in the hospital.

The defendant next contends that he was so intoxicated that he could
not form any specific intent to commit any of the offenses of which
he stands convicted. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-5(b) (Burns 1979). He assumes
incorrectly, however, that all the offenses charged are specific intent
crimes; only the attempted murder of Eric Sanford is. Zickefoose v. State,
(1979) 270 Ind. 618, 888 N.E.2d 507, 510. See Preston v. State, (1972)
‘259 Ind. 353, 356, 287 N.E.2d 347, 348."

1. The problems encountered by Indiana courts in determining to which offenses
voluntary intoxication is available as a defense are reviewed in Carter v. State, (1980)
Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 790, These problems are alleviated by the Legislature's amend-
ment of Ind. Code 36-41-3-5(b) (Burns Supp. 1980).

614 Le

The acts related above appear to be those of a maniac, Stout v. State,

(1974) 262 Ind. 538, 541, 319 N.H.2d 123, 124; however, whether or not

the defendant’s voluntary intoxication prevented him from

Hi forming the specific intent required for attempted murder

was a question of fact for the jury and one upon which the

defendant bore the burden of proof. Bates v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 214,
409 N.E.2d 628, 625 (cases cited therein).

In Bates, which dealt with a defendant’s claim of voluntary
Hs drug intoxication, we stated the standard of review for such
cases:

As this Court stated in Booher v. State, (1901) 156 Ind. 435, 60 N.E. 156:

“Tt does not follow, by any means, in any criminal case, in which
the intoxication of the accused person may be considered in
evidence, that the fact that at the time he committed the alleged
erime he was intoxicated, he was thereby rendered incapable of
entertaining the specific felonious or criminal intent with which
he is charged. He may have been grossly intoxicated and yet
capable of forming the intent to kill and murder or to commit any
other offense in which an intent is an essential element. The cor-
rect rule or test in such cases, and the one generally asserted by
the authorities, is that the (intoxication) of the defendant, in order
to rebut such criminal intent, must be of such a degree as to
deprive him of the power to deliberate or form the necessary
design or guilty intent; otherwise it is not available. Or, in other
words, as affirmed in Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347 (24 N.E.2d
128), 8 L.R.A. 33, mere intoxication of the accused, in the absence
of such mental capacity resulting therefrom as will render a per-
son incapable of thinking deliberately and meditating rationally,
in forming the guilty design or intent, can not be regarded as suf-
ficient.” Id.

From all the evidence, the jury was entitled to infer that the defend-
ant, suffering from delusions and paranoia, intended to kill whomever
was on the other side of the bathroom door, when he opened

HM sit and found Eric Sanford. The defendant had been suffering
from a fear that someone was in the house; that someone was

trying to get him; and that that someone was Officer Miller, whom the
defendant believed, rightly or wrongly, was out to get him. Rita San-
ford testified that on opening the bathroom door, the defendant looked
“* # * straight ahead, you know, like somebody as big as him.” The

Le 615
EE

defendant then used a weapon in a manner which would cause death.
Jackson v. State, supra; see Dobbs v. State, (1957) 237 Ind. 119, 124, 143
N.E.2d 99, 101. Under such circumstances, the jury could find that the
defendant intended to use the bedpost to kill someone. See Burkhalter
v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 282, 397 N.E.2d 596, 598. Hooker v. State, (1979)
180 Ind.App. 222, 387 N.E.2d 1354, 1858 n. 1. Under the doctrine of
transferred intent, the essential element is present if the accused in-
tended to kill someone. Taylor v. State, (1978) 260 Ind. 264, 279-80, 295
N.E.2d 600, 609, cert. denied, (1978) 414 U.S. 1012, 94 S.Ct. 377, 38
L.Ed.2d 250.

The remainder of the defendant’s argument on this point deals with
the testimony of his own expert witness concerning the symptoms of
a toxic reaction to PCP. These symptoms include amnesia (the defend-
ant had no recollection of the incident), violent behavior, rage reac-
tion, misperception of surroundings, and reacting to imaginary situa-
tions. The Witness further testified:

“Q. We've been talking a little bit here about the toxic effect,
of PCP. Do you believe that what we’ve described here could
be defined as a mental disease?

“A. (pause) I think in the sense that the brain is malfunctioning
that, yes, its a diseased situation in the brain.

“Q. Asa result of this brain dysfunction, or malfunction, to cause
a mental disease, is a person able to know the wrongfulness
of his acts, or to be cognizant of his acts?

“A. During the toxie state, no.

“Q. In fact, during this toxic state is a person able to form any
sort of intent to do any specific act?

“A. Nothing that’s reality-based, no. I think the meaning of in-
tent implies reality contact.

“Q. And in your opinion, from your observations of Steve and
your knowledge of what happend (sic) that night, was Steve
in such a high toxic state that he was not able to know or
appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or to form such
intent?

“A. I’m convinced of that. The entire picture is (sic) described
to me from start to finish was typical of a PCP toxic reac-
tion in which a person has no intent, no knowledge of what's
happening.”

616 |

This evidence was introduced on the issue of insanity and was rebutted
by the testimony of a court appointed psychiatrist who stated:

“Q. Isn’t it true that with PCP that it’s a very unpredictable
drug?

“A. Well there have been reports of very severe reactions to
PCP, yes, it’s considered one of the more dangerous you
might say of the street drugs. A lot of behavior and
assaultiveness and violence associated with it. Same as with
alcohol.

“Q. This violence that is associated with it, with PCP or alcohol,
is the brain malfunctioning to such a point that the person

cannot control his impulses so that he exhibits this violent
nature?

“Q. (sic) The drugs generally have the effect of the individual
not having much concern about what they are doing, and
if they have angry or assaultive or violent tendencies they
are more likely to express them, because they don’t care
about the consequences.

“Q. Do they know the wrongfulness of their acts?
“A. Yes, I believe so.”

We will not rejudge the credibility of these witnesses. Jackson v.
State, supra.

The defendant’s next sufficiency claim merely reasserts the claim
that the defendant's actions were neither knowing nor intentional. Fur-
ther, after recognizing our standard of review for sufficiency claims,
the defendant suggests that we adopt the “rational trier of fact” stan-
dard of review enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, (1979) 448 U.S. 307,
318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573. We decline to do so,
and under our established standard, the evidence is sufficient to sup-
port the verdicts.

ISSUE II

The defendant raises a constitutional challenge to Ind. Code

§ 35-41-4-1(b) (Burns 1979), which requires the defendant to establish

the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.

Hs We rejected a similar challenge in Price v. State, (1980) 274
Ind. 479, 412 N.E.2d 783, 785.

617

We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

Note—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 129.
P|
MIKCO STEVEN BALL v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 12778817. Filed April 16, 1981. Rehearing denied June 9, 1981.]

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Marcia
L. Dumond, Deputy Public Defenders, for appellant.

618 |
Ld

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Joel Schiff, Deputy Attorney
General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.— Defendant-appellant Mikco Steven Ball was charged by
information in Hamilton Circuit Court with three counts of first degree
murder. Ind. Code § 35-13-4-1 (Burns 1975). The information alleged
that Ball purposely and with premeditated malice killed Eugene Lillico,
Rick Burke and Steven Nichter. After a change of venue to Jefferson
County, appellant Ball pleaded not guilty to each count and was tried
to a jury. The jury convicted Ball of second degree murder for each
of the three killings. See Ind. Code § 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975). The trial
court subsequently sentenced him to three life terms. Ball raises four
issues for our consideration on this appeal, concerning: (1) whether
the trial court erred in allowing testimony from a clergyman; (2) whether
the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence certain confessions
given by Ball; (8) whether the trial court erred in giving final instruc-
tion number 28A to the jury; and (4) whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to sustain the convictions.

IL

Appellant Ball first argues the trial court improperly permitted
testimony from a minister, Purvis Earl Lawson. The record reveals
that Ball initiated a conversation with Reverend Lawson in which Ball
admitted killing three people. Over defendant's objection, the trial court
permitted the prosecutor to elicit this evidence from Lawson. On the
basis of Ind. Code § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1973), appellant challenges the
pastor’s competency to testify as to Ball’s admissions.

The statute in question provides in part:

“The following persons shall be incompetent witnesses:

Fifth. Clergymen, as to confessions or admissions made to them
in course of discipline enjoined by their respective churches.”
The key question in this case concerns whether Lawson engaged in
this conversation in the course of “discipline enjoined by” his church.
Reverend Lawson testified that he is the pastor of the Southside Bap-
tist Church in Indianapolis. He stated that he is not a graduate of any

| 619
Cd

theological seminary, and that his church is not associated in any way
with the Southern Baptist Convention. Lawson also stated that his
church has a written constitution, but that this constitution is not made
available to non-members.

The record reveals that Ball had attended Lawson's church for four
or five months prior to the conversation in question; however, he was
not a member of the church, and had not attended services for approx-
imately eight weeks before contacting Lawson. Ball telephoned Lawson
on Saturday, January 3, telling him he wished to speak with him the
next day following the morning worship service. Lawson agreed, and
when the service was concluded, he and Ball sat in the choir loft and
talked. Ball told Lawson at that time that he had killed three people.
Lawson testified that initially he did not believe Ball’s story, but he
also encouraged Ball to turn himself in to police if what he had said
was true. Ball said he would think about it. The following day, Mon-
day, Lawson related to Indianapolis Police Officer Arnold Nelson what
Ball had said, although he did not mention Ball’s name. Nelson said
he was unaware of any missing persons or any unsolved multiple
murders. Lawson and Ball talked by telephone again that night, and
Lawson testified that he again urged Ball to turn himself in. The next
day, Nelson and other police officers contacted Lawson and informed
him of the disappearance of three men. Lawson testified that the cir-
cumstances related by police surrounding the disappearance of the men
coincided with the details Ball had given him concerning the murders.
That night, Lawson contacted Ball and eventually convinced him to
turn himself over to the custody of Indianapolis police officers.

We hold Lawson was not an incompetent witness. He testified that
pastoral confession does not constitute one of the tenets or disciplines
of his church. He also testified that his church does not recog-

Hl __ nize a confidential pastor-parishioner relationship with respect

to evidence of a crime. Lawson stated that if a person were

to talk to him about a legal matter, he would tell them that he would
not “stand up” for him and would not keep the information confiden-
tial; instead, he said he would testify against someone if he learned
from them that they had committed a crime. Lawson also stated that
his status as a preacher would not affect his decision to testify against
a person in that regard. Therefore, we conclude that Ball’s admissions

620 ee
a

to Lawson were not made “in [the] course of discipline enjoined by”
Lawson’s church. § 35-1-14-5, supra; Knight v. Lee, (1881) 80 Ind. 201,
203-04; Buuck v. Kruckeberg, (1950) 121 Ind.App. 262, 268, 95 N.E.2d
304, 306. The trial court did not err in admitting Lawson’s testimony.

tL.

Appellant Ball next argues that the trial court erroneously failed
to suppress incriminating statements Ball gave to police officers. He
contends these statements were not given voluntarily and, therefore,
should not have been admitted.

As we have stated many times, the admissibility of a confession is
to be determined from an examination of the totality of the circum-
stances. On appeal, this Court will review the question of such
HE admissibility as we do other sufficiency matters. We will deter-
mine only whether there was substantial probative evidence
to support the trial court’s findings. In making this determination, we
will not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.
E.g., Lonson v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 581, 406 N.E.2d 256, 259; Porter
v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 180, 391 N.E.2d 801, 806; Ray v. State, (1979)
272 Ind. 111, 396 N.E.2d 373, 375; Murphy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 184,
191, 369 N.E.2d 411, 414.

In the case before us, the record reveals that Indianapolis Police
Sergeant Jack Ohrberg met with Ball at around 11:00 p.m. on January
6, 1976, in the presence of Officer Nelson and Reverend Lawson after
Lawson had persuaded Ball to turn himself in. Ohrberg testified at
the hearing on Ball's motion to suppress that he orally advised Ball
of his rights, but told Ball that he did not have any printed waiver
forms on hand. Ball told Ohrberg that he understood his rights. He
then attempted to direct Ohrberg, Nelson, Lawson, and Officer Philip
Gerdt to the location of the bodies. During the search, Ball made several
incriminating statements in response to Ohrberg’s questions regarding
the location of the bodies. Nelson and Lawson substantially cor-
roborated Ohrberg’s testimony regarding this sequence of events.

After approximately three hours of fruitless searching, Ball was
returned to the Indianapolis Police station. There, Ohrberg again ad-
vised Ball of his rights, and Ball signed-a written waiver of rights form.
Ball then gave a tape-recorded oral confession. When this statement

Le 621
a

was transcribed a few days later, Ball read and signed the transcrip-
tion. The tape recording of the confession was admitted at trial and
played for the jury. Ohrberg testified that Ball appeared nervous, but
not under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. Ohrberg further stated
that he did not coerce Ball into giving these statements, nor did he
make any specific promises to Ball concerning treatment he might need
or leniency.

Ball also made an oral confession during the search for the bodies.
Indianapolis Police Officer Philip Gerdt testified that he and Ball talked
about the killings while they were alone briefly in the car. Before the
crimes were discussed, however, Gerdt orally advised Ball of his rights.
Gerdt testified that Ball said he understood his rights and specifically
stated that he did not want an attorney.

The evidence clearly reveals that Ball’s confessions were given volun-
tarily. Ball was advised of his rights on each occasion before discuss-
ing or being questioned about the killings, and in either oral

Hor written form, waived his rights each time. When given the
opportunity to do so, Ball signed a waiver form, in which he
acknowledged that he did not have to speak and further acknowledged
that he had not been pressured or coerced into giving the statement.
In light of all the testimony heard on this question, we believe there
was sufficient evidence of probative value to support a finding that
the statements were not given involuntarily, and to justify the admis-
sion of these statements into evidence. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, (1976)
430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424. There was conflicting
testimony presented concerning alleged promises made to Ball, or other
alleged inducements which prompted him to confess. Such conflicts
were, of course, for the trial court to resolve. Love v. State, (1980) 272
Ind. 672, 400 N.E.2d 1871, 1372-73. See Lonson v. State, supra; Ray v.
State, supra; Richardson v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 61, 63, 373 N.E.2d 874,
875. See also Gutierrez v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 639, 395 N.H.2d 218,
223-24; Johnson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 370, 378, 380 N.E.2d 1236, 1241.

I.

Appellant Ball next argues the trial court erred in giving final in-
struction number 28A. This instruction provided:

“Tt is the law of Indiana that every person who shall aid or abet

622 |
as

in the commission of a felony, or who shall counsel, encourage,
hire, command, or otherwise procure a felony to be committed,
may be charged by indictment or affidavit, and may be tried and
convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal, either
before or after the principal offender is charged, indicted or con-
victed; and upon such conviction, he shall suffer the same punish-
ment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment
of the principal.”
Record at 227. Appellant acknowledges that this instruction correctly
states the law. However, he claims the record is “entirely devoid” of
evidence that Ball aided anyone in the commission of this crime. There-
fore, he argues, this instruction served only to confuse the jury.

We find, however, that there was sufficient evidence to justify giv-
ing this instruction. A number of facts or circumstances of this case
point to the involvement of another person. First, the three
Hs victims were killed, one after another, by a shotgun blast fired
from a single load sixteen-gauge shotgun. However, the scene
where the bodies were discovered gave no indication that a struggle
had occurred. Second, while Ball only admitted carrying a sixteen-gauge
shotgun, shotgun shells of a different gauge were also discovered in
the field where the bodies were found. Third, Ball was arrested the
night before these killings for an incident which occurred at the Deja
Vu tavern. However, one of the co-owners of the Deja Vu subsequently
supplied the money for Ball's bail that same night. Fourth, another
co-owner of the Deja Vu testified that he had been granted immunity
in exchange for his testimony before a Hamilton County grand jury
concerning these matters. Finally, when one of Ball's friends, Edward
Pettigrew, asked him if he had been involved in the disappearance of
Lillico, Burke, and Nichter, Ball answered, “Yes and no.” Neither Pet-
tigrew nor Ball elaborated on the meaning of this remark. We think
these facts justified the giving of an instruction on aiding and abet-
ting. There is no error here.

Iv.

Finally, appellant Ball challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. This
claim is based largely on his argument that his various confessions
should not have been admitted into evidence. We held in Issue II, supra,
that these confessions were properly admitted. Thus, the confessions

L | 623

were fully probative on the issue of Ball’s guilt. Baker v. State, (1980)
272 Ind. 554, 400 N.E.2d 137, 188; Robinson v. State, (1979) 272 Ind.
312, 397 N.E.2d 956, 959; Hudson v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 310, 313, 375
N.E.2d 195, 196.

The evidence revealed that appellant Ball was employed as a waiter
at the Deja Vu tavern in Indianapolis. One of the victims, Rick Burke,
had been employed at the tavern, and another victim, Gene Lillico,
had been hired to replace Burke. On December 24, 1975, one of the
co-owners of the Deja Vu, Donald Martinelli, fired Ball. On the follow-
ing Saturday, December 27, Ball was arrested for disorderly conduct
outside the Deja Vu. However, Martinelli subsequently arranged for
Ball to be released on bail.

The next day, December 28, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Ball went
to the apartment rented by Nichter and Burke. The three men put
a television and a phonograph into Nichter’s car and then went to
Lillico’s apartment. Ball was carrying the sixteen-gauge shotgun at this
time. He had borrowed this gun from his neighbor a few hours earlier.
When Nichter’s brother went to the apartment later that evening, he
discovered both doors standing open.

After picking up Lillico, the group went to the Deja Vu tavern, which
was closed at the time. They gained entry through the use of Lillico’s
key. While inside the tavern, Lillico opened the safe and took approx-
imately one thousand dollars from it. This money was given to Bail.
The group then drank some liquor and attempted, unsuccessfully, to
pry open the cigarette machine. They left the bar shortly thereafter.

Ball then drove the other three men north on Meridian Street in
Nichter’s car. In southern Hamilton County, Ball stopped the car and
all four men got out of the car and walked into a nearby field. Ball
then proceeded to shoot each of the victims. All three victims were
shot once in the back or side of the head from close range. The bodies
were ultimately discovered several hundred feet from the road. The
expert testimony established that the victims were probably killed at
the spot where their bodies were found.

When Ball returned to Nichter’s car, he was unable to drive it out
of the ditch where it was parked. Ball then walked to a nearby house

and, with the owners’ permission, called a tow truck for assistance.
Ball had the car towed to downtown Indianapolis. He then returned
to his home. Ball returned the shotgun to his neighbor on the following
day.

In his taped confession, appellant Ball fully admitted carrying the
shotgun and shooting the victims. By his own statements, the evidence
clearly shows the killings were purposely done; this element
I__ is also supported by the fact that there were three victims,
each killed by a shotgun blast inflicted at close range, each
shot having come from the same gun. The requisite malice may be in-
ferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely
to cause death. Fryback v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 660, 400 N.E.2d 1128,
1181; Faust v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 640, 642, 366 N.E.2d 175, 176. See
Ind. Code § 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975). Clearly, the evidence is sufficient
to sustain the convictions.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Givan, C. J., DeBruler, Hunter, and Prentice, JJ., concur.

NotE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 187.

OTIS CHANDLER v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 9808377. Filed April 20, 1981.]

19
a
oS
|
CE

626 De

Patrick Brennan, Dennis M. Brennan, Brennan & Brennan, of South
Bend, for appellant.

Lindley E. Pearson, Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney Generals, Palmer
K. Ward, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.— The defendant, Otis Chandler, was convicted by a jury of
felony murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) (Burns 1979 Repl.), and was
sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment. He now presents eight issues
for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss and motion for mistrial based on several discovery violations
by the state;

2. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to grant defendant’s
motion to suppress his confession;

8. Whether the trial court erred when it prevented the defendant
from ascertaining the identity of a police informant;

4, Whether the trial court erred in restricting certain cross-exam-
ination of a prosecution witness;

5. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the victim’s son to
remain in the courtroom after he testified;

6. Whether the trial court erred when it allowed the state to intro-
duce color slides of the deceased victim;

7. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for
a separate trial; and

8. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to give certain in-
structions tendered by defendant.

The evidence most favorable to the state reveals that in the after-
noon of September 18, 1978, defendant and several others burglarized
the residence of Telesfor Radomski in South Bend, Indiana, during the
course of which Mr. Radomski was shot and killed.

[| 627

L

About six months prior to trial, defendant made a discovery motion
which was granted by the trial court. When trial commenced in January
of 1980, it became apparent that the state had not fully complied with
the court’s discovery order. After several violations were revealed,
defendant moved to have the charge against him dismissed, contend-
ing that he had been substantially prejudiced in the preparation of his
case. In the alternative, a mistrial was requested. The trial court denied
the motions, and defendant assigns this ruling as error.

In Carson v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 208, 391 N.E.2d 600, 602, this Court
stated:

“When the State violates a proper discovery order, a trial court
has wide discretion to remedy the transgression.
“ ‘Obviously, the trial judge is usually in the best position to
determine what harm, if any, evolved from a violation,
whether or not such harm can be eliminated or satisfactorily
alleviated and the dictates of fundamental fairness. Absent
clear error in his decision it should not be overturned.’ Reid
v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 555, 372 N.E.2d 1149, 1155.” Accord,
O'Conner v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 460, 399 N.E.2d 364.
Furthermore, it is well settled that the granting of a mistrial lies largely
within the sound discretion of the trial court and is only proper where,
under all the circumstances, the defendant has been placed
Hina position of grave peril to which he should not have been
subjected. Tinnin v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 203, 416 N.H.2d
116; Schmanski v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 331, 385 N.E.2d 1122.

We will now proceed to examine the specific instances of discovery
violations. On the second day of trial during direct examination of one
of its witnesses, the state attempted to introduce some photographs
of the decedent’s body and the murder scene which defense counsel
claimed had not been given to him contrary to the discovery order.
Over defendant’s objection, the photographs were admitted into evi-
dence. First, we note that defendant made no motion for a continuance
in order to fully examine the photographs. Also, defense counsel ad-
mitted in open court that he had been informed by the state that some
pictures had been taken and that he had not taken advantage of the
state’s invitation to visit the prosecutor’s office to make sure that
discovery had been completed.

While it may still be arguable whether or not the state’s actions con-
stitute minimal compliance with the discovery order, defendant has
not demonstrated to this Court, in any event, how he was substantially
harmed. He has made no showing that the existence of these photo-
graphs necessitated any trial preparation beyond what he already knew
he had to do. Crosson v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 511, 376 N.E.2d 1136.

Later that same day, the state called the evidence technician from
the South Bend Police Department's homicide unit who testified that
he had sent some cards containing the rolled and flat impressions of
defendant’s fingerprints to the FBI in Washington, D.C. for comparative
analysis with some latent prints discovered at the murder scene. He
could not recall the date that he had mailed the cards, and the state
sought to refresh his memory with a transmittal receipt. Defense
counsel objected for the reason that the receipt had not been given
to him in violation of the discovery order. The objection was summarily
overruled.

Assuming the receipt was even covered by the discovery order,
defendant has made no argument whatsoever as to how he was harmed
by the failure to disclose. He has made no showing that he lacked
knowledge of the mailing date or how that information was relevant
to the preparation of his defense.

Besides granting the defendant’s discovery motion, the trial court
had also ordered the state to transcribe all grand jury minutes and
make them available to defense counsel. On the first day of trial, it
was discovered that not all of the grand jury minutes had been tran-
scribed and been made available. The trial court ordered that it be
done immediately. In the afternoon of the second day of trial, defense
counsel objected to the testimony of state’s witness Artie Lamar James
on the basis that over the lunch hour, he had first been given the grand
jury minutes containing James's testimony and therefore did not have
sufficient time to review them for effective cross-examination.

It was also brought out at this time that defense counsel had been
trying to locate Mr. James prior to trial but had been unable to get
an address from the state. Due to a breakdown in communications in
the prosecutor’s office, the prosecuting attorneys in defendant's case
did not learn of the address until five days before trial and did not

P| 629
Le”

convey that information to defense counsel. At this point, the trial court
asked defense counsel what he wanted and counsel requested that there
be an adjournment until the next morning in order to give him more
time to talk to James. The court granted that request and ordered
that James be made available for an interview that evening outside
the presence of the prosecutor.

When trial reconvened the next morning, defendant did not allege
that his meeting with James had been insufficient for purposes of
preparing him for trial. In fact, the record reveals an exten-
Hl sive cross-examination of James by defendant’s attorney.
Moreover, the trial court granted the specific relief requested
by defense counsel. When the state has violated the trial court’s order
for discovery, a continuance is the most appropriate remedy unless
the state’s action is so misleading or demonstrates such bad faith that
the only way to avoid a denial of the defendant's fair trial rights is
to exclude the state’s evidence. O’Conner v. State, swpra; Carson v.
State, supra.

On the morning of the third day of trial, defense counsel informed
the court of additional discovery violations by the state. He stated that
the previous evening, the attorney for Artie James had given him a
police report prepared by Officer Charles Mahank which had never
been delivered to him by the state. That report disclosed that the grand
jury had convened a second time. Defense counsel said that he had not
been given a transcription of that hearing. In addition, defendant's at-
torney told the court that that morning, the prosecutor gave him
another police report prepared by Officer Mahank which he had not
seen before. It was at this stage of the proceeding that defense counsel
made the motion to dismiss and the motion for mistrial.

The prosecutor informed the court that a transcript of the second
grand jury meeting had just been given to him, and a copy was then
turned over to the defense. The only person testifying at this second
hearing was Officer Mahank. He did not testify at trial until the next
day, the fourth day of trial. Therefore, defendant was able to review
the transcript overnight prior to cross-examining Officer Mahank the
following day. Defendant did not move for a continuance when it came
time to cross-examine the witness, and a lengthy and extensive cross-

630 ee
Es

examination was conducted. Defendant has made no showing on ap-
peal how he was prejudiced by the late disclosure of these grand jury
minutes.

As for the police reports, defendant has not even attempted to ex-
plain how he was prejudiced. He merely states that they represent
further examples of the state’s violation of the pretrial discovery order.

One report was an investigation report, most of which was comprised
of statements made to the police by defendant and Artie James. Defend-
ant has not demonstrated that these statements contained facts that
he did not already know. Indeed, the content of defendant’s statements
closely parallels his written confession made to police, and there is no
contention that defense counsel had not been given a copy of that. The
other report was merely an arrest report of one of defendant’s code-
fendants. It contains nothing of substance as to the events surround-
ing the commission of the crime.

This Court should not be understood as approving the manner in
which the state conducted discovery in this case. We fully understand
the trial court’s expression of displeasure when it stated:

“T might tell the Prosecution that the Court is on a short fuse
with respect to the record shown by the State’s cooperation with
reference to the duties under discovery and you are not far from
a motion to dismiss for failure to abide in principle with the
philosophy of the discovery procedures in this matter.”

As Judge Staton observed in Upshaw v. State, (1976) 170 Ind.App. 206,
211, 352 N.E.2d 102, 105:

“[T]Jhe purpose of pretrial discovery is to promote justice and to
prevent surprise by allowing the defense adequate time to prepare
its case.”

The trial court in this case took into consideration the harm suffered
by defendant as a result of the state’s conduct as evidenced by this
passage:

“Motion for mistrial or dismissal based on what might be generously

termed or sympathetically termed as at least apparent recalci-

trance by the State is denied sort of hesitantly. We feel the Pros-

ecution for whatever reasons has not complied in as good faith
as has ordinarily been the practice of the Prosecution but I do

Le 631

not think has reached the point that has prevented the defendants

from having a fair trial or marshalling the defense of these causes

so that also is denied, motion for mistrial and motion to dismiss.”
We do not believe that there is clear error in the trial court’s discre-
tionary decision to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for
mistrial.

t.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress his written confession. He claims that he was under
the influence of marijuana and alcohol at the time he made the state-
ment, that he was not adequately informed of his rights, and that he
did not understand the significance of the waiver he had signed.

It is the state’s burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights, and that
the defendant’s confession was voluntarily given. Shepler v.

HE State, (1980) 274 Ind. 331, 412 N.H.2d 62; Jackson v. State, (1980)
274 Ind. 297, 411 N.E.2d 609. Upon a review of the denial of

a motion to suppress a confession and the subsequent admission of that
confession over objection, this Court will not weigh the evidence or
judge the credibility of witnesses. The admissibility of a confession
ultimately depends upon questions of fact which are to be resolved
by the trial court. If the evidence is conflicting, only that evidence which
tends to support the trial court’s ruling will be considered on appeal.
If the trial court’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence of pro-
bative value, it will not be disturbed. Fleener v. State, (1980) 274 Ind.
478, 412 N.E.2d 778; Wollam v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 286, 380 N.E.2d 82.

At the time of the confession, defendant was a juvenile.
i | In Lewis v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138, this Court
determined the appropriate standard to be employed in such

a case:

“We hold therefore that a juvenile’s statement or confession can-
not be used against him at a subsequent trial or hearing unless
both he and his parents or guardian were informed of his rights
to an attorney, and to remain silent. Furthermore, the child must
be given an opportunity to consult with his parents, guardian or
an attorney representing the juvenile as to whether or not he

wishes to waive those rights. After such consultation the child
may waive his rights if he so chooses provided of course that there
are no elements of coercion, force or inducement present.” Jd. at
489, 288 N.E.2d at 142. Accord, Hall v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 448,
346 N.E.2d 584.

Contrary to defendant's contentions, Officer Mahank testified that
he read to defendant and his mother his constitutional rights to re-
main silent and to have an attorney present. Officer Mahank stated
that he asked both defendant and his mother whether they understood
those rights, and they said that they did. In addition, Officer Mahank
testified that defendant did not appear to be under the influence of
drugs or alcohol and that defendant and his mother were permitted
to consult together in a room by themselves for approximately ten
minutes before defendant agreed to sign the waiver and make the state-
ment. There is no evidence of coercion, force, or inducement. Therefore,
there was no error in denying defendant's motion to suppress.

Iii.

During cross-examination of Officer Mahank, defendant’s attorney
asked if the witness had talked to a Captain Smith about the case and
Officer Mahank replied that he had received a report from him. Defense
counsel then asked if Captain Smith had received some information
from an informant about the case, and the witness replied in the af-
firmative, stating that he had also met with the informant. Defense
counsel requested the identity of the informant whereupon the state
objected, and the court sustained the objection. Defendant maintains
that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous because it was important
for him to test the reliability of the informant.

It is well settled that the general policy in this state is to prevent

the disclosure of an informant’s identity unless such disclosure is rele-

vant and helpful to the defense or is necessary for a fair trial.

HB Craig v. State, (1980) 278 Ind. 361, 404 N.E.2d 580; McCulley

v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 185, 272 N.E.2d 613. Since the state

has the privilege to withhold the identity of an informant, the burden

is upon defendant to demonstrate an exception. Craig v. State, supra;
Lewandowski v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 4, 389 N.E.2d 706.

Here, the defendant has clearly not-satisified this burden. There has

Le 633
ee

been no showing whatsoever that disclosure of the informant’s identity
would have been relevant and helpful to the defense or necessary to
a fair trial. There is simply no indication what role the informant played
in the investigation and prosecution of this case. Accordingly, there
was no error in sustaining the state’s objection.

Iv.

Also during cross-examination of Officer Mahank, defense counsel
attempted to determine whether the witness had withheld evidence
in a previous criminal prosecution, but he was prevented from doing
so when the trial court sustained the state's objection. Defendant made
an offer to prove that the witness would testify that in the case of
Arline v. State, (1978) 156 Ind.App. 95, 294 N.E.2d 840, he withheld
a certain weapon from the defense and had lied under oath. Defendant
contends that this line of questioning was proper cross-examination
in that it had a bearing on the present credibility of the witness.

A reading of Arline does not support defendant's contention. The
opinion reveals that the police in that case gave the prosecutor a knife,
prior to trial, which was allegedly involved in the crime and that it
was the prosecutor who intentionally withheld it from the defense. Of-
ficer Mahank had been asked during the trial in Arline whether he
had found such a knife in the course of his investigation, and he replied
in the negative. Defendant’s assertion that this was perjured testimony
is pure speculation and finds no support in the Arline opinion. The
trial court committed no error in restricting defense counsel’s cross-
examination.

v.

Defendant next maintains that the trial court erred in permitting
a prosecution witness, the victim’s son, to remain in the courtroom
after he had testified. At the beginning of trial, the court granted a
defense motion for the separation of witnesses in which they were
ordered to remain outside the courtroom until they were called to
testify.

After the victim's son testified, he requested that the court permit
him to remain inside the courtroom and observe. Over defendant's ob-
jection, the trial court granted the request upon determining that the

634 |

son would not be used as a witness again. Defendant does not contend
that the presence of the son in the courtroom violated the separation
order, but he does argue that the son’s presence “distracted and aroused
the emotions of the jury so as to prejudice [his] right to a fair and im-
partial proceeding.”

Defendant has cited nothing in the record to substantiate his claim.

Whether or not to allow the son to remain in the courtroom was a matter

within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court will

__ not interfere except for an abuse thereof. Dixon v. State, (1976)

264 Ind. 651, 348 N.E.2d 401. Without a showing that defend-

ant’s right to a fair trial and an impartial jury was in any way prejudiced

or violated, we cannot find an abuse of discretion. DeBoor v. State, (1962)
243 Ind. 87, 182 N.E.2d 250. There was no error here.

VI.

Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred when it allowed
the state to introduce, over his objection, two exhibits by way of color
slides projected onto a movie screen. The pictures portrayed the body
of the deceased victim prior to the autopsy. Defendant argues that
the proper way to have admitted the exhibits would have been to dis-
tribute them as photographs to each juror. He contends that the color
slides unduly inflamed the passions of the jury.

The fact that a photograph might arouse the jury is not a sufficient

ground in itself to justify its exclusion as long as the evidence is rele-

vant and material. Porter v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 180, 391

HE (N.E.2d 801; Quinn v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 545, 356 N.E.2d

1186. Defendant does not explain and we fail to see how the

slides inflamed the passions of the jury any more than color photographs

would have. Since defendant has conceded the admissibility of the ex-
hibits as photographs, his argument has no merit.

vil.

Defendant was tried jointly with two other defendants. He moved
for a separate trial, but it was denied by the trial court. Defendant
assigns this ruling as error.

The decision to grant or deny a motion for separate trial is within

bn 635

the sound discretion of the trial court. Taggart v. State, (1979) 271 Ind.

186, 390 N.E.2d 657; Gutierrez v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 518,

HM (386 N.E.2d 1207. Defendant must show on appeal that in light

of what actually occurred at trial, the denial of a separate

trial subjected him to such prejudice that the trial court may be said

to have abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion for

severance. Gutierrez v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 639, 395 N.E.2d 218; Ortiz
v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E.2d 1188.

Defendant first asserts that by being subjected to a joint trial, he
was found guilty by association. While conceding that one defendant
was found innocent, he maintains that the jury would not believe that
the police could be wrong three times so that they were bound to find
at least one of the defendants guilty. Second, he contends that his
counsel was forced to be less aggressive in the joint trial. He cites
no specific examples. Defendant’s contentions are mere conclusions
without support in the record. Prejudice having been asserted but not
demonstrated, the trial court did not err in denying severance. White
v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 302, 330 N.H.2d 84.

VUL

Defendant's final specification of error is that the trial court erred

in refusing to give eight of his tendered instructions. However, with

one exception, defendant has failed to support his allegations

Hl with cogent argument and appropriate legal authority as re-

quired by Ind. R. Ap. P. 8.3(A)(7). These issues are, therefore,

waived. Abrams v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 287, 403 N.E.2d 345; Carman
v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 76, 896 N.H.2d 344.

The remaining issue properly preserved for review concerns defend-
ant’s tendered instruction number three which reads:

“An accomplice who turns ‘State’s Evidence’ and agrees to
‘cooperate’ with the State in consideration of lenience or the
dismissal of charges, to be realistic, is being bribed regardless
of facts that public policy has approved such action in the interest
of effective law enforcement and, therefore, such accomplice’s
testimony, though not necessarily false, is highly suspect and
should be highly scrutinized by the jury.”

This instruction apparently refers to state’s witness Artie Lamar

James, another participant in the offense who was not tried with de-
fendant and his two codefendants.

The substance of defendant’s tendered instruction was taken from
an observation made by this Court in Newman v. State, (1975) 263 Ind.
569, 334 N.E.2d 684. However, in that case, we made the remark in
the course of explaining why we were ordering a new trial when the
prosecutor failed to disclose to the jury an agreement of leniency be-
tween the state and an accomplice who testified for the state. This
Court did not hold that an instruction embodying that language would
have been proper.

Even assuming that there was some sort of an agreement between.

the state and Artie James, and defendant has made no showing that

such an agreement existed, this Court has consistently held

Ho that a cautionary instruction concerning the credibility of ac-

complice testimony is erroneous as an invasion of the province

of the jury. Murphy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 184, 369 N.E.2d 411; Cherry

v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 298, 280 N.E.2d 818; Turner v. State, (1972) 258

Ind. 267, 280 N.E.2d 621. There was no error in refusing defendant’s
instruction number three.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
Note—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 142.

THOMAS COX v. STATE OF INDIANA.

(No, 6808177. Filed April 22, 1981]

637

Robert Graves, Donald Scheer, of Marion, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, J.—On October 30, 1979, appellant Cox was found guilty of
murder by a jury in Grant Circuit Court. He was sentenced to forty
years with an additional ten years added for aggravating circumstances.
He appeals.

Appellant alleges errors concerning the trial court’s jurisdiction, a
refusal to grant a motion for a change of venue, a witness being per-
mitted to testify, the sufficiency of the evidence and whether the ver-
dict was contrary to law, and sentencing.

638 |
Po

The evidence at trial revealed that Jerome Evans was shot in the
back at the “Little Harlem Tavern” in the early morning hours of
February 23, 1979. An autopsy revealed that the victim bled to death
as a result of a gunshot wound to the heart and aorta, fired from a
distance of approximately three to five feet. The victim and the ap-
pellant were involved in an argument before 11:30 p.m. on February
22. Subsequent to the argument and prior to the shooting, the appellant
told Maxine Weatherly that he and Evans had had a fight earlier that
evening and advised her to duck down if Evans came in the door,
because he was “going to blow his damn brains out.” Cox came into
the bar carrying a sawed-off shotgun. He walked to the bar where the
victim was standing, pointed the gun and fired it at Evans, who was
turning. Evans reached for Cox, struggled with him and then fell to
the floor. Cox and his two brothers began kicking the victim, who was
lying on the floor. Cox finally kicked the victim in the head and hit
him with the gun barrel. He stated that if he wasn’t dead he was going
to finish him. One of the appellant’s brothers picked up the gun, handed
it to Cox and they left the tavern. No weapon was found on the body
of the victim and no weapon was seen in the victim's possession at
the time of the incident.

I.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in reassuming jurisdic-
tion of this cause. Defendant filed a motion for change of venue from
the Judge, The Honorable Morris Hall, on March 1, 1979. Judge Hall
granted this motion and named a panel from which the parties were
to strike and select a special judge on March 1. On March 13, 1979,
the trial court reassumed jurisdiction upon the failure of the defend-
ant to strike from that panel. Appellant objects to the denial of his
Motion for change of judge because he claims he did not receive notice
of the court’s appointment of a panel and demands that he be allowed
to strike.

Judge Hall disqualified himself to serve as judge due to the serious
illness of his wife on August 13, 1979. The parties, by agreement,
selected Thomas Newman, Jr., as special judge pending his qualifica-
tion and assumption of jurisdiction. On August 20, 1979, Thomas
Newman, Jr., qualified and assumed jurisdiction. Appellant now argues

Ye 639
CT

that the regular judge, The Honorable Morris Hall, erred in reassum-
ing jurisdiction. He claims that counsel did not receive notice of the
panel, and therefore had no opportunity to strike.

Criminal Rule 13 provides that the party filing an application or mo-

tion for a change of judge shall bring it to the attention of the presiding

judge. Our court has held that this places the obligation upon

I that party to take the initiative in the change proceedings

and to follow through to see that they are completed. State

ex rel. Brown v. Hancock County Superior Court, (1978) 267 Ind. 546,

872 N.E.2d 169. In addition, it is clear that the defendant by agree-

ment with the other parties selected Thomas Newman Jr., as the special
judge herein. There is no error on this issue. .

I.

Appellant also claims the trial court erred in not granting his mo-
tion for change of venue from the county. He claims that the trial judge
was without jurisdiction to hear the motion based on his claim that
he erroneously reassumed jurisdiction, which was treated in Issue I,
supra.

Appellant also claims that he was statutorily entitled to a change
of venue as a matter of right because his case was a case where the
punishment might have been death. Ind. R. Crim. P. 12. This
Il __ issue has been recently addressed by this court in Hall v. State,
(1980) 273 Ind. 507, 405 N.E.2d 530. Here, as in that case, it
is true the defendant was charged with murder, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3
(Burns 1979 Repl.). However, it is also true that the penalty of death
applies to that crime only when certain aggravating circumstances are
alleged and proved. None of these aggravating circumstances was
alleged or shown in this case, so the death penalty was not applicable
here. Cox was not erroneously denied a mandatory change of venue.
Id., 405 N.E.2d at 533.

Tl.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in allowing a State’s
rebuttal witness to testify when he had violated the court’s separation
of witnesses order.

It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit a witness to
testify, even though he has violated a separation order, in the absence
of connivance or collusion by the party calling the witness.
HE 0°Conner v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 460, 399 N.E.2d 364.

The record reveals that following the conclusion of Cox’s testimony
the State called Cleo Richardson to contradict certain statements. Cox
objected and the prosecutor stated that he had kept careful watch to
keep witnesses out of the courtroom, but that he did not recognize
Mr. Richardson as he had never seen him before that time. He also
added that Richardson's testimony did not become relevant until the
defendant testified. Cleo Richardson testified that he was notified that
he would be asked to testify approximately thirty minutes before he
was called.

Richardson testified generally about the relationship between Cox
and the deceased. He testified that they had had a karate school and
grew up together and worked together. Cox and Evans had had
arguments and fights and Richardson had acted as a “go between” to
try to smooth over these disputes.

Cox claims that Richardson’s testimony was prejudicial because it
emphasized that he had stated that he was going to kill Evans. Our
review reveals that much of the testimony focused on the relationship
of these men and emphasized that the deceased had wanted to go out
and fight and that Cox did not want to fight. Richardson stated that
Evans had beaten up Cox and that Cox was looking for Evans. Other
testimony stated that Cox would call Evans a “fag” or “punk” and that
Evans didn’t do anything about it. The exchanges were verbal, not
physical. Both men were holders of black belts in karate.

The record reveals no connivance or collusion by the prosecutor who
called this witness. There was also no evidence that the challenged
testimony was prejudicial. Much of its was inaudible and the appellant
has not specified how it prejudiced him. The ruling of the trial court
will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion.
Buchanan v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 360, 332 N.E.2d 213. There is no such
showing here and no error on this issue.

Ye 641
TC

Iv.

The appellant next claims that the State failed to negate his claim

of self-defense and claims that therefore the jury's verdict was not sup-

ported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law. To

Iso prevail on a claim of self-defense the defendant must have

acted without fault, have been in a place where he had a right

to be and have been in danger of death or great bodily harm. Hoover

v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 566, 376 N.E.2d 1152; White v. State, (1976) 265

Ind. 32, 349 N.E.2d 156. The final determination of whether the State

met its burden to prove that the appellant did not fulfill one of these
requirements rested with the trier of fact. White v. State, supra.

The evidence as previously set out revealed that Cox and the vietim
were involved in an argument before the shooting incident. Cox had
told Ms. Weatherly that he was going to “blow his (the victim’s) brains
out.” Five witnesses testified that Cox entered the bar and, without
provocation, shot the victim with a shotgun. Then Cox and his brothers
kicked and hit the victim while Cox stated that “if he wasn’t dead he
was going to finish him.” No weapon was found on the victim and none
was seen in his possession at the time of the shooting. The evidence
was thus sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that the defendant
shot the victim purposely and maliciously and was not acting in
self-defense.

v.

Finally, appellant raises an issue on sentencing. Appellant was
sentenced to forty years with an additional ten years added for aggra-
vating circumstances. The court found aggravating circumstances in
that the appellant, without provocation, shot and killed the victim and
then stated “if he is not dead I will shoot him again.” The court found
that there was no self defense necessitated by the circumstances and
that the deceased was unarmed. The court found that there were no
mitigating circumstances.

Ind. Code § 35-4.1-8-7 (Burns 1979) enumerates both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances that the court may consider, but this listing
does not limit the factors which may be considered. Holmes v. State,

(1980) 272 Ind. 435, 398 N.E.2d 1279; Harris v. State, (1979) 272 Ind.
210, 396 N.B.2d 674.

In addition, the record also reflects that the court considered the
presentence report which included felony convictions. At the sentenc-
ing hearing the prosecutor also stated that the defendant was on parole
at the time he committed the crime, and this was not objected to or
contradicted. See Rowley v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 584, 394 N.E.2d 928.

We do not find that the sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light
of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. R.
App. Rev. Sen. 2 (1); McNew v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 214, 391

HE N.E.2d 607.

Judgment affirmed.
All justices concur.

NOTE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 737.
|
JOHN A. SMITH v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 12798345. Filed April 22, 1981.]

643

William J. Lawrence, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— Appellant, John Smith, was convicted of murder, a
felony, in a trial by jury before the Honorable Patricia J. Gifford, Judge
of the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division Four. He was charged
with having knowingly killed Marvin C. Foster by stabbing him with
a knife, such charge having been brought pursuant to Ind. Code
§ 35-42-1-1. Appellant received a determinate fifty year sentence. On
appeal we consider the following contentions of appellant:

(1) that the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence;

(2) that the trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibits Nos.
84, 35 and 36, envelopes containing scrapings;

(8) that a statement by appellant should have been suppressed;

(4) that the trial court erred in allowing testimony by a police
officer explaining his reason for statements made to appellant; and

(5) that the trial court erred in refusing to permit introduction
of a photograph tendered by appellant.

L

The claim is made that the evidence serving to identify appellant
as the assailant of the victim and to prove that he harbored the intent
to kill the victim was insufficient to support the jury verdict. In deter-
mining this question we do not weigh the evidence nor resolve ques-
tions of credibility but look to the evidence, direct and circumstantial,
and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the verdict. Smith
v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction will be af-
firmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from
which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that appellant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 536, 255
N.E.2d 657.

The evidence viewed from this standpoint showed that appellant,
the decedent Marvin Foster, and the prime prosecution witness, Kalvyn
Collins, were friends and for at least a year prior to Foster’s death
had spent a lot of time together. The mother of appellant and the mother
of Collins worked together and visited one another’s home. On August
17, 1978, Foster and Collins lived in a one room basement apartment
along with Collins’ infant daughter. Collins’ mother Flora Ruffin lived
upstairs in the same house, as did one Robert Ward. On the night of
the 17th at 11:00 p.m. Ms. Ruffin came home from work and as was
her custom looked in on her daughter. She saw that the three were
already in bed asleep. Foster was on one side of the bed, Collins was
on the other, and the baby was between them. Ms. Ruffin went on
upstairs, and after dozing off, was awakened by her daughter scream-
ing. She went out of her room and her daughter yelled frantically to
her, “Momma, John has killed Marvin!”

At this point Ms. Ruffin saw the baby attempting to climb the stairs.
She was covered with blood. Ms. Ruffin picked the baby up and con-
tinued to the basement where she saw Marvin Foster on the couch
in the room bleeding. He held his hand out to Ms. Ruffin and said, “Mom-
ma, help me.” Shortly, Mr. Ward, the roomer from upstairs then ap-
peared and examined Foster’s eyes and declared that he was dead.

Le 645

The police were called, and arrived at the apartment at about 2:00
a.m. Collins was observed by them to be dressed in a blue night gown,
with blood on her, and in a state of shock. There was a large amount
of blood on the bed and in the doorway and on the couch.

An autopsy of the body of Foster resulted in findings that he had
bled to death primarily from a stab wound at the neck which severed
a main artery. He also had knife wounds on his arm and leg and
shoulder. He was a young male person weighing between 180 and 190
pounds.

Collins testified at trial that she and Foster and the baby had gone
to bed before eleven o’clock. After falling asleep she was awakened
by loud noises of a commotion and screaming. Foster said “John, you
mother fucker, you!” She then turned on the light and saw Foster
fighting and struggling with appellant, John Smith. He was hitting
Foster. She then ran out of the apartment and called to her mother.

At the outset appellant contends that the evidence serving to iden-
tify him as the person who inflicted the fatal wounds upon Foster was
insufficient. In so doing appellant focuses on apparent weaknesses in
the testimony of Collins. She testified that she did not see a knife and
did not actually see appellant stab Foster. She may have testified that
she recognized appellant before she turned the bedroom light on. On
cross-examination she admitted to having consumed alcohol during the
evening. She also admitted that she and Foster had had violent fights
and that she had herself once stabbed him.

Standing against this evidence were the many facts and inferences
including that on this night Foster and Collins were seen by Collins’
mother already asleep in bed, and were not engaged in an argument
or fight. The physical evidence demonstrates a very violent and forceful
attack. It is beyond question that Foster was stabbed repeatedly with
a knife or cutting instrument. The jury may well have reasoned that
Collins’ failure to see the knife resulted from the fact that she was
abruptly awakened from sleep and confronted with a violent struggle,
in which life hung in the balance. Movements of hands and bodies would
naturally be fast and random. In sum, the violent nature of the rela-
tionship between Collins and Foster and her possible impairment from
ingestion of alcohol and the nature of her testimony were for the jury
to weigh and evaluate under the circumstances in arriving at its deci-

646 —
Cd

sion whether to credit Collins’ testimony that she recognized appellant
as Foster's assailant on this occasion. The jury was presented with
direct proof of identification presented by Collins, which was suscep-
tible of belief, and was sufficient to warrant the jury in concluding to
a moral certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant attacked
Foster with a knife as he lay asleep in his bed, and repeatedly stabbed
him, thereby inflicting wounds upon him from which he quickly bled
to death.

Relying upon these same evidentiary items, appellant contends that
the evidence was insufficient to warrant the conclusion that appellant
had the intent to kill in this assault. He also argues that the
Hl testimony of Collins was equivocal and therefore insufficient
to convict. In Gaddis v, State, (1969) 253 Ind. 78, 251 N.E.2d
658, relied on by appellant, this Court reversed a conviction, deeming
the identification evidence insufficient to convict. There, the lone
eyewitness to the crime was unsure of his identification of the accused
and defendant presented an alibi defense. Here Collins was completely
unequivocal in her identification of appellant, and no alibi defense was
presented. Appellant and Collins were very well acquainted as were
their respective families. Her testimony was that appellant was hitting
Foster and Foster was bleeding from the mouth and fell to the floor.
The testimony of the pathologist showed that one wound to the neck
pierced the throat and another a major artery in the neck and that
appellant’s lungs were found filled with blood. Based upon the same
considerations as above, we conclude that the jury was warranted in
concluding beyond a reasonable doubt from the stealth employed, and
the repeated acts of stabbing, that appellant intended on this occasion
to kill Foster.

I.

The claim is made that the trial court erroneously permitted the
prosecution to introduce three brown paper envelopes into evidence.
They were sponsored by a police technician who testified that

Hs she took scrapings from three designated locations at the
crime scene and placed them in these envelopes. She testified

that they contained what was possibly blood. After they were admitted
there was no further testimony regarding them or their contents.
Evidence is relevant if it is material to an issue in the case and tends

be 647

to make a desired inference more probable. Musick v. State, (1976) 265
Ind. 207, 352 N.E.2d 717; Pirtle v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d
634, These exhibits do not possess the evidentiary requirement of
relevancy. The defense objection to their introduction was well taken.
However, we find that their introduction posed no danger of creating
unfair prejudice or misleading innuendo. No specific form which such
prejudice may have taken has been presented. The only possible in-
ference which may have been drawn from the envelopes is that there
was blood in three locations in the apartment. This inference would
not prejudice appellant's substantial rights, as there were photographs
and many statements made throughout the trial, that the victim Foster
bled profusely and that there was much blood on the baby, the bed,
the floor, the wall, the sofa, the doorway, and the sofa, and rags used
to help Foster. Of the fact that there was blood present throughout
the apartment, there was not doubt. The admission of these envelopes
was harmless.

Il.

Appellant unsuccessfully sought suppression of an oral confession
allegedly made by him to police officers as he was being transported
by them from Chicago to Indianapolis. He claims that the State
Il failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this confes-
sion was made voluntarily. Indeed such was the burden of
the State. Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E.2d 1188. In order
to satisfy this burden the State must prove to the satisfaction of the
trier of fact that the decision to give the statement was the product
of a rational intellect and a free will, and not induced by any violence,
threats, promises, or other improper influences. Nacoff v. State, (1971)
256 Ind. 97, 267 N.E.2d 165.

Appellant was arrested in Harvey, Illinois, held there two days and
transported to Cook County Jail in Chicago and held there an addi-
tional two days when he was picked up by officers from Indianapolis.
During his detention in Illinois, he was interrogated concerning other
possible crimes, and at some point was taken before a magistrate where
he was advised of his rights and waived extradition to Indiana. While
in the Cook County Jail, he was required to eat from a piece of card-
board, part of his clothes were taken from him, and he was unable to
lie down. When picked up he was advised of his rights pursuant to

648 —
Ee

the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, with the exception that he was not told that if
he chose to speak, he could stop talking at any point and have a lawyer
present. On route from Chicago with the two officers, they encountered
a sévere snow storm, but though the roads had been closed they chose
to continue on. During this hectic episode, appellant engaged in general
conversation with the officers. He said that he was in a hurry to get
back to Indianapolis, and was told by the officer driving that he too
wanted to get back and that they would drive through. Appellant asked
who the witnesses would be against him and was told, “the same wit-
nesses as at the beginning.” Appellant then said that he stabbed Foster.
The officer who was dealing with the driving then told him to shut
up, and that if he wanted to give a statement he would have to wait
until they got back to Indianapolis.

From the foregoing, we conclude that appellant’s statement that he
stabbed Foster was not inadmissible as involuntary or as taken in viola-
tion of the requirements of Miranda, supra. It is elementary
i | that the State is not required to prove that it gave an advise-
ment of rights to a suspect unless it seeks to introduce the

product of custodial interrogation.

“Although Miranda’s requirement of specific warnings creates a
limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be claimed,
the exception does not apply outside the context of the inherently
coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed.”
Roberts v. United States, (1980) 100 S.Ct. 1358.
Custody was surely present here. Appellant was isolated in the car
with police officers when he made the admission of having stabbed
Foster. However, there was no questioning by the officers and no con-
duct on their part designed to bring forth a self-incriminating response
by appellant regarding events surrounding the killing of Foster. Rhode
Island v. Innis, (1980) 100 S.Ct. 1682. Consequently appellant's state-
ment was not Miranda violative.

The claim is made that appellant’s statement was inadmissible as
involuntary. There is no question that appellant was subject to uncom-
fortable and frightening conditions in the Cook County Jail, or that
he had been subject to interrogations by detectives from Harvey, Il-
linois. Appellant also supports this claim by pointing out that he was

[| 649
LC

not brought before a magistrate on the Indiana charge of murder in
Indiana until two days after notice of his arrest by Illinois police had
reached Indianapolis. There is nothing in these experiences of appellant
that would bring pressure to bear upon him to speak about events in
Indianapolis. The Illinois custodial events were behind him and the
delay from date of receipt of notice by Indianapolis police to that point
was approximately one day. Appellant was with Indiana police as he
spoke and was on his way to Indianapolis. They would not be perceived
by him as responsible for conditions of his prior detention. They testified
that they did not threaten appellant or offer him any inducement to
speak about the charge, or mistreat him in any manner.

Appellant also attempts to support this claim by pointing out that
the State brought forth no evidence of appellant’s low intelligence and
mental capacity. They did however testify that he responded to them
as though he knew what was happening and understood accurately
the meaning of his prior waiver of extradition, the warrant for murder,
and the purpose of his custody and transportation by the officers.

The evidence on this point was sufficient to warrant the trial court’s
conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant’s decision to state
that he had stabbed Foster was freely and voluntarily made, and was
not the product of coercion or other improper influence. There was
no constitutional error in permitting the introduction of the statement.

Iv.

In testimony one of the police officers who returned appellant to
Indianapolis was permitted over an irrelevancy objection to explain
his reasons for telling appellant to shut up, after appellant had said
that he stabbed Foster. It is a general rule that a witness to or partici-
pant in a conversation may relate a previous relevant conversation
or the substance thereof.

In answering, the officer stated:

“My reasons for telling him to shut up was due to the fact of hav-
ing taken many statements pertaining to a defendant’s statement,
I always want to be sitting still where a person is in good condi-
tion. The best position for taking a statement is when a person
is sitting down. I didn’t want him to say anything while I was
driving. I was worried about staying on the road; it was a bad

650 |

night and I always advise a person, his first right is to remain
silent don’t say anything ‘cause right now when you're traveling,
you're concerned about staying on the road and Sgt. McCoy and
he were talking and I just told him to shut up and not talk about
the case.”

Appellant relies on the general rule that a witness may relate a previous

conversation or the substance thereof, but must leave it to the trier

of fact to determine the intent of the parties. Elkhart &

HE Western R.R. Co. v. Waldorf, (1897) 17 Ind.App. 29, 46 N.E.

88. In the circumstances of this case, the limitation in this

rule was not violated, as the witness had previously testified that as

part of his statement to appellant to shut up, he had stated to appellant
his reasons for it. The officer testified:

“Q. Okay, what did you overhear the defendant say?

A. He was saying to Sgt. MeCoy that he had stabbed the sub-
ject and I—when he said this, that he had stabbed a man,
I turned sideways and said ‘Hey, I don’t want you to talk
about this; your first right is you got aright to remain silent,
don’t even talk about this case ‘cause I want to wait until
I get back to headquarters and then I can take a taped state-
ment off of you.’ And like I said, I told him to shut up.”

No error occurred when the trial court overruled this objection.
Vv.

The trial court sustained a prosecution relevancy objection to a
defense exhibit which was apparently a photograph taken of appellant
with the prosecution witness Collins. The photograph was
H_staken on the occasion of a homecoming party given for appel-
lant upon being released from the penitentiary one year before

the attack upon Foster. The photograph would apparently have tended
to prove a cordial relationship between appellant and Collins at the
time. After the court sustained an objection for the second time to
the photograph, it invited appellant to substantiate its relevance
whereupon defense counsel expressly withdrew the exhibit. The deci-
sion to do so was undoubtedly predicated upon the fact that the jury
had already heard a detailed description by the sponsoring witness
of the meaning and content of the photograph, and other evidence also
heard by the jury unmistakably chronicled the fact that appellant and

a

[| 65
ee

Collins had been friends. When counsel did not attempt to support the
relevancy of the exhibit on the occasion of its second unsuccessful at-
tempt to introduce and withdrew it from the record, he acquiesced
in the ruling of the court and there was no error in its exclusion.
Strickland v, State, (1977) 265 Ind. 664, 359 N.E.2d 244; Foust v. State,
(1927) 200 Ind. 76, 161 N.E. 371.

The conviction is affirmed.

Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NoTE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 743.

JAMES C. MOON v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 8808340. Filed April 22, 1981.]

|
William J. Dougherty, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney Generals, Michael
Gene Worden, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

HuntER, J.—The defendant, James C. Moon, was convicted in a bench
trial of attempted robbery, a class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns
1979 Repl.), and carrying a handgun without a license, a class D felony,
Ind. Code § 35-23-4.1-18(c) (Burns 1979 Repl.). He was sentenced to con-
current terms of twenty years for the class A felony and two years
for the class D felony. Moon presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; and
2. Whether the judgment of the trial court was contrary to law.

The evidence indicates that during the evening of November 7, 1979,
the defendant and a machete-bearing accomplice entered the Brookside
Market at 2129 Brookside Avenue in Indianapolis. The defendant, who
was carrying a revolver, fired a shot at the ceiling and demanded money
from the cashier. Startled by the shot, a patron near the cash register
bolted down an aisle toward the rear of the store. The machete-bearing
accomplice gave chase.

Their path carried them toward a window, largely veiled from public
view, which connected the owner’s living quarters to the store. Through
that window the owner had been observing the developments. As the
two men neared the window, the owner saw the accomplice raise the
machete to swing it at the patron. At that point the owner pushed
the window open and fired five shots at the accomplice.

Wounded by the gunfire, the accomplice dropped the machete and,
together with the defendant, fled the premises. In the aftermath, it
was discovered that one of the bullets fired by the owner had ricocheted
and hit the cashier in the leg.

L

Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction for attempted robbery as a class A felony. That contention

P| 653

is predicated on the fact that the “bodily injury” necessary to elevate
attempted robbery to a felony of class A status, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1
(Burns 1979 Repl.), was inflicted by a bullet fired by the owner of the
Brookside Market. Since neither he nor his accomplice fired the shot
which injured the cashier, defendant maintains there is no evidence
to establish his liability for class A attempted robbery.

We disagree. The responsibility for any bodily injury which occurs

during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery rests

on the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of who inflicts

| | the injury, so long as it is a natural and probable consequence

of the events and circumstances surrounding the robbery or

attempt. That our legislature so intended is readily manifest in the
language employed in the robbery statute:

“{TJhe offense [robbery] is a class B felony if it is committed while
armed with a deadly weapon, and a class A felony if it results
in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any other per-
son.” Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.).
The pronoun “it” obviously refers to the robbery or attempted rob-
bery. If the robbery or attempt “results in” bodily injury, the
perpetrator of the crime is liable for a felony of class A status.

The statutory attribution of responsibility for any bodily injury which
flows from a robbery or attempted robbery no doubt reflects the legis-
lature’s recognition that regardless of the perpetrator’s design, the
crime of robbery has inherent potential for violence. Victims may resist,
police or bystanders may intercede. Neither these responses nor the
concomitant likelihood that some bodily injury will occur can be regarded
as unnatural or improbable consequences of the perpetrator’s conduct.

These natural responses and consequences were alluded
Eto by this Court in Bailey v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 318,. 412
N.E.2d 56, where, in discussing the statutory term “results

in,” we stated:

“The term is a causative one of considerable generality, but in
denoting natural consequences and human responses to express
human conduct within the ambit of elements of the offense of rob-
bery, that quality does not result in legal uncertainty. * * * If
an injury to any other person arises as a consequence of the con-
duct of the accused in committing a robbery, the offense is prop-

654 ee
ee

erly regarded as a class A felony. If the injury does not so arise

attribution of a class A felony is improper.” Id. at 59.
Here, the defendant and his accomplice walked into a grocery store
armed with a revolver and machete. They fired a shot into the air,
demanded money, and swung a machete at a store patron. The bodily
injury which ultimately occurred, albeit caused by the gunfire of the
store owner, was a natural consequence of the conduct of the defend-
ant and his accomplice in attempting the robbery. Accordingly, the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for at-
tempted robbery as a class A felony.

Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
the conclusion that he was capable of forming the specific intent to
attempt the robbery. He predicates his defense of intoxication on his
testimony .and pretrial statements that he had ingested extensive
amounts of drugs prior to the robbery attempt and remembered nothing
about it.

Voluntary intoxication is no defense in a criminal proceeding unless

it is shown that the defendant was so intoxicated as to be incapable
of forming the requisite intent. Wombles v. State, (1979) 270

HB Ind. 181, 383 N.E.2d 1037, 1039; Stevens v. State, (1978) 267
Ind. 541, 372 N.E.2d 165, 166. It is a question of fact upon

which the defendant has the burden of proof. Stevens v. State, supra,
Dobrzykowski v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 604, 382 N.E.2d 170, 172. When
the sufficiency of the evidence is raised as an issue on appeal, this Court
will not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.
Rather, we will examine only the evidence most favorable to the state,
together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If, from
that viewpoint, there is substantial evidence of probative value to sup-
port the fact-finder’s conclusion, it will not be set aside. Dobrzykowski
v. State, supra; Henderson v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 334, 3438 N.E.2d 776.

Testimony of witnesses at the robbery scene indicates that the
defendant was the person who fired the shot at the ceiling, demanded
the cashier turn over the money, and ordered a patron not to interfere
in the robbery. The record also reveals that once the store owner began
shooting, the defendant had the presence of mind and physical capacity
to flee the Brookside Market, drive the getaway car, and flee on foot

Le 655

from police pursuit after abandoning the vehicle. Based on this evidence,
the fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the defendant was not
so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the requisite intent.

I.

Defendant's contention that the judgment of the trial court is con-

trary to law is predicated on the argument the court erred in permitting

a witness to be questioned about the defendant's prior criminal

i | history. The record reveals, however, that defendant neither

objected to the questioning at trial nor challenged it in his

motion to correct errors. Consequently, the allegation of error has not

been preserved for our review. Gutierrez v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 639,

895 N.E.2d 218, 222; Ballard v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 482, 318 N.H.2d
798, 807.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
DeBruler, J., concurs in result.

NoTE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 740.
P|
JERRY W. GARDNER, SR. v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 280838. Filed April 24, 1981]

Peter L. Benjamin, of Merrillville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

DEBRULER, J.— Appellant, Jerry Gardner, was convicted in a trial by
jury of two counts of first degree murder and one count of assault and
battery with intent to kill. He was sentenced to two terms of life im-
prisonment and one term of not less than two nor more than fourteen
years. On appeal he raises the following issues:

1. Whether the evidence that he was sane at the time of the killings
was sufficient to convict.

[| 657
—

2. Prosecutorial misconduct in final jury summation.

8. Error in overruling an objection to cross-examination of an ex-
pert witness.

Appellant was charged and convicted of stabbing and killing his wife,
Deidra and his infant son Jerry, Jr., and stabbing and attempting to
kill his infant son Monty. He was also charged with stabbing
Hand attempting to kill his blind brother, but was acquitted
on that count. At trial appellant relied primarily upon the
defense of insanity. The offense was alleged to have occurred on
December 14, 1975. The burden fell upon the prosecution at the 1979
trial to prove appellant sane to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hill v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429; Ind.
Code § 35-41-4-1 (amendment placing burden on defendant to prove in-
sanity effective April 1, 1978). That burden can be met by proof that
the accused was not suffering from a mental disease or defect at the
time of his conduct comprising the offense or that if so suffering he
was nevertheless possessed of a substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of such conduct and to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law. Williams v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 476, 393 N.E.2d
183; Hill v. State, supra. The insufficiency of evidence of the element
of sanity is subject to the same rules as are other insufficiency claims.
Therefore in determining the question we do not weigh the evidence
nor resolve questions of credibility but look to the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom which support the verdict. Smith v.
State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction will be af-
firmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from
which a reasonable trier of fact could infer guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Glover v. State, (1970) 258 Ind. 536, 255 N.E.2d 657.

In preface to a recounting of evidence from which the jury could
have inferred appellant's sanity, there is a body of strong and persuasive
evidence supporting the inference that appellant was suffering from
schizophrenia at the time of the offenses and unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct and totally unable to resist the impulse
to kill his family. Three psychiatrists so testified. Appellant’s brutal,
violent acts against his defenseless wife and two infant children so
bespeak. Appellant’s confession evidences that appellant was respond-

658 |
Ee

ing at the time of the killings to a voice he heard from a god or spirit
commanding him to kill, and that he had been observed on occasion
to cry and gesture in an unusual manner without apparent reason, and
that he had spoken on several occasions prior to the killing of hearing
voices and attributing them to spirits or voodoo.

In spite of this impressive evidence, the jury concluded that appellant
was legally sane at the time of the killings, and it is our judicial assign-
ment to examine the evidence supporting that inference and to deter-
mine whether it was sufficient.

In December, 1975, appellant was employed at United States Steel
as a straightener. He lived with his wife, two infant sons, his blind
brother, and his mother and father. On the night of the 14th, on retir-
ing, appellant told his wife that he heard voices again and went to the
kitchen and got a butcher knife which he put under his pillow. After
she went to sleep he watched television for a while. He began to hear
voices and went “berserk” and began swinging the knife and stabbed
his wife and two children repeatedly. During this episode he cut or
unplugged the wires on three phones in the house. When he was finished,
he poured himself a glass of wine and drank it. He went across the
street to the house of a policeman, but unable to raise anyone there,
went to the hospital and spoke with a nurse and told her of an emergency
at his house. He was directed to another place in the hospital, but went
to the police station instead and told officers present that he thought
that he had killed his wife. Within a short time the bodies were
discovered and appellant made a complete confession. When making
this confession he said that he was hearing the voices again and his
body tensed. He indicated no remorse during this time. Later in the
day he was very remorseful and cried and was discovered to have a
cut on his left wrist and had to be taken to the hospital.

Appellant’s blind brother testified that he had never known appellant
to act in a strange or unnatural manner and that he had never heard
him speak in a strange manner. Appellant’s mother testified that she
found him sitting and rocking in a corner crying one day. She also
testified that shortly before the tragedy at the house, she was taking
appellant to work and he was talking to himself and making strange
signs with his hands and said that she should follow the voices which
he was then hearing. She told him to stop that, and he did so.

L | 659

The jury also heard evidence from psychiatrists that there are vary-
ing degrees of the disease of schizophrenia and that during remission
persons suffering from it would know right from wrong and would have
the capacity to conform to the mandate of the law. It also heard that
more than a year before the killings appellant had called friends and
asked them to come over as he was hearing voices and seeing visions
and was afraid that he might kill someone. Prior to that in 1973 ap-
pellant had had similar experiences in an episode during which he had
taken some “street drugs”.

Based upon this evidence the jury was warranted in inferring that
appellant had a substantial capacity at the time of the killing to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. He became aware prior to
December that his experiences in hearing voices made him dangerous
to others. On the night of the 14th he dismantled the telephones in
the house so as to prevent those within from getting help when he
attacked them. He went across the street to the home of a police of-
ficer neighbor and then to the police station and reported his conduct.
These are the actions of one who is aware of the wrongful nature of
his conduct.

Based upon the foregoing evidence the jury was warranted also in
inferring that appellant, in spite of the diseased state of his mind, never-
theless retained a substantial capacity to resist the compul-
Hs sion he felt to kill. A stern reprimand by his mother caused
him to suppress it. He had held it in abeyance on a previous
occasion until he could call for support from friends. When confronted
with superior opposing force at the police station interrogation, he did
not act in response to it. Appellant’s brother with whom he was close
found him to be normal and natural in speech and act. Given the evi-
dence, the jury was warranted in concluding that appellant retained
the will to reject and suppress the compulsion arising from his illness
and conform his conduct to the law. The evidence is therefore suffi-
cient to sustain the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
was sane at the time of this tragedy, in the legal sense.

The next contentions of appellant are that the trial court erred in
refusing to grant a mistrial or admonish the jury because of alleged
excesses indulged in by the trial prosecutor during final jury summa-

660 Le
EE

tion. The first such episode occurred when the prosecutor standing
close to the jury at the rail said to the jury:

“Another indication of his ability to conform his conduct to the
requirement of the law, when he heard the voices in his home that
morning and his actions; when he heard the voices that afternoon
at the police station. Supposedly he couldn’t control his actions,
he couldn’t conform them to the requirements of the law when
he was faced with a woman—his wife—two babies, ladies and
gentlemen, three months old and sixteen months old—”

The court overruled an objection to the conduct of the prosecutor on
the basis that he had screamed and that it was intimidating and an
improper appeal to the emotions and prejudice of the jury and denied
a motion for mistrial. The content of this part of the argument was
entirely proper as founded in the evidence and related to the govern-
ing law. The manner in which it was delivered is not and cannot be
accurately communicated via the written word to an appellate court,
and consequently the law is content to afford the trial court a broad
discretion in controlling the tone and manner of delivery of trial counsel.
Based upon the record before us we find that the trial court did not
err in overruling the objection and in denying the motion for mistrial.

The second such episode occurred when the trial prosecutor read
an excerpt from Hill v. State, supra, on the issue of insanity, in which
this Court had explained that the jury after hearing the medical opin-
ions and other facts in the case is the best organ to make the “legal,
social or moral judgment” whether a person with the characteristics
appearing in the total evidence would or should not be held account-
able for his acts. The prosecutor then said that they should not permit
the defendant to fool them as he had fooled the doctors and that, rep-
resenting society, they should find him legally and morally accountable.
He also used such words as slaughter in the course of the final
argument.

The prosecutor’s use of words such as “slaughter” and “fool” were
permissible characterizations of appellant’s conduct as revealed in the
evidence and their use did not constitute misconduct. The ex-

Hs cerpt from the Hill case was properly employed. It fairly and
pointedly states the position of the jury in relation to the

various forms of proof of sanity and insanity, including medical opin-

be 661
a

ion and inferences from physical facts and related circumstances. This
jury faced conflicting evidence from these different sources. We are
unable to agree that under the circumstances with which the jury was
required to deal in this case, the prosecutor’s words and the manner
of their delivery would have inflamed the passions and prejudices of
the jury against appellant. The final summation of the prosecutor was
within reasonable bounds and was properly tolerated by the trial judge.
Spirited advocacy is not misconduct. Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549,
856 N.E.2d 1188. The trial court did not therefore err in denying the
objection or overruling the motion for mistrial directed to this matter.

The final contention in this appeal is that the trial court erred in
permitting the trial prosecutor to attempt impeachment of a physician
witness by reference to nurse’s notes in the patient’s hospital report
which disclosed that appellant had been observed by Nurse Bronezyk
reading a book on witchcraft. The objection to this process was based
upon hearsay and the denial of confrontation. The witness expressed
his opinion that appellant was not legally sane on the date of the of-
fense and predicated the opinion in part upon his review of appellant’s
record and medical reports at the Beatty Memorial Hospital to which
appellant had been committed for treatment between his arrest and
trial. The trial court overruled the objection, but prior to the use by
the prosecutor of any specific statements in the records admonished
the jury that they were not to consider them as proof of the truth of
the matters contained therein, but only to test the credibility of the
witness.

Appellant argues that the use of the nurse’s note was improper hear-
say and violated the confrontation clauses of the United States and
Indiana Constitutions, for the reason that the expert witness

i | did not use or rely on the note in arriving at his ultimate opin-
ion. We do not agree on either score. The nursing notes con-

stituted part of the patient’s hospital record which the witness stated
he examined preparatory to forming his medical opinion. In the course
of this examination he segregated nursing notes from the “staffing
reports” and used or relied only on the latter. The nursing notes re-
jected, like the staffing reports credited by the witness have the same
potential for creating an impeaching effect and were therefore properly
brought to light before the jury by the cross-examiner for its use in

determining the weight to be given to the witness’ opinion. Such use
is proper under an exception or relaxation of the hearsay rule and does
not violate the right to confrontation where the jury receives a proper
limiting instruction such as was given in this case. Smith v. State, (1972)
259 Ind. 187, 285 N.E.2d 275. There was no error when the trial court
overruled appellant's trial objection to the use of this matter under
these circumstances.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 749.

RICHARD ALLEN DOBESKI v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 9808369. Filed April 29, 1981.]

be 663

Nile Stanton, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General, George B. Huff, Jr., Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HuNTER, J.—The petitioner is before this Court appealing from the
denial of his petition for relief under Post-Conviction Relief, Rule 2.
The only issue raised is whether the court abused its discretion by
denying petitioner’s request to file a belated motion to correct error.

The facts from the record show that petitioner was tried by a jury
and found guilty of first-degree murder in October, 1965. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment. His trial counsel filed a timely motion
for new trial on November 5, 1965, which was denied on December
21, 1965. There is no record of any further action being taken until
October 4, 1979, when petitioner filed a request to file a belated mo-
tion to correct error and motion for evidentiary hearing. A hearing
was held in Porter County Cireuit Court on October 30, 1979, and the
request was denied without comment on May 2, 1980.

At the hearing, petitioner’s mother testified that she and her son
assumed that trial counsel, John J. Davie, was going ahead with an
appeal after the trial. She stated that she learned one or two years
later that an appeal had not been taken and that it was then too late
to take an appeal. Petitioner testified that he believed after the trial
that his trial counsel had prepared his appeal, but learned about two
years later that an appeal had not been taken. Both petitioner and his
mother also testified about their efforts to retain counsel for an appeal
during the following ten years.

After the hearing, John J. Davie filed an affidavit with the court
at the request of the prosecuting attorney. Mr. Davie stated that he
specifically remembered talking to Mrs. Dobeski after the trial and
explaining various options which were available for her son. He
remembered advising her that there would be further substantial costs
for an appeal and that there were still attorney’s fees and psychiatrists’

fees from the trial which had not been paid. He stated that he left the
decision up to her after conferring with her son whether they wanted
to appeal and she did not respond to him. Mr. Davie stated that he
had explained that an appeal would not likely be successful, that the
appeal would be costly, and that he would not become personally liable
for any further expenses in her son’s case.

We must first note that it is well settled that the petitioner in a
post-conviction proceeding has the burden of establishing his grounds
for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge hear-
Hing the petition weighs the evidence and determines the
credibility of witnesses. His determination will be reversed
only where the evidence is without conflict and leads unerringly to
a result not reached by the trial court. Laird v. State, (1979) 270 Ind.
328, 385 N.E.2d 452; Cottingham v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 261, 879 N.E.2d
984. Whether or not a petitioner has exercised due diligence in re-
questing permission to file a belated motion to correct error lies within
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless
an abuse of discretion is shown. Wilhite v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 56,
402 N.E.2d 1211; Jones v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 556, 387 N.H.2d 1313;
Newland v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 512, 236 N.E.2d 45.

In this case, petitioner contends that the circumstances show that
he did exercise due diligence. At the time of his arrest, he was 16 years
old and depended upon his mother to make all the necessary legal ar-
rangements for him both during and after his trial. He had no resources
of his own and acquiesced in his mother’s wishes, foregoing oppor-
tunities to contact attorneys on his own. He stated that he continually
asked his mother about the appeal. His mother contacted several dif-
ferent private attorneys over a period of ten years but was repeatedly
advised that there was nothing they could do. Petitioner, on his own,
finally contacted a public defender who advised him that the transcript
was probably unattainable. Petitioner still pursued the matter until
he contacted a private attorney willing to seek the transcript and repre-
sent him. The petition for belated appeal was filed on October 4, 1979,
approximately fourteen years after his original conviction.

In denying this petition, the trial court found that petitioner failed
to show that he had been diligent in requesting permission to file a

Le 665

belated motion to correct error as required by Ind. R. P.C.
HB Relief 2 § 1(c). We have held that the burden is upon the peti-
tioner to show that he maintained that degree of care and
attentiveness towards his claim and the progress of it in the court which
one might expect from an individual under the particular cireumstances
shown. Zellers v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 22, 389 N.H.2d 299. There are
no definite rules regarding what constitutes diligence and what does
not, and each case must be determined in the context of its own cir-
cumstances. Wilhite v. State, supra.

We do not find that petitioner has met his burden of proving that
he used due diligence under the circumstances of this case. From the
facts before us, it appears that petitioner, through his mother upon
whom he was relying, made an informed decision after the trial not
to pursue an appeal at that time. A long period of time elapsed from
his trial in October, 1965, until the filing of the present appeal in Oc-
tober, 1979. The testimony of petitioner and his mother that they had
continued to contact various private attorneys in unsuccessful attempts
to appeal during that fourteen-year period is not sufficient evidence
to meet petitioner’s burden.

Although petitioner was relying upon his mother's help during a large
part of that fourteen-year period, that fact does not exempt him from
our rules. The diligence required by our post-conviction rules

Hs may also entail a degree of perseverance; and we have held
that a petitioner may not be made exempt from the rule by

showing that the fault was, in part, not chargeable to him. Wilhite v.
State, swpra. Upon the facts of this case, where petitioner had the ad-
vice of a competent attorney about his options for an appeal and where
no concrete steps toward an appeal were taken during a fourteen-year
period, we find the trial court was justified in finding that petitioner
had not shown the diligence required by Ind. R. P.C. Relief 2 § ile).

Finally, we do not find any merit in petitioner’s claim that his original
motion for new trial was inadequate because his trial counsel omitted
several issues which petitioner now feels are very significant.
We have held that the mere omission of issues in an other-
wise timely and proper motion would not render such motion
inadequate so as to serve as grounds for a petition under Ind. R. P.C.

Cy
a

6 |
EE

Relief 2 § 1. Adams v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 406, 386 N.E.2d 657.

For all of the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and |
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler and Prentice, JJ., concur.
Pivarnik, J., not participating.

NotEe—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 753.

Le
Ear D. MORGAN AND DREXEL HOLLAND v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 8808381. Filed April 30, 1981.]

yl
ll

a
a
a

Charles L. Berger, of Evansville, for appellant Morgan, John G. Bun-
ner, of Evansville, for appellant Holland.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendants (Appellants) were jointly tried in a trial by
jury and each was convicted of Robbery, a Class A Felony. Ind. Code
§ 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979). Defendant-Morgan was sentenced to a term
of forty (40) years imprisonment, while Defendant-Holland was sentenced

to a term of fifty (50) years imprisonment. Although the defendants’
direct appeals have been separately briefed, they present substantially
the same issues:

(i) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motions
for separate trials;

(2) Whether the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror;

(3) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motions
for a mistrial;

(4) Whether the trial court erred in giving certain final instructions;

(5) Whether the trial court erred in refusing one of Defendants’
tendered instructions; and

(6) Whether the sentences were excessive and irrational when com-
pared to the sentences awarded the defendants’ accomplices.

ISSUE I

The defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their
motions for separate trials. While they both assert that separate trials
were necessary for a fair determination of their guilt or inno-
HB cence, see Ind. Code § 35-3.1-1-11 (Burns 1979), their specific
reasons in support of the assertion are different. Further, both
defendants concede that the trial court’s ruling was discretionary and
that they can prevail only by demonstrating an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., McChristian v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 57, 396 N.E.2d 356; Tewell
v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 88, 339 N.E.2d 792.

Defendant-Morgan submits that his motion for a separate trial should
have been granted for two reasons: 1) that while he did not testify,
Defendant-Holland did, and for that reason, the jury engaged in pre-
judicial inferences against him, and 2) that Defendant-Holland testified
concerning an on-the-scene identification which would not have been
disclosed had he been granted a separate trial. This submission is
without merit.

Defendant-Morgan has presented no cogent argument in support of
these contentions. He has not revealed what the identification evidence

P| 669
Oe

was, how he was thereby harmed or how such harm, if any,

__swas unavoidable. We cannot accept his conclusions that he

was improperly prejudiced absent a presentation of his con-

tentions in context. Alleged errors so presented are not subject to
review. Ind. R. App. P. 8.3(A)(7).

With respect to Defendant-Morgan’s contention that his election not
to testify was especially prejudicial by reason of his co-defendant’s elec-
tion to testify, we are of the opinion that final Instruction No. 11 was
an adequate safeguard. In any event, a defendant who elects to stand
upon his Fifth Amendment rights must assume the risks that are
therein inherent.

Defendant-Holland also claims that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying his motion for a separate trial. In support thereof, he
urges that Defendant-Morgan’s usage of two witnesses in his defense
prejudiced him (Holland). He alleges that the witnesses had lengthy
eriminal records, and that by virtue of their testifying, the fact that
an accomplice, State’s witness Strauss, had been beaten in jail was
brought before the jury.

Again, the defendant has failed to support his argument with any

cogent argument. Ind. R. App. P. 8.3(A)(7). Further, it is elementary

that a defendant can not select the witnesses his co-defendant

Hi swill call to the stand and that a defendant has no right to be

protected from damaging evidence, McChristian, 396 N.E.2d

at 359; Frith v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 100, 109-10, 325 N.H.2d 186, 191-92.

If we were to accept Defendant-Holland’s contention, joint trials could

be held only upon the consent of the parties, a result not envisioned
by the Legislature in enacting Ind. Code § 35-3.1-1-11.

ISSUE IT

Both defendants contend that the trial court erred in excusing a pro-
spective juror prior to voir dire examination. The juror (Musgrave)
was excused by the court pursuant to the unsworn statements of a
deputy prosecutor and a deputy sheriff revealing that the juror stood
charged with an unrelated crime and that he was, in fact, appearing
in another courtroom that day.

670 |
po

Defendants submit that Ind. Code § 35-1-30-4 (Burns 1979), pertain-
ing to the dismissal of jurors for cause, does not enumerate “being
held on criminal charges.” They accordingly assert that the juror should
have been questioned on voir dire and that to excuse him upon unsworn
statements constituted a denial of due process. We do not agree.

A trial court has the inherent discretion to excuse prospective jurors.

So long as that discretion is not exercised in an illogical or arbitrary

manner, we will not interfere with it. Z.g., Holt v. State, (1977)

HB 266 Ind. 586, 365 N.E.2d 1209. The trial court’s action was
reasonable, given the circumstances.

ISSUE III

The defendants claim that the trial court erred in denying their mo-
tions for a mistrial. The motions were based upon alleged prosecutorial
misconduct stemming from the questioning of two witnesses. The pros-
ecutor sought to elicit testimony from the witnesses (accomplice-Strauss
and DeMarco Meriweather, a jailmate of Strauss) that Meriweather
had beaten Strauss in retaliation of the latter’s promised testimony
in this case. Defendants contend that the prosecutor pursued this line
of questioning after being halted by the trial court and that the mere
questioning constituted an evidentiary harpoon, calculated to prejudice
the jury against the defendants.

Accomplice-Strauss was asked upon redirect examination whether
he had ever been threatened by either of the defendants. The defense
immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court
Hl sustained the objection but denied the motion and admonished
the jury “to disregard the question or any implications
thereto.” Defendants have not convinced us that the admonition was
an inadequate means of curing the prejudice, if in fact, any occurred
by the mere posing of the question. See Thompkins v. State, (1978) 270
Ind. 163, 383 N.E.2d 347; Ballard v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 482, 318 N.E.2d
798.

Defendants, however, contend that the prejudice visited upon them
by the questioning of Strauss was compounded by the prosecutor's ques-
tioning of Meriweather. Upon cross-examination, the prosecutor asked
the witness if he “beat Royal Strauss up this summer,” to which ques-
tion the defense objected and sought a mistrial. The objection was sus-

a 671

tained and the mistrial motion denied. The trial court then informed
the prosecutor to rephrase the question and to lay a proper foundation
for it. Eventually, the prosecutor did so, and the witness responded
that there had, indeed, been a fight between him and Strauss when
they were in jail.

The denial of a mistrial motion rests largely within the discretion
of the trial court, and we will reverse that court’s decision only when
it is shown that the defendant was placed in a position of grave
I peril to which he should not have been subjected. White v.
State, (1971) 257 Ind. 64, 272 N.E.2d 312. The defendants have

not satisfied that standard in this case.

At the outset, we note that there was some basis for the prosecutor's
line of questioning in that Meriweather admitted to having had a fight
with Strauss. This admission was relevant to Meriweather’s credibility.
See Hardin v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 63, 414 N.E. 2d 570. As such, the
defendants were not placed in positions of peril to which they should
not have been subjected. Moreover, any prejudice engendered by the
question was slight when compared to the strong evidence against the
defendants. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the verdict and
there is, therefore, no reason to believe that the verdict may have been
a product of inflamed feelings created by improper trial techniques.

Defendants also contend that the prosecutor acted improperly in that
he deliberately used perjured testimony. The contention arose from
the testimony of accomplice-Addie Louise Brown. Upon cross-
examination, Brown admitted that she had not told the complete truth
to the police in her initial statement in that she had, at that time, stated
that she had not seen a gun on the day in question. Upon redirect ex-
amination, the two statements she had made to the police were admitted
into evidence over the defendants’ objections.

The exhibits were merely cumulative of what the witness had
testified to upon cross-examination, and their admission lay within the
trial court’s discretion. E.g., Pierce v. State, (1970) 253 Ind.
HH (650, 256 N.E.2d 557. We perceive no abuse of that discretion
here, in light of the clarifying effect of the exhibits. No prose-

cutorial misconduct has been demonstrated.

ISSUE IV

The defendants next submit that the trial court erred in giving final
instruction No. 10, dealing with direct and circumstantial evidence, and
final instruction No. 19, dealing with the proposition that the jury should
not concern itself with penalties when assessing guilt.

With regard to instruction No. 10, which related to circumstantial
evidence and the manner in which it was to be considered, both Defend-
ants contend that it was improper in that it inadequately instructed
as to the weight to be accorded such evidence and implied that jurors
were entitled to rely on the quantity rather than the quality of cireum-
stantial evidence. We do not agree that such instruction is susceptible
to such an interpretation. It appears to be a less than perfect instruc-
tion, but we see nothing misleading about it in any respect.

Apparently the defendants tendered no circumstantial evidence in-
struction of their own, and they were not entitled to one, as a matter
of right, inasmuch as the State’s case was not dependent en-
Hl tirely upon such evidence. Faught v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 153,
390 N.E.2d 1011; Wolfe v. State, (1928) 200 Ind. 557, 159 N.E.
545.

Defendants are also critical of a reference in the instruction to the
exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis “except that of guilt,” assert-
ing that it should have been the exclusion of every reasonable hypo-
thesis “of innocence.” The contention is a mere semantic quibble and
unworthy of response—as is evidenced by the absence of any mention
thereof in their at-trial objection.

With regard to instruction No. 19, the defendants submit that because
the jury knew of the actual sentences received by Defendants’ accom-
plices, and that because those sentences were relatively light, the jury
should have been instructed on the putative penalties faced by the
defendants to avoid an assumption by the jury that the defendants,
if found guilty, would receive comparable sentences.

Again, the submission is without merit. We have repeatedly held
that a jury need not concern itself with penalties when assessing the
culpability of criminal defendants. E.g., Craig v. State, (1979)
HE 272 Ind. 385, 398 N.E.2d 658; Debose v. State, (1979) 270 Ind.
675, 389 N.E.2d 272. This is because a jury has no role in deter-

P| 673
ee

mining the sentence a criminal will serve. Id. The jury was properly
instructed, and if it made an incorrect assumption, it was despite the
instruction, not because of it.

ISSUE V

Defendants next complain that the trial court erred in refusing their
tendered instruction No. 1, dealing with the credibility of an accomplice.
In support of this assignment, they cite Newman v. State, (1975) 263
Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684; but their reliance thereon is misplaced, and
the contention is without merit.

In Newman, we held that the failure to disclose an agreement of leni-
ency between an accomplice and the State constituted reversible error.
Id. at 574, 334 N.E.2d at 688. That holding requires that the
HM agreement be disclosed to the jury, not that a cautionary in-
struction pertaining thereto be given. In the instant case, such
an instruction would have unduly disparaged the testimony of the de-
fendants’ accomplices, and for this reason, the refusal to give it was
proper. Morris v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 473, 364 N.E.2d 182, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 972, 98 S.Ct. 526, 54 L.Ed.2d 462. See Lewis v. State, (1976)
264 Ind. 288, 342 N.E.2d 859. See also Hackett v. State, (1977) 266 Ind.
1038, 360 N.E.2d 1000.

ISSUE VI

The defendants’ final assignment is that their sentences are excessive
and irrational, in light of the relatively light sentences received by
their accomplices. Defendant-Holland also contends that his sentence
is manifestly unreasonable because of the nature of the offense and
his character.

The defendants’ accomplices, Strauss and Brown, pleaded guilty to
lesser offenses as a result of “plea bargaining.” In similar situations,
we have passed upon the sentences meted out to principals
Hand accessories. It may be gleaned from those decisions that
when one defendant proceeds to trial and his accomplice
pleads guilty, the sentences need not be identical. This is by reason
of the special nature of a guilty plea and because such a plea does not
result in a judicial determination on the merits. See Tessely v. State,
(1978) 267 Ind. 445, 370 N.E.2d 907; Combs v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 294,
295 N.E.2d 366. In short, there is no requirement of consistency.

The penalties statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (Burns 1979), provides
for a base term of imprisonment of thirty (80) years for Class A felonies
and further provides for increasing such term by not more than twenty
(20) additional years, in the event aggravating circumstances are found
to exist and for decreasing such term in the event mitigating circum-
stances are found. Thus the sentences of forty (40) and fifty (50) years
are within the ambit of the discretion given to the trial court.

Ind. Rule App. Rev. Sen. 2 provides for appellate revision of
sentences, if manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the of-
fense and the character of the offender. This determination

HM scan be made only from a review of the record. We have no
means of making such a review in these cases, because tran-

scripts of the sentencing hearings have not been included in the record.

There being no reversible error, the judgments are affirmed.
Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NoTE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 964.

Ricky V. Evey, JR. v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 12808464. Filed April 30, 1981,]

Yi 675

Jerry E. Levendoski, of Fort Wayne, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General, Aimee L. Kolze, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

HUNTER, J.—The defendant, Ricky Van Evey, Jr., was convicted by a
jury of robbery, a class A felony. Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979
Repl.). He was sentenced to a term of twenty years in the Indiana State
Prison. He presents the following issue for our review: whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is raised as an issue on appeal,
this Court examines only the evidence most favorable to the state,
together with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.
If, from that viewpoint, there is substantial evidence of probative value
to support the jury’s verdict that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, we will not set aside the conviction. Henderson v.
State, (1976) 264 Ind. 334, 343 N.E.2d 776.

Viewed from that posture, the record reveals that on the afternoon
of January 15, 1980, two men entered the St. Mary’s Car Wash at 2211
St. Mary’s Street in Fort Wayne and inquired about job openings. After
filling out job applications, one of the men pulled a sixteen inch piece
of piping from his coat and began striking the attendant about the head
and body. As the attendant retreated, the attacker demanded money.
Once the demand was heeded, the men tore the telephone from the
wall and fled with the cash. The attendant, who suffered a two-inch
laceration of his scalp, made both pretrial and in-court identifications
of the defendant as the man who wielded the pipe during the robbery.

Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is focused
on the attendant’s in-court identification of him. Defendant argues that
the identification at trial was the tainted product of an impermissibly
suggestive out-of-court identification, and that no other evidence of

676 ee
je

probative value was introduced to establish that he participated in the
crime.

As the state has emphasized in its brief, however, no objection was

interposed at trial to the attendant’s in-court identification of defend-

ant or to evidence of the pretrial photographic identification.

It is axiomatic that questions of evidence are waived if no

objection to the introduction of the evidence is made at the

time it is offered. Stowers v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 403, 363 N.E.2d 978;

Zupp v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 625, 283 N.E.2d 540. Consequently, the

defendant has waived his right to challenge the propriety of the atten-
dant’s in-court identification.

We note the well established rule that an in-court identification by
the same witness who has participated in an impermissibly suggestive
out-of-court identification is admissible if an “independent
HH basis” for the in-court identification is established. Parker v.
State, (1976) 265 Ind. 595, 358 N.E.2d 110; Swope v. State, (1975)
263 Ind. 148, 325 N.E.2d 193. To determine if the “independent basis”
exists, we examine the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the
witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the time the crime
occurred. Those circumstances include the length of time the perpe-
trator was in the presence of the witness, the lighting conditions at
that time, the distance of the witness from the perpetrator, the capacity
of the witness for observation, and the opportunity of the witness to
observe particular characteristics of the perpetrator. Id.

Here, the robbery occurred in broad daylight. The attendant testified
that he was in the presence of the defendant for approximately five
minutes, that the defendant was “right in front of my face” and that
“When something like that happens to you, you know, their face kind
of sticks in your head.” The record also reveals that prior to his
photographie identification of defendant, the attendant accurately
described his physical characteristics to police. Based on these circum-
stances, an independent basis for the attendant’s in-court identifica-
tion did exist, regardless of any suggestiveness which may have oc-
curred at the pretrial photographic identification. Parker v. State, supra;
Swope v. State, supra.

The attendant’s in-court idéntification of the defendant was une-

quivocal. That testimony is sufficient evidence to support the defend-
ant’s conviction. Richardson v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 566, 388
HE N.E.2d 488; Lewis v. State, (1978) 270 Ind. 91, 383 N.E.2d 65.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.
DeBruler, J., concurs in result.

NoTE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 971.

THOMAS OWENS v. STATE OF INDIANA.

{No. 9808366. Filed April 30, 1981.]

Harriette Bailey Conn, [Mrs.], Public Defender, Carr L. Darden,
Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.

HunTER, J.—The petitioner is before this Court appealing from the
denial of his petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Rule 1. His conviction
for kidnapping and assault and battery with intent to commit a felony
(rape) was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. Owens v. State, (1978)
268 Ind. 326, 375 N.E.2d 203.

Petitioner presents the following issue for our review: whether the
trial court erred in refusing to modify his sentence to conform to the
ameliorative terms of present kidnapping or criminal confinement
statutes.

At the time petitioner was charged, convicted, and sentenced, the
crime of kidnapping as then defined carried a punishment of life im-
prisonment. Subsequently, our legislature, in its substantial revision
of our Criminal Code, redefined the crime of kidnapping. Carved from
the previous statutory definition was the offense of “criminal confine-
ment,” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.), punishable by a
significantly less severe penalty than the life imprisonment previously
imposed for such conduct.

The conduct for which defendant was convicted falls within the
parameters of the offense presently defined as criminal confinement.
That evidentiary fact, petitioner maintains, entitles him to a modifica-
tion of his life imprisonment sentence to conform to the ameliorative
terms of the present criminal confinement statute.

Defendant’s contention has twice been rejected by this Court. Wat-
ford v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 262, 384 N.E.2d 1030; Holsclaw v. State,
(1979) 270 Ind. 256, 384 N.E.2d 1026. In Watford, we held that a defend-
ant whose judgment for kidnapping became final prior to October 1,
1977, the effective date of the criminal confinement statute, was not
entitled to have his sentence modified. Similarly, in Holsclaw, we held
that a defendant sentenced nearly one year prior to the effective date
of an amendment reducing the penalty for his offense was not entitled
to a reduction of his sentence.

Here, petitioner was sentenced on October 24, 1975, nearly two years
prior to the effective date (October 1, 1977) of the criminal confine-
ment statute. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to modify
his sentence. Watford v. State, supra; Holsclaw v. State, supra.

Petitioner has attempted to buttress his argument with the conten-
tion that the failure to modify his sentence results in “vindictive justice,”
contrary to Article 1, Section 18 of the Indiana Constitution. Inasmuch
as that claim was not presented in his motion to correct errors, the
argument has been waived. We note, however, that this Court has

be 679
EE

previously rejected the argument that sentencing under the law in ef-
fect at the time a crime was committed, rather than pursuant to
ameliorative terms of a subsequently effective statute, constitutes “vin-
dictive justice.” Lynk v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 445, 393 N.E.2d 751.

For all the foregoing reasons, there was no trial court error and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
Givan, C.J., DeBruler, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NoTE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 969.

JIMMIE RUSSELL v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 180S15. Filed May 1, 1981]

2
©
Ss

Walter E. Bravard, Jr., of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Thomas D. Quigley, Deputy
Attorney General, for appellee.
DEBRULER, J.—This is a direct appeal from a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter, a class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-8, raising six issues:

(1) admissibility of a photograph of the victim’s body awaiting an
autopsy;

(2) propriety of the trial court’s denial of a motion in limine;

(83) insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict;

Le 681
Le

(4) fundamental error in admission of evidence of the victim’s family
status;

(5) admissibility of defense evidence excluded as hearsay; and
(6) admissibility of gruesome photographs.

The evidence favorable to the State shows that on July 15, 1978,
appellant, Jimmie Russell, in the aftermath of a fight between Harold
Hunter (the victim's brother) and a neighbor in Harold Hunter's front
yard, obtained a shotgun and killed Walter Hunter with it.

L

A photograph of the victim’s body awaiting autopsy was exhibited
to the jury. A defense objection that it was irrelevant, inflammatory,
and reduridant was overruled. It is contended on appeal that this rul-
ing was error and that there could be no rational basis for showing
it other than to inflame the passions of the jurors against appellant.
He relies on Kiefer v. State, (1958) 239 Ind. 103, 153 N.E.2d 899, a case
in which this Court reversed a conviction because during trial, photo-
graphs taken at the morgue showing the autopsy in progress and the
victim’s body after the autopsy had been completed, had been shown
to the jury. The photograph here, appellant argues, was obviously
superfluous because the witness who identified it made no further
reference to it, and because other photographs had already been dis-
played covering every possible purpose for which they could be intro-
duced. We cannot agree with this analysis.

Kiefer involved photographs of a body whose wounds were exag-
gerated by the autopsy process. In this case, the photograph showed
a wound to the throat. This wound appeared less gruesome

_in the morgue photograph than it appeared in photographs
already in evidence which had been taken earlier at the scene

of the crime. The photograph was not superfluous because the deputy
coroner used it to identify the subject of an autopsy about which he
had been called to testify for the State. It is not fatal to the question
of admissibility that the deputy coroner did not refer further to the
photograph in giving testimony about the cause of death. In Whitfield
v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 629, 366 N.E.2d 178, this Court found no error
in the admission into evidence of a photograph showing a victim lying

682 Le

in a pool of blood. We said that the picture was of use to the jury despite
the absence of reference to it in the testimony and even though the
parties had stipulated the cause of death. The photograph here was
similarly of use in identifying the autopsy subject.

The trial court did not err in admitting this photograph into evidence.
I.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his mo-
tion in limine to prevent the State from introducing evidence which
it knew was inadmissible. In his argument, however, appellant does
not contend that the trial judge abused his discretion in overruling
the motion in limine concerning the results of several scientific tests.
Instead, appellant argues that in the course of the trial, the prosecu-
tion sought to introduce testimony, through a witness, about the results
of a neutron activation test although the test results had not been in-
troduced in evidence and the witness who was asked about the results
was not the person who had performed the test. Defense counsel ob-
jected on hearsay grounds and the objection was sustained. Appellant’s
argument seems to focus on the prejudice engendered by his having
been “forced” to object in front of the jury and appearing to be an
obstructionist.

In addition, appellant points out that in closing argument the prose-
cution referred to the defense objection to the admission of evidence
of the test results. Defense counsel objected to this comment and the
trial court admonished the jury to disregard it. This comment was an
evidentiary harpoon whose prejudicial impact could not be cured by
admonition, appellant contends, citing White v. State, (1971) 257 Ind.
64, 272 N.E.2d 312.

The combination of being forced to object before the jury, having
the prosecutor point out the objection in closing argument, and having
the trial judge admonish the jury served to draw the attention of the
jury to highly prejudicial testimony, appellant contends.

We can find no merit in this issue.In a recent case involving an allega-
tion that a trial court erred in overruling a defendant’s motion in limine

be 683

directed at the exclusion of references to statements of a stab-

i | bing victim, we found no error because the defendant’s con-

temporaneous objection was sustained and the objectionable

evidence never entered the case. Walker v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 197,

409 N.E.2d 626. Here, the evidence concerning test results was not
admitted.

Concerning the claim that the prosecutor’s comment was an eviden-
tiary harpoon, we observe that the defense did not move for a mistrial.
Indeed, when the trial judge asked defense counsel if he was
Il satisfied with the admonition, counsel replied that he was
satisfied. Moreover, a mistrial would not have been required
if defense counsel had moved for one. This comment was the type of
irregularity which can be cured by admonition. In the absence of a show-
ing by the appellant that the comment had a discernible and apparent
effect on the jury’s verdict, we will presume that the jury was able
to heed the admonition to disregard the improper comment. See High-
tower v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 481, 296 N.E.2d 652.

No error was committed on this issue.
I.

Appellant next contends that the jury’s finding of guilty of volun-
tary manslaughter was not based on substantial evidence and was con-
trary to the evidence in that it denied him his lawful presumption of
innocence and in that the evidence was not reconciled with the theory
of his innocence. Specifically he claims that the State failed to prove
an essential element of voluntary manslaughter: lack of sudden heat.

Appellant observes at the outset of this claim that there was much
controverted evidence, but he acknowledges that when this Court
reviews a claim of insufficiency it will consider only the evi-

IH dence favorable to the State and reasonable inferences that
can be drawn therefrom, and that the conviction will be set

aside only if there is a lack of evidence of probative value from which
a trier of fact could reasonably infer that a defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, citing Rogers v. State, (1972) 154 Ind.App. 445, 290
N.E.2d 185; and Taylor v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 25, 284 N.E.2d 775.

684 ee
Cd

The voluntary manslaughter statute provides:

“(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another
human being while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary
manslaughter, a class B felony.

(b) The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that
reduces what otherwise would be murder under section 1 (1) of
this chapter to voluntary manslaughter.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3.
Regarding his claim about “sudden heat,” appellant refers to the

statutory definition of the crime prior to the 1977 amendment:

“a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human be-

ing while acting under an intense passion resulting from grave

and sudden provocation commits a class B felony. ... The state

is not required to prove intense passion resulting from grave and

sudden provocation.”

Appellant claims that the omission of the burden-of-proof clause in
the current statute as amended suggests that the State now bears the
burden of proof. Regardless of the burden of proof, he argues, there
was no reliable evidence of sudden heat. Since the jury found him not
guilty of murder by virtue of the voluntary manslaughter verdict, and
since there was no evidence of sudden heat, it follows that the only
correct verdicts could have been “innocent” or involuntary man-
slaughter, he contends. At best, he continues, the evidence revealed
that he had merely had an opportunity to commit the crime, and this
created only a suspicion of guilt. The jury, he asserts, appeared to be
unable to determine whether defendant or another man had killed the
victim and in convicting him showed “an inclination to a compromise
verdict,” thereby denying him his legal presumption of innocence.
Finally, defendant asserts that the residue of evidence fails to meet
the requirement that each material allegation be supported by substan-
tial evidence of probative value.

Appellant is mistaken in considering sudden heat a constituent ele-
ment of the crime of manslaughter. The statute clearly states that sud-
den heat is a mitigating factor in conduct that would other-

I wise constitute murder, rather than a positive element. While

it is plainly the State’s burden to prove the existence of each

element of a crime by substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is not the State’s burden to prove the existence of a mitigating factor.

a 685

Iv.

We have recently upheld a conviction for voluntary manslaughter
in the complete absence of sudden heat, recognizing the long standing
rule in Indiana that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser in-
i | cluded offense of murder and one of which one may be con-
victed if charged with murder. Hardin v. State, (1980) 273 Ind.
459, 404 N.E.2d 1854, 1357. Appellant seeks to circumvent this barrier
to review by averring that the error is fundamental. He presents
neither supporting authority nor cogent argument on this claim of fun-
damental error. The sole citation is to Rowe v. State, (1968) 250 Ind.
547, 237 N.E.2d 576, on the substantive issue of the impropriety of ad-
mitting evidence of family relations. There, however, the admission
of evidence was properly objected to and therefore reviewable. This
issue has not been preserved for appeal.

v.

Appellant next claims error in that the trial court sustained the
State's objections to defense evidence on the grounds that it was hear-
say. By referring to the specifications in the motion to correct errors
we assume that appellant refers to two occasions: (1) when he made
an offer of proof as to testimony of a defense witness, Mrs. Gray, con-
cerning a phone call she received from Rachelle Hunter, the daughter
of the victim's sister-in-law, and (2) when he attempted to introduce
a copy of a deputy coroner's field report.

After generalizing about the nature of hearsay, and that some
statements are admissible under exceptions to the hearsay exclusion
rule, appellant makes no reference at all to Mrs. Gray’s testi-

Hs mony in his argument. Having failed to argue this issue with
specificity as required by Ind. R.App. P. 8.3(A)(7), he has for-

feited it on appeal. We observe briefly, however, that Mrs. Gray’s
testimony was to have been that Rachelle Hunter telephoned her to
say that Walter Hunter had been shot and that Mrs. Gray should come
to the scene of the shooting, and that the purpose of the testimony
was to establish why Mrs. Gray went to the Hunter house. The tran-
script shows that Mrs. Gray had already testified that Rachelle Hunter
had called her to tell her “that there had been a killing.” Therefore,
the gist of the excluded testimony had already been given. The State

686 De

objected to Mrs. Gray's testifying about what Rachelle had said, on
hearsay grounds, but the testimony was not stricken and the jury was
not admonished to disregard it. Even if we could say that the evidence
had been entirely excluded, it was certainly excludable as irrelevant,
since Mrs. Gray’s motive for going to the Hunter house was not a
material. issue in the case.

Concerning the other excluded item of evidence, referred to in ap-
pellant’s brief only as a report prepared by the deputy coroner who
had been called to the scene, appellant argues that it was either not
hearsay or fell within an exception to the hearsay rule and should have
been admitted. By referring to the motion to correct errors we can
infer that appellant alludes to his Exhibit F, the deputy coroner’s field
report.

This report was identified by deputy coroner Osborne who prepared
it. It purportedly showed that someone at the scene of the shooting
told Osborne that a man other than appellant was seen leaving the
scene with a shotgun. Appellant states that this report was passed
on to the police files and contained information that would have re-
quired further investigation by the police. The failure by the police
to pursue evidence that someone other than defendant might have done
the shooting, appellant suggests, would, if fully presented to the jury,
have cast serious doubt on the validity of the police investigation of
the incident. The jury, he continues, was deprived of essential evidence
relevant to the defense theory of the case, which was that Harold
Hunter shot the victim, Walter Hunter, and then disposed of the shot-
gun by having another man take it from the scene.

The evidence, appellant claims, was being offered to show that the
State had certain information, regardless of its truth, which the jury
should have been permitted to consider in determining whether the
State had proved its case or had sought to hide exculpatory evidence.

The transcript reveals that Exhibit F was deputy coroner Osborne’s
handwritten report of his findings at the shooting scene, including both
his examination of the body and information obtained from

Ho cther people with whom he talked at the scene. The State
objected to the introduction of the report in the course of
Osborne’s testimony on the grounds that it contained hearsay, and the

P| 687

objection was sustained. Osborne then testified, “I was told by someone
that someone had run from the scene.” Again the State objected on
hearsay grounds and the objection was sustained, but the testimony
was not stricken from the record and the jury was not admonished
to disregard it. Appellant then made an offer to prove outside the
presence of the jury in the course of which he related that the purpose
of admitting the statement of what someone told Osborne was to show
that Osborne had written the statement in his notes and had given
his report to Sgt. Hoke, who denied having knowledge of such infor-
mation. Thus, the document would have impeached Hoke’s credibility.
There is, however, no evidence that Sgt. Hoke had Exhibit F in his
file on the case. Sgt. Hoke was called as a defense witness and testified
about defendant’s Exhibit C, described as a deputy coroner’s field
report, a document not bearing Osborne’s name. Later, Osborne also
testified regarding this document which he described as a “code-a-
phone” report prepared by coroner's office staff from information he
telephoned in to the coroner's office.

There is no evidence that Sgt. Hoke had Exhibit F in his file, or
that Exhibit C contained the same information as Exhibit F. Therefore,
Exhibit F could not perform the evidentiary function of impeachment
for which it was offered and was irrelevant. There was no error in
excluding this evidence.

VI.

Finally, appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible
error in overruling defense objections to the admission into evidence
of several photographs depicting the body of the victim, and the im-
mediate area of the porch where the decedent was shot.

Conceding that a trial judge has considerable latitude in determin-
ing admissibility of possibly prejudicial evidence, appellant asserts that
the potential prejudice of such a gruesome display outweighed its
relevance. Appellant does not discuss his specific objections to the
photographs in issue but avers that the photographs were merely
cumulative of photographs already admitted without objection and that
“[t]he danger of repulsiveness and jury prejudice was real... .”

Our review of the record convinces us that these photographs,
although gruesome, were properly admitted. State’s Exhibit 6 depicted

the nature and extent of the shotgun wound inflicted on the

Is victim and it showed where shotgun wadding, State’s Exhibit

15, was found. This wadding was from the same gauge shotgun

as the one appellant was seen tossing behind the victim’s house after

the shooting. Exhibits 7, 11, and 12 are photographs of the crime scene,

and 7 and 12 show where more wadding was discovered. A witness

would have been permitted to testify about the things depicted in the

photographs and they assisted the jury in orienting themselves and

understanding other evidence. See, e.g. Whitfield v. State, supra. The
trial court did not err in admitting these photographs.

The conviction is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., Hunter, Prentice and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotTe—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 973.

Don C. Cox v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 280849. Filed May 5, 1981.]

ey
oO
oS

690 |

Ld
|
Perry H. Harrold, Wilson, Coleman & Roberts, of Indianapolis, for

appellant.

Theodore L.. Sendak, Attorney General, Palmer K. Ward, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.—In a trial by jury, Defendant (Appellant) was convicted
of four (4) counts of Robbery, Class B felonies, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1
(Burns 1979), one (1) count of Attempted Robbery, Class A felony, Ind.
Code §§ 35-42-5-1, 35-41-5-1 (Burns 1979), and one (1) count of Murder,
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2) (Burns 1979). He was sentenced to ten (10) years
imprisonment upon each of the Robbery convictions, to forty (40) years
imprisonment upon the Attempted Robbery conviction and to fifty (50)
years imprisonment upon the Murder conviction. This direct appeal
presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion
to suppress certain evidence obtained by interrogation of himself and
three other men;

(2) Whether the trial court failed to enforce the defendant's rights
under Ind. R. Crim. P. 4;

(8) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion
to prohibit the testimony of a State’s witness;

(4) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion
to suppress his own statement;

(5) Whether the trial court erred in ordering the fingerprinting of
a defense witness;

(6) Whether the trial court erred in giving preliminary instruction
No. 8;

(7) Whether the trial court erred in refusing Defendant's tendered
final instructions Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13;

(8) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion
for a mistrial;

Pe 691
Ti”

(9) Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to correct
error grounded upon allegedly newly discovered evidence; and

(10) Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.
Additionally, Defendant has asked for clarification of his sentences.
ISSUE I

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the testimony of and
or evidence from the defendant, Kevin Edmonds, Paul Rowley and
Michael Daniels. The motion was based upon the allegations that these
men had been questioned by the police soon after the incidents at bar;
that the sessions had been tape recorded; and that the tape had been
subsequently reused. The defendant contended that the reusing of the
tapes amounted to a wilful or negligent destruction of material evidence
and that therefore, no evidence/testimony should flow from the four
men. Following a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the
motion, ruling that the defendant did not demonstrate materiality.

Defendant has not persuaded us that he was, in any way, harmed
by the denial of his motion. The record discloses that neither Rowley,
nor Daniels testified in the case. Further, the defendant did
HB not object to the testimony of Edmonds at trial. Also, although
the tapes were not available to the defendant, it does not ap-
pear that he was thereby harmed. He did have access to a summary
of one of the statements and a copy of a transcription of the other,
and he thoroughly cross-examined the witness. Finally, the defendant
testified in his own behalf, and while it may be interpreted that he
objected to the use of his statement to the police for impeachment pur-
poses upon cross-examination, it also appears that he did have a copy
of the statement. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to deter-
mine Defendant’s allegation of error. He had access to his own state-
ment and to those of Edmonds. There is no basis for holding that the
trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

ISSUE II

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motions under Ind. R. Crim. P. 4. While the defendant was arrested
on February 6, 1978, an information was not filed against him until

692 Le
Es

February 14, 1978. Thus, the State had until February 14, 1979, to bring
the defendant to trial. Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C). In this case, the jury was
not sworn until April 18, 1979. The extraordinary delay of a sixty-three
(63) days must therefore be accounted for.

The defendant’s argument is two-pronged: _ first, that the trial court
erred in failing to order his release from jail when he was not brought
to trial within six months of the date the charges were filed against
him, see Ind R. Crim. P. 4(A); and second, that the trial court erred
in denying his motion for discharge because of the failure to bring him
to trial within one year of the date the charges were filed against him,
see Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C). Both facets of the argument are without merit.

As to the defendant’s assignment relative to Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(A),

it is well-settled that a violation of that section presents nothing on

appeal. See, e.g., Fryback v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 660, 400

HE sON.E.2d 1128; Collins v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 430, 364 N.E.2d
750; Lewis v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.E.2d 859.

Proceeding to the defendant’s assignment relative to his motion for
discharge under Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C), that section provides:

Defendant discharged. No person shall be held on recognizance
or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate
embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge
against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on
such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was
had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where
there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because
of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in
the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall
file a timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of
this rule. Any defendant so held shall, on motion, be discharged.

As mentioned hereinbefore, the defendant was not brought to trial
for sixty-three days beyond the expiration of the one year period.
However, a delay of at least seventy-one days was attributable

Hl to the defendant. First, on June 22, 1978, he filed a motion
for a change of venue. The motion was granted and the case
subsequently transferred to Hancock County, where the transcript was
duly received and docketed on July 28, 1978: a delay of thirty-six days.
See Nettles v. State, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 205, 327 N.E.2 625. See also

Ye 693

State ex rel. Garvin v. Dearborn Circuit Court, (1972) 257 Ind. 631, 277
N.E.2d 370; State v. Grow, (1970) 255 Ind. 183, 263 N.E.2d 277. Second,
on August 31, 1978, the defendant filed a “joint” motion for continuance
of the September 5, 1978 trial date. The motion was granted and trial
was reset for October 10, 1978: a delay of thirty-five days. Because
seventy-one days of the delay were attributable to the defendant, the
trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for discharge.

ISSUE HI

The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his mo-
tion to prohibit a State’s witness from testifying. The witness was Kevin
Edmonds, one of the defendant’s accomplices in the criminal events
at bar. Early in the case, Edmonds had been represented by an at-
torney who subsequently withdrew to become associated with the Pros-
ecutor’s office. Thereafter, Edmonds was represented by an attorney
who formerly had been associated with the Prosecutor’s office. Defend-
ant submits that these facts demonstrate a conflict of interest severely
discrediting Edmonds’ testimony.

While we agree with the defendant that Edmonds’ representation

by these two lawyers bore upon his credibility, we can not say that

he should have thereby been precluded from testifying. The

[i witness’ representation by these two lawyers was a proper

subject for cross-examination and argument, and there has

been no showing that it had any relevancy other than as to Edmonds’

credibility. As such, there was no basis for excluding the witness’

testimony. Cf. Brown v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 399, 385 N.E.2d 1148 (Pren-

tice, J., dissenting) (Defendant’s counsel had previously worked on the
case as a deputy prosecutor).

ISSUE IV

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress his own statement to the police. In support
thereof, he asserts that he was intoxicated when the statement was
given, thereby rendering it involuntary. We do not agree.

Initially, we note that the record indicates that the defendant was
not in the “custody” of the police when he gave the statement in ques-

694 ee
Es

tion. Moreover, under the totality of circumstances then ex-
Il istent, there was a reasonable basis for the trial court’s denial

of the motion, in that several police officers testified that the
defendant was not then intoxicated. Accordingly, the contention is
without merit. See Jackson v. State, (1980) 274 Ind. 297, 411 N.E.2d 609;
Feller v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 541, 348 N.E.2d 8,

ISSUE V

At trial, the defendant’s mother, Jane Flynn, testified in his defense.
Upon cross-examination, she was asked whether she had ever been
arrested and convicted of a crime, and she responded in the
negative. Upon rebuttal, the State sought and obtained an
order from the trial court, over objection, compelling the
fingerprinting of Flynn. The purpose of this was to establish that the
witness was the same person as one Jane Carruthers who had been
convicted of shoplifting in 1967. Defendant assigns error to the finger-
printing as an improper technique of impeachment. We see no error
here. The State was entitled to impeach the witness by showing that
she had previously been convicted of the crime of shoplifting. She denied
that she had been so convicted, but acknowledged that she had previously
been known by the name Jane Carruthers. Jane Carruthers had been
convicted of shoplifting, hence the issue of whether the witness and
Carruthers were one and the same person became relevant.

Defendant also argues that evidence of prior convictions that occurred
more than ten years previously should not be admitted for impeach-
ment purposes, citing Fed. R. Evid. 609. While the rule does
Hs support the proposition, it does not apply in Indiana State
Courts, and our case law runs contrary to the Federal Rule.
Hall v. State, (1976) 167 Ind.App. 604, 389 N.E.2d 802.

ISSUE VI

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving
preliminary instruction No. 8 dealing with reasonable doubt. Specific-
ally, he asserts that the instruction was incomplete in that it did not
inform the jury that the State carried the burden of proof. The asser-
tion is without merit.

Instructions are to be considered with reference to each other and

bn 695

as an entirety. E.g., Ferrier v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 117, 361 N.E.2d
150. In this case, preliminary instruction No. 7 properly ad-
I vised the jury concerning the State’s burden of proof.

ISSUE VIL

The defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to give
certain tendered instructions. The assignment is without merit.

Defendant first complains that his tendered final instruction No. 2,

which dealt with prior inconsistent statements, should have been given.

However, the trial court gave an instruction on such subject

i | which fully comported to the law. No error is presented when

a trial court refuses an instruction, although correct, the

substance of which is covered by instructions given. Tolbert v. State,
(1979) 271 Ind. 269, 391 N.E.2d 823.

Defendant next complains that his tendered final instruction No. 3,
which dealt with the voluntariness of an admission to the police, should
have been given. The trial court did give an instruction No. 8 which
dealt with an admission, but it neither informed the jury that it was
the final determiner of voluntariness, nor did it enumerate the factors
to be considered in making the determination.

As enumerated in Issue IV, swpra, there was a reasonable basis for
the trial court's ruling that the defendant’s statement (admission) was
voluntary. In fact, there may have been no basis for concluding that
the defendant was intoxicated when he made it. Further, the defend-
ant has not demonstrated to us that anything in the statement was
inculpating. Under these circumstances, we can not say that the trial
court committed reversible error by refusing the tendered instruction.

Defendant next complains that his tendered final instruction No. 5,
which dealt with the testimony of an accomplice and the caution a jury
should use when considering such testimony, should have been

Hs siven. However, the court did give an instruction No. 7 deal-
ing with the accomplice testimony. Said instruction stated that

such testimony should be weighed in the same manner as the testimony
of any witness. We do not perceive this as being error, for the defend-
ant’s tendered instruction would have unduly disparaged the testimony
of a particular witness, i.e. Kevin Edmonds. Morris v. State, (1977) 266

696 —
a

Ind. 478, 364 N.E.2d 182, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 972, 98 S.Ct. 526, 54
L.Ed.2d 462. See Lewis v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.H.2d 859.
See also Hackett v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 103, 360 N.E.2d 1000.

Defendant further contends that his tendered final instructions Nos.
6, 9, 10, 12 and 13 should have been given, as they correctly stated
the law. However, these contentions are not supported by cogent argu-
ment or citation of authority; and present nothing for review. Ind. R.
App. P. 8.3(A)(7).

ISSUE VIII

Error is assigned with reference to the trial court’s denial of defend-

ant’s motion for a mistrial. Apparently, the motion was made during

the State’s opening statement and was premised upon alleged

Ho misconduct. However, the record does not contain the open-

ing arguments, and there, therefore, is nothing before us to

review. See, ¢.g., Lax v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 34, 414 N.E.2d 555; Hill
v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 411, 370 N.E.2d 889.

ISSUE IX

The defendant next submits that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to correct error because of newly discovered evidence. This
assignment is based upon the testimony of one Ken Lloyd, given at
the hearing on the motion to correct error. Lloyd was not only a cellmate
of the accomplice-Edmonds in the Marion County jail, but was also an
acquaintance of the defendant. He testified that he was interviewed
by the police and a prosecutor on April 11, 1979, and related that at
that interview he had said that he had driven by the defendant’s home
on the day the crime occurred, that he had seen Defendant’s car and
that the car had snow on it. Further, he testified that when he and
Edmonds were cellmates, Edmonds did not appear to know the facts
of the instant case and had repeatedly asked him about them. Finally,
Lloyd testified that the prosecutor had offered to recommend a two
(2) year sentence for him, if he would talk about the defendant.

Defendant first contends that the State acted improperly in failing
to inform him of the April 11th interview, in light of a continuing
discovery order. He claims that Lloyd’s testimony was exculpatory,
because of the statement regarding the presence of Defendant's car

be 697

at home on the day in question. However, the prosecutor who inter-
viewed Lloyd on April 11 also testified at the hearing on the motion
to correct error, and he stated that Lloyd had not said anything about
the defendant's car during the interview.

Defendant also contends that Lloyd’s testimony was sufficient to
establish the discovery of new evidence and hence his entitlement to
a new trial. We disagree.

In order for a defendant to prevail upon the basis of newly
HH discovered evidence, he must establish

“ (1) that the evidence has been discovered since the trial; (2) that

it is material and relevant; (8) that it is not cumulative; (4) that

it is not merely impeaching; (5) that it is not privileged or incompe-

tent; (6) that due diligence was used to discover it in time for trial;

(7) that the evidence is worthy of credit; (8) that it can be produced

upon a retrial of the case; and (9) that it will probably produce

a different result.’ ” Bryant v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 268, 385 N.E.2d

415, 421 (quoting Tungate v. State, (1958) 238 Ind. 48, 54-55, 147

N.E.2d 232, 235, 236) (other citations omitted).

In this case, the “newly discovered evidence” was merely impeaching
of the testimony of one of the State’s witnesses. Mavrick v. State, (1965)
247 Ind. 77, 210 N.E.2d 426. Additionally, it was not of the genre which
probably would produce a different result on retrial. For these reasons,
the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant a new trial. Norris
v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 508, 356 N.E.2d 204; Bradburn v. State, (1971)
256 Ind. 453, 269 N.E.2d 539.

ISSUE X

The defendant’s final assignment is that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict. In support thereof, he claims that the
sole inculpatory evidence was supplied by accomplice-Edmonds and
that, in view of that witness’ interest in the case, no reasonable jury
could have relied upon his testimony.

Squarely meeting the defendant’s submission is our recent decision

in Bentley v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 67, 414 N.E.2d 573, There, as here,

the only person who connected the defendant to the crime

HE owas an accomplice. In finding the evidence against Bentley
to be sufficient, we stated:

i 698 a

“The defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence is a challenge to
the credibility of the witness, Craig, without whose testimony the
defendant could not be connected to the crimes. He contends that
because of Craig’s prior convictions and that his testimony was
bargained for, it was unworthy of belief. The credibility of
witnesses, however, is to be judged by the trier of facts, not by
courts of review. Although we have, in a few instances determined
that the evidence was insufficient because the only incriminating
evidence was inherently unbelievable, we do not find this to be
such a case. The jury was aware of the witness’ prior criminal
record and of the benefits flowing to him in exchange for his
testimony. Unquestionably, those elements rendered his veracity
suspect, but they are in a better position than are we to make
the credibility determination. We cannot say that a reasonable
man could not believe the witness’ testimony to be true.” Id. at
574 (citations omitted).

We can discern no difference between this case and Bentley.
Defendant was sentenced as follows:

“The Court having heretofore entered judgments of conviction
on the verdicts of the jury in this cause now sentences the defend-
ant to the case and custody of the Indiana Department of Correc-
tions as follows: Count 1, Robbery, a B Felony, ten (10) years;
Count 2, Felony Murder, fifty years (50); Count 3, Robbery, a B
Felony ten (10) years; Count 4, Robbery, a B Felony, ten (10) years;
Count 5, Robbery, a B Felony, ten (10) years; and Count 6, At-
tempted Robbery, an A Felony, forty (40) years. The Court fur-
ther finds, adjudges and decrees that the defendant shall serve
the sentences for Counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 in this cause concurrently
with one another and that he shall serve the sentences for Counts
2 and 6 consecutively.”

It is clear from the above that the four sentences for robbery are
to be served concurrently with each other. It is not clear, however,
whether the sentences for murder and attempted robbery are to be
served consecutively, one to the other, or consecutively, to the rob-
bery sentences, or if they are to be served concurrently with each other
but consecutively to the robbery sentences. The cause is therefore
remanded for clarification of the sentence. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Givan, C.J., and DeBruler, Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur.

NotEe—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 1279.

699

JOHN SAGE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

[No. 10798281. Filed May 5, 1981.]

Charles H. Scruggs, of Kokomo, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Janis Summers, Deputy At-
torney General, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J.— Defendant (Appellant) was convicted in a trial by jury
of Rape, a Class A Felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979), and Rob-
bery, a Class B Felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979). He was
sentenced to a term of fifty (50) years imprisonment upon the Rape
conviction and to a term of twenty (20) years imprisonment upon the
Robbery conviction, said sentences to be served consecutively. This
direct appeal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motions
for a change of venue;

700 |
Po

(2) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion
for judgment on the evidence;

(3) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Rape convic-
tion; and

(4) Whether the sentences were excessive and contrary to law.
ISSUE I

The defendant filed two motions for a change of venue from the county,
and both were denied following full evidentiary hearings. The defend-
ant concedes that the trial court’s rulings were discretionary, but he
contends that the court abused its discretion, in light of substantial
pre-trial publicity of a prejudicial nature. In support thereof, he points
to numerous newspaper articles and radio reports pertaining to the
incident at bar. He also relies upon the additional publicity engendered
by reason of his brother's having been concomitantly charged with other
crimes which were not related to this case. Finally, the defendant sub-
mits that the motions should have been granted because of the nature
of the charges against him.

We have reviewed the publication examples contained in the record
and in the briefs and do not find them to be of a sensational nature.
Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 725, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1644,
HB s6: L.Ed.2d 751, 757 (“build-up of prejudice . . . clear and con-
vineing”); Baniszewski v. State, (1970) 256 Ind. 1, 10, 261 N.E.2d
859, 368 (“prejudicial atmosphere prevailing before and during the
trial”). In addition to showing adverse publicity, to be entitled to a
change from the county, a defendant is required to show that the poten-
tial jurors were unable to sét aside their preconceived notions of guilt
and to render a verdict based upon the evidence. Irvin, 366 U.S. at
728, 81 S.Ct. at 1642-43, 6 L.Ed.2d at 756; Pine v. State, (1980) 274 Ind.
78, 408 N.E.2d 1271, 1272. As in the Pine case, we are at a loss to deter-
mine whether the latter requirement was met, because no transcript
of the voir dire examination is contained in the record. There is,
therefore, no basis for concluding that the trial court erred in denying
Defendant’s motions.

ISSUES II & III

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying

be 701

his motion for judgment on the evidence, said motion being made at
the close of the State’s case as well as at the close of the trial. On ap-
peal, the contention is limited to the State’s case on the Robbery charge.

The defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial was
insufficient to support the Rape conviction. Because both contentions
relate to the sufficiency of the evidence, we have grouped them for
discussion.

The defendant first submits that the State did not prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that any property was taken from the victim. He
claims that the victim did not describe the property allegedly taken
from her and that there was no showing of force at the actual time
the alleged robbery occurred.

The defendant also submits that there was insufficient evidence of
force to support the Rape conviction. In support of this contention,
he points out that the “victim” sustained no physical injury, that the
“rape” occurred in a living room with the lights burning, that the “vic-
tim’s” request for a cigarette was honored, that the “victim” first
reported the attack to her husband rather than to the police and that
there was no proof that Defendant was armed with a deadly weapon
at the time the “rape” occurred.

When resolving sufficiency questions, we neither weigh the evidence,

nor determine the credibility of witnesses. Rather, we examine only

the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom which

Hs support the verdict, and if such evidence and inferences would

permit a reasonable trier of fact to find the existence of each

element of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not

be disturbed. Bawm v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 421, 345 N.E.2d 831; Dozier
v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 329, 343 N.E.2d 783.

In this case, the victim was sleeping on her living room couch when
at approximately 2:20 a.m., she was awakened by a knocking at the
front door of her apartment. Believing that it was morning and that
her fiance (now husband) had arrived to awaken her, the victim opened
the door. Two (2) men, one of whom was wearing a mask, forced their
way past her into the apartment. The unmasked man, subsequently
identified as the defendant, pointed a gun at the victim’s head, threatened
her verbally and asked if anyone else was home. The victim responded

that her daughter and another little girl were upstairs asleep. The masked
man then stuck a knife to the victim’s throat, verbally abused her and
went upstairs.

When the masked man returned, he and the defendant led the vic-
tim into the kitchen. There, they searched the victim’s purse and asked
for money and drugs. Returning the victim to the living room, the
assailants began gesturing obscenely and the masked man again stuck
the knife against the victim’s throat, while uttering profanities. The
intruders then forced the victim onto the couch, removed a portion
of her clothing and began to ravish her. The masked man penetrated
her first, while the defendant held a gun to her head. Thereafter, the
defendant raped her, while the masked man went off elsewhere in the
apartment, and the defendant took whatever small amount of money
was in the victim’s purse.

When the masked man returned, both assailants again threatened
her life and the lives of the two (2) children upstairs.:‘They then left.
The victim attempted to use the phone, but the wires had been cut.
She then attempted to arouse her neighbors but failed. Ultimately,
she awakened the two (2) children and drove to her fiance's place of
employment. The group returned to the apartment, after summoning
the police, who met them at the apartment. The police took the victim
to a hospital where she was examined for the presence of sperm. The
results were positive. These facts are sufficient to support a convic-
tion of Rape and of Robbery.

ISSUE IV

The defendant’s final contention relates to sentencing. He contends
that the sentences of fifty (50) years imprisonment upon the Rape con-
viction and twenty (20) years upon the Robbery conviction are excessive
because the trial court did not set forth reasons in support thereof.
Applying identical rationale, he claims that the imposition of con-
secutive, rather than concurrent, terms is manifestly unreasonable. We
do not agree.

The penalties statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (Burns 1979) provides
for a base term of imprisonment of thirty (80) years for Class A felonies
and further provides for increasing such term by not more than twenty

[| 703
pF

(20) additional years, in the event aggravating circumstances are found
to exist. The base sentence for Class B felonies is ten (10) years, and
not more than ten (10) years may be added thereto for aggravating
circumstances. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (Burns 1979).

When a trial court enhances a sentence, it must set forth its reasons
therefor. Ind. Code § 35-50-1A-3 (Burns 1979). See Page v. State, (1980)
274 Ind. 264, 410 N.E.2d 1304. The defendant’s contention that
Hs the trial court did not set forth those reasons is simply not
borne out by the record. A supplemental record of the pro-
ceedings, containing a transcript of the sentencing hearing, was filed
by the State in this case. That record contains the trial court’s reasons
in support of the enhanced sentences. They are 1) the prior felony record
of the defendant, 2) the fact that the defendant was on probation when
the crimes at bar transpired, and 3) the nature of the crimes. These
reasons are sufficient to support not only the enhanced sentences, see
Ind. Code § 35-50-1A-7 (Burns 1979), but also the imposition of con-
secutive terms. See Gardner v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 627, 388 N.E.2d
518, 517. Accordingly, we can not say that the sentences are manifestly
unreasonable. Ind. R. App. Rev. Sen. 2.

There being no error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Givan, C.J., and Hunter and Pivarnik, JJ., concur;

DeBruler, J., concurs and dissents with opinion.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

DEBRULER, J.—The crime of rape is a class A felony if committed with
the use of a deadly weapon. Unlike rape, the crimes of robbery,
burglary, and arson are class B felonies when committed with the use
of a deadly weapon, and only ascend to the level of class A felony when
bodily injury results to the victim by use of the weapon. Here the trial
judge gave the maximum sentence of fifty years for rape, under cir-
cumstances where no bodily injury was inflicted upon the victim by
the use of a deadly weapon. In the absence of findings of aggravating
and extraordinary circumstances such as the existence of a prior record
of convictions involving bodily injury to victims, or indicating that bodily
injury by use of the weapon would have occurred in the instant case

704 —
po

but for some interruption of the crime, the extreme upper range of
the statutory term of imprisonment provided for rape should be reserved
for those convicted of rape which results in bodily injury by the use
of a deadly weapon. Here the findings are silent regarding the inflic-
tion of bodily injury upon victims of past crimes, and indeed the record
shows two prior convictions, one for forgery and one for second degree
burglary. Appellant's crime, while egregious, dangerous, and wholly
outrageous, was not interrupted, but was of such a nature that it ran
its tragic course without resulting in bodily injury through the use
of the deadly weapons being wielded. Under these circumstances, I
deem the findings of the trial judge of aggravating circumstances to
be insufficient to support his meting out the very maximum possible
sentence, and the sentence itself to be manifestly unreasonable. I would
remand this case to the trial court with instructions to reduce the sen-
tence.

By maintaining rational distinctions of this sort in the sentencing
process, this Court can even add to the hoped-for protection which
criminal statutes provide for potential victims.

NotE—Reported at 419 N.E.2d 1286.